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The County Gentleman
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LAND &WATER
Vol. LXIV. No. 2747
QATTTRHAV TANTTARV o tot- r published ast price .-iixp en c e
bAlUKUAY, JAlNUAKX 2, igij La newspaperJ published weekly
Copyright, Rusitii 6- Sons, Suurtaa
LIEUT.-COMMANDER NORMAN D. HOLBROOK, V.C.
Who, by an act of brilliant daring, cr.ttred ihe Dardanelles ar.d sank with a torpedo the Turkish battleship Mesiudi^eh, which,
next to the Goeben, is the most powerful unit in the Turkish Navy. In order to re.ch this ship it was necessary to
pass under and through the mine-fields, and the exploit loses none of its magnificence by the fact that the currents at the
entrance to the Dardanelles are exceedingly treacherous. it is a matter of congratulation that, although hotly pursued and
fired at, the intrepid Commander succeeded in reluming safely to his base.
f
LAND AND WATER January 2, i9i«(|
THE
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H. M. TROUNCER,
81 King William S,r«., Actuary and Manager.
London, E.G.
186
January 2, 1915.
LAND 'AND WATER
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
HOTE.— Thll ArtlcU bai be«n inbmltted to the Preii Bnrean, which doei not object to the publication ti ceniored and takc» no
reipondblllty for the correctneii of the itatementi.
In accordance with the requirement! of the Preii Bnrean, the peiltlon> of troopi on Plant lllnitratlnj thli Article muit only be
regarded ai appr oxlmate, and no definite itren;tb at any point ti Indicated.
/<yi^^ T^rtd Sea.
^y^
so
Miles
SWJTZEHLAND
THE DEADLOCK IN THE WEST.
FOR now three weeks — or nearly — a pro-
nounced offensive by all the Allied forces
in the west against the opposed German
forces has proceeded. This offensive
has gained here 50 yards, there 100,
there 500 : rarely a thousand. It is still, in the
popular eye, " a deadlock " — but the phrase is mis-
leading.
On account of the scale upon which this war is
being conducted, and because it necessarily con-
tains a great quantity of novel tactical features
(due partly to the unprecedented numbers
engaged, and in some degree, but less, to unprece-
dented weapons), there is a tendency to speak of
this so-called " deadlock " in the west as though
it also were something unknown in the history of
war, and therefore presenting no elements by
which we could calculate its nature and probable
duration.
This view is erroneous. We have many-
parallels in history by which to judge the situation
and some elements for calculating its staying
power. It is evident that these new elements pro-
foundly modify any strict analogy with past ex-
perience, but the elements of the business are
pretty clearly what they have been throughout
military history.
The enemy is holding " lines "—that is, tem-
porary field fortifications — and the Allies in the
west are engaged in forcing those " lines." That
the enemy is sufficiently numerous to hold " lines "
over three hundred miles long is due to the num-
bers engaged in this new kind of war, and such an
enormous extension is a novel feature.
Another not wholly novel, but paradoxical
feature is the fact that those now attacking are
themselves moving from "lines" which, if the
defenders are (as they can be) largely reinforced,
will in their turn be subject to pressure and have
to be held against a counter offensive.
But for the moment the Allies are on the
offensive in the west, and their offensive is directed
against the lines held by the Germans. The essen-
tials of the problem are exactly what they have
always been. A force holding " lines " can only
be driven out of these in one of two ways ; either
the " lines " are pierced in some part so that the
enemy gets round the flank of either of the two
halves into which the " lines " are thus divided —
enfilades it, takes it in the rear, and all the rest
of it ; or the enemy gets round one or the other, or
both, of the ends of the " lines " and turns them in
that way. To prevent the latter misfortune, a
man drawing his " lines " reposes both ends of
them upon obstacles which the enemy cannot turn,
or can only turn so slowly and with such difficulty
that he will be met and defeated if he tries to do
so. For instance, Wellington drew up his " lines
of Torres Vedras " between the sea and the broad
waters of the Douro, and the French had no choice
but to try and pierce them, which they failed to
do. The French revolutionary generals conceived
in the same way the " lines " of Weissembourg, re-
posing one end upon wooded hills and the other
upon a broad river (these, if my memory serves me
right, were pierced at one moment, but not
turned).
The Germans in the present instance have
their " lines " drawn from the frontier of Switzer-
land— the territory of which neutral country the
Allies do not propose to violate — and the North
Sea.
Now, if your " lines " are so drawn that they
cannot be turned by the extremities, and your
enemy has no choice but to pierce them somewhere.
1»
LAND AND WATEE
January 2, 1915.
then everything will depend upon your having
enough men to hold the lines as against the num-
ber of men he can bring against you. And the
problem here is not a mere question of proportion
(as, that one man behind earth can hold up three
men, or five men, attacking him), it is also a ques-
tion of absolute numbers.
To put an extreme case : The Eoman Wall
across North Britain is an example of "lines."
Suppose ten men tried to hold it against fifty, their
effort would be manifestly ridiculous. Ten men
could not hold it against ten, let alone against
fifty, because ten men are not sufficient to watch
any force at all that was free to operate against a
front stretching from Carlisle to Newcastle. Ten
men could not " hold " the Wall at all. Con-
versely, a million men Avith proper artillery could
hold those " lines," not against three million or
five million, but against any number of millions.
Because the enemy, however numerous, could not
deploy a sufficient number of men at any one spot
to break down the solid defence which so very
large a body as a million could, with proper com-
munications, concentrate wherever an attack
threatened.
The piercing of entrenched " lines," therefore,
depends in the main upon this mathematical con-
ception.
" When the defenders of a ' line ' have become
so rare that they cannot concentrate on any point
whatever in a given time, men sufficient to stop
such numbers as the enemy can (a) usefully deploy
(b) concentrate on that point in the same given
time — then the ' line ' is pierced," and once
pierced its whole structure disappears. It must
either retire precipitately or suffer disaster. For
instance, twenty men could not hold a mile of wall
against 100 men trying to scale it by ladders.
Somewhere in the rushes to and fro a party of the
hundred would get up.
Suppose 1,000 men could just hold it against
5,000. That would be because 1,000 was enough
to " man " the wall, i.e., enough to concentrate a
group of ten or so in any point and push the ladder
off. But 500 would leave gaps. Six hundred could
not hold it at all, quite irrespective of whether the
assailants were 5,000 or 3,000 or 2,000. And once
a body of the assailants scaled a bit of the wall tlie
whole organisation of its defence must collapse.
A warfare of " lines," therefore, is essentially
one in which the attackers wear down in numhers
and material resoui'ces the besieged ; the besieged
have not an indefinite power of resistance, but
must, after a certain amount of wearing down,
break.
That is why the whole thing is compared to the
Strain put upon a very hard, but at the same time
brittle, substance such as a rod of glass, and that
is why a reserve is kept back to strike at the right
moment, as a hammer might strike just at the
right moment upon a glass rod already strained
by the hands.
Critics sometimes talk as though the existence
of trenches behind trenches, that is of a series of
" lines," parallel one with another behind the
original " line," rendered the problem in-
soluble. "The enemy," they say, "may be
driven out of his fir.st 'line,' but he will
fall back upon his second; from his second
upon his third— and so forth. There is no end to
it." But that is not the way the thing works, or
can conceivably work, unless the second lines ard
shorter than the first and the third lines shorter
than the second. So long as a General has enough
men to hold his first line against the enemy's num-
bers and mechanical means of attack, so long he
will hold that first line. When he has no longer
enough numbers to hold his first line he is mani-
festly equally unable to hold a second line of the
same length. He can only usefully fall back on a
second line on corulition the second line is shorter
thari the first.
One could put the whole thing in a phrase by
saying that an army is not " pushed " back from its
lines, it is " threate^ied with the Ireaking " of its
lines.
The effort which you make against an en-
trenched army is not like the effort vfhich you
make in shoving a door open against opposition;'
it is like the effort you might make in grinding at
various parts of a long cord. If a man whose
business it was to keep a cord stretched against
you found your attrition maldng it grow so thin
in places that it would not hold, he might move
it rapidly back, sever the weak places and knot
them up again ; but he could only do this on condi-
tion that the new line to vv'hich he had retired, and
which he proposed to hold with his cord, was
shorter than the old one.
The point is exceedingly elementary and
therefore calls for an apology, but it is so much
misunderstood at the present moment, and, mis-
understanding breeds at home such a lack of con-
fidence in the future of this trench fighting in
France and Belgium, that it is well worth insisting
upon.
We have here an isthmus between two seas,
or a plain of open land between two moun-
tain ranges, or belligerent territory between two
neutral frontiers, or any other kind of issue re-
quiring artificial defence between two natural
obstacles.
It is defended by a General of country F
against the invasion of forces from country E.
To defend this issue and to prevent an enemy
from E penetrating towards F in the direction of the
arrow, the General draws up his entrenched lines,
A-B, sufficient for the defence of which (but only
just sufficient) are his sixteen units — which I have
represented by sixteen dots— holding the lines.
His wastage in men, or the corresponding increase
of his enemies, Avhether in numbers or in mechani-
cal opportunities for attack, reducing his sixteen
to the value of ten his lines are lost. They cannot
be held with only ten units remaining. Why^
Because they are too long.
It is no good preparing behind those lines,
A-B, another scries of lines, C-D. The ten Vi'hom
he has left will not be strong enough to hold C-D
^January 2, 1915.
LAND AND WATEE
any more than they were strong enough to hold
A-B. Still less is it of any use for him to prepare
further lines such as G-H, for G-H is as long as C-D
or A-B was, and by the time he got to G-H further
wastage may have reduced him to only eight units,
and it would be quite impossible to think of hold-
ing the lines.
Still more obviously would this be the case if
the country were so formed that the next lines
which he could form behind and parallel, A-B,
were, as in the accompanying diagram, each suc-
cessively longer than the original line.
It is self-evident that the only case where a
General who is compelled to give up his original
entrenched lines can fall back to other parallel
lines prepared behind them, is when those other
lines are shorter than the original line. Thus, in
the accompanying diagram, a General who, for
political or other reasons could just hold A-B with
his original sixteen units, finding them reduced to
ten might well fall back to new prepared lines,
CD.
He would say : " I have to give up all the in-
tervening country between A-B and C-D (which for
such-and-such a reason I should very much like to
have held), but the all-important thing is to pre-
vent the enemy getting to F, and though it is a'
disaster to have to give up the country intervening
between A-B and C-D, yet it would be a much
worse disaster to let the enemy get to F. There-
fore, I will fall back on the new prepared line.
C-D, which is much shorter than my old line, A-B,
and which I can hold with the ten units that are
left to me."
Now the whole interest of the campaign in the
West lies in the fact that the German Commanders
are deprived by the physical and political
geography of Western Europe and by the political
task they have been set from thus falling back suc-
cessively to shorter and shorter lines behind their
original line.
This original A-B is for them the existing line
betv/cen the North Sea and the Swiss Mountains.
F is the soil of Germany proper, to keep the in-
vader out of which is the grand political object of
the German Commanders at this moment. If they
give up their line A-B, upon what shorter line,
C-D, and up to what further shorter line, E-F,
can they fall back ?
Note upon the map on page 4 the existing
German lines in the West, and the conjectural
lines behind on which they might retire, and note
in what a political dilemma either such retirement
would put the Commanders of the German Army !
Their present A-B line which they hold is roughly
three hundred and fifty miles in length in all its
convolutions. I have marked it 1, 1, 1, 1. Suppose
they fell back upon the C-D line passing in front
of Antwerp and Brussels to Namur, then up the
Meuso to the neighbourhood of Verdun, and so
along their original line to the Swiss Mountains.
I have marked it 2, 2, 2, 2. They would shorten
their total present line by not much more than a
seventh, and this slight advanta.ge they would only
gain by sacrificing all their present hold upon the
strip of North-Eastern France, which is their
principal political asset in the Western campaign
as it is now developing. The distance from their
present positions just north of Verdun to Antwerp,
counting the necessary fluctuations in the line,
would be nearly 200 miles. Their existing lines
from the same point north of Verdun round past
Eeims and along the Aisne and then up to the
North Sea by Nieuport, are barely 240, and to gain
that 12 or 13 per cent, of relief from the strain
upon their diminishing numbers, as compared Avith
the increasing strength of their adversaries, they
would have to give up all thought of further ad-
vance on Calais, all Western Belgium, and all the
French territory they hold, except a tiny strip east
of the Meuse Valley.
See v/hat a sacrifice they would be making in
the objects and nature of their war, and for how
slight an end !
There is more than this. There is the loss of
abandoned wounded, and of materials and of
stores that woiild necessarily accompany such a
retreat — and all this for a concentration of men
hardly perceptible.
But there is a further line behind this again
to which the enemy might retire, and by so retir-
ing really seriously shorten his line and concentrate
his effectives.
It is a line which many must have been struck
by as they looked at the map, and it is one which,
if this v/ar were to be conducted by the Germans
merely as a problem of strategy, they would ob-
viously regard as their next line of defence.
It is the E-F line v/hich, starting from the
Dutch frontier, covers Liege, runs along the valley
of the Ourthe, includes the Grand Duchy of
Luxembourg, and further south, reposes upon
LAND AND WATER
January 2, 1915.
F 'K' A "K C
jL
Thionville and Metz, and then upon the Vosges
exactly as the present line does. I have marked it
3, 3, 3.
Supposing the Allies to respect the neutrality
of Holland, this line we can perceive at once to
have quite obvious advantages. It is hardly two-
thirds of the original line in length ; it has three
great fortresses upon its front, nearly half of its
trajectory is taken up with the difficult and highly
defensible country of the Ardennes in the north
and the Vosges upon the south; and, lastly, it
keeps German soil intact.
That line, the Liege-Metz line, we can quite
safely say is at once the obvious and the only
second shorter line upon which, with reduced effec-
tives, a German retirement could safely be made.
But, unfortunately for Germany, German
problems are not as yet — nor perhaps will ever be
— purely strategical in this war. They are grossly
interfered with by political considerations. To
fall back upon this obvious second line is to give
up Belgium and Antwerp and all hope of threat-
ening Great Britain. It is to confess the begin-
ning of the end. It is morally certain that such a
confession will not be made by such confused
thinkers until it is too late.
This second line, the line, Li^ge-Metz-the
Vosges, once abandoned, there is no other. The
line of the Rhine, in spite of its great fortresses, is
not one upon which a force seeking concentration
could retire. One has but to look at the map to
see that this is so. It is a line which, in all its
convolutions, is almost as long as the present line,
and before a German Army should retire to it, that
JTanuary 2, 1916,
LAND AND WATER
invasion of German soil which, let us always re-
member, it is politically essential for the German
rulers to frevent, would have taken place.
No; the more one looks at the problem, the
more convinced one is that the enemy will hold on
to his present lines in the West as long as it is just
compatible with his strength to do so, and possibly
a trifle longer.
This would seem to be the whole value of that
now persistent Allied pressure upon the immense
stretch of trenches from Westende to the Swiss
frontier : the certainty that the enemy will try to
hold those trenches up to and beyond the safety
point. It is the fervent hope of every Commander
of the Allied forces who is watching the struggle
that political considerations, which are already
hampering German strategy, will pin the enemy
just too long to his present line ; and that is why
that line must be kept occupied, sawn yard by
yard, frayed and frittered away by the persistent
effort which has been patiently watched in the
Western campaign throughout now nearly three
months.
But here the reader may well ask by what
right the French and British Commanders are at-
tacking and thus discounting an increasing
strength upon their side and a correspondingly
increasing weakness upon the enemy's side along
the line which he now just barely holds ?
Is it not true that the Germanic Powers be-
tween them can put in arms more than three times
as many men of military age as can the French ?
Is it not true that the British contingent at this
moment adds not one-tenth to the French line?
And is it not true that, even when the present full
number of British volunteers are trained, equipped,
officered, gunned and sent out, they will have
added but 30 per cent, to that line ?
All this is true; but it is nevertheless also
true that, so long as the war remains active in
Poland, the Western Allies may confidently ex-
pect that gradual diminution, both in the mechani-
cal weight of armament, and in the proportionate
numbers, of the enemy, which will compel either
his disaster upon the existing lines, or his retire-
ment to a much shorter one.
This they can predict from the following
three converging factors in the case : —
(1) Superiority in equipment passes with time
from the German to the Allied side.
(2) Wastage is very much more rapid upon
the German than upon the Allied side.
(3) The Occupation of the Enemy upon his
other, or Eastern, front, must, as things have
turned out since the second battle for Warsaw was
engaged, increase for some time to come.
I will take these three factors in their order.
I. Equifment. — The war prepared by Ger-
many and forced at her own moment by Germany,
found Germany more ready than her enemies in
the West on several points. She was not more
ready in military science and temper ; her strate-
gic theory has been proved, indeed, inferior to that
of the French, and she has made no successful
assault, save with vastly superior numbers, but
many an unsuccessful one with them. But she
had a much larger stock of weapons and ammuni-
tion for the successive equipment of reserves, and
her doctrine of heavy artillery, which has proved
sound enough, had provided her at the outset of
hostilities with an immense numerical superiorit;
in this arm.
But the provision of equipment is, for th
Allies, only a question of time. The blockade o
Germany, though but partial, is already felt ii
certain essentials in equipment; and in the par
ticular case of heavy guns, once the plant is ready
it can be calculated to a few days what space o
time will give the English and the French shop
a numerical superiority of output. The rapidit;
with which large ammunition can be turned ou
in the West is again much greater than in the Ger
manies. England, in particular, has a mucl
larger population free from the necessity of ap
pearing in the field, and both France and Englanc
receive in larger quantities than they can use the
materials for the manufacture of all that is neces
sary to modern war. Already some slight supe
riority in the heavy artillery work is apparen
throughout the Western lines upon the side of th(
Allies, and every day that passes increases this.
II. Wastage. — In the point of wastage, w(
have further statistics which were not availabl(
when earlier estimates were made in these pages
It is true that the French have not yet given us th<
number of German i^risoners whom they hold, bu
the Russian figures have been communicated, anc
the French Ministry has openly published th(
number of French wounded, from which we ma^
fairly estimate the general statistics of casualties
I hope to go into these figures more precisely in i
later article. I deal with them here only in rounc
numbsrs.
{a) Prisonees. — The first thing we note ir
these figures is that the Russians before the receni
action in Poland, counted over 130,000 Germai
(exclusive of much more numerous Austrian^
prisoners. It is safe to say that the total numbei
of wastage from this source. East and West, is no1
short of a quarter of a million at the present
moment. One German estimate (unofficial it is
true) gives the German "missing" at 400,000
But these may include many unaccounted dead
Also a quarter of a million is quite likely too low
an estimate for the total number of Germar
prisoners. But at least a-quarter of a millior
there are.
That figure — a-quarter of a million — by itseli
means little in the problem of the enemy's com-
parative wastage. Of French and Russian
prisoners combined the Germans could produce an
even larger number ; a number perhaps a third as
large again or more : but let us interpret its full
meaning.
Let two very important things be remem-
bered : First, that the great bulk of French and
Russian prisoners taken by the Germans were
taken in the earlier phases of the war more than
three months ago. The rate of wastage from this
source is now greater on the German than on the
Allied side.
Next, let it be noted that all the German
prisoners in French and Russian hands are true
efi^ective soldiers.
The Germans count in their statistics those
masses of civilian population which they have
seized under their peculiar system of war and car-
ried away into captivity. There are villages in
French Lorraine where none of the old men are
left, and of the males no one but the chil-
dren under sixteen.
LAND AND WATER
January 2, 1915.
The policy has, like every other German
policy in this war, lacked thoroughness and homo-
geneity. It has — just like the massacres, and just
like the looting — been carried to an extreme in
one place, left almost unpractised in another.
But we have enough evidence before us to know
that the proportion of prisoners of war in Ger-
many v.'hich consists of civilian inefficients, or of
men below or above the military age, or of men
of military age employed upon necessary civilian
occupations (such as mining or railway running)
is very large. In the town of Amiens alone, for
instance, which was in the possession of the Ger-
mans for only a few days, 2,000 able-bodied men
of military age were taken, largely from the rail-
way services; and a French doctor recently re-
turned from a prisoners' camp in the North of
Germany has testified to the numbers of old men
present there : driven into captivity mainly from
the eastern fringe of France.
(b) Killed and Wounded. — But if wastage
from prisoners is now increasingly against the
Germans, and is already large, wastage from
casualties of killed and wounded is far more strik-
ing. We can infer positively from the known pro-
portion of killed to wounded that the Germans
have lost three men to the French one.
The published Prussian lists of casualties as
reported through Copenhagen ma^ke the propor-
tion much larger, something like four or five Ger-
mans killed to one French. But we have no need
to consider the more favourable estimates; at
three to one the ratio is quite sufficient to show
that the present lines in the West cannot indefi-
nitely be held.
The reason of this abnormal contrast betv/een
German and French casualties is clear enough. It
consists in several points.
( a ) That the Germans had to win at once if
they were to win at all, and were therefore lavish
of men. (0 ) In the great superiority of French
Field Artillery — and of the excellent Eussian gun
when it can be properly supi^lied. (7) In the
superior numbers with which the campaign in the
West was imdertaken by the Germans. ( S ) In
the formation the Germans choose for fighting.
( e ) In the fact that most of their casualties have
occurred in that most expensive of all
efforts, a prolonged and unsuccessful offen-
sive. Of such a nature was all the
fighting on the Yser and later round Ypres, and
of such a nature has been the whole of the second
battle for Warsaw. ( ^) In the small reserve
with which the Germans work. ( ij ) In that the
Germans unlike the French embrigade older men
with younger. ( fl ) In that the Germans unlUce
the French permit a large number of volunteers
under age to join the colours, and so eat their
wheat green. Etc., etc.
One detail I think will sufficiently illuminate
this contention of the very much more rapid was-
tage of the Germans from casualties. Takincr the
number of wounded of all kinds at eight times the
number of dead,* and applying that test to the
«.-nl//^t^r'"' '■^^'^"'^« ^?? "^f" m'^'le in these columns to the mul-
Me 8 as being "con^en-at.ve," or too low, as a multiple to connect
dead and wounded; i.e., there aitj more (we eav) thai 7 wounded
normally, to 1 k.Ued in action. Correspondents who have douuTthi;
from a consideration of exceptional cases may, if thev will consider
t^ one proof out o many. The toUl casuJjies ^f fhe Br'itT on
sVltZ ^iT*f^*1 n November were 82,000; ot thesenothing likt
S^OW represented Uio k.Ued-the ratio was not even. 1 in U, let alone
published official figures of French wounded of all
kinds, we get for the total number of French killed
in the war more than double hut not three times
the numbers of Prussian officers alone reported
killed to date ; excluding the list of officers killed
in the Bavarian, Wurtemberg, and Saxon Armies
— of the former we are told that 25,000 havefallen.
The French with just under 500,000 officially re-
ported wounded mmj have lost 50,000 dead — evea
possibly 60,000 — but more probably much fewer.
Remember that it is not here a question of
total actual numbers but of proportion. V/e are
contrasting the rate of wastage rather than its
amount. It is true that more than half the men
wounded return to the front in either army, but
the rate of wastage in killed and wounded which
the German force was suffering when the trench-
work began, and which it is still suffering, count-
ing east and west together, is at least three times
that of its western opponents.
III. The Occupation of Germany in the East.
The occupation of German effort in the
eastern field is the third factor which makes the
reduction of forces in the western trenches to
breaking point ultimately inevitable. What that
occupation is we shall follow in detail when we
come in a few lines to the present phase of the
two battles for Cracow and for Warsaw; but in
considering this necessary weakening of the
German lines in the western trench-work we are
concerned not with the details but with the general
character of the eastern struggle.
This Polish war is now for the Germans essen-
tially a series of attempts to reach certain objec-
tives—notably Warsaw — which attempts necessi-
tate the concentration of every man they can spare
from the v/est; such attempts are necessarily
coupled with very high loss in case of failure to
reach the objective — and that objective has, after
weeks of effort, not been reached. To beat back
Russia and to stiffen Austria Germany must put
very large forces into Poland; she cannot with-
draw them until she has made the threat upon
Silesia fail by the capture of Warsaw ; and War-
saw she approaches and does not take.
If she sends back forces from the east before
Russia is really hard hit, then Russia readvances
and Silesia is again in peril : for it is not possible
to hold merely defensively the whole line from the
Baltic to the Carpathians.
THE ACTION NEAR LA BASSEE (IN
FRONT OF FESTUBERT, RICHE-
BOURG, NEUVE CHAPELLE, AND
GIVENCHY).
The sharp affair in the neighbourhood of La'
Bassee, somewhat to the north and west of that
town, which is the only event of moment in the
West this week, is a very good example of the way
in which contradictory accounts come in, and of
how, almost inevitably, each side in a war accuses
the other of falsehood. It is also an example of
the way in v/hich the enemy's accounts may, as they
are intended, create an impression worse than the
truth. Let us begin by the German Wireless of
last Saturday, December 26th. It tells us that
the affair between the Germans and the British
forces (including certain Indian contingents) re-
sulted in the capture of 819 men, 19 officers and
loss in dead alone to the Allies of 3,000. But
6*
January 2, 1915,
LAND AND WATER
it gives no detail of day and place save to call it
in general " The action near Festnbert."
Now suppose one read that message alone, it
could convey but one impression, and that not at
all a pleasant one for our side. But when you
read the evidence in its entirety you get something
very different.
You have first of all the French message of
exactly six days before, Sunday the 20th, which
tells us that the line near La Bassee was straight-
ened out after the capture of the Chateau of Ver-
melles by the capture of the German trenches at
Givenchy, and that message added that to the
north of this position the Indians had gained a
certain amount of ground and the British forces
had lost a certain amount of ground.
Coming on the Sunday and despatched on the
Saturday, December 19th, these laconic French
phrases referred to the situation upon Satur-
day the 19th. Upon Tuesday, December 22nd, the
Germans, referring to actions already past, tell us
that the English had tried to retain the ground
they had lost, but had been repelled. The Ger-
mans, hov.-ever, admit that round Richebourg
(where the Indian troops were) the Allies re-
covered their ground and held it — which is simply
a belated admission of the accuracy of the earlier
French version.
Lastly there comes the British " Eyewitness "
who, two days later, again gives us the official story
as a whole and makes it comprehensible ; and now
we know what liappened.
It was on the night between Friday and
Saturday, the 18th and the 19th, that the British
forces rushed the German trenches, presumably
near Neuve Chapelle, advancing from 300 to 500
yards. In that success a certain number of Ger-
mans must have been killed, many more wounded
and a certain number captured. How many v.e
are not told. On the Saturday morning the Ger-
mans counter-attacked and recaptured part, but
not all, of the ground first taken by the British.
During all that Saturday and all Sunday this belt
of ground was the scene of a fluctuating struggle
in each receding wave of which, of course, the
enerny pick up a number of our wounded and take
them prisoner, and note that we have a number
of dead, as indeed they have on their side a number
of dead. The Germans were successful in re-
taking nearly the whole of the ground lost by
them, and upon the Sunday, though suffering
heavy losses as they advanced, they continued until
about noon to secure their position. During all
this, of course, they were picking up more wounded
men and making them prisoners, and estimating
the increasing number of dead. In the afternoon
of Sunday the tide turned again. The furthest
group of houses occupied by the enemy was re-
taken, and by Monday morning the greater part
of the ground first captured, then lost, had been
recaptured again. An armistice, in the course of
the fighting, allowed for the burying of the dead.
This fluctuating of the line, ending in very
much the original position occupied, cost both
sides a heavy price. It meant, of course, for both
sides many casualties. Regarded as an attempt
of the Allies to advance it was a reverse ; regarded
as a German attempt to cover La Bassee it was a
success for the German. For all these villages,
Festubert, Richebourg, Neuve Chapelle, Givenchy,
lie east and north of La Bassee, and when all are
captured by the Allies La Bassee will be unten-
able. Regarded as an attempt of the Germans to
push back the steadily advancing line which now
seriously threatens La Bassee, particularly from
the south, it was a failure. And in general the
line stands very much as it stood before the stroke
and counter-stroke were given. But no one would
derive so inconclusive a result from the German
Wireless.
ON THE WORD "SIEGE."
I would like to add a note at the end of these
comments on the western field of war with regard
to the metaphor " siege " applied to the present
situation of the Austro-German forces within the
Armies of the Allies.
It is the penalty of using very exact termin-
ology that the conversational comiotations of one's
terms make those terms seem paradoxical. For
instance, if you say of an aristocratic state that
is not a democracy and proceed to praise that state
for its aristocratic qualities, people will call you
paradoxical because they have some vague ide*
that a democracy is something humble but vaguely
nice, and that an aristocracy is something haughty
but vaguely bad.
I see by one or two criticisms in the Press that
Colonel Maude's admirable phrase ta describe tne
present situation of the war, ' The Siege of the
Germanics " — a phrase which I was quick to bor-
row with due acknowledgments because it seemed
to me an excellently descriptive metaphor — has
suffered from this penalty of exactitude. I will
therefore recapitulate here the points which attach
to that phrase.
(1) The essence of a siege is the restriction of
the besieged manoeuvre to a particular area. The
more you compel your enemy to a particular area"
from which he has to try and fight a way out
through your restricting lines the more are the
conditions those of a siege.
(2) The word " siege " does not necessarily
connote famine. It does not necessarily connote
complete containment. Least of all does it connote
uhima'.e surrender and failure upon the part of
the hesiejed.
When we talk of this particular case as "a;
siege of the Germanics " we are using a metaphor
subject to all the limitations of metaphor ; for the
word siege historically applies to limited areas,
and we are here applying it to a very large one.
With regard to this particular siege it is evi-
dently true : —
(1) That the blockade (which is something
separate from a siege, though usually accompany-
ing it) is imperfect.
(2) That the besieged area can provide itself
v>ith food, though not with all the other essentials
of modern war.
(3) That the circumvallation is not complete.}.
(4) That quite obviously the besieged may be
able to cut their way out; because the besiegers
are still numerically inferior to them. i
None the less their present condition, in whicbll
they are battering against an imperfect ring oi^
hostile Armies (and Navies) which they fail top.
break, is essentially a state of siege.
.7*
LAND AND WATER
January 2, 1915.
THE POLISH THEATRE OF WAR.
WHAT has happened in the Polish
theatre of war after a month's fight-
ing is an excellent example of the
way in which this war, like so
many in the past, having estab-
lished its character, develops that character
throughout a whole series of campaigns.
So it was, for instance, with Marlborough's
wars. They began with the unexpected use of the
cavalry at the right moment at Blenheim, and they
went on with just the same feature appearing and
reappearing time after time until Malplaquet. So
it was with Napoleon's use of massed artillery.
So it was with Wellington's choice of defensive
position and his dependence upon the reserved
fire of a thin line.
This war has already presented a certain fea-
ture which on a smaller or greater scale is being
repeated over and over again. This feature, if it
could be kept up, is the most favourable augury
we have for the final success of the Allies against
what are still their numerically superior enemies.
It is a feature directly produced by the mind and
method of Prussia, and it is as follows in its three
phases : —
(1) The determining of a particular objective,
at once politically and strategically important,
from the attainment of which other subsidiary con-
sequences may flow, but the attainment of which is
the prime task set to the Army.
(2) The successful approach to that objective
as the result of a very carefully thought-out and
widely laid plan.
(3) The failure at the last moment to reach the
objective, a failure involving losses enormous in
proportion to the intensity of the will to reach tha*
goal — and how intense that will may be only those
who have studied the half-hypnotic theory of
Prussian military text-books can tell us.
The great strategical object in the whole of
this Polish campaign has been, of course, to relieve
the pressure of the great Southern Russian Army
against Cracow. The way in which this was to be
done, if it was to be done permanently, was by
exercising unexpected counter pressure in the
north and taking Warsaw, which town, as we have
so often seen in these notes, is from its gather-
' ing u}X)n itself all the communications from
; the east, essential to the German plan. The great
advance of that plan, its sudden discovery, is now
; nearly two months old. The battle for Warsaw
itself has now proceeded in two separate chapters
for nearly a month, and in the last of these
• chapters, in this very Christmas week, it has to all
^ appearance failed. If it finally fails, if the Ger-
1 mans do not succeed in taking Warsaw, neitlicr
1 can they ultimately succeed in relieving the pres-
■< sure upon Cracow. And, indeed, the first result
of their failure before Warsaw in the north was
t the recovery of the Russians in the south against
t Austrian pressure, and the beginning of a re-ad-
1 vance by their troops.
I Let us never forget the formula which govern^
- the whole of the Eastern campaign, and therefore
ultimately the whole war : —
d TJie Russian objective is Silesia which Cracotv
J- bars. The German counter stroke can only he in
tj ihe 7iorth and fails if Warsaw is missed.
g The great action of which Poland is the
theatre still divides itself, therefore, into two sepa-
rate fields, united by a less important central
" bridge " as it were, which keeps the northern
and southern armies, both of Austro-Germans and
Russians, in connection with one another. These
two fields are (1) in the north, the battle for War-
saw, where the Germans are attempting to take
the town and the Russians are defending ; and (2)
in the south, the battle for Cracow, where the con-
ditions are reversed.
Before dealing with the present phase of these
two particular actions, the battle for Warsaw and
the battle for Cracow, it may be well to examine
the position as a whole. Why the Russians re-
tired before the Austro-German advance I have
already suggested, although it is no more than a
suggestion. I believe it to be due to difficulties of
supply, which difficulties are due, in their turn, to
the conditions of winter, coupled with the absence
of railways. The railways to the west of the Vis-
tula being ruined, the maintenance, especially of
munitions for quick-firing artillery, far from that
great avenue of communication, is difficult. At
any rate, retirement there was, until after the first
week of December, and that retirement halted
upon the following line : —
; 2fiUt
Rather more than thirty miles below "Warsaw,
in a straight line a little north of east, is a point
where the small river Bzura falls into the Vistula
from the south. The Bzura runs in this part
through flat country, rich enough in times of
peace, full of plough lands, and falling gently to
the water level on either side. The broad,
monotonous landscape is interspersed by woods,
one group of which between the Bzura and War-
saw is large enough to be called a forest, being
nearly twenty miles in extent. We must conceive
of this landscape in the north as being as yet
largely free from snow, while, the winter remain^
ing singularly open, the frost is not yet severe.
The first sharp frost of some three weeks ago waSi
interrupted by a thaw, and the difiiculties of thg
January 2, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
fighting here, especially for the side which takes
the offensive, are curiously similar to the corre-
sponding diiliculties in Flanders.
The Russians then having fallen back to just
behind the line of this river, their line followed its
bank up to the place where a sub-tributary called
the Rawka comes in from the south. They have
paid no attention to the preservation of particular
towns. They are evidently concerned only with
having a defensive line as straight as possible, and
using as much as possible the natural obstacles of
the country.
Their line went on up the Eawka behind
Skiernievvice, and so up the stream to Rawa. At
Rawa there is a break between the Upper Rawka
and the Pilica, where there is no natural obstacle
to defend the Russian front. As this part of the
country is hilly, advantage can be taken of the
broken land. The line strikes the river Pilica a
few miles west of New Miasto, passing through
Inowlodz, where it crosses the river. It then con-
tinues in the same north and south direction past
Opoczno, where it strikes the railway line, which
has very probably been partly restored in the inter-
val since the German retreat of two months ago.
There is again a gap south of this without any true
defensive obstacle upon which the line can rely,
imtil we come to the upper waters of the Lotsosina,
which rises in the hilly country of Kielce, where
again the railway, if it has been repaired, gives an
opportunity for supply. From these upper waters
of the Lotsosina the line runs down without break
to the Nida River, of which it i? a tributary, and
then straight dov/n the Nida to the place where
that stream falls into the Vistula. It was con-
tinued beyond the Vistula along and behind the
River Donajez, through Tarnow, where it begins
to rely upon a tributary of the Donajez, the Biala,
through Tuschow, then across the hills to Jaslo,
and thence bent back eastward to the Carpathian
Mountains, missing Dukla by some ten or fifteen
miles, and leaving that village and its all-impor-
tant pass in the hands of the Austrians.
From this general survey there will be appre-
ciated the following points : —
(1) The Russians have evidently fallen back
upon a chosen position, the elements of which have
been studied throughout the whole of its 200 miles
of length. In other words, the retirement Avas
deliberately undertaken, and halted where the
Russian commanders intended it to halt.
(2) The line so chosen involves a very consider-
able retirement from before Cracow, the Russian
line being nowhere nearer than thirty-five miles
to that fortress.
(3) The line so chosen equally involves a close
and apparently dangerous proximity to Warsaw,
and the defence of that capital from very near at
hand, the nearest point being Sochaczow, a little
closer to Warsaw than the nearest point in the
south is to Cracow.
(4) The line is guaranteed against turning in
the south by the Carpathian Mountains. Unless
the enemy could cross these in very large force at
some pass behind the Russians, he would not be
able to make the Russian line fall back any further
save by great pressure from in front.
(5) The line is fairly well suppliedwith avenues
of supply — the railways, which must be to some
extent repaired already, and which must be
getting into better working every day; the rivers.
which are, especially in the case of the Pilica,
navigable for boat transport ; and most important
of all, the great trunk railway through Galicia,
Avhich supplies the largest force, the main Russian
Army, in the south.
(6) The northern flank has been left open. la
other words, the Russians appear convinced that
the enemy cannot threaten Warsaw from beyond
the Vistula, that is, from the north, and may pos-
sibly be preparing themselves to be threatening
German communications along that river and
along the railway which runs parallel to it. But
of this I will speak in a moment.
(7) The way the line is drawn is obviously
intended to cover the existing investment of
Przemysl, the fall of which Avould mean not only
the capture of many Austrian prisoners, but the
release of very considerable Russian forces for the
front against Cracow.
(8) Lastly, it is evident that the whole centre
of this long line opposite Tomasow is defensively
its weakest point, since it has here no natural
obstacle along which to align itself, yet this centre
is also the point from which the Austro-Germans
can act with least effect. The two danger points
are Warsaw and Cracow, and the real effort of the
Germans and their allies must be to take Warsav/
if they can from its own neighbourhood, and to
keep the Russians from advancing from Cracow
into Silesia. Further, it may be noted that tho
avenues of supply to the Germans and Austrians
for an attack on the centre are poor. They have
plenty of railways for operating in Galicia and for
concentrating men upon the passes of the Carpa.-
thians. They have one great line and the unfrozen
Vistula to supply their attack in the neighbour-
hood of Warsaw. But to maintain very large
forces against the centre would be difficult. An
attack in the centre is further hampered by the
way in which the Pilica runs here, perpendicular to
the front both of the attacking and defending
forces. It is, even so high in its course, a formid-
able obstacle, with but few bridges and banks
occasionally marshy ; it thus separates the attack
into two halves at this point — two halves which
can only with difficulty reinforce the one the other.
So much being said of the general plan, let us
turn to a consideration of the two actions in par-
ticular. Their present phase is instructive and,
compared with the news of the last two months,
reassuring.
I.— THE BATTLE FOR WARSAW.
The battle for Warsaw is essentially concerned
only with the Rawka and Lower Bzura Rivers.
South of Rawa there was neither, till now, a sufficient
German force concentrated nor a sufficiently short
approach to Warsaw itself to produce or to make
desired a decisive effort. North of the Vistula there
was nothino: bemsc done. The whole action there-
fore lay upon a front of about 50 miles, this front
corresponding accurately to the courses of the
rivers. Save on the extreme left, as Rawa is
approached, the landscape is one very dead and
even. It is rolling indeed, and diversified by fairly
numerous watercourses, especially in the south of
the field. But in the immediate neighbourhood of
the Bzura River it is what I have described above, a
dull winter landscape, Avith hardly, at this moment,
the relief of more than a sprinkling of snow. The
River Bzura is, during this lower part of its course,
about 50 yards wide. It is everywhere shallow, and
9»
LAND -AND WATEK
January 2, 1915.
Sklemiewice "^UP
Tn^Ush. Jifiles
■sn
can be forded in numerous places, even in these
lower reaches. The trenches of either party were
drawn close to the banks of the water when the action
opened, or at least when the action opened in its last
and Diost intense phase. This phase lasted, roughly
speaking, one week, though tlie preliminaries v/hich
opened it and the inconclusive skirmishes into
which it dwindled away would between them cover
more like ten days. That week was the week
between December 18th and Christmas Day_; and
it will be seen in what follows how curiously
parallel the whole thing was to the battle for the
possession of the Yser crossings, Avith only this
difference, that the Yser is not fordable.
Two main fronts of attack developed. The
first roughly along the line A B sought to force the
Lower Bzura by fords and by what remained of
certain bridges. About two miles below Sochaczow,
near the point marked with an X, stands a
country house. A little above Sochaczow, between
that town and the railway bridge, is a half-broken
wooden foot bridge ; and further up the river
still, beyond the railway bridge and on the left
bank, is the village of Debsko, At all these three
places a special effort was made, and these efforts
ran successively down stream. The first, at the
beginning of the intense part of the action ten days
ago, was made at Debsko ; the second, upon last
Friday, by the foot bridge above Sochaczow ; and the
third, upon Saturday and Sunday, against the point
marked by the country house and the X on the
sketch above.
These movements only refer to the principal
separate assaults ; innumerable other partial
attempts were made, and the fiercest fighting^ of
all was during a general attack upon several points
at once which took place in the course of last
Sunday and Monday.
Now, the characteristic of all these attacks seems
to have been that, with few exceptions, the right
bank of the river was reached, and that the defeat
of the Germans (which was very thorough upon this
line) took the form of an annihilation of each body
as it crossed successively. We have the description
of dense columns of the enemy taking the water (not
yet frozen save at the edges) usually during a night
attack, fording it well above their middles, and still
proceeding, in spite of their heavy losses during this
wading, to scramble through the mud of the further
bank; and it is once there— often after having
carried the first Eussian trench— that each separate
assault was checked, and those who had succeeded
in crossing either shot down or captured. We know
nothing of the losses— at least there has been no
official estimate of them by which we can judge.
The estimate has been made that the total number
of Germans concentrated upon this extreme left of
their line for the final assault upon ¥/arsaw was not
less than a quarter of a million men ; it may well
have been more. Although the packed and dense
assault did not cover the whole front of the 50 miles,
yet it was developed over a total front, m sections, of
more than 25 miles ; for it not only took place along
this main front A B, but also along the front C D
across the Rawka, especially at the village ot
Bolimow, and further along the front E F south-east
of Skierniewice. We must be careful not to be led
away by general phrases, which are nearly always
used in connection with the repelling of an assault,
during which process the losses of the enemy always
seem to the successful defensive larger than their
true proportion to the whole forces engaged. Where
actual details are mentioned, the numbers who gob
across and formed upon the further bank do not
seem to have been very large. We hear of one
body (the largest) of 7,000, two battalions in one
erase, of a few companies in another, and so forth.
Nevertheless the German losses must have been
very heavy, and that for many reasons. In the first
place, the whole point of the movement was to break
down the defensive, pass the obstacle, and get
through to Warsaw at all costs. In the next place,
the nature of tliat obstacle means that for the few
who got across, a much larger number must have
been hit in the crossing. The ground down to the
river on the further side slopes like a gentle glacis,
and offers a perfect field of fire upon most parts of
the banks, at least as one approaches the_ stream.
A little way inland, or westward, there is in many
parts a sharp bank ; but between this bank and the
stream the fiat ground lies open to the fire of the
trenches opposite. Again, the muddy though shallow
little river is a sufficient obstacle to hold men
attempting to cross it, and it is probable that the
losses during the attempted fording of the stream
make up much the greater part of the v/hole. It
v/ould seem that in front of Bolimow and southward
of Skierniewice the attacks were more concentrated,
especially in the former case, only one or two
crossing places being attempted, and therefore
perhaps the losses were less upon this side. But
at any rate the Eussian counter blow along borh
the rivers was sufficiently strong to check and at
last to silence the fire of the oflPensive, and after
seven days of this heavy v.-ork, by Christmas Eve,
the attack had dwindled to a few sporadic
demonstrations. By Christmas Day_ itself it had
ceased. The official German communique admitted
the failure upon Saturday night.
Whether the offensive will be resumed or not
cannot of course be told. If we are to go by the
analogy of the work in the West, it should be
resumed, but so far (Tuesday evening) the great ■
effort to reach Warsaw has failed.
But meanwhile there is developing upon the
left flank of the Germans in this region an obscure
movem.ent, the value of which is probably exag-
gerated in the correspondence we get from the
Polish theatre of war, but which may turn out to be
of moment. In order to appreciate this movement
let us look at the sketch on the top of the next page.
1Q«
'January 2, 1915,
XAND AND WATEK
It will be remembered that the Germans, when
they failed in the first phase of the second battle for
Warsaw rather more than a fortuis^ht afro, made an
attempt in a rather half-hearted manner to threaten
the town in an altogether novel direction from East
Prussia, advanced with perhaps fifty or sixty
thousand men along the railway through Mlawa to
about the point A B, where they were checked and
driven back over the frontier. The Eussians who
inflicted this check towards the north are said to
have been reinforced and to have occupied in some
strength the district which lies between the Mlawa
railway, the Vistula, and the frontier, having come
down in number upon the point of Dobrzyn and the
banks of the river just below, opposite the town of
Woclawek. As I have said, all this movement is
obscure. We know nothing of the numbers in
•which the thing is being done, we have no official
nev/s upon it — nothing but private correspondence ;
and it is obvious that anything save a very large
force here would be in danger fi-om the German
armies in East Prussia. StiU, if there is a large
force operating here to the north, if those slowly
equipped and slowlj' arriving Russian reserves with
which the Busslan front is constantly being fed
have been largely directed along the right bank of
the Vistula, then their presence below Plock and in
all this Government of Plock which lies between the
Mlawa railway and the river would, from the banks
of the Vistula, seriously threaten the main German
communications : that is, if the forces upon the Vis-
tula were accompanied by heavy artillery and could
hope to cross under the cover of its fire. The only
line of communication for the German armies in
front of Warsaw, which now stand along the line
C D and have been held up there by the Kussians in
the fighting of the last week, is the railway which
goes from Lowicz to Thorn in Prussia, and that
railway is vulnerable from the Vistula for some
miles above and below Woclawek, where it ap-
proaches the stream. I only give the rumour
for what it is worth. The chances seem to
be heavily against anything coming of such a
movement. It may very well be no more than a
cavalry raid. It is very much too far away from
the main field of fighting, and much too greatly in
danger on its own flank from East Prussia alx)ve
(the Germans have already moved a large force to
Mlawa, which they have reoccupied) ; but if any-
thing comes of it, its origins in this unconfirmed
message are worth watchino-.
II.— THE BATTLE FOR CRACOW.
The_ conditions of the battle for Cracow in the
south differ fundamentally from those for the
possession of Warsaw in the north. It is not only
that the roles are reversed, and that while it is the
German object to seize Warsaw, it is the Pussiau
object to seize, or at least to invest or mask,
Cracow ; it is also that the nature of the fighting,
the ground, and, we may now add, the results, are
so different from what has taken place along the
Bzura and the Eawka, 150 miles away. In front of
Warsaw the Eussians have checked and thrown
back the German offensive. In front of Cracow the
Austrian mo\'ements (stiffened perhaps by an
addition of German troops) having pushed the
Russians back an average of 50 miles from that
fortress, which is the gate of Silesia, are now
suffering from a return of the Russian offensive,
which return has for several days in succession
continued to advance.
As we saw above, the southern end of the
Russian line ran down the Lotsosina, to where that
tributary joins the Nida, then down the Nida to its
mouth, where it falls into the Vistula. Beyond the
Vistula it follo^^^ed roughly the course of the Lower
Donajez, up to the confluence of its tributary, the
Biala, and then ran up that tributary past Tarnow,
through Tuschow, and so across the hills to Opilny,
to Jaslo, to Krosno, and thence southwards it
reposed upon the mountains. This line, it will be
seen, though pushed well back from Cracow, still
kept astraddle of the great main railway of Galicia,
R R, which is essential to the life of any army
operating in that province. There are other side rail-
ways, some of which I have indiccited on Plan IX.,
which help to supply the Russian army, or at least
to take the pressure off the main line. But it is the
iwssesslon of that main line which is life or death to
either combatant ; particularly to the Russians,
because along it from the eastward they obtain all
their provisions in a naked land, where the grip of
winter is now far more severe than it is round
Warsaw to the north.
It is further evident that this Russian line as
it was drawn up at the end of the retirement not
quite a fortnight ago, was designed to cover
Przemysl, as I have said. In order to uncover
Przemysl and relieve it from its investment by the
Russians, and in order to compel the Russians to
fall back until they were parallel with the railway
R R and at last perhaps should be forced to cross
it to their certain disaster, the Austro-German
forces were concerned not only to push along the
northern foot of the Carpathian Mountains, follow-
ing up the Russian retirement, but also to capture
the passes, and so threaten the Russian line in the
rear.
_Apparently_ by the calling up of men from
Servia (and paying the price in the disaster suffered
there) the Austrians found sufficient men just to
force, the passes. They occupied first the Dukla
Pass, then, in much smaller numbers, the crest of
the Lupkow, and were, in still smaller numbers, stiU
fighting ten days ago for the Uszoc Pass. It was
just at that moment that the Russian counter-
offensive began ; and these Russian movements
always mean, as we know from the past, the coming
up of the newly equipped bodies, for it cannot be
too often repeated, if we are to understand this war,
that while Russia's advantage is numbers Russia's
disadvantage (especially since Turkey came in) is
slowness of equipment and supplv.
The new Russian offensive, then, first took the
form of throwing the Austrians from the left bank
of the Nida, which they had occupied, to the right
bank. The fighting took place especially in the
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tTanuary 2, 1915.
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regions of Pinczow, Vlslica, and New Korcyn, near
the mouth of the river. And the enemy were so
far pushed back that the Russians now stand upon
the right bank. The next obstacle between them
and Cracow is the Nidzika, about a day's march
further on. These operations took place in the
week before Christmas, and up to and including
Christmas Day, and left perhaps a couple of thousand
prisoners in Russian hands, but no field guns.
To the south of the Vistula tbe Russians
pushed on to the Lower Donajez, crossed the Biala,
and established themselves firmly upon the further
bank. But the most remarkable of these move-
ments of their counter-offensive was that taken
along the arrows from Jaslo and Krosno up to the
foot of the Dukla Pass. An advance was made of a
full day's march from the front Jaslo-Krosno, to the
front Dukla-Zmigrcd, at the foot of the mountains.
Some 15,000 of the enemy fell into the hands of the
advancing Russians, and it is probable that at
the moment of writing the Dukla Pass itself — upon
the possession of which dej^ends every strategic
movement in Galicia north of the Carpathians and
every threat against Hungary to the south— is being
fought for, if not decided. This success was achieved
upon Christmas Day. What the fate of the
Austrians was in the Lupkow Pass meanwhile we
have no official information to guide us ; but we
know that on this same Christmas Day the Uszoc
was taken by Austrian troops, or at least the crest
of it ; it remains to be asked v/hether this
movement, counter-balancing the Russian success at
the foot of the Dukla, will do anything for the relief
of Przemysl and the pushing back of the Russian
line.
To venture a guess, it would seem that the
possession of the Uszoc, in spite of the fact that the
railway from the Hungarian plains to Lemberg goes
over that gap, would not prove of permanent value
to the Austrians. And one's reason for hazarding
that guess is that the Uszoc is too far away from
the main operations to be valuable, save in the
hands of a very large body of men, who should also
be operating against a much smaller b:.dy beyond
the mountains. You cannot outflank with inferior
numbers. You cannot outflank in a very long
detour save with heavily superior numbers. And
if, of the two passes, the Dukla falls into the hands
of the Russians its possession will outweigh by flir
the possession by the Austrians of the Uszoc to the
west.
We may take it, then, that in its present phase
the battle for Cracow consists in a successful and
continuous counter-offensive on the part of the
Russians, who are using their reinforcements to
press back again along the road which, during the
last month, they abandoned. It remains to be seen
whether Germany and Austria combined can still
produce further reinforcemeats which shall check
the movement ; biit, for the moment, botl; the
initiative and the oQensive are, in this region, again
in Russian hands.
Mr. Belloc's next lecture at Queen's Hall on the War will
be on Weclnes;lay, January 27th.
A CHILD'S HISTORY OF THE WAR.*
Although written, primarily for young readers, this book does
not fall altogether into the category of what are generally known as
children's books. The author has kept in mind the fact that the great
war which is at present being waged will be the first important mcmoi^
of a host of children, and thus " it is the more necessary tbat there
eliould be shown to them as soon as possible the other side of the shield
.... that the memory of the Great War should be touched to noble
issues — that it should be, first and foremost, a mcmoi-y of deeds aa
gallant as any that have been inscribed in Christendom's long roll of
honour." In linking up tlie incidents of the bcok to form a connected
story of tlie first days of the war, the autlior has achieved this greater
aim, and, having said this, further criticieia is unnecessary. Wo
heartily recommend the book.
•"Told in Gallant Deeds,
and Co.) 5s. net.
By Mrs. Belloo Lowndes. (Nisbet
12*
January 2, 1915,
LAND AND WATEK
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
■0TB.— Thli ArHdo hai b««n wbmitteJ to the Preii Bureau, which do:i not object to the publication ai ceniored, and takes no
rtspoDiibillty for the correctneti of the ttatementt.
THE NORTH SEA.
AN aftermath of the East Coast raid is a good deal
of questioning as to why the East Coast is noi'
defended by heavy guns. The answer is that a
consistent feature of British policy has been to
limit shore defences to the absolute minimum, on
the grounds that every farthing spent on forts is
necessarily that number of farthings less on mobile defence,
since there is necessarily a limit to expenditure.
That this policy is a right one can hardly be denied, and
the arguments in support of this view are many and various.
First and foremost, we have to remember the circumstance
that if a place be unfortified and undefended it is (or, rather,
was) recognised as immune from attack. To put a few guns
to defend it, therefore, merely lays it open to be damaged,
as it then ceases to have a nou-combaiant status.
Furthermore, supposing a place to be defended with — say
— six guns. It is obvious to anyone that if the enemy means
to attack he will come with enough ships and guns to over-
whelm those sis. He has practically unlimited guns avail-
able. Along these lines secondary fortifications are necessarily
a sheer waste of money.
First-class fortifications could in no case be erected every-
where, except at an enormous expense for construction and up-
keep, which could never be justified.
Such fortification of a coast line has been done — it has
been done by Germans on tlie North Sea front. But, compared
to ours, her sea front is almost infinitesimal. There remains
also the fact that, though by this expenditure slie has made ii'
practically impossible for our fleets to approach her coasts, it
is only at first sight that this looks like a gain. The seeming
gain is purely imaginary, since, had the money expended in
fixed defences been spent in ships, the German Fleet would
have been quite equal to ours, and she would not have been in
her present position of having her trade swept from the seas.
Conversely, had we fortified our East Coast in any really
efficient style, we should not have had a Fleet capable of
sweeping the seas, and food by now would probably be at
famine prices.
Finally, of course, there is the fact that the bombardment
of coast towns is such an utterly senseless operation from the
point of view of military advantages that no one could have
reasonably anticipated the occurrence of such an incident.
Also the risks undertaken were obviously out of proportion to
any possible advantage even from the warped German concep-
tion of naval warfare.
This, I hope, will serve to explain clearly why our coast
towns are generally unfortified, and why any fortresses to pro-
tect them could not have been " value for money," even against
the German Navy.
In further connection with the East Coast Raid, one or
two correspondents have called attention to the fact that
photographs of German unexploded projectiles fired by the
battle-cruisers into Seaton-Carew appear to bo capped armour-
piercing projectiles, such as would be used for firing at a
warship, and useless for a shore bombardment. It has been
asked whether this indicated a lack of organisation in the
German Navy.
The answer, I am afraid, is in the negative. So far as
I know, modern German big guns are supplied with one type
of projectile only. This is, of course, an ■■' all-purposes "
shell, fitted with a cap for armour piercing, if necessary, and
carrying a considerable high-explosive charge, the nature of
which is a carefully guarded secret. It is claimed to be con-
siderably superior to lyddite, and to be identical as to compo-
sition with the charge now used for German torpedoes. These
have certainly proved tliemselves capable of violent damage.
The number of German shells that failed to burst was very
small, and some failures were inevitable. But there is nothing
in any of the evidence to suggest that A. P. shells were fired " by
mistake." We must content ourselves with the Whitby evi-
dence, alluded to last week, as conclusive proof that, towards
the latter end of the Raid, the Germans, knowing that British
defending forces were coming up, got " nervy."
Perhaps the most curious point raised by correspondents is
in connection with my statement that the Germans regard the
Derffinger and Scharnhorst as one and the same thing in the
matter of rating. People write and challenge me to produce
a single British publication which admits any such thing.
Tliere is no such publication. The trouble is entirely due
to careless phraseology on my part; though even so it should
have been clear that in a matter of this sort what we think
counts for nothing. The point I sought to make in the issue
of December 19 was that the Germans make no "official"
difference between the Derffinger and the Scharnlwrst.
Oflficially they refuse to recogni.'^e the existence of a " battle
cruiser " in the way that wo do. While the sentence com-
plained of was l>eing printed the Germans, using their battle-
cruisers as " cruisers," were slaughtering the non-combatants
on our East Coast — a clear indication that they consider their
battle-cruisers as' vessels attached to the battle fleet but not
units of it.
This is a point which later on may possibly assume very
considerable importance. So long as the Germans employed
small cruisers or auxiliary cruisers for commerce destruction,
it enabled us to use all our old protected cruisers, if not to
chase them, at any rate to cut them off or surprise them, as tho
slow old Highflyer surprised the fast liner Kaiser Wilhelm der
Grosse.
Once, however, the battle-cruiser is imported on the scene
as a corsair, tonditious will materially change ; and instead of
twelve to one against the corsairs, the superiority will sink to
something like two to one.
Of course, there is one particular factor — the German
battle-cruiser has to get out, and also get clear of pursuit by
our battle-cruisers. Tliis is a problem of some considerable
magnitude. Still, since it offers Germany her best chance of
"doing something," it is probably a feature of the German
programme.
Regarding matters in this light, we may probably take it
that the East Coast Raid was tentative in object. We may
look for repetitions, perhaps. Should the.se take place, they
will be designed to familiarise us with tho idea that " baby
killing " (to quote Mr. Churchill's immortal phrase) is the be-
all and end-all of German naval strategy.
In connection with the next raid, or the next again, or
the next after that, we m.ay expect to see the German High
Fleet come out. Not very far perhaps, and certainly not with
any idea of a decisive action. But with a very decisive inten-
tion of covering a rush of the German battle cruisrcrs on to
the High Seas.
The late Commander Rice, R.N. (who met an untimely
death in an aeroplano disaster off Calshot), was universally
recognised as " the coming man " of the British Navy. It
was an axiom of his that it was absolutely futile to specu-
late what tho enemy would do : that the correct procedure was
to put yourself in the enemy's place and then ask yourself :
" What is the best possible thing to do in the circumstances? "
Then, supposing you were equal to the enemy in brain power,
you were in a position io meet and defeat his best effort. If,
however, you regarded the probable movements of the enemy
merely from your own point of view, you were liable to be
taken at a disadvantage from the occurrence of the unexpected
instead of the anticipated.
A sounder philosophy than this was probably never pro*
pounded. From our point of view any East Coast raid do-
signed to intimidate our trade can only end in disaster to
the corsairs. But if we dispassionately put ourselves in the
enemy's place the point of view is materially altered. It is
no longer a question of the best way of winning on the water,
where victory is humanly speaking impossible: it becomes a
question of how to achieve the maximum of mischief.
"Attrition " was merely a Bernhardi theory which cir-
cumstances have already shown to be faulty, owing to his in-
ability to realise the cardinal point that where it is a matter
of a hundred against fifty an attrition of tv/o to one merely
leaves matters as before, and that consequently something like
the abnormal figure of three to one has to be achieved, and
even this — at present rates — would take years to accomplish.
Obviou.sly, therefore, some other plan is required, and the
utilisation of big battle cruisers in the role for which they
were originally designed seems the most feasible of any.
The wise prophet always " hedges." I also will hedge by
pointing out that German plans are always liable to be in-
fluenced by " Mahan theories." Mahan, in tlie plenitude of
his recipe for the command of the sea, never properly realised
that the Power to which that is unattainable is driven to
seek "other ways." He was content to point out the futility
13»
LAND AND WATER
January 2, 1915,
of tie other way9. He failed to point! out ttat it was " ether
ways or nothing."
We do not know how far von Tirpitz is his disciple. If
be be a true disciple he will sit tight in the Kiel Canal. But
the indications are rather that he will not do go. Apart from
all naval questions, German puTjlic opinion may — if it has not
already — demand action of Kome kind.
Also, from what we do know of von Tirpitz, he is " a
man with a head on his shoulders." Given a free hand he is
Tery unlikely to overlook the cardinal error made by Mahan
and others who, while conclusively proving the necessary in-
gredienii for victory, have ignored the " most mischief " ques-
tion where victory is impossible — which is tlie crux of the
entire situation. German action in the future, therefore, de-
pends somewhat on how far von Tirpitz has a free hand and
on how far he may be hampered by theorists. But, should he
have any free hand, I think we may take ii as certain that
tho German battle cruisers will presently bo on our trade
routes. In which case we shall be faced with a second and
altogether different and more difficult war situation to any
which has hitherto obi'ained.
Of late the Gorman Press have been overfull of a scheme
propounded by von Tirpitz, the essence of which is to destroy
British commerce by submarine attack. It is not an original
«cheme, since it is all to be found in a pre-war story of Conan
Doyle's, which appeared in the Strand Magazine and in
America in Collier's Weekly, where it was luridly illustrated
by Henry Reuterdahl.
The attempt may be made as a last forlorn hope; but its
success would depend on at least two factors which Germany
does not possess. These are (1) ability to arrive at and remain
at a strategical poini' without British interference, and (2)
tho problem of how to deal with a powerful neutral like the
U.S.A., finding that inoSensive American civilians had been
treated to a nautical Louvain.
It may, of course, be argued that in a war of this kind
an extra enemy or two would not matter, but seeing the
desperate game that Germany has played for American sym-
pathy one can hardly imagine her as inviting active
American hostility.
Personally, I think that the whole thing can be put down
to bluff, pure and simple. German fubmarines are very un-
likely to hamper our trade in any way whatever.
They have talked of their submarines just as they have
talked of their Zeppelins. About their battle cruisers they
have preserved a complete Eilence. And on this account I
characterise them as the danger point.
On Christmas Day the first real figln' of the " now war-
fare " took place. Cushaven was attacked by British sea-
planes, supported by cruisers and submarines, and defended
by Zeppelins, seaplanes, and submarines.
Cuxhavcn, of course, is Germany's latest and best naval
and aerial base; and it has been made as impregnable as any
such place can be made. The mcral effect of any attack on
it must, iherefore, have been tremendous; the more so as for
the last two or three months the Germans have employed all
tlieir ingenuity in attempts on Portsmouth — failing in every
eSort — whereas at Cuxhavcn we " goi' there" at the first
attempt.
Between the British and German official reports there is
a considerable discrepancy. It is puerile to suppose that
either report is deliberately false. We must, therefore, take
it that the truth lies somewhere midway. All we claim is no
loss and some damage; the Germanti claim something of tho
same kind reversed.
THE HIGH SEAS.
Details of the Falkland Islands battle have now comein,
and they reveal strategy of a high order on the part of Admiral
Sturdcc. Admiral Sturdoe was, of course, in greatly superior
force, the respective squadrons being something like four to
ono in fighting value on paper.
There were, however, certain modifying circumstances
which might easily have very profoundly aSected results.
When tho enemy appeared, the two battle cruisers were
coaling and, therefore, unavailable for immediate action.
Theoretically, of course, they should not have been coaling
simultaneously; but it appears that both had almost abso-
lutely empty bunkers, and either of them uncoaled would Have
been useless as a fighting unit. To coal together was, there-
fore, a bit of mere plain common sense, especially as there was
no particular reason to erpect the enemy to appear at the
time and place that he did appear.
Next, the Canopus, on account of her slow speed, had no
fighting value against the enemy; they had merely to keep out
of her way, and hammer the weakly-armed County class
cruisers.
It; is clear, therefore, that Admiral Sturdee's position was
fine in which a mess of things could easily have been made —
for any inkling that battle cruisers were about would have
coincided with a vanished von Spee.
The battle which ensued was, of course, on " slaughter
house" lines, but the strategy which preceded it was for that
very reason of a high "big game shooting" order.
Tho appended diagram is not, of course, in any way
representative of the tactics employed, but it will, I think,
indicate the problem better than a lengthy verbal description.
y^ X
(B,)
^-^ — y
©
®
DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTUATK THE STRATBGICAL PROBLEM OF THE
FALKLAND ISLES BATTLE AS EXPLAINED IN THE TEXT.
G represents von Spee, B 1 the British battle cruisers,
B 2 other British cruisers, B 3 the Canopus. A point in front
of and equidistant between B 3 and B 2 is where G was lured
to before he discovered the trap. In the form of a diagram
witTi sizes to indicate approximate fighting values, it looks
simple enough; but sea warfare is a more complicated matter
than diagrams.
For example, von Spee had experienced oS Chile how
Cradock, though in hopelessly inferior force, did not hesitate
to attack him. If, therefore, our lesser cruisers at B 2 did
a bolt for it he would have suspected a trap of some sort. On
the other hand, did they attack him they would have been
anniliilated witli difficulty.
Wo now begin to see how tricky tho problem was.
So far as I can read matters everything centred on ihe
Canopus; and there must have been some very pretty manoeu-
vring on both sides.
Be that as it may, von Spee was "contained" until
the two battle cruisers rushed out to annihilate him. Then,
of course, he realised the facts of the case. He turned and
fled, while his lesser cruisers scattered. The sequel was a
foregone conclusion, whicli docs not require discussion, except
in so far as we may credit the Scharnhorst and Cneisenau on
the magnificent fight that they put up against absolutely over-
whelming odds. They might easily have surrendered without
any dishonour; but they went down fighting, and to that
extent obtained some moral success and spoiled Sturdee's vie-
t'ory accordingly, since a surrender would have been of in-
finite psychological value to us.
Against this we can set that the Leipzig did actually
hoist the white flag (probably the ward room table cloth).
When approached by our Glasgow she fired a shell into her;
but since only one shell was fired we may put! this down to
the perfervid zeal of some " no surrender " German. The
Glasgow, of course, re-opened fire, and the Leipzig went
under.
It is a matter of regret that this should have occurred;
the ship would have been so infinitely more valuable to us a«
a prize of war. However, since the Glasgow had no means of
knowing that the " white flag trick " was not being played
on her, she had no option but to re-open fire, as she did. We
can only put the matter in the chapter of ill-luck.
For the rest, " Thank God, we have the ships " seems to
be tlie sanest attitude to adopt. Man for man, I greatlydoubt
whether we can put up anything against the enemy in the
matter of brute courage. But it gives us one more indication
of how accurately the late Admiral Cradock judged the situa-
tion when he went to his death and the disabled Monmouth
hoisted no white flag, but sank helplessly.
Physical victory is at present a matter of who has most!
ships to lose. On that score we can rest content. Moral
victory is another affair altogether. Who dies best can count
for much. That! white flag from the Leipzig — for all that some
unknown German sailor heavily discounted it by subsequently
firing a shell— is probably our very best asset out of the Sturdeo
victory.
Till it be proved, there is no such thing as a fact in naval
warfare conducted on modern lines. When the shouting is
over, and the headlines are over, and when all things ai-o
reduced to a bedrock of fact, I tliink that we shall find that
that white flag from the Leipzig was our best asset m thq
Battle of the Falklands.
U*
fTanuaiy 2, 1915.
UAND AND WATER
THE ADVANTAGES OF CONVERGENT
FIRE.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).
IN my last' article I bhowed tho cumulative influence that
individual courage and coolness exercises on the battle-
field, by enabling a smaller number of men to do the
necessary amount of work, thus diminishing the losses
and economising the vital forces of tho whole nation.
This' week I propose I'o esplain how for equal numbers
of rrien greater resulcs can be obtained from their collective
firo power by grouping them suitably against the enemy.
Clearly if, say, one man to the pace can hold his own front
against, say, five-fold odds, because he comes of a well-bred
fighting stock and has been suitably tr.ained, 10,000 such men
can safely hold a from' of 10,000 yards against, say, 20,000
men of inferior race on, say, a 5,000 front, provided they
©an see either directly or by means of olx;ervation posts or
aeroplanes what the enemy is doing and whether he is trying
to mass superior numbers against any part of their position
for a surprise attack, and ihen they can employ the balance
of their numbers by establishing an overlap on either or both
flanks.
The advantage thus gained can best be understood by
taking the case of a small force completely encircled — or
rounded up — a position into which want of nK>bility or local
conditions of camping grounds has often driven us, in the
first case in the Boer v/ar, and in the second in frontier ex-
peditions' in the mountain passes and districts in India, where,
very fortunately, ■ne were not tho worse fighting race of the
two considered as individuals.
Here, for instance, is the typical case of a British brigade
■with transport, say 5,000 men, compelled to camp in a circle
not exceeding 500 yards in radius — rather a close fit — when
camels and other baggage animals, stores, eto., havo to be
provided for.
It will be seen that if th.e exi'reme range of the rifle be
taken as 2,500 yards, then every bullet fired from the invest-
ing arc A-B-C, even if it mis.scs' the particular head at which
it was aimed, has got to conio to ground somewhere wiihin
the inner circle and is pretty sure to strike a baggage camel
or somebody before doing so.
But a defender's bullet aimed at a man on the investing
lino A-B-C, if it misses him will find very little to hit in the
1,000 yard belt beyond him, and is practically a round wasted.
I remember some years ago working out in detail a case
of this sort which had happened during the Tirah campaign,
after which many things were said about our bad shooting and
tho apparent deterioration of our troops as compared with
their predecessors of some fifty years earlier date, from the r."^-
sult of which it appeared tliat every Afghan sniping into tlie
brovrn of our camps had a twenty-fold better chance of hitting
something vulnerable than one of our men shooting outwards,
whereas with the old musket, range only 1,000 yards, his ad-
vantage had only been as about three to one — a fact quite
sufficient to account for the trouble the modern hillmen ■nith
their Martini-Henrys' had been causing us.
The same question cropped up again in South Africa,
where the Boers, thanks to the mobility conferred upon them
by their ponies, always managed to " round up " our slov.'er-
moving infantry, and ihus derived an initial advantage in
probability of hitting someone, according to the degree of
overlap they established, whether complete or partial. It was
not ihe fact that they v.ere better marksmen than our men —
for except with a few of the older men thi.s was seldom tho oaae
— but it was because their superior mobility gavo them the ad-
vantage of position that our " regrettable incidenis " were so
frequently reported.
Of course, a line can only have two ends' to it, so in the
gigantio fronts of the present war this advantage can rarely
appear in this extreme form, but it can still be used locally,
especially by artillery, for directing a converging fire on cer-
tain points which it is desired to storm; and ihis advantage
belongs entirely on each occasion to the side which has made
up its mind to attack first, and this explains why the
Germans are still trj-ing from time to time to assault certain
portions of our lines. This is the only form remaining to
them by which they can still derive advantage from the initia-
tive, for in every other direction they are completely held by
us.
Now, if we combine the advantages which have accrued to
us, thanks to our better shooting and superior coolness, as I
explained in my last article, with these to which I have just
called attention, we can realise better how far we have gone
towards establishing a complete superiority over our enemy.
I think we may fairly a.ssume that tho troops we fought
in the retreat from Mons and on the Aisne and Marne were
at least twice as good as the partly-trained masses, all thai
are no'w left to oppose us; whereas ours can be relied
on in allotting tasks to them fully twice as much as at first,
i.e., we are certain of them now, whereas no staS in the
world could have counted on any men for such brilliant fight-
ing qualities before they had b;en sufficiently tested.
We can, therefore, trust longer fronts to fewer men,
keeping thus greater reserves in Land for the final decision;
and as Mr. Hilaire Belloc has so well pointed out in his last
contribution to these columns, reserves are the hammer to drive
the ultimate issue home, and thanks to the staunchness of the
first line troops ihey can be kept out of danger until they
are actually wanted. The enemy must place more rifles in
his first line and support them with fresh troops and reserves,
all very muoh closer at hand, so that tliey are swept by the
" overs" meant for ihc first line the whole time the engage-
ment lasts. And from the moment he breaks cover for an
assault he noiv draws a convergent fire from every gun within
range, for local conditions completely prohibit his attacking
on a broad front of a couple of miles', as in the earlier days
of the war, which is the only way to minimise the effect of such
convergence.
It is impossible, of course, to give absolute figures in a
comparison of this nature, but trying it every way in my
mind I do not think I overestimate our present advantage in
putting it as high as four to one, i.e., setting aside the extra
exposure inherent in every attack. I believe the Germans are
losing four timea as many men in each assault they are now
making as previous experience led them to anticipate, or as
we should sufier in attacking them under similar conditions.
But whereas we are now accumulating or about to ac-
cumulate fresh troops of excellent quality by the hundred
thousand, they have now been compelled to call out men of
an age and general physical inferiority that no one had ever
dreamed of sending into the field at all, and are so markedly
sliort of artillery projectiles that they have had to prohibit tho
only u.se of artillery fire which gives a certain giiarantce of
adequate preparation for their assault*.
The 1915 edition of " Dobrett's Peerage, Baronetage, Knightage,
and Compauionagc," published by Dean and Son, Ltd., at 31s. 6d.,
reflects, on almost every page, the effect of the war, for liiuxdreds of
both titled and untitled names familiar in " Debrel't's " have appeared
in the casualty lists, wlii'e thousands of Naval and Military appoint-
ments and promotions have been dealt with. The volume contains
the names of all officers announced oa December 2 as appointed D.S.O»
1C»
LAND AND WATER
'January 2, 191&.
CORRESPONDENCE.
ZEPPELINS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir,— I am one of those, who, although busy, find
lime to read each issue of Land and Water more than once,
end consider I get excellent vulue for time so spent. Keading
Mr. L. Blin Desbleds' instructive and interesting article re
"Value of Zeppelins for Naval Warfare" in last week's, I
am of opinion that the Admiralty have taken measures to
pi-event the tell-tale glares from tlie funnels of warships) being
eeen by observers stationed in airships or other air craft.
I expect thoy have provided large cowl-sLaped hoods of steel,
fixed over funnels in such a way that they can be detached
during the day-time and when coming into harbour in order
to deceive the enemy through their spies. This precaution
being so simple, it musit be assumed that it has been taken.
On this assumption it appears to me that a further
opportunity for deceiving the enemy in mid-air presents itself.
It consists of the preparation and distribution on the high seas
of imitation or mock furnace glares at any point and at
any distance from warships. Let Uiem be called mock glares^.
These can be produced in many ways, from the old crude
torch to the most up-to-date method, viz., chemicals. Between
these you have gas, oil, electricity, acetylene, etc. The floats
may consist of old rafts, old row boats, casks, etc., according
to the class of weather and the condition of the sea. The.*
could be oast off from the warships before nightfall.
In addition to deceiving the enemy in mid-air it miglit
also require a second torpedo from a hostile submarine to
extinguish one of tliose lights.
The opinion of Mr. Fred T. Jane as naval expert and
of Mr. L. Blin Desbleds for the aircraft section on this would
be very valuable.— Yourg faithfully, J. J. Murray.
Mraiielg, Dublin.
December 26, 19H.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — We are all the beneficiaries of the excellent paper
by M. Desbleds on Zeppelins. It raises the entire problem of
lighter versus heavier-than-air fliers. The Zeppelin, as your
correspondent points out, is tlie most valuable auxiliary of a
warship and for reasons to which perhaps he has drawn in-
B/ufficient attention in detail.
(1) These hovering hawks, stationary, a hundred miles
ahead of a fleet and with a wireless connection, can take all
the strain off the sailor man. A dozen men, the crews of three
" hawks," relieved every few hours, can allow whole fleets to
lie snugly in some adjacent harbour.
(2) Not less important, these hovering kestrels can detect
both efubmarines and mines. A rigid dirigible was recently
used for this purpose by the Italian Government to deal with
Austrian mines in the Adriatic. The power of penetration for
the eye, exercised vertically by contrast with horizontally, is
very great. In fine weather especially, submarines submerged
forty feet could be detected easily. Recent experiments in
the Gulf of Florida by tlie U.S. Aeronautical Department
demonstrate this.
(3) But more important still is the personal factor in
the great problem of heavier versius lighter. The expert aero-
planist is, and always will be, a super-man; no less. But in
a year or two every sea coast town here is likely to have ita
Zeppelin scout or destroyer. These rapid rigid dirigibles will,
•with us, probably represent a popular volunteer effort.
Because any man whose nerve is equal to a steam launch might
navigate these diminutive Zeppelins, given fair weather. A
friend of mine, expert in such matters, quotes their cost of
construction at less than ^10,000.
Tliese are some of the reasons why the Germans, after
nearly nine years of anxious experimenting, believed that their
progress with lighter-than-air machines justified a vote of
seven millions sterling. That generous expenditure and all
their years of experimentation is tlie present Germany makes
to England. We to-day take up rigid dirigibles at the point
of efficiency to which the enemy has brought them. — Yours
faithfully, Moketon Frewen.
DANGEROUS SENTIMENT.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I gather from Mr. Jane's article in Land and
Water of December 26th that towns on our East Coast are
supposed to be protected by mines.
_ It would seem that there is more supposition than pro-
tection about it, and one would like to know whether the pro-
tection could not bo made a little less inadequate. Or is
this prohibited by the "chivalry and humanity" thai" our
prattling pro-Germans are so fond of prescribing" for our con-
duct of this war? These excellent qualities seem to have led to
the_ escape of the Dresden, and will doubtless lead to more
serious disasters if they are not given up in favour of more
practical methods. — Yours, etc.,
.V. D.
Prestfelde, Shrewsbury,
December 28, 1914.
THE FIELD FORCE FUND.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — The Field Force Fund committee appeal for woollen
shirts and mufflers for their parcels, which they are sending
to the front in large consignments weekly on the requisitions of
commanding officers.
Requisitions for over 37,000 of these parcels have been
received during the last few days, and must be despatched
after Christmas. All contributions in money and kind will
be at once acknowledged by the hon. treasurer and hon. secre-
tary, c/o Lady Henry Bentinck, 53, Grosvenor Street, W.
December 24, 1914.
MORAL V. MORALE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Radley College, Abingdon,
December 28, 1914.
Sir, — In a note to his last interesting article in Land
AND Water, Mr. Belloc wonders why Moral is so often spelt
Morale. In my youth I always heard it pronounced, as,
indeed, till quite recently I always pronounced it, as a tri-
syllable, Morale. I have alwa3's believed it to be the Italian
of the French word. Moral.
In the same way, in my early days Napoleon was always
called Bonaparte with an Italian final e, a pronunciation
which I am sure Wellington always used, and which Napoleon
himself tried to forget. — Yours faithfully,
E. Brtans.
Terms of Subscription to
"THE COUNTY GENTLEMAN
AND ,
LAND AND WATER"
(ESTABLISHED 1862).
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BACK COPIES of "LAND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articlfs by HILAIHK BELLOC, "THE WAK BY
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togetiier with a valaable reference, "THE 10P0GRAPH1CAL
GUIDE," can be obtained through any News.igent, or on
application to the Ofticcs of "LAND AND WATEK," Cbntbal
House, Kingswav, W.C.
LOOKING BACKWARDS.
Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on " The World's War by Land and Water" will doubtless
wish to reta'n in correct rotation this remarkible series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth bin-Je s to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is, 6d. each.
Or we will supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complete,
for 6s. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numbers already
received we have had to reprint so.-ne of t!ie earlier
numbers. Same can now be supplied at 6d. per copy.
Order now from your Newsagent, Bookstall, or direct
from the Publishers,
"LAND AND WATER,"
CENTRAL HOUSE, KINGSWAY. LONDON.
16«
January 2, 1915
LAND AND WATER
Sk
SHELL
AT THE FRONT!
Quality tells more than calumny.
Never before in war ha» the value of the petrol-
driven engine been so incontestably proved as in
the present conflict. In every branch of the
service — heavy transport, despatch riding, gun
haulage, armoured car raids, aerial reconnaissance,
Red Cross Ambulance work, etc., "Shell"' spirit
IS being used more extensively by our Forces
at Home and Abroad than any other petrol
187
LAND AND WATER
January 2, 1915
SUBMARINES
By "AN ENGINEERING CORRESPONDENT"
THE submarine is playing a very important part
in the present naval war, and has already
demonstrated its power as an offensive weapon,
while, at the same time, its trustworthiness
and radius of action are amazing.
Very little is known about the details of construction of
the various submarines used by the different naval powers,
although they are all of the same type, being based on the
construction of the Holland, built by the Holland Torpedo
Boat Company. The Holland was a small vessel of about
70 tons displacement when submerged, with a speed of about
six knots on the surface and of five knots when submerged.
She was completed in 1898, and in 1900 was purchased by
the United States Government, remaining in active service
until 1910. This boat is now preserved as a naval relic at
the Naval Academy at Annapolis.
Naval experts throughout the world watched carefully
the experiments carried out with the Holland. These experi-
ments proved a great success, and from that date all the
large naval powers commenced to build submarines. The
development has been exceedingly rapid, as may be judged
from the fact that the latest type of submarine has a displace-
ment of about 1000 tons, can travel at 18 or 19 knots on the
surface and 12 below, while 1700 to 2000 ton boats are being
considered.
The largest and most modern types of submarine boats
possessed by the three leading European powers bear a
remarkable similarity in their size and general effectiveness
in warfare. The change in motive power within recent
years from petrol and paraffin engines to the Diesel engine
has greatly reduced the dangers from ignition of explosive
mixtures of fuel vapour and air, and has increased to a great
extent the radius of action.
Submarines when on the surface are propelled by internal
combustion engines, but when submerged are driven by
electric motors, fed from storage batteries, which are charged
by the oil engine when the submarine is running on the
surface. The reason for using electric motors when running
submerged is, of course, on account of keeping the air as
pare as possible and utilising it only for breathing purposes.
The outstanding feature of the Diesel engine as compared
with the ordinary internal combustion motor is the complete
absence of any ignition apparatus. As is well known, the
compression of air generates a large amount of heat, and this
is used to fire the charge in a Diesel engine.
Most submarines at present are fitted with two Diesel
engines, each of 1000 horse power, giving 2000 horse power
on twin screws. An excellent six-cylinder 1000 horse power
Diesel engine has been developed, of which considerable
numbers have been made. These engines are fitted with a
reversing gear, as the advantages of reversing the main
engines when manoeuvring are considerable, since the
power developed by the main engines greatly exceeds that
provided by the electric motors installed for under water
propulsion.
In several countries attem]5ts are being made to develop
Diesel engines of 2500 horse power each, and thus obtain a
total of 5000 horse power for a submarine boat. It is antici-
pated that with these engines a speed of about 20 knots on
the surface will be attained as compared with tlie maximum
at present possible. The largest German boats nearing
completion displace 750 tons on the surface and 900 tons
submerged, have a length of 214 feet, and are propelled by
two Diesel engines of 2000 horse power each. These boats
will have a speed of 20 knots on the surface and 10 knots
submerged.
In France the majority of the boats are propelled by
petrol and paraffin engines, but for the later boats steam
turbines are being adopted. The propulsion by steam is not
new, and was tried in the earlier French submarines, but was
abandoned owing to the diificulties experienced in closing
down the boilers before diving. It is expected that these
diificulties will be overcome by the adoption of modem
water-tube boilers having a very high rate of evaporation
and using the latest type of oil fuel burning apparatus.
Most submarines use the system of " diving by the
head " and use horizontal rudders in the stern. Previous to
diving the ballast tanks are filled with water to reduce the
submarine to a di\ing condition, when the conning tower
alone sliows above water. The boat when thus prepared can
dive by the mere action of the horizontal rudders, the " nose "
being dipped down and the " tail " up. The angle of descent
is not deep and the action of the rudders can be controlled
exactly. Some submarines have horizontal rudders or diving
planes so arranged that their action draws the ship under
water without affecting her longitudinal trim.
Although the general tendency is to increase the size of
submarines, it must be remembered that such enlargements
add to its visibility when running awash, and increase the
time and distance required for disappearing when the vessel
dives. It is, of course, possible to overcome this difficulty by
diving at a steeper angle, but this again intensifies the difficulty
in bringing the vessel to an even keel and increases the danger
of striking bottom in narrow waters.
An invention which will probably revolutionise submarine
warfare is the Fessenden oscillator, which enables submarines
even when submerged to communicate with one another
through the water. The Fessenden oscillator can be described
as an improved method of producing powerful sound waves
by electrical means and communicating these waves to the
water. These sound waves can be received by an ordinary
microphone and telephone, such as is done in ordinary
submarine bell signalling.
By this method Morse code has been transmitted through
water over a distance of 30 miles, and telephonic conversation
under water has been carried out over a distance of about
half a mile. With improved apparatus these distances will
be greatly increased. It has already been demonstrated in
America that with this invention it is possible for a flotilla of
submarines, when equipped with the Fessenden oscillator, to
make a combined attack on an enemy with only one boat
showing its periscope in order to direct the others, the
remaining ones being directed by telegraphy and telephony
through water. Again, this invention makes it possible for
the submarine when submerged to receive orders or report
movements from and to a battleship, cruiser, or any other
boat on the surface of the water.
The B.H.S. Field Kitchen. — Messrs. Brown, Hughes and
Strachan, Ltd., Holland Gate, High Street, Kensington, have built
up a wide reputation owing to the large number of military ambulances
which they have supplied for conveying the wounded, both at home
and at the front. It is a fine thing to bring the injured soldier swiftly
to the hospital, so that he may receive at the earliest possible moment
the necessary skilled attention. There are, however, other needs
just as pressing if the soldier is to be kept going. We refer to the
provision of good nourishing food, hot and ready to serve at any spot,
either near or far away from the firing hne. To this end, Mr. Strachan,
the managing director of the above firm, has designed and constructed
a travelling motor kitchen, fitted up with every requisite for the
speedy preparation and serving of large quantities of hot soup
and broth, and so on. Simplicity of design, combined with light
yet strong construction, is the keynote of this ingenious military
vehicle. No stone has been left unturned in order to give effective
service in the smallest compass, simplicity having been studied
throughout. There is every reason to believe that these kitchens
will give every satisfaction under working conditions.
riuRBERRV Comforts for Officers. — These most serviceable
articles of outdoor equipment adequately meet some of the most
poignant needs of our brave defenders. \ weatherproof or British
warm, woven and proofed by Burberrys, should survive the severest
war service on land or sea, whilst waistcoats, shirts, hoods, and
bivouacs of various patterns, made from the famous Gabardine cloth,
are unrivalled for protection, light weight, and durability. For
naval officers Burberrys have ready some splendid thick fleece overalls
for wearing under oilskins. These are appropriately called "Husky
Suits," being both approved by and largely supplied to the Admiralty.
An illustrated catalogue of Burberrys' military and naval kits '.vill be
sent post free on application to Hayniarket, I^ondon, S.W.
Christmas Eve witnessed the opening performance of a gorgeous
Oriental pantomime, entitled " Aladdin," at the National Theatre, in
Kingsway, lately known as the London Opera House. It is a happy
inspiration on the part of the management to light again the wonderful
lamp of Aladdin, and no expense has been spared to reproduce in the
palatial environment of the National Theatre the famous story of
" The .Arabian Niglits " entertainment. The company engaged to
interpret the pantomime includes some of the leading e.xponents of
dramatic and pantomimical art, notably Miss Claire Romaine, who
has made the character of " Aladdin " one of her greatest studies.
In addition, we have Miss Billie ISarlow and Miss Bessie Burke,
together with a host of popular comedians. The entire production is
in the hands of the well-known stage manager and producer, J. M.
Jones, and the aim of the management is to present the pantonume
in all its Oriental magnificence, and to make light and laughter the
dominant note during these dark days of war. The prices of admission
are popular, and range from Cd. to 7s. 6d.. each scat being so placed
that an uninterrupted view of the stage is obtained.
188
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER
Vol. LXIV
No. 2748
SATURDAl, JAJnUAKY 9, IQIo La newspapek.J pubusuku weekly
Copyfiaiiit iiti^uit>j
SIR MOxNTAGUE CHOLMELEY, BART.
GRENADIER GUARDS
This well-known Sportsman, who was Master of the Burton Foxhounds for two seasons, has,
we regret to say, recently teen reported killed in action on Christmas Eve, after having been
at the front only a month
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915
Send him the ever rciniy
means to keep in toiicli
with all at home.
Remember, too, those who
are keeping the " silent
Wiiiches of the sea."
3?-- I
Waterman's
Ideal
FoiiiJtatePen
On Land & Water— No Pen to equal this
Look where you will you cannot find a Pen that will serve you so well as a Waterman's
Ideal. Waterman's Ideal is recognised the world over as the best Fountain Pen made.
It never requires shaking, does not splutter or leak, and is made so well that it will give
a lifetime's service. That is why nearly all the busiest writers use Waterman's Ideal.
From Mr. Hilaire Belloc ;
" How do I know that the fellow writes with a quill ? A most
unlikely habit ! To that I ans.ver, you are right. Less asser-
tion, please, and more humility. I will tell you frankly with
what I am writing. 1 am writing with a n'aterman's. Ideal
Fountain Pen. The nib is of pure gold, as was the throne of
Charlemagne, in the ' Song of Roland.' . . . Well, then,
the pen is of pure Gold, a fen that runs straight away like a wil-
ling horse, or a jolly little ship : indeed, it is a pen so e.xcellent
that it reminds me of my subject — the pleasure of taking up
one's pen."
From " 0« Taking up One's Pen," contained in "On Nothing," by
Uilaiie Belloc. liy kind permission of the Author and Publisher.
From a returned Traveller ;
■■ During the last fifteen years spent in and around the
' White Man's Grave,' I ha\e tried Heaven knows how many
fountain pens, but for stability in the Tropics give me a
Waterman every time A few other pens cracked, other nibs
corroded, one or two fell absolutely in twain, but the ' Water-
man ' I took out with me in iqio did well. She never leaked,
and though the ' Kroo ' boys had hold of it (in their mouths)
once or twice, tlie dear old thing kept on writing. Lost {pro
tern) in the Niger River ; overboard in Las 1 'almas slie went
on writing just the same, and I have told all ihe ' boys,' from
Dakar to Bonny, that my Waterman was top-hole."
L. BILLINGHAM.
{Original letter may be seen by anyone interested).
The " Safety " Type is best for men on active service, as it is for Ch.iplains, Doctors,
Red Cross Nurses, Ladies, Travellers, and Sportsmen. It can be carried in any position,
and will not leak. Beware of IMITATIONS !
Four types : Regular, S.ifety, Self-filling, and Pump-filling, with numerous designs in
each. Nibs to suit all hands, exchanged gratis if not exactly right. In Silver and
Gold for Presentation. Of Stationers and jewellers. Style Booklet free.
L. G. SLOAN,
'"Cbc pen
Corner,"
KIngsway, London.
L. E. WATERMAN CO. New York: 173 Broadway.
Montreal: 107 Notre Dame Sl eel, W.
The burberry
Lined Proofed Wool, detachable Fleece or Fur
The BURBERRYexcludes
rain, sleet or sno'w, and
never becomes sodden or
heavy.
It provides luxurious
vvarmth in the coldest
weather, yet is healthfully
self-ventilating.
It dries with extraordinary
rapidity.
No amount of knocking
about affects its unrivalled
protective properties.
A RECENT LETTER
FROM THE FRONT
"All Officers coming out for
the Winter should have a Burberry
with a detachable fleece lining and
(Jabardine Overalls. They will
be covered with mud the first
hour in the trenches, but Gabar-
dine dries well and the mud drops
oir All our Officers are very
pleased with their Hurberrys."
A.D.P., 16th London Regt.
See that your BURBERRY
is labelled '• BURBERRYS."
MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE.
Worn by HIS MAJESTY THE KING
and H.R.H. the Prince of Wales.
LORD KITCHENER describe! it as
"a most valuable addition to cam-
paigning Kit."
SHORT NOTICE KIT
Durberryi keep Tunics. Slacks,
Breeches, Great Coats and Warms,
ready to try on : so that fitting is
done when ordering, either in Lon-
don or Paris, and the kit completed
in a few hours.
BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON
8 & 10 Bd. Ma!esherbes PARIS; Basingstoke and Provincial Afents
.\#\llllllllllll/|///„„
^VIRGINIA CIGARETTES "I,
^ JOHN PLAYER & SONS ^
■^ beg to draw the attention c^.
^
of connoisseurs to
PERFECTOS No. 2
hand-made Cigarettes. They
are distinguished by a superb
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10 - 6d. 20 - 1/-
50 - 2/6 100 - 4/9
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larger Cigarettes of the same quality
JOHN PLAYER & SONS,
Nottingham. <^
1?^
1^
yv^ The Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Great Britain and
Ireland) Ltd.
200
January 9, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
lOTB.— Tkti Artid* hti U*m nlmltUi to tk* Prtit Barcta, which <m( aot object to th« pabllcatloa ti ctawrol ul takoi ■•
rttpoiilbllltr for tho correctaoii of tho itatcmtBti.
h kccorJtico with tho rofatroBcati of tho Prcii Barcaa, the poiltloat of troepi oa Plaai lUattrattBr thli Article aait oalj bo
reformed ai approiimate, aad ao definite ttrenfth at any polat It Indicated.
THE WEST.
THE week just past, while it has been the
most stagnant of the whole autumn and
winter so far as the trench work in the
West is concerned, happens to have pro-
vided excellent examples of what that
trench work means, and of why slight advances in
one place or another, or slight losses, may be of
such moment.
I.— THE AFFAIRS AT SILLERY AND
PERTHES.
About a week ago the Germans reported and
the French admitted the capture and destruction
of a French trench by a mine. The progress thus
obtained by the Germans in the region of Sillery
was insignificant. The French casualties were
limited to one company, and part of the ground
was retaken. The whole incident if we read it by
\7UidmSi
Sillery
We have already seen in these columns what
the general problem of trench work is. A very
long line is held by numbers only just sufficient to
maintain themselves : continual attacks upon that
line are not intended to have the effect of slowly
driving it back, nor even of breaking it in one weak
place (that is the task of the reserve whenever it
comes into play). They are intended, by attri-
tion, to give the enemy pause at last and to make
him consider whether he still has enough men to
hold so very extended a series of defensive posi-
tions. For when he decides that his numbers are
no longer sufficient for that task, he may be com-
pelled to fall back to a shorter line, and such a
shorter line means, in the case of the western field,
a very serious retirement, carrying with it politi-
cal consequences of which I -will speak later.
But apart from this general character of
trench fighting there are particular examples to
show how success in one region or another may
have effects quite out of proportion to the compa-
ratively small measure of advance made. Of this
■we have had this week three examples : the first
a small example of a German success five miles
from Reims; the second a small success of the
French in the plains of Champagne at Perthes;
the third a much more important success of the
French in Upper Alsace, at Steinbach. I will
deal with the first two together and with the third
separately.
itself would be confusing reading, and apparently
of little moment : one of those very numerous de-
tails of all this fighting with which weeks and
months have made us only too familiar.
Similarly, another telegram, a French one,
announced the advance of the French trenches,
first by 300, then by 600 yards, in the neighbour-
hood of Perthes, a village about ten miles west
of the Argonne Forest and about twenty -five miles
east of Reims.
This French communique also, read by itself,
would mean very little, and would make almost
meaningless reading. Whether the French ad-
vance was admitted in the German communique
or not I forget, nor is it of importance. The little
forward movement was made and it was main-
tained, and like that at Sillery, twenty miles off
to the left in the same line of trenches, it was
apparently of little value.
But when we come to look at the thing as a
whole, we see more clearly what particular effects
successes of this kind may have.
Here is a rough sketch of the trenches, over
a space about sixty miles in length, from east to
west. From in front of or north of the town of
Reims, to the north-east of the town of Verdun-
It will be seen that the line is by no means a
straight one. From where it starts, well to the
north of Reims (it has here been pressed back by
1»
mil
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915,
the French to the low heights on the Rethel road),
it comes suddenly down south, and even bends a
little to the west again round the hill of Nogent.
Indeed, it is the continued occupation of this
height by the German guns which allows the shell-
ing of Reims to be continued occasionally, and
which also supports the outward thrust here of
the German trenches. The French have not suc-
ceeded in retaking that height. Now, it is just
where this bend or forward thrust of the German
trenches takes place that the French lost their
advanced trenches by the explosion of an enemy
mine, and the German thrust was brought for-
ward, as at A, from the dotted line to the thick
line.
In the same way a,nd over a greater extent of
ground in much the same days, the French line
was advanced, as at B, in the region of Perthes.
Many other minor flexions of this line took
place in the same period. Thus, in front of the
Wood of Forges on the Meuse, in front of Verdun,
at C, there was an attempt of the enemy to thrust
forward which was broken back: while in the
Wood of Grurie, at D, they seem to have made a
few yards. But A and B, the movements at Sil-
lery and in front of Perthes, are the most impor-
tant.
Now, why are comparatively small movements
of this kind of importance? The general import-
ance of perpetually keeping the enemy moving and
occupying as many of his men as possible we have
seen. But what particular importance is there in
small special advantages of this kind? If they
cannot be followed up, of course, there is no par-
ticular or local importance : but my point is that
each such slight advance does promise more than
it actually obtains, and that at any moment a suc-
cess or a failure upon this scale may breed a very
much larger success or failure.
Look, for instance, at these points, A and B.
It is apparent that behind the French line there
runs past the village of Sillery, past the junction
of St. Hilaire, past Suippes to St. Menehould, and
so to Verdun, a line of railway important to the
French supply. It is equally apparent that there
runs along the line R, R, R, R, a line of railway
which crosses the Argonne, and is important not
only to the German supply, but also for linking up
what was the Crown Prince's Army in front of Ver-
dun with the other German forces in Champagne.
Now it is the object of either combatant in this
region to reach out and to cut such lines of supply,
and if either could attain his object he would im-
peril the whole line of trenches of his opponent.
If the French from B could get across the railway
R, R, R, R, or the Germans at A could get across
the railway running from Reims through St.
Hilaire to St. Menehould, the corresponding sec-
tion of trenches between the two railways would
have to be abandoned — by the Germans in the first
case, by the French in the second. During all
these weeks of fighting in this region neither
party has succeeded in reaching either of these two
essential lines; but note that the space to be
crossed is not great — such an advance as was made
at Perthes the other day is something like a third
of the distance the French have to go to achieve
their object — and that the only reason each of
these numerous attempts does not get home is that
the force against which it is made at once brings
up men from other parts which are not being at-
tacked, and strengthens the threatened line. On
the day when this bringing up of men is done
slowly, or on the day when the line is too thinly
held for the gaps to be thus stopped by regular
concentrations wherever they occur, there will
follow in that region a really considerable ad-
vance. And that is why, in spite of such very
small immediate results, the men in the two
parallel lines of trenches continue to attack and
counter-attack. The thing will be still better
understood if we look at it in more detail.
Here, for instance, is the detail of the Sillery
ie/i-^<^
^^i>to»*«*^
■T — ' — T
position. The great road south-eastward from
Reims, A, A, and the railway from Reims to St.
Hilaire, B, B, are the parallel lines which supply
the French trenches, which I have indicated by a
line of crosses. Opposite these French trenches
you have the German trenches, which I have in-
dicated by a dotted line. Of course, in reality
the system of trenches is infinitely more compli-
cated, and the distance between the opposing
firing lines considerably varies: but that is the
general conformation of the line east of Reims. It
is dominated by the heights of the hills of Nogent
I'Abbesse, which the Germans continue to hold.
The German attack which was successful in blow-
ing up the first French trenches was made at about
M, the site of an isolated farm to the south of Sil-
lery, and within the parish limits of that small
town or large village. The Germans only suc-
ceeded (and that apparently temporarily) in get-
ting the French line back as far as N, but the
sketch is sufficient to show what they were driving
at, and what proportion their success bore to the
task before them. Small as was the distance, it
was more than a quarter of the way to the level-
crossing in front of Great and Little Sillery at
O, and if the Germans could ever thrust their
trenches out so as to include O, and perhaps to
occupy the Sillerys, they would cut, and therefore
be masters of, the railway, B, B, and the road,
A, A, at one and the same time, and probably
paralyse a long section of the French trenches im-
mediately to the east, which this railway and thij
road supply.
Here we have two local examples, at Perthes
and in front of Sillery, of the way in which the
trench fighting is carried on, and the particular
local objects which it has in view, apart from tha
general object of ultimately compelling the enemy^
to shorten his line.
January 9, 1915.
XAND AND WATER
But the success at Steinbach, at the extreme
south-eastern end of the line in Upper Alsace, is
a matter of greater moment. To that we will
next turn.
II.— THE AFFAIR AT STEINBACH.
A rough diagram of the position in Upper
Alsace (only a diagram, not a map) is afforded by
the following sketch. The shaded oblong, V, V,
Avith the passages across it at P^ and P^, repre-
sents the Vosges with the two southernmost passes
across those mountains. The dotted line, S, S, S,
represents the Swiss frontier. The continuous
perpendicular line, R, R, represents the Rhine.
The circle, M, represents the town of Mulhouse,
and the star blocking the gap between the Vosges
and the Swiss frontier at B represents the fortress
of Belfort. From the Vosges to the Rhine lies a
flat plain (slightly inclining, of course, towards the
river) everywhere more than ten, and every-
where less than twenty miles broad. Mul-
house is a very important manufacturing
town, much the chief town of Upper Alsace :
it is not fortified. The trenches as they
stood at this extreme end of the line a week ago
may be represented on the diagram by the line of
dots. Finally, you have just behind that line of
dots, at X, a little promontory, as it were, a jut-
ting-out position from the foothills overlooking
the plain, and just in front of it the small tovm of
Cernay at C.
Now, from such a diagram it is fairly evident
what the French plan was. The French were
already in possession of the crest of the Vosges,
represented in the diagram by the double line run-
ning from V to V. They were in possession of the
passes, but not in full possession of the mouths of
those passes where they debouch upon the Alsatian
plain. To enter Mulhouse would be both politi-
cally and strategically a result of high importance.
In the first place, it would uncover a section of the
Upper Rhine (fortified, it is true, though not
heavily fortified) and provide, for the first time
since the campaign in the West was opened, an
issue into Germany proper. Further, to capture
Mulhouse would be to hold in fee one imiDortant
industrial district of the conquered provinces. It
would have its full effect in Germany politically,
and quite inevitably it would draw down (as I
think the mere threat has already drawn down)
considerable German forces from the north.
It is an invariable rule that, if you desire to
be rid of a military obstacle, it is easier to turn
it, if you can turn it, than to try and pierce it. Or
rather, if you are making for an objective covered
by an obstacle, to get round towards your objec-
tive is usually less expensive than to butt right
at it. In this case of the trenches in Upper
Alsace in front of Belfort, the arrow from Belfort
indicates the direct advance on Mulhouse. That
portion of the trenches was, of course, very
strongly held. But the French, being in posses-
sion of the pass, P^, which is called the Pass of
Thann from the town standing at the foot of it on
the Alsatian side, could, if they broke the Rhine
near X, occupy a gun position there dominating
the plain, and might hope either to proceed to the
occupation of Cernay, and so onwards on the north
of Mulhouse, towards the Rhine, along the double
arrow — thus rendering useless and compelling to
retire the whole of the German line between X and
S. Such a thrust would put Mulhouse into their
hands, and at the same time uncover something
like twenty miles of the Upper Rhine.
Note that the much more probable result of
such a thrust would be to bring German forces
down in considerable numbers from the north in
order to save Mulhouse. But, though this result
would, of course, not be so satisfactory to the
French as the entry into Mulhouse and the reach-
ing of the Rhine, it would have its value because
the number of men by which the Germans hold
their western line is limited, and if it is seriously
menaced in one place it can only be strengthened
there at the expense of dangerously weakening an-
other. This is particularly true of Upper Alsace,
where the forces are few, the quality of the Ger-
man reserve troops poor, and the distance from
the main field of the fighting very great.
X, the gun position which the French were
fighting for, is a hill just to the south of the village
of Steinbach, and to show in detail the whole
value of the movement it is necessary to look at the
succeeding plan. Here it will be seen that the
Vosges fall from their high mountainous part on
to the Alsatian plain, and their terminus along
that plain is very abrupt. High, wooded moun-
tains, across which goes the main road of the Pass
of Thann — and which resemble for their landscape
the lower Californian hills and red woods more
than any others I know — fall in sharp foothills to
the plain; and the distinction between the hill
country and the flat along the line, F, F, is more
marked than any other I can recall. For the
Vosges stand straight up out of the Alsatian plain
like a long, mountainous, wooded island rising out
of the sea. From these heights a man looks across
the Plain of Alsace to the Rhine and sees beyond
that stream the corresponding heights of the Black
Forest. The plain is as flat as can be, though
sloping over its fifteen or sixteen miles of extent
towards the great river.
3*
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915,
tOOOydrd raitffes
ieoo 0 1 1 » * f 6 r * ,
■ •— H — r- h ' r- ' I ■ «..
O I ^ 3 4 ft
English Miles
About 1,000ft. above the plain, upon a peaky
foothill, stand the ruins of the old Castle of Stein-
bach, at the point I have marked C upon the
sketch. Steinbach village itself is in the coombe
below, and I have marked it S. Just to the south
of Steinbach village and to the south-east of the
Castle Hill, there is a fiattish promontory or
tongue free from vrood (though there is wood upon
the hillside leading to it), and by its position domi-
nating the plain to the south as well as to the east.
This gun position I have marked by the letter H.
Batteries upon H (if the high ground behind is
clear of the enemy) sweep the whole of the plain
and the lower hills around. They ddininate the
little lump of high ground near the village of High
Aspach: they dominate the other gun position
above Uiloltz, and they command the market town
of Cernay.
There is often a coincidence between a view-
point for the picturesque and a good gun position ;
and it is worth noting that the Castle Hill of Stein-
bach, though not identical with and higher than
the gun position I am speaking of, dominates to
the eye all the plain of Upper Alsace. It is the
position to which a man climbs who wishes to em-
brace in one view the whole of that sweep of plain
between the Vosges, the Swiss hills, and the Black
Forest.
The fighting, then, was for the village of
Steinbach and the slight hills on either side. It
was concluded, as we know, two days ago, from
the moment of writing this: i.e., on Sunday, Jan-
uary 3. The positions are apparently still held,
and Cernay is already in danger of a further
French advance. The thing can be seen in more
detail in the following plan, where the gun posi-
tion above Uffoltz at 150ft. above the plain is seen
contrasted with the gun position south of Stein-
bach, which is 200ft. above it.
All the heavy fighting for the position of the
heights was done by the Chasseurs Alpins from
across the mountain stream called the Thur (which
runs past Cernay and feeds a mill brook running
to that town), and up in the direction of the
arrows. A, A — at least, so I read the rather con-
fused private telegram which has come through.
And it would seem that the gun position which tlie
French now occupy had previously been defended
by German field artillery, 77's, which were either
silenced or captured.
We must not exaggerate this local success.
There are still ten miles between these foothills
and Mulhouse, and another eight or more from
Mulhouse to the Ehine. There is the bad obstacle
of a large forest, and the virtual certitude of Ger-
man concentration to relieve the pressure here.
Still, the positions carried, if they are maintained,
are the positions that dominate with their fire all
this part of the plain. This novel pressure upon
Upper Alsace, if it is maintained, wfTI have one
very great political consequence which should
strongly affect German strategy: and of that I
propose to speak next week.
II.— THE EASTERN FIELD.
N the eastern field there is a dearth of action
after the heavy work of the last month,
which is due to two separate causes. In
the north the second battle for Warsaw has
I
Casth Hilt A Uffpte
Jhann
Old ,,
Tfiontr .
stLC nut A K)f{iriz
'^Posuion
StcinhoJ^
"liiVi
?^.VSfe.
Xer
n(^\
(or
Seri<^
hett
Ixn)
'oiinn
Q^
^^ti Stt,
^
^^«/?/?,
^Oiii.
Tlelgkts as above plain.
^^ to Mulhouse.
V
January 9, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
come to an end through the exhaustion of the
enemy. In the south the comparative lull
(which is not absolute, for there is a continual
Russian advance) is mainly imposed by theabomin-
able condition of the weather in the Carpathians
and on the Galician plain at this moment.
As to the comparative calm in the north, it
still continues, though with reinforcements the
enemy may renew the attack; but the great effort,
which lasted up to and somewhat over Christmas
Day, has definitely failed. There has succeeded
to it a series of sharp encounters along the centre
of the Polish line — none of them in any way deci-
sive— and a curious movement, not very easy to
understand, of the extreme north of the German
line attempting to cross the Vistula. The position
of the troops here dees not exactly correspond
with the tributary rivers Bzura and Rawka. We
can establish it more or less successfully from the
telegrams and it seems to be somewhat as follows :
^fv^ ^^«V
Vithori
VI
Along the Bzura the Russian trenches are every-
where along the right or Warsaw bank, except
near its mouth. Here it would seem that the Rus-
sian line crosses the stream, for Vitkoritze upon
the further bank is in Russian hands. Further
south along the Rawka, as that narrow stream
gets shallower towards its sources, the Russian
line no longer corresponds with the water. So
far as one can make out, it recedes considerably
from the line of the Rawka in front of Bolimow,
where the Germans have established themselves
on the right or Warsaw bank. But it would also
seem that the real difficulty for an advance upon
Warsaw there lies not in the comparatively insig-
nificant obstacle of the stream, but in the woods
and low heights which the Russians are here hofd-
ing behind it.
Still further south in the region of Rawa the
line comes to the stream again, and there has been
fighting for the points where the two brooks,
Bialka and Rylka, fall into the upper waters of
the Rawka. All this Russian line is thoroughly
maintained and seems to be in no danger. But, as
I have said, there is a curious movement going on,
wherein the Germans seem to be trying to cross
the Vistula in front of Vischegrod. It may be
suggested that this attempt means that the enemy
does not believe that even with reinforcements
he can pierce the Bzura-Rawka line, and that if he
is to make another attempt with such reinforce-
ments to seize Warsaw, he can only do it by esUb-
lishing a bridgehead beyond the Vistula, crossing
troops there, and then advancing upon Warsaw
in the direction of the arrow. Vischegrod, oppo-
site the mouth of the Bzura, is a town upon which
three main roads converge : it is a place where the
throwing of a pontoon would be comparatively
easy by using the island of Yamytcheff, which
stands here in mid-stream. The town is further
protected by a tributary coming in upon the right
bank of the Vistula. The Vistula is here, fei
normal times, about 1,000 yards broad or a little
less : swollen by the recent thaws, it may be some-
what broader at this moment. At any rate, the
attempt of the Germans to cross here and to es-
tablish a bridge with a bridgehead held beyond
upon the northern bank, has been checked by the
action of small armoured steamers, which have
been sent downstream from the depots at Warsaw.
Further south, in all the central part of the
line, in the region in front of and below Petrckow,
ar
•.ulf7^.••!•.-;v4 -fi f a n siTB
and so on to the Lotsosina, there have been quite
inconclusive attacks, each checked in turn at the
points marked upon the map by the crosses. It
will be seen that this line runs without
5*
LAND AND WATEH
January 9, 1915i
flexion and in the original direction north
and south. There is no intention on the
part of the Russians of advancing it; all the
efforts of the enemy are to pierce it. The
attacks near Mikhala, Gora, Volmino, Polikhno,
and four or five other places, such as Kamans,
Mazornia, Malogorszcz, and Zakrsow, all lie
along this line, and are each marked by a cross.
It is the original line of which I spoke last week,
which runs straight from the Upper Rawka to the
west side of the Lotsosina, and so down the Nida
^0 the Upper Vistula. This Russian line is the
straightest and shortest possible for the defence of
"Warsaw. It was deliberately taken up and has
been maintained for seventeen days. It has not
hitherto bent, still less has it been pierced.
On the other hand, there has been for the last
few daj'^ no appreciable movement further south
and west of the Russians, towards Cracow, from
across the Nida. We have no nevv^s, for instance,
that the Nidcza has been reached yet by our Allies,
and it is equally true that the passes of the Car-
pathians are not yet in their hands. The private
telegrams announcing their capture four or five
days ago were what is politely called " an antici-
pation of events " ; and that from Rome describing
the pouring of troops down on to the Hungarian
plains was rubbish. The position as knoAvn at the
moment of writing — Tuesday night— that is, the
position of last Sunday— was that the Russians
held the mouths of all the passes, were nearly at
the summit of the Uzsog, and had driven the
Austrians right up into the hills at the place Avhere
the all-important Dukla Pass debouches into the
fairly open northern country. The Austrians in
their retreat had left — as may be imagined in such
vile weather of blizzards and snow (for it is much
worse in the Carpathians than in Northern Poland
near Warsaw, where the winter is open, very
wet, and still mild) numerous prisoners and not a
little material — 4 guns, for instance, 3,000 men,
and 68 officers, with half-a-dozen Maxims, south
of Gorliche. But until clear weather and a frost
come it is jDrobable that advances everywhere here
will continue to be extremely slow. It is none
the less an advance, and none the less a continual
and daily depreciation of the Austrian forces.
THE SUPPLY OF MEN.
IN the last few days that incessant question,
the supply of men, has again been raised in
more than one quarter, both by those who
have emphasised anew the present character
of the war, and by those who have put forth
further estimates of enemy-reserves in the public
Press.
It is a matter to which all critics and students
of the great campaigns must continually return,
and the object of the following notes upon it in
this week's issue is only to reduce the matter to
its simplest terms, so that a general judgment may
be drawn which shall also be precise.
To obtain a precise conclusion on this matter
is the more valuable because (for some reason
which is not easy to discover, but probably con-
nected with the advocacy of particular policies),
many authorities are not content to keep to the
plain rules of arithmetic, but are concerned sora3
to exaggerate, others to belittle, the total existing
forces and the total reserves of force present with
the Allies or with their enemies.
Now, if we keep certain principles clearly
before us, and if we apply those principles to the
published statistics of modern Europe, we shall
arrive at certain numerical results upon which
there can be no doubt whatever ; unless we are pre-
pared to call those published official statistics
false, or the rules of arithmetic doubtful.
I propose to pursue the following plan : —
(1) To begin with, the absolute numbers of
males of what is called " military age." (2) Then
to see how many of these are " potential " forces
for any nation, i.e., how many could (if there were
no loss by inefficiency, necessary civilian employ-
ment, absence in fields other than that of the Euro-
pean conflict) possibly enter the field. (3^ Thence
to proceed to what I shall call the " actualities,"
that is, the numbers which, out of these potential
numbers, could in practice be summoned within
one year supposing full equipment and supply
arailable for them. These figures I shall call the
" Final figures." But they will need " weighing "
by a consideration of age, of efficiency, of rate of
loss.
I.— ABSOLUTE NUMBERS.
We start, then, by asking the number of males
of what is generally but very loosely called "mili-
tary age " in each of the five great belligerent
Powers.
We are justified, for the purposes of a
strongly outlined sketch such as this, in omitting
the smaller populations involved, and in consider-
ing only France, Great Britain, the German Em-
pire, Austria-Hungary and Russia.
" Military age " signifies, when the phrase is
used in this arbitrary fashion, all years from the
twentieth to the forty-fifth year inclusive. That
is, the phrase presupposes the calling up and
training of lads whose twentieth birthday falls
sometime near or after the declaration of war,
and men of succeeding ages up to those who attain
their forty-fifth birthday near the same moment.
How misleading the phrase can be, and how it
must be modified when one comes to practical
judgment we shall see in a moment. But, for the
purpose of establishing first principles, this is the
period of human life in the male which we set
apart under the sacred phrase " military age."
Now, we know from published statistics how
the Great Powers stand to one another in this
factor of strength.
Germany has 12,000,000 such men; France,
7,000,000; this country, 8,000,000; Austria,
9,000,000; Russia, 26,000,000.
The reader will at once protest against these
figures being given unqualified, particularly in the
case of Great Britain and of Russia ; and we shall
see in a moment how different the " potential,"
still more the " actual " numbers of men available
in action during the current year are from the
mere total numbers of males thus aligned. But for.
January 9, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
Ihe beginning of our inquiry we must first set down
those certain official statistics.
It will be seen then, that if a; nation could put
under arms and train and use for the purposes of
war the whole of its adult male population from
the ages of twenty to forty -five inclusive, and if
all the men thus trained and put under arms were
of equal value and formed equal units in perfectly
constructed and proportioned armies, and if all
this could be done at the very outset of war (an
absurd hypothesis, but one necessary to the de-
velopment of this argument) the Germanic Allies
would have begun the fight with a preponderance
of 21, as against 15 in the West ; and with a handi-
cap of 21, as against 26 in the East.
If compelled to fight both such hypothetical
enemies at once, Germany and Austria would
have been at a disadvantage of almost 1 to 2 :
21 to 41.
Let me put it in tabular form : —
Allies.
Enemy.
England ...
8
Germany . . .
12
France
7
Austria
9
Russia
26
41
21
There is the first — and most misleading — step
in the whole aftair.
n.-THE POTENTIALS.
Now, let us consider how these resources
shrink when we consider, not the mere totals
of adult males, but the " Potentials," That is the
most that, under existing conditions of military
organisation and expectation in each country, each
could bring forward in a j'ear, supposing there
were no such things as delay in equipment, ineffi-
cients, necessary civilian employment, etc.
In other words, supposing that the five Great
Powers had been able to put under arms at the
outset of the war the total numbers which their
military organisation proposed as theoretically
available for the field, apart from all deductions
necessary for civilian work, for physical inefii-
ciency, etc., how would the figures stand then?
The British conception of total possible mili-
tary resources envisaged an Expeditionary Force
of fewer than 200,000 — but with reserves behind
them. Behind these again a militia (whether to be
used at home or abroad does not affect the argu-
ment, for Britain is part of the European Belli-
gerent area) of, say, roughly, half a million men.
That half million was not, of course, fully trained
for war, but we are considering, for the moment,
only the hypothesis of total potential forces.
Again, the total armed forces of the Crown in this
country were very much larger, of course, than the
Expeditionary Force envisaged. But for the pur-
poses of the European (and decisive) campaign,
the Expeditionary Force and the Territorials at
liome or on the Continent should alone be con-
sidered. For the forces used in the Dependencies,
etc., do not count in the active total of the field of
European operations.
Beyond these existing figures Great Britain
might hope for voluntary or compulsory levies,
which we may put for the purposes of this calcula-
tion at a maximum of two million volunteers avail-
able within the time that the Great Continental
Powers could bring in and train the total of their
disposable men. We may set down Great Britain,
then, with the figures ,2 (of a million) for an Ex-
peditionary Force, ,5 for her Militia r Terri-
torials "), and obtain the total figure .7. The
figure 2 stands for the 2 millions of maximum
available reserve of volunteers, making a grand
total of 2.7. Seeing that the Expeditionary Force
had its own reserves for filling gaps and making
up the full strength, we are not exaggerating if w©
make of this figure 2.7 the round figure 3.
Let us set down Great Britain, then, the first
upon the list, with the figure 3 3
The French figure 7 allows for no modifica-
tion. Not that all this 7 are, or will be, in the
field, of course, or could be. But that the French
military organisation covers the whole of the male
population : it is the maximum French Potential.
So, without further analysis we may briefly
set down the French figure beneath the British
one: 7 ••• 7
The same rule applies to the Germanic Allies.
The German Empire trains only half its men in
time of peace ; but it has an organisation for call-
ing up in batches and using all the rest, and
though in Austria-Hungary the proportion trained
is even smaller and the machinery at once looser
and more complex, yet under the conditions of
war every single man is available as much in that
service as in the German. We may, therefore, set
down the two original figures unmodified in the
case of these two Powers, which again gives us
for Germany the figure 12 12
In the same way with the forces of Austria-
Hungary, we are justified in maintaining the
original figure which, as we have seen, should be
set down at 9 9
Russia presents a problem totally different
from that of any other European Power in this
respect.
Though a heterogeneous Empire and un-
able to supply more than a fraction, she difi'ers
from Great Britain. She differs still more,
though she has conscription, from France and
Germany or Austria.
The first thing to appreciate is that the 23
million subjects of the Czar who are of military
age are not available for one united army at all.
It is not, of course, as ridiculous to talk of them
under one military heading as it would be to talk
so of the subjects of the British Crown ; for these
are even more diverse. And the nucleus of Russia
proper is much larger in proportion to the out-
lyers and dependent peoples than the nucleus of
Britain is in proportion to the British Empire.
Still, to think of the Russian co-efficient as 2G
compared with the German co-efficient 12, is to
think in terms of nonsense. The true Russian
number even potentially available for action
against the Germanic Allies is but a fraction of
those 26 : what fraction it is roughly, we will next
proceed to examine.
Lest all this part of my argument should be
misunderstood, the reader may note the diversity
of the Russian Empire and its consequent limita-
tions for the formation of a homogeneous army
in the following official statistics published upon
the authority of the Russian Government itself
and checked in pro]X)rtion to the niunbers given
in the census. From these statistics we find that,
of the 26 million adult males of military age, only
just over 15 are Aryans, and of these the Slavs
1*
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915.
proper, including the Poles, count but 14 million
iadult males of military age ; while Russia proper,
excluding Poles, has available (according to the
same statistics) only about 12-13 million of adult
males of military age. There are, of course, very
large sections of the population other than Slavs
upon vyhich Russia draws impartially for her con-
scripts, but I give these figures to explain in some
part the discrepancy between the apparent and
the real resources of the Russian State in war.
Next, apart from this heterogeneous charac-
ter, it must be clearly appreciated that economic
necessity forbade Russia to train more than a cer-
tain number of men, or to provide equipment for
them or officers for them. The number so trained
was very large, but less by far in proportion to her
total population than was the case in any other of
the great conscript countries. It may be urged,
indeed, that this left a vast quantity of untrained
material by way of reserve, and that is true ; but
you cannot make an army from such sources
alone. An army also needs guns and the
whole framework of regimental officers and staffs,
and that preponderating factor of equipment which
cannot be improvised.
It is true that after an indefinite delay this
great absolute superiority of numbers would begin
to tell, but it would not begin to tell in the first
year of a war, and hardly in the first two years.
It would tell very heavily in a struggle prolonged
as were, for instance, the Revolutionary and
Napoleonic wars.
We must not, then, think of Russia for one
moment as we think of France or of Germany : a
single homogeneous nation occupying a compara-
tively restricted and highly developed area, organ-
ised under one comparatively simple military sys-
tem which works exactly with the civil administra-
tion. We must think of Russia for what she is,
an Empire. She is an Empire, the development of
which is still on the way to modern organisation.
In this process, it is true, she has advanced with
astonishing rapidity, but it is still far from com-
pletion. It is an Empire in which the economic
resources of all kinds, including communications
and eqmpment, the instruction of officers, and the
rest, cannot be, as it is in the older countries, co-
incident with the maximum man-power of the
State.
No one can exactly fix the limits of the num-
bers which Russia could put into the European
field in an indefinite space of time. But we can
make some rough estimate of her potential (not
her actual) adult male population thus available
within, say, the space of one year, supposing she
could obtain all the equipment she needed and had
the commimications wherewith to feed and to sup-
ply all present upon the field.
Russia calls up for training every year rather
more (but not many more) young men than does
Germany. She calls up anything between a sixth
more and a fifth more — that is, for regular train-
ing; you must allow a good deal of margin for
irregulars.
When we consider that Germany by her
system can lay her hand on just under 4^ million
men of military age who have had some
sort of training, we may safely put the similar
number in Russia at over five million. But you
cannot put it at much over five million, because
ihe increase of the Russian population is so rapid,
and the re-organisation of the Russian forces has
been so recent, that the later contingents are much
larger than the early ones. In other words, the
proportion of older trained men is smaller than iii
other armies. That this has its advantages as well
as its disadvantages we shall see later. Let us
for the moment fix in our minds that number, five
million.
Now how much are we to add to that five
million to give what I have called '' the potential " ?
Here one is necessarily vague, just because
there is this very large mass of untrained reserve
(of very varying quality and even of varying races),
and also because the number that you can find for
your potential is limited by the moral possibility
of officering them and training them. I suggest
as a maximum one man in such a potential reserve
for each man who has had some training. That
maximum will, of course, never be reached in any-
thing save quite unexpected length of war, stretch-
ing over many, many years. But let us take it
as a maximum upon which to work the rest of our
calculation. Then if Russia has five million
trained men, we may call her " potential "10. It
is certainly not more.
We can now set down in tabular form the
following list of " potentials " in millions : —
Allies.
Great Britain 3
France ... 7
Russia ... 10
Total
20
Enemy.
Germany ... 12
Austria ... 9
Total ... 21
III.— ACTUALITIES.
These potential figures do not, of course, re-
present actualities. They are maxima, and
maxima altogether superior to what will really
be raised — save, perhaps, in one case — in the full
year. Let us proceed, then, as the last stage ia
this analysis, to consider the actualities to which
these " potential " numbers shrink in their turn.
GREAT BRITAIN.
The three million maximum potential which
we have set down for England is modified only by
two considerations. The first is whether recruit-
ment upon the present system will give this num-
ber— which can certainly in theory be attained;
the second is whether the existing army on the
Continent into which the new levies must be
" digested " will be large enough, when the time
comes, to achieve that process of absorption.
You do not pour new levies into a field unsup-
ported. It would be fatal. You mix them with
and embrigade them with, make them fight side
by side with, men who have already formed them-
selves to war in action.
If we allow so long a space as a year for the
process, and if we consider both the quality of the
material and the intensive training to which it has
been submitted, we may, I think (short of unex-
pected disasters), be easy as to this second con-
sideration.
As to the first consideration, that is, whether
our present system of recruitment will provide the
full number or no, only the future will show. More
than half, but not two-thirds, of the task is already
accomplished. We have about another million to
find. To accomplish this by a compulsory
system is a highly controversial proposal, not suit-
January 9, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
able for discussion in these columns. But it is
worth pointing out that this country is the one and
only belligerent country in Europe which can still
manufacture freely, that its industry is largely
supplying the Alliance, and that a voluntary
system fits in an exact and elastic manner the
demand for labour. Under the alternative system
of compulsion you would have to arrange arbi-
trarily and mechanically what men were to be
drawn for service, and what were to be left behind
for industry — let alone for shipbuilding and for
communications, for mining and for agriculture,
and for commerce and for seamanship, mercantile
and naval; and you would probably get worse
material, too.
At any rate, it is the peculiar condition of
the English co-efficient, which we have set at 3,
that it is a potential quite able to become an
actuality. We have no necessary reason to scale it
down.
There is another point about the British con-
tingent attached to this last point, which is that
all the men it concerns are so far (or for much the
greater part) first-class material. We have no
deductions to make for age, inefficiency, or civi-
lian employment, for the volunteers are recruited,
by definition, only between the ages where men are
best suited for the field, and only from men who
have passed the doctor.
Let us set dov.'n our English maximum
" actual figure," then, at 3.
FRANCE.
The French potential co-efficient of 7 is in a
very different situation. It is a situation neces-
sarily imposed upon every conscript nation, to wit,
that you must deduct from its " potential " maxi-
mum all those who are not efficient for military
service, and all those who must be kept back for
the absolutely necessary civilian employment con-
nected with communications and supply. In point
of fact, this French co-efficient of 7 shrinks under
such a test to something a little less than 4. The
inefficients even among the young men in any
nation are more than a fifth, and it is with diffi-
culty they can be kept much below a quarter. To
those inexperienced in the figures of a recruiting
system, such a proportion will seem extremely
high, but it is the unavoidable conclusion of prac-
tice. It must be remembered that the word " in-
efficient " does not mean broken down in health,
or superficially and obviously weak, or diseased, or
malformed. The inefficients are these, and very
much more than these. They are the young re-
cruits who, for a quantity of other less apparent
reasons, for such trifles as varicose veins, or a weak
heart, or twenty other things which would be in-
significant in civilian life, are not apt for service.
If this is true of the first and youngest batches of
recruits, it is, of course, more and more true of the
Reserves as their age increases, and when we get
towards the last batches of the so-called " military
age," to the men approaching forty and past forty,
the proportion who would be only a weakness to
an army if called up from their ordinary civilian
occupations becomes very large indeed. To these
we add the men who must, as a matter of prime
necessity, be kept back for the furnishing of com-
munications and supply of every kind, and, as I
have said, we scale down our 7 to 4. And, indeed,
4 ia an outside Hmit 4
GERMANY.
Exactly the same thing applies to a conscript
country such as Germany. I shall deal particu-
larly with Germany in a moment, because round
the possible German reserves of strength a great
discussion is raging at this moment. But we are
quite safe in saying that if Germany had trained
every one of her adult males, her proportion would
be at least what the French is, and for her 12 mil-
lion we must write down 7. The number has been
given in these very columns as high as 7^ by
making every allowance in favour of the enemy
and deliberately over-estimating his strength. But
in practice, and as an actuality, it is as certain as
anything can be that the German 12 becomes 7,
just as the French 7 became 4. We write down,
then, for Germany the actual figure 7 7
AUSTRIA.
Upon exactly the same calculation we may
decide, without fear of putting too small a number,
to write down Austria at 5^ instead of 9.
RUSSIA.
With Bussia we approach the only indeter-
minate factor in this calculation of actualities.
We know that Russia after five months of war has
not in the Polish field anything like her total
number of men who have received training, let alone
any additions from her untrained reserve. To some
extent this is due to slowness of equipment, from
the fact that the supply for these very large numbers
was not stored in time of peace, and can only
(precisely as in our own case, and to some extent,
that of the French) be provided after anxious delay
in time of war.
It must always be remembered in this con-
nection that a nation desiring to make aggressive
war upon its neighbours, and planning to force war
at a particular time, will always have an immense
advantage in equipment and supply. If you do not
want to make war : if, still more, you had never
planned war for a particular moment of your own
choosing, it would be folly to lock up, or rather to
waste, economic energy in vast useless stores, most
of which deteriorate or are superseded in a few
yearj. As a fact, no civilised nation has dreamt of
doing such a thing except Germany. Germany did
not begin to do it till about three years ago, and
Germany was only able to do so because she
intended to make war at one chosen and particular
moment to which this vast accumulation of
equipment corresponded.* The argument is an
obvious one, but it wants insisting upon because
foolish people usually talk of the alternate policy as
" unpreparedness." It is nothing of the kind. It is
simply normal livmg. If indeed the other nations
had known that Germany would really push calcula-
tions so far as to force a universal war at her own
moment, then they might have provided against
that moment ; but no one did this because every-
one— except Germany — knew that to force war
simply at your moment and without grave reason
save the desire for aggression means, in the European
comity of nations, ultimate crippling and decay, and
therefore no one thought that Germany would be so
foolish.
At any rate the matter stands thus : that even
of possible trained men fi'om the Russian dominions
* It is si~ni(icant t)iat (Tea Austria, her c'ojs allj, has foaad herself
(hort of equipment ani has bad to borrow it from Qermsm/, a million
rides among other thing*.
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915.
the number present equipped and fighting in the
European field' is far less than the total, and that
this is in part due to delay in equipment.
But there was very much more than this. In
the first place the Russian forces are divided into
three quite distinct bodies — the Asiatic, the
Caucasian, and the European armies. In the
Polish field, as against Austro- Germany we are only
concerned with the last of these three.
In the second place the Russians, most wisely,
do not use their last Territorial Reserves of trained
men.
In the Russian European Service much the
greater part of the conscripts serve, I believe, for
three years. They then pass into the " Zapas," or
classes to be called up for active service in case of
war, and this " Zapas " only covers men up to the age
of about 37. The greater part of trained men are not
called up for this war after that age. Russia has, of
course, upon the model of Germany, her " Opolchenie,"
like the German Landsturm, which stands for the
older trained men and for all the elHcients among
the imtrained. She will certainly begin to train the
untrained younger men first, seeing what vast stores
of men she has. What number shall be set down
for these untrained reserves as available — consider-
ing the equipment to be produced in the time —
during the first year of active operations on a large
scale, up to, say, the beginning of September,
1915? That is the "actuality" as opposed to the
"potential" in the case of Russia, and we may
suggest a maximum of 3^ millions. We may
presume 3 J million of trained men out of the five
million to appear, first and last, in the European field
alone : for Russia wiU leave out the oldest categories,
and has to provide for the Caucasus as well. We
may add one untrained man to be called up
and trained and ofiicered and, in such a delay,
equipped, for one trained man available at the outset
of hostilities. So we may turn this 3^ of trained
men present in the Polish field to 7. Not necessarily-
less — but most certainly not more.
It is a high maximum I know, and very possibly
it will not be reached, perhaps not even nearly
reached, in the firstyear. Still it is a possible maximum
of actuality ; and we may now set down our table
of these actualities, finally, as follows, for the first
full year of active operations on a large scale, that
is, up to the beginning of next September : —
Allies.
Britain ...
France ...
Russia . . .
Total
3
4
7
"14
Enemy.
Germany
Austria
Total
7
12i
and these should be our final figures.
But before leaving these figures, let us remember
one very important point which tells, happily, in
favour of the Allies.
After a certain limit of age, which cannot be
exactly fixed, but which is certainly not long after
35 for the mass of men and at the very latest
not after 37, the military value of a man not
in long and continual military training becomes
very low. The French recognise this by using their
"Territorial" Reserve (a phrase which means in
France the older men) for duties different from those
incumbent upon the active army properly so called.
They garrison, they watch communications, they
are separated in the mind of the commander (and
in his dispositions) from the younger or " active "
levies.
Now of the five great nations at war, the two
which form our enemies — the Germanic body — are
here heavily handicapped.
When we call Germany " 7 " and Austria " 5| "
we are including great numbeis of men between
37 and 45, but where the Allies are concerned, it is
only the French co-efficient of 4 that suffers this
handicap. The British are necessarily exempt from
this iveahness because they are picking their men, and
the Russians can be exempt from it also because of
the very great numbers from whom they can also
choose. And the real weight of the Allies by the
time Russia and England have put into the field
every man they can put in, usefully equipped, will
be greater than their apparent numerical establish-
ment, because upon the whole Britnin and Russia
will be using younger armies. Numerically the
Allies should be at their actual maximum as 14 to
12^ against the enemy ; in fighting power they will
be much more like 16 to 12.
THE GERMAN MARGIN.
Now all this elaborate calculation is based, of
course, upon an ideal state of things in which the
losses of all parties would be exactly proportioned
to their original strength. But we know that .as a
matter of fact the losses have been much heavier
upon the side of the enemy so far than upon our
own. They have been a great deal heavier in killed
and wounded ; they appear to have been even
heavier in prisoners.
There is an unofficial but sober and highly
credible estimate, proceeding from Switzerland
and published by a newspaper which has been
singularly sober and careful and reliable throughout
this war (the Paris Temps), which sets the prisoners
in the hands of the enemy at about 5f hundred
thousand, and the German and Austrian prisoners
in the hands of the Allies at over 600,000.
But the first of these figures certainly includes
a great number of civilians, the latter hardly any.
The Germans assure us that they do not count the
vast numbers of civilians whom they have driven
into captivity in their lists of jjrisoners. But they
are not to be believed. German ofilcial information,
as has been repeatedly pointed out in these columns,
is sharply divided into two categories, iluch the
greater part of it is scrupulously, I had almost written
pedantically, exact. But the small amount which
is inexact can invariably be proved to be outrageous-
nonsense, and all the worse nonsense because it i»
often based upon a verbal quibble.* Thus, when
the Germans tell us that they do not count civilian
prisoners, they may be preparing to explain later
they do not call any man between 17 and 70 a
civilian. But, at any rate, to say that they are not
counting what we should call civilians as prisoners
is nonsense. We have had only this week an
example of the same kind of nonsense. The Russians
published the figures of 134,000 German prisoners
in their hands. Upon this the German official
communique protested that these figures were
swollen A\ith civilian prisoners ; and the protest
may have been justifiable enough, for the Russians
• Scarborough is an "armed port of war" — and later tliis means
that it liad Territorial soldiers in the neighbourhood. A '"decisive
victory " is won in Poland after the Falkland Island battle — _and later
tills is discovered to be a Russian retirement of 10 miles— not in action.
Peterkow is " stormed"— that is, occupied after the liuasian retire-
lucut. &c., &c.
10*
■January 9, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
have been able to intern a certain number of German
civilians who remained in Russia. But when the
official German communique goes on to say that
"The total number of German prisoners is not 13
per cent, of the Russian claim " it ia playing the
fool. That would mean that the total number of
Oerman prisoners in Russian hands was only
17,000 !
But (l) the Germans lost heavily in wounded
and retreated 2)recipitately before the first Russian
invasion of East Prussia. (2) When, after their
triumph at Tannenberg the Germans invaded in their
turn, they v/ere beaten back from the Niemen with
heavy loss and left heaps of wounded, particularly
upon the causeway of Suwalki. All that was
before the end of the summer. (3) In October
they brought up 200,000 men against Warsaw
alone ; were beaten, and retreated at the rate of
10 miles a day, suflering a series of heavy actions
as they fell back. (4) At the same time they fell
back from the middle Vistula with another 200,000,
fighting the whole time and necessarily losing
heavily in abandoned wounded. In every such
retirement after heavy action great numbers of
Tvounded men fall into the enemy's hands. (5) Con-
siderable bodies of them have passed the Bzura
between December 10th and 25 th and have been
thrust back across that sti'eam again leaving their
wounded. (6) In the prolonged action a month ago,
from Ilowo to Lodz, the whole district for 30 miles
behind the mouth of the trap in which they were
so nearly caught (that is, behind Glovno and
Strykov) was strewn with the wounded of the
whole Army Corps and with innumerable small
isolated bodies which surrendered. It is ridiculous
to suppose that in a series of fluctuating actions
of this kind the various retirements have not
abandoned at least 50,000 wounded men ; double
that number is far more probable, and there must
be many unwounded prisoners as well.
An estimate of 17,0C0 is one of those extra-
ordinary statements which, like the 15,000 British
drowned in the Yser, the fortified naval base of
Scarborough, and the denial of the siege guns in
front of Osowiec, leave every critic bewildered.
Something must be intended, some efiiect must
be expected, but what it is no one living out of the
German atmosphere can understand. And, I
repeat, these monstrosities are the more remarkable,
from the fact that they are embedded in a mass of
perfectly cold and reliable summaries. So much for
prisoners ; they are losing a little more rapidly than
we are.
We have already seen what the proportion of
casualties is in the much more serious category of
killed and wounded. We know that of the German
forces alone not quite four men have been hit to the
French one, although the German forces have never
been double the French. We know this, not from
induction, but fi-om official statistics published upon
both sides. We can confidently say that the recent
fighting in Poland, with its continued and unsuccess-
ful assaults in close formation, has been just as
murderous as the fighting in Flanders. What the
total German casualties to date may be we do not
know, but we shall know them soon, because the
German authorities are still careful to publish those
statistics.
V/hat is perhaps more important for us is the
German margin, and it can only be repeated here
what has been said so often in these columns and
what mere arithmetic should prove true, that this
margin is certainly not more than 2\ million men.
From 7 or at the most 1\ take 5, and 2 or the most
2J remains. It is much more likely to be under
two million than over. It can be enormously swelled
by using boys, slightly swelled by using old men ;
but the use of either of these categories of material
is worse than useless to an armed force, and only
accelerates its failure.
Mr. Belloc's nesfc lecture at Queen's Hall on the AVar will
be ou Wednesday, January 27th.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.— Thlt ArtleU hai been (nbrnttteil to tha Preii Bursan, wbteh daei not object to tbe pnbllcatlon at eeniored, tod taket at
reiponiibllity for tbe eorrectneii of the (tatementi.
THE MEDITERRANEAN.
AS usual, there is little to report. True, the
Austrian battleship Yiribus Unitis is reported
to hare been submarined in the engine-room, and
the report, though unofficial, has been more or
less confirmed, and ia probably quite correct.
Since, however, the Austrian Fleet is
steadily pursuing a policy of remaining in har-
bour, the disablement of a Dreadnought more or less cannot
materially affect results.
On the other hand, there are decided indications of a
remarkably smart piece of work on the part of the French
submarine ooucorned, if, as reported, she was attacked in
Pola Uarbour.
The Virlhus Unitis is the first Dreadnought to be sub-
marined, also the first ship to survive submarine attack.
Here, at any rate, is a vindication of the Dreadnought policy;
even though nearness to a dock may have contributed to the
battleship's survival.
The safety of a Dreadnought against submarine attack
lies in her bulk — she is too big for a sudden inrush of water
to have any immediate effect. Also, of course, she is con-
structed, with a view to surviving underwater attack, far
more thoroughly than were tlie ships of an earlier era, when
the torpedo was a much less dangerous weapon than it now is.
One ha« necessarily to write on imperfect information,
but, since all Dreadnoughts have some form of armoured
underwater protection, it would look as though tlie protec-
tion hitherto deemed sufficient has proved insufficient in prac-
tice, even against the comparatively mild torpedoes used bj
the French.
Here, incidentally, it may not be irrelevant to refer once
more to the circumstance that the German torpedoes appear
to carry a far more powerful and violent warhead than any
used by the Allies. Most or all of our ships which have been
submarined went down swiftly to the tune of a terrific explo-
sion: those of the enemy bagged by us have gone down in a
n*
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915.
more or less leisurely fashion. The inference is that Ger-
many is ahea3 of the rest of the -vporld in the matter of
high explosives.
The integral idea of all Dreadnought anti-torpedo pro-
tection consists of some internal armour on vital spots, and
solid bulkheads. To meet this an American naval officer
invented a torpedo which is practically an eight-inch gun
in miniature. On contact it does not explode in the ordinary
fashion, but instead discharges a high explosive shell into the
enemy's inside.
The idea is not exactly novel: because a good forty
years ago the Americans designed a ram called the Alarm, on
somewhat similar principles.
The idea failed because the Alarm had to attack under
fire, and because the ram proved itself at that period efficient
■without ulterior aid.
To-day, however, things have altered, and there is un-
doubtedly reason to imagine that the Germans have some
adaption of the American invention mentioned above.
THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
The most important event of the past week is un-
doubtedly the American Note. It is couched in very mild
and courteous language, and entirely devoid of anything
which could in any way be regarded as a threat. But it does
very clearly establish the possibility of a situation which I
discussed in one of the earliest of these articles.
In subsequent issues 1 have shown at some length how-
German attacks on British trade reacted on Germany in the
Pacific, owing to the fact that neutrals suffered as much as
we did, and how such results as they secured were nega-
tived accordingly.
Now, there is no question whatever that America is hit
by our interference with German trade. Not improbably
she is hit as badly as Germany is hit. I have not tlie space
necessary for a full consideration of details, but, in any case,
the broad issue is the only thing that really matters. And
this issue is that, just as in the American Civil War of fifty
years ago we suffered from the Federal Blockade of the
Southern States and individual British traders of ours sought
to recoup themselves with "blockade-runners," so, to-day, in-
dividual American traders seek to recoup themselves with a
modern and up-to-date form of blockade-running.
Here, however, the situation materially changes. In the
American Civil War cargoes had to be run in direct to
Charleston or elsev/here on the Confederate coast, and there
they were exchanged for cargoes of other goods, which had to
be run out again. In a word, it was all plain sailing.
In this war, however, there is no such thing as blockade-
running to German ports. Trade is generally consigned to
neutral ports, and all blockade-running takes place on land.
The net result of this is that the " right of search " on
the water is considerably negatived where value for money is'
concerned. Tho really acute " blockade-runner " is apt to
find a way round any rule of The Hague Convention; and
as a general rule we may take it that his operations do not
properly commence till his "contraband " is on the conti-
nent of Europe. To that extent, therefore, the naval " right
of search " is more or less farcical, or, at any rate, more
likely to inconvenience the honest American trader than the
American blockade-runner.
Further, it may be observed that we have an inalienable
right to ask Continental neutrals to prevent the smuggling of
contraband, and that in a general way our desires have been
conceded. They would be more easily conceded still perhaps
were our list of contraband reduced to the things that really
matter most — say, petrol, copper, rubber, and foodstuffs.
We have placed a ban on materials suitable for Zeppelin
envelopes. But could we prevent Germany from obtaining
petrol, we might well allow her to waste her money on silk of
which she could make no use I I am inclined to think that
there is a good deal of contraband which might be dispensed
with, without loss to us and with advantage to neutrals whose
"benevolent neutrality" would }ye very valuable.
Of one thing we may be certain. Germany does not con-
duct her elaborate and expensive Press campaigns in neutral
countries for the empty benefit of moral sympathy. She has
a clear eye to material benefits which may accrue from " bene-
Tolence."
We may do well, therefore, to follow her example; the
more so as we could easily abrogate for tliis war a great deal
of that "right of search" which, when first formulated, was
based on the idea of war between countries possessing ex-
tensive coastlines. The coastlines of both Germany and
Austria are so relatively small that much of the original idea
is correspondingly superfluous.
To this extent, therefore, the naval " right of search "
is obsolete; and, things being thus, we may do well to aban-
12*
don it so far as may be. We are not fighting for legal tradi-
tions, but for ordinary existence. And — so far as can be
gauged at present — things are such that the benevolence or
otherwise of neutrals will turn the scale in a very tight fight,
NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.
On January 1, about 2.30 a.m., during a gale in the
Channel, the old battlesliip Formidable was struck by a minQ
or torpedo. Accounts vary as to whether there were one or
two explosions. The ship sank in three-quarters of an hour,
only about twenty-five per cent, of her crew being saved.
In view of the weather conditions prevailing at the time,
a mine is more probably tlie cause than a submarine, though,
as our E9 torpedoed the Jlela in a considerable sea, the possi-
bility of submarine attack cannot be altogether disregarded.
If so, it represents very high technical skill on the part of
the enemy, plus a very considerable amount of luck, for the
Formidable must certainly have been encountered by acci-
dent, and also we have never yet heard of a night attack by
submarines.
A mine is consequently much more probable, especially
since during the recent heavy gales a good many must have
broken adrift. In tlie Russo-Japanese War the Japanese
cruiser Takasago was lost in almost identical circumstances,
and some time after the war had ceased one or two merchant
ships met disaster from mines which had broken adrift in
past gales and floated about ever since.
Theoretically, of course, a mine which breaks adrift
should automatically bccofto innocuous, but in actual prac-
tice there are bound to be one or two equivalents of the occa-
sional misfire which happens with a gun.
We may, 1 think, acquit the Germans of deliberately
having sown floating or drifting mines in the Channel and
North Sea. So far as the latter is concerned, the circum-
stance that their battle-cruisers came out for the East Coast
Raid seems conclusive evidence against any haphazard and
non-systematic mine sowing there; and since their submarines
have more than once been reported in the Channel, the same
thing would apply. A drifting mine is just as likely to be
hit by a friend as by a foe.
Along this lino of argument one must put the loss of the
Formidable into the same category as the loss of the Bulwark
— that is to say, pure chance and accident.
Some of my readers have conceived an impression that
infernal machines were introduced on board both vessels, but
this theory is untenable for at least two definite reasons. In
the first place, were deliberate internal destruction sought,
far more important fighting units would have been selected.
In the second place, the organisation of a British, or, for
that matter, any other man-of-war, is such that no matter the
will to do so, tlie accomplishment would not be possible. The
count against Germany in real crimes against civilisation ia
sTifEciently heavy to obviate any necessity for further
imaginary ones.
As for the Formidable liersclf, she was no loss to speak
of as a fighting unit. A good ship in her day, the Dread-
nought era rendered her obsolete before her time. The really
serious loss, as the Times naval correspondent has insisted, ia
in the matter of personnel, because while good soldiers can ba
made in a few months, it takes as many years to make a good
sailor.
Fortunately, we have a considerable supply of trained
men; but the supply is not inexhaustible, and wo are adding
sliips to the Navy more quickly than we are losing them, and
the new ships in all cases require larger crews than did the
old ones. Consequently, though the material loss of the
Formidable may be relatively insignificant, the loss in per-
sonnel is of the nature of a disaster, quite apart from the
ordinary ethical meaning of the word where human life isf
involved.
From January 5 to January 11 inclusive the Victoria Gallery, 123,
Victoria Street, is occupied by an exhibition of competitors' work in
the competition organised by Colour, the shilling monthly magazine
wliich ia doing good service in the furtherance and support of modern
Bi-itii:h and Continental art. The exhibition is extremely interesting,
representing as it does the efforts of nev/, and in many cases unknown,
aspirants to aHistic success; here and there crudity is evident in the
work shown, but there is sufficient of talent in many of the drawings
to command notice, and here and there one risay find work that passes
beyond mere talent. The judges of the competition include the lead-
ing British artists.
In War and the World's Life, of which Messrs. Smith, I'lder
and Co. have now issued a five-shilling edition, Colonel Maude follows
out the Clausewitz theory of war as a part of a nation's deve!opn:ent,
and shows clearly how Clausewit?,, Eernhardi, and the whole school
of German philosophers and n.itional guides went wrong in not
recognising t];at the furvival of the fittest meant the fitte.=;t in an
ethical sense. Although originally publislicd six years ago, the book
was! written with a view to such a situation as has arisen out of the
German thirst for dciiinrince, and embodies the sound, icosoned views
of a practical writer on the principal topic of the day.
January 9, 1915^
LAND AND WATEB
^"I^^^x^ 0 K^x^A Y
THE AIRSHIP IN NAVAL WARFARE.
A NEW FACTOR IN THE NORTH SEA OPERATIONS.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
FHOM the military poiat of view there are, broadly
speaking, two important qualities which the
modern airship possesses, but which the aero-
plane still lacks. Tliese two qualities are: —
(1) Capability of remaining stationary over any
given point.
(2) Ability to navigate at night for a consider-
able length of time.
On account of its capability to remain stationary, an air-
ship can observe, in detail, a constantly changing situation ;
the results of its observations can be transmitted, by means
of wireless telegraphy, to the Commander-in-Chief, and "con-
tact " with the eremy can thus be maintained. The aero-
plano, on the other hand, must travel in a circle, round and
round any particular spot over which it is desired to make
prolonged reconnaissance, and, in order to bring back to
Headquarters the information it has obtained, it must lose
"contact" with the "situation."
The range of the wireless apparatus of a modern Zeppelin
being about 150 miles, and the speed of a military aeroplane
being about seventy miles an hour, it follows that a message
sent from the airship would reach its destination much earlier
than it it were carried by an aeroplane.
It would seem, therefore, that, so long as no flpng
machine exists which can remain stationary over a predeter-
mined point and transmit by wireless telegraphy the result of
its observations to Headquarters, there is a part that it cannot
fulfil, but which can be fulfilled by the airship. In the pr^
sent war, so far as land operations are concerned, the Zeppelin
has been unable to perform that important function ic aerial
operations for two reasons. Firstly, the anti-aircraft guns
of the Allies would not allow it to come sufficiently low to
make detailed observations; and, secondly, in maintaining a
stationary position, ii would be a relatively easy prey to the
quick and small aeroplane.
On the open sea, however, these two dangers, which, on
land, would threaten a Zeppelin engaged in carrying out de-
tailed tactical observations, would not exist to any important
degree. Whereas, on land, an anti-aircraft gun can be placed
almost anywhere, on the high sea it must be placed on a
ship, which would be visible from the dirigible. And, on
account of its greater radius of action, an airship could, with
ease, carry out observations from a position that can, only
with great risks, be reached by an aeroplane. This point
can be illustrated by actual figures.
SOME AIRSHIP AND AEROPLANE
RECORDS.
The greatest distance flown over sea is that traversed by the
Norwegian airman. Gran. On July 30, 191?, he flew in a
monoplane, from Cruden Bay, in Scotland, to Kleppe, in Nor-
way, thus covering a distance of 320 miles« Over land,
13»
LAND AND WATEK
January 9, 1915.
bo'wever, a distance of 487 miles was flown by tte Italian air-
man, Deroye, on July 17, 1913, this being the record, up to
date, of a non-stop flight in a straight line. We can thus,
until any further record is established, assume that no existing
Aeroplane can, with a rea-sonable margin of safety, undertake
« flight over the sea of a distance greater than 400 miles.
The conclusion is, therefore, that, for the present, the radius
of action of an aeroplane flying oyer the sea is about 200 miles.
If we now examine some airship records, we find that
the French airship, Adjudant-Vingenot, left its shed at Toul
on June 20, 1914, and made a non-stop voyage in a circuit,
passing over Toul, Oommercy, Verdun, Sedan, Mesieres,
Maiubeuge, Oompi^gne, Paris, Versailles, Paris, Meaux,
Chalons, Vouziei'a, Montmedy^ Longuyon, Nancy, Neuf-
chateau, MLrecourt, Oommercy, Toul, thus showing that, for
a considerable part of its journey, it must have travelled with
the wind.
On that voyage, which lasted 35hr. 20min., the airship
carried a, crew of eight, besides Captain Joux, who was in
conunand. This performance of the Adjudant-Vincenoi is
the record for duration in a " closed circuit " voyage, that
is, one in which the airship eventually returns to its start-
ing-point. Recently the Zeppelin L.Z.24 remained in the air
for 34hr. and 59 min., travelling in varioiis directions over
Germany. It did not, however, make a " closed circuit," for
it started its voyage at Friedrichshafen and ended it at Johan-
nistal.
RADIUS OF ACTION OF THE
ZEPPELIN.
In examining duration records, it is important to bear in
mind the fact that the sustentation of an airship, or its
power to remain aloft, is independent of its propulsion. It
is, therefore, possible for the airship to remain aloft without
the working of its motor, or motors, thus economising fuel
whenever it is possible. The aeroplane, however, has to work
its engine during the whole of its flight, for, without propul-
sion of its own, it has no sustentation. Therefore, it follows
that in establishing duration records, an airship may take
advantage of the wind to go from one place to another; so
that a duration record of this type of aircraft is evidently
considerably greater than the length of time of its possible
navigation under full power. Also, when concerned solely in
the establishment of a duration record, the airship has not
on board a full crew, as would be necessary for prolonged mili-
tary observations, nor has it a supply of projectiles and of
ammunition. Under such conditions a greater amount of fuel
can be carried than would be possible when the airship is out
for a military cruise. In these circumstances it can be as-
sumed, with a fair degree of accuracy, that the probable dura-
tion of an airship voyage under full power is, at present, about
one-third of the record times already mentioned, that is, one
of about twelve hours. A Zeppelin, having a speed of fifty
miles per hour, would thus be able to travel, under war con-
ditions, a distance of about 12 x 50 = 600 miles. Conse-
quently its radius of action would be about 300 miles. That
of the aeroplane is, as already shown, only 200 miles. The
importance of these figures, and of the airship's possible in-
fluence on the North Sea operations, will be readily grasped
if reference be made to the sketch-map on the previous page.
THE ZEPPELIN IN THE NORTH SEA.
The Island of Heligoland, off the coast of Germany, L»
not only a naval base, but also the most up-to-date Zeppelin
station. From it a modern Zeppelin can undertake cruises of
considerable length over the North Sea, and can survey the
greater part of that portion of the Atlantic Ocean. Indeed,
an airship, having a radius of action of 300 miles, can travel
from Heligoland to any point bounded by the arc, Z, Z, Z.
From any position on that arc, Z, Z, Z, a Zeppelin, at a.
height of, say, 4, 000ft., could, in fine weather, make observa-
tions over a further distance of twenty-five miles, so that,
although the range of action of a Zeppelin from Heligoland
would be limited by the arc, Z, Z, Z, its range of observation
would extend up to the arc, 0, O, 0. The section-lined area,
contained by the arcs, 0, O, O and Z, Z, Z, is a belt which,
under normal conditions of wind and weather, would be be-
yond the radius of action of a Zeppelin, but over which it
would be able to keep watch. Zeppelins, stationed at Heligo-
land, could, therefore, observe over the thousands of square
miles of sea area which lie between the arc, O, 0, 0, and the
coast of Continental Europe.
Observation, carried out by the Zeppelin over the North
Sea, could not be sent by wireless telegraphy unless the air-
ship were within the cross section-lined area, bounded by the-
arc, W, W, W, and the mainland of Europe. The radius
of the arc, W, W, W, is 150 miles, which is the range of th&
wireless telegraphy apparatus fitted on a modern Zeppelin.
If a Zeppelin, therefore, has made an observation beyond ISC'
miles from Heligoland, it would have to return to within tliat
range before it could send its wireless message. This is an
important point to remember in dealing with the new factor
which has been introduced into np.val warfare by the advent
of aircraft, for it shows that it is only within the arc,
W, W, W, that a Zeppelin can maintain contact with its ad-
versaries and Headquarters.
If we now examine the radius of action of the aeroplane
from various points of the English coast, we shall see that,
with an aviation base near Sheerness, observations can be
carried out within the area contained by the arc. A, A, A.
From a point near Cromer aeroplanes can scout the sea are*
within the arc, B, B, B. With Scarborough as centre, obser-
vationg, by means of aeroplanes, can be carried out within
the arc, C, C, 0, and, from a point near Peterhead, aero-
planes can make observations within the arc, D, D, D.
Of all the various circles that can be described with a.
radius of 200 miles about a centre lying on the English co.ist,
the one drawn from a point near Cromer cuts the greatest
area of the Zeppelin wireless zone. This is useful to note.
Another point of practical importance is that there is a
zone in the north-east of the North Sea which can bo scouted
by means of Zeppelins stationed at Heligoland, but which
cannot be reached Ly aeroplane from the British coast. Th.at
zone is denoted by dotted lines in the sketch.
THE LOSS OF THE "FORMIDABLE."
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).
THE heavy loss of trained and most highly effective
seamen, which seems to form an inevitable feature
of the sinking of any of our warships, simply
compels one to ask the question, whether, in fact,
all means of keeping our fighting vessels afloat
after submarine attack, in any of its forms, have
been considered, and put through a fair and conclusive trial.
I make no apology for venturing outside the usual
limitations of my articles, for the subject has interested me
for years, and as an officer of the Royal Engineers, a corps
formerly entrusted with the business of submarine coast de-
fence, it was part of my duty to make myself thoroughly
familiar with the problems involved in modern battleship
building, and in particular to follow all the records of ex-
periments made with submarine mines against such vessels
which from time to time the Admiralty placed at our dis-
posal. The Oberon and the Resistance arc the first two whose
names recur to me.
I saw SOOlbs'. gun-cotton mines exploded under them at
different times, afterwards studying their effect in dry dock,
and 1 was as convinced then as I am now that even that
charge should not necessarily send a ship (sucli as we were
then building) to the bottom, or such as we have since built,
unless the mine happens to explode the ship's magazine, as it
would appear does occasionally happen, though tbeory is quite
powerless to explain the how or why of this occurrence. But
service in India called me away, and it was only after tjie
Japanese War that I approached Sir William While, who had
just retired from the Admiralty, and discussed iiiy scheme
with him. Unfortunately, we differed fundanieiitally on
facts of which I had been an eye-witness and lie had not ^ce)!,
and again, since the matter was not one in Aviiich I was.
directly concerned, 1 allowed my patent to l.ipse, and re-
solved to stick to my own last.
My idea was exceedingly simple, and can he tested by
anyone who will try to force an empty biscuit tin, mouth
downwards, in his bath — when the resistance he will encmni-
ter will astonish him.
It was not applicable for mci'chant steameis, because, r.s
a rule, it is uneconomical to subdivide tliem by a horizontal
plane, which interferes with the facility of leading and un-
loading cargo. But all our warships, from small protected
cruisers upwards, are so subdivided by tho armour plr.to
turtle-deok running right through them fronr bow to stern,
and beneath which all the engines, boilers', magazines, etc.,
are always placed. This turtle-deck is pierced with hatch-
14*
January 9, 1915.
;and and water
irays sufficient for the service of the ship, which can be closed
down whenever it is necessary to use forced draught. This
means filling the space below the deck with compressed air at
a pressure of three or four inches of water, say a couple of
ounces only to the square inch.
Now, considering a vessel with a turtle-deok and a big
bole rent in her bottom (as large as you please), it is clear
that we have a somewhat distorted case of the old "diving-
bell," familiar in every textbook of physics for the last cen-
tury at least, in which the persons in the bell are kept dry
by pumping in compressed air as the bell descends — the pres-
sure of air inside being kept equal to the weight of the head
of water outside.
This " diving-bell " idea is in daily use all over the
world by civil engineers for getting in deep water founda-
tions, making tunnels under river beds', etc., and this at
depths far greater than anything required even in our big-
gest battleship — in which a pressure of one atmosphere only
would be required to counterbalance the weight of a thirty-
foot column of water outside. At this depth men feel little,
if any, discomfort, and can work for fairly long spells. All
that is required to fit out a cruiser or a battleship in this
manner is the provision of what are called " pneumatic
locks " at the hatchways to enable the men to get in and put
to their duties.
Now, to the best of my recollection, the rock on which
Sir William White and I split was briefly this:
He contended that if a ship was struck by a mine fairly,
the shock would be so great that the vessel would break up
structurally, and therefore the safeguard I proposed would
not be worth employing; I maintained that neither the Re-
sistance nor the Oberon^ nor, in fact, any fighting ship of
which I had ever heard, had been damaged structurally to
this extent, even by 5001b. charges of gun-cotton, which was
double the charge usually employed in torpedoes or contact
mines. So far the experiences of this war and the Japanese
have proved that I was right on this point, for except when
the 7)iagazine has been exploded, all ships, even merchantmen
of quite moderate tonnage, have floated quite a reasonable
time, thus demonstrating that the structural damage has been
small.
What I believe is now required is for a committee of in-
fluential civil engineers and civilian naval architects to take
up the question, and to extort from the Admiralty a definite
reasoned statement of such experiments as have been made
in this direction, and why or in what point they failed.
There may be some obscure reason connected with the
•working of the ship to justify the neglect of such experiments
— but against this I noticed that the Annual Report of the
U.S. Naval Department a few years ago stated that experi-
ments with compressed air had given satisfactory results.
But even if tho " pneumatic lock " difficulty is really th«
<5rux of the case, and reconstruction of older types is out of
the question, there seems no reason why we should not give an
extra five-feet depth to the double bottom, which is, or can
be, structurally isolated from the hold of the ship, and then
keep this permanently full of compressed air. It would be
equally effective in keeping out the water.
At any rate, it seems to me only right that in such an
important matter the country should be informed in a man-
ner intelligible to competent civil engineers, who know all
about the use of compressed air, whether full and conclusive
experiments have been made, and why they have led to no re-
sults. I know that a few years ago a great many naval officers
fully shared my view of the matter.
I should like to take tbis opportunity of acknowledging
the many valuable letters I have received from readers of this
paper, and to apologise for my failure to answer all of them —
pressure of work being my only excuse. I may add that, with
exceedingly few exceptions, the suggestions these letters con-
tain are not new, and for the most part are already in the
Service or about to be adopted, if the campaign lasts long
enou.sh.
GORP.ESPONDENCE.
TO DESTROY SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of La«d and Water.
Sia, — I have been struck with the many brilliant sug-
gestions towards helping on tho work of the Allies ashore and
afloat, but I have thought of two other plans wliich, as an
armchair critic, seem to me feasible, and which I have not
yet seen in print: —
Wliy not acquire the three or four motor-boats,
* Maple Leaf," " Despujols I. and II. ,° etc., which havedone
■over fifty miles an hour? In calm weather, such as the Cux-
baven attack enjoyed, they would be invaluable for locating
and destroying the periscopes of tho submarines. As they
•^nly draw about eighteen inch&s of water, no torpedo could
touch them. In speed no submarine or destroj'er could catch
them, and being such small marks, they would be nearly im-
possible to hit at the pace at which they could travel.
Each might have a small quiokfirer to destroy periscopes.
In fact they could easily come alongside and break or destroy
the latter by pulling an oil drum or something of the kind over
them.
Another suggestion occurred to me on reading the
account some weeks ago of a submarine which got caught in
a fishing net, and had to come to the surface to get disen-
tangled. There are miles and miles of old nets in all our fish-
ing villages, and these could be put ontside of the harbour
to be attacked by our fleet, and on the enemy's submarines
coming out they would be immediately caught by them, and
would have to come to the surface at a place of which the
Allies would hav« already got the range. The nets could
be sunk to any depth, and woiild make an almost impene-
trable wall, Bs they would effectively stop the propellers of
the submarines, in which they wquld get twisted up ; and
anyone who has done any fishing in a propeller-driven boat
knows how difficult it is to get even a single fishing line fi-ee
when caught in a propeller.
I offer these two suggestions for what they are worth. —
I am, dear sir, yours faithfully,
Dungarvan Club, co. Waterford. Robert T. LouaAN.
A BULLET TO DESTROY ZEPPELINS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Your correspondent, Mr. D. S. Macnair, suggests
that as it is accepted that the ordinary rifle bullet would be
useless to destroy Zeppelins, it should be an easy matter " to
design a hollow bullet containing a charge of some pyro-
technic composition which would ignite when the rifle is
fired."
Permit me to point out that such a bullet has been de-
signed recently by Mr. Charles E. Dawson, of Uckfield (whom
I may mention, incidentally, is the discoverer of the famous
Piltdown skull). The following do-
ecription of the bullet and tho accom-
panying design appeared in a recent
issue of the Sussex County Herald: —
" An ordinary bullet is bored at
tiie apex to form a cavity, which is
filled with phosphorus and a small
portion is allowed to project beyond the
apex of the bullet. On discharge the
phosphorus is heated, and it flames, or
is predisposed to flame, on coming into
the slightest contact with another body.
Thus on coming in contact with an
airship it would immediately ignite
the gas, and the machine would be
destroyed. An ordinary bullet would,
of courw, merely penetrate the en-
velope without doing further damage.
" Mr. Dawson's bullets are in-
tended merely for the destruction of
airships, and when not in use must
be kept under water to preserve the
phosphorus. The smallness of their
size is an advantage over the shells,
which may destroy buildings. The
bullets must be used with care and not
for ordinary uses, as considerable
damage by fire might be done." —
Yours faithfully. Arthur Beckett.
"MORAL" AND "MORALE."
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — With all deference to Mr. Belloo, the reason why
we spell (or used to spell) " morale " with a final e is not far
to seek. We borrowed tho word from the French in tho
eighteenth century, and in French, as everyone knows, it is
spelt moral, but we already had the word " moral," which ii
an adjective, and is pronqunced with the stress on the first
tyllable : the word which we borrowed is a substantive, and
(as we pronounce it) has the stress on the second syllable, so
we gave it a final e, partly in order to distinguish it from the
adjective "moral," and partly to indicate the difierence in
pronunciation. The spelling morale was universal from tho
eighteenth century until quite recently, but unfortunately a
year or two ago some wiseaore discovered that the French
word is moral, and so now we think we ought to alter a time-
honoured spelling in order to shew that we know the origin
of the word. If Mr. Wiseaore is logical, he will suggest that
we ought to write " soverain " instead of "sovereign," and
" naif " instead of " naive." — Your obedient servant,
Charles Sweet.
15»
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 1915.
UNDER THE GRACIOUS PATRONAGE OP
H.M. QUEEN ALEXANDRA
AND
HJI.H. PRINCESS ARTHUR OF CONNAUGHT,
CITY OF LONDON
RUSSIAN CAVALRY AMBULANCE PRESENTATION.
to be covered from the actual fighting line to the base hos-
pitals conditions which did not exist during former -wars, put
every army in the greatest difficulty in regard to the trans-
portation of the wounded.
"Almost all the frontier railways in Western Poland have
been destroyed by the invaders, and for the most part com-
munication by motor oars is reserved for concentration pur-
poses. This involves the Red Cross in great difficulties in
increasing the number of motor-ambulances', for there are
not enough motor-cars in Russia, although the number in
war service is so gigantic, fully to supply this purpose also.
Every special motor ambulance would, therefore, be of the
greatest help to the Russian army, and especially to the Rus-
sian cavalry.
" I know what it is after being wounded to be carried
by a horse-drawn ambulance for ten hours, and I can realise
keenly by my own experience how splendid is the idea to
help the Russian cavalry. How many thousands of poor
suffering Russian soldiers would have benefited by such am-
bulances, how many would have been drawn from the pitiless
arms of death, and how great will be their thankfulness to
those who inaugurated stich a humane idea and helped to
realise it 1 "
The gift of ambulances, which is under the patronage
of H.M. Queen Alexandra, will be made direct to Her Imperial
Majesty the Empress of Russia, as Head of the Russian Red
Cross. They will be in units of not less than ton ambulances
each, the first of which it is' hoped will be shipped complete
in January. Further units will follow, making the presen-
tation worthy of the City of London, and of the cause to
which they are dedicated.
In thus giving expression to the friendship and gratitude
of the English nation towards Russia, the City of London
follows ancient precedent. Of late years, under the auspices
of our own Foreign Office, intercourse and commerce between
England and Russia have immensely increased. To-day,
throughout the vast Russian domains, comprising one-sixth of
the habitable globe, the name of Englishman is everywhere
honoured, and his better acquaintance is eagerly sought. Not
the least of the beneficent consequences which will result from
such a gift, made at such a crisis, will be the increase of our
national prestige and of our friendly and commercial rela-
tions with this great country.
The committee, therefore, feel justified in approaching
with confidence those who have interests, direct or indirect, in
Russia, or in the numerous Russian affairs that centre in the
City of London.
The estimated cost of each unit of ten cars, with acces-
sories and maintenance for three months, is £6,D00. The
services of the drivers arc voluntary.
Besides cash contributions, the Committee will gratefully
consider offers of motor-car chassis suitable for fitting to am-
bulance bodies, as well as for offers of voluntary serviee .-is
drivers. Arrangements have been made for the publication
of the subscription lists in Russia.
This is the only fund being raised specifically by the City
of London.
All cheques should be made payable to the hon. organising
secretary, Mr. W. E. W. Hall, 33, St. Swithin's Lane, Lon-
don, E.C.
Thb Mansion House,
New Yeab's Day, 1915.
Russia is losing thousands of men daily through want of
proper motor ambulance transports.
Do we Britons realise what Russia is doing for her Allies?
Russia has not the facilities for the manufacture, or the
possibility of obtaining motor vehicles such as England,
France and other European countries possess.
As a comparison, Britain's cavalry losses are extensive
enough on a fighting line of about 40 miles in extent; imagine
what Russia's are, with imperfect communication, on a front
extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea, a distance of
nearly 1,200 miles.
The object that this committee has in view is to show
England's appreciation of these facts and to remedy as far
as lies in their power this most trying position.
It is, to-day, superfluous to point out the vital assistance
which Russia is giving the Allies. Without the pressure
which her magnificent forces are constantly exerting on the
German-Austrian armies, the redemption of Belgium would
be indefinitely postponed, and we in England would not feel
the present increasing confidence that the final victory will
lie with our troops.
But while Russia's resources are potentially unlimited,
her powers of immediately equipping the mas.ses of fighting
men she is pouring forward are greatly handicapped. The
territory where the fiercest fighting is taking place had, even
before its devastation by the Germans, comparatively few rail-
ways or roads affording quick transport. The brunt of the
hardship which these conditions impose on wounded Russian
troops falls most severely on the cavalry, which number more
than the combined cavalry of all the other Allies, and to whore
brilliant operations the successes of Russian arms have been
largely due.
In the Carpathians and in Poland the Russian Cavalry
operates on a front often fifty miles away from a base, cover-
ing the flanks of the army and screening its advance. The
case of the wounded Russian cavalryman, however, is best
stated by Lieut. -Col. Roustam Bek, in the Daily Express, who
writes with an intimate knowledge of his subject:
" The situation of wounded cavalrymen at present is
terrible. The troopers are obliged to undergo many tortures
while being carried on horseback or in horse-drawn ambu-
lances for many hours or days until they reach the field hos-
pitals. Many of them are dying when they reach these
refuges, being unable to withstand this terrible journey. If
they could have been brought in a shorter time to the hos-
pital their lives could, in many cases, perhaps in the
majority, have been saved.
" In general, the Russian ambulance equipment is not
inferior to that of other countries. It can, however, easily
be understood that in the presence of such an enormous num-
ber of casaulties as have been recorded during the present
war, as well as in regard to the great distances which have
THE
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BACK COPrES of " LAND AND WATER," containing the
series of Articles by HILAIRE BEILOC, "THE WAR BY
LAND"; and FRED T. JANE, "THE WAR BY WATER,"
together with a valuable reference, "THE TOPOQRAPHICAL
QUIDE," can be obtained through any Newsagent, or on
application to the Offices of "LAND AND WATEK," Ciwthai,
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Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on " The World's War by Land and Water " will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this remarkable serirs
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is, 6d. each.
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January 9, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
Aiding the wounded
Never in history has better or more skilful at-
tention been given to the wounded than during
the present great war, and the petrol - driven
motor ambulance and hospital have given
invaluable aid in the great work of mercy.
Throughout the war-swept area red-cross
conveyances of the allied forces are run upon
SHELL
MOTOR SPIRIT
and can therefore be thoroughly depended
upon. It is well to remember when pur-
chasing petrol to say ' Shell ' and insist upon it.
It is supplied for all the services of the allied
forces only and is obtainable everywhere.
LAND AND WATER
January 9, 191 5
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
The Trend of the Times
A' ' CE in Wonderland's " Duchess would have been
in her element nowadays, for numerous are the
morals to be drawn and many the people who
draw them. Moralising, indeed, is like nothing
so much as an infectious disease, so fatally easy
is it to catch the habit. It was, perhaps, but to be expected
that Christmas should give the moraliser a rare opportunity.
The contrast between the season of peace and good will and
the greatest war in history was obvious, but not too obvious
to form the te.xt for many a theme. Now and again these
sayings grated, yet once in a while they rang true and well,
either giving us new thoughts, or crystallising those vaguely
felt but as yet unexpressed. But if Christmas be allowed as
a moralising season for the moraliser let not the same hold
good where the New Year is concerned. There will be
plenty of time to morahse when the war is ended ; at the
present there is too much call for acti\c work to permit of
such an indulgence.
So much is happening besides, where the very idea of
moralising is nothing short of an impertinence. The
platitudes of conventional sympathy have rightly seemed
inadequate in many scores of cases where the hand of the
war has pressed heavily. And the same, in a lesser degree,
holds good about those whose nearest and dearest are still
forming part of the fighting line. The would-be comforting
remark is sometimes apt to lean towards the sententious and
thereby miss its aim. The simpler the sympathy given the
more we can be sure it will be valued, and if it can be expressed
in deeds, witliout a single spoken word, so much the better.
The Inside of a Week
Rumour, for once, has proved herself to be anything but
the lying jade of her reputation. Some weeks ago a whisper
went round of Lord Kitchener's intention to give leave of
absence from the front to our fighting men in France, and
experience has shown this correct. Soldiers, many of whom
have been in the war area ever since August, have been home
for a brief four days, and in scores of happy instances took
the family circle by surprise. It would be easy enough to
draw poignant pen pictures of these reunions, but any of
that which came beneath my more immediate notice
would most assuredly be exaggerated. And this for the very
simple reason that neither husband nor wife dared to let
themselves go. Tlie end of the short four days and its
inevitable parting loomed too near. Any breakdown, any
painful scenes, had to be avoided at all costs, and avoided
they were until the final good-bye had been said and the
little wife could drop her mask of iron self-control.
She told me that this parting was infinitely worse to
bear than the first one, and this is easy to understand. There
are no illusions left now about the sheer horror of this war,
and the weeks of scanning the casualty lists and fearing a
dread telegram from the War Office have had their effect
upon the strongest nerves. Women who said good-bye to
their husbands and sons when the Expeditionary Force first
sailed for France had a sad enough parting, indeed, but
there was a merciful veil of ignorance over all the campaign
would mean. Now they know well enough the grimness of
the task set, and much else upon which it is wiser not to
dwell. So all that remains for the women left behind is to
keep busy — so busy that for thinking there is but little time,
and for nerve-racking worry still less.
Erica.
Bi'RBERRYs' annual haU-price sale commenced January i and is
still running, A large section of the vast basement and first floor of
their palatial showrooms in the Haymarket arc entirely devoted to
this sale. To the usual attractions afforded by the well-known quality
of goods disposed of, must this year be added an immense assortment
of men's suits from their completed suit department. .\n illustrated
catalogue of the sale, including both men's and women's dress, will be
forwarded, post free, on receipt of a post card, by Burberrys, Hay-
market, London, S.W.
How much money do
you WASTE on
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BARRS
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202
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXIV. No. 2749 SATURDAY. JANUARY 16, 1915 [^iTI^^^prpEi!] l^^^if.ll^^^A'L^
CopyrtfiUf Lt^aytutt Ituoitn
THE EARL OF DERBY, K.G.
Who has been working indefaligably and has given much valuable assistance as a speaker
in the present recruiting campaign. He had conferred on him the distinction of the
Order of the Garter as a New Year's honour.
LAND AND WATER
January i6, 191 ^
More letters showing
how 0x0 is valued
at the Front
The reviving, strength-giving power of OXO has
received remarkable endorsement in the great war.
It is invaluable for all who have to undergo exertion,
either to promote fitness or to recuperate after fatigue.
0X0 aids and increases nutrition ; it stimulates and
builds up strength to resist climatic changes ; it is
exactly suited to the needs of our men at the front, and
in training, as well as for general use in the home.
From a member of the London
Scottiih w!th the British Expe-
ditionary Force.
And so after all these horrors
here I am living in a cow byre
some way away from the firing line
to recuperate. Lilie manna, how-
ever, yourgloriousboxhasarrived,
coffee and milk, butter, Brand's
Essence, OXO — oh joy ! Never
was seen a more glorious box, and
all my cow byre is interested in it.
We start to-night on our feast, and
1 am to thank you both from all
my section for being so generous.
Reprinted from the "Globe,"
Dec. 12th, 1914. >
A gentleman has sent us a letter
from his son in the Army Service
Corps in which he cays : —
I must tell you how delighted I
was to get the OXO. It is great.
You should have seen us preparing
it. We made a wood fire by the
roadside, and boiled the water in
an empty petrol can — enough for
three of us. The OXO was made
in my dixie can, in which we soaked
some biscuits. We then placed
the can on the fire to boil ; all the
time it was raining hard, but we
were repaid by the satisfaction vie
got for our efforts.
I shall be very pleased to get
some more when you are sending
again, as a good cup of OXO
before we turn in at night con-
siderably warms us up.
From an A.B. on H.M.S. " Landritil."
In my opinion there is no better gift anyone could make
to our bluejackets, especially at a time like this, and when the
nights (and days) are so nippy as they are at present.
Personally I think OXO is worth its weight in gold,
0x0 is made in a moment and,
witli bread or a few biscuits,
sustains for hours
■«^v
BY APPOINTMENT.
THE "X" TYRE
Most motorists will have noted the renewal of attacks
on the "X" (or Dunlop) tyre made in the general
and motor press by a foreign tyre manufacturer. By an
inaccurate comparison an attempt is made to show
that his own tyres are superior to Dunlop tyres costing
25 per cent. more.
j] manufacturer ivlio is reduced to such a pass
cannot have much confidence in his own goods.
DUNLOP
tyres, on the other hand, sell on their own merits alone, ana
have from the very first been advertised in accordance with the
British standard of fair play and good taste.
In relation to the service they give, the prices are lower than any
other, and that those prices are accepted and endorsed by the
public is proved by the fact that since the first Dunlop motor
tyre was made the demand has always exceeded the supply.
The Dunlop Rubber Co., Ltd., Founders throughout the World
of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry, Aston Cross, Birmingham ;
14 Regent Street, London, S.W. PARIS: 4 Rue du Colonel Moll.
DUNLOP SOLID TYRES FOR HEAVY COMMERCIAL VEHICLES
Country Ltie
Smoking Mixture
Tnis JeUghtiul combination of ttie Beat
Tobaccos la iold in two itrcngtki
IMILD anJ MEDIUM
5
D.
|>er ounce
1/8
|>er
i-lt. tin
PS8
N.B. "Country Life i( t>acKca only
in original f"^'"^* <"><^ t*'>' ^y ^^
Nlanutacturerg :
JOHN PLAYER 6; SONS. NottlngU
The Imperial Tobacco Co. {of Gt. Britain & Ireland), Ltd.
212
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY LAND
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.— Tbit Article bit been inbmltted to the Preii Bareai, which doti not object to the pabllcitlon •• ceniored and takct no
rtipoaiibiUt; for the correetseii «f the itttemcBti.
In accordance with the reqnirementi of the Preii Bnrean, the positioni of troopi en Plani iUaitratlng tbii Article antt only b*
regarded ai approximate, and no definite itren;th at an; point ii Indicated.
A NOTE ON THE NATURE OF A
BLOCKADE.
I THINK it has been pointed out in these com-
ments that the essentials of a siege are that
the operations of the hesieged force are confined
to a restricted area by the action of the
besieging forces ; so that it is the object of the
besieged to force their way out and of the besiegers
both to prevent the besieged from forcing their way
out, and gradually to contract the area within which
the besieged are restricted in their operation.
Subject to this definition, the present phase of
the war may be acciu-ately described as the siege
upon an enormous scale of the Germanic powens.
A condition commonly but not necessarily
accompanying a siege is that called the blockade.
The essential of a blockade is that you prevent the
means of livelihood from reaching the besieged,
and also, of course, but as a secondary matter,
the opportunity through munitions of continuing
theii' resistance in arms.
You may have a siege without a blockade, as
when an armed force is so restricted that it
cannot break out and yet still possesses avenues
of supply, or is permitted some forms of supply
for political, religious, or other reasons by the
besiegers. But you could hardly have a blockade
without a siege, because no armed force would
permit itself to be starved if it were able to cut
its way out.
Now the present siege of the Germanics is
remarkable for the fact that it a true siege accom-
panied by a very imperfect blockade. The German
and Austrian armies have tried very hard indeed to
force their way out through the lines that contain
them in France and Belgium and Alsace, to master
Servia and get away out in that fashion, to break
through the Russian lines in the East. They have
hitherto failed in all these attempts. But in the
blockade which should accompany such measures
the besiegers have shown no consistent military
policy.
I do not say that the besiegers have not shown
a consistent moral or political policy : I only say
that they have shown no consistent military policy.
If you desire to reduce your enemy by blockade
you prevent his getting anything whatsoever of
which he stands in need. The Romans in front of
Jerusalem, for instance, or the Germans in front of
Paris in 1870, did not say, "We will prevent arms
getting through but we will allow food," or, " We
will prevent the food for soldiers going in, but we
will allow food for civilians." If they had adopted
such a policy they might just as well not have had
a blockade at all.
If the German Empire had the luck to cripple
the British fleet and its lesser allies, it would
establish a blockade with these islands. It would
not allow cotton to go through and thus keep
Lancashire in employment, while forbidding rubber
to go throvigh, or copper, because these two articles
were supposed to be of special military value. It
would allow nothing to go through, for its aim
would be the reduction of the blockaded party.
Now the blockade of Germany and Austria-
Hungary cannot be absolute because hundreds of
miles of frontier everywhere march with neutral
powers, and the native products at least of those
neutral Powers can reach the enemy at will. It
may not even be possible to prevent a certain
leakage from without through the agency of
private individuals living in neutral territory who
buy ostensibly for neutral purposes but secretly
sell again to the enemy.
But there is a broad distinction between pre-
venting all you possibly can from getting in and
deliberately allowing whole categories of goods to
come in, and even failing to do your best to prevent
the entry of such categories as you have selected
for contraband.
If you do not prevent everything you possibly
can prevent from going into the blockaded area,
then your blockade is imperfect and wiU almost
certainly fail. You may have excellent moral,
religious or political reasons for thus running the
risk of losing the war ; but you can have no military
reason. As a military operation, to allow cotton,
let us say, to go into Germany, and to forbid copper,
is meaningless. What you are fighting is the whole
nation \yith all its resources, economic and social,
and inasmuch as you allow those resources to be fed,
by so much do you increase the chances of the
enemy's winning and of your losing, and by so much
do you kiU and wound your o\N'n soldiers, deplete
your own wealth and prolong the duration of
hostilities.
It is a matter upon which there can be no two
opinions, and one upon which it is singular enough
that there should be any confusion of thought.
Especially is a blockade imperfect when it
allows matter which the blockaded country cannot
get at all, save from outside, to go through, and yet
sticks at matter which the blockaded country can,
to some extent, find for itself When, for instance,
it allows cotton to go through and wastes energy
upon preventing copper going through ; or when it
allows cocoa to go through and is anxious to prevent
nitrates.
There are four cau.ses, and four only, which may
operate upon the government of the blockading
nation to make the blockade of its enemy imperfect :
(l) Religion : as when it would be thought
impious to prevent certain sacred objects, or certain
men in discharge of a sacred office, from passing
through the blockading lines. This objection is
absolute, but it has to-day, I believe, little weight.
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 1915.
(2) Moral : that Is when the various parties to
a combat are agreed upon certain things as human
and to be tolerated ujion either side. Thus it
mif>lit be thought inhuman to cut off water supply
and yet tolerable to cut off food. The test in this
case is whether the enemy would be willing to
apply the same test as you apply to him. The
morals differ from religion in this, that they are
matters of contract and of reason.
(3) A greater military advantage to be ob-
tained : as when you propose to bring in as your
ally later on (or, what is the same thing, to prevent
his fighting against you) someone whose supply of
goods to the enemy in a staple matter of trade is
vital to him ; or when you yourself need such
supply and fear its being cut off from yourself, if
you offend the neutral by closing the enemy's
market, and when the advantage so aimed at is
greater than the disadvantage immediately suffered.
(4) A private interest : as when merchants
becoming wealthy by export to the enemy, direct or
indirect, prefer their advantage to that of the
commonwealth and have power over the Government
to make their advantage prevail — and this last
cause may operate in many ways and in the most
roundabout fashion^ — through shipowners as much as
by merchants — through men who fear any general
diminution of trade throughout the world as
ultimately certain to react upon trade they do them-
selves— through financiers who may pretend, or,
if they are sufficiently stupid, believe that the
counters with which they deal and the lubrication
of exchange are equivalent to wealth itself, but who
most commonly ha^e no object but their personal
enrichment, being men without national affections,
and at large between all combatant parties.
Unless one of these four causes can be proved,
and one of the first three (which alone are reputable)
maintained, there can be no excuse for weakening
in time of war the military action of the nation by
rendering imperfect and impotent what might be a
complete and potent military process.
It is incumbent upon those who prefer to leave
the blockade of Germany imperfect to explain which
of these causes they invoke for their action, and to
make it quite clear that they have a better reason
for leaving that blockade incomplete than they
would have for making it perfect.
THE BATTLE IN THE CAUCASUS.
THE Russian victory in the Caucasus or, as
it probably will come to be called, the
Battle of Sarikamish, is an event of im-
portance not so much from the numbers
engaged as from the lessons it teaches
upon the German direction of the Turkish Army
at this moment and from its probable political
effect.
It has been suggested that the action will pro-
bably bear the name of the " Third Battle of Arda-
ghan " because some part of the extended action
was fought in front of that town while, in the same
neighbourhood, two other conspicuous Russian
victories have taken place ; one in 1829, the other
during the last Russo-Turkish War in 1877 during
the Russian advance on Kars. But the centre of
the action, the place where far the heaviest shock
of troops took place, appears to have been near
the railhead of the Kars Railway, within a few
miles of the frontier, at the road junction of Sari-
kamish. And the telegrams that have hitherto
reached us already call the battle by the name of
this place.
In order to understand what has happened
and the significance it has in relation to the Ger-
man direction of Turkish military effort we must
first appreciate the nature of that frontier and the
proportion of the forces involved.
Take an oblong (see plan at top of next
page) bounded on the north by the 45th
Parallel and on the south by 38th Parallel,
between Longitude 35 East and Longitude 49 East.
That is, an oblong more than 450 but less than
500 miles across and about 700 miles long. Within
such an oblong all the Caucasian territory where
the Christian has pressed back the Turk during
the last hundred years is comprised.
The broad isthmus between the Black Sea and
the Caspian is the scene, ti tract of land nowhere
less than 300 odd miles across and upon the aver-
^^ge more like 400. The boundary that looks as
^houj^h it were fbced by nature between the one
Power and the other is the great Caucasian range
of moimtains, the ridge of which runs along the
line A-B. It is one of the most complete natural
barriers in the world, surpassing in this character
the Pyrenees, and rivalling the mountains that
bound India upon the north. Its highest summits
touch from 15,000 to 18,000 feet, its principal
passes do not sink much below 8,000 and 9,000 ; no
railway has yet been driven across it, though, as
in the case of the Eastern Pyrenees, the system
manages to squeeze round at an extreme end be-
tween the mountains and the Caspian Sea. Only
two main roads have been engineered from north
to south through all the 500 miles of its extent. But
this great chain, though it forms so complete a
natural barrier, does not divide two civilisations;
for religion, which is the determinant of culture,
has produced for centuries Mahommedanism north
of the chain, as it has preserved great bodies of
Christendom, Uniate and Orthodox, to the south
of it. It is this Christian majority to the south in
wdiat is called Georgia, and beyond this again in
the mountains of Armenia, to which the Russian
effort has perpetually been extended. And its
last limit before the present conflict (a limit fixed
in 1878 after the war of 1877 by the Treaty of
Berlin) was thai marked upon the sketch by the
dotted line, C-D, about half of which belongs to the
frontier of the Turkish Empire, and half to that
(now a nominal one) of Persia against Russia. This
frontier upon its Persian side is largely natural,
following the course of the Araxes River, as far
as the nearly isolated mountain mass of Ararat,
which stands where Persia, Asiatic Turkey, and
the Russian Empire meet, but eastward of this
mass of Ararat and on to the Black Sea the frontier
follows no natural features, it cuts across high
ridge and deep ravine indifferently, and may be
neglected in any strategic plan. The great fea-
tures of the district between the Caucasus and
Asiatic Turkey, for the purposes of military his-
torv. are: —
2»
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
45E
v^' Lake Van>''<^^<^<>y- «
<^^ \LciiuUvmia
35 E .^^^^'Xfourtfawunw Itwuf.
-45N
49E
-38N
(1) A depression running from sea to sea,
roughly parallel with the Caucasian chain, and
(roughly also) at an average of sixty miles or so
from its summits. This depression has, of course,
its western and its eastern slope, the watershed
between which on the Pass of Ssuram (at S) is
itself nearly 3,000 feet above the sea. But the
railway follows it all and unites along this natural
trench Baku, the Oil centre, upon the Caspian,
with Batoum, the European port upon the Black
Sea, and this railway is connected along the Cas-
pian coast with the systems to the north of the
Caucasus. Not quite midway between the two
seas is the chief town of Tiflis (T), at the foot of
the principal road across the Caucasian Chain,
and the nodal point upon which all land communi-
cations (rail, road, and sea) for a Caucasian cam-
paign must centre.
From Tiflis southwards runs towards the Tur-
kish frontier and the fortress of Kars (K) a rail-
way which crosses two ridges of fairly high moun-
tains and climbs beyond Kars to its railhead at
Sarikamish, 6,000 feet above the sea (Sh). The
mountains between the main Caucasian railway —
that from Baku to Batoum — and the Armenian
frontier, are too complicated to be represented
upon this rough sketch, even in their main lines.
They appear in the sketch as no more than " a
mountainous area." It is all a tangle of high hills
leading up to the Armenian Plateau. But we
must conceive of all the land between the railway
and the frontier as rising gradually by some 5,000
feet, with summits 10,000 and even 11,000 feet
above the sea, and so cut up that travel from one
point to another, save along the Kars railway (and
even that crosses great heights), nearly always in-
volves the passage of a steep and snow-clad ridge.
I shall give later a sketch of that tangle on a
larger scale. In the direction along which the
Kars railway points — that is somewhat south of
west — but over the border and some 80 miles
further on is, at a height of over 6,000 feet, the
town of Erzerum (E), the place of concentration
for the Turkish forces in this neighbourhood.
Finally, upon the Black Sea at T.R. is the port of
Trebizond, the principal Turkish port for this dis-
trict.
With these main elements before us we can
follow upon a somewhat larger scale the details of
the recent Russian victory.
The first thiug to seize is that the general plan
of the Germans upon this front after they had
brought Turkey into the war was an envelopment
of the Russian army of the Caucasus, or at any rate
of so large a part of it as should destroy the useful-
ness of the remainder.
There was but one district in which such an
envelopment could take place, for there is but one
main avenue of approach by which a large force
can march from Russian into Turkish territory or
from Turkish into Russian, and that is the road
from Kars to Erzerum. The Russian army would
certainly bring forward the bulk of its forces by
that road, which is further supplied with a railway
as far as the terminal station of Sarikamish, 15
miles from the frontier. Once this main advance
began, and the main Russian force was engaged
in the valley in its march upon Erzerum, it was to
be held in front by resistance upon the main road,
and while it was thus held Turkish forces stationed
upon the left or northward of this main road were
to sweep round and come upon the right flank of
the Russians. There was even one extreme Tur-
kish force still further to the north which was to
come round by sea to work round behind the Rus-
sians while the general engagement was in progress
and to cut the main railway from Tiflis to Kars
upon which the Russians depended for their
munitions. The whole thing may be put
diagrammatically as follows : where K is Kars,
S is Sarikamish, and E is Erzerum. A railway
coming from Tiflis and the depots of the Russians
in Georgia accompanies the road as far as the rail-
head at Sarikamish. The Russians are expected
to make their main advance upon Erzerum as
along the column A-A. The Turks under German
direction proceed to envelop this Russian advance
by holding it in front with a force B-B, and then
moving forces C-C and D-D round against the Rus-
sians in the direction of the arrow, while yet
another force, E-E, strikes through to cut the rail-
way behind Kars somewhere near X. There was
a certain amount of detached work going on av/ay
to the south, that is to the left of the Russians and
the right of the Turks, but we need not concern
ourselves with that, the study of which would only
confuse our grasp of the main operations.
What the Turks had here been bidden to carry
out was exactly upon the model of all modern
German strategy, and that is what makes us cer-
tain that the blunder was made under German
direction. It may even be regarded as the third
of the great failures of this enveloping strategy in
the present war. The jirst was Von Kluck's
failure to get round the Allied Army in front of
Paris; the second was Von Hindenburg's failure
to get round the Russian line in front of Warsaw;
3*
LAND AND WATER.
January 16, 1915.
and this Caucasian battle, fought with Turkish
soldiers under totally different climatic and topo-
graphical conditions, is a third failure in exactly
the same image.
In order to effect an envelopment of this kind
the Germans had to count on a numerical superi-
ority of their ally's troops in this region, for you
cannot thus hold in one place and turn in another
unless you are numerically superior to your enemy.
Nothing could make up for this necessity of superi-
ority in niimbers save some great superiority in
mobility, which mobility the Turks, lacking any
railways in this neighbourhood, obviously did not
possess. We may take it, therefore, that the
120,000 men or so (possibly altogether as many as
160,000) which the Turks had to hand were con-
fronted by no more than some 100,000 Russians, or
at least expected to be confronted by no more.
A second necessity, lacking which a movement
of this sort is bound to fail, is the exact co-
ordination of all the movements. If your various
bodies converging upon the enemy do not keep in
touch and work accurately to a time-table, they
are bound to be defeated in detail, for some of
them will be in conflict with the whole of the enemy
before the rest have come up. The classic example
of this sort of failure is the Battle of Tourcoing in
1794.
The co-ordination of movements over dis-
tances of more than a hundred miles in such a dis-
trict as this jumble of high mountains between
Armenia and Georgia in the depth of winter was
impossible, and it is difficult to see how the Ger-
mans could have believed it possible. The whole
place is a confusion of immense ridges, arranged
on the most complicated pattern, with passes over
them often 8,000ft. above the sea, and peaks rising
two to three thousand feet higher. The whole
place is deep in snow and subject at this season to
very heavy storms. Translating the diagram into
the actual map and following the movements from
day to day this is what happened : —
Batouai
Epzerum
I "4 ^
Koprikoi
Towards the end of October there was con-
centrated at Erzerum a force consisting of three
Turkish Army Corps : the 9th, the 10th, and the
11th.
With what rapidity the Turks could assemble
their men we do not know, but at any rate the great
concentration was taking place about that time,
and the corresponding Russian concentration was
taking place in the neighbourhood of Kars in those
same days. The distance from Kars to Erzerum
Mbiaifaiiwas ^^^
regwzis '^f<^
^Uobes
level: Sm
tfanuary 16, 1915.
liAND AND WATER.
&9 the crow flies is about 115 miles, and by the
road over two high passes something like 140 if I
am not mistaken. Both centres stand very high ;
Kars nearly 6,000 feet above the sea, Erzerum
over 6,000, while the road between them rises at
the pass to as much as close on 8,000 ; and we must
conceive of the whole of this theatre of operations
as a tost sea of huge mountains separated by a
network of deep ravines, even the lowest floors of
which are deep in snow.
The sketch at the foot of the preceding page
may give some idea of the extremely difficult
country over which some German, working with a
map, saw fit to design a converging movement
against the Russian columns which were advancing
up the Kars-Erzerum road.
In this sketch I have marked the high moun-
tainous land by shading, and the ridges or crests
along which all that high mountainous land is
grouped I have marked by a series of dashes.
Heie and there in the mountains are figures
showing the height of some crest or of a pass,
while the valley floors are left white. It will, I
think, be clearly seen from such a sketch how
impossibly confused the whole district is.
Obseire, for instance, how the 1st Turkish
Army Corps, coming from the valley of the
Chonik River and making for Ardahan, had to
cross a high ridge, and had for such a passage
nothing but one bad mountain road, with the
height of the pass more than 8,000 feet above the
sea; from which, upon the further side, was a
sharp fall of nearly 3,000 feet on to Ardahan
itself. Observe in what a tangle of mountains
lies the point of Olti and the neighbouring point
of Id ; from one of which. Id, the 10th Army Corps
started for its ill-fated adventure against the Kars-
Sarikamish road, and upon the other of which,
Olti, that same Army Corps has withdrawn by
something which is no more than a mountain
track, after its defeat.
There is, indeed, in all that extraordinary
confusion of high peaks and gorges, only one
natural avenue for troops, which is the depression
leading from Kars up to Sarikamish, a sort of
broad Hoor in the midst of the mountains, the road
up which, after the pass at X, comes down on to
the valley of the Araxes at Koprikoi, the old "Ad
Confluentes." It so happens that between the
upper waters of the Araxes River and the first
sources of the Euphrates, near Erzerum, there is
no saddle of high land ; and the road passes easily
from the Upper Araxes to Erzerum. But, apart
from that main line between the two military
towns of Erzerum itself, more than 6,000 feet
above the sea, and Kars, little more than 400 feet
lower, there is the only good marching route of
all that land. And the attempt to converge upon
Sarikamish from the neighbourhood of Id and Olti,
as did the 9th and 10th Turkish Armv Corps, was
an attempt necessarily doomed to failure.
So was the attempt to bring in a wide sweep
an extreme body round by the sea through Arda-
han, and so on through to the railway behind
Kars. For though, once at Ardahan, such a body
had a clear road through open country before it
imtil it readied the railway behind Kars, yet in
order to reach Ardahan it had to cross the high
ridge, A, A, A, the summits of wliich touch 10,000
feet, and the saddle over which from the vallev of
the Choruk was itself over 8,000 feet above the sea.
The reader who follows these campaigns upon
the best maps may be curious to note the prolonga-
tion of the railway from Kars to Sarikamish, and
may have wondered why I spoke of the latter place
as the Russian " railhead." None but the most
recent maps give this extension. Two years ago
the railway stopped at Kars. It is only since
1913 that the extension to Sarikamish at the foot
of the high mountains has been opened.
From such a digression upon the details of
that impossible country I return to the movement
itself.
Sundry preliminary actions between the ad-
vanced forces of the two armies that were concen-
trating would have interest in a full history, but
would only confuse the main lines of this sum-
mary. We therefore proceed at once to the main
advance, which did not develop until the last ten
days of November. It was on November 20th that
the Russians had reached their furthest point in
their march upon Erzerum, driving the Turks from
Koprikoi. We shall do well if we conceive of this
Russian success as being rather due to a deliberate
retirement upon the part of the Turks than any-
thing else, because immediately after the action at
Koprikoi the Turkish counter-advance began. Jt
was pursued slowly and successfully during the
month of December, and took the following form :
The 11th Corps marched towards Khorosan,
which is just over the Turkish frontier and about
thirty miles from the Russian railhead at Sari-
kamish. There was heavy fighting in Christmas
week, and two days after Christmas the Turkish
11th Army Corps had reached the outskirts of
Khorosan itself, which the Russians were defend-
ing. I have marked their position at this moment
with the figures 11, 11, 11. Meanwhile, concen-
trated round the frontier post of Id forty miles to
the north was the 10th Turkish Army Corps, which
I have similarly marked with the figure 10, and
between it and the 11th, that is, between Id and
Khorosan, was the 9th Turkish Army Corps, which
I have marked with the figure 9. The Russians
were well held in front of Khorosan, and their
main forces stretching back along the valley to-
wards Sarikamish and so to the rail and road to
Kars were to be attacked by the 10th and the 9th
Army Corps sweeping round in the direction of the
arrows, X-X. Meanwhile, far to the northward,
yet another Turkish force having been brought
round by C, and consisting partly of troops from
Constantinople, that is from the 1st Army Corps,
were advancing to take Ardahan, and having
taken it to go on along the direction of the arrow,
Y-Y, and to cut the railway behind the Russians
a little below Kars.
While we speak thus upon the sketch-map of
" advancing in the direction of the arrows," we
must constantly remember that this meant in prac-
tice the crossing of high mountain ridges in the
blizzards of mid-v,?inter, and at the same time keep-
ing all the movements exactly co-ordinated. The
first of the failures was that of the body, I, in front
of Ardahan. The Turks here did manage to take
the town. They had to fight for more than a fort-
night to get it, but they were in possession upon
New Year's Day. Hardly had they established
themselves there, however, when a Russian force
coming up just in time broke them two days later,
5*
LAND AND WATER.
January 16, 1915.
upon January 3rd, drove them out of the town, and
checked the Turkish advance on this extreme left
for good and all.
In those same days vfhen the sweeping move-
ment round by Ardahan was held up, that is, the
days at the end. of last year and at the beginning
of this year, the main Turkish advance on the
Erzerum-Kars road, and round upon the flanks of
it was being pressed. The 11th Turkish Army
Corps held the Russians firmly at Khorosan ; the
9th and the 10th were successfully struggling
across the mountain ridges and appeared upon the
heights above Sarikamish about Christmas Day.
They had been so far successful as to very nearly
achieve their object; they had very nearly en-
veloped the Russians, and the position in the last
week of the year may be grasped from the accom-
panying map.
^Astr Corps uiflwht:
i^40Ch Corps
h K
Corps caking vIaor<nis offensive to
tdievc pressure on medeftated
lOdi^too late 0 save the $th*
The 1 1th Turkish Army Corps holds the Rus-
sians at Khorosan ; the 9th Turkish Army Corps is
first above and then in Sarikamish itself; the 10th
Turkish Army Corps to the left of the 9th is coming
down upon the valley and the railway between
Sarikamish and Kars. For three days. Boxing
Day and the two days following, there was a
violent struggle between the Turks and the Rus-
sians of which Sarikamish was the centre. . The
9th Turkish Army Corps was holding Sarikamish,
the 10th was fighting for the railway beyond, ap-
parently ; whether it managed to reach it or not
we have not been told. It seems to have been to-
wards the end of the day December 29th that
the struggle began to turn in favour. of the Rus-
sians, and New Year's Day and the day following
must have seen the pushing back of the 10th Army
Corps — for nothing else will account for what came
immediately after, the isolation of the 9th. The
position January 2nd would seem to have been
much as on the following sketch. At any rate,
on Sunday, January 3rd, the same day which saw
the victorious entry of the Russians into Ardahan,
and the decisive check administered to the 1st
Turkish Army Corps there, the 9th Corps still
■holding desperately to its position in the valley at
Sarikamish found itself isolated by the defeat of
the 10th Corps upon its left and was wiped out.
The 11th Army Corps up by Khorosan could do
nothing. It had held up the head of the first Rus-
sian advance, but it could not go further — it had
not moved since two days after Christmas. The
9th Turkish Army Corps was therefore left en-
tirely to itself as the 10th broke away northward
and the result was that this 9th Corps lost, killed,
wounded, or captured, the whole of its effectives ;
all its staff including the German officers present
are prisoners on their way to the interior. All
the artillery of the Corps has been taken and, in a
word, the Turkish centre has ceased to exist.
But the action has continued none the less
during the week that has passed since that date,
while the Russians continued their pursuit of the
retreating 10th Corps, using, for that purpose it
may be presumed, all the troops they originally
had against the 10th Corps, and reinforcements
from those who had just wiped out the 9th Corps.
The 11th Turkish Corps began taking a vigorous
offensive in order to relieve the pressure upon the
retreating 10th. The 11th Corps pushed up be-
yond Khorosan in what must have been a very
vigorous offensive, to within a long day's march
of Sarikamish, and the position at the end of this
effort was much as it is upon the next sketch:
With Sarikamish at S, the Turkish 11th
Corps is hitting hard at A (Karai Urgan,
eighteen miles from Sarikamish) and trying
by so doing to bring the Russians back
from their pursuit of the 10th Corps.
Whether that 10th Corps will in the main get
away or not only the future will show, but the total
result of the operations is to leave the Turks upon
this front in a position of marked inferiority as
against the Russians and to put an end for the
moment to any anxiety the Russians might have
had for the safety of their Caucasian provinces,
of their oil wells at Baku, of their frontier strong-
hold at Kars, of the integrity of their main force
in this region, and of their railways and communi-
cations.
We must not exaggerate the magnitude of the
event. The forces engaged were but a fraction of
the total numbers that Turkey can put into the
field, and the defeat though complete leaves two-
thirds of the Turkish forces round Erzerum in
being. Whether a new offensive will be attempted
upon this same front by the Turks we cannot tell,
but we can be certain that much time must elapse
before it could develop in any strength. There
are considerable forces in European Turkey from
6*
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
which to draw, but the railway could not take
them more than a couple of hundred miles towards
this front; there would still remain nearly two
months of marching by mountain tracks before
Erzerum would be reached, and if, in the interval,
the Russians account for the remaining 10th and
11th Corps it is fairly certain that new Turkish
Armies will not be sent north-eastward at all.
Were transport by sea secure such reinforcements
might reach the port of Trebizond and the region
of Erzerum in a few days, but transport by sea is
contested and though it has been effected recently
along that coast quite insecure, as we know by the
fate of the two transports sunk by Russian fire.
Upon the whole it would seem as though the effect
of Sarikamish was decisive, so far as this theatre
of the war is concerned.
THE POLISH FIELD.
In the Polish field there is an absence of any-
thing decisive during the whole of the week,
and even of any minor action with any de-
finable result. In Galicia and in Bukovina
the Russians are in the mouths of the passes
and have not yet proceeded to control the summits,
or even to advance towards such control. The
reason probably is that the weather has made
transport for an advancing force impossible. Clear
weather, however cold, would see the beginning
of another forward movement. And here it may
be worth while commenting upon the perfectly
meaningless phrase which has twice escaped the
German General Staff, and which has been re-
peated by their apologists in the United States : I
mean the phrase that " the Russian offensive is
broken." That phrase is not meaningless in itself,
it is only meaningless in the circumstances to which
it is applied. There is a perfectly simple meaning
to the expression " the breaking of an offensive " :
it means that your enemy having attempted an
offensive movement has failed in it, not only for the
moment, but so finally and thoroughly that he will
never be able to begin again. A Russian who felt
inclined to prophesy might be inclined to say that
the Austro-German offensive movement against
the line of the middle Vistula and the San was thus
" broken." It would be a foolish prophecy, because
so long as there is a great army capable of
threatening your own in front of you, and so long
as it has ample reserves of men, it may always re-
turn to the attack. But, still, the Austro-German
effort has been a very clear case of a vigorous offen-
sive breaking down at the end of its first stage.
On the Russian side there has been nothing
of the sort. There has been a deliberate retire-
ment before the German advance, the taking up
of a defensive line, and the maintenance thereof.
The retirement followed no surprise or lost general
action : it was a calculated retirement based upon
difficulty of supply under the climatic and topo-
graphical conditions of Russian Poland. So far
from being the end of the Russian offensive, it is
quite manifestly the preparation for the Russian
offensive, to which only the accumulation of
supply, a matter of the weather, and the time is
lacking. Whether such a new offensive will suc-
ceed or not is quite another matter ; but that it is
not only possible, but in the very strategical nature
of things in the Eastern field, is self-evident.
Meanwhile the last phase of the German at-
tempt to break through to Warsaw consists in
something singularly like what happened in
Northern France from three to two months ago.
Upon a comparatively narrow, selected front a
very violent attack is delivered. The terminal
points of this front, the hamlet of Sukha and the
farmsteads called Mogele are about a day's
march apart, and stand upon the Bzura muish
where the first violent attack upon Warsaw was
made a month ago. Upon that restricted area the
enemy massed in particularly dense formations,
and depending exactly as he did in the West upon
a lavish and concentrated display of heavy artil-
lery, is directing all the weight of his effort ; pre-
cisely what he did first on the twelve-mile front
between Dixmude and the sea, later upon succes-
sive narrow fronts round Ypres. Hitherto the re-
sult has also been the same.
THE WESTERN FIELD.
THE ATTACK ON MULHOUSE.
The French offensive against Mulhouse was
much more likely, as was said in these columns
last week, to bring down German reinforcements
into Upper Alsace than to achieve its immediate
object of reaching the Rhine, although that
frontier of Germany proper, which would thus
have been uncovered, is only sixteen miles away
from the advanced French positions.
But, as was also said in the same place, the
bringing of German reinforcements down from
the north to stand against this pressure on Mul-
house is an end in itself, though less serious than
the approach to the Rhine.
We must always remember that the great
asset the French have is their superiority in
gunnery; not only in the mechanical superiority
of their field guns, but in the superiority of their
training, rapidity, and genius for gunnery. Their
great weakness on this side at the beginning of the
war was an insufficiency of heavy artillery, and
that weakness has now been made right.
Consequently, wherever the French are exer-
cising pressure upon the long line of trenches, their
gunnery must be met as best can be by German re^*
inforcements in the same arm. The heavy re-
7*
LAND 'AND WATER
January 16, 1915,
infoicements in infantry alone that Germany has
required to meet this novel pressure upon Upper
Alsace must come from somewhere: the whole
point of exercising such pressure is to " stretch "
and thin the line somewhere else. But whereas
infantry of sorts can be improvised, gunners can-
not. By which I mean that the heaviest part of
the advantage acquired by the French in thus ex-
ercising pressure upon the extreme of their line is
not that it brings great masses of German infantry
there — though that is not to be despised: it is
especially that it compels the enemy to denude
some part of his line of its proper complement of
guns. And you will find that the moment heavy
German reinforcements are needed at some point
where pressure of this kind has been applied, the
second step immediately taken is for the French to
search the line up and down to find where a weak-
ness in guns may be discovered. It takes a day or
two to move such guns : they may often come from
reserves of material. But it only takes a few hours
to move the gunners, and the gunners, moved from
one part of the line, at once weaken that part of
the line. How the novel pressure upon Upper
Alsace has worked the last few days may be
gathered from the accompanying sketch.
There has been a double effort upon Mulhouse
since the village of Steinbach was captured, now
nearly a fortnight ago. There has been an effort
from the north by a French offensive in front of
Steinbach itself, which effort has been met by
strong German reinforcements there; and there
has been an effort about six miles away to the
south, near the two Burnhaupts, where the Ger-
mans have also brought up considerable reinforce-
ments to check this second movement.
The first is about ten miles from Mulhouse, or,
counting right up to the French front, about
11-11^. The second is no more than eight. On
the northern part of this double effort the German
defensive, though still maintained, is maintained
under most expensive conditions. The French
hold all the gun positions on the foothills, and they
hold, of course, the dominating heights just above.
For instance, above Wattwiller they hold the
height more than a thousand feet above the plain
upon which stands the mined castle of Herren-
fluh; while above the famous gun position upon
" Hill 432 " (which means a point marked in the
Ordnance Survey as being 432 metres above the
sea, or about 1,400 feet above the plain) they hold
the height which supports the ruins of the castle of
Steinbach, also somewhat more than a thousand
feet above the plain.
Against their positions reaching down from
the first of these ruined castles the enemy have
made very determined, but as yet unsuccessful, at-
tempts to carry the slopes from the plain village
of Wattwiller. They have maintained themselves
in Uffoltz, which is divided between the hill slope
and the plain ; they have not succeeded in re-taking
the site of Steinbach village ; they have failed to
carry and re-capture Hill 432, and in general they
have here established a check to the French ad-
vance, but have failed to throw it back.
In the southern sector they have been more
successful. The French for a moment captured
Upper Burnhaupt, they were driven out of it again
by heavy German reinforcements five days ago,
and at present their line is roughly that of the dots
across the above sketch map.
Our principal interest in this affair so far hag
been in the estimate of the German reinforcements
required to stem the threat of the French offensive
in Upper Alsace. We have some indication of this
in the estimate of German losses during the re-
capture of Upper Burnhaupt alone. These losses
amounted to about 4,000, of which one-half repre-
sented unwounded prisoners; and that, of course,
must have been during the initial stage of the
fighting, because, as it was the French who retired,
they would have taken no prisoners, either
wounded or unwoimded, in the last stages of this
local action. We may therefore estimate at a
Division the reserve called down from the north to
protect the advance upon Mulhouse from the south
alone; and one is perhaps safe in estimating at
nearly the same strength the forces protecting
Mulhouse from the northern advance. What the
French forces opposed are we do not know, but pre-
sumably superior in number of guns at least, and
probably in men as well, for it is they who have
been able to take the offensive.
But the pressure all along this front is not
confined to the direct threat upon Mulhouse. There
are forces operating in front of Colmar to the
north and against Alstricht to the south; and it
is the most probable development of the situation
that the pressure, and the bringing up of men to
withstand that pressure, will increase continually
all down the line of the Vosges as spring ap-
proaches. It is much the best game for the French
to play, and the Germans know it. It thins the
rest of the line somewhere to within danger of
breaking point. It has some political value, and
its high political-military value lies in the fact that
here only is the frontier of Germany proper imme-
diately exposed to the French offensive. It is
within sight from the hills. Everywhere else the
limits of the German Empire, as distinguished from
annexed and disaffected territory like Alsace-
Lorraine, or territory merely occupied like Bel-
n»
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
gium and Luxemburg, are far from the French
Ime. This attack upon Alsace has got the further
purely strategical value that if it grows heavy, if
the Germans have to shorten their line, they will
be compelled to do so by an abandonment of the
Upper Alsatian plain. It will be their shortest
and almost their only alternative. On each of these
considerations, and on all of them together, it
seems certain that the offensive in this quarter is
serious and is likely to grow more serious.
THE SUCCESS NEAR PERTHES.
The only other event of the week in the West,
besides the German recapture of Burnhaupt, is the
local French success near Perthes, in which they
took the height " Hill No. 200."
And here, again, we can use the highly de-
tailed local fighting as an illustration of what the
present trench work means. Immediately in front
of Perthes, itself 162 metres above the sea, the
ground sw^ells in a sort of gradual lump to a
rounded summit, 200 metres above the sea, or
thereabouts — that is, about 120 feet higher than
Perthes village. All this country is a confused,
bare, rolling land of damp chalk and clay, and
Perthes is almost at the highest of its monotonous
Uft. It is from this region that the little muddy
streams, thick, white like milk in rainy weather,
ooze from the ungrateful soil of the Champagne
Pouilleuse. The Suippe rises not far off, and the
Tourbe, near the farm of Beausejour, about three
miles only from Perthes. What the French have
done is to seize the fortified height above Perthes
village, which is marked B upon the accompany-
ing sketch ; and the importance of their action lies
in its representing a further advance towards the
railway lying behind the German trenches and
supplying the forces that line them with munitions
and food.
If you had made a sketch of the French and
German opposed trenches about a month ago in
this region, you would probably have had something
like the lines M M for the Germans, N N for the
French. If you were to make a similar sketch
to-day, you would have something like the line R R
for the Germans and S S for the French. And
though the advance does not represent • more than
3,000 yards at the very best from the extreme
fc neiakbourlwod
cfTUuims
to Grand 'Preazui
theAraontie
Perthe^i63
M
■TPf:
r^^'^Th.
N
1^ *■ 3 * S
» 11,1 I I
IV
6 r 9 a »
I ■ I I I 1
Xanpes of WOOyards.
positions held, and on an average more like 1,500,
its whole Interest lies In Its approach to the railway.
I have seen somewhere the remark that the
capture of the point B or the HUl 200, in front of
Perthes, gave the French gunners a dominating
position commanding this railway.
This is an error. The whole of that ugly naked
landscape is far too confused to obtain a good gun
position, and there are four lumps of much the same
height In the same neighbourhood, which I have
marked A, B, G and D on the sketch, while the
shallow valleys between the swells of ground are
not much over 100-150 feet deep. Moreover,
artillery by Indirect fire can, when it is in range,
destroy such a work as a railway with precision
by mere measurement upon a map. It does not
need to dominate fi'om a height. What an advance
like this does Is to give 'the guns operating against
such an objective a shorter range over which to
work. If, for instance, the French should reach the
village of Tahure, more than half-way between
Perthes and the railway, then the French,
advancing their heavy guns behind their line, could
make the railway perfectly unusable. As the
trenches now lie it may be doubted whether they
have yet quite achieved this object. The whole
meaning of their push forward here m the middle
of Champagne Is the approach towards the railway,
and their foremost troops are now just under four
miles from that line of communication and supply.
THE POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT OF
THE ENEMY'S STRATEGY.
WITH the apparent breakdovm of the
Austro- German offensive in the
East, with the containment of the
Austro-German offensive in the
West, and the increasing pressure
upon the Belgian and Alsatian extremes of the
Gierman lines there, we have a strategical factor
apparent in the next phases of the war which may
best be called "The Political Embarrassment of the
Enemy's Strategy."
That is, we may expect, if things continue
npon the same lines, that the enemy will suffer
during the next few months in the following
fashion: — .
He will not be able to pursue purely strategi-
cal aims. He will be embarrassed in such a pro-
ceeding by certain political considerations which
may confuse and which will certainly hamper what
ought to be his purely strategical objects.
This point is so important that it is essential
we should make it, even though it seem a little pre-
mature; we shall almost certainly find it domi-
nating the future of the war ; and at the outset of
such an inquiry the reader may well be perplexed
by the use of that word " political."
We perpetually read in military histors' that
such and such a general " had designed an excellent
plan of campaign, but it was marred by political
8*
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 1915.
considerations." Now this phrase seems ambigu-
ous. For it is evident that every campaign must,
in the wider sense of the term political, be domi-
nated by political considerations. A nation does
not go to war save for certain political ends. Its
warfare is dictated by its foreign policy. It desires
to achieve certain political gains, or to prevent cer-
tain political losses. Save for such a desire war-
fare would have no object and no meaning. Thus,
Austria threatened Servia with the political object
of extending her influence — and particularly the
influence of Hungary— in the Balkans. Germany
took advantage of that situation to force war upon
Russia and France with the political objects of
ridding herself of Slav pressure from the East, of
making herself secure over her Polish subjects, of
putting an end for ever to the French menace from
the West, and probably of acquiring a seaboard in
the Low Countries whence she could challenge the
maritime supremacy of Great Britain. All wars
are political in their inception; all have a political
motive behind them, and the strategy of all is
destined to achieve some political end.
How, then, can we talk of political considera-
tions as " embarrassing " or '' confusing " strategi-
cal plans ? When military history speaks in those
terms it is using the word " political " in a special
sense, and what is meant is that, during the course
of a campaign, certain subsidiary political ends,
far less in importance than the total defeat of the
enemy, come in to hamper a general and prevent
his pursuing the unmecQate military object which
he should alone pursue, the weakening and ulti-
mate destruction of his opponent's armed forces.
For instance, when the Germans invaded
France in the overwhelming force of, say, 16 to
10 last August, they calculated on the " political
lure " of Paris as something certain to divert the
French generals from their plain military task of
maintaining their armies intact until, if it were
possible, they could hold and check the enemy. It
was obviously the business of the French generals
to prevent by any means in their power the anni-
hilation as an offensive weapon of the numerically
inferior forces they commanded, and in pursuit of
that plain object it was the duty of the French
generals to neglect all secondary considerations,
such as the safety of a particular town or district.
The one thing they had to remember was that the
armies must be kept in being, and that the invader
must be held, and later defeated, in spite of his
overwhelming numerical superiority.
But the German General Staff calculated that
the threat of material destruction in Paris, and
even of an occupation of the French capital, would
be of such effect that the French generals, rather
than risk this destruction or occupation, would
compromise the whole campaign. They calculated
that the advance on Paris, and especially the im-
mediate approach to the capital, would either con-
fuse the French general strategical plan or would
so change that plan as to make its new object not
the holding of the enemy and his ultimate defeat,
but merely the immediate salvation of the area of
]^aris.
By a curious irony the war has so developed
Ihat no one of the Allies, but rather the Austrians
and the Germans, now suffer from this embarrass-
ment, and that the strategy of the Austro-German
forces, which should be directed to the single end
of defeating the Allies in the field, is already
hampered, and will, presumably in the near
future, be much more gravely hampered by con-
siderations not purely military, but, in the
secondary sense of that word, political; and it is
this political embarrassment which I propose to
analyse in what follows. It will prove essential to
our comprehension of the further phases of this
war.
The political embarrassment of which I speak,
and which is already entering into and disturbing
the plans of the enemy, is two-fold.
First: There are the political considerations
which tend to disruption within the Germanic body
by the threat of Hungarian disaffection and of
Austrian defection.
Secondly: There are the political considera-
tions affecting Germany alone, her desire to hold
on to Belgium, not for a military but for a
political reason; her desire to hold on to
Alsace-Lorraine, not for a military, but for a
political reason; her desire to hold on to East
Prussia, not for a military, but for a political
reason; her desire to hold on to Silesia, not for a
military, but for a political reason.
It will be noted when we come to examine the
matter in the form of a diagram, first, that the
danger, certainly of Hungarian, possibly of Aus-
tro-Hungarian secession from Germany, is, from
considerations of geographical position alone, in-
creasingly strong. Secondly, that the German
Empire cannot equally defend the four extreme
and separate areas — Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine,
East Prussia, and Silesia — to which its political at-
tachment is now fixed, but will have to choose
between them, since these areas are four widely
separated outliers of the whole territory wherein
the German effort at defence is now being played.
IN WHAT THE POLITICAL EMBAR-
RASSMENT TO THE ENEMY'S
STRATEGY CONSISTS.
L- GENERAL.
I would first ask the reader to grasp the fol-
lowing four simple diagrams.
I shall, for the purposes of elucidating this
argument, which is at once of a novel and, I think,
important character in understanding the future
of the campaign, repeat the two principal of
these diagrams later in the article. But I put
them at the head of my argument in order to make
my principal point clear before I elaborate it.
Here are two oblongs, A (left blank) and B
(lightly shaded). Supposing these two oblongs com-
bined to represent the area of two countries which
are in alliance, and which are further so situated
that B is the weaker power to the Alliance both (I)
in his . militar}'^ strength and (2) in his tenAcity of
10»
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
purpose. Next grant that B is divided by the
dotted line C-D into two halves. B not being one
homogeneous State, but two States, B-1 and B-2.
Next let it be granted that while B-1 is more
likely to remain attached in its alliance to A, B-2
is more separate from the Alliance in moral ten-
dency, and is also materially the weaker half of
B. Finally, let the whole group A-B be subject to
the attack of enemies from the right and from the
left, from tlie right along the arrows X-X-X, and
from the left along the arrows Y-Y by two groups
of enemies represented by the areas M and N
respectively.
It is obvious that in such a situation, if A is
the chief object of attack, and is the power which
has both provoked the conflict and made itself the
chief object of assault by M and N, A is by this
arrangement in a position 'politically weak.
That is, the strategical position of A is gravely
embarrassed by the way in which his Ally B sepa-
rated into the two halves B-1 and B-2 stands with
regard to himself. B-2 is isolated and thrust out-
ward. The enemy M upon the right, attacking
along the lines X-X-X, may be able to give B-2 a
very bad time before he gets into the area of
B-1 and long before he gets into the area of the
stronger power A. It is open to M so to harass
B-2 that B-2 is prepared to break with B-1 and
give up the war ; or, if the bond between B-2 and
B-1 is strong enough, to persuade B-1 to give up
the struggle at the same time that he does. And
if B-2 is thus harassed to the breaking point, the
whole Alliance A plus B will lose the men and
materials and Avealth represented by B-2, and may
lose the whole shaded area B, leaving A to support
singly for the future tlie combined attacks of M
and N along the lines of attack X-X-X and Y-Y.
Now, that diagram accurately represents the
political embarrassment in strategy of the Gcr-
man-Austro-Hungarian Alliance. B-1 is Austria
and Bohemia; B-2 is Hungary; A is the German
Empire ; M is the Russians ; N is the Allies in the
West. With a geographical arrangement such as
that of the Germanic Alliance, a comparatively
small proportion of the Russian forces detached to
harry the Hungarian Plain can make the Hun-
garians, who have little moral attachment to the
Austrians, and none whatever to the Germans,
abandon the struggle to save themselves ; while it
is possible that this outlier being thus detached
will drag with it its fellow half, the Austrian half
of the dual monarchy, cause the Government of
the dual monarchy to sue for peace, and leave the
German Empire isolated to support the imdivided
attention of the Russians from the East and of the
French from the West.
It is clear that if a strong Power, A, allied
with and dependent for large resources in men
upon a weaker Power, B, is attacked from the left
and from the right, the ideal arrangement for the
strong Power, A, would be something in the
nature of the following diagram, where the weaker
Power stands jirotected in the territory of the
stronger Power, and where of the two halves of
the weaker Power, B-2, the less certain half, is
especially protected from attack.
Were Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the
[Rhine land upon the one hand, the Hungarian
Plain, Russian Poland, and East Prussia upon the
.other hand, united in one strong, patriotic, homo-
geneous German-speaking group with the Govern-
ment of Berlin and the Baltic Plain, and were
Bavaria, Switzerland, the Tyrol, Bohemia to con-
stitute the weaker and less certain ally, while the
least certain half of that uncertain ally lay in
Eastern Bohemia and in what is now Lower Aus-
tria, well defended from attack upon the East, the
conditions would be exactly reversed, and the
Austro-German Alliance would be geographically
and politically of the stronger sort. As it is, the
combined accidents of geography and political cir-
cumstance make it peculiarly vulnerable.
And that is my first point.
My second point concerns the German Empire
alone.
Let us suppose a Power concerned to defend
itself against invasion and situated between two
groups of enemies, from the left and from the
right. We will again call that Power A, the enemy
upon the right M, and the enemy upon the left IS .
the first attacking along the lines X-X, and the
second along the lines Y-Y.
Let us suppose that A has political reasons for
particularly desiring to save from invasion four
districts, the importance of which I have indicated
on the above diagram by shading, and which I
have numbered 1,2, 3, and 4.
Let us suppose that those four districts happen
to lie at the four exposed corners of the area which
A has to defend. The Government of A knows it
to be essential to success in the war that his terri-
tory should not be invaded. Or, at least, if it is
invaded it must not, under peril of collapse, be
invaded in the shaded areas.
It is apparent, upon the very face of such a
diagram, that with the all-important shaded areas
situated in the corners of his quadrilateral, A is
heavily embarrassed. He must disperse his forces
in order to protect all four. If wastage of men
compels him to shorten his line on the right against
M, he will be immediately anxious as to whether
he can dare sacrifice 4 to save 2, or whether he
should run the dreadful risk of sacrificing 2
to save 4.
If wastage compels him to shorten his defen-
sive line upon the left, he is in a similar quandary
between 1 and 3.
The whole situation is one in which he is quite
certain that a defensive war, long before he is
11*
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 1915,
pushed to extremities, will compel him to " scrap "
one of the four corners, yet each one is for some
political reason especially dear to him, and even
perhaps necessary to him. Each he desires with
alternating anxieties and indecisions to preserve
at all costs from invasion, yet he cannot, as he is
forced upon the defensive, preserve all four.
Here, again, the ideal situation for him would
be to possess against the invader an arrangement
in which , if he is compelled to consider four special
zones of territory more important than the mass of
his territory, he would have the advantage of
knowing that they were clearly distinguishable into
less and more important, and the further advan-
tage of knowing tJiat the more important the terri-
tory was the more central it was, and the better
protected against invasion.
Thus, in this last and fourth diagram the
Pktgramiy
government of the general oblong, A-A-A-A, dis-
tinguished four special zones, the protection of
which from invasion is important, but which vary
in the degree of their importance; the least im-
portant is the outermost, lightly shaded (1) ; more
important is an inner one (2) ; still more important
is (3), and most important of all is the black core
of the whole.
Some such arrangement has been the salvation
of France time and time again, notably in the
Spanish wars, and in the wars of Louis XIV., and
in the wars of the Revolution. To some extent you
have seen the same thing in the present war.
To save Paris was exceedingly important,
next came the zone outside Paris, and so on up to
the frontier. But with the modern German Em-
pire it is exactly the other way, and the situation
IS that which we find in Diagram 3, which I here
repeat
The four external corners are the essentials which
must be preserved from invasion, and if any one of
them goes, the whole political situation is at once
in grave peril.
The strategical position of modern Germany
Is embarrassed, because each of these four corners
must be saved by the armies. 1 is Belgium ; 2 is
East Prussia ; 3 is Alsace-Lorraine j 4 is Silesia ;
and the German commanders, as well as the
German Government, must remain to the last
moment in grave indecision as to which of the four
can best be spared when invasion threatens, or, as
is more probable, must disperse their forces in the
attempt to hold all four at once. It is a situation
which has but rarely occurred before in the history
of war, and which has always proved disastrous.
I sum up, then, and I say that geographical
considerations must, if the campaign proceeds
upon the same lines as it has hitherto followed —
the Germans defending themselves in company
with a not too confident pair of Allies against their
enemies to the East and the West — heavily em-
barrass the strategy of the enemy because they
first tend to detach those uncertain Allies;;
secondly, leave the German Empire itself in con-
fusion between the necessity of sacrificing sooner
or later one of four quite separate, apparently
equally important, and all of them outlying corners
of the area now occupied by the German armies.
Such is the general proposition, the details of
which I will examine and, I hope, prove.
II.-PARTIGULAR.
1. The political embarrassment due to the geo-
graphical position of Austria-Hungary.
We have already considered in a diagram the
way in which the geographical disposition of Aus-
tria-Hungary weakens Germany in the face of the
Allies. For the sake of clearness, let us repeat
that diagram here.
Translated into terms of actual political
geography, these two oblongs, with their separate
parts, are, as a fact, as follows; where A is the
German Empire ; the shaded portion B is the un-
certain ally, Austria-Hungary, so far as that
portion is now free from Russian armies, and this
last divided by the frontier, R^S into B-1, the more
certain Austrian part, and B-2, the less certain
Hungarian part, the latter of which is only pro-
tected from assault by the Carpathian range of
mountains C-C-C-C, with its passes at D-D-D.
M, the enemy on the right, Russia, is attacking the
Alliance A-B along X-X-X, while the enem^ aa
12*
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
the left, N, France and her allies, is .attacking
along the lines Y-Y-Y.
Hungary, B-2, is not only geographically an
outlier, but politically is the weakest link in the
chain of the Austro-Germanic Alliance. The
area of Hungary is almost denuded of men, for
most of these have been called up to defend Gler-
many. A, and in particular to prevent the invasion
of Germany's territory in Silesia at S. The one
defence Hungary has against being raided and
persuaded to an already tempting peace is the
barrier of the Carpathian Mountains C-C-C. The
mouth of every pass across these is now in the
hands of the Russians, and when, or if the summits
shall be again in their possession, and the Russian
cavalry reappear upon the Hungarian side of the
hills, the first great political embarrassment of the
enemy will have begun — I mean the first great
political embarrassment to his strategy.
1. Shall he tr}^ to defend those passes (which
are already nearly forced) in permanent fashion?
Then he must detach men and detach them very far
from the areas which are vital to the core of the
alliance, that is, to the German Empire, A.
2. Shall he send back Hungarian troops to
defend Hungary ? Then he weakens what is "vital
to him, the strength of the effectives which still
keep the Russians out of Silesia at S.
3. Shall he abandon Hungary? And let the
Russians do what they will with the passes over
the Carpathians and raid the Hungarian Plain at
large? Then he loses a grave proportion of his
next year's wheat, much of his dwindling horse
supply; his almost strangled sources of petrol;
he tempts Roumania to come in (for a great sweep
of Eastern Hungary is nationally Roumanian),
and he loses the control in men and financial re-
sources of one half of his Allies if the danger and
the distress persuade Hungary to stand out. For
the Hungarians have no quarrel except from their
desire* to dominate the Southern Slavs ; to fight
Austria's battles means very little to them, and to
fight Germany's battles means nothing at all.
There is, of course, much more than this. If
Hungary dropped out could Austria remain?
Would not the Government at Vienna rather than
lose the Dual Monarchy follow Hungary's lead?
In that case the Germanic Alliance would lose at
one stroke H-25ths of its men. It would lose
more than half of its reserves of men, for the Aus-
trian reserve is, paradoxically enough, larger
than the German reserve, though not sucTi good
material.
Admire how, in every way, this geographical
and political problem of Hungary confuses the
strategical plan of the German General Staff. They
cannot here act upon pure strategics. They can-
not treat the area of operations like a chessboard
and consider the unique object of inflicting a mili-
tary defeat upon the Russians. Their inability
to do so proceeds from the fact that this great,
awkward salient, Hungarian territory, is not poli-
tically subject to Berlm, is not in spiritual union
with Berlin ; has been denuded of , men to save
Berlin, and is the most exposed of all the enemy's
territory to attack. And every day the problem
re-presents itself to the great General Staff of the
Prussians : " How can we save Hungary without
hopelessly weakening our eastern line ? If we aban-
don Hungary, how are we to maintain our effec-
tivea?:'
Such, in detail, is the political embarrass-
ment to German strategy produced by the geogra-
phical situation, and the political traditions of
Hungary itself, and of Hungary's connection with
the Hapsburgs at Vienna. Let us now turn to tho
even more ihiportant embarrassment caused to
German strategy by the corner positions of the
four essential areas of territory occupied by Ger-
many at this moment.
2. TJie political embarrassment due to the
geographical position of the four essential area$
occupied hy the German atomies.
We saw in the first part of this analysis and
followed upon a diagram, which I here reproduce,
a peculiar political weakness in the German
strategical position to-day, which consists in the
fact that the four areas which the German Gov-
ernment must for diverse reasons particularly pre-
serve from invasion are (1) widely separated each
from its neighbour; (2) standing at the outlying
corners of the territory occupied by the German
Armies. This point is of the gravest possible
moment, and has perhaps not received all the at-
tention it deserves. Of the four outlying points in
such a diagram. No. 1 stands for Belgium, as we
have seen above. No. 2 for East Prussia, No. 3 for
Alsace-Lorraine, No. 4 for Silesia. And it is the
distinctive mark of this most strange situation and
the most embarrassing of all, that each area must
be preserved from invasion for a different and yet
equally importomt reason.
Germany miist hold on to Belgium, or it is all
up with her; she must hold on to East Prussia, or
it is all up with her ; she must hold on to Alsace-
Lorraine, or it is all up with her ; and she must
hold on to Silesia, or it is all up with her. If there
were some common strategical factor binding
these four areas together so that the defence of
one should be connected with the defence of all, the
difficulties thus imposed upon German strategy
would be greatly lessened. Though even then the
mere having to defend four outlying corners in-
stead of a centre would involve confusion and em-
barrassment the moment numerical inferiority
had appeared upon the side of the defence. But,
as a fact, there is no such common factor. Alsace-
Lorraine and Belgium, East Prussia and Silesia,
stand separate one from the other. Even the two
on the East and the two on the West, though ap-
parently forming pairs upon the map, are very
distinct and distant one from the other, while be-
tween the eastern and the western group there is
a space of 500 miles.
Let us, before discussing the political em-
barrassment to strategy produced by these four
widely distant and quite separate areas, translate
the diagram in the terms of a sketch-map
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 1915.
On the accompanying sketch-map, Belgium,
Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia and Silesia are
shaded as were the four corners of the diagram.
No. 1 is Belgiimi, No. 2 is East Prussia, No. 3 is
Alsace-Lorraine, No. 4 is Silesia. The area occu-
pied by the German Empire, including its present
occupation of Belgium, is marked by the broad
outline, and the areas shaded represent, not the
exact limits of the four territories that are so im-
portant, but those portions of them which are
essential : the non-Polish portion of Silesia, the
non-Polish portion of East Prussia, the Plain of
Belgium, and all Alsace-Lorraine.
Now, the reason that each of these must at
all costs be preserved from invasion is, as I have
said, different in each case, and we shall do well
to examine what those reasons are ; for uj^on them
depends the political confusion they inevitably
cause to arise in the plans of the Great General
Staff.
(1) Belgium.— The occupation of Belgium has
been a result of the War, and, from the Geiman
point of view, an unexpected result. Germany
both hoped and expected that her armies would
pass through Belgium as they did in fact pass
through Luxembourg. The resistance of Belgium
produced the occupation of that coimtry; the
reign of terror exercised therein has immobilised
about 100,000 of the German troops who would
otherwise be free for the front; the checking of
the advance into France has turned the German
general political objective against England, and,
to put the matter in the vaguest, but most funda-
mental terms, the German mind has gradually
come, since October, to regard the retention of
Belgium as something quite essential. (a) It
gives a most weighty asset in the bargaining for
peace. (6) It gives a seaboard against England.
(c) It provides ample munition, house-room and
transport facility, without which the campaign in
North-Eastern France could hardly be prolonged.
(d) It puts Holland at the mercy of Germany, for
she can, by retaining Belgium, strangle Dutch
trade, if she chooses to divert her carriage of goods
through Belgian ports. (e) It is a specific con-
quest ; the Government will be able to say to the
German people : " It is true we had to give up this
or that, but Belgium is a definite new territory,
the occupation of which and the proposed annexa-
tion of which is a proof of victory." (/) The reten-
tion of Belgium has been particularly laid down as
the cause of quarrel between Great Britain and
Germany ; to retain Belgiimi is to mark that score
against what is now the special enemy of Germany
in the German mind, (g) Antwerp is the natural
port for all the centre of Europe in commerce
westward over the ocean, (h) With Belgium may
go the Belgian Colonics, that is, the Congo, foi
the possession of which Germany has worked
ceaselessly year in and year out during the last
fifteen years by a steady and probably subsidised
propaganda against the Belgian administration.
She has done it through conscious and unconscious
agents ; by playing upon the cupidity of Parlia-
mentarians, of rum shippers, and upon religious
differences, and upon every agency to her hand.
We may take it, then, that the retention of
Belgium is in German eyes now quite indispen-
sable. " If I abandon Belgium," she says, " it is
much more than a strategic retreat ; it is a political
confession of failure, and the moral support behind
me at home will break down."
If I were writing not of calculable considera-
tions, but of other and stronger forces, I should
add that to withdraw from Belgiimi where so
many women and children have been massacred,
so many jewels of the past befouled or destroyed,
so wanton an attack upon Christ and His Church
delivered, would be a loss of Pagan prestige in-
tolerably strong, and a triumph of all that against
which Prussia set cut to war.
(2) Alsace-Lorraine. — But Alsace-Lorraine is
also "indispensable." We have seen in an earlier
part of this article what the retention of that terri-
tory means ; bewildered by the difficulty of main-
taining so enormous a line in the West, the Ger-
mans left the unfortified upper corner of Alsace
in weak hands (reserves), and not too many of
them. The French pressure here has at once called
German troops from the north, probably from
Champagne, where, as a consequence, the French
have advanced in five places. Alsace -Lorraine
is the symbol of the old victory. It is the Gemian-
spealdng land which the amazingly unreal super-
stitions of German academic pedantry discovered
to be something sacredly necessary to the unity of
an ideal Germany, though the people inhabiting
it desired nothing better than the destruction of
the Prussian name. It is more than that. It is
the bastion beyond the Ehine which keeps the
Rhine close covered; it is the two great historic
fortresses of Strasburg and of Metz which are the
challenge Germany has thrown down against Euro-
pean tradition and the civilisation of the West ; it
is something which has become knit up with the
whole German soul, and to abandon it is like a
man abandoning his title or his name, or surren-
dering his sword. Through what must not the
German mind pass before its directors would con-
sent to the sacrifice of such a fundamentally sym-
bolic possession ? There is defeat in the very sug-
gestion; and that very suggestion, though it has
already occurred to the great General Staff and
has already, I believe, been mentioned in one pro-
posal for peace, is still intolerable to the mass of
the enemy's opinion.
(3) East Prussia. — East Prussia is sacred in
another, but also an intense fashion. It is the
very kernel of the Prussian Monarchy. When
Berlin was but a market town for the electors of
Brandenburg, those same electors had contrived
that East Prussia, which was outside the Empire,
should be recognised as a Kingdom. Frederick
the Great himself while of Brandenburg an elector
was in Prussia proper a king: a man whose fathet
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
had emancipated that cradle of the Prussian power
from vassalage to the crown of Poland. The pro-
vince in all save its southern belt (which is Polish)
is the very essence of Prussian society : a mass of
serfs, technically free, economically abject, gov-
erned by those squires who own them, their goods,
and what might be their soil. The Eussians
wasted East Prussia in their first invasion, and
they did well, though they paid so heavy a price ;
for to wound East Prussia was to wound the very
soul of that which now governs the German Em-
pire. When the landed proprietors fled before
the Russian invasion, and v/hen there fled with
them the townsfolk, the serfs rose and looted the
country houses. Prussia dares not 'see that hap-
pen again. In a way quite different from Bel-
gium, quite different from Alsace-Lorraine, East
Prussia is essential. Its abandonment means
ruin. Forces will be preserved to defend it, how-
ever urgently they may be needed elsewhere, as
the pressure upon Germany increases. The Ger-
man commanders, if they forget East Prussia for
a moment in the consideration of the other essen-
tial points will, the moment their ej-es are turned
upon East Prussia, again remember with violent
emotion all that the province means to the reign-
ing dynasty and its supporters, and they will do
anything rather than let that frontier go. The
memory of the first invasion is too acute ; the terror
of its repetition too poignant to permit its aban-
donment.
(4) Silesia. — Silesia, for quite other reasons
(and remember that these different reasons for de-
fending such various points are the essence of the
embarrassment in which German strategy will
find itself), must be saved. It has been insisted
over and over again in these notes what Silesia
means. Its meaning is twofold. If Silesia goes,
the safest, the most remote from the sea, the most
independent of imports of the German industrial
regions is gone. Silesia is, again, the country of
the great proprietors. Amuse yourselves by re-
membering the names of Pless and of Lichnowsky.
There are dozens of others. But, most important
of aU, Silesia is what Belgium is not, what Alsace-
Lorraine is not, what East Prussia is not, it is
the strategic key. Who holds Silesia commands
the twin divergent roads to Berlin northwards, to
Vienna southwards. Who holds Silesia holds the
Moravian Gate. Who holds Silesia turns the line
of the Oder and passes behind the barrier for-
tresses which Germany has built upon her eastern
front. Who holds Silesia strikes his wedge in be-
tween the German-speaking north and the Ger-
man-speaking south, and joins hands with the
Slavs of Bohemia ; not that we should exaggerate
the Slav factor, for religion and centuries of vary-
ing culture disturb its unity. But it is something.
Now, the Russian forces are Slav ; the resurrection
of Poland has been promised ; the Czechs are not
submissive to the German claim of natural mas-
tery, and whoever holds Silesia throws a bridge
between Slav and Slav if his aims are an extension
of power in that race. For a hundred reasons
Silesia must be saved.
Now, put yourself in the position of the men
who must make a decision between these four out-
liers— Belgium, Alsace-Lorraine, East Prussia
and Silesia, and understand the hesitation such
divergent aims impose upon them. Hardly are
they prepared to sacrifice one of the four when the
defensive problem becomes acute, but its claims
will be pressed in every conceivable manner : by
public sentiment, by economic considerations, by
mere strategy, by a political tradition, by the in-
fluence of men powerful with the Prussian Mon-
archy, whose homes and wealth are threatened.
"If I am to hold Belgium I must give up Alsace.
How dare I do that ? To save Silesia I must ex-
pose East Prussia. How dare I? I am at bay
and the East must at all costs be saved. I Avill
hold Prussia and Silesia — but to withdraw from
Belgium and from beyond the Rhine is defeat."
The whole thing is an embroglio. That conclu-
sion is necessary and inexorable. It does not ap-
pear at all until numerical weakness imposes a
gradual concentration of the defensive, but once
that numerical weakness has come, the fatal
choices must be made. It may be that a strict,
silent and virile resolution such as saved France
this summer, a preparedness for particular sacri-
fices calculated beforehand, will determine first
some one retirement and then another. It may
be— though it is not in the modem Prussian tem-
perament—that a defensive as prolonged as pos-
sible will be attempted, and that, as circumstances
may dictate, Alsace-Lorraine or Belgium, Silesia
or East Prussia, will be the first to be deliberately
sacrificed; but one must be, and, it would seem,
another after, and in the difficulty of choice a
wound to the Germany strategy will come.
The four corners are differently defensible.
Alsace-Lorraine and Belgium only by artifice and
Avith great numbers of men ; Silesia only so long as
Austria (and Hungary) stand firm. East Prussia
has her natural arrangement of lakes to make in-
vasion tedious and to permit defence with small
numbers.
Between the two groups, eastern and western,
is all the space of Germany— the space separating
Aberdeen from London. Between each part of
each pair, in spite of an excellent railway system,
is the block in the one case of the Ardennes and
the Eiffel, in the other of empty ill-communicated
Poland. But each is strategically a separate
thing. The political value of each is a separate
thmg, the embarrassment between all four in-
superable.
The current number of tbe Anatio Jtnievi contains a mass of
valuable matter with regard to the part our Indian Allies are pL-ivinB
in the War, luclncling an article on "The Indian Troops in Frarice*
Jv 9?f*' ^''*''»'>' and "India's Rally Round the I'la"," by
A. Ynsuf Ah. Another exceptionally interesting article on the'fall of
Tsmg-rao is contributed by Shinii Ishii, a Japanese writer who deals
with huj subject from the inside. While topical in many of its features
the J^evi^w maintains its literary character, and in this connection its
literary supplement forms a well-compiled critique of the leailin?
publications of the day.
In The Kaiser's War, published in handy half-crown form by
Messrs. George Allen and Unwin, Mr. Austin Harrison holds to the
view that " if five years ago we had seen through the Crerraan purpose
and answered it with conscription, this war would not have broken
out." In addition to thie, he separates Germany from Kaiserism to a
certain extent, and— a dangerous attitude at the present time-
admits to admiration of " numbers of German things which I do not
find in this country," including "a factual honesty of thought."
Thus th« preface; but, having read more than the preface,
we find in the book a fearless criticism of many things
which we might do batter, and not least among them
the treatment of soldiers" wives and dependents. The book is lucid,
as Its author's work usually is, and is a stimulating work, well worth
reading.
Messrs. J. Arrowsmith have just published The Third Great War,
by Laurie M.ignus, a shilling book designed to prove that the history
of militarism did not start with Bemhardi an<d ihis echool, but waa
combated by both Marlborough and Wellington. The book contains a
mass of historical fact in support of its author's argument, wliich is
well thrust home in view of the limits of such a work.
15»
LAND :/SND WATER
January 16, 1915,
THE DRAINAGE OF THE SALISBURY
PLAIN CAMP.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).
I THINK it would be greatly to the public advantage
if the House of Lorda concentrated on the prob-
lems of administration immediately under their eyea
here in England inetfiad of discussing questions of
recruiting and terms of service ■without adequate
figures before them to go upou.
It is the case that the War Office is meeting all the re-
quirements of the generals at the front without stint, but
they seem both blind and deaf to the complaints of those at
home who are charged with the very onerous duties of rais-
ing and training the new armies now forming at various
centres all over the country.
It was common knowledge to everyone that the new mil-
lions could not be trained in a few days, and it would have
been only reasonable foresight to provide for the rain which
was sure to fall in the winter months, though no one could
have anticipated the abnormal downpours of the last six
weeks. Yet even one-half the amount of rain which has actu-
ally fallen would suffice to turn any newly formed oamp into
a bottomless slough.
Every one of these new sites for hut encampments should
have been provided at the outset with a decent system of sTir-
faoe drainage, and the men, as they came in, might just as
well have been trained to digging trenches, by making drain-
age channels throughout the camp, as in fortifying imaginary
hillsides against impossible contingencies. The action of
digging is the same in both cases, and all that is' really needed
is to harden the hands and back muscles of the men by pro-
gressive instruction : the shape of the tiling they dig is quite
immaterial.
If the men could not be provided with sufficient entrench-
ing tools at the time, a few of Fowler's trench-ploughing
machines, such as are being now used at the front, which cut
out a trench 2ft. 6in. deep in a single haul, would have paid
for themselves over and over again before now, and done much
to stop the grumbling besides improving the health of the men
now undergoing training.
I have one special case before my mind as Ivfxite, viz., the
state of the Salisbury Camps, with which every reader of the
illustrated dailies is by now familiar. Here there can be no
possible excuse for the condition into which they have been
allowed to deteriorate, for both as regards levels and subsoil
their sites are about the easiest to keep clear of water in
Europe.
i<Sump pit'
The accompanying sketch gives a section of the ground.
Underlying the abort turf familiar to everyone who has ever
Been a chalk down, there is a thin layer of vegetable mould
resting on sand and light clay (very light) interspersed with
■mall broken chalk flints and rounded gravel. It can be seen
in any quarry section all round the chalk hills which encircle
London. Sometimes it may be two to three feet thick, in
North Kent, for instance, but on the Salisbury downs it is
often not more than six to eight inches deep. Below this
oomes the chalk, which will soak up water like a sponge, and
^hioh normally keeps the whole chalk country so dry.
But when troops encamp upon it in any considerable
ftmnbers, as soon as the first smart showers fall the action
of the countless feet going and coming churns up the surface
dust and vegetable mould into what engineers call "puddle,"
!.«., an impervious clay which retains the water that makes
the "puddle" in the ordinary sense cf the word, and ihit
impervious clay in time turns the whole country-side into
a moving creamy sea, which flows down country lanes, and
renders them impassable, and this is what has happened u>
the present case.
All that was needed, and is even new necessary, is to
break up this impervious film of creamy soup by running
ordinary ploughs orisS-crcss over the country, or by dig-
ging side drains about a foot deep.
If the ground ia very level, " sump " pits must be pro-
vided every acre or so, pits about 3ft. to 4ft. deep, ift.
diameter, filled with chalk flints or broken brick, and, if
things are very bad, centrifugal sludge pumps can be fitted.
Viokers-Maxim, I know, make some of them, and the first
steam-plough in the district can be requisitioned to work
them.
It is really the duty of the commanding officer on the
epot to see to all this. As we know, from the very first. Lord
Kitohencr stated in the House of Lords that he would back
any man to his utmost who took the responsibility of meeting
his men's natural and obvious requirements; and that this
was no empty form of words was at once apparent when
several interesting relics of red tape days were presently sent
back to the oblivion from which it is a pity that they had
ever emerged.
BRUSHWOOD SCREENS FOR GUNS AND
FIRE TRENCHES.
Looking at photographs of the various methods now in
use for hiding guns and fire trenches from observation, I have
been reminded of a most ingenious method of defence, which
was used against us by the Maories in New Zealand in. the
early 'sixties of the Ia«t century, that might be usefully com-
bined with the existing types, not only to conceal guns in
trenches from observation, but to protect them against shrap-
nel bullets, shell splinters, and possibly to stop many rifl«
bullets striking obliquely to the front.
We used Armstrongs against these " pahs," as they were
called, and found that our shell could do nothing against
them, for they did not offer sufficient resistance to make the
percussion fuses work, and if we fired time fuses to burst cut-
side, the splinters were all caught and held.
The idea can be readily grasped from the subjoined
sketch.
Light brushwood, willow, and the like, not more than
half an inch in diameter, if possible, and with the twigs and
leaves left on, were attached in a thickness of about eight
inches to a foot, to a horizontal beam, which was lashed to
uprights in such a manner that the screen was free to swing
when struck — the lower ends of the sticks being loosely seized
together with yarn, and cut oS just clear of the ground.
Against a background of forest, orchards, or other trees,
these screens were quite invisible; and since, as I have said,
no artillery fire made any impression on them, we were forced
to attack them by regular trench and sap work. As we were
exceedingly short of white men, we sent out for natives to do
the digging, and as we paid very good wages, the enemy
thought it a pity that good money should go a-begging, so
sent out a portion of the garrison through the bush to work
in our trenches. As one dark man seemed very much lik«
16*
January 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
another, they were made very welcome. But, of course, tlie
enemy was thua fully apprised of our progress, and when we
had approached near enough to make a rush for the " pah,"
with axes to hack the screens down, they trained every old
gun they could find down our line of approach, blazed ofi one
volley into the brown of the assailants, then bolted into the
bush to a fresh position, where the same game was played over
again.
This idea of a swinging screen, however, deserves far
more attention than it has yet received. We used to be taught
— though I never saw it tried — that two folds of a blanket
hanging loosely over a string, and kept about two inches apart,
would stop a Snider bullet, and it is quite certain that it
would suffice to stop all ordinary shrapnel bullets and small
splinters of shell. Further experiments might well be made
with the idea.
THE ZEPPELIN BASE ON HELIGOLAND.
THE LOOK-OUT ON THE NORTH SEA.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
THE German airship base of Heligoland is situated
in a sort of ditch, the Sapskiihle, which, a few
weeks before the outbreak of hostilities, was being
prepared for the erection of the moet up-to-date
Zeppelin shed, and the necessary hydrogen fac-
tory. The Heligoland shed, which is now com-
pleted, at a cost of £20,000, is of the same type as that
built near Cuxhaven and handed over to the Grerman authori-
ties towards the end of April, 1914. Like the one erected
in Cuxhaven, the aii'ship shed of Heligoland can shelter two
modem Zeppelins. It is about 625 ft. long and 180 ft.
wide, and is of the " revolving type," that is, being mounted
on a pivot, it always turns so as to place itself in line with
the wind. This type of shed makes the entry and exit of the
airship safer, since these manoeuvres are thus rendered in-
dependent of the wind.
This ability to always place itself lengthwise in the
direction of the wind is not the only remarkable feature of
the Heligoland airship shed. Being mounted on powerful
hydraulic presses, the shed can be made to rise and sink in
the ditch. When the airship is not in use it lies in its shed,
which is then in its tunk position; but when needed for
action, to allow the airship to emerge, the shed is brought
to its raised position. The ditch is of such a depth that,
when the shed is brought to it« " down * position its roof
is just below the level of the ground. It is, therefore, im-
possible to perceive the shed from the sea, this fact rendering
its bombardment by our warships very difficult of accomplish-
ment.
So far as known, the shed just described is the only
one on the island of Heligoland from which airships can carry
out operations over the North Sea, and there is every indica«-
tion that the Heligoland airships are kept in constant readi-
ness to sally forth. We see, for instance, that, on the occa-
sion of the daring air raid which our seaplanes made on Cux-
haven on Christmas Day, it was the two Zeppelins from
Heligoland, and not those stationed at Cuxhaven, that, at a
moment's notice, came out, apparently, to try to resist the
raid.
BRINGING A ZEPPELIN INTO ACTION.
In order to appreciate the rapidity with which a modern
Zeppelin can be brought into action, it is necessary to have
■ome idea of the method adopted to run it out of its shed.
Inside the shed there are, for each airship, two rails
running the whole length of the hangar and projecting some
distance outside. On each pair of rails there are four small
trucks used to facilitate the quick exit of the airship. Two
strong ropes from the nose, and two more from the tail of
the airship are attached to the four trucks, there being one
rope to each truck. The trucks are so placed that there are two
of them towards the forepart of the airship and two othei"3
towards its aft. To each of these four main ropes are at-
tached a number of smaller ropes weighted by ballast when
the airship is at rest, but held by a number of trained men
▼hen it is in readiness to come forth.
To get an airship out of it« shed the motor in the aft
nacelle is started, causing the trucks to run along the rails,
and the airship thereby issues under its own motive power.
The men, holding the ropes, run along the rails, and when
the two aft trucks, which are near and below the nose of the
airship, reach the extremity of tlie rails, the four main ropes
are unfastened from the trucks, and the airship is held by
the men only, until the order " Let go I " is given.
When the airship returns to its shed, the main ropes
are attached to the trucks which have been brought outside the
shed. The aft engine is started, and the airship enters under
its own power. The sacks of ballast are quickly fastened to
the airship, and trestles, covered with felt, are placed under
the cars of the dirigible. The different balloons are then
refilled with hydrogen, and the water pockets, placed between
the balloons, inside the envelope, are filled with water, which
is the ballast employed on board a modern Zeppelin. The
airship is then ready for its next trip.
THE ZEPPELIN AND TORPEDO ATTACKS.
Although there is a report to the eSeot that the Zeppelin
airship has recently been fitted with some apparatus whereby
a Whitehead torpedo can Be discharged from it with complete
success, it is not yet as a fighting weapon wherein lies its
greatest value to naval operations. It is, nevertheless, just aa
well not to ignore this new fighting element of the Zeppelin
on the score that, the German airship having, up to the pre-
sent, failed under certain conditions, it must necessarily fail
under all conditions. Such a method of reasoning, in spite
of its illogicality and danger, is that which has generally
been adopted in the Press, even by qualified writers. It is,
however, satisfactory to note that the Admiralty does not
look at things in tKe same light, and is, therefore, in a better
position to foresee all eventualities.
There are, of course, no details available as yet of the
means whereby the Zeppelin can be used to discharge torpe-
does, but it may be presumed that, for such a purpose, the
airship is brought down to very near the sea level, and then
the torpedo is fired. And, if it be remembered that the
modern torpedo has a range of action of over two miles, it
will be recognised that the Zeppelin is provided with a new
means of naval attack that cannot altogether be left out of
account. It is true that, in order to discharge its torpedo
with some chance of success, a Zeppelin must come within a
range of two miles from the battleship or cruiser against
which it may be operating, and that, at such a distance, the
airship would be very exposed to gun fire from the warships.
However, when all has been said on the subject, the fact
remains that this new potentiality of the Zeppelin, especially
at night, introduces another factor into naval fighting which
cannot fail to add considerably to the strain to which a fleet
is already subjected.
The greatest importance of the Heligoland airships, how-
ever, lies in the means of reconnaissance they can aflord to
the German fleet, and may have been the means which ren-
dered possible the recent raid on our East Coast. In compar-
ing the respective values of sea scouts and airships, one might
say that there is between them the same difference as exists
between a short-sighted man and one whose sight is keen. It
is important to remember this fact. It explains the apparent
anomaly of our naval airmen bravely carrying out operations
over land, to the Swiss frontier at Friedrichshafen, to well
into German territory at Diisseldorf and Cologne, and, over
Belgium, to Brussels. In all these instances our naval air-
men were taken from their usual naval duties in order to
attack the airship sheds at those various centres. The object
of the Admiralty in thus sending its valiant airmen over land
was not to try to deprive the German armies of their Zeppe-
lins, which, as we know, are quite unfit for land warfare, but,
in all probability, was to ensure that the German navy should,
if pos-siblo, not have better eyes than our own.
There are f«w people so well qualified to write on Belgium and it«
people as Dr. Sarolea, who, in his book, How Belgium Saved Europe,
tells the story of the Belgian tragedy, and forecasts, in Bome degree, the
place that tiie Belgiaji nation will take in European civilisation when
Prussiaiusm is both dead and damned. Published at 28. by Messrs.
William Heinemann, this book is one that will have a permanent interosk
and will occupy a noteworthy place among the literature of the grea»
war.
17»
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 1915,
CORRESPONDENCE.
CRITICS ON THE HEARTH.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sib, — Your self-styled " armchair critic " from Co. Water-
ford is a kindred soid. I, too, was inspired in the early days
of the war with the idea of first catching your submarine (in
fishing net) and then cooking it. So inflated was I with my
brilliant inspiration that I wrote to tell the Admiralty how
to do it, and received a most polite printed acknowledgment.
I proposed to cast my net over a wider area than harbour
mouths — in fact, from Calais to Dover; but can you believe
it possible, sir, submarines have since careered down the Chan-
nel and sent refugee ships and ironclads to the bottom with
impunity J
A friend of mine walked into the office the other day,
and when entrenched in my armchair immediately assumed
the role of critic. He assured me he had a brilliant idea; it
was an invention to blow up trains which were not there. At
least, they were not visible, and the invention went nosing
along the railway and blew the train up. He also assured
me he had penetrated to Lord Kitchener's armchair and had
thereupon sold his invention for eighty pounds. I was
awfully interested in that eighty pounds, but failed to dis-
semble, when my friend, to my chagrin, quickly remarked,
" But I haven't got it yet; they owe it to me, you know."
I have, of course, been fired by this success with new
ambition, ».nd am preparing further brilliant ideas ; amongst
others 1 shall tell them how to send up a man-lifting kite
(west winds being prevalent, and the Germans being east,
unable to retaliate), and to haul up by an endless cord through
a pulley on the kite explosive bombs which will be dangled
like the Sword of Damocles, over the enemy's heads, and
then exploded by an electric wire or the pulling of a string.
If that does not annihilate them all, I shall suggest the
provision of steel screens, V-shaped and loopholed, to be
attached to the front of a push-cart, or fixed upon runners
like mud-skis, each screen to contain within the V a dozen or
so of men, who will advance by pushing it along up to the wire
entanglement, which will then be cut through with nippers,
and the advance continued in absolute security until the
trench is reached. The rest will be easy.
It is evident, sir, that if our respective armchairs were
removed to the locality of Whitehall, where they ought to be,
things would begin to happen.
May I be permitted, even as my co-inspirationist from
Co. Waterford, to conclude with the remark, "I offer these
suggestions for what they are worth "J — I am, sir, very faith-
fully yours,
" Critic on the Hkakth."
AERIAL WARFARE.
To the Editor of L.\nd and Water.
Sir, — In your issue of January 9, " The Airship in Naval
Warfare," Mr. Desbleds, in his very interesting article, surely
makes one very serious miscalculation when he says: "This
is an important point to remember in dealing with the new
factor which has been introduced into naval warfare by the
advent of aircraft, for it shows that it is only within the arc
W.W.W. (150 miles) that a Zeppelin can maintain contact
with its adversaries and Headquarters." Granted that the
range of wireless of an airsliip is only 150 miles, what is
there to prevent two airships working togetlier, the first 150
miles out from Heligoland practically stationary about
4,000ft. high, the other ranging 150 miles farther out, bul'
still keeping in touch with Headquarters and the enemy
through the intermediate airship. As you can see, many
modifioations of this could be so worked as to bring practi-
cally the whole of the North Sea within the range of the
Zeppelin. — Yours faithfully, H. Ttrell-Smith.
St. Aidans, Clonskeagh, Co. Dublin,
• There is not, in theory, any reason why two or more
Zeppelins could not be employed in the manner described in
the preceding letter. It is only within the arc W.W.W. , how-
ever, tliat a Zeppelin can maintain direct contact with its ad-
versaries and Headquarters. — L. B. D.
THE SPORTSMAN'S BATTALIONS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — May I ask you to help me to raise the neces-
sary funds for the 2nd Sportsman's Battalion? The facta
briefly are these : —
A battalion of 1,400 men costs £8 to £10 per man over
and above the money allowed and repaid by the War Office^
and this amount the individuals raising the battalions have
to find. The money is not for luxuries, but for ordinary
necessary comforts which mean so much to a man under-
going strenuous training, and prevents illness, discontent
and other troubles. Out of this fund also administration ex-
penses, advertising and printing have to be paid, which are
necessarily heavy items. It would be most kind if your
readers would send me cheques towards this fund, and so
help me in the big national work I have undertaken. The
cheques' should be made payable to E. Cunliffe-Owen, and
crossed 2nd Sportsman's Battalion, London Joint Stock Bank,
Ltd., Strand.
Any sum will be gratefuljy received and acknowledged
at once, and every care is taken in the expenditure of the
funds.
Thanking you in anticipation for doing the best in youB
power to help in this matter, believe me to be, yours faith-
fully, E. CUNLIFPK-OWEM.
Hotel Cecil, Strand, London,
SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sib, — The readers of your article on Submarines in yoar
issue of January 2 will be interested to have some particulaxs
of an earlier submarine thau the " Holland " boat to whlcb
you refer.
A submarine was built in 1886, twelve years earlier than
the Holland boat. It was, I think, built at Sarauda's yard
on the Thames, but I cannot recollect the inventor's namo^
It was sixty feet long, eight feet diameter, propelled by twin
screws driven by electric motors and accumulators; these were
used for surface as well as submerged running. There waa
no engine, and the accumulators- had to be charged from some
outside source. The speed was slow, and the range of opera-
tion very limited.
I made several trips in this boat with the inventor, but
it was not pleasant work, as there was no periscope, and we
had no idea where we were going.
I do not know what becajnc of the boat. When last I
saw it, it was in the Tilbury Docks.
C. 0. Grimsuaw.
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for 6s. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numbers already
received we have had to reprint some of the earlier
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Order now from your Newsagent, Bookstall, or direct
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JG»
Januarv 16, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
HOTE.-Thl. Articl. hai httn i.bmttted to th. Prei. Bureau, which d.e. .,t .bject t. th. pablicatiou at ceniored, aod t«k«i
reiponilbility for th« correctneit of the itatcmeoti.
NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.
THE loss of the Formidable is now attributed to a
submarine. The claim was originally made in
Germany, though, curiously enough, the number
of the submarine has not been stated. If a sub-
marine were responsible (which I still feel some-
what sceptical about owing to the above circum-
stance), it must have been a matter of absolute blind chance
and of the one in a thousand variety at that!
The claims made in Germany a'bout the wonderful skill
exhibited by the delivery of a night attack are absurd. Even
in daylight the submarine is somewhat in the position of a
floating mine possessed of a certain amount of mobility, fail-
ing perhaps twenty times for every success secured, and success
18 then partly a matter of an invisible opponent having been
blundered into by the victim. At night these conditions pre-
vail to an enormously exaggerated degree. The boat (if boat
there were) must necessarily have been on the surface, and she
let fly as the Formidable unexpectedly passed her in the dark-
ness.
Here for a moment it may not be unprofitable to discuss
the shoals of suggestions which have been sent in to Land and
Water, though only a small fraction of them have been pub-
lished. I would first of all refer to the " diving bell " protec-
tion idea of Colonel F. N. Maude. This idea as an idea is
quite sound, and, as a matter of fact, it is a regulation fit-
inent in the most modern U.S. battleships. Given sufficient
air pressure, a torpedo explosion — unless, of course, the
weapon chances to land in a magazine — must be rendered per-
fectly innocuous, for no water could enter the hole made by
the torpedo.
For practical reasons, however, the system cannot be
applied to old type ships. It has to be associated with solid
bulkheads, because watertight doors, whatever their theoreti-
cal value, almost invariably give out in critical moments. The
fault does not lie with the doors so much as with the human
element concerned. Either the doors are not efficiently looked.
or else something gets left in the way to jam them. In addi-
tion thereunto, however, ihey are, of course, the "weak link
in the chain," very liable to give way owing to some struc-
tural defect — defective rivets, or what not, starting the
trouble.
One way or another, therefore, the diving bell idea,
though quite perfect in theory, is in practice only really
applicable to ships fitted with 'solid bulldieads. Of these we
have but a few. We started such bulkheads with the original
Dreadnought, but at a later date dropped them again, because
of the enormous inconvenience and loss of efficiency in other
directions which they entailed. And — but here probably I am
approaching the regions' of " enough said." To recapitulate:
it is the soundest of all theoretical defences, but inapplicable
practically to ships not specially designed for its use.
It remains to deal with a mass of correspondence on the
submarine defence question addressed to this paper or to me
direct. I am afraid that (to be honest) I must say outright
that while fully appreciating the patriotic motives which lead
to such suggestions, not a single one is of any technical value
■whatever.
The Navy employs a variety of experts whose sole duty is
to " think out things," and these experts are so multifarious
that what one didn't think of, another would. The only
known case of an amateur hitting on a brand new idea is that
of Mr. Pollen with his fire control system; and we may safely
put that down as the " one chance in a thousand," and even
«t that it was only evolved by practical observation on ship-
•board. It could never have been evolved in a chair on shore.
So I trust that readers whose patriotism has induced them to
send in " ideas " will forgive me for telling them that were
there anything in any of the ideas to which I havo lieen asked
to give publicity, the Navy itself would have hit on the idea
long ago.
•The rock on which all "ideas" founder is technical
applicability. At one end of the scale 1 will take a corre-
spondent who suggested that warships should be fitted with
underwater windows wherefrom observers could detect ap-
proaching submarines. The idea is brilliant, but, unfortu-
nately it is impossible to see under water mora than two
or three yards at the most, and a submarine attacks at any-
thing from one to five hundred yards.
Somewhere about the other end of the scale a correspon-
dent suggests steel plates stuck out all round a ship as a sub-
stitute for torpedo nets. Up to a certain point, this is logical
enough, and would be effective; but its practical application
is to be found in the ineffective double bottom which every war-
ship possesses — and that was invented fifty years or so ago
by the late Sir Edward Reed. An "external defence
of a similar nature, to be in any way effective, would be so
heavy that it would reduce a warship to the condition of ■»
floating log — fully defensive, perhaps, but incapable of effec-
tive attack.
Now, the first and last axiom of the British Navy is to
" kill the enemy." The turtle is amply protected by Naturo
against being killed, but it is the unprotected human biprj
who manages to make the turtle into soup. His offensive
defeats the turtle's defensive.
Up to a certain point, protection counts, but when many
years ago Sir Nathaniel Barnaby resigned his position as
Chief Constructor of the British Navy, because the Admiralty
authorities of those days insisted on offence being subordi-
nated to defence, ha probably voiced an eternal truth — much
as the " submarine menace " may seem to have altered things
since then.
In any case, I cannot see in anything done by German
submarines' any reason why we should abandon the Nelson
doctrine of " Kill the enemy." We have lost ships by under-
water attack in this war. We shall — as I have regularly in-
sisted—probably lose many more ships to submarines and
mines before we arc through. But whenever opportunity has
occurred we have been the attack, and it is as the attack that
we shall ultimately win. The submarine is a new and poteiU
arm; but everything appears to indicate that its hostile
potency would in effect be increased tenfold were we to reduce
our offensive power in any way in order to obtain a certain
extra security against its attack at the expense of our offen-
sive potentialities against larger game. Infinitely better,
surely, was' the spirit displayed at Heligoland Bight by Ad-
miral Beatty when he acted on the fifty years old maxim of
the famous American Admiral Farragut — " Damn the torpo-
d'.>cs."
What submarines arc to us to-day, the torpedoes (the word
then used for mines) were to Farragut fifty years ago. Thero
is every reason to suppose that the principles under which
Nelson acted in one era and Farragut in another still hold
good.
There is just one other aspect of the question to which I
should perhaps devote a little attention — the suggestion in a
letter in last week's issue, that racing motor-boats should be
utilised to attack enemy submarines. I am afraid that there
is not much in this. In the first place, we already have many
fast motor-boats employed on general patrol dutv : in
the second the sea is a big place, and the chances of a motor-
boat and a submarine coinciding are small. Even so, thera
would still remain the question as to whether the sighted sub-
marine were German or British.
No matter how one regards the question, I cannot from
any point of view see that any better policy than that of the
British Admiralty could be adopted.
Here we can best go to Germany for elucidation and
guidance. We then find a curious state of affairs. In this
country no one with any naval knowledge whatever tallis of
the "skulking German Fleet." One and all are unanimous
in conceding that the Germans are doing the best possible in
the circumstances under which they have to act. We may
say that this or that particular act was folly and a military
error— the bombardment of Scarborough, for one example —
but we do not condemn von Tirpitz as an idiot.
In Germany, on the other hand, we find naval experts with
■European reputations declaiming with monotonous insistence
that our strategy is all wrong, that Lord Fisher is an ass,
Winston Churchill a braggart, and Admiral Jelliooe an In-
oompetont.
Now, all these famous experts are more or less in oloso
^(i*
LAND AWD WATEB
January 16, 1915.
touch with the German Admiralty — they hare none of that
independence which obtains with naval writers in this country.
Outside this, h«w«ver, they are Gejman* and patriots. la
neither case ean wa poE>sibly Imagine th«n laying theiixselvai
out to explain wliat we ought to do to hurt them were what we
happen to be doing not inconvenient to German naval aspira-
tions. Q.E.D., what our Admiralty is doing is effective and
inconvenient to German hopes.
THE HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
Lord Selborne and others have recently been criticisiag
the Admiralty for sending the late Admiral Cradock to meet
the eBemy^ with insufficient for«e.
These criticisms strike me as singularly unfortunate,
because they display a marked failure to appreciate the actual
cireijmstances.
Von Spec, with the Scharnherst and Gneisenau, belonged
to the China Station. Here we maintained (and any old Navy
List will indicate) a force sufficient te deal with von Spee.
The normal station of Admiral Cradock was in the Atlantic,
ifhere again the disposition of forces was equally adequate.
Von Spee elected, or was ordered, to leave Kiao-Chau to
its fate and to operate in a totally different quarter of the
world. It was a smart move; but we should not blame Scot-
land Yard if all the crooks of the West End suddenly trans-
ferred themselves to Whiteohapel, and the local police were
unable to cope immediately with the situation 1
This, however, is a fairly exact analogy as to what actu-
ally occurred. With all due deference to Lord Selborne and
his friends, I maintain that to attack the Admiralty for in-
adequacy in the matter of the supply of force to Admiral
Cradock is as absurd as it is ill-timed — the more fcO as the
Canojms was sent to reinforce Cradock as a, species of ultra-
precaution.
THE BLACK SEA.
A large Turkish transport is reported to have been sunk
ou January 2 by striking a mine at the entrance to the
Bosphorus, and on the 5th another Turkish transport was
Buuk between Sinope and Trebizond. This vessel was being
convoyed by the light cruiser Medjidieh, which was attacked
by the Russian cruiser Pamiat Merkooria and a destroyer.
As the Pamiat Merkoaina. is considerably more powerful than
the Tui-k, and the latter escaped, the action cannot have
amounted to more than the eichange of a shot or two at long
range.
Stories' of the Goeben continue to float round, and she is
now reported to have struck a mine and been considerably
damaged. She ha«, however, so often been reported badly
injured, that all stories about her are best accepted with
reserve.
On the 6th the light cruisers Breslau anJ Ilamidkh are
reported to have been engaged with Russian warships, and
to have sustained considerabte damage, but no further details
are available at the time of writing.
The principal feature of all naval operations in the Black
Sea is the curious futility that characterises them. The rival
fleets are fairly equally matched in fighting value, with a
balance in favour of the Turco-German combination. The
opet ations should, therefore, by all the rules of naval strategy,
have taken the form of a strong attack on the Russian Fleet.
Instead of that we have had nothing but a series of trivial
minor operations and bombardments, which cannot possibly
preduce any main result.
When, some, little while ago, the Goehen encountered the
Russian Fleet, or a portion of it, she was not engaged in seek-
img it; and, having met it, she was mainly engaged in avoid-
ing action. Her real objective was apparently some triviality
of minoJT value.
There is presumably some underlying objective in these
apparently aimless movements of the Turco-German force:
but it is curious that the obvious circumstance that all these
operations could be more easily and safely performed were
the Russian Fleet defeated first should be so completely
ignored.
In the Mediterranean, as in the North Sea, the inaction
of the battle fleets of the Germanic powers is perfectly intelli-
gible— their inferiority being such that anything of tlie nature
of a fleet action would merely be courting disaster without
object. We cannot attack them because there is nothing to
attack. In the Black Sea, however, more even conditions pre-
vail, and the Rus'sians have certainly been out ready to give
battle. The chance to attack was g^iven ; hut not acceptied by
the enemy.
NAVAL LOSSES.
The war afloat has now continued long enough for us to
endeavour to arrive at some kind of profit and loss account.
It is not to be ajrived at exactly, because, apart from the
fact that tonnage is little or no guide, there is the added com-
plication that on both sides there is a tendency to conceal or
to mlaimise l«ssea.
Generally speaking, we may say thai on both sides, if
there has been a heavy loss of personnel, a loss- of materiel has
been promptly owned up to — a piece of frankness due mainly
to the impossibility of concealment. But whenever the crew
er the bulk of the crew have been saved, nothing about
material loss has been allowed to transpire.
This,, of course, ia ia ace.«u:dance with all the precedents
of warfare — it is folly to disclose what can be concealed. It
is a consideration of this circumstaoice which prevents me
from giving any exact detailed statement ais tot rt^lative posi-
tions now and when the war started.
There has, further, to fee taken into censitleratiea tlie
circumstance that on each side new ships liave been added.
The profit and loss account, therefore, cannot possiKy be
accurately represented merely by those tabular lists of Bosses
with which the dally Press has familiarised us.
As statements (saving for the factor of concealed losses)
they are valuable : but they are practically no iadex whatever
to the real relative position of affairs, while they are further
liable to produce an absolutely uncalled-for pessimism.
In, the following statement I liave endeavoured by the
us© of plus and minus signs of various sizes to represent mora
or less graphically the approximate effect of the wair upon our
Navy and the German fleet, taking into equal consitlepation
all the vai'ious factors of loss, new coastructioja, purchases,
and so on and so forth, A * indicates no appreciable ehaag*.
Dreadnoughts
Battle Cruisers ..
Pre-Dreadnoughts . .
Cruisers
Light Cruisers ..
Torpedo Craft ..
Submarines
British.
+
German.
*
+
Aa already stated, this is purely appuQximate; there is
ao attempt at exactitude. I am merely endeavouring to
convey a general idea. To assist tliis general idea I liaAcc
put the " things that matter "' in heavier type in the first
column.
No one, not even Lord Fisher or voa Tirpitz, is ia a
position to assess rehative fighting values one type agaiast
another to the types in the first column. We merely knew
that a Dreadnought in vhe ordinary way will certainly sink
a pre-Dreadaought. Wte know, also, that a " cruiser " v«iJl
sink a " light cruiser " in similar cir«umstances. But no one
can possibly assess submarines and Dreadnoughts and eiay
tliat a Dreadnought is equivalent tft 60 many submarines ai,
vice versa, that a submarine is worth so many Dreadnoughts.
All we do know is that aJl these various arms; are complemen-
tary to each other, and that the compai'ative uniiaportance
of pre-Dreadnoughts and "cruisers" ia due to the fact that
they represent types of warsliips which are no longer caH-
structed.
For the rest, we only know for certain that a dozen
Dreadnoughts, plus tlie complementary lesser craft, are
superior to a dozen pliu x Dreadnoughts minus the comple-
mentary lesser craft. And herefrom, we may deduce, some
idea of Germany's loss and our gain. Germaay has sustaiaad
heavy losses in light cruisers, which are invaluable for scout-
ing purposes. We, on the other hand, have increased aiid
multiplied in this direction, with the result that Germaa hig
ships or transports attempting to slip out run something li&e
douBle the risk of detection that they ran on tlie outbreak of
wai'. This is perhaps the real measure of our gain.
THE MEDITERRANEAN.
According to German wireless, the officer commanding the
Austrian submarine V 12 has been decorated for having ]!Fut
two tJorpcdoes into the French battlesliip Gourhet. The state-
ment is complicated by the fact that tliere is no U12 in- the
Austrian Navy, which has only eleven boats altogether. It ia,
of course, possible that a boat built speculatively by the Whita-
head Works at Fiumehas been acquired and become U12 ;, birf
failing corroborative evidence, the story is singularly sugges-
tive of a Teutonic version of the submarining of the Virikut
Unitis.
It is expected that the subscription list for Mr. Belloc's forthoeining
series of S lectures at the Queen's Hall will be closed by Monday,
the ISth inst.
Mr. Belloc Las arrangc<l to lecture at the Town Hall, Cheltenbaiii(
on the 28th January, and at Uristol, on the 30th January.
anuary i6, 19 15
LAND AND WATER
I
SHELL
is the spirit of
the Allies.
Larger quantities of 'Shell' than of any
other Petrol are being used by the Navy
and in every branch of Military Service.
Any statement that other suppliers' Spirit
is used as largely by our Forces is not in
accordance with the facts. * Shell ' is
working for the Allies only, and therefore
I
LAND AND WATER
January 16, 191 5
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
A Word in Season
EVERYBODY who has helped to arrarge a village
jumble sale is well aware of the motley contri-
butions it attracts, once an appeal for them is
issued These are so many and various, and
occasionally so grossly unsuitable, that more often
than not an overhauling must take place before the sale is
open to the village at large. It is felt by those in charge of
the proceedings that tattered garden-party frocks, patent
leather shoes of deplorable character, and odds and ends of
tarnished finery will hardly add to the well-being of the
community. And yet as long as jumble sales continue we
may be certain that there will be mistaken people looking
upon them merely as a convenience whereby they can get
rid of their accumulations of rubbish, and quite oblivious ot
the purpose they are intended to serve.
It would however, seem at all times to be a dangerous
experiment— this asking for superfluous clothing. There are
too many folk who interpret it to their own advantage rather
than that of the ultimate recipient. Perhaps this is not
altogether due to selfishness ; perhaps it is owing to that
lack of proportion from which we are assured on excellent
authority a large proportion of the race suffers. Be this as it
may the effects are disastrous and the same. Lately there
has iaeen an incentive for everj-body to ransack their ward-
robes War refugees have arrived here in the utmost
destitution, making not only a demand for our syinpathy but
for our tangible help. To our credit it must be allowed that
this in scores of cases has been given both generously and
well and in such instances there is no cause for complaint.
On the other hand, certain misguided souls have once again
completely missed the mark, forwarding a conglomeration of
articles fit only for the dustbin, and hardly worthy of that.
It is really not fair that this fresh strain should be put
upon the hard-worked executive of the war refugees' camps.
The mere rejection of the unsuitable takes time, to say
nothing of the waste of energy involved. We are still in the
first month of the New Year, and there is still time for the
making of fresh and good resolutions. Perhaps it is not too
much to hope that people whose interior economy forbids
their contributing aught that is in reasonably good condition
will cease to contribute at all. They need not be afraid that
the war refugees will suffer in consequence or that their sorely
needed supplies will stop.
War Clubs for Women , , ,, ^ i.i, r„„i ;,
One of the best ways we can help the men at the front is
to see that their wives and families are well looked after at
home And this need by no means stop at material comforts
alone • those are more or less assured. That there is,
however a necessity to provide occupation and suitable
amusement has been recognised by many people, Lady
Henry Somerset amongst their number. Some short while
ago a club was started at Battersea, called "The Women s
War Club " It provided a place where women could meet,
hear the iatest news, rest in attractive well-warmed rooms,
and buy tea and similar refreshments at small cost, trom
the moment it was opened this club had an immense success
and it was easy to see it supplied a great want in the most
satisfactory manner.
The idea now is to start several other clubs on the same
lines and of these Lady Henry Somerset will be president,
so that they will benefit at first hand from her great experience
of social work in all its many branches. The working of
these clubs will be nothing if not practical There is to be a
central bureau, which will supply particulars and details to
^1 iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiii>»iiiiiii|
I How to help Tommy Atkins |
= We cannot all go out to fight, but we can ^
= all do something to help our soldiers who ^
S are fighting our battles and defending the =
S honour of our native land, and in this way E
= contribute to theirwell-being and efficiency =
I SEND HIM A FLASK OF I
I HORLICH S I
liiALTED MILK TABLETS |
Invaluable to a soldier s
in the field and most =
efficient in relieving =
hunger and thirst E
and preventing fatigue. E
We will send post free to anj E
address a flask of these delicious =
and sustaining food tablets and ^
a neat vest pocket case on E
receipt of 1/6. If the man is on =
active service, be particular to s
give his name, regimental —
number, regiment, brigade and ^
division. —
Of all Chemists and Stores, in con- —
venient pocket flasks, 1/- each. _
Larger siies, 1/6, 2/8 and 11/- _
Liberal Sample sent post free for 3d. in stamps. =
HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co., =
SLOUGH, BUCKS. E
l^ffiTTmiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiillllllllllllllllllllllllllllllMll"''"'''''^
NORWICH UNION FIRE
INSURANCE SOCIETY, LTD.
FOUNDED 1797.
With wkick Is InctrfrleJ the Strmich and
Union Accident Ininrance AtstcUlien.
HEAD OFFICES:
NORWICH & LONDON.
FIRE. ACCIDENT.
MARINE.
Sickness. Employers' Liability. Third
Party. Fidelity. Burglary. Plate Glass.
Property Owners. Hailstorm. Motor.
Loss ol Prolits lollowint Fire. Livestock
PROMPT & LIBERAL SETTLEMENTS
BRANCHES AND AGENCIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD.
NATIONAL RELIEF FUND.
The Prince to the PeopU.
_ ^_ J H/,„m .»».•»/ #•■'/«'• " Buckintham Palace
"At swh a moment we all stand by one another, and it is to H>e heart ol the
British people that 1 conlidently make this most earnest appeal. EDWARD P.
^■■.^ri.ti... ■..!>€ Mtt«ti I. : H.I.H. Pri.« .1 Wde^ l.clu.tli.- Talice. UU...
BRAND'S
ESSENCE OF BE^F
MUTTON & CHICKEN
FOR ALL CASES OF EXHAUSTION
AND WEAK DIGESTION.
OffineSpring-flowcrmgBULBS HyaCf/WTHS.OflFFODILS, Tl/tlP
CROCUSES, SISIOWaROPS, IRISES. Ac. All m
Quality and at Greatly Reduced Prices. Ckaranci Lists ok ^pp
BARB & SONS. n. 12 & 13 Kln4 Street. Covent Garden. LONIM-
214.
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXIV No. 2750 SATURDAY. JANUARY 23, 1915 [r>".^w?A'?.,.il.!] ^^^^^Ji^^^i^
CopyrifU, F. A. Swaitu
LORD DESBOROUGH
A Popular Leadrr in Sport and National Defence
LAND AND ^^^ATER
January 23, 1915
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LAND AND WATER
THE WAR AND HEALTH RESORTS
By A SPECIALIST
NOT content with organised efforts to capture
the trade of the enemy, those in intellectual
authority are challenging the right of Germany
to claim superiority in the realms of the applied
sciences. There can be no doubt that many of
us have been too prone to accept Germany's opinion of
herself without sufficient analysis and disputation, and this
may account for the arrogance which has ended in the claim
of Germany to dominate the world. German institutions
and methods had become so idolised in this country that, as
one writer put it, " we must either imitate them or perish."
The war has changed all that. It would be foolish to go to
the other extreme and underrate the great work accomplished
by Germany in most of the spheres of human activity. That
would be playing her own favourite game of belittlement :
but we are no longer going to bow down to an idol, and we
know, after careful inquiry into their title-deeds, that the
universal claim of superiority on the part of the enemy is
an arrogant delusion.
In the matters of hygiene or therapeutics Germany
might seem able to meet the challenge of superiority better
than in most spheres. We have not hesitated in accepting
the excellence of their health resorts and watering-places in
a very practical way. We have been amongst their best
patrons. We had ceased to admit ourselves as rivals, with
a subserviency which onl}' the present state of national
antagonism may impress upon us. The doctors of Harrogate,
Buxton, Bath, and the rest, are now actually courageous
enough to submit their claim for consideration, even at the
high standard Germany claims to have set for itself, and to
have some part in the capture of Teutonic interests. This
is as it should be.
For perfection in one branch of medical hygiene I have
indeed looked in vain throughout Germany and Austria, and
have found it " a long, long way " from the beaten tracks
of therapeutics. Perfection is a big word, and yet it seems to
come to my pen easily after visiting an institution which
I found, not exactly " at the back of beyond," but far north-
ward on the civilised paths which fringe the northern seas.
In an institution looking out across the Moray Firth to the
Black Isle, in a country of rare beauty and equable climate,
there exists to-day a diagnostic and therapeutic system
that, in the thorough and delicate minutiae of its methods,
seems to me to admit no rivalry throughout the whole inter-
national domain of medicine. I do not make this claim
without a sense of responsibility, as I make it without
prejudice, having neither axes to grind nor logs to roll in the
matter. I have assured myself of the fact that those in
authority are actual pioneers in the systematic study and
treatment of disorders of metabolism.
Some twenty years ago a distinguished man of science
made the prophecy that the future of therapeutics would
be in the hands of the bio-chemists, or, to put it in less
scientific phraseology, that the medical treatment of disease
would depend to a major extent upon a study of the changes
that take place in the chemical conditions of the body.
The institution of which I write is, then, the first of its kind
in the United Kingdom which is concerned with the treatment
of the disorder of metabolism, founded upon an elaborate
and systematic study of the chemical changes which are
effected by these disordei's. I have made a fairly prolonged
investigation into the practices at this institution, and, well
accustomed as I had been to scientific methods, it was a
source of great satisfaction to find that there did exist an
establishment that was absolutely unaffected by any of the
laissez-faire or empirical methods of the medical flaneur —
an institution which counted neither upon some certain
" cure " nor pushed a scientific " panacea " as an effective
method for nine out of ten cases of disorder. Having some
years ago severed all connection with medical science, and
being unconnected with any of its interests, my view may
seem the more detached and unprejudiced.
Each case is treated on its own merits. To the aid of
the individual patient is called the elaborate investigations
of physicians, analytical chemist, and bacteriologist. Pro-
longed medical diagnosis is supplemented by the most
minute day-to-day record of blood, alimentary, and other
conditions. Diet is as carefully and systematically prescribed
as medicine, baths, and other healing agents ; and the effect
of food, baths, medicine, exercise, etc., noted and tabulated
each day with an attention to uniformity and system which
inspires a confidence which is lacking in other more or less
haphazard methods. This institution is not a place at which
to play at being cured. Sleep, exercise, rest, diet, baths,
massage. X-ray analysis, are all treated with the respect
which must be paid by the patient who'desires to obtain the
beneficent results at which the higher forms of medicine aim.
There is no slackness ; the etiology or history of each case is
noted in the fullest detail ; the exact nature of the disorder
is arrived at by a prolonged study made by the physicians,
the X-ray speciahst, and the chemist, and the effects of
restriction — increase and modification, as the case may be —
duly noted in the elaborate tables which accompany the
history of the case. The whole staff are in constant
collaboration, and each day the patient is examined with
the assistance of all the elaborate and up-to-date machinery
available in the institution. The chemical laboratories
would do credit to a university, as the various baths are
entirely modern and effective.
Dietary — an important item in the establishment — is
conducted on the most subtle principles. There are not
half a dozen possible diets for a particular disease, but half
a hundred, and these are carefully prepared under the eye
of the " diet sister " on the nursing staff (an important item),
and the results carefully noted, the idea being — say, in a
case of diabetes — not to give the patient the minimum but
the maximum that he can stand. A careful study of sugar
and acetone results gives the physician an excellent idea in
what way lies the patient's " salvation." Each patient here
has one prescribed meal, which is written on a new menu
placed before him at each meal. There is, therefore, no
monotony but a delightful variety consistent with the results
aimed at. Exercise, baths, and medicine are regulated on
more or less the same system, under the guidance not on'-y
of the medical staff but that of the expert nurses.
It is gratifying to learn, from both physician and patient
alike, that in such cases as diabetes, colitis, anaemia, gout,
heart trouble, emaciation, and other disorders the results
have been most noteworthy, not only in the matter of cure,
but as also affording, in the more untractable cases, a
unique basis on which to found the hfe of the patient after
he leaves the institution. The lengthy report drawn up for
the benefit of the physician who may be looking after the
patient in his private life is one of the most valuable practices
of the establishment, giving an elaborate summary of the
investigations, treatment, and food capabilities of the patient
on which to base his future dietary and therapeusis.
•Apart from the remarkable scientific facilities with
which I have dwelt, I came away from my visit with delightful
memories of social and geographical amenities. The
delightful golf and tennis courses, the excellent shootings,
the facilities afforded for fishing and curling, the charming
park and gardens, the noble sea views and unequalled seaside
walks, the mild winter climate, the high percentage of
sunshine, the low rainfall, the dry and porous soil, the teeming
historical associations, left me a memory which will not soon
fade. More than anything else, I came away with a strong
impression of the word " thorough " and the thought that it
must be very consoling to those who will be cut off from
continental " cures " by the war that there is in the north
of Scotland an institution which has not a rival throughout
the continent of Europe.
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January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
BOTE,— Thli Artld* bai been labDltted to the Preit BnreaD, which doei not object to the pibllettloB ii ctmorcd tnd takei do
reipoDilbllity for tho correctneii of tho itattmcnti.
h accordaneo with tbo requlremtnti of tho Preit Boreas, tho poiltloni of troopi on Plaai llloitratinf tbli Artlcio ■■it only bo
rcfarded ai approiimate, and no dcfinito itrenfth at any point It Indicated,
Town
Soisions
Village of Venitel
jT
EitfflishMcles
o
SOISSONS.
ON Friday, January 8, the Divisional Com-
mander before Soissons, at the head of
perhaps 10,000 men, who held the slopes
of the plateau beyond, received one of
those orders of which, during the last
month, there have been distributed, perhaps, 100
to the various parts of the French line. It was to
go forward vigorously and attack the enemy's
trenches upon the crest.
The meaning of this and similar orders, and
the significance of the whole affair in its develop-
ment and consequences, will be dealt with later.
For the moment we are only following the events
themselves.
The organisation for this effort against the
crest from the slopes was made upon that Friday
evening, January 8.
The orders were sent out, and it would seem
that the movements were made long before day-
light upon Saturday, the 9th. On that day the
French line, which had been no further up than the
base of the slopes and partly upon the valley-floor
round about the sixty- and eighty-metre lines, and
not yet in occupation of Cuffies, began to push up
the chalky slopes that led steeply for nearly 300
feet to the comparatively level top of the plateau.
The first German trenches upon the slopes
were carried, and at the same time an effort was
being made to push through Crouy village and
advance up the valley which carries the railway to
Laon. The straight road from Crouy to Missy
(which is marked upon the sketch at the head of
this) was roughly the position of the French right
at this moment, though there were advanced
bodies upon the slopes above.
It must be clearly understood that the mass of
the troops were upon the left and centre, and that
the great bulk of the fighting took place within a
mile to east and west of Crouy village.
The French had three lines by which re-
inforcements could reach them, and by which, if
necessary, they could retreat. These were the
bridge over the Aisne within the town of Soissons
itself, a temporary wooden bridge in front of Veni-
zel village, and another behind Missy village.
By the Saturday evening the first part of the
effort had been successfully accomplished. The
slopes were in most places upon this three-mile
front in the hands of the French, and they had
reached in some points the plateau itself.
On the Sunday, the 11th, the effort continued.
Trench after trench of the Germans was carried
by the French Infantry, and by the end of the day,
or by the morning of Monday, the 12th, the flat
spur, the summit of which is 132 metres above the
sea, or about 280 feet above the water level of the
Aisne in the valley below, was fully held.
LAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
'r-^-
t^"^
J46
I20 -
locr
00 60
To
'■lb Tarts
about 'S.Enalnh mile.
The importance of this spur consisted in i/.s
forming a gun position, whence the valley above
Crouy could be swept. In the accompanying
sketch map it is marked P, and its character is
clearly apparent. We may regard it, then, as
solidly occupied upon the morning of the 12th.
We shall see in a moment how this French
local movement, with its comparatively small
numbers, its lack of any but a local reserve, etc.,
connotes a general plan common to all the line,
and how it resembled work that was being done
elsewhere along the long line. At any rate, by
this Monday we find the French on top of the spur
at P only just below the general flat of the plateau
which the Germans have been holding for now four
months. The French had also taken the village of
Cuffies, but they were still held at the mouth of
the valley where the railway runs, and found it
impossible to debouch from Crouy, the village
which holds that mouth.
It will be seen that the vigorous Fre-nch ad-
vance had already lasted forty-eight hours.
At this juncture large reinforcements of
troops began to appear upon the enemy's side, and
these reinforcements having at last produced an
appreciable superiority of number for the enemy,
the counter-offensive was taken by them, beginning
about the Monday noon.
Those of the French who had now gained the
crest of the hills were anxious to observe that the
valley-floor below them was already flooded, and
that the waters were rising to the level of the tem-
porary bridges. Beside the two wooden bridges
at Venizel and Missy, the French engineers
had added a foot-bridge. Tuesday saw the
French facing new and very large reinforce-
ments and losing groimd on the right. The
waters still rose during all that day, and just after
four o'clock, as the ever-increasing numbers of the
Germans who were being concentrated against the
French division were beginning to exercise a serious
pressure, the bridge of Venizel, the central and
most important of the bridges, broke. The re-
inforcements, and in particular the artillery muni-
tions from the other side of the river, were thus cut
off in the French centre, and it was evident that
unless these communications could be rapidly re-
stored, the position of the division beyond the river
—now fighting, perhaps, three to one — would be
desperate. The order to retire v/as not yet given,
when the second bridge, that at Missy, in its turn
was carried away.
The French that Tuesday evening still hold
upon their left and kept the edge of the plateau,
but Crouy, which had held them up in the early
operations when they were equally matched in
numbers, now became more and more difficult for
them to hold, and they were pressed down the
slopes further east on to the Crouy-Missy road.
It should here be noted, for the purposes of
forming our judgment later on, that no consider-
able reinforcements were suggested for the French
apparently until that same day, Teesday; in spite
of the increasing number of the enemy, the original
strength of a depleted division had to take all the
weight of the fighting.
The German forces continued to increase
They were, as I have said, perhaps about three to
one when reinforcements Avere attempted to be
sent forward by the French across the still intact
bridges, just sufficient to hold the positions already
acquired.
It was now dark, and after dark, in the night
between the Tuesday and the Wednesday, the
French engineers laboured as best they could to
replace the bridges, in spite of the rapidly rising
water. By this time the whole valley floor was
flooded.
When the morning of the 1 3th came — that is
the morning of Wednesday — the French beyond
Jamiary 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
the river saw that one of the bridges had been re-
established— that of Missy. It had only been done
at very great sacriiice, and there is much in the
work of the sappers that night to recall the Bere-
sina. Across the Missy Bridge munitions began
to be forwarded to the further bank, especially
those for field guns, which were most badly needed,
when, just before eight o'clock in the morning,
after little more than an hour's full daylight for
this work, the single temporary bridge was again
carried away before the rising flood, and this while
the force in front of the French division had in-
creased to perhaps four to one.
A retirement was ordered, and while the
French still clung to the village of Cuffies and the
spur at P, they were taken back from Crouy. If
Crouy was untenable, the forces along the slopes
to the right were obviously untenable also. On
this same day, Wednesday, as the right fell back,
the left abandoned the edge of the spur and fell
back in line with the right astraddle of the great
high road to the valley. The position was there-
fore as in the accompanying sketch B.
The division which the flood had cut off from
reinforcement was only withdrawn with the great-
est difliculty, but apparently in perfect order.
_ By Thursday, January 14, the remains of the
division— probably not more than half of those wlio
had set out on the Tuesday— were back in Sois-
sons ; the Crouy-Missy road was abandoned and all
the north bank of the river from a point about half
a mile above Soissons to a point about half a mile
above Missy itself. Further to the east and to the
west the French held the hills, and the total result
was that the Germans had here advanced across a
M-edge of ground nine furlongs wide upon a front
^cpof Plateau^
-Bridge
of three miles, touched the river Aisne upon that
front, and were within a mile of Soissons, the cap-
ture of which would give them a bridge across the
river.
French detachments held a small point in
Missy village, where the bridge was again repaired
and so allowed the French right to retire across it.
The guns protecting this retreat could not be
trusted to the bridge, and after being rendered
useless (no very important detail, for there was no
ammunition left to speak of) fell into the hands of
the enemy : other guns had also been abandoned
further to the left, presumably from the loss of
their teams and crews, as the ground here is not
of a nature to bog them even after such heavy rains.
By that Thursday evening the French retire-
ment was complete, and the French had lost, per-
haps, 5,000 in killed, wounded and prisoners; in
%. *^
Octn?i Barrier
•St. Pauir
^.
^H^\ ^sf
Town
Station. ati4
carce^ingljj[ important junction
LAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
field guns fourteen (as it would seem) ; and in
machine guns perhaps a score.
On the morning of Friday, the 15th, Ger-
mans, whose numbers had now increased to about
40,000 men, were everywhere advanced to the line
of the river, and had possession of the road from
Crouy to Missy. The positions in front of Soissons
were maintained by the French, but on that
Friday there was a vigorous attempt on the part
of the enemy to rush the town itself. Such a suc-
cess would have put into the enemy's hands the
junction of four railways, the best bridge head
across the river, and have thrown upon the French
artillery the onus of shelling their own city. It is
probable that the attempt will be renewed, for the
possession of Soissons is of real value. The hand-
to-hand fighting got at last as far as the suburb of
St. Paul and then went no further. It was
checked there, and would appear to have remained
so checked during the last four days.
The Germans once in possession of Soissons
would have a real advantage, and might almost be
said to have recovered there the initiative. They
would hold a railway junction of first-class import-
ance; they would have a bridge head over the
flooded Aisne; they would have broken the first
French line.
The Germans out of Soissons north of the river
have accounted for about half a depleted French
division, at a far heavier numerical cost to them-
selves, and have gained 1,800 yards over a front of
5,000 yards, weakening slightly other parts of
their long line, which weakening will lead, and has
already partly led, to a number of local small suc-
cesses of the Allies north and south.
Nor can the Germans withdraw more than a
certain proportion of the men here concentrated
without losing the small advantage gained. For
they are in a very narrow salient wedge. Thi
French are far advanced on east and west — especi-
ally on the west — and if the Germans are to remain
on the Aisne, even over a front of only three miles,
they must immobilise great numbers here to keep
the angle open. They stand roughly as the wedge
A, B, C, D, on the accompanying sketch, and they
TrACy
IcVal
Craonne
Soissons
isne
must hold, and, if possible, push back A B and C
D, or retire. They are, at the moment of writing
(Tuesday), engaged precisely in this "pushing
back " of A B and C D.
II.— THE MEANING OF SOISSONS.
Having grasped what happened at Soissons,
let us ask whether the action has any lesson to
teach us upon the present phase of the war.
If we co-ordinate all the facts that we know
with regard to that action so far and consider cer-
tain results in other parts of the field, Ve shall
find, I think, that we have rather important in-
dications given us here of how the enemy stands in
the west.
The salient features of the action at Soissons
are five : —
1. A strong French offensive is ordered with
no more than the troops long on the spot (a
division) against a particular sector of the long
German line.
2. This unexpected offensive delivered at a
point chosen by the French (who preserve the
initiative), though made without special re-
inforcement, succeeds at rather heavy cost to
them.
3. Upon its success and after a delay of rather
more than forty-eight hours very large enemy re-
inforcements arrive, so large that they out-
number doubly, trebly, and at last four timea
over, the French in the district.
4. These large reinforcements are almost
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by
some corresponding proportion of field artillery,
but apparently no new heavy artillery.
5. Having succeeded in their object of check-
ing and even reversing the French attack by the
bringing up of such numbers, the German
counter-offensive is spent and can go no further.
Now consider those five points as fixed and
then turn to what happened 200 miles av/ay and
more in Upper Alsace nearly a fortnight ago.
1. The French took the offensive because they
possessed the initiative, and they took it at a
point where they were not expected.
2. This unexpected offensive was made with-
out special reinforcement, by no more than the
troops originally present in the district; none
of the great French reserve appears to have been
used; it is successful, though at rather a heavy
cost.
3. Upon its success and some time afterwards
— in this case nearly four days — large enemy
reinforcements begin to arrive, until they quite
outnumber the French in the district.
4. These large reinforcements consist almost
entirely of infantry, supported, of course, by
some corresponding proportion of field artillery,
but with no more heavy guns than were present
originally.
5. The enemy using their new-found supe-
riority of numbers, in part reverse the French
offensive, but their counter-offensive exhausts
itself and cannot be pursued.
You see that there is an exact parallel in the
main features.
In certain important details there are impor-
tant differences. At Soissons ground which had
been held for some months is lost by the French
over a breadth of just more than a mile, while in
Upper Alsace all that is recovered by the Germans
is a particular swell of land (Upper Burnhaupt)
from which the French had but recently driven
them, while in the main the whole Alsatian opera-
tions record a considerable French advance. The
forces engaged in Upper Alsace on the German
side are rather less than the forces engaged against
Soissons. Also, in the one case, the fight imperils
an important town; while in the other the fight
only concerns a few ruined villages in the moun-
tains. Also, in the case of Soissons, you are fight-
ing nearly as close to Paris as Reading is to
London, whereas in the case of Upper Alsace you
are fighting in a region remote from the heart of
either belligerent.
But in the main the great features are the
same, and there is but one considerable contrast
to note for the purposes of our induction, which is
that in the case of Upper Alsace, vital as that point
A*
January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
is to Grermany, the reinforcements come up nearly
two days later than in the case of the attack on
Soissons.
Now what are the obvious lessons to be drawn
from this parallel and its differentiating point?
The first is that the Germans are not yet working
with new formations.
The Germans, never knoiving quite tvhere the
French are going to attack, are in great peril of
having their line broken whenever an attack upon
a considerable scale is delivered. TJiey will not
risk men, as yet at any rate, in trying to recover
the initiative for themselves and in being the first
to attack. They are thus compelled to wait for the
French initiative. They meet it whenever a strong
attack is delivered by hurrying up men from else-
where, and the men so hurried up, though coming
in great numbers, do little more than hold their
own.
This conclusion is indisputable, for it is no
more than a summary of ascertained facts. But
it leads us to another conclusion which, though not
directly ascertainable, follows logically from such
premises of fact.
This further conclusion is that the Germans
strengthen that part of the line which is attacked
by drawing men from other parts of their line, not
from large available reserves nor from new forma-
tions.
It is exceedingly important to seize this, for
it makes all the difference to our judgment of the
situation.
Supposing the enemy had new large forma-
tions already in the field or new great reserves
gathered and ready to operate in the West, he
would in the first place not wait until some par-
ticular point of his extended line was attacked,
but would himself begin to attack in force upon a
point of his own choosing. That he does not do
so, but has to await attack, proves that his men
are drawn from the existing lines. But, apart
from this, the rate at which the German reinforce-
ments are brought up sufficiently prove my point.
Such new reserves or new formations of
the enemy Vvould either be grouped close
behind the existing line so as to attack wherever
the enemy thought fit, or at any rate to be used
(even if only defensively) where the enemy thought
fit, or they would be grouped at some central
point well behind the lines, from which central
point they could be directed at a moment's notice
and with approximately equal rapidity in any
direction where a threat against the continuity
of the defensive line Avas delivered.
Either sUch great reserves if they existed
would be massed as at A and at B ready to attack
on the points of their commanders' choosing at
(a) -or at (6) or for purposes of general defence
they would be kept at some central point such as
C ff.bout equi-distant from all the points that could
be threatened and ready to be launched wherever
the threat occurred.
But what takes place proves that neither of
these dispositions has been made, and that there-
fore no such new formations or great reserve are
yet present upon the western line of the enemy.
For the German reinforcements do not arrive until
some time after the French attack has put the lines
in peril at some point chosen by the French them-
selves, and, what is even more important to my
case, they don't arrive with the same delay.
Against Soissons, which is a central position,
they come up with a much shorter delay and also in
larger numbers and with more effect than against
Burnhaupt, which is an extreme position. At
Soissons they arrive within two days; at Burn-
haupt after four days.
Put all this togetj^or and you may be perfectly
certain that work of this kind is, so far, being
done at the expense of other parts of the line.
Take a line shaped as is the line A, B, C in
the accompanying diagram.
If you find that on the enemy's being attacked
unexpectedly to himself and through the action of
the Allied initiative at a central point, B, he can
bring up reinforcements within a delay of, say,
forty hours, while if he is attacked at such an ex-
treme point as C he can only bring them up in a
delay of, say, a hundred hours, it is sufficient proof
that he is bringing them up from along his line.
For in the case of B he has two short distances
to go, bringing his men up from various portions
of A-B and B-C ; in the case of C most of bis units
will have a long distance to go, as some of them
will have to be drawn from A-B, which is further
from C than any portion of the line is from B.
Eemember that he dares not weaken too much
any part of his line : he must draw men in small
amounts from all along it. The thing is clear if
we suppose him to be drafting men from the four
points 1, 2, 3, 4 in aid first of the point B, next of
R*
tAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
flKe point C, and if we allow for the distance be-
tween any one of these points one day for entrain-
ing, carriage and disentraining. His last rein-
forcements will, in the case of an attack on B, ar-
rive within a delay of two days, which is the length
of the journey from the extremes to the centre;
while in the ease of C his last reinforcements will
arrive in a delay of four days, which is the length
of the journey from A to C.
But apart from this arithmetical line of argu-
ment we have the noticeable fact that before any
of these concentrations took place the enemy's line
is demonstrably weakened in all sorts of points
save where the main attack is being delivered
upon it.
Thus, the last two weeks which have seen a
concentration upon Soissons and upon Burnbaupt,
in two regions where the French had nased their
initiative to develop an unexpected activity and to
press home, a whole series of minor successes were
registered by the Allies in many places scattered
along the line. There was the advance befqre
Perthes, the perceptible advances at Boye, and in
front of Arras, north-east of Verdun and just north
of Pont-k-Mousson. In other words, you get on the
line A, B, C, two strong French attacks which by
successive reinforcement of the enemy are turned
back at B and at C, but meanwhile you are getting
smaller but more numerous successes of the Allies
at 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, where the line must in all
probability have been perilously weakened by the
enemy.
The enemy, then, is still drawing upon his
existing line.
There is a second conclusion to be drawn from
this state of affairs which is also of moment in aid-
ing our judgment upon the present phase of the
war, and this is that the ejiemy is now put into
great anxiety by the thinness of his line.
When the French took Steinbach and the gun
position dominating Cernay, their whole advance
•was no more than a mile and a-half ; yet it sum-
moned down into Upper Alsace from other por-
tions of the line, at least an extra German division.
The French captured, before they lost Burnhaupt,
2,000 prisoners, and accounted for at least as many
more killed and wounded; and casualties of 4,000
do not mean less than a division at work — at least
where that division is successful.
The French at Soissons found themselves at
last in front of quite 40,000 men upon a front of
little over three miles. Now, let the argiunent
consequent upon this be carefully noted. If the
enemy had made these great concentrations of
men for the purpose of attack we could not arrive
at the conclusion that he was anxious for the stabi-
lity of his line. On the contrary, we could con-
clude that he was quite secure behind his " wall "
and could therefore choose his ov/n moments and
places for striking.
But the enemy made a concentration utterly
different from this in character, both at Burn-
haupt and in front of Soissons. He did 'not mean
to concentrate and did not attempt to concentrate
until the forces that were pressing him had
achieved a certain result, and when that result was
achieved, although in each case it was quite a small
thing in mere distance (the advance of a mile in
one case and of less than two miles in the other),
he at once is at the expense of weakening his line
elsewhere and of forming concentrations for re-
pelling an attack which, slight as it seems, lie
judges may be fatal.
It is but the repetition with further proof of
what has been said so often in these columns : —
The problem before the Allies in the West is
not the problem of gradually pushing bach an op-
posing force ; it is tJie problem of compelling that
force under pressure to shorten lines which are,
already as stretched as they can be, consistently
ivith beiyig held at all; and when the compulsion
for shortening these lines shall arrive, it cannot
take the Jorm of gradual retirements from one line
of trenches to another close behind it; it can only
take the form of a wholesale retirement, either
evacuating Northern France and half Belgium or
evacuating Alsace.
All this does not mean that the enemy may not
in the near future bring up large reinforcements
and new formations with the object of hold-
ing his line unshortened. It does not mean that
he may not, even in the near future, bring up re-
inforcements so large as to take the offensive again.
It only means that the considerable movements
we have seen during the last two
and particularly at Burnhaupt and
Soissons, prove the non-existence so
such reinforcement; and it also proves
the twin facts that the enemy fears gravely
for the stability of his line in the west and only
reinforces threatened points at the expense of the
general strength along the rest of it.
We can sum up, therefore, and say that in the
last two weeks, including Soissons, we have had
upon a line of some 400 miles between the Swiss
mountains and the North Sea a considerable body
of German reinforcements successfully resisting
attacks delivered in front of Soissons (1) and in
Upper Alsace (2), but that the concentration along
the lines to these points has been effected at a cost
of so weakening the general strength of the lines,
that the Allies have exercised successful pressure
upon a smaller scale by the French in front of Nieu-
port {a), in front of Lens {h), by the French in
front of Arras (c), in front of Roye {d), in front of
Perthes {e), north-east of Verdun (/), north of
which
weeks,
before
far of
January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
nssons
— Frontier,
Line of Trenches.
Pont-a-Mousson (g), at the mouth of the pass just
east of Colmar (h), and that we have not yet against
us any new considerable bodies of the enemy in
the West, but only the same original line which
already feels itself gravely imperilled.
CREDIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE.
It is worth while examining in detail the Ger-
man communique relative to this action, which
reached London last Friday. It is perhaps the
most remarkable point in the whole affair.
As we have seen throughout this war, official
communiques are the best documentary evidence
we have ; the credibility of the various parties to
them is therefore exceedingly important in the
formation of our judgment, and the German com-
muniques in particular have been remarkable for
two characters which at first sight seem to go
ill together, but which are perfectly reconciled by
what is rather unfairly termed " a scientific
temper."
These two characters are : —
(1) Minuteness in detail coupled with accu-
racy where accuracy is desired.
(2) The harnessing with the same of startling
falsehoods which cannot deceive the particular
enemy in question, and which must have some
political object of influencing domestic or foreign
neutral opinion, or even the opinion of Govern-
ments and peoples allied with the enemy in ques-
tion.
These two contradictory characters are recon-
ciled by the motive of the German authorities,
which is neither to tell the truth nor to tell false-
hoods for the sake of truth and falsehood, but to
tell the truth only for the sake of obtaining general
credit, and to tell falsehoods when it is thought
wise and useful so to do upon the basis of such
credit once obtained.
The official German communique which ap-
peared in print last Saturday is a very good ex-
ample upon which to work. I quote it as it ap-
peared in the Westminster Gazette (which has from
■■
LAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
the beginning of the war, and even before its out-
break, been remarkable for the volume of its
German information), and as it was delivered
through the Marconi channel.
" The German booty taken in the battle
north of Soissons up to the present amounts to
5,200 prisoners, fourteen cannon, six machine-
guns, and several 'revolver guns.' The French
suffered heavy losses ; five thousand killed French-
men were found on the battlefield. Their retreat
south of the Aisne came within range of our heavy
artillery. In how far the proportions have
changed, compared with previous wars, a compari-
son of the battle discussed here with the results of
the battle of 1870 shows, although the importance
of tlic battle north of Soissons cannot be compared
with that of the battle of August 18, 1870, the
width of the battlefield approximately corresponds
to that of Gravelotte and St. Privat. The French
losses of January 12 to 14, 1915, however, pro-
bably surpass those of August 18, 1870, by a con-
siderable amount. This is the truth."
The salient points of this statement are : —
(1) The minute detail of the number of
prisoners mentioned, 5,200.
(2) The mention of the number of French
killed, 5,000.
(3) A very extraordinary recollection of and
parallel with Gravelotte.
(i) A very exact enumeration of guns.
On the fourth point one remarks with interest
that the German estimate is too low. The French
have admitted a loss of more guns (counting
machine-guns) than the Germans give.
The third point is negligible. The two
actions, Gravelotte and Soissons resemble each
other in nothing save that Germans and French-
men were opposed, and it would be wasting the
space of this paper to analyse such puerilities.
But the first and second statements are really
worth watching. Their value will be 'apparent to
all acquainted with the elements of military his-
tory, and I think they can be made apparent to
the general reader as well.
On 'the right bank of the Aisne in front of
Soissons was a French division (three brigades)
already depleted by Avar, and further weakened
by the big offensive movement ordered ten days
ago when the spur above Crouy was taken by it.
French officers, eye-witnesses oi the scene, tell us
that about 10,000 men were engaged. That is
probably the rough figure. But swell that figure
as we may we cannot make the French more than
16,000 in the nature of things. Had they been
perfectly fresh troops just sent out, there v;ould
not have been present in the thick of the action
many more than 17,000 men, and there is no doubt
whatsoever in the mind of any observer used to
the meaning of such units that, under the con-
ditions of this action, after the heavy fighting
which had preceded it, the months of war behind it,
and the general disposition of the French along
all this section of the line, 10,000 is nearer the
truth than 15,000. But 15,000 is a maximum.
The total front over which the action ranged,
a front of trenches and of thinly stretched line,
was less than three miles, but all the heart of the
action was in a section of less than 1^.
The whole point of the battle was the impossi-
bility of reinforcing this single French division in
time because the sudden rising of the Aisne had
carried away certaifl bridges. We are asked to
belieA'e that out of such a unit — 10,000 at the least,
15,000 at the most — over 5,000 are prisoners
and at least 5,000 dead. The statement has
no conceivable significance in arithmetic or
in any other form of analysis. Put as low
as you like the proportion of wounded to
killed (and in an action of this sort the pro-
portion of killed to Avounded is A-ery high),
you cannot in the most murderous action get it
loAA-er than one to three where such numbers are
concerned. It is almost certain to be higher than
that, but let us put it at that ; then the killed alone
account, with the wounded, for nearly tv/ice the
force present ! Five thousand killed means at the
very least 15,000 wounded. So, after leaving
nobody to get back across the Aisne and nobody
to be taken prisoner, the Germans have already
accounted for twice the number of Frenchmen pre-
sent if they Avere ten thousand, or 5,000 more than
Avere present if they Avere 15,000. No matter by
Avhat avenues you approach the result, the Ger-
man figures of men make nonsense : Avhile the Ger-
man figures of guns are less than the Avhole truth
and probably based on a real estimate of numbers
hitherto counted.
We have no need to accept on their OAvn autho-
rity the French accounts, Avhich tell us the com-
paratively small number of troops engaged upon
their side, admit a loss of guns larger than the
Germans claun, allow for somewhat over a thou-
sand prisoners, and tell us that the enemy did not
pursue. Even if the French contradiction did not
exist, the German account is a foolish mixture of
accuracy and falsehood on the face of it.
Why this folly? The general accuracy of
German official neAvs has been amply insisted upon
in these notes, and occasional absurdities inter-
mingled Avith such accuracy noAv and then noticed.
Those absurdities haA'e been increasing of late in
proportion to the accurate rest. Why?
I can only hazard the suggestion that there is
something in common betAveen the fantasies them-
selves and the romantic language Avhich commonly
accompanies them; and that that something in
common is a necessity for impressing domestic and
neutral opinion. Hence the silly parallel with
Gravelotte (Avhich Avould be like comparing
Givenchy with Waterloo), hence the theatrical rant
about ail this being done " under the eyes of the
War Lord himself," hence the comparison of the
German failure in front of WarsaAV to the great
Adctory of Salamis, and hence those extraordinary
phrases which appear reiterated at regular in-
tervals that (for some mystical and incalculable
reason) victory, that least determinable of all
human events, must necessarily fall to the German
General Staff Avhich has hitherto failed in every
single one of its main plans : the envelopment of
the Allies in the West, the entry into Paris, the
investment of Verdun, the march upon Calais, the
seizure of Warsaw and of the raihvay nexus there,
the subjugation of Servia and the " counting out "
of the Servian Army, the raiding of Caucasia, etc.
It Avill be an advantage to the Allies at least,
and in particular to those whose duty it is to study
this Avar in detail, when the German communiques
return to the older plan (far better suited to the
German temperament) of accurately detailing a
mass of undigested matter, and thus supplement-
ing the continued frankness with which the Ger-
January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
man casualties, German prices, and other capital
points of news are conveyed by the Germans alone
of the belligerents to the outer world.
THE EASTERN FIELD.
IN the eastern field of war there has been an
almost complete lull along the whole line,
with the exception of some violent fighting
upon the Bzura, which has not advanced the
enemv, and in connection with which the
Eussians have attempted no advance either.
There are in this field but two points to notice,
upon one of which we have so little information
that it is impossible to do more than state the frag-
mentary news and base a doubtful guess upon it.
The other is a still smaller detail, but clearer in its
meaning and effect.
The first of these two pieces of news is the an-
nouncement that Eussian forces have occupied
Sierpe in the belt of North Poland between the
Vistula and the East Prussian border, have pushed
f orv;ard across the Skwara ( ? ) and are therefore
within forty miles of Thorn. Such a position is
obviously upon the flank of the main German line
of iconamunication for Hindenburg's advance on
Warsaw, to wit, the main railway from Thorn to
"Warsaw. This railway nearly touches the Vistula
at a point about half way between Plocz and the
frontier, and is everywhere within raiding distance
of a force that shall have crossed that stream from
the North.
If we were dealing with considerable bodies
cf iHussians operating in this theatre the news
would be of great moment, but I submit that in
the lack of further evidence we have no right to
presume large operations as yet in this belt of
North Poland between the East Prussian frontier
and the Vistula, and until we know more about
them there is no ground for planning out any con-
siderable consequences or illustrating the move-
ment as a whole.
It appears to be so far a movement of cavalry
operating in no great numbers against smaller de-
tached bodies of cavalry upon the enemy's side,
and one's ground for believing this is, first, that
very large Russian movements in this district,
being supported by no railway, v/ould necessarily
be slow and would as necessarily have given rise
to vigorous changes of disposition in the German
forces south of the river. There has been no trace
of the latter and therefore we should not, in the
lack of further evidence, believe in the former. A
Russian force has entered Plocz, but everything
turns upon the total niunber of the Russian forces
north of the Vistula, and, I repeat, that if that
number were very great the v/hole German battle
front would turn northward. That there may be
a movement there later on the part of the Russians,
and that it will profit them is seen by merely look-
ing at a map, but that they v/ill soon be able to
concentrate and to equip sufficient men in this dis-
trict so easily there is no proof.
The second piece of news which, as I have
said, is more detailed and certain, though dealing
-only with the minor point concerned, the seizure
of the Kilribaba Pass by the Russians in the
wooded Central Carpathians between Bukovina
and Transylvania, that is, in the midst of that
Eumanian population, the Russian presence among
whom is having such a powerful effect upon the
international position of the Rumanian Govern-
ment at this moment.
This is the first point upon the watershed of
the Carpathians which the Russians have crossed
since the second battle for Warsaw began, and
since, in conformity with the Russian retirement
on the north for the protection of Warsaw, the
Russian Armies south withdrew some forty or fifty
miles from Cracow to the line of the Dunajec and
abandoned the passes over the Carpathians, watch-
ing only the mouths of the same.
Now, the remarkable point about this is that
it has taken place at a comparatively unimportant
moment. The great passes which carry one the
railway and the other the high road from Transyl-
vania into Bukovina run to the north and to the
south of Kilribaba, and here the Russians have
not even attempted to move to the crest of
the pass until better weather shall assure their
transport. The Kilribaba is only a saddle of
wooded land befween the sources of two mountain
torrents, not suited for taking any considerable
body of troops from side to side. We must wait
for such a movement until weather conditions
render it possible for the Russians to bring up
wheeled transport in sufficient amounts for the
support of heavy colimins and the forcing of the
heights, and it is not in any way probable that this
movement upon a minor saddle in the wooded hills
can be used for any large offensive movement to-
wards the Hungarian side. But the pass has this
advantage : the road down from it on to the Hun-
garian side is easy and moves aivai/ from the
nearest railhead, so that the enemy can only con-
centrate against it with difficulty.
THE CAUCASUS.
In the Caucasus we are still without news from
the Turkish side, and that may make us fairly cer-
tain that the Russian description of the conse-
quences of the late Russian victory is accurate
enough. The fighting at Karai Urgan, in which
the 11th Corps of the Turkish Army (the only
corps, it may be remembered, which remained in-
tact after the debacle of a fortnight ago) attempted,
by vigorously attacking the head of the Russian
Army, to withdraw pressure from the retreat of
the broken 10th Corps, has, according to Russian
accounts, collapsed. It cannot be true that this
large body of men has been " annihilated," for
there is no account of their having been surrounded
or intercepted in their retreat, but it is evidently
true that the whole body has given way, that great
numbers of the unwounded stragglers have fallen
prisoners to the Russians, as well as masses of
wounded, and evidently also, great quantities of
field equipment and artillery. The unofficial
statement that the whole of the artillery of the
11th Corps has been taken cannot be accepted
until we have official confirmation, and it is in anv
case exceedingly unlikely. What would happen
in an action of this sort, fought in driving snow
thousands of feet above the sea, would be the per-
petual abandonment of pieces stuck in the drifts
during a retirement, or captured time and again
by swoops of cavalry on the rearguard, but they
are not conditions under which the whole artillery
of an Army Corps is to be found concentrated in
one area and taken en bloc. That did happen
apparently to the artillery of the 9th Turkish
Army Corps on January 3rd and 4th, but that, as
we know, was intercepted and surrounded.
9»
LAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
Nothing of the sort has happened to the 11th that comprising three full corps and the greater part of
■we can°gather. a fourth, no longer exists, save perhaps in sufTi-
None the less, the Turkish offensive in this cient force to undertake the defence of some pre-
district is evidently at an end, and the First Army, viously fortified position.
A FURTHER NOTE ON THE NUMBERS
OF THE GERMAN RESERVE.
NOTES upon the actions reported in the
various theatres of war have their inter-
est and sometimes, it may be hoped,
their use, if they are accurate and sober
in the formation of opinion. But
another matter, which has been referred to several
times in these columns, is, if we judge it accurately,
not only of interest but of the highest practical
importance, and that is the real reserves of the
enemy.
My apology for returning in a few lines to
that subject this week is that the discussion has re-
appeared with some activity in the Press this
week, and that a sound conclusion upon it is
really vital to our expectations of what the war will
become in the future, and of what this country in
particular must expect to meet in the spring.
Figures have already been given to show that,
though paradoxical enough, the mere reserves in
man power is larger in the weaker of the two Allies
— Austro-Hungary, but for the moment we are
more concerned with the possible reserves or " dis-
posable " men left to the German Empire for pos-
sible later use in the field.
Now, here there are two schools, roughly
speaking. The school which expects Germany to
produce, trained and equipped within the next few
months, certainly three million, possibly four
million, of men; and the school which estimates
her powers in this direction at certainly less than
2^ million, and probably nearer two million men.
I have so often given figures showing on what
the second school relies for its judgment that I am
almost ashamed to repeat them, but as they are
absdiute figures and seem to lead to unavoidable
conclusions, and as none the less very different
conclusions have been reached upon other figures
by other forms of computation, I will briefly re-
state them here.
We have not got to guess, we know the total
number of adult males of military age, from 20 to
45 years inclusive, in the German Empire. It is
in round numbers 12 million men.
We have not got to guess, we know that Ger-
many has hitherto put into the field at least 5
million. She may have put more, she cannot
have possibly put less, for her known minimum
losses, coupled with the known minimum number
which can hold the western and manoeuvre on the
eastern front, make this calculation certain.
Five from twelve leaves seven. Now. the
quarrel is between those who say that of this 7
million 4 million may appear (as an extreme), and
those who say, as another extreme, that only 2
million will appear. The argument for those who
think that four will appear is probably based upon
three erroneous elements of calculation.
(1) They consider only the total number of
adult males and omit all reference to necessary
civil employment : that is the chief error.
(2) They calculate the number of " unfit," not
upon the known proportion in armies where uni-
versal service is really imposed (as in France or in
Bulgaria), but merely upon the normal returns of
German calculations dealing with men who in any
case are not to be taken as soldiers.
For the Germans can call up of young men of
military age just over 600,000. Of these they take
half to be soldiers (including, of course, none of
those who are at all doubtful in health), the re-
maining half they draft into either very partially
trained or, more often, wholly untrained reserves.
They chose to put down the incapable on pa'per at
so low a figure as 7.73 per cent., but that is per-
fectly ridiculous in practice. No one can get the
proportion when you are taking men for actual
service, and not merely for being written down as
possible soldiers on paper, below 20 per cent., and
the real proportion in practice is /nuch more like
25 per cent. The absurd allowance of 7.73 is
arrived at by only examining a selection of all pos-
sible young men, and by putting into a nominal re-
serve (knowing they can never be used) many of
those who, in actual conscription, would eitlier
have to be rejected or would break down.
(3) Those who are wedded to the higher figure
allow between 20 and 45 a loss of only 2 per cent, a
year for each year, half for death and half for
accident, etc.
These decreases, in practice, are also far too
low. They represent the number of males who are
incapable not only of military service (because they
are dead, or have been run over by carts, or have
gone blind, or mad), but also everyone up to 45,
no matter what the state of his lungs, stomach,
heart, weight, brain, eyesight, feet and veins.
Common sense will tell anyone that after 35, at
least, men who have never been soldiers in their
lives and are suddenly called up from sedentary
occupations, do not show a proportion of 25 per
cent., as young men do, of inefficiency (which only
means military inefficiency), they show a propor-
tion of certainly half and probably more than half.
They do this without question when the age of 40
is approached.
Now, in order to form a judgment as to what
the real reserves in the German Army are now,
v/e simply have to decide which of these two views
is in practice sound. We know from proved and
ascertained experience that at least 25 per cent, of
men must be rejected. That leaves 9 out of 12
million. We know that at the very least 2 million
of able-bodied men must be retained to run " the
nation." That leaves you less than 7^ million. We
know that 5 million are already in arms at least.
Surely the calculation is obvious!
Mr. BeUoc has arranged to lecture at the Town Hall, Cheltenliani,
on the 28th January, and at Bristol, on the 30th January. His next
lecture at the Queen's Hall, will take place next Wednesday at
8.30 p.m.
In response to tlie general desire for an afternoon lecture, Mr.
Hilaire Belloc will speik at 2.30 on Tuesday, February 9th, at the
Qaeen'B Hall. His iiext evening lecture is on Tuesday the 2fith inst.
10«
January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
HOTE. — Thii Artlcit hai beta (obmitted to the Preii Bartao, whicli doei not object to the pablieitloo ai ceniored, tod takei no
reiponsibility for the cor''ectneit of the itatementi.
HIGH SEAS GENERALLY.
The "Konigsberg."
THE Konigsherg, which was bottled up in tha Rufugi
River, East Africa, ia now reported to have been
destroyed. According to a story published by the
Southend Telegraph, the captain of one of the
merchant ships which was sunk ia tho blocking
operations, who had just got back, states that the
Germans' completely hid the ship with foliage, entrenching
some of the crew to prevent any cutting-out expedition.
The ship waa, however, located by aeroplane, and with
fire directed from aloft, her destruction by gun-fire quickly
followed.
Von Spec's Squadron and the Admiralty,
In reply to correspondence received on this subject, if
readers who write asking for details or an explanation aa to
the meaning of my statement last week that we had a " suffi-
cient force " on the China Station will refer to the issue of
October 10th they will find " deleted by Censor." I can only
repeat that the force was sufBcient to deal with him. Ap-
parently he outmanoeuvred us by slipping out secretly before
war was declared.
The "Kronprinz Wilhelm."
The German armed liner Kronprinz Wilhelm Lis been
heard of again, having recently sent into Laa Palmaa the
orew.^ of one British and three French ships sunk by her. As
the first was captured so long ago aa October 28, and the
other dates are November 21, December 4, and December 20,
it will be clear that tho career of this 23|-knot corsair is not
of a particularly mischievous nature. From the British ship
she took 3,000 tons of coal ; but of the others, one French
steamer was in ballast and tho other two Frenchmen were sail-
ing vessels.
The inference from the above intervals is that the Kron-
_^prinz Wilhelm must have been considerably harried by British
cruisers, which, though unable to get into action with her,
have sufficed to negative her activities to a vary large extent.
Theoretioall}', a ship like the Kronprinz Wilhelm would be
able — if unimpeded— to capture a ship or two a day.
The "Dacia" Case.
A caae which may have far-reaching consequences is that
of tlie German merchant ship Dacia, which has been purchased
by the son (American) of a German, and has loaded a cargo
of cotton for Bremen. It involves a delicate problem of
ownership and a variety of other issues on which questioos of
.precedent are likely to be founded later on.
East African Operations.
A somewhat belated report of an East African A&air has
just been issued in Berlin. It is to the effect that on Novem-
ber 2 two British cruisers and twelve transports appeared
off Tanga and subsequently effected a landing of 8,000 troops
at Ras Kasone, where, after a three days' fight, they were re-
pulsed by 2,000 Germans, although supported by a heavy fire
from the cruisers.
This report can, I think, be taken with a considerable
grain of salt; two gunboats and a small landing party of
marines is more probably the correct presentment of affairs.
The British force is stated by the Germans to have consisted
of one European and four Indian regiments.
THE BALTIC.
With the advance of winter there appears to be a complete
lull in the Baltic. Tho German ships are reported to have
withdrawn entirely, but whether they have done this because
they believe the Russians to be ice-bound, or as part of some
scheme of strategy, is not evident.
As I pointed out some time ago, there is no absolute neces-
sity for the Russian Fleet to be frozen in, since Libau is an
ice-free port. Abo there is a good supply of powerful ice-
breakers, in addition to which the new Dreadnoughts of the
Gangool class have ice-breaker bows instead of the usual war-
ship prow.
Consequently, although nothing has happened of late, it
by no means follows that the next few mouths will be un-
eventful.
THE NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.
Up to the moment of writing there has been a singu-
larly quiet time in naval operations, or, rather, perhaps, ona
should say, in operations that are hoard of, for only tho»j
actually engaged can say what is going on behind the scenes.
Perhaps the chief actual incident is the way in which
Germany baa seized the Von Tirpitz idea of commerce de-
struction by means of submarines and aircraft.
Either operation would, of course, be " piracy " pure
and simple, devoid of even the technical justification which
was put forward in the matter of the East Coast Raid. Con-
siderations of this sort, however, are not at all likely to inter-
fere with any German schemes; and so it is mere waste of
paper to discuss questions of legitimacy. Far more germane
is the question : " Can anything really be done? " In Conau
Doyle's story, " Danger," everything was done, and done by
eight submarines only 1
Conan Doyle, however, was engaged in writing fiction —
a readable story dealing with fictitious submarines far
superior to any existing craft. His boats were somewlyit of
the genus of Julea Verne's Nautilus, in "Twenty Thousand
Leagues Under the Sea." We have not got to deal with Cap-
tain Sirius or Captain Nemo, but with the technical possi-
bilities of the present year of grace.
Now, supposing we credit Germany with twenty suitable
submarines — certainly the utmost effective force that she has
available for the purpose.
The first thing that occurs to one is that this would leave
her with few or no boats to continue ordinary naval opera-
tions with, and a state of affairs of that sort would materially
assist tho British inshore squadron in rendering itself particu-
larly unpleasant, plus a free hand in arranging for an un-
comfortable reception for returning German submarines.
We may perhaps allow an average of four torpedoes per
boat — call it a total of eighty torpedoes. Now the history of
the war is that it usually takes two torpedoes to sink a war-
ship, and that a mine, which is infinitely more powerful,
has nothing like the effect on a merchant ship that it has on
a warship. Wherefrom wo may assume that a liner (having
no magazines to be exploded) would certainly require two toc-
pedoes and possibly three.
Data as to the number of misses made by German sub-
marines are not available, but one way and another we oan
safely put them at fifty per cent.
Along these lines we get a hypothetical total of twenty
merchant ships destroyed out of a gross total of four thousand
or so. And those twenty, it has to be remembered, must either!
be sought for out at sea or else waylaid more or less inshore,
where motor-boats may be expected to Be " hunting peri-
scopes."
One way and another, therefore, especially since we are
by n.->w fully alive to the trick of the " mother ship " under
a neutral flag, I do not think that the German threat can bo
regarded as anything but a stupendous piece of cheap bluff.
11*
LAND AND WATER.
January 23, 1915.
TLe aerial part of it certainly is bluff pure and simple. The
submarine part may possibly be attempted as a final eSort;
but if so it is certainly doomed to failure, not only for the
reasons stated above, but also because it fails to take into
account the circumstance that the British Navy -would un-
doubtedly be doing something in the meantime.
• • *
The Loss of the "Formidable."
I have received an unprecedented number of letters on
this subject dealing directly with the cause of the disaster —
more than one of them anonymous, and therefore impossible
to reply to privately. Of these the most important is a corre-
spondent who elects to sign himself " Yours disgustedly.
One who knows." I designate his letter as important in
spite of the fact that on one page he attributes the disaster
to " disobedience to Admiralty orders," and on the nest lays
all the blame on the Admiralty 1 This because he mentions
some other incident known to me as having occurred, but to
which I cannot refer because it would certainly be deleted
(rightly I think) by the Censor.
Other correspondents favour me with stories of signalling
to German submarines which they have either heard of or seen.
On this subject of signalling 1 may mention that in the
capacity of scoutmaster at a certain place I have spent many
a weary night in damp ditches in company with a police
inspector watching suspected houses and places, but (much to
my disgust) never yet struck a case which had anything in it.
I have also done duty with the military on similar fruitless
nocturnal espeditions.
That information gets out is true enough; but over six
months of some personal experience I am reluctantly com-
. polled to confess to complete (or almost complete) scepticism
to nearly all the signalling stories. If there be any spy
signalling it is very rare, and it is' of the utmost importance
that we should keep our heads in the matter, because every
false alarm makes things easier for genuine spies. This is
the psychology of tJie official apathy of which we occasionally
hear so much. In so far as the enemy may be connected
with any signalling or supposed signalling, I should say that
in the majority of cases it is done with the direct object of
creating the " nothing in it" idea.
Returning to the general mass of correspondence 1 find
that a large number of readers refuse to accept my theory that
if a German submarine accounted for the Formidable it was
a matter of " blind chance." A foolish captain stalked by a
clover German suhmarine is the favourite theory. I am unable
to find any evidence whatever to support that theory.
Even in daylight there is a tremendous amount of luck
in submarine operations', and at night, especially in a gale,
a submarine must necessarily be blind, and no amount of
skill can aflect results. Given a single mine adrift and a
submarine, a ship would in such circumstances run almost
exactly eeiual risks from either.
As for the second explosion there is little or no evidence
on which to base even a hypothesis as to whether it came
from the engine-room or was caused by a second torpedo.
The sinking ship having been located it would, even in a gale
at night, be quite possible for a submarine to work round
and fire at her; but it would be a case of wasting a torpedo
to have done so.
Non-Sinkable Ships.
Amongst the mass of correspondence which have reached
ine in connection with the loss of the Formidable comes a
letter from France recalling an old plan of Captain Bazin,
the integral idea of which was a flat-bottomed ship supported
by huge cylinders. This particular idea is unfamiliar to
me; but I take it that in substance it is more or less on the
lines of a vessel subsequently projected by the great Italian
naval architect, Cuniberti. Any such ship would be proof
against either torpedoes or mines'. But it is by no means
clear how she would manage to attain any speed, or where
she would stow her machinery.
In any case, however, the duration of modern wars is not
long enough to permit of the introduction of new types; even
in the old wars, which were infinitely more lengthy, it was
rarely found possible to embody new ideas. In 1795 the two-
decker Glation was experimentally armed with twenty-eight
68 pounder cannonades, and twenty-eight 42 pounders. She
fell in with six French frigates — one of them a uO-gun ship,
two others of 36 guns. With her what v.ere in those days
abnormally heavy guns slie beat off tlio attack without the
least difficulty, though by all the general ideas of the time
she should have been an easy prey to her antagonists. Yet
it was never found possible to adopt a corresponding arma-
ment for other British ships — some kind of technical diffi-
culty presumably intervened.
To construct a ship on Bazin lines would certainly take
at least two and a half years, probably longer, and it would
then be only a purely experimental unit.
The sensational stories about the rapid building of the-
Dreadnought some years ago are mainly responsible for the
prevalence of incorrect ideas on the subject of the rate of
construction. The rapid building of the Dreadnought was
somewhat on a par with the " express locomotive built in a
day," of which we occasionally hear. There is really little
<oT no abnormally rapid building — what does take place is a
rapid putting together.
In the case of the Dreadnought the maximum of material
was all collected together before the ship was commenced ; but
for that she would have taken the normal time to build. It
is impossible in actual practice to accelerate construction to
any very great extentr— there is a limit to the number of
hands which can be usefully employed without getting in each
other's way — and in addition thereunto guns, armour plates,
and various' other things are made by processes of which the
integral factor is a very slow cooling which cannot possibly
be expedited.
• * «
Dummy Warships.
One of the German newspapers published in New York
has come out with a tale about old ships being bought by the
British Admiralty and converted into dummy warships.
Whether true or not there is nothing novel in the idea. Apart
from the familiar dummy guns which figure so largely on
modern battlefields, the dummy warship is quite a classical
idea.
It has not proved partfcularly useful in the past — unless
the story be true that Russian cruisers took a group of dum-
mies at the Pescadores to be Togo's main fleet.
In these days of submarines, however, there may be more
possibilities in dummies than in the past, as though surface
detection of the deception is probable in most atmospheric
conditions, a good deal of uncertainty would prevail through
a periscope. On the whole we may not feel ungrateful to the
Germans for suggesting the idea.
General Matters.
To "Constant Reader," " T. K.," " L. M. B.," "A.
L.," and others. I regret inability to refer to the question
raised. The Admiralty prefers reticence, and in matters of
this sort the Admiralty is necessarily the best (and the only)
judge. I am quite unable to agree with the criticisms of
Admiralty policy. Critics of it, I think, totally fail to
realise the magnitude of the task with which the Admiralty is
faced.
With reference to the series of short histories published by the
Encyclopicdia Briimujlca, reviewed in these columns recently, we
regret that by an error the publishers were wrongly named. The
volumes are published by tlie Encyclopaedia Britannica Co., by per-
mission of the Cambridge University Press, and not as stated last
week. It may be stated in passing that they embody the history of
the countries concerned in the war in a form and compass that is un-
obtainable from any other source, and will be found particularly useful
by students of the war.
The political causes which have led up to the present war are
briefly summarised in The Origins of the War, a two-shilling volume
by J. Holland Rose, published by the Cambridge University Press.
Beginning with the Anglo-German rivalry of 1875 88, the author traces
the development of the present situation from the world-policy of
Germany, the Morocco trouble, and the Baghdad railway, the unliealed
sore of Alsace-Lorraine, and the Far Eastern question. It is an able
study of the principal problems of modern international transaction*
and German aims.
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12*
J^anuary 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE AEROPLANE ON THE OFFENSIVE.
A POTENT QUALITY HITHERTO UNRECOGNISED.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
NOTE.-Thii Artid. ha. been .nbmltted to the Pre. Bure»n, which doe. not object to the pnbllettlon t< cen.ored, and take, no
re.poDiibility for the correctne.. of the itatementi.
IT is with a deep sense of responsibility, and after very
mature consideration, that this article is written. It
will be a matter of considerable regret if it does not
attract, in a practical manner, the immediate atten-
tion of our authorities, and does not convince them
of the value of the suggestions therein made. It is
obvious that, in the present state of international
politics, the writer cannot go into details to prove, by dot^
ting the i's and crossing the t's, the soundness of his views ;
but it IS hoped that his conclusion, based on general reason-
ing, will appeal to those on whom rests the very heavy
burden of directing our military operations in the present
conflict, inasmuch as it is contended that, by the employ-
ment, in a particular manner, of a weapon, now in our pos-
session, it may be possible for the Allies to reduce, by many
long months, the duration of the present war.
It is beyond contest that the worth of the aeroplane,
«t the front, has been demonstrated for certain purposes,
such as reconnaissance work, dispatch-carrying, and other
«pecifio uses, which, as Sir John French recently told us,
are suggesting themselves almost daily. The most valuable
way, however, in which the Allies coidd'use the aeroplane is for
offensive purposes on a comprehensive scale.
A GUN WITH A 150-MILE RANGE.
In fact, in the hands of the Allies, the aeroplane could
rov.- be regarded as being equivalent to a powerful gun with a
range of about 150 miles, a much more formidable weapon
than the large Krupp gun which was so conspicuous in the
first stages of the war. Besides having a range of from seven
to eight times that of the Krupp siege-gun, the aeroplane,
considered as an offensive weapon, v/ould not, like the
German monster machine, require any complicated preli-
minai-y installation for its proper working. The offensive
aeroplane would almost always be ready, and its missile
would reach its aim with a greater certainty than if it were
fired from any existing long-range gun. Some figures, from
actual experience, will prove the truth of these two state-
ments.
In November and December, 1913, the French air-
man, Helen, flew during thirty-nine consecutive days, an
average distance of 330 miles a day, most of the flights being
made in tempestuous or foggy weather. Another French
airnian, Fourny, a few weeks before, had flown an average
of 439 milps daily for tuenty-thrce consecutive days. These
performances, among others, show that, in the beginning of
1914, there Wire aeroplanes in existence which, almost every
day, had a range of over 300 miles, or a radius of action
over 150 miles, and this conclusion regarding the reliability
of the flying-machine applies with even greater force at
prcsant, in the beginning of 1915. It is not too sanguine,
tlicrofore, to assume that we have now in our possession de-
signs of machines capable of flying 150 miles over territory
occupied by the enemy, there to discharge their shots or
explosives, and then to fly back to their base.
The practicability of considering offensive aeroplanes as
being equivalent to a 150-mile range gun having thus been
^tablished, it remains to show its efficiency.
EFFICIENCY OF THE OFFENSIVE
AEROPLANE.
Since the beginning of hostilities the aeroplane, as we
have been told in various official dispatches, issued either
by the War Office or the Admiralty, has, on several occa^
sions, been used for the dropping of projectiles, such as,
for instance, on various airship sheds at Friedrichshafen,
Cologne, Diisseldorf, and Brussels. The exact amount of
success achieved by our airmen in their offensive operations,
thus carried out, has never been officially published. It is
not, therefore, possible to discuss the success or non-success
of our airmen in these special offensive missions. Nor is it
proposed to examine the question v/hether those airmen, who
•were detailed for those missions, had had a suitable train-
ing differing from that of ordinary military aviators usually
employed on reconnaissance or kindred work to especially
fit them for their offensive undertakings. But, apart from
■what little offensive aerial work has been cai'ried out at
the front since the beginning of August, 1914, there are
available some figures, obtained in peace time, which will
serve as a guide in considering the efficiency, in actual prac-
tice, of the aeroplane regarded as the equivalent to a ISO-
mile range gun.
Towards the end of 1912 the airman Gaubert piloted
an aeroplane in which Scott, acting as bomb-dropper,
dropped dummy bombs on a goal oi a circular shape 35
feet in radius. Scott, who had been training himself for that
purpose, dropped the " bombs " from a height of 820 feet,
and he succeeded in dropping on the target 12 projectiles
out of 15, thus securing an average of hits of 80 per cent.
This feat was surpassed in the following year, towards the
end of 1913, when the French Lieutenant Varcin, who had
also undergone special training, dropped, on a pre-arranged
date, from the same height of 820 feet, fifteen bombs °ou
a target of the same radius, namely, 33 feet. Lieutenant
Varcin succeeded in hitting the mark thirteen times, his
average of hits being thus very nearly 87 per cent.
These figures speak for themselves. There is no long-
range gun in the hands of the Allies, or in those of their
adversaries, which, however well served, could secure a
higher percentage of hits. It can, of course, be objected
that at a height of 720 feet, from which the " bombs " wero
dropped so successfully, the aeroplane would, in actual war-
fare, be very much exposed to artillery and to infantry fire
from below. This objection is well founded; but there is
no reason why, with a sufficient amount of training, a large
percentage of hits should not be secured from greater
altitudes, especially on bigger targets. Tliis would be the
more attainable when one keeps in mind that, at a height
of 720 feet, an aeroplane is more subjected to " tossing " and
" pitching" on account of the wind eddies wliich exist near
the earth's surface, than it would be at a height of from
2,000 to 3,000 feet, where the atmosphere is more steady.
At an altitude of 3,000 feet an aeroplane, which of necessity,
is in motion, is practically immune from artillery and infantry
fire.
It may, therefore, be concluded that, with sufficient and
adequate training, an aerial bombardier can be formed who
will render the aeroplane the equivalent of an efficient 150-
mile range gun. It is not too much to ask for the adequate
training of aerial bombardiers when constant practice is de-
manded from the artillery and infantry in order that they
may be efficient. From information which the wi-iter pos-
sesses it would appear that efficient aerial bombai-diers can
be trained very quickly.
EFFICIENCY OF PROJECTILES.
There is another important point to be considered in
connection with tlie offensive aeroplane, quite apart from the
machine itself; it is the efficiency of the projectile to be
dropped from the aeroplane.
Let us consider, in turn, the weight of projectile an
aeroplane can carry, the quantity which can be dropped at
a time, and its possible effect. The weight of projectile an
aeroplane can carry will depend, of course, on how far from
the base it is required to be dropped. The greater the dis-
tance an aeroplane has to travel the greater is the amount
of fuel and lubricant that has to be taken on board the
machine, and, consequently, the smaller is the quantity of
projectile that can be carried.
As regards the amount that can be dropped at a time,
we have to guide us some experiments carried out at the
French military centre of Chalons, by Captain Bousquet, who,
from a hei_ght of over 3,250 feet, suddenly dropped from his
machine a weight of 242 lbs., without the stability of the
machine being affected in the slightest degree. The services
which an aeroplane, carrying 700 or 800 lbs. of projec-
tiles, can render, from the offensive point of view, can,
therefore, be easily conceived by the reader, and need not be
laboured.
The effect of the projectile from an offensive aeroplane
would depend not only upon its nature but also upon its
mass. It does not require very much imagination to under-
stand the effect of bombs filled with some modern explosive
and weighing 100 or 150 lbs. each.
Having thus established the value of the offensive aero-
plane the writer proposes to discuss, in his next article, the
especial importance of a strong aerial offensive in the presen /
war.
LAND AND WATER.
January 23, 1915.
ON THE COLOURS OF UNIFORMS
AND BRODRICK CAPS.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).
THE subject of the colours of uniforms is by no
means novel, and was discussed by our ances-
tors almost as widely as it is to-day.
On the whole they found a very practical
solution, rendered possible by the fact that in
those days there was a distinct and radical differ-
ence between the duties of light infantry and of the line.
The line did the actual shock of battle work, the light in-
fantry or rifles the preparatory skirmishing, mostly in
broken or wooded ground, and every country solved the pro-
blem of invisibility to suit its prevailing tone. Tlius, Lord
Amherst in America, about 1758, clad his light infantry in
" nut brown," an excellent colour for the Canadian woods.
In Germany, whence came the " rifle " or " jager " regi-
ments, a dark green suited the shadows of their pine forests
better, or was thought to do so.
In the Peninsula, with few trees but much red and dark
ochre rock and mountain, our brick-red tunics were parti-
calarly good, and green not in much favour. The Duke of
Wellington, when asked his opinion as to the colours of uni-
forms, said that in his experience he had not found it a matter
of much importance, but that it was essential under all
circumstances that each army should show a clearly-marked
difference of profile in its headdress against the skyline; and
ft little reflection will show how sound this reasoning was.
But in these later days we have forgotten the Duke and
the wisdom of our forefathers, who often spent more years
»t the front than we spend months at the mana^uvres, and
when we adopted the " Brodrick " cap (it was not Brodrick's
at all, by the way) it looked to me as if we had attained
the very nadir of our imbecility, for both Germans and
Eussians, in their flat-topped forage caps, showed precisely
the same silhouette against the sky as our own, and as we
wore nearly the same-coloured greatcoats, it seemed impos-
sible to conceive how mistakes could be avoided.
Fortunately, the Germans elected to stick to their "Pickel-
fcaube," or spiked helmet, on service, so that the matter of
the caps has about righted itself, but there have been many
regrettable incidents, I am told, due to the similarity of tone
in our clothing.
The truth is that the whole question about " colour "
Las never received any scientific attention at all from the
people responsible for our Army clothing. We took to khaki
because in India and South Africa we were not only operating
in a country with which it blended easily, but our fighting was
almost entirely of light infantry character, i.e., in open order,
in small bodies, where concealment is the essence of the
whole problem.
In Prance and Flanders the war is of a totally different
charnoter, where the great decisions which depend
on the co-operation of ai-tillery, infantry, and on the
control the staff can keep of the movements are the chief
things that matter, small skirmishes being only a temporary
condition that will now pass away as the weather improves.
In these big operations the essential is that the gunners
should be able to watch the infantry closing on the enemy,
and support them with fire, over their heads, to the very last
moment possible.
This is why the French never would abandon their red
breeches as long as a certain old artillery general lived. Like
every other nation, they had played with the question for
years before the war broke out, and numerous reports had been
presented from the infantry advocating various shades of
greeny-greys and khakis, but he struck his pen tlu'ough every
one of them, pointing out in very direct language that if he
could not see their little red breeches (but he used a coarser
word) how tlie heU was he to know when to cease firing
in support]
He died about three years ago, and, as is generally
known, a new invisible colour was approved by the French
just before the war, but too late for its introduction, and it
is fortunate indeed that this was so, because it is now be-
coming quite apparent, especially to English onlookers, that
for this same reason the little red breeches are proving worth
thousands of lives to our Allies.
An English artillery officer describes the attack on
Vermeilles the other day as a " dream," the co-operation
of guns and infantry was so perfect. The gunners could see
the red legs twinkling ahead of them, and kept up such a
storm of shrapnel over their heads that the enemy could not
see to take aim. Tbe shells kept raining in on them till
the last twenty-five yards (he said) had been reached, then
the guns ceased, and before the Germans could look up to see
what had happened the French were upon them with the
bayonet, and the place was can-ied.
Similar accounts have come to me from other sources
during the earlier phases of the war, and I feel perfectly
satisfied in. my own mind that where all other conditions
have been so nearly balanced, this last factor, the power
of covering the infantry advance for a couple of hundred
yards more owing to their visibility, has just turned the
scale in favour of the French infantry.
Generally their success has been attributed to the 75mm.
gun. It is, in fact, an excellent gun, but at these ranges
all modern guns are so nearly perfect in accuracy that there
Is nothing to choose between them. Wliere the French score
is in the perfect co-operation of the guns with the infantry
which they have been able to attain.
CORRESPONDENCE.
"MINE AND TORPEDO NET DEFENCE."
Sir, — It is by no means surprising to learn that Sir Wil-
liam White combated Colonel Maude's suggestions for the
conversion of battleships into diving-bells, seeing that as a
practical naval architect ho must have been well aware of the
general impracticability of any Buoh proposals.
The protective deck or decks of the modern vessel of war
possess three functions: — (1) To keep out shot and shell from
the engine and boiler rooms, from the magazines, and from
the vital portions of the ship's interior economy. (2) To give
lateral strength and stiffness to the general construction of the
Teasel. (3) To seal hermetically, as far as it may be possible,
all lower compartments from the inrush of water consequent
upon the breaching of the bottom by the explosion of torpedo
or mine.
These decks, however, for the ordinary working of the
chips, are pierced by a large number of openings, e.g., engine
and boiler room hatchways, funnels and funnel-casings, ash-
hoiBts, shell and amnaunition lifts, ladderways and hatchways
for the passage of the crew, etc., etc., and it is obvious that
in proportion to the number and magnitude of these openings,
the principle of the diving-bell must disappear; and no
naval architect who has had experience of fitting air-looks
to boiler rooms, worked under forced draught, would
desire to multiply or extend these cumbersome and clumsy
contraptions to other compartments of the ship. Colonel
Maude writes as a Royal Engineer and inventor, but I think
he scarcely realises the extremely narrow limits of space and
weight within which the naval designer is compelled to work.
The art and mystery of battleship design may be compendi-
ously if crudely defined as the effort to squeeze a quart into
a pint pot — a task of proverbial difiioulty.
Colonel Maude writes lightheartedly of increasing the
depth of the double-bottom from 3ft. to 5ft., not realising that
the draught of these vessels has to be calculated within inclies,
and that every cubic foot of air space added at the bottom of
the vessel tends to send up the centre of gravity of the eliip,
to shorten the height of " meta-ccntre " (that theoretic pivot of
the vessel's pendulous suspension), and generally to disturb
the calculations of stability upon which the safety and sea-
worthiness of the ship depend. In these directions I fear that
the problem of safeguarding a ship against mine or toi]-iedo
attack has already been mainly thrashed out, though probably
still something remains to be done in providing controlled
water-communication between the several transverse and hori-
eontal compartments of the ship.
Few vessels go down by direct vertical submersion, but
when one or more side-compartments have been breached the
inrushing water upsets the stability and trim of the vecsel.
till, with more or less rapidity, it turns turtle and goes to the
bottom.
Apart from the active defence of a battleship by gunfire or
torpedo boat patrols, and beyond all question of construc-
tional design, there still remain to be explored the possiljili-
ties of net-defence, which in my judgment have in recent
years been grossly neglected by our naval authorities. The
January 23, 1915.
LAND AND WATEIB
explosive effect of a mine is intensely local, and if only it can
be kept twenty or thirty feet from tlie side of the ship, its
destructive energy becomes practically innocuous.
Admirals and other naval experts often object to net-
defence on tb.e ground that it is cumbersome and difficult to
handle, that it is, under modern conditions, largely ineffective,
^nd that it tends to interfere with the speed and manceuvring
qualities of the ship — but in reply it may be said that these
neta and their supports can easily be designed so as to become
oomplctely effective for the purpose proposed, and that it is
better to lose a few knots' speed, notably within the narrow con-
fines of the North Sea, than to lose the vessel itself; and there
can, I fear, be little doubt but that we shall continue to be
..horrified by news of fresh naval disasters, and th« still more
irreparable loss of gallant lives until our naval authorities
take into more serious consideration this most pressing prob-
-lem of Net-Defence. — Yours faithfully,
Arnold F. Hills, M.I.N. A.
Hammerfieldj Penshurst, Kent.
RUSSIA AND AVIATION.
To the Editor of Land and Wateb.
SiE, — Having lately come over from Russia on important
business which has kept me very occupied, I was fortunate
enough in a spare moment to read Mr. L. Blin Desbleds'
article on " The Airship in Naval Warfare," published in
your esteemed journal of January 9th, 1915.
With all duo respect to Mr. Desbleds, with whom I am
somewhat acquainted through correspondence, I cannot agrea
with his views on the subject treated by him in the before-
mentioned article.
Having had intimate experience of dirigibles or airships
for many years I may state that the capability of the airship
to remain stationary over any given point is extremely pro-
blematical. In practice I have never seen it done in average
weather or even under the ideal conditions of the White
Nights of Northern Russia, better conditions than which it is
impossible to find, except perhaps on the paper of the mathe-
matician.
When attempting to keep an airship stationary over any
given point, instead of doing so the airship, even when on its
best behaviour, drifts slightly about in every direction, with-
out any definite wish of its own as it were, the toy of every
phenomenon of the element in which it floate, and not even
superior management of the vessel will fully counteract this
behaviour, which those having deep practical experience of
airships know to be sufficiently aggravating and disconcerting
when endeavouring to do with accuracy anything requiring
this quality of remaining stationary, which the airship is gene-
rally supposed to possess, such work can be better carried
out when the airship has a certain amount of engine-driven,
accurately-gauged headway I
Under the general term of aeroplane, it is apparent from
Mr. Desbleds' article that he compares the small type of aero-
plane generally known with the modern airship, quite ignoring
the existence of the large 400-h.p. to 900-h.p. aeroplanes, an
equally modern development, which Russia, keeping its own
counsel, has brought to a high pitch of perfection during the
past two or three years, and with which I have had also much
to do.
The comparison made by Mr. Desbleds is unfair, as these
large aeroplanes are as superior for general utility to their
small sisters as the modern airships are to the early smaller
airships.
These large aeroplanes can be made so to hover as it wei-e
over any given point, as to attain very similar conditions to
those obtained on an airship having a very slight amount of
headway as aforesaid, for periods of time amply sufficient for
their operators, with the modern perfection of instruments, to
fulfil with accuracy anything which previously it has been sup-
posed could better be accomplished on airships, when trying
to make them remain stationary over a given point.
These large aeroplanes are fitted with four engines, and
have a speed of seventy miles per hour, and can be made to
fly non-stop, whenever so required, for twelve hours, and they
can be as easily navigated at night for such periods as in the
daytime. They have ample crew accommodation, and carry
an installation of wireless telegraph with a range of not less
than 200 miles, searchlights, machine guns, bomb-dropping
apparatus, and photographic laboratory.
Such aeroplanes have proved their complete superiority
to airships, and their use during this war has brought great
benefit to Russia, and the sooner Great Britain has such
machines the better. — I am, Sir, yours truly,
C. J. H. MACKBNZIE-KENNEDr.
Member of Technical Committee,
Imperial All-Russia Aero Club.
33, St. Swithin's Lane, London, E.G.
PROTECTION AGAINST SUBMARINESi
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — I enclose a memo, re submarines. I have
already sent the substance of it to the Admiralty, but it was
mixed up with other proposals, and not so clearly put as
it now is. They do not consider the idea practicable. I
have asked them whether I may communicate my ideas io
the Press, as some others have done, and they agree.
I should be extremely glad if you would (in Land and
Water) give, briefly, your ideas on the proposal. I know
you take great interest in such matters. Various similar
ideas were commented on in The Times in November.
1. Main Idea. — Tlie idea is to arrange so that a submarine,
in fairly shallow or confined waters, shall notify ita pre-
sence and its whereabouts. It is proposed to lay down wires
which the submarine will touch and break or displace.
Since the vertical height from keel to top of periscope is
considerable, a system of horizontal wires would be most
efi&oient.
2. Wires. — To be laid horizontally one above another,
and at such intervals — say 25 feet — that a submarine must
strike one or other. To be suspended at suitable intervals
by cords or wires from floats. To be anchored at the ends
and at other points if necessary. See sketch Fig. 1. Length
of a^ wire not to be so great as to seriously retard the sub-
marine, otherwise the latter would become aware of the fact
that it was entangled and might go astern, and shake off the
wire.
%-2-
4.t>^
-y^!
^alox^ By suimaraii!
3. Indicator Floats. — A submarine striking a wire would
double it up and carry it along. Connected with eacb
end float there would be an indicator float (A, fig. 1 and 2),
whicli would remain on the surface and move along in wake
of submarine and show a flag. A watching destroyer could
follow. At night the float could carry a light or be coated
with luminous paint.
4. Remai'ks. — Wires could be laid across mouths of har-
bours, etc., or around selected areas of sea (e.g., areas near
Belgium when ships shell the coast), or even right acrcss
the Straits of Dover. The south part of the North Sea is
only about 120 feet deep. The wires would be in lengths,
eacE overLapping the next. They would be more simple
than a system of nets such as has been proposed. In some
cases it might be suitable to attach the ends of the wires
strongly to the shore. The breaking of the wire might in-
terrupt an electric current, and so signal the presence of the
submarine. Of course ships crossing the wire would have to
stop engines and slow.
E. 8. Bkllabis, M.I.C.E.
30, Lansdown Crescent, Cheltenham,
15*
LAND AND WATER
January 23, 1915.
EXPLOSIVES.
To the Editor of Land and Wateh.
Sib, — Mr. Jane's statement " that Germany is ahead of
the rest of the world in the matter of high explosives " seema
to be well founded (at least, bo far as we are concerned), and
to constitute the explanation of several apparently isolated
facts. I venture to put forward some suggestions and to ask
come question;?.
(1) la this not probably the explanation of the effect
produced by the German siege guns and Jack Johnsons ? The
debated question of the size of these guns is not the impor-
tant one, but the explosive. We hear nothing of such
devastating effects being produced by our shells.
(2) The pictures recently published of the ruined forta
at Tsingtau suggest that the Japanese possess an equally
powerful explosive. The fall of Tsingtau seems to have sur-
prised the Germans as much as that of Namur did ourselves.
Further, a rumour declares that the Japanese have reported
cur torpedoes to be of no use, that is (I take it), compara.-
tively speaking. Could we not get some aid from our ally ?
(3) Does this throw any light on the comparative rapidity
with which the Good Hope and Monmouth were destroyed once
the German armed cruisers got the upper hand? The Good
Hope blew up a little more than an hour after firing began,
and the Monmouth sank within a little more than two hours.
On the face of it the odds did not seem to be so hugely against
us. The battle at the Falkland Islands was of much longer
duration.
(4) What effect may this superiority in explosive shells
and torpedoes be likely to have on the great naval battle which
will take place when the German Fleet has completed equip-
ment, trained the reservists and new recruits, and effected a
sufficient attrition of the British Fleet by mines and sub-
marines? If it does'. It is rather melancholy that after the
experience of the Boer war we should have allowed ourselves
to be caught again with an inferior armament and one which
affects everything — shells, torpedoes, bombs, mines, and hand
grenades. .What are our chemists doing? — Yours,
H. J. C. Geiebson.
THE LOSS OF THE "FORMIDABLE."
To the Editor of Land and Water.
SiE, — I have been deeply interested in reading Colonel
Maude's description of his idea for keeping fighting vessels
afloat after submarine attack.
The reference to the " diving bell," which under the new
name of a caisson bell is now of such practical utility in
civil engineering works, very happily illlistratea Colonel
Maude's suggestion for lessening the dangers attendant on
naval warfare.
Tliere is, however, this difference between the diving
bell and the warship. The diving bell rests on the ground
at the bottom of the water, the weight of its structure being
greater than the weight of the water which it displaces.
The filling of a space in a warship with compressed air is
intended to prevent it reaching the bottom — in fact, to main-
tain it at the surface. If the bottom of a caisson bell is,
say, 30 feet below top water level, it will be necessary in
order to prevent water entering the bottom of the bell to
charge the bell with compressed air and maintain it at a
pressure per square inch equal to the weight of a column
ef water 30 feet high and 1 inch square in section. The
pressure of the air inside will then balance the external pros-
sure of the water at the bottom of the bell.
Now, supposing when in this condition the bell is punc-
tured— say, at a vertical height of 4 feet from the bottom —
the balance in pressure between the air inside and the water
outside is broken ; for at the point of puncture the heaxl of
water is reduced to 26 feet, whilst the pressure of the internal
air at this level is still equal to a column of water having a
head of 30 feet. Air will now escape through the puncture
and water will rise in the bell until it reaches and covers
the orifice. The remaining air will then be locked in the
upper part of the bell, and water will cease to enter. If
the bell had been constructed with a watertight bottom, and
instead of being punctured it had ripped open — say, from
the bottom to a vertical height of 4 feet from the bottom,
the result would have been the same.
With considerable diffidence I would like to compare the
punctured bell with the punctured ship, but wish it to be
quite understood that I make no pretence to a knowledge
of marine engineering, and if my comparisons are at fault
I welcome corrections.
1 believe that a ship floats because the weight of water
wluch it displaces is less than the weight of the ship itself,
and that when a ship fills with water to such an extent that
this difference in weight ceases to exist the balance of
buoyancy is lost and the ship sinks.
Imagine a ship to be constructed with an absolutely
air-tight deck, and every part of the exterior of the ship
below the deck also of air-tight constrnction. Assume
further that the bottom of the ship is 30 feet below top-
water level, and that the whole of the space below the deck
is filled with compressed air at a pressure equal to the external
head of water — in fact, under the same conditions as the
caisson bell before referred to. If such a ship be punctured
or breached may I not reasonably conclude that she will fill
with water until the top of the breach is well covered ? This
filling with water will decrease the difference in weight
between the water displaced by the ship and the weight of
the ship, and if to such a degree that tlie balance of buoyancy
is lost the ship sinks.
Now if my conclusions with regard to the ship are
correct then I think answers to the following questions are
reqnired before the practical utility of compressed air as a
means for keeping a vessel afloat after submarine attack can
be demonstrated : —
I. — Is it practicable for the space below an air-tight
deck to be filled and maintained with compressed air at a
pressure of, say, 15 lbs. per square inch without lessening
the fighting power of the ship or the crew to an appreciable
extent?
II. — In tlie event of submarine attack would the ex-
plosion so damage the ship as to render the deck and the
exterior of the ship below the deck and above the highest
point of the breach no longer air-tight?
III. — Is the highest part of the breach caused by sub-
marine attack at such a level that, under all conditions,
sufficient space is left between the highest part of the breach
and the air-tight deck to preserve the balance of buoyancy.
— Yours faithfully, John Chadwick.
OILSKINS AND RUBBER BOOTS.
To the Editor of Land and Wateb.
Dear Sir, — The response to the appeal wliich I made
for oilskins and " gum " boots through the medium of
your paper, has been most generous, but further efforts are
needed to collect the large number (4,000) asked for by the
Commandant of No. 1 Base (France). The receiving Depot is
at 8, Beauchamp Place, Brompton Road, S.W., where all gifts
are gladly acknowledged. Letters may be addressed to Mrs.
Bruce Williams, 22, Alexander Square, S.W. — I am. Sir,
yours faithfully, M. A. Williams.
22, Alexander Square, S.W.,
Bcrke's PeeRagb (1915 edition), published by Messrs. Harrison & Sons
(Bookselling Dept.), 45, Pall Mall, London, is now to hand. This
valuable work of reference should be in every library.
As evidence of the fact that "Burke" is corrected efficiently and
rio-ht up to date we notice that the following items appear in the text of
the work :
The death of Sir John Barker, December I6th, 1914 ;
The death of Sir H. F. Grey, December 17th, 1914 ;
and the Addenda brings the happenings up to December 19th.
Mention is also made in tlie text of the honours given by the King in
France, i.e., The Order of ^Terit to General Sir Jolin French, The Garter
to the King of Belgians, The Bath to General Joffre, and The St. Mirhael
St. George to other French Generals, and all the D.S.O.s and V.C.?
conferred up to December 19th.
The deaths of three Baronets who had long been lost sight of are
also now recorded, »>., Sir Henry Burnaby, 5th Bart. ; Sir Richaid H. K.
Farmer, 6th Bart ; and Sir George Compton Reade, 9th Bart.
The price of the volume is £2 2s. net.
LOOKING BACKWARDS.
Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on " The War by Land and Water " will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this rernarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T. JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is, 6d. each.
Or wc will supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complete,
for 6s. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numbers already
received we have had to reprint some of the earlier
numbers. Same can now be supplied at 6d. per copy.
Order now from your Newsagent, Bookstall, or direct
from the Publishers,
"LAND AND WATER,"
CENTRAL HOUSE. KINGSWAY. LONDON. I
January 23, 1915
LAND AND WATER
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Through the Eyes
OF A Woman
How to Live
THE lot of the housekeeper does not seem likely t(
become any easier as time goes on. Considering
the present state of affairs during the past five
months prices have not mounted as rapidly as
they might have, but of late they have shown a
distinctly upward tendency. And it is unlikely that these
will decrease in the near future ; instead, we must make up
our minds to e.xpect the reverse. Bread has gone up in price,
eggs are dearer, butter shows at least an additional penny on
the pound, and even such a modest commodity as kindling
for the domestic hearth shows a shrinkage of quantity, the
bundles of firewood being palpably smaller.
As a matter of solid fact, we should consider ourselves
fortunate that things are not worse than they are, and nobody
at present has much to grumble at so far as the supply of
their creature comforts is concerned. Many of those creature
comforts, however, are going to cost them more, and those
who, like Mrs. Gilpin, are of a frugal mind are wondering
where and whence they can economise. And this is a point
which can very fairly puzzle the brains of the cleverest of
women. The really clever housekeeper knows that economy,
like cleverness itself, must be disguised if it would achieve
success. There is nothing more damping to the spirits than
the clever person who is yet stupid enough to brazen his
cleverness. There is nothing more chilling in the home than
a " drawing in " atmosphere. How to avoid this impression,
and yet effect all necessary economy, is the problem of the
day to all housekeepers.
The Means to the End
Those who really wish to solve the problem in the most
practical fashion can best do so by drawing up a summary of
their daily routine and studying it. Few things are more
illuminating than a list of this sort. We see our mode of
Hving down in black and white, and can gather at a glance in
what direction money can be saved. This needs some very
clear thinking, because there are certain ways in which mone}-
must not be saved, however harsh may be the demands upon
our purse. As good patriots it is incumbent upon us to
support the organisations working for the good of our soldiers
and sailors. Looking farther afield, we should stretch forth
a hand of comradeship to our Allies, giving help wherever we
can, and thus promoting that feeling of oneness which is
amongst the foremost assets of the Allied cause. Then there
may be cases of want, only indirectly caused by the war, but
demanding our aid more forcibly now than at any other time
For, strange though it may seem in these days of terrible
strife, there has yet never been a time when the brotherhood
of man should be more apparent. We are all members of
one large famOy fighting in a common cause, and the strongest
must help the weakest or else both family and cause will
perish in the ordinary course of events. AU these claims
upon us, then, must be generously accepted if we would do
our share of the work.
No better term has ever been coined than that of
" personal expenditure." E.xpenditure is personal ; so
personal, indeed, that nobody can regulate it but ourselves.
For this reason it is well nigh impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rules about the spending of money. People
must cut their coat according to their cloth, and it is only
the owner of the coat who can judge the true value of its
material and the particular way in which it should be cut to
suit him. Once this is acknowledged, however, there still
remains something that all can banish from their
daily life with the best economical results. If we made up
our minds to rigorously bar all superfluities and diligently
examined ourselves as to the exact meaning of the word,
how much more simple would our lives become. It is the
easiest thing in the world to waste time, money, and energy
on the superfluous ; but we have reached a point when
mistakes of this sort will be swiftly punished, and it behoves
us all to beware.
A Foe to Fight
There is an enemy to be fought in the home as well as
abroad, and it is quite as insidious a foe. Its name is Waste.
Napoleon once said that stupidity was worse than a crime,
but in this case we must quote the reverse. Waste has
always been stupid, but at this present time it is criminal.
There is a legitimate output for every penny of our incomes,
228
January 23, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
|llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllillllllllllillllllllllllE
I How to help Tommy Atkins |
^ We cannot all go out to fight, but we can =
— all do something to help our soldiers who =
S are fighting our battles and defending the ^
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~ contribute to their well-being and efficiency S
I SEND HIM A FLASK OF I
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Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-
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229
LAND AND W A 1 E R
January 23, 1915
THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN
and \vc must not sliirk its responsibility. It is a wise woman,
therefore, who makes uncompromising warfare against waste
and finds it her business to see there is no such thing in her
household. It will not be a very easy fight to win. but each
day that passes shows how necessary it is to wage.
Some people, in order to prevent a leakage in household
expenditure, are putting both themselves and their servants
on a fixed weekly allowance. A definite sum is allowed per
head each week, and the vexed question of why the baker's
book is double that of the preceding week is never raised.
Why the housekeeping books should fiuctuate for no special
reason is always an unsolved problem, but this plan certainly
prevents it arising. Most things, indeed, at the present day
seem to resolve themselves into the principles of mathematics,
and for the idealist and dreamer they are hard times indeed.
It is only the piactical mind that delights in the ruthless
reduction of everything to pounds, shillings, and pence ;
but it is the practical mind that tides over a financial difficult}',
and housekeeping is nothing nowadays if it be not common
sense writ large.
Erica.
CORRESPONDENCE
5th batt. rifle brigade depot, minster,
isle of sheppey
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I should be extremely obliged if you would kindly
insert the following letter in your paper. There must be
hundreds of old garden and deck chairs stored away which
would be of the very greatest value to our soldiers for their
wooden buildings, which are being built for winter quarters.
Many of our soldiers have neither mattresses nor chairs, and
have to sit on the wooden floors, which is very trying after
long marches.
Would any of your readers who can do so very kindly
send to —
Eric Gilbey,
5th Batt. Rifle Brigade,
Minster, Isle of Sheppev.
Tf possible, each county should supply its own camps
Calciu.m carbide, hitherto ahnost entirely a foreign production,
can now be obtained of English manufacture in considerably better
(|iiality than heretofore. Our illustration shows the Thornhill factory
of Messrs. Chas. Bingham & Co., manufacturers of all-British carbide,
with no less than twenty-three points in the United Kingdom at which
a stock is maintained for the convenience of consumers. The quality
of the product may be estimated from the fact that one of the hngsst
St -'el firms in the world insists on " Thornhill " carbide, and will not
use the foreign product.
-Messrs. Bryant & May, the well-known match manufacturers,
have designed and put on the market an exceedingly useful metal
ca.se, which takes the ordinary matchbo.x and protects the contents
and the striking surface from damp or any other injuries. The case
is neat and workmanhke in appearance, and should win favour among
those who have occasion to use matches in exposed positions. It
would be a useful addition to a smokers' outfit in the trenches at the
present time.
The inventors and makers of the medicated gelatine leaves
referred to in this issue, are Savory & Moore, of 143 New Bond Street.
In these exceptional times much importance and interest attaches
to the pubhcation of that well-known annual, " Sutton's Amateur's
Guide in Horticulture," a copy of which for 1915 has just been received.
In an address to their customers Messrs. Sutton direct attention to
the vital necessity of producing at home foodstuffs of all kinds on as
extensive a scale as possible, and those who have land suitable for
raisi.-- garden crops will no doubt be aUve to the advantage of
cultivating every available yard, not only to meet individual wants,
but to pro. ide against any national emergency.
yHE
For the Comfort of
Mounted Officers
KHAKI RIDING SHIRT has been
specially designe<l for long days in the saddle. By means
of a tail piece attached to the back of the shirt which is passed
between the legs and fastened in front, it is impossible for the
skirts of the shirt to g'^t out of place, or for the shirt itself to
ruck up Absolute comfort and additional warmth is thus assured.
PRICE
THE KHAKI RIDING SHIRT
{as t/Zus/raleiJI
Pure Cashmere Underclothing and Body Bells in different
weights. Beautifully soft, warm and comfortable.
TURNBULL & ASSER
Sporting Hosiers
71-72, JERMYN STREET, LONDON, S.WV.
(5 doors from St. James's Street.)
Telegrams: " PadHyvvh^rk, London " 'IVI'-pbo-if : 4628 Gcrnir.l
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I MILITARY
I WATERPROOFS
IM
ADE in best
double texture
mackintosh twill, /j
witii strap at back, /^
cut for riding. f>-^
Medium weight ^
£3 3 0
Detachable fleece
lining, three-quarter
length Extra
£1 1 0
Write for illustrated booklet
" Comforts for the Trenches."
I Dunhills
E 2, Conduit Street, W.
E MANCHESTER: GLASGOW:
S; 90/92, CroM St 72, Si. Vincent St
miiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiirn
230
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXIV No. 2751
SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 1915 [!:^^^il/i';.,^a l^^rJi^Sf.^v^.f.ik'i.;?
Copyright, BassanO
MAJOR J. H. S. DIMMER, V.C.
This officer served his machine gun during the attack at Klein Zillebeke until he had b^^..
shot five times— three times by shrapnel and twice by bullets — and ci>ntinued at his post until
his gun was destroyed. For this act of bravery he was awarded the V.C, also tl
decoration — the Military Cross.
een
ne new
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915
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240
January 30. 1915
LAJN U AND W A 1 EK
THE PART PLAYED BY RAILWAYS IN
MODERN WARFARE
By "A.M.I.C.E."
^ LTHOlTiH the Rreat war now raging has with
/^k sonic justice been called a " motor war," owing
/ ^ to the enormous use made of motor transport,
/ % it might even more truly be described as a
-^ -^^ " railway war." Although motor transport has
played a great part in facilitating the movements of vast
armies, in feeding the large masses, and in providing them
with stores and ammunition, the railways have been and
continue to be the chief means of transportation.
The Franco-German War of 1S70-71 was really the fir^t
great conflict in which railways became an important element
of strategy and tactics, and since that date tliere have only
been two land 'Campaigns of first-class importance in which
they were used to a large extent, namely, the South African
and Russo-Japanese wars. Unfortunatelv, both campaigns
were conducted in sparsely populated districts provided
with very few railway facilities, and as these wars were
fought outside Europe but little attention was directed to
the work of the railways.
A Commission of railway investigation, instituted by the
French Government during the armistice in 1S71, stated that
a railway is a docile and powerful instrument which should
be used with intelligence. Its numerous and disciplined
staff is accustomed to obeying precise orders emanating from
one authority, and is, of course, completely bewildered when
contradictory instructions are sent in from different quarters
at the same time. The Commission reported that this
important element of useful working had been completely
overlooked in the Franco-Gerrran War, and this was proved
by numerous facts. In consc q lence of different orders,
counter orders, too frequent requisitions from military
authorities causing fatal delays and blocking up the sidings,
fighting between generals for priority of trains, etc., the
French railways were hopelessly crippled during the best
part of the war. On January 15, 1871, 6,500 vans were
immobilised for such reasons at a single spot on the Paris-
Lyons-Mediterranee Railway. Inexperience of the practical
working of the railways for military purposes resulted in the
accimiulation of abundant provisions at one place, while at
other places the armies lacked everything. During the
march of Bourbaki's army an obstruction in the station of
Clairsal resulted in 15,000 men remaining eight da\s and
nights in the cars with food for three days only. The
Commission reported that the capabilities of railway trans-
ports are practically indefinite and are only limited by the
amount of rolling stock available. The Eastern Railway of
France transported on an average 12,000 to 15,000 men per
day, with cavaln*', artillery, and war material, the trains
following each other every hour or half-hour. Each train
usually contained 1,200 men or a battery of artillery. \'inoy's
army — 50,000 strong, with artillery — was transported in
thirty hours, while on November 22, 1870, 100,000 men were
concentrated at le Mans in three days by three different
railway lines.
The French admitted that the Germans made more
efficient use of the PVench lines than they did themselves,
because the German railways were being managed b\- a
G n-ernment Commission which had absolute control over all
the different railway companies. This arrangement is, to a
certain extent, the same as that instituted at the beginning
I if the war in Great Britain.
During the war of 1S70 the ordinary pa.ssenger and goods
t affic of the German railways dwindled to practically nothing,
tlie principal business consisting in moving troops, forwarding
siege guns, ammunition, convoys of provisions and stores,
and in bringing back from France many numerous trains of
sick and wounded, as well as prisoners of war. Of the French
a'my captured at Metz 70,000 were sent off by railway
through Saarbriicken, whilst 85,000, with an escort of 16 for
every 100, were forwarded by rail to Germany via Trier.
Passenger carriages were requisitioned and furnished by
ev-ery German railway company in proportion to the means
at its command, and fi\-e trains, with 2,000 prisoners in each,
left Metz every day. Within two weeks after the declaration
of war the Germans laid 10 miles of railway on the right
bank of the Rhine, opposite the fortress of Germersheim, to
Graben, near Bruchsal, in order to form a junction from
Worms to Germersheim. This short line proved of great
strategical importance, and was foimd of immense use for
the rapid conveyance of troops. With the fall of Toul and
Metz the Germans obtained uninterrupted communication
between Germany and Nanteuil, about 46 miles from Paris.
The French destroyed the railway bridge over the Mame,
and consequently the Ciermans had to send their siege guns
from this point to Paris by road. The Eastern Railway
Company of France suffered most at the hands of the Germans,
as this railway was entirely in their possession. Its loss in
rolling stock was, however, small, as most of it was brought
safely to the main station in Paris before the German advance.
One of the results of the war of 1S70 was the very
important arrangement carried out between the PZnglish and
German Governments, by which the English overland mails
to India and Australia were diverted from the French route
and conveyed through Germany to Munich, and then over
the Brenner Railway to Verona, whence they passed through
Italy to Brindisi and shipped to Alexandria.
Up to the present war railways in this country have
never been called upon to handle such a volume of traffic as
has been necessitated by the transport of the Expeditionary
Force to France, and also in connection with the movements
of Territorials and Kitchener's Army, but those familiar with
our railways have always felt confident that at the critical
moment the railway companies would not be found wanting.
In the South African War the London and South-
Western Railway did admirable work. The Chairman of the
Company stated that between October 20, 1899, and Saturday,
February 3, 1900, there had been embarked at the Company's
wharves at Southampton 3,244 officers, 114,933 men, 12,929
horses, 267 guns, and 997 military wagons, with 10,000 tons
of stores and ammunition. This traffic was conveyed over
the line in 592 special trains, and in no case was a transport
delayed by the train service.
The following figures show the number of troops and
material handled on specific days on the London and South-
western Railway. All this traffic was carried at a time
when trade was excellent, and in no case was the ordinary
public train service interfered with : —
Officers
Militi
Date, l8rg.
and Men.
Horses.
Guns.
WaKc
Friday, Oct. 20
. 4566
16 .
5
• 38
Saturday, Oct. 21 . .
. 5048 .
103
20
. 89
Sunday, Oct. 22 . .
- 4859 .
524
9
27
Monday, Oct. 23 . .
■ 4255
437
5
■ 38
Tuesday, Oct. 24 . .
. I581
272
9
41
Saturday, Xov. 4 . .
• 3652
344
2
8
Saturday, Nov. 11..
. 2222
6
I
5
W ednesday, Nov. 15
828 .
406
12
42
The London and North- Western Railway also shipped a
large number of troops from Liverpool and other places.
The company brought them from various parts of London
and the country. In connection with the South African War
this company carried 62,071 troops, 126 guns and horses in
359 special trains without interfering with the ordinary
traffic. Lord Roberts, in his report on the field transport,
referring to the Railways Department, said that the difficult
and arduous work performed by this department reflected
the greatest credit upon all concerned. From Capetown to
Pretoria is 1,040 miles, and Pretoria to Komati Poort is
292 miles more and, considering the enormous length of line
to protect, it was a wonderful achievement to carry an army
of 250,000 men with all their equipment into the heart of
the enemy's countrj-.
(To be continued).
Terms of Subscription to
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241
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 19 15
Iff
FoRTNUM & Mason
Mess Purveyors
for the Front
By A)>t>mnlmeni.
execute orders, singly or at stated intervals, for thousands of
Naval and Military Officers on Active Service.
Fortnum & Mason supply carefully selected articles to large
numbers of Regiments and Batteries (and separate companies) in
France. The prices are strictly competitive, and the unique and
up-to-date experience of the Firm is placed at the disposal of those
interested, and particularly Mess Presidents.
Special Catalogues for Household Use, Ordinary Export, or
the Front, are sent on application.
FORTNUM & MASON
182 Piccadilly, London, W.
TD.
Telegrams : " FORTNUM, LONDON.'
Telephone: REGENT 41.
HOI EL CECIL
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Hilaire Relloc
has written a fascinating article
entitled " Can the Loser Pay ? " and
in it he tells, with his customary
soundness and brilliancy, how, at
the end of this present world-war,
the conquered nation, beaten to
their knees, will pay "through the
nose " and continue to pay for years
and years to come. Mr. Belloc
throws a new light on the question
of war indemnities and his splendid
article is published exclusively in
the current (February) number of
NASH'S
AND PALL MALL MAGAZINE
on sale by all neyvsa^enls — 6d. a copy.
Exceptional inclusive terms to resi-
dents and special rates for Officers.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Telephone: GERRARD 60, ^P^'i/- MANAGER.
242
January 30, 1915,
LAND AND WATEK
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC,
ROTE.— Thli ArtlcU hti bteo tobnltttd to th* Preii Barcao, which doei not object to the publication •• coniorcd and takei n«
rciponilbility for the corrtctneti of th« itattmenti.
In atcordaico with tho rcqnirementi of tho Freii Borean, tho poiltloni of troopi on Plant lUnttratln; thli Article mnit only bo
regarded ai approximate, and no definite itrenftb at any point ii indicated.
THE WESTERN FIELD.
THE news from the western front in the
course of the last week has involved no ap-
preciable movement of troops. Indeed,
the mark of all the last few days has
been that throughout the whole field (by
land) the campaign has been stationary. The line
at Soissons stands just where it did, as does every
part of the western front ; even in Alsace, where
very large German reinforcements have failed to
take the wooded height of the Hartsmann Weiler-
kopf which overlooks Steinbach and Tliann.
The real interest of the time is the approach
of that moment — now not far distant — when the
German Empire shall begin to put forward its new
formations which are also its last reserves.
How these will be used, and where, are the
main points upon which all speculation now turns.
clear that if ever he can bring large reinforcements
of suflGiciently good material for the action he
should try in his first new offensive in the West to
invest Verdun, unless some political folly attracts
him to the mere name of Reims, as it attracted him
to the mere name of Calais.
It is evident that a really successful offensive
down the line of the Argonne would be the shortest
way of closing the buckle, of which the wedge at
St. Mihiel is the clasp, and to conceal the massing
of men under modern conditions a great belt of
woodland is perhaps the best opportunity.
In the same way the French, for their offen-
sive, have already considered the Vosges and its
forest. But the advantage of woods in concealing
a concentration is set off by the disadvantage of
woods as a field for attack. What seems conceiv-
able is the use of such a belt as the Argonne for
®Mtz
1
(i)7Bul
'Days irlarch.
tlXS SHOWIKO THB SITUATION IH THB VICIKITY 07 VKROUN.
and obviously the most vital matter offered to our
judgment.
I hope next week to have room for its discus-
sion at length, meanwhile there is some interest in
remarking the very active efforts the enemy con-
tinues to make in the Argonne, because it is pretty
concentration, and thence the delivery of an offen-
sive stroke southward and eastward from it across
the Clermontois, the fairly open land beyond CIer-<
mont and towards Triaucourt, that is, ialong the
upper valley of the Aire. It is evident that this
movement, if it is successful, will isolate Verdun,
LAND AND WATER.
January 30, 1915.
^Ii2,
9d Varh &
Chalons
and tha
J^otthcrn half
of the
trench Line
To
Chdions
^nd Paris
Centre
Showmgthetiumei^us Tratich communications
forrBfxd concentmtibn at aity point threatened
in the reentrant German Line between
St. MthUland the Arjlonne*
To along the
Southern end
cfthe French
Line.
id
and the isolation of Verdun would mean either the
falling back of all the French line to the south of it
or the exhaustion of the southern half of the
French line in repeated attempts, at relief. In
either case such an investment would break the
grip in which the Germans are now held on the
west. It may be suggested, but it is only a sug-
gestion, that the continued activity in Argonne is
in preparation of such a move.
On the other hand, it is difficult to see how
any concentration here could succeed against the
rapid means of counter-concentration which the
French possess immediately behind the German
re-entrant angle. There is full railway opportu-
nity for massing troops by the big double lines
through Chalons and the other parallel line to Bar-
le-Duc, and there are very numerous cross-lines,
single and double, and for all movements within
this angle the French have obviously the shorter
line, for they are inside the concavity formed bv
the resistance of Verdun.
In connection with the resistance of Verdun
there arises a point which has been put by more
than one correspondent, and which may as well be
dealt with here.
Why (it is asked) does Przemysl, which is
quite isolated from the rest of the Austrian forces,
still hold out, and why (it might be added) is no
effect produced by siege work against Vei'dun?
Why does that fortress continue to impose a dan-
gerous re-entrant angle upon the German line in
spite of the fact that modern permanent fortifica-
tion is, as has been repeatedly pointed out in these
columns, since the lesson was learnt at the begin-
ning of the war, dominated by modern howitzer
fire? Liege fell in a few days, Namur in a few
hours, Maubeuge in something over a week. What
is the meaning of these apparently exceptional
cases ?
The answer to that question is that yet an-
other German theory has been proved true. There
is a method of defence (alternative to permanent
fortification) which we know that Metz has
adopted since August, and which we may presume
that Verdun has, and Przemysl as well, and this
may be described as follows : —
Since the vulnerability of a permanent work
consists almost entirely in its restricted area, since,
that is, an enclosed fort with a known position
upon the map can be destroyed by distant howit-
2*
'January 30, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
zer fire (which the guns of the fort with their flat
trajectory do not dominate, and which with its
long range and therefore large circumference of
action the guns of the fort cannot easily search
out), let the permanent fortification be abandoned
and a series of trenches traced upon a perimeter
larger than and exterior to the perimeter of the
old forts, and let the mobility of heavy guns be
organised as well as may be — for it is always a
difficult matter — by the laying of light rails within
such works. Let the emplacement of them be
chosen in positions naturally concealed upon the
edge of wooded heights and whatnot, and then the
defence loses nearly all the disadvantages it had
through the known position of restricted fortified
areas. You have established a quasi-mobile ring
of defensive fire and replaced the old immovablo
ring. The fire of those who desire to invest a
fortress so organised has to search as best it may
for the unknown gun -positions of those whom it
would besiege, and having found them is never cer-
tain that precisely the same position will be held
upon the morrow. The only condition necessary
to the success of such a plan is the condition of
numbers. You must have more gims and a larger
number of trained gunners, and they have, of
course, to do a great deal more work than under
the system of narrowly restricted permanent forti-
fications.
I believe it will be found when the history of
the war is written that Przeraysl has been holding
out under these conditions, and that our Russian
Allies have been kept at a distance from the old
permanent works precisely as the Germans in the
regions north and east of Verdun are kept at a
distance from the old permanent works of that
fortress.
THE EASTERN FIELD.
IN the eastern field of war there are three re-
maining points of interest, the action in the
Caucasus having come to an end apparently
with the escape of the remnants of the lOtli
Turkish Army Corps and the safe retirement
of the 11th. The Battle of Sarikamish now three
weelcs past has had its decisive effect, and has
killed the Turkish offensive against Caucasia,
while the long-reported concentration of troops
for an advance against Eg\^t has not yet begxm
to take effect.
The three points of interest then are: —
First: The reported move against Servia;
second, the actions on the frontier of Bukovina,
near and upon the crest of the central Carpa-
thians, where the old Northern Roumanian fron-
tier marched with that of Austria-Hungary; and,
third, the hitherto curiously rapid advance in
Northern Poland between the Vistula and the
frontiers of East Prussia.
I name the three movements in the order of
their apparent importance.
As to the first : We have as yet no grounds for
FIAH TO ILLUSTRATB TBB BEFORXED UOVB AOALHSX SKRVIA.
3»
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
believing that it will be pursued. The news of a
considerable advance against Servia was put for-
ward through the same sources as that which the
German Government has used time and again with
the object of deceiving the Allies. We had it from
the same sources as the news that masses of Ger-
man troops were being concentrated for a new at-
tack upon the Yser more than a month ago when,
as a fact, the whole German effort was being de-
veloped in the eastern field, and at the very
moment when the German General Staff had de-
termined to stand for some time upon the defen-
sive in the West.
Moreover, it is elementary that a diversion
towards Servia at this stage would be very bad
general strategy. The Austro-German line in the
eastern field cannot be held as the German line in
the West can be held, that is, continuously from
end to end. It cannot be so held because it is
nearly twice as long. The coming of better
weather, the equipment of further Russian re-
serves, may put the extremities of the line in peril
at any moment. For it is obvious that a line of
trenches can be turned like any other line by supe-
rior numbers when they are available, unless that
line reposes, as does the line in the West, upon
two absolute obsta<!les — the sea and a neutral
frontier — and unless there be men enough to hold
the whole of such a line. The Austro-German
forces in the East are not numerous enough to hold
a line from the Carpathians to the Baltic continu-
ously, and therefore they are in peril of a Russian
offensive whenever Russia has sufficiently ad-
vanced her equipment and munitions to attempt
it, or even when the first more favourable condi-
tions in the weather permit it. To waste ten Army
Corps in a distant and quite separate field under
such circumstances and that against an enemy
whom it is comparatively easy to contain along the
line of his frontier rivers, of the Save, the Drave
and the Danube, would obviously be bad stra-
tegics.
But there is one possible motive for sucb a
blunder which, like every other disturbance of
Austro-German strategy, is political in character,
and that motive would he twofold: —
(1) If Servia could really be successfully occu-
pied a road would be opened for the provision of
munition, and if necessary later of reinforcement
to the Turkish Ally of the Germanic Powers.
o
L
2f
I
One HtoLdz^edMiies
^
^ GxrpatklaiL ^dbuzubxitLSystent
•- ..^.^ ToUtixxdFroiifiers
= Tosses X TbeKirUbaha Toss
D E Sassian. FroittoitJimSlO # /
F E - (reeared)oiiJan.2S^\
N
PLAM ILLUSTKATIN'O TrtE BOKOVINA CAMPAION.
4»
January 30, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
rh
• V ♦,
cm
lawa.
.••
rsaw
^'^i
inS CAMPAIGN OF THB VI9T17LA. AND EAST PRUSSIA.
(2) Much more important, it might be hoped
that Bialgaria would throw in her lot then with the
Germanic Powers.
The reason of Bulgaria's tendency in this
direction is already history and is fairly widely
known. But because it is not always fully appre-
ciated in the complexity of the present struggle
it may be worth repeating here.
When Austria forbade, after the Balkan War,
the access of Servia to the Adriatic, she embroiled
Servia with Bulgaria by suggesting and permitting
the occupation by the former country of land which
was (in the main) racially and by culture and tradi-
tion, Bulgarian. This area is roughly marked
upon the accompanying sketch-map by the letter
A. Bulgaria was offered, indeed, compensation
towards the East in the district B, but that district
was not historically Bulgar at all; it was Greek
jand Turk, and the artificial arrangement, so char-
acteristic of Viennese international policy, may
be compared to a settlement that should give
France a slice of Spanish soil, while condemning
her to lose a further portion of Lorraine. This
unnatural plan was the cause of the second Balkan
War in which Bulgaria lost. To recover for herself
the district, A, is a permanent object of Bulgarian
policy, and if Servia were subdued in a third Aus-
trian attempt upon her Bulgaria would, of course,
be offered this district, A, as the prize of her joining
with her excellent Army, unstricken as yet by the
present war, the Germanic cause.
Apart from that political reason there is no
military reason why a great body should be wasted
by itself in the south when it may be needed at any
moment to guard the issues of the Carpathians, or
to fight against a new Russian offensive in Poland,
and until one can get better evidence of such a
movement it is as well to hold one's judgment in
suspense as to whether it is taking place at all.
(2) The movement upon the frontiers of Buko-
vina is in another category. We know that the
Russians have made an effort here in spite of the
abominable weather conditions, and we know of
what importance it is to Austria that Hungary
should be saved from a second invasion. The news,
therefore, of an Austro-Hungarian concentration
upon this corner against the Russian movement is
probable in itself, and is borne out by the fighting
of which we have official news.
There are two points about that fighting which
are specially worth noting.
The first is that comparatively small forces
are being employed here upon either side. Let it
be noted that the front is a short one, not more
than fifteen to twenty miles, and that the last ac-
counts speak of "a whole Austrian division" as
being engaged in the region of Kirlibaba. But
when one talks of a whole division in this way it
means that the fighting has hitherto been in terms
of brigades, and that compared with the forces
hitherto present in the region, even one division is
a considerable new unit. Now, consider that upon
the Polish front, that is, along the Donajec, up the
Nida, and so across to the Lower Vistula, there
cannot be less than 100 divisions at work upon the
enemy's side, probably a good deal more, and then
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
one can estimate the comparative unimportance
in mere numbers of what is going on on the Rouma-
nian frontier.
The second point to note is that the fighting,
such as it is, has not given the Russians permanent
possession yet of the crest, that is, of the passes
over into Hungary.
The main lines of the geography of this region
may be appreciated in the sketch on page 4,
vi^here it w^iil be seen that the front spoken of in
the communiques lies upon what is for the Russians
the wrong side of the range. The last accounts
speak of places ten miles east upon the aver-
age of those points upon and just beyond the
crest which v/ere mentioned ten days ago, and this
almost certainly means that the first points upon
the summits seized by the Russians were held by
no more than outjDosts, which fell back before a
new Austro-Hungarian concentration from the
three railheads at A, B, and C.
These two matters, the supposed new move
against Servia, the Bukovina movements, are not
ver}^ important points, but they are all there is to
note for the moment in this south-eastern field.
The third district in which there has been some
movement is, as we have seen, that between the
Lower Vistula and the East Prussian frontier.
The accounts have been meagre from both sides,
and western judgment has been a good deal puzzled
by the rapid mention one after another of a series
of places which seem to mark a curiously rapid
advance of the Russian forces upon the flank of
the main German line of communications between
Thorn and other German depots, and the German
Army on the Bzura and the Rawka threatening
Warsaw. The matter is strategically of the
vitmost simplicity.
For provisioning in a ruined land the German
front along the Bzura and the Rawka, where the
bid is being made for Warsaw, there are only two
divergent lines of railway, the one leading to
Thorn, and the other, widely divergent, leading
to Silesia and ultimately to Posen. Further, so
long as it is really open, the Vistula in an avenue
of supply in itself. Now, it is clear that anyone
operating in the region, A-A, with a large force is
in a position to threaten the Vistula line, and if he
can cross the river to threaten the railway: Avhile
at one point, B (which is Vloclav/ek), the line could
actually be destroyed by heavy artillery operating
from the further bank of the stream. But there
are certainly as yet no large forces in this northern
wedge of Russian Poland, and we may be confident
that the movements of which we hear are, as has
been said before in these comments, no more than
the movements of cavalry. For this conclusion we
have evidence which has already been given, but
which it may be well to recapitulate.
We have in the first place the rapidity of the
movements, in the second place the equally rapid
fluctuations of the front (if it can be called a front),
and in the third place the obvious indifterence of
the great German forces in front of Warsaw to
what is going on upon their flank. To such
arguments may be added the fact that, since there
is no railway to support a Russian move of this
kind (the whole district has only one north and
south line through Mlawa to Warsaw), large in-
fantry movements would have to be accomi:)lished
even more slowly than elsewhere.
Glance, for instance, at the names of the
places where contact has been establiisLed. We
hear of such contact at Konopka south of Mlawa ;
again at Sierpc, and across the Skrawa; then for
one brief moment we hear (a week ago) of contact
at Skempe. That is, we have isolated skirmishes
over a field forty or fifty miles broad, and in places
separated by distances which bodies of infantry
could ncA'er deal with in the time.
The most advanced post of which there is men-
tion scores a local German success at Lipno; later
the telegrams speaks of another brush at least a
day's march further East again, and all of this
means without doubt that only comparatively small
bodies of cavalry are " feeling " for each otlier
aloing that dreary land of stunted trees, small
swells of heaths, and bottoms of marsh and mere,
not that any considerable movement is or can be yet
afoot there. When such a movement really does
develop, or if it can develop in spite of the German
forces upon its flank in East Prussia, we should
at once be aware of it by the retirement from the
line of the Bzura, which would be imposed in that
case upon the German forces.
COPPER AND COTTON.
THE discussion of a military problem dift'ers
from the discussion of a political pro-
blem in the same way that the discus-
sion of means difl'ers from the discussion
of an end.
Every war is fought with a political object, but
the conduct of a war once it is engaged is not a
political, but a military affair. In other words, one
may say " This action tends to make you win the
war, that action tends to make you lose it," and the
political comment to be offered against such purely
military grounds of action must have a very great
weight indeed if it is to expect attention. For to
lose a great war is, next to losing its soul and
liberty, the worst thing that can happen to a
nation. This is particularly the case in a war
such as is this war, deliberately forced by a power
whose avowed object, proclaimed through years of
public action and speech and print, is m.astery over
its neighbours, and the enforced change of their
lives to its own model.
If you are about to fight another man for your
life — and for his ; if at the outset of such a struggle
you see a third party handing him a lethal weapon ;
if, seeing this, you neither protest nor attempt to
prevent it, then it means either that you are will-
ing to sacrifice your life rather than break some
principle which forbids you to interfere, or it
means tiiat you believe interference would involve
even greater dangers than the possession by your
enemy of the lethal weapon in question.
These elementary principles are surely quite
clear.
Now, proceeding from them, the first thing we
have to establish in a purely military criticism
upon a policy of contraband is that the blockade of
an enemy should be as complete as possible : but
that general point has already been dealt v.ith in
these columns. It is too early to return to it, and,
moreover, the pei^fect blockade of the Germanics
is not possible in the sense in which it is possible to
block the entry of goods into a fully besieged town,
January 30, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
because, at the very least, they can obtain some
supplies from neutrals.
But there is another point which will be
universally conceded, and which has not been dealt
with in these columns. It is of the first import-
ance. It is of capital importance at this particu-
lar moment.
If for political reasons distinctions must be
made between absolute contraband, conditional
contraband and free goods, it is at least clear that
the scale so established must run from more
dangerous to less dangerous goods. We may
doubtfully allow luxuries to pass into a besieged
place ; we may still more doubtfully allow certain
necessaries — medicaments, for instance, or (less
surely) clothing— to pass into a besieged place ; we
may do so from a respect for a particular code of
morals or from fear "of a neutral who is supplying
the enemy with these. But before we allow guns
and ammunition, and, in general, lethal weapons
to pass into the hands of the enemy, we must surely
have infinitely stronger grounds for our action.
Now, the point to which all this leads up is
that cotton is to-day in the latter case.
Cotton is not only a harmless substance which
provides the civilian portion of our enemy with a
livelihood, with wealth, and with clothing. Nor
is it even only a necessary requisite for the equip-
ment of his troops whose function it is to kill or
disable as many Englishmen as they can. It is
also — and the matter is so clear that one marvels
it should ever have stood in doubt — the equivalent
of what was known to generations of soldiers as
the chief factor in ammunition — gunfowder.
When you allow cotton to go into Germany
you are behaving exactly as though t^e Germans
had allowed train-load after train-load of good old-
fashioned black gunpowder to come week by week
through their lines into Paris during the great
siege of 1870. You are supplying the enemy with
a lethal weapon just as much as though you were
to send an order to some neutral country begging
them to cast heavy artillery for the benefit of the
Germans and undertaking to let those guns enter
Germany without molestation. And you are in
particular permitting Germany to obtain that one
element in her power of killing your soldiers which
she cannot supply of herself.
These are, of course, strong words, but they
are as clear a part of the truth in the present situa-
tion as is the weather or the numbers we discover
for recruitment.
It is not to be presumed from this statement
that no political argument can be found strong
enough for the raising of the blockade (^) in the one
matter of cotton.
In time of war there is no public duty more
imperative than acceptance of existing authority,
of whatever character; and the political authori-
ties of a great country to-day have before them, as
no private citizen can have before him, all the
evidence upon which they determine their policy.
But what, perhaps, is not always before them or
before the public is the purely military aspect of
that policy, and it is only to emphasise the military
aspect that this note is written.
1 I am reminded by a correspondent that, strictly Bpeakingr, in tho
English language and la legal terminology the term "blockade" applies
only to the prevention of goods from entering a port. Bat I know of
no other convenient term to describe what is called abroad a " bloous "
and I therefore continue to uee it.
There might have been the very best and
strongest reasons to convince Bismarck in 1870
that the free passage into Paris of train-loads of
gunpowder was worth permitting. He would,
perhaps, have had a difficulty in persuading
Moltke, but still good reasons might conceivably
have been present. It none the less would have
remained within the due province of criticism to
point out that what was going in was not black
sand, but an explosive which, when you put a
match to it, discharged a missile, and that such
missiles killed and wounded German soldiers.
Why does one say that cotton is the equivalent
to-day of what was then gunpowder ?
Because every explosive charge which launches
a missile in modern war is simply cotton treated
in a particular fashion — "nitrated" to use the
barbarous jargon. The proportion in which it is
"nitrated" gives it its explosive character or
lack of chemical equilibrium. For instance, the
famous T.N.T. (not a cotton explosive), about
which such furious nonsense has been written, is
a stable form : a triple nitration. The French
formula is less stable, that is, more explosive ; it is, I
believe quintuple ; because the French nitrate more
highly than the Germans. But in every case, where-
ever a modern weapon is discharged cotton is the
stuif that launches the missile. All the factories have
their plant for the treatment by nitration of cotton,
and it is in terms of cotton that every operative
in the process and every engineer connected with
it has thought for years.
The chemicals whereby cotton is subjected to tho
process of nitration which turns it from a harmless
vegetable product to an explosive are obtainable
by Germany and Austria in spite of the blockade.
They are obtainable In any quantities, for tliey
are obtainable In the last resort from the air.
The air we breathe contains, as Is now very generally
known, nitrogen. But cotton cannot be produced
In Europe at all. It Is a sub-tropical product
and the three great sources of It are the Southern
States of the American Union, India and Egyjit.
The supply from India and Egypt we can ourselves
control. The whole question, of course, turns
upon how to deal with the supplies from America.
Whether to purchase them ourselves or no : whether
to let them go through to Germany freely.
It will here be objected by those who are
familiar with the elements of modern armament that
other substances than cotton can be used for the
purposes of making the explosive In question. Wood
pulp, for instance, can be used, and has been used.
Almost any substance capable of absorbing a fluid,
of fixing elements In It, and of subsequent dissection
and moulding into any shape large or small, miglit
take the place In theory of cotton.
This Is true. The objection is sound, and
Germany and Austria have Inexhaustible reserves
of wood, for instance, which might replace cotton if
cotton were denied them. Or they might fall back
on rags.
But the check that would be produced by a
stoppage of cotton supplies may be compared to the
check that Avould be produced by a sudden cliange
of calibre In armament. It would mean the
erection of new plant for the manufacture of
this all-important military material, the charge
used in your guns and rifles, and It would mean
what Is perhaps more Important under the strain
of war, new habits in the workman and his
1*
LAND AND WATER.
January 30, 1915.
chiefs. It would mean a host of new experi-
ments. It would mean even after the delay of
changing from one material to the other, uncer-
tainty, checks in provision, the calling in from time to
time of badly manufactured or dangerous stuff. It
would mean either under-nitration for fear of
mistakes in the novel materials, or accidents and
explosions in the magazines. It would be a very
serious check to the enemy for a prolonged space in
the war ; it would be a permanent drag upon him
throughout the war.
When we say that habit is in the workman
even more difficult to change than plant in the
machinery, the practical man acquainted with manu-
facture must be consulted, and will surely support
such a contention. Under the strain of war
especially, when every unit of energy that can be
spared is being forced into the business of armament,
of continued and feverish supply, to ask great bodies
of men suddenly to change tricks of manipulation
and acquired routine connected with a particular
material and to adapt themselves to another untried
material is like asking a general to change his front
in the stress of battle. It is imposing upon this side
of the enemy's sti'ength the greatest weight we can
impose upon it.
To see the importance of the matter In its full
light we may contrast cotton with copper.
Copper is indeed a military necessity just as
much as cotton is. Copper also could conceivably be
replaced, but only by a worse material, and at an
expense of change in habit of manufacture. Copper
is not a product of the enemy's country save in com-
paratively small amounts. He must obtain it from
without, and the blockade treats copper as contra-
band. Further, the main supply comes, just as
the cotton comes, from the greatest of the neutral
countries. Copper is necessary to the manufacture
of a rifle cartridge because its alloys and compounds
can be drawn in the closed shape without a rim or
joint, which makes the metal case of the cartridge
gas-tight. These same compounds being much
softer metal than any iron do not upon the explosion
of the charge similarly damage the chamber into
which the cartridge fits. Copper is necessary for
making rings round every kind of shell, Avhich rings
take the rifling as the discharged projectile
leaves the chamber and passes into the
muzzle of the gun. But the amount of copper
needed in proportion to the stocks available to
Germany is something quite different from, and
far less than, the similar proportion of cotton for
explosives. It is true that something like £4 wiU be
paid in gold by the German Government for as much
copper as you could buy in the outer market for £1.
But that is because Germany and her ally are
wisely making provision for a prolonged struggle,
and are determined not to be balked for lack of
mere material. High as is the price of copper in
Germany and Austria to-day the civilian electrical
works are not yet shut down, and the great reserves
of copper in the foreign areas controlled by the
German and Austrian armies have not seriously been
damaged yet.
The civilised world handles every year, If
I am not mistaken, something like a million tons
of copper. Of this Germany handles every 3'-ear
about one-quarter, or 250,000 tons. Take such a
stock of rifle cartridges as tvvo thousand million,
or say 500 rounds a man for the Germany Army
In Its original strength, the amount of copper
required for that vast stock I make out to be
10,000 tons, or one-twenty-fifth only of the normal
supply for the total Industry of the nation. What
may be needed for the rings of shells, large and
small, would be a much more difficult calculation,
for you have all sorts of sizes to take Into account,
and the rate of expenditure can only be very
roughly and inaccurately guessed at. But multiply
it by four times the amount required by the
infantry, and you are still at no more than a fifth
of the normal amount liandled by the nation In
the year. Add to this the fact that the war was
brought about at the moment chosen by Germany,
that Is, after Germany had been laying In stocks
of every kind, and had jirepared the fullest possible
equipment, and add to this consideration again the
known fact that the main masses of copper in the
occupied countries— the electric light cables, the
electric tramway cables, etc. — have not yet been
touched, and you can but conclude that while It
is an obvious military policy to prevent the entry
of copper as far as possible Into Germany and
Austria, yet such a blockade can as yet, and for
a very long time to come, do no more than un-
quiet the enemy for the future.
With cotton It is otherwise. It is not a material
of which very large stocks are accumulated, or ona
which remains In stock very long, for It Is bulky, and
it Is of its nature rapidly manufactured. Further,
it cannot, like copper, be reduced to its original state
once manufactured. Again, It Is far easier to control
the imports of cotton than of copper. It is im-
jiossible to conceal It. It moves in vastly larger
amounts, and there Is not, as there is In the case of
the metal, a corresponding use for it In most of tlie
neutral countries. Finally, the addition to our old
stocks of cotton by purchase A^'ould be an operation,
if Immediately expensive, yet not ultimately depleting
the resources of the nation.
There must be repeated once more at the close
of this note what was said in the middle of it :
Political considerations may be strong enough to
account for any modification of what would appear
upon the surface to be a military necessity. It is
none the less important for everyone concerned In
this grave Issue, the public, as well as their governors,
to appreciate that the entry of cotton In Germany
and Austria does not mean the entry only of a
material which clothes the enemy's soldiers and
increases the enemy's general wealth ; It means in
the eyes of those who supply the armies everything
that used to be meant years ago by the word gun-
powder. It means the one most obvious and purely
military necessity Avhich the enemy necessarily lacks.
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LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.— Thli ArtieU hti bees labmlttei U tki Prsii Bartis, which doti sot object to th« pibKcttloo ti ceBiortd, tad Ukei ■•
reijoniibility for th> correctaeii of the ttatementi.
THE NORTH SEA.
The Battle of the North Sea.
ON Sunday, 2ith, Admiral Beatty's battle-cruiser
squadron met the German battle-cruiser squad-
ron in the North Sea, and, having chased it, euc-
ceoded in sinking the Blucher and damaging two
battle-cruisers.
This is probably the most important naval
action v.hicu the war has yet seen. I use the -word "prob-
ably '■ because we do not know -what -was the German objec-
tive. If it were merely to indulge in another East Coast raid,
then the action has less military significance than the battle
of the Falkland Islands. If, however, the German objective
was to endeavour to slip out on to our trade routes — as I re-
cently suggested in these Notes they -will sooner or later
attempt to do — then the battle takes on a very high impor-
tance, for these battle-cruisers would have been far more dan-
gerous in the Atlantic than von Spee's ships would have been
had Admiral Sturdee failed to find them off the Falkl.inds.
The idea of a foiled coast raid will probably be most
pleasing to popular sentiment in this' country on account of
the element of poetic justice involved, but for every pound's
worth of material damage that the German ships could have
achieved against the coast towns, they could have done some-
thing like ten thousand pounds' worth on the high seas, to
say nothing of a possible interruption of our food supply.
As the Germans turned tail and ran for it so soon as they
sighted Bcatty's ships, it is clear that they were not out spoil-
ing for a fight at all hazards. On the other hand, to turn and
run frjr it was the only logical thing to do.
To have fought a pitched battle would have resulted in
annihilation with small prospect of inflicting much, if any,
damage in return, for the Britisli squadron had a very con-
siderable superiority, as the following table of guns avail-
able on the broadside will indicate: —
BRITISn.
Lion 8 13.5in.
Tiger 8 13.5in.
Princess Royal ... 8 13. Sin.
New Zealand 8 12in.
Indomitable 8 12in.
GERMAN.
Derfflinger 8 12in.
Sevdlitz 10 llin.
Moltke 10 llin.
Blucher 8 8in.
That is to say, 40 big guns against 28, plut 8 inter-
mediates unlikely to do much damage. I have omitted all
reference to lesser guns, as it is obvious that, though well
supplied with these, the Germans would not be given an oppor-
tunity of using them. Still, the measure of our big gun
superiority is not merely a matter of numbers, but also of
superior size and, consequently, greater effective range and
penetrative power. Altogetlier, tlicrefore, our superiority
may Ije put as at least two to one, and the German admiral
could have had no delusions whatever as to the result of a
general action had he attempted one.
A.s things were, he got off with the loss of his weakest
ship, the Blucher, and considerable damage inflicted on two
of his battle-cruisers — probably the Dcrffllnger and MoUke,
presuming the flagship, Seydlitz, to be leading the line.
No doubt he had hopes of getting back beiore our ships
could close sufficiently to do him much serious damage. No
doubt, also, he had dreams of drawing his pursuers over mine
fields or in the way of subniarines'. Of all this, however, we
shall probably see nothing in the German reports, which we
may Ix> certain will make much of " the British in overwhelm-
ing force," and a " masterly retreat." We need not grudge
them such an explanation.
There is one circumstance in connection with the action
which puzzles me, and that is' tiie absence of the German
battle-cruiser. Von der Taiin, which is, or was, the flagsliip of
l?ear-Admiral Funke, a fast vessel armed with eight 11-inch
guns, and certainly a more fitting unit to the squadron than
'was the much weaker Blucher.
Aa to why she was absent there are three possible
Lypotheses. Of these, the first, that slie was under<.'oing refit,
is improbable. A second is that she has cither been sunk or
badly damaged by mine or submarine, and the loss concealed.
A third possibility is that slio came out and managed to slip
awa.y bound for the trade routes. Whether she will get there
is another matter. If she does, the Germans will probably
consider the Blucher well lo.st ; and till the whereabouts of
the Ton der Tann is ascertained, we may do well to avoid
over-elation about a victory, of which the main signific?.noe is
in any case that our shi2)s were at the right spot at the right
moment, rather than the precise amount of damage inflicted.
Submarine Attacks on Merchant Shipping.
On January 21 the British sto.inicr Durward was cap-
tured and sunk by a German submarine off the Dutch Coast.
According to the accounts which have been issued, three torpe-
does were fired into her, and it then took her about half an
hour to sink. The submarine is stated to be U19, and the
approiimate cost of the torpedoes fired mu.st have been some-
thing like double the value of the cargo of the Durward. A
cruiser could have dons the same work at about one-tenth to
one-twentieth of the sum involved. The Germans may, of
course, obtain more value for money next time, but taking
one thing with another it looks as though the von Tirpitz plan
of attacking merchant ships by submarines has economic dis-
abilities likely to render it inoperative, the more so as only
a relatively small number of German submarines .".re armed
with guns, and so are unable to compel a steamer to stop.
A submarine which can get out is, of course, an efficient
substitute for a cruiser which cannot; but since war is mostly
n matter of psychology and money, paying twopence for ;i
l>enny is not likely to endure very long.
Of course, n certain amount of capital is injured, out of
the sailing of various vessels being cancelled. But I for ono
absolutely refuse to believe that much money is to be made out
of commerce warfare unless it be on a heavy scale. And if
nothing can be made out of it, the odds are that the enemy
is accumulating financial lossc? and w:asting strength accord-
ingly. To adopt a chess analogy, at the best there is little
in it except exchanging pieces. Unless a great deal of dis-
crimination be used by the enemy, it is .1 great deal mon>
likely to be equivalent to throwing pieces away. There is not
the remotest occasion for panic in any ■way whatever.
Nor, so far as the Duruard is concerned, is there any
reason to describe the operation as " piracy." So far as tlia
circumstances admitted, U19 acted exactly as" the Emden
acted. Her ultimate fate, we may hope, and believe, will be
more or less the same. Everything %va8 what is vulgarly
known as a " fair cop," and to seek to represent things other-
wise is foolishness.
This statement will, I expect, bring me a certain storm of
protest from those who fail to realise t!;at we are engaged iu
a war of facts without regard to sentiment. If the Germans
submarine a single merchant ship, leaving her crew to drown,
we shall tlien have a very decided case for vengeance. But our
case then ■n-ill certainly not be improved by h_vsterics now a-bout
perfectly legitimate and reasonable acts of war.
So long as .i merchant ship is captured and destroyed
only after her crew have been salved, there is nothing to I>o
feaid, whether it be from the air or from under the sea. There
is no difference in principle involved. If the enemy considers
himself likely to obtain advantage by such procedure he is
morally as well as legally entitled to seek that advantage. It
is by no means to our disadvantage that he should divert his
torpedoes from main to subsidiary objects.
The Admiralty and the War.
For some time I have been receiving letters which express
profound dissatisfaction with the Admiralty and our Ad-
mirals. Of late these letters have increased in number and
intensity, and it is abundantly clear that an ever-increasing
section of the public is coming to regard Winston Churchill as
a "gasbag." Lord Fisher as a " noodle," and Admiral Jelii-
coe as an " incompetent."
Tlie only satisin.ctory feature of this state of affairs is
that it is characteristically British — it happened regularly in
the old wars. With the porsible exception of the Trafalgar
campaign, there was never a war in which the great Britisli
public -was not firmly convinced of the incompetence of all
9»
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
those primariljr responsible for its naval operations. I am by-
no means sure that I should attempt to escept the Trafalgar
campaign — no less a person than the great Duke of Wellington
regarded Nelson as a "vapouring and vjjin-glorious charla-
tan " I
This, or some similar term, is frequently applied to Mr.
Churchill. From one point of view it is correct: he has said
things about tho enemy which smack much of the democratic
political platform. But, we have to remember th.it this is a
democratic war, and that the millions like their stuff well
spiced, and need it if they are to bo kept up to the mark.
For tlie rest, Mr. Churchill is the first First Lord we have ever
had who has laid himself out to become familiar with the
technicalities of his post. He entered office deeply distrusted,
and cordially disliked by the Navy. The outbreak of war
may not have seen him loved afloat, but it certainly found him
respected and esteemed in a way that no predecessor ever was.
We now come to Lord Fisher, a man with an absolute gift
for making personal enemies, and a remarkable talent for
making himself unpleasant to any enemy. That, apart from
his record, is proof that he is no " noodle." As for his record,
that began in the Mediterranean years ago, when he was
thoroughly abused for sacrificing old ideas about "steam tac-
tics " in favour of some new-fangled fad of his own about the
value of the torpedo. These ideas are accepted to-day, but
when promulgated they were regarded as modernity carried to
ridiculous excess. It is possible that Lord Fisher may occa-
sionally have anticipated to-morrow a little too quickly j but
there is certainly no "back numl^r " about him. The only
error he is ever likely to make is in crediting the enemy with
better brain than he actually possesses. But I really do not
think that we are likely to arrive at any ultimate trouble over
ft Sea Lord who is inclined (by his record) to over-estimate
the enemy's brain. Rather, I think, we should esteem him
as a man prepared for every contingency.
We now come to Admiral Jellicoe. His record in naval
manoeuvres is that he never was beaten. War may be
different, but every naval manoeuvre scheme simulated real
war as nearly as was possible. He was easily the best man at
the game, and the games that he played were many and
various.
Now, wiUiout any eye-wash, compliments or anything of
that sort, I may say that all the critics, non-technical or worse
as they may be, are all actuated by genuine motives, but tliis
war is emphatically a case of " trust the man at the helm."
(The above was written before news was received of the
action in the North Sea. In order to avoid seeming to pose
as a prophet wise after the event, I have therefore cut out
certain paragraphs which followed these remarks, and will
merely refer readers back to a previous issue of these notes.)
A word may be added as to the German official statement
that one British battle-cruiser was sunk. The statement is
incorrect on the face of it; but we shall do well to avoid regard-
ing it as an official lie. At the Yalu the Chinese honestly
believed that they had seen a Japanese cruiser sink; at
Tsushima the Russians were equally convinced that they saw
a Japanese vessel go under. Similarly, and for similar
reasons, I am of opinion that the German claim is mado in
all good faith; and if we call them liars wo shall merely con-
Tince them that their claim is true, inspirit them accordingly,
and discount the moral effect on them of our victory accord-
ingly also.
The correct explanation of the German claim is probably
as follows. The Blucher wns seen to drop astern in a sinking
condition. A little later, the British ships were up round and
alx>ut her, and other German observers saw her sink. The
wish being father to the tliought, it was perfectly natural
honestly to presume that the unrecognisable mass of sinking
■wreckage was one of the British warships. It has been abso-
lutely demonstrated that precisely similar reasons accounted
for the mistaken claim at Yalu and Tsushima. There is an
»ld saying about the danger of assuming your opponent to
be a fool. It can be equally dangerous to assume him a liar.
Air Raid on the East Coast.
The air raid on Yarmouth and district has probably a con-
siderable significance. We may take it that it was merely a
reconnaissance somewhat on the lines of the first naval raid
on Yarmouth, when the IlalcyoH was fired at. We must be
prepared for the next effort to be quite on Scarborough lines,
and perhaps more so.
Emphasis it laid by the Germans on the fact that their
•" naval airships " were concerned in the raid. This may be
merely a reply to the fact that it is the British naval air ser-
Tice which has played havoc with German Zeppelin sheds on
more than one occasion; but personally I am not inclined so
to regard it.
There ia considerable difference between navigating a diri-
gible over water and over land, and I am inclined to bo
sceptical as to whether any purely military Zeppelin could
cross the North Sea.
The German naval airships are said to be differently con-
structed to the land ones, owing to experience gained.
I have no exact information as to where this difference
exists: I merely know of its existence. But the point is
an important one to remember. It has something to do with
a variation of cooling between the atmosphere of sea and land,
and the consequent expansion or contraction in " gas bags."
Further I cannot follow it.
If, however, the difference in construction is so great as has
been alleged, it means that only the naval Zeppelins which
have been built and the crews specially trained for sea work
are seriously available for offensive operations across the
North Sea against this country.
As to the operations which have already been indulged in,
the less said the better. From the military point of view,
they were absolutely fatuous : one cannot possibly conceive of
even an expected military advantage (except in so far that it
has increased recruiting in this country, which was certainly
not the object sought after). From the humanitarian stand-
point the affair was mere ordinary murder in cold blood.
Comment has been aroused by the circumstance that neither
by sea nor land was any defensive attack made on the hostile
aircraft. It is rather generally attributed to inefficiency on
the part of the Naval Air Service, and all others concerned.
I do not think this criticism justified. I have seen some-
thing of our aerial defence work. It is not in the public
interest to go into details, but whatever else it may have
been, there was certainly no lack of efficiency visible.
Even on land and water, where men have been accustom.ed
to fight for thousands of years, surprises still occur, despite
all precautions. In the air, which is an entirely new battle-
field, surprises are necessarily far more easy, since all precau-
tions have as yet to be based to a very large extent on theory.
THE BLACK SEA.
That the Goeben has been considerably damaged is now
independently confirmed, neuti'al eye-witnesses having seen
her carefully screened Ky transports. The chances of her
being effectually repaired by tho dockyard at Constantinople
are small, as the resources for any such work are inadequate,
and the temper of the Balkan States hardly of a nature to
lend itself to the smuggling through of spare parts, etc.
One way and another, therefore, there is fair reason to
hopo that the Russians, who have at present secured the undis-
puted command of the Black Sea, will continue to hold it
undisputed till the end of the war.
At present they are making full use of their advantage,
and the Turkish loss of war material, sent overseas in spite
of the obvious danger, must be growing very serious. Tho
latest report is that a transport carrying most or all of the
Turkish aeroplanes has been ilcbtroycd.
GENERAL MATTERS.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
P. S. (Castlecaulfield). — An idea substantially similar to
yours was mooted many years ago. I do not know whetlicr it
has been adopted. If the Admiralty is not sympathetically-
responsive, it mp.y either mean that the idea is in use, or else
that there are technical difficulties in the way of its employ-
ment.
A. S. H. (Dundee), and P. H. (Southend).— I do not
think that I was in any way unduly optimistic in estimating
that there has been no numerical net increase in the German
submarines. They have certainly lost nioro boats than they
admit to; and they could not possibly yet have completed
mare hords than were in their normal programme. That since
tho war began they have laid down a great many boats ia
probable enough, but none of these would as yet be complete.
As regards the value of scouts, whether or no both fleets are
intent on engaging does not materially affect the question. It
is in any case of the utoost importance for an admiral to be
kept informed of the exact strength, formation, and course
of the enemy, before that enemy is actually sighted. As re-
gards my statement that, " For the rest, we only know for cer-
tain that a dozen Dreadnoughts, plus the complementary lesseti
craft, are superior to a dozen plus a Dreadnoughts minus the
complementary lesser craft," did not merely refer to scouta
only, but also to destroyers, submarines and auxiliary vc-ssela
of every sort or kind.
Id. D. F. — I am inclined to think that " Hartmann, tho
anarchist," was one of the best futurist stories ever written;
but you must remember that it was a story, not a questior^ol
existing facts, such as we now have to deal with, and I anx
afraid that your " suggested floating battery " comes into
something like the same category^ That is to say^ it does oo^
10*
January 30, 1915.
LAND AND V/ATER
at present exist, and tliis war will bo over long before any
such vessel could exist, even supposing tiio idea to be feasible.
iWe liave to fight this war with existing material.
"One Who Knows."— It is obviously impos.sib!o to dis-
cuss tho efficiency of any subordinate admiral. I have read
your letter with much interest. I am not personally acquainted
with the officer mentioned, but I was a frequent visitor on
board his flagship in a previous command, and I am bound to
Bay that views expressed about him in tho wardroom in no
way coincided with yours. lie may have "gone oS " since;
but I am afraid that I should require more evidence than the
Btatemeuts of an anonymous correspondent before 1 would
suggest any such thing in these columns. It is obvious that
you Jiave inside knowledge of tho naval service, but— so have 1 1
Other matters apart, don't you think that I'd be what the
Americans call "some cad" to attack a naval officer on
evidence sent anonymously, even granting that all you allege
were quite true?
E. H. (Hatch End), and various others.- 1 appreciate
your sentiments, but I think you are quite wrong. I have
dealt with the subject in the body of my article this week, as
I think it is certainly one of supreme importance. If my
argunients do not satisfy you, I shall bo extremely obliged if
you will write again to the editor for publication, because I
for one am firmly convinced that this question of the
Admiralty and the public is a rnntter of far greater moment
than the submarining of a battiMhip or two. As I have said,
I think critics of the Admiralty are incorrect; but there exist*
the old stoi-y of the danger of sitting on the safety-valve,
and I trust that you will understand that, absolutely unsym-
pathetic though I am to your arguments, I do realise thattha
underlying motives of your criticisms are entirely j'atriotio,
and on that account worthy of appreciation and commenda-
tion, on which you will, I hope, forgive me if I suggest tha
possibility that I know more about the inside and unwritten
history of the naval war than you do I From the King to tha
errand boy, we are all of us engaged in a struggle for national
existence. This being so, views naturally vary widely; but
no one outsido a lunatic asylum would seek to grind an axe.
Did I think that the Admiralty was v.rong I should assuredlj
assert it in no uncertain words.
M. H. S. (Reading). — I do not believe in the German
" super-submarines." intended to attack British commerce
on the high seas. They have also been heard of as intended
to transport an invaHing army to our shores. Tho rcasoa
for my scepticism is, that if they had such craft the Germans
would have been careful to observe absolute secrc'cy about
thera.
L. M. M. (Edinburgh). — Thank you for your letter,
which I am answering privately. The contents are better not
published.
A. C. (Hamilton). — You will see that I have already dealt
this week with one of the questions raised by you The rest
I will — so far as possible — refer to in my next week's notes.
THE ACTION OFF THE FALKLANDS.
AS DESCRIBED BY AN OFFICER ON THE "INVINCIBLE."
NOTE.— Tbli Article hat besa labmitted to the Preii BoreaB, which loei not object to th* pablicatioa at ceoiored, and takei no
respsoibUitjr for the correctaeti of the itatementi.
->^'
4*
^'
^ow^ d Invuici[)Lc
d ri'MexiUe
G'uXSCJO
V.SiavXzy
■i
I EXPECT by now you have heard all the news about tlia
sinking of the Schanthorst, Gneiscnan, Leipzig and
Avrnberg. Anyhow, as all censorship is removed I
will tell you as much as possible of the action and
event-8 leading up to it. The situation was' more or
less as follows : —
On Monday, December 7th, we arrived at Port Stanley in
the F.ilkland Islands and prepared for coaling. The Canopus
battleship was installed there as guard ship. The ships, there-
fore, in Port Stanley on December 7th were Invincible, In-
flexible, Carnarvon, Cornuall, Kent, Glasgow, and Bristol and
Macedonia. . . ,
At 7.30 a.m. on December 8th we started coaling, we
being ancliored in Port Stanley ("we" being us and In-
'■ftexible). Kent and Cornuall and Bristol had finished, Glasgow
wa-s doing repairs. At about 8 a.m. signal station reported
4 four-funnelled warship in sight, and then shortly afterwards
a light cruiser. These were recognised as either the Scharn-
horst or G'neisenau and tho Nurnberg. We immediately gave
orders' to the fleet to raise steam for full speed. The Kent,
Cornwall and Glasgow proceeded out almost at once, and
Bign-illed the movements of the enemy to us from the entrance.
The Canopus opened fire with her I2-inoh guns from her moor-
ings.
The enemy were then reported to be retiring, but were
later reported to be waiting further off, having been joined by
three ships. We then knew that the whole squadron, consist-
ing of ScJuirnliorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Nurnberg and Dret-
den were there. We, of course, could hardly believe our luck,
as this was the very squadron that we had come out to destroy,
and they had come to find us instead of we them (of course,
it was obvious that they did not know that the Invincible and
Inflexible were with the fleet), and their reason for coming
was to destroy our coal and wireless station.
At about 10 a.m. we left harbour, having got steam for
full speed. Directly the enemy saw us they turned round and
went away at full speed — they -nere then about 14 miles away.
The disposition was then as in Plan 2.
The Kent, Glasgow, and Carnarvon were going under 24
knota, and therefore we had to reduce speed to keep them
with us; we were, however, slowly overtaking the enemy.
The enemy altered course, and we were nearly right astera
oiiasing them, as in Plan 3.
'Cuelsenmt &
Dresden \
Schartifiorsth
^uremBarg'\
12 miles
i^eat UnvlnciSte
H Giasgfow I Inflexiite
t Cornwall
I Carnarvott
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
Seeing that the Carnarvon, Kent and Glasgow couldn't
keep up we went on 24 knots, and at five minutes to one we
opened fire on the eternmost light cruiser. The Scharnhorst
men, seeing that to run away was hopeless, turned and en-
gaged us, and the three light cruisers (enemies) made away
pursued by the Kent, Cornwall and Glasgow.
It was then like this : —
/
S^<^
^;^--
%r^
%..%
'^ ^Enemy's Li^kf
■^ Cruisers rutminq away
/ncAase
VC-
X
•^
(^Cornwall
dJBrisfoi
When we started opening fire 1 saw no more as I had to
go down inio the turret, but this is roughly what happened.
The German ships' largest guns were 8.2in., while we had
12in., and it was therefore up to us to keep ost of their
penetrative range and torpedo range, and sink them with
gun fire. We found soon that we were on slightly diverging
courses; the Germans seeing this turned to starboard in the
hope of getting away, but wo also altered starboard and came
up with them firing the whole time, viz. : —
I
\
\
K
Coarse sphere cT
6y £nem^
' ^ ^ _i_.
— ^— --N
Coarse sfeei-ed
by British.
Wo then found the smoke was getting in our way, so we
altered, viz. : —
,i|i ■.■ iia I iiip.
Course
sCeeredbyv
Xrctisk \
Coarfe s^ered
SyBnemy
Itnd got the other side of the enemy. Shortly after this tho
Scharnhorst iUnk (3.55 p.m., after we had been in action two
hours). We were then concentrating on the Gneisenau, the
Scharnhorst having slowly listed to port and then turned
bottom up, and the propellers were seen etill going round.
The Gneisenau fought on very gallantly, when at G.12 p.m. she
listed to port and slowly dived down.
Now to go back to what I did — tho whole of the time I
Was superintending the loading in the turret. Several things
broke down, but we soon gofc them into action again. It
was rather awful, and I was in a bit of a funk as I couldn't
jBoe what was happening, and you quite distinctly heard the
screech of their shells, and one quite early made the whole
rock by hitting somewhere near. They let us know when
they could about how the action was going. Of course, I never
saw the Scharnhorst sunk, but after the " cease fire " had gone
I looked through the telescope and saw the Gneisenau heel
over and dive.
Now came the awful part. The Inflexible, Carnarvon,
and ourselves hurried up to where she had disappeared, shown
by slightly discoloured water, and on coming up close saw
a good amount of wreckage with men clinging to it. Never
shall I forget it — they were mostly calling out, and it sounded
like a wail to us. We all lowered boats' as quickly as
possible, and picked up as many as possible, but heaps must
have sunk as the water was 40 degs., and they were all numb.
It was awful being on tho ship, because when all the boats
were away riiey kept floating past, some swimming, some un-
conscious just beneath the water. We lowered people down
on bow lines, and hauled them up the ship's side — some of
them were quite dead when they came in. Altogether this
ship saved about 115, of which 14 were dead. The Inflexible
saved about 70, and the Carnarvon a few. As regards the
enemy's light cruisers, the Cornwall and Glasgow sunk the
Leipzig, and the Kent the Nurnberg. The Dresden, we sup-
pose, got away.
As regards our damage, eighteen shells hit us, doing
various damage. Of these I will name one or two of the
most important: — (1) Entered wardroom, burst, went through
deck beneath, absolutely wrecked wardroom, nothing left
whole except steel walls, which were riddled with splinters.
(2) Entered through upper deck and burst between wardroom
pantry and my cabin, wrecked pantry, large splint-ers entered!
my cabin, wrecked bunk, set fire to bedclothes, and wrecked
drawers under bunk, made splinter holes in walls (the hoso
was then turned on my cabin, wetting most of my clothes which
weren't burnt or riddled). (3) Entered starboard side, went
through two decks and entered Admiral's pantry without
bursting. It is certainly miraculous that we had no casual-
ties, except the Commander slightly wounded. The Inflexible,
which was only hit three times, had one killed and three
wounded, the Kent about seven killed and six wounded, and
I don't know about the others.
I daresay you have noticed that I haven't mentioned
nbout the Bristol. She luckily couldn't raise steam in time, and
so came out later with the Macedonia, and was able to capture
or sink the enemy's morchantmen and colliers. I told you
that we had 101 saved on board. Seven of these are officers,
and the funny part is that I know two of them, and have met
them several times when I dined on the Gneisenau in China
(tho Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in China when I was
there). However, the fellow I liked best, who was in the
Gneisenau, I .-im afraid was drowned.
The weather during the action was quite calm.
At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 8, at 3.30,
Mr. Hilaire Belloc will give an illustrated lecture entitled
" The Progi-ess of the Wai-."
At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 4, at 3.30,
Mr. F. T. Jane v.ill give an illustrated lecture on " What the
Navy is ReaUy Doing in this War."
Mn. Hilaire Eelloc will lecture on " Strategy, Numbers and
Material," at Queen's Hall on the afternoon of Tuesday, Qth February,
His nest evening lecture there is on Wednesday, February 17th.
LOOKING BACKWARDS.
Readers of the special articles appearing in this Journal
on " The War by Lemd and Water " will doubtless
wish to retain in correct rotation this remarkable series
of articles by HILAIRE BELLOC and FRED T.JANE.
We have, therefore, prepared special cloth binders to hold
the first thirteen numbers, at a cost of Is, 6d. each.
Or wc will supply the thirteen numbers BOUND complete,
for 6s. 6d.
Owing to the big demand for back numbers already
received we have had to reprint some of the earlier
number*. Same can now be supplied at 6d. per copy.
Order now from your Newsagent, Bookstall, or direct
from the Publishers,
"LAND AND WATER"
CENTRAL HOUSE. KINGSWAY,LONDON.
12*
January 30, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF
ATTRITION ?
A PLEA FOR A STRONG AERIAL OFFENSIVE.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
NOTE— Thi» Article hw beea submitted t9 the Press BurcaH, which does not object to the publication as cjnssred and takjs no
responsibility for the correctness of the statem;ats.
T might be an interesting theme for the military his-
torian to discuss how the Napoleonic wars would liave
ended, had not the French, a hundred years ago, been
H defeated at Waterloo ; but there can be no two opinions
•*■ that Wellington's crushing victory brought to its close
a campaign which might have been very protract-cd
had it not been for the opportune intervention of the English
contingent in supporFof their Prussian allies. Yet the result
of the Battle of Waterloo — which has shaped the course of the
history of the great nations for the last hundred years, and
tas exercised a greater influence on the political history of
the world than any other recorded event — in its last resort
depended upon a timely participation of the English guard.
It Ls a matter of pure speculation to imagine what would
be the present relative position of the European powers had
the Haye-Sainte been crushed and the English troops, which
irere under cover in the corn fields, been annihilated before
they could take a timely part in the battle which dashed to
the ground, for ever, tiie dreams of conquest of the great
Buonaparta.
THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO AND
AIRCRAFT.
Let us now consider the battle of Waterloo in the light
of modern knowledge, and see how its result might have been
aSectod by the employment of certain appliances which scien-
tific progress has since brought to the service of war. Let
us picture to ourselves the anxiety of Napoleon at his enforced
ignorance of the position of Wellington's men and we shall
then liave no doubt that, if he had had air scouts at his dis-
posal, he would not have failed to make good use of them.
This is clear from a perusal of bis military Manuel, especially
that part dealing with the importance to a commander-in-
chief of having exact information about the strength and posi-
tion of the enemy. Let us assume that his air-scouts had
located the position of the English troops, waiting in con-
cealment for orders to participate in the battle that was
already engaged, and let us, merely for the sake of argument,
Buppose that he could not take from the general field of battle
a sufficiently strong force to hurl against the British forces
either to destroy them or to keep them in check, thus depriv-
ing his enemy of a reserve which might be thrown against
him, as, in fact, it wa.*, at the critical moment. What
would a Napoleon do in the hypothetical Waterloo we are
considering? Ho would know that if he did not annihilate
the English troops or succeed in keeping them away from the
field of battle they would be employed against him at a well-
timed moment; and yet he had no troops to use for the pur-
pose without courling disaster from another quarter.
Let us exert our imagination a little more. Let us sup-
pose that, at this grave moment, some dai-ing airmen of the
Napoleon's Imperial Flying Corps, realising their commander-
in-chief's perplexity, hinted to him that their aircraft, besides
being valuable for reconnaissance or kindred work, were also
of great offensive value, and that the worth of their suggestion
was recognised by their oommnader. The question which
would immediately present itself to the Napoleon for solution
would be, how best to use his offensive aircraft to attain his
special object — that is, either to annihilate the English troops
or to prevent them from coming to the assistance of their
Prussian allies.
THREE KINDS OF AERIAL OFFENSIVE.
Three methods of dealing with the problem would sug-
gest themselves. He might (1) carry out an aerial raid over
the ground occupied by bhe English ; (2) attack, from above,
the English troops lying in the cornfields ; and (3) by destroy-
ing the roads, bridges, etc., prevent the English contingent
from participating in the battle.
If the Napoleon possessed but a small number of aircraft,
the first solution would be the only one capable of adoption.
Its effect, if the operation were constantly repeated, would be
either (1) to force the English troops to take up a new posi-
tion nol exactly of their own choosing, or (2) to compel them
to take part in the general action sooner than they had anti-
cipated. In either case the aerial raid could not do more
than alter the original plans of the English commander in
some details, and would not influence, to any considcrabU
degree, the issue of the battle r.iging at that moment.
If, however, the Napoleon had at his disposal a power-
ful force of aircraft, consisting not only of a groat number of
machines but also of an adequate body of airmen, fitted and
trained for offensive work, he would be in a position to adopt
the second course open to him ; that is, to make a regular
attack from the air on the English forces below. Thera
would then be a battle royal taking place in a vertical plane,
and of such a novel character to those on the ground that, not
only morally — because t'ney would be unprepared for it — but
also materially, they would be at a disadvantage to the aerial
attackers. The fighters from the air would be provided with
the equivalent of a great number of big guns, all placed in
position, and ready to deal death and destruction, right and
left, whilst the soldiers below, in replying to the attack, would,
almost entirely, be relying on their rifles which they would use
with astounding inefiiciency, for all their training and prac-
tice had been based upon a horizontal range. The result
would have been that the English reserve would have found
themselves in such a difficult position that not even a dis-
ordered retreat nor a precipitate flight could save them from
the aerial offensive.
For certain reasons, some based on local and economic
factors and others on the psychology and training of his air-
men, the Napoleon of our hypothetical Waterloo might, how-
ever, prefer not to engage the English force in a vertical
battle, but, by directing his aerial attackers to destroy all the
possible routes by which the English reinforcements could
march to the support of their Prussian allies, he would pre-
vent them from influencing the battle in progress. For the suc-
cess of such a plan, it would be necessary that the aerial attack
should result in the destruction of all the avenues v.-hereby
the enemy could receive timely reinforcement. Such an at-
tack must be made in force, and the same bridge, or road, or
pas-sage should be attacked several times to ensure certain
destruction. An aerial raid, of a small number of aircraft,
made with the object of destroying avenues aJong which rein-
forcements could be sent to the front, would not, however,
lead to the moral certitude that the aim of the raid has been
accomplished.
Let us now turn from the hypothetical Waterloo which,
as regards many details has, of necessity, been very imper-
fectly and inaccurately examined, and let us see how, in tha
present conjecture a strong aerial offensive of the Allies might
considerably curtail a campaign which, by the employment
of the ordinai-y method of warfare only, promises t-o bo a ver/
protracted one.
MUST THERE BE A WAR OF
ATTRITION ?
Almost all the foremost military critics of the world hava
repeatedly declared that the present great European War
must be one of attrition. Must it, however, be sot Yes, if
the Allies do not apply to their utmost all the legitimate
means al their command. No, if they employ, on a compre-
hensive scale, a method of attack which, as we have seen,
might have reversed the results of Waterloo and which, as
the writer has pointed out in his last article,* could prove of
inestimable value in the present war, and especially in tha
situation existing to-day at the front.
Without taking into account the misery and poverty and
grief of hundreds of millions of women and children, who, by
no process of logic, can be made responsible for the war;
without considering that every day that passes sees the
destruction of thousands of noble and valuable lives ; without
being influenced by the fact that all the scientific progress
of the world, relating to a true and well-understood civilisa-
tion, is at a standstill, the writer contends, on purely tech-
nical grounds, that it might be profitable to the Allies, with-
out relaxing in any degree the rigid application of the plan
of campaign of their commanders, in whom they have full
confidence, to enter upon a formidable aerial offensive which
might render a war of attrition unnecessary after all. Think
• "Tha Aeroplane on the Offensire," Land and Water, Janoarr 23,
1015.
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
of it I Expressed in terms of money only, every day by which
the 'duration of the war can be shortened means a saving of
several tens of million pounds.
Tho -writer, for obvious reasons, cannot, in an article
meant for publication, express himself otherwisa than in
general terms. So he will, to-day, content himself by asking
his readers to consider the effect it would have on the duration
of the war if an aerial attack by the Allies succeeded in cut-
ting, for twenty- four hours only, all means of communication,'
Tietwoen the Germans in tlieir trenches and their base. And
from his information as well as his technical knowledge and
calculation.s, the writer knows that, in seriously suggesting
a strong, comprehensive and sustained aerial offensive, he is
not a victim of wild dreams.
THE QUESTION OF INVISIBLE
UNIFORMS.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B. (late R.E.).
IN my last article I quoted tlie opinion of the Duke of
Wellington, i,aat in his day the colour of uniforms
was of small importance as compared with the
desirabUity of an easily distinguishable silhouette
against the sky-line, and it must be apparent to any-
one who thinks the matter out that it must be of even
less importance nowadays, when men begin to fire on one
another at ranges measured by tho mile. There were riflemen
in the Duke's days in all armies who could shoot as straight up
to about 400 yards as we can shoot at 1,200, and the sport of
picking off officers, shooting down gun teams, etc., was as
popular then as now, and concealment to the stalker must
have been quite as important, and far more difficult to obtain,
just as it is quite easy to get within a mile of a black buck,
but to creep up unobserved within the last two hundred yards
is much harder. The truth is, as I said before, that the
■whole question never received any scientific tactical con-
sideration at all, and that we were rushed into the change
from red to khaki by an utterly uninstructed public opinion
which will cost us far more lives in the near future than the
reformers ever expected to save.
Cut this picture out, place it aK.-iinst different backgrounds at a distance
•way from tie eyes until the Ugiire looks aa large as a man appeata at
COO yards, i.e., about ball an inch high.
I do not question that there are times when concealment'
is desirable, but I do maintain that in the big battles which
lie ahead of us it is far more important for the success of
the whole army that the Commander, and his Staff generally,
should be able to see how the several units under their
command are combining their operations, than that here
or there a few skirmishers should retain a whole skin. The
trouble is that a little more consideration of the matter would
have shown us how to combine both requirements at the same
time.
I found the key to this problem some years ago at a cold-
weather camp in India, by the following curious experience.
Riding with the Staff for a big Divisional inspection on
a great open plain, witihout a scrap of cover for miles, when
approaching the ground we found that we could see one single
scarlet battalion drawn up, and, away on its left, the glint
and movement of horses betrayed a battery. Apparently two
battalions were still missing, and, as the General did not wish
to catch the line unprepared, we pulled up and waited.
There were the usual caustic comments on the and
Regiments. " Late again, as usual ! " kind of thing. But
I produced my field glasses — an unusually good pair, with
a big field for picking up colours in tiie dark or in a half--
light — and there, to my astonishment, I saw the two missing
battalions drawn up in line, quietly waiting in their appointed
places. I said nothing for a few moments until the General
became impatient, and then I passed up my glasses. I was
tho only one present whose uniform allowed him to wear
field glasses in full dress, and the General's astonishment was
complete.
He had had much experience in the Mutiny. As we rode
(heme afterwards wo discussed tlie case and s.imilar happen-
ings, and found an explanation simple and scientific enough.
All the infantry were weai-ing scarlet alike, and all in
marching order, bub whereas the one battalion we had
detected at once wore brovvn belts, the others had the usual
pipeclay belts of the period. The white pipeclay belts broke
up the mass of each individual into rectangles and triangles
not exceeding 12 inches in size, and at anything over 1,000
yards these little surfaces dwindled to points too small to be
perceived as colour by the optio nerves.
Then we compared notes, and I carried out ol>scr-
vationa for quite a long period under his direction,
which led to the final conclusion that except against
a particular background it was not the colour but the
size of the unbroken masa of it that mattered. Even
" Skinner's Horse," who then wore a most conspicuous canary-
coloured tunic or kaftan, became invisible at 1,500 yards
when wearing their white belts, whereas liliey, or any other
regiment, in complete khaki, belts and all, could be picked
up at a couple of thousand yards or more with ease. But
the essence of the whole matter lay in immobility. Moving
troops can always be detected, and the trouble is that it is
precisely when troops are lying down — i.e., not moving — -
that both Staff and artillery want to know exactly where they
are, and that is just the time when, with the present khaki,
you cannot find them.
The moral effect on the men themselves must also
not be neglected. In the present war, the cause for which
wo are fighting is 6o great that no hardships or dis-
comfort seem able to depress the men, but it will not
always be so, and I can recall many instances told me by
men in India, and in the Zulu War, of the electric effect
produced on a "fed up " body of men by the order for a
general clean-up and an inspection parade. When the men
saw themselves again as a whole, clean and smart in spite
of retreats and hardship, the regiment found its own soul, so
to speak, and became a different body.
Let mo cite a single instance told to mo by tho Subhadafl
Major of a native cavalry regiment who had been through
tho dreary experience of the siege of Kandahai- in 1879;
where depression had reigned supreme and blie native regi-
ments were more than a little doubtful in their minds as to
the invincibility we had claimed.
Roberts' column had arrived overnight, after the march
from Kabul, and next morning, the 1st September, my friend's
regiment marehed out to take up its position for the coming
battle. On tho way they were overtaken, first by tho 9th
Lancers, then by a battery of R.H.A., both of them turned out
to perfection as if for a Royal inspection, and he said, " Saliib,
the sight of those men, so splendidly smart and efficient,
made our hearts go up with a bound, and we fought that
day as we had not fought for montflis before ; but if they had
been all rusty and dirty it would have been a very different
story, for our men were very full of doubts that morning."
presently a slight movement in the interval caught my eye.
Messrs. Maskelynb and Df-vant are inviting convakscont scltliers
and failors to their entertninment at St. Gforge's Hall. Reserved spats
will bo given free of charge, to any convalescent soldiers and sailors
who ask for them This iiivitaUon hoUs good for any performanco
until the Easter holidaje.
14*
January 30, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE GERMAN RESERVE.
To the Editor of Land and Wateh.
Sin, — There seems to me to be one possible loophole in
Mr. Belloc's calculation, of which a supporter of the larger
— four million — figure as that of the German reserve might
avail himself. Of the 12,000,000 males who enter into the
calculation, Mr. Belloc disposes of 25 per cent., that is
3,000,000, as the usual proportion of persons unfit for military
service. Of the rest, 2,000,000 at least are needed to keep the
mechanism of internal industry going. But would not the
aforesaid 3,000,000, or a very large number of them, be com-
petent to do even hard civil work, though unable to endure the
eicoptional severities of a military campaign? Or, if by
themselves they were unequal to the burdens of industry,
■would not they, with tlie addition of 1,000,000 completely
abl-e-bodied men, be able to do as much as the 2,000,000 which
18 Mr. Belloc's figures? In that case the German.") would have
put into the field 5,000,000, be keeping 4,000,000 men for tho
running of the country, and possess a reserve force of
3,000,000 men.— Yours.' etc..
J. K. MOZLBT.
Pembroke College, Cambridgo.
January 25, 1915.
To tlie Editor of Land and Wateh.
Dear Sir, — May I venture to indicate some factors which
seem to have escaped Mr. Belloc's attention in his " further
note on the numbers of the German Reserve " in your issua
of the 23rd instant?
Mr. Belloc says: "We have not got to guess, we know
the total number of adult males of military age from twenty
to forty-five years inclusive, in the German Empire." But
the German authorities would seem to have cast their net over
A much wider period than this. Youths of eighteen, and
even younger, seem to have been called to the colours ; nor
docs the age limit of forty-five appear to apply, judging from
the description we get of prisoners taken.
Again he says: "We know that at the very least two
million of ablc-lx)diod men must be retained to ' run the
nation.'" Surely, much of this most necessary work can be
done, and well done, by men physically unfit for military
service.
Thus, Germany's potential reserve of men would seem
to be appreciably larger than Mr. Belloc's contention would
allow. But there is another side to the question.
Germany may be able to call up and drill these men.
She may even be able to ofiBcer them quite as well as we are
able to oflScer our million. But when we consider the delay
end difficulty we experience in arming, equipping and cloth-
ing that million, with all the world open to us from which
to draw raw material, how much greater must be Germany's
difficulty in the task of equipping and supplying with ammu-
nition her potential millions, with her industries stifled and
cramped by the silent pressure of hostile eea power?
It might not be prudent to build too confidently on this,
but it seems at least probable that our enemy will at most be
able to furnish from this source drafts for his existing forma-
tions, and that he will be quite unable to form from this
material new Field Armies. — Faithfully yours,
Geo. M. p. Murrat.
Kingstown,
January 2-I.
To the Editor of Land and Watee.
Dear Sis, — With reference to Mr. Belloc's articles as to
the number of men that Germany still has in reserve, particu-
larly his article in the current issue, is there not one point
which Tie has overlooked? From the 12 millions between 18
and 45 he deducts 3 millions as being militarily unfit, and a
further 2 millions for "able-bodied men to run the State";
Ibut surely out of the 3 millions there will bo a very large num-
ber who would be sufficiently able-bodied for the purpose of
"running the State." Moreover, there may be a large num-
ber of men from among those over 45 who would also be
sufficiently able-bodied for the purpose. It seems to me that
from the 3 miUions and those over 45, Germany ought to be
able to provide, if not the whole, at any rate the greater part
of the 2 millioHS required to " run the State," leaving these
free to serve in the Army ; and if I am right as to this, it
would about bring the figures of the reserve up to tho num-
ber of 4 millions, with which Mr. Belloc disagrees.
It would be interesting if Mr. Belloc could give us his
yiews as to this. — Yours faithfully,
Eabbt Knox.
14, St. Helen's Place, E.G.
January 22.
THE BLOCKADE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Mr. Belloc asks why the blockade of Germany can-
not be made absolute, by which he means why she cannot
be cut off from obtaining anything whatsoever that is trans-
ported by sea to neutral countries and thence transmitted to
Germany, for nothing is reaching German ports direct and,
as ho admits, we cannot intercept the products of neutral
countries contiguous to Germany.
The answer would seem to be particularly easy. We
are invited to defy the Declaration of Paris, to make every-
thing contraband without reference to its warlike character
or any presumed destination for military purposes, and to
apply the doctrine of continuous voyage to everything. To
do any such tiling would be to botray each and and every one
of the causes for which, according to Mr. Asquith, we took
up arms, tho faith of international treaties, international law,
and the rights of neutral states. Surely everyone must see
how impossible that is. — I am, etc.,
A. A. MiTCHELI..
7, Huntly Gardens, Glasgow.
January 19.
THE FORMIDABLE.
To the Editor of Land and "Water.
Sir,— In reply to the letter of Mr. John Chadwick about
the loss of the Formidable and the use of compressed air to
prevent similar disasters I think my best answer is to ask
Mr. Chadwick whether he thinks a naval architect of Sir
William White's eminence would have wasted his time in
talking to such a hopeless amateur as he plainly imagines mo
to be.
It was part of the necessary intellectual equipment of
a Royal Engineer officer to be thoroughly familiar with the
principles governing the construction of battleships; and as
I spent some two-thirds of my service of forty years in dock-
yard towns, and had watched the construction and completion
of pretty well every type of vessel in the Navy since the laying
down of the old Alexandra, about 1872, I am quite aware of
the structural difficulties he alludes to. But I am equally con-
fident that they can be overcome.
F. N. Maude.
WATER-LOGGED TRENCHES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Numerous letters from the trenches describe them
as sloughs of mud slush, into which the men sink sometimes
to the waist; others refer to the unavailing efforts made to
ameliorate this condition by the use of pumps, due to the
muddy mixture deranging the mechanism of the appliances.
Such a problem could be solved by resort to more
primitive methods. In Eastern countries and in Eastern
Europe and Russia it is customary to raise water from
shallow wells and streams by the simple apparatus I will now
describe in its application to trench slush, an apparatus
which could be constructed in half an hour from materials
at hand, and by which one man could dispose of several
gallons a minute without exertion.
The materials would consist of a short tree trunk of
about four to six inches in diameter, or a baulk of timi <r,
of a length sufficient to rest horizontally from one side of a
trench to the other. Alternatively of a tree stump about six
to eight feet long, terminating in a Y-forked end. Upon
this beam, or within the fork of the Y, is balanced a sapling
some 20 to 30 feet long. The butt end Is further weighted
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 1915.
by lashing to it a supplementary weight, preferably an addi-
tional piece of the butt end or stump. A bucket is attached
by a cord to tho taper end of the sapling, which is then ad-
justed upon the beam so that it balances like a see-saw. The
sapling should be slightly hollowed or cut away at the ful-
crum where it rests upon tho beam, to prevent it from
Blipping.
Immediately beneath the bucket a sump should be dug
out, into which the slush will drain. The operator stands
at the butt end, and by raising this the bucket descends into
the sump, where it fills, and is then raised by a downward
pull upon the butt end, which may have, if necessary, a
ehort cord attached to it. The filled bucket is thus hoisted
well above the trench, and may be swung sideways over the
edge, deposited and tipped over by a few deft movements
imparted to the butt.
This slight exercise, a relief from the monotony of
doing nothing, would sufjfice to drain and keep dry a con-
siderable section of Irench.
Tho accompanying illustration will make clear the con-
etmcticn of the appliance and its use. — Very faithfully yours,
Howard C. Cleavek.
35, Berners Street, W., January 18, 1915.
THE GERMAN MIRAGE OF 1870-
To the Editor of L.^nd amd Water.
SiHj — I have been glancing over the work which was
translated and edited by Major-General J. F. Maurice, C:B.,
about fifteen ycais ago, on the Franco-German War, written
by tho German generals who took part in it. It is well worth
re-examination to-day, as there can be little doubt that the
easy victories therein described have done more than any-
thing to egg on the Kaiser and the Military party in Ger-
many to their present campaign. Here, for instance, is what
Lieutenant-General Albert vou Bcguslaweki wrote of the
French preparations in 1870: —
" The results of tho mobilisation were on the whole so
defective that the corps which were already in position
at the end of July were imperfectly provided with the
needful trains, ambulances, ammunitions, and provision
columns, so that the offensive movement planned for the
31st July had to be postponed, and meanwhile the Ger-
mans anticipated the French attack. The French forti-
fications were very insufficiently garrisoned, and them-
selves were for the most part antiquated and unfit to
offer any lengthy resistance to the artillery of tho Ger-
mans. Of the fortresses on tho frontiers, Metz alone had
advanced forts, and even these vrere partly unfinished."
Tho conclusion of this' German general's remarks upon the
war of 1870 is of interest, since by reversing the names of
France and Germany, it describes exactly the position to-
day:—
" The challenge of France made the national sentiment
of Germany burst into full flame. All internal disputes
were forgotten, and the whole German army down to the
humblest of tho rank and file was inspired by a sense of
the righteousness of their cause, and filled with defiant
courage, with an assurance of victory, and with tho firm
determination once for all thoroughly to settle accounts
with the old enemy."
Could any better description be penne3 of the feelings
end intentions of the Allies? — Your obedient servant,
J. Landfeau Lucas,
Spectacle Makers' Co.
Gkndora, Hindhcad, Surrey.
FIELD-GLASSES.
To the Editor of Lamd akd Watee.
Sib, — Although the appeal made by my father. Lord
Roberts, to sportsmen and others, to lend their race, field
or stalking glasses for the use of officers and non-commis-
sioned officers under orders for the front has been most grati-
fying a very large number of glasses are still required.
Up to the present some 18,000 pairs of field and stalking
glasses have been received. These have been carefully
examined and classified by an expert before being issued.
The names and addresses of Uie owners are registered, and
the glasses themselves are engraved with an index number
in order that tTie owners can be traced at the conclusion of
the war and their property, when possible, returned to them.
Many people who did not possess field-glasses felt that
they would like to contribute towards the fund which has
been raised for the purpose of purchasing them, and sent
cheques instead.
My father was deeply grateful for the generous response
made to his appeal, but at the same time he realised that an
even greater number of glasses would be required, the stock
in hand being nearly exhausted, while the call for them was
continuous. He had made up his mind to appeal to the
public once again, and a letter to this efifect had been written,
but not signed, before he left for France. I therefore ven-
ture to make this further appeal in his name.
All contributions will be dealt with in the same way as
formerly and duly acknowledged.
It is important to note that all glasses, cheques and
communications should be addressed to the Secretary,
National Service League, 72, Victoria Street, Westminster,
S. W.— I am, Yours faithfully,
AlLEEN KOBEETS.
WHAT OUR CHEMISTS ARE DOING.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Letters such as the one in your issue of the 23r(I
inst., signed H. J. C. Grierson, unless contradicted, do much
harm; they make people think that everything our Army has
is inferior to that of the enemy.. He states that " we have
been caught again with an inferior armament, shells, torpe-
does, etc." I cannot speak with authority on torpedoes, but
I fancy when we come to use them they will be found no6
wanting. I have served for forty years in the Koyal Artillery,
eo know sometJiing about guns, and can state that our slirap-
nel shell and fuzees are superior in every way to those of the
Germans. Only this morning I have received a letter from an
K.A. officer who has been out since the beginning of the war,
and in it he says: —
" The high-explosive of the 6-inch howitzer is a wonder-
fully good shell. It always detonates even on the softest
ground, and with great effect. I have never seen any German
ehcll, even the 11-inch they had up at Yprcs, to equal it for,
force of explosion."
I think this is an answer to his question, " What arc our,
chemists doing?" — Yours faithfully,
R. A.
THE ADRIATIC.
To the Edftor of Lakd and Watee.
Deae Sir, — As a very interested reader of Land and
Water for many years i take the liberty of asking for a little
more information regarding the operations in the Mediter-
ranean.
In a recent issue Mr. Jane states " th.i.t the Allies
have made no attack because they have had nothing to
attack." Surely, if tho enemy Fleet is not in open water it
must Fe lying in Pola and Cattaro, neither of which porta
would seem proof against guns of large calibre, and the only
conclusion one can come to is that our attempt to reduce these
places bears a very poor comparison with the Japanese
methods at Kiao-chau.
I feel sure that numbers of your readers will be glad to
hear from Mr. Jane on this matter, as I have met such quan-'
titles of interested people who seem to think that a veil 13
drawn over doings in Uiis particular area. — Yours truly,
J. A. Burns.
Abbey View, Dalkey, Co. Dublin.
A STUDY IN SELF-EXPRESSION.*
Though concerned largely with sociological problems, and
this in no dreary and wearisome fashion, the dramatis persona
of this novel are not made sub.servient to the theme, nor
allowed to be merely pegs on which to hang ideas of social
reform and other things. Philip Crayford, pathetic in hia
solitude, is the central figure, albeit his dominance is more
felt than insisted on. W© feel his son Paul, around whom
the story is woven, to be altogether a lesser though probably
more arresting character, and the author has given us a fine
study of the young man's groping for self-expression, reaching
out towards his ideal, and coming to its attainment tlirougb
apparent failure. The feminine characters command lesa
sympathy; it Ls not easy to see Joan Altringtqp, the princi-
pal woman character, with Paul's eyes, for to us her innate
worldliness, covered with a glo.ss of sentiment, render her
an improbable source of inspiration. It is a relief to turn to
Mrs. Kennaird, sincere, though lacking Joan's inbred delicacy.
Taken altogether, there are many types here worth con-
sidering, and we commend this book as a thoughtful and
really interesting work.
• " The Young Man Alasaloin." By E. Ctaries Vivian. (Chapmaji
and HaU. 68.)
Jaiuiary 30, 191 5
LAND AND W'ATER
SHELL
is the spirit of
the Allies.
Larger quantities of 'Shell' than of any
other Petrol are being used by the Navy
and in every branch of Military Service.
Any statement that other suppliers' Spirit
is used as largely by our Forces is not in
accordance with the facts. 'Shell' is
working for the Allies only, and therefore
for you. Be on the side of the Allies and
use 'Shell.' Refuse any other Spirit.
OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE.
i
'A
24;
LAND AND WATER
January 30, 191^
Through the Eyes
OF A Woman
The Garden !n War Time
EVERYBODY loves a garden, and one of the
outward and visible signs is the writing of many
gardening books. The possession of e\'cn a few
yards of ground seems to draw its owner towards
tlic craft of the pen. People who in the ordinary
course of events would have remained silent feel inspired to
record their gardening experiences. They arc helped out on
every side. Nearly all the great poets have expressed
beautiful thoughts in beautiful language on man's " j)urest
pleasure." Some personal notes, combined with aptly
chosen quotations and attractively illustrated, form the
somewhat slight basis of many a gardening book— and,
what is more, many a gardening book that is infinitely well
worth the reading from every amateur's point of view.
Quite recently one of the more modest of these
publications reached me. It was a small booklet of perhaps
sixteen pages, and there was not a dull word in it from start
to finish. The history of gardening was its fascinating
subject, and the writer had evidently made it his very happy
hobby as well as study. There was a delightful note of
personal enjoyment through every one of his strictly limited
pages.
The war news that morning had not been particularly
cheerful, and this booklet seemed to promise a welcome
relief from war-time thoughts. And so it proved for a short
while, until in course of time the writer traced the history of
gardening from its earliest beginnings to the sixtcentli
century. At tliis time we learn the garden of a house was as
important as the rooms of the house itself. Every housewife
was her own manufacturer. Through the good services of
her garden she made cordials, potions, preserves, lotions,
essences, and soaps. Every foot of ground was cultivated,
and all that grew had its very definite purpose. It must not
be wasted, but in course of time gathered and used in the
making of some household necessity.
Then once more the mind played its accustomed trick.
Try though we will, touch on any topic we may, one and all
lead back to the same absorbing subject. Even this picture
of a sixteenth-century garden followed the inevitable rule,
and thought turned from it to the war. As time goes on we
are all bound to think more seriously of the food question.
Unlike our ancestors, we no longer manufacture at home.
We are dependent for our daily bread upon many sources,
most of which are beyond our immediate control. It would
look as if our forebears had infinitely the best of it. And
that being so, can we in the present day, in any way, follow
their example.
Gardening as a Business
■We seem to have wandered far from the time when
everybody baked their own bread, killed their own meat,
and furnished all the contents of their store cupboards
themselves. Instead, we deal with some great store which
supplies us with every detail from flour down to boot buttons.
Numbers of people live in great towns possessing not so much
as one half-inch of land, while even those who live in the
country have little notion of turning their land to their
profit. And the result is simple. We are all the slaves of
fortune. We depend upon others for every necessary of life.
It is an artificial way of hving, and is therefore at any time
likely to be upset by an artificial set of circumstances. A
gamble in wheat in the United States of America spells
privation in many a home in England, and so do other causes
equally as wanton.
This is the eleventh hour, and it is too late to funda-
mentally change the mode of living of millions of people.
It is not too late, however, to husband every resource we
have. The lucky possessors of gardens can see that every
square inch is utilised and that none of the produce is wasted.
They may, indeed, if good fortune be with us, find they have
never enjoyed their garden to the full until this present year
of grace. Gardening as an amusement is one thing, but
gardening for both amusement and benefit is another. Every
cabbage has its economic value now. It is a more important
vegetable than it was a short twelve months ago, when flippant
folk looked upon it as an evil, but fortunately an unnecessary
one. Potatoes, again, deserve far more consideration than
has hitherto fallen to their lot. We can hardly cultivate too
many or give them too much space, even if we abandon some
of our flower beds to do so.
^iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
I How to help Tommy Atkins
S We cannot all go out to fight, but we can
^ all do something to help our soldiers who
~ are fighting our battles and defending the
S honour of our native land, and in this way
S contribute to their well-being and efficiency
I SEND HIM A FLASK OF
I HORLICH S
i MALTED MILK TABLETS
Invaluable to a soldier
in the field and most
efficient in relieving
hunger and thirst
and preventing fatigue.
We will send post free to any
address a flask of these delicious
and sustaining food tablets and
a neat vest pocket case on
receipt of 1/6. If the man is on
active service, be particular to
give his name, regimental
number, regiment, brigade and
division.
Of all chemists and Stores, in con-
venient pocket flasks, 1/- each.
Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-
Liberal Sample sent post free for 3d. in stamps.
HORLICK'S MALTED MILK Co.,
SLOUGH, BUCKS.
7.....imilllllllllilllllllillllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
RUGS! RUGS!! RUGS!!!
WE WANT 5^000—
OLD OR NEW
HAVE YOU SENT ANY YET?
If you have not, please send as soon as possible.
If you have, please get your friends to help.
THE BRITISH ARMY HORSES
AT THE FRONT NEED THEM
BADLY DURING THE COLD
WINTER MONTHS, AND WE
ARE GETTING URGENT
DEMANDS FOR THEM.
The R.S.P.C.A. FUND for Sick and Wounded Horses, under
the Chairmanship of the Duke of Portland, is THE ONLY
ORGANISATION APPROVED BY THE ARMY COUNCIL
for aiding the British Horses at the Front.
E. G. FAIRHOLME, Hon. Sec. to the Fund,
loj, Jerinyn Street, London. S.W.
244
anuury ]o, 1915
LAND AND WATER
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THROUGH THE EYES OF
WOMAN
A
(Cunt iini^ti from page 244)
The owner of a g irden, with its fruit, its vegetables, its
roots, and its herbs, is in a more enviable position than the
mere town dweller. At any rate, he approaches more ncarlv
the former scheme of things, when every house was sufficient
to itself, for food supplies were concentrated around. It
is to be hoped that all who own a garden will recognise their
responsibilities — and their privileges.
The Supply and the Demand
The working parties started all over the country ever
since the war began have up to the present been as busy as
possible. Everything that everybody could do was wanted,
and so nobodv was working to no purpose. But now, in the
nature of things, it is somewhat different. Some of the Red
Cross centres, hospitals, and other institutions are over-
burdened with supplies, whilst others have not got enough.
It is. then, very necessary to make sure that the institution
to which gifts are forwarded has need of them. And this can
be done without the slightest trouble to anyone but the
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They have made it their sjx'cial work to discover the immediate
need of the immediate moment and supply it.
Working parties who are in doubt should seek the
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can do this either by letter or by visiting the club. Members
of the Committee can be found there anv time between
II a.m. and 5 p.m., and here advice can be had for the
asking. It is all part and parcel of the e.xcellent work the
organisation is doing, and helps to e.xplain the e.xtent of its
growth. The Committee is in constant communication
with hospital ships, hospitals on shore for both soldiers and
sailors, and the various Red Cross centres, and can be looked
upon as nothing short of an intelligence bureau. Not onlv
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efficient aid, this, and can hardly have been offered at a more
opportune moment. We do not want to stop all our knitting
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owing to doubt as to whether more gifts were needed. More
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be sure that the work of our hands is not sent in the wrong
direction. It certainly will not if the Voluntar\- Aid
Committee at the Empress club have anything to say to it.
^ Erica.
Harbutt's "Fibrous Plasticine" isnotonly useful to gunrn-rs, but
to ordinary people who are worried with heavy noises like tra\ellin.:.! in
the Tubes or heavy traffic on stone sets, and you will find that if two
small plugs are made of the plasticine, cone shape, and inserted in the
ears these noises are nearly cut off, or reduced to a slight murmur, but,
strange to say, one can still hear ordinary conversation. The plugs
can be removed in a moment by outside pressure below the ear.
" The Enghshwoman's Year Book and Directory, 1915," is divided
into two parts : one including education i^rofessions. and social life,
and the other being mainly devoted to philanthropic effort in its many
manifestations. One of the most interesting features is the table of
" Records for Women," showing how all along the line women are
breaking new ground in those professions and honours previously
supposed to be exclusively men's privileges.
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TESTIMOMAI..-" I feel lliat 1 must ihank you and yu.ir
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246
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXIV. No. 2752
'^ATTTTJDAV TrF"RT?TTAT?V fi tat- tpublished ast peicb sixpence
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—WAR BOOKS OF PERMANENT INTEREST
War and the Empire
The Principles of Imperial Defence.
By COL. HUBERT FOSTER, Director of Military Studies at the
University of Sydney, Late Quarter-Master General in Canada, etc.
With Coloured Map of the World. Cloth, 2/6 net.
" Written In sufficiently simple language for any average reader ; the book embodies
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'* Mr. Cope Comford's sketches of life in the Navy are full of dash, humour and go.
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Lord Roberts' Last Message to his Fellow Countrymen.
The Supreme Duty of the
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By FIELD-MARSHAL EARL ROBERTS.
Price 3d. net. 50 copies for 10/-. Price3d.net.
100 copies for 20/-.
Carriage extra. Obtainable from any Bookneller.
General Sir Alex. Taylor,
G.C.B., R.E. : His Times, His Friends,
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Works by Hilaire Belloc
The Home University Library.
1/_ nAf Each Volume contains 256 pages. |^/_ f|Ct,
WARFARE IN BRITAIN.
An account of how and where great battles of the past were fought on British
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THE FRENCH REVOLUTION.
Sketches the great cliaractcrs of the Revolution -its theoretic basis, military
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Other Notable Books in the same Library.
GERMANY OF TO-DAY. By chines Tower
The author ilescribes the aims, constitutions and governments of the various
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"Jraces the growth of Naval Power from early times to date, and shows its
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MASTER MARINERS. BvJR spears
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The first six chapters record the development and relations of the European
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NAPOLEON. By Herbert Fisher. LL.D.
A priceless little .Memoir, containing the story of his youth, his caricr, and his
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A valuable and impartial survey of the parting of England and the United
States.
WILUAMS & NORGATE. 14 HENRIETTA STREET. COVENT GARDEN, W.C.
256
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
ROTE. — Thli ArtleU hat been inbmlttcd to the Prcii Bnrean, which does not object to the publication at ceniored anil takei do
reipondbility for the correctneii of the itatementa.
In accordance with the reqolrementi of the Preie Bnrean, the poiiticni of troops on Plant lUnstratin; thlt Article mntt only be
rcfardtd at approximate, and no definite stTcn^th at any point it indicated.
THE EASTERN FIELD.
N the eastern field Russia has now developed
a plan the elements of which are quite clear,
though the counter-moves of the enemy are
as yet only partially developed, and the fac-
tors making for success or failure are still
quite indeterminate.
The plan is, briefly, to hold the centre with no
more than sufficient troops (even in front of War-
saw), and to attack — with political as well as
purely military objects — on the two wings.
The opportunities and difficulties of these I
will discuss separately.
Upon the immensely extended line a thousand
miles long in its total trace, counting its recesses
and local salients, the Russians have endured as
to all the centre a violent offensive, the culminating
sector in which has been the fifty miles imme-
diately in front of Warsaw along the Lower Bzura
and its tributary the Rawka. This offensive,
though still renewed, has failed, and is probably
nearly exhausted. It has cost the enemy very
heavily in men, probably in men permanently dis-
abled or killed or prisoners along the whole Polish
line, as many as a quarter of a million — perhaps
more. The difficulties of ambulance, especially in
the centre of Poland, har^e rendered unusually
high the German permanent losses, and correspon-
dingly low the number of the wounded who will
ever be able to return to the colours.
But the enemy, upon the model of his similar
action in the West after similar failure there, has
entrenched himself and has begun to depend upon
the support of heavy artillery for the maintenance
of his entrenched position. These trenches run
from the Middle Vistula to the Upper Vistula, a
line not far from straight and approximately 160
miles long. From the Upper Vistula to the Car-
pathians the front continues just along the Dona-
jec river, then up a tributary, the Biala, up to the
foothills of the Carpathians, and here a certain
amount of continued trench work, but more the
balance of artillery and the vile weather, keeps it
stationary.
It is this length of line from the Middle Vis-
tula near the mouth of the Bzura to the Upper
Biala (a tributary continuing the Donajec line) —
say, 200 miles or more — which may be regarded
as the centre of the whole vast scheme ; and that
centre is for the moment immobile. The Germans
and Austro-Hungarians, who are in much larger
numbers here than their opponents, cannot ad-
vance further than the line so drawn up, not even
in front of Warsaw.
But on either side of this centre are two wings,
differing greatly in character, and it is upon these
two wings that the Russian movement is taking
place. The southern or left Russian wing runs
all along the base of the Carpathians from the
upper torrent-reaches of the Biala to the borders
of Roumania: that is, to the district called the
Bukovina, Austrian before this war in poli',ical
definition, Roumanian in population.
All along this left or southern wing the Rus'-
sians are more or less advanced into the mouths
of the Carpathian Passes. They do not hold the
summits of any one of them, and against the efforts
they are about to make in this region — particularly
from the Bukovina — the Germanic Powers are
massing very large forces, the nature and the
chances of which will be discussed in a moment.
On the northern or right wing of the immense
Russian line the situation is as follows: —
There are three sectors :
(1) The district between the Vistula and the
East Prussian border, a district in the form of a
wedge, a hundred miles broad at its base, dwind-
ling to nothing at its apex in front of Thorn.
(2) A front upon " the region of the lakes,"
this front stretching roughly from Goldap to Oso-
viecs. This front is about sixty to seventy miles
broad.
(3) Finally, there is the northern sector run-
ning right up to the Baltic and measuring about
100 miles or a little more in extent.
With these elements clear we can study our
Ally's plan as it appears to be conceived for the
immediate future, and the enemy's apparent coun-
ter-plan so far as this has developed.
But before taking either of these movements
upon the wings in detail, we must appreciate the
most general conditions under which the whole
struggle must take place for at least four months
1»
wanted war and has prepared fur it during tlic
last three years with the greatest secrecy and
energy and has declared it at exactly her own
moment, subordinating everything to that one end,
while the Allies have only considered war during
that period as a possible catastrophe to be avoided
by every means in their power, and surely to be
successfully prevented if another crisis should acci-
dentally arise. The whole thing is as simple as
anv one of the corresj^onding problems that con-
tinr.ally arise in daily life. A knows that B wishes
him ill, but he is not going to give up his normal
occupations in order to devote himself entirely to
the ruin of B, because he has often called B's bluff
in the past and because, judging other men from
himself, he cannot believe that B is going to give up
everything for the sake of attacking him, and be-
cau.se it is no part of healthy living to devote one's
entire time and opportimities to a struggle which
may never take place. If Europe were a chaos
and nations a l^and of cut-throats, then the obVious
policy for England and France would liave been
for both these countries to go to war some years
E
;* »
A c
0,,,- -yw
M Im t ii
f' b »
M
from the Baltic to the Carpathians the
enemy along A-B counting as 3 and our Allies
2*
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
along C-D numbering 5; then by massing the the inV.aders out, there is a lively recollection of
extra two units at either end they would begin the event throughout the Empii'e. The great
pushing the corresponding ends of the enemy back, estates were raided, the peasantry (who are half
A would fall back to E, and B to F. The pressure servile in condition) rose in revolt against the Frus-
wonld continue because there would always bo sian squires and looted the country houses ; there
superior forces against the enemy on either horn v;as a stampede of refugees to Berlin and very
of the crescent and the enemy could not reinforce heavy material damage done. On the other end
either horn without danger of having his centre of the line at D-D you have two important con-
broken in because his numbers would be too small, siderations embarrassing the enemy. The first is
He would be pressed back and back until with the
advance reaching, say, G on the north he would
be in peril for some one of his great lines of com-
munication, such as M-M. Long before that hap-
pened he would have had to fall back with his
centre and with his other extreme as well. If he
'did not fall back in time his centre would be cut
off and at least one part of his line — perhaps the
whole of it — would be swamped.
that the presence of the Russian forces in what is
nationally Roumanian territory more and more
urges Roumania to move, and Roumania has half
a million fresh men admirably trained and
equipped. On what is politically Hungarian soil,
and still free from invasion, at least three million
men of Roumanian blood and speech inhabit the
eastern slope of the Carpathians and naturally
attract Roumanian interference. It must not be
But if things are tlie other way about, and if forgotten that here, as everywhere, the Germanic
A-B counts as 4, while C-D as yet only counts as 3,
D
Powers as a whole stand for the principle of sub-
jecting populations to an alien Government; the
Allies stand as a whole for the reconstruction of
the minor nationalities in Europe.
The second consideration embarrassing the
Germanic Powers at the southern extremity, B-D,
is the peculiar position of Hungary. Hungary
was as much the cause of the war as anyone, for
Hungary claimed to keep subject Servians and
Roumanians against their wills, but the Hunga-
rians have no cause to sacrifice themselves for the
Germans; they are something quite apart, and, as
Vv'as shown in these notes some time ago,
the gravest political weakness of the Germanic
Allies consists in this necessity they are under
of placating this outlier, the alien, suspicious,
and now actively discontented Hungarian element
on the outer edge of their body. If Hungary went
the remaining half of the Dual Monarchy would
be almost compelled to make peace, and when that
had hai^pened Germany certainly could not hold
out.
We talk continually of the war as though
" Germany " were the only enemy. We too often
forget that the forces of our enemy are nearly
doubled, their reserves more than doubled, by the
alliance of Germany with Austria.
Now, an invasion, though it were but partial
and temporary, of Hungary by Russian forces
there can be no question of C-D acting in this
fashion. By the time he had massed men at either
extrem.e, C or D, leaving only just enough men in through the extreme passes of the Carpathians, or
the centre to hold firm, he would yet not have men by Russian and Roumanian forces combined, when
enough at either extremity to maintain a con- Roumania enters the field, might just prove that
tinuous and successful advance indefinitely. The extra straw on the camel's back which would de-
enemy could easily mass men to stop him by with- tach Hungary from the alliance and break down
dravnng forces from their own centre (which they the whole Germanic scheme.
can well afi^ord to do), apart from the fact that
their lines at the extremities are already stronger
than his.
Indeed, C-D upon a field of battle would be
foolish indeed if he attempted any such movements
upon the extremities in force.
But a line a thousand miles long passing
through very various political areas is not like the
field of a single battle. It may ofl^er political
opportunities of which the weaker force can take
To smn up, then, Russia attacking at the two
horns of the crescent cannot hope to envelop ;
she has not the men for it. She will not, during
the winter months, have the equipment to provide
the men for it. But she may perfectly well by
causing alarm at both sides of the long line, under
the political conditions of those extremities, cause
grave embarrassment and division to her enemy.
She may make Hungary so clamour for reinforce-
ments that Germany, in terror of losing Hungary,
advantage. Tliis happens to be the case in the will throw too many men towards the south-cast
eastern field to-day. At A and C you have that
province of East Prussia upon which German
opinion is more sensitive perhaps than any other
part of the national soil. It has already suffered
invasion, and though the Germans won a great
victory at Tannenberg five months ago, and drove
and weaken herself elsewhere. If, while that is
happening there is a successful raid going on in
Eastern Prussia she may well compel the Germans
to reconsider their policy of helping Hungary and
fluster Germany into withdrawing troops from the
south to secure the north.
i»
LAND AND WATER
February 6, 1915.
On the western lines in France we cause such
'diversion by attacking unexpectedly at the most
widely separated points. Now on the sea, now in
the centre at Soissons, now right up in Alsace at
the southern extreme. It is a mechanical system
which produces perpetual going and coming up
and down the Grerman line, and as perpetually
wears it down.
In the East, where there is neither railway
facility for this nor a closed line of trenches to be
broken, there exists what does not exist in the
West, and that is grave diversity of political
objects at the extremes of the Une, and it is of this
that our Allies in the East are taking advantage.
r<pf f Sutar,
\ tuwil
Lew<Qun Lnki
Tkorn,^'
Otowiea
Third Stetor
<^i^fiTtirfim
:^
I.— THE EAST PRUSSIAN FRONT.
The Russians at the beginning of the cam-
paign, when the number of their equipped men was
inferior to that which it has now reached, dared
not attack north of the central section of the East
Prussian front. It is never safe to separate an
isolated body too far from your main line, and had
the Russians in October and November attempted
to work much further north than Wirballen, their
forces would have been too extended or would
have had an isolated portion to the north. Some-
what increasing numbers, as equipment slowly
grew, have permitted them to act nearer to the
Baltic.
Now, this is of great importance. The middle
'district from Wirballen southward between
Goldap and Snwalki towards Osowiecs is the region
of the lakes. It is one tangle of defiles between
endless pieces of water of various sizes, and
marshes. These defiles are both fortified and
thoroughly studied by the enemy. But to the
northward of the main railway line the country
is more open. There is a certain amount of marsh,
but the further north you go the easier the ground
becomes.
The political centre of all this district is the
town of Tilsit, famous in Napoleonic history, and
it is upon Tilsit that the most northern new
■Russian move is converging. Though Tilsit is only
fifteen miles or so from the frontier (less from the
very nearest point), its occupation, should the Rus-
sians be fortunate enough to force their way there,
would be of considerable effect, not only because of
the political blow struck, but also because forces
diverted to prevent a continued advance over the
Niemen (which the Germans call the Memel) would
be working very far away from the mass of the
German Army. Numerous as the German forces
in the East still are, they cannot be everywhere,
and it is almost certain that in the attempt to de-
fend East Prussia the Germans would pile up in
the north an excessive number of men.
The movement has for the mom.ent only begun,
and we have no right to form any judgment as to
its development. The Russian cavalry has cut the
railway at and destroyed the station of Pogegen,
just north of Tilsit beyond the river, an afternoon's
walk. In its advance on the town from the south
it has reached and occupied Lasdehnen, a small
town not more than eight miles from the frontier,
and the larger railway junction of Pilkallen,
about fourteen miles to the south and not ten
miles from the frontier. South of Pilkallen they
are still engaged with the Germans in a group of
woods which lies between that point and the main
railwav, and their line runs southv/ard and west-
ward, getting further and further from the fron-
tier until it touches the lake region somewhere
apparently behind and south of Goldap. What
happens to it in the lake region itself is not
very easy to determine. A private message which
reached London on Friday last said that the Rus-
sians were already in occupation of Lotzen.
If this is true it is news of very high importance,
for they would there hold the principal defile
through the lakes, and the principal railway junc-
tion of the whole district. But I can find no offi-
cial confirmation of such important news, unless
the German official communique, which told us at
much the same time the Russians were repelled
from the Lowentin Lake, may be regarded as con-
firmation : for the mention of a repulse — and no
more — in an official communique ahvays connotes
a more or less successful attack by the enemy.
When it is quite beaten — still more if the enemy
lose ground — the official communiques are much
grander. The Lowentin Lake is just south
of Lotzen, and if there has been fighting
along any portion of it then there has been
fighting in the immediate neighbourhood of Lot-
zen ; but it is remarkable that no Russian official
news should apparently exist upon the subject.
Lotzen, it may be noted, is over forty miles within
the frontier, and an advance so far would, among
other possessions, involve the occupation of the
Imperial hunting grounds and country house at
Margrabowa.
We may sum up and say that on this front our
Allies have, over a front of about a hundred miles,
penetrated the enemy's territory through a zone
of about one day's march, narrowing northwards
to less than this ; but southwards, where the region
of the lakes is reached, extending to much more,
to two or three days, or even four days if the
private telegrams which reached London at the en 1
of last week are accurate. The amount of terri-
tory occupied in this raid is about as much as that
held by the Germans in Flanders, reckoning from
the sea to the line of the main railway and a little
beyond. But the Germans' foremost trenches
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
II.— THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
The effort at the Carpathian end of the line
differs in every possible respect, political, geo-
graphical and strategic, from the effort on the East
Prussian front.
near Noyon are one-third more advanced into and its garrison blockaded by the Eussian armies.
French territory than are the Russians in East The reader will also note the position of Bukovina,
Prussia even if they do occupy Lotzen — and there the situation of the Roumanian population under
can, of course, be no comparison between the Hungarian rule (interspersed, it is true, with Mag-
economic and political importance of the two belts, yar and German elements, which also form, as a
I have seen, by the way, in connection with rule, the wealthier portion of the community),
this German advance into East Prussia, the crit- and lastly he will note the way in which, these
iqism that it would be baulked by the line of the passes once crossed, the roads down them lead
Niemen or Memel. I cannot see how this is the directly to the Hvmgarian Plain, which is wholly
case ; that line is perpendicular to the general ad- without natural or artificial defence,
vance, which is taking place on both banks and Lastly, it must be remembered that the whole
with sufficient forces. Tilsit could just as well be of this fighting is taking place in deep snow, and
occupied from the south as from the north, the under the most abominable conditions of weather,
only advantage of the attack from the north being Now let us see what are the positions and the
that it further embarrasses the enemy and cuts him objects of the two combatants. As to position,
off by railway from the town of Memel and the the Russian line runs everywhere along the foot-
sea, hills of the mountains much as I have marked it,
until the neighbourhood of the Bukovina, where
the Russian line advances much more closely to the
summit of the range, and has, at one moment,
actually crossed that simimit, though not holding
any part of it at the present moment, the furthest
point it ever reached being at Kirlibaba, where
there is no good road. This means, of course,
that the Russians have massed most of their troops
(in proportion to what the enemy had to oppose
to them) towards the south-east. It seems to be
true conversely that the Austro-German attempt
Avould take the form of a special concentration to-
wards the north-west. We cannot know, we can
only guess, but the best guess to make under the
circumstances is that the enemy will put stroug
forces in front of the Bukovina frontier to prevent
its being crossed (indeed, those forces are already
present) and will then make his chief effort across
the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, and the
Volosc. It is obvious what such a swarming north-
ward and eastward from the Carpathian ridge
here would mean. It would mean the attempt
to relieve Przemysl and (that eternal objective in
all this fighting for months) the pushing of the
Russians beyond the main railway, Lemberg-
Przemysl-Tarnow, by which alone an army in
Galicia — particularly in a winter campaign — can
live.
Which of the two forces has the better
chance of success we cannot yet possibly deter-
mine. We know that Germany has lent at least two
corps ; we know that Austria-Hungary has called
up the heaviest force she can possibly spare ; we
can safely conjecture that pressure upon Serbia
has been removed (I believe the information
upon it to have been false, as I said in these
columns a week or two ago) ; we know that so far
the pressure has been strong enough to prevent a
further Russian advance into the hills, and, up to
the time of writing — Tuesday evening — that is all
we know. The near future will tell us both whether
Russia alone can force any of the passes and also
Avhether Roumania will come in, in time. But
note this. If the Russians do force in any numbers
any one of the passes they have done the trick, for
in this field alone they have better lateral commu-
nications by railway than the enemy, and the
country beyond the hills is vulnerable in the
extreme. Put a Russian Army, for instance,
marching down the valley of the Szamos or the
Bistritza, and quite certainly the enemy's forces on
The length of the whole curve, which is the
first element to consider, is from the Donajec to
the Bukovina, not very far short of 300 miles.
Next, the 300 miles are not a uni-
versal front across which the general action may
stray; they are, for strategical purposes, a series
of defiles, which defiles are the passes over the
moiintain. There are six main passes from the
Roumanian frontier to the basin of the Donajec,
and the railway is carried across the range in
no less than four. These main defiles are in their
order the Dukla, the Lupkow, the Uzsok, the
Volocz, the Delatyn, and the Borgo, which last lies
in the knot of the mountain system, where Rou-
mania and the Bukovina and Hungary meet. The
reader will note upon this line the position of
Przemysl. It lies about forty miles from the sum- all the northern passes — leaving no more than just
mit of the range and about one-third of the way enough to hold them — will turn back south to chal-
alpng the whole curve. It has long been isolated lenge the invaders of Hungary.
5*
LAND AND WATER
February 6, 1915.
THE WESTERN FIELD.
IN the western field there has been a series of
those attacks and counter-attacks which
have upon the side of the Allies the object
(and upon the whole the result) of slowly
wearing down the enemy's numbers in
greater proportion than the losses sustained
against them, but the actual movements recorded
have been quite insignificant and merit neither
illustration nor particular analysis.
The most conspicuous have been the very
violent attack in the region of La Bassee, the cap-
ture of the big dime or sand hill just east of the
river outside Nieuport, and the rather heavy work
in the Argonne, in which one line of French
trenches was taken and the French lost ground for
about two hundred yards.
The most remarkable point about these various
engagements has been perhaps the heavy German
loss connected with the days immediately preced-
ing and coincident with the German Emperor's
birthday.
It is not a very great matter nor a very mate-
rial one, but it is curiously worth watching on the
part of any student of this war, that the enemy
adds to his high military efficiency little marks of
superstition or non-military motive which throw
an interesting light upon his psychology of war.
One cannot imagine a modern French com-
mander acting in this fashion or in that because
it is July 14tli or the anniversary of Austerlitz,
but we have the Germans crossing the frontier
on the same day and hour as in 1870; making
Sedan Day coincide with the daring (and luckily
disastrous) march across the Allied front near
Paris, comparing a brigade action with Gravelotte
" because it had the same frontage in kilometres " ;
and now wasting a number of men in three days
which had no direct military significance, but
which happen to coincide with the Emperor's
birthday : as though it were part of the business
of war to give one's commander-in-chief a present,
and that present a sacrifice.
It is not vnse to ridicule too much this not
logical and not material sentiment in war : this
touch of superstition. One certainly cannot con-
nect it with rational plans, but no one will deny
to the enemy a great excellence in drawing up and
maturing such plans. The touch of non-rational
motive which you find added to such plans, both
by individuals-and by nations, usually connotes a
high exaltation of feeling, and it is an indication
of the enemy's mind which must not be neglected.
We shall probably find examples of it recurring in
the future of these campaigns. If it is exagge-
rated it wlU be all in our favour.
The capture of the great dune will prove of
importance if it gives the Allies a sound gun posi-
tion. That it does so as against the plain to the
east is obvious. The Dunes run in this region be-
tween the main road and the sea, and behind the
main road is a flat, cultivated and pasture country
full of water, meadows and ditches and traversed
by the main canal between Nieuport and Ostend.
(From any conspicuous one of these numerous sand
hills, once its simamit is occupied, there is a clear
range eastward as far as, say, Slype, 7,000 yards
away, and southward well beyond St. Georges.
But what one cannot tell, what no one can tell
unless he is on the spot, and cannot always tell
then, is the relation of the position to other posi-
tions amid these tangled heap.? of sand bound to-
gether with coarse grass, which line the whole of
that coast for fifty miles. It may be that the posi-
tion here captured is of such importance that it
will permit a steady advance eastward along the
main road, more probably it will meet opportuni-
ties of resistance eastward among the low heights
of the same formation and will not seriously ad-
vance our offensive upon this extreme flank of the
enemy.
The fighting m the Argonne bears out what
was said in these notes last week : that the enemy
would continue to make vigorous efforts in the
woods west of Verdun, because one part of his
plans must be the attempted investment of that
fortress when he can bring up his new formations.
Perhaps it would be more accurate to say : " Be-
cause one of his commanders is advising the ulti-
mate attempt to procure such an investment " ; for
there is and will continue to be upon the side of the
enemy a series of disconnected plans each depen-
dent upon a different commander. That is quite
evident from the way in which for now three
months the enemy's energy has been spent upon
one point after another, not only as opportunity
seemed to suggest, but as individual Generals ob-
tained the ear of the chief command, or were left
free to act each in his ovv^n region.
Beyond this there is nothing to be said wifeh
regard to the western field at the moment of writ-
ing— Tuesday evening.
THE COMING GERMAN OFFENSIVE
IN THE V* EST.
Although it is true that nothing is less easy to
forecast than tiie course of a v/ar, yet there are
sometimes circumstances in which one can be fairly
certain of the general course which warfare will
take when a particular campaign has reached a
certain point in its development.
For instance, when one of the French armies
was contained in Metz (in 1870) by the Germans,
and the only other regular forces the French pos-
sessed had been captured wholesale at Sedan, it
was so obvious that the next German move would
be an advance on Paris that no one concerned with
the defence of the French allovred for any other
issue.
The next development of our enemy's plans is
not quite so obvious as that ; but it is fairly clear
that this next move will be a very heavy assault
upon the western line in the hope of breaking that
line.
The reasons for this are fairly obvious; the
enemy is aware that the French are working with
a large strategic reserve. He is also aware that
Great Britain has, more and more ready day by
day as equipment increases and as training is per-
fected, another reserve consisting of new forma-
tions, and one which in future can grow, not in-
deed indefinitely, but up to limits far beyond what
was expected in Germany v.'hen the war broke out.
His total reserve of men is not2^-million. Many
converging lines of proof and reports which are
believed to be reliable in the West combine to put
the German "disposable" reserve which has not
yet been put into the field at no more than two.
6»
February 6, 1915.
!L'AND AND WATEE
million of men. The enemy is not certain cf the
quality of the British new formations, or of their
rate of equipment. Sometimes he seems to make
calculations upon these too favourable to himself.
But what his real judgment is we can hardly tell,
because we only hear the official accounts put
forward to affect opinion within Germany itself
and to affect the opinion of neutral countries.
At any rate, he knows that if he allows too
long a delay to pass he will be confronted in the
[West with bodies superior in number to his own,
and against a superiority of number he believes it
impossible to contend ; his whole theory of war is
based upon the certitude of a numerical superi-
ority. This superiority he still maintains; he
knows that he will not now long maintain it.
Therefore he must fight.
He must fight rather in the West rather than
in the East for the following reasons : —
1. All the resources of the future in every-
thing but unequipped men are to be found in the
iWest.
2. His efforts upon the East have failed to
attain the objective of Warsaw, but they have suc-
ceeded in keeping his enemy there at bay. And
he may presume upon the rigors of the climate to
prevent any considerable pressure being renewed
upon him in this quarter before the spring. This
calculation may not be a wise one ; an exceptional
period of very hard but very clear and windless
weather would probably permit successful action
by the Russians on the extreme north of their line.
Such action they are contemplating already, but,
take the line as a whole, and it is improbable that
the enemy believes in the danger of serious peril
from the East before the spring.
3. Upon the West, on the contrary, he can
shortly come, say, after the next six weeks upon
drier weather and upon a better chance for attack-
ing. This is particularly the case in the more
inland parts of the line, and the mention of this
leaves us to consider where that effort may come.
There are five main fields of action in the 400-
mile line between the Swiss mountains jand the
North Sea.
which is Verdun, because the southern part is
blocked by Epinal, and because near Verdun aloaai
of the great fortresses are the Germans threaten-
ing, an action in which would first require the in-
vestment of Verdun.
3. Next you have the open Champagne dis-
trict west of the Forest of Argonne.
4. Next comes the "elbow" of the line, the
Soissons district and all its neighbourhood to the
north up, say, as far as the Albert-Arras region.
5. Lastly, there comes from this Albert- Arras
region to the sea what may be called the Flanders
district, including, of course, much territory that
is not within the limits of Flanders.
Now, it is absolutely impossible to say wliich
of various opportunities an enemy will take. The
whole business of generalship is to prevent an
opponent from guessing what you are to do next.
But we can examine these five sectors so tliat,
when the shock comes, we may be able to estimate
its chances, and at the same time to judge where
the attack would seem to be most dangerous. Let
us take these five sectors one by one.
1. First and southernmost is the district pro-
tected by Belfort and the southern half of the
[Vosges Mountains.
2. Next we have all that region the key to
1. To attack in mass with their new forma-
tions upon the sector of Belfort would have one,
and only one, advantage; the success of such an
advance would be followed by the turning of the
whole French line. It would be necessary for the
southern portions of that line to fall back as a
whole to some such line as A-B ; it would iincover
Nancy; it would turn the barrier fortresses; it
would isolate or uncover Verdun. Judged in terms
of its difficulty, however, and not in terms of its
advantage, it would be the most hopeless of
achievements of all the tasks the enemy could pro-
pose to himself. The Vosges are an obstacle across
which only heavy and prolonged fighting woidd
carry the offensive. They were abandoned last
summer, and have had to be painfully recovered
by the French only because they were turned upon
the north. After the battle of Metz, in the region
X, in the last ten days of August, the country to
the west of the northern end of the Vosges was in
the hands of the enemy, and the French line had
7^
LAND AND WATER
February G, 1915.
to fall right back from the crests of the mountains,
as along the arrow, the original French line being
A-B before the battle and C-D after it.
But we are supposing for the purposes of this
analysis a new German offensive undertaken with
the fullest strength available against one sector of
the line. If these new formations should attempt
too wide an advance, if they should try at once to
attack the first sector from the cast and to turn it
from the north they could not succeed. The main
-battle would inevitably develop upon the northern
front, and the French from within the angle could
concentrate there very much more rapidly than
'their opponents. The thing could only be done at
the beginning of the campaign, and with the ad-
vantage of complete surprise at this stage of the
war, where every party to it has learned by heart
the nature of the fight, that surprise, where a large
body of men were concerned, would be absent.
South of the obstacle of the Vosges the first
-sector only consists in the narrow gap of Belfort,
and Belfort is not only among the strongest of the
fortresses, but has had six months of leisure in
which to develop the new character of siege work :
to establish temporary and concealed batteries far
outside the old permanent works, and to design a
covering trench work all along the eastern half of
the circumference of greatly extended fortified
zone.
Whether the enemy will think the advantage
of breaking the French line here great enough to
counterbalance the vast difiiculty of the task, and
therefore v.orth while, only the future can show.
2. The second sector, which may be called the
sector of Verdun, was already marked in these
notes last week as that in which the principal
German effort, when it came, might very probably
be made. It has at first sight no conspicuous acl-
vantages ; it involves the reduction of what must
have become in the course of the last few months a
most formidable new system of defence, and pro-
gress could not be rapid or dependent upon sup-
plies. While it was taking place, moreover, the
French should have ample time to concentrate.
But when one looks a little more closely at ths
problem one may well believe that the Verdun
sector would especially attract the enemy.
Apart from the general considerations men-
tioned last week, there are special points well
worth remarking.
(a) The enemy has here very short and very
excellent lines of railway communications, as along
A-A to Treves and Goblentz, along B-B to Spires,
along C-C to Strasburg. Great depots advanced
to within a stone's throw, so to speak, of his objec-
tive, are available at Luxembourg, at Thionville
and at Metz. Very numerous railway lines con-
nect him in a couple of hours with the further bases
on the line, and a network of these running north
and south, as well as east and west, permit him to
mass men very rapidly upon any point of this
sector.
(b) The conformation of the line is already
such that one particular and successful effort
would complete the investment of Verdun. The
enemy holds the v/edge ending at St. Mihiel, and
the line to the north and east of this goes round in
three-quarters of a circle. It is only the remain-
ing quarter, or a little more, that has to be joined
up to effect the enemy's purpose, and he would, did
Qermarj
StMihkl
8*
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
he threaten to achieve such a success, put the
French commanders in the dilemma whether to
allow a large force to be invested upon the frontier,
and so hold up further offensive there, or to retire
while there v/as yet time, and in so doing to give
the whole of Lorraine and most of the Barrois to
the enemy, to abandon the heavy artillery in posi-
tion and to jeopardise the whole line to the south.
One may repeat that, merely as a problem
upon the map, the most ob\'iou3 move for the new
German attack would be down east of the Argonne
on to the main railway supplying Verdun, and
H?e,
lb Paris 8b
Chahnt
and Chi
T^orthira half
ff[che •'
trench Lint
To
Chalont
iad Parit
*^''. Centre
Shoivuig: the mimcrMic Fctticii eotaaunicMioag
tor rapiH concentration at imj point thrtatcaci
in (he rM'nCrant O^rmxn Lint bttwua
St. Mthidand the An^nnc.
Toalottgtht
Southern end
^efthi Freaeh
Line.
thence downwards towards the western bank of
the Meuse opposite St. Mihiel. The counter argu-
ment to this is only what may be seen almost any-
where on the line, the facility for rapid concentra-
tion upon the French side. But this facility is
rather more extended at this particular point than
anwhere else. It is, as a sketch printed last
week and here reproduced shows, a close system
of railway, double and single, of Verdun railway
system, normal gauge and light, and can be fed at
once from all the depots that lie towards Paris,
from all that are drawn up between the frontier
and the centre, and from all that are reserved
further south. There is, perhaps, no point
between the Swiss mountains and the sea where a
larger number of the French reserve in men and
material could be more rapidly put into the field
than the arc now protected by Verdun.
3. Sector of Champagne. Three elements
combine to make the new offensiA'c attempt to
break through in the sector of Champagne — that
is, the open country from Reims to the Argonne.
The first is that this sector is the centre of the line
so that existing troops could be concentrated more
rapidly upon it than elsewhere. The second is one
of those political reasons which have already had so
much effect upon the conduct of the campaign from
the German side: the reoccupation of Keims would
be a success to put heart into the further German
offensive. The third reason is the nature of the
country ; how far the advantages here are counter-
balanced by the defensive character of modern
French work, only those who have had experience
of the latter during this campaign can say. But
CorxL^k
'^ Solssons
^\ THE CaAUPyiC2^E
(
cxistutq G^rmazL
iijtu oFTrenches «
Vitry
c t 0 '^
ll^
X3
9*
LAND AND WATER
February 6, 1915;
the sweep of country from the Argonne to Berry-
au-bac is much the most open in the whole line, and
the soil is one which, though very sodden and difficult
immediately after rain, is fairly quick to dry. It is
the soil in which the Prussian regiments found it
impossible to move forward at Valny, but had
they attacked three days later they would have
carried the hill, for even half a week of dry wind
gives you fair going. In the Champagne Pouilleuse
the earth is a mixture of challi: and light clay, the
obstacles in all this sector are quite insignificant,
there are no woods save a few regular stunted
plantations, and the streams are little white sluggish
things, such as the Suippes, which not even stop
vehicles in all their upper courses.
The drawback to making an attack in force in
the Champagne Pouilleuse is that it has to be con-
ducted in a country where every movement is
observable for miles, that were it successful it would
find immediately in front of it one of the best
defensive positions in the whole of France known as
the " Cliffs of Champagne " and consisting in steep
hillside running north and south from the neigh-
bourhood of Reims right down to beyond the level
of Chalons and to nearly opposite Vitry,
4. The fourth sector, the " elbow " where the
great line of trenches comes nearest to Paris (you
can motor out from Paris to the trenches, spend an
hour upon your message there and be back in Paris
all between breakfast and lunch) looks the most
tempting opportunity of all, but that appearance
is little more than a suggestion caused by the
shape of the line. If the attempt be made
Arra*
/
v^;
X4
here it will be made only because the lure
of Paris will prove poUtically too strong for purely
military plans. The point of a salient like this
is not the best point for attacking a line as a
whole ; if while you are attacking inside the angle
and trying to break it at its point (a) your enemy
with an equal force strikes it on either side as at (b)
or (c) he will imperil you far more than you are
imperilling him, he will be quite certain if he is
successful to cut the avenues by which you live, for
those avenues are necessarily confined to the narrow
area of the angle. You do not, even if you break
through, threaten his communications, which,
especially under the particular circumstances of the
case in question, are at large. He can be fed,
ammunitioned, from anywhere along the open
country behind him, M-M-M and N-N-N. You are
dependent on 0-0-0. It is almost true to say the
first appearance of a great force upon the side
of such a salient is sufficient to prevent the com-
mander of an equal enemy force from proceeding to
attempt an issue through the point of the salient.
Whatismuch more likely, if the enemy j^roposes to use
his new armies in this sector at all, is that he would
move to attack one side of the angle, as Soissons to
the east of it or Boye to the north of it. But
even so he would be acting under difficulties and a
corresponding force striking at the side opposite to
him would, if it were successful, destroy him. The
only advantage that he would have would be that
working inside the angle he could more quickly
decide which side to attack than his enemy could
concentrate for the counter attack upon his flank.
Take it all in all the use of the new German
armies in the " elbow " of the line would be the use
of them in the worst possible place of all the five
sectors. If the gap made were narrow it would be
useless or rather disastrous, and to make it broad
against the convergence of the defence on either
side is hardly possible.
5. The last sector, the sixty miles or so from
the Arras region to the sea, would of course, if it
were the object of attack, reproduce the conditions
of all the earlier fighting. These conditions would be
reproduced with the advantage to the enemy of his
new formations and increased numbers. He would
have the same objectives the French side of the
Straits of Dover and the possible turning of the
French line by the North. He would guarantee
himself fi"om any future danger of being attacked
along his own right flank from the Belgian coast
and in general success here would rank only second
in its military eflect to success in the sector of
Verdun, while the political effect, for what that is
worth, would be much greater. Further, it would
be a local success won after months of effort over
ground the names of which are the household words
of every party to this campaign in the west, the
enemy would hold Arras itself, Bethune, Boulogne
and Calais, Hazebrouck, St. Omer, Ypres and
Nieuport. That is only a moral point, but it is
worth counting. More than one critical authority
has gone so far as to say that the new offensive will
certainly be delivered against this fifth sector. That
seems to me a great deal too strong. , Nothing ia
10*
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
certain ia war. As a mere noathematical problem
Verdun is easier of solution and more fruitful of
result than Flanders ; further, tlie fifth sector is the
last to dry with the approach of better weather,
and lastly, it has been more exhaustively studied
for purposes of defence than any other. But that
the chances of the new offensive being, directed
against this familiar ground are high no one will deny.
It need hardly be pointed out that when ^the
uew German offensive is made (as we presume it
will be made) it must succeed or result in a situation
which will put within sight the termination of the
war.
Germany will be using the last of her reserves.
She will without a doubt, if she attacks at all, attack
to win finally and with her whole force and at any
expense whatsoever. It will not be an effort after
which the offensive, if it fails, will be able to fall
back upon another prolonged defensive. For fall-
ing back thus upon a prolonged defensive means
the awaiting of further reinforcement and the
opportunity for recuperating strength. But after
this next effort no such reinforcement can be
Qxpected upon the enemy's side ; the throw will be
a final one.
This does not mean that the struggle will be
short. It may be prolonged, as the fighting for
Warsaw was prolonged ; or the tremendous (and
happily unsuccessful) efibrt to obtain the Straits of
Dover. The effort may be postponed until the
spring or even the late spring. It may come upon
us before the end of February. When it is at last
in movement it may occupy two months or more
before it shall either achieve success or confess to
defeat. But it is coming ; and when it comes it
will come upon one of these five sectors and more
probably upon the second or the fifth than upon the
first, third or fourth.
A NOTE ON THE EGYPTIAN
ADVANCE.
Though the advance against Egypt has not yet
developed, it is worth remembering by what road
the enemy appears to depend for his main supply,
and it is a point I will develop at length next week
with a sketch map.
That route would seem to be neither the sea
road 7ior the Akaba road, but rather up the Wady-
el-Arish Southward — where there is no serious
obstacle to a light railway and no fear of attack
from the sea — then, from where the Wady strikes
the Pilgrim road, to Suez.
FINANCIAL PRESSURE AND WAR.
T
HERE has been a good deal of talk in the general experience. Your individual or your
last few days of the financial pressure group of individuals not possessed of sovereign
ujion Germany and upon Austria-Hun- power cannot get food or arms without the pos-
gary which results from the present cam-
paign. The point merits attention in
these notes, for, though it is not strictly military,
it is a subject with which every student of military
history is acquainted from the past.
The particular error most common in connec-
session and use of the current medium or the
instruments of credit based upon the current
medium. But the sovereign power can perfectly
well obtain both Avithout the use of such a medium.
Take all the gold away from the enemy and, if it
were possible, deprive him of the power of issuing
tion with this subject is the error that an enemy instruments of credit, you would yet leave the
ca^n be reduced by the lack of what is vaguely
cabled " money"; a term used confusedly in such
statements to mean (a) the total amount of
current metallic medium possessed by the enemy;
(b) this plus the instruments of credit based upon
the metal ; or (c) (much more uncertain) a general
enemy as well able to fight as ever. The only case
in which the possession of the current mediiun
(which in our civilisation is gold) and of instru-
ments of credit based upon that medium is appa-
rently necessary to a nation fighting for its life is
the case of foreign exchanges. And even here the
estimate of all economic values real or imaginary, necessity is not absolute. To appreciate this trutli
in services or in goods at the service of the enemy.
Generally speaking, when public men discuss
the matter, they mean by " money " either (a) or
(b) or both muddled together, and a calculation is
made that because the stock of gold in the enemy's
possession is dwindling at such and such a rate, or
because the instruments of credit based upon that
stock are exchanging abroad for less than their face
value, therefore within such and such a space of
time the enemy, though still possessed of arms,
food, and men, will be unable to continue fighting.
let us see what the current medium does and what
instruments of credit based on it do.
The current medium does not produce wealth
— guns, wheat, cotton for powder, copper for
shells, for instance — it does not even, in the largest
view, create a demand for them : all it does is to
make their exchange easier.
In normal times, and under the regime of
private property, one citizen produces, or controls
a stock of, wheat; another of guns; another of
copper; another of cotton, etc. The man who
That the error is a gross one all military history wants copper may have wheat to give for it, but
proves; revolutionary France (for instance) was
bankrupt, and her instruments of credit exchang-
ing at a negligible fraction of their face value at
the very moment when she was about to enter on
her stupendous career of victory, and to change
the face of the world.
It is an error, I say, to believe that an enemy
can be beaten from lack of this " money " — save
the man with the copper may not want! the wheat.
He may want the guns; and the man with gims
may not want either copper or wheat — he may
want cotton — and so forth. As only in rare cases
do two individual citizens possess each a surplus
of what his particular known to him neighbour re-
quires, some common denominator arises which
all will take as a common standard of value. It
-possibly through some disturbance in tho arrival of reaches that position through a number of chara*-
necessary and foreign supplies — and it is an error ters: permanence, desirability, ease of carriage,
proceeding, like most economic fallacies, from the etc., and in our civilisation that place has been
extension of private and particular to public and taken by gold.
11*
LAND AND WATER
UTebruary 6, 1915^
If the number of transactions in a community The presence of a current medium, even fictitious,
increases much more rapidly than its stock of gold let alone genuine, is not necessary to the continuance
there would be a difficulty in effecting them (inci- of a war or the national life as a whole within the
dentally prices would fluctuate wildly and tend to boundaries of the nation, but it is necessary for its
fall in the most disturbing fashion) were not more foreign transactions unless the government of the
and more of the work done, as production and con- other countries whose citizens aie trading across the
sequent exchanges expand in volume by instru- frontier will consent to be at the pains of organising
ments of credit, that is, by promises to pay, to International exchange, and that no neutral country
which " credit " or the belief that they certainly at peace will be at the expense and trouble of doing
wOl be redeemed when presented generally to oblige a customer who happens to be at war.
attaches. By this contrivance one ounce of gold We may sum up, then, and say that Germany wUl
does the work in exchange of ten or a hundred or a never from failure of gold be exhausted in her material
thousand ; for to one instrument of credit presented power to make war with goods produced within her
for payment in a given time there are always many
in circulation.
So far, so good. In normal times if you with-
draw gpld from the public or make individuals fear
that instruments of credit will not be met there is
own boundaries. But may she not be exhausted if
gold or its equivalent fails her In her power to make
war with materials that have to be imported from
outside ?
To see how far that is likely, let us see how the
a sudden break put on all exchange and therefore citizens of a sovereign power trade with foreigners
on all production.
But if the Government — the sovereign power
— steps in to compel production and to direct its
goods to the consumer, or by an artificial currency,
successfully imposed, supplies the place of true cur-
rency, there may be inconvenience, but need cer-
tainly be no famine in anything the nation can
make.
For Instance, take all the gold aAvay from a
country and the man who makes hats can still
exchange those hats with the man who makes boots,
and the man who makes boots exchange those boots
with the man who grows wheat, and the man who „ ^ ,
grows wheat exchange that wheat for hats with the not send the 1,000 ounces of gold in a bag to the
Take a concrete case. Let us say that there
are in Lombardy (as there are for a fact) large
stocks of india-rubber ; the German armies are
in bad need of india-rubber. The German manu-
facturers export to Italy electrical Instruments
made In Germany. In time of peace the normal
process of commercial exchange is this : the German
manufacturer sells to an Italian importer a number of
electrical Instruments for the sum of sniy 1,000 ounces
of gold (the said 1,000 ounces being called by
difierent names In the dISerent European countries,
but the ultimate medium of exchange being gold
measured by weight). The ItaHan merchant does
n:!an who makes hats, and so forth, there passing In
each transaction neither metal nor the jiromlse to
jmy metal but any symbol such as a bit of paper on
which Is printed the name of a familiar coin. If this
enforced currency be Increased beyond the sum
which would have been used In actual gold, supposing
gold had been present, prices rise, and an attempt
to regulate currency of this sort, based as it is upon
German manufacturer, but sends him a piece of
paper on -which he writes a promise to pay to the
German 1,000 ounces of gold ; and this piece of
paper he sends (or In the origins of the system sent)
to the German manufacturer who supplied It. A
firm making motor-cars for the German armies pur-
chases India-rubber from an Italian manufacturer,
and tends him a piece of paper promising to pay
a guess as to what would have taken place If gold had 1,000 ounces of gold. The sum total of these trans-
been present (a guess that can never be accurate), actions, so far as international commerce is con-
always leads sooner or later to a vast disturbance in cerned. Is that Germany has lost a certam_ amount
prices and an according suilering and strain in the of electrical Instruments, and has gamed an
commonwealth, but still this strain does not kill a equivalent amount of rubber ; whUe tliere hes m
nation, it does not prevent the producer from pro- Germany a paper promise to pay so much gold, and
ducing or ultimately two producers from exchanging, in Italy a paper promise to pay the same amount
If the citizens come to doubt the value of the of gold. Those who deal with bills and other
paper altogether, that is if a man taking a £1 note
suspects that nobody will take it back from him, it is
of course exceedingly difficult to force the fictitious
currency, and in the old days one of the greatest
difficulties a Government had in getting such
fictitious cmreucy to work was the coercing of its
subjects into taking that currency ; but we have
changed aU that. The police to-day are everyAvhere.
A modern government is the absolute master of its
subjects ; not only fiom its vastly increased organisa-
tion but Scorn the nature of modern lethal vreapons,
and we may be quite certain that the modern
government, particularly such a government as that
of Germany, can force a fictitious currency upon its
subjects for a very long period.
But even if it had not this power, even if the
fictitious currency breaks down, there still remains
in the last resource the power of the government to
Instruments of credit compare the two situations ;
they find that the sums cancel out and no gold
jDasses.
The real process Is of course a million times
more complicated than that. The foreign exchanges
ramify through all commercial countries, and concern
not two foreign merchants, but thousands upon
thousands who are continually exchanging and re-
exchanging. The acceptors of bills do not work for
nothing, and their profits further complicate the
affair, while, of course, the deals that cancel out one
against the other are not deals known to a small
circle, but moving as currency does, at large over
the whole surface of commercial life with its mUiions
of individual purchases and sales ; but the principle
Is that which appears in this purposely simple
example, and it will be apparent from that example
that although no Italian actually gets German gold
organise national industry under Its own inspection ha that particular set of transactions, and no German
and to have the stocks of raw material registered actually gets Italian gold, yet lusmcss wouiu not
and taken over by its officials, the workmen set to have been done urdess the Italian merchant .i<id
work upon them, and the finished products dehvered heliev^d that the German could pay hmx gold uUen
where their consumption is necessary. ihe time came.
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
Now, suppose the Italian begins to doubt the cient to continue her resistance and her armed
German's abihty to redeem his promise. It is struggle for a long time.
obvious the German Government cannot step in 3. Wood and materials for shelter : In all
directly. It cannot coerce the Italian, or force its these Germany and Austria-Hungary are abundanti/
currency upon him ; or, still less, make hiln manu- supplied, not for one year or two but for c».er.
facture the rubber and send it to the German army 4. Fuel. In all fuel except petrol the Ger-
motor-car man. manic allies are abundantly supplied not for one
At the very beginning of the strain, from the
moment that foreign neutral merchants were doubt-
ful whether they would really get paid in full, the
exchange would begin to go against Germany badly,
she would have to promise on paper to pay 11
year or two but for a generation or more. It is true
that the main coal supplies He near the frontiers
and are subject to the first effects of invasion, but as
matters now stand there is no limit to the enemy's
supply in this regard, and mineral oil is not a
ounces of gold to get foreign materials for which she necessary fuel save as it is burned in the internal
would only pay 10 ounces of the actual metal, and combustion engines; in other words coal will do all
as the prices went on she would have to promise
to pay not only 11 but 12, and then 12 to 13, and
so forth.
It is obvious that as the strain increases matters
may become very bad indeed, and foreign imports at
last hardly obtainable. The only way out would be
for the foreign Government, acting as a friend,
to guarantee Germany's ultimately paying. But
even if a neutral were to go so far, It would only
affect the narrow circle of exchanges taking place
entirely between Germany and that one country.
There are required for a modern nation
prosecuting a war which covers all its energies,
and is a fight for life, the following main staples —
1. Food.
2. Textiles for clothing.
3. Wood and other building materials for
shelter.
4. Fuel for warmth and mechanical actions
of all kind dependent upon heat.
5. Armament.
These five cat.'gories cover the whole field.
The nation can continue to exist and continue to
fight indefinitely If it has just enough food, just
that Germany and Austria-Hungary want in the
way of fuel whether for their machines or their
warming, and the absence of petrol strikes only at
our next category, armament.
5. Armament. It is only in this category of
armament that we find the enemy seriously em-
barrassed and a decreasing power to pay for imports
in gold affecting him. With a blockade imperfect,
the financial position of the enemy, though it
cannot ultimately reduce him in his domestic
energies, may embarrass him if his stock of gold
falls, or if his instruments of credit are Inflated ; and
the importation of foreign goods which are neces-
sary for the prosecution of the war may be gravely
impeded.
The armament of a modern nation needs the
following materials — iron and coal : coal for working
up the iron and for producing steel. Without
iron and coal it would be crippled at once. Iron
and coal the enemy possesses in superabundance.
Next, modern armament needs explosives, and our
explosives consisting of various substances chemically
treated, the main propellent explosive is cotton
chemically treated. But, as we saw last week, cotton
can at a pinch be replaced by wood pulp. It would
be a change expensive in time and in energy ; that
expense might be fatal in the midst of a great war.
enough clothing", just enough fuel and just enough but still, theoretically it is possible. Therefore, ui
shelter, and in proportion to its numerous supplies
a corresponding and at least not inferior supply of
weapons and projectiles and explosives.
1. As to food. The Germanic allies have
enouffh food — not enough food to be comfortable —
for a full year. They will not have enough food in
th ■ " ■ •"
the matter of propellent explosives, the enemy can,
though hampered by increasingly bad credit, supply
himself Explosives of disruption, such as you
have in a torpedo or a shell, are composed of
materials which, if I am not mistaken, the enemy
possesses in abundance.
We may take it that no difficulty in foreign
e second year of the war if certain portions of exchange, no financial trouble can prevent tho
enemy from makmg all the guns he wants and
all the shell and all the bullets. We may take It that
at the expense of some strain (which might at the
critical moment of change be fatal) he will get all
the explosives he needs, but there are certain
necessaries in which he is not thus provided ; chief
among them are horses and petrol. The allies
necessary in great quantities to a modern European opposed to Germany have been obliged to buy
nation ; we cannot live in our climates without them ; horses fi-om over sea in very large numbers. Tho
but the German stocks will last a very long time. Germanic powers are not in that position ; they would,
One can conceive that a modern nation which has if they could, buy horses in similar large numbers,
been a large manufacturer of textiles in time of peace but the avenues of entry are closed to them. Even
would proceed for certainly two years even if it if there were no blockade, financial difficulty would
imported no raw material during that time. But as here hit hard an important source of supply.
their territory are occupied before next harvest
notably East Prussia and the Hungarian plains ;
but it is nourishing an illusion to confuse the great
discomfort to which the enemy will be put by
having to husband and to ration his food with true
famine or the actual absence of such food.
2. Textiles. The materials of clothing are
a fact the Allies have allowed Germany to obtain
all the cotton and all the wool she wanted. She
cannot produce all the wool that she needs, and by
no means can she produce the cotton she nec*k3, for
cotton is a sub-tropical product, but if an unsatis-
factory exchange at last so impaired her in these
Petrol the enemy had in equally sufficient
amount so long as he imported freely from Roumania
and so long as he had at his disposal all the
Galician oil wells. The first of these supplies wo
believe to be stopped, though we are not certain
on what date import ceased. The second fluctuates ;
imports that they ceared altogether (a most unlikely his supply is now gravely insufficient, and even if
event) she would still have domestic stocks sufti- no blockade existed the financial strain would
13*
LAND AND WATER.
February 6, 1915.
handicap him in his purchase of this material from
abroad.
Lastly, there is a category of things necessary
to war, which he either possesses only in small
quantities or does not possess at all. We have
already seen in these notes how he stands in the
matter of copper. He is, perhaps, just beginning to
feel the strain here. If the war be prolonged he must
feel it, and even in the absence of a blockade, an in-
secure financial position would hamper him in his
purchase from abroad of a necessary factor in
armament. He needs, also, antimony (which he
does not possess at all) for the hardening of lead,
and he needs indiarubber acutely. It is in this last
item that insecure finance would, perhaps, hit him
worse if the war were prolonged to a second year.
Even in the absence of a blockade, an unfavourable
exchange would gravely afiect his power of purchase
over an article which is tropical in origin, and
nowhere obtainable within his frontiers.
Quite apart from the blockade by sea and with
reference only to their financial position the Germanic
A}lies,'aa their position becomes unstable through the
strain upon gold, this latter will not handicap the
enemy in any of those things vital to the prosecu-
tion of war save horses, petrol, rubber and certain
metals, of which the chief is copper. All these
materials, some of which must be purchased in large
amounts, and notably horses, rubber and petrol,
would be gravely endangered by a really unsound
financial position of this kind. Petrol and rubber,
which are necessaries for modern war, would be
the most afiected.
But if we look on the situation as a whole it is
not true that blunders or unavoidable trouble in
mere financial arrangement will compel the enemy
to peace within a suitable period, certainly not
within one year, probably not even two.
At Devonshire Park, Eastbourne, on February 8, at 3.30,
Mr. Hilaire Belloc will give an illustrated lecture entitkd
" The Progress of the War."
Mr. Hilaire Belloo -will lecture at Guildford on Saturday
afternoon, February 6, and at Queen's Hall on the afternoon
of Tuesday, February 9, on "Material and Matters." Sis
next evening lecture, on "The Progress of the War," is on
February 17.
Mr. Fred T. Jane will lecture at Queen's Hall on Friday
evening, February 26.
Owing to great pressure on our space Mr. Belloc is unable to deal
with " Correspondence " this week.
THE WAR BY WATE
By FRED T. JANE.
BOTE. — Tbli Article hai been iibmttted to the Preee Barean, whlcH doet net object to the psbDcatloD at ceDfored, and tahei no
retponiibllity fcr the correctocii of the itatemcoti.
THE NORTH SEA.
The North Sea Action.
ADMIRAL BEATTY'S further report puts a Bome-
what different complexion on the North Sea fight.
It was apparently not the two-to^one afiair that
it appeared on paper to have been, but a more
or lees equal fight which, had Hipper's tactica
been good enough, oould comparatively easily
have been a German victory — a victory mainly averted by the
fact that Admiral Beatty was the superior tactician.
Reports are atill not full enough for complete comment,
but certain main facts emerge very clearly indeed ; and no
further information that we may ever glean is likely to afEeot
these main facts one iota.
Now, marshalling these facta in chronological order, the
first is that the German battle cniiser squadron was accom^-
panied by light vessels. Since it certainly did not take these
lesser vessels with it for the pleasure of their society, it
fallows that they were taten for some definite object.
For the bombardment of an undefended British seaport, a
light cruiser would be as efB.cient aa a battle cruiser, and a
good deal more economical. In this connection, by the way,
it is important to remember that for many a year all German
naval policy has been along the lines of getting a pennyworth
of value for every penny expended. It is true that in the
Trade War tJio reverse of this obtained; but the blame for
ibat lies with unexpected British naval activity, not with
errors of judgment on the German side. Similarly, the first
Xast Coast raid was a wonderful waste of money without
i«sult — but they did not so regard it. To them it represented
" .We risk x. We stand to gain x + y. Under the head of
|*SfrightiFulness " y will be a valuable asset to us. Therefore
it is worth risking a few 'ight cruisers to obtain y."
In the second end destructive raid, y having been pre-
■nmably easily secured before, they thought that i might also
be incorporated, and they obtained such t as having killed
land wounded a number of non-combatants may represent.
To us this does not seem a military asset, but the German
mind is attuned differently to the British mind, and in a
matter of this sort it is only the German mind that counts.
Now, of the " baby-killer " raid we know two things.
Of these it is fairly well established that it was a battle cruiser
expedition pure and simple, carried out, apparently, without
auxiliaries.
On the third egress the German battle cruisers were
accompanied by a full complement of destroyers and such
other auxiliaries as would be required for a battle. From
this the inference is that a battle waa expected — to take
destroyers out for what Mr. Churchill calls a " baby-killing '
expedition would be a waste of money along tlio lines of the
economical German mind.
I suggested last week that a possible Gei-man objective
was to get battle cruisers out on the trade routes, but I have
no desu-e to labour the point. I will merely say that if that
were their objective they had arranged for it in the smartest
possible way.
We now come to tho preliminaries of the action. Here,
again, the Germans exhibited a very high technical alility
to gi-asp things. When onr light squadron found them and
did not at once turn and ran, the German admiral imme-
diately deduced that a British force superior to his own was
somewhere in the vicinity.
I am somewhat inclined to fancy that the really correct
thing for our light squadron to have done might have been
to do a " cut and run." Perhaps they did. Equally,
perhaps, that gave the show away. You never know. In
chess, a knight that retreats is often more dangerous than
one that advance.s, and in naval warfare you cannot sit down
for an' hour and think things out like you can in chess. The
only possible thing to do is to act on the instant and along the
main idea.
The action, whatever it was, of our light squadron is,
therefore, a matter of minor significance; whatever they did
was bound to be right or bound to be wrong, according to
the enemy's reply.
The enemy's reply was absolutely correct. It was to
turn about and run for it, taking no chances. So swiftly
and well was this accomplished by the Germans that only our
two fastest battle cruisers, the Lion and Tiger, had any actual
important part in the battle, other than the finishing off the
rearmost and slowest German.
The guns per broadside really engaged were as follows :
BRITISH.
Lion 8 13.5in.
Tiger 8 13.5in.
GERMAN.
Derininger 8 12ia.
Soydlitz 10 llin.
Moltke 30 ]lin.
Bldchcr 8 Bin:
Omitting the Blilcher as hopelessly outranged and a sort
of lamb sent to the slaughter^ this gives us 16 British big
M«
February 6, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
-gnns against 28 German guns; of lesser power and calibre, it
is true, and four of them likely to be masked on account of
■iho echelon formation of the turreU of the Seydlitz and
MoUke. Let ua, then, call it 16 versus 24; and since the
16 were bigger and better guns, we arrive at a " more or less
equal." One big hit may do twice the damage of one lesser
'bit. But if the lesser gun is big enough to do serious damage
and can get in twice as many hits, the bigger gun is unlikelv
•to score much ofE it. I do not say that this was the exact
proportion, but I do say that when the Lion and Tiger forged
The Submarine Attack on Trade.
On January 31 three British merchant steamers were
c^tured and sunk oil the Mersey by the German submarine
U21. In each of these cases the usual cruiser routine was
followed, warning being given to the crew to leave, and their
ship then destroyed. This was unpleasant, but it wa,s quite
legitimate warfare.
In the Channel, ofiE Havre, on the same day, two more
mercaant ships were hit and one of them sunk. Accordino-
to an official
aheLl and engaged, the action was the most equJ thing we botrof ttl ^'f''^"'' ^^^ /he French Ministry of Marine.
.h.ve ever seen in thi. war, or are ever likely lo see. Thus ^^l.t, fZ'.t^LVZ tT^.°^^ "^*^.°"^ ^^^'^^S- . I*
<4he second stage of affairs.
The third stage arose when the Lion was "damaged."
The Bliicher (wliich never counted for much) was out of it.
>«nd, coming up astern, was another British squadron fully
equal in gun power to the German one. Deleting one
>©chelonned turret in each case, the respective broadsidea
■were : —
BRITISH.
Princess Royal ... 8 13.5in.
New Zealand ... 6 12in.
Indomitable 6 12in.
GERMAN.
DerfBinger 8 12in.
Sevdiitz 8 llin.
MoUke 8 llin.
The advantage in favour of the Germans, reckoning the
*>>o?er guns, would be four numerically, but their guns being
generally inferior, and some of them probably out of action,
they would be the weaker squadron. Still, as Hipper had
ihe speed gauge of these three British^ships, it certainly looks
■on such evidence as is available as though he should have
been able to slow down, and give the Tiger some serious
punishment, or else inflict more damage on the Lion.
There are four reasons, any of wliich may explain why
35ipper did not attempt to do this. They are: —
(1) That it did not occur to him.
(2) That he was too damaged to attempt it.
(3) That he was obsessed with the idea of drawing the
British squadron into a mine or submarine area.
(4) That he was in a state of wh-at is vulgarly known as
"blue funk."
Now, of these four reasons the first is very improbable
Indeed, because it was so palpably obvious and because tlve
story of the Horatii and Curiatii is as old as the hills.
Against the second reason is the circumstance that the
Germans officially deny our statement that two of their battle
cruisers were badly damaged. In matters of this sort one does
pot do well to discriminate too much between the official
reports of either side — that is to say, it is rank folly to
assume that one side is truthful and the other an unmitigated
liar. By far the safest thing is to assume that the other
aide is " mo<Ierately truthful." And this, so far as the
North Sea action is concerned, we may find proof of in the
fate of the Bliicher. She was hammered and hammered till
she was more or less out of action ; but it took a couple of
torpedoes from the Arethusa to send her to the bottom. A
vivid illustration of the old motto of the torpedo school : " A
gun cannot sink a ship 1 " On which account I incline to
the opinion that we damaged the Germans a good deal less
than we think, and also somewhat more than they admit.
War is not a matter of " glory headlines " in the halfpenny
Press, but of arriving at as near the actual truth as possible.
f)ut of all of which I am inclined to fancy that Hipper could
have slowed and closed and done extra damage had he
desired to.
Tlio third reason — that of drawing the British into a
trap — is, I fancy, the most probable of any. It represents
the integral idea of Teutonic notions of naval warfare. I
have not seen much of them at naval war game, but such little
as I have seen has always been influenced by some such idea,
as being considerabl}' superior to any stand-up fight. It is
-^to a certain extent. But its weak point is that it pre-sup-
poses a certain amount of stupidity on the other side — a
dangerous assumption to act on.
The fourth reason ia permissible. It is to be deduced
from the wild firing at nothing of the first East Coast raid ;
irom the hurried and wild bombardment of Wliitby in the
second raid (when British ships were known to be approach-
UigV But I think wo should discard it, if only for the reason
that it 18 blank folly to assume that the enemy is inferior in
courage or determination to win.
When the war is over and tlie books are opened, and all
is known, I think we shall find that we won and Germany
k>st the "battle cruiser action of the North Sea" because
Hipper was obsessed with the idea of getting something for
»othing out of drawing our ships over a submarine or mined
area, and because Beatty, as the superior tactician, was able
V> fathom that idea. In short, it was rather an affair of
Beatty versxis Hipper, than an affair of a certain number of
British ships against a certain number of German ones.
chanced that the crew of the sunken ships were saved, as
some French torpedo craft happened to be about. But this
in no way excuses the act, which was a deliberate attempt to
slaughter non-combatants without warning, and so comes
under the head of " piracy." It is to be hoped that should
the crew of this submarine ever be captured there will be no
false sentiment about making them prisoners of war. Thej-
should be tried, and, if condemned, hanged as any ordinary
pirate would be.
That submarines were in the Channel we have long
Imown, as we have had experience of them before, but that
they should have got into the Irish Sea is certainly un-
expected news. It throws a marked sidelight on reports
which have been current as t« mysterious signals and lights
which have been seen on the Welsh coast. Signalling there-
abouts seemed pointless, and so the stories were not generally
believed. Now, however, it certainly looks as though a sys-
tematically^arranged campaign was being indulged in; and
the lights are probably intended to indicate to German sub-
marines the places where supplies have been smuggled in iu
the past.
Tliere is only one recorded case of any trace of sup-
plies having been discovered near any spot from which sig-
nalling has been reported. That was an empty ten-gallon
drum of petrol; but aa all the German submarines burn
heavy oil, it probably had no connection with the war. It
stands to reason that the enemy would not be so indiscreet
as to signal from the place where the stores actually were,
but adopt some code to indicate that the stores were so many
miles away in one direction or another.
A really systematic search of all likely hiding places,
including lonely and deserted buildings, outhouses, sandy
dells, etc., could be carried out by the civil population
along the coasts, who might be enrolled as special constables
for that purpose. Or for that matter, Boy Scouts could bo
employed, as part of their training is the search for hidden
objects, and algo Boy Scouts have a wonderful trick of
nosing out things which do not strike other people.
It was a Boy Scout who some years ago discovered a
German who had been serving in the British Army for two
years under an English name, and about whom no one
luid the remotest suspicion as to his nationality.
In any case, one main point is clear. It is absolutely
impossible for a German submarine to reach and maintain
itself in the Irish Sea for more than about twenty-four hours at
the very outside, and when the problem of having to get
home again is taken into account this seems an exaggerated
proposition. The distance from Heligoland to the Mersey is
roughly about 800 miles — perhaps a little more for a sub-
marine compelled to observe secrecy. There and back call
it 1,000. The maximum radius of V21 is 2,000 miles. At
the very best, allowing for lying by and everything, that
could not possibly give her more than three days in which
to operate. Allowing for contingencies, twelve hours would
bo nearer her actual limit, and even this is a generous cal-
culation.
Economical speed, on vhich the endurance calculation?
lire made, is, however, a slow speed, and at that a result
achieved under the most favourable conditions. One way
and another we arrive at the fact that while it is just physi-
cally possible for U21 to get oS the Mersey and returfi
home, there- are very material possibilities against her re-
maining off the MMTsey for more than an hoar or so without
aid from outside.
Now all the evidence is to the effect that she must have
remained there for considerably longer than the possible
period.
We must discard all theories about an intention of re-
maining to do as much damage as possible, and then sur-
rendering— for one ren.son that her supply of torpedoes or
explosives is necessarily very limited ; for another, that
such a policy would result in the extinction ot all the
German submarines without much more loss to the British
Mercantile Marina tL.ia was achieved single-handed by the
Hmden.
A priori, therrfore, there are stores and supplies some-
where— either on the Welsh coast or on the Irish coast, or
possibly on both. Maybe, also oa the Isle of Meo, «ince
15*
LAND AND WATER
February 6, 1915.
U21 insisted on some of its victims being sent there. Blufi
ia as frequent in the great game of Wax as it is in the game
of "Poker."
In any case, it seems abundantly evident that either
on our own coasts or adjacent thereunto in our own waters,
the German submarines must have some bases of supply..
The surest defence fgainst them is not to seek for needles
in hay, but institute a systematic search for every possible
base. Deprived of these, the German submarine corsairs will
soon^ become helpless.
THE BALTIC.
The Russian Navy has not been long in demonstrating
that winter is no bar to its activities. On January 25 the
small cruiser Gazelle was submai-ined off Rugen, where she
was patrolling.
Though only a small vessel, the torpedo failed to sink
her, and she was towed into Sassonitz by a ferry steamer.
The Gazelle was an old vessel of small size and little
fighting value. However, she was well fitted up for the work
she was engaged on, so her disablement is useful to the
Allies.
The submarine probably came from the Aland Islands,
which are quite 500 miles from Rugen. This fact, coupled
with the weather conditions, will probably have a consider-
able moral effect on the Germans, who in the past have had
a tendency to regard the Russian submarine service as inefiB-
cient.
It is officially announced that on the 25th a Zeppelin
dropped nine bombs on Libau, and was then brought down
by gunfire.
THE ADRIATIC.
Certain correspondents want to know why the French
Fleet is so inactive in the Adriatic. It is suggested that if
the Austrian battle fleet will not come out, then the French
Fleet should bombard Catlaro.
Now early in the war there was a bombardment of
Cattaro, but it produced little effect, and so was discon-
tinued. Had Cattaro fallen, all the other bases could have
been captured, but there would liave been a twofold danger
in the attempt: in the first place from submarines, and
in the second place, of being caught with depleted maga-
zines, just as Persano v.as caught by Tcgethoft at Lissa.
That little studied naval campaign of fifty years ago probably
Influences profoundly the present situation.
To attempt a serious bombardment of a strong position,
with a "fleet in being " no great distance away — a fleet
which, though inferior, is not more inferior than was that of
Tegethoff to Persano's at Lissa — is to court a French replica
of the Italian disaster in the past.
The policy of the French Navy is dull and unexciting, but
the object of war is not to provide headlines and interesting
reading for the general public. (It is astonishing how many
people there are who fail to realise this. It is due probably
to picture palaces and " football.") The French ai'e doing
the right thing with their battle fleet, just as our Admiralty
ia doing the right thing with the British battle fleet.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
A. C. (Hamilton, N.B.). — (1) In reply to your ques-
tion, the sea-keeping abilities of British and German sub-
marines of equal date are more or less the same, but with
a theoretical balance in our favour, because our boats are
generally larger. On the other hand, as the Germans un-
doubtedly employ mother ships under a neutral flag, and as
we consider it beneath our dignity to play a similar trick,
their actual sea-keeping quaJitiea are probably twice thai
of ours.
(2) As boats ceteris paribus Qur submarines are certainly
superior to the German class. " ^
(3) The Germans have undoubtedly displayed very greati
daring with their submarines, but if you investigate you
will find that this daring is mainly confined to four or five
boats which have done all the work to date.
(4) As regards the relative merits of big ships, the
modern British warship is superior to the Gennan in the
matter of offence. In the matter of defence, that is to say,
avoiding being hurt, the advantage rests with the German
ships. Our theory is to hit the enemy so hard that he
cannot do any hitting back. The German theory is to be
able to take almost unlimited punishment and trust to luck
that the relatively feeble reply hits will eventually achieve
victory.
(5) 1 do not think that the fact of the men appearing
on shore with the name of their ship on their caps is likely
to give anything away to the enemy. For example, it might
be a blind; it might be that they had just been relieved by
another crew and had not time to change their cap ribbons,'
or they might have been suddenly drafted to another ship.'
(6) I think that we would be well advised to be caieful
about accepting stories of German treachery. In the Franco-
German War of 1871 nous sommes trains was the undoing
of the French troops in many a battle.
^ A. F. K. (near Bath).— We, all of us, find the Censor-
ship troublesome. Occasionally the Censor's operations hava
turned a reasoned argument into seeming drivel. On the
other hand, it has to be remembered that the Censor works
on inside knowledge, and is seldom, if ever, in a position to
explain his reason for suppressing certain information. Aa
you are an Oxford man, may I refer you to the history
of the Peloponnesian War, and request you to ask yourself
whether the Athenians would not have fajed better if the
democracy had been kept less informed about the course of
naval operations. It is possible, of course, to cite one case
in which the pressure of nontechnical public opinion did
lead to an advantage, but against this I think there are many
in which the reverse obtained.
A. E. J. (Redhill). — Comment on the matter to which
you refer is not permitted by the Press Censorship.
P. E. B. (Broadstone). — There are plenty of small craffi
patrolling looking for submai'ines, but a submarine is a diffi-
cult fish to catch.
E. (Uckfield).— (1) It is the fortunes of war that the
small craft which have to do the spade work rarely get into
the limelight. Occasionally, as in the case of the ArctJiusa,
they do, but, generally speaking, it is necessarily the big
ship which is equivalent to the star actor.
(2) As regards the official reports of the Falkland Islands,
there is probably some good reason for this being withiicld.
(3) The third matter to which you refer is better not dis-
cussed in print further than I have already dene.
A. P. 0. W. (Highgate). — Your idea is quite sound, but
60 far as I know, it is already in application. You will under-
stand that to discuss it is not to the public interest. It
is extremely important in this war to kill the enemy without
letting the enemy know how and why he has been killed.
H. S. J. (Saundersfoot). — I commented on the matter to
which you refer several weeks ago, but it was deleted by the
Censor. If it is now allowed to be published, you will see
my views on the matter as then written. If you do not see
them, you will understand that the fiat of the Censor is etiU
against publication.
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Vol. LXIV No. 2753 SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1915 [r#i4l?pi^PElt'] ^""'^^ sixpence
PUBUbHEL) Wl,EJi.l.i
Copyright. W. & D. Doviuy
QUEEN ALEXANDRA
Under whose Patronage the Field Force Fund is appealing to
our readers this week with a novel suggestion for assistance
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 191 5
Published To-day!
THE
MAPo/?A<?WAR
DRAWN UNDER THE DIRECTION OF
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having special refe^'ence to Mr Bellocs remar^
able weekjy War Analysis in LAND &^ WATER
Special Features of
the Map
THE MAP is 33" X 41 1" in size, and is in eight colours.
— Belligerent areas are shown distinct from neutral
countries. — The Map indicates only those places
which are likely to be mentioned in war news and
despatches ; it is therefore clear and easy to study. — In addition,
it indicates the political boundaries, — fortified zones, — rivers, — •
hilly countries, — mountain passes, — marshes, — fen-lands, — rail-
ways,— roads, — canals, — industrial areas, all these features are
shown in different forms and colours, so as to be readily
distinguishable.
The whole Map is divided into 2-inch squares, representing
roughly 100 miles each way, so that approximate distances
from one place to another may be calculated immediately.
Each square has a separate number and letter, and places falling
within each square are specially indexed with such number and
letter, so that any place may be found immediately by reference
to the Index.
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rr
LAND AND WATER
Mar Xec tares
" But all mankind's concern is charity."
A NOVEL and interesting scheme has
been inaugurated by the Committee of
Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund.
It has been arranged through the
medium of Land and Water that clergymen,
Members of Parliament, schoolmasters, members
of local committees, and other public speakers,
shall have the privilege of giving as lectures in
aid of this fund the valuable articles which have
appeared in this paper since the commencement
of the war on the operations of the war by Mr.
Hilaire Belloc — whose masterly criticisms of the
" War by Land " have been so favourably noticed
in high military circles — by Mr. Fred. T. Jane,
the great naval expert on " W'ar by Water," and
the interesting and practical suggestions on
" Tactics and Strategy " by Colonel F. N. Maude,
C.B., together with questions dealing with aero-
nautics from the able pen of Mr. L. Blin Desbleds.
These lectures will be illustrated by lantern
slides of the maps, plans, and diagrams which
have appeared in the articles from week to week.
There will be no charge whatever made for these
privileges, but the only condition qualifying the
offer is that a charge for admission to the lecture
will be made or that a collection be taken and
that the proceeds shall be allocated to the Queen
Alexandra Field Force Fund. The lectures,
lantern slides, and the advertising matter will be
supplied free of charge.
By this means those who are unable to serve
the empire in the firing line are given a great
opportunity to help our gallant troops at the
front, whose needs are increasing dailv. There is
little doubt that such a series of lectures will be
an instantaneous success, as the articles from the
pens of the above-mentioned writers have been
acclaimed b}- the Press as the finest contributions
to the literature of the war. The subject matter
of the lectures is dealt with in such a lucid and
fascinating manner that, whether in town or
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In every parish in the United Kingdom there
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where the lectures may be held, and it will be
found that there are man\^ who will gladly give
their services and do the necessary organising
that will ensure local success.
Such lectures would, apart from helping the
object for which they are instituted, be of great
educational value, and they should be given at
regular intervals — weekly or fortnightly — as the
war proceeds. The profits thus accruing will
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small necessities and comforts which the soldier
so greatly appreciates.
A few words with regard to the Queen
Alexandra Field Force Fund will not be inappro-
priate here.
This fund, which is operating with the
express sanction of the War Office, has for its
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The committee are in constant touch with the
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needs of the men under their charge, so that the
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ments of the men already at the front are consider-
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As can be gathered from the title, the fund
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Particulars of lectures held, the amounts
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LAND AND WATER
February 13, 19 15
OSTENDJ;i
NORTH lombartiyde
DUNKIRK.
SEA
"^ CALMS
o ROUEN
oEvreuJ^
'-Chartnes! o
0x0 at the Front
CONTENTED CANADIANS
\ Sergeant in Princess Patricia's
Canadian Regiment writes : —
At last we are where we wanted
;o be and are contented with our
.ittle lot. Christmas Dinner con-
iisted of bully beef and biscuits and
whatever we could forage. My friend,
Sergeant , and myself did not
lo so badly, as we had 1 carrot,
\ turnip, 2 leeks, 1 onion, OXO,
md 12 oz. of bully beef, with three
bard biscuits, all mixed up and
boiled in a bully beef tin. It sure
made a tasty dinner.
Reprinted from the " Daily Mail"
Jan. 7th, 1915.
Scottish Soldier's cheery letter.
" In one billet our mess kitchen
vas partly blown away with a
■ihell, and the old thatch made a
■omfortable shakedown. Seven of
IS mixed up dinners and messed
>ut of one tin — potatoes from the
jiit, bully beef, OXO and hard
uiscuits — which we enjoyed im-
mensely."
From the Glasgow "Daily Record,"
Jan. 4th, 1915.
lieprinted from " Carlisle Journal,
Nov. 13th, 1914.
' ' Yesterday morning I had 31 patients
— slightly sick, sprained ankles, and
such like. I discharged 12 ot them to
' duty in the afternoon. At 6 30 I had
' to stand ready to get in cases brought
' down in motor ambulances from a
' hospital nearer the front. I saw
' them all in, had hot OXO and bread
' for them, and went up for my dinner,
' got back about nine o'clock, and then
' itftrtad to dxcu the cases needing it
' DMft."
A Strong Support
The reviving, strength - giving
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it is exactly suited to the needs
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in the home.
OXO is made in a moment and,
with bread or a few biscuits, sus-
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is an efficient safeguard against
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OXO Ltd., Thames House, London. E.G.
OXO in the Navy
The two following letters have been
received by the Editor of ' Popular
Science Siftings," 123, Fleet Street,
London, E.G.
From the Commander of
H.M.S." Viking."
The ship'8 company of H.M.S.
"Viking" are most grateful for the
gift of OXO sent by "Popular
Science Siftings." I need hardly
say that OXO is a most suitable
gift for the crew of a torpedo boat
destroyer in Winter,
From the Captain of
H.M.S. "Tiger."
" I should like to express to you
the very grateful thanks of my
Ship's company for your most
acceptable gift of OXO, which you
have 80 kindly sent for their use.
Your present, I can assure you,
will be much appreciated."
From one of the men of
H.M.S. " Colossus."
Having had some OXO sent
me by my brother, who advised
me to write for some more, I now
take the opportunity of writing for
£1 worth. It is grand for night
watches, being taken before we go
on, as it takes such a short time to
make, and must be taken warm,
hence the sustaining power we get."
280
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATEE
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
ROTE.— Thli Article bai been inbmitted to th« Prcii Borean, wbicb doei not object to tbe pobiicatlon ii centorcd and tskci a*
responiibility for tbe correctccii of tbe ttatementi.
la accordance with tbe reQulrementi of tbe Preii Eureaa, tbe positioci of trcopt on Plant Ulnitratinr tbli Article maft only b*
regrarded ai approximate, and no definite (trenftb at any point ti indicated.
T
THE ATTACK ON THE SUEZ CANAL.
HE movements upon either front, even
upon the East, have been so slight this
week up to the moment of writing (Tues-
day evening) that there is little matter
to analyse. But such as there halve been
we discover in the eastern field, and the most im-
portant perhaps of the episodes over that very wide
area is the attack upon the Suez Canal and the
failure thereof on February 2nd.
It seems that the total number of the enemy
that reached the region immediately east of the
Canal, in what the Turks call a Reconnaissance in
Force, was not less than 12,000.
No successful crossing was effected at any
point, save by four men, who were captured. The
operation of bridging at one point (Toussoum,
opposite the Sand Dunes, south of the Ismailia
lake or Lake Timsah) was permitted up to a
certain point and then attacked. The bridge was
destroyed. Much of the bridging material fell
Ismailia
:siaiv
Station
O I 2 3 4 S
I I I I « I
'enaTfUl
'lake Ihnsak
'-} Sand Dimes
\%
to
gics of the campaign is very high, and supposing
that, from geographical circumstances of any kind
the crossing of the obstacle were manifestly impos
sible, while the molesting of it from the easterr
side were easy, then it would still be the business
of any wise commander to maintain a series oi
attacks upon the Canal, although he should have
no hope of crossing it. For it is not the occupa-
tion of Egypt that counts in itself so far as th<
mere progress of the campaign is concerned—
though it would count, of course, heavily as a
prize in the settlement after the war — it is onlj
Egypt as the ground from which the Suez Canal ii
controlled that is material to the large operations
of this campaign : and from the point of view of tht
enemy the complete control by themselves of thai
waterway, though valuable, would not be verj
much more valuable than its increasing interrup-
tion.
Germany and Austria and their Turkish Allj
are already held by sea. Even if the Turkish in-
vasion should succeed in obtaining control of the
Canal that control would have, therefore, little
positive value to the Germanic alliance. But the
negative value of interfering with commerce
through the Canal is exceedingly high.
Much of this country's food, certain of its re-
inforcements, a great mass of its general trade,
is dependent upon that strip of water ; and so has
come to be all that rapid communication with the
vast, foundational, Indian Dependency which, in
the last forty-four years, has grown to wholly re-
place the longer route by the ocean.
There is here a parallel with the maritime
strategy of the enemy in home waters.
Thus, the submarine threat cannot, it is evi-
dent, actually account for any very large propor-
tion of the tonnage entering and leaving British
ports. What is hoped from the submarine threat
is that the sense of insecurity may be so nourished
by occasional and unexpected disasters as to in-
terrupt the regularity of our supply. It is evident
into our hands. The enemy lost a considerable, that this feeling of insecurity can be more easily
though not very high, proportion of killed, effected in a highly circumscribed area such as this
wounded and prisoners, and has now so far retired belt of communication between Port Said and Suez
that none of his troops (we are officially informed) than upon the high seas. It is enough that first
is to be found within a belt of twenty miles from one point upon the Canal and then another should
the eastern bank. be rendered difficult of passage fairly frequently,
Now, the first point we have to seize in con- for all regular traffic through the waterway to be
nection with the whole of this expedition against interrupted. It is this, I think, which accounts for
Egypt is the strategical object in view. the experiment — for it was no more — of last week.
What was the motive of the enemy in prepar- It is probably this which accounts for the employ-
ing and conducting this attack? What will he ment of but a portion of the forces the enemy had
intend when he knows it? at his disposal. And it is this which makes it
It may, I think, be prudently suggested that fairly certain that the attempt will be renewed,
his motive is not simply the occupation of Egypt It is evident that the chief instrument for
and the driving of the British forces thence ; nor merely molesting the users of the Canal would be
his task only the obviously difficult one of sur- heavy artillery. Heavy artillery concealed in the
mounting the obstacle of the Canal. He has also irregular land lying east of the Canal, dependent
a secondary and most important object, which is upon its long range for a certain immunity, and
the rendering of the Canal unsafe in the opinion of occupied both in threatening the water and per-
shippers for commerce. haps in lessening the depth by ruining portions of
The value of this object in the general strate- the banks, would be a very serious menace. Only
1*
Ih^ZcsAM/e^
EAND :a;nd water
February 13, 1915.
those who are at once acquainted with the nature
of the banks at various points and with the pro-
bable effect of heavy shell fire upon them, are com-
petent to say how far this method of attack could
proceed. But it is evidently that upon which the
enemy would rely if it were open to him.
But that it is open to him we may gravely
of the Canal, without too great irregularity, would
have little in common with the regular engineering
of a permanent way. It is astonishing across what
irregularities of soil the old Decanfille lines (for
instance) could be used, and at what pace they
could be laid.
There runs from the point of El Arish upoii
CklRO
r
'doubt; for to bring pieces of any size across the
'desert would probably prove impossible, even with
the use of petrol traction and of a light railway
jto supply the columns. And this phrase " a light
irailway " leads to the discussion of a point which
has been debated elsewhere than in these columns.
Among men acquainted both with the ground
and with the Turkish service, there seems to be a
debate as to whether the laying of a light railway
to aid these operations will, or even could, be
undertaken. As one eminent critic put it the
other day, " The Turks are no great railway
builders." If the task is undertaken, it must be
remembered upon the other side that the laying
of such narrow-gauge fixed rails and iron sleepers,
or cross pieces, as would permit of provision and
water reaching a front, say, a day's march east
the sea coast up to the heart of the peninsula an
ancient watercourse (now dry save towards its
mouth and in exceptional seasons), which takes its
name from the place where it reaches the sea — El
Arish. This dry watercourse of the Wadi-el-
Arish is said, by those who have seen it and
travelled upon it, to afford a fair ground for the
laying down of a light railway; and at a point
about midway between Akaba and Suez (but a
little nearer the latter point), the upper reaches
— or what were once the upper reaches — of this
watercourse touch the Pilgrims' track from Suez
through Akaba to Mecca. The rails might then
follow the track up to a point, say, ten miles east
of Suez.
There would be no need to carry them further,
for we know that the enemy is supplied with petrol
S-fi
■;:- 5
a..> w ■■■'■,.■
W
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Il'»'.l
ii
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l!-lf!t
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" AND WAT EH
nitions But it matters little where the Canal is crossed
steeply so long as it is effectively crossed at any point ; and
Dre the its molestation is possible, and might be long con-
cement tinned, without its crossing being effected at all.
ng the Prisoners have already given accounts of the
jpope. roads by which they came (the northern road is so
aihvay far reported only), but we have not yet sufficient
gulf), evidence of which of the three possible routes will
d with be, or has been, taken by the main force. It is
th, has probable, or certain, that this first attempt was
s to be made by three separate bodies coming by (various
-ibie routes, or at least by the southern and the northern
that routes simultaneously. From the same source —
lean the statements of prisoners — we have evidence that
'sm^atxif^si:iii&*:i£^z-i^mii^'^4
i^.ib^cilB&^fiferf1-i^^*3«fe£t._^^.*^^.l•^_*c.s ,. ^.
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LAND AND WATER.
February 13, 1915.
fail until it had been pressed with singular tenacity
and with corresponding loss. Of the whole line
(which stands at present much where the dots run
upon the accompanying sketch) it was the front,
A, A, just in front of Bolimow, the front most
immediately threatening the city, which was
chosen for this attack. It is not the German point
nearest the city : that is on the Vistula. But an
attack along the Vistula bank is impossible because
of the fortress of Nev Georgievsk, between War-
saw and the mouth of the Bzura, and difficult,
naturally, because the district is a belt of marshy
forests on the left bank.
away, west of Warsaw; and that front has been
maintained for now two months almost unaltered.
The great attack of the other day, in which
something less than four corps (the equivalent of
that with which von Kluck struck at the British
contingent at the opening of the war) massed upon
a front of about 10,000 yards was engaged, did not
The German trenches are here upon the east
of the Rawka — a position which does not repre-
sent any retirement of the Russian line, for the
very slight rise of the ground for some little way
in front of those trenches (becoming steeper as one
goes eastward) gives the Russians an excellent line
upon the low heights that look down on the little
stream. Upon these 10,000 yards or so the enemy
attacked with a force which may have been any-
thing, in its present condition, from 80,000 to
120,000 men, and more probably nearer the former
than the latter figure. The attack was supported
by rather less than 100 guns a mile — no very heavy
proportion for such a concentration — and both the
tire of the German artillery and the massed Ger-
man columns of infantry which were thrown
against the Russian trenches were seeking to effect
a breach only just wide enough for their purpose.
In ether words, they were limiting the hammer-
blow by which they hoped to tear through the Rus-
sian defence to the very strictest and weightiest
form compatible with a permanent success. You
must not strike in too narrow a front, because, if
your breach of an enemy's line is to be of perma-
nent value, it must not be less than of a certain
extent : it must be wide enough for you, when you
have effected it, to have room to turn him left and
right and begin hammering at the ragged edges of
either of the two torn halves.
How near this 10,000-yard effort was to suc-
cess we do not know, because we only have the
account of one of the combatants. For the same
reason we cannot decide what the total losses of
the defeated assailants may have been.
Tlie account which puts them at 30,000 must
almost certainly be exaggerated. Such a propor-
tion of losses out of such a force in sucli a time
would be crippling, and no commander would risk
being thus weakened, unless, indeed, at the most
expensive moment of the action success had seemed
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
So nearly certain as to warrant a local-r-and brief
• — continued waste of men. But though the figure
30,000 may be too high, the losses must certainly
have been, from the nature of the fighting, severe.
It must never be forgotten that a great assault
which fails is tactically, and for the front which it
covers, a defeat. You come out of it not as you
were, but weaker than you were, both morally and
materially; and that in proportion to the effort
you made to succeed. So true is this that in the
case of the action before Bolimow the Russians,
when they had repelled the enemy, were able to
make certain advances; notably just below the
junction of the Rawka with the Bzura, at the point
marked D, and at the point marked K (which is the
village of Kamion). In both these points the Rus-
sians crossed the river and established themselves
upon the further side.
The details of the action are fairly simple.
L
\ f Jh:ues
s
From in front of Skiernievicz (S), past Boli-
mow (B), runs the little river Rawa, which falls
into the Bzura at A . It has in front of Skiernie-
vicz a belt of woods on either bank (marked with
shading on the plan) which stretch all along the
railway to Warsaw, past the roadside station of
Bednary (at Ba) to Zyradov, at Z.
On either side the ground falls gently down
to the Rawa ; but on the eastern side there is a roll
down again to the little parallel stream of the
Sucha, and on the crest of this roll, or rather just
in front of it, covering Borjumov (Bo), Gumine (G),
and the Chateau and Works of Volia Shidlovska
(V), run the Russian trenches. The German
trenches face them, between the crest and the
River Rawa. From Z to Warsaw is about twenty-
six miles.
The Germans massed their guns on the night
of Tuesday last, February 2, on the ridge west of
the Rawa, along the crest I have marked with a
line of crosses. It was a snowy night. Air work
was impossible, and they took advantage of the
weather to concentrate on that narrow front, from
S to not quite A, nearly four corps. That same
night they attacked the positions Bo-G-V-Ba,
grouping their densest force just north of the
woods against V on a section Y-Y, about 3,000
yards in length, or less than a third of their total
local front. All Wednesday the advance made
ground. The Chateau at V was occupied, so was
Gumine, G; while behind the Avoods and up the
railway the Germans carried the station of Bed-
nary (Ba) in a corps-a-corps. Upon Thursday,
February 4, the issue was still doubtful ; the Rus-
sian line still pushed back to the crest or beyond it,
and the weather still a scurry of snow. But on
Friday the tide turned; by the Friday night the
whole crest was recovered, and by Saturday morn-
ing the German line (whose most advanced points
had reached to the dots on the sketch) was back
west of the line of dots and dashes which roughly
represents the present Russian positions.
The massed attack smouldered out on the
Sunday and ceased altogether on Monday, the 8th.
It had, after six days of effort, quite failed.
But the local result along that front (which
might give to the action the name of Bolimow, for
that is the name of the village just beyond the
stream on the slopes in the neighbourhood of which
the artillery was posted) is not perhaps of such
importance as is the indication it affords of the
enemy's general attitude towards his chances upon
the eastern front. This last violent bid for War-
saw means that the pressure in East Prussia is
being felt. It means also, perhaps, that the pres-
sure upon the central Carpathians, to which I will
turn in a moment, is giving anxiety. It is true
that in East Prussia considerable enemy reinforce-
ments have arrived, so that the forward movement
of our ally there would seem for the moment to be
held ; and it is further true that in the Carpathians
the Russians' advance in the centre has gone with
a retirement upon the southern extremity of their
line. But these heavy blows delivered by von Hin-
denburg upon the centre in Western Poland have
hiiherto been directly connected with the desire to
draw pressure off some other part of the Kne, and
it is probable that this last action in front of Boli-
mow was no exception to the rule.
THE SITUATION IN THE
CARPATHIANS.
I said last week that the Russian effort was in
the main intended, when the advance was resumed
upon the Carpathians, to press over near the
Roumanian frontier and from the Bukovina;
Avhile the enemy's object was rather to bring pres-
sure to bear in the central portion, westward of
and south-westward of Przemysl. In the fighting
that has followed, each party has failed exactly
where he chiefly attempted to succeed — and that is
always what happens when you meet a blow by
countering elsewhere, in the set German fashion.
The enemy have been compelled to fall back,
perhaps, over the Dukla, certainly over the rail-
way pass immediately to the east of the Dukla,
because the Russian communiques speak now of
the front passing in this region through Meso-
Laborcz ; and as Meso-Laborcz is beyond the ridge
this should mean that the Russian advanced bodies
are here over the main crest of the range. This
advantage is not absolutely certain; it is only to
be presumed from the wordnig of the communiques
issued by one side, but it is a probable inference.
In the Bukovina, on the other hand, there has
been a retirement of the Russian forces before an
advance in considerable strength of the enemy.
The enemy have not only re-cccupied the heights,
as the summit of the Kirlibaba Pass, but have
passed over the Borgo and have entered Kimpo-
lung.
The double situation, and the change from the
corresponding situation some ten days ago, may
best be seen by comparing the following sketch,
where the Russian line is marked in what is its
5»
EXND KND WATER
February 13, 1915.
i.»- ^assiaii£ut£
present probable position, with the corresponding
line in the same region indicated in the sketch map
appearing last week, which I here reproduce.
Whether the considerable reinforcements
along the Bukovina front, which we know to
include German troops — probably Bavarian for
the most part — include new German formations or
not we cannot gather from the evidence. And that
is. a pity, because our judgment of the future of the
campaign at this stage very largely depends upon
our discovering whether the enemy has begun to use
his new foi'mations yet or not, and, if so, in tvhat
numbers.
It is already more than six months since the
first mobilisation : he must in such a space of lime
have had full opportimities for training, and from
what we know of him he must surely have had them
ready provided with a sufficient equipment. The
more of his new formations that may now be actu-
ally present, or that may have been present in the
recent fighting, the less reserve is there to be used
for the renewed offensive upon the west.
It is possible that in the captures of the next
few days, if our ally continues to press across the
central portion of the range, we shall have in more
detail the evidence upon this very important point
which is at present lacking.
THE WESTERN FRONT.
There is upon the western front in the present
week nothing to record of any importance, at the
moment of writing, Tuesday evening. The front
has fluctuated in no point appreciably, and, save
for the engagement of two or three battalions in
the heart of the Argonne, there has not apparently
been any attempt at a movement.
It is hardly worth remarking that the German
official communique has been at the pains of deny-
ing that the considerable effort made at the end
of January (round about January 27), which effort
was broken with the loss of perhaps 20,000 men,
had no connection with the Emperor's birthday.
It was, according to the German version, no
more than a coincidence. Whether these things
are coincidences or no only has this value to a
student of the war : that if the non-military motivco
at work are as strong as we believe them to be they
are some guide to the state of mind of the enemy.
There is no more in it than that. I forget, for
instance, on exactly what date it was that the Ger-
mans went through the Arc de Triomphe in Paris
after the cessation of hostilities in 1871, but if any-
one will look up that date and see whether it cor-
responds to a particularly strong German effort in
the west it will help him to form his judgment.
Hitherto it has undoubtedly been true that these
almost religious exercises have influenced the plans
of the enemy in some degree.
THE CASUALTIES.
The official returns of the total casualties to the
4th of February in the British contingent of the
Allied armies, coupled with a recent publication of
the Prussian lists, affords a new opportunity for the
comparison of wastage.
Our casualties here will be found to support
the general conclusions which have been arrived at
in these notes with regard to tlie former rate of
wastage in the Allied service and in the enemy's, and
to prove how much heavier is his than ours.
The British casualties are just over one hundred
thousand, and that means, roughly, 25 per cent, of
all those who have at one moment or another crossed
the sea. These figures are very nearly in the same
proportion as those which can be deduced from the
French declaration late last autumn — allowing for
the passage of time since that declaration was made.
It is Interesting to compare such rate of
wastage with the official German figures : but it is
impossible, unfortunately, to accept the official
German figures as the equivalent of the English,
and that for two reasons : First, the GermaDS do
not put down the cases of lightly wounded ; secondly,
there is no compendiary German declaration of
casualties to date, but only the publication of long
lists, which are necessarily imperfect and belated ;
as are, for that matter, the newspaper lists published
on our own side.
The fundamental factor in any such calculation
is the relation of wounded to killed. It has
repeatedly been affirmed in these notes that a
6«
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER,
multiple, certainly not less than 7, is safe. Of
8 men that fall on a large average but 1 is killed ;
or again, if we know how many are killed, then to
find less than seven times as many wounded may
convince us that the lighter cases are not mentioned.
This principle has been challenged by many
critics, but I think it remains firm when one is
considering gx-eat bodies of men, and averaging
losses over many hundred thousands. It is a highly
conservative estimate, as the British figures
prove, and the fighting has not spared the British.
Upon that basis the German multiple, which
was under 4, and is still a good deal less than
5, will not do ; it must mean that the Germans
only note grave wounds (which the relatives of the
wounded men should hear of), and death.
Then Prussia admits in her Usts just under a
million casualties. Many of the entries appear-
ing are so far back as August 20th, and the lack of
any reports fi-om recent heavy fighting in Poland and
the Carpathians justify us in turning that million into
twelve hundred thousand. It is probably more. Next
we must add to this 1,200,000 the lighter cases
(for though these return, as do ours, they are
necessary to the total which we are about to
compare with ours), and add at least 50 per
cent, for these — for if you add to a multiple of
less than 5 in order to reach the very reasonable
and certainly too low multiple of 7, you must add
50 per cent, to the first figures — add that 50 per
cent, for light wounds, and it turns your 1,200,000
into 1,800,000 of Prussian hit and caught, apart
from sickness. The reality is almost certainly
nearer two millions or even beyond two millions, but
we are here deliberately making what is called a
"conservative" estimate, i.e., an estimate against
our expectations or hopes.
Here, then, you have 1,800,000 for the total
Prussian lists if (a) all casualties whatsoever were
included ; (h) all to the present day were collected.
Now to these Prussian lists of aU kinds you
must add the lists of the non-Prussian parts of
the army, which I now take to mean (though
at first I believed it meant more — aU who were
not technically Prussian) the Saxon, the Wurtem-
burg and Bavarian contingents alone. These are
rather less than a quarter, but much more than
a fifth, of the total armed population of the
Empire. Supposing we add 400,000 for these
unknown published extras (which is only just over
22 per cent. — the real figure is nearer 23) and you
get 2,200,000, excluding sickness in any form, for
your grand total.
Now what percentage is that of the men put
under arms up to now by the German Government ?
When we have discovered that we are in a position
to compare our wastage with theirs.
Our wastage, remember, we found to be about
25 per cent.
The men put under arms by the German
Government so far are certainly not less than five
millions. If they have brought none of their new
formations into the field save an insignificant
number of volunteers, then their losses stand in
the very high proportion of 44 per cent, of casualties
of all kinds, excluding sickness, out of the total
number of men they have up to now put under
arms. But it is wise to weight the scales against
one's own expectations and to allow a larger number
than five millions armed to date and therefore a
lower percentage of casualties. But the Germans
have certainly not yet armed six million men. Let
us suppose that they have armed as many as five
and a half miUions so far, then their losses in casual-
ties of all kinds, excluding sickness, will be forty per
cent., and that I believe to be not far fi-om the true
estimate.
I believe that when the history of the war is
written it will be discovered that of every hundred
men put into uniform and given a weapon in the
German Empire fi'om the outbreak of the war to the
beginning of February, 1915, forty were hit or
caught; and I equally believe it to be a just estimate,
which the history of the war will prove when it
comes to be written, that the casualties of the Allies
(in the West at least) are, to the casualties of their
opponents, in a proportion not very difierent fi:om
that of twenty-five to forty.
This great difference is one of the prime factors
in the changed aspect of the war as it proceeds, and
in the opportunity for the Allies' attaining an ulti-
mate numerical preponderance.
If it be asked why this difference in wastage
should exist I think the answer is found both in the
expectations with which the enemy forced this war
and in the method by which he has therefore con-
ducted it, as well as in the tactical traditions of his
service.
To win rapidly, and therefore necessarily at a
high expense of men, was at the very core of the
German plan. To use tactical methods which were
also expensive of men, was a tradition from which
he neither could nor desii'ed to escape, and we know
by his quite recent action in front of Bolimow that he
has not modified this tradition in the least, even
after the exceedingly heavy lessons taught him,
and even though the campaign has now endured
long beyond his first expectations, and has cost
him far more in men and in material than he had
planned for upon his most extreme provision.
Certain consequences follow from this tre-
mendous rate of wastage in which, however, I have
made no effort to estimate the corresponding margin
of sickness. The first consequence is one which
somewhat modifies our view of the enemy's in-
creasing weakness through wastage. We must
remember that about one-half of those who are
wounded can return to some form of service. One
half of the wounded, excluding the killed and the
prisoners, is about three-eighths of the casualties.
Now three-eighths of 40 per cent, is more than
three-eighths of 25 per cent., and the total number
of killed, disabled or caught upon the enemy's side,
is, therefore, not in so high a percentage compared
with ours as on a first view one might conclude.
When you have allowed for the returns of the
lighter cases, you get only one quarter of the
German forces permanently out of the running,
while you get for the Allies on the West between
15 and 16 per cent., or something rather less than
one-sixth.
The next inference from our figures is one that
very closely touches the immediate future of the
war.
We know from past calculations based upon
official lists what indeed might have been expected
fi:om the nature of Prussian fighting that the loss
in officers has been particularly heavy, even heavier
than it has been among the Allies in proportion, and
we are fairly safe in estimating that not far short of
one-half of this professional body upon which the
enemy's service is utterly dependent for cohesion is
now out of the field, that is, not far short of one-half
of those officers employed in the active line and in
1*
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 1915.
command of units, as distinguished from those em-
ployed behind the army and upon the staffs.
Well, the action of the new formations which
Germany proposes to bring into the field has always
threatened the Allies with its superior efficiency on
this very score. The enemy has told us that though
we could raise in the case of Russia and of England
very large new formations limited in amount rather
by the slowness of equljiment than by the lack of
recruits, our great difficulty would be the provision
of a sufficient body of officers. As against the
original force which the enemy put into the field
and with which he proposed to win a short and
decisive campaign that prediction was sound. It
will hardly apply to his new formations now. There
is. Indeed, a carefully arranged system whereby
reserve officers of more or less training are prepared
for such formations, but their value cannot be com-
pared naturally with the professional soldiers who
are now permanently out of the field.
It would be very foolish to exaggerate this
element in the situation, but it is not one to be
neglected. What would perhaps be still more
interesting and what unfortunately we have not
been told is the rate of loss among the non-
commissioned officers of the German service. For
the German service differs from othei's, particularly
fi'om the French, in the way in which these men
are obtained. They are as a body distinct in age
and in outlook fi-om the mass of those v.hom tliey
command. They are older, they are professional
soldiers, they are picked for character and to some
extent for social position. They furnish later the
lower elements of that highly developed bureau-
cratic system, which the modern German Empire
has established to the admiration of certain of its
enemies, to the disgust of others. At any rate
the new formations are still more difficult to
imagine lacking this element than lacking their
proper element of professional officers. For with
all the military excellences attached to the service
of our enemies elasticity and initiative in the lower
ranks are not among them. One may say without
either exaggeration or the fear of that detestable
error which consists in belittling one's opponent
that the Germans could not improvise armies as
Great Britain is doing to-day, or that they would
maintain an improvement under the strain of war
such as the French service has maintained. It
is the corollary of their full prevision, with
its prepared equipment and all the rest, that
the duration of the war beyond its expected limit
and the wearing down of the original military
framework upon which it depended tells moro
severely in the German case than in ours. The
last conclusion connected with this calculation of
wastage is the chief one ; and that is, that progress-
ing as it does at a greater rate than that of their
opponents, the numerical superiority of the central
powers — which they still retain by a precarious
margin — will, if they cannot effect a decision Avithin
the next few weeks, disappear altogether, and that
the gradual equipm.ent of the Russians and of the
new British contingents will at least dip the scale
against them. And we have yet to see how they
vnll meet a campaign under the conditions of
numerical inferiority ; for we must remember that
the whole scheme of German strategic and tactical
traditions is based upon a certitude of numerical
superiority against the enemy, as is their treatment
of permanent fortifications and every other product
of their military mind.
A FURTHER ECONOMIC POINT.
THESE notes dealt last week with the
elements of one side of the economic fac-
tor in war — the real effect of a metal re-
serve, and of the instruments of credit
based upon it to a nation fighting for its
life, and it v/as attempted to be shown that the im-
portance of such a reserve and the instruments
based upon it was very greatly exaggerated by sucE
financiers as have come to consider the mere
economic effort almost entirely in terms of the
certain relation to it. But it is neither parallel
nor equivalent to it, and one nation, spending
apparently far more than another equally wealthy,
may in reality be under a far less severe economic
strain. To appreciate this, let us examine what it
is that a nation consumes of its wealth under the
effect of a great war. A great war consumes or
lessens the vrealth of a nation in two v.-ays — direct
and indirect. It consumes the wealth of the nation
directly by the destruction of existing wealth,
mere medium of exchange. It was attempted to whether when the enemy destroys such existing
be shown that, save in a doubtful case of certain wealth or when the military authorities of the
foreign supplies, our enemies would be able to con- nation itself destroy such existing wealth for
tinue the war even under the strain of an increas- military reasons. Indirectly a great war lessens
ingly adverse exchange. While for internal effort the potential wealth of a country, or lessens its
they were free even if their currency sliould break wealth production for a considerable space of time
down altogether — of which, by the way, there is no because it puts the economic energies of the nation
likelihood or sign. to the production of things not useful in normal
Perhaps it may be advisable in the lack of times, and therefore not usable in consumption
general news this week to turn to another aspect save during the period of war; it further re-
ef the economic question, which is the strain im- duces the economic power of a nation by taking
posed upon the Allies by their present rate of ex- men from the manufacture of things which will
pcnditure. It is a question which has come to the help to produce further wealth and putting them
front lately through the meeting of the various to the manufacture of things which, once con-
Parliamentarians nominally responsible for sumed, produce no further wealth; finally, it dis-
finance in the various allied Governments. The locates the normal machinery of production, and
economic sti-ain imposed tipo'i a nation hy its ex- leaves many producers without a demand for their
pendilure of material darinq a great tear is not to wares.
be measured in terms of the strain imposed upon
its exchequer.
What the public authorities are spending is
indeed some guide to the real strain. It bears a
All that expenditure upon the part of the
national exchequer which is effected under the
headings of the nourishment, the billeting, and the
paying of troops, the paying for service other than
a*
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
milit-ary services, the provision of pensions, of
uniforms, huts, etc., and even the production of
armament ; the hire of transports, of colliers, the
ordering of every kind of material for the conduct
of the campaign, is not equivalent to an added con-
sumption of national wealth. It is merely for the
time being the canalisation of economic wealth into
channels other than those which it usually follows
in time of peace, and what is more, this canalisa-
tion is upon the whole (for the moment only) asocial
benefit ; for it tends to provide necessaries for the
poor and to check the provision of luxuries for the
rich. When you tax a rich man heavily for war
purposes and use the money for producing
uniforms and boots you are, in fact, destroying his
power of demand which would have produced a
fur coat, and using that power of demand to cause
the production of boots and clothing Avhich will
keep a large number of the poorer members of
society from the weather. In the same way, when
you tax a Avealthy woman heavily in time of war
and give high pensions to the widows of soldiers
you are turning what was the power of demand
for a new motor-car into the power of demand for
bread and meat and milk, and so forth all along
the line. A nation that chooses to be generous in
its payment and equipment of soldiers and raises
the money as far as possible from its wealthier
classes is not really " spending " newly apparent
large sums at all.
Of direct destruction of wealth, of direct ex-
penditure, of real consumption in war of what would
not have been consumption in peace, in a word, of
extra strain, you have two forms, — first the destruc-
tion of existing wealth by the enemy or by one's
own forces — as when the enemy dropi>cd bombs on
Great Yarmouth, or when wc dig trenches across a
man's garden on the East Coast : secondly, the loss
which ai'ises from the disorganisation of society,
from a sudden call upon men to do new, unusual
things for which they are ill fitted, and a sudden
cessation of their activities in a field where they
have acquired experience and dexterity. This
dislocation takes a thousand shapes. You see it
most clearly perhaps in the professional classes
and some skilled artisans where there is a gap,
lasting often as long as the war Itself, between
a man's power to produce wealth upon his ordinary
lines and his opportunity for turning to some
new activity. In peace, for Instance, a rich man
was prepared to give a hundred measures of wheat
to a skilled artist who v.ould produce him a
certain piece of furniture, in war the hundred
measures of wheat arc taken to feed the armies. It
does not follow that the skilled maker of the furni-
ture will either be able to join the service or to take
up any other form of production. In which case the
commonwealth as a whole does lose such economic
values as he would have produced had he been
employed to make the furniture.
In the first of these categories Great Britain
has suffered very slightly : far less than any of her
Allies. For there has been as yet no serious destruc-
tion of property either by the enemy or by her
Government for the purposes of war within her
boundaries. In the second category also the expense
has been surprisingly small and the transformation
of society has been effected with comparatively
slinrht friction.
But the Indirect effects which follow upon the
Betting of men to non-productive from productive
tasks Is serious in the case of an industrial country
such as this. There is already an indirect form of
loss through the closing of one great market with
which the industries of Great Britain exchanged.
And since what comes into this island is largel}'. If
not entirely, procured by the exchange of what goes
out of It, and since what goes out of it and is offered
for exchange is provided by labour and capital used
in a reproducti\e manner, the putting of men to
tasks which give, when they are accomplished,
material that can never form capital or be used for
the production of wealth, ultimately lowers the
economic power of a nation : Lowers It progressively
and cumulatively as time goes on, and is particularly
noticeable after the lapse of one complete year,
because it Is within the cycle of a year that
agricultural pi-oduction, upon which ultimately all
economic effort depends, runs through its cj^cle.
You have a hundred measures of wheat which
are your capital. You use them to feed sailors who
take a ship across the sea for you and bring 3'ou
back more measures of wheat. Or you use them in
feeding labourers who till the land for you and this
produces further wheat. Your capital Is used pro-
ductively. But use them in feeding the crews of
transports who take your troops across the sea, or
In the feeding of these troops themselves in the field,
and there does not result from your expenditure
any further wealth. It ends in its consumption.
Similarly, if you burn a certain amount of coal In the
production of an engine for creating wealth, such as
a loom, your coal, thougli consumed, has been an
agent for producing further wealth ; but If you buru
your coal to make a shell, then, when your shell has
been delivered and exploded, the process Is at an
end, and no further wealth has resulted from the
consumption of your product. The conclusion of
any such analysis must be very plain. It Is
two-fold. First the mere figures of national
expenditure conceal the truth and give rise to ac
illusion. That nation apjiears to be spending most
which Is pi'ovldlng most generously for equipment,
pay, and the rest of it, but during all tho
earlier part of the process the total economic
posit icn remains precisely the same as though
tho Government had left the taxes at their
ordinary cost during a time of peace, the real
expenditure being during the first few months of a
gi'eat war. In the case of a nation whoso territory
is not damaged, when a certain time has elapsed, and
particularly after the revolution of one year, a sharp
strain is felt and that strain Increases, because as
time proceeds j'ou discover that your people have not
been producing wealth at the old rate, and ihe
eS'ect of this cessation of useful and its replacement
by unuseful labour is cumulative. When wars are
severe and conqjaratlvely short of duration one may
expect a period of great strain immediately after
their conclusion, but hardly an economic strain
during their jirogrcss When wars are lengthy,
the double strain Is felt of exhaustion In stocks and
of Impotence to replace those stocks. And of course
if the territory of the nation is ra^'aged as well you
come to enormous items of expenditure, such as
have ruined Belgium and a fringe of FranGt\ and of
East Prussia and of Western Poland.
Mr. HiLAiBK Bklloc will lecture on the "Progress of the War" at
Queen's Hall at 8.30, February 17. Ticlicts for this lecture are now
nearly all Bold.
Mr. FttKD T. J.VXK will lecture on the "Naval War" at Qucen'a
Hall at 8,30, Fcbruai-y 26.
Professor V. B. I.kwes -will lecture on " Modern Explosives " (with
experiments) at Queen's Hall at 8.30, March 2.
Schools, societies, etc., should apply at the Hall for special tenna.
8*
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 1915.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
BOTE.— Thli Artlcit bti been isbmltted to the Prcsi Bureaa, which doei not object to the pobllcatloD ai ceoicred, and takei ae
rctpoDiibility for the correctneii of the itatemtnti.
THE NORTH SEA.
THE most important item of news this week is, of
course, Germany's declaration of a " general
blockade " under terms of something very like
piracy pure and simple. If the official German
statement means anything at all, it means that
both British and neutral merchant ships are to be
submarined without warning and their crews left to drown
in a desperate attempt to create " frightfulness." It is true
that certain ezemptions have since been made, but they have
probably only a paper value.
Since the method has actually been put into operation —
even to the extent of discharging torpedoes at a hospital ship
— we must take it as a war idea seriously embarked on by
Germany.
That the Germans regard nothing as sacred where to dis-
regard offers advantage we have long known. But Germany
apparently half-prepared to assert " If you won't be a friend,
you can be an enemy for all I care " is a new proposition. It
is not an unsound one from the German standpoint.
Along the lines on which this war is being conducted it
can make little military difference to Germany whether the
United States be a strict neutral or an active enemy. In her
relations with lesser neutrals the situation is not very
materially difTerent. In the ordinary way — if the United
States indulged in indiscriminate blockade running — a small
neutral state may be inclined to pass on contraband to Ger-
many. But if a strong neutral like the U.S.A. is quarrelled
with, a stopper is at once put on the hypothetical smuggler.
There is nothing left to smuggle withl
Now, so far as the United States as a neutral is con-
cerned, it matters nothing at all to her whether she trades
with us or Germany, provided the profits be the same.
But it certainly matters a very great deal whether trade with
Germany means detention and Prize Court proceedings,
whereas trade with England might entail the chance of de-
struction without warning.
Out of which I am inclined to think that the first result
of Germany's declaration of piratical intentions will be to
Germany's advantage. I do not think that the advantage
will last, because sooner or later German pirates will sink
by mistake an American ship or a ship carrying Americans.
Then, if these are left to drown, there will be serious trouble.
From the military standpoint such trouble would not affect
Germany. The naval odds against her are already such that
she could view an increase of odds with comparative
equanimity. Taking distances into consideration, America,
if involved, could do little or nothing on the spot to counter-
act the submarine campaign.
Indirectly, of course, by the stoppage of shipments
•he could hamper Germany enormously, but it might hamper
American trade to an almost equal extent. Consequently the
Germans reckon steadily on a " nothing doing." And this
probably is exactly what will obtain until they leave a score
or BO of American citizens to drown " by mistake."
Sooner or later, of course, this will happen. Then — but
I am afraid not till then — will Germany realise the analogy
of the pig which attempts to swim and so cuts its own throat.
This will be the end of their submarine warfare against
cur commerce. But it is idle to disguise that they have taken
the last desperate step ; and though every post brings mo half-
a-dozen " ideas " as to how to fight submarines, the bed-rock
fact remains that the problem is yet unsolved.
Eventually, of course, it will be. But it is not accom-
plished yet, and there are no indications as yet that the real
" how to do it " has yet been discovered. It will be. But we
are still waiting for the will-be : and a thousand well-mean-
ing and patriotic civilians who have never been inside a sub-
marine in their lives will never hit oS the antidote. Somc>
day the technical folk will, and then the aspect of affairs will
change. But every single suggestion which has been sent in
is of the "put salt on the bird's tail" order. Many of the
suggestions sent in display a high ingenuity; yet one and
all invariably forget the cardinal fact that by the time the
submarine is located she has probably discharged her tor-
pedoes. The future lies with the inventor who can discover
a submarine at least fivo miles off. He will not do it with
a microphone — ideas on those lines have been tried, and
failed. There is possibly some opening for a camera obscura
able to differentiate between the vertical lines of a periscope
and the horizontal lines of a wave, but only an extremely
smart optician (or someone in some such line of business) would
have a chance of tumbling across it. There is not the ghost
of a chance of any amateur finding out how to do it. And
unless the skilled optician had some very clear idea as to how
submarines work I am afraid that he would do little better
than the ordinary amateurs.
I am strongly of opinion that the British Navy will solve
the apparently impossible submarine problem just as it solved
many another apparently impossible problem in the past.
The swarm of privateers in the Napoleonic wars constituted
a very serious problem, but it was eventually dealt with.
Every bane has its antidote.
For the rest we can only express the hope that our
people will emulate the Russians who, having caught some
Germans dropping bombs from a dirigible on an undefended
town, have definitely declared that they will treat them as
common felons. If we catch any German submarine folk
who have torpedoed merchant ships without warning and left
the crews to drown, it is to be hoped that we will have the
sense to hang them off-hand, and if circumstances admit to
hang them at the yard arm of their trawler mother ship from
which they worked, and to set that trawler drifting for the
rest of the pirates to see I It is true that the prospect of being
hanged in chains did not do much to deter the pirates of the
old days, but it has to be remembered that Captain Kidd and
his fellows operated solely for loot, and that the circum-
stance of being invariably drunk served to render them
philosophical as to their ultimate fates.
Submarined
HAP TO ILLUSTRAIE AEEA OF U2rs 0PEEATI0N3.
The Neutral Flag and Passive Defence.
The fact that a submarine can torpedo a merchant ship
quite unawares is not entirely advantageous to the submarine
or entirely to the disadvantage of the liner. A submarine
lying submerged taking peeps through her periscope,
especially if any sea be on, has very limited vision, and is
somewhat in the position of a sea anemone which has to wait for
its prey to come to it. The odds, therefore, are greatly against
any particular merchant ship coinciding with any particular
submarine. That is why V21 operated on the surface ; it
gave her better vision and considerably more speed.
Supposing the Germans to think better of the full terms
of their declaration about attacking British and neutral ships
alike, it is presumed that by using a neutral flag British
ships would have ample opportunities of evasion.
The ruse would be quite legitimate ; but its practica-
bility is perhaps another matter. It would give the Germans
an excuse for any neutral sunk on the grounds of " suspected
British " and increase the risks of neutrals. Out of which I
10«
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
am inclined to think that, as in the past wars, our trade will
have to he carried on under the B.ed Ensign, and the risks
of such damage as enemy submarines can do taken in the
Bame chapter of accidenis as stray mines have to he taken.
And we shall probably find that the threat is far worse than
the accomplishment.
The North Sea Action.
There is a tendency in some quarters to criticise
Admiral Beatty on the grounds that he did not allow the
Germans to get nearer to our shores and commence bombard-
ing while he cut oft their retreat. Criticism of this sort is
easy on paper ; but apart from the fact that a raid may not
have been the German objective, is the circumstance that the
Germans appear to have turned tail directly they sighted our
light squadron — though here, incidentally, their aircraft may
have spotted our battle cruisers likewise.
Undoubtedly this is the main purpose for which aerial
scouts at present exist, and a fleet seeking to evade action
with a stronger force is probably strengthened accordingly.
In a word, the attack is far more difficult to-day than it was
ten years ago. Before the war speculations to this effect were
many and various. It is curious that what appears to be the
first practical demonstration should have happened without
comment of any sort.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
A. D. (Corstorphine). — If the Germans took the Bliicher
So be a British warship sinking they would have been quite as
justified in dropping bombs on her as we were in torpedo-
ing her. So long as a ship keeps her colours flying she is
deemed to be stiU fighting.
R. K. 0. (Birkenhead). — A periscope is a difficult thing
lo see at the best of times, and no one but a submarine officer
would have any chance whatever of detecting the nationality
of an attacking periscope. Whan boats are on the surface
there is no difficulty whatever in recognising a German boat
on account of a peculiar rise in the bow.
G. S. .W. (Tunbridge Wells). — In discussing the North
Sea action I was guided entirely by Admiral Beafty's state-
ment that the Lion and Tiger were separated from the rest
of the Fleet. Hipper was certainly capable of seeing that,
and equally seeing that the Lion was hit, and had an oppor-
tunity of which he did not or could not avail himself. As
regards the speed at which the battle was fought, it was cer-
tainly nothing approaching the maximum speeds which have
been recorded of the various vessels engaged. Very high
irial speeds have been recorded for various ships. For
example, the Bliicher on her trials reached 25.8, bul it is
doubtful if she could have maintained more than a speed of
23 knots during the chase, and that was probably the speed
of the German squadron.
As regards the more modern vessels, they are all tur-
bine-driven, and speed with turbine ships is somewhat of an
•Insive quantity. That is to say, there is a certain high speed
which can be maintained for several hours on end, and there
is also a considerably higher speed which can be reached
during a short special spurt.
B. S. (Cambridge).- — As a rule, large ships are always
accompanied by small craft. Light cruisers and destroyers
are more capable of picking up a crew in the water than
any extemporised slow vessel would be.
F. W. (Lincoln). — At the time the loop was made the
'Seharnhortt was clearly in a critical condition, and probably
the Gneisenau was considerably winged. Neither ship prob-
ably was in a position to attempt anything tactical. The
loop of the British Fleet was presumably to get clear of the
Bmoke (as stated). Incidentally a ship end-on is more likely
to be hit than one broadside-on, the diSerence between a hit
and a miss being mainly a matter of elevation. Supposing a
ship to have a freeboard of 25 feet, the target ofiered by her
would be approximately 30 feet, as a shot passing at, say, 27
feet would pitch on the deck somewhere on the other side of the
.vessel. The beam of a ship 75 feet or so broad is roughly
equivalent to a vertical target of five feet. Supposing a ship
lo be end-on, instead of the target representing 30 feet it
would for a ship 500 feet long be something like 65 feet, and
therefore twice as likely to be hit.
J. R. C. (Dublin). — The German armoured cruiser to
which you refer is the Ersatz Hertha, which was laid down in
July, 1913. Nothing very definite is known about her, i.e.,
whether she is a sister to the Berfflinger, with eight 12-inch
guns, or whether she carries a lesser number of 15-inch. It
is more probable that she is a sister of the Berfflinger and
'Lvtzoui. In any case, the idea that she can be both faster
and more heavily armed than anything we possess or have
building strikes me as highly improbable, the more so as the
.Gorman practice for the last few years has been to sacrifioe a
certain amount of gun power for the sake of better protec-
tion. Our 1914 Naval Estimates provided for one ship of
the Queen Elisabeth class, and three battleships. When war
broke out there were five " battleship cruisers " of the Queen
Elizabeth class under construction. In any case, the war will
probably be over some while before the Ersatz Hertha is com-
pleted.
Lieutenant (Sheffield). — (1) The Agincourt was originally
the Sultan Mehmet Eechad V . All her guns are mounted in
the centre line, and she is practically the sanje as British
ships of equal date.
(2) The Chilian ships at the beginning of the war were
the Almirante Latorre (taken over), and the Almirante Cock-
fane. The ships building for foreign countries in German
yards at the outbreak of the war were the Greek battle cruiser
Salamis, two small Russian cruisers, Mooraviev Amurshy and
Nevelskoy, and two destroyers for Holland. These were all
taken over by the German Navy. Two or three other Chinese
destroyers were reported to be on order, but it is doubtful if
they have been commenced.
At Monfalcone, in Austria, there were building for
China one cruiser of 4,900 tons and three cruisers of 1,900
tons. In addition, at the Stabilimenfo Tecnico, twelve de-
stroyers were on order for China, but it is doubtful if any
of them were laid down at the outbreak of war.
(3) The Lion and Tiger have the same armament, but
the disposition is such that, whereas the former only bears
two guns right ait, the latter bears four. Our first ship to
carry 15-inch guns was laid down so long ago as October,
1912, whereas the first German ship mounting 15-inch guns
was not laid down until April, 1913, and they can hardly
complete her much before the end of the presant year.
J. L. G. (Westminster). — (1) I think that it is extremely
probable, if not certain, that the East Coast raids were
" managered " by German agents in this country.
(2) The question you raise as to why, if the Formidable
was really sunk by a German submarine, the German Ad-
miralty has not published the number of that vessel, is very
intricate. Personally I still keep an open mind on the ques-
tion, and think that it is quite on the cards that she blun-
dered into a mine which had broken adrift, and that the
second explosion had something to do with the boilers.
An alternate possibility is that if it were a German sub-
marine she went down with her victim.
(3) So far as attrition is concerned, the Germans are cer-
tainly making nothing out of it, nor are they ever likely to
do so.
H. H. (Le Court). — As regards your query about the
German submarine coming alongside a victim flying the whita
ensign, it is idle to discuss whether the Germans were right
or wrong in doing so. Up to a certain point the rules of naval
warfare allow of the misuse of flags, but the Germans are
bound by no laws or rules whatever; and there is nothing
more to be said.
M. H. L. S. (Reading). — Many thanks for yours. In
reply: If the Admiralty suppresses good news they have
probably some strategical object in view in doing so, and
their reticence should be supported at all costs.
S. M. M. (Edipburgh). — I am sorry, but I do not think
that it is advisable to discuss the scheme to which you refer,
though it may interest you to know that it was invented by
a German, and that if our people make use of it the Kaiser
is being hoist by his own petard.
M. T. W. (Scarborough). — I am greatly interested in your
letter. The figure eleven on a piece of shell which landed
near you does not go for anything, because the Germans use
the metric system.
The " washers " to which you refer are probably the
bands round the shell, which enable it to grip the rifling when
leaving the gun. If there was an 8.2, that would probably
have come from the Torch, which was known to have been
there.
The only other German armoured cruiser with four fun-
nels which could have paid attention to you is the Boon ;
the other two four-funnellers, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau,
were attended to by Admiral Sturdee ofiE the Falkland Islands.
All the battle cruisers have two funnels only, and the
Bliicher only had two funnels. I think you may take it that
it was either the Moon or the Torek which paid its attentions
to you and your fellow-townsmen, although the story exists
to the eSect that the Von der Tann was in that particular
" baby-killing expedition," and got hit from behind by a
torpedo from a British destroyer.
J. R. P. (Grantham). — (1) I am afraid that it is outside
my province to advise the particular newspaper you mention
" not to make an ass of itself over the perspective of naval
operations." It is the prerogative of the halfpenny press to
lay things on thick. The reason they do so is that theic
public demands it>
XI*
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 1915.
(2) What with German spies and other things, I do not
»ee how your suggestion could be got to work.
(3) Your suggestion of electrically-driven pumps which
should be employed to squirt water into the German trenches
is more in Colonel Maude's line than mine. From what I hear
from friends in the trenches the Germans are much more
careful than we are in the matter of arranging their drain-
age; but when j'ou get out there I am certainly of opinion
that you might do a great deal to make our trenches more
comfortable, if you got your idea adopted and could solve
the mud problem.
W. II. (London). — You ask why not hunt submarines as
we hunt whales 1 This idea was promulgated by Lord Charles
Beresford about eighteen months ago. The trouble is that,
although the analogy between the whale and the submarine is
correct, the whale is a silly sort of animal, entirely ignorant
that it is in any danger ; the submarine, on the other hand,
is a terribly intelligent whale.
As regards your statement that as an " exciting, profit-
able, and glorious sport it should surpass anything yet seen
on land or water, and that there would be no lack of men
to take part in it," if it could be got up as a new kind of sport,
it is not impossible that — supposing enough participants —
■ome results might be obtained, but I am rather afraid that,
taking all circumstances into consideration, the odds are
that amateur sportsmen engaged in the job would be rather
more dangerous to British submarines than to German ones.
J. \V. S. (Sanderstcad). — It is quite true that if a sub-
marine fires a torpedo at a ship at too close a range she is
quite likely to be destroyed by her own action. I have noted
your suggestion, and have forwarded it to the proper quarter.
1 do not think that it is novel. It is all right in theory,
but certain technical difficulties seem in the way. Quite
apart from the Press Censor, you may rest assured that no
idea likely to give a hint to the enemy would be published
in the columns of Land and Watek.
J. H. B. (Edinburgh). — The maximum draught of any
battleship never exceeds more than about 30 feet. Any battle-
ship would be quite safe in eight fathoms. The Dogger Bank
presents no obstacles to any warship. It is simply called
" Dogger Bank " because it happens to be shallower than the
rest of the water round about it.
J. C. P. (London). — (1) See reference to neutral flag in
article.
(2) A certain number of our merchant ships carry a gun
or two aft for protection, but that is against armed liners.
The chances of a merchantman detecting a submarine subs-
merged are practically nil. The latest German plan appears
to be to torpedo without warning.
(3) The U21 has returned to Germany after her Irish
Sea exploits, so there is no more to be said. She probably
achieved it lashed alongside some vessel flying the neutral
flag.
(5) The Gierman battle cruisers returned to Heligoland
by the north entrance inst-ead of by the usual southern routes.
A submarine is not ubiquitous, and I think you should re-
member before suggesting that our submarines are incompe-
tent that if some time ago our battle cruisers managed to
enter Heligoland Bight without being injured by German sub-
marines acting in their own waters, it is only natural to
assume that German warships under more favourable condi-
tions should be able to maintain an equal immunity. It is
true that the German battle cruisers had been knocked about^
but the steaming capacity of all of them appears to have
been unimpaired.
A. B. H. (West Hartlepool). — Unfortunately, your letter
of December 24 has only just reached me. If the enemy had
fired a hundred rounds they gave you a hundred shells. It is
a matter of one round one shell. As regards the Germans
having the range, they could work that out by chart with-
out further knowledge, though I dare say that you, in common
with the other towns visited, had some German fellow-towns-
men who amplified the information.
Z. E. P.- — Something such as you suggest was first mooted
in the Crimean War, and has figured in " future war stories "
since. Presuming it to be feasible, there would be an ample
supply of volunteers without occasion to call on you. I am,
however, asked to convey to you an appreciation of your
oiler.
N. H. (Wales), and O. G. — I have personally forwarded
the matters to which you refer to the proper quarter. It
seems to be highly significant.
THE VERTICAL BATTLE.
INFLUENCE OF AERIAL ATTACKS ON TRENCH WARFARE.
By L. BUN DESBLEDS.
IN its last analysis, the meaning of the yford "victory"
is ability to force an opponent to accept the views
of his victor upon terms, or conditions, imposed by
the latter. In every-day life victories are won,
many times a day, by an individual who
imposes his will upon another, or by the operation
of the law when it forces the inhabitants of a country to
follow certain lines of conduct laid down by the
legislator. Just as the greatest pos.sib!e victory for the
legislator would be the total absence of offenders against the
laws he has laid down, so the greatest victory a commandea-
could win would be the absence of the enemies he expects
to encounter. Altliougli this seems like enunciating an axiom
which everybody knows, yet the necessity for the enunciation
is not pleonastic, because for some there cannot be victory in
the present war unless a great many of their enemies are
exterminated, and for others a victory means a triumphant
entry of the Allied troops into Berlin after Jiard-fought and
bloody encounters. Again, victory to many means the destruc-
tion of the German fleet and the capture of tl)e German
colonies; whilst to others it means the abdication of the
Kaiser and his imprisonment for life in a fortress or on a
desert island. Final victory for (he Allies may be accom-
panied by all these things, but, in essence, victory has nothing
•whatever to do with battles, or with the killing and maiming
of a great number of the opponents, or with the sinking of
their ships and sailors, or with the capture of their colonies,
or with the imprisonment of their commanders. It may be
necessary to take one, or more, or all of such actions in order
to ensure the permanency of a victory. But, essentially, the
modern view of victory is the ability to impose upon nations
opposing us our notion of right or wrong, in their relations
with other countries, in at least the same degree as it is
imposed upon the inhabitants of our country in their inter-
course with one aoothcr. It follows, therefore, that the more
easily, and the more promptly, we can force upon our oppo-
nents the adoption of a code of international ethics, accept-
able to the Allies, and obtain the necessary guarantee that it
will be kept by tliem, the greater will be our victory.
Without in the slightest degree criticising what has been
done by our commanders, to whom the State has entrusted
the task of carrying out the operations to enforce our views
and those of our Allies, the writer desires to press home the
point which he lias already, on two occasions, brought forward
in tliose columns, namely, that a strong, comprehensive, and
sustained aerial offensive might result in a much earlier
victory than would otherwise be the case.
AERIAL OFFENSIVE AND TRENCH
WARFARE.
In its present stage the war is essentially one of trench
work, at least as regards the Western field. In his articles
Mr. Ililaire Belloc has made the character of this method of
v/arfaro vej-y clear, even to the lay reader. The writer has.
12*
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
therefore, no need to explain the state of affairs ia France
and in Belgium, with which the reader must be now perfectly
familioj-. In studying the drav.ings illustrating Mr. Belloc's
articles the reader cannot have failed to notice that at many
points on the Western front of operation the situation is
somewhat as indicai©d ia Diagram 1, which does not desig-
nate any particular portion of the confronting lines, but only
the general state of conditions prevailing at a great number
of points from the North Sea to Alsace. In the diagram, A,,
Ai, A, represents a portion of the German lino, and Bi, B.,
B. the opposing portion of the line occupied by the Allies.
Behind the portion of the German line under consideration
there is a railway system with a branch, It, E, B, running
almost parallel to it, and having nodal points at P, Q, S, T
and V . This railway system cannot bo destroyed by the
ordinary means of attack, but would bo exposed to an aerial
offensive. There Is possibly another railway system behind
the line B,, B,, B, of the Allies, but wliich, for the purpose
of our argument, need not be indicated in the diagram.
Now, let us suppose that the Allies had, at some point O,
behind their line B,, B,, B,, an aerial base 0, from which
their aircraft could carry out offensive operations within a
circle of radius M containing the nodal points P, Q, S, T
fmd V , and let us examine the effect of the destruction by
means of aircraft of one or more of those nodal points on
tte enemy in the trenches along A,, A,, A,.
If our airmen succeeded in destroying the nodal point
'S, and did damage there of such magnitude as would require
oonsidcrabla time for repair, they would, during that time,
deprive the enemy, on the right of S, of quick and direct
railway communication with those in the trenches to the left
of S, but the enemy could still send reinforcements and sup-
plies by rail along the whole of tho line we are examining.
!n»e same remarks^ apply to the nodal points 7 and T.
If it were the junction Q that was destroyed, rail com-
munication between the enemy would be maintained along
the liae, but supplies during the time necessary for repair
would only reach the troops in the portion of the trenches we
are examining through the branch P, T. Supplies and
reinforcements could, however, be sent from one portion of
the line to another by means of tho branch E, E, E. If our
airmen succeeded ia destroying the nodal point P the Germans
in the trenches along A,, A,, A, would b© prevented from
direct railway communication with their base, but would still
be able to transfer troops and supplies along the line E, E, E.
AERIAL ATTACK versus AERIAL RAID.
From the foregoing it will be gathered that the destruc-
tion of any single point of such a railway system as we have
been considering would only load to temporary difficulties
and slight delay, but would not render tho system entirely
useless to the enemy in the trenches. As an aerial raid, con-
oiderod merely as an offensive operation, could result in the
destruction of only one point, the conclusion which is forced
upon us is that generally speaking, so far as their offcnsire value is
eonctrned, aerial raids can only lead to local and temporary emharrass-
menls, but cannot have a very great influence on the character of
trmch warfare.
If, however, the nodal points P , T , and S were destroyed
by a simultaneous and concerted aerial offensive, and the
destruction were of such a character as to entail delay for
the necessary repair, then the German troops occupying tho
territory, sliown by section lines in Diagram IT., would b©
deprived of railway communication with both their base and
their neighbours in the adjoining parts of tho country. If
considerable delay were necessary' to repair tho nodal points
P, T, and S — and by considerable delav is meant one of
only twenty-four hours — then it would be a relatively ea.sy
matter for the Allies to force the surrender of the enemy
occupying the trenches contained within the section-lined
area. Tho result of such an aerial offensive would enable
the Allies to occupy tho ground previously held by the enemy
in very much the samo manner indicated in Diagram III.,
where the doited lines represent the position occupied by the
Allies previous to the assumed successful aerial offensive, and
the full lines thrir position after such an offensive. The
German position v.-ould then be somewhat as that indicated, ia
the same diagram, by means of a continuous thick dark line.
It will thus be seen that if an aerial offensive were made
with success at various points along the whole line of the
German trenches tho result would be the driving of a number
of powerful wedges into the enemy's line, which would bo
bound to break at some point. A successful aerial offensive,
however, at any one place depends, as we have seen, upon
the simultaneous destruction of several vital nodal points.
Tho failure lo succeed at any one point may mean the failure
of the whole aerial offensive. Hence, in order to ensure iht
tmcess of an aerial offensive at any place the various vital pointt
must be subjected to a simultaneous attack in fmxe and not simiilf
raided.
THE N-SQUARE LAW.
The success of an aerial attack depends, to a great degree,
upon a law which is well-known to military and naval
strategists, and which applies with equal strength to aerial
warfare. That law is known as the " n-square law," because
it shows that the fighting strength of any force, whether on
land, on the sea, or in tho air, varies as the square of its
numerical strength. The following explanation, although
not a mathematical proof, will help the reader to grasp the
meaning of that law so far as it applies to bomb-dropping from
aeroplanes.
Everything beiug equal, two aeroplanes can carry twice
as many bombs as a single machine. If the bombs from one
machine were dropped until there were none left, and then all
tho bombs were gradually dropped from the second machine,
then the fighting strength of the two maclilnss would be twice
that of a single ono. If, however, the two aeroplanes
dropped their bombs simultaneously, they would do the same
damago ia half the time, or twice as much damage in the same
time. Hence the fighting strength of two aeroplanes acting
simultaneously is twice as great as it would be if the machines
wero acting at different times. It follows, therefore, that the
fighting strength of two aircraft acting simultaneously is four
times tho fighting strength of a singleone, that is,if we double
the number of machines inan air squadron, the fighting valueof
the squadron becomes 2^ times as great. In tho same way, if
we treble the number of machines of an aerial fleet, its fight-
ing value becomes 3', or 9, times as great. The importance
of the number of aircraft sent out on an offensive, and likelj
to be engaged in a vertical battle, is thus made evident.
P.S. — Tho writer would be much obliged if all firms
capable of manufacturing any aeroplane parts, whether in
largo or small quantities, would communicate with him with-
out delay. In view of possible developments of great im-
portance the writer wishes to get into touch with all those
who arc in a position to undertake the manufacture, according
to drawings and specifications, of simple aeroplane parta,
either of wood or metal.
One of tho most noteworthy books of this present year is Mr.
J. Mil's Whitham's Slarvcacre (Methuen and Co., 6s.), wkich, deal-
ing with the tragedy of a country villago, makes fine drama out of
very Kiniple elements. The figure of Itaikes, lihe farmcx, dominates
tho book, and this m.in's ch.ir.icter is delineated with nieh TuthJei'e in-
sight .as reminds tis of Hardy aX hiii bc«t ; not that Ilaikes ifi tho only
good portrait, for there are others equally convincing, and the "chorus,"
racy of tho soil, is Also well drawn. A. strong, well-written book this,
tho be&t its author ba.'; yat prodoccd.
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 1915.
ON TRENCHES AND TRENCH WORK:
A NOVEL FORM OF TRENCH DREDGER FOR DRAINAGE.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, G.B. (late R.E.).
IT is interesting to notice how tlie trenches in Flandera
and everything connected with them are gradually
working their way through a cycle of change back to
the types of thirty years ago.
We began the campaign with ideas taken from the
conditions of the South African campaign, and as it
happened the Germans also had closely copied our types.
Generally, they were all cut exceedingly steep and narrow,
with the parapets kept down as low as possible, so as to afford
the smallest possible target to the enemy's artillery, and as
long as the ground was suitable and the weather dry, they
answered their purpose sufficiently well — that is, giving good
cover to the men from the splinters thrown backward by high
explosive sheila.
Moreover, as they had generally to be laid out in the dark,
no one could be certain where their prolongations might rest
when daylight came; hence the numerous traverses we were
accustomed to make in South Africa came in handy.
But it is open to question whether they saved us as much
as we thought they did, for almost from the first the Germans
took to locating them by aeroplanes from above, anid clearly
the broader belt of freshly-turned earth made when the exca-
vated soil was thrown out to form parapets, both to the front
and rear, was far more easily visible from above than the
parapet in front, and the trench only, would have been.
If, for instance, a " Taube " could detect the broader,
line at, say, 5,000 ft., it would have had to come down to
3,000 ft. to see the smaller mark, and its risks would have
increased in almost a double ratio as the height diminished.
But a Taube which found and signalled the range would cost
us far more in men than we hoped to save through the protec-
tion afforded by the parapet at the back.
The superiority of the German siege artillery on the
Aisne, and at first in Flanders, simply compelled us to fight
our way in so close to the enemy that he could no longer use
ajlQlery fire, least of all big, high explosive shells, for
fear of hitting his own trenches, and thus we came back to a
condition of affairs in which the inconspicuousness of the front
parapet hardly mattered. At fifty yards you oaa see a 12 in.
parapet just as well as a 3 ft. one.
We did not exactly tumble to this obvious point for the
first few weeks, and meanwhile the rains descended and the
floods came, and the steep-sided trenches collapsed; the subsoil
water rose up through the bottom, and I imagine both our
men and the Germans have had about as hard a time during
the last few montlis as has ever been recorded in history.
to me as quite a new idea the phrase I so often heard from mj
old Crimean instructors, " Men don't mind so much the chance
of being killed; what they cannot endure is the certainty of
having to stand knee-deep in slush and ice." And judging
from photographs I have seen, we are rapidly coming back to
the old Crimean type of trench, viz., one that is broad enough"
for convenience of movement, and sloped sufficiently for men
to attack out of it; for the power of counter-attack is the most
vital feature of all to be preserved for the sake of the moral
of the troops.
Nor is there sufficient reason why we should cling to a flat
target any longer now that the artillery superiority has passed
BO markedly over to our side. We now not only outnumber:
our enemy in guns of all calibres, siege and field, but we have
unlimited ammunition behind us, and can employ a system of
silencing his guns whenever they appear, to which want of
ammunition precludes his making any adequate reply. Fur«
ther than this, the skill of our gunners has been proved to be
superior to anything he can bring against us, and our sheila
burst with certainty, where 20 per cent. (I have even heard of
30 per cent.) of his projectiles never burst at all.
We can tTierefore afford to go in for a higher parapet,
which not only gives us the advantage of command at short
ranges — which is as important now as it ever was — but we can
also diminish the difficulties of drainage to a minimum, the
most important point for many weeks to come.
The sketch will make this clearer.
In section A, as fast as you bale out the water it filters
back again. In B you can just keep it under.
Further, all kinds of rough but effective appliances for
lifting the water out of B can be employed. The water casi
be allowed to settle in sumps (C) and then pumped out; bat
pumps soon clog in muddy water, and the simplest and most
practical apparatus I know of is an application of the ordi-
nary dredger type, which can be easily improvised out of the
Moreover, at these very short distances apart, attacks and
counter-attacks became almost nightly occurrences, and then it
was clearly apparent that these deep, unstopped trenches were
veritable man-traps if the enemy charged home. Troops could
neither spring out of them to charge or escape from them to
run away; in fact, they had no chance at all of putting up
a fight for their lives, and the consequences have on several
occasions been pretty disastrous on both sides.
It is, however, the rain which ia responsible for the
general trend of opinion in favour of more rational ideas.
Men returning from the front have again and again repeated
materials usually to be found in village smithies' and wheel-
wrights' shops. It consists of a number of buckets shaped like
a coal-scuttle, attached to an endless belt rotating over two
drums (A B), held apart by a straining piece (C), and
mounted on any convenient platform of sleepers, or similar
timbering. A man turns the handle at A, and the contents
of the buckets as they tip pour out into a trough which leads
them clear out of the trench on the side away from the enemy.
The sump pit can be made a continuous drain, and the wbola
apparatus moved backwards and forwards to prevent too largo
an accumulation of mud piling up at the rear of the trench..
February 13, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
CORRESPONDENCE.
FINANCIAL PRESSURE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Deae Sib, — Mr. Eelloc, in his interesting article " Tinan-
oial Pressure and War," published in your issue of
February 6, shows that, from a financial standpoint, increas-
ing stringency can only diminish the capacity of a country
to carry on war in so far as it may affect the import of
goodt from foreign countries.
It may be reasonably assumed, therefore, that it would
.be good policy for a country situated as Germany now is to
import either solely, or in as great a proportion of the whole
as possible, those items mentioned by Mr. Belloo as being
iiital for the prosecution of hostilities, such as horses, petrol,
rubber, and certain metala (chiefly copper) ; in other words,
that the less Germany imports of those commodities which
can possibly be dispensed with the greater her financial
capacity for the purchase of the vital elements.
Now, Mr. Belloo postulates that although Germany does
not produce internally sufficient food stufia for comfort, yet,
J)y exercising great care, the nation can manage to exist
jrithout the shortage in any way affecting her capacity for war.
It would seem, therefore (paradoxically enough), that
should Great Britain decide to include food stuSs as con-
traband, the action would actually assist our enemies by
rendering it financially possible to procure the vital elements
lor a longer time — thus prolonging the period of resistance.
Of course, this line of argument does not take into
eccount the effect of a shortage of food on the comfort of
the individual, and so on the moral of the nation as a whole,
which might far outweigh the financial gain; but from a
logical standpoint it seems difficult to refute. — ^Yonrs faith-
tuUy, J. H. Close.
"" Kowsley, " Rosebery Road, Cheam.
AN EASILY MADE EAR-PLUG FOR SOLDIERS
IN THE FIRING LINE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir,— So many soldiers are suffering from the effect
on. their ears of the awful noise of the battlefields that it
might be of use to them to know of the most effective way
of keeping out the concussion. Years ago as a Volunteer I
Buffered greatly in this respect, made many experiments, and
ft>und the following beyond all comparison the best.
Take a little piece of muslin, scrape off into it some of
the wax of a candle, fold it up into a little pill the size of
the ear opening, tie it round close above the pUl with some
thin thread, leaving tags about three inches long; cut off the
spare muslin, and that is all. The resulting plug, which
looks like a miniature grenade, can be pushed into the ear
at any time, fits itself accurately, owing to the warmth of the
body keeping it just neither hard nor soft, and it can be
pulled out again readily by the tags of the thread. Holding
it near a fire will soften the wax enough to be easily moulded
lo the proper size.
Wool as ordinarily used is of no value at all, any hard
plug tends to injure the ear, while the little candle-wax
grenade fits perfectly and yet is absolutely harmless. One
can be made in five minutes ; though, of course, a little adjust-
ment in the amount of wax used is needed to get a perfect fit.
Should anyone care to ask me I shall be happy to send a
0ample to them at any time. — Believe me, etc.,
Oldfield Thomas.
15, St. Pefersturg Place, Bayswater, W.
THE FIRST LORD.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I do not think the " Man in the Street " objects
'either to Lord Fisher or Admiral Jellicoe; certainly not to
the latter. But they do object to a civilian using autocratic
power at the Admiralty which the folly of Parliament has
given him.
The " Man in the Street " holds Mr. Churchill responsible
for the Cressy disaster, the three cruisers being sent in defiance
of naval opinion.
For the Pacific defeat in sending Admiral Cradook with
an inferior force to attack a superior.
For the Antwerp expedition of untrained men.
For the mystery of the Goehcn at Messina.
They also object to the First Lord of the Admiralty de-
serting his post at Whitehall for the trenches at Antwerp.
They are also aware of his treatment of Sir George Calla-
ghan, and feel the anchoring of the Niger gunboat off Dover,
and the Formidable disaster is probably owing to his defiance
i>f naval advice and in his belief tliat he is a second Nelson.
"^ 50AST-DWELLER IN CORNWALL.
THE AGE QUESTION.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — ^Could you see your way to give in one of
your future issues of Land Aim Water some notes on the
qualifications of naval officers! It seems at present that the
entry to this ser\ace must be determined before tlie age of 13,
and after that age a boy desiring to enter the service is
bai-red. Surely a lad having a good education should have
an opportunity of entering at least as late as 16. I am con-
cerned, because I have a boy aged 14 anxious to enter the
Navy, and find he is too late. I do not know if this i^
witMn the scope of your paper, but if it is I should be
obliged by a note in your correspondence columns. — Yours
faitlifuUy,
NADTicna.
CATCHING SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — One of your correspondents mentioned
the efficacy of an ordinary fishing net for catching and
disabling submarines. I have been told that Messrs. Brunton
Bros., of 17, St. Stephen's House, Westminster, have already
devised a scheme which has been probably shown to the
Admiralty. The scheme consists in attaching a net to the tail
of a torpedo (not charged), and on a ship sighting a submarine
tie torpedo is launched across the bows of the latter, the net
trails out behind, and unless the submarine sees and evades it,
disaster is the result. I believe that this has been tried ex-
perimentally.— Tours faithfully,
MAtTRicB A. Wood.
Cecil Chambers, 86^ Strand, London, W.C.
EARLY SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir,— Mr. Grimshaw's letter in a recent issue has proved
interesting to many readers, no doubt; to myself particu-
larly so.
In 1884 a submarine boat wm designed by Mr. J.
Waddington, and built at Birkenhead by Messrs. Cocliranes]
of that city. This vessel was approximately 40 feet long
and 6 feet greatest diameter, tapering to a point at each
end. The rudder was fixed under the boat, and diving fins
or planes were fitted. A conning-tower and pumps for alter-
ing the displacement were a part of the equipment. Pro-
pulsion was effected by one 20-h.p. electric motor, made by
Messrs. Siemens, driven by a battery of accumulators sup-
plied by the Electric Power Storage Co., the whole electric
installation being fitted by the writer and his partner, Mr.
F. H. Perry. The battery, which weighed over five tons,
had to be charged from an external source.
The electric power was guaranteed by us to drive the
boat at 8 miles p.h. upon the surface, which was easily accom-
plished. In all the chief features it will be seen this ship
was a prototype of the present-day under-water ship. The
designer had hopes of interesting the British Admiralty in
the idea, but without success, and I believe eventually lost
all the money spent on the work. Of course, the boat waa
never properly fitted for diving, but Mr. Waddington's belief
was that, having shown the invention so far advanced,
further assistance, both financially and mechanically, would
have been available to complete a practicable submarine.
The first trials took place at the end of 1884 in the great
float at Birkenhead. When everything was in place, three
men, including myself, went inside, and the conning-tower
hatch was then bolted from the inside, the tanks then, filled,
and the boat, attached by chains from a crane at the dock
side, was lowered to the bottom. Communication being
est.ablished by telephone with those above, it may be imagined
the stay below was not very prolonged, just sufficient to show
everything was tight. Afterwards the boat was driven at
various speeds, and performed evolutions upon the surface
which certainly were most wonderful at that time. The hull
was almost entirely submerged at times; in fact, two of
those on board were heartily glad when the trial was over.
The nose of the boat was a solid steel piece about three feet
long, and in making a sharp turn at full speed we just
missed running into the s.s. Alasla, which would have meant
our going down like a stone and the big steamship being sunk,
as she was lying up for repairs.
Although the submarine of to-day is marvellous in its
perfection, the same risks exist, added to many others ; and
I take off my bat to the crew of any submarine. — Yours truly,
Chas. W. Coi,
15*
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 1015.
THE INDIAN TROOPS.
To the Editor of Land A^'D Water.
Sin, — I am encouraged by the generous response of the
public to the appeals for supplying the King's Indian troops
in France -with " comforts," wliich are practically necessaries,
to dra-w attention to the urgent requests that 1 have received
for " waterpoof hoods " to protect the puggarees (turbans) of
the men from getting soaked by rain and snow. The demand
comes from so many quarters that I fear the few I am able
to send will meet but the barest fraction of the need.
In addition to pants, vests, socks, gloves and similar gar-
ments, which wear out quickly and require constant renewal,
there is a general request for condensed milk, brown sugar,
cigarettes, sugai- candy (for non-smoking castes like the Sikhs),
spices, etc.
With the balance of the money standing to the credit of
" The Indian Troops Comforts Account," with Messrs. H. S.
King and Co.. 9, Pall Mall, S.W., I shall, so far as it will
rerjch, endeavour to comply with these requests. — Yours faith-
fully.
Ameer All
2, Cadogan Place, London, S.W.
MR. H. J. C. GRIERSON AND EXPLOSIVES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — Are our explosives so ineffective as Mr. Grier-
son would suggest? The llela when torpedoed on September IG
by submarine E9 was reported to have sunk in under half an
hour.
According to a letter of an ofiGcer on the Inflexible (the
Times, January 20) one of the German officers said that one
turret had been blown bodily overboard by a 12in. bhell. I
do not know what a Gin. turret weighs, though I have seen
tliem under construction, and it strikes me that it must be a
monstrous explosion which would move one, let alone blow
it overboard.
Is it fair to compare the battles of Coronel and Falkland
Islands J It is reported that the Good Hope and the Monmouth
closed with the German ships so as to bring their lighter guns
within range. In the Falkland Islands battle it appears to
have been a stern chase according to Jane's description of the
fight.
The Good Hope was laid down 1897 and the Monmouth
1899. The Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau 190i and 1905.
Armour is improved every year, guns, too, so that tlie
two older boats were outch^ssed in every way to a greater
extent (judging from Fighting Ships) than the latter were
in the Falkland Battle.
The " Fire Question " is also answered in the Times letter
of the 20th inst.
Are not we English a bit too ready to condemn EnglifH
production and to belaud that of the foreigner? Wouldn't it
be as well to follow Mr. Jane's and Lord Beresford's advice
and trust the Admiralty? — Yours faitlifully.
Ernest IIillaet.
The Hawthorns,
Tanshelf, Pontefract.
P.S. — Will you allow me to add that your journal gives
me the greatest s.itisfaction to read of anything 1 have found.
Everything else, newspapers and periodicals alike, appear
either openly or suggestively to be governed by politics.
BOOKS FOR CAMPS AND TRENCHES.
To the Editor of Land and Watbb.
Deab Sib, — It would be very kind of you if you would
draw tlie attention of your many readers to the Camps Library.
tThis Library was started by Sir Edward Ward with the object
of preventing overlapping by forming a central depot to
■which the public could send all books (old and new) intended
for the use of our soldiers at homo and abroad. Ho also
wished to create a distributing organisation from which all
camps and recreation rooms could obtain books and maga.-
cines.
The Library has, I think, justified its existence, as
during the last two months it has not only formed lending
libraries of over 30,000 volumes in the various camps and
recreation rooms throughout the United Kingdom, but has
also sent thousands of books and magazines to all the regi-
ments serving abroad, as well as to the various convalescent
camps and to all the field ambulances.
We have special facilities for transit, and there is little
delay in getting the books to their destination.
Tlianks to the splendid generosity of the public large
boxes and packets of books arrive here daily, for in these
grave yet great days everybody loves to give. As .someone
sending books writes this morning, " For the men in the
trenches, from a grateful woman, who appreciates her qniei
home more than ever. She has tv/o dear boys at the front,;
and she only wishes she had more books to send."
We want more and more books, for the demand made*
upon us by camp and trench is immense.
We should also like to make the Library known, w
widely as possible among the various camps and recreation
rooms who need books. Sir Edward Ward's idea is that each'
camp should form its own lending library, and work it fo^
itself with its own rules and regulations. We charge a
small fee (to pay for packing, etc.) for books sent to the
camps, which then beccms the entire property of tlie regi-
ment acquiring them.
We are here to help and to help other people to help.
Books should be sent (carriage paid) to the Campa
Library, 22, Earl Street, Westminster, and small donations
towards expenses we should so like to get. — Yours faithfully^
EvA Anstrutheb (Hon. Sec.)<
22, Earl Street, Westminster, London, S.W.
CRITICISING THE ADMIRALTY.
To tlie Editor of Land and Watee.
I>EAB SiE, — In response to Mr. Jane's comments, r*
marks, and invitation in current issue, I desire to say thai
I am unable to work up any enthusiasm for either " lunatia
asylums " or the " grinding of axes " ; also that I and very
many others consider the withholding of frank criticism ol
our Admiralty and other departmenta is harmful in the ex-
treme ; also that the repeated successful demonstrations by
the enemy on our East Coast have created a distinct feeling
of uneasiness and insecurity. And, finally, that the main
point of my letter to Mr. Jane has not even been touched,
far less disposed of, in spite of his knowledge of " the
inside and unwritten history (or policy) of the naval war."—
Yours truly, E. H.
Hatch End.
[There is no " v\-ithholding " of criticism. The Ad-
miralty has made no important error to date, however mat-
ters may appear to amateur critics of them. There are, I
think, still people who believe the moon to be made of green
cheese, and that the earth is flat. But they have given up
demanding " frank criticism " of astronomers and geo-
graphers who believe otherwise. For the rest we are fighting
to beat Germany — not to create a feeling of ease and security
in the civil population. — Feed T. Jane.]
RULES REGARDING CORRESPON-
DENCE FOR PRISONERS OF WARt
1. Letters, postcards, and postal parcel* should b« addresaed aa
follows : —
(Name, initials, rank and regiment),
British Prisoner of War,
in Germany (or Austria-Hungary),
c/o General Post Office,
Mount Pleasant, Londoiki
When the plac« where the prisoner is confined is known, the words,
"At ," should be inserted at the beginning of the thir^
line of the address. It is recommended that i>arcela should not
be sent unle-^s the place of confinement is known.
2. Communications should be limited to private and fwDily new*
and to necessary business communications, and should not be sent too
frequently.
Xo references to the naval, military, or political situation, or to
naval and military movements and organisations, are allowed. Lettca
or postcards containing such references will not be delivered.
3. Friends of prisoners of war are advised to send postcards in
preference to letters, as postcards are less likely to be delayed. It
letters are sent they should not exceed in length two sides of a shee*
of notepaper and should contain nothing but the sheet of notcpaper.
Letters and postcards may be written in English (though letttrs in
German are probably delivered more quickly). On no account should
the writing be crossed.
4. Letters cannot for the present be accepted for registration.
5. Postage need not bo paid either on letters or parcels addressed
to British prisoners of war.
6. Xo letters should be enclosed in parcels, and newspapers must
rot on any account be sent. So far as is known there is no otih«i»
restriction on the contents of parcels; tobacco may be sent, and will
be admitted duty free, but foodstuffs of a perishable character should
not be sent.
7. Remittances can be made by money order to British prisoner*
of war. No charge is made for commission. Instructions as to how
to proceed can be obtained from pest offices. The transmission of coin,
•ither in letters or parcels, is e-xpressly prohibited. Postal orders and
bank notes should not be sent.
8. Postal parcels will be insured without charge.
9. It must be understood that no ffuarantee of the delivery of
either parcels or letters can be given, and that the War Office accepts
no responsibility. In any case considerable delay may take place, and
failure to receive an acknowledgment should not necessarily be taken
as an indication that letters and parcels sent have not been de'.ivered.
10. So far as is known, prisoners of war in Germany are allowed
to write letters or postcards from time to time ; but they may not
always have facilities for doing so, and the fact that no commuriication
is received from them need not give rise to anxiety.
Wab Office
16»
Feb
ruary 13, 1915
LAND AND WATER
Two British Made Safety Fuuntain Pens
suitable for British Soldiers
These pens
in any posit
conveniently
uniform pocl'
Onoto Pens are the only standard
10/6 pens all British made by a
British Company with British capital
and employing British labour.
Onoto Pens
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., LTD., LONDON
HOTEL CECIL
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to Resi-
dents and Officers.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Telephone: GERRARD 60. ^Pply. MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
BOMBS
From Hostile Aircraft
The danger arising from fires caused by bombs CAN
BE MET by installing
"KYL=FYRE"
THE FIRE EXTINGUISHER.
PRICE 5/» EACH.
Raids by hostile aircraft are not a matter of theory
to-day. They have actually occurred, and may be
expected again.
BE PREPARED!!
Even if you have an up-to-date MOTOR FIRE
ENGINE IN YOUR DISTRICT it CANNOT be in
TWO PLACES AT ONCE. It is to your interest
to take reasonable precautions.
DO NOT DELAY !
A large number of " Kyl-Fyre " Extinguishers have
been supplied to the Army and Navy Authorities for
Hutment Camps, also Red Cross Hospitals, etc., etc.
Apply, KYL-FYRE, Ltd.,
12 Elms Buildings, EASTBOURNE.
281
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 191 j
ft
-o
BUCHANAN'S
SCOTCH Vi/HI SKIES
'>
41
STUDY IN BLACK AND WHITE: OUR WATCHDOGS.
"RED SEAL" "ROYAL HOUSEHOLD" "BLACK & WHITE"
(An Extra Special Blend of Choice Old Whiikiei).
48/- per doz.
60/- per doz.
54/- per doz.
Buchanan's Scotch Whiskies are well matured and perfectly blended. Their vast
stocks in Scotland ensure an unfailing supply of the same faultless quality.
282
February 13, 1915
LAND AND WATER
HOW NAVAL GUNS ARE AIMED
By SIDNEY GRAVES KOON
THE marvellous accuracy of our naval gunners has
been time and again a cause for self-congratula-
tion on the part of those of us who never saw a
naval gun fired. But how many of us know the
intricate process by which that success is
achieved ? How many know the complex relations that
exist between the enemy's speed, his distance from our gim,
the weight of our shell, the velocity with which it leaves the
muzzle, the rolling of our ship as it tears through the heaving
billows ? The certainty that, sooner or later, a dreadnought
action must take place in European waters lends point to a
brief study of this subject.
;^— ^
l^fffi
FIG. 1.
When a battleship A, Fig. i, fires a shell at a hostile
ship B, that shell takes a curved path C-C-C, called its
" trajectory." If the gun is properly aimed the shell lands
on the target, explodes with a horrid noise, spreads destruction
round about, and sometimes sets fire to the ship B. If the
ships are very close together, as was often the case a century
ago, the path of the shell may be practically a straight line,
like that shown below the trajectory. Unfortunately for
this ideal condition of shooting, however, the attraction of
gravitation acts so persistently upon the shell in its flight
that the gun has to be aimed well above the point to be hit,
under penalty of falling far short and burying the shell
harmlessly in an inoffensive ocean. So the shell starts on a
coiu-se such as that of the upper straight line, from which it
is gradually pulled farther and farther down as it wings its
flight across the miles of water between its gun and the
enemy's ship. The angle D between the straight line above
the trajectory and that below it is called the " angle of
elevation " of the gun. The distance between gun and target
is the " range." And it is the correct determination of this
range which is the most difficult part of accurate naval
gunnery. The greater the range the greater must be the
angle of elevation ; the hghter the shell the greater the
elevation for a given range ; the greater the velocity with
which the shell starts its journey the smaller may be the
angle of elevation and, consequently, the flatter wDl the
trajectory be.
But there is another important element, and that is the
location of the exact target from right to left. If it be
desired to hit the enemy's mast and the shell actually hits
something a hundred feet away on either side that is not good
gunnery. So we have the two things to look out for — the
gun's elevation to correspond with the exact range and its
" traverse " to correspond with the location " sideways " of
the point to be hit. The range is determined simultaneously
from several positions on the ship, of which one may be K
in Fig. 2. The method will be described later.
FIG. 2.
The traverse is in many cases adjusted by an officer in a
narrow place in the turret G H. This is the man who fires
the gun. He stands between the gun F' and the armoured
wall of the turret, and looks at the enemy through the
peculiar-shaped telescope E'. What he sees is indicated in
Fig. 3, where the " cross-hairs " of his telescof)e are shown
to be on the forward funnel of the hostile ship. The axis of
this telescope is very accurately parallel to the horizontal
axis of the gun. And the telescope pierces the heavy armour
of the turret in the manner shown in order to avoid having a
small shot or piece of shell come right through into the
turret if it should chance to land just where the telescope is.
If, now, our shell could cover instantaneously the distance to
the enemy, a shell fired from this turret, with the correct
elevation, would strike the forward funnel. But it takes a
modern shell 16 seconds to travel the six miles now considered
a moderate battle range. During 16 seconds the enemy, if
steaming at 20 knots speed, would have moved ahead 540
feet. Consequently the shell would strike 540 feet behind
FIG 3.
FIG. 6.
FIG. 7.
the point at which it was aimed, or perhaps 200 feet behind
the stern of the target ship. So we see that, just as in
shooting at a wild duck on the wing, we have to estimate the
enemy's speed and anticipate him — in this case by 540 feet.
Now to get the range. Several instruments are in use
for this purpose, all based upon a simple principle of
trigonometry. If we know the angle L of a right-angled
triangle. Fig. 4, and know the side M opposite that angle,
FIG. 4.
then the side N can be readily computed. In this case M
is the distance between centres of the mirrors P and P'
in the instrument. Fig. 5, while N is the range sought. The
^-Hl
^^w^^
FIG. 5.
side M is known to the thousandth part of an inch. So it
remains to measure the angle and tluis determine the range.
The mirror P is fixed at exactly 45° to the axis of the tube
PP'. A ray of Ught, entering the instrument at P and
reflected to the mirror R. is again reflected into the eye-
piece S, where it forms the lower half of the image in Figs. 6
and 7. Similarly, a ray of light, entering at P' and reflected
to R' and thence into the eye-piece, forms the upper half of
the image. The mirror P' (or sometimes R' instead) is
adjustable. The amount of movement of that mirror
necessary in bringing the two halves of the image in Fig. 6
into correct mutual position, as shown in Fig. 7, may be
measured to the fraction of a minute of arc. And this
measure, shown on an ivory scale, tells the officer using the
"telemeter" — or " stadiameter," as it is variously called —
just how far away his target is.
The arc of movement of the mirror is almost inappreci-
ably small. With a 6-foot " base hne " PP' , an angle of
40 seconds of arc (one ninetieth of one degree) represents a
range of 10,300 yards, or about sLx miles. An angle of
30 seconds shows the range to be 13,750 yards. As an angle
of 29 seconds indicates 14,225 yards it is evident that an
error so small as one second of arc (the thirty-six-hundredth
part of one degree) will produce, in estimating this 8-mile
range, an error of 475 yards, or a quarter of a mile. To
correct such errors, and at the same time those variations
due to the action of atmospheric conditions upon the powder
used and upon the refraction of rays of light passing over
long distances at sea, " spotters " are employed. Men with
powerful glasses, stationed in elevated positions from
which they can watch the fall of shells in the water, verif\-
or correct the range as determined by stadiameter and
telephone their observations to the ordnance officer below.
In this way it takes only a few shots to locate the exact
range required, after which hitting the enemy is a mere matter
of the precision with which these various elements may be
continued in their several combinations.
283
LAND AND WATER
February 13, 19 15
to His Majesty the Kino
Water jiroofers by Anpoiiilmei
"AQUASCUTUM"
The Incomparable Waterproof
officers' waterproof
FIELD COATS &
BRITISH WARMS
FOR ACTIVE SERVICE
(Hcighi and Chtst MeasurtimnI only requited)
Jan. II, 1915.
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You may be interested to know that
I liave worn one of your "Aquascutum"
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front in North France. My work has
been mostly on despatch work, by
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please supply me with a similar coat to
take with me on my return to the front.
LIEUT. E. G.
Scuthernhay, Exeter.
SIX FIELD-MARSHALS HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED
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for Officers' tunics, in
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The O.W.
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This CUIRASS is soft
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S " Comforts for the Trenches."
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so that the foot shall know not the
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very supple Brown Scotch Grain uppers,
extra stout English oak bark tanned soles,
hand sewn throughout, No. W01538, 55/-
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exact as above but no cap, 35/- per pair.
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284
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol I,X1V No. 2754 SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1915 [rNEwfp'i'it;^.'] f,*'''^ ''^f "Z!,"?
Cn//>'«srt.. 0u;t^ano
GENERAL SIR ARTHUR PAGET
Who IS taking to France and Russia the decorations bestowed
by King George on officers of the French and Russian armies
LA^D AND WAIER
February 2C, 1915
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294
Fcbruury 20, 1915
LAND AND WATER
THE TORPEDO
By •• A.M.l.C.E."
THE torpedo is to-da}' one of the principal arms
of naval warfare, and is carried in practically
every type of warship from the submarine to the
largest battleship. Although this has been the
case for several years it can safely be said that
the introduction of the submarine greatly increased the
importance of the torpedo as an offensive arm.
The modern torpedo may be looked upon as a small
submarine vessel without conning tower and periscope.
the innishing water causes the appearance of flames and
smoke so as to indicate the spot where the torpedo has struck.
The compressed air chamber consists of steel walls
having a thickness of about a quarter of an inch, and has a
capacity of about 12 cubic feet. It is capable of withstanding
a pressure of about 2,000 lb. to the square inch, although
the actual working pressure is 1,470 lb. per square inch.
This pressure is reduced by means of a reducing valve to
515 lb. per square inch, at which pressure it supplies power
Depth Regulator
RUDOER
Striheh
Charge
COMPRCSSED Air
Chamber
Balance
Chamber
EncineRoom
PROPtLLEBJ
Detonator
Two Smatts
One tNsiOE The Otucb
iTCCRiNC RuODtB
Diagrammatic Sketch or a Torpedo.
capable of travelling at a very high speed under water, and
carrying a charge of gun-cotton which explodes on striking
an object.
The torpedo was invented by Commander Luppis, an
officer in the Austrian Navy, who sold his patent to Whitehead,
an English engineer engaged in the well-known naval works
in Fiume. Practically every navy throughout the world
ussiS the Whitehead torpedo e.xcept that of Germany, which
employs the Scliwartskopf type. In France some torpedoes
are" made by Creusot, and in America by the Bliss-Leavitt
Company. There is, however, very little essential difference
between the various torpedoes.
A torpedo looks very much Uke a steel cigar, and varies in
length from 14 feet to 19 feet and in diameter from 16 inches
to 21 inches. There are six main parts in a torpedo, and.
beginning from the nose, they are as follows : (a) the head,
(6) the chamber containing the compressed air, (c) the balance
chamber, {d) the engine room, (e) the buoyancy chamber, and
(/) the tail end.
In the nose it carries a small thin steel rod which ends
in the detonator. When the torpedo hits an object the steel
p':n is forced violently inwards and fires the detonating
mixture, consisting generally of fulminate of mercury, which
in turn fires the main charge, consisting of about 200 lb. of
wet gun-cotton.
In order that this great charge is not fired accidentally
a small safety pin is provided in the nose, and until this is
withdrawn the detonator cannot operate. Other safety
appliances are also provided, such as a small safety fan, which
is spun round by the water, and must revolve a certain number
of times, representing a certain distance travelled, before the
steel rod is free to move. It is, of course, important that the
crew should see that these safety devices are removed before
firing the torpedo, and it is, of course, a very easy thing,
especially in the excitement of an engagement, to forget to
withdraw the safety pin. In such a case the torpedo would
be quite harmless when striking an object. Thus several
torpedoes were found during the Russo-Japanese War
which had not exploded, though they had struck the
steel netting protecting battleships against torpedo attacks.
For practising torpedo firing in times of peace the torpedo
is fitted with a dummy head made of thin copper and filled
with water, so that the weight is equal to that of the " war-
head." When the head is destroyed by striking an obstacle
to the engine. If the air were carried direct from the
reservoir to the engine the energy stored would be expended
in a very short time, while the speed of the engine would
rapidly decrease.
The balance chamber contains the mechanism for
regulating the depth under water at which the torpedo is
adjusted to run. In the engine room is placed the compressed
air engine for driving the propellers. The engine is generally
of the three-cylinder type and has an indicated horse-power
of about 60. In the American Bliss-Leavitt torpedo a
compressed air turbine of the Curtis type is employed.
The buoyancy chamber provides the buoyancy of the
torpedo, so that when a torpedo has exploded its charge it
can come to the surface and be picked out of the water. It
also contains the gyroscope, which is an instrument for
automatically correcting the course of the torpedo for any
deflection which it may experience.
As the torpedo leaves the tube a bolt in the latter catches
a trigger on the former, and this releases a spring which
starts the gyroscope. In case the torpedo swerves in the
water the position of the gyroscope relative to the torpedo
alters, thus putting into operation compressed air valves
which direct the steering i udder in such a way as to correct
the deviation. A torpedo, in fact, rushes through the water
along a zigzag path about two feet broad. The great
accuracy of modern torpedo firing is largely due to the intro-
duction'of the gyroscope. The tail section carries the two
screw propellers and the horizontal and vertical rudders,
each worked by a small auxiliary air engine supplied with
compressed air from the main reservoir, but entirely inde-
pendent of the main engine.
The auxiliary motor controls the horizontal rudder
automatically by means of the balancing mechanism, and
thus ensures a constant depth of immersion, while the motor
working the vertical rudder is controlled by the gyroscope.
The latest type 18-inch Whitehead torpedo contains a charge
of about 200 lb. of wet gun-cotton, and maintains a speed of
43 knots for 1,000 yards, 32 knots for 3,000 yards, and 28 knots
for 4,000 yards. The 21 -inch Whitehead torpedo carries a
charge of 300 lb. of gun-cotton, weighs nearly 2,000 lb., and
has an effective range of some 7,000 yards. A curve is given
showing the range and speed. The great increase in range
of the torpedo during the last few years is chiefly due to the
(ConiiHiud on page 2*Jd)
295
LAND AND WATER
February 20, 19 15
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LAND AND WATER,
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
THE new interest -which has arisen not un-
expectedly, but with great rapidity in
the present week is the German strategic
counter-offensive, which has at last been
undertaken in the eastern field. It is
the only great interest (by land) up to this moment
(Tuesday evening) and it merits particular atten-
tion. That interest alone will fill this week the
great bulk of these notes, reserving for next week S.
discussion of those doubtful elements on which may
be based an estimate as to the duration of the war.
This new German counter-offensive in the East
has various aspects, general and particular, with
which I DroTDOse to deal in turn.
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I.
LAND AND WATER
February 20, 1915.
THE GENERAL MEANING OF THE
MOVEMENT.
I.
The new counter-offensive taking place as it
does upon both wings of the enemy's lines between
Romuania and the Baltic has, in general, two dis-
tinct elements of the highest moment to us in the
West First it is apparent that the recent efforts of
the Eussians, though acting with inferior numbers,
have at last drawn the newly trained men of the
enemy to the East, not only in the regular drafts
which have been coming in for a long time past to
fill gaps, but in larger numbers, including probably
-whole new formations on a grand scale. The enemy
iias, therefore, decided that a violent new effort in
Poland is necessary to him, and that until some
sort of more or less conclusive result is arrived at
there he must continue to direct on to that field his
remammg reserves.
Secondly, it is obvious that this great move-
ment has not one co-ordinated strategic object.
This last point is really an important one for
us to seize. It is on a par ^vith so much that has
already appeared in this campaign that we cannot
afford to neglect it, and the lack of co-ordination
apparent in this new counter-offensive is perhaps
the chief adverse element to the enemy in the whole
problem — for on the north, that is, upon his left
wing, he is acting with a purely strategic object,
upon his right with an object largely political.
We must not misconceive the origin of this
double motive. It is not due to confusion, it is due
to necessity. In the north the political problem is
a clean one. Two great forces at the orders of two
great Governments with no serious neutral within
striking distance at all are at issue, and victory
or defeat will be determined by the action of exist-
ing armies alone. Therefore is it that the problem
the Germans are engaged in at the Baltic end of
their line is a piirely strategic problem.
On the other hand, the problem the Aus'fcrians
and Germans are engaged upon at the Carpathian
end of their line has become mainly a political one.
Here there is a powerful neutral — a neutral
capable of throwing. into the field nearly or quite
half a million men, a neutral whose capacity for
war, though not recently tested, is believed, inso-
much as this capacity depends upon organisation,
to be very high, and a neutral whose popular sym-
pathies are very well known to be opposed to our
enemies. That neutral is Roumania.
So long as the problem in the Carpathians re-
mained a strategic problem, so long was the
struggle a struggle for the northern passes, and
ultimately for the great transverse railway by the
use of which alone can an army in Galicia live
through the winter : so long was it secondarily a
struggle for the release of Przcmysl, but in the last
two weeks the German General Staff and their
Austrian Allies have evidently received news
which convinces them, rightly or wrongly, that
Roumania is in the act of deciding.
The whole weight of the campaign upon the
south, or right wing of the Austro-Germans, there-
fore, has swung as though upon an axis. It is but
three weeks ago that their main effort was directed
to the maintenance of the Dukla, of the Lupkow
and the Uszog, and not a month ago whein Russian
forces in Bukovina were steadily advancing, and
in one place CKirlibaba) had crossed the ridge of
the mountains.
To-day the new German bodies and the new
German drafts, which were here helping the Aus-
trians, and in every probability a great mass of new
Austrian troops as well, are doing more than hold
as best they can the Russian strength in the Dukla,
Lupkow and the Uszog Passes, while they are
bearing heavily against the Russians to the South ,
have forced them back well into Bukovina, have
passed the line of the Sereth River, and propose
to attack Czernovitz: the reason of this swing
being the desire or necessity of the Austro-Ger-
mans, first to produce the moral effect of impress-
ing Roumania in this neighbourhood, and secondly
to produce the local strategic effect of separating
if possible the actual Russian from the potential
Roumanian Army in the near future.
With these preliminary observations we can
examine the whole of the eastern field and the new
developments therein. And I propose to take that
examination in the following order: —
First. — To analyse the northern operations:
that is, in brief, to consider the lines of the Niemen
and Narew.
Second. — To examine the present situation in
the Carpathians.
Thirdly. — To consider what indications we
now have of the presence and extent of the new
enemy formations in both fields. Inadequate as is
the material upon this latter point, it must be
stated as clearly a3 possible, because what we shall
have to meet in the West in tlie near future de-
pends entirely upon what the enemy is having to
spend now in the East : he only has a certain num-
ber of men to go round.
I.— THE LINE OF THE NIEMEN AND
THE NAREW.
THREE points have been perpetually in-
sisted upon in these notes as the founda-
tions to any apprehension of the vVar in
ioland. These three points are : —
{a) The inferiority (which lis bound
to continue for some time to come) of our Allies in
numbers, in equipment and in amount of ammuni-
tion in the face of their enemy's superiority in all
three.
(6) The lack of railways upon our Allies' terri-
tory, coupled with the necessity of a railway to tb.e
functioning of a modern army, particularly in its
artillery.
(c) The all-importance of Warsaw as a bridge
and a railway nexus : its importance being such
that the Germans holding or cutting off Warsaw
destroy the offensive power of Russia west of the
Vistula and the San — that is, the offensive pov.er
of Russia against Prussian territory as a whole.
Now, in the light of these three principles, the
strategic object of the new German advance in the
north is perfectly clear. They propose to control
that one of the three main railways meeting in
Warsaw which runs northward and eastward—
the main international line to St. Petersburg.
With that in their hands the capture of Warsaw is
achieved. Munitions cannot in great amounts,
nor the newly equipped men as they probably
arrive in great numbers, supply the defensive of
the vital points or maintain that long line which
stretches across Poland from the mouth of the
Bzura almost due south to the Carpathians.
The natural defences lying along this line of
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
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LAND AND WATER
February 20, 1915.
railway and standing before it like a screen, shel-
tering it from a German advance, consists in two
rivers, the River Niemen and the River Narew.
In its detail it consists in the central part only of
the River Niemen (from the point (a) near Jurburg
to the point (b) near Grodno), of the Borbr, a tribu-
tary of the Narew ; of the Narew down all its latter
portion until it falls into the Bug, and of the Bug
up to its junction with the Vistula at Novo
Georgievsk.
The weakness and the strength of /this con-
tinued line are as follows: —
Its weaknesses :
First, its great length. It is in length from
where the Niemen enters German territory to
where the Bug, after receiving the Narew, falls
into the Vistula, excluding the sinuosities of the
rivers and taking only the straight lines between
one defensible point and another, more than 250
miles in extent.
Secondly, it does not, as does the Rhine, for
instance, form a complete barrier, because (a) the
last seventy miles or so of the Niemen run through
German territory and both banks of this lower part
of the river have been in Germa'n hands continu-
ously, so that a crossing here and the turning of the
line is easily effected, (b) There is a gap between
that point, Grodno, where the Upper Niemen
turns eastward and ceases to form part of the line,
and the point where the Borbr becomes available
as a line of defence.
Thirdly, the strength of the line has been
made to depend very largely upon permanent forti-
fications, and we know from the experience of this
war that permanent fortification has not the value
which it was supposed to have. Kovno, Olita,
Grodno, Osovwiecs and the string of fortresses on
to the Vistula are so many local strongholds, the
power of resistance of which it is now known will
depend much more upon the number of men that
can be spared for the defence of outer temporary
works than the existing inner permanent works— ^
that has been the universal rule ever since the be-
ginning of this war wherever a fortress has been
in question. Verdun is proving it to-day and so
almost certainly is Przemsyl.
Fourthly, not all these fortresses are of similar
value. The last one, Novo Georgievsk, has the
highest reputation, but many of them are of the
second class, or at least are reputed to be of no
greater strength.
The strength of the line, on the other hand, is
best seen when we examine it in detail.
The Niemen where it leaves the Russian terri-
tory is about 500 yards broad and a deep, navi-
gable stream till quite half-way between Kovno
and Grodno it retains this character to the full,
and even as high as Grodno or rather in the reach
which is below that fortress it is still a formidable
obstacle.
Secondly, just as the Niemen becomes
narrower, more winding and therefore more open
to an attack, the enemy finds himself in that con-
fused and difficult country which is the continua-
tion of his own Masurian Lake district. He is in
the midst of all that tangle of marsh, lake and
forest, the central town of which is Suwalki.
Thirdly, to the south of this, again, where a
small scale map suggests a mere gap between the
two rival streams, the defensive line is admirably
strengthened bv nature in two wavs. Therpi
is the great mass of forest several days'
march in length and breadth, which takes its
name from the town of Augustowo, and is con-
tinued in another great mass of forest southward,
while the V^alley of the Borbr, especially below
Osowiec and before it falls into the Narew, is ex-
ceedingly difficult of passage; vast stretches of
marsh, notably the Lafi and Wizna marshes, miles
and miles broad, interrupt any passage west to
east.
Fourthly, though topographically the weakest
part of the line, is the Lower Narew. This stream
is, below Ostrolenka, a very appreciable
obstacle, comparable in width, I believe, to the
Lower Gise, or the Thames above tidal water, and
having no natural passages. But, more important
than this is the fact that this last portion of the
line is within easy relieving distance of all the great
forces concentrated round Warsaw, and depending
upon the stores and the communications of that
principal depot of Russian Armies in Poland.
There is a good treble railway service to Ostro-
lenka and Warsaw, and nowhere more than one
day's march from the line or well within two days'
march.
Fifthly, and lastly, there should be noted
in the whole character of the line a particular topo-
graphical point which may very well prove of im-
portance in the near future, and which has an
element of strength in it against weakness due to
the fact that it can be turned in German territory.
That point is as follows : —
In the neighbourhood of the fortress of Kovno
the course of the Niemen turns a corner. It is all
very well to command both banks of the river in
the neighbourhood of the Prussian frontier, but
you cannot turn the line, in spite of commanding
the right bank, until you have fought your way
round a long detour right round Kovno. It is
strategically true to say that you must hold Kovno,
or at the least invest it before you can have really
turned the line of the Niemen. Therefore upon
Kovno, by all deductions from theonore obvious
necessities of the case, the German offensive must
be directed. Part of the present movement may
be regarded as a direct advance upon Kovno, for
there are forces moving along from Gumbinnen,
which forces had got as far as Wilkowj'szki last
Sunday. There are other forces following along
either bank of the Niemen itself, which forces had
at the same moment got about ten miles inside the
Russian border.
The going here is tolerable. There are cer-
tain local marshes of no great size across the
northern paths from Tilsit to Tauroggen, where
the northernmost German forces now are ; there is
an excellent causeway, and all that countrv down
to the Gumbinnen-Kovno line, a front of fifty
miles, is fairly well provided and tolerable in sur-
face, though it must be remembered that the alter-
nate frost and thaw of the season have rendered
the roads worse than usual. Alternate frost and
thaw, by the way, though more extensive this year
than usual, are not unknown in Northern Poland :
Napoleon's retreat of 1812, fol- instance, a little
south of this point (which legend has transformed
into an almost Arctic operation) proceeded, as a
fact, two months earlier in the year, through
exactly the same alternation of frozen roads and
thawing slush. It would have been less disastrous,
perhans. had the frost alwavs held.
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
Kovno, then, is the point upon which we shall both his pursuit of the Russians after Tannenberg
probably find our attention fixed during the next
few days. Any turning movement round Kovno
for the investment of that fortress meets with two
obstacles, with which I shall next deal.
Upon the right bank of the River Niemen
in front of Kovno, from the point of view of
the German advance along that bank there are two
obstacles, of which the one is far more serious than
the other. The first of these is the small River
Dubissa. The line of this stands at a rather less
distance from Kovno than does the line of the
Bzura and the Rawka from Warsaw. It is in the
twenty odd miles away at its junction with the
Niemen instead of in the thirties. It is important
to note this, because it is evident that the furnish-
and their earlier operations were conducted in
this difficult belt, the answer is that which I gave
last week, that until either party had sufficient
numbers equipped and ready neither could extend
its line so far up to the North as the open country
beyond the lakes and the Kovno-Tilsit district.
Now, with sufficient forces for reaching north of
the lakes and near the Baltic, to link up with the
general line, obviously the enemy, as much as our
Allies, will prefer the easier going, and the attack
will hardly develop its main strength in the
Suwalki, Kovno, Osiwiec dislrict.
That is why we hear of the Russians holding
their own at Lyck. They are holding their own
at Lyck because the main German forces are not
ing of a defensive front being, as it is, in the nature pressing in the centre at all, but to the north and
of the spokes of a fan, a certain amount of elbow-
room is of advantage. If you have to distribute
ammunition and food over a front, say, of thirty
miles from a point only five miles behind that front,
your extreme munitionment will be very much,
more hampered than your central munitionment,
and the co-ordination of your defences will be
adversely affected. Still, twenty odd miles is
enough for a radius, and the Dubissa might well
be the line upon which a defensive to prevent the
investment of Kovno upon the north would stand.
But the Dubissa is even at its approach to the
Niemen quite a small stream, and it slopes away
in its upper reaches from the Kovno position.
Much nearer Kovno, indeed about an hour or two
outside the western suburbs of that half-Polish
town, is a far more formidable obstacle, the
Niewiasa. This stream is deeper and broader than
the former. It is not defendable by marsh land,
but there is a considerable belt of wood in strips
along either bank, a feature which, unfortunately,
cuts both ways, but, on the whole, is better for the
defence in the situation of that particular line,
because the woods screen the massing of men
behind the river better than they do the massing of
men in front of it. The Niewiasa, then, is the lino
which would be the obvious position were it not
so near the town itself. The Wilia, a very formid-
able stream, which enters at Kovno itself, is, of
course, out of the question except at some distance
from the town, for the town itself is astraddle of
the water. Indeed, Kovno has only been fortified
because it affords protection to the junction of the
Niemen and the Wilia, just as Namur affords it
to the junction of the Sambre and the Meuse.
By this it is not meant that we shall see a stand
either upon the Dubissa or the Niewiasa. A line
of trenches might be held upon the right bank,
well forward of either position, or, again, a main
German advance from the south might be the chief
operation, but so far as natural obstacles are con-
cerned, these are the only two in the neighbour-
hood of the northern German advance.
Such being the elements of Kovno and its dis-
trict, (the point where Napoleon watched his
armies cross into Russia, his hands clasped behind
his back and he whistling " Malbrook." It was the
height of June; there was hardly darkness in
that high latitude, though it was but just past the
midnight), let us consider next the more southern
portions of the line.
The enemy has already experience of an
attempt upon the Grodno district, where he failed
so conspicuously last autumn. If it be asked why and of the Austro-Hungarian empire ?
to the south of it.
Now, when you get south of Osiwiec you are
on that string of minor fortresses Lomza, Ostro-
lenka, Roshan, Pultusk, Sierok, which all follow
the line of the river and repose upon the very
strong ring of Novo Georgievsk. Nevertlieless it is
to be presumed that a great effort will be made by
the enemy in this belt and probably a little to the
south of Ostrolenka. It is true that he bas here
no railway, but K"e has fairly good roads and a
railway to the north of him, not much more than
two days' march away on the frontier, and to the
west of him at (C), (C) from four days to nothing
according to his approach to that railway down the
river Narew. We may sum up and say that this
new German offensive in the north, not unexpected
in its nature, but somewhat unexpected in its
rapidity, will presumably include two different
operations — the attempt to invest Kovno and the
attempt to pass the Narew south of Ostrolenka.
Of these two operations the former definitely turns
the defensive line; the latter alone would imme-
diately strike at the great northern line of com-
munication of which Warsaw is terminus ;_and we
must again bear in mind at this stage that in the
two operations Kovno, which will be quite a sepa-
rate matter on the Russian defensive side from the
holding of the Lower Narew, is the easier task for
the enemy to undertake. But the stroke at Ostro-
lenka and south of it, should it be successful, would
be the more fruitful for the enemy because it would
lead, were it successful, to the cutting off of
Warsaw.
Meanv.-hile, the enemy is, as usual, making
everything he can of his advance in his reports:'
every bogged or disabled gun of the Russian re-
treat is counted, and every wounded man left
behind — while vague total numbers, obviously ex-
aggerated, are given us of his captures as he ad-
vances. But it is quite certain that there has as
yet been no decisive action in this field. The whole
business has been the retreat of half-a-dozen Rus-
sian corps before, perhaps, ten or twelve German
ones, just concentrated for this new effort.
II.— THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
F these are the conditions upon the extreme
left or northern wing of the vast line, and
if these purely strategic considerations de-
termine the actions there taking place,
what determines the corresponding action
upon the southern or right hand, where the
Roumanian border marches with that of Russia!
6»
LAND AND WATER
February 20, 1915.
I have already said in the remarks prelimi-
nary to this that the political factor was here
predominant.
It -mil be seen in the accompanying sketch
that there is jiothing to prev.ent Russian and
Romnanian forces from joining should Roumania
shortly go into the war, because a common fron-
tier between Russia and Roumania runs several
hundreds of miles. None the less a wedge struck
in by and including the position of Czernovitz
would cut the Russo-Roumaniau effort in two, for
it would cut the main railway which affects all
the eastern Galician and Bukowina portions.
The Austro-German advance in this region, which
would be very serious, already threatens that
railway. A mere gap or breach in the line, though
serious, would not be fatal. But a thorough occu-
pation by the enemy of the v/hole of Bukowina
would be a very different matter. There is no
good railway system running through the western
territory by which the Russian army in Galicia,
western and central, could act as one with an army
in Northern Roumania. The above sketch show-
frontier
Showing importance oF Czcrnovvitz as a
Railway Centix..
•»•—•—• l^ton tiers.
IV,
ing the railway system 'on either side of the fron-
tier is suiTicient to prove this. What the war's
fortunes may be here in the next few days we
cannot tell, but we can establish a criterion of tlia
enemy's success. If he occupies Czernovitz ia
force he has ia this region established his object:
for that town is the axis of all the railways.
Now, what about the Northern Carpathian
Passes where the enemy originally intended to
make his greatest effort, but from which he has
been diverted to this new southern effort against
Bukowina, and which are now in part held by our
Ally?
The position is very confused, and it is made
none the easier to understand by the fragmentary
nature of the Russian and of the Austrian com-
muniques.
Let us first state what we positively know.
We know that the Russians are over the crest of
the Dukla, we know that they are not yet debouch-
ing from that wide and easy valley on to the Hun-
garian plain below; they are not even yet at the
southern mouth of the pass. We knov,' that they
were some days ago across the crest of the Lup-
kow, and we have no ncv,-3 from the enemy (as we
surely should have if things were so) to the effect
that they have lost that advantage. But here again
we know that they have not yet advanced beyond
about half-way down the Hungarian slope, even if
they have for so far. Our Allies do not, so far as
I can gather, hold the crest of the Uszog. They
are still fighting on the upper torrents of the Saa.
They here claim certain successes, but their very
mention of the district proves that they are there
\ipon the wrong side of the hills. South of the
L^szog they are certainly every^vhere east of the
crest until we get to the Bukowina,. where, as we
have seen, they have fallen right back on to the
plain.
The general position is therefore to-day, or
was last Sundav, as in this sketch.
/
.^
0^ /
— Crest oj-' ICic^i
' Approxiwdtc f
Russians in Carpathians,
Sundai^. February l4-'-l91S
More than that we cannot say, but what vv^e
can gather both from the effort here and from the
effort hundreds of miles away in East Prussia, is
that the enemy, both Austrian and German, has
now begun to use very seriously the newly trained
men sent forward as drafts to replace losses, and
even the new formations with which we have so
long been threatened.
We further know that he is, for the moment
at least, making expenditure of these last reserves
of energy upon the eastern field. Let us turn,
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATEE
therefore, to the last point, which is a guess
— it can only be a very rough one — of what he has
to spend in this fashion, and of the proportions in
which this reserve fund of human energj' has
already been drawn upon in the hope of an imme-
diate decision in Poland.
III.— THE ENEMY'S USE OF NEW MEN.
UPON the two opposing sides, that of the
Germanic Powers and that of the
Allies, two contrasting elements of re-
serve power have appeared.
It is that contrast which lends the
clue to all the later phrases of the campaign, and
the development of that contrast should decide the
issue.
(That contrast is as follows : —
Roughly speaking, upon the Germanic side
there is a limited known reserve of man-power for
which equipment was prepared in sufficient or
nearly sufficient amount before Berlin forced the
war upon Europe. That is the advantage Berlin
obtains by choosing her hour for fighting and by
having spent over two years in making all ready
for the unexpected blow. The limitation of the
human forces at the disposal of Berlin and its
Allies is a necessary disadvantage.
Roughly speaking, Russia, Britain, and, to
a much less extent, France, have a certain elastic
reserve of man-power.
As to man-power France has some elasticity,
because (a) she did not expect to use her elder men
nor desire to do so, (b) she refused to use men
below the military age, (c) men exempted were as
a rule exempted wholly and not labelled for mili-
tary but non-combatant office (for the most part),
{d) she has a certain recruiting field in her colo-
nies.
Britain had a difficulty, but a much greater
elasticity. Her difficulty was that her new recruits
required lengthy training.
The difficulty of Russia lay wholly in the
tardiness of equipment. She had a large trained
reserve of men ; young men and very apt.
It must be remembered that the Germans,
having control of the Baltic, and having
through their Turkish alliance control of the Dar-
danelles, blockade Russia absolutely, save upon
those ports, Archangel and Vladivostok, which
are ice-bound at the critical period. The German
Government is neither afraid of neutrals, nor too
careful of financiers — who, for that matter, are
still laying their money all over the world on its
success. The German Government prevents any-
thing from getting into Russia that it can prevent.
This tardiness in equipment is the great han-
dicap on the allied side. But it is a handicap
which every day tends to remove. Therefore, the
Germanic Powers are, more than ever, fighting
against time.
Next, note that when the numerical prepon-
derance passes to the Allies, that moment will cor-
respond more or less xnth. the coming of better
weather, which will permit of a vigorous offensive
in the West, before it permits of a vigorous offen-
sive in the East, and remember that this vigorous
offensive in the West will, unless Germany gets a
decision in the East, be begun by the people who
have the initiative, who, in the West, are the
Frajico-Eritish forces. Next note that unless a
decision in the Eagt ig reached before the spring
the Germanic Allies are badly handicapped, espe-
cially in the northern field of Poland, by the state
of the roads in the general thaw that comes after
the winter.
Put all this together and you will remark that
Germany and Austria have it in their interest to
pui as many men as possible into the eastern field
just now.
Now, how long does it take to train a new
man, and in what way is he best used ?
It takes about six months, and after six
months you can use your man with fair confidence
even in large masses, hut he makes vei-y much the lest
material when he is mio:ed with existing units, and
very much the Worst when he has to act in large
nimibers upon his own account and imder the
leadership of his own officers, of whom but a small
proportion can be professional. To all these con-
siderations add the following and concluding
one: (1) That Germany had everything ready
for training a large untrained body espe-
cially earmarked as a recruiting ground, (2) that
Germany and Austria have lost very heavily —
much more in proportion than the Allies, (3) that
every factor in the struggle besides those men-
tioned (the factor of the imperfect blockade grow-
ing more perfect, the factor of enormous wastage,
the psychological factor of a populace dependent
upon self-confidence, the factor of the wastage of
cadres, the dynastic factor, the factor of the hesi-
tating neutrals — all but one of them anti-German,
etc.), makes it important for Berlin to impose an
inconclusive peace as soon as possible; take all
these considerations together, and it can only
be reasonably concluded that the Germanic
Allies have put into the field as many new men as
they can have found in equipment (for the six
months have passed), that they have drafted most
of these in as new material to feed the existing,
but heavily depleted units, that they have equip-
ment ready for such, and have therelore been able
to put them forward the moment they thought
them sufficiently trained, and, lastly, that they will
be very chary of using wholly new formations ; in
other words, that they have already very seriously
drawn upon. the actual human material available.
This new German and Austrian offensive in
the eastern field, of which the present week has
seen so striking a development, is, it may be
reasonably conjectured, the first considerable
effect of the new levies. It will be of the greatest
importance to one's judgment of the campaign to
see how those levies comport themselve?, and in
what numbers they would seem to have appeared.
The first of these elements lies in the future.
The second is susceptible of a rough — but only a
very rough — speculation.
Wc know that upon the West the enemy's
numbers have been maintained: had they not been
maintained a line of 400 miles, with quite 5,000
men a mile, could not have been held. We are as
certain as calculations can make it that the German
losses, allowing for the slightly wounded already
returned, or about to return, give us quite a
million and a-quarter men of absolute loss
and probably much more (the German Army
alone is here considered, because as the question
is one of proportion, its sole example will suffice).
Now, we are equally certain that numbers have
been mrantained in the Ea.st and even increased
before this offensive movement was begun. We
7*
LAND AND WATEH
February 20, 1915.
may then safely say tJiat a million and a-half new the elements we have fore-calculated, the duration
men and probably more have been drafted in in of the war. It is enough for the moment to sum
one way and another up to the present moment, up and to say that the enemy has already called
But, though there is a very active newspaper dis- up more than half of his margin of men, that he
cussion still raging upon the point, evidence has has been compelled to put his latest and large addi-
becn given in these columns to show that the avail- tion into the eastern field, that he is there expect-
able reserve of men (not boys) in Germany's hands ing an immediate decision, and that if he fails to
would not be very largely over two million : two obtain it he loill he unable to force a mere defcn-
million and a-half is certainly an excessive figure. sive upon the East such as he has established on
Well, then, it would seem that by whittling ilie West^ and will there/ore be unable either to
down every item so as to weight the balance against tuithdraw large forces from the East to the West
false expectations, we may justly say that the Ger- or to raise new men in drafts or new formations in
man Empire — and presumably the Austro-Hun- any considerable number.
garian also — had used and brought up something
like half of their available reserves in man-power
before this new counter-offensive was attempted.
iThat counter-offensive is proving serious
numerically and still has great' weight of men be-
hind it after more than a week of effort. The Rus-
sian retreat has been rapid, and it has been pro-
yoked, without a doubt, by the discovery of very
great bodies of men newly appeared in East Prus-
sia. The same is true in a minor degree of the
Austro-German success and of the corresponding
Russian retirement in Bukowina. It follows that
to the very heavy drafts of new men demanded by
the enemy's army before the recent movement, and trated uponlhis new development in Poland. In
But if he does arrive at a decision in the East,
then he has still a large margin of men — probably
equipped and ready — to come upon us with the
better weather, and to try and break the cord
which istill binds him in the West. He must act
quickly and while still the Polish weather "hampers
him, because his time in the West is drawing shorj;
and about the coming of the nightingales it may be
too late.
THE REMAINING FRONTS.
Everything of interest this week has concen-
amounting to probably more than one-half of their
total margin, there have recently been added
further large new forces, and the conclusion would
seem to be that the enemy is now not far from
having put into operation in one way and another
the greater part of his available reserve in men.
He may have a third of that reserve ^till un-
equipped, or for some other reason not yet usable
in the field ; he may have a trifle more. He has not
got a full half. And he is being compelled to use
the flower of this new and last material in the East
because our Russian Ally, with all their heavy diffi-
culties of equipment and their serious lack of com-
the West the stagnation has been almost deeper
even than in the v/eek before. The wooded height
(not quite 3,000ft. above the plain), which the light
Alpine troops carried in the Vosges fiVe days ago,
affords no more than an incident. The loss of a
French trench in the wood before Souain \vas upon
the same scale. The wood fighting of the Argonne
has had so little effect that if you trace it on the
map you find no more than a few paces won and
lost not in the decisive direction — which is north-
west and south-east — (for the Germans are trying
to close the buckle and the French to keep it open ),
but at right angles to that direction: the recent
munication and in spite of a strict blockade (which and unimportant conflicts of the Argonne have
he must wonder that the enemy does not also suffer!) been waged in the heart of the forest, not on its
in spite of still inferior numbers, and in spite of Verdun edge — and their front has faced away
that lack of railway facility which is the life of a from Verdun. The only other movement Worth
winter campaign in such a climate, has managed recording has been the attempt of the Germans to
to keep the eastern field unceasingly active and an shell the Allies out of their new trenches upon the
increasing menace to our opponents. 'We shall big sandhill east of Nieuport, and their failure
have discovered before this campaign is over that
we have owed very much to the invincible tenacity
of the Russian soldier.
The full consideration of these numbers, of
hitherto to recover what they lost here a fortnight
ago.
On the Servian frontier things seem to be at a
standstill. There is no news from the Caucasus
Ihe new formations and new drafts on the enemy's nor (at the moment of writing) any renewed at-
iBide, I will reserve for discussion next week upon tempt upon the Suez Canal.
NOTE.— Thli Articit hai been inbmittiil to the Prest Bnre&a, which doii not object to th« pablicatioa ai eeniorel and takei no
reiponslbllitjr for tha correctneti of tht (tatesienti.
Ii lecordanc* with the reQotrenienti of tbo Preii Barean, tha potltioni of troopi on Plant lllnstratin; thli Artlcla mnit on\y ba
regarded ai approximate, and no deflnita itrength at any point li Indicated.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NORTH SEA AND CHANNEL.
Hostile Submarine Bases.
IF Von Tirpitz has so far failed to create any particular
effect on our merchant shipping with his submarine
commerca warfare, he has certainly managed to attract
attention and arouse widespread interest in the ques-
tion of how the German submarines manage to act and
» _ keep going bo far away from their home ports. It
la impossible to reply individually to the scores of readers
who have sent in information or theories on this question,
60 I am here dealing with ihe matter in a general way.
Roughly, the -correspondence on this subject resolves itself
under two main heads: (1) Signalling and shore bases; (2)
independent sea supply.
As regards the first of these, the usual theory is that
stores exist at various places in these islands — not necessarily
on the ooasi! — and that they are taken out in small neutral
coasting steamers, times and places being signalled from tbo
shore. No doubt something of this sort has happened in the
«l»
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
past, and to some extent may contioue to happen ; as, despite
all vigilance, there are plenty of looely places from which
signalling is possible. On the oiher hand, a good many re-
ports about signalling have, on investigation, proved' sus-
ceptible of a simple " explanation "—though here, perhaps,
the culprit would be particularly careful to arrange for that I
The second group of theories is along the line that the
Germans, foreseeing the possibility of land stores being un-
earthed, have arranged a second string to their bow in the
shape of stores sunk at certain easily-located shallow spots, and
80 their submarines are enabled to keep the eea for practically
indefinite periods — the limit being running out of torpedoes.
There are no inherent diflScultiea in the way of obtaining
such submerged stores. They are sure to be "provided with
appliances which will make grapnel fishing for them quit©
easy, and once they are brought to the surface their trans-
ference to the submarine at night is a most simple proposition.
Mr. Simon Lake, U.y.A., inventor of the Lake sub-
marine, baa, however, been amplifying this matter to an extent
which— though no doubt useful to Mr. Lake as an advertise-
ment— has discouraged a number of people in this country
to a totally unnecessary extent.
One special feature of the Lake submarine is that it has
two submerged trap doors in ii's bottom. Through these doors
mines can be laid, or a diver explore the bottom of the ocean
quite as thoroughly as many a year ago Captain Nemo, of the
Nautilus, did in the pages of Jules Verne.
So far, so good. Cut Mr. Lake (or his interviewers for
him) has made the further statement that the German sub-
marines have adopted all his submarine trap-door devices.
So far as I can ascertain, they have never had the prescience
to do anything of the sort. Photographs of the sections of
tlie latest type of German submarine (presented by the Kaiser
to a German museum) give no indication whatever of any
such useful door. In any case, it is unnecessary for the
obtaining of underwater supplies. For that matter, the Lake
device, if I remember rightly, was originally advertised for
tJie quite unmilitary object of recovering treasure from by-
gone wrecks. To give a militant touch later on the obvious
alternative of mine-laying was substituted. But, so far as the
securing of previously laid under-water supplies is concerned,
submarine trap-doors do not aSect the question.
The Great Air Raid.
On February 12 a fore-e of thirty-four British naval
aeroplanes attacked Ostend, Zeebrugge, and district with a
.view to destroying communications and the German naval
base at Zeebrugge. Ostend railway station was more or less
destroyed, and mischief inflicted on the railway in several
places. It was, of course, impossible to ascertain the exact
damage inflicted, and it is important to note the official state-
ment that " no submarines were seen."
Probably directly the aeroplanes were sighted any sub-
marines at Zeebrugge promptly went below and remained
there till danger was past — their most sensible course. It does
not follow, however, that the German submarine service sus-
tained no damage. We maj' reasonably assume that there was
a submarine or two being put together, or, if not thai!, at
any rate, plant for the purpose which must have been con-
siderably damaged.
While it is wise not to exaggerate the importance of the
raid, there ar© several points in connection wiih it which
call for attention.
Of these, the chief seems to be the complete impotence of
the land fire. Seeing the large number of machines engaged
it might have been expected that what missed one would have
hit another on the principle of " firing into the brown." Also
a fair number of aeroplanes have been brought down during
the war by shell and rifle fire, and what has happened before
might well have been expected to happen again.
One inference is that the defenders were flurried with the
numbers of the attack, and so fired on no regular system :
but as the force probably divided and attacked several spots
simultaneously, tiis is a questionable hypothesis.
So we cannot make much out of this point, saving that
obvious anti-aerial gunnery is proved to be a very exact
science indeed, needing a great deal of training and probably
a good deal of natural aptitude as well. The ordinary " man
behind the gun " seems more or less completely harmless
against aeroplanes.
No dsiibt this will be remedied in time, buiI the selection
of suitable men and the necessary training is unlikely to bo
accomplished very quickly.
The lesson of most importance, however, is that the
aeroplane is the correct reply to the aeroplane. The German
offensive-defensive in this direction seems to have been ex-
tremely feeble or else non-existent altogether. It is this cir-
cumstance which robs the Ostend and district raid of its
importance as a .^uide and lesson, and makes "Great Air
yiclory " sound ultra- Yellow Press,
Of far more real importance probably was the foiled
German attack on Dunkirk, which has been chronicled merely
in short paragraphs. Here the Germans retired on findinjj
Allied aeroplanes prepared to fight ihem in the air. Their
position was roughly "Everything to lose and nothing to
gain."
One swallow does not make a summer, but herein may
lie the glimmerings of a new law which will eventually sharply
differentiate between war in the air and war as we know it
on land and water.
On the ordinary elements of the pasi it has been abund-
antly proved that victory is almost bound to go to the attack,
because it is able to select ita own time and place. At first
glance ihis seems even more true of the air. We do not
immediately recognise that the circle has perhaps been over-
shot, that the attack is hampered by having two objectives :
(1) Destruction of something on land; (2) Destruction of de-
fending aircraft which intervene. The defence, on the other
hand, has only the single objective of destroying the enemy.
Hence as time goes on we may expect to see aerial warfare
become more and more puzzling and intricate, and not im-
possibly a diminution in the number of air raids as
" counters " come to be more and more studied.
This, at any rate, seems to be the outstanding lesson of
Dunkirk; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, we may expect
at no distant date to see aerial warfare resolve itself into
something analogous to modern chess as played by the best
masters, or fencing as displayed by its leading exponents.
The surprise attacks of to-day will, in the future, come
to be regarded as inexpressibly crude amateur efforts, bear-
ing about as much resemblance to what will bo evolved as
the naval warfare of the early Plantagenet days bears to the
naval warfare of to-day.
This, perhaps, is the best illustration of any, for anyone
who has read history even in the most cursory way. In those
old days the French ships would casually sack an English
town, and the English ships as casually sink a French one.
Only very gradually was it discovered that the ship must
fight the ship for any military asset to be secured. Taking
the stupid bombardment of Scarborough, the Hartlepools, and
Whitby into account, it would look as though Germany has
not yet succeeded in arriving at a true military perspective.
If she turns out to be equally obtuse as regards the air, slio
is asking for trouble as surely as Persano asked for it at.
Lissa nearly fifty years ago.
Air power is governed by exactly the same inmiutable laws
as is sea power, only a good deal more so. By evading our
aerial defence it is perfectly possible for German aircraft
to do quite a lot of damage to London or other places. By
further evasion it is possible for them to return in safetj-.
The risks, however, are great, and while the mastery of the
air is in dispute, any such action is folly from the military
standpoint.
The Power which secures the mastery of the air will be
in exactly the same position as that which secures the mastery
of the seas — that is to say, able to bombard and destroy with-
out let or hindrance. I3ut the idea that the air admits of
substantial results from surprises and evasions is entirely
incorrect. It is pleasing to record that the fact that v.e
employed thirty-four aeroplanes to do to Ostend what could
have been done by half-a-dozen or so proves that we at least
have recognised the cardinal fact which governs aerial warfare.
The obvious inference is that we were out for a fight and
that the Germans declined action. If it means anything at
all it means that we have learned the lesson of the Plantagenet
Navies better than they. \Vhioh is all so much to the good.
■■ Grahame-^Vhite tumbled into the water ; Samson will prob-
ably emulate him soon. After that we shall have no more
air-deities, and the real business of aerial war will begin.
It will be a war in which there is no place whatever for
" heroes " — to be brutally truthful a war in which the bulk of
those engaged hope that every " hero " will die an early death.
I know the Naval Air Service pretty w^ell. It is not
afraid of anything that Germany can put up against it. But
it is in deadly terror of adulation from the sensational Pres.^.
The only thing the Naval Air Service as, a whole desires is
that whatever it achieves or does not achieve should be put
down to the Naval Air Service as a whole. In a general way
iheir motto may be summed up as: — "Do your job, but ba
careful to keep out of the limelight."
There is no one who hates the sensational Press quite so
much as the successful "air bug" or the successful "sub-
marine crab." By the time the eulogies on him are finished
he feels a veritable worm, and even his best friends regard
him in a somewhat similar light. It may sound strange: but
I know of more than one flying man who has funked things
for fear of being suspected of seeking big headlines in the
daily Press.
fi«
LAND AND WATER.
February 20, 1915.
The Blockade Threat.
B7 tho time these liaes axe in print, the momentoua
ISth Febru&rjr will have come and gone. Whether it will
be diSerent from the 18th January or the 18th December re-
mains to be sees. Personally, I am inclined to think it
will turn out to be a crude, attempt to induce Admiral
Jeliiooa to alter hia dispositions — hai-dly a promising echeme.
In any case, and supposing the scheme of piracy to be em-
)>arked on in » larger measure than heretofore, the Germans
will discover that, as Mr. ChurchUl hinted in bis speech in
the House of Commons, the resources of the British Navy
are by no means exhausted. The possibility of all German
food supplies being cut ofi aa a retaliatory measure may
vuitke von Tirpitz hesitate aa to the perfection of his scheme.
Also, quite apart from what the Navy may be doing,
the spirit of the British Mercantile Marine is, as we have seen
in the case of Captain Propert of the Laertes, hardly of a
nature to submit to the latest form of " Kultur."
Furthermore, if von Tirpitz has studied the psychology
of our First Sea Lord, he must be well aware that Lord
Fisher's "Kuthless, Eemorseless, Relentless," was and is
far more than a mere alliterative phrase.
A cleverly reasoned article in the Daily Mail this week
suggested that Germany's best move is to compel the U.S.A.
to make war on her, aa that would give her the opportunity
«f offering peace while power remains to her, on the grounds
that she could not fight all the rest of the world, and that
any refusal of the Allies to make peace, which would enable
Geimany to prepare for a farther struggle, would put
American sympathy on the side o^ Germany. This may
explain the " blockade."
Meanwhile, however, several neutrals are painting their
nationalities in large letters on the sides of their ships, and
all no doubt will eventually adopt this form of protection.
This will render more or less inoperative any use of th«
neutral flag by us — and there would be difficulties in the
way of adopting the neutrals' protective system.
The psychological moment will come if and when the
pirates sink without warning a British liner on board of
which are American passengers.
It is sometimes said that the ratio of " real Americans "
to the entire population of the United States is small, espe-
cially in voting power, and that immigrants of non-American
ideals are in the majority. Personally, I doubt this, except
perhaps in the case of German-Americans. Otherwise, after
a few years' residence, a high proportion of immigrants are
apt to become more American than the Americans. And
no real American is going to stand by unmoved and see his
fellow-countrymen left to drown because some German has
a notion about " frightfulness." Nor, if the American
nation be dragged into the conflict, does ft seem likely it
will love its enemies to the extent of enabling them to repeat
the performance on a more auspicious occasion.
GENERAL MATTERS.
G. P. (Oxford). — As the Germans have offici.illy stated
that their fleet took the offensive in the North Sea acfion, it
certainly looks on the face of it as though their official
announcement that three British destroyers were sunk was 3
" deliberate lie." Personally, however, 'l am still of opinion
that it was more' proBably an honest misconception on their
part. They saw one of our destroyers hit. and the speed at
which they were running away, coupled with the smoke, etc.,
would cause that destroyer to disappear almost instantlv, and
if a couple of boats slowed down io stand by, they 'would
also eeem to have disappeared and would he presumably sunk.
This is an undramatic explanation, but, in all naval history,
I believe that it is only the Turks and Chinese who have
deliberately circulated false official stories of successes. The
reasons for not doing so are not a love of the truth, but a
considergtion of the efiect on moral, should the lie be dis-
ct.vered in the country of the liars.
At first sight this seems discounted by the German state-
ment that they " took the offensive," but that!, after all, is
only our old friend's " strategic movement to the rear " ; and
I suppose that Hipper has long since explained to Von Tirpitz
that " offensive " meant endeavouring to draw Beatty into
a mine field. What we would like to believe and what we
Lave to believe are not always one and tlie same thinpr.
W. B. J. M. (Kensington), H. R. (Hampstead)', E. T.
(Liverpool), G. H. (Bournemouth), and others.— You will note
that I have dealt wiiii the submarine matters to which you
refer in the text this week.
P. J. B. (London, W.).— I am afraid that I cannot add any
further conjectures as to why Hipper did not return to
attack the Lion and Tiger. On page 15 of the issue of
February 6 you will find that the attempt to draw across a
mine field theory is the probable explanation.
A. G. C. (Barnt Green).— I have not read the pamphlet to
which you refer, but you may take it that the German oflicial
statement as to the loss of three cruisers and one destroyer
in the action off the Bight of Heligoland is quite correct.
There was so much fog about that it was impossible for ua
to ascertain the exact strength of the Germans. The four-
funnelled cruiser was probably the Boon or Torci. Very
likely she received a hit and hauled out of action. It has
further to be remembered that a ship can easily get a funnel
or two knocked out of her in action, and so subsequently be
presumed to be another vessel.
D. G. (Wales). — Your theory about « small coasting
steamer being in communication with the German submarines
is by no means improbable. As to the "well-dressed
strangers " in your district, 1 should say that your best course
is to picE a few private quarrels with them and learn what
language ihey use when Ihey are excited.
T. W. (Manchester).— 'Ao lost German destroyer to whict
you refer is, of course, S90. The other matter I am referring
to in the text, though, aa nothing has appeared about it iii
the Press, it may come under the ban of the Censor.
W. Y. (Athlone). — The idea of bullets containing phoa-
phorus or something similar in the base being fired at
Zeppelins is all right in theory, but, in practice, suffers from
tlie fact that hydrogen is not an explosive unless mixed with
air. Given enough such bullets ripping up one particular
bag, it is possible that an explosion might occur, but I doubt
if it is in the probabilities.
A. H. A. (Glasgow). — I have forwarded your informatioa
to the proper quarter.
R. D. B. (Dorset) and H. W. R. (York).— Something
similar to what you suggest is already in existence.
L. F. S. (London). — I do not think that there is anything
that our Navy does not know in the matter of locating mines
and sweeping for them. The device to which you refer is some-
what similar to that employed by Farragut's monitors in
the American Civil War. It was effective so long as it was
merely 3 question of the bow of the ship hitting the mine.
In the Russo-Japanese War it did more harm than good, as
this war saw the introduction of blockade mines — a couplo
of mines fastened together in such a fashion that on the
connecting cable being touched one mine would be brought
up against one side of the sEip and the other to the other.
W. McC. (Cornwall). ^1 have forwarded your letter to
the proper quarter. The story you tell me is interesting, but
you can trust the Navy to be very much on the look-out in
the distj-ict you mention.
L. L. S. D. (Leighton Buzzard). — The speed of 26.4 knot-s
assigned to the Blucher aa best speed in " fighting ships "•
merely indicated the maximum to which she reached for m
minute or two; the 25.8 was her best on the measured mile.
None of these fancy speeds go for much.
Tou have more or less caught me tripping about the
Torek. She ran on to German mines after the first attempted
East Coast raid. The four-funnelled cruiser " was either the
Boon or Torek," but the Torek having been previously dis-
posed of, it was, of course, the Boon, or one of the new four-
funnelled light cruisers still left in existence.
C. (St. Leonards). — See answer to the above.
H. M. (Hendon). — It is possible that the Brunton echeme
about which a letter appeared in the correspondence columns
last week, may have points about it, but I am afraid that
would not apply to your proposed improvements. Apart
from other questions the difficulties of fitting would be very
great. With reference to your two questions, any reply
would be censored. Your theory of detecting periscopes by
means of a masthead observation using a suitable colour
screen is decidedly interesting, and has the advantage of pro-
ceeding along a known basis. At any rate, it would be
worth trying.
J. T. S. (Ballyhooly). — (1) All the text-books give the
monitors engaged oS Zeebrugge aa carrpng two 6in. guns
forward and two 4.7 howitzers aft. The draught is given
as 8^ feet. (2) The amount of ammunition carried in super-
Dreadnoughts is ample for all needs, but it is not advisable
to state the exact amount. It may console you, however
to know that it is more than you estimate.
F. C. H. (Liverpool). — Certainly if a merchant ship
sighted a submarine, mado for her and let go an anchor at
the same time, and the submarine, submerged, were hit by
tJie anchor, something would undoubtedly happen. But aa
the submarine would be moving under water in the process
of diving, the chances of success do not s3em very great.
W. H. B. (Headingley). — Experiments for the detection
of periscopes are extremely interesting. I followed the
rough examples with much interest, and would advise you,
directly you have made a rough working model, to submit
it to the Admiralty without delay.
E. J. P. (Lowestoft). — Many thanks for your kind appre-
ciation.
(A large number of replies is unavoidably held over
until next week.)
10*
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE FUTILITY OF AIR RAIDS
THE EFFICIENCY OF AIR ATTACKS.
SOME POINTS IN AERIAL TACTICS AND STRATEGY.
By L. BUN DESBLEDS.
IN the mind of the puWic there exists a great misconcep-
tion about the moaning and the scope of an aerial
offensive, and the plucky raid of Friday, the 12th
inst., which was carried out with great skill and
valour by our airmen over tlie districts of Bruges,
Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe, and Ostend, has probably
increased that misconception instead of clearing it up. This
misapprehension, which appears to be shared by a great num-
ber of military critics, is due to the fact that there has been,
up to the present, a general failure to distinguish between an
aerial attack and an aerial raid. It is, of course, no easy
matter to draw a sharp distinction between an attack and a
raid, so far as the new weapon of war is concerned. The
attack and the raid are both offensive actions, which depend
not only upon the aerial force taking part in them, but also
on the relation which those offensive actions will bear to the
carrying out of a pre-arranged plan of operations. In his last
article the writer endeavoured to prove tv/o propositions :
■firstly, that so far as trench warfare is concerned, aerial raids
can only lead to local and temporary embarrassments, and can
have no important influence either on the character or the
duration of that kind of warfare; and, secondly, that, in
order to ensure the success of an aerial offensive at any place,
the various vital points must be subjected to a simultaneous
attack, and not simply raided. Additional confirmation of
this reasoning has been acquired, once more, by the exploit
of the 12th. That raid .'ilso affords us evidence that! those two
conclusions as regards trench warfare can be extended and
made to apply to other kinds of warfare as well. In fact, the
ennouncement issued by the Admiralty opens as follows: —
During the last twenty-four hours, combined aero-
plane and seaplane operations have been carried out by
the Naval Wing in the Brutres, Zeebrugge, Blanken-
berghe, and Octend districts, with a view to preventing the
development of submarine bases and establishments.
Here we have the object of the raid clearly set out. It
was " with a view to preventing the development of submarine
bases and establishments " that the raid was undertaken. Let
113 now see how far that object was achieved. The Secretary
of the Admiralty's announcement gives the result of the raid
in the following terms : —
Great damage is reported to have been done to Ostend
Railway Station, which, according to present information,
has probably been burnt to the ground; the railway
station at Blankenberghe was damaged and railway lines
wore torn up in many places. Bombs were dropped on gun
positions at Middlekerke, also on the power station and
German mine-sweeping vessels at Zeebrugge, but the dam-
age done is unknown. . . ,. . No submarines were
seen.
■Whether these results prove that the special object of the
raid has been, or has not been, accomplished, the writer would
not like to say in an article meant for publication. But there
is one conclusion which can, with certainty, be drawn from
the Admiralty report, and which cannot be controverted. It
is that whatever may be the real amount of damage done by the
raid, such damage can only cause local and temporary embar-
rassments, which may delay, but will not prevent for ever, the
development of those submarine bases and establishments.
The Admiralty further states: —
Thirty-four naval aeroplanes and seaplanes took
part.
Here we have the reason why Zeebrugge, Blankenberghe,
and Ostend are still available for the Germans to use as sub-
marine bases. If these places had been aerially attacked in-
stead of aerially raided, and if these attacks were constant and
continuous, the German bases on the North Sea would be gone
for ever. In his last article the writer has explained the
meaning of the " n-square law," which establishes the fact
that the fighting strength of any force varies as the square of
its numerical strength. He now proposes to bring forward
some other arguments which still further prove the value of
an aerial offensive on a comprehensive scale, and the necessity
for a large number of aircraft.
In Diagram 1, A B C D represent a vertical plane con-
taining the line of flight M N of an aeroplane, and B E H C
tka horizontal plane, or ground. If there is no wind — an
atmospheric condition which hardly ever occurs — or if tlie
wind, either Sk head one or a following one, is exactly in the
3---^-
A^
3>j/\CR/vJ>lX
line of flight M N of the aeroplane, a bomb, dropped from
the aeroplane at the point A, will follow a course which lies
entirely in the vertical plane and will strike the ground at
some point 0 lying in that plane. If, however, when the
bomb was dropped there was a wind blowing in some cros.s
direction W, the bomb would be driven by the wind out of
the vertical plane, and strike the ground at some point 0' out-
side the vertical plane. In the same manner, if the wind blew
in some direction W', the bomb would strike the ground on
the other side of the vertical plane A B C D. Now, since
at different altitudes, the wind may blow in different direc-
tion, it follows that a bomb, dropped from an aeroplane,
flying at a great height, may be swayed one way and then
another, and that that process may be repeated several times
before the bomb actually strikes the ground. Several methods
have been devised to steady the bomb in its downward course,
and a number of inventions have been made with the object of
reducing the influence of the wind on the bomb to a minimum.
The fact, however, remains that the influence of the wind oa
bomb-dropping cannot yet be ignored.
The factor introduced by the wind, which can be easilv
corrected by artillerymen on the earth, where the speed and
direction of the wind can be easily estimated, leads, in the case
of aircraft, to a difficulty arising from the fact that the force
and direction of the wind cannot be easily gauged by th';
airman who creates his own speed relatively to the air. The
conclusion to be drawn from the preceding remarks is that, in
the present stage of development of aerial ballistics, bombt
dropped from aircraft, at a great altitude, may fall either to
the right or to the left of the vertical plane containing the
machine, and that^ therefore, to ensure the efficiency of an
aerial attack bombs should be dropped from aeroplanes not
only in the vertical plane containing the target, but also in
other vertical planet to the right and to the left of that
target.
11*
LAND AND WATER
February 20, 1915.
From this conclusion we can deduce a formation 8uit<
able for an offensive aerial fleet which is indicated in Diagram
2, where A denotes the leader of an aerial squadron of nine
aeroplanes. In this arrangement the leading machine fliei
over the vertical plane containing the target, and there are
on each side of that plane four machines. If the bombs
dropped from the machines on the right of the leader are
blown by the wind away from the target, those dropped from
the machines on the left of the leader will be blown towards
the target.
The same arrangement for a larger number of aeroplanes
can be made as indicated in Diagram 3, where each dot re-
presents a machine, and an examination of that diagram will
make evident the importance of the number of the aircraft
necessary to effect an aerial offensive of real value.
THE
AND
COMING SIEGE OPERATIONS
THE INSTRUMENTS TO BE
EMPLOYED THEREIN.
COMPARISON WITH SEBASTOPOL.
By COL. F. N. MAUDE, C.B. (late R.E.).
THE resemblance between the present war of trenches
and the old siege warfare grows daily closer, and
from all my friends at the front I hear indications
of changes towards the more wholesome methods of
former days. Sapping and mining are going
strong, and every day we hear of mines exploded,
craters occupied, and successfully maintained, against the
enemy's counter attacks.
It is this successful tenure of the ground won that empha-
sises the advantages we are accumulating, for the holes blown
out by mines are mere death-traps for the troops that rush
them, unless and until their artillery has secured a consider-
able ascendancy over the enemy's guns and infantry. What
happens now is something like this. Before our mines are
exploded, our gunners have located and ranged upon every
German gun position in their section; then, as soon as the
mine is fired, and the crater rushed, every one of our guns
turns on the enemy, and covers their batteries with showers
of shell, thus rendering it impossible for them to interfere with
our men in the mine crater whilst they are engaged in convert-
ing the side towards the enemy into a fire position, and helping
them to scatter his columns as soon as they break cover for
the counter-stroke that inevitably follows every mine explo-
sion, whoever makes it.
We did exactly the same thing in the Crimea, and so did
the Confederates in the siege of Petersburg, and the lines cover-
ing Richmond.
Some day it may occur to the man on the spot that driving
mine galleries at the rate of one foot an hour in order to create
a moderate sized crater once a week is a very slow and tedious
method of progression when one's howitzer shells will produce
as many craters, big enough for the purpose, and, moreover,
grouped with sufficient accuracy, wherever and whenever you
please. Then we shall adopt a far more rapid and secure
method of progression than any we have hitherto tried. The
idea is in the air; I have watched it coming for a long time,
and one day we shall wake to find its universal application.
Meanwhile we are also beginning to find out that trenches,
in themselves, are nothing; it is only the iiocn inside them that
render them unassailable; and as week by week the quality of
our adversaries deteriorates, our operations will crystallise out
into a more co-ordinated form, and we shall begin to apply in
B more drastic manner the resources we possess for localising
the defenders in each separate sector of the front, and apply-
ing to them in a modified form, but equally effectively, the
methods of isolation from supplies and reinforcements which
have always in the long run undermined the soul of the defence
with the greatest certainty. Men may get accustomed to shell
fire, and grenades, etc. ; they never become acclimatised to
hunger and cold.
Our chief support in this coming phase of the campaign
will be our airmen, and the manner of their operation is
clearly foreshadowed by the raid on the Belgian coast last
.week.
What happened there, locally, will soon be general, at
chosen points, all along the front, and until the Germans can
find men as bold and daring as our own there is no protection
for them from this form of attack.
Raiding the node points of the enemy's communications,
whether by road or rail, they will gradually make the supply
of the men in the trenches almost a matter of impossibility ;
and as our gunners gradually work up under cover of our,
trenches to ever closer ranges, their shells will go flying miles
beyond the enemy, tearing up the roads between the dep6ts
and the front, until the supply of food and small arm ammu-
nition, to say nothing of heavier articles — trench mortars, rolls
of wire for entanglements, etc. — becomes practically ruled out.
We know what our men suffered during the first months, when
all the advantages of heavy artillery, searchlights, and so
forth, were on the enemy's side. We have been profiting
largely by that experience, and intend to improve on the
example given us.
All this it needs no prophet to forecast. It is all in the
course of natural evolution. We are passing rapidly through
the same cycles our ancestors traversed again and again in the
past; the objects before us were always the same, and all we
have had to do has been to adapt our new means to the acquisi-
tion of the same ends. In the Crimea we had no searchlights,
but we used star shell and carcases (smoke shells) for the same
purpose, and when our siege train proved inadequate we
brought out and employed heavier weapons in numbers never
before thought of. We even went beyond the mechanical skill
of the age, and designed a 36in. mortar, by the side of which'
Krupp's much-vaunted 42 cm. mortars would have looked
mere babies. But the war ended before this monster could be
brought to the front, and it was concluded, as I think this one
will, by the sudden and complete collapse of the moral will
power of the enemy.
We had never succeeded in easily investing him. Supplies
could still, with difficulty, get through to the last, but the cease-
less strain of slaughter and the hopelessness of relief gradually
undermined his powers of resistance, and the end came
abruptly with the storming of the Malakoff by the French, an
operation in which MacMahon's Division of the French Army
lost nearly 50 per cent, of its men in a rush from the trenches
of barely 200 yards. That night the enemy was in full re-
treat, and at some time not very far off a similar assault (in
which, I hope, we shall play a more distinguished part than
we did that day), only on a far greater scale, will bring about
a similar result.
Men remain human beings only, and like causes produce
like effects, whatever the weapons may be by which these
causes are set in operation.
The current issue of the Asiatic Review is noteworthy, in view of
the present prominence of mattera Grecian, for an article on "Greece
and the War," by Professor Platoa Drakoiiles, who ranks as one of
the principal authorities on Greek afEajrs, standing probably gecond
only to Mr. Venizelos himself. The article, dealing as it does with
the policy of Greece, the rise of the Young Turk party, and the elcmenta
out of which the present situation in the Balkans has arisen, is a
valuable contribution to current war literature. Other interesting
articles, inclnding "England, Turkey, and the Indian Mohammedans,"
by Syu'd Hossain, and a descriptive sketch of the Cocos-Keeling
Islands, where the Emden was destroyed, make this an extremely topical
ajid reada^bla number of the Asiatic^
12*
[February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
A DIARY OF THE WAR.
SYNOPSIS.
AuQDST 3ed. — Sir Edward Grey stated British policy aud revealed
Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting our obligationa
to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatum to Germany.
German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.
August 4th. — Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English
Government took over control of railways. War declared between
England and Germany.
August 5th. — Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of State for
.War. H.M.S. Amphton strucli a mine and foundered.
August 6th. — House of Commons, in five minutes, passed a vote of
credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by
600,000 men. State control of food prices.
August 8ih. — Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000
men.
August 9ih. — The enemy's submarine, U15, was sunk by H.M.S.
Pirmingham.
August 10th. — France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans
advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by the
Government for the issue of official war news.
August 11th. — England declared war against Austria.
August 15th. — The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish
populations of Itussia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to
Poland complete autonomy and guarantees for religious liberty and
the use of the Polish language.
August 16th. — Japanese ultimatum to Germany demanding the
withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.
August 17ih. — The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in
France.
The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.
August 18th. — General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien appointed to com-
mand of an Army Corps of the British Expeditionary Force, in suc-
cession to the late General Grieraon.
August 20ih.— The Servians gained a decisive victory over the
Austrians near Shabatz.
August 21st. — The German forces entered Brussels.
August 22nd. — Servia announced that their army had won a great
.Tictory on the Drina. The Austrian losses were very heavy.
August 23aD. — Japan declared war on Germany. The Russian
army gained an important victoi'y near Gumbinnen against a force of
160,000 Germans.
August 24th. — It was announced that Namur had fallen.
The British forces were engaged all day on Sunday and after dark
in the neighbourhood of Mons, and held their ground. Luneville was
occupied by the Germans.
August 27th. — Mr. Churchill announced in the House that the
German armed merchantman Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse had been sunk
by U.M..S. Highflyer on the West Africa Coast.
August 28th. — A concerted operation was attempt-ed against the
Germaua in the Heligoland Bight.
The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the Maim. The First
'Batlla Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, Koln class, and another
cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, ^nd in a sinking
condition.
Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged. The total
British casualties amounted to si.xty-nine killed and wounded.
Lord Kitchener announced that " The Government have decided
that our Army in France shall be increased by two divisions and a
cavalry division, besides other troops from India."
SErrEMBEB 1st. — The Russians met with a check in East Prussia,
but wore successful in minor engagements in Galicia.
SErrEMBEB 2nd. — Continuous fighting was in progress along almost
the whole Hue of battle. The British Cavalry engaged, with distinc-
tion, the Cavalry of the enemy, pushed them back, and captured ten
guns. The French Army gained ground in the Lorraine region. Tho
Kus&ian Army completely routed four Austrian Army Corps near
Lemberg, capturing 150 guns.
SEPTKMBEn 3ed. — The French Government moved to Bordeaux.
September 4th. — The Russian Array under General Ruzsky cap-
tured Lemberg, and the Army of General Brussiloff took Halicz.
Septembeu 5ih. — The formal alliance of lingland, Franc?, and
Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three
Governments concerned, binding each nation to conclude peace, or
discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies.
SsrTEMBEH 6th. — It was announced that the scout-cruiser Path-
finder foundered on Saturday afternoon after running upon a mine.
September 7ih. — General Joflre's plans were being steadily carried
out. The Allied forces acted on the defensive and were successful in
checking and forcing back in a north-easterly direction the Germau
forces opposed to them.
September 8th. — The Allies gained ground on the left wing along
the line of the Ourcq and the Petit Morin river. Here the British
troops drove the enemy back ten miles. Further to the right, from
Vitry-le-Franoois to Sermaise-les-Baius the enemy was pressed back
in the direction of Rheims.
SEPTEj.ir.Eii 9th. — The English Army crossed the Marne, and the
enemy retired about twenty-five miles.
September 13tii.— On the left wing the enemy continued his retreat-
ing movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive
to the south of Lierre.
Septembee 14th. — AU day the enemy stubbornly disputed the
passage of the Aisne by our troops, but nearly all the crossings v.ere
secured by sunset. On our right and left the French troops were con-
fronted with a similar task, in which they were successful.
September 15th. — The Allied troops occupied Rheims. Si.'c hundred
prisoners and twelve guns were captured by the Corps on the right
of the British.
September 16th.— Submarine E9, Lieutenant-Commander Max
Kennedy Horton, returned safely after having torpedoed the German
cruiser Hela six miles south of Heligoland.
Septemskb 19ih. — The Russian Army seized the fortified positions
of Sieniawa and Sambor.
The British auxiliary cruiser Carmania, Captain Noel Grant, Royal
Navy, sank the Cap Trafalgar off the east coast of South America.
The action lasted one hour and forty-five minutes, when the German
ship capsized and sunk, her survivors being rescued by an empty
collier.
Septembee 22nd. — H.M. ships Aboulir, Hague, emd Cressy were
sank by submarines in the North Sea. The Aboukir was torpedoed,
and whilst the Hague and the Cressy had closed and were standing
by to save the crew they were also torpedoed.
Septembee 23bd. — British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered
an attack on the Zeppelin sheds at Diisseldorf and Flight-Lieutenant
Collet dropped three bombs on a Zeppelin shed.
September 27tb.— Between the Oise 9nd the Somme and to the
north of the Somme, the battle continued along a very extensive front
with perceptible progress on our part. By the evening our troops
regained the ground they had lost. Between the Argoune and the
Meuse there was nothing new to report.
Septembee 28th. — At certain points, notably between the Aisne
and the Argonne, the enemy made further violent attacks, which were
repulsed.
OcTOBEE 1st. — Jhe arrival of the Indian Expeditionary Force at
Marseilles was annoonced.
OcTOBEB 2nd. — His Majesty's Government authorised a mme-
laying policy in certain areas.
OciOBEB 6th. — In Russia the German army, which was operating
between the front of East Prussia and the Niemen, was beaten all
along the line and retreated, abandoning a considerable quantity of
material.
Octobeb ^h. — The British naval airmen carried out another aao-
cessful raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Dusseldorf.
Octobeb IOth. — Death of King Carol of Roumaniai.
October 11th. — The Russian cruiser Vallada was sunk in the
Baltic by a German submarine.
Octobee 14th. — The Belgian GSovemment removed from Ostend to
Havre.
Octobee 15ih. — H.M.S. Yarmouth (Captain Henry L. Cochrane)
sank the German liner Maxkomania off Sumatra, and captured the
Greek st«amer PorUoporoi.
October 16th.— H.M.S. Hawle (Captain Hugh P. E. Williams,
B.N.) was attacked and sunk by submarines.
October 17th. — The new light cruiser Undaunted (Captain Cecil H.
Fox), accompanied by the destroyers Lance (Commander W. de M.
E^rton), Lennox (Lieut. Commander C. R. Dane), Legion (Lieut. C. F.
AUsop), and Loyal (Licut.Commander F. Burges Watson), sunk four
German destroyers off the Dutch coast.
October 25th. — A German submarine was rammed and sunk by
the destroyer liadger (Commander Charles Fremantle, R.N.) off the
Dutch coast.
October 29th., — ^Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg re-
signed his position as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
October 31st. — H.M.S. Hermes was sunk by a torpedo fired by a
German submarine in the Straits of Dover.
November 2nd. — The Admiralty declared the whole of the North
Sea a military area.
November 4th. — It was reported that the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Leipzig, Dresden, and Niirnberg concentrated near Valparaiso, cmd
that an engagement was fought on November Ist The Monmouth was
sunk and the Good Hope very severely damaged. .The Glasgow and
the Otranlo escaped.
Novembee 5th. — The German cruiser Torch struck the minei
blocking the entrance to Jahde Bay and sank.
November 7th. — The fall of Tsingtau was annoonoed.
Novembee 10th. — The Emden was driven ashore and burnt at
Keeling Cocos Island by H.M.A.S. Sydney (Captain John C. T.
Glossop, R.N.). The Konigsberg was imprisoned in the Rufigi Island
by H.M.S. Chatham.
Novembee 11th. — H.M.S. Niger (Lieut. -Commander Arthur P.
Muir, R.N.) waa torpedoed by a submarine in the Downs, and
foundered.
Novembee 14Tn. — Field-Marshal Lord Roberts died f,t the Head-
quarters of the British Army in France.
November 23rd.— The German submarine U18 was rammed by a
British destroyer, the Garry, off the coast of Scotland.
November 26th. — H.M.S. Bulwark blew up in Sheemess Harbour.
December 8th. — A British squadron under Vioe-Admiral Sir
Frederick Sturdee sighted off the Falkland Islands a German squadron
consisting of the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Niirnberg, Leipzig, and
Dresden. Three of these five warships were sunk, including the flag-
ship of Admiral Count von Spee. The two others fled from the action
and were pursued.
Decembeb &rn. — Valievo was retaken by the Serbians, who ener-
getically pursued the Austrian forces.
Decembeb IOth. — A further telegram was received from Vice-
Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee reportipg that the Niirnberg was also
sunk on December 8.
Decembeb 13th. — Submarine Oil, Lieut. -Commander Norman D.
Holbrook, R.N., entered the Dardanelles, and, vn Bpit« of the diflBcult
current, dived under five rows of mines «)d torpedoed the Turkish
battleship Messvdiyeh, which was guarding the minefield. When last
seen the Messudiyeh was sinking by the stem.
Decembeb 16th. — In the morning a German cruiser force made a
demonstration upon the Yorkshire coast, in the course of which they
shelled Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough. They were engaged
by the patrol vessels on the spot, and a British patrolling squadron
endeavoured to cut them off. On being sighted by British vesse!«
the Germans retired at full speed, and, favoured by the mist, suc-
ceeded in making good tbeir escape.
LAND AND WATEE
February 20, 1915.
Decimbbb 17th. — Great Briiain proclaimed Egypt a British Pro-
tectorate.
Decembkb 24th. — A German aeroplane dropped a bomb into »
rarden at Dover, doing no great damage and causing no casualties.
Dkcembeb 25th. — A Gennan aeroplane flerw over Sheemess. Pur-
rued by three British machines end fixed on by anti-aircraft gun* it
made ofl towards the East Coast.
British cruisers, destroyers, submarinea and seaplanes made a com-
bined raid on German warships lying in the roads o£f Cushaven. Our
ships while rtanding by to pick up tiie seaplanes, were lliemsc'.ves
attacked by enemy Zeppelins seaplanes, and submarines. They beat
off the attack and succeeded in picking np three out of the seven
airmen with their machines. Tliree otlier pUoU who returned later
were picked Tip, according to arrangement, by British Bubmariues,
which were standing by, their machines being sunk. The extent of
the damage by tie British airmen's bombs cannot be estimated, but
all were discharged on poiu4.a of mUitary significance.
January 19th. — German aircraft raided the iilast Coast in the
tvening and dropped bomI)s on Yarmouth.
January 34th. — Early in the morning a, British patrolling squadron
sighted three German battle-cniisers and an armoured cruiser, the
Bliicher, steering westwards. The German warships turned and made
foT home, but were brought to action. The Bliicher was sunk, and
two oither German battle- cruisers were seriously damaged.
Januaby 26ita. — On the Yser front Belgian troops made progress in
Lhe Parvyse district.
Near La Bassce, at Givenchy and Cuinchy, the enemy delivered
fi^e wttacks on the British lines. After having made Blight progress
Uie Germans were driven back.
Jancahy 27th. — ^In the region of Perthes, on Hill 2C0, four violent
attacks by the enemy were repulsed.
At St. Mihiel we destroyed the new pontoon bridges of the enemy
an the Meufie.
January 28th. — In tie Vosges we made appreciable progress to the
north of Senones, on the slopes of the Signal de la M^re Henry.
We also progressed in Alsace in the region of Ammertzwiller-Btirn-
banpt Le Bas.
January 29th. — In Belgium, in tie region of Nieuport, our infantry
fained a footing in the Great Dune. A German aircraft was brought
down by our guns.
January 30th. — Before Cuinchy, near La Eassee, the British Aimy
repalscd the attack of three German battalions.
January 31st. — In the sectors of Arras, Roj-e, Soisson«, Remis, and
Perfies our batteries destroyed two of the enemy's guns, several
works, and a certain number of mortars, and dispersed several concen-
trations of troops, bivouacs and convoys.
Fbbbuart IST. — ^The enemy violently attacked our trenches to the
north of La Bassee-Bethune road. Ke wa.s repulsed, and left numerous
dead on the ground.
FBBauABY 2nd.— The Turks attempted to croas Uie Suez Canal near
Tussum.
They were allowed to bring their bridging material to the bank
■mnolested. When the bridging operations had actually started we
attacked them. Our attack was completely successful. The er.cmy
fled in disorder, leaving the whole of the bridging material in our
hands, and some of t'ue enemy were drowned in tie Canal.
The enemy also attacked us on the El liautara front, bat were
easily repulsed.
February 4th. — In tie district of Albert and Quesnoy-en-Sauterre
»e destroyed several blockhouses.
In the Woevre, in the valley of the Seille, we obtained advanced
post successes and scattered son:e of the enemy's convoys.
February 6ih. — In Champagne, north of Beausejoar, our troop*
made slight progress during the night.
February 7th.— Between the Canal and tie BethuneLa Bass^
n>ad, at a point one kilometre to the cast of Cuir.chy, a brickfield,
where the enemy had maintained himself up to the present, was
captured by the British.
(fEBRUABY 8th. — To the south-west of Carency we m.ade a successful
coup de main on a German trench, which was wrecked by a mine, and
lie defenders of which were killed or captured.
To the west of Hill 191, to the north of Massiges, our batteries
ct&cked an attempt to make an attack.
A DIARY OF THE WAR
DAY BY DAY.
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9th.
The enemy bombarded Soissons, Furnes, and Ypres.
In the Black Sea Russian cruisers bombarded a Turkish
battery near Ti-ebizond and sank a steamer with her cargo,
&nd the Turkish cruiser Breslau bombarded Yalta.
The Wilhdmina, the United States ship laden with food
for Germany, arrived at Falmouth.
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 10th.
In the West insignificant encounters mainly confined
to artillery firing and thi'owing cf bombs.
In the East the Germans lost tens of thousands of men
during their six days' attack on the left bank of the Vis-
tula.
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 11th.
German forces amounting to about a brigade made an
attack on the Marie Therese works in the Argonne.
The enemy delivered a violent bombardment against
Nieuport and the banks of the Yser.
The Russians fell back from the line of the Masurian
Lakes towards their frontier.
FRIDAY. FEBRUARY 12th.
Thirty-four British aeroplanes and seaplanes Hia.de a
raid on the Belgian coast ; considerable damage was done to
the enemy's bases and establishments.
Flighl^Commander Grahajne^Wlhite fell into the eea oft
Nieuport, but was rescued.
An attack by the enemy in the direction of Arracourt
was repulsed.
In the Vosges French Chasseurs carried Hill 957 with
insignificant losses.
SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 13th.
In Belgiv:m there were some artillery duels.
At La Boisselle we exploded a mine and occupied tho
cavity.
The enemy bombarded the villages of Bailly and Tracy-
le-Vaz. The heavy artillery reached the railway station of
Noyon.
SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 14th.
Tliere were artillery duels in Belgium between the Oise
and the Aisnc, and in Champagne. In Lorraine, in tho
region of Pont-a-Mousson, we delivered a counter-attack
against the enemy, who had occupied Norroy, and who had
gained a footing on the adjacent height. The fight con-
tinued.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15th.
We carried about 250 metres of a trench between
Bethune and La Bass^e. In the Argonne, in the direction
of Bagatelle and Marie Therese, the struggle continued very:
stubbornly from trench to trench.
In Lorraine the enemy succeeded in occupying the
height of the Xon Beacon and the hamlet of Korroy. He
was repulsed by a counter-attack as far as the slopes north
of the beacon, where he still maintained himself Ln eomo
portions of trenches.
CORRESPONDENCE.
We are receiving daily numerous letters from our readers dealing with the military and naval situation, also
suggestions regarding inventions. It is only possible in these columns to reply to a fev/ of them, but we take
this opportunity of assuring our correspondents that the subject matter of theil letters are carefully dealt
with and forwarded to experts.
THE MAN IN THE STREET.
To the Editor of Lakd kso Watek.
SiH, — In your last issue a "Coast-dweller in Cornwall."
*ook upon himaell to pose as the " Man in tho Street," and
in that capacity to indulge in a violent diatribe against Mr.
Churchill.
It might be interesting to l«axn on what grounds the
gentleman Lq the neighbourhood of Land's End claims to be
tba mouthpiece of public opinion, but as " an individual in a
neighbouring by-way " I should like to protest against his
•asumption of the title on this occasion, not because I think
that Mr. Churchill may be perturbed by such condemnation,
but because I have a feeling of sympathy for the " Man in tho
Street."
The "Man in the Street" has a sense of justice, and
regards with repugnance the idea of condemning a man
unheard on th« basis of rumours and suppositions. He does
not desire to condemn Mr. Churchill until the facts are known
and any charges against him proved. If Mr. Churchill has
made mistakes (ia it not a privilege even of greatness?) ho
will have to face fair and straightforward criticism when those
mistakes are proved ; but may we be preserved at such times
as these from the carping criticisms of the armchair type J
Would the "Man in the Street" look with favour on the
insinuation that " the ' Formidable ' disaster was probably
owing to Mr. Churchill's defiance of naval advice, and in hi
belief that he is a second Nelson"? "Probably," forsootkl
Does that word convey the impression of fair criticism 7
Incidentally, I may mention that many men in many
London streets have given Mr. Churchill the credit for the
mobilisation and readiness of the Navy at the beginning of
August, and in consequence he was, and in my opinion is
still, a favourite in the eyes of the public.
I might also mention that there was a successful raid
made by naval aeroplanes last week. Perhaps, if any aero-
planes had been lost, their loss would be due to Mr.
Churchill's belief that he is a second B16riot 1
I do not desire to put myself forward in opposition as
the " Man In the Street," and I therefore sign myself, — Yours,
etc., A LAlSSLUiiB£& I« AN At.i.f.t.
1<1*
February 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
CRITrCISING THE ADMIRALTY.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir. — Mr. Jane'i comments upon my letter in current
issue are so elusive and wide of the mark as to render further
correspondence nugatory, but I crave permission to state dis-
tinctly that Mr. Jane has all along refrained from and depre-
cated criticism of the Admiralty, and, further, that many of
us were under the impression that ' ' a feeling of ease and
security in the civil population " was one of the results to be
expected from the presence of our North Sea fleet I — Yours
truly, E. H.
Hatch End.
•vreapoa being used is sound, and the danger of causing fireg
could not be too carefully impressed on the users^ — Youri
faithfully^
Francis SArNDERS,
Lieutenaut Commander.
[N.B. — It is highly improbable that the War Office would
permit any unauthorised body of men to form euch a coipi
as suggested by the writer. — Editor.]
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Deas Sir, — I ara quit© in agreement with your corre-
spondent, " E. H.," who contends that " withholding of frank
criticism of our Admiralty and other departments would
be harmful," but a criticism to be of value should be en-
tered upon with a full knowledge of the points criticised.
The very fact that your contributor speaks of " repeated
successful demonstrations by the enemy on our East Coast"
ptoves both that ho has only a surface knowledge of the
incidents, and also that the East Coast folk who are better
informed are, like Brer Rabbit, " lying low and saying
nuffin."
As an East Coast resident, let me assure "E. H." that
no feeling of "insecurity and unea^siness " exist-a among the
East Coast people as a whole. We are taking our risks vrith
the rest of our countrymen, and are quite convinced that,
while Fisher, Scott, Wilson, Jellicoe, etc., remain at their
respective posts, there will be very little call for a layman's
criticism..
Let our friend ask the first Jack Tar ho meets on
leave how things are going. He won't be told tunything,
but the broad grin that will develop on Jack's face should
reassure him. i".
THE LINE OF THE RHINE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
SiB,''-May I oall attention to what would appear to be
a flaw in Mr. Belloc's otherwise cogent reasoning in his all-
important argument in regard to holding and falling back
to second, or third, defensive linos. Throughout he
aiBSumos in each illustration, though he omits to say
so, that the physical characteristics or natural strength
of each alternative position is equal — the only factor
he deals with being the comparative length of each. When,
he applies his reasoning to the several lines 1, 1, 1, 1, " the
present "—2, 2, 2, 2, " Antwerp, Namur, Metz, Swiss fron-
tier " — 3, 3, 3, 3, " Liege, Metz, Swiss frontier," aad finally
to " the line of the Rhine," he IfglTtly dismisses the latter
as negligible on account of its greater length.
It is true he refers to Grerman political essentials In this
connection, but it is to be remembered that they have already
undergone considerable modifications, and, it is to be hoped,
will have to submit to further ones.
I devoutly trust I am mistaken, but the natural strength
of the line of the Rhine, backed as it is by numerous
parallel railways, has always appeared to be one that might
well be effectively held by a relatively smaller force, and
certainly by a much smaller one than now opposed to us in
the west. — Yours obediently,
S. AiTHtTR PetO.
Downs Court, Sandwich, K«Bt.
MOTORS AND AIR R.\IDS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Through the agency of your interesting paper,
would it be possible to collect a number of owners of motor-
cars or motor-cycles who could be issued with rifles and
specially-prepared ammunition as recommended by your cor-
respondent, Mr. Arthur Beckett, in your issue of January 9.
Since his letterr was written Zeppelins have visited this
country, and so far as we know returned to Germany without
injury.
These pests may come again any calm night, and it is
clearly time to find an antidote in any part of the country.
Should one of these phosphorous bullets ignite the gas in a
Zeppelin balloon, as Mr. Beckett claims, I venture to say the
destruction of one or two -with their crews woulfl prevent our
German friends again favouring us with their attention.
The owner of a car or cycle would have the advantage of
local knowledge, and could choose his own site from which to
lattack.
Mr. Beckett's remark on the advisability of a small bore
HARDENING HORSES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — ^After, years of practical experience in handling
horses, especially in America, 1 am concerned to note t'uat
numbers gathered for our New Army have been lost through
being picketed out unsheltered in exposed situations.
Of course, for campaigning horses must get used to expo-
sure, but that should be a gradual process. They should in
no case be out ia winter weather without wind breaks, if there
are no natural ones, such as woods or banks. Wet does not
hurt a horse with a winter coat on, but draught and cold do;
and to tie a horse out in an exposed situation without wind-
breaks or natural shelter is absolute murder.
I see that a number have died of what is called " rug
pneumonia," caused by their being supplied with rugs that
get wot through and are not dried oS. if, however, the horses
were provided with wool-lined tarpaulin cloths, such as ara
used for dray horses, these would be cheap and effective in
keeping their backs dry and turning the wind. In New
Zealand, work horses are not stabled, but, after being rubbed
dry and fed, are turned out with waterproof rugs on. Of
course, the trouble in campaigning would be to carry the rugs
along, but this would be amply repaid by the horses saved.
In W. Virginia, our horses ran out in rain, snow and
sleet, but had always shelter to go to. We never lost one from
pneumonia, but if under the same conditions they had been
tied up in exposed places, they would have died. To leave
sick horses in the open is a scandal; no colonial would make
such mistakes. — Faithfully yours. Colonial.
THE GERMAN LOSSES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — Mr. Belloo this week makes an interesting
calculation of the total German losses up to date. This calcu-
lation is based upon the assumption that the Germans do not
include in their lists the numbers of those lightly wounded.
This assumption, however, ia not correct. During a
long period of captivity in the enemy's country, one of my
few pastimes was the ghoulish one of poring over the endless
Verlustlisten; after each name was given one of the follow-
ing categories: leicht verwundet, verwundet, tchwer verwun-
det, schwer varletzt, vermisst, gefangen, or tot. Of these
leicht verwundet appeared oftener than any other category
but verwundet. I have still in my possession a Verlustlist,
in which eighty out of a total of 420 casualties are specifically
given as " leicht verwundet." — Yours faithfully,
2, Savoy Hill, W.C. C. J. Thomas, M.B., B.So.
THE SAILORS AND SOLDIERS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — ^W^e shall be extremely grateful if you will
permit me to use your valuable paper as a medium for an
appeal on behalf of the above Fund.
The need of tobacco and pipes for our soldiers and sailors
is very urgent, and wo shall welcome any donation, eitlier in
money or kind, that will enable us to remove this want. It
is true that there arc several other Funds opened to this end,
but when it is realised that to supply every man with only
half an ounce of tobacco each (a modest estimate of one day's
requirements) nearly 28 tons of tobacco are needed, it will be
realised that the fear of any overlapping is almost superfluous.
Anyone desiring to help the Fund can do so by (1) sub-
scribing direct ; (2) taking a collection box ; (3) organising an
entertainment or concert. Cheques, postal orders, etc.,
should be made payable to Mr. Roy Horniman, hon. treasurer,
and crossed " Barclay's Bank." Should any of yonr many
readers be interested and would like further particulars of the
Fund, I should b© most happy to answer any inquiries.—
Your obedient servant, W. Evan Cot.mson.
Central House, Kingsway, W.C.
HOSTILE SUBMARINES,
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — With regard to the threatened attack on
our Mercantile Marine by German submarines with the
intention of blockading our ports and etoppLng our over-
seas trade, it has occurred to me that an eiSective way of
15*
LAND AND WATEH
February 20, 1915.
dealing with this would be to anchor deeplj-suuk mines
right on trade routes, some distance from such porta as
Liverpool, the Bristol Channel, the Clyde, the Thames, or
Belfast.
If a field of those mines were moored at a depth of,
say, 40-50 feet from the surface, and 10 or 15 miles from the
entrance to the ports, I think it would greatly hamper the
movements of hostile submarines. If they went below they
would run the risk of contact with the mines, and if they
remained on the surface a destroyer could deal with them.
I think the knowledge that the mines were there would tend
to keep them on the surface and make them more easily
got at.
If the mines were securely moored at a sufficient depth,
they would be no danger to passing ships, and would still
be near enough the surface to catch a submarine running
submerged ; and, if a suitable depth of water were chosen,
they would still be near enough the bottom as to make it
dangerous for submarines to pass under them. — Yours truly,
Chas. E. Allan.
A USE FOR BEER BARRELS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — The Germans sink our merchant ships by torpedoes
from submarines. Let us procure a dozen old merchant
steamers, give them cargoes of empty beer-barrels bunged and
well packed, and roped together, and send them to and from
the estuary of the Thames to the entrance of Rotterdam, with
an inviting-looking deck cargo hiding a 4-inch gun. Such
boats could not be sunk by one torpedo, or by two, and the
4-inch gun would suffice to sink any submarine that dis-
covered herself for the purpose of challenging. — Yours truly,
R. W. Western.
Authors' Club, 2, Whitehall Court, S.W,
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Deae Sib, — In a recent issue Mr. Arthur Beckett de-
scribes a bullet for the destruction of Zeppelins. One grave
objection to these is the fact that they must be kept under
water, which can only be conveniently done at fixed stations,
where anti-aircraft guns would be more efficient ; in addition,
a hole in the point of a modern bullet containing a gradually-
diminishing weight would materially affect the ballistics.
Experiment has shown that when flaming bullets are
fired against hydrogen bags enclosed in an external enve-
lope the number of actual ignitions of the hydrogen is very
small, possibly due to the vacuum caused at the moment
of impact. — ^Yours very truly, Kenneth Goadbt.
46, Harley Street.
THE CHINA STATION.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — In that portion of your article appearing in a re-
cent number of Land and Water under heading " The High
Seas Generally " your correspondent, Mr. Jane, etat-es: —
" Von Spec, with the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, belonged
to the China Station. Here we maintained a force sufficient
to deal with Von Spee."
Being one among the many " others * (along with Lord
Selbome) who venture to criticise the Admiralty, may I ask
why this " sufficient force ' allowed Von Spee to escape from
Kiao-Chaul Obviously, if our force there had been " suffi-
cient ' Von Spee would never have reached the Pacific, and
the nation would have not been deprived of the gallant Admiral
Cradock and the many brave seamen. Many of your readers
would be glad to know what our " force " is on the China
Station, and would be equally gratified to learn when, and by
whose order, the Canojius was sent to reinforce Admiral
Cradock's fleet. The British people, after all, pay for the
Fleet, in cash as well as in tears, and the Admiralty is com-
mitting a grave fault in. concealing these particulars. — Yours
faithfully, A. L.
THE QUESTION OF NUMBERS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — In estimating the total forces which Germany can
put into the field, there ia one important difference between
the two schools which Mr. Belloc has omitted to mention. He
himself starts with men of twenty years of age, but the other
school expects Germany to put into the field at least a million
youths below that age. Though not the best of troops, they
would be by no means negligible. — Yours faithfully,
Henrt Bdrt^
Mayfield House, Farnham.
CHOOSING KIT I
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — Some time ago you were kind enough to eup-*
ply me with the addresses of the makers of certain articles re-
commended in your paper. I have got them, and find them
all excellent.
I would like to trespass again on your time, and would
be very much obliged if you could tell me the maker of the
water-bottle mentioned in your issue of January 2, and also
let me know where I could obtain the saddlebag described in
your number of January 9.
Thanking you in anticipation. — I am, yours truly,
A. V. T. Robinson
(Captain, R.E.),
6, York Terrace, The Lines, Gillingham, Kent,
THE BLOCKADE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — With reference to the threatened submarinl
blockade and your articles in Land and Water. Should
not our Government and the French Government hencen
forth intern their prisoners of war on board ships and duly
notify the German Government that these vessels might
possibly have an occasional cruise round our coasts'! — Yoursj
faithfully,
Albert E. Burns..
A COMPARISON.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — I have read each week, with very greai
pleasure, Mr. Belloo's articles in your valued paper. In his
description of the Battle of the Caucasus, in the issue of
January 16, however, he makes a statement to which I find
it difficult to give credence. He says that " in order to effect
an envelopment of this kind the Germans had to count on si
numerical superiority of their ally's troops in this region,
for you cannot thus hold in one place and turn in another;
unless you are numerically superior to your enemy." I give
one example which seems to me to disprove this. At the battle
of Chancellorsville in 1863 Lee, with 62,000 men, divided hia
force, sending part under Stonewjill Jackson to turn Hooker's
right, whilst he, with the remainder of his army, held him
in play along his front. Hooker's total force was 130,000
men. Surely that is an example of such a thing being done,
not by numerical superiority, but by astounding numerical
inferiority. And the world knows the great victory then won
by the Confederates, and the price they paid for it through!
the death of Stonewall Jackson. — Yours faithfully,
Norman Brccb,
Nairnside,
Bearsden, Dumbartonshire,
THE FIRST LORD.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I expect there will be many to answer your corre-i
spondent, the " Coast-dweller in Cornwall," but I should like
you to allow me to point out two matters to him. First, if he
blames Mr. Churchill for our defeats, he must praise him foi;
our victories. The other matter is that it is not a good plan
to change horses when you are crossing a stream.
I am not concerned to defend the First Lord — if he is a
Nelson, his family history would warrant it — nor do I carp at
your correspondent's use of the word "civilian." In his
sense, I almost think Julius Csesar would have been a civilian.
I am sorry for him if he does not realise that a good deal
of " autocratic " power is in vogue in the Navy. — Yours sin-
cerely, M. Gardner.
Farm Corner, Tadworth, Surrey.
Mb. Belloc will lecture at Chester at 3 p.m. on Friday,
February 19th, and at Hove Town Hall at 3 p.m. and 8.30 p.m,
on Tuesday, February 23Td. Mr. Fred T. Jane will lecture on the
Naval War at Queen's Hall at 8.30 Friday, February 26th. Professor
Lewes will lecture on Modem Explosives at Queen's Hall at 8.30
Tuesday, March 2iid.
NOTICE TO READERS.
Next week's issue will contain an article by
Mr. Belloc on "THE DURATION
OF THE WAR."
16*
Feb
ru
ary
20,
1915
LAND AND WATER
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having special reference to Mr. Bellocs remark-
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Special Features of the Map
THE MAP is 33' X 4'J' in size, and it in eight colours.
— Belligerent areas are shown distinct from neutral countries. — The
Map indicates only those places which are likely to be mentioned
in war news and despatches ; it is therefore clear and easy to study. — In
addition, it indicates the political boundaries, — fortified zones, — rivers, —
hilly countries, — mountain passes, — marshes, — fen-lands, — railways, —
roads, — canals, — industrial areas, all these features are shown in different
lorms and colours, so at to be readily dittinguithable.
The whole Map it divided into 2-inch squares, representing roughly 100
miles each way, so that approximate distance* from one place to another
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Each square has a separate number and letter, and placet falling within
each square are specially indexed with luch number and letter, to that any
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297
LAND AND WATER
February 20, 191 5
THE TORPEDO
(Continued from page 295)
Z
^
^
^^
-^
~~~~~
piercing wire nets and leaving a hole large enough for the
torpedo to go through.
The subdivision of modern battleships and cruisers into
several watertight compartments, so that when hit by a
torpedo it can still float and probably be saved, can hardly
be considered as a defence.
There is great scope for naval engineers to discover a
method by which torpedoes and submarines can be detected
at a distance, so that there is time for the ship to get out of
the way. Perhaps it is also possible to devise apparatus
capable' of altering the direction of hostile torpedoes after
having been fired by the enemy.
Rancc in Yards
use of heated air in the engine. The air as it issues from the
reservoir is heated in a small steel chamber by means of a
small liquid fuel burner, and this " superheated " air is
delivered to the engine. The application of heat consider-
ably increases the quantity of energy available, and the
distance through wliich the torpedo can be driven is thereby
greatly increased.
Torpedoes are fired into the sea either from above or
below the surface of the water, and are expelled from the
tubes either by compressed air or a small charge of powder.
As the torpedo carries its own power, only a force sufficient
to throw the torpedo clear of the ship is required. When a
torpedo is fired from a deck tube and strikes the water it
immediately dives to the depth (generally about 12 feet) at
which it is intended to run.
It is now recognised that the submerged torpedo tube is
the best for firing torpedoes, as it is much safer from the
enemy's gun fire, and also because a more accurate course
can be set, since when dropping fr<jm the deck into the water
the torpedo is bound to be deflected to some extent.
When firing a torpedo under water from a moving ship
a steel bar is pushed out from the ship's side, so that the
torpedo is protected from the rush of water along the hull of
the ship, which otherwise would drag the torpedo out of its
course. In some ships this bar is moved out before the
torpedo is fired, while in others it shoots out automatically
the moment of the firing of the torpedo and returns again
when the tube is clear.
A torpedo tube consists of a cyhndrical vessel fitted in
the bow or stern, or in both, as the case may be. One end
projects a small distance beyond the vessel and is fitted with
a sluice valve, so that the water cannot enter the ship.
Suitable safety devices are provided, so that the torpedo can
only be fired when the sluice valve is open. The torpedo is
pushed into the tube from the inside end just as a shell into
the breech of a gun.
A firing director is provided so that the torpedo can be
fired at the right moment. It is a difiicult matter to fire a
torpedo so that it will hit the object aimed at, as allowances
must be made for the speed and direction of the two opposing
vessels and the time necessary for the torpedo to cover the
distance between the ships. In a running action between
torpedo boats and battleships only some 20 to 30 per cent, of
the torpedoes fired are expected to hit. As a modern torpedo
costs from ;f6oo to £1,200, unsuccessful torpedo attacks are a
pretty expensive form of warfare.
Attempts have been made to use electric waves such as
are used in wireless telegraphy to control the direction of a
torpedo after it has been fired, but up to the present these
inventions have not yet passed the experimental stage.
The only real defence against torpedoes is gunfire against
the craft carrying them. Against the torpedo itself there is
no real defence except trying to get out of the way by smart
manoeuvring. Until the "advent of the submarine, a torpedo
craft approaching a vessel could be seen in daylight, and was
either destroyed or put to flight. In those days only the
night attacks were likely to succeed. But the submarine is
practically invisible, both by day and night, hence the great
opportunity of a successful torpedo attack and the difficulty
of destroying the submarine.
If a ship is at anchor the torpedo net is employed. It is
a steel net suspended from booms from the ship's side. The
distance between the ship and the net must be such that,
when a torpedo strikes the net and explodes, the water can
shatter the force of the explosion
It is doubtful whether a net is a sufficient safeguard
against modern torpedoes fitted with a net-cutting device.
These torpedoes axe capable., under favourable conditions, of
WAR PUBLICATIONS
IT is interesting to note that the management of " Colour," the suc-
cessful and artistic shilling monthly, has arranged a second art
competition for subscribers, entrance to which includes an exlubi-
tion of the competing pictures at a London gallery. The last number of
" Colour," by the way, is well up to the general standard set in earlier
issues, and "the frontispiece especially — "The Green Parrot "■ — is a
fine piece of reproduction in colour work. Both in its artistic and
literary items " Colour " is of such a high level of work as to give it
a leading place among periodicals of the day.
Messrs. WilHams and Norgate's " Home University Library "
includes two volumes by Mr. Hilaire Belloc which are of exceptional
interest at the present time. Of these one is the " French Revolution."
a critical study of the great upheaval with which the eighteenth
century ended, and one which enables us to realise the chief personages
of the great drama, since the work is free of the sentimentaUty which
characterises so many of the studies of this period and deals in
reaUties. The other volume, " Warfare in England," is a brief outline
of the various wars which have been fought out on British soil, from
the Roman Conquest to the last Scottish wars. The initial chapter on
strategical topography is an illuminating lesson in the art of war.
Messrs. John Murray have just issued a shilling edition of
Professor Cramb's " Germany and England," which, reviewed in
these columns some time ago, has proved one of the most popular
books on the causes of the war— as it is one of the sanest of treatises
on the subject.
In " The Origins and Destiny of Imperial Britain," pubUshed at
5s. by Messrs. John Murray, Professor Cramb has been at pains to
trace the growth of Imperialism, " whether conscious or unconscious,
from the earliest times." It is not a book to be read hghtly, but an
earnest study of British destiny, and its author's conclusion, that
" the purple fringe of another dawn is on the horizon," embodies the
feeling that is gained by a careful perusal of the work. We recommend
it as a worthy text-book for students of the highest forms of
Imperialism.
In " Echoes from the Fleet " (Williams and Norgate, 2S. net)
Mr. L. Cope Cornford has embodied a number of sketches and stories
of the Navy of to-day. All are worth reading, and some are very good
indeed ; the book as a whole is of such quality that Lord Charles
Beresford describes it as " a valuable contribution towards a better
understanding of the Rova! Navy." Such appreciation, from such an
authority, renders criticism on the part of a landsman superfluous.
.Apart from the technical value of the book it contains some very
good stories. We need say no more.
" Battle," by Haldane Macfall, published by Messrs. Simpkin,
Marshall & Co., is a well-compiled work describing the work of an
armv In these days, when those who cannot fight are thinking and
commenting on war, it is a very useful little volume, and we commend
it to the notice of those who wish to understand more clearly the
way in which armies perform their tasks.
Motor Fuel — From personal inspection we can testify to the
immense care taken bv the Shell Company in the endeavour they
are continually making' to improve their methods to ensure that the
quantitv and qualitv of the spirit shall be up to the highest standard.
To the' motorist gummed up valves and dirty sparking plugs are
often a source of serious inconvenience, and both these calamities
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which contains aUen material. Motorists and aviators by using
Shell spirit safeguard themselves against accident and inconvenience.
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AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXl\ So 2755 SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1915 K"^^^!^^] j;^?,^i^,fi^^^
CopysshL J. Russell & Saar
GENERAL SIR DOUGLAS HAIG
Commanding the 1st Army Corps
T, A N D AND \\' A T E R
February 27, 1915
THE ROLL CALL OF THE LONDON SCOTTISH. A Photograph, full of human interest, taken by an aniaieur.
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February 27, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
1AM not yet, I regret to say, in such a case that much
learning has made me mad. But it becomes dail\-
more apparent to me that continual study of militar\-
experts — not excluding the notorious Bernliardi who.
I sincerely trust, is likely to draw no royalties for the
extraordinary sale of his candid and unprincipled volume —
has thoroughly fogged such intelligence as once I boasted. It
has been my lot not only to read the militarv experts but to
talk to some of them and to take counsel w-ith them ; and
I refer now not to such military experts as you and I. who
could teach General Joffre and Sir John French and Admiral
Jellicoe their business, but to the pukka experts whose quali-
fications give them authority for the dailv instruction of a
hitherto unmilitary nation in the colossal art of war.
Rightly or wrongly, I draw certain inferences from the
doctrine of these men ; and I find that it may be applied to
the inglorious sport of game shooting, in which some few of
us, because military authority sets up such humiliating
standards of age and physical fitness for martial occupation,
are still engaged at less frequent intervals than was formerlv
the case. One of these inferences is that large flanking
movements are the essence of both strategy and tactics.
Another is that the success of such movements presupposes
a quite sufficient force of all arms, combined with an excellent
accuracy of fire and a perfect fire control.
Unfortunately, the special constable and myself were
compelled to disregard these axioms when we endeavoured to
destroy the enemy force of partridges with a ludicrously in-
adequate army. It so happened that the old soldier was
compelled to fail us at the last moment. His defection was
was only made known to us when we reached the platform.
If we had remembered our military experts we should,
perhaps, have withdrawn our force in safetv without
risking disaster. But one beater and one black dog awaited
us at the wayside station, and the day was verv fine. So we
pursued our enterprise, filling the train journey with much
talk of our country and with gloomy suspicions of a supposed
German spy in a corner of the carriage — who turned out a
private of the new army.
All the morning, then, we pursued our partridges with
indifferent success. An unusual drought — which would ha\-e
been so valuable to the good fellows who are saving our skins
for us in trenches often half full of water — had made these
birds uncommonly suspicious of human approach now
become particularly audible on the baked stubbles and through
the languishing root fields. Our line of three, even when
reinforced by half a beater in the shape of a small bov, could
not cope with tiie tactical situation. If we extended to a
hundred paces the coveys rose in the gaps of the line and
flew away unpursued by shot — until we became so chagrined
that we fired absurdly long shots, with the sole result of
frightening the birds into more protracted flight. If we
closed on the centre and took the few fields of good cover in
narrow strips the coveys rose far away on the unguarded
flank. Besides, a little of this sort of sport goes a good long
way. To divide a ten-acre field of mangolds into three
sections, and to take each section against the wind across
the drills, retracing one's tired steps between each section,
is well enough when three guns, knowing that two or three
coveys are in the field, have a reasoned hope of getting so
near them that every gun mav come into action. But when
two guns, with a beater and a half, aided by a wilful black
dog, divide ten acres of mangolds into five sections, doubtful
whether any coveys are actually in the field, and morally
certain that if so they will rise out of shot, one consequence
is certain. That consequence is that they compound with
strategy, abandon the retraction of tired steps, blunder over
the field in the easiest way, and are so surprised when a
close-lying covey does rise that they miss with all four barrels.
That was, more or less, the first four hours of the day.
Fortified by tea, the partridges were found in an unexpectedly
kindly mood. All the familiar coveys were on the ground
— without any too visible ravages by our former batteries.
.\\\ waited for us in roots or on stubbles. Most got away
without paying anything like the toll that should have been
exacted. Not for the first time nor, probably, for the last
I have entered— in small, shv letters— in the game-book
" shooting abominable." But "it was a glorious late Septem-
ber evening, and we cheered the chief beater by talking to
him of Zeppelin raids and telling him that, after all, his
brother (somewhere on the River Aisne) might not have a
family monopoly of the unnerving excitements of explosives.
But there is yet another inference to be drawn, I think,
from the military experts and their literature. That is that
anticipation is tlie most important thing of all. The number
and the variety of military anticipations would appal me if I
were to consider them in cold biood. And anticipation has
a fierce satisfaction utterly denied to the prosaic fact with
which it so seldom corresponds. I shall therefore anticipate
thedoingsof three whole guns on the little shoot when, not
too late in October, we snatch, if it so mav be, three more
days from the wreckage of an annual holiday.
First for the total bag in modest figures. It shall be
fifteen brace of partridges, twentv-eight pheasants, three
hares, and thirty-five rabbits, with one duck, two plover,
and five pigeons to add a pleasant variety. We are to shoot
with the accuracy reserved for our best days. We are to
find the withy bed full of pheasants, of which'several — let me
be candid— are to escape by the back door. In Kilkenny
Copse— you see how frank my imagination is— we are to
suffer a reverse. An unfortunate lapse on the part of the
black dog, who will there run in, despite all objurgations,
and set up a premature flush of birds, and some confusion on
the part of the guns will help several of these birds to go
scot free. But when we come to Ashwales we shall deal
very faithfully with its eleven pheasants, killing ten of them
with a mortal precision of fire. Then shall be accomplished by
one of us the two agreeable feats of a high pheasant and a
hare to two barrels, followed as soon as the new cartridges
are in by a right and left out of the covey of partridges which
bursts suddenly and attractively out of the shelter of the
bottom hedgerow. And on one "of the other days w-e are to
find our partridges in that most curiously submissive and quies-
cent mood which surprises the shooter at intervals throughout
the season, so that we make hay of them while the sun shines,
and are amply rewarded for march and countermarch.
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VI
LAND AND WATER
February 27, 191 5
Soliii Silver C'^se
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Tconiar^iTn^
L A X D AND .W A T E R.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
KOTE.-Tlih Article ha, been submitted to fbe Vcn Biifcau. wl.ich dws not object to the publication «• ccnMred, aad t.kci ■«
responsihiiity tor tiie corixitoess of tilt statements.
In accordance witli t!.e rcqiilrements ol t!ie Press Burcnu. the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only b<
rejjarded as approximais, and no deauiie strength at any point is indicated.
THE EAST PRUSSIAN FRONT.
"HAT has happened upon the East
Prussian frontier in the course of tlie
last fortnight is now perfectly clear,
and v/e must seize its details before
w-e proceed to its meaninft.
Upon Tebruary 7th, Just after the great
effort in front of AVarsaw had failed, %yit}i very
made against the Rawka line in the first week of
tlic month was extremely serious, very expensive,
and only just failed of "success. But whether it
were a feint or no, it was during its progress that
the German troops, already pressing in East
Prussia, were joined by the new formations, the
importance of which will be discussed in a
moment, and that the clearing of the invaded
province was begun. The belt of East Prussia
^ea^7 losses to the enemy, the concentration of
German troops in East Prussia was complete and
the advance against the Russian invaders taken.
Some have conjectured that the great attack
upon .Warsav/ from February 2nd to February
8th was no more than a diversion, with the object
of witlidrawing the Russian attention from the
blow which was about to fall in the North. This
conception is a little far-fetched. The effort
which our Allies had occupied and completel>r
denuded of supplies, as against their necessarV
retreat (for, as has been repeatedly pointed out
in these columns, tlie Russian equipped number.s
are not yet sufficient for an outer advance upon
either wing) had reached the river, the line A 15
in the above map. Tlie Russian forces in this
district amounted to no more than four army
corps— say, after the v>aste of war, 130,000 to
^^m
LAND AND WATER.
Februarj- 27, 1915.
ilSO.OOO men, and these four army corps we will
indicate upon the sketch (purely diagrammatically,
of course) by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4. Against this
force there appeared upon the whole line from
a^ilsit to the Southern frontier anything from
300.000 to 500,000 Germans, who made it their task
to clear Prussian territory of the enemy and to
advance upon the line ot the Niemen and the
Narew.
Let it here be pointed out that upon four
separate occasions the Russians have Ijeen suddenly
attacked by a German movement in force. The
first at Tanncnberg, six months ago. Next in the
Budden advance during October through Russian
Poland. Next in von Hindenberg's great stroke
to capture Warsaw at the end of November or the
beginning of December; and lastly in this struggle
in East Prussia, during the last fortnight.
The reason of these sudden attacks has been
largely the perfection of the German railway
.system and the imperfection of the Russian; but
rthere may have contributed to them the difficulty
of air work under the weather conditions of the
time and place, and perhaps other factors of which
we know nothing. At any rate, these sudden
.attacks have continually taken place, and have been
las remarkable for their reject ition in the Eastern
field as for their absence in the Western.
You have, then, suddenly and unexpectedly
.attacking the four units upon the line A B any-
thing from eiiiht to ten uJiits, going direct along
'the direction of the arrows from the west. At the
first shock the Russian retirement was immediately
ordered, for it was apparent that vastly superior
forces had come into contact v/hh the four Russian
army corps, v>hich together constituted the 10th
]{ussian army, and which had been forcing their
way into East Prussia, with the special object of
embarra.ssing the g-eneral plan of the enemy
between the Baltic ajid the Carpathians.
That I'etirement would ha^e been normal
enough but for a successful piece of strategy on
tlie enemy's part, which cost the Russians perhaps
30.000, ])erhaps 40,000, men, and rather less than
lialf the artillery of one corps. This successful
piece of strategy I will next proceed to describe.
The blow aimed at unit No. 4 was directed
with special weight against the left-hand of its
line at C. The German commanders evidently pre-
;feupposed— and with justice — that the fourth unit
of the Russian command, in peril of being thus
cut off from the rest of the army and having
behind it the ad^'ance on Kovno, would fall back
as rapidly as possible upon that town. Permanent
fortifications are always — and necessarily — a lure
to an army in peril from superior forces pressing-
it. And this fourth unit had, as a fact, not only
fallen back with the utmost rapidity towards
Kovno, but also had turned slowly in the press of
tliat retreat from facing east to facing north-
east. The unit immediately to the south. No. 3
(which was the 20th Army Corps under Bulgakov)
neither retreated with the same rapidity nor
in the same direction. The precipitate retire-
ment of No. 4 under the pressure upon its
left left No. 3 exposed, and the enemy broke in
through the gap thus left between No. 3 and
No. 4. No. 3 could not even attempt to extricate
itself by a parallel march towards Kovno — the
distance was too great — while No. 4 was marching
eoraewhat north of east, 3 was falling back
Routh of east, and suffered the whole weight of
the German north central advance. No. 4 got
away, but No, 3. was fjent, partially enveloped, and
for the most part wij^ed out as a fighting force.
It was not wholly enveloped, as is proved by the
fact that it did not lose even a full half of its
guns, and that certain elements composing it
escaped entire. But of the thirty odd thousand
men composing it the greater part never returned
to Russia. They were killed, or picked up as
wounded, or, some portion of them, captured as
unwounded prisoners. The v, hole movement may
bo clearly enough seen in some such diagram as
the followincr :
where the shaded lines represent the Germans
and the unshaded ones the Russians. 4,
threatened with vastly superior forces and
returning from C, falls back on to the position
of the dotted oblong A, meanwhile making for
Kovno at K. Meanwhile 3 tries to fall back
towards the position B, but befoi'e he gets there
is badly crushed upon both Hanks by the extending
enemy in front of him and by the spreading out of
that enemy's lines, which takes immediate advan-
tage of the gaj) between A and B, and of 3 only a
small proportion makes good the retreat to the
frontier.
Meanwhile 1 and 2, lov>er down the line,
fought normally enough and suffered no disaster.
They retreated in not too great haste, fighting for
more than a week with their rearguards to defend
the narrows between the lakes in the Masurian
region (half shaded upon the map). The last
stand of these rearguards was round the town of
Lyck, which was carried by the enemy upon the
10th of Eebruary. By the 12th all the Russian
forces were out of German soil. What I have
called the fourth corps was safe back near Kovnt-,
the third had for the most part di-sappeared in its
disaster, the second and the first were standing in
front of the line of the Niemen, and lay there in
front of Grodno, passing in front of Osowicc to in
front of Lomaz. On Sunday, the 14th, the large
German forces, having reordered their line, pro-
ceeded to two tasks, the advance of the smaller
body from .Wilkowiski and Marianpol to the
Lower Niemen and the advance on the line Grodno-
2»
fwf^
Lkhb k^D WATEK.
Osowiec-Lomza. Tluit advanc* was ^^ov>'. Heavy
as had been the Ruasian losses, the fosi>cs of the
enemy attacking the well-defended narrows
between the lakes must have been far heavier than
that of the Russians in v»'oamled and killed (save
in the 2()th Corps), and there appears to have l>eea
something like a halt for the reorganisation of tlie
advancing force l)efore its next effort was made.
That next effort took the form of a number
of local actions upon the Thursday and Friday
and Saturday of last week, and it is intere-sting
to note where these local actions took place,
because these points are an indication of the
approacli of the enemy to the Niemen and Narew
line.
You have three points in particular. Each of
them is about ten miles from the defensive line
of the rivers, the fate of which line lends all its
meaning to the present turning movement for the
investment of Warsaw.
You have, first of all. an engagement taking
place on the road between Grodno and Lip.sko,
Osowics
0 1 z s ^ s
Omt.
JO
I
W-Us
M
somewhere about the point nsarked X. There is
only one highroad in this district. It was upon
either side of this causeway that the action seems
to have diverged, and its iocality shows that the
enemy have passed without check through the
forest of Augustowo : an advantage which they
owed to the partial destruction of the 20th
Russian Army Corps. The enemy is in his next
colunui aiming at the central point of Osowiec.
We are not given the name of the locality
where the shock took place in this line, but it
nmst have been at much the same distance from
the river as on the Grodno advance, and at about
eight miles or so from the Bobr one, which
is part of the Niemen-Xarew line, as in
the following plan. Here, again, only one
main road cro.sses the belt of marsli through
which the little river Bobr sluggishly winds,
the great marsh known as the Marsh of
Lafki. Our indication as to the locality of thi.s
shock is afforded by the news that the guns of the
forts of Osowiec, the range of whose north-western
sector lies somewhere along the line A B, were in
action : so your central German advance had
reached, by last Saturday morning at latest, to
within a clay's march of the defensive point of
Osowiec, upon which everything here depends.
The third point on which the German advance
has developed, as shown on the following page, is
further south still and is concerned with the bend
of the Xarew east of Lomza.
This is a verj' important point.
It is here that the defensive line approaches
most nearly to the railway which it is the object of
the enemy to cut. Xhere are no obstacles of marsh
just at til is place, when once one is west of the
great Wizna marsh.
Here, again, the action took place at about
a day's march from the defensive line. The village
of Jewabno is the starting point for two columns
that might be taking the roads for Wizna
and Lomza respectively. At any rate, it is the
out]iost which must be taken before Lomza and
the line of the Xarew at this point can be carried.
Upon Friday, or possibly as late as Saturday
morning, a counter offensive undertaken by th"«
Russians carried and kept Jewabno against the
Germans.
Matters therefore in general stand thus. The
Russian retreat has been effected riormally enough
with the loss of not 12 per cent, of its guns and of
such wounded prisoners as a rapid retirement
before an unexpected blow delivered by greatly
superior numbers necessarily involves. But to thi.s
general statement there is an unfortunate excep-
tion in the army corps lost, the 2nd one in the
Russian line from south to north, the 20th, of
v.'hich two divisions disappeared and of which not
quite one-Iialf of the artillery appc^irs to have
been taken.
The remainder of the 10th Russian army,
having lost altogether, say, 35,000 or 40,000 men
and 60 or 70 out of, say, 600 guns, is now just in
front of the defensive line IS'iemen-Bobr-Xarew,
which covei's the main railway feeding Warsaw
from the X.E., and on Saturday last (v.e have no
later news at the moment of writing, Tuesday
evening) it was engaged with various portions of
the enemy on points about a day's march in front
of this defensive line.
So much being said, let us turn to the object"
and comparative success or failure of the Gerraaa
movement in this region as a whole.
The effort of the Germans uDon the frontier
»»
LAND \ \ t ) W A T E R.
YchvmvY 27. 1015.
{Jewah
no
rS>
# 1 a > 4 5
MiUs.
■<s^.
of East Prussia and agaiiist the line of the Niemen
and the Xarew is then developed and unmistak-
aljle. They are on that line as I write. What con-
clusions does the jX)sition lead us to as to the
nature of their attack i
The first thing we must attempt to settle is
whether our original estimate that the great
movement was intended to i>ieree the defended
line of the Niemen and Narcw and to reach the
main railway lying behind that line was an accu-
rate estimate or no.
The next judgment T pi'oj^ose to reweigh is
the couclusion that tlic new formations were cer-
tainly present upon the German side.
The third judgment which we may return to
— a much less important uiatter — is the measure
of the German success in tliis field so far.
As to the first of these )Kiints :
It is clear that if th.e German effort was not
directed Jit the piercing of the Niemen-Narew lino
and the seizing of the raihvay beyond it, it had no
strategic object.
It does not follow that the German move was
either purpo.eeless (which wtadd be impossible) or
ill-directed. It may have had no object but that of
" countering." Just as a man, finding himself too
hai-d pressed by an enemy, may deliAcr a sudden
blow exhausting to himself for the moment and
neither intended nor expected to finish his oppo-
nent, but at any rate sufficient to relieve the pres-
sure for a time. If the Germans were acting in
this ^vay, then the conclusion to which so many
critics of this campaign have come, th.at Germany
feels herself besieged and is acting like one
l^esieged, is doubly proved. For to expend so much
energy on what is no more than a sortie, and was
not intended to be more than a sortie, with no
<lefinite object of final success in front of it, would
be a full confession, not only of assiegeraent, but
of nearly hopeless assiegeinent.
But it is not to be believed that the German
General Staff as yet adopts that attitude. That it
regards the forces of itself and of its ally as held
in the East and West is certain, because that is
a, |)lain fact, obvious to every observer. But
that it regards the position in the ]:^ast as so
desperate tlmt a mere hcaxy demonstration lead-
ing to nothing is all that is left to do,
cannot l»e accepted. The Germans and
Austrians are still in superior numbers upon
this front. Ti)ey certainly have a concerted plan,
and it is almost wearisomely obvious that the
possession of Warsaw is the key to that plan. It
is not tf) be credited that with the knowledge —
common to anyone pcssessing a railway map — of
iWarsaw l:>eiaig the capital j>oint of the campaign,
they would make a move like this round the north
ilank of the Warsaw position without meaning to
threaten Wnr.'^aw. Tliey may ?)c checked in their
front, and when they arc cheeked they may pre-
tend, or desire to believe, that they never
alteaipted the threat at all. But it will require'a
most cogent and exceptional proof to convince
anyone that a movement u)^on such a scale was
undertaken for nothing more than at the least a
demonstratioji and at the test a counter blow.
It may l>e urged (as certain critics have
already urged) that the enemy's object vras merely
to clear the iuA-adcr out of German soil. That is
surely quite incredible, for the simple reason that
it is not war. Short of sundr}' political inanities
upon the defensive being moral and the offensive
immoral. Iiuman speech cannot be fiamed to ex-
press the ineptitude of an operation which sliould
consider mere political frontiers. An army goes
into the field in order to defeat other armies
sti-ategically. That is, it goes into the field ia
order to render the opposing army, through los.ses
of e^ery kind, wiiether of numbers or coiiesion. so
much inferior that it can no longer op'pose with
success. It dc^s not go into the field merely to
clear certain geograpliical areas to which its
leaders happen to Ix; attached. If it did that,
it would simply be a.sking for defeat in the future
and spending its strength in an object that was
not military at all.
Let us. then, take for granted that the enemy
has the oidy conceivable strategic object the region
affords, and tiiat he is tiying to break the Niemen-
Narew^ line; further, that he is trying to do this
in order to cut the i-ailway behind that line. How
do his chances of success look in the light of the
latest new s ''.
We note, in the fii'st place, that the Eussian
retirement, as a whole, was neither confused nor
suhject to the will of the enemy. The Russians
have not retired in such, directions and such dire;'-
tions only as the suj)erior forces before them deter-
mined. They have retired upon divergent lines
towards cliosen bases— Kovno, Osowiec, Lomza.
On one of these lines tlicy have suffered a local
disaster — the line through Augustowo. The others
have been accurately followed. They have so
retired that each of the fortresses defending the
line of the rivers shall be at its maximum strength
if or when the enemy reaches that line, and by
this method of retirement they have left the enemy
the choice either of neglecting the remaining force
upon the northern flank between Grodno and
Kovno — Avhich may then go south at their time
when the issue is joined upon the Narew — or of
following the retreat up to the Niemen between
Grodno and Kovno and then, separating their
forces, by the marshy district of forests l:>etwecn
Grodno and Osowiec.
It is important to note this character of the
region of the retreat, not only because it shov,s
that the retreat was, though rapid, in the main
orderly, but also because it enables us to judge the
accuracy of the German reports and the confidence
the Russians still place in their fortified line. It
also permits us to be perfectly certain that the
retirement was effected in the face of very greatly
superior German forces.
Next, let it be noted that the Germans are
directing their principal effort, not toward the
Niemen, Ijut tow-ards the Narew, and that is again
what would be expected of a force whose principal
object was the railway line Screening Warsaw
4*
February 27, 1915.
LAND A N D ,W A T E I?.
froai the north-east. Tor tlie nearer to Warsaw
that line is reached, in rea.son, the greater the
effect the cutting of it will liave upon tlie fortunes
of the city. That Neo Georgievsk itself can be
speedily reduced must Ik at least so doubtful to
the enemy that he must attack the Narcw line
well above the junction of that river with
the Bug. The attack will, of course, if it
develops, concern the whole stretch of the river.
I am spe^iking only of the point where he will pre-
sumably use his greatest force and attempt to
break through. He has against him in this attempt
the paucity of the roads, the condition of the soil
(another serious thaw having just set in), and the
absence of any railway save the two lines, one on
Osowiec, the other througii Mlawa, moi'e than
100 miles apart.
The railway from Mlawa will bring up
ammunition for an attack on Xeo Georgievsk, but
not for the middle Narew, and if Osowiec gives
I'im a better road and a l>etter railway for a single
approach, it is yet the hardest point in the whole
line for any particular single approach, for it
stands in a mass of marsli and forest. In spite of
Ids difficulties, however, it seems clear enough that
the enemy intends a hea^^- attack upon the Narew.
and that if he does not deliver it it will only be due
to his own misculculation of the difficulties and
the strength of the position gathered against him.
It is true that permanent fortifications have
gone down to howitzer fire in this war, but it ha.s
only done so where there have been good roads for
the big catci*}jillar wheels to travel on and railways
to bring up the heavy ammunition of the monsters.
Now let us turn to tlte second question —
whether, as has been stated in some quarters
wortliy of respec^t. the enemy brought up his new
formations as I suggested last week.
The additional evidence ap}iearing since then
seems to me to make it cl«3arer than ever that he
did bring up such new formations.
It is true that the Grand Duke speaks of cer-
tain forces being brought up Ijy the enemy from
the front immediately before Warsaw upon the
Bzura and the Kawka. But these cannot be in any
consi<Ierabse number. Tlie forces upon the two
rivers iii front of Warsaw have already been
heavily tried. It would })e impossible to diminish
thcDi .'^afoly in any cc»nsiderable degree.
The enemy ha<l in East Prussia up to about
the first week in Februai'v very snuill forces indeed
— {IS the scale of this war goes. lie held positions
the natural strength of which is inferior to none in
Europe. He helil them against nothing more than
the 10th Russian Army, consisting of no more
than four army corps; yet he was compelled to give
way somettiiat. It is not cretlible he had much
more than 80,000 or 100.(K)0 men in the field.
After the first week in February he appears
v.'ith anytliiug between oOO.OOO and '400,000 men.
Where did the extra new fcn'ces come from ? Not
from the Carpathian front, for that needs every
man the enemy can spare <ind more. Not from the
Ave-st front, which is very heavily tried, and into
which, as a fact, he has had. to put new forces quite
recently.
Not from any considerable trained reserve,
because we know from every intlication of the cam-
paign and from everj' expression of German strate-
gical opinion that he does not work with such a
reserve (ludike the French), or rather, to I)e acx^u-
rate, he does not work with a large one. It is the
strategy of delay whicli does that, an^d not tlie
strategy of sudden action.
The extra men can only have come from the
new levies. In what numbers these new levies, and
in what formation, have appeared we cannot
exactly tell, but we may surely safely estimate
those present upon the whole of this front froni
the Rumanian border to the Baltic at this moment
as not less th.an six and probably not more than
ten corps. That is not less than a quarter of a
million nor more than alx>ut 400,000 men. The
point is of considerable iuijwrtance to our judg-
ment of the whole war at this juncture, because
there is nothing u^wn which we must try to obtain
a juster opinion than upon the enemy's margin of
men. We know that he has been filling gaps with
newly-trained men, very largely, we know that
these new formations have appeared upon the
East; it seems possible that some of them iiave also
appeared in Alsace. IIow many have altogether
been put in the field up to now from the German
Empire alone we cannot yet tell, but if we say,
counting all the filling of gaps that has gone on in
the last few months, and counting the.se new great
masses in the East, something over three-quarters
of a million, but less than a million, we prolnvbly
shall not be far wrong. It is a point wliich raiher
concerns the analysis upon tiie duration of the
war which will follow this; for the moment let
us be content to conclude that the new formations
have certainly appeared and that so far they have
principally appeared in the Eastern field aiu< par-
ticularh^ in this action or series of actions against
the Niemen and the Narew.
The third point of our enquiry is the extent
of the success so far scored bj the enemy again.st
the 10th Russian Arjuy.
Let us first sum up v.bat is exactly known,
being admitted directly or indirectly by tlie-
defeated as well as affirmed by tlie victorious .side.
Two divisions have suilored so soverely as to
count no longer in the field. But tlie guns of less
than one division have been lost. The retirement
in the case of each Russian body, witlt the excep-
tion of the two divisions that were isolated, Iws
been protecterl u[>on every route and in every pas-
Siige or defile by a rear gunrd. These rear guards
ha%e necessarily .suffered he^ivily; they have akso
necessiirily abandoned many of their wounded to
the enemy. On the other bund, there has been but
a small proportion of the whole force engagecl in
such actions. If we put down at about 12 per cent,
the general losses of the retirement and add the
destruction or little Ics-s than the destruction of
the two Ix'hded divisiiMus, we must revise our
earlier estimates and allow for something over
40,000 out of action — killed, wounded, and
prisoners, upon the Russian side.
That is a very heavy toll to have j»aid. It is
more than a quarter of the whole lOtli Russian
Army. On the other hand, we must reaieml^r t hat
the whole army was but a sijjall proportion of the
total Russian line. Four army corps out of,
perhaps, seventy-five.
The loss in material was surprisingly .small
so far as guns go. In transport it seems to hav<J!
been heavy, which is what one would expect under
the conditions of -such a retix^at undert<"tken with
all tlie bad luck of a i-eeent thaw and followed by
a heavy fall of snow.
What the correvS{»onding losses of the attack-
ing side may have been we c^in only guess. The
LAND A N D .W ATE R.
February 27, 1915.
only losses in guns would be the Ceases wliieh do
occur in a rapidlv-pressed advance of guns dis-
abled bv the enemy's fire. In transport hardly any
loss, but in men a very heavy one. You do not
force a quantity of defiles between marshes and in
such weather against even a greatly inferior
eueniy (Russians were inferior by per)iaj)S one to
three) without losing a great niany men in the
))rocess. And that is particularly true when one
is using raw troops newly levied. They must be
used in fairly close formation to be kei)t together,
and their success depends upon mass. We shall
not l>e far wrong if wc put down the loss of the
whole operations at 10 per c<;nt., or something
larger for the attacking bodies and the smaller
retreating Iwdies. It is probable or certain
that the German offensive had more than
forty odd thousand men hit during those
nine days. But, on the other hand, it
must be "remembered that these los.ses are not
— as in the Russian case — absolute. All the cases
of slightly wounded recover, and, among the
pursuers, are returned ultimately to tiie fighting
line, whereas most of even the slightly wounded in
a fore« retiring with such precipitation as did the
Russian fall into the enemy's hands as prisoners
and are lost for good. Of unwounded ])risoners,
the enemy's losses must have been insignificant.
The Russian account puts them at 1,000.
Such would seem to l)e the summaiy of coni-
i)arative losses on both sides; and the statement
leads me to a further comment upon the present
condition of the German official communiques.
We liave already seen in the earlier cora-
ments published some months ago in these
columns what was for long the character of
the German official communique. It was
accurate, open, and, as far as detail would
allow, terse. We have further seen tliat vvhcn the
hope of a speedy and decisive victory was lost tlie
German official communique changed somewhat in
tone. It began to include, side by side with the old
type of information, manifest, though rare and
not commonly important, calculated inaccuracies,
.sometimes dcliljerate, and in our eyes fantastic,
falsehoods. I say " in our eyes " because it was
evident that these falsehoods were not intended for
our consumption and may have been wise enougii
for the purpose for whiih they were designed.
With llie c«nununiqu<^ upon these movemei^t.s
in East Prussia, and against the Niemen and the
Narew, we seem to liave reached a third phase, in
which the document for the first time deals in
phrases at once vague and capable of grave rtiis-
interpretation as well as needlessly boastful.
This is no particular accusation of the enemy.
Official documents of this sort in \\ar have been
far tlie commonest tliroughout militaiy historj^
and particularly on the losing side. But tliey make
a remarkable contrast with what we have hitherto
J^en led to expect from tlic German General Staff,
and they point to some disarray m the domestic
opinion which they are designed to affect.
Thus, there is a deliberate confusion between
tlie figures applying to the late separate and suc-
cessful movement clearing tlie Russians out of
East Prussia and the " winter battle,"' wliich
obviously is used as a term for the whole mass of
the operations since October.
Further, for the foriner, which is capable of
fairly close analysis by students of war, we are
given credible figures, less than a dozen batteries
and losses of some 40,000, whereas for tlie whole
business of many months — in which analysis is
impossible because all details are lacking — we are
given fantastic figures. Again, we are told that
" the lOth Army Corps may be regarded .as
leaving ceased to exist." That is rhetorical non-
sense. The 10th Army has lost, at a guess, 12 per
cent., certainly not 20 per cent, of its stiength as
to three-quarters of its composition. The remain-
ing quarter has indeed been so severely dealt with
as to have lost the existence as a separate corps,
while of tlie txjtal aitillery of the 10th Army a few
l)ea\7 pieces, and more than 10 but less than a
dozen batteries have also bex?n lost, out of the
seventy or eighty which accompany the whole
force.
Remark, again, that the series of com-
muniques, when they are all taken together, do not
read consecutively. We are first told that the
enemy must have lo.st such and such a number,
we are next told that he has positively lost a lesser
number, and there are other discrepancies of the
same sort.
All these are not very import^int points, but
they are worth noting, just as the demeanour of a
witness in a law court is worth noting. For the
German comnu>niqu<^s are one of our very few
sources of evidence upon the campaign while it is
in progress.
THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
Upon the Carpathian front there is no new.s
save that, now a week old, of the occupation of
Czernowitz. It is a pity. It means that the enemy
has thrust his wedge in between a possible
Rumanian intervention and the Russian armies in
Galicia. It means also the occupation of that rail-
way centre which the capital of Bukovina is. and
the importance of whidj I pointed out last time.
It means all that, no inore, but unfortunately no
less. It dfxrs not inean, as certain of the enemy's
j)apci'fi Lave suggested, that the Russian jiosition in
Galicia is threatened. 'J'hc left flank of tlie Rus-
sian armies in Galicia can be maintained, in spile
of the occupation of Bukovina. Moreover, the
communications of the enemy's force in Bukovina
ai'e very difiicult. They go over passes deep in
Miovv, and the i ailway does not yet serve them. As
a strategic move it seems far less than what is
liaj>pening in the north against the Warsaw rail-
way, but as a j^olitical move it has the importance
which I have descrited. It would begin to have
strategic i»nportance if Stanislaus were occupied,
for that Vvould give raihvay communication across
the mountains.
THE WESTERN FIELD.
In the Western field of war there has not been
this week, any more than the last, a movement of
sufiicient im))ortance to justify a careful analysis
or to occupy the space of these columns. But such
operations as Jiave taken place, in spite of the
immobility inqioscd upon both combatants by tlio
weather, have this two- fold interest: First, thati
they show the jiressure upon the German line to be,
if anything, increasing, and, secondly, that in one
))oint there seems to be some indication of a new
formation having reached the field. The slight
advances made liefore Loinbffirtzyde — a matter of a
few yards — the larger push forward in the Cli3ni->
pagiie diittrict over a front of two or three miles,
tlic slight success just cast of Yarennes and south-
6»
February 27, 1915.
L A X D A N D W A T E R.
east of Verdun, the ocoupatioii of one of the spurs
in the Vosges overlooking the Plain, are all so
many small local advances which, taken individu-
ally, mean little. But taken together tiiey mean
that over all the line upon which they have
occurred the German positions are now being held
with a strict minimum of mcJi. This does not mean
they will continue to be so held. The moment the
enemy feels more secure in Poland he will come
back in grc<iter strengtii upon the West, and; as I
have said, there are indications that, in one point
of the Alsatian front, some of his new bodies have
already come into the field. The evidence for this
is no more than a brief sentence in the French com-
munique of Monday to the effect that considerable
masses of the enemy had recently appeared in front
of the valley mouths, which lie cast of Colmar,
and that they had come on in peculiarly deep ancl
sol i d form. They must ha ve come from somewhere,
and their presence, coupled with their arrange-
ment.
suggests new levies.
But much the most important point on all
this front until the large new bodies appear upon
either side is the weight of the heavy artillery.
.We are assured, both in French and English
evidence, that the heavy artillery on the French
side now dominates its opponent, but only ])ersonal
elements could deterinine how far this is the case,
and the question of decree here is very important.
Sliould a really decisive su])oriority appear, it
would mean a great deal. It would mean some
einbarrassment for ammunition on the enemy's
side and stmie breaking strain in its mamifacture.
It will, perhaps, mean that the blockade in certain
metals is beginning to tell, and it will decide more
than any c>ther factor except some great supe-
riority in numbers the issue of the next advance
OH either side. Without his then great suj^eriority
in heavy ju'eces. the enemy could not have done
what he did during the advance on Paris. With,
out it he could not have stood as he did on the
Ai.sne. Lacking it. he will liardly succeed in the
advance with new numbers against our positions
or resist a corresponding advance from our side.
A POINT UPON THE DARDANELLES.
The attack upou the Dardanelles is only
indirectly a land operation. It is chiefly a naval
operation with a naval object, and conducted in
the ma in by naval forces. There is one i)oint about
it which merits attention in connection with the
land strategy of the affair. Tlie Galipoli penin-
sula, as it is called, which forms the European
.side of the Dardanelles Straits, and which takes
its name from the town of Galipoli, north of these
Straits at G (.see plan (5) is divided from the main-
land bv Narrows, which ma v Ix; called the Isthmus
of BulairatBB.
Xow, it is evident that if this Isthmus is
captured and held in sufficient force by a power
commanding the sea. the reduction of the isolated
forts marked by cros.ses u(X)n t!ie diagram, lying
to the south along the European shore of the Dar-
danelles, is only a question of time, and with a
nmdern siege train and high explosives, a question
ot what should be a short time. It is of interest,
therefore, to note the conditions of the Isthmus of
Bula i r. They are here indicated in a rough sketch.
(Plan 7). *
The Isthmus is, generally sjieaking, occupied
by one big lump of hill, with thi-ec summits, 433ft.,
4B9ft., a))ti 4:i6ft. respectively, tiie 2,000ft. con-
tour reaching close to the sea upon either side and
the highest summit being a little to the south-
east of the central point. "This highest summit is
cronned with a permanent work — of the value of
^vllich I know nothing— and there are, of course,
entrenched lines reaching across the narrowest
jKirt and following the ridge from A to B. But
this line can be turned by anyone in command of
the sea. A range of 6,000 yards drops sheer from
tlie top to the water on the sea side of the Isthmus,
right over the hills into the Dardanelles Straits^
r
Oulf of X.eros
I
^'^^dantlU^- ^'""-^
0
I0i9
.o. — I
1099
J
I
5009 MM
yards 'Jtat^e
vn.
and there is deep water close up to the north-
western shore of the Isthmus.
The whole operation of oceupying this little
belt of land or of sweeping it frwn the .'jea to pre-
vent its being crossed by the enemy closely,
resembles that which the Japanese undert<x»k when
they made untenable by their mea-of-war the
isthmus which unites the Peninsula of I'ort Arthur
to the mainland.
7*
LAND A N D ."^ A T E R.
February 27, 1915.
THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
THE first question everyone asks Jiimsclf
about the war is, What will be its
})robab]e duration ? It is a matter which
has not been discussed in these columns
because, as will be again insisted upon in a
moiuent, it is not susceptible of calculation or
description. But as the matter is now more than
ever a subject of pul)lic discussion, and as more
or less trustwortliy reports of this and that
authoritative opinion are being circulated, it may
be wise to consider the elements of our judgment
in this matter.
The I'cason that interest and conjecture upon
the duration of the war have become so much more
acute of late is that the end of the winter is in
sight and that this moment coincides Vv ith the end
of the {leriod required for training the enemy's
new levies and for equipping our own. The da} s
tlirough which we are passing are therefore a
]ittle more suitable for this very indeterminate
discussion than were those of the j^ast, and we
may without imprudence sum uj) the only elements
l!j)on which any judgment can be based.
First let it be said thnt any attemjjt to esti-
mate with )>fecision the proliable duration of any
campaign whatsoever is a folly. It is a folly into
Avhich the enemy very consj)icuously fell when he
made such careful arrangements for a six months'
campaign and failed to foresee the possibility of
a cara))aign lasting for a year — or at any rate
made no full jireparations for tlie same.
'J'here is no reason why we should imitate
this folly by ])retendiiig to any limit of our own,
especially after so many months of warfare have
taught us how full of unexpected accidents a
modern campaign can be.
Bat though even the vaguest pro])hcey would
ho gi'atuitous folly, it is in this, as in almost all
other military affairs, possible to put two alterna-
tives and to say in the one case, " the war will
not be of less than such and such a duration," in
the oth.er case, '" it will not be of less than some
other limit."'
Before tabulating and considering the ele-
ments of such a judgment, one probable and one
im})robal)le disturbing factor in the calculation
must bo eliininated. The probable factor is t!ie
entry of one or more of the nations now neutral
into the campaign : the improbable factor is
fc^cj'jarate action, open or concealed, u]:)on the ))arfc
of any one of the Allies to the detriment of the
rest.
If cither of these disturbing factors ho
admitted all forms of calculation upon thi.s
jtiattcr fall to the ground. We can only judge
with the material we have to hand of what will
follow if, for instance, Roumania and Italy threw
tlieir weight into our scale before next May, or if
Bulgaria joined the enemy without a correspond-
ing recoupment upon our side; or what would
happen if some one of the Allies, fi'om exhaustion
or from any other reason, j^ursucd the connnon
object with less vigour than tlie rest, it is perfectly
impossible to determine.
Eliminating these disturbing factors, then,
tliere remain two great alternatives upon the
(general character of which we can decide at once.
Either the enemy, vvho is now in the strict sense
of that terin besieged, will raise the siege or tlie
siege will continue.
First, note that he can only raise the siege by
breaking through upon the West.
A local and sufficient decision in the East
might, indeed, enable him to bring great forces
back west and might therefore indirectlj^ secure
his ultimate object; but that object will only be
finally secured if his success m the West is
complete'. — that is, if he break the line containing
him and find himself able to defeat in a final
manner tlie French army and its allied British
contingent.
In the case of that alternative all discussion
oC the duration of the war falls to the ground.
The menace to our civilisation would be then so
a)))iarent and so pressing that every resource left
to the Western Allies would be brought into plaj'.
And there can be no question, especially upon the
jiart of this country, of admitting the final
result.
It is probably true to say that in case of such
a disaster a state of war would technically remain
even after the very distant period in which the
defeated parties should have suffered complete
exhaustion, for, to use a phrase justly which has
been often used rather wildly in this campaign,
siich a situation wouUi literally and exactly mean
life or death to Great Britain. It would mean
the security of her food sup})ly, and without
food men die.
It is only in the .second alternative that any
element for judging the ]iossible duration of tlie
v.ar can In? considered. That second alternative
is the maintenance of the jjresent siege, and the
calculation upon which we are engaged somewhat
remotely resembles the .sort of calculation which
every besieging army general has always made of
the power of resistance of the besieged.
Let us see of what the settlements principally
consist.
1. There is first tlie element of wastage, and
tl.iat has a trijile form — the wastage in number:,
of men, the wastage of ammunition, and the
restriction of suj^jilies due to a more or less
perfect blockade.
2. There is secondly the element of new
numbers^that is, of recruitments ujion either
side. Can the besieged arjuy count on more men
— if so, how many? Can the besieger count on
further numbers — if so, in what amount?
3. The third element is the element of topo-
graphy. What effect upon my siege will it have
to occupy this, that, and the other point of
vantage, and what effect v.ill it have if the enemy
on his side manages to push out and occupy this,
that, or the other j^oiut — after breaking my lines?
We will consider those three main elements
of the calculations in detail.
1. First, as to the wastage of men.
There is no need to reiterate in this analysis
the calculations which have so often found place
in these columns. My readers know upon what
figures they are based and that, already .some little
time ago, one could estimate the total j.iermanent
losses of Germany alone, excluding cases of sick-
8*
February 27, 1915,
LAND A X D ,W ATE R.
ness, at a million and a quarter, and the total
permanent losses of herself and her ally, counting
of coui'se the vast number of Austro-Hungarian
prisoners, at about double that amount.
What is more important is a comparison
between these vast figures and the corresponding
figures of the Allies. We have a basis for calcula-
tion, as my readers knovr, in the British ofiicial
figures, and in one — the only one — ollicial pro-
nouncement delivered in France now nearly three
months ago. On the basis of both these state-
ments we may justly regard the total losses of the
(Western Allies (excluding sickness) in perma-
nently disabled, killed, and captured of rather
morethan half a million, but a great deal less
than three-quarters of a million men. In other
words, the Germanic powers have l>eeu wasting,
and are wasting, at a rate nearer four than three
times the rate of the Western Allies. It is true
tjjat they, have very much more men than the
(■Western" Allies, and it is also true that we have
no figures upon which to estimate, even generally,
the corresponding Russian losses, tliough we are
pretty safe in calculatijig that the latter aviU
hardly, counting genuine prisoners of war— that
is. soldiers taken as prisoners— touch the million.
Perhaps three-quarters would be nearer the mark,
but the whole thing is, upon that side, obviously
a mere guess.
Well, with the Avastage as regards the
W^estern field (where the ultimate decision must
lie. though indirectly, as I have said, tlie Eastern
field must determiiie tiie Western result), let us
next consider t!ie function of ammunition.
Here, again, we have no precise or eveJi
general figures to guide us, but we can take a
broad survey based \ipon the simplest and widest
considerations. It is not only that Germany lias
to be supplied. It is Germany ami her Ally, and
if Germany is highly industrialised, as highly
industrialised as England herself, Germany's
Allv is not so.
' Now we know that in those materials for
amnmnition which are abundant both v^ith the
Allies and v.ith the enemy, the factor is that
. either working at their fullest pressure can
hardly meet the demand. We can roughly, but
justlv. conclude that with the exhaustion of the
original stocks the enemy's position becomes, in
comparison v\ith our OAvn, more and more difficult
in this particular of ammunition.
What is his position with regard to the
necessities of life in the shape of food?
There is nothing more difficult to determine
in all our calculations upon the war. On the one
hand wc know that the whole Trussian system
depends upon exact calculations, with all the
strength and weakness attaching to this
mechanical way of making war, and with its
corollary of falsehood never j^roceeding from
emotion, I ait always from reasoned motive.
Our knowledge of this character in the Prus-
sian svstem would naturally incline us to Ix^lievc
that all the talk about tlie ]")inch for food and the
open proclamation of swii-city is a falsehood
designed to deceive us as to the enemy's real
resources.
On the other hand, we nmst weigh against
this presumption (\Ahich found weight in niany
quarters and has been supported by some of the
best critics upon our Press) the fact that you
cannot carry through a plan beyond a certain
magnitude for more than a certain time. The
bread taxes are realities, so is the war bread, and
so are the known imports required by Germany^
from year to year; so is the sum spent by tlie
German Government which cannot have passed
more than a certain amount for provisions, so is
the estimate of the enemy that the war ^ would
hardly last more than six months, so is tlie fact
that he made war immediately after harvest.
Put all that together and it seems much more
likely that the scarcity is real than that it is
merely an elaborate pVetcnce; and to this we
must 'add two facts— first, that the Prussian
falsehood, Vvhen it is calculated, is usually of a
very simple and even a crude nature. To carry
through a falsehood of this highly complicated
length aiid gigantic character is something of
which v,e have no experience in the career of
Bismarck and his successors.
But the way in which this scarcity in food
and in other necessaries of life, such as textiles,
will affect the duration of the war, depends
entirely upon the strictness of the blockade to
which we subject the enemy.
There are two factors, both political, Avhich
tend to modify the severity of this blockade.
I criticise neither : 1 merely state them.
The first is a point of foreign policy. It is
believed by many excellent judges— or has been
believed until quite lately — that a strict blockade
would cost us more in complications with neutrals
than it would advantage us against the enemy.
The second is a c-onception, partly humani- .
tarian, partly of. baser origin, but finding con- -
tinual, though restricted, expression in our Press,
that to spare the enemy the i-igours of a complete
blockade is at once our duty and our interest.
We ne?d not here discuss the obvious point,
that of all nations in the world the Prussian is
least moved by considerations of humanity, and
tliat it would never cross tlie mind of one of her.
statesmen or generals to spare this country any
rigour in blockade with a povvcr of blockade
open to them.
I repeat, these notes arc not political and are
not to ]ye used for the purposes of criticism. 8o
far as this specific question is concerned — the
duration of the war — there is no factor in the cal-
culations more clear than that of the blockade.
Whatever the forces may )je, tending to end or
to continue the war, and however indetcrminato
our calculations of them may be, the force of a
blockade is at once all powerful and incalculable,
and the duration of the war is, other things being
equal, calculable in an exactly inverse proportion
to the rigour of the blockade. The sliarper the
blockade the shorter the war. The weaker the
blockade the longer the war.
It must be remembered in this connection
that the blockade from which the Geririanies
.suffer, is not only that imposed by the Allied
fleets, of which force, of course, the Britisli
fleet is far the superior. France will not allow
Germany an ounce of certain materials v.hich she
largely controls. Russia, far more important as a
source of sujiply, will not allow Germany or
Austria a grain of food for the direct feeding oC
her people or for their indirect feeding through tho
keep of her cattle. And Russia can here c ut off
grain to the value of 50 per cent, per family
in the German Enij)ire. She can compel, anri
that Empire to kill
has compciie
■'"ed,
d
vast
9»
LAND AND .W ATE R.
February 27, 1915.
quantities of animals the support of which is
no longer possible. Not the least important
has been tlie action of Russia in the matter
of horses. Normally, Russia sends into
Germany 150,000 horses a year. Now slie is
sending none. Further, Russia sends in vast sup-
plies of eggs and butter and the rest dairy produce
in general, which have also been cut off.
And there is one more article of import whicli
Germany needs and which will very gravely affect
the future of this war, and that is labour. .What
numbers can be spared from civilian occupation
for the formation of the new ai'mies in Germany
is the most poignant and the most doubtful of the
matters we touch in this country. But whatever
the margin may be, it is heavily afi'ected by the
a))seace of Italian and Slav labour, and tJie place
of these yearly immigrants cannot nearly be taken
by the use of prisoners of war.
We may sum up and say that in everj- element
of wastage or of tlie strain imposed by time n'^on
tlie resources of tJie enemy, the argument points
towards a war of shorter rather than longer dura-
tion // the containment of the enemy continues
unbroken and if the blockade which it is now in
our power to impose is at last seriously imposed.
As to the precise limits for the duration thus
influenced, it is of course absolutely impossible to
make even a rough guess, but the following ele-
ment in our judgment should be carefully noted.
The pinch for food and the pinch for ammunition
has already begun upon their side. The accumula-
tion of amnmnition beyond what we are actually;
expending has just begun on the West. Allow,
now, three full months and the weight of valu-;
able projectiles upon the two sides will hav^
turned in favour of the Western Allies and;
against the Germanic powers — /'/ they are still-
contained, and the same calculation, a little more;
prolonged, gives the early summer as the corre-"
sponding date for the chief effect of the blockade;
of food. Not the end of May, but the end of Junej
or beginning of July gives the point of maximum-
strain in this regard, and that strain will be very,,
heavily increased indeed if the Hungarian plain,
or any considerable part of it, should fall into
Russian hands before the harvest. . ■
Everything, therefore, seems on this line of
argument, to converge upon the early summer as.
the decisive moment.
But it is only one line of argument. There,
remain two more, as I liave .said : the supply of ,
men and the topographical argument. With these
I propose to deal next week.
TO END THE WAR.
HOW VICTORY xMAY BE OBTAINED AT A COST OF £10,CO0,0€O.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
THATEVER may be the resources of the
eneniy in men, food, supplies, arma-
ment, and ammunition, and whatever
may be their bravery, determination,
and tenacity, the Allies could end the present war
well within six months. This result could, more-
over, be achieved at an expenditure, in lives and
money, very much less than any amount v.hich the
most optimistic military expert, in his most opti-
mistic moments, would venture to fix. It is true
that, in order to bring about such a result, it would
be necessary to revi.se our ideas concerning the
methods of warfare wliich our generals and strate-
gists have inherited from their predecessors. If
it be accurate to say that the object of a war is
to end that war on terms acceptable to the victors,
then, if it could be proved that, by a slight re-
adjustment of our ideas in the light of modern
conditions, we could bring the present war to an
capabilities of military aeronautics than, by the
vezy force of circumstances, it has been possible,'
for any member of our Go^■ernme'nt, or of those of
our Allies, to. devote to the ])ew weapon of war. It
is, therefore, in his technical capacity that the'
writer brings forward liis views in the hope tluit
they may be conducive to the sparing of many lives,
great sorrow, and much sacrifice. He would like '
the reader to realise that it is neither lack of
modesty nor self -congratulation, but, raliier, an
earnestness that his views should receive careful
consideration, and a deep sen.se of moral responsi-
bility that he should do his utmost to save
thousands of lives, that have prompted him to
write the preceding fevv' words, although tliey may
seem self-laudatory.
THE ME.\NING OF AERIAL SUPREMACY.
Before an explanation is given of what i.s
early close, it would be reasonable to assume that, meant by the phrase " a comprehensive and sus-
when such proof is established, we shall be expe-
ditious and thorough in giving effect to our
modified views.
In the present article the writer proposes to
bring forward evidence, based on actual facts and
experience, which will prove that an aerial offen-
sive, on a comprehensive and sustained scale, can
lead to a quick and glorious conclusion a war
which, otherwise, may be both protracted and
costly.
The writer desires to elaborate his views, at
some length, on this all-important proposition,
and claims earnest attention both on the score of
his technical training and experience in aero-
tained aerial offensice," it would be well that tiie
reader should have a clear undei'standing of tho
real value of aeronautics in the present war.
At the beginning of liostilities there was very
little available experience, obtained in actual
warfare, to enable our military authorities to hai^e
a clear conception of the capabilities of the fifth
arm. Perhaps the princi[)al reason that, at first,
induced our Government to devote a certain
amount of attention to the new weapon was the
fact that other Governments were encouraging its
development. Then the other Governments, see-
ing our efforts to create an air fleet, increased
their own efforts, witli the result that, a year or
nautics, and on the fact, also, that, possibly, he so previous to the beginning of the present war,
the world witnessed a competition among the
has given more thought and consideration to the
10"
Pebruary 27, 1915.
E AND AND 5V: A T E R,
SKETCH MAP OF ESSEK SHOWING IHE KHUPP WOEKS.
leading nations for tlie " Supremacy of the
Air "' — a pleasant-sounding jjhrase, but, at the
moment, lacking in exact meaning. Xow, after
seven months of arduous lighting, and after the
new arm has been severely tested, the phrase has
acquired a concrete meaning which it is necessary
to define.
General Sir John French, in his admirable
despatches from the front, has drawn forcible
attention to the services which his airmen render
daily to the Army. In fact, our Army owes a
great part of the ascendancy it has established
over the enemy to the precious assistance given by
our airmen. It can be said that the services which
our aircraft render to our Army can be gauged by
the ascendancy whicli our airmen exercise over
those of the enemy. The amount and accuracy of
the information wliich our air service gives to our
commanders relatively to tliat given to the enemy's
generals by theirs may, iu most cases, be taken
as a direct measure of our ability to preserve our
initiative. We are thus led to define the term
" Supremacy of the Air " as meaning the capa-
bility of airmen to give, in good time, the neces-
sary information which will enable their com-
manders always to possess the initiative. Tliis
definition assumes that the part played by air-
craft is connected with, and inseparable from,
the successes of the armies to wliich they are
attached. It is a " Supremacy of the Air "
having, to a certain jlegree, negative characteris-
tics. To a defeated army, with its units broken
up and fleeing in various directions, or to an
army too weak to t-ake advantage of the informa-
tion supplied by its airmen, such a " Supremacy;
of the Air "' would lic almost valueless. It is^
however, the kind of aerial supremacy afte?
which the various nations were striving when tiic-;
war broke out during the declining days of Juhv
1914. Through lack of any accumulated cxpcrV
11*
LAND AND .W. A T E R.
February 27, 1915.
cncc to guide them, the military authorities of
the various countries had not sufficient data to
prepare themselves for any other kind of aerial
6U[>reniacy.
It should not be assumed that such a
" Supremacy of the Air," because of some nega-
tive characteristics, is not of the greatest value.
iThe truth lies in the opposite direction. We
should, tlierefore, grudge no praise to all those
who liave helped our country to obtain that
supremacy right at the Ijeginning of hostilities.
It is a supremacy of such considerable value that
we sliould run no risk of compromising it, and,
whatever developments we may wish military
aeronautics to assume, it must not be to the
detriment of the particular supremacy we have
already acquired,
TWO KfNDS OF AERLAL SUPREMACY.
The fact remains, however, that we are now.
as regards military aeronautics, in possession of
data which were not available when the v.ar
broke out. fSome preconceived ideas concerning
the value of aviation have received terrible blows
and liave met with a quick destruction. Unfore-
seen uses of the aeroplane have come into pro-
minence. Our airmen have shown a greater
valour and adaptability than even the most
enthusia.stic supporter of the new arm could
have expected. It is, therefore, well that we
shouhl pause and take stock.
AYhcn this is done, we shall find that a most
important quality of t]>e aeroplane has been
brouglit to light. This (|uality is its value for
offensive operations. We have alre-ady, so far
as the luimter of machines is concex*ned,
utilised it in a timid nianner in carrying out
a number of raids. Is that timidity due
to the fa-ct that we have not really grasped
the full value of the aeroplane for offen-
sive purposes ? Or is it because we are so engaged
in maintaining tlie supremacy we haA-e already
obtained that we cannot vigorously push on the
development of a real offensive air-fleet?
The writer has. in these columns, constantly
explained the isuportancc of an aerial oft'ensive.
Since the publication of his articles tlie
Admiralty have reported two air raids by aerial
squadrons of thirty-four and forty aeroplanes
strong respectively. Compare the result of tiiese
raids with those undertaken with a still smaller
numtx^r of machines — the C'uxhaveu raid on
Christmas Day, 1914, for instance — and you v.ill
realise clearly tlie importance of the number of
aeroplanes composing an attacking aerial fleet.
I-'or oiTensivc vvork, of permanent value, it is not
an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is
required, but one of about a thousand, or moi-e,
strong.
With such an air fleet we could enter upon
the conquest of a second kind of *■ Supremacy of
the Air," a kind in which the offensive value of
the fifth arm would make it-self felt, in a j>er-
manent manner, miles l>eyond tlie range of our
guns. In fact, siich an air fleet would be a force
that could not Ijc stop}»ed by trenches, rivers, or
fortified jdaccs; it would Ix^ a force in who.se way
no obstacles could be put. and which would carry
tlie war straight into the heart of the enemy's
country.
This second kind of supremacy could be
obtained by the Allies well within six months, and
the possession of it would mean an utter impos-
sibility for the enemy to continue the struggle.
Such a state of affairs cannot be reached lAith an
offensive fleet of a few dozen, or even a few
hundreds strong.
IIIE BUILDING AND MANNING OF AN
AIR FLEET 2,000 STRONG.
In connection with the employment of aero-
planes at the front, it is important to remember
that the fifth arm is still somewhat frail in con-
struction. Major W. S. Brancker, Royal Artil-
lery (Royal Flying Corps Reserve) General Staff,
in a lecture delivered at the irniversity of London
a few weeks before the beginning of hostilities,
said : " A good average pilot may fly, day after
day, round an aerodrome and make many land-
ings without ever straining his aeroplane, or
even breaking a wire; but in war the pilot must
fly in any weather to obtain information and
land on almost any ground to deliver it. The
result will be numerous small breakages and
strains, all of which take time and skill to
repair, and which demand the provision of a
large quantity of spare parts, and their delivery
wherever they are required in the theatre of
war. The ditliculty of supply of spare parts v. ill
l>e increased in proportion to the number of
different types of aeroplane employed. The same
applies to engines, which, in addition, require
thorough periodic overhaul after a compara-
tively short time at work.
" Again, in war there will be no sheda
available for housing machines on the ground.
The aeroplane of the moment cannot stand for
long in the open witliout serious deterioration in
its flying qualities. . . . All this points to.
the fact that only a sn»all proportion of the
aei'oplanes in the field will be fit to take the air
at any given moment." These, and other reasons,
show that if 1,000 aeroplanes are to be always
ready for offensive purposes, we nuist possess at
least twice that number of machines and keep on
making good the losses.
Now the question which presents it.self is
whether it would be possible lor this country to
build, in the space of a few mouths, 2,000 aero-
[•lanes, train the men necessary to pilot them,
for?n the necessary contingent of mechanics
which would be required to accompany tlietn at
the front, and organise an adequate transport
service. The v.'riter has gone carefully into these
questions and he is convinced that, though the
effort would have to be a considerable one, the
formation of a powerful offensive aerial fleet,
thoroughly equipped and manned, could be pro-
duced in this country in tlie time stated. It can,
Ijcsides, te asserted that such a fleet could l>e
brought into existence without interfering with
or hindering, in the slightest degree, the develo|>-
ment of the present air flet^t which is so neces.sary
to our armies for reconnaissance and kindred
work.
Seven months ago no one could have fore-
told that the Britisli Army could be made million.s
strong. We have made the effort and succeeded
in pro<lucing a nev.- Army by far stronger than
any which we have had in the i>jist. In the same
manner, if the country decides to consider the
creation of an offensive air fle^t 2,000 strong, th©
12»
n^)YURv^f^mf.
"LANiV' ^k-li
PMIWI.
Bg6gL.»^
Avriter is in a position to indicate bow this could
be aceomplisJwd, in EnglamI, within six months.
THE MEANING OF A "COMPREHENSIVE
AND SUSTAINED AERIAL OFFENSIVE.'
The reader has, probably, by now sonic idea
of A\hat the writer means by the phrase " a com-
jve/icnsire and sustained aerial offensive." It
is a kind of offensive that is not to be confused
with a raid. Unlike the latter, a coniprehensi\'e
and sustained aerial offensive v."oukl render the
maintenance of a hostile field army impossible,
and would bring to an end the system of trencli
warfare which is long and costly in lives and
money. With a powerful offensive air fleet, our
airmen could attack, njght and day, the roads
and raihvavs behind the liostile lines, and couhl
prevent the enemy from receiving supj^lies,
ammunition, or reinforcement.
The jx)ssessiou of an adequate offensive
aerial fleet would enable us to strike, with might
and with assured results, at the enemy's arsenals.
In the sketch map is shown the western portion
of the town of Essen, which is well within the
range of our airmen, and where are situated the
gigantic Krupp's works. These workshops lie iu
tlie v»est of the town and cover an area somewhat
greater than that of the City of London. Imagine
what the destruction of such an arsenal would
mean to the enemy, and imagine what Avould be
the ])light of the German armies if they were
suddenly deprived of guns and of amuumition.
And such an air fleet, built and equipped on the
scale indicated in the preceding lines, and capable
of dealing such a decisive blovv as the destruction
of Essen, would cost less than £10,000,000 !
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE. — This Article has been submitted to the Press Rurciii, which docs nr.t ohiett to the pubMcatinii »s censored, aiiil taUts
responsibsiity for the correcfDCss u( the statements.
THE MEDITERRANEAN.
ON (lie IQtli ?.u Anglo-French force of battlesliips,
battle cruisers, and auxiliaries of various kinds
opened fire at 8 a.m. on tlie Davd.inellcs forts at
Cape Ht'lies and Kum Kale at long range —
probably six or seven miles. Early in the war a
Hiild bonibaidment bad proved that the forts could be oiit-
rj-ngcd — probably they mount nothing heavier than S.2's in
the way of modern guns, j^bis a number of bigger guns of
obsolete pattern.
Up to 2.45 only big guns were employed for the attack;
but then Vicc-Admiral Garden, who was in command, ordered
ehiDs carrying guns of 6 inch or thereabouts to cloRe in to
near range. Two forts on the European tide were silenced,
and one on the Af^iatic side. The bombardment, ceased at
dusk, when one fort was still firing. None of the warsJiips
engaged was hit.
In general, this may be regarded as the nio.st important
naval o|>eration to date. Even as an illustration of the
ubiquity of Sea Power it has its lessons, for the British ships
engaged were drawn from all quarters of the globe (the In-
flej:ib!r, for instance, fought at the Falklands, and the
Triiimpli astibted in the bombardment of Kiao Chau). The
jjriueipal ships engaged, and their broadsides were: —
force the Dardanelles, and so reach and capture Constan-
tinople is toward (the assumption riiay be wrong) it will be —
as botli Duckworth csiu Hornby described it in the past — "' a
difficult
FRENCH.
Bouvtt.. 212in., 110.8, 4 5.5
G'auloi^. 412in., 5 5.5
Siifien. 412in., 5 6.4
BEITISH.
Inilrxihlf 812in.
AffoinemKoii... 4 12in., 5 9.2
Cornuallis ... 412in.,6 6in.
yetifffdiice ... 412in.. 6 Gin. ;
Forty big guns firing steadily naturally were capable of
doing an enormous amount of damage. Whether they did so
or no is another matter. Bombarded fortifications have often,
after a short interval, a knack of resurrecting themselves iu
a way which ships cannot. This is due to the fact that unless
a gun be actually hit, the effect of shell fire is merely to
destroy the gun's crew or possibly bury the gun in debris. To
dig away the debris and find fresh gunners is comparatively
eai y. Hence it has become a canon that a bombardment must
be followed up by a lauding party to destroy all guns that are
still 6cr\-iceable. There are also canons as to military co-
©jieration.
The passage of the Dardanelles has always been regarded
as an extremely difficult operation. The Italians are said to
have contemplated and decided against it in their recent war
with Turkey, though here, of course, international politics
may have had weight in their councils.
The fortP, qua forts, being Turkish", are probably much
less formidable than they are supposed to be, and they are all
euBceptible to long range bombardments, Danger lies rather
in the mine fields laid in the narrows. These will have to be
cleared under fire from field artillery and lifle fire (even sup-
posing all forts to be silenced), unless a strong allied army
operates along the Gallinoll Peninsula,
Supposing, therefole, that (as assumeei) an attempt to
MAP
ILLUSIRATE
DAHDA^ELLES-.
On the other hand, the advantages of successful operations
would be enormous. Turkey would be eliminated from the
war by the fall of Constantinople, but tht.t would be among
the least of tiie Ijenefits.
Corn and oil, which we need from the Black Sea h.arbours
cannot reach ue while Turkey rules at Coii.stantinople. Hence
the immediate result would be an excliangc of useful com-
modities between the Allies.
DURATION OF THE \\AR.
As Mr. Belloc has been announced to discuss this week
the Duration of the War from the military standpoint, it will
perhaps be of interest to say a few words about the same
question from the purely naval standpoint. Here, since,
humanly speaking, the situstlon is all against any Trafalgar,
we are necessarily reduced to considering the less dr.imatio
issues which must nltiniRtely bring hostilities to a conclu.-icii.
These ai-e all contained iu the phrase, " Silent Pressure
of Sea Power," though fruliject, of course, to how nulitarjr
oj)erations liiay eventuate.
13*
These military operaUoa.i arc, of corn-so, enlirely owtsiJe
my province ;T have no means of estimating llie probabiiities
of a Russian advance or what may happen iu the West in tha
spring. I can simply record the iiaiifcical imprcf.siou, entirely
as a ninifiral imprcosion, which from the miiitary point of
view may be just as inaccurate as from the naval point of
view are military ideas as to the part played by the Navy.
Very roughly and quite crudely the ih.-vh/ idea of the
land warfare may be put down a,s something very like " stale-
mate," or, at any rate, " ijerpetual check," which comes to
about the same thing. 1 do not a&sert that this idea is
correct : it is far too liable to be upset by side factors such as
resources, food, ammunition, and what not.
J/i«t, save in .<;o far as the supply of men is concerned, it
seems to me that the whole of the ether question:; are entirely
naval; entirely matters having to do with the 'silent
pressure of Sea Power," and as entirely unconnected with
the gain or loss of " some ground " in the laud warfare.
Of course, a sudden jireponderanco of strength on one
side or the other might alter the whole aspect of the laud
campaign : I am necessarily confined entirely to considering
things on tlse hypothesi.s of the maintenance of iiie 'jtuftis quo
on land and what will happen then.
To dais the Navy ha.s hit Germany very hnvd by the
annihilation of her overseas trade, and also a cutting cff of
food supplies which is probably more apparent than real.
Personally 1 do not believe that vie have appreciably affected
Germany's food supply or that we shall ever do so, no ruatter
what measures we may take. We can cut off certain luxuries
dear to the German stomach, we may render the national
tendency to overeat difficult of accomplishment, we may make
them uncomfortable and disgruntled, but I am convinced that
the entire force of the British Navy will never etarve a single
German. The utmost we can do is to drive thom to support
life on about tiie same provender that m.iliions in this country
have subsisted on for the last one or two hundred years.
So far from shortening the duration of the war, T am
inclined to think that an embargo on German foodstuff
from overseas will lengthen the struggle, and serve to keep
v.p to the scratch the "hate" which is Germany's main
motive power.
Consequently it may be that possibly our best policy
v.'ould be to let the Germans get all the food they waivt, even
if necessary spending money in seeing that their food is
abundant I
Coupled wtih this, however, everything iu the nature of
raw material of any sort or kind would have to be declared
contraband — in a phrase, we should sfarve the iiuhi»tri-s, no(
the iiu/ividh'fils. With both exports and imports cut off, the
bulk cf the civil pojjulation would be out of employment — i.e.,
v/ithout the means to purchase food. The German Govern-
ment v/ould l)e compelled to resort to free doles, and the
moral effect of such on a population would very soon make
itself felt. What happened to ancient Roiiie would just as
assuredly befall Germ.any, and even a threat to stop food
supplies (let alone carrying it out) would probably end the
war to a certainty six mouths from now were a policy of this
sort pursued in the interim.
Tlie adoption of piratical methods by German submariues
is generally believed hore to be due to economic pressure and
shortag*! of food supplies. I greatly doubt whether this has
much to do with the matter except in the " talk dejiartmeuts."
Pather, I take it, German public opinion wants to see the
Navy on v.'hieh it has spent so much money " do something,"
and submarine attack on commerce rejiresents the clieapest
and most sliowy way of seeming to " do something."
Altogether (looking at the matter, of course, entirely
from the point of view of what our Navy can accomplish), f
should say that — failing some perhaps rather improbable
drastic change in the situation on land — a naval war based on
attempts to curtail German food supply may wall go on in-
definitely, even if Germany did not possess scores of eminent
chemists ])erfeclly capable of inventing chemical sub-titutes
for every known form of food.
If, on the other hand, we more or less glut them with
food, but, by the stoppage of oversea trade, import or export,
of every sort and kind, create a vast j)opulation unable to
purchase food, and forced to subsist on Government charity,
I am inclined to think that the Briticsh Navy can end t'le v/ar
inside sit months.
The " dramatic effect " of Waterloo (pos.sibly, for that
matter, the previous dramatic effect of Trafa Igar) has ever since
blinded us to the fact of the enormous power which the Navy
wields iu the matter of apparently indirect resi-l/i. The public
can envisage to the full a regiment fighting in the trenches;
jirhat it cannot envisage is that a battleship, floating .seemingly
idle, miles and miles from anywhere, may be altering for good
and all the history of the world.
Let me add that the reason for this i.-i that no one has ever
managed to e.y.plnin iih>/ in a manner to be " understandeJ
of the people." No one ever will. It is a fact beyond cxplaia-
iag. Only a fairly good chess player can properly realise aa
inkling. The great Napoleon hiniself could never grasp it,
and he fell because he could not. At St. Helena, no doubt,
too late, he realised.
All the indications of the present war are that neither
the Kaiser nor von Tirpitz can see further through a brick
wall than could Napoleon, or they v/ould never have .signe-1
their own death warrants by their fatuous declaration of a
submarine blockade, and so delivered themselves into our
hands for the sake of murdering a few non-combatants.
Between this kind of thing and the practice of Chinese pirates,
who paint horrid faces on tlie bows of their junks, the
difference is well-nigh negligible where the British N.ivy i*
concerned .
To tills extent the duration of th.e war will be shortened.
The German.! are out to " frighten the enemy." The British
Navy is out to ' ■ kill the enemy. ' '
THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE."
The policy of leaving the crews of submarine victims to
drown v.'ithout warning ha.s been followed by some Oermati
submarines but not by others. Presumably all Germati
officers are not yet "blooded" to the methods of Captaiti
Kidd and his fellow-pirates.
The probable motive of the policy I have discuiwed ehsa-
where in this article: jicre I am endeavouring to find au
historical analogy which may have some bearing on tha
fjuestion.
This i.s somev^hat difRcult to find. Ancient history teems
with instances of captured m.ercbant ships, whose crews wera
either slaughtered or made into slaves. But even in thosa
long ago days there was a certain logical idea of phirj^r: I
cannot recall any historical instance of slaughter of non-
combaiants for the ,Tiere result of slaughter. Primitive man
in the Stone Age may have acted on some such lines ; but it 14
doubtful. I'or slaiighier without some idea of tangible gaiii
we must probably go back to the primitive aps.
The suggestion of an ape intelligence aa the motive forc«
i? not, however, so much due to the wanton slaughter and
deatrnction of all and sundry, as to the inability lo j'erceiva
the futility.
Once merchant ships take to cruising in groups, it rnusi
follow, as 1 suggested last week, that the main danger will b->
run by the submarine aggressor — so that even such ape-lik-*
joy as may be obtained from wanton destruction will not bo
forthcoming. Equally ape-like is the inability to realise that
drastic retaliatory measures are to be er.pected, measures
which (if sufficient submarine success be secured) may run c.j
the entire German nation (including the Kaiser) being pro-
claimed outlav/s and common murderers.
One's amazement is, however, not at the slaughtering
wanlonuess of the German ])lan, but ut its sheer stupidity.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENCE.
I), D. W. (South Shields).— The Admiralty is always
iuflii-
ready to consider any scheme that is reasonable; no
ence " is required.
B. n. H. (London, W.C.).— All data published abouh
recent big guns have been extremely vague. The extreme
possible range is therefore entirely conjectural. It is further
complicated by tha fact that the service muzzle velocity is not
the maximum possible: also the mounting does not admit oi"
the maximum of elevation.
T. H. (Winchester).— (1) Would be censored. (2) When
German armed liners were to be expected the A(f>tiia)>ia was
i;seful; later on her work was to be done ecpially well by a
less costly vessel. (3) The war will probably Ije over before
the ex-Greek S'tlaniis is completed. It takes about a year to
build and equip a submarine. (4) Allowing the obituary
notices to appear was an official oversight. Such notices are
now forbidden, I believe.
B. B. (St. Neots).— (1) See reply to " B. H. H." above.
(2) Your theory that messages are sent to Germany by means
of the "Agony" column is very probably correct. But it
could also be done via '" Want places," " Situations vacant, "-
and v/hat not. There seems no way by which it could b«
stopped. (3) There is nothing novel about the submariua
mine-layer. (4) .Something similar to the scheme you auggesfe
is already employed. The Admiralty leaves nothing to chanba
in matters of this sort, but they wisely saj nothing as to wliai
they are doing.
14'*
Februarv 27, 1915.
L A J\ JJ
A i\ u ,\v A 1 J!, a.
B. E. C. (Ealing). — Many Uianks for the cutting. Tbe
6ku»'t'FaHaB Governinent kas certainly done its share and done
it. weJl.
ii. M. (South Sliields). — There are plenty of devices for
obtaining »eeuracy with hoinb-dropping, but the trouble is
that when bombs are dropped from any height there is always
the unknown factor of the wind in between the machine and
the target. The wind blows st different velocities at different
altitudes, so defiections occur which cajinot be allowed for
from great heights.
.. J. G. (Edinburgh.). — So far as I know the idea you
suggest is already in active operation.
V. N. S. P. (London, S.E.). — Very inauy thanks for your
•ynipathetic letter. I am not at all sure that the person to
whom you refer resides in an '' Englishman's " home. His
handwriting certainly appears to have been acquired in
•nothcr couptry.
R. F. W. (Dublin). — A distinguished technical expert
wrote Isst week and gave nie a resume of experiments which
Im was carrying out with a view to the production of an
instrument somewhat along the lines which you have since
ruggested. It may interest you to know that you liave inde-
pendently hit on a similar idea.
A. R. S. (Newcastle-on-Tyne). — Your view that it is
" HBcommonly like whining to proclaim to the world that the
fellow j'ou are fighting is mad and then complain because he
bites your stomach " is, I think, a level-headed one. Of
course, to sink ships without warning is piratical: but by
making too )nuch scream about it, we run the great risk of
playing into Germany's hands.
W. T. H. (Torquay and New York). — Mining the mouth
of an enemy's Jiarbour is mainly a waste of mines, because
Rt the best it can meiely delny the enemy. The Japanese
wasted eudles.s mines off the ciiirance to Port Arthur. The
Russians, of course, maintained a regular service of sweepers
to keep a channel quite clear. It is more than probable that
the Gern-an mines around Heligoland, &c., are what is known
«s observation mines, i.e., they are exploded at will from the
ishore, and, therefore, only dangerous to a hostile vessel.
C. M. — Unfortunately, to discuss most of the matters to
which you refer is tahoo. I am quite satisfied in my own mind
th.at (he Admiralty is correct in its policy. As for the con-
flicting rumours, one may be as correct a.s another. I see and
fympatliise with the taritaiising situation in which you find
yourself. I am a fellow suCcrer.
H. A. H. (Highgate). — Torek was a pensiip for lioon.
P. H. II. (Newbury).— (1) 1 have forwarded the lettsr
ntlbout tlie Lwiituniii to the editor^ .Your view is, of course,
CDvrect. . (2) Re your question, the Admiralty has withheld
information for strategical reasons which are to our advantage.
■ :• ■ •' X. Y. Z." (Scarborough). — A scheme like yours was
fxperimenled with some years ago. I do not know with what
success.
J. \l. (Ashbourne). — See answer to " X. Y. Z." above.
J. S. (Dundee).- — I have read your communications with
great interest. You appear to have covered every possible
argument.
R. W. C. (Dunfermline). — It was long ago officially
requested that no speculations as to future fleet operations
nhould be made. This was a wise step for the following reason.
Those wlio write necessarily get to know odds and ends of
«ews which have not seen the light, and from these odds and
ends it is not diflicult to prophesy as to probable happenings,
«nd so very jjossibly unintentionally to aid the enemy to
l>ridge the gap which exists between the British mind and the
German one.
L. M. T. (AVimbledon). — Sorry, but I am not allowed to
discuss the matter.
H. O. M. B. (Landinam). — (1) Many thanks for your
long and interesting letter. It is the curse cf the country
that the ordinary population living in districts remote from
danger is totally incapable of realising that we are at war. A
fsmall German raid in one of these places would probably be a
blessing in disguise. (2) 1 have discussed tlie underwater
supply of submarine stores in last week's issue, which coin-
cided with your letter. (3) Both Philip of Spain, in Eliza-
bethan days, and NaiKjleon, at n later era, had desigus of
invasion conducted with flat-boLtomed boats; schemes which
never came olf . The Germans are reported to harbour simil.-ir
plans, but, though they 7night be immune from torpedo attack,
they would certainly not escape shell fire. I fancy that their
plight would be reminiscent of the Turks on the Suez C'aual.
1 hope you will .soon recover and be able to go back.
M. W. (Bournemouth, ex Belgium). — If you have any-
thing of value to give to the Briti->li Admiralty, you should
«ffer it to (hero direct. Jiut if you want to make it a matter
of trading information for cash, I have no syT»pathy witli you
whatever. I do not w-ish to be rude, but we all of us are up
against a common enemy, and no " indueements " bbould be
considered. Perhaps, however, you have Hot used "induce-
ment" in the English sense: in which case I apologise for
the above remarks and refer you back to the first sentence
of this.
AV. B. F. (St. Newlyn East). — Our remote descendants
may see something along the lines which you suggest, but
tc-day it would be entirely impracticable.
GoGo (Birkenhead). — (1) A zig-zag course is the best
thing because a submarine, when submerged, is slow moving,
unable to see vei-y well, and compelled to be bows on in order
to fire its torpedoes. (2) It is, of course, illegal in any case
whatever to sink merchant ships without warning, and,
indeed, to sink them at all is only legally permi.ssible when
there is no reasonable possibility of bringing them into port
with prize crews. However, Germany lias cast aside all ideas
of international law, and reverted to the ethics of two
thousand years ago.
D. S. H. (London, N.W.). — Your idea for locating mines
is certainly ingenious, but the whole area could be swept more
quickly than your " detectors " could be laid down.
T. C. (Hayward's Heath).— So far only one of the Chilean
Dreadnoughts has been taken over, the AJmiraiite Latorre,
Jiow the Vanot/a. The other Chilean ship, the Almtrmite
Cochrane, is far less advanced, so the question of taking her
over cannot yet arise. The policy of the British Admiralty
is to inconvenience as little as may be neutrals who have shii^a
building in this country.
M. J. C. (Glasgow). — (1) Roughly speaking, errors of
"direction" in modern gunnery do not exist. No matter what
the range, " direction " is mainly a matter of " hitting the
haj'stack." " Elevation," on the ether hand, is governed
by many factors, of which a few are correct eslijuation not
only of the range but of where the target will be when the
shell fetches up, variations in powder, the motion of the ship
firing, and a few other contraptions as well. (2) The article
to which you refer deals with American naval gunnery, v.hich
ditfers from ours in various ways. Tl)e Americans think their
way the best. We think ours is. The Germans have prob-
ably a third way still! Anyway, you will realise that any
explanation as to how and why a British shell hits a German
ship in a tender place is quite inappropriate at the present
time. Be content to thank God for the hits, and don't bother
how it's done so long as it is done.
P. G. C. (Potter's Bar). — It is imj^oss-ible to answer j-our
first queftion. As regards the .second, so far as 1 know U16
managed to get out of E.sbjerg within the 24-hour li.mit.
According to my information there was nothing part!C»ilarly
wrong with her, but the weather was bad and she took advan-
tage of International Law to gain much needed rest. There
is no nation so attached to International Law as Germany —
uhrn (u/riinliii/f <« to he ohlointd jrom it.
A. Z. (London, N.). — 1 am afraid that beyond informing
you that the Queen Kliuthf'h is already known in the Navy
as " Black Bess " I cannot give you any information such as
j-ou desire. But you can " bleej) in your bed " to the extent
of taking it that Lord Fisher will probably know better what
to do with her than " the majority of the members of your
club who discussed the matter." It it quite true that I
ujihold llie Admiralty as against civilian opinion which is
" profoundly dissatisfied ": but what would you have? When
j'ou order a suit of clothes, do you do the cutting and fitting,
or do you leave it to your tailor?
'■ Patriot " (Loudon, W.). — Your 27 reasons why
Admiral Jellicoe should have his battle fleet off Heligoland
form interesting (though terribly lengthy) read>ng. I should,
however, l)e more impressed with your " patriotism " ar.d
your conviction of oiu- Admiralty's " incoi>i))etenee or
treachery" if your letter " s's " were after the English
instead of the German style. Tlie only thing in your letter
which I can congratulate you on is " 1 prefer to anonymous
be." Here you are undoubtedly wise!
L. K. (Loudon, S.W.).— The flagship of the Italian
Admiral Persano at Lissa was the A Ifovdntnte, the " Dread-
nought " of her era. He .shifted his fiag to her from the
He d'l folia shortly before the battle, and kept her out of the
line. Had he gone into .action, leading the Italians in the
A/fori/iil(ire, he would prol>;.bly have won — the Austrian fleet
was distinctly inferior in ships.
,1. P. G. (London, S.W.). — Your scheme is ingenious,
but I am afraid that it would be out of court on account of
weight, and also ou account of the complication ef fitting.
The ordinary Bullivant torpedo iiet is far timpler and of far
less weijfht.
15"
GORRESPOiNDENGE.
LARGE ORDNANCE FOR SIEGE OPERATIONS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
SiK, — In Land and Water of Fehniary 20, Colonel
liau'.le niatle some iiitorestiiig remarks on the oj)erai.ion.s at
the siege of Sebastopol. A good deal of useful iniormatiou
ii)ight be obtained from careful study of this siege, but of late
years it has been quite ignored. The tactics employed by the
great engineer, Todlobeu, which delayed the siege for .so long,
and the skilful co-operation of the French and Briti.sh bat-
teries in asiMriting attacks on outworks and at the final assault
on the Malakoff, are worthy of careful study. One great
lesson taught by the siege was the great power exercised by
a,rl.illery and the necsssity for its devc-lopment. At Sebastopol,
as Colonel Maude points out, vei-y much more powerful
ordnance were employed than those used in former sieges,
but the greatest effect was produced by the Sre of large mortars
— 13-itich. The result of the fire may be judged from the fact
that for some two months before the fall of the place, the
Puussian casualties were one thousand each day. Colonel
Maude m.ontions Mallet's mortar of 33-iuches calibre, which
v.as a trial in the right direction. But there were difficulties
i.\ tlie manufacture of very large ordnance at that time, and
the authorities failed to grasp the importance of the idea. It
i ; a cunous fact that Antwerp, when besieged by the Trench
in 1832, surrendered chieily from the moral effect produced
by a few shells fired from a monster mortar with a calibre
of 24 inches, which the Belgians considered " the finishing
stroke to the enemy's barbarous manner of acting." — Yours,
&e.,
Charles 0'.vr:.\, Major General.
THE 9TTI LANCERS.
To the Editor of Land a.\d Watf.r,
Sir, — Can any of your military readers settle this ques-
tion? I see a niucli-adveitised print which depicts t!ie
9ih Lancers charging German guns. The letterpress describ-
ing this print tells how the Lancers captured the guns at
Mons and that the original picture is by iVIr. J. Halford Koss.
The 9ih Lancers have shown exceptional gallantry, aud
none are braver or have suffered more severely than they
have. But I am told that they on no occasion charged gun.s
at close quarters, as shown by Mr. Halford Boss, and that
their famous attack was again.st a great number of infantry,
v.'hojn they did not come near to on account of barbed wire
defences. — Yours,
Old Soldieh.
GERMANY S RESERVES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — A correspondent of the Times, under the heading
of " Six Weeks in Germany," states that there are 750,000
picked men in reserve of the 1915 category. I fail to see how
this can be possible, for in 1897 the German population wa.s
only 54,000,000, and the number of male births did not
exceed 945,000 at the then birthrate of thirty-five per 1.000.
The deaths in the fir.ib year of life in Germany at tiiat date
wore 138 per 1,000 in Prussia, end as higli as 282 per
1,000 in one State. At the lowest estimation 189.000 would
Lave died in the first year of life. If to this number is added
the deaths between the first and eighteenth year.^, and con-
sider the number of u -.fit, it does not seem possible that ll:a
estimate as given above can be correct. — 1 am. Sir, yours
obediently,
Medjcus.
Till- EFFICIENCY OF AIR ATTACKS AND THE RHINE
RAILWAY BRIDGES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Up to the j)resent no .system of concerted air attacks
ha.? been attempted against the vital node points in the
.western line of German communications — namely, the railway
bridges over the Rhine.
Of the railway bridges from Cologne to the Swiss frontier,
only those from Cologne to Mayence arc over 120 miles from
Verdun, and the remainder arc within striking distance from
Nancy, if we take 120 miles— the distance from Belfort to
Friedrichshaven — as a feasible radius for operations. The
aero2>ranes might be used in squadrons of five to make simul-
taneous attacks on the bottle-necks formed by the bridges.
I have only a copy of the 1896 Times Atlas by me, which
would make it appear that there were then only twelve rail-
way bridges in the area in question. This would need a fleet
of sixty aeroplanes, only some twenty more than the number
used last week on the Belgian coa^t.
The targets offered by the bridges are long, and the diflfi-
culty caused by the fact th-it tlicy are narrow would be
couuieracted by tlie adoption of Mr. L. Blin Desbled's plan of
dropping bombs in other vertical planes to the right and left
by each squadron.
Great delay and confu.-ion among the German transport
would result even if half the bridges were severely damaged
on the same day. lu Colonel Maude's words, " Raiding ilia
node points of the enemy's communications will gradually
make the supply of men in the trenches almost a matter of
inipo.-sibility.''
The concerted operation ought to bo repeated before the
repairs to the bridges have been completed. To make the
plan a success the two factors of co-ordination and repetition
of attack are essential. — I re.a^.ain. Sir, your obedient servant,
H. J. Thomas.
Nev.' House, Wadhurst.
PERTHES-LES-HURLUS.
To (lie Editor of Land and Water.
Sia, — Tlie village of tliis name has been prominently
mentioned in many of the French official ir.essage.i concerning
t!ic war. An inquiry addresL-ed by tlie present writer to Iha
columns of your contemporary, Xutfa an<l Qtiffirn, as to llie
meaning of the latter part of this name has brought a s-alaed
reply from an esteemed correspondent to the effect that the
name signifies Perthes near Hurlus. Le ? should bo spelt hi
or Jh, an obsolete word meaning " near," " by the side of,"
from the Latin htttit. It is now only used in connection with
place-names — e.g., Plessis-lez-Tours. Hurlus is a larger
village, about a mile south-east from Perthes. — Your obedient
servant,
J. Landfear Luca.s,
Sp^ri'Jch Makers' Cuiiipttrnj.
Glendora, Hiudhead, Surrey.
SUBMARINES AND MERCHANT VESIELS.
To the EiHtor of Land and Watf.r.
Dear Sir, — The instructions to the latter when attacked
by the former are to give the submarine their .stern and steam
away as fast as possi'ole. Would it not be an additional
security to the merchant vessels if, wliile thus acting, they
were to throw overboard a quantity of old fishing nets, which
would entangle a torpedo sent in jjursuit of them ? — Youra
faithfully.
Elcot Park, Kintburv, Berks.
H. J. P. Thomas.
THE WEST YORKSHIRE R E G I .M E N T .
Tu tlie Editor of Land and Wate:-(.
Dear Sir,- — Will you allow nie to appeal through tha
medium of your paper for warm gloves and miUens for the
men of the 12th Service Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment,
now traiuiug at Leig'nton Euz.^ard ? Much of these inen'.s
time is spent on th.e ritle range, and they suffer very much
from cold hands and chilljlaius, neither of which are con-
ducive to good marksmanship.
People send quantities of warm clcthing to our n;en at
the front, but are a little apt to forget the men of the new
armies at homo. — I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
Babette Jaques (Mrs.).
Ashl,?gh, Grove Road, Leighton Buzzard.
Mr. Hilaire Bflloc will lecturo at the Boroiigli Hail, StafTord,
\\ tciiicsda.v, 3nl Miuch, and at thi; Tcniporance Hall, Derby, on
iluu'sriay, 4th Miali.
His next lecture at Quceu'3 Hall, Lomluii, will be on tlie evening of
luesclav, 9lh March.
.Mr. Jane will lecture on the Naval War at Queen 'a Hall, London,
on I'liilay eveuii.g next, the 26th inst.
I'iofessfir Lewes will lecture at Queen's Hall ou " Modera
l';.xplc»3ive4 " on Xueailay, 2nU ilaixht
16*
February 27, 19 15
LAND A xN D WATER
Onoto Pens
Are the only standard
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having special reference to Mr. Bellocs remark-
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Special Features of the Map
THE MAI* is ^^' X 41^' in size, and is in eight colours.
— Belligerent areas are shown distinct trom neutral countries. — The
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in war news and despatches ; it is therefore clear and easy to *tudy. — In
addition, it indicates the political boundaries, — ^fortified zones, — rivers, —
hilly countries,— mountain passes, — marshes, — fcn-lands, — railways,
roads, — canals, — industrial areas, all these features are shown in difterent
forms and colours, so as to be readily distinguishable.
The whole Map is divided into z-inch sijuares, representing roughly 100
miles each way, so that approximate distances from one place to another
may be calculated immediately.
Each square has a separate number and letter, and places ''ailing within
each square are specially indexed with such number and letter, so that any
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with Explanatory Article by Hilaire Belloc, and Index net
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LONDON
w.c.
^IX
LAND AND W A T I- R
Fel
iruary 27, 1915
THROUGH THE EYES
OF A WOMAN
The One and Only Subject
A MAN home from the front on a few days' leave
recently had one bitter cause for complaint.
He admitted that the mud in Flanders was
muddier than any mud that had ever been
known or imagined. He granted that the
trenches at times were not the most comfortable form of
habitation, but there was one thing only tliat really roused
him to wrath.
" What I can't stand," said he, " is this incessant war
talk. You people talk of nothing but war from the time you
get up in the morning to the moment you go to bed at night.
What Kitchener has said, what Fisher is doing, why the
Grand Duke retreated, why this or that news has been
suppressed ; Zeppelins. Taubes, the new English gun, Joffre's
spring plan of campaign, so on, and so forth, every minute of
the day. It's sickening ! " Here he paused for breath, as
may reasonablv be supposed, but shortly afterwards informed
us that the only people who did not talk incessantly of the
war were the soldiers themselves, and that other folk had
better follow their example.
This may be and no doubt is (juite true, but the
question nevertheless remains : What else is there to talk
about ? Precious little in very truth. The point is : Had
we at times better be dumb than talk about the war and
nothing but the war ? Personally, I am inclined to think
we had. .-Xny kind of obsession is dangerous, but the war
obsession is more so than most, as all will agree who give the
matter half a moment's thougiit. The way in which even
the mildest and meekest amongst us welcome with fierce joy
the news of carnage amongst the enemy or a report that all
the Kaiser's sons have been killed is a case in point. It is
very natural, no doubt, but in quieter moments many of us
will wonder at the depths of ferocity which we have displayed.
Feelings we never dreamt of possessing have been betrayed,
and with blood and thunder for ordinary tea-table talk it is
really no cause for wonder they have risen to the surface.
The Practical Side of Things
Since August even the least practical amongst us have
attempted to become practical members of a practical nation.
We have honestly tried to eschew vanities, and each woman
in her way, be it small or vastly important, has endeavoured
to be of some positive use. Complete households, from the
mistress to the scullery maid, have turned to with a will,
and worked with fingers as well as with brains. There has
been very little idhng ; it has, in fact, been almost a com-
petition amongst women as to who could be the busiest, and
many have mapped out every moment of their day, grudging
almost a minute of wasted time. And all has been governed
by this one object of usefulness. The dilettante has been
sternly banished from the scene, and no half-way measures
welcomed.
No clearer proof of the practical phase through which
women are passing can be given than that furnished by the
new skirt. This new skirt has been intimated for some
time, but it is only now, when women are forced by the
rapidly approaching spring to pay^ome heed to their ward-
robes, that its claims are being seriously considered. A
delightful book has just reached me from New York, which
has something to say, albeit very little, upon the matter of
clothes. It is written by Mrs. Beatrice Forbes-Robertson
Hale, the well-known feminist — though she is rather better
known in America than over here — and is called " What
Women Want."
Mrs. Hale, writing in June of last year, when tight skirts
were still habitual, goes so far as to say : "I doubt if one
can touch pitch without being defiled more readily than one
can habitually wear a hobble skirt without being belittled."
If she had been writing at the present time on present-day
fashion she could have no such text for her theme. For the
latest skirt is exceptionally full, and wide. It measures,
indeed, no less than five yards round the hem, and it is
exceedingly short, into the bargain. Such a practical skirt
as this has not been seen for years, save for country use.
Now we are invited to wear it at all times and seasons.
Every skirt is short and full, whether it be for day, afternoon,
or evening use. It will be delightful to move unshackled
once again, and, to quote Mrs. Hale once more, by this gain
in freedom our " accoutrements gain in sanity."
tContinutd on page 316)
PERMANENT COAL.
A Clever Invention, An Inexpensive Appliance,
Suitable for all Coal-Grates, which Saves
Scuttles upon Scuttles of Coal.
An exceedingly clever invention by a North-country scientist bids fair to
revolutionise ail existing ideas of coal consumption, it is suitable for gratis
of all kinds and sizes (including kitchen ranges), and only costs 3/-, or j/b
post free.
No Alteration in Appearance of Fire. No Treatment
of Fuel. No Special Installation, or Renewal.
The Incandescent Fire Mantle is a device of special de?.ign and com-
position, fully protected by Patent, which is simply placed iu the centre of any
grate. li scicntilicallv utilises the heat energy created by the combustion
of the coal, which, instead of flying up the cliinmey, as is the case of the
larger portion of such energy in ordinary grates, is made to bring the mantle
to incandescent heat. Thus there lies in the centre of the fire a white hot
mass which may be termed everlasting coal, throwing off more 1 '-at tliaii
coal alone can give, yet absolutely unburnable, and as good at the end ol
twelve months a, it is the first day. The appearance of the fire is in no wav
altered; the mantle is coinpletely covered by the surrounding coal, and its
presence cannot be detected. No I.sstall.\tion, .\lter.\tion, or Special
Treatment of the Fuel or the Grate is Necessary. There is no
recurring expenditure of any kind ; when once yon have purchased the fire
mantle at its modest price of 3s. you can enjoy for ever a beautifully bright
and hot fire at an enormous saving of coal. The mantle is placed into the
grate with exactly as much -and no more — trouble than it is to put on a
lump of coal. It requires no attention or care of any kind.
Remarkable Test Figures.
As the result of a recent strictly supervised test upon modern grates, it
was found that the average consumption of coal per grate in the ordinar.'
grate (eight grates were experimented upon in this particular test) was 34 lb.
of coal for a period of 11 hours. On the following day one of the new fire
mantles was placed in each of these same grates, and the coal consumption
per grate for a period of 12J hours was then found to have been reduced
to 19 lb. 30Z., whilst the heat was greater.
Saves its Cost in a Few Days.
The price of the Incandescent Fire Mantle is 3s. (3s. 6d. post free),
which small sum is saved back in a few days. The mantle lasts for an
indefinite time and can be used in grates of any size, pattern, or construction.
On account of the proportionate saving in postage, two mantles can be
dispatched post free to any address in the kingdom on receipt of 6s. 6d., and
three for only gs. At this time of enforced economy, and with the additional
danger of the present high coal prices rising still further, the great saving
effected by the Incandescent Fire Mantle should not be neglected. Orders
and remittances to be addressed to The Incandescent Fire Mantle Syndicate,
(Dept. 28), 9 Station Parade, Queen's Road, London, S.E.
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■lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
314
■ra?
ruary 27, 191 5
TTTTTrTTTrTrrmr
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Dreadnought H.M.S. COLOSSUS. 20,000 tons displacement; length 546 ft. ; beam 86 fi. : completed 191 1 ; engines 29,000 horse power ;
speed 21 '5 knots; cost about £1,730,000; maximum coal capacity 2,700 tons ; guns, 10 12-in., 16 4-in., and smaller ; 3 torpedo tubes ; crew 900.
From the original by Montague Dawson.
CfPjright of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
f Fi^tar-'iBVipf^ a rpntnrv.l
LAND AND WATER
Feb
ruarv 2'
1915
THROUGH THE EYES OF A
WOMAN
(Continued from page 314)
Good Work !n Belgium
When a lii>fi>iv of the war comes to bo written it is quite
likeh' that space may be found for mention of Dr. Hector
Munro and his gallant band of helpers. For a long time
past this Ambulance Corps has been doing splendid work in
Belgium. Thcv have established centres at Antwerp and
Ghent, and after being forced to leave these places have now
made their headquarters at Furnes. The work is endless,
and the strain upon all concerned a heavy one. but the
Corps is hourly reaping it.^ reward. There is hardly a soldier
amongst the Allies who has not heard of its fame, and many
of them have already cause t(> bless the day when Dr. Munro
and his staff took a hand in the hospital work abroad.
Numbers of wounded soldiers have been rescued from the
hring line by one or another of the Corps' motor ambulances,
manned by plucky helpers, and the rescue work has often
been carried out under circumstances of great danger and
difficulty.
.\mongst the members of the Corps is Lady Dorothie
i-'i'ilding, one of Lord Denbigh's daughters. She is a pretty
girl with an infinity of pluck and courage, and apparently
tireless. Evcvvitnesses report that time alter time she has
gone out under fire to bring in the wounded, and that she does
not know the meaning of fear. It is a splendid reputation
to have won. The last time I saw Lady Dorothie was at
Ascot. She was watching the King and Queen drive away
just before the last race, the first day of the meeting. She
was very well dressed and very attractive to see, yet I do not
doubt she has never been better suited than by the workman-
like kit she is wearing at present while on her work of mercy
and sorely needed help.
The Discipline of M ar
The chance of the silver lining goes far towards making
the blackest of clouds tolerable. It ajijieals to the optimism
that is latent in every man, no matter how strenuously he
may den\' it. It would be hard for us all if we could snatch
no gleam of comfort from the dread event which has over-
whelmed humanity. Life w^ould be well-nigh intolerable, all
sacrifice vain, and the future a thing of no account. As a
matter of happy fact, we can look with confidence upon the
reverse side of the shield. We look forward to a future full
of hope and promise, one in which values will have been
readjusted and seen aright. It is the old story of the cleansing
(ire, and it is fortunate that it is so. Otherwise all things
would resolve themselves into one gigantic puzzle, the
answer to which was for ever missing.
It is this hope of the ultimate issues that is helping
many a woman to face her life just now. In spite of all the
activities into which we have plunged, in spite of our com-
mittees, organisations, institutions, and schemes of a hundred
and one des:-riptions, there is a terrible amount of time left
for thinking. Women have the infinitely harder part of
watching and waiting ; about that there is no shadow of
doubt. The only thing to be done is to take a long and wide
enough view — not to limit events to February of 1915, but
to imagine what Februaries of succeeding years will be,
when peace is restored ; and for the first time in most of our
lives we realise what peace really means. In common with
many things, it is in its absence we have grown to appre-
ciate it, and the lesson could not have been learnt in any
other way.
Erica.
SCOTTISH MOTOR AMBULANCES
At Bucliingham Palace on Wednesday H.M. the King inspected
a numlier of nu)tor amliiilances wliich are l)eing sent to the front by
tlie Scottish Branch of the Britisli Ked Cross Society. ]'arlied in the
Mall, tile loni; string of cars looked very handsome and imposing,
stretching as they did from the Victoria Memorial to nearly half-way
down the avenue. At the close of the in.spection the King, addressing
Sir George Beatson, chairman of the Scottish branch, and other
members who were present, said : —
" I cannot refrain from expres.sing my appreciation of this
splendid gift which has come from Scotland. I assure you,
gentlemen, 1 appreciate it very highly, and am quite sure it will
be of the greatest service to our troops in France. I am glad to
have this opportunity of expressing my warm thanks to you, and
1 can assure you that this inspection has aflforded me the greatest
interest and pleasure."
The Scottisli Branch of this Society has made the work a national
one, all classes having sub.scribed. We think that a little more than
ihe mere mention of the fact is due to the man to whom the Society
owes the success of the movement and the raising of over ;^i40,ooo —
no mean total. We refer to Mr. James Inglis Ker, J. P., whose
unceasing efTorls have made the scheme possible.
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SBSsS^^ea
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol LXIV No. 2756
SATURDAY. MARCH 6, 1915
rpcbushed ast p r 1 c e s i x p e n c k
La sewspapek.J published weekly
WING-COMMANDER SAMSON, D.S.O.
Whose brilliant air feats have been so eminently successful.
^^'"T^i^-
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March 6, 191 5
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"THE KINGFISHER'S HAUNT" - do.
"IN THE HEART OF KENT" - do.
"THE WEALD OF SURREY" - do.
"IN LOVE" 22 X 14
"AWAITING THE DECISION" - do.
" TO THE RESCUE " - - - 23 x 15
"AN UNWILLING PLAYMATE" - do.
"THURSDAY" - - - - 22 x 11
"FRIDAY"
Plate
paper.
Inches.
30 X 22
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
do.
ARTIST.
B. W. LEADER, R.A.
LORD LEIGHTON, P.R.A.
J. W. WATERHOUSE,
G. F. WATTS, R.A.
E. HEISSONIER.
W. F. YEAMES, R.A.
C. W. FURSE, A.R.A.
G. WILLOUGHBY.
DOUGLAS SHERRIN.
LEYTON BROCK.
LEYTON BROCK.
DENDY SADLER.
R.A.
do.
The above 20 Fine Art Plates we offer at the following nominal prices, viz.. One Plate 2/9, Two
Plates 5/-, Four Plates 9/6, Six Plates 14/-, or any Ten Plates for 21/- ; or the complete Twenty for 40/-,
securely packed and carriage paid to any part of the World. And to every Reader purchasing not less
than Ten Plates for 21/- we will present " THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS" FREE OF ALL
CHARGE, by way of SPECIAL BONUS.
In ordering please give the titles of the pictures required, and if ten or more plates are ordered
THE FOLLOWING COUPON SHOULD BE SENT WITH THE REMITTANCE. All orders
will be executed in rotation as received.
"LAND AND WATER" COUPON.
This Coupon entitles the Holder, purchasing not less than ten of the above Plates for 21/-, to one
copy of "THE CHARGE OF THE SCOTS GREYS, "from the original painting by Lady Butler.
L. W. COLBAN-EWART, managing Director,
THE BRITISH ART ASSOCIATION, LTD.
lUNDZE KOTAL FATRONAGE
251 KENSINGTON HIGH STREET, LONDON, W.
H,B.— ANY OF THE ENGRAVINGS SELECTED WILL BE EXCHANGED IF DESIRED,
AND THE REMITTANCE RETURNED IN FULL IF PICTURES ARE NOT APPROVED.
Remittance must accompany each order, and cheques should be crossed : " LONDON CITY' AND
MIDLAND BANK."
All orders should be addressed in full :
L. W. COLBAN-EWART, Managing Ditector,
THE BRITISH ART ASSOCIATION^ Ltd.
251 KENSINGTON HIGH STREET, LONDON, W.
WEBBS'SEEDS
WEBBS' SELECTED AILSA CRAIG ONION.
6d., 1/-, and 2/6 per packet, post free.
All who have Gardens should obtain
WEBBS' GARDEN CATALOGUE.
Beautifully Illnrtrated. POST FREE.
EDWARD WEBB & SONS (STOURBRIDCD LTD.,
The King's Seei^smen. STOURBRIDGE.
BEGONIAS
for Exhibition, Greenhouse, BeddiUf;,
Hanging Baskets, etc. Awarded 40 Gold
Medals. Seeds 2/6 and 5/- per packet.
DELPHINIUMS
from our unsurpassed Gold Medal Col-
lection, choicest named varieties in strong
ground roots, most lovely shades.
OTHER SPECIALITIES :
Carnations, Cyclamen, Polyanthus, Blue
Primrose, Violets, etc.
IlhistTLited Calalogua Free.
BLACKMORE&LANGDONy Bath
SHANKS'S
MOTOR
MOWERS
Thoroughly Reliable Machines. Fitted
with all modern improvements, includ-
ing High Tension Magnetos and Relief
Clutches. The Motors are of ample
power. Used by the London. Birmingham.
Edinburgh. Manchester. Nottingham, and
Renfrew Corporations. Also by The
Royal Automobile Club. The Royal Flying
Corps, &c., &c.
A. SHANKS & SON, LTD.,
ARBROATH (SCOTLAND) and
BUSH LANE HOUSE, BUSH LANE,
CANNON ST., LONDON, E.G.
WHISTLER
11 STRAND,
SECOND-HAND GUNS
PRISM GLASSES
CATALOGUE AND PRICE LIST ON APPLICATION
.330
?vlarch 6, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
formed into the cords in which it is used. Propellants of the
nitro-ccllulose-nitro-glycerine type are used by Italy, Japan,
Great Britain, the German and Austrian navy, Brazil, and
Argentine.
Modern smokeless powders develop a much larger total
volume of gas for the same weight of charge than the old
gunpowder, and, therefore, greater velocit\' of the projectile
or bullet is attained than formerly, the gas production taking
place gradually during the whole time of the passage of the .
projectile down the bore. Although the total propelling force
is greater it is more regularly sustained, so that the maximum
pressure is not increased. In the old powJers almost complete
combustion of the explosive took place before the projectile
had time to move far down the bore of the gun, and therefore
the muzzle was much shorter than in modern guns.
We will now deal with the disruptive explosives of
group 2, to which nitro-glycerine, dynamite, and gun-cotton
belong. Practically every country has adopted picric acid
as a bursting charge for shells, under a different name and
with certain differences in composition consisting merely in
the addition of an ingredient to reduce the melting point.
Picric acid is obtained by the action of strong nitric acid
on carbolic acid, and is a most powerful explosive. It is a
pale yellow crystalline solid, intensely bitter in taste, has a
high melting point, and was largely used as a dye long before
its explosive properties were discovered. Eugene Turpin, of
Paris, introduced picric acid mixed with collodion in the
French Service under the name of melinite. Picric acid
solidifies from the melted condition in a closer or denser form
than from the water solution, in which forni it can more
readily be exploded by detonators. Lyddite, which is used
in the English Service, is simply melted and solidified picric
acid. A disadvantage of picric acid is that when left in contact
with metals or oxides it forms very dangerous detonating
salts, and therefore it is necessary to varnish the interior of
shells, giving special protection to the detonators and taking
the utmost precautions to prevent access of foreign bodies
while the acid is in the molten state. In order to overcome
these disadvantages a new explosive has within the last few
years been introduced, and is known as trinitrotoluene or,
briefly, " T.N.T." The French Service calls it tolite, the
Spanish Government trilit, while the Carbonite Works of
Schlebusch call it trotyl. It is obtained by heating toluene
with a mixture of nitric acid and sulphuric acid. Toluene is
a liquid hydro-carbon obtained along with benzene from coal
tar. Trinitrotoluene melts at about 80° centigrade, is nearly
insoluble in water, and does not form metallic salts, as picric
acid does. It is used chiefly in shells, and has practically
superseded picric acid. The Germans use it also with great
success in mines and torpedoes, for which work gun-cotton is
generally employed. In the Austrian Army and Navy a
very powerful explosive has been introduced under the name
of ammonal, which is a mixture of trinitrotoluene, ammonium
nitrate, charcoal, and aluminium.
Detonators are used for exploding the explosives of the
first and second group. Since iSoo, when Howard invented
fulminate of mercury, and since 1815, when Joseph Egg
made the first cap, but little progress has been made in the
manufacture of these articles, the only development being
that potassium chlorate enters partly into the compositi( n
of detonators. For smokeless powders a hotter flame is
found essential, and is obtained by adding a combustible
substance. A peraission cap consists of a little metal cap or
case filled with a mixture of fulminate of mercury and
potassium chlorate. When a percussion cap is stnick by the
hammer of the gun or rifle it detonates and evolves the
necessary heat to inflame the neighbouring powder charge.
The composition used in percussion caps varies according to
the nature and size of the powder charge to be fired. It
contains generally' potassium chlorate, mercury fulminate,
and antimony sulphide, to which ground glass is sometimes
added. Detonators are generally made of copper tubing
varying in length from one and a half inches up to six inches,
and are charged with fulminate of mercury and other
ingredients. These detonators are ignited either by means
of safety fuses or by electricity. A safety fuse consists of flax,
spun and twisted in the same manner as in cord making, having
a column of fine gunpowder in the centre. Its rate of burning
can be varied from seventy-five to forty-five seconds per vard.
The electric fuse consists of a very small and fine piece of
iridium-platinum wire, which is wrapped round with a small
piece of fleecy gun-cotton in close proximity to the fulminate
of mercury. When an electric current is passed through the
fine wire it gets red hot and sets fire to the gun-cotton, which
in turn ignites the fulminate, and this, being placed in close
contact to the explosive charge, detonates the latter.
The electric fuse is employed in all large siege and naval
guns. By this means a round can be fired at the exact
moment by merely pressing a button, and all the gxins can be
fired simultaneously from some central position. It has been
found that a small quantity of mercury fulminate placed on
top of trinitrotoluene forms an excellent detonating mixture,
and a great many detonators manufactured in Germany use
this mixture. Mercury fulminate is obtained bv dissolving
three parts of mercury in thirty-six parts of nitric acid,
keeping the mixture at a low temperature until dissolved,
when seventeen parts of alcohol are added. The fulminate
settles in crystals wluch are thoroughly washed, after which
it is taken to the drying rooms.
The loss of the French battleship Liberie and several
other explosions brought home the importance of stability
of explosives. Although modern explosives are far more
stable than those in use twenty years ago, it is necessary to
take strict precautions when storing large quantities of
explosives. On all British warships cooling machinery is
installed to keep the magazines at an even temperature of
70°, as at and below this temperature it can be safely assumed
that stability is permanently assured.
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
The All-Powerful Present
WE have often been told by philosophers and
such-like authoritative people that the true
secret of enjoyment is to live in the present
and let the future take care of itself. Human
nature is so constituted, however, that it is
frequently difficult to follow this advice. It is a matter of
temperament, no doubt, but even the most sanguine tempera-
ment is apt to have its moments of reflection in which woes
yet to come conspicuously figure. The odd thing is that at
the moment, whether we be inveterate optimists or most
pessimistically inclined, we are obliged, more or less, to li\^e
from day to day. Probing into the future is too unprofitable,
as most of us have proved. It is quite impossible to prophesy
the fate of Europe, society, or any individual a year or even
sLx months ahead. I doubt, indeed, if we can do it for as
long as that. So at last we have been obliged to curb any
tendency to anticipate, and women have been specially
constrained this way. Sufficient unto the hour is the evil
thereof. It is a good motto, but lately we have been able to
substitute the better one of letting the morrow take care of
itself. Those women whose men are at the front learnt the
necessity for this in the early stages of the war. The very
stress of anxiety forced them to look upon no news as good
news. It would have been impossible to get along otherwise.
A pretty woman whose husband has lately been mentioned
in dispatches voiced this to me a short while ago : "I never
now," she said, " look forward one minute after the other if
I can possibly help it. It does not work very well in the
household, but it is infinitely better for me." And such an
exaggeration as regards her house may be permitted to one
whose menage runs on oiled wheels, whatever its mistress
may say to the contrary.
On a Radical Change
In spite of all we may say and think to the opposite,
in spite of the days which inevitably arise when we hardly
think of such matters at all, the time comes when we must
look for a while on the lighter side of things. It is really
necessary, not only for our own sakes but for that of every-
body connected with us. A well-written amusing novel can
be as good as a tonic, an evening at a laughter-provoking
play a rejuvenator. And in our less tense moments we can
certainly spare time to marvel at the radical change which
has overtaken women's clothes. Things being as they are,
it is wonderful how it has come about, but that it has not
only come but means to make a definite stay is obvious.
Now, this change has not come from Paris. Whatever may
be written or said to the contrary, the big ateliers of Paris
— with a very few exceptions — are not open. It has doubtless
been originated by the many model designers, who, escaping
from Paris when she was threatened with siege, came over
331
LAND AND WATER
March 6, 1915
here, and are working in this country. And if we may judge
from the results, they have been surpassingly busy. Our
skirts, our coats, and the treatment of our necks are all
fundamentally changed. It is really almost bewildering,
riie advent of the short, wide skirt has already been so
widely discussed that there are few words left to say about
it. Instead of long, fuU coats we are invited to consider
short cut-away models verging towards bolero type. And,
greatest change of
all, we are told that
bare throats must
not be seen during
the daytime. Those
of us who have
grown attached to
the coUarless blouse
and its feeling of
freedom and com-
fort wiU no doubt
dislike this new
fashion intensely.
StiU, the possibility
is that in the short-
est while from now
we shall all be
swathed up round
the throat in
mummy-lik e
fashion. The turn
of the year and the
approach of spring
with — it is to be
hoped — sunshine
makes clothes-buy-
ing a necessity, and
we shall assuredly
exchange old lamps
for new.
More About Books
No rival to the Camps Lending Librarj- will be found in
the War Library, which makes its appeal from Surrey House,
Marble Arch, London. To this address the public are asked
to send all the books they can spare for the use of sick and
wounded soldiers. It is in this last respect that the difference
between the two libraries lies. Though they agree in their
request for as many books as possible, their purpose is at
variance. Quoting
I
from the Secretary
of the War
Library's letter,
they supply the
sick, while the
Camps Library
supplies the strong.
The War Library
api)eals for maga-
zines as well as for
books, and hopes
that these will be
forthcoming as
quickly as possible
in view of the large
number of wounded
now being brought
to England. The
importance of the
part cheerful books
and magazines play
in a soldier's con-
valescence can be
gauged from a
letter written by
Sir Arthur Sloggett,
Director - General,
Medical Army Ser-
vice, referring to
the Library's work.
In it he says : " We
shall be only too
glad officially to
recognise the gener-
ous efforts which
you are prepared to
make in collecting
and supplying
literature for the
hospitals." As a
matter of fact, this
work was started
in August, since
which time hos-
pitals in France, as
well as in Great
Britain, have re-
ceived a number
of books. In com- .
mon with many
THE NEW LADY LONDONDERRY CopyrieK MOam, unit c»«ri« things, however, it
Who hai laggeited women working on the land while the men «re «t the front. jg Qj^g thine to start
She it Colonel'in-Chief o( that much diicnased body, the Women'i Volunteer Reserve , ° , .
a good work and
another to maintain it. It is with the latter effort that
the crux of the matter hes, and it is everybody's business to
help if they can in one degree or another.
The Teaching of
New Trades
Whatever may
happen in the im-
mediate future,
when brighter days
should certainly
dawn, the past few
months have not
been easy ones for
London dress-
makers and their
workroom staffs. It
is difficult, indeed,
to know what many
of the girls would
have done if the
Queen's" Work for
Women " Fund had
not come to the
rescue in very prac-
tical fashion. With
the aid of the
Central Committee
on Women's Employment numbers of dressmakers have secured
work which has literally saved them from starvation. They
have become flannel-belt makers.shirt makers, and sock makers,
and have learnt their new trade in remarkably quick time.
Forty girls are now working full time at the Committee's
Test Workroom in Piccadilly and over seven thousand are
being employed on a large War Office contract for regulation
shirts for the Army. It is not an easy thing to learn a new
trade in a limited space of time, and at first, from all accounts,
the organisers of the work had a very difficult task. They
were absolutely determined, however, to make the scheme a
success, and were never daunted. An excellent system of
dividing the work was adopted. It was soon found that
while one girl was good at sleeves another was expert at
button-holing. Each girl, therefore, was set to do the task
at which she was best, and shirts have often been the work
of four or five pairs of hands in consequence. Sock-making,
again, under the Committee's guidance has become a great
industry. A contract for over two million pairs of socks has
been undertaken, and it is estimated that through it over
twelve hundred women will be employed weekly till July.
The spectre of unemployment amongst women is a very real
one, but methods such as these will do everything to lay it.
For the big idea of employment — not charity— is the motive
underlying all appeals on behalf of the Queen's Fund.
In the South of France
The Allies have much in their favour, and not least is
the fact that the Riviera will be at the service of all the
wounded soldiers who can manage to be sent there. Even
the shortest whUe of bright Riviera sunshine is the best tonic
known to man. A feeling of health comes with the first
glimpse of blue sea, bluer sky, and the golden fruit of the
orange groves. Life is not without its compensations after
all. This morning's mail brought a letter from the manage-
ment of a Nice hotel enlarging upon the advantages of the
Sunny South at this time of year. Chief amongst them was
the fact that the season would be " Germanless." The
Teuton and the C6te d'Azur go together remarkably badly,
and nothing spoilt Monte Carlo so much as the German host
it attracted year after year.
This German invasion spelt the fashionable doom of the
Principality. Every French hotel proprietor recognises this,
and several in the past took steps to stem the German
tide, following the example of the brilliant Parisian who
can make or mar the fortune of a town at will.
ESJCA.
1
332
March 6, 1915
LAND AND WATEl^
The Church Army
tfll All Soldiers are welcome in our
^RECREATION HUTS
in camps and barracks at home and in France
and Egypt ; for Rest, Recreation, Refresh-
ment, Reading, Writing.
All Soldiers' Wives are welcome in our
RECREATION ROOMS
in garrison and other towns, for Rest, Recrea-
tion, Refreshment, Reading, Writing, and
latest News. Creche for Babies.
OTHERS WILL BE OPENED AS FUNDS PERMIT.
Prebendary GARLILE, Hon. Chief Secretary,
Headquarters : Bryanston Street, Marble Arch, London, W.
Oi-D Calabar
THE STAPLE MEAT
DIET. BISCUITS
FISH
>%-. BISCUITS
HOUND
BISCUITS
AND
MEALS
SOLD EVERYWHERE
SAMPLE and BOOKLET
EQUEST TO
OLI> CALABAR BISCUIT CO.. LIVERPOOL. ENC
A perfect
feed
for every
breed.
Marvellous Fire Extinguishing by Boy Scouts.
THE usefulness of Boy Scouts as Firemen was forceably
demonstrated at a recent display, when a large wooden
building was saturated with petrol, paraffin, etc., and set on
fire. Although the fire was of terrific fierceness the Scouts
completely extinguished it in less than 40 seconds. The Chief
Scout, Sir Robert Baden Powell, has warmly expressed his
approval of the merits of the "Kyl-Fyre" Extinguisher.
No house should be without a supply of this wonderful
appliance, as the risk of serious fires is greatly increased owing
to raids by Hostile Aircraft.
" Kyl-Fyre " is an ideal appliance for RED CROSS
H03PITAI.S, HUTMENT CAMPS, etc., instantly exting-
uishing Electrical and Petrol fires.
The price of this remarkable extinguisher is only 5s. each and
full particulars can be obtained from
"KYL-FYRE Ltd.,"
12B Elms Buildings, Eastbourne.
ft^
1V.?2!
# VIRGINIA CIGARETTES %
I
1
^
I
1
JOHN PLAYER & SONS
beg to draw the attention
of connoisseurs to
PERFECTOS No. 2 |
hand-made Cigarettes. They 5
are distinguished by a superb =
dehcacy, the result of a 1
matchless blend of the finest =
Virginia Tobacco. §
10 - 6d. 20 - 1/- I
50 - 2/6 100 - 4/9 I
1^^
) i) y^y The Imperial Tob ceo Co. (of Oroat Britain and ^W
y J' '///, Ireland) LU. .'^^^
^ "PERFECTOS FINOS" are
yjT larger Cigarettes of the same quality
// ^ JOHN PLAYER & SONS,
^y Nottingham.
'"', The Imperial To
Ireland) Ltd.
"^illllllllllllllR
= Are you Run-down S
■ When your system is undermined by worry or over- work ■■
2S — when your vitality is lowered — when you feci " any- ■■
■■ how" — when your nerves are "on edge"— when the ih
■i least exertion tires you — you are in a " Run-down " JJ
22 condition. Your system is like a flower drooping for ■■
■■ want of water. And just as water revives a drooping ■■
■■ flower— so ' Wincarnis ' gives new life to a " run-down " 2
S constitution. From even the first wineglassful you can •■
SS /«' it stimulating and invigorating you, and as yon ■■
iS continue, you can feel it surcharging your whole system ^
2 with new health— hcw strength — new vigour and new g
2 lije. Will you try just one bottle ? i^
s Begin to get well FREE. S
1^2 Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wincarnis'— -not a mere taste i^
■■ btit enough to do you good. Enclose three penny stamps <'to pay ■■
^ postage). COLEMAN & CO. Ltd., W212. Wincarnis Works. Norwich. mm
iiiiiioBeiiiueBiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii
xtt
LAND AND WATER
March 6, iqi 5
'Don't send imitations! CiVe him a
Watermans(Ide3)fiiuntainPen
He certainly deserves the best of all the Fount.iin
Pens. Haven't you seen his oft-expressed wish in
vivid letters from the Front ? " If only I had a
Fountain Pen ! "
Waterman's Ideal Fountain Pen has never been success-
fully imitated. Some pens may look like Waterman's
Ideal, but they don't write like it — there are difFercnces
in nib, patented construction,
and materials used.
When you decide to give him
the best send him the " Safety "
Type Waterman's Ideal. He
can carry it in any position
in his pocket — no clip is
needed — and it can't leak.
Just the right pen for Travellers,
Sportsmen, Nurses, Doctors, etc.
Waterman's Ideal is made in
four types — Regular, Safct^',
Pump-filling and Self-filling.
Nibs to suit all hands. F.very
pen guaranteed.
In SUi'ei- and Gold for Presentation.
Of all Stationers and Jewellers.
L. G. SLOAN, lo^nPsr KINGS WAY, LONDON
Which shall it be?
BRITISH
OR
©crman
inavis
Similar Taste !
Similar Properties!
i^pprt.
Repd. Rep. I.
riiits. i-l'jr.ts.
IKR
noz.
6/- 3/6 2/6
LARRI.IGF. P.Ain.
A. J, CALEY & SON, Ltd..
CheniM St. Works, LONDON ; Chapel Field Work., NORWICH
INEXPENSIVE & EASY LOCOMOTION
DURING WAR TIME.
T^O replace the cars and the horses,
ride a Sunbeam with the Little
Oil Bath. It is by far the easiest run-
ning Bicycle in the world. The above
is an illustration of the All-Weather
Model. Price List free on application to
3 SUNBEAMLAND, WOLVERHAMPTON.
London Showrooms:
57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.G.
158 SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Square), S.W.
HOTEL CECIL
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
Residents and Officers.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
TeUphon.: GERRARD 60. ^PP^V' MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
334
Marcli 8, 1915.
L A IS D AND jy: A T E R.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
ROTB.— TUf ArtlcU lux beca lubmllteil to the Presi Bnrein, *rhtch doei aot ebject to tbe pabllcallM u uwimtl, ni Uktl M
respansibllity lor tbe correctaesi cl tbe 1111(000(1.
la acsorilAaM irltb the rcqalrtmcDtii cf ths Press Bartan, tbe positions of troops sa Plaos tllustratla< tkli Article wust aal/ b«
regarded as spproxtmate, and a* deflnlto itrengtk at any polot is ladicatel.
THE forcing of the Dardanelles is by very
much the most important event strategic-
ally which vre have seen in this war since
the battle of the Marne. It is evident
ilhat if this operation be successful we have begun
to solve, long DC fore the end of the winter, the main
problem of Russian equipment and munitioning,
and at the same time released foodstuffs of which
our market is in need. At the same time we have
released the Balkans from their hesitation, we
have left Austria without an object towards the
operations in which there is most movement and
chance for a decision, but that upon which tha
future of the campaign for the moment mosli
obviously turns.
It presents the same strategical interest which
it has presented since the beginning of February,
when the triple action was engaged of holding the
Russians in front of AVarsaw and of attempting
to push them back upon either flank. But in using
this phrase it is necessary to modify one conclusion
to wnich a certain amount of public criticism has
Bouth-east, we have cut off all supply available for come, presumably in error. Men speak as though
modern war to the Turkish forces in Asia
Politically the event is of even greater
magnitude.
The whole of this week, however, these opera-
lions have been naval in character, and do not
come within the scope of these comments.
Upon the western front there has been too
the action along the whole eastern front from
the Baltic to the Roumanian border was one
united conception, an effort to push in the
two flanks of the Russian army so as to
compel the centre to abandon the line of
the Vistula and the all-important bridge-
head for the same, which is politically the
little movement to make any commentary worth capital of Poland — Warsaw. It is a false judoj-
while, and so far as that field is concerned I shall
deal this week onlv with its most important aspect
at the moment, which is the call for ammunition.
Of movements upon any general scale we have no
examples except upon the eastern field, and with
this, therefore, I shall begin my comments thia
.week.
THE EASTERN FRONT.
SALTlC
Kovno
The Austnf'Gernum
tine Last Mondai^
JAsurch 1ft.
ment. The enemy's effort on the left wing of tna
Russians in the south is not a strategical effort
balancing what he is doing upon the right wing
of the Russians in the north. It has a different
motive, and it is proceeding in a different fashion.
As has been pointed out more than once ia
these columns, the effort in the south is probably,
political : though political only, of course, in the
sense of a political action affecting later strategy,
the enemy is pushed into the Bukovina in order,
as we have seen, to intercept any potential com-
bination between the Roumanian forces and the
Russian forces in Galicia. But the hope by this
effort to turn the Russian effort in Galicia and to
attack it seriously in flank is not probable, for
reasons which I hope to show later in this article.
Bui in the north, by far the most important'
field, what he set out to do was undoubtedly to
isolate Warsaw, and in this attempt we still tavq
to follow the main point of interest this week.
THE ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE NIEMEN
AND THE NAREW.
The Battle of Przasnysz.
The eastern front continues to be what it has
been for the last two months, not only that field of
LAND AND .W. A T E R.
March 6, 1915.
1 musF, al the risk of wearying the reader,
repeat the elements of the position in order to
make clear what has taken place in the past week.
i[\Varsaw is the meeting-place of the railways
feast of the Vistula. Of these lines, the southern
ones, marked 2, 3, and 4 upon the sketch, especially
3 and 4, lead to Warsaw from the more important
bases. But the northern one, marked 1, leads to the
capital of Petrograd, connects the northern armies
upon the East Prussian frontier with the main
force near Warsaw, and if cut would isolate
(Warsaw in some degree, and vrould check in some
measure its flow of reinforcements; but, most im-
portant of all, would lead in a few days to the
cutting of the remaining railways. For there is
no natural line and no fortified line that would
Eave Railways 2 and 3, and ultimately 4, if once
this sheaf of railways were entered by the enemy.
rXho rivers are not transverse, and there are no
.■works north of the Brest-Ivangorod line.
We know that the enemy has done everything
to take Warsaw by direct attack along the front
A — B, and has failed. We know further that since
February 7 he has changed his plan, and while
only holding along A- — B, has determined to strike
for the railways behind Warsaw from the province
of East Prussia; that is, along the arrov/s C.C.C.
{Lastly, we know tluit there lies between this attack
from C.C.C. and the sheaf of railways the fortified
line represented by the Rivers Narew and Niem.en,
along which are stretched the strongholds from
Kovno in the north to Xeogeorgiesvk m the south,
passing by way of Grodno, Oso^viecs, Ostrolenka,
Let me also repeat the m^ain point of the whole
jthesis, since it is that upon which current opinion
in tliis country has been, to some extent, confused.
Unless the Germans fierce this fortified line, and,
lacing pierced it, carry on, they have been defeated
i?i their general plan, and would have been stronger
for not having undertaken it. If, on the contrary,
they pierce this line and carry on till they reach
the railways, they have succeeded in their plan.
It is exceedingly important to grasp this per-
fectly simple point, not because we are noting the
scores in a game, but because we are watching a
]nilitary action upon which our own fate to some
extent depends.
Unless the German Headquarters had a plan
of this kind, it had no plan at all — and that is not
to be believed. Merely to clear the enemy out of
East Prussia is not a military object, because it
promises notliing for the future of the war. But
to isolate, and ultimately occupy, Warsaw pro-
mises everything; for, holding that nodal point,
you prevent furtb.er offensive action by tlie Rus-
sians for a long time to come, and you are free to
bring many of your forces now in the East back
westward, as also to use in the West your last new
formations vvhcn they reach the field.
But it is in tlie West that the only final deci-
eion of this war can be acliieved. Therefore do
the Gennans particularly intend to take Warsaw;
and to take Warsaw on the lines of the present
effort means to pierce successfully and con-
tinuously through the defending line of the
Niemen and the Narew until they reach and cut
the .sheaf of railways. To do that would be to take
iWarsaw in reverse. To fail to do it means that
they have lost this movement again and that they
have wasted energy for nothing.
Let_ us keep that quite clear. Their local
•uccess in enveloping one Corps a fortnight ago
does not affect the greater issue. The enemy musS
in this field win or lose as a whole, and an offensive
which fails in its purpose is not something which
cancels out in war : it is a minus quantity. An
offensive which fails leaves the attack weaker than
it found it.
With all this postulated as a foundation for
our judgment, let us see how the struggle now
stands in front of this Niemen-Narew line. The
issue is by no means yet decided, but the news of
the past week is, upon the whole, favourable.
Three main points of attack marked the
objectives of the German advance.
MI
aw
H.GeovgiesvV.
Rovno
•; .^c^ ^Grodno
Warsaw
B
(1) A point a little aboA^e Grodno and outside
the fortifications of that stronghold.
(2) An attack upon Osowiecs, and an attempt
to pierce through and strike at the line beyond.
(3) Of particular importance, an attack upon
the sector between the illawa railway and the
town of Ostrolenka. This last is the most perilous
and the most vital of the three moA^ements, because
the nearer to "Warsaw the enemy gets on the rail-
ways, the more powerful is his effect.
I will take these three issues in rever.se order
to tlieir present value in the campaign.
(1) The Attack upon Grodno. This attack
alone of the three has, up to the present date, suc-
ceeded in piercing the line, but it has not pierced
it in great numbers, and it has not pierced it
thoroughly at all. Yv^e should even have the right
to regard* it as a diversion in the general plan
were it not that there has been used upon this
sector the best of the ten Army Corps which the
Germans have concentrated for their great effort
from the north. It is the same body as that which
had proved the deciding factor in the enveloping
of the Russian 20t]i Army Corps the other day.
It is the German 21st Corps, in garrison during
peace time upon the French frontier, and corre-
sponding somewhat to the French 20th and 6th
Corps.
But though a body of such excellence has been
used right up here on the left of the genei-al effort,
we must not conclude that that point was there-
fore regarded as of special importance by the
enemy. We must rather decide that Vvhen tlie con-
centration was effected three weeks ago the 20th
Corps was put where it was in order to act where
the hardest work had to be done in forcing the
defiles between the lakes. That was apparently
the task assigned to it. And this being so, it could
not but appear when the Prussian frontier was
crossed in the region of Suwalki and Augustowo,
even though that region v^ere not after the first
operations the chief theatre of the .struggle.
At any rate, the attack upon the Niemen by
March 6, 1915.
LAND AND ,T\: A T E R.
u ted here to
Brce the DefUe ^ „.
between the f ^
two main Lakes
\^h-olon^ation of
the action cP'
the 20^ corps
this Corps in this region has not. so far, come to
very much. The river was crossed, but tlie crossings
were not, by the last advices received, decisively
maintained. .We have no direct evidence at the
moment of writing (Tuesday evening) that the
bridgeheads beyond the river'had been retaken by
the Kussians; but we have got the mention of
fighting upon the left bank in the last few days —
that is, upon the German side of the stream — and
it is sell-evident that no very large movement
across the Nicmen here could" be taken with a
single Army Corps, cut off from help from the
south by the fortress of Grodno. Grodno would
either have to be taken or masked by a large force
before the passage of the river was securely held.
iThe passage of the Nieraen here has been effected
at the point where the Augustowo forest gets up
to the river, and it is under the cover of the
Forest
Limits of
GenmzziZaze
'orrespondag
^ItAForest
bdt
Fortified Zone ofOrodno
under range of its
guns
forest that the crossings have been made. .What
we do not know is whether behind the crossing
thus effected any considerable bodies of the enemy
are prepared to move. If they arc, the attack here,
north of Grodno, may be serious. If thej-^ are not,
it will have to fall back with the retirement of
the other two efforts further to the south and west.
All one can say is that, according to the news
already received, the crossing of the A'iemen north
sector of the ring of forts, exactly as he attacked
them last October, when he suffered defeat in hia
attack. He is acting now with very much larger
forces, but with no better guns. (We must wa it for
better proof o'f that 420 millimetre.) We have no
news 01 the result one way or the other, except that
the attack by the siege-train has now proceeded for
something more than a week without our hearing
from the enemy's side of any result yet foilowiiig
on it.
(3) T?i8 Fight round Przasmjsz. The fight
round Przasnysz is much more serious, and wo
have more details of it to hand. In this third sector
the enemy has clearly failed. But I will again
modify the impression which sucli a statement!
miglit make, by pointing out that the action, as a
v,'hole, from Grodno to the Vistula, has not yet
been decided, and that we must not jump to tha
conclusion that it is, merely because there has been
a rather pronounced German retirement in that
sector of it which most immediately threatened
Warsaw.
With that proviso we can proceed to tha
description of the action.
Upon the same days which saw the defeat of
the 20th Russian Army Corps at Augustowo and
the approach of the enemy to the fortified line
(from Tuesday, February 16, to Thursday,
February 18), a strong movement was apparent
upon the extreme left of the Russian positions
along the rivers
The following diagram wiU
Frontier
M
^V^i
20
R
Warsaw-
make clear what was tried. The East Prussian
frontier being represented diagramatically by the
line A — B, and the line of tlic Narcv/ by the line
M — N, the Germans were advancing up to and
upon the front P — R (letters which represent the
two towns of PJocz, upon the Vistula , and Rachiaz,
about thirty miles to the north -cast), Warsaw and
its railways being some sixty miles away up the
Vistula, bur ally informs us of the checking of
this advance upon the front P — R on or shoui this
same date— February 18. It is probable, however,
that the pressure here being exercised was baited
quite as much at the will of the enemy as at that
of our ally, for on that same dav- -Februarv 18 — ■
of Grodno, though effected over a stretch of four-
teen miles, appears to be insufficient in strength upon another front of about the same length to the
and not developing. We must wait for further north between Mlawa (represented by the letter
news to judge whetiier it can progress or no.
(2) The Attach on Osowiecs. The attack on
Osowiecs is straightforward enough. The enemy
here has brought up his principal siege-train and
M) and Khorgele (represented by the letter K)
was discovered a large concentration of two Corps
pointing southward directly towards the fortified
line of the Niemen.
Against
this latter and
is at present occupied in attacking the western dangerous concentration, separated as it was bw
»*
LAND AND iWlATER.
March 6, 1915.
Wq railway from "Mlawa fo New Gcorgievsk, the
Russians immediately moved up from their forti-
fied line N.N.N., and the two bodies, thus advanc-
ing, met in the neighbourhood of Przasnysz (which
I indicate by the letter P).
The action that followed might well be called
Ihe action of Przasnysz by those who have the
ability or tlie tcmerity"to pronounce tliat name, for
upon the possession of this place depended the
result of the struggle.
There were tvvO reasons for this : First, that
Przasnysz stands in the middle of the dry upper
watershed between the River Orzcc and the River
Lid}-na, and has therefore, in that marshy land,
become the centre of diverging highways which
lead towards the south; and secondly, because
Przasnysz happened to become the " nucleus," as
it were, of the battle.
Often when a great action is joined some ono
point becomes a nucleus of this sort, so that its
retention or loss by one side is equivalent to
euccess or failure in the action by that side. And
this was the case with Przasnysz.
Upon Saturday, February 20, ten days ago,
the rapid German advance forced a Russian
brigade, which v.as acting as an outpost, back
upon Przasnysz, passed on east and west of that
town in two bodies, one along the arrow I have
hiarked I, the other along the arrow I have
marked II, while a third body along the arrow
marked III made for and held the passages of
the Orzeo River. All these bodies, pressing south,
had about four days' march in front of them if
they were not arrested before they should reach
the Narew and the fortified line. It so happened
that between the lines of advance I and II there
is a ridge of rather higher land in that endless
flat snow-covered waste, which may be con-
veniently called The Ridge of Voliaverslorskn,
which lies just beneath it about half-way between
Przasnysz and Cziechaloff. I have indicated this
ridge by the letter V and the shaded mai'k. The
Russian advance seized this ridge and held it
throughout that week-end and on until Wednes-
day, February 24. Their tenacity, though almost
surrounded and violently attacked from botli sides
of the hi^h ground, was what decided the battle.
On that Wednesday, the 24th, the Germans got
into Przasnysz, talking there twenty guns and a
number of prisoners, which seem to have included
eoracthing like half the brigade which had been
pressed into that town from outside. But tho
Russian force upon the ridge still held; and it
was upon the same day, just at daybreak, that the
main Russian advance from the south against the
pressing German line began. This advance was
stretched upon that morning of Wednesday, tho
24th, from the point Y upon the map shown to the
point marked Kr, wliich stands for the town of
Krazncsielcc, upon the Orzec. It was first suc-
cessful from the right, forcing the River Orzec, in
spite of the German 38th Division of Reserve,
which was holding the passages. On the next day,
Thursday, the 25th, the centre of the German line
was pushed back on to Przasnysz, from which it
had moved forward somey>'hat the day before, and
this Thursday was the hottest day of the action.
The pressure thus effected upon their centre for-
bade the Germans to prosecute as vigorously as
before their attack upon the ridge north of V,
and on either end of this the Russian forces moved
up in rescue of the advanced forces which had so
successfully held that height. By the morning of
Friday, the 28th, it was apparent that tlie German
line Vv'as beginning to waver, and in the course
of the day the first Russians entered Przasnysz,
and the sides of the ridge to the west of it wero
already cleared. But the action still swung, and it
vras not until the whole of the Saturday had been
passed in the most furious fighting in the open
that the Sunday morning saw the full retreat of
the f Jerman lino.
This retreat has been called, rather unjustly,
a rout. That is ^vas not a rout is sufficiently clear
from the fact that of the whole two Army Corps
10,000 prisoners alone remained in the Russians'
hands after the full retreat had begun, and we
presume that m.ost of these vrere wounded. But
it was a hurried retreat, as is again proved by tho
confusion of the various units; and by Monday
morning the success of our ally along this sector
was complete.
We may sum up, tlien, and say that the great
German advance on the Narew and the Niemen
has at the moment of writing achieved the follow-
ing position : —
From twelve miles north of Grodno to about
twenty-six miles north of that fortress, in a region
where dense woods cover both banks of the broad
river, certain detachments, so far small, have
effected a crossing. \Ve have not heard that they
have yet issued from the woods, and strong efforts
are being made to thrust them back.
Ix)wer down, in front of Osowiecs, the effort
to break the fortified line is taking the form of a
bombardment of the eastern works of that fortress.
In the centre, tho sector most dangerous to
Warsaw, the sector of v/hich Mlawa is the prin-
cipal town, the enemy has received a severe check,
losing Przasnysz, which was the centre of his
action, and falling back in fuU retreat towards his
own frontier.
That is how the third great bid for Warsaw,
the attempt to take it in reverse, stands at the
Tiresent moment; or, rather, stood upon Monday
morning, the news of which was the last to have
reached London at the time of writing,
THE BUKOVINA
I said at the outset of these remarks upon the
eastern front that the Austro-German move into
the Bukovina did not promise any great strate-
gical result, and that because the taking of the
Galician Russian army in flank was hardly pos-
sible from the Bukovina alone, or at any rate from
that portion of it now occupied by the enemy's
armies. I would like to make this point clear,
because while it is but a theory, and a theory in
4»
March 6, 1913.
LAND AND K A T E R.
contradiction with certain views that have been
put forward with admitted authority, it seems to
me at the moment the best theory.
Anyone holding the Bukovina, and particu-
larly Czernowicz, holds, as I have shown in past
numbers of this paper, the communications
whereby Eoumania and the Russian army in
;Galicia might join hands. It holds the knot in
which the railways ioin. But unless more than the
Bukovina is held, ttiere is not a sufiBcient avenue
of supply for the working of large armies round
upon the flank of the Russians in Galicia, and
the consequent freeing of the northern Carpathian
passes from the invader, let alone for the relief
of Przemysl. You are dealing here with the
thickest portion of the Carpathian chain, and rail-
ways are. especially in a winter campaign, of the
first importance to your supply. Nov,% the only rail-
way of this region crosses the Carpathian 'chain
on the line betv.ecn Marmoras and Kolomea.
iThere are railways leading up the valleys of the
range, with its dense woods and poor roads, but
there is no crossing tlie ridge until this Kolomea
railway is reached. From Kolomea to Przemysl
itself is a matter of 160 miles, and to the Dukla,
as the crow flies, a matter of nearer 200 miles. A
firm hold well north of the Bukovina by the enemy,
which should include the whole of this line across
the mountains, will enable supply to reach a large
Q ^L
•Kolomea
JO
Cngiiib UCU*.
/
life
i»
army which could work against the flank of the
Russian armies to the west in Galicia, and thus
turn the grip of the Russians upon the western
Carpathians. But until, or if, the Austro-Germans
push be}ond the central Carpathians and occupy
much more than the Bukovina alone, the avenues
of supply seem insufficient for any such attack.
Since writing the above, news has come that
the Austrian forces are as far north as beyond
Stinisland, and even if checked there it is clear
that the railways into the plain are now in their
hands, which will, if the position is maintained,
change all these conclusions.
THE CALL FOR A>IML'NITION.
If you were to ask off-hand a man of good
observation, well educated, and perhaps one
acquainted with war and yet not a soldier : " What
is the prime factor at this moment in the problem
of the trenches? " he might be at a loss to ansv,er
you, or, rather, many such men would give many
different answers. 'But a soldier on the spot, at
any rate a soldier anywhere near tlie higher com-
mand, would almost certainly reply : " Ammuni-
tion, and especially hea^y gun ammunition."
This is the point vre have to consider most
carefully from now onwards, and it is one of those
points in v/hich public opinion and a fair grasp
by civilians of the conditions abroad is of great
yalue. Just as it was of value to point out that
cotton is to-day gunpowder, and that the cotton
that went into Germany did not only make shirts,
but also killed British soldiers, so it is of im-
portance to insist now upon this business of
ammunition. For public opinion v/ell awake to the
one as to the other will support all the public
action necessary. Whereas public opinion con-
fused or ignorant upon these essentials sometimes
leaves the authorities without driving power
behind them.
The reason that ammunition, and in par
ticular hea^y gun ammunition, is so important is
this : In the other factors of the trench problem
(to give it a short but convenient name) European
armies, such as the Allies and the German, are
fairly enough matched. But in the provision of
ammunition, and particularly of hea^y gun ammu-
nition, we can, if we choose, dominate more and
more.
The fire discipline of the Allies is superior
to that of the enemy, and this is particularly trua
of the British contingent. But the field of fire has
become so very much shorter than was expected
that this advantage is more or less eliminated. I
do not mean that the excellence and steadiness of
the shooting is not tested quite as much over a
narrow field as a wide one, but I do mean that
troops which have now been exercised for months
in the art of stopping a man before he covers two
hundred yards have got to be much of a muchness.
In the construction of trenches, from the
detail of their comfort to the tracing of their
position, the enemy was altogether superior to tho
Allies some months ago. The Allies are now at
least his equal. In the sanitation necessary to this
kind of siege warfare the Allies are probably tho
superiors of the enemy. We ha^e reason to think
that his losses from sickness are far superior to
ours. In machine gun work we were his inferiors
in the beginning and are said to be now his equals.
In field gun work the Allies had, and maintained,
I am told, superiority both in rapidity of fire and
in accuracy. This is said to be particularly true
of the French, who certainly had the best weapon,
and, what is more probable, the best tradition.
But take the thing all round, and there does not
seem, according to the evidence of those who have
suffered actual experience in the field during the
last few months, to be now any chance of con-
spicuous difference save in this matter of heavy
gun fire, and what that means can perhaps be most
graphically presented to the eye by an ideal
section of the line.
It is, of course, no more than the simplified
suggestion of ground which takes an infinite
variety of shapes in this four hundred miles of
line. But, such as it is, I hope it will serve to
show very roughly how the trench fighting is
conducted.
The first element in that fighting is, of courso,
the line of the trenches themselves. Let us sup-
pose that in this section they run as we see tlieni
in the accompariying sketch. In reality, of course,
the ultimate lines of the two opposing forces are
much more regular, especially where there has
been heavy attacking and counter-attacking, and
a real plan would be confused with a number of
empty trenches abandoned; but for the purpose
of my illustration tliese two roughly parallel lines
will serve to stand for the opposing lines in a
particular section- of the field. These advance
trenches are very narrow ditches, deep in compari-
son with their mouths, provided every few yards
LAND A N D ^\^ A T E R.
llarch 6, 1915.
with interruptions of earth which preAent their
being swept along tiieir whole length Avith fire in
case an enemy gets up to tJie line, and also provided
witli hollows underground where men not actually
on the watch can rest and sleep. The trenches do
not consist of one individual line, but of a complex,
one set behind the other, sometimes two, soinetin]es
three, sometimes more than three, though there are
sections in which the nature of the ground and of
the defence is such that retirement to the places
behind the trench where the stores of amm.unition
and the quarters of command are can be eiiected
without a complexity of this kind. From the front
line to the second, from the second to the third (if
there is a third) trenches perpendicular to tlie
general line and zigzaggisig so as to save those who
pass through them from enfilading fire (that is,
tire along the length of the trench) are constructed.
These are the trenches of communication, longer
or shorter according to the kind of cover afforded
and to any one of a thousand accidents of ground.
These two systems of trenches opposing one
the other (which would look, upon a complete plan,
more like cracks in glass than anything else) fight
each other in a number of different ways. The
object of all such fighti]ig being, of course, to make
one's opponent abandon his trenches, or, better
still, to kill, wound, and capture him in his section
of trench as you cany it. Let us see how this can
be accomplished.
Supposing the opposing forces possessed
nothing but rifles and stores of explosives, then
they would fight only thus : They would continu-
ally watch vvith periscopes and through small
openings on the edges of the trench the movements
of their opponents, shooting at any object that
showed itself. From time to time a body would
leave some section of trench and try to nish across
the open. They would choose for this a favourable
moment, at dusk, for instance, or in the dark, or
perhaps when they thought their enemy was off his
guard. Against such a rush the defenders would
pour as heavy a fire as they could, and in most
cases they would stop it, particularly as in front
of the trenches are constructed obstacles of all
kinds, especially networks of barbed wire
stretched intricately among a number of posts.
It is obvious that with fighting of such a sort
the two forces would pretty w-ell immobilise one
the other unless there vrere overwhelming numbers
upon one side. Where the trenches are fairly close
small lx)rabs thrown by hand or grenades can be
used as weapons of ofience to clear or to confuse
the opposing trench, and other devices, such as
trench mortars and spring catapults, are used.
The impcssibility of trench fighting being decided
betAveen equal forces in this fashion is heightened
by the use of machine guns, which are so posted as
to rake the approaches to a trench and*^ to mow
down the men caught in the Avire entanglements in
front of it.
But to such small arms there is added the field
artillery, a weapon firing a sliell about three inches
in diameter and covering at its point of explosion
a radius of, say, something like a cricket pitch.
The concentrated fire of a number of these guns
Avill, of course, make any piece of ground unten-
able. And if you can concentrate such fire upon a
particular attack you make it suffer even more
severely than rifle ifire even makes it suffer. This
fire from field guns has the further use of keeping
doAA-n the firing power of the trenches o]iposed to
it. It " searches " them, and by carefully timing
the fuses of the shells it can cause considerable
losses even through the very narrow entrances
which are all the trenches present to the surface.
If one side had field artillery and the other had
not, the side Avhich had field artillery would ulti-
mately, though slowly, break the resistance of the
trenches opposed to it. But the effect of these
shells, with their flat trajectory skimming t!ie
surface, is ten-fold more against an advance in the
open than it is against men dug in. These field
guns must further be used A-ery accurately, for
they fire over their OAvn men and are posted in con-
cealed positions w^ell behind the line, their range
being at an extreme not more than six thousand
yards and their useful work mostly done at ranges
betAveen one thousand five hundred and three
thousand yards. They also work against one
another, a battery of such gujis attempting to keep
down the fire, and, if possible, to destroy, other
batteries opposed to them. In such a plan
as that Avhich I have giA-en you might have
a field battery concealed in some such posi-
tion as A, and working against another field
battery concealed in some such position as B.
Both A and B Avould be used to fire at the trenches
opposed to them oA'cr their own men, to SAveep the
zone between the trenches in case of an attack,
and to shoot at each other, and to keep down each
other's fire, or, if possible, to destroy each other.
These field guns also shoot at marks well behind
the lines on Avhich they are established, as villages
or posts Avhere they believe that men are concen-
trated for relieving the men in the trenches ; they^
fire at the roads along Avhich transport can come —
and so forth.
Thus A Avill shell a village placed at C, and
will sheU the road leading from C to D, another
village or place of concentration, but Avith field
artillery alone and fairly matched on the two sides
tl'.e trench problem, as I haAC called it, Avill not be
soh'ed, because Avith the broad trajectory of such
weapons, and the comparatiA-ely small range and
the comparatively small radius of action of the
shell, their true Avork is rather against men in thg
6*
March 6, 1915.
LAND AND .W. ATE R.
oj>en than against men dug in. It is in the third
kind of weapon that the solution is rather to be
discovered, and this kind of weapon is the lieavy
gun. The heavy guns ai-e concealed just as all the
others are; positions are chosen for them well
behind the lines \^'here they are effective on account
of their much longer range : 6,000, 7,000, 8,000
3'ards or more are available to them as ranges of
perfectly accurate hre, and their effect against
men in trenches is something very different, and
that for the following causes :
(1) In the first place, what their shells do
when they fall is on quite another scale from the
shells of the field artillery. In the mere numerical
computation (which is not everything) they have
an effect varying with the size of their calibre.
A six-inch gun does not fire a shell twice as effec-
tive as a three-inch gun. It fires a shell eight
times as effective. But one cannot put the thing
numerically at all, because a six-inch shell falling
into a trench has far more than eight times the
effect on tJie defenders, both in actual losses and
in the confusion caused, than a three-inch shell.
(2) These hea"\y shells destroy a trench where
they fall. They " knock it to pieces." They
batter the walls of earth and make thera fall in ;
they open big craters, ruining the spade work in
their neighbourhood, and they create a state of
affairs which cannot be repaired while the shelling
is going on.
(3) In the third place, they are much harder
to discover, working as they do at a long range
and Avith a hifjher ansrle of fire than the smaller
pieces. They can be concealed, not only by arti-
ficial methods, but behind considerable rises of
ground. It is obvious that the longer the range of
a piece the larger the area you have to search iu
order to discover it.
A — A— A. But pieces with a range of C — B can
be anywhere along the much more extended lino
C — C — C, and their choice of concealment is
therefore much greater.
(4) The big piece is not disturbed by rille fire
or by field gun fire or by any weapon except ita
own peer. I have, for instance, a battery of hea^'v
pieces beliind the hill at M. It is weU conceaiea,
and it can shell, with disastrous effect, the wholo
line of the enemy's trenches between F and G, and
nothing can knock it out except a similar body of
the enemy's, similarly concealed at N. The only
way in which the guns at N can knock out the
10, *? ^^
guns at M is by finding out exactly where they are,
whether by their flashes, which ought, if the con-
cealment has been properly managed, to be in-
visible, or by air work, and it is, in point of fact,
air work alone which is of any real use in this
kind of struggle.
(5) Perhaps the most important of all tho
advantages of the heavy piece after the effect it
has where the shell falls is the angle at which the
shell falls. A heavy piece firing at a range of
several thousand yards comes do\A-n upon tho
trenches from above, and the effect is largely pro-
portionate to the angle at v/hich the blow falls.
Thus, we see in this diagram how the trajec-
tory of a field piece at F exploding a shell at A
Pieces with such a radius as A — B firing at
mark at B must be somewhere along the lino
above the trench T will do a certain amount of
execution, but the heavy gun at G, firing
along the trajectory G — A. comes right down on
to the trench with a very different and much mora
active blow. At very long ranges it has the effecti
of falling almost perpendicularly, and with an
accurate aim, of destroying all the work and moaft
of the mind within it.
LAND AND 3EATEE.
March B, 1915,
Now, IhesiS principles being grasped, le? us
add to them the foUo'sving conditions of the cam-
paign in its present phaso ;
(a) The air work of the Allies has now estab-
lished a definite superiority over that of the enemy.
It is one of the most notable features of the war,
and perhaps one of the least expected, and its
success is largely due to the excellence of the
iBritish Avork in this field. Therefore, the Allies
do find the positions of the enemy's heavy guns
more rapidly and more often than the enemy finds
the position of ours.
(b) The blockade puis the enemy at a disad-
vantage which increases with time. All shells need
copper bands to engage in the rifling of the piece
find to give them the twist upon which depends
the accuracy of their fire. Now, copper, though
the enemy is not yet actually short of it, is giving
the enemy concern. His fear for the futuro
makes him consider every shot, and the blockade
will now have another effect more slow in its
development. Every great shell is propelled with
an expenditure of cotton of so many pounds. Of
iron with which to make the shell, and of nitrates
.with which to make the explosive within the shell
"the enemy has no lack. But in copper he has long
been hampered, and he will now be hampered in
cotton. The heavy French artillery, which in
this region quite dominates that of the
enemy, was used lavishly. It was not only used
to batter the trenches and to cover the assault,
but also to create a ditch or zone of impassable
ground behind the enemy's trenches, so that ho
could not bring up reinforcements or fresh ammu-
nition. But to act in that way the commander
must feel no sort of anxiety for his reserves of
ammunition. He must be as prodigal with it as
though his supply were infinite.
It is here that this all-importance of a great
mpply of heavy ammunition comes in. The side
which is quite free to use as vast a supply as it
chooses must ultimately have its will over the side
.whicli is hampered, and counts every shot.
But here the reader may say : " I can well
understand that the enemy will be increasingly
hampered in his production of heavy ammunition^
but why should this qneslion Irouble Co arise, and
in particular to the British, who have the markets
of the world open to them ? '-
The answer lies in the fad" that the produo*
lion of a shell is so very much slower a business
than the employment of it in action.
I was present the other day, by the ccurtcsj^
of one of the contractors for ammunition in the
North, at the manufacture of a number of five-inch
shells in an enormous factory (used in time of peaca
for the production of very difl'erent machinery).
Some hundreds of men were turning and pressing
the cases of five-inch shells. I saw the cutting
tool slowly paring down the surface of the thick
metal, and I considered as I watched that tedious
process how, when the cyiindri-conical body was at
last completed, its copper band attached and
pressed in and smoothed down, its interior filled
with the explosive, its fuse attached, and the whole
long business come to its conclusion, I might see
that shell run into the breech of a five-inch gun,
discharged, and hear its explosion miles away, alii
in as many seconds as it had taken hours to make.
The big shed in which I watched this process was
working to produce, I believe, 3,000 such shells,
and I was told in how many days they would be
delivered.
There is needed for the proper supply of the
heavy guns, and, therefore, the chief factor in a
decision upon the West, all the heavy gun ammu-
nition that the whole resources of the nation can
turn out at the utmost speed and with the most
vigorous resolution and skill. There can never be
too much for the appetite of the great pieces.
There can only too easily be an insufficiency or a
hitch, and on the continual increase of that supply,
and on the swelling and further swelling of its
stream depends tho immediate future of this
country more tlian on any other single factor. One
could almost wish that half of the energy devoted
to the very satisfactory results of voluntary re-
cruitment could be turned ou to emphasising and
re-emphasising this all-importance of the supply]
which the heavy guns are hungry for, and for
which they will clamour when the hour for th«!
advance has sounded. For there lies the key.
THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
WE hare seen that three material
factors must be considered in any
judgment, or rather guess, upon the
possible duration of the w'ar, and
Ihat these were : (1) the factor of wastage — in
Bupply as in men ; (2) the factor of numbers—
Ihat is, of recruitment upon either side and of
equipped recruitment; and, thirdly, the geo-
graphical factor— that is, the effect upon the
duration of the war of the seasons, of varying
elevations of land, natural obstacles, the soils
in trench warfare, etc.
To these must be added, in conclusion,
.■^hat sometimes proves the most important
thing of ali towards the end of a vrajc— the moral
^ctor.
II.
With the first of this series "we dealt briefly
last week. Let us turn this w^eek to the second.
Before entering the subject again, however,
It is necessary to repeat this warning: That no
guesswork upon this matter has any finality.
All one can do is to state the elements upon
■which a judgment turns ; to aiiempt prophecy
in the matter is gratuitous foll3^ The whola
thing may bo compared to what a man mi,^ht
judge of the chances of a good eleven pitted
a^amst another eleven of equally proved merit.
Ho could only say in the early middle of the
game : " The wicket being what it is, the score
standing as it does, the past form of either team
being such and such, I take it that the end will
be so and so, and will be reached in such an Jl
March 6, 1915.
LAND AND SKATER.
puch a time." He does not mean by this to
assert; he is only Btating a probability more or
less well founded, according to the evidence he
brings forward.
To this main criticism I think a second
Bhould be added, particularly important in the
case of any military judgment. It is this : There
is all the aifference in the world between saying
that the critical moment should arrive round
or after such and such a period, and naming
that period as "the end" of hostilities. There
has been in every military operation which
history records a point, not always exactly
defined, but lying Avithin fairly narrow limits,
after which the end was in sight ; but how long
the journey would take before that end was
actuall}'- reached nearly always depends upon
ays
of cc
factors not in the cognisance or contemporaries.
All that I am trying to do in these notes is to
gauge the critical moment which, if it is suc-
cessfully past, will put the end of the war in
Bi^ht for the Allies, and even in this task I am
doing no more than making the roughest of
guesses.
So much being said, let us consider this
pecond point of the reserve of men. We have
Been that the factor of wastage brings one to a
critical point in the early summer— say any
time between early May and late June.
Now an examination of the problem from
the point of view of man-power converges upon
Bomewhat the same period. I should not be
surprised if something of what I here have to
Bay is censored, etill less complain at any
exercise of that necessary power. But I shall
be as discreet as my limited knowledge permits
jne to be.
Upon the side of the enemy we have three
elements to consider — always excluding, as I
said last week, the unknown chances of
neutrals joining in. These three elements are
what Germany has to put foi-ward of trained
and equipped men and when; what Austria-
Hungaiy, and what Turkev.
Germany is at once tlie Power which we
can best judge in this regard, because her
problem has been more thoroughly studied,
and, as we shall see in a moment, her two Allies
can hardly be judged save upon the analogy
of her own position. Moreover, what Germany
can do is the important point, for what she
cannot do, certainly lier Allies cannot.
Weil, then, the two things that we have
to note about the reserve of German man-power
ftre, first, its total amount, and, secondly, the
eize of the batches in which it can be success-
fully put into the field.
As to the first of these, I will simply repeat
the estimate which has been so continually put
for.vard in these columns, and which I believe
to be amply supported by independent
estimates of the highest ofiicial character.
Germany, over and above the men she trained
and equipped for the first efforts of the war —
her regular forces — commands a maximum
reserve man-power of perhaps more than two
millions and certainly less than two millions
and a half. We need not return to the argu-
ments stated over and over again in these
columns in favour of this number, upon which,
as I have said, a weighty agreement exists.
There is only one point upon which we need
linger, for that is one which has appeared oft^n
In the correspondence columns of this pap6r,
and it is one upon which there is always a good
deal of misunderstanding : I mean the propor-
tion of military eflicients kept back for civilian
employment. It is obvious tiiat great masses oi
the necessary work, both agricultural and in-
dustrial, can be done by men who Avould not
pass the doctor. But that one allows for in
making this estimate. The point is that a very
considerable amount of absolutely necessary
work can only be done by men who certainly
would pass the military doctor. That is true of
a great deal of railway work, of most mining,
of nearly all the lieaA-y work in metals whicli
provides, remember, not only the guns and
the ammunition and the shipbuilding, but
also the necessary upkeep of very heavily
worked railways, and of all the auxiliary
machinery without which neither can a great
campaign be conducted nor the general life of
the nation maintained. It is even true in some
degree of agriculture, and if any proof were
lacking of a truth so patent," here is an
excellent example. If there is one nation
which has trained every man available it
is the French. Yet the French in the
heart of the campaign have been compelled
to accord leave m rotation to men at the
front for occasional absolutely necessary
agricultural work in the interior, and tlie rail-
way work, though nothing like what has been
necessary to the German Empire in this war,
has again compelled the French to retain so
considerable a proportion of militar}- efficients
that even in the small belt of Franco occupied
by the enemy these have appreciably swelled
the total of prisoners taken by the Germans;!
for, as we all know, the totals given ])y the
Germa.ns of their prisoners include many more
than the actual soldiers captured.
To leave this point, then, and to return to
the German reserve of man-power. Let us call
it two million four hundred thousand — a very,
high estimate. That figure is convenient, both!
because it weighs the scales against our expec-
tations or hopes, and also because it is divisible
into three batches of 800,000, the importance of
which figure will be apparent in a moment.
How many of this reserve has Germany
already put into the field ?
To judge that, let us note that two consider-
able bodies of newly trained men, whether
drafted into existing formations or forming
new units, have already been noted, and their
numbers roughly estiinated in the field. The
first batch came in with the late autumn of last
year. The last batch have bejrun to appear with
the more recent operations ot the late winter —
and here let me add that I am revising and
somewhat changing here upon later informa-
tion earlier estimates of my own, which were
based upon insuflicient data.
Wo know, again, that the number of men
Germany can tram at any one time is limited to
a certain maximum. Her machinery of in-
fctructions, including ground accommodation
and instructors, permits her to produce, in
successive relays, batches of no more than
800.000.
We need not, unfortunately, modify this
much by any consideration of difficulty in
equipment, for Germany has been ])reparing
this war for three years, two of which have been
L A X D AND W ATE E.
March 6, 1935.
Bpent in vorv active preparations, and she made
tae war at her own moment, when these pre-
parations were complete. We ma}^ rcasonahiy
presume that slie woukl put the newly trained
men into the field as rapidly as she possibly
could, for her great advantage is in this very
fact, that she alone was prepared, and that, in
the long run, time was against her. We may,
tlierefore, reasonably conclude that her first
relay exhausted one of these batches; her
second relay the second, and that a third only
remains. Tor in two million four hundred
thousand you have three groups of 800,000
each. Allowing (in spite of a certain proportion
whom we know from prisoners and from letters
and diaries found to have been sent forward
after a very short training indeed) that the mas-4
of each batch has received full three months'
training, and allowing, in order to weiglit the
scales against our expectations and hopes, that
not all of the theoretical maximum of any one
batch could be dealt with, yet Vv-e shall not have
much more than a million left, while in all prob-
ability the remaining 800,000 of the theoretical
calculation are over, rather than under, the
mark.
On what kind of date ought we to expect
the appearance of these last levies? At the
earliest the end of April, at the latest May ; or,
at the ver}^ latest, for that margin which might
not be accommodated in tlie training grounds
at once, and could only be put in as the earlier
units left for the field, we might admit that
the last of the newly trained men would appear
in the month of June.
This calculation gives us much the same
critical date — the early summer — which we
found in discussing the first factor. It is upon
an examination of the reserve of man-povver, as
upon an examination of wastage, the early
summer that should provide" the critical
moment. After that moment the man-pov/er of
the enemy cannot bo increased or recouped
appreciably so far as Germany is concerned!
For Austria-Hungary we have data far less
certain. Such vague and general indices as we
have got may be put very briefly thus :
As the Dual Monarchy trained and armed
originally a smaller proportion of its total popu-
lation, a larger margin remained theoretically
available. On the other hand, the Dual
Monarchy had nothing like the organisation for
the rapid training of largo masses of men in
rotation that the German Empire had, and we
are putting the figures very high indeed if v/o
allow a reserve yet to appear proportionate to
the German reserve, and if we admit a further
600,000 as available for Austria-Hungary at the
same date. We must remember that the serioiis
threat under which the Austro-Hungarian
dominions, and particularly Hungarv, have
lain since the invasion of Galicia and the
presence of the Prussians in the Carpathians,
must have already urged the inclusion of all
that v/as available, hoAvever imperfectlv
trained, and it is hardlv likely that there
remain more than half a' million of doubtful
material in this field. That may be an under-
estimate if the earlier levies were mismanaged.
The under-estimate may even be grace. But
there is no sign in the eftorts this part of the
Germanic Alliance has hitherto made of
steady recruitment. There is rather every In-
dication, since the threat to Hungary 'first
became serious last autumn, of great masses of
imperfectly trained men having been pushed
forward.
Of Turkey, all we can sa^^ knowing the
diificultics in 'equipment, and" the totally dif-
ferent social conditions one has to deal with, as
well as the hopeless variety in recruitment, is
that this branch of the enemy's alliance will
hardly put forward in the near future any con-
siderable bodies beyond those already in the
field, either so ofiicered or so munitioned as to
menace tlie opposing Powers in any unexpected
degree. Turkish territory is already nearly
isolated from its Allies; its further and more
complete isolation would seem imminent.
We may sum up, and say that the key to
the understanding of all this factor is tho
German recruitment, that this has been studied
fairly carefully, and that if a further million
can be provided thence bv the early summer,
Ave haA'e iu that figure the limit.
Against these figures we know that the
Allied recruitment is of three kinds. There is
the training of the Erench neAv class already
completed. We have next the new British
Armies, and we haA^e lastly the enormous
Pussian reserv-e of men, whose presence in the
field demands one thing only — equipment.
Now the problem of Russian equipment,
Avhich AA^e have touched upon before in connec-
tion with the ice-bound ports of that Power, is
affected by two efforts now in progress ; the first
is the forcing of the openings to the Black Sea,
the fortune of Avhich is not yet decided. The
second is tlie completion of" the broad gauge
line to Archangel, on which the Pussian neAva
officially passed has just informed us that it is
in progress, but hoAV far advanced we are not
told. The old aA^enue of supply from Arch-
angel was not more than many hundred miles
of single narrow gauge line, very insufficiently
provided AAith rolling stock. When that insufll-
cient avenue Avill be supplanted by a full rail-
Avay, we do not yet know, but, apart from this,
Avitii the early summer entry through the ports
Aviiich are kept open Avith such difficulty, if at
all, during the Avinter, will begin again, and
here, as in other linos of analysis Av^e have
examined, though a little later "than the date
upon Avhich those other lines converge, Ave find
the critical moment corresponding to the open-
ing of the summer season, Avith a possibdity
that good fortune at the mouths of the BlacK
Sea may ver}^ considerably advance such a
moment.
To put the matter in the most general terms
possible, it would seem as though by the begin-
ning of May, at the earliest, by the end of June,
at the latest, and Avith increasing force in the
interval betAveen, the crisis of the AA-ar, so far as
reserves of poAA-er are concerned, should be
reached. In that period something like %
balance in men might well be established, and
if that period be successfully past, the tide
Avould seem — judged by these necessarily im-
perfect arguments— to be turnin.fj.
There remain to be considered the geo-
graphical and the moral factors ^ — the first
capable of close scrutiny; the latter liable, of
course, to no more than the vaguest judgment
— and with these I propose to deal next Aveek.
io»
March 6, 1915.
LAND AND KATEE.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
KOTB. — Tbli Article bas been submitted to the Prcst Burean, vrhlcfa does not object to tlie publication at centered, and takes b«
respnosibiiity (or tbe correctoesi ot the ftatcmentt.
THE DARDANELLES.
"~^IIE official details now published of the preliminary
operations in the Dardanelles indicate very
clearly the immcuse relative superiority of forts
to ships.
The forts were : —
A.
B.
C.
D.
Cape Helles 2 9.2
SeddulBahr 6 10.2
9.2
10.2
Orkanieh Tabia 2
Ku m Kalossi Tabia 4
It is improbable that any of tliese were modern guns,
Ks we know that in the first boiubardir;ent of February 19
they were outranged.
The 9.2's are presumably Vickers g\;ns of about fifteen
rears ago. At and about that lime Turkey was buying
v'ickers guns. The 10.2 is an old Krupp size, and as like
an not tome of these guns were there when the British Fleet
went up the Dardanelles in 1878. The 10.2 would appear to
be identical with the 25 centimetre cast-steel breechloader of
22 calibres. There are later 10.2's, " mode! 1889," of 40
t,nd 50 calibres, v>ith muzzle velocities up to about 2,500;
but the.se would (being on shore mountings) hardly be out-
ranged by the guns of an old battleship like tbe Vengeance.
In any ca.>:e, however, the forts were not " first class,"
•cd in addition thereunto, being Turkish, are most unlikely to
hftve been in any high state of efficiency. Yet they sur-
vived the first heavy bombardment, and were only finally
reduced after over seven hours' firing from the British ships
Qveen Elizabeth, Agamemnon, Irresistible, Vengeance,
'Albion, and CornwcUis, and the French ships Gauloit,
Euffren, and Charlemagne — all ships making eicellen*
practice against an indifferent reply.
From this we can get a clear inkling of the magnitude
ef the task on which the Allied Fleet ia engaged, and— unless
Turkish resistance suddenly collapses— progress ia likely to
b« slow and tedious.
By the 26th four miles had been gained — ^that is to say,
twept clear of mines. In addition. Fort Dardanus (E),
mounting four 5.9-inch (probably old Krupp guns), had
been more or less silenced by long-range fire from the Albion,
Majestic, end Vengeance.
The whole of these operations must, however, be regarded
as merely preliminary. Harder work is probably ahead
when " The Narrows " come into the zone of operations,
and only good luck combined with the most brilliant tactical
arrangements are likely to save us from more or less con-
■iderable losses.
The public impression that forcing the Dardanelles is a
mere parade is very erroneous. The actual ta;k is one of
ttupendous magnitude, perhaps one of the greatest naval
operations ever undertaken. If it is to bo paralleled at all
we must go back to the fall of Constantinople (Byzantium)
to the Turks, and reflect that they will lose it mainly owing
to the prevalence of conditions similar to those by which they
gained it. However, its slow results will be a useful lesson
to these misguided people who are wont to demand why the
British Fleet does not bombard Cuxhaven and force the Kiel
Canal. Ships v. forts must ever be a very hard task for the
■hipa.
Why our latest Dreadnought, the Queen Elizabeth, should
lave been sent to the Dardanelles to join up with a crowd of
old ships is a matter of considerable public conjecture. The
probable reason is the most obvious. She is a brand-new
fhip of an entirely new type just commissioned. Any newly-
commissioned ship requires time to " shake down." It is
doubtful whether, had she joined the Grand Fleet right off,
the Queen Elizabeth would have been of much value. In tbe
Dardanelles she can get shaken down and "blooded," and
a practical experience obtained as to the exact value of
the 15-inch Bhell which the ia hurling into tha Turkish
fortifications.
A further complication of the attack, and one which will
be most acute off Chanak, is that the Turka have abundant
faciiitiea for placing floating micea to drift down jrith tbe
MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE POSITIO.NS IN TEE D.'VRDAXELLES.
current against the Allied Fleet. Meeting this attack will
demand unceasing skiU and vigilance.
GENERAL MATTERS.
The Recent Air Raid.
In the issue of February 20 I dealt with the big air raid,
and mentioned the dislike of the Air Service to the deification
which is apt to befall any of its members who chance to get
into the limelight. I was endeavouring to convey that it is
inevitable that this should happen with a new arm and the
sensational Press, but that the phase will pass. Either I
worded myself clumsily, or else some people read things irre-
spective of the context. In any case, I deeply regret to find
that at least one reader ia under the impression that I
intended to imply that a certain distinguished officer was " on
the boom." Nothing was further from my thoughts.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
H. M. R. (llugeley).— There is a possibility that a
aufficiently sensitive instrument could be cou.«tructed, but I
chould imagine that the motor-boat would see the periscopa
long before the detector would work.
R. P. (Deal). — Your suggestion would not affect matters
except in abnormal cases on .account of the depth of water.
W. T. C. (Belfast). — No such appliance is known.
T. F. H. (Birkenhead). — Very many thanks for your
letter. The circumstance has already been reported.
H. N. (Ticehurst). — Although experimentally sub-
marines have been detected by aeroplanes, aircraft appear to
be of very little use for this purpose under war conditions.
This is due to the fact that in peaco experiments the sub-
marines would be somewhere at a certain time and also tha
area of water in which they liad to bo looked for was small.
In war practice, of course, the area of water is very large
indeed and the time of the submarine an absolutely indefinite
quantity.
W. O. W. (Liskeard).^(l) Di?oi!«'?ion on this subject is
forbidden. (2) The Sulamis was expected to bo comjjieted at
the end of this year. As she was being built by the Vulkan
Co. at considerably over the normal German rate of construc-
tion it is improbable that they can expedite her. The Lutzow,
building at Schichau's at Danzig, was down for completion
next July, but as her construction could easily be accelerated
it is quite possible that she is already very nearly completed
for se.'i. Three battleships of the Eoenig class were com«
pleted shortly after the outbreak of war. The fourth vessel
of the class will probably be completed iu the course of •
11»
LAND AND 3E A T E R.
March 6, 1915.
fnoiit!i or so. (3) I am afraid that tlie stories of the sinking
of tlie Bertha and tlie Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse are versions
of one and tlie same thing, due to vague descriptions, and
both of them also may be incorrect stories of the loss of the
Tricdrkh Karl, which is the only German ship officially
announced to have been lost in the Baltic since the Magdc
lurg was destroyed. (4) Suggestion noted. (5) It is im-
possible to disintegrate items like those you have quoted from
the Manclnirian Newt. It is pleasing to hear that they regard
it as official that the Von der Tann and Karhriihe are sunk,
but disquieting that they credit the French Navy with having
lost the Jean Bart and Courhet. This was officially denied
by the French Admiralty and officially stated as correct by
the Austrians. Tossibly the Manchurian Neus was quoting,
end not giving any official Russian statement. (6) " Fight-
ing Ships " will be published about May or June as usual.
F. T. (Midhurst). — A pleasant feature of the present
,war is the way in which everybody seized with an idea spreads
it about in the hope of its being useful. You may, however,
take it that our destroyers know all there is to know in the
matter of hunting submarines. Did you ever see a man with
a gun making his first effort to shoot snipe ? Our destroyers
are (or were) in that position against hostile submarines. The
principal danger from submarines is the fact that they are a
novel weapon. It is only the non-nautical Germans who
imagine that in the submarine they have discovered something
which sets all the laws of Nature at defiance. We shall evolve
an antidote in due course.
H. R. B. (Checkenham) . — All that you suggest has been
done for a long time.
R. G. (Bristol). — To foul the propellers of a submarine is
excellent in theory, but in practice, unfortunately, it is rather
on all fours with catching a bird by putting salt on its tail !
The bigness of the sea is the cause of the trouble. Imagine a
grasshopper in a ten-acre field seeking to locate and make
a meal off some particular insect and you get a not very
exaggerated analogy I
S. O'D. (Bramhall).— You may depend upon It that the
Naval Air Service has long since utilised aeroplanes for every
purpose to which they can be put.
H. M. (Kingstown) and W. D. S. B. S. (Bournemouth).
> — ^You have both hit on the same idea independently. It
is all right in theory, but in practice would be too slow to be
of value, to say nothing of the fact that a torpedo in motion
is always a good way ahead of its betraying bubbles. More-
over, the chances of any one particular merchant ship beiug
attacked are very small. The best defence is that adopted by
]th9 Admiralty.
T. H. M. (Crosshaven). — Time fuse shell are used against
aeroplanes, as well as shrapnel; but any laud fire is neces-
sarily haphazard. The correct reply to the aeroplane is the
aeroplane. Anti-aircraft guns will no doubt improve : they
may very possibly improve so that dirigibles become entirely
.Vforthlesa; but they are never very likely to prove a satL*-
faclory defence against aeroplanes.
F. J. R. (London, E.G.).— (1) Modern submarines have
two periscopes, and there is no probability of their being
caught from behind. (2) Aircraft have proved of little or no
value against submarines. The idea of " harpooning " them
was suggested some time ago by Lord Charles Beresford. The
trouble is to find the submariue. As remarked some while
ago in this column, it is easy to harpoon a whale, because it
lacks intelligence enough to make itself scarce when danger
threatens. The submarine, oa the other hand, b a very
intelligent whale.
F. S. (Guernsey). — Many thanks for your enclosure.
OLeast said soonest mended. Your enclosure is conclusive and
unpleasant evidence that the German official report of the
ITauga affair was not the bluff that I assumed it to have been.
lAll the same, we shall presently have Taaga.
A. W. (Bideford). — The German was probably harmless,
or you would not have encountered him in the way you did.
lA favourite method with the Germans was to put a harmless
man to attract attention while the real spy worked unseen
.behind.
H. S. (No address). — I have forwarded the matter to the
proper quarter. Probably they are unaware of 7/hat is under-
»ieath the sheep's clothing at the place you refer to. Fortu-
nately, if your surmise be correct, there b a proverb which
runs: " Every bullet has its billet."
"A Man in the Street." — ^Your suggestion has been in
pperation ever since the war started.
H. B. J. (Golder's Green).— Your. plan for the destruc-
tion of submarines is ingenious, but I a:n afraid that they
^i°4 too elusive to be destroyed on the lines you »uggeaU
C. P. M. (Maida Vale, W.). — ^Your theory is correcfi,
but you may reckon that our submarine expert* thought of
it long ago.
R. B. (Birkenhead). — No, I do not consider you "a
blithering idiot," but I am afraid that you are amongst tha
multitude which fails to realise the intrinsic difficulty of
getting into touch with a submarine. Once in touch, suit-
able methods of destruction are simple and plentiful; the real
problem is how to find the needle in the bundle of hay.
J. T. H. J. (Cymmer). — There is nothing intrinsically
wrong in your idea for combating submarines except that
the submariue blockade danger is hardly important enough to
warrant such extensive precautions. It is necessary to
remember that submarines, like aircraft, are novel weapons
of warfare, and consequently get headlines out of all pro-
portion to their actual fighting value.
N. B. M. (London, S.W.). — I am quite ready to concede
that German-Americans have their rights, and no doubt from
their point of view " Deutschland fiber alles " interests theoa
more than " The Star Spangled Banner." But as the busi-
ness of Mr. Winston Churchill is to look after the interests of
this country I am afraid that I cannot follow your theory
that anything he or the Admiralty may do against Germany
is " a low-minded policy." I take it that you are a German-
American and honestly entitled to sympathise as you will, but
you cannot expect us to sympathise with you. The Germans,
of course, are delightful people, but it happens to be the
business of this country to kill the enemy, and I am afraid
that even if you called Mr. Winston Churchill a d d
nasty brute you would not induce a single British sailor to
be unduly softhearted thereby.
" Retaliation." — Your scheme of a trap for German sub-
marines is absolutely perfect in theory. It would certainly
work, but do you realise that the chances of any one particular
merchant ship being pirated are about one in a thousand,
while the cost of what you suggest would be something like
one in a hundred— i.e., we should bo paying through the nose
against imaginary dangers? But when all is said and done
there is no certainty in any scheme, and no scheme can safely
bo based on the theory that the hostile submarine is not very
wide awake. I do not believe that there is any such thing as
passive defence against Germany's submarine " blockade."
Safety only lies in an offensive-defensive by the British Navy.
H. M. (Hampstead, N.W.).— Ideas more or less like
your suggestion, though not always so carefully worked out,
come to mo continually from correspondents. In so far aa
the scheme is practicable it has long been in operation.
A. W. Y. (Glasgow). — As you say, your idea is not novel,
but your proposed application of it most certainly is, and I
suggest that you communicate with the Admiralty direct,
being careful to explain to tham exactly how it works ia
every way.
W. C. (Wincanton).— (1) At 17,000 yards a shell would
have drop enough to fetch up agaiu.st the protective deck.
The curious thing is that it has never been absolutely settled
whetlier a projectile fired at long range with a considerable
elevation reaches the target point downward, or poinb
upward as it left the gua. (2) High angle fire to the full
extent of 45deg. or more is not possible from warships,
because no provision for such extreme elevation \a made. II
could, of course, be secured by inclining the ship sufficiently.
(3) Your idea of traiuirig seagulls to detect periscopes by
feeding them from periscopes ii) on the face of it ludicrous.
But in actual practice it might very well work in inshore
waters. Come to think of it, the idea that the jumping lid
of a boiling kettle could revolutioniije motive power must
also have struck many past sages as ludicrous. By the way,
if 3'ou look up back numbers of the Strand Magazine of aboul
ten years or so ago, you will find that one Angus Sherlock,
writing about Naval War Game, detailed a scheme abouk
■utillsin" porpoises for naval purposes. So far as I recollect
the Umpire allowed the claim. The French once seriously
considered training eagles to attack aviators, and at the
present time I believe that parrots are utilised to give warn-
in" of approaching aeroplanes. One way and another, there-
fore, your idea about seagulls cannot be considered silly,
despite the fact that tho rime's paragraph of February 25. to
which vou refer, merely suggests that the submarine chanced
to frighten the seagulls.
E. D. F. (London, S.W.). — Your scheme is very
Interesting, but I am rather doubtful whether the captue
balloon would stay there, also as to whether it would really
see very much. As I have so frequently suggested in thesa
columns, the submarine b a very wily fish.
12»
March 6, 1915,
LAND AND JN! A T E R.
A NOTE OF WARNING.
BRITISH AERIAL SUPREMACY MUST NOT BE COMPROMISED
BY AIR RAIDS.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
KOTB.— TUi article bas ticea mbniitted to the Tress Barean, Trhlch does not object to the publication as ceotored, and takes no
reajioniibiUty lor the correctness o( Ibe statements.
TWO principles seem to have guicted our military
authorities in dealing wilh the production of air-
craft during the period immediately preceding
the outbreak of hostilities. These two principles
are I
{») Everr reaily promisingly constructed aircraft must be given a
tnai.
(ft) Evej-y promising constractor must be giren work.
As students of military aeronautics are well aware, {he
adoption of those two principles by our authorities and their
adherence to them were not brought about without much
pressure from aeronautical designers, constructors, and a
oertain section of the technical Pre?3. Anyhow, when the
war broke out, these two principles being already in opera-
tion, the country found itself in possession of several designs
•f aeroplanes, especially suited for military purposes, and of
a number of firms who had already acquired considerable
•xperience in aeronautical construction. When, therefore,
{n his last article, the writer expressed the view that no
praise should be grudged to those who, right at the beginning
of hostilities, enabled Great Britain to secure that kind of
aerial supremacy for which the various countries were striv-
ing, he had in mind not only our splendid airnsen and those
©n the General Staff who were responsible, in all its details,
for an intricate and then untried organisation, but also those
designers and constructors who, in the early days of aeronau-
tics, have had on many occasions to face with an empty purse
official apathy and general indiiference. The writers also
who, in the public Press, supported and encouraged them
deserve as well their meed of recognition.
THE NEED FOR CRITICISM AND
SUGGESTIONS.
The writer Is led to mention the above facts because
there has of late been a tendency, in certain quarters, to
point to the exploits of our Flying Corps as evidence that
witlciam of, and suggestions to. His Idajesty's Air Depart-
ments are out of place and can sen.'e no purpose. It can be
asserted, however, and proved, by means of indisputable
documentary and other evidence, that our Air Service owes
the efficiency it already posse.sscd when the war broke out to
th« very sharp criticism to which it had been subjected in
tha past. As regards outside suggestions, the writer con-
riders that now, more than ever, these should be welcomed :
(1) Because in studying tlve ti«w military uses to wliich. every
day, it ii fu'JiKl tb.it the aeroplane can be put, our aulhorilios
do not pof.-!ca9 the accumuLit-ed experien-e wliioh cx-sts m
the case of other methods of warfare. They are, therefore,
no better prepared to d-:;aJ with them than any other student
of military aeronautics.
(8) Because an important unforeseen potentiality for oflensive pnr-
pc*es ha» now become evident in She aeroplane, and this
potentiality, on account of its possibiiity of shortening (he
war, must be deveiopod and employed T.ith as little deUy as
may be.
To none, therefore, should suggestions be more welcome
(iiati to those responsible for the development of our Air
Bervioe and for its adaptation to the important task lying
before it.
CHE TWO KINDS OF AERIAL SUPREMACY
The writer has already, on a former occasion, tried (o
make clear the point that, speaking in a general manner, the
E resent war has shown that an aerial fleet may bo employed
1 two ways i
(1) It may form part of our land and sea forces |
and
(2) It may be nsed as nn Individual force which may act either
independently of or in co-oporatiou with our land and sea
forces.
In the following lines it will be explained why, so far
•a the present war is concerned, ihe tame arriol fleet cnjinoi
ferfnrm the two preceding functions uith the best potsihle
ret'ultt. When it is considered as a part of our land or sea
forces, an air fleet or an air squadron is especially concerned
with the reconnaissance or kindred work necessary to the
•OBunandar of the force to which the air fleet or squadron 19
attached. Tlie main value of such a fleet being the carrying
out of careful, and at times difficult, observations, it follows
that, apart from tb.e reliability and qualities of the aircraft
constituting the squadron, the principal factor influencing
the efficiency of aerial reconnaissance is the capability of the
observer to make and report his observations accurately and
carefully. •" Both pilot and obser\'er must be able to read
Rnd understand a map just as quickly and easily as they can
a book, end at any moment of a cross-country flight they
thould both know esaclly where they are. Beyond this the
observer — or, in a single-seater, the pilot — must be able to
pick up troops on the ground, determine what they are,
estimate their numbers, and mark their precise position on
the map. Ho may have to do this in a rough wind and in the
midst of fleeting and distracting clouds, and either during
his return journey in the air, or after landing from a long
and perhaps alarming and uncomfortable flight, he must
write a clear, intelligible report of what he has seen. All this
is difficult, and, in consequence, the results of aerial recon-
naissance will sometimes be inaccurate and misleading.
" This liability to error will be intensified by subt-er-
fuges undertaken by the enemy with the express purpose of
deceiving the aerial observer. Small forces may be strung out
on roads to represent large columns, whilo the mass of the
troops are kept hidden in woods and villages; dummy trenches
may be constructed, while real ones are hidden; guns may be
made to look like bivouac shelters, bushes, or country carts,
while country carts may be made to look like guns. Bivouacs
can and have been completely hidden from above, and troops
billeted in villages will be hard to locate. The game of
deceiving the airn:au offers endless opportunities for in-
genuity, the onlj- drawback being that all these tricks give
the troops that carry them out a great deal of trouble and
extra work without the satisfaction of ever knowing whether
they have been successful . . . The best guarantee that
aerial reconnaissance will overcome the difficulties presented
by imperfect observation and hostile subterfuge lies in tho
careful training and wide experience of its observers, and in
the presence of sufficient numbers of aeroplanes to enable
doubtful information to be checked and corrected without
delay."
Now, since in his last article, f for reasons therein given,
the writer has been led to define that " Supremacy of the
Air " which we have already acquired as meaning " the
capability of airmen to give, in good time, the necessary
infor;naticn which will enable their commanders always to
possess the initiative," it follows that, if for some reason, such
as the carrying out of a raid or an attack, we deprive even
momentarily our land or sea forces of a number of aerial
observers of "careful training and wide experience," wo
compromise, at least for a time, the retention of our aerial
supremacy as above defined.
Further, it does not follow that aerial observers of
" careful training and wide experience," whose number is
limited and whose fcrvices are indispensable to the com-
manders of our land and sea forces, would make the best
aerial bombardiers. J
Tho writer has, beside!", explained on various occarions
why aerial attacks should be made in force. Consequently,
if an aerial attack be undertaken with an air fleet meant for
the maintaining .and developing of that supremacy of the
air which is at present ours, not only would the peritonnel of
that fleet not be best suited to employ the aeroplane as an
offensive weapcm, but also by such a policy we would run the
risk of compromising the most valuable assistance which the
airmen attached to our Ar.my and Navy can render to our
land and sea forces.
If, therefore, tlie country decides to endeavour to
The Aeroplane in War," civen at the XTnivep-
Brancker, Royal Artillery (R.F.U,
• From a lecture oin
gfty of London by Major W
Reserve), General Sufl.
+ " To End the War," Land akd Wateb, February 27, 1915.
X See " The Aeroplane on the Ofieniive," Laijd akd Watib,
January 23, 1915.
i3«
LAND AND ffiATEE.
March 6, 1915.
r
/
TRIENDl y
DIAGP^Ail TO ILLUSTRATE A SUGGESTED MKTHOD Of
AEiJIAL AT'J'ACK.
obtain an aerial supremacy wliich would enable us, almost
immediatelv, to carry the war right into the heart of tli«
enemy's territory, a special offensive air fleet must ba created
at once.
SUGGESTED METHOD OF AERIAL ATTACK.
In the diagram FFF represents tlie boundary line
between a friendly territory and the enemy's country. This
boundary line may be defended by trenches, fortifications,
or natural obstacles. TTT represents a portion of the enemy's
territory which it may be necessary to attack aerially. Such
an attack must be made ou a comprehensive and sustained
scale. For this purpose it is suggested that the requisite
number of aeroplanes should be collected at a certain number
o: bases, Bl, B2, B3, and B4, and CI, C'2, C3, and C4, and
that, at first, the machines should start only from the bases
Bl, B2, E3, and B4, at such times as to fly, almost simul-
taneously, over the ground to be aerially bombarded. The
squadron starting from Bl would fly over the outskirts of
the territory to be attacked and gradually drop its bombs
over the outer circle it would describe. The squadron from
B2 would fly over the circumference of a circle inside th«
one described by the preceding squadron, and fly in the same
clockwise direction. Similarly the squadrons from B3 and
B4 would describe other iruier circles as indicated in th«
diagram.
This comprehensive aerial attack could bo sustained by
four other aerial squadrons which would start from base*
CI, C2, C3, and C4, immediately the four squadrons from
Bl, B2, B3, and B4 have returned to the friendly territory,
and would fly over the ground to be bombarded in a direo-
tion contrariwise to the one adopted by the squadrons from
Bl, B2, B3, and B4.
In concluding this article, the writer wishes to repeal
his note of warning that wo should not be tempted to raak«
it a practice to carry out two entirely different kinds of
operations — reconnaissance and attact— with the same ai<
fleet.
SHIPS V. FORTS IN THE DARDANELLES
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
FOR something more than thirty years the whole
political question of the Near East has turned
upon the matter which is now being put to the
test in the Dardanelles by the Allied squadrons
of France and England.
It has been partly a naval question, partly one of land
defences, and opinions have varied in proportion as the
sailors understood the engineers and the engineers under-
stood the sailors.
It has al'ivays been an axiom of the German school, trained
exclusively on land, that guns in forts could beat guns on a
moving platform at sea; but our sailors have as consistently
maintained the directly opposite view, while our own
engineers, almost equally at home en land or sea, have refused
a complete assent to either extreme, pointing out that no
hard and fast rule could be drawn, but that each case must
be judged by the advantages which a selected site afforded its
defenders and the skill with which the engineer and artillerist
had applied the means at hand to the attainment of the object
in view.
Now it happens that this particular site of the Dardanelles
has been made the subject of countless controversies ever
since the British Fleet steamed past the Turkish batteries in
1878. We have always known every sounding in the straits
and all about the conditions of current and anchorage which
governed the application of submarine mines to supplement
the gun defence of the forts.
I suppose this particular ca.?e is the one instance in
history in which both R.E. and R.N. expert opinion has been
in entire agreement— i.e., we both accepted the Dardanollos
as an indefensible site, as against such ships as the British
Navy could always bring to reduce its defence, if the occasion
made it worth while to incur a certain amount of risk.
I believe, in fact, that the German engineers held much
the same view; but the Turkish forts on the Dardanelles
afforded such splendid positions for Messrs. Krupp to dump
their monster exhibition cannon, as these passed out of date,
that other than intellectual arguments prevailed at Constan-
tinople.
yhe whole question really turns upon the freedom of ships
to move in fairly deep water and the ease of observation ef
fire effect from their fighting tops.
In low-lying country, behind sand dunes, for example, it
used to be nearly impo.ssible to see where one's shells wer«
falling, even after the site of the battery was located; bu*
in the Dardanelles this facility for escaping observation does
not exist, and even if it did the modern aeroplane completely
overcomes these difficulties.
Eliminating this one advantage of invisibility possessed
by the land battery, the ship now has things all her own
v.ay, for she represents a power of concentration of fire under
a sinfle control far in excess of anything that has ever been
proposed in coast batteries since the days of the old ston*
batteries of the Crimea.
Of course the number of fighting ships must bear som»
reasonable proportion to the number of batteries they will
engage; but even against a fair superiority of land batteries
the modern battleship possesses advantages in practice whiok
the layman seems never to be able to take into account.
It is, of course, the object of the batteries to wing th«
ships, just as it is that of each ship to hit the batteries; but
whereas the battery, or group of batteries, can only predict
where a ship will bo, say, a minute in advance, and that only
on condition that she is clearly visible, the ship always know*
half an hour in advance, if need be, what her range to th«
battery will be, because her speed ond helm-angle are entirely
under her captain's control, and he can vary either, or botii,
as he pleases.
Further, thanks to Q.F. guns and the extraordinary
power of modern artillery, a sliip can from time to time sa
shroud the fort in a cloud of dust, smoke, and dirt, thrown
up by bursting shells, that for some minutes all observation
oi the ship's course from the fort, or from anywhere near it,
becomes impossible, and while the dust so raised is settling
she can change her cour,-je and reappear at an entirely
unknown range for her enemy.
It is clear that there are ways of overcoming this diSi-
culty if it has been thought out and installed in advance; bu*
it is quite certain from the "progress reports" hitherto
received that this is a development well beyond any whic^
the Turks hav* as yet worked out.
14»
March 6, 1915.
LAND AND v\\' A T E R.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE COST OF A SAILORS' HOME.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
EiH, — You may have noticed that the Scottish National
Council of the Y.M.C.A. has been doing really good work at
the training camps in Scotland since the beginning of the
]Fftr.
We hare had a rery urgent appeal from luvergordon to
do something for the Navy men who spend their leisure time
ashore there. These men when they get their leave ashore
have absolutely no place to spend their time, and certainly
BO place to spend a night in. We have embarked upon the
building of a sailors' home with fifty bed cubicles, restaurant,
iraoke room, billiard room, and entertainment room accom-
modation— a place where they can go freely, and always find
ft warm welcome, comfort, and entertainment.
The appeal from the officers and from the district has
be:-n so strong that we have embarked upon the construction
cf the home without the funds being secured. The total cost,
including furnishing, will bo £3,600. Towards this we have
gathered £900, and have received £500 as a Treasury grant
on condition that it is fiui'shed in three months' time. We are
appealing for the remaining £2,200. The national indebted-
neM to our sailors goes without saying, and I am sure the
need for this sum only wants to be made known to insure its
being received. A recommendation to the undoubtedly
eympaibetic readers of your splendid journal would be of
Inestimable value in securing the required amount. — Thank-
ing you in anticipation, I am faithfully yours,
Andrew H. Pettigeew.
of Government expenditure; they would not be enriching
themselves at the expense of the State by receiving a high
rate of interest; and they would, by means of the sinking
fund, end by giving their country the present of an organised
business undertaking free of cost.
By subscribing the capital, some of us who are not able,
by reason of age or health, to serve our country in the field,
would feel that we were doing something in the service of the
people, and in our small way helping to perform a XtiToipjua,
■ — I remain, yours very truly,
J. W. Williams.
Perhaps you will say that this is sentiment, not business;
but in war time sentiment has greater power than ever.
New House, Wadhurst,
"THE 9TH LANCERS."
To the Editor of L.'.nd and Watek.
5;r, — With reference to the letter headed " The 9th
Lancers," which appeared m Land and Water of
February 27, I am able to answer " Old Soldier's " ^estion.
On August 24 the flank of the 5th Infantry Division
was threat'ened by a very hea-v7 attack by the enemy's
infantry. The 9th Lancers and part of the 4th Dragoon
Guards were ordered to charge with a view to checking the
enemy's advance. This llsey did under a terrlfio fire, being
•iipported by the remainder of the 4th Dragoon Guards,
the 18th Hus.iars, and L Battery R.H.A. No guns were
charged. The mistake made by Mr. H. Ross and other artists
is, I think, due to the fact that it was imm.cdiately after the
charge that Captain Grenfell went to the help cf tke 119th
Battery. This battery had suffered very heavily, and, owing
to the heavy fire, was unable to bring up the teams. Captain
Grenfell, assisted by officers and men of the 9th Lancers,
helped the gunners to man-handle the guns cut of action.
I think°a good many people have mixed up the two
Incidents. I enclose my card. — Yours,
"AN AIR FLEET 3,000 STRONG."
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir,— Your plan ought not to fail for the want of
•apitil Though tlie Government may not at once vote the
monev, cannot an appeal be made to the publio? In thia
appeal let patriotism be put before dividends.
I venture to suggest the following points, in sketching
the lines of a patriotic limited liability company.
1 The company shall be formed with a capital of
£10 000,000, divided into £1 shares, and et allotment
preference shall be given to tlie small subscriber.
2 The maximum dividend shall be 5 (or even 4) per cent. ,
io that the shareholders shall feel that they are helping their
country at least as much as their pockets. _
3 The employes shall have full trades union rates of pay
(and shall further have divided among them 2i per cent of
the profits over and above the fixed dividends paid to the
ihareholders). n i,_ „„; i
4 That any further profits that may accrue shall be paid
into a sinking fund, which sinking fund shall be used to pay
off the shareholders at par, either by annual drawings or as
a whole when the sinking fund shall have reached the sum
of the capital. ^ , ., , ,,^
5 That at each drawing and repayment of capital the
Government shall step into the place of the fo™<^y "^'^^''..''f
the stock, BO that in the end the Government shaU own the
whole concern. ., . , ,, . ,
The general public would, by Bubscribing for the stoc^,
.void the necessity of stUl further inflating the present volume
ANTI-SUBMARINB TACTICS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — In the discussions which have appeared in the news-
papers as to the best form of anti-submarine tactics, I have not
yet seen a suggestion that a special type of boat should be con-
structed for the purpose of attacking this new enemy. De-
stroyers were designed and constructed for the special purpose
of attacking torpedo boats. Is it not probable that a new type
of vessel will have to be designed for the special purpose of
attacking submarines? If this proves to be the case, let us
consider the principal points which should bo embodied in the
design :
(1) She must have speed at least as great as that of the
lubmarine; also she must respond quickly to her rudder and
turn in a small circle.
(2) She must be adapted for ramming and constructed in
such a manner that she will withstand the ehock of collision.
(3) She must carry deck armament somewhat more
powerful than that of the largest submarine and also a largo
icatter gun to use against the periscope.
(4) She should have as low a freeboard as is compatible
with a capability of keeping at sea in stormy weather and, if
possible, she should have no mast or funnel in order that she
may be invisible at a distance.
Possibly some of our torpedo boats could be adapted to
fulfil the more important of these conditions, but if not, is
there any good reason why the Admiralty should not, without
delay, construct a few specially designed anti-submarine boats t
Destroyers are too large and too valuable for the purpose, and
as for steam yachts, whose maximum speed is twelve or
thirteen knots, and which are slow in answering their rudders,
I am confident that no yachtsman would consider them at all
fit to cope with a fast and active submarine enemy.
If the Admiralty are trusting to armed steam yachts or
to unarmed merchant steamers and trawlers for the destruc-
tion of the enemy's submarines, I venture to think that they
will discover before long that they have made a grave mistake
and one which may have serious consequences.
Perhaps I should add that I am writing this letter in the
cspacity of a yachtsman of forty years' experience and also
as an ex-olEcer of the Eoyal Enginetrs.— I remain. Sir, yours
faithfully,
Dunleath.
THE EAST KENT HUNT.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — The East Kent Hunt has formed a corps of
Mounted Scouts.
The Committee consists of Mr. H. W. Selby Lowndes
(the M.F.H., who is chairman). Mr. S. L. Harries (hon. sec),
Mr. ,T. E. Churchill (hon. sec. P. and D), Mr. J. D. Masted,
and Colonel Baynes, who is in command.
Captain Bell has kindly lent Bourne Park for drilling.
The corps is recognised by the War Office, and already a
number of drills have taken place.
Amongst others who have enrolled and attended the
mounted drills are Messrs. Selby Lowndes, Harries, Churchill,
Uniacke, Collard, Tanner, Miles, Turner, _ Hunt, Kelsey,
Maxted, Coleman, Goodson, Afhenden, Cathie, Ac, and it is
hoped that hunting men in East Kent who are not eligible for
Lord Kitchener's Army will jcin as scon as possible.
Mr. A. F. TJniacke, of 13, St. Gsorge's Street, Canter-
bury, who is the hon. sec, will funiish .ill particulars as to
conditions, drills, uniform, &c., on application. — Yours
faithfully,
H. W. Sllev Lowndes.
LAND AND lW A T E R.
March 6, 1915,
NET DEFENCE.
To the Editor of Land and Watir.
Bra, — Permit me to recur to the pressing, yet perplexed,
problem of defence against miiie and torpedo attacK. Many
methods of protection will suggest themselves to your readers,
which may be classified into two main categories of Active and
Passiie defence. Neither should be neglected at the present
time.
To deal with " Active "defence first. "Forewarned is
forearmed." No owner, or sea-captain, should allow his ship
to sail without a full and sufficient equipment of guns,
machine-guns, rifles, and, above all, gunners, for dealing
faithfully with submarines and other " vermin " of the high
seas. Nor should anti-aircraft artillery — in these days of
Zeppelins and Taubes — be forgotten; while a pent-house steel
net, suspended awning-wise between the masts, should furnish
a satisfactory protection against the impact of sky-dropped
bombs.
With regard to " Passive " defence, there is, in my judg-
ment, no protection comparable with that of steel-net crino-
lines, only the old-fashioned system of torpedo net defence
has to be reconsidered, extended, and enlarged. The explosive
energy of mines and torpedoes is intensely local in its opera-
tion, and if the explosion can be kept, say twenty feet, from
the sides of the vessel attacked, it will, in most cases, prove to
be comparatively innocuous; and every foot of increased
distance rapidly reduces its percussive force. I venture,
therefore, to suggest that all sea-going vessels should for the
present be supplied with a V-shaped framework forward,
constructed out of stout pitch-pine baulks, steel joists, or
girders. Upon these baulks would be suspended steel nets
composed of rings — say six to eight inches in diameter, linked
together in vertical, lateral, and horizontal planes, &s illua-
jtrated in the following diagram.
Take a ship of, say, 300 feet in length (different sizes of
vessels would, of course, vary proportionately in their equip-
ment). I calculate that the weight of nets for such a ship,
running fore and aft its total length, and having the depth of
the vessel's draught, together with cylindrical, cigar-shaped
floaters, for carrying the weight of suspension, and linked in
flexible connection with stout steel chains (vide accompanying
diagram), would not exceed, say, fifteen to twenty tons,
the cost of which, according to the complexity of the fittings,
might be estimated to be between £300 and £500. These nets
iWould, of coiirse, involve a certain reduction of speed, but the
fittings could be ea?ily designed so that the nets and their
floaters could be taken aboard at will, when the vessel was
steaming or sailing outside the zone of probable mine danger
or of submarine attack. The loss of speed involved is a serious
inalter, but not to be taken into account as compareii with
the sinking of the ship itself, and the even more irreparable
loss of gallant lives.
Thus "actively" and "passively" armed our mer«as«
tile marine, no less than our naval fleets, might continue ta
plough the oceans with supreme indifference to the petty malio*
of piratical foes, and the terror of " the destruction whioh
walketh in darkness " would swiftly cease to overshadow the
spirits of those ' ' who go down to the sea in sliipa and occupy
their business in great waters." — Yours faithfully,
Aanold F. Hills.
'• Hammerfield," Peashurst, Kent.
TEUTONIC TRUTH.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — As Mr. Hilaire Belloc some time ago justly doubt*4
In your paper the accuracy of the number of prisoners of wM
ofiicially stated as having been captured by Germany, tibe fot
lowing may interest you.
The Frankfurter Zeitung, which during this war revealed
itself as the most Jingo paper in Germany, and is therafor»
not to be suspected of playing the German authorities nn-
pleasant tricks, stated on February 25 that Germany and
Austria-Hungary held then together 805,000 prisoners of war.
Of the 462,000 Russians, 230,000 were in Austria-IIunffarT,
Deducting also 50,000 Serbians held there, altogether 525,0^
prisoners wore, according to that German paper, in Germany.
When seeing that report I happened to remember that \im
German Chief Headquarters issued December 31 an official
statement, saying: "The total number of prisoners of wa»
interned in Germany, not including civilian prisoners, waa.
at the end of 1914, 8,138 officers ejid 577,875 men (totaS
586,013^." And that official statement added: " Thea«
figures do not include a number of those taken in the course ol
the pursuit in Russian Poland, nor those et present on thel»
way to concentration camps." Yet, leaving those out, you will
notice that the German Chief Headquarters mentioned 04
December 31 not less than 61,000 more prisoners of war thaa
the Frankfurter Zeitung reported to be la Germany oa
February 25 !
In order to make it clear to our readers in Holland whaf
reliance can be placed on the German official reports, I took
further the trouble to calculate very carefully the number o7
Etisoners of war which, according to the official reports sent
y V/olff's Bureau from Berlin to our paper, are supposed t«
have been captured on both fronts by the Germans between
January 1 and February 22. In that time there were reported
118,426 prisoners of war captured by the Germans in Eask
Prussia end Poland and 15,453 on the Western front. Adding
these to the number officially reported on December 31, wo ge|
a total of 719,892, or 194,892 more than tha FranlcfwU*.
Zeitung reported on February 25.
One other proof of how the " nation of poets and
thinkers " is juggling with its numbers of prisoners. Accord-
ing to the Berliner Tagehlatt, the German Minister at Berne
issued to the Swiss newspapers the statement that the numbe»
of German war prisoners up to the end of January were : In
France, 49,350; in Russia, 2,030; and in England, 7,247j
total, 58,627. Now, the official statement issued from the
German Chief Headquarters on December 31 contained the
following remark: "The Russian statement alleged to have
been issued by theRusslan Ministerof War, that 1,140 German
officers and 134,700 men have been captured by the Russians.
is incorrect, as the Russian figures include all civilians arrested
on and since the outbreak of war. The number of actual
prisoners of war is not more than 15 per cent, of these figures.'*
Very well, 15 per cent, of 135,840 gives 20,376 " actual
prisoners of war " which official Germany acknowledged to be
in Russia at the end of 1914. And the German Minister ai
Berne has the hardihood to say that four weeks later ba|
2,030 German prisoners of war were in Rus.=;ia. '
The Teutonic mind appears to be a wonderful tliiaj^-«
J am. Sir, youra sincerely,
JonN C. vaj» deb Veeb
(London Editor of the Anasterdam Telegraaf)»
49, Minster Road. N.W.
MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S LECTURES
Llandudno Pier Pavllioo... Saturday
Colwyn Bay... Pier Pavilion... Saturday
London Q'joen's Ilal!.. Tuesday
Winchester Guildhall Wednesday
Salisbury Victoria Uall... Wednesda^j'
BoiuTiemouth.... Pavilion Thursday
Wej-mouth Burdon Rooms. Thursday
Plymouti. Guildhall Friday
Ex«ter„..„^n.. Victoria QalL, ^ordajr....,^..
ON THE WAR.
6 March, 3 p.m.
0 March, 8 p.m.
9 March, 6.30 p.m<
10 March, 8 p.m.
10 March, B.30 p.m.
11 March, 3 p.m.
11 March, 8.50 p.m.
12 March, 3 and B.38li
U Maicli. &30 p.|^
Ifi*
March 6, 1915
LAND AND WATER
Onoto Pens
Are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
made by a British
Company with British
Capital and Labour.
From
10/6
upwards.
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO.. LTD.. LONDON.
FIRTH^S
a
STAINLESS STEEL
for CUTLERY, etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
ARTICLES MADE FROM THIS
STEEL, BEING ENTIRELY UN-
AFFECTED BY FOOD ACIDS,
FRUITS, VINEGAR, etc., WILL BE
FOUND TO BE OF ENORMOUS
ADVANTAGE IN HOTELS.
CLUBS, RESTAURANTS,
CAMPS. NEITHER THE KNIFE-
BOARD NOR GLEANING
MACHINE IS NOW NECESSARY.
^ CUTLERY OF THIS STEEL
MAY BE HAD OF ALL THE
LEADING MANUFACTURERS.
SEE THAT KNIVES BEAR THIS
MARK.
JfirthL
(stainless)
Original and Sole Makers:
THOS. FIRTH & SONS, Ltd.
SHEFFIELD.
GOLDSMITHS.
SILVERSMITHS &
SILK MERCERS
MILITARY
LUMINOUS WATCHES
(VISIBLE AT NIGHT)
FITTED EITHER WITH THE ORIGINAL PATENT
SCREW CASE. OR A PATENT SOLID ONE-PiECE
CASE INTO WHICH THE MOVEMENT SCREWS
(as preferred). DUST AND DAMP PROOF.
THE FINEST SERVICE WATCH OBTAINABLE
£2 15 0
Also in Plain Nickel or Oxydised Case, One Guinea.
NOTE. — All watches sold by Harrods carry a (uaranlee for three years.
HARRODS LTD. LONDON, S.W.
R. BURBIDGE. Managing Director.
335
LAND AND WATER
March 6, 191^
CHOOSING KIT
Practical Hints
THESE articles are written from practical experi-
ence of military matters, with a view to keeping
our readers in touchwith the various requirements
of active service. Changes of climate and the peculiar
conditions under which the present campaign is being
waged render different items of equipment advisable at
different times, and we are in touch with officers at the
front and others from whom the actual requirements of
officers and men can be ascertained. The articles are
not intended to advertise any particular firm or firms.
We shall be pleased to supply information to our
readers as to where any of the articles mentioned are
obtainable, and we invite correspondence from officers
on active service who care to call our attention to any
points which would be advantageous in the matter of
comforts or equipment, etc., to those who are about to
leave for the front.
In the manufacture of articles of kit generally, a good
many makers suffer from not knowing the actual require-
ments of their customers. For instance, there was shown to
me a day or two ago a waterproofed and lined vest, which
would have been perfectly admirable for a motorist or for
any man not called on to undergo any extreme exertion, but
for a soldier, whose life alternates between absolute stagnation
in the trenches and violent movement in marching and
attacking, it was of very little use owing to insufficient
ventilation. It was a good thing, but not for campaigning
purposes. The same is true of a multitude of articles made
for military use ; they are good things, but they are made
without knowledge of the conditions under which the troops
are working, and they are unpractical in design.
A New Flask
" All the advantages of sUver, at the price of nickel,"
sums up a new flask which is manufactured in nickel and
silver-plated inside with a view to the absolute avoidance of
corrosion. The flask is, first of all, made in two parts, in the
usual oblong shape ; these parts are joined to form one
unleakable whole, and then the interior plating is done, so
that the flask is equivalent to a silver one so far as its interior
goes. It is then fitted with a good bayonet top, and there is
a flask which is within the reach of any officer as regards
price, is neat in appearance (if that is desired), handy in
form, and sufficiently stout in manufacture to stand any
amount of knocking about without acquiring the dents and
creases to which silver is liable, owing to the thinness in
which it is made up. Here is a really serviceable article for
the officer or man who has not yet got his flask.
Waders
I have recently inspected a new pattern of wader designed
for use with the ordinary military boot. It is made of the
same thickness of weU-waterproofed material from top to
toe ; it reaches well above the knee, and fastens to the
suspender button at the waist. It weighs just over one
pound, folds into very small compass, and slips over the
ordinary sock inside even a close-fitting boot. It is
absolutely waterproof and protects from frost-bite, and it is
about the cheapest thing of its kind yet introduced. The
average pattern of wader — even if it can be worn with an
ordinary boot — necessitates having a size two or three times
larger than usual, but one would be surprised at the ease
with which this article will go into the ordinary boot —
without discomfort to the wearer. There is thus no necessity
to carry an extra pair of boots, and as these waders are
portable and cheap they are eminently useful for trench
work at the present time.
A Chilblain Cure
Some time ago a simple remedy for chilblains was
suggested in these columns, and with reference to this a
correspondent writes : " Seeing this remedy for chilblains
suggested, I wondered if the following excellent remedy
would not be more easily obtainable than camphor dissolved
in brandy. I myself have cured chilblains with this remedy
for years, and although it sounds rather a drastic remedy,
it does not hurt in the least. It was given me years ago by
an old Irishman who had used it repeatedly and always
successfully. The procedure is to dry the chilblains well.
An Oilskin
without the sticky feeling
I HIS Oilskin-coat being specially treated is
' without the objectionable stickiness insepar-
able from ordinary oilskins.
ENTIRELY WATERPROOF. LINED WOOL FLEECE
Can be worn if necessary over Gieat Coat.
50/-
PRICE
Oilskin Cap, also non-sticky
3/6
Motor Cycle Suit,
Jacket and Overalls,
37/6
Also suitable for Aviators.
For those v^ho suffer
with cold feet.
Chamois Leather Socks
3/9 per pair.
. n» Lintn //«//.__
Regent Street. London.W.
KHAKI SHIRTS
For Active Service
I HESE Shirts are made from a very
' durable and unshrinkable flanriel,
woven specially for use, in the Regulation
^hadc.
They are a good weight and are exception-
?lly well cut, made and finished by our
own workpeople in our own factories.
Price, with a detachable collar
to each
: 6/11
Khaki Collars
Made from oddments of
Regulation Shade Flannels.
Usually 1/6 each. Now
8/6 doz.
: Zephyr Khaki Shirts, finest Egyptian j
: Cotton for summer wear, 7 / 1 1
i with two collars, Each I / 1 1 ;
^"-—-^^^^Tht f-tntn ftair -"'^
Regent Street. London W
PRACTICAL KIT
OFFICER'S WATERPROOF, lined fleece, £ s. d.
guaranteed waterproof. An ideal Service coat - Price S SO
With lining, detachable ,,BieO
\Vithout lining 3 3 O
" I have given one of these coats a pe1son.1l trial under bad winter
conditions of weather, and have found it all that could be desired in
wet and in cold ; it fulfils the double purpose of waterproof and
warm coat, and, unlike the coat with detachable lining, is not unduly
heavy. The proofing is of the very best quality, really proof against a
soaking rain for any length of time ; the lining is a soft, light fleece,
which altogether takes away the "feel" generally associated with
waterproof garments, makes the coat comfortably warm for winter
wear, and is so light in weight that on a dry, cold day it is preferable
to a cloth coat ; the fact of its being windproof adds greatly to its
warmth. A further point in its favour is that it is thoroughly well
ventilated, and altogether it seems about the best all purposes coat
that one can obtain." — Author of " Choosing liit " Article, Land and
Water, Fth. 13, 1915.
POCKET FLASK, oxydised, plated inside,
non-corrosive. Strong and light
SAM BROWNE BELT, best bridle leather - 2
HAVERSACKS, extra large and strong. Made
from an officer's design
WIRE NIPPERS, insulated handles, inleather case
DOi insulated handles, Ironside pattern
LOADED STICKS, weighted pigskin knobs
Do. covered all over pigskin
OFFICER'S NEWMARKET WHIP, with
thong, covered pigskin 1
"ACTIVE SERVICE" MESS BOX, iiued
for six persons 6
LUMINOUS WATCHES, in wrist strap, silver 2
14 6
15 O
12 6
12 6
15 6
12 6
15 O
1 O
18
2
6
O
Send for full List of War Equipment.
SWAINE 6 ADENEY
Br appomtment to H.M. The Rintf
185 PICCADILLY. W.
336
March 6, 1915
LAND AMIi WATkk
LAND AND WATER
MONTHLY
LITERARY REVIEW
WM. BLACKWOOD 6 SONS
•* BLACKWOOD" — "The most brilliant of our magazines" — has a unique reputation for military articles. During
the present crisis its circulation has reached a point unequalled since the Franco-German War.
By far the best account of events at the Front is appearing in
BlacKw^ood's Magazine
under the title of "The Diary of a Subaltern."
Tlie January and February numbers are out of print in spite of largely increased impressions.
ORDER YOUR MARCH COPY AT ONCE.
In it appears also "With Rawlinson in Belgium," being the diary of one who had exceptional opportunities for
witnessing the events immediately follovying the fall of Antwerp and the historic stand in front of Ypre~.
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THE WAR OF LIBERATION
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The Peace of the World - H. G. WELLS
Germany and Double Allegiance
OLIVER E. BODINGTON
On Secret Service in Germany
MAJOR STUART-STEPHENS
Kultur - - - .
The Pro-German Danger
AUSTIN HARRISON
France — A Battle Ground
A. H. M.
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LAND AND WATER
March 6, 1915
CONSTABLE
The Political Thought of
Heinnich von Treitschke
By H. W. C. DAVIS, M.A.
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*' Mediseval Europe," " England undci' tho Normans and Angevius." D.Mny dvo. 6j. net.
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" The present volume is the book we want. It b not a hasty pamphlet written ad hoc, but a careiul study of a
^reat political force.'* — Daily Chronicle.
"It certainly clears the air to gel this lucid exposition of Treitschke's political ideas from a responsible
Oxford Scholar." — Standard.
" Mr. Davis has done his work with great skill and discretion." — Manchester Guard/an.
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While we tefnly watch our Russian ally, it is an opportune moment
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gain a belter underslanding of a kindly, social, and deeply religious
people, whose standard of morality is love, whose religion is faith, and
whose philosophy is a mixture of hope and fatalism.
"'Thirty-five Years in Russia' is that rare thing in our literature, a book
written by a substantial and representative Briton, who has no axe
to grind and favours no type of political propaganda." — 'C/ie 'Cimes.
THE ORIGIN, CAUSES
AND
OBJECT OF THE WAR
By Sir PERCY FITZPATRICK
AUTHOR OF "THE TRANSVAAL FROM WITHIN."
2s. 6d. net.
Sir Percy Fitzpatrick, who has long occupied a prominent position in
South African politics, briefly and clearly answers the question —
What is the reason of the war, the cause, and how has it come about >
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THE SHADOW ON
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LITERATURE
FOR THE MONTH
ii
Culture"
By R. A. SCOTT-JAMES
A FEW volumes of general literature still straggle
out from the Press — a few novels, a few volumes
of essays and poems, a few works concerned with
the older miscellaneous interests of the worlcL
- But for the most part the literary horizon is still
dominated by the war. There are some books which record
actual incidents from tlie many fields of battle ; some which
explain the causes of the war, or foretell its effects ; some
which set out to tell the history of it ; whilst others more
modestly describe the past wars of English, French, and
Germans.
It happens that the two most conspicuous of the books
that have been recently published really do, in the important
sense of the term, begin at the beginning. They are books
which serve to show that we are not merely at war with
German armies, or even with the German nation, but with
the mind through which Germany in her public capacity is
and has been thinking. In other words, they enlighten us
about the " culture " that has been so much bruited, and
reveal it as a culture which was already carrying on war
against every other culture in the world. These two books
are concerned with Treitschke and Neitzsche, the two German
professors who have exercised, directly and indirectly, a
profound influence upon the imagination and political thought
of modern Germany. It is by a strange irony of circumstance
that these two men, so different in character and ideals,
should both have contributed to the same end. Nietzsche,
as we shall see, would have deprecated the result : he would
have poured scorn upon the crude misunderstanding which
has made modern Germans actually range themselves under
his banner. Once, in a dream, he looked into a mirror, and
saw not himself, but " a devil's grinning face, a devil's
scornful laugh." That devil's face is the popular miscon-
ception of Nietzsche. This distortion of him brings him
nearer to Treitschke, and the two men together are repre-
sented as apostles of militant Germany ; and we shall not
fully appreciate what it is that we are fighting against until
we understand how those two men have expressed — or have
appeared to express — the spirit of modern Germany.
There is no work accessible in English which gives a
better all-round account of Treitschke than
" The PoHtical Thought of Heinrich von Treitschke."
By H. 'W. C. Davis, M.A. (Constable.) 6s. net.
The compiler of this book, Mr. Davis, a Fellow of Balliol
College, Oxford, has, as far as possible, let Treitschke tell his
own story ; that is to say, the greater part of the volume
consists of extracts from his writings, and for the rest Mr.
Davis has outlined the main events in the professor's life,
and those movements in German history which influenced
and thrilled him. In his earlier writings Treitschke's style
seems to have been heavy, involved, unnecessarily obscure.
In his later works a kind of animal strength enters into it,
and in the " Politik " he is forceful, impassioned, and clear.
It is the " Politik " and the essays on English History which
matter for us ; every reading man should know something
about these works. But those who can plough their way
through the chapters devoted to his earlier works will see
more clearly not only how Treitschke developed, but how
Germany, under Prussia, was developing with him.
Treitschke is the master in the school in which Bernhardi
is no more than an apt disciple. The gospel of the modern
German State is the gospel according to Treitschke. It is
not that this learned professor had any extraordinary creative
genius or that he diverted his country from the course it was
following. He followed the trend of his time, he expressed it,
and in later life — from 1874 to i8g6 — when he was a Professor
at Berlin University, he so well stated what was going on in
the minds of the younger men that his words " were swallowed
as a gospel " ; they " expressed the new ambitions of Germany
for ' a place in the sun,' for sea-power, for foreign trade, for
a colonial empire."
It had taken him many years of professional and political
life to arrive at the uncompromising dogmas of his " Politik."
He was born in 1S34. He was brought up, as he says himself,
" in the atmosphere of the Court of Dresden, in circles whose
338
March 6, 191 5
L A IN U A 1^ LI W A 1 L K
one political idea was hatred of Prussia." His whole life was
a protest against his early upbringing. The revolutionary
movements of 1848 stirred him profoundly. They did not
make him a revolutionary, but they helped him at first to be
a " Liberal," a believer in popularly elected local governments,
and a central executive controlled by a parliamentary system.
But German Liberalism in the 'fifties was not opposed to the
system of the modern Empire, then non-e.xistent. It was
opposed to the petty princes and the narrow-minded govern-
ments of the separate states, and Treitschke became the
foremost " intellectual," who championed the cause of a
united Germany ; who asserted that before all else Germany
must become one nation, strong, undivided, compact, under
an all-powerful centralised government. And he saw that
there was only one means of attaining this end. Prussia was
already strong. Prussia had behind her a successful military
history. He became known as the " apostle of Prussia."
It must be remembered he was a theorist who believed
himself to be also an historian, though his range of reading
was narrow — and his theory was that of the State. He was
influenced most of all by Aristotle's " Politics " and " The
Prince" of Machiavelli. The first taught him that the
State was an end in itself, to which every citizen owed
unfaihng obedience and devotion. The second taught him
that the State is set above ordinary law and morality ; that
its success is the paramount consideration ; that no ordinary
scruples must deter the ruler, whose business is to make the
State strong. More and more it was the idea of the State
as sheer power which grew upon Treitschke. Prussia was
the one embodiment of power which he saw ready at hand.
It was Prussia, then, that he welcomed as the saviour of
Germany.
By degrees his Liberalism, his belief in Parliamentary
systems and the vote, his interest in the average man and
the " individual," were swept overboard. He and the young
Germans who were growing up around him became infatuated
with the idea of a nation which was to be united, unique,
pre-eminent, and dominant. The Franco-Prussian War
seemed to be only the beginning of a glorious career of ascend-
ancy, which derived especial glory from the fact that it was
military.
Happy the generation on whom a stern necessity enjoins a
sublime political ideal, a great and simple and universally compre-
hensible ideal, which forces every other idea of the age into its service !
And such an ideal exists among us to-day — the unity of Germany !
Whoever fails to serve this ideal is not living the life of his nation.
Our life is spent in camp. At any moment an order from the
Commander-in-Chief may summon us to arms again. It is not for
us to pursue the myriad glittering hopes of freedom which flutter
through this age of revolution, to let our eyes be blinded by desire.
He welcomes war because " o\'er and over again has it
been proved that it is only in war a people becomes in very
deed a people." Warfare is therefore an " important function
of the State." " It is to war that all the States we know of
owe their existence." " Even among civilised nations war
is still the only form of law-suit by which the claims of States
can be asserted." War also promotes heroism and manliness,
and is the best training school for the manly virtues. And
he goes on to show that there is no law beyond itself to which
the State can submit. In dealing with uncivilised nations
" the necessity of employing intimidation is obvious." And
similarly, " there never has been a State, and there never will
be a State, which, in concluding a treaty, seriously intended
to keep it for ever."
There is no need to point any moral. Treitschke, let
it be clearly understood, has stated the theory of government
which the German nation accepts. Given that the State is
the German State, then Germany can do no wrong. It may
be patriotism to break treaties. It may be patriotism to
massacre civilians. It is the supreme morality of the German
citizen to serve a State which abjures morality. The position
has, at least, the merit of being logical. If we read Treitschke
at least we may know what it is that we are fighting.
It is worth noting that whilst Treitschke attracted,
Nietzsche frightened Germany. The devilry of the doctrine
of sheer physical force was not evident when preached by a
man who was so well disposed to the acceptable virtues.
Treitschke proclaimed the glory of war, but only against the
enemies of Germany. But Nietzsche, in effect, proclaimed
that Germany ivas the enemy ; that the danger lay within.
Treitschke exulted in the unique culture which Germany
was creating for herself ; and he claimed to make smooth the
way for the fine practice of religion and the free development
of the Christian virtues. Nietzsche denounced German
culture, and poured scorn upon the pretensions of her scholars,
the sentimentality and hypocrisy of Iier religionists, and the
slavishness of the accepted codes of virtue. In attacking
Richard Wagner he was attacking the idol of everv
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Pan-German, and offended alike the orthodox in religion
and in art.
Indeed, it was only when he was " misunderstood " that
from being the object of attack he became in his turn a new
idol of the German people. Inevitably, he became much
talked about ; and the young scholars brought up under
the Treitschkean regime began to see points of contact
between him and their master. How obvious was the parallel
between Nietzsche's super-man and Treitschke's ideal
ruler ! The one was to be a " free spirit," free from all
obligations which he had not imposed upon himself. He
was the aristocrat, conscious of his own strength and
vision and courage. He was not to be bound by the meaner
virtues which slaves had created for their own protection.
Gratitude for favours conferred, pity for weaklings, sympathy
with degenerates — all of these " moral " qualities Nietzsche,
the immoralist, scorned as marks of subjection to habit,
indolence, and the survival of slavishness. The philosophy
of Nietzsche seemed to young Germany the acceptable
philosophy of ruthlessness, egotism, and the right of the
strongest.
No doubt Nietzsche was more talked about than read.
The best antidote to this misconception of him is to read his
works, which have been admirably translated in Dr. Oscar
Levy's edition, and also an extraordinarily attractive book
recently published : —
" The Lonely Nietzsche." By Frau Foriter Nietzsche.
Translated by Paul V. Cohn. Illustrated. (Heinemann.)
15s. net.
The author is Nietzsche's sister. She does not pretend to
share his views or to be especially qualified to expound them.
She was a clever woman of much good sense and tact who
was always on confidential terms with her brother. This
volume opens in the year 1876, and covers all his most
important productive period, and brings us down to his death
in 1896. There is no irrelevant domestic gossip ; no tittle-
tattle about a great man. It is a sympathetic biography in
which the author describes the conditions under which her
brother worked, and lets him speak for himself through
scraps of conversation, letters, and his books.
There is nothing in his life to bear out the popular view
of him as a morose, irritable man, and a misanthrope. On the
contrary, he could enter with all his heart into the deeper and
the lighter sides of friendship. His breach with Wagner
affected liim piofoundly and made him ih. In Wagner he
thought he had found his " ideal " of a man — his " goal " —
and when he discovered his " staginess," his " histrionic self-
deception," his rel gious insincerity, he exposed rather than
concealed his sense of loss in the words : "Do thou go cast,
and I will go west." Even when strangers intruded into his
periods of solitude they found him courteous. " Nothing,"
he said, " can compensate me for having forfeited Wagner's
sympathy during the last few years Even now, my
whole philosophy is shaken after an hour's sympathetic
conversation witli some entire stranger."
His " superman " was not a man deprived of the natural
affections ; his " immoralist " was not a man really relieved
from moral obligations. What he denounced was the
morality of ease and habit. His own life was one of strenuous
labour and sacrifice, a perpetual struggle against ill-health,
and the sacrifice of every impulse which did not lead him
towards his goal. In his view the " moral " obligations were
too paltry to be considered in comparison with the conflict
within a man to attain his own God. " If you give rein to
all your meaner qualities," he wrote to Fraulein Salome.
" who can go on associating with you ? " " Heroism involves
self-sacrifice and duty — and that daily and hourly." His
ideal was that of a " spirit which plays naively ; that is to
say, spontaneously and from a sense of overflowing abundance
of power" — his supermen were "argonauts of the ideal,'
seeking their " highest expression," and questioning them-
selves before each action : " Is it such that I want to perform
it time and time again ? " How different is this " will to
power " of Nietzsche from the gross ideal of physical strength
which is set up by Treitschke, the " blond beast " which
the former feared would be confused with his superman !
" My foes have become mighty and have distorted my
teaching," he complained. " The coarse grained," as his
I)i')grapher writes, " have turned the image of the superman
into a devil's grinning face."
It is enough now to notice that his sister, in this admirable
biography, has shown us Nietzsche more fully, and has
proved how distorted is that German interpretation wiiich
finds in him the counterpart of Treitschke. " The rulers
there (in Germany) are men of heavy, artificial souls
And it was among them that I spent my whole youth ! "
340
March 6, 19 15
LAND AND
\VAfER
In speaking of Nietzsche it is very natural to turn to
the EngUsh advocate of the superman, and I find ready to
my hand two new books. One is
" Bernard Sh«w : A Critical Study." By P. P. Howe.
(Seeker.)
Now, we cannot say of Mr. Shaw that he is a " caricature of
his (Nietzsche's) notion of a disciple," for Mr. Shaw would
indignantly deny that he is a disciple of Nietzsche or anyone
else that has ever lived in the world. But it happens that he
has spent about half of his active Ufe in asserting the super-
manish idea of the duty of every man to be himself to the
utmost, translating the moral and transcendental ideal of
Nietzsche on to that everyday, workaday plane which in
intellectual matters is supposed to be the sphere of the
Englishman. The war, in removing us by a generation or
two from everything that preceded it, has put men Uke
Mr. Shaw under the perspective of distance ; and though he
still remains to us a briUiant dialectical essayist, a styhst
with an incisive pen, a satirist with a gift for exposing the
foibles and minor hypocrisies of his time, a humanitarian
who attempted to be a dramatist, and a witty, likeable
historical personage, notable in his day, he seems thin now
in comparison with the great men.
But that is no reason why Mr. Howe should treat him as
a mere joke and an excuse for fireworks. It is true :Mr.
Shaw's manner has never lent itself to reverential treatment
at the hands of a critic ; but Mr. Howe might at least have a
little reverence for his own functions as a critic. Regarded
as a squib, or as a Fabian Society debating joke, his
attack on Mr. Shaw is amusing. But it happens to fiU a
whole book. He quite truly points out, in sentences which
•coruscate with Chestertonian raillery, that Shaw is,
first and foremost, a Fabian advocating " efficiency," that
his style aims only at effective assertion, that his dramas
are only so many excuses for " talking," that his characters
are puppets, that his " laughs " are debating-society retorts,
that he is not an artist, and that he has only made " serious
drama " funny." But he seems to admit that Mr. Shaw is a
moralist, and he should, therefore, as a critic, have examined
that part of him in which his excellence lies — his moral
principles and beliefs. Mr. Howe acknowledges that he can
>tate a case ; he does him less than justice in not explaining
that he had also a case to state.
. " Killing for Sport." By Various Writers. Edited by
H. S. Salt. (Bell.) 2». 6d. net.
Here Mr. Shaw describes himself " as a critic and as a
castigator of morals by ridicule (otherwise a writer of
comedies) " It is characteristic of him that he damages
the arguments of the writers who follow him by making
light of the injury that is done to the animals " killed for
sport," dwelling entirely upon the moral damage that is
done to those who kill.
" The Human German." By Edward Edgeworth.
(Methuen.) 10s. 6d. net.
If we would study German " culture " on its domestic,
social, everyday, average side, we may learn something from
Mr. Edgeworth's book. The author suffers from facetious-
ness, and a sla.igy, staccato style. The merit of his book
Ues in the fact Jiat he is writing of what he knows familiarly,
and he shows us various types of German — the hapless
middle-class official, the maid-servant, the tradesman, the
professor, and even the baby. A superficial book, but
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street, at the theatre, or on holiday. I am inclined to think
that it shows us German " culture " on its worst side.
BEFORE THE WAR
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consolidation of Prussia and the character of the n;an whom
Wilhelm II. believes to be his alter ego. Now we see ilic
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THE FUTURE OF CONSTANTINOPLE. By J. Ellis Barker.
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CHINA AND THE WAR
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WHEN IGNORANCE WAS BLISS: JULY AND AUGUST IN NORTH
CENTRAL SIBERIA By Dora Curtis.
POETRY. PROPHECY AND THE WAR. By John Frieman.
OUR NBW ARMIES: A STUDY AND A FORECAST.
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ihe^descnption of Bruges at the beginning of ' The Diary of a Successful Man ' reads sadly today."
-Athenaitm ■■ All wVll weTcome this book of "Reminiscences"
record that has yet appeare,! "— /jar/i Telei'raf'h.
LONDON : ELKIN MATHEWS, CORK STREET. W.
mantle of the one fallen upon the shoulders of the other.
" The question of right (droit)," said Frederick, when he was
invading Silesia, " is the affair of the ministers," and, later,
" the jurisprudence of sovereigns is commonly the right of
the stronger." " When one has an advantage," he argued,
in the strain of a modern chancellor, " is he to use it or not ? "
Mr. Temperley describes him as fulfilling Burke's idea of one
of the " great bad men of history." But in domestic policy
he had the judgment to see that the interests of his people
were identical with his own, and he aimed at an impartial
administration of justice and religious freedom. As a
diplomatist, he understood — as Bismarck understood — that
an enemy must be isolated and allies must be found. His
successor to-day can more easily imitate his hardness, his oppor-
tunism, and his Spartan pose than his diplomatic talent or his
administrative genius. Frederick the Great left an " adminis-
trative machine " ; he could not bequeath his genius.
Mr. Temperley's book is not a mere piece of research,
carrying on in pedestrian spirit the task which Carlyle left
incomplete. It is a vigorous, clearly thought out, brilliantly
written study of Germany and Austria during a period of
transition, at a time when two striking personahties, Frederick
and the Kaiser Joseph, " made things hum " in central Eiirope.
"The New Map of Europe, 1911-1914: A Study of
Contemporary European National Movements and
Wars." By H. A. Gibbons, Ph.D. (Duckworth.)
6s. net.
It is interesting to invert the role of the prophet and see
what we ought to have seen, that events of recent years were
leading us straight to the war. The German temperament,
the expanding industries of Germany, her desire to found
colonies, the French claims to Morocco, the temporary
Algeciras settlement, the Agadir incident, the closing of
Persia by the Russo-British agreement, the check to Austro-
German ambitions in European Turkey by the successes of
Bulgar;a, Servia, and Greece — these are some of the main
factors which Dr. Gibbons reviews with some knowledge and
detachment. He is a clever American, who has been travelling
about in Europe and the Near East since 1908, arriving
dexterously on the scene wherever politics, revolution, or war
promised him a tourist's diversion. His book is particularly to
be commended in that it is one of the first to give full promin-
ence to the supremely important part which the Near East
has played not only in precipitating but in causing the war.
" The Influence of King Edward, and Essays on Other
Subjects." By Viscount Esher. (Murray.) 7s.6d.net.
Lord Esher can speak with authority about the lives and
personalities of Queen Victoria and King Edward. He
dispels certain favourite popular illusions. King Edward's
death was not hastened by the political crisis of 1909. He
did not " mould the foreign policy of his country." He did
not initiate or plan the Triple Entente. " He always recog-
nised that to initiate the policy of Great Britain was the
business of Ministers for the time being, and his function was
to criticise or approve it, and finallj' to support it with all
his powers." He was genuinely a friend of the German
Emperor, and believed in his desire for peace, but he shared
the general view that the Navy and Army should be kept as
strong as possible. Lord Esher eulogises, with the necessary
formality, his tact, charm, and talent, but speaks more freely
about his youth and education. He quotes in fuU a docu-
ment which should be imperishable — the Memorandum
issued " for the guidance of the gentlemen appointed to
attend on the Prince of Wales," the most delightful part
being a description of " the qualities which distinguish a
gentleman in society."
The other essays in this book are of less value, but those
referring to national defence are instructive as representing
the usual Conservative view current before the war.
DURING WAR
The materials are still lacking for a complete scientific
account of any period of the war. But preliminary judgments
can be formed ; preliminary history, even, can be written.
In the West a first distinct phase of the war came to an end
with the retreat of the Germans before Paris and their assump-
tion of a defensive position on the Hues of the Aisne. Anything
up to this point is sufficiently distant to form the subject
matter of prehminary history.
" Nelson's History of the War." By John Buchan.
Preface by Lord Rosebery. Vol. 1. (Nelson.) Is. net.
Mr. Buchan is not, in the strict sense of the term, a
military expert ; but he is a man of affairs, a student of
history, skilled in grasping a situation, and still more skilled
342
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER
Vol LXI\
Xo
^757
SATURDAY MARCH 13, 191;
rl'U liLlSllKl) AS] !■ II I C 1; S I X P E .N C K
LA .\l\\~pai'l;i:.J puulished wekkly
BRIGADIER-GENERAL FOWKE, C.B.
Chief Engineer to the British Expeditionary Force
Sir John French, in a recent despatch states : " I wish particularly to mention the excellent fervices perforrrr d
by my Chief Engineer .... who has been ir.defaliKable in supervising all such work. His ingenuilv and
skill have been most valuable in the local construction ol the various expedients wliich experience has shown to
be necessary in proionged trench warfare."
LAND AND WATER
March 13, 19 15
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352
March 13, 1 91 5
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER
The Need for Rest
IT is very hard to realise the necessity for rest in these and granted that we are a race slow to take up new ideas, it
days. Nearly every woman has her weeks crowded is little short of amazing the progress we make when once we
with one engagement after another, for if social do. Once we have thoroughly made up our mind we assimilate
doings are more or less in abeyance a vast amount an idea with great speed, and in no half-hearted manner. So
of benevolent work is occupying everybody's time, it is quite hkely that in a short while from now every woman
It is quite easy to work hard for several weeks at a stretch, will have adopted the shapeless silhouette so definitely
giving ourselves no repose during the day time of any sort decreed. The days of the hour-glass figure have been gone
or kind. Then there inevitably comes a time when nervous for a long time, but they have never seemed so remote as
iW
strain begins to tell, and we
become trying not only to
ourselves but to everybody
else who chances to cross our
path. The fact is that it is
only now that all are beginning
to feel the immense strain that
the past few months have been.
There is a kind of tension
in the air which reacts upon
our nervous systems, little
though we feel inclined to
acknowledge it ; and the result
is that nearly everybody is
living at infinitely higher pres-
sure. Our very morning
papers, awaiting us so harm-
lessly on the breakfast table,
may any day hold the news
for us of some tremendou-^
shock. Every postman's knock
may herald the tidings of some
nerve-racking news. These
are destructi\'e days to live
in ; of that there is no shadow
of doubt.
The only thing to be
done is for everybody to try
to counteract this restless in-
fluence as much as possible.
It can be done, of course, by
mind concentration on matters
far removed from war news,
but it is not everybody who
has either the training or the
ability fRr this. The ne.xt best
thing is not to over-fatigue
the poor willing body. And to
this end even the shortest of
rests during the day will lead.
Since the war started many people when dressing for
dinner have abandoned the evening gown of convention in
favour of the rest gown. Rest gowns are, indeed, amongst
the best innovations known to the world of dress. They are
easy to don and comfortable to wear, besides being infinitely
becoming when the work of clever hands. If we can possibly
manage to secure half an hour's rest before dinner-time, and
only rise to garb ourselves in something reposeful when our
dinner is of the informal character that permits it, we shall
have gone far towards the prevention of fatigue.
The Shapeless Silhouette
At any other time but this it is safe to state that most
women would have talked of the fashions and nothing but
the fashions. As it is, the new models are of a sufficiently
surprising character to have caused much comment and
remark. A girl whose marriage has just figured amongst the
many war weddings, and who was married in a simple
walking suit, voiced the common opinion about the new
skirt very neatly recently. " As I walked up the aisle," she
said, " in my short, full skirt I felt like a Dutch girl." And,
as a matter of fact, the new skirts have a distinct touch of
Dutch style about them. They need to be carefully made
because, as it is to the unaccustomed eye, they only just
escape verging on the clumsy side.
It is an amazing thing this matter of custom. As each
new design is introduced it has always been the fashion for
every woman to declare that she thinks the new styles are
perfectly hideous. A short while after that we hear no
such sweeping opinion, and in a little time again we may
meet her any day of the week out-Heroding Herod in her
adherence to the latest mode, whatever it may happen to be.
As a nation, it cannot be doubted that we are apt to
dislike aught to which we are unaccustomed. This being so.
C^putglil. MaJu.n, LaUu Cl,.„les LADY BEATTY
One of the many American women who have married
Englishmen now fighting on land or sea. Her husband.
Admiral Sir David Beatty, it one of the foremost men of the hour
now, when shapelessness seems
to have been pushed to an
almost unkind extreme The
natural figure is completely
disguised by the short, full
skirts and short, full coats
which are falling to our lot,
but there is a certain charm
about the very impudence of
the proceeding, and the aiuiace
of the thing is undeniable.
One Hundred Miles of Pennies
The organisers of the
Queen's " Work for Women "
F'und never let the grass grow
under their feet. Every scheme
that can possibly be suggested
for the promotion of the fund
is heeded, but it is rarely that
such a good money-collecting
idea is brought forward as
their mileage scheme. Lady
Roxburgh and Mrs. C. Arthur
i'earson are organising it, and
they hope to raise £22,000 in
pennies before they finish. The
name of the scheme explains
itself, but its magnitude can
only be grasped after a
moment's reflection. It is in
very truth a great task that
these ladies have undertaken,
for it is no less than the collec-
tion of a hundred miles of
pennies.
A hundred miles of
pennies, we hear, heaped in a
pile would make quite a moun-
tain of copper. If we imagine
that this great mound had been taken from a long string of
houses, each house having a frontage of thirty feet and every
householder contributing a penny, we can get a mental
picture of the undertaking, for such a line would not only
span the circumference of the earth, but leave 5,124 miles
to spare.
It is hoped that girls and womenfolk all over the country
will help in this mighty collection of copper. Even the
poorest amongst us may feel moved to contribute one penny
towards the Mileage Scheme, while those richer in possession
of this world's goods will probably send many pennies with
their contribution. Most people know the headquarters of
the Queen's " Work for Women " Fund ; but at the risk of
repetition it may be said that the address is 33 Portland
Place, and that particulars of the work will always be
promptly forwarded.
The Potato-Bread Spirit
The news that Germany is making l)read out of potatoes
has been received in different ways by different i>eople.
While some have looked upon it as a sign of grim deter-
mination and methodical forethought on Germany's part,
others have made it a subject for ridicule. The cheap jester
is, unfortunately, always with us, and the war has not brought
about his extinction.
One of the points making a recent speech of Mr. Lloyd
George's memorable is his apt reference to what he has
aptly called " the potato-bread spirit." The Chanrellor's
opinion is that this spirit should terrify us, not give us cause
for mirth, because it is the right spirit for a nation meeting
a great emergency. Few will disagree with him. With this
question the morale of the whole German nation is concerned.
Fortunately for us, there is much to make us confident,
\toiUimud on page 366)
353
LAND AND WATER
March 13, 1915
Which shall it be?
BRITISH
OR
German
fio'LE^llftSl
Similar Taste !
Similar Properties!
PER
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Repd. Rcpd. Repd.
Quarts. Pints. J-Pims.
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TO CYCLISTS
Why not let the Cycle do it ?
The Sunh am is still the only bicycle which has a
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of Automatic Lubrication.
Why do riders waste their energies pushing round
dirty and badly lubricated chains and driving bearings .''
Why not let the cycle keep these clean ?
Why not let the cycle oil these parts }
Think of the power you waste, and the time you spend
doing work that the cycle will do itself — IF it is a
Sunbeam — IF it has the Little Oil Bath.
Illustrated Catnlngue on appliration to Dept.
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Londan Showroomt :
57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
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— indicates good timekeeping, strength and durability. ^
S You cannot buy a better watch for friends at the front, or =
S for wear on your own wrist. —
^ There is also an exquisitely dainty series for ladies' wear, ^
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1 WalihamWakhes |
S Of all Reliable Watchmakers and Jeivellers. ~
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554
March 13, 1915.
LAND AND JEATEE,
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.— TUj Artlel* ku been labmltted to the Press Burean, wklch does not object to the pubUcttioa u eeawred. aad takes m
responsibility foi the correctness ot the itatemenls.
In accordance wlti the requirements ol the Press Burean, th e positions of troops on Plans iilattratio^ thU Article omit only bt
rej^arded as approximate, and no definite strenitih at an; point is indicated.
THE ATTACK ON THE DARDANELLES.
AS the understanding of the attack upon
the Dardanelles involves a little study
of the conditions by land, both upon
the European and upon the Asiatic
side, I may perhaps be excused for attempting
some analysis in tliis part of the paper of what
is, in its main features, a naval operation. Who-
ever designed the method of attack deserves well
of Europe, and if, as was probably the case, that
man was an Englishman, this country deserves
well of Europe, too. Eor the method of attack is
not only one that would have been impossible but
for the recent development of naval gunnery, it is
also one tliat shows peculiar originality, and its
success, if it is attained, will largely depend upon
the power which the latest British men-of-war
have to attack the forts in the Narrows of the
Btrait by indirect fire from the open sea.
The Dardanelles are a passage of salt water
thirty miles in length as the crow flies from their
entry to their exit, and somewhat more if the
slight turnings of its channel be followed. It con-
sists roughly of two parts, one a sort of funnel,
reaching from the mouth, which is over four
thousand yards across, to the Narrows, between
Chanak and Kilidbahr, where there is less than
two thousand yards between the Asiatic and the
[European shores, and these Narrows may be
regarded as forming one continuous belt as far
north as the lighthouse at Nagara Point. The
distance to the Narrows from the mouth is just
over t\\ elve sea miles, or rather more than thirteen
and a half land miles, and the Narrows themselves,
from their most restricted part opposite Chanal^
to Nagara Point, are as nea,r as possible three sea
miles more ; but, as will be seen from the accom-
panying sketch map, there are in these Narrows
but two critical points, that of the passage of
Chanak and that of the passage opposite Nagara
Point itself, which last is well over two thousand
yards. Rather more than twenty miles beyond
Nagara Point, opposite the town of Gallipoli, the
Straits broaden out into the Sea of Marmora.
Upon the European side the Straits are covered
by a peninsula of land known as the Gallipoli
peninsula. Its conformation determines all thesQ
operations.
This peninsula is closed to the north by an
isthmus, known as the Isthmus of Bulair, from the
town lying immediately beyond it tov/ards the
mainland, and across this narrow neck of some
three miles from A to B upon the plan have been
constructed permanent works with the object of
defending the peninsula from attack by land and
from the north. Within the peninsula itself aro
a somewhat confused mass of heights, the higher
summits upon which are to be found a range wnich
follows the sea coast along the line C D. The peaks
of this range at c c « are not far from a thousand
feet. At / the culminating point is reached in a
summit of between twelve and thirteen hundred
feet.
Of the remaining heights scattered every-
where along that narrow belt of land I have chosen
a few, merely as examples; g, for instance, is
over eight hundred feet, so is h; k and I are over
nine hundred feet, and of such summits (varying
1*
LAND AND .WATER.
March 13, 1915.
from four hundred fee! above the sea to nearly a
thousand) there are, perhaps, fifty or sixty, at
least, in the confused jumble of these hills.
It will be apparent from this, and from what
follows, that if the Narrows, with their heavy,
fortifications, had stood at some such point as
H M, the passage of the Straits would have been
\-ery much more difficult, even under modern con-
ditions. No indirect fire could have reached the
Asiatic shore from the open sea beyond, for the
range would have been one of over twenty-five
thousand yards, and only by the greatest good luck
and with no precision in firing, however close the
bombarding ship had lain inshore, could the Euro-
pean shore even have been touched across the full
breadth of the peninsula; while the high range
C D, steep on the sea, would have compelled the
bombarding ship to stand well out to allow for the
trajectory of the shell to pass over heights so near
the shore from a thousand to twelve hundred feet
above the gun platform. But where the Narrows
actually are, the conditions were far more favour-
able. The line 0 P, which represents the shortest
range to the main works of Kilidbahr from the
open sea, is a range of exactly eleven thousand
yards, and even O Q, along to the Asiatic shore
beyond, is not fourteen thousand. It was possible,
therefore, for the latest and most powerful of the
British men-of-war to attack both shores by in-
direct fire.
Indirect fire signifies fire at an object invisible
from the firing point and sustained only from
calculation and through the directing of the range
by a direct observation in the vicinity of the target,
,%\ hich direct observation is conveyed to the firing
platform out of sight.
It is clear from this that the reduction of the
forts upon the Narrows from a gun platform such
Rs that of a modern man-of-war, lying outside in
the open sea, at, say, R, necessitated three develop-
ments equally modern and unsusi^ected when the
permanent works of the Dardanelles were
designed. First, heavy guns operating with accu-
racy at a range of over eleven thousand yards (up
!to over twenty thousand yards \) from the vessel ;
secondly, observation from the air above the target
to correct the fire; and, thirdly, wireless tele-
graphy to convert the results of observation to the
gun platform. It is these three quite recent
developments in modern military and naval science
that have permitted this great experiment.
Between 0 and P — that is, in the strip of
land intervening between the Dardanelles and the
Karrows and the open sea to the west — there lies a
great lump of rather flat-topped hill called the
OPasha Dagh. Its eastern slopes come down rather
steep on to the Dardanelles, but its highest summit,
at a point near P, marked by a cross, is only 653
feet. The plateau slopes somewhat, and the slope
down from its western edge towards the open sea
is easy, broken only by a small ravine at V V. As
a consequence of this disposition of the land, a
man-of-war, with guns possessing an accurate
range of fire at from eleven to fifteen thousand
yards, can make sure of hitting the works at P,
and, of course, can make still surer of hitting the
works at Q. If we represent the land and sea in
section, it will be clear why this is the case.
Drawn to scale, the slope of the Pasha Dagh
has a comparatively flat summit, and its steep fall
on to the Dardanelles m.ay be represented by the
sky line of the shaded portion in this diagram, the
highest summit at X being no more than 653 feet'
above the water level A B. Supposing a ship to
lie at about the point R, the trajectory of her fire
will, roughly, be represented by the dotted line
R P and R Q, topping well over the comparatively
low-lying land in between, and reaching P in spite
of its presence, which is under the steepish eastern
slope of the Pasha Dagh, and, a fortiori, reaching
easily the point Q beyond, the observation of the
hits and the correction of the fire being made by
hydroplanes above P and Q at S and T, whicJb
hydroplanes can, by wireless, report the results to
the ship at R.
]\Ieanwhile, to support and emphasise the
effect of this fire from the largest and newest naval
gun platform in the open sea at R, you have a
number of ships firing at somewhat shorter range
further down the channel at positions round about
,W, and tliese ships can also, to some extent, help
to correct the fire of R by their observation of the
hits as seen from the level. The guns upon the
naval platform at R are to most of the larger guns
in the forts along the Narrows, roughly, as the
cube of 11 is to the cube of 15 — that is, tliey are
more than one-third as powerful but much less
than one-half as powerful. An 11 -inch gun is in
power to a 15-inch gun much as 13 is to 33. There
seem to have been, over and above the 11-inch guns,
which were the normal heaviest armament of the
Turkish forts in the Narrows, two 14-inch guns
upon the eastern side at Q. These more nearly
approached in power the naval guns turned upon
them, but they had no opportunity for indirect fire,
because they did not know where the naval guns
were in the sea outside, nor had they observation
from the air (we may presume), nor were they
mounted for firing westward, and, beyond all this,
they had the difficulties of steep land immediately,
in front of them, interfering with their high-angle
fire.
The permanent works upon the Narrows
themselves would seem to be somewhat according
to plan C. But, of course, the sketch is only
approximate, because no map gives the exact posi-
tion of a permanent work. It is only obtainable by,
Secret Service in peace or direct observation iu
war.
5
Ar
y"^ ■' ir<7????Vrrr<'?:^^^^^
Pasha Dagh ""X ■*^»
Dardanelles
^Nn«M«|«*MiM-«M*MM«n
B
2*
March 18, 1915.
LAND :&:nd Ki:A:TEK.
By far the most powerful group of batteries
lie upon the slope of tno Pasha Dagn between the
escarpment at B and the water at its foot, and of
these, again, it would seem that the most powerful
was just outside, and to the south of, the buildings
at Kilidbahr, at the point marked 1. It is here,
according to the report, that the first battery was
blown up on Thursday. The further batteries in
this group stood upon the hillside at 2, 3, and 4,
and an especially powerful one, apparently, at 5,
facing the nortnern approach to the Narrows.
Between 6 and 3 a group of two minor works stood
upon the slope, and four other main batteries lay,
the one between 2 and 3, one behind 3, and two
more between No. 5 and the shore and to the north
of No. 5. Altogether, eleven permanent works
seem to have been established on this projecting
hillside within the limits of little more than a
mile. A twelfth was established at Cape Dema,
which I have numbered 6 upon the plan.
Upon the opposite, or Asiatic shore, four
principal works must be considered. One, just'
outside the town of Chanak (No. 7), close on the
water, was particularly powerful and fast, with
two 14-inch guns, and corresponded to its twin
work (1) upon the European shore. Half a mile
further south Hamidieh, No. 8, defended tha
Narrows in their southward aspect from the
Asiatic side, and it seems to have been upon these
two works, 7 and 8, that the greater part of the
fire from down the Strait was concentrated.
Supposing these formidable works to ba
reduced (the works below them towards the ^gean
have already been silenced), there still remains,
before the whole passage of the Narrows is in the
hands of the Allied Fleet, a group of further
works on the Asiatic side, strong batteries at 9,
10, 11, right along the shore up to a low elevation
on the Nagara Point itself at 14, and a smaller
work behind Abydos Point at 15; while on the
European side a somewhat less formidable series
are to be found, roughly, at the points 18, 17, 300
feet above the water, crowning a very steep slopd
at 18, and one similarly placed at 400 feet up, at'
19, and a similar work at 20. But all these bat-"
teries above, or north of the Narrows, would seem
to depend ultimately upon the Narrows them-
selves. If the great group of works between the
two lines C D and E F can be reduced, the problem
of the Dardanelles is solved, although there
remains a lengthy task for the Allied Fleet before
the Sea of Marmora is reached.
It is worthy of remark that the shores are
steep on everywhere, and that there is plenty of
water, except in the bight below Chanalc, in the
shaded portion inside Sari Siglar Bay, where the
soundings vary from two to four fathoms, where a
five-fathom line comes well out from the shore and
a small strip just north of Chanak from Sari
Siglar Bay ; out neither of these bits of water i|
a*
LAND AND 5V: A T E R.
March 13, 1915.
tiseful or necessary fo the bombardment of the
^-orks. All that is being undertaken from far
down the channel.
There is one aspect of this tremendous piece
of work which must not be neglected. The Turki,sh
forces by land are considerable, and though full
communi'cation between those upon the Gallipoli
peninsula and those upon the mainland to the
north is interrupted by the continued shelling to
iWhich a portion of the Allied Fleet subjects the
peninsula of Bulair, yet there is already a con-
eiderable concentration of men, with many field
pieces, occupying the peninsula itself. Ultimately
these forces will have to be reduced. It can hardly,
with the weapons at its disposal, imperil the pas-
Bage of the Dardanelles by the Fleet when once the
permanent works upon that Strait have been
reduced. But it can render all land operations
difficult when the turn of these shall come, unless
a force equal in amount and munitions can be
landed somewhere in the north to meet it or to cut
it off from the other Turkish forces on the main-
land. The concentration upon the Asiatic side
cannot be dealt with in the same way. But the
possession of the Dardanelles will forbid its junc-
tion with the men in the Gallipoli peninsula,
II.
THE NIEMEN-NAREW FRONT.
[ The efforts of the enemy to pierce the fortified
line upon the Xiemen and the Xarew, and so to
reach the Warsaw railway beyond, seem to have
come definitely to an end. The issue was in doubt
until after the publication of last week's number,
but the communiques on both sides since then show
clearly enough what has happened. The force
which had crossed the Xiemen below Grodno has
repassed the river and is retreating through the
Kovno
\JJie$uhc\'ina
Augustowo forest. The force which was defeated
at Przasnysz at the other end of the line has fallen
back right to the German frontier, and all that
remains of the effort is a diminished bombard-
ment of Osowiecs in the centre — presumably, in
order to prevent the Eussians from using the rail-
way that passes through this town for their
advance. It was said at the beginning of the
movement that its whole meaning was to be tested
by the success or failure of the Germans to pass
the line of the Narew and Xiemen. It would seem
at the moment of writing that had failed.
III.
THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
It was repeatedly insisted upon in these notes,
in dealing with the Austro-German action across
the Carpathians in the Bukowina, that the main
purport of that pressure was political, and that
the occupation of Czernowitz meant, above all, the
separation of a potential Eoumanian army, should
Eoumania decide to intervene, from the main
Eussian armies in Galicia round Przemysl and
Lemberg. But this opinion I must now modify,
for the success of the attack upon the Bukowina
and the occupation of Czernowitz was followed up
in such a fashion that to the first political object
of the move could be added a purely strategic one.
It has been pointed out more than once in
these columns that no effort upon the south-
eastern, or left, flank of the Eussian army in
Galicia could hope for success unless the Austro-
Gerraans were in possession of the decisive points
in the railway system of Southern Galicia, by
which they could get supplies across the mountains
and concentrate men.
Now, for the few days, as was clear from the
note appended to last week's article and put in as a
postscript at the last moment, the Austro- Germans
nearly succeeded in getting hold of the two decisive
points in this railway system, and therefore
during those days distinctly menaced the Eussian
flank. In order to see what happened, the follow-
ing sketch of the railway system may be of value.
In this sketch the more important lines are
marked with cross bars, the three railways which
alone approach the complicated Galician system
from Eussia are marked with double lines cut into
segments, the less important railways — those of
Galicia and Bukowina — with marked single lines,
and the Russian frontier with a hatching.
To hold Czernowitz at C was indeed to cufc
off the Eoumanian system from the Eussians, and
also from Galicia to the north, but until Kolomea
at K was held, no railway transport across the
mountains was available to the Austro- Germans
for any considerable effort against the southern
flank of the Eussian armies in Galicia, which had
their central base at Lemberg at L, and which are
investing Przemysl at P. Even with Kolomea in
their hands, the Austro-Germans would be ham-
pered until they obtained the point S, Stanislaus,
where four railways meet, and until they were
across the line S P, which lies under the foothills
of the Carpathians and permits of transport for
the munitions that could have come across the
mountains by the railway passes 1, 2, 8, and 4.
The summits of all these passes are in Austrian
hands, the only ^mmit remaining in Eussian
hands being the road pass at Dukla, D.
Now, the Austrians, as we knew, after a tele-«
A*
March 13, 1915.
1.AND AND iffiATEK,
gram which reached London after the last number
of this paper was going to press, did get into
Kolomea, and, what is more, tnough we were told
nothing about it at the time, they got, what was
much more serious, into Stanislaus. A further
effort, carrying them to Tarnapol at T, would have
turned the Russian positions m Galicia ; so much
60 that it would have involved the Russians
retreating from Lemberg and the relief of
Przemsyl — in a word, the abandonment of the
whole Carpathian front by the Russian armies. I
cannot find that we were told that Stanislaus had
fallen into Austro-German hands, but this indeed
was involved in the mention of an action at the
point marked X to the north of Stanislaus, and,
roughly speaking, during the four or five days,
Februarj- 27 to March 3, it would seem as though
this railway junction of Stanislaus, and the direct
line to Przemsyl which runs from it, was La the
hands of the enemy.
But we now know that an action, offensive
upon the Russian side, was successful. Kolomea
would seem still to be in Austrian hands. There
is therefore still the opportunity for the enemy
to provision himself across the mountains by rail-
way line No. 4 and to continue his new effort.
Btanislaus, and with it the railway parallel to the
range, which is under the mountains from S
to P, was retaken by the Russians upon Thursday
last, March 4, and if it can be retained by them
the point will be of capital importance. For so
long as Stanislaus is in Russian hands the single
line from No. 4 across the mountains will hardly
provision a sufficient effort from the northward
against the flank of the Russian army to Galicia<
Very hea\T fighting has taken place, roughly
along the line M N in the eastern foothills of the
range, with the object of relieving Przemsyl, but
also with the further object of bringing pressure
to bear here, while the flanking movement was ia
progress to the plain, and with the further object
of seizing the railway line S P. According to
the Russian accounts all these efforts have so far
been brought to a standstill, with very heavy loss
to the enemy.
What the Austro-Germans were trying to do
in this latter plan can best be described in the
following two diagrams, L being Lemberg and
P Przemsyl, the invested fortress. Przemsyl
the Austro-Germans attacked across the Car-
pathians in numbers increasing as one went
further south along the line, their object being to
push the original Russian line at E F back to
A B C, and thence back into a rectangular form,
such as A B C, v>"hich done, they could mass to
bring the greatest pressure against A B — that is,
against the flank of the territory occupied by the
main Russian army. This army was facing south-
v.est, towards E F, with the object of forcing the
Carpathians when the moment should permit that
operation. A strong attack in flank upon A B
would have forbidden it to continue its pressure
against the south-west, and, if successful, would
have compelled it to retire from Galicia alto-
gether, to raise the siege of Przemsyl, to fall back
behind Lemberg, along the arrow' (1). If it bd
5»
LAND AND JV] A T E R.
March 13, 1915.
Bsked how this plan could be sound, leaving the
long line B C perpendicular to the line of A B,
the°answer lies in the disposition of the lower
obstacle in that step below the Carpathians, which
main obstacle is the river Dneister. It will be
apparent from tlie following sketch that the
pushing back of the Russian line more and more
eastward will at last succeed in throwing a por-
tion of the Russian forces behind this obstacle,
and when that was done, a comparatively small
force sufficing to hold it upon that line, the mass
with Halicz— and this turned, after a three days'"
battle, in favour of the Russians. Stanislaus waa
reoccupied, the thick black lino on the sketch
roughly re-established, and the plan of forcing the
Russian armies behind the Dneister for thei
moment was defeated. At least, this seems to me
to be the explanation of what has been taking
place upon the plain below and just north-east oi
the Carpathians in the last seven days,
IV.
THE EFFORT IN CHAMPAGNE.
Although the ceaseless attacks along the
iWestern front upon one sector after another do
not, cannot, and are not intended to break
through the line, and have, therefore, no more
than a continuous and not a decisive value at
this moment (their business is rather to wear
down), yet there is one portion of them which
has illustrated during the last few weeks the
French intention in this kind of war so
f f«5nf & hatUng
Secmd lower ?rfst^
Lr'-
'Present FreaSirtenck£S
pertKea S^^ar^ — 1> O
• — -!--» YnU sur
lourbe
c-
of the Austrian effort could have been turned to
the left and north-west against the flank of the
Russian armies. In other words, B C would have
been immobilised, and A B, and particularly the
portion A D, Avould have been subject to the most
pressure. The original Russian line, some six
weeks ago, ran along the line of crosses, mostly
over the ridge, and only at the point E (at the
Beskid passes) falling behind it. The Austro-
German effort had the effect after about a month's
work of forcing the line back to the full black line
parallel to, and in the main beyond, the moun-
tains. Czernowitz at C was occupied; so was
Ivolomea at K.
The enemy's thrust thus accomplished the
beginning of his final design; for Stanislaus at
S was occupied, as we have seen, and the ulti-
mate Russian positions, beyond which they were
not forced, were reached in the last daj-s of
February — corresponding to the dotted lines
behind the full black line upon the sketch. If at
the apex of this point, between S and H — that is,
upon the right between Stanislaus and Halicz,
the effort could have been continued, and if our
ally had been compelled to fall back to the river,
the whole of the Russian position in Galicia
would have been in peril, for it would have been
taken in flank. It is not to be wondered at,
therefore, after the very heaviest fighting took
Elace at this point, about half-way between S and
[ — that is^ on the main road uniting Stanislaus
E-"
Suippes^^.
-F
i^^FmichFrcntr
thoroughly that it is well worth following in
some detail. I refer to the section between tlie
camp of Chalons and the forest of iVrgonne,
the eastern of the two sections to which tho
open, rolling, chalky district between Rheims
and the Argonne is divided.
Many weeks ago, when the French line
stood not very far from Suippes, it was pointed
out in these columns that the chief effect of a
prolonged and successful' advance in this dis-
trict would be to get upon the railway line,
which here runs all along behind the German
positions and feeds them. This railway lino
continues through Argonne, and helps to link
up the German armies in Champagne with
the Crown Prince's army in front of Verdun. At
the moment that criticism was written the
distance of the French trenches from the rail-
way was, if I remember right, rather more
than four miles, and in all the long weeks that
have passed since that date no more than a mile
of total advance has been gained. The nearest
French trenches are still quite three miles from
the railway.
The French are in front of Perthes and of
the Farm of Beausejour. But they are a long wayj
from the position oi" TahurOj for instance, The^
March 13, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
have reached a line roughly corresponding to
the line A — B (a front of not ten miles) on the
above sketch map, having advanced in the
course of nearly two months from about the line
C — D, and in the course of, say, four months
from, roughly, the line E — F. It is clearly
apparent, even from so elementary a sketch,
that the rate of advance is insignificant, and
that although this has been a sector of peculiarly
concentrated effort.
,What, then, was the object of the French
commanders in this sector, as in the others of
which this one may be taken as a type? It was
here, as everywhere else, attrition, and this
wearing down of the enemy has been effected
here as everywhere else by the two new factors
of superior aviation and superior work with
heavy guns, coupled, perhaps, v/ith greater
and increasing reserves of heavy gun am-
munition.
The enemy has nearly preserved his original
line, even in this sector. He has fallen back at
a rate of less than thirty yards a day on the
average. It is self-evident that work of that
kind is not, and nev'cr was, intended to be tho
" pushing back " of the enemy out of France.
It is the fastest rate obtained on any part of
the line, and yet it would take three j^ears of it
to go twenty miles and a lifetime to put the
enemy back entirely into his own territory,
let alone to defeat him.
No; the object in view here, as everywhere,
in the West, is usury. Here we have a front,
taking in its extremes, of not much more than
tv/elve miles from beyond Souain to beyond
iVille sur Tourbe, and on that front the Germans
have fought month after month under the increas-
ing disadvantages of superior heavy gun fire
and of wholly superior aviation. There have
been whole days together duriiig which no
German airmen have been seen above the
French lines, and it is not, I believe, an unjust
estimate that the French have taken three
observation flights to tlicir enemy's one in this
single sector.
Now, these two things combined, supe-
riority of air-work and superiority of heavy
gun work, mean, the first that the enemy has
not been able to gauge the weight of attack
against him; secondly, that his maintenance
of the line has only h&en possible at a very
heavy expense. Both these converge together
upon a common effect of constant and heavy
loss.
Not knowing quite what he has in front
of ]iim, the enemy masses and attacks in mass;
losing perpetually out of proportion to his foe
he must as perpetually reinforce. It is exactly
three weeks, at the moment of vvriting, since
this great effort began in its present form. The
order for the new offensive dates from Tuesday,
the 16th of Februar}-. In that interval there
has been sent as reinforcements alone, not
counting the troops originally present, some
80,000 to the German front. It is significant
that much the greater part of these great
numbers has been hurried forward in the last
ten days, and that the worst casualties on the
enemy's side have occurred in the same period.
The Cologne Gazette of the Sunday before last
gave a conspectus of the fighting and its results.
The remainder of the evidence is only drawn
from the statements which the French censor-
ship has passed. We must remember that in
this particular case there is special opportunity,
for information, that direct observation accounts
for a good deal, and that the margin of error in
the French calculation cannot be great.
It is an estimate drawn up from the same
sources which gives one a total German losa
since the attack began, excluding prisoners, o4
certainly over 40,000. That is to say, about a
third of the total German effectives put foot on
this piece of the front, for there were certainiyj
40,000 already present before the reinforce-
ments were moved up. It has already been
mentioned in a previous issue of this paper, I
think, that up to a date now nearly a fortnight
past not less than 80,000 rounds of shell had
already been delivered in that sector, and it is
this fortune in ammunition, coupled with a
better handling of the heavy pieces, that has
determined so heavy a loss to the enemy.
The advantage will probably be continued.
The line A — B on the sketch map above roughly
represents a crest from which the land gradually
slopes down to Tahure, and then, after a slight?
swell, falls again on to the railway. This second
crest I have marked in a dotted line upon the
sketch map. It is considerably loTver than the
first, and joins round to the first in the direc-
tion H.
It is possible, therefore, that after further
prolonged efforts the railway itself raav be
reached and the whole German line be 'com-
pelled to fall back some appreciable distance
— though there is little doubt that by this time
a parallel light line will have been built behind
the main railway. But even if that success be
achieved, the lesson of this front— Souain—
Perthes — Beausejour — Ville sur Tourbe — is not
to be discovered in the rate of the advance but
in the heaviness of the enemy's perpetual
losses.
The particular district in question has ad-
vantages over nearly all the rest of the front-
It is quite open ground, save for the group of
woods west of Perthes; it is light soil which
dries quicker than any other part of the whole
line, and it is fairly central. It is thoroughly
well supplied by the railway in French hands,'
which runs four or five "miles behind and
parallel to the French positions, and the soil is
favourable to rapid excavation and gives good,
dry lodgings when it is tunnelled out. The
effect of the advance here is therefore more
marked than elsewhere between the Vosgea
and the sea. But the kind of thing that is going
on here is going on everywhere, though usually
upon a smaller scale, and the reader will do
well to mark this particular section and the news
from it in order to judge the nature and the succesa
of the war of attrition in the west.
THE CALCULUS OF THE GERMAN LOSSE.S
In connection with this matter, one natur-
ally turns to the very high estimate issued by
the Press Bureau upon French authority for
the total losses of the enemy. That estimate is
no less than three million for the German forces
alone, counting sick, and, apparently, excluding
the lightly wounded who have returned.
To deal with these figures is particularlj}
difficult, because one is in the following dil*
LAND AND KATER.
March 13, 1915.
»mma : If we go by what we hear from sober
observers at the front, who are in a position to
co-ordinate all reports and to sift thera, we are
ready to accept the very highest figures. It is
true to say that, in proportion to the actual
experiences of our witnesses, to the oppor-
tunities they have had of seeing with their own
eyes, and of comparing together the multitude
of documents presented to the General Staffs
upon this subject, are they more inclined to
raise their estimate of the enemy's losses.
Thus I have myself, in these pages, estimated,
from what I was then told, the losses of the
enemy in three weeks against the salient of
Ypres at over 100,000, and perhaps as much as
120,000. But I have been told by one who
was present in all that fighting, and in a
position well calculated to judge things re-
ported to him, as well as things that he saw,
that this original estimate of mine was far
below the mark, and that it could safely be
doubled.
We are then, when we base ourselves upon
the evidence of eye-witnesses and of those w-ho
have the first-hand evidence before them, led
towards the higher figures.
But when one takes the experience of
former wars and calculates the proportion of
Bick out of the total casualties on the analogy of
the figures on the Allied side, and tests all this
by the published oflicial German lists, one is
inclined to a much lower estimate — to some-
thing not much more than half w hat the highest
figures Vvould present.
The most severe criticism the higher
estimate has received actually halves the large
recent French estimate of three million. This
criticism proceeds from the pen of a very com-
petent critic in this country. But to put the
total loses at only a million and a half is
certainly far too low-. It is allowing only 5
per cent, for sickness at any one moment. It is
not allowing for the large floating total of
slightly wounded (for while the slightly
wounded are constantly returning, their ranks
are as constantly being supplemented by new
casualties at the front), and, above all, it is
placing far too much reliance upon the German
ofiicial figures. It can be affirmed as a piece
not of conjecture but of arithmetic that either
the proportion of German dead is utterly
abnormal, or that the Prussian list is published
with more care, and first, the dead, next the
Bcverely wounded, next the slightly wounded,
and that, with all this they are always very
gravely in arrears. We know at a given datd
Uie proportion of British dead out of the total
casualties. It was more than 11 and less than
14 per cent. We cannot accept for the enemyj
a proportion of betw een 20 and 25 ; or, at least,
if we do we must be prepared for very much
larger lists of total dead at the end than wa
have 3'et been given. This lowest estimate, for
instance — arrived at, as I have said, by a very^
competent critic in this country — allows for a
quarter of a million of German dead. It is true
to say that there is not an authority on tha
General Staffs of the Allies who has carefullyj
weighed the figures who would not, at least,
add 50 per cent, to that number and be mora
readily prepared to double it.
It must be remembered before we leave this
subject that men perpetually write as though
estimates of this kind had for their object either
the undue heartening of public opinion or the
stiffening of it for a special effort in recruitment
or in endurance. In other ways it seems almost
to be taken for granted that these estimates
must be false one way or the other, on account
of the supposed motive with which they are
inspired. But there is a third motive, after all,
which is much the best, and that is the desire to
obtain, even in matters of conjecture, to as|
great an accuracy as possible. And I think that;
if we strictly confine ourselves to that motive
alone, though we may not admit absence from
the field of three million of the
will probably accept two and a
and most of these absent for good.
Take the analogy of our own known and
published casualties at a certain date : 25 per
cent, of total forces in casualties, and of casual-
ties rather more than half death and serious
wounds; death being, say, one-eighth and serious
wounds between, say, three-eighths and a half.
Eemember that those casualties relate to a force
which has been successfully passing through
violent action and then through periods of lull,
while the German forces have been, on one front
or the other, perpetually engaged in an hitherto
fruitless attack. Admit the Germans have put
forward to this date six million — probably more;
admit, also, what is certainly the received opinion
with the best authority abroad, that their loss
from sickness far exceeds ours in proportion.
Remember that on the Eastern front the propor-
tion that returned is far less because the ambu-
lance difliculties are there much greater^and you
cannot in the end reach a much lower total than
that which I have suggested.
Germans, we
half million.
THE DURATION OF THE WAR.
III.
CONCLUSION.
IN preceding articles we have seen that the
critical point in the great campaign wrill
presumably come, so far as men and
munitions are concerned, in the early
f)art of next summer, or, at the earliest, in the
ate part of the spring.
We have lastly to consider the climatic and
ihe moral factors.
It is again necessary to emphasise what
should be an obvious truth, but v/hat the eager-
ness of our expectations tends to mask from our
judgment : that no reasonable conclusion upon
the actual length of the campaign can be
attempted. It Avould not only be mere guess-
work, but it would be gratuitous folly. All one
can do is to estimate the main factors which
converge upon what I have called the critical
March 13. 1915.
LAND AND J7 A T E R,
point— the moment which will presumably be
that of greatest strain — a sort of watershed in
the history of the struggle, after which the
failure or success of what is now an attack upon
a besieged district will begin to take clear
shape. And even this conjecture upon the
critical point in the campaign must be made
subject to the reservation that the entry of
certain forces now neutral would heavily
modify any conclusion now drawn. This being
Eaid, let us consider the two remaining factors
I have mentioned above.
First, in the matter of topography, we must
remember that the forcing of an entrenched
line, or the wearing of it down, and tlie com-
pelling of an enemy to shorten it (which is the
problem in the west) is, even supposing
superiority in heavj^ artillery, and in muni-
tions, and in air work, a problem to be stated
in terms (among other terms) of soil and of
climate. And largely in the same directions
must be stated the problem upon the Eastern
front, for though it is not there in the main a
question of impelling the enemy to shorten his
line, or attempting to force a line of trenches,
yet the crossing of the Carpathians, quite as
much as the possibility of advancing in
Northern Poland, is a matter of climate and of
Boil.
Now it has further to be remarked that one
part of an extended line, if it is sufficiently
broad, suffices to determine an issue. And we
must consider the effect of the weather, of local
conditions, of soil, not only over the whole of
the two great lines, but especially the favoured
portion of them. In the west this portion speci-
ally favoured as a rule by climate and always
by soil is the Champagne. "We have already
seen, in another part of these columns, the
conditions enjoj^ed in the district between
Rheims and the Argonne, over the flooded land
to the north and the hilly land to the south of
it for advance. The possibility of such an
advance comes earlier in those conditions of
soil than elsewhere, and the rainfall is less
heavy in the spring than in the fen country to
the north or in the liills to the south, but if we
asked on what date in the year the conditions
become really favourable for action here,
though we find it a little earlier than the date
which we arrived at in considering the reserves
of men and the question of material, yet we do
not find it so much earlier as heavily to disturb
our calculation. And it is again in the late
spring or early summer that the critical
moment would seem to come. Though the early
summer is, perhaps, too late a date to put for
this particular factor, save in exceptional
years, the end of April is, roughly, in this part
of France, which is already central and Con-
tinental in climate, suitable to action upon a
large scale. The snow is still melting in the
Vosges for a month after all the choking plain
to the east and to the north of the hills of the
Meuse is clear of wet. The moment differs, of
course, from year to year, and I have seen bad
conditions of flood in early April in the Marne
portion, but in the latter part of the month one
13 nearly always in full spring.
Upon the Eastern front there is only one
sector where the topographical conditions of
fioil and climate have a real advantage over the
rest, and that is the central watershed of
Poland, between the upper waters of the Pilitza
and those of the Nida : the higher land which
slopes westward away from the hill group
round Kielce. It is not a portion of the line to
which much attention has been directed until,
oddly enough, the last few days. All the heavy
work has been done to the north or to the south
of this. Were there no such thin^ as the
fortress of Cracow, the same remarlv would
apply to the northern bank of the Upper
Vistula and the approach to Silesia, but,
Cracow standing as it does, the first sector upon
which, so far as climate and conditions of soil
are concerned, action on a large scale will be
easy, is that which I have here mentioned — the
watershed between the Pilitza and the Upper
Vistula basins. Unfortunately it is hardly here
that any decision could be attempted. It leads
nowhere. The passes in the Carpathians do
not benefit so early by the change of season,
though they are further south. They are not
free till nearly a month after the snows have
melted round Kielce, and it is the passes in the
Carpathians which obviously offer the best
strategic opportunity and the greatest political
fruits to an advance.
The marshy district which is even now im-
perilling the German retreat from the Niemen
and from the Narew, though far worse in
winter than in spring, is never easy going even
in the driest of years, and in the open wintet
wiiich has proved such a handicap to the
Russian efforts in this frontier, has only been a
handicap, because it has reproduced the condi-
tions of spring. When the snow molts, there is,
along that belt of land from Lithuania to Cen-
tral Poland, a state of affairs in which armies
must be almost immobilised, and, in general,
action upon this northern part of the Eastern
front (so far as climate and local conditions of
soils, and apart from other questions of num-
bers and equipment and munitioning) must be
looked for later than in the west. It must also
be looked for somewhat later (but not so late
as in the north) in the passes of the Car-
pathians. The earliest portion to get fit, the
centre, near Kielce, being unsuitable in situa-
tion for the main blow.
But far more important than these very
general material considerations are those
moral ones which have been but imperfectly
understood, perhaps, so far, in the west at
least, and which it behoves us to grasp quite
clearly. All centre upon the attitude of the
Germans. It is the Germans who, l^y their
efforts, will maintain the Austrian alliance: it
is the German determination of force which
still controls even the doubtful Hungarian
position; and the German mood to-day, the
chance of its changing to-morrow, are what
probably the nations of the West have most
difficulty in grasping, and what it is most im
portant for them to grasp.
The foundation of the whole matter is, as
has been so often repeated in these columns,
the completo confidence of the Germans in the
certitude, or, rather, the necessity, of theii
victory.
Acted upon by the enormous news of the
first six weeks, neither one nor the other oi
these two factors has l)een measured to its full
extent by British opinion.
9*
LAND AND ,W. A T E R.
March 13, 1915.
We can best understand how the German
people looked at the chances of the war,
remembering what the average Imperialist in
this country felt upon the sea power of Britain
\n, say, the years 1898-1900. Not only was
there no question for a moment in the mind of
any German that counted, or with the general
mass of opinion, as to the invincibility of the
German army, but there was what counts more
than calculations : there was faith. There was
that unquestioning "taking for granted" of
certain conditions which seemed to be part of
the nature of things.
It is our judgment, of course, partly
because the war has been presented to us in a
[partial manner, but more because as a reflec-
tion of our own mood, that the German haa
long lost his confidence. He has not. If he is
losing it at all, he is only beginning to lose it.
For in the first weeks of the war came that
series of crushing victories of which we only
heard in this country doubtful and confused
accounts.
There was Metz and there was Tannen-
berg. There was the avalanche of advance
upon Paris. There has been no corresponding
eort of defeat. And just as great nations may
idecline for generations without noting the slow
[process, so the losing partner to a campaign
may greatly fall from a worse position to a
worse, hardly noticing his lapse until the first
shock of defeat touches him.
The enemy, I make bold to say, will not
realise " the critical point " which we have dis-
covered in reserves of men and in material, and
to some extent in climate, until the invasion of
his soil upon a large scale has begun, or until,
preceding this, he suffers on some one front a
serious local defeat, such as the German armies,
at least, have not yet suffered.
The number of German prisoners in France
Is very large. I have been given figures (under
reserve), and if those figures are accurate (I
do not publish them here) they are much in
excess of anything that the most sanguine
opinion in this countrj^- was ready to accept.
But whereas at Maubeuge alone anything
from twenty-five to thirty thousand men
capitulated and were lost to the French army,
whereas in the advance on the Marne the
Germans must have picked up many thousands
of French wounded, prisoners, and stragglers,
whereas in the battle of Metz we know that
they captured something like half a division,
there is no single action in which the French
have taken prisoners great numbers of
Germans by one tactical move. The accumula-
tion of their great haul has been the result of
an unceasing trickle of surrenders proceeding
for months, and even at the battle of the Marne
the total of the German prisoners was made up
of a number of small units. Further, the wise
French policy of not publishing these numbers
(wise because it ultimately weakens the enemy
by confusing his calculations) j'et tends to keep
up a fictitious confidence in Germany, and wo
may make certain that we shall not find in the
near future, not in the late spring or early
summer, the date to M'liich every other form of
argument leads us, a "critical" point in the
factor of moral. That point of the factor of
German moral will come earlier or later,
perhaps even so late as the very eve of collapse,
and it will only be determined by the material
ravaging of German soil or the dramatic effect
of a local disaster on a really considerable scale.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE — This Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publlcatioa as censored, and takes no
responsibility for the correctness oi the statements.
THE DARDANELLES.
OPERATIONS in tlie Dardanelles continue. Fortu-
nately the Turkish guns are mostly obsolete and
the garrisons none too efficient or well provided.
And BO we continue to make "some progress,"
and shall so continue till there is a sudden " give "
and Constantinople once more falls.
But it cannot bo too strongly emphasised that "one
■wallow does not make a summer." We have a certain
number of ships which we can spare for these operations,
•hips which we could lose without jeopardising our naval
superiority. This— coupled with the fact that the enemy are
not a brainy folk— makes the Dardanelles effort possible.
But all the evidence is to the effect that had the Dardanelles
been German instead of Turkish no fleet could possibly have
done anything whatever, even were the factor of mines and
•ubmarines excluded.
The factor of mobility is, of course, a considerable asset
to a ship, but against this must bo put the relative targets.
Allowing heavily for speed and for selection of range, we still
get target ratios somewhat as follows : —
♦ * ♦
FORT.
SHIP.
The fort guns may, of course, be blinded by dust and
debnsj but as the forts' position -finders, &c., are not located
ia the fort, but in any unkaosp and inconspicuous place
outside it, whereas the sliip is self-contained in the same
respect, the handicap against the ship is clear.
In the Dardanelles we have so far managed to out-
ravgc the forts. But given forts of equal range to the ships,
we are reduced to realising that, while the ship may hit or
may miss, the fort is — humanly speaking — absolutely certain
to hit.
Indeed it is only in this strength of the fort that its
weakness lies. As every garrison gunner knows, many a
fort has guns liable to be outranged because hitting was
regarded as so certain that medium calibre guns were con-
sidered amply to suffice. Outranging is a modern and novel
idea of which the first glimmerings only appeared in the
South African War.
It was not invented in that war. The real perceivers of
the value of outranging were the Brazilians, who many years
before insisted on being supplied with v.'hat were then
abnormally long guns, on the grounds that they required
something which could hit the enemy from a range which
he could not reach in return.
Tlie only comment this evoked at the time was con-
fined to Bneering speculations about Brazilian "nerves"
and what not. To-day, of course, outranging is the la.sb
word in the science of war.
Along such lines forts are liable to be reduced; bub
apart from this nothing has ever happened to negative the
old proverb that one gun on shore is worth a dozen such
guns afloat. We cannot bo too careful in avoiding falsa
deductions from successes in the Dardanelles.
In connection with the Dardanelles operations there is
a certain cynical humour about the fact that German naval
lO"
March 13, 1915.
LAND AND ,"W; A T E R.
experts are advising the Austrians to remember Tegethoff
and how ofif Lissa he attacked and defeated a numerically
Buperior Italian Fleet which was bombarding that island.
Between Tegethoff and Lissa there was nothing; between
the Austrians and the Dardanelles there is the bulk of the
French Navy.
_ The Austrian Fleet is in exactly the same strategical
Eosition as is the German High Sea Fleet. It can stay in
arbour or it can come out and accept annihilation.
On March 5 the first step at attacking the Narrows was
made. The Queen Elizabeth opened a long range bombard-
ment, firing twenty-nine rounds in all, blowing up Hamidieh
II Tabia.
The forts operated against were : —
Medjidieh Tabia (J).
Namazieh (T)
2 11-in.
1 11-in.
4 9.4-in.
1 10.2-in.
5 3.4-in.
11 9.4-in.
Hamidieh II Tabia (L).
3 8.2-in.
2 14m.
3 5.9-in.
Of these the guns in J and T are probably old Krupp
pieces. The official report speaks of Hamidieh Tabia (L)
being armed with the ' ' best and heaviest guns ' ' — but
•pecifies no further.
We are left in doubt as to whether " best " is used in the
■ense of best guns in possession of the Turks or best guns
existing. That is to say, whether Fort L was armed with a
couple of 14in. 36 calibre Krupps of model 1889, and construo-
tiou some later date, weighing 90 tons but of no very con-
•iderable range, or the modem 14-in., which most gun factors
have produced during the last two or tliree years. Probably
the guns were the old 90 ton; unless Krupps managed to do
• deal with Turkey over these 14-in. guns which were intended
for the German Navy, but never mounted, owing, it is said,
to a difficulty in connection with the design for naval
aaouutings.
THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE."
So far the " blockade " can hardly be described as suc-
tessful. I am by no means sure that every merchant ship
destroyed has not cost Germany a submarine.
When one comes to think of it, a fair number of sub-
marines have in the past been sunk or damaged by merchant
•hips which have run into them purely accidentally. Now,
thanks to the example set by Syren and Shipping, not only
have our merchant ships been taught that " attack is the best
defence," but also they have been taught that there is more or
Uss a price on the head of every pirate and outlaw.
Supposing, of course, that the submarine be sighted, it
Is more or less even odds whether the threatened merchant
•hip will not knock out the enemy. To be victimised means
either death or probable trouble; to succeed means money;
kudos, and the still higher gain of " done my bit." This last
ia also certainly something of which Von Tirpitz did not think
vben planning his great " blockade."
It is never wise to prophe.sy too directly; but it is diflicult
to get away from the impression that the British Navy and
the British Mercantile Marine between them are perfectly
capable of de.-tling with the " blockade," without any ueces-
•ity of those " retaliatory me.isures " of which we have, per-
kaps, already heard too much in Parliament and elsewhere.
GENERAL MATTERS.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
J. V. M. (Burgess Hill).— (1) Subject is tahoo. (2)
Tou may be quite satisfied that the Queen Mary was not
■unk at the battle of the Dogger Bank. (3) Big special guns
•re rather like the big gooseberry and the sea serpent which
we used to hear so much of in more peaceful times. (4)
What the Germans may accuse us of does not, I think,
amount to much. So far as I can make out, they intended
to fall on us suddenly in their own time. We forestalled
them, and they make up hymns of hate accordingly. From
their point of view I suppose the grievance exists.
A. C. S. S. (Cheltenham).— (1) The fate of the Von
der Tann is purely a matter of speculation. (2) The Dresden
la probably in hiding somewhere. (3) The Kolberg has nob
heeu sunk. (4) Wo can only speculate as to how many sub-
marines Germany has lost, but it mu.st certainly be far more
than she admits even now.
B. P. (Leicester). — (1) A g^n of any kind in an aero-
plane means so much extra weight which could otherwise be
osed for carrying petrol or for bomb.^. (2) The American
" Lake " type of tubmarine carries tubes which can be
Irained exadly as you suggest.
A. J, W. (Hellifield). — Obstructions such as you sug-
gest would be washed away in next to no time.
E. C. W. (Gayton).— (1) There is great difficulty in
classifying the Qaeciv Elizabeths. They are too fast to be
ordinary battleships; not fast enough to be "battle
cruisers." That is how they come to be properly designated
as "battleship cruisers." (2) The Erin was formerly the
Turkish Rechad V. The Brol:e and Falknrr were two
Chilean destroyers completing at White's Yard at Cowes.
A. S. O. (Dover). — Tour idea is certainly novel, and
if not practicable for the sea might have aerial possibilities.
You might certainly submit it to the Admiralty. Have the
specification neatly typed.
Z. H. L. (Rome). — Theoretically aircraft can detect
submarines under water quite easily. In practice the chances
of their coinciding sufficiently are something like ten
thousand to one agaimst.
" Protein." — I am not a chemist, but I understand
that chemical foods are within the region of chemical
possibilities, certainly near enough should the necessity be
omnipresent. No doubt they would ba no nicer than
"potato bread," but "needs must when the devil drives."
The aeroplane would probably still be a toy had it not been
for its war utility and the consequent strenuous develop-
ment. In the same way a people faced with starvation on
account of war would keep on seeking substitutes, chemical
or otherwise, for ordinary articles of food.
C. S. (Liverpool). — (1) Submarines have often been down
a hundred feet and more, but the exact depth to which one
could go would entirely depend on her construction. All sub-
marines can go deeper than any practical purpose necessi-
tates. (2) The depth to which a diver can go depends on
his experience and en his heart. Fifteen fathoms is as deep
as most fancy going, though the limit is about twenty-five
fathoms. But a quarter of an hour is about as long as any
man could stand it. You will find much interesting informa-
tion about divers in the pages of " Whispers from the Fleet,"
by the late Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, who lost his
life in the Battle of Chile.
W. H. (Cadford St. Mary).— I do not think there is the
least danger of German or Austrian submarines managing
to interfere with the operations in the Dardanelles.
W. R. J. (Brecon). — Your idea is ingenious. But it, or
some variation of it, continually reaches me. Some idea.s
are more ingenious than others. The cardinal defect of all
is the same: " The submarine is too wily a fish to be had
with lobster pots." It can so very easily improvise a defence.
The best technical brains of the British Navy have been at
work on the whole problem for years. Honestly I don't think
there can be a non-technical civilian idea which the British
Navy has not already long ago considered, and either flung
aside as no good or else adopted. Seeing the careful way in
which you have worked things out, I do not like replying
to you in this seemingly cavalier sort of fashion, but perhaps
when I tell you that any number of people write and say :
" My idea is to put a mine in the way of a submarine: the
authorities, if they approve, can work out details," j'ou will
appreciate that the length of this answer puts you into a quite
different category.
X. (London, W.).- — Leave Uiings to Lord Fi^Iier. You
are fully entitled to " think tliat he is an incompetent ass,"
but supposing he had the time for it, what do you think
he'd think about you? "Democratic rights" may be all
right in peace time, but just at present we happen to be at
war, and advice (or orders) to the man at the helm from
passengers ia out of place !
L. D. (Halifax). — Noted. But the German spy fever is
being overdone. Some Ministers, remembering the old party
political days, may have overdone their talk a bit, but,
generally speaking, they have not done badly. We should all
of us labour to keep them up to the scratch, but in my
opinion criticism qua criticism is to be deprecated. When all
is said and done we have to sink or swim together.
K. G. (Macclesfield). — From almost prehistoric days
there have been enthusiasts who believed that ships could
defeat forts; but all the teaching of history is that it can only
be done (as in the Dardanelle.s) by using overwhelming force.
Herbert STEP^I;^so^f (Liverpool). — (1) It is never pos-
sible to arrive at exact particulars, but the bulk of the
evidence is that the Ewdea sank the Russian cruiser in Penang
under the Japanese flag. " War is war " (as Prince Henry
of Prussia said), and in war everyone hits below the belt when
the chance occurs. Tht Pi s-ians took things that w;iy. Vi'e
cannot do better than follow their example. They reckon to
return it " in kind " one day. To outrage International Law
is silly en that account. (2) I am afraid that the gyrations
of Lord Haldane are outaido the province of this article. So
11*
LAND AND tW A T E E.
March 13,
1915.
far as I can gather, lis is a " boaven-born genius " or an
" out-and-out traitor," according to the politics of whoever
sizes him up. Personally, I have only a literary acquaintance
with him; so far as that goes I can put him in neither cate-
gory. All I can definitely say is that — so far as my experience
goes — he was out to do his job according to his lights. Every
politician has to do a certain amount of eye-wash. Beyond
that he is honest, or he would not be where he is. There is no
monopoly of honesty on either side.
A. F. T. (London, W.C). — ^Your idea is all right, but
you can safely lay sixty to one that the British Na\-j' tumbled
to it six months ago.
F. G. (London, N.). — Fifty people at least have sent in
the same idea before. See replies to several. It is something
like a million to one whether any non-technical idea sent in
is v.orth the paper that it is written on. At the same time,
it is worth a lot against Germany. Your idea is not, but the
spirit which prompts you to send the idea along is quite as
potent as if you were a man (or two men) in the trenches. I
take ofE my hat to any lady who tries to do her bit, no matter
how ridiculous that bit may be. As a matter of fact, your
particular idea is not in the least ridiculous, but experiments
long ago proved it to be impracticable.
A. E. (Cardiff). — Your idea is quite sound. The only
thing against it is that it has been in operation ever since the
war began. Not quite as you put it, perhaps, but the same
integral idea. The British Navy is no fool, and there is little
that it has not thought of long since.
B. C. (London, N.). — See the last three replies.
M. F. (Quinta, St. John, Madeira). — (1) Yes. You are
right. I have acknowledged the silly pen-slip about the
Torch. (2) Re the Queen Elizabeth, see answer to
"E. C. W.," above.
"Alphabet " (Cardiff). — Duly noted. There have been
German spies galore; but a certain amount of perspective
should be observed. Think of the number of our people who
Lave harmlessly been to Wiesbaden, Baden-Baden, &c. It is
easy to overdo the spy business and to help the enemy accord-
ingly.
N. B. M. (London, S.W.). — I am glad to learn that you
are not a German-American. Three weeks ago I suggested
that attempting to starve the civil population was probably
a mistake. Apparently you and I are arguing to the same
effect from different standpoints. Where I think you get
adrift is as follows : You do not seem to realise that Mr.
Churchill is a Democratic Minister compelled to minister
to a democracy — and you know what Mr. Bumble (vide
"Oliver Twist") said about "the public." Consequently
Mr. Churchill has to consider his audience as well as his
job. I will allow that he has let off " hot air " on more than
one occasion. I will further admit that there are few abusiv*
adjectives which I did not apply to lii.Ti in the piping times
of peace, but — we are at present at war, and it is due to him
that we are where we are. ralmam gvi meruit feratl
W. H. M. G. (Eastry).— Yes. Some of the ideas about
nets and torpedoes are assorted and peculiar ! As for th«
Zeppelin basket, that really does exist. It was originally
designed to carry a machine gun, but now I believe is used
for bonib-dropping, being let down when the machine is
more or less stationary. Not impossibly it is stayed to prevent
being " dragged " when in motion. Otherwise, of course — •
exactly as you suggest — it would be dragged to goodness
knows where.
W. H. G. T. (Toronto, Canada). — Many thanks for th«
cutting you enclose of the American "expert's" views. I
have no means of ascertaining the naval qualifications of
Mr. Benjamin, "naval expert," but I certainly agree with
you that his opinion that Admiral Beatty should be shot
for not having plunged into a clever German trap suggests
that Mr. Benjamin's sympathies do not lie with the British
Navy. Put your trust in Admiral Beatty, and let th«
Germans say what they like.
" Verilist Tvno " (Dunmore). — At Heligoland, so far
as we know, tlie Germans have concreted everythi'.ig. Wt
could probably ease off torpedoes v/ithout number and leava
the bases of the fortifications untouched. When our really
big guns come along it is not impossi'ole that we may gradu-
ally disintegrate the island, but ,1 am afraid that it is
exceedingly improbable. Destroying a fort is something lik»
trying to kill a tortoise which you cannot capsize.
" AiE Bug" (Dundee). — I think that the Army and
Navy Gazette hit the right nail on the head. All these " air
mechanics" know a great deal about the technique, but
where war strategy is concerned they are apt to be babies in
arms. They can never realise that the enemy uill not be idU
in the meantime. Our Army would have been in Berlin by
now if German guns and German rifles had not been in ths
way.
" Encore Ret.\li.vtion." — Sorry I misunderstood yon.
What you now explain as the idea suggested has been in
operation ever since the war began.
GREAT BRITAIN'S AERIAL POSITION.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
DUEING six consecutive weeks the writer has, in
these columns, endeavoured to draw the serious
attention of the authorities to the great value of
the aeroplane for offensive purposes, and in one of
his articles he suggested the creation of a special
air fleet 2,000 strong. In studying the potential capabilities
of the fifth arm he has been led to certain conclusions, which
were explained in his articles, and some of which it may now
be useful to repeat. He therefore asks those who may bo
concerned with the adaptation of the new weapt^of war for
offensive purposes to bear in mind the following vital points :,
(1) An air flee! may be used for two distinct purnosos :
(aj It may form part of a land or sea force, when its t61«
must necessarily be limited to the operations of that force
considered as a v/holc. It is as a part of a land or a sea
force that, generally speaking, t!'8 belligerents, whether
aliiod or opposed to us, have, up to the present, employed
their aircraft. In such employment of their aeroplanes
the British have obtained so great an ascendancy over
their adversaries that they now claim to possess the
"Supremacy of the Air." "This term should, in reality,
convey no other fact than that our air.men can carry oiit
more comprehensive and more detailed and reliable obser-
vations than those of the enemy,
(i) It may be looked upon as a force of offensive and destruc-
tive value, to be employed either independently of, or in
cooperation with, a land or a sea force. With'thc excep-
tion of a few raids, which can only be regarded as very
timid aerial attacks, the employment of aircra/t for offcn-
tivt and dett I active purpoici hat not yet become mi
accomplished fact.
.(2; Froni considerations based upon the carrjing capacity of
existing aircraft and upon the lack of precise know-
ledge of aerial baUistics, as well as upon various general data,
*Ti "Ji.''/^""" «"• fl"' '«"»' be strong in number.
%t>i I lit same ci/ /!<•?( should not at one time bi med to form nart
of aland or a lea force, and at another thne to act as an inJe-
pendent force, lue, plan of detackiug from »u air fleet, forming
pari of a land or a sea force a number of machines to carry
out an offensive operation, such as a raid, which can only lead
U) local and temporary advantages, has, since the opening of
hostilities, been adopted both by the Allies and by the enemy.
This, although it may not have led to permanent results, has
been useful. It has proved in actual practice the potential
value of the offensive aeroplane, and has established the im-
portance of the number of aircraft in a lleet carrying out offea-
6ive operations. But it is an action which must cot be too
frequently repeated, as such a course may comproraJse the aoriai
supremacy v/hich is already ours and yet hava no reaJ iailuenc*
on the war.
(4) A powerful offensive air fleet speciall}/ built to act either inde-
pendently of or in co-operation with a land or a sea fore*
should be cieatid at once. That force could permanently iiv-
fluenca both the character and the duration of the present wa«,
BRITAIN S UNIQUE POSITION.
In considering the capability of the British Isles to pro-
duce in a short time a very large number of aeroplanes, on«
cannot fail to realise that a great part of the resources of the
country which could be employed in the production of an offen-
sive air fleet are still unutilised. In his last article* the writer
referred to the two principles which seem to have guided our
military authorities in the production of aircraft during the
period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities.
These two principles — (a) every promising constructed aircraft
must be given a trial, and (6) every promising constructor
must be given work — were also, in a greater or less degree,
those which guided the foreign countries. To these two prin-
ciples is due the fact that at the beginning of the war all the
principal belligerent countries possessed several successful
designs of aircraft and a number of firms who had acquired
experience in aircraft construction. But now, owing to her
voluntary system of military service and to her command of
•"A Not« of Warnius," Land mo Wiita, Mgicli 6, 191^
March 13, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
tie seas, the capability of Great Britain to construct aircraft
on a large scale is unique.
Of all the nations now at war, Great Britain, by reason
of her system of voluntary military service, has had her
industries the least disturbed, and on account of the
Eupremacy of her Navy she is not short of any material that
may be required in the construction of war weapons. Hence
these two causes have given to the country the means of supply-
ing her armies with more and better awcraft than is possible
to the enemy. The full significance of these two causes of
the aerial supremacy which is at present ours — (a) an undis-
turbed industry; (6) the naval supremacy — will be readily
understood when it is remembered that the aeroplane con-
structor depends for the carrying out of his v/ork upon a great
number of industries which, in their turn, depend upon an
adequate supply of the necessary materials. Confronted by
a disorganised industry, an aeroplane constructor, however
talented and however experienced, could not easily produce
a single machine. To give the reader an idea of the various
industries on which the aeroplane constructor depends for
the construction of an aeroplane, some of them will be men-
tioned. The motor industry must supply him with a light and
reliable motor; the propeller maker with a suitable propeller.
Tho wings of the machine must be covered with a strong and
light linen fabric, which must be supplied by the linen in-
dustry. This linen fabric itself must be treated with a
" dope," the manufacture of which depends on the chemical
industry. Tho wheels of the macJiino are provided by the
cycle maker, and their covers and inner tubes by the rubber
industry, and the production of hundreds of other small but
important parts, such as turn-buckles, different flanges and
connections, t^e-pieces, various taps, valves, nuts, nipples,
petrol fillers, fuel and oil tanks, pulleys, bracket seats, chassis
eprings, and many other parts, the mere mention of which
would require some several hundred words, depend upon a
large number of miscellaneous engineering industries. It is
thus clear that with her industries disorganised and deprived
of the necessary material, comprising wood, rubber, steel,
copper, aluminium, fibre for linen, petrol, lubricating oil, and
other substances, it is very difEcult, if not impossible, for a
country to try to create during the war an air fleet capable
of offensive operations of permanent value.
In her ability to produce aircraft Britain stands alone.
Frsnce, on account of her compulsory system of military
service which called to the colours thousands of men who
suddenly had to leave her industries short of labour and or-
ganising power, docs not now possess the tithe of our resources
for aircraft construction. The occupation by the Germans
of the highly industrial districts of Northern France still
further reduced the industrial resources of our Ally. It is
for this reason that France, who, under more fortunate cir-
cumstances, would probably have created a grand offensive
air fleet, now finds herself incapable of even attempting the
effort. It is upon us that the burden rests of creating
such a fleet. It is a duty which we are bound to perform,
since it may, without interfering with our other arrangements,
lead to a much shorter war and to a smaller sacrifice of lives.
THE BUILDING OF 2,000 AEROPLANES,
Aeroplanes can now be built much quicker than at th«
beginning of hostilities, both because fewer types of machines
are constructed and because greater practice in the construc-
tion, on a larger scale, of the various parts required has been
obtained. Tho rate of con.struction can be further increased,
and in creating an offensive air fleet 2,000 strong, the writer
suggests the adoption of only one type of machine. This type,
which would be the standard type for the offensive independent)
fleet, should be built outside the regular aeronautical industry,
which is already fully employed in producing the necessary
machines for our present aerial fleet, which, on account of its
%-arious duties, must necessarily contain units of various
standards. The offensive air fleet, being brought into existence
for one single definite purpose, would consist of only one
type. The creation of such a fleet would not prevent the
development of aeronautics, would not interfere with the estab-
lished aeronautical industry, and would employ numerous,
and as yet untapped, engineering and other re.';ource8
of the country which are now unutilised and are lying fallow.
The writer makes this comment advisedly. During the last
few weeks he has been in touch with scores of industrial firms
all over the country where work is slack through want of
orders, and who are desirous, and capable, of supplying all
the various necessary parts for the creation, within six months,
of an offensive air fleet on the scale indicated. The list of
these firms the writer is prepared to communicate to the
authorities should it be required.
THE ASCENDENCY OF THE ALLIED
AIRCRAFT.
WHAT IT MEANS IN THE COMING ADVANCE.
By COLONEL F.
WHILE everyone is wondering when the Great
Advance from France and Flanders to the
Rhine will begin, no one seems to have noticed
the grcw^th of a new factor in the conduct of
warfare, which, working quite silently, his
completely changed the nature of the vast problem before the
Allies.
It began to make its appearance some six months ago,
when Sir John French in his dispatches wrote of cur
Buperiority wliich was evinced by our airmen as compared to
those of the Germans.
But, even then, scarcely anyone began to speculate
•eriously on what might follow this ascendency, because no
one could have believed that by degrees such a power would
in so short a time be so firmly established as to render the
German air fleet for all practical purposes as non-existent as
the ships in the Kiel Canal. But, reading between the lines
of the French communiques, it was possible to see what was
coming when day after day artillery duels were decided with
the vantage to the gunners of the Allies.
If we look back to the dates when this remark first ap-
peared with regularity, it will be evident that at that time
there could be no question of our numerical superiority in
guns, or even in ammunition supply, to account for the fact,
and as between the actual skill of the gun-layers the advan-
tage could only be trifling.
The factor which remains as explanation of the phrasing
of the reports was " facility " or " superiority of observa-
tion," and it was in the domain of the flying men that we
could look for this facility, as all other methods were the com-
mon property of both sides.
Week after week, as the comrouniquds told of enemy
guns smashed up by direct hits, of batteries silenced, and
N. MAUDE, C.B.
whole lengths of trenches blown in, it became more especially
evident that our ascendency was increasing, and when ab
last began the series of French local attacks on a considerable
scale, in Alsace, then near Soissons, and since in almost every
sector of defence in turn, there could be no doubt that wo
had firmly established it.
In each case these offensives were seen to compel th«
Germans to bring up reinforcements to avert the danger
threatening some vital point, generally one of the lat-eral
railways, on which tho cohesion of the fighting front depends.
As Mr. Hilaire Belloc has so well shown in these pages,
the Germans were very hard put to it indeed to find rein-
forcements for the threatened sectors. At Soissons, thanks
to the local superiority of numbers which they were able to
accumulate and to the rise of the Aisne, they could claim an
advantage which loomed very large through the turgid lan-
guage of their announcements. But this did not by any
means suffice to put the observers of the game off the true
line. The recent operations between Perthes and Souain, to
mention only the principal group, have confirmed the impres-
sion which has been forming in my mind for some time — ■
viz., that the French have now attained so entire a mastery
over enemy movements that they can oblige him to come outi
into the open and attack them when and wherever they please.
This is the meaning of the announcement they made officially
last week that " at a given point and at a given hour we are
free to do what we will."
I believe tho claim to be thoroughly justified by the
circumstances, and its importance it is difiBcult to over-
estimate.
In every battle, siege, or campaign the chief object of
the commander on one side has always been to compel his
adversary to use up his reserves prematurely at some point)
13*
LAND AND ,W A T E E.
March 13, 1915.
cliosen for liira to waste them, not selected by liim of his own
volition.
Tliougb Napoleon generally succeeded, in his latter cam-
paigns, iu so completely dominating his enemy's will as to
realise this ideal, he never established such a degree of
ascendency as this quotation from the French report confirms.
Indeed, it was an inconceivable proposition for any leader
to arrive at until the con.ing of the aeroplane, as handled
bv the Allied airmen, created the possibility. And the asser-
ti"on of this power in a commuuication meant to bo circulated
to the enemy has been made intentionally to establish a moral
superiority over the enemy commanders. Moreover, it shows a
veiy nice appreciation of the psychology of the German nation.
For how is any staff to maintain confidence in its own
capacity to handle its day-to-day problems when, as in a
game of chess, the other player cries constantly " Check! "J
One may try one move after another, analogous to the
bringing up of reinforcements, but the word follows each
effort, until it dawns upon the beaten player that he is in
truth cornered, and the next announcement will bo
"Mate I"
Nothing could batter illustrate the confidence which it
felt by the French General Staff in their power to deal withi
the present situation. The same remark applies, of course,
to our own people, and this extraordinary position of
superiority (one never yet obtained by any army in war) wa
owe entirely to the extraordinary aptitude for air-servic«
developed by the flying men of both nations.
If we compel our enemies to continue attacking us under,
for them, the most unfavourable circumstances possible to
produce, we can continue the process until the numbers at hia
command are no longer adequate to hold the present eitenS
of front. Then, and then only, need the Allies send forward
their own troops to hasten hia retreat.
The German line is already wearing very thin in places*
Events in Austria and Poland make it exceedingly improbable
that their men can again be transferred from East to West J
and as for reinforcements still to be found within the German
Empire, I am in entire accord with the estimate given lasi
week by Mr. Hilaire Belloc, with the exception that I think
it is the very outside limit of German endurance, and that th«
end may come some weeks sooner than he anticipates.
CORRESPONDENCE.
GARDENING IN SCHOOL AND HOMB.
To the Editor of Laxd and Water.
Dear Sir, — The true amateur gardener is an enthusiast
who welcomes every opportunity of increasing his (or her)
knowledge and skill. Good gardening books are not wanting,
but what is badly needed is a practical demonstrator in the
arts of trenching, digging, raking, hoeing, seed-sowing, plant-
ing, and so on, accompanying the work with short explana-
tory lectures of an informal character on the principles under-
lying it.
Teachers of gardening and Nature-study in and around
London will particularly welcome such an opportunity. In
the schools of the London County Council alone gardening
13 taught in three hundred departments, and the wide educa-
tional value of gardening in its relation to Nature-study and
other subjects is now beginning to be recognised in private
■chools.
With a view to helping teachers and amateur gardeners
alike I have arranged to give a course of ten lecture-
demonstrations in gardening in the beautiful gardens of the
Royal Botanic Society (Inner Circle, Regent's Park, near
Baker Street Station) on Saturday mornings, beginning
March 6, at 11 a.m.
All interested are cordially invited to be present at the
first lecture-demonstration, which will be free. Tickets for
the course (lOs. 6d.) may be obtained from me at 9, Temple
Fortune Lane, Hampstead Garden Suburb, N.W. (telephone
Finchley 1262).— Yours, <fec.,
Helen Colt.
LAND TRAINING.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — Kitchener's Army is magnificent. I am
second to none in my admiration for men, officers, and what
both have achieved. I, who have watched my husband's
battalion grow from three to 1,320 men, know what I am
talking about; but out of our thirty- three officers I do not
think one, except my husband (the CO.), has ever heard
a shot fired in anger. Perhaps one or two were in the Boer
war.^ Anyhow, with the utmost keenness they cannot help
lacking in one thing — i.e., experience of war under modern
conditions. In all the letters I get from the front from
brothers, cousins, and friends, the cry is, " Come and learn."
One week of personal experience in the trenches is worth three
months of drill book and listening to others' experiences.
Would it not be possible to send relays of officers from
Kitchener's battalions, two at a time, for a fortnight each, to
replace two at the front in each regiment ? It is well known
that some of those who have been right through the war are
deadly stale. A fortnight away would bring them new life,
especially with the interest of imparting what they know and
seeing some of the stuff preparing which is going to come to
their help. On the other hand, our young officers here are
deadly keen to learn, and two of them could easily be spared
at a time for that purpose. I do not, of course, venture to
Bettle details and I am not blind to the possibility of casual-
ties occurring among the new officers, but it would not lead
to any more casualties, as there would be two instead (who
have borne the burden and heat of the day) safe at home
resting, and I believe it would save a great many mistakes
and therefore casualties when the time comes for our ardeni,
but inexperienced, young officers to take their regimenta
abroad. It would, of course, cost Government something, but
such a trifle, compared with the advantages I believe would
be gained, does not count.
If, Sir, you think there is something to be said for thi»
idea I should be grateful if it could be forwarded to th«
proper quarter.
C.O.'s WiFB.
AN APPRECIATION.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I beg to inform you that I regularly receive th«
copy of Land and Water which you so kindly send me every
week.
I very much appreciate your paper, which is much'
valuable to me. As you may have noticed, I have alreadj
quoted several times iu the Temps Mr. Hilaire Belloc'a very
remarkable articles. — Thanking you again, I am, yours ver/
truly,
BOISSONNET
(Lieut. -Colonel).
21, Boulevard de La-Tour, Maubourg.
GRATITUDE.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sib, — Owing to your courtesy in publishing my
letter appealing for gloves and mittens for the 12th WesI
Yorka, I have had enough sent to supply nearly every man ia
the regiment with a pair. I tried to write and ackiiowledg«
every parcel, but some were sent anonymously. In the name
of the men of the 12th West Yorks I desire to thauK
most heartily all those who so generously responded to mi{
appeal. — I am, Sir, yours very truly,
Babetth Jaqttes,
Ashlyn, Grove Road, Loighton Buzzard.
HARDENING HORSES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I have now had some experience, ever since lasf
November, in conditioning horses from Canada for remounts*
Most have come in poor, some very poor, several far from
well, and so far all have gone out in very good case.
I have tried keeping them on hard water and on mixed
water, and on quite soft rain water out of a big tank. No
doubt all horses do better on soft water, but in all my experi«
ence of horses, in not a few countries, I never found any so
susceptible as the Canadians to the difference of water. Tha
advantage of the all-soft is most marked. The general
thriving has been remarkable, and the beneficial effects on
coats and skins wonderful. Many of these horses have very
bad coats and very bad skins, but with the soft water all goes
well. We also not infrequently dress the bad ones all ovefl
with sulphur and train oil, worked into a stiff paste and well
brushed in, against the lie of the hair, with an old wateii
brush. The effect is magical. I have done this with bad-*
coated horses for years. Many tails have arrived badly
rubbed, some nibbed to soreness. For this zinc and carbolia
lotion or ointment is hard to beat. If a horse rubs tha
stump of his tail against whitewash he gets it itchy, and wiii
14*
March 13, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
continue to rub it to its destruction. All my boxes are tar
varnished to well above the top of the tail of a 17-hand3 horse
and whitewashed above. I have not clipped any of the
Canadians.
I don't believe in clipping horses that will have to stand
out, and so esposing their vital organs with the thinnest
skin over them. A sick horse in a box will stand with his
muzzle to an open window to his advantage. A horse out in
a wind will stand with his tail to it. In a cold wind Arabs
put a long sheet on to below the hocks, which generally blows
in between the hind legs and keeps the belly warm. For
standing out in a windy, exposed position it is well to have
woollen ruga with brass eyelets along each long side and to
lace them under the belly. This is the North African plan
for cold windy nights.
I may, perhaps, be permitted to say that in Africa in
very hot weather, and elsewhere, I have never known a horse
go wrong from the sun on his head ; and I look upon the sun-
bonnets that were at one time fashionable as nonsense, but
under a hot sun horses standing out for long sometimes are
seized with vertigo, and die rapidly with the sun shining on
their loins. This is prevented by putting a numnah, or folded
blanket, over the loins. No harm comes to them when in
motion, but the standing out may be fatal.
Old Malton, ^- ^ ^^"°«-
TO ATTACK ZEPPELINS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — The phosphorus-tipped bullet which figured
In a recent issue of your paper would not succeed in igniting
the gas of a Zeppelin. Phosphorus bursts into fiame at a
touch in the presence of oxygen. But a balloon contains
hydrogen. Consequently the phosphorus could ignite only
on leaving the balloon for the out«r atmosphere.
It is, however, obvious that Zeppelins should be attacked
by projectiles charged with some species of pyrotechnic mix-
ture, but this must produce its own oxygen.
It is also obvious that a stream of bullets or shells of the
ordinary type, fired at overhead marks from Maxims or quick-
firers, will result in a shower of spent projectiles somewhere
in the " defended " city — a shower that would mean death to
many harmless citizens and much damage of property — wliila
the Zeppelins attacked would probably be the worse merely
by a few unimportant holes.
What is needed is a bullet that will ignite the gas of
balloons, damage aeroplanes equally with the ordinary bullet,
facilitate aiming, and fall in a harmless condition.
I venture to think these qualities are possessed by a pro-
jectile patented by me last December.
The pyrotechnic mixture is carried
in a thin aluminium sheath a, which
may be stiffened in larger calibres (up
to IJ inches) by a lining of quick-
burning celluloid. The conical cap b —
of celluloid or other light, tough, and
brittle material — contains the load of
the projectile, which makes up the
weight to the normal. This load con-
sists not of solid lead, but of filings,
or very fine shot; c is a movable parti-
tion resting on a ring; d is a wad; x a
charge of powder.
When the pyrotechnic mixture is
consumed and the summit of the
trajectory attained, the charge of
powder blows the empty shell A away
from the loaded cap b, and the lead
romptly spills, so that (a) the cap,
b) the load of shot, and (c) the empty case fall severally
and harmlessly to the ground. A shower of such objects
would be no more dangerous than a severe hailstorm, and as
easy to avoid — by going indoors. No one can escape from
projectiles falling from a height of two or three miles and
capable of penetrating roofs and floors.
This form of projectile has other advantages. In order
that the gases of explosion upon expulsion may not tend to
expand the case a or blow out the whole contents, the pro-
jectile is driven out by a fuse-plug or driving-plug, f._ This
is blown out by the gases of combustion almost immediately,
but not before, the projectile has travelled two or three
hundred feet. During the brief period before this release
there is no very perceptible escape of sparks or smoke, so that
the exact position of the gun is not revealed.
But once the plug is blown out, the projectile leaves a
rocket-like trail of sparks and smoke, which by day or by
night will plainly mark the trajectory of the projectile.
fW-cAaeJr
f.
Especially will this be the case with machine-guns, so tha*
to hit a Zeppelin should be as easy almost as to strike a butter-
fly with the jet from a garden-house. But Zeppelins are
notoi-iously not an easy mark v.ith ordinary projectiles.
I do not suppose our Government will adopt this device — ■
such inventions usually go abroad. I give you these particu-
lars so that, when Zeppelins are flying over Loudon and the
shot and shell of our defenders are raining down upon our
housetops and our heads, your readers may at least havs
the satisfaction of knowing that they are not the victims of th«
ine-\-itable. — I remain. Sir, yours very truly,
Beknaed Miall.
THE SOLDreRS AND SAILORS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of L.».nd and Water.
Dear Sir, — We have received an urgent appeal from the
Hospital Bristol, St. Malo, France, for tobacco and pipes for
the wounded men in that town, who number several thousand.
We are urgently in need of funds and should greatly
appreciate assistance from your readers, most of whom are
no doubt smokers and will appreciate what the loss of this
little luxury is.
At the present time we have more applications for
smoking material than we can pos.sibly cope with.
Cheques, postal orders, tc, crossed " Barclay and Co.,"-
should be made out to the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. Roy Horni-
man. — Your obedient servant,
W. Evan Colli son, Hon. Sec.
.Central House, Kings way, W.C.
THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sib, — Let me say at once, frankly, that I am one
of those who have " axes to grind." Not a very large one, but
still an axe. You will see the edge of my axe sticking up in
the course of this letter. Further, please note I am not
attempting to criticise anyone or anything; I am endeavour-
ing to state facts — from my own point of view, of course. I
have ventured to write to you because I am somewhat puzzled,
also because the particular question which puzzles me has not
been dealt with to any extent in your esteemed journal,
although Mr. Blin Desbleds did just mention it once. It seems
to me to be of some importance. I am puzzled by an apparent
anomaly which may very likely exist in the particular case
with which I am familiar alone, but which, on the other
hand, may possibly be more general than this.
Here is the anomaly. According to the speeches of
Ministers and the articles, leading and otherwise, in the
papers, it is of great importance that all the engineering
works of this country should be employed to their full capacity
in turning out war material for the use of H.M. Forces and
the AJlies, and one might imagine that practically every firm
of that description, however small, would be doing what it
could in this direction. From what one reads, even in the
columns of your esteemed journal, it might be supposed that
England and her Allies had to strain every nerve, not only to
supply the forces in the field at the present time, but to equip
the new armies now being trained, and that there is not an
engineering shop in these islands which could not be " doing
its bit."
But is this really the case 1 Is it not rather the fact that
the Naval and Military authorities have the situation very
well in hand, and that plentiful and perfectly adequate
supplies of every kind of war material are assured from the
output of the Government shops, and from that of the large
firms with whom the Government in ordinary times is
accustomed to contract 1 Let me put a concrete case.
After the war had been in progress for some months a
email engineering firm which for several years had been en-
deavouring to perfect and market a speciality found itself
faced with the following situation:
(a) It was impossible to go on trying to make the speciality,
because
(1) Many of its best employees handed in their notices owjnp;
to the very large bonuses and high wages oCfered by tlia
big firms who were engaged on contracts for war materials.
Tho men very naturally desired to participat* in theso
bonuses, and the increase in the cost of living accentuatcil
their desire.
(2) Raw materials, which had been steadily rising in
price, finally became unobtainable in certain cases; tho
firms who supplied them " begging to b,) excused from
quoting," since they were fully occupied on Government
woi'k.
(Ji) The firm, therefore, had (1) either to close down and let their
employees go; (2) to close down, partially cutting dow.i
expenses as far as possible, and remaining in a state of sus-
pended animation for the period of the nar; or (5) to try and
obtain Go\ernmcnt work.
15*
LAND AND J\^ A T E E.
March 13, 1915.
After careful consideration tlie latter alternative was
decided upou, and requcL-ts to bo allowed to quote were for-
warded to various Government departments and to several of
the large manufacturing firms.
The majority of the big firms had no work they could
ofTcr. Some bad work not suitable to the capabilities of tha
small firm above mentioned, and one asked for a definite
quotation, but after having considered it found the prices
altogether too high, although these had been " cut " to the
limit which would allow the small firm in question a bar*
profit.
Of the Cfovernment departments, some said they had no
work they could offer, several sent polite acknowledgments,
followed in one case by requests for quotations for different
kinds of work which have been and are being submitted to
the be?t of the firm's ability, and one wired that an interview
with the firm's representative was desired. This was followed
\y a very small "sample" order, and by assurances thai
f-ore orders would be forthcoming. So far so good.
Unfortunately the process above mentioned has been go-
ing on for some time, and the firm's employees have been and
are still worrying and asking " When shall we get tha Govern-
ment work? " They state, and with some justice it must be
acknowledged, that " this has been going on since Christmas,
and all you have to show us is one small order." It should be
remembered that their friends in Leeds, on the Tyne, in the
West Riding, and many other places are earninnr very high
wages, and the large firms are continually advertising for men.
Naturally they feel envious.
On the firm's side of the matter, too, there is nothing to
feel particularly joyful about. For months now the wages,
rent, rates, taxes, all other expenses have been going on
and nothing coming in. Such a process cannot continue in-
definitely. I wonder if any of your readers have ever con-
sidered v/hat it costs to run even a very, very small manufac-
turing business. To take a purely hypothetical case, and ons
nothing to do with the firm above mentioned, it is a very,
very small business, as businesses go nowadays, the wages bill
of which is only £100 per week. Yet how many of your
readers would care to be called upon to find that sum at th«
present time, plus the corresponding overhead charges and
salaries 1
Now, of course, we are at war, and in war someone must
inevitably suffer. It may well be that it is better for th«
country that the small firms should close down and their work-
men go to aid the output of the large firms. This will entail
the entire extinction of many of the small firms for good and
all, since a small shop depends on its workmen who have been
trained in its speciality to a greater extent than do the large
shops. Once the men ara scattered the firm as an " entity "■
disappears.
However, this may be quite a necessary and unaToidabls
feature of the war, and it may be truly argued that it is nok
worth while to try and keep the small firms alive because
(a) They cannot turn out tie quantities of which the krj* 6nn*
are capable ;
(4) They cannot do anything lika the namber of diSer«nt Tar!eti«i
of work ;
(c) Their priees are bound to b» somewhat highsr, rino* larj;*
capital, the very latest machiuery, and gveat output all ape^
economy o! prciiuction.
On the other hand, the small firms may be useful in their
own way, and it may be more advantageous from the national
point of view to employ them rather than to let them go under.
If it is (and it is a point for the authorities to decida) thera la
a very simple way of doing it. That is — ■
(1) Give them work suitable to their capacities.
(2) Give thera work promptly.
You will have observed the axe in the latter part of this
inordinately long letter.— With apologies, yours faithfully,
" One or tue Principals of a Small Fism."
11, Bootham Crescent, York.
THE DIFFERENT SPEEDS OF AN AEROPLANE.
To the Editor of Land a.\d Water.
De.vr Sia, — I have for some weeks been trying to find
out the answers to the series of questions given belo'w. Per-
liaps Mr. L. Blin Desbleds would kindly furnish them, as
they are probably of interest to many of your readers as well
as to me f
1. Dr. Clazebrook, in a lecture reported in technicil jonraalj and
daily papers, slated that one of the flying machines could
travel at a maAimum speed of, say, eightv-fivo miles per Lour,
and down to forty per cent, this was a minimum. Docs thij
tnean that, m favourable air conditions, it could fly hori-
zoDtallv at any desired speed between these two limits for half
or one Lour, or more?
2. Dr. O'azebrook mentioned the lower limit as especially nsefu!
fof alighting purposes. Is this merely in facilitatiug selecting
a spot on which to frlight, or in occupying less distanc* an4
time in coming safely to land '
3. Has the lower speed limit advantages in scouting, as In a fifty-
one liundred milo trip a greater ti.iie would be taken, and cob-
sequcntly the country could be examined more closely ?
4. What are the means wtich allow of this range of speed f AdjosV
meut of the angle of the wings, or of the tail, or of both ?
5. Is the power required about tho same throughout the range, or
is the motor ruu faster or siowai as tha speed is varied up o>
down ?
6. Is there any small quite np-todate book published giving exMl
general information such as asked for above?
-Yours, very truly,
" ExQuiaia.''
Eeplies.
1. The statement means that for a certain amoont of power a«
aeropUno can fly horliontally at two speeds — a high speed and
a low one. In the instance quoted the lower speed is forty
per cent, of the higher one. The accompanying cur\o will
make tho point clear. It refers to a Bl^riot monoplane, but all
other aeropl&nes have a cuna of a siroilar character. Thia
I
a.
Curve sUcwtry fUe reh£ion. Sedi^r'egft
the cnduLotcoit of'azt aeraohne
hiclirjofcon. in. CLeqrees
cnrve shows two important facts : (a) there Is an Inclinatica
and where the horsepower OA is a minimum; (6) there ara
two inclinations, Bi and B2, of the machine for which tb*
horse-power OB, required to fly it horizontally, Is the sam«k
Therefore, for a given horse-power OB a ma<;hine can fly
horizontally either at the inclination Bl or at B2. Now, t«
each inclination of the machine there corresponds a speed.
Therefore, for a given horse-power OB, tho machine can fly
horizontally at a speed corresponding to the Inclination Bl a*
at that defined by the inclination B2. If the motor was per-
fectly elastic the horse power it developed could be regulated
to give any amount of power comprised between OB and th«
minimum OA. In such a case the aeroplane could be flown at
any Inclination comprised between Bl and B2 — x.t., it would
have any speed contained within the limits of those defined by
Bl and B2. Unhappily, aeroplane motors are not verj* eloslw
as regards power, and one cannot rely to fly at any desired
speed t>ctween tha two limits which are glvea by tht aaiaa
amount of power.
2. It could be employed for all these pnrposea.
5. Yes.
4. Adjustment of longitudinal iuclination of Um machioa m
explained in (1) above.
5. This is explained In Reply 1.
6. I am afraid not. One could consult with advantage the Report*
of the Government Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, tha
works of G. Eiffel, and of br. Praudtl. There is, of courss^
a special periodical literaturo dealing with aeronautics. Th»
best two are, to my mind. La TecKntqtie A6ronautiqu& and
L'Afrophile. Thera is a'iso a first-rate German publicatioiig
which, at present, however, ia not availabl«.
In the appeal which appeared in our columns last weaH
on behalf of the Y.M.C.A. for funds for the con-struction of *
Sailors' Home at Invergordon from Sir Andrew H. Pettigrew.
we omitted to give the address to which subscriptions could
be sent. These should be addressed to that gentleman a|
8, Marlborough Terrace, Glasgow, W.
MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'S LECTURES ON THE WAR.
Bournemouth.... Pavilion Thursday 11 March, 3 p.m.
Weymouth Burdon Rooms. Thursday 11 March, 8.30 p.m-
Plymouth Guildhall Friday.." 12 March, 3 and 8.30.
Exeter Victoria Hall.. Saturd.iv 13 March, 2.30 p.m.
Leeds Albert Hall ... Thursday 18 March, 3 and 8.30.
Newcastle tfowu Hall .... Friday...' 19 March, Sand 8.30.
Glasgow Monday 22 March.
Edinburgh .Tuesday 23 March.
Seats may now be booked for the next series of Lectures at Qaeea'a
HaH; these ore to be given on tha fijst Wednesday in April. Ma/,
and June.
Mr. Fred T. Jane will lecture at the Mechanic's Hall, Nottingham,
at 8, on Wednesday, 17th March, under the auspices of the Navy Leagua,
His Grace the Duke of Portland has consented to take the clmr.
Mr. Walter Leaf, D.Litl, wiU loot re on "The Da,rdenolles " at
the iEolian Hall on Friday, March 26th, at 8 p.m. Tickets, prica
7a. 6d. end 2i. 6d., can M obtained from Hmu P. Btrachey, 6£U
Victoria Street, S.W.
16*
M
arch 13, I 91 5
LAND AND WATER
Onoto Pens
Are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
made by a British
10/6 Company with British
upwards. Capital and Labour.
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO^ LTD., LONDON.
FIRTH S
"STAINLESS STEEL
for CUTLERY, etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
ARTICLES MADE FROM THIS
STEEL, BEING ENTIRELY UN-
AFFECTED BY FOOD ACIDS,
FRLTTS, VINEGAR, etc., WILL BE
FOUND TO BE OF ENORMOUS
ADVANTAGE IN HOTELS,
CLUBS, RESTAURANTS,
CAMPS. NEITHER THE KNIFE-
BOARD NOR CLEANING
MACHINE IS NOW NECESSARY.
^ CUTLERY OF THIS STEEL
MAY BE HAD OF ALL THE
LEADING MANUFACTURERS.
SEE THAT KNIVES BEAR THIS
MARK.
i
firthI
stainless)
Original and Sole Malieis:
THOS. FIRTH & SONS, Ltd.
SHEFFIELD.
SQUIRE'S FOOT OINTMENT
As supplied to the WAR OFFICE.
AN EFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR THE FEET AGAINST WE'T
AND FROST OR TH£ RIGOURS OF A TRYING MARCH.
'^hc Jollowing letters, tupical 0/ many received, show how invaluable it ha
proved to our soldiers in the trenches : —
Jl Lieutenant writes ; — "Excellent. Mjffeet have been soaring often,
and have never been cold since I used it."
Jf private of the London Scottish^ writing to his doctor friend, says : —
" '^hank you once again for the ointment you so t^indlysent me, and to lelljfou
how excellent / found it. I managed to i^eep my feet and ankles quite warm."
SQUIRE &, SONS, \I°:
Chemists on the establishment of H.M. The King,
4130XF0RDST., LONDON, W.
Richard Dehans Latest Success
The MAN Of IRON
By Richard Dehan, n
BISMARCK
:hard Dehan,
Author of " THE DOP DOCTOR.'
"One reads the eight hundred pages with
ever-increasing absorption in the terrible
and wonderful story." — Pall Mall Gazette.
" Remarkable for scope and pov/er, for
grasp of the larger aspects of the subject,
and for great interest at this moment." —
Evening Standard.
HEINEMANN
355
L A N D A X D W A T !■: R
Man
ch 13, 1915
MOTOR AMBULANCES
NEEDED
By ATHERTON FLEMING
DURING my wanderings in France and Belgium,
searcliing for that which, under the present
strict censorsliip. is almost as elusive as the
famous philosopher's stone — " real " war news,
to wit — I have had many opportunities of
studying the question of motor ambulances and of actually
seeing them doing the work for which they were destined.
More than once have they stood me in good stead and spirited
me away from awkwardcorners. Still it is not of the assist-
ance which they have rendered to me personally that I wish
to write, but of the very real work that they have done in
connection with the removal of wounded men, and the
thousands of valuable lives they have saved, not only those
of our own countrymen, but of the men of France and Belgium.
Modern warfare, from the very nature of it — and from
the vast number of combatants engaged — means huge
casualty lists, and from the extent of it— the length of the
fighting front — the great difficulties in the way of the quick
removal of the wounded, heavy wastage of life owing to the
absence of that immediate attention which so often saves the
lives of badly wounded men, when neglect, even of a temporary
nature, would inevitably mean death. To obviate this
neglect as much as it is humanely possible is the mission of
the Red Cross, and to those who realise what modern warfare
really means it will at once be obvious that to tackle the
matter successfully not hundreds but thousands of ambu-
lances are required ; also, that these thousands must te
constantly at work, which also means efficiency, and a very
high standard of efficiency at that — a standard which it is
impossible to maintain unless there is at every hospital base
a sufficiently large number of reserves and a properly equipped
repair depot and staff of mechanics.
Since my return I have been tackled by several people
in connection with the subject of Red Cross work. Some of
them have been possessed of enough common sense to enable
them to realise the actual condition of things with regard to
the necessity for a very large number of suitable ambulances ;
others, I am sorry to say, have been frankly sceptical and
have openly sneered at the efforts of many really good schemes
to raise money to buy more ambulances. To these latter
I have but one thing to say : it is impossible to have too
many ! It is bad enough for a soldier to be wounded in the
service of his country, bad enough for him to suffer the pain
which his wounds bring him, but it is infinitely worse should
he have to lie where he drops for hours — sometimes for days —
until he dies from exhaustion or loss of blood. It is to put a
stop to this kind of thing to always have at hand plenty of
assistance and a sufficient number of vehicles to enabL'
these badly wounded men to be conveyed rapidly and comfort-
ably to the nearest place where skilled medical aid may be
obtained. It is for this reason that I repeat my assertion
that there cannot be too many of these ambulances in the
field at any part of the extensive front.
During the early stages of the war there was an appalling
scarcity of Red Cross cars. Both the enemy and the Allies
do not appear to have thoroughly realised the huge number of
casualties which modern conditions render inevitable, for it is
a weU-known fact that the (ierman Red Cross in the first two
months of the war were very badly provided with \ehicles
and medical supplies. On our own side matters were rapidly
remedied, and our own War Office also made prompt arrange-
^nents to cope with the situation by placing large orders with
practically all makers of repute for a steady supply of
suitable vehicles with bodies built to their own designs.
In the early days it was surprising to see what a number
of old crocks of cars were sent out to act as ambulances.
People at home seemed to think that any old scrap-heap of a
car, with as cheap a body as possible, was good enough for
the work. I used to see cars pulled up by the roadside, miles
away from anywhere, with the gear-box dropping out, or the
back axle gone, or some other complaint usually the outcome
of senile decay. One car simply shed its body en route.
Fortunately, it was empty at the time ; had it had its load
of wounded on board I shudder to think of what would have
happened to them. Possibly it may interest my readers to
know that many of these ambulances are expected to — and
in many cases do — run anything from one hundred to one
hundred and fifty miles per day every day of the week. A
practical motorist wiU at once see just what this means and
liow really good a car must be to stand up to the work.
Only a sound chassis can do it, so that it can easily be seen
^^Lonliniied on t'ii < 358/
" fT/ie road has an incurable habit of
disproving what looks convincing enough
on paper."
CLAIMS for tyres may be divided into t\' o
classes — paper claims and road claims. The
paper claim is to compare your tyre with a
rival's, show a cash saving of 10, 20 or 30 per cent.,
and declare that your tyre is the superior in that
proportion. That is not the
DUNLOP
wiy. All Dunlop claims are essentially road claims.
1 he ROAD is the only true arbiter between tyres
and tyres, and the verdict of (he road last year was
overwhelmingly in favour o: Dunlops. To take one
instance out of many — the Tourist Trophy Race.
Every manufacturer used Dunlop tyres
(with one exception).
All the prizes were won on Dunlop tyres.
We believe that the motorist prefers the road claim to
the paper claim. The enormous demand for Dunlop
tyres confirms us in this.
The Dunlop Rubber Co, Ltd..
Founders throughout the World oi the
Pnejtnatic Tyre Industry,
Alton Cross, Birmingham ; 14 Regi-nl
Street, London, S.W. PARIS : 4 Rue
du Colonel Moll.
356
March 13, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
i'J'-
Batile Cruiser H.M.S. INDOMITABLE. DisplactmenI 17,250 tons. Built by Fairfield Shipping and Engineering Co. Completed iSC8.
Length 562 ft.; beam 78J ft. Cost about £1.752.000. Engines 46.000 horse power; best speed 287 knots. Guns, 8 12-in. 16 4-in.
3 torpedo tubes submerged. Maximum coal capacity 3,000 tons. Crew 750. ' "'
From the original by Montapue Dawson.
CoMr/Mf ■-/ MHSSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
LAND AND W A T !• R
March 13, 19 : <;
MOTOR AMBULANCES NEEDED
{Continurd from pa^e 350)
that the weeding-out process was fairly rapid and that not
very many of the old crocks survived the ordeal.
The need for a constant supply of suitable vehicles is
very real, and will remain so as long as the war lasts, for the
awful road conditions, combined with incessant hard work,
must of a necessity wear the vehicles out muih quicker than
they would be worn out under normal conditions ; not only
that, but as our troops ad\ance the work will become much
heavier, owing to the increasing distances between
the fighting front and the coast hosjiital bases. Another
important work which has to be reckoned with is the fact
that the first large batch of ambulances have already done
the equivalent of three years' work, if one compares their
mileage with that of the average car's normal mileage in peace
times, and that, therefore, a lot of them are due to crack up
at about the same time ; also, it must always be remembered
that although the cars ha\-e been fairly looked after it has
been a matter of sheer im]X)ssibility to give them one-tenth
part of the attention that they would have received in the
ordinary way.
My ad\-ice to any philanthropicallv minded person who
feels inclined to present a motor ambulance to the Red Cross
is to select a good strong chassis of some well-known
make, and one of which sjiare parts are easily and quickly
obtainable, hand it over to a really good body-builder who
specialises in ambulance bodies, and who is not likely to
produce an abortion of a body that is apt to fall off the
chassis the first time it is subjected to rough work. Along
the long straight roads of fiance, through the flatlands, the
wind at times is very strong, and I have seen, more than
once, some of these canvas and lath atrocities, which are
known as " cheap " ambulance bodies, simply give up the
ghost altogether and collapse Uke a trodden-on matchbox,
enveloping their unfortunate occupants in the debris, to
wait possibly an hour or more until the arrival of an empty
vehicle to their relief.
The need for a sufficiency of motor ambulances was
brought very clearly before me during the ten days I spent
with the French Red Cross in the vicinity of Arras,
at the time of the second assault of this much-beleaguered
place. At Feuchy, a little hamlet about three kilometres
from Arras, there was a field hospital— a place which I shall
never forget as long as I live, a veritable Inferno. Every
house in the village had its full complement of dead, dying,
and wounded. They lay literally in hundreds on the side-
walk— some on straw, the majority on the wet ground.
Whenever there was a vacant space," due to the removal of
a body, it was quickly taken up by a fresh arrival. To
deal with this never-ceasing tide of wounded, to convey
them to the hospitals in Arras, there was — what do you
think? One large hay wagon! It was only due to 'the
devoted services of two citizens of the town who owned cars
that the majority of these poor de\-ils were enabled to get
into hospitals at all.
A WELL-DESIGNED AMBULANCE BODY FITTED
TO A CADILLAC CHASSIS
Twool ibcK were given to the Red Cros. Corps of ihe Au.tra'iji. E»pedilion.rT
rorce by K. Barr Smith. E.q . and one by Mewra. Eye. «i Crowle. Ltd. The
rehidei are completely equipped wi.h eieclric liuhtins and seK-.taiter, five demount-
able rim., lyres, and tubes whilst the bodies, which are of local manufacture, have
been equ.pped to the I.St d-tail. and are fitted with four well-sprung .Iretcher. and
»cconm,.,.lat,on lor one attendant in.ide, or with the .iretcher. down they will carry
ten .ligi.,,, wounded Kildier.. There are also fitted iocLet. for .urgical appliancei
ftBd walef tank.
The burberry
Linetl Proofed Wool or detachable Fleece
The remarkable weather-resisting proper
ties of THE BURBERRY first became
generally known to Military Men during
the South African War.
The reputation won during those memor-
able days has been more than jtistified
during the present campaign, which has
conclusively proved it the most serviceable
f.afe;;uard against bad weather.
THE BURBERRY is the only self-
ventilating weatherproof top-coat which
has consistently demonstrated its use
fulness as a shield against the rain, snow,
wind, mud and water which are the every-
day conditions under which our gallant
Army is fighting in Flanders and Picardy.
The following tribute from the trenches is
an example of numbers of letters and
Press comments received recently :
Just a line to congratulate you on the
water-resisting properties of vour goods. I
was moved into the trenches and could not
get at my overcoat, and all I had in its
place was one of your Tropical rain coats.
This stood three days' rain, and although
the men's coats were soaked, nothing got
through my lUtrberrv."
(Capt.) E. M., 14/A Co. London Regt.
26-1-5.
MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE
THE YOKE BURBERRY
A new cavalry weatherproof. Tlit
front is cut to fall well forward
and cover the horseman's knees.
FUR-LINED BRITISH WARMS
at GREAT-Y REDUCED PRICES
Usually NOW
1 7 Lined Pony Skin
14 Lined WaUaby
1 1 Lined Marmot
These afford Officers a rare opportunity of
obtaining luxurious Warms of superb quality.
9Gns.
£6 6s.
II Cm.
£7 7s.
UGns.
£7 7s.
SHORT NOTICE KIT
Burberry* keep Tunics, Slacks,
Breeches.Great Coats and Warms,
ready to try on ; so that fitting is
done when orderins, either in
London or Paris, and the kit com-
pleted in a few hours.
BURBERRYS
Haymarket LONDON
8 & 10 Bd. Malesherbes PARIS
Basingstoke and Provincial Agents
ALL MATERIALS COST MORE
BUT THE PRICE OF THE
FAMOUS
12 h.p. ROVER
CAR
£350
WILL NOT BE ALTERED
THE ROVER CO., Ltd.
METEOR WORKS, COVENTRY.
S9/6I New Oxiord Street,
London. W.C.
and at
and
16 Lord Edward Street.
Dublin.
358
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND & WATER
Vol. LXIV. No. 2758 SATURDAY. MARCH 20, 1915 [^^e^^I^pI'^pe'I^^] l^^^^inli^^^iiA^
CopyriglU, J. KuiStU & io..s
MAJOR-GENERAL W. PULTENEY, C.B.
Commanding the Third Army Corps
LAND AND WATER
March 20, 191 5
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370
March 20,
1915
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER
The Change in Things
THROUGH the nature of things, on account of theu- knowledge of England, her people, and their ways are
our geographical position and because of our apt to feel it. " I cannot," said a well-known Frenchman
national character, the war has seemed to many the other day, " understand London. If the Germans were
an onlooker to lea\e England untouched. Visitors as far from you as they are from Paris, if the\- were at
from France have found it difficult to reconcile Oxford, for instance, you might at last realise what war
the sight of London going on serenely, much the same as means." A few of us perhaps do not yet realise it ; others
usual, with the fact of a great nation fighting for her very who do betray the knowledge in no visible way. It is no
existence. It is, of course, intensely difficult for 'them to wonder that the report of our indifference is a growing one.
understand, and it can hardly
be expected that they would.
The change in the nation —
for a change there is — is far
too subtle for any foreign
mind to understand. It does
not matter how close may be
the bonds of union between
two nations or how inter-
mingled their interests may
be. Certain manners and
customs in the one are bound
to be as a sealed book to the
other. It cannot in the very
essence of things be other-
wise. So it comes to pass
that it is only we who are
living in the centre of things
who can understand them
as they are. We can see tlic
change in the men who have
joined Kitchener's Army. It
has happened in front of our
very eyes. Men who have
spent all their days before in
office and shop, some of whom
spent nearly all their time in
underground rooms away
from sunshine and fresh air,
have become changed beings.
They have grown, thej' have
straightened, they have filled
out. They are leading a life
at last — not an existence. It
needs but the briefest glimpse
of the faces as one of the new
battalions swings through the
streets on a route march to
prove this. Has the war come
as the Uberator of thousands
of men from lives that were
not worth the Uving ? One
wonders. In any case, it is
hard to believe that when
once it is over they will settle
down to the old drab routine
once more. They are playmg the greater game, and the old
hmitations are fading in consequence. Nobody can wish
them back or regret this change the war has brought. In
this particular way its influence is golden, and even a drab
routine should melt beneath the glow.
Those Who Stay at Home
The frame of mind of the non-combatant population is
more difficult to gauge. To the foreign temperament it
must be baffling, if not indecipherable. We, of course, know
from our personal experience that this war has bitten deep
into the lives of the greater majority of people. We know
that in scores of cases it has left traces which will never
pass away from the lives of those it has seared. We realise
that days yet to come will bring this branding iron into
many a home as the casualty lists grow bigger. We see
numbers of people being called upon to display courage and
fortitude to an almost unlimited extent ; we are witnesses
to the way in which they do it, but are as silent in our
admiration as they are in theu" grief. The discipline of war
is no mere term, but the most tangible of realities, as many
are proving day after day. And yet to the untrained eye it
would certainly seem as if nothing out of the ordinary were
happening. We can hardly blame our visitors from abroad
if they are deceived by this lack of demonstration. We can,
indeed, hardly wonder if they are irritated by it. It must
be irritating— intensely so ; the least imaginative person can
see it. Even those of our Allies who pride themselves upon
Copyright, Madame Lai'ie ChatUb
THE MARCHIONESS OF LINLITHGOW
Though she is engaged wilh many philanthropic schemes at Hcpetoun
House, South Queensterry, Lady Linliihgow finds time to help
in the hospital work abroad. She has raised a fund in
aid of the French hospitals, and medical stores are
being sent across the Channel twice a week
And yet the change this war
is making in all our lives is an
immense one — so immense
that nobody can calculate it.
Only time will give the answer
to the sum, and perhaps it
wiU never be finally suppHed.
A Letter from Belgium
A short while ago men-
tion was made in this article
of the Hector Munro Ambu-
lance Corps. Last week a
letter was received from two
officers in the Belgian Army,
which I have great pleasure
in repeating word for word.
They ask that their names
shall not be published, for
reasons they themselves give,
at the end of the letter. It
runs as follows :
" We have just received the
number of Land and Water of
the 27tti of February. We read
in this number, under the title
" Through the Eyes of a Woman.
Good Work in Belgium," an
article on Lady Dorothy Feilding
and Doctor Munro, who, since the
beginning of the war, have been
so devoted to all our wounded,
and we are enchanted to see
that through your newspaper the
names of these two braves shall
be known. But we both think
that to be just you should add
three other names to those two :
Miss Mary Chisolm, Mrs. Gleason,
and Mrs. Knocker.
These three voluntary nurses
have established their ambulance
in Pervyse quite near the trenches.
Pervyse is shelled every day, but,
nevertheless, they remain and
help day and night our wounded
and sick men, going near the
trenches to pick them up. They
are billeted in a room in a ruined
house, and we believe theirnames
must be known as an example of
devotion and abnegation.
We should like you not to publish our names under this letter,
lor we do not want these three ladies to know that we wrote you."
Such a tribute straight from the headquarters of the Belgian
Army shows that the fine work being done by Englishwomen
amongst the wounded in Belgium is fully appreciated.
Girls' Patriotic Clubs
The helping hand is being stretched out in all directions ;
it is one of the cheering notes of these difficult times. ]Many
signs have made it obvious that the need for girls' clubs in
the many new military centres is a great one. Once these
are formed they will provide a place to which girls can take
their men friends, in which they can find books to read,
papers to see, to say nothing of the comradeship of their
own sex. A committee on behalf of the clubs is working
at 33 Park Lane, W. In order to raise the necessary funds
an alphabetical scheme has been drawn up. Twenty-six
well-known ladies have offered to receive donations from
those whose names have the same initial letter as their own.
A full list of these will soon be published. Meanw'hile the
work has many influential friends to help it on its way.
Lady Sydenham is the honorary treasurer, and Miss Emily
Kinnaird, with her great knowledge of social work, is taking
a leading part in the movement.
Women's United Service Clubs
So many leagues and societies have been founded for
the public weal during the last few months that Lady Jellicoe
iConltnued un pa/f SfiOJ
37»
LAND AND WATER
March 20, 191^
A USEFUL STEED DURING
THE WAR.
The Royal Lady's Sunbeam
With the Little Oil 'Bath Gear=Case
£12 12 0 ^^ Speed Gear
The Easiest Running Lady's Cycle in the World.
The All-black pattern for use in all weathers is
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Illustrated Catalogue on application to Dept.
3 SUNBEAMLAND, WOLVERHAMPTON.
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Which shall it be?
BRITISH
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OR
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**My heart's right there.''
Your Soldier friend off to the Front, or at the Front —
has he a Waterman's Ideal ? If not, much as he may
desire to write to you, the most convenient means of
doing so is missing. Send him a Waterman's Ideal, so
that he can write as his heart dictates, clearly, quickly,
and without trouble.
Foun^^riPen
Send the Safety Type — it can be carried loose
in the pocket in any position and will not leak.
A LANCE-GORPL. IN THE
ROYAL FUSILIERS, writing
to his brother, said :
"Can you send me a Fountain
Ten? The Pens here are no good.
}yhenever I want to write there are
four or jive of our fellows buzzing
7-ou7id the inkwell.
He got a Waterman's Ideal
(Safety Type), and is delighted
with it.
1 0/6 ^nd upwards for
Regular and Self-
Filling Types.
12/6 ^^'^ upwards for
Safety and Pump-
Filling Types.
Of Stationers and Jewellers every-
where. Booklet free from —
L. G. SLOAN,
"Che^cn Writer"
Kingsway, London, W.C.
Hotel Cecil
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Telephone: GERRARD 60. ^PP'i/. MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
37-1
March 20, 1915.
LAND AND SI A T E R.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.— Thi« Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, wiilcb does not object to the publlcatioa as ccuered, aod (akei n
respsaslbiiity for the correctness ol the statements.
la accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans ll!ustraflnj« this Article molt only b»
rcfiardcd as approiioiate, and no definite strength at any point is Indicated.
...yf
100 IrijIlsE Miles
3ei£ort
THE IWO ACTIONS OF LA BAS&EE AND
PERTHES IN CHAMPAGNE.
THERE has been fought in the last few
days by the British and Indian forces
north of La Bassee, against the Bavarians
and a remnant of the Prussian Guard,
an action which is highly significant of tlie ends
to which all trench v.arfare in the west is designed.
Let us try and see what happened.
At the beginning of last week. Monday and
Tuesday, the "8th and 9th, the heavy French
fighting one hundred miles to the south of the
British positions in Champagne had come to its
climax and had achieved it» purpose. It is im-
portant to cast one's eye to that distant point,
because, as will be seen in the sequel, what the
British did near La Bassee was closely co-
ordinated with the French effort in Champagne,
and the two together exactly illustrate the now
successful plan of attrition to which so many
months of effort have been directed.
This heaw French action in the Champagne
district had drawn down to the German front
reinforcing troops from all along the line, but in
particular e^st of that country in front of Lille,
between Ypi-es and La Bassee itself, ^^hich is
where the German line faced the British Expedi-
tionary force.
During those same days of Monday and
Tuesday, upon the left of the British line — that
is, in the neighbourhood of Ypres and somewhat
to the south of that neighbourhood near Armen-
tiferes — pressure had been exercised upon the
enemy of a little more than normal kind, and, in
the words of the description upon which all this
is based, a definite mastery over the enemy in this
section had been obtained. He had, it may be
presumed, been led to expect further movement
here — let us say, between Ypres and Armentieres.
and on the night of the Tuesday a small body of
the enemy made a counter-move upon St. Eloi, just
outside Ypres, which was repelled.
But with the morning of Wednesday, tho
10th, it was apparent that the plan designed by
the British command was of a different character
from what the enemy expected, and that as a great
effort was about to be made, not upon the left and
left centre between Armentiferes and Ypres, but
upon the extreme right in the neighbourhood of
and to the north of La Bassee, where for some
time past the enemy's pressure upon the allied
line (which here joins its two contingents, the
French and Britisli) has been particularly strong.
1»
LAND AND .W. A T E R.
March 20, 1915.
The line in the iiuniediate neighbourhood of
this field, beginning with the canal between La
Bassee and Bethune, ran somewhat as follows (so
far as can be gathered by an observer at horns
from the French and English reports). It started
from the neighbourhood of Cuinchy just north of
StVcLOst
L'Avoiie'
Tetubert
Qlveachy®
C/iafeauof .
VermeUes »
^£kK^
4^
/
I I m
3 § ^
IJi I.. Ti lU Wll *
Iij^OsH Miles
that slight slope of land which the French car-
ried some weeks ago, when they took the ruined
chateau of Vermelles. The trenches covered the
little village of Givenchy and then ran down the
slope upon which this place is built on to the
marshy flat just west of Festubert (which the Ger-
mans foolishly and Flemishly spell with an h). This
point in front of Festubert represents the extreme
of the indentation which the local German suc-
cesses caused in the allied line in an attack they
delivered mainly against the Indian troops some
.weeks ago. From this extreme point it went
north-eastward again, not far from the lane that
leads from the church of Festubert to the high
road on the east, passing by the group of scat-
tered houses near Quinquerue; thence it went
north, still with a little east in it, covering the
'tv;o Richebourgs, until it struck the high road
about a kilometre behind Neuve Chapelle church.
[Tlience it ran off due north-east to the Barn Wood,
or Bois de Grenier. It was in this small section
that the chief effort was to be made. If the reader
,w ill look at the accompanying sketch map he will
eee that the importance of the salient held by the
Germans round La Bassee largely consists in the
railway facilities of the place. (See Plan III.) It
is fed by lines whicli supply it from the neighbour-
hood of Lille on the north-east and Douai on the
south-east, which lines support one another
in a whole system of communications, all based
on the main railway which runs from Douai to
Lille. It will further be seen that, so far as the
communications with Lille are concerned (and
Lille is, of course, the principal depot for all this
part of the German front), the junction outside
the village of Don is of great importance. There
concentrate upon it the two lines leading to Lille
from La Bassee as well as the lines from the
south and the line from Formelles in the north.
That is why Don was bombarded by British air-
men. Much stress has been laid upon the high
road which also runs from La Bassee northward
to Estaires, but this is not of any great import-
ance, for it ends, so far as the Germans are con-
cerned, in the air, being cut by the allied trenches
about five miles from La Bassee and before it
reaches any source of supply. It is, hovrever,
true that a smaller road coming in and join-
ing this main road from Estaires at Neuve
Chapelle somewhat relieves the pressure u}X)n the
main road north-eastward out of La Bassee, which
is the chief artery of transport communication
with Lille.
Before the action began the village of Neuve
Chapelle, and the church which is its centre, lay
between the two lines of trenches, British and
German, the British holding apparently the
line marked A B in the sketch on page 4,
and the Germans the main village street marked
C D. It was about half-past seven in the morn-
ing of .Wednesday, the 10th, that the action
opened with a very heavy and concentrated fire
from the larger guns and from the howitzers
behind the British lines, parallel upon a smaller
scale to the corresponding deluge of heavy
artillery fire which opened each of the great recent
actions in Champagne. This rafale (if one
may apply that term to heavy artillery, which
more properly belongs to the work of field bat-
teries) continued for over half an hour. It so
dominated the German trenches that it quenched
their fire while it was proceeding, and on the same
evidence the men of the British trenches Avere free
to move at will during that period. Shortly after
eight o'clock, following upon this preparation, the
assault was launched, and was immediately
successful, the whole group of German trenches,
roughly in three lines, falling into tlie hands of
the British, save at one point, which held out till
noon. This point, which thus continued until
midday to form the resisting angle in tlie midst
of the Britisli advance, would seem to have lain
somewhere near the point marked with an X upon
the sketch map IV., and it was maintained against
three separate attacks. It fell at last to the
arrival of reinforcements, and the whole line
straightened out from a point about a mile and a
half north of Neuve Chapelle, south-westward, to
more than half a mile in front of the village. On
the south of this movement, another advance from
the southern of the two Richebourgs all but reached
the little wood called the Bois de Biez, while in
the afternoon, upon the north, again in front of
Neuve Chapelle, another advance covered a
further four hundred yards of ground. Mean-
while one point in the line had continually held
against the British advance, and this was the
cross roads at Z (see plan IV.), where the village
street falls into the main Estaires road and comes
on towards Richebourg I'Avoue. The enemy here,
held out till half-past five in the afternoon,
and the place was only carried by nightfall.
The total result of the operations will seem to have
been the occupation of a belt shaded upon the
small map opposite. The next day very violent
efforts upon the part of the enemy were made to
recover the lost ground, the strongest being made
2»
March 20, 1915.
E AND AND .W A T E R.
si
from the cover of the Biez wood. But the enemy;
failed to debouch from Ihis point against the
shelling of the wood by the British batteries on
the village of Neuve Chapelle itself.
Richebourg ^S) *^
*-■«{
£ichcbom^@)
L'Avone
Festiibert®
.« 4. 8
MOea:
e occupied
bq advance
A heav}' fire from the German field batteries
was directed on the village, but did not result in
the recovery of any ground. The operation
resulted in the capture of some 1,700 prisoners,
and this seems to have been the result of the direc-
tion of the attacks being both to the north and to
the south of the village; at least, that is the
French account. The result of these efforts above
and below the built-upon area being to surround,
when they closed upon the east, a considerable
body of the enemy still fighting among the build-
ings themselves.
As to the developments following upon this
considerable action, they have been, so far as the
enemy is concerned, slight up to the moment of
writing. One violent attack delivered at St.
Eloi put the enemy, for the second time since
the trench work began, in possession of the houses
of that village. The attack was made by the
LWurtembergers, and v/as carried out in the dense
masses of that tactical formation which the enemy
cannot abandon, because it is the strongest thing
in his tradition. It was upon Sunday night that
the effort was made. It was preceded, of course,
by a heavy bombardment, both of the trenches
themselves and of the town of Ypres, behind or
near which, presumably, were stored the muni-
tions which supplied the trenches to the south.
iTlie retirement from the village in the face
LAND AND BE A T E R,
March 20, 1915,
both of these very superior numbers and of a
threatened envelopment upon the Monday took
place during the darkness. Before dawn the
arrival of reinforcements permitted of a counter-
attack, which was partially successful, and by
daylight the whole of the village was recaptured
and the greater part of the trenches in front of
it, from which the British had l^een driven, were
also reduced.
_ Such is the mere recital of the event. St.
Eloi, just south of Ypres, has been carried by the
^'"urtembergers and inunediately recovered by the
BritisJi. The line which ran "in and re-entered
behind Neuve Chapelle now bulges into a sliglit
salient in front of it, and the ground gained at
the maximum width of thisbelt (the fighting was
against the Bavarians and the remnant of the
Guard) is about 1,500 yards.
But the character of the action is of much
greater moment than its scale, and it is to an
analysis of that character. we shall next turn.
We note, in the first place, how much
dei)ended in it upon the .superiority in the air
vvhich the British forces have established for
themselves.
^ The deluging of the enemy trenches with
heavy shell, which was the characteristic of the
opening phase, and which was designed in exacE
co-ordination with and upon the same general
lactic as the plan adopted by the French a
hundred miles further along the line, had only
the value which it had because the positions
of the enemy trenches had been exactly dis-
covered and marked, and because at the begin-
ning of such a deluge the machines in the air
could send word of the first eflfects of the fire.
Anyone who knows that fogg\', ungrateful,
marshy land of Flanders, where every debate
of Western Europe has been fought out for
a thousand years, knows what its sky and air
commonly mean in the winter months and how an
observation from above nnist, upon most days, be
conducted wdth peculiar hardihood and with a
peculiar sense of mastery over an enemy's power
to reply whether from the ground or from the
sky.
But this superiority in air work which the
British have now finally, and for a long time past,
achieved is further proved in another indii'ect
and most interesting fashion.
Before the successful and violent attack upon
Neuve Chapelle was launched there was an enor-
mous concentration of material. One does not pro-
duce an artillery hell of that sort from heavy pieces! "
4*
?ne"v«*^pv«
March 20, 1915.
LAND AND W A T E li.
English Miles
■71
without a vast previous ac<?umulation of transport
to feed the big guns and the howitzers which are
going to do the damage. In the earlier part of the
war such an accumulation would haA^e been
spotted by the enemy. His air work was still the
equal of ours, and often its superior. It is the
sharp characteristic of tliis last piece of business
that the enemy was taken completely by surprise.
He seems to have had no idea that a concentration
of this sort was going on right in front of him.
He seems to have been completely taken in by tlie
small demonstrations south of Ypres on the
Monday and the Tuesday before the big attack
was launched upon the Wednesday and fought
its way to a conclusion on the Thursday.
It has next to be remarked that the handling
of the heavy artillery, when it did come into play,
was evidently superior to that of the correspond-
ing large pieces upon the enemy's side, and that
the munitions, for which there has been so anxious
a call from the front, must have arrived in an
increased stream.
It is further to be noted that the action con-
tradicts what many serious observers had feared
—namely, that the long winter trench work would
destroy the power for vigorous attack in the men
who had suffered it. That has been the experi-
ence of most wars in the past, and it was feared
that it might be the ex[)erienc^ of this war.
Lastly, the move shows in a particularly lucid
manner the working of that policy of attrition to
which such frequent allusion has been made in
these pages. But that is so important a point that
it deserves a separate passage, for we can seek for
no better opportunity of examining the method at
work.
THE POLICY OF "ATTRITION."
The truth is that the two combined actions,
that in Champagne and that north of La Bassee,
give a very clear model, upon a rather large scale,
5*
of the v,'orking of that policy which has been al
the back of all the allied effort in the West since
the beginning of Uecember, and since the enemy
confined himself in the West to holding his line
while using all his available men for his greater
effort against the Russians — an effort so far
fruitless. That policv is, as we know, the policy,
of " attrition."
Everybody knows in general what that word
means in connection with the trench warfare. It
means the wearing down of the enemy's numbers
and qualities until he shall no longer be able to
hold the great length of trenches— over four
hundred miles long — to which he is now pinned.
When he can no longer hold that line he must
shorten it — a perilous operation, further involv-
ing the loss of territory he now keeps in Belgium
and France, or it will break, and in either case
the critical moment will be the opportunity for
the launch of the main eft'ort against him.
The enemy, upon his side, is fighting in the
East for a decision to enable him to push back
troops West Ijefore that policy of " attrition "
shall have imperilled him in the West, and if ho
can, in time, do this, the policy of attrition has
failed ; but if, on account of his losses in the East,
or of his being detained there too long, or of the
renewed equipment of our Eussian ally, in greatex'
efforts with the freeing of icebound ports or tlie
forcing of the Dardanelles, he fails to strengthen
himself sufficiently in the AVest in time, then it is
the policy of " attrition " which will decide the
war.
It behoves us, if v,e are to understand the
campaign in the West, to see clearly what is meant
by this policy. You wear down your enemy by^
causing him numerical losses in men and in
material, and moral loss in strain, sickness, and
fatigue.
Now, it is clear that you can thus wear down
your enemy by continually attacking him, but it is
also, unfortunately, clear that you only do so at a
certain expense to yourself. And if that expense
is equal or superior to that of the enemy you are
not succeeding in your policy of " attrition " at
all. For you are using more men than he is, and
that is something which, seeing that he still has a
numerical support in the whole field, would be a
disastrous fault leading straight to defeat.
The policy thus can only be successful if you
are making the enemy lose upon the whole, and
taking the entire front upon aji average, consider-
ably more men in the process of " nibbling " than
you are losing, and can make him suffer a greater
strain than you are suffering.
At first sight it v.'ould seem that this was
impossible, for the attack to which you are con-
tinually condemned in such a method is noimially
more expensive than the defence.
But there are certain elements of the exact
situation in the West which, if they are co-
ordinated, would be .seen to offer an opportunity
for the success of this policy, although it involves
continual attack.
These elements are as follows : —
1. The enemy is hot working in the West
with a large reserve. He must use all the men he
can possibly spare for getting, as quickly as pos-
sible, his decision upon the East. He is, there-
fore, presumably holding his line with only just
the number of men he requires for that purpose
and is keeping no considerable number unem>»
LAND AND WATER.
March 20, 1915.
ployed behmd that line, upon the chance of using
the":n lat^r. r. .l i*
2. He requires for the holding of the Ime
a considerable force on account of his military
t)-adition and of his school of war. The type of
discipline whicli jiromotes and enforces close
foi-mation in attack, and which reduces to its
lowest value individual initiative in the soldier,
has great merits in war, as this campaign has
proved; but it has certain inevitable defects, one
of which is that you must always pack your men,
even when you are defending.
3. The allied air work and the allied grow-
ing supply of heavy pieces and their munition
combined has given their heavy artillery clear
superiority in the West over that of the enemy.
4. It 'is accepted that the sanitary condition
of the enemy is in the West gravely inferior at
this moment to our own. I do not bring forward
the evidence for this ; I only state it as it has been
told to me, and I !.>elieve it to be a true statement
upon the evidence I have heard.
Now, put all this together, and observe what
follows upon it if the policy of " attrition " is con-
ducted in a certain manner.
Suppose upon a particular section of the
front, such as that in the Champagne district, the
light chalk upland, some twenty to forty miles
east of Eheims, you order for a certain short
priod an attack "to te delivered on the German
lines. You are not intended to break through.
You may break through by a bit of luck, but that
. is not your main object. Your main object is only,
for the moment, to make the enemy in this field
lose more men than you are about to expend.
In the first place, your assault is backed by
lieavy artillery far superior to his own. He loses
heavily from that.
In the second })lace, it is so important for
him to preserve his line (where, by definition, he is
upon the defensive) that he will mass men in very
considerable numbers against you so as to be cer-
tain of ensuring his line against breaking.
In the third place, he can only obtain men by
borrowing all up and down the line. He cannot
borrow from a large reserve, for by definition he
has not got a reserve. His whole plan excludes
it. He can only get the greater part, at least, of
his reinforcements by sending for units to all sorts
of places between the Swiss mountains and the
East. It takes him some time to effect that con-
centration, and until he has effected it he will not
admit a counter offensive, because all the tra-
ditions of his service foi'bid this until he has
secured a considerable superiority of number.
In the fourth place, when he has so concen-
trated a very great number against your develop-
ing attack, he will, by his consistently dense
formation vvhen lie takes the counter offensive,
lose more heavily than you in your open order.
In the fifth place, the superiority of the allied
field artillery will particularly try him during
such rushes, and that superiority is amply
assured.
Finally, not only does he thus lose very
heavily in maintaining his ground, first by a pre-
carious defence, and afterwards by a dense
counter offensive in the section where the first
attack was delivered, but the other sections from
which he has borrowed are all more or less
weakened. Some one or more of them will be more
weakened than the rest, and the chances are that
these local weaknesses will be discovered and
taken advantage of. Tlic allies in that distant
section will deliver an attack ultimately depend-
ing on, and produced by, the main attack far
away, and if the weakness of the enemy at the
])oint of this secondary attack has been pushed too
far he will run the risk of heavy local losses
there.
Now a])ply this to the two sections— the
main one in Champagne, the secondary one
at La Bassee, and the plan of " attrition " becomes
clear in that excellent double model.
In the fii'st place, it becomes clear that the
great action in Champagne brought down the
enemy's numbers there by a prodigious amount,
probably not less than 50,000 men.
And in the second place, it becomes equally,
clear that this action in Champagne drew men
from the north, and precisely from that region
where at the very moment that the action of
Champagne ceased the British offensive was taken
round Neuve Chapelle, just north of La Bassee.
As to the first point, we have the elements
for an exact calculation.
The full French account, as published for
official information in France, gives us a very
accurate list of the forces which the Germans
brought up upon this front, and we have further
information, to some extent, from the sanie
source, of the points from which the German rein-
forcements were drawn when the French attack
began on the 16th February. The Germans had
here 119 battalions, 31 squadrons, and 64 field bat-
teries, 20 batteries of heavy guns. In the chief
effort, the three weeks that the main action lasted,
they further brought up twenty more battalions
of cavalry, six of which were of the Guards, two
more batteries of heavy guns, also of the Guards,
and a whole reo-iment oi field artillery — not less
than the equivalent of a full army corps.
The total number of men of every arm con-
centrated upon this narrow front in the course of
this devastating piece of fighting was not less than
200,000, and probably as much as 220.000 men,
and of those, certainly one-fifth — probably nearly
a quarter— were to be found in the casualty lists
before the achievement of the French purpo.se.
For if 10,000 dead w-ere accounted for, as they,
were wathin the zone v/hich the French could per-
sonally survey and tabulate, you have not less than
12,000 at the very least over the whole action, and
it is not credible, even in violent and close fighting
of this kind, that the proportion of wounded to
dead was much less than 3 to 1. It would be very
astonishing if it were any less — that is, excluding
unwounded prisoners.
As to the districts from which the Germans
hurriedly drew their reinforcements when the
front in question was beginning to be pressed in,
the French have been able to identify at least stj)
batteries of field artillery, six battalions of the
Guard, and tvjo heavy batteries of the Guard as
having come from the district in front of tho,
British trenches in the North.
There is another way in which we can esti-
mate what the German losses were upon this
front. The Germans have informed us (and one
sees no particular reason to believe that the infor-
mation is inaccurate when it tells against them)
that the losses in Champagne in those days ex-
ceeded the German losses during the recent heavy
fighting along the East Prussian frontier. Now,
though the Germans were successful in that fight-
ing in the East until their reverse before Pzrasnyz
6»
March 20, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
at the end of February, yet it is no exaggeration
to estimate their totaf losses at more than 40,000.
They were handling in East Prussia eertainly ten,
and, according to the latest official French" esti-
mates, fourteen army corps, and it is not to be
believed that a force of nearly or more than half a
million men fighting thus day after day against a
determined enemy, tliough successful, could have
lost less than 10 per cent. We must further add
to the fourteen array corps which the French
calculate to have been present together in East
Prussia three independent divisions of cavalry.
Lastly, the French note a further piece of evidence,
converging towards exactly the same result — to
wit, the employment of at least five German army
corps against them at this point, and that cer-
tainly, for among their prisoners they they have
discovered men belonging to that total number of
separate corps.
It is worthy of remark that the Guard seem
to have suffered specially heavily, as might have
been expected, seeing that these troops, of the best
quality, were called in towards the end and most
murderous part of the struggle to reinforce the
sorely-tried German front. It is probable that
two regiments of the Guard ceased to exist as in-
dependent units. There is proof, for instance,
that in one regiment — the second of this famous
body — certain units had to be dealt with as
follows : —
The second and the fifth companies were
eliminated. The remains of the first, the sixth,
and the seventh were drafted into one new com-
pany, composed of all that \\as left of these three.
Note, however, before we leave this business,
that the whole affair was a gradual advance, very
well contested by an enemy still determined; for
though numerous machine guns were captured, as
one trench after another was carried, not a single
piece of field artillery was lost by the enemy, and
after a check so serious we may legitimately regard
that as proof of the discipline and orderly nature
of its resistance, even to the end of the violent
conflict.
As to the second point, the weakening of the
German line in the north by this action in Cham-
pagne, and the advantage that could therefore be
taken near La Bassee of such weakening by the
English, we know that quite six thousand men
and a brigade of artillery, together with two
batteries of heavj- guns, came from this neighbour-
hood down into the Champagne district to the
reinforcement of the Germans there pressed by the
French advance. The prisoners and tlie dead
have, as we have seen. Ijeen sufficient to establish
what units they were that were thus borrowed from
Flanders for the defence of the German position
upon the front bet\\een Souain and Ville-sur-
Tourbe, and the exact correspondence Ix^tween the
twenty days of French effort east of Rheims and
the succeeding four days of British effort south of
Lille is fully established.
THE RATE OF WAST.\GR.
We must not omit, in the presence of such
news, a furtiier reference to the rate of the enemy's
v.astage. The policy which hojies to continue that
v.ast.ige at a greater pc\ce than our own lias
already been described, but the absolute rate of
wastage is not to be despised, for upon it will also
depend, as well as upon the proportionate rate,
the ultimate exhaustion of the eneinv.
In other words, we not only depend upon
^vearing him down faster than we wear ourselves
down, we also depend upon wearing him down at
at least sucli a pace that he shall be embarrassed
to within some defined and limited time in the
holding of his present positions.
Observe that the detail of these two actions
reported by the British and the French respec-
tively have teen only two sections of his line, the
one but a front of twelve miles, the other but a
front of four, at the most, and accounted within
a space of little over three weeks for nearly 70,000
men. the British estimate being, after a careful
examination of the enemy's evident losses in the
La Bassee district from the recent action, not less
than 17,000, and perhaps 18,000.
Now, 70,000 men is nearly the equivalent of
two full army corps, and the total line upon which
this kind of thing is being carried on is not to be
measured in sections of twelve or fourteen miles. It
is 400 miles long in the West. It is anything from
700 to 900 (according to its sinuosities) long in the
East, and in the East the enemy losses have been
further accentuated, during the winter at least,
by the difficulties his ambulance work has experi-
enced. It is reported (and the report has nothing
im.probable about it) that the enemy's ambulance
\\-ork at one moment in front of Warsaw com-
pletely broke down. In those empty plains so ill-
provided with roads in the best "weather (and
during the recent succession of frost and thaw a
mass of Napoleon's " Polish mud ") the succouring
of the wounded must have been a task far more
difficult of accomplishment than it was in the
highly-organised and fully-developed West, and
we Icnow that the type of attack and the propor-
tion of losses was not less, but more, than it has
recently been in the West. It rather resembled the
violent assaults upon the line of tlie Yser which
niarked the end of October and tlie middle of
November.
What the total rate of v/astage has been from
the Bukowina to the Baltic in these four months
of incessant struggle we tiave no statistics to tell
us — not even a general guess is possible; but we
are quite safe in saying that the proportionate
rate has teen double that in the West and the
absolute rate treble. What more it may have been
we cannot tell.
Now the significance of such wastage lies in
this. That the enemy is now really fighting for
time as he never was at the beginning ol" the cam-
paign, though our Press v/as too fond of record-
ing it as the cliief element then present in t!ie
struggle. It needs but the arrival of munitions
and the increase of equipment for additions A'ery
large indeed to appear in the Russian line, and
these additions should te coincident with the drier
weather following upoji the thaw of the spring.
And at the same time should appear the new con-
tingents in the West — that is, the recently trained
younger French levy, and the much larger new
British armies. It is a sort of race between the
advent of all these reinforcements to the Allies
and the pace at which the wastage of the enemy is
continued. lie cannot reinforce — whatever our
alarmist Press may say~at anything like the rate
or to anything like tile amcniiit whicli tlie Allies
can reinforce wlien once equipment and munitions
reach the Russians, and when once our own new
contingents are fully fitted out for service abroiid.
Every such piece of news as that from Cham-
7*
LAND AND ,W. A T E R.
March 20, 1915
paf^ne or from La Bass^e, though it does not mean
and is not intended to mean the approaching
breaking of the German line, does mean the
further grave ^Yeakenin^ of the total force witii
Avhich the enemy can hope to meet the mam
advance when the moment for that mam advance
has sounded.
TH2 GERMAN AND FRENCH
COMMUNIQUES.
There has been given us during tliis week in
connection with the movement just described a
very excellent example of the contrast between the
German and French official communiques; and
■we shall do well to compare the two, not because it
is profitable to abuse an enemy or praise an ally,
but because our judgment of the war is largely
based upon the official couimuniques issued by the
five principal belligerent ))owcrs, as an apprecia-
tion of their methods is essential to such a
judgment.
It has already been pointed out in these
columns some weeks ago that the French and
German communiques are distinguished by two
elements in the German report :
First, it is detailed and accurate in certain
particulars, and lias maintained that accuracy
from the beginning of the war.
Second, it contains statements often detailed,
but deliberately and positively false.
It is, Ave may remark in passing, to no purpose
to abuse the enemy for this second feature. It is a
feature deliberately inserted with a legitimate
military purpose — to wit, the confusion of the
enemy.
Now to this second feature thei-e has been
added in an increasing degree during the last few
months a third feature, which it is important for
us to note particularly if we desire to follow the
state of mind and the aims of the enemy since the
war entered its present pliase. This third feature,
as has been also pointed out in these columns, con-
sists in vague statements applying to large opera-
tions in a general fashion, and apparently betray-
ing a puzzling lack of judgment in a people who
have so carefullj^ considered all the clianccs of this
great war, which is of their own making and
brought about at their own chosen hour.
The features of the French communique can,
I think, be put down with equal simplicity. The
French communique has for its cardinal character
the omission of all things wliatsoever that may be
of advantage to the enemy. However indirect this
advantage, it is avoided by a reticence puslied to a
degree which would perhaps be impossible any-
where else than in France. For the French con-
ception of national discipline, utterly different
from the German (for it is spontaneous), is quite
as severe and certainly more practical.
Coupled with this reticence, the French com-
munique often admits deliberately optimistic
explanations of a reverse or check. I mean that
it does not only keep silent about numbers, casual-
ties, movements, and so forth, but it will fre-
quently counter adverse rumour by publishing an
official explanation intended to support the
national temper.
We must remark tliat (as is to be expected)
this second feature in the French communique has
been less frequent during the last phase of the war
than at the moment of great trial in the first weeks
of active operations.
Lastly, we note a feature increasingly common
in the French communique since the correspond-
ing feature appeared in the German com-
njuniques— I mean the detailed reply to those
detailed false statements which the enemy has
recently increased in number.
Now, in order to have a reasonable estimate
of both witnesses in this series of evidence, we
must, if possible, estimate not only their habits,
but their motives for these habits.
Why does the German communique show^ the
features we have noted in it ?
Why does the French communique show the
features" we have noted in it ?
The accuracy in detail which is a uniform
feature of the earlier German communiques, and
wdiich is still a leadijig feature in the present ones,
proceeds, I think, fi-om a tendency observable in
all niodern Gorman work, which tendency a friend
would call " thoroughness " and an enemy " plod-
ding." As in their historical works and in many
other departments of modern German activity, so
in these military records, the modern Germans
have an appetite for detail, and whenever you con-
sider detail vou are unusually inclined to accuracy
in detail. It is indeed the 'mark of too close an
attention to detail in any de])aitment of tliought
that, w-hile your genera) judgment is often im-
paired by it, your jirecision of jiarticular state-
ment is improved. And, other things being equal,
a German official ve?(U'd will usually be more
trustworthy for its details, will contain less errors
due to emotion, fatigue, or laziness, than will
corresponding records oi" other societies.^
In a mood which does not lend itself to false-
hood, or in the absence of motives for the same, the
German communique lias been thoroughly trust-
worthy.
What, tlien, of the inaccurate elements which
we have noted ?
It has been pointed out frequently in these
columns that the main motive in this has been the
misleading of tlie enemy commanders by state-
ments which may be accepted for the short time
by those comman'dci-s, and would, if accepted, dis-
turb their plans.
For instance, the enemy receives a severe
check, loses a great number of men and guns, and
is occupied in a confused and too rapid rci:ire-
ment. His commanders ai-e not for some little
time able to compute the exact extent of their
losses. If the moment be immediately seized and
the Germans ])ublish estimated losses much larger
than the true ones, and as mucli as the enemy can
be got to believe during this period of confusion,
it must affect that enemy's plans adversely, and
this fact is magnified if, intermixed with tho
exaggeration, you mingle undoubtedly true bits of
statistics. For instance, you say : —
" In the lake near Lotzen we discovered such
and such a number of heavy pieces which the
enemy had throw^n in during his retreat, l^cause
he could not take them away with him, and we
captured such and such a number of unv.ounded
prisoners."
The commander of the defeated and retiring
force surveys the great confusion of his command
and knov.s that he has lost \cry heavily, and is,
perhaps, ready to accept, for forty-eight hours or
so, bei'ore tlie full statistics come in, the figures
given by his adversary. He cannot well tell of the
men mitising, what proportion are killed, what
wounded, and what unw(.)unded prisoners. If the
8»
March 20, 1915.
LAND A X D .W A T E R.
? proportion of the latter be very high, it may make
lim believe that the moral of his forces has been
seriously affected. Meanwhile he docs know that
the heav^' guns in question ivcvc thrown into the
lake, and his knowledge of this detail tends to
make him accejit the rest.
Finally, if things are not going as civilian
opinion has been led to expect, it is of both mili-
tary and political importance to reassure that
opinion as best one can. No Government and no
General Staff neglects that duty; and what we
have to remember in the German performance of
it is not so much the exaggeration or inaccuracy
as the curious clumsiness (as it seems to us) which
marks this third feature.
For instance, after such a communique as
that which I liave just quoted, there may be added
some such phrase as " the enejny is now dis-
persed and our troops are occupied in collecting
the enormous booty left behind in his rout.' This
phrase may correspond to a very different reality.
In point of fact, perhaps what liappened was that
the German force, having got too far from its
real head, was ahead of its supplies, and was
unable to make good a vigorous pursuit. But the
truth is put in this more flattering fashion in order
to reassure opinion at home and to console it for
the absence of further favourable developments.
When we turn to the communique the Ger-
mans have issued with regard to the prolonged
French effort upon the Souain — Ville-sur-Tourbe
front (it lasted for the ten days from the 26th
February to the 8th ]^Iarch), we get an excellent
example of all these features. We are told that
the French fired about 100.000 heavy shell. That
is accurate. We are next told that the front was
at first held by " two weak Rhine divisions "
against a quarter of a million men. This is a false-
hood so large and clear that at the first reading
it astonishes one: but the motive of telling it is
soon apparent, and from its character we can
judge the nature of similar statements in other
evidence of the same sort. It does not need any
detailed proof to assure all the soldiers, and even
most raei-e students of war, that the front in ques-
tion could not possibly haA^e been held in that
fashion. Two depleted divisions means something
less than 30,000 men — i.e., something less than
2,000 men a mile. Further, the point in question
was not held ; it gave way. But the statement is
not without a cause. It has for its main object the
confusion or mis-information of the French com-
manders, who know perfectly well that it is non-
sense. It has for its object the heartening of
domestic opinion. Hence the sentimental detail of
the district from which the defenders were drawn.
iWe shall appreciate, however, that sucli statement
is not as clumsy as it looks when we remember that
the German civilian population cannot, any
more than the French or our own, hear the full
truth, or indeed any truth which their Govern-
ment does not desire them to hear. It will un-
doubtedly prove, when we can get the real facts in
detail in some official history of the war, that
troops from the Rhine provinces were present;
that they withstood in some part of the field a very
formidable assault for some little time ; that they
behaved with gallantry; and that, perhaps, they
were for the moment isolated from .support. It
will also probably appear that about this time
there was danger of grumbling in the Rhine pro-
vinces, and that this emphasis upon the deeds of
the troops from that district was of political ad-
vantage to the German Government.
Xext turn to the statement in the same com-
numique that over 2.000 unwounded French
prisoners were taken. That may be true, or it may
not. Most probably it is untrue, because in a pro-
longed but successful advance a capture of this
sort, though quite possible, is unlikely : it is rather
the kind of thing you get in a retirement. But the
French commanders can hardly have a positive
knowledge upon the subject. They will discover
that a certain number of men are missing, and the
more the enemy can get them to believe there are
missing unwounded the more they may affect tlie
French commander's judgment of the condition
of his troops; although it is a doubtful game to
play v> ith the army of Champagne, tlie temper of
Avhich is by this time thoroughly well known to its
leaders.
Note again the characteristic compliment
paid to the courage of the French troops. That
has been an official note in the German despatches
for some time past. It is connected with the idea
that the French are ready to make peace and are
fairly sympathetic to the German service, and this
in its turn is a parallel to what we know of the
really startling incapacitj- of modern Germany to
understand things outside itself — a feature often
present in nations after a considerable period of
rapid material progress. Finally, obserAc the im-
possible remark with which the communique
closes : " The French lost 44,000 men, which is
about three times the amount of the German
losses."' Whether the French lost over 44.000
men, we have no evidence to tell us, though
it is an unlikely figure, but that the
German los.ses were only 14,000 to 15,000
men is more nonsense. But, it is not nonsense
written without a cause. The French know, of
course, moi'e or less, what the German losses have
been, because they have advanced over the ground
upon which tliese losses have taken place. For
instance, they have counted the dead, and they
rendered an estimate of 10,000. It would be
foolish for the French to lie in this matter, because
the Germans appro.ximately kjiow their own losses
by this time, and upon a general advance of this
sort thousands of Frenchmen are able to cor-
roborate the official estimate or to discover its
falsehood, if it is false. Seeing that numbers of
those who fall are buried by the enemy or are with-
drawn upon the point of death, we may be fairly
certain that the total losses in dead were more, and
not less, than 10,000, and we may be equally certain
that the total losses in wounded and unwounded
prisoners were at le<ist three times as many. That
is the very lowest nuiltiple one can possibly take.
The German statement, therefore, is not even
intended to deceive the enemy. Its falsity is
clearly designed to a political and domestic end.
And here again we can guess what that end may,
be.
All observers of recent actions in the East and
the West are agreed upon the enormity of the Ger-
man losses. We further know to what that high
percentage of loss is attributed. It is attributable
to the tactical traditions of the enemy : his fighting
in close order; to the superiority of tJie Allied
heavy artillery in the West, which in its turn is
due to the superiority of the Allied air work, and
its repeated chances during such work, as in Cham-
pagne, with its frequent retirements of the enemy
in masses over open field, and its equally frcQuent
9»
LA^D AND .W A T E E.
Mdvch 20, 1915.
counter-offences for country almost devoid of
colour between the occasional stunty pine and
larch plantalions with which the policy of
Napoleon III. studded this region of the camp
of Chalons and its neighbourhood. The dry, poor
chalk soil is often capable of no other crop, and
the plantations take the place of what was once
useless waste.
In the French communique, both that pre-
ceding and that following the long German com-
munique of this week concerning this section of
the Western front, we have also this feature,
peculiar to the French records which have been
noted.
Thus there is a remarkable absence — common
to all these statements — of figures, which could be
of no use to the enemy. Masses of German pris-
oners have been taken. We know this from the
evidence of eye-witnesses describing columns as
they passed through to the rear. Portions of the
French Press and certain private letters bear
sufticient witnesses to what we would, in any case,
have expected to be the result of so prolonged and
successful an effort. But when it would be at once
interesting to the student and of high political
value in heartening opinion at home, the ft/ II
figures of these captui'cs are not given us. It is a
fixed French principle that they should not be dis-
closed. Captures by the British, both of guns and
men, are differently treated, and the German
method is in high contrast, for it perpetually men-
tions the number of prisoners captured, and
usually makes a point of exaggerating this.
The French communique are again largely
concerned with a detailed refutation of the Ger-
man claims. They are careful to mention what
the enemy already knows, the extent of his con-
centration. They even point out — what is valu-
able for us to learn and know — news of the enemy,
the way in which that concentration was eft'ected
by borrowing men from other parts of the line.
On the other hand, they say nothing of their
own losses, rarely even to make them out less than
the enemy claims.
In general, we may say of the.se two present
communiques that they are not only the latest but
the fullest examples of the principal witnesses v.e
have in the judgment of this great debate, and are
a fair guide to the temper of those witnesses in
the future evidence that will be laid before us.
THE EASTERN FRONT.
On the Eastern front there is virtually
nothing to record this week — or at least in progress
— worth analysis at the moment of writing (Tues-
day evening).
It is evident that the forcing of the Dar-
danelles is going to be — vvhat everyone who knew
the district and the means employed was prepared
for — a lengthy business.
The chief element in the delay is, of course,
the weather in that district and, at this time of
the j^ear, the " black sea scud " hanging low and
preventing all air work, the gales from the North,
together make the chances of bombardment only
available sometimes after rather long intervals-,
with a very high wind or with low-lying clouds, it
is impossible for the machines in the air to correct
the indirect or long-distance firing of naval guns;
and, with this fire uncorrected, even the largest
high-explosive shells at such ranges would be
wasted.
The chief drawback to these delays does not
lie in the postponing of the task— though that is
of considerable moment to the Russians — it rather
lies in the time which the larger interval gives
the enemy to recuperate his forces. Unless a
permanent work has been totally destroyed, the
guns dismounted, or shattered, or the mountings
displaced, a few days' grace will enable the de-
fenders to set things more or less right again.
Whereas a certain number of shell of a certain
calibre — say, 11-inch shell — falling upon a per-
manent work, may destroy it if the delivery of
such shell be unintermitted and rapid, a very
dift'erent effect would be produced if the same
number of shell is only delivei^ed in small groups
and after long and irregular intervals. The moral
effect alone counts here, and the material damage
done by a partial bombardment is, as we have seen,
capable of being restored if a sufficient breathing
space is afforded.
Further, the reader must remember that when
you are dealing with over a score of permanent
works, as is the case with the Narrows, the diffi-
culty is multiplied by much more than the mere
multiple of guns. A group of permanent works
like this are much more than ten times as formid-
able as a couple of works would be. First, because
of the way in which they support each other
against a gun platform upon the water ; secondly,
because of the way they can support each
other against attack from land. No permanent
work can be regarded as finally reduced until it
has been destroyed to the satisfaction of the land-
ing party. Its mere silence, even its wrecked ap-
pearance as seen from above, does not completely
guarantee shipping that may have to pass it for
the future. Until a landing party has occupied
the work, and either completed the necessary
destruction or satisfied itself that there is no more
to do, the work may still be formidable.
Where you have a small group of works this
task is much easier in proportion than where you
have a large one; for against the parties landing
to effect the final destruction of partially wrecked
forts and batteries, other forts and bat^teries still
in existence can fire.
All these considerations combined should
moderate the expectations of those who looked for-
Avard, after the first unexpected success of the
Allied Fleet in entering tiie Straits, and after the
development of the novel principle of attack to
which the Narrows was subjected, to a rapid ad-
vance by us upon Constantinople.
There is, of course, as was pointed out in this
paper at the time (and German criticism was made
to that effect), the problem of the land forces. Until
the shores of the Dardanelles on either side are
sufficiently held, commerce cannot use that channel.
The problem of holding the land is partly
political and partly military. Only tho.se ac-
quainted with the Near East (which the present
writer is not) can decide hov.' far a political threat
to the capital would disarm the Turkish armies
in the field ; such a threat to the capital might be
delivered by the fleet without procuring the sur-
render or the withdraAval of the troops to the
south. The military problem, supposing the fleet
to be successful in reaching the Sea of Marmara,
but not successful in causing the withdrawal of
troops through political action, is two-fold. Tho
occupation of the Straits by the fleet, should the
forcing of them be successful, will prevent the
Asiatic shore from reinforcing the European. But
the reduction or the dispersion of troops waiting
10 ••
March 20, 1915
E A N D AND iW; A T E R.
upon the opposing shores, is very different in the
European from what it is in the Asiatic case.
On the European side it is evident that every-
thing depends upon the Isthmus by which the
Gallipoli peninsula hangs to the mainland : the
Jsthmus of Bulair.
That Isthmus, as has been repeatedly pointed
out in these columns, is completely subject to gun
fire from the open sea. It is already untenable by
the enemy, and v.'ould, if it were possible, be still
further secured by ships acting from within the
Sea of Marmara. A sufficient force landed here
could contain for an indefinite period, until
exhaustion and surrender, any garrison that the
enemy may have put into the Gallipoli Peninsula,
and if such a force were supplied at its leisure
with a sufficient siege train, it should make sure
of an adA'ance sufficiently strong to destroy any
temporary works the enemy might erect in that
tangle of hills.
But on the Asiatic side the problem is A'ery
different. It really depends upon the power
the enemy may have to furnish himself with
munitions, and particularly with a good supply
of munitions for his artillery.
Now this depends, of course, upon whether
he has depots of such munitions, and upon his
communications with the same, and it is to be pre-
sumed that this factor has been the main one in
deciding the bombardment of the coast near
Smyrna and of the railway serving that place,
while it is probable that action near the Bosphorus
later on, if the forcing of the Dardanelles be
achieved, would similarly starve the Asiatic side
of the Dardanelles from the north. But if very
large stores of munitions are already accumulated
in that district, the problem of holding the Asiatic
shores of the Straits upon a sufficient belt to make
the commercial passage through them quite safe
and continuous will be a serious one.
THR CARPATHI.\NS.
We have of movements in the Carpathians no
news of importance, save a vague Au.strian com-
munique to the effect that a considerable battle has
developed north of the Uzog pass in the foothills,
and claiming a considerable number of prisoners;
and a further rather more detailed Russiaa
account of the same action — which reports nothing
decisive. There is no development worth noting,
either by way of the expected Russian re-advance
into the Bukowina or the debouching of the enemy
from the foothills into the Galician plain in the
neighbourhood of Przemysl. It looks as if, at the
moment of writing, the opposing lines were
occupying very much the same situation as they
did upon the very important capture of Stanislaus
by the Russians, not quite a fortnight ago.
On the East Prussian front there is the same
stagnation and lack of news. We had some days
ago an announcement from the Russian side that
the Germans were massing a very important force
to act again in the region of Przasnysz, and to
attempt once more the march southward upon the
communications behind Warsaw, in the neighbour-
hood of that town, and the forcing of the Narew
line upon its lower part, near Neo Georgievsk.
We find no further news, however, of this
movement, and if it develops, shall probably not
have the result of the development until next week.
The German papers, by the way, are strenu-
ously denying that there was any movement of
troops from the West to the East in aid of Von
Hindenburg's great concentration at the begin-
ning of February. If this criticism be directed
against the absurd exaggerations which we have
had in the Press, representing the Germans as
perpetually moving vast bodies backwards and for-
wards between the two frontiers, it is salutary and
seasonable, but if it is intended to convey that no
movement whatever lias taken place, it is to be con-
troverted by the clear evidence of prisoners and
material captured, for we know in this positive
manner that one corps at least of the 10th, 12th, or
14th that were mas-sed in East Prussia, and still
remain there, was the 21st corps from Alsace-
Lorraine, and it was this corps which alone suc-
ceeded in piercing for a moment the defensive line
by passing the Xiemen just below Grodno. It has,
of course, since achieving this feat — which was
about a month ago — fallen back again to the neigh-
bourhood of the frontier, and now lies upon a line
running from the woods just east of Augustowo.
11*
LAND AND WATER.
March 20, 1915.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.— This Article bas been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes a»
rcipoasibllity tor the correctness of the statements.
X,. "
THE DARDANELLES.
UNDUE optimism, or, at any rate, a total failure
to appreciate the difficulties couuectod with the
forciug of the Dardanelles, continues to be a
feature of the situation where the mass of the
general public is concerned.
We have much airy talk about the " wonderful progress
of modern gunnery" rendering this or that possible, as witness
the nonsense which has been written about " the wonderful
guns of the Queen rJIitaheth," enabling indirect fire to be
used over the Gallipoli peninsula.
It, of course, makes good headlines to attribute it all to
modern gunnery, aircraft observation, and so on and so forth;
but, as a matter of fact, aircraft (if employed) were merely
a refinement of methods which v/ere common over almost equal
distances so long ago as the Ilusso-Japanese War.
In this particular war, at Port Arthur, indirect fire was
the order of the day more often than not. Early in the war,
using the heights as an observation station, the Russian
JRelri:an, herself invisible, landed a couple of 12-iueh shell
right alongside the Japanese Fuji, firing over a considerable
neck of land and at a range of something over tea miles. By
canting the ship, and so securing extra elcv.ition, the same
thing could have been done at fifteen. The Japanese at (lie
time put it down to land forts; but as none of the land forts
had such guns, this idea subsequently became untenable for
obvioiis reasons.
Again, Captain Kuroi, commanding the Japanese naval
shore battery, dropped many a shell on the Kussian Fleet iti
Port Arthur, altlioiigh it was quite invisible to him. For
"observation" he relied partly on a captive balloon with
primitive signalling arrangornents, parti/ on observation
from ships outside, which had to be careful to keep well
away from unreduced land forts.
Later on, 203 metre Hill was capinred, and an ideal
observation station secured; but plenty oi dainao-e v.-as dona
before that ' "
So far as the Dardanelles are concerned (see plan), any
battlesliip at X, given an observing ship at Y (more or less
out of range of A and B), could at any time witlun the last
ten or twelve years shell A and B with considerable accuracy,
the necessary information being wirelessed directly or in-
directly as per plan on page 13, using Z as a repeating ship.
Now all this has been obvious for years. Equally
obvious is it that at any time during the period, supposing, the
forts at the entrance to be destroyed, the key to A and B
must lie at C, which should have been foitiued accordingly.
That no defensive works were erected must be put down
to Turkish casualness or stupidity. It is folly to suupose that
tlie Germans failed to recogniso the joint in the armour, much
as they may have relied upon the old verity that the fort is
superior to the ship. Possibly they calculated that reverence
for that doctrine would alone suffice to save the Dardanelles
from any attack. Possibly also th^y never really expected
to be able to drag Turkey into the war, and having done so.
lound It impossible to obtain the necessary gum to defend
Chauak's heel of Achilles.
It has also to be remembered that merely to erect a
small extempori.ned .si.t-inch battery is a matter of a week to
• lortniglit at the least; to establish really efficient bi-' gun
forts must at least be reckoned in months, and more proljablv
In years, even were there no problem of finding the gua^
•iountings, ammunition, and other details.
Here let us take a chess analogy. Everyone who has
merely a nodding acquaintance with the game (which nodding
acquaintance incidentally represents more or less accurately
Turkish knowledge of rncdern war), knows the wonderful
things that could be done against the most skilful opponent,
if on!i/ an extra move could be worked in here and there.
Black is handicapped from the first by being a move behind ;
in this particular Dardanelles game Fate or stupidity, or
both in conjunction, have put Black (the German-Turkish
combination) three or four moves behind-hand.
But — if we are to obtain any level-headed or correct
estimation of affairs — we must keep all the superlatives out
of court. We must never forget that circumstances have
been on our side, that the stars have fought against Sisera,
that an intensely difficult and dangerous operation is being
carried out, and that its success or failure depends entirely ou
three factors :
(1) Outranging.
(2) Making the uttermost of every weak point in tUa
defence.
(3) The psychological effect of slow but sure progress.
This, of course, in no way coincides with the general
public view of the Dardanelles affair. At any moment the
third factor may intervene and render all else nugatory. Bui;
failing it, the task is colo.ssal ; and, had the Dardanelles been
German, I for one am absolutely convinced that they would
have proved impregnable even against outranging fire, since
there is no limit to the armour which can be applied to a
fort gun, nor any limit (other than the financial one, which
can be neglected) to the number of guns which can be
mounted.
This fact the Germans assimilated many years ago, and
they have fortified their own coasts accordingly. °When,
eventually, the very third-rate defences of the Dardanelles
succumb to overwhelming naval force, we may expect some-
thing in the nature of a public demand for similar operations
against the really first-class defences of Cnxhaven or Heligo-
land. We may also expect to find the German Press and its
naval experts explaining at great length that forts are hopeless
against ships, in the hopes that they will be quoted over here.
It is here that danger lies, danger of popular attempts to
force Admiralty policy. Such attempts do not stand to suc-
ceed, but the occurrence of them to any extent is bound to
encourage the enemy as a sign of weakness. Herein lies the
true inwarduMs of " Trust tlie Admiralty."
THE SMYRNA OPERATIONS.
The importance of the Smyrna operations is somewhat
apt to be overlooked. It is true that they are of less import-
ance than what is being done in the Dardanelles, though in a
way, of course, they are a natural corollary. For example,
the capture of Constantinoj)l3 is bound to turn Turkey into an
Asiatic Power pure and simple; so that, in addition to itu
actual value as a great trade centre, Smyrna has a hypothe-
tical value of considerable significance.
\Yar is necessarily a matter of anticipating and allowing
for contingencies. Since a siege and defence of Constantinople
is out of the question because of the Allied Fleet, we may
take it for granted that (unless prevented) the Turks will
withdraw all their European troops to Asia Minor— a concen-
tration not to be ignored.
From what v.'e know of Turkish conceptions, or rather
misconceptions, of sea power, it was ever in the chanter of
12*
March 20, 1915.
LAND AND SV! A T E R.
Charwk
^ u 'Z K ^ ^
possibilities that an attempt would be made to collect trans-
ports at Smyrna with a view to operations against Egypt.
With a view to protecting these, the fortifications were pro-
bably being improved. There was also always the possibility
ef an Austrian squadron managing to evade the Fi-ench Fleet
and get into Smyrna.
One way and another, therefore, it was necessary either
to disable Smyrna or else to maintain a lengthy and consider-
able close blockade of the port.
From all of which it is abundantly clear that the bom-
bardment of Smyrna comes into a totally different category to
the bombardment of Scarborough and other of our East Coast
towns. In the first case, we have definite operations as a
definite and integral part of a definite scheme; in the other,
mere aimless destruction in no way commensurate with the
risk, probably not even worth the cost of the ammunition
expended.
THE SUBMARINE BLOCKADE.
The most important event of the week is undoubtedly
the destruction which has been wrought on hostile submarines
by British destroyers. It is not impossible that the reported
sinkings of submarines by merchant ships may be imaginary
or partial successes. That is to say, there exists a possibiliti/
of sunken wreckage being occasionally taken for a submarine,
also the further possibility that a submarine may be struck
and merely damaged to the extent of her outer skin. To avoid
being unduly optimistic we should consider these things, and
perhaps discount by fifty per cent, in order to be certain of
being on the right side.
Where destroyers are concerned, however, we have two
recent tangible cases of organised destruction resulting in the
loss of the boats and the capture of the crews. This last is
certainly an application of the truth of the proverb that " a
live dog is better than a dead lion," because the taking
prisoners of crews is evidence which cannot be concealed or
suppressed, and proof to the German people of weak points in
that submarine blockade on which so much faith was pinned.
To U8 it is also satisfactory as indicating that we are
learning the limitations of submarines, and acquiring practice
in ways and means of destroying them. In this the ram seems
easily the best weapon, as it was expected it would prove to
be, since it is the simplest.
The problem of the crews lias probably been best dealt
with in the way in which the Admiralty has acted. To accord
the " pirates" the ordinary treatment given to prisoners of
war would have been manifestly incorrect. On the other hand,
to hang them, though logical, would probably have defeated
the object in view. It is necessary to remember in connection
with this blockade that the German submarines are acting
under definite orders from their own Admiralty. All the sub-
marines have not carried these instructions out to the letter;
Fome capt-ains have been careful not to outrage the laws of
humanity. To ascertain and differentiate during the war is
necessarily difficult, if not impossible in many cases. The
pertainty of an ignominious death as the certain result of
capture would tend to drive all submarine officers to Ish-
maelite tactics.
The British " reply " has now been definitely proclaimed.
Whether it will have satisfactory results remains to be seen.
There is ever a great deal to be said for the alternative policy
of ignoring the blockade altogether. We all know the psycho-
logical advantage secured by the roan who refuses to lose his
temper in a quarrel or the fate of a boxer who " loses his
hair."
To be sure we have not done that, and our proclamation
is moderation itself. All the same, however, it will so be
represented in Germany to the German public, and by Ger-
man agencies to all neutral nations. It is along such lines
that wo may lose as much as we gain, correct tlicugh the
" reply " qua reply may be and is.
THE HIGH SEAS.
On March 14 the German corsair Di-fsthn (which
escaped after the battle of the Falkland Islands) was caught
by the Kent and Glasgow off the island of J;; an Fernandez,
and after a short five minutes' action hoisted the white flag.
She was, of course, hopelessly outgunned, and it is little
wonder that she sank soon aft-erwards.
The significance of the incident lies in the state of im-
potence to which, as a corsair, she had been reduced. Instead
of destroying and harrying British trade, she was herself
harried and in hiding.
There remains now only the EarhriiJif, also in hiding and
also impotent. Two armed liners remain, but of these the
Prim Eitel, should she leave the harbour where she is now
definitely located, is practically certain to be destroyed.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
W. M. (Westmeath). — When Duckworth went through
the Dai'danelles he was fired at from holes drilled in the rock,
which projected huge stones. This has given rise to the story
of similar submerged torpedo-dischargers to-day. It is not
very likely that any such exist — in any case, they could exist
anywhere just as well as at the Narrows. Ten years ago the
Germans installed, as part of their defences at Cuxhaven and
elsewhere, huge submerged drums fitted with torpedo tubes.
A. F. R. (Montreal). — There are practically no "tactics"
in modern naval warfare compared to the tactics of thj old
days. The German criticisms of British tactics do not count
for much, and the alleged " bad maiuetivring " of the North
Sea action was due to t'lie fact that Admiral Bealty refused
to be dragged into a clever German trap.
C. S. P. (Wimbledon). — It is impossible to answer your
question as submarines vary so, but in a rough sort of way
you might give the destroyer half a minute if spotted, though
it has, of course, a fair chance of not being spotted.
Ducks and Drakes (Hythe). — The course of a torpedo
is not to be deflected in the way you suggest. I believe that
in the early days of torpedoes one or two provisional patents
were taken out, but that they never came to anything.
13*
LAND AND ]R: A T E R.
Mcxrcb 20, 1915.
E. n. G. M. (Devon).— Tlie wavy gold lace baud indi-
cates Royal Naval Eeserve. The white band indicates that
he is in the pay department of that branch of the Service.
E. W. S. (London, W.C.).— The best known bomb-
dropper is the Scott, invented by an officer of the U.S. Flyiug
Corps. It was described and illustrated in Aeronautics some
time ago. If you mail 65 cents to the Aeronautics Press Inc.,
250, West 54th Street, New York, you will get the particular
copy. Any of our aerial journals would also give you in-
formation galore.
J. L. (Glasgow). — No; quite impossible.
S. M. T. (York). — With reference to the Dardanelles,
you have not taken into account my point of the immense fire-
superiority of the ships of the Allies engaged. Ships (if
stationary), armed as the forts were, would have been
annihilated in seven minutes instead of seven hours 1
G. McI. (Belfast). — The device you mention is a very
old one.
T. L. B. (Windermere). — Your suggestion that, as
English prisoners in Germany are apparently being badly
underfed, exchanges should be made on the basis of u'etrjht
instead of numbers, is certainly original ! I doubt, however,
whether the idea would find favour at Donington Hall !
Brune (Kilmarnock). — The original idea of the sub-
marine was direct attack on the bottom of a ship from below,
but it has long since been given up. It is not possible to see
under water for more than a very short distance. That is why
the submarine when submerged uses a periscope, and has be-
come a practical instead of an impracticable weapon of war.
C. R. (Epsom). — I do not think your idea is very
feasible. It has a certain attractiveness, but you have to
remember that the average anti-aircraft gun is of small
calibre.
W. T. (Canterbury). — Theoretically, of course, a pro-
jectile from a rifled gun should reach the target point up, but
that this has never been regularly believed is evidenced by the
fact that the turrets of most battleships are inclined at such
an angle that the net result would be the receipt of a direct
blow instead of an indirect one.
Some time ago a series of experiments were carried ou6
in America with a view to settling the point, photographs
being automatically taken as the projectile passed through a
series of tissue paper screens. In this case the evidence was
point downwards.
You will, of course, be familiar with the fact that tha
modern rifle bullet in leaving the muzzle has a distinct waggle
for some two hundred yards or so before it settles down to its
flight, though it was some little time before this was definitely
discovered. In some similar kind of way it may be that the
gyroscopical action of the projectile from a long modern high-
velocity gun undergoes interferences.
Be all this as it may, there is not, or until recently was
not, unanimity of opinion amongst gunnery experts.
Incidentally, at the Battle of the Yalu the old Japanese
battleship Fuso was hit by a shell on the side. This shell
went upwards, and, striking something, was deflected back,
so that it actually came out through the same side of the ship
some feet above where it had entered. This was at one time
evidence for the striking point-upwards theory.
A. R. B. (Torquay). — Nothing is to be done with
magnets.
A. P. B. (W^indsor).— (1) Answered in the text. (2) I
do not think there is any truth in the rumour that the
Japanese Fleet is going to participate in the attack on the
Dardanelles. For one thing, we have ample force without
it. For another, the Japanese Fleet has still its own duties
in the Pacific. (3) Any reply to this question would be
censored.
A. J. R. (Rutherglen). — The first cost of a submarine is
a very variable quantity. According to the German Naval
Estimates, they work out at about £6,000 each. Our own
Estimates give little, if any, clue. The latest type could
certainly be put at about £10,000, and probably more. Many
thanks for your appreciatory remarks.
S. G. (Isle of Mull). — Something similar is already
in use.
(Several replies held over till next ueeh.)
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.-I.
AIRCRAFT AND CAVALRY.
w
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
■ HEN Admiral Mahan wrote ' ' The Influence of
Sea Power Upon Modern History " he had, to
guide him in his judgments and deductions,
the minutely recorded events of centuries.
Probably a few generations hence another
Mahan will prove the influence of air power on the produc-
tion of a state of world politics which, to his readers, will be
modern history. And although to us the influence of air
power on generations to come, or in shaping the course of
history, is still enshrouded by the mist of our limited know-
ledge, yet it is obvious that, side by side with the influence
of sea power, so cogently made evident by Mahan, there is
now another power, brought into being by the advent of air-
craft, which is forcibly asserting itself.
The writer will not attempt to predict to what degree
the war will be influenced by the work of air navies. There
are not sufficient data on which to base any conclusion; but
the information contained in the official reports already pub-
lished by the War Office and the Admiralty is enough to
indicate the character of the influence which air power has
already exercised. From this it will bo possible to make
certain deductions of considerable value for the immediate
future.
Not taking into consideration the number of combatants
of the opposing armies now trying to force history into two
different channels, there are two factors which, so far as the
land operations are concerned, distinguish the present war
from previous ones. These two factors are the employment,
on a large scale, of railways and quick motor transport for
strategic purposes, and the application of aircraft to the needs
of war. To a certain degree, as will be seen, the influence of
these two factors is interdependent. Aircraft affords a quick
method of reconnaissance, and railways and motor vehicles a
means of taking advantage of the results of those observations
5vith as little delay as may be.
But it is important to note that the employment of air-
craft for reconnaissance work has not diminished, and can-
not diminish, the value of cavalry reconnaissance. In reality,
it has made the cavalry of even greater worth than before.
This is due to the fact that aerial reconnaissance and cavalry
reconnaissance are of two entirely different characters, and
can be made to supplement each other. The former has
already, in numerous instances, relieved the cavalry of cer-
tain duties and responsibilities which were placed upon it
simply because, before the advent of aircraft, no other arm
could undertake them. Certain tasks were assigned to tha
cavalry not because they could be perfectly accomplished by
it but because tho.se tasks v/ould bo less satisfactorily per-
formed by any other arm. It was, for instance, part of tha
cavalry's work to be sent out, unsupported, to very great
distances from the main force, in order to gather, at random,
and in all directions, information concerning the enemy which
might prove of strategic value. The cavalry had, for this
reason, very often to undergo a strain quite out of proportion
to the results achieved, and which wasted much of its
strength and resources. By relieving the cavalry of at least)
a considerable portion of long-distance and random recon-
naissance, the advent of aircraft has greatly diminished the
strain to which it was hitherto subjected.
Unless prevented by a superior force of aircraft, an air
squadron, or even a single machine, can carry out in clear
weather long-distance reconnaissance with very satisfactory
results. This work can be accomplished by the airman much'
more quickly and with much less strain than is possible to the
cavah-y. Since the beginning of hostilities it has, therefore,
been possible, by the employment of aircraft, for the Com-
mander-in-Chief to save his cavalry much fruitless marching,
and, possibly, much fighting, for the same amount of informa-
tion which his airmen obtained with ease. The full significance
of this fact must not be overlooked. Unprovided or insuffi-
ciently provided with aircraft and reliable aerial observers,
au army, forced to depend entirely, or almost entirely, upon
its cavalry for strategical reconnaissance during the period
preceding a battle, would, when the opposing armies began
to close, have its cavalry so tired and scattered that their
useful employment at a critical moment in the battle might
be seriously hampered.
There are, however, many details of reconnaissance whiclj
14«
Maivh 20, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
can only be obtained by tlie cavalry. For iubtauce, it may
not be jjossible for aerial observers to distinguish, from a great
height, between friendly and enemy troops. In such a case,
when once the position of the troops has been located by the
airman, the cavalry could, if nccessray, be sent out to deter-
niiue the point. The cavalry would then only be ascertaining
the correctness of a specific observation, and would not
be using up its strength on, possibly, an uncertain
mission.
There are also other points connected with reconuaiseance
which are altogether beyond the capacity of aerial observa-
tion. The airman cannot, for instance, discover the morale
of the enemy on the ground. Nor can he find out their
physical condition. An air fleet cannot keep in touch day
and night with any particular unit of the enemy. These are
some of the reasons why the use of aircraft does not diminish
the value of the cavalry for reconnaissance. Again, there is
the possibility of bad weather rendering an aerial reconnais-
sance out of the question, or the case where the enemy is under
cover in a wood.
From the preceding lines it will be gathered that the
co-operation of aircraft with cavalry henceforth gives to a
Commander-in-Chief a means of carrying out reconnai.-^sance
which his predecessors did not possess. Therefore, Napoleon's
dictum that " an army is nothing except for its head " has
at the present time an even greater force and significance
than a century ago, for the " head," by the judicious com-
bination of aerial and cavalry scouting, now posses.ses better
" eyes."
There is a point connected with aerial scouting which it
is important always to keep in mind. It is that the Com-
mander-in-Chief must have an exact estimation of the tem-
perament and training of his air scouts, for on these con-
ditions must depend the degree of reliance to be placed on
their observations, carried out at times under difficult cir-
cumstances. It may be that there is a greater degree of
understanding between British airmen and their commanders
than there is between those of the enemy, and this possibly
has contributed to the ascendancy our airmen have gained.
If such be really the case, it would follow that, as far as pos-
sible, the same air reconnaissance squadron and cavalry force
should always be employed to co-operate with each other so
as to ensure the best results from such co-operation.
Another consideration of importance in connection with
the use of aircraft for reconnaissance duty is that the com-
mander must always have a sufficient number of machines in
readiness to start at a moment's notice. There must also be
an ample number of trained aerial observers in order that too
great a continuous drain should not be placed upon a small
force. It is only with a large air fleet that a commander in
the present war can derive the full advantage of the co-
operation of his aircraft and cavalry.
In concluding this chapter on the Influence of Air
Power, the writer cannot do better than quote the following
lines from Sir John French's despatch, dated November 20,
1914: " The work performed by the Royal Flying Corps has
continued to prove of the utusost value to the success of the
operations. I do not consider it advisable in this deppatch to
o-o into any detail as regards the duties assignotl to the Corps
and the nature of their work, but almost every day new
methods for employing them, both strategically and tactically,
are discovered and put into practice. The development of
their use and eniploynieut has, indeed, been quite extra-
ordinary, and I feel sure that no effort should be spared to
increase their numbers and perfect tl'.eir equipment and
efficiency."
CORRKSPONDENCE.
SOLDIERS' AND SAILORS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
De.\r Sir, — As I know your valuable paper is extensively
read both by naval and military officers on active service, I
should be extremely glad if you would allow me space to ask
any Commanding Officer who is short of tobacco for his troops
at the Front to communicate with me, and my committee will
be pleased, as far as lies in their power, to forward a supply.
I will take this opportunity also to thank those of your
readers who have so kindly and promptly contributed towards
the needs of the wounded at the St. Malo Hospitals. £25
worth of tobacco and pipes have already been despatched. —
Yours faithfully,
W. Evan Colli son, Hon. Secretary.
Central House, Kingsway, W.C.
QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S F.ELD FORCE FUND.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — Your generous support of the good work being
carried on by this fund prompts me to write that a suggestion
for its augmentation has been submitted by the present writer,
in high quarters, by a proposal to hold a Wellington and
Waterioo Loan Collection of pictures, trophies, etc., in Lon-
don during this centenary year of the great battle, in aid of
this fund. . ,
The exhibition might also well include portraits, etc., of
Napoleon and his generals, and any other available work (of
which there are a large number in this country), which would
materially add to the interest of the collection.
At Apsley House alone there is a wealth of souvenirs,
including the great marble figure of Napoleon by Canova—
totally unknown to vast numbers of our own people m the
present generation, and to our many visitors in the metro-
polis from the countries of our Allies and our Colonies.
A suitable location at Kensington or elsewhere can readily
be found for the exhibition, and the fund in which Her
Maiesty Queen Alexandra is taking so great an interest, and
to which she has graciously lent the advantage of her name,
would, without doubt, substantially benefit during the coming
mouths.
I am. Sir, your obedient servant,
J. Landfear Lucas.
Spectacle Makers' Company.
Glendora, Hindhead, Surrey.
ANTI-SUBMARINE TACTICS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir _I„ your issue of March 6 your correspondent Lord
Dunleath submits proposals in this connection which are
certainly deserving of earnest consideration. Some months
ago I approached the authorities with very similar proposals,
but the submarine menace had not then become so ac\ite. Pos-
sibly a comparison of my suggestions with those of your corre-
spondent may be of interest to your readers.
It should be noted that I approach the subject from the
standpoint of a naval architect, with many years' practical
experience in the design and construction of vessels of various
types. It is unquestionable that for submarine chasing a
special type must be evolved.
My conclusions as to the principal points which should
be embodied in the design of a submarine chaser are, how-
ever, somewhat different from those suggested by your pre-
vious correspondent.
(1) Speed. — This must be at least twice as great as the
surface speed of the fastest submarine likely to be encountered.
Quick response to the helm is, of course, of the utmost im-
portance, combined with ability to pivot quickly, like a " fly
on a pin," as 1 have heard it expressed.
(2) litimi/ii in/. —This should have no place in the pro-
posed tactics, and should, therefore, not be taken account ol
in the design. For destroyers such ramming tactics are quite
feasible, but not for the light fast craft 1 advocate. Besides,
shallow draft is, in my opinion, of the utmost importance,
and this is not compatible with ramming tactics, unless the
submarine is caught in the surface condition, when gun fire
would much more certainly destroy it.
Armament. — One Q.F. gun on a circular, all-round
pedestal, say, on top of a conning tower, with some form of
launchable spar torpedo in the bow, and a couple of large
calibre machine-guns are sufficient. A single torpedo-tube
carried on an all-round racer aft might be useful in emer-
gency against enemy ves.sels, thus increasing the scope of the
type, but it is possibly a mistake to depart from the primary
purpose of submarine chasing.
Invkihility. — Low freeboard compatible with speed and
seaworthiness is, of course, important, but high speed in the
vessel I propose and sea-keeping qualities absolutely compel
a high forecastle; wireless telegraphy calls for some form of
mast; and high power for a very substantial funnel or funnels.
It should be possible, however, to so arrange the profile of the
vessel as to very materially improve the invisibility as com-
pared with, say, a modern destroyer.
Let us now con-sider the practical design of a vessel em-
bodying these characteristics; keeping in view the supreme
importance in the present case of rapidity of construction and
simplicity of handling, without which all our sviggestions are
quite useless, since shipy.irds are overcrowded with work, and
highly-trained crews are needed in many other directions.
I should take as my model a cross between a reduced
15*
LAND AND W. x\ T E R.
March 20, 1915.
torpedo-boat de-.troyer and tlia TioMiiia, with possibly also
some effort to work in a hydroplane after-body.
I sho-ild give the full body, with its higii forecastle and
flaming bow lines, very much the form of the latest
destroyers, keeping draft at lowest possible limits, and round-
iug-up the keel from mid:'hip3 to stern. The full beam would
be carried very far aft on the load-line, very much as iu the
case of the Tiirhinla already referred to. Perhaps an en-
larged Maple Leaf would best represent the type advocated.
Such a vessel at moderate speeds up to twenty knots
would travel very easily with moderate change of trim, but
at .speeds of thirty knots or thereby "squatting" would
occur to a considerable extent, a tendency which might be
utilised to advantage in quiet waters to obtain a hydroplane
effect, very conducive to quick handling on the rudder.
Eoughly speaking, such a vessel could be worked out on
a length of 200ft., a displacement not exceeding 350 tons, and
a draft of 7ft. at normal trim. Twin-screw turbines and
two express boilers, oil-fired, would be fitted to develop five
to six thousand s.h.p.
A word as to the tactic?! to be used with such vessels.
Flotillas of eight or ten would be based on each large shipping
district or naval base — e.g., Thames, Forth, Mersey, Tyue,
Bristol Channel, and so forth — v^ith special enlarged flotillas
for strategical points, such as Dover Straits, Mull of Cantyre,
St. George's Channel, &c., &c. Ships making port or ap-
proaching danger zones would be shadowed by one or more of
these special craft rapidly varying their positions relative to
the vessel shadowed by alternating periods of slow with
sudden bursts of high speed, than which there would be
nothing more disconcerting to the submarine. It is not too
much to claim that no submarine would think of wasting
torpedoes in attacking a vessel so protected, nor would it be
safe for a submarine to even show its periscope in such a neigh-
bourhood. Flotillas of these vessels would also employ/
" scatter " tactics in waters where a submarine has been
located. It is at present impossible to locate a subinarine's
course after it has once dived, but a number of fast vessels
can from a given point " scatter " over the points of the com-
pass and with fair prospect of locating the submarine again
at its ne.vt effort in surface observation.
Unfortunately, such a programme as I have outlined re-
quires the building of at least a hundred new vessels of this
special type. Frankly, this is quite out of the question at
present; at least, in this country. All our available ship-
building resources must be utilised to provide the units for
immediate necessities, such as cruisers, torpedo-boat
destroyers, submarines, and other types which the Censor
niiglit not like to have enumerated. It might be possible to
get round this difTiculty, but here again publication is inad-
missible.
In my opinion, some of us ought to help the authorities
by building and experimenting with some such craft as I
have outlined, gi'.ing special attention to simplicty of cou-
structiou and standardisation of parts for rapid reproduction
in batches. One thing may be definitely stated, and that is
that the mere design of a thoroughly practical anti-submarine
craft presents no difficulty at all. To provide a hundred such
for early delivery is quite another matter.
J.R.
WASTAGE.
To the Editor of Land .<i.d W.vter.
Sin, — Seldom indeed can it be said that Mr. Belloc docs
not make his meaning abundantly clear. But his criticism iu
your last issue of the military writer's figures is difficult to
follow.
Mr. Belloc has told us that the total German casualties
arc forty per cent, of their whole force in the field, which he
puts down at 6,000.0a0. This, it will be noticed, would give
2,400,000 casualties in all.
On the other hand, he estimated last month the per-
wannil losses of Germany alone at 1,250,000 (to be doubled
if Austria is included). Tliis fairly corresponds with the
larger figure given later by the ndlitary writer.
If, then, Mr. Bellce's 2,500,000" refers to pn-mavent
losses only, is he now including those of the Austrian Army
as well? If not, is he estimating the to'al list of casualties,
and not (like the military writer) the permanent losses only?
Yours faithfully,
Shrewsbury. A. L. O.
MILITARY HONOURS.
To the Editor of L.ind and W.\ter.
r)E.\R Sir, — Your military correspondent may be able to
*^P^^'° t'O tliose who, like myself, are not conversant with
things warlike the following approximate figures based on
the recent list of Military Honours :
Percentasje of Honour?! awarded to Regimental Officer*
iQ Iba Field 5 p.O.
Percentage of Hoaoura awarded to Staff Ofiicera in the
Field 35 p.O.
Casualties among Regimental Officers 30 p.o.
CdsuaUies among tliu Staff 5 p.o.
It would seem from above almost as easy for a Regi-«
mental Officer to acquire a place in the " Roll of Honour " u
for a Staff Officer to appear in the " List of Honours."
While at the same time the Regimental Officer runs six
times as much chance of being knocked out, with one-seventh
the chance of being noticed. — Yours truly,
CiVILIAK.
March 2, 1915.
ARTICLE ON SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of L.\sd and Water.
Sir, — Now that submarines are so much before the publia
would it not be useful if your paper, v/hich has so many
interesting articles iu it, was to get some naval expert who
can v/rite intelligibly to give us an article on submarines t
The public know very little about their strong and weak points
or really what their caiJabilities are or how they can be best
attacked or guarded against. I would suggest the following
points would be of interest ;
(1) How lon:5 can thev stay under water, and how do they sta/
Uenoath the surl'iR-e'
(2) How loiij; doe3 it tal«> thoni to sink or ris«?
(3) What rate do they lra-,el as a rule above and below tb«
surface ?
(4) What is the emalleil lifle, gnn, bullet, or shell which will
pierce them?
(5) How long call they keep the sea without replenishing thei»
stores ?
(6) What ia their ai-niameiit besides torpedoes?
(7) How do men-of-wir ,Tr.d tci'pedoboats attack and defeiul
themsel.-es agtinst submarine*?
— Yours truly,
P. C. S. P.^YNE,
2ud Lieut. Beds. Yeomanry.
13, High Street, Olney, Bucks.
LA MEDAILLE MILITAIRE.
To the Editor of Land a:;d Water.
Dear Sir, — I should be much obliged if you could giva
me the follov/ing information through your paper, with regard
to the French decoration " La Medaille Militaire ":
(1) How many classes are there?
(2) What class are the W.O., N.C.O., and men to
receive whose names appeared in Army Ordert
under date November 5, 1914 !
(Z) What colour is the ribbon?
(4) Is the ribbon colour the same for all classes!
Waverley Hotel, Bournemouth.
MISSING.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — We see daily in the newspapers reports from our
front that " a section of our trenches have been lost or recap-
tured," and that besides the " killed and wounded " many
hundreds of our men are "missing." It seems hardly
possible that a section of a trench can contain so many. An
explanation of this — to nie and others a puzzle — -as to whera
the missing come from, and where they go to, and how they
get there, might quiet our doubts. — Your obedient servant,
Y.
Tangier and Constitutional Clubs.
MR. HILAIRE BELLOCS LECTURES ON THE WAR.
Newcastle Town Itali Fiiday 19:Maroh,3and8.30,
Glassow St. Andrew's Hail. Monday 22 Manh, 8.15 p.m.
Edinburgh Usher Hall Tuesday 23 March, 8 p.m.
Manchester Free Trade Hall... Wednesday 24 March, 8.30 p.m.
Soutliport Cambridge Hal!.... Thursday 23 March, 8 p.m.
Seats may now be booked for the next series of Lectures at Quf>en'»
Hall ; these are to be given on the first Wednesday in April. May,
aiid June.
MR. JANE'S LECTURES ON THE NAVAL WAR.
Bournemouth.... Pavilion Friday 19 March, 3 p.m.
Guildford Borough Hall Saturday 20 Afarch, 3ii.ni.
Hovo Town Hall Tuesday 23 Marcii, 3 p.m.
Bath Assembly Room.s. . Thursday 25 March, 3 p. m.
Malvern Assembly Rooms.. Friday 26 March, 3 p.m.
Shrewsbury Assembly Rooms. Saturday 27 March, 3 p.m.
Mr. Walter Leaf, D.Litt.. will lecture on "The Dardanelles" al
the .^olian Hall on Friday, Marcli 26lh, at 8 p.m. Tickets, pric«
7s. 6d., 5s., 2?. 5d., and Is., can be obtained from Miss P. Strachey, 58,
Victoria Street, .S.W.
Trinted by Tin Victoria Houss PRiKriNa Co., Lm., Tudor Street, Whitefriars, London, E.O.
March 20, 1915
LAND AND WATER
noio
Pens
are the only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., LTD.
U
FIRTH S
STAINLESS ' STEEL
for CUTLERY, etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
ARTICLES MADE FROM THIS
STEEL, BEING ENTIRELY UN-
AFFECTED BY FOOD ACIDS,
FRUITS, VINEGAR, etc., WILL BE
FOUND TO BE OF ENORMOUS
ADVANTAGE IN HOTELS,
CLUBS, RESTAURANTS,
CAMPS. NEITHER THE KNIFE-
BOARD NOR CLEANING
MACHINE IS NOW NECESSARY.
n CUTLERY OF THIS STEEL
MAY BE HAD OF ALL THE
LEADING MANUFACTURERS.
SEE THAT KNIVES BEAR THIS
MARK.
i
_ firth)
stainless)
Original and Sole Makers:
THOS. FIRTH & SONS, Ltd.
SHEFFIELD.
BOOKS OF
READERS OF
INTEREST TO
"LAND AND WATER."
mv
March to Timbuctoo
By GENERAL JOFFRE
with a Biographical Introduction, " The Abbd," by ERNEST DIMNET,
author of "FRANCE HERSELF AGAIN."
Bound in Cloth, with a Portrait Wrapper, 2s> neti
IN
THE
ENEMY'S
COUNTRY
Being the Diary of a little tour in
Germany and elsewhere during the
first daj's of the War.
By MARY HOUGHTON
With ao Introduction by
EDWARD GARNETT
Cr. 8vo.
Cloth, 5s. net.
A DIPLOMAT'S
MEMOIR of 1870
Being an account of a balloon escape
from the Siege of Paris, and a Pohti-
■ cal Mission to London and Vienna.
By FREDERIC REITLINGER
Private Secretary to Jtf. Juies Favre,
Head of the National Defence Govern^
ment of WO.
Translated from the French by
HENRY REITLINGER
With
Pictorial Wrapper,
2s. net.
Cloth,
THE
LITTLE TOWNS OF FLANDERS
A Book of Woodcuts by ALBERT DELSTANCHE
With a Prefatory Letter from EMILE VERHAEREN
This edition, with the plates printed from the original woodblocks, and the
text set in Florence Type, will be limited to 500 numbered copies, 100 of
which will be signed by M. Delstanche. The unsigned copies, demy 4(0,
bound in boards, will be sold at 12s. 6d. net. The signed copies, bound in
vellum with silk ties, at £t is. net.
LONDON CHATTO & WINDUS
ST, MARTIN'S
LANE, W.C.
Harrods Khaki Shirts
for Officers
Warm and
Comfortable
THE Officers*
Khaki Shirts,
one of which
is here sketched, are
thoroughly dependable
in every way ; they
arc smart, too, and of
the correct style and
pattern for regulation
wear.
The cut and work-
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highest order, and carry
the obvious stamp of
luving been made by
expert shirt - makers.
Tue fitting is perfect.
Quoted here are the
prices for different
styles :
With collars attached, each O/ll and 10/6
Without collars, - each o/O and lU/u
Collars to match, - each 1/ " and 1/0
HARRODS LTD LON DON, S.W.
Richard Burbidt4, Manatint Director.
^7 1
LAND AND WATER
AN APPEAL
Our " Land and Water " Ambulance Scheme
By ATHERTON FLEMING
,eek's article I endeavoured, to the must suffer. It is the intention
blHty, to impress upon the readers of of this journal to open a subscnp
the absolute necessity for an adequate idea of replacing one, at anv rat^
or ambulances at the front. We cannot funds will allow. In order to do this
,■. We cannot lake the risk of having needed. The cause is a good one.
March 2o, 1915
A RELIC FROM THE FRONT
Pathetic interest attaches to the above picture :-The eogales. which are of " Tiiplex ■' slasj weie recover d (.ora
the wreck of an aeroplane which (ell nose first and buried its ensme some 2 It in the frozen 8-ound. 1 he
unfortunate pilot's face was completely wrecked by the instrument board, but. as will be seen, the g'ass ol the
sossles which were still in position was found in the condition shown in the illustration. It slanrfs to reason
that had the pilot been wearing ordinary glass gogties and escaped with his life he would most probably have
been blinded
of the proprietors
tion list with the
more than one if
the sum of £500 is
the sum required
is not large,
and I am sure
the readers of
L .-^ N D AND
W .-v T E R are
sufficiently gen-
erous to enable
the scheme t o
be carried
through success-
fully. No sub-
s c r i p t i o n will
be too small ;
the modest
sum of one
shillmg from each
reader would
b e sufficient t o
supply a fleet
o f ambulances.
One ambulance
only is asked
for, for the
initial effort.
Please help to
the best of your
ability . Full
particulars of
the scheme
will be given
in our next
to be replaced at once, or our wounded issue, and the subscription list will then be opened.
ENGINE '* LAZINESS"
car be a four-cylinder, high-powered one or
. single-cylinder, it is equally liable to the in-
own as loss o{ power — a form of laziness, if
I, but one for which there is always a cause ;
can be treated, and, what is more, cured.
; loss of power can be considered under three
mpression ; (2) poor ignition ; and (3) poor
may be due to leakage at either the inlet or
J plug, compression chamber (if it be a detach-
rings. ff a little soap or oil is placed round
the engine started up, escape of bubbles will
he leak, and when found it can be remedied.
;lain is broken a new plug is necessary ; if the
b " blows " a new washer is required. Copper
low made of all sizes and shapes, but, failing
let of asbestos cord rubbed up with a little red
I gas-tight joint. Inspection will reveal if the
t, and they are pitted, they require grinding,
)n its seat perfectly. Tliis can be proved b\'
d marking the seat in a few places with chalk,
and press it well home. Move it round with
: it out, and if the fit is correct it will at once
the piston rings may be a cause of their not
n. PulUng the engine round after injecting
gh the compression cocks is the treatment,
or worn piston rings are the last and, I believe,
n this class. Treatment will depend on the
new piston rings may be needed, or if the liner
need relapping, and, if much is so removed,
is rings. With proper lubrication, however, a
ee or four years on the set of rings, and the
uire lapping in double that time ; but this all
1 sufficient oiling.
Poor ignition may be due to the plug, coil, accumulators 01
contacts. If the plug is sooted it should be taken out and cleaned or
a new one put in. If the platinum points on the coil trembler have
worn irregularly remove the screw and trembler blade, and with a
very fine file dress them so that they are square with one another ;
then replace, and, with the contact-maker at contact, adjust the
trembler to give a good " buzz." If the accumulators are run down
get them recharged, and if away from home borrow a fresh set. If
none can be obtained it may be possible to get home by adjusting
the sparking plug points a little nearer to one another. The usual
place where contact trouble occurs is at the contact-maker ; the
fibre wheel may be worn out of truth with the \\ ipe, or the latter may
itself be irregularly worn. A new wipe can be fitted or the old one
can be filed true. If the fibre ring is much worn it will need spinning
in the lathe, but on the road the wipe can be usually adjusted so as
to get the engine to take one home with a good pull. Often the spring
that keeps the wipe in contact merely wants bending or pulling out
so as to cause it to press more firmly against the ring. Mud or oil
on this part is a frequent cause of stoppage, but occasional cleansing
will prevent this. Loose terminals or partly-broken wires, too, may
be the cause of poor ignition, also imperfect insulation of the leads.
The latter at the accumulators often corrode ; after attaching them
it is well to smear on a little grease, which will prevent the acid, which
often slightly escapes, from attacking them. All exposed wires
should also be well insulated. I believe in putting them througl
rubber tubing and then lead gas piping, and using tinned copper wire
covered with vulcanised rubber. This may be dearer, but it obviates
all possibihty of a " short."
If the water circulation is imperfect theengine will heat, the cylinder
oil may then burn, and the rings, among other possibilities, not hold
compression ; in addition, the cyhnder will be so hot and the gas will
expand so much that a fuU charge cannot enter, and what does, as a
result of the excessive heat, will explode prior to full compression, so it is
as well to see to the pump and also that the water tank contains water.
MajCi '-^
Bcii:*-
1 :«(■<*■
t
lOTHiUK
F
-IBO
ni
T
CS.4PTi
"'WfwdtoiBh,
11 v., - A:
374
Maich 20, 1915
LAND AND WATER
A PARABLE OF PARA.
The tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE FIRST.
TWO merchants of the East met at the gate
of the city, each with his ass well-laden
as if fora long journey. " Whithergoestthou,
friend?" asked the one. "Dost thou perchance
also journey to Damascus ? " " Even so," replied
the other, "and if thou be willing, we will journey
on our road together, for these be perilous times
and the way is hard."
" Yea, verily, thou art right, friend ; hard for
man and beast. Hast thou seen to it that thine
ass is well-shod ? " " Of a surety, good friend,
and shoes have 1 to spare should aught befall,"
Whereon the other smiled in his beard, but
answered not, and they went on their way, the
one with the other. (To be icniinued.)
PUBLISHED BY
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO. LTD.,
Para Mills, .. Aston Cross, .. Birmingham.
H. Regent Sireel, LONDON, S.W. PARIS: 4, Rue du Coionel Moll.
Foundris of the Pneumatic Tyre Ini-ustrv thrrughout the VC'crld.
Y'OU cannot buy a
German car ; you
might buy a Neutral
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a British car.
H
UMBER CARS ARE EN-
TIRELY BRITISH.
HUMBER LIMITED. COVENTRY.
LONDON: 32 Holborn Viaduct. E.C.
60-64 BromptoD Road. S.W.
London Repair Works — Canterbury Road.
Kilburo. N W.
SOUTHAMPTON-27 London Road.
Agents Everywhere.
375
LAND AND WATER
March 20, 19 1 5
THE WINTER IS
NOT YET OVER
bitter winds
sweep over the plains
of Belgium in the
early Spring.
Extra protection is
still acceptable to
officers and men.
Russian Hood Scarf in fleecy
wool material. 12/6
"Stanley" Cape Sheet of
" Marsliproof," as supplied
by us to the British Red
Cross Society, forming cape
or motor-apron, ground-sheet
or sleeping-bag. _ 10/6
Lined fur. 6 guineas.
Woolly Cardigans with long
sleeves, strong in wear, grey.
80/- a dozen.
Fleecy Mittens or Cuffs in
dark assorted colours, special
value. 11/- a dozen.
MARSHALL©
SNELGROVE
Special Department for Cam-
paigning Accessories. Direct
Entrance Corner of Oxford
Street & Marylebone Lane,
LONDON
The
SUBMARINE
MENACE
The sanest, surest safeguard for all those who adven-
ture at sea in these days of mines and submarines is the
* Gieve '
Life SavingWaistcoat
Of the twelve officers taken from the water on the sinking
of H.M.S. Formidable ten were wearing this waistcoat.
From recent evidence given by the above and others
in a position to judge, the superiority of the "Gieve"
Life-Saving Waistcoat lies in the following important
ADVANTAGES :—
I. The wearer is kept aHoat indefinitely,
undress if be so desires.
although fully clothed, and can
a. Can alwavs be worn (deflated) with or without tJniform as an ordinary
waistcoat without looking unsightly or feeling uncomfortable.
3. Can be inflated sufficiently to keep wearer afloat witliin 20 seconds, and when
fully inflated (in about 30 seconds) is buoyant enough for wearer to assist two
others if necessary.
4. Each waistcoat carries a flask ready for emergency.
5. No matter how rough the sea or how strong the gale the "Gieve" Life-
Saving Waistcoat keeps its wearer always head and thvulders clear of the water,
with arms tree, and permits him to recline in any position, and freely to help
himself and others.
Made to any size,
flannel lined.
GIEVE'S
Gieve, Matthews &■
Seagrove, Ltd.
50/-
On view and on
sale at
LONDON— 65 South Mollon Street.
PORTSMOUTH— The Hard.
DEVONPORT— 44 Fore Street.
CHATHAM— Railway Street.
WEYMOUTH-i & 2 Grosvenor Place.
SHEERNESS— 72 High Street, Ulue Town.
EDINBURGH- 30a George Street.
HARWICH— Kingsway, Dovercourt.
A SOFT
SERVICE CAP
(Patent No. 5002/14).
Indispensable to Officers
at the front, most comfort-
able to wear, and retains
its shape. Rolls up into
small compass for pocket
or haversack. Absolutely
Waterproof, with a back
curtain that folds inside
when not required. Kept
in all sizes.
Price 16/6
Obtainable only from
MILITARY OUTFITTERS
.STUDD & MILLINGTON,sY^:n^.rs.rLond'o.w^
/I
DRYFOOT
the ideal
Waterproof
Copy of leller just receiyed from the Front
From Lleut.-Col. C. E. Stewart. Black Watch. 1st Batt..
1st Division. British Expeditionary Force :— Thank you
so much for the 'Dryfoot' which arrived safely. It has
been well tested by me. and has certainly done all it
professed. In spite of the muddiest of fields, nw boots
have kept dry Inside, so I know that it will be very
welcome to the men."
WHY NOT SFND YOUR FRIEND IN CAMP
ATINf IT WILL RE APPRECIATED.
To be obtained from all leading Shoe Firms & Stores
Price 1/- large tin; 6d. small tin.
5.,/r Manu/acrurers : .„.«„ , .-,„
THE SEAL PRODUCTS, LTD.
Wholesale only. Kllburn, London, N.W.
OPE®BmDLE)B
Civil. Militarv & Naual Sbilors ^^
■.■■■III ■"*
OFFICERS' KIT.
Officers at the Front have learnt from bitter experience that the
excessive strain on active service renders uniforms made from
any but the finest Khaki useless in a few weeks. Although there
is a regulation colour, there is no regulation quality for Officers'
materials, and in consequence the best quality costs from 300 to
400 per cent, (a startling assertion, but true) more than the
indifferent qualities often used.
The prices charged for Service Kit by Pope & Bradley are quoted
for the finest and most expensive materials procurable and for
West End workmanship. The policy of the House has always
been to supply only the best that money can buy, and considers
its reputation at stake over every Military garment produced.
The initial War Office grant is amply sufficient to cover a full
equipment from Pope & Bradley, and it is a false economy to en-
deavour to try to save a few pounds by buying second-grade Kit.
Service Jacket (Heavy Khaki Serge)
Do. (Guards' Barathea) . .
Bedford Cord Breeches (Buckskin sirapp d|
Slacks . .
British Warm
Service Greatcoat
£3 3
£4 4
£2 12
£1 5
£3 15
£4 10
0
0
6
0
0
0
MUFTI.
The Mufti productions of the House represent the highest tradi-
tions of Bond Street tailoring, and, by trading upon a rigid cash
basis, are offered at the most moderate prices compatible with
their quality.
Lounge Suits from £4 4 0
Overcoats " ~1 1 °
Evening Suits .1 £6 6 0
Upon application, we shall be pleased to forward our book, "THE MAN OF
TO-DAY," dealing exhaustively with men's dress in every phase.
TWO ESTABLISHMENTS ONLY
14 OLD BOND STREET.'W®
11-13 SOUTHAMPTON ROW^WC
.170
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol LXrV No. 2759 SATURDAY. MARCH 27. 1915 [r^J'.'^^iVi'^Kl'] U^^iLlh^'^iKKV^
Copyright, Lcja\ettt
VICE-ADMIRAL SACKVILLE H. GARDEN
Commanding the Allied Fleet which is engaged in opening ihe way of the Dardanelles
LAND AND WATER
March 27, 1915
PERMANENT COAL.
A Clever Invention. An Inexpensive Appliance,
Suitable for all Coal-Grates, which Saves
Scuttles upon Scuttles of Coal.
An exceedingly clever invention by a North-country scientist bids fair to
revolutionise all existing ideas of coal consumption. It is suitable for grates
of all kinds and sizes (including kitchen ranges), and only costs 3/-, or 3/6
post free.
No Alteration in Appearance of Fire. No Treatment
of Fuel. No Special Installation, or Renewal.
The Incandescent Fire Mantle is a device of special design and com-
position, fully protected by Patent, which issimply placed in the centre of amy
grate. It scientifically utilises the heat energy created by the combustion
of the coal, which, instead of flying up the chimney, as is the case of the
larger portion of such energy in ordinary grates, is made to bring the mantle
to incandescent heat. Thus there lies in the centre of the fire a white hot
mass of what may be termed everlasting coal, throwing off more heat than
coal alone can give, yet absolutely unburnable, and as good at the end of
twelve months as it is the first day. The appearance of the fire is in no way
altered; the mantle is completely covered by the surrounding coal, and its
presence cannot be detected. No Installation, Alteration, or Special
Treatment of the Fuel or the Grate is Necessary. There is no
recurring expenditure of any kind ; when once you have purchased the fire
mantle at its modest price of 3s. you can enjoy for ever a beautifully bright
and hot fire at an enormous saving of coal. The mantle is placed into the
grate with exactly as much— and no more — trouble than it is to put on a
lump of coal. It requires no attention or care of any kind.
Remarkable Test Figures.
As the result of a recent strictly supervised test upon modern grates, it
was found that the average consumption of coal per grate in the ordinary
grate (eight grates were experimented upon in this particular test) was 34 lb.
of coal for a period of 11 hours. On the following day one of the new fire
mantles was placed in each of these same grates, and the coal consumption
per grate for a period of 12 J hours was then found to have been reduced
to 19 lb. 30Z., whilst the heat was greater.
Saves its Cost in a Few Days.
The price of the Incandescent Fire Mantle is 3s. (3s. 6d. post free),
which small sum is saved back in a few days. The mantle lasts for an
indefinite time and can be used in grates of any size, pattern, or construction.
On account of the proportionate saving in postage, two mantles can be
dispatched post free to any address in the kingdom on receipt of 6s. 6d., and
three for only gs. At this time of enforced economy, and with the additional
danger of the present high coal prices rising still further, the great saving
effected by the Incandescent Fire Mantle should not be neglected Orders
and remittances should be addressed to The Incandescent Fire Mantle Syndi-
cate (Dept. 76), 9 Station Parade, Queen's Road, Peckham, London, S.E.
The
LOVE OF A BARGAIN
CHE love of a barg.iin is
not essentially the pre-
rogative of women ; it is
not the exclusive enjoyment
of the lovy-of-purse. It is
inherent and innate in all of
us — no matter what our
position.
In other words, the know-
ledge of having secured un-
usually high value for our
expenditure brings a secret
joy and satisfaction — a joy
and satisfaction transcending,
in point of fact, those which
follow even a free gift of
something of great worth !
Every purchase made of
Jelks & Sons may be re-
garded in the light of a
bargain. Owing to the
widcspre:id business they do
by private treaty, by secur-
ing complete and beautiful
homes from well-circum-
>tanced people who, for one
reason or another, arc
giving up housekeeping —
they are in a position to
offer
High-grade Second-hand Furniture
at prices which are without
parallel in the business.
Each month they publish
a Bargain List of articles
ranging from a Jacobean
sideboard to a lizard skin,
including articles of terlu,
articles of common use —
household goods of every
A penonal call U solicited, otherwise WRITE
BOOKLET 1 °ost free). London Deliveries all
description. Lovers of a
bargain would do well to
send their names and
addresses to Messrs. Jelks
to be placed on their list
lor a free monthly copy
of this unique guide to
"the better things" in
furniture.
TO-DAT FOE THE DEBOEIPTIVE BARGAIN
Districts daily. Country Orders Carriage Paid.
^""„';S'-' W. JELKS & SONS s/,.r,.„
263, 26S, 267, 269. 271. 273, 275. HOLLOWAY ROAD, LONDON, N
Tele. : 259S, 2S9« North : ,,,.6 Central. Telegrams : •• Jellicoe. London ■
BEMOVAL ESTIMATE FEEB.
;f ' ^
Send him a Flask of
HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS
Think what a blessing these delicious Food
Tablets are to men on active service. They
are always ready for immediate use, and a
few dissolved in the mouth will maintain the
strength of the Soldier when he most needs
it. They supply sufficient nourishment to
sustain for hours ; give increased body heat
and vitality ; prevent fatigue, and relieve thirst.
Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.
We will send post free to ANY address a flask of these
delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat vest pocket
case on receipt of 1/6. If the man is on active service,
be particular to give his name, regimental number, regiment,
brigade and division.
Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket
flasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/.
Liberal Sample Bottle sent post free for 3d. in stamps.
HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., Slough, Bucks.
MIIIHIIIIIIIIIIR
SSIIK
s Are you Run-down S
Ba , B
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aiiiiiiiHBiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiifi
386
March 27, 1915
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
By MRS
Dress v. Clothes
DRESS ! " said the Mere Male in a superior
way. " How can you possibly think of dress
at such a time as this ? "
" But I am not exactly thinking of
dress," I answered, looking up meekly from
the pile of patterns and designs my dressmaker had just
sent me. " I am thinking of clothes — a very different thing."
" That's mere femini' e prevarication," said the Mere
Male, who is a lover of long , _
words.
" No, my good man,
it's not," said I. " Far •
from it. It is a case of
sheer necessity. I, like most
other women and like the
lady in tlie song. ' have
nothing to wear.' We have
got to buy some clothes,
or we shall have to remain
indoors, clothed like squaws
in blankets."
"So I suppose in a
short time," said the Mere
Male, with an ever-ready
wit, " I shall have the
pleasure of seeing you in a
wide skirt, a coat like a
badly cut mess jacket, and
a pill-box hat."
" To say nothing of
boots twelve inches high,"
I put in, not to be outdone
in this flight of fashionable
fancy.
The Mere Male grunted;
there is no other word for
the sound he made.
" What did you say ? "
I asked.
" I didn't speak," said
the Mere Male in a tone
whicli spoke volumes.
" Then I will," said I,
now thoroughly aroused.
" It isn't because we women
are thinking of dress and
nothing but dress that we
are buying clothes ; we are
buying them because we
really need them, in the
first place, and because we
have some regard for the
dressmakers, in the second."
" From altruistic
motives," said my friend,
with his horrid habit of usirg
words of three syllables
and over, and with more than a tinge of sarcasm.
" You can call them what you like," I retorted, " but
the fact remains that the present spurt in clothes buying is
spelling salvation to the dressmakers. It means money for
heaps of little workroom girls over here, to say nothing of
the midinettes in Paris."
" So you women are in the right, as usual," said the
Mere Male, only half convinced, but well on the road to
conviction, nevertheless.
" Exactly," I said.
" And you have had the last word, as usual ! "
" Precisely," said I.
The Helping Hand
As a matter of fact, the Mere Male, even is his most
argamentative mood, is a helpful being. He enabled me to
sec in a flash what this revival of industry must mean to the
dressmaking houses. It must have lifted from many the
:hreat of impending ruin ; it must have relieved scores of
minds, from the brilliant directors of famous establishments
to the humblest worker in the smallest workroom. It is,
of course, no use pretending it is charity pure and simple
that is leading us all to the fitting-room. It is nothing of
the kind. Our needs for new garments are too many and
obvious to allow of any such philanthropic gloss. The only
ERIC DE KIDDER
Copyright, Madame LallU Charles
THE DUCHESS OF MARLBOROUGH
Nobody is working harder oi behalf of her adopted land than I e Duchess
of Marlborough. She is generally in the chair at the principal meelings
of the Women's Emergency Corps, and her name figures in the
Alphabetical Scheme for the Giih' Palriolic Clubi
treasures does not cease here.
thing is that by replenishing our wardrobes we are keeping
many in employment who were in danger of seeing their
means of livelihood vanish away. We are doing a kindness
to others as well as ourselves as we order our new spring
clothes. And, aU other considerations set aside, why shoukl
we go about in dismal dowdiness. Things are glormy enough
without us making them more so by appearing in metaphorical
dust and ashes. I hold no brief for reckless extravagance in
clothes. At this time it
would seem to most of us
worse than criminal. Tliere
is, however, such a thing as
the happy medium. It is
easy to talk about — not so
easy to find. In this par-
ticular case it can soon be
defined ; midway it lies,
exactly between needless
expense and undue
economv. A point for nice
discrimination in very truth,
b at in valuable wh. n once we
have finally arrived at it
The Market Gardeners
A letter lias just reached
me from the Kiviera. It
is written by a fortunate
mortal at St. Jean, Cap
Ferrat, that fascinating spot
within short distance of
Nice. The average visitor
to the Riviera knows
little of St. Jean, but
tlie few who do recognise it
as one of the beauty spots
of the earth. The part of
St. Jean which is not sea — if
such an Irish statement may
be permitted — is one big
flower-garden. The mimosa
is beginning to fade, but
heaps of lovely things have
arrived to take its place.
Festoons of ivy-leaf ger-
anium, clusters of roses,
sweet-smelling stock, bed
after bed of carnations,
white, rose and pink sweet
peas now on the verge of
flowering — the list is well-
nigh inexhaustible. St.
Jean, in common with all
the neighbouring district,
contributes to the Nice
flower - market ; but the
demand for their fragrant
Great baskets, hampers, and
boxes of flowers are being for« arded regularly to Paris and
London. And this not only in spite of the war, but in spite
of the fact that every able-bodied Frenchman has either
joined the colours or is working on .Army supplies. Last
year numbers of men were working in the flower-fields ; this
year the women are doing all the work concerned with them.
My letter tells me that there is not a single man working in
the gardens surrounding the villa in which it is written, save
one who is over seventy. The gardeners have gone, their
wives are working in their stead, and the work — hard thougli
it often is — is being carried out just the same in their absence.
A SERIES of lectures, with practical demonstrations, will be given
every Friday (except Good Friday) at 3 p.m., from February 26 to
April 16, on " Cooking for the Sick and Convalescent," at the Queen's
Gate Hall, Harrington Road, South Kensington, under the auspices
of the Gas Light and Coke Company. The lectures are intended for
the assistance of those who have generously undertaken the work of
nursing wounded and invalid soldiers back to health, and will be
given by the company's staff of fully qualified lady advisers, all of
whom hold diplomas for cooking. Admission to the lectures and
demonstrations will be free on presentation of a ticket, to be obtained
on application to the Gas Light and Coke Company, Horscferry Road,
Westminster, S.W.
387
LAND AND WATER
March 27, 1915
I
F, knowing all you know,
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of
kk
SIRIS
ff
a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as Apollin-
aris and similar to it in taste.
Repd. Quarts.
Per Doz. 6/"
Repd. Pints.
3/6
Carriage Paid.
Repd. a Pints.
2/6 P*r Do2t
BV^ Sample Bottle FREE on receipt of Coupon '
Name _ ~
Address
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral Waters
A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Cheoies Street Works. LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.
iUlllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllilllllllllllllllllllllillllllllllimillllU:
I The BestWristlet for the Front |
= .... and for the training camp, too. =
S You cannot send him a more useful gift, =
= or one that he will treasure more. S
= It will keep good time on the march, in =
= the camp, and in the trenches. S
= All Waltham Watches have an enviable ^
= reputation for accuracy of timekeeping =
S wherever watches are known. S
= For that reason the gift of a Waltham is =
= always most warmly welcomed. =
S »/j^ to tie the exfuiiitely dainty series fir ladies' wear. ^
I WahhamWaiches |
SS Of all Reliable Watchmakers and Jewellers, S
For GBDtlemen
— S«Ud Silver Cues —
Riverside •• 6 14 3 No. i6i -'"5 u 3 I Itiranida . « if
LadyWalUtam 4 tS 9 No. 160- ■ 9 o |
S "O
ForUdlM
Raby • -
^ SOLD AI-SO IN- COLD AKD KOLLBD COLD CASBS. 52
^ « Wristiei Watch " Pamphlet and WaUham Waich Booklet pott fHe fr^m ^
^ Waltham Watch Co. (Dept. 63), 125 High Holbom, X-ondon.W.C. ^
liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimmiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiil
Hotel Cecil
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Td.phon.: GERRARD .0. ^P^'i'' MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
PRESSING-
PUSHING-
PLOUGHING
nPHESE three words each picture the amount of Energy
needed to drive a Bicycle according to the amount of
Friction generated by the chain and driving Bearings.
When there is NO
Friction, as in the case
of the Sunbeam, then
the Rider only has to
press on his pedals.
When there is some
Friction, as in the case
of many so-called high-
grade machines, then
the Cyclist has to push
on his pedals. But when
from various causes
there is much Friction,
then the unfortunate one has to plough along on his pedals.
The point to emphasise is that the Sunbeam's Little
Oil Bath Gear Case saves the Friction and the Pushing
and the Ploughing.
For Easy Cycling, then, get a Sunbeam. Write
for the new Sunbeam Catalogue to —
3 SUNBEAMLAND— WOLVERHAMPTON
London ShowTOomt i 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, B.C.
15I SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Squire), S.W.
388
March 27, 1915.
LAND AND 3K A T E R.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.— This Article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, whicli does not object to the publlcatloa 8S censored, ud (akei M
responsibility for the correctness ot the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions ot troops on Plans Illustrating this Article must only bl
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
THE POSITION ON THE EAST PRUSSIAN
FRONTIER. ,
I.
THE capture of Warsaw, with its railway
bridges, is, as has been the theme of these
articles for many weeks past, the capital
operation of the enemy in the present
phase of the War.
If he can obtain possession of that point, he
guarantees himself in the East against a Russian
advance for some time to come, and is free to mass
in the West before the munitioning and new
equipped armies of the Allies in the West imperil
his line through Northern France.
The fortunes, therefore, of the campaign for
Warsaw must be grasped as a whole if we are to
understand the present phase of the War, and I
propose to take the opportunity of the present lull
and indecision in this quarter to recapitulate the
operations there and to lead them up to as precise
a description as our scanty views permit of the
situation at the moment of writing.
It will be remembered that the Germans,
after having failed to take Warsaw by direct
attack from in front along the Bzura and the
Eawka (which attempt had lasted nearly two
months, and had cost them in total casualties per-
haps two hundred thousand men) determined with
the beginning of February to attempt the capture
of the city from behind. Their plan was to come
down from the North to cut the fortified line of
the Niemen and the Narew and so to get a-straddle
of the sheaf of railways that converge upon the
bridges of Warsaw across the Vistula.
This is the fundamental point of the Eastern
Campaign in its present phase. I have described
it more than once in these pages during the last
six weeks. I take the liberty of repeating it again
this week because a clear comprehension of it is
essential to the comprehension of the present
position.
The position, then, at the opening of February
was that on the accompanying sketch map. The
enemy having failed, after prolonged efforts, to
capture Warsaw at W by a direct attack along the
line B R (which is the line of the Bzura and the
Rawka) from the direction A, gathered certainly
more than ten, and possibly fourteen, Army Corps
in East Prussia — that is, anything from 400,000
to nearly 600,000 men — and designed to come
down in the directions BB B and get a-straddle of
the railways 1, 2, and 3 which converge upon the
bridges of Warsaw and by which alone a Russian
Army, working westward of the River Vistula,
can live. In front of those railways stretch like
a screen the fortified lines of the Narew River,
prolonged by the fortified lines of the Niemen
River. The enemy's design was to push out from
East Prussia and break that line.
During the first week of February he delivered
a very violent attack upon the Bzura Rawka line
which lasted from February 2 to February 8. We
Q -^ br_ I (S
(D
can now see that his probable main object in doing
this was to distract attention from the concentra-
tion of his troops in East Prussia, though, at the
same time, we must remark that his effort was
sufficiently violent to warrant some hope of his
breaking through in this last attempt. At anVj
rate, with February 8 and 9 his advance with
the large forces concentrated in East Prussia
began.
He had immediately opposed to him nothing
but the Tenth Russian Army, a force of no more
than four Army Corps, amounting, after several
months of fighting, to perhaps not more than fron\
120,000 to 140.000 men, even allowing for the
drafts bv which they had been replenished.
Suc"h a force is, for a campaign of the present
dimensions, a weak one. It does not represent
more than a fifteenth perhaps of the total Russian
forces operating between the Baltic and the
Roumanian frontier.
This tenth Russian Army was eitlier taken
by surprise or at any rate compelled to a very
rapid retreat before this greatly superior concen-
tration of the enemy, and its retirement took up
the whole of the second week and extended into the
third week of February.
When the German forces struck it, in an
immediate superiority of at least five to two, and,
counting the German forces behind the first line
in a superiority of quite three to one, the situation
of this tenth Russian Army was that set out in th^
next map.
It had slowly fought its way over the EasE
Prussian Frontier, going partly north of the lakei
LAND AND .WATER.
March 27, 1915.
r—v*
sentimental one of clearing German soil of the
invader, but the practical one of cutting the rail-
waj-s behind Warsaw (if he did not succeed in
achieving which task his movement would have
failed), he proceeded to advance upon those rail-
ways in three main bodies, which I have marked
in the accompanying sketch 1, 2, and 3 respectively.
district and partly engaging itself in that district
until it had come to occupy the line A B; its right
wing was within half a march of the East
Prussian town of Tilsit, its extreme left was a
couple of marches south of the town of Lotzen.
It had not quite penetrated either to Insterburg
nor, I think, to Lotzen itself, and it must be re-
garded as a chain of four forces, each an Army
Corps, which I have numbered in the accom-
panying sketch 1 to 4. These four Army Corps
retired very rapidly before the advance of their
vastly superior enemy along the arrows marked
upon the sketch towards Kovno, towards Suwalki,
towards Augustowo, and further to the south.
During this retreat they suffered no more than the
losses normal to a perilous operation of this kind,
say ten or twelve per cent., in men and material,
save in the case of one Army Corps (the Twentieth
Russian Army Corps), which, either because it
deliberately remained behind to act as rear-guard,
or because it was so handled that it got out of
touch with the forces to the north and to the south
of it, suffered envelopment, and was almost wiped
out as a fighting force.
This disaster occurred in the marshy forest
district surrounding the town of Augustowo, and
the success (though but local and partial in a cam-
paign of such dimensions) was a he&vy score for
the enemy.
The enemy exaggerated it, naturally, and told
us that the Tenth Army as a whole had been
destroyed. This was, of course, not the case; but
it had lost through normal casualties and through
this particular disaster quite a third of its men
by the time the first chapter in the great movement
was closed, which we may fix roughly at the end
of the third week of February — say, Saturday,
February 20.
In this first shock the newly-concentrated
German forces had everywhere crossed the frontier
of East Prussia, and had, along the whole
crescent of their advance, penetrated into Russian
territory.
With the last week of February, from Feb-
ruary 21 to February 28, inclusive, opened the
gi'coud chapter, and to understand this we must
iave recourse to a third sketch.
The object of the enemy being, not the purely
in V
"Baftic )l\
L em e
I
WARSAW
^ <^ ^ I av
The first and smallest body was directed
against the neighbourhood of Grodno. The
second was directed against the fortress of
Osowiecs, the third was directed upon a broad
front towards the lower Narew, and the reason of
this disposition was as follows :
It is obvious that the effort to cut the railways
behind Warsaw would be successful and rapid in
proportion to the closeness to Warsaw at which the
advancing force managed to strike home.
A success by column 1 would be of little use if
column 2 were held up and column 3 were defeated.
For column 1, supposing even that it could
get past Grodno and cut the railway behind that
fortress, would have a very long way to go before
it would get at the next of the railways which
spread out divergently eastward from Warsaw;
and coming up so very far behind that city would
have but little effect upon its fate.
But if column 3 could manage to force the
defensive line and get upon the railways imme-
diately in the neighbourhood of Warsaw, where
they all come close together, and where the cutting
of the first would be rapidly followed by the cut-
ting of the second and third — and that so near to
the city that this success would immediately isolate
it — then the object of the great German move
would be decisively accomplished.
Further, a blow thus struck in the neighbour-
hood of Warsaw would divide in two the main
Russian forces in the North; it would leave the
great army in Warsaw in front of it and to the
west isolated from the bodies that had retired
upon Osowiecs and upon the upper Narew.
Nevertheless, it was necessary for column 1
and for column 2 to be operating as they did, both
because their action would occupy the Russian
forces in the North and prevent their coming down
South to the relief of the neighbourhood of
Mar
Cli
1915.
LAND AND ^V
iWarsaw, and secondly because the cutting of the
railway even high up would prevent the arrival
of reinforcements from the North down on to the
threatened district near the Vistula.
We hare then this second chapter of the great
movement opening with the advance of the three
German bodies upon the whole line of the Niemen
and the Narew with the object of piercing that
line, and particularly with the object of piercing
it in great force at its Southern end between the
two fortresses of Ostrolenka and New Georgievsk.
The fortified line of the Niemen and the
Karew consists in the following elements.
It starts with the fortress of Kovno upon the
broad and considerable obstacle of the lower
Niemen and runs up that river to the correspond-
ing fortress of Grodno about eighty miles aw^ay.
Between the two is the minor fortified point of
Olita. At Grodno there is a great bend in the
River Niemen, the upper reaches of which come in
from the East, so that the line of the river is no
longer useful as part of the screen to defend the
sheaf of railways that converge on .Warsaw. In-
deed, the main line from Warsaw to Petrograd
cuts the Niemen at this bend.
TTeiv G^eoi^ievskv^^^^ '■^ T,
But a natural obstacle suitable to the pro-
longation of a defensive line or screen is discovered
in the neighbourhood of Grodno in the shape of
the small sluggish river called the Bobr. This
stream oozes through great belts of marsh which
are crossed by only one causeway and railway, and
at the point of this crossing the little town of
Osowiccs has been fortified. Some twenty odd
miles below' Osowiecs the Bobr falls into the
Narew, which river takes on from that point the
task of the defensive screen. There is a small
fortified point early in this continuation at Lomza,
a more important one at Ostrolenka lower down,
and below Ostrolenka a fortified point at Rozan,
then a more important one at Pultusk. A short
day's march south of Pultusk, at Serock, the
Narew falls into the River Bug, which almost
immediately afterwards falls itself into the
Vistula, at the highly important great modern
fortress of New Georgievsk, whence a railway
leads to Warsaw on the one hand and up to the
Prussian frontier at Mlawa on the other.
The whole of this line, in a chord drawn from
one extremity to the other, is just over two hundred
miles long. In all its twists and turnings it is
considerably over two hundred and forty. And it
vvas the business of the enemy to get through this
fortified screen, and that without too much delay,
if he desired to take Warsaw before the melting
of the ice in the White Sea or the possible forcing
of the Dardanelles should permit the further
munitioning of Russia and before the new armies
appeared in the West from England.
As we have seen, he attacked during the last
week of February in three main bodies — the first
towards Grodno, the second towards Osowiecs, the
third in the region which I have marked upon the
sketch with the letters A B. a front stretching
from the neighbourhood of Khorgele to that of
Mlawa.
In order to follow the fortunes of this triple
attack it is necessary to appreciate the fact that
here upon this frontier, as upon the whole lino
where Russia and Germany meet, the enemy has
provided a perfect network of railroads upon his
side to which the Russians have built nothing
corresponding. Indeed, it was the knowledge that
the Russians, sooner or later, would perfect their
system of railroads which, among other things,
tempted the German Government to force on the
war at the moment it did. This German series of
railways, the main line exactly following t!ie
frontier and feeders coming out from it at regular
intervals, is clearly shown upon the sketch. Wa
shall see how this affected the fighting.
The smallest column, consisting of only ona
Army Corps (the 21st Army Corps of the German
active Army, a first-rate body), crossed the Niemen
at the point I have marked X upon the sketch,
about fourteen miles north of Grodno. It was able
to do this under the cover of a thick belt of wood
which here passes the river and extends eastward,
but it did not cross in any great force, and, as wo
have seen, its object was no more than to occupy
the enemy in this region and to prevent his forces
there from coming down South to the main field
of action near Warsaw. Precise details as to this
crossing are lacking, but it would seem to have
taken place round about February 20, and such
units as got across tlie water would seem to have
lingered there for rather more than a week, await-
ing the developments that might take jilace down
South. They did not proccecl further than the
limits of the wood which had coAcred the
operation.
In front of Osowiecs the second column ]]ad
for its mission the reduction of that central
fortress and gaining possession of tlie railway
which here crossed the fortified line.
Now the elements of Osowiecs are simple
enough. You have a river (see plan 5) A B, a
townlet at C on its banks, a railway and a road
parallel to each other on the line D E, and upon
either side of this crossing place at C two grejit
marshy districts X X and Y Y, the narrows be-
tween which are occupied of course by the crossing
and by tlie tow^n of Osowiecs itself. Taking
advantage of so strong a situation, permanent
works have been erected round Osowiecs as at
LAND AND JV. A T E R.
March 27, 1915.
P Q R aiul S. The Geiiiian siege train coming up
from the direction D had the advantage of the rail-
way to supply it Avith its ammunition and to move
its hea^y pieces. It bad the disadvantage of being
able to occupy no more than a rather narrow sector
|W V between the marshes, and to this must be
added the fact tliat the roads, or rather tracks,
running latterly from the main causeway are very
poor, and at this time of year, especially in this
open winter with its alternate frost and thaw, ill
fible to support the passage of heavy munitions.
Further, the district is very flat, as may be pre-
Bumcd from the presence of so much marsh, and the
opportunities of hiding a liowitzer from the direct
fire of the permanent works are not numerous.
From all these causes combined the bombard-
ment of Osowiecs, though l)egun in this last week
of February and continued to the pre.sent time,
has so far been of no effect. It has been reportecl
that the Germans here emplaced pieces of 16 to 17
inclies calibre. I venture to doubt this until there
is better evidence.* But it is certain that the large
'Austrian pieces of about 11 inches were present,
and it is remarkable that the bombardment should
have been prolonged o^er so many weeks without
any apparent result. AVhether this were due to
insufficiency of air work or to whatever other
cause, we are not told. At any rate this bombard-
ment of Osowiecs, the work of the second column,
■was, like the advance on Grodno, only subsidiary
to the main operation, which was the advance upon
the lower Xarew and the attempt to pierce that
line and get upon the railway in the neighbour-
hood of Warsaw. This advance was conducted
apparently in a force of four Corps, among Avhieh
it was destructiAe to place tAvo composed in the
main of the new German levies.
Having massed upon the front ]\flawa — Khor-
gele, about a day's march in front of the Prussian
• There are probably now in the field a few new German howitrers
tt about 14 or IS inches cAlibro.
fi'ontier railway, and supported with munitions
from that line, being further supplied from its
right by the railway Avhich runs south-AA^estward
across the Frontier through MlaAva, the German
line began to adA'ance upon Monday, February 22.
The district is one line between the Rivers
Orzec and Lidynia, which riA'ers reach the fortified
line defending the WarsaAV railways about fi.fty_
miles aAvay from MlaAva and Khorgele.
The Germans adA^anced not quite half way to
the defensiAe line, having, for the centre of their
effort, the town of Przasnysz. Their right followed
the railAA'ay line doAvn from Mlawa, their left the
marshy riA^er Orzec. They reached Przasnysz
upon Wednesday February 24, after a carefully,
co-ordinated advance in line of rather OAcr tAA^enty
miles. Upon Thursday, the 25th, they over-
Avhelmed the Russian outpost there (a Brigade
Avith a feAv guns), announced a great victory, and
re-formed their line for further adA^ance.
Another larger Russian adA^anced body, a
whole division, occupying a SAvell of land at the
point I haA^e marked X on this sketch, detained
them and fought Aery gallantly for thirty-six hours
against far superior numbers in order to permit
the arriA-al of three Russian Army Corps coming
up along the direction of the arrows from the
lyv<tj^
Mawa
NarcAv. The right of this Russian force forced the
passages of the Orzec against a stubborn German
resistance, the left relieved the isolated division,
Avhich had been holding out at X, and the German
line began to give Avay. It is Avorthy of note that
the Russians discovered the ncAV levies to be in-
sufficient, thougli in equal or superior numbers, to
resist this advance. In the course of Friday,
February 26, Przasnysz Avas re-occupied by
the Russian forces, and a general German retire-
ment began. It Avas no rout, as the journalists of
the Allies AAere sanguine enough to maintain ; only
ten thousand prisoners and perhaps a score of
guns fell to the victors. But the significance of this
extended action — Avhich goes by the name of the
Battle of Przasnysz — lay in the fact that it
marked the close of the .second chapter in this great
operation, and the frustration of the German
design to reach and pierce the NarcAv defensive
line.
As the German retirement in the first days of
March fell back in orderly and leisurely fashion
to the original line MlaAva^Ivliorgele, tlie nearer
it got to its frontier raihvay, the stronger it
became, and the less effective Avas the Russian
pressure against it. From that day to this, over a
4*
March 27, 1915.
LAND AND W A T E R.
period of three weeks, the Germans have here
remained entirely upon the defensive. Nor have
the Russian forces, which could effect no general
strategical results by further advance northward
in this region, been re-inforced for the purpose of
prosecuting such an advance. They remain drawn
up in front of the German lines, content to contain
the enemy, and to watch any further attempt of his
to take the offensive again.
For about a fortnight, the fighting here took
the form of a scattered number of local engage-
ments, in which the Russians have taken a certain
number of guns, continuous driblets of prisoners,
and have, in a few places, advanced slightly by the
capture of disputed points.
At the end of the fortnight, about a week ago,
the Russians noted a very considerable new concen-
tration taking place in front of them. They
announced the imminence of a new great battle
and of a further attempt upon the part of the
enemy to force the Narew line, but the situation
has not developed, and, after three weeks of in-
decisive and petty actions, not only on this front,
but everywhere along the frontier, a detailed
German communique enables us to define, with an
accuracy rare in this Eastern campaign, tiie exact
cordon of positions held by the Germans as late as
a week before these lines will appear, Thursday,
March 18.
fe^|^<2t...K«:'VN0
lA^^'^T'^^''''^^^ i^farloinpd j.'
/ /GRODNO
TUk
Vil
Tlie German line, then, upon that day, start-
ing from the Vistula, ran as follows :
From just east of Plock, it ran almost due
north to Zurorain, which means that the flank here
has been bent v.eH back by some recent Russian
concentration in that region, for, quite a short time
ago, it v.as far eastward of such a line. From
Zuromin it turned to run south of Mlawa, south
of Khorgcle, and just south of My.szyniec, and on
south of Kolno. There it bends a little away from
the frontier, follows the left bank of the Bobr for a
very short distance, and is then bent round in
front of the guns of Osowiecs. From those
marshes it turns northward, just includes Augus-
towo, covers the local chief town of Suwaiki, and
reaches Mariampol to strike the m.ain inter-
national line from Berlin to Petrograd at the
station of Pilwiski. Thence it bends right back
close to the frontier, and reaches Tauroggen,
beyond which point it is not prolonged.
Now it is clearly apparent, from the trace of
this line upon the .sketch, that it is drawn with thy
single object, for the moment, of covering the East
Prussian frontier, and of drawing its provisions
from the scheme of railways that runs just within
German territory; and though, from such a line,
further German forces may initiate a third
chapter in the great movement, and may attempt
yet another advance in force against tlie line of
the Niemen and the Narew, yet the main object of
remaining in precisely this situation, with such
considerable forces, is the political object of saving
German soil for the moment from further moles-
t<ation. With the exception of the point at A,
where the line just touches the Bobr, the v,-hole
system is clearly designed as a screen against raids
into East Prussia.
It is the first rule in war not to do what your
enemy expects you to do, but it is a secondary rule,
sometimes of value in practice to do, from time to
time, what, for any reason, he particularly desires
you not to do. It is evident that the enemy is, by
the disposition of this line, nervous about the
purely political element in the situation, German
soil. He Vrill, apparently, make some consideral'le
sacrifice for the, not military, but political, object
of saving that soil from further suffering. The
Russians, therefore, have, in the last few days,
undertaken an expedition detached, and presum-
ablv of no verv great size, against the isolated sea-
port o± Memel, in the extreme north of the East
Prussian province.
We must remember that East Prussia is
German in its wealth much more than in its
texture. It is the squires and the merchants iu
the towns — the town population in general — that
regards, v.ith jieculiar tear. Russian action over
the frontier. That the attack on Memel has a
.strategic object may be doubted. Piophecy. and
even conjecture, in any campaign, particularly in
such a campaign as this, where tlie value of secrecy
has been so tlioroughly comprehended on evei-y
side, is futile enough, but it is not easy to believe
that any serious action could be undertaken from
the Memel district. It lies at a very great distance
from the mass of the Russian forces, and an
advance from that corner would butt at once into
the serious obstacle of the broad and deep Niemen,
just near its mouth, and upon all that Tilsit dis-
trict which our Ally found it impossible to
traverse in his last advance of December and
Ja nuary . We a re, t here fore, fa i rly sa f e in regard-
ing the raid upon Memel as designed to increase
the nervousness of the enemy only, and as further
designed to increase an exasperation v.-hich is
apparent in the wild order for looting and burning
masses of Russian property by way of revenge for
this incursion, exasperation of such a sort being
the worst possible counsellor in war.
The telegrams to hand speak of the participa-
tion of the civilian population of Memel in tho
fighting. If that is so, it will mean, of course,
that the German example, though it will not have
LAND A N D .W A T E R.
Mcirch 27, 1915.
been followed by our Ally, can at least be pleadet!
for any just severity the Russians may have seen
fit to exercise at Memel in the pursuit of legitimate
warfare, and the first instance of this kind which
war has afforded may be valuable as some indica-
tion of what the enemy's policy will be when, or if,
hostilities upon a considerable scale shall be raging
on his own soil. We nmst wait for further news to
know whether the raid into Memel can even be
continued.
Nothing would be easier than for the enemy
to move considerable forces in relief of the town.
He has a good railway leading up to it on his side,
and the Russians have not, I believe, any sucli
facility of commur.ication on theirs. But the
diversion is interesting, and its consequences may
be well worth following.
II.
YET A"; AIN- ATTRITION'.
It is right enough that what has been said
first by a few individuals concerned with tlie
exact study of the present campaign, and what
they have learnt from those actively engaged in
prosecuting it in the field, should somewhat
later be published officially, and this is what has
happened in the case of the trench-fighting in
the West.
It has been pointed out continually in these
columns for many weeks past that the effort
against the trenches in the West was not, in the
main, an effort at breaking through, but an effort
at wearing down. In the ultimate analysis, vic-
tory consists in the imposing of the victor's will
upon the vanquished. This, in its turn, is only
possible by the military success of the victor's
army over the vanquished, and this last phrase
only means, when it is translated into terms of
real things, the disarmament of your opponent in
a larger measure than of your own forces; and in
proportion to the extent of his disarmament, com-
pared vvith your ovv-n, is your victory complete.
Now an enemy is disarmed (by compulsion
rather than persuasion, vvhich is another matter)
by one of five methods or by any number of them
combined. These five are death, disablement from
wounds, disease, capture, and the destruction of
his organisation or cohesion.
Supposing your enemy meets you with a
number of armed, equipped, and organised men
equal to your own, and supposing that in any
fashion, after such and such a lapse of time,
you have reduced the number of his armed,
equipped, and organised men to one-half of your
own. You have lost, of course, heavily, and it is
the difference between his losses and yours that
has put him into this unfavourable posture.
Having to meet you now one to tv>^o, he is
hardly sanguine of success. He already dis-
counts defeat; he is perhaps prepared to accept
part of your terms. If you are not satisfied with
this, if you believe you can go on increasing the
disproportion, and if you regard your full terms
as essential to your future safety, you proceed
with the task of disarming him by death, by
killing in action, by capture, by disablement in
action, by breaking up his organisation with
heavy blows against him, and by allowing the
wastage due to sickness to run its course.
Being already tv,o to one, you can probably
accelerate the pace of the process, and in a com-
paratively short time compared with the first
period, disarm forces, yet perhaps by a number
and quality combined, not as one to two, but one
to four, compared with your own. AVhen he is
in such an extremity he will probably accept your
terras; and if he does not, why you go on.
All the wars of history, all the great actions,
dramatic or dull, all the campaigns, whether slow
and confused like the Peninsula, or simple and
immediate, like that of 1815, are, at bottom,
nothing more than examples of this fundamental
process.
All war is the attempt to disarm the enemy,
and we only talk of '" A War of x\ttrition " as a
special case when we mean that the process is a
continuous and detailed one instead of a rapid
and wholesale one.
What happened, for instance, at Waterloo
— a decision arrived at within ten hours? What
happened was that a Frencli force, acting in the
proportion of about seven to six (if I remember
rightly) found its opponents swelled by the advent
of their Allies till their fighting, no longer more
than seven to nine, broke under the strain (that is,
lost cohesion) and, upon reforming after the pur-
suit, stood to their opponents no longer as seven
to nine, but as less than three to ten. The Duke of
Wellington's command and Blucher's had dis-
armed the French by killing, by capture, by dis-
ablement through vvounds, and by scattering them.
They had lost a great number of men themselves,
but they had made the enemy lose a very much
larger number in proportion, with the result that
two or three days after the battle with the figures
stated in this extreme contrast, about three against
ten, nothing more could be attempted, especially
as to the numerical disproportion was added of
course the moral shock.
There is an inevitable tendency everywhere,
save perhaps in the higher command, for armies
and the civilian opinion behind them to be struck
by the adjuncts of military success more than by
its fundamental character. Whether tlie enemy
retreats or goes forward : whether he loses guns :
whether he is fighting on his own soil or on ours :
whether a success is achieved quickly or tardily.
All these things have their value, for they are
of moral effect, but ultimately the real test is
" How do the numbers of armed, equipped and
organised men, and of the materials at their dis-
posal, stand upon either side, and if, by your
method of action, whether Fabian or Napoleonic
(though the phrase is hardly fair to Napoleon, who
could be as Fabian as anybody) you are more and
more tending to leave your enemy in a lower and
lower proportion numerically to your ov,n men,
you are heading for victory, and if the contrary,
you are heading for defeat."
In this particular case of the trench fighting
across North-Eastern France you have as pitiless,
but as clear an instance of this last principle as
history has ever afforded. The " Eye Witness "
with the British forces has at last set it openly
for official publication, and it has been aiming for
months past in all the work of the Allies : the work
is a work of attrition. There might be a collapse
at any moment in some section of the enemy's de-
fensive line. There might be, therefore, a breach
achieved there. If that comes off unexpectedly, so
much the better. But it is improbable, and it is
not the main calculation. The main calculation is
directed towards perpetually lowering the
numbers of the enemy as compared with the
numbers opposed to him, both in men and in mate-
rial, until at long last the tide shall have turned.
6»
March 27, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
In the French formula " the enemy, having
been drawn to put forth the maximum of his effort
before your ov.n maximum of effort against him is
reached, the growth of your effort to a maximum
shall correspond with the decline of his."
It is the only principle upon v.hich forces in-
ferior at first in number and in munitioning can
make for ultimate victory.
It must, therefore, whether after such a sharp
local success as Neuve Chapelle the other day, or
after a sharp local reverse such as that of Soissons
some months ago, be perpetually repeated that
what counts (supposing discipline and all moral to
remain unaffected) is not the local defence or re-
tirement, but the proportion of total losses even
at Soissons, where against a single depleted French
Division certainly two, and possibly three, corps
converged, and where reinforcements failed
through the breakdown of the bridges in the flood
of the Aisne, the enemy lost about three men to
the French two. A French body of about 14,000
men beyond the Aisne lost in killed and wounded,
and in prisoners, half its effectives. The blow was
severe, the enemy advanced over an area almost
exactly equal to that seized by the British a fort-
night ago at Neuve Chapelle. But the enemy
gained this local success at an expense of not less
than 12,000 men. That is the estimate of men
who were not engaged in influencing public
opinion, but surveying as eye-witnesses the nature
of the action : of men who saw the dense German
masses swarming down the valley to Conchy at its
narrow mouth, and who saw the play of the 753
upon those masses from the spur above Soissons
which was ultimately abandoned.
At Neuve Chapelle, tacitly and locally a suc-
cess, you have the same principle at work as at
Soissons. which was tacitly and locally a defeat,
save that at Neuve Chapelle the proportionate
enemy losses were more than three to two — more
nearly two to one.
The enemy has told us that Sir John French's
estimate of 17,000 to 18.000 losses upon the Ger-
man side is ridiculous, and that the real losses were
more like a third of that amount.
Let us digress a moment to analyse that
statement.
THE GERMAN COMMLNIQUE ABOUT
NELVE CHAPELLE.
The advance at Neuve Chapelle was made
against a front of over 4,000 yards and covered
a depth nearly a mile wide at its maximum, I
believe, or possibly a trifle more. The total area
rushed was, I suppose, nearly two square miles
in extent, and the succeeding lines of trenches
occupied were not far short of tvro and a half
miles long. Let us suppose that this front were
at first being held by so small a number as 6,000
men. The calculation is a very rough and con-
fused one, of course, because a defensive front is
not held by one fixed number of men, who are
rooted there like trees, but by a minimum
actualh' on the spot always, with considerable
reinforcements available in a comparatively short
time, whenever serious pressure develops upon
them.
The troops on the spot upon that Wednes-
day morning were taken completely by surprise.
For thirty-five minutes they were in as bad a
storm of heavy shell as has fallen on anyone in the
campaign, except possibly at one moment near
Perthes three weeks ago. A further belt of shell-
ing immediately behind them forbade retirement,
even in disorderly groups. The moment the
shelling ceased, the British concentration was upon
them. Of prisoners taken, apart from all other
casualties, you have some 2,000, and under a
shelling from which there was no escape you
have the greater bulk of the men who were
holding this first line of trenches.
Next following upon this completely success-
ful stroke of the Wednesday morning, you have
three successive days, if I am not mistaken, of
attempts to retake the positions lost. There is
here no question of surprise; the enemy is not
able to concentrate, unwatched, as the British,
either from weather conditions or from the polity
of the enemy's air work, we believe concentrated
unwatched, before the main action. The Ger-
mans' counter - offensive is expected and taken
for granted. It is met as every such expected
attack can be met. It is poured in from
reinforcements and still further reinforcements
and is regularly and methodically repelled.
That means upon the face of it continuous
heavy losses, necessarily exceeding those of
the defensive, and particularly exceeding them
in the case of troops who come on, as we know,
as the enemy does in this campaign.
.We know what the losses were upon the
successful side in the first surprise attack and in
the defensive work which succeeded it, and it
lasted, I understand, for three days. The enemy^
asks us, in his statement of his own losses, to
accept for these losses a figure only two-thirds
that of our own. That is nonsense, and does not
even, as has often been tlie case in the past with
the enemy's figures, accomplish misguidance.
No one will believe it. If the enemy had
said : " Our losses were not 18,000, as you
imagine, but very little more than 12,000,"' the
statement would have had its due eft'ect, and
would have had weight with that kind of man
who always tends to react against every confi-
dence; but when he says that his losses were not
6,000, there is nothing doing.
Those who are interested in this point may
further note a very characteristic detail. Some
weeks ago the French published their estimate
of the German losses on the Perthes front. Tiie
Germans issued a statement in which they used
the very same phrase that the losses were " not
a third of the French estimate."
In conclusion, it must be reiterated that the
devices of this sort for misleading an enemy aro
perfectly legitimate, and that the enemy's mis-
statements of this kind are no more unworthy
than the calculated reticence which is so striking
a feature of the Allied accounts; but there is
apparent in this German work exactly what you
get in the great bulk of German historical work
and textual criticism^ — to wit, the sharp contrast
between painstaking and bad judgment. Tha
enemy, as a general rule (and particularly in the
early stages of the campaign), gives us very
careful statements of acceptable detail. He some-
times gives us false statements carefully thought
out, for the sake of producing effects which may
reasonably be expected — e.g., when he tells tiie
public at home that Scarborough is a fortified
port, or that London, ha\ing been in fear of
Zeppelins (which it is), was hiding in cellar.s
(which it was not). He has also often given us, and
7*
LAND AND JV, A T E R.
March 27, 1915.
Bonietimes continues to give us, false statements
which sufficiently resemble the truth as to be
acceptable, or which so refer to matters we cannot
judge as to leave us in tloubt— e.g., his statement
that the whole of the Russian 20th Army Corps
had gone with a loss of some 50,000 men. The
real loss in that particular case turned out in the
long run to be something under 25,000.
But he also puts in (and particularly of late,
since he has begun to feel embarrassed) statements
which do not belong to either of these categories
and which it is stupid for him to put forward, as
that noted in the beginning of tliis week's notes,
that the whole Russian 10th Army Corps had
been wiped out, so that the German prisoners
in Russian hands were only a sixth of the
iiumbei-s officially given by the Russians, and this
last protest about his los.ses at Xeuve Chapelle
came under such a heading.
CAUSES OF SUGCHSS OF THE POLICY
OF ATrRlTION.
To return from this digression to the policy
of attrition, we know, and it has been analysed
in tliese columns, why one can calculate upon
the proportion of losses of the enemy being
nearly always greater than that of the Allies,
although the Allies are the attacking party. It
is due to the facts that the attacks are carefully
calculated to a local effect alone; that superior
air work allows them to concentrate with greater
security than the enemy; that the. heavy artil-
lery on the Allies' side is now at least equal to
tliat of the enemy, and usually, from the excellence
of air work in correcting the shots, surpasses it
in effect; that the Allies work with larger
reserves than the Germans in the .West, and tha£
the German counter-offensive is nearly always
undertaken in massed formation.
Now, so long as this principle of attrition
can be continued successfully, that is so long as
the tenacity required for so strict a plan avails,
neither the command that orders it nor the public
opinion behind the command at home will change
their policy, for the Allies in the West are heading
directly for the aim of all war, which is the dis-
armament of the enemy in greater proportion than
on'e own disarmament, in a given time.
That policy will be working both in the
means and in the end. It will be working in the
means because the ceaseless fretting at the lines
is continuously costing the enemy more than it
costs the Allies. It will be working in its ends
as Avell, because the fruits of such a polic}^ unless
the enemy can achieve a decision in the East and
bring back masses westward, must be ultimately
the breaking or the shortening of the German
lines, with the consequences frequently being
described here. We are able now to estimate one
very considerable example of this policy of attri-
tion, of the way in which it is conducted and of
its results in the Champagne fighting. Full
details of the whole operation upon the Perthes
front have been supplied by the French Govern-
ment and by an English eye-witness, to whom the
French Government gave special facilities, so
that we are in a position to follow out, in detail,
the whole of this lai'ge operation.
THE OPERATIONS IN CHAMP.AGNE.
The whole front of this great effort, which
lasted from the middle of February to the end of
SRadcd Atcis= Wood'^.
ORTiliVL Pnz'i
8»
March 27, 1915.
EAND AND lW.ATER
Ihe first week in March— that is, for three weeks
—is contained between the high road running
from Sommepy to Suippes through Souain, and
the high road running through Cernay through
Ville-sur-Tourbe towards Ste. Menehould. That
front is fed, on its French side, by the railway
from Rheims to Ste. Menehould, and on the
German side by the railway from Rheims to
the Pass of Grandpre in the Argonne. The
distance between the tv.o high roads is an
average of about twelve miles. Less than nine
at the north end, and nearly fourteen at the
south end. This country is a very peculiar
one, the characteristics of which I have already
partly described in past numbers. It is a rolling
land of chalky texture, but not like the chalk of
our towns — chalk friable and mixed with a very
thin, poor earth. The crops are insignificant,
and the whole area is studded with little stunted
plantations of pines, deliberately introduced by
Government some fifty to sixty years ago, and verv
regular and ugly in appearance. Just south of
it is the big camp of Chalons, dedicated, as such
sterile districts often are (like Salisbury Plain
and Dartmoor here) to military uses, and especi-
ally to artillery practice. The few villages, which
try to nourish themselves by the cultivation of this
land, are quite small, ranging from one hundred
to tv»-o liundred inhabitants (thus Massieges has
less than one hundred and fifty, Minaucourt
barely two hundred, Perthes itself only one
hundred and seventy, and Hurlus just over one
hundred, winle Tahure had — it is still in German
hands — one liundred and ninety-nine). Even
Viile-sur-Touvbe has but just over five hundred.
It gives some idea of the contours of this bare
and barren country side when we know that the
water levels of the Dormoi.se and of the Tourbe
are about two hundred feet below the crests of the
swells between the watercourses.
The choice of this front for the considerable
French effort that has been made was due both to
the fact that the thin chalky soil dries rapidlv in
each interval of windy weather, between the days
of rain, and to its being the watershed of this
part of Champagne. All the little streams of the
district rise round about these villages, the places
at the head of each stream being distinguished
by the prefix Somme, meaning source. The whole
place has been for ages a natural fighting-ground.
Valmy is in the neighbourhood ; the place where
Attila was defeated is not so far off.
When the attack began the Fiench line lay
in and out of the road running from Souain to
Perthes. It is a bad little road, kept up out of
the local rates, and not forming part of tb.e
national .system. I remember it well. But that
is by the way. The Trench line on this 15th
September ran as the dots run from A to B. It
also ran, of course, on eastward and vv est ward
beyond A and B, but the great French eft'ort was
made just there.
Now, in all tlie work of those three weeks
the French got no further than the line C
marked with crosses, which gives them possession
CI the crest overlooking the depression through
which the Dormoise runs. The average
advance was not, I suppose, more than five
hundred yards, but was, perhaps, nowhere a full
thousand.
And that is typical of the whole business in
every part of the line. The order is not to break
through — yet : it is to wear down.
,ff^^3^
2i\
®
®
T-^y^J^^ZTZTrH^^-.U^ Farm
~-'lh Line oF Feb. i^
Perthes
English Miles
The 16th and the 17th February were spent
in fighting for a little field work which the
Germans had strengthened at the point (1) in
front of Beausejour Farm. It was taken and
lost in part for a week ; 23rd February still saw
that point in front of Beausejour in dispute. The
27th came, and it was not yet wholly carried. It
was not until the last day of the month that the
work was entirely in French hands. Exactly the
same thing went on with point (2), which is a
little swell of land, upon the crest from which
one can see the fall northwards towards the
Dormoise, except that it was taken two days
earlier— on the 26th. The most violent efforts
were made during all the succeeding week to
recapture it, and the Guard, which had been
borrowed from the La Bassee district and the
neighbourhood of Neuve Chapelle, were hurled
at It day after day. Point (3), which is also
upon the' crest, the "Germans retained almost to
the end. At (4), just in front of the ruins of
Perthes, it was the same storj- — a very gradual
advance against German field works, which was
not successful until the end of February; and
at (5) a regular little effort was, just like the
point at (1), half taken in the first days of the
movement, but only finally held on the 27th
February. Lastly, at (6), on tlie extreme west of
these few five or "^ six miles, a wooded post, held
with the greatest tenacity by the enemy, was not
carried until the very end of the movement, upon
the 7th of March.
Xow, in this effort, something like a quarter
of n million of men were pushed up on the French
side, first and last, during the three weeks. The
application of that blister brought up on the
enemy's side a smaller or larger number. There
v,-as no question of breaking through. The task
was to force the Germans to borrow men from all
up and down the line (which among other things
produced Xeuve Chapelle) to make them con-
tinually in these weeks of counter-offensive and
fruitless assault pour out their strength and
waste it. No one attempting to gauge an effort
of that kind by the mere belt gained comprehends
its purpose. The first violent advance, which is
expensive, but which is prefaced by a whirlwind
of hea\7 gunfire (destructive to the enemy in
killed, wounded, and prisoners, at least as much
as to the Allies' side), is expensive, but its object
is attained. It gets possession of points upon
which the enemy breaks himself over and over
again in the succeeding days, and in the balance
to be struck at the end of these continual efforts
the weaker in proportion to the Allies CAcry
time. The very slightness of each advance is
almost a measure of its great meaning.
9*
LAND AND ffiATER.
March 27, 1915.
THE FALL OF PRZEMYSL.
The fall of Przemysl presents a number of
points of interest which must be dealt with in
more detail next week, when a fuller account is
available than we have at the moment of writing
a maximum, take the old multiple of three to
one; but whether so large a multiple is necessary
or not depends upon local communication as
much as anything. The Eussians have presum-
ably laid down sections of light railway to facili-
ttvuiiauie luiiii vve nave av luc luuuieuL ui wrimig ""^v ^"^^^ vcvr,,ii .^^v/i/iu-.c \j± jigui' ictiivvtiy uu xauiii-
(Tuesday). But the news, in its most general *ate movements along the investing lines, but we
cJiaracter, at once suggests two very important
results : The moral effect upon Austria and the
material effect upon the campaign in the release of
men and material for the Russian operations upon
the West and the Carpathian front. The first
thing we must try and estimate is the number of
men this success is likely to release.
,We shall have no detailed information upon
this, because, naturally, no army provides us with
figures of that sort.
But we can fix a minimum without much
difficulty.
Przemysl held out for five months. Its per-
manent works were, therefore, never seriously
under heavy large calibre fire. Whether it was
have as yet no means of gauging the efficiency or
the extension of their communications round
the place.
Even if it were safe, however, to take a lower
multiple, and to hazard the conjecture that the
number of men required for containing the garri-
son of Przemysl is less than three hundred
thousand, we must remember that a portion of
the troops thus occupied were upon the Car-
pathian side of the town, and that, though the
troops now released for further action upon this
front will increase the forces facing the Austrians
in the foothills of the mountains by Sonak and
Lisko, yet we cannot count the whole of the
troops round Przemysl as now forming a new
uiiuv^i iii.civj ittigc uaiiuic uic. lvv ucLuer iL was ^i'jwjjo iuuuu x iz.cm_ysi CIS xiuvv luziiun
because of the difficulty in munitioning with large offensive element upon the Russian side
high explosive shell or, as in the case of Verdun,
because the big pieces of the defence were moved
out of the permanent works and put into tempo-
rary field works upon an exterior circumference
to the old permanent works does not much affect
our conclusion. In either case the line of invest-
ment was a very long one necessarily. Przemysl,
being blockaded and not bombarded, this peri-
phery was maintained at its utmost limit until
quite the last few days, and we may take it as
fairly certain (though we cannot be quite certain
till full details arrive) that the place surrendered
as a consequence of exhaustion in supplv and not
of attack upon its permanent works.
We can only guess at the periphery thus
held. On the analogy of Verdun (which has never
been completely invested even on the date of
maximum, September 5), the periphery of in-
vestment would not be less than fifty miles. Give
the outline of the outermost permanent works no
more than thirty miles, and fifty miles for the
investing lines cannot be an exaggeration. I
believe they will prove to have been more.
Now turn to another factor in the calcula-
tion—the garrison which was defending the
place. If we estimate its original strength at
certainly over 140,000, we shall again be certainly
withm the mark. These figures are purely con-
jectural, the figures of remaining efficients at the
close of the siege are necessarily far smaller,
and for the exact totals we must wait for
further news. It has been proved in the
course of this war that the real chance for the
ring fortress against modern large high explosive
shell, with their rapid destruction, lies in
the size and mobility of the defendino-
army, which throws out temporary works and
maS Ss' 'TheTi/m^^^\'^^ r^ "^ r- ^^^^^ ''''^^ (^bi^l^ i« ^^ P^"««i^° hands) to the
^3 bees in rlnfn. .T. T^T ?^''- ^^^\ ^' husy Kolomea railway pass (4) is just one hundred and
of thTMaine and i-on'."d\n^'' ''"'' '^' ^""l*^ ^^'^- ^^'' ^^^e? threeMilv4y passes (be ngt^e
Tier and the Frenr'--"^^^^^^^ "" "^^^ "^^""'^ ^^^' ^^' ^''°^ ^^^' ^"^ ^^' variously-
else Aorth and eV.rnf vf -? ^^^\d«'"f ^o hi"g named one which leads from Munkacs to Stryi
S such ites sucres?fnli n""^ °' *'^\holding (3) are twenty, sixty, and a hundred miles from
essential 1 h.rf S^' aT^''' Y^ obviously Dukla respectively. Przemvsl stands fifty miles
essential. A bare hundred thousand would give north-east of the' ridge of "the mountains (just
It is perhaps the lowest safe estimate to take
two hundred thousand as the force certainly,
released by the fall of the city. It may very
well be that this number is far below the" mark,'
but in such calculations one must always weight
the scales against the hopes and expectations of
one's own side.
More important in its ultimate effect upon
the campaign than the mere number of men
released will prove the elimination of this
secondary objective in the Austro-Gerraan effort
and the new power upon the Russian side of
moving troops at will, without the embarrassment
of that large interruption in Russian communi-
cations and movements which the siege of
Przemysl formed.
In order to appreciate the considerable im-
portance of this new factor, we shall do well to
grasp the main elements of which Przemysl is the
centre.
The ridge of the Carpathians from bevond
the Dukla to the Kolomea railway pass is a
stretch of one hundred and sixty miles. From the
less than three thousand men a mile, and that
number is almost certain to be exceeded. The
very prolongation of the defence is proof of the
number of men thus immobilised by the siege.
Now, to contain such a number, we may, as
10»
bej'ond the foothills and about half-way between
the first two passes) at P. The main Russian line
of communications for all the armies in Galicia
right up to the front against Cracow runs through
Przemysl to Lemberg at L, and from Lembers- ia
March 27, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
two main lines along the arroAV-heads towards the
Kussian depots in Russian territory. I have
marked this main line of communication in
double. The four railways across the passes of
the Carpathians (1, 2, 3, 4) join the lateral rail-
way along the foothills of the Carpathians,
which the Austrians have for months been trying
to get a-straddle of, and only once really domin-
ated, during the few days when they held Stanislau
at the end of February.
Xow, in this railway system, the investment
of Przem.ysl made a gap and an interruption
represented roughly by the circle A B C, and the
Austrian front, moving across the Carpathians
and attempting to relieve Przemysl and turn the
Russians out of Galicia, lay along the line of
crosses D E. So long as Przemysl held out all
the munitioning and supply of the Russian front,
which was withstanding the Austrian pressure,
upon that line D E, was based upon Lemberg, and
suffered difficulties in proportion as one went
westward towards the Dukla. With Przemj'sl
fallen, these difficulties disappear, and the whole
front becomes of equal strength for the recep-
tion of reinforcements and of munitioning. At
the same time the main railway line through
Galicia, which the circle of investment ABC
round Przemysl interrupted, is released for fully
supporting the Russian front towards Cracow,
which stands about eighty miles away in the
direction F.
In a word, the fall of Przemysl will give the
Russians in the next week or so a complete and
restored set of communications behind their Car-
pathian front, which has hitherto been hampered
and interrupted by the resistance of the fortress.
Bodies of men can be moved at will, and rapidly,
against any point that is threatened by an enemy
concentration, and such concentration is far less
easily effected by the enemy along the detached
lines which separately cross the mountains at 1,
2, 3, and 4, than by the Russians who hold all
the connected lines on the Galician side and the
lateral railway along the northern foothills of
the range.
For a further analysis of this important
piece of news we must wait for the full details
which will presumably come in during the rest of
the week, and I will deal with them in the next
issue of this paper.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.— TUi Article has been sabmitted to tlie Press Bureau, which does not object to the piibilcallon as censored, and tsucs do
responsibility for the correctness of the statements.
was never able to do, owing to the Turks always having been
the superior naval power.
Now, however, all that is changed, and the mere presence
of Russian warships off the Bospliorus must teem with un-
pleasant Euggestiveness for the Turkish Government. It is
THE DARDANELLES.
THE Dardanelles continue to remain the chief centre
of interest, and, reading between the lines, it is
clear that at the end of last week the Allied fleet
had received something of the nature of a set-
back— the Germans will jirobably eventually call
It a " decided defeat."
I have been somewhat severely criticised in the past for
insisting in these Notes that forcinsr the Dardanelles must
necessarily be a very difficult and dangerous operation, and
net the mere " naval parade " which so many people were
inclined to imagine that it would be. Now that losses have
been sustained, there is a tendency for the undue public
optimism of yesterday to be replaced by an equally undue
pessimism. It is necessary, therefore, to emphasise the fact that
whatever public opinion in the matter may be, our Admiralty
most certainly did not enter upon these operations without
carefully counting the cost or without being prepared for, and
anticipating, losses. Nor was it under any delusions as to the
relative fighting values of sliips and forts. Consequently,
though we have had one set-back, and may yet experience
ethers, there is every reason to believe that Constantinople
will ultimately be reached; though there is always a possi-
bility that its actual capture may be effected by the Russians,
if (aa now seems established) the Gocben is really out of
action.
A Russian c.ipture would be politically advantageous,
owing to the fact that Constantinople has been her goal for
centuries, and in the event of success, will presumably be
claimed as her prize of the war. If Russia captured Constan-
tinople, it would clear the air of a possible bone of contention
between the Allies on " dragging chestnuts out of the fire "
lines.
What Russia can or cannot do depends entirely on the
condition of the Goehcn. A disabled Goeben means that
Russia has undisputed command of the Black Sea, and that
Russia is, therefore, in a position to land a large invading
force to the north-west of Cape Rumili, and thence march on
Constantinople — a distance of twenty miles or so.
The military operations which would be entailed are out-
side my province, and I have no means of estimating the
fortunes of the troops once they were landed. I refer to them
merely to point out that any operations, to be successful, must
necessarily be conducted with both naval and military forces.
the work of the Russian fleet being mainly confined to cover-
ing the invasion and maintaining oversea communications^
a thinf which, in all her previous wars with Turkey, Russia
Sea Miles.
UAP OF THE BOSPHOUUS.
also likely to affect matters in the Dardanelles, and should
lead to the withdrawal of troops from the Gallipoli Peninsula,
a matter which would greatly facilitate the reduction of the
forts. One of the many advantages of forts is that, though
they be silenced by ship fire, their permanent dcptruction is
practically impossible, unless landing parties be landed, and
that, in the face of a strong covering field army, is a very diffi-
cult operation for a fleet which necessarily has only a strictly
limited number of men available. Matters are simplified if
the fleet is accompanied by a military force capable of exten-
sive operations, both against tlie mobile field army and of
attacking forts in the rear.
An attack on the Bosphorus by the Russian Black Sea
fleet, should it take place at all, is likely to be confined to a
long-range bombardment of the outer forts. From Capo
11*
LAND AND ,W. A T E R.
March 27, 1915.
Rumili to Constantinople is, roughly, only about fifteen miles;
but compared to the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles are as a
broad highway to a country lane. In addition, the whole
passage is" tortuous and surrounded by hills from which a
plunging fire can be delivered.
The forts are probably even more third-class than those
of the Dardauelle?; but the position is such that a single six-
inch shore gun is probably equivalent to the entire broadside
of a battleship in destructive capacity. Furthermore, there
are few opportunities for outranging on account of the many
twists and turns, and over the greater part of the course
attacking warships would have to come singly and in the
terribly disadvantageous end-on position. The deadliness of
that positiou (the ideal one of a past generation) is not so
much that only a portion of the guns can be utilised, as that
the chances of being hit are multiplied several fold. Hitting
with modern gunnery is purely a matter of elevation — misses
in the matter of direction are so rare as to be almost negligible.
Owing to the use of heavily armoured bulkheads, being
"raked" has no longer the terrors of the old days, but
modern gunnery and long modern ranges have introduced a
new danger. The appended diagram indicates how a com-
paratively slight error in elevation (that is to say, in comput-
ing range) may leave a ship broadside on unscathed, while
seriously damaging the end-on ship.
Of course, there Is an apparent off-set to this. That is to
say, an efficiently garrisoned fort normally knows all the
ranges from constant practice, and (in theory) is, therefore,
unlikely to make errors in elevation. In practice, however,
irheu under fire, errors are far easier. In fact, a ship attack-
venient and more or less dangerous bo far as hypothetical
damage is concerned, but an assurance against fatal results.
Ihe really important part of the business is the actual
bombardment and its results. Of this, only the general out-
lines have yet reached us. But we have been told enough to
know that the forts have given a better account of themselves
than the British public expected.
It is to the last degree improbable that either our
Admiralty or the French Admiralty were under any
delusions. In the early days of the war, when the Germans
smashed Liege v/itliout difficulty, it was at once assumed on
all sides that the days of forts were numbered. It seemed
clear that the heavy gun was omni])otent.
Along that assumption Cattaro, the Austrian station
in the Adriatic, was bombarded, and all of us took as a fore-
gone conclusion that the lesson of Liege would be repeated,
and all the Austrian naval stations fall into the hands of tha
Allies.
Cattaro forts received a great many shells and a great
deal of apparent damage was done. But, after a while tha
attack was relinquished, and has never been resumed. lb
was — as I mentioned at the time— somewhat of the nature
of an experimental bombardment. As I also mentioned,
there was every reason to believe that the experiment would
be successful.
Apparently, however, it all only went to prove that what
Nelson and others of his era thought of forts against ships is
just as true now as then; just as true as when, in 1882, after
the British Fleet had pounded the Alexandria forts into ruins
the American ofiicers who witnessed it laid down the maxim
lore
Broadside on.
Ziidojt
DIAGGiU TO ILLUSTKATE HOW A SHIP END ON 13 A BIGOEB TARGET THAN A BHIP BROADSIDE ON.
Ing a fort relies mainly on obscuring the fort's vision with
dust and tiie shattering of nerves by big shell explasions, which,
33 like as not, do no other harm. That is why the fort
retaliates by placing its position finders well away from the
fort. This ensures range-finding being fairly free from the
dust problem, but it does not pi-otect the sight-setter from
nerve-strain. Consequently the net result is that the end-
on ship remains at a serious disadvantage whenever the range
is more than point blank. Consequently, also, a Russian
attempt to force the Bosphorus would be a needless risk of
warships.
We may now revert to the Dardanelles operations them-
selves. That two British ships, Irresistible and Ocean, and
one French ship, tlie liouvef, were sunk by floating mines is
not a matter of any great military significance. The fighting
value of all thrje, so tar as modern naval warfare is concerned,
was very sliglit — in a line of modern Dreadnoughts any of
them would have been a drawback rather than a help on
account of their relatively slow speed and comparatively short-
range guns. Nor does the fact that damage was done by
floating mines amount to much; such mines were expected,
and their effects, of course, well understood. The disquieting
feature here is that inadequate provision appears to have
been made to meet this form of attack. I say "appears,"
because some time ago there were apparently well authenti-
cated rumours of a German submarine having been smuggled
into Constantinople in sections, and a German submarine
may, perhaps, have done what Turkish m.ines are assumed to
have done. Incidentally, the Germans attribute the
damage to "torpedoes." And here, en passant, it may bo
observed that had several submarines been available for the
defence, the Allied Fleet would probably have been rendered
impotent.
As for the actual floating m.ines, these arc easily to be
provided against by precisely the same means as those
employed fifty years ago against " torpedoes " — as mines were
then called— by Admiral Farragut in the American Civil
.War. A boom defence in the bow is ample to render floating
iTiines innocuous, and all that they c.iu really accomplish is
to compel attacking ships to adopt the end-on position— iucon-
that " save in exceptional circumstances ships are no good
against forts."
At Alexandria there were very exceptional circumstances
— a fleet out of all proportion to the mediocre defence and all
the forts " low site " ones. In the Dardanelles tlieso circuia-
Btances are partially reproduced to some considerable extent —
that is to say, an overwhelming naval force is employed, and
the forts are of a third-rate nature.
Yet even so, considerable damage has been done. The
Infexiblc has sustained a heavy casualty list. The losses of
the French Fleet which engaged the forts at close range have
not yet been published, but v/e know that the ships were
frequently hit.
The Turks (or their German advi.^trs) appear to have
been past masters at feigning disablement, or in bringing up
heavy howitzers to replace lost guns during the intervals when
bad weather caused a lull in the operations — a condition
which has obtained throughout the attack.
The price of victory is going to be heavy — as like as not
the losses of the Allies have only just commenced. But the
reward of victory — corn ships from Russia, munitions of war
to Russia in return — is so great that heavy sac.-ifices will be
well justified. Once the Narrows are passed the worst should
be over — once the Sea of Marmora is reached, succe.s3 is
assured. But the way is long and difficult, and there has
never been any occasion in the war in which it is so absolutely
uece.ssary that the general public shall trust the British Navy.
It is idle to deny that on the face of it the destruction of
three battleships in one day by alleged floating mines seems
suggestive of carelessness or stupidity, or what not. But it
is necessary to remember that (apart from the possibility that
it was a submarine which did the dam.age) the brief official
statement gives no inkling whatever as to the dispositions of
the ships or the conditions under which they were compelled
to act. Criticism of the Navy in such circumstances is not
folly; it is criminal hitiacy!
THE SUBMARINE "BLOCKADE"
This particular German "revue," like "Charley's
Aunt," is still running; but its failure may now be taken as
assured. To say that the Germans have lost a submarine foi;
12»
March 27, 1915.
LAND AHb WAT
every victim that they have secured would be hyperbolic; but
there is every reason to believe that wlien the balance-sheet
of the operations is available for study it will be found that,
taking loss of merchant shipping on our side and loss of
submarines and loss of their services for uar work on the
German side, it will be found that Germany figures as the
loser. The effort was, of course, mainly psj'chological ; that is
to say, it mainly depended on creating a panic which was not
created. Thus at one fell swoop it dropped from the stars to
solid earth, and all the illusion with which the Germans hoped
to surround it melted into thin air.
THE WAR IN THE AIR.
Four Zeppelins have attacked Paris, four hostile aero-
planes have made an attempt on Deal. In both cases the
attack was beaten off, a further illustration- — if one were
needed — of the fact that in aerial warfare as it is at present
the attack is handicapped by its dual objective of destroying
nnd also having to ward oS and look cut for counter-attack,
whereas the defenders have only the single objective of
destroying the attackers. Over Paris anti-aerial guns appear
to have taken as prominent a part in the defence as defending
aeroplanes; off Deal the defence was ahncst entirely aerial.
That this aerial defence is the best defence can now hardly
be questioned any longer. The net result may be put down
as further proof that aerial warfare reproduces ships v. forts
on an enlarged scale. Successful attack must be in over-
whelming force.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
II. D. P. (Lctchworth). — It is necessary to take into
account the enorr;ous number of inventions and ideas which
are submitted to the Admiralty. This k bound to create
delays such as that to which you refer. There is also the
point that althoigh the thing may be perfectly workable, it
may not be applicable to the conditiciis of modern naval war-
fare. This is the crux of the question. To take an extreme
case, consider the inventor who designs a series of armour
plates ten or twenty feet away from the ship's hull as a
defence against torpedoes. As a defence, this, of cou7-se,
would be absolutely ideal, but it is totally inapplicable
because it would render the ship unable to move ! This, of
course, is an extreme case, but it illustrates my point in hyper-
bole. I quite see your point about the successful inventions
of non-esperts, but I cannot call to mind a single case of any
euch invention applied to naval matters. The Whitehead
torpedo might at first sight appear to contradict this, but
Whitehead was a competent engineer working on certain
definite lines connected with his own profession. The vast
majority of people who Bubmit things to the authorities
simply send in the " idea " which they are convinced " would
work were proper experiments carried out witli it." It ia
these absolutely non-technical people wlio choke the way for
those who, though non-naval, are at least engineers.
W. M. H. (Eastbourne).— (1) The Ltffexible normally
belongs to the Mediterranean squadron. Tliat reason alone
would account for her employment in the Dardanelles.
(2) The Queen Elizabeths are, in a sense, improved battle-
cruisers. Lacking a little, perhaps, in speed, they have an
improved protection as a compensation. The reason no more
battle-cruisers are being built was explained by Mr. Churchill
Eonie time ago, when he stated that it was considered better
to build a batch of these fast ships in one year than to build
them at the previous rate of one a year. (3) The Germans
have a successor to the Lutzoir, but it is doubtful whether
she will be completed in time to take part in the present war.
W. N. (Chester). — Very considerable crews are required
for the ai-med merchantmen, and you may rest assured that
the Admiralty have not inflated the complements beyond
what is required.
P. P. (Glasgow). — A good many aeroplanes are fitted
with wireless, and so, also, are many submarines. The dis-
tance ever which messages can be transmitted from either
are, however, small. You may be quite sure tliat the matter
to which you refer has not escaped the attention of the
authorities.
H. \V. H. (London, N.W.).— Chain shot, if fired from a
sufficiently large gun, would certainly be effective igainst
periscopes. The difficulty, however, is to see the periscope in
time.
J. M. (Cork). — A torpedo with a war head — i.e., an
explosive charge, which misses its mark — is adjusted to sink
automatically. Otherwise, it would be as dangerous to friend
as to foe. In peace time it would, of course, be adjusted to
come to the surface at the end of its run.
G. W. T. P. (London, S.W.) and others.— The photo-
graph of the British and French ships off the Dardanelles is
authentic enough, but it is by no means clear that all the
Dantons were there. It is very difficult to recognise some of
the more di.stant ships. In any case, you may be quite certain
that the Allied fleet elsewhere is quite capable of dealing with
tlie Austrian 5 rhould they come out.
Cf. L. S. (Cheltenham). — B 4 was a misprint for B 2.
The other boat to which you refer was sunk some lime ago.
S. B. C. (Barnes). — The story to which you refer is not
only quite probable, but also very probably true. For very
obvious reasons the Press Censor has seen to it that it has not
appeared in print.
if.B. — Man>/ Answers are unavoldahhj held over this week.
EVOLUTION OF SIEGECRAFT
By
ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER.
COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, G.B.
^HE engagement at Neuve Chapelle is a striking
exanjple of the degree to which the attack in war
has now dominated the defence.
In the old days 10,000 defenders of such
staunchness as the Germans certainly have dis-
played would probably have held their own against all the
actual rifles and bayonets our trcops brought into the field, but
to-day the defence, <iua defence, practically broke at the
first ru.sh, having inflicted insignificant losses on their
assailants.
What followed — viz., the fighting in w^hich our serious
losses occurred, was essentially of the nature of a field battle
in which neithsr side had time to entreiich, but went at each
ether in the open, or seized on villages and houses as points
of support — v,-heie the lines were so intermingled that
artillery power could not be called in to prepaie the way of
the attackers.
As the whole fr.ture course of the war now turns on this
established fact, it will bo of interest to recapitulate the
puccessive steps, by which this present relation of attack and
defence liss been attained.
As I have pointed out in previous articles the Germans,
when com.pelled to abandon their attack on Paris, fell back
along the roads by which their heavy artillery was advancing
for the bombardment of the defences of that city.
Thanks to the presence of this overwhelming artillery
fire our offensive came to a standstill, for our field guns and
infantry were clearly overmatched by the heavy German guns,
together with both field artillery and infantry, in numbers
still superior to our own, which awaited us in positions their
reserve troops had had ample time to prepare; also at this
period the German aircraft sliowed a distinct preponderance
in numbers and activity as compared to ours.
We met the situation, as I have before explained, by
getting in under the German guard, i.e., hj entrenching on
the sides of the hills sloping towards us, so that the enemy's
gunners could no longer lay their guns on us by direct vision,
but had to rely on the observation of their airmen, which
procedure certainly helped, but was by no means equal to
laying by direct sighting.
But we could not stop the German infantry from mas.sing
behind the brow of the hills and attacking us downhill, and
ultimately, under cover of darkness, digging themselves in
witliin fifty to one hundred paces of our firing line.
This, however, obliged the German heavy guns to cease
firing for fear of hitting too many of their own side, ar.d
our guns, as thej' came up, found theniselvcs ir like case, so
that, as the front extended, and reached the great plains of
the north, the two infantries, acting under the instinct of
Eelf -preservation, got as close to one another as they possibly
could — fifty to one hundred and fifty yards — in order to secure
protection from the inces.sant shell fire, which is the most
unendurable of all the strains of war.
The artillery arm, being tlius for the time eliminated,
there was no longer any dominant reason for keeping the
trendies flat witli the soil, since concealment at fifty yards
was quite out of the que.stion, and, as the higher you made
the parapet, the more you escaped from the mud, the height
13*
L A JS D AND .W. A 'r E II.
March 27, 1916.
«f the parapets again increased, until, as I prophesied, the old
siege type of trench founded on Crimean experience, began
to reappear.
Had we been quicker to see what was coming, we might
have saved many lives, and our men generally would have
been spared much suffering.
Then, however, both French and British siege guns
began to arrive at the front in numbers sufQcient to hold their
own against the Germans, and finally, assisted by the growing
ascendancy of our airmen, the Allies began to dominate the
German gunners completely.
This brought about a further step in the evolution of
sicgecraft, and one which is entirely novel.
As the German artillery fire weakened, matters became
very much more comfortable for our supports and reserves.
Instead of resting in cellars and dug-outs our men could
come above ground again, and could enjoy decidedly im-
proved sanitary conditions in the wrecks of houses still left in
the villages.
The moment the German batteries began to sliell one
of these places our guns replied, and laid them out for that
day, at least.
Our gunners, however, were free to shell and destroy
everything within miles which could give cover to German
supports; consequently, the latter were driven to dig them-
selves in even deeper, and driven to take greater precautions
to keep the target, presented by th.e trenches, low and
invisible, more so, indeed, than we had had to do at the
besinnin?.
In some places T am informed that (where the soil allows
it) the Germans have had to dig trenches nine feet deep for
their supports to live in, and the labour of scattering the
earth to hide them, to say nothing of getting it out in the first
instance, is excessive, and sanitary conditions, of course, ara
almost impossible.
Moreover, though, by means of trestles and pickets
driven into the soil, it is practicable to arrange these trenches
so that men can fire out of them, they are exceedingly difficult
to climb out of, and, if an attack is pushed home, their
garrisons are caught like rats in a trap, without hope of
escape.
In the water-logged plains of Flanders, such deep
trenches are, of course, entirely out of the question, and here
the difficulty of keeping sufficient reserves within easy reach
of the fighting line is becoming more and more acute, an
advantage we are pretty certain to make the most of before
many weeks have passed.
Now this process is going on in some form or other aft
every point along the vdiole of the fighting front, and it
makes every movement of the enemy more difficult in propor-
tion as the number of our siege guns is increased, and the
store of shells available for them grows greater day by day.
OUR AMBULANCE APPEAL.
AN OUTLINE OF THE SCHEME.
By ATHERTON FLEMING.
FOLLOWING the announcement made in our last
issue to the effect that the proprietors of this
journal have decided to open a subscription list
with the object of raising a sum of money — £500 —
for the purchase of a completely equipped motor
ambulance, I have received many letters, suggestions, and
inquiries. To answer all letters is impossible, so I am
endeavouring to explain hereunder the features of the
scheme. All suggestions will be filed, and will receive the
most careful consideration when the time comes for layinc'
out the money. Several writers have made very practical
remarks as to the ultimate destination of the ambulance,
and there has been at least one offer of both a car and a
driver. Taking the question of destination first, and that
has been very carefully considered, I have come to the
conclusion— alter making recent investigations and adding
to them my own personal knowledge of the conditions—
that the Belgian Field Force is still the most badly off with
regard to Red Cross facilities. The work of Dr Hector
Mimro and his helpers has done much to alleviate the
sufferings of these poor wounded Belgian soldiers, who
cannot look to their own countrv for help for the simple
reason that all but a small portion of Belgium is in (he hands
of the enemy. The remaining strip of Belgian territory is
being tenaciously held by these brave men; its loss would
wean a severe blow to the Allies. To succour and cheer
these long-suffering soldiers has for months past been the
work of Dr. Munro, and only those who have seen can
iinderstand what he and his helpers have had to go throucrh
during these months of bitter weather. Theirs has been
a plain, straightforward night and day fight with the
horrors of modern warfare in all its grim and grue-
some reality. Dr. Munro is not engaged in this
^r} t^"", *'^« ^^'^^ ''f tli« limelight; it is for the sake
of the Belgian soldier. He has not the financial resources of
a huge organisation such as the British Red Cross behind
him, yet he has done wonders with the little help he has
received, and he is now appealing for more help. That is
why I have come to the conclusion that the readers of
L.^ND AN-D Water cannot do better than show their appre-
ciation of his services by presenting him with an additional
motor ambulance. It is proposed to deal with all monies
subscribed as stated hereunder: —
1. That a subscription list be opened with this issue
. l^r^^ *^'° "^^'*TEK for the purpose of raising the sum
of £500.
2. That this sum be devoted to the purchase and
equipment of a suitable motor ambulance, containino-
accommodation for four stretcher cases and altornativl
accommodation for " sitting-up " cases and orderly.
3. That the chassis be of a well-known and reputable
make— to be decided later— and the construction of the
body be handed over to an expert ambulance-body
builder.
4. That details of equipment, such as lighting, &c.,
be left to the discretion of Dr. Munro, owing to his better
knowledge of the conditions under which he has to work.
5. That the motor ambulance — which will bear an
inscription: "Presented by the readers of Land and
Water to the Munro Field Ambulance "—shall be handed
over to Dr. Munro for use with the Belgian Armv.
6. That should there be any balance in hand after
the purchase and equipment of the ambulance the decision
shall rest with the proprietors of this journal as to whether
it shall be handed to Dr. Munro for the maintenance and
upkeep of the presentation ambulance or ujed in the
nucleus of a second fund for the provision of another
motor ambulance.
7. That all cheques, postal orders, or money orders
should be made payable to " Land and Water Motor
Ambulance Fund" and crossed "London County and
Westminster Bank, Ltd." All subscriptions will be
acknowledged by the proprietors of this journal.
This is the way we propose to deal with the matter as
soon i'.s the state of the subscription list enables us to do so.
It does not require a great many subscriptions to raise the
modest sum of £500. As I mentioned last week, the sum of
one shilling from each reader would be sufficient to supply
a fleet of ambulances. Yet it is essential that ereri/ one
should send their shilling. Please do not let your faith in
your fellow-man lure you into thinking that the list will
easily be over-subscribed without your assistance; if every-
one did this we would be a very long time in raisin" £5 — not
to say anything of £500.
I make an earnest and personal appeal to everyone
who reads these lines to send something ; never mind how
small. Money spent on a cause such as this is never money
wasted. I have spent some months in the war area, and
I know what the wounded have suffered and are still suffering.
The matter is now before you, the subscription list is open,
and the success of the scheme rests entirely in the hands of
Land and Water readers.
MR. HILAIRK BELLOCS WAR LECTURES.
A series of lectures on the Progress of the War from month to month
will be given at Queen's Hall on the first Wednesday ia April, May,
and Juno. Seats are now being allotted.
A lecture ivill also ba given at the Oper.n. House. Tunbridge WoUs,
on Friday, April 9, at 3.20, on "The Strategy of the War."
Mr. Belloc will lecture on the War at Eastbourne on jMarch 27 i,
MR. JANE'S LECTURES ON THE NAVAL WAR.
Malvern Assembly Rooms Friday 26 March, 3 p.m.
Shrewabury Speech Hall Saturday 27 March, 3 p.m.
(UasTOw St. Andrew's Hall Monday'. 29 March, 8 p.m.
F.diiiburgh Usher Hall Tuesday 30 March, 8 p.m.
Dundee Kinnaird Hall Wednesday 31 March, 8 p.nu
Torquay Theraviliun Saturday 3 April, 5 p.m..
14«
Maivli 27, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
CORRESPONDENCE.
THE SAILORS' AND SOLDIERS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of Lakd and Water.
Deab Sik, — On behalf of the above fund a military Rugby
mat-ch has been arranged between the H.A.C. and the
R.A.M.C. (Aldershot). This will take place next Saturday,
at the Athletic Ground, Richmond, at 3.15 p.m. Prior to
the match, by permission of the cfHcer commanding and the
Court of Assistants, the H.A.C. (Headquarters) brass band
will play selections, also during the interval.
Many of your readers are supporters of Rugby football,
•nd would welcome this opportunity to witness a game, and,
•t the same time, help a fund v.hich is engaged in the good
work cf supplpng tobacco to the British troops and the
wounded in the hospitals in France.
Six Internationals have intimated their intention to take
£art, and four of the remaining players have played in
aternational trial games. — Yours faithfully,
W. Evan Collisox,
Central House, Kingsway, W.C. Hon. Sec.
OUR NEW ARMY HORSES.
To the Editor of Land axd Water.
Sir, — In reply to questions asked by Sir William Byles
In the House of Commons on March 1 Mr. Tennant stated
(a) that under one per cent, of horses purchased for the New
Army had been cast as unsuitable; and (b) that less than
two per cent, per month (italics mine) had been lost from
death and destruction before leaving this country. He further
■tated that the percentage was not considered high.
Let us see what it means. The Times of January 5
had «n inspired article congratulating the country on the
•upply of 140,000 horses secured in addition to " 36,000
magnificent horses " for the Expeditionary Force and 18,000
for the Reserve formations. It was admitted some wrong
'uus had got in and that some folks had cheated the nation
for their own profit. Taking Mr. Tennant's one per cent, we
get 1,400 as the figure for wrong 'uns bought by ignorance
or chicanery, and allowing £40 apiece for them we arrive at
the sum of £56,000 as the amount of loss — less, of course, the
•mall sum received for them on being cast.
But turn to the percentage of horses which have died.
Two per cent, per month on the above figure of January 5
for seven months of war works out at 19,600 horses which
have died. Reckoned at £40 apiece, and allowing £34,000
for Mr. Tennant's " under two per cent." as margin, we get a
total monetary loss of three-quarters of a million. Does Mr.
Tennant not consider this high ?
But to some of us it is not the financial loss that is the
most grievous question. It is the appalling and unnecessary
Buffering thrust upon so many thousands of highly sentient
creatures. A total of unnecessary pain and cruelty which
shocks and shames us. And we ask once more: What is
being done for the horses that are still sick, still tethered in
lines unsheltered to face the bitter winds of March and April ?
— I am. Sir, yours faithfully
•' ^ E. Ward.
161, New Bond Street, W.
THE NEUTRAL FLAG.
To the Editor of L.and and Water.
Dear Sir, — It would appear from what is called the
Lusitania incident that the public are ignorant as to the uses
and the practice of flying a national flag at sea.
A merchant ship on the high seas normally flies no flag
at all — only on the approach of another ship would the
national flag be broken. In coastal waters a flag will probably
be flown. A flag is never flown during the night — from sun-
down to sunujD — for obvious re.isons. If the Lusitania
arrived at Liverpool in the morning much of her passage of
the Irish Sea would have been in darkness.
The National flag is always flown from a special flagstaff
at the stern or, if she is so rigged, from a gaff on the mast.
The flying of a national flag from the masthead is no claim to
its use nationally, but is intended as a compliment to the
nation so honoured. In this complimentary way vessels
entering a foreign port will usually fly at the masthead the
flag of that foreign country. In the same way a vessel carry-
in " many foreigners — a.s the Lusitania would be_ carrying
Americans — might fly, at the masthead, their national flag,
merely as a compliment to them.
The attempt to secure protection by deceiving the enemy
by flying a neutral country flag as an ensign is probably
justifiable, and in the case of an ordinary " tramp," not dis-
tinguished by build and traversing no specified route, the
result has a chance of success. In the case of passenger liners,
whose routes and time tables are published (and at any rate
approximately maintained) the ruse might deceive an un-
usually obtuse German naval officer. An absolutely distinc-
tive ship like the Lusitania stands alone, and she would be
identified as the Lusitania long before it was possible to make
out what ensign she was flying.
Possibly some non-nautical passenger took the use of the
American flag at the masthead to be the use of it as a national
flag. This would be an easy error for the non-nautical
passenger to fall into. But if the Lusitania did really replace
her own British ensign by the use of an American flag, thereby
pretending to be an American ship, her Commander must
have an exceedingly low opinion of the intelligence of a
German commander of a submarine. Further, the speed of
the Lusitania is such that a submarine would not h-ivc a ghost
of a chance, either submerged or awash, of successfully
launching a torpedo. I fancy that most sailors will, at present,
believe that the Lusitania never flew an American flag in
place of her own ensign, but that if she did so — that she did
a foolish, because unnecessary and ineffectual, thing. —
Obediently yours.
Nautical.
Hillside Cottage, Newbury.
MILITARY REWARDS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I am glad to see a letter in your paper calling
attention to the want of proportion in awarding rewards for
military services. In the last list of casualties there is one
Btaff officer wounded out of over two hundred names. Ever
since I joined, in 1860, it has always been the same — the
combatant gets the kicks, the staff the halfpence. — Yours
truly,
R. P.
THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — I have read with very great interest and
appreciation the letter in your issue of March 13th from
" One of the Principals of a Small Firm." I should like to
take the opportunity of heartily supporting all that he says,
especially as since that letter was written Lord Kitchener has
informed the nation of the really urgent need for the in-
creased manufacture of munitions of war, and therefore all
doubt as to this urgent need, which is queried in your cor-
respondent's letter, is now at an end.
I should like before going further to make it quite clear
that my firm, which is one of the small ones, has no complaint
whatever to make with regard to ordinary Government pro-
cedure as regards inquiries and contracts, which is both good
and businesslike, but if the country is actually in need of
more war munitions than it can at present obtain, there are,
I believe, many firms who would be only too glad to under-
take more Government work than they have yet obtained,
many, doubtless, having obtained none at all.
I am glad to believe by my own experience, and by the
fact of the very big wages being paid by firms recognised in
times of peace as firms who make for the Government, that
the question of price is not very acute, so long as the Govern-
ment know that they are obtaining goods from firms who
have previously satisfactorily supplied their demands, and
that the Government is prepared to pay those firms extra
when it is found necessary to work overtime, night-shifts, and
week-ends.
On the other hand, it appears that in dealing with new
firms the Government is very keen as regards price, and no
allowance is made if these firms have to put on a night-shift,
which will cost them considerably more proportionately than
would a night-shift to a big firm whose custom it was often to
run one.
In normal times it is quite right for the Government to
buy as cheaply as ever they "tan, and to be as keen as possible
in so doing, but it is quite another thing now, if our existent"
as a nation to a large measure depends on the supply of <-)'-
war material, and I would suggest that it is better to I ■!
generous as regards prices when offering work to new firms,
15*
LAND AND\W:ATER.
March 27, 1915.
and tlius enable them to enter into the manufacture of tlie
urgently required articles.
I believe that if the Government could see its way to
offer business to various firms at a definite price, and at the
Bame time allow the firms, should th.at price be too low for
them, to state at what price they could undertake the v7ork,
it would be found that a very large number of small firms
could supply a considerable amount of material to the satis-
faction of the Government departments concerned.
Lord Kitchener in his speech requests that firms having
men and machinery at liberty should place them at the
disposal of the Government, but he does not say how this can
be quickly and effectively done. Those of us who are alreadv
receiving inquiries from certain Government departments,
and yet are not fully employed, would be glad to get into
touch quickly with other departments who are requirinc
goods such as we can satisfactorily manufacture, while firms
who are not on any Government department's list, equally
desire a simple and quick method of obtaining suitable work.
I remain, yours faithfully,
OXE OF THE PrIXCTPALS OF ANOTHER Su.iLL FiRM.
Manchester.
"THE DIFFERENT SPEEDS OF AlV AEROPLANE.'*
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — With reference to his letter in your issue of
the 13th inst., " Enquirer " may bo interested in the follow-
ing information. His question (6). While there is no small
book published that covers the whole ground of possible
inquiries relating to aeroplane capabilities, the need for such
book is not felt if one is well grounded in the fundamental
principles, and these m.ay fairly well be grasped by the study
of " The Mechanics of the Aeroplane " (1912) and " Flight
Without Formulae " (1914), both translations from French
works by Comm. Duchene, published by Longmans, Green
and Co. at 7s. 6d. net. The feature of these works is their
clearness and simplicity, and tlie absence of mathematics
renders them easily understandable by the layman.
His question (4). While it is true that in the particular
machine referred to by Dr. Glazebrook the speed is con-
trolled by adjustment of the angle of attack of the machine
as a whole, it should be borne in mind that it is quite feasible
to vary the speed by other means in suitably designed
machines. For example, subsidiary aerofoils may be used as
air brakes, or the angle of incidence of the wings alone niav
be altered relatively to the body of the machine" either with
or without alteration of the camber of the wings.
Yours faithfully,
Bertram G. Cooper,
Secretary and Editor, Aeronmitical Journal.
11, Adam Street, Adelphi, London, W.C.
KHAKI.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir,— The majority of people, if they think about the
matter at all, imagine that " khaki " is a product of recent
years. This is not so.
.cr>. " ^^^^^^ " ^^3 "sed in India as far back as the late
60 s or early '70's for soldiers' uniforms in the hot weather
tne material used being a kind of cotton drill. A similar
material has been in use in Arabia and by the Fireworshipper=.
ot Persia from time immemorial, and is in use to-day in
Persia for making their outer robes, the material being made
trom a natural self drab-coloured cotton which is still culti-
vated in small quantities in some parts of Persia— notably
Kashan and "iazd; the stuff, of course, being entirely home-
"u- i~v^',^^°^°' ^P'^'*^' ^o^en, and made into garments,
which, by the way, are very durable. All these processes of
production have come under my own personal observation
\Ve read in the Press that our manufacturers are hard-
pressed to provide a sufficient supply of "khaki" material
tor our new Army; but we have, surely, in the cultivation and
development of this particular cotton a potential means of
securing our future supply of. at any rate, cotton " khaki "
absolutely irrespective of the supply of " dye stuffs "
A supply of seed of this cotton could easily be obtained
and India, Egypt, and Africa could doubtless do the rest in
the course of four or five years.
lianlm?^ /"^^^ '! * ^^^^^^^ grower, with strong branching
Haulms, full pods, and a long and strong staple. Tlie.e
qualities could, no doubt, be readily improved upon by t^e
cotton-growing experts in the countries above-named ^
authoriHe^r/^ ""',^''^ ^" °^ «"ffi"«"* interest to the
t^Yo7r::CLur '' *° ""'' ''"^ consideration!
B. W. Stainton.
"LAND & WATER" WAR LECTURES
PROGRESS OF THE SCHEME.
Widespread interest has been aroused in the Land and
^\ATER Lecture Scheme cjp behalf of Queen Alexandra's
Field Force Fund. As our readers know, these illuminating
lectures have been arranged from the articles by Mr. Belloc
and Mr. Blin Desbleds appearing week by week in our
columns, and, in remote country villages and largo towns
alike, audiences have followed the skilful argume'nts and
penetrating analyses with keen appreciation.
The purpose of the scheme is two-fold— to extend the
advantage of the most expert war criticism available and to
render substantial aid to an organisation that has done
splendid work in brightening the" lot of our gallant soldiers
at the front.
Financially Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund hai
reaped no inconsiderable benefit, and it is hoped that publio
men, clergymen, literary societies, ic, in districts not yeb
touched will respond to our invitation in even larger numbeTS,
and so still further augment a fund that needs every help
possible to cope with the necessities of the new armies" ready
anon for the front.
Edger as every patriot is to do everything within mortal
power to help our troops, but for Queen Alexandra's Field
Force Fund much effort v.ould be lost and much waste in-
curred^ for lack of proper organisation and facilities.
Working in direct co-operation with the War Office, tho
Fund supplies comforts to the units in the field with the
utmost economy and absolute fairness of distribution.
It enjoys special facilities for cheap purchase of articles
required and for free transmission of these and gifts in kind
straight to the men.
This is how it is done. Our readers will agree that a
better system could hardly be adopted. Instead of supply-
ing the articles on the principle of "so many men " so man/
cardigan jackets, or pairs of socks, or pounds of tobacco, as
the case may be— a method obviously unfair and w^teful,
since some soldiers are well provided for by their friends,
while others, perhaps the greater number of whole regiments,
have no friends, or have friends too poor to send them gifts
instead, it is arranged that the Commanding Officers send
lists from time to time of the precise things their men want.
The saving is enormous.
Our soldiers' needs are not diminishing as time goes on,
but increasing. To the glory of England the enormous
armies that have been in training for so many months past
will be sent with all speed to reinforce those already at tho
front and to help strike the decisive blow. In tlie "trenches
these new men will want comforts — the comforts that are
"necessaries" there. How very urgent is the need for
money and supplies will be readily seen.
Wich one exception, the lectu"res are illustrated by slides
prepared from the maps and plans appearing in Land and
Water. Thus the clearness of the subject-matter as regards
arrangement and terminology is heightened by diagrammatic
reference easily followed by the audience. In most instances
additional slides of topical interest are provided.
So far, four lectures have been prepared, their titles
giving readers who have followed the war articles iu these
columns sufficient clue to the material utilised.
(1) " The Failure of German Strategy "
(2) "TheDcadlockin the West."
(3) " Can Aircraft End the War? "
(4) " How Long Will the War Last? "
Each lecture is complete in itself, but where a series can
be given it is usually advisable to follow the above order.
Texts of the lectures and full particulars will be sent to
applicants who can arrange for public meetings, at which
there should always be a collection on behalf of Queen
Alexandra's Field Force Fund, except where, in the same
interest, a charge is made for admission. To save local
expense, partially printed posters and otlier advertising
matter are supplied free. Letters should be addressed :
The Hon. Secretary,
Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund,
24a, Hill Street,
Knightsbridge, S.W.
The success so far achieved has been extremely gratifying
to the Field Force Fund Committee, and no less to ourselves,
whose privilege and pleasure it was to initiate the scheme. Bufe
to the scope and usefulness of the idea there is no necessary
limit. Not a town or village in the kingdom but should have
its War Lectures to arouse patriotic interest and enthusiasm.
All that is wanted is the respon.se of public-spirited citizens
willing to spend a little time and interest iu a cause most
worthy.
Printed by Tub VicToau House Pbiniinq Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Whitefriars, London, E.G.
Vlarch 27, 191c
LAND AND WATER
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389
LAND AND WATER
March 27, 1915
THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE
STEAM TURBINE
IN WARSHIPS
By "A.M.I.C.E."
THE development of the steam turbine, both on
land and sea, has been one of the most remarkable
industrial developments of modern times.
Although the first marine turbine was constructed
in 1894 for experimental purposes and the
Admiralty adopted it in i8g8 as an experiment in a small
destroyer, we find that at the end of the year 1913 Great
Britain alone possessed 226 warships fitted with steam
turbines, having a total horse-power capacity of 4,339,300,
and 98 merchant ships with a total horse-power capacity of
928,790 ; truly a marvellous development.
Mr. Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons on
the Navy estimates, praised the design and performance of
British warships. It is only natural that our Navy should
lead the world in regard to engine-room performances, for the
steam turbine, the modern propelling engine of the Navy,
is a British invention, and was tried by our Admiralty four
years before any foreign power experimented with this type
of engine.
The invention of the steam turbine by the Hon. Charles
A. Parsons has revolutionised the production of mechanical
power on land and sea. It has rendered possible steamship
speeds far greater than could ever be attained with recipro-
cating engines. Although the adoption of the steam turbine
is quite a modern engineering development it is, as a matter
of fact, the oldest steam engine in existence.
The Greek philosopher Hero described a primitive
turbine in the second century B.C. This turbine consisted
of a hollow sphere mounted between two bearings. The
sphere was partially fiUed with water and placed over a fire.
The steam escaped from two bent tubes fixed at opposite
sides, and the reaction of the steam caused the ball to rotate.
Hero's machine was only a toy, but it worked well and formed
the earliest-known use of steam for the production of motion.
Nothing further was done until Branca, an Italian architect,
constructed — in 1629 — a machine in which a jet of steam from a
boiler impinged on a wheel and caused it to rotate. Many
inventors worked at the problem until, at the end of the
eighteenth century. Watt invented the steam reciprocating
engine of to-day, in which steam acting on a piston imparts
a rotary motion to a wheel. Nothing further of any real
value was done until 1884 because during that period
inventors were too busy perfecting Watt's steam engine.
The first turbine brought out by Parsons had a capacity
of only 6 horse-power, and was used for driving a small
electric generator. The successful introduction of electric
lighting about that time created a demand for good high-speed
steam engines for driving electric generators, and thus gave
an immense stimulus to the study of the steam turbine.
A turbine may be defined as a machine in which rotary
motion is obtained by the gradual change of the momentum
contained in the fluid, which may be either steam or water.
Essentially the steam and water turbine (or water wheel,
which is familiar to everybody) resemble one another. Steam,
however, is a highly elastic fluid, and water is not, and this
fact renders several modifications in design necessary. Steam
and water turbines are divided into two classes — reaction
and impulse. In the reaction type, of which Parsons is the
best known, the steam passes alternately through many
rings of fixed and revolving blades, and expands slightly
during the passage through each ring, at the same time
imparting its energy to the movable blades. In the impulse
class the steam is passed through special nozzles, in which
the steam expands and attains a very high velocity. It then
impinges on the blades of a wheel, which is set in motion.
The steam turbine is, therefore, a very simple machine,
depending for its action entirely on the physical properties
of steam. It was essentially developed for driving dynamos
to generate electrical energy. The great difficulty which had
to be overcome in the early turbines was the excessive high
speed, but Mr. Parsons, after several attempts, found that
the most practical method of keeping down the speed was
the application of " multiple stage expansion." This is the
combination of several small successive turbines, which
together form one turbine, the steam passing through all
{CoHiiniuU on pagt U02)
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A "PARABLE OF PARA.
The tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well,
CHAPTER THE SECOND.
NOW it came to pass that the two travellers
were delayed on their journey. " Look ! "
cried he who had bought wisely; "thine
ass has cast a shoe." And it was even so. So they
tarried awhile, and he who had bought too well
shod his beast with a shoe that he had to spare.
And the wise man smiled again in his beard, and
they continued on their way, the one with the other.
And behold the way was exceeding rough, and
they were yet again delayed. " Look, fi-iend, thy
beast has cast another shoe ! " And it was even so.
So he shod his beast with yet another shoe, but
was sore distressed, for the way was long and
hard, and he felt not safe. And they continued on
their w^ay, the one sore troubled in his mind, and
they spake not the one to the other. {To be continaed.)
MORAL : — Depend not on quantity but quality.
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
Para Mills, .. Aston Cross, .. Birmingham,
ftuiuttrs tf tiu Pntumatu Tfre Imtustri throughout th* Virid,
390
Marcli 27, 19 I 5
LAND A X JJ \\' A T E R
1^
H.M.S. MINOTAUR. Cruiser. Built at Devonporl. Completed 1908. Cost £1,410,336. Normal Displacement 14,600 tons. Length 525 it. ;
beam 74J ft. ; draught 28 ft.; designed H.P. 27,000; speed 231 knots. Maximum coal 2,000 tons. Guns, 4 9"2-ln., 10 7"5-in., 14 12-pounam-»,
2 12-pounders (field); S torpedo tubes submerged. Crew 755.
From the original by Montague Dawson
C<,uriihi of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
(Established a century.)
LAND AND WATER
March 27, 191 5
the elements. After the first difficulties had been overcome,
and engineers began to be less sceptical, it did not take a
great deal of time to make the steam turbine a great success.
The chief reason was that it was proved beyond doubt that
the turbine exceeded the best type of reciprocating engine in
steam economy.
The success of the Parsons turbine on land led, in 1894,
to the formation of a company for applying the steam turbine
to marine purposes, and the famous Turbinia was built — a
small boat 100 feet long, 9 feet beam, and a displacement of
44 tons. The early experiments were disappointing because
the speed obtained was low. After several experiments it
was found by Mr. Parsons that the speed of the
propellers was much too high, due to the high turbine
speed. By redesigning the propellers and the turbine
machinery to enable a lower propeller speed to be obtained,
success was attained in 1896, when speeds exceeding
32 knots were obtained — a wonderful result for such a small
vessel. By dividing the turbine into three separate ones,
the steam doing work successively in each one, each driving
a separate propeller, the speed of the turbine was much
reduced, with a consequent increase in the propelling force.
As a turbine cannot be reversed, a special astern turbine was
installed on the centre shaft, which runs light when the
vessel is moving forward.
In 1898 the Admiralty ordered the ill-fated destroyers
Cohra and Viper, having a displacement of 370 tons and
390 tons respectively. The turbines were arranged some-
what differently than in the Turbinia, there being four turbines
in each boat — two high-pressure and two low-pressure ones —
each driving a separate shaft. Remarkable results were
obtained with both vessels. With the Viper a speed of
37 knots was obtained on the measured mile, and the Cobra,
on a three hours' trial, steamed at an average speed of
34-6 knots.
Unfortunately, the Viper was wrecked near the Channel
Islands in August, 1901, and in September of the same year
the Cobra was lost in a storm in the North Sea. These
disasters had nothing whatever to do with the turbine
installation. Experience with these vessels had shown that
at high speeds the steam consumption was less than in boats
fitted with reciprocating engines, but that at low speeds the
steam consumption was rather greater. In the next destroyers
— the Velox and the Eden — special " cruising " engines were
installed. In the Velox two sets of reciprocating engines
were installed to be used when steaming at about 12 knots,
while in the Eden two small turbines were installed for a
similar purpose.
In 1902 the Admiralty decided to use steam turbines in
the Amethyst — one of four third-class cruisers then building
The three other ships — the Topaz, Diamond, and Sapphire —
are of exactly the same dimensions and form of huU, but
were fitted with the best tvpe of rec procating engines, so
that an excellent opportunity occurred for exact comparative
trials. These light cruisers have a displacement of 3,000 tons,
and were designed for a speed of 2i| knots. The Amethyst
was fitted with two cruising turbines, one of the high-pressure
and the other of the low-pressure type.
(To be continued)
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GANT'S FAMOUS SPORTSMAN'S DIARY.
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CONTENTS. Ph'
ATHLETICS 78
AVIATION 65
BILLIARDS 61
BO.XING 84
BRIDGE 75
COUKSING 61
CRICKET 25
CYCLING 88
DAILY WANTS DICI'IO-NARY 8
DISTANCES (Comparative Tables ot French and English) —
FISHING 67
FOOTBALL (Assoi3iation) 34
FOOTBALL (RUEhy) 40
FRENCH OWNERS' COLOUES (with EngUsh equivalent) —
GOLF 43
HOCKEY 45
HUNTING 57
LAWN TENNIS 48
LIOHTING-UP TABLE 74
MOTORING 71
NEWMARKET COURSES (Lengths oJ) —
OLYMPIC GAMES 39
POLO 60
ROWING 82
SHOOTING 57
STARTING PRICE READY SECKONER . . 54
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YACHTING 84
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392
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &WATER
Vol. LXV. No. 2760
SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1915
rPUBUSHJBD AST PRICE STXPBNCB
La NBWSrAPBRj PUBUSHEli WBBKLT
CtpyritU, Mautl A Pot
MAJOR-GENERAL (TEMPORARY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL)
SIR W. R. ROBERTSON, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.
The New Chief of the General Staff
LAND AND WATER
April 3, 1915
€^iJe-^
■/„
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fxfr/fff/l/
/e-/otyne/a£^e^ .^^^/^5C^/ S^^^/^yiy Jlo^^i^my.
./^moei/i 0^l€aefv^ b^iee/^ ^:5^/ii(^x.<^._y^^',;^<?«5'^ am/u>' y^^nc^e^
The tale of the man who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE THIRD.
AND in a little while they came upon a village,
and he who had bought too well sought
out the smith that he might provide him
with Y^t another shoe, for he had none left. And
the good smith said : " "Vea, master, shoes can I
sell thee, but not of this fashioning. Doubtless
could I procure the shoe thou desirest, but since
thou canst not wait awhile 'tis all I have to offer.
See, thy friend's beast is so shod, and thou saycst
he has had no misadventure." And the wise
man said : " Take thou the shoe and come with
me to a place where we may rest, and I will
enlighten thee as to the talc of this shoe."
(r« de continued.)
MORAL :-
You can always get a Dunlop if you need it.
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iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiia
April
3, '915
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
Br MRS
The Gentle Art of Argument
WHAT an argumentative race we are becoming !
We can argue almost every hour of the day about
some controversial point or another. Even
those people who never had an opinion of their
own — or if they had were too timid to voice it
— have rushed into the fray. Should racing continue as usual,
ought there to be such a thing as fashion, should we have
conscription, is the censorship too strict, or, on the other
hand, ought we to have no _
news at all ? Everybody
has different opinions ; no-
body is shy about making
them heard. Many people
have no wish to listen to
anybody's ideas but their
own. The result is that
every one is talking at once,
and many a gathering that
set out to be a quiet and
friendly occasion has come
to a very strained close.
To my way of thinking,
people with determined
views and penetratirg
voices ought to come under
military discipline. They
take an unfair advantage
of the helpless mortal
placed next to them at the
luncheon or dinner table.
There is no getting away.
The martyrdom must be
endured for at least an
hour, and often longer.
.\nd the worst of it is that
the people who talk most
are those who know least.
The information is never
first hand. They have
always heard some wonder-
ful story from somebody
who knows somebody else,
whose cousin has the kev to
all the secrets of State. The
amazing tale is launched ;
some equally intrepid soul,
with an equally rasping
/oice, challenges it. Then
argument is let loose. Some people talk all the time,
hardly daring to draw breath in case their flow of ideas should
be interrupted ; others take advantage of anything
approaching a lull. There is more than a hint of flat contra-
diction, there is certainly a growing acidity of tone. Somebody
with a noble effort of tact manages to change the subject.
.Ml is peace for a few minutes and then, alas and alack I we
are on the rocks of controversy again, though nobody can tell
how exactly it has come about. It is really enough to put
an end to "all attempts at hospitality. We can never be
certain that our guests will not come to metaphorical blows
over one or another of the burning questions of the day.
On Talking and Thinking
The truth is that the war has made everybody think
harder than they have ever done in all their lives before, and
everybody has an opinion of their own. To some this is such
a novel experience that they burst into argument as easily as
a bird bursts into song. The worst of it is that from an
•irL^'uer to a bore is a very small step Also, that the habit of
argument grows, until it becomes an almost mechanical one.
We surelv do not want to emerge from this war professional
controversialists. It would be a bad omen for future peace,
even when this present clashing of arms has ceased.
" Do vou know, I have really got into a positive habit of
saying ' I don't think so at all,' " said an attractive Irishwoman
to me the other dav.
" But I thought you never argued," I said, lioping that
this charming trait in her charming self was not to be totally
abolished.
"Well, I never have till now," she admitted, shaking a
pretty head upon which one of the new veiled sailor hats was
prettily poised. " But since we crossed to England I have
done nothing but argue. I have argued till I am hoarse. I
ERIC DE RIDDER
Copyrifhl, Madams Lallie Ckaria LADY LOVAT
A characlerislic p^rlrait of La-'y Loval, who it one of Lord Ribble»c)»le|i
pictureique daughters. Her husband, the fourteen h Lord Lovat, is
ibe founder and Honorary Colonel of Loval's Scouts, which were
originally raised for serrice during the South African War
have argued about Ireland. I have argued about Bosnia. I
have argued about every stone of Constantinople, though
I don't know it, and have never been near the place. I have
even talked about war and warfare with a wounded warrior,
and shrieked contradiction into his ear till my voice went."
" How luckv for him," I murmured in the traditional
stage aside.
"I don't think so at all," said she; then stopped and laughed.
" No," I said, after a
i befitting pause, "as a
I matter of fact, neither do
I."
" Besides," said my
friend, wrinkling up her
nose in a way she alone
amongst women can make
attractive, " he was really
only very slightly
wounded ! "
The Invaluable Motor Car
One of the most unos-
tentatious yet one of the
most useful forms of work
is that being done by the
Ambulance Column of the
London district. The idea
of this Column originated
in the days before war,
when some far-seeing
people were working at
Red Cross training and
often getting laughed at
for their pains. It is an
entirely voluntary work,
carried out by means of
motor ambulances and
private motor cars. The
object is to meet the trains
of wounded as they arri\e
at the London stations,
and convey them from
thence to the various
hospitals. A fleet of private
motor cars under the
Column's direction have
conveyed numbers of sick
and wounded men, ever
since our wounded first started to arrive br.ck in London.
Over 22,000 have already been helped in this splendid way
and the total is a growing one with every day that passes.
Mr. Lancelot Dent, and his wife, who is a tireless Red Cross
worker, are the organisers, and their address is 83, Wcstboume
Terrace. The services of the Ambulance Column are placed at
the entire disposal of the War Office, and there is no other organi-
sation of the kind. The process is a very simple one. As soon as
the War Office knows that a train of wounded men is due to
arrive in London they ring up Mr. Dent and give him particulars.
Mr. Dent then calls up the motor cars at his disposal, and the
soldiers, many of whom are in a terrible state from fatigue
and wounds, are duly met. This is the only work of the kind,
and the gratitude this work draws from our fighting men
would be surprising, did we not — many of us — know there is no
more grateful soul on earth than disabled Tommy Atkins. He
takes things very much as a matter of course in a general
way. It is his job to fight, too sadly often it is his job to get
wounded. But when he arrives back in London, travel-
stained, worn, and frequently in sharp suffering, it is little
short of a godsend to him to find a comfortable car, in which
he can make the last lap of the journey along the streets to
hospital. Many people, seeing the crying need for help, have
lent their cars. But many more are urgently needed. With the
horror of incessant casualty lists in mind, with glad pride in
English pluck, heroism and endurance, many, no doubt — once
they know of the Ambulance Ci^liimn^ — will send their cars to
help it. Mr. Dent's telephone number is Paddington 6054.
The latest playing cards issued by Thomas De La Rue & Co.. Ltd.,
have on the back a reproduction of Bert Thomas'.s now famous
picture, " 'Art a Mo', Kaiser." A proportion of the profits on each
pack of cards on which the picture appears is being devoted to raising
funds to send tobacco and cigarettes to soldiers at the front.
LAND AND WATER
April 3, 1915
Give him the
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Depend upon it, if he has the opportunity to write
he wilt write. Give him the world's best Pen —
Wate^&an*s
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Ask your stationer or jeweller to show you a selection
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possessing the same valuable
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aris and similar to it in taste.
Repd. Quarts.
Per Doz. 6/"
Repd. Pints
3/6
Carriagt Paid.
Repd. % Pints,
2/6 P<r Doz.
BV~ Sampte 8o((/« FREE on receipt of Coupon
Name
Address
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral Waters
A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenies Street Works. LONDON; Cbapel Field Works. NORWICH.
Abolishing Cycle Friction
' I *HIS is an illustration of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
Wheel in action inside its dirtproof Gear-case.
See how the moving chain picks up the Oil and sprays it
into the Speed-gear Mechanism The same action takes
place in the Free Wheel and in the Rear Hub. So the
whole Driving
Bearings of
Sunbeam Bi-
cycles are al-
ways clean, and
always oiled.
Inconsequence
they run with-
I out Friction,
landarcguaran-
\teed not to wear,
' much less wear
out. This
simple Inven-
tion has helped
to make Sun-
beams by far
the most im-
portant high-
grade Bicycle
in the World. Futile and vain attempts have often
been made to imitate it, especially by Foreigners. The
Sunbeam's abolition of cycle Friction is one of those
Triumphs of British Workmanship of which this
Country can indeed be proud. Ride a Sunbeam.
(f^rite for the New Catalogue to
3 SUNBEAMLAND— WOLVERHAMPTON
London Showrooms : 57 HOLBORN VIADtTCT, E.C.
m8 SLOANE ST. (by Sloanc Square), S.W.
Hotel Cecil
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
TJ.pho».: GERRARD 60. ^PP^y- MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND KATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
NOTE.— This article iias been submitled io flie Press Buresn, jvliich does not object to the publication ai ceniored, and lakes B*
respoasibillty lor the correctness oi the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article mast only N
regarded ns approximate, end no deaaile strength at any point is indicated.
THE CARPATIIIAiN FRONT.
The Russian Advance, the Uzok and the Lupkow
Passes.
IT not infrequently happens in the course of
a campaign that what had been, sometimes
over a considerable period, a secondary
field of operations, becomes a field of first
importance, success or failure in which proves
decisive. There seems some possibility of this
being the case in the future with the Carpathian
front.
Upon the whole Eastern front Warsaw was,
and is, the critical point. With the Germans in
Warsaw (especially wnth Przemysl still holding
out), the Galiciau operations — hitherto stationary
— would have failed altogether, and a retirement
of the Russian armies from the plain east of the
Carpathians would have had to come.
But v/ith Warsaw untaken, and, apparently,
now in no danger of falling during the immediate
future, and with the interruption of Przemysl
gone, it is quite another matter. Northern and
Central Poland may ^^•ell stand immobile while
more decisive operations take place in Southern
Poland ; and at the outset of these operations we
shall do well to master the general and the particu-
lar conditions of tliat Carpathian front, where a
great action has been at issue for more than a
week, and still at the moment of v/riting (Monday^
evening) (1) remains undecided.
The general conditions of the Carpathian
front may thus be summarised. A broad belt of
mountain land, running roughly north-west by
south-east, and, for the purposes of this field,
about 250 miles long, or a trifle more, stretches
from the Roumanian frontier to the sources of the
Dunajec river above New Sandec. This line of
the Dunajec river, prolonged by an upper tribu-
tary coming in from the south, roughly defines
the extremity of the Russian occupation in
Galicia. It will be observed that this front (which
I have marked on the sketch B with a line of
crosses stretching from A to B) menaces Cracow,
at a distance of rather less than fifty miles upon
the average. The Russian armies occupying the
Galician plain to the east of the Carpathian
mountains have been pressed back in the southern
end of their occupation to, roughly, the line of
crosses C D, and are in possession of the crest of
the Carpathians only upon the narrow issue
between B and C. But it is further to be
remarked that this particular section of the front
B C is precisely that in which the Carpathians can
most easily be crossed and where there is the best
system of communication immediately to the east
on the Galician plain for the support of an effort
(1) The ^xigencios of the press in the holiday yrec'i. advuics lh«
writing of liiij iuue by twenty-four hours.
LAND AND W A T E R.
April 3, 1915.
tv&cow
'" ^r ^Cj *ft2.e mys I
HUNGARY ''<^^' j^^^.
Vx/X/
at the invasion of Hungary in the direction of the
arrow.
.When we come to tlie closer analysis of tliis
section of the front in detail, y\e shall see how im-
portant this point is. So long as Przeinysl held out
the railway system at the disposal of the Russians
jn the Galician plain, though close and sufficient
for the supply and movement of very great
numbers, was interrupted. Przeniysl, as we jaw
last week, made a great hole in the railway system
of the plain, and in particular cut that main line
whicJi is the backbone of all the Galician com-
munications, and vvhich is the principal avenue for
Russian supply. This truth can, perhaps, best be
expressed by the addition here of another slight
sketch in which this railway .system is expressed in
its relation to the front of effort we are considering.
The double line marks that main avenue of com-
munications of which I speak, and just east of
Lemberg, L, it splits into two branches, crossing
the Russian frontier and leading to the main
Russian depots in the South and East of Russia,
Lemberg being itself, of course, a large advanced
ba.^-e. The leaser railways I have marked with
single lines. Novv Przemysl, at P, so long as it held
out, caused an interruption I'oughly represented by
the circle of dots set round it on the sketch. The
provisioning of the Russians further west could,
indeed, be effected round by Rawa Russka, to the
junction of Jaroslav, but it was a small and incon-
venient line, and further the great masses of men
immobilised to maintain the siege of Przemj'sl had
to be provided for first. The line which runs later-
filly to the foothills of the Carpathians through
Jasco, Sanok, Sambor, and Stryj, to Stanislau,
was everywhere quite close to the Austrian effort,
the Russian front upon this southern side running
as do the crosses on the sketch. Until Przemysl
fell the Russians were therefore grievous!}^ ham-
pered in their movements of men.
Once Przemysl had fallen, however, the A^hole
railway sy.stem was free, and all parts of it north
of this lateral line were at the Russians' divsposal.
It seemed uncertain what use the Russians would
immediately make of their nev/ opportunity. But
the most obvious and immediate advantage pro-
vided for them by the fall of Przemysl was to
attack along that crest B C where they already
commanded one principal pass across the i-ange,
and where they v.ere already so far advanced
towards the mastery of the ridge immediately to
the south. This sector B C lay in the imiuediate
neighbourhood of Pr/eniysl, the quarter of a mil-
lion of men or so relea.sed by the fall of the [)laee
could be brought up at once, and the striking of a
blow here for the forcing of the f'arpathians was
easier than an advance elsev>hei'e — as against the
Cracow front or towards the Bukovina. It would
carry more weight and could be delivered at once.
To this plan, therefore, the Russians seem to
have tui'ned, and they are at present engaged in
attempting to master a sufiicient belt of the main
ridge to enable them to advajice when the weather
serves down on to the Hungarian plain.
This belt, the front ui^-on which they ai'e now
fighting, may be defined by two extremities, Bart-
field, the local name for which is Bartfa, and
sixty miles off to the east, upon the other side of
the crest of the mountains, IBaligrod.
It is these sixty miles the conditions of which
have to be analysed.
First let us examine the advantages of com-
munication, which the Russians here enjoy over
their opponents. (Plan D).
The base of the whole thing is the lateral rail-
way running in front of the foothills on the
Galician side, from the junction at Sanok
towards Jasko. At Sanok comes in the railway
from the Hungarian side, which crosses the ridge
of the mountain by the saddle known as the Lup-
kow Pass, where also a good road — hard, broad,
and excellently engineered — crosses the moun-
tains upon a line almost coincident with that of
the railway. Three other roads, which have no
railway corresponding to them, also cross the
mountains in this region : that passing by Jaliska
and starting from Rymanow, that starting from
Svidnik and going over the Dukla Pass to Dukia,
and that startin.g from Bartfeld (with the railway
accompanying as far as the station of Zboro) and
leading to Zmigrod. All these communications
crossing the main ridge of the Carpathians are
easy, and, as the map shows, they stand close
together, permitting of the advance of parallel
columns in support one of the other. The country
is fairly open, the heavy vvoods not beginning
until the shaded area marked A upon the right of
the sketch. The passes are quite low. The Lupkow
Pass is not a thousand feet above the towns of the
foothills, the Dukla only 500, and this last height
is but little surpassed by the summit of the
Jaliska and the Zmigrod roads upon either side.
Further, a most important point, thei*e is a
good lateral road running from Sanok to Zmi-
grod, and sei'ving the terminal of each of these
avenues of advance.
The situation of the Russians upon this Bart-
feld— Baligrod front, before the fall, of Przemysl
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND 5KATEB,
■^— >— iW iWII I 1 ly )i
^ >^x X X X xxHx K
r 1 T^B iTi <■>
Sngtish CMiu:*
^.^
on the 22nd March, seems to have been somewhat
as follows. The Russians held the whole of the
ridge over a line of about ten miles from E to F.
From about F their line bent outwards on to the
southern slope of tlie Carpathians so that they
securely held the low and broad Dukla Pass, and
it would seem that the line did not reach the
crest again till somewhere about the point G; so
that the salient on to the Hungarian side of the
mountains, the grip upon the passage of the crest,
represented nearly twenty miles. The telegrams
are too meagre to make quite certain upon this
point, but I deduce from the news of the fortnight
before the fall of the fortress that the Jaliska road
was commanded just beyond the summit. Beyond
G the line ran to some such point as H, with Bali-
grod either just within or just without the limits
of the Eussian occupation. At any rate, it is quite
certain that both the summits of the railway and
of the road on the Lupkow Pass were stiU in
Austrian hands last Friday.
After the faU of Przemysl, a week ago, this
Baligrod-Bartfeld front was immediately rein-
forced, and the effect of this pressure was im-
mediately felt- The Austrian retirement began
down the slope towards the Hungarian plain.
Heights dominating the Lupkow Pass on the ridge
were carried by the Russians. We have not yet
got any sufficient accounts to justify our saying
that the Russians command the road and the
railway itself, where they cross the ridge of the
Lupkow Pass, but we can safely put the Russian
line upon last Friday, the 26th, the third day after
the entry of the Russian troops into Przemysl, at
the new front indicated by the dots K, K, K upon
the sketch just given. We know that the Austnans
have evacuated the point of Zboro, that the
Russians are just above Mesolaborcz, and that they
are forcing the positions in the immediate neigh-
bourhood of the places where the road and the rail-
way from Sanok to Mesolaborcz cross the ridge
close to the village of Lupkow.
It is perfectly clear that the whole Russian
effort is directed towards the piercing of this
" waist " of the Carpathians, and the occupation
of all the roads leading down on to the Hungarian
plain upon a belt of some fifty miles. What wa
have to watch in the next few days is the progress
our allies may make in this effort.
It is worth noting in this connection that the
concentration upon the Bartfeld-Baligrod sector
leaves deliberately neglected for the moment the
next railway pass across the m.ountains, the Uzok,
and I would beg my readers' attention to some
digression upon this momentary neglect of the
Uzok, because it is important to the strategy of
this move.
We all know that a modem army is dependenfi
upon the railway. Now the Ru.ssians, making thia
effort across the Bartfeld-Baligrod front alone,
will, even if they are successful in reaching, with a
short delay, the plain upon the further side,
depend upon only one line of railway, that crossing
the Lupkow Pass.
It may be that as further reinforcements come
through the now liberated Galician railway;
system, an attack will be made upon the Uzok
simultaneously with the attack upon the Lupkow.
The two lines stand one to the other in the
fashion shown upon the accompanying elementary
sketch (E). The three road passes, Polianka, Dukla,
and Jaliska (marked (1), (2), (3) upon the sketch),
are succeeded next in order by the road pass (4),
and the railway pass (4a), which go by the common
name of Lupkow. At a distance beyond the
Lupkow of some forty-five miles, another mor^
LAND A T^ D .W ATE R.
April 3, 1915
9 ®@
T^Pnemysl
ToSambor
L
}^imsa
»i J.
recently-built railway crosses the crest near the
liamlet of Uzok (5), and proceeds down upon the
Galician side to Samlxjr, and so beyond to Przemysl
(like its neighbour, through the Lupkow), and by
another line to Lemberg. These two railway lines
mastering the range do not meet until far down on
the Hungarian Plain. There is a fairly good
lateral road leading along the Hungarian side of
the foothills from Homonna to Berczna, but there
is no railway commimication.
If the Russians, therefore, content themselves
with trying to force the Lupkow and obtain posses-
sion of the railway communication over the crest
at that point, tlicy will be relying upon the
Austrians liaving to abandon the Uzok (5) (the
crest of which they still command) on account of
the fear they will feel of the appearance, sooner
or later, of Russian forces behind them upon the
Hungarian plain. The Russians cannot move in
any great force in Hungary without a railway.
iTo command the Lupkow alone would not be
enough; thcv must, for a general movement, ulti-
raatelv command the Uzok, too. But, supposing
they do not force the Uzok, they can have no lioj.e
of obtaining it save by the threat of this lengihy
turning movement.
ISIow, there are excellent reasons, in spite of
the inconvenience of working with a single rail-
way, for leaving the Uzok alone and concen-
trating upon the Lupkow for the moment. It is
not conceivable that the Uzok will be left alto-
gether alone, supposing that the Austrians cling
to it obstinately in spite of the threat to their rear.
It is only a question of time for the Russians to
bring up sufficient reinforcements to permit them
to act upon the Uzok as well as upon the Lupkow ;
but for the moment it would seem as though the
Lupkow were their principal objective, and a
detailed examination of the tv.o passes shows why.
The Lupkow is roughly thus. The railway
having come up a very easy valley from the C^ali-
cian side, enters its last gradient tow^ards the ridge
at a point rather more than 1,200 feet above the
sea— at a point marked A in the sketch. It only
rises some 240 feet more to Radoszyce, and thence
to the summit at B, the total rise is but just over
300. Upon the further side the gradient is slightly
steeper, Vidrany being only just under 1,100 feet
and Mczolaborcz under 1,000.
At the summit there are two short tunnels,
the longest of w^hich is barely 400 yards, and
the crests in the neighbourhood are quite lov>' —
2,100 feet or thereabouts. Therefore the destruc-
tion of these tunnels (which are rock tunnels)
should be repaired without too much difficulty, ami
the heights in the neighbourhood (some of which
are already carried) are neither steep nor
elevated.
There are no considerable viaducts or long
bridges. Lastly, and most important of all, the rail-
way pass is easily turned by road. One road turns
it in its immediate neighbourhood, running from
the village of Radoszyce, on the Galician side, to
Vidrany on the Hungarian side by very easy
gradients, over a summit but slightly exceeding
2,000 feet. The other road coming in from the
Jaliska Pass (which we have seen to be already in
Russian hands) strikes the railway just beyond
Vidrany at Mesolaborcz, and turns the railway
line yet again. It .should be impossible for the
Austrians to command the railway summit if or
when these roads arc in the Russian possession.
And it should equally be impossible for them to in-
flict any very permanent injury upon the line
which here crosses the range.
Further, let us remark that the country all
about here is open, with only isolated woods; and
the formations, though of limestone, not craggy or
particularly lending themselves to local defects.
Lastly, the height of this Lupkow saddle is so
inconsiderable that it is already only patchy with
snow, and the snow will be no serious encum-
brance before the end of the month if the season is
reasonably open.
Now, with all these conditions, those of the
Uzok Pass form a comjilote contrast.
In the first place, the Uzok Pass, being in the
heart of the mountains and away from the central
-" waist," stands higher; though that is not an im-
]5ortant point, for it is less than 3,000 feet above
the sea. But it is also far steei>er from Turka, the
mountain town at the Galician foot of the Uzok.
The rise to the summit is over a thousand feet,
and on the further side the road presents all the
character of a true mountain pass, zig-zagging
dow-n tovrards Hungary, on to the hamlet of Uzok
itself. A few miles further it has fallen (follow-
ing the upper torrent reaches of the River Ung)
by nearly 2,000 feet, and is still a mountain road
when it enters the larger flat above Berezna and
there receives the lateral road coming from the
Lupkow Railway and Homonna. Again, dense
masses of wood on the Hungarian side clothe the
mountains everywhere in this part; beech on the
lower slopes, pines climbing up thickly to the
central road. On the further, Galician, side, from
w-iiich the Russians must approach, there is but
bad lateral communication for the massing of their
troops. The mountain formation here resembles
: that of the Jura. It runs in parallel ridges,
crest upon crest, of which the main ridge of the
<*
■ u
April 3, 1915.
LAND A N D W A T E R.
Carpathians is only the last : and such formation
admits of no easy system of cominunication. The
last lateral road by which a Russian concentration
against the pass can )3e efVected comes in on Tui'ka
itself. The forcing of the pass, therefore, cannot
be aided by the advent ox bodies arriving from
either side. It can be accomplislied only by direct
attack on a very narrow front. Nor is the line of
the railway turned upon the further side until we
reach the road from Homonna, wliich conies in as
low down as Berezna, nearly two days' march fi-ont
the summit.
For more than three days of ^•ery good marcli-
ing, and more like four average days, troops
attempting to force the Uzok Pass are tied to a
single road of a true mountainous character.
iWhen we return from this general character of the
pass for road and railway alike, to the railway
alone, the ease of its defence or destruction, and
the corresponding difliculty of its seizure are also
apparent.
A detailed sketch of the railway crossing is
somewhat as follows :
2l«> 350C!fi:tt '■
\\ i'f^&N^" ••^2i^^'^ "*'
•-x^Jv^^t^^
st^
^■^^^^s^^
9
1 ji 0 '♦
Miles. .'■hI
At the summit itself a tunnel of a mile,
between A and B, vulnerable from its length, diffi-
cult of repair if it were destroyed, meets one.
Immediately bej'ond the summit upon the
Hungarian side the railway is conipelled, from the
steepness of the ground, to turn and loop in true
mountain fashion, continually passing through
short tunnels and over not inconsiderable ravines.
At every such point a retiring enemy could cut it,
while the fall on the Hungarian side is so steep
that by the time the railway has reached the neigh-
bouring point X it has already fallen nearly 2,000
feet from its sunnnit.
The Uzok, therefore, is a railway pass far
less capable of rapid seizure and use than is the^
Lupkow. Nor is it remarkable that the line was not
cairied across the Uzok at this point until many
years after the engineers had thrown a railway
across the Lu]:)kow.
Before leaving this front it must be premised
that a very rapid advance is unlikely until the
spring weather liberates the roads completely.
The present eliort of the Russians is rather
to master the summits and to open the gates into
Hungary than to pass through tliose gates in force.
Though, if they succeeded in capturing those,
gates, the advance into Hungary v*-ould hardly be
delayed beyond the month of April.
It is worthy of remark in this connection that
the Austrian manoeuvres — I think three years ago
—turned upon the thesis of the defence of the.
Hungarian plain under conditions presuming the
loss of Przem^sl and the loss of the main range.
It is generally believed that the lesson drawn from
those manoeu\'res was that a crescent position
taken up along the western foot of the mountains
could not be held, save with the aid of strong rein-
forcements from the north.
Now it is fairly certain that the enemy could
not find heavy reinforcements from the north in
the case of a Russian advance. If Austria and
Germany had been fighting Russia alone, and if
Russia had attained her present position in such
single combat, one might imagine such reinforce-
ment to be possible; but Germany would net be in
a position to throw considerable numbers into
this field in aid of her ally v/ith Warsaw untaken
and with the siege conditions, with Germans to
their trenches in the west, unbroken.
We have been many months expecting the
ultimate effect of Russian numbers. Their sup-
posed imm_ediate effect was a grave error of judg-
ment, and the delay under wliich they would begin
to tell -was far longer than opinion was led to
believe in tliis country by most military critics and
by all public men. But it was an ultimate factor,
bound to come iuto play if the enemy could obtain
no decision in the East and sliould let '-tonth after
month slip by without pinning or decisively rcfeat-
ing his opponent in that quarter; nnd it would
.seem as though, with the fall of Pi-zemysl, this
double elerucnt of time and of numbers in fa^ou^
of the Allies v.ere at last beginniiig to tell upon the
Carpathian front.
PRZE.MYSL.
The further news and details following upon
the capture of Przemysl. lacking which we
remarked last week that it was impossible to state
the full effect of that achievement, arc not yet to
hand. The only definite figure we have to go upon
is a Cjuasi-official statement that the total num);er
of prisoners was 120,000. The estimate of 100,000
was, therefore, not so far cut, and, indeed, it
should be clear that the defence of so large a peri-
meter as from thirty to thirty-five miles could
hardly be undertaken' with a smaller number of
troops. We are also told that the total number
of Russian prisoners found within the fortress was
about 3,000, and, further, that the greater number
were, as was to be expected, cases of wounded.
Of captures of material, only four locomotives
were seized, apparently intact ; but of other rolling
stock a very great quantity, and a certain stock of
coal. Of th.e fate of the guns we have heard
nothing as yet.
It is clea r that the least number of men set free
on the Russian side by the fall of the fortress
LAND AND WATER.
April 3, 1915.
cannot be less than a quarter of a million, which
estimate has been used in the above notes upon the
present Carpathian position.
It is further clear that no considerable
destruction of the railways of which l^izemysl is
the 1 unction can have taken place, l^ecause the
moA-ement of trooi^s began almost immediately
after the entry of the Ru^sia.n forces into the city.
The main interest of the siege can only, it is
to be feared, arise much later, when full details ot
its character are published. What military
students in the West really want to know is
whetlier the power of prolonged resistance which
Przemysl showed was due mainly to the organisa-
tion of temporary works outside tlie inner ring —
as at Verdun and Metz— or whether it was mainly
due to the absence of a proper siege tram on the
Paxssian side. It is fairly evident from the very
brief notices received that the fortress, when it
did fall, fell from exhaustion, and not from bom-
bardment or assault. Therefore, if Przemysl held
out of its own strength against regular and
developed siege attack, it would go far to show
that the opinion formed at the beginning of the
war, that the modern siege train has destroyed the
modern fortress, must be revised. That the modern
siege train can, with superiority in air craft,
destroy the restricted permanent work, and that
in a few days, is now a commonplace. But it by no
means follows that fortresses cannot be devised for
the future which shall be possessed of veiy numer-
ous mobile batteries, m only some of which guns
need be placed (and which these were the enemy
would have to find out for himself), while the
opportunity should be afforded for the completion
of still more numerous temporary works at short
notice. What dooms the permanent work as we
now understand it is the restricted and known area
upon which the high explosive shell of the assault
has to v.'ork. Once eliminate or modify the two
factors of restriction, in area and knoion site, and
the strength of the defence may be revived.
Another matter of interest would be to dis-
cover what was the sanitary condition of Przemysl
at its fall, what was the proportion of death from
wounds and what from disease, as also the organi-
sation of large sorties under modern conditions.
But for all this we must wait until detailed news
ari'ives.
THE WESTERN AND OTHER FRONTS.
There has been no news of consequence this
week up to the moment of writing (Monday even-
ing) upon the Western front.
The Hartraannsvveilerkopf, a wooded height
of over 3,000 feet in the Yosges, which stands
boldly out from the foothills and dominates the
whole plain of Mulhouse, has been recaptured by
the French. Here, as nearly always, the French
are silent upon the number of their prisoners.
The Belgian troops have achieved tv> o slight
successes upon the Yser. The trenches captured
by the French south-east of Verdun at Les
Eparges, just at the base of the hills called the
Heights of the Meuse, were in part retaken hj the
enemy on Sunday, and were then almost entirely
recaptured by the French before the end of
the day.
In general the mass of local attacks upon
various parts of the 400-mile line does no more
than continue the series of these during the last
winter months. The clioice of assault remains
almost always with the Allies ; the object of attri-
tion remains the same.
An insignificant skirmish took place towards
the Suez end of the Suez Canal. Of its nature wo
can guess nothing except that it can have dealt
with nothing more important than reconnaissance.
The enemy retired towards Naldal, half-way to
Akaba.
On the East Prussian front we have very briet
news describing fairly heavy fighting, especially
at the western end of the line between Mlawa and
Plock. But there is no appreciable change of ad-
vance or retreat in the opposing lines that face each
other from the point where the Niemen enters East
Prussia to the Vistula. It is probable that this
immobility is principally due to the spring thaw,
which turns the whole of these marshy districts
into an impossible sludge. The bombardment of
Osowiecs still continues in desultory fashion, and
has now entered its sixth week. There is no result
apparent.
A REVIEW OF THE G
MIND UPON THE WAR.
T is important from time to time, even in con-
nection with the mere dry bones of military
study, to review the mental attitude of the
enemy.
The conclusions in this field are not suscep-
tible of positive proof.
Evidence is at large, and may be variously
interpreted, but one cannot forgo periodical judg-
ment of the matter, because it is ultimately upon
the moral attitude of the two opponents that a
campaign depends, and the moral attitude of the
enemy at particular critical moments helps us to
gauge the development of the phase succeeding.
Such a critical moment is approaching. The
end of winter, the enemy's continued heavy
jwastage, his limit of reserves, the new contingents
fllwut to appear in the West, all determine this;
and it is advisable to take stock nov/ of the enemy's
mind, from the opening of the campaign to tha
present apparent change in his moral attitude.
The mood in which Germany, controlling also
her powerful ally, began the war is by this time
a matter of history.
The enemv possessed an instrument of war
amply suflicient for victory (in his opinion),
according to the plan he proposed— a plan, in his
opinion again, morally reasonable; and, as a mili-
tary operation, so practicable as to be certain of
success.
He had not used this instrument for aggres-
sion, he had not used it even (save quite recently)
to threaten; but he knew that it was ready to use
whenever he chose, and the moment for using it at
last arrived.
If we desire to grasp this simple attitude
common to the directing minds in Germany, we
6»
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
cannot do better than recall the attitude of similar
men in this country towards the position of
England at sea. Consciousness of superior
strength did not here produce aggression. It does
not necessarily mean aggression. It always pro-
duces a party which would like to use such advan-
tage actively, but, especially after a long peace,
there will be stronger counsels against the running
of the slight risk involvedandfor lettingwellalone!
We know that the higher authority in
Germany was for many years against action.
But there was this great difference hetween
the two parts of the parallel here drawn. The
British fleet had one aim only, to defend an amply
sufficient national patrimony long acquired.
.Whereas the German forces, though conscious
that time was with them (for the numbers and
vvealth of the German Empire Avere rapidly in-
creasing), were in the hands of men who felt two
things which might move them to action at last :
First, that Germany had not her due, especially
in the matter of Colonial expansion ; secondly, that
Russia, which was in proportion increasing even
more rapidly than Germany, might ultim.ately
become dangerous. Against the Slav spirit as a
whole the German spirit is arrayed in a
mixture of contempt and fear difficult for the West
to understand.
Rather more than three years ago elements
provoking action began to outweigh the conserva-
tive factors in the German directing mind. The
ultimate cause was, of course, the change in the
attitude of Britain, which had, in its turn, been
due to the German threat by sea. Germ.any had
chosen to build a great fleet, manifestly designed
to challenge that of this country.
The inunediate action was the French move
towards Morocco, ultimately supported by the
British Government. But, though less acute, the
Russian menace (as the Germans thought it) was
increasing side by side with this Western provoca-
tion— as the Germans regarded it to be.
We can be mathematically certain when the
decision which changed the German attitude from
one of indefinite delay and of a mere reliance upon
time as the ally of their Empire to a determina-
tion to attack came.
It was in the summer of 1911 that the direct-
ing minds in the German Empire decided upon war.
When I say that this is mathematically
certain, I mean that it is a judgment susceptible of
mathematical calculation. The accumulation of
stores and of complete equipment for a particular
date, the study of the effect of heavy artillery in
the field, and the necessary length of and prepar-
ing ammunition therefor; the enlargement of the
Kiel Canal ; the increase in the number of trained
men — every step which we now see to have been
taken by the military authorities and the Govern-
ment of Berlin — exactly converges upon the
summer of 1914. It was not, however, believed
that Great Britain would actively join the Franco-
Russian alliance against Germany when Germany
forced war, though it was believed that Great
Britain was the author of the general scheme
which threatened German expansion.
When a preparation of about three years,
designed for the summer of 1914. was afoot, it was
obvious that the war must be forced as soon as
possible after tlie harvest. Everything was well
thought out and accurately ordered, as befits a
civilised nation preparing secretly for an act of
war to be effected at its ovvn moment.
Stores of cereals, dependent upon the harvest,
must be waited for, but for some months before
that date other accumulations of stores not depen-
dent upon the harvest must be provided : money,
certain metals not sufficiently present within the
boundaries of the Empire, and so forth. The finan-
cial dispositions began to be taken, apparently,
shortly after the beginning of 1914.
There was a realisation of foreign invest-
ments; there was a steady accumulation of gold;
and, most important of all, there was a plan laid
whereby the City of London should, even if Great
Britain did not enter the war, be hampered in the
financial support of those vvho (in the German
conception) were to fight England's battles upon
the Continent.
An admirable occasion for the pretext of war
was afforded by the assassination of the heir to the
Austro-Hungarian thrones at the end of June.
Immediate advantage could not be taken of it, how-
ever, because it came a little too soon. The harvest
was not gathered and the last preparations were
not made. For a whole month Europe was allowed
to believe that the crime would have no serious
international consequences. At the end of July
the Austro-Hungarian Goveimment presented to
Serbia — that is, virtually to Russia — a challenge
of such a sort as had never been presented in
Europe before. It was a direct demand for war.
But the ally of Germany, which in this matter
acted as her servant, had not the determination of
the master. As late as Tluirsday, the 30th of July,
Austria hesitated. The Government at Berlin at
once stepped in and made matters certain by the
double ultimatum presented within the twenty-
four hours to Russia on the one side and to France
on the other.
Now, the mood in which the directing mind of
Germany entered a great campaign at this moment
was one absolutely certain of immediate victory.
The Russian mobilisation would be slow, Russian
communications were bad, the Russian object in
the war was not national salvation. To hold up
Russia upon the East was at once easily possible
and amply sufficient. It would be many months
before Russia could be a menace, though ultimately
— within a year, say — Russia might have found
time to equip and to munition those very consider-
able numbers which were her principal asset.
But meanwhile in the West a decision could
be arrived at, and that without peril of miscar- ,
riage. France could be suddenly attacked in over-
whelming numbers and in a fashion for which she
was not prepared, and the destruction of the
French resistance would make possible in a com-
paratively brief space of time an arrangement
wdth Russia upon the East.
The space of time thus required for the com-
plete success of the enemy's plan was the more
restricted from the fact that this plan did not in-
volve too large a direct political achievement. It
hardly aimed at annexation at all. It aimed at
undisputed hegemony in Central and Western
Europe. France was not to be dismembered, but,
already in active decline (as the Germ.ans thought),
was to be rendered incapable of giving further
trouble.
Russia had only to withdraw her pretensions
in the Balkans, and to leave the economic expan-
sion of Germany and Austria a free hand towards
the South and the East. England, after these first
rapid blows, would accept the result.
In the popular mind this decision took the
7«
LAND AND .WATER.
April 3, 1915.
form of confidently expecting great viciories a. the
outset of war and a victorious peace, perhaps
within a few weeks, certainly within six months
of its inception. .
The lirst of these expectations was amply
realised. The strong fortress of Liege was com-
pletelv in German hands within ten days oi the
first 4ots. The full mobilisation of the Gerrnan
forces had not been completed a fortnight when
the greater part of Belgium was securely held.
The capital, Brussels, was entered and occupied
immediately afterwards. The hrst French armies
gathered to meet the shock were borne down m an
avalanche of invasion. All the six weeks succeed-
in" the forcing of the war Avere an uninterrupted
trfumph, even exceeding nhat had been eafected
by the general public in the German Empire: the
whole earrison of Maubeuge, the crashing b.ow or
the battle of Metz, the uninterru]ited and enor-
mous charge through Northern France to the very
gates of Paris, prisoners by the hundred thousand,
and guns in interminable numbers. To crown all,
iust as the decisive stroke against the beaten
French Army made possible the immediate occupa-
tion of Pans, with the approach of Sedan day,
the German population received the astounding
news of Tannenbcrg.
The point has been repeatedly emphasised in
these pages. It needs no further elaboration. The
mind of a nation influenced by a legitimate exalta-
tion of this kind can change but very gradually;
and cannot change at all save under the pressure
of some vivid and clearly defined disaster.
No such disaster followed. Nothing hap-
pened which could reasonalily make the general
lay opinion of Germany abandon its old unques-
tioned confidence in the"^ supremacy of its military
Diachine and in the certitude of ultimate victory.
But what happened was of a nature which, if
it could not thus affect the popular mind, was
certain to affect the directing mind, and, in par-
ticular, the soldiers ultimately responsible for the
conduct of the campaign. For those soldiers had
planned a great strategy of a simple sort, and the
plan had manifestly gone vvrong. The battle of
the Marne meant that the envelopment or crushing
of the French Army was thenceforth impossible.
It meant that the rapid decision in the West was,
therefore, equally impossible, and that the cam-
)->aign vrould be indefinitely prolonged. More than
that at first it did not mean.
The second chapter of the war emphasised in
the directing military mind of the enemy this new
mood. Pinned to a line of trenches 400 miles long,
but still in superior numbers, the obvious task for
the enemy in the West was now to break through.
From the early part of October to the middle of
November the enemy's Great General Staff massed
his vast numerical superiority for a great attempt
to break through the northern end of the line, first
upon the front Dixmude-Nieuport, then upon the
front of the salient of Ypres, lield by the
British contingent. He disastrously failed in the
double attempt. He suffered very heavy losses
indeed — certainly the equivalent of six army corps
—and he knew that the future was more doubtful
than ever.
But it must be clearly borne in mind that the
renewed failure, most significent to the staff, had
no immediate effect upon the popular conception of
the war. As we see clearly enough from the
instance of our own popular oi^inion, such purely
adventitious conditions as the fact that war was
taking wlace on the enemy's soil, that there was no
dramatic single surrender of large numbers of
prisoners and guns, &c., were quite sufficient to
maintain (though they could not reinforce) the old
confidence.
We know how different is the attitude of the
purely military observer from that of the general
public in any military operation.
Perhaps the clearest example of the contrast
is to be found in the fact that mere advance is
coupled in the popular mind with the idea of suc-
cess, and it is often even identified with it.
The third chaj^ter of the war opened with yet
another change of plan upon the part of the
enemy's directing military mind.
So much time had ])assed by the middle of
November that Russia might in the course of the
next few months prove formidable. If she became ■
really formidable in equipped numbers and ammu-
nition in a further five or six months, and no deci-
sion had in the meantime been rcache;! in the
West, the German fortunes, already very doubtful,
might begin to turn towards disaster. By this time
—the middle of November— quite half the avail- -
able untrained German men to be put into the field
had already been put into the field. The remaining
margin was not very large, and the Avastage from
the conditions of a winter campaign, from the fact
that everything liad been designed for a short war,
but, above all/from the strategic and tactical tra-
ditions of the Prussian service, was continuously
enormous.
This third chapter therefore tcok the follow- •
ing form :
The Germans, v.-ith their Austrian ally, were
to pin the Russians behind the Vistula while still
tlie vvinter lasted. To achieve this immobilisation
of the enemy upon the East, it v»as necessary for
the Germanic alliance to command permanently
the railway l)ridges of Warsaw, and to that end,
leaving in the West only just sufiicient numbers
to hold the line, the main energy of the enemy was .
directed throughout the whole of th.e winter.
The grand strategy of this third phase is still
in progress, but so far it has failed precisely as tho
grand stratcgj- of the first phase, the envelopment
or destruction of the French, and the second phase,
the breaking out in the West, had failed in their
turn.
The attempt to carry Warsaw by direct attack
from the West broke down and was abandoned
after the first week in February. The attempt to
carry it round the northern ilank broke down, in
its first effort at least, by the first week in March.-
We are just coming to the first week in April, and
Warsaw, with its bridges, is still secure.
A secondary, and rather political than mili-
tary, field connected with this main Polish effort
Avas that of the Carpathian front. The Austro-
Germans must clear the Russian armies from
Galicia if they were to free Hungary from the
menace of invasion during the coming spring.
W^ith this object in mind tliey massed forces far
superior to the Russians in the field, and planned,
while holding the Russians along tlie front of the
mountains, to turn them in flank from the south-
east. They were aided in this conception by the
prolonged resistance of Przemysl, with its garri-
son of some three to four army corps. Should
Przem}sl fall, it was certain that the Russian
armies in Galicia could not be expelled. Przemysl
fell upon March 22. The abandonment of the
8*
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
attempt to turn the Russian flank bad already
been settled after a little-known battle of critical
importance fought ten miles south of Halicz, whicli
ended on March 4 with the Russian occupation
of Staiiislau.
Such, then, is the present situation of the
campaign in the mind of the directors of German
strategy. They see their original plan all gone
to pieces, they see the second phase (w-hich was an
attempt, not to restore the original plan, but to
redress its disastrous failure) ending in the middle
of November in a further complete failure. They
rote day by day, with tlie figures before them, a
gigantic and unceasing rate of wastage immensely
superior to that of their enemy, especially to that
of their enemy upon the West, and they perceive,
vfith winter rapidly drawung to its end, with the
munitioning of the Russians in sight within the
next few weeks, with the Dardanelles seriously
threatened, with the new contingents about to
appear in the West, and, perhaps most important
of all, with the rapid production of ammunition
and of sufficient hea\T artillery for trench work
in the West, that the tliird i)hase of this plan for
the immobilisation of the Russian armies is head-
ing straight for a third disappointment.
It is morally certain that under such condi-
tions the Great General Staff of the German Army
no longer presumes upon victor3^
It is morally certain tb.at it no longer pre-
sumes upon imposing its original will upon the
will of the Franco-Rusoian-British allies.
A eriticxil turning-point in the mind of the
enemy has been reached. The change has run its
full course in the directing part of that mind, and
the tuning of German public opinion to another
key has also begun.
The all-important problem whicb we must try
to solve at this moment is the present state of the
German mind, directing and directed, towards the
future of the campaign.
I will hazard the suggestion that it is at the
present m-oment an attitude to be defined somewhat
as follows :
" The w-ar has not gone as we expected. We
admit it freely. But it has become something
much more serious for us than the danger of
defeat. We are — no matter through what accident
or whether we are to blame or no— fighting for our
existence. The issue ought not to be of this charac-
ter. We did not threaten the existence of others;
we only threatened their too great power, and tried
to take the place we thought our due. AVe are pre-
pared to meet a reasonable demand upon us and
to discuss terms. We quite understand that to
leave certain districts in German hands after the
war would be unwise. We quite understand the
demand for limited autonomy in Poland; but, of
course, Russia will have to follow suit. We do ask
for certain facilities in the Low Countries, especi-
ally for trade and outlet to the sea ; but we want
nothing more than that — which is, after all, only
the public recognition of advantages which would
be ours anyhow by the natural progress of our
trade and produce."
In some such attitude as this they would
approach Europe and the neutral countries. In
other words, they would be asking for a draw.
Now, this is something which has been long
foreseen and much discussed — in these columns as
elsewhere.
But the novel feature which depends upon
quite recent evidence is the way in which the state
of mind behind such a demand is already appa-
rent on the German side.
It is no longer a case of prophesying that some
such attitude wwald ultimately be adopted. It is a
case of recognising that it is already adopted
to-day.
The directing military mind of the enemy has
decided that victory in the original seniie is now
quite impossible. It proposes, as will be argued
in a moment, the ultimate resumption of what it
regards as the vital part of the struggle — the
attack on England; but in the immediate future
it wishes for peace upon terms that will leave
Germany almost as strong in proportion to her
neighbours as she was last year. It is preparing
the general public opinion of Germany for a corre-
sponding movement of opinion upon the part of
the neutrals, and perhaps of certain elements
which it believes it can find among the Allies.
Note, for instance, the double work which is
appearing in our Press, as in that of other coun-
tries— one limb of which work consists in the new
moderate description of German aims and of Ger-
man successes therein, the other limb of which con-
sists in describing the still perfect organisation
and still calm confidence of the German military
machine.
In the first of these matters the most striking
document has been General Bernhardi's summary
of the war for the Americans. General Bernhardi
is a very lucid and, what is more, a very weighty
writer. " His technical work is, I believe, univers-
ally admired by all those competent to judge it, and
his excursions into politics, if less valuable, are yet
clearly the pi'oduct of a man who can think his
subject out and state it well. Ilis religion may not
be our religion ; but one can be certain after read- ,
ing his work that he writes whatever he does write
with a definite object and fits his means to his end.
What he has been recently Avriting for America
is, therefore, a piece of evidence to be closely
studied. And it amounts, roughly, to this : " Wo
have not done what we thought we could, but we
are not defeated — it is not even possible to defeat
us in any thorough manner; and mcauAvhile we
have clear advantages over the enemy which we
permanently hold."
He then proceeds to sumniarise those condi-
tions, and it is well worthy of note that they are
the sort of things which particularly appeal to
civilians, and which few soldiers Avould, if they
were writing for soldiers only, take the trouble to
mention.
The document is as valual>le a witness in what
it leaves out as in what it puts in. For instance,
the (to us) extraordinary description of the battle
of the Marne is, from "the point of view of the
writer, and of the effect he desires to produce, ex-
ceedingly well done. The right wing of the
German Army fell back slightly, but before
superior numbers; it fell back in good order; its
losses were inconsiderable, &c., «S:c. One can con-
ceive a less able man making a fool of himself in
trying to describe so that it should appear favour-
able to neutrals, and particularly to uninstructed
opinion, that deadly blow delivered in the second
w^eek of September which would seem already to
have changed the course of European history.
But General Bernhardi's description is per-
fectly suited to the object he has in view. It is
true that the Allied numbers were superior to the
German right wing. The fact that the poncentra-
tion of this superiority upon one part of the field,
9»
L A X D A X D W A T E R.
April 3, 1915.
although tlio total forces on the Allied side were
heavily inferior, was a triumphant piece of
strateg}- he discreetly veils. It is true that the
retireiiient was at its maximum over but a few
miles — say three or four days' march — and at the
pivot end of the swing hardly noticeable. It is
true that the losses were not heavy for an opera-
tion of the kind, or at least not exaggeratedly
heavy. And what he goes on to say is equally true
—that ti;e nttsmpts to turn the German right wing
failed.
But the skill shown in the concoction of this
document, though worthy of some admiration, is
not the main point. The main point is the object
he clearly has in view. And that object is not the
compelling of the neutrals to any exaggerated ad-
miration for Germany : on the contrary, its object
is rather to provoke a limited and sober respect.
Let anyone unacquainted with military history as
a whole, of all principles of strategy, and the
main lines of the present campaign, read Bern-
hardi's work. Such a reader will conclude that the
Germans have not do)ie as well as they expected,
but they can still put up an interminable fight
which it would be foolish to prolong.
Bei'nhardi knows that Germany is making for
defeat, and that any nation, once defeated, can be
and will be crushed. He is a soldier. But his
civilian audience here and elsewhere do not know
this.
Exactly the same thing is apparent in the
descriptive articles of German ambulance work,
German recruiting, German food supplies, and the
spirit of the German people at home, which are
mysteriously appearing even in the journals of the
nations now fighting Germany. " We have no exal-
tation, such as there was at the beginning of the
campaiSj'n, but there is a carefully calcula'ted dis-
semination of confidence — not confidence in any
decisive success, but confidence in the power of in-
definite resistance."
Interviews granted by public men in Germany
to their journalists, and equally finding their way
into the Press of the Allies, are upon the same note.
As though by order, all fantastic boasting has dis-
appeared, and its place has been taken by a sort of
quiet regard of the future, which is intended not
to terrorise, but to make the enemies of the Ger-
manic alliance regard the struggle as intermin-
able.
When we turn to a third category of evidence,
the domestic Press of Germany, we find a slightly
different note, but one still in consonance witli the
efi'ect which is aimed at in the neutral countries,
and upon certain sections of opinion among the
Allies.
The fact that the war is still being prosecuted
in foreign territory is perpetually insisted on.
The fatuous description of the siege work as " the
invincibility of the wall of steel " regularly
appears and reappears. No hint is given of the
plain military truth that, in a state of siege such
as this, the initiative has passed to the besiegers.
Take a particular instance. The whole break-
down of the great German " sortie " against
iVV arsaw is recorded as a series of local successes ;
and in that record the absence, or, rather, the nega-
tion, of general success is forgotten.
Now, this impression, deliberately calculated
and imposed upon the German public in one
form, and upon the neutral and allied publio
m anotlier does not of course deceive its
own authors. The Great General Staff knows its
own losses, it knows the adverse conditions of the
present siege work ; it has reckoned very seriously
the limits of time within which it is working. But
we sho?ild fall into disastrous error if tve imagined
jnthlic opinion in Germany was merely playing a
part. It is honestly convinced; and it does not
recognise that it is acting under orders.
This is, of course, less true of public opinion
in the Dual Monarchy. The Press, the accounts of
travellers, and private letters amply testify to the
big rifts in the corresponding state of mind wliich
it has been the object of Germany to produce in the
mixed populations of her ally. She has failed ; and
v.'hereas Germany proper has suffered no dramatic
blow which could awaken the public conscience to
the truth, Austro-Hungary, in the fall of Przemysl
and in the now certain peril of the Carpathians^ is
not in the same case. Further, Austrian soil is
occupied, and the Austrian losses in prisoners are
hardly less than double those of the Germans. The
Austrians taken prisoner by this time must be well
over 400,000. Przemysl, at the end of the story,
and Lemberg, at the beginning, alone account for
far more than half that number.
Austro-Hungary, then, is already, so far as
its mind upon the war is concerned, entering that
condition which the German mind would only
enter after some considerable local defeat or after
the occupation of some considerable portion of
German soil, or after the surrender of some con-
siderable garrison.
Well, the general lesson to be drawn from the
present attitude of that which is morally the chief
part of our enemy seems to me to be this : We
must regard his present confidence, especially in
its calmness and superficial strength, as at
once a real emotion and a particularly arti-
ficial one. I do not mean that there is not
the chance of change adverse to us and favour-
able to him. But I do mean that the gulf
between the military reality and the public
opinion supporting the German soldiers is a
gulf to-day very m^uch wider than any which has
existed previously in this war. Between the height
of almost insane exaltation of the first days and
the very great achievements of the German army
in those same first days thei'e was no such strain.
To-day there is all the strain that accompanies an
unstable equilibrium, all the top-heaviness that
any State suffers (particularly in time of war)
when those who know are in a • mood utterly
different from those whom they instruct.
We often hear it said that the awakening will
be terrible. It is no more than a private judgment,
but personally I should doubt it. Changes of
opinion — the ridding of public opinion from illu-
sion and the fitting of it to reality — are only ter-
rible when violent. It is even possible, if
things were mishandled, that the enemy might get
his inconclusive peace in time, and that his public
should never learn the present anxiety of its
rulers.
But one thing is certain : if he gets his incon-
clusive peace, then, without doubt it will be but a
truce .so far as this country is concerned. And
whatever a settlement maght do for the satisfac-
tion of the Continent, it would leave the German
Empire at least determined and able to pursue, at
no very distant date, its task of undermining the
supremacy of Great Britain at sea and the whole
international position of these islands.
lO''
April 3, 1915. LAND AND .W.ATER.
INFLUENCE OF AIR FOWER.-IL
SIR JOHN FRENCH'S MESSAGE.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
KOTE.— ThU article has been lubmittcd to tlie Press Bureau, whicU does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no
responsibility lor the correctness of the itatements.
" ... I feel sure that no effort should be spared
to increase their numbers and perfect their equipment and
•flicieucy."
IN these words Sir John French, in his report, dated
Novemljer 20, 1914, concluded a stirring paragraph
dealing with the invaluable services his aircraft had
rendered him in times of great stress. The importance
of that message canot be overestimated. If aircraft
•re to have any considerable influence in shaping the course
of the present war " no efforts should be spared to increase
their numbers and perfect their equipment and efficiency."
And here arise two very serious and pertinent questions : Are
we doing our utmost and are we utilising to the full extent
the resources of the country for aircraft construction ? These
are the questions to be examined now that the influence of
air power has begun to be realised.
And in order that the reader may, when considering these
two questions, be in a position to judge for himself whether
they can be answered in the affirmative or in the negative, it
is necessary for him to know certain things about the pro-
duction of aircraft.
Before entering, however, upon the necessary explana-
tions to enable th.e reader to grasp the present position of
Great Britain's aircraft productivity, the writer wishes to lay
stress upon the fact that, in writing this article, he is solely
actuated by tho consideration and by the hope that it may
prove useful to those responsible for the construction of our
air fleet. He has no intention of criticising a Department
which has ri.sen splendidly to face an unprecedented situation
and to undertake a work at least twenty times as great as
that for which it was organised. It is to the great credit
of our Aeronautical Department that its achievements are
already sufficient to allow us to judge, in actual practice, of
the possible ultimate influence of Air Power.
An aeroplane in flying order consists of several hundred
■mall parts, of metal or of wood, carefully put together.
These parts themselves are simple of construction, and can
be m.ade in any fairly-well equipped workshop. Their manu-
facture does net demand any considerable special knowledge
nor any sjiecial experience. A good mechanic or wood-
woiker can easily produce them under proper supervision.
The assembling of the parts to form complete machines is,
however, a more difficult work and requires adequately trained
men. It will thus be seen that, broadly speaking, aircraft
construction depends upon two factors: (1) the making of
parts; and (2) their erection.
That there is a very great and pressing demand for aero-
plane parts cannot be doubted. These parts are not only
required for the construction of the complete machines, but
are also indispensable for repairs at the front. It is giving
away no secret of the Allies' aeronautical organisation to say
that each macliine that is put into service requires a certain
number of spare parts to make good, with as little delay as
possible, the breakages which are inseparable from the
employment of aircraft over unprepared ground. In fact,
it has been estimated that, in the present stage of develop-
ment of aeronautics, quite a third of the number of aircraft
on active service is, at any one time, in the repair shops. It
is, therefore, a matter of surprise that the full resources of
the country for the manufacture of aircraft are not yet
utilised, especially in view of Sir John French's message
quoted at the commencement of this article.
To supply the need of our army and its gallant Coru-
mander-in-Chief for a numerous and well-equipped air fleet is
manifestly our duty, and no pains should bo spared, and no
pos.sible means neglected in this endeavour. Our Aeronautical
Department has done magnificent work, and for its achieve-
ments the country owes it a debt of gratitude. But the fact
must be faced that this department is now taxed to its utmost,
and is not organised on a scale sufficient to meet the un-
expected situation arising out of the v/ar.
To the excessive demands made upon our Aeronautical
Department must be ascribed the three following causes of
delay which binder it from teking full advantage of tho
industrial resources of the country.
These causes are :
1. Considerable delay in having the necessary material
passed by the Government inspectors.
2. Too much time is allowed to elapse between tha
giving of consecutive orders. This is especially
the case when orders are given to the smaller
firms.
3. Most serious. The manufacturers experience a
great delay, in some cases extending over several
months, before they are paid for the work done
and the goods supplied.
The elimination of these three unfortunate causes of
delay brought about by the high pressure at v.liich our
Aeronautical Department is now working, would, without any
doubt, greatly accelerate our rate of aircraft production.
And as well as the necessary removal of this check to
the manufacture of aircraft due to the causes aribing from
an overtaxed organisation, there are also numerous sources
of supply which would, if utilised, still further assist to in-
crease our possible rate of aircraft production. As evidence
that these sources of supply are as yet untapped, and are
only waiting to be drafted into channels of usefulness, tha
writer will quote from a few of a great number of communi-
cations which he has lately received from industrial firms all
over the country.
In a letter dated February 17, 1915, a firm having
already experience in the manufacture of aeroplane parts,
says: " We could easily m.ake three times the quantily if we
had the orders; the main difficulty is to get the material
passed by the War Office inspectors. For instance, we have
had one order on hand since December last and finished tho
tools early in the year, but we are still without the material,
cur customers informing us that they cannot send the steel
as it has not yet been approved. As it seems to be only
mild steel strip for the wire strainers there ought not to be
this delay. Provided this obstacle could be removed, we could
give immediate delivery, as we have the tools made."
The manager of another engineering firm writes:
" . . . . Several of our mechanics are at the front. . . . but
we are decidedly short of work for those remaining, mo.^tly
over at^e, or could not pass the doctor. . . . The making of
aeroplane parts would suit us very well, since we arc well cut
out for the work. . . . Should you be able to put some work
in our way, we would all do our best to give satisfaction."
On March 3 another firm, evidently not working to its
full capacity, writes: "... We have excellent facilities
for turning out in quantities small fittings, both in wood and
metal."
One of the largest contracting firms in this country
writes: " We are of opinion that a considerable amount of
our present machinery could be utili-sed . . . but, in all
probability a certain amount of special machinery v.-ould be
necessary. We feel convinced that should our plant be
capable of doing the work without any large expenditure of
money for special machinery, our directors v.'ould be only too
pleased to be of any use to the Government in this way. . . ."
From another letter: " I have a large factory equijiped
with up-to-date machinery, and, owing to the present slack-
ness of trade, same is not being fully used, and I think I could
undertake to manufacture any small parts in metal."
" We have a large pattern-shop, foundry, forging, turning,
and fitting shop," writes another manager. "We are at
the present moment rather slack, and could give prompt and
immediate attention to any work which you night be able
to place our way. We enclose you a photograph showing the
interior of our erectiug-shop, which will give you son.e idea
of the capacity of our works."
The writer could give many similar extracts from t!;e
numerous letters he is receiving daily from industrial firms.
He thinks, however, that the excerpts he has given are suffi-
cient to show that there are yet a great number of engineering
firms not working at their full capacity, and that these firms
are willing, and are probably sufficiently well-equipped, to
carry out the construction of aeroplane parts.
11*
LAND AND W.ATETl.
April Z, 1915.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE. — Tills Article lias been submitied to the Press Bureau, nhicli does not object to the publication as censored, and takes a»
respoasibilit>' for the correctness ol the statements.
THE MEDITERRANEAN AND DARDANELLES
UP to tbe moment of writing (Monday evening)
there is a species of lull in the Dardanelles opera-
tions and a tendency to believe that the set-back
received by the French Fleet was more serious
than at first imagined. The paucity of news
concerning the French is doubtless mainly responsible for
this, also the information that naval reinforcements are being
despatched. This, of course, would, on the face of it, seem
to suggest that the Allied Fleet lui.s either been found insufli-
cient lor the task in hand or else that it has been damaged
more badly than we have been led to believe.
Actually, there appears no reason for despondency of
any kind. No one at all conversant with the various factors
involved ever expected that there would be any sort or kind
of walkover. The forts have possibly proved more formidable
than was first anticipated, but perhaps tlie chief of the " more
formidable than expected " factors is the mobile artillery
attack on the mine-sweepers.
Even here, however, it is well not to draw too serious
conclusions about the ojficialh/ unexpected having happened.
Taking all the information available it would appear
that the first big attack which led to the destruction of the
four forts at the entrance was somewhat of the nature of a
reconnaissance in force. It would look as though the in-
tegral idea was to test the defences and weaken them so far
as might be preparatory to the landing of a strong military
force on the Gallipoli Peninsula, such as is now taking place,
and that there was no deliberate intention of attempting to
force the Narrows. To which may be added (as surmised
last week) the creation of a diversion to allow time for a Rus-
sian land attack from the Bosphorus direction to develop.
There was, perhaps, the further consideration that with
large naval activities taking jjlace so near home Turkish
military operations against Egypt would bo heavily handi-
capped. It is, indeed, quite within the zone of possibilities
that owing to the, perhaps unexpected, rapidity of the recent
Turkish m.ovemcnt against Egypt, the Allied Fleet com-
menced operations at an earlier date than had been originally
intended. This at any rate would be a quite logical use of a
Fleet in co-operation with military operations, and a clear
use of the potentialities of Sea Power. History teems with
instances of warships being em])loyed to exert pressure at one
point in order to affect the issue at some other and far
distant spot.
Any of the above are far more reasonable suppositions
than tlie hasty asBumption of " someone has blundered,"' or
that the task has been urderestimated by those responsibla
for ita inception. There is every expectation of eventual
victory, but roseate anticipations of its early accomplishment
are best left alone. Far m.ore probably there will be slow and
arduous progress, culminating in a sudden and perhaps un-
expected collapse of the defence.
From now onward we may expect the attack to assume
three distinct phases :
(1) Purely naval operations.
(2) Purely military operations on shore.
(3) Concerted joint operations, resulting from the inde-
pendent actions of the first two.
This last, if the teaching of history goes for anything,
will be the critical stage of affairs. In the past combined
naval and military operations have always had an clement of
chance about them; and been brilliantly successful or dismal
failures, according to how far or howlittle the naval and
military commanders have understood each others' limita-
tions, and possibilities.
AUSTRIAN SUBMARINES.
A statement has been circulated to the effect that Au,stria
Is building twenty large submarines with a view to a " sub-
marine blockade " of the Mediterranean. That she is build-
ing them is probable enough; but the rest of the story is
rather absurd. Not only is Austria faced with the problem
of finding trained crews, but she is also confronted with the
problem of how to got through the French blockade in the
Adriatic, to say nothing of bases and the return home again.
Probably the real idea is some kind of counter-attack on
the Allie3 in the Dardanelles, or on trade therethrough later .
on, when Constantinople has fallen. The threat can safely
be heavily discounted, whatever form it may ultimately take.
SUBMARINE AND TORPEDO OPERATIONS.
This being the first war in which submarines have taken
a real part they were bound to bo a factor of varying import-
ance with a hypothetical value rising and falling until the
submarine had adjusted itself into the general scheme of
things. The past saw a precisely similar process in connec-
tion with torpedo craft. In the early days of these nearly
every admiral held views totally different from those of every
ot'ier admiral — thcso views running the whole gamut from
omnipotence to impotence.
This variation of opinion was little if at all due to pre-
dilection, progressivlsm, or conservatism; but almost entirely
caused by personal experiences, which in the early da/9
varied very considerably. A brief study of the evolution of
torpedo craft will thereioro go far to elucidate the position
of subm-arines in the present war; all the mora so. perhaps,
becrar?e Admiral Fisher has been so closely identified v/ith
the progress of both arms, and his work in both cases has
followed the same general idea.
Like the submarine, the torpedo-boat first appeared a.i
a very trivial craft armed with a very inefficient v/eapon. In
the American Civil War of some fifty years ago it was a
hybrid sort of vessel — half submarine, half torpedo-boat,
seemingly just as likely to develop in one direction as in tha
other. In the years that followed it developed as an above-
water craft, iu part owing to the difficulties which then
existed in connection with suitable submarine motive power,
in part owing to the fact that in the war of 1877 the Russians
extemporised launches as spar torpedo boats, and made a war
factor of them, in part because of the advent of the White-
head torpedo, which rendered the boat's actual contact witk
the enemy no longer necessary. There was no adapting thtt
Whitehead to the elementary idea of a submarine.
Some two or three years later, the old Irfexihlf (the
Drcadnour/ht of her day) was equipped with a couple of small
torpedo-boats, which she carried as an integral portion of her
armament, and it was Lord Fisher (then captain of the In-
fe.nhlf) who, asked what he would do if he met a warship
equal to his own, replied that he would probably not engage
her and risk receiving as much damage as he could inflict;,
but wait till night and then send his torpedo-boats to attack
the enemy.
Thereafter Lord Fisher was closely associated with the
development of the torpedo-boat as a self-contained sea-going
offensive arm. Since he was the creator of the I'ernon tor-
pedo school he may be regarded as the father of our torpedo-
service in verj' early days.
This development was later on attended with varying
fortunes. For example, in the 1890 naval m.anauvres, tha
entire fleet of one side was torpedoed almost immediately
after " War was declared."" The circumstance was more or
less hushed up at the time so far as the general public was
concerned — and the event " was considered not to have taken
place " on the grounds of some technical point in the reading
of the rules.
Still, here was the torpedo-boat in a state of omnipo-
tence. In the foUov/ing year, however, certain special torpedo
manoeuvres wore carried out with entirely different results,
the torpedo-boats being hunted down and rendered impoleufc
to an extraordinary degree. In the next year again somewhat
similar results occurred. I am writing as an eyewitness of
these various operations and of many things which happened,
but, very properly, did not find their way into print at tha
time. The swing of the pendulum of opinion was extra-
ordinary.
These various operations xiltimately led to the evolution
of " destroyers," on the homeopatliic principle that " the
torpedo-boat is the correct reply to the torpedo-boat."
Generally speaking, there followed a very general conviction
that the torpedo menace was an empty phase ; a state of
opinion which endured till Lord Fisher (then Commander-iu-
C'hief iu the Mediterranean) startled the v/orld by giviug up
the time-honoured " steam tactics " and substituting there-
for the evasion of torpedo craft.
It is indicative of " opinion " at that time that for this
12»
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
ke wa3 most fiercely assailed and criticised, despite the fact
that once at least in test operations liis entire fleet was
torpedoed. However, the net result was the rehabilitation
cf torpedo craft and very large destroyer programmes. In this
stage the torpedo-boat itself practically disappeared, its place
being taken by the destroyer, which was favUe princrps till
the Kusso-Japanese War, wherein it accomplished less than
the enthusiasts had expected, mainly because war ezperience
taught means of evading the worst dangers.
This particular war also taught the future possibilities of
submarines, despite the fact that the elementary boats there
engaged proved absolutely non-effective. The net result of
the war was that the destroyer assumed its proper place in the
scheme of things — roughly Eoraething midway between the
two extreme points of view which were held in the past. The
mobt generally accepted modern view is that if destroyers find
battleships at night they will successfully torpedo them^their
handicap is the finding.
Now, if we come to consider the evolution of the sub-
marine, we find a not very dissimilar series of vicissitudes.
From being the idle dream of inventors, the submarine
suddenly came to be regarded as an invincible arm, destined
to sweep the seas of all above-water craft. That was before
our Navy had any submarines, or in the early days of the
elementary Hollands, which have long since been scrapped.
Later came a period when it became known that only one
of our Holland submarines had ever torpedoed a warship
under battle conditions. This was subsequently followed by
a series of disasters of which the net result was a decided
tendency unduly to depreciate the value of the submarine.
From here onwards it is, for obvious reasons, inadvisable
to deal too fully with the course of events. It suffices to say
that some little while before the war the submarine had easily
reverted to a position of very high importance; wliile we had
the official statement that it was probably destined eventually
to replace the destroyer altogether.
Since the \var vicissitudes have continued. It is clear
that the Germans placed unlimited faith in their submarines
—a faith which, at any rate till quite recently, oppearal to
be abundantly justified. I say "appeared" because while
their successes can be counted, the record of their failures is
ueccssarily vague. Some record of torpedoes which failed to
hit officially exists uo doubt, but a record of liow many
CJerroan submp.rines failed to gain suitable positions for attack
must recessarily bo unknown. Vv'hat we do know, however,
is that means for combating the "new danger" aro being
eteadilv- perfected — three German submarines having been
officially stated as sunk by the Navy since the blockade began,
plus other losses cf which no full details are available. The
net reiult of (his is perhaps an undue depreciation of the sub-
marine qua submarine.
Very e.irly in the war I ventured to prophesy in these
Notes that for reasons having to do with, the pfrsonnd, Gor-
man submarines would eventually prove fsr less efficient than
eur own, and that we should find the bulk of the work co.io
by a few only of their boats. This last has certainly hap-
pened. U 2-^, sunk last week, was commanded by the s,u:ie
officer who distinguished himself against our Crefsifs in I 9,
end who, in his new command, did most of such work as was
dene by the " blockaders. " In submarines the mr.-J is cer-
tainly more than the machine; and German naval officers as a
clais lack that ability to adapt themselves to the peculiar
conditions, as betvrecn officers and men, which are essential
to the successful and effective use of submarines, .md which
obtain in our service.
Here a word or two may be said about the curious theory
held by a som.ewhat considerable section of the British public
that the German submarine service is superior to our own.
It is well to correct this idea. It is obvious that so far as
viatcrid is concerned, as a general rule, the bigger the boat
the more potentially effective she must be.
Now, any British boat is larger than any German boat cf
equal date — we have always led in dimensions. Increased
dimensions necessarily mean increased speed, or increased
radius, or increased habitability (a very iinportant point), or
very possibly all three in varying degree. Our boats are,
therefore, as machines, capable of accomplishing all that the
German boats have done, and more. This is obvious.
As regards personnel I have already explained where
our advaut°age lies. Yet there is the unfortunate public im-
pression which justifies tho sarcastic naval jest: " To the
public every German submarine is a pirate, every British
Bubmarino inefficient! "
In vain did the Israelites of old explain the impossibility
of making bricks without straw. Egyptian ideas on the
possible and impossiblo still prevail. Metaphorically speak-
ing our submarine service is "without straw" in just the
same way as is our battle fleet. And so we hear little or no-
thing of the weary routine of work of our boats, and as a nation
fail to realise that they aro " containing " the enemy, despite
the fact that a fast squadron has slipped out now and again
without loss from our submarines.
To turn to more general matters, it seems clear from
recent events that the submarine is essentially the weapon
of the stronger power, and likely to grow less and less impor-
tant as the weapon of the weaker. The whole or most of the
destruction which our Navy has inflicted on German sub-
marines has been mainly due to the fact that v.-e are the
stronger power. Had the Germans been able to support their
submarine " blockaders " with cruisers, they would have had
none of the hazard of secret bases, and their liability to be
rammed would have been reduced to a minimum.
If, and when, the German big ships offer opportunity to
our submarines, these two inconveniences will be absent on
our side, and we may confidently lock forward to the sub-
marine coming definitely into its own as the weapon of the
stronger naval power. As the weapon of the weaker we may
(as measures to neutralise its menace are developed) look to
see it fade in importance. This, of course, is exactly what
eventually happened with torpedo craft.
For the rest, the Admiralty figures of the net result of
the submarine blockade during one month are nineteen
British merchant ships sunk, out of 5,970 which reached or
left home ports during the same period. The chances of loss
were, therefore, just about 1 in 314; and something like half
ft dozen " pirates " may have been accounted for — lost in the
process. This works out at an average of six ships per pirate.
The cost of German submarines {pace a recent omission
of a cipher in an answer to a correspondent) works out at
from £60,000 to £100,000 for the little boats, and about
£170,000 for the larger. As the blockaders are mainly largo
submarines we may pool the average cost per boat at,
roughlv, £150,000. Allowing for torpedoes expended, up-
keep of tenders, and what not, the blockade must have cost
Germany at least one and a half million pounds in dead loss
- quite probably it has cost her two millions, and this irre-
spective of loss of war services of her submarines, and effective
crews now drowned or captured, who can hardly be replaced
within the time-limits of modern war.
AERI.\L OPERATIONS.
German aircraft have also co-operated in the submarine
" blockade," but so far without any result whatever. A story
has been published of one British merchant ship which fired
rockets at an attacking aeroplane and frightened it off accord-
ingly. The story may be accepted— with some limitations;
the chances of hitting being to all intents and purposes non-
existent. The aeroplane is reported to have sought higher
altitudes in consequence of being fired at; possibly the pilot
suspected some new kind of war rocket witli wire entangle-
ments attached.
While the German aircraft have been mostly engaged in
more or less fatuous operations, the British aeroplanes have
been conducting operations of a direct military significance.
Bombs have been dropped on a German submarine yard re-
cently established at Hobokeu.
The exact amount of damage done is necessarily conjec-
tural; but, according (o Dutch reports, one submarine was
destroyed, and others damaged, considerable havoc b-eing also
wrought on the workshops.
MR. HILA.1RE BELLOC S WAR LECTURR5.
London Queen's Ha!! Wednesday.... 7 April, 8.30 p.m.
A series of lectures on tl'.e I'rogrcsi of the War from month to month
Killbe give:i at Queen's Hall on the first Wednesday in April, May.
and June. Scats arc now being allotted.
A lecture v.i!l also be given at the Opera House, Tunbridgo Wells,
on Friday, April 9, at 3.50, on - The Strategy of the War."
MR. FRED T. JANES LECTURES ON THE NAVAL WAR.
Toifiuav Pavilion Patmday 3 April, 3 p.m.
riyinou'th Guildhall Wednesday 7 .\pril, 8 p.m.
MR CRAWFURD PRICE (Eye-witness in the East) LECTURES
ON SERBIA— The Ta'e o! a Gallant Naiion.
BUvckpool Winter Garden... Tue.-day 13 April.
Yoib Opera House Wednesday 14 -^pril,3p.m.
Manchester Free Trade Hall. Thursday 15Apiil,8 p.m.
Souliiport Cambridge Hall.. Fiiday 16 April, 8 p.m.
lUg,
We liave received a copy of " Warren's Map Guide " to the motor,
motorcvtle, and cycle trades in London. It forms a useful and valuable
<!ire<?tori-, as it contains every one connected with these trades in
alphabetical order, a;id also geographically arranged over seventy map5,
£0 a-s to show the exact position of each firm. It is a street guide to
over 8.000 streets, and addrc'^scs can bo turned up cither from the
ilrects or from tho aliduibtliciJ liAt. It i< a valuable book for motorist*
iuU motor cyclists.
13*
LAND AND .WATER.
April 3, 1915.
THE PASSAGE OF THE RHINE.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.
DURING the Inst few weeks tlie Allies, eacli in tlieir
separate spheres of action, have completely demon-
s-trated their power to hold their ground anywhere
and everywhere that it may please the enemy to
assail tliem. On the French frontier we have indeed gone
farther, and have given convincing proof that we can make
the Germans dance to our piping — in other words, they must
attack us v/here and when we dictate, and not where they
might themselves choose to strike.
Tills ought to satisfy the most greedy for the moment.
But no sooner is one bogey laid than another springs up.
Judging from my correspondence and the daily papers, cur
people now appear to be obsessed by the fear that we shall
cever be able to force the passage of the Ehine.
I cannot share this fear, or doubt, for after studying
that river from this point of view for very many years, and
setting aside for a time the question of improvements in arma-
ment, I know very well that the passage of the Rhine ha.s
been forced again and again, and " What man has done, man
can do," is a good working m.otto.
Now th.ere is a curious paradox about the passage of
waterways whicli has never received the attention it deserves;
it is one that military history shows as holding true within
limits quite wide enough for the present purpose, and thib
is, that once a stream becomes too deep to wade and too
wide to jump, the wider it grows, still remaining navigable,
and the longer it becomes, the easier it is to surprise or force
its passage. -
This is only another way of expressing the axiom that tiie
Power which controls the sea can disembark its troops, within
certain limits, wherever it pleases. But though sea power
depends on fleets, it is the fire power carried by the ships,
Qot the ships themselves, that confers the ultimate power.
In all fighting, since firearms definitely established them-
selves ao the principal weapons on the battlefield, no position
has ever been carried, except by surprise, until or unless the
assailant has first established a local superiority of fire power ;
and as far as the defenders are concerned it has been quite
Immaterial to them, once the superiority has been acknow-
ledged, whether the weapons whicli delivered the bullets were
fired from a floating or a land platform.
The case of the Yser Canal and Dixmude is not to the
point here, because it was not only too sh.ort for the numbers
engaged to admit of a genuine surprise, but also because the
Germiins never really succeeded iu obtaining a sufficient fire
superiority, except quite locally, and for an insufiicient time.
The Rhine, however, is some 400 miles in length from
Basle to the Dutch frontier, and is navigable throughout tlie
whole of this course.
It is also everywhere so wide that unless it is illuminated
From end to end by flares, star-shells, or searchlights — a some-
what large order — ordinary darkness is quite enough to hide
the movements of men on the one bank from sight on the
other side of the river, except where it runs between rocks,
i.e., from Bingen to Coblentz. From below Goar to Bonn
the clay banks, some 15 feet sheer, are covered with reeds
and scrub, giving concealment from anything except aero-
planes.
Behind this screen the concentration of men and gear
necessary for ihe construction of rafts or bridges has always
been made.
Below Cologne — indeed, in several other places — v.-here
the river widens out, the breadth is too great for the fire of
the old-fashioned muskets to reach across it; even the field
artillery of Napoleon's time did not effect much damage
Bgainst such targets as the enemy allowed them to see.
The boats attempting the crossing therefore had to face
the unsliaken — i.e., aimed fire of the defenders, which up to
200 yards was about as accurate as that of modern rifles at
800, and there was then no shrapnel shell to compel the
attackers to keep their heads under cover.
Of course the assailant always tried to surprise an
unguarded passage; very generally ho succeeded in so doing.
But he could never be sure that his surprise would in fact
materialise; consequently he had to set his teeth and be pre-
pared for the worst before making the attempt.
At the present time, tliaiiks to the increased range of all
arms and to tho immensely augmented power of our shells.
the conditions have altered enormously in our favour. I usa
the word " enormously " with deliberation, and not loosely,
because it is impossible to give an exact numerical ratio to
define it.
But let anyone who wishes to arrive at a real approxima-
tion of the advantages wo now possess, take a scale map of any
big river running through plains or lightly rolling country,
and having selected any point for crossing, strike two arcs
from it— one of 3,C00 yards, the other of, say, 12,000 — and
then calculate the area enclosed between them which would
be available for placing his covering batteries.
Then remember that the advantage accruing is not only
due to the greater opportunities for concealing his guns
afforded by the outer area, but also to the ampler space
secured for the placing of still more batteries— which do not
need to be in one line nowadays, but can be arranged behind
and iu front of one another to fire over each other's heads.
You can have either perfect concealment and fewer guns
or less concealment and more guns, but the advantage is
always partial concealment and in proportion a greater
number of guns.
On such an area you could in fact place all tho heavy
batteries of the French and British Armies without serious
inconvenience to one another, and thanks to our aeroplane
ascendancy, you could converge all their fire on a single point
of your own choice.
The passage of a river is iu fact only the same problem
of the assault on Neuve Chapelle, for example, with the
advantage thrown iu that a close fire defence of the last
100 yards or so is quite impossible owing to the sheer fall of
the banks into tlie river.
Trenches could not exist on this slope in view of the
enemy, and the firing line must of necessity be drawn well
back from it, while we, on our side, can scarp dov^^n the edge
of the bank, and convert it into a firing position for our
subsequent advance.
Moreover, by the time we reach the Rhine — and that may
not be long ahead as things are going now — the quality of
the troops opposed to us will be very much lower than those
we have already faced, and, after, all, whatever may be the
nature of an obstacle, it is not the natural impediment to
physical progress that signifies, but the courage of the men
who stand behind it.
This subject is of such great practical interest at the
moment to those of our men who will have to undertake the
exploit of carrying the Rhine, that I would suggest to ray
readers to secure, if possible, some military histories of classic
passages of rivers, with map.'!, and send them out to their
friends in the trenches, so that the men may be familiarised
by lectures, given in billets, with the real nature of the task
before them.
Jourdan's passage of the Rhine at Neuwied in 1794;
Napoleon's passage of tlie Danube at the Isle of Lobau, in
1809; the Russian passage of the same river below Silistria
in 1877; are instances which occur to me.
No very precise detail is needed; the essential point can
easily be brought out — viz., the increased area between the
two arcs referred to above for the placing of the guns. This
can be convincingly shown with a blackboard and chalk;
failing that, the diagram could be drawn with a stick on the
ground.
The essence of the tiling is that wliat our ancestors did
that we can also do, more especially since we now possess an
overwhelming advantage on our side.
That much of the correspondence that has been addressed
both to the Editor and mj'self on military matters has been
unanswered must not be regarded in any way as an act of
discourtesy, but has been due to the ill-health of the writer,
who hopes to deal with them at an early date.
A Wellington and Waterloo loan collection of pictures, trophies,
&c., in this centenarj' year of tho grpat battle, is conUmplated in aid of
Queen Ale.xandra'a Field Force Fund ; and the Hon. Charlotte KnoUys,
at Marlborough House, lias addressed a letter conceriuaig it to Mr. J.
Laiidfear Lucas, of the Hurlingham Club and the Spectacle Maker*'
Company.
At the Annual Oeneral Jfcetine of the Hunters' ImprovemPTit
Society it wa.s unanimou.sly resolved that the sum of £25 should bs
aIlofate<l for the relief of side and wounded liorses in the War. After
considering the claims of tho Blue Cross Society and of the B.S.P.C.A.
Fund for sick and wounded horses, the meeting decided that the sum
voted should be equally divided between the two above-named Societies
14*
April 3, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
CORRFiSPONDENGE.
AN APPEAL.
To Ibe Editor of Land .\i;d V\'.^.ter.
Dear Sih, — After the outbreak of the war my husband
and I, wishing to do " our little bit," subscribed over £100
towards the war relief funds and gave hospitality to several
Belgian refugees.
But when Lord Kiti.liener's appeals kept coming for
more men and still more n.en, my husband decided that he
ought to offer himself, so he threw up his busine.-s and also
resigned a working directorship bringing him in £300 a year
and joined as a private in the O.T.C.
He has just now got his conrmission and finds himself
Etraitened in means for the purchase of needed extras.
So I write to ask j'ou if you would be so good as to
insert tliis letter in your paper in case any of your readers
feel disposed to lend to my husband for the period of the war
any of the following :
A pair of binoculars.
A revolver.
A sword.
A prismatic compass.
Credentials would be sent to any persons good enough to
•ffer such welcome help. — Believe me, yours faithfully.
Officer's Wife, K.A.
N.B. — Replies to this letter should be addressed to the
Editor, Land and V/atkr.
AMBULANCE.
To the Editor of Laxd and Watkr.
Dear Sir, — Since the middle of December I have been
in France and Belgium attached to an Ambulance Corps,
but owing to various reasons^ we have never been able to do
the work we expected to. I and two others have now left
the Corps and are very anxious to get to work. I should be
glad if you could kindly put us in touch with any bcdy which
would be glad of our sei-\-ices. I have a beautiful ambulance
to accommodate four stretchers or ten sitting-up cases, and
drive and care for the car rnyself, a.nd hold First Aid certi-
ficates. Mrs. Campbell cooks, drives, nurses, and does First
Aid. Mrs. Ore-Paterson is a trained nurse. Our services
are given voluntarily. V\'e are willing to go to France,
Belgium, Serbia, the Dardanelles, anywhere at all where
there is plenty of hard work. Our reason for leaving the
Corps was that we realised the impossibility of a private unit
ever Ijeing allowed to work.
If you could give me the names of any units needing help
to whom we could apply, I should be most grateful. — Yours
truly,
(Miss) O. Kei.so King.
Swcethaws Grange, Crowborough, Sussex.
KHAKL
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — It may interest your correspondent B. W. Stainton
and others of your readers to know that khaki was used for
military uniforms in India in 1857. Dunlop's Khaki Eisala,
of which my father was a member, was a Volunteer Force
of cavalry raised at Meerut during the Mutiny, and did very
good work in that district. I believe their uniforms were
dyed with a reddish-brown earth called " Multani Mutti."
The only really fast khaki dye I know which will stand re-
peated washing without losing its colour, and I have tried
uiauy, is that invented by the firm of Lehmann and Gatty.
Khaki, of course, is the Hindustani for dust. — Yours
faithfully,
Indiccs.
Pokesdown.
Tliere is an enormous amount of cars bo owned in the
country which would at once be at the disposal of the Red
Cross or any other hospitals if the owners were guaranteed
that their cars would be replaced at the end of the war or if
a fair sum would be given for tliem at the start; and, more
than this, the owners would in many cases be willing to give
their services free if it were demanded for the conveyance of
the wounded from field to hospital. If it was clearly under-
stood that no car would be accepted unless it were strong
and serviceable as to chassis, sound in every way as to engine,
and drivers must be thoroughly competent for the work, and
the ov.ners would be at no loss, there would be an ample
supply of cars and drivers for all requirements, and the
pitiful tale of the wounded left for hours and days untended
would c«ase. Many cars would be useful as they are. In the
case of ambulance bodies bsing required, these ought to be
supplied, and not left to the owner to rig up a body which
" ought to do."
For this purpose cars should be really good, well Ining,
and well sprung ; thereby much suffering will be saved to
the wounded, for whom they are intended. Now that the
large stock of second-hand or, to speak more truly, tenth-
hand cars has been exhausted and left in the Belgian or
French ditch, the gcod and sound car will come into use.
I know, because I have seen that the depots for these have
been practically cleared out; and at one of the largest in
the country I was told by the manager that the ambulance
jiad been a god-end to them, as it took all the old chassis
which they had had in stock for years, and had given up all
hope of selling. This is not the kind of ambulance to offer
to a wounded man, nor can it be sound business to use a
worn-out article which must be left by the roadside in a
few days.
This is a War Office job and should be taken in hand
at once. — Yours faithfully,
Herbert Okeden.
MOTOR AMBULANCES NEEDED.
To the Editor of L.vnd and Water.
Dear Sir,— This will be " world without end " so long
as it is left to private owners of cars to give them free, gratis,
and for nothing. Our soldiers are wounded in the service
of their country, and for this service funds are provided by
their country. Why should it stop short there and say :
" Now we have done with you, find some good samaritan to
come and help you and set you on his own beast " ? Surely
it is up to that same country to supply the beast. If it will
do this there will be an ample supply of Samaritans.
Because people have been able to buy a car — often at
considerable sacrifice— why are they to be expected to give
it up any more than those who have horses, and vans, and
lorries, for notliing ?
THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of Land and W.ater.
Sir, — In a recent issue " One of the Principals of a
Small Firm " laments that orders for war material all go to
tl'.e big manufacturers.
Your correspondent is evidently not a manufacturer of
textiles, or he might have a different tale to tell.
The experience of those in the textile trades is that as
often as not manufacturers, bcth large and sm.all, are passed
by altogether, and the contracts are given to middlen.en, who
may know nothing whatever about tlie goods they handle.
Over ?nd over again has it hap]jened in Lancashire and York-
shire that a manufacturer sends in his tender, and after some
weeks' waiting receives the official intimation that his offer is
declined, and then a few days later sells the identical goods
to a middleman (the successful tenderer) at a higher price
than he quoted direct.
The soldiers' clothes and equipment bear, accordingly,
two profits, though there is evidently no valid reason why
they should bear more than one. As to how this comes about,
there may be various opinions. Among disinterested
observers there can be but one opinion as to whether the
public good is served thereby.
Yours faithfully,
" One of the Principal.s of a Lakce Firm."
■50, Piccadilly, Manchester.
CANADIAN RED CROSS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — May we ask, as a great favour, that the
accompanying notice be inserted in Land and Water :
The Information Department of the Canadian Red Cross
Society, 14, Cockspur Street, gratefully acknowledges the
many generous offers which have been made to it on behalf of
the sick and wounded of the Canadian contingents.
Offers of private hospitality, of drives for convalescents, of
sini'ing in the hospitals have all been noted, and will be made
use of as occasion arises.
For the present the number of voluntary visitors to the
hospitals in London is sufficient.
Thanking you for your kind con.sideration, sincerely
yours,
(Lady) Julia Dru-mmond.
Canadian Red Cross Society, Cockspur Street, S.W.,
15*
LAND AND W. A T E R.
April 3, 1915.
LETTER CASES.
To t'ae Editor of Land and Water.
DsAH Sir, — Findiug that tliera is a great demand for
small waterproof pocket letter-cases for tlie soldiers, I aai
employing some women out of work to make them.
They measure 6i by 4| inches, are light iu weight, and
pontaiu writing materials.
I can supply them at 9d. each, which covers co?t of
material and making and leaves a surplus over to hand to the
Red Cross and St. John Ambulance Societies.
The cases were greatly appreciated during the South
African war, and I have sent many to the front now.
I shall be very glad to receive orders. — Yours truly,
C. Minnie Gseen.
The Moorings, St. Albans.
SIGNALLING IN THE FIELD,
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sis, — ilorso and semaphore, with flag, or disc, or hand,
have each marked disadvantages. Morse is slow to send — ■
semaphore requires quite six feet of cover behind the sender.
I suggest the following method of rendering semaphore less
con.spicuous :
Substitute for the lowest radii a wave of the flag from B
to F and back and from F to B and back — e.g., A becomes a
wave of tlie flag from B to F and back, G a v/ave of the flag
from F to B and back, I a sign — left hand as at present at C
right, a wave of the hand from B to F and back, N crossing
waves from B and F. The time lost to semaphore A, G, H,
I, K, L, M, N, Z, X, V, wave, and S is at the most one letter
for letter. Time still gained over Morse all other letters except
T and E (perhaps I). In the suggested code A = about—-,
G = about . less one — , H = about .... leas one .,
I '^ . . plus one ., K = — . — less one — , and so on.
A man sitting down could use this code with his hands or
with discs and be screened by a fair-sized bush. In this
country a gorse bush would cover a man sending by hand,
sitting down. Would it cover him standing up or kneeling ?
The answer is, very rarely. — Yours truly,
" Flagwao."-
Bath Club, Dover Street.
SUBMARINE CHASERS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — I read with great interest the proposals put for-
ward by your corre?ipondent "J. R." in your issue of
March 20. As I am of the opinion that it is quite practicable
to evolve a satisfactory "submarine chaser" on much mora
modest and economical lines than those suggested by " J. R.,"
it is possible that you may consider the following as being of
sufficient interest for publication.
As a beginning I may say that I agree with your corre-
spondent's general conclusions as to speed, armament, kc,
except that I consider that a speed margin of 10 to 12 knots
quite sufficient for the purpose.
My objection to the vessel proposed by " J. R." is that
it would be unnecessarily expensive and that it would re-
quire too large a crew to operate. Incidentally I may point
out that your correspondent's proposal is similar in almost
every respect to the "30 knot" destroyers turned out in
the later 'nineties, which were 210 feet long, 350 tons dis-
placement, 6,000 I.H.P., and 8 feet draught. This type,
however, carried the comparatively powerful armament of
one 12pr. Q.F., five 6pr. Q.F., and two torpedo tubes, and
consequently if brought up to date would be better vessels
than that proposed by "J. R."
Now as to an alternative. There are in the French Navy
three or four score " Toriiilleurs de Defence Mobile," Nos.
295-369, built 1903-1909, and having the following char-
acteristics: Length 122 feet, displacement 97 tons, 2,000
I.H.P., and 26 knots speed. These handy little craft are
armed with two small Q.F. guns and three torpedo tubes.
What we want is something a little lighter and faster; a com-
promise between the French boats and the Turhinia would
about " fill the bill."
The Turliinia, mentioned by your correspondent, was
100 feet long, 44 tons displacement, 2,300 I.H.r., and 34i
knots speed.
The approximate particulars of the type I suggest would
be as follows: Length, 105 feet; beam, 12 feet 6 inches;
drauglit of hull, 4 feet; extreme, 5 feet; displacement, 75
tons; I. H. P., 1,600; speed, at least 28 knots. The speed esti-
m.ite is modeL-t, as it is based on an Admiralty co-efficient of
200, whereas the corresponding figure in tlie case of the Tur-
linia w.a3 over 220. The machinery would be either turbine
or internal combustion engines of the same type as inst.alled
in submarines. Possibly the latter would be preferable as
being already a standard pattern and capable of quick and
easy manufacture.
The armament would consist of a 12pr. Q.F. forward and
a 3pr. Q.F. aft, on an anti-aircraft mounting. I have noi
been able to investigate the weights of such a vessel in detail,
but it might also be possible to mount a torpedo tube.
A vessel such as I have proposed would not cost mora
than one-third of the cost of the type proposed by "J. R.,"
and could be manned by a crew proportionately small. There
are many small yards in which vessels of this kind could be
built without disturbing the supply of tlie present needs of
the Government, and they could be largely manned from the
ranks of the Motor Boat Reserve. — Yours sincerely,
J. D. C.
Glasgow,
OUR MOTOR AMBULANCE
APPEAL.
AN EXCELLENT START.
By ATHERTON FLEMING.
■T is my very pleasant duty this week to announce that aS
the time of going to press we are in receipt of a large
number of subscriptions for the benefit of this fund,
the amounts varying from one sliilling to thirty
pounds. The first appeal to our readers has produced
nearly one-quarter of the amount asked for. This is exceed-
ingly satisfactory, and no more than I expected from the
readers of Land and Water. Nevertheless, more money is
wanted, and, for the benefit of those who have not as yefc
read the appeal which appeared iu our last issue, I reproduce
hereunder this rough outline of the scheme :
1. That a subscription list be opened with this issue
of Land and Water for the purpose of raising the sum
of £500.
2. That this sum be devoted to the purchase and
equipment of a suitable motor ambulance, containing
accommodation for four stretcher cases and alternative
accommodation for " sitting-up " cases and orderly.
3. That the chassis be of a well-known and reputable
make — to be decided later— and the construction of the
body be handed over to an expert ambulanc6-bodj[
builder.
4. That details of equipments, such as lighting, ic,
be left to the discretion of Dr. Munro, owing to his better
knowledge of the conditions under which he has to work.
5. That the motor ambulance — which will bear an
inscription: "Presented by the readers of Land and
Water to the Munro Field Ambulance " — shall be handed
over to Dr. Munro for use with the Belgian Army.
6. That should there be any balance in hand after
the purchase and equipment of the ambulance the decision
shall rest with the proprietors of this journjil as to whether
it shall be handed to Dr. Munro for the maintenance and
upkeep of the presentation ambulance or used in the
nucleus of a second fund for the provision of another
motor ambulance.
7. That all cheques, postal orders, or money orders
should be made payable to "Land and Water Motor
Ambulance Fund " and crossed " London County and
Westminster Bank, Ltd." The address of this journal is
Central House, Kingsway, London. All subscriptions will
be acknowledged by the proj)rietors of this journal.
We are on the eve of great events — of fierce fighting on
both sides, decisive battles which will decide the fate of
n.^tions. Every little thing one can do to help should be done.
The L-AND and Water Ambulance scheme is but a very, very
small effort to help in some material way, and the ambulance
itself will be, I hope, ready to do its share just about the
time when every available help is of vital importance.
Belgium's brave army is rapidly being got ready for
its dash at the enemy, when the word is given. Remember
that the Belgian army is dependent upon us and that they are.
only waiting for the time to come when they can avenge the
cruel outrage of their country. What they have suffered is
for the sake of Britain. Please let them see that we appreciate
their sacrifices, and that, when the great forward movement
takes place, they shall go into battle knowing that at least
one more unit has been added to the little fleet of ambulances
comm.anded by the man who has already done so much iox,
the Belgian wounded — Dr. Hector Munro, to wit.
Printed by The Victokta Houss I'ais-iixo Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Whitetiiars, London, E.G.
April T,, 191 5
L A X D A X D W' A T E R
Onoto
Pens
are the only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO. LTD.
FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL
ForCUTLERY,etc.
Neither Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
R
steeT,"bevna en-fclrely vun-
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H-u.\-bs,vvTveaaTTetc.,"wvLLbc
rouT\3. •fco'be oP eTtOTm.o\xs
ojivoLTv-tcLge vrv~Koteis,
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ccxTTvps. MevbKei- -tKelotife-'
Doartl no-r ^Ixc cTecuT-tTLg,
TaoLcKtue is Tioxir neccsscury.
Gitlert) of-tKls &\.ejeS^ "^^^
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THOS. F1RTH& SONSX^."
SHEFFIELD. -
The Truth
about
Apollinaris
/N view of attempts to create undue
prejudice against Apollitiaris, the
public will he interested to know the true
facts of the case.
At^ollinaris & Johannis, Ltd., is a
British Company with 4,500 Hritish
Shareholders, who have invested over
£3,000,000 in the Company and who
hold 97°., of the total capital.
At the commencement of the War the
German Government, recognising the
British interest in Apollinaris, placed
Supervisors in control of the spring in
the same way as the British Govern-
ment has appointed Supervisors in
control of some concerns in this country,
where German interests are paramount.
Apollinaris water is a natural product
of the soil and comes from the Apolli-
naris Spring, situated in the Rhine
Provinces.
In 1872, a British Company, recognis-
ing that the waters of the Apollinaris
Spring were greatly superior to those of
any other known mineral spring, success-
fully secured for British interests the
world-wide distribution of this famous
table water.
Since its foundation 43 years ago, the
business has been carried on under a
Board of Directors consisting entirely
of British subjects.
Attempts to create prejudice against
Apollinaris can, therefore, only damage
the interests of a British Company and
its 4,500 British Shareholders.
I, A XI) AND WATER
April 3, I 91 5
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Furniture
In our Furniture Galleries you can inspect the most
complete collection of Furniture and Furnishings, and
everything offered carries the Whiteley note of sound
construction and supreme value.
-^jj-.^, .»Q4. *f4i4» .4^-
, ,^c 4-» .-w-M^ -^ja-*^ .^.j.-..*^ -*-:;^'f* -*-'•-*» -^^-♦•- ^-^^■-*- '^o^' ■■
Superior Dimng Room Suite, consiructed 01 Mahogany, and weil hniilieJ, designed au>.i-
Chippendale.
6 ft. Sideboard, with very fine figured wood, and orn.imentcd brass gallery, £30 : 0 : 0.
Oval End Dining Table, «iien extended measures 8 ft. o in. by 4. ft. o in., Jill : 19 : 6.
Set of remarkably fine Chippendale design Chairs, comprising 6 Small and 2 Carvers,
upholstered in Morocco, £24 : 0 : 0.
Luxurious Fasy Chair, upholstered in best Morocco, hair stuffed, £14 : 10 : 0.
How to Furnish out
of income without
Disturbing Capital
I f you so desire you may furnish
out of income at Whiteleys.
/\n goods are supplied at the
marked cash prices A deposit
jt 10 per cent, of the total
purchase is required, and
payment of the balance may
be extended over a period ot
one, two, or three years,
according to the value of the
goods selected. The only
addition to the net cash price
is interest at the rate of 5 per
cent, per annum on the out-
standing monthly balance?.
Whiteley's Catalogue
oF Furniture for 1915
is now ready
This is a perfect guide to
furnishing the home with taste
and economy. It includes
complete estimates for fur-
nishing flats or houses for
/;io5, £i6s, and ^2oc,
showing every item in detail
Write to-day and we will
forward you a copy by return
post free.
e^-^@^- •¥e4- -^-r-f •
High Grade Bedroom Suiie, constructed ot well seasoned Mahoganj', and finished as
antique. The Wardrobe, Dressing Table, and Washstand are half-circular in shape.
The Suite complete, £38 : 10 : 0.
4 ft. 6 in. Bedstead en suite £9:9:0.
Wm. Whiteley Ltd., Queen's Road, London, W.
131 ^^
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April 3, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
CHOOSING KIT
Practical Hints
THESE articles are written from practical experi-
ence of military matters, with a view to keeping
our readers in touch with the variousrequirements
of active service. Changes of climate and the peculiar
conditions under which the present campaign is being
waged render different items of equipment advisable at
different times, and we are in touch with officers at the
front and others from whom the actual requirements of
officers and men can be ascertained. The articles are
not intended to advertise any particular firm or firms.
We shall be pleased to supply information to our
readers as to where any of the articles mentioned are
obtainable, and we invite correspondence from officers
on active service who care to call our attention to any
points which would be advantageous in the matter of
comforts or equipment, etc., to those who are about to
leave for the front.
Letters of inquiry with reference to this subject
should be marked " Choosing Kit."
Aluminium Perfected
Hitherto, the drawback of the aluminium water bottle has
laid in its joints. It is impossible to solder aluminium in the
way that is pursued with tin, and consequently the Service
pattern of water bottle in aluminium has been a failure, for
a certain percentage of these jointed bottles lo ked at the
joint even when new, and the rest could not be depended
on not to leak at some inconvenient occasion, while the
material used in closing the joints of the metal lent itself to
corrosion if anything but pure water were placed in the
bottle. There has now been evolved, however, an alu-
minium water bottle, of the ordinary Service shape and size,
"spun up" out of one piece of aluminium, without a single
seam. It has no sharp internal angles ; it has the freedom
from corrosion pecuhar to pure aluminium ; it is the lightest
serviceable water bottle yet made ; and it will stand the hard
wear of active service as long as a man is likely to require it.
Strongly covered and fitted into a "ciadle" for attachment
to equipment, it is a practical article built on common sense
Unes, and thoroughly to be recommended for hard Service use.
A Waterproof Cape
In the matter of keeping out the rain one sometimes
needs additional protection to that provided by the regulation
or other coat one has taken, and for this purpose a water-
proof cape, designed bv an officer, on practical Imes seems
about the best thing. The cape in question is not supposed
to take all the work of waterproofing, as a coat does ; it is
desi-'ned so as to cover one almost to the knees, giving plenty
of freedom to the arms and plenty of room inside, and is
provided with its own fastening strap so that it can be
attached to the equipment when rolled up. It roUs mto a
very small compass indeed, and its weight is a matter ot
ounce'; only This particular cape has found many patrons
among men actually serving in the trenches, and its extreme
portability is a great point in its favour.
A Cap Cover
Passing reference was made a few weeks ago to a water-
proof cap cover which protects the back of the neck by means
of a flap extending down over the collar of the coat, and vyitli
spring weather coming shortly and the need for heavy balac-
lavas disappearing, this cap cover is worthy of notice. It
fits over the field-service cap and transfonns this into a head
covering something Uke the old-time head-dress of the Indian
Army, by means of which the back of the neck is thoroughly
protected. With even a closely fitting overcoat collar the
water drips down the back of one's neck and causes exasper-
ation, but this curtain, falling over the collar, saves all that
and completes the equipment for keeping out the wet at all
points.
By Way of Correction
In referring to a folding open periscope a week or two
ago reference was made to the clips which support the
mirrors of this particular pattern in such a way as to imply
that these clips were not of sufficient strength. Alter re-
examination of the clips^-cspecially those of the larger pattern
instrument— I am convinced that only very rough usage indeed
would impair the efficiency of this periscope. 1 make this
Oilskins, in various shades,
non-sticky. Colours, brown
and green Unlined, from 22/-
Lined f.eece - • 50/-
:»4^
Khaki Flannel Sh'rts, >vith a
detachdLle collar to each, good
quality, durable and unshrink-
able - - - each 6; 6
K^Snt Street. London W
Easter Sale
OF
Mens Wear
FROM now until Easter we
are offering some very special
bargains in shirts, pyjamas,
men's wear — especially in Khaki
clothing of all kinds — in our well-
known and reliable makes.
Of Special Interest
to Officers
Silk and Merino Underwear, ideal for
summer wear, in cream, grey, pink, blue and
helio, unshrinkable.
Vest, 6/6 Pants, 7/6 Drawers, 6/11
Khaki Wool Socks, good, heavy ribbed
make, durable and well fitted for marching
Per pair 1/6
Weatherproof Overcoat, full shape, Raglan
shoulders, light weight.
Price 42/- to 63/-
Mack-ntoshes, fawn colou- - from 25/6
Ditto, Regulation- - - - 63-
British Warm Coat, lined fleece 55/-
Our own malerial. special quality - 75/-
■ — __^ Tly Ltntn Htll
KeqSnl Suvt. Lono
PRACTICAL KIT
OFFICER'S WATERPROOF, lined fleece. i !; i
guaranteed waterproof. An ideal Service coat - Price 8 6 O
With lining, detachable ,,B150
Without lining ,,330
••I have given one of these coats a personal trial under bad winter
conditions of weather, and have found it all that could be desired m
wet and in cold. The proofing is ol the very best quality, really proof
against a soaking ram for any length of time. A further point ip its
favour is that it is thoroughly well ventilated, and altogether it
seems about the best all purposes coat that one can obtain."— Author
of •• Choi sing Kit" Article, Land and Watbr, Fih. 13, 1915.
Do>
Do>
Do.
Do.
pocket
MAP CASESi khaki canvas, double fold
do. three fold
do. do. with
1
be; t pigskin, three fold - - 1
do. do. with pocket 1
POCKET FLASK, oxydised, plated inside,
non-corrosive. Strong and light
HAVERSACKS, extra large and strong. Made
from an officer's design . . - - -
PRISMATIC COMPASS, in leather case
£3 ID O & 4
PRISM BINOCULARS (-1-5 and + 8)- -8
LOADED STICKS, weighted pigskin knobs
Do. covered all over pigskin
OFFICER'S NEWMARKET WHIP, with
thonfr, covered pigskin, loaded butt - - - 1
"ACTIVE SERVICE" MESS BOX, fitted
for six persons ------- 6
LUMINOUS WATCHES, in wrist strap, silver 2
Do. do. metal 1
I Send for full List of IVar Equipment. |
SWAINE 6 ADEN
By appoiBtineot to H.M. The King
185 PICCADILLY, W.
a. d.
16 6
17 6
5 O
1 O
5 O
14 6
12 6
10
17
12
15
O
e
6
O
1 O
18
2
5
6
O
O
EY
LAND AND WATER
AprU 3, 1915
For the man on
Active Service
Amidst the hardships of Active Service, makeshift comforts and facilities are absolutely
necessary. The Officer's Field Kit illustrated below is one of these " indispensables "
— with our usual " something better " in make and quality. There are a hundred and
one other such on view at our Showrooms, as the following list merely suggests :
Valises - - - from 63/-
Active Service Knives - -
M/-
Water Bottles -
_ ___
10/6
Sain Browne Belts - - 45/-
Flasks for Service Jacket
Periscopes
_ «
14/6
Camp Knife, Fork and
pocket
27/6
Drinking Cups (coll
apsible)
7/6
Spoon Combination 3/6 — 7/6
Map Cases . - - from
1?/-
Torchlights -
-
4/6
Watch Wristlets - from 50/-
Compasses - - „
30/-
Air Cushions -
.
7/6
Sleeping Bags - - - 45/-
Writing Cases for Service
Swagger Canes
- from
2/6
Swords - - - from 84/-
Jacket pocket
8/6
Senrice Whistla
-
2/-
c
OFFICER'S FIELD KIT (War Office sealed pattern). Compactum rt ^ | ^ |X
Bed and Horsehair Pillow in green WiUeiden canv.is, War Office Bag, i» g • 1 U a vf
Folding Bath and Washstand, Water Bucket, Folding Chair, War Office
Ground Sheet, Brown War Office Canvas Kit Bag with lock - . . NET CASH
Mappin&W^jb
TTTI
Silversmiths to His Majesty King George V. ±j1.U^
158-162 Oxford St., W, 2 Queen Victoria St., E.C. 220 Regent St., W,
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2761
r PUBLISHED AST PR I C F, S I X P E N C E
C A "TTTDTA A "V . A ID t> T T ■, ^ i ,-% t r T PUBLISHED AST PKIUK S 1 X. f E N I. ^
SAl UKDAY, • ArKlL lO, 1915 [a newspaperJ published weekly
C«pyri^'>ty /. Russtll and Sons
BRIGADIER-GENERAL N. W. BARNARDISTON
Who Commanded the British Forces co-operating with the Japanese at the Siege of Tsingtao,
LAND AND WATER
April lo, 191 5
Disti nctive
'^M Tailor Gowns
^ in the New Spring Mode
JUST as " Land and Water " has built
up a name for autlienticity in Naval
and Military matters so has our
REGENT STREET House earned
fame for Authentic Fashions.
And further — the Fashions shown in our Regent
Street Salons are always in good taste — the qualities
are sound — and the Values unsurpassed. Just now
the Spring Costume Styles are the special attraction
and some particularly interesting creations are shown
in Tailor-made Gowns. Note the two examples
pictured : —
R.S. 22. C. Coat and Skirt in Cnert Coating. Plain Skirt
with double box pleat at back ; Coat cut rather shorter in front,
back panel ending with box pleat ; high roll collar. In a
variety of materials. 6 gn«.
R.S. 21. C. Well-cut Coat and Skirt. Coat cut on newest
lines, rather shorter in front than behind, fastening with straps
and ball buttons ; collar of black edged black and while cord.
Skirt in latest style cut very full. Made in our own workrooms
in a vaiiety of materials to order. 84 gns.
The Regent S^- House o/
Peter Robinson, L^-
/?.S 21. C. '//'
The reason for the smiling face—
HORLICK'S
"^•^^
MALTED MILK TABLETS
Think what a blessing these delicious
Food Tablets are to men on active
service. Tliey are always ready for
immediate use, and a few dissolved in the
mouth will maintain the strength of the
Soldier when he most needs it. Tliey
supply sufficient nourishment to sustain
for hours ; give increased body heat and
vitality; prevent fatigue, »nd relieve thirst.
Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.
We will send post free to ANY address a flask of
tliese delicious and sustaining food tablets and a
neat vest pocket case on receipt of 1/6. If the man
is on active service, be particular to give his name,
regimental number, regiment, brigade and division.
Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient poclset
flaslis, 1/. each. Larger size.^, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-
"^IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIR
Liberal Sample Bottle sent post free for
3cl. in stamps.
HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO.,
^J^ Slough, Bucks.
^
I Are you Run-down §
2J When your .sjstem is undermined by worry or over-work —
■■ — when your vitality is lowered — when you feci "anv ■■
gg how"— when your nerves are "on edge"— when the least SS
2 exertion tires you — you are in a " Rundown " conilition. 5J
■■ Vour system is like a flower drooping for want of water. ■■
nm -'^nd just as water revives a drooping flower — so 'Wincarnis' ^S
g^ gives new life to a "run-down" constitution. From even ■■
■JJ the first winegla.«sful you can fetl it stimulating and in- ■■
g vigorating you, and as you continue, you can feel it sur- ^J
1^ charging yonr whole system with /lew health— ?ie!K strength ■■
^ — 7HU- vigour and neiv life. Will you try just one bottle? |_
I Begin to get well FREE. |
— Send for a liberal free trial bottle of 'Wincarnis' — not a meretast*:-. ^5
^5 but enough to do you good. Enclose three penny stamps (to pay ^S
Z postage). COLEMAN & CO., Ltd., W212, Wincarnis Works, Norwicli. S
■lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
cr>
April 10, 1915
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER
A Vanished Type.
ONCE upon a time a very clever, humorous artist
drew a verv' clever, humorous picture called :
" The I.ady Who Will Not Be Ignored." There
she was, as true to type as anything ever put
upon paper. It was the day when skimpy
skirts, gigantic hand-bags, and hats with sky-scraper plumes
almost as tall as their wearers, were indicated to a long-
suffering puVjlic. Some
women compromised,
adopting the fashions
with modifications as
Englishwomen very
frequently do. Others
flatly refused to have
anything to do with
the modes at all, and
a third class went to
the other extreme.
They wore skimpier
skirts, more aggressive
hats, and carried more
arm-breaking and
colossal bags than any-
body else. They were
determined to make an
impression, resolved
not to be overlooked.
Among them was
" The Lady Who Will
Not Be Ignored " ; the
flamboyance, and fun,
and foolishness of the
thing was irresistible.
That perhaps was
flamboyant fashion at
its height. But though
the fashion died, flam-
boyance continued to
flourish in various
stages and degrees.
And now it has van-
ished from our midst
very quieth', very sud-
denly, very unmistak-
ably. Coats and skirts
are our staple form of
wear. All the big shops
say that they are sell-
ing little else. There is
a ban on bright colours,
there is a ban on ex-
aggeration of design.
In a word, we are un-
obtrusive. Good taste
in clothes has becone a shibboleth. It is amongst the first
fruits of the war, and a result with which few will quarrel.
The passing of the Flamboyant Lady, indeed, is a relief both
to the eyesight and mind.
The Business Side.
It is one thing to provoke interest, quite another to keep
that interest maintained. Every promoter of a charitable
scheme realises that. Public support is certain to flag if
public interest be not carefully cultivated and nutured. Even
the best of causes is apt to suffer, if its virtues, its aims, and
its workings be not continually trumpeted abroad. It is one
of the sad proofs of the fickleness of human nature. It is a
proof, also, of its forgetfulness if reminders are not constantly
forthcoming. That being so. it seems amazing that the
business side of a big charitable undertaking is so repeatedly
neglected. Appeals are often couched in the prehistoric
language of charitable officialdom. They are conventional,
monotonous and lifeless. And in consequence they fail in
their object, or at anv rate reap no full measure of success.
It would be well worth many a society's while if those re-
sponsible spent part of the funds upon the salary of an expert
advertisement writer. Its cause may be one of the best on
earth, but it is not always enough to allow this to speak for
itself. Sbmebody well graduated in the art must speak for
it. And this not once, but many times, if the funds are to
continue growing. If a society is to flourish, it must be run
upon the lines of an up-to-date business establishment. The
societies which do flourish are those who realise this, an4
the way for funds as the shopkeeper paves the
Copyright, Madami- Lallie Charles. LADY WIMBORNE
Who has helped to dispatch a Nursing Unit to Serbia, in response to an urgent
appeal from those in authority there. Lady Witnborne is the new Vicereine
of Ireland, her husband having been chosen as successor to Lord Aberdeen
way for a sale. In the first days of the war, it is quite likely
that calculated pleading on behalf of a cause was not necessary.
Organisations first in the field had the advantage of an awakened
interest. Ever>^bod\' was eager to help and attention very
alive. Time has passed, and there is, perhaps, a plethora of
charitable endea\'our. It will be a case of the survival of the
fittest. The fittest, not only in object, but in presentation
of that object to the public upon whose support it depends.
The " Land and
Water" Motor
Ambulance.
|K)H War is so much a
man's business that
we women are only too
glad to find any way
in which we can help.
If we cannot fight our
country's battles
directly, we can cer-
tainly do so indirectly
by helping those men
wlio are fighting for us
in the allied cause. It
is, as 4 matter of fact,
almost the sole way in
which we can help, and
that being so, it is
fortunate it happens to
be an unusually im-
portant one. It is for
this reason that the
" Land and W'ater "
.-Vmbulance, through
the very nature of its
work, makes a special
appeal to women. This
has been proved by the
generous way in which
women have already
subscribed towards it.
Is it too much to ask
that every woman
reader of " Land and
Water " will consider
sending some sum —
no matter how small —
to our Motor Ambu-
lance ? It might per-
haps be so were it not
that the needs and suf-
ferings of the wounded
form an " Open Sesa-
me " to every woman's
heart, and that this
Ambulance will help one of the smallest and most suffering of
the Alhed nations, as those who read its particulars will discover.
pave
The French Wounded Emergency Fund.
The strain upon our medical resources, naturally enough,
brooks no comparison with that upon those of France. The
French Army holds an infinitely longer battle-line, its
casualties are proportionately great, and its hospital accom-
modation is taxed to the uttermost. The French Wounded
Emergency Fund has its headquarters at 34, Lowndes Square,
S.W., and through its agency medical stores and clothing are
being sent across to France. We are, most of us, so well
aware of the truth and limitation of the saying, that charity
begins at home, that it is delightful to find an exception to
the rule. Our own Medical Service is well organised and
working splendidly, as the wounded back from the front
testify over and over again. The French system is not
working so easily, for the simple reason that there is a well-
nigh intolerable demand upon the supply. The whole medical
organisation is strained almost to snapping point ; it might
have snapped, indeed, if certain individuals by dint of almost
superhuman efforts had not managed to prevent it. Here,
once again, can we prove that wo are .\llies in the fullest sense
of the word by helping the French Wounded Emergency
Fund, which acts as a bridge between us and the wounded
French soldiers. Its helpers meet the cross-Channel steamers,
and see that the bales of goods are transferred without delay
to the various French hospitals. Everybody with an affection
for France has a golden opportunity for showing it by sending
a present of money or clothing to 34, Lowndes Square.
LAND AND WATER
April lo, 19 1 5
wisely
CHAPTER THE FOURTH.
AND they came to a house of rest and ordered
wine. And he who had bought wisely spake
thus: "In the beginning there was no shoe. And
then there arose a wise man who bethought him of a
shoe, and another there arose, far-seeing, who pictured
all that it might mean. And after much labour and sore
travail, the world saw that it was good. And the shoe
spread till all the world made service of it, and many
were the imitations of the shoe that arose, saying: 'We
also are as this shoe, and even finer than this shoe.' So
it has come to pass that he who would know the shoe
he should buy is sore puzzled, for of the makers of
shoes, one pulleth him this way and another pulleth
him that vvay, till he knoweth not what he shall do.
But I have travelled far and wide, and many are the
shoes I have used, yet this is the shoe of all shoes that
likcth me most. And, now, friend, we will eat, and then
will 1 proceed with the tale of the shoe." (To be continued.^
MORAL : — Imitation is the sincerest form of flattery.
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
Founders of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry throughout the World,
Para Mills, .. Aston Cross, .. Birmingham.
LONDON: 14, Regent Street, S.W. PARIS: 4, Rue du Colonel Moll.
Work that Foreigners
have failed to imitate.
THE
SUNBEAM
CYCLE'S
SPLENDID
LITTLE OIL
BATH GEARCASE
r^O you know that the Makers of the Sunbeani Cycle are
'^ the originators of the Little Oil Bath Gearcase ? Do
you know that this Gearcase forms an integral part of the
machine and is not an "Afterthought"? That — after all
these years of imitative effort — it is still the only satisfactory
Oil Bath Gearcase ? All the Sunbeam driving Bearings and
the chain run in this Gearcase. There they are protected
from Dirt and Damp, and continuously and automatically
lubricated by the Little Oil Bath. This ensures the perfect
running of the superbly built Sunbeam in all Weathers, and
this guarantees their perpetual Wear.
Write for the new Catalogue to —
3 SUNBEAMLAND— WOLVERHAMPTON
London Showrooms: 57 HOLIiORN VIADUCT, E.G.
158 bLO.\NE STRKKl iby Sloane Siiu.ireX S.W.
HOTEL CECIL
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Telephone : GERRARD 60. Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
For "Active Service" a
Dust and Damp-proof
Watch Case is essential
It is just as easy and no more expensive
to obtain a watch with
dust-proof and damp-proof
Screw Case, as to ohtain one
with a case that looks so,
liut isn't. Whatever watch
j'ou choose can be supplied
" DENNISON QUALITY " CASE
(the Original Screw Ca»e)
Over 600 varieties in Cold, Rolle 1 Gold, Silver, nnd Nickel, for
Wristlet and Pocket \V .itches of all makes. Insist on a " Dennison
Quality *' Case nnd so ensure tlie continuous accuracy and
reliability 01 the watch. Look for the name '* Deunison Watch
Case Co.," and the initials " A.L-D." in the Case.
Explanatory "Booklet free.
DENNISON WATCH CASE CO., BIRMINGHAM.
tight-fitting
DESKS of
QUALITY
If you are furnishing an olfice this
year, or addiiiK to its equipment,
remember that solid worth counts
for more than sensational prices.
The carefully made "(Jlobe-
Wernicke* Desk is not only more
attractive, but lasts {jearx longer than the cheaper-priced article.
9lol>C^rt)ickc Roll Top Desks
We have over 50 styles of Desks. Note the pull-out writing bed In desk illustrated
above. Send for Catalogue 100 1).
Packing free. Orders for £2 Carriage Paid to any Goods Station in the British Islet.
3ibc 9loW^Vcrt)ickcCo.Sid.
Office anrl IJbrani h'urnixhers. (All-British Concern)
44 Holborn Viaduct, London, E.C. ;
82 Victoria Street, S.W. ; 98 Bishopsgate, E.C.
22
April 10, 1915.
LAND AND JV: A T E R.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
NOTE.— This artlcU bis been sabmUCed to the Press Bureau, which docs not object to the pablication is ceosored, lad lakei U
responsibility tor the correctness ol the statements.
la iccordance with the rcqalrecieafs o! the Press Bareau, the positions of troops on Plans Illustrating this ArtlcU mast 011I7 b«
regarded as approximite, and no definite strength at any point Is Indicated.
|tlll| Larger Termanent Wbr^
r~l Smaller Permanenf J\vrks
Q Temporary Works*
■•■ CorJjoiu' Lines .
/ 2 3 f S 6 >7 e^ 9^10
'Ranges of WOOyds. upfylO.OOOyds.
'Railway ii) Calidan 'Russhm ArnyT^
in the West and Cracow front
■-."> 1000- .: 'v-'c. -"-■'./";. -^
•1200
I 1
THE DETAILS OF PRZEMYSL.
WE are now in a position, through the
Russian Press, to grasp clearly
enough the nature of the defence of
Przemysl. It will be remembered how
at the time of the surrender all details were lack-
ing, and it was impossible to do more than con-
jecture the most important points. Yet an under-
standing of Przemysl was exceedingly important
to a general understanding of the campaign,
because the controversy upon the change in modern
strategy had mainly turned upon the role of
permanent fortification in modern war and
because later phases of tlie war must, whatever
happens, put that debated question again to the
test.
Of course the greater part of the study of such
a case as that of Przemysl can only be a<^com-
plished upon the ground, and in the accounts
received there are many puzzles, which only a
knowledge of the ground could solve. Still,* we
know enough now to be able to draw certain con-
clusions, and, further, to be able to understand the
nature of the operations.
I have given upon the accompanying sketch
map the main features of the ground.
The town of Przemysl stands at the point
where the River San leaves the foothills of the
Carpathians and enters the Gaiician plain. It is,
therefore — more than most fortresses — a real
door. So long as it is held, the main avenua
across the Carpathians is closed. The trunk
railway, which feeds all armies operating in
Galicia and runs from the Russian frontier
to Lemberg and Cracow, is deliberately bent
LAND AND W A T E R.
April 10, 1915.
ertificially round so as to pass through Przeinysl
and the fortifications of that town command
the use of the line. Further, the railway
over the Lupkow Pass, the most direct from
Buda Pesth and Vienna, joins this main
line at Przemysl Station. Tliis essential rail-
way junction, the most important strategical
point, perhaps, in all Galicia, I have marked
upon the sketch with the letter A. The town
itself, which is in normal times about as large
in population as Colchester, and which is very
mixed in race and creed (quite a third of it being
Jewish), stands upon the right bank of the San,
and the higher foothills which buttress the mam
range of the Carpathians here approach close to
the stream from the soutli. The water level at the
town itself is about 600 feet above the sea, while
the hills in the immediate neighbourhood of the
town to the south have summits more than 700 feet
above this level.
The formation is continued on the north side
of the river in hills only slightly less elevated and
considerably softer in outline. A sort of rounded
plateau here dominates the San, rising to a sort
of backbone a thousand feet above the sea, or some
400 feet above the water, with its highest summit
another 300 feet more. To the eastward opens
out the great plain, tlirough Avhich the San runs
with many turnings, bounded often by marshy
fields and occasionally leaving stagnant back-
.■waters, which represent its old course.
The town is not, therefore, one of those ideal
ring fortresses wliich stand surrounded by fairly
isolated heights. It is a site which has been
fortified in spite of the difficulties attaching to the
ground, and not on account of natural opportuni-
ties afforded.
Nine main works defend the place. They
are often reckoned as eight on account of the
proximity and common object, and probably the
linking up also of the two works south of Side-
liska, the south-easternmost horn of the ring.
P'aking these nine works in their order from
ithe north of the river on the east, the first is on
the spur of the thousand feet contour, overlooking
the village of Letowninia. It is supported at less
than four thousand yards range by the second
.work, which is upon the northern summit of the
plateau overlooking the village of Ujkowice. The
first of these works is at about five thousand yards
range, the second is nearly seven thousand yards
range from the centre of the place.
The third fort is on the open glacis of the
plateau, between the villages of Batycze and Mal-
Kowiee. It is probably the strongest of all the
works, Avith the possible exception of five and six.
It dominates the great main road to the north, and
is a good five miles (or eight thousand yai-ds) range
from the town.
The fourth work is at a rather puzzling dis-
tance away upon the cast. A gap which can only
be accounted for, if the information supplied is
correct, by some peculiarity of the ground — pos-
eibly marsh. It lies but a little above the water
level, and overlooks the village of Bolestrizyce.
The gap between this fourth work and the fifth is
even more remarkable, amounting, it would seem,
to close on ten thousand yards. But, even without
a knowledge of the ground, the map is sufficient to
explain this, because there is a considerable area
of marsh in the bends of the river that correspond
.with this gap, and because the main railway and
the road which come in from Lemberg through
Medyka are thoroughly dominated by each work
on the north and on the south.
This fifth great fort and the tAvin work. No. 6,
close in its neighbourhood, have a characteristic
that can only be explained by some feature in the .
ground. They are very far thrust out from the
fortress, and they are evidently regarded as guard-
ing a joint in the armour, because a whole system
of smaller works, temporary and permanent, have
been thrust out beyond them towards the hills in
the neighbourhood of the village of Popowice.
Another big gap occurs between fort six and fort
seven, which overlook the valley of the little tribu-
tary river, the Wiar, from the east and from the
west. But after this fort seven the rather abrupt
and confused hill country to the west of it has been
heavily defended.
Fort eight, on Lipnik Hill, is the highest in
the whole system — 1,350 feet above the sea and
some 750 above the valley floor. It is only just
over two thousand yards from its neighbour and
not much more than three thousand from the ninth
and last fort of the ring, which stands on an
abrupt spur immediately overlooking the San.
Apart from these large Avorks there are eight
or nine smaller AA'orks, the general design of which
is to close the gaps between the larger ones, and
in the course of the siege a considerable number
of temporary works were erected all along the
ring, some of Avhich are indicated upon the
sketch.
In the immediate neighbourhood of the toAvn
a closed system of trenches was draAvn to coA-er
the last thousand yards or so of the approach, and
Avas extended on the north-west up as nigh as the
village of Lupkowica, upon the plateau, so as to
prevent this outlying portion of the enceinte from
being too immediately overlooked.
NoAV, the first thing that strikes us upon the
inspection of such a system is the absence of that
extension of temporarj^ batteries outside the
original ring Avhich has marked the defence of
Verdun, and which, it Avas guessed in these
columns, would be found attached to Przemysl.
And the absence of these can only mean that the
Russians could not, or did not, bring up against
the place any very heavy pieces. For instance,
there is a AA^nole district north-east of the toAA^n
where forts one and tAVO are oAcrlooked from
further heights, which run up to 1,300 feet; and
had Przemysl been subjected to such an ordeal
as the Verdun forts suffered in early September,
fort one and fort tAvo could haA'e been knocked to
pieces by indirect fire from behind these neigh-
bouring hills as surely as Troyon was battered to
pieces by the big Austrian howitzers hidden
behind the heights of the Meuse.
This is of a piece with all we know of the
siege. It was a mere iuA-estment; and the place
fell, not from the piercing of any part of its
armour, but from exhaustion.
In connection with this, hoAvever, it is in-
teresting to note Avith what care the defence
organised works and destroyed communications
Avitb the apparent object of fighting to the last,
and only letting the place fall to an assault. No
other explanation fits the tracing of that enclosed
enceinte of trenches Avhich coA-ered eA-erything in
the immediate neighbourhood of the toAvn, or the
destruction of the main raih\'ay bridge over the
.Wiar at B, which so astonished the Russians when
I
2»
April 10, 1915.
LAND AND WATEE.
Ibey entered the city. The point B is amply pro-
tected by the ring of forts, and to destroy the
bridge there, so as to cut the road and the railway
communication from Lemberg, the chief sources
of supply, has had no effect (considering that
the fortress capitulated intact) save to hamper the
revictualling of the place rather cruelly.
There are other small points in connection
with the system, one of the most curious of which
I have marked with the letter 0. The trenches
here did not follow the natural obstacle of the
river, but ran inside it, just enclosing the parade
ground. And still more remarkable is the care,
already alluded to, which has been taken to guard
in a special manner all the south-eastern approach
in the neighbourhood of Siedliska and Popowice.
One would naturally expect that the most vulner-
able sector would be the north-east one ; but there
is doubtless some local reason for making the
defence especially anxious for this sector defended
by forts five and six.
THE CARPATHIAN BATTLE.
The news of direct and recent action this
week is very scanty. The most important part of
it is from the Carpathians.
It is annoying that a series of great actions
upon which will, perhaps, depend a great change
in the whole war, and the theatre of which is the
Carpathian Range, should be so meagrely reported
in the West. The great war is one co-ordinated
operation, and the lack of full accounts of any
decisive part of it makes it impossible to judge
the condition of the whole.
From such information as we have, however,
it is possible to construct some idea of the Rus-
sian advance, its rate of progress, and its critical
points.
In the accompanying map we have all the
points marked which have been mentioned in the
last few dispatches, and from them we can dis-
cover pretty accurately how the Russian line lies.
The point is, of course, to establish its relation to
the main ridge of the Carpathian Mountains,
which ridge is as it were the wall still defending
the Hungarian plain. That part of the ridg<
upon which the Russian effort is now being so
weightily directed is called the Beskid Mountains,
and the front of the Russian Army last Saturday
would seem along this stretch to be as indicated by
crosses as follows.
In the neighbourhood of the Dukla all the
three road passes, the Polyanka, the Dukla itself,
and the Jaliska, are in the hands of the Russians,
but the position there would seem to be almost
stationary. The foremost Russian line on the
Hungarian slope beyond the ridge is much
what we saw it was last week. The Austrian
references to fighting near the railway at A, in the
upper valley of the Laborcz. establishes a point
there, but I think it is doubtful whether the road
over the Lupkow Pass, cutting off the bend of the
railway, is already in Russian hands. The railway
at its summit certainly is not, for we are told that
the Russians have taken the point B, the last
station before the summit upon tiie Galician slope.
Thence the line goes round in front of the high
moutain village of Wola Michowa, and more or
less follows, for the next twenty miles, the Polo-
nina heights.
These heights are a wooded ridge parallel to
and only just lower tlian the main ridge and water-
shed of the mountains which stands facing them
over a deep valley to the south. The Russians in
the last telegram received, which relates to Easter
Sunday, report that they have actually got across
the main ridge also at one point just east of the
Rustok Pass. The situation here can best be
understood by a reference to the following sketch :
Between the Polonina Range (which is less abrupt
on its northern or Galician side) and the Main
Ridge in the Valley of Boreky, a profound ravine,
some two thosand feet deep, into which the wooded
Polonina crest falls very steeply and out of which
the main range rises on the further side. All thia
valley and the district as far as Cisna has been
abandoned by the Austrians, and just bevond
Cisna the main range has been crossed, and the
Russian outposts are on the further, or
Hungarian, southern slope upon the steep foresti
buttresses of the main range, called the bmolnik
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LAND AND i^ATER.
April 10, 1915.
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Hills. A second breach has been made in the line
after the Dukla and about thirty or thirty -five
miles away.
It is not clear whether upon the Uszog
[Pass road they have a hold of Turka or
no, but it is probable, and thence their front
reapproaches the central range until it finds
itself on the Stryj road opposite German contin-
fents which hold the mountain village of Koziowa.
'urther east, the front hardly concerns the main
.Carpathian battle, for it bends back further and
further away from the mountains.
One may sum up the Russian position in the
hills as it was at the end of last week by saying
that the Lupkow Pass is within an ace of failing
into their hands, that the whole ridge for more
than thirty miles on, even in the neighbourhood of
the Uszog, is immediately threatened by their
attack, which is now close up against the last
summit, and that, in the sector between the Uszog
and the Stryj railways they are a distance varying
from one to two days' march from the summits of
the hills.
It is obvious that if Russian success should
come in this neighbourhood it will, no more than
the corresponding task in the West, take the form
of a mere slow pushing back of the enemy. The
light is against a line which will either maintain
itself, or break, or be compelled to take up some
shorter position : and what that shorter position
can be on the Carpathian front it is not easy to
discover.
We know that in the West if tlie Germans
should ever have to abandon their present 425
miles of line they have behind them a line nearly
a fifth shorter, and yet another behind that, the
best line of all, quite a third shorter than their
present line. But there is no such choice for the
Austro- German forces in the Carpathians. They
must hold the mountains or give them up.
They will have no such opportunity for the
defence to Avhich they are now reduced if they fall
back into the open plain, or if they are found still
unsuccessful in any counter-offensive when the
snow melts and the new pasture comes in the open-
ings of the mountain woodland
It is significant
that very considerable German reinforcem_ents are
being sent to this front. But those reinforcements
are not inexhaustible. If they number, as it is
believed, already seven army corps, they have
surely reached the maximum of the stiffening
which they can here lend to an unfortunate ally.
!Mean while, we must wait patiently to note
week by week upon the map tlie nature and the
extent of the Russian advance towards and over
the ridge which, as I said at the opening of this, is,
perhaps, at this moment the most critical field of
the W'hole war.
THE R\ID ON CHOTIN.
The present phase of the war, in which close
grips are established over long lines of country
and advance is either very slow, as in the Carpa-
thians, or halted altogether, as in France, natur-
ally tempts such forces as ma 3^ be free for thern
to engage in raids. We had a Russian one on
IMemel the other day ; we have had an Austrian one
at Chotin; and we should doubtless have corre-
sponding efforts in the West were they possible. As
they are not possible, their place is taken by occa-
sional daslies through the air, which, like these
Eastern raids, are not exactly co-ordinated with
any general plan, but are only intended for some
local effect, or by similar dashes across the sea.
The history of this .sort of operation is always
the same. You may watch it at work in war after
'April 10, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
war. The raiders aim at notliing more than annoy-
ance. Thev therefore work \Yitli the least possible
mimbers. The value of tlie annoyance they cause is
strictly moral. The conditions' under v/hicJi it is
worth while raiding and the conditions under
which it is not depend entirely on the enemy's
state of mind, and particularly on the state of his
civilian mind and on the pressure that civilian
mind can exercise upon the government and upon
the army. No raid ever presupposes a permanent
occupation. TJie success of a raid is to be
measured by two things : tlie amount of damage
done and the ultimate safety of the raiders.
Judged by these standards, the raid on AJemel
seems to have been fairly worth while; the raid
on Chotin hardly worth while.
The Russian raid on Merael was undertaken
because tlie whole German sclieme depends upon
the integrity of German soil. On that dependsthe
opinion which is the foundation for the armies,
and though Memel is but an extreme outpost, vet
its tejnporary occupation profoundly affected the
German mind. Indeed the Avhole of that East
Prussian land has come to be for the Germans
what a sore tooth is for a sleepless mind. Some-
times it stops aching, but it has ached and may
ache again. On the other hand, the Russian
raiders of Memel did not do anything like as much
wrecking as they might have clone, but they could
boast that they escaped with very little loss — for
the German accounts of their capture were almost
certainly false.
The raid upon Chotin satisfies the criteria of
a raid less. It was indeed undertaken by the
Austrians with no waste of forces. It seems as
though the whole body did not consist of more
than one division of second-line troops with a
brigade of cavalry. Moreover, this little force
appears to have been roughly handled. We have
only the account of one side so far. but the account
is probable enough, because from the nature of the
ground, as will be seen in a moment, the position
of the raiders was always somewhat perilous.
It is not accurate to speak of the " wiping
out " of the invaders, as it is put in one message,
for the total number of prisoners does not come to
much more than fifteen per cent, of the invaders.
But the division must have suffered heavily in
killed and wounded as well, and it has certainly
failed in its object. It has done very little harm
in the district attacked, and even if it had been
more successful it would not have affected Russian
opinion seriously. The eastern fighting, from the
Baltic to the Black Sea, has taken place upon soil
that is politically Russian, but the nationality ot
all these marches is not Russian. The little corner
on the Dniester, for instance, of which Chotin, I
understand, is the chief town, is Roumanian in
speech, population, and religion.
This corner is connected with the quite
modern and artificial frontier of the district. Its
elements nmy be seen in the accompanying sketch.
The River Dniester runs in a very tortuous
channel through hilly country, coming from
Galicia and I'unning through Podolia on its way
to the Black Sea. For a few miles it forms the
frontier between Austrian Galicia and the Rus-
sian Empire. The frontier then turns up north-
wards, following a small tributary called the
Soruts. South of the Dniester the frontier runs
along an arbitraiy line north and south for rather
more than thirty miles, until it strikes the Pruth,
on which river Czernowitz stands. From this
point the Pruth becomes a boundary between
Roumania and Russia, as also for a few miles
between Roumania and Austria. The Russian
lines and the Austrian lines facing them run in
this district much as the line of crosses in the
accompanying sketch.
Tlie raid followed, roughly, the line of the
arrow in the sketch, and got about half-way to
Chotin— or, say, one day's march into Russian
territory. Its advance bodies, holding two vil-
lages, was then rounded up and the rest retired.
The whole thing was on a very small scale, and is
only interesting as an example of this tendency of
a state of deadlock to break out into raid. It is
just possible that a subsidiary object of the little
effort was the impressing of loc^al Roumanian
opinion. But, if so, the effect was not worth any
considera])le expense of men.
The details of this affair can best be appre-
ciated by a glance at sketch IV.
As is so frequent upon this frontier, the good
roads belong to the Austrian side, and beyond
them there is often nothing but a track of earfh.
By such a good road the Austrian divisioTi
appeal's to have marched up from Czernov/itz to
the village of Poporoutz, where apparently it
halted after the first days march. On the second
day it would seem to have crossed the frontier and
to liave taken the track which leads along the edge
of the forest to the market town of Chotin, on the
Dniester, rather more than twenty miles away.
This forest stands on the right bank of the
Dniester, over an area of about fifty square miles,
and is ravined by numerous bi'ooks falling into
the river. It stands somewhat high, and to the
south of it is a plateau of open country dotted with
numerous villages. To hide an advance in such
country was impossible. The advanced bodies of
the raid would seem on the second day to have
been billeted in tv.'o villages on the edge of the
forest, Szilowcy and Manicy. Here they took
contact with considerable bodies of Russian irre-
gular cavalry, accom]ianied, of course, by a strong
force of guns and many dismounted. The
main colunni fell back, defended by a rearguard
occupying the two villages, and the troops form-
ing this rearguard appear to have suft'ered heavily.
They consisted of Hungarian reservists, and lost
about two thousand prisoners. It may be pre-
sumed that the uhole of the body that escaped is
by now back beyond the frontier.
LAND AND ,W. A T E R.
April 10, 1915.
THE WESTERN FRONT.
The only news of interest upon the .Western
front at the moment of writing (Tuesday evening)
is the capture by the French of Regnieville, a suc-
Mihiel
PontaMou$5on
cess which they achieved last Saturday, following
upon their capture of Fey en Haye, two days
before.
Slow as are the results of all this siege work,
the particular advance in question may quite pos-
sibly prove of importance to the near future, and
in order to understand why this should be so, one
has but to grasp the elements in this elementary
sketch.
We all know that the Germans have for six
months occupied a curious wed^e pushing up to the
Meuse at the Bridge of St. Mihiel. The effort they
made was a considerable one with large forces,
and its object has long been clear. If ever they
had the good luck to be able to take a vigorous
ofPensive in the West again, it would greatly in-
crease their power if they could invest the fortress
of Verdun, and so make the whole French line fall
back. In order to effect this, they advanced in
September in great force up to the point of St.
Mihiel, on the Meuse, and held it. Meanwhile,
much further along their front (which is indicated
on the accompanying diagram with a double line)
they proposed, by attacking vigorously from the
Argonne, which lies to the west of Verdun,
to complete the ring. The wedge at St.
Miliiel was a sort of buckle to which they
desired to fit the strap by pushing down
from the north-west. In this attempt they have
been quite unsuccessful. They have, if anything,
gone back in the Argonne. They lost Vauquois
a fortnight ago, and their line through the woods
is bent where two months ago it was straight, but
6*
April 10, 1915.
LAND AND .W. A T E
Xv.
Les Eparges
Metv
;St MibielN
m
they still hold on to St. Mihiel in the hope that
later forces released from other theatres of war
may enable them at ia^t to advance from the
Argonne. They hold on thus to the advance post
of St. !\Iihiel not -without some peril. The position
is awkward, threatened on either side, and depen-
dent upon a line of supply from Metz, the first
half of which is furnished with a railway, long
established, to Thiaucourt, and the second half
with a field railway the Germans themselves have
constructed, taking it through the middle of the
wedge, as far as possible from its two threatened
edges.
In sketch VI. the shape of tlie wedge
occupied will be seen roughly delineated. It runs
from the Moselle to the Meuse. and its two edges
are being bitten into continually by the slow
French advance. On the north that advance has
been considerable, and the French have taken Les
Eparges, but on the south the action is more im-
Mi\es
Main 'Road 1120 jeet
Motu5on
^n
portant because the line at Thiaucourt comes close
to this southern edge.
The French advance at Thiaucourt began
from the main road which runs from Com-
mercy to Pont k Mousson. Once they got hold of
this tliey advanced into the wood called the Wood
of the Priest (Bois du Pretre), slowly making their
way in desperate forest fighting comparable to
that of the Argonne. They hold at the present
moment very nearly the whole of this wood, lying
on a front indicated by the line of crosses, and
somewhat helped by the fact that the whole of this
ground slopes away from the high road, which la
about 1,100 feet above the sea. down to the valley
in which the railway runs, 400 feet below. They
carried, as we have seen, Fey en Haye, and last
Saturday Regnieville, two tiny hamfets, the one
with less than 200 inhabitants in time of peace,
the other with a trifle over : both now, presumably,
in ruins.
From Regnieville you cannot see down into
the valley to Thiaucourt. tlie nearest point of the
enemies' supply railway, because of a belt of wood
which interrupts the view, but if the French ad-
vance can pass this wood and establish itself well
on the slope beyond, the railway is done for. The
big guns working behind the line will have it in
range, and there are a mass of vulnerable points,
culverts, and one narrow road bridge, if I am not
mistaken, which would be within extreme range of
guns posted between the high road and the woods.
The whole thing is an advance upon Thiaucourt.
This detail of Regnieville which we have been
reviewing, and all similar local successes, past and
present, in the trench warfare — Perthes, Neuve
Chapelle, the HartsmannAveilerkopf — have one
common feature which must be grasped if we are
to understand the present phase of the war. Thia
common feature is the domination exercised over
the new trench warfare bv the heavv gun.
Many excellent critics have said that there ia
nothing new in this, because whene\er siege work
was concerned the heavy gun was obviously the
master weapon. They are right so far, that the
action of the hea^'}' gun along the Western front
in the present phase of this war differs only in
degree, and not in kind, from the action of every
big piece that has been turned against any earth-
work during the last three hundred years. But the
novelty of the present work consists in two points :
the degree of exactitude necessary to the fire of the
heavy guns, and the degree in the number of their
projectiles.
As to the first point, exactitude, it is necei-
1*
LAND AND WATER.
April 10, 1915.
sari/, from the closeness of the trenches and their
size, and its possibiliti/ is partly due to the charac-
ter of the modern weapon and the exact stan-
dardisation of propellant explosives, but much
more to the supremacy in the air which the Allies
have established. It is a matter of legitimate
pride that the pioneer work here was mainly
British work.
We are told by those who have every oppor-
tunity for forming a personal judgment that the
mastery of the air acquired by the Allies is a
mastery due to just those qualities of adventure
and daring which many have too hastily imagined
to have vanished from modern war. The enemy
has flying machines not differing appreciably from
those of the Allies. He can rise as high. He can
fly as fast. Where he seems to liavc failed is, as
everywhere in this war, on the not calculable side
of human effort : the spiritual side that supple-
ments the machine. Direct attack in the air, fly-
ing in difficult weather, flying low, he le^ives
mainly to his opponent, and therefore his opponent
masters him.
The essence of the type of attack which tlie
French have perfected in the last month or two
is this :
On a chosen day the infantry in a particular
section of ti-enches are bid to stand by for deliver-
ing an assault. As against that day a great con-
centration of lieaAy pieces and of munition for
them is arranged. This concentration may be
grasped by the enemy or missed. More usually, it
13 largely missed, because of his imperfect air-
work. At any rate, once effected, on the morning
chosen the heavy i)ieces begin to deliver a concen-
trated fire against the enemys trenches. It lasts
for a space of time varying w ith the nature of the
work in hand. At Neuvc Chapelle this tornado
was kept up thirty-five minutes. On the Beause-
iour front it seems to have been kept up usually for
bursts of rather less than an hour. The other day,
on the Hartsmannwoilerkopf, it Avas kept up
almost Avithout intermission from ten in the morn-
ing until two in the afternoon.
This cannonade must, to be of value, obtain
an exact accuracy of range. So close are the two
opposing forces, so small is the objective presented
by a trench, and so necessary to the result is the
local effect of each projectile that, save with an
exactitude in delivery unknown before the present
campaign, tlie method would fail. It is the
machine in the air, partly by its previous recon-
naissance of the precise trace of the enemy's
trenches, partly by its spotting of individual shots,
that determines this accuracy, and, once deter-
mined, it shakes the enemy beyond the power of
continued resistance.
An exact co-ordination must be observed
between the work of the heavy guns and the work
of the infantry that follows it. The infantry in
the trenches cannot, of course, move until the artil-
lery work is over ; but the very moment it is over,
■while the enemy w^ho has been subject to that can-
nonade is still stunned and distraught by it, and
long before the survivors can remodel the trenches
which have been knocked to pieces by the heavy
fire, the infantry leap from their trenches and rush
the intervening space and the first trenches of their
opponents. They establish themselves hurriedly,
but as thoroughly as they can, before the counter-
offensive is launched.
To interfere with the value of that counter-
offensive, the heavy gun fulfils another task. It
next creates a zone of fire behind the captured
trenches, passage through v.hich zone is sometimes
impossible and always exceedingly cosily.
It will be seen that this method constantly
pursued does all that the war of attrition demands.
It kills and Avounds great juimbers of the enemy;
it leaves initiatiA-e entirely in the hands of the
Allies; it cau.ses considerable batches of prisoners
to be jiassed continually from the enemy's lines
into ours. It has but one dvaAvback. It is spas-
modic on account of the enormous amount of
projectiles it consumes in each effort.
But it may be asked Avhy so obvious an
arrangement is mainly in the possession of the
Allies, and why the enemy, since tv»'o can play at
any game, does not attempt similar action against
us.
Sometimes, of course, he does attempt it; as,
for instance, in the attack on St. Eloi the other
day, in front of Ypres. But he does not attempt
it once to ten times that it is tried against him.
And the reason that he thus finds himself perpetu-
ally receiving bloAvs AAhich he cannot adequately
return is mainly due to his now fixed inferiority in
the air and next to his husbanding of ammunition.
Here the second jioint, the superiority in
munition of the Allies in the West, comes in. It is
of the first importance, but, unfortunately, it is
a matter on which, in the nature of t1)ings, Ave haA^e
ver}- scanty evidence indeed. We do kiioAv, hoAv-
CA'er, that, for reasons which Avill be suggested in a
moment, the enemy is still charj' in his lisc of big
shell along the Western front.
In the first place, he is certainly hampered for
nickel, and probably already somcAvhat hampered
for copper.
In the second place, he probably feels more
than do the Allies the burden of relining guns and
of completing ncAv peioes. The reason of this,
paradoxical as it may seem, is that he VA^as so much
better prepared Avith heaA-y artillery than Avere
the Allies at the beginning of the Avar. If you
have everything ready and thought out for one
set of things, you exclude by all that preparation
another unexpected set of things. Just as a back-
ward country suddenly deA-eloping itself Avill more
easily get the latest machinery than an old and
wealthier country, long dcA-eloped, so a country
which has jircpared for the use of a particular
Aveapon in a certain maximum quantity, and to be
exercised over a maxinnim time, is likely to be at
a loss Avhen the allotted time is exceeded and the
quantity proves insufficient, compared Vvith riA^als
Avho take up the whole thing on a noA'el scale.
In the third place, he wants many of his
heaAj guns for the Eastern front. The only real
advantage the Austro-Gcrmans haA-e OA-er the
Russians is their superiority in this AA-eapon.
Take it aAvay from the enemy in the East and he
is beaten.
In the fourth place, neutral markets for muni-
tions are closed to the enemy ; a handicap which
makes him rage most furiously, for it offends his
sense of justice.
And, in the fifth place, counting CA^ery man as
he does in such an industrialised state, and keep-
ing a bare minimum back to supply his armed
forces from the factories, he is hampered some-
Avhat for labour.
COTTON.
Explosive he has in any quantity he likes, bothi
8»
April 10, 1915.
LkRU ANU W.AiJLll.
propellent explosive and explosive for bursting
charges. The latter he makes from the distillation
of coal, which he has in abundance, and which he
can nitrate at will. The former, thanks to the
deliberate relaxation of the blockade, he now pos-
sesses in a very large amount. Indeed, the main
question for those who are agitating in this matter
to consider now is wliether it is worth while to
prevent his getting cotton, since he alread}' has
such a very great stock of it. He cannot use
anything except cotton, and we have allowed
him to accumulate about one million bales.
,We have forbidden v,ool to go into Germany,
though wool comes from the Empire, and though
wool only clothes his soldiers. "We have allowetl
cotton to go in freely, quite as much since the
Order in Council as before. The matter is gun-
powder. The matter is controversial, and, thciT;-
forc, I will not debate it here, but I believe my
figures are correct. A million bales is, I believe,
somewhat short of the material for.300,000,000lbs.
of explosive, and at tlie same time it is the support
of large numbers of his industrial population.
Whether it is worth while or not to have pro-
visioned him — and to continue to provision him—
60 handsomely with the one chief material factor
in modern war, and the one which he could not
possibly get without our aid, it is for those who
know all the facts— and I do not pretend to know
them — to determine.
A SIGNIFICANT WITNESS.
One must be very careful in follo^ving the
evidence — especially the evidence for numbers —
in these great campaigns, never to allow any ele-
ment into one's calculation that is not what the
French call " positive."
Nor should one put into the wrong categories
the various activities of the enemy. One should
not. for instance, mix up false news which is
deliberatelv spread among the German populace
with official news circulated by the Governinent
for French, English, and Russian General Staffs
to accept or reject.
I will not, therefore, exaggerate the import-
ance of the following piece of German propa-
ganda, but I do use with regard to it the word
" signific<ant "' because it is a very clear example
of something which I have insisted upon per-
petually in these notes — to wit, that the various
sections into which the enemy's efforts at influenc-
ing opinion is divided are fa'irly clear-cut. What
I am about to quote throws a very clear light upon
the way in which neutral countries are being
coached by Germany.
It is a series of figures published in an organ
of the Swedish Press as late as March 19, and
purports to be (what it no doubt is) a suinmary
furnished by a writer " who has been recently in
Berlin." Its principal figures are as follows (to
the nearest round figure in tens of thousands) :—
For RUSSIA : 750,000 dead.
770,000 prisoners,
li million wounded.
For the FRENCH: 460-70,000 dead.
500,000 prisoners.
720,000 wounded.
For ENGLAND: 120,000 dead.
80,000 prisoners.
180-90,000 wounded.
For GERMANY I
340,000
130,000
620,000
dead.
prisoners,
wounded.
Now, I need not tell my readers that these
figures are fantastic. My point is rather to im-
press upon them the quality of the phantasy. It
is this : The enemy is getting now into the habit
of hitting blind. We have had plenty of neces-
sary falsehood by way of suppression, and not a
little falsehood by way of direct statement or
implication on all sides in this great war.
But you will not find at all in the statements
of any of the Allies, nor will j'ou find in any of
the statements issuing from Germany (until these
last few weeks) the element of the monstrous.
When one reads, even in official French
accounts, the news of prisoners who believe that
the Germans are in Paris, or any startler of that
kind, one hesitates to believe the story. But
statistics such as the above— sent to supposedly
friendly newspapers — give one pause.
The British prisoners in this silly circular
are multiplied by four; the British dead by less
than ten, but more than six; while the total
wounded of all sorts are made out little more than
the dead.
The German figures, all added together, come
to less than the belated and imperfect ofileial lists
(published by the Allies) for Prussia alone a month
ago, and give a proportion of less than two
wounded to one killed.
The French prisoners are more than double
the total numbers which the Germans have
been able to make up by counting every conceivable
civilian item into their own oflicial numbers (as
published for us — who can judge, not for
neutrals). The total of French casualties, adding
the sick, amount to more than the whole im-
mediate front French fighting line.
It is clear that these figures were not even
exaggerations of existing lists. They were made
up out of the author's head and had no relation to
reality. But they were certainly sent to the Press
of a neutral countrv believed to he friendly.
The lesson to be learnt from an incident of
this sort seems to me to be three-fold.
In the first place, and most important, it is
another piece of evidence showing the working of
the enemy's mind; wherein there is that mixture,
not uncommonly found in individuals, of patience
and bad judgment; or, let me say, of accuracy and
responsibility, where calculable things are con-
cerned, coupled with great incapacity where
things incalculable (like the mind of the dupe) are
concerned.
In the second place, it is a piece of evidence
showing us that a North German or Prussian
statement is always quite simple; and that v;hcn
we have got to the motive of it we can put a label
on it vvithout fear of error. Such an enemy state-
ment is always either rigidly accurate, or false,
but quite credible, or false and fantastic, as the
case may be; but the three categories do not run
into one another. These bits of enemy news are
simply accurate or simply false, and if false either
credible or quite ridiculous.
It would be interesting, by the way, to collect
and criticise a whole conspectus of this kind of
thing. Such informations must be numerous in the
Press of neutral countries, and particularly in the
Press of countries still thought by the German
General Staff to be favourable to the German causa.
8«
^BW^Pfl
Twr
April 10, 1915.
THE WAR BY WATER.
THE SUBMARINE POSITION & THE ^BLOCKADE."
Bv FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.— This Article has been submitted to the Prors B-irenii, «hich does not object to the publication as censored, and takes no
responsibility for the correctness oi the sialemeuts.
THE moat important iiicideiil during the lust weok
is not one that at first sight would appear to have
any particular significance outside tJie operation
itself. It is some long time since we first sent aero-
planes to drop bombs on submarines building or
being put together at Zeebrugge, and the work c.'ime into the
category of " doing damage " rather than aught else.
Of late, however, aerial attack on submarines has been
resumed with considerable assiduity, and there is every
reason to believe that what appears to the public merely as
" another daring air raid " is really part of a scheme of high
general strategy. Indeed, it is not impossible that v/e are
witnessing the dawn of an entirely^ new era in naval v/arfare.
Before the war there was a somewhat general impression
that aircraft had to a great extent neutralised submarines.
Theories varied in daiiil ; but in all the main idea was that
submarines would easily be detected from th? sky and then as
easily destroyed by bomb-dropping unless they hastily buried
themselves many fathoms down or were protected by aerial
consorts. We also heard a great deal of the ideal combination
of aircraft and submarines, but to all intents and purposes
we have seen nothing of the sort.
On the otlier hand, two factors have by now made them-
selves abuiidantly clear. Of these the first is that, f/irri) the
comma),./ of the sea, the small craft of the superior Power
can do a great deal in the way of eliminating submarines —
how much we shall have to wait until the end of the war to
learn. However, the mere fact suffices.
The second factor is that, given the, command oj the air,
submarines building or lying at their bases can be attacked
and destroyed. This last, however, may be merely a tempo-
rary phase, at any rate, so far as building is concerned, be-
cause bombproof sheds ofier an obvious remedy unless the
air power available be sufficient to prevent the construction
of such safeties, or they can be destroyed by gun fire from
big ships in bombardments like that of Zeebrugge .some
mouths ago.
Neitlier factor seems to liave presented itself to the
German mind, any more than a third factor, which I shall
discuss later — that of permvncl.
Details of new German submarine construction are, so
far as the public is concerned, necessarily hard to come by;
they arc naturally only approximately to be arrived at, and
then only by piecing together odd scraps of information
derived from neutrals. We, of course, knov/ (hat on the
outbreak of war Germany had from eight to twelve sub-
marines in various stages of construction. The.se can hardly
have sufficed to replace losses which may run to anything
between fifteen and twenty. Some of the reported rammint's
by merchant ships may be duplications of the same story, or
the rammed submarine may have merely been injured some-
what and not sunk. None the less, considerable losses must
have been sustained, and, one way and another, the available
force of German submarines at the present moment must be,
relatively speaking, inconsiderable, especially when wa
remember that they have the Baltic to attend to as well as
our waters. With things as they were German submarines
would have gradually died out, just as the commerce raiding
cruisers did.
But — judging from the reports of neutrals — there i.-i
every rea.son to believe that on the outbreak of war Germany
suddenly laid down from fifty to sisty submarines. This has
been so often reported, and reported from so many different
Eources, that it may safely be assumed as a fact. In addition,
the improvising of submarine building yards on the Belgian
coast suggests that all the private yards of Germany are "also
building submarines.
Now, the average time for construction of a subntariua
under normal conditions is anything from a year upwards.
But in circumstances of pressure nine months is a quite
possible and reasonable period, and the war has now lasted
nearly nine mouths. Therefore, we may expect a very etrly
and large numerical increase in German submarines.
Now, this means that on the outbreak of war Germany
suddenly altered her naval policy, her usual proprammo
Laving been six boats a year. Why she made this'^sudden
change must necessarily be a matter of surmise. Wo can if
we will attribute it to a"pre war belief that the British p:mpira
would not be co-operating with France and Russia. Or wa
can attribute it to a sudden realisation of the impotence of a
few big ships against many — a sudden falling-away from
German eyes of the scales of convention. Yet again the easa
with which in rapid succession our l'nfhfind<r and the three
i'fen-iies were submarined may have had much to do with the
sudden conviction of Germany that her future, instead of
lying on the water, lay under the water.
Possibly all three causes operated. In any case, how-
ever, the net result is of the natiire of a new era, a vast
increase (for as soon as one boat is launched another appears
to be laid down) in the number of sul)mariaes and a decision
to regard the submarine as the principal warship for modera
requirements.
Now, where numbers are concerned this is perfectly
feasible; but v/here personnel is concerned the matter assumes
a somewhat different aspect. So far as men go, submarine
crews can probably be trained insjide a month. Their duties
are mainly mechanical.
With submarine ofTicf-rs, however, the state of afTairs is
totally diSerent. On the officers everything depends, and a
semi-trained submarine officer is rather worse than useless.
It takes a good two years or tlie better part of that time to
train an officer to commaud a submarine efficiently. On his
nerve, skill, endurance, and judgment everything depends to
a degree of which the general public (and, for that matter, a
fair number of senior oflicers) have no conception whatever.
When war broke out Germany had available ;:omewher«
about one hundred trained submarine officers at the outside.
Of these, cue v/ay and another, she must have lost anything
from one-third to a half, and none of those officers whom she
may have trained in the interim can yet be suitable for effec-
tive command.
So far as war efficiency is concerned, we may take it,
therefore, that tlic numerical increase and the effective in-
crease will not be at all one and the same thing. It will
necessarily mean the scrapping of all the older boats, or else
relegating them to training service. It will also be necessary
to promote to the command of large boats officers from small
boats and officers who have been second in command of boats,
and who — to a certain extent — are, therefore, still "under
training."
Consequently, if fifty new submarines be added to the
German Fleet in tlie course of the next few weeks, it will
not mean fifty bo.its added to the effective force of those
already existing. It will, however, mean the substitution
of newer and greatly improved boats for older ones, and here
our aerial raids to check new con.struction perform a special
function. Germany, having failed in her challenge to us on
the sea, is now about to fight for the under-sea mastery.
The recent air raids on submarine bases indicate thab
our Admiralty is fully alive to the situation and determined
to leave no stone unturned in maiutaiuing our submarine
superiority. Speculations as to all the measures being taken
are undesirable; but no harm is done by drawing attention to
the fact that when this war started we had tv.'o or three sub-
marines to every one possessed by Germany and a much more
considerable building programme in hand. This naturally
implies a far larger number of trained and efficient officers —
that is to say, humanly speaking, we possess as heavy a
margin for the new warfare as we did for the old.
It is true that in the new warfare in which Germany has
elected to seek naval salvation there is the problem of how
submarines are to fight each other. Unless both sides are
determined on a surface fight nothing is to be done save by
surprises, which of necessity are likely to be few and far
between. But, as 1 pointed out last week, the superior Power
has the advantage of being able to adopt the offensive, and
the net result of Germany's great submarine move will prob-
ably be that we learn to attack her in ways that else we might
not have deemed possible.
In the wanton slaughter of non-combatants in merchant
ships von Tirpitz is probably training our Navy to adapt
itself to the new era in naval warfare; indeed, the real neb
10*
April 10, 1915.
IkHD A :V U — \V A T E a.
result of tte submarine "blockade" may be tlie hastening
of tiat era. If the " blockade " has taught us the limita-
tions of the submarine, it has also served to give us a clearer
idea than heretoforb of its potentialities.
It is early days yet to prophesy that this war v.ill witness
the disappearance of the Dreadnought as a naval unit. Such
a state of affairs could perhaps only be brought about by a
succession of incidents iu which the Drerninoiir/Jtt was invari-
ably annihilated by the submarine — and it is a far cry to
adopt that as a probability.
None the less — for all that, little to justify such an
hypothesis appears to have occurred — there is reason to believe
that the next two or three months or so are going to witness
profound modifications of many of the previously accepted
ideas of naval warfare. If not fully up to the prophecy of
Admiral Sir Percy Scott a year or so ago, all the present
Indications are that the capital ship will presently be the
lubraarine, all other vessels gradually becoming subsidiary
and auxiliary to it.
THE DARDANELLES.
ITp to the time of writing (Monday niglit) there have
been no further developments in the Dardanelles. Occasional
bad weather interferes with the operations, and mine sweep-
ing is considerably hampered by the perhaps somewhat
unexpected activity which the Turks (or, more probably,
their German advisers) are displaying in the matter of repair-
Inc forts and making use of mobile artillery.
At and about the Narrows the channel is so restricted
that every sort and kind of weapon can be utilised to annoy
the mine sweepers, while concealment of guns from aerial
observation has now become such a fine art that it is unfair
to espect too much assistance from the sky. Pending the
dearance of the shores by a land force, it is difficult to see
how progress afloat can be aught but very slow and tedious,
especially since every spell of bad weather gives opportunity
to the enemy to make good his damages.
THE B03PH0RUS AND BLACK SEA.
The Russian Black Sea Fleet is now reported to be con
'ducting operations against the Bosphorus defences, but so
far as^can be gathered nothing of a serious nature has yet
been attempted. Very probably the Russians are badly
hampered by lack of equipment and sup]5lies for any co-
operating land force, while they are undoubtedly furlhar
hampered by the circumstance that they can ill afford to lose
any of their ships, as they have no reserve to draw on such as
we and the French have.
The difficulties of any naval action against the Bosphorus
were dealt with iu these Notes a fortnight ago. One way and
another, therefore, it is likely enough that Russian progre.-.^
will be as slow or slower than our own.
The small Turkish cruiser MedjidirJi is semi-officially
reported to have struck and been sunk by a mine iu the Black
Bea, where she was conducting some marauding operations
devoid of all military significance. Her loss can have no
material effect on the campaign, as her fighting value was
•mall and she was getting old.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
F. A. C. M. (Bath).— (1) All except the very latest
German submarines have a peculiarly raised bow which
cannot be mistaken. (2) The captain of a merchant ship
would certainly be unable to tell the nationality of a sub-
merged submarine from its periscope. On the other hand,
no British submarine would approach a ii:ercliant ship in
■urh a condition, so " sunk by mistake " that way would be
en improbable event. (3) In the national interest the
Admiraltv mav at any time see fit to conceal a loss, but yo(i
may take'it that they would immediately inform privately all
the relatives of the lost.
PoBEi.ES.— The Navy lias quicker way? of disposing of
hostile mine fields than by the scheme which you suggest.
W. A. W. (Clifton). — You are by no means alone in
criticising the responsible naval authorities because the Orrt'n
and other ships were sunk by floating n:ines. But, as I pointed
cut at the time, no information has yet been forthconung as
to the conditions which obtained, and in the absence of any
such information both comment and criticism must necessarily
be unfair and futile. Trust the British Navy.
R. N. (Belfast). — A submarine can lie at the bottom of
the sea provided the water be not too deep. It could do .-o
down to 150 feet or so. If, of course, it tried to do the same
thing in the deepest part of the Atlantic the pressure would
crumple it up.
J. H. (Scarborough).— (1) I am sorry, but I do not know
the answer myself. Possibly some of the big projectila-makers,
such as Hadfield or Forth, would give you the inforr.iation you
require. (2) The lliu. and 12in. German sJiells have two
copper bands; I do not remember what the 8.2 has. (3)
The marks on the nose of the shell presented to you by the
German warships are no clue to the dimensions of the shell.
(4) Nothing seems definitely certain as to which ships bom-
barded Scarborough, but the ships out are generally believed
to have been MoUlce, SeydUtz, Daftinger, Von der Tann,
Bluchcr, and some of the small fast cruisers like the Rostock.
One, at least, will never be seen again.
M. W. C. (Bristol),— (1) At the present moment, to all
intents and purposes German cruisers are swept off the seas.
The fate of one or two is somewhat uncertain, but they are
certainly quite harmless. (2) The Gazelle was got into har-
bour badly damaged. (3) The Admiralty very v,-isely object
to comments on questions having to do with the particular
condition of any particular ship. (4) The Emden'< landing
party apparently got away while the Sydney was otherwise
euga^ged. (5) Portugal has no Navy suitable for moder.i
navaf warfare. She has been several times reported as being
technically at war with Germany, but that appears to be the
end of the matter.
E. P. S. (Cheltenham).— When a ship is interned she 13
usually more or less taken possession of by the port authori-
ties, and it is legally correct to disarm her.
W. C. S. (West Hampstcad).— Devices for catching sub-
marines under water are as common as blackberries. They
are unfortunately nearly always based on a failure to appre-
ciate the capabilities of modern submarines.
O. W. J. (Liverpool). — A device such as you suggest is
feasible, but even at the present time the submarine is
" nobody's friend." It might deceive merchant ships, but
would not deceive naval officers.
A. B. P. (Winchester).— I do not think that there is
any truth in the rumour to which you refer, but in any case
it is inadvisable to allude to it in print. For the successful
conduct of this war it is absolutely necessary for the public
to tru5t the responsible authorities and to be content to remain
ignorant about matters which are naturally of the utmost
interest to everybody.
R. C. B. (London, S.W.).— If you study the title of that
photograph of the Fleet outside the Dardanelles, you will see
that no date is specified. It was probably taken quite early iu
the war, and no connection with the more recent operations.
E. S. R. (St. Andrews). — The scheme you suggest is
quite feasible, but the Brili>h Navy is hardly likely to be
caught napping that way.
W. S. C. (Glenarm). — The scheme yon suggest was em-
ployed in the American Civil War and has been in use ever
fiiiee.
J. S. D. (Highgate). — (1) American uewspr.pers are
always discovering " young inveutor.s " who have hit on some
idea "to revolutionise war. The writer of the paragraph which
vou enclosed is obviously entirely ignorant of what can be
"done with modern torpedoes. Any of the latest Whiteheads
will easily travel five miles. (2) Your periscope suggestion
was, I happen to know, subuiitted to the Adn iralty by an
optician very early iu the war. It is, of course, based on a
device commonly used in the music-halls. The bulk of the
periscopes which are seen by people are hallucinations— even
men daily trained to look for them find it very hard to see
them. (3) I understand that this idea has lieen experimented
with, but that it did not prove practical. (4) I think the
game answer applies.
HoFEFtii. (York).— There is little limit to the auxiliary
services for which submarines can be employed, but success
r.lways depends entirely on the individuality and ability of the
officers in charge.
MR. HILMRE BELI.OC S WAR LECTURE?.
Biimin^'lmm Town Hall Tuefday 13 An.il 3.20 i 8.30
Leau.ii.Klo" 'IWnHall Weaufsday 14 Apii . o p.m.
Xouiiigbam Albeit Hall \Vedo<-sday 14 .-ipnl. 8 p.m.
Lontlun. Queen's llaU WtJnf.ih^y 5 -May, 3.30 p.m.
MR. FRED T. JANE ON THE NAVAL AVAR.
I^,]s AlbertUall Thursday 15 .April, 8 p.m.
fJl„.flieM VicteilaHall Friday 16 April. 8 p.m.
Hiinogat* Kursasl S.itiuday 17 Apiil. 3.30 p.m.
MR. CRAWFURD PRICE ON "SERBIA."
Biackpeot Winter Caidens... Monday 12 Ai>ri!. 8 p.m.
Searborough ()p<'ra House -Tuesday 13 Apiil, 3 p.m.
York Oneia House V.'ediiceday 14 April, 5 p.m.
MaiK-hcster Kiee Trade Hall. Thm-;,d5y 15 .\pii!,8 p.m.
Boutbport Cambridge HjII.. Frid.-)y 16 April, Op.ra.
PROFESSOR LEWES ON "MODERN EXPLOSIVES."
Torquay Pavilion Fiiday 9 April, 3 p.m.
n*
^vInTT
AND \\l A i L li.
April 10, 1915.
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER.-IIL
co-operation of aircraft with artillery.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
IN a previous article the writer endeavoured to sliow tliat
the advent of aircraft relieves the cavalry of certain
tasks for which it is not really suited, thereby increas-
ing the value of that arm, provided always that the
latter is capable of taking full advantage of its air
service. The ascendancy, for instance, which our air service
seems now to possess over that of the enemy is due not only to
the superiority of the service itself, but also to a very careful
and intimate co-operation that, for efficiency, must exist
between air squadrons and the forces to which they are
attached. Destroy that close co-operation and you destroy, at
the same time, aerial efficiency as at present known.
It is not only as a means of reconnaissance, supplement-
ing the cavalry, that aircraft have already exercised an in-
direct influence in the present war. The aeroplane has also
rendered invaluable service to tlie artillery.
The employment of smokeless powder by the belligerents
lias rendered the location of targets for artillery a very diffi-
cult matter indeed, and has resulted in a great waste of
ammunition and a great amount of useless wear and tear of
big guns. This is especially the case where the equipment of
the gun enables fire to be delivered from positions hidden to
the opposing artillery.
Ascendancy in the air now enables a commander to use
his aircraft to co-operate with, and to assist, his artillery. The
assistance which an efficient air service can render to the artil-
lery can be classified under four heads: —
(i.) Discovery of hostile batteries, their strength and
arrangement,
(ii.) Indication of concealed targets,
(iii.) Observation of fire and assistance in the process of
ranging,
(iv.) Information concerning the effect of the fire.
Thus, suppose that, as indicated in Diagram II., an artil-
lery commander at A wishes to determine exactly the distance
A B of & hostile battery B hidden from him, and that he
decides to have recourse to the services of one of his airmen
for that purpose, he would indicate to his aerial observer the
direction of B, and would decide with him at what altitude he
would fly over the enemy's battery. The airman would then
go to some suitable place, C, behind A, and from there would
rise to the prearranged altitude, 77. In passing, it is interest-
ing to note that the aeroplane reaches its altitude by mo^nng
in a spiral until the required height, H, has been reached.
It then flies out, keeping at that height, towards B. At D
it is immediately over B, and it has to make this fact known
to the artillery officer by means of a system of signals which
tho writer cannot indicate in an article meant for publication
during the war.
If the artillery officer at .-1 knows the exact moment when
In Diagram I. an illustration is given of a position where
an enemy's battery B is concealed from the artillery at A.
Tho battery B may be so concealed by trees and bushes that
the ordinary methods of reconnaissance cannot easily locate
it. An aeroplane, flying from A over B, may determine the
position of the battery, unless the battery itself is rendered
Invisible from above. In most cases, however, there will be
some sign of activity near B which will attract the aerial
observer's attention and which will enable him to make a
detailed observation of B.
In assisting an artillery commander the airman is most
often given the general direction of the enemy's battery rela-
tively to his own, and his task consists in locating the target
along that direction.
In such a case the aeroplane rises to a prearranged height
behind his artillery commander's battery in order to run less
danger from hostile fire. When the airman has reached the
required altitude he flies out towards the battery, in the
indicated direction, to locate exactly the target. The location
of the battery enables the artillery commander to determine
the distance of the target with a great decree of accuracy.
the aircraft is at D, a point vertically above B, then all he
has to measure in order to determine the distance A B is tlia
angle DAB. He has then sufficient data either to obtain
the range A Bhy calculation or by means of a range-finder.
It is impossible to over-estimate the value of exact and
quick range finding. Its importance is threefold :
(a) It is conducive to a quicker destruction of the
enemy's battery.
{h) It reduces the waste of ammunition and the wear
and tear of the guns.
(c) It reduces the time to which batteries may be
exposed to the enemy's fire.
In other words, an aerial ascendancy which allows the
co-operation of aircraft with artillery, whenever the situation
demands it, is of such great moment that no country possessing
Buch an asset should run the risk of compromising its
effectiveness.
It must not, however, be forgotten that the influence of
air power resulting from the co-operation of aircraft with
artillery is just as indirect as that arising from its use with
the cavalry or any other arm. An artillery commander caa-
12»
April 10, 1915.
LAND AND WATER,
take full advantage of llie assistance of liis air service only
if he is not outranged by the artillery of the enemy, and if he
has an adequate supply of guns and ammunition. It would
be of no avail to him to know the exact range of the enemy's
battery if the enemy did not allow him to place his guns
sufficiently near enough to damage their battery, or if he had
not sufficient ammunition for that purpose. It is thus clear
that it is but an indirect influence which air power can exert
when it is obtained as a result of the co-operation of air units
with land and sea forces. An air fleet can only exert a direct
influence if it be employed as an entirely independent force.
The general conclusion, therefore, to be drawn from the
facts which the writer has already explained in this, and the
previous articles, on the Influence of Air Power is that such
an influence can be exercised in two ways: —
(a) Indirectly, by~ the co-operation of aircraft with
cavalry, artillery, &c.
(t) Directly, by employing aircraft as an independent
force.
The first demands that air fleets, or air squadrons, should
be placed under various cavalry and artillery commanders,
whilst the second makes it clear that they should form a force
capable of acting either independently or, when necessary, in
direct co-operation with the Commander-iu-Cliief. The in-
advisability of employing an air fleet, at one time indepen-
dently, at another under the orders of cavalry or of artillery
commanders, is obvious. Such a method would not lead to the
close and intimate co-ordination necessary to an air fleet
acting in co-operation v.ith cavalry or artillery, and would
not, on the other hand, leave the aerial force sufficiently
free to act on its own initiative and at its own time. And
yet to benefit fully from influence of air power it is necessary
to be able to use its direct, as well as its indirect advantages.
With air fleets, as we now have them, it is necessary to com-
pi-omise their direct, in order to profit by their indirect
influence, and vice versd. The dilemma in which a Com-
mander-in-Chief is at present placed as regards the employ-
ment of the aerial force at his disposal is the following : Shall
he employ his air fleet to exert direct influence, in which case
he would have to forego the advantages accruing from the
co-operation of his aircraft with his other arms, or shall he
employ his aerial force to exert the indirect influence with
which we are now familiar, in which case he would have to
renounce the possible effect of the direct influence of air
power ? This dilemma the writer proposes to deal with in his
next article.
NAPOLEON'S PASSAGE of the DANUBE
in 1809.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B., late R.E.
To show how much easier the passage of a great river
has become, thanks to the improvement which
has taken place in modern armament, there is
given here a brief account of the forcing of the
Danube by Napoleon below Vienna.
It was in face of the whole Austrian Army, some 240,000,
h\ 1809, and there are many points of similarity between
it and the passage of the Rhine v.'hich we shall undertake this
vear; therefore Napoleon's operation is particularly interest-
ing at the present moment.
In March, 1809, the Emperor had conjured out of tha
earth, so it seemed to his enemies, one of the greatest armies
he had ever led, consisting of about 200,000 in the first line,
followed by many reinforcements. Its numbers came as a
complete strategic surprise to the Austrians ; but, like another
nrrny now arrayed against us, its magnitude had been attained
by the sacrifice of quality, and it could no longer attack on
the battlefield except in heavy massed formations, so curiously
does history repeat itself.
Essentially by weight of numbers skilfully concentrated
at the decisive points, Napoleon had driven the Austrians
before him right across Bavaria and through the n'.ount-ainous
barrier which lies between the Bavarian frontier and Vienna.
He forced them to evacuate their capital and to transfer all
their available troops to the left bank of the Danube, which
runs north of the City of Vienna about three miles away.
The river here is as wide as the Thames at Gravcsend,
and runs with almo.st equal speed — i.e., four miles an hour in
flood, and the floods were endless that year.
Over that width of water the artillery and musketry fire
of the time was of no avail, and as the Austrian pickets were
alert on the opposite bank, v.'hich they held for thirty miles
above the city and twenty miles below it (quite a narrow
front even then for a quarter of a million to defend), the out-
look for the French, the prospect of their crossing the Danube,
was far from inspiriting. But some eight miles below Vienna
was an island — that of Lobau, about 1,000 yards long, 300
wide, and separated from the Austrian shore by fifty yards of
water, its borders densely clothed by willows and reeds.
The Emperor determined to surprise the passage of the
river at this point. Collecting all the vessels and timber
necessary for bridging in the little tributary which, flowing
through Vienna, enters the Danube just above the Lobau,
under cover of night parties of light infantry in boats cap-
tured the island, drove out the Austrian pickets, and the
building of the bridge at once was begun, the while a fleet of
boats ferried more troops to the island. The short bridges
between Lobau and the left bank gave very little trouble to
the French, and at daylight Napoleon attacked the villages
of Aspern and Esslingen with the first troops to arrive on the
ground, while ceaseless Etreama of reinforcements poured
over the bridges.
At midday, however, a big flood poured down the river
carrying with it quantities of timber from tlie hills, breaking
the main bridge. This was repaired again, and again
destroyed, this time very seriously. The Austrians during
this time, fighting with desperation, had repulsed all the
French efforts, and, driven back, crowds of wounded and
beaten troops came streaming into the island.
This was, perhaps, the most critical moment ever faced
by Napoleon. His marshals, seeing what they believed to be
a debacle, urged instant retreat out of Lobau, using all avail-
able boats as ferries.
This the Emperor absolutely declined to consider. He
realised, as perhaps his mai-shals did not, that at the first sign
of withdrawal on his part ell South Germany would rise
against him, and the retreat once begun would never cease
until the French had reached the Rhine.
So be remained, and fortunately the next day the
weather moderated. Then he ordered the most colossal pre-
parations for forcing the passage of the narrow arm of the
Danube, deploying his troops in face of a victorious army on
the opposite side, and military history holds no like record.
The arsenals and storehouses in Vienna supplied the
Emperor with ample material, and after six weeks' labour
the whole front of Lobau facing the enemy was converted into
a huge battery of siege guns some 200 in number. These
could sweep a zone inland 600 yards broad with such torrents
of grape and case shot that no Austrians could survive within
it; neither could they entrench, for the subsoil water lay too
near the surface.
Finally, two great bridges were completed, and a picket
boat service was organised to deal with the fireships and rafts
of timber which were sent by the Austrians to drift down
the current against tlie bridges.
Meanwhile they (the Austrians) had drawn as near to
(he river as the French guns would allow, and lay literally ia
formation for immediate action confronting the French.
In spite of this, under cover of night and later of the
morning mists, the Emperor succeeded in sending over the
Danube a fii'st contingent of nearly 100,000 men, and with
them achieved what was practically a surprise. The 100,000
were followed before nightfall by as many more, and for forty-
eight hours one of the greatest battles in history raged, the
result most uncertain to cither side, until at length the
Austrians, satisfied with the punishment they had inflicted
and knowing that great reinforcements must reach them
before long, gave up the field to the French, and rehired to a
fresh position, while the Imperial troops were too crippled to
pursue. An armistice followed, and finally conditions of
peace were arranged, with which we have nothing to do.
What is of interest is for us to note how immeasurably
simpler the case would have been for Napoleon had the
present-day appliances, both civil and militarx', been avail-
able on both bides in his time.
13*
LAND AND WATER.
April 10, 1915.
He did not capture and tlicn bold on to tlie island of
Lobau because lie liked doing so, but because in no other way
could bo create an artillery superiority sufficient to sweep
out a space large enough for the deployment of his army. The
process of fortifying the island occupied weeks, during thii
whole of which period his enemy was receiving reinforcements
and organising new ones, and his attention was then concen-
trated Oil the ona and only point from whence the enemy could
come.
During all these weeks rumours of the repulse suffered
by the French at Aspern and Essliugen were spreading
through the country and encouraging the inhabitants to raid
the French communications, and incidents revealing the
intense ill-will of the people, and not to be concealed from
the troops, could not but depress their spirits when they
proved to be of daily occurrence.
To-day the howitzers and light siege gun train accom-
panying every army, together with the field batteries, once
they had established a relative superiority over the enemy, as
those of tlie Allies have done in France, could have created
and maintained an even more intolerable zone of destruction
from 3,000 yards range as Napoleon's siege guns could accom*
plisb at 500; and instead of 200 guns, a modern army would
probably dispose of nearly 2,000 in a case of similar im*
portance.
The nights would have been just as dark and the current
just as Bwift, but the means of overcoming these difficulties
are now so incomparably more powerful that they would not
present to us the same problem that Napoleon had to solve;
while working under cover of searchlights the degree of dark-
ness no longer matters, for, turning their beams full on the
enemy, you can follow up in the shadows outside them with-
out the chance of being seen, while you can when detected
put out of action any searchlights of the enemy.
The whole question returns to the old one I quoted last
week: " What man has done, man can do." And if in 1809
the French forced the passage of the Danube with the troops
and materials then at their disposal, and against a strategical
numerical superiority, they — or we — to whoever the task may
be given, can force the Rhine with far greater ease in view of
the greatly better means we now control, m all uf uhich the
relative superiority iww belongs to us.
A DIARY OF THE WAR.
SYNOPSIS.
AcGuST 3rd. — Sir Edward Grey stited British policy and revealed
Germany's amazing offer, in the event of our neglecting onr obligations
to France. Mobilisation of the Army. Ultimatiini to Germany.
German and French Ambassadors left Paris and Berlin.
August 4th. — Germany rejected England's ultimatum. English
Government took over control of railways. War declared between
England and Germany.
August 5th. — Lord Kitchener appointed Secretary of Stats for
War. H.M.S. Amphion struck a mine and foundered.
August 6th. — House of Common.s, in fiv« minutes, passed a vote of
credit for £100,000,000, and sanctioned an increase of the Army by
500,000 men. State control of food prices.
August 8th. — Lord Kitchener issued a circular asking for 100,000
men.
August Qtii. — The enemy's submarine, Ula was sunk by H.M.S.
Birminghatn.
August IOth. — France declared war on Austria-Hungary. Germans
advanced on Namur. The new Press Bureau established by ths
Government for the issue of official war news.
August 11th. — England declared war against Austria.
August 15ih. — The Tsar addressed a Proclamation to the Polish
populations of Russia, Germany, and Austria, promising to restore to
Poland complete autonomy and gnai-ant-ees for religious liberty and
the use of the Polish language.
August 16th. — Japanese ultimatum io Germany demanding ths
■withdrawal of her vessels of war from the Far East.
August 17th. — The British Expeditionary Force safely landed in
France.
The Belgian Government transferred from Brussels to Antwerp.
August 18th.— General Sir H. Smith-Dorrieu appointed to com-
mand of an Army Corps of the British Exjjeditionary Force, in suc-
cession to the late General Grierson.
August 21st. — The German force.'* entered Brussels.
August 23iiD. — Japan declared war on Germany.
August 24tii. — Fall of Namar.
August 27th. — The German armed merchantman Kai^'r Wilhflm
der Gro$se, was sunk by H.M.S. Highflyir on the We.st Africa Coast.
August 28tii. — A' concerted operation was attempted against th«
Germans in the Heligoland Bight.
The First Light Cruiser Squadron sank the Mainz. The Fir.st
Battle Cruiser Squadron sank one cruiser, Koln class, and another
cruiser disappeared in the mist, heavily on fire, and in a sinking
condition.
Two German destroyers were sunk and many damaged.
September 3kd. — The I'rench Government moved to Bordeaux.
September 4th.~ The Russian Army under General Ruzsky cap-
tured Lembcrg.
Sepiemp.eu 5th. — The formal alliance of England, France, and
Russia was signed in London by the representatives of the three
Governments concerned, binding each nation to eoncluda peace, or
discuss terms of peace, only in conjunction with its Allies. End of
retreat from Mons to Marne.
September 6th. — The scout-crniser Pulh/iiiJer foundered after
running upon a mine.
September 7th. — Fall of Maubeuge.
September 9th. — The English Army crossed the Marne, and the
enemy retired about twenty-five miles.
Sepi F.MBER 13th. — On the left wing the enemy continued his retreat-
ing movement. The Belgian Army pushed forward a vigorous offensive
to the south of Lierre.
September 14th. — All day the enemy etubbornly disputed the
passage of the Aieue by our troops, but nearly aU the crossings were
secured by sunset.
Septemkek ISth. — The Allied troops occupied Eheims.
September 16th. — Submarine fc'S, Lieutenant-Commander ^^ax
Kennedy Horton, torpedoed the German cruiser Hcla aix miles south
of Heligoland.
SEFfEMBEP. 19th. — The BritUh auxiliary cruiser Carmania, Captain
Noel Grant, Royal Navy, sank the Cap Trafalgar off the east coast of
South America.
September 22md. — H.M. ships .ihoid-ir, Uogut, and Crttsy were
«unk by submarinea in the North Sea.
September 23hd. — British aeroplanes of the Naval wing delivered
an att,ack on the Zeppelin sheds at Diisseldorf.
October Isr. — 'The arrival of the Indian E.xpeditionary Force rt
Marseilles.
October 2.vd. — His JLijcsty's Government authorised a min»-
layin^- policy in certain areas.
October 5th. — In Russia the German Army, which was operatina
between the front of East Prussia and the Niemen, was beaten all
along the line and retreated, abandoning a considerable quantity ol
material.
October 9th. — The British naval airmen carried out another suo-
cessful raid on the Zeppelin sheds at Diisseldorf.
October IOth. — Death of King Carol of Roumania.
October 11th. — The Russian cruiser Pallada was sunk in the Baltio
by a German submarine.
October 14th. — The Belgian Government removed from Ostcnd to
Havre.
October 15th. — H.M.S. Yarmouth (Captain Henry L. Cochrane)
sank the German liner Alarkomania off Sumatra, aud captui'ed th«
Greek steamer Pontaiioro.%.
October 16th.— H. JF.S. JlawH (Captain Hugh P. E. William*,
R.N.) was attacked and sunk by submaruies.
October 17th. — The new light cruiser Undaunted (Captain Cecil H*
Fox), accompanied by the destroyers Lance (Commander W. de M.
Egerton), Lennox (Lieut. -Commander C. R. Dane), Ticgion (Lieut. C. F.
AUsop), and Loyal (Lieut.-Commander F. Burgea Watson), sunk fou»
German destroyers off the Dutch coast.
October 25th. — A German submarine was rammed and sunk by
the destroyer Badger (Commander Charles Fremantle, R.N.) off th»
Dutch coast.
October 29th. — Admiral H.S.H. Prince Louis of Battenberg re-
signed his position as First Sea Lord of the Admiralty.
October 31st. — H.5[.S. Hcrmei was sunk by a torpedo fired by a
German submarine in the Straits of Dover.
November 2nd.— The Admiralty declared the whole of the North
Sea a military area.
November 4th. — It was reported that the Schnrnhnrst, Gneiiinau,
Leipzig, Dresden, and Nilniberg concentrated near Valparaiso, and
tliat an engagement was fought on Noxember 1st. The Monmouth
and the Good Hope were sunk. The Glasgow and the Otranto escaped.
November 5th. — The German cruiser Yorck struck the mine*
blocking the entrance to Jahde Bay and saidc.
November 7tii. — The fall of Tsingtau was announced.
November lOrn. — The Emden was driven ashore and burnt at
Keeling Cocos Island by H.M.A.S. Sydney (Captain John C. T.
Glossop, R.N.). The KOnigsbtrg was imprisoned in the Rufigi Island
by H.M.S. Chatham.
November 11th. — H.M.S. Niger (Lieut.-Commander Arthur P.
Muir, R.N.) was torpedoed by a submarine in the Downs, and
foundered.
November 14Tn. — Field-Jfarshal Lord Roberts died at the Head-
quarters of the British Army in France.
November 25nD. — The German submarine VIS was rammed by a
British destroyer, the Garry, off the coast of Scotland.
November 26th. — H.M.S. Bulwark blew up in Sheerness Harbour.
December Bth.— A British squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir
Frederick Sturdee sighted off the Falkland Islands a German squadron
consi-sting of the Schumhorst, Gneisenaii, Nurnherg, Leipzig, and
Dresden. Three of these five warships were sunk, including the flag-<
ship of Admiral Comit von Spee.
December Oth. — Valievo was retaken by the Serbians, who ener-
getically pur.?ued the Austrian forces.
December IOth. — A further telegram was received from Vics-
Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee reporting that the NUrnberg was also
sunk on December Bth.
December 13th. — Submarine Bll, Lieut.-Commander Norman D.
Holbrook, R.N., entered the Dardanelles, and, in spite of the difficuH
current, dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed ths Turkish
battleship Mcfsudiyeh, which was guarding the minefield.
December 16rH. — In the morning a German cruiser force made a
demonstration upon the Yorkshire coast, in the course of which they
shelled Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough. They were engaged
by tli« patrol vessels on the spot, and a British patrolling squadron
endeavoured to cut them off. On being »ig)it-ed by British voaaeU
14*
April 10, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
the Germans retired at fuU jsij;-id, and, favoured by the r.iist, suc-
ceeded in making good their escape.
DeCEiiBKn 17ru. — Great Britain proclaimed Egypt a British pro-
tectorate.
DfiCEiiEER 24th.^ — A German aeroplane dropped a bomb into a
garden at Dover, doing no great damage and causing no casualties.
December 26th. — A German aeroplane Hew over Shceinesa. Pur-
Eued by three British machines and fired on by antiaircraft guns, it
made off towards the East Coast.
British cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and seaplanes made a com-
bined raid on Gorman warships lying in the roads off Cuxhaven. Our
ehips, whilo standing by to pick up the seaplanes, were themselves
attacked by enemy Zeppelins, seaplanes, and submarinea. Tliey beat
off the attack and succeeded in picking up three out of the seven
airmen with their machines. Three other pilots who returned later
were picked up, according to arrangement, by British submarines,
wliich were standing by. their machines being sunk. The extent of
the damage by the British airmen's bombs cannot be estimated, but
all were discharged on points of military significance.
J.wu.^nx 19tu. — German aircraft raided the East Coast in the
evening and dropped bombs on Yarmouth.
Janu.miy 24th. — Early in t!ie morning a British patrollinj; squadron
Biphted three German battle-cruisers and an armiiared cruiser, the
Sliicher, steering westwards. The German warships turned and mads
for home, but were brought to action. The Bliichcr was sunt, and
two other German battle-cruisers were seriously damaged.
Febuu.'iP.y 2xd.— The Turks attempted to cross the Suez Canal near
Tussuni.
They were allowed to bring their bridging material to the bank
nnmolested. Wlsen the bridging operations had actually started we
attacked them. Our attack wa's completely successful. The enemy
fled in disorder, leaving the whole of the bridging material in our
hands, and some of the enemy were drowned in the Canal.
The enemy also attacked us on the El Kantara front, but wee
easily repulsed.
FgBnuAKY Grn. — In the Black Sea P.ussian cruisers bombarded a
Tuikish battery near Trebizond and sank a stc.nmer with her carg.:>,
and the Turkish cruiser Unslait bombarded Yalta.
The Wilhdmina, Ih© United Stat<>s ship laden with food fur
Gel many, arrived at Falmouth.
FEBRC.vny Uih.— The Rushians fell back from the line of the
Ma.surian Lakes towards their frontier.
Febuu.4;iy 12rH. — Thirty-four Biitish aeroplanes and seaplanes
made a raid on tho Belgian coast; considerable damage Wiis done to
the enemy's bases and establislmients.
Februaby 16th. — Forty British aeroplane* and seaplanes, assisted
by eight French aeroplanes, dropped bombs on Ostend, Middlekerke,
Ghistelles, and Zeebrugge.
Febru.vry 17th. — A Zeppelin was wrecked on the Danish island of
Fanoe.
Febru.^ry 18th. — In Lorraine the French carried the village of
NoiToy.
Another Zeppelin was wrecked off the Danish coast.
February 19th. — The Austrian Army occupied Cuernowitz, the
Ruissiaus falling back beyond the Pruth.
A British fleet of batlle.^hips and battle cruisers, and aided by a
strong French squadron, the whole under the command of Vice-Admiral
Sackville H. Garden, began an attack upon the forts at the entrance to
the Dardanelles. The forts on the European side were silenced.
February 21si. — A German aeroplane visited Esaex and dropped
bombs on Colchester, Braiiitrce, and Coggeshall.
The French torpedo-boat Dugue struck a mine at Antivari and
lank.
February 25th. — All the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles
were successfully reduced.
February 26th. — Great Biitain formally declared a blockade of
German East Africa.
The Germans retired along the whole front in the Przasny&z region.
February 28th.— The Dacia was arrested in the Channel by a
French cruiser and conducted to Brest.
M.\RiJH 1st. — The Piime Minister announced to the House of
Commons that commodities of any kind were to be prevented, by
means of the Allied Fleets, from reaching or leaving the German
Empire.
The Russian Army concluded the operations round Przasnysz,
where they defeated two army corps and drove them buck to tho
frontier.
March 2nd. — The captain of the British collier Thoradh reported
ramming and sinking a Gcnuau submarine off Beachy Head.
March 3rd. — Operations iu the Dardanelles were resumed and mo'.e
forts were silenced.
March 4tu. — Tlic German submarine VS was sunk off Dover by
destroyers, her crew being .sa\ed.
The Russians re-entered 8t-anislau and crosse<l the Lukwa.
March 6th. — A squadron of battleships and cruisers, under the
Commander in-Chief, East Indies, began the bombardment of Smyrna.
March 8th. — Six aeroplanes of the Naval Wing, under Wing-Com-
mandcr Longraore, carried out an air attack on Oetend. Bombs were
dioppcd on tlie submaruio base and on the Kursaal, the headquarter*
of the military.
March 9th.- In the House of Commons Mr. Lloyd George brought
In a BiU to enable the Government to take over any factory or work-
eliop in which war materia! cmild be produced.
March IOvh. — British troops, supported by French artillery, carried
the village of \euve Chapcile, and advanced north-cast and south ea^t
of it.
The German losses were very heavy, and 1,000 prisoners and some
machine-guns were captured.
The German submarine V H wag rammed and sunk by the destroyer
ArirL Ten of the crew of twenty-eight were saved.
March 11th. — A British air squadron bombarded Westende, and
British aviators succeeded in destroying the railway junctions at Cour-
trai and ^lenin.
The Gctmau auxiliai-y cruiser Prince Eitrl Friedrich arrived at
JCewpnrt News with the crews of \c«sela sunk by her.
II.M. auxiliary cruiser Biujano was torpedoed in the Firth of Clyde.
Mapxh 12rH. — Tho British troops csptnred the village L'Epinette
and gained possession of part of the German lines near Pietre,
capturing about 400 prisoners.
March 13th. — Tho British troops crossed the brook of Layos,
which runs parallel to the road from Necve Chapelle to Fleurbaix, and
beiwccn this road and Aubers they captured several trenches.
JLuicH 14tii.— H.JI.S. Glasgow and H.M.S. Kent sank the Dresden
near Juan Fernandez Island.
March 15th. — The British Army, which the German attack hart
compelled to fall back beyond St. Eloi, recaptured the village and
almost the whole of the neighbouring trenches, in spite of several
counter-attacks by the enemy.
March ITiH.^The French troops continued to make progress in the
region of Perthes.
March 18th. — Russian troops reached Mcmel, after crossing the
frontier near Gorshdy and beating the German forces, capturing some
machine-guns and motor-cars laden v.ith stores.
After ten days of mine-sweeping inside the Dardanelles, the British
and French fleets made a general attack on the fortresses at the >farrows.
Three battleships were lost in these operations by striking mines —
tile French ISouvel, and tho I rresistible and the Ocean.
March 19th. — At Przemy.sl the garrison made a determined sortie.
Tile enemy was forced back on his own line of forts. In repulsing the
sortie the Russian troops captured more than 4,000 prisoners and sixteen
inachiue-guns.
March 20th. — In the Vosges the Great and the Little Reichacker-
kopf were captured by the enemy.
March 21st.— Two Zeppelins attacked Paris in the early hours of
the morning. The material damage done was insignificant.
March 22nd. — The fortress of Przemysl surrendered to the
Russians.
Mauc!! 23mi. — A Turkish force, 1,000 stiving, v.as routed near the
Suez Canal. *"
March 24th. — British aviators carried out a successful raid on
German submarines being constincted at Hoboken, near Antwerp.
March 25th.- The G«rnian submarine US9 was sunk with all hands.
Tho Russians caiiturcd an important Austrian position in the
I.upkow Pass ; 5,000 prisoners and several dozen machine guns were
taken.
March 26th. — ^French aviators bombarded the airship sheds of
Frescaty and the station of Metz, and also the baaiacka to tho east of
Strassbonrg.
March 27ih. — In Alsaee the French troops captured the summit
of Hartmannswcilcrkopf. The Germans abandoned important material
and left nnniorous dead on the field.
March 28rn. — Belgian aviators bombarded the aviation camp at
GliLstelles.
DAY BY DAY.
Tuesday, March 30.
NorlJi-east of St. Mihiel, French artillery forced the
enemy to evacuate in disorder the village of Hendieourt.
West of Bois-le-Pretre, French troops carried a line of
trenches and captured about 100 prisoners.
Wednesday, March 31.
Ill tlie Argoune, the French captursd 160 metres of
trenches.
French aviators carried out a series of raids in tlie
Woevre, in Champagne, in the Soissons district, and iu
Belgiiini.
The British steamers FJominian and Croirn of CaftlUe
sunk off the Scilly Isles by V2S.
I hursday, April 1.
Briti.«ih aviators made a successful raid on German sub-
niarines at Hoboken and Zeebrugge.
In tha Woevre, French troops occupied the village cf
Fey-eu-Haye.
The Ru-ssian troops captured a aeries of fortified height?
on the Rest id inountaius and in the direction of Chokin.
Friday, April 2.
The Geriiian submarine I'lO destroyed three trawlers
off tiie Tyne.
On the Niemen front the Russian troops drove back the
Germans :ind infjicted lieavy losses.
Bp.!!:i-< of Bulgarians made a raid into Serbia. Their
attack wjs repulsed by a Serbian regiment, and thej' were
driven from the field carrying their wounded.
Saturday, .April 3.
In the region of the Sonime, at La Boi.sselle, mine war-
fare continued with marked advantage to ihe French troops.
Near Lassigny and in U2>per Alsace German attacks
were repulsed.
Sunday, April 4.
The day was quiet on the whole western front except in
the Woevre, where the progress of the French troops con-
tinued.
On the front to the west of the Niemen fightiag developed
greatly iu favour of the Russian troops.
Mon 'ay, April 5.
The French troops captured three successive lines of
trenches at the Bois d'Ailly, south-east of St. Mihiel. They
also gained a footing in a jiortion of the enemy's works to th«
nortli-east of Regneville.
15»
LAND AND J7 A T E R.
April 10, 1915.
GORRESPOiNDENGE.
MILITARY HONOURS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — If rewarda for valour only are taken into account
(V.C'.'a, D.S.O.'b, and Military Crosses), I think it will ba
fouud that t"i8 regimental officer has his share. Mora of theso
could not be given without cheapening them.
Sucli rewards aa are given to tlie Staff — f.g-t CB.'s,
C.M.G.'s, and brevets — are naturally not obtainable by
junior regimental officers. The proportion of Staff to regi-
mental officera who receive these appears at first sight, there-
fore, to be high, though it is not really bo. It must also bo
remembered that the Staf! are selected men, and are, thora-
fore, likely to do better thiu their regimental brothers. —
Youra truly,
A Recimentai, 0rric2B.
BLI.NJDED SOLDIERS AND SAILORS.
Arrangements for their Comfort and Occupation.
LIFE AT ST. DU.NSTAN'S.
To the Editor of Land and Wateb.
Sir, — The vast number of letters which have reached us
during the last few weeks with regard to sailors and soldiers
who have been blinded in the war shows eo keen a publio
interest in and sympathy with these brave fellows that I feel
I may ask you to permit me space in which to acquaint your
reader.s v.-ith what is being done to comfort and to help them.
So far as we know at present, there are in thii country
nearly fifty soldiers who have loiil their sight at the front,
including three officers, and three Belgians, whom we are
glad to treat on an equality with the Britisli soldier.
Wo know of only one blinded sailor — a midshipman.
After v.'e had settled in our minds the be-it steps to
pursue, we called into our counsels some of the leading
experts among these who spend their lives in the care of the
blind. We were gratified to learn that in the main the
arrangemcntn v.e had devised met with the cordial approval
of this gathering.
This spacious house, witli it? fifteen acres of grounds,
which lead direct into Regent'.^ Park, end which has been
BO generously placed at our disposal by Mr. Otto Kahn, is
an ideal place for our purpose. An arm of the large Regent's
Park lake runs into the garde.'is, thus rendering easy rowing,
an ideal form of exercise for blind people.
The premises are well adafited for the purpose of tem-
porary training-rooms and workshops.
The occupations which are being taught here are i
1. Carpentry.
2. Boot Repairing.
3. Mat Making.
4. Basket Making.
5. Telephone Operating,
6. Massage.
7. Poultry Farming, Market Gardening, io.
These arrangements cover the industrial field which will
be, for the present, open to the blinded soldier. lu the
majority of instances we do not espcct to complete the train-
ing at St. Dunstaa's. Our function here is to diecover the
pursuit for which a man is best fitted and give him pre-
liminary instruction in it.
The grant which has been made by the Prince of Wales's
Fund for the purpose will enable us to arrange for completion
of training and to settle the men in life. The cost of running
the Blinded Soldiers' and Sailors' Hostel ia borne by tha
National Institute for the Blind, the Red Cross Society, and
the Order of St. John.
A special fund has been started from which to supply the
men with typewriters and other apparatus, and also to pay
the travelling expenses and board and lodging of near rela-
tives who live in the country and who are invited periodically
to spend a few days close to their husbands, sons, or brothers.
We invite contributions to this Fund.
Further, the National Institute for the Blind ha.s placed
at the dispLisal cf the Committee a seaside home, which it has
lately established at Brighton. This comfortable and com-
modious home will be used as a convale,<;cent resort for men
who require a period of repose after being discharged from
hospital. It will also be used for week-ends and brief holidays.
The training of the blinded Boldier is not confined to
industrial pursuits. All the men are learning to read and
write Braille, and in most cases are making remarkably quick
progress. They leftrn typewriting, too, and are given Lcturea
on interesting aubjects by the leading experts of the day.
Th? faar of occupying too much of your valuabld spao*
prevents my dwelling upon the happy conditions under which
our community hero lives. A cheerier set of fellows it ba*
never been niv good fortune to meet, and the kindness of many
friend? in providing them v^ith flowers, fruit, and other
luxuries in unending.
The ladies belonging to Voluntary Aid Detachment* who
look after them do much to make their lives bright and happy.
It is not for mo to express an opinion as to the perfection
of the plans which have been made, but I do venture to sajr
that no blind men have ever been given so grand an oppor-
tunity of making good ia the world as ia afforded to these.
W^ho will deny that no trouble or expense can repay them for
the sacrifice which they h<ive made in defending our homei
and ui)holding the honour of the British Flag ?— Yours faith-
fully,
C. Arthur PEiVRsoN,
Chairman Blinded Soldiers' and Sailors'
Care Committee.
St. Danstan's, Regent's Park, N.W.
THE SMALL FIRM.
To the Editor of Lano and W-atsr.
Ds.tR Sir, — Will you permit me to thank " One of th«
Principals of Another Small Firm " for his kind appreciatioo
of my letter, and also for his interesting remarks aa to th»
procedure of the Government when dealing with small iirmat
I quite agree with all he says about prices, and I thiolt th«
Government would, as he .suggest^i, find it very ndvautagecua
when obtaining tenders to state the prices usually given for
the work, and to allow tho firms tendering to put in their
quotations, if these prices were too low to euaVjla the firms
to undertake the job. One of the chief difficulties of a small
firm which has not previously undertaken Government work
ia to know at what price " about " it would stand a chance of
having its tender accepted. Often a great deal of time which
might be much more usefully employed is needlessly wasted
in getting out estimates at which the Government officials do
not have to glance more than once to know that they ar«
hopelessly "out"; on the other hand, firms frequently do
not feel justified in quoting for work which they could well
do because their machine tools do not happen to be apecially
designed to do that particular class of work, and consequently
they could not do it quite so cheaply as a factory constructed
solely for tho job. A good definite " lead " from the Govern-
ment as to prices on each piece of work required would sav«
much time and money and prove to be a real economy ia
the end.
With the latter part cf your esteemed correspondent' •
letter I am in entire .igreemeut.
Lord Kitchener has said that the need for munitions ia
urgent; the Times has had a leading article on " Shells "; on
all sides we hear a loud chorus condemning strikes and dis-
putes, and all delays in and hindrances to output; and in th«
daily Press we are repeatedly told that the vanning of th«
war depends just as much upon tho workshops of the country
as upon its bravo soldiers.
Well, for our part, we should only be too delighted to ba
doing our bit. Let the Government give us the work and tell
us to go ahead. We would do our level best, and I can assura
you that among the small firms strikes are not likely to inter-
rupt output.
But the great and apparently almost insuperable obstacia
in the way is the reluctance of the Government to give us tha
orders. For three montha now the firm with which I am
connected has been attempting to obtain Government work,
and all they have given us up to the present is one small
sample order. The majority of the departments sent polita
acknowledgments of our letters, and to one we have had tha
pleasure of submitting some tenders, but so far nothing has
materialised bsyoud tno sample order above-mentioned.
Yours faithfully,
One of the Principals of a Small Firm.
OUR AMBULANCE APPEAL.
At the moment of going to press our Fund totals £530,
and it is our very pleasant duty heartily to thank all those
who Lave been so generous as to assist us m such a prompt 1 1 d
substantial manner. Further subscriptions are still needed
to form a small fund for the upkeep of the motor ambulance.
Next week a full list of subscribers will be published.
PrifiteJ by TiiE X'iciouu UoDSS PjEiNnNa Co., Lib., Tudor Street, Whitefriars, London, E.G.
April lO, 1915
li![!i|
L
LAND AND WATER
iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii^^^^^
Does not
LEAK
in any
position.
Onoil
u
^^ Military
Size
FIRTHS
STAINLESS" STEEL
ForCUTLERY,etc.
Neitiier Rusts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
u
Ar-tlcLes -rruxBk^ -froTn. -bKvs
steeL,"bevn.a cn-klrely \xr\-
a-PPecte(irb_y -foocL cxexcLs,
H-ux-fcs,wn.egcLT7etc.,xpvlin>e
rourv3^-to~be or eTtOTm.o\xs
cuxvcLTv-tcxge vrvTTLO-teis,
clxtbs, T-es-bavL-roLTcts a.t\<i
coTTvps. MevtKeT ^Kelaviie-
DOartl TVOT- -tVte cLecLniTLgj
TTvackLne is noxu ■vdtce.seaccy.
Gibleini of -tkvs steeL Trvoiy
GeKaxL or all "tKe lecLcLvnci,
Tnarvu/tLcturers . S ec -tkxxt
kn.wes~T)caT- -tkls TrvaT-k^.
IL
Ongjnal and ^^^^^ Sole Makers
THOS. F1RTH& SONSX^.^
SHEFFIELD.
Officers' Kits by
PRACTICAL— the one word
sums up the Hazel Kit. With
a hundred years' experience of
Military Tailoring, with 1,300
skilled workers, and with a com-
mand of the market for materials,
we can put everything xOoTth
having into Hazel Kits — with
accuracy, economy and despatch.
PATTERNS ON APPLICATION.
Jacket, waterproofed serge or whipcord £3 1
Trousers, waterproofed serge or whipcord 1 3
Breeches, waterproofed Bedford cord,
buckskin strappings 2 10
Great Coat, waterproofed Melton ... S 19
British Warm, waterproofed Melton,
fleece lined 8 0
Cap 0 16
Sam Browne Belts, complete I 12
Gabercotton Weatherproof 4 4
Perfect (iuing assured by our self-measurement form.
HAZEL & CO., 5 1 A, Berners St., London, W.
Telephone : Regent 4960. Telegrams : " Weslazel, London."
Branches: 6 YORK PLACE. LEEDS; 84 MILLER STREET. QLASaOW;
and 137 LONQMAKKET STREET, CAPE TOWN.
|||||||||||||||llll|lllilllllllll|IUIIIIIIIIIIIII!lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll!!IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIW
If, knowing all you know,
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask you
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of
SIRIS
a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as ApoUin-
aris and similar to it in taste.
Repd. Quarts.
Per Doz. ©/-
Repd. Pint*.
3/6
Carriage Paid.
Repd. i Pints.
2/6 P^' Doi.
Sample "Bottle FREE on receipt of Coupon "•!
Name
Address ! -
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral Waters
A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenies Street Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.
LAND AND WATER
April 10, 1915
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE
STEAM TURBINE IN WARSHIPS
{^concluded)
By "A.M.I.CE."
After a long series of exhaustive trials it was found that
the Topaz obtained a speed of 22-1 knots when developing
9,933 indicated horse power, while the Amethyst steamed
23-63 knots and developed 14,200 horse-power, notwith-
standing the same boiler power was installed in both ships.
The economy in steam consumption especially at high speeds
was considerable. At the same time, the manoeuvring
capabiUties of the turbine cruiser proved to be quite satis-
factory. These trials definitely proved that the steam
turbine was superior from every point of view to the old type
of engine, and it was decided to install them in future in all
torpedo boats.
In 1905 a committee was appointed to consider the
question of the design of armoured ships, and the adoption
of steam turbines was recommended for all such ships. The
Dreadnought was the first battleship in the world to be fitted
with steam turbines. It must be mentioned, however, that
at this stage the Admiralty was probably largely influenced
by the Cunard Committee, who at the end of 1904 had decided
to install steam turbines in the Lusitania and Maiiretania.
An official statement was issued by the First Lord of the
Admiralty in 1906 regarding the adoption of turbines in the
Dreadnought, in which it was stated that although the steam
turbine system of propulsion has some disadvantages, it was
adopted because of the saving in weight, reduction in working
parts, reduced liability to breakdown, and its smooth working,
ease of manipulation, saving in coal consumption at high
powers, and hence boiler-room space and saving in engine-
room complement ; also because of the increased protection
due to the engines being placed lower in the ship.
The usual arrangement in battleships and battle cruisers
is to fit a high-pressure turbine on the outer shaft and a low-
pressure turbine on the inner shaft on each side of the ship,
so that there are four shafts, each carrying propellers, in each
ship. The two inner shafts carry each the cruising and low-
pressure ahead and astern turbines. In later types of ships
the cruiser turbines have been done away with because the
weight and space saved have been utilised to increase the
efficiency of the main turbines when running at half power.
The three battle cruisers of the Invincible class are equipped
with turbines developing about 42,000 horse power, while in
the Lion class they develop about 75,000 horse power. Such
ships could never have been built with reciprocating engines,
as, owing to the superior economy of modern turbine instal-
lations, at least 30 per cent, less boiler capacity is required.
The first foreign warship to be fitted up with steam
turbines was the French torpedo destroyer No. 293 in 1902.
The steam turbines were imported from the Parsons Marine
Company. Although France led the way on the Continent,
nothing further was done until the 1906 programme, when
another torpedo boat was equipped with turbines, while at
the end of 1906 it was decided to fit the battleships Voltaire,
Danton, Vergniaud, Condorcet, Diderot, and Mirahcau with
turbines. Each vessel has a displacement of 18,374 tons, a
speed of 19 knots, and a turbine horse-power capacity of
22,500. These battleships are fitted with Parsons turbines,
and the arrangement is practically the same as in the
Dreadnought. In 1908 the French Navy decided that in
future all warships should be fitted with turbines.
In Germany the marine steam turbine was adopted late
in 1902, and a small turbine destroyer was put in hand. The
vessel S125 has a length of 215 feet and a tonnage of about
410, and was equipped with Parsons turbines similar to the
British destroyer Eden already mentioned. In 1903 the small
cruiser Liibeck, having a displacement of 3,150 tons, was
equipped with Parsons turbines, and tests were carried out
between this boat and the Hamburg — a similar cruiser,
equipped with reciprocating engines. Tlie trials were again
entirely in favour of the turbine-driven ship. The first large
armoured vessel built in Germany with turbines was the
(battle cruiser Von der Tann, which has a length of 561 feet
and a displacement of 19,000 tons. This vessel proved
thoroughly satisfactory, and attained a speed of 27 knots
when developing about 70,000 horse power. The earliest
Berman boats employed turbines made in England, but the
later ones were constructed in Germany.
A steam turbine is essentially a high-speed machine and
sliould be run at a fairly high speed in order to get the
maximum steam economy. On land steam turbines for
generating electric power are run at speeds varying from
1,000 to 3,000 revolutions per minute, but in ships this is
not possible, as the screw propeller must be run at a fairly
low speed. In order to get the maximum efficiency out
of a turbine on board a ship it is necessary to run the
turbipe at a high and the propeller at a low speed. At present
both are connected rigidly, and therefore it is necessary to
compromise on the speed question, the result being that the
turbine is run at too low and the propeller at too high
speed.
At the end of the year 1913 Parsons turbines were
installed in the following number of ships : — ■
Country.
Warships.
Mercantile Ships. ,
Number.
Total
horse-power
capacity.
Number.
Total
horse-power
capacity.
Great Britain .
Germany
FVance
U.S.A
226
38
34
37
4.339.300
1,508,600
6ot,8oo
553.300
98
5
12
8
928,790
191,000
164,500
S6,ooo
There are great possibilities in the interposition of a
reduction gear between the high-speed turbine and low-speed
propeller so that each may work at its highest efficiency.
The application of mechanical gearing to destroyers was
preceded by extensive researches. The Parsons Marine
Company carried out a . series of experiments with the
Vespasian — a cargo boat of 4,350 tons displacement. There
are two turbines, which are connected by means of
mechanical gearing to the propelling shaft. The steam tur-
bine runs at about 1,250 and the propeller at 63 revolutions
per minute. The results have confirmed the theoretical
considerations as regards economy obtainable by this new
application and sliown great reliability in running. The
loss of power in the gears is srrtall, amounting only to
some 2 per cent.
There are at present a few destroyers in the Navy fitted
with geared turbines, while the application to larger warships
is under consideration. The geared turbine has already been
installed in several Channel steamers, and excellent results
have been obtained.
Several other metliods of power transmission between
the propeller and turbines have been proposed, the most
important being the hydraulic and electrical transmission.
The hydraulic system has been developed in Germany by
Dr. Fottinger, of Dantzig. In this system the steam turbine
drives a centrifugal pump which delivers water to a hydraulic
turbine, which is connected directly to the propeller shaft.
This system was employed in the Kmigin Luise, of the
Hamburg- Amerika line, which had a displacement of 1,800
tons. The steam turbines ran at 1,825 ^rid the pro-
pellers at 453 revolutions per minute. It will be
remembered that this vessel was fitted out as a mine-layer
and was sunk by the Amphion on August 5 near Aldeburgh.
The system gave complete satisfaction, and it was understood
that the German Admiralty were considering its apphcation
to a very large warship.
In the electrical transmission system, which has been
successfully developed in America, high-speed turbines are
coupled to electric generators, which in turn drive slow-speed
motors, the latter being coupled to the propeller shaft. The
U.S.A. collier Jupiter was fitted up with the electric trans-
mission gear, and exhaustive trials were carried out. A few
weeks ago it was announced that it had been decided to fit
the latest American super-dreadnought, the California, with
the electric transmission gear. The California will have a
displacement of 32,000 tons, a speed of 21 knots, and will
carry more weight of armour than any previouslj' built
battleship. The great steam economy thus obtained has
resulted in a considerable reduction in boUer and con-
denser-room space. The decision of the American naval
authorities is of great importance, and the performances of
the California will be watched with interest. An advantage
of the electric and hydraulic system is that the astern turbine
is not required, while a further advantage of the electric
system is that all speed control and manoeuvring can be done
directly from the bridge without signalling to the engine-
room staff, owing to the flexibility of electric power.
The possibilities of the various systems of " speed
reduction " in warships are very great. Owing to the higher
over-all efficiency of the low-speed propellers and high-speed
turbine greater steam economy, with a consequent reduction
in weight and space, is obtained.
24
April lo, Tc)i5
LAND AND WATER
-4.
H.M.S. BIRMINGHAM. Light Cruiser. Displaoement 5,400 tons. Lenj'th 430 ft.; beam 50 ft. Built Elswiek. Cmis^''6f 6 in.
4 3-pounders; 2 torpedo tubes. Engines 22,000 h.p. Speed 25 knots. f
(From the Original by Montague Dawson.
Copyright of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
(Estibl.shed a Century.) L
LAND AND WATER
April lo, 1915
FORTNUM & MASON^S
" rORTMASON " (West African) BOOT
Now procurable in sufficient quantity lo meet
the huge demand of Officers in France,
HAND-SEWN. LEATHER ALWAYS
SOFT «• WATER-PROOF. Per Pair
35 35/- 35/
"FORTMASON" TRENCH HELMET
Made of rubber, lined fleece. Warm,
comfortable and waterproof.
With peak 6/6 Without 5/6 each.
Fortnum & Mason, Ltd.,
182 Piccadilly, London. W.
YOU CANT GET WET IN
J I The Guinea
A FeaiherVl Weight Waterproof
For Civilians and Soldiers Alike.
" You can fiut it in your pocket when the aun thinea."
Warmth without Weight
Weighs only 21 oz.
The Guinea "Mattamac"is made from
a specially woven feather-weight matta
fabric of intense strength, and is guar-
anteed absolutely waterproof. In
appearance it is indistinguishable from
the ordinary weatherproof, but it is
carried as easily as a newspaper or will
go into an ordinary pocket.
Practically Untearable.
Not Transparent.
In a " Mattamac " you can't get wet.
Thoroughly well cut and made. Storm
collar and adjustable wind cuffs. Smart,
roomy, free— for every outdoor purpose.
Lasts years, any climate. In fawn,
khaki, or grey. Also for Ladies.
SENT ON APPROVAL FOR SEVEN DAYS.
Send chest measurement, also height, with 21/-, and coat will
be sent (post free in Great Britain) on seven days' approval,
and your guinea refunded if not approved. Patterns free.
iVaterproof Specialists (Dipt. IVl),
45 Conduit Street, London, W.
and
29 Old Christchurch Rd., Bournemouth
^
DRYFOOT
the ideal
Waterproof
Copy of letter Just received from the Front.
From Lieut.-Col. C. E. Stewart, Black Watch, 1st Batt.,
t«t Division, British Expeditionary Force:- "Thank you
^o much for the ' Dryfoot ' which arrived safely. It has
been well tested by me, and has certainly done all it
professed. In spite of the muddiest of fields, my boots
have kept dry inside, so I know that it will be very
welcome to the men."
WHY HOT senD your friend in camp
A TIN? IT WILL BE APPRECIATED.
To be obtained from all leading Shoe Firms & Stores.
Price I/- large tin ; 6d. small tin.
Hole Uanufactureri:
THE SEAL PRODUCTS, LTD.,
wiioiesai,^ only Kilbupn, London, N.W.
"Every Requisite for the Comfort
of our Soldiers at the Front."
TURNBULL & ASSER
Sporting Hosiers
Waterproof Oilskin
Shell Waistcoat
With sleeves for wearing under
a tunic. Specially designed to
prevent any damp penetrating
to undergarments. Extremely
light in weight, folds into
small compass and can be
carried in the pocket.
Price 27/6
Khaki Stocking
Puttees
For use in Home Seivice when
off parade, or at the Front when
out of the firing line. 'Ihe
Stockings present the same ap-
pearance as regulation puttees,
but can be taken on and off in
a second. Officers have found
them the greatest comfort and
relief as a quick chiinge after
the strain caused to tlie legs
by ordinary puttees.
Price 7/6
71-72 JERMYN ST., LONDON, S.W.
(5 doors from St. James's Street.)
Telegrams: "Paddywhack, London.'* Telephone: 4628 Gerrard,
Service Kits
for Officers
IN 48 HOURS
WE have supplied hundreds of outfits to OfiBcers of
all grades and Regiments in H.M. Army to
their entire satisfaction. The regulation Service
Khaki is of the very best quality and the workmanship
is second to none. Write for prices and patterns of our
various Khaki materials.
PRICES
FiFLD Service Coat (Regimental Buttons and Badges
of Rank extra) £3 3 0
Bedforu Cord Breeches 2 15 0
iNFANTJiV Knickers 1 10 0
Slacks 110
Great Coat (Regulation Buttons extra) - • - 3 13 6
British Warm (Fleece-Lined) 4 4 0
Regulation (WaterprooO Slipover - - - - 2 16 0
Our Representative tinll be pleased to -u^ait upon any Re^rnent.
RFTD BROS """'Tai.n„T""'
l.\^i^ll-^ AJ IX Vv'vj. Breeches Maker*
209 OXFORD STREET, LONDON
STORM PROOFS
For ACTIVE SERVICE
(Na.vat and Military)
A RUBBER.COATED CLOTH PRODUCED BY ELVERY'S.
"A tough pliable base is provided, upon which the
specially prepared surface is laid, and the chief point
about the material is that it is absolutely imp>erviouB to
wet, will not crack, and will stand a great strain with-
out tearina. Pails o( water can be poured over the
rubber surface with impunity ; nothing can soalc in,
and a rub down will render the garment absolutely
dry."— Extract from "Field," 27/2/15.
SERVICE COAT (as illvi-tratedi 70/-
Al.-.i 8iiii;ili. d witti ilelHclifcble Fleece Linings.
CAP COVER witli curtain lixed .-rdctaciiftl.le) - - B/6
KHAKI RUBBER GAUNTLETS 7/6
KEGULATION WATERPROOFS, strung and reliiiblc
(lufAi.tiy ..1 r:u:Ll,y) 65/-
WATERPROOF KIT In every detail
OiliUns. Waders. Leggings, Waterproof Boots,
Sleeping Bag Valises, Air Coibiona. &c.
GOODS SENT ON APPROVAL BT RHTURN.
J. W. ELVERY & CO., Ld.
Waterproof Specialists, [Estd. 1850.
31 CONDUIT STREET, LONDON, W.
(One tloor fruiii Nuw Boti.i Stie^t-)
AUu at 46 & 47 Lower Shl-IvVJIU Str«>>t and HA Niub.iu Street, DUBLIN
aud 7S Piitiii.'k. Slreec, CORK.
26
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2762
SATURDAY, APRIL 17. 1915 [ri^^'v^s^pTpE^I] '.^i&inlU'^H^Ll
Commander-in-Chief, Royal Australian Fleet
r
\
Cofyrig' I, Htath, Plymeutk
VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE EDWIN PATEY
LAND AND WATER
April 17, 1915
>^
LONDON &
LANCASHIRE
FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY
LIP
SECURITY - £5,927,293.
FIRE.
CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS.
ACCIDENT.
BURGLARY. MOTOR CARS. DOMESTIC SERVANTS.
MARINE.
Head Offices:
45 DALE STREET, LIVERPOOL.
155 LEADENHALL STREET, E.G.
NORTH BRITISH
y^TCHER
CROSS
LIMOUSINE
TYRE.
The
perfect
ALL-
RUBBER
NON-SKID
assuring safety en
all road surfaces, as
used In all departments
of "War Service."
THE NORTH BRITISH RUBBER CO., Ltd.,
169, Great Portland Street, LONDON, W.
Factories: Castle Mills, EDINBURGH.
^>4r>
The reason for the smiling face—
HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS
Think what a blessing these delicious
Food Tablets are to men on active
service. They are always ready for
immediate use, and a few dissolved in the
mouth will maintain the strength of the
Soldier when he most needs it. They
supply sutfioient nourishment to sustain
for hours ; give increased body heat and
vitality; prevent fatigue,and relieve thirst.
Send a Flask to YOUR Soldier.
We will send post free to ANY address a flasic of
these deliciou.s and sustainin;; food tablets and a
neat vest pocliet case on receipt of 16. if tlie man
is on active service, be particular to give Ills name,
regimental number, regriment, brigade and division.
Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket
flasks. 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2/6 and 11/-
Libcral Sample Bottle sent post free for
3cJ, in stamps.
HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO.,
Sloug^h, Bucks.
illlllllllllllllR
= Are you Run-down g
S When yonr system is undermined by worry or over-work ■■
■H — when your vitality is lowered — when you feel ".any- —
gg how" — when your nerves are "on edge"— when the least g5
■■ exertion tires you — you are in a "Run-down" condition. HJ
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llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
36
April
1915
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER.
Cross-Examin
w
A Cross-Examination , - ..
■ H \T are vou supposed to write about i
asked Cecilia, as the train having shrie'angly
run through a seemingly endless tunnel,
emerged at last into sunshine and peace.
Cecilia and I were week-end visiting bound
together. , , , .
This was the sort of question that could only be counter-
questioned. << I, i T U • 1
" I mean," she said, in replv to mv query, that 1 should
never be surprised if I were to find one week you had devoted
a whole paragraph to the
best way of button-holing
flannel petticoats, or to the
making of a cake without
flour, sugar, butter "
" If you can give mc
such a receipt," said I.
breaking into this without
delay, " -I will not onfy give
one paragraph, but two to
it, if indeed I do not devote
the whole article to such a
splendid invention. Every-
body would clamour to read
it. 'Perhaps, though, this
cake wouldn't need cook-
1 it
mg ?
" Don't be so silly,
snapped Cecilia, whose
temper railway travelling
never improves. " You
know quite well what I
mean. If you do not write
about cooking, I should say
that was the one thing you
did not write about."
Personal, with Due Apology
"It is a general arti-
cle," I said, without much
brilliancy, but with more or
less accuracy.
" Very general," said
Cecilia, whose temper still
seemed ruffled.
"To tell you the truth,
my dear," said I with a
praiseworthy attempt at
explanation, " my article
often seems to me, myself, to
Coryr,gHt. M^ame Lallie Charle, VISCOUNTESS CURZON
A new portrait of Lady Curzon, who is renowned for her beauty and
charm. Her husband. Lord Curzon. is serving on the Queen
Elizabeth, our latest and finest battleship, in the Dardanelles
uiicii 3^^...o ^^ .-.^, ......«-.•, ^- be a humble imitation of the
Walrus and the Carpenter, who talked of many things."
" There are some ideas for you," said Cecilia, who can
never resist an A/ur quotation. " You have not yet
talked of ' shoes, and ships, and sealing wax, of cabbages, and
kings.' " • r u
" I could write pages upon shoes," said I, thinking of the
full short skirt of the moipent, and its demands upon foot-
wear.
CecUia said nothing, but— perhaps unconsciously— put
forth a small foot, perfectly sliod in darkest brown crocodile
leather. . .
" No," I said, following out my train of thought, it is
on account of the war, were it not for that it would be a
dress article. As it is, it's a mixture, because there seems
so much else to write about as well."
" I have got a few new clothes to show \-ou," said Cecilia,
who was rapidlv becoming good tempered again.
"You are' quite right though," she went on magnani-
mously. " There is heaps more to write about, perhaps that
explains vour mixture article."
" The mixture article," I said, " exists for the mention
of anything of interest to women. For that reason the
letters' that arrive asking for mention of such and such a fund,
or such and such a work, are always very welcome."
" They receive attention," quoted Cecilia.
" Always," said I, " and generallv the written word."
" Then," said she, ' 111 future I shall expect a full account
of everj'thing to which I lend mv valuable patronage, or "
But the threat, ii threat it was, was lost in the bustle of
arrival at the station of our destination.
On Atmosphere
That night after dinner, and before the mascuhne element
had emerged from the dining-room, conversation turned on
the subject of atmosphere. The different atmospheres to
be found in different houses, the varied atmospheres in various
shops An American girl who had just crossed the Atlantic,
and narrowlv escaped shipwreck through a German submarine,
•rave us her \iews, which were well worth attention. She
outlined the difference there is between a second-rate shop,
and one of assured reputation. It is one which apparently
strikes the American mind very sharply. Every woman
Ustening knew what she meant. In some places the customer
is almost forced to feel that those who serve pay but a minimum
of attention, and that onlv because they are paid to do so.
It is here, of course,
where all the better class
shops score. Their staff is
trained to study custorn-
prs, their whims, and their
ways, and to gain the
knowledge quickly. It is
alwavs pleasant to go to a
shop" where one is recog-
nised, and given a full
meed of courteous . atten-
tion in consequence. It
Hatters everybody's vanity
to feel no mere unit of a
shopping public to be
dealt with as quickly and
expeditiously as possible,
but a customer whose visit
is valued.
The Clothes We Need
It is the personal note
in business that pays, and
in the fair American's
opinion, with Cecilia as
seconder, this is the rea-
son why the Regent Street
House of Peter Robinson
has made its huge suc-
cess. The atmosphere is
admirable here, the trained
attention as perfect as pos-
sible. " You always get
well looked after there, and
they seem to know by in-
stinct what you want,"
said Cecilia, coming into
mv room to sav good-
upstairs to bed. She was
night, after we had gone _j.
wearing a satin wrapper in a lovely shade of geranium pink
which set off the pale gold of her hair.
I learnt that these wrappers are to be bought in different
colourings at this Regent Street house for the modest price
of 29s. 6d. They are really delightful garments, and just
the thing needed after the long days so many are spending
iust now engaged upon some charitable work or another.
It is the greatest rehef to slip out of a street suit into something
soft and chnging. These wrappers have a roll back collar,
and drape from one side to another beneath a cleverly finished
fastening, but they are of sufficiently simple design to serve
excellently as dressing gowns.
Lingerie, of course, is always a feature here, and at present
there are some unusually fascinating nightgowns to be secured.
They are of finest French lawn, embroidered by hand in a
bold, yet dainty floral pattern, and marvels of cheap-
ness for I2S. 6rf. A fine edging of lace outlines the neck
and prettily rounded sleeve, and the quality of all the
fabrics used is so fine that the moderate price is doubly
amazing.
And the next morning, when the girl from the States
appeared in one of the best cut crepe de Chine shirts it has
ever been my fortune to see, I was not surprised to hear
this hailed from the same address, and that 15s. gd. had been
its purchasing price. It was made of that good-looking
hea\'y weight crepe de Chine which always appears to advan- r
tage." and has duplicates in black and all colours. Amongst (
the primary features are a semi-militaire collar, and large(|
pearl stud fastenings, and its other advantages can be seen t
in Peter Robinson's catalogue. Much praise also is deserved
by an art silk sports coat in every colouring, cut with the
requisite fulness for the new skirt, and pouching prettily
at the back over a tasselled girdle. And the price is but
33s. 6d.
37
LAND AND WATER
April 17, 1915
PRESSING-
PUSHING-
PLOUGHiNG
THESE three words each picture the amount of Energy
needed to drive a Bicycle according to the amount of
Friction generated by the chain and driving Bearings.
When there is NO
Friction, as in the case
of the Sunbeam, then
the Rider only has to
press on his pedals.
When there is some
Friction, as in the case
of many so-called high-
grade machines, then
the Cyclist has to push
on his pedals. But when
from various causes
there is much Friction,
then the unfortunate one has to plough along on his pedals.
The point to emphasise is that the Sunbeam's Little
Oil Bath Gear Case saves the Friction and the Pushing
and the Ploughing.
For Easy Cycling, then, get a Sunbeam. Write for
the new Sunbeam Catalogue to —
3 SUNBEAMLAND— WOLVERHAMPTON
London Showroomi: 57 HOLBORN VIADUCT, E.C.
158 SLOANE ST. (by Sloane Square), S.W.
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE FIFTH.
AND as they eat, the wise man proceeded with
his tale. "Look thou at this shoe. Mark the
generous proportions. Torture it and learn the
toughness of the fabric which bends but breaks not.
Thou didst observe not long since the marks my beast
had left in the dust. Didst also observe how sure-footed
he was ? Place thy finger in this cunning channel.
Dost understand ? Consider how yon smith, even in this
small village, had of this shoe. In every spot the length
and breadth of this our land it is the same. So great
a name has it attained that more would buy than shoes
there are to satisfy them. What, thou wouldst satisfy
thy hunger a little ? Thou art right. Perchance we
would then be in better case to deal with so important
a matter." (To be continued.]
MORAL : A demand which exceeds the supply and
always has, is a perpetual and unanswerable argument
for the goods.
Published by
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
Founders of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry throughout the World,
Para Mills, .. Aston Cross, .. Birmingham.
LONDON': 14, Regent Street, S.W. PARIS: 4, Rue dii Colonel Moll.
Messages from the Front
An Officer who fought
in the battle at Neuve
Chapelle writes to
say that he borrowed
a Waterman's Ideal
from a friend and in
spite of all the knocks
and shakes it received
during the battle it
was just as good as
before.
He adds : " No praise
was too great to
bestow upon the
Waterman's Ideal."
{N.B. — This pen had been
used continuously for a
number of years before its
owner joined the forces. )
Watennans(ldeai)ltiuntainPen
For friends on Active Service, the *' Safety" type is recommended. It
can be carried in any position and will not leak. Every pen guaranteed.
10/6 and upwards for regular and Self-Fillins Types.
12/6 and upwards for Safety and Pump-Filling: Types.
0/ StaUoners and Jewellers everywhere.
Avoid Si'ECious Imitations! Booklet Free from
L. G. SLOAN, Ch^l^CTL Writer, Kingsway, London
HOTEL CECIL
THE
COST of LIVING REDUCED
DURING THE WAR
Exceptional inclusive terms to
RESIDENTS and OFFICERS.
Self-contained Suites and Bedrooms
with Private Bathrooms.
Telephone: GERRARD 60. Apply, MANAGER,
HOTEL CECIL, STRAND.
38
y\.pril 17, 1915. LAND AND iffiATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.— This article has been submitted to the Tress Burean, which does not object to the publication ai censored, and takes ao
responsibility for the correctness ol the statements.
In accordance with the requirements ol the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only bt
regarded as approximate, and no de&nite strength at any point is indicated.
THE TURN OF THE TIDE IN NUMBERS. be possible to train and equip tbem. The greaC
THE tide in numbers has already turned reserve in numbers of Eussia would similarly
fully upon the West. It is not "far from appear when sufficient time had been gained,
turning upon the East. Much the greatest effect of time in favour of the
That is the explanation of the whole Allies was that after enough time had passed to
situation during the last fortnight. allow for the making of heavy artillery and of
Numbers in men, numbers in material, decide munitions therefor by the French (with their
a war in its largest aspect. Their power is par- natural genius for this arm, and with their readi-
ticularly clear in such a war as this, where the ness to learn any new thing), and after the corre-
whole efforts of whole nations are being put forth, spending, though necessarily lesser, effort on the
each to avoid the permanent wounding of the same lines, in this country, superiority would
national soul. definitely pass from the enemy to us.
If this simple, but fundamental, truth, that There was a second factor in which time wasr
numbers are at the root of all, had been kept in gomg to be on the side of the Allies, if that time
mind, opinion would have been less confused in could be sufficiently extended without the enemy'a
the past than it has been. We should not have getting, through his superiority m numbers, a
heard the " organising power " of the enemy decision. It was the factor of political attitude,
treated as something miraculous, nor should we and it appeared in all sorts of ways. The enemy
have heard exaggerated the unpreparedness of began by being coclcsure; failure was bound to
the Allies. depress him. The French in all their history have
The truth is, and has been from the beginning, fought better in the latter stages of a campaign
that upon the moral side the enemy had but one than in the earlier. Air-work, mainly under
clear advantage. In a number of his subsidiary British example, everwhere advanced upon its
guesses as to how modern war would turn out, moral side. It was not a superiority in material
particularly in his own tactical experiments, he that ultimately gave the Allies in the West the
was right. And this gave him, as I shall show in preponderance they now enjoy in the air : it was
a moment, a great superiority in certain forms of skill and daring.
material at the outset. But in nothing else was Finally, there was one last factor which put'
he the superior of his foes— least of all in grand ti^ie upon the side of the Allies, and that was the
strategy. enormous enemy wastage.
His one asset— the one great thing that really Everything combined to swell that factor : the
counted — was numbers. enemy's tactical tradition; his necessity for win-
Take the theories of modern war in which he ning quickly; his use of new levies very rapidly,
proved right; his power to maintain close forma- raised; his becoming involved in a winter cam-
tion ; the effect of high explosive shell ranged by paign for which he had not prepared, and whicK
air-work upon permanent fortification; the use in places broke down his medical organisation (5.(7.,
of heavy pieces in the field, &c., &c. The fact his ambulances in Poland during December). It is
that the enemy was right in his theories on these certain that when the full statistics of the fighting
things and that the Allies were, on the whole, are published, we shall find that the higher
wrong, gave him at once the advantage of numbers estimates of the enemy losses have been more nearly
in the right material against his opponents. He accurate than the lower. And I believe that when-
had prepared an immensely larger supply of ever the end comes the comparative figures, especi-
machine guns, a weapon closely allied to the use ally in the West, will surprise official opinion at
of close formation in attack. He had prepared home.
a vastly superior number of heavy pieces distin- Had all parties to the war pursued the same
guished for their mobility and a vastly greater policy in respect to the publication of numbers the
amount of munitioning for them. truth I am here emphasising, that the enemy;
But it was the other element of numbers, the wastage was, and is, startlingly greater in propor-
mere numbers in men, that made most difference, tion than that of the Allies, would have stood out
And the greater part of the self-reproach the very clearly. But they do not pursue the same
Allies address to themselves for the unexpected policy, and therefore the image of the truth is con-
but necessary trials of the opening campaign in fused in the mind of many.
the West is simply a misunderstanding of what The Germans, for instance, publish long lists
must almost certainly happen when sixteen men of killed in which names appear often very late,
are attacking ten. The business of the smaller and sometimes months after the casualties they
number in that rude trial is not to win, for it refer to. They publish long lists of wounded which'
cannot, but to hold out in spite of the hammering — certainly do not give every case — and no wonder,
that is, if time proposes to be ultimately upon their They do not publish lists of sick. They give in
side. details, down to the last unit, the numbers of those
Now time was ultimately upon the side of tlie they call their prisoners, sometimes adding the
Allies. Britain was not a conscript country, and civilians to the soldiers, sometimes confusing the
her reserves of men, of potential numbers, needed two categories, sometimes separating them, or men-
time to appear. If time could be gained, it would tioning one only.
1*
LAND AND .W. A T E a
April 17, 1915.
The Austrians supply us with hardly any in-
formation. We have to deduce from chance utter-
ances or private reports all that v^^e know.
The Russians publish nothing official, save,
very rarely, a few big facts : as, that they had at
one moment (some months ago) rather over 100,000
German prisoners ; that they had about a fortnight
figo over 800,000 Austrian prisoners.
The French have deliberately pursued a policy
of complete reticence, varied only by occasional
purely local pieces of information : " In taking
Buch and such a trench we captured 100 prisoners
and a machine gun." Of their own losses they
publish no casualty lists. We have had just one
statement, about four months ago, with regard to
the number of wounded men who have been
received in hospital, and the proportion that have
l^een discharged. We can guess from their method
of conducting the war, and from their use of
reserves, certain maxima and minima of losses, but
we can do no more. The British publish full
casualty lists in which ultimately every kind of
loss, except that through sickness, is recorded. But
they do not publish the numbers of the prisoners
they take.
With methods so various obtaining in the five
Great Powers at war, there has, I repeat, been a
confusion in the public mind upon this great main
fact of numbers, and in particular upon the im-
mense German and Austrian wastage which has
brought about a turn of affairs in our favour
earlier than the best judgment had thought
possible.
We can be rid of that confusion if we bear
clearly in mind the leading fact with which I
opened this article : the tide has turned strongly in
the West; in the East it is already nearly slack
water.
The tide in numbers having turned has, short
of the entry of further enemies into the field
against us, turned for good.
Germany and Austria liaA-e still a certain
amount of untrained material to hand, which they
can put into the field between this and midsummer.
•But they have not more than the full British
reserve of men coupled with the young recruits
■which the French have trained and have not yet
used. Superiority in numbers of actually equipped
and present men in the West is already established,
and it is now only a question of the completion of
equipraeat for that superiority to go on increasing
steadily. The same is true of munitions for the
Iieavy guns; the same is true of air-machines; the
same is true of the numbers of the heavy pieces
themselves.
In the East, the long-lasting numerical in-
feriority of the Russians to the coalition opposing
them began to change (presumably) about a fort-
night or three weeks after Vladivostock was open.
At first a dribljle and later a stream of equipment
and munitioning then became available at the
Russian front. Had it been possible to force the
Dardanelles that stream would already have
become a flood.
Russia M-as blockaded by two things : the
enemy and winter. Winter has raised the blockade
in the Far East. She maintains it in the White
Sea. But she will not maintain it indefinitely even
there. The twenty-eight miles of river between
Archangel and tlic o])en sea will be free by the
middle of May at latest; perhaps earlier. Wc
know, of course, that if the ice-breakers had
remained undamaged Archangel might have been
partially kept open throughout the winter. As a
fact it has been closed for fully four months.
Whether the narrow gauge railway to Vologda has
been broadened yet in its whole length we do not
know; but if it has another stream of munitioning
will in some four weeks begin to pour in to the Rus-
sian front from the north. We may take it that
on the Eastern front the problem of numbers is
solved.
Now let us see how this factor of numbers
is woi'king in the two fields which have been most
prominently before the public during the last
week— the St. Mihiel Wedge and the Carimthian
Front.
THE ST. MIHIEL WEDGE.
The French are hammering at either limb
of the great salient in front of Metz which has
its apex at St. Mihiel upon the Meuse. They are
attempting, by threatening the communication
which runs through the centre of this wedge, to
compel the enemy to withdraw from St. Mihiel
and to straighten his line.
That is their objective.
But it would be a great error to read into
this attempt some mysterious efficacy in the mere
shape of that salient.
The French are not hammering at the St.
Mihiel wedge simply because it sticks out.
If the French reach the lines of communica-
tion, the railway which has been continued beyond
Thiaucourt to the river, and tlius compel the
enemy to withdraw, they will have achieved a
great local success. They will be cheered, and
wc shall liave the papers full of a new tone for
a day or two. So people were cheered by the
pounding of the advanced German trenches at
Neuve Chapelle and their occupation by British
troops. So people were cheered by the heavy
work in the Champagne district, which advanced
the French line by an average (perhaps) of the
distance between Hyde Park Corner and St.
Paul's. But neither at Neuve Chapelle, nor in
the Champagne, nor here in the Woevre was the
end in view a mere advance, whether of one mile
or of twenty. The end in view was the wearing
down of the enemy's numbers and the fretting of
that long line of his until it should be too thin
to hold. Supposing the enemy thought of
St. Mihiel as something all-important to his pres-
tige— strategically it is no longer of importance
to him, for by this time he knows very well that
he cannot make the strap meet the buckle and
that he will not invest Verdun — well, supposing
2»
'April 17, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
that he continues to make St. Mihiel a point of
honour. Can he save it ?
Of course he can. It is only a question of
men. He has only to run a greater and a greater
risk of having his line pierced somewhere else.
He has only to withdraw men from Flanders, from
the Vosges, from the Plain of Alsace, from the
Aisne, and keep on pouring them in to hold either
limb of the wedge which the French are thus
imperilling.
There is in this matter not a little misunder-
standing due to the traditional meaning and effect
of the word " attack." " This attack," men say,
" will necessarily be far more expensive to us than
the old defensive was." Or, again : " We must
expect very great losses, for we shall be the attack-
ing party." But under the conditions now estab-
lished upon the Western front, those terms hardly
apply. . The attack does not take the form of a
number of men in the open rushing to swarm over
a well-defended obstacle, and suffering in propor-
tion to the difficulty of that attempt. The defeat
of the enemy does not take the form of their having,
after a long defence behind earth where they have
suffered little, fallen back in order and defended
some new position. If that were the form of the
present fighting along the Western front the attack
would, indeed, be enormously more expensive than
the defence. But it is not the form. The form is
this :
The Allies being fairly free from enemy obser-
vation (a freedom they owe to their established
superiority in the air) concentrate munitions for
their heavy guns upon a particular point; they
then, after a certain delay for such concentration,
deluge a narrow sector of the enemy's front with
heavy gun fire (in which they also have a marked
superiority, and the accuracy of which again
depends on superiority in the air). They then,
the moment that tornado of fire ceases, rush the
most advanced trenches of the enemy.
Fighting of that kind does not mean that the
attack spends more men than the defence. The
attack spends enormously more ammunition, and
it subjects its artillery to much more wear and
tear, but not more than it can replace.
The second chapter in these efforts is still less
an example of expenditure in men by the attack.
It consists in the rallying of the enemy in a
counter-offensive, and in his attempt without a
superiority in heav}'^ guns or in anr work to take
back what he has lost, or at the worst to hold that
part of his second or third line of trenches which
he had preserved. And this counter-offensive is
normally far more expensive to him than to the
Allies whose pressure he is trying to stem. He can
always stem it, as I have said, if he chooses to bring
up more men ; but only by losing, day after day,
great numbers of those men over and above the
corresponding losses of his opponent, and the men
must come from somewhere.
Every one of these bits of work — that at Les
Eparges the other day; that at Regnieville; that
at the wood of Montmare; that at Goussainville
— does its bit in slightly increasing the numerical
superiority of the Allies on the line against theii
enemy.
At Neuve Chapelle weather and certain mis-
calculations made the German counter-offensive
particularly severe for the British. Nevertheless
the total German losses were far heavier upon that
narrow front than the total British losses. In
the Champagne three solid weeks of tremendous
work with something like half a million men en-
LAND AND [W.ATER.
April 17, 1915.
gaged first and last in territory the size of South
I^ndon resulted in no conspicuous advance,
thou<^h advance there was. The Germans saved
the railway line behind their trenches. They lost
the crest of the watershed and some hundreds ot
yards of ground. But they came out of the
struggle much weaker in proportion to the French
than^'fhey went in, and that was the object of our
Allies in initiating the actions they thus took
between Souain and Ville-sur-Tourbe.
It is the same story along the whole front
from xMtkirch to the North Sea, and it is a story
that can have but one ending unless civilian
opinion is misldS and fails the armies.
Let us turn next to the details of the attack
on the St. Mihiel wedge.
The ground upon which this struggle for the
wedge of St. Mihiel is being decided is singularly
simple. It consists in two clearly-marked dis-
tricts : The rolling plain, called the AVoevre, on
the East (an average height of some 700 feet above
the sea), and the range of hills, called the
" Heights of the Meuse," on the West. These
latter consist in a ridge which slopes up from the
Meuse Eiver to an average height of over 300 feet
and an average width eastward of about eight
miles. It then falls extremely rapidly in a sort
of wall— 500 to 600 feet high at the northern end
and nearly 1,000 at the southern— down on to
the plain. And the plain, the Woevre proper,
stretches to the Moselle, and is a district of
numerous woods, m.eres, and small watercourses
amid large open ploughed fields. The whole dis-
trict is, therefore, the belt between Meuse and
Moselle.
looks along that chain of heights from some village
at the foot, such as Hattonville, it presents an
almost artificial appearance of regularity.
This conspicuous feature in the ground of the
present effort is transverse to the fronts of both
armies. The wedge or buckle of which the apex
is at St. Mihiel cuts the escarpment of the heights
of the Meuse in two points— the northern one near
Les Eparges, the other on the south near Apre-
mont.
But even if there were no hills here at all
the problem would be much the same. It simply
consists in the effort of the French to reach tlie
single line of communication upon which the hold-
ing of St. Mihiel depends, and the efforts of the
Germans to prevent their reaching it.
That single line of communication is, as haS
been pointed out in past articles, the old single-
line railway which runs from Metz up the ravine
of the little River Mad to Thiaucourt, and the con-
tinuation which the Germans are reported to have
built on to it in the last six months from Thiau-
court to St. Mihiel. I believe it will be found,
when the thing can be examined in detail, that
this continuation has been run (as I show it upon
the accompanying sketch) up out of the Mad vaUey
This wall forms one of the very sharply-
defined landscapes of Europe, and may be com-
pared to the escarpment of the North or Sout a
Downs or of the Cotswold in this country. ^Whilo
the summits of the hills along this escarpment
dominate the plain, even in the north, by 600 feet,
the saddles often fall to less than 400; but as one
to Vigneulles, and then over the comparatively
low saddle to tlie village of Creue, and so down
the ravine called the Rupt de Creue to the Meuse,
and so to St. Mihiel. The last part of this guess
may be wrong, because it would bring the railway
rather close to the French lines, and it is possible
that the new rails are laid over the higher wooded
country to the south and more directly towards
St. Mihiel, as at A— B on the sketch. At any
rate, the piercing of this line at any point would
make the position at St. Mihiel impossible.
Now, the place where it is most im.mediately
threatened is Thiaucourt, where it comes nearest
to the French advance, which has thrust trenches
out north of Regnieville, as we know. And it
mav therefore be asked why tiie position of tho
spur of Les Eparges on the north is of such
importance.
The value of a special effort at this latter
point consists in this : That so long as the French
remain in possession of the spur of Les Eparges
they can from behind the ridge and on its western
slopes in wooded country establish positions for
their heavy guns which will com.mand at known
and fixed ranges all the nearer part of the plain
now open to their complete observation.
The position to be captured at Les Eparges
was the rounded boss of a summit upon a plateau
which stands out curiously from the mass of the
hills parallel to their main axis, and is separated
4»
'April 17, 1915.
LAND AND KATER.
from them by very steep-sided ravines in wEicli the
village of Les Eparges lies. To the west of this
ravine the hills, long held by the French, are a mass
of woods, and the summits of these hiUs top a
along this front, it is the new superiority in heayy
pieces and their munitionment which is wearing
down the German line.
The local importance of the plateau above
Combres is peculiar and worthy of study, for it led
at once to the bitter tenacity of the defence, and
the continuous concentration of the assault, with
the ver}' heav}^ losses involved upon either side.
It was not a case of capturing an elevated gun
position, for the plateau is dominated more and
more by the rising crest of the spur southward.
Nor was it, as it would have been in the old days,
the obtaining of a commanding height, whence the
plain below could be shelled, for a gun position
of this sort is but a disadvantage in the present
trench warfare against any well-hidden position
from which heavy gun fire can be directed by air
work.
contour 400 feet above the stream which runs
through the valley. A rounded plateau on the
eastern side, to the capture of which the French
bent all their efforts, is only 300 feet above the
water in the village.
This plateau is fairly free of wood, and the
view from it commands the whole plain of the
iWoevre. Beyond it and below, on the edge of the
plain, is the little village of Combres. It is fairly
clear that the capture of this height must have
been effected by a concentration of hea\y gun fire
from behind the ridge of the forest of Amblonville,
to the West, and that here, as in every other case
But the point of the plateau between Les
Eparges and Combres was that it thrust out
a hill in Jront of future heavy gun positions
to be established in the forest to the west,
it permitted batteries there established to
shell positions in the plain, their effect per-
petually observed from the new summit, and
themselves shielded by it. Therefore, the enemy
had erected regular fortifications upon this
plateau, now long-established, and attack on it
had the effect of compelling the enemy to concen-
trate upon that one spot great numbers of men.
The narrow hill between Combres and Les Epargea
was, as it were, the nucleus of the defence which
the Germans had established from the line of their
railway up to the neighbourhood of Fresnes.
The line is not cut by the occupation of tha
plateau. There is plenty of opportunity for tha
enemy to entrench to the east of the captured
position, but here, as everywhere, the object to ba
attained was the compelling him to bring up
renewed masses of men, and to sacrifice them in the
LineofTrenciL Frenches
ToUetz
ToJtUthid
(3oisl£?rdre
. TONT
AM0US50N
vr
k*
LAND AND .WATER.
April 17, 1915.
attempt to keep a point to which he attached pecu-
liar importance.
On the south limb of the wedge the French
effort is complicated by the chance there is there of
possibly dominating the railway, but meanwhile
this effort necessarily draws great masses of the
enemy to the threatened points, and, therefore,
achieves much the same numerical result as the
attacks on the north.
The conformation of the ground is such that
it is not possible for the rails leading from Thiau-
court to St. ISIihiel to go at first very far away
from the course of the little Eiver Mad. For the
Mad runs after its first part in a very steep
trench, the sides of which can only be negotiated
by tunnelling or the use of a light railway and
break of gauge. TI.e wood of Montmare, in front of
iThiaucourt, the village of Rcgnieville, the western
part of the Bois du Pretre, in front of Pont a
Mousson, between them give the line of the French
trenches, about a third of the way from the high
road to the Mad, or, measured in ranges, you have
from the French trenches to the ISIad no more now
tlian 5,000 yards ; if anything, the trenches of the
wood of Montmare, though we do not quite know-
where they cut that wood, are a little closer to the
ravine than those of Regnieville.
THE CARPATHIAN FRONT.
On the Eastern front the new business is also
a matter of numbers, though after a rather dif-
ferent fashion from the West. Why are the Rus-
sians thus able to ])ress slowly mile by mile on to
the crest of the main range and down the further
slopes of the Hungarian side of the mountains ?
Because their numbers have here increased and are
still increasing. The fall of Przemysl released
another quarter of a million ; much more, it freed
the whole Galician railway system and permitted
new streams of equipped men to be fed and muni-
tioned upon the mountain front from the advance
passes in Galicia and from the main passes in
Russia itself. Meanwhile the new munitioning
of Russia with the end of the winter still swelled
the numbers, and the pressure upon the Car-
pathian barrier may be compared to the pressure
of water upon some containing wall when that
water rises higher and higher by continued addi-
tion.
How was this threat to Hungary to be met ?
Only by a pouring in of corresponding numbers
upon the other side. Germany must lend her
desperate allj' first three Bavarian corps, then
four more corps, making seven in all; )-et the
Blow Russian advance continued. It is said that
she will attempt to find somewhere .yet another
100,000 men, and see whether the dam can be
mended. But those men must come from some-
where, and every man taken round to the Car-
pathian front weakens Germany in every other
part of the field.
Throughout the war until the present phase
the Germans and the Austrians met the local pres-
sure of the numerically inferior Russian forces in
the same way. They massed their greatly superior
numbers by the use of their superior railway
system in some unexpected direction and struck
a blow at a point which the Russians could not
afford to lose.
When at the end of November, ju.st as the
attempt of the Germans to break out in Flanders
had failed, the Russians were at the gates of
Cracow, eminently superior numbers were swung
up north and the blow was struck at Warsaw
which came within an ace of succeeding. The
pressure on Cracow was relieved.
As, towards the end of the winter, the Rus-
sians had perceptibly increased, and as the direct
attack on Warsaw had failed, a new and a last
concentration of great German numbers was
made in East Prussia, and the month of February
was full of this renewed surprise attack from the
north to cut the railways behind Warsaw. It
failed in its turn. But it created a diversion.
It emploj-cd vast numbers of the Russians upon
what was for the moment a purely defensive
scheme.
Here we are in the middle of April, the snow
is already melting upon the southern slope of the
Carpathians, the pressure of the Russians there
gets heavier and heavier, the danger is extreme.
Why does not some new diversion relieve that
pressure and conjure that peril? Because the
enemy no longer has a superiority in men where-
with to effect such a diversion.
On both fronts, then, it is the same story. The
tide in numbers has turned.
As to the exact positions of the Russians on
the critical part of the Carpathian front, near
Lupkow, by the last telegram received on Tuesday,
it is as follows :
Tdnnel-
%:0'
..s^
WdaWlcIuwa
0/4^ 4-
fall I ■ 1 1 L.
Tfcles
'Russian Troni"
yg
On the Carpathian front it is interesting to
note that the Height 909, which is situated just
south-east of the summit of the Lupkow, remained
in the hands of the enemy until last Thursday, and
was the last point of this front upon the main
ridge to remain till the general Russian capture
of that ridge between the Rustok and the district
west of the Dukla.
The point 909 — the highest peak in this dis-
trict— thus forming an exception to the general
Russian grip upon the watershed, having fallen,
something like forty miles of this line, or a little
more, is now in the hands of the Russians.
It would be an error to regard the mere sur-
mounting of the ridge, even upon so broad a sector,
as the conquest of the range.
It is here, as everywhere, a question of num-
bers. Could the enemy by some miracle pour in
great masses of new numbers, he would check the
advance as securely upon the Hungarian as upon
the Galician side, for the broad belt of wooded
slopes on the Hungarian side offer as good oppor-
tunities for resistance as does the corresponding
belt on the eastern slope of the mountains. It is
true that the snow has disappeared more largely
from the Hungarian slo])e than from tlie Galician,
for it is the slope turned away from the wet winds
6«
April 17, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
and it is tte slope tliat looks towards the south.
Bat this is not wholly a disadvantage to the defen-
sire. It gives befter opportunities for trench work
and much better opportunities for concealment.
iWTiat the gradual disappearance of the snow-
in the whole range during the next few weeks will
accomplish is the provision of pasture for the Rus-
sian irregular cavalry, and the freeing of separate
bodies from being tied to the few roads across the
hills, and in particular the horsemen will be able
to come into action.
It is probable that the defensive along the
range has been very far from continuous. It has
been concentrated upon the points where the roads
cross, because during the winter all advance on the
part of the Russians has been tied to these roads.
But as the weather moderates, the defensive will
have to be spread out more evenly along the whole
line, and this is a factor in weakening that line
which must not be neglected.
Meanwhile, the efforts to check the slow
advance of our ally over these mountains are not
always without fruit.
Where the Lupkow Pass Railway comes down
from the summit on the Himgarian side, round
alxjut the station of Mesolaborcz (at X X on the
above sketch), there has been a series of sharp
actions which have quite held up the Russian
advance in that district, and have probably in-
ilicted a local reverse upon our ally, for the
Austrian claims to 10,000 unwounded prisoners
remain uncontradicted, and the Russian line has
here been quite stationary for three weeks past.
But it is not a local success of this kind, nor
the m.ore numerous small and steady advances of
the Russians upon the whole of this course, which
really decides the issue. The whole thing is a
furious corps a corps; a swaying, now just upon,
now just over, the summits of the hiUs ; a wrestling
bout in which superiority of numbers will be tUd
ultimately deciding factor, and which every new
week's further equipment of the Russians inclines
in their favour.
A NOTE ON NEUVE CHAPELLE.
There has been a tendency'', as the exact truth
about Neuve Chapelle began to come through, not
from the Press, but from the great numbers of
men who have returned wounded from that action,
to under-rate its effect and to misunderstand its
character. It is therefore worth while to re-
emphasise both. As it has been very well put in
the phrase of one correspondent, to whose experi-
ence I have had access, " The thing for the public
in England to note is not how much might have
been done, but hovv much was."
Now v/hat was done may be briefly tabulated
as follows :
1. Through superiority in air- work now fully
established, great quantities of munitions were
concealed for several days without the enemy's
guessing what was happening. It is the firsi
time this has been don^ tipon the Western jront.
2. The local weakness of the enemy through
the same superiority and through the co-ordina-
tion of this effort with the attacks in Champagne
was equally established.
3. At a he^ivj- expense, especially during the
counter-offensive, to our own side, it inflicted a
still greater loss upon the enemy who could afford
it far less.
4. It discovered the continued or rather im-
proved capacity for a vigorous offensive in m.en
vrho have passed months under the strain of trench
vvork.
5. In general, it showed that, with a sufficient
preparation, the piercing of the line or its shorten^
iug under the threat of i:)iercing was certain.
COTTON.
I MUST beg my readers to permit me j'et
another reference to cotton, and that for
the purpose of giving more details upon
the subject.
Everyone by this time knows in a general way
that cotton is gunpowder, and that yet cotton has
been allowed to come freely into Germany through
the blockading cordon ; wnich is exactly as though
guns and submarines and consignments of shell
had been allowed to get through the cordon,
save for this difference: that Germany and
Austria-Hungary can, at a certain rate, make
guns and shells and submarines, whereas for
cotton they are absolutely dependent upon supply
from over the sea — that is, upon the goodwill of
Great Britain among the Allies.
But while this verv' startling fact is now-
public property, the precise significance of it in
detail is less generally appreciated. How much
cotton there is, what it is worth, how much the
enemy probably use, tlie difference that e»en at
this date the preventing of his getting this
material would make — all these points arc left
vague in the public mind. If the public c^nn got
a grip of them it will help to strengthen opinion.
There are probably in Germany now, in re-
serve, as I said last week, one million bales of
cotton. It is doubtful whether Austria has any
reserve. Supposing, therefore, that all supply;
from neutrals in Europe and all supply from over-
sea were to stop at this very moment, the enemy
would presumably have to fall back upon rather
less than 500 million pounds, or, in round
numl>ers, 250,000 tons of cotton.
It is believed that hitherto he has used about
lialf his cotton imports for textile fabrics and
about half for making what I shall continue to
call his gun-powder, because that inaccurate, old-
fashioned term gives the quickest impression of
the truth.
He has therefore in reserve, having accumu-
lated it during these months during which we
have permitted him to obtain it in spite of the
blockade, about 125,000 tons of gunpowder, which,
if he could afford to stop all his civilian weaving
and to throw immense numbers of men out of
employment, could possibly be increased to a
maximum of something less than 200,000 tons in
round numbers.
I give these figures first and insist upon them
because the extraordinary situation by wliich
enemies working for the destruction of this
country are supported in obtaining the material
with which to destroy it can only be defended
upon the plea tiiat coLton has already corao in in
such quantities that belated action' taken now
1*
L A JS D AND 5K A T E R.
April 17, 1915.
yrould be useless. In other words, the groom may
plead against being asked to shut the stable door
now that the horse has been stolen.
,Wel], if Germany has a maximum potential
reserve of less than 200,000 tons of propellant
explosive and a practical reserve of not more than
125,000 tons, let us next ask ourselves how long
this would last, and whether it could be supple-
mented in any way supposing that after all these
months of war we did stop the public from going
on.
The estimates of what the enemy is using
yary, of course, enormousl)^ It is an exceedingly
difficult problem to work out even as a conjec-
ture. Austria, for instance, uses a powder in
,which there is a proportion of glycerine higher
than that in the German powder. But both of
these are higher than the proportion in the French
service, and in the American (among others).
Again, we do not know what secret modifications
may not have been introduced in the period during
which Germany was actively preparing for this
.war — that is, between 1911 and 1914 — three j-ears
iNvhich, as we know, were given up to the designing
and munitioning of the great campaign that was
to be entered on just after the harvest of 1914.
It is, further, very difficult to guess nearer
than a maximum and a minimum very widely
separated what the average expenditure is per
day, though we know accurately enough the ex-
penditure in cotton of any particular weapon,
tfhe French 75, for instance, would shoot away
a bale of cotton in four hundred rounds, and the
largest existing guns would shoot it away in less
than two. The small arm ammunition, the ex-
penditure of which is perhaps the most difficult
thin^ to calculate, uses up about a bale of cotton,
I believe, in about 80,000 rounds, rather less than
more. A machine gun actually in the field is
provided first and last with about half a bale of
cotton, and every company in the field, apart from
its machine guns, is provided first and last with
about three bales of cotton.
By this I do not mean that your machine gun
or your company will not get rid of more cotton
than that in the war : it will get rid of enormously
more. But I mean that your first provision is at
least upon that scale.
The lowest estimate — and I fear it was once
the official one, too — has put the total expenditure
of cotton hj the enemy at 300 tons a day. The most
expert estimate I have seen puts it at over three
times that, at 1,000 tons a day.
Now, it is wise to keep one's estimates always
beloio the figure that most helps one's argument,
even though one has good ground for accepting
such a figure. We will, therefore, heavily scale
down the maximum of 1,000 tons and stay at 750
tons.
Three hundred tons cannot be accepted for a
moment. It is based upon those older calculations
which this war has completely upset. Even 750
tons is less likely than 1,000. Tliere are a number
of observations all pointing to the larger rather
than the smaller figure. Both Germany and
Austria used from the beginning an enormously
greater number of machine guns in proportion to
their forces than the Allies had allowed for. The
attack throughout this war has everywhere been so
persistent, the losses before an attack failed so
nea%y, that the expenditure of small arm ammuni-
tion by the soldier, as well as by the machine gun,
has been quite out of proportion to what even the
enemy expected. Again, the heavy gun, which is,
of course, the great glutton of cotton, was relied
upon by the enemy in this war in a fashion which'
the Allies had not foreseen, and was used by them
with a prodigality which has called forth at last
a similar or even superior effort upon our side in
the West.
In the East, apart from what were until quite
lately his superior numbers, the enemy still relies
upon the much greater supply he has of heavy,
pieces and of munitions for them. While — most
significant and most calculable of all the proofs — ■■
we have the fact that the enemy, although he pre-
pared this war for so long, is, and has long been,
clamouring for cotton ; a truth easily proved by the
rate of his recent import and his willingness to pay,
as we shall see in a moment, at a very high price for
the cotton he does get.
Let us now recall the estimates of reserve
which have already been given — 125,000 tons
reckoned for, 200,000 tons available at a pinch —
and we can easily see the result. The enemy now
has gunpowder for about another three months of
war, or at the most another nine months or so.
That is, supposing the war to go on at its present
rate and the enemy to lose no stores.
The first thing we have to remark upon stating
these figures is that even upon the estimate most
favourable to ourselves the immediate cessation of
cotton import would still leave the enemy able to
continue at the present rate to the end of the year.
That is the basis, of course, of the argument in
favour of despairing of future action on account
of results of the past action. That is the argument
for not shutting the stable door because the horse
has certainly been stolen. But we should pause a
moment at this stage in the consideration of our
matter to consider certain further aspects of it.
In the first place, no one can guarantee that'
the war is to go on at the present rate. If we allow
the enemy to obtain great masses of cotton in the
immediate future, he will be able to develop in the
West perhaps a renewed lavish expenditure of
heavy gun ammunition such as that which marked
his first bid for the victory that he so narrowly,
missed.
In the second place, the moment the siege of
any place in the enemy's hands begins, we shall
have a sudden leap up of expenditure, on his part,
of cotton. The same is true of the defence of any,
obstacle behind which he may lie, such as the
Ehine.
Then, again, we must remember that in all
calculations of this sort, though it is wise to
take a moderate estimate against our own wishes,
it is also wise to leave no chances to the enemy <
If his real reserve is smaller than we imagine — •
which it well may be — if his real expenditure is
much higher than we think ; if, for instance, he is
using cotton at a rate 50 per cent, greater than we
have allowed for, his reserve is already smaller. It
would hardly last out the summer, and any chances
of our being able to starve him in gunpowder at
the eai'liest possible moment should obviously be
taken, even if by our own action we have allowed
him to accumulate this great store.
Again, the action of your enemy becomes
embarrassed long before his last munitions are ex-
hausted. The mere condemning of him to husband!
his ammunition would be equivalent to putting
him under a very heavy handicap.
fi»
'April 17, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
Again, we must allow for the possibility of his
losing stores. He must have lost, for instance, the
other day, in Przemysl, a huge quantity of accumu-
lated propellant explosive. A future success of
the same sort on our Western side, in Belgium, for
instance, would have a similar result.
All these considerations point one way, and
show the utility — I should have thought the im-
perative necessity — of stopping the supply at once.
But let us next see what chance of supply he has
through neutrals.
There are two sets of neutrals. What may
be called the North Sea group and Italy. The
neutral Balkan frontier cannot be used for the
importation of cotton on any large scale. Now,
from Italy the enemy is not at the present moment
obtaining cotton, and has not obtained it for some
time past, I believe — a significant indication, by
the way, of the policy of that countr}'. From the
North Sea neutrals the enemy has been obtaining
eveiT kind of munition which we have allowed to
go through.
We must always remember, by the way, that
this is in no way an unfriendly or illegal act upon
their part. The neutral sells you provisions and
munitions, if he can reach your market. It is the
enemy's business to prevent his doing so if he
can, but not the neutral's business to diminish his
own chances of trade. If we are right in elimin-
ating the Italian cotton stopped in transit — as I
am informed we are — we may probably estimate
t!ie total amount Avhich the remaining neutrals,
the North Sea group of neutrals, could now spare
to Germany, if further effort were regulated so as
to supply their own needs alone, at about another
25 per cent, added to the present German reserve.
In other words, supposing Germany and Austria
could now carry on for four months with what they
have, the neutral countries in Europe which are
willing to provide them could extend that four
months to five ; if for eight months, then to ten ;
but no more. Such, at least, would seem to be, in
a matter necessarily conjectural, the situation.
The argument on that side, therefore, that the
horse is stolen and that the stable door does not
need shutting is not very strong. And we may
conclude at once the whole of this part of the dis-
cussion by saying that if we were perfectly free to
stop the gunpowder going in now we obviously
ought to do so and that it would be of very great
practical effect.
If we are not free that lack of freedom must
be due to one of two calculations or to a combina-
tion of both. First, it may be put forward that
if we interfered with Germany's imports of cotton
the United States would regard this as an un-
friendly act, and that wliat we obtain from that
source would fail us. It is for those who have
all the available official knowledge in the matter,
which no private critic can pretend to, to decide
whether this is the case or no. But meanwhile tlie
private critic and the public in general are pos-
sessed of certain very obvious facts in the matter
which certainly do not make the argument any,
stronger. We know, for instance, that for £1
paid by Germany for German munitions the Allies
are paying a great deal more than £10, and one
does not sec a man giving up £10 or £15 worth of
trade in order to save £1 worth.
Further, we may remark that we have not
hesitated to inflict upon our own Dominions and
our Allies restrictions which this policy has not
imposed upon a neutral country. We prevent wool
going into Germany, and wool is an Australian
product. I understand that we prevent Indian
cotton and Egyptian cotton going into Germany.
It is American cotton that goes in alone.
But there is no need — or at least there appears
none, to one having no more information than is
open to the general public — to inflict any hardship
upon this powerful neutral.
The cotton we buy at the present moment in
open market for British use we get to-day for just
under sixpence the pound. Germany in her need
is willing to pay, I l:)elieve, about double this. Had
we adopted the policy of preventing this reserve
of ammunition from growing up in Germany (and
if we had, the war might well be over now) we
could have paid for the total of her present resen-e
with a sum of somewhat more than ten million
pounds. Even if we had compensated the
American exporter at the rate Germany is noio
ready to pay (a thing we need never have done if
we had begun early), twenty millions would have
met the bill.
So it comes to this, that something which
would have ended the war perhaps already, and
certaiiily would have appreciably shortened it,
while at the same time ensuring victory, has
not been done, although that something would only
have cost the Allies much less than 1 per cent,
of expenditure they have already had to meet :
would have cost Britain alone less than a week of
war.
Before leaving the subject there are two
more points to be mentioned. The first is the use
of substitutes for cotton, the second is the supply
for the future.
The most obvious substitute which occurs to
one, which has already been mentioned in these
columns, is wood-pulp. But I am informed that
there could be no question of the substitution of
wood-pulp for cotton in the course of the present"
war. The results obtained by experiment are un-
satisfactory. The change would be, in the course
of a great struggle, impossible. Cotton with im-
purities or already made up into stuffs is also out
of the question. Wc may take it that if we stopped
the enemy's import of this raw material nothing
could replace it.
Lastly, let us note the supply. There will be
no cotton of the next crop available for Germany
during the critical period of stress immediately
before us. The picking of cotton is a summer and
early autumn business, and it is with the winter
that the new supplies come in. Therefore, apart
from supplies still available, the critical period of
the war for the enemy and for ourselves, which is
approaching, will also be one in which the restric-
tion of cotton import concerns a lessening stream
of commerce.
CONCLUSION ON NUMBERS.
I began my notes of tliis week with the capital
statement that the tide in numbers liad turned.
We shall see during the remainder of the war how
that prime factor will affect the enemy's decision.
It must be remembered (and it is forgotten
perhaps more in this country than among our
Allies) that the enemy has never presupposed in
Ills military writings, in his strategical school, in
the inmost of his military mind — which affects the
very training of his recruits and the whole moral
standpoint of his armies — the possibility of find-
ing himself in an inferiority of num.bcr. He has
LAND AND .W. A T E R.
April 17, 1915.
^ worked on the presuraption of superiority.
"^^"^ Is masked that presumption under a number
P^^%lish titles, indicating a moral rather than a
^^Serical ascendancy. But a numerical ascend-
icy it was in his mind, and a numerical ascend-
?hcy it remains. All his plans of war prove it.
His whole scheme of fortification proves it. How
will he behave when he in his turn has to fight
under the conditions which the French, the British,
and the Russians suffered throughout the autumn
and winter ? What plans will he make correspond-
ing to the plans of the French for saving all that
could be saved during the extreme peril of the first
days of the war? With what coolness will he
deliberately sacrifice his Lilies and his Lodzs
when the time comes for such sacrifices ? How will
he conduct a retreat in the face of superior
numbers ? How will he act when here and there he
has to fight his Le Cateaus with one gun to his
opponent's four? What effect upon his Govern-
ment will it have when superior forces with heavier
arms are as near to any one of his half-dozen vital
centres as Von Kluck Avas to Paris on Sedan day ?
Nothing but the future can tell us how he will
behave under circumstances of this kind, which he
never believed possible, and to which for nearly
fifty years he has deliberately shut his eyes.
He may show an unexpected tenacity, quite
unlike anything he has shown in the historical past.
He may even display that supreme quality in
generalship which exactly weighs the political
against the military objective, and at once, without
so much as a day's hesitation, sacrifices the first to
the second. He m.ay '- resurrect Buonaparte to
save Napoleon."
On the other hand, he m.ay suffer from the
bewilderment which so commonly overtakes those
who deliberately cherish illusion and who imagine
that by some witchcraft a blind confidence in
success produces it.
But whichever of these two spirits ho shows —
the first, which will prolong the war, and perhaps
secure his more lasting defeat, but save him in his
own eyes before history; or the second, which
would bring the war to a very rapid conclusion
and leave the Allies immediate and very difficult
tasks of settlement — one thing is certain : before
he is under the necessity of attempting the better
attitude at all, before his peril threatens him with'
bewilderment or braces him to resistance, he will
get some powerful influence to bid for peace.
There is a formula going round, more com-
monly accepted among the Northern than among
the Southern of our enemies, but diffused through-
out their whole body, that may be translated as
follows :
" We have not been victorious, but we cannof
be defeated."
Treated as a military formula, such a sentence
is simply meaningless. It is as meaningless as that
other phrase dear to many a politician, " Defence,
not defiance." There is no such thing in military
history or in military fact as the mere defensive,
save as a prelude to disaster. If you are convinced
that you can never pass from the defensive to the
offensive, then you are convinced that you are
beaten.
But though the phrase and the idea are mean-
ingless in a militar}- sense, it is not for nothing
that they have been sown broadcast throughout the
Germanic body. The harvest to be reaped from
that seed is, the enemy hopes, a " draw."
It is desired that opinion among the Allies,
civilian opinion, should come to regard the whole
thing as a deadlock, and to believe that they have
in front of them an enemy who, while he has failed
in his attempt at conquest, will never himself be
conquered. It is designed to produce an opinion
which will regard the prolongation of the struggle
as useless for either side and as imperilling the
whole of our civilisation without achieving any
further definite result. If this opinion prevails,
and if, just as our superiority in number begins to
tell, the enemy obtains his inconclusive peace, it
will mean for the future, and perhaps for the im-
mediate future, no further conflict upon the Con-
tinent, but action specially directed against this
country. That is quite sure.
THE WAR BY WATER.
SUBMARINE BLOCKADE AND LEGAL ISSUES.
By FRED T. JANE.
NOTE.
-Thii Article hai beta snbmttted to tlic Press Bureau, which does not object to (lie publication » ceniored, and takci so
responsibility ior the correctness ol the statements.
THE submariiJO " blockade " still continues to be tbe
main topic of interest in the naval war. If half
tbe rumours one bears be correct., the blockade (off
some of our ports, at any rats) is sufficiently " in
being " to have acquired the appearance of a legal
•iatus, or something approaching thereunto.
I If we are going clearly to understand this naval war,
ita real meaning, and know how we actually stand, it is of the
; first importance to discard nndue froth and verbiage about
"pirates," "paper blockades," and so on, and eo forth.
These things merely como in the zone of thought and senti-
ment ; they do not enter practically the realms of solid fact.
For the last week or two I have endeavoured to impress
upon my readers that the submarine is r new arm, and to
Indicate how and why on that account it must necessarily
continually rise and fall in importance nntil it arrives at ii*
proper level.
In conajdering the blockade, therefore, the first thing to
lake into account is not so much what the submariue is ffoir.y
to be at some future date, which we cannot definitely deter-
mine, but rather what it it at thi» actual moment in this
month of April, 1915.
Now, here at the cuLset it is necessary to say something
to counteract the prevailing impression that the Germ.ans are
employing some kind of " wondercraft " with which they
stole a march on us. Ideas of this kind are all right fcr the
Bonsational Press, or for wind-bag German naval experts,
like Count von Eeventlow. Tho Gerinan submarine U3a and
others of her kind have been described as remarkably large,
mysterious craft; but, as a matter of fact, U36 chances to
have been photographed by the captain of one of her victims,
and (unless fal.se num.bers v/ere employed) she is to all intents
and purposes a replica of all her pre<leces=ioi-3, from U17
OBK'ards, and an exact sister to U25 and later boats.
Quite apart from measurements which can be worksd
out from tho photograph that v.-as taken, we have to remem-
ber that ever since Germany made a bid for Sea Power her
policy has been consistently conservative, consistently a case
of going slow. Startling or even considerable in^iovationa
have invariably been left to other navies — Germany waLcfa-
in-T and following cautiously and methodically, changing her
designs very slightly and very gradually.
This policy left her behind in the adoption of the turbine,
the adoption of the largest possible guns, tho best types ol
iO'
April 17, 1915.
Land and .water.
wnall cruisers and destroyers for modern naval nejds, and
it kept back her submarine development — that is to say, she
did not hasten to adopt the sea-going submarine, and our
E class had been in existence some two years before Germany
followed with boats of about the same size {i.e., somewhere
around 800 tons). There was, therefore, never any serious
reason to suppose that the six boats of the 1914 pro-
gramme, U30 onward, would differ materially from other
predecessors.
As for the fifty or sixty boats laid down on the outbreak
of war, it is as certain as anything can be that they will
be exactly replicas of U36, for the simple reason that no
nation, let alone so methodical a nation as Germany, would
in war time embark on anything in the nature of wholesale
construction of craft in any way experimental. The risk of
failure is obviously all too great to be undertaken. A naval
war is clearly not the time for experiments on a grand scale.
We may take it, therefore, that Germany is conducting
the blockade with boats of the type that she has produced in
the immediate past, and put all stories of super-submarines
out of court.
Now, the German boats are quit* good boats — inferior
to ours of equal date, because our Navy has been consistently
progressive, while the Germans have been content to proceed
on more conservative lines. As boats, however, these Ger-
mans are very good, well designed, and of considerable
radius. That — coupled with some system of supply — has
rendered them capable of reaching places and remaining oS
places which before the war would have been considered
unattainable and impossible. In fine, the Germans have
demonstrated to their own satisfaction their ability to
blockade, in so far as appearing to keep just within the letter
of the law can be pleaded.
In strict International Law the blockade is, of course,
not effective, because the area claimed to be blockaded is
altogether out of proportion to the means available. That
no blockade can be expected to stop all vessels from breaking
in or out has always been accepted; but it has always been
strictly laid down that for a blockade to be deemed effective
prevention of ingress to or egress from the blockaded ports
must in the vast majority of cases Ise effectual. That is a
condition of affairs which most certainly has not obtained.
So far as can be gathered, the practice of German sub-
marines is to show themselves off a port with set purpose — -
this has the effect of temporarily stopping all ingoings and
outgoings. The submarines then apparently secretly move off
elsewhere, leaving it to our patrols to hunt vainly for them.
This is not the invariable rule, but it seems to be a fairly
common event, and to it even may partly be due the circum-
stance that our losses only average about one merchant ship
a day.
Now, if a hostile submarine deliberately shows herself,
she must be doing so with some definite object in view. The
object would appear to be a vague attempt to comply (or, at
any rate, appear to comply) with the letter of International
Law. Under this a blockade is not raised if the blockaders
withdraw for a time on account of s'triss of weather. It is
raised if the blockaders are driven off by the other side or if
they voluntarily withdraw.
The voluntary withdrawal of surface ships can be
observed and proved; the voluntary withdrawal of sub-
marines cannot be observed, and is hard to prove; while
" stress of weather " is just sufficiently vague to be capable,
in the hands of a clever lawyer, of being translated into all
kinds of things on the lines of " circumstances alter cases,"
plus the argument that when the laws of blockade conditions
under which they act are not allowed for.
At any rate, the point is that there do exist obscure issues
which could be argued about; and it is of very great import-
ance to note that the Germans are evidently making an effort
to secure some kind of legal case for themselves. If that
means anything at all, it can only mean that they realise
the prospect of having to explain their actions to the world
at some future date, and this again implies that the possibility
of ulimate defeat enters into their present calculations. A
victorious Germany would have no qualms about Inter-
national Law. So much for one phase of the question.
We now come to the other side of the matter — the
einking of merchant ships without warning, leaving the crews
to drown.
Our view of this procedure is dear enough, we regard
it as piracy, and wanton, murderous piracy at that. But it
will enable us to form a clearer conception of the exact
■ituation if we endeavour to visualise the matter for a
moment from the German point of view, always bearing in
mind that if — as seems established — a shadow of justification
for the blockade itself is being sought, similar " justification "
is unlikely to be ignored over the greater issues Involved in
the methods of destruction wliich are employed.
Here, when we come to examine the subject as a whole,
I think we shall find that the German official statement was
careful to say vaguely that it might not always be possible to
save the crews, or words to that effect — in any case, loopholes
were left for possible future arguments on the lines of
" thought this was one of the merchantmen which carries
guns for defensive purposes." Further, it will be noted that
it is only in the minority of cases that destruction without
warning {i.e., piracy) has taken place; in many cases, taking
circumstances into consideration, a good deal of calculated
courtesy has been shown.
We may, if we choose, attribute this to the circumstance
that German naval officers able to slaughter non-combatants
in cold blood are few and far between. An equally probable
hypothesis is that (this fact being realised) no general order
about sinking without warning was ever issued, though one
or two officers may perhaps privately have been allowed to
understand that such actions would not be disapproved of.
This absence of orders in black and white can, of course,
be used to give a clear field for official disavowals of com-
plexity at any suitable date; the offenders being made scape-
goats as convenient, or allowed to plead as best they may, the
" thought she had a gun trained on us " excuse. In support
of this hypothesis is the fact that where a submarine has been
seen after a sinking without warning incident, the circum-
stance of her number being painted out is generally or always
noted. This renders it impossible to bring the crime home to
any particular boat.
To the above must be added the further important
question of the exact legal status of a merchant ship which
attempts to ram a submarine; especially when the matter v>
further complicated by the fact of rewards having been
offered for success in such attempts.
International Law is quite clear on the subject of re-
sistance. The merchant ship may (we are considering tlie
legal position only, be it remembered) try to escape, but any
act of resistance renders her a legitimate prize, even though
she be otherwise innocent.
Now, the ram, or using the ship for ramming purposes, is
a weapon as old as the Battle of Salamis. To attempt to ram
a submarine is, therefore, technically, as well as actually,
" resistance," and any such action apparently places the mer-
chant ship in the combatant category — that is to say, legally
entitles the submarine to destroy her without notice ! A?
rammings, or attempts to ram, have undoubtedly taken place,
any ordinary police-court lawyer, to say nothing of a special-
ising international jurist, could make out a quite plausible
case for every act of " piracy " wliich has taken place. The
submarine captain has merely to swear that the quarry
appeared to be about to attack him or was attempting to
attack.
So it is, therefore, that though German " piracy " may
be utterly foreign to the spirit of the law or all ideas of inter-
national morality, we are still faced with the fact of some
possible technical legal ju.stification — in German eyes jierfect
justification— if properly manipulated.
In this connection the at first sight apparently merely
childi-sh and hysterical outburst in the presumably inspired
German Press over the destruction of U29 takes on some con-
siderable significance. Without waiting for any information
on the matter, the Germans roundly assert that I;29 was
treacherously sunk, decoyed to doom, slaughtered while
saving life (this last being presumably due to the fact that
Captain Weddingen, of XJ29, had earned a name for carry-
ing out his unpleasant duties with humanity and courtesy).
The outcry is important as further evidence of German
desire to drag in legal issues; in this case to manufacture an
argument of the " Even if our actions have not been quite
legal, neither have yours " type.
Now, from all the above two central facts emerge. Of
these the first — already alluded to — is that, for reasons of
her own, Germany has not ignored legal issues to anything
like the extent that she is supposed to have by the British
public. The second point — one to which I drew attention two
or three weeks ago — is that neither psychologically nor finan-
cially has the blockade been a German success. None the
less, it is being persisted in. The natural question is — Why 1
Plausible explanations are fairly plentiful. As simple
and plausible a one as any, and the most generally
accepted one, is that it satisfies the German public that its
expensive Na\'y is " doing something " — at any rate, in one
direction. This explanation, however, seems rather far-
fetched. German public opinion is mainly concentrated on
military matters, and military rather than naval men appeaj
to have the chief control of the German Pleet. It is, there-
11*
LAND AND W A T E R.
April 17, 1915.
fore, not very probable that these soldiers would go out of
tlieir way to continue or de:naud naval operations wliich
- — beinor devoid of military significance in the way of assets — ■
would merely be a sort of free advertisement of the existence
of the German Navy.
Similarly we can discard as rather improbable the theory
of the German Fleet driven desperate and prepared to
resort to any and every expedient. There are no indications
that the German Fleet i.s yet so driven; while experience has
now tauglit us that several seemingly (from the war stand-
point) purposeless movements had really considerable method
in their apparent madness. And so we shall not go far wrong
if wo suspect that the apparently futile submarine blockade,
with its curious occasional strivings to observe some kind of
technical legality, is devised with some ulterior object in view.
Place this alongside tlie fifty or sixty odd new sub-
mariues which are now nearing completion, and it needs no
great stretch of imagination to see in the submarine blockade
something of the nature of a feint intended to cover a future
great and concerted submarine attack on our warships.
At any rate, this i.s by far the safest hypothesis to adopt :
the tendency to regard the German Fleet as a more or less
negligible factor, which prevails in so many quarters, being a
very dangerous one. The battle fleet is intact and has been
added to since war was declared. It is too much to hope that
the big battle cruisers are damaged beyond repair; there are
certainly as many new destroyers added as those which have
been lost, while submarines are on the verge of being very
considerably increased numerically. Only in light cruisers
is there any deficiency that matters.
This deficiency has its serious side, for the German Fleet
is to that extent deprived of " eyes." But since all the
indications are that the intention is to rely upon the sub-
marine as the capital arm, the lack of light cruisers should
not be built on too much. Substantially the German Fleet
remains " in being " just as much as it was six months ago.
By all the lessons of history its morale, from confinement to
harbour, should have deteriorated ; but hero again we will
be wiser to assume too little rather than too much. The
German Navy, manned mainly from an inland population, is
not and never has been permeated with " sea sense." In the
past the confinement to harbour of a shut-in squadron gener-
ally worked out at a deterioration of " sea sense." The nou-
exiitent, however, cannot be liable to deterioration.
DARDANELLES AND BLACK SEA.
The dearth of news from this area of operations more or
less continues. Whether it be due to suspended action or to
the withholding of news till some tangible result can be re-
ported it is idle to speculate too deeply, though the former
may l>e suspected because of the bad weather just now pre-
vailing. Mostly we have to be content with more or less
reliable stories of a large French expeditionary force and the
presumption of considerable military operations in the early
future.
Mine-sweeping is proceeding, but large-scale bombard-
ments are no longer reported, and we may take it that any
attempt to emulate what Sir John Duckworth did by rushing
in the past is now definitely abandoned, if, indeed, it were
ever contemplated. Forts — owing to their extraordinary re-
cuperative power — have, as the more thoughtful generally
anticipated, proved themselves a match for ships, despite the
advances of modern gunnery.
There is some reason, however, to hope that the Turkish
morale has suffered somev/hat during the last month ; so that
a gradual wearing-down of resistance may be anticipated.
This, perhaps, is evidenced most by the curious proceedings
of the Goehen. She has been patched up in some way, and
was sent into the Black Sea recently — presumably as a species
of bogey rather than aught else. At any rate, on meeting
some of the Russian Black Sea Fleet — which theoretically she
should have been able to destroy in detail— she turned tail
and ran for it, being under fire for some hours without doing
or receiving (apparently) any particular damage. The pre-
sumption is that owing to injuries previously received her
speed has con.5idcrably deteriorated — for she seems to have
been only just able to get away. The Russian guns were
probably outranged. The bad shooting of the Goehen may be
attributed in part to damaged turrets, in part to deteriorated
7noralr.
How far her crew are Turkish and how far German is
not known, but it is fairly apparent that this ship is incapable
of securing for Turkey the command of the Black Sea.
It remains to be seen how far the Rus.sians will use tlieir
command of the sea. Their reported exploit of having pene-
trated mine fields in order to engage forts at close range docs
not impress one as having been either useful or particularly
reasonable. For the rest, without a land force in co-operation
it is clear that the ships alone cannot accomplish anything
against even merely moderate resistance in the Bosphorus.
Here, then, matters as regards Constantinople mjarj
remain for some considerable wliile — possibly till, as in the
Crimean War and in the American Civil War, vessels are
extemj)orised capable of dealing with the particular situation
involved. In both those campaigns forts were dealt with
by towing, or slowly propelling, what were virtually heavily-
protected floating forts into close proximity with the works
to be destroyed.
THE IHGH SEAS GENERALLY.
T);e armed German liner Eitel Frifdrich is now definitely
interned at Newport News, U.S.A., where the solitary
remaining corsair, Kronprim Wilhelm, has since put in — her
supplies having been cut cff. Here she, too, will probably b«
interned, as once having been located she has little or no
chance of leaving harbour without encountering a British
cruiser.
So ends ingloriously the great Commerce War from which
Germany at one time hoped so much. Though immature, to
the extent that the number of ships participating was less
than had been hoped, ic was conducted with a skill, thorough-
ness, and forethought beyond reproach. Supply ships wer«
everywhere, and the nieans of conveying information were
remarkable. Retiring to unknown bases was brought to li
fine art. But out of it all only about sixty merchant ships
were accounted for, at a cost which one way and another must
have equalled the damage done. Mahan's dictum as to the
folly of commerce warfare has been fully borne out.
In concluding remarks on this phase of the war, a pa.ssing
reference may be made to the statement that the Eitel Fried-
rich had run out of 8.2 ammunition, and interned herself
because this was unprocurable in America. So large a gun
sounds very improbable for a merchant ship, but it is worth
recording, that before the war there were plenty of circum-
stantial statements as to German liners being fitted to mount
such guns. How and in what way the E'liel Friedrich used
up her heavy ammunition has not transpired. So far as is
known, she sank very few merchant ships, and that cannot
have consumed much in the way of projectiles, even suppos-
ing them to have been used. Probably British naval activi-
ties prevented her from ever obtaining her necessary supplies
of ammunition. The mounting of 8.2's would suggest an
intention to render armed liners capable of decisive action
not only against British armed liners bn^ also at^ainst small
British cruisers.
ANSWERS TO CORRESPONDENTS.
D. C. T. (London, N.W.). — If a submarine has been
rammed or fired at and oil is subsequently seen on the water,
the assumption is that she has been disposed of, but this
assumption is not necessarily invariably correct.
HiBEENicus. — (1) Your scheme is not novel. (2) You
may take it that the Admiralty knows what it is doing, and
there is no reason to believe that the apparent waste of time
is anything more than apparent.
E. N. B. (London, N.E.). — Arm.ing merchantmen
against privateers was a common practice in the old days. To
be frank, I do not think that it would answer to-day against
German submarines, except for the first time or two. The
best safety for merchantmen is for several to travel in
company, and even if one is submarined the odds are even
that one of the 8ur\-ivors will ram the submarine. See, how-
ever, the legal point alluded to in the text.
Ignoramus. — (1) It is practically impossible for either
side to lay a minefield without the other side coming to know
of its location tolerably quickly. The chances of trapping a
German submarine into a minefield are consequently small.
(2) The same answer applies; the sea is too big a place for
any entire closure to be possible. (3) It is not advisable to
answer this question. (4) The first two answers explain why
the idea, though ingenious, is somewhat outside the zona of
practicability.
L-INDLUBDEB (Cork). — Unfortunately, German sub-
marines possess an intelligence which is not shared with the
whale ! Everything else which you suggest has been tried
since the war began, but the results achieved have been very
slight.
C. M. (Dulverton).— I trust you will forgive my disagree-
ing with you, but I am afraid that the only chance of a
merchant ship against a submarine is being able to ram her*
You may take it for certain that if fired at, a hostile sub*
12*
April 17, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
marine would instantly submerge and torpedo without
further notice — probably without being seen, and in doing
so she would be quite within her legal rights. I am endeavour-
ing to deaJ with this very complicated question in the text,
but you must understand that to a great extent we are faced
with the unknown, and consequently, though suitable anti-
dotes will eventually be evolved, they can only be arrived
ak by trial and error.
C M. (Cheltenham). — A submarine attacking a
merchant ship would fire the torpedo at the ship's broadside,
and so the bow defence would be of no avail.
E. M. B. (Hove).— (1) The idea that German sub-
marines are superior to ours is entirely incorrect. The latest
German boats are very good, but so also are our latest boats.
The rest of your question about submarines was dealt with
in last week's article, which appeared a day or two after your
letter was received. (2) This question is better not answered.
Ycra may take it that our Garrison Artillery know what they
are doing.
H. E. C, (Baling)". — The " decoy duck " is an idea which
in some form or other is as old as naval warfare itself.
J. R. B. (Manchester). — Your invention, or what is
■obstantiaily the same thing, was anticipated by David
BashneU in America in the year 1773.
C. P. S. (Bath).- — The scheme you suggest has been in
use ever since the war began.
J. W. M. (Earlscolne).— See answers to " H. E. C." and
" C. P. S."
T. B. (Bizerta). — There is nothing novel in the sugges-
tion of your French friend.
M. N. O. (London, S.E.).— (1) Whether or not it is
wiser for a merchant ship to go for a submarine or to attempt
to evade her by a zig-zag course must depend upon a variety
of circumstances and the judgment of the captain of the
merchant ship. It is impossible for anyone to lay down a
general rule to be followed in all circumstances. (2) An
elephant gun against a submarine would be little more effec-
tive thau a pea-shooter.
E. S. (Frome). — See first sentence of reply to " Land-
lubber " above.
C. T. (London, W.). — You may depend upon it that
the Admiralty is fully alive to the submarine mena«3. The
arming of merchant ships is a moot point to some extent, for
reasons that are dealt with in the text. AH through this war
the situation has been more serious than the public elects to ,
believe.
A. H. A. (Schatzalp-Davos, Switzerland).— (1) It is
not to the public interest to make any statement whatever as
to new warships that the Admiralty may have in hand. (2)
A similar answer applies. The enemy is equally curious on
the same subject. (3) I think you may safely put the alleged
German apparatus for enabling submarines to look about
them under the water in the same category as the inventions
of the late Baron Munchausen. The German story is not even
original, as some years ago an Italian inventor floated, or
attempted to float, a company with a submarine which was
to cruise at great depths and discover hidden treasure with
a powerful searchlight. But even he did not go to the length
of claiming to see through a brick wall, which is about what
the German claim amount-s to.
I. S. A. (London, E.G.). — You will see that I have
endeavoured to deal with the legal poser which you raise in
the text of this issue.
Inquirek. — You are mistaken. The German shooting at
the Falkland Island action was, in the circumstances, un-
commonly good.
INFLUENCE OF AIR FOWER.-IV.
THE AERIAL DILEMMA.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
WITH few exception.", arising from very special
circumstances, victory for a naval country has
always been the result of the assistance given by
her navy to her land forces. A navy has, by
itself, hardly ever won a campaign; but, on
the other hand, many a war would not have been a victorious
one to a naval country had it not been for the influence and
pressure of her sea-power. History, therefore, emphasises
the value of co-operation between the army and the navy
of a country. This Is not, however, its only lesson. A closer
•xaraination of the contributions of armies and of navies of
the past to final victories shows that, besides the co-operation
of the two Services, there must also be the individual inde-
pendence of each.
These teachings of history are very valuable as a guide
in the development of air power, whoso influence upon the
destinies of nations is now at its dawn. But for the fact that
there is associated with air fleets a distinctive military feature
which is not a characteristic of naval forces, it would be
possible to adapt, bodily, all the teachings of the history of
navies to the rising air power — a power which can already
exercise a direct, as well as an indirect, influence on the
destinies of nations. There ii>, therefore, a parallelism
between air and sea power. But, unlike navies, air fleets can
remain in continuous touch with any operating army, and,
before many years are over, they will, no doubt, be in a similar
position as regards high sea fleets. Thi.i capability of air
fleets, which can be, and, to a certain degree already has been,
made of great niilitary value to both armies and navies, is the
reason why the entire teachings of naval history cannot bo
grafted on to the growing air power. Whereas a navy always
exercises its influence, whether direct or indirect, by the
power wliich it possesses as a separ^iie and independent
Service, an air fleet cannot give the best possible assistance to
the force with which it is operating if it be independent of
that force. The indirect influence ox sea power demands co-
operation, whilst the indirect influence of air power necessi-
tates co-ordination, and, to a certain degree, Eubordination.
The soundness of this assertion will be fully grasped by
considering some examples of the respective indirect influence
of sea and of air power.
Wlien a navy employs a part of its organisation for the
transport of troops, or of ammunition, or of supplies to any
desired place, or v/hen it uses its influence to permit of such
transport being made by merchant vessels, it exercises its force
only in an indirect manner. The sea pov.'er is then used to
assist the land forces, and the navy simply co-operates with the
army. When the army has received a suflicieut supply of men,
arms, ammunition, and supplies, it carries on the war on land
according to its own plans and independently of the navy. It is
true that it may be required of the navy to see that the expedi-
tionary force is continuously supplied with all its necessaries.
This, however, does not alter the relative position of the army
and of the navy. It only makes their co-operation a con-
tinuous one for a specific purpose, and there is no need, on
that account, to place the navy under the authority of the
Commander of the expeditionary forces. In fact, such a sub-
ordination would be inadvisable, and the necessary arrange-
ments for an efficient co-operation between the army and the
navy are, in consequence, entirely left to the authorities in
oSice.
An air fleet, on the other hand, can produce an importanb
indirect influence only if its work is co-ordinat-ed with that of
the force with which it is co-operating, and if that coordiua-
tiou is made on the spot as and when circumstances demand.
Tliis is due to the nature of the assistance which aircraft can
render to a land or to a .^ca force. It is obvious, for instance,
ihat it must rest wiih the commander of a force whether, on a
particular day, or in particular circumstances, he would use
his aircraft for reconnaissance in conjunction with the cavalry
or for the purpose of assisting the artillery, or for any other
suitable work. When an air squadron is co-operating with
cavalry, tlie assistance which it can render to that force is, of
course, of a different nature to that which it can give by co-
operating with another arm, the artillery, for instance.
Neither does it follow that, both as regards machines and
penoiiiifl, the air squadron best suited for co-operating with
the cavalry is also the best one to be employed for assi: Ling the
artillery; but neither of them may be the best for dealing
with hostile air squadrons trying to prevent such co-operation.
That certain eir-squ.adrons are epeeially suited to perform
certain duties is a feature which, to some degree, is also to be
found in the navy. But there is this difference between the
co-operation of sea and air power with the land force, that
whereas the former, from the nature of its work, as
osemplific'd above, always exercises its influence, howevei;
13*
LAND AND ,WATEE.
April 17, 1915.
indirect, as a Service, the latter must, for the maximum
efficiency, be used as an Arm. Considered as such, an air
fleet must, tlierefore, be subordinated to the commander of
the force with which it is operating, whether it be a land or
a sea fcrce. An aerial squadron may be a cavalry arm, or an
artillery arm, or a naval arm. In days to come both navies
and armies will, no doubt, be provided with air squadrons,
specially equipped and manned, for these three, and very
likely for other purposes. A study, therefore — even such an
incomplete one as is being made in these Notes on
the Influence of Air Power — shows that, in order
to derive the fullest advantage of the indirect influence
of air power, it is necessary to subordinate the work
of air fleets to that of the various arms they may be employed
to assist. But, in the present war, on account of the fact
that the aerial arm is being seriously employed for the first
time, it has not been found possible to give the amount of
co-ordination and subordination which is necessary for maxi-
mum efficisncy. The present campaign has witnessed an im-
provised utilisation of the new arm, and in that improvisa-
tion Great Britain has shown adaptability to such an extent
that .~-he has acquired, over her opponents, an ascendancy of
the greatest value.
Such direct influence of air power, however, as would re-
sult from aerial attacks, aerial bombardments, and other
offensive operations can only be obtained by the organisation
of aerial forces as a Service, with the same liberty for inde-
pendent action as is enjoyed to-day by navies.
The primal difference that exists between naval and aerial
power is the following : A navy exercises its maximum direct,
as well as its maximum indirect, influence by being an
independent Service, whereas an aerial force exercises its
greatest indirect influence by being considered as a supple-
mentary arm, and would exercise its maximum direct
influence were it, like the Army and the Navy, an inde-
pendent Service.
Previous to this war the lack of knowledge and experi-
ence with regard to the military capability of aircraft led to
a very crude system of dividing service aeronautics into (i.)
military and (ii.) naval aeronautics. Now, experience in the
employment of aircraft in actual warfare demands the more
scientific and truer division of: (i.) Service, (ii.) Arm. This
latter would itself be subdivided into (a) the military aerial
arm and (b) the naval aerial arm. The present organisation
of aerial forces does not permit the fullest advantage being
t-aken of the direct as well as of the indirect influence of air
power, because an aerial force is, at present, a hybrid which
has to perform both the duties of an arm and those of a
Service. In consequence there arises an aerial dilemma of
great interest, to wliich attention has already been drawn in
the previous article on the Influence of Air Power. This
dilemma is the following: Shall a commander look upon his
air fleet as a service and employ it to exert direct influence,
in which case he would have to forgo the advantages
resulting from the co-ordination of his aircraft with the
other arms, or shall he employ his aerial force as an arm to
exert the indirect influence of air power, in which case he
would have to renounce the possible effect of the direct in-
fluence of air power 1 No solution has yet been offered to this
aerial dilemma now facing commanders, who have had, there-
fore, to content themselves with a compromise, the result of
this compromise being that the only effort to use the direct
influence of air power has been the carrying out of a number
of timid raids. But to this dilemma, as far as it concerns
Great Britain, the writer hopes to be able to offer a solution
in his next article.
CORRESPONDENCE.
ANTI SUIJMARINE TACTICS.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Sir, — My letter, which you published a few weeks ago,
has resulted in an interesting discussion on the subject of anti-
submarine tactics. Your two correspondents have described
the types of submarine chasers which they recommend, and,
from their technical knowledge, as naval architects, their
views on the various points at issue are evidently
valuable. There is, however, one important point wliich
I raised in my letter, which neither "J. R." nor
"J. D. C." has referred to — viz., the desirability
of attacking the submarine by the method of ramming.
Both your correspondents, apparently, rely for their
offensive entirely on the gun and the torpedo. Either
of these weapons would doubtless be effective against a sub-
marine on the surface, but I fail to see how they could be
used with advantage against a submerged submarine, the
periscope only being visible above the surface of the water. I
presume that the only objection to endowing a submarine
chaser with ramming power is that she would have to be more
strongly constructed, and that consequently she would have
less speed for a given length of water-line — in other words,
she must be a longer and larger boat for a given rate of
speed.
All these points, however, must clearly be left in the
hands of the Admiralty, who, of course, will consult com-
manders of our own submarines and commanders of those
destroyers v/ho have had opportunities of attacking the
enemy's submarines. What we want is that the Admiralty
should build as quickly as possible, and if they are uncertain
as to the best tyjie of boat, that they should build a few boats
of different types. For instance, they might build a few
boats designed to ram, with a speed of 20 to 24 knots, and a
few others of lighter construction with a speed of 28 to
30 knots. — Yours faithfully,
DUNLEATH.
GUN EMPLACEMENTS.
To the Editor of Land and Watek.
Sir, — I have read somewhere that there may be a diffi-
culty in providing emplacements for guns as our troops
advance, owing to the time it takes for ordinary concrete to
Bet or become solid.
A quick-setting cement is probably known to tie
authorities, but in case it is not, I would inform yoa that encH
a cement exists in a mixture of magnasite and mameaiiun
chloride.
I have never used this cement to make a concrete, but
Jiave used it as a quick-setting mortar. I may say that
within twelve hours this mortar becomes as hard as ordinary
Portland cement mortar does in three or four days.
I do not ask for any acknowledgment of this in your
columns, but in case any further information is desired on
this subject I am willing to give it. — Yours faithfully,
Fkancis Drakb.
Alining and Metallurgical Club, London Wall Buildings,
London Wall, London, E.C.
WAR LECTURES.
Many additional inquiries with regard to tlia Land and Wate*
lecture stheme hav« been received by Queen Alexandra's Field Fore*
Fund as a result of our recent article. Arrangements are being mad«
for lectures well into May, and there is still ample time to fix up date*
before the season is over foi indoor meetings.
Both as a means of patriotic propaganda and as practical aid to th«
fund that supplies, on properly organised lines, the comforts so urgently
needed by our soldiers in France, the scheme has proved a gratifying
succe-ss.
Clergymen, members of political bodies, and public men generally
are earnestly in\it<-d to write for particulars and texts of the lectures t-9
the hon. secretary, Queen Alexandra's Field Force Fund, 24a, Hill
Blroct, Kiiightsbridge, London, S.W.
SMALL FIRMS.
We have received a letter from a firm of aeronautical engineers
who would like to get in touch with some of the small firms whose plant
at the present time is idie. If the principals of these firms will kindly
commnnicato with the Editor of Land and Wateb he will put them
in communication with the correspondent. Envelopes should be marked
"Small Firms."
MR. HILAIRE BELLOGS WAR LECTURES.
Preston Town Hall Wedne.s(lay 28 April, 3 & 8.
Blackpool Winter Gardens Thursday 29 April, 3.30 & 3.
Liverpool Pliilharmonic Hall... Friday 30 April, 8.30.
Liverpool Philharmonic Hall.. Saturday 1 May, 3.
IrfjBdon Queen's Hall Wednesday S May, 0.30.
MR. FRED T. JANE ON THE NAVAL WAR.
Sheffield Victoria HaH Friday 16
Harrogat« Kursaal Saturday 1'
April, 8.
April, 3.30.
April, 8.
April, 8.
April, 8.
April, 3,
April, 8.
Aprilj 5.
MR. CRAWFURD PRICE ON "SERBIA."
Bonthport.«..™..Cambridg« HaD,.^. Friday 16 April, 8.
Torquay....™ Pavilion „.,».., Wednesday...,,, 21 April, 5.
Woymoath ...Barden Rooms..,...,, Thursday. ..,..„ 22 April, 8.
Boornemotith.... Winter Gardeas.nOT FridAy..„...„... 23 April, 3 & &
14»
Blackpool... Winter Gardens Monday.,
LiverpooL Philharmonic Hall.. Tuesday
Bouthpoit.... ..,,.. Cambridge Hall...... Wednesday..
Baj:ton.....„„.„. Opera House ThuisJay....
K(ancheBter..„....Free Trade Hall Friday' ,
Scarborough...... Opera House..... Saturday....
.19
20
.21
.22
23
,24
April 17, 1915.
U A N D AND K A T E R.
OUR AMBULANCE APPEAL.
By ATHERTON FLEMING.
AS we go to press the total amouut of subscriptions
received is £621 17s. 3d., a figure which is very
satisfactory indeed. An order has been placed
for a chassis, to cost £430, and it is estimated
that the cost of the body — which is being built to
the design of Mr. Amos, the consulting engineer to the Hector
Munro Ambulance Corps— will be about £60. Mr. Amos is
intimately acquainted with the many and varied requirements
of a thoroughly efiQcient motor-ambulance, and many fittings
will be added which Dr. Munro's experience at the front
has shown to be necessary. A great deal of trouble
has been experienced in procuring a chassis for almost
immediate delivery, but we have been fortunate in obtaining
the co-operation of the Napier Co., who are doing their best
to obtain an exemption order from the War Office, and may
be able to deliver in about a fortnight or three weeks. In the
meantime, the body is being built, and, under favourable
circumstances, the complete ambulance ought to be handed
over to Dr. Munro within one month.
One of the most interesting letters I have received in con-
nection with the fund is reprinted hereunder, and I wish to
assure the writer that his subscription is none the less welcome
because of its size, and that it is sincerely hoped that when our
ambulance goes on active service, it will help in some little
way to alleviate the sufferings of many of the brave Belgian
poldiery, and then tlio purpose of our fund has been
achieved.
16, Buckingham Palace Gardens,
London, W.,
March 30, 1915.
Sir, — I learnt with much pleasure that your estimable
magazine has opened a subscription to provide the Belgian
Army with a new ambulance car. I am glad to send you my
small offering, knowing so well what it means to be without
sufficient help for the wounded, since I was myself lying a
whole day helpless on the battlefield. Notwithstanding their
heroism and devotion, the stretcher-bearers — who had to carry
the wounded right back to the ambulance train — were forced
to leave hundreds of them exposed to the cross-fires of friend
and foe. This is the most terrible experience that a soldir can
be called upon to suffer, the onJjj remedy for which is a well-
equipped service of motor-ambulances.
I am sure that all Belgian soldiers will feel deeply grate-
ful to you for your great kindness in opening this subscription
list. — I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
G. Van Vuffel,
Sergent-Reforme du 2e de Ligne Beige.
P.S.— I hope you will be able to read this badly-written
lett-er, but, since I have lost the use of my right hand, I have
to write with my left one.
LIST OF SUBSCRIPTIONS.
Mr. Frank Ga^keU 100
Mr. \V. BeU 25
Mrs. J. M. Richardson 20
Mrs. Gcs3ages 20
Mr. G. B. Richardson 10
Mrs. G. Ronald 10
Miss Go.x 10
Mr. Wm. W. M. Parkin Moore 10
Mr. E. M. Quin 13
Anonymoua • 5
Mrs. S. D. A. Rouquette 5
Miss E. M. Rjrie '. 5
Mr. F. V. Philip 5
Comman<I«r R. G. Fane, R.N
,, C. L. Maclean, R.N
„ H. A. Glossop, R.N
Lt.-Commander L. G. D. Way, R.N
IJcat. Martin, R.N.V.R
The Countess of Radnor... 5
Colonel Chas. Mclnroy 5
Mrs. J. P. Morgan 5
Mr. Alfred Steele Perkins 5
Mr. W. Wilson Greg 5
Mr. H. S. Hall 5
Mrs. A. Mountain 5
Mrs. W. Richardson 5
Miss E. J. Wallace 5
Mrs. L. W. Hellyer 5
Co!. C. F. PoUock 5
Mr. S. R. Ccoks:.n 5
I.<ord Kilmaine 5
Capt. W. Hig.?on, M.F.H 6
Mrs. H. Bevan 5
Capt. Geo. W. Taylor 5
Mr. D. Watson 5
Anonymoas 5
Mr. C. W. B'oxsom 5
Capt. G. W. Liddell, D.S.O.I .
Mrs. Ethel Liddell / ^
Miss Helen M. Atkinson 5
Mrs. G. Singer 5
Mrs. A. Gnossptlius 3
Mr. O. E. G. Bowen 3
Mrs. Bowman 3
Mr. W. W. Kettlewell 3
Mrs. M. J. De Lottiiilere 3
Mrs. E. F. Elakcney 2
Mr. R. H. Basnall 2
Mr. H. Aithur Steward.
Mr. W. H. MacLeod ....
Capt. A. H. Ma£on
Mrs. Alexis Doxal
"A Reader"
Mr. and Mrs. T. H. Valentine..
. 2
2
2
. 2
2
2
Major B. Edward Freamo 2
s. d. . R
0 0 Mrs. Dunn Pattison 2
0 0 .\lis.s A. M. Whidborne 2
0 0 Mr*. Uertiude McGroben 2
0 0 Mrs. E. M. Pcrcival 2
0 0 Mrs. H. J. Hoare 2
0 0 AnonvmoHS 2
0 0 .Mr. and Mrs. Cheese 2
0 0 Capt. BUgh 2
0 0 Mij.s Vio'.et Donne 2
5 0 Mr. E. Wilson 2
5 0 Mr. G. and Mi.ss L. Sheldon 2
5 0 .Mrs. A. M. \cild 2
5 0 .Mis.5 M. Z. HoUish 2
Sir JIaibv Crofton 2
L. S. and E. G. Foote 2
5 0 -Mrs. W. H. Watsons 2
"U. w:' 2
Mrs. Gillespie 2
5 0 Mrs. T. B. Nelson 2
5 0 Capt. Dawson 2
0 0 Mrs. Parkins 2
0 0 Mr. J. B. Gunning Moore 2
0 0 Mr. A. E. Mellersh '
0 0 The Mis^s Webb )
0 0 Miss Diigard i-
0 0 Mrs. N. Dugard )
0 0 Lt.-Com. H. Feilding, R.N
0 0 .Mr. CharVs A. Knight
0 0 Mrs. E. de Ridder
0 0 Mrs. A. Douglas Farmer
0 0 Mr. Leonard Hall
0 0 Mr. E. M. WeUs
0 0 Canon Wilson, D.D. (Worcester
0 0 Mr. E. L. Simon
0 0 "A. T."
0 0 Mr. and Mrs. Hugh G. Cunning
0 0 Miss Port
n „ Mr. .T. Smith
" " Jlr. W. H. Fenand
0 0 Mr. W. D. Salea
0 0 Mr. Geoffrey C. Cijbb
3 0 Miss H. N."Ma.ck
0 0 Mr. R. B. Burnahy
0 0 Mr. Herbert A. Dugard
0 0 Mr. H. Wade Deacon
0 0 Mr. John G. Philpot
0 Mr^. Home Rigg
0 Mr. H. E. F. Roberts
0 Mrs. Hawkins
0 Mr. D. L. Clarke
0 Miss Julia Crossley
0 Mr. W. J. Hud.wn
0 Miss Landon Tlionias
0 Mr. Julian G. Lousada
0 The Rev. E. G. Sullivan;
s. d. Mr. S Codfri-v Bird 1
2 0 Mrs. Benliam " 1
2 0 Mr. Lionel D. Swift 1
2 0 Mrs. G. Ford Hutchinson 1 j
0 0 Miss Ferguson /
0 0 Mr. CJeo. T. Henderson 1
0 0 Mrs. W. Philip 1
0 0 Frank Penrose, Esfj.. M.D 1
0 0 Miss Christine Whvte 1
0 0 Mr. H. Paiker.....'. 1
0 0 Miss JIary Butitr 1
0 0 Mr. and .Virs. Claude Barton 1
0 0 The Hon. H. Parker 1
0 0 Mr. Jno. P. Fox 1
0 0 Mrs. H. Pi'kington 1
0 0 Mr. F. J. Dyson 1
0 0 Mr. T. W. Fletcher 1
0 0 Afrs. Tapplv 1
0 0 Mr. C. H. "Tapply 1
0 0 Mrs. Hotson 1
0 0 Mrs. M. A. Robinson 1
0 0 Mr. and Mrs. W. K. S. King 1
0 0 Mr. C. W. Di.Ton 1
6 0 Mr. G. H. Piikington 1
Mr. D. W'. Payne 1
6 0 .Mis? Rose \
Mr. B. Guest 1
2 0 Mrs. E. A. Brutton 1
1 0 Mr. G. V. Pound 1
1 0 MissRuss?]] 1
1 0 Mr. Arthur Belfield 1
1 0 Mr. H. J. E. Burrell 1
1 0 Mr. E. Harold Wood 1
1 0 Mrs. Gilbert Stracey l
1 0 Anonymous 1
1 0 Mrs. Lands l
1 0 Mrs. Walton Cohen '.'. l
1 0 Lt.-Col. H. Lowther 1
1 0 Madame !.« BoulJ de Naus 1
1 0 Mr. F. H. Anson 1
1 0 Mrs. R. 0. Atkinson 1
1 0 Dr. and ^frs. de Montmorency 1
1 0 Miss Chamlwrlin 1
10 "C. B. W." 1
1 0 Anonvmous 1
1 0 Mr. B. A. Coasena 1
1 0 .V[i.s3 E. Cannell X
1 0 "R. B." 1
1 0 Anonymous 1
1 0 Miss "E. H. 0\v€n 1
1 0 Miss Eila Brown 1
1 0 Mr. Jolin H. Merrivale 1
1 0 Lt.-Com. and Mrs. Helyer 1
1 0 Miss E. and Miss F. Biisk 1
1 0 Anonvmous (Tweeds) 1
1 0 Mrs. *B. E. Foatcr 1
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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15»
LAND AND KATER,
April 17, 1915.
£ s. d.
Mr. Alfred B. B«n 10 0
Mr. J. PlatU 10 0
"A. G. S." (Tuiibrldge WelU) 10 0
Mr. Alfred James 10 0
Mr. John Harsrcave* 10 0
Mrs. John Wisdom 10 0
Jfr. John Wiikinson 10 0
Mr. \V. F. Frank 10 0
Miss Tliorncby 10 0
Mrs. Naisniith 10 0
Mr. Ernest H. Browne 10 0
Mr. J. M. Grieg 10 0
Mrs. O. C. Marston 10 0
Mr. Honev 10 0
Mr. A. C. Trench 10 0
Mr. Jclin \V. Denham 10 0
Mr. J. M. Tankard 10 0
Miss Murser 10 0
Miss F. Jul! 10 0
Lt.-Col. \V. W. Rotheram, R.E 10 0
"2 Constant Readers" 10 0
Sir Clifford AUbutt 10 0
Mrs. Duncan 10 0
Surgeon-Gen. H. F. Lillv, R.N' 10 0
Lt.-Col. B. G. Crawford," I.M.S 10 0
Miss Lrediiani 10 0
Miss Madeline Barrett 10 0
Miss Finney 10 0
Miss A. Gladstone 10 0
Mrs. R. Berrj- 10 0
"R. M." 1 0 0
Mrs. Lingard 10 0
Miss Editii E. Inglis 10 0
Mr. Ernest Brown 10 0
lyfr. Arthur Redfern 10 0
Mr. John R. Hobhouss 10 0
The Lady Antrim 10 0
IMr. L. N. Carvalho 0 17 6
Mr. E. P. Worth 0 11 0
Miss N( ra J. Blair 0 11 0
Mr. J. E. Monk 0 10 6
Miss Oldings 0 10 6
Mr. F. Fawcett 0 ]0 6
Mr. Horace Field 0 10 6
Miss E. Adeia Marshall 0 30 fi
Miss Marian Hopkinson 0 10 6
Miss Olive Lapage 0 10 6
Mrs. K. Tetlcv 0 10 0
Mr. J. N. Hignctt 0 10 0
Mr. P. Vere Turner 0 10 0
Mrs. Wimbush 0 10 0
Uts. Bury 0 10 0
Mr. A. B. Sampson 0 10 0
Mr. H. L. H. Mander 0 10 0
Mi^ Perrin 0 10 0
Mr. and Mrs. Hugh Maiwell 0 10 0
^frs. A. E. Nicholson 0 10 0
Mr. Hughllngs Davies 0 10 0
Mrs. Eva M. Mcllcrah 0 10 0
Dr. W. Bevan Lewis 0 10 0
Mr. G. W. Orr 0 10 0
"L. and F." 0 10 0
"W. J. R." 0 10 0
Mrs. F. Scliwabe 0 10 0
Mr. Charles Williamson 0 10 0
Miss Barker 0 10 0
Mr. E. M. Smvthies 0 10 0
Mr. Fred J. Sw.in 0 10 0
Miss Gertrude A. Fryer 0 10 0
Miss Murpliy 0 10 0
Miss Laird .' 0 10 0
Capt. K. H. Bruce 0 iO 0
Messrs. A. B. Collins and M. H.
Fenwick 0 10 0
Mr. J. R. Beckett 0 10 0
Mr. Henrv- G. Tempest 0 10 0
"10 Readers" 0 10 0
"Stamina" 0 10 0
Anonymous 0 10 0
Sir F'. Denys 0 10 0
Miss Steele' 0 10 0
Miss Campbell 0 10 0
Mr. H. Saunders 0 10 0
Mr. C. F. Horton 0 10 0
Mr. John Gill 0 10 0
Major Soccombe 0 10 0
Capt. H. McD. WiUiams 0 10 0
ISCrs. K. L. John.son 0 10 0
"10 Subscribers" 0 10 0
Mrs. Nott 0 10 0
Miss E. M. Hewson 0 10 0
Mr. Walter G. Scott 0 10 0
Mr. S. Slater 0 10 0
Mr. 0. A. Pawson 0 10 0
Mr. C. F. Shearson 0 10 0
Readers 0 8 0
5Irs. and the Misses Darley 0 7 6
Mrs. Dickenson 0 7 6
Mr. J;i3. Logan 0 7 0
Misses Kernbla 0 6 10
Miss Balfour 0 6 0
Master and Mrs. A. F. Hargrca ves. .. 0 6 0
Anonymous 0 6 0
"I. M. L." 0 S 0
Mr. W. R. Mitchell 0 5 0
Mtss Perry 0 S 0
"Orchids" 0 5 0
£ s. d.
"A Reader" 0 5 0
Miss Guthrie Smith 0 5 0
Mr. W. J. Watson 0 5 0
Mr. A. S. Gosset 0 5 0
"H. B. D." 0 5 0
Miss Tymms 0 5 0
Mr. Clifford R. Akers 0 5 0
Miss MacPonald 0 5 0
Messrs. F. and ti. Sherwin 0 5 0
Miss Barnet 0 5 0
Mr. B. P. I-ascelles 0 5 0
Sir Frederick Hogg 0 5 0
Mr. Maurice G. Hannay 0 5 0
Mr. W. B. Fenton 0 5 0
Mr. Richard Hilliard 0 5 0
Mrs. Denis de Vitre & Four Children 0 5 0
Mr. Sa.muel S. Martyn 0 5 0
Mrs. Taylor '. 0 5 0
Mrs. Montgomery 0 5 0
Mrs. M. G. Bailister 0 5 0
Mr. Gilbert A. Winson 0 5 0
" A Soldier's Mother " 0 5 0
Miss M. Clevcrley Price 0 5 0
Mrs. ^[. W. Dove 0 5 0
Mrs. Newton 0 5 0
Mr. Fred K. Harland 0 5 0
"Anonymous" 0 5 0
Dr. Gurney Thomp.son 0 5 0
Mr. Jas. D. Birchall 0 5 0
Missl>eake 0 5 0
"M. G. M." 0 5 0
"E. M. H." 0 5 0
'Mrs. Eleanor M. Harvey 0 5 0
Mi.'ss Dillon 0 5 0
Miss Vera Esposito 0 5 0
Miss Frecling 0 5 0
Mr. J. J. Hmlges 0 5 0
"F. B." 0 5 0
Miss Loui.?e Maitland 0 5 0
Mrs. Gordon Canning 0 5 0
>rr. and Mrs. If. H. Joseph 0 5 0
Major C. S. B. Moner 0 5 0
Miss A. F. Stewart 0 5 0
Miss W. Hopkin 0 5 0
ifr. W. M. Glasgow 0 5 0
Mr. and Mrs. J. L. Behrend 0 5 0
Mr. E. S. Chattock 0 5 0
Miss I. Roberts 0 5 0
Mr. F. Stanton Barnes 0 5 0
Mr. M. D. Dublin 0 5 0
Mrs. Jean Macwilliam 0 5 0
Miss Stubbs 0 5 0
"Potteries" 0 5 0
" M. C. C." 0 5 0
Miss J. Hulburt 0 5 0
Mrs. Furley 0 5 0
Anonymous (Stirling) 0 5 0
Mr. E. Bennett 0 5 0
Mr. T. Wood 0 5 0
Miss Ritchie 0 5 0
Miss Henderson 0 5 0
Mr. A. C. Dutton 0 5 0
"Rifleman" 0 5 0
Miss F. Widlas 0 5 0
Misa K. Walia.s 0 5 0
Mr. and Mrs. C. Wykeham Perry 0 5 0
Mrs. N. B. Gunn 0 5 0
Anonvmous 0 5 0
Mrs. "Wilkinson 0 5 0
Mrs. G. Matthews 0 5 0
Mrs. Tillie 0 5 0
Miss Clare G. Bradford 0 5 0
Mrs. Crighton Simpson 0 5 0
Mr. and Mrs. Mcndl 0 5 0
Misa Esther Swainson 0 4 2
Mr. John Beveridge and three mem-
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Anonymous 0 4 0
Miss M. R. Smith 0 4 0
Mr., Mrs., and Jlissea Florence and
Alice Barker 0 4 0
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£ s. d.
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Miss Mary Wake 0 2 6
Miss C. Horton 0 2 6
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Mr. L. W. Wainwright 0 2 6
"C. E. W. " 0 2 6
Miss A. Hodge 0 2 6
"D. M. " 0 2 6
Mr. E. H. G. MiUer 0 2 5
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Mr. W. O. Wallace 0 2 3
Mis.^ Violet Jacob 0 2 0
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39
LAND AND WATER
April 17, 1915
MONTHLY
LITERARY REVIEW
By R. A. SCOTT-JAMES
MR. JOSEPH CONRAD has conferred this
immeasurable boon upon us ; he, a Pole, with
the temperament, instinct, and antecedents of
a Slav, has written great Slavonic literature
for us (Slavonic, that is, in all but language
and subject-matter) ; he has written it for us in our language,
at its best, in terms of things and images that we know, thus
naturalising amongst us not only himself, but a classic ex-
ample of literature Slavonic in temper, inspiration, and
method. His new book contains four short stories : —
" Within the Tides ;
(Dent.) 6s.
Tales." By Joseph Conrad.
These tales, being slighter, have not the all-compelling,
concentrated force of the three stories in " Youth," and in
personal interest they fall short of " 'Twixt Land and Sea."
Nevertheless, all but the first of the four are as good as
they could be, for the point is made, the effect attained, the
thrill, the horror, the mocking tragedy is achieved. And
the first story only falls short in that the author is long in
getting to the business. The gist of the tale is all in the
concluding sections, when the explorer brings the girl, her
father, and her aunt to his island, knowing that the long-
lost, mediocre youth — whom the girl has idealised and sought
— lies dead there. He, the explorer, inflamed by this lovely,
reserved, conventional girl, deeming himself worthy of her,
and knowing the worthlessness of the youth whom she seeks,
confronts her with the other's grave and his own passion ;
and sees her "in the pose of simple grief — mourning for
herself," conventionally " surprised " at his passion, and
offended. " I had nothing to offer to her vanity." Certainly
Mr. Conrad abhors an anti-climax.
In the other stories we are in the affair from the start.
One tells of how an old ship was wrecked for the sake of the
insurance money, and how grimly everything went awry.
Another is a gruesome story of 1813, the scene an inn in a
desolate region in Spain, where an English naval officer
discovers his comrade's body in a wardrobe, and escapes
from the horrid contrivance by which the other had been
done to death. The fourth defies description in a sentence ;
we are back again in the Eastern atmosphere of " Almayer's
Folly " ; but Mr. Conrad has grown more cynical, and the
" good " man who has saved his cargo and his life from
treacherous assassins, is brought home to a wife green with
jealousy.
I have often heard it said that for Mr. Conrad " the
tale is the thing " ; he is just a teller of tales. In a sense
he is. The plot, the situation, the cHmax, are all-important.
But his tales are much more than narratives. Everyone
knows that a good ghost story is nothing if it does not
produce the " feel " of the ghost and the horror itself. What
the teller of good ghost stories does with the uncanny Mr.
Conrad can do for the more varied and far more subtle
realities of life. The persons are real and complex, the
situation is tense, dramatic, charged with emotion, and the
scenery enters into the drama and becomes a part of its
life. What matters in a tale is not the bare incidents, how-
ever ingeniously contrived, but how you conceive them,
imagine them, present them to yourself in terms of life and
feeling. In the long run it is Mr. Conrad's personality that
matters ; by mastery of language his imagination dominates
the plot.
"The Invisible Event." By J. D. Beresford.
(Sidgwick & Jackson.) 6s.
Just before I read this book I was examining the preface
to " Fanny's First Play " (now published by Constable,
IS. 6d. net), and found "Mr. Shaw reiterating: "Is it any
wonder that I am driven to offer to young people in our
suburbs the desperate advice : Do something that will get
you into trouble ? " I do not intend to discuss " Fanny's
First Play " in these columns ; it was sufficiently discussed
when the" play was produced four years ago. But Mr. Shaw
has set the problem : How to " combine loss of respect-
ability " (respectability being in his opinion the besetting
sin of our age) " with integrity of self-respect and reasonable
consideration for other people's feelings and interests ? "
It may seem surprising that such a novelist as Mr. Beresford,
who has ten times as much interest in human nature as
Mr. Shaw has, ten times the capacity to make characters
real and alive, should yet be so hypnotised by his ideas as
to let these ready-made problems dominate his novels.
However, the problem is not everything. Mr. Beresford
may have used the fashionable situation, but his characters
are all his own, they work out their destinies in his way,
and this book is a powerful conclusion to the trilogy which
began with " The Early History of Jacob Stahl."
The novel opens abruptly at the point where Stahl is
completely convinced that he cannot do anything in life
without Betty Gale. Marriage is impossible, for a wife from
whom he had been long separated is still living, and refuses
to divorce him. To Stahl the situation presents no difficulties ;
he needs Betty, she needs him ; the ceremony of marriage is
a ritual binding only those who fear pubhc opinion. But
Betty does fear public opinion. She shrinks from the
hostility of her selfish relatives at the Rectory ;' she shrinks
even from the horror of old Mrs. Parmenter, whose partner
she is in running a boarding establishment." I hate to see
dead people walking about," says Mr. Shaw. " To Jacob
she (Mrs. Parmenter) appeared as a dying woman, to Betty
as the representative of public opinion."
Betty does run away with Stahl, and joins him in a
cottage in Cornwall. But her difficulties are not at an end.
She had not merely feared public opinion ; her conscience
confirmed her fears. It is here that Mr. Beresford breaks
away entirely from Mr. Shaw. Stahl argues ; but argument
is nothing to Betty. " I shall be all right if you'll only let
me alone," she says, evading the earnest arguments that to
her " wore an air of sophistry."
" Well," you are coming round to my point of view, anyway,"
he says.
" I've got to, if I'm to have any peace of mind," said Betty,
pointing the essetitial he had overlooked.
Betty Gale is a character whom the reader will not
easily forget — strong, active, impulsive, honest, lovable.
The personality of Stahl, too, is drawn with great power ;
and Mr. Beresford is equally skilful in living in the characters
of the selfish, respectable people who are such poor supports,
and Betty's wavering conscience. Mr. Beresford is one of
the most interesting, suggestive, and impressive novelists
now writing, and his book is a rare example of fine, animate,
stimulating fiction.
"Peter Paraeon: A Tale of Youth."
Palmer. (Seeker.) 6s.
By John
We have hitherto known Mr. Palmer as a clever, incisive,
discriminating critic of literature and drama, and in this
first novel he shows that he can be no less skilful as a critic
of life. " Skilful," perhaps, is the word that first comes to
the lips — the sentences and the chapters are so neatly
trimmed, the whole story arranged with exquisite precision.
But he has not refined away the flesh and blood in the process.
Peter Paragon is a kind of diminutive Faust, and he
shares that quality with so many modern heroes of fiction !
They are nearly all little Fausts, plumbing the depths of
experience in their cradles, at school, at the university, in
London, and at length in some happier Margaret's arms.
Peter plumbs and plumbs all these little depths.
But, to be fair to Peter, he is a nice boy at school, and in
love ^vith Miranda ; he is a really spirited, live, original
undergraduate at Oxford (in an Oxford far more real than
" Verdant Green's," more interesting even than Mr. Compton
Mackenzie's) ; he is an eager, masculine adventurer in the
adult cosmopolis ; and Miranda, at the best, is not merely
Miranda, but an eternal ideal. Mr. Palmer stands out head
and shoulders above the other dozens of creators of Peters
homunculi.
THE "NINETEENTH CENTURY"
The April number of the " Nineteenth Century " contains a very
timely article by Sir Harry Johnston. There are few persons who
understand African administration as Sir Harry understands it, and in
the past none could have accused him of being an anti-German. But
he is now urging strongly the necessity of capturing and holding the
German African colonies, and of refusing to restore them after the
War. Dr. S. T. Pruen's article, " What the Germans did in East
Africa," gives a few illuminating facts in this connection. In the
same number of the Review Sir Francis Piggott discusses neutral
trading and the acute questions involved in it : M. Emile Vandervelde
contributes an important article (in French) on the Belgium of To-day
and the Belgium of To-morrow. An exceptionally interesting con-
tribution is that from Mr. Havelock Ellis on " Richard Graves and
' the Spiritual Quixote.' "
Messrs. Jarrold & Sons have supplied a much felt want in their
weekly publication " Foreign Opinion," the first issue of which appeared
the latter end of March. It is valuable to be able to read the various
opinions by well-known foreign writers as to the different phases of
the war and of the various attitudes with which it is regarded when
looked at through foreign eyes. The first number contains articles
by Von der Goltz, Max Lenz, Theodore Woolsey, Gabriel Hanotaux,
Count Reventlow. and Ramiro de Maeztu. A feature of the number is
the " Comment and Caricature."
40
April 17, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
Beirs
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TobaqcQ
A true friend will bring you at all times
the priceless gift of comradeship, encourage-
ment and sympathy.
There is no truer friend than a well-
seasoned pipe carefully filled with "THREE
NUNS" tobacco — for that is the only mix-
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aroma, and wonderful coolness can satisfy
the need of a smoker of real discernment.
A Testing Sample will be forwarded on application to
Stephen Mitchell & Son, Branch of the Imperial Tobacco
Co, (of Great Britain and Ireland), Limited, Glasgow.
"King's Head" is similar but stronger.
BOTH ARE OBTAINABLE EVERYWHERE.
PER fijd OZ.
No. 392.
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THREE NUNS" CIGARETTES^
MEDIUM.
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41
LAND AND WATER
April 17, 191 5
For the man on
Active Service
Watchmake.
to Admiralty
(€
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Mappings Famed
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This fine movement wristlet watch was first
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desert-experience is the severest test a watoh
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During the last Boer War it renewed its
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It is compensated and jewelled. In silver
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It is fitted with a luminous dial, which shows
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£2 : 10 : 0
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220 Regent St.. W,
The Royal Work^
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THE "GIEVE"
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The Peril of the Submarine
An Officer lately on H.M. Auxiliary Cruiser
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Made to any Size. 50/ •• net. Flannel Lined.
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(Gieve,
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Service Jacket (Khaki Serge or Whipcord) ...
Do. (Guards' Barathea)
Bedford Cord Breeches (Buckskin strapped)
Slacki
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Kills (Regimental Tartan)
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Lounge Suits from £4 4 0
Spring Overcoats ... ... ,. £3 13 6
Dress Suits ... „ £6 6 0
Upon application, wc shall be pleased to forw.ard our book, " THE MAN OF
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TWO ESTAISLISH.MENTS ONLY
14 OLD BOND STREET.-W:®
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42
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2763
SATURDAY. APRIL 24, 1915
rpublished as"| price sixpenck
La newspaperJ published weekly
Cojiyri^<t, H't-it 1^ Siftt. Sottiksea
CAPTAIN W. A. H. KELLY, C.B.
In command of H.M.S. "Gloucester" during the chase of the German cruisers
" Goeben " and " Breslau "
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 1915
The Reo-ent Street House of
Peter Robinson is famous for
Distinctive Headwear
LADIES who desire individual Style
and Distinctiveness in their Head-
wear, but who are disinclined to pay the
high prices that usually go with exclusiveness, will do //"
well to pay a visit to the REGKNi" STREET House ;-
of Peter Kobinson and inspect the new and beautiful
Models they are showinij
ill Spring Millinery. Their
\ew Hats are ilistinctive in
every sense of the word, but
they are also very moderately
priced. Note the three illus-
l rated.
R. S. X. 2. Charming Hat in
black Taffetas, with lace edge,
preltv I-'ariy Victori in tiimming
of Silk Flowers, and loops of
libbon falling at back. 49/6
R.S. X.3. New Sailor in Taffetas,
with killed hemstitched frill on brim
an 1 crown, trimmed I aurel leaves of
Silk and " Futurist " rose. In black,
vnavy, nigger, or any shade. 35/9
A Booklet of the new
Fashions for Spring will
he forwarded post free to
any reader of ^^ Land and
IVater" who requests it.
r
R.S. X.I. This useful and bernniing
Har can be had in any colour, in soft
Taff tas lined straw, with novrl trim-
ming of .Shepherd's t'l.iid ribbon: pearl
buttons lasten one of the new \'cil to
the crown. 39/6
The Regent Street House
of Peter Robinson L^
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIK
§ Garrould's
To H.M. War Office, H.M. Coionial Offick.
India Officf,. St. John Ambvlancf, .\ssochtion.
London County Counoil, Gut's Hospitai, Ac.
i Are you Run-down |
■■ When your system is undermined by worry or crer-work ■■
J5 —when your vitality is lowered— when you feel "any ■■
■■ how"— when your nerves are "on edge"— when the least ^^
^ exertion tires you— yon are in a "Run-down" condition. JJ
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g -nuo vigour and new life. Will you try just one bot le ? (b
I Begin to get well FREE. §
■■ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of ' Wincamis '—not a mere taste, ™
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IM postage). COLEMAN & CO., Ltd., W212, Wincamis Works, Norwich. ^
■lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Ladies are incited to visit tlie
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON
Complete Equipment of Nurses for
Home Detachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock.
HOT WATER
BOTTLES.
Write -for
GARROULD'S NURSES' CATALOGUE.
POST FREE, containing
Hurses' Uniforms, Surgical Instruments and Appliances.
EngllBh
Matinfac-
tore
Each
Bottle
Qnaranteed
Model 55.
Sti-ong Po'-table
Canvas Camp
pea "•! Folder, 9;6.
With i'il'ow, 12/-.
Lcneth, 6ft. ;
width, -Jft. Sin.
H'e have supplied a
lartie number of lUese
t auip Folders for the
WoKMled.
IDX Oin. 3/-
12 X i5in. 3/9
14 X 8 in. 4/6
12X10 in. */»
14 X 10 in. 6/3
10 X 10 in. 6/2
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.
CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS, various
size<. T/6, 8,9, 9/11, 10 9, &c.
WATER BEDS. AIR BEDS AND MAT-
TRESSES. 29/6, S2/6, 26/9
AIR & WATER PILLOWS, 3/-, 10/6, &c.
FEEDING CUP, 4}d. each.
BED PANS, from 3/9
LEG & ARM BATHS, from 26/6 & 8 6
STRETCHER, War OfBce pattern.
Complete with Webb Straps and |
P How, 2 Gns. Without Straps and
Pillow, 35/6
GARROULD'S MOTOR
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of Invalids by Road, Rail or Sea.
BODY & LIMB RED FRAMES, from 4./3i
DRESSING SCISSORS, from 1/6
INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very light
and strongr. 17/6
INVALID BED TABLES, from 6/6
INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
every description.
FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
special prices.
INVALID BED RESTS, 6/11
WARD BEDSTEADS. 3 ft. 13/9;
2 it. 6 in. 12/9
AMBULANCES AND
Estimates Free.
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Telegrams: " Oarbould, Lohoon." Telepliones : M20, 5321, i 6297 Paddilnjtun.
April 24, 19 1 5
LAND AND WATER
THROUGH THE EYES OF A WOMAN
Wpmen in Congress
A PROPOSAL has recently been made, whicli has
set many people a-talking. It is suggested that
a Conference of Women should take place at the
Hague, before many more days have elapsed.
It will deal with the question of peace. \\'omen
from many countries are to be there. Women from England,
Germany, Austria-Hungary, Felgium, and var'ou; neutral
countries. There will be no
Frenchwomen, for the simple
reason that the women of
France have flatly refused to
have anything to do with the
idea. They will not even c in-
sider the notion of meeting
women from Germany at pre-
sent. It is a suggestion they
cannot tolerate. The feeling
in France runs far too high for
that. Her sufferings are too
great, and the knowledge cf
the German menace too sore.
Various Opinions
Opinion is by no means
unanimous in England. There
seems, indeed, a great depth of
feeling about it, and not onlv
criticism, but controversy is
rife. The women, however, who
have made up their minds that
it is the right thing to go have
probably made up their minds
to face a vast amount of criti-
cism also. That, they no^oubt
recognise, is inevitable. The
first mo\ement connecting
women and peace came from
America in the very early
stages of the war. A great
demonstration of women took
place to protest against the
senseless destruction and bar-
barity of war. From all ac-
counts it was a very fine pro-
ceeding, and made a great
impression upon the mind of
o\X'ryone who saw it. It was
the outcry of woman as wife,
and woman as mother, against
this rutl-less slaying of men,
and the smashing of homes
and lives. The American
woman can look at the question from a more or less unbiassed
point of view. Circumstances aid her to be an impartial
critic, and she can regard the question as a whole, and free
from personal feelings. American women have come to the
conclusion that war is the most destructive enemy that
woman can have. V'aluable though it is to both, they yet
consider that peace is infinitely more valuable to women
than to men. It is almost impossible not to wonder whether
the women at the Hague can meet under calm conditions
as the Americans did. If women of enemy countries
can discuss burning questions without heat and without
bitterness, it must surely approach a miracle. One glance at
the names of those who will act in the English deputation must
convince everybody that the task has not been lightly under-
taken. It is to be carried out by those who only act from
fi.xed convictions, and whose opinions have long been quoted.
Lord Robert Cecil's criticism of the proposal is that it is
premature, and with this many will agree. When peace is in
sight a women's congress is bound to be infinitely more satis-
factory than it could possibly be at the present moment.
Then it can be of immense importance.
The Belgian Soldiers' Fund
Just behind the " Times Book Club " a wonderful work
is being carried out. It is known as the Belgian Soldiers'
Fund, and the object is to provide comforts for Belgian
soldiers on active service. The address of the Fund is 17-10,
James Street, Oxford Street, and the premises can be easily
recognised, because a large Belgian flag is flying from them.
The Belgian Soldiers' F'und sends out a great number <.f cases
and bales to the Belgian Army on Monday of every week.
These packages are shipped to Dunkerque, and the shipping
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER.
is easy and prompt, because it has the advantage of a free pass
from the Admiralty, and the packages are met the other end
by Belgian officials. This, indeed, is one of the chief points
about the I-"und. Not onlv has it the support and gratitude of
every member of the Belgian Government, from the King and
Prirrie Minister downwards, but it has the approval of our own
War Office and Admiralty as well. The working of the I^und
is one of complete harmony. It is a triumph of sound,
common sense organisation.
All that is wanted is sufficient
support. The briefest review
of the object for which it exists
will serve — it is indeed all that
is possible here.
The Friend in Need
Everj'one who has given
the matter a moment's thought
knows that the words " our
debt to Belgium " are no mere
formula. It is the clearest of
realities. The debt we owe
Belgium is an immense one,
the seven daj's she gained for
us of such vast value, that it
cannot be reckoned in words.
The best way in which we can
show our gratitude is by deeds.
The Belgian Soldiers' F'und is
the means through which we
can act. The keynote of this
Fund is one of friendship.
People in England are asked
to befriend the Belgian soldiers
who ■ liave borne and suffered
so much during the last few
months. The catastrophe which
has o\-ertaken Belgium has re-
sulted in families being parted
and divided, and many a sol-
dier in the Belgian Army to-
day has not the smallest idea
where his wife and family are.
.\s a consequence he has no
one to send him those comforts
which hearten him, and mean
so much to his well-being.
Through the good serx'ices of
the I'^und, many people are
sending gifts to the Belgian
soldier, but more friends are
ever wanted. The cases and
bales sent out by the Fund
contain articles of food and clothing. If people send money
instead of gifts in kind, articles are bought at wholesale
prices by an experienced bu\er. The demands upon every-
body's purse are heavy in these days, but the F^und makes no
big requests. It is grateful for the gift of one pound of sugar
or rice weekly. It is the regular weekly gift — however small
— that is most appreciated, because then there is a working
knowledge of the ]>robable amount that can be dispatched
week by week.
Pure Water for Belgium
The Belgian Army appreciate so warmly the packages
from James Street, .that the various commanding officers
draw up lists of their special requirements, and forward them
to Dunkerque. During the past month a tremendous success
has been scored by the portable field kitchens, which, under
the Fund's direction, have been conveying soup and coffee
to the Belgian troops. Though they carry fifty gallons,
they are so light that they can pass over many a shell-
torn road, which could not be crossed by heavier traffic.
The great problem in front of Belgium is the water supply.
The floods have, made burying of dead men and animals an
impossibility ; when they subside and the present mud turns
into dust, the conditions in Belgium will be indescribable.
It is proposed to raise a force of 150 field kitchens, each of
which will carry fifty gallons of sterilised water. What this
will mean to the Belgian Army no tongue can tell. By their
aid the nightmare of typhus that threatens Belgium as fully
as Serbia will be laid. Every penny that can be spared should
find its way to the Pure Water Fund, full particulars of wl.ich
will always be fonvarded on request from James Street,
though the worth of the work almost speaks for itself.
Copy.i^ht. M.ui.,mt Laiiu ci.arus THE COUNTESS OF LISBURNE
Who is ihe wife of one of ifie newly-appoint d officers in llie Welsh
Guards, Lord Lisburne having f>een just gazetted amongst the
lieutenants. Lady Lisburne is the daughter of Don
Julio de Bittencourt, of the Chilian Embassy
s?>
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 191 5
A PARABLE
OF PARA.
The tale of the man
who bought not
wisely but too well.
CHAPTER THE SIXTH.
AND when they had eaten, the wise man said, "Thou
seest the condition of my beast's shoes. Innumerable
journeys have I undertaken since last! shod him. And
note well, theirfirst life is not their last, for when thoucomest
to shoe thy beast again, this shoe can be re-fashioned in
such a manner that thou hast a new shoe and naught but a
few pieces to pay. But have a care that thou sufferest none
but the makers to work their will upon it, or thou wilt be
sore disappointed. The price ? What payestthou for thine
own foot-wear? They are from Hassan's shop methinks;
not dear nor cheap; a fair price and full value. Is it not sor
Well, here also thou obtaineth full measure, and art well
treated. No hucksterersarethcy. Lastly, as a man possess-
ing the finer sentiments, hast considered that this shoe is
fashioned by men of our own race? What sayest thou?
Of a surety I have reason, and one day thou wilt speak
unto another even as I have spoken unto thee." (The end.)
MORAL: "Do not buy more tyres than you need by
buying other tyres than Dunlops."
Published by
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Founders of the Pneumatic Tyre Industry
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Abolishing^ Cycle Friction
THIS is an illustnilion of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
Wheel in action inside its dirtproof Gear-case.
See how the moving chain picks up the Oil and sprays it
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place in the Free Wheel and in the Rear Hub. So the
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IIM
54
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND ,W.ATER,
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
KOTE. — Tbi« article has been submitted to the Press Bur«aa, which does not object to the publication as ceosored, and iakd M
responsibility lor the currectness ol the ststemcDts.
lit accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans Illustrating this Article must only b*
regarded as approximate, and no deSnite strength at any pcint is indicated.
i^HE news of the past week has been so slight
that there is no particular commentary
to be made (or at least none which would
be useful to the general study of the war)
upon the details.
I shall therefore take the opportunity, with
my readers' leave, of considering as thoroughly as
may be the problem presented by the Carpathian
fighting.
There have indeed been a couple of points
in the West which have excited interest in the
French and English Press. The first is the cap-
ture of the hill marked " 60 metres " on the
Belgian ordnance map just south of Zillebecke by
the British contingent. The second is the fact
that the French liave in the Vosges pushed forward
upon one of the ridges of the lateral valley leading
down upon the Alsatian plain north of the height
captured a fortnight ago.
But neitlier of these local m.ovements is more
than typical of the initiative possessed along the
whole line by the Allies in the West. There is
nothing to be learned from them beyond what we
already know — that, with sufficient preparation,
the Allies can attack where they like, and that
where they attack they will almost invariably
draw upon the enemy a higher loss than he inflicts
upon them.
The matter has been repeated so often in
these columns that I do not labour it; but it is
of the first importance to the understanding of
that attrition which, though people are getting
rather tired of the term, remains the foundation
of military policy between the Swiss mountains
and the North Sea. It may be summed up in
these maxims. The attack is less expensive than
the defence. This paradox depends upon the
allied superiority in heavy artillery. That artil-
lery is superior on account of superior airwork.
In those three points you have the whole business,
and there is no more to be said upon them until
the moment shall come for putting them to the
test upon a far larger scale.
In Northern Central Poland nothing has
happened, and in the Carpathians themselves
little m.ore than the intensive actions confined to a
few hundred yards which mark the slow advance
of the Russian occupation from the crest.
But the general problem presented by the
Carpathians will remain for some weeks a capital
element in the campaign, and perhaps the chief
element. It may even become the determining
thing of the whole war.
It is therefore amply worth our while to pause
in this lull and analyse the conditions of the
front between the Duiiajec and the frontiers of
Roumania.
THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF A MOUN-
TAIN CHAIN AS AN OBSTACLE.
All o1)stacles to a strategic advance have this
in common, that their characteristic is to impose
delay.
Each type of obstacle, however, differs from
the rest in the fashion whereby it must be sur-
mounted and defended. Thus marsh involves the
building of a causeway; a belt of sea is defended
by a fleet and can only be surmounted by a fleet ; a
river is usually to be crossed anjnvhere when once
the opportunity of throwing a bridge is acquired.
A range of mountains commonly presents a
particular type, both in the methods of surmount-
ing it, and in the methods of defending it, which
give to the strategic problem connected with it a
special character capable of definition and
analysis; and one range differs from another
according to the height, the breadth, the character
of artificial communications aci'oss it, and so
forth. As the Carpathian front has become for
the moment the principal field of the wai", I
propose this week to describe the general character
of a mountain chain as an obstacle, and next to
analyse the particular conditions of the Car-
pathians.
A mountain chain opposes the rapid progress
of an army in three ways, all inter-connected.
First, and least important, you have the mere
fact of the slope. The attacking party has nor-
mally to advance up hill until the crest of the
chain is acquired.
Second, and much more important, mountain
districts are, by their forests and their crags,
difficult of access save by certain well-determinecl
avenues, commonly those of the main valleys, and
these avenues are made accessible in various
degrees by the artificial work of roads and rail-
ways.
Thirdly, a mountain chain is commonly a
deserted territory, with few inhabitnnts, few
towns, and, therefore, few opportunities for
shelter and storage.
Certain consequences flow immediately from
these three main characteristics. The most im-
portant is that frequent and good communications
will be discovered in the Plain upon either side,
and will usually grow rarer and rarer as the crest
is approached. A consecjuence of this is that the
defence of the chain becomes increasingly easy,
and the attempt to cross it increasingly difficult
as the belt of mountain country from foothills
to foothills is traversed by the attack.
The problem, therefore, of mastering the
obstacle of a mountain ehain is by no means the
problem of merely reaching its most deserted and
highest portion, the crest, after which one may
expect the task of the advance to become easier.
Students sometimes fall into this error on the
analogy of lesser elevations. If you are trying,
for instance, to master a range of hills such as the
Cotswolds, when you are in possession of the crest
you have done your work. Supposing an array
coming up from the Plain of Oxford along the
gradual Eastern approach of the Cotswolds, and
another army concerned to prevent their crossing
this chain and appearing in the Plain of the
Severn — the decisive fighting vv'ould take place on
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 1915.
the Eastern slope; and if the invading army
carried the crest it would be impossible to defend
the short, steep escarpment down on to the Severn
.Valley.
But with a great mountain range the dis-
tances involved are so considerable that this
analogy does not apply.
With the crest already in one's hands, one
Btill has a belt of territory at least a day's march
broad, and usually much more, to pass before one
is out of the wild country and free to use the
numerous and easy communications.
Consequently, the real strain upon an army
which is trying to force a belt of mountain terri-
tory conies at the end of its effort, so far as com-
munications are concerned, and just as it is reach-
ing the further plain it is putting the m.aximum
Btrain upon its columns of supply.
Next we must note that wdien once the Plains
are reached the army reaching them has a very
great advantage at once over his opponent. This
advantage is not only due to the fact that once the
obstacle has been surmounted, and once the
" bridge heads," so to speak, have been established
on the further side of it — that state of affairs
applies to the successful crossing of any obstacle —
the particular advantage given by the forcing of a
mountain cliain and arrival upon the plain beyond
may be compared to bursting of water through a
dam. So much effort and such numbers are required
for the difficult passage (which, remember, can only
necessarily be conducted by a large body upon a
cex'tain breadth of front), that if it is successful,
by the time its effort reaches the plains the
enemy is probably already beaten. This does
not apply to the case of a deliberate retire-
ment behind a mountain range on the part
oP the defence, when the defence feels itself
unequal to the task of holding the hills; but
it does apply to such a battle as this which is
raging in the Carpathians on the Hungarian side.
An army which shall have been forced doAvn the
Hungarian slope on to the plains will hardly be in
a posture to defend those plains against the masses
that have been accumulated against it, and that
have forced it from the hills.
This consideration, though it is very vague
and general in its character, explains, I think,
more than one of the successful irruptions over a
mountain chain in history. At first blush it would
seem as though the army in the plain had every
advantage. It has good communications behind
it, whereas the array coming across the mountain
has bad communications. It has probably also
shorter communications behind it. It can move
large bodies with rapidity laterally, whereas the
army that has only just arrived on the plains can
only move small bodies laterally, and probably not
with rapidity. It has destroyed or impeded the
communications which it left behind, whereas it
has kept intact the communications upon which it
rejDoses.
From all these causes it would seem that the
army which has been pressed back across the
mountains sliould be in a better posture than the
army which has forced the obstacle. But the his-
torical cases which in practice prove the contrary
are so numerous that they call for an explanation,
and I believe the explanation to be what I have
said — that the effort to force such an obstacle
being what it is, when it is successful has all the
effect of the bursting of water through a dam,
and, the plains being reached, tlie momentum of
victory counts for more than all the rest.
I repeat, however, that this does not apply
to the case of the defensive voluntarily abandon-
ing a belt of mountain district before a superior
offensive which it thinks it is not able to meet. In
this latter case the defensive, ha,ving fallen back
on to the plains, is in a very good posture to meet
tlie offensive proceeding from over the mountains.
It compels that oft'ensive to fight with an obstacle
at its back, and that is ahvays a handicap, and it
has tlie advantages above enumerated which tlie
plain can give.
2»
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
THE PARTICULAR POINT OF THE LATERAL
VALLEYS.
A mountain range nearly always has a par-
ticular character which renders the problem of
offence and defence within its limits different from
that of any other obstacle, and this character must
be explained diagrammatically.
From the crest of a range of mountains X — Y
(as shown on plan II.) there descend to the
plain upon either side a system of valleys
which usually run more or less perpendicular
to the crest. Thus you will have on one
side of X — Y the streams 1, 2, 3, 4, and on the
other side the streams a, b, c, d. These streams will
commonly run through deep gorges, and will be
separated by difficult secondary ranges (repre-
sented by the dotted lines), across which it is very
difficult to move men and material, and a line
across which it is difficult to keep in touch.
mi
The streams on either side especially mark the
lines along which communication across the
mountains is possible by road or by railway.
Now, as the streams proceed down towards
the foot-hills they unite in larger streams and more
open valleys as at the points 5 — 6, e — f , and later
on these new main streams unite in their turn
before reaching the plain, as at the points g and 7.
Now it is evident that an army forcing its
way across the mountains fi^om the plains at
M — N towards the plains K — K, when it has
reached the crest X — Y and passed the four passes
at the heads of the streams, is hampered in its
movements because each portion has for some time
been separated from tlie rest by the lateral or
sec^ondary ridges which come down from the cen-
tral range towards the plains on either side.
When it begins to go down the further slope
towards K — K, pressing the defensive before it,
these conditions remain unaltered until the first
of those points is reached at which the streams
join.
Supposing, for .instance, in the above
diagram the enemy, advancing from a dii-ection
A, uas made itself the master of all four pa-sses
1, 2, 3, and 4, and is already beginning to get down
on the further slope. And supposing the front it
has managed to occupy by a certain date is repre-
sented by the line of crosses in the accompanying
sketch. The four colunms which are pressing
down the four valleys a, b, c, d, will have various
fortunes. Some will probably be able to go
forward faster than others. Let us suppose
that for some reason the progress is more
rapid towards the X end than towards the
Y end, and that after a few more days'
fighting the front is represented by such a line
as the line of dots on the accompanying sketch. It
will be observed that the force which is fighting
its way down valley a is very close to the point e,
where the two streams a and b join. When the
advance gets to e it will cut off the retreat of the
enemy still ojJeraiing in valley b. For that enemy
to try to get away towards valley c across the
lateral ridge which separates the two valleys wiU
be difficult or impossible. Therefore, as the
advancing force coming down valley a gets nearer
and nearer to e, the enemy force in valley b is in
greater and greater peril of finding itself cut oil
from food and munitions altogether. If it is to
save itself it must fall back; and under the mere
threat it would do so rapidly.
Therefore a successful advance along valley
a is enough, when it has been sufficiently pushed
forward, to clear at once valley a and valley b
of opposition. Even, therefore, if the enemy in
valley b has been able to keep up a much better
defence than in valley a, the lack of success of the
enemy in valley a has the effect of neutralising hia
success in valley b, and the last state of the front of
both armies will be that of the dashes. The appear-
ance of the invaders at e only from the one valley
a will automatically give control to the invader of
both passes 1 and 2 and of both the roads leading
down from them.
The process continues. No matter how well
the defensive keeps its end up at the Y end of the
chain, if the invader at the X end pushes down to
the point G, where the streams all unite, ha
threatens with destruction the defensive far up
valley c and valley d, and it must fall back rapidly,
if it is not to be destroyed. In effect, the mere pre-
sence of the invader at E will almost certainly
make the defensive towards Y begin falling back
rapidly, and long before the invader is at G his
advance will have automatically uncovered the
whole of the mountain belt and the defensive will
have been forced back to the line K — K.
THE
THE
DOUBLE THRUST" OF
OPPOSING ARMIES.
Bearing all these principles in mind, we can,
by examining the actual points in the Carpathians
during the last three weeks, discover how matters
stand. The Russian and Austro- German armies
now at issue in these mountains lie opposing each
other upon a line which makes an angle with and
I*
LAND AND .WATER
April 24, 1915.
crosses the main crest. The position may be ex-
pressed in the foregoing sketch, where X— Y repre-
Bents the crest of the Carpathians, the shaded area
the mountain belt, the part left blank on either side
the plains, and the brackets (1), (2), (3), (4), the
four main passes of the Dukla, the Lupkow, the
Uzsok, and the Jablonitza, of which the last
three are railway as well as road passes, Avhile the
thick line running transversely through the whole
represents the front of the two armies. In such a
scheme the most salient point and that which
leaves the issue most in doubt is this : —
That the Austro- Germans are in possession
t)f a great deal of the plain upon the far side of
the mountains in the district I have marked with
the letter A ; while the Russians are only in posses-
sion of a narrow mountain district beyond the
crest, which I have marked with the letter B.
If the effort of either combatant w^ere pre-
cisely the same in character and in strength, it
would be obvious that this possession of the plain
on the Eastern flank by the Austro-Germans v.ould
give them the advantage over the Russians, and a
Bituation such as that represented in the diagram
w^ould mean that the Russians could not hope to
force the Carpathians. For although they had
crossed at one place, they would appear to have
been badly beaten in the race for the plains by
their opponents crossing at another, and the
'Austro-Germans, with their advantage of roads
and railways in tlie plain, could bring such an
effort to bear there that those plains at A — A
•would become the principal field of action, and the
Russians could not move with safety until their
enemies had been driven out of the flat country.
But, as a fact, the effort has not been of the
same character upon the two sides. The Austro-
Germans occupying the plains at A — A, and tlie
belt of mountains between those plains and the
main crest, have been where they are for several
months past. They did not slowly beat the
Russians back. The Russians voluntarily retired
before greatly superior numbers long before
'Frzemysl had fallen, and long before their new
munitioning and equipment had permitted them
to bring forward reinforcements.
The Russians are not upon this Eastern flank
in the position of a force in front of which the
dam of pressed invasion has burst. They are on
a calculated defensive, long dra\\Ti up and held
with sufficient numbers.
At the other end of the line, the X end,
although the Russians are still far from the
plains, their advance into the belt B — B has been
the residt of steady and hea\7 fighting against a
defensive which has been slowly beaten back, and
which may at any moment betray signs of exhaus-
tion.
Nor is this the only matter in which the
apparently superior position of the Austro-
Germans must be qualified.
The Carpatliian belt is not of even width, nor
its difficulties of ground of equal character, nor
its passes equally easy to use in the maintenance
of communications. Its actual shape is not the
parallelogram represented in diagram IV. > but
rather something like that of diagram Y.,
in which the increasing width of the range
as one goes south-east is indicated by the
shape of the shaded portion and the increasing
difficulty of the ground indicated by the increas-
ing closeness of the shading as one goes from north-
west toward south-east. Though, therefore, the
Austro-German line covers a good deal of the
northern plain, that is, a portion of Galicia and all
the Bukovina, while the Russian line only covers a
small mountain portion beyond the main ridge, yet
the Russian advance represents an easier field of
action and less perilous communications upon its
side of the crest than the Austro-German effort
upon theirs. Moreover, the increasing difficulty of
the ground as one goes south-east means higher
mountains, both lateral and main, deeper ravines,
far more extensive woods, and, I believe, a rarer
population.
The modification of the position is further
emphasised by the nature of the passes which,
when they are studied, will be seen to be at once
easier and closer together whore the Russians are
pressing forward than where the Austro-Germans
hold them in check.
In order to appreciate this the following
sketch map m.ay be useful.
—riwiaaiiJ'aMiwaiiwwBaa
Taking as the limits of the plain country the
principal towns Avhich stand at the issues of the
valleys and marking these with dots, givjng the
railways in the usual convention (the single lines
single and the double lines double), and showing
the principal road passes by brackets, it is appa-
rent that every facility for crossing the range
increases as one goes to the left — that is, north-
ward and westward— and that whoever is pressing
on in the region A— A has advantage over his
opponent pressing on in the region B— B.^
It is upon this general advantage tnat the
Russians are now counting, in spite of the fact
that their enemies have a good footing on the
plains, which they have not; the actual front
being very much what the thick line is on the same
sketch. Should the Russians, for instance, succeed
in forcing their way down to the point H (which
is Homonna, and at the gate of the plains), they.
lApril 24, 1915.
LAND AND SViATER.
IRoy/a-ruska \ -^
^ jTo 'Russiaa
will be in a better position to advance southward
than will the Aiistro-Germans to advance north-
ward. For they will have behind them short,
easy, and numerous communications, while their
enemies will have long, difficult, and few communi-
cations.
Let us conclude this survey of the mere posi-
tions by examining the ground and the communi-
cations in some detail, and for tliat purpose I will
append another sketch map.
Notice in the first place upon this map the
length of the front. The Austro-German defence
of Cracow holds the valley of the Dunajec in its
lower part, and the valley of its tributary, the
Biala, up to the summits of the mountains. In
other words, the railway from Tarnow to Kaschau
cannot be used by the enemy, but he has probably
by this time built a subsidiary line liaking up
Neu Sandec with the main Cracow line. From this
front along the Dunajec and the Biala, from, say,
such a point as Jaslo to Dorna Watra on the
Roumanian frontier, is a line near to which, but in
a bow slightly bending eastward of which, runs
the full length of the Carpathian chain, or, rather,
of that part of it concerning the present opera-
tions. The direction is but a little eastward of due
south-east; the distance is 410 kilometres, or just
under 255 miles. Counting the sinuosities of the
front and the curve of the mountain chain, we are
dealing with something rather over 300 miles of
country. In this stretch the range continually
rises. The height of the mountain mass above
Bartfeld is about 3,800 feet high. Immediately
to the east the whole range sinks, and there is a
sort of natural saddle, the lowest point of which is
the Dukla Pass; for about that point the rise
begins. There is a peak, before the Uzsok Pass is
reached, already nearer 4,600 than 4,500 feet. In
the midst of the vast woods forty miles away to the
south-east there is a peak not far short of 6,000
feet. Beyond the Jablonitza Pass the Pop Ivan is
over 6,000, and immediately overlooking Dorna
;Watra itself and the Roumanian frontier is a peak
nearer 8,000 than 7,000 feet in height.
As with the peaks, so with the passes. They
climb higher and higher as one goes from the
region of Cracow towards the frontier of Rou-
mania. The Lupkow and the Dukla are not 2.00Q
feet above the sea ; the Uzsok is nearly 3,000. Tlie
Beskid Pass between Stryj and Munkacs is a little
lower, but the Jablonitza is well over 3,000, and
the road pass of Stiol, which is the highest of all,
is, I believe, nearly 4,000.
We have already seen that with the gradual
rise and broadening of the Chain as it goes south-
wards the country gets more deserted, the forest
larger, and the communications more rare. Within
the first sixty miles of Polyanka the passes^
all of which are in the hands of the Russians now,
number no less than six high roads and one doublo
line of railway. In the next sixty miles you have
but three road passes and two single lines of rail-
way, unless one counts as two separate avenues for
advance the two roads which diverge from the
Beskid Pass, one towards Ungvar, the other
towards Munkacs. In the remaining distance of
over 120 miles there are only two road passes, one
of which, along the Delatin or Jablonitza, is
accompanied by a single line of railway.
In connection with these passes it may be of
interest to delay for a moment upon a point
which has been discussed recently in the papers :
the accuracy of the term " Magyar Way."
Tradition points to the invasion of the Hun-
garian Plain by the Magyars in the ninth
century over the comparatively open gap
which leads from Stryj to Munkacs, and is to-
day generally known as the Beskid Pass. This tra-
dition is accepted, I believe by the learned bodies
of modern Hungary, and the national monument
5*
LAND AND 5V.ATER.
April 24. 1915.
(erected in memory of tliis arrival of tlie Hun-
garian nation to its present seat stands upon the
plateau of Munkacs itsdf. But there is another
tradition which gives the name to the next pass,
the Jablonitza, and this is the one followed in the
map issued by Messrs. Dobson and Molle under
my name.
In the examination of this part of the Car-
the mouth of whicli is Sambo (Sam); the two ni
tlie junction of which is Sanok, and, further on,
that of Dukla and that of Jaslo.
But while the valleys on the Galician side
thus follow a normal course and come down
parallel one to the other from the crest of the
mountains, those on the Hungarian side all
" bunch," as I have described, into one compara-
li^^^c^
^^ Z/
^^
<^^
BortfielcL^
^^^^G^
pathians as a strategic field, even more important
than their gradual rise and broadening to the
south and east, and the increasing rarity of com-
munications in the same direction, is the orienta-
.tion of the valleys. It so happens that the Car-
Tiathians not only bend gently outward towards
Ihe east — a fact that would, in any case, make the
passes over them tend to converge from the east
towards the west — but also have a system of water-
courses upon the western or Hungarian side which
converges the valleys very rapidly on to the Hun-
garian plain.
It is exceedingly important to note this,,
because upon it will depend the whole plan of the
iRussian invasion if the war turns in its next
development into a pressing of the Russians into
Hungary. The valleys on the Hungarian side all
lead down to the main stream of the Theiss, and
bunch together in the most rapid fashion upon a
short sector, which I have indicated on the sketch
map by the line A B. The crest of the Car-
pathians, running roughly as does the dotted line,
is upon the eastern side marked by a number of
Sateral valleys, leading down normally enough to
the Galician plain. As, for instance, that at the
mouth of which is Stanislau (S), the two at the
mouth of which are Czernowitz (C), that of the
Pruth, at the mouth of which is Kolomea (K),
that at the mouth of which is Stryj (Str), that of
tively small space, and the strategic effects of such
an arrangement are considerable. The railways
follow the valleys, and so do the roads. SzoUos
(1), Munkacs (2), Ungvar (3), Homonna (4), the
towns at the valley mouths on the Hungarian side,
stand upon a line only eighty miles in length. The
corresponding towns upon the Galician side
stand upon a line three times as long.
The effect of this is that a successful advance
from Galicia into Hungary will, if it is pressed
home upon the left or west of the line, decide the
fate of the eastern end of the line.
Supposing, for instance, that the Russian
advance from the left in the above sketch map
got as far as the shaded bar C — D, the invaders
v/ould then be in possession of all the issues into
the Hungarian plain. They might hold not forty
miles of front and yet be cutting all the lines of
retreat for all the enemy forces on the crest of the
mountains and beyond them from the Uzok right
up to the Roumanian frontier.
Put all this together, and the lesson is plain.
Of two things, one, either the Russians intend to
make the Carpathian front the chief seat of their
activity during the next few weeks, or they are
only clearing out the pressure upon them in this
retreat and intend their main effort to be made
across the Dunajec and on towards Cracow.
In the second case the conformation of the
6»
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
valleys is of no particular importance. Having
got a good grip of the Carpathians, they will not
proceed further towards the Hungarian plain.
But in the first case the conformation of the vallej's
is very important indeed, for upon the way in
which they " bunch " together towards Hungary
Russian success would depend. And, further, the
effort wliich has captured the Dukia and the
Lupkow, and which is now menacing the Uzok,
would become explicable.
If it is the Hungarian plain which is the
objective of the main Russian forces (and the
chances are that this is their objective), then it is
manifest upon the argument developed, and from
tlie lie of the roads, tne railways, the valleys, the
width of the chain at various parts, its difficulties
of ground, and its varying height, that a success-
ful passage over the narrower, lower, and better
traverse northern and eastern end automatically
masters the southern and western.
It is manifest, in other words, that in attempt-
ing an invasion of Hungary under modern condi-
tions, with troops so numerous that the front of
the whole ridge over 200 miles long can be
defended, is best accomplished by hammering hard
upon the right of the invaders, and that the
attempt at the defence to counter this by an
advance upon the broader part of the mountains
against tlie invader's left is handicapped in every
way.
Whether the Russians are aiming at the in-
vasion of Hungary or no we cannot tell. They
have the initiative, and their commanders know
what we do not. But if they are, then pressure
upon the north and west is the very fashion in
which to attain their end, and the command of the
passes of that lower end of the chain, including
the Uzok, Vv'ill determine the struggle.
The immediate future will show whether this
object is theirs or no. If it is their object it is
best obtainable in the manner they liave chosen
during the last six weeks of the present fighting.
So far we have been examining the whole
problem of tlie Carpathians statically upon the
assumption of an equiility in numbers and in
munitions upon either side.
But the problems of war, like all problems of
human activity, are not static, but dynamic, and
an appreciation of the position on this Eastern
front can only he arrived at when we have trans-
ferred our estimate from static to dynamic terms.
In less pedantic Vvords, the problem of the
Carpathians would be solved not only and in part
by the advantage of positions, but also, and mucK
more, by the advantage of numbers.
Now, here direct evidence fails us.
We have no statistics to guide us. But we
can adopt certain general conclusions based upon
the " feeling " which each side has made of its
opponent, and also upon the knowledge of the
recent Russian munitioning, of the recent German
efforts in this region, and of the recent German
weakening upon the Western front.
It is no unfair estimate to gauge the opposing
forces between the Dukla and the frontier of
Bukovina as approximately equal since the fall of
Przeraysl. The extreme severity of the struggle,
its doubtful fortune, and the tenacity of the
counter-offensive beyond the mountains all point
to such an estimate.
Further, we know that there has been a com-
paratively slow, a rather reluctant, but recently a
considerable lending of German troops to the
Austrians here. We have been given the estimate
of three army corps, rising to seven, and possibly
later to ten.
Now, all that points to a very special effort
made by the enemy, and yet that effort hardlv hold-
ing its own. We know, on the other hand, ttat the
Russians have been receiving munitions in an in-
creasing stream during the last month, and per-
haps during the last six weeks. We further know
that the numbers of the Russians in this region
have been increasing during precisely the same
period, and we know that the total numbers
they can put in the field are chiefly limited by
this power of munitioning and equipping, in
which they have been handicapped during the
winter.
The conclusion is clear. If the Russians are
m.aking the Hungarian plain their objective, they
can, to the strategical condition analysed above,
add, as the season proceeds, the dynamic element
of numbers.
I repeat : One may not presuppose in the
course of a war which of two alternative objectives
is in the mind of a commander who has captured
and retains the initiative. And that is the posi-
tion of the Grand Duke to-day. If his objective
shall be Cracow or any other, the arguments given
above lose, not their cogency in respect to the
Carpathian chain, but their importance in the
study of the campaign. But if his objective is the
Hungarian plain, then this analysis of the obstacle
which covers that plain will prove its value in the
operations in the near future.
INFLUENCE OF AIR POWER. V.
THE AERIAL DILEMMA: A SOLUTION.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
READERS of the notes ou the Influence of
Air Power which have already appeared
in these coluiiins v. ill, perhaps, remem-
l)or that the writer, in his previous
articles, has endeavoured to show that, when ana-
lysed, it is found that the capabilities of aircraft
in actual warfare at present give rise to a difficult
situation, which amounts to a real dilemma.
That difficulty is due to the fact that air fleets, as
we now know them, can be used Ixith as an arm
and as a serrice. As an arm, an aerial force is
used to supplement other arms, such as the cavalry,
the artillery, &c., and, in consequence, it must l»e
subordinated to the commanders of those various
arms. Thus, if an air squadron is working in
co-operation with the artillery with a view to
assisting or correcting gunfire, or to discovering
the position and arrangement of hostile batteries',
or to carrying out otlier kindred tasks, it is evi-
dent that, for maximum efficiency, that air squad-
ron must be subordinated to the artillery \>ora-
mander. Subordination and co-ordination are
equally necessary in the case of co-operation
between the aerial arm and any other arm, be it the
7*
LAND AND .WATER
April 24, 1915.
cavalry, the iufantry, or the engineers. It is to
their success in closely co-ordinating the eniploy-
ment of their aerial aVm in co-operation with the
other arms that the writer has beeii led to ascribe
the principal cause of the aerial ascendancy which
the British have now obtained, and which has
already proved of such consequence that very great
care should be exercised in order that it may not
be impaired. Although to that close co-opera-
tion and co-ordination tiie efficiency of British
air work is directly traceable, yet it must
be kept in view that there are other very
important causes which have contributed to
Great Britain's aerial ascendancy. An^ong
these are (i.) the efficiency of the machines
themselves, resulting from good design, careful
manufacture, efficient repairing and supervising
staff, and adequate transport service; (ii.) a very
careful training of the aerial pilots and of the
aerial observers, rendering their piloting safe and
reliable and their observations of real value; and
(iii.) the personal factor, which has resulted in the
British airmen making a better use of their
machines than tlieir adversaries and employing
them with success in circum-stances in which their
opponents would not dare risk themselves aloft.
When, however, Great Britain's aerial
ascendancy is carefully and coolly scrutinised
and oiily incontrovertible facts are allowed
tlirough tlie sieve of exacting criticism, one is
forced to the conclusion that as a service, capable
of independent action like the Navy, for instance,
no country has, as yet, obtained any marked
ascendancy, although to be strictly accurate it
would seem that, at present, so far as its offensive
or direct value is concerned, the advantages of
aerial power lie, perhaps, with the enemy. The
writer would not draw public attention to this
state of affairs if he could not at the same time
propose a remedy, Avhich is not available to our
opponents. But, before doing so, he would like
once more to state clearly the nature of the aerial
dilenmia now facing the belligerent Powers. Shall
a commander look upon his air fleet as a service
and employ it to exert direct influence, in which
case he would have to forgo the advantages result-
ing from the co-ordination of his aircraft with the
other arms, or shall he employ his aerial force as
an arm to exert the indirect influence of air power,
in which case he would have to renounce the pos-
sible direct effect of the influence of air power ?
The tendency, both among the Allies and the
enemy, has been, up to the present, to employ their
aerial force mainly as an arm. But, the offensive
value of aircraft having been recognised, several
air raids have been undertaken both by the Allies
and the enemy. Those air raids which have lacked"
in boldness so far as the number of macliines is con-
cerned have not had very lasting' effects for various
reasons. All these reasons, however, can be traced
directly to the fact that the present organisation
of an aerial force does not allow it to operate as a
service, with freedom to act entirely on its ow^n
initiative as and when circumstances demand. In
this connection it is veiy important to note that the
enemy, not from any special effort of their own,
but through the force of events and, to a very great
degree, through Great Britain's very ascendancy
in the employment of the aerial arm, has, in part,
escaped from the horns of the aerial dilemma
enimciated above. This is a point worth consider-
ing with care.
The readers of this publication will perhaps
remember that in one of his previous articles* the
writer explained why the Zeppelin airships were
unsuited for larid fighting but were valuable for
naval warfare. The ascendancy which the Allied
airmen have obtained since the writing of that
article further increases the unsuitability of the
Zeppelin airship as an aerial arm for land opera-
tions, and, therefore, th.e Gennan artillery or
cavalry commanders never lia^c recourse to the co-
operation of their Zeppelins. While the vselcss-
7iess of the Zeppelins as an arm. for land opera-
tions has had the result of releasing them to an
independence of action of their own, so far as land
warfare is concerned, yet, as a naval aerial arm,
they are still of potential value. In this respect
again their utility has not been in evidence, but,
in this case, through no defect in the airships them-
selves. This is a point worth understanding
fully. As regards the war on land the Zeppelin,
as an arm, is of no real value in view of the anti-
aircraft organisations of the Allies and of their
aerial ascendancy obtained by a judicious and bold
emplojnnent of their aeroplanes; with reference to
sea warfare, the Zeppelin, as an arm, is, again, of
no real value, not through any anti-aircraft
superiority or aerial ascendancy of the Allies, but
through tlie enforced seclusion of the German
fleets in their harbours. There being no German
naval opei'ations of any importance, there is no
use for the Zeppelin airships as a naval aerial
arm. The net result of these various circum-
stances is that the Germans are now in possession
of an aerial force capable of entirely independent
action — that is, one Vvdiich, within restrictions im-
posed by the machines and their personnel, can, for
all intents and purposes, be considered as a ser-
vice and therel)y caj)able of exercising its influence
directly. Thus it is that the enemy, on account
of the unsuitability of their airships for co-ordi-
nation in land warfare and of their inability to
co-operate v^ith naval operations, have not, at the
present moment, to consider the dilemma in
exactly the same light as the Allies. In conse-
quence they have somewhat evaded a difficult
situation, and are even able to turn it to their
advantage. Thus they have carried out recent
airship raids in the neighbourhood of Paris and
on the North-East and East coasts of England.
It is very likely that, with the coming fine season,
the Zeppelin service will attempt to exercise direct
influence of air power on a more comprehensive
and more sustained scale.
Now it is necessary that the Allies should
possess means of exercising the direct influence
of air power to at least the same degree as their
adversaries. In other w'ords, it is imperative fur
them to devise some method whereby to escape
from the dilemma, and, as regards Great Britain,
the writer ventures to suggest a simple plan
whereby this can be done.
Great Britain's direct influence of air power,
at the present juncture, should possess three char-
acteristics : (a) It shoulcT be at least as great as
that of the enemy ; (b) it must be capable of ward-
ing off the enemy's menace ; and (c) it must not be
detrimental to the aerial ascendancy which Great
Britain already possesses. It is not a very easy^
matter to calculate the number and exact poten-
tiality of the existing Zeppelins for offen-
• " Tte Modern Military Zeppelin," lAsn isB Wiim. Deo. 26. 1914.
6*
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
Oiordharres:^
O'dV^i&Ci
m ^Reprtsenti pcsitlcm.
DONE
MarCtuHoU
HELIGOLKKD
arui'DU.'NE
/avsM o
1 1 1 ■ I 1 1 1 . ■ I
Out;0r
Harbour
'uA^erconitrficUoai./'
-^- /
Scale ofF^ee
swo
%
w-4— I
I
On thU map of Hclisoland is sho-wn the pKJsilicn of a Zeppelin shed, completed ar.d handed over to the German
authorities since the outbreak of hostilities. In view of the recent activity of the Zepi>elin airships tlie exact position of the
Zeppelin base in the North Sea cannot but be of very great interest to our naval authorities. A description of that most
up-to-date aerial base was given in the issue of Land akd Water, dated January 15, 1915. The shed is about 525ft. long
»nd 180ft. wide, and like the one near Cuihaven, it is of the " revolving" and "collapsible " type. Close to it is a
factory for tlie manufacture of the necessary Isydrogen. It is estimated that tlia Zeppelin base of Heligoland, which,
aarmally, ocutains two airships, has been built and equipped at a cost of £20,000.
that.
for complete safety, the wise, of one or two aeroplanes and for the training
of one or two pilots. Every seaside town would,
besides, undertake to have always under construc-
tion and training one or more machines and pilots.
In this manner there would be, in a very short
time, a number of aeroplanes distributed along tlie
coast of Great Britain in constant readiness to
ward off a Zeppelin visit. After a .short time
there would be a nucleus of an offensive air service
ready for independent offensive operations. Such
a fleet would not only be a suitable one for carry-
sive purposes, so .
plan must allow for a liberal estimate of the
enemy's direct aerial potentiality. Since the
enemy can aerially menace a great number of
places the plan must provide for preparation and
readiness at a great number of points. It is
evident that this cannot be done by employing, at
various places, the machines or military pilots who
are necessary for the maintenance of the British
aerial ascendancy.
The plan which the writer proposes, and
which fulfils all the preceding desiderata, is the ing on war, on a large scale, into the heart of the
formation of a National Air Service by arousing enemy's country, but also would be especially vala-
local initiative, especially in the sea-coast towns.
The National Air Service could only be successful
if it received Government sanction and if it
worked in consultation with the official aeronauti-
cal departments. In accordance with the sug
fested^plan every seaside to^vn would be asked to
e responsible for the construction, locally or other-
able for coping with the German submarine war-
fare on commerce. There are, of course, many
details that would have to be settled with regard
to rendering efficient such a National x\ir Service
as outlined above; but in principle the scheme, as
a solution of the dilemma facing us, is simple and
practical.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By FRED T. JANE.
ROTE.— This Article has been submitted to the Tress Burcan, which does not object to the publication as cecsored, and takes no
responsibility for the correctness c( the statements.
THE NORTH SE.A.— THE POSITION OF
HOLLAND.
ALTHOUGH it yet Eeems early days to speculate as
to Holland being dragged into the war, there
are cot wanting various recent indications that
Germany is seeking a pretext to establish herself
in the Netherlands.
German ideals as to possessing the Rhine down to tho
sea are, of course, neither novel nor secret; but we appear to
be on the verge of a situation created by the naval war which
has no connection with past sentiment, but which has been
entirely brought about by modern needs.
On the outbreak of war Germany had a very restricted
sea front. This restricted sea front was then and before that
time generally regarded in Germany (and here also for that
matter) as a German asset. We are all familiar with the
comparative diagrams which used to be produced: " What
Germany has to defend," represented by a species of dot;
" What Britain has to defend," indicated by a very lonj
line.
In its way tlie diagram was misleading, because
8«
LAND AND .WATER
April 24, 1915.
*' defence " is an incorrect term to use in relation to warfare —
•specially naval warfare, of wliicli the be-all and end-all (if
Buccess is to be hoped for) is attack.
However, this coastal question obtained as a classic, and
it is merely quoting ancient history to say that Germany
regarded her small coast line as a valuable asset. She more
or less fortified every yard of her coast line at a cost which
would certainly, if otherwise expended, have provided her
with a fleet fully equal in strength to that British Fleet which
the war found her faced with.
Approximately the ideal adopted was an impregnabla
inverted V, in the centre of which lies Heligoland. It is to
be expressed diagrammatically as indicated in Figure 1, " i "•
representing the passive shore defence, the arrows the active
local naval defence based mainly on Heligoland.
From the impregnable barrier thus created the German
Fleet was theoretically to emerge as convenient — being able
to fight or retire to safety when desirable, as circumstances
might dictate.
On the face of it this seemed a very strong and alluring
position, especially when contrasted with the relatively vast
and undefendable (by complete shore defences) British coast
line. There— till the war broke out — the matter remained.
A very short experience of war, however, revealed the
now obvious fact that the smaller the coast line the easier it
is for a superior enemy to establish an efilcient watch over it,
limiting all egress to the range of the local defences. Para-
doxical as it may at first sight appear, Germany's weakness
lies in the very strength of her inshore defences.
Her tardy recognition of this is evidenced by hor frantic
efforts to reach the sea at places beyond the German coast
line. From the military point of view (using military in the
strict Army sense) there was, we may take it, no very special
advantage in securing Calais. Yet Calais was sought for at
extravagant cost. Similarly large efforts in Belgium were
directed to establishing control of a sea front — that is to say,
operations for naval rather than strictly army purposes — the
obvious objective being the creation of a more extended .sea
front, and so a corresponding increase &l the arya to be
watched by the British Fleet.
We can see the advantages of an extended front in our
own case in the failure of the German submarine blockade.
It is impossible for the available hostile force to watch more
than a small fraction of the total area; on the bulk of the
mileage merchant ships can come and go with impunity.
With Germany the exact conditions are different; but
tie main principle involved remains the same. So far, so
good. But, the mouth of the Scheldt is closed to German
war shipping. The submarines which she is putting together
at Hoboken can hardly reach the sea except through what are
now neutral Dutch waters. Every really suitable harbour
•n the coast is Dutch, not Belgian. The Dutch fleet is insuf-
ficient to offer any effective resistance in defence of its bases,
and it happens to con«ist of ships which, being de.signed to
operate in Dutch and contiguous waters, would be a useful
reinforcement to Germany if captured.
To this add facts as they have happened during the last
few days. Dutch vessels have made their nationality abun-
dantly clear. Not content with names and nationality
painted in huge letters on their sides, they have been veritable
sea picture palaces of Dutch flags and other evidences of
neutral nationality. The very stupidest of German sub-
marine captains could not possibly have sunk any Dutch
vessel " by mistake." Such slaughter of the innocents as has
taken place mnst have been entirely deliberate, entirely in
the category of " things ordered."
There is no other possible hypothesis under which this
matter can be explained. Wherefrom we are driven to assume
that, for purposes of her ov.'n, Germany is bent on driving
Holland into war, and that a war against her is well inside
the probabilities, mainly or entirely in order to secure for
Germany an effective extended North Sea coast line and bases
which Belgium, despite Zeebrugge, has been unable to afford.
Holland — once a great Sea Power — can, however, provide
them. Not to put too fine a point upon it, Holland is Ger-
many's best trump in the war by water. By driving Holland
into the Allied Camp, Germany has everything to gain and
nothing to lose. Holland is equally useful either as friend or
foe. But as a neutral she is a hindrance aud a nuisance to
Teutonic schemes.
Military matters are not my province; but I take it
that we are in no position to assure Holland much more im-
munity on land than we were able to afford to Belgium. On
which account we may yet see the Dutch driven to accept a
German alliance. If tliey do, we cannot blame them — we can
only put it down to our lack of military power to back up our
Sea Power. So far as Sea Power alone is concerned, we may
safely rely upon it that the British Navy has the po.ssible situa-
tion well in hand. But, whichever way this particular cat
jumps, we must remember that Holland is gradually being
forced into an invidious position, and we shall do well to
remember that, since Germany is obviously endeavouring to
force her to side with us, it will probably appear to Dutch
statesmen that the lesser evil will be to take sides with
Germany. On the whole, it may be the lesser evil for us also.
Our main business is to see to it that Germany does not
extend her sea front. The rest — pregnant as it may seem — is
a matter of relatively small importance. In the coming sub-
marine warfare every extra mile of coast that can be utilised
will have a value far above anything that could have been con-
ceived of in the old days, v/hen warships operated in consider-
able groups and were always easily located. With submarines
the groups are much smaller, and single action is not un-
common, while location is very di8ficult. Equally difficult will
shutting them in be, a very high numerical preponderance of
blockaders being essential to any success.
One way and another; it looks as though future North
Sea operations are going to be coastal affairs, having for their
prime objective the curtailuietit of hostile bases, as opposed to
the old idea of endeavouring to entice the caemy out and then
fight him on the open sea.
Of course, there never was a time when it was not
recognised that, given th-e dcntruction of the base, the sequel
would ba the anniiiilation of the fleet operating from it; but
co-incident with this, there was ever the fortification of bases
to an extent which more or less rendered the.ni impregnable
to ordinary warship attack. Bases have been captured by in-
vestment from the land side, as in the ca.^o of Port Arthur,
but such operations are necessarily very lengthy, and they
are not possible in many cases.
Submarines, however, from their ability to use extem-
porised bases, will, of neces.sity, force the pace and render ib
more and more imperative for us to curtail iu every possible
way Germany's access to the North Sea. On that, more than
anything else, the main issue depends.
THE B.\LTIC.
Con.':iderable importance may be altaclied to the Swedish
report that a large German fleet has bean seen iu the Abo
direction. If there be any truth whatever iu the report (and
it has a circumstantial sound) it would look as thoug]i the
pressure of Russian sea power in the Baltic has made itself
felt, and tliat Germany has seriously embarked upon an
attempt to destroy the enemy at her '' back door."
Such an attempt would naturally be mado in very con-
siderable force, for the Russian Fleet has lately been added to
by the completion of some or all of the Dreadnoughts of the
Gmif/oot class. Equally naturally, there will be nothing for
it but for the Russians to retire to some protected base where
the Germans will have to contain lliem — an operation not to
be carried out without depleting tlie High Sea Fleet of some of
its best capital ships — half a dozen at the very least.
The alternative is to allow the Baltic to become a Russian
Jake, with the more or less total cutting off of all such supplies
from Scandinavia as at present reach Germany.
For the Russians to atteinpt any fleet action against odds
is quite unnecessary: they can accomplish more by compelling
IC
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
the Gemiaiis to contain them, the containing force being
•ubjecfced to the perpetual menace of submarine and destroyer
attack at a considerable distance from any satisfactory base.
It has to be remembered in this connection that all the
main development of German bases during the last few years
has been on the North Sea front. Even Kiel has sunk con-
eiderably in importance during the last few years, while
Danzig has vegetated for years. Its sUtus is about equal to
that of our dockyard at Pembroke, less the fine anchorage
which Milford Haven affords. Kiel is, or was, the Tortsmouth
of Germany, but from Kiel to the retiring places of the
Russian Fleet is a far cry. Swinemund is to all intents and
purposes an open roadstead, and the German Baltic Coast
offers nothing to be compared with the bases and estuanes
which are available for our Grand Fleet.
Admiral Jellicoe's task is hard enough, but it is child s
play to the task of the Germans if they seriously attempt to
bottle the Russians, and if the attempt be made, it means the
virtual withdrawal of all such menace as the High Sea Fleet
may have represented where we are concerned. It means that
Germany, compelled to assert the mastery of the Baltic, is
giving up all ideas of contesting the sovereignty of the North
Sea, at any rate so far as big ships are concerned.
Very earlv in the war, in one of the early issues of these
Notes, I ventured to prophesy that. the Baltic might very
probably become the keynote of the major naval opera.tions
owing to the fact that Russia possessed a " fleet in being'
which had been underestimated in German calculations, and
which Germany dared not ignore any longer.
All the present indications are to the effect tliat, numeric-
ally small though the Russian Fleet is, it is yet sufficiently
powerful to constitute a very serious strategical menace lu
Germany's rear.
Feints are, of course, no more uncommon in sea strategy
than on land. But allowing for all possibilities in that
direction, the probabilities at present all jwint to the Baltic
as the scene of future big ship activities, leaving the North
Sea to submarine and coastel craft operations, plus, perhaps,
» determined effort on the part of the German battle cruisers
to get on to our trade routes.
THE DARDANELLES.
The vague reports which come from here emanate chiefly
from Turkish sources, and so need not be too fully relied upon.
For what they are worth they indicate that progress, if any,
ia very slow.
That the forts are capable of giving a very good account
of themselves now seems clearly established; and every day
will see improvements effected. How much real damage
they can inflict is a matter of speculation. Danger would be
not so much from direct fire as from high-angle guns and
howitzers, the projectiles from which, falling on the decks,
are liable to go right down through if sufficiently heavy.
The 11-inch howitzers employed by the Japanese at Port
Arthur on several occa.sions penetrated the armour decks of
the Russian battleships and made their exits through the
bottoms. The damage thus done was altogether out of pro-
portion to anything inflicted on the same fleet by ordinary
gunfire, which ships are normally constructed to resist.
Apparently the Turks are fairly well supplied with
howitzers, and the Germans have taught them the art of
keeping these concealed till the psychological moment. Evi-
dence as to this is that at long range the enemy has never
•ucceeded in doing any damage; all the mischief having been
done when the ships have closed in to finish off forts which
have appeared to be more or less out of action. All this
damage is suggestive of howitzers, which on account of their
high trajectory are relatively speaking too short-ranged to be
available for anything of the nature of long bowls fighting.
For the rest, we have had the misfortune to lose sub-
marine E15, and as a set-off a Turkish torpedo-boat has been
destroyed in the JEgean.
As regards the first, E15 ran ashore, and the majority of
her crew were taken prisoners by the Turks. As some less of
life occurred the presumption is that she was under fire before
or after her wreck — more probably before, though the currents
in the Dardanelles are bad enough to account for anything
unaided.
The Turkish torpedo-boat accounted for attacked the
transport Manitov, which had British troops on board. She
was subsequently chased by the Minerva and destroyers, and
driven ashore.
AFTERMATH OF THE COMMERCE WAR.
Apparently there wa"* some fire to the smoke of the
German protest that the Dresden was sunk in neutral waters,
u the circumstance has now been the subject of a practically
unqualified apology to the Chilean Government from Sir
Edward Grey. I say " practically unqualified," because care
is taken to point out that the British Government is still not in
possession of the full facts.
We may expect to see a good deal of spurious capital
made out of the circumstance by the Germans, who are great
sticklers for the letter of the law when any advantage is to be
secured therefrom for themselves.
As a matter of fact, however, if ever International Law
were a dead letter, and if ever circumstances justified cases
even from the legal standpoint, this incident of the Dresden
is a case in point.
Although all the facts as to the BresJen are .still un-
known, we have ample evidence that Chilean neutrality has
in the past been persistently outraged by Germany, and so
far as can be gathered the island of Juan Fernandez was to
all intents and purposes a German base — a base, too, not
made use of owing to the exigencies of the naval war, but
apparently arranged for long ago. Indeed, in some quarters
it has been argued that Juan Fernandez is no more Chilean
than Kiao-Chau was Chinese, on the grounds that the
Chilean Government had leased it to a German. This argu-
ment is not on the face of it correct; because the Kiao-Chau
lease was a Government affair, whereas the lessee of Juan Fer-
nandez was, or purported to bo, a private German subject
interested in Robinson Crusoe's Island.
But — unless my memory deceives me— it was airily put
forward by tlie late Admiral von Spee as a reply to questions
raised as to his abuse of Chilean neutrality. Along these
lines Germany at any rate has no case — she cannot expect to
have things both ways.
The Chilean Government was inevitably placed in a very
awkward position. Juan Fernandez is the other end of no-
where, unconnected with the mainland by cable, and with a
Chilean governor in no position to assert his neutrality — even
assuming Chilean sovereignty to be undenied. There were
no means of interning the Dresden, and so far there is not
the remotest proof that she ever intended to intern herself,
except, perhaps, as a temporary measure.
Consequently, for our cruisers to have acted other than
they did would have been rank folly.
International Law is really International Custom rather
than Law. It was Captain Marryat who long ago described
an armed neutrality as " generally meaning a charge of
bayonets" — an apt illustration of the position of a strong
neutral. A weak neutral, on the other hand, is compelled to
trust to the obsen-ance of cu.stoni, and the Chileans were thus
very much placed between the devil and the deep sea. They
had no means of enforcing neutrality with a "charge of
bayonets " while von Spee commanded the victorious fleet in
being, and it is to say the least of it wildly improbable that
the captain of the Dresden informed the Governor of Juan
Fernandez of the circumstance that von Spee had ceased to
exist.
From every point of view, therefore, the action of the
British cruisers in destroying the Dresden was logical and
justifiable, while Sir Edward Grey's apology to the Chilean
Government was at once dignified and diplomatic.
Finally, it may be worth wliile drawing attention to the
extraordinarily small amount of friction with neutrals which
our war against the German corsairs has produced. In one
way and another every weak neutral has been fully exploited
by Germany, and it is to the lasting credit of our Government
and our Navy — the latter especially— that this fact has been
recognised, and that no neutral has ever had cause to complain
that we have misused our naval power to sacrifice a neutral to
our own ends. By this prodecure we have at times, perhaps,
lost certain small advantages; but the circumstance should
stand well to our credit in the peaceful, but fierce, trade com-
petition war which will follow the cessation of hostilities. If
we have shown that we do not hesitate to disregard neutrality
where the enemy has previously done the same thing, we have
none the less consistently indicated the possession of a sense of
justice which should ever be remembered in our favour.
We very much regret that, owing to indis-
position, Colonel Maude has been unable this week
to contribute his usual article on Tactics and
Strategy. The large circulation of L.\nd and
Water compels us to go to press with the cover
and advertisement pages some days before publica-
tion ; as a result Colonel Maude's name was j)rinted
on th^ cover before the news of his indisposition
reached us. — Editor.
11*
LAXD AND .WATER,
April 24, 1915,
A GLIMPSE OF WAR.
WATER.
By W. L. GEORGE.
HE battalion bad started long before dawa. At
first it bad besa iiigbt, blue, mysterious niglit,
pale and fugitive and hung with little golden
stars, the night of the East, made for white
courts and the spinning of Scheherazade's tales,
a night like blue silk flecked with gems. And then it had
passed away hurriedly, as if afraid of the day, of the
thunderous sun, like a nymph surprised, leaving beliind her
as a trail the rose and the mauve of dawn, sweet heralds of
a fiercer air.
Private Norley raised bis bead towards the dawn. Ho
had grown tired of the night, for it had been long, and after
a while had thought of nothing save the sand which bad
mysteriously penetrated between his sock and his foot. But
he loved the familiar dawn, for it was not as the brooding
night; it was passing. For a moment Private Norley thought
of dawn as he bad often seen it before, wlien he had gone of
nights to feed some calving cow. It had come up so'iietimes
just like that on Wincbelsea marshes, making their grey into
opal, and little Itye, upon its tiny hill, into a rosebud. He
thought of the marshes for a little while, of the fresh, cold
wind full of Channel salt. It hurt his mouth to think of the
feel of that wet wind, for his tongue was so dry. The beat
was coming; be knew that, for already the dawn was dying,
sun-slaughtered, and on the eastern horizon a ball of fire,
zoned in flame, soared into the Egyptian sky.
He felt very hot suddenly. And be was afraid. He
looked at his wrist-watch; he tried to remember the time-
table which the sergeant-major had discussed with the ser-
geant the night before. They were late evidently; already
they should be in sight of El Arisb. And for a moment
Private Norley wondered what it all was for, why they were
going east of the canal, why they had gone so far and seen
nothing, neither Englishman nor Turk, what there was be-
yond the oasis. The bewilderment of the private who can
range through empires, ignorant as a hcr.se in blinkers, was
upon him. But Private Norley did not long wonder; he was
a good-tempered, healthy young animal, who had never be-
fore thought of life in general : eating, drinking, sleeping,
making love and dying as late as possible, that was the sum-
total of bim. And be was ready enough to do it all decently.
So at once be abandoned speculation, searched the horizon for
the palm trees which promised water and shade.
Then he remembered: a full two hours had been wasted
at a dry oued. The ammunition carts bad, one after the
other, stuck in the river-bed, and it had been endless, helping
the little oxen, half unloading the carts, shoring up the
wheels, so that the beasts might struggle up the crumbling
bank of pebble and sand. As the battalion turned towards
the south Private Norley caught a glimpse of the carts,
massed between the second and third platoon, ammunition
wagons, provision carts, ambulances, oflicei-s' wagons, can-
teen, the vast impedimenta of arinies. Reflective and im-
partial, he damned everything on wheels.
The strap of bis rifle hurt him a little now as it cut into
his moist shoulder. He changed it to the right, and for a
long time thought of nothing. There was hardly anything
to arouse a thought, for the desert unrolled to the right and
to the left, to the front and to the back, without beginning,
without end, not quite flat, just like a dirty blanket, with
crumples here and there. Sticking out, it seemed, of the
horizon a few rocks that looked black against the felty sand;
near the track sometimes a few gleaming white bones, camels',
no doubt. Notable only, upon the right and left of the bat-
talion, were the flanking parties, watchful little patrols of
the camel corps, so far away that even through a field glass
they looked like little brown toys. Private Norley was too
used to them to notice that they were there. Besides, there
was something else to help the silence that had now come
upon the marching troops; they had left their bivouac at
'Abu Dara singing the inevitable " Tipperary," but, little by
little, the song had died down long before the order came
that there must be no talking now. For the heat had come
and was growing round them.
Ho rialised it, and suddenly there was nothing but heat.
The pith helmet made a ring about bis forehead; this v/as
wet, and yet hard and hot, as if his head were bound in metal.
He felt the sun upon his cheek, a steady burn, and a sting as
«f a pin-prick upon his upper lip. He bru.shed it angrily as
if to remove an insect. There was no insect, but tha
movement, so diilerent from the steady tramping, brought
him out into a heavy sweat. Private Norley called himself a
fool, but it v/as too late. Water seemed to rush from his head
into bis hair and under his helmet to steam. He found his
fingers so clammy that the wooden butt of his rifle slipped
away; he dared not touch the burning steel. For a long time
be thought of nothing, but just went on with the water run-
ning down from that metal ring about his forehead, hot
water tliat soaked his moustache, soaked his eyelashes until
ho had to blink them free. And even then there was a veil as
of steam before his eyeballs. One thought only came to bim
then : water. As he went he slipped his hand under his coat,
touching as be did so bis neighbour, wlio shrank away a
little without speaking, knowing that any contact would
increase his beat. Carefully Private Norley drew forward
the bottle, rai.sad it to his mouth. He could have spat the
liquid out, so great v/as his disgust, for, o.sier-covered and then
felt-covered, and then sheltered by his coat, it was hot. And
yet as he swallowed, bating the tinnish taste, the disgusting
suggestion of weak soup, he was gluttonous.
Suddenly he thought of water, real cold water, as it
flows out between two stones from the spring by Udimore
Hill. He remembered that place v/here in April there always
grew so many primi-osss, and a spasm of rage shook him as ha
thought that this very minute oxon and horses were drinking
their fill of that water, so clear, so cold.
His pal upon the left had seen bim drink :
" Pretty fair muck, ain't it?" he remarked.
Private Noiley spat without replying. Ho heard beliind
bim another roan making a feeble joke about lining up at the
bar when they got to El Arisb. Somebody said something
Private Norley did not catch, but it awakened an imm.ediata
echo, and a precise private, a schoolmaster in civil life, said
they ought to have some water from the wat«r cart. In a
min\ite the whole battalion was talking of wat-er, and Privat-o
Norley could think of nothing but the water carts between
the two platoons, that looked so queer, swaddled up ia
canvas, like fat old men, to keep off the sun.
In front of Private Norley marched bis lieutenant. He
was a slender young man, and he went with an air alert and
disdainful, as if he did not hear the growing murmurs among
the men. Private Norley did not remember that this was one
of the popular oClcers, a good fellow who never punished a
man without making him feel in the wrong: be thought of
that way of his and bated bim therefor; his persuasiveness,
added to his rare severity, became an insult. For it was hot,
so hot, that Private Norley thought only of feeling liot. He
found himself cursing quietly, and then grumbling half-aloud,
with five hundred others who grumbled also :
" We must have water. We must have water off the
cart. . . ."
The battalion was baited, faced to the right. The Major
came to quell the mutiny, trotting along the line on his little
black horse, whose sweating flanks shone bluish. He stopped,
and upon the yellow sand the shadow was blacker than tha
horse.
" I hear murmurs in the ranks. They must stop. Tha
next man who complains will be shot." The voice was quiet,
not very loud, and yet, so light was the air, every syllable
came clean and audible. Then the tone softened: "But,
boys, I don't want it to come to that. You've got to under-
stand. We're two hours late, we may be attacked any
minute. We may not get to El Arisb at all, and if we don't
we'll need our water. So I must ask you to be patient."
The Major added, with an amiable smile: "I'm feelin"
pretty dry myself, you know!"
The last words were human and the battalion laughed.
They went on. But it was still hotter now, nearly half-past
ten and the sun above invisible, for all the sky was as the
blue flame of a gas-fire and as burning. Upon the sky-line
Private Norley could see four or five palm trees. The oasis 1
Yes, but be had seen those palms an liotir before and they
looked no nearer. His tongue was thick and large in his
mouth; he parted his lips to breathe and his tongue tried to
come out, while he panted like a dog. The sweat upon hi»
eyelashes had caught the dust, liis eyes were full of grit, and
be wondered vaguely, when he moved his eyelids, why thoj
12»
'AprU 24, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
'did not crackle. He did not look np towards the palms. He
merely thought: " We shall never get there," and went on.
He thought: "My big toe's blistering." Thou again: " We
ihaU never get there!"
A little later he saw a mirage, a village upside dov.'n on
the top of its own picture right side np. He did not care.
Ho did not know that he cared very much v/hether they got
to El Arish or not. He only knew they never would. His
belt hurt his hip. He moved it a little and burnt his finger
upon the buclile. . . .
The battalion was lined up in front of the oasis. Private
Norley and his neighbour quietly shoved each other: they
were fighting in deadly earnest for the scrap of shadow
afforded by the stem of a palm tree. But discipline endured :
no man moved out of the ranks while water was drawn from
the well, and squad after squad st'ej)ped forward to fill its
water-bottles. The ofiicers, fearing mutiny, dared not delay
and riaked colic. At last Private Norley drank. . , ,
His mouth was full of something that felt solid, some-
thing new, something he gulped at savagely, tried to bite.
. He clioked and still fiercely he bit on at the cold
thing which filled his mouth. He could hardly breathe, for
he could not tear his lips away from the bottle-neck. Ho
had known what it was to eat when hungry, he had known
prai.se, and love, but now his sweating, burning body was
racked to the very entrails by the passionate wedding of his
flesh in a cold embrace witli this water that pene-
trated him. lie felt his lungs swell and an exquisite fresh-
ness riEe from his breath. It was agony, for his teeth
froze; and his head ac'ied above the eyes as if he had bitten
ice. But still he could not stop, as if he were in the grasp
of some frightful sensual desire that imperiously bade him
go on to his delight through the pain. . . .
He stopped, threw down the water-bottle, and, clasping
both hands upon his belt where he felt all swollen and cold,
he breathed greedily of the hot air. The bottle w^as empty.
P
PROJECTILES.
By "A.M.I.G.E."
ROJECTILES employed in modern warfare R;ay be
classified as follovv-s: — (1) Shrapnel shell; (2)
Common shell, which may be either the ordinary
common or high explosive shell; (3) Universal
fhell, a combination of the shrapnel and high ex-
plosive, which lias been developed to a considerable extent
by the Germans; (4) Armour-piercing shell.
SHRAPNEL SHELL.
Shrapnel was first proposed in 1792 by Major Shrapnel
Of the Royal Artillery and was introduced into' the Englisli
Army about 1808. The long wars in the beginning of the
nineteenth century gave inventors several opportunities
cf studying artillery problems, and it was during this period
that the shrapnel shell was developed.
and
TuUets :s£sm 'antmiTub- SHRAPNEL SHELL
Shrapnel consists of a hollow shell filled with bullets
a .small bursting charge, ignited either by a time or
percussion fuse. The object of the bursting charge is to rup
ture only the shell in order to release the bullets. Each bullet
will then proceed by itself according to the velocity and
direction given to it by the bursting charge. When a shrap-
nel shell bursts in llight the bulleta will spread out in a cone
which is technically known as " the cone of dispersion."
The thickness of metal of which the shell is made should
be strong enough to withstand the explosion of the charge
in the bore oi the gun, but at the same time it should be easily
destroyed by the bursting charge, which should be sufficient
only to open the shell. In case the bursting charge is too
powerful, the disturbing effect produced on the bullets when
the shell bursts would be too great and the bullets would be
dispensed over too wide an area. In the shrapnel .shell used
with the 15-pounder quick-firing gun there are 230 bullets
per shell. The body of the shell consists of forged steel,
while the head contains the fuse and the base the bursting
charge consisting of 1^ oz. of gunpowder, which is placed in
a tin cup. A central tube passes through the centre of the
shell in order to communicate the flash from the fuse to the
bursting charge. After the bullets have been packed into the
shell, melted resin is poured in which, when holidified, keejjs
the bullets from rattling. It is usual to place a smoke com-
position among the bullets, consisting either of coar.se black
powder or a mixture of red phosphorus and black powder,
the object being to render the bursting of tiie shell more
\isible. Apart from its usefulness when ranging it is also
in)portant because a dense cloud of smoke in front of the
enemy may prevent him from obtaining an accurate range.
T.N.T. melted and poured into the shell combines the func-
tions 01 a packer of iiullets and smoke producer.
The exact moment when the shell is exploded may bo
varied from the instant when the shell leaves tlie gun to any
distance up to several thousand yards. This variation \%
obtained by means of a time fuse, which may be looked upon
ft3 a small automatic apparatus for igiuting the bursting
charge. It can be so adjusted as to come into operation at
any predetermined time, wliich varies, of course, witli the
range. Shrapnel fitted with a percussion fuse diffei-s from
" time " Bhrapnel, for the shell does not open in flight
but only after contact with the target. It is chiefly used for
range finding. In the olden days, when shells consisted of
sjiherical balls filled with gunpowder, a piece of slow burning
match was inserted, having such a length that it would burn
about the same time the shell would take to reach its destina-
tion, when it would explode. Shrapnel is the principal shell
used by field artillery. It is mainly employed against living
targets as it is the nsost efficient " man-killing " type of shell
known. When burst by a time fuse in the air, it sends a hail
of bullets over a fairly large area, having a deadly effect
against infantry in the open. Against entrenched detach-
ments it has, however, very little effect.
COMMON SHELL.
A com.mon shell is a hollow projectile filled with a burst-
ing charge, which is ignited either by a time or a percussion
fuse. Common shell occupies a place between the shrapnel
and armour piercing shell. It is of very little use against
living targets, and its proper field of employment is against
earthworks, unarmoured fortifications, and trenches. When
made of forged steel it will penetrate thin armour, but would
be scattered against modern armour.
Ordinary comnson shell filled with gunpov.'der has now
become obsolete.
A high explosive shell is simply a common shell filled with
lyddite, melinite, T.N.T. , or any other high explosive. It
is made in two types — thin and thick walled. The thin
walled shells are not emjiloyed in field guns, but to a certain
extent in howitzers.
Thick walled high explosive shells consist of forged steel
filled with picric acid or T.N.T. One of the difficulties
encountered with high explosive shells is to obtain com.plete
detonation of the bursting charge without using a large
quantity of fulminate of mercury. The use of a large
quantity of fulniin-ate of mercury as a detonator would bo
too dangerous, as the shell might ea.-ily be cxpl.ided before it
leaves the gun owing to the great facility with wliich fulminate
of mercury can be detonated. As a rule picric or nitro-
glycerine powder is used as an intermedium (which in turn is
detonat<:d by a small quantity of fulminate of mercury) to
explode the main charge.
In the Krupp high esjdosive shell the first charge con-
sists of fine grain nitro-glycerine powder, which is enclosed in a
small ;:leel cylinder and is ilrcd by.itieans of the fuse. The
violent bur:;ting of this suiall cylinder detonates tlie primer
consisting of T.N.T. or picric powder, v/Iiich in turn detonates
the main bursting charge. Technically tins j.roce.ss is kntiwn
as " jjrogressive detonation."
High c.vplosive ."Jiells are gonernlly made to burst by
means cf a percus-ion fuse. Tlie French high esplosi>-e shell
used with the field ariillory has a weight of 141bs., carries a
bursting charge of about IJlb. of melinite, and is made of
thick steel which, when exploded, is broken into thousands of
small pieces.
Quick-firing guns fire fixed ammunition; the projectile
complete with fuse and bursting charge, the brass cartridge
case containing the propelling charge and primer are com-
13»
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 1915.
binod as a complete unit like a rifla cartridge. The brasa
cartridge case contains in the base the percussion cap, which
is fired by the striker of the lock. After firing, the empty
case remains behind, and is thrown out automatically when
the breech is opened.
UNIVERSAL SHELL.
In the universal shell an effort has been made to combine
the qualities of both high explosive and shrapnel shells.
For field guns such a combination v.ould be advantageous,
aa at present it is necessary to carry two classes of shells, and
in the excitement of an engagement it is a very easy matter
to use the wrong kind of ammunition. In order to introduce
one type of shell many military inventors attacked the prob-
lem. In February, 1903, Major van Essen, of the Dutch
Army, patented a fairly satisfactory design of universal shell,
which v/as taken up by Messrs. Ehrhardt and brought out in
the next year. The universal shell was lat«r on taken up by
Messrs. Krupp and Schneider, while the German Army
adopted it for their field howitzers.
The universal shell consists of a shrapnel body fitted with
a high explosive head. The head contains the fuse, detonator,
exploder, and main bursting charge of picric acid, which are
enclosed in a steel chamber, entirely separated from the body
Cai-fndge
SbM
Tropelling Charge
wrnmi
'llllifimnmi
TeraxsslOTL
Cap
Jfcin Charge Smcke Trodueirg
Towder
UNIVERSAL SHELL
of the shell, wliieh is of the usual shrapnel type. The bullets
are not packed in resin, but in T.N.T., which at the same
time acts as an explosive. The bullets are blown out in the
usual v/ay by a small bursting charge, placed in the base of
the shell. When the projectile is used for obtaining a high
explosive effect the fuse is set for percussion. The high ex-
plosive head detonates violently on striking an object, while
immediately afterwards the burster and T.N.T. explode,
throwing shell fragments and bullets with great force over a
fairly wide area.
For shrapnel effect the fuse is set so that the shell bursts
in flight. The bullets arc blown out while the head flies
forward to explode on impact.
This type of shell is especially useful against gunshields.
When gunshields were introduced the high explosive shell
was developed, as the ordinary shrapnel has little effect against
gunshields. When the universal shell strikes a gunshield
it generally tears large holes in it, while at the same time the
shrapnel effect immediately following the high explosive action
is liable to cause great havoc among the gun detachment.
ARMOUR-PIERCING SHELL.
Armour-piercing shells are mainly employed in the Navy
for penetrating the heavy armour of battleships. The lata
Sir W. Palliser introduced the first satisfactory armour-
piercing shells in 1863. They were made of cast iron, the
pointed head being cast in a metal mould and the cylindrical
portion in ordinary refractory sand. By this means it waa
endeavoured to give extreme hardness to the head, which is
the part required to perform the piercing of the armour. They
had the advantage of being very cheap, and v/ere successful
against wrought iron and soft steel armour, but broke into
fragments against hardened steel armour.
The Holtzer projectiles, v/hich were introduced in 1886,
had a great reputation, and were made of chromium steel.
The addition of chromium increases the hardness and tough-
ness of the steel without increasing its brittleness. When,
however, improved steeJ armour came to be employed the
chromium steel projectiles, tempered and hardened as they
were to a very high degree, could not pierce the plates. The
introduction of the soft steel cap gave the advantage to the
projectile in tl;e struggle armour versus projectile.
The term capped projectile applies to a projectile the
point of v/hich has been covered by a cap of soft metal with
a view of increasing its penetrative effect. In 1873 the
Russians carried out certain experiments with capped pro-
jectiles, but no reliable information was published. Captain
English, a British engineer, observed that the penetrative
powers against a Ilarvey armoured plata were increased
25 per cent, when a comparatively thin wrought iron plata
vas placed in front of it. He came to the conclusion that the
soft iron plate acted a."? a sort of cushion, preventing th«
point from being broken off and steadying it previous ta
peneti'ation.
As soon as the necessity of capping projectiles became
apparent, various experiments in different countries wer«
carried out, but it was not until 1901 that the utility of cap-
ping v.-as fully recognised. The difference between capped
and uncapped projectiles is astonishing. In a trial 6-inch
capped and uncapped projectiles were fired against 11.8-inch
Krupp ceiuented armour plate. Uncapped projectiles fired
with a striking velocity of 2,827 feet per second broke upou
A}U,roull?IERCI!iG SHELL
the face of the plate without perforating it, while capped pro-
jectiles with striking velocities as low as 2,799 feet per second
completely perforated the plate without breaking up. At
the moment of impact the nose of the projectile is embedded
in the soft iron and thus obtains additional support, prevent-
ing it from being fractured. Modern armour-piercing shells
are cast from a special mixture of chrome steel, and are sub-
sequently forged into shape in order to secure a better grain.
The chief difficulty consists in hardening and tempering
the projectile, especially the point. There are generally two
hardening processes— the first by quenching in oil, followed
by tempering, and the second after all mechanical work upon
the projectile is completely finished. The point of the pro-
jectile obtains its required hardness in the final process, but
the remainder of the shell does not have the sarrie degree of
hardness, as when once the point of the projectile has pene-
trated, the body passes the hole without difiicalty. Finally,
the finished projectile is submitted to a gentle heat treatment,
which to a certain extent ensures it against fracture due to
sudden changes in temperature.
The projectiles have a small cavity to contain the bursting
charge, which, as a rule, does not exceed 3 per cent, of the
total weight of the projectile. They are stored for three
months before being filled with the explosive owing to their
liability to split from the strains set up in the metal by the
hardening process.
We have briefly dealt with the principal projectiles used
in modern warfare. There are, however, some special type of
shells which are used at night time for illuminating purposes.
Star shells are employed with field artillery. They are
made more or lc?=3 on the same basis as the shrapnel shell,
but instead of using bullets, cylinders of some light-giving
composition are employed, which are ignited when the shell
bursts.
In another type of shell a number of small parachutes ara
folded together, which open out after the shell has exploded.
In the centre of the parachute an illuminating charge is carried
which is automatically ignited when the shell bursts. Krupp
has devoted special attention to this type of shell.
QUEEN ALEXANDRA'S FIELD FORCE FUND.
THE propasal {or a Wellington, Waterloo, and Napoleon Loan Exhibi-
tion of pictures, trophies, &c., in aid of the above fund, described
in L.VND .^ND W.iTEtt of March 20 hy Mr. J. Landfoar LtiC*», of th«
Spectacla MaJicrs' Company, is now uiidor consideiittioa ia detail hy th»
CVjuutess of Bactive, Chairman of tbe Fund.
OffcM of historic relics and objects for tlis Ex]iibition ara already
to hand.
Tha Hon. Charlotta Knoliya has again written to XTr. Lncas, stating
that she has explained tha present position of a.lTaJri to H«r Majesty
Queen Alexandra.
MR. IIILAIRE BELLOCS WAR LECTURES,
Preston Town H.ill Wednesday 23 April, 3& 3.
Blackpool Winter Gardens Tinirsday 29 April, 3.46 & 8.
Liverpool Pliilharmonir Hall... Friday 30 April, 8.50.
Liverpool Philh.armonic Hall.. Saturday 1 Ahiy, 3.
Bournemouth... Wintej Gardens Monday 5 Jfay, 3.30 i 8.
London Queen's Hall Wednesday 6 May, 8.30.
MR. FRED T. JANE ON THE NAV.\L WAR.
Manchester Freo Trade Hall Friday 23 .\pril, 8.
Scarboroagh Opera House Saturday 24 Aisril, 3.
Dover Town Hal! Tuesday 27 April. 8.
FuLkeijtona Town Hall Weduesday 23 April, S..
MR. CRAWFURD PRICE ON ".SERBIA."
Bournemouth.... Winter Gardena Friday 23 April, 3 & 8.
COMMANDER BELLAIRS, R.N., M.P., WILL LECTURB AT
Bournemouth.. ui Jriday .....JO Aprilj 3.30 Je 8^
14*
April 24, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED
DRAMAS OF THE ANIMAL WORLD.
Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas English.
I.-ROUSSARD.
TWILIGHT Lad called to Roussaid, Roussard tlae
Brown Jack Hare. He snuffed the drov/sy evening
Bcents, tbe alsikes, the clovers. He stretched him-
self within his form; backwards from iixed fore-
paws until his scut broke through the flimsy roof-
ing; forwards from fixed hind-paws, until his ears and head
ttood clear.
Daylong he had been drowsing, for the most time with
opened eyes as though he feared his sentinel ears might sleep;
with rounded, terror-haunted eyes that mirrored every rustle;
with drooping, hollowed shells of ears that twitched at every
twig-snap.
The glimmering, whi.spering undergrowth was back-
ground to his dreams. Never a lilting course by night, but
brought its panic-flight with it; never a day of drowsing ease,
but brought night's panic back in dreams.
The stiffened forward stretch relaxed. Roussard, with
bogging paws, sat up to listen, swivelling his ebon-pointed ears
to north and east and south to west.
Roussard dropt back to wash his face, to comb his
whiskers, clean his feet. His furry hands danced past his
moistened lips, and fluttered down his cheeks, and fanned his
muzzle.
He pulled his cars down to his mouth and preened their
■oft grey linings. He nibbled at his body-fur till every hair
gleamed like a strand of silk. He glossed the pointing bristles
of his whiskers; he furbished up his pads.
Then, with a little shake, he stretched liimself. Like
warrior armed, like traveller girt, Roussard, Jack Hare of
Valrimond, was ready for the night.
Spring-heeled he leapt, his long ears forward tilted, his
white scut drooped, his back a rounded curve.
He landed five yards eastward of his thicket. He claimed
that thicket vvhoUy, though Valrimond lies halt a league away.
Moon after moon he stablished it, as his inviolable domain.
Tbe woodland hares, though curious at the first, had, instinct-
taught, allowed him full pos.session — had left him Lord and
Master of the Combe.
One hare, one form, one quarter of the wood — such was
hare-law.
Yet chance had given the combe to him, chance and the
fortune of the hunt. A hunt by two wire-sinewed hounds,
double on double, swerve on swerve, and, at the end, when
breath had almost left him, a lucky couch betv,een two plough-
turned ridges, with ears drooped back, and fur wind-
smoothed.
A night and day he couched — like a grey stone; and,
when the gloaming called, set course for home, and passed the
combe, and found the combo untenanted.
Ho owed his life to that. The owner of the combe had
crossed his line — and fallen to the dogs.
So Rou.-isard gained his kingdom, a kingdom thieketed
with bramble cover, a windless kingdom, flanked by clover
fields.
Lilting on feather-balanced feet, as though he feared the
■ound of them, Roussard danced moth-like to the gap.
A south wind crept to meet him, with kisses for the
parched June leaves, with sighing, rustling whisper from the
clover.
He slipped witliout and p.-aised. This way and that he
•nuffed the air, this wny and that swung anxious ears to sift
the tangled rhythm of tbe night. Tlie tv,^ilight deepened in a
velvet silence. Tlie south v.'ind sighed itself away. Within
the supple ramparts of the dusk, there was no susyecL sound,
no .suspect scent.
Roussard let droop his silky cars, and kicked, and bucked,
snd pranced, for joy of living.
His play-time, feeding-time had come.
He nibbled here and there, a clover-head, a dandelion ;
but, for the most lime, played.
From clump to eluinp he bounded like a oolt; he leapt at
his own dusky leaping shadow; he ran the hedgrowa end to
end; even towards the village street to bi'ave its human
turmoil.
But he was quickly back again, back to the dewy clover-
fields, the honoy-sweetened clover-fields.
For here he had been wont to meet his kin, Jack Hares
as crazy as himself, who nosed his nose, and dared him to
run races.
Yet for two moons he had not seen a hare.
A smaller race had quartered on the slope, a dark-furred,
sulky-tempered race, a pushing, jostling, upstart race, who
met his greetings with a scowl, who eyed his passing wickedly,
gibbering in uncouth tongue, and crinkling muzzles.
Roussard was half afraid of them, short-eared, squat-
bodied, gnomish things who burrowed under earth.
He loathed their presence, yet he failed to link it with
the absence of his kin.
Roussard was very perfect knight; he scorned a quarrel
with these dv,-arfs, whose strength and swiftness were not half
hia own.
So this night, as he sped afield, he took small heed of
countless scuttling shapes, which leapt, and stamped, and
grunted at his coming.
A waning moon climbed slowly up the sky, dulling the
rainbow sparkle of the star-shine, revealing earth in shimmery
mist of grey.
Roussard stared round-eyed at the moon, half-feai-ful,
half-perplexed.
Roussard sat on a mole-hill.
Beneath him was a dip of ground.
Roussard's eyes left the moon, and travelling sidelong up
the slope, lit on the rubble heap.
Dark shadows jerked about it. and, as the moon climbed
higher, shaped themselves.
It was a rabbit parliament.
Some squatted, some sat up. They heaved and thronged
and jostled one anclher. Some shrugged their shoulders,
some upreared their scuts, some pricked their ears, some
lowered them, as though to voice their ayes and noes, and
ghalls and won'ts by gesture.
The moonshine lit them doubtfully — a reel and rout of
glistening tails and leaping, swaying bodies.
Stub, crinkly, v/hiskered muzzles twitched grimacing;
white chisel-teeth gleamed threatening through cleft lips;
short fore-paws drummed on testy, heaving waistcoats; now
and again a hind-paw struck the ground with menacing thud,
with vicious .stamp, which double-scored its argument.
To Roussard, solitary, like all his kind, such concourse,
such palaver, was prodigious.
He stared at it with glassy eye, with rounded frigid
vacant eye, with eye behind whose soullessness there seemed to
lurk presentiment of ill.
Till the fiun rose he stared at it; then, as they scattered,
he, too, made for home.
He chose the wind he used the most, the wind which
crossed the stubble to the dyke, and tunnelled to the hayfield,
and skirted the we.st side of this, and pierced the hedge close
to the gate, and so into the lucerne field, and, downwards, to
the co!:ibe.
He quickly reached the tuuTiel through the dyke, and
reaching it, stopped dead. Two rabbits barred his bolt-hole.
Soured-faced they stared at liim, grating their teeth, flutter-
ing their puckered muzzles.
They gave v/ay sulkily, one either side.
Roussard pressed on, to thread the run that crept along
the hedge. The gap was hplf-v/ay down its lengtli, but
Roussard whisked about be!"ore lie reached it. From near the
r'st-3 whiffed mustiness — viiore rabbits, many rabbits. At least
these had not sighted him, and there was yet another bolt-
hole lower.
He made a circling cast afield and drcv/ towards it
cautiously. Two rabbits watched its entrance.
Roussard retraced his stops, far back tliis time, towards
the dyke, and found the squatting sentinels still on guard.
Then,' eastward, by a half-forgotten trod, which swerved
about in widened are, and reached the combe on its .south side.
This was untramelled highway, with 0)ie sniout only
breaking it, a tunnel through the thorn hedge flecked with fur.
Roussard swept down it like the wind, with head pres=:ed
hack and flattened ears, and white scut tilted forward. And
rabbits started every side, and glowered, ar.d stamped swift
signals as he passed.
15*
LAND AND .WATER
April 24, 1915.
Hfl reached the Bmout, and crouched to slither through
i^, and found it choked with rabbits.
The sun had risen, Man had risen, too.
It was no time for flights afiold. The smout was blocked;
then he must leap the hedge.
He backed away and held his strength as he drew to it in
an easy canter. Like deer he leapt and cleared it by a yard;
and landed in his enemies' headquarters. The slope beyond
was brown with them.
R.oussard was desperate now. He thrusted through, and
reached his combe, and flung into hig thicket.
His grass-pile rose close-moulded to his sides beneath
the barbed entanglement of bramble. Slowly he gained his
breath again. His nose ceassej its quick snuffling, his eara
drooped b.ack and .■stiffened. In the half-light below the criss-
cross tangle he seemed like weather-beaten atone sunk deep of
its own weight.
He, slspt the sleep tli.at was his daily portion, broken by
every whisper of the weed, broken by every long-drawn spell
of silence, broken by every straying beam which searched his
thicket's shadow.
And, when sleep claimed him wholly, he dreamed dreams.
His ears pricked sharp, his frightened eyes dilated, he
trembled snout to scut, and woke a-tremble.
This day, of all days, he slept ill. The night's adven-
ture v.-eighed on him, the broken course, the rabbit folk. Each
rustle was a thunder-peal, each sunbeam a -heath firo.
So the slow, restless, haunted hours trailed their long
course to sundown.
Once more he idly stretched himself, once more he listened
fearfully. There was no note discordant. The wind surred
through the trammel of the briar, and fluttering leaf and
dancing bud waved farewell to the light.
Roussard leapt forth across the boundary wall, across the
leaf-choked ditch tliat bordered it.
A honeyed scent was w.iftcd to his nostrils, scent of dew-
laden clover. Life's ecstasy was his once more. Twilight with
rounded, soothing lips had kissed the haunting terror from
his eyes.
He tripped, he danced, he caracoled, he gambolled, rejoic-
ing in his solitude, rejoicing in the glamour of the night.
And pre.-iently he sped afield, and crossed the rise, and,
of a sudden, checked.
His ears had caught a tumult of small voices, a mumble-
sound that he had heard before — but where ? and when ?
The fox's bark he knew, the ermine's spit, the badger's
smiff, the shrill of mouse, the whimper of the hunt. But it
was none of the.se.
The answer stabbed his memory like a knife.
It was the rabbits' call-note.
It circled him. It closed on him. From east and west
and north and south it spat its vicious menace. Could he break
through ?
This way and that he slewed his head, this way and that
his quivering ears crossed and recrossed like swords.
But Fear had chained his feet. Fear of the nearing
skirmishers, grey shadow splashes dancing tuft to tuft. Fear
of the serried black beyond, the stamping, grunting, jostling
horde, which surged and swayed towards him.
There was no chance of flight; Eoussard, perforce, must
use his second weapon. Roussard dropt limp to earth and
closed his eyes.
A huge buck rabbit drove at him, and butted him and
sought to overturn him.
Another followed quickly, with bared teeth.
Another leaping, lashed with his hind-feet and scored a
crimson furrow ou his back.
Roussard sprang five feet up, and left a strip of white-
furred skin behind. •
Like ants they swarmed about him as he landed.
Vainly he drummed and buffeted, vainly he dodged and
swerved.
The sharp-clawed vermin fastened to his flanks, trans-
pierced his ears, tore at his eyes, mouthed at his silk-furred
groin.
He staggered with fierc'e gnashing teeth about him, and
murderous blood-shot eyes aflame, and crimson-dripping
muzzles.
He rose and fell, and rose and fell, and presently, thej
pinned him on his back.
« * » * *
A scream of agony vibrant through the night — voicing
a shame unspeakable, an unsndurnble pain: and then, aa
though fiends stamped applause, the double-thud of feet upon
the turf, and gibber-notea, and chucklings : and then, th«
slow alternate tread of Man.
The Man passed on his way.
Roussard rose quivering, bleeding, maimed.
His torturers had dropped off him, had scuttled to their
holes.
He still could crawl — but whither ?
Not to the combe-^he knew now why the combe was
cursed of hares.
To Valrimond ?
To Valrimoud slunk Roussard, Roussard the Brown Gib
Hare.
CORRESPONDENCE.
TO ATTACK SUBMARINES.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — Lord Dunleath in his latest letter recom-
mends the Admiralty to build fast vessels, of speed 20-24
knots, designed to ram submarines, or of lighter construction
and speed, 28-30 knots.
I am afraid this suggestion shows a failure to understand
the following points; —
1. The difficulty of designing such craft.
2. The capabilities of a submarine.
With regard to 1, it would be impossible to design a boat
smaller than a destroyer which would be able to ram a sub-
marine at any .-peed over 10 knots without seriously damaging,
and, perhaps, sinking, herself. The necessary strength would
entail the sacrifice of high speed and easy manaeu\Ting.
With regard to 2, no submarine submerged with the
periscope showing would allow herself to be rammed by a
hostile craft, as she could dive to any depth up to 100 feet or
BO in a very few seconds.
Should the submarine be on the surface, she would notice
tlio approach of the attacking vessel in plenty of time to
submerge.
Against this may be cited the fact that submarines have
been sunk by ramming during the present war; but it is
extremely likely that they were either " caught napping " or
forced to the surface by some contrivance of wliich we know
nothing.
The Adii'iralty have doubtless adopted the plan which
our own submarine experts consider the most efficient. — I
remain. Sir, yours faithfully,
N. O.
OUR MOTOR AMBULANCE FUND.
By ATIIKRTON FLE.MiNG.
WE have pleasure in announcing that the total
amount received for the Land and Water
Motor Ambulance Fund to date is
£691 14s. 6d. The following errors liava
crept into our list, and we take this opportunity
of rectifying them. A donation of £5 from Mrs. C'righton
Simpson was entered as 5s. ; 12s. from a Scottish reader is
now acknowledged; and a subscription from Mr. James B.
Greig, of Laurencekirk, was entered under the wrong name.
Our apologies are due to these subscribers. The Fund i»
now closed, and a full account of expenditure will be published
later.
Anonymous, £10; Mrs. Bainbridge, £10; Mr. D. C.
Rutherford Lindsay Carnegie, £5 Ss. ; Mr. Walter Neves,
Mr. Frank H. Cauty. Mr. A. L. Wingate, £5 each; Miss
M. E. Freeman, £3; " Kiddington ViUage," £2 los. ; Mrs.
Harold Gordon, Mrs. Diarmid Noel Paton, £2 2s. each; Mr.
H. Knox-Shaw, £2; Mr. W. Harold Eraser, £1 Is. 6d.; Mr.
Sholto Douglas, Mr. R. M. Blake-Smith, Mrs. A. M. Hedley,
Captain H. Watts, Mrs. Massey, £1 Is. each; Mr. E. A,
Asgood, Miss May Stokes, £1 each; Miss E. B. Sparrow,
Miss J. Lambert, Mr. J. H. Cox, lOs. each; Mr. H. Clifford
Davis, " Q. E. D.," Miss A. G. Simson, Miss Jackson, Mrs.
Murray N. Phelps, Mr. J. Cohen, 5s. each; the Misses Eva
and Edith Godman, Mr. R. Henry, 43. each; Miss S. Thomp-
son, Mr. P. J. Egan, Miss M. Finlay, 23. 6d. each; Mrs.
J. M. Latham, 2s. 3d. ; Captain Arthur St. John, Mr. J,
Barry, Miss Troup, Mrs. W. Robinson, Miss Holt, Anony-<
mous, 23. each; Miss M. Meek, Miss S. Wildsmith, Master
Jack Hender.^on, the Rev. E. J. Janson-Smith, Is. each.
Piinted by Tiis Victoeia House Pbintiko Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Whit«friara, Londoa, E.C.
April 24, 1915
LAND AND WATER
are the only Standard
10/6 Fountain Pens
All British Made by a
British Company with
British Capital and
Labour.
THOMAS DE LA RUE & CO., LTD.
FIRTH'S
"STAINLESS" STEEL
For CUTLERY, etc.
MMer Musts, Stains, nor Tarnishes.
u
Xr-tlcLes TruxAe -from. -fcKvs
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Name
Address..
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral iVaters
A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
Chenles Street Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.
55
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 19 1 5
THE
ORIGIN OF GOUT
HOW TO DETECT URIC ACID SYMPTOMS.
URIC ACID, the fundamental cause of all gouty
suffering, is in reality a normal product of the
human system, owing its existence partly to its
introduction into the bod}' as a constituent of
certain classes of food, and partly as a result of the
natural tissue changes — the wearing out and repairing processes
constantly going on.
As soon almost as uric acid gets into your circulation from
either of these sources it gives you evidence of its disturbing
presence by certain wcll-deftncd symptoms, which are nature's
signals of impending gouty outbreaks. You feel out of sorts,
heavy, and dull, especially in the mornings ; your liver is out of
order ; you are -restless, easily irritated, and s' ep badly. You
suffer from dyspepsia, flatulence, and heartburn. You are
depressed, and trifling little affairs worry you. You have per-
sistent and severe headaches. You frequently experience
sensations of burning and irritation in the skin, or occasional
twinges of pain in your joints, or there may be stiffness in both
joints and muscles, and dull aches in various parts of your body.
GOUTY PROGRESS.
When the uric acid becomes embedded in the muscles, gouty
rheumatism or lumbago results. At first there is only a slight
sensation of stiffness, and an occasional catch of pain. Gradually,
as the atoms congregate, and the sharp crystals bore their resist-
less way into the substance of the muscle, they increase the
stiffness, and the piercing of the penetrating acicular crystals
causes the sharp, cutting pain that tortures sufferers from gouty
rheumatism. This is the term employed when the muscles of the
limbs and shoulders are affected, whilst lumbago is the name
applied when the loin muscles particularly are involved.
Other varieties of gouty sufferers are chronic, or rheumatic,
gout arising from the clogging uratic deposits in the joints, and
attended by swelling, inflammation, pain, and stiffness ; sciatica
and neuritis when the nerve sheaths are penetrated by the sharp
crystals, which cause the hot, stabbing pain in thighs or arms ;
kidney stone and gravel, which are simply deposits of urates in
the organs ; and gouty eczema, the inevitable result of uric acid
forcing its way into the skin.
HOW TO ESCAPE GOUT.
As long as uric acid remains in the system, so long will the
pain and agony caused by its presence continue. The uratic
masses must be converted into soluble substances, and swept out
of the body before relief can be obtained. It has been con-
clusively demonstrated that Bishop's Varalettes are the most
generally effective uric acid solvents and eliminants. They go
directly to the root of the matter, and expel uric acid from the
system. The rational and scientific mode of action of Bisliop's
Varalettes is bound to result in successful alleviation of gouty
suffering.
Bishop's Varalettes are made by an old-establi>hed firm of
manufacturing chemists of the highest standing, who have for
very many years made uric acid solvents a subject of special
study. Their investigations into this branch of therapy have
enabled them to place in the hands of the medical profession and
gouty subjects a remedy that is at once reliable, safe, and sure.
Physicians recognise and acknowledge this by prescribing Bishop's
Varalettes daily. Bishop's Varalettes are free from any harmful
ingredients, such as colchicum, iodides, mercury, potash,
salicylates, and do not contain any purgative, narcotic, or anodyne
drugs, so that even delicate subjects can take them with absolute
confidence. They do not depress or lower the system in any
way.
DIET AND GOUT.
There is scarcely any subject that gives rise to more dis-
cussion, or, at times, proves more perplexing, than the all
engrossing one of foods and drinks suitable for the goutily
inclined. Popular opinions on tliis subject are so often t]uite
erroneous that it will be welcome news to you that a booklet has
been recently published dealing with the whole question of diet
in a clear, authoritative, and comprehensive manner.
No difficulty in future need arise in arranging pleasant,
varied, and satisfying menus, made up wholly of uric-acid-free
dishes. Classified lists are published of allowable and non-
allowable foods, and the booklet forms a perfect guide for the
gouty. It contains, in addition, a mass of useful information on
the whole subject of uric acid disorders.
A copy will be sent, post free, on application, to the sole
makers of Bishop's Varalettes. Alfred Bishop, Ltd., Manufacturing
Chemists (Est. 1857), 48 Spelman Street, London, N.E. Please
write for booklet N.
Bishop's Varalettes are sold by all chemists in vials, at is.,
2s., and 5s. (25 days' treatment), or direct from th? sole makers.
LITERARY REVIEW
By R. A. SCOTT-JAMES
" The Place-Names of England and Wales." By
Rev. James B. Johnston, M.A., B.D. Murray.)
15s. net.
Any man who loves walking tours, anyone, in fact,
who takes an intelligent interest in his " own locality
will find untold wealtli of information in Mr. Johnston's
volume. Most of the place-names of England, whether
they be the names of town, village, river, hill, or bog,
have their long historical association and their origin'
— their interesting and baffling origin. Mr. Johnston
dispels many long-treasured illusions. The termination
" Caster " or " Chester," for instance, is no proof of
the former existence of a Roman camp. " Oxford " has
probably nothing to do with " Oxen," the first part of the
word being the old Celtic uisc (meaning water), and is thus
not only the same word as Onse, but also Isis. The arrange-
ment of names is alphabetical. If we refer to this work
carefully we may follow the place-names of England to thtir
probable Celtic, Saxon, or Scandinavian origins, and learn
at the same time much about language, history, and
geography.
"A Life of Robert Cecil, First Earl of Salis-
bury." By Algernon Cecil. (Murray.) 12s. net.
It would he hard for us to conceive modern England
without the family of the Cecils. It has handed on an intact
tradition from the time of Lord Burghley, and his son, Robert
Cecil, the first Earl of Salisbury, down to the late Lord
Salisbury and the Cecils of to-day. Mr. Algernon Cecil
himself is essentially one of them. He has tlu^ characteristic
breadth of mind and grasp of affairs, the sense of the
constitutional order of things, and its importance, the
shrewdness, the subtle feeling of what is fitting and not fitting,
along with the humane traits which have been developed in
some members of his family — an 'interest in reUgion, in
literature and the subtleties of ps\-chology.
He lias been able to understand Robert Cecil, the first
earl, and show him from within and without. 1 doubt if
anyone else would have made so interesting a book out of so
uninspiring a subject — so uninspiring, indeed, that no
biographer has hitherto attempted the task, though for
fourteen critical years he was practically Prime Minister of
England. Queen Elizabeth, Essex, Raleigh, Bacon- —
these 'are the alluring figures w-hom the biographer loves.
But Lord Burghley and Lord Salisbury — what were they ?
Bureaucrats, employers of spies, wielders of patronage — the
indispensable but iminteresting props of Crown and State.
But not uninteresting in Mr. Cecil's hands. He has not
been content mereh' to ransack the Record Office and the
archives of Hatfield House. He has studied this industrious
administrator with the coolness of a Machiavelli examining
the methods of maintaining a principality.
"The Great Age."
son. I (IS.
By J. C. Snaith. (Hutchin-
Mr. Snaith has been as bold as the most romantic of
novelists may be. He has not merely introduced Oueen
Elizabeth. Francis Bacon, Cecil, Raleigh, etc., but the far more
remote and difficult character of William Shakespeare. The
fantasy is ingenious and neat. A young heiress of incomparable
beauty and courage rescues from a dungeon a youth wrong-
fully condemned to death. She wanders with her Orlando
over the fields and woods of England till, in the city of Oxford,
she meets for a second time one William Shakespeare. How
she comes to act the part of " Rosalind " in " As You Like
It," and how Shakespeare constructs a play setting forth the
fortunes of his proteges, and recites the story to the Queen — •
all this must be left to the reader to discover. Improbable,
fantastic, as it all is — as it is meant to be — it is saying much
for Mr. Snaith that if he has not created a character for the
gentle dramatist he has not made him stiff, or undignified, or
bookish, or ridiculous ; in fact, he has outlined something
into which the part of Shakespeare might be fittedi
The following are novels or books of stories to which
I should like to call the reader's attention.
" The Empty House." (Short Stories). By Algernon Blackwood.
(Nash).
" The Good Soldier." By Ford Madox Hueffcr. (Lane.)
" Brunei's Tower." By Eden Phillpotts. (Hcinemann).
" The Voice of the Turtle." By Frederick Watson. (Methuen).
" The Family." By Eleanor Monlaunt. (Methuen).
" The Titan." By Theodore Preiser. (Lane).
" A Lover's Tale." By Maurice Hewlett. (Ward. Lock).
April 24, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
H.M.S. SKIRMISHER. Light Cruiser. Displacement 2,895 tons. Built by Vickeps Maxim : Completed 1905. Length 360 ft.
Beam 40 ft. Horse-Power 17,500. Speed 252 knots. Guns, 9 of 4 in. 2 torpedo tubes. Max. Coal 380 tons. Crew 260.
(From the Original by Montague Dawson.)
Cci„riM of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH
LAND AND WATER
April 24, 1915
THE "GIEVE"
LiFE-SAViNG Waistcoat
The Peril of the Submarine
An Officer lately on H.M. Auxiliary Cruiser
"BAYANO"
which was recently torpedoed and sunk (in a few minutes)
with few survivors, states that he owes his life to the fact
that he was wearing the " Gieve " Life-Saving Waistcoat
at the time of the disaster. Of the 12 officers taken from
the water on the sinking of H.M.S. Formidable, ten were
wearing this waistcoat.
The "Gieve" Life-Saving Waistcoat is the only life-saving
apparatus that is really reliable under all conditions —
because it is the only device of its kind that can be worn
continuously with comfort at all hours oj the day or^ night,
and under every conceivable circumstance of life at sea.
Being worn (deflated) as an ordinary waistcoat, in absolute
comfort and without bulging or hampering the wearer in any
way, it is ready at any moment for use and can be inflated
in 20 seconds, when it is buoyant enough to support wearer
headand-shouldcrs clear of water, indefinitely.
Made to any Size. 50/ - net. Flannel Lined.
On Dieu» and
sale at .
GIEVE'S
(Gieve, Matthews & Seagrove, Ltd.)
LONDON— 65 South Molton Street.
PORTSMOUTH -The Hard.
DEVONPORT— 44 Fore Street.
CHATHAIVl Railway Street
WEYIVlOUTH-1 & 2 Grosvenor Place.
SHEERNESS— 72 High St, Blue Town.
EDINBURGH 30a George Street
HARWICI{— KIngsway, Dovercourt.
Officer's Ideal Water Bottle
FOR THOSE ON ACTIVE SERVICE
Improved shape, does not absorb wet.
Will stand the hardship of the campaig^n.
Nickel Silver. Non-Corrosive.
Silver Plated Inside.
Covered with Khaki Twill.
Screw Stopper, or Bayonet Top.
Supplied with Swivels or Shoulder Straps
CAPACITY li PINTS, IQ/C
COMPLETE, FROM AO/O
TO HOLD A QUART, 91 /
COMPLETE, FROM ^1/-
Obuiinablc only from —
STUDD & MILLINGTON
Xililary Culfillers,
SI CONDUIT STREET, LONDON, W. >
SERVICE KITS
IN 48 HOURS. —
Every detail guaranteed correct, in
accordance with War Office regulations.
Patterns and Estimate post free.
A large number of half-finished Service
Jackets always on hand, which can be
completed in eight hours.
WEST & SON, Ltd.,
Military and Sporting Tailors,
151 NEW BOND STREET, W.
(Opposite Conduit Street.)
'Phone — Gerrard 81 bl.
"Every Requisite for the Comfort
of our Soldiers at the Front."
TURNBULL & ASSER
Sporting Hosiers
Waterproof Oilskin
Shell Waistcoat
With sleeves for wearing under
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carried in the pocket.
Price 27/6
Khaki Stocking
Puttees
For use in Home Service when
off parade, or at the Front when
out of the lirinff line. Ihe
Stockings present the same ap-
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reUef as a (juick change after
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Price 7/6
71-72 JERMYN ST., LONDON, S.W.
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Telegrams : "Paddywhack, London." Telephone: 4628 Gerrard.
SHOOLBREDB
"Service" Luminous Watches
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THE
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15/6
with or without back curtain.
The accepted design for both
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151 NEW BOND STREET, LONDON, W.
58
The County Gentleman
A.\D
LAND & WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2765
SATURDAY. MAY 8, 1915
r PUBLISH ED AS"! PRICK SIXPENCE
La newspaperJ publish tu weekly
Copyright, •'Land and Water. \
\.By Joupii Simpson, R.E.A.
A MASTER OF STRATEGY
GENERAL JOFFRE
Commander-in-Chief of the Armies in France
LAND AND WATER
May 8, 191 5
H.M.S. SWIFT. Destroyer. Displacement 1,825 tons. Length 345 ft. Beam 34i ft. Draught lOi tt. Horse-Power 30,000.
Speed (max.) 39 knots. Built by Cammell Laird: Completed 1907. Guns, 4 of 4 in. 2 18 in. torpedo tubes. Cost £2£0, 500.
(From the Original by Montague Dawson.)
c<,py.igkt of MESSRS. ANDREW USHER & CO., DISTILLERS, EDINBURGH.
(Established a Century.)
Mav 8, iqis
LAND AND WATER
A GLIMPSE OF WAR
6-in. Q.F.
By W. L. GEORGE
CORPORAL QUADRING, at the telephone, stared
into the feeder, so dark and mysterious as it
passed through the floor of the turret into the
ammunition room. There was a noise of ma-
chinery in his ears and yet he was alert, quiet,
at his ordinary business. His free ear, aloof from the in-
sinuating sound that the carrier made as the shells slowly
travelled and rose in the feeder, aloof even from the rumble
and crackle of the distant firing which he heard when the
cupola rose, was given to his lieutenant who sat there, three
feet away, still as a wax figure, listening at that other telephone
hnked with the heart of the fort, the fire control. He had
nothing to do but just to hsten and to wait for sounds, for
orders, for events in this atmosphere of strange business.
The fire was slow, three shots a minute only. And auto-
matically, from time to time, as the little voice below said :
" Steady ! " he rephed : " Steady ! "
Nothing was happening yet, but he knew that something
must soon happen. Things were not going well with the
fortress. He wondered where the French were, whether
that field artillery on the right could be theirs ; he wondered
why in those bursts of sound when the cupola rose he heard
so little musketry. No doubt the Germans were witliin
five miles. But then ? Why were they not yet being battered ?
He was lost in the enormous strife. The lieutenant was
talking now :
" Control ! D'you hear me ? Control ! . . . Yes, sir ! . .
Aeroplane wrecked ? . . . What shall I do, sir ? . . . Yes,
sir."
Then to the sergeant :
" Range nine four fifty." And to Ouadring : " Speed
up."
" Speed up ! " cried Quadring into the telephone.
The machinery went a httle faster. Slowly before
his eyes a shell rose in the black void, harmonious,
beautiful in lines, exquisitely polished. As he listened he
stared at the sergeant, grizzled but alert, watched the shell
slide into the hands of four men and travel as if on velvet
towards the breech : quick-opened, it swallowed the shell,
snapped it up like a greedy mouth. He saw the sergeant
push aside a gun-layer, infinitesimally alter the direction.
" Speed up ! " said the lieutenant, sharply.
They were firing four a minute now, rather bUndly
towards that place where the German howitzers might be,
to show that the fort was fighting rather than to fight. Then
the small shell began to fall. . . .
Corporal Quadring hstened, interested and_ calm. He
knew the sound : even,' fifteen seconds, when the cupola
rose, he recognised the Krupp fifteen-pounders. " Small
fry," he thought, disdainfully. He did not know where
they were falling, hidden in the circular chamber of steel
that whirred under his feet, the small, crowded room, in-
tolerably light ; he felt comfortable and secure behind the
walls of grey metal. The lieutenant was talking again.
Quadring understood : another aeroplane had located the
howitzers. The range was altered.
" Speed lip ! Speed up ! " said the heutenant, authori-
tative rather than impatient.
They were firing at twelve-second intervals now, and
there was a gritting sound. It bothered him, this sound,
so near him. It dominated the more frequent bark of the
fifteen- pounders outside. Where were they falUng ? . . .
They sounded nearer now. Then Corporal Quadring heard
a large splosh. Oh, they had hit the glacis then ! " Fluke,"
he thought. But there came another shell and then, as the
6 inch fired again, two or three simultaneously, quite close:
shrilling through the explosions he heard a cry. He grew
taut : " That must have been on the infantry parapet !
Poor devils ! " thought Corporal Quadring. And then
smugly reflected that he was better off inside. Still, the sound
worried him. Ah ! this was it.
" Oil can," said the sergeant.
"Oil can," . repeated Quadring, through the telephone.
" Oil can," said the little voice.
And, as if by magic, the oil can rose in the feeder. A
note of excitement had come into the lieutenant's voice :
" Yes, sir, I understand." Then to the sergeant : " Nine
one fifty. Get all you can out of her."
Ouadring's heart gave just one beat more and then
became normal. They were in for it now.
Suddenl}', on his order, the feeder came alive. It rasped
and it whirred, running at top speed, for indeed the quick-firer
was giving all it could and the four men seemed to seize the
new shells as fast as they fed them. Corporal Quadring was
all bewildered outside that calm spot where lay his duty.
His first excitement increased, for at last . . . Yes, here
it was ... a dull heavy sound upon the cupola ; the Germans
had the range, unless it was another fluke. . . . No, not a
fluke : as the cupola closed down two shells fell together on
the steel roof. The heutenant smiled :
" That's the first," he said, " but we . . ."
Corporal Quadring did not hear the rest, for this was not
a fifteen-pound shell that had fallen so close over his head
that he sank it into his shoulders. The whole turret had
quivered under the heavy impact. And now it was indeed :
" Speed up ! " Hands were feverish as they grasped the
shells ... for the turret had be.gun to move . . •. the
cupola rose . . . the 6-inch fired into the gleam of blue sky.
The cupola blotted out the blue sky and, rumbhng upon its
rails while with a swish water escaped from the pipes, the
turret moved along the trench to take up a new position.
It could take no risks now. . . .
In front, behind, Quadring heard the explosions. Yes,
they were being battered now. The gun was pushed, to its
utmost, it seemed ; the sergeant in one movement tore off
his coat, wiped his face upon his shirt-sleeve. And yet it
was not fast enough.
" Speed up ! Speed up ! " shouted Quadring.
The lieutenant murmured : " Too slow ! Go below,
give 'em heU !
It seemed curiously cool and dark below. The store-
keeper was sulky, hardly listened. Quadring just noticed
the wounded hydraulicist who had been hit in the trench
and brought in, rather to clear the rails than to save him.
He lay, a smaU khaki bundle, folded up as if to get him out
of the way, under a mask of red, his coat black-dyed with
blood, half-stunned by a scalp wound.
Then from above came a sound heavier than he had heard
before, a vast boom, and for a second everything tottered
as if the wall and the feeder itself swayed. The turret shook
like a man who has been struck. " Got us full ! " he thought,
while he stumbled up the stairs tripping on the iron treads,
shying back from the electric globes hke a nervous horse.
Above, all was urgency and yet calm. Still the feeder was
belching shells, still the cupola, a Uttle askew from the blow
of the eleven inch sheU, rose and feU as the quick-firer replied.
He was seized bv movement . . . minute after minute passed,
lengthened into an hour of heat and fire. ... He was con-
scious only of the swaying of the turret as it rushed along
its trench, fired, rushed back and fired again. It was aU
action, it was all haste, mechanical as if the men with the gun
and the steel walls formed an automatic trinity. Sound
was all about him like a black blanket shot with red streaks.
Every rise of the cupola let in the growing roar of the German
guns, hke a wedge, then closed it out. He felt rather than
heard the sound grow. He understood. Nothing would
help them, now their range was found, save perhaps some lucky
shots unUmbering those howitzers liidden behind hill 44 or
45, or, he thought bitterly, 48, who could teU ?
He exclaimed. As the cupola .rose a shell burst on the
edge of the work and for a second all was invisible, for the
turret was filled bv a cloud of concrete. Corporal Quadring
retched a mouthful of dust . . . fierce, he forced his stung
throat, murmured :
" Speed up ! "•
Thicker and thicker came the sounds. Boom upon
boom ringing on the cupola. " It'll buckle," he thought.
Then again : " It'll buckle." And as he thought the voice
below spoke :
" Bearings jammed ! "
" Go on," said the lieutenant.
The gun still raged into the strip of sky ; the cupola
was doomed and would soon protect it no more. Right,
left, fire . . . then left, fire and right again . . . the turret,
half-exposed, was fighting still. But a heavy shell fell
upon the edge and suddenly the three inches of steel bent,
crumpled like a fan. Right, left . . . then a pause. It
synchronised with the bursting of a shell in the trench itself.
Quadring knew, he could imagine the rails and roadway twisted
up : the turret would never move again ... it would only
wait. Wait ? For what ?
(Con:iftntii on page loo.)
S7
LAiND AND WATER
May 8, 1915
Imitation
is tbe sinccrest form of
flatter?, anb that is wb?
?our frien^5 bu? tbe
original article,
**Zbc tsre tbnt taugbt tbe CraOc."
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jfoiinOerd of tbe Uneuniatic Xlme
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May^ 8, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
NOTE.— ThU article has beea submitted to the Tress Bareaa, which does aot object to the pobUcatiaa ai couoredi, aad takes M
respoQslblllty for the correctness ot the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bnrean, the positiaos ot troops on Plans illustratia^ this Artld* wuitt oaly be
regarded as spprozimate, and no definite strength at any point U indicated.
THE AUSTRO-GERMAN BLOW IN
WESTERN GALICIA.
THIS issue of Land aot) Water will be in
the hands of the public upon the morning
of Thursday, May 6. It is probable
that by that time the main truth about
the Austro-German blow delivered in Galicia,
which took place upon Friday, Saturday, and
Sunday last, April 30, and May 1 and 2, will
then be public property.
But at the moment of writing this article
(which is Tuesday evening) there is nothing upon
which to base a judgment save analysis from past
news of a similar nature. It is an unfortunate
coincidence, for the purpose of this analysis, thaf
the first and imperfect news received from one side
only shoiild be all that we have had in London
before the main part of this article can be com-
pleted. But it is unavoidable. If further news
correcting the first German communique is
received in time for the addition of a postscript
to-morrow (Wednesday) morning I will add such
a postscript.
First of all, we can make certain of the follow-^
ing points : —
(1) There has been a long concentration of
enemy troops against the Dunajec front. Tliat is,
against the positions of our ally upon the extreme
west of their armies in Galicia.
• — '*''' V '
Stanislau
KolomcA
LAND A N D W ATE R .
May 8, 1915.
(2) This concentration was not effected
Becretly. The Intelligence Department of our
ally warned their commanders of great numbers
massing against them for the attack.
(5) It is certain that the force thus conceii-
trated contained great numbers of the new troops
which, as has been pointed out in these columns
more than once, constitute the third and last
batch of enemy reser\es.
(4) It is equally certain that the concentra-
tion thus effected and thus launched upon the wes-
tern front of our ally's positions in Galicia
resulted in a considerable success for the enemy.
(5) It is equally certain that the enemy,
in thus forcing certain points of a line entrenched
and prepared" for months, has lost very heavily
indeed, and that unless he has quite bi'oken
through he has lost m.ore than the Russians.
(6) But he has attained a measure of success,
to be estimated probably fairly enough in his
figures : 21,000 wounded and unwounded priso-
ners of the enemy and 16 guns ; out of a force of,
say, 200,000 to 250,000 and, say, 800 guns.
(7) According to the measure of that success
— i.e., according to how- far he has pushed back
the Russian line — will prove the gravity of the
position immediately developing. In any case,
unless our ally's old line is restored, his grip upon
the northern Carpathians is threatened, and if
the blow he has suffered is as heavj- as the enemy
pretends (which is not likely) he could not per-
manently retain his hold upon the mountains at
all, and might not be able to maintain himself in
the Galician plain.
In order to appreciate what has happened,
we may consult the elements of the sketch map on
the preceding page, and reproduced opposite.
The main line of communication running
through Galicia is that marked C G C C upon the
sketch, and proceeding from tjj^ depots in Russia
through the advance pass at Leraberg, through the
junction of Przemysl, and through Tarnow across
the Dunajec.
With the rest of the gridiron of Galician rail-
ways, mostly single lines, we are not for the
moment concerned, save that the lateral line run-
ning through Gorlice, Sanok, Sambor, and Stryj
to Stanislau and Kolomea (marked on the sketch
with the letters D D D D) is obviously his main
road for the transfer of troops from east to west
and west to east : in other words, for the concen-
tration of the Russians against attempts their
enemies are making to dislodge them from the
Galician plain.
Now, the position which the Russians held,
just before this great attack upon their western
front was delivered, is to be followed in the line
of dots upon the sketch map A.
It will be perceived that the frontiers of the
Russian occupation were roughly in the shape of a
right angle; from between Stryj and Stanislau to
the neighbourhood of Eartfeld on the Hungarian
side of the mountains was one limb of this right
angle, and from the corner in the neighboui'hood
of Bartfeld up to the Vistula was the other, and
sliorter, limb of the angle.
Upon the power of resistance of this shorter
limb, which power of resistance was taken for
granted till the last few days, it is clear that the
possession of the Carpathians by our ally
depended.
The matter is so obvious that most critics in
iJxe Press have said, rightly enough, that a mere
glance at the map would be sufficient to prove it.
But to make quite certain of the point, we may
put it diagrammatically here. Thus, an army
desires to master a certain obstacle, O 0. It is
disposed in a rectangular form, ABC. Its
enemies are exercising the power for a thrust
against it towards C (represented by the arrow
there), but it has been exercising an equally
powerful thrust at the B end (represented by the
arrow there) and has there crossed the obstacle in
part, and can, with the advance of the season, hope
to master it entirely.
There is also, in the direction E F, a certain
number of enemy forces able to strike against the
turned back side A B. It is self-evident that the
security of all tlie work being done on the line B C
depends upon the force there operating being quite
secure from interference on their right and
adequately screened by the force at A B. If the
force at A B is broken, or bent back, the people
going along the arrow 2 will be in peril, and, as the
country in w^hich they are operating is mountain
country, and has few roads, and very difficult com-
munications, A B has only got to be bent back some
little way as towards B D for all the people who
are working on the thrust of the arrow 2 to be in
grave peril of being cut off, and, in a military
sense, destroyed.
Now we shall Icnow, perhaps by the time these
lines are in print, but unfortunately not at the
moment they are written, how far this protecting
line A B has suffered. That it has suffered, and
had dents knocked in it here and there, we may
take without fear of error.
The Berlin communiques were, on the face of
them, extravag-ant, and the public rejoicings
ridiculously on a par with the premature celebra-
tions of victory before Warsaw last December.
But however exaggerated enemy reports may
be, serious fighting has taken place, and the
enemy has advanced.
If we turn again to the first map reprinted
opposite we shall see that this claim of the
Germans, apart from its flamboyant language, is
one which is not made without foundation. They,
would not say they had forced the Dunajec unless
they had forced it at certain points, and they
would not say that the enemy was retiring east-
wards unless he were also retiring at certain
points. The Russian line was simple and united.
It was based on one continuous line of river, and
if it is pierced at all it may have to fall bark.
The original line ran from the Vistula up the
Dunajec until the junction of the river with its
tributary, the Biala, and thus ran from Tarnow
up the Biala in front of Gorlice, past GryboAy,
and so to the Hungarian frontier, which is
on the crest of the mountains, just above Bartfeld.
That line no longer, at the nioment of writing,
stands intact. We have a further claim to regard
the matter as serious from the very fact that we
have received no news from the other side^
May 8, 1915.
LAND AND SfiATER,
'^
\
a1
although it is now nearly three days since the
matter was decided, or, at any rate, more than
forty-eight hours. And we cannot but remember
that similar silence has marked difficult passages
upon the Eastern field in previous months.
On the other side of the account we must set
certain considerations of which the immediate
future will test the value, though we cannot yet tell
whether they are of great weight or of small.
We know, in the first place, that Berlin has
invariably exaggerated in the last few months the
successes of the German troops and has been par-
ticularly prone to lend decisive value to what have
been proved in the issue to be subsidiary things—
for instance, the fighting at Soissons, and the de-
struction of the 20th Russian Army Corps at
Augustowo.
Again, we know that the moment is extremely
critical in the matter of neutral intervention. At
any moment one of the greater neutrals — Italy —
and possibly another — Roumania — may enter the
field— with results which will be suggested later
in this article. There is not the least doubt that,
at such a critical moment, it will be well worth the
while of the enemy to exaggerate his success, and
particularly to give it a sort of lurid character
which would impress foreign opinion.
Again, we know from the example of what
happened in front of Warsaw, last December, that
if tne position is still undecided, it may yet be
retrieved. Berlin has in the last few months been
in the habit of crying Victory at the very first
opportunity it could find, and always before things
were concluded.
In front of Warsaw the Russian line was
pierced, and it seemed as certain as anything could
be that Warsaw would fall. In spite of that, we
know Russian reinforcements arrived, the breach
was healed on the second day, and not only was the
breach healed, but the Germans, who had broken
through, were very nearly enveloped and only cut
their way out with the greatest difficulty.
We are not yet justified at the moment of
writing, therefore, in regarding the success which
the enemy certainly has had as either being upon
the scale he claims or of the decisive character
which he also claims : but we shall do well while
waiting further news to appreciate how very criti-
cal all that corner is.
Upon the rough sketch on the following page
you have the elements of the situation.
The Russian line runs from the Vistula up
the Dunajec to the point A ; it is continued through
Tamow, reposing upon the River Biala and the
railway which follows that valley. It passes — ■
or, rather, passed — through Ciezkowioe (upon thq
3*
LAND AND iSKATER,
May 8, 1915.
O S ID
i«— WliQIi I I 'HriiTM 1.1 I
QO
Titles
..#
*
«J)akla
'Bart&ld
#
eastern side of the valley, and already in the foot-
hills of the Carpathians) and went on up into the
higher hills between Grybow and Gorlice, and
then crossed the crest of the Carpathians about
half-way between the towns of Gorlice and Bart-
feld. It held the whole belt south of the crest of
the Carpathians within the mountains them-
selves, as we know : the three road Pass of Poly-
anka, of the Dukla Pass and of the Jasliska, and
the railway and road Pass of Lupkow, after
which point it held a very narrow belt of the
southern slope and, a few miles further on, no
longer held the ridge of the Carpathians, failing
as yet to master the Uzog. Now, the protect-
ing' front between the point B and the point F,
where the Dunajec falls into the Vistula, the
(Western Russian line, based upon the Dunajec and
the Biala, has apparently been attacked at various
points upon its whole length; most seriously at
Ciezkowice, and elsewhere below Tarnow and on
the lower Dunajec. The communications with the
Carpathian pass, which the Russians still hold,
are only one long day's marching behind this pro-
tecting screen of the western wing; and if that
■wing cannot be re-established quickly it is obvious
that the positions between the point B on the
accompanying sketch and the Lupkow Pass will
become impossibla.
The actual position on which the enemy claims
(in the Austrian communique, at least) to have
struck his chief blow is, as we have seen, that which
defended the town of Ciezkowice. This town is
upon the Biala, just in the foothills of the Car-
pathians where the hills have summits from three
to four hundred feet above the level of the water. It
is not difficult country, nor is it a point lending it-
self in any particular way to the attack. If the
Russian line broke there (which is still doubtful),
it was merely a break in one place out of many
that might have gone under the strain. The rea.1
interest will be here, as everywhere else on ^the
line, to know how far back the Russians fell.
Gorlice (see plan Cl on next page) is about 10
miles to the south-east, and the positions behind
the passes — the points from which retreat
through the passes could be cut off — rather more
than 20 and less than 30 miles in the same
direction.
"With this said, we are unfortunately com-
pelled to close our analysis midway, becau.se we
have for the moment no further material. We
do not know whether the blow struck is a final
one — that is, whether it has produced an irre-
trievable effect and pushed the Russians right
back, or whether the whole position may be re-
stored by the arrival of Russian reinforcements.
4»
May 8, 1915.
LAND AND iSRATEK.
^/^-'S
o
^- *
CliZKOWICE
ToGorlice
10 Miles.
MILES.
Contours oF lOO feet.
Cl.
We are similarly ignorant as to whether if
this decisive effect has been produced the falling
back of the line has been sufficient to endanger the
positions on the Carpathians.
It is unfortunately certain that behind the
line there is no immediate further position to be
easily taken up. After the line of the Dunajec
and the Biala the next defensive position is that
of the Wisloka river, which passes through Jasno
cm its way to the Vistula. But the River Wisloka
is a long way behind the Dunajec-Biala line, peri-
lously near the Dukla, and at Jaslo actually across
the communications of the Polyanka Pass.
It will hardly be possible, while hanging on
to the Wisloka line, to protect the hold upon the
Carpathians which the Russians now have. It is
too far retired. The accompanying little sketch D
shows the proportion of distances involved and the
relation oi the old line to the new, supposing that
new one to be taken up upon the Wisloka.
There is a further very unpleasant effect fol-
lowing upon this blow if it is nearly as decisive as
the enemy pretend, which is that the line north of
theVistula will also be partly bent back. At present
— or, rather, just before this blow was delivered — ■
the relation of the line to Warsaw and Russian
Poland was roughly what is shown marked with
dashes upon the accompanying sketch E, and in
that the portion south of theVistula A B represents
the Western Galician front, which the enemy has
just been hammering. But if it is necessary to
fall back even further than the Wisloka line it
would mean that all the northern part A C beyond
the Vistula would have to fall back very heavily
and very hurriedly, as along the line of dots, into a
position probably not prepared, abandoning the
important town of Kielce, and leaving too narrow
a belt altogether between the foremost positions of
our ally and the Vistula river. But, I repeat.
LAND AND .WATER
May 8, 1915.
there is no determining the thing at all until
further news is received, only awaiting that news
■we must be careful not to belittle too much the
encitiy's claim. He lias done something certainly
unexpected, certainly of considerable moment,
though not, so far as we now know, either decisive
or upon the scale w^hich his rumour warrants.
THE PROBLEM OF THE DARDA-
NELLES.
In order to understand what has happened in
the Dardanelles we must first of all seize the heart
of the problem, which is the mastery of the
Narrov/s.
There is indeed much else besides this capital
matter.
of the Narrows, may on occasion go as fast as four
knots and runs upon an average at two.
The large permanent works all stand round
about the two sides, the European and Asiatic, of
the Narrows, round the two projecting capes,
that upon the European side at E being known as
Kilidbahr and that on the Asiatic side as the town
of Chanak at F. The projecting tongue of land
covering all the European side of the Straits is
known as the Peninsula of Gallipoli. Its
narrowest point is at the Isthmus of Bulair.
This tongue of land has certain features,
vvfhich it is important to note carefully if we are
to grasp the main problem.
I will tabulate them in their order.
(1) It is, topographically, a somewhat con-
fused tangle of hills which cormnonly rise to sum-
The enemy can establish temporary batteries ;
he can, as we know from past and unfortunate
experience, devise unexpected forms of attack
against the ships advancing along the waterway.
But the pith of the whole affair is the mastery
of the Narrows, because there, within a compara-
tively small area, are established the permanent
works and the large guns which make the action
of the fleet so difficult.
It is true that torpedo tubes under water and
floating mines and, as I have said, the temporary
batteries could molest the fleet even if the per-
manent works were destroyed, but supposing these
works to be destroyed, the resistance of temporary
forms of offence could not last very long. If the
Expeditionary Force obtains possession of the
Narrows it will be able to clear both banks of any
such temporary weapons of offence, and the fleet
will be able to go through.
Now, the Dardanelles as a whole run after
the fashion apparent in the accompanying sketch.
Our readers are already familiar with the main
features. In a 30 miles stretch of water aver-
aging, say, 2 to 4 miles across, there is a gut at C
a mile across at its narrowest or southern end (a)
and a little more than a mile across at its northern
end (b), which is the centre of resistance to any
hostile passage up the straits. From the straits,
running from North to South in the direction of
Jthe arrow, runs a stream which, just at the strain
mits of 3, 4, 5, and 600 feet, but which in one long
stretch coming steep on to the Gulf of Saros touch
at one point, H, over 1,300 feet. It is therefore a
country very well situated for the erection of tem-
porary defences and possessed of a number of
natural positions for defence.
(2) Its water supply is ample — at any rate,
at this season of the year. A number of little
streams run in between the confused series of
ridges and summits. Nothing, therefore, is to be
feared by an invading force upon that score.
(3) Its communications by land are very
poor. One fairly good road runs down as far as
Gallipoli itself from the North. After that there
is only, running southwards towards Maidos, a
road which bifurcates into two, one running more
easterly than the other. Both branches are bad,
the eastern, nearest the Straits, being roughly
paved only.
On from Maidos to the lighthouse at Sedd el-
bahr there is a somewhat better road, which bulges
out towards the west through Krithia (K) in order
to avoid the high plateau of the Pasha Dag-h, or
hill of Kilidbahr.
Unless some temporary line has been laid in
all these months of warning, some rough light rail-
way or other, by the Germans, there is no artificial
means of communication, and even petrol traffic
would have a very rough time south of Gallipoli.
There are numerous tracks up and dov/u the
peninsula, but they are tracks and no more.
6*
May 8, 1915.
LAND AND 5KATEE.
tee</y
Rocky &' B^J
Laniinj TIaces
The gist of all this point upon the communi-
cations is that unless the enemy has already estab-
lished a considerable railway within the hills of
the peninsula, apart from that which is near the
permanent works of the Narrows, he will not be
able to bring up a reinforcement of this sort
quickly, not can he easily feed very large numbers
of men. In other words, we are fighting an artil-
lery already present and not one which can be
rapidly increased.
(4) Till some way past the Narrows the Euro-
pean side dominates the Asiatic side. There-
fore, it is enough for a force to be completely
master of the Gallipoli Peninsula and it can
ensure the retirement, at last, of an enemy from the
opposing shore.
(5) The landing-places upon the peninsula
from the open sea are few and have to be carefully
chosen, and this is particularly the case with
regard to the southern end, where most of the
coast is steep to the water and rocky.
There is here but one really good landing-
place of considerable extent, which is Morto Bay.
This lies at a ran^e of 5,000 yards opposite the
Asiatic mouth of the Dardanelles, the Cape Kum
Kale, and therefore is under the fire of small
mobile artillery from that point, which must be
occupied before a landing at Morto Bay can bo
effected.
All along the inner side of the peninsula, be-
tween the Narrows and the mouth of the Dardan-
elles, are hills falling quite steep down into the
water in a line of bluffs and sharp slopes-
broken only by three or four valleys of water-
courses.
On the side of the open sea or Gulf of Saros
there is a little more chance of landing, because the
hills fall for the main part less steeply down to the
water : but everywhere a landing force finds a de-
fensive position immediately in front of it. No-
where is this the case more than at the extreme
point of the peninsula at M N, where there is a
rocky little natural position between 100 and 200
feet in height, running right across, and this must
be forced or turned before the landing party
occupies the extreme of the tongue of land.
The particular problem of attacking the
Narrows thus can be judged upon a smaller area.
If we take the above sketch we shall have before us
aU that is essential to our judgment.
The first thing to be noted in this area is the
presence of two main defensive positions for the
defence of the Narrows against any force
approaching from the open sea and from the
south. These two positions, of which I have very
roughly indicated the contours in the accompany-
ing sketch (the exact contours are only known to
those who possess confidential information), may
be called the positions of Atchi Baba and the posi-
tions of Soghan Dere. I have expressed the first
by a line marked A B, the second by a line marked
C D. A landing having been effected upon the
point of the peninsula, and the British force so
landed advancing towards the Narrows in the
direction of the arrow (1) will necessarily stand
first well dug in along the Atchi Baba position A
B. The slopes leading away from this position
towards the point of the Gallipoli Pensinsula are
easy. They form a sort of glacis with an excellent
field of fire, but they are not escarped. At K, the
village of Krithia upon the only road (the one
which goes round the hills to Maidos), we have the
principal concentration at this moment of the
allied troops, and they will attempt with the heavy
pieces at their disposal for bombardment and with
the numbers at their disposal for storming to carry
this first defensive position A B before what will
presumably be the heaviest part of the work, that
against the line C D, can be attempted.
.Whether this bombardment and storming will
LAND AND uWATER.
Hay 8, 1915.
be successfully accomplished or no, only the future
can show, but that must necessarily be the first
Btep in the operations.
It may be asked why the co-operation of the
fleet cannot determine the issue — the ranges are
comparatively short (the whole peninsula along the
line A B is only a little over 4 miles across) — and
why the Turkish line cannot be taken in reverse.
t£he reply to this lies in the conformation of the
land towards the ^gean at the A end of the A B
line. There the land goes so steep down on to the
Bea that ships have to lie far out in order to have
any effect upon the Turkish lines above.
It is none the less true that their co-operation
•will have a certain weight at this end, and may
help so to weaken the defensive as to permit the
storming of the line.
Let us grant this first position A B to have
fallen — which it has not yet done. There remains
the much more formidable position of the Soghan
Dere, which may also be called, from the big hill
round which it is grouped, the position of the
tPasha Dagh.
The Pasha Dagh is a plateau with very steep
escarpments upon the west, and possessing a
southern outlier, also Avith very steep escarpments,
wluch OAerlooks the vaUey of the stream Soghan
Dere and the village of Maghram (M). These
escarjpments, at the southern or C end of the bent
line C D, run to about 600 feet in height, at least
their chief summits are of that elevation.
The slope is about that of one of our chalk
escarpments at home, like that of the Cotswolds,
for instance, above the Severn Valley, or that of
the Surrej^ Hills upon their southern side.
The position is thus a formidable one. And
even if A B is carried, C D may give the Expedi-
tionary Force a task greater than it can perform.
Meanwhile, with command of the sea, there is
still the possibility of the last and stronger line
C D being turned. For this to occur it will be
necessary for a separate force of the Allies to
advance successfully towards Maidos (along the
arrow 2).
The British have already landed a force at E
(Gaba Tepe), which occupies an entrenched posi-
tion upon the flat of the seashore, and will be ready
to co-operate against the northern or right flank
of the entrenched Turkish position C D when
occasion serves.
But it cannot move, of course, until the pres-
sure upon the enemy from the south becomes very
serious. For the forces are too evenly matched to
permit of a comparatively small and isolated de-
tachment risking itself until the enemy is engaged
heavily as a whole.
When that engagement takes place, however,
it would seem certain that an advance from E
towards Maidos wiU be undertaken. The country
between the two is easy. The advance can be sup-
ported by fire from the sea (the whole distance
across the peninsula from the open sea to Maidos
being not much more than 8,000 yards range) and
the road between the open sea and the Straits rises
not much more than a hundred feet.
If the Expeditionary Force should succeed
not only in storming the first defensive line, the
Atchi Baba line A B, but also in breaking the
second defensive line C D and establishing itself
upon the Pasha Dagh, then the permanent works
in the Narrows would be at its mercy, and that
for the following reasons.
(a) It would have swept free of concealed
batteries and submarine torpedo tubes (if such
have been established) all the shore of the Dar-
danelles up to the Narrows.
(b) It would be in possession of the domi-
nating heights upon the European side, which
would at the worst keep down the fire of, and at
the best completely clear, the Asiatic shore.
(c) It would have the permanent works on
either side of the Narrows at its mercy, and this
particularly from the fact that the Expeditionary
Force has at its disposal very numerous air
machines, which are a weak point in the enemy's
equipment.
Indeed, did the Expeditionary Force succeed
in setting foot permanently upon the plateau and
summits of the Pasha Dagh, the main task of this
difficult venture would have been accomplished.
The ships could freely use all the lower Dar-
danelles up to the Narrows, and the only fear
would be that of drifting mines. There would be
no fire from either shore.
As to what has been actually accomplished of
this task so far, one can only give the most general
lines, because the details since more than a week
ago have not been given us, at least at the moment
of writing (Tuesday evening), but the following
points are clear.
(1) In order to use the little bay marked F
upon the accompanying sketch (called Morto Bay),
which is controlled by fire from the point G on the
Asiatic side (which is the Cape of Kum Kale), the
latter point had to be occupied.
The French — only a division of their Colonial
troops were employed — developed a strong attack
upon the whole of that ground, which is, by the
way, the Plain of Troy and the scene of the Iliad.
This aEfeck was a feint, and while they were doing
it a portion of the force, screened by the attack,
entrenched themselves on Kum Kale. The forward
bodies in the Plain of Troy then retired, remaining
in occupation only of the extreme point G, from
which the opposite bay F is threatened.
But upon the security of this bay depended
the landing of the Expeditionary Force on the
extreme of the Gallipoli Peninsula, because there
lay, as we have remarked, a good defensive posi-
tion along the end of the Gallipoli Peninsula below
the point Avhere I have marked the double line
MN.
"With the landing of the bay thus covered, this
defensive position was turned and the invading
force could advance up the main road to Krithia
at K, where apparently it lies at the moment of
writing.
A further advance along the Asiatic shore
would be quite useless and will presumably not be
attempted, and all that we have to watch is the
progress and, let us hope, the success of the assault
upon the first enemy position of Atchibaba, A B.
It should be said in closing this department
of our subject that the Turkish communiques with
regard to all this piece of fighting have been very
unreliable and that the German conclusions
drawn therefrom are certainly too optimistic.
The task is an exceedingly difficult one, it
may well end in failure, but it has not so far pro-
ceeded upon the fantastic lines indicated from
Berlin ; and the critics of the campaign in the Ger-
man Press, whose opinions have been quoted, are
altogether too confident of the result — or, rather,
altogether misread the extent of the progress al-
ready achieved.
It is further necessary to reiterate the verj
a»
May 8, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
elementary point which was as true of tLi ;> ■'■
attack that failed two months ago as it is now;
the ultimate success of the Allies will depend
more than anything else upon the number and
calibre of their heavy pieces — that is, of their
siege train. If both are sufficient they will suc-
ceed; if insufficient they will fail. For both the
preparation of the attack upon the two main
positions, and — given both attacks to be suc-
cessful— the reduction of the permanent works
of the Narrows will depend upon the big gun
and the big howitzer.
THE HINDENBERG METHOD IN
THE WEST
The fact that Field-Marshal von Hinden-
berg was present in the West, during the recent
violent attack upon and failure against the
junction of the British and French lines north
of Ypres, might seem to indicate, to the student
of this war, the appearance in the fighting in
Flanders of certain features with which that
name has made us familiar in the East.
It is not well to exaggerate the effect of any
one man in general operations of this kind. The
commanders of the German armies in front of
Dixmude, Ypres, and Armentieres will retain
to the full their responsibilities and know the
war in this quarter after so many months in a
fashion forbidden to von Hindenberg, even if
that aged and successful General be put
directly over them. That he has thus been put
in direct command is doubtful enough. It is
more likely tliat he was sent into this field
merely for the effect that his name might pro-
duce, and that he did no more than inspect.
But let us take the point for what it is
worth, and ask ourselves what the method of
this Commander has been in the East.
It will not lead us to the expectation of any
startling novelties upon the Belgian front.
Von Hindenberg's point was a careful
study of the Masurian Lake region upon the
southern and eastern boundaries of East
Prussia. Using his local knowledge, not to say
his hobby, in the early part of the war, he did
achieve a very striking success against the
Russians at Tannenberg. He enveloped with a
force, possibly inferior, certainly not largely
superior, the Russian Army of invasion and
nearly destroyed two of its army corps out of
five — thoroughly defeating the whole
Since that success he has had in the eyes of
the civilian German nation a label attached to
him which the German Government has used
for all it was worth. His name alone heartens
Berlin— and, for that matter, the rank and file
of the troops — whenever it is mentioned; and
therefore the presence of von Hindenberg is
expected to work a miracle.
But all that has nothing to do with either
strategy or tactics, and what this Commander
has done in point of fact since his local and
very striking success for his country on the
Masurian Lakes, has not perceptibly differed
from the action which Ave can predicate of any
Prussian General officer acting anywhere.
He has massed men with successful
IBecrecy. He has used them, once concentrated,
in tho battering ram fashion. He h >^ ^^ raT)idlv
pendent always upon the tactical tr* ^ ^ ^ ^'
his service, with its enormous wasta^^'.-^j.
he has failed. His use of the railway systl , .
behind him in the East was nothing eithei
original or unexpected, and if he has any say
in what is going on, or to go on in the immedi-
ate future in the West, he certainly doss not
mean enveloping movements such as those
which he practised in the East, because in the
West those are not possible. It means no more
than what we have already seen, unexj)ectedly
rapid concentration, an unexpectedly heavj'^
blow (delivered at enormous expense) upon a
selected point and hitherto, on the Bzura, at
Przasnych, the checking of that blow before it
has had any definite effect.
There ia no other feature in the Western
fighting worth new comment thio we^k, unless
it be the dropping of bombs upon Dunkirk.
That piece of futility will stand in the history
of this war in the same category with fifty
others. There is nothing remarkable ia dis-
charging a large missile over the trajectory in-
volved. Anyone can work out a ballistic for-
mula of initial velocity, air resistanco, and
the rest, and discover what gun it is, with what
charge, and what elevation, that would drop
a missile, of what weight, at what range,
and everybody knows that any gun such
as there are many hundreds of in the modern
world, can fire a missile from behind Dixmude
or behind Nieuport v/hich would fall some-
where within the large area of Dunkirk.
What you cannot do at those ranges is to
take useful aim, or to keep your gun safe. All
you can do is to drop a missile within some
rather large area and trust to Providence for
the result. And meanwhile you must emplace
j^our gun in some immobile fashion which
renders it liable to discovery and to destruc-
tion. If anyone asks what object the enemy
had in view when he thus dropped shells into
Dunkirk at a maximum range and without
aiming, the answer is simple enough. He was
after moral effect. It is exactly what he did"
when he droj^ped bombs on Scarborough or
when he dropped them the other day on Nancy,
or when he dropped them on two occasions
upon Paris. It is a perfectly legitimate method
of warfare, as is the Chinese method (now
abandoned) of imitating the cries of wild beasts.
In attempting these "moral" effects, all j^ou
have to do is to gauge three things. The ex-
pense to yourself, the intelligence of the enemy,
and the nei-ves of your enemy. Upon the first
of these three things an accurate calculation
can be made; to the two others no exact calcu-
lation applies. It is a matter of judgment, and
perhaps of a sense of humour.
At any rate, the bombardment of Dunkirk,
while imperilling three German heavy guns
(probably naval) will have as much effect
upon the war as though the shells had been
sent out to sea
One last point in the news of the week, the
raid into the Baltic provinces of Russia, I shall
deal with later, if, as is not probable, it comes to
anything considerable. So far it is mainly
cavalry work, it has no effect upon the mam
dispositions of the campaign, and its fruit is
yet to be discovered. It is probably an isolated
effort
LAND AND JVATER
May 8, 1915>
riE INTERVENTION OF ITALY.
1
be successful^
can show.
ptep if ^ seems quite clear that the next few days
will decide whether the pivot of neutral
intervention, Italy, will come into the v/ar or
not.
There are three neutrals worth considering —
and only three (no one outside the newspaper
OAvners in this country imagines intervention from
elsewhere). These three are the Northern Balkan
group — that is, the Bulgaro-Roumanian, the
Greeks, and the Italians; and of these by far the
most important is, of course, the Italian neutral.
In a certain fashion Bulgaria and Eoumania
balance each other, but Roumania was always
more ready to engage upon the side of the Allies
than was Bulgaria to engage upon the side of
the A.ustro- Germans. The intervention of Ron-
mania when it came, or if it came, would have a
positive object, not indeed independent of the vic-
tory of the Allies, but progressively obtainable as
that victory was gradually a])proached. Roumania
had for her object (and still has) the occupation
of territory governed by Hungary though in-
habited by Roumanians. She further lives in
a lively fear that if she does not intervene, this
capital popular object of redeeming what is cer-
tainly national territory will be lost. The Court
of Roumania is Prussian, and that is the main
force against the intervention of Roumania.
Bulgaria also wants territory which is nation-
ally Bulgarian and which Austrian policy de-
flected after the second Balkan War into the hands
of Serbia. But this territory which Bulgaria de-
sires to occupy is close to the Grecian boundary and
close to the ^Egean, and a quarrel with the Allies
would further cut off Bulgarian territory during
the war from all access to the outer sea.
The temptation of Bulgaria depended much
more upon passion than upon reason. She had a
great deal to lose if she made a mistake and
jumped too early, for she would have made of
Russia a permanent and implacable enemy, and
the Allies, once victorious, would have left her
no opportunity for such treason in the future.
She had very little to gain unless she moved after
it was perfectly safe to move.
The Greeks, had they intervened early, under
the leadership of the man who is perhaps the best
statesman in Europe (and almost the only man of
outstanding ability which the Parliamentary sys-
tem has produced in our time), would have had
immediate and definite advantages. They would
have had a claim to all that doubtful land, Greek
in soul and language, but politically a prey to any
intervener, which rings all round the ^gean.
With every week that passes the reward they
can hope for grows less. The balance agains"t
their intervention was the certainty of very con-
siderable losses in a population already tried by a
double war and in an adventure which is ad-
mittedly one of extreme difficulty. Their smaller
craft would be useful upon the sea, their numbers
against the Dardanelles, but had the experiment
failed, even with their aid, that aid would have
been wasted.
Now, in the matter of Italy the question of
intervention is something altogether different.
Italy is a Great Power. Italy has had months in
which to prepare, and during the latter part of
those months has been preparing with great in-
dustry. She is in a position which no other Power
connected with this war can boast : a position of
preparation undertaken after the lesson of the war
had been learned. She knows, for instance, the
supreme importance to-day of vast quantities of
artillery ammunition, and that is why she has
stopped so much cotton on its way to Germany. It
will be a pretty piece of historical irony if the
American cotton, which the imperfection of the
British blockade designed for our enemies, should
after all be turned against them and should be
discharging missiles to our profit. Italy has also
had ample time to acquaint herself through the
Intelligence Department of her Government with
the dispositions of the German Powers. She
knows in a way that we can never know what their
public opinion is and what their abilities are for
meeting her upon her own frontier, for she has
heen neutral and the recipient of not a few truth-
ful communications all this long time. The enemy
has told her things not always false, with the ob-
ject of persuading her of his ultimate victory.
She knows the worst. Her governing men are
under no danger of exaggerating, as are those of
France, Britain, or Russia, but particularly of
Britain, the strength of the enemy. Italy has fur-
ther the very great advantage of being able to
choose her own moment. Lastly, she has the ad-
vantage of entering fresh into the struggle at a
time when her enemy, if she chooses to have an
enemy, is approaching exhaustion.
The arguments aga inst Italy's intervention are
political arguments clearly appreciable. There is
first of all the obvious truth that anyone who can
keep out of this tornado is well out of it. The
Italian people have been im-mensely enriched by
the power to produce peacefully and to trade while
nearly all the rest of Europe had sunk its energies
in a violent conflict for life. The Italian popula-
tion, monuments, and treasures have remained
intact.
More important than this negative factor was
the highly positive factor that Italy could get one
great part of what her people desired without loss
by mere occupation of adjoining territoiy at the
end of the war upon the defeat of the Austrians
and the Germans. Heavy fighting would not be
likely until an army reached the hills, but what
the Italian people and the tradition of their
modern resurrection really desire is not the defeat
of an enemy beyond the mountains. It is the re-
construction of a complete Italy upon this side of
the mountains. The Istrian Peninsula, Pola,
Trieste, and even Fiume, are upon the hither side
of the hills : part of the Italian plain.
Now, it is conceivable that at the end of a
great campaign, in which the combatants
were exhausted, even upon the victorious
side, the Italians would have no more to
do than to walk in and occupy this northern
corner of the Adriatic. The valley of the
Trentino, or at least the lower Italian-speaking
part of it, would follow as a matter of course. And
Italy would appear at the end of the struggle play-
ing upon a rather smaller scale the part Roumania
played after the second Balkan War : demanding
a moderate accession of territory, to which she was
really attached, and no more — and that without
fighting.
10*
May 8, 1915.
laHE) 'IK
But the Italian tradition demands a great
deal more than that. It demands with a natural
appetite the permanent establishment of Italy as
a great Power. It is important for the Italians,
if the unity and cohesion of their State and
the permanence of its influence are to be
secure, that they should enter the councils of
Europe upon an equal footing with nations poli-
tically older than their own. It was this feeling
which gave rise to the enthusiasm — soon checked —
for Colonial expansion, half a lifetime ago. It was
this feeling which, led to the attack on Turkey, the
occupation of Tripoli, and the naval work in the
iEgean quite recently.
There is more than this. The Italians feel of
the Adriatic that it should by right be an Italian
sea, and, in the background, is that feeling which,
whatever academically minded men in this country
may say to the contrary, is present everywhere
throughout civilisation : the feeling that a Ger-
man, when he has the power to make war, is im-
possible : the feeling that this war is, in spite of
all the triteness of the phrase, really a war for
civilisation against blunderers who are capable in
their brutal simplicity of destroying civilisation.
All these things move Italy to intervene, and,
incidentally, Italy has the very great asset of a
Ckiurt which is national. Her monarchy, parlia-
mentary and a compromise though it is, is at least
not a German monarchy. Her Court is not an
international Court. There is a great deal more
in that than the conventions of our modern politi-
cal caution are disposed to allow.
If Italy comes in she would bring up for the
first great actions (supposing the enemy to accept
her challenge) about a million men. This force
would be properly gunned and would have behind
it munitions upon a larger scale than any corre-
sponding number of any other Power in the field.
It would be new to modern war and therefore un-
tried. Possibly, or probably, it would meet in the
first actions with local unexpected reverses, but it
l^ A'fTil.
would bo so much more numerous than anything
that could be brought against it, it could so rapidlj
acquire the lesson of aU this new fighting, and it
would be of such importance — once the conflict was
joined — to make good that the move could not but
change to our advantage, and that almost immedi-
ately, the whole character of the war. It may be
safely prophesied the military spirit would spring
suddenly in Italy to an unexpected height. The
nation has desired for very long something that
it lacked, not only native territory but a military,
name, and the trial once undertaken that appetite
would become very vivid indeed. Anyone doubt-
ing that is ignorant of the Latin temper. It is a
spirit not prompt to war, yet nourished by war.
Italy thus intervening would probably,
though not certainly, determine the intervention of
Roiimania, and there would come upon the Austro-
Hungarian forces a pressure too strong to be borne.
Would there be a corresponding increase of
tension upon the Western line of the enemy, so
that he would be compelled to shorten that line :
in other words, to evacuate Northern France and
most of Belgium before the English and the French
deliver their blow ?
It is to be doubted. Austria would bleed
first. The German Empire would lend her against
this new peril no more forces than it has already
lent, for there are no more to lend.
But after the intervention of Italy has pro-
duced its full effect, after the Austrian Empire has
begun to weaken its defence and that defence to
" crack " at any one vital point upon the ring,
then with the advance of no matter what enemy
force into the interior of Hungary or the Slav
provinces of the South-East, the German position
would be logically desperate. The time remain-
ing would be appreciable, but short, and a blow in
the West, even a breaking of the containing line
there, would no longer be able to save the German
Empire from complete defeat. Its commanders
would shorten their line.
THE WAR BY WATER.
THE GREAT LANDING.
By A. H. POLLEN.
KOTE. — Tbls article has been submitted to the Press Bnrean, irhich does not abject to the pnblication as censored, and takes no
responsibility for the correctness of tlie statements.
IT will probably be found, when the full details
of the great landing on the Gallipoli Penin-
sula are published, that the most remarkable
combined naval and military operation ever
carried out in face of strong opposition has been
accomplished. The official account, no doubt, tells
us all the facts which are strictly material to our
having a fair grasp of the situation on April 29.
But it is pardonable to say that the more we know
of the success that attended them, the more we wish
to know of the methods by which that success was
attained. The difficulties in disembarking troops
on a shore which is well defended are, of course, so
great as to be almost insuperable, and until the
landing force is not only on tlie beach, but has been
able to establish itself in tenable positions and in
fighting formation, the entire conduct of the opera-
tions is under the naval command. I believe that I
am right in saying that, technically, every man in
a boat is under the naval officer in charge, and, even
when disembarked, under comm.and of the naval
" officer of the beach " until paraded under his own
officers, when authority over him passes from naval
into militaiy hands. The task put upon the
admiral commanding and his officers is, therefore,
a stupendous one. Where there is no port, no
wharves, and no piers, the mere transport of the
men from ships to the land and then their disem-
barkation constitute a vastly complicated affair.
Everything that can float and can carry men
or stores must be requisitioned, not only from
every transport, but from every man-of-war. This
numerous and variegated fleet, divided up into
separate flotillas, each told off to its special unit.
W
LAND AND WATER,
Ma7 8, 1915.
must be pulled, sailed, or towed in proper order to
the section of beach which each unit is designated
to attack. As a staff operation, the organisation of
boat work on this scale is a noteworthy perform-
ance. As a feat of seamanship, the efTective land-
ing, as near simultaneously as possible, of such
large forces and in six different places is quite un-
precedented. And the boat w^ork would not be
limited to a single expedition for each boat. There
obviously could not have been boats or rafts enough
— nor, for that matter, beach enough — to land
more than a fraction of the expeditionary force at
any one time. So fast as boats were emptied, steam
piiuiaces, destroyers, and other craft would have
towed them back to the transports for fresh loads.
But theNav}''s duties were not ended when it
had delivered the Army safel}^ at the beach. It
would have to maintain an offensive of the utmost
intensity on every enemy force within reach, so
as to reduce hostile attack on the disembarked in-
fantry to a minimum. When one looks at the
largest available charts of the waters round the
Gallipoli Peninsula, one is not surprised that the
Admiral in Command reports that the Fleet is
filled with an intense admiration for the achieve-
ments of their military comrades. For, as far as
one can see, almost the whole of the northern coast
of the peninsula is continuous cliffs. The five
separate beaches m.entioned in the official state-
ment would appear at best to be exceedingly con-
fined spaces, the defence of M'hich by well-placed
infantry, machine guns, artillery, and wire should
not have been difficult. That a whole army has
been landed with success on such unpromising
ground is undoubtedly a thing of which that Army
may be proucL It suggests a repetition of Wolfe's
adventure on the Heights of Abraham, but on an
incredible scale. And we may be sure that had the
work of the Navy been carried out with anything
t-hort of perfection the thing would have been nut
only costly — it had to be that — but impossible.
By far the m^ost difficult of aU operations on
a coast of this character is the landing of artillery
and horses. It is a thing that puts the resource-
fulness of seamen to the hardest test. No mention
at all is made in the official report of artillery being
used in the first five days'" fighting, but the corre-
spondents from Athens and elsewhere assert that
the guns were landed and employed by the
Australians and New Zealanders in their advance
from Sari Bahr. But that the attack on Sedd-el-
Bahr made on the afternoon of the 25th was made
through undamaged wire entanglements would
seem to show — first, that by the evening of the 25th
no sufficient artillery for destroying these obstacles
were available at Cape Teke; and secondly, that
the lines defended by them were not exposed to
the ships' ordnance. The artillery, we may per-
haps take it, was not landed until the subsequent
days. The official report speaks of its disembarka-
tion with stores as being continued on the 28th and
29th, so that some of the guns may, therefore, have
been landed on the 26th and 27th. Anyway, by
the 29th, the whole of the end of the peninsula was
in our hands and entrenched, while the Australians
and New Zealanders held a second position ten
miles to the north, at the end of the gap in the hills
ihat runs through to Maidos from the Gulf of
Saros.
The Fleet, having got the Army under its
jharge, with its guns, stores, horses, &c., safely on
ihore, still has to mother this force, for the Fleet
must continue to be, in a military sense, the Army's
base. It is probable, indeed, that the troops will
be dependent on the ships and transports for liter-
ally everything. It is doubtful, for instance, if
they could even find water enough anywhere in the
peninsula, and this state of dependence must con-
tinue long after the whole of it is conquered. And
the Fleet must do more than this. The immediate
objective of the expedition is the opening up of
the Dardanelles — ^in other words, the subjection
of the forts on both sides of this historic waterv,'ay.
The taking of forts is a military, and not a naval,
operation. By this I mean that a properly
equipped army can subdue and take any fort in
the world in time, while no navy, however well
equipped it may be, can, without an army, take
and subdue forts at all, unless it carries so many
men as to be, in fact, a na\'y and an army too. In
the taking of the Dardanelles the function of the
ships will be to do for Sir Ian Hamilton's army
what the 17-inch howitzers did for the German
army in the taking of Liege, Maubeuge, and Ant-
werp. The ships on the spot actually carry the
greatest number of powerful guns ever brought
into use in any military operation. In range, in
numbers, and in mobility they surpass any artil-
lery force that could concei\'ably be used from land
positions. The ships' batteries include at least
fifty of the most powerful pieces, running from
Qneen Elizabeth's eight 15-inch (which in a single
salvo can hurl — to an incredible distance — ^no less
than sixteen tons of high explosive shell) to
Triumph and Swiftsure's four 10-inch. There
are besides these Agamemnon and Lord Nelson's
broadsides of ten 9.2's, Triumph and Sioiftsure's
fourteen 7.5's, and probably at least fifty 6-inch
guns as well. This vast battery can be employed
at long or short range. It can be moved up the
Straits as fast as forts are subdued, mines cleared,
and torpedo stations destroyed. It will be the
first function of the Army to facilitate the use of
these guns by helping to ensure the accuracy of
the ships' fire. The Army's own artillery "will
have the important function of taking the forts
in reverse and, as far as possible, preventing the
enemy from returning to the forts when driven out
by the ships' fire. Finally, by occupying and de-
stroying the battered forts, the Army will open the
way for the Fleet to enter the Sea of Marmora.
And this is the objective of the expedition, because
if half of them get through uninjured, and the
Army is able to prevent the enemy from closing the
Straits behind them, the fate of Turkey will be
sealed.
THE ARTILLERY PROBLEM.
This is an exceedingly attractive programme,
but it is as well to remember that, vast as is the
artillery force engaged, the difficulties to be sur-
mounted in using it with effect are enormous also.
That using guns at long range against a ship
presents problems of a kind totally different from
using them against land positions is already a
familiar truth. It is more difficult to keef the
range of a ship when you have found it, because
the ship is free to move at any speed it likes, and
in any direction ; but it is more difficult to find the
range of a fort, because, first, it is an object far less
distinct from its surroundings than is a ship ; and
secondly, the projectiles that miss do not mark
their positions by well-defined columns of water
13»
May 8, 1915.
TTFfr^rO— TTTTTTEr
epouting 100 feet up m the air, whose posit on
KlatioBsliip to the target can easily be detected
from the ship's fighting tops. A projectile that
misses a fort may be 500 yards short, and seen,
from the ship to be a hit. It may be 500
yards over and appear to be exactly whei-e
it is wanted— namely, just over the parapet.
You can find the range of a ship by spot-
ting from the masthead, because the column
of water is so plainly visible. But, against
a fort, aU spotting, to be effective, must be done
from some point at a distance from the firing ship.
Where a second ship can stand off, at any angle
greater than 30 degrees from the line of fire and
closer to the target, the second sbip can spot for the
first The recent attaclis on all the Turkish forts
except those at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale were
ineffective because there was sea room here tor
spotting ships almost at right angles to the liiie ot
fiJ(^-the ideal position— while, once in the Dar-
danelles, the Straits are not wide enough to permit
an advance ship to spot for the others. And aero-
planes are not a satisfactory substitute. At best
an aeroplane can help one ship only. It the
troops can seize good observation positions oa -he
hills above the forts, it should not be long before a
bombardment of greatly improved accuracy is
brought to bear upon them.
But even ^ith such positions, there will still
be considerable difficulties. It would, for instance,
be a mistake to suppose that tne guns I have
enumerated could ever be brought simultaneously
to bear upon the same target. Guns of separate
ships cannot be controlled together m groups as
the guns of a battery can be on land. At sea, where
it can very seldom happen that more than three
ships desire to concentrate on a single target, the
difficulty of spotting independently for «u;h unit
ship is very great, but not insuperable, i he
Germans use an ingenious device for simplifying
this procedure. The spotting officer l^as a press
button under his hand, which is started the
moment the salvo is firrd. This controls a timing
element, which is set tv. he number of seconds the
projectiles composing the salvo should take to
carry to the range set upon the sights. Halt a
second before the end of this interval a striker
within the device is brought sharply against a loud
..ong. The salvo of the spotter's ship, therefore,
Ihould strike the target or the water ^tile the
ffoni? is still sounding. If several ships are engag-
ing the same target, the spotter ignores eveiy salvo
except the one that coincides with the gong. But
this method could not, of course, be employed un-
less the .sDotter were in the firing ship itselt
It is, of course, a commonplace that in-
creased fire effect may be got either by a greater
accuracy of a small number of pieces or by the
concentration of a larger number of pieces on the
same Urget. If the arrangements for the correc-
tion of fire arc sufficiently good, and if the ships
can without danger come within such range that
a high average of hits may be expected, tJien so
powerful is the battery of even the smallest of the
ships, no fort can be expected to survive very long.
But, if concentration and accuracy can be com-
bined together, the rapidity with which the desired
effect is obtained will naturally be much greater.
The difficulty in correcting the fire of a mul-
titude of ships is, it may be added, two-iold,
because each salvo must be identified as coming
from a particular ship, and then that ship be in-
formed of the correction. There is apparently no
escape from the necessity of having a separate
spotter for each ship. If the spotter is in an
independent position, the obstacles m the way ot
this double task are considerable. Neither identifi-
cation nor communicating the correction will be
easy And it is not only the concentration ot many
ships on a single target that creates the difficulty.
It will be almost as great when several ships en-
gage in a simultaneous attack on contiguous torts.
The final solution can take one of two forms.
Either concentration will be abandoned alto-
gether, or two or three ships may be combined
against a single fort, and the forts selected as
targets be taken from different groups. Expe";
encS wiU show the better way, and no fleet has had
such experience of long-range fire as that now at
the Dardanelles. Indeed, this experience appears
to be the only asset which the attempt to force the
Straits by ships alone has yielded.
In the official report there was nothing to say
whether the gunfire which Queen Elizabeth and
Triumph directed on to Maidos was indirect— that
is over the land, or direct up the Straits from some
spot above Kephez Point. The onlv detail given
was that Queen Elizabeth had sunk a transport
after the third round. And to hit a transport by
indirect fire seemed almost impossible. bubse-
Quent unofficial reports, however, speak as it aU
the shooting had been indirect. Should this prove
true, an amazing thing has been done.
A BRUSH IN THE
NORTH SEA.
THE past week has been remarkable for a
vigorous revival of the submarine attacks
on British and neutral shipping, and the
first exchange of shots that has occurred
in the North Sea for a hundred days This last
was a small affair of outposts, and is chiefly
interesting for the fact that the Germans had
actuaUy rescued a British officer and two men
from a sunken trawler; but only to confine
them below in their own boat, and to keep them
there while that boat was being attacked and
finally sunk by the British destroyers. On Monday
the \dmiralty had published our having saved
over 40 German officers and men and their baving
failed to save any of ours, and on Tuesday added
the evidence of the disgraceful proceedings I have
recounted. Both announcements have been made
without comment, nor is comment required. Apart
from the brutality of the German conduct, the en-
coimter seems to be without any particular
strategic importance. By their own account the
German fleet, well protected from any sudden
attack by a screen of Zeppelins and destroyers,
liad made a parade the week before m the
North Sea, and then boasted of it as if there
were no British warships of any kind m that
area The torpedo-boat captains, perhaps taking
the German Admiralty at its Avord, pushed a little
too far on Saturdav, with the result we know. But
neither the parade nor the adventure ot the
torpedo-boats gives rise to any hope that Germany
will put the command of the sea m dispute by
coming out in force to attack Sir John Jellicoe.
Nor will the submarine attacks on neutrals alter
radically, though they may embitter, a situation
already complicated enough.
13*
TTnd and Water
May 8, 1915.
A REVOLUTION IN WARFARE.
THE GREAT OPPORTUNITY.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
No one will, to-day, deny the invaluable services
rendered by tlie aeroplane since the opening of
hostilities. Yet, when the war broke out, there
were numerous persons — and among tliem high
military authorities — wJio were unable to fore-
see tl'.e great part aircraft were going to perform. In spite
of the accumulated evidence pointing to the great importance
of the aeroplane for offensive purposes and showing in what
manner this weapon must be used if it is to be of real value,
there is as yet no sign of its being employed as it ought to be.
It can be afhrmed that the aeroplane is a sufficiently
powerful weapon to force the German Fleet to come out into
the open sea, at our bidding, to accept combat with our
Fleet, or to be destroyed in the seclusion of its harbours and
under the very nose of their guns and in spite of the protec-
tion of their forts. The expert knows that there is in the
aeroplane a potentiality, capable of immediate apphcation,
whereby the fifteen odd railway bridges on the Rhine could
be destroyed in the course of a few hours, and thereby cut
the German Army in the Western field of operations from
rapid communication with Germany. But no advantage has
yet been taken of this knowledge.
People are discussing whether the advent of aircraft in
military and naval operations has, to any considerable degree,
modified the principles of war; and it is the general opinion
that aeroplanes and airships have not revolutionised warfare.
But why have they not done so? Simply because we have
not permitted it. And tliis can be proved as clearly as a
proposition of Euclid.
If a Commander-in-Chief had some means at his dis-
posal by which he could prevent the enemy from using their
guns and their rifles, all along the line, from the North Sea
to Alsace, would not that method be considered revolutionary 1
If you could prevent the enemy from using their weapons by
the employment of your aircraft, would you not consider that
your air fleets have revolutionised your ordinary, tedious,
long, and costly methods of carrying on war ? If, therefore,
it can be shown that aircraft can render the enemy's guns
and rifles valueless to them, it must also be admitted that
aircraft are capable of revolutionising the present methods
of warfare.
It is estimated that, every ten minutes, a military train,
carrying reinforcements, ammunition, and supplies, passes
over each of the fifteen principal railway bridges over the
Rhino. This means that 144 train-loads of ammunition, sup-
plies, or reinforcements passes over each of the bridges in
twenty-four hours, or that it requires 2,140 train-loads a day
to keep the German Army operating in the Western field pro-
vided with war material. To keep the German Army well
supplied it is necessary that these 2,140 trains should cross
the Rhine every day, and on the regular running of these
2,140 trains the German Army in the Western theatre of war
depends.
It is computed that the German Army in Belgium and in
the North of France has ammunition and supplies sufficient
for four dap only. If, therefore, you suddenly prevent the
2,140 trains from crossing the Rliine the German Army will,
even after twenty-four hours, find itself in a very serious
predicament indeed. If only a third of the number of
trains crossing the Rhine— that is, 714 trains — were continu-
ously stopped from running for a few days, the German
Western Army would find itself considerably handicapped as
regards arms, ammunition, reinforcement, supplies, &c.
Can aeroplanes be used to hamper, to any considerable
degree, the German railway traffic to the extent of preventing
some 700 trains from daily crossing the Rhino? This
ques-tion the writer proposes to examine.
We have read lately, both in the reports issued by Sir John
French and by the French War Office, that the Allies' air-
men have been busy destroying a number of railway junctiona
some little distance behind the enemy's trenches. That this
could be done the writer had shown in one of his previous
articles*, and in it he has also foreseen the reason why the
recent aerial offensive of the Allies' airmen against th6
railway junctions behind the enemy's trenches has not been
followed by direct permanent results. This kind of aerial
attack on railways is, however, of a quite different character
14*
and carried out with a quite different object from the aerial
offensive we are now considering.
The recent aerial offensive against railway junctions had
for its object the hampering of the distribution of men,
supplies, ammunition, <fec., in the theatre of war, whilst the
aerial offen.sive now under consideration would be to prevent
reinforcements, ammunition, supplies, &c., from ever reach-
ing that theatre. The first kind of offensive aims at the
destruction of nodal points on the railway system almost
immediately behind the enemy's lines, whilst the object of
the second is to prevent trains from passing from Germany
into Belgium or France.
To be successful this second kind of aerial offensive
against railways should result in a simultaneous and pro-
longed intsrruption or in repeated interruptions on all, or
some, of the lines from Germany into Belgium or France.
It is clear that a single aeroplane or a small number of
flying-machines, of the existing types, cannot produce any
permanent destruction of railway engineering works sncb
as bridges, culverts, kc. Besides, it is very probable that
such works are protected against possible aerial raids. This
would force aircraft to fly over them at a great altitude, and
one would hardly expect that, dropped from a height of
7,000 to 8,000 feet, the few bombs that could be carried by a
sm.all number of aeroplanes, destined to a journey of some
considerable duration and to fly at a great altitude, would
hit the mark. But if, instead of a few machines, a large
number, say 150 or 200, set out to destroy a bridge, the
chances are that they would succeed. If they did not suc-
ceed once, they would certainly succeed if the operation were
repeated. The necessity, therefore, of employing a large
number of aeroplanes for offensive operations against railway
lines from Germany is made apparent.
Besides attacking the engineering works of the permanent
way, aeroplanes operating simultaneously in numbers of 40
or 50 could also bomb running trains. Such destruction of
trains would be of especial value if it were performed at
points where they enter into, or emerge from, tunnels, for,
in such cases, the aerial attack, if successful, would produo*
considerable delay in the traffic.
It will thus be seen that aeroplanes on the offensive, pro-
vided there be a great number of them, could, without doubt,
considerably dislocate the railway traffic from Germany into
France or Belgium. They could do this in three ways::
(a) By destroying, or seriously injuring, railway bridges over
the Rhine; (b) by attacking running trains, especially as they
enter, or emerge from, tunnels; (c) by causing damage to
local stations, junctions, <fec. The writer estimates that the
pos.session by the Allies of an offensive air fleet, 1,000 aero-
planes strong, and kept at this strength, would, in a very
short time, render the maintenance of the German Army in
the Western theatre of war a matter of extreme difficulty, if
not of impossibility. Add to this the fact that with a dis-
organised railway traffic the enemy would be unable to
transfer quickly troops from the Western to the Eastern
theatre of war, and vice-versa, and that the damage which a
strong offensive air fleet could do the German arsenals, and
you will come to the conclusion that a powerful air fleet
could now not only prevent men, ammunition, and arms from
being sent to the German front, but could also actually inter-
fere with the manufacture of those arms and ammunition.
Just as a large number of machines is necessary for the
destruction of railway permanent works, so it b indispen-
sable for the destruction of the enemy's arsenals. In one of
his previous articles the writer estimated that some 1,000
aeroplanes were required to destroy for good Krupp's
works at Essen, and, after careful investigation, he ex-
pressed the opinion that that number of machines could be
produced in Great Britain in the course of about five months
without in the slightest degree interfering with the estab-
lished aeronautical industry. He arrived at that number of
machines as he had calculated that it would require some 70
tons of explosives to annihilate for ever the great arsenal.
Now, if aeroplanes could render guns and rifles useless in
the hands of the enemy through lack of ammunition, is it toa
much to say that they could revolutionise warfare ?
• " The VerUcal Battle," Laiid and Watbb, February 13i 1915^
May 8, 1015.
LAND TTTD W.ATEK.
THE MORAL EFFECT OF FORGING
THE STRAITS.
By COLONEL F.
THE incidents that have occurred in the Dardanelles
furnish a useful illustration of the methods
adopted by the Allied Governments for prose-
cuting the war, as compared with those used by
the Germans. While the Government of Germany
endeavours by acts of terrorism, submarine blockade,
bombardment of exposed localities, and so forth, to stir up
discontent amongst the electorate, and thus bring pressure
to bear ufwn the directing organs of the fighting forces, we
have systematically refrained from directly molesting the
people, but have concentrated our efforts on operations
intended to impress and dishearten the enemy's Government
and General Staff, leaving them to break gently to their
Buffering dependents what has happened.
The threat of a submarine blockade had no effect what-
ever in disconcerting our responsible Heads of Administra-
tion, but the threat against the Dardanelles, in spite of the
many delays that have attended its execution, will be shown
(when accurate documentary evidence is forthcoming) to have
spread consternation throughout the countries of the Dual
Alliance, and to have modified the whole situation far more
than the direct introduction of many Army Corps and the
expenditure of many millions of shells.
If there is one operation of war that the German General
Staff has of late years studied more thoroughly than any
other, it is the question of disembarkations on an enemy's
shore, and, like everyone else who has really gone into the
matter, they had arrived at the general conclusion that, given
adequate artillery support from the fleet — ^i.e., the facility of
fairly close approach to the coast — and efficient numbers dis-
tributed over a wide enough front, success in such movements
could be more certainly guaranteed than it could be in any
other operation. It was even more certain than the passaga
of a river.
They more than probably experienced a temporary feel-
ing of reUef when our first attempt to rush the Straits broke
down, but the Headquarters Staff knew that we possessed
both the means and the determination to concentrate the
forces required to effect a successful landing, and also that, in
the uncertainty of the spot against which a first effort would
be made and the well-known condition to which the Turkish
Army had been reduced, it was impossible to guarantee suffi-
cient opposing numbers at each and all of the many points we
might select.
The still neutral nations of the East grasped the situa-
tion at onco, and their intervention, previously very doubtful,
N. M A U D E , G. B.
became so inimical that reinforcement, not hithert-o dreamed
of, had to be sent from Germany to meet the threatened
danger that was clearly gathering momentum. The longer
the delay accorded, the greater the forces we were concen-
trating, and correspondingly greater the growing anxiety ak
the enemy Headquarters, which is clearly to be traced in the
increasing mendacity of the official communiques, in which
no intelligent Staff officer in any army could be found to be-
lieve any more than would those of the Allies or even their own.
Our education has been conducted on such uniform lines
ever since 1870 that there is no room in us for misapprehension
on that point. All this effect was gained by the mere threat
of forcing the Straits. Now, what will follow as a consequence
of our having actually landed?
The Turks cannot hope to get together more than 300,000
men for the defence of the areas immediately threatened,
and of these some 60,000 are now securely locked up in fch«
Peninsula of GaUipoh itself, where they can neither be reitt«
forced nor withdrawn, as already the Isthmus of Bulair iS
completely covered by our fire.
One hundred thousand Turks, at ihe least, are held up
by the threat of a Russian descent from the North, of whiclx
we may expect to hear almost at any time. This leaves about
140,000 available for distribution between the French on the
Asiatio side of the Straits and along the coast from Bulair
towards the Greek frontier.
There Lb aLso the garrison of Constantinople itself to ba
provided, and the city is certainly not in a condition safa
enough to allow it to be left to its dvil population alone.
As regards the details of the landings effect-ed, they
remind one of those employed in the disembarkation of Aber-
crombie's troops at Aboukir in 1801, except that in the latter
case, owing to the short range of ships' guns, a hundred and
odd years ago, there was no artillery support for the assailants.
Abercrombie's boats had to row in for five miles, and the
enemy opposed them with heavy guns and most vigorous
charges of both foot and cavalry, delivered aa our men were
forming up on the beach. One battaliaa was, in fact, charged
by horsemen while stiU knee-deep in water.
There seems to have been a similar absence of surprise
in the present instance, and all the resources of field enguieer-
ing and wire entanglement had been liberally provided for our
reception, but so terrific is the power of modem ships' arma-
ments that all those obstacles which could be reached by them
were shot to pieces on a front sufficiently wide to allow cm
men to attack under favourable conditions.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED.
III.— RANA.
Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas Engh"sh.
JUNE'S noonday sun weighed heavy on the pool.
Across it stretched a gossamer haze, soft, filmy,
evanescent, its edges tacked to stiff upstanding reeds.
The massing of the slimy growth of thread-
weed, the twisted green of water-thyme and star-
wort, the overspread of Uly leaves, had each been toU paid
gladly to the season — toll from a silver treasury, toll paid to
the slow course of days, to ardent sun, or dreamy moon, as
each compelled the exchange.
The willows drooped green tresses to the water, as though
to shield their dainty feet from sunshine's wanton kisses.
Slow, fretful, gurgling bubbles sighed from under,
creeping the length of lily stalks, which, by the curling of
their leaves, seemed treacherously to abet the mirrored blue.
And then came heaviness onco more, and torpor of the
heated air, without a threading breath of wind, without a
petulant bird-note — its lullaby a cricket's churr, borne from
the sun-burnt slope.
The concert of the frogs had ceased at dawn. Yet,
hour by hour, gome soloist had voiced his futile passion.
Twin bubbling spheres swelled from his tisroat, and shrunk,
and swelled again, and so made music.
Now even these mad minstrels ceased lamenting. Each
sat immobile on his leaf (as the sun's heat had ordered)"
staring with steadfast gold-rimmed eyes, breathing full-
lunged the infinite air, disdaining wind-flung grasshoppers,
and lazy, amber-tinted flies, which melted in the haze.
The pool lay lifeless, spell-bound.
It was the drowsy witching-time, which turns frog-foIK
to stone — the hour when frog-folk, come what may, must
bask. A few had left their element, and lay flat-bellied in
the g^ass. These too paid homage to the sun. To dream of
life contented them. No footfall shook the ground; no
danger threatened.
Head high, hump-backed, sat Rana on her leaf — Rana,
the portliest matron in the pool, High Priestess of her tribe.
Her legs were doubled under her; her speckled paunch
drooped flaccid either side. Her colouring, emerald slashed
with gold, commingled with the colouring of her throne.
Six times had Rana known the heat of the summer — the
lethargy that came with it, the weariness, the numbing of
the veins.
Six times had Rana known the heat of autumn — the
gathering of the water frogs, the palsying of their slackened
nerves and sinews, the struggling through the gloomy mid'>
depth weeds, the plunge into the ooze of the abyss.
15*
LAliJU — AINU lW.ATEU.
May 8, 1915.
Tlie land frogs gave the signaL These left th« pool when
spawning-time was past, and, through midsummer, roamed
afield, and fattened on the grasshoppers. Bub autuma
brought the truants homo, for they, too, wintered in tho
mud.
The silence of the pool grew heavier, tenser; as though
Bome crisis threatened it, as though some pent-up energy
Bought outlet from its depths.
Yet life restrained itself, till Rana blinked.
Was it a sign I Or answer to a sign?
A wind-sped ripple danced across the water; a finch
screamed from her cloister in the willows; a footfall half a
field av/ay stole vibrant to the hollowed bank, and scared the
adventurers stranded in tho grass.
The pool roused from its slumbers, and, thrilling with
new springs of life, with .sense of strife perpetual, with dread
of danger unforeseen, dragged slowly from the quagmire of
oblivion.
Flop! fell a great green grasshopper past liana's nose.
His feelers streamed behind him. He dropped with shins
hinged to his fleshy thighs, with network of his leaf-green
wings spread sodden on the water.
Before they snapped together, Rana had him.
She launched with one quick back-thrust from her leaf,
and gulped him with a tongue-flick, and rode at ease, with
balanced leg.?, rocked on her buoyant element.
The feeding hour had come again.
G.ay dragon-flies sped to and fro, darting, reversing,
wheeling; with rainbow-tinted wings a-whirr to match the
rainbow shimmer.
Dull splashes sounded from the reeds, and flops, and
throbs, and gurglings.
Tlie swallow's flight that flecked tho blue, trailed mir-
rored shadows criss-cross on the ripples.
The air was thronged v.-ith life's redundant echoes — tho
gossip of the haymaker.-i, the neighing of the stallion in the
close, the drowsy lowing of the driven kine.
Eana, still idly floating, stared goggle-eyed and listened.
The distant voices had no message for her; but presently
came notes of instant menace, the flip and flop of frightened
frog-folk diving.
Eana sank quietly do7/nwards, until her nostrils only
cleared the water.
What sound was this ?
The yap of fox she knew, the grunt of hern, the squeaks
of stoat and rat. But it was none of these — softer it was. and
more sustained, a lecherous, sibilant love-note. It chained
her, fascinated her. Slie slewed about to search for it, and,
oa a sudden, checked and froze to stone.
With browning channel in his wake, with muddied
smear across the weed (as though his trail v/ere tainted), the
Water Snake slid from the swaying reeds.
His eyes were fixed on Rana's eyes. He made soft
Burring music. His tail was hitched about a thickened reed-
stem.
Rana stared back. Her hind-legs slowly rose awash,
then slowly stretched behind her. Her forelegs stretched
opposed to them. She floated like a stick upon the water;
and, like a stick, drew slowly to the bank.
The snake's flat head swayed balancing. The primrose
collar on his neck had v>'armed to foxy orange; the olive of
his back and sides matched the rank pond-weeds under him;
his blue-grey belly melted in the ripples.
And Rana, floating with her legs a-wash, her paddle-feet
immovable, drew shorewards like a needle to a lodestone.
The snake's head steadied over her. He seemed to
bal-mce motionless, but, from the anchored tail of him, crept
shuddering ripples scale to scale, and spent themselves in his
thin forking tongue.
Rana had stranded close inshore.
Her pool, her leaf, her kindred were forgotten.
The tongue benumbed her consciousness, constrained her
course, effaced her personality.
Just as a power outside herself compelled her in the
autumn to the mud, so now an impulse from without com-
pelled hzT passive to the jaws which gaped their hideous
summons.
Yet, in some sense, she felt the menacing difference.
No safe retreat awaited her, no sanctuary of ooze.
Her instinct warned her of annihilation. Her braia
forestalled the inevitable, foretasted the unknown.
The snake's jaws widened slowly. They hid the steely
glitter of the eyes; they loosed the twist and flicker of the
tongue.
Wider they stretched and wider still, and lengthened
out towards her. The reeds were lost behind them, tho
shelving bank, tho sky itself.
Rana sat np, crooked both hind-lega, Ie«pt, and, Iik«
arrow deftly aimed, dropped head-first ia the gape.
The jaws clicked to, luxated bone from bone, spread lat-
ticed to embrace her head and shoulders.
Her hind-legs, brandished wide apart, waved their last
message to the world.
A gluey slime enveloped her> A worming of the gullet'»
walls dragged her with screwing dowa-pull to the belly.
The imprisoned air drummed in her stifled lungs. A
surge of frothing bubbles lapped her face. It crept between
her tightened lips. It ate into her close-veiled eyes. It
stung and scalded, rotted flesh and bone. The sense of
death stole over her, or, rather, of life's slow disintegration
—a lethargy distinct from stroke of sun, in that its dull
imaginings were crystallised in pain.
And suddenly the darkness leapt, and pitched, and
reeled gyrating. Her dangling legs lashed to and fro. Her
palsied nerves awoke to quickened feeling.
The down-pull of the gullet ceased abruptly. Ita
muscle-tautened walls relaxed.
As her feet swayed, the weight of them tugged at her
slime-smeared body, and dragged her slowly backwards froni
the abyss.
She kicked to find a purchase. She squirmed and
writhed and met no check.
Her head slipped clear. Her hands slipped clear, Sha
dropped into the void.
A tilt of Nature's balance had released her.
The snake had lain exposed to gorge his meal — the
scales about his yellow throat stretched on the drawn skia
clear of one another; his lower jaws disjointed from their
hinging; his upper jaws loosed from the palate bone.
His head was a broad target.
From towering pine the buzzard sighted him, and,
swooping, drove her talons at his back, and soared with him
on high.
With broken spine he dangled from her claws, and Ratia
dangled from his mouth, and, of her own weight, slipped
adrift and fell.
She had not seen a feather of her ally.
She fell feet-spread, and squelched like flattened egg.
The air whooped from her lungs; her tongue protruded.
And yet she was not dead. Long hours she lay, dead to
all outer seeming, but, in the healing shades of night, •
miracle was wrought.
Her tongue crept slowly back to its set station. Her
lungs once more drank air.' Her belly filled and rounded
like a bladder. Her pupils, which had closed to slits,
widened to gold-rimmed spheres again. She blinked, she
closed her triple lids, and gathered up her feet beneath her
body. The world was homing to her— light in her eyes, sound
in her ears, a livelier tint about her sweat-drenched skin.
She woke to sudden consciousness, and listened to the
night.
She gazed at the star-spangled sky.
What were these glittering points of gold which flecked
the infinite blue? Did frogs celestial blink at her, or glow-
worms of a world beyond her reach ?
She gazed at the stone-laden ground.
What was this dusty grit beneath her feet? This sun-
baked sand which clung to her moist skin ? Where were
her palaces of reed ? Where the soft oozy mud ? Could
Borne mad chase of grasshoppers have brought her to this
desert < But instinct checked her questionings. A single
thought obsessed her brain— how she might come to water.
Round her wore earthy-smelling plants, and voices un-
familiar— the cheep of partridges astray, the churring of the
nightjar.
But suddenly, from westward, came, faint with distance,
strains which had a meaning.
Brek-el<-ek-e.h-eh-ek-ek-ek-:^x! Eo-ax. Korex. Ero-ex.
Ero-ah!
They floated wind-borne up the slope, zigzagged through
stiffened grass-stems, through nettle-beds, through parsley-
green, through a maze of vetch and bindweed. The campions
caught the echo of them, and flung it to the oi-eyes. They
spent themselves in undertones against the sand-cliff wall.
Rana sat up with ears agog.
The past was blotted from her mind. She made no effort
to unite the severed strands of memory. She hopped straight-
way towards tho beckoning sound. Night-long she hopped.
At times she paused, took bearings, and pressed on. She
reached her goal at daybreak, circled the four-square bed of
reeds, and, from the overhanging bank, gazed rapturously
at the throng of heads whioh peeped white-throated from the
rippled surface.
Then, with a leap magnificent, she plunged back to hee
world.
Printed by Tin Victohia Housb FsimiMa Co., Lid., Tudor Street, Whitefriars, London, E.C.
May 8, 19 15
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are ifibeiUd
" Bitrberrys."
"J' at /// trh sijtisfait du Burberry.
II ?n'a rendu les nieilleurs services
pendant la campaigne. Je vous prie
de m'en /aire /aire un pareil de la
nouvelte nuaitce re'glementaire."
—Gdn^ral d'Urbal.
MILITARY
WEATHERPROOF
Lined Proofed Wool
or Detachable Fleece
Keeps its wearer dry and
comfortable in rain or
damp, and survives long
and rough wear, because
the cloth is especially
woven and proofed by
Burberry processes.
Owing to the density of its
materials, The Burberry
provides hygienic warmth
and protection against
cold or windy weather.
Airylight, it obviates
fatigue and all tendency
to overheating — even on
the mildest day.
Faultlessly self-ventilat-
ing, it maintains equable
temperature, and is
healthful to wear under
all conditions.
SHORT NOTICE SERVICE KIT
Burberrys keep Tunics, Slacks,
Breeches. Great Coats & Warms,
ready to try on! so that fitting
is done when ordering, either
in London or Paris, and the
kit completed in a few hours.
MILITARY BROCHURE POST FREE
BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON
8 & 10 Boul. Malesherbes PARIS; Basingstoke & Provincial AgenU
If, knowing all you know,
you still can support German
productions, we do not ask yoii
to leave off drinking Apol-
linaris, BUT if you desire to try
what your own country can
produce, we ask you to write
to us for a FREE sample of
SIRIS
a pure British Table Water
possessing the same valuable
antacid properties as Apollin-
aris and similar to it in taste.
Repd. Quarts. Repd. Pints. Repd. \ Pints.
PerDoz. 6/- 3/6 2/6 PtrDoi.
Carriage Paid.
Sample Vottle FREE on receipt of Coupon 'SS
Name
Address-.
Usual Purveyor of
Mineral Waters
A. J. CALEY & SON, Ltd.,
ChcDles Street Works, LONDON; Chapel Field Works, NORWICH.
89
LAND AND WATER
May 8, 1915
Garrould's
To H.M. Wak Office, H.M, Colonial Office,
India Ofpiok, St. John Ambulahoe Association,
London ConsTr Council, Guy's Hospital, <fco.
Ladies are invited to visit the
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON
Complete Equipment of Nurses for
Home Detachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Instruments and Appliances in Stock.
HOT WATER
BOTTLES.
Write for
GARROULD'S NURSES' CATALOGUE.
POST FREE, containing;
Nurses' Uniforms, Surgical Instruments and Appliances.
Model 55.
Strong Portable
Canvas Camp
Open "•a Folder, 9/6.
With I'illow, 12/-.
Leneth, 6ft. ;
widtli, -.'ft. Sin.
IVe have mpplied a
(Closed) large number of these
-^l(j Camp Folders for the
Wounded.
10 X Sill. 3/-
12 X Gin. 3/9
14x8 ill. 4/6
12x10 ill. 4/9
14x10 in. 5/3
16X10 in. 6/i
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.
CIRCULAR AIR CUSHIONS, various
sizes, 7/6, 8/9, 9/11, 10/9, &c.
WATER BEDS, AIR BEDS AND MAT-
TRESSES 29/6, 52/6, 26/9
AIR & WATER PILLOWS, 3/-, 106, &c.
FEEDING CUP, 4}cl. each.
BED PANS, from 3 9
LEG & ARM BATHS, from 26 6 & S 6
STRETCHER, War Office pattern.
Complete with Webb Straps and
Pillow. 2 Gns. Without Straps and
Pillow, 35/6
GARROULD'S MOTOR
INVALID CARRIAGES
For the removal of Invalids by Road, Rail or Sea.
BODY & LIMB BED FRAMES, from 4/3J
DRESSING SCISSORS, from 1/6
INVALID CARRYING CHAIR, very light
and strong, 17/6
INVALID BED TABLES, from 6/6
INVALID CHAIRS AND CARRIAGES of
every description.
FIRST AID CASES AND CABINETS at
special prices.
INVALID BED RESTS, 6/11
WARD BEDSTEADS. 3 ft. 13,9;
2 It. Bin. 12/9
AMBULANCES AND
Estimates Free.
E. & R. GARROULD, 150 to 162 Edgware Rd., LONDON, W.
Telegi-ama : "Garrould, London,'
Tdephone.s : 5320, 5321, & 6297 Vaddingtoii.
BY APPOINTMENT
The "Military"
Luminous Watch
THE Goldsmiths and Silversmiths Company's
Luminous Watch has a patent solid one-piece
silver case into which the entire movement screws,
thus making the watch securely dust and damp
proof. Fully visible at night and accurately ad-
justed, with fine lever movement, it is the most
satisfactory Luminous Watch, and is unequalled
for Naval and Military service, for which it is
specially adapted.
£3 3 0
A large i election ol Lumlaous Watches available from £2 2 O
TH E
Goldsmiths & Silversmiths
Company, Ltd.,
WaUhmakers to the Admiralty,
1 12 Regent Street, London, W.
The House
of
Frederick
Corrioge
LIMITED
BUCKINGHAM PALACE ROAD, S.W.,
is renowned for refined taste,
especially in Dainty Coats and
.Skirts. One example is here
illustrated.
"LILAH"
(Mantle Dept)
"THIS CHARMING SUIT of Navy
■* Gaiby Coid. Collar of ivory silk,
edged conlrasting shades of taffeta, and
pearl studs. Coat has a long liack
slipjhlly draped over a full circular Skirt.
Also in black.
£7 7 0
YOU CANT GET WET IN
I I The Guinea
A reaiher\l Weight Walerpronf
For Civilians and Soldiers Alike.
" You can put it in your pocket when the sun shines."
Warmth without Weight
VV'eigh.s only 21 oz.
The Guinea '' Mattarnac " i.s made from
a specially woven featlier-weiglit malla
fabric of intense strenj^tli, and is guar-
antoed absolutely waterproof. In
appearance it is indistinguishable from
the ordinary weatherproof, Ijut it is
carried as easily as a newspaper or will
go into an ordinary pocket.
Practically Untearable.
Not Transparent.
In a " iMatlam ic " you can't get wet.
Thoroughly well cut and made. Storm
collar and adjustable wind cutis. Smart,
roomy, free— for every outdoor purpose.
Lasts year^i, anv climate. In fawn,
khaki, or grey. " Also for Ladies.
SENT ON APPROVAL FOR SEVEN DAYS.
Send che-t measurement, also height, with 21/-, and coat will
be sent (post free in Great Britain) ou seven days' approval,
and your guinea rcfundeil if not approved. Patterns free.
, ^^^^ iyalerproof Specialists {D.pl. Wi),
l/\RpOmN 45 Conduit Street, London, W.
BROTHERS VX/ and
29 Old Chnstcluir, h Rd., Bournemouth
90
May 8, 1915
LAND AND WATER
THE NEW TONE IN DRESS
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER.
AWELL-known Englishwoman, who has just
returned from some months spent in France, is
of opinion that the whole atmosphere here has
changed in a very subtle fashion. She declares
there is a visible difference between the country
as it is to-day and as it was in August and September of last
year. There is a growing fixity of purpose, a gra\-er apprecia-
tion of the serious problem before us ; an intensity of tone
which several critics formerly
found lacking. The woman
in question was one of the
many who, from time to time,
have waxed indignant upon
this theme. " If people in
England could only see
France," she has written,
" then you would at last
realise what war really is,
and how wholeheartedly the
French are meeting it.
When will England wake
up?"
But at last it seems we
are to have this reproach
removed from us. To all
intents and purposes the
country is going on much the
same as usual, but there is all
the same an underlying in-
fluence showing the changes
at work. It is something
that cannot be seen so much
as felt. Theatres are open,
so are the restaurants. The
inveterate race-goer can still
take the train — always allow-
ing for it being delayed — to
Gat wick or NewTnarket. It
is true that after ten at night
nobody, however thirsty and
however temperate, can slake
their thirst b}' anything
alcohohc. It is true that
anybod}' who makes any
engagements at all does so
on the spur of the moment.
We live too much from day
to day, fearing yet always
hoping to allow of any other
course. Our days and their
disposal lie at the mercy of
an official telegram or a
name in the dread list in the
paper, and in consequence we
make but a few plans. Social
entertaining, in the ordinary
sense of the word, is dead
naturally enough. It is true that there is an unusual number
of men wearing uniform. At any evening, at any play, it
will be found that a great proportion of seats are occupied
by men in blue or men in khaki. It was, however, none of
these things that gave the impression of our altered point of
view, but the general aspect of things as a whole. And
foremost amongst these must be counted the wa\' in which
nine women out of ten are dressing themselves at the
present time.
Subdued Note.
It was a case of this tenth woman, a morning or two
ago in Bond Street. In the distance appeared a patch of
vivid, unusually aggressive, pillar-box red. As it grew nearer
it resolved itself into a girl who looked nice enough to know
better. She was dressed in a suit of tliis flaming hue, and,
without exception, she was the one woman in all that crowded
thoroughfare who wore any strident hue. Every other woman
was quietly garbed, that is to say, every woman whose dress
in any way merited notice. No impression of poverty' was
given — in the greater nimiber of cases very much the reverse —
but there was an absence of colour that was almost remarkable.
Everything worn was of neutral tone, or verging on the
dark side in colouring. It needs but the briefest thought to
see that this lack of ostentation, of anything glaring, blaring,
or unduly striking, is symbolical of the Englishwoman at her
THE
best. It is the outward and visible sign of her feelings.
The war has had many indirect influences, but the one
it wields over dress is amongst the strongest of aU.
It has killed vulgarity at one fell swoop, and nobody
is a penny the worse, but on the contrary infinitely better.
It is to be hoped that even the strongest reaction in
days to come will not revive blatancy of fashion once
more. We have surely learnt to eschew anything so
ugly.
Studied Simplicity.
In the meanwhile every-
body is agreed that women
have rarely appeared to
better advantage than at
the moment. Clothes being
stamped with the hall-mark
of good taste are more be-
coming than they have been
for a long while, and every
tendency towards undue ex-
aggeration is slowly but surely
being curbed. Exaggeration
might easily have crept in
with the new outline, but up
till now it is conspicuous by
its absence. When the first
new coats and skirts were
launched in the leading ateliers
there was but the smallest
difference between them and
the crinoline modes of our
grandmothers. It was felt
that while full skirts are
delightfully practical, half
their comfort is gone with
any suggestion of the hoop.
Numbers of women, who
allowed a stiffening of whale-
bone to be sewn inside the
hem of their dress, had it
promptly removed, and not a
few had folds of material
taken away, leaving only a
reasonable fulness — one more
proof, if proof were needed,
that moderation is the goal
aimed at by most folk just
now.
Since women have proved
the utihty of the wide skirt it
is likely to remain, otherwise
it is more than possible that
such a radical change of
fashion at this crisis of history
would not have been tolerated
for a moment. As it is the
relief from the day of shackled garments is great, and again
the war influence makes itself felt. Many women are on their
feet from morning to night, planning, organising, and helping
some fund or work in one direction or another. The wide
skirt is a boon to all industrious people without doubt. So,
too, is the disappearance of flamboyant headgear. The almost
severely plain hats presented to "our notice amply fulfil the
needs of the moment. And that being so, it is kind of them
to be attractive at one and the same time.
The Cause and the Effect.
Women are grave, and, as a natural result, their clothes
are grave also. It is a cheering sign that in spite of this
tendency to sombreness there is no tendency to neglect the
personal appearance. The fact that there are still some
women amongst us who continue to take an interest in
clothes is not a proof of what was neatly termed " our in-
curable levity." The true answer hes in the character of the
clothes themselves. They are practical, they are subdued,
they are free from any taint of aggression. These at least
are the main points of clothes chosen and worn by the
women who matter. The mere idea that Englishwomen
should dress flauntingly and unbecomingly at this time is a
painful one. It is not, however, carried "out in reahty, as
anyone can see at any gathering of responsible women. The
country is the gainer by this tendency on the part of Us
daughters.
Copyright Madautt Lallic CharUs
COUNTESS OF STRADBROKE
Who has turned Henham Hall, her husband's place in Suffolk, into a
hospital for wounded soldiers. Lady Siradbroke has been in charge
herself since the war began. It is not so very long ago that
Henham was visited by Zeppelins. Several bombs were
dropped without any serious damage being done.
91
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915
-sS;.
HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS
It is our privilege and duty to see that our
fightinj" men are provided with all they ask for
and need, and letters lionie frequently tell how
grateful olheers and men are for liavinj; received
a supply of these delicious Food Tablets, and
they eagerly ask for more. A few dissolved in
the mouth gi\e and maintain strengtli and
\igour, and also prevent fatigue and relieve
thirst, and thus enable the soldier or sailor
to be at his best when his best is called for.
We will send post free to ANY address a flask of
these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat
vest pocket case on receipt of 1 6.
If on active service be particular to give regimental number, rank, name, squad-
ron or company, battaiion, battery, regimentlorother unit), staff appointment
or department. State whether serving with British Expeditionary Force or
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force; or, if not with either, give name of place
at which unit is stationed. In the case of a sailor give the name of his ship.
Of all Chemists and .Stores, in convenient (locket
(lasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1,6, 2 6 and 11/-
Liberal Sample Bottle sent post free for 3d. in stamps.
HORLICK'S MALTED IWILK CO., SLOUGH, BUCKS.
B
E
Motor Tyre
Made from finest
PLANTATION RUBBER
in the largest rubber
factory in the British
Empire.
A Tyre that, again and again, has proved
its superiority to all others, for strength,
durability, and security.
Used extensively by the War Office, the
Admiralty, the British Red Cross Society,
and the Governments of France, Belsrium,
and Greece.
READY TO WEAR
FROCKS
All our Ready-made Cos-
tumes are of an exceptionally
interesting character. They
are copied and adapted from
the most exclusive Paris
models by our own highly
skil led workers, and are
quite different from the
ordinary ready-to-wear frock.
The materials of which they
are made are invariably of
excellent quality, while the
fit and finish are invariably
excellent.
A Dainty Afternoon Qown
(as sketch), in rich quality Silk
Hruch^, designed with full skin,
m:itle on a yoke, bodice with
revers and embroidered lawn
collar.
69/6
THE RAVAGES OF
MO TH.
Store your Furs in our
Frefzing Chambers. Par-
ticulars of our neiv Combined
Fur Storage and Insurance
against all and erery risk
sent poit free on application.
DebenKam
&Freebodly
Wijlmore Street.
tCovcndish Square) London W
As in the days of ^M.arlborough
and Wellington, Jl>J^ 1 ±1
with its radio - active Waters and
bright, sunny climate is now bringing
health and strength to the
wounded and invalided
from our Great War.
BATH is delightful
in May and June.
Wrilc lo Ihe Director 0/ Ihc Bathing
Establishment, BATH, for Booklet,
"A British Cure," List 0/ Hotels, etc.
Send your chauf-
feur to the front
and buy a
self- starting
,1IIC1
CAR.
BEDFORD BUICK MODELS :
<Our British-built Coachwork).
15-18 h.p. Empress ... £295
15l8h.p. Streamline Torpedo £305
15- 1 8 h.p. Arcadian Cabriolet £375
BUICK VALVE-IN-HEAD MOTOR.
GENERAL MOTORS (Europe). Ltd., 135 Long Acre, London. W.C.
Telephone: Gerrard 962j (3 liaei). Teletrramj : " Buickgen, London." 33
BUICK. MODELS:
15 I8h.p. 2-sealer £245
IS-Hh.p. 5-seater £255
Complete Equipment, including
Mictielin Tyres.
104
May 15, 1913
LAND AND WATER
A GLIMPSE OF WAR
A LA BAYONETTE
By W. L. GEORGE
THE word went round. It was shouted, and yet in
the storm of sound was as a whisper. Private
Denny just nodded ; his neighbour bellowed into
his ear and handed on to the right the news
they all guessed, though they knew it not yet.
A very little his heart began to beat with an excitement in
-which there was haste, lust, and a little fear. As he filled
his magazine he smiled. It was a broad smile, a smile of
memory, for as he secured the bayonet more firmly he noticed
a long "black streak upon the stock which had dried there in
the night and stained the wood dark. For this was not the
first time he had used the bayonet, and he looked at it fondly,
-trying the point. He thought of the French who called it
La Rosalie. " Sentimental tosh ! " he thought, and then
softly caressed the blade. Readiness increased : his neigh-
bour on the left cast away his overcoat ; another felt nervously
at his puttees. They looked knowing, they laughed a little
nervously ; they did not try to speak, for the broken roar of
the guns which it seemed could not increase ... yet
increased.
Already the sun had risen in the pale morning, gay with
laughter, balmy with soft airs. Private Denny's cheek was
caressed by a wind tenderer than any woman's hand. He
breathed of that ak full of the sweet scents of new grass,
breathed deep as if to gain strength from earth. But all the
time he was conscious of the things which passed over his head,
invisible and yet present in movement and in sound, little
eighteen-pound shells, gUttering no doubt in the sun for the
angels to see, not presences but half hisses, half screems,
little things that burst not far away, hardly a hundred yards,
in a fume of green smoke and a spatter of stars . . . and
bigger things, too, of which he was just conscious by the
rushing of their wind, things that fell just ahead there, in the
German trench, fell wetly and dully, raising a piUar of smoke
and earth. He knew, and he knew, and still his heart was
beating. As if with ears not his he heard the sergeant at the
periscope who watched the fall of the explosive shells :
" That's got 'em ! Good ! Got 'em again ! Half a dozen
more Uke that. . . . Steady boys ! Steady ! It won't be
a minute before. ..."
He did not hear the voice any more, for his body was
filled by the sound of the whistle. It came, sudden, im-
perative. So shrill that it burst through the dullness of
heavier sounds just like, thought Private Denny, a
bayonet. . .
The whistling did not last a second and it lasted hours,
tor it was bom in a wilderness, an earth on which all other
sounds had died. For quite suddenly the little shrapnel
and the big shells that swung overhead, as the ghosts of birds,
flew no more, and in the emptiness was nothing now but the
needle sting of the whistle. Private Denny did not know
how it happened : perhaps the whistle had jerked him to his
feet, seized him by the neck, with all those others of his
battaUon, hurled him out of the trench upon that soil in front,
so oddly pock-marked everywhere with holes.
He was running in the silence. He was separate from
his body, and hardly knew what he did ; his feet registered
a crumbling of the earth all torn with shell, rose up painfully
from steel shards. The light sun was in his eyes and he was
all aglow as he ran on stumbling, by instinct rather than
intent maintaining his place. There were men to the right
and left, brown shadows, ordinary men who played bilhards
and went to church, and got drunk, just like Private Denny ;
but here they were, running on, rather bent, hardly thinking
of the wheezing sound the bullets made as they buried them-
selves at their feet. A man fell in front of him . . he
stepped over and forgot him. It seemed so far, so long,
though only twenty seconds, and he ran on as if bound for a
paradise, anxious to see, to feel something other than this soft
air.
And then, at his feet, so near that he almost fell, he saw
the German trench. Its trim edges torn like a saw, its roofs
of timber and turf fallen in, the timbers, shuffled and knotted
together like ropes, a ruin of black holes full of water, mounds
of earth shored up into incredible pillars. He leapt. With
aU those other brown shapes he struggled as in a dream, lost
among the walls that hung over him ready to fall, angry
because here was nothing for him in this place, pricked every-
where with bullets, laid bare to its very entrails by explosive
shell. He stepped forward, he recognised a difference of
ground. He understood, he had trampled a body that lay
there, and before him was another. Driven on, without
knowing why or how, he made for the traverse. He tottered
in this lake of water and earth where many grey coated things
lay stiU or rolled uneasily, broken, blood-soaked, unUke men.
An order came to him ; he seized his spade to begin repairing
his section of the parapet. He stuck it into a mound of earth
at his feet to clear it away. He started back, for half the
mound fell away, and there came out a grey-clad arm with a
hand that, straight-fingered, clutched at the air.
But he did not dig, for from the left he heard the crackle
of rifles. He obeyed an order that he half understood. A
trap then ! The trench not wholly dominated ! A spurt of
rage filled his heart and a sudden heat filmed his eyes.
They could not get into the traverse this way, for the
earth had fallen in. The sound of musketry in his ears.
Private Denny found himself following his sergeant, cautiously
crawhng along the ground towards the traverse on the left.
It seemed so long, and stones and steel shards hurt his hands,
tried to stab him in the breast. But nearer and nearer they
came, silently. His heart leapt, for here was the edge of the
traverse ... he saw the long line of spiked helmets a little
below.
There was a cry, a shout, and Private Denny had joined
in it, felt it come out of him, solid and sonorous as stricken
brass. And now with the others he had flung himself into
the traverse. It was narrow, he fell almost against his enemy,
so close that he could not use his bayonet ; he had a confused
sense of rifle fire suddenly dying away, of a new atmosphere
that was all heat and efi[ort, "hand to hand. He could hardly
see anything because he saw too much, flying shapes, things
that struck at him, things at which he struck. He was
conscious only of movements and of feelings, of being thrust
against a wall, of striking back at some heavy phantom and
hearing the crunch of bone against the butt of his rifle. They
were all about him, grey shapes and brown shapes. A bullet
hissed past his ear. He struck out savagely into space, and
his bayonet entered the wall of the trench ... he swore.
There were things about his feet too, soft things that struggled
and moved . . . then the air seemed to clear, and, quite
suddenly, as if he had taken a section of the battle, he was
alone with a single enemy. An extraordinary clarity came
into his mind, and for an interminable second the long English-
man with the hard mouth, and the Bavarian, much shorter,
much heavier, gazed into each other's eyes. They were
watchful, they were nimble, they were like cats about to
spring. Private Denny felt himself dodge from right foot to
left foot as if he were sparring.
The Bavarian struck straight out. Denny got the
bayonet upon the barrel of his rifle, and it fled aside past him,
incredibly fast and brilliant, hke a pike in a stream. And
automatically he lunged back, straight towards the thick grey
body that stooped. He failed as the other leapt aside . . .
he cried out, for carried away he had fallen right against his
antagonist, so near that he could see the different colours
in his eyes, feel the heavy warm weight of him. For a second
they remained gripped and swaying. Jaws locked, with eye-
brows knotted, they sprang apart, still watchful, feinting
with their weapons, heads down. They struck again, and
the rattle of the rifle barrels was as that of castanets. Private
Denny gave a little growl, for suddenly the Bavarian, lunging
on, pierced his sleeve, and he felt the sharp sting of the bayonet
along his skin. He was not sparring now, but as the other
half-feU, carried away by his rush, Private Denny stepped
aside and, raising his weapon, brought it down straight against
the fleeting grey side. . . .
He was thriUed with an excitement that held hardly any
horror as the speared body resisted. He thrust on, deeper
and deeper, desiring only one thing, to drive in the steel yet
deeper. . . . and for a second he held him pinned, all his
body shaking with the quiver that ran through from his
stricken foe up the knife and along into his arms. He
was taut, wanted to hold the thing so pinned for ever. His
lungs quite narrow, his hands rigid as dry bones in the
intensity of his clutch, he so remained for a second. Then
suddenly la.\ and shivering, he withdrew the bayonet.
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915
Work that Foreigners
have failed to imitate.
THE
SUNBEAM
CYCLE'S
SPLENDID
LITTLE OIL
BATH GEARCASE
p\0 you know that the Makers of the Sunbeam Cycle are
■*^ the originators of the Little Oil Bath Gearcase? Do
you know that this Gearcase forms an integral part of the
machine and is not an " Afterthought " ? That — after all
these years of imitative eflfort — it is still the only satisfactory
Oil Bath Gearcase ? All the Sunbeam driving Bearings and
the chain run in this Gearcase. There they are protected
from Dirt and Damp, and continuously and automatically
lubricated by the Little Oil Bath. This ensures the perfect
running of the supeibly built Sunbeam in all Weathers, and
this guarantees their perpetual Wear.
Write for the new Catalogue to —
3 SUNBEAMLAND— WOLVERHAMPTON
London Showrooms
57 HOLBOKN VIADUCT, E.C.
158 SLOAN E STREEr (by Sloane Square), S.W.
Imitation
is tbe sincerest form of
flatter?, an& tbat ie wb?
?our friends bu? tbe
orio'nal article,
unkfts
*' tibe tgre tbat taugbt tbe CraOe."
Che Dunlop Rubber Co., Ctd.^
jfouiiOera of tbe pneiiniatic Z'Qxt
^iiOuatrfi tbrougbout tbe TllllortO.
And after the fight—
what then ?
Why, naturally, he wants to tell
you all about it — how just a mere
handful of them drove back the
enemy and won high praise from
Headquarters. See that he has the
means to write. A reliable Fountain
Pen is essential. It is one of the
few things that he can carry about
wherever he goes. Give him the
world's best Pen — the pen that
Mr. Hilaire Belloc himself uses.
Watermans(Geai)fiuntainPen
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106
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND iSEATEE.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOG.
NOTE. — This article has beta submitted to tlie Press Barean, wliicfa does net object to the publicatioa as censored, and takes no
responsibility tor the correctness of tbe statements.
In accordance witb tlie reqnirements ot the Press Bureau, tbe positions of troops on Plans tliastratiag this Article must only b«
regarded as approi^imata, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
THE news this week ill repays analysis,
because while it is of great importance,
it is not yet dej5nitive. The great Austro-
German movement in Western Galicia is
still upon a confused front, and we cannot even
be quite certain what that front is.
The French movement north of Arras is in
full progress at the moment when these notes
must cease, and beyond the bare statement of the
official communiques there is no general result to
determine.
Of the Dardanelles, perhaps the most impor-
tant point of all in the campaign at this moment,
and certainly the most important from the British
point of view alone, we have been told nothing
since the landing, or, rather, nothing of a sort
which enables us to define positions and to analyse
movements. The last declaration of Lord Crewe
in the House of Lords upon Tuesday night, just
before sending this paper to press, was no more
than a reaffirmation of the success of the landing
and the repelling of the enemy's attacks upon the
line alreadv formed.
The German raid into Courland, probably
a purely political move, offers no ground for
analysis either. It is not directed towards anyj
definite result as yet. Libau is occupied, but with
what object this cavalry movement (for it is ia
essence no more than a cavalry movement, though
supported by a brigade of infantry, probably^
dependent upon motor traffic) has been undei'-«
taken there has been no sign, and, as I have jusf!
said, it probably has no direct military object ati
all.
What is of real importance this week, and
what I shall attempt to go into fully, is tho
orientation of the enemy's energies at this moment!
towards a moral effect : his increasing reliance
upon what he believes will check the intervention
of neutrals and produce a moral disarray in the
civilian opinion of the Allies. That is of real
importance for us to grasp. It connotes a certain
state of mind in the enemy's higher command
which is well worth recognising, and it must bo
stated plainly with details before we can grasp
its full significance. I shall deal briefly, tbere-
GENERAL PLAN OF THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIAi
LAND AND ,W.ATER,
May 15, 1915.
fore, this week with the military movements, in-
conclusive as they still are, and which lend them-
selves very little to illustration. I shall deal at
some greater length with the point I have just
mentioned.
THE OPERATIONS IN GALICIA.
The concentration of so many of the new
levies, Austrian and German, with older forces
drawn from elsev,'here, upon the front east of
Cracoe, and the blow they are delivering against
the Russian " screen " which was defending
operations in the Carpathians to the east, is
proving, as the days pass, of greater and of
greater importance.
The conjectures to which the first news of
this great action in Galicia gave rise have proved
accurate enough. The Western front of the Rus-
sian armies in that province has retired over a
belt of thirty to thirty-five miles, more towards
the south than towards the north. The northern
passes of the Carpathians have consequently been
abandoned, at least the three road passes of the
[Polyanka, the Dukla, and the Jaliska. The Lupkow
road and double line of railway pass and the ridge
on as far as the Rostok is still apparently, at the
moment of writing, in the hands of our Ally. How
far the abandonment of the crest of the mountains
must proceed will obviously depend upon the
limits to which this retirement of the Russian
[SVestern front continues. But the margin is not
a very wide one, as the map on the preceding page
"will show.
The original line held by the Russians ran,
as my readers know, from the Vistula up the
Dunajec to the point where the Biala falls in.
It then ran up the Biala to the crest of the Car-
pathians, corresponding to the line marked 1 on
this sketch map. The next defensive position
behind this was the line of the Wisloka, marked
E. and it was pointed out in a previous article
that if the line of the Wisloka were taken up by
the Russians after their retirement, that would
certainly mean the loss of the Polyanka, and
1)robably of the Dukla. Now it appeared from the
ast communiques that the line of the Wisloka
had been passed — upon the south at least — and
that at one point, the next parallel valley, that of
the Wislok, and had been reached by the Austro-
•German advance, and that these are attempting
to reach Sanok.
But the Wislok does not form a true position
at all for the purposes of guarding the Russian
armies in Galicia. It bends right back eastward.
[It falls into the San, not the Vistula, and it is the
line marked on Plan I. with the number 3.
It would therefore seem as though the check
which our Ally will attempt to give to the advance
of the enemy would not follow a river line at all,
but would cut across the two valleys in some such
fashion as that indicated by the dots on the
Becond sketch map. That our Ally will be able
to hold this line and remain upon it is doubtful.
(It is a fluctuating line not prepared. It could only
be held in a few selected places by rapid entrench-
ment. It would hardly stand against the supe-
riority of heavy artillery upon the enemy's side (of
which more in a moment) when the big pieces
iBhould have been brought up over the intervening
belt. But what would be a perfectly possible line
is all the line of the Lower Wisloka, then a cut
across to the Upper Wislok, and the following
of that ^stream in the mountains so as to bar the
way to hanok. Such a line would run as the line
of crossrs runs on the subjoined sketch, and might
be tenfiwie. But before such a line could be held.
the Russians would have to recover as a whole the
lower line of the Wisloka.
Now we do not know exactly where their line
runs in connection with the lower part of this
stream — that is why I have upon my second sketch
marked two lines of dots, one fairly close to the
river, the other well behind, and put to each a note
of interrogation. If they have been thrust back
as far as tlae second line they could hardly recover
so broad a belt against an advancing superior
force, with a particular superiority in heavy guns,
or, after having advanced across it, consolidate the
whole ground lost between this and the Wisloka,
or hold it firmly after such a counter-offensive.
Yet, if the Russians do not hold the Lower Wis-
loka, at least, and the Upper Wislok, it is difficult
to see what natural feature they can adopt as a
foundation for their new line. The Wislok itself
bends so far east that it turns the Galician Plain
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
altogether, and thought it is true that any well
prepared line of trenches is nowadays a position m
itself, without any natural feature to support it,
on account of the strength of the modern defensive,
we have no indication that such a line has been
prepared across the peninsula between the Vistula
and the San, and in the country north of the Lower
tWislok.
If any position has been prepared in this
piece of country we shall see the Russian line
gradually consolidate upon it and check the for-
ward movement of the enemy. If none has been
prepared there are only two alternatives : a fluc-
tuating battle as the Russian reinforcements
arrive, the recovery of the Wisloka line, and the
consequent protection of the Russian positions
upon a portion at least of the crest of the moun-
tain west, or a falling back of the whole line, the
abandonment of all the crest and of half of Galicia
as well. And which of these two events we shall
see, only the future can determine.
It must, of course, be insisted upon here, as it
has been insisted upon in the case of every retire-
ment or fluctuation of the line upon the east or
upon the west, that the problem before the enemy
is not the clearing of a particular bit of territory,
or the relieving of the pressure upon a particular
line, even upon a line so important as the crest of
the Carpathians ; the one essential which he must
do, and which, for his own success, he must do in
quite the near future, is to break the eastern or the
western line. Until he has done that his strategy,
in the largest sense, has failed.
The exact position of the fluctuating double
front between the Austro-German advance and
the Russian retirement upon Saturday, May 8,
Vr'ould seem to be somewhat as may be gathered
from the accompanying sketch. The line
qz^
^
'''\slfUkc
■d^
■
'D
Vl^^l^
jKvostio
i i
) Saiiolt
0
fa
.J
.
"Jfiles
IV
started at that moment from the Vistula N. ov
N.E. of Mielec. It then ran Imck almost due soutli
until it approached the Wisloka in the neiglibour-
hood of Debica, defended portions of that river
line, but abandoned it before Jaslo was reached
(Jasio was in Austrian hands on the Friday
night), and struck the Wislok near Krosno. The
.Germans established a crossing beyond the Upper
,Wislok near Krosno, but no more, while the
Austrians do not appear to have crossed the
Upper Wislok nor to have approached nearer
to Sanok than the line of that river.
It is evident from all this that the strength
of the blow has been delivered by the German
right against the Russian left of the line, and
that the whole front has swung roimd from north
and south to north-west and south-cast. The
retii'ement has not greatly affected as 5^et the
position of the Russian line north of the Vistula,
but it has rendered untenable the positions of
which we have spoken, rendered extremely pre-
carious the remaining hold upon the ridge between
the Lupkow and the Rostok, and has not yet
established itself in any permanent fashion.
More important, to our judgment, than the
future of the campaign on this front and the exact
line held for the moment by the two belligerents
is the nature of the Austro-German success, and
this, it cannot be doubted, is due to a great
superiority in heavy artillery upon the side of the
enemy.
Now let us examine the causes of this and see
what chances there are of the situation being
reversed for the future.
The superiority of the enemy in hca^y artil-
lery on this front is due to two things.
First, that he has been able, just as we have,
during the winter months, to construct further
heavy pieces.
Secondly, that he has been able to munition
these and to provide an accumulation of shell
with which to effect his grerit bombardment of the
last two days of April and the first of May. The
Russians have not been in that position. They
have suffered from lack of equipment of every;
kind and fi'om lack of munitions right through
the winter under a rigorous blockade, and from
the fact that their own powers of construction
were more limited than those of the industrialised
western and central nations of Europe, as well a3
from the fact that their more limited railway com-
munications hampered the bringing up of such
supplies a)5 they had.
The situation, due to this starvation in muni-
tions, which had been very serious indeed in
February, was somewhat relieved during March'
and April by the appearance of munitions pro-
cured through the Far Eastern ports and coming
in by the Trans-Siberian Railway.
Now, in the middle of May Archangel is also
open. But Archangel, though not so far off as the
Far Eastern ports, is a good thousand miles away,
from the chief front, and of these thousand miles
300 were, when the war broke out, a narrow gauge
railway with very little rolling stock — the section
wliich runs from Archangel to Vologda.
That is half the meaning of the great experi-
ment in the Dardanelles.
If the Dardanelles could be forced Russia
could, in a far shorter time than through any other
avenue, be munitioned. Until she is fuUy mimi-
tioned (especially in heavy artillery and shell
therefor) the handicap against her is exceedinglj;
heavy.
Unfortunately, it is not only in heavy artillery;
munition tiiat this handicap is apparent. The
first full accounts of the fighting, as they have
appeared in the Hungarian papers, reached Eng-
land only two days ago, and one of the most strik-
ing features in those accounts was the description
3«
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915.
of how, in the original crossing of the Dunajec,
ths Russian field guns failed from lack of ammu-
nition within forty-eight hours.
The difficulty of equipment of the Russian
reserves — which is perhaps the most crucial diffi-
culty of all — has been in part got over, but the
munitioning of field gans, as we have seen, and
particularly of heavy guns in a sufficient quantity,
IS a problem apparently still unsolved; and it is
this which lends its gravity to the struggle now
taking place in Galicia.
AVe must further remember that one feature
present in the depth of winter has now, happily,
been eliminated, and that is the inferiority in mere
total nmnbers of the Russians to the enemy along
this Eastern front. The equipment of reserves in
sufficient numbers to redress the balance was
already apparent by the end of April.
It is not everything, but it renders the position
less acute than it was when the great German con-
centration was descending upon Warsaw in the
middle of February.
THE CAVALRY RAID ON LIBAU.
Nothing has been said in these notes hitherto
of the new German raid through Courland — that
is, along the Baltic Coast — because no military
importance appeared to attach to it. This judg-
ment— or, rather, conjecture — stiU holds. No
critic can say that a movement of cavalry and horse
artillery, with a small proportion of infantry —
probably dependent upon motor traffic — operating
at a great distance from the main armies, attack-
ing nothing vital, even politically, in the enemy's
state, is an operation of war which can possibly
be read in conjunction with the general military
aims of the campaign. It is a raid.
If we try to estimate the subsidiary objects
in view when this raid was planned they seem
to be three.
First : The impressing of Russian civilian
opinion, through the coincidence of so deep a
thrust, with the new violent and successful effort
of the Austro- Germans in the southern part of
the Eastern field.
Secondly : The impressing of neutral, and
especially of uninstructed neutral, opinion in the
same direction.
Thirdly : The obtaining of munitions and
supplies.
No Russian artery of communication is cut
by an offensive of this kind; no forces sufficient
to effect any permanent work are present, but
with these three objects, and especially with the
second, the whole thing exactly fits.
It must be remembered that the towns of the
district raided are very largely inhabited by
German Jews, with sympathies naturally strong
in favour of Germany and opposed to Russia, and
this is particularly true of Libau. That is a state
of affairs which would facilitate the temporary
occupation and the material results expected from
it. Beyond this there is really no more to be said.
THE DARDANELLES.
We have this week upon the Dardanelles no
nev/s upon which any judgment of the advance of
the operations can be based. There is no British
official communique which gives us the smallest
detail. We may conjecture, therefore, that the
allied line is still upon the slopes at the foot of
the Achibaba position, passing throngh Krithia,
or at least we have no nev>'s that this position has
yet been c<irried.
It is evident from the nature of the opera-
tions that the greatest possible secrecy must be
observed. The authorities have permitted very
full accounts to come to England of all that accom-
plished first stage in the business — which was
also, perhaps, the most difficult — the landing and
the getting a footing upon all the southern end
of tJie peninsula. There is nothing to do but to
wait patiently for further official news, which will
give us the progress of the operations later on.
Meanwhile it inay be suggested that probably the
interval corresponds to the landing of further
munitions and particularly of heavy pieces.
The great difficulty in an operation of this
kind is the landing of the first advance troops.
Once these, supported by the fleet, can establish a
position from sea to sea across the narrovv^ piece
of land, the transports can at their leisure put on
shore the heavy pieces of munitions and all that
the expedition will need, acting securely behind
the screen of the troops that have established
themselves.
It is remarkable enough that we do not receive
news of the operations from German sources
either. After the first few days, when the usual
accuracy of judgment in Berlin upon military
affairs in this war was misled by the absurd
Turkish commimiques, there seems to have set in a
mood of caution, and the last German newspapers
available wiU not commit themselves to the future
of the experiment in the Gallipoli Peninsula, upon
which so much of the future of the war should
tiu'n.
The summary of the Dardanelles position
remains exactly what it was last week. The end of
the Gallipoli Peninsula is solidly held. Krithia
is the centre of the allied position upon the slopes
of the Achibaba ridge. The enemy position along
the crest of the ridge still stands. Until the attack
upon this enemy position has developed, until we
know the result of that attack, our analysis cannot
proceed.
THE OPERATIONS NORTH OF ARRAS.
Upon Sunday and Monday, beginning prob-
ably with the Saturday before, the French
developed veiy heavy pressure upon the line just
south of the British position — that is, upon the
line between La Bass^e and Arras. The Germans
believed them to have advanced with something
well over a hundred thousand men, and possibly as
much as four corps, and the effect of that advance
so far has been the gain of a belt which at its maxi-
mum is over two miles broad, and of some three
thousand prisoners, with a corresponding number
of machine guns — 50. Of field guns only quite a
small number has fallen into the hands of the
Allies at the moment of writing : less than a dozen,
but even this means that the first positions of the
enemy were carried. There cannot be, in this par-
ticular region, any intention of breaking through.
It is not the place for such an attempt. The
character of the operations does not point to it at
all. What is probably the object of the move is to
relieve the rather serious pressure which was
beginning to be felt just to the north upon the
British trenches. Into what it will develop we
cannot tell, but the engagement is proceeding at
the time of writing. It cannot but draw down
May 15. 1915.
LAND AND iWATER.
from the north some portion of the enemy forces
now operating east and south of Ypres, and when
it has thus relieved the pressure upon the northern
part of the allied line its task will presumably be
accomplished. But it is not here that the coming
offensive will fall, and, viewed in the light of that
great expectation, the whole of this considerable
piece of work is of minor importance.
THE ENEMY'S ESTIMATE OF THE
NEWLY-rKAINED BRITISH LEVIES.
Among the most important factors in the
future of the war is the estimate the enemy may
make of the new British formations. More impor-
tant still, of course, is the real value of these new
formations, because events will in any case correct
any erroneous estimate the enemy may make. But
the enemj^'s estimates are none the less of value
because according to them will his plans be laid.
It must be remembered that these new formations
are just becoming a principal character in the war.
They will, henceforward, be the chief source of
recruitment in the V/est. It is the British recruit-
ing field (in which term one includes, of course,
the Colonial troops) which is the most elastic and
the largest, for the French have put in everyone
they could, and their recruiting field only consists
now of the young men growing up to military age
this year.
Now, it is important to note that the German
estimate of the new British material seems to have
changed very sharply in the last few weeks, and
that the enemy's respect for it has as rapidly in-
creased. There has already been wasted during
this war so much ink in the alternate efforts (no
doubt with laudable objects) to raise and to depress
the spirit of civilians, according as it was thought
that a certain spirit was needed to win the war, or
another spirit to promote recruiting, that one feels
a natural reaction against anything which could
savour of rhetoric in this connection. But it is
the sober truth that the new British formations
appearing in the field, with whom one includes
the Colonials, have had an effect in Germany
which is appreciable not only through private
reports but also through the printed descriptions
of the fighting.
It is not remarkable that this should be the
case, but it is extremely important for us to
appreciate that it is the case.
It is no wonder that this change between the
German opinion unexperienced and the German
opinion experienced should have taken place ; and
at the junction of the two national organisations
north of Ypres three weeks ago, where there was
a m.edley of racos and units more heterogeneous
than upon any other front in the whole war
(Zouaves, Belgians, Coloured French Colonial
troops, French Marines, British Colonial troops,
&c.), it was the action of the Canadians which
necessarily impressed itself most upon German
observers.
The story is now an old one. Until we had
" Eye-Witness's '•' full description it was not
quite clear what had happened, but now we all
know the story pretty thoroughly. The French
retirement, imder the effect of the new gases, left
a great breach in the line. The Canadian left was
completely isolated, and at one moment there must
have been a gap of many hundred yards, perhaps
ft thousand yards or even more, rapidly increas-
ing, between the extreme Canadian left and the
right of the French line. There had not been a
hole torn through the line at the junction of the
two organisations, but the position was like that
created when a blow breaks a slat of wood. The
part receiving the blow breaks back and away
from the part just below the point of impact,
w hich part still stands on the old line. The old
line had faced roughly east and west, and the gap
between the Canadians and the French troops
faced north and south. If the Germans could
have rushed that gap they would have broken the
first line round Ypres. That they did not so rusb
it was due to the promptitude wath which the
Colonial troops swung round, but much more to
the tenacity they displayed in resisting an
enormously superior enemy when almost en-
veloped.
If two points may suffice to illustrate the
quality of this action they may be cited as
follows : —
First : The heavy guns abandoned in the
retirement far beyond the line were recaptured —
that is, a strong counter-offensive, assumed on
the field itself immediately after the first blow
and against greatly superior numbers, was under-
taken and successfully carried.
Secondly, and much more important : While
certain units suffered losses up to seventy per cent.
in killed, wounded, and missing, the organisation
as a whole remained and the line was not broken.
You get much the same thing in the case of
the Dardanelles. Though it was a regular divi-
sion that did perhaps the hardest work, the land-
ing (upon the impossibility of which Berlin had
really seriously counted) was also effected by
great numbers of the new troops.
Though it will be a very heavy asset in our
favour if this opinion is maintained — and every-
thing points to its being maintained — we must
remember to estimate its causes and to see its real
nature. It is partly due to the excellent physical
quality of the human material employed. No one
could have looked at the new armies witliout
appreciating that point. It is partly due to the
fact that this siege work luckily demands qualities
in which old and new troops do not greatly differ
so long as the moral is sound, and, further, has the
advantage of seasoning and training the men who
have recently come in.
Next, we note that if the proviBion of officers
for very large new formations is the great diffi-
culty, which we know it is, yet these new forma-
tions are coming to the war at a moment when the
enemy's losses in officers have been far greater than
anything he had allowed for, and in which his
cadres are seriously and unexpectedly weakened.
To some extent the very delay in equipment and the
corresponding length of time during which many
of the new formations had to be kept under train-
ing was an advantage in seasoning.
Lastly — a factor not to be despised, though it
is often exaggerated in the history of war — the
spirit with which new troops will go into action
is increased by every blunder which the enemy
makes in what I have called in an earlier part
of this article his " political policy."
THE POLITICAL OBJECT OF THE
ENE.MY.
It is in this dearth of really decisive news
throughout the whole field of the campaign that
LAND AND SKATER,
May 15, 1915.
one naturally turns to the sensational and, in a
military sense, useless actions of the last few
weeks, and particularly of the last ten days.
The public mind naturally and instinctively
t\uns to them, as, indeed, the enemy intended that
it should. But it might be imagined that an analy-
sis which deals only with the purely military con-
ditions of the campaign should leave aside acts
v/hich are less and less military in their conception
and execution. In what way (it may be asked)
does such an action as the shelling of Dunkirk, or
the raid on Libau, or the German Emperor's tele-
gram to his sister, or the sinking of the Lusitania
concern military history ? One might as well, it
Avould seem, drag in the guillotine at Arras, or the
speeches of Eobespierre into a military narrative
01 the early revolutionary war.
I do not think this criticism is sound. As it
seems to me, the enemy's recent actions, which have
quite evidently no military object proportionate
either to the expense of their undertaking or the
risk he runs by them, and many of which have no
direct military object at all, are none the less well
worthy of note, and very useful in the analysis of
the purely military side of this campaign.
We are always to ask ourselves whenever an
enemy command does anything, from the movement
of a batteiy to the sending of a political telegram,
why he does it, and how his action can possibly lear
upon the conduct of the war. His action may
often be foolish ; Ave may often see it to have been
a blunder ; but it is never quite meaningless.
Let us, therefore, begin by contrasting the
operations of the Allies in the West with those of
the German forces, segregating these two oppo-
nents because it is between their methods that the
contrast most severely applies.
The Allies in the West, as the turn in their
numbers has gradually come about, as they have
provided themselves with more and more heavy
artillery and with a larger and larger accumu-
lation of munitions for the same, have with every
passing week concentrated more and more clearly
upon the purely military objects of the war.
For instance, the first use made by the French
of their new security in heavy pieces was to push
forward in a belt of the Champagne until they com-
manded the lateral communications of the enemy
between Argonne and Lille. That done, they
baited. Next they Avorked south and north of the
St. Mihiel wedge, up to Les Eparges on the one side
and the neighbourhood of Freilu on the other. They
here also could bombard the points of junction of
his lateral communications. They pushed forward
to the heights north and east of Pont a Mousson
until from those heights they were in range, though
distant range, of the chief southern communica-
tions of Metz. In the Vosges, at very heavy
expense, very slowly, but with continuous deter-
mination, they pushed on until they occupied simi-
Jar positions, from which they dominated at long
range the main railways of the Alsatian plain.
QThat done, they fell back upon the defensive.
Their air service, over and above its main work
of observation and of " spotting " for the hea\y
pieces, dropped bombs upon certain headquarters
(especially the great general headquarters at
Mezieres), upon the railway junctions (work done
with peculiar success by the British Flying Corps
in Belgium), upon the airship sheds, and upon
stores and munitions. It is particularly to be
noticed that all this process of purely military
work became more and more restrained, as it
Avere, was more and more exactly directed toAvards
purely military objects as the Avinter passed into
spring and as the moment for an offensive
approached. The whole thing has been aptly com-
pared by Colonel Maude to the Laying of founda-
tions by an engineer before he builds, and the
nearer the moment has come for erecting the walls
upon the foundations the more minutely and
thoroughly has the allied work concerned iteelf
with those foundations alone. There has been less
and less, as the weeks passed, of chance blows or
of tentative adventure. There has been a steadier
accumulation of men and of munitions, a somewhat
increased rigour in the blockade by sea, and, as
was perfectly right, a someAvbat increased severity
in the censorship.
Now, compare with this process and its cumu-
lative character the corresponding action of the
enemy.
He begins as early as December with announc-
ing an indecisive action before Warsaw, which all
but ended in a disaster for himself, as comparable
to a defeat of the Persians by the Greeks. He later
announces, after the local defeat of one army corps,
the total destruction of the tenth Russian Army.
He proclaims that the special bombardment of
Rheims is an act of retaliation. He drops bombs
upon watering-places along the East Coast, where
— as almost everywhere in England noAvadays —
there were troops billeted, but Avhich he carefully
styles as being " fortified places." He announces
that he will sink merchantmen by submarine, but
at first he attempts to save the crews. He proceeds
to a policy of sinking them Avith or without saving
the crews, indifferently. He announces his great
offensive in Galicia in terms of extreme rhetoric
Avhich do not correspond Avith the facts. He makes
a raid upon the Baltic coast of Russia Avhich can
have no direct effect upon the campaign as a whole.
He sends out more than one bombastic telegram to
reigning families allied with his reigning house
and takes care that they shall be published abroad.
He shoots at extreme range, Avithout aiming, large
shells into Dunkirk, hitting at random, and Avith
no conceivable military object. He sinks the Lusi-
tania, producing an effect, one side of which, its
horror and its novelty, must bear no relation to the
comparatively small cargo of munitions thereby
prevented from reaching his foe, and his Press,
which, even where it is purely financial and cos-
mopolitan, like the Cologne Gazette, acts under
orders, and particularly emphasises that side of all
these actions which is calculated to affect, not
military, but civilian opinion.
I would even go so far as to say that the use of
poisonous gases, which he has developed, falls
under the same category. That they are efficacious
in driving men from trenches we knoAv. But there
is something else. The thing could have been done
with chemical agents that Avould not have the pecu-
liar effect of these poisons. Again, it is an agency
expensiA'e in preparation and in time. Again, it
can only be used under special circumstances of
weather. Again, it is an agency that has only been
used on one tiny fraction of his Avhole line.
Now, I am not denying that in all this the
enemy is putting his very fullest military effort
forward as well. My point is that the most
remarkable part of his recent activity has l:>een
this appeal to the nerve of neutrals and of belli-
gerent civilians. When he dropped a few .shells
6*
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
into Dunkirk the other day from a range of over
twenty miles, with his guns at an extreme eleva-
tion, with no earthly chance of hitting any one
military target, he produced in our Press exactly
the effect which he desired. There was first a
nervous fear lest his fleet might not be in the North
Sea. Next, that exceedingly naif astonishment
that heavy guns could deliver shells at range so
great. When he sank the Lusitania he excluded
tor the moment from the attention of most neutrals
and of all civilians the very much more important
military developments of the few days succeeding
that tragedy. And no wonder, for it was a thing
more awful by far in its effect upon the imagina-
tion than the much more disquieting advance of
the Austro- Germans into Galicia.
The whole thing may be compared to the
action of t^^'o boxers, one of whom should confine
the whole of his energy to the boxing while the
other produced appeals time and again during the
match, or sought to impress the spectators by blows
that drew blood. The expert would, perhaps, in
too great a degree confine himself in such a mat^h
to the way in which the mere chances of the game,
according to the rules of its art, were turning ; but
the spectators, in proportion to their ignorance of
that art, would have their attention directed to the
side issues of disgust or of protest.
What does this obvious and increasing orien-
tation of the enemy's efforts towards politicjal effect
mean ? It means that Prussia, of the two weapons
upon which she has always relied, is now relying
more upon the terror of the civilian population
than upon the purely military art. She is still
relying upon both, but relying more than ever upon
the first. And that means, in its turn, that she
l^elieves this m.oral effect upon the civilian popula-
tion to be becoming more and more her best chance
of obtaining an inconclusive peace.
I am not here concerned with whether her
calculation is wise or unv/ise, still less am I con-
cerned with an estimate of its morality. I am only
regarding the matter as an index of how the war
stands in the mind of the German General Staff
and of what they probably conceive the future to
be. And I discover that index to point towards an
increasing doubt whether they can by military
means alone achieve wh.nt has become their some-
what modest aim. of saving the State. To acquire
an hegemony in Europe, to eliminate the French
from the list of the great neutral Powers, to for-
bid Russia future influence in the Balkans, to
keep the Italian forces vassal or ally, to exploit
economically the Turkish territory in Asia — to
do any one of these things in even the remote
future, no one of their directing minds is so
foolish as to hope. The whole plan, carefully
matured and diligently prepared, has failed. In
one respect, indeed, and a most important one,
that plan may still conceivably be pursued, I mean
the outlet of energy which would concern itself
with a special duel against Great Britain : the
surpassing of British eeaborne commerce by Ger-
man, the acquirement of Colonial possessions at
the expense of Britain, and the exploitation for
the future of those particular economic fields in
which England has gained supreniacy. It was but
one chapter of the whole programme, and, save to
those who had least grasp of reality among the
North Germans of our generation, not the most
important chapter. The mo.'it important thing by
far was to become the chief Power in Europe. The
attack on Britain would follow only as a natural
course. But the attack on Britain, once conceived
as a form of slow and necessary successful mari-
time and economic competition, has now become
the only feasible part of the national ambition. It
can be pursued at the price of an inconclusive
peace. If the German organism is spared, if the
Prussian Empire remains in being after the war,
nothing else of the programme will stand, but an
attack on Britain segregated from all the other
lost ambitions is still permitted. It would be an
attack delivered no longer by the chief Power in
Europe, only by one Power among many, and that
Power degraded and weakened as compai'ed with
its great Continental neighbours. But the attack
covld he delivered if an inconclusive peace were
patched up, and that inconclusive peace, the
enemy believes, can best be served by concentrat-
ing his moral effects upon neutral and civilian
people, but particularly against the opinion of this
country. That is the moral of all that crescendo
of horrification which has used poir.onous
gases against the extreme of the British line,
which has shelled Dunkirk at twenty-two miles
(and lost a gun), and yet not shelled Nancy at
nfteen, which has sunk the Lusitania, and which
proposes to burn, one after another, a group of
civilian habitations in these islands, and anyone
who chooses can draw his military lesson from so
strange a perversion of the mind. It is in clear
lineal descent from those lesser massacres of
civilians and those experiments in terror which
marked the campaign of 1870-71.
AN ELEMENTARY
GLOSSARY.
{Continued.)
TrIE cliief weapon in modern war is the miasile, jus*
as the chief weapon in ancient war was the arm
properly so called, tlie thing held in the hand,
the lance or the sword.
The missile is obviously an extension of th«
lauce or the sword. It strikes a blow as does the lance or tho
sword. The only difference in its action is that it strikes
a blow beyond the reach of tho human agent responsible for
its discharge.
With the insignificant exception of certain trench de-
vices, the modern missile is discharged by the explosion of
chemical compounds of a sort varying in the different ser-
vices, but roughly combined in English under the term
povder.
The charge thus used for driving the missile forward and
throwing it at the enemy is called " the propeUant charge "
(to distinguish it from a bursting charge, &c., of which mora
in a moment).
The basis of this explosion is everywhere nowadays
cotton, though the proportion of cotton differs with the dif-
ferent services. It is highest in the French and American,
and lowest, I believe, in the Austrian.
Tiie missiles thus discharged by the use of propellant ex-
plosives are nowadays, save in the case of certain very largo
pieces, still bound up in one piece with the propellant chart^e,
just as the shot in a gun is bound up in one cartridge with
the powder and the cap, and this form of constructing ammu-
nition is known as firfd ammunition. Among the other
points, which render copper so essential to modern war-
fare, is one connected with this matter of fixed ammuni-
tion. It is important that the lower part of tha
cartridge which holds the propellant explosive and grips the
base of tha missile should be seamless. Brass can be pres.'jed
from one whole piece into the required shape so that tha
7*
LAND AND .WATER.
May 15, 1915.
,^^eo 01 ine cartridga is all of ons substance with the sides,
but apparently no substitute for brass, with its due propor-
ticfl of copper, can give quite the same results in this respect.
Missiles thus discharged ara of two kinds — those dis-
charged from small arms, called sntall arm ammunition, or
generally hvlleAs, and those discharged by artillery, generally
called shell. Both the bullet and the shell, both the ammu-
nition discharged from the rifle and that discharged from the
gun, are iu longitudinal section parallelograms, terminating
in ogives. Iu cubical shape, cylindro-conical. In more
simple language each is a round barrel, tapered off to a point
in front, but with a circular base. With this shape, though
it is quite modern in conception, everyone is now very
familiar. It has been adopted for two rca^'ons. It is the
shape that flies most steadily and gives the best results in
activity; it is also that which, on the whole, offers the least
resistance to the air, and would therefore travel furthest
with the same propellaut charge.
As between the bullet and the shell, between the small
arm ammunition and the ammunition for artillery, there are
three radical differences of dimension, construction, and ob-
ject in use.
The modern bullet averages round about a third of an
inch iu diamet-er, the size var^'ing slightly with the different
services, but the shell begins round about three inches in
diameter, and increases indefinitely with the calibre of the
gun discharging it, the largest shells at the present moment
being over 16 inches in diameter. It is obvious that the
size of the shell varies not v/ith the diameter but with the
cube of the diameter. The two characteristics which dif-
ferentiate the two kinds of missiles are first and most obviously
their size — small arm ammunition is handled ; a quantity of
it goes into a light packet; it is insignificant in weight com-
pared with man's strength. Artillery ammunition must be
lifted, and after quite the first and smallest specimens cannot
be lifted by man without the aid of mechanical contrivances.
But much more important a distinction nowadays is the
nature of the blow struck. Small arm ammunition has for its
object the disablement of an enemy with one wound. It is
but rarely that a bullet will strike more than one man, and
it is obvious that, in comparison with the total number of
bullets discharged, only a small number of men will be hit.
The shell, save in certain exceptional cases, is de-
signed to explode at that point in its career wliere
it will do most damage to the enemy, and the
fragments of the exploded sliell and the bullets which it iu
particular cases contains disperse and may strike a number
of men or inflict many wounds upon one man. Artillery am-
munition is essentially an ammunition which is not intended
to strike with solid effect, but to act by explosion upon reach-
ing its most useful point, either upon impact or in the air
just over the object to be attained. Shell, therefore, is pro-
vided with a hnrstiitg charge, and the bursting charge is of
different composition from the propellant charge which drives
the missile out of the v/eapon. This bursting charge is not
based upon cotton, and can be composed of such different
materials that almost any nation can decide upon one type
the materials for which will be found within its boundaries
in spite of any pos-sible blockade. Thus, most of the bursting
charges in the German service are based upon the by-products
of the distillation of coal, of which, of course, Germany pos-
sesses an inexhaustible quantity.
Roughly speaking, the reason that the bursting charge
and the propellant charge are made of different materials
is this: In a bursting charge what you want is imme-
diate action of the most violent kind, or, as it is technically
called, rapid combustion, but in the propellant charge you
want gradual action. You want the pressure upon the pro-
jectile within the bore of the piece to be exercised with a
sort of increasing push; only thus can you get the maximum
efliciency of a gun with the minimum of material. Of course,
the combustion is really inconceivably rapid in both cases,
but if we could put time under a microscope, as we can put
dimensions in space under a microscope, and turn the seconds
into hours we should see a bursting charge acting all at once
as an explosion of gunpowder does in the actual time of our
experien. J, while we should see the propellant charge in the
shape of a much slower and cumulatively increasing expan-
eion of gas from the dissolution of the solid chemical com-
pound forming the original explosive.
The bursting charge in a shell is brought into action by
a device known as a fuse,. This fu.se is fixed upon the point
of the shell, the conical shape of which has just been de-
Bcribed, because that is the part of the shell most likely first
to strike an object at which the shell is aimed, and, there-
fore, a fuse there situated can be used for exploding the shell
on impact as well as for exploding it in the air.
Tlie fuse that explodes the shell on impact acts in a
fashion which everyone understands and which need not be
explained. The same fuse acting in a different fashion,
which explodes the shell while it is still in the air, has been
brought to extraordinary perfection in our time, and the
nicety with which the exact moment of explosion can be cal-
culated has made a totally different thing of modern field
artillery from what the same arm was within living memory.
This action of the fuse wliich explodes the shell while
it is still in the air is known as time-fusing, and the fuse
when it so acts is a time-fuse. The principle of its action is
the same as that wliich worked in the extremely crude fuse
of an older period. It is essentially a train of combustible
material, which is set alight at the discharge of the missile
from the piece, which is timed to burn for a certain period,
at the end of which it will explode the bursting charge, and
the fuse is " set " to such and such a number of seconds and
fractions of seconds as will cause the explosion to take place
just over the point where the effect of that explosion will be
most damaging.
When a shell thus explodes at a particular time chosen
in its flight it creates what is technically known as " a cone
of dispersion." If the projectile were to be stationary at
the moment it exploded its fragments would disperse through
a sphere on all sides; as it is in rapid movement, they dis-
perse as a fact through a cone, the apex of which is at the
point of the explosion. In timing a fuse the object is to get
the shell to explode just where this "cone of dispersion"
will do most execution against the enemy.
Por instance, if you are shooting against a swarm of
men charging against you across the open, you try to set your
time-fuse so that the shell shall explode rather above the
heads of the men and a little in front of the advancing mass.
In this way the cone of dispersion, coming down upon them,
will cover the greatest area of the target at which it is aimed.
If, on the other hand, you are trying to search a trench (a
thing which the shell does most imperfectly, unless it is of
high angle fire) you time it so that it jhall burst just above
the trench and a little in front of it, but so nearly upon it
that thf cone of dispersion will take effect entirely within the
trench.
Shells are fitted with fuses which will always explode on
impact, and may, if it is so desired, explode to time instead —
that is, in the air before impact take;; place. But, generally
speaking, shells are of two kinds: those which are intended
to explode on impact and the work of which is done upon
their striking the target, and those which are normally in-
tended to be exploded v.ith a time-fuse. Of the former sort
are high explo.sive shells, the object of which is to destroy
earthwork, and to stun, bewilder, kill, and wound men
sheltering behind earth and in trenches. Of the latter sort
are the shells of field-gims, which, with the exception of a
small proportion to be used for the destruction of the target
aimed at, are shrapnel— thsX is, shells which not only burst
into a number of fragments but also discharge on bursting a
great number of missiles in the shape of rounded or slightly
flattened bullets which they contain.
MR. HILAIRE BELLOC'3 WAR LECTURES.
Derby Assembly Rooms.. Thursday 13 May, 3.
Sheffield Town Hall Thursday 13 May, 8.
Yoik Opera House Friday 14 May, 3.
Harrogato Kursall Satm-day 16 May, 3.
Dover Town Hall Wednesday 19 May, 3.
Folkestone Town Hall Wednesday 19 May, 8.
Next lecture, Queen's Hall, Wed., Jun« 2, 8.30.
OUR FRONTISPIECE.
Copies on Art Paper of the series of War
Portraits, specially drawn for Land and Water
ty Joseph Simpson, R.B.A., may he had, price.
2s. 6d. each, on application to the Publisher, Land
AND Water, Central House, King sway, London^
JV.C.
Last week's portrait. General Joffre.
This week's, General Foch.
8*
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER,
THE WAR BY WATER.
THE "LUSITANIA" AND THE SUBMARINE WAR.
By A. H. POLLEN.
KOTE. This article has been sabmitted to the Press Bureaa, which does oot object to the pnblication as censored, and tal^es co
responsibility for the correctness ol the statements.
THE sinking of the Lusitania is an event
whicii strikes the imagination with
extraordinary force. No disaster in the
long history of men's conquest of the sea,
save the loss of the Titanic, compares with it.
But the Titanic kept afloat for several hours, and
the Lusitania sank, it seems, twenty minutes after
she was struck. It is the awful suddenness of the
thing that horrifies. It was this that cost so dearly
in lives. There were boats enough for all, but no
time to lower them. It is a singular comment that
the number of the boats was dictated by the lesson
of the Titanic loss and was prescribed by the Inter-
national Commission^ — called at the Kaiser's in-
itiative ! That over one thousand civilians, some
two hundred of them neutral, should have been
murdered in cold blood ha;? excited an emotion
simultaneously expressed in widely separated
countries in almost identical terms. I do not pro-
pose to discuss the moral aspect of this singular
crime. No one needs conversion to right views on
the subject, except those to whom moral appeals
have no meiining. I propose, therefore, to deal
with it solely as an incident in the new kind of war
which Germany has declared upon our seaborne
trade.
It is perhaps as well to remind ourselves how
it was that hostilities took this form. On Decem-
ber 10 last came the news that the whole of
Von Spee's squadron, except the Dresden, had
been sunk at the Falkland Islands. The blow was
a heavy one to Germany, and it became unme-
diately necessary to restore her prestige. Within
a week a pov.erful squadron had been sent across
the North Sea, had bombarded Scarborough,
Whitby, and the Hartlepools, and had escaped
home again unengaged by any British ship. The
event was hailed in the German Press as a great
victory, and a proof that Great Britain did not
command the North Sea. Great Britain, though
indignant, showed no signs of fear or panic. The
rest of the world, particularly America, spoke of
the bombardment of unfortified places as a lapse
into barbarism, and jeered at the runaways. As an
assertion of Germany's sea prestige the raid was
not a success. A new situation seems then to have
arisen. To strike those who could not strike back,
to run away as soon as the chance of a fight
showed, and then to proclaim this as a victory
had made the German Na\y ridiculous in the eyes
of the world. What was there to do? It was
suicide to seek a fleet action. To sit down under
the domination of the English Fleet was equally
impossible. In a spasm of anger Von Tirpitz
taunted the Americans with stopping their trade
with Germany at England's dictation, and asked
them how they would like to see all trade with
Britain stopped by submarines? There would at
least be nothing ridiculous about that. This was
within a week of the Hartlepool raid. The threat
was received by the American Press with the com-
ment we should expect from those whose business it
is to give educated expression to the judgment of a
civilised people. The answer seems to have been
exasperating to those to whom it was addressed.
But, if I remember right, no more was heard of
the threat until after the affair of the Dogger
Bank, when the German Fleet suffered that fiSal
eclipse of reputation that must foUow flight —
and unsuccessful flight — in action. Had raiding
been given another chance? Was it the loss of
the Bliicher that determined the German Emperor
to turn the submarine threat into an actuality ?
The terms in which the new blockade was declared,
no less than President Wilson's reply, will be
fresh in the reader's mind. Both have been ex-
tensively quoted during the last few days. The
point to remember is that the threat arose out of
the defeat at the Falkland Islands and the failure
of the cross-ravaging raids. It was resolved upon
after the great discredit of the Dogger Bank. Its
execution was only delayed until Germany could
construct a justification. A Government mono-
poly of corn and flour was forthwith put into
effect, and it was proclaimed that as the German
people were on the point of famine no mercy could
be shown to the Power that was starving them.
The blockade itself came into effect on
February 18 and has now been in force for the best
part of three months. As a means of reducing
our food supply or of diminishing our willingness
to continue the war it has been a complete failure.
Hardly one in every 400 of our ships has been
sunk, and until Friday last no big ship had been
sunk at all.
Is there anything in the sinking of the Lysi-
tania to make us fear that the submarine is a more
effective weapon than we all thought ? More effec-
tive than its past failure would indicate ? Is any
greater success in the attack on our trade to be
expected ?
The time has been ample to prove that, so far,
the judgment of every competent critic, expressed
before the campaign began, was correct. Betv>een
August and February the only successes of any
note which the enemy's submarines had scored
against our fighting fleet were the sinking of the
three cruisers on September 22, of Hawke on Octo-
ber 15, and of Formidable on the night of New
Year's Day. No other warship had been touched.
It is generally agreed that rational precautions
would have saved these five ships also. On each
of the three occasions the victims had been going
at slow speed, or were stationary; on two they
were said to have been cruising in neighbourhoods
they had been frequenting for some days ; in none
was there any destroyer protection.
During the whole of this period a very
crowded traffic had plied daily between the
Southern ports of England and the Northern ports
of France. Some hundreds of thousands of men
had been sent across to fight, and a constant
stream of supply ships, hospital ships, and trans-
ports had been in regular passage, from one end
9*
LAND AND .WATER
May 15, 1915.
of the Channel to the other. Not a sinc;;o attack passengers who laughed at the threat did so
was successfully directed against any one oP theiii. iDeeause they had absolute confidence in the pro-
And against all — except hospital ships — sub- tection that the British ^avy could give them. To
marine attacks, even without warning, would have accept them as passengers was an implied under-
been within the accepted rules of war, and justi- taking that this confidence was not misplaced. If
fied by a direct military purpose. The absence we could not spare tliem destroyers, could we not
of attack on the transports and warships vvhen at least have seen that, once oft' tlie coast of
properly protected; the failure of the attack (in Ireland, the ship had an escort of patrol vessels?
the Heligoland affair) on the fast battle-cruiser Such vessels hail, in fact, accompanied the Giilf-
Quccii Mary, confirmed _t he conclusions put for- light, and though they were not able to save her
ward before the war. The submarine is a slow-
moving sort of assassin, and can do his w^ork only
if he can stalk a slow prey or waylay a fast one.
He is defenceless against attack, and finds safety
only in evasion. Th.e situation could be sum-
from being torpedoed, it was one of these vessels
that took every soul off her alive before she sank.
Might not an escort have saved a thousand lives
on Friday last?
Captain Turner admits that he was warn* '
marised thus : Submarines could not frequent of the presence of subinarines, though not that he
waters patrolled by destroyers, that they could net was told of the sinking of the three steamers I have
show tliemselves in the neighbourhood of ships, if named. And in following his old route and in
destroyers were in their company; lastly, that in dropping his speed to seventeen and eighteen
daylight a big ship at high speed might be safe knots, he says he was acting, so far as he was able
from even a close-range attack if she were
efficiently conned and skilfully handled.
It would seem, then, that no fast liner, either
going at its top speed or avoiding an habitual
or expected route, or with a destroj^er or two in
company, should be in any danger whatever. It
is the fact that these precautionary measures
were at once so obvious and so w'ell known that
to, under " instructions." Did the Admiralty in-
struct him to follow the usual homeward course, on
the supposition that the pirates, after all the warn-
ings they had given, would certainly be looking for
him elsewhere ? Was he told to go slow because it
would be a great<>r risk to wait for a pilot in the
Mersey than to be at the mercy of any waylaying
submarine in the danger zone? Would not both
makes the omission to adopt any one of them so forms of danger have been averted had the ship
startling in the case of the Lvsitania. Although
capable of twenty-five knots, she was going barely
two-thirds of this speed when torpedoed oft' the
Old Head of Kinsiile. She was apparently passing
within a mile or two of the route which, time out of
mind, every home-bound Atlantic liner has fol-
lowed. Although submarines were known to be act-
ing off the South Irish coast, no destroyer preceded'
or accompanied the doomed liner.
The recent sinkings of the Earl of Lathom, of
the Candidate, and of the Centurion, and the at-
made a detour at twenty-five knots, and so arrived
at the prescribed hour, after a longer journey
through safer waters, at a speed which has been
proved to be protective?
It is clear that we do not yet know the full
story, and what we do know is not very satis-
factory. No new fact is disclosed that should alter
our judgment on the submarine. We onlj' know
that precautions hitherto proved effective were not
taken. We do not know why not. The Admiralty
has done so well for the merchant service that the
tempt to sink two others in these waters might present disaster is doubly conspicuous. And it is
have been notice enough that the Lusitania was in
a danger zone. But to make sure, the German
Ambassador in America had given every possible
publicity to the intention to sink her, if it could
be done. The warning was repeated to individual
paasengers by telegrams addressed to them person-
ally. Note that the urgency of this effort to deter
Americans from travelling in her afforded no
reason for supposing that, if a submarine got with-
in striking range, the Lusitania would be stopped
and told to disembark her passengers. Two in-
ferences only were possible. The thing was a bluff
or murder on an untold scale was in prospect.
Neither Mr. Churchill's answers in the House
of Commons on Monday, nor Captain Turner's
the m.ore regrettable from the fact that, while the
crim.inality of Germany cannot be disputed, our
competence to combat it can be.
THE DARDANELLES.
Since I wrote last week, no official news of the
progress in the Dardanelles has thrown any fresh
light on the Naval share in those operations, but of
unofficial news we have a good deal of an extra-
ordinarily important and interesting character.
Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett, who viewed the operations
at Gapa Tepe from H.M.S. London, has ca,bled the
most brilliant description of the landing of the
Australians and New Zealanders on the 25th and
26th. The story is necessarily far from complete,
evidence at the Irish inquest explained why none anddealsonly with what a single observer on board
of the three precautionary measures I have m.en-
tioned were taken either to save the ship or to pre-
vent a hideous loss of life. We are told that a
destroyer escort is only given to merchant ships
that are " vitally needed " by the Government.
The Lusitania was the only one of the world's
great liners in commission. She exceeded in dis-
placement by over 12,000 tons any other passenger
ship in use. Her continuance in the Atlantic ser-
vice was perhaps the miost striking of all visible
evidences of our comm.and of the sea. Was there
no " vital need " to safeguard so tremendous an
embodiment of our naval prestige?
one ship could see. On Tuesday was pub-
lished an almost equally interesting account of
the landing at the Five Beaches at the point of the
Peninsula. The two reports amply justify tho
forecast made last week that this landing would
turn out to be the greatest operation of combined
military and naval forces ever recorded.
Every step in the difficult and complicated
job of disembarking troops into boats, of towing
them to the shore, and all of this by night, had, it
seems, been rehearsed day after day until ever)'-
one was step-perfect, but heartily sick of the
drill. The rapidity with which the operation
But more than our naval prestige was at stake, was actually performed on the 25th is the best
The warnings that murder was intended had l^een justification of these arduous rehearsals. It is
openly and ubiquitously given. The American characteristic of the Navy to leave nothing to
10*
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND .WATEE
chance in an affair of this kind, and, indeed, so
great are the difficulties that to have attempted the
thing without every detail having been learned
would have been a mere courting of disaster. The
speed at which all these vital nianoeu\Tes were
worked out and mastered is little short of extra-
ordinary. Early in April Sir Ian Hamilton was
reviewing the French troops in Egj'pt. By the
21st every transport at Murdos Bay and every
officer and man on board was apparently ready for
action. There must haA'e been a verv strenuous
fortnight's work, though no doubt many of the
more ingenious arrangementjs — such, for instance,
as the conversion of the River Clyde into the
modem equivalent of the Horse of Troy — must
have been put in hand a long time before.
Our most pressing curiosity at the moment,
however, is not to do with the past, but with the
present position and the future prospect. We
Know more of the present position since Mr.
Asquith's statement in the House of Commons on
Thursday last. Of the future we can say this with
confidence, that the success of the entire operation
will depend upon the extent to which the artillery
of the Fleet is able to co-operate with the infantry
and artillery upon shore. Last week I dwelt upon
some of the limits of this co-operation — such as
the inability of ships' guns to give the infantry the
advantage of the searching efiect that can only be
got by high-angle fire , the virtual impossibility of
combining the fire of more than one ship on a
single target; the necessity of each ship being
served by a separate observer in every long-range
bombardment of a fort; and, finally, the difficul-
ties of keeping up quick and accurate communica-
tion between each observation station and the ship
it serves. But there is one limitation to which I
did not draw attention at all, and it is perhaps
the most obvious of any of them — I mean the fact
that thick v.eatlier may, at any moment, deprive
the Army of the Fleet's assistance, and that it may
remain so deprived for a considerable period. One
gathers, for instance, from one of Mr. Ashmead-
Bartlett's letters that, from the 12th to the 20tb
of April, perfect weather conditions, both for
landing and for long-range artillery, prevailed;
but that from the 20th to the afternoon of the
23rd the conditions were altogether unfavourable.
A Murdos telegram of Friday last tells us that
there was a gale blov/ing on the 5th, 6th, and 7th.
It seems that these gales generally bring with them
low-hanging clouds and a grey mist, which make
long-range tire impossible, because the gunners
cannot pick up the target thi-ough their sights.
There were many interruptions to the bombard-
ment in February and March ov.ing to this cause.
The weather was not so bad that the ships could
not co-operate on the 6th, and there is no inti-
mation that there was any thick weather
between April 25 and May 5, so that there
should have been ten clear days in which to
make the most of the offensive of the combined
Services. It seems clear that the naval gunfire,
both direct and indirect, was of vital moment in
the momentous actions of the 26th, 27th, and 28th.
The capacity of the Army to stand safely on the
defensive, if weather should throw the naval guns
out of action, would naturally depend upon two
factors — first, how far the offensive had beeu car-
ried while the help of the naval guns was avail-
able, and, next, upon the number and weight of
the artillery which it has been possible to land,
emplace, and to supply with ammunition. It Vvaa
no doubt realised from the first that the grcatect
weakness of the position lay in the possibility of
a sudden divorce between the two Services. But it
should be remembered that, with the advance of
the summer, the spells of bad weather should be
at once less frequent and shorter when they come.
AN AFFAIR OFF THE BELGIAN
COAST.
The Secretary of the Admiralty made an
announcement on Saturday last to the effect that
the T.B.D. Maori had struck a mine off the Bel-
gian coast, that the crew had taken to the boats,
and that the T.B.D. Crusader's boats had been
lowered to assist. The enem.y then opened fire, and
Crusader, after being under fire for an hour and a
half, had to retire, leaving her own and Maori's
boats behind her. Seven officers and eighty-eight
men were in them and were taken prisoners. It is
not stated that either the Crvsoder or the boata
suffered any casualties, and to most people the
story has appeared exceedingly puzzling. Was
the mine struck before daylight? Why was
Crusader unable to pick up any of the boats? It
IS possible that Cntmder drew the fire of the forts,
in the hope that the boats would be able to pull
out of danger, and manoeuvred quickly to avoid
being hit herself? Perhaps after an hour and
a half of this it was found impracticable for
the boats to make way enough to have any hopes
of getting to safety. To take in the crews.
Crusader must have stopped and become too easy
a mark. To stay any lontjer was to take a useless
risk, possibly involving tlie risk of losses amongst
the boats as well. Wliat the destroyers were doing
within range of the forts is not explained. The
German vessels that took our men apparently came
out and returned without being engaged. What
kind of vessels were they ? Perhaps the most in-
credible part of the story is that our boats were
taken and not sunk. The less of a destroyer and
so many officers and men is a sericus matter, and it
is to be hoped that the Admiralty will give us
further particulars.
THE STRONG LINE FOR AMERICA.
By CAPTAIN CLARENCE WIENER.
fCaptain Wiener -is the wel! known American military expert and
writer. Ug held 3. rduimission in tbe British Army during tlie .S^mth
Afiican war, when he w.ia twice mentioned in di-^jj-itchea. His views
»a an American citizen have special interest at the present moment.J
IT would be well if Americans cea33d to gaze on the sur-
face of things only — it would be well if they looked
closoly into the iiatura of the great catacly.sm that is
taking place not only on the plains of Europe, but in
many other quarters of the inhabited globe. For the
moment the United States might be styled the playground of
the world, for there no sounds of guns iired in anger are
heard, no cries of outraged womanhood, none of the miseries
of absolute devastation. Yet this lilierty from the horrors of
conflict may well ba but a nioineniary respite. Should the
Teutonic races win through on th'^ir policy of " blord and
iron," America will have bnt a few brief years cf culpable
peace; in the end Prussian rr.iiitary doniini.tion will hold her
in its grasp as the ice holds the polar seas.
It would be well, while there is yet time, to take these
things to heart. And to act. For never again — if true civili-
sation and enlightened progress is throttled new — will we, the
citizens of the United States, have Fuch grost forces actino
in unity with ourselves. That may appear a fclfish view-point
U*
LAND AND WATER.
May 15, 1915.
lo take. Bnt policy is destiny In this, as in all elm. Still,
let US look at the other side of the picture. If we Americana
now stand aside and allow other Powers to fight our battles, aa
well as their own, what will be the result t Will these nations,
as victors, look up to Americans t Will they even regard
Giam as friendly equals 1 Why should they f They will
have suffered much hardship, much travail; the agony and
horror they have passed through will take many years to
heal. If America selfishly and superficially stands aside, it is
true she may not suffer loss in the field; but will she not be
made to feel in time to come how cowardly and how un-
friendly her action has been t
The world is out of joint. It is no time to fall back
npon " quack cures," if true understanding is to be preserved
among peoples; and if the Germanic race is to be saved from
itself, there is now but one cure, and one alone — it is by appli-
cation of the surgeon's knife.
We of the United States are far too apt to boast of manly
qualities, the freedom of our institutions, the liberty of our
personalities, and let it end thus in windy and futile pratings.
Such exhibitions will cause us little benefit in time to come,
unless backed by resolute and virile action. We must not
let pass this golden opportunity of aiding in the righting of
the world's affairs, of doing our share in cutting out the
canker of a malignant growth in the side of universal friend-
ship and true brotherhood.
We are fond of talking of effete Europe, but where would
the United States be if England, France, and Russia — not
forgetting valiant little Belgium — had sunk into a state of
atrophy? For ia there really a sane statesman, even a sane
citizen, among us who could truthfully state that in his
opinion the Teutonic races would have waited to cross the
'Atlantic in order to occupy Canada and Brazil ! Waited for
:what, forsooth ? The pleasure of the United States I No ;
,we would have been trampled under the iron heel of Potsdam
(ust as ruthlessly as was Belgium and Poland. Are we
Americans such fools that we won't admit these things even
to ourselves?
Why, then, do we try to screen ourselves behind a wall
0f evasion ? If we were such dullards a few brief months
ago as to believe the Germanic races loved us better than
•ther nations, surely the scales have by now fallen from our
eyes ? We need only to look at the scurvy and virulent car-
toons in their public Press to see how we are regarded now
that our neutrality cannot bo used as a catapaw in their
favour. Nor is even this neutrality respected. The German
lAmbassador and his entire staff are implicated in the most
damnable underhand acts against us; nor doea it stop at that.
JThis gentleman and his staff are engaged in trying to bolster
up, both oflScially and privately, a pestiferous propaganda in
our country and against friendly Powers in a most mendacious
and improper manner. What wonder if we finally imut
upon his immediate recall ? Of the extraordinary trio, Bern-
Btorff, Miinsterberg, and Demberg, the latter alone will then
remain to sway American public opinion improperly by
gaseous lies and subterfuges.
The Governmer.t at Berlin not only laughs at the impro-
priety of the conduct of their representatives in America —
it insults and allows to be insulted publicly in Berlin the
U.S. Ambassador. AU this might be set down to temporary
and rabid madness. But tliere is no excuse for their pre-
sumptuous and murderous dictation in regard to the conduct
of the war. They are without the pale of civilisation, outlaws
of humanity, and must be treated as one treats a mad dog.
They must be destroyed. Civilisation and barbarism, Rome
and Carthage, cannot both exist.
These perfidious exponents of a brutal doctrine first of all
declare a blockade that they can in no way enforce. They
then aflSrm, against all accepted rules of International
law, that they wiU sink all ships whatsoever found within a
tremendous sea area, which they are good enough to term a
" war zone." The United States protests against this entirely
novel and iniquitous treatment. Berlin laughs at us and our
"quack" measures; she sinks two of cur ships flying the
national emblem. What do we do ? Talk ! We might be even
forced to say something quite severe did the occasion arise
again I And now she has sunk without warning of any kind a
trans- Atlantic liner, involving the murder of many American
citizens. Certainly it cannot be said that the "threats"
delivered to the passengers in New York were proper " warn-
ing." It will not mitigate the sentence civilisation will pass on
the wholesale murder of undefended " neutrals." Yet it ia
proposed that the Executive ia Washington should send a
query to Berlin asking if this ghoulish deed was, in fact, in-
tended I No wonder that Europe is taking us for a useless lot
of money-grubbers; this is what we are certainly degenerat-
ing into. Why not take our stand — a manly and a chivalrous
stand ? I'm afraid that if we do not there will be but few that
will remain proud of being Americans. That is not a pleasant
prospect to true patriots.
So if we finally wake up to a proper sense of our honour
and declare war on these brutal buccaneers, what will
transpire ? First and foremost we shaU be doing our duty to
civilisation. We shall be doing our apportioned share in
bringing to a close within the speediest time a conflict of great
Buffering. We shall at the close of this conflict be on an equal
footing with the other friendly nations. Politically, we shall
be in a position of tremendous and almost unequalled
strength. Is this not worth while ? But far and away
more important, more advantageous, and great'Cr for us in a
myriad ways will be the comradeship and federated under-
standing between ourselves and the friendly nations — a real
contribution towards the peace of the world.
THE BIG AEROPLANE.
ITS VALUE FOR THE OFFENSIVE.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
BOMB-THROWING from aircraft can be considered
an eflBcient and reliable method of bombardment
only when the number of bombs dropped in a
given time ia large. The importance of the
number of bombs in carrying out an aerial attack
has on several occasions been Bhown in this publication. A
large number of bombs can at present be carried only by a
large number of aeroplanes, at least so far as the French and
the British are concerned. As regards the Russians, they
have for the last year or so been experimenting with an aero-
plane of very large dimensions and having a great lifting
capacity. Reports which have recently been published would
tend to show that the Sykorsk-y biplane has now been succesa-
fnlly applied to military uses. If such were really the caae
the advent of the large military aeroplane would give to the
Euasians a weapon of considerable offensive value.
THE "LIFTING" AND THE "FLYING"
QUALITIES OF AEROPLANES.
There are many reasons why the Iarg» aeroplane is a
arach more powerful weapon than the smaD one, and in com-
^ling the large and the small machine it is necessary to Weep
b mind some tedinical details, such as the " Ufting-qutdity '*
Mid the " flying-qualitf " of aoroplanes.
By " lifting-quality " of an aeroplane is meant the
amount of weight it can lift with reference to the power con-
sumed. The greater the weight lifted, for a given amount
of power, the greater is the " lifting-quality " of the machine.
The term " flyint) -quality " is used to denote the weight aa
aeroplane can carry, at a given speed, with reference to the
power consumed. The greater the weight that can be carried,
at a given speed, for a given amount of power, the greater
ia the " flying-quality " of a machine.
It is evident that in considering the value of an aeroplane
for offensive purposes it ia very important that its " lifting-
gvality " as well as its " flying-quality " should be taken
into account. An aeroplane with a great " lifting -quality "
can, relatively, carry a large weight for a small amount of
power — that is, of fuel — consumed. If, besides, it has a great
" flying-quality," the machine will be able to carry that large
weight, at a required speed, with a relatively sm^ consump-
tion of petrol.
An investigation of these two qualities of an aeroplane
shows that they are always; more pronounced in large
machines. It follows, therefore, that from an offensive point
of view the large aeroplane ia much more valuable than the
small one, because of its much greater " lifting " and " fly-
ing " qualities. This conclusion is now deSnitofy establiah«d.
Bucii was not the case, however, a year or so ago, and wei«
VP
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND .WATEB*
a not for that lack of knowledge it b very likely that we
would liow be in possession of a large nnni'oer of offensive
aeroplanes of great dimensions, of large carrying capacity,
and of good " lifting " and " flying " qualities.
TWO LARGE AEROPLANES.
It was towards the end of 1915 or the beginning of 1914
that the advantages of tlio large machine over the, email one
began to be recognised. In France the engineer Collies
was about that time experimenting with the Jeanson-Colliex
seaplane — a machine of huge proportions. In Russia,
Sykcrsky, with the as.?istance of his Government, was develop-
ing the enormous aeroplane which, two or three weeks ago,
was used at the front for the first time.
The JeansouColIiex hydro-aeroplane has a span of 89
feet and a lifting surface of 1,560 square feet. It is fitted
with two Chenu motors of 200 h.p. ea«h and driving a pro-
peller 16ft. in diameter. The t-ctal weight it can lift is
10,340Ib., the " useful" weight being about 4,4001b. Its
speed is about 60 miles per hour. The offensive potentiality
of auch a machine, especially as regards bomb-carrying
capacity, is enormous, and it is a great pity that when the
war broke out the Jeanson-Colliex machine was not sufla-
ciently " developed " for immediate military application. It
may be added that its trials were carried out with groat
success.
The Sykorsky biplane is driven by five motors of 100 h.p.
each. Its span, from wing-tip to wing-tip, measures 121ft.,
and its leugth from nose to tail 66 feet. It has a lifting sur-
face of 1,958 square feet, and has already taken, to a height
of nearly 1,000 feet, a load of sixteen passengers.
The employment of the Sykorsky biplane in military
operations will, in the hands of our Russian AUics, be a
weapon of considerable offensive value, and if the report be
true that th's biplane has now been successfully adapted for
use on the Eastern front we may expect some considerable
development in the matter of aerial attacks.
Both the Jeanson-Colliex seaplane and the Sykorsky
aeroplane could carry a load of 1,0001b. of bombs over a dis-
tance of 250 or 300 miles, and fly back to their etarting base.
OFFENSIVE AEROPLANES FOR
SIEGE WORK.
The large aeroplane, besides being well suited for earry*
ing out such offensive operations as have been already azi-
amined in the columns of this publication, would b« especiany
valuable for siege work.
It has been estimated that, up to the present, some 5,000
shells have been fired by the Germans on the Russian fortified
town of Ossowiecz without having reduced it. Now a fleet of
300 large aeroplanes, consisting of 150 machines in actual uss,
and of the same number in reserve or in the repair shopa,
could drop daily, or several times daily, 6,000 shells of 25Ib.
each; that is, 150,0001b. of shell and high explosives.
In view of this enormous potentiality of the Sykorsky
biplane, it would seem that our Government, as well as tliat
of the French, would do well to adopt the Russian type of
aeroplane (if its success is such as it has been reported) ia
conjunction with the types already in use.
A NEW MEANS OF DEFENCE
AGAINST AIR RAIDS.
In view of the recent airship raids into this country, and
•f the possibility of more visits from Zeppelins, the writer
would like to call the attention of all those connected with
aerial defence to a note read by Professor Branly at a meeting
of the Acad^mie des Sciences held in Paris on March 29,
1915. In hia note Professor Branly, to whom the world owes
wireless telegraphy, shows that by moans of a small motor,
such as that of a motor-bicycle, it is possible to obtain a light
of 40,000 candle power. This is a more powerful light than
that obtained from any other source. As Professor Branly
says in his communication, one can with such luminous
sources possess ' ' a mobile defensive belt against night attacka
of all kinds." It would seem that the most efficient defence
against aircraft operating in darkness is to dazzle them by tha
employment of an intense light.
HONOURS OF WAR.
A STUDY IN GERM-CULTURE.
By JOSEPH THORP.
THE Coran.andant of Fort A. stood in the laboratory
cupola of the poison-control watching through his
mica monocle the Ober-Professor Hauptmann
von Strafenberg putting the finishing touches to
an important experiment in germ kultur. The
air was hushed with mystery. The experimenter trembled
like a chronic dipsomaniac.
The Commandant nei-vously raised his rubber-gloved
hand as if to brush an upturned moustache, and, encounter-
ing the celluloid vizor of his helmet, made a gesture and a
guttural exclamation of profound impatience.
History was being made.
The eminent Kriego-biologist was on the eve of the
greatest discovery of tha Great War — the second or third of
tho series of Great Wars that was definitely to end War.
From the minced fragments of babies' comforters (which
had been collected by volunteer corps of frightful, armed
nursemaids throughout the empire, and, of course, ruth-
lessly commandeered in occupied territory), mixed with the
tertiary gases of hyper-oxidised taxi-cab lubricating oil, dis-
tilled by the Hanptmann-Professor's own pet processes from
the Imperial dustbins of the All-Absorbing's own pet suburb,
he had compounded a medium in which the bacillus of cere-
bro-pneumo-typhns (first bred in the famous State germ-
kennels of von Kalbskopf) multiplied at an indecently ter-
rific rate.
The Professor, overwhelmed with emotion, staggered
to a chdir, tore off his prismatic lenses and amalgamoid in-
sulators, aud, waving the sealed test tube in his hand,
exclaimed triumphantly, " It is finished I I open. And
there is no longer an enemy I "
" Good ! " said the Commandant on a note of anxiety,
eyeing the wagging tube. " But are you quite sure that there
will be anv garrison? Not, of course, that it matters," he
added in loyal apology.
The Professor dived into the pocket of his aluminiumised
overall " If Excellency will but sniff this powder, he can
vith impunity face the aU-removing test tube."
*• Ah I 80," replied the other. " But perhaps a mere
formality; of course it would be more in accordance witK
the regulations if I " and here he touched the bell.
" Precisely," said the Ober-Professor Hauptmann.
An orderly answered with uncanny promptness.
" The Lieutenant commanding the Fifth Typhoid Bat^
tery will attend in five minutes with twelve of his men for
testing purposes; also the Engineer- Asphyxiator will present
a report on the controls of his new hyperaesthetic plant."
But, in fact, the report arrived before the Engineer-
Asphyxiator, for it was just at that moment that an enemy
howitzer that had been doing some inconclusive searching
suddenly landed a lucky shell in the E.-A.'s department.
The outraged officer a few minutes later rushed in
breathless, carrying a smoking germ-mauser in his hand.
" I have the honour to report to your Excellency that a shell
has exploded in my battciy; that the main retort has been
shattered, and the new .000042 cm. germ-brood has escaped;
and that my dogs of men have broken and disgraced my
regiment."
"A shell!" cried the Commandant. "Barbarians!
Swine-dogs 1 They do not fight ; they batter. And your
men? " said tlie Commandant, fiercely.
"They will break no more!" said the Lieutenant
grimly. " Have I your Excellency's permission to join
them? " he added, holding the barrel of his mauser under
his nose and preparing to inhale.
" It will be more in accordance with the Imperial regu-
lations if this ceremony is performed in your own quarters."
The Lieutenant saluted, clicked, and was going when
the Ober-Professor detained him.
" It win be still more in accordance with the ultimate
fitness of things if the Herr Lieutenant will postpone this
ceremony. Ho will live to see the triumph and honour of
our arms. I open this — pouf ! and the enemy is no more.
So." And Ober-Professor Hauptmann von Strafenberg
hugged himself in a bland ecstasy.
It was at this moment that the Engineer-Asphyxiator
E resented himself. " I have to report, sir, that the main
arrel of the C.-P.-T. has been spht and damaged beyond
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915.
repair. I have no material (the last supply of tri-piilpcd
gramophone records has bsen exhausted), and, as the Pro-
fessor is doubtless aware, the effect of the leak is that I havo
no men, or at least none worth seriously considering."
The Professor blanched; the Commandant reflected.
'• This is more than unfortunate, gentlemen. The gal-
lant di-i'ence cau no longer be continued. The Herr Haupt-
rnaun Professor carries in his hands the salvation of our
country. It is necessary that he leave the fort. It is con-
venient that we go with him. We have made an ineffably
brave defence. The twisted and so beautifully coloured corpses
of our r.^sh enemy testify to it." He pointed to some terrible
thinas out on the glacis. " The savour of our deeds shall
smell to heaven for all time. Meanwhile we can count
upon the uucuUurcd chivalry of a profoundly stupid enemy.
We will demand tlie honours of war, the right to leave v^ilh
our weapons, and our little personal possessions — such, for
instance, as this test-tube, eh. Professor? You, Herr Lieu-
tenant, will now carry out a flag of truce. You will take al.'io
these tetanoid capsules. Scattered with discretion, they will
uo doubt cause trouble later.
" Engineer, you will, abo with discretion, connect an
emergency tube from the main typhoid battery with the
prisoners' quarters.
" Herr Professor, I can leave the wells in your excellent
hands "
It was a little later in the day that a Major of Artillery
of a stupid and guileless race returned to the fort with the
Lieutenant to discuss the terms of capitulation. They boiled
down into the granting of a safe conduct to the Commandant,
the Herr Ober-Professor Hauptmann, the Engineer-
Asphyxiator, and the Lieutenant of the Typhoid Battery.
The Major's signature was fixed t-o the authentic parch'^
ment. A sudden faintness overcame him. The Professor
examined him with professional detachment. "It is un-
fortunate," said he, " that he will not live."
" A tetanoid capsule, if I mistake not," said the Com-
mandant, sniffing cautiously.
" Precisely," said the Professor.
" They will always be fools."
" And we shall never be gentlemen," said the Lieu-
tenant, not without emotion, as he gave the last salute to tho
incomparably stupid Major.
" As this amusing gentleman has so inconsiderately re-
moved himself," said the Commandant, emitting a cultured
laugh, " it will hardly be necessary to await the entry of the
enemy. We will leave by aeroplane at once."
BERNHARDI'S VOLTE FACE.
By ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN BRIDGE.
SUFFICIENT commentary on this rather
whining apology of General v. Bernhardi would
be a comparison of the date of publication of his
" Gennany and the Next War" and the date
of his prefatory letter, of v/hich a facsimile is
prefixed to the present apologetic volume.
Bernhardi's " Germany and the Next War " was pub-
lished, I believe, in 1911. I do not know the date of the
first publication of the English translation, but everyone is
aware that the lx)ok v,'a3 reviewed in many English news-
papers and periodicals long before the present war began.
The opinion then formed of the meaning of the work was
virtually unanimous here aud identical with the opinion of
it still prevailing.
No knowledge of any attempt on General v. Bernhardi's
part to explain away or apologise for the sentiments expressed
in the book ever reached the reading public in this country
or — apparently — in the United States. It was, and still is,
impossible to escape the conviction that, at any rate until
after tlio Battle of the Marne, General v. Bernhardi saw no
reason why anything that he had written three years earlier
called for recantation or apology. The change which the
result of that battle imposed upon German hopes is reflected
as in a mirror in General v. Bernhardi's new statements.
The letter in v.-hich he asked the Emperor William's permis-
sion to publish his present recantation is d.ated November 20,
1914, by which time even the most stupid and sanguine
German must liave been convinced that the result of the
Battle of the Marne was not likely to be reversed in a hurry.
It is, therefore, quite easy to understand why General v.
Bernhardi found it advisable to try to explain away towards
the end of 1914 sentiments and statements which he had pro-
mulgated in 1911, and to which, in spite of unfavourable
criticism, he had sturdily adhered throughout almost the
whole of the intervening time. The Battle of the Marne,
following on the heroic aud never-to-be-forgotten resistance
of the Belgians, capsized the whole German strategic plan,
and General v. Bernhardi's earlier notions went overboard
with the rest of the Pots-dam prognostications.
How much of his new statements comes from General v.
Bernhardi himself? It certainly looks as if the " one or two
articles," which he a.sked the Emperor's permission to write —
a permission on which he counted with confidence— it certainly
looks as if these " one or two articles," now published in an
Englisli translation, had been submitted to illustrious inspec-
tion and been improved by the interpolation of statements
emanating from or inspired by the highest authorities.
The reproaches cast at England arc in the true Wilhelm-
strasse-Potsdam style. The intolerable ' tyranny which
Bernhardi or his inspirer imputes to British policy — especially
in South Africa aud in India — has been rewarded, not as
those personages expected, by disaffection and revolt, but by
spontaneous offers of Princes, Feudatory Chiefs, and people
in India of their property and even their lives for the support
of that policy; whilst in South Africa hostilities against the
most important oversea German possession are being con-
ducted by South Africans on their own part, the General in
Command and most of them being Boers.
I do not know v/h other it is General v. Beriihardi him-
self or someone else more continuously in touch with the
highest German authorities who coined the word " Naval-
ism." It is, of course, a mere t>i qtioque to be hurled at
anyone who speaks of Prussian Militarism. The coinage is
regarded, in Germancphile circles, as a brilliant specimen
of Pots-dam wit. The word was exported to the United
States and distributed widely to be used by interrupters at
public meetings at which German diplomatic and belligerent
methods were discussed.
Of course tliera is no parallelism between Prussian
Militarism aud so-called British " Navalism." Everybody
understands the fiv.st and knows what it is, and it would not
be General v. Bernhardi's fault if it was not understood and
known. His former book makes that quite clear. British
" Navalism," according to the new German view, is that,
because the widely-scattered British Empire — with its com-
ponent parts separated by great tracts of sea^possesses h
great Navy — not so powerful relatively as the German Army
is on land — our naval power must be used for the oppression
or restriction of other countries. Not one word in proof of
this is attempted. If any were possible we may be sure that
it would be thrust before our eyes. The truth is the exact
opposite of what General v. Bernhardi and his inspirers assert
or intimate. Here is one sufficient demonstration of it. No
economic or industrial factor in Germany has been more
highly developed since the establishment of the Empire than
the German mercantile marine and German commercial
interests overseas. It would be possible to show " graphic-
ally " that increase of the British Navy has been accompanied
by an increase of German mercantile tonnage and in the value
of German overseas trade. In m.any parts of the world, down
to the very outbreak of the war, British naval power pro-
tected German interests. Aeciisations against British
" Navalism " therefore are but empty and insincero
vituperation.
It is hardly possible that General v. Bernhardi can be
ignorant of the fact that the so-called " convention " between
Great Britain and Belgium for the defence of the latter littla
country if its neutrality was violated v/as communicated by
King Albert to the Gcrniau ofHciyls and consequently v,'as not
kept secret. ALo it is not "hardly possible," but quita
impossible, tliat the so-called "convention" was e-^-cr
entered into. The word "convention" is a forgery of tiia
German Governn^ent in a MS. document which contained
no such word, but did contain the v/ord "conversation,"
for which " convention " was fraudulently substituted. A
facsimile of the document was published some months ago by
tho Field newspaper, in which German handwriting and tho
forgery are at onea perceptible. 'Why does not General
V. Bernhardi fcell his readers of tltis?
"The New Bemhoidi; Hie Latest Views on Wer.*^ fLoBa«n
Piico la. net.)
14*
May 15, 1915.
LAND AND .W.ATEE.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED.
IV.— FUSELINE.
Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas Engh'sh.
DEEP gloom and a slow-dripping fchaw. But for the
drip, deep silence.
A click, a swish of steel. A scream which
scythed across the gloom; which mowed long
swath of silence down; which burst torrential on
the void across the shattered flood-gates of the night.
The Marten Cat was canght.
The dainty, nimble Marten Cat; the brown-furred, white-
frilled Marten Cat; the come-by-chance of last year's fickle
pairing.
This night, as most nights, she had roamed afield; had
left the moss-clad alder-stump in which she wintered solitary.
The cold had com© betimes. The migrants had long since
winged south, in serried, wedged battalions.
The food had dwindled, vanished. Fuseline, hunger-
maddened, prowled nightly round the village.
More prudent than her kin, maybe, maybe less bold, she
shunned the straw-roofed wheat-stacks, the holes and corners
of the lofts, the cob-webbed, angled rafters.
Each morning found her snuggled in her nest, far from
the ^^llag6, far from Man.
Six moons had passed, since, with a moon abetting, she
dragged her last hen-blackbird from its brood. Few birds
remained with the forest border; and these were Reasoned
veterans, who clung, despite the snow, to their old haunts;
whose cunuing, equal to her own, was proof against surprise.
A week of fruitless stalking, of biting, gnawing hunger-
pangs, steeled her to her first raid on human dwelling.
Through broken tile, stuffed clumsily with straw, through
chink, where dry worm-rotted beam shrunk from its mortared
setting, she crept into the cowshed loft, thence down the hay-
shoot to the ground, thence by a cat-hole to the whitewaslied
hen-house.
Lightly she vaulted to the roost on which six melancholy
birds drowsed with their legs crooked under them.
She slew them, every one.
A single cunning bite sufiiced, a bite which loosed a jerk
of blood. Her clav>'ed feet pinned her victim down. She
pva-sed her lips and sucked its neck. She dropped its limp,
luke corpse when it was drained. Blood was good meat, good
drink. Why trouble to tear bones apart, to mumble throbbing
flesh?
Drunk with her meal, her white frill crimson-dotted,
with m.atted fur, with belly like a drum, she homed uncon-
scious of her tell-tale spoor.
Long hours she slept, and, in those hours. Fate spun
her silent web.
Each nisht she grew more daring. She braved the shut-
tered houses of the village, within v/hose courts growled
watch-dogs tushed like boars. She braved the full moon's
radiance, when Man lurked in his ambush armed, and spurt
of flame, and thunder-peal, brought to one luckless prowler
death, to all that prowled a warning.
Often the night's excursion failed, consumed itself in
wander-hours, aimless, monotonous wander-hours, past
garden-walls, through hedgerow gaps, up sloping thatch and
tiling.
But one, a gloomy, moonless night, brought welcome
change of fortune. A sentinel star gleamed through a break
of cloud, like candle twinkling from a cottage casement, aTid,
in the dim half liglit of it, came Fuseline to the drain-hole
in the wall.
She passed down a clear avenue. The road was fenced
about with littered bavins; dried pea-sticks of the year, whose
darkened lines converged across the snow to the drain outlet.
Within this lay an egg, a cracked egg, oozing yellow yoke.
She leapt at it, and gulped it, and licked her stickied lips.
A great find that. Could there be more ? All night she
nosed about the wall.
Next night the same path beckoned. She found another
egg within the drain. Next night, another.
#»»•«♦
The winter's day closed sullenly, under a leaden sky. The
hummocked snow clung weakly to the boughs. At times, slow-
melting, water-laden masses sploshed to the earth and ebbed
away in muddied rills and trickles. Fate brooded on the
forest, mothering the slow birth of the thaw beneath the un-
easy rustling of her wings.
Rose to the window-opening of tlie alder, as tiiough =i
splash of snow had caught its ledge, a v^hite-frilk'd, eager-
questioning, small face.
On easy, sinuous, gliding feet slid Fuseline to earth. She
must be quick. The day had dragged, and two days' hunger
gripped her. She ran her course apace. Her stout-clawed,
sinewy, splayed feet danced feather-light across the melting
drifts; her plumed tail balanced after her; down silent sludge-
scored runs she crept, past rough-set walls of weathered stone,
past hedgerows blanketed with white, whose endless measured
dripping marked the hours.
Hope fired her blood, Hope winged her feet, towards the
expected meal.
Straight to the bavin road she came, and found it fenced
witli flanking baulks of timber.
Had these been there before 1
The melting of the snow had blurred her landmarks. The
egg was there; slie smelt it, caught it-s whiteness — this time u
little deeper in the drain.
And one road only led to it — between smooth walls of
wood.
Had these been there before 1
A snow-splash fell, and, under it, the end of one wall
vanished.
The snow, then, might have hidden them.
With groping feet, v/ith snufling nose, she picked her
dainty, cautious way, and, as she neared the egg, smelt Man.
She paused, she listened, pricked her ears, half dubious, half
afraid.
The scent hung close to ground; it needed but a lift of
neck to clear it.
The scent was stale — and she was very hungry.
Six inches more !
The little paw stole venturing out, one inch, two inches.
three-
And jaws of steel, fanged, murderous, whipped from their
muddied ambuscade, and snapped across the wrist.
The Marten Cat was caught.
Her scream died in a wailing bleat whose echoing
shuddered down the aisles of darkness.
Twigs snapped, leaves danced, quick stamps and thuds
proclaimed the panic flight of thieves four-footed.
The wrist, the hand was shattered — bone, tendon, liga-
ment crushed to pulp. Yet her fust impulse was to rescue it.
Vainly she writhed, and tugged, and plunged, and bit the
pitiless steel.
Her twists, her stragglings spent themselves — ended in
piteous meanings.
Yet she fought on — five hours she fought.
From eastv/ard crept a dim half light, a yellowing of the
cload bank.
A shot rang out. That meant a Man abroad. And she
was in His power, and He was coming.
She flung her head back, d.nimmed the ground, arched,
tautened like a bow.
A cock crew close at hand.
Backwards she tugged, to right, to left. Forwards she
plunged, until the chain, with savafje jerk, restrained her.
Tbe teeth bit deeper in her flesli. She licked the welling
crirascn.
Her head drooped limp; she seemed to sleep.
But second cock-crow roused her, ;;nd clank of chain from
ox's stall.
The eastern ridge was yellowing. The dav.n was close
at hand. And Man would come witii dawn.
It was her life against her limb. Her limb mu.st go.
Writhing, contorted, la.shing like a snake, she flung her hind
feet off the ground, and twirled and spun her body's weight
against her arm's cohesion.
The imprisoned wrist was twisted like a rope.
The wrist-bones cracked and splintered. The arm-bones,
snapping like dried twigs, thrust their jagged ends through
15*
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915.
flesh and skin. Courage I The cord was fraying, stretching,
parting. Her eyes swam in a mist of blood; froth slavered
from her lips; her fur was matted, sweat-drenched. Again
the ghastly spinning of herself. The twisted tendons roped as
one, and once more the cock crew. Hor teeth? Her teeth
were her last hope. Fiercely, magnificently, she turned them
on herself, sawed her own living flesh with them, mumbled
and gTiawed till the trapped wrist hung by one silver tendon.
A last fierce bite, a last fierce wrench — Man would not
take her this time. Three-legged she vanished in the gloom,
nor cast a glance behind.
******
Dawn rose from yellow shroud of mist, a wrinkled,
haggai'd, spectre dawn. The gin held fast its spoil — the
twisted pulp of flesh and fur, the oblation to Man's
sovereignty.
Down mournful hedgerows dripping tears of snow,
dragged Fuseline, three-footed, smudging a crimson trail.
Now that the wcrifice was past, her force, her energy
collapsed.
Blindly she dragged, unconsciously, until across the
clouding of her brain flashed Instinct's lightning warning —
Sleep or Die.
She checked hor perilous open course; she whipped
through thorny hedgegap; through trellis-work of leafless,
trailing bramble.
She reached a snow-capped drift of leaves, in whose soft,
feathery pile hor feet sank deep.
She coiled on it to lick her wound, and then to doze, and
then to sleep — a sleep profound, nerve-, tendon-, muscle-
laxing; a sleep in which her warm young blood coursed heal-
ing, soothing, mending.
Twelve hours she slept, and, waking, licked her wound
afresh, and crept to the hedge-border. She gazed; she
listened; instinct-taught she mapped a bee-line to her home.
Softly rhe moved, bent low to earth, snaking her head
between the tufts of grass.
And, when she reached her alder-stump, she swarmed it.
Despite the crippling of her limbs, despite the weakening loss
of blood, she gained her hole, and flung to its embrace, as
tired-out child flings to a woman's lap.
Six days the alder held her. Hour after hour she licked
her stump — and fever was her food.
At last she issued, grid of skin and bone, owl-eyed, droop-
shouldered, pitiable, like cripple whose infirmity strengthens
his prayer for alms.
But nothing now could drag her to the village, nor even
to the common waste, where fowls ran riot after food, and grit
to build their eggs from.
Her forest was sufficient. She waited for the Spring,
The Spring would bring the buds again, and, with the buds,
the birds.
And, in two t«pid nights. Spring came.
Each sunrise she had scanned the sky, had listened for the
swish of wings. She heard them now, high overhead, like
surr of floating silken train, like murmur of incoming tide,
voicing desire and hope.
The vanguard soon sped northward. But aft^r them
would travel the main army, to quarter on the forest, end to
end, to plot a web of joy, and love, and music.
Memories of spring-time feastings ro.se to mind; of
thrushes ambushed in their leafy hidings; of pine-trunks
scaled to attack bewildered doves; of crows' nests stormed and
pillaged.
As yet her spoils were meagre. She must await the
pairing-time, the nuptial flights, the scoldings, wranglings,
combats.
The weeks would shape their ordered course. She looked
for easy feastings, for feastings morning-stx^nted, evening-
stalked.
Leaf raced with leaf, shoot swelled to bud. The green
gained mastery of the wild, gained mastery of the sunshine.
Each thicket held ita nursery, each briar, each thorn was
tenanted.
As whim impelled her, Fuseline fed.
Sometimes along the skirting fence of bramble, sometimes
aloft, in pine, or fir.
Blackbirds were easy twilight prey. They perched low in
the thickets. They sang full-toned, in stations predisposed,
their challenging passionate love-notes; love-notes which
broke, and swelled, and broke.
Un.'seen she slipped beneath them. The bird sang on;
she wormed six inclies further; the shrilling ceased; she
checked and closed her eyes. What was she but a shadow in
the tangle; a thickening of the knotted trunk to which sha
clung close-welded ?
And presently she gauged her leap, and seized her scream-
ing prey, and stilled its screaming.
Yet for such chase her skill was sorely hampered.
The loss of limb meant slower leap, meant balance less
assured. Often she missed, and screech of fright alarumed
through the wood — the prelude of long weary wait in ambush.
The last .slow blossoms of the oak yielded to May's warm
sun. In robe of green the Fore.st met her Lord, in robe ol
green ablaze with virid gems, with emeralds, beryls, chryso-
lit-es, with tourmalines, with jacinths.
< The insect hum innumerable, the whisper of the burgeon-
ing leaf, echoed, in drowsy undertones, the music of Spring's
wooing.
The birds' song was a livelier acclamation.
They filled the air with pipings, tw^itterings, churrings,
v/ith whistle-calls, with bubblings, chirrupings, sizzlings.
And Fuseliite picked her course unheard, and reached the
thrush's nest unseen.
The mother bird, deep sunk in the nest's hollow, spread
ruffling feathers to conceal her brood. But not for fear of
Fuseline, though fear stared from her haunted eyes. A bird
of prey had sighted her. He rode at anchor in the blue, sway-
ing, yet holding station. Her eyes had felt his eyes. Instinct
restrained her motionless, and bade her shield her brood with
her own body.
A pipe of call-notes from the wood proclaimed the enemy
sighted.
The stragglers flocked together. The crows cawed hoarse-
toned signals tree to tree, made plain the danger, shirked
attack. Let him attack them first— and they would meet him.
The Buzzard took no heed of them. His eyes were on
the thrush. He swooped, but never reached her.
He checked to grip the nearest branch. One claw held
him in station, its fellow twitched in air. His neck stretched
out, his curving beak gaped challenge at his rival.
And Fuseline reared face of hate against him, and snarled
her lips, and bared her teeth, and flashed his challenge back.
Between them cowered the mother thrush, deep in the
hollow of her nest, a beak, a tail, two frozen eyes, shielding
her brood beneath herself, stilling the pipings of distress which
her own heart-throbs warranted.
So Greek met Greek, the bird of prey, the beast of prey,
across a common victim. Their eyes glanced hatred, clashed
like swords.
And Fuseline struck home the first.
Like dart she loosed in air, like dart she bedded in th«
mark.
Full weight she struck the breast-bone of the Buzzard,
and jerked him, like a squirrel, from his bough.
His wings swayed flailing in the air, plunged crashing
through the twigs. His talons forced her hold and gripped
her back.
Skywards he slanted heavily, his burden dragging at his
flight.
His vengeance should come later.
Whirled, shaken, spun in dizzying, airy spirals, tossed on
the windy ocean of the sky, the beast would surely sicken.
Then his crooked beak should drive at it.
But this was not to be.
At first the j)enduloua rocking swing, the parting from
earth's solid base, bewildered, palsied Fuseline.
Eyes closed, she dangled limply, unconscious of the
deepening gulf between her and her world.
But presently she writhed about, infuriate, gnashing at
the claws, and, before beak could aim at her, reached the
broad breast, and fastened with her teeth.
A gush of blood jerked spouting from the wound. As
one who feels a mortal stroke, the Buzzard threw his head
back.
His talons slackened, loosed their grip, and Fuseline
hung dangling from her tooth-hold.
But, with a twist, she swung aloft, and, planting claws
deep in the feathered flanks, mumbled the bleeding, quivering
flesh, and burrowed to the heart.
Once more the talons clinched on her, stiffened this time
in throes of death, stabbing her lungs, her entrails.
Upwards the huge bird soared, his supreme effort spent ia
flight, up, up, towards the Sun.
And suddenly liia pinions drooped. He swayed, he
swung, he foundered.
Swirling from the high firmament, two crimsoned corpses
struck the earth as one.
Printed by Thi Vicxoau House PatHziMO Co., Ltd.. Tudor Street, VViutefriars, Londoa, KC.
May 15. 1915
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LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915
"CHEESE IS THE BEST
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An old West Country saying which conveys the
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Acidity caused by undigested food is very injurious to
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Dr. Jenner's Absorbent Lozenges, made only by
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TESTIMONY.
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DR. JENNERS
ABSORBENT LOZENGES
CREOSOTED FENCING
FARM BUILDINGS and GATES
For durability Crcosotcd Wood is the most economical raatcrLil — it never requires
r«inting or tarring. Impervious to decay. Ask far fencing Calalngue, post fre*.
ENGLISH BROS., WISBECH
to8
May
'0.
1915
LAND AND WATER
FEMIN A
THE BREAKING OF BARRIERS
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDFR
SLOWLY, but very unmistakably, a change is coming
over our entire social system. We are undoubtedly
growing less aloof. The icy remoteness that clothed
us as a nation generally and as individuals in particular
_ is visibly melting. Of that there can be no shadow of
doubt. Asking questions is apt to be a profitless game, when
there can be no satisfactory, or at best only a partial, answer.
Nevertheless, it is a fascinating pursuit, and we are likely to
continue asking them. Many
people are asking many ques-
tions at the moment, but
only a very few are finding
any solutions. These, when
found, generally admit of in-
finite argument. It is plain
that the England of the future
can never be the England that
existed before August 4th,
1914. We have been brought
out of ourselves, forced to
look at things through un-
prejudiced eyes, shaken and
battered out of preconceived
habits and ideas. It is all
profoundly interesting, but
how and when will it all end ?
One of the immediate
results of the war has been
the bringing together of the
classes. Men of vastly differ-
ent social position are fighting
side bv side in the ranks of the
army. Great ladies and tat-
terdemalions — the feminine
gender — have worked in the
same room, cutting-out, bast
ing and making the historic
shirts for soldiers and sundry-
other garments. The upper
ten have come into contact
with the submerged ninety
more closely during the past
few months than at any other
period of their lives. This,
perhaps, is particularly true
where women are concerned,
for schemes for the common
wed are occupying most
people's attention just now.
People, who formerly had little
thought beyond themsehcs.
go out of their way to bring interest into the hves of those
less fortunately placed. It is an astonishing mix-up, brought
about by the forcing-house of events, the result of which
cannot at present be even remotely seen.
The New Charity.
Many women must have realised for the first time in their
lives that there are no more severe critics of the well-to-do than
their poorer sisters, and that great efforts must be made and
maintained to keep these critics' approval. For that reason
the old system of charitable help is over and done with. Ladies
spending their time making " ugly gannents for the deserving
poor " can no longer be satirised. Charity to be of any use
at all must be clothed in an up-to-date guise. It must be a
workable and welcome proposition, otherwise it must fail to
hit the mark and be worse than useless. The most successful
charities at the moment are those which do not mask them-
selves beneath a charitable cloak. This may be paradoxical,
but, like many paradoxes, it is undoubtedly true. One of the
most successful works now being done in the East End amongst
people affected by the war is that of a weekly entertainment
and tea to which a penny admission is charged. This, of course
by no manner of means covers the expenses of the entertain-
ment that is provided for by private enterprise, but the idea
of getting something for nothing is forthwith abolished. From
all points of view it is an excellent proposition ; both classes
meeting are giving something. The people who sing, play,
act, supply the tea, and make all necessary arrangements, not
only provide a certain amount of money, but give a consider-
able slice of their time. Not only does it mean an afternoon's
occupation, but the difficulty of reaching the spot is no small
matter. By no manner of means is it within the shilling
taxi-fare radius.
Ccfyri^k: A ita Martin
LADY MURIEL PAGET
Who has made a successKil study of Invalid Cookery,
and is busily engage J looking efter the
(ick ani woundei
One main factor affecting charitable enterprise is the
prosperity of the working classes at the present. It is not a
matter of providing material necessities and Uttle else. It
is a far more subtle thing than that. The object behind all
works of this kind is that of education. It is hoped that those
benefiting will gain a sounder outlook, and be able to stand
firmly on their feet throughout all the clianges or \'icissi-
tudes fate may have in store. This education does not begin
and end with the penny visi
tors. Those in control are
always learning, they say, and
many are making careful
study of a matter to which in
days of yore they hardly gave
a thought.
The Criticism of the East End
One effect of this small
admission charge is the fact
that the audience thereby is
entitled to criticise. And criti
cise they certainly do. It is
far more difficult to please an
audience in Lambeth or Hox-
ton than one sitting on
spindle-legged gilt chairs in a
house in Grosvenor Square.
The reason no doubt is the
forcible one that while the first
listen the second in all prob-
ability do not, but whatever
it may be, the result is the
same. The consequence is
that infinite care is taken by
those responsible for the en-
tertainment. If the enter-
tainers do not please the
entertained, they feel they
have lost the main object of
their lives. It is one of the
signs of the times, and yet
another proof that " the old
order changeth." People in
one section of society are learn-
ing to respect and consider the
opinion of those in another.
And those in " the other " are
proving that the leisured
clcisses are by no manner of
means so selfish as they are
made out to be, but willing to
be sympathetic and helpful in a wholly unexpected way.
Numbers of women will never forget the lessons the last few
months have taught.
The great factor at work behind the scenes is that of the
common burden. Every woman in the country to-day, be
she high or low, rich or poor, has the same hopes, the same
fears, the same maddening feeling of powerlessness. It is
fortunate that there are outside interests to which we can
devote ourselves ; that we can do a great deal of useful work
for the country, indirect though it be. Otherwise we are back
in the position of the lady of medieval times, who, having
bade farewell to her lord departing for the wars, sat down with
folded hands to await his return. Inaction and the twentieth-
century temperament are bound to be at variance.
Cosmopolitan London.
Our insular character is also departing. London, and
indeed the whole of England, is the home for countless people
of different nationality to our own. We hear French spoken
almost as generally as English, we are brought into daily
contact with people of different customs and ideas. It is also
worthy of note that we are wilhng to help other nations as well
as our own. Some of the best supported works are those
intended to benefit one or another of our Allies. We have
pro\ed that though charity may begin at home, it is not by
any manner of means obliged to stay there. Insularity is
being slain on every side, and there must be few who will
regret its burial.
We have often been warned, frequently with great truth,
against the dangers of undue optimism. The most confirmed
pessimist, however, will surely admit that there is a marked
spirit of friendship in the country to-day. We are fortunate
in many things, but in none more so than this.
109
LAND AND WATER
May 15, 1915
BOOKS OF THE WEEK
A LITERARY REVIEW
MR. NOEL BUXTON and his brother have written
an unpretentious but extremely important
book. It deserves the widest notice, for it
broaches an urgent question of policy upon
which they have a unique claim to pronounce
an opinion. The events in the Dardanelles have brought
home to average Britons the important part which the Near
East is playing in the War. Those who had made a long study
of the Balkans knew from the first that the attack upon
Serbia was something more than a pretext ; that for years
Germany and Austria had aimed at expansion towards
Turkey, across Macedonia and the Balkan States. Austro-
German diplomacy has had its gaze fixed upon a not too
distant future when the decaying Turkish Empire should
become an Austro-German dependency. Macedonia was on
the road to Asia. Nearly twelve years ago, returning after a
tour of inquiry in those regions, I had occasion to report that
agents of Austria, political and commercial, were permeating
Macedonia. Later, when the whole of that region was par-
titioned among the victorious Balkan States, it became alrnost
certain that Germany and Austria would endeavour to seize
by force what they had failed to win by intrigue.
THE EAST.
It is safe to assert that if the Germans could have been
victorious in the war, the Balkan States would have fallen
entirely under their influence, Macedonia would have been
annexed, and in a short time the whole of Turkey in Asia,
and probably Persia also, would have become parts of the
German Empire. That has now become unthinkable. If
we would understand what a tremendous asset the Balkan
States may yet prove to the Entente Powers we should turn to
"The War and the Balkans." By Noel Buxton,
M.P., and Charles Roden Buxton. (Allen and
Unwin.) 2s. 6d. net.
Even high diplomacy cannot ignore a measured state-
ment on this subject by Mr. Noel Buxton. His extraordinary
prestige in the Near East is not generally known in this
country. For thirteen years he has travelled to and fro
between England and the Balkans. In London, through the
Balkan Committee, he brought together nearly all available
expert opinion, and focussed it upon the task of clearing up
misunderstandings. He was in communication with those
similarly interested in foreign capitals, and so closely was he
in touch with the people and politicians of the Near East,
so completely was his disinterestedness recognised, that he
attained a prestige there which would be hardly credited in
this country. Since the war broke out, he and his brother
have spent four months in Roumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia,
and they are, therefore, at this moment, possessed of the latest
information. I mention these personal matters to show that
this book must not be regarded merely on its merits as a piece
of Uterature, but as a statement with an immense weight of
authority behind it.
The military situation at present dominates all others.
The first question that will be asked is, what have we. Great
Britain and our Allies, to gain from the adhesion of the Balkan
States ? The answer is : " the forces of the Balkans, if
united, are equal to the force of a great Power." The authors
estimate these forces at 1,300,000 bayonets. This is a very
cautious and conservative estimate. The real number of
effective troops would probably be nearer two millions,
composed of some of the best trained fighting men in Europe,
many of them veterans who have served in two strenuous
campaigns. It might be added that a neutral Roumania
affords the enemy their only economic outlet in the East.
Secondly, what is the means of securing their adhesion ?
The stumbling-block at present is Bulgaria. AU of these
States desire to expand, but Bulgaria can only expand at
the expense of the others, who stripped her of territory
at the end of the last war. But how can Roumania, Serbia,
and Greece be induced to part with territory to Bulgaria ?
Here again the answer is simple. They can be doubly and
trebly compensated at the expense of Austria-Hungary and
Turkey, who together nile large territories properly Rou-
manian, Serbian, and Greek. Transylvania^should go to
Roumania ; Bosnia, Herzegovina, Dalmatia, and Croatia,
to Serbia ; Smyrna, and other districts on the^Asiatic littoral,
to Greece. Here we have the gist of the argument : —
It is beyond question that there are terras which, while not
alienating Serbia or Greece, are sufficient to induce Bulgaria to range
herself on the side of the Entente . . .
The attempt to persuade the Balkan States to make voluntary
agreements witli one another should be abandoned . .
The arrangement contemplated must be dictated from without.
England must take an equally prominent part with France and
Russia in dictating the terms. . . .
Germany and Austria have already made definite promises. . .
It is not too much to say that the diplomatist might take a leaf
out of the book of the soldier and the sailor. At present, while military
and naval action is being pressed forward with determination and high
technical intelligence, it is entitled to more adequate support from
diplomacy than it has hitherto received.
The last sentence is important. Diplomacy has a chance to
contribute to success in war. When such issues are at stake
the Foreign Office can no more afford to be idle than the War
Office or the Admiralty.
"A History of Persia." By Lieut.-Col. P. M.
Sylces. (Macmillan.) 50s. net.
It is impossible to resist the fascination of this book at a
moment when Constantinople, the ancient centre of civilisa-
tion, is again threatened by an invading army, and the countries
of western Asia, which through thousands of years have been
tossed about from conqueror to conqueror, are again to be
re-shuffled. Needless to say, in writing the history of Persia,
Colonel Sykes has not attempted to confine himself to the
country which now goes by that name. The Persian Empire
at one time included nearly all that is now Turkey, and much
besides; its history cannot be separated from that of theHittites,
the Assyrians, the Babylonians, the ancient Greeks, the
Romans, the Arabs, the Mongols, and the Turks. Colonel
Sykes has indeed erred on the side of covering too wide a field.
He has told us so much about contiguous Empires which have
figured prominently in history, that he has often failed to
disentangle the features of the distinctively Persian, or
Iranian, peoples. He has lived and travelled for twenty-one
years in the country, and he, if any one, should be able to
trace the genesis of what is characteristically Persian in the
habits, customs and institutions of the people. He justly
cladms " to have acquired to some extent the Persian point of
view," but there are times when this excellence proves a
weakness, and leads him to over-estimate the glory of terri-
torial conquests and eastern despotisms, and to think too
little of racial customs and traditions. •
Of course it is no easy task to unravel these obscure pages
of history. The cuneiform inscriptions do not tell us much of
the lives of the people. Ancient records busied themselves
with the affairs of Kings and Courts, and ignored the things
which are more important to the scientific historian. It is-
only by reading between the lines that modern research can
re-construct ancient civihsations. Colonel Sykes has followed
the more straightfonvard course, but even so, the record is
valuable as well as romantically interesting.
There is no other complete history of Persia embodying
the results of recent researches. He has described the natural
features of the country as no one unfamiUar with it
could have done. He has begun from the very beginning,
showing us a primitive, predatory people existing close to the
mighty Empire of the Assyrians, and falling under their sway.
He contrasts the civilisation of Babylon with the brutalising
influence of Assyria. He describes the appearance of the
Medes and the Persians, who over-ran the older Empires
under the leadership of Cyrus and Darius, and there is a short
but particularly interesting chapter on the refining religion of
Zoroaster. There were great epochs of revolutionary change
which are not all of equal importance in their effects upon
civilisation. The conquests of Alexander were large, but
their effects were less lasting than the arrival of Christianity,
and, for Persia, far less convulsive than the arrival of
Mohammed and the Arabs, who effected more lasting changes
by their religion than by their swords. We must remember
that the Persians who preserved their racial character in spite
of an apparently endless succession of despotisms, were
Aryans. They first figure in written history as men who
were taught " to ride, to draw the bow, and to speak the
truth." In the ninth and tenth centuries, as the author re-
minds us, learning, literature and art flourished in Persia
when Europe was plunged in barbarism. Firdawsi, Nizami,
Sadi, Hafiz, and Omar arc only a few of the great names
which make Persian literature glorious, and can we find a
more interesting definition of poetry than that given by
Nizami ?
Poetry is that art whereby the poet arranges imaginary propositions-
and adapts the deductions with the result that he can make a little
thing appear great and a great thing small, or cause good to appear
in the garb of evil and evil in the garb of good. By acting on the
imagination he excites the faculties of anger and concupiscence in such
a way that by his suggestion men's temperaments become affected
1 10
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &W ATER
Vol. LXV No. 2767
SATURDAY. MAY 22. 1915
( PUBLISHED AS-] P R I C K S 1 X P E N C >'
[a newspaperJ published weekly
lfa«r."J
iBy Joseph Sim St/ft, R.B.A.
GENERAL RENNENKAMPF
Commander of the Russian Armies in East Prussia at the beginning of the
Russo-German campaign and, later, in command of the Russian troops during their
series of brilliant victories over the Turks in the Caucasus.
LAND AND WATER
May 22, 1915
BURBERRY WAR KIT
Illustrated
Military
Catalogue
Post Free.
HORLICK'S
MALTED MILK TABLETS
It is our privilege and duty to see that our
flgliting men are provided with all they ask for
and need, and letters home fre<|ncntly tell how
grateful olhcers and men are for having received
a supply of these delicious Food Tablets, and
they eagerly ask for more. A few dissolved in
the mouth give and maintain strength and
vigour, and also prevent fatigue and relieve
thirst, and thus enable the soldier or sailor
to be at his best when liis best is called for.
We Will send post free to ANY address a flask of
these delicious and sustaining food tablets and a neat
vest pocket case on receipt of 1 6.
If on active service be particular to give regimental number, rank, name, squad-
ron ~r company, battalion, battery, regiment (or other unit), staff appointment
partment. State whether serving with British Expeditionary Force or
M d :erranean Expeditionary Force; or, if not with either, give name of place
w lich unit is stationed. In the case of a sailor give the name of his ship.
Of all Chemists and Stores, in convenient pocket
llasks, 1/- each. Larger sizes, 1/6, 2 6 and 11/-
L ral Sample Bottle sent post free for 3d. in stamps.
1 HORLICK'S MALTED MILK CO., SLOUGH, BUCKS
Cool by Day — Warm at Night
THE BURBERRY weatherproof
Made in airyliglit, self-ventilating materials, lined
Proofed Wool or Detachable Fleece.
Instead of a series of separate
wires knotted or tied together
EACH LENGTH OF B.R.C. FENCING
IS A UNIFIED WELDED FRAMEWORK
OF HIGH TENSILE STEEL WIRE.
To eliminate loose, sagging
wires, and chafing weakening
knots — to form a stronger,
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fencing, the vertical and hori-
zontal wires of B.R.C. Fencing
are welded together — insepar-
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Greatest rust resistance is
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by the B.R C. exclusive process
of heavy galvanising offer manu-
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of knots and loops.
B.R.C. WELDED
^!^ FENCING
Tests proz'ing the greater rust lesistame of B.R.C. Fencing
are shown in the new B.R.C. Fencin,e; Catalogue, post free from
HALL & PICKLES i^l^S^% 19 Port St., MANCHESTER
UNIFORMS,
Strong Khaki Serge, or
'I'ropical Gabardine for the
Near East, woven and
proofed by the Burberry
process.
TIELOCKEN
MOTOR-
CYCLE
OUTRIG
Splendidly protective ; made
in Gabardine lined Wool.
Fastens with a strap-and-
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buttons.
WARMS AND
GREATCOATS
Light Ser:;e or Gabardine
lined Wool or Silk, as v/ell
as every detail of Se vice
Dress and equipment.
SHORTNOTICE
SERVICE KIT
lJurberrys keep
Tunics, Slacks,
Breeches, Great Coats
and Warms ready to
try on ; so that fitting
is done when order-
ing, and the kit com-
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Genuine
Bttr terry
Garments
are labelled
' Burberrys, '
The Tee
Burberry
— A netu
Cavalry
pattern.
ADVANTAGES OF GABARDINE FOR OFFICERS'
use in warm or changeable climates : —
Far superior to Khaki drills — much lighter and
stronger. Dense weaving gives it extraordinary
wearing qualities, reduces weight to ti minimum
and provides wonderful protection against wind
and rain, yet it is the coolest possible wear under
a blazing sun.
Gabardine is available in every shade of Khaki,
as well as Regulation Tartan.
BURBERRYS Haymarket LONDON
10 Boul. Malesherbes PARIS; also Provincial Agents
HANDMADE
LINGERIE
BLOUSE
An e.xact copy of a
Doeuillet Model, in fine
clear French Lawn, having
all seams defined with
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buttons. Stocked in 4 sizes.
21/9
The same Blouse in fine soft
pure French Linen, 29/6.
THE RAVAGES OF MOTH
Store you* furs in our Freezing
Chambe*s. Particulars of our
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Insurance against all and every
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Vt'irimore Street.
Covcndish Square) London.VC^
122
May 22, 1915
LAND AND WATER
A GLIMPSE OF WAR
THE BRIDGE
By W. L. GEORGE
PRIVATE BRADDEN was conscious of haste and
grievance. With three other Stourshires, he knelt
upon the soft, sweet-smelUng bank, clumsily nailing
on the driven pegs the boards to make the platfonp.
All about him was a crowd that seemed without
order or purpose, for the Stourshires were not practical
engineers and, rather hke locusts, swarmed climisily about the
bridging train which the R.E.'s had left behind, going off
with their bigger pieces to build the main bridge for the
artillery a little further up stream ; they had left to the
despised infantrymen the rough bridge that was to carry the
ammunition carts. As Private Bradden banged down the
boards, and hit his thumb, and swore, he observed the vast
litter made round him, of beams for tresthng, of short pieces
marked %vith a mysterious " T," rolled lengths of rope, and of
incomprehensible thin lathes which poured out of the waggons
when their slides were pulled down. The Stourshires were
furious because they were left in support and on menial en-
gineers' work, with their puzzled officers who anxiously helped
their memories of bridge-building with httle pink books.
" Ain't no job for a man," he repeated from time to time,
gloomily. Then two boards ingeniously nipped his knee.
He swore at everything in general.
The Stourshires were paying the penalty of victory, for
quite unexpectedly their division had rushed the third line
of the German position and now, far beyond the Uttle river.
Private Bradden could hear the steady crackle of rifle fire.
From time to time he heard above his head the squeal of
shrapnel, bound for the fighting lines three miles ahead.
" And we here ! " he thought, angrily, " messing about on the
other side of fifty feet of mud ! " He was unjust, for the
unexpected victory demanded a supply of ammunition, and
a hint of the need for the bridge was to be found in the motor
field-kitchen which, three yards off, had stuck in the mud over
the axles, impotent, its fires out.
He went on nailing. The platform was nearly done.
And those bhghters not ready with the trestles ! Ah I There
they were : from the confused crowd upon the bank came at
last six men, carrying the first transom lashed to its supports,
the Heutenant following proudly his work of art. Then he
was in the river : quite suddenly as the water ceased below his
knees, so shallow was it, and as he felt the suck of liquid mud,
Private Bradden understood and was ashamed. The beam
was in his arms ; more than heavy, it felt bulky, a gigantic
thing under which he staggered with his pal, shoulder against
shoulder, their faces hot and sweating, their legs already cold
and sticky with ooze. There was a swaying in this big thing
he carried that was hard against his cheek. And yet he
staggered on a foot or two, breathless, just able to gasp,
" Yes sir," in reply to orders. The base of the supports
seemed held in the mud as in glue ; it was in glue he struggled,
desperately kicking with his feet to find something to shove
against, and somehow, it seemed, sinking deeper with the
mud rising higher, freezing him up to the waist. He knew
only then that he must chng and cHng bhndly to this trestle.
He felt hasty hands above, tugging it into place. And
then, as he stood so fixed, thinking of nothing, holding
only, no longer a man but^ swaying, hmp vice, he felt them
nail the road bearers into place, between trestle and platform.
He could only hold, not think, for every blow of the hammer
went through the beam into his body, jarred his head. It
seemed to last a very long time. Little objects distracted
him, a half-company of A.S.C., deserting their waggons and
floundering through the mud, carrying upon their shoiflders
smaU cases of cartridges. He saw a hussar smothered in
bandoliers. The horseman fell, rose again, hke a pillar of
grey slime. They could not wait for the bridge, then, and
suddenly Private Bradden felt proud of what he did.
" This'U save 'em a wetting," he thought.
The shells stiU passed over his head and it seemed to him
in his dulness that the sound was more distant, as if the British
line were driving on. It comforted him, this sound, and yet
it angered him to think that it should so swiftly draw away.
With enormous efforts, as if tearing himself from a
grave, he hauled himself out of the mud, climbed up the
trestle, half sick with the struggle, his legs aU clogged and
sticky with slush, but at once he was nailing on the road
bearers. His limbs trembled, he was exhausted by the
powerful clinging of the river's miry hands. As he nailed
and cast the road bearers towards the next trestle, he could
see the water between the lathes, grey and slow, maUgnant,
as if it watched and regretted not having sucked liim under.
All about him was still the fever of haste, men at the head of
the bridge, throwing out the road bearers, men below his feet
securing the trestles by driving supports round their base,
men in front of him, half in water, half in air, driving the
further wooden outpost into the mud with heavy, clumsy blows.
The bridge was growing, it was magical. Now four
trestles were lashed and bore the road, while the chesses
were already laid across the first twelve feet. And yet it
was not fast enough, so greedy a mouth was there at the other
end, clamouring for cartridges. An endless line of the A.S.C.
floundered into the water, clumsy as it fell, with its Uttle
bundles of ammunition. A little further up stream he could
see the North Wessex, unable to wait, hurling itself into the
water, half-swimming, half-wallowing, and, it looked, drowning
a httle. ...
Head down to the bridge he nailed the chesses into place,
Uttle lathes that seemed too thin to bear a cart, he nailed
urgently, silent now when he struck his hand, like a punching
machine rather than a man. A voice next to him said :
" One of their airyplanes."
Private Bradden did not look up, though mixed in with
the distant firing he now heard the rattle round him of hundreds
of rifles and the scurrying barks of the machine-guns. He
knew what it meant if the observer was not brought down,
and still went on nafling, by instinct rather than wiU. He
was conscious of an officer by his side, by his leggings only,
impatient leggings that stamped with eagerness, as 3 afraid
the bridge would never be built. There was fever in aU their
bloods. On the bank he could hear quarrels among the
transport men, as waggon after waggon arrived at the river-
side and the horses backed away from the water, guessing the
mud, refusing with lowered ears. Then came the first shell.
Ah ! So they had not brought that aeroplane down. Private
Bradden put out a hand behind him, seized a road bearer,
and flung it out towards the next trestle where another hand
caught it. A shell burst in the water a few yards off. It
was pretty, like the waterspout in the pond in Municipal
Park. Private Bradden thought swiftly of the nursemaids
in Municipal Park at Stourton, so far away. A shell fell ahead
upon the bank ; he saw the mud fly like a wet brown leaf.
He worked faster now. Behind him he heard a gurgle and a
groan, something fall into the water heavily. " One gone,"
he thought, and struck in a nail. Then for a second he stopped
as, very slowly, under his eyes, through the slit between two
chesses, he saw one of the Stourshires floating past, greeny-
white under the water, with a zone of pinkish water
round his peaceful face. Nail . . . hit, hit . . . nail, wipe
the sweat from your eye and hit again. He thought only of
that though now the shrapnel feU thicker. He could hear it
squeal, then burst in an exifltant roar. . . he heard it spit as,
here and there, a buUet chipped the wood. Though he could
not see it he guessed the transport upon the bank waiting for
him, Private Bradden, organiser of its victory, to finish its
bridge.
On the other bank, men helding out their hands to him
in appeal, men got into his way, they shoved, their faces were
hot, their Umbs felt heavy and wet with gluey mud. He
turned to leave the bridge. Already it was pitted everywhere
with bifllets. He laughed ; it was as if the wood had had
smallpox. He ran back along the bridge, the others behind
him. In the river were half a dozen bodies that had fallen
in, head first, and stuck in the mud oddly, their feet in the air.
One leg was kicking feebly. Private Bradden bent down
across the trestle, half in the water, to draw the man out.
Above the sound of the shrapnel he heard the rumbling
of the waggons as the first two flung themselves on the bridge,
so fast as they dared, towards the safety of the other bank.
Everything seemed to shake round him, the lapping water,
the writhing Umb he clasped, the sodden timbers to which he
clung with one hand and both feet. He heard curses, and
blood rushed into his lowered head, dimming his eyes. Then
something struck his feet and he feU into the water on the top
of the creature that struggled so feebh'. It was crowded and
crushing in the water, for things fell all about him, large things
that plunged and struggled, beasts that screamed. His hand
touched a horse, and he felt it grow warm and wet For a
moment he was Uving in a world where all was heavy and wet.
When at last he half-stood, half-knelt, in the stream
that flowed on unruffled, with its burden of mud and blood,
he saw just beyond the place where the waggon had fallen,
with its horses plunging and half-drowning, the place where he
had stood upon the bridge as he leant down, blown away by
an explosive sheU as if it had been cut out with a knife by a
gigantic hand.
123
LAND AND WATER
.Inv
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124
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND ,W.ATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
MOTE. — This article has been submitted to the Press Bnrcan, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n«
responsibility for the correctness o! the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only be
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
MUCH the more important of the two
great series of operations which we
have witnessed during the last few
days is that which has thrust back the
Russians from the Carpathians in the East and
threatens, as a matter of sentiment, the re-entry of
the enemy into Przemysl ; and saves, a matter of
strategical importance, Hungary from invasion.
But the Western operations, as they concern us
more nearly, will be dealt with first.
Thev have a certain connection because, larsre
as are the last new levies of the enemy, the greater
part have been thrown into the Eastern field, and
have left the Western line for the most part not in
strength to resist the attacks delivered upon it;
or, rather, not in sufficient strength to permit so
great a concentration as was attempted against
Ypres without weakening dangerously other parts
of the line.
It by no means follows that great enemy rein-
forcements will not reach the enemy line shortly.
It is, on the contrary, highly probable that the
enemy will attempt a determined oft'ensive here
the moment he discovers either that he cannot
break the Russians in the East or that he has the
good fortune to pin his adversary there behind
some line. Meanwhile the story of what has
happened in the West is a story of, upon the whole,
a superior Allied ofiensive.
THE ALLIES' SUCCESS IN THE WEST.
In order to understand the very considerable
success attained in the West during the last few
days against the German lines that run from the
neighbourhood of Arras to that of Ypres, we must
first seize the territory- as a whole.
We are here concerned with a line approxi-
mately fifty miles long — perhaps, counting all its
sinuosities, more than fiftv miles. It has behind
it a greater accumulation of German ammunition
in depots, a better gridiron of communications,
and, in proportion to its length, a far greater
body of men than any other section of the German
trenches in France and Belgium combined. It is
also the point where the British and the French
forces join. It is therefore the sector upon which
the enemy has both been able to develop his
strength to a maximum and has desired to obtain
a decision over and over again. He is still
occupied in that attempt.
The British contingent holds on this line,
roughly, the sector A B. To the north, beyond A,
there is a sector A Z, which is continued up to
the sea by a mixture of French and Belgian
troops. To the south of the British contingent,
from B to C near Arras, passing in front of the
line in front of Lens, the line is French again, held
mainly by Regulars, and continues French all the
way to the Swiss mountains, 400 miles away.
Now, tlie pressure exercised by the Germans
upon this line was first delivered very violently
and with the use of poisonous gases in the last
week of April against the dent which corresponds
to the thrust of the arrow (1). It had the effect
of pushing in the line dangerously from the old
position, marked by dots, to the new position,
marked with a full line. The object was to cut
off, if possible, the projecting piece or " salient "
round Ypres, and, if fortune was very favourable,
to break through the line just where the British
and the Allied forces joined. Under the pressure
of that attack the line gave way, as I said, from
the dotted position to the position A Z. Mean-
\\hile the old British line, which I have marked
with crosses, in front of Ypres, had also to fall
back to where the full line stands in the sketch.
While the British line thus fell back nearer Y^pres,
the enemy delivered a very violent assault indeed
^ jLa. Basse'e
• Lens
LAND AND WATER
May'22, i9iS/
upon it during and after its retirement. During
the first days of May he continually attacked
Hill 60 from the south and south-east (along the
arrows (2) (2)), and meanwhile prepared his
principal attack, which he launched upon Satur-
day, May 8, along the Menin road, in the direc-
tion of the arrow (3).
For the purpose of thus concentrating all his
weight against the British salient and attempting
to crush it in, he had, in spite of his considerable
reinforcements of winter-trained men, to concen-
trate large bodies of troops.
The whole thing was a repetition of what has
liappened over and over again in this trench war-
fai^e. Whether the enemy draws men from up the
line for the purpose of attacking or for the pur-
pose of defending the second point, he is bound
to be weakening himself somewhere, and the better
airwork of the Allies, their more rapid concentra-
tion, and, recently, their superiority in numbers,
both of rnen and of hea'sy guns, permits them to
take advantage of that weakness, and such an
enemy concentration is always followed by sharp
counter-attacks upon the weakened point.
That is exactly what happened after the
enemy had thus drawn men round Ypres during
this first week in May. There followed at once,
with the second week, sharp counter-attacks
against him to the south. The second of these in
order of time, but the one which Ave will take first
because it concerns the British contingent, was the
British counter offensive against tlie enemy's own
salient of La Bassee. It began with an attack
iipon the ridge of Aubers. This ridge stands just
in front of tliat beJt of ground at Neuve Chapelle
which had been occupied in the memorable conflict
of some weeks ago. The British attack all but car-
ried the summit, but failed to hold it, on account,
as it was said, of lack of sufficient munition.
Had the ridge of Aubers been held a point would
liave been thrust up north of La Bassee which
might ha\e endangered the German hold upon
that important junction. But while the attemj)t
to capture the ridge of Aubers upon the whole
failed, the next British move amply succeeded.
The original line had lain, as do the crosses in
the above sketch, in front of La Bassee, forming a
very pronounced indentation of our line. Attacks
launched at the end of last week in the direction of
the arrows (4) (4) from the villages of Eichebourg
I'Avoue, and Festhubert recovered all the belt
marked with diagonal shading, and gave the line
the shape it now holds.
Meanwhile, much further to the south, the
French were taking action upon a very large scale.
All the way from near Arras at C to about the
point £, but with especial vigour in front of Lens,
they were attacking with the particular object of
seizing the point marked X, which crowns a spur
of land 300 feet above the plain, and marked,
before its ruin, by a chapel of Our Lady of Loretto.
From this spur of land one looks down upon the
plain beneath all the way to the important railway
•junction of Lens and beyond, and to hold that
sjHir is to dominate the railways of the plain and
ultimately Lens itself.
In five days' fighting, from May 8-9 to May 12
inclusive, the French managed to carry all the
shaded portion here between the line of dots repre-
senting their old position, and the full line, repre-
senting their present advance trenches.
Tlieir first effort was directed along the arrow
(5), towards the village of Loos. It was at first suc-
cessful, but later it failed. But their group of
assaults (6) (6) (6), delivered upon and to the south
of Our Lady of Loretto amply succeeded, not only
in inflicting very heavy loss upon the enemy (in-
cluding several thousand prisoners and seventeen
guns), but what is, as we shall see in a moment,
equally important, in establishing a future com-
mand over the German lateral communications in
the plain below, and their operations here merit a
particular description.
The spur of Our Lady of Loretto and its
neighbourhood may be best understood by such a
rough sketch map as the following.
* '/f7ol3iBsi$$^e
V^rmeUes
X X K K + «. •
O 1 4 3
Neuville StVk&st
"EiKlish CMiles.
Arras
aI
There comes down all the way through the
Artois from the sea, starting at Cape Gris Nez,
passing through St. Omer, and ending just north
of Arras, an irregular line of heights, the last of
which have their base upon the plain, roughly
corresponding to the line of dots on the accom-
panying sketch.
Everywhere from these heights one overlooks
flat country to the east, which flat country holds
the main communications of the enemy.
The French line through this ran very much
as the line of crosses runs on the accompanying
sketch, leaving a j^ronounced dent opposite the
important railway junction of Lens, in which dent
the most important point was that marked N D,
the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette upon the
projecting spur of the hills overlooking the plain.
The Germans had very heavily fortified this spur.
2*
Mav 22, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
•
Loos
Ayerq^e
ofPkui
.'NeiLviiii -
VstAuose
Heights Iti T\'Ietres-
0 X /^
\
LaTcu^effe \
\
Ovfiles
\
y
round the niins of the chapel, and all the ralley
below in the shaded district of which the three
comers are the three villages of Souchez, Ablain,
and Carency. The French had made repeated
attempts to take this fortified area because, until
it was taken, they could not properly watch, and
later submit to hea\y gun fire, the railway com-
munications of the plain and their junction at
Lens.
In this last effort, May 8-9— May 12 tliey
were successful. The details of this action may
best be followed uf)on the accompanying sketch.
They began in the night between May 8 and
;May 9 by attacking to the north and to the south
of the positions. They attacked on the north,
along the direction of the arrow (1) towards the
village of Loos. They appear to have advanced
about as far as the line A B, and then to have lost
— on May 11 — the trenches there captui'ed.
But on the south, along the arrow (2), after
nearly four hours' preparation upon the mornin"
of Sunday, May 9, they carried first the hamlet of
La Targette, and then beyond it a part of the
village of Neuville St. Vaast. They made about
2,000 prisoners, captured seven guns, and occupied
a belt of territory about two miles in extent.
Their next effort was to force the fortified
area Souchez. Ablain. Carency, lying in the valley
below the spur of Our Lady of Loretto, which
spur, with its ruined chapel, is marked with the
letter A on the above sketch.
They first attacked between Ablain and
Carency, and at the same time along the spu_r
towards A. They pursued this attack on the night
between tlie 11th and the 12th, that is between
the Tuesday and Wednesday of last week.
Against Carency they failed, but they carried the
height A, on which the ruined chapel stands. As
they already had possession of La Targette and
most of Neuville to the south they had already got
3*
LAND AND WATER,
May 22, 1915.
past Ablain and Carency on both sides and were
nearly abreast of Souchez. In the course of that
same day, Wednesday, and in the following night,
they carried the wood to the west of and in front
of Carency, the hill marked 125 metres to the
north of Carency, and ultimately the fortified
village itself, accounting for four battalions of the
enemy which were as garrison, and taking,
apparently, over and above the killed and
wounded, about a thousand prisoners.
It is curious to note that the German com-
munique instead of being silent upon this success,
admits only a tenth of the garrison of Carency,
using the words " we lost " in that place from 600
to 700 men. But all communiques of a reverse
naturally minimise its defect, and it is possible
that these figures refer to unwounded prisoners.
At the end of the whole operation the French
were in possession of all the fortified area between
the three villages along the stream of the spur of
the chapel above, of part of Souchez, and of nearly
all the village of Neuville, their line being approxi-
mately that of the dashes in the preceding sketch.
THE OBJECT OF THESE OPER.4TIOi\S
The question has certainly occurred to nearly
all those who read the news in this country, " How
are we to estimate the iiTjportance of such a
success as this of the British near Festhubert or
the French at Carency ? "
' The first, the most obvious, and, unfortunately,
the most erroneous suggestion is that one should
measure success by the belt of territory gained,
and correspondingly measure a reverse by the belt
of territory lost, and estimate the credit and debit
in the width of such gains and losses of ground.
It is inevitable that this sort of reply should
suggest itself to the mind, because, roughly
speaking, in all fighting the successful force
advances and the unsuccessful force retires.
But it is, as has been frequently pointed out
in these columns, a complete misconception of the
trench work in the West to estimate it in these
terms.
The next less obvious suggestion which occurs
to those who watch such movements is to estimate
success or failure by the shape of the line held.
They notice a prominent salient and connect
it with the idea of danger. They notice a dent
in the line and connect it with the idea of a bi^eak
at that point.
Now, this reply to the question is not so false
as the first one, but it is still erroneous, from the
sim.ple fact that the " line " in question is not
com.parable in texture to a thin cord, but rather
to a rather tough and broad sandbag. It is per-
fectly true that if ycu see the Allied line, for
instance, give way badly at one point and see a
" V " in it very rapidly and dangerously broaden-
ing and deepening, you might argue a tolerably
bad breach of the line at that point. Common
sense tells everyone that a breach in a line, if it
be sufficiently v/ide and inflicted by a sufficient
force, means the turning of v>'hat vvas one large
army into two smaller ones, and the rolling up
and defeat of the lesser portion.
But this watching of the shape of the line,
unless the shape varies very much indeed, is not a
true gauge to apply. The real test of success or
failure is simply this : How far has stick and such
an operation adoanced us towards that point when
the enemy will be corupcUcd to shorten his line or
to run the risk of seeing it break?
Now, no one can estimate the full value of an
operation judged by this standard, save the com-
manders upon the spot, who have before them the
evidence of the enemy's losses and of their own,
who can judge of the enemy's moral, of his shoot-
ing, of his air work, and all the rest of it, and
who can estimate the number of men the enemy
can still put up in front of him.
Roughly speaking, the question we ought to
ask in all this struggle in the West and about
each particular operation is two-fold, each por-
tion of the ansv/er being directed towards the
general reply upon the approach we have made to
compelling the enemy to shorten his line; and the
two questions are, first, v/hat effect has the opera-
tion had as a preparation for a final offensive?
Secondly, what losses have Ave compelled the
enemy to sustain compared with our own ?
As to the second of these two questions, we
will for the moment neglect it, because it is diffi-
cult to apply to particular actions. We only get
the answer in general results after all the evi-
dence has been co-ordinated. It is published with
some accuracy by the French General Staff from
time to time; or, at least, the conjectured enemy
losses are published. This unknown factor is, of
course, the most important, because the Com-
manders of the Allies in the West will not under-
take a general offensive until they find that the
enemy is neariag the breaking point. To attack
too early would be exactly like buying a stock
before it has reached its lowest quotation. It
would be a waste of energy. There is only one
thing that will make them launch a strong offen-
sive before this critical mioment, and that would
be so decisive a defeat of the Russians in the East
as to threaten the approaching return of numerous
enemies towards the Western front a week or ten
days later. Such an event would indeed pre-
cipitate what would otherwise be a premature
offensive; but in the absence of such an event,
tlie offensive will certainly be delayed until the
critical moment of which I speak.
But the first question, " How far does our
action advance us in our preparation towards the
final attack? " is easier to answer.
Colonel Maude has very aptly compared all
this preliminary work to the action of an engineer
who is at pains and great expense of time in
laying down strong foundations which, when they
are once achieved, will permit of rapid and secure
building.
Of what nature are these " foundations "
which the Allied Commanders in the West are lay-
ing down and the efforts in the preparation of
which have now spread over so many months ?
It is a point very well worth considering in
detail, because it is perhaps that which is least
apprehended in general conversation upon the
war.
LATERAL COMMUNIGATIOiNS.
In order to understand this point, it is
essential to grasp Avhat is meant by lateral com-
munications.
A fixed line held with a certain minimum
number of m.en (as is the German line across
France and Flanders from the Swiss mountains to
the North Sea) and so placed (as is this line) that
it cannot be turned at either end (reposing, as it
does, one end upon neutral territory and the other
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
upon the water) must not only be defended by the
number of men which are the least required to
hold it, but must also be able to concentrate men
i i. — I — c — 1 1
P Q tte.
ttt
•piagfamA
rapidly/ here or there, tcherever an attack upon a
particular point is delivered. This is particularly
the case when those who are preparing an offensive
are superior in number both of men and of
weapons to those awaiting, and that is the case at
this moment in Flanders and France, so long as
the Eastern field draws the enemy away in great
numbers.
The enemy holds his line, which we will
suppose divided into a number of ideal sections,
A, B, C, D, E, &c. He is threatened by an attack
in force against him on, say, the sector C, along the
arrows (1) (1) (1). He must concentrate as quickly
as he can large bodies of men upon C to withstand
the shock. He must draw men up quickly from,
say. A, B, E, and F. And that, as a fact, is what
the enemy has continually done since his defensive
campaign in the West opened. Whenever the
attack has produced a dent in his lines, he has, at
intervals of from twenty-four to forty-eight hours,
and sometimes a little more, brought up from
other parts of the line reinforcements which have
strengthened the threatened place, and often
recovered the territory lost.
Now, to bring men thus up and down the line
continually there are needed good communica-
tions, which nowadays means railways (as well
as good roads for petrol traffic) running every-
where a little behind the line of the trenches, and
roughly parallel to that line. These communica-
tions are called lateral communications.
The military correspondent of the Times has
very well described the strength of the German
positions by the metaphor of a " crust," which, if
it is broken, has behind it a far less persistent
resisting medium. To keep that crust intact the
enemy must, whenever a blow is delivered against
it, mass men by using these lateral communica-
tions.
Now, supposing that a commander opposed to
a defensive line of this kind intended to strike
his blow for breaking it upon a particular date,
towards which date he was accumulating great
masses of ammunition, and in view of which he was
disposing his men and reinforcing as largely as
possible the armies at his disposal. Supposing, for
instance, that date were roughly the first half of
October, how would he proceed in the period pre-
ceding that date ? What would his preparations
be against the enemy during September, August,
and July ?
It is obvious that when he struck be would
not strike in one place only. It would be im-
portant for him to embarrass the enemy materially
yj engaging him in many points at once, so that
le should have diflBculty in reinforcing any one
Eoint at the expense of another, and to embarrass
im morally by leaving him during such a com-
bined attack bewildered as to where the main
blow would fall.
Therefore we might expect that on a selected
number of sectors, perhaps half a dozen, sporadio
activity would be displayed by the offensive,
though he had no intention of breaking through,
as the effect of any of these partial attacks would
have the intention of leaving the enemy nervous
about every one of these half-dozen threatened
points, and that is exactly what we have seen
happening during the past few months.
But apart from that he would have a much
more complete and detailed object in his attacks.
He would desire to seize, as the ultimate result of
each such effort, points from which he could com^
mand the lateral communications of the enemy.
Observe the effects of this.
Supposing the line to consist of twelve seo-
H
♦^■
A+
♦-f-f
M M I I IliM I I I I M
::f
*->
— ?^ I J a
+^^-w-
::E
t-+-
-♦-t-+
I I I I I M t
;:d
w
li I I I I I I I
t t I 1 1
::c
1 1 1 1 1
B
.t
/^ -^ 4^ f
ii tJia^ratixC
tors, numbered in the above diagram 1 to 12. In
the preparation for the offensive, sectors 3, 6, 8,
and 10 have been particularly attacked, but at
different times. Now 3, after that 10, later on 6,
then 3 again, then 8, then 10 again, and so on.
The effect of all these attacks has been to
make the enemy continually move men up and
down the line along his lateral communications,
the railways (and roads) A B, and organise the
whole system which has rendered these lateral
communications, with their depots of ammunition
and their hospital arrangements and all the rest^
essential to him.
Now, when the main attack is delivered
at the end of all this preparation, if upon
these sectors 3, 6, 8, and 10 the offensive hat
'secured points a, b, c, and d, from which he can
gravely incommode the lateral communications bf
shell fire, what is the result? The result is that
the enemy, already bewildered and confused by a
general attack in several places at once, and begin-
ning to move his troops according to his guess as
to where the most violent attack will ultimately
develop, finds his power of moving them gravely,
embarrassed, or, perhaps, in one or two places,
actually cut. The offensive meanwhile knows at
what point he has been most successful in
threatening or even severing the lateral communi-
cations and what effect this has had in starving
of men one of the sectors to tlie north or to the
south of such a place. If he finds a grave weak-
ness developing on the enemy's side on another
sector on account of this interference with the
lateral communications, he will at once direct a
special effort against that point, and, in general,
his success in breaking the enemy's line or so
threatening it that it must withdraw, will mainly
depend not only upon the previous reduction of
the enemy's forces through loss during the months
of fighting past, but also upon the command of
the enemy's lateral communications which that
fighting has gained.
6*
LAND AND WATER
May 22, 1915.
It is true that the enemy will never be
entirely dependent upon one line of lateral com-
munications. He will, for instance, be able to say,
" If you cut my main line of lateral communica-
tions (A, B) or em.barrass them seriously in two
critical points, such as X and Y, so that I cannot
bring up men to help sector 3, for instance, from
the other sectors between 3 and 12, as quickly as
before, yet I can always bring them rather more
slowly in a roundabout method by using com-
munication lines C, D, E, F, which ultimately
effect the same object. You cut my lateral com-
munications or gravely embarrass them at X and
Y from the positions which you gained during
the fighting of the last few months, but I
can get away beyond your shell fire by bringing
my troops round along the lines, 0, D, E, and F,
to the secondary lateral communications G, H,
with which these lines join up." All extende<l
railway systems show such lines lying one behind
another and connected by cross lines.
This is true; with vour first lateral conmmni-
cations interrupted you can still, in any country
well provided with railways, use secondary round-
about lines behind the first. But in war everything
depends, after the factor of numbers, upon the
factor of time, and in thus imposing delay upon the
enemy's concentration you heavily handicap him,
so that he already, by hypothesis, is only just strong
enough, if that, to hold the line at all, and when
you thus secure that he could not bring up men
in forty-eight hours, but only in four days, say,
to the threatened section, it may well be that you
will attain your object before his concentration
can be effected.
Now, if you will take a railway map of
Eastern France and compare it with a con-
tour map you will perceive that the action of
the French ever since December has been
aimed at securing 'points from which they can
dominate the 7nain lateral covimunications of the
Germans.
In all save one district, that of Soissons
(where a stroAg attempt to reach the ridge domi-
nating the lateral communications behind the
hills of Craonne failed, as we know), the French
are now in a position to attack the lateral com-
munications all the way along, and that at the
critical points.
They have the outliers of the Vosges above the
Alsatian Plain and its railways. They have the
heights of Les Eparges above the Woeuvre, and its
railways. They have the crest of the ridge at
Beausejour, above the Rheims-Argonne Railway.
They have only the other day secured the lieights
above Lens, and the fight "^for Notre Dame de
Lorette was essentially a fight to get hold of the
point from which the junction of Lens and the
railways of that plain could be observed and ulti-
mately dominated by distant shell fire.
This point must not be misunderstood to
mean that the holding of a height nowadays gives
direct artillery domination, as it used to formerly.
No one can place guns in a conspicuous position
without having them destroyed; but to dominate
this lower ground over which communications pass
is to have a height behind which you can hide
your heavy artillery, from which you can judge its
effects, and the attack upon which by infantry is
more difficult than such an attack would be across
level or falling ground.
THE OPERATIONS IN GALIGIA.
We are now in a position, with more than a
fortnight's fragmentary news, to piece together
the various parts of the great Russian retreat
from Western Galicia, and of the less important
Russian counter-offensive in the east of that
province, and I propose to describe with
elementary plans the nature of this very important
operation.
The main Austro-German offensive against
the Russian positions in Galicia opens upon the
last two days of April, the Thursday and the
Friday, the 29th and 30th of that month. It was
somewhat upon the following plan.
The Russians, who, some months ago, had in
their second general offensive nearly reached
Cracow, the key of Silesia, were, by a powerful
counter-effort of the enemy, thrust back on to the
line of the Dunajec and the Biala, the River
Dunajec being the principal tributary falling
from the south into the Upper Vistula, and the
River Biala a sub-tributary falling from the crest
of the Carpathian Mountains into the Dunajec
before the latter river joins the Vistula. This
position to which the Russian armies were thrust
back from before Cracow months ago, I have indi-
cated upon the subjoined sketch by a series of dots
following the streams which give the position its
name. It might also be called the position of
Tarnow, because Tarnow is the principal town
through which the line passed.
Now the special function of the line thus
thrown from the crest of the Carpathians to the
Vistula (it was continued beyond the Vistula by
further lines up through Russian Poland, drawn
in front of the town of Kielce, which continuation
I have indicated by dots on the accompanying
map) was to protect the operations of the
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Russian armies in Galicia against the Carpa-
thians and tlie effort of the.se armies to cross the
crest of that range and to invade the plains of
Hungary. Protected by this screen, as it were,
of the lines at Tarnow. the Russians were able
by slow pressure to make themselves masters of
the three road jiasses marked 1, 2, 3 on the sketch
(tlie Polianka, the Dukla, and the Jaliska respec-
6*
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
lively), of the Lupka road and railway pass (4),
and ultimately of the Lusko road pass (5) ; while
they seemed on the point of seizing them, they
had not yet quite mastered the Uzog road and
railway pass (6). Beyond this point of the Uzog
their line fell away from the mountains north-
wards and was subjected to considerable pressure
from the Austro-Germans, who had there estab-
lished a solid footing on the Galician side of the
hills. The Russian line, as it stood before this
great offensive on the part of the enemy and
retreat on the part of the Russians, which we are
about to follow, lay therefore along the solid line
from A to B on the above sketch.
Now, the enemy concentrated in great force
against this slow, but successful, Russian advance,
bringing up as well as his old formations very
large numbers of new winter-trained troops, both
Austrian and German, which may roughly be said
to constitute his last reserve. Some portion of
these had been sent West, as we know, but the
greater part were undoubtedly used upon the Gali-
cian front. But the enemy did not mass the
greater part of his forces against the most
threatened points— that is, against the passes
which had fallen into the hands of the Russians.
He attacked, upon the contrary, along the line of
the Dunajec and the Biala, and maintained his
assault all during the last two days of April, the
Thursday and the Friday, and upon the critical
day, the" Saturday, May 1, he attacked in parti-
cular strength at two or tjbree points upon the
Lower Dunajec and at the point of Cestowice at
C upon the Biala.
By Sunday, May 2, he had succeeded in his
attempt. Not indeed that he completed the full
task of breaking the enemy's front and of piercing
through, still less of reducing to chaos its
cohesion.
The German communique, issued with the
political object of preventing Italy from coming
into the war, grossly exaggerated the effects of
these general actions along the Dunajec and Biala
front, but, neglecting the political side of the
matter, we must remark that the attempt to
compel a Russian retreat along this front was
successful, and we may further add that it was
successful because the Russian munitions for
heavy artillery and for field artillery had, as we
remarked last week, given out.
This running dry of munitions compelled the
Russians to a rapid retirement, which went
through the following stages. Upon Monday,
May 3, the positions seized by the enemy upon the
further banks of the two rivers, the Dunajec and
the Biala, were consolidated, and a belt a few
miles wide was occupied, in most places upon the
further side of the streams. The Russians were
compelled, of course, to abandon many of their
wovmded and a certain number of their guns
which had lost their teams or had been wrecked.
In other words, they suffered all the consequences
incidental to a retreat, but that retreat was per-
fectly orderly. They left behind them a compara-
tively thin line of rearguard to permit of the con-
tinuance of the retreat unmolested, and it was not
until Thursday, May 6, that the enemy were in
full possession of Tarnow, the principal town
upon the other side of the rivers and the centre
of what had been the whole Russian defensive
line.
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On the same day (Thursday, May 6) the last
positions that were being clung to by the Rus-
sians on the Lower Dunajec, just before it falls
into the Vistula, were given up. The reasons for
the greater tenacity of the Russians on the north
of their line while they were giving way towards
the south will be explained in a moment. On the
same day (Thursday, May 6), while the Russians
were but just abandoning the extreme northern
positions of the line along the Vistula, the enemy
upon the south had got as far as the upper waters
of the River Wisloka, and the general position
upon that day was that the Russian line had
fallen back from its old position along the
Dunajec to the Biala to a position indicated on
the accompanying map II. by the line of crosses.
Jaslo, on the Wisloka, had just fallen into the
possession of the enemy, and it was with great
difficulty that the 48th Russian Division, retreat-
ing across the Dukla pass (2), managed to save
itself from being cut off.
By Saturday, May 8, this giving way of the
Russians upon the south of their line had gone so
far that they had already lost the Upper Wisloka
altogether, and were back upon the upper waters
of the Wislok, a river which bends right round
eastward, as we saw last week, and is a tributary
of the San.
Krasno fell upon this day into the hands of
the Austro-Germans, but the northern end of the
line still held fairly strong, and the position on
this Saturday, May 8, was that indicated upon the
above sketch map by the line of dots, which lino
also indicates the belt through which the retreat
had passed in the course of three days. It will
be apparent that by this time all the passes 1, 2,
3, and 4, and possibly 5 as well, had had to be
abandoned by the Russians. On the 9th the enemy
seized the point of Debica, upon the Wisloka,
which point upon the day before had still been
covered by the retiring Russian line, and by the
11th he had actually pushed up to the upper
waters of the San, and though not yet in posses-
sion of Sanok, he had crossed the river just above
that town at the point marked A on the above
sketch map.
On the same day the northern end of the Rus-
sian line, which had been holding out fairly,
stoutly, began to retire and fall back to Szezucira
(marked S upon the sketch map), and by Friday,
last, the 13th, the Russian retreat had straightened
7*
LAND AND WATER
May 22, 1915.
out into the line indicated on the sketch map above
by the line of dashes, which I have further indi-
cated on the sketch by the letters A and B, at the
two ends.
The full retreat so far, however, had fallen
upon the north, onb^ a iviatter of about twenty miles
from the mouth of the Dunajec at C, to A, but
upon the south from the head waters of the Biala at
D to B, a matter of more like ninety miles.
What was the cause of this greater tenacity
in the north compared with this rapid retirement
upon the south of the line ?
The reason that the Russians thus hung on to
the northern positions as long as they could was
that a too rapid retirement there would have left
a gap between their positions on the north and
on the south of the Vistula, and that the thing
that Avas most important to prevent, the piercing
of a hole through the general Russian line, might
have been accomplished by the enemy. The
danger will be appreciated by a glance at the next
sketch.
The original line along the Dunajec and the
Biala being represented on this sketch by the line
A B, the Russian positions were continued north
of the Vistula along the lines of the River
Nida, and so up following the line B C covering
the Russian-Polish town of Kelice, and ulti-
mately reaching to in front of Warsaw in the
north.
Now, as A B retreated towards the San, unless
the retirement of B C could keep pace with that
retreat, there would appear along the Vistula a
bad gap between the two halves of the Russian
line, of which the enemy could have taken advan-
tage to break througL It was, therefore, very
important that the retirement of the Russian line
in Galicia, at the B, or Vistula, end should be slow,
and that the rapid falling back should not be per-
mitted until the corresponding line north of the
(Vistula, in Russian Poland, had had time to
prepare its own retirement.
By last Saturday this retirement on the north
of the Vistula had been effected. Kielce,
apparently, had been evacuated, uncovering the
Russian line through Northern Poland, running
now rather in the direction E F, and the Russian
retirement upon the San could be effected towards
the north as it had already been towards the south.
It would seem that by the evening of Sunday last
the Russian line, probably reposing upon the
Lower San, had reached some such position as
E F G upon the above sketch.
Jaroslav, we know, had fallen into the hands
of the enemy a day or two before, and while it was
not certain how far the Russians might have to
fall back north of the Vistula, it was fairly clear
that south of that river they would repose upon
the Lower San and there make a stand.
Roughly speaking, they had fallen back in
rather less than a fortnight at an average pace of
five or six miles a day and at the extreme of their
line somewhat faster. They had, presumably,
abandoned in wounded and stragglers and a cer-
tain proportion of unwounded prisoners, inevit-
able from such a retreat, well over 100,000 men,
and they had lost in one way or another perhaps
fifty or sixty field guns. They had at the same
time, of course, entirely lost their grip upon the
northern Carpathians and the easy passes across
those mountains, and their immediate opportuni-
ties of invading Flungary with the approach of
summer were lost. And all this considerable
check to the plans of the Allies we must ascribe to
the difficulty the Russians find in equipment,
and still more in the munitioning of their artil-
lery, particularly of their heavy guns.
THE LINE OF THE SAN.
We find the Russians, then, at the end of
this great retreat, standing upon what they them-
selves called the line of the San; but here arises
an interesting and as yet doubtful point.
Properly speaking, this " Line of the San "
is not a line at all. As was pointed out in these
notes last week, a prepared position along the
Wisloka carried across the narrowest part of the
intervening space between that river and the Wis-
lok, and then carried along the Upper Wislok,
would have proved a true defensive line reposing
upon strong natural features, covering all the
Galician positions behind it, and, though com-
pelling a certain withdrawal of the Russian line
north of the Vistula, not rendering that with-
drawal too pronounced. But the line of the San
River fails as a protective screen south of
Jaroslav, and can hardly be continued north of
the Vistula at all.
To fall back upon the San is to leave quite
uncertain the position of Przemysl, and above that
town the positions in the foothills of the Carpa-
thians, for south of Jaroslav the San comes in
from the mountains in a great bend westward,
8*
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
forming a line far tx)o long to be held by the re-
treating troops and apparently already forced in
more than one place.
It is probable that the mere name Przemysl
will have a great effect upon the situation, and
that our Allies will be at great pains to prevent
the re-entry of the enemy into that town, although
it is no longer a fortress. But in so doing they
are producing a very dangerous salient in the
defensive line, which it is the enemy's whole
object to break through.
To put the matter as a mere strategic
problem without any considerations of sentiment
of any memories of the immediate past : suppose a
force' badly hampered for munitions, as is cer-
tainly the Russian Army at this moment, and con-
cerned with arresting the advance of an enemy
well provided, coming upon it from the west and
east across the Galician Plain, what line would
such a defensive presumably take up?
Undoubtedly it would take up the line of the
San from its junction with the Vistula to some-
where in the neighbourhood of Jaroslav. But not
far from that railway junction it would leave the
San to follow the Wisznia, and continue the same
direction as the Lower San does north-west by
south-east on towards the Dniester. It would thus
defend Lemberg and the two main lines of rail-
way (1) and (2) leading from the Russian bases;
it would concern itself with protecting the
advance base of Lemberg; but it would not bother
about the pronounced salient of Przemysl and the
big bend of the San westward beyond that point.
Our Allies may be able to hold the salient
of Przemysl, or they may not have had time to get
away the'hea\y guns of that fortress. They may
have munitions for these guns, but to attem.pt to
hold Przemysl quite clearly weakens their line as
a whole.
All conjecture upon the probable line that
will be adopted, whether Przemysl will be held or
no, is the less easy from the fact that the Russian
commimiques ever since the beginning of the
retreat have been quite insuflicient for the
formation of opinion. We have had to depend
almost entirely upon the statements of the vic-
torious Austro-Hungarians, and these, though
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they probably sometimes exaggerate the number
of prisoners, are accurate in the statement of
places reached and of crossings effected over the
various rivers which run parallel one behind the
other across the Galician Plain.
THE RUSSIAN COUNTER-OFFENSIVE
IN THE EAST.
Meanwhile, upon the extreme left, or eastern,
wing of this long Galician Russian front, our
Allies were taking the counter-offensive. Their
probable object in this I will deal with in a
moment. The first thing to appreciate is what
the precise movements were.
During the whole ten days of the main retreat
of the right wing (A — B in the sketch below) from
the Dunajec towards the San, the Russian left
wing (C — D) seems to have lain quiescent. But
four or five days before the line of the San was
reached by the right wing (A — B) of the Russian
armies in Galicia the left wing of the same
(C — D) began its counter-offensive, Sunday,
May 9, being the first day of this operation.
It is significant that the pressure exercised
here took five full days to develop, and presumablji
means what we noticed upon the right wing — the
lack on the Russian side of heavy artillery
ammunition. The Russians effected against their
enemies to the east of Galicia (and on a smaller
scale) in five days what the Austro- Germans had
effected upon a larger scale in the west of Galicia
in two days and a half — to wit, the compelling of
their adversary to retire from a defensive line
long occupied. This defensive line was that of
the River Dniester, from the borders of the
Russian Empire up, presumably, to a point about
ten or fifteen miles as the crow flies down the
river below Ualicz. We have no information as
to the exact point Avhich the Austrian defensive
line along the Dniester reached, but the point
marked with a cross on the accompanjnng sketch
is a fair guess, seeing what followed.
We may take it, therefore, that the counter-
ofTensive of the Russians on their left wing struck
at an Austrian line which bent round from where
the Dniester enters Russian territory, went north
at Nadworna, and got into the foothills of the
Carpathians about fifteen miles south-east of
Stanislau. Such a line would, with its main
sinuosities, be about what the Russians claim it to
be — to wit, a front of a hundred miles.
By the 14th the Austrian front, though no
more really broken than the Russian front along
the Dniester had been a fortnight before, was in
full retreat, leaving behind it its wounded and
stragglers, exactly as the Russians had left theirs
behind during their retreat upon the right wing.
LAND AND HVATER.
May 22, 1915.
Somewhere about last Friday or Thursday
night the rearguards of their retreating columns
had reached the left bank of the Pruth, and
during the Friday the Russian effort was concen-
trated upon the crossing of that river. Already,
upon the Thursday evening, the bridge-head
established at Sniatyn had fallen into the hands
of our Ally, and during the Friday the river was
crossed, so far as we can discover, in several
places.
It will be seen, however, from the above sketch
map that the higher reaches of the Pruth, before
it becomes a mountain torrent, curl round south-
ward, and the Russian advance, the Austrian
retreat parallel to that advance, did not impinge
upon the line of the Pruth north-westward of the
town of Kolomea. This town remained, as late as
last Saturday, in the hands of the Austrians,as also
did Czernowitz, lower down ; and the line was con-
tinued up north-westward in the direction of Nad-
worna. But Nadworna itself was carried by the
Russian advance in the course of last Friday. It
will be particularly interesting to see whether
that advance can master the railway junction at
Delatyn, because if it does our Ally will have
blocked the main avenue of retreat across the
mountains to their adversaries. No railway
crosses the Carpathians southward of this pass,
and, as will be seen on the above sketch, the rail-
way junction at Delatyn ends the communication
of this pass with the Galician Plain.
Roughly speaking, this counter-offensive has
had the effect, in the course of last week, between
Sunday morning, the 9th, and Sunday night, the
16th, of forcing the Austrian front back from a
line, such as that of the dots in the above diagram,
to a line such as that of the crosses immediately
to the south of them, and, by the latest advices it
would seem that the Russian pursuit is con-
tinuing.
As to the scale of the whole operation in com-
parison to the much larger business towards the
RUSSIAN BMTrp^
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north, in which our Allies have been compelled to
retreat, it must necessarily be judged by the pro-
portion of prisoners in the two cases, for prisoners
mean (in an operation of this kind) mainly the
wounded and stragglers abandoned in the retreat,
and the proportion to the total numbers engaged
would not be very different in the different armies.
By this rule the Russian counter-offensive on the
extreme left of their Galician line would seem to
deal, so far as the enemy was concerned, with
about a sixth of the total forces at work in
Galicia. The effect of that counter-offensive, com-
bined with the Russian retreat upon the north,
may best be gauged, perhaps, by some such general
sketch as the following. It will be seen that the
line approximately occupied last Sunday is not a
settled one. It fluctuates very considerably, and
involved at that moment a dangerous salient
round Przemysl and discussed above. But it will
also be seen that as a line it is still intact. The
territory lost in this particular retirement by the
Russians is marked with horizontal lines — that is,
the territory lost since the beginning of May ; that
regained by them is marked with stippling.
It will be seen how much upon the balance the
enemy have gained, but it need hardly be repeated
that the final result of such operations is not to be
measured in the belt of advance or retirement, but
it has two main strategical effects. The first, a
lesser effect, the fact that the Austro- Germans
have compelled our Ally to lose their hold of the
Carpathian passes in the north; the second, a
more important point, that they have none the
less failed to break the Russian line, and to
recover their liberty of manoeuvre in the largest
sense.
OBJECT OF THIS RUSSIAN COUNTER-
OFFENSIVE.
On this point the question will be asked,
.What object our Ally had in thus assuming the
counter-offensive against the Austro- German
right and from his own left?
The answer to such a question must, of
course, be purely conjectural, and I do no more
than put before my readers the conjectures the
situation suggests to me.
In the first place, just as the original occu-
pation of the Bukowina by the enemy's forces four
or five months ago was largely a political under-
taking, aimed at preventing the Roumanian
Government from deciding in favour of interren-
tion, so this Russian move back again into the
Bukowina may have primarily a political object.
(Whether there is any chance, proximate or eemote,
of the Roumanian Government deciding upon
intervention is a thing only known to those in
authority, and necessarily unknown to tlie jiresent
writer; but it is conceivable that the obvious
approach of Italy towards intervention is pro-
ducing a parallel moA'ement in Roumania, and
that in any case the Russian more presupposes
the possibility of Roumanian action. That is the
first point.
The second and more obvious point, of which
there can be no doubt, is that this counter-offensive
had the character we always get in any counter-
offensive along any line. Finding yourself em-
barrassed in one sector of your line, you try to
relieve the pressure by attacking upon another
sector. That is a very simple principle common
to all warfare at all times. But it is only just to
remark, if we desire to arrive at a sound judg-
ment upon the position in Galicia, that the Rus-
sian counter-ofl'ensive upon their left has nothing
like the same effect in checking embarrassment
upon their right and centre that similar strokes
at a distance from the threatened point would
have in Flanders, for instance, or in the plains of
Central Poland.
The Carpathians, as has been frequently
described in these columns, rise in height and
1Q»
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
broaden in width and increase in difficulty of com-
munications as one goes from nortli-west to south-
east. If all this were taking place in a flat
country, with excellent lateral communications^
that is, communications parallel to the Austro-
German front — then applying great pressure on
to the Bukowina end of the line would no doubt
tempt the Austro-Germans to bring round their
troops from the north and so relieve the difficul-
ties of the Russian line on the right, communi-
cating upon the San. But these lateral communi-
cations are lacking. The troops would have to be
brought a long way round by rail from Hungary,
along the railw^ay line which follows the Galician
foothills of the Carpathians. But this line
is not in Austro- German hands, save at its
western extremitj^ For the Russians have the
important junction of Stanislas, and possess
many other sections of the line further west.
Therefore all that the heavy pressure against the
Bukowina, now being exercised by the Russians,
can do at the best is to compel the withdrawal of
the Austro- German troops now occupying that
province, and perhaps to draw to the front certain
local reserves lurking behind the Bukowina across
the passes in Hungary. But it will certainly not
have the effect of bringing men and guns down
from the north to save the threatened point in the
south. The Austro- German effort against the San
and against the salient of Przemysl, and in
general the Austro- German attempt to take the
whole of north Galicia from the Russians, will
hardly be affected by this counter-move in the
south.
Thirdly, it may be asked : Does the Russian
counter-offensive here presume an attempt to get
ultimately into Hungary over the Southern Car-
pathian passes if the northern Carpathian passes
are lost ? The answer to this question would seem
to be almost certainly, No. The distance is too
great and the communications too difficult at the
moment for such a stroke to expect success. If,
indeed, the Austro-German advance on the north
can be checked and thoroughly held, if in the
fruitless attempt to prosecute it the enemy were
to waste great numbers of men and to emplace
more or less permanently great numbers of guns
along the San, then by the time considerable bodies
of reserves could be equipped, and by the time the
artillery could be properly munitioned — which is
the great weakness of the Russians — it is conceiv-
able that the new attempt towards Hungary might
be made across the higher, broader, and wilder
Carpathian country of the south-east, close to the
Roumanian border. If the Roumanian Array
intervenes, it is obvious that a blow would ulti-
mately be struck in that direction, but for the
moment the Russian advance into the Bukowina
does not seem to be aiming at crossing the moun-
tains.
THE DARDANELLES.
We have from the Dardanelles news confirm-
ing the strength of the Achibaba position, and
showing that the enemy still maintains himself
along the Achibaba ridge and is continuously
resisting the attack delivered by the Allies from
beyond Krithia.
On May 6, 7, and 8, the British attacking up
the slopes below Krithia on the left, the French
making for the buildings of Halar on the right,
failed to carry the ridge.
Meanwhile it may be of interest to the readers
of Laxd and Water to examine the exact con-
figuration of this first main position, the Achibaba
Ridge, upon the carrying of which will depend all
the first part of the campaign in the Gallipoli
Peninsula. On the next page I append a sketch of
the contours defining this strong position. The
heights of the contours are given in metres, and
the probable contour lines (the important ones over
100 metres) are given at 120, 140, and 150 metres
above the land. The contours are given at dis-
tances of 15 metres from the only two points at
which such contours may be shown — to wit, the
summits of the ridge of the cliff at the south-
eastern end above the Dardanelles.
I give the scale in ranges of 1,000 metres,
8,000 metres being approximately five miles.
It will be seen from the above sketch that the
position is a very strong one as against attack
coming from the south-west — that is, from the
direction of Krithia and from the slopes there
falling towards the extremity of the peninsula,
upon which slopes the main allied force now lies.
The main line of the position, which from the
contours would seem to be that which the enemy
would occupy (though, of course, all this is only
conjecture, for nothing but observation on the spot
can tell one exactly where upon the ridge the
trenches will be drawn) is indicated on the sketch
by the dotted lines. In front of it on the slope
nearly as far as Krithia are parallel enemy
trenches. Below the ridge is hidden the enemy's
artillery.
It will be observed that both ends of this
line, the north-western end on the ^Egean Sea
and the south-eastern end upon the Dardanelles,
reposes upon a very precipitous descent towards
the sea, while it is further remarkable that the
difficulty of turning the extremities of such a line
are increased by the presence I'unning inland from
the Dardanelles at A and from the ^-Egean Sea at
B of two ravines with precipitous sides, which
protect from direct assault any position drawn
above them.
The vulnerable part of the line is therefore
to be discovered apparently only in its centre. It
is true that the extreme steepness of the sides of
the ravine at B, and probably also that at A, will
create a certain amount of dead ground upon the
slopes. That is a ground which cannot be searched
by rifle fire from the ridge above the point. A
glance at these contours shows that each of these
ravines can be searched thoroughly by enfilade
fire from that part of the position which lies at
the head of each. Thus ravine A is commanded
entirely by the spur of the 150 metre contour in
front of the buildings at Halar, which spur is
seen projecting at the point C, while the ravine
at B is similarly commanded by the spur marked
D at the north-western end upon tiie 130 metre
contour. In general, and so far as mere observa-
tion from the air is of any value in such conjec-
tures, it would seem that the position is not to be
taken by force save .somewhere in its central por-
tion between D and C, and with regard to that
portion it must again be admitted that the oppor-
tunities for defence are very great. It is true that
the saddle at the lowest point of the ridge, just
opposite Krithia, at the point marked E E is low.
It is not much more, if any more, than 10 metres,/
LAND AND .W.ATEE.
May 22, 1915.
^
t.
'z\
.*.
.^i"
^
J
'D
or 33 feet, above the upper houses of Krithia, and
lies only a mile in front of that place. But, on
the other hand, this saddle is completely com-
manded by rocky slopes rising upon either side to
north-west, the lesser summit of 144 metres to the
south-east, the high summit of Achibaba itself
marked by an X and 216 metres above the sea.
The whole saddle is commanded at ranges of less
^^^^ "''"■^
*"--,
••^
E
than 2,000 yards from the slopes of these twin
hills.
In a word the depression in front of Krithia
cannot be used by the assault until the summits
commanding it from either side are carried and
the Achibaba position will not be in the hands of
the Allies until the points D and X have both been
seized.
A further matter to note is that the slopes
towards the .^gean are so precipitous that, while
the plateau, with its culminating ridge along
which the position lies, can indeed be shelled in
reverse from the sea, yet the shi[)s will have to lie
far out to effect their purpose.
While the troops on land are attacking from
the Krithia side, the ships will be able to shell
the position from the north-eastern side as along
the arrow 1, and it is notorious that fire thus
ia»
Max 22, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
eoming in reverse renders any position exceed-
ingly perilous, but this steepness of the fall of the
land toward the ^gean renders the fire of the
ships one that can only be delivered at very long
range and one that may consequently be less
effective. The point will be clear enough from the
following diagram.
Supposing the section of the land to be
roughly what appears in this diagram, with the
lesser peak D at D and the higher Achibaba peak
at X, it is clear that, save from quite a long way
out at sea, or by the aid of aircraft from above,
one could get no view of the falling of the shells :
even the slopes of the summit of Achibaba would
not be visible save from many miles out into the
.Egean, while the ships would also have to stand
Avell out in order that the trajectory of the fire
indicated by the dotted lines and arrows should
surmount the steep slopes which fall down to the
water on this side.
The real opportunities afforded to a fleet can,
of course, only be tested by those who have the
ground under their own eyes, but a study of the
contours makes such conclusions as those I have
suggested seem fairly certain.
One may sum up, therefore, and say that a
study of the map alone impresses one with the great
strength of this position and with the very intense
efforts that will have to be made if it is to be forced
at all. Once forced, upon the other hand, the
retirement of the enemy beyond it over lower
ground will expose them to severe punishment.
The north-eastern slope of the ridge towards the
valley which lies between it and the second
position — the escarpment of the Pasha Dagh sur-
rounding the Narrows — is a series of long, easy
stretches of falling land entirely exposed to fire
from those who may have acquired the summits of
the Achibaba ridge. Troops falling back from
that ridge across the Soghan Dere — that is, fall-
ing back from the position A B on the above
sketch to the semi-circular position C D on the
escai'pments of tlie Pasha Dagh and covering the
Narrows — will, during the first part of their re-
tirement, be completely exposed to fire following
them from the ridge they have just abandoned.
Save in the neighbourhood of the buildings at
Arpeton (see Diagram D), there would seem to be
no cover afforded, either by natural features or by
the contours of the ground, though it may be that
rocky scars or what not of a sort which the contoui
map does not show occasionally afford such cover.
It must not be forgotten either that once th<
ridge is taken it will be under fire from heavj
artillery posted on the Pasha Dagh or its neigh-
bourhood, as also under fire at long range from the
permanent works and mobile barriers of heavy
guns upon the Asiatic coast.
THE PRESENT GERMAN TEMPER.
iWhile it is an error to exaggerate the moral
factor represented by the temper of the enemy at
any moment, it is well to appreciate what that
temper is, for it has its effect upon each phase of
the war, and the reader may be recommended to a
very excellent summary of that temper which
appeared in the Times of last Monday. It was
there pointed out that German confidence in vic-
tory— meaning, presumably, the confidence of the
populace, not of those trained to war and able to
weigh the international situation — was perhaps
higher now than it had been since the winter. Tlie
cause of this state of mind is simple enough. It
has been produced by the great Austro- German
advance in Galicia, and those of us who are wise
enough to put ourselves into the shoes of the enemy
and to imagine how we should feel if we read in
the course of a fortnight of an advance over some-
thing like fifty miles and the presence of our
troops at the very gates of a recently-fallen
fortress, of great captures of prisoners, and of
more moderate but appreciable captures of guns
will understand perhaps why uninstructed
opinion of the enemy is aftected by similar news.
At the same time we shall do well to re-
member that all those strivings after a moral
efi^ect which have distinguished the enemy's action
during the last m.onth and more remain fruitful
in his eyes. The Lusitania, for instance, has been
sunk with a certain moral result which, probably,
the enemy does not yet appreciate. But the imme-
diate effect has not been to throw into the scale
any tangible and measurable weight against him,
for expressions of disgust, of horror, or of hatred
produced by such acts, as also by the minor exist-
ence of the same temper Avhich is to be found in
the use of the new poisonous gases, the bombard-
ment of Dunkirk, the attempting to burn English
watering-places, and the rest of it, will neces-
sarily seem to those who have approved and sup-
ported such conduct only so many tributes to their
success. The impartial observer of the campaign,
including, of course, the enemy's own General
Staff, distinguishes clearly between what is a mili-
tary and what is not a military action. You would
probably find, if you could hear the discussions
of the commanders, civil and military, of the
enemy armies at this moment, that there was a
party, consisting, presumably, of the more sol-
dierly and better read or better travelled men,
who doubted the value of such peculiarly civil
experiments, just as during the French Revolu-
tion the more soldierly-minded amongst those who
conducted the State tried to make of the terror an
instrument merely of martial law and tried to
restrict its expansion into an instrument of
torture.
To take the specific instance just quoted, it
is probable that quite a number of men, either a
13*
LAND AND WATER.
May 22, 1915.
minority or less powerful than the rest amongst
those conducting German affairs, see that a crime
such as that committed against the Lusitania,
while it has very little direct military value, in-
directly lowers the chances of a successful issue, in
so far as purely moral agencies can tend towards
that result. But we cannot expect the mass of the
German population to follow reasoning of this
kind, and we should do well to remember that
every new accretion to this pressure of terror
upon enemy civilians is supported by the mass of
German opinion.
In the same way, not only the most soldierly,
but all of those who"^ are occupied in purely mili-
tary direction upon the side of the enemy, know
perfectly well wliat the retirement of the Russian
Army from Galicia means. They set down on the
credit side the Russian loss of the passes, the
security of Hungary for the moment (and a most
important moment it is), and the Russian losses
in men and material; but they set on the debit
side the failure to break the Russian line, which
was necessarily the ultimate object of so consider-
able an attempt.
They know that Russia is fighting upon two
fronts at once, or, if the Eastern front be divided
into its two natural sections, then upon three
fronts, and that the Austro- German coalition
cannot undertake a great offensive wnth its last
reserves of this kind without correspondingly
weakening, and ultimately dangerously weaken-
ing, the forces in the rest of the field. In ot^her
words, every impartial student of the campaign,
whether hostile or friendly to the Austro-
Germans, recognises that a great expense in men
and munitions of this kind is in the long run worse
than immobility, unless it succeeds in its main
object.
But here, again, you cannot expect the man
of uninstructed German opinion to have any such
detached and purely intellectual standpoint. We
have only to remember how opinion at home is
moved by the news of a small advance and
depressed by the news of a small retirement to
judge the like leakage in this, as in most other
affairs of popular emotions during the strain of a
war.
What is the practical effect upon our analysis
of the operations of this judgment — if it be
correct (as I believe it is) that the enemy's civilian
opinion is now more confident by far than it was a
few weeks ago ?
So far as I can judge, the main effect would
seem to be this : that this opinion will be prepared
for very heavy losses indeed during the heavy fight-
ing that is bound to come with the early summer.
It would seem to me to mean that what the French
call the " va-tout " upon the part of the enemy,
an expenditure of men m.ore lavish than even he
has yet attempted, will be the result of the
reaction of this civilian temper upon the military
commanders. And with regard to this judgment,
if it be sound, we may further say, as we have said
throughout this campaign, that two alternatives
present themselves, the second far more probable
than the first.
Either by deliberately incurring a quite
abnormal wastage in men the enemy will achieve
his main object, which is the piercing of the line
containing him to the east or to the west, the
recovery of his liberty of manoeuvre, and the
defeat upon a large scale of some considerable
body of those pierced and turned — a main success
which would be followed by the drawn peac-e at
which he is aiming, including the retention (of
course) of the Belgian ports : that is the first alter-
native. Or — the second alternative, and the more
probable if we are to judge by the analogy of the
whole campaign from the battle of Ypres iu
October and November to the present day — thia
vast expenditure of men for which he is preparing
opinion at home will fail in its object. If it does so,
then it will have precisely the effect which the
Allies would most desire. For, at the risk of very
tedious repetition, it must again be insisted upon
here, as it has been insisted upon so often in these
columns, that this siege warfare is ultimately a
warfare of wearing down. The enemy deliberately;
chooses to lose more men in proportion than he
can make his opponents lose. He deliberately
chooses this expensive policy, enormously more ex-
pensive in the West, and probably some^yhat more
expensive in the East, because he believes that
sooner or later it will bear fruit which will make
the expense worth while ; but with every failure the
depletion of his numbers makes it less and less
probable that the next attack will succeed, and
there is a certain limit after which his losses will,
if he does not break the containing lines, produce,
as a mere arithmetical certainty, a state of affairs
in which he can no longer hold his own lines at
their present length.
What will be the effect of all this on neutral
intervention and what would happen to the
enemv's numbers and to his use of men if Italy
should declare war, or, better still, Italy and
Roumania between them should declare war?
Without attempting to prophesy, which is
manifestly futile, one may suggest a consequence
which is almost certain. The arrival of Italy into
the field would draw away from the Eastern and
Western fronts not less than ten corps. The arrival
of Roumania as well into the field would make
that ten grow to not less than fifteen.
Let no one imagine that these numbers are to
be drawn from some supposed reserves of men
alreadv trained which the enemy has not yet
thrown into the fighting line. It is the very
characteristic of the present situation, it is the
very root of the German confidence and of the
fury of the Austro-German attack in the East,
that the enemv is putting into the fighting line
at this moment every atom of fighting power he
has at his command.
The intervention of a neutral at this moment
would not presumably be felt upon the West,
though it would prevent anything more than a
veryl)rief attempt at attack towards the West. It
would probably be felt upon the Eastern line. For
there the insufficiency of Russian equipment and
munition presents a" better hope of holding the
results already acquired with a lesser number of
men than those now occupied in pressing forward.
HILAIRE BELLOC.
MR. HILAIRE BELIOGS WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Belloc's next lecture al Queen's Hall, London, will b»
on Wednesda]), June 2nd. ll will be illustrated b^ coloured slide*
oj the recent fighting and Will deal with the present position cj
the war.
Mr. Belloc's next lecture at the Winter Gardens, Botme-
mouth, is at 3.30. Tuesda};, Afaj) 25th.
14»
May 22, 191Su
LAND AND .WATER
THE WAR BY WATER.
THE AMERICAN NOTE.
By A. H. POLLEN.
NOTE. — This article lias been submitted to the Press Bareaa, which does not object to the pnblicatioo as censored, and takes n*
responsibility for tlie correctness ol the statements.
SEVERAL events of great naval importance
have occurred in the past week. H.M.S.
Goliath (Captain Shelford) has been tor-
pedoed in the Dardanelles. The British
Legation at Athens has offered liberal sums to
those who give information of the whereabouts of
the German submarines. The Russian Fleet has
had an inconclusive engagement with the Turkish
Fleet— headed by the Sultan Janus Selim (late
Goehen). It was inconclusive because the Turks
retired. But for its ultimate influence on the
naval war, President Wilson's Note to Berlin is
likely to be the most important of them alL
At the time of writing there is no indication
of the sort of reception the German Government
has given to this exceedingly explicit document.
The Press, however, is in a very unrelenting
mood. Nor is there any indication of the course
President Wilson will take if that reception
proves unfriendly. It may, therefore, appear
premature to discuss its possible results; but it
does not seem so to me, for Germany must either
promise to desist from wholesale sinkings or
refuse to desi^, and if she refuses, America must
either submit to a most outrageous snub or her
relations with Germany must cease altogether to
be friendly. If they cease to be friendly, those
relations must be either those of open war or of
passive hostility. In any event, then, the Presi-
dent's Note cannot leave things as it found them,
and, for obvious reasons, it is the war at sea that
will be most affected by the change.
The real interest of the Persident's Note is
not that it calls upon Germany to cease offending
America; it is a definite demand that she shall
cease from her crimes against humanity. This is
to take a very high line, and seems to create a
situation which does not permit of an ambiguous
reply. If Germany accepts the reproof, the
simplification of the naval position hardly needs
to be demonstrated. The Germans cannot, how-
evei", be asked to abandon their right to stop con-
traband in neutral ships or to capture enemy
ships. And as submarines are the only craft
she has available for either purpose she can
only search and capture as far as a sub-
marine crew can do these things. The ex-
periment would be interesting. If loyally
attempted, of course, without illegal sinking, a
certain success could be possible, but only if the
captains respected the fragility of the submarine.
Great Britain would have no hesitation, one sup-
poses, in undertaking that merchantmen should
not attack them in return for a German promise
to abandon the sinking of merchantmen. But the
undertaking would have to include sinking after
search as well as sinking before search. Is it
likely that Germany will invite us to enter into
any such bargain? It is more probable that she
will reject America's claim to direct her method
of conduct. .What, then, will America do?
Jhere seems to be a choice of three courses
open. She can break off friendly relations with-
out going to war. This, from a naval point of
view, will leave things much as they ai^e, except
in one important particular. It is that the
Americans will probably take strenuous steps to
prevent goods being shipped from the States to
Germany through neutral countries. If this were
done, the task of patrolling the North Sea and of
searching the trade now making for Danish,
Swedish, and Norwegian ports would be greatly
eased.
It is more probable that public opinion in
America will insist upon active hostilities, and
if these were confined to naval hostilities the
gain to the Allies would be very great indeed.
Obviously if an effort were made to raise and
equip a military force, industrial resources now
devoted to making munitions for us might be
deflected to making them for the national army.
This would be a development highly deleterious
to us, for no American army could be ready in
any useful time. Nor would this deflection of
munitions be the only disadvantage. The effort
would so strain American financial resources as to
make it impossible for the European Allies to
expect assistance there. But with America at war,
but not committed to a land campaign, the Allies
who are so committed might, in addition to shells,
guns, and rifles, have the benefit of the sympa-
thetic support of the only great neutral money
market in the world.
It is, however, to the direct help of the United
States Navy that we should look for the most im-
portant and the most direct results. The United
States Navy is powerful in fighting units of the
first class. It possesses no less than ten completed
ships of the Dreadnought type. They can bring
into battle broadsides amounting to eighty 12-Lnch
guns and twenty 14-inch guns. And the Okla-
homa and Nemda were within ten per cent, of
completion on March 1. These two ships would
raise the total of the Dreadnoughts to twelve, and
add a further twenty 14-inch guns to the broad-
side. The Pennsylvania and the Arizona are
some way off from completion. Of pre-Dread-
noughts there are five of the Kansas, two of the
Louisiana, and five of the New Jersey classes, all
laid dowTi in 1904, 1905-6. These constitute
twelve ships of reasonable speed and very consider-
able gun power. There are, indeed, no twelve
pre-Dreaduoughts in Europe more heavily armed.
With the stiU earlier types, the three Maines, the
three Alabamas, the Kearsage and Kentucky and
the four old battleships of Mr. Witney's pro-
gramme we need not concern ourselves. America
possesses no battle-cruisers, but there are ten
armoured cruisers, five armed with 10-inch and
6-inch, and six armed with 8-inch and 6-inch guns,
all nominally capable of twenty-two knots. But
these, again, are of no great value except for
patrolling purposes. Of fast cruisers America
has very few ; in point of fact, three only, the
15*
LAND AND .WATER
May 22, 1915.
Salem, Birmingham, and Chester. It is more to
the point that of destroyers of a modern type —
that is, of seven hundred tons and over, and cap-
able of 29 or 30 knots — she has thirty-four com-
pleted and a further six that were very near com-
pletion on March 1.
This is clearly a very formidable force. It
is manifestly impossible for America to employ it
in a campaign of her own. If she declares war
against Germany, this force must co-operate with
the naval forces of the Allies. How should it be
used ? The prospect opens up a great number of
strategical possibilities. For one thing, the
junction between the British Grand Fleet and the
American battle fleet would put an end once and
for all to any likelihood of the German fleet
attempting to come out. Slender as the prospect
is to-day of the High Seas fleet being able to main-
tain itself Guccessfully against the King's ships
under Sir John Jellicoe, all hopes of doing so
would have to be abandoned if it was known
that we had been strengthened by a new
squadron of such strength as the latest eight
American Dreadnoughts would prove to be. If
only eight came into the North Sea there would be
two more available for the Dardanelles. The pre-
Dreadnoughts would be retained as a reserve
within home waters, or to reinforce the Allies when
wanted. What is perhaps more to the point is the
gain to the Allies in the reduced necessity for
supervising the merchant ships crossing the
Atlantic, and the larger number of ships that
would be available for protecting them from sub-
marines. In this matter the American destroyers
and three fast cruisers would be of the utmost
A^alue. Indeed, there is no reason why the sixteen
older boats should not join in protecting the
Atlantic traffic. In many respects these fifty-six
destroyers would, indeed, be the most valuable re-
inforcement we could have.
THE WAR IN THE MEDITERRANEAN.
Two pieces of information, to which I have
already alluded, from the Mediterranean, have
reached us in the course of the past week, which
have added considerably to the anxiety with
which the public has awaited the sequence of
svents in the Dardanelles. When H.M.S. Goliath
(Captain Shelford) was sunk by a torpedo fired
from a destroyer on the night of the 12th-13th inst.,
Captain Shelford, nineteen officers and about 500
men lost their lives— a very grievous blow. The
officers and men are irreplaceaole. The ship repre-
sented perhaps one-twentieth of our naval force
in the Straits. The loss gains in significance by
the news from Athens. In discussing the perils to
which the allied bombarding fleet was exposed,
we have generally counted gun-fire, mines — obser-
vation, contact, and drifting — and torpedoes fired
from tubes submerged by the shore, as the only
dangers to be expected. We must now expect
active sea attack as well.
Evidently we must not measure the efficiency
of the Turkish destroyers by the inefficiency of
her bigger ships. The attack of the Mauvenet-
i'Millet could only have been made at night. It
is rather surprising to find that the Goliath was
covering the Frencli advance in darkness. The
difficulty that would be experienced by a ship
under vray doing anything useful in the way of
gunnery, against targets which cannot be seen,
must have b,een very great.
THE SUBMARINE AT THE STRAITS.
The sinking of Goliath makes the fact of
German submarines having reached the Mediter-
ranean of acute interest. Seven weeks ago, when
the sinking of U39 was announced by the
Admiralty, I pointed out that these boats had a
sufficient fuel capacity to carry them to the Dar-
danelles and leave them a considerable radius of
action when they arrived. It has, indeed, been a
mystery to many observers why Germany
should be squandering on a perfectly futile form
of sea brigandage forces that must be of vital
necessity to her elsewhere.
There can be little doubt now that the first
of the large submarines was completed for the
German fleet in the month of February, and that
they have been coming into commission at the rate
of two — if not three — every month. With a
straight run at fifteen knots — a moderate surface
speed — these boats could get from Zeebrugge to
the Dardanelles in about ten days' time. If allow-
ance is made for periodical submersions to avoid
attack, the journey might occupy three weeks. By
this time, had all the new submarines been sent to
the Mediterranean, half a dozen might be there.
There would, of course, be serious difficulties
in getting very valuable results out of them. The
only well-equipped naval base available would be
Pola, and from Pola to the Straits is nearly
twelve hundred miles. The alternative to such a
base would be an arrangement by which
apparently neutral supply ships were provided
somewhere in the Greek Archipelago. But it does
not seem safe to assume that neither Smyrna nor
any other seaboard Turkish town in Asia Minor
could be used. No doubt Sir Richard Pierce's
squadron will keep the sharpest possible kind of
look-out. But German submarines have been able
to evade the British patrols and destroyers that
infest the Channel, so that however close the in-
vestment of Smyrna may be from the sea, the diffi-
culties in the way of submarines using this, or
some other Turkish town, should not be insuper-
able.
At any rate, the threat is a formidable one.
One has only to read Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett's last
despatch to realise what a target our transports
must afford. The threat emphasises what perhaps
hardly needs emphasis — the truth that every delay
in bringing these operations to a successful issue
makes success more difficult and more hazardous
to the forces engaged.
THE PROTECTION OF THE SHIPS.
It brings home to us also the crucial necessity^
for the protection of the bombarding fleet. When,
on March 18, Irresistible, Ocean, and Bouvet wero
sunk by drifting mines, the Admiralty made the
somewhat naif statement that immediate steps
would be taken to protect the ships in future ; so
that we were driven to ask whether this particular
danger was unforeseen. As a fact, there are few
subjects about which naval opinion has chopped
and changed so curiously as on the question of net
defence. When the first official trials of the
Luppis- Whitehead torpedo in British waters were
made, experiments with nets to protect ships from
them formed an integral part of the practical in-
vestigations carried out. As a consequence,
from the earliest date of the adoption of the
torpedo, stout nets were carried on all armoured
16'
May 22, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
ships to protect them when lying at anchor or
going dead slow. But nets were not a complete
defence, even in these conditions, and were quite
useless with the ship going faster than three or
four knots. Moreover, the nets, the booms, and the
apparatus for raising and lowering the nets were
a great weight. There were, in addition, many
other reasons for finding them a serious nuisance
in a ship. Ten years ago the opinion had
gained that they might be discarded. The White-
head torpedo had done practically nothing in the
Spanish- American War, nor in the war between
China and Japan, and by 1905 naval opinion was
practically agreed on giving up nets altogether.
The sensational opening of the Russo-Japanese
War caused a complete revulsion — once more nets
were treated as absolutely necessary for the equip-
ment of a ship.
But in 1908 and 1909 the high-speed, long-
range torpedo came into use. This put a com-
pletely new aspect on things. At short range a
torpedo going fifty knots can cut its way through
any net, so that against the latest weapon, fired
at short range, the net was no protection at all,
even in the limited conditions in which it had
teen such with the older and slower weapon. But
this is by no means the only reason why nets fell
into disrepute. With a long-range weapon, it
6eem.ed clear that the torpedo was destined to play
a great part in fleet actions, and in fleet actions '
with ships under way nets of course could not be
used. The necessity of protecting fleets at anchor
was forgotten in the larger question. The old nets
might be useless against the new torpedo; but no
new method of defence was worked out.
Had it ever been contemplated to employ the
pre-Dreadnought battle fleet as it is now being
employed in the Straits, we may be sure that every
net would have been replaced. That they were
not replaced is perhaps a measure of the extreme
haste with which these ships had to be sent upon
their new duties. The lesson of the omission must
have come home with great force after the events
of March 18, and no doubt nets and booms have
long since been sent to make good the deficienciea
that may have existed. In the case of
Goliath it is not at all certain that nets could
have defended her. In the Dardanelles current
it would have been almost impossible to have kepfc
them in place even with the ship stationary over
the ground.
It is not to be supposed that re-netting tbo
ship is the only precaution that ought or has been
taken to protect the fleet from drifting mines or
from torpedoes, either from the shore stations
and destroyers or submarines. Provision must
certainly have been made for more active
measures.
THE LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, G.B.
OR the past forty years at least all soldiers who
have made a serious study of their profession have
been warning the members of the various Peace
Societies of the dangers and diiEculties they were
creating for this country by endeavouring to
codify certain customs which had grown up dui-ing centuries
of warfiirs and to confer upon this codex the status of " Inter-
national Law."
The position in which we were placed by the various
Hague Conventions, at v.'hich these new laws were accepted,
was a most difficult one, because from the nature of our
duties as an ancient Colonial Empire we had to be prepared
to fight all varieties of races, often under conditions of such
extreme danger and responsibility for other lives and greater
interests that it was futile to prescribe or limit in any way
any use which the men on the spot might make of the re-
sources at their command.
For exam.ple, if a British steamer caiTying many white
women and children (a mission expedition, let us say) were
beset by Chinese pirates, would the missionary in charge ob-
ject to tlie captain's turning the steam hose on to their
assailants and beating them off with superheated steam, when
the ship might be unprovided with any other adequate means
of dealing with the situation ? Such steam produces results
many times worse than asphyxiation, and death from its in-
juries is quite as painful as that of chlorine vapour; but,
judging from the outrages committed by German officers on
English schoolgirls and Belgian nuns, the fate of white
women falling into Cliinese hands could be no worse, for
nothing this side of hell could be more terrible than the Ger-
man atrocities, no crime more deserving of such drastic
punishment.
Again, an officer holding an outpost of vital importance
against the rush of hordes of " Fuzzies " could not be blamed
for using fire-smoke, dum-dum ballets, or any other means at
his command in order to prolong resistance and gain time for
jUie troops he is covering to concentrate; and, by the way.
blaming the officers would not prevent their men selling thein
lives as dearly as it was possible for them to do.
The framers of this code, of course, recognised thew
cases of supreme necessity by limiting its application to
" civilised " nations only,- and in so doing provided cpportunic
ties for the revolting outrages we are now witnessing; for,
though every thoughtful soldier realised that when fighting
with their backs to the wall all races instinctively shed thei^
civilisation, the nation as a whole declined to believe in the
realities of warfare, and, in spite of the experiences of tha
Napoleonic wars, failed to perceive the loopholes which Th«
Hague attempt at legislation provided for the advantage ol
an unscrupulous enemy.
The result has been a series of very unpleasant surprises
for the navies and troops equipped only for the prosecutioa
of civilised warfare, of which the recent use of poisonous, no^
merely asphyxiating, fumes is far the worst and most cruel.
The use of all kinds of gaseous fumes and of ether
poisons has been studied for years and years, and almost all
have their antidotes and can be guarded against, provided
the possibility of encountering them is admitted. Speaking
generally, however, military commonsense, quite apart frons
human consideration, has rejected such things as far less
effective than the means which can be provided of equal local
efficiency and more general appUcation.
But since all parties in the present war had signed ■
declaration binding them to refrain from the employment of
the before-mentioned and similar means, such as squirting
burning petrol, &c., the Germans promptly took advantage
of the opportunity afforded them by their knowledge of our
reputation for adhering to our given word, and, with the
absolute unscrupulousness and lack of truth on which they
pride themselves, proceeded to score here and there tern*
porary successes.
Had they believed that we were prepared with the same
appliances the chances are millions to one that they would
not have employed any such expedients, for when the adVan-t
i7*
LAND A N D W A T E E
May 22, 1915.
tage of surprise does not exiat tV.o means wbieli experience
lias shown to be most effective in the long ruu would ou'iy
kave been used by all combatanta.
In fighting day by day, a toa of high explosive divided
arnonc'Bt many sliel'.g and discharged frora mobile v/eapoua
will do far more damage than a ton of chloriue, and takes
far lea?! haulage and trouble generally than will the appliances
needed to discharge tlie gaa; hence, beyond certain linuted
surprises, the Germans have gained but little in the theatre
of war and have lost inconr.parably mora outside it — namely,
the last rags of consideration which their first outrages and
crimes migiit have left them to co^er the disfigured and naked
body of their race. They have forgotten the dioium of
Clausewit?:, that the use of absolute force in war must be
tempered by expediency; in other words, tliat it does not pay
to outrage the general sense of decency and the feelings of
the humau race by methods more ruthless and ciuel than those
Bauctioned by custom.
And, further, they have done this at the most inoppor-
tune m.oment for their own cause. The resentment aroused
by their atrocities in Belgium was beginning to die down,
and in the general feeling of war-weariness it was in danger
of being forgotten. It is more than possible that the sym-
pathy of all neutrals (including, of course, the United States)
misht ha%'e been against the Allies in their det-ermination to
exact terms of peace that shall ensure the root destiniction of
Prui'slan militarism. But the siuldng of the Luaiiavia has
opened the half-biind eyes of some parts of the world t-o what
a renewal of war with Germany, following on a period of
armed truce, would mean to all on whom she could lay her
hands, and I doubt v/hetlier at the present moment there is
a neutral Power in existence which wJli have even a word of
sympathy for Germany's inevitable punishment when the end
arrives.
Fortunately the conduct of her sea pirates has shown
D3 the practical way t^ attain our purpose in a manner that
■will enlist the sympathies of all neutral peoples.
It was easy to talk of destroying " Prussian militarism,"
but. as the attempts of Napoleon after Jena proved most con-
clusively, it was by no means easy to suggest a practical
!nethod of doing so.
But it will be well for all countries to remember that the
German Army can never again be formidable without it has
sea power behind it.
The present war has proved this up to the Ivlt.
Once normal conditions have been restored the Socialist
Pavty in Germany will be quite strong enough to prevent any
expenditure on a War Navy unless it can be shown that sucJi
a fleet serves some other purpose than that of supporting
aggression. When it had, at the beginning of its existence,
the plausible excuse of protecting its ocean-going commerce,
it pos9e,ssed a motive strong enough to capture both comincr-
cial and labour votes.
If we in the future rigidly prohibit any German-ov/ned
vessel flying the German merchant flag from entering any
port in the civilised world (even in those of the British Empire
would suffice), then the argument of " commerce protection "
would at once cea.se to exist, and consequently money would
be lacking for a War Navy.
Such prohibition would not inflict any injury on legiti-
mate German trade (her merchant navy, of course, excepted),
for it is all the same to the inland merchant who transports
his goods over-seas, provided that freightage is rea^^onable,
and the competition for the carrying trade between British,
Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and iJussian ships, &c., would
Buflice to keep that down to about its proper level.
Tnoidentally, it would give back to the neutral nations
their share in that trade which the German subsidised liners
had taken away frora them.
Deprived of her fleets, Germany would then bo in much
the same position as Switzerland. No one would threaten
her, for no one covets one acre of her legitimate possessions,
and since, shorn of her weapons of aggression, she could not
tiireaten in her turn, no matter how large her Army might
be, and the peace of Central Europe would be secured for very
many generations by this device.
THE DANGEROUS TALK OF PEACE.
By FREDERICK GRUNDY.
w
HY not discuss the terras of peace 1 " Such
v/ere the words that appeared over a long
article by a distinguished writer a short
time ago. No more depressing thought
could well occur than sucla a discussion at
nicli a moment as this.
After nine months of warfare on a scale hitherto un-
imagined, in which the units engaged are not mere arniies,
but nations in arms, and those the greatest nations of Europe;
when for three parts of a year such countries of
Europe as have not already been drawn into the
bloody vortex have been shuddering on its brink;
when an entire kingdom has been laid waste and
tbose of its civil population wh.o are not refugees in
foreign lands are dependent for their scant daily bread upon
the charity of strangers: when five-sixths of Poland is in even
a more pitiable and desperate condition, after waging a war-
fare which, in the words of that great patriot Paderev/sld, has
been "Parricide, Fratricide, and compulsory Suicide";
when for month after month the ears of the world have been
insulted and stunned by stories of inhuman cruelty and bestial
lust, incredible but for the overwhelming evidence of their
truth; when the killed, the wounded, and the captured are
already numbered by the million — when these and a hundred
other things are considered, it may seem strange to find any-
thing depressing in the thought of peace.
As a fact, there is m.uch that is depressing, even alarming,
in the way in which the idea of peace is being put ionrssd at
the present moment. The danger is not lessened but rather
iiicreased by the fact that at the moment the majority perhaps
of the British people v/ill say, " We are not thinking of peace,
and will not think of it until the Allied Armies have achieved
complete victory and the Allied Nations can impose fitting
terms. Besides that, we are being warned v/ith increasing
insistency of late in tJis daily Preis not to be deceived by the
rosy optimism which pervades the official reports. We are
told that ' the changes of line in the last six months would
hardly be noticed by a map-maker,' and see the Government
being urged ' to iise every effort to make the nation under-
stand how small is the progress yet attained on laud, and
how great and manifold are the sacrifices which must be
faced.' If this be true, is it likely that Germany, any more
than ourselves, will be willing to listen to peace talk vet
awhile?"
This is not difficult to answer. It is some little time ago
now that " the directing mind " of Germany, aa Mr. Belloo
has well called it, had been forced to the point of admitting,
" We are prepared to meet a reasonable demand upon us and
to discuss terms."
It must not be thought that the recent nnspeakable con-
duct of the Germans, both on land and sea, betokens any idea
on their part — or, rather, on the part- of the " directing
minds " — that they will ultimately secure complete victory
over the Allies by the steady pursuit of their policy of
" f rightfulness." The murder of harmless fishermen,
a.^phyxiating gases, and the torpedoing of peaceful linera
differ nothing in manner or degree from the horrors of
Belgium and Poland. If after the latter Germany saw some
Impe of success in approaching Europe and the neutral
countries with what amounted to a request for " a draw," it
is not likely that she will be deterred from that object because
in the meantime .she has committed fresh atrocities.
Indeed, when we consider the strange ramifications and
perverted logic of the German mind, the vei-y opposite is
more likely to bo the case. " If all these atrocities have not
made it impossible, but only rather difficult, to float the idea
of a draw," such a mind would argue, " then let us try
other.s." This, surely, is the basic idea of fcha German policy
of " f rightfulness."
It ib this idea of " » draw," or even something slightljf
13*
May 22, 1915.
LAND ' AND WATER.
better for ibe Allies, '' a win on points," that is set distreHsing
in the recent talk of peace. For the moment it has, ■perhap<,
been supjsressed. But it has not been killed, and.nothir.g
could be more dangerous — or, rather, fatal — to the future
peace and welfare of Europe in general and this country in
jjarticular. This should be abundantly evident to all clear-
thinking minds. " A win on points " is invariably followed
by another contest when the loser has been " readied " again.
It may be argued tliat the ways of the prize-ring are not
those of the great nations of the world. There are already
many, and presently their numbe»-s will be increased, who
place their confidence in the show of " sweet reasonableness '
that has of late marked the propagandist work of Count
Bernstorff and Ilerr Dernburg in America, and similar efforts
by means of numerous articles and interviews now to be
found in the German Press. These, perhaps sincere, but cer-
tainly misguided, people profess to believe that a peace made
in the immediate future would be a good, a jutt, and lasting
peace, and will stigmatise as brutal and uncivilised any wish
to beat to its knees a foe that is " prepared to meet a reason-
able demand."
Before saying anything of the danger that undoubt€uly
exists of these sentimentalist and opportunist views spreading
and increasing in power until they may actually threaten to
rob the Allies, and indeed the whole civili.sed world, of the re-
ward they rahould gain for the vast sacrifices they have made,
and have yet to make, in this war, lot us consider just one
great and unanswerable reason against even listening to aiy
talk of peace until Germany has been decisively and completely
beaten. There are m-any arguments against a premature
peace, and all of them should be strongly impressed upon the
minds of the public, but in this article it is only proposed to
deal with one. It can be done in very few words.
It is no longer necessary to spend time in poinlirig cut
how this war was long prepared by the Prussian n)ilitarisfc
party, and how plainly a few years ago the very year, even
the very month, for its outbreak was decided upon. Nor is it
necesary to dilate upon the fact that the German Empire is
working and fighting as one man with the Prussian militarists.
The prophets wlio foretold that the Saxons or the Bavarians
would soon tire of sacrificing their blood and treasure for
Prussia have been falsified. Those who put their faith in the
German Socialists, even by revolution, putting an end to the
war unless victory v/ere rapid and complete, have been de-
ceived. There is not the slight-cst sign at ])resent of any
breaking away from the Prussian dominance, ncr is there any
sign even that if',for their own ends, the " directing " military
minds of Prussia can now secure an inconclusive peace the
German nation as a whole, or any parts of it, would rise
against the men who have clieated them with false liopes and
hurl them from power. Everything, indeed, points to tho
contrary and suggests that Germany would be as acquiescent
in such a conclusion to the war as it has been in everything else
offered to it by its " directing minds."
And here lies the greatest danger of a premature peace.
It is this which affords the most depresinsg thought when
one turns the mind towards the end of the war. So long as
Germany is content to submit to the domination of the
Prussian militarists, so lon^ as she continues to suffer her
present form of government, tlie peace of Europe cannot be
reasonably assured. No matter what terms of peace the Allies
may eventually be able to i.mpose, one thing they cannot do.
It is impossible to impose upon a nation its form of govern-
ment. This can be done with conquered and inferior nations
as we have done it in the case of various coloured races. It
can be done v^ith a conquered and vassal nation as Germany,
Austria, and Russia have done it in the case of Poland. But
it would surely be impossible in the case of Germany. Yet
if after peace has been made Germany remains, as she is now,
a military autocracy, that peace will be but a truce, a long
one perhaps, but still a truce. The only cure for this is some
democratic form of government for Germany. A democracy
can never prepare a war in the sense that Germany has pre-
pared this war. A democracy will fight, as this country and
France are fighting now, but it can never prepare for long
years and i>hen say " In such and such a year wa shall be
ready," and when that year comes draw the sword. There
is not, and cannot be, in a democracy sufficient continuity of
policy or administration for such an undertaking. Even con-
tinuity in the policy of necessary preparation for defence is for
a democracy a difficult matter to secure, as we have just seen
both at home and in France. But with a military autocracy
euch as Germany's it is perfectly easy. Her Parliament is
merely a glorified debating society upon which the " directing
minds " can impose their will, and, while maintaining their
continuous war policy, can keep the bulk of the people con-
tientcd by not neglecting the country's trade and commerce
and' material welfare generally, as certainly they I'.cvc net
been neglected bv Germany's autocrats.
How, then, can a reformed system of government bs
secured for Germany? The only way seems to be by inflicting
such a defeat upon her as will make the Gernian people realise
into what evils a Tnilitary autocracy must plunge them at
constantly recurring intervals. Then they may themselves b«
stirred to effect a cliange. But this will certainly net be done
while Germany is still waging war entirely upon the territory
of her enemies. Not until the Fatherland itself is threatened
is the German jjeople likely to realise the truth.
Here, then, is one compelling reason which, whatever
sacrifices it may entail, m.akes the crushing defeat of Germany
a stsrn necessity and no mere act of vindictiveness.
But is there any real danger of this premature and incon-
clusive peace? At present, it may be urged, all talk of it i?
confined to America. Our own vveak ones — even Mr. Shaw —
seem to have been silenced. They may be silent, but, un-
happily, they still exist. There is, undoubtedly, a real danger.
At a certain point in a great war neutral pressure has often
helped to bring about what has been repugnant to one of the
belligerents. The termination of the Russo-Japanese War is
considereJ by many to have been such a case. This neutral
pressure may, indeed, need something to work upon. Can we
be sure that it will not be found in onr own country ?
A chain is only as strong as its weakest link, and at
present the Allies have not experienced the maximum strain
that will be put upon them if this v/ar is to be pushed to the
bitter and necessary fini-sh. Especially is this true of cur-
selves. There are no very obvious signs here as yet of the
pinch of war. One sees little evidence of reduction in luxury
or other enforced sacrifices caused by the war. Those who ara
suffering most, as yet, belong to the class that always suffers
in silence as long as they suffer alone, but they are liable to
add the weight of their influence to that of other sufferers who
are not so patient of the pinch when it comes. ' ' War money "
is ]?lentiful today with the working classes, and the well-to-do
are not yet really hurt. But a people cannot spend
£700,000,000 per annum on war without feeling the pinch,
and feeling it very severely, sooner or later. Many as have
already been killed and wounded, we have not yet suffered our
severest losses in the field. It is foolish, therefore, to close
one's eyes to the danger that the time may come when more
and more will be inclined to listen to the voice of the tempter
saying " You can put an end to it now." It is not too early
to look forward to such a possibility. If the Allies weaken in
their present strong resolve, then all their sacrifices will have
been in vain. This country must not prove the weak link in
the chain, must not even show the slightest sign of bending,
for even that might entail ruin. If, then, merely the appear-
ance of readiness to .sheathe our sword before our task is fully
completed be a danger, as surely it will be, then to guard
against it is only simple commonsense. This can best be done
by keeping constantly before the minds of the people the un-
answerable reasons for fighting on until our enemies are not
only reduced but reformed.
Owing to the exceptional importance of recent
military events — which are fully analysed in this
issue of Land and Water, it has been found im-
possible, although extra, pages have been added,
to include all our nsual features. Consequently
the continuation of Mr. L. B. Desbled's articles on
" The War by Air," and Mr. Douglas English's
" Tales of the Untamed," will appear in our next
issue. — Editor.
OUR FRONTISPIECE.
Copies on Art Paper of the series of Wat
Portraits, specially drawn for Land and Water
by Joseph Simpson, R.B.A., viay be had, price
2s. 6d. each, on application to the Publisher, Land
and W.vter, Central House, Kingsway, London,
W.C.
Previous portraits. General J off re. General
Foch.
This week's. General Rennenkampf.
19'
LAND AND WATER.
May 22, 1915.
THE HAPPY WARRIORS.
By J. D. SYMON.
IN this war of surprises, itself so great a surprise to the
unready majority, the private soldier has come into
his own in a way that not even his growing recogni-
tion during the South African War seemed to fore-
tell. It is little more than twenty years since Kipling
could write with bitter irony :
" It's ' Tommy this ' and ' Tommy that ' and ' Tommy, go
away ' ;
But it's ' Thank you. Mister Atkius,' when the band begins
to play."
And the balladist went on, not without truth, to enlarge
upon the private's unaceeptability in public places, which he
summed up in the ugly phrase, " Chuck him out, the brute ! "
That scorn of the common soldier was a legacy from the
bad old days of the Press Gang. Our grandfathers
and great-grandfathers, in spite of their debt to
the fighting man, thought no shame of their dismal old
saying that the rank and file of the Army was the " off-
scourings of the earth." The feeling lingered on through
piping times of peace, until the author of " Soldiers Three "
and the "Barrack Room Ballads" pulled us up sharp and
showed us in Learoyd, Ortheris, and Mulvaney, the modern
Porthos, Athos, and D'Artagnan (the exquisite Aramis has
no counterpart here), the gold that we were trampling under
foot. The movement was distinct from the outset. Almost
as soon as the new point of view had been indicated a song in
one of the earliest of the musical comedies ran riot through
the country. Every barrel-organ and every whistling errand-
boy united in the praise of " Tommy, Tommy Atkins." It was
a poor thing of a song, jejune and spasmodic, not to be com-
pared for a moment to the verse that inspired its sentiment;
but it did its work, and before its Cockney accents, verbal and
musical (for there is a Cockney accent in music as well as in
words), had been quite forgotten, South Africa went ablaze,
and the public sliouldsred for the first time with real purpose
and conviction its duty to the soldier iu the field. In the
Crimea, it is true, after many scandalous initial blunders, a
great work had been accomplished ; but the soldier of the
'fifties was still, in the popular view, a fellow who risked his
none too valuable life for sixpence a day. It was his job, like
any other man's, and there the matter ended. No man cared
overmuch for the soldier's soul or took the trouble to realise
that he had one. And his body did not cause much concern
until it had been wounded.
To-day we have changed all that ; and the change has re-
acted with the happiest results upon the soldier himself. He
has always been a cheerful being, even in the times when he
had least encouragement he was a mad wag, but his present
light-heartedness is a finer thing. He showed it from the
first moment of his landing, when his daft, inconsequential,
and quite unwarlike ditty about an Irishman adrift in
London won the heart cf La Belle France and atoned to her
for the loss of the exj)ected red-coat. Since then a new
development of the happy warrior has risen into view, an
amiable by-product of the altered personnel of our new
armies. A phrase, old as the times of Gustavus Adolphus, has
come back to its own. We forget that the word " private " is
an abbreviation. It has become almost a noun. Historically,
it is an adjective, and its originally attendant noun is full of
meaning for us to-day. No; it is not "soldier," as the
majority suppose. Let us hear what that doughty free-lance
and former follower of Gustavus, Captain Dugald Dalgetty,
has to say on the subject: " My lord, I found myself trail-
ing a pike as a private gentleman under old Sir Ludovick
Leslie, where I learned the rules of service so tightly that I
will not forget them in a hurry." And again, " Sir, I was
six years first private gentleman of the company and three
years lance-speisade." Promotion came " dooms slow " to
Dalgetty, partly because the " private gentleman " had nice
ideas of his own dignity and " disdained to receive a halberd."
This by the way. Our present point is the originally
honourable position of the rank and file and the wonderful
return to that gentlemanly ideal in the bearing and character
of the men who have flocked, in what numbers we are not
told, to answer Lord Kitchener's call. They are the blithest
lads that you could meet on a spring holiday, if a Words-
worthian parody be permissible; happy warriors, indeed, and
in their chance intercourse with the civilian world most
gentle and courteous comrades of the way. There is no better
tonic than an hour, or hours, for choice, spent with them in
the railway carriage. Fun, as refreshing as it is clean, goes
rollicking from side to side, and their laughter, that
revealing thing, is heart-whole and wholesome. The diverse
elements that go to the composition of the new forces have
produced a curious amalgam. The man of little education
and the man of much education act and react on one another
with the happiest results and ofteu with unexpected effect.
The talk that ranges over pay and accoutrements, the peculi-
arities of comrades and of the powers that be, sometimes takes
a higher flight, and one is reminded of that young Scottish
sailor, a brother of Robert Fergu.son, the poet, who
discussed with so much knowledge and insight technical
questions of verse-making. Only the other evening, in
the last train, I fell among artillerymen returning
in force after a few hours' leave to the pretty village of which
they are at present the everlasting wonder and delight. They
were all delightfully young, full of " push and go " enough
to satisfy even the Chancellor himself, alive to every passing
humour, and still schoolboys at heart. Every type was there
— the ex-clerk, the Board school boy, the public school boy,
the man who had gone further than tiie public school before
his release from tutors and governors. At first the talk was
professionally critical, of careless driving on somebody's part
and an overturned limber, wherein lurked jokes hidden from
the layman; there was sport, too, of some non-com. whose
speciality, amounting to a craze, was extra stable orderlies.
But the plum of the talk came with a reference to the
battery's tame poet. Whether the bard was of the company
one could not discover. If he were, he restrained his blushes
nobly. He had reason to blush. Hearty admiration of his
pow^ers did not prevent ruthless quotation for the ears of all
and sundry of his priceless lines. As a lampoonist he seemed
to shine. Most of his couplets were strictly personal and
carried a sting in their tail, but they were never coarse or ill-
natured. The rhymes to difficult names clinked ingeniously.
If not always perfect, they were at least adequate to the pur-
pose and so far promising of immortality that they seemed to
bear endless repetition. But the short epigram, it appeared,
did not exhaust the powers of genius. The corporal in the
corner had recently caught the sacer rates in the awful act of
composition. In less than no time the poet had slung off
something of almost epic dimensions. " And jolly good verse
it is, too; not a bit broken in tlie what d'ye call it? " " The
rhythm," interposed a gunner with the indefinable hall-mark
of the university upon him. " Yes, the rhythm; that's the
bally thing I mean. It just streams from him "
"As fast as he can put it down!" said another
voice. And therewith they praised their famous man
once more and bandied his glowing lines about until
their station came past the window and it was tin:e
to say good-night. Singing, they left the station, and so to
billets and to bed. Enviable fellows ! If the young shirkers
knew what they are missing they would be with you to-day.
"The songs may have nothing to do with war; perhaps our
happy warriors themselves do not consciously realise why
it is that they cannot keep from singing at every " march
at ease." But it is the light-heartedness of men who
have found a work lying to their hand and are doing
it with tlieir might. Equally determined are those over-age
men who fill the ranks of the volunteer training corps. They
have not the younger men's blessed sense of certain usefulness,
but, on the chance, they mean to be ready in their limited way.
And the greybeards, too, count kin with the happy warriors
and have still a good song left in them to cheer the route
march. But it is the day of the young men, and such
young men ! Already the enemy knows that the
tale of guttersnipe recruits is a lie. We have got
the very best. Salute them as they go singing by. The
toll is fearful and will be heavier still, but they do not think
of that, for they are, as never before in our history, " gentle-
men unafraid." These notes began with Kipling; with
Kipling, it seems, they are to end. Again a phrase of his,
taken from a different context, has supplied just the right
description for our happy warriors from the highest to thow
who trail the rifle as " private gentlemen."
Printed by Thb Vicioan House PaiuiiNO Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Whitefriara, Londou, E.C.
Mav 22, iyi3
LAND AND WATER
are the ohly Standard
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.- - 1^ — ^«»,^ iVaterproof Specialists {Dipt. W\),
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BROTHERS IjX and
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RARE ALREADY
The best tributes to a hero are always
those that are paid In Ills lifetime. It i.s a
delicate compliment then, to present The
heroes of the War in the guise of the
immortal Sh" Toby Phitpot, the original
Toby Jug.
And so Jugs have been made from cartoons
by Sir F. Carrutliers Gould, representing
Lord Kitchener, Sir John French. General
Joffre, and Admiral Sir John Jellicoe. Only
250 of the first, and 350 of each of the
remaining three will be made, after which
the moulds will be destroyed.
The already rare " Kitchener " Jug Is almost
entirely disposed ot, but subscriptions for
the three other Tobies are now invited.
F C G
TOBY JUGS
Ix>rd Kitchener— Sir John French -General
Jolfre - Sir John Jellicoe.
Trice 2 Guineas each.
' rrench poor les PrancAls."
Toby Jug of Sir John French,
aboQt ten lcch«i Ugh.
(Umlted to 350 coplei. )
I
T»l«phon*—
9SS4 Pftdd.
Controlled cxcluijively by
SOANE e? SMITH, Ltd..
Specialists in China and Class,
462 OXFORD ST.. LONDON. W.
Tel*'aT*ni»—
"Enrihcn.
L«n<lHii.*
125
LAND AND WATER
May 22, 1915
B
FEMIN A
WHAT CAN I DO NEXT?
By MRS. ERIC DE RIDDER
ILLETING is over here," ran my letter, " but
I feel I cannot sit at home doing nothing but
read the horrors in the papers ; what can I do
I next? " The writer of the letter is one of the
busiest women in the world, with a large family,
and many household cares. These have been intensified
during the past few months by the introduction of a great
number of troops into the neighbouring district. Four
officers have been billeted " in the house, and twenty-four
non-commissioned officers and men billeted elsewhere on
the estate. As the house
and its surroundings are
many miles from a railway
station and shops, and in the
heart of a country district,
this incursion was none too
easy to deal with. It meant
much thought and prepara-
tion on the part of the
owners, and quite a con-
siderable amount of work in
one way or another.
Now this is all over, the
troops have gone, and nobody
so far has taken their place.
And the sole wish of those
left behind is to get busy
over something else. It is
felt that inaction — even the
comparative inaction that is
all ever falling to my friend's
lot — is unbearable. The great
need is to be up and doing.
Anything that is useful, any-
thing that is needed, any-
thing that will serve to keep
the mind from dwelling on
horrors that sadden it inex-
pressibly. This wish for
occupation is a feeling that is
growing with every day that
passes. Strong though it is
already, there is no doubt
but that it must grow
stronger with the passing of
time. Numbers of women in
every rank of hfe have this
common desire. It is one of
which those in authority might surely take a fuller advan-
tage than they are at present doing. But the ways of such
are apt to be passing strange.
A Form to Fill
Not so very long ago, every woman in the country who
wanted occupation was invited by the Government to register
her name at the nearest Labour Exchange. Forms of
application were prepared, each containing the customary
categorical catechism, and to await the applicants was all
that remained. Whether the Labour Exchanges are not the
popular resorts they possibly ought to be, whether the scheme
was not pubUshed widely enough, has yet to be divulged.
In any case, the response, from all accounts, is not an over-
whelming one, and by no manner of means in proportion
to the great number of women living in these islands.
I am told by those who ought to know that this idea
was designed for women in general, not for any one class in
particular. The object was to make a register of available
women who could be called upon, whenever it was necessary,
to release men for active service by taking their place. The
principle of this is such an excellent one that it can only be
hoped it wUl be pushed to its far hmits, with much more energy
than has heretofore been the case. Judging from the
Government application form, it would seem that women
and agriculture are more closely linked together in the official
mind than anything else. Touching though they do upon
leather-stitching, brush-making, clothing-machining, and light
machining for armament, it is with regard to agricultural
work that a special set of questions is framed. Women in
France, and those in Germany also, started to work on the
land in place of men, almost the first day war was declared.
Here, though one or two wholly praiseworthy experiments
have been made, there is no such definite movement. .\nd
yet the women of this country are more than willing — are
even anxious to serve their land in some tangible fashion.
Not by tilling the land alone, but in scores of other ways.
FuU use is not made of this great depth of purpose. There
is a hitch somewhere, a hitch that badly wants finding, and
remedjdng without loss of time.
Women and War Service
Just before Christmas of last year it was decided to
obtain a return of all the men still remaining who were
eligible for active service.
This was done by the means
of forms, which were distri-
buted at the door of every
householder with a polite
request that it might be filled
up at his early convenience.
If those in seats of authority
really desire the services, on a
large scale, of women, they
might reasonably go to a like
amount of trouble to gain the
necessary information ; it
would save the walk to the
nearest Labour Exchange,
which is surely an aggrava-
tion of circumstance. Person-
ally, I have never been within
the sacred portals of such an
institution, but I would in-
finitely sooner struggle with
the intricacies of an official
form within my own domicile
than beneath the glassy eye
of aloof officialdom. It may
of course be an error of taste,
but it, I believe, is a feeling
shared by many. Safely
seated at one's own writing
desk, personal possibilities
would unfold in an aston-
ishing way, and the form be
returned full of information
upon which the Government
could draw. There can really
be no reason why the women
of this country should not
be circularised as well as the
men. If they were, there can be no doubt it would call
forth an astonishingly strong response.
One Side of the Question
A number of well-known women have signed their names
to a letter which has just appeared in the Press on the subject
of soldiers who do women's work. Taking for granted that
the main object at the present time is to raise every man
available for active service, they comment upon the fact
that military clerks are being occupied in Flanders, as well
as in England, upon work which women could do equally
well. There is also a suggestion that women should be
employed as hospital orderlies instead of men, thereby liber-
ating many active youths who are now fulfilling this part.
Women are acting as orderlies in the hospital units which the
Scottish women have sent to France and Serbia, and the
work, it is claimed, has been perfectly carried out, hard and
arduous though it often is.
There are heaps of men doing other forms of women's
work in England to-day. In times such as these, it surely
does not take a stalwart young man, six foot in his socks, to
sell manicure cases, or dilate upon the latest thing in neckwear.
He can undoubtedly be more profitably employed elsewhere.
If the whole country, men and women alike, could be formed
into one great business organisation with the crushing of
this German menace as its sole aim and object, it would move
forward the halcyon da\'s of peace by leaps and bounds.
Since it is man's business to go and fight, it is equally woman's
business to perform the tasks he leaves behind. Few women
will be found who dispute this corollary, but it remains
that their services have yet been barely requisitioned. Signs
are not lacking that this omission will have to be remedied
before much more water has run under the bridge, and the
sooner it happens the better will it be for everyone concerned.
O'/.ir/i;/;/ A'/Al Martin
LADY MICHELHAM
Who has been nursing wounded soldiers in the Soulh of France,
and together with her husband has presented a luxurious
ambul ince train for the use of the Alhes
126
May 22, 1915
LAND AND WATER
SHANTUNG
SUITS
With the advent of the warm
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A Delightful Beverage
lust try " Milkmaid Brand " Caf^au Lait —
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lAULKMAIDi
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Try the new "Ideal Milk" Biscuit-
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127
LAND AND WATER
May 22, 1915
BY SPECIAL
APPOINTMENT
TO H.M. THE KING.
Every Officer now needs Protection from the Sun.
THE NEW
"Lincoln Bennett"
SOFT SUMMER SERVICE CAP
MEETS THIS REQUIREMENT.
Price 19/6 Net.
Grease-Proof Shield, 1/-.
Post Free In ihe Front.
Made of special material whicli is scientifically SUN PROOF.
Fitted with the patent 'Lincoln Bennett" ventilation which
ensures a cooling current of air over and round the head.
The protective back curtain hangs from the edge of the crown instead
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of the head, leaving a cool air space between the curtain and the head.
When the curtain is folded up this cap is exactly the same in appear-
ance as the soft cap now so largely worn.
Selections sent free on approval.
LINCOLN BENNETT & CO., Ltd., 40 Piccadilly, LONDON, W.
re/ep/icine:-REGENT 636.
To those going on Active Service
You k.now that Safety, Health and Fitness
depend upon a wise choice of footwear.
National as well as personal economy is found
in the use of the most lasting leather — the
scarceness of hides considered.
CONSULT MANFIELD'S and let your
responsibility he theirs. You must not take
the risk of campaigning with boots in the least
inferior or unsuiied to the task-
'* Active Service" price list on application — a typical
example ther from in Waterproof
Russet is here shoivn.
MANFIELD<^SONS
2<;»& 229 Piccadilly.
London, W. ^
Branches throuthoui ^
London & United
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The "QUORN"
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Made of Khaki, Flannel, and all Material*
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THE "QUORN" RIDING SHIRT has been specially designed for
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PRICE
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Sporting Hosiers and Underwear Speciaiists,
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(6 doors from St. James's Street.)
Telegrams: "Paddywhack, London." Telephone: 4628 Gerrard.
The Norwegian Pattern Trench Boot.
specially designed for Officers at the Front
MAXWELL
(Est. 1750)
8 DOVER STREET,
PICCADILLY. LONDON. W.
Field and Service Boots of
every Description.
Active Service Kit
Accessories of a!! Kinds.
Telephone :
1097 Regent.
Officer's Ideal Water Bottle
KOR THOSE ON ACTIVE SERVICE
Improved sKape, does not absorb wet.
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JWi'i/aru ( ulfiUcrs.
SI COM)i;iT 5rRF.ET. LONDON, W. •
128
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2768
QATTTRnAV MAV -x-i wiie fPUBLisHED ASi prick sixpenok
3/\ i U is.iJ/\ I , ivirt 1 zg, 191 5 La newspaperJ published weekly
\lCopyriekit Horace Nich^lU*
GENERAL SIR IAN HAMILTON, G.C.B., D.S.O.,
General Officer Commanding the Allied Troops in the Dardanelles
LAND AND WATER
May 29, 1915
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J. B. Dunlop, Esquire.
WHY ON EARTH
should the demand for Dunlop Tyres
always exceed the supply unless your fellow-
motorists have proved to their satisfaction
that Dunlop covers and tubes are practically
and financially the safest proposition ?
Our output is huge, and ever growing, and yet
like Oliver Twist the public asks for more
DUNLOPS
"The tyre that taught the Trade."
THE DUNLOP RUBBER CO., LTD.,
FOUNDERS OF THE PNEUMATIC TYRE
INDUSTRY THROUGHOUT THE WORLP
ASTON CROSS, BIRMINGHAM.
LONDON: 14 REGENT STREET, S.W.
PARIS: 4 RUE DU COLONEL MOLL.
138
Mav 29, 191 5
LAND AND WATER
THE SPIRIT OF THE FUTURE
GIVE the English people a chance, and they can
adapt themselves to anything, within reason.
And the war appeals to them, pace the pacifists,
as being eminently within reason. As a scientific
writer of some eminence has lately said, they
" seem rather to Uke war with Germany." Pulled and
pushed by the poUticians and the papers, they have yielded
remarkably httle to the alternate impulses of bUnd optimism
and pessimism that they have been told should be the patriot's
peirt ; that they have kept on so even a keel has been in spite
of the majority of their instructors. For the most part they
leave the speech-makers and the leader-writers severely alone,
and devote themselves to an attempt to dig out all the meaning
that may lie embedded in the calm, terse language of com-
muniques from the front. The efforts of politicians or news-
paper proprietors to attract or deflect their attention
seem comically puny ; you figure a giant who is the
People, studiously poring over the latest news, while
on either side diminutive orators and wire-pullers are
shouting admonitions to him through megaphones. It
would make a subject for the satirical genius of Mr. Will
Dyson.
Perhaps we expected too much in the way of light
and leading from those who seek to control the state of
mind of the nation. We get a fallacious notion into our
heads — magazine stories have done much to foster it — of
a strong, silent man who sits, spider-hke, in the centre
of a vast web of telegraph and telephone wires, and whose
finger is on every pulse in the country. This is true enough
of financiers, in so far as their doings are purely (if the adverb
is appropriate) concerned with money ; but these go wrong
directly they touch human issues. Equally, it is true enough of
a commander-in-chief at the front (in so far as his wires remain
intact) to the extent to which purely military matters are
concerned. But it is far from true of Government depart-
ments and newspaper offices, except in so far as their pro-
ceedings are a matter of simple mathematics. And even then
they have been known to make mistakes in adding up the
figures. A newspaper is often convincd that "a great
wave of popular feeUng " has arisen in the country by the
receipt of a great flood of angry and incoherent letters — the
work of some minority that has temporarily lost its head —
and in any case is about as " popular " as the National Liberal
Club. What it is that chiefly convinces a Government
department that " the country is calling out " for this action
or that, is a mystery into which it is beyond the scope of this
brief article to probe ; in any case it is, or one may hope that
it will become, a peace time question. One could hardly in
reason have expected that most of these walled-in office-
dwellers would at once comprehend and direct the new stir-
rings of the national spirit.
What stands as the forefront of the people's spirit is
the people's army ; behind this stretch further ranks, from
the much focussed munition workers to the wives and mothers
whose brave patience is not the least factor of nationed
stability. Few of the talkers who run up and down the ranks
have much part or lot in the great movement that has assured
our victory. The portrait which, of those at home, the people
most often recall to their mind's eye is not of any gesticulating
orator, but of the quiet figure of Lord Kitchener. He says
very httle, but they know that he " thinks a thundering
lot," and they feel that his thoughts are their thoughts.
Mr. Asquith, though, is in another case from the would-be
directors of pubUc thought. He has been big enough in
spirit to see the national spirit as something far bigger.
Humbly constituting himself the mouthpiece of the people,
he has let the national inspiration blow through him to fine
purpose, and has given us perhaps the only utterance from
high places that is worthy to go down in history. Also, a
negative but a notable achievement, he has refrained with
characteristic dignity from the movement to bullyrag the
people about " realising the war."
This remarkably stupid insult to the enormous majority
of the people made one glad that they had no ear for the
megaphones, being too busily employed in seeking out the
rare gradns of fact upon which their reaUsation supported
its half-starved existence. It was a rehef when the movement
turned again into a fitting internecine warfare between the office-
dwellers, and the papers, finding that the people were out of
range, were led by one or two more perspicacious among
their number to renew their fire upon the real culprits,
a few men who were magnifying their vocation into
concealment for concealment's sake. This, at least, did
soUd good. The problem of spreading enough news for
reaUsation, and of spreading it in a form concrete enough to
cause some stirring of the blood, while keeping the enemy
effectually in the dark, was and is difficult enough, though the
wisest should have it in hand. The people's realisation,
like the people's army, had perforce to come slowly. We
shall prove to have done none the worse for that. An island
nation with a powerful fleet can afford to deal even with the
cataclysm of Europe by a gradual and organic process of
growth. Germany knows well enough the meaning of our
ascending curve of power and purpose. That is why the
Hymn of Hate was written.
An unspoken consciousness may be felt, now, to be at
the back of many minds, that after the natural period of
human gestation a new soul of our country has indeed come
to the birth. It is a birth too gigantic to be known at once
for what it is, too vast to be visible. And the more than
Gargantuan infant is naturally inarticulate as yet. But his
thunderous crowing is heard from the troop-trains, as he
reaches out to strangle the serpents that menace his cradle,
even as did the infant Hercules. In another mood, he can
show an infantile destructiveness at times ; he must not be
allowed, nor will the People allow him if we may judge by the
talk of sensible men and women who can distinguish between
patriotism and destructiveness, to smash those of his toy shops
that are labelled " Made in Germany," and guzzle the sweets
that they contain. He has much to learn, as have all babes,
even the most prodigious. But we cannot instruct him—
save by keeping him out of mischief — any more than we can
instruct the individual infants who lord it over us until their
time comes to take our place. As in their case, a wise provision
of Nature puts his earliest education into his own hands, not
into ours. Wide-eyed, this new-born, inarticulate soul of
the nation absorbs, wonders and watches. Later, he will
begin to criticise ; his " Why ? " will resound in the land.
We may reflect with trepidation that our answers will need
some preparing. He is the " insurgent bigness " of Mr. Wells'
brilhant fancy, " The Food of the Gods ; " but his giant
size is the outcome not of invention, as in that book, but of
her mother Necessity.
Meanwhile, the people who are in the pre-war generation
of thought and feeUng, the people regarded as a conscious,
articulate mind, not yet readjusted to the huge imphcations
of what is to come, is as sparing of speech and as inscrutable
of eye as ever. And of that abstract People, since all abstrac-
tions are no more, really, than figures of speech, it may be
well to remember that the people who read this paper are
a concrete, reaUsable part. When we ask the question as the
office-dwellers so often ask it in vain, " What are the people
about ? " or, in the words of the philosopher Caddies, " What's
it aR/or ? " there is something to be said for narrowing down
the enquiry into the form of " What am I about ? What do I
mean ? What do my family, my business, my interests mean ? "
Or, for that matter, " What does ' Land and Water ' mean ? "
To the last question the consistent reader wdl return a
simple answer: It means among other things the best
critical analysis of the momentous operations on land and
sea which are shaping the destinies of Europe — an analysis
that is free from bias and uncoloured by controversy :
it means facts, and clear, straightforward reasoning about
facts. When we connect this idea of a meaning with
our part responsibiUty for the parenthood, small though
that part may be, of the nation's new spirit, we may reflect
that our small share is not unpractical. The finer the cliild,
the greater its destiny, the more it needs, in the first stages,
simply — nourishment. And fact, prop)erly presented and
co-ordinated, is the nourishment of reason, even as reason is
the stuff of which the things of the spirit are biult up. The
new spirit of the nation, the spirit, for instance, to take the
clearest and the most cogent case, of the men who return
when the long job is done, will be a spirit that knows, and
seeks to know, new things, and a spirit that thinks. We
must be prepared ; we must be ready to see many old shells
broken, many unforeseen products of " insurgent bigness "
arising. But we shall not be unworthy of the new Ufe. Give
the Enghsh people a chance, and they can adapt themseh-es
to anything, within reason.
139
LAND AND WATER
May 29, 191 5
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140
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND .W.ATEE.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE This article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as csnsored, and takes a*
respoDSibility lor the correctness ol the statements.
la Mcordance with the requirements ol the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only be
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
T
ITALY.
HE intervention of Italy will bring into
the actual fighting, within a few weeks,
perhaps 800,000 additional men. That
twelve were opposed to them at one end of the
corridor, which should be the only issue; but if
there are two issues, and if you have eight oppo-
nents at one and only four at the other, it might
well be that, by a proper distribution of force, the
is, we shall have equipped and present j.g^ jj^g^^ leaving only just enough at one end to
in any area of operations that may be chosen, and contain the eight against them there, could, with
near "enough to the front for immediate opera- ^j^e remainder of their force break through the
tions or the immediate reinforcement of the same, fom- at the weaker issue of the corridor,
twenty new array corps on the side of the Allies. g^t supposing while you were making this
Curiosity is" eager to suggest the many ways attempt a door opened in the side wall of the cor-
in which this newly arrived force might operate, ridor and three new opponents appeared! It is
There is a form of vanity which is satisfied by obvious that such an appearance would heavily
attempting to forecast future events, to profit by weight the chances against the ten men breaking
the accuracy of such a forecast, and to be silent out. It is probable that it would turn the scale.
upon its errors. They might afi'ect to despise the new oppo-
AU this spirit is quite valueless in the forma- nent; they might be his superior in experience of
tion of a sound judgment with regard to the cam- the fighting; they might in any number of ways
paign as a whole, which sound judgment is the boast of real advantage over him; but the un-
sole legitimate object of such notes as these. doubted fact would remain that they would have
We can only bring to the formation of such to detach some part of their strength to deal with
a judgment certain known truths and show what him at a moment when that strength was
conclusions may be built upon them. Of alterna- whittled down to an already dangerous inferiority
tive plans or results built on such conclusions one against their original enemy as a whole
can say no more than that any one of them is
possible, none of them certain.
Now, what are the known facts connected
with the intervention of Italy?
The great, the salient fact, is connected with
that point upon which I have insisted so con-
tinually in these columns — the question of
numbers.
The tide had already turned against the
enemy, but it had turned in an unequal way.
There was a superiority in the numbers of men
against him upon the west. There was already
a slight superiority in weapons and in muni-
tions, and particularly in those heavj- guns
which are the determinant factors of the pre-
sent campaign. But while the total of the
Allies was already superior to the total that the
enemy could put into the field, even with his last
reserves, the inequality of distribution gravely
affected the situation. For in the East it had not
been possible to equip a sufficient number of
weapons to m.ake the opposed numbers in men
there more than equal, while in munitions, especi-
ally for artillery, and particularly heavv' artillery,
the enemy enormously outweighed our Ally upon
that front.
Now, the entry of Italy into the field throws
a new weight into the scale in this mere point of
numbers, and that weight is of the very highest
strategic importance.
Theorists mav discuss, and the future will
Now, if we try to put the thing numerically
we discover that the advent of the Italian
mobilised army into the field would at once fix
at least ten enemy army corps. It cannot possibly
do less than that. Allowing the maximum of
natural advantage and of war experience to the
enemy, an offensive strength of 800,000 cannot
conceivably be contained by less than 400,000 men
under even the best geographical conditions. The
French — under worse geographical conditions, it
is true — could only just meet an offensive in the
proportion of sixteen to ten last August, and ten
corps on the Austrian-Italian frontier would be
sixteen to eight. As a fact, the intervention of
Italy will cost the enemy more than that. I
deliberately put the minimum number conceivable.
The next elementary truth we must notice in
this connection is that this fixing of so much
enemy strength is quite independent of the first
chances in the field. In the clash of armies before
a decision is arrived at, or before the establish-
ment of a prolonged defensive, delaying a
decision, is achieved, everything is at a venture.
iWe do not know, until the action develops, even
the trend of the war; but the essential thing from
the point of view of the Allies as a whole is the
effect upon that numerical estimate which has
been continually insisted upon in these pages
because it is fundamental ttsj any sound judgment
upon the war. Ten army corps must come from
somewhere. They will not come from the West,
prove, the respective values of the new fighting for they are not present in the West; they will
force and its enemy, but what is absolutely cer-
tain is that it accounts for and displaces great
numbers of that enemy.
The situation may be compared to the case
of ten men trying to break out of a corridor
against twelve. They could not break out if all
not come from some great reserve, for there is no
such great reserve in the hands of the enemy.
He is now in the very act of using his great
winter-trained reserve, his third batch, and, save
for the frills and the boys growing up to man-
hood, his last. They must come from the East
1*
r. A N D AND WATER
May 29, 1915.
^.
100 Miles
1,
aud from the forces bcliind and feedinsr the
Polish front. Much of this force has been
already long present upon the frontier, for Italy's
intervention has been a possibility for months, and
a probability for weeks. Much more of it has
been lying behind the first line and vvaiting until
it shall be discovered where the pressure will
come. But, at any rate, the final decision of Italy,
affecting the southern enemy front, dries up rein-
forcement elsewhere, and one can lay it down that
the entry of Italy will es])ecially relieve the enemy
pressure against Russia upon the East.
The next point to consider is the geographi-
cal nature of the Austro-Italian frontier, which
forms the new enemy front.
THE ITALIAN FRONTIER.
The Italians are working upon a front which
is everywhere strategically disadvantageous to
them. Were it otherwise, one would have allowed
a nuich larger number of enemy army corps to be
fixed by their action. The enemy has everywhere
the geographical advantage from the sea to Lake
Garda, and this fact will dominate all the open-
ing phases of the campaign, whether Austria or
Italy takes the offensive here. To appreciate this
capital truth, let us analyse that frontier.
It is clearly divided into three sectors,
marked on sketch (I.) AA, BB, and CC.
I. The first (AA) is that of the Trentino, or
basin of the Upper Adige (corrupted in German
to Eltsh), a perfectly illogical piece of frontier,
coming right down in a salient within what is
geographically Italian — that is, upon the
southern slope of the Alps. But it has none of
the disadvantages of a salient.
A salient — that is, in plain Engli.sh, a thrust-
out wedge — is weak in proportion as you can
attack it from citlier side, and so make people
at the [X)int nervous about their ability to retire.
But the salient of the Trentino (so called from
the town of Trent or Upper Adige basin) has
upon either side of it two great walls, which are
the lateral buttresses of the main Alpine chain.
These lateral buttresses are not impassable. It is
conceivable that under favourable circumstances,
and with the advantage of some unexpected sur-
prise, one or more passes on the east or
west of this triangle might be turned. If this
were successfully accomplished, the Trentino
Mai^
f^^la of Mps
Brenner Pass
'Lake
Garda
TL
May 29, 1915.
L A N D AND W A T E R .
below such a flaaking movement would have to
be abandoned by the enemy. But, with normal
prevision upon the part of the enemy, such a move
would be impossible. On the west the Stelvio
Pass — (1) on the foregoing sketch — is quite im-
passable against a most moderate defensive : a true
mountain road and still blocked with snow. The
Tonale (2), south of tlie great frozen mass of the
Ortler, is in no better condition. There is an
easier pass (3) only a few miles to the left of
Lake Garda, but it is still a single mountain road
through a defile, and on cither the main Adige
Valley or up the Arco Valley from Lake Gardii
there is no room for any deployment. The railway
negotiates the ^'ai Sugana over the pass at Tezze
(4), but there is no true passage here of any con-
siderable force.
There is, indeed, only one avenue up the
Trentino, which is that of the main Adige Valley,
and an advance up the Adige A'alley would be the
mere forcing of one narrow road. Now we know
how immensely powerful the modern defensive is,
and on the top of that the town of Trent, a couple
of days' march from the valley, is a strong
fortress.
It may fairly be said that the Trentino is for
the Au.strians a defensive asset of the first
quality, and that if Italy can force it she will
have achieved a task which military opinion
throughout Europe regards as one of the utmost
difficulty, and will correspondingly raise her
prestige.
But the forcing of the Trentino, supposing
any appreciable strength lay behind, woidd be
barren enough of result. The valley of the Adige
leads only, like all those tributaries of the Po, to
the main chain of the Alps, and though the
Brenner Pass (which is its conclusion across the
main ridge) is the easiest of the great Alpine
highways and the hi.storic road over the moun-
tains, modern defensive opportunities make it
impregnable to any force save one overwhelm-
ingly superior to the defenders.
II. The second sector of this front is that
of the Carnatic Alps. These form a ridge quite
unbroken save at the Pass which leads frora the
Fella Valley past Pontebbo, to the sources of the
River Save* That gate, though high, is crossed
by a railway, and is, like the Brenner, one of the
historic roads of invasion; it was Napoleon's
road; but it is far too narrow for an attack in
Here again then, the defensive has an over-
whelming opportunity, which nothing but sheer
exhaustion or crude incompetence would forego,
and between this I'ass and the Upper Adige
Valley, a pjatter of ninety miles, there is the high
Carnatic Alpine wall, which no large !x)dy of
men could surmount against a defensive worthy
of consideration.
III. There remains the third sector of the
frontier, which runs dc>wn south again across the
force by armies upon the scale engaged in this
great war against any adequate modern defence.
bulwarks of the Julieu Alps to the Plain of
^'enetia, and across that plain to the sea.
In the mountains where tiie frontier follows,
for the m.ost part, one of the lateral spurs of the
main Alpine chain, tlie conditions still are those
of the first two sectors, but when the line comes
down on to the lower level and towards tije plain,
the defensive has, indeed, no advantage aiiparenfc
upon ordinary maps. But look at the district on
any maps of fairly large scale, and you will sec
the way in which the frontier has been drawn so
as. to protect the all-important Istrian Penin.sula
fi'om invasion, in a fashion v.hich deliberately or
accidentally has given advantages to the
defensive.
The frontier fir.st follows the Iviver Juarli,
which has, as it approaches the plain, defensive
positions all along its eastern, or Au.^triaii, bank.
There is only a tiny front on this frontier, of less
than twenty miles (nearer fifteen), upon wliicli au
insufficient force could deploy, and tliough the
coimtry behind it is not mountainous, there comes
immediately parallel with the frontier, and cio.se
behind it, the defensive line of the Isonzo, with
hill countiy following everywhere the easleru
bank of that river.
Now, this, the ouly Aoilnerable sector, deiisands
closer examination.
The political frontier issues from the hill
country in front of Cividale at the village of
Mernico. It then continues down the valley of
the Juarli. There it cuts across to the Natisone,
passes immediately in front of Palmanova, and
LAND AN D WATER.
May 29, 1915.
reaches just south of that town the sea niarslies
beyond which nothing can be done. The total
distance from t-he issue of the hills to the marshes
is, as the crow flies, no more than fourteen miles.
All the first part of this — that is, all the left
bank of the Juarli as far as Brazzano — gives the
Austrian defensive an excellent series of posi-
tions, though there are places where the right
bank dominates the left, while south of Brazzano
and half-way between that point and Palmanova
tliere is a knuckle of high land — X — north of
Medea, on which any delaying action fought by
the Austrians against the Italians on this narrow
gate would find a point d'afpui.
But let us suppose no attempt is made to save
the merely political line. The Austrians can
readily abandon it, and discover immediately
behind it (not three hours' march away) the
parallel and much more formidable line of the
Isonzo.
This river issues from a gorge which can be
defended with the utmost ease as far as Salcano,
while the southern part of the line towards the
sea is dominated everywhere by clearly marked
heights from Eubbia to Monfalcone on the sea
itself. These heights I have indicated on the
sketch by the letters C-D.
There remain between the two positions the
plain and town of Gorizia. This plain is not
more than six miles across, encircled everywhere
with hills, and in a situation for artificial defence
as good as any to be discovered on the frontier.
The line of the Isonzo is a really formidable
line. Until it is carried Trieste and the Istrian
Peninsula are safe, unless, indeed, a naval argu-
ment modifies all these conclusions, drawn from
Continental conditions only. It is the point of
sea power. The sea road towards Trieste is but a
ribbon, everywhere confined between hill country
and the water, hut it is everywhere tinder the guns
of the Italian Fleet. That fleet is, by far,
superior to the Austrian Fleet in the Adriatic.
On the otlier hand, this war has shovm that
a fleet cannot cover a coast against the danger oi
submarine attack.
The modification of the land strategy pro-
duced by this consideration I must leave to my
colleague who deals with naval affairs upon this
paper, for I am not com.petent to discuss it. I
merely note it in passing as conceivably negativ-
ing all that is to be said upon the strength of the
Istrian frontier regarded merely as a military
line by land.
To sum up : In all three sectors, though for
different reasons in each, an Austrian defensive
has very heavy opportunities against an Italian
attack. In the first sector, the Trentino, because
the Austrians hold the mouth of an enclosed
valley. In the second, because they have a wall,
the Carnatic Alps. In the third, because they
have on the frontier itself, but much more on the
Isonzo, a good natural defensive line. Those who
conceive of the campaign as a mere occupation of
the flat country below the Alps by the Italians,
accompanied by a voluntary retirement of the
enemy until the watershed is reached, have not
paid attention to the details of the ground.
The Italian offensive all along this stretch,
then, from the Lake of Garda to the Istrian
Peninsula, is heavily handicapped. It has only
one leal advantage over the defensive— a serious
one, It possesses a first-rate lateral communica-
tion in the railway running on the Italian side
along the foot of the Alps from Verona, through
Trevezo, to Udine, which raihvay throws out
branches to the north. The defensive in the hills
has, of course, no such power of moving from right
to left, or of sending munitions at will from point
to point. But it is so governed by natural cir-
cumstances that this Italian advantage in arti-
ficial lateral communications is far outweighed.
Meanwhile we must carefully note that there
does not exist on the Italian side corresponding
advantages for the defensive against an offensive
undertaken from the Austrian side of the
frontier.
The defensive is so strong nowadays when it
is properly entrenched that, with suflicient pre-
paration, almost any line can be held. These
remarks must, therefore, not be taken to mean
that an offensive in equal numbers from the
Austrian side would be successful. It might or
might not be. But it would only be acting under
the difficulties that every offensive acts under in
modern war unless it is backed by very superior
heav}' artillery.
So far as purely natural features are con-
cerned, the xvhole frontier is, strategically speak-
ing, as much a temptation to the enemy to advance
as it is the threat against an Italian attempt at
the offensire.
All this is supposing that the enemy can
really spare the men for a proper defensive, or
even for an offensive. Whether he can spare them
or no we cannot tell until the action has developed.
But as I write this — upon Tuesday evening —
there comes the news that skirmishes have already
taken place upon the third of these three sectors,
the front behind which lies the position of the
Isonzo.
THE HEAVY GUN.
But this discussion of geographical details
and the artificial strengthening of specified
points is subsidiary in the present campaign
to that one factor which is now known to be
everywhere the decisive tlnng — the heavy gun and
its munitionment.
Does Italy propose to force the extremely
strong defensive line of her enemy? Only a
superior concentration of heavy artillery deliver-
ing a tornado of high explosive shell will be of
effect.
Will she find herself in a position to force
the permanent works round Trent? They will
resist for months, just as Przemysl resisted for
months, unless there is brought against thein in
great numbers the heavy mobile howitzer and
v/ith it m.asses of munition. That modern instru-
ment of war, supplied for even forty-eight hours
with an uninterrupted stream of projectiles and
cliarges, will, as we knoAv, dominate most per-
manent v.orks. In a week or ten days it will
dominate any permanent work. Five days nearly
did for Troyon ; ten days entirely did for Manon-
villiers; rather more than a week for the perma-
nent works of ?»Iaubeuge; a day or two for
Antwerp; and a few hours for Namur. But in
the absence of the weapon and its provision the
permanent work resists indefinitely.
The lesson is such a simple one, it w-as so
early .seized by the French General Staff, it is so
clearly the great tactical issue of the campaign,
that one is almo.st ashamed to insist on it again,
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
though public opinion still needs that informa-
tion.
The heavy piece decides. And what the for-
tunes of Italy may be in the next few days or
weeks is a question almost certainly to be
answered in the words that answer the question
of Russian resistance upon the line of the San
and the supreme question about what fate will
attend the ultimate offensive in the West. It is
the answer to the question why the enemy swept
Galicia as he did. It will be more and more
the answer to every remaining problem in this
war.
Given the proportion of heavy guns, and of
shell between two combatants at such and such a
critical moment (and shell in the case of heavy
pieces nearly always means, of course, high ex-
plosive shell — everybody has known that except
a few sensational journalists), and you can with
fair certainty predict the result.
The Italian State has had many months in
which to prepare. She has had even more time
than since she first began to interfere with
German supplies in December. She has had
time to produce new heavy pieces in great
number. Her engineers are the most skilful in the
world; her modern industrial power in the north
is formidable indeed.
Whether full use has been made of all the
opportunities thus present, particularly in this
crucial matter of the heavy piece, the immediate
future alone can show.
One last point must be remembered in con-
nection with the entry of Italy into the war : it
limits the avenues of enemy supply to the North
Sea, and the North Sea is now at last strictly
guarded. It eliminates the only Great Power in
Europe concerned as a neutral to trade with the
enemy. It is true that Italy had ceased to send
war munitions through since December and
January last. But now we know that nothing
will go through. The neutrality of Switzerland
is, indeed, guaranteed, but in the matter of com-
mercial supplies Switzerland will have to be
(whatever official term may be used) rationed by
the French and the Italians, for Germany will
give her nothing.
(P.S. — As the above was written on Tuesday^
erening the news came through that the Italian
covering troops had advanced towards the line of
the Isonzo upon Monday, the 2Mh, meeting hut
little resistance, hut nothing had developed at th»
moment of going to press worthy of comment.)
THE BATTLE OF THE SAN.
We knew last week, by the latest advices
upon which the article in these columns was then
written, that the Russian retreat to the San and
the Russian proposal to hold the line of that
river, the continuation of that line northward
through Russian Poland, and southward to the
Dneister, had in part failed and in part suc-
ceeded, as follows :
(1) The enemy had managed to cross the San
upon a sector about eleven miles in length, begin-
ning at Jaroslav and going up to Lezachow.
(2) The Russians had determined to hold on
to the very dangerous salient of Przemysl — why,
it was dangerous and the consequences of thut
holding it we shall see in a moment.
(3) Upon the extreme south of the line the
Russians had advanced over a belt of about eleven
or twelve miles between the Dneister and the
Pruth. They had there inflicted verj'^ heavj' losses
upon the Austrians in this region, but had not
succeeded in going further than the Pruth.
(4) They had a similar success upon the ex-
treme right or northern end of their line in
Russian Poland, aHvancing by a belt of about
similar width from the river running through
Opatow (I do not know the name of it) to the
parallel river running through Iwaniska.
Sketch of the Advance of Russian Right \^^ixyg
North of WstoU in Russian Poland.
LAND AND .WATER,
May 29, 1915.
In the week that has passed we have seen the
development of this situation, and we have also
had information which helps to explain it. The
great main elements of the whole thing are these :
The entire enemy movement from its incep-
tion upon the Dunajec four weeks ago to the
present day has had for its object the breaking of
the Russian line.
The instrument for effecting this was a very
large body of men, amounting altogether to
perhaps a third of all the enemy's numbers in this
southern part of the Eastern front, and mainly
consisting of German troops. In artillery they
massed no less than 4,000 pieces, of which (in-
credible as it may seem) 2,000 are estimated to
have been heavy pieces of various kinds.
This gigantic " bolt " was very dense in
general formation, and in its tactical action
struck day after day in swarms denser even than
has previously been seen upon the German side in
this war.
On this account the Austro- German losses
were extremely heavy : though the enemy had the
advantage of retaining as prisoners most of those
who fell upon the Russian side during these great
operations, yet his total losses are almost cer-
tainly twice as hea\7^ as the Russians, and
perhaps more.
We discover that a concentration so enor-
mous and the use of heavy shell to the extent,
perhaps, of two million rounds, necessitated the
advance of this main body strictly along the
chief railway line, Tarnow-Jaroslav. All the in-
dentation in the Russian line throughout the re-
treat lies upon that railway line, and the supply
proceeding along it is the explanation of the whole
central advance of the Germans and Austrians.
Meanwhile, above and below this central
" bolt," the whole enemy line was advancing
northward as far as beyond Kielce (K), south-
ward from across the Carpathians nearly as far
as Stanislau (S-T).
The whole thing may be roughly represented
ithus, where V-V is the line of the Vistula; S-S
certain passages of the San forced. It looks for a
moment as though the Russian centre v.as going
to break at last.
The critical day we now see to have been]\Ion-
day, the 17th of May; but the Germ.an forces across
the San were unable to hold more than a narrow
belt, Russian reinforcements arrived in sufficient
numbers for the moment, the expenditure of
enemy ammunition had partially exhausted his
supply, and for rather more than a week the bolt
was checked, and the Russians, as a whole, stood
to the positions upon which they had been forced.
Meanv/hile the retention of Przemsyl had
given an opportunity to the enemy elsewhere than
at the point where the " bolt " was acting — that
is, elsewhere than in the neighbourhood of Jaro-
slav. Of that opportunity the enemy at once took
advantage. He is, at the moment of writing, still
pressing that advantage with all his might.
In the accompanying sketch of the whole line
it will be seen that the retention of Przemysl has
not only produced a salient of a very peculiar
Ixmbtrg
•qX .Komorno
Jpiti
100 Ml la.
V
~;Ctenimti
From Cracow
To Lemherg &
'Rassiaih 'Bases
"<--.
-^^
»?t.
' VI
is the San ; P is Przemysl ; T-J the main railway
line from Tarnow to Jaroslav; the shaded oblong
represents the " bolt " ; the shaded line the
enemy, and the white the Russians. These
last are perpetually retiring before the ad-
vance, and day by day, as they retire, just save
themselves from breaking at the centre under
the repeated blows of the " bolt," which is tied
to, and launched alon^, the main railway. The
process continues until this bolt reaches the San
(S-S) at Jaroslav (J). Jaroslav is carried and
kind, but has left upon the southern edge of the
" neck " of this salient, at D, an extremely -vulner-
able sector in the Russian defence. The main
railway line, which has come south from Jaroslav,
runs eastward here from Przemysl towards the
main base at Lemberg, and this railway lies but
a very short distance indeed behind the positions
to which the Russians have been pressed, at D.
To cut that railway would be for the enemy, not
indeed equivalent to the breaking of the Russian
line, but the next best thing to it, and perhaps a
preliminary to it, too. The whole district
of Przemysl would fall into his hands, a multi-
tude of unwounded prisoners would be cut off, and
there would be such an indentation made in the
here curiously twisted profile of the Russian front
that it might very well give way altogether.
The enemy, perceiving this, struck blow after
blow at D for the possession of the railway. He
is still striking those blows.
He is restricted here to a comparatively
narrow front, because upon his right, between the
two' towns of Komarno and Drohobycz, is
an extensive marshy district (M), in which troops
cannot operate.
It is lucky for the Russians that this natural
obstacle exists, for it prevents the enemy from
extending the area of his attacks east of Przemyol
and it gives the Russian line here something to
repose upon. But the enemy, to prevent a Russian
concentration against him and to hold the maxi-
mum number of troops elsewhere, is attacking
with almost equal violence beyond the marshes in
front of and to the east of Stryj.
»•
Mav 29, 1915.
LAND AND W A T E R .
We have, then, proceeding at this moment,
apart from the general figlU. all alon^ the line and
from Russian Poland right down to the Bukovina,
three special centres of effort : (1) The now-
dwindling effort of what was the main bolt, north
of Jaroslav. It has crossed the San, but has not
got much further. (2) The effort in front of Stryj,
which is subsidiary to the whole plan, and, indeed,
principally directed to " holding '" the Russians
in front of it. (3) What is undoubtedly, for the
moment, the main effort, that now being pressed
with all the vigour the enemy can command
against the main Lemberg railway line east of the
Przemysl salient.
It is upon this last that we must concentrate
our attention during the next few days ; it is here
that the success or failure of the enemy's great
effort in its last phase will probably be deter-
mined.
The details of all this are as follows :
Upon Friday, May 14, the Germans under
Mackensen reached the outskirts of Jaroslav and
began their attack upon the outskirts of that
bridge-head, behind which the Russian columns
were retreating on to the other bank of the San.
The Russian trenches followed the crests to the
west of the town, the Meierkof, the Jupaszowka
Hill, and the Chateau of Chemianski. The Rus-
sian rearguard posted here was not strong. It
consisted of a single division, and its function
was apparently no more than to fight a delaying
action while the passage to the right bank of the
San was being effected by the mass of its com-
rades. It succeeded in achieving its task, holding
up Mackensen's Germans during the whole of the
Friday and Saturday, long after dark on the
latter day — the 15th; but before midnight the
heights were carried and Jaroslav was in tiu
enemy's hands.
During all this fighting and in the previous
days, the Russians had been able to ascertain what
units had been withdrawn from the Western
front for this main enemy effort in Galicia. They
would seem to have been the 1st and 2nd Division
of the Guard, the 10th active and the 41st Reserve
Corps; two more composite divisions formed of
regiments specially picked for this work, and
sundry detached units over and above these. The
very high proportion of heavy artillery accom-
panying and permitting the advance of the whole
great force along the railway may be judged by
the fact that the Guards alone were backed by
fifty heavy pieces.
On Monday, the 17th, the critical day in this
area, the San was crossed in several places. The
river offers, along the ten or eleven miles below
Jaroslav, several opportunities for forcing such a
passage under the cover of heavy bombardment.
The chief passage seems to have been effected
at the fords of Lezachow. It would seem as
though the enemy, once in possession of points
upon the right bank of the San, had pushed down
it, clearing the whole bank, for there was fighting
in w^hich certain Russian bodies w^ere pushed
across the Lubaczowska, where the enemy line
touched Pradawa.
By the Tuesday morning, the 18th, it was
fairly clear that the Russian line parallel with,
but behind the San, at this point, would hold. It
is true the Austrian body captured Sieniawa upon
that day, but the enemy advance got no furth.;r.
Roughly speaking, the Russian line now lies in
Line on Iieyfii Iield
ij/Xussian. Vmsion,
Bghtiy dddi/iaj
action, as a.
^ear^aard
->v Maierkof
^ ^he water
Jaroslav
this region, as do the dots upon the above sketch,
and has been able to maintain this position for a
week.
Meanwhile, on the extreme north of the line
in Russian Poland the Russians had successfully
advanced on the Monday, and on this same Tues-
day were consolidating their advance at Iwaniska,
Their total line upon this day followed the stream
from Iwaniska to the Vistula; uncovered Tar-
nobrzeg ; cut across the Peninsula between the Vis-
tula and the San to the neighbourhood of Nisko,
and then ran up covering the river and lying on
the left bank as high as Lezachow. The whole line
is shown on sketch VII. on the preceding page.
After Lezachow it yielded both banks for a
stretch of eleven miles down to above Jaroslav,
after which point it ran to, and corre-
sponded with, the works surrounding Przemysl,
went round by the south of that ring of
forts, but came up dangerously far north on the
east, only just covering the railway at D, then
coming down sharply to the marshes of the
Dneister. Beyond these it is not very clear how it
ran, but apparently corresponded roughly to the
Dneister line until the approaches of the Buko
vina, where the success of a fortnight ago put it
well to the south again, occupying Nadworna, but
failing to include the important junction of
Delatyn, failing to cut the railway between Dela-
tyn and Kolomea, failing to occupy the bridgf*-
head of Kolomea itself, but further down crossing
the Pruth and occupying the point of Sniatyn. A
little below the latter it went round north of the
Pruth again, just failed to occuj)y Czernowitz,
and so reached the frontier.
Such was the shape of the Russian front on
May 17. This shape it still retains at the
moment of writing (Tuesday, the 25th), and,
as has been pointed out above, the danger-point
is probably no longer the sector just north of
Jaroslav, but the dent D, east of Przemysl.
7*
LAND AND .WATER,
May 29, 1915.
Now let us see what has happened there at
D. All the end of the week — Friday, the 14th,
Saturday, the 15th, Sunday, the 16th — a bombard-
ment was being kept up above the western works
of Przcmysl, which the Russians had elected to
defend. But it was not here that the main effort
was to be looked for : that came ten miles away,
to the east, at Hussakow, to which point the
enemy got in his violent effort of the Monday and
the Tuesday, the 17th and 18th.
It would seem that he captured Hussakow
upon Tuesday, the 18th, towards the end of the
day. But he was driven out of it : apparently,
upon the Wednesday, the 19th. He thereupon did
•what he has done throughout this campaign —
attempted a flanking movement, and struck hard
at Lutkow — and Lutkow the enemy carried and
held. Beyond this point he could not proceed, but
the following rather more detailed sketch will
show how dangerously close he is to the railway
at this short sector of the front.
Meanwhile, away beyond the marshes, forces
under Linsinger were fighting between Stryj and
Stanislau, trying to occupy the Russians in front
of them and prevent their sending reinforcements
to the neighbourhood of Przemysl. They were,
further, attempting to push the Russians before
them beyond the line of the Dniester.
In the Bukovina the Archduke Eugene was
doing no more than hold his own after the retire-
ments towards the Pruth, which has been lately
mentioned.
THE ENEMY ON THE EASTERN
FRONT HAS NOT YET SUCCEEDED.
Now, the whole of this great battle, which is
still in process, has clearly for its enemy object
the piercing of the Russian line, while the object
of our ally is to preserve the cohesion of his line,
in spite of grave lack of supply and in face of
what has hitherto been the far superior munition-
ing of the enem3^
The whole meaning of this battle, therefore,
lies in the two alternatives. Either the Russian
line will remain intact or it will not.
If it remains intact the enemy is, strategic-
ally speaking, beaten. The fact that he has
advanced; the fact that he has nearly cleared
Galicia of the enemy ; the fact that he has reduced
the Russian forces originally present in Galicia
by a sixth or even a fifth; the fact that he has
destroyed or captured of their field artillery a
twentieth or a tenth; his possible entry into
Przemysl — all these matters, which are so many
scores on his side and which will necessarily, and
perhaps rightly, impress general opinion, are in a
different category altogether from the major busi-
ness of his strategic objective — the piercing of
the line.
As to losses, though he has the advantage of
taking prisoner the stragglers and wounded of
the retiring enemy, his actual loss of strength is
certainly very much heavier than that of the Rus-
sians, for he has attacked in the most compact
shape and eveiy succeeding day with the intention
on that day of breaking, at no matter what ex-
pense, his opponent's line. As to his geographical
advance, it gives him strategically only this
advantage — that the good railway system of
Galicia passes more and more into his hands,
while his foemen are more dependent as they retire
upon the inefficient railway system of Russia.
?S^^^^5
4
f
Xn£lish2/fiUs-
istttienwaSack &}
reach tlxeraihvatj
C6im!esoff) r^xSed
/TifhrsAes b^in aiout
SmUisti) tiieSI.cn.
2nd'Ensmg (^rectioaofarrow
a^ark -proceediiig
'«^
^''^-^^S^^^^'
J^^h
\ro$A3>rBOR
about 10 miks
fX
8*
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
As to the purely moral effect of certain names
such as that of Przemysl, unless a garrison and a
great deal of material were captured at tlie same
time, it may be neglected.
But the piercing of the Russian line would be
quite another matter. It would be a decision.
Now the elements which decide the chances
of this event are numerous. They include, among
the more important, the numbers of men engaged,
and the equipment of the infantry and its muni-
tion. But far and away the greatest of all the
factors in the issue is the munitioning of the
artillery, and particularly of the big guns and
howitzers. Upon that, more than upon anything
else, the issue will turn.
We are not yet in possession of known facts
which permit our judgment to repose upon a
secure foundation. But we can estimate the pro-
babilities of the situation.
Power of artillery, and particularly of heavy
artillery, obviously depend upon these four
factors :
(1) The number of pieces.
(2) The munitions present — that is, the
amount of shell present for discharge from those
pieces.
(3) The rate at which communications can
send up supply to the front (which rate governs
the rate of discharge).
(4) The rate at which heavy munitions can be
produced or purchased at the sources of supply,
which ultimately governs the vfhole problem.
To these four factors one might add two
more : The power of " spotting," through air-
work or otherwise, so as to determine the range,
and the general efficiency in the handling of the
pieces. But these last two points may be elimin-
ated, as they are pretty well equal on both sides
upon the Eastern front.
Now, these four factors being the deciding
things we must first of all recognise that in the
number of pieces between Central Poland and the
Bukovina — that is, upon the three-hundred-mile
line which is the scene of the present great battle
— the enemy has certainly an advantage. lie can
produce heavy pieces in greater numbers than the
Russians can. And since he has been able to keep
his hea\T artillery going forward at the rate of
about five miles a day, he will, during the check
imposed upon his advance for a whole week or
more, have certainly got everything into line.
Again, on the fourth point, the ultimate
power of producing munitions, the enemy clearly
has an advantage. He is far more highly indus-
trialised than Russia, and Russia's pov.er of pur-
chasing from outside is limited by the blockade,
including the closing of the Dardanelles, which
leaves her no avenues of supply save the little gate
round the north of the Baltic, the port of Arch-
angel, and the very distant ports of the Far East.
The issue really lies, therefore, in the second
and third points : the supply of ammunition
present on the front and the rate at which the com-
munications can pass it up. ScxDuer or later the
great supply of heavy artillery ammunition can
be reaccumulated by the enemy in greater amount
than by our ally, but can he luoduce it in the crisis
of this particular battle in sufTieient amount ?
And are the advantages of communication lying
behind his line still so superior to tho.se lying
behind the Russian line that he will maintain a
secure superiority in the crisis of the battle?
It may be doubted, and for the following
reasons :
The expenditure of heavy artillery ammuni-
tion during the last month upon the enemy's side
in Galicia has been like nothing hitherto
attempted in the war. The dozen or so great pre-
liminary actions by which the French have laid
their foundation in the West, and the two or three
in which the British have supported them, in-
volved a concentrated fire of from half an hour to
four hours at a time, with long intervals between
each outburst. The intervals were thus prolonged
because the Allies in the West rightly believed
that time was upon their side, and were deter-
mined, if they mvst shoot away very large amounts
in these preliminary actions of the last three or
four months, yet to shoot it away at a rate less
than the rate of accumulation that was going on
behind the line. They are rightly determined that
when the biggest movement of all comes there shall
be an overwhelming reserve of shell.
But the enemy in Galicia was, during all
May, fighting against time and determined, for
political as well as for purely military reasons, to
do his very utmost. The enemy in Galicia was
doing with his munitions what the Allies in the
.West will only do with their munitions when they
choose to provoke and to initiate the crisis of the
war.
Therefore the enemy in Galicia was perfectly
lavish with heavy artillery nmnitions day after
day.
The intervals between each outburst of his
concentrated fire were not internals of vvceks, but
only of days, and sometimes of hours. There v/as
a deluging of the Dunajec and Biala line for three
whole days — the last two days of April and the
fi.rst of May. Twelve miles further on, in the
middle of the first week of May, there was another
such deluge of shell. At the end of the week, a
third upon the Upper Vislock and across the
plain to the Vistula; two more in the next week — -
and so forth. While, upon reaching the line of
the San, at the end of three weeks, the forcing
of that river above Jaroslav was accomplished
exactly as the forcing of the Dunajec had been
accomplished twenty days before — by a riot of
heavy shell.
Let it be noted, further, that although the
San was forced under this immense expenditure
of ammunition, there did not follow a Russian
retirement such as took place upon the Dunajec.
A sector of the River San, a full day's march
in length from the Jaroslav northwards, was
possessed and held. But after that feat the Rus-
sians forbade a further movement forward. They
continued securely to hold the lower reaches of the
river. To the north, beyond the Vistula, they
actually advanced, as they did to the south
between the Dneister and the Pruth. Meanwliile,
such immediate visible supply of heavy ammuni-
tion as the Russians could command had appa-
rently been coming up from the bases in Russia.
The railway system behind the Russians is in-
sufficient, but it increases in power as the Rus-
sian communications shorten.
One may put the matter — quite hypothetic-
ally, of course — in terms of given spaces of time.
Suppose the enemy has largely exhausted his
supplies at the front, and cannot renew them for,
say. a fortnight or more, that would be ample
time for the consolidation of the new Russian
LAND AND .WATER,
May 29, 1915.
line, and the attempt to break it would have
failed.
Now, supposing the Russian line— on account
of this gradual depletion of munitions on the
enemy's side and correspondingly gradual accre-
tion "on the Russian side — to stand, why would
such a dull result be equivalent to a strategic
defeat for the enemy ?
Because in these moments, which are the
critical moments of the whole campaign, there can
be no such thing as the establishment of a dead-
lock.
The enemy is fighting in the East in order to
get his decision, and, having got his decision, he
would reverse the machine and put all his energy
into an attack on the West. He must hope to
deliver that attack w^ith his full weight before
the Allies strike their main blow. Quite apart
from the intervention of Italy, that must neces-
sarily be his general plan. There is no other.
This being the case, he is under the necessity
of achieving his object in the East within certain
limits of time, or of sacrificing himself again in
the East when he turns back westward. If he
attempts to hold the ground he has conquered in
Galicia — as probably he will — he is thereby
weakening his oncoming work in the West, and
he is exposing himself to a counter-offensive
whenever the accumulation of Russian supply
permits it. In a word, if the Russian line stands,
then the enemy is simply, for all his efforts in
Galicia, coming back to the strategic conditions
existing before he struck his great blow.
He has achieved a great deal. He has saved
Hungary from in^•asion, and he has raised, for
what that is v/orth, the already determined spirit
of the civilian population behind his armies. But
he has not done what is necessary to the prosecu-
tion of his plan. He has not released the full
reserves of energy which he will require immedi-
ately upon the Western front.
When I speak thus of " reversing the
machine " and " turning its reserves of energy
towards the Western front," I do not only mean
an accretion of the enemy in numerical strength
of men upon the Western front. I mean even more
the releasing of munitions and guns for the work
there; and the direction of his productive
capacity, of his streams of shell, westward, after
their outpouring for a month past towards the
East.
Let us sum up, therefore — or, rather, repeat—-
and say that we are still awaiting in this great
l)attle of the San one of two issues : Either the
Russian line breaks or it does not. And if it doea
not break tlje enemy is a great deal further from
his chances of an inconclusive peace, and a great
deal nearer thorough defeat than he was when he
crossed the Dunajec.
But let us not forget the alternative. If the
Austro-German forces under the effect of superior
munitionment for the heavy pieces do pierce their
opponent's line, they have all the southern part of
it at their mercy, they compel the Russians to lose
the line of the Vistula; they will be in a position
to act quite soon with very hea\y reinforcements
on the West, and they will be nearer to the goal of
what they term " an honourable peace " and to the
saving of Prussia than they have been since the
December morning when they pierced the Russian
front before Warsaw in that terrible crisis of
which, in this country, we heard nothing, and the
extreme peril of which was but just barely con-
jured by the restoration of the Russian line upon
the third day.
THE DARDANELLES.
Of the operations upon the Dardanelles we
know nothing save that Ave have the casualty lists,
as yet incomplete, and that the first enemy posi-
tion, that of Achibaba, is not yet taken. It is clear
that the general plan connotes as great an inter-
ference as possible with the enemy's munitioning
in shell and reinforcement in numbers from the
Asiatic side across the Straits, and the hope that
this interference may prove fatal ultimately to his
continual resistance. How far this hope is justi-
fied only the future can tell.
THE WEST.
The really important point about the Western
front during the last week, if we regard the war
as a whole, is purely negative. It is the refusal of
the offensive until the chosen moment. There has
been local work on the lower slopes of the Notre
Dame de Lorette position, but what happens here
does not very much matter, for now the junction
of the lateral communications at Lens is well in
range.
There has been more important work
straightening out tlie dent between the two
s^ilients occupied in the advance of a fevv^ days ago,
the one in front of Eestubert, the other in front
of Richebourg I'Avoue, each rather under a mile
in depth. It was in this straightening out of the
dent between the two salients that the incident
occurred which is worthy of comment in a separate
note.
A NOTE.
There are two perfectly well authenticated
pieces of news of which we have the best evi-
dence this week, anc^ which, though they only
concern slight details, are most significant.
They are of a nature Vvhich those who con-
cern themselves with the moral issues of this
war are m.ore concerned with, ])erhaps, than is
military criticism; but that criticism also can
learn a useful lesson from them.
The first piece of news is this — we have all
read it in the papers under the best authority.
A body of Saxons (presumably without
officers) were advancing to surrender to the
British the other day. They held up their
hands in sign of their desire to be made pri-
soners and to be relieved of the strain of war—
for they were in a very perilous position.
As, rightly or wrongly, it is admissible in
North German morals to use such methods as
a ruse, the British troops continued to fire upon
the men thus desiring to surrender, because
they could not tell whether tlie holding up of
hands was an action done in good faitli or was
what our forefathers would have called a piece
of treachery.
Meanwhile this body of presumably
officerless Germans was observed by other
bodies of the enemy whose oflicers were still
present to control them, and these at once
poured in a fire which massacred the would-be
surrenderers.
Througliout this war the great military
virtues of the enemy have been clearly apparent :
his patient preparation and his discipline
chief, perhaps, among the rest. But there has
10*
Mav 29, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
been a tendency, especially in this country, to
forget tiiat the particular type of military excel-
lence the enemy displays carries with it and
connotes corresponding weaknesses. The French
are fully aware of this truth; and it would
be well if public opinion in this country
would seize it also, because upon it must
largely be founded any just forecast of the
future.
Conceive of a body of British troops, even
though deprived of their officers, thus advanc-
ing, when they were not surrounded, simply
because they were feeling the strain too much,
and proposing to surrender ! Further conceive
other bodies of British troops at the orders of
officers surviving among them shooting down
these defaulting members of their own body!
The story would not be credible.
In the case of the North German it is per-
fectly credible, and, indeed, we all know it to be
true.
Why is this ? It is because the type of dis-
cipline produced by Prussian tradition is
mechanic<al. The fact that the men massacred
were Saxons and the men massacring them pre-
sumably Prussians is of some weight, because
the inability of the various German tribes to
coalesce (although they are perpetually shift-
ing and changing) is one of the chief marks
of European history for 2,000 years. But
we know well enough that exactly the same
thing would have happened if the surrendering
troops had been Prussians. What happened
was that a body of modern German soldiers,
having lost their officers, turned at once into an
utterly different organism from the same body
possessed of its officers. That means, among
other things, that a break-up, when it began,
would be exceedingly rapid. It means, of
course, a great deal more than the mere func-
tion of the officer in the Prussian system. The
whole anecdote is enormously significant and
must be carefully ^veighed for its full value to
appear. It must be weighed especially by
those who know the opposite pole of European
civilisation and who are acquainted with the
promotion from the ranks wliich in the French
sei'vice has been continuous throughout this
war. The words used by the English officer
describing this curious scene merit textual re-
production :
" The j-emains of a battalion of Saxons . . .
thrown into the figiiting, having decided to
surrender en bloc . . . some hundreds
strong . . ."'
tlie second anecdote, equally well authen-
ticated, is that of a body of sixty Germans who
behaved as follows, obviously pursuant to some
general order : —
They first of all stripped the British dead of
their uniforms. Then they put on these uni-
forms. Then one of their number who knew
English thoroughly was ordered to advance to-
Avavds a British trench and to call out : " Don't
shoot, Ave are the Grenadier Guards."' An Eng-
lish officer thereupon left the British trench,
approached the disguised Germans, and was at
once shot at — luckily he vvas missed. The
British then, after preliminary fire, charged
with tlie bayonet and killed every one of the
Germans who had acted in this fashion.
Now, it would be easy to waste rhetoric
upon this second example of the enemy's
methods, but for the purposes of these notes I
am concerned only with the military lesson to
be drawn from them. It is of a piece with a
thousand other details in the war, all of which
may be combined under some such formula as
this, upon which all the enemy's mind reposes :
" War is nothing in itself. It is but a
means to an end. All restraint upon it
due to the isolated military temper is a cause of
weakness."
That is exactly the Prussian tradition. The
chivalric side of war (which proceeds from an
isolation of the military temper and is a pro-
duct of soldierly living) is regarded by the
Prussian tradition just as a chemist regards
some bye-product in a process of manufacture,
which bye-product is due to the isolation of his
material and hurtful to the object he has in view.
That the spirit of the soldier should per-
meate the State, as it did in Rome or in Revolu-
tionary France, is the last thing the Prussian
theorist desires. It would breed what are, in
his eyes, romantic excrescences of sentiment,
hampering the progress of the State and strang-
ling its growth. The soldiers are, in the Prus-
sian scheme, instruments conformable to
mechanical formulae in the service of the State :
they must never produce an organism develop-
ing^ virtues and a savour of its own — once they
do that they deflect the aim of the State as a
whole.
Now, one of the most interesting (and
purely military) questions which the war will
decide is whether this fashion of treat-
ing warfare is ultimately successful. It has
given us example after example of actions
which have no direct military effect, which are
intended only to impress civilians or neutrals.
It has given us the use of poison, and may very
well before the campaign is over give us an ex-
ample of massacre.
As a mere conjecture I would suggest that
this spirit would betray a very great weakness
in defeat, not because it is compatible with
courage — on the contrary, we see it permeating
men who display the utmost courage in facing
death — but because it is the very opposite of
instinctive. Laborious calculation is a neces-
sity of its existence, and in the disarray of de-
feat it would go to pieces; at least, so I surmise.
Hence, if a soldier can help the State best
by spying, he must spy : by poisoning, he must
poison : by treason, he must betray : by death,
he must be willing and ready to die.
It is a system productive of very great re-
sults, as we have seen for two hundred years.
The principal objection is that it is too simple and
omits the incalculable part in the human affairs.
Also, it wastes energy enormously in the repres-
sion or elimination of subconscious, instinctive
things; especially of those produced most
naturally in military life, from tlie })ro found,
such as Honour, to the superficial, such as the
Panache.
H. BELLOC.
MS. HILAIRE BI^L'OCS WAR I.ECrURES.
Mr. BcUoc's next lecture ai Queen's Hall, London, will be
on WeJnesdav, June 2nd. It Will be illustrated b\f coloured slides
oj the recent fighting and will deal with the present posilion of
the war.
Mr. Belloc's next lecture al the Winter Gardens, Bourne-
mouth, is at 3.30, Monday, June 2&th.
11*
LAND AND .W.ATER.
May 29, 1915.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By A. H. POLLEN.
MOTE.— Tht« article bag been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the pnbllcatian as censored, and takes no
responsibility lor the correctness •! the statements.
A WEEK OF CHANGES.
THE past week has been almost barren of
naval news. No operation at sea is re-
ported. There appears to be no material
change in the position in the DardaneUea
— none, at least, affecting the share the Navy
is ultimately to take in that exceedingly import-
ant field. There have been, as so often before,
rumoui's that the German High Seas Fleet was
on several days west of Heligoland. But even an
excursion in force to the Dogger Bank hardly
justifies its sonorous title, and certainly does not
prove any intention to seek a general action. It
is free to " come out '' when it likes. For a cer-
tain radius, its action is not, and in modern con-
ditions apparently cannot be, interfered with by
the capital ships under either Sir John Jellicoe
or Sir David Beatty. But it is a restricted chain
that tethers it to Heligoland. It dare not get
beyond the range of a safe run back to the mine-
fields, unless it is willing to dare everything. If
it could lure our faster squadrons into fighting on
ground prepared by mines ; where submarines are
waiting; into which destroyer flotillas can be
poured — a partial battle in conditions of German
choosing — our enem.y have always been ready to
offer us. But it seems that we may wait for ever
to the decisive fight.
There is a lull, whether intentional or not
we cannot yet tell, in the submarine war. Only
two ships have been attacked and sunk; two ships
and a few trawlers. Has the American Note
brought reflection to the Wilhelmstrasse ? It is
not impossible. Neutrals are becom.ing scarce.
The pirate campaign has been in every sense a
failure. No future success can compensate for
the loss of reputation it has brought ; for nothing
short of seriously crippling British trade and
food supplies is a success at all — and three
months of brigandage have shown both these
objects to be unattainable. And the submarines
are wanted elsewhere. The Kaiser might intend
to make an American virtue of a German neces-
sity and call the whole thing off. He must do so
sooner or later. It is not inconsistent with the
facts that it has been called oft' already. It will
take some time to give new orders to all the sub-
marines. Many must be away on long-spell
cruises in distant grounds — and their wireless
is not good for more than one or two hundred
miles. Even if piracy and murder were officially
and publicly renounced — and nothing else can
ensure the Americans keeping the peace — we
should expect sporadic attacks to be made until
all the U boats had returned within a communi-
cating radius.
But for all the dearth of news, the week lias
been an eventful one. No eight days s'ti'^e
August may, eventually, l^e found to have affected
the naval aspect of the war more profoundly.
Italy, possessing the most powerful of the neutral
navies, has joined the Allies; and the supreme
command of the British Navy has been taken out
of the hands of Mr. Churchill and Lord Fisher
and confided to others.
It is no part of my duty here to 'discuss this
exceedingly important event. But it is right that
the public should be reminded of a thing which'
has been completely lost sight of, where it has not
been misrepresented^ in recent discussions. Much'
has been said of the splendid services and eminent
talents of the veteran Admiral of the Fleet who
has retired from the arduous office of chief naval
member of the Board of Admiralty. Unfortu-
nately, enthusiasm has carried many of his
admirers far beyond the limits of useful apprecia-
tion. They injure the person they are trying to
serve, and they imply that the British Na\'y, de-
prived of a particular leader, must lose much of
its fighting value. This is grave injustice to
flag officers who are now serving. To those who
know anything of the professional estimate of the
outstanding figures in the three Admiral lists
nothing can appear more ludicrous than to sup-
pose that there could be any serious difficulty in
finding a competent First Sea Lord. If there were
any difficulty, it would be limited to the em-
barrassment of those who had to choose the most
worthy who could best be spared from other
duties. That there are many worthy is obvious.
It is one of the most curious of our characteris-
tics as a nation that while public curiosity has
brought every other class into the glare of news-
paper notoriety the officers of the Navy remain
unknown. Accidental circumstances have fami-
liarised us with a few names — all of men long
since retired. Of the younger generation the
reader of newspapers knows nothing. It looks,
therefore, to some as if to pass the supreme com-
mand from a known to an unknown man were
equivalent to exchanging the leadership of a
genius for that of an incompetent. The sooner
this delusion ends, the better for us all. The
Na\y has men of talent, knowledge, courage, and
experience not only to fill all the commands, but
to make at least two alternative Boards as well.
It is no service to the nation or its Allies to speak
as if this were not the case.
THE ITALIAN NAVY.
THE intervention of the Italian Navy sliould
have a profound effect, not only in the
Mediterranean but elsev/here. Its msteriel
consists of four Dreadnoughts completed before
1915, and two are due for completion this
year, and, for all one knov.-s to the contrary,
may be completed already. These ships are
armed with exceptionally hea\y broadsides. The
first four can bring no less than fifty-one 12-inch
guns to bear in a fleet action. The last two add
twenty-six more to the battle force. Of pre-
Dreadnoughts there are ten of comparatively
recent date, and some older and slower ships, for
whom a value may be found. There is a certain
number of protected cruisers, but the nominal
speed of the fastest is only 22 knots. But thera
12 «
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
are three very fast cruisers, and, besides, twenty
submarines, forty destroyers, and sixty sea-going
torpedo-boats.
One may assume tliat, in the first instance, the
Italian Navy will take over from the French the
task which "the French Dreadnought squadron
have so far discharged, that of holding the Adria-
tic against Austria. It may seem at first sight as
if, now that the Italian arsenals and ports from
Venice to Taranto have become available, that
holding in the Austrian lleet should become
greatly simplified. But it must be remembered
that the whole Italian coast now becomes subject
to Austrian attack. Indeed, it was attacked at
certain places within an hour or two of the
declaration of war. It follows, then, that Italy
does not simply take over from France the task of
holding the Adriatic, because it is no longer the
same task. It will probably be highly desirable
that some of the French units should join up with
the Italian fleet to ensure that the display of
strength shall be overwhelming. It is true that
the Austrians, held so far by the French alone,
have shown no greater anxiety to break out of the
Adriatic than the Germans have shown to break
out of the North Sea. And so long as the contain-
ing squadrons — whether purely Italian or purely
French, as they are novv, or Italian with French
reinforcements, as one supposes it is likely to he —
remain at their present strength, it might be sup-
posed that the main units of the Austrian Navy
would not disturb the naval situation. But Venice
is very close to Pola, and the situation at Trieste
is exceedingly critical. Circumstances may force
one side or the other to force an action. And until
this action is fought, it is unlikely that many of
the capital ships, French or Italian, will be avail-
able in any other field.
But "if any fleet action is brought on, two
highly important results should follow. The
events should be certain. The Allies ought to
win. The Austrians should be no match for the
Italians backed by a French squadron. But, as
in Nelson's time, so now, nothing is sure in a
fleet action. Torpedoes, mines, submarines— -a
lucky chance may make such changes in relative
strength where the total numbers are so small.
Still, the Allies have the reserves and the
Austrians have none. They cannot be reinforced
from Kiel or Cuxhaven. And if the Austrian
Fleet is crippled or sunk, we should get a new
force available for the North Sea. We can
hardly be too strong there. It is not only a ques-
tion of a general action. There is the risk of
invasion against which our shores must still be
guarded.
But, whatever the course of events in the
Adriatic, it seems at any rate reasonable to sup-
pose that Italy's destroyers and torpedo-boats
should suffice for purely Adriatic needs, and con-
sequentlv, that a considerable number of French
destroyers should be freed for other fields. As I
pointed out in these pages last week, by far the
greatest naval anxiety that faces us at the moment
IS the threat which the German submarines hold
over the allied fleet and transports at the Dar-
danelles. These are, after all, our army's only
base, and there seems no other way of defending
this base against submarines except to patrol it
with the utmost vigour with flotillas of destroyers,
as numerous, as fast, and as well handled as they
can possibly be. If, then, Italy's destroyers and
sea-going torpedo-boats can relieve the French •
destroyers now in the Adriatic, these will form a
reinforcement of the most vital possible kind.
Highly important as the intervention of Italy
must be in a military sense, if it results in securing
the continued safety of our ships at the Straits
and so ensures the success of the operations at
the Dardanelles, this intervention may be decisive.
Although the Italian Navy had no ship-to-
ship fighting in its war with Turkey over Tripoli,
it is nevertheless to be remembered that the Italian
Na\7^ has had a very considerable and quite recent
war experience. Numerous and prolonged bom-
bardments were made of different towns on the
coast, and, as at the Dardanelles, all the opera-
tions connected with the transport and disem-
barkation of the forces sent to Tripoli were
directed by naval officers. And all these opera-
tions were carried through with the utmost pro-
fessional skill and dash.
THE DARDANELLES.
It is rather a singular thing that, while we
have had two official communiques concerning the
course of operations at the Dardanelles, neither
of these make any mention whatever of the Navy's
contribution to the operations. Of unofficial riews
there is enough and to spare, and most of it appa-
rently utterly unreliable. There is something pic-
turesque in the story of the Allies and the Turks
fighting on the Isthmus of Bulair : the Turks sup-
ported by the Goehen in the Sea of Marmara, the
Allies supported by the Queen Elizabeth in the
Gulf of Saros. An aeroplane, it is said, was em-
ployed to mark the Queen Elizabeth's shots while
she felt for the Goeben over the hill-tops. If a ship
cruising about wei*e hit by indirect fire it could
only be the result of an absolute fluke.
The special correspondents who have watched
the different attacks on Krithia speak of the ter-
rific apparent effect of the shrapnel and lyd-
dite from the ships' guns. But it is noticeable
that the only direct hit made on the enemy's bat-
teries that Sir Ian Hamilton alludes to was made
by one of the howitzer batteries. One suspects
that the truth of the matter is that the Turks
and Germans have taken very good care to make
their chief gun emplacements where none of the
ships can get a direct aim at them, and a well-
placed land battery would be far too small a mark
to be hit by indirect fire. In these infantry en-
gagements, therefore, the support of the ships*
guns is of greater moral than military value.
SUBMARINES AND SPEED.
CERTAIN correspondents have written to ask
me if I can explain in simple language
exactly why it is that the speed of a ship is a pro-
tection against submarine attack. One correspon-
dent points out to me that, if a submarine fires at a
ship of the length of the Lusitania — the length
being about 230 yards — it would be aln «%t impos-
sible to miss her, whatever her speed. No miscalcu-
lation either of the speed of the ship or of the
speed of the torpedo would make much difference
when the target was so large.
This would be perfectly true if the torpedo
were being fired either from a destroyer or from
a submarine lying on the surface, so that the
officer in charge had an uninterrupted view of the
target and could make a roughly correct estimate
13*
LAND AND iV.ATER.
May 29, 1915.
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of the angle of her course and speed. But the
making of these estimates becomes very much
more difficult when the target is viewed through
a periscope. Unless the water is perfectly smooth
the view of the target cannot be continuous. In
any case, visibility will be poor, and it will be
exceedingly easy to make mistakes. So that even
with a ship as long as the Lusitania speed adds
very materially to the difficulty of hitting.
But the main protective quality of speed is
not the difficulties added to hitting when within
a thousand yards range, but the difficulties it puts
in the way of the submarine getting to within a
thousand yards. If the reader will look at the
two diagrams, he will see that in Figure 1 the
submarine is supposed to see the Lvsltania at a
distance of 7,000 yards, in this- sense, that it is
not until she has "come within 7,000 yards that
she is able to estimate the course she is on. He
perceives that to get within a thousand yards he
must take a certain course. It will be seen that,
proceeding under water at eleven knots, he can
get within 1,000 yards of the Lusitania, so long
as she is going at 18 knots. But if, as in the
second figure, the Lusitania is going 25 knots, he
will not be able to get nearer than 2,900 yards
before firing. It comes, then, to this. If sub-
marines were placed five miles apart across a
certain channel, no 18-knot ship whose course
could be estimated by a submarine from a distance
of 7,000 yards could get through this cordon
without at least one of them being able to get a
shot at her at a range of 1,000 yards less; but
that a 25-knot ship could pass at an equal dis-
taince between any two of them and neither be
able to get a shot at less than 3,000 yards. The
risk, therefore, has been enormously reduced.
Speed is thus a double protection. It not
only diminishes the chances of a favourably
placed submarine making a hit — still more
greatly it reduces the submarine's capacity to
place itself favourably.
A GLIMPSE OF WAR.
THE SNIPER.
By W. L. GEORGE.
SECOND-LIEUTENANT MARLOWES stared into
the periscope. From time to time he shifted it a
very little, so as to alter his field of vision. About
him all was peace. It was morning and a pale sun,
silvery rather than golden, made the moist air
luminous. It had rained in the night, and every blade of
grass carried on its tip a water jewel. In the trench some of
the men slept; some wrote letters, while others, lazily puffing
»t pipes, read fortnight-old newspapers. And in the area he
mirrored in the periscope all, too, was peace; across the ragged
meadows a soft wind blew, curling the grass; a field-mouse
scurried and startled him, for any movement now could shake
the young man's nerves. Beyond that emptiness, beyond that
silence, three hundred yards away, the Gorman? in their
trenches skirted the wood, invisible and yet certain, silent,
watchful, ever-present, ever-threatening. Marlowes heard
a voice, the sergeant's: " FilUng up again. Arie, go and dig
that drain up a bit." He grew aware that a little water
elooshed about his feet; no doubt the drainpipe was choked.
He heard Arie's feet cloop in the mud; instinctively he
dropped the periscope and turned. The big Wiltshireman
•ame towards him, careless, hands in pockets, obedient, but
sulky. He stood well over six feet, and at once Marlcwea
grew taut; he lost his temper.
" You idiot ! " he shouted. " Keep down your "
But before he could finish the phrase he heard a shot.
Arie took another step forward, then two uncertain httl«
stumbles. For a moment he swayed ou one leg, whirling his
arms in the air. Then, with a long wet smack, he fell forward,
shot just over the right ear.
A mad fury rose in the breast of the young second-
lieutenant: " Two to-day ! Fools! They do it on purpose,"
he thought. And he reflected: "Two on Tuesday, one on
Wednesday; Thur.'jday we lost three like that. Damned
idiots! And this is the second this morning." He heard
them dragging the body in the traverse; he thought no more
of what had been Private Arie. All his faculties were con-
centrated on the sniper, somewhere in one of those trees, who
bad already cost his half -company eiglit men. As he stared
into the periscope, striving to penetrate the green thickness
of the leaves, he wondered about the sniper. He imagined bins
AS som.o fat German shopkeeper who had made shooting into
a hobby, who was very proud of the silver mugs and golden
medals he had won on Sunday afternoons. Marlowes thought
of tlia trophies; ho swore. '' It can't go on," he thought.
14*
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
" Got to do something. Can't see the begg<ar." He tapped the
mirror of the periscope angrily, as one tai>s the barometer to
try and make the weather change. Evidently the fellow was
in a tree, but which tree ? There were quite twenty or thirty
trees big enough and thick enough to hide a man. He stared;
there was no movement, nothing; just then not even the wind
stirred a leaf. Second-Lieutenant Marlowes's meditation
became profound; he was a rather exquisite young man, and
in other days made a living by deciphering hieroglyphs at the
British Museum. He held a firm little chin in an agreeably
manicured hand, but he stared no longer into the mirror; he
now wore the air of abstraction that came to him when he had
to decide whether a new inscription was of the period of
Eamese^ I. or of that of Sesostris. Round him the men went
on reading and smoking in the peace of life that is so near
death.
It was a very long time later when Marlowes's face lit up,
grew almost laughing. He signed to a man, half whispered.
" Yes, sir," said the man, rather blankly.
" You quite understand? Melons if you like — anything
of that sort."
"Yes, sir."
The half-company watched their officer at some very
curious work. With his own manicured hands he drove two
boards into the side of the trench ; the first two feet from the
ground, the second about five. Then he bored in each a
mysterious hole, and passed through the two holes a still more
incomprehensible stake. He did that again, some fifty yards
further along. An excitement passed along the line, and the
sergeant-major, who had not been in London for twenty years,
murmured something about Maskelyno and Cooke. Conver-
jations grew fervid; eyes followed, and discipline alone
forbade questions. The war was forgotten. There was
nothing of v^ar in the air, only now and then the crack of a
rifle, far away on the right or left, and the rumble, so distant
ta to be only the ordinary accompaniment of life, of the
French artillery some seven or eight miles to the north.
Marlowes, sitting by the side of Ids apparatus, looked irritat-
Ingly like the sphinx.
The feeling in the trench grew tense. A man was
speaking to Marlowes, offering him two large, very dirty
objects. " The best I could do, sir," said the man. " You
•ee, sir, I didn't know the French for melon."
" Oh, this'll do very well," said Marlowes, fingering the
earthy lumps. " What are they ? Big potatoes ? "
The private smiled. " No, sir; they call 'em swedes."
"Ah!" said Marlowes. "I'll remember that. But
now for some fun."
The whole half-company stared. Even the sentries
prew negligent and v/ent unreproved, for the sergeants, too.
could not keep their eyes away from the extraordinary
picture of their officer, who was impaling the swedes upon
the stakes and moving these up and down through the holes
in the boards. They were beginning to understand. Then,
as Marlowes stuck upon the first big vegetable a forage cap,
they grasped. With infinite caution, hugging the wall, Mar-
lowes raised the stake and its burden in the air so that no
more than a moving gleam of khaki cloth could be seen over
the edge of the trench.
The sergeant-major sneered. " He's fashing himself a
lot to draw their fire."
Marlowes raised the stake a little higher. There was a
sharp crack. A quiver went through him as if he were hold-
ing that stake very hard. The forage cap descended; there
wa.s a hole on the extreme left of the swede.
" Sergeant," said the officer, " see that nobody touches
that."
Half an hour later, at the second point, it was a cap that
rose above the other swede. The sniper was waiting, it
seemed, for as soon as it rose the crack came and the bullet,
boring through the centre of the swede, buried itself in the
further wall. A suspicion ran through the trench that in this
was something odd, that the strange young man with the
dandy air wa.s plotting. But what ? In that minute from end to
end the question was whispered, " What's he up to? " And
the mystery became still more mysterious, for Second-Lieu-
tenant Marlowes, after measuring the distance between the
two stakes with strange accuracy, sat upon the ground, a
piece of paper between his feet which he decorated with the
most incomprehensible lines. They radiated, iutersected,
producing points v.hich Marlowes, after a stare through the
periscope, marked " No tree." There were figures, too, things
that looked like division sums, and three words, " fifty-one
degrees." At last the young officer made at the intersection
of two lines a convincing dot. Periscope in hand, he rose to
his feet; he stared a very long time; he fumbled with strips
of paper held at varying angles. At last he exclaimed
sharply. Near the intersection of the line made by tha
bullet which had struck the first swede on the extreme left
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with the direction of the bullet embedded in the centre of
the second swede stood a tree, a low, very leafy oak. And
there was no mistaking it; over to the right were three or
four small oak trees that offered no cover, and on the left was
nothing for four or five yards. Marlowes gazed at his tree,
his heart beating with ghoulish delight. " So," he thought,
" that's where you are ! " For a minute or two he examined
the tree. There was no movement in tlie leaves, nothing to
show that it hid watchful eyes and unerring hands. Without
motion, without life, it was sinister; it was like tall grass in
wliich lurks a snake, nimble, able and anxious to strike.
Within half an hour Marlowes, having obtained from
his captain relief at the price of a confidence which made his
senior scoff, cautiously groped along the wall of a ruined
farmhouse, half a mile beyond the lines. Near by two men
noiselessly erected a machine gun. They hugged the wall,
all of them, and the muzzle of the gun slid forward by im-
perceptible degrees until it slewed round. the corner of broken
brick. The young man's heart was beating with excitement,
and as he sighted the gun his hands cares.sed the black barrel
as if he loved it. Three times he checked the direction, then
drew back. "Now! " he whispered. There was a click.
Then for half a minute a series of rasps, of sharp explosions
that deafened him, so near were they, as the maxim spat out
its two hundred and fifty bullets into the distant leaf. He
watched it, fascinated by its quick, purposeful action, the
regular unwinding of the cartridge band. He stopped it, re-
sighted, and then, for a minute, to various points, playing
as from a hose, bullet after bullet went forth. To make sure,
he put a few volleys into the " po.ssible trees." Through his
field-glass he saw leaves fly into the air as feathers from a
wounded pheasant.
It was two days later, just after dawn. A grey drizzle
fell slowly into the field, now no longer green, but all
trampled and shell-torn, black wherever the exposed earth
was sodden with rain. Before Marlowes lay the wood, from
which he could hear Engli.sh voices as his men dug themselves
in. The German trench was in their hands, and feverishly
they were making ready for the counter-attack. He was
busy ; the parapet had to be rebuilt, and that swiftly, bat a
burning desire filled his heart. He had to see, he must
see. He took a step away, then returned, half-ashamed, ad
if he were deserting. But no, he could not bear it. He
must see. He ran along the trench. He climbed out, ran
crouching among the trees, leaping over trunks that had been
smashed by shell. Suddenly he stopped. Here it was, the
lonely oak tree. He looked up, he could not see very well.
But dawn was breaking, and suddenly it came up rosy
through the branches. Touched here and there with tender
mauve, its face glowing in the first rays of the sun, somethinw
grey and torn hung quite stiff, caught by one foot between
two branches. For a moment Marlowes watched it, hano-inc
there so quiet. He felt touched with pity. Then pity fled
and he reproached himself: "That's what conies," he
thought, " of being scientific."
15*
LAND AND .W.ATER
May 29, 1915.
THE SOUL OF ITALY.
By GUGLIELMO EMANUEL.
London Correspondent of the " Carrier e della Sera."
THE soul of Italy is aflame.
Italy, entering on the war, sees in it for her
ft war of liberation and defence; liberation of
her landa and her sons from the domination of an
alien race; defence against the menace to all the
Latin peoples, which would be the permanent outcome of a
German victory. Not only is Italy fighting to free those
Italians who alone of all Austrian subjects were denied the
■acred right of their nationality, but she is fighting to defend
.what Italy is now, what Italy possesses already, from the
danger of a Teutonic hegemony.
Serbia had been attacked — and Russia through her;
France had been assailed and England menaced when the
land frontier of Belgium was invaded by the German hordes.
But it would be childish to consider as defensive wars only
those conflicts in which the enemy suddenly invades the
territory of a country. Defensive wars are all that are
waged in defence of threatened freedom, and the threat
against Italian independence has been tirgent and continuous
from the day in which Italy entered the Triple Alliance.
■That unfortunate pact has never been rightly understood in
this country; for Italy it was the only way to postpone the
inevitable attack from Austria. Prince Biilow himself in
his memoirs has clearly stated the problem in admitting that
"Italy and Austria can only be allies or enemies." Just
because Italy could not afford to be the open enemy of tho
Dual Monarchy, she had to accept the position of an ally.
For more than three decades Italy lived in the dread of an
ally in whom she plainly saw an enemy; defence had to
be discreet as it was permanent, under the perennial veiled
threat. Austria openly and insolently made armed prepara-
tions on the Italian north-eastern frontier, coldly calcu-
lating that it was — together with the persistent suppression
of Italian nationality among her subjects — the best way to
cow Italy into submission and renunciation of her dream
of complete national unity. It was quite clear that the Haps-
burg Monarchy was not simply taking excusable measures of
preparation against the time that her neighbour should
grow tired of subjection. Austria was in reality preparing
to attack It^ly when the opportunity should be favourable.
The strange thing about the Triple Alliance was this, that i%
had already ceased to guarantee that security from an Aus-
trian menace for which alone we had entered the compact.
Twice, though we had not offered to Austria any cause of
offence, Italy had been in immediate danger of invasion by
her ally : once when the country was visited by one of the
greatest disasters that ever befell a country, the Messina
earthquake; the second time when the young kingdom was
engaged in the Tripoli campaign. It is no exaggeration to
say that at every moment Italy was open to attack, because
ehe had not those strategic frontiers on the Alps and th«
Adriatic which the present war is going to assure her.
Behind Austria was the mighty danger of Germany.
The march on Salonica through Serbia not only spelt the end
of the free Balkan nationalities, but also meant that Italy
should become in the Mediterranean what she was already in
the Adriatic, the humble servant of the Teutonic powers.
Such was the situation when the ultimatum launched
against Serbia plunged Europe into the greatest war
that the world has known. Italy could not be asked to fight
on the side of Germany and Austria to help her own further
subjugation and accomplish her own final downfall. Not
even the stolid, unimaginative German could advance such a
pretence. Italian neutrality was proclaimed and accepted
by her allies. But that eventful day made an empty formula
of the Triple Alliance, and prepared the way for the partici-
pation of Italy in the war on the side of the nations fighting
for freedom and right.
Neutrality has lasted nine months. They were not
wasted months. It is no longer a secret that last August
Italian military preparations were not such as to allow her to
enter the field with reasonable chances of success. Those
adventurous spirits who immediately understood the call of
destiny had to wait patiently for her workshops and arsenals
to pile up the arms which were sorely needed. The out-
break of war had caught Italy just while she was in the
process of renewing her artillery armament; to rush into
hostilities before such all-important business had been com-
pleted would liave been sheer madness. But the long vigil
has been a blessing, because during the suspense the national
consciousness has developed, and every hour has afforded new
reasons why the Italian people should enter the fray with an
invincible purpose.
From the purely national problem of accomplishing tha
final unity of the country, and conquering her natural
frontiers on land and sea, the people has been slowly but
surely brought to consider another aspect of the struggle:
the human — or inhuman — aspect. In this Italy has been
helped by the way Germany has chosen to wage war. The
Latin soul has been shocked and revolted by the ruthless
devastation of Belgium, by the systematic frightfulness of
the German armies, by the slaughter of non-combatants on
board the Lusitania, and the unscrupulous use of poison ga.ses
blown against a most chivalrous opponent.
It is just because Italy knows now what a modern war
means — and nobody of those who were involved in it last
August knew— it is just because she does not ignore the cost,
the sacrifices, the appalling losses she is going to incur, that
her decision is equivalent to national regeneration.
The resolve to fight has been maturing slowly but deeply
in the conscience of the Italian masses, who visualised what
a German hegemony over Europe would mean. Even among
the most simple of Italian peasants, as among the fiery
nationalists, the aim of Italy became twofold ; not only was
war necessary to make Italy greater, but to make her
greater in a better Europe, where such horrors would be made
impossible, and a more just, more human order of things
would be inaugurated.
One could not gauge this deep working in the people's
soul in term of numbers or of Parliamentary majorities.
German and Austrian diplomatists, of course, were quite
unable, for psychological reasons, to understand the strong
and ever-increasing determination of the Italian people to
share in the great defence of civilisation against barbarism.
But, happily, tho Italian Government of Signer Salandra —
probably the most national and representative one that t'li
kingdom ever had from the dajrs of the Risorgimento — was
quite alive to the real feelings of tho country.
And the people felt sure, by their wonderful prophetic
instinct, that tho Cabinet was in accord with them, and
worthy of the honour and the responsibility of leading the
nation in this supreme hour. The spiritual preparation for
the sacrifice was going on unobserved, perhaps unconsciously,
all those long months of vigil. Now the decision is irrevoc-
able, and the conviction from which it arises lends it a sort
of religious exaltation.
All the events of the last two weeks, from the day in
which Italy's poet, after five years of voluntary exile, came
back to clarion the dawn of a new Italy, to the day when two
hundred thousand people marched to the Quirinal after Par-
liament had sanctioned war, were marked not only by enthu-
siasm but also by a kind of vivid romantic glow. Every
assertion of Italian feeling was marked by expressions of
singular beauty. There was nothing prearranged or
organised in the demonstrations, with the exception of tha
Quarto celebrations, but a sort of ritual full of subtle mean-
ings was unconsciously created every time the crowd gathered
— a natural outcome of the stirring of the national soul.
When the processions started, very often they were pre-
ceded by wagons laden with garlands which the citizens took
to hang as votive offerings before the statues of the illus-
trious dead who gave their lives to the making of Italy ; it wa3
very like a propitiatory ceremony of ancient Rome, but
nobody thought of this, for it was utterly spontaneous.
Surely it has been fortunfate that Italy should hava
found the voice of a supreme poet Hke D'Annunzio to eipresa
the emotions of the nation in those days of spiritual militia,
when every citizen felt himself a soldier even before the war.
The mob was moved by his eloquence, from the roughest of
navvies that acclaimed him when he reached the first Italian
frontier town, to the crowds who begged for speeches from
him, in Turin, in Genoa, in Rome, every day, and would not
be satisfied. There is something august in this adoration of
a whole peopla for the man who more than any other has tha
gift of creating noble words — fit to celebrate noble deeda;
surely this recognition of tho creative energy of poetry is a
testimony to the pure motive* of tha Italian people in entas"
ing JfeVS var. All tho country is aflama for la beOa ffuerra.
16*
May 29, 1915.
LAxND AND .AVATER.
BOMBS USED BY AIRCRAFT.
By L. BLIN DESBLEDS.
SINCE the outbreak of hostilities bombs have been
dropped, almost daily, from aircraft on railway
junctions and stations, trenches, batteries, food and
ammunition depots, reinforcement convoys, engineer-
ing works and workshops, shipyards, warships and
Eiibm&rines, military, naval, and aerial bases, defended and
undefended towns and villages, and, in most cases, the bombs
have had a considerable destructive effect. In view of the
success which has attended the numerous offensive uses to
which aircraft have already been put, it is very difficult, if
not impossible, to understand why they are not, for offensive
operations, used on a reaUy comprehensive and sustained
scale.
To the demand for more shrapnel and explosive sheila
for our field batteries should be added another plea, just as
earnest and every bit as pressing, for bombs for our aircraft.
In fact; it should be ever kept in mind that we have already
in the aeroplane and in the airship the equivalent to guns
of 150 and 300 miles range respectively.
For obvious reasons tlie writer cannot deal with all the
aerial bombs that have been proposed or used. In the first
place, the number of air bombs that has already been invented
and patented is so large that they would require, for even
their briefest description, a volume rather than an article.
Also, the fact that some of those bombs which have been a
subject for the inspiration of our inventors, and some of
which inventions are of really great worth, precludes any
description being given which may prove of value to the
enemy. For tliese two reasons the writer will confine the
greater part of his article to the German aerial bombs.
Bombs employed by aircraft may be di\'ided into two
great classes: (i.) the explosive, and (ii.]^ the incendiary
bomb.
The Explosive Aerial Bomb.
The explosive aerial bomb may belong to one of two
categories: (i.) It may be designed with a view to being
dropped from the aircraft with no initial velocity of its own;
or (ii.) it may have provision for being propelled with a high
initial velocity of the order of tliat lof a bullet leaving the
muzzle of a gun.
Explosive aerial bombs of the first kind are generally
very sim.ple in construction. They are nearly all of the
type illustrated by the sketch shown in Fig. 1, which repre-
eents the cross section of an aerial bomb greatly in favour
with the enemy.
An examination of the sketch ^ y^, '\v
shows that the aerial bomb consists ~ Si^.—
of a hollow vessel V made of iron. 7r
This vessel, which is somewhat
pear-shaped and is open at its top, (,— -
constitutes the bomb proper. ''
Through the open top of the p~
hollow pear-shaped iron bomb is ^
screwed a detonating device to Iha D"
upper part of which are fixed four P
small metal wings which are Z^-
elightly inclined to the vertical
axis of the bomb, and which, in -._
effect, constitute a small aerial ■
propeller. When the bomb is
dropped the pressure of the air on p/yft
these small wings, or blades, causes <-''
the bomb to rotate at a great SECTIOX.A.L, .SKETCH OF
, .,, ,, ,, ,, P ,, EXPijOSIVE AERIAL BOMB
speed, with the result that the
bomb is not very greatly affected by the wind and keeps its
downward course fairly well. Another important function
of tliese blades is explained a little further on. Tv.o of these
blades, marked G C, are shown in the sectional sketch.
The four blades which impart a rotation to the bomb are
protected from injury by means of a number of stout steel
wires, IF, curved round them. In some models of aerial
bombs these steel wires are absent, and the bomb is carried
by means of a handle, as shown in Fig. 2.
The sketch shown in Fig. 1 can also be used to explain
the working of an aerial bomb. The pointed portion, marked
P, is the one which causes the percussion. It is kept, by
means of a spring, S, at some distance above the capsule, A ,
which, when struck by the percussion point, P, set« fire to
the detonator, D, the inflammation of which cau.ses tho
principal charge, E, to explode, with the result that the
body, V, of the bomb is burst into many pieces, which art
scattered with great force.
It will be easily understood that the handling of aa
aerial bomb, such as the one which has been described, would
be a very dangerous operation, were it not possible to ensure
that the pin, P, would not accidentally strike against the
detonating cap, A. The object of the spring, S, is to keep
the percussion pin, P, away from the detonating cap A. To
make sure that no accidental shock will cause the spring S to
move dov/n, there is a hole, H, through the axis, M , to whi<^
'Balls 5i0 Ve&na&r Safe&f-PuL
Exphsive Sprigs 'Sotiztui£
T^.2. Charge 'Blades -
BECTIONAL SKETCH OF SHEAPXEL BOMB.
the blades, C C, are attached. Through that hole, H , a pin,
F , is passed, and so long as the pin, F , is through the hole, H,
the axis, M, which is screwed, at B, on to the percussion
pin, cannot move down. The presence of the pin, F , there-
fore, ensures that it is impossible for the detonating cap. A,
to be struck by the percussion pin, P .
At the moment of dropping the bomb the safety pin, F^
is removed.
As soon as the bomb begins to fall the action of the air
causes the small four-bladed aerial screw, C C, to rotato.
This rotation unscrews the axis, B, and sets free the per-
cussion point, P, which, being rectangular, and placed in a
rectangular hole, G, cannot rotate.
When the bomb hits the ground or the aimed object,
the shock causes the point, P, to strike against the detonating
cap, A , thereby causing the explosive charge, E, to exploda
and the bomb to burst.
The Shrapnel Aerial Bomb.
Tiie bomb shown in section in Fig. 2 works on the sama
principle as the one already described. It contains 340 steal
balls and is, in truth, a sort of shrapnel.
The employment of this type of explosive aerial bomb
is especially effective against troops in close formation, as is
usually the ease, for instance, of troops held in reserve a short
distance behind the firing line.
When; the explosive charge is fired the parts of tha
shrapnel aerial bomb, as well as the bullets it contains, fly
radially in all directions with con.iderable force.
Tho tw^o kinds of bombs already described are made of
various sizes and are used both on aeroplanes and on airships.
They are either dropped by hand or by means of an apparatus
called a '' bon.b-drcpper."
Some of the bombs whi/.i the Germans dropped during
the aerial bombardment of Antwerp by the Zeppelin airships
differed from the preceding ones both in shape snd in
construction.
They were not pear-shaped, but circular. They were
made up of three distinct circular shells inside one another.
These three shells were soldered at various places with brass
soldering with a view, probably, to causing three pieces of
shell to fly off from each bur.-ting-point.
A number of rivets went through the three shells. These
rivets had circular heads, which pres.sed against the inner
surface of the innerm.cst shell. They were 0.58in. in
diameter and were placed 0.78in. apart. These bombs were
provided with a number of percussion needles, and at least
one of them was ezpcctcd to act and set fire to the explosive
charge in the inmost shell whatever might be the manner in
which the bomb dropped.
Several of the ehells which were dropped on Antwerp did
not, however, explode, and this is how it has come to pasa
that the construction of the Zeppelin Antwerp bombs is no
longer a secret of the German War Office.
17*
L A N D AND .W A 1 E V,
Mav 29. 1915,
The Aerial Torpedo : A Shorl Hiitory With a Moral
Tho writer understanclr, that, toward^ the end of 1907, an
aerial torpedo was submitted to our aittlioritiea. How it was
dealt with by our officials the writsr does not pretend to know ;
bub what is clear is that the British Government did not con-
sider it worth while troubling about. Had our Government
acquired the Unge's p.'itent, it is very likely that the Germans
would have been deprived of the possibility of arming their
aircraft with aerial torpedoes.
The Uuge's aerial torpedo i.s tho invention of Colonel
Unge, of the Swedish Army, and the secret of it was carefully
kept.
In the beginning of 1908 the " Mars Gesellfchaft "
acquired the rights of manufacturing the Unge's aerial tor-
pedo, and, a few months afterwards, sold them to the Krupp
Company.
in 1909 one hundred Unge aerial torpedoes were built in
Stockholm and despatched to Esjen for experimental pur-
poses. It was announced at the time that these aerial tor-
pedoos liad an Initial ?peed of 164 ft. /see., which increased
up to 984 ft. /sec. duriug its flight of 2.79 miles.
Since then, and up to the time of the oulbrealc of hostili-
ties, there is, so far as the writer is aware, no mention made
cf the aerial torpedo. But is it not probable tliat it is Unge's
invention which Krupp's have now developed for the German
Government ?
The moral which the writer would like to draw from the
preceding lines — and he dees it with a full knowledge of what
be Is saying— -is that the newly-organised Government should
rot forget the groat need of strengthening the staff to which,
at the Admiralty or at the War Office, is entru.sted tiie ex-
tremely responsible duly of esamining new ideas and new
ioventious conceraing aeronautics.
Description of the Acriai Torpedo.
The shape of the aerial toq>edo, a.s can be seen from tba
■ketch (Fig. 3), is a cylinder, against one eitreaiity of which
rests a cou9.
The aerial torpedo consists of three distinct parts. Iq
front there, is the explo.'iive portion, which is provided with
a conical apex with a detonator and which contains a power-
ful explosive ; then come.i a cyliiidrlcal portion of the torpeda,
which is fitted with some powder of such a composition that,
wiiou ignited, it does not burn with any flame, but produces
Tercussion Tropulsix^e Charg^e
^^^ Ixphoii^e \ Turbine
Charge \ \
'<4 ( ^
%•-
DI.iart.VMUJ.TIC SKETCH Oi' AERIAL TOSPKDO.
during it? combustion a great quantity of gas and of srnoka;
and, lastly, at its rear cilremity there is a small turbine. Tha
aerial torpedo is fired from a torpedo tube which is mounted
on a eupport with a universal joint, so that it may be pointed
in any required direction.
By mean.s of an electiic spark the propulsive charge ia
ignited, and the gases emanatiug from the ignition of the
propulsive charge escape at the rear of the torpedo, causing
the propul.nott of the aerial torpedo by the working of lb*
small turbine.
Besides having a great speed given to it by the turbine,
the aerial torpedo has also a considerable speed of rotation
whirh enables it to keep v.'ell within its trajectory.
The writer hopes to be able t-o deal with the incendiary
and the anti-submarine aerial bomb in a subsequent article.
HIGH EXPLOSIVE SHELLS.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
THE whole trouble with regard to high explosive sheila
originates in the fact tliat the British nation has
always refused to believe in the possibility of a
struggle for existence on the present scale, and con-
tinued its disbelief up to August 4, 1914, if not
beyond, and has never been willing to accept the risks which
are inseparable from a due preparation for such an occurrence.
High ex])losive shells came first into importance about
1885, when we learnt of some terrible accidents, both in
France and Germany, arising from experiments with new
explosives, to be used as bursting charges instead of the old
black powder with v.'hich common shell had up to then been
filled. These accidents made people nervous.
I happened to be in Germany, staying with some German
" comrades "—as we used to call one another in those days —
when some very important experiments were made with these
new projectiles against a target fort, copied full size from the
works then being erected by the French between Toul and
Verdun. My hosts made no secret about the matter, though
ithey begged me to keep away from the practice ranges in ord;r
lo avoid unpleasantness for them. All day long I heard the
explosions, v;hicu were very different in note from those to
which Shoeburyness and India had accustomed me, and i-a.
the evening I was told about everything that had happened
and been done. It was impossible to mistake the treniendou.i
impression made upon all who took part in or had merely
observed the experiments.
The target fort had been practically razed to the ground,
and they all believed that when war came — owing to certain
frontier incidents, it seemed very near at the time — they
iwonld be able to surprise and demolish the French frontit'r
'defences when and where they pleased, exactly as they have in
fact since destroyed those of Liege, ls''amur,"Maube"uge, and
other places. I also learnt that the same explosives were being
used in field guns as well — a point of importance in the present
case.
Returning to England, I placed my information with the
proper authorities, who knew all about the explosives used.
but could Tiot find, a saLisfactory fuse with w'licu to eraur*
" detonation."
For year.? I wrote about the matter in technical papers,
and worried every artillery officer of my acquaintance as to the
reed for considering it. AH the response I could get was thab
every attempt to devise a reliable fuse had so far failed. That
this was true enough was made clear in South Afric.!». where
our high explosive shells most signally failed to come up to
exjjectations.
One of the highest autliorities of his day ultimately told
me that the real secret of the delays and failures lay in tin
dangerous nature of the experiments. They could get tho
lyddite to detonate perfectly, but only by using a propor-
tion of fulminate which made the handling of the shells exceed-
ingly dangerous. Shoiild a serious accident occur frora thin
cause— say, the explosion of a limber-box in transit by railway
or on board ship — such diftlculties might be raised by tho
owners, the civil authorities, and the public as to paralyso
troop movements entirely in time of peace.
How the French, German, Austrian, and Ru.ssian gunners
managed to transport these particular sliells with safety we
did rot knov? then. But a.? the high explosive shell
thfn rriif?d in our service for field artillery, and as
in view of the battle-work of the future common
to all armies shrapnel was undoubtedly the better " man-
killer," our artillerymen were perfectly ju.stified ia
deciding to retain this latter as the principal projectile foi
field service.
It was only after the " Inimortal " 7th I>i7i.iion had
brought about a complete change in the character of tho war,
through saving the whole situation by their lieroic resistanco
in the great gap of Ypres, that the demand for high explo-
sives became urgent. Even then the extraordinary and
v?holly unprecedented quantities that would be required could
not in reason have been fore.?ecn. And no one who is not
intimately acquainted with the whole machinery of ordering
shells, laying down aiid increasing the necessary cew plant,
4c., kc, can possibly ii.v.'e any idea of the magnitude of th«
strain which was thus thrown upon our resources.
18*
May 29, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
CANADA.
YPRES, April 22 24, 1915.
I SAT beneath the great dome of St. Paul's, and all about brasses and cymbal.s,
me gathered the people who had come to do homage to
Canada's dead. Statesmen, men of high place,
Admirals of the Fleet, generals of division, soldiers
from the field. Royal ladies. Sisters of Mercy, ai.d
women and girls from the factory and the shop — they came,
an endless tlirong, to pay their tribute to the fallen. Cana-
dians in the flush and vigour of health had come from their
camps; and from the hospitals, with shattered bodies and
crippled limbs, came the wounded and the broken.
Fathers, whose hopes lay buried in the grave; mothers,
whose only sons had been taken; brides widowed in their
bloom, met together to share their grief. And the high and
low, the great and the humble, the strong and the weak, the
bereaved and the anxious and the distressed, in that solemn
hour stood side by side as members of one great family,
•baring a common fealty to each other, to their country, and
to their King.
» * »
The glorious music rose and fell, and rose again, as if it
would say: " Honour the brave, chant for the dead ! Exalt
lUiem who pass t-o their reward I " and organ and druma, and
[lieproducfd bi/ special pertniesion
of the Proprietors oj Punch.
and pipes and reeds and strings,
thundered and rolled and sang in a mighty unison st-ep, the
symbols of their faith borne in front of them, passed the long
procession of choir and priests and bishops. The musio
faltered, hushed and died, and the solemn ritual began.
Glory of music rose and beauty of words, homage of
people and tribute of King! How shall these comfort us? —
for they, our beloved, are dead. They are gone, in the fulness
of their strength, and their hopes and their dreams are lying
in the dust. For them the promise of the years is not, and in
all the days to come we shall know them no more.
" He that believelh in Me, thovf/h he uere dead, yet shall
he live.'"
Oh, stricken father, lift up your head ! The son of your
youth has passed beyond our mortal vision, yet still he lives
and presses forward the banner of his Lord.
* * *
But our hearts are heavy. In the morning and in the
night they are tortured and cry out, remembering how,
though our love stretched out its arms, it could not reach jaor
19*
LAND AND WATER.
May 29, 1915.
succour, as, in blood and agony, they, the brave, went from
the light and sweetness of life to the silence of their lonely
graves.
" Though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death,
Thou art u-ith me."
Take comfort, poor widowed girl and desolate mother.
They were not left alone. Love, greater than yours, upheld
them, and around them was the everlasting mercy.
« « «
Sorrow multiplies on sorrow ! To-day and to-morrow the
v7eio-ht of our woe increases and the earth groans with our
anguish. We remember the land across the sea where, even
to the borders of another sea, they weep with us for those who
will not come again. And to what end 1 To what end do we
bear the burden that presses upon us ? For what avails valour
and glory and conquest if these our sons are slain ?
" lilest are the departed who in the Lord are sleeping. They
rest from their labours and their works do follow them."
Oh, sorrowing souls, look up ! Not alone for valour and
glory, for country and King were the lives laid down. It is
the battle of Christ we fight ! That His message of mercy and
love micht be preserved to a stricken world, they, your gallant
ones, endured and agonised and died! Rise up! With
streaming eyes but steadfast hearts, rise up, and leave them,
the ooiK;eti.iled, in their Father's gracious keeping.
Through the vast cathedral poured the sonorous measures
of the Dead March. Wave upon wave it soared to the
distant arches and echoed about the tombs of the mighty
dead. The piercing call of the " Last Post" shrilled out,
and in the pause we seemed to hear the cry come back : ' ' Yea,
we are here, we, whose bodies lie around you ! We, who of
old fought and died that you who came after might enter into
your heritage. Sons of our sons, keep faith." Surely they
thrilled, those spirits of the departed, when we lift«d up our
voices and hailed you: " Oh, Canada! " land of our birth,
young mother of brave men. And surely they rejoiced, the
glorious company of soldiers, saints, and martyrs, as we sang
anew our fathers' song, our battle cry of old: " For Christ
and King."
« * *
Oh, men of Canada, true descendants of the race whicli
bred you, well have you proved your right to sing that song.
The sacred love of altar and of throne flames in you as it
flamed in your fathers before you. And against it the legions
of fear and torment and death hurl themselves in vain. And
behind your steadfast fortitude, as behind a rampart, your
people stand and look forward unafraid. For they know that
the loyalty and the faith and the honour of their country,
and all that they cherish and hold dear, are safe in your
hands.
Eleanok McLaren Brown.
Reproduced by special permi-mon of the proprietors of
the Canadian Gazette.
A DAY WITH THE FRENCH AMBULANCE SERVICE
GOOD news flies fast, even when it is not true. It
must have been long before the attack had
begun that the rumour reached us at Mont-
didier that the French had carried a sti'ongly
entrenched position at Andechy. We received
no orders then and there, but we were told to be ready early
next day and to set out with every available car. All that
night at intervals we heard the prolonged roll of distant guns.
The morning was cold and clear and brilliant, a day in har-
mony with news of victory and the excitement which the
prospect of fresh work brought to us, whose routine had been
for weeks to ply between hospital and station, station and
hospital, to wait and loaf about far behind the line in case we
should be wanted. We knew that the capture of Andechy
meant that the Germans would have to fall back some miles;
back, in fact, to some such position as they at present occupy
at this part of the line, one far nearer Roye than Montdidier.
We knew it must have been a tough piece of work and that
the casualties must be heavy, for not only our cars but those
of the American hospital had all been ordered out to supple-
ment the Service de Sante. The road was running with
water as we swished across the high open plat«au and on
down into the woods below. The woods, all glittering wet,
were full of soldiers; red breeches and blue coats could be
seen everywhere moving about in between the bare poles of
the undergrowth, and the smoke of wood fires rose and curled
among the trees. Some of the men were dragging branches
to throw on the flames, others were drying their clothes, flap-
ping them in the smoke; some were lying, huddled up or
stretched out, asleep upon the dead leaves. By the roadside
a group of oSicers were munching their breakfast, with maps
upon their knees, and here and there a horse was tethered to
a tree. There seemed to be a gaiety and animation in the
scene which freed the spirits. It was a fresh side of war to
us, a very different one from the wards of hospitals, or the
Bheds and offices of railway stations, where men lay upon
floors bandaged and inert, or sat disconsolate in rows, their
arms in slings, with pink tickets tied on to their buttons,
waiting, interminably waiting, to be hoisted into trains.
But these soldiers did not hail us demonstratively, as those
going into action invariably hailed us. On the contrary, they
stared gravely at us as we passed; all except an Arab, tur-
baned and white-robed, with a liigh yellow forehead and the
face of a laughing philosopher, who was driving a hooded
waggon packed with loaves; he grinned at us with all his
teeth and called out " Ingleesh."
Presently we stopped to ask the way to Warsy of a
bespattered cyclist, and from him we learnt that the troops
in th« woods were not men resting after a victory, but sur-
vivor* who had lost half their comrades in a gallant but un-
Bucceiisful attack. It had been a terrible affair. There was
dist'jess in his expression. " But we will drive the grey molea
rvt next time," he said as he hopped on his machine again.
Warsy was almost axle deep in slush and full of soldiers.
Soldiers were beating linen under the arch of the well where
the women used to do the village washing ; they sat in rows
along the churchyard wall, and stood about listlessly in
groups. Perhaps their listlessness sprang from that relief afc
having come out of danger, which is really an intense form of
living, making a man content with the stone he touches or
the sight of the sky and the grass, and mere nearness to
another human being a deep kind of satisfying intercourse.
The wounded had been taken to two places in Warsy, the
chateau and the church, but it was only in the chateau that
there were surgical appliances; the floor of the church had
only been cleared and straw put down for the wounded to lis
on until they could be taken away. We went to the chateau
first.
The side of war that the surgeon or the Red Cross worker
see? is the side which the imagination is most reluctant to
contemplate. In well-appointed hospitals the proofs on
every side that everything that it is possible for human
skill to do is being done is extraordinarily quieting both
to the onlooker's distress and to the wounded themselves;
but in such places as these so little is possible. The salon of
the chateau had been hurriedly turned into an operating
room. The pictures, books, and ornaments were as their
owners had left them. The grand piano served as a second
dressing-table. Several cars were quickly filled up here with
wounded, some of whom it would have been better not to
move, but room had to be made for more desperate cases.
The rest of our cars went round to the church. It was a large
church, and the floor of it was covered with wounded men,
up to the altar. Some seemed too exhausted to care, some
were propped up, sitting against the walls, some were
frightened about themselves, as well as in pain, some were
smoking cigarettes, some were sleeping, some were dead. It
took many journeys to empty. When night came the huge,
shadowy place was lit by the little flames, no bigger than a
penknife, of votive candles; and with the dark the guns
began again. It m.ight be thought that such scenes of dis-
tress must shake the nerves, at least of men who know that
to-morrow or the day after they may also be among the
victims. But it seems in the magnitude of the disaster there
is something which steadies. Into each man is borne a sense
of his own insignificance. The clearing hospital at Montdidier
Station, where the cases were taken and swiftly examined and
distributed, some to go by train, some to remain in the hos-
pitals in the town, was crowded to overflowing. At one time
there were more than thirteen hundred wounded there. They
lay side by side in the lean-to shelters of tarpaulin as close
together as men sleeping in tent. There had been engage-
ments at other points on the line, and the cars had been
bringing them in from all sides. Yet in twenty-four hours
it, too, was once again quite empty. The French organisa-
tion is certainly very prompt in emergencies.
Desmond MacCartht.
Printed by Thi Victohia House PaiNnNQ Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Whitefriars. Londou. E.C
May 29, 1915
LAND AND WATER
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141
LAND AND WATER
May 29, 1915
The Burden of
the Death Duties.
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142
May 29, 19 1 5
LAND AND WATER
^MiUjCa
LANDMARKS
OF THE SEASON
M:is. ERIC dp: RIDDER
IN the usual order of things and in the accepted phrase,
the London Season would now have been at its height.
Debutante daughters would have been first presented,
or going in the near future to make their curtsey at
Court. The Opera House would have opened its
great doors. Ascot house parties have been arranged, Hurling-
ham attracting its gay throng, and showing good polo. As
it is, most of the old landmarks of the Season have disappeared,
and even those which e.xist have a very different countenance
from that of years past. There is an influence underlying
them all, breathing aloud the fact that we are chin-deep
in the greatest of all wars. Things that are the same are yet
not the same, indeed one doubts if they can ever be the same
again, with the war's steady influence finding its way into
every home, and always leaving its indeUble mark.
The Academy is a case in point. It is amongst the land-
marks that remain, and we, being a conservative race, grate-
fully recognize it as such. It is nothing short of a relief to
turn aside out of the traffic, away from sensational newspaper
bills into the quiet courtyard of Burhngton House, and mount
the short flight of stairs into the Central Hall. For it is the
same Academy, to all intents and purposes, that we used
to visit in the days gone by, before destruction raged loose
in the world. The same, and yet is it the same ? Apart
from the war pictures with their obviously topical interest,
in other respects it is not. There are numbers of visitors
in black, there are many with that strained look of anxiety
on their faces to which we have grown sadly accustomed.
There is the picture of two great white oxen, called " Plough-
ing." It is by F. E. F. Crisp, the Academy student of great
promise, who will never use palette or brush again. There is
Lavery's fine London Hospital picture \vith its sense of
broken men, yet its wonderful atmosphere of cheer. Old
landmark though the Academy is, and one of the last left to
us, it is yet a landmark with a difference.
The World at Large
London is full, quite as full as it ever is at this time of
year. The superficial observer with no knowledge that social
engagements in the ordinary sense of the word have ceased
to exist might be excused for thinking that things are going
much as usual. Any morning in Bond Street, the all too-
narrow thoroughfare is full of people driving and people
on foot. The Park has lost its deserted look, the restaurants
are full, and so are the theatres whose productions have
caught the public taste. And yet, though outwardly things
may appear the same, everybody's inner hfe is changed as
by an avalanche. Everybody's field of activity has changed.
People are just as busy as ever they were, but it is for vastly
different reasons they are remaining in town. The fixtures
of the social calendar have been replaced by those dealing
with helpful works of every kind and description. Many
people must regard themselves with amazement, as they
contrast their hfe this year with that of those preceding.
For it is as opposed as the poles, the habits of years have been
rooted up, and an entirely new programme substituted.
No longer are invitation cards sent out with formal
biddings to dinner or ball many weeks ahead. Now a few
words on a card, or a ring of the telephone bell, and a verbal
invitation are all that are ever expected or desired. And there
is no question of notice at all. There is no such thing as
entertaining on anything hke a dignified scale. The social
• horizon has narrowed until it has become the smallest of
dots, in fact one is puzzled to discover it at all.
Present-Day Hospitality
While entertaining, however, has died a xiolent death,
hospitality in the truest sense of the word has never been more
flourishing. No matter how much we may each practise
household economy it has not yet prompted us to close our
doors against our neighbours. And it can only be hoped that
the necessity for such a day wiU be slow in dawning. People
have never felt more strongly than at the present time that it is
not good for man to live alone. There is a strong feeling
of human companionship bound up with every stage of the
great tragedy. It is among the most human signs of the
times. Since the days of wholesale parties have passed,
when so many hundred of cards were dispatched, and friends
and mere acquaintances met in one heterogeneous throng,
we have made more effort to meet each other. Much more
care is being taken over the minor entertaining which has
replaced the " crush." A luncheon party of six or eight women,
for example, takes a certain amount of careful planning if it is to
fulfil a hostess's expectations. In these days, when everybody's
nerves are strained to breaking point, it is no manner of use
asking people who are likely to be uncongenial to meet
each other. Indeed, for that matter, nobody is inclined to
meet uncongenial spirits at lunch or any other times. We
see the people we like, avoid those we do not, and everybody
is infinitely better in consequence.
Dinner parties as social functions have ceased to exist.
There will be no regimental dinners this year, no great dinners
of forty or fifty people as a prelude to some monster ball.
We still dine out, it is true, but we do so in a spirit of
informality, and more often than not arrangements are
disturbed at the last moment on acccount of guests being
called away on public duties elsewhere. Nothing is fixed,
nothing definitely settled under the existing scheme of things.
We live from day to day, many of us indeed not daring to
look forward as far as that, lest it be too long a stretch of
time to treat with impunity.
The Change in Things
With everything else that in the days long ago made
up the sum total of the Season, it is the same. How can things
in all possibility be as in days of yore ? It is not only im-
possible, it is unthinkable at present at any rate, whatever
the future may hold. Too many famiUar figures will never
be seen again at Lord's, too many well-known faces have
vanished from the river. Lovers of tennis, who followed
the game at the Wimbledon Tournament, or at Nice or Caimes,
during the Riviera season, must remember with sorrow one
of the great hghts of the tennis-world, whose steady clean
play was a joy to behold. Regrets will lurk wherever the
polo ponies are to be found, memories find a place in many
a comer. Such a catastrophe as a war of this magnitude
was bound to mean the complete upheaval of things in
general, and of the Season in particular, with its regular
schedule of circumscribed events.
"STRAIGHT TIPS FOR 'SUBS'."
Many newly-gazetted subalterns will welcome Captain A. H. Trap-
mann's little book, " Straight Tips for ' Subs.' " In a few simple words
it explains what he must do in His Majesty's Army, and how he
must behave as a commissioned officer.
The chapter describing " Who's Who in the Regiment " is calculated
to save many a subaltern from a snubbing and worse, for, as Captain
Trapmann says, " the junior subaltern (yourself) is a blot on the earth
until he justifies his existence." As for the other officers, the author
sagely remarks to the subaltern, " You will feel awkward if you find
yourself saluting the bandmaster or treating the colonel as a long-
lost brother."
Messrs. Samuel Brothers, Ltd., the well-known outfitters of
Ludgate Hill and Oxford Circus, will supply free of charge a copy of
this useful little booklet on receipt of a postcard.
143
LAND AND WATER
May 29, 191 5
BOOKS OF THE WEEK
A LITERARY REVIEW
We necessarily turn to Mr. Roosevelt's book when con-
fronted with the pronouncements of President Wilson. Mr.
Roosevelt has been absolutely frank about his own country
and about us, and he and other Americans have no wish that
EngUshmen, in their turn, should be unduly reticent. Alluding
to his own famous speech at the Guildhall, he once said to the
present writer : "It would be better for all parties if there
were a more candid interchange of honest opinions upon
national and international matters." We have appreciated
American sympathy, and have gained from it mord support,
but on the other hand, there is no use glossing over the
prevailing British opinion that official America, early in the
war, missed a golden opportunity of protesting against the
German breach of the Hague Conventions. Mr. Roosevelt
assures us that if he had been at the White House this
opportunity would not have been lost.
" America and the World War." By Theodore
Roosevelt. Murray. 5s. net.
In part Mr. Roosevelt's book is one mainly for Americans,
and in part it is a book for all the world. In so far as his
general position gives him the opportunity to bludgeon
President Wilson, it has httle concern for us. It is much
better that we should not discuss his comments on what he
calls the " milk and water " pohcy of the President. It is
better that we should leave Americans to deal with the
charges he brings against the present administration : that
it has neglected the navy, that it has not provided a big
enough army, and that it ought to have insisted on fortifying
the Panama Canal.
There is enough to consider in his more general pronounce-
ments about the rights and wrongs of the present war, and
the value of treaties and armaments. He is not pessimistic
about the future. He believes that we are very slowly pro-
gressing toward " a more real feeling of brotherhood among
the nations." But the time for disarmament is not yet ;
mere pacificism will retard the ends of " righteousness."
" Events have clearly demonstrated " — and this is his main
contention — " that in any serious crisis treaties unbacked by
force are not worth the paper upon which they are written."
" Peace treaties and arbitration treaties unbacked by force
are not merely useless but mischievous in any serious crisis."
He takes up the standpoint of an impartial American,
and of one who is on the side of " righteousness " before
peace. He has no animus against Germany. He simply
asserts that he would throw his weight against any Power
which had put itself in the wrong by violating treaty rights
and common obligations. He does not doubt the patriotism
of Germans. He merely declares that it was Germany who,
from whatever motives, actually violated the neutrahty of
Belgium ; that it was Germany who ill-treated French and
particularly Belgian civihans, contrary to the Hague Con-
ventions signed by the United States ; that it was Germany
who dropped bombs on unfortified cities contrary to the same
conventions. " All of these offences," he says, after setting
forth a catalogue of illegalities, " have been committed by
Germany If I had for one moment supposed that
signing these Hague Conventions meant literally nothing
whatever beyond the expression of a pious wish which any
power was at hberty to disregard with impunity, in accordance
with the dictation of self-interest, I would certainly not have
permitted the United States to be a party to such a mis-
chievous farce."
He states emphatically his view that America ought to
have protested, at the very beginning, against these violations
of treaties and conventions. He goes on to urge that America
should prepare herself with the armed force without which
treaties and conventions are valueless. And finally he insists
that any future agreements on the hnes of the Hague Con-
ventions will prove worthless.
The one permanent move for obtaining peace, which has yet been
suggested, with any reasonable chance of attaining its object, is by an
agreement among the great powers, in which each should pledge itself
not only to abide by the decisions of a common tribunal, but to back
with force the decisions of that common tribunal.
What Mr. Roosevelt says is of importance, not only by
reason of his personal views and his great influence in America,
but because he may yet again be a President of the Republic.
There is much repetition in the book, but this serves to make
his view unmistakable. We appreciate his friendhness
towards England all the more because he seeks to be just to
Germany. We agree with him that it would be very unwise
to assume that the present war will be the last of all wars ;
but the general question of big national armaments, to be
maintained in time of peace, opens more subtle, compUcated
questions which he does not touch upon. We would commend
to his attention a little book which deserves to be widely
read :
" Krupp's and the International Armaments
Ring." By H. Robertson Murray. Holden and
Hardingham. 2s. 6d. net.
Mr. Murray exposes the manner in which Krupp's and
kindred firms have been built up, and the hold they have
acquired over modern civilisation. " Kruppism and Modern
Mihtarism are interdependent." Most people have a vague,
general idea as to the vast political and economic power
which this monster business corporation has brought to
bear upon Germany. Mr. Murray traces the history
of the firm from its humble origin, and describes the
stages of its growth since the Franco-Prussian War.
The Emperor is one of the largest shareholders. Krupp's
has been able to infect the Press, and has set itself to
stimulate Jingoism. But though Germany has been " the
cradle of Kruppism," and it was a Krupp who produced the
first gun made of crucible steel, Mr. Murray insists that since
the formation of the Harvey United Steel Company in 1901
the armament firms have been in league the world over,
exploiting for profit the fears and ambitions of nations.
Even in Great Britain the Government has preferred to place
orders with private firms rather than use the Royal Arsenal
at Woolwich. He urges that there can be no possible im-
munity from militarism and war except by " the sweeping
away of all chance of private profit to be gained in the arming
of the nations." There can be no safeguard against war as
long as there are Krupp's and similar firms — that is to say, as
long as there are vast vested interests dependent on the
imminence of war. Mr. Murray's book is important.
Speaking of Mr. Roosevelt's book, it is of interest to
mention a slender volume just issued : —
" When a Man Comes to Himself.'
Wilson. Harper. 2s. net.
By Wood row
This is no more than a short essay on the generalities of
life and conduct, and has no bearing whatever upon current
pohtical events. It is a moral application of the maxim
to " see life steadily and see it whole." We see in this essay
the same traits which distinguished his Life of George
Washington. Most statesmen would be primarily concerned
with the statesmanship of Washington ; President Wilson
emphasised especially his goodness — and that indeed is the
traditional schoolroom criticism. An edifying if somewhat
conventional study in right behaviour and successful morals.
" The Little Man and Other Satires.
Galsworthy. Heinemann.
By John
It is almost inevitable that such a writer as Mr. Galsworthy,
with his pronounced opinions, his special interests, his definite
technique, should come to be regarded as a sort of fixed star.
We already speak of a " Galsworthian subject," a " Gals-
worthian character," a " Galsworthian type of Englishman "
— and we could not do so if he had not familiarised us with
these types in " A Man of Property," " Justice," " Strife "
and elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is unsafe to label Mr.
Galsworthy too exactly. In whatever he writes we may be
sure that there will always be a serious undercurrent. He
will always mean something as well as observe something.
And, in technique, he seldom resists that effective device of
contrasting apparent opposites, sometimes in order to show
the underlying unity of human nature, sometimes merely to
throw his subject into relief.
But in the first sketch in this book he shows us that a
subject which lends itself both to reflection and to pathos
can also be treated with the lightest humour and not without
a touch of genuine farce. The " Galsworthian " feeling is
there ; but also a good deal which could never be covered
by that label. In the first scene we have several persons
talking at the refreshment buffet of an Austrian railway
station — an Enghshman and woman, an American, a German,
a Dutchman, and a " Little Man." They discuss, each with
his own national idiosyncrasies, the question of chivalry,
kindliness, and Quixotism. (It should be mentioned that it
was written nine months before the war began.) The German
144
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &W ATER
Vol. LXV No. 2769
SATURDAY, JUNE 5. 1915 [r5fe^s«pTp#l] l^iafnlh^'^iiS.^
[.Cttyrigkt, Richm.rd SlanUy &• C*
THE KING OF ITALY
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 1915
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156
June 5, 1915
LAND AND WATER
AN INLAND MARKET TOWN
By J. D. SYMON
IT lies within easy reach of London, but it is in no sense
suburban, for it retains its ancient traditions, its busy
corporate life, most keenly individual, and although
the builder of these latter days has not been kept
wholly at bay, the town still holds many quaint and
charming relics of the domestic architecture of an older
England.
From the long High Street you can turn aside in
fifty places, and passing under a low-browed archway find
yourself in yards and open spaces where buildings of the
mellowest warm brick huddle in a delightful confusion of
half-timbered gables and casements that were made before
the days of devotion to fresh air. The hand of modernity
has been too intrusive at certain places in the High Street,
but enough remains to uphold the character of an Enghsh
market town, and at favoured spots the architect, as distinct
from the builder, has done his later work well. He has
contrived things which, a hundred years hence, will give our
descendants no cause to blame their forefathers.
One or two inns retain the right Georgian character,
and over the door of one of them hangs what may
be taken as a survival, the last survival I know, of
an ancient vintner's custom, and one that has been
enshrined in a familiar proverb, whereof the meaning
is little reflected upon by the majority. " Good wine
needs no bush " comes glibly to the tongue, but if you
asked the philosopher what he meant by " the bush," he would
very hkely answer, " Well, just the bush, you know." Here
in my market town he would find the visible symbol ready
to his eye in explanation, but alas, for purity of the antique
thing.
Here again, the hand of the twentieth or perhaps the
late nineteenth century has forced its inevitable modifica-
tions. The bush is a bush no longer, but a colossal hanging
fiower-basket, about which, however, ivy has been made to
twine so cunningly that when it is in full leaf, you do not
suspect the wire sub-structure to the clustering foli?ge. It
may not be the bush pure and simple, but it is a noble and
pleasing variation of the old symbol, and it has this advantage
over the original sign that whereas that was sometimes severed
from its root, and doomed to wither soon, this bunch of
ivy is upgrowing evergreen, perennial, and suffers not, like
its prototype, a constant interchange of growth and blight.
Manufacture has laid a light hand upon the township,
not always to the beautifying of the outskirts, but at least
one factory has shewn unwonted signs of grace, and has painted
its long low sheds a delicious green on the walls and the
pleasantest of old tile-red upon the roofs. The chimney has
to be endured, but the buildings faU snugly into the landscape,
and cannot be called a blot. Not every industry is so praise-
worthy. There are other places of commercial output, the
effect of which, to say the least of it, does not make for harmony
but to these it is possible to turn a blind eye. They offend
you for a moment only as you seek the open fields in certain
directions.
Thank heaven, there are some unsullied approaches
to the country. At heart this Borough is still a country
market town, and on market-days the square is filled with
the bleating of sheep and the lowing of oxen, when the white-
washed pens are up and full, and round about stand the
bargaining farmers — sturdy yeomen, who have, most of them,
in these later months, sent "their sons to other business than
that of peace, for our County Yeomanry has made a name
in Flanders. War has laid its hand upon the town, but there
are moments " about full market time," as Xenophon says
by way of introduction to a memorable battle-piece, when
there is little to suggest that anything has broken the peace
of rural England. The market is ablaze with flower stalls,
which on sunny days are almost Continental in their vividness,
and this fairy merchandise is neighboured by stalls of drab
commodities, pieces of sole leather for the cobbler, odds and
ends of scrap iron, and, most fascinating to the youthful eye,
a complete emporium of cheap accessories for the bicycle.
One sign of war there is, visible only to those who know the
Hfe of the town intimately and can feel" the pulse of the market,
for here in these altered times the townsfolk are buying most
of their vegetables, to the loss, perhaps, of the estabhshcd
greengrocer. He, honest man, is rather handicapped; seme
of his young men who formerly took orders at the trades-
men's entrance, are taking orders of a different sort elsewlcre,
and there is a hint, too, of a lack of horse transport. But
otherwise, to the outward eye, at certain hours this inland
market town might not even have heard of the present
struggle.
But this aloofness is only apparent. Loiter a little
longer in the market place, and you will catch a glimpse of
inevitable khaki, and by and by a string of Army Ser\ice
wagons will lumber into view, turn the corner, and disappear ;
and again, at stated hours, the chaffering business of farmers
and townsfolk will pause for a moment while a regiment swings
into view, stepping smartly from the drill ground to its mid-
day meal, for, during these months since August, wave after
wave of khaki has beaten against our unwaUed citadel, and
sometimes has subsided and come to rest there for a time.
The soldiers have been encamped for the most part beyond
the town, and there is a httle bridge some way out that has
cut them off almost entirely from the townsfolk, except during
their hours of leave ; but if their presence has not been
obtruded to the eye, it has not been without its effect upon the
community. There has been an inevitable come and go
between the warriors and an unwarlike population. The
town, for all its apparent calm, is really throbbing with the
pulse of war ; it has had, in truth, a great shaking up. Hitherto
its acquaintance with the military caste has been of the
slightest, and some of its good folk, mingling for the first time
with officers, have not yet quite realised that " Mr. " is the
only title for a subaltern. They roll the really fine word
" Lieutenant," unctuously about the tongue, and take such joy
of the invocation that one almost regrets that so nobly soundmg
a title should be taboo.
Then in the auxiliary organisations for the care of
the wounded and the soldiers' dependents, and in the provi-
sion of recreation for the soldiers' hours off duty, the women
have found a new interest in hfe. They speak in terms of
war, they have become learned, many of them, in the
elements of the nurse's craft, and the horizon of a quiet
life has widened. The thoughts of many who last year found
the next tennis party or the next game of golf sufficient
centre for their days, are now on distant fields with those who
have gone out from our immediate circle, and there has been
an extension of military acquaintance among the members of
those stranger battalions that have sojourned for a while
beside our more or less rural ways.
For the reflective elder people there is some harking
back to times of which our fathers and grandsires have told
us — to those Napoleonic days when English market-towns
were alive with the tramp of marching regiments, and when
the bfllet-master might any day knock at the door. These
were the hours of hfe and colour, of scarlet coats and glittering
accoutrements, lending to military presence a fascination
which is not hkely to return. But the spirit is the same, and
there is still martial music to supply in sound what is lacking
in colour.
The town, never perhaps exactly sleepy but intent
on the affairs of the meurt, industrial and agricultural, has
experienced at its hours of awakening a new and bracing
sensation from the mingling of the peahng bugles of reveille
with the strident siren of the factory. Everj' morning while
a regiment is at hand, the townsfolk are reminded by a
drifting echo of martial music that these times are not as other
times, and that when tyrants rage, hfe becomes more flian a
mere matter of profit and loss.
But there is romance, too, in the sound of the bugles —
romance that thrills the girls of to-day, just as their
great-grandmothers thrilled when they peeped shyly from
behind their early window curtains to wave a farewell
to last night's partner at the ball as he marched
perhaps to Waterloo or some Peninsular field. Thus, stiU
earlier, in northern dawns, the girls looked out to catch a
gl'mpse of Bonnie Prince Charlie. With these associations
is bound up the sentiment of a whole body of our national
lyric utterance, which finds, perhaps, its most poignant
expression in Robin Adair. It breathes through many an earlier
novel, and fiction it seems to me is never more gracious than
when it floats in the atmosphere of an ancient well-ordered
township, with fair old houses of the better sort, where the
furniture came from the hand of great artists and the girls
were the girls Jane Austen knew.
It was into surroundings like these, a world of lavender
and roses and old formal gardens standing back from the
street behind warm-red brick walls that the advent of the
marching regiments brought so piquant a note of contrast
and of romance, and in an age when the redcoats have
gi\-en place to a duller hue, it is this that stiU survives
in the thoughts and feelings of our English market town,
touched to a new excitement, and it may be to a new
purpose, by the transforming hand of war.
157
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 1915
J. B. Dunlop, Esq.
WHY ON
EARTH
should the demand for
Dunlop Tyres always
exceed the supply unless
your fellow - motorists
have proved to their satis-
faction that Dunlopcovers
and tubes are practically
and financially the safest
proposition r
Our output is huge, and
ever growing, and yet,
like Oliver Twist, the
public asks for more
DUNLOPS
"The tyre that taught the
Trade."
Dunlop Rubber Co., Ld.,
Founders of the Pneumatic
Tyre Industry throughout
the World,
Aston Cross, Birmingham.
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PARIS: 4 Rue du Colonel Moll.
Abolishing Cycle Friction
THIS is an illustration of the Sunbeam's Driving Chain
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one of those Triumphs of British Workmanship of which
this Country can indeed be proud. Ride a Sunbeam.
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June 5, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE.-TIiis article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n*
responsibility for the correctness ol the statemcuts.
In accordance with the requlremenls of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article must only be
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
THE NEW ITALIAN FRONT.
THE work upon the Italian frontier is so
far preliminary only to main operations :
covering troops at work in front of an
army still mobilising. When these main
operations develop, we shall not understand them
unless we seize clearly two main points, which are
of far greater importance than the success or ill-
success of the outpost fighting, the seizing of
passes and the shelling of permanent works
during the period of mobilisation.
These two points are, first, the numerical
effect which the intervention of Italv will have
upon the campaign, whether our new Ally is suc-
cessful or unsuccessful in the main operations;
secondly, the fact that success in these main opera-
tions will very largely depend upon the railwavs
which either party commands.
Nowhere in Europe, save upon the frontiers
of Russian Poland and the Pyrenees, is there so
great a contrast between two railway svstems as
upon this new front. To great modern armies the
railway is everything. Not only does it actually
feed them, but it supplies in a fashion quite im-
possible to any other form of transport those im-
mense masses of heavy artillery munitions upon
which all work against the modern defensive is
now proved to depend.
Let us begin, then, by analvsing the condi-
tions under which the entry of Italy into the field
wiU affect that numerical factor which is the basis
of every sound judgment upon the war as a whole.
THE NUMERICAL EFFECT OF
ITALIAN INTERVENTION.
Call the total numbers of men fighting on the
two fronts, Eastern and Western, thirteen. Then
on the same scale Italy brings in during the first
phase a further one. How can so slight an addi-
tion greatly affect the issue ?
Because this immediate addition of one (with
another one in reserve) challenges the narrowing
margin of man-supply remaining to the enemy. °
To appreciate this truth, the argument may
be tabulated as follows :
Roughly speaking, before Italy came into the
field the position was this :
Of the enemy's total possible numbers of men
of useful age, efficient for service and available
for the fighting line, as distinguished from all the
services auxiliary to the actual fighting, rather
more than half remained.
The Allies in the West had suffered far less
severely in proportion to their numbers, and had
in the new voluntary armies of the British a
perpetually growing reserve.
The Allies in the East— that is, the Russians
— from a difficulty in equipping their very large
potential reserves, and feeding and munitioning
their existing fighting line, had not this numeri-
cal superiority over the enemy opposed to them.
The Allies, as a whole, were already in
numerical superiority over the enemy, and one
that was absolutely certain to increase as time
went on. But the Allies, being divided into two
widely distant fields of action, that superiority
could not be used as a whole, and there was still
an opportunity for the enemy to show Ms
superiority locally upon the Eastern front.
In the matter of munitions, which are the
other limb of the numerical calculation, the
divergence was less pronounced in the West, but
probably in the rate of production and accumula-
tion of shell the Allies here had also some advan-
tage over the enemy, and, with neutral sources of
supply open to them and an unhampered supply
of material, this superiority would presumably
grow. But on the Eastern front the enemy pos-
sessed a very heavy superiority of munitionment
over our Ally.
Upon such a situation there enters upon the
side of the Allies a force which will reach in a
comparatively short time the figure of 800,000
men, and behind these are reserves ultimately
totalling at least another 800,000.
What will be the effect of this addition ?
In the first place, to state the thing in round
figures, you have probably seven units of the
enemy distributed thus : Two on the Western
front; three on the Eastern front; two, all told,
within the area contained by these two fronts and
ultimately available — counting the classes of 1916
and 1917, or, rather, that part of those classes
which has not yet been used.
As against these you had on the Allied
Western side three; on "the Allied Eastern side
three. Behind the Allied Eastern side you had
any number j'ou like — two, three, or four — which
only waited equipment to appear in the field, and
which could gradually replace wastage; and on
the Western side already two, ultimately three, in
process of rapid equipment and able in a very
short time to appear in the field.
In the same proportion, the advent of Italy
brings in, as I have said, one upon the south, and
that at first sight seems a small figure. But the
effect it may produce, while depending largely,
upon the form which fighting takes upon this
new front, can quite rapidly become consider-
able.
To appreciate the way in which this new
factor will affect the enemy's numbers, although
that new factor is only the addition of one to the
other thirteen units mentioned, let us see the
effect of that one wpon the enemy's reserve of man-
'power — taking that reserve of man-power at the
figure suggested. Either against this one which
Italy brings in a purely defensive attitude is
adopted, the excellence of the enemy's frontier
depended upon, and only half is sent forward to
stand against the one.
LAND AND WATER.
June 5, 191B.
That is the first possible policy.
It will naan that the defensive must submit
to what is presumably a liuiuerically r.uich
superior lieavy artillery attack. That defensive
is particularly v.eak just where the Italian offen-
sive would do most damage. A purely defensive
attitude of this sort would probably mean, after the
lapse of a few weeks, the loss of the Istrian coast,
and. though the enemy would have weakened him-
self by no more than the figure one-half, he^ would
have gained nothing ultiinately by so weakening
himself. He might almost as well have sent no one
to adopt that purely defensive attitude, for there
is in truth no such thing in war as the unqualified
defensive : it would be expenditure without fruit.
One might as well have merely abandoned the
territory thus ultimately lost.
But such a development is exceedingly un-
likely. It is far more probable that you will have
one of the reriiaining possibilities of the situation
developing, and of these the next is a strong offen-
sive undertaken by the enemy to see whether he
can get a decision on this new Southern front
which will rid him of peril there for some time to
come.
Well, if he does that the calculation is very
simple. Such an attitude disposes at once of most
of the men of any kind remaining to the enemy.
It would be impossible for him to undertake a
strong offensive against the Italians unless he
were to cease simultaneously his offensive upon
the East and to forgo any reinforcement of the
Western line.
Eut he cannot, upon the Eastern front,
simply drop the offensive. If he does not main-
tain it, and even maintain it at its present rate
of expense, he must go back. The Eastern front
is not a continuous line. It is subject to fluctua-
tion on account of its great length, and when the
pressure which makes it fluctuate one way ceases
to be applied, it begins at once to fluctuate the
other.
The German phrase about " the Russian
oiTensive being broken " is meaningless. You
break the offensive of a man, or of an army, when
you have hurt him so m.uch that he cannot recover
his strength. But tliough the equipment and
munitioning of the endless Russian reserves is
slow, it is not non-existent, and the moment the
violent and expensive hammering at the Russian
front relaxes, the tardy process of Russian
accumulation begins to be felt again by the enemy.
We have had at least a dozen instances of this in
tlie course of the war, and we are all the more
certain to see future ones, because the ports which
are ice-bound in winter, though distant, are now
open, and a certain measure of supply can reach
our Ally from abroad.
Suppose a third development on the Italian
front — and quite a possible one. The enemy will
not risk remaining weak in the West and abandon-
ing his own offensive in the East for the sake of a
violent and perhaps unsuccessful effort upon the
new front. On the other hand, he dare not risk a
• purely defensive attitude there with insufficient
men. He compromises, and sends there, as he sent
during months into East Prussia, forces which
keep up a sort of ding-dong alternate resistance
and counter-offensive along the Italian front. He
attempts no decision, but simply keeps his foe
occupied from the Trentino to the Adriatic. Then
he is occupying, perhaps, one-half of his remain-
ing i-eserve of men and suffering an additional
wastage nionth after month, to no definite end.
He might count, perhaps, on losing by death,
capture, sickness, and evacuation of wounded not
more than 100,000 men a month, but he would be
losing that, and he would be having to supply the
gapsat that rate, running the risk all the time of
seeing this form of defensive break down at any
moment, and his main Adriatic ports and arsenals
fall into the enemy's hands. It would mean that
he would have taken about half his reserve of
men for this new front and that of the remain-
ing half the drafts which he would otherwise
have been sending in full strength East and West
would be diminished by about 25 per cent.
All this emphasis I give to the grave numeri-
cal effect of Italy's coming in supposing the fight-
ing to be confined to the Austro-Italian frontier
alone, Italian troops not to be used upon points
where the defensive has far less strength. (The
Austro-Italian frontier is the strongest defensive
line in the whole of the fighting— -much stronger
than the Carpathians, and stronger, even, than
the Masurian border.) And it is, further, an
analysis which leaves out of calculation the im-
mensely superior facilities of the Italians for
bringing up heavy pieces and their munitionment.
It is, therefore, an a fortiori argument.
It is taking the worst conditions for one's
own side and leaving out many elements that are
in one's favour; and the conclusion is that what-
ever form the fighting takes upon the new fron-
tier, the enemy, if he does not want ultimately to
abandon his territory on this new front, will, at
the least, suffer to the extent of one-half his
reserve power to begin with, and about a quarter
of the remainder, and at the most would suffer the
expenditure of nearly all his reserve power.
It is diflicult to see any way out of this
arithmetical conclusion : That the entry of Italy
into the field cannot have any other than a very
powerful effect upon the contrast in numbers
between the Allies and the enemy at this moment,
an effect far greater than the mere addition of a
twelfth or thirteenth (for that is about what it
is) might suggest — it is nearly a sixth of the
allied force actually in the field — and an effect
thus disproportionately great because the entry
of these new numbers immediately affects the
enemy's small remaining reserve of man-power.
THE RAILWAY PROBLEM ON THE
ITALIAN FRONT.
The war, whatever form it takes upon this
front, will be mainly conditioned, as I said at the
outset of this, by the contrast between the rail-
ways upon either side of the front, and that, in
its turn, will mainly affect the war through the
supply of munitions for heavy pieces.
The Austro-Italian front is essentially a
mountain barrier upon which, by their political
action of half a century ago, the Austrians
obtained the advantage — that is, the frontier
between their ovv"n territoiy and that of Italy
commanded the exits from the valleys of the Alps.
On account of this it would in any case be
necessary, even if there were no such thing as
heavy guns and no such things as railways, for
any Italian force desiring to operate against the
Istrian Peninsula to secure itself against an
attack upon its communications from the north.
June 5, IQlti.
LAND AND ^W.ATER.
Here is the matter in its simplest diagram-
matic form.
side a totally different state of things. There foi
the whole distance of this front we have but one
lateral line, marked (2 2) upon the sketch, confined
strictly to a narrow mountain valley, and not pos-
sessing any branch lines at all. The enemy would
A certain point (T) and its territory (Trieste
and the Istrian Peninsula) being of political im-
portance and the objective of an Italian advance
(1), is defended by a certain strategical frontier,
A B, which is the line of the Isonzo, with its
principal nucleus at Gorzg (G) ; but the political
frontier, turning round by the north along A C D,
has given to the enemy openings which are the
mouths of the valleys at E and F, from which
enemy forces can come down right upon the flank
of the main line of the Italian offensive (1), and
interfere with its communications. The line
A F C E D is the mountain line of the frontier,
the bulge at C is the point of the Trentino, and
the gates upon either side, E and F, are the passes
out of the Trentino on to the Italian plain,
notably by the Val Sugana and over the Tornale.
It is obvious that under any conditions of
warfare a force acting along the line (1) against
A B would have to protect its flank thus menaced
from the north.
But the factor of railways, especially as
supplying the munitions for artillery, and par-
ticularly for heavy artillery, adds something to
the problem of this frontier which was not pre-
sent when the great campaigns of the past
— notably the victorious advance of the young
Napoleon — established the military study of the
district.
The contrast between the railway systems in
this region is a product of the Alps. To some
extent it redresses the disadvantage under which
Italy suffered from the way in which the frontier
is traced ; but, apart from any advantage or dis-
advantage upon either side, it makes the posses-
sion of certain nodal points absolutely essential
to the campaign. How this is so the following
sketch will show.
The Italian plain has running through it a
line (111), serving Verona (V), Vicenza (v), Tre-
viso (T), Udine (U), which permits of rapid
lateral transports of men and munitions from East
to West, or vice versa, at will. Furtlier, this main
backbone is supplemented by, and relieved by,
sundry other lines, some of which are shown in
the sketch, and which, all between them, form a
perfect network of communications available to
the Italian commanders for the supply of muni-
tions laterally to any point of concentration and
back towards their main bases. This is because
this system of railways is the system of a plain,
and of a plain very densely populated and highly
developed by modern industry. But once we have
passed the frontiers we have upon the Austrian
I
^ ^^^rca^iSas,
To ftaUan 'Bases
only bring up munitions to his front along one of
two lines, that marked (3) passing through Ta
(Tarvis), that marked (4), and passing Tr (Trent),
and his only means of concentrating munitions
and men at will from one of these lines to the
other is the narrow mountain communication
(2 2), a good railway line with plenty of rolling
stock, but unrelieved by any branching lines.
Further, it is evident that the capture by the
Italians of three points, nodal points, or junc-
tions, in this system, would necessarily have the
greatest effect upon the war. These three points
are Tarvis (Ta), Trent (Tr), and, most important
of all, the mountain junction of Franzensfcste
(F). There are altogether three, and only three,
railway lines of advance out of the Alps on to
the Italian plain upon this front, and these are
the Pass of Pontebba above Tarvis, which I have
marked P (1); the Val Sugana, which I have
marked P (2) ; and the Valley of the Adige, which
I have marked P (3). Now the capture and
retaining of Tarvis (Ta) blocks all entry by the
pass P (1). It renders circuitous and difficult tlie
supply of munitions for the capture of that pass.
The capture of Trent (Tr) closes the two railway
entries P (2) and P (3), but for a counter-attack
down the Adige Valley you would still have the
whole railway system of Alpine Austria concen-
trated upon them. For though munitions and
men could not use the pass P (1), blocked by the
occupation of Tarvis (Ta), yet the full communi-
cations on the east with the Austrian basin, the
railways (3 3), could add their effect to the rail-
way from Innsbruck (4 4), and, so far as a single
double-line railway could be used, the line down
the Adige towards Trent (Tr) would be a perfect
avenue of supply. The railways do not join again
save sixty miles away and more behind the great
mountain masses.
Franzensfeste itself is only the name of a
fort, but it is the junction of the railways here in
the neighbourhood of the village Aicha. It would
be no good holding the mere town and station of
Brixan, half an hour's walk away, unle.'is the
junction were seized.
3»
LAND AND .WATER
June 5, 1915.
The frontier at this point follows the water-
shed of the Carnic Alps, and the height of this
wall at the critical point is not formidable, and
the shape, which is more important than ils
height, is not formidable either. In the twenty
miles or so from the Terglou mass (which is where
the Julian and Carnic Alps join) to the railway
frontier at Pontebba there are numerous passages
Tbnwbba*;
^^p's ^* '-.Terglou
'Is?
.Lcugenfeld
-ESJ
over the wooded hills, and one good high road over
the Predil Pass, which is only 3,800 feet above the
sea and 1,400 above the railway. .While, there-
fore, a main force shall be advancing up the valley
from Pontebba past the fortified point of Malbor-
ghetto toAvards the junction of Tarvis, other
bodies could be turning the line by coming in
from the south and beyond the Predil all the way
to the Terglou, and there are opportunities for com-
paratively large bodies of infantry to come down
upon the railway over the Save Valley. No good
roads, I believe,"but tracks, and the ridge, save in
the immediate neighbourhood of the Terglou, is
not formidable.
The seizing of the second group of Austrian
Alpine railways is a more difficult matter. The
(junction of Trent itself is heavily fortified, and
3t is but the first of the nodal points, and the least
important. The point Bozen (a branch railway
which leads up a side valley, but does not join on
with any further railway system) could be reached
along a comparatively open road by anyone who
Itad possession of the Tonale Pass to the south-
,yest, but the all-important junction above Brixen
Main Line, over
the SrennepTass
to IrLTisbruek.
JS
at Pranzensfeste (F) could not be reached save by
a frontal effort up the gorge of the Eisack. There
is no way over the mountains for an army, or, at
least, no way which quite a small force could not
block.
There is, indeed, upon the map — at least,
upon a map on a large scale — an apparently easy
attack upon the lateral railway where the Italian
frontier comes close to it, in the region of the
Dolomites. It is obvious that cutting this lateral
railway would have the same effect as seizing the
junction at P. But between the valley in which
the lateral railway runs (called the Pusther Valley)
and the Italian streams on the Cortina side is the
ridge of a main range, and all that Dolomite region
is abominable fighting country. There are three
roads, one on either side of the Cristallo, the great
mountain to the north of Cortina, and a third just
where the frontier comes closest to the railway
over the Kreuzberg. Against an insufficient de-
fence, of course, any one of the three might be used,
but it is not a region in which great numbers of
men could act against any considerable opposition,
THE PRZEMYSL SALIENT.
The fighting round the salient of Przemysl
continues undecided, and, vast as is the import-
ance of the issue, there is very little analysis of
the position to be usefully attempted until some-
thing like a decision appears on one side or the
other.
The preliminaries of this struggle and the
reason that the particular point of Przemysl has
become of such moment is already familiar to the
readers of these columns. The successful advance
of the enemy through Galicia, chiefly possible
through the dearth of Russian munitions, particu-
larly in hea\7 shell, exhausted itself at the line
of the San. A portion of that line in the imme-
diate neighbourhood of Jaroslav was forced in
the middle of May, the enemy obtaining a belt
beyond the river which reached ultimately as far
as'Sienawa, and was in places four or five miles
broad. But the enemy was unable to advance
further than this, and the Russian line remained
unbroken.
Meanwhile the Russians had chosen to hang
on to the salient of Przemysl, thus creating a
situation apparent in the sketch of the line here
shown.
The salient was full of danger to the Rus-
sians because a sufficient concentration of the
enemy upon either side of its " neck " at D might
cut that neck, destroy all the forces within the
salient, and possibly pierce the Russian line as
weU. , . 1
This latter and major peril attaching to tlie
tOOM'U*-
June 5, 1915.
LAND A X D W A T E R
A
^■^^/^
®
liiiA
SIg
iwf\
©
Al
salient must not be forgotten. If in my general
line A E I allow a salient BCD, and if my
enemy, hammering along the arrows 1 and 2, cuts
off my salient, he may not only enjoy the im-
portant results of capturing everything that lies
within the shaded portion, but "it is also very
likely that in his push he would get right through
as along the arrow (3).
If, therefore, the Austro-Germans could suc-
ceed in cutting the neck at D they would stand a
very good chance of piercing the Russian line as
well as capturing whatever was within. the salient
itself. That is why the enemy is making the very;
vigorous effort he is to cut that neck at D. How
far he has progressed in this task and what risk
he runs of failure may be seen in the following
tvvo diagrams. Here, first, is the detail of his
position round Przemysl itself.
The Russian line having been forced back
in front of Jaroslav (J) across the San, a
further violent effort was made by the enemy,
based upon the railway, and he forced the
San again in front of ' Radymno (R) and a
little above that point as well. Just above
Radymno comes in the River .Wisnia, and be-
tween it and the San the string of four
villages, Stubiento (St), Stubno (S), Naklo (N)
(upon which we must particularly fix our atten-
tion), and lastly Pozdziacz (P). They are united
by a road which comes in from Radymno and runs
on to Przemysl. Just behind the tvro last of them
lie the marshes of the Wisnia, which are here
drained by that river, canalised between A and B.
Now the German effort at one moment got as far
as the village of Naklo, l)ut the Russians have so
far stopped its getting further. From Naklo to
the railway is about six miles. On the south of
Przemysl, at about the same distance, the enemy
is attacking in precisely the same fashion in the
neighbourhood of Hussakow (H), so thai" the
whole salient is about twelve miles across.
The situation is still quite undecided, but it
is worth noting that meanwhile north of Jaro-
slav the Russians have begun to advance per-
ceptibly against the enemy's flank. They have
retaken Sienawa, also Lezachow, where the' enemy
crossed it before a fortnight ago. They have even
crossed the Lubaczowka, and are advancing to
threaten the operations between Jaroslav and
Rad}Tnno. Our Ally is able to act thus in the north
probably because every concentration of effort has
been made against the salient of Przemysl itself by
loi^ ia loooMetrtM.
LAND AND .WATER.
June 5, 1915.
Ihe enemy, and he has weakened himself elscAvhere.
It can only be insisted upon once more that
this critical point of the Eastern front has not
at the moment of writing (Tuesday evening) pro-
duced any decision one way or the other.
PS, — As this paper goes to press news comes
that the enemy has forced the outer works of
JPrzemysl on the north (German communique) but
failed to force the principal work on the west, as
yet (Russian communique). This success was
obtained by him last Sunday, and on Monday he
was turned out of the western fort (No. 7).
Should Przemysl be forced thus by direct attack
it will, of course, not have the effect which would
be produced by cuting the neck of the salient : it
would still leave the Russian centre intact.
THE MILITARY ARGUMENT FOR AND
AGAINST CONSCRIPTION.
BECAUSE men who have the power both to
promote and to burk discussion have re-
cently worked hard in favour of immediate
compulsory service, and because the matter is, in
the course" of such a war as this, to be regarded
mainly from its military side, I must beg my
readers' leave to set up, as well as I can, the argu-
ments for and against the system; I mean the
purely military arguments. The political and
moral arguments for and against are not suitable
for these pages.
We must first of all clearly distinguish
between a system of conscription established in
time of peace and in preparation for war,
matured and organised in all its details (a task
of some years), bearing its fruit in the shape of
trained reserves, &c., we must distinguish, I say,
between this and compulsory service (what the
men of the French Revolution called " Levee en
jSIasse ") suddenly decreed in the midst of a war.
The two methods have widely different
f.haracters and are of widely different military
effect.
ARGUMENT FOR CONSCRIPTION
WHEN LONG PREPARED.
In favour of conscription, as organised
during peace, with leisure for the scheme to
mature, and as a preparation for war, the purely
military arguments are so strong that they hardly
need stating. Briefly, they are these :
(1) Conscription gives j^ou the maximum
number of men.
(2) Conscription gives you perfect regularity
in your recruitment.
(3) Conscription permits you to organise the
;whole State for war with the meiximumslmpUciti/.
[You knoAV just what men of just what age you
will get and in just what numbers, if you call up
such and such a number of classes — that is, yearly
contingents. The " class 1915," for instance, means
the young men who will have reached and passed
the age of twenty in the course of 1915. You laiow
what reserves you have behind, whatever number
of " classes '' you have chosen to call up. You know
in what trades (and in what numbers in those
trades) your reserves are employed. You exactly
allow for the men who must remain behind as
miners, on the railway, as ship-builders — even
for agriculture.
(4) Conscription lowers the expense of an
army —
(a) By the simplification of all its machineiy ;
(b) By giving you men whom j^ou need not
tempt with the promise of a special wage ;
(c) By providing you with a regularly work-
ing machine for assembling men, feeding them,
transporting them, &c., which is obviously a
cheaper machine to work than the rapidly impro-
vised and unexpectedly and capriciously expand-
ing organisation which the voluntary system
clamours for suddenly in time of war.
One of the many reasons why the expenditure
of Great Britain has been so greatly out of pro-
portion to her military effort (compared with the
other Allies) has been the fact that no such simple
machine was ready.
(5) Finally, conscription provides a group of
minor advantages such as these :
(a) It allows }'ou to drill and train your m.en
in large known units, for which your instructors,
training grounds, housing, &c., are all marked
down ;
(b) It tells you what equipments you must
have ready for j'our reserves;
(c) It enables you to keep your exact propor-
tion between all arms ;
(d) To draft men at will from one unit to
another, &c., &c.
On the other side of the account all that can
be set is the undoubted truth that a professional
army (not any sort of voluntary force) is, number
for number, superior to a conscript army. But as
against this one must always remember that a
professional army can only form quite a small
proportion of the total available material.
Connected with — or, rather, a part of — this
same argument is the fact that esprit de corps —
that very valuable traditional spirit differentiat-
ing one unit from another, stimulating competi-
tion between all, and promoting a sort of local
patriotism of the utmost moral effect — tends to be
swamped in a conscript army, and is always much
more lively in a voluntary or professional one.
But, I repeat, there is no comparison between
the purely militaiy arguments in favour of and
against a system of conscription, as established
during some long period of peace, in preparation
for war. The weight of argument is all in favour.
Roughly speaking, such a system reaches its
maximum of utility after a trial of about twenty-
five years. Men are first drilled (when they have
passed their medical examination) after or about
their twentieth birthday. They are, in the bulk,
quite unfit for even the"^last military duties after
forty-five. In twenty-five years, therefore, you
have a national system with all its last reserves
established.
6*
June 5, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
COMPULSORY SERVICE ESTAB-
LISHED DURING THE COURSE
OF A CAMPAIGN.
But while the arguments for and against con-
scription on its purely military side must thus be
stated strongly in favour of the system, when there
is time for preparation, and when it is being
established under peace conditions — with presum-
ably a long time before one in which to mature it
— quite another set of arguments attach to the
application of compulsory service during the
actual 'process of a great caiwpaign.
The two great examples, of course, are the
French Revolutionary Wars and the action of the
Northern States during the Civil W^ar in
America. The analogy of these examples in the
past is imperfect, but so far as they teach us any-
thing we shall discover from them exactly what
we fiiid upon an examination of the conditions
applying to Britain to-day — to wit, these two
main propositions :
(1) Compulsory' service thus applied in the
midst of a war is valuable or necessary in inverse
proportion to the established rate of voluntary
enlistment.
^2) Compulsory service is valuable or neces-
sary m proportion to the expected duration of tlie
campaign after the policy is adopted, compared
with the tim.e through which the campaign has
run before the policy was adopted.
To examine these fundamental propositions :
Let us first eliminate those arguments in
favour of a long-matured scheme of conscription
which obviously do not apply to universal com-
pulsory service during the course of a war.
Next let us state the military arguments
against the adoption of such a policy in the midst
of a war, and, lastly, let us state the arguments in
its favour.
When we have thus surveyed the field we
shall see that the two propositions laid down
above are true and are the main truths that we
have to consider at this moment.
L— THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT
AGAINST.
(ff) The advantages of a conscript system
which do not and cannot apply to compulsory
service inaugurated in tlie midst of a war are,
first, and most important, the provision of older
reserves. A long matured conscript system gives,
as we have seen, an exactly calculable reserve
of older men behind the existing young men of the
active army. We c-an call up for the purpose of a
small war so many men ; of a larger war, so many
more. If we have only trained a certain propor-
tion of our total manhood, yet under a conscript
system we know exactly how many of the re-
mainder could pass the doctor, where each is to be
found, v,'hat his trade is, and what his age.
A con.script system applied in the midst of a
war does not enjoy these fruits of long prepara-
tion. Ail the work of registration, &o., has to be
undertaken in the midst oP the other very lieavy
work of the campaign ; t!ie reserve of previously
trained m.en does not exist, and, presumably, a
great proportion of the men available ha\e
already volunteered.
{h) Next, wc have not that element of sim-
plicity whi'.h a conscript py.stem long established
during peace would have given us. Many units
are formed ; the new levy will add bodies varying
in character from those we already possess.
The " cadres " — that is, the body of profes-
sional officers and non-commissioned officers whicli
form the framework within which the new units
are organised are not in existence.
IL— THE POSITIVE ARGUMENT
AGAINST.
With the.se two negative points go, of course,
the positive arguments directly opposed to com-
pulsion in the course of a campaign, as follows :
{a) A compulsory levy suddenly calls for
the training of a great body of new officers, the
material for which you may not be able to find.
{h) It calls for new equipment which you will
not have ready.
{c) It sharply differentiates within the body
of your army between the men who have already
volunteered and the men who have been summoned
— the moral effect of this upon any .armed force
must be very seriously weighed, and is one of the
principal checks against a rash and unconsidered
ai^plication of the policy.
(d) Lastly, you have — and vastly the most
important point — the fact that the com-pulsory
'principle suddenly applied in the midst of a
great campaign involves the setting up of new
machinery by which to decide who is required for
work at home and who can best be sent to the
front. To segregate men into these two c -tegories,
to make certain that you will be making the most
of your industrial power, to turn out the maxi-
mum amount of ammunition, and of weapons, and
of ships, and of clothing, and the rest of it, is a
business at once lengthy and laborious. It will
throw chaos into every branch of public service,
and it will, as a mere mechanical task, be one of
months. Finally :
(e) (An argument which has its military
side). If of many allies one in particular is of
use to its fellows in spheres other than the field
itself — e.g., as holding the sea, commerce bearing,
transport work, coal supply, finance (which re-
poses on production and commerce), manufacture
of equipment, &c. Then the arguments in favour
of restricting the total body of men to be used in
the field obviously apply to that ally as a member
of the whole. If it put too many men into the
field at the expense of other activities necessary
to the whole alliance that alliance would lose far
more than it would gain.
in.— THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR.
The merely military arguments in favour of
adopting the compulsory principle in the midst of
a war are simple, and may be put verj' briefly.
(1) It provides in the long run (supposing all
its disadvantages can be got over) the full maxi-
mum of fighting power. Sooner or later a com-
pulsory system, even though it be applied after
a campaign has already run a great part of its
course, will give you all the men available for the
completion of it.
(2) It gives you a simple machine calculable
in all its numerical relations and freed from every
anxiety upon recruitment as a whole, or the excess
of men in one service at the expense of another.
(3) It ultim.ately permits you to arrange
exactly the man-power in manufacture and trans-
port required behind your army for its supply and
maintenance.
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 1915.
(4) It leaves you free to face an indefinitely
long future secure*^ in an increasing stream of re-
cruitment, calculable exactly in amount.
(5) It provides a universal system every-
where equally cemented by the strongest sort of
discipline. There are no patches.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.
Now, it is quite evident from such an exam-
ination of the full arguments for and against that
the two main propositions we have put forward
above can be established.
(1) The compulsory ■principle applied in the
midst of a campaign is valuable in inverse pro-
portion to the i\ite of voluntary enlistment
already developed and continuing.
Supposing that a nation has in adult males
of military age a total of eight millions. Suppos-
ing that of these eight millions six millions at the
outside are efficient ; , supposing that of these six
millions (under the particular conditions of the
country in question) the number of men who —
though efficient for military service and of
military age — will be required for transport, for
manufacture of munitions, clothing, &c., for
carrying on the foreign trade, for supplying not
only its own armies but also, perhaps, those of its
Allies, three million must remain behind. You
have then a maximum of three million left.
Supposing that of these three million two
million have voluntarily enlisted. It is presum-
able or certain that these two-thirds will physic-
ally be a pick of the whole; that the strict regula-
tions fur their enlistment will have eliminated the
older men and the less fit, who will only be taken in
the last emergency. It may justly be postulated
that with two million thus voluntarily enlisted the
grave dangers and disorder and delay occasioned
by the sudden adoption of a compulsory principle
would not be compensated by a corresponding
advantage. You might get another half -million
equal, as material, to the two million you had
already obtained, but half a million will be the
outside figure. The chances are that most of those
not enlisted would be men somewhat over the age
or somewhat less efficient than your voluntarily
enlisted material, or (as the state of the labour
market proved) required for the civilian work of
making provisions, of transport, &c., upon which
every army in the field reposes, or for some purpose
of commerce, or exchange vital to the alliance.
Supposing, upon the contrary, that with three
million really available, only a million or less had
enlisted. Then you would be justified in running
the risks and sufiering the disadvantages of a
belated application of the compulsory principle
even during the strain of a gi-eat war.
The whole thing is a balance, a compromise
between the advantages and the disadvantages cf
getting the greatest possible number upon the one
hand — and lack of homogeneity in the forces, the
immensely laborious business of segregating
those who may go from those who may stay, find
ing new cadres and new equipment, the con-
sequent vast confusion and delay, &c., &c., u])on
the other.
.Where exactly the balance must be struck
only those who study existing conditions in all
their details and who have all the statistics (many
of them secret) before their eyes are in a position
to judge. But one can repeat that wide margin
between a certain minimum and a certain maxi-
mum, and say that if anything like two-thirds of
the total maximum are obtainable by voluntary
recruitment, the difficulties attaching to a com-
pulsory principle for the remaining third out-
weighs the advantages. While at the other end
of the scale one can say, with equal certitude,
that anything like a third, or, at any rate, much
less than half, of the total available strength'
appearing on the voluntary principle during the
first part of a campaign shows that the compul- ■
sory policy, with all its drawbacks, is worth
applying.
One may add that the compulsory principle
lias better arguments on its side if the higher figure
be nearly, but not quite reached, than has the
voluntary principle on its side if little more than
the lower figure has been reached.
With very high figures of voluntary enlist-
ment (such as three-quarters of the men available
having already appeared in the first months of the
war), the belated application of compulsion would
manifestly he a folly. If only a third — or, at any
rate, less than a half — of the available numbers
ha\'e appeared, it would as manifestly be wisdom
■ — that is, it would be wisdom in a great war
involving the very existence of the nation.
(2) But the second proposition is of at least
equal importance with the first. The value of
compulsory service applied in the midst of a cam-
paign varies with the expectation, of the length of
the war, and with a comparison between that ex-
pectation and the time elapsed since its outbreak.
If, from the course of a campaign, it seems
probable that the first part, which has already
seen a very large voluntary enlistment, will not
be followed by many more months of hostili-
ties, then the tardy application of compulsion
would not be worth the disadvantages attach-
ing to it. You would find yourself at the end of
the war suffering from all the friction between
volunteers and conscripts, with masses of men
on your hands whom you would have to dis-
band and who would have been called up for
nothing, Avhom you had yet but imperfectly
trained and probably had not equipped at all.
You would have struck a blow in the void.
If, on the other hand, the war seemed des-
tined to long duration, and the lapse of time
between its outbreak and the application of
compulsion was little compared with the prob-
able lapse of time between the application of
that principle and the close of hostilities, then
the argument for compulsion would become
stronger and stronger in proportion to your ex-
pectations of the length of the campaign— and
that for two reasons : —
First, that the compulsory principle would
call in year after year men who had just
reached military age, and in regular numbers.
Secondly, that, tardy as equipment must be
for great improvised armies, and slow as must
be the provision of officers for them, the lapse of no
more than six months would set this right. If
the war were destined to continue one, two, or
three years after the compulsory principle had
been adopted, then its adoption would be
amply justified.
REGISTRATION.
In thus presenting the merely milita,ry
arguments for or against the compulsory prin-
ciple at this moment in the campaign, there
must not be omitted a certain third course for
which the strongest arguments exist and
June 5, 1915.
LAND AND 3EATER
against which no appreciable arguments (of
the military character at least) can be put for-
ward : This is the course of registration.
The adoption of a register upon which all
men of military age, or, indeed, beyond what is
commonly called the military age, should be
set down : their physical efficiency, their place
of residence, their occupation and aptitudes,
would not only be a step necessarily prelimin-
ary to any general enrolment, but of the utmost
value to the voluntary sjstem itself should it
be continued, and an instrument indispensable
to any future organisation, voluntary or com-
pulsory, of the total national fighting power.
The drawing up of such a register was ad-
vocated by the present writer many months
ago, in the first phase of the war. He can see
no military argument against it. Its military
value is obvious, and though it would have
been far more useful had it come into existence
last summer, it can still be of high value even
at this late turning-point of the campaign — for
the turning-point we have, without doubt,,
reached and are now in the act of passing.
H. BELLOC.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By A. H. POLLEN.
MOTE. — This article has been submitted to the Press Burean, irbich does not object to the publication as censo red, and takes no
responsibility lor the correctness of the statements.
6UBMARINES-£f COMMUNICATIONS.
URING the past week we have suffered
the hea^y loss of two battleships —
Triumph and Majestic — by submarine
attack at the Straits. The mine-layer
Princess Irene blew up in Sheerness Harbour with
a lamentable loss of life, practically all the officers
and men being killed. The German war on mer-
chantmen has been quite extraordinarily virulent,
a dozen ships having been torpedoed — one Ameri-
can ship, the Nebraskan, and five other neutrals
among them. The previous week's lull betokened,
then, no weakening of this unscrupulous cam-
Saign. The shifty reply to President Wilson's
ote was received just as the news of the attack
on the Nebraskan arrived, so that the whole ques-
tion has become dangerously acute. Finally, E 11
has repeated the achievement of E 14 by crossing
the Sea of Marmora, sinking transports, and ex-
ploding a torpedo right amongst the quays of Con-
Btantinople.
Both this and the sinking of our battleships
were singularly brilliant performances. But it
would be a mistake to limit our interest in them by
looking only at the skill and enterprise displayed.
The submarine here plays a new role. Each side is
using it to attack the communications of the other.
Our transports and warships are the base of the
forces on shore. If they can be sunk or driven off,
the army wiU be isolated. The communications of
the German Turkish Army lie across the Sea of
Marmora. There are no suitable roads overland
into the Peninsula. Reinforcements, ammunition,
supplies, must come, and the wounded must go
back, by water transport. Which side stands to
lose most by its communications being disturbed ?
Surely not ours. The moral of the Turks, both at
the front and at home, is poor. It seems that the
German domination has not become sweeter with
the failure of all Turkish military effort. If our
submarines can continue their ravages, the enemy
should be faced with a position at least at difficult
and disconcerting as our own,
THE LOSS OF THE BATTLESHIPS.
Triumph, according to the Turkish reports,
was steaming slowly with her nets out, soon
after midday on Tuesday, May 25, when she was
sighted and fired at by a German submarine. The
torpedo, it is said, tore through the nets and,
striking the ship amidships, exploded. Triu7nph
sank in nine minutes. She must have been expect-
ing trouble, for all the officers but three and
nearly all the crew were saved. The Turks give
great credit to the German officers for not having
shelled the destroyers and other craft that hurried
up to save Triumph's crew. It would have been so
easy, the account says, to have killed the sailors
struggling in the water by shrapnel and to have
blown up the rescuing British boats. The noble
feelings of the German officers made them forbear
from so cruel a proceeding. The account goes on
to say, as if in strong contrast to this becoming
humanity, that the submarine was pursued for a
long time by British destroyers, but escaped un-
damaged. Perhaps the pursuit is a better ex-
planation of the German forbearance than this
alleged humanity. According to this account.
Triumph was accompanied by another battleship,
and was preceded by two destroj;'ers, while other
destroyers and scouts were cruising in the neigh-
bourhood to cover the battleship against sub-
marine attack. This is partly confirmed by the
Admiralty's note of May 26, which says that
the submarine was unsuccessfully chased by^
destroyers and patrolling craft until after dark.
Of the loss of Majestic we have no details at all,
except that she was supporting the army on the
Gallipoli Peninsula and was torpedoed in the
course of the morning. This also, then, seems, aa
one would suppose, to have been a daylight attack.
THE NEW SITUATIOxN.
It has, of course, for a long time been obvious
that the Germans could and would send sub-
marines to the Mediterranean, and for at least
three weeks their presence there has been so well
known that large rewards have been publicly^
offered for information that would lead to the dis-
covery of their bases. Readers of the daily papers
will have noticed that the Echo de Paris announced
last week that Tchesne, quite near Smyrna, was
known to be a German submarine base. Another,
it was reported from Mitylene, on Tuesday, has
been discovered. There have been frequent^
bombardments of the Asia Minor coast in the
neighbourhood — no doubt all suspected bases have
been receiving attention. The Jeanne 'd'Arc is
reported, in the course of a reconnoitring expedi-
tion, to have seized a large Turkish cratt having
many thousands of cases of benzine on board, and,
further, to have destroyed several benzine depots
on shore. A blockade of Smyrna and the Adriatic
9»
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 1915."
coast, as from June 2, has been announced.
Replenishing with fuel and food should be the
main problem to the German submarines, and these
activities will, in all likelihood, make the finding
of a safe base more and more difficult as time goes
on. One supposes that it will be impossible for
them to use Constantinople without risking the
passage of the Turkish mine-fields, a task which
the English submarines certainly have compassed ;
but they possess better facilities for ascertaining
where the mines are than the German officers, even
with such Turkish information as they can get.
If the presence of these boats were a complete
surprise, it would be easier to look upon their
success with equanimity. But the situation
which exists to-day is not unexpected, and we
have reason to suppose that every possible pre-
caution has been taken to meet it, both by the
Admiralty and by the Commander-in-Chief on
the spot. It is precisely the fact of this attack
having been anticipated that makes the loss of
these two ships so disturbing a matter. It seems
only too certain that we must prepare ourselves
to hear of other losses, and those not less serious.
But there is no reason to anticipate these losses
occurring with extraordinary frequency ; we shall
not lose a ship every three days. With so many
destroyers about, with surrounding waters so
actively patrolled, and with everyone so especially
on the qui vive, there must have been a lot of bad
luck to make this double loss possible.
Can anything be suggested that has not been
'done ? For all practical purposes there exists but
one form of passive defence to torpedo attacks,
and that is the use of nets. If the Turkish
account of the loss of the Triumph is correct, the
torpedo cut through the net. The Admiralty
notes make no mention of nets at all. I pointed
out a fortnight ago that when the hot-air torpedo
was first introduced it was realised that at top
speed — that is, at short range — its cutters could
certainly force their way through any net then
in existence. But, of course, nets can be made
much stronger than the old nets were, and it is
quite possible that, even though Triumph had her
nets out, they were drifting surface high. Had
she been going more than four knots this must
certainly nave been the case. The torpedo that
struck her, therefore, may have passed under, and
not through. Tier defences.
The only other means of protecting ships is
either to drive off the submarines by destroyers —
and in this line it would, indeed, only remain to
get as many more destroyers as possible — or for the
ship to make the task of the submarine impossible
by maintaining a high speed.
The reader knows from previous discussions
that :
(1) When a ship is at high speed the capacity
of a submarine to place itself favourably for
attack is very greatly diminished, and
(2) That a fast ship is much more difficult to
hit than a slow one. And, as may be gathered from
the instructions given to merchantmen, that
(3) A fast ship on a zig-zag course is a mote
puzzling target than one on a straight course.
Can, then, the battleships at the Dardanelles
Srotect themselves by speed and manoeuvring?
._ Undoubtedly they can, but — unless the fire control
in use is very different from any adopted by most
other navies — only at the cost of diminishing the
efficiency of the guns. This is because all move-
ment by a firing ship introduces great difficulties
in keeping the range, and in some cases presents
an insurmountable obstacle to keeping the line of
fire. All these difficulties become greater in pro-
portion as the ship's speed increases and as her
course is varied. In short, any manoeuvres adopted
by a ship to baffle the enemy submarine will baffle
her own gunners even more completely.
I have attempted below to explain this crucial
matter without being too technical. And if I fail
to make it as lucid as it should be, I am yet going
to appeal to the reader to take some trouble to
understand what I say, because in this matter we
have the best possible illustration of the truth that
all schemes of naval strategy, and every end which
it is proposed to gain by the tactical use of ships,
ultimately turns upon the methods that are
adopted for the einployment of naval weapons. If
these methods are defective, tactics must be
restricted and many strategical objects made im-
possible of attainment. Hence the fortunes of a
whole campaign may turn upon certain minuticB
of fire control, which ardent and impatient spirits
in time of peace have thought far too insignificant
for consideration.
THE SUPREME COMMAND.
Altogether, the successes of the German sub^
marines at the Dardanelles have added consider-
ably to the dangers and difficulties of that alrealy
anxious situation. But it is not a situation which
justifies any sort of panic or unbalanced
fear. The submarines have simply added to
the difficulties of an already exceedingly difficult
undertaking. And it is fortunate that for the
solution of these difficulties the Government has
now the help of two of the best minds which the
country possesses. After my notes appeared last
week, it was definitely stated — what, indeed, we had
every reason to expect at the time of writing — that
Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Jackson had taken
Mr. Churchill's and Lord Fisher's places at the
Board of Admiralty. Mr. Balfour brings to his
duties an unrivalled knowledge of affairs and a
wide experience, if not of departmental adminis-
tration, yet of the supervision of the administra-
tion of the whole Empire. For the first time a
man good enough to be Prime Minister is not too
good for the Na\'y. No statesman of the first rank
has given a closer or more continuous study to the
problems that arise out of the defence of the
Empire. It was, indeed, he who took these
problems out of purely departmental hands and
constituted an amphibious and non-party body for
their special consideration. And he has been a
member of this body since its formation. Those
who Icnow him best say that he is conspicuous for
a characteristic that certainly endeared his pre-
decessor as First Lord to the Naval Service. Like
Mr. Churchill, he has a fine fi-ghting spirit, a
quality of which those at the head of a great fight-
ing department can never ha,ve too much. In Mr.
Balfour's case the fighting spirit will be accom-
panied by perhaps a greater patience, a greater
willingness to leave the professionals to do what
all agree is wanted in their own way. He will
certainly trust, and have every reason to trust, the
quite exceptionally gifted officer whom he has made
his first adviser. Just as Sir Arthur V/ilson was
undoubtedly the greatest tactician the Nav;^^ pos-
sessed in tile passing generation; just as Lf.»rd
Fisher revolutionised the construction of all con-
10*
June 5, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
temporary navies, and so ]ilaced himself, at the
normal finish of his career, in a category by him-
self, so is Sir Henry Jackson a type of officer the
times most ciaiuorously demand — a man who can
bring to tlie administration of the Xa\y a mastery
of its technical problems that is quite unparal-
leled, and broadened and illumined by a con-
tinuous study of its higher strategics. The
new administration is being put to an im-
mediate and most severe test. But whatever
losses and set-backs there may be — and both are
to be expected — Mr. Balfour and Sir Henry Jack-
son can be looked to with absolute confidence to
handle the situation with the coolness, the
courage, the judgment, and the knowledge that it
requires.
THE CRUX OF NAVAL GUNNERY.
IF two sbips are stationary at any distance apart, the range
remains constant; if both advance in the same direction
and at the same speed, the range remains constant. But
if either mano.uvrcs, the range reflects the difference of
movement. Suppo.^e a ship advances in a straight line
towards a fixed target at an even speed, the range
must decrease at that speed; such a manoeuvre would
represent no difficulties to gunnery. The sights would
bimply be lowered at the rate at which the ship was moving.
If she was going 12 knots, at 400 yards a minute ; at 15 knots,
500 yards a minute, and so on. Given a reliable speedom.eter,
good communications, and an efficient sight-setting service,
it would be exactly as if the ship was stationary.
But if the ship went on a course not directly towards or
away from the target, the rate at which the range altered
would not be constant — it would vary. As the range in-
ci eased, the change in each successive minute would become
less — as it diminished the change would become greater. On
the other hand, the rate would change very little and very
slowly. If the target were visible, with the instr.iii«e;!ts
generally in use, this changing rate could be ascertained;
and if the speed of the ship was not very high, the sights
RCuld still be correctly altered.
If the firing shiii, however, began to nianceu\re — that
rest or on parallel courses; or changing, when either moves
differently from the other. Next, that the rate at which
the range changes is either constant — which is rare, because
limit'Cd to movement in certain fixed relative directions — or
tarying. Finally, that the variations of the rate reflect the
manoeuvres of the ship. If the ship is going slow and
changes her course only by small turns — a few degrees at a
time — then the variations in the rate will be small ; while if
the ship is fast and makes large turns, the variation will be
large. As we have seen in a given ease with a fixed target, a
turn of 90 degrees, made in 90 seconds, can convert a de-
creasing rate of 500 j'ards into an increasing rate of a like
amount — a total change in rat-e of no less than 1,000 yards a
minute and a half !
How can the range be kept in such conditions ? Ob-
viously, the only way would be to make the sights move as
the range changes. It all turns on continuous knowledge of
the rate, or, rather, on the rate being anticipated and con-
tinuoushj conirollmg the sights.
The rate-finding instruments used in most navies are
based upon a formula that was first embodied in an instru-
ment made and patented, some ten or eleven years ago, by
Captain Duniaresq, of the Royal Navy. This instrument,
when set to the firing ship's speed and to the speed and
3
'' ' ^v
s.\V)"..,
A Tirlnj Sbjjp
B Pore
C Iiitsrverun^ Hill
'B A-Lniing Point- ^^t^ --,, ^ ^\
T 5pottuig?o5Ltu3n. A
X)AB=I)enectonAiigk
is, make sudden and large turns — then the range would jump
up and dowG. Suppose, for instance, a ship was advancing
at a high speed with a target bearing 45 deg:ees from the
port bow — that is, before the beam — and suddenly turuml
90 degrees to starboard. If before the turn the range was
decreasing at 500 yards a minut«, it would now be increasing
at practically the same rate. The turn, therefore, would have
converted a decreasing rate into an increasing rate.
The reader will have perceived from the foregoing that
ranges are either constant — when the ship and target are at
course of the target if the target is moving, must first be
held in such a position on board ship that its zero line is in
coincidence with that of tJie firing ship's course — no easy
matter when a sliip is yawing, and almost impossible if the
ship is turning. A pointer lias then to be directed at the
target. When all this is done, the rate at which the range
is changing at that moment is indicated. Messrs. Barr and
Stroud have introduced an improved instrument, which is,
in fact, a mechanical equivalent to Captain Dumaresq's in-
dicator. It shows the rate on a dial instead of on a table.
11*
LAND AA'D ,WATEE
June 5, 1915.
and can be made to operate a transmitter, so that tlie in-
Btantaneous rate, when ascertained as above, can be trans-
mitted to the place where the orders t-o raise or lower the
sights at the speed required are being given.
Note with regard to both these instruments that they
indicate the rate at the moment, that they must be pointed
at the target, and must be kept in coincidence with the
course line. Neither can give a continuous indication of a
A can now continue firing with confidence so long as its
position is not altered; but if A proceeds to start at a high
r
ir-"""V
/c\
f\j:
A E
%2.
changing rate, neither can be used when the firing ship is
turning. Both require the target to be visible. Let us see
how these limitations affect the Dardanelles problem.
Our ships there are engaged in two tasks — to support
the infantry in their advance to the Gallipoli heights and
to destroy the forts when the heights are won, and the Army
can correct the ships' fire. In each task they have to engage
their targets, either direct — that is, with the target visible —
or indirect, when the target is concealed by intervening hills.
Let us take the last case first.
The sketches. Figures 1, 2, and 3, will make the neces-
sary procedure clear. Figure 1 shows a ship. A, lying out
at sea engaging a target, B, on shore, which is concealed from
'A by an intervening hill, C. At F (to the left of C) is a
higher hill in the possession of A's troops, from which A's
fire is observed. E represents the coast line, and D is some
conspicuous object — a rock or ruin on the coast, which is a
convenient aiming point for the gunlayers in A. The general
position of B in relation to A would have been ascertained
by plans, maps, and charts; so that an approximate range
can be put upon A's guns, and at the same time an approxi-
mate deflection angle, DAB, put upon the sights, which
then will be pointing at D, while the bore of the gun will be
pointing towards B. The observers on the hill F (or in aero-
pjanes) will correct A's fire both for deflection and range; so
that the angle, DAB, and the range, A B, will in a few
rounds be ascertained with precision.
F
speed on a wavy course, coming in due time to A2 and then
to A3, the range will have changed in all from 15,000 yards
to 15,500; but there will be many gradations up and down.
Now, as A cannot keep the bearing of B, B being invisible, it
v.ill be impo.ssible to know the rate at which the range is
changing, and consequently it will be impossible to keep an
accurate range. But, further, the angle, DAB, wUl, of
course, change monstrously. D therefore becomes valueless
as an aiming point and the direction, as well as the range,
of the target will become lost the moment A moves.
Now, supposing that there were no hill at C, and B was
visible from A wherever A proceeded to, then it would theo-
retically be possible, by means of instruments built on tha
principle of Captain Dumaresq's, to have a constant iadica-
tion of the actual rate of change. But unless that rate is
impressed upon the sight synchronously with its occurring,
vei-y serious errors intervene, as would appear, for instance,
from Figure 4. In Figure 4 the upper ship. A, is supposed
to be descending from north to south towards the lower ship,
B, which is proceeding from west to east. When at a range
of 10,650 yards, A proceeds to make a 90 degrees turn, so as
to come on a course parallel with B. This turn, we will sup-
pose, takes one minute and a half to execute. In that minute
and a half the range will alter from 10,650 yards to 10,000
yards. In the first half-minute the range is diminished by
325 yards, in the second by 225 yards, in the third by 100
yards. But the rate at the beginning of the first half-minuta
is 375 yards per half-minute; at the beginning of the second
half-minute is 300 per half-minute, and at the beginning cf
the third is 175 yards per half-minute. If, then, these rates
had been persisted in for the whole of each half-minute, there
w ould have been an error of 50 yards in the first half-minuta
V
k^
w
^0
1 1
521
V2
In tlie ZOstcoTods between 1 and 2 the roi^eluis cliar^ed zlSi^ds
%' m m^ % • O • ^ ** ' ' _m • « 100 •
At 1 tiie rafce of dioiige was 3 75 \^i<>. per 30 secoiwk
M ^ • m « . ^' ^ wC/W m •• **^ «ft
•s O % m ^ « %• L C D •% m^ m» ••
Hal these rat&s been appUnd. iov SOsecotds
contixiiioush^ , thusre would hoye been on error of
50i^ds inthe i^.^ 30 seconds
75 . . . 2«^ . .
ACotal of 100 - •
La.
^1^.4
12*
June 5, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER.
and of 75 in each of the last. In 90 seconds, while making
a single quarter-turn, therefore, the guulayers in A would
have got the range wrong by no less than 200 yards, and
would probably have ceased hitting before the first minute
was over.
There is nothing novel or unexpected in war haring
brought this problem to the front. It is at least six years
since the fire-control experts of the British Navy realised that
no rate-finding or rate-keeping device would be adequate to
the requirements of modern action unless it could automatic-
ally deal with a varying rate, alter the sights automatically
as the rat« varied, and, above everything else, be capable of
generating the future hearings of the target — and tliis
whether it was stationary or maintaining a previously known
course at a previously known speed. The grounds put for-
ward six years ago for maintaining that such a device was an
elementary necessity of war were that in action it would often
be necessary to manoeuvre, and that the target would be often,
and for considerable periods, obscured by smoke. If, then,
the loss of bearings meant the loss of the range, gun-fire
would be inefficient because intermittent.
But when, aft«r many years of patient and costly experi-
ment, an automatic rate-finding and rate-keeping device was
produced to meet these requirements, it was very early
realised that, though evolved principally in view of the neoes-
aities of naval action, it would be invaluable for either direct
or indirect bombardment, where the attacks of destroyers or
submarines would make protective evolutions necessary.
Indeed, the demand for a solution of the rate problem
arose largely out of the perfecting of the long-range torpedo.
For it was this that made it quite certain that destroyers
armed with these weapons would in the future take part in
Fleet actions. A threefold corollary would follow on their
participation. In the first place, battleships would have to
be sub-divided into smaller squadrons — say, four ships in-
stead of eight, so as to shorten the target front presented
by a line of ships. Secondly, all evolutions would have to
be carried out at the highest practicable speed, so as to in-
crease the difficulty of aiming the torpedo correctly. And,
lastly, sudden and large changes of course would be necessary
so as to avoid or disconcert torpedo attack, when it was known
to be imminent.
At the time of which I am spealcing it was axiomatic that
the moment a squadron changed coui-se gunfire would have
to cease because the rate of change could neither ba accurEt<'ly
calculated, nor, if calculated, kept accurately on the rights.
The solution called for by these conditions was really a de-
mand that ships should be able to keep the range with exactly
the same accuracy when manoeuvring as they could do when
they were standing still. It is one of the curiosities of modern
naval history that when a solution in concrete form of the
most obvious of all artillery problems was produced the mono-
poly of it, which the Admiralty had paid heavily to nutko
possible, was abandoned before the device itself was tried.
At the Dardanelles, where the targets are stationary,
only one-half of the fire control problem cornea into play —
viz., making the ship's hekn free once the range and bearing
of the target have been ascertained. If ever a Fleet action
takes place, the necessity for a solution of the other half of
the problem will arise. We shall then have to find out the
speed and course of the target, as well as its range and bear-
ing. The range of any target at sea or on land must, at great
distances, ultimately be found by the observation of fire.
Obtaining its bearing is a comparatively simple, but not
quite a simple business. But ascertaining its speed and course
presents difficulties very similar to those presented by ascer-
taining and keeping a variable rate. They become greater
in proportion as the ship manoeuvres or goes faster. And no
means are of the least use unless they give an instantaneous
and accurate result in all conditions. Like the rate-keeping
system, no manoeuvring by the firing ship must check or
impede the necessary operations.
A. H. POLLEN.
ROUMANIA AND THE WAR.
By COUNT CHEDDO MIYATOVITCH.
Late Serbian Minister to the Court of St. James.
PUBLIC opinion in Britain, as well as in some other
countries, gives evidence of disappointment that
Roumania, the youngest member of the Latin
group, has not entered into the war simul-
taneously with Italy, her elder and more powerful
sister. In some quarters, even, the opinion is held that
Houmania is sitting on the fence waiting to act on the side
of the group of Powers to whicli victory inclines. Such an
opinion is a great injustice to Roumania, and we ought at
once to recognise that her situation is far more complicated
and difficult than that of Italy has ever been.
Italy had only one Italia Irredenta, but for the Rou-
manian people there exist two Roumanise Irredentse : Transyl-
vania and the Tarnish Banat under the crown of Hungary,
and Bessarabia under the sceptre of the Tsar. Until quite
lat«ly Roumanian statesmen were divided into two groups:
one group was of opijiion that the problem of greatest urgency
was the delivery of Bessarabia from Russian rule, while the
other group thought it more urgent that Tran^sylvania should
be delivered from Hungary. It is not surprising that of late
a new group has been formed of opportunists pure and
simple, who thought that the problem as to which plan
should first be put in execution would be determined by cir-
cumstances. Under King Carol, the first of the three groups
was decidedly predominant, bat during the last ten years the
second and third groups were gaining in influence, and since
the declaration of war they are apparently in the ascendent,
although there is still a con.siderable numlier of Roumaiiiaii
politicians who distrust Russia to a greater extent than they
distrust Austria and Germany. These men are not inactive,
even to-day, when the un.sheathing of Italy's sword gives
greater probability of victory to the Allies; l!ie Roumanian
situation is complex, because opinions are so far removed from
unanimity.
But, even if opinion had been unanimous on the side of
the Transylvanian programme, it would be necessary to
secure the success of that programme not only during the
war but also during the negotiations for and the conclusion
of pence. It was absolutely necessary to make an arrange-
ment with Russia, and that arrangement is no sinsjile affair.
The eventual annexation of Transylvania, Bukovina, and
Banat by Roumania affects the interests of Russia, Bulgaria,
and Serbia. Russia, in negotiating with Roumania, has to
consider not only her own interests but also those of her
two protegies, Serbia and Bulgaria. Put differently, it
might be said that Roumania has to consider every detail
of her immediate future, and to take into consideration the
harmonising of her interests with tho-'se of Russia, Bulgaria,
and Serbia. Negotiations are a difficult matter, for they are
affected by very complex questions, and I am not at all sur-
prised that they are not yet concluded.
I must say, and t'nat with sincere regret, that a certain
responsibility rest.'! on the Roumanian Government for the
slew progress of the negotiations, owing to her claims having
been excessive at the outset. These claims included not only
Transylvania and Bukovina, but with Banat was claimed the
whole left shore of the Danube from the Turnu-Severiu up
to a point opposite Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, and this
in utter disregard of the fact that a large part of Banat and
the wide Danubian zone, from Baziali to Panchevo, is Serbian
country, inhabited by Serbs in overwhelming majority. For-
tunately, there is now a fair prospect that the interests of
Serbia and Roumania can be harmonised in that particular
zone.
But the greatest difficulty in the way of a speedy declara-
tion of war on Austria-Hungary by Roumania lias been pro-
vided by the attitude of Bulgaria. Only Bulgariaiis can
understand that attitude fully, but no doubt they are the best
judges of their ov.t. interests. They strenuously deny the
accusation which has been made against them to the effect
that they have written compacts with Au.'tria and Turkey
binding them to reraain strictly neutral, and they have
declared that they will remain neutral even if Roumanii
attacks Hungary. But as they are at the same time co}n-
plainiug bitterly against the injustice done to Ihera by the
terms of the Treaty of Bucharest, and vow to redress that
injustice at the first opportunity, they are regarded distrust-
fully by all their neighbours — Roumaniam, Greek.s, and
Serbs alike. M. Veuizelos, an acute and :ar-.«eeing states-
n.an, considered that it would be nei-«ssary to secure tha
13f»
LAND AND lW.ATER
3une 5, 1915.
neutrality of Bulgaria by the cession of Kavalla before Greece
conld join iu the war on the side of the Allies, as is her fervent
.wish. Roumania, for this same reason of the doubtful
neutrality of Bulgaria, could not venture to invade Transyl-
vania until some security against attack by Bulgaria had
been obtained — for Bulgaria looks forward to the reconquest
of Silistria, and not only the territory ceded by virtue of the
Treaty of Bucharest, but the entire Dobrutcha. Roumania
seems to be willing to buy security by the cession of some ter-
ritory to Bulgaria, but wants not only a special treaty with
(Bulgaria, but also a guarantee from the Entente Powers that
[Bulgaria should in no case occupy Dobrutcha. Bulgaria, a
proud country, considers a foreign guarantee of her own
formal engagements a superfluity, and at the same lime the
Entente Powers do not see how they could guarantee to
Roumania the attitude of Bulgaria in all circumstances.
I wish to state only the difficulties which Roumania has
to overcome before slie can join in the war on the side of the
Allies. These difficulties are great, but not insuperable; for
Roumanian diplomacy is very able, and is assisted by Russian
diplomacy, the ablest and most resourceful statecraft of th«
world. The sentiments of the Roumanian people have always
been in full sympathy with the aspirations of France and
Italy, and they have never been more in sympathy than now,
when these two countries are fighting for the highest ideals of
humanity and for a permanent peace in Europe. But, apart
from sentiment, the political and economic interests of
Roumania — indeed, her duty to Roumanians outside the
bounds of her rule — are clearly pointing to the one possible
policy — intervention on the side of the Allies, and the render-
ing of assistance in the task of securing freedom, justice, and
permanent peace, which means a new organisation of Europe
on the basis of nationalities. Roumania will undoubtedly
join the Allies as soon as her diplomatic relations with Russia,
Bulgaria, and Serbia are completed, and we shall not have to
wait very much longer for the successful conclusion of
a full and reliable understanding between these four
countries.
THE VALUE OF ITALY TO THE
GREAT ALLIANCE.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
DURING the critical weeks preceding the declara-
tion of hostilities between Italy and the Dual
Alliance, it seemed to me that her ultimate
decision was so inevitable that not even the
dullest of diplomats could fail to perceive the
danger of delaying preparations to meet her entry into the
struggle on the side of the Great Alliance. Yet the news
which has come through during these first few days is sufficient
to show that Germany is very far from ready to afford substan-
tial assistance to the Austrians, who, on their own part, are
already so pressed by the Russians in the North that the troops
already in position to meet the Italian invasion are far from
adequate to the occasion. This only serves to throw into
stronger relief the desperate nature of the German offensive
against the Western Carpathians and to expose the motives
underlying the extraordinary exaggeration of the first
bulletins announcing glorious victories. Clearly the whole
undertaking was set on foot to impress the Italian diplom-
atists, and so all-important was this end to German policy
that she concentrated every available man and gun for the
purpose, hoping that the first gain of ground, which was
inevitable in view of the forces she had assembled, misflit
stave off the danger of Italian intervention, even at the
eleventh hour.
I doubt whether the German General Staff ever ex-
pected more from their blow, for no men in the world
Lave been better trained to understand the fatal dangers
which arise from lessening in any way the mobility of a
Pield Array, and the veriest beginner amongst them must
Lave seen from the first that if an expenditure of between two
million and three million shell a day was an essential element
of the plan, the momentum must die out from their attempt as
soon as the Army had advanced more than fifty miles or less
than one hundred from their last railway depots. After
which the rate of advance would be limited to the rapidity
with which the railways and roads destroyed by the Russians
in retreat could be reconstructed — say to four or five miles a
day; whereas the Russians, on the wings of the great
" phalanx," still retain their full freedom of movement at
the rate of between twelve to fifteen miles a day, and it ap-
pears very clearly from the most recent reports that they are
using this advantage most thoroughly.
Since the Defence of the Realm Act applies not only to
our own future movements but to those of our Allies, any
attempt to forecast the strategy that the Italians will adopt
i.^ impossible, but it is permitted to us to speculate freely on
our enemy's means and movements, and the following figures
will suffice to gi-ve a guide to our readers. It is worth
while recapitulating them because although published
cllioially by the French Government in January last, their
full significance seems to have been lost upon the British
public.
According to these figures, the Germans ia January last,
over and above the 4,000,000 men (the approximate strength
of the armies actually at the front), had only 2,000,000 me:i
fit for the field, comprising the 1915-16-17 classes, as well
as untrained Landsturm. At the rate at which their armies
had been wasting through killed, wounded, and prisoners —
not sickness — it vrould have taken rather under than over
ten months to exhaust them. After that date the armies at the
front could no longer be maintained at their full numerical
strength and collapse would be inevitable and speedy.
Now the established rate of wastage, making due allow-
ance for wounded rejoining from hospital, but still not for the
sick, was 260,000 a month, and since the fighting has con-
stantly been growing in intensity and will continue to do so
amazingly in a very short time, it is reasonably certain that
this rate of wastage has been maintained at least, and will
certainly have been found to exceed it during the two months
which have just gone by.
It is clear, therefore, that Germany can have no new
formations to send against Italy, and therefore, unless she
leaves her ally in the lurch altogether— in which case Austria
will collapse — she must build up a new army from troops
already engaged on her several frontiers, and it seems to me
beyond the wit of man even to suggest whence they are to be
taken.
It is a case of " catching a Tartar " literally and on the
grandest scale, for certainly the Russians will not let go their
bold either in Galicia or Poland, nor does it seem probable
that General Joffre or General French will allow such a
weakening of the line in front of them to take place
unpunished.
To be of any use to their hard-pressed ally at least
ten German Army Corps wiU be required, for not
only can the Italians keep ap army of at least a
million in the field, but they have more than a million
behind to replace their casualties, and thanks to the lateral
railways which connect the two wings of the Army — one on
the Isonzo, the other on the Adige — they can play upon their
enemy the same game by which the Germans in Poland and
Galicia have for so long been able to hold in check the
Russians, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had con-
vincingly asserted the superiority over them iu each of the
three arms — cavalry, infantry, and artillery.
There is no such superiority hero in the case of the
Austrians, for in fighting records the Italians stand much on
a par with their opponents, even when both start fresh and
equally equipped. Austrian victories in Italy have invariably
been due to superior readiness and superior generalship, but
now the readiness is on the Italian side and the Austrians
have no Radetsky to rely upon.
When the fresh redistribution of German troops can ba
ascertained the apparent deadlock which has for so long dis-
heartened the public will be broken and decisive events wilj
begin to crowd on one another.
14»
June 5, 1915.
LAND AND 3EATER.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED
MARGOT.
Adapted from the French of Louis Pergaud by Douglas English.
C KOONING one sing-song plaint from morn to eve,
like some old beldame, drivelling in lier dotage;
crammed, morn to eve, with glutting, noisome
offal j forgetful of the savage dignity with which
at first she had repelled her gaolers; Margot, her
every natural impulse curbed and stifled, had ceased to care.
Gone were the leafy corridors of green; gone the slow-
billowing sea of forest verdure; gone the broad-bosomed
kindly oaks, on which her youth had wantoned.
The snare, the gun, the birdlime, the decoy — all had
been aimed at her iu vain; and this — this was the end.
The first short troubled flutter from the nest had brought
to Margot her new life.
She was full-fledged. Her parents had forsaken her.
No longer might she expect their hourly service — seeds, in-
sects, grubs, thrust down her gaping throat.
She had not turned a feather at the parting. She had
not felt the unnerving dLffidence which young things, fronted
with life's problems, dumbly suffer.
Some instinct told her life was very good.
Before her lay the forest, raiubovz-tinted ; a brimming
store of warmth, and light, and revelry — a treasury inex-
haustible.
Borne on tlie happy tide of circumstance, she drifted, in
light-hearted ease, towards a sunny sea.
Full ecstasy of life was hers, full ecstasy of careless
mirth, shared with her chattering kin.
This sisterhood, this union in a common life and know-
ledge, was the keynote of her being.
By this, the life of her community, she judged the other
winged folk of the thickets, their likeness to, and difference
from, herself.
The ties of kinship disciplined her life, but no such bond
as links the migrant hordes to fly, to plunder, or to fight, as
one; no such community of lot as fires the crows to help
their kin in battling with the hawks.
The mainspring of such interest is the need of it — to
fight a common danger.
Nor hawk, nor buzzard dreamt of eating Margot — risky
to chase and hard to kill, and bitter flesh at that. The
•mailer fry were juicier, the finches, whose one weapon was
their flight, the squabby, nestling game-birds.
Margot had fed herself at once — for little came amiss
to her. She gulped down seeds or berries, worms or insects.
81ie ate whole nests of fledglings, driving the tiny mother off,
or even killing her with one fierce peck.
Her shot-silk plumage, ebony faced with white, her
narrowing tail that almost overbalanced her, were counted
cheap as ornament; her bitter leathery flesh was not worth
eating; all that she really had to fear (though this she had
to learn) was the chance fancy of some prowling gunner, who
fired, of wantonness, to keep his eye in.
The glut of food made jealousy unthinkable. Margot's
call-note resounded every hour, a chattering gurgle, tuneful,
almost tender, which summoned all her kinsfolk to a feast :
acorns gigantic on the broad-backed oak which sentinelled
the clearing; or sugary berries on the rowan-tree, close to the
four-way crossing of the rides. All crammed their fill, first
come, first served, and clacked like men whose tongues are
loosed by liquor.
Jacquot the Jay came sometimes, a handsome bird,
thougli heavy, puce-vested, cinnamon-coated, with azure
pipings on his wings. He was a gallant trencherman and
crammed his gizzard manfully.
Each evening, after thirst was quenched (a social rite
at coppice spring, or at the boundary pool) and after short,
capricious bursts of flight had stretched their wings and left
them widely sundered, rang clear the summons of their
chieftaincss, the Mother Margot, oldest of them all. And
all winged straight towards her elm or oak, whose urgent
claims as roostiug-place were judged by her wise prescience
of wind, or moon, or rain. '
Their greetings were soft sizzles of endearment. From
branch to branch they tripped and jerked and fluttered, each
in her turn evicted from her perch, each in her turn the
mischievous aggressor. The tree itself seemed animate. Its
boughs and leaves, continually astir, rejoiced in harbouring
the sprightly chatter, the bubbling mirth of comradeship
F«newed.
15*
Then, as the sun sank red behind the trees, and day-
light waned, and night's mysterious gloom brought warning
of night's dangers, the voices, one by one, died down.
A few disjointed peevish notes dropped lightly branch
to branch — the last good wishes for the night, the last appeals
for quietude. And then came silence.
The joy of summer sunshine ! Long days of feasting
and of chattering : days spent in palaces of green, whose
galleries stretched endless : days spent in clearings bathed
in gold, beneath an azure canopy: days spent with flippant,
saucy merles; with loutish jays; with cynic crows; with pert
or cringing mavises.
She learnt the trees whose branches were the steadiest ;
the sheltered dips and hollows; the fresh, cool springs; the
friends, the foes, the rivals of her world.
Slowly, insensibly she learnt the mystery of the forest.
The pas.sing of the jays concerned her first.
Morn after morn a silent host of them traversed the
forest south-bound. At set appointed hour they checked,
and dropped as one on wizened leafless oak, as though this
were a predetermined halt. They rested, then pursued their
course.
The first day Margot followed them, but as they reached
the forest boundaries, and fined away in smoky streamers
south, lost heart and sought her trees again.
Eight days their passage lasted, and eight days Margot,
curious, fascinated, escorted their interminable columns.
Where were they bound for? Did some all-powerful fo3
pursue ? Some m.onstrous gluttonous bird of prey ? Did the
same fear obsess the silent ring-doves, or the grey hordes of
starling folk who swung and curled iu spirals to the zenith,
then, like a cloud-burst, dropped on stubble-field or freshly
upturned tilth ?
She stared at their battalion movements wondering.
Nor did she scorn small trivial happenings. Slie hungered
always for the strange, the new. She hugged the sin of
magpie folk, insatiate curiosity.
Squirrel had utterly dumbfounded her. Squirrel
flashed wingless twig to twig; spun like a crazy top from
bough to bough; looped branches, rippled down the trunk,
and suddenly flung skywards, like an arrow. Squirrel had
seen the hare and smelt the dog. As Squirrel reached the
topmost twig, boomed (the first time) on Margot's ears the
thunder of the gun.
Margot took little heed of it. Her curious eyes wcro
fastened on the Man. She watclied without misgiving, and
unsuspicious of their fateful meaning, the twist which slung
the smoking tube behind his turning shoulders, the stoop to
lift the slaughtered hare, the busying of liis hands about the
body.
The smell of powder jangled on her senses, and almost
brought distrust with it. Still she kept i-tation on her
branch, not troubling to conceal herself, while blackbirds fled
with shrilling screams, and crows winged quickly out of range
with angry squawks of warning.
Margot had yet to learn that Man meant Danger.
The hare, that dangled limp between his hands, per-
plexed yet hardly frightened her. The lesson was but dimly
comprehended. She could not yet conceive herself the hare.
She was a creature of the skies, far, far beyond Man's
grasp. Her sence of circumstance was like the squirrel's.
Squirrel pelts up his tree at Man's approach, whisks
round the trunk at some convenient fork, and, with his body
hidden, thrusts his nose out. He is too high for Man to
harm. He waits for threatening gesture, stares spell-bound
at the slow uplifting weapon.
The passing of the south-bound jays was warning of the
fall. There was still food abundant; the same fresh springs
gushed water: but, with September, came the rains, and,
after these, chill, lengthening nights, which draped the trees
in mourning.
Daily the throng of birds decreased. The sunless,
moisture laden air condensed in clinging mist, a woolly mist
that wrapped about the trees in mournful swathes of silence.
The foliage was no longer weather-proof; it chinked and
crannied as the yellowing leaves peeled one by one from theii
frost-shrivelled stalks. The treacherous rain-drops found i
way between them, and dripped and splashed in spattering
shutes and falls, dulling the plumage, soddening the wings.
LAND AXD WATER
June 5, 1915.
Soon thera were few leaves left.
Some fell without a breath to quicken them (their hue
alone foreshadowing their fate), slowly, reluctantly, on wind-
less evenings.
Others were whirled on high by northern gales, and
swept to earth witli swish and crack and rattle, which drove
the red hares headlong from their forms out to the opeu
plough.
Sadness and Heaviness and Pain had crept into the
forest — and Margot and her sisters heard their voices. In-
stinctively they huddled up together. Dawn found them
preening ruffled, steamy plumes in readiness for flight.
Dawn railed them East and scattered them, like wide-
flung seed, on i.^. ; ., plough, and stubble. The change
of season brought a change of habit. They sought afield, by
choice deliberate, food they might yet have found within the
forest. The open ground was sunniest. But there v.'as other
cause of melancholy, which saddened them and warped their
joyous round.
The fates had leagued against them with the times, and
brought a night disastrous to the race.
Margot had winged belated to the pool, whose banks
were shadowed by the curtseying willows, whose surface mir-
rored, in a ccpper glow, the passing of the sun.
Her beak still stickied with the haws, she dropped
among the sisterhood, to drink her fill, and there await the
summons to the roosting-place. She lit on strange commo-
tion, took flight to view it better, and poised above a tumult
of her kin.
Something was wrong with one of them — with two
with three. They could not take to wing.
Their whipcord legs crooked under them, then lashed
out straight to fling their bodies upward. But no light hop
or forward flutter followed. Their feet were glued to earth.
They bobbed and curtsied pitiably, with flapping wiuo-s, with
screaming, anguished cries. ° °
Margot drew closer, curious.
What horror had befallen them ?
By slow degrees and painfully one prisoner raised a foot.
The claws lay close together, stiffened downwards, and from
thj extreme 3nd of them a slimy tentacle reached earth, finin-T
or thickening as the leg compelled, but never v/holly sun"^
dered. The other leg stayed fast. To lift it needed leverage
from its fellow. To lovrer this meant glueing it afresh.
The ill-fated three had reached the pond the first, had
chosen the three obvious shelving bays.
The others, Margot with them, dispersed about a circHn^
Btone-built rampart, new margin to the pool since yesterday"
On this they hunched themselves, and with strained necks
and over-topphng bodies, risked drowning in the straarrlin<T
weeds which masked the muddy depths. °° °
They quenched their thirst laboriouslv, with cou^h and
chore and splutter, then turned to gaze 'in wonder "at the
captives. \ ainly they circled round and over them Their
presence brought no comfort, no relief. The luckless onea
stiil voiced their woes incessantly, still danced, left-right, left-
nght, their mad mark-time.
Behind a spur of purpling cloud a blood-red sun went
down. Clear from the forest rang the nightly summons.
Ihey must be gone, must quit the pool, and seek the chosen
she.ter. Slowly, unwillingly they turned, and, as they left
the pool-side one by one, the abandoned captives whirred
forlorn '' '^"'°'' """"^ '^''"^'"^ distraught, and screamed
At sunrise they were back again. A touzled feather hero
^nd there, a nibbled bone, a skull, a claw, told of grim hap-
penings in the murk of night. ^
Henceforth, for all the°magpie race, the pool was cursed.
1.0 summer s heat could tempt them to its coolness, to dibble
or to preen themselves, or bathe their glossy feathers
I he days lagged past, each with new trials and set-backs
For now the food was dwindling. The ripened fruits were
rS f? . f """''^ "^^^ ''''''^' ^'^^ °' ^id themselves
behind the frost-proof armour of the bark.
Margot and Margot 's sisters must need support them-
selves wi h chance-found gleanings. Yet self^ was ne^^r
Xrl^°f n ^''°''' ''." ^"'"'''''^ '"^ paramount strength the
interest of the race. It was as though some shrill-voiced imn
was spokesman of their conscience. Each find was advertised
«t large, with strident caU inviting all and sundry From
every quarter of the wild winged up the starved communit^
b.mi r° ^A *^^°^'y "^ight the meal begin-with squab-
bungs round a food-scrap. ^
Lnn„f" ^°S "bscured day's passing. Alert upon her leafless
S,e^ /T'' -'.'^'""^ °^ ^'' ^'"itless hunting. Her head
twitched side to side. This way and that her "beady eyes
peered curious. The call-note sounded from a brake of thorn
whose foliage, sheltered by the holm oak's strength, still clun<i
to It forlornly. Margot sizzed instant answer; then soared
above the network of the boughs, and marked two others of
her kind, who quickened to the sound.
She tacked her flight to theirs, and, as she crossed the
clearing after them, met smoke-wreath and the musty stench
of powder. The thunder-clap had had no meaning for her-
the stinking smoke was ominous. It brought back memories
of the hare.
Onward she flew. Again the thunder crashed. Acrain
the slow stench met her. *
She pressed her flight; the three sped on in line; and,
for the third time, boomed the deafening roar.
But this time there was more than stench and sound
There was a lurid spurt of flame, which lit the darkening'
coppice : a whizz of hail about the three, who now flew close
together. The foremost of them checked, and spun, and
dropped.
A whip-lash cut at Margot's breast, and swept her of!
her balance. Instinctively she swerved to right herself, and
with changed course flew on.
But she had seen.
Two visions pieced together in her mind; two stoopin.'
men with smoking tubes slung round them: two soft limp
forms picked up by callous hands. The first had been a hare •
the second was a magpie. '
And Margot understood.
Never before had she seen her own blood. It welled up
slowly, crimson drops of it, like berries of the rowan. She
watched her clean breast feathers mat together, and staunch
the clotting flow.
From flesh wound she learnt fear of Man. Must she fear
magpie also ? What of the sister, whose call-note had lured
her to such welcome? She heard her still, and from the self-
•Bame brake— clear, unmistakable. No sigh of wind disturbed
the evening's calm; no rustle of slow-dying leaf waved from
the bough's extremity its message of farewell.
The call sped forth untrammelled. Pyets and jays and
blackbirds flocked towards it. At quickened intervals rang
out the thunder of the gun. Only the wary veterans held
aloof, and crows, whose ears discerned the man-made decoy.
^ Margot had not the wit of crow, nor even veteran mag-
pie's wit. To her henceforth all men were surely ''unners,
all sticks and staves their implements of murder.
Sportsman she shunned, and wayfarer alike.
Daily her mind brought knowledge of fresh dangers.
There was the owl, an enemy of all nestlings, and so an enemy
of the race. And oh ! the mobbing of him. Shipwrecked in
broadest daylight, roUing his eyes, wing-spreading, backed
against the trunk. The day-birds flocked to haze him, with
whirr of wing, with mocking, strident screams. The red-
breast all aflame with insolence; the ebon crows with hungry,
prying eyes; the linnets, finches, tit-mice— all lettin<' " dare
not" wait on " will." °
And suddenly the racket of them ceased. Their circling
widened to a prudent distance, and, in a moment, flned afield.
A crow had signalled danger. Thundered the gun, and two
that loitered, dropped — the victims of Man's guile once more,
the dupes of a stuffed enemy.
The sameness of the dreary, trailing days was broken
by the snow. All night it fell, slow, feathery, dreamy,
noiseless. It shrouded earth; it choked the water-holes; it
limned each bough in white, against the morrow's blue.
Margot could find no food in it, so winged towards the
village. She sneaked behind the orchard fence, she scanned
the paths, she pried about the walls.
Patches of soil the snow bad not yet mantled lay on the
hedge's shelter-side. She flew to tliese at first, glancing
askance towards the shuttered houses. A fresh turned mole°-
hill starred the white, and from it whiffed the scent of flesh.
Good fortune tliis — a lump of bacon-fat, food for one day at
least. She drove her beak at it and tugged.
(To be continued.)
MR. HILAIR2 BELLOC'S WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Hilaire Belloc will gioe a jmther series oj three lectures
on the War at Queen's Hall, London, on Tuesday, June 22 •
Tucsda];, July 13; Tuesday, July 27. Seats may now be booked.
MR. L. BLIN DES.HLEDS LECTURES.
11/ T,"^o illustrated lectures on " The Role of Aircraft in the
War will be given at the Polytechnic, Regent Street, as follows :
Lecture L. June 17. on " Aircraft as an Auxiliary Arm." Lee
i^reiL. June 24. on "Aircraft on the Offensive." Both lectures
Wilt begm at 8 p.m. Tickets can be obtained at the Polytechnic.
'^"""^ "" ^ Vicxo^ iio.:^ r^,,,,, ^^.^ i^^.^ ,,^^^ ^^^.^^^ Uhit*fri^3. London, E.G.
June 5, 1915
LAND AND WATER
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GREASE-PROOF LININGS, 1/6 EXTRA.
SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS, from 30/- per dozen
BRITISH WARMS. 55/-, 63/- Lined Fleece, in^ Sires.
105, 107, 109 OXFORD STREET,
62a PICCADILLY,
47 CORNHILL. 60 MOORGATE STREET
LONDON.
159
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 1915
SHANTUNG
SUITS
With the advent of the warm
weather Natural Shantung
Suits, similar in character 10
the garment illustrated, will
be in great demand. These
Suits are adapted from the
most exclusive Paris Moilels
by our own highly skilled
men tailors, and are made in
rich heavy Natural Silk
which tailors exceptionally
well.
Dressy Snitias ikttch), in heavy
weight Natural Shantung Silk.
Short Sacque Coat, trimmed with
novelty cotton material |to tone.
Full well -cut skirt.
98/6
THE RAVAGES OF MOTH
Store your Furs in our Freezing
Chambers. Farticulars of our
new Cotnhined Fjtr Storage and
Iniitr.ince against all and every
risk sent post free on application.
DebenKam
&Freebody
>o*»ftutt uitrneif
Wirtmore Street
iCovcndisti Square) London W
Famous for over a Century
for'raste,for Quality, for Value
CREPE DE CHINE
COATS
During the last few weeks
a marketi demand has
arisen for loose fitting
Sports Coats in rich
heavy Crepe de Chine,
similar in character to
the garments illustrated.
Rich Heavy Crepe de
Chine Sports Coats {as
sketch) J in a large variety
of colours, also black and
white, pt;rfectly tailored,
very graceful and becoming.
89/6
Tk€ RAVAGES of MOTH.
Store your Furs in our Frees-
ins;' Chambers. Farticulars
0/ our Neif Comi'ined Fur
Slor,ige and Insurance
against all and every risk
sent post free on application.
DebenKam
&Freebocly
wijimore Street.
iCovcndish Square) Londop.\i^
GARROULD'S
To HM. War Office, H.M Colonial Office, India OlBce,
St. John's Ambulance Association, London County Council,
Guy's Hospital, tSc.
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON.
Complete Equipment of Nurses for Home
Detachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Implements and Appliances
in Stock.
+
Illustrated Catalogues of Nurses Uniforms, &c.. Post Fr»t,
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSINa
Circular Air Cushions (various sizes), 7/6,
8/9,9/11. 10/9, &c.
Water Betis, Air Beds, and Mattresses,
29'6, 52/0, 26/9
Air and Water Pillows, 3/0, 10/6
Feeding Cups, 4Jd. each.
Bed Pans from 3/o
Leg and Arm Bntlis from 23/6 and 8/6
Invalid Bed Tables from 0/6
Invalid Carrying Chair (light and strong),
17/6
Invalid Chairs and Carriages of every
description (see catalogue).
First Aid Cases and Cabinets at special
prices.
Invalid Bed Rests, 6/11
Ward Bedsteads: 3ft., 13/9 : 2£t. 61n., 12/9
Camp Folders : 6tt., 9/6 ; with pillow, 12/0
En n OADDflllin Telegrams: " Garrould,I.ondOQ."
. <k n. UAnnUULU, i50toi62 eogwarero., lomdon, w.
BENSON'S
Luminous ''Active Service" Wristiet Watcii
VISIBLE AT NIGHT.
Fine quality lever
movement, in strong
silver SCREW case,
damp and dustproof.
£3:3:0
Largest stock of
Luminous Wristlet
Watches in London
WARRANTED TIMEKEEPER. ^^°'^ £2 : 10 : 0
25 OLD BOND STREET, W.
and 62 & 64 LUDGATE HILL, E.G.
s Are you Run-down g
2 When your system is undermined by worry or over-worli ■■
■■ — when your vitality is lowered — when you feel "any- ■■
2 'low " — when your nerves are " on edge "—when the least ^^
■■ cxenioD tires you — you are in a " Run-down " contlition. JH
■■ Your system is like a flower drooping for want of water. ■■
S And just as water revives a drooping flower — so 'Wincarnis' Sj
JS gives new life to a "run-down" constitution. From even [Jj
^* the first wineglassful you can fetl it stimulating and in- ■■
■■ vigorating you, and as you continue, you can feel it sur- S5
iH charging your whole system with ntw health — new strength ■■
^ — new vigour and ntw life. Will you try just one bottle ? f^
I Begin to get well FREE. I
■■I Send for a liberal free trial bottle of ' Wincarols * — not a mere taate, ^5
^2 ^"^ enough to do you good. Enclose three penny stamps (to pay mmm
2 postage). COLEMAN &C0., Ltd., W212, Wincarnis Works, Norwich. S
■llllllllillllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllffl
i6o
I iHie
iyi5
{.AND AiND WATER
I • • o " ■
f^umjCi
THE CALL
OF THE COUNTRY
Mrs. eric DE RIDDER
ONCE upon a time a great poet bracketed England
and April in an exquicite snatch of verse, one
which we all know so well, that it is needless to
repeat it here. And by reason of the beauty of
his words England and April will always be
associated together. Yet if most of us were given the choice
we should probably not object to the spending of April far
away from our native shores in a place of less capricious
climale than that vouchsafed by the tearful month.
But in June — when June beha\'es — it is a very different
matter. June and England are synonymous terms of beautv.
In the early days of June, when the trees are strong with their
fresh young foliage, when the chestnuts are in perfect cande-
labra form, when lUacs, near the eve of waning, give their
subtlest fragrance, nothing can approach our land. It is
unique, it is a priceless possession, it is good to live in.
\\'ith ghastliness past all description as part of our daily
existence, it is a relief to turn, no matter for how short a time,
from the thoughts of war, and nothing but the war. Not
for the space of one half second are we allowed to do so in
London. If we want to give our minds and hearts a rest in
this, or indeed in any other great town, we must take our
telephone off its stand, refuse to admit callers, and by no
manner of means go forth into the streets, for the streets
simply serve as vast hoardings for w-ar news. Even if the
gruesome side of war does not for the moment present itself,
it is :till with thoughts of war that we are presented. We
can see groups of khaki-clad men drilling in the parks, men
that possibly in the shortest space of time from now wiU
abandon these fair scenes for ones of destruction in Flanders.
We meet at every turn things that echo the war. It is
impossible to escape the all-pervading thought in all its
many guises.
The Contrast
That is the reason why the inveterate country-lover
finds that he had yet much to learn about the scenes in which
he delights. Much though in years gone by he appreciated
rural things, it has been left for this year of sharp contrasts
to teach him their fullest value. And those to whom formerly
country matters were as a sealed book, have opened the
volume and started to turn its pages. They find peace there,
or at any rate the comparative peace, which is aU most of us
at this moment can hope for. The country stands out in
welcome relief from the strident clatter of great towns. It has
come into its own at last. There is no agitation amongst the
great forests of trees, with their galaxy in varying shades
of green. They stand immovable ; even the strongest gust
of wind serves but slightly to ruffle them. There is peace
and strength in the very sight of the great trunks, and wlien
as in favoured beauty spots, they -are embedded in a wide
carpet of bluebells, or in a thick undergrowth of moss and
bracken, nothing is omitted to please the imagination.
An American woman, who lived on her nerves if any
woman ever did, once gave me the following information.
When she found, or fancied she found, things had grown past
bearing, she took a first-class railway ticket, secured a carriage
to herself, by fair means or foul, and started forth on a journey
through some lovely part of England, or wherever she
happened to be. The recipe always worked. She returned
home, once more a reasonable being, and in infinitely better
temper and spirits. Besides, what is more to the point, she
was bearable once more to live with, which she herself was
the first to admit was not the case before. At the present
moment, were my American an Englishwonian and were she
in England, she would probably be trnve'ling aU dav long.
With the present claims upon our railway s\-stem we may
be thankful the United States in general, and Washington
D.C. in particular, have once more claimed her as their own.
But this has nothing to do \vith the subject in hand.
The Rural Life
I have another woman in my mind's eye, who since the
war began has started chicken-farming. In days, which
in reality are such a brief while ago, but seem to be separated
from us by hundreds of years, her life was made up of one
continuous round of social engagements. She was seen
everywhere, at places at home during the season, and at
places abroad where people congregate at other times of the
year. The usual Hfe of the woman of leisure and means,
who enjoys the society of her fellow-creatures, seemed to
have become second nature to her. She has three sons,
all of whom are serving their King and Country in some
capacity or another, and no other children.
As soon as they scattered to different parts of the iighting
area, she took to a small house with large garden in a remote
part of England, and incidentally to chickens. These she
declares she is rearing not only for pleasure, but for profit.
How these profits are arrived at it is past me to imagine, for
the chickens seem to the unsophisticated mind to be lodged
in a kind of palace de luxe, and the egg-laving to be dis-
appointingly small. Their owner, however, avows that
these profits exist, and since she is devoting them to three or
four different charities, and I have reason to know that these
have received cheques from her in the course of the last few
months, one must assume that they do. At any rate they do
in her fertile imagination. And since the charities benefit,
and she herself is given distraction in the intervals of waiting
for news from the front, aU gets what they require.
Not excluding the chickens themselves, who untH the day
of reckoning, when they leave their feathered nest for food,
and all undoubtedly live in fatness and contentment.
A Peaceful Spot
In the meanwhile, the small house is all that a smal
house in the country should be. The lattice windows have
leaded panes, and those of the rooms upstairs open to show
a vista of far off wooded hills with a gleam of water in between,
where the river runs its sihery way. Inside there are all
kinds of quaintly patterned cottage chintzes, with just the
amount of bright colouring that one looks for in a- country
chintz, and is disappointed to find lacking. Were it not for the
sword of Damocles hanging overhead, June in this quiet spot
would give an idyllic existence. As it is life is made more toler-
able. And for the smallest of mercies we have learnt to be
duly grateful.
A short while ago, in one of my articles, I suggested that
an organisation should be started, enabling women to take
the place of men, called away on active service. A corre-
spondent has kindly written to tell me that one exists. It is
called the Women's Defence Relief Corps, and has been started
by Mrs. Dawson Scott. To help the country in its hour of
need is the one aim and object of all belonging to the Corps,
and the name that has been agreed upon for its members,
is the simple and e.^p'.icit one of " Helper." A farmer has
just engaged a band of Mrs. Dawson Scott's " Helpers " for
hay in Middlesex at men's wages. She hopes to get many
women in England roused to the fact that they can be of
great help with the hay and corn harvest, that is so vital a
matter. The Headquar'.ers of the Corps are at " Harden,"
<>. King Street, Southali, INIiddlesex, and from here a hand-
book with full information is issued.
i6i
LAND AND WATER
June 5, 191 5
A JL TTD
Silversmiths to His Majesty King George VI
CONTRACTORS TO H.M. GOVERNMENT.
158-162 OXFORD STREET
220 REGENT ST., 2 QUEEN VICTORIA ST., LONDON,
ROYAL WORKS. SHEFFIELD.
OFFICERS' Field
(War Office Sealed Pattern) Complete -
including best Willesden Canvas Leather-bound Bag fitted with Lever Lock
Kit
£7:10:0
The Officers' Field Kit consists of 8 Articles, as detailed below : —
Green Willesden Canvas Compactum Bed (size 6 ft. 6 x 2 ft. 6)
,, Pillow, stuffed horsehair
Brown Canvas War Office Bed Sack
Green Willesden Canvas Folding Bath and Washstand in Sack
Bucket
,, Folding Chair
Brown War Office Ground Sheet
,, ,, ,, Leather Bound Kit-bag to take all the above,
with secure lock
If the Bed is supplied with hook joints ... 4/- extra.
Large size Bed 7 ft. x 3 ft. ... ... ... 8/- ,,
Pillow 4/- „
.£119 0
G 0
3 6
1 7 G
3 0
8 6
18 6
2 15 0
J) >)
Painting Name and Regiment in White Block Letters on Outside of Kit-bag - 5/-
SEND FOR PHOTO-ILLUSTRATED CATALOGUE
\6?
m
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND &W ATER
Vol. LXV No. 2770
CATTTP'naV TTTMT7 i -> roir rPUBLISHED ASH PR I C K S I X P ENCE
bAlUKUAY, JUrMii 12, 1915 [a newspaper] published weekly
Copyright, '* Land ana 1Vatty"\
{By J»s€ph Simpson, R.B.A,
GENERAL CADORNA
Commander-in-Chief of the Italian Army
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915
•f
:tMOTWrf^
46 PICCADILLY, LONOON, W.
PHONE REGENT 189.
'IC*"
13 Market Street,
MANCHESTER.
8 Cas.le Street,
LIVEKPOOL.
HAT
MANUFACTURERS
Also
Branches at
8 Don>-f;al Place,
BELrASr.
CORNHILL, LONDON,
11 Gordon Street,
GLASGOW.
40 W';stmoreIand St.,
DUBLIN.
E.C.
BY APPOINTMENT
To THE King.
Soft mnd Flexible Field Service Cap with Curtain, Light
in weight and Comfortable, 17/6
This shape also made in Patent Sun-pr^^of Cloth, 18/6
All Badges «tipnli-H <"rom 3 6 _^
An Announcement which concerns
every reader of *^ Land & Water ^^
MILITARY & SPORTING
HAT SPECIALIST
Woodrow's Flexible Cap is ths correct Headwear for Officers,
Soft and Flexible Field ServiceCap without Curtain, 15/-
Celluloid Grease-proof Shield, 1/6
'*»i cu'-''
AT considerable expense we have produced the crests
and badges of nearly all the regiments in His
Majesty's Army on our well-known " CON AMORE "
Cigarettes, and we venture to think that no more accept-
able gift could be sent to your friends or relatives serving
either at home or abroad than a box of these well-known
cigarettes bearing the badge of his Regiment.
We make no additional charge for the crests, which are
also accurately reproduced on each box of cigarettes. We
have the crests of over loo regiments ready.
"CON AMORE" Cigarettes are obtainable at all the
leading tobacconists and stores, at the following prices : —
Per box
Per box
Per box
of 100.
of 50.
of 25.
Egyptian
blend
... 76
••• 39 •
■ 2/-
Turkish
...
... 7/-
... 3/6 .
• 1/9
Virginia
... 6/-
... 3;- •
. 1,6
CO or so Cigarettes sent
post free.
Boxes of 25 postage 2d.
extra
Should any difficulty be experienced in obtaining "CON
AMORE ' cigarettes, kindly write direct to the manufac-
turers, MARCOVITCH & CO., LTD., 13 REGENT
STREET, S.W., and per return you will receive a box of
cigarettes.
NOTE. — Special Wholesale Terms to Messes.
A reduction of i/- per 100 on quantities of 2C0 or more
" CON AMORE " Cigarettes sent to members of the
Expeditionary Force.
Officer's Ideal Water Bottle
FOR THOSE ON ACTIVE SERVICE
Improved shape, does not absarl) wet.
Will stand the hardship of the campaign.
Nickel Silver. Non-Corrosive.
Silver Plated Inside.
Covered with Khaki Twill.
Screw Stopper, or Bayonet Top.
Supplied with Swivels or Shoulder Straps
CAP.AC1TY \i PINTS, 1 O /ft
CO.VIPLETE. FKOM iO/O
TO HOLD A QUART, Ol /
■ — " FROM ^1/-
COMinXTE.
Obtainaljle unly from —
STUDD & MILLINOTON
^ililaru Culfiltcrs,
51 CONDUIT STREET, LONDON, W. ■
po^T'^' <A
By Appointment,
115 & 115a REGENT STREET, LONDON, W.
Specialists in
Regimental Highland Outfits.
Service Jacket (collar badges extra)
British Warm (unlined)
Do. do. (lined camel hair fleece)
Service Great Coat (unlined)
Do. do. do. (lined camel hair fleece)
Regimental Kilts £% 15s. 6d. and
Khaki Kilts £4 4s. od. and
Regimental Slacks ...
Khaki do
Kilt Trews
Apron (front)
Do. (all round)
Regimental Hose Tops (ist quality)
Do. do. do. (2nd quality)
Khaki do. do. (ist quality)
Spats
Garters ..
Glengarry (plain blue)
Do. (diced borders)
Sam Browne Belt .
Natural Camel Hair Sleeping Bag
Sporran, Claymore, Sgian Dhu, Bonnet Brooch, Safety Pin, etc,
ESTJMATBS GIVEN FOR ANY RBOIMBNT.
. . . from
los. 6d. and
from
5s. fid. and
from
£ s. d.
3 13 6
3 13
4 14
4 14
5 IS
6 6
4 14
2 5
1 S
16
6
9
7
5
4
6
I
14
14
2 5
2 2
LIGHT SPRING OVERCOATS
from 3 Gns,
SPRING SUITINGS, GOLF OR
FISHING do. ... from 5 Gns.
NORFOLK and other SPORTING
COATS from 58/6
DRESSING GOWNS
from 52/6
Appreciation !
Quite a big percen-
tage of Bedford and
Bedford- Buick Cars
are sold entirely by
the recommendation
of one owner to
another.
BEDFORD BUICK MODELS:
(Our British-built Coachwork).
15-18 h.p. Empress ... £295
I5-I81i.p. Streamline Torpedo £305
15-1 8 h.p. Arcadian Cabriolet £375
The ideal CliassU lor Ambulance Work-BUICK ONE-TON. Buick Valve-
in-Heail Motor. Full Elliptic Rear Springs and Pneumatic Tyres. As
supplied to the British Red Cross Society.
GENERAL MOTORS (Europe), Ltd., 135 Long Acre, Loi\don, W.C.
Telephone : Gerrwd 9626 (3 linet). Telesrams ;" Buickgen, London." 37
BUICK MODELS:
I5-I8h.p. 2-5eater £245
15-18 h.p. 5-sealer £255
Complete Equipment includes
DELCO Self Starting and Lighting
and Michelin Tyres.
174
June 12, 1915
LAND AND WATER
AN ISLAND UTOPIA
By K. RICHMOND
IT would be interesting to know how the England of to-day
would strike an observer who could come amongst us
ignorant of all that has happened in the last ten months.
National change has to proceed by steps, though the
steps be of the swiftest ; it has to be, in 'the strict sense
of the word, gradual. Even a revolution of thought, a complete
volte face of public opinion, has always been prepared b\' a
long series of small and often unperceived changes, slowly
accumulating until the balance tips over. And revolutions
of thought are essentially foreign to the English genius.
We take things as they come, and adjust them as they come
— a practice which has long made us the despair of the would-
be-picturesque demagogue, who lives for, and by, the moment
of crisis. And for that reason we are perhaps the slowest
people in Europe (with the possible exception of the Russians)
to realise exactly where we are at any given moment. It is
always open to our public men, as in these days, to hold and
to utter diametrically opposite views upon the state of mind
of the nation ; and we are so used to the absurdity that it
seldom raises a smile.
It might be an advantage to us to employ a public
servant whose duty it would be to Hve out of England,
returning periodically to receive his impressions and to
record them for the general benefit. This function has
at times been admirably performed by Irishmen ; but
some Irish critics suffer the disability of being too clear-
sighted. When a man's mind is so luminous that all the
facts are transparent to him, it is only a step further to
forget that the facts are there at all — to " see through " them
with that piercing insight which discovers precisely what the
critic expects and wishes to see. The candidate for our
imagined office of National Critic would have to be of pure
English blood, a student of history, and a man who had been,
in his time, familiar with every rank in the social scale.
He should belong to no party, and should have no particular
financial or class interests, ."^nd most certainly he ought not
to be too clever ; he should be " able " — a word which has
come to characterise a typically English form of mental
competence. Even in war time such a man might be
spared from other forms of national ser\'ice ; indeed, in war
time his function would have a doubled and redoubled value.
It is another question where, in war time, he could go for
that complete dissociation from daily detail which would be
part of his duty ; he needs entire freedom for thought and
reflection, as well as unsophisticated surroundings.
There is a little island in the .\tlantic, set, as though by
an inversion of the jeweller's art, like a spot of gold in a sheet
of sapphire ; it is unknown to the tourist, and its name is kept
secret by the few who know and love its unspoiled beauties.
Here we will send our seeker for the unsophisticated. After
a night's voyage, from the liner's port of call, in a tin^' steamer
that appears to be made of japanned tin, from whose deck
he has watched the leaping phosphorescence fly past like
wTeaths and coils of luminous smoke, he is carried through
the surf and to the shore by an islander ; an islander dark-
skinned but grev-eyed, of surprising lankiness and still more
surprising strength. He is assured that mules shall be duly
saddled and laden for his journey to the hills by the time his
simple breakfast is eaten ; but the heat has grown to its
sweltering climax of noon and begun to decline again before
the cavalcade is on the move. Later, he will learn that
the Island is blissfully devoid of the time sense ; its " now "
means, usually, to-morrow ; its " to-morrow " means never.
But long before completing this discover^' he will himself
be under the speU, and the rich days will be flowing past
unpartitioned and unnumbered. He first touches upon the
bedrock of old human wisdom in the laconic talk of the
grey-haired muleteer who trudges by his side ; and upon the
bedrock of natural wisdom in the behaviour of his invincibly
opinionated mule. " You would now both be dead, if he
had obeyed you," is the muleteer's quiet comment on one
occasion when the mule, open-mouthed but imperturbable,
has disregarded the dragging rein ; and our tra\-eller views
the chasm with a shudder, and the mule with a new respect.
The crest of the pass attained, the western sky beyond is
aflame with that afterglow peculiar to the horizon of the
sub-tropical Atlantic ; gilded crags sweep down three thousand
feet to a sheh ing plam which is a sea of almond blossom ;
twenty miles further, and six thousand feet below, the veritable
ocean basks and gleams. The descent into fairyland, through
gradually enshrouding night, becomes mysterious, and the
sure-footed mule a magician disguised. Carrier women,
basket on head, come swinging, bare-footed, down the pre-
carious path ; at a word from the muleteer they light small
torches made from resinous pine-splinters, wTapped round
with leaves that burning may be slow. Thus revealed,
they stand out against the darkness as glowing portraits of
womanhood, broad of brow and hip, and deep of bosom,
erect and quiet-eyed. At the foot of the crags they take a
side-path for their own village, calling out good-nights.
By midnight our traveller is on the path that leads to his
minute inn, inhaling deeply a faint breeze that comes, now
fresh and cool as spring water, now warmly laden with per-
fume from the orange trees on either side ; and soon the
awakened host and hostess, welcoming but drowsy, have
fed him with omelette and light wine, and he is asleep-—
and as far from the fret of civilisation, in body and in spirit,
as we could wish.
His sojourn in the Island will not rub ofi the bloom of the
first impression. It is a place whose natural beauties do not
cloy, but quietly sink deeper and ever more memorably into
the consciousness. And it is the home of an extraordinary and
an abounding human simpUcity. He will discover that there
are no rich in the Island ; and no poor. From time to time
he win meet with men and women, old and outworn, who
have no younger relations to support them in their decline ;
these are the newsbearers of the community, and they totter
from village to village with tidings of birth and death, pros-
perity and vicissitude, always finding a hospitable roof and
a welcome for their wise garrulity. He will find no traces
of government that anyone need bother about ; ,no crime,
and no police. In the course of long and rambling discussions
with the innkeeper he will begin to realise a philosophy
that concerns itself but little with any but the essentials
of hfe, and will find as much difficulty in explaining or justi-
fying to him many of the preoccupations of Europe as did
GuUiver in parrving the questions and criticisms of the horse-
King. He will discover a courtesy that knows neither sub-
servience nor condescension, and an openness of speech that
is wholly unconscious of its apparent daring. He will redis-
cover the essential human subsoil — and that discovery is
the main purpose of his exile. It is needless to labour the
fact that in the process he will also rediscover himself, an
achievement which will not be without effect upon his sub-
sequent usefulness.
Then he will return, his mind untrammelled and impression-
able, all equipped to diagnose and interpret the national
symptoms of his own people. ... All this is no more than
an airy speculation : for the business of our imagined official
is everybody's business, and it is no good giving everybody's
job to one man. AU can in some degree, if it be only in
thought and imagination, escape the trammels of the crowded
hour, when their duty is not calling them to sterner tasks.
Beneath all the an.xieties and urgencies of the day there flows
the quiet, purposeful current of English hfe ; and in the English
countryside there is peace and beauty and the magic of human
tradition to be realised, no less than among sub-tropical
hills. Some are ashamed of being normal in war time,
and would have us all in hysterics if they could have their
way. " Be different, somehow," they seem to say, " even
if you cannot be useful." Meanwhile, it is the men who think
less of their emotions than of their heritage who are doing
our country's share in the winning of the war, and the
nation is realising its purpose and its selfhood through those
to whom the meadows and moors, the homesteads and
hamlets of England, are full of a still and an eternal
meaning.
175
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915
THE SUNBEAM CYCLE'S
FREE WHEEL
Ever Clean and always Oiled.
TO be able to use such expressions about the
Driving Bearings of any piece of Mechanism
is calculated to make an Engineer's Mouth water. •
Yet the wonderful Little Oil Bath Gear Case
enables all Sunbeam Driving Bearings to run
under these ideal me-
chanical conditions — For
example here is the Free
Wheel—
The arrows indicate Oil
Holes that pierce the
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LAND AND KATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE This article has been submitted to the Press Bureau, which d»es not object to the publication as censored, and takei nV
respousibility lor the correctness of the statements.
In accordance with the reqnirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustrating this Article mnst only b«
regarded as approximate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
THE really important thing which has
happened in the campaign this week —
that is, up to the news received upon tlie
evening of June 8— is the evacuation
without disaster of the salient of Przeraysl.
If the campaign upon every front be re-
garded soberly in its largest aspect, no other
event connected with it during the last few days
bears comparison with this very considerable
feature. For it was doubtful during a whole fort-
night whether the salient of Przemysl held by the
Russians right in front of their general line might
not lead to the piercing of that line.
Next to this matter we must note in order of
importance the violent effort proceeding from
Stryj whereby the enemy is attempting to force
the Russian line on its left centre, having failed
to force its right centre at the salient of Przemysl.
^With regard to this enemy success we only
know that German and Austrian forces have
established themselves just beyond the line of the
Dniester. There is, of course, no sort of claim as
yet that this forcing of the river threatens the
whole line. But we shall do well to fasten our
attention upon the enemy's success here in front
of Zurawno because it may lead to bigger things
in the near future.
Upon the analogy of the similar effort nearly
a month ago in front of Jaroslav and the crossing
of the San, we might discount this new enemy
success. But all that is conjecture. It is our busi-
ness rather to appreciate exactly how much tho
enemy has here done.
In the other theatres of operations there has
been a very violent and quite inconclusive action in
the Gallipoli peninsula! I will deal with this in
its order, though briefly, for it needs no diagram
and is simply a case of an assault directed against;
a line which is not yet pierced and against a posi-
tion which still stands firmly.
It would seem, as we shall see later, that the
real problem in the Dardanelles is the possibility
or impossibility of cutting off the supplies for tho
enemy in the Gallipoli from the Asiatic shore.
Upon the Austro-Italian frontier nothing
has been doing upon which one can base any effec-
tive account of the operations. Upon the side of
our Ally mobilisation is still proceeding; upon
the side of the enemy no considerable forces have
yet been gathered, even for purely defensive pur-
poses. All that can be discovered — as we shall
see later — is that the Italian covering troops have
occupied, as they were bound to do, the passes
leading into the projecting " bastion " of the
Trentino : have, with rather less advance, pro-
ceeded against the passes in the second sector of
the frontier, the Carnic Alps, and have attempted
their chief preliminary effort against the line of
the Isonzo, occupying the Monte Nero, and
attempting to turn the whole line of the Isonzo.
Afacslies of
Ulz Dmester
'^^a^tl ^^^^tyji
'^ht^:fiJ:m^
lOOMiles
^Crernowitz
LAND AND WATER.
June 12, 1915.
THE EVACUATION OF THE SALIENT
OF PRZEvlYSL.
It was pointed out in these columns many
weeks ago that the salient of Przemysl was a
Kerious danger- point upon the general Eussian
line. If we. regard that line in its entirety, as it
vras taken up at the end of the great Kussian
retreat through Galicia — tl^at is, as it lay in the
middle of May, three weeks
j>
ago — ic
is, rcuL
- jhly
speaking, the line also of the San and of the
Dniester liivers, which two watercourses aie
joined geographically by the course of the
AViznia, a stream not shown in the accompanying
sketch, but running into the San above Jaroslav,
pointing v/ith its course directly at the Dniester,
and filling the gap between that river and the San.
The line of the San, the Wiznia, and the
Dniester is one continuous defensive natural line,
which stands in front of Lemberg, and protects
the railways leading from the Russian bases up
to the front.
From that line the semicircle round
Przemysl projected in a dangerous salient. Why
such a salient was dangerous was discussed in
the last two numbers of this journal. A salient
alwaj 3 requires for the protection of its long con-
tour a larger number of men than would be
required for the protection of the direct line
across its neck. It is vulnerable to attack against
either side of that neck. If the neck is pierced
the whole of the salient and of the nien and guns
and material contained in it fall into the enemy's
hands, and it is even possible that the double
pres.sure upon either side of the neck, if it be
successful, may carry the enemy right through
the mam line behind it, and pierce the resistance
of those whom lie is attacking. That is w'hy, in
the foregoing sketch, the neck of the salient at
or less what happened. For a fortnight the
enemy forces chieliy concentrated to the north
and south of the " neck " of the Przemysl salient,
somewhat exposing themselves to attacks upon
their communications upon the north, at least
round Jaroslav. Such an attack the Eussians
could not press sufficiently to iniperil the enemy's
adA'ance, but, on the other hand, the enemy
obtained no decisive result against the neck of
the salient. He lost very large numbers of men in
direct assault against the southern and the
northern face of the " neck," and could not have
reduced it to a less width than twelve miles. He
claims to have dropped shells on the railway
leading out of Przemysl, but it is unlikely that he
did any damage by this long-distance fire, because
Ave know that the mass of the material within the
town and surrounding it was successfully with-
drawn.
In the last days of May the Eussians had
allowed to remain, apparently, no more than a thin
covering line coincident with the heights upon
which the old permanent fortifications had stood
before their destruction.
During the Saturday and the Sunday, the
29th and 30th of May, the last remaining defence
of the field works established upon,or just exterior
to, the old permanent works of Przemysl gave
way before the direct pressure from the w-est,
north, and south. It w\as lat€ in the afternoon of
Monday, Dilay 31, that the fort m.arked 9 upon
the following sketch was evacuated; but it
was recaptured and held until nightfall. The
whole process vras obviously no more than th6
covering of the general Eussian retirement. la
the same evening the works marked 2, 3, and 4 in
the above sketch were carried by Bavarian in-'
fantry and permanently held. With the next
Przemysl v»as marked with a D, as indicating afternoon, Tuesday, June 1, the southern forts (7,
the danger-point existing during the last three
weeks upon the Eussian line as a whole.
When this salient first appeared in the
middle of May upon the Eussian line, it was
admitted in these columns that the writer could
discern no sufficient reason for the retention of so
very perilous an extension to the general defensive
position of our Ally. Further news enables us to
nil up this gap in our knowledge, and we can dis-
cover why the salient of Przemysl Avas retained.
It Avas held, not for sentimental reasons (Avhich
6, and 5) Avere CAacuated, and before dawn on
Wednesday the enemy entered. The Eussian line
by the Aveek-end had straightened out and
shortened beyond the San, passing through
Med\ka, as does the line of crosses in the following
sketch, and the salient of Przemysl, the rolling
stock, stores, and probably the greater part of the
artillery Avithin it being now Avithdrawn, Avas
abandoned by our Ally.
I Avill not further labour the point tliat the
straightening of the line and the c'iving up of this
should surely be of no effect in a campaign of this salient is strategically of no adA^antage to the
magnitude, and threatening such dangers, and
promising such fruits as does the great Avar !), but
m order that there should be ample time to
remove from Avithin that raihvay junction all
stores and rolling stock, and, further, in order to
enemy whatsoever. The enemy not only has not
pierced through the Eussian line at this point, but
has given up the attempt to pierce through here.
His real effort is now being directed at a point
some forty miles aAvay to the south and east beyond
fc=e able to reraoA'e (a nmch lengthier business) such the marshes of the Dniester, to Avhich point we will
heavy artillery as the enemy may haA^e left intact next turn.
when he capitulated upon the 22nd of March. It is an effort based upon the town of Stryj,
It must be clearly understood that there were which he captured the other day (getting at the
no munitions for these guns, the enemy having, same time, unfortunately, control of the great oil-
as a matter of obvious necessity, destroyed his field), and it is for the moment in front of Stryj
munitions before capitulating. And it must and against the 13niester line that he is attacking
further be understood that the permanent works for the third time (the first Avas in front of Jaro-
of the fortress had also been destroyed before the slav, the second was at the salient of Przemysl) to
capitulation, so that Przemj^sl Avas not a strong- pierce our Ally's line. Unless he pierces it, let ns
hold at the moment when the Eussians decided
still to preserve it as a .s-ilient in their general
line. Such defences as the Eussians threw up
were evidently field defences exterior to, or im-
provised upon, the old ruined permarjent works.
'With all this clear, Ave can appreciate more
always remeinhei', he has failed in his strategic
ohjcctire.
This effort, based upon Stryj, stands to tlie
whole line in a fashion characteristic of CA'cry
effort the enemy has made East or West. Every
one of his great efforts to break the containing
a*
June 12, 1915.
LAND AND \EATEE.
[I-Ill Larger Tenrniiient V^rAs Cdss^roj/ecC)
\~\ SmoLlerTermansnt Works (destroijed)
O Temporary Works (cks^rqyed)
.'-•-'• -- Contour Lines ,
1 2 } ^ s 6 re 9 to
TlazKjesoflOOOyds. uptoIO.OOOfds.
'— ' Last liiisslazi covering Una
CjOOo
"^^f'ci-m
^J& .'-''V- 6'"*"' ^^w/'
L
^° Popouice
B
line, whether in Flanders or in France to the
south, or in Northern or Central Poland, or in
Galicia, has had this feature in common — that it
has been a sort of alternative striking, first here,
then, finding he could not break the line, there.
iTake the line as a whole from, say, Czernowitz
(C) to a point beyond the Vistula at B, a matter
altogether of nearly three hundred miles, and you
will discover that the enemy's efforts have been
made successively in one point after another of
the Russian centre. First he strikes against
'Jaroslav (1), gets over the river, but does not go
Jaroslav
" Marshes ^
. C
more than a mile or two; that is the effort of
May 14-17. Then he notes the salient of Przemysl
and tries to cut it off from the north and the south
(the arrows 2 2); the Russians foiled him hy^
evacuating the salient in good order in the last
few days. Next he strikes the other side of the
marshes from Stryj at the crossing of the
Dniester at Zurawno (3). Here, again, he gets
across the river, as, nearly a month ago, he got
across the San at Jaroslav : but whether he will go
further we have yet to sec.
This crossing of the Dniester at Zurawno is
worth detailed examination.
The great marshes of the Dniester block all
attack across the upper course of that stream. If
below them you try to cross the Dniester from the
base of Stryj, you are curiously involved in a
double crossing; for the rail which supplies you,
and the road also, rims in such a fashion that it
crosses both streams, the Stryj and the Dniester,
near where they join. So if you try to fight your'
way across the line there by Zydaczow you have
two obstacles to surmount successively. But if you
attack a little lower down, at Zurawno (not a day's
march off), you have the advantage of missing
another small belt of marsh, you have a good road
from the rail-head, and high ground just bevond
LAND AND W.ATEH
June 12, 1915.
f—
,^3^f^^
.4
40lfiks
G?.oimi>
fi^ ^^
the river upon which to establish yourself if you
eucceed in forcing the stream. It is an excellent
choice for forcing the line of the Dniester, and it
is only about forty miles oil from Lemberg, though
the commuuications by road are not good.
The details of this crossing at Zurawno may
be appreciated from the subjoined sketch. The
Dniester flows, immediately above the town,
through marshy districts which make an approach
diflicult, and a footing upon the far side impos-
sible. But just at the town itself you have a tract
of dry ground across which leads the road from
; \^«><t2*
Tn^lish Uiiu.
Stryj and the railway only a short distance off,
not more than a day's transport for the munitions
of the heavy artillery that prepares your cross-
ing. Further, upon the eastern bank beyond, you
have high ground, the contours of Avhich are
roughly indicated in tlie above sketch in feet
al)ove the sea.. The river beina: here some 740 feet
a(X)ve the sea, the first contour line represents the
beginning of the hills, v,'bose summits are from 200
to 400 feet or more above the water. These
summits, or the slopes of the hills, the enemy has
now gained. It remains to be seen hov.' far he
will be able to press forward beyond the obstacle
which he has successfully surmounted. Hitherto
it has always been discovered that upon his
getting more than one easy days journey from
the railway, with the power of munitionment
to his great superiority in heavy guns on this
front, which the railway gives, the enemy can no
longer go forward. .We must hope that it will be
another example of the same' holding up of bis
ndvance.
THE DARDANELLES.
It is significant of the extreme difficulty of
solving the problem of the Dardanelles that the
second great assault was not delivered until
exactly a month after the first attack upon the
Achibaba position, which, as will be remembered,
took place upon May 4-6.
All that can be said about this second effort
is that it has left the position intact. What losses
it may have inflicted upon the enemy, how far the
bombardment may have shaken his defences, only
those upon the spot can tell. But the line still
stands unbroken ; the first of the two great posi-
tions with which the enemy defends the Narrows
is intact; the Allies have not even reached
Krithia village upon the slopes of the Achibaba,
and we must wait for a further effort before a
decision even as regards the first position is in
sight.
Meanwhile it may be worth noting that the
crux of the problem lies in the ability the
Allies may discover of cutting the enemy's supply
across the Straits. The British submarines have
already rendered transport through the Sea of
Marmara impossible. It remains to be seen how
far their effort, or that of the indirect fire from
the Fleet, can interfere with the passage of rein-
forcements and munitions for the enemy from the
mainland to the Gallipoli Peninsula across the
Narrows. In the absence of a really large siege
train, wherewith to reduce the positions directly,
such a hampering of communications, though
tardy, would seem to be the only solution.
THE ITALIAN ATTACK UPON THE
ISTRIAN FRONTIER.
The covering troops of the Italians, behind
whose action the main army is mobilising, proceed
methodically to occupy the passes which dominate
the Lombard plain. Whether they will be able
to hold these or not Avhen the enemy has brought
up his own main force only the future can show.
As we know, the Italian covering troops have
already occupied the summit of Monte Nero, on
the far side of the Isonzo, in the mountain
country, from which summits their artillery
ToMaitiAusLTiarL
Bases Jelower
mdd
./A
J ZnalLskTyili.es
4»
June 12. 1915.
LAND A N D WATER
largely commands the valleys to the south and east
beyond the town of Tolraino. Why have they at-
tempted this turning of the line of the Lsonzo
t.hrough the mountains upon the north ?
In order to answer that question one must
recall the point v»'hich was empiiaslsed here last
week, that the war on the A nstro- Italian frontier
liill necessarily he a war for railways.
Now, observe how the railways run just here
upon the frontiers of Istria.
From the Austrian bases to Trieste there are
two lines — one coming through Laibach, far off
to the east, at pre.^ent out of reach of the Italians
(and marked A A on the preceding diagram) ; the
other comes directly down by the shortest road
from the north, through the long tunnel under the
Jelov/er Wald at C, and so comes down by
B D B to Trieste.
Now, an attempt to cut this line by attacking
anywhere along the lower lsonzo would mean
trying to force the very difficult positions in that
valley, which are probably w^cll defended. Gorz
and its fortification protects the main junctions
at the foot of the Alps and closes the gaps. But
by getting right up into the hill country and
coming down upon the railway to Tolraino at such
a point, say, as D, it is hoped to cut the railway,
to paralyse the supply of Gorz, and to halve the
supply of Trieste. All that district is highly
mountainous— the summit of the Mont€ Nero
(which the Austrians call the Krn) is 6,000 feet
above Tolmino in the valley — and it is probable
that the vigorous effort by the vanguard of the
Italian force is made here because they found
hardly any defence prepared in these northern
hills.
It is evident that to cut the railway at D
would be to destroy its value for Trieste alto-
gether. The other line coming in from E cornea
in from and is held by Italian territory. It
does not communicate with the Austrian basei
at all.
To cut the railway B B at D or thereabout!
is not to isolate Trieste, because there exists tht
alternative road A A; but it prevents Trieste
having two avenues of communication and it cuts
the shorter and more important one — so impor-
tant that in the creation of it the Austrians have
been at the pains of tunnelling under the main
range (the Wochein Tunnel — four miles long).
Further, the danger to the railway at D is difficult
to meet. Reinforcement can only come up from
Gorz by the narrow gorge of the lsonzo — a
dangerous and insufficient avenue of approach.
A GENERAL SURVEY.
^OR some reason or other, in part because
the siege work in the West has lasted
just long enough to try public opinion,
there has appeared in the last week
or so an uneasy spirit which was absent during
the earlier spring months. The first consequence
of this uneasiness has been a disarray of judg-
ment. The firm major lines upon which all sound
opinion sliould base itself have got blurred. You
hear people asking perfectly meaningless ques-
tions, such as, " Is it true wc have not enough
shell? " — one can never have enough shell. Or,
" When will the war come to an end ? '" — to which
on the face of it any answer would be ridiculous.
In a y.'ord, educated opinion in this country
has quite latterly fallen into something of the
mood v/hich you will find present in men who
have undertaken some financial speculation when
that speculation has not yet decided itself, but
has lasted longer in its development than they
had expected. Commercial m.en so situated often
show this sam.e vacillation of emotion and suffer
this same loss of grip which general opinion
to-dav is in danger of suffering in connection with
the vital matter of the great campaign.
We all know that in such commercial ven-
tui'cs the rule is to bear steadily in mind the
main factors which moved our judgment when we
first entered the speculation, and that the most
important point of all it not only to face reality
where reality appears adverse to our schemes, but
to appreciate it as a whole : favourable, adverse,
or neutral. Mere delay (and very often the delay
is not greater than experience warranted) should
not be allowed to disturb our conclusions.
This disarray of civilian judgment having
set in (the process arises by much irresponsible
writing and talking from men not competent to
judge), the best way to check it is to recapitulate,
for the purposes of the present moment, those
main elements in the campaign upon which alone
any ordered judgment can repose.
Only w'hen we have grasped this once again
can we proceed to a true estimate of the present
position.
I shall beg my readers' leave in this and suc-
ceeding numbers of Laxd and Water to present,
as I see it, the whole situation at this moment. It
may be that in the course of sn.ch a presentation
very great happenings will m.ake the drab pre-
sentation of the campaign as a whole seem un-
worthy of the moment. It may be that a con-
tinued and wise postponement of the great offen-
sive will leave room for such a summary. But in
any case a summary of such a kind is essential as a
corrective to too great a doubt bred by delay, as it
is to too great a hope bred by the very vigorous
action immediately before us.
For the purposes of presenting such a survey
I will begin at the beginning, and, at the risk of
some repetition, first lay dovm the jxditical
foundations upon which all our calculations upon
the war must be built.
There were three great political military
ideas upon which the enemy acted when he pro-
posed this enormous conllict.
There was first his intention to take the offen-
sive against Russia and France, after a prepara-
tion of three j'^ears — ^a decision taken nearly four
years ago. There was, secondly, the enemy's con-
ception of how alliances for and against him
would stand this adventure of his when he took
the field. There was, thirdly, his judgment, not
nearly so imwise as opinion in the West at first
imagined — that is, that his attack would be im-
mediately successful.
I will deal with these in their order.
1. The enemy consists in a certain group,
generally called " the Germanic Powers," and
consisting politically of 123-5 millions who are
LAND AND WATER,
June 12, 1913,
subject to the two ruling houses of Hohenzollem
and Habsburg- Lorraine. Though called " the
.Germanic Powers " (for the whole effort is a
German effort) the enemy includes great bodies of
Slavs and Magyars, and can command the military
service of a certain number of Italians as well,
who happen to lie within the artificial frontier of
Austria. They, further, can conscript into their
armies more or less unwilling Roumanians, to the
number of about 300,000, who also lie within their
frontiers, and a smaller number of even more un-
willing Serbs.
This combination of the two Governments,
that of the German Empire and that of Austro-
Hungary, which was almost the servant of the
German Empire in the matter, proposed to chal-
lenge, after the harvest of 1914, the Eranco-
Russian allies.
This determination was arrived at in the
Bunimcr of 1911, the time required for the pre-
paration for such a great modern campaign at
one's own chosen moment being roughly of three
years.
In expectation of this campaign the " Ger-
manic Powers " in question made ready not only
those materials and forms of organisations which
are universally known to be necessary to modex'n
war, but also made ready in a special fashion cer-
tain materials and forms of organisation pecu-
liar to those theories of war which they had
espoused, and which their chosen enemies had
upon the a\ hole discouraged.
What those theories of war were and how the
■" Germanic Powers " were aided by special pre-
paration we shall see in a moment. Meanwhile
we found our general survey of the present situa-
tion upon this fundamental truth, which I repeat.
The " Glermanic Powers," under the direc-
tion of Berlin, determined three years ago (in the
summer of 1911 — Agadir) to challenge and to
defeat the Franco-Russian combination upon the
Continent of Europe, and they fixed the date upon
which this victory of theirs should be entered as
the period immediately after the harvest of 1914.
It is in a sense true to say that their chief
objective was not France, but Russia. They feared
the growth of Russian power, for they felt Russia
to be a new country rapidly developing, and their
domination over the Slav populations, of which
Russia is the champion, urged them to strike
before she should have developed her communica-
tions and all her other military resources.
But on the other hand it was necessary for
Ihem, from their standpoint, to get France out of
the way, because, f roni that same point of view (a
distortion the absurdity of which we are not here
concerned with), France, though an aged and
decrepit society, would be an impediment to them
until she was convinced by defeat that she
could no longer count in Europe. Further, the
immediate defeat of France upon the West' was a
prospect reasonably probable. A highly organised
country very much inferior in numbers to the
*' Germanic Powers," and with its capital a week
or so from the frontier, could surely be imme-
diately and decisively defeated. This done,
Russia would be alone in the struggle and could
ultimately be convinced of her inability to disturb
the h^emony in Europe of the Germanic
.Confederation.
2. Thi3 calculation, matured during the
course of the three years between the summer of
1911 and that of 1914, wisely discounted the aid
of Italy. It was judged that Italy would remain
neutral; it was also hoped, rather than judged,
that Great Britain would remain neutral. Against
the possible entry of Great Britain into the field
the enemy, however, did make every precaution. He
organised a financial situation destined to hit the
City of London very hard should Great Britain
support those who were virtually her AUies when
the war broke out, and while he did not act as he
could have done, distribute commerce destroyers
with exact care in that period immediately before
the outbreak of war, he yet took every precaution
to safeguard his naval power and organised his
machinery for the production of the main instru-
ments, from the submarine to the airship, where-
with Great Britain should be attacked. He also,
though in characteristically clumsy fashion, pre-
pared the ground for anti-British manoeuvres in
neutral countries, particularly in the United
States of America.
The entry of Great Britain into the campaign
was a surprise to the enemy, but it had to some
extent been discounted. That the Italians, with
their conscript system, their considerable reputa-
tion as engineers and producers of material, their
excellent field artillery, and their two millions of
trained men, would enter the field before the end
of the war against the enemy^this the enemy
never believed at all.
3. The enemy took the field with the moral
certitude of victory from the most impartial
standpoint, and with a still further certitude of
victory from his own particular standpoint.
His whole certitude was based upon the
factor of numbers. He would attack in the West
with an immense numerical superiority. He
would almost certainly arrive at his decision in
the West, therefore, in the first three or four
weeks of the campaign. Meanwhile he had
reserves of man power at least equivalent to his
large trained body, which reserves of man power
he could train and put in the field in successive
batches as the poAver of Russia upon the East
might slowly mature and become menacing.
Russia would gather her forces very slowly,
because she had bad communications, an unde-
veloped industrial plant and material, and was,
further, a poor country in proportion to the size
of her population. And while Russia was thus
very slowly gathering her resources France would
be defeated, the winter would be coming on
(during which Russia could get no aid from
abroad), and before that winter was half-way
through the whole campaign should normally
have been decided.
We must remember, in this connection, that
the " Germanic Powers " were certain enough of
forbidding the provisioning of Russia through
the Dardanelles, because they were certain enough
before the full winter set in of procuring by pur-
chase the adhesion of the cosmopolitan financial
clique which has governed the Turkish Empire
since its late revolution.
This attitude of the enemy was based, we
must remember, not only upon the false analogy
of 1870, with its rapid and crushing successes,
but also upon a sober analysis of the situation as
far as it could be numerically estimated.
To every trained man of useful age — from
20, say, to 35 or 38 — which the French Republic
could put into the field, the enemy could put into
6*
June 12. 1915.
LAND AND WATER
the field nearly two men, with another two behind
them ready for training as the war proceeded.
Their superiority ia guns was upon the same
scale. Russia, they calculated, w^ould put
into the field, during these first v/eeks of
war, when France was being defeated, only
so many as could be checked without too greit
an effort upon the Eastern frontier, and
held until the destruction of the French army was
completed. But, as I have remarked above, the
enemy's conlidence reposed not only in his numeri-
cal superiority, coupled with the peculiar \ailner-
ability of France upon the West, and the peculiar
tardiness of Russian concentration upon the East,
but also upon certain calculations peculiar to his
own theories of war, and what those were will be
examined in the next number of this journal.
It will be seen that the enem.y's theory of the
coming war was not, as an unbalanced and very
hasty journalistic judgment in this country con-
ceives, a marvel of preparation, of organisation,
and of decision, but what one might expect after
so many years of peace, and what was discover-
able in the military opinions of every other service
in Europe, a mixture of wisdom and unwisdom,
a patchwork of guesses which proved in some
things exact; in others muddled; in others, again,
merely disastrous errors. '
I shall turn to an examination of those
theories with the more interest when I resume
this analysis next week, from the fact, to which
allusion has already been made, that in this
country alone among all the Allies there has been
conducted, during the last few davs, a very
vigorous, but quite uninstructed, effort to amaze
public opinion by an over-praise of the enemy,
and by the representation of his strength as sonie-
thing, both in scale and in quality, different from
the strength of those Avhose approaching task in
the West it is to breaic his backbone and to have
done with his influence in Europe.
H. BELLOC.
{To he continued.)
THE WAR BY WATER.
Bv A, H. POLLEN.
KOTE — Tbis article lias been submitted to the Press IJisrcau, which docs not object io the publication as censored, and takei a»
respoiisibiiity lor the correctnea.s oi the statements.
THE DARDANELLES.
FROM the Dardanelles we have this week
two exceedingly important pieces of
news. A German steamer employed as
a transDort bv the Turks has been sunk
by an unnamed British submarine, and m the
operations of the 3rd and 4th of June the British
forces co-operated with the land forces, as on all
previous occasions v/here such co-operation was
possible. These two fa.cts are significant as show-
ing that our submarine attack on the Turkish
communications is continuously maintained, and
that the German submarine attacks on our ships
have not in any way whatever interfered with
the normal course of our operations.
There are, it seems, only two German
steamers of considerable tonnage known to be in
the Sea of Marmara or at Constantinople, and
as one of these — the General — is accounted for,
the ship that is lost must be the Corcovndo, a
North German Lloyd boat of 8,000 tons burden.
She was apparently plying as a sort of ferry
between the Asiatic and the European shores of
the Dardanelles. On the Asiatic side the Turks
have the benefit of railway communications, and,
if the Dardanelles can be ferried, Constantinople
is in close touch with the front. But if the ferry
is made unsafe, and transports cannot ply
direct across the Sea of Marmara, then there is
no alternative channel of communication to the
long overland route which is entirely without rail-
ways, and the roads of which are reputed extra-
ordinarily bad. Moreover, the road leads over the
Isthmus of Bulair, where the convoys would be
singularly exposed to attacks from the Allies.
This being so, so long as we can maintain our
submarines in the eastern section of the Dar-
danelles and in the Sea of Marmara, so long shall
we put the enemy forces in the Peninsula of
jGallipoli into an exceedingly unenviable position.
The direct military value, therefore, of these
submarine enterprises can hardly be exag-
gerated. But there seems good reason for sup-
posing that the m.oi'al value can scarcely be less,
it has always been very doubtful if the majority
of the inhabitants of Constantinople are in sym-
pathy with Enver Pasha and tliose who have
brought the Ottoman Em.pire under the heel of
Berlin. The appearance of E14 almost at the
quays of Constantinople iteelf is credibly reported
to have caused a brief but really serious panic.
Several transports have been lost already, and
novv by far the largest the Turks could command
is gone. The moral value of this action is in-
creased by the fact that we have already lost one
submarine in the Sea of Marmara in circum-
stances not yet disclosed to us, if indeed they are
officially known, and another in the Dardanelles.
I'ersistence with the submarine campaign in face
of these losses m.ay well impress the Turks quite
as much as our persistence in using the ships to
bombard them in the peninsula, despite the suc-
cesses of the Germ.an U boats.
And, in the m.eantime. the German U boats
have no more successes to their credit. And for
this we can probably thank the activity of our
scouting craft and the thoroughness with which
all possible German submarine bases are being
searched out and shelled. Each side, indeed, is
faced with peculiar difficulties in this curious
underwater war. To get into the Sea of Marmara
at all, our submarines have to pass the Narrows
and then to travel between twenty and thirty
miles of th.e Dardanelles before they reach hostile
and land-locked waters, where no supplies or help
can possibly reach them. The bottle-neck, through
which they enter the narrow channel that leads
to the field of their vrork, is heavily mined below
the surface. It is by this time no new experience
for submarines to thread their way through miaii-*
LAND AND 5V.ATER.
June 12, 1915.
fields, but except at the Dardanelles, when the
passage of the mine-fields is completed, the sub-
marine finds itself in open waters. In darkness,
therefore, its progress, except for the risk of
collision, is safe. But darkness would only add
to the danger of the Dardanelles passage. More-
over, the surface itself is for some miles domi-
nated by an extraordinary array of all sizes of
guns, from 14-inch to quick-firers. For a boat to
show its conning-tower above water would be to
risk detection should searchlights suddenly be
thrown on. It would seem, then, that the long,
and not too easy, channel of the Dardanelles — for
a three to four knots current adds considerably to
the dangers of navigation where the seaway is so
narrow — would have to be negotiated for the
most part by an underwater run. The difiiculties,
therefore, must be enormous, and constitute a test
of nerve and skill of the highest possible order.
But once in the Sea of Marmara, it is possible
that the British submarine's task will be easier
than that of the German submarine when in the
neighbourhood of Gallipoli. The total number of
Idestroyers at the disposal of the Turks is not
large, and few, if any, of them are really fast.
Such as they are, they must probably be kept to
guard the batleships. But it must not be supposed
that the transports are left to look after them-
selves. The Turks have plenty of small craft, not
eo fast or perhaps so well armed as destroyers, but
all formidable to the submarine.
The task of the German submarine presents
difficulties of quite a different order. They have
first to find a secure base, and next, to avoid our
destroyers' counter-attack in making any effort
against our ships and transports. As I have
said, all presumed or possible bases are, no doubt,
by this time being mercilessly liunted out and
eljclled. That is, all bases but Constantinople.
And though, if thej reach the field of their
work, they will find more targets than our
boats will find in the Sea of Marmara, those
targets will have the benefit of a far more
numerous and far more active protection. As
things have gone, the honours in numbers of
\ictims are with us, although in the military
value of the victims bagged, the honours are with
the enemy. It would certainly take many
Turkish transports to counterbalance Triumph
and Majestic, old as those gallant ships were.
OBut if we look, not to the direct military value,
but to the moral value of the successes gained, it
is probable that the advantage is entirely on our
side. We have not only heard through Sir Ian
Hamilton's report that the sinking of Triumph
and Majestic has not deterred our battleships
from joining in the operations, but there have
been unoflicial reports, both from Athens and else-
where, that reinforcements have been reaching
the Allies continuously during the week.
It is the British public that has not stood the
loss of the battleships quite so well. But the
British public was hardly in the right mood for
BO severe a test. For three weeks, at least, it has
been subjected to a continuous bombardment of
high explosive journalistic pessimism. And, as
this bombardment may continue, and as it is cer-
tainly possible that more ships — transports, if not
war vessels — may be lost, it may not be altogether
out of place to state again the simple facts of the
situation, even though it be a thrice-told tale.
First, then, we must realise that, while there
exists no means whatever by which ships and
fleets can be absolutely protected against sub-
marines, a screen of fast craft, moving at high
speed, and exercising the keenest possible
vigilance, can make operations so dangerous to
the submarine itself as almost of necessity to
drive it away, or keep it so far under water
as to be powerless. I say almost because the cases
of Triumph and Majestic do show that the vigi-
lance of destroyers can be evaded. But, as these
are the only occasions on which this vigilance has
been evaded, it seems unreasonable to suppose
that such a success can be often repeated.
If submarines cannot be driven from the
neighbcurhod of ships by destroyers cr fa&fc
craft, the ship has no defence except to
make itself a difficult target by moving
quickly and on a changing course — measures
which also reduce the chances of submarines
getting within striking distance. But even
speed is far from being an absolute protection,
although, except in the case of the Lusitania,
which was nearly 800 feet long, there is, I believe,
no known case of any ship faster than fifteen
knots being hit. At the Dardanelles, bombarding
ships and transports engaged in disembarking
troops Avould have to rely for protection upon the
vigilance and activity of destroyers, because the
character of their duties would make it necessaryj
to remain absolutely or nearly stationary.
THE yVLLIED FLEETS.
In the Baltic there seems to have been a
lively exchange of submarine amenities. The
Russians have lost a transport, the Germans three
war vessels. From the Adriatic there is much
more news, and the strategic importance of it is
manifest. The cross-ravages of the aircraft can
be ignored, first because experience shows us now
that the permanent military damage which air-
craft may inflict is small, but mainly because
neither side is ever likely to tell us the truth as to
the damage actually done. One wishes one could
believe the Roman report that the dirigible's
attack on Pola not only caused a considerable fire
in the naphtha stores, but drove the ships out of
harbour in some sort of panic, so that a battleship
rammed and sank a destroyer. In the kind of
fighting that is likely to take place in the Adriatic
a loss of destroyers by the Austrians would be
serious indeed. But it is wiser to keep our specu-
lations for the more reserved statem.ents of the
official bulletins.
From these it appears that at lea,st two
squadrons of the Italian fleet and one squadron of
destroyers have been busily at work since tha
beginning of the month. Three separate bombard-
ments ofMonfalcone — an important minor dock-
yard and destroyer base — have been carried out
by destroyer flotillas, one on the 1st and the other
on the 5th of June. The newer Italian destroyers,
be it noted, carry even heavier guns than ours — •
4.7, instead of 4 inch. And on the second occasion
a squadron of larger ships were in attendance.
Monfalcone is surrounded by shallow water and
no deep-draught ships can get within range. The
work, therefore, had to be left to the destroyers
only, and it is to be supposed that after the first
bombardment the Italians fully expected the
Austrians to attempt to cut off the flotilla when it
withdrew. But no such attempt was made.
•8
June 12, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
Meanwhile another fleet has been operating
in the Dalmatian Archipelago, destroying light-
houses, wireless stations, and observation points,
on Lissa, Curzola, and other islands, and cutting
the telegraph cables between all the islands and
the mainland. More than this, the coast railway
between Ragusa and Cattaro has been shelled and
is reported to have been destroyed. As this railway
is apparently the only military line of communi-
cation by which troops and supplies can be sent
to Cattaro other than by sea, the importance of
destroying the raihvay, if it is really destroyed,
would be considerable. But railways are proverbi-
ally almost as easy to repair as they are to destroy.
The significance of these operations is not to be
measured by the actual dam3,ge they have done, as
if such damage were a kind of final asset, but
rather by the fact that they illustrate Italy's asser-
tion of the comm.and of the Adriatic. And what
she can do once she can do again. For here, as at
Monfalcone, the Austrian fleet has not ventured
on any counter-attack.
The Austrian fleet has to solve much the
same problem as faces the Germans in the Xorth
Sea and the Russians in the Baltic. What is the
function of an inferior fleet ? An army in inferior
numbers can fight successfully on the defensive
for a very considerable time, but the role of an
inferior fleet is still to seek. In this war, at any
rate, it is seemingly Avithout a mission. The
Adriatic situation, however, is not quite so simple
as it .seems. The Austrians, we must suppose,
wnll not of set purpose seek a general action. The
odds are too much against them for that. But,
unlike the Germans in the North Sea, they may be
compelled to action.
The probability of a fleet action, then, turns
primarily upon the land campaign, and the
character of this, iu turn, may to a great extent
be determined by the action of the Italian
fleet. Alwavs assuming that Russia and the
Western Allies can keep the Austro-German
forces sufficiently occupied, so that the Italians
will be able to invade Istria, it is well within the
region of possibilities that the first fleet action of
the war would take place in the Adriatic.
All w^e can say for the moment, however, is
that, far from following up their raid on Ancona,
the Austrians have now retreated to their ports,
and the Italian fleet holds undisputed command
of these waters. It is a command that Austria
may dispute at any moment. But I submit that
she is unlikely to do so until compelled.
THE COURAGE OF MR. CHURCHILL.
Mr. Churchill's speech at Dundee is really
almost a naval event of importance. Its value lies
in this : To the great scandal of the Empire, to the
confusion of ourselves and the amazement of our
Allies, we have had to reconstruct our Government
in the middle of a war, and primarily owing to
disagreements on the chief command of the Na\y.
Upon Mr. Churchill has fallen the humiliation of
relinquishing the post of First Lord just when
the British Fleet was discharging the main pur-
pose of its being — namely, the complete command
of the sea, with a thoroughness unparalleled in
history. The as.sertion of supremacy was made
on the first day of the war, and all our subsequent
military operations have been made possible by it.
Mr. Churchill has been the leader through all this
time, and is surely entitled to some of the credit
of so overwhelming a success. The minor set-backs
in the first five months of war hardly affected
that success at all. It is the unsuccess of the expe-
dition in the Dardanelles and the disagreement
with Lord Fisher that have brought hira down.
In speaking at Dundee, therefore, he came
before his constituents in the character of a
beaten man, and he spoke at a crisis when the
country has been more depressed in spirit than
perhaps at any time since last August. A man
who at such a moment as that c-an deliver the best
of his fighting speeches, indeed the best fighting
speech that we have had in ten m.onths, is some-
thing more than able, clever, or brilliant.
Throughout this crisis ]Mr. Churchill has shown
the loftiest sort of moral bravery.
The time has not yet come to estimate the
value of Mr. Churchill's work as First Lord, but
in justice to him two things should be borne in
mind. Not for one moment since war became
either imminent, or an accomplished fact, has he
been otherwise than a fearless and intrepid
leader. The qualities he stipulates in our chiefs,
" courage, energy, audacity, the readiness to take
all risks and shoulder all responsibilities," he
exemplifies splendidly in his own person. He
may not always have been wise, but he never was
afraid. And the Navy loves him because its heart
goes out more to courage than to any other quality.
Mr. Churchill became First Lord at a
moment of transition. The British NaA-y had just
been reconstructed by Lord Fisher. The monster
ship, long-range gun-fire, the long-range torpedo,
the high speed capital ship, the submarine, the
aeroplane, all were novelties of the last ten years.
Each novelty had its enthusiasts, each trying to
push the qualities of size and power and speed to
their utmost limits. And the enthusiasts defeated
the experts. They had a simpler game to play.
All they had to do was to ask for more^
speed, size, range, &c. Thus, between 1907 and
1914 we pass from the last mark of the 12-inch
gun, through two stages of the 13.5, and reach
the 15-inch. Between 1908 and 1914 the speed,
range, and power of torpedoes, and the size and
radius of submarines was doubled and almost
trebled. But no recognition was given to the
fact that, as guns increase in power and range,
and as ships grow in speed and mobility, there
must be developed a technique of gunnery so that
the new weapons can be adapted to the new con-
ditions. And no systematic official effort was
made to work out how the existence of these fast
long-radiused submarines would affect the grave
problem of the defence of fleets, or how the long-
range torpedo would mould the tactics of fleet
action. As for the problems involved in bombard-
ing shore positions, they were ignored altogether.
Method was forgotten in the general devotion to
mass. Those limits could only be ascertained by,
patient investigation and experiment. In the
rush for size — that could be advertised — there
was no time for the dull and disillusioning pro-
cesses of thought. Thus it was Mr. Churchill's
misfortune never to have the eternal truth brought
home to him that the Navy is an instrument that
can only be used rightly if used within the limits
of its mastery over the u-ea]jons that it employs.
The expert who asked how all these fine big things
were to be used struck a note of doubt; the enthu-
siast struck the note of sanguine confidence.
A. H. POLLEN.
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915.
MACHINES AND MEN.
By JOHN BUCHAN.
HAVE been asked by the Editor to set down
my impressions of the character of the pre-
sent stage of the War in the West. Let it
be understood that they are my own personal
impressions. They have no kind of official sanc-
tion, and I do not know whether any soldier of
authority agrees with them. But they are first-
hand, and I give them for what they are worth.
Every war is a contest of two factors — men
plus machines. The one without the other is
.valueless. An unarmed soldier and an unmanned
gun are things of equal futility. As matters
BiarA at present the Germans are our superiors in
one thing only. They have the better and stronger
machine, and they use it to keep our man-power at
arm's length. We believe, and we have cause to
bciie\e, that the quality of our fighting manhood
lis, on the whole, better than theirs. They seem to
realise this, for they are striving to make it a long-
range war. Our business is to devise as quickly as
possible a counter-machine of at least equal
strength which will give us a chance of " in-fight-
ing." On that depends our success, for it is close-
quarter fighting that alone will give us the
complete victory, which is the only kind that can
be contemplated. The German machine is so good
that it is unlikely that we shall be able to better it ,
at the most we can create something equally
strong. But our fighting stuff is so good that even
in the most desperate war a outrance when the
Germans were fighting in direct defence of their
homes, I do not think they could equal it. There
lies our hope of superiority. Our business is to
find some way of giving our manhood its chance.
QUALITY V QUANTITY.
To put it in another way, we are equal or
Buperior in quality, but inferior in quantity. Our
guns and our gunnerj^ are as good as the German,
our field guns better. Perhaps they are more
ekilful in the tactical use of machine guns, for
they have made a speciality of them and have five
to our one. But in air work, in intelligence, in
leading, we are certainly their superiors. We are
clearly superior, too, in the quality of our Armies.
I do not mean that there are not thousands of
German soldiers as brave, as well-trained, and as
.well-disciplined as any in our own ranks. But
their armies are no longer homogeneous. The
terrible gaps have been filled up with veiy raw
material which has not been absorbed and cannot
be absorbed. You have only to talk to a Germ.an
prisoner of the first line to learn the quality of
many of the new drafts. The most notable fact,
on the other hand, about our present front is its
high quality all round. The famous old regi-
ments that have been in the field since Mons are
now largely made up from reserves, but it rrould
be rash to say that the Guards Brigade, for
fexample, is less good now than it was on the
'Aisne. The Territorials and Yeomanry have
been lately fighting alongside our best in-
fantry and cavalry, and doing marvels. The
New Array, to anyone who has watched its
growth, is not less efficient. The result is that
our new troops do not make an ugly patchwork,
but seem part of the old pattern, and the same is
true of the French. Again, as to officers, we arg
better supplied with the right kind. The mor-
tality in the German officer class has been terrible,
and since that class is a caste the losses are hard
to replace without a violent breach of the whole
service tradition. We are far better off in this
respect than most people at home realise. There
is a type of man in England whom the Germans
overlooked in their calculations — the man who
spends a few years in the Army and then leaves
it to take the hounds somewhere or travel abroad.
Nearly all that class is available now. Besides,
in a peculiar degree the war in its present phase
is a subalterns' war. Young men with half a
year's service are as efficient for trench warfare
as veterans of several wars. They have all the
knowledge that is relevant, and are young and
keen and cheerful to boot. One hears people com-
plain that boys fresh from Sandhurst or Oxford
are being " sacrificed." But they are not sacri-
ficed, for, if they only learn a little caution, they
are precisely the men wanted for the work. 1 have
in mind a famous battalion which won great glciy
at the first Battle of Ypres and in many recent
actions. After the colonel the next senior officer
has eighteen months' commissioned service, and
none of the others more than a year. Yet the
battalion is in as good fighting trim as in October.
THE NEED OF QUANTITY.
These reflections make for optimism. But
the time for optimism will not arrive till we have
got our quantity to a level with our quality.
There is a long road to be travelled before we can
make certain of a decisive victory. Our quantity
needs to be increased, largely increased, under
two heads — men and mechanism.
1. Men. — Probably at this moment the
Allies outnumber their opponents on the
Western front. To estimate the British number
might give information to the Germans, v/ho, I
understand, are sedulous students of Land and
Water and Mr. Belloc's articles. But it may
safely be said that for the thirty miles of
line which we are holding our numbers are
ample. Why, then, the need of m.ore men? For
two reasons, one particular and one general.
The French Army since August has been under-
going a strain which only those who have
seen these splendid troops at close quarters can
realise. British officers have had leave; the
French have had little or none. The whole of
France has been stretched taut in one mighty
effort. Now it seems pretty certain that we m.ust
look forward to a second winter of trench war-
fare— I hope on a different and much more
easterly line of trenches. If that happens it is im-
perative that the British should hold an adequate
share of the front. ,We have a greater population
than France, but we are at present holding less
than a tenth of tlie line. No doubt it is a very
critical part, and we have had some of the hardest'
fighting of the war.
In the second place, it is men — the human
factor — by which a campaign is ultimately won,
A machine does the preparation, but the soldier
completes the job. Our business is to get a
10*
June 12, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
■achine which wiH nullify the enemy's, and then
use the weight and equality of our man-power.
Since we are not fighting for an equivocal peace
but for the unconditional surrender of Germany,
we must have the men to launch on her when we
have shattered her defences. Exaggerated notions
about the value of sea-power have tended to
obscure in the minds of many people what such
a decision as we are aiming at really involves. .We
are not fighting for insular security but for vic-
tory, and therefore it is not enough to sweep
German merchantmen from the seas or even to
destroy her Navy. Germany wiU not be beaten
by shortage of food or shortage of munitions, but
by shortage of men, and her decisive crushing can
only take place by land. We must shatter her
power in her own element; otherwise the war is
as indecisive as the traditional combat of wolf
and shark.
2. The Machine. — Here we have a long lee-
way to make up in certain breaches. There is,
first of all, machine guns. The Germans are be-
lieved to have at least twelve to a battalion; our
maximum is four, and that is not often reached.
In all the trench fighting machine guns are highly
important, as important as the bombs and
grenades wliich we have learned to use most skil-
fuily. The German line when it is attacked tends
to " bunch '" and collect into fortresses which
bristle with machine guns, and the efl'ect of this
equipment is as if their troops were armed with
a vionderful new automatic rifle.
Another deadly part of their machine is their
poisoned gas. I am inclined to think that we are
on the way to get even v.ith tliis devilry without
using a tjounter- poison. Our latest type of res-
pirator is very good, and it was found in the fight
at Ypves on May 24 that those troops who had
been jjractised in their use till they were handy
with tliem got off wonderfully lightly. Most
people would prefer that we should not use a
similar weapon in reply. We can probably
devise a gas as deadly and as practicable as the
German chlorine.
Most important of all is the supply of high
explosive shells. It is useless to indulge in re-
criminations on this subject. Probably it will be
found that none of the experts till quite recently
were quite clear on the matter, and if experts
speak with a divided voice the administrator at
home is helpless. But to-day there is no ques-
tion about the need. A German artillery or gas
attack can only be met by a counter-bombard-
ment. At the second battle of Ypres, which began
on April 22, our line was miaintained against im-
possible odds and with very great expenditure of
life. Again, infantry cannot advance against
trenches and entanglements, as the enemy con-
structs them to-day, unless an artillery prepara-
tion has broken them down. The French movement
the other day towards Lens succeeded, because for
four miles they had sterilised and flattened out
the ground with their gunfire. The sight of that
ti-emendous performance — great guns firing all
day with the rapidity of maxims — was a lesson
in the practical business of war. For miles there
was nothing left of hostile parapets and entangle-
nients — only a ploughed countryside, and frag-
ments of wire and hum,anity. After it the
infantiy could advance as safely as on parade.
It is useless to labour this point, for we are
have not yet got the adequate machine, and until
we get it we fight at a disadvantage. The
bright spot is that once we have got it we have
a clear superiority. Germany has trusted too much
to her machine. Under cover of it her soldiei's
have dealt out death at long range, and they are so
familiarised with this method of fighting that it
may be doubted if they will do well at close range.
Certainly in the last month their infantry attacks
have been fiascos. Von Jklackensen's thrust on the
San, so far as we can judge, has been chiefly an
affair of artillery. Counter their artillery with
an equal or stronger weapon and the Allies are
free to get to grips with them. I do not think there
is a single case where, when we got to close
quarters, we have not succeeded.
THE STR.4TEGIG PURPOSE.
There are three ways in which an enemy can
be defeated. You may outflank him, roll in his
wings, and compel a wholesale surrender. Or
you may wear him down in a series of small
actions where his losses are on the average much
higher than yours, till a point is reached where
his resistance crumples from sheer lack of
numbers. Or, finally, you can make in his line a
rent wide enough for your wedge to move in, roll
up the ragged ends, and break his cohesion.
The first plan is impossible in the West,
where the flanks of the armies rest on the Alps
and the sea. The old manoeuvre-battle is hope-
less, since you cannot alter the configuration of
Europe. The second is the plan the Allies have
pursued during the winter. A war of attrition
is successful when the enemy's normal rate of
wastage is greater than yours, and this has been,
generally speaking, the case whichever side
initiated the attack. But attrition is a slow
business, and a decision reached by exliaustion
is not as valuable for our jnirpose as a series of
crushing defeats in the field. For one thing, it
costs the victor too much. Besides, if Germany
is beaten by a slow wastage she may still trust
in her military machine and believe that later,
under more favourable conditions, it may suc-
ceed. But if the very gods in which she has
confided play her false she may turn to more
wholesome deities.
The third plan — to tear a great rent in her
line— is the most hopeful. If that rent is wide
and deep enough we may succeed in cutting the
communications of a large section of her front,
and so forcing her to shorten it and take up a new
line. The same manoeuvre repeated may drivo
her back inside her own borders, and give us the
first stage towards victor}- — a campaign within
German territory. But to make the rent needs
a machine the equal of her own — more guns, far
greater reserves of ammunition, and a great
weight of men. We can provide all these things if
we choose, and so the issue is in our own hands.
One last word. Germany is formidable not'
because she is more wicked and unscrupulous
than ourselves. Her vices and follies are in tho
long run hindrances to her, not assets. She is
formidable because of her vijtues — her paticnco
and science and foresight, the astonishing unan-
imity and discipline of her people, the endurance
and self-sacrifice of her armies. We can win only
by showing superior virtues, and that is an en-
couraging reflection for honest men. The DevU
all agreed. The melancholy reflection is that we has not yet got his own way with the ■world,
11*
LAND AND 5V:aTER.
June 12, 1916.
SONGS OF THE ENEMY.
By DESMOND MacGARTHY.
THE two little books I am about to review were given
me by a wounded Prussian soldier. Tliey fell
into my hands in this way : One misty momiDg the
French launched a small attack in the direction
of Bisschoote. It had been a very brief afFiiir,
easily successful, and costing them liitlo. When our ambu-
lances arrived on the scene it was all over. A few prisoners
were being conducted across the fields, not more than eight
or nine altogether. They came along stolidly enough, great
grey louts, looking very big and thick beside the French
soldiers on each side of them. The moment they got into tlia
village street — or, rather, the ruins which remained of it —
we swarmed about them, jostling to h.ave a look and to
examine the things which had been taken from their pockets,
letters, paper-money, tobacco, &c. They appeared — there
is no other word which describes their demeanour —
uncommonly shy. One or two were grinning in an
mpprehen.5ive, propitiatory way, others stood sullen and
absent-minded.
The scene reminded me of the sudden discovery of a bat<.'h
of new boys in a school-yard at the beginning of term-time.
Questions were shied at them, which provoked laughter, but,
of course, no answers, and there was the same sort of mis-
chievous enjoyment among us of Llio fact that the new corners
did not know how to behave or what might not be going to
happen to them next. Presently the ring broke to make
way for an officer, who took the papers and asked if anyone
could spsak German. I said I tiiou"ht I could .manacje to
make them understand, and began to act as interpreter for
the usual questions. What regiments did they belong to ?
How long had they been there ? How many of them had
there been? Had (hey suffered much in their feet? (The
French had suffered themselves a great deal from inflamma-
tion and frost-bite owing to standing long in wat.ery trenches.)
To this last question they replied, " No," which made iis
look with envy at lh?ir boots, which, sure enough, were
heavily soled and came high up tlie leg.
After this interrogatory was over they were marched away
to a cottag.? with four walls intact, en the doorstep of which
two French soldiers sat down with their rifles across their
knees and began rolling cigarettes. " Now M. le Majeur,"
•aid the officer, " come and see what's the matter with this
boggar over here. The surgeon is downat the otlier post." lex-
plained that I was net a doctor. " Well, jou can talk to him.
He makes out he cannot move." We went together into a
cottage kitchen, where, in the semi-obscurity an enormous
German was lying on the floor. He had a short scrubby
beard and small black eyes which caught the light from the
window. I knelt down beside him. " Wie geht's?"
" Schlecht." Yet he gave an impression of great health
».nd strength and an immense indifferent indolence, sprawling
there on his back. Was he in pain ? No. Where had ha
been hit? He didn't quits know. He said he was very
cold and couldn't feel his legs. We slowly turned him on
his sida v/ith some difficulty, to see if he had been hit in the
spine. His back was so caked with mud it was hard to dis-
cover vvl'.ether or not there was a hole in his coat. But since wa
could do nothing it was better not to disturb him further, so
we propped him up and he settled himself stifflly.
Rising from my knees I saw that a few yards from his feet
the door into a side room was open and that the head and
shoulders of another German were visible. This man's mouth
was open and his temple was smashed in. His face was yellow,
and he bad been dead some time. I got up and pulled the door
to. The officer nodded. Oui, 9a n'est pas beau," and he went
out, while I sat down by the prisoner to wait till the ambu-
lance should come back to pick us up. Enemy or not, one feels
a respect for a seriously wounded man which makes one em-
barrassed and often at a loss to know what to say. I thought
this man was done for, though he looked placid and robust.
Jh ia easiest to ask questions.
" What is your namel "
He told me, but his speech, was thick and I could not
ntcfa it. I did not aak again.
" Married I'i
" What are you t "
" Arbeiter — in a factory. "-
" Where do you live?"
" East Prussia."
" How long have you been at the war ? "
" Four months."
' ' Had a hard time t Have you been in many battles 1 "
" Ach, ja." He spoke as though it was wearisome to
look back on such things.
" What are they going to do with me ? " he said, after a
pause.
" Take you to a hospital and put you to bed."
Ho made a feeble movement with his hand towards tha
door I had shut. A French soldier came in with a tin mug
of hot coffee, which seemed a sufficient answer to his suspicions.
After he had drunk it, I asked him if he would like to write
a letter. If he gave me an address and told me what he
wanted to say, I might bo able to get it through, but I had
no paper. He pointed to a pocket, and in it I found a torn
note book and two other thin books bound in blue canvas. I
had some difficulty in understanding the address. He sent
his greetings to hia mother and said he was wounded and a
pri.'oner. Seeing me turning over the pages of one of th«
li:tle books, he said I could keep them.
One v/as a manual of prayers for men at the front and th«
other a " War Song Book." The most noticeable feature of
tlie prayer-book is its systematic provision for every sort of
occasion. There is a prayer for recruits, a prayer for setting
out on tlie march, another for going into action, one of thanks-
giving for victory, another to be read after a defeat. There
are prayers asking for courage and patience, also for the
Christian churches, for the Fatherland and one for " our
dear rulers and t'ne Imperial house." It is a dignified little
manual, written in the sterling old Biblical German v.'hich
shows the language to advantage, and it has evidently been
compiled by men who regard war in a sole.rcn, self-dedicatory
spirit. The s.ong-book was a good deal more thumbed, and if
the first book, read in the light of the Report on the atrocities,
produces a strange confusion in one's mind, this book, too,
stirs unexpected reflections.
In the first place they are sterling patriotic songs, though
not good poetry — indeed, most of them are far from it. But
the words of a song need not be poetry; they need only be the
stuff out of which poetry is made; then the music comes and
turns them into poetry. Such are these songs. What is
startling is that the emotion they express is not tlia menacing,
aggressive patriotism which would consort with their actions,
but the kind which is equivalent to love of home. It is odd
to find that even " Dciitscklajid iher allcs," the first phrasa
of which seem.s so exactly appropriate to the spirit of modorn
Germany, is, after all, only an appeal (written in 1841) to
Germans to put tlie common traditions of the race befor*
local patriotism, and not to be divided by their rivers and
princes.
The essence of patriotism is the love of an idsal which a
man feels inherent in the civilisation, the places and tradi-
tions, out of which hs drew liis life. No literary skill in
adjectives is necessary to express this quality in things. For
the Englishman, Frenchman, Germ.an, the word English,
French, German will serve best to expre.« that particular
uniqueness in them which mysteriously satisfies. Where th«
skill of the writer comes in is in simply mentioning the tilings
in which this uniqueness is most constantly felt, and in the«»
songs this is done well. The Germans have come tran,pling
and ravaging into other people's countries, intensifying every
brutality possible in war, yet heartening themselves all th»
time with songs about their own pine-woods and water-mills,
the peace of their homes, their sweethearts, their wives, their
wine, their good-fellowship, their friendships, and, above ail,
their longing to be free and united. And, stronger contrast,
still, the fighting songs of these inventors of gases, bom-
bardera of seaside pleasure places, skuttlers of ships, are full
of the spirit of a romantic chivalry.
One feels after reading them there was never a niore
foolish thing said than: " Ijet who will govern them, if I may
writfl the songs of a people."
12»
June 12, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
BOMBS USED BY AIRCRAFT. II.
By L. BUN DESBLEDS.
EXPLOSIVE bombs are very rarely tlie direct cause
of a fire, but where a building is injured or col-
lapses, as a result of an explosion, a conflagration
is often started by open lights or fires inside the
building, and is assisted by e^scapiug gas from
broken mains or by arcs from broken electric wires.
The iiicendiary bomb, on the other hand, is designed
with a view readily to set fire to buildings and their contents.
A number of such bombs were dropped from the hostile air-
craft which recently visited Southend, Deal, and Ramsgate.
Some of these bombs were carefully examined by the British
Fire Prevention Committee, which has prepared several
leaflets giving valuable advice to the public as to the manner
in which fires caused by incendiary bombs could be stopped
or circumscribed.
Description of a German Incendiary Bomb.
The incendiary bomb, used by the Germans, has the
general external appearance shown in the sketch (Fig. 1).
It is conical in shape, and is of about lOin. in diameter at the
base. A rope, which has been saturated with some inflam-
mable rubstance, is coiled round its outside, and binds
together the various parts of the bomb.
There is at the apex
-Metit Handle
■inftainm*
a.bU rope
of the bomb a stron-'
wiro handle by which it
is held over the nacelle
of the aircraft before
being dropped. So as to
prevent any premature
operation of the bomb,
a safety-pin is inserted
in the ignition mcchan-
iam, and is only re-
moved at the moment
when the bomb is to be
used.
The base of the
boiiib is sometimes flat
and sometimes cup-
shaped as shown in tLe
sketch (see Fig. 2). Ou
ihat base, which is of
■beet metal, there is fitted a fuanel, also of sheet metal,
conical in shape and pierced with a number of holes. At tho
top of this funnel are fixed the handle aud the mechanism
for igniting the bomb.
The funnel is generally filled with Thermit, which upon
ignition generates int-ense heat, and by the time of the con-
cu^oa has taken the form of molten metal of the extra-
f'Diametirtfbase-i
lOias.
Fis. 1.
SKETCH OF A GERUAN
INCEKDIART AERJAL BOMB.
Hcindle
Safetv
m
J IgnlHon
Device
Rope h
^•^ O
{ Thermit
TAelted
. Willie
'Phosphorus
Cup h-^^^^^cty
iOia-
liK. Z.
SKCTJONAL SKETCH OF AN INCRKTIAKV V.fmB.
ScfetuTui
"RsservoiTS
Ter&ratuig
ordinarily high temperature of over 5,000deg. Fahr. Tha
molten metal is spread by the concussion, and its temperature
enables it to cut its way tl. rough a sheet of metal one-
quarter of an inch thick. Outside the funnel is a padding
of a highly inflanimable or resinous material, which is bound
on by the inflammable rope already mentioned. The resin-
ous material creates a pungent smoke. There is generally
some melted whit* phos-
phorus in the bottom
of the bomb which de-
velops nauseous fmiies.
In some cases celluloid
chippings are adiicd
and occasionally a small
quantity of petrol.
The " Guerre" In-
cendiary Arrow.
The Allies aLo
have a number of in-
cendiary bombs. It is,
of course, impossible to
explain in an article
meant for publication
the devices which we
or our Allies may pos-
sess. There is, how-
ever, a French incen-
dir.ry bomb about which
so many articles have
already been written
that the Censor cannot
object to a short descrip-
tion of it being made in
this publication.
The " Guerre " incendiary arrow, a sectional sketch of
which is shown in Fig. 3, derives its name from that of its
Terfcra£iT,£
Fi^.m.
Fig. 3.
SECTIONAL SKETCH OF THE
' GUEEKE " INCEKDIAKY ARROW.
Guerre. It weighs
in length and 3in. in diameter.
oijiy
2l\h.
and is about
inventor, M.
16in.
It consists essentia'!}' of two parts, one of which carries
a reservoir containing petrol, or any other iuflammabie sub-
stance, and the other slides reLttively to the first one. Besides
means for perforating the reservoir, this latter part contains
a device for igniting the inflammable material.
The shock produces the sliding of the two p-'.its rela-
tively t-o each other, which produces an incendiary result.
M. Guerre's incendiary arrow has already proved very
successful.
The British Fire Prevention Committee's Suggestions^
To cope with the possible danger arising from incendiary
bombs, the above Committee has suggested soivic precautions
to be taken wherever tliere may be a likelihood of an aerial
bombardment. A knowledge of these precautions, as well
a? the metiiod suggested by the Committee to deal with the
effect of incendiary bombs, may prove so useful that the
writer has summarised them below :
1. Should definite information be received of the ap-
proach of hostile aircraft, or actual bombardment
commence in the vicinity, refuge should be promptly
taken in the cellar, basement, or lower floor.
2. All gas lights or stoves should be turued out, and
the gas supply turned off at the meter.
3. All electric lights should be switched off, and the
supply turued off at the n:ain switch near the meter.
4. All oil lamps should be extinguished and taken into
the cellar or basement, and all open fires above base-
ment level should be put out.
5. All doors, windows, aud shutters should be closed.
6. Buckets of water are the most suitable and the mo--:t
ecoiionucal fire appliances. When oil or spirit is
kept on the pren;ises buckets of sand may prove of
great value.
7. Don't wait until a fire occurs t-o find out how it is
jjossible to get out in the dark. Think of a oouplo
of ways out b.^forehand.
8. If there is dense smoke from a fire, rememlser
that the air is clearer near the ground, so crawl on
the flcor, with a handkevol'ief, wet rag, or respiratoi
in front of ytiur mouth.
TlZ*
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915.
9. Ascertain the quickest menn? of obtaining assistance
from t!ie Fire Brigade and Police. Post up the
neccssarv particulars, nearest fire-alarm, <fcc., on
tlie ground floor.
10. Don't run or shout. Keep calm.
Fires caused by incendiary bombs may be prevented
from spreading, regardless of the high temperature generated
at the actual seat of the outbreak, if wat«r be promptly
applied in fair bulk, force, and continuity.
The Bragj-Smith Anti-Submarlne Aerial Bomb.
It is very rightly questioned whether a moving aircraft
is capable of dropping a bomb straight on to a moving sub-
marine. Besides, it is very likely that a submarine, when
seen from an aircraft, would be moving a few feet below the
surface of the water; so that an ordinary aerial bomb, even if
it fell over the submarine, v/ould, on striking the water, im-
mediately explode, while the submarine itself would remain
uninjured, and be free to continue its career.
An anti-submarine air bomb must, therefore, be de-
signed to damage the submarine, whether it actually strikes
the submarine or not, provided it falls within 20 or 30 yards
of the submarine, and it must not exjilode on impact with
the water.
Such anti-submarine air bombs have now been designed.
There is, for instance, the Bragg-Smith air bomb that will
not explode until it has penetrated into the water to a pre-
determined depth. Such a bomb, Lj/ its explosion under the
water, would destroy or would capsiee a submarine, whether
it actually struck the submarine or fell some 30 yarda
from it.
w
E reprint from the Trihune de Geneve the following
letter writen by Professor de Wilde apropos of a
recent article by Mr. Desbleda in L.vnd and
Water :
I have read witli Kcon interest an article in your paper by Mr. BlLo
Desbleda on "a scliemo to revolutionise warfare."
I venture to point out that the 2,140 trains which, according to
the author of the schemo, must every day cross the fifteen principal
bridges over the Rhine in order to re-victual the German army operating
in Belgium and the North and North-East of FraJic«, must also pa^s
over the bridges of the river Mouse at the following points : Vis^, Liege,
Huy, Namur, AnseremnKj near Dinant, CharleviUe, and Sedan, which
makes only seven bridges instead of fifteen.
All these bridges aro in the hands of the Germans. Those at Huy
and Anseremmo cannot l>e of much use as they only serve to connect
small railways consisting of but a single line. If the trafTic on the other
five bridges were stopped the German army, at the end of a few days,
would be without food and without munitions.
The great railroad from Cologne to Paris, via Aix-la-Chapelle,
Liege, Namur, Chaxleroi, Maubeug*, runs through the valley of tho
Vesdre between Verviers and Liege, and through the Valley of tha
Sambre, between Namur and Maubeiige. In these two valleys thera
aro at least thirty bridges whose destruction would be fatal to tha
Germans.
Also, if the aeroplanes were to start from Doullens or from Amiens
(Departement de la Sommo) th« length of the flight would be reduced
by half.
In modif^dng Mr. Blin Desbled's schemo in the manner I have just
indicated it would be rendered much easier of execution and much mors
economical, wliile, at the same time, its full efficacy would be preserved,
P. De WILDE,
Honorary Professor of the Univei'sity of Brussels,
THE VALUE OF THE INITIATIVE.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
THE principal cause of the confusion which exists in
many minds as to the relative strength or weak-
ness of the military situation ari.ses from the loose
and inaccurate way in which technical terms are
being used by those never trained to appreciate
the exact sense iu which they are employed by experts. The
experts themselves are also a good deal to blame in the matter,
because out of sheer intellectual slothfuluess they have con-
tinued to employ words which, owing to the rapid change in
conditions, no longer give a correct picture of the phenomena
they are intended to describe and ignore entirely that these
meanings also vary with the rank and position of the men
who use them.
Writing from the strategist's point of view, it is technic-
ally correct to speak of the Allies in France as the attacking
party, and the men in the trenches are equally correct in con-
sidering themselves essentially as defenders, tliough by their
defensive action they are in reality furthering the cause of
the offensive just as materially when repulsing German
counter-attacks as when storming the opposing trenches with
the bayonet.
If strategists had thought out their subjects with greater
precision, I think they would long since have limited the use
of the word " attack " in their field of action, and substituted
the word " initiative " to cover all cases where in fact one
side exercises by free choice the power of compelling his enemy
to assail him. I am dwelling on this point because it seems
to me that the main cause of the wave of pessimism that is
pa.^sing over us is due to the fact that the public neither
understands or believes how thoroughly the Allies now possess
this power of " initiative " or how, though the Germans per-
sistently attack us locally, we have in fact thrown them on
the defensive, and their only form of defence is the local
counter-attack, which they are compelled to deliver in the
hope of holding us at arm's length for as long as possible.
We have obtained this initiative not only because our
resources in men and material are greater than those opposed
to us, but because our leaders have the will and the skill to
use them to better advantage. At first, after the closing of
the gap at Ypres, we were thrown purely on the defen-
sive— that is to say, that we had to await passively the
delivery of the enemy's attacks at points of his own
choice, for at the moment he was still superior in avail-
able resourcss. But presently, as our aircraft and the French
artillery established their supremacy, a gradual progress was
apparent, beginning in Kovember, and continuing on unto
the present time; and we — i.e., the Allies — by degrees
asserted our power of attack against certain well chosen
points in the enemy's line which he had to hold at all co.Hs.
Soissons, Perthes, Les Eparges, the Vosges, to cite only a
few examples. To defend these the enemy was compelled to
rush his reserves about by rail, concentrating and attacking
first one point and then another, and always sacrificing men
in the ratio of from 3 to 1 to 4 to 1, thus gradually bleeding
himself to death.
Then, when to end this annoyance once and for all, the
Germans brought up the great reinforcements they had been
preparing throughout the winter, we, hearing of their concen-
trations, primarily thanks to our aircraft, began a series of
attacks at Neuve Chapelle, Hill 60, Arras, ic, which com-
pelled him to disseminate his forces instead of assailing us
with a great concentrated effort.
Except through the use of poisonous gases, he has gained
nothing at all by this vast expenditure of energy, and, though
wa know, with a fair approach to accuracy, the numbers of his
army corps which have been shaken and demoralised by their
repeated failures, it is not yet certain whether more remain
behind or not.
If his furious attacks now cease, the conclusion that there
are no longer fresh reserves to be drawn upon follows, and if
there is any doubt on the matter, a further application of
pressure in any one of the many sectors open to us should
settle the point beyond dispute.
This is the main line of thought which must be
held fast in spite of all distractions, for distractions, of
course, there must always be as long as one is dealing with
human factors. Great masses of stores, artillery, and troops
cannot be moved by enchantment, but time and all the
vicissitudes of active service have to be taken into account,
and it would represent an inconceivable degree of perfection
if, in the execution of such movements, troops were not sub-
jected locally to very high strains, being, in fact, called upon
to purchase with their lives the time needed to overcome tha
internal friction of the whole machinery involved, which
stretches back, say, from the gun at the front, through count-
less factories and workmen's hands, till we reach the crude era
or other raw material from which the finished article — shell,
boots, &c. — is made.
Such moments of exceptional strain on the men have been
frequent lately, and one can well understand the depressing
effect of heavy casualty lists on their friends and relations;
but the mere fact of these great efforts of endurance being
demanded is proof positive that the superior command under-
stands and appreciates the value of the material he employs,
and is exercising a wise economy in its expenditure, so as to
keep in his hands the most crushing superiority possible whaa
the time comes for the knock-out blow.
14"
June 12, 1915.
LAND AND iW.ATER,
TALES OF THE UNTAMED.
MARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the French by Douglas English.
IT lifted on a treacherous wire, and loosed from either
side a whip of steel, which cut into her neck. So fierce,
so Budden was the grip that she dropped limp with
sprawling limbs. She woke to find herself fast held,
to hear the crunch of human tread, to see a monstrou*
two-legged thing loom up in ominous black.
And Instinct whispered counsel.
She felt that she was trapped, that she must somehow
free herself before the monster reached her. She arched her
body like a bow, and, with firm-planted claws and lashing
wings, pulled back with frenzied strength against the grip.
Her beak, her head, her tautened neck were as one cord which
stretched to breaking-point. The trap's jaws eased — her ears
•lipped past the catch of them. Another maddened pull, a
•crape which ra?ped six feathers from their roots, and she was
free.
Ten seconds more and she had met her fate. The Man
eame running as she writhed, and flung himself to grip her.
She slipped like oil between his fumbling fingers, and winged
her screaming fliglit aloft to cross the ridge on which the
•now lay thawing. His fat bewildered face, upturned, stared
after her until she passed the skyline. She had escaped once
mora from Man, and mastered one more lesson.
The hoar-frost danced and twinkled on the trees; the
plough was one vast iris-tinted brilliant, whose myriad facets
caught the sun's v.hite flame, and mirrored it in pink, and
gold, and azure. No snare, no enemy was in sight. One
sound, and one sound only, broke the stillness — the cry of
magpie in distress, and Margot and her sisters sped towards it.
Did some faint memory of the pool still haunt them ?
There was no water here, no tree; a waste of snow-clad earth,
ft waste of sky, save where a grey smoke spiral told of the
cottage hidden by the rise.
But there was something which brought back the pool —
a sister voicing her distress, and that distress a riddle.
She lay upon a wooden board, breast upwards. Her feet
clawed at the empty air. She wailed and screamed inces-
santly.
From every side, from forest, wood, and copse, flocked
mags in twos and threes to stare at her.
The bird was crucified. Two staples driven through her
fleshy wing-boues racked her with pain unspeakable. But
•he felt torture worse than this — the inversion of her world.
With feet and belly uppermost, it was as though the heavens
had capsized. Her dizzied brain reeled to and fro, her head
boat dully, sideways on the wood, as, with one rounded terror-
stricken eye, she searclied the abyss that hung above her
head, and saw the plumage of her sisters' breasts above her.
They screamed and wheeled and screamed again, and,
one by one, approached in lowering spirals, and so dropped to
earth. They circled round her, tripping, strutting, prancing,
with pointing beaks, with necks outstretched. Their orbits
narrowed gradually. Margot was boldest of them all. She
danced across the prisoner, whose claws, now clenched, now
wide outspread, sought point for thrust, or grapple.
Her sisters, too, drew near. Not one of them could
understand.
There was a babel rout of birds, a jostling, cackling horde
of them, wing-flapping, sideways leaping, with eyes and
tongues adrift in wonderment.
And, suddenly, a tragedy.
Margot had skimmed, for once, too near. The groping
claws entangled her. Like drowning hands they fastened
on her neck, and her screams joined the captive's screams, and
both were hardened to short, gasping sobs, to stifled, gurgling
discords, which, for an instant, struck the audience mute.
An eerie duel this.
The prisoner's claws gripped, strangling, and Margot
tugged against them, wings awhirr. Her feet, which rage had
steeled, slipped sideways on the ice-glazed board. She fell,
recovered, slipped again, and lunging fiercely with her
hampered beak, sought to pierce heart or eye. She brought
her claws to bear at last, and drove into her rival's quivering
body, and tugged, the while, against the grip. In vain she
clawed, in vain she stamped. Her rival was insensible to
pain, and clinched her hold the tighter.
Margot was strangling fast. Her eyes were shot with
blood; her beak gaped wide to ease her lungs; bet heart raced
pulsing, throbbing.
And round her stalked the sisterhood, and clucked, and
sizzed, and giggled.
The screams grew weirder, wilder. The combatants had
plumbed the depths of hate. They fought for life, and voiced
their agony, fighting.
But suddenly came swish of soaring pinions, and, round
the duel, stillness.
Clear-marked against the skyline rose a Man.
Margot had seen him instantly. She checked her screams,
and wrestled on in silence.
Her ravil could see nothing but her enemy, and miauled
and screamed at random.
The Man loomed higher, higher still. He towered colossal
over them, shapeless, fantastic, terrible.
His footsteps crunched the hoar-frost jewels to powder,
and left broad muddy smears behind. His breath steamed
on the frosted air, and hung impure about his clumsy going.
And Margot-knew that Death minced in his wake.
His shadow crept across her. His vastness blotted out
the sky. He fixed cold, pitiless eyes on her, and, on a
sudden, shook and rocked with peal on peal of laughter.
A droll bird this. The draggled plumage tickled him;
the terror-haunted eyes; the treading feet.
He stopped and Margot sliivered.
She felt her feet clutched by his horny fingers, her hea4
racked from her body, lier windpipe tauteiied, strictured.
It was the end. Her wings dropped limp to either side.
The death-sob jerked and rattled in her throat. Her mind
reeled into darkness.
But suddenly the lower grip relaxed. Her rival's claws
were roughly forced apart. Her neck was freed. Sh«
breathed.
The Man alone now held her.
He gripped her feet, held her breast-high, and stared *t
her with goggle eyes and thin-lipped, sneering mouth.
And Margot, screwing round her head, stared back. Shit
could not understand. She only knew that she was prisoner,
that she had lost her forest.
Yet she made bid for freedom. She wrestled with hia
sturdy grip. She stabbed her beak against his fist, with
strength born of despair.
The Man's fist was hard as oak.
He jerked her head away from him, and mocked hear
frantic writhings. But soon he tired, swung off his back »
cage of latticed wire, unhasped the door, and thrust tiam
prisoner in.
Margot had felt the unloosing of his fingers, and, for %
moment, thought herself at large.
She flung at the unyielding wires, and stabbed and pecked
and scratched at them. Her feet slipped past their barrier
and clawed the air beyond. With wings a-whirr she leapt,
and fell back stunned. She bruised her head, her feet, in
vain. The rigid wires defied her strength; she could not bend
a strand of them.
And over her the invulnerable hand, the pitiless, mock-^
ing, terrible hand swung on its swivelled ring the jolting cage
which held her unknown destiny.
Strange sounds, and diverse, drummed upon her ears.
She paid no heed. One thought beset her mind— to get away j'
one hope possessed her senses — to break or bend the wires.
A wall of nightmare faces rose about her. She knew not
how the wall came into being, or how the crowd which formed
it multiplied. She grasped no differences in men, no
individuality, of height, or face, or gesture.
All smelt the same; aU were her captor's friends, friends
leagued with him to compass her destruction. The circle
moved along with her, with shouts, with boisterous laughter.
And Margot, who knew nothing of Man's voice, thought
every ciy a menace, a call to others of the tribe to share an
easy kill. So had she seen a flight of crows wing screaming to
a crippled hare, and peck her eyes, and eat her where tiiey
found her.
Each shout, each laughter-peal from human throat,
stabbed at her heart, and froze her young warm blood.
And suddenly the day was blotted out — in chaos of
fantastic sounds, of heavy airs, of noisome, musty odours.
With rounded, terror-haunted eyes she cowered before
this darkness in the noonday.
The stench, the gloom of four-walled room at first
15»
LAND AND .WATER
June 12, 1915.
bemused her mind. Her vision cleared to probe a luad-grey
murk, wliicli was half night, half day.
She was a prisoner in Man's lair, the frowsy parlour of
the village pot-house. Half-kitchen this, half lounging place
for topers who had credit. The slate hung obvious on the
wall. It was ill-lit, ill-furnished. Low tables flush against
the walls, littered with beer-stained tumblers; low benches
running past them ; a sink; two greasy roller towels; a copper
with a blazing v/ood fire under it; the walls hung randomwise
with gear, with pans, with sieves, with colanders. The ceiling
crossed with rods of iron, from which iron hangers dangled,
and bore the weight of bacon-sides, and sausages, and hams.
The chimnoy-piece was dominant. It rose pyramidal
from a twelve-foot base, v/ith hinging flaps to ease or loose the
draught, with stove and elbow-jointed flue. A scent of curing
thickened in the air, the juniper that had embrowned the
Lams.
Three loafers sprawled half-fuddled round a table. Man's
mate, full-breasted, red of face and arm, made racket at the
sink. The crockery chinked, the tin- ware clashed and jangled.
Husband and children helped — and hindered her. Margot
was for the children — at a price.
The cage was dumped down roughly, rattling the dreg-
fouled, finger-printed tumblers; and Man lurched round in-
quisitive.
Arms swung, hands clapped together; and Margot's
terror-stricken eyes froze in a rounded stare.
The children's fingers ventured through the bars, oEFeriag,
imploring friendship. But Margot saw a threat in them, and
backed av/ay, and cringed.
Though baby fingers had no claws, fear kept her sharp-
edged beak tight closed — fear of the chink and jangle of the
glass, fear of the drowsy lolling heads, the bulldog necks, tha
Uquor-swoUen bellies.
V/hat bird of prey was terrible as Man ?
These ogre mouths drained at one gulp the measure of an
ox's brimming mud-print; these gobbling jaws would bolt her
whole, engulf her in a maw unfathomable.
That Man was enemy she knew. What of Man's tools
and implements 1 The flashing knives, his instruments of
death, whose blades clove crusted slabs of bread like lard; the
copper- ware which jangled at a touch; the grids; the high-
suspended tube of iron, from which she seemed to catch the
stench of smoke, and memory of soft bodies dangling limp.
So fear of the unknown joined strength with fear of the
unseen ; but worse than these, more singular, more torturing,
was the unnerving sense of her own smallnesa. These sprawl-
ing, lounging bodies towered colossal; they surged gigantic
from the void, they fined away in mystery. Above them hung
the heavy-cloistered darkness, which seemed to totter over her,
the darkness of the impenetrable ceiling. With head hunched
back between her wings, she shuddered at each grince of
plate or tumbler; she shuddered at each scraping, creaking
footfall, which marked tha lurching coma and go of
Man. But in this nameless stress of mind, this vague
delirium of fear, she found a grain of comfort. The cage itself
was, in a sense, protection; the mesh-work ranipartof the wires
was proof against assault. She had not long to wait for dis-
illusion, but for the moment this strange hope sustained her.
The day trailed past, its every moment haunted. Man
came, swung glass to mouth, and went his way; and Margot
only saw his smacking lips.
Yet no one sought to harm her. A few, the mischievous,
caught up her cage and twirled it round and laughed at her
bewilderment.
This strange assault made whirlpool of her senses.
It was the walls that spun about, the tables that up-
reared themselves, the men v/ho swayed and danced like
wind-bent boughs, the pots and pans which leapt at her, in
dizzying whorls and spirals.
Night came at last, and Margot's eyelids drooped. She
was worn out. Her roosting-time was past. Hunger and
fear and weariness drowsed into broken sleep.
But suddenly she started. A draught of air had swept
across her eyes. A human hand was near her ! was groping
round her body ! v.-as fingering her ! was grasping her I
Then came a click — the prison door reclosed. And
Terror grinned afresh at her — across the futile bars, and
turned her blood to water, and swept her mind adrift from
its sheet anchorage.
The cage, her fancied stronghold, had been breached.
Her mind reeled under this fresh torment.
She backed and cowered as gleam and spurt of flame
flung blaze of gold and crimson to the roof, and framed a
vault of flickering lights and spectre-haunted shadows.
(To be continued.)
CORRESPONDENCE.
SUBM.\UINES.
To the Editor of Jj.kkd and Water.
Sir, — The activity of enemy submarines has no doubt
drawn considerable attention to this style of craft. That some
cfhcient means may be found to locate submerged vessels and
thereby assail their comparative security from attack may be
inferred from the fact that it is possible by microphonio
means to hear the beat of their propellers. It remains to
discover some system by which, eitlier from variation in in-
tensity of sound received or some other differential, aa
accurate determination of their position can be found.
A point, however, which has to be considered is the case
of a submarine which, having taken up its position, silently
awaits the approach of its intended victim. In such instance
this method fails. The remedy necessitates the change from
the measurement of direct to reflected sounds, and the effec-
tivene.sg of such method will be appreciated by those who,
travelling by train or car, have observed the variation in
intensity of sound produced by such reflecting surfaces as
walls and trees.
A further improvement in the means of determining tha
slight differences in intensity of sound from submerged sur-
faces consists in the measurement of their cumulative effects.
On such principles it is suggested that a reliable instru-
ment could be constructed which would take from the sub-
marine her means of self-defence and thwart the " f rightful-
ness " it was her mission to inspire. — ^ Yours truly,
DZTECTOK.
CUN-DHAFNESS.
To the Editor of I;Axd and Water.
De.vr Sir, — In a recent issue an interesting letter ap-
peared from Mr. Oldfield Tiiomas, with whom I have since
been in correspondence, relating to gun-deafness. He recom-
mends as " beyond comparison the best " preventive an car-
plug made as follows:
" Take a little piece of muslin, scrape off into it some of
the wax of a candle, fold it up into a little pill the size of tha
ear opening, tie it round close above the pill with some thin
thread, leaving tags; cut off the spare muslin, and that is all.
The resulting plug, which looks like a miniature grenade, can
be pushed into the ear at anytime, fits itself accurately
owing to the warmth of the body keeping it just neither hard
nor soft, and can be pulled out again readily by the tags."
I have consulted an eminent ear specialist, who entirely
approves of the idea of supplying these ear-plugs to the Army
and to the Fleet, and I am willing to arrange for them to be
made in considerable quantities if I can first be assured of a
demand for them. I should therefore be glad to bear from
officers in command of regiments and ships before putting the
v/ork in hand. I should also like to hear from any ladies
who would care to help me should the scheme be taken up.^
Yours faithfully,
(Mrs.) Anne F. Masst.
Hazelhurst, Sway, Hants.
THE SAILORS' AND SOLDIERS' TOBACCO FUND.
To the Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir, — We should bo extremely obliged if tha
officera in command of hospitals where there are wounded
soldiers would kindly communicate with us in the event of a
donation of tobacco being acceptable.
It is a rule of this fund only to supply at the request of
commanding officers, &c., in order that wa may be quite sura
that there is no waste.
Donations will be thankfully received to enable us still
further to extend the scope of our work, as we have great
difficulty in keeping pace with the demands that are made
upon us. — Yours faithfull)'.
Hoy Hornisian, Chairmaru
MR. HILAIRS BELLOCS WAR LECTURES.
Mr. Hilalre Bclloc will givo a finthsr series
Qu*t;!i's Kail on Tuesday, Juna 22, Tuesday,
July 27. Seats may now bo booked.
Mr. Belloc will lecture at the Town Hall,
Monday, June 21, and at the Wiutcx Gardens,
on Monday, June 28.
Mr. Bclloc will lecture at Edinburgh ((he
Aberdeen, June 17; Stirling, June 13; Ayr
Paisley (evening), June 19 ; t!ie To-.vn Ilail,
Monday, June 21; and at the Wtiiter Gardens
oa Monday, June 23.
of three Icctnres at the
July 15, and Tuesday,
Hove, at 8 o'clock on
Bournemouth, at 3.30,
TJssher Hall), June 15;
(afternoon), June 19;
Hove, at 8 o'clock on
Bournemouth, at 3.30
Printed by the Victoeia Houss PaiNriNQ Co., Ltd., Tudor Street, Wlut€friara, London, E.Gi
June 12, 1915
LAND AND WATER
For the NAVY
The small size Onoto Pen is specially suit-
able for use on active service. It fills
itself rapidly without the need of a glass
filler, and can be carried anywhere in any
pocket because when closed it never leaks.
Besides, Onoto Pens are the only standard
10/6 Fountain Pens all British made by a
British Company with British Capital and
Labour.
THOMAS DE LA RU^ 4 00 . LTD., LONDON.
noio
The Self-filling
Safety Fountain
Pen
!By Special Jlppointment ^
'Co His Majesty The King.
REGULATION SERVICE CAPS FOR OFFICERS
SOFT FITTING WITH FLEXIBLE SOFT TOP.
18/6
oua
2'S
For Officer* or Men.
Very ierciceable agaimt bad weather and thoroughly waterprooft
also a protection from the sun,
BADGES & BUTTONS EXTRA.
GREASE-PROOF LININGS, 1/6 EXTRA.
SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS, from 30/- per dozen.
BRITISH WARMS, 55/-. 63/- Lined Fleece, in all Sizes.
105, 107, 109 OXFORD STREET,
62a PICCADILLY,
47 CORNHILU 60 MOORGATE STREET.
LONDON.
BARLEY
WATER
should be the National Bever-
age in these strenuous times,
when every Citizen is called
upon to do his utmost for his
country. Barley Water in-
vigorates both mind and body,
imparts endurance and makes
good the expenditure of energy
occasioned by physical exer-
tion. But it
should be made from
ROBINSON'S
p.e"^ BARLEY
which contains all the nutritive and sustaining qualities of
the Barley Grain and is guaranteed pure.
Recipe by a Famous Chef (Mr. H. HAMMOND. M.C.A., Chef de Cuisine,
Thatched House Club) :—
Put the outside peel of two lemons into two quartsof water, add eight lumps of sugar
and boil for ten minutes. To this add two dessert spoonfuls of Robinson's " Patent "
Barley, previously mixed to a smooth paste with a little cold water. Continue to
boil for five minutes and allow to cool. When cold strain oflf through fine muslin and
add ice and lemon juice to taste.
^.5._Pfarl barley should on no eucouni be used as it is frequently adulterated
with French chalky -which is most injurious to the system.
KEEN, ROBINSON & CO., Ltd., LONDON.
BURBERRY WAR KIT
Cool in Summer Heat
Warm when it is Chilly
Dry in Rainy Weather
THE BURBERRY
WEATHERPROOF
Made in a i r y I i g h t , a i r-
free cloths, lined Proofed
Wool or Detachable Fleece.
KHAKI UNIFORMS
Serge, Drill, or "Gabardine"
TIELOCKEN COAT
Provides double protection
over the vulnerable parti.
Fasteni with a strap-and-
Ivackle in place of button*.
BRITISH WARMS
& GREAT COATS
iH/avsurc/iourmauriaL It i^ight bergc Or ' Gabardine ;
for Summer ; densely-woven, ^'/^J;_ 'raTn'J^l.lZT'Jilj ^ well as every detail of Ser-
self- ventilating and durable. it«trai ccm/urt- c.Jt.s. vice Dress and Equipment.
Illuitrated '. SHORT NOTICE ACTIVE SERVICE KIT. "" G'nmne
Military | Burberrys keep Tunics, Slacks Breeches, Great Coats and | GarmVnts
Catalogue Warms, ready to try on ; so that fitting Is done when orderln?, laittud
Poit Free. ' ^t^herin London or Paris, and the kltcompletedlnafeg hours. | 'Burbirrys'
BURBERRYS Haymarket S.W. LONDON
8 & 10 Boul. Malesherbe* PARIS; Batingatoke and Provincial AgenU.
177
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915
The FASHION for
PE TTICOA TS
Owing to the remarkable
change of fashion that has
recently taken place, Under-
skirts have again become
an absolute necessity. We
have now in stock a very
large variety of dainty and
inexpensive Petticoats all
cut in the new full shape.
Dainty Lingerie Petticoat,
especially designed for wear under
light Summer frocks, with deep
flounce of very fine Swiss em-
broidery, and finished with bead-
ing and slotted ribbon.
Stocked in 34, 36 & 38 ins. long.
I
10/6
THE RAVAGES OF MOTH
Store your Furs in cur Freezing
Chamfers. Particulars of our
neiv iSontbined Fur Storage and
Insurance against ail and every
risk sent post free on application.
DebenKam
&Free]body
Vt'irtmore Street.
iCovcndish Square) London.W
SHANTUNG
CO A TS
With the advent of the wann
weather Natural Shantung
Silk Coats, similar in
character to the garment
illustrated, will be in great
demand. These Coats are
adapted from the most ex.
elusive Paris Mfjdels by ouf
own highly skilled men
tailors, and are made in
rich heavy Natural Silk
wfiich tailors exceptionally
well.
SUMMER COAT (as skttch)
in rich quality Shantung, de-
s giied Willi belt and box pleat
back, new military collar, lined
black.
59/6
The RAVAGES of MOTH.
Store your Furs in our Frcfz
ing Chambers. Particulars
0/ our New Combined Fur
Storage and Insurance
against all and ez'cry risk
sent post free on application.
DebenKam
&F,
reeoo
Wigmore Street.
Cavendish Squore) London.W*
GARROULD'S
To H M. War Office. H M. Colonial OlHce, India Office,
St. John's Ambulance Association. London County Council,
Guy's Hospital, &c.
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON.
Complete Equipment of Nurses for home
Detachments and the
SEAT OF WAR.
All Surgical Implements and Appliances
in Stocl<.
+
Illustrated Catalogue of Nurses Uniforms. Oc, Post Free.
LIST OF USEFUL ARTICLES FOR SICK NURSING.
Circular Air Cus^'ions (various sizes), 7/6,
8/<). 9/11, lO/fi, (fee.
Water Beds. Air Beds, and Mattresses,
29/6, 52/0. 26/9
Air and Water Pillows, 3/0, 10/6
Feedins Cnp?, 4id. each.
Bed Pans from 3/0
Leg and Arm Baths from 2.')/6 and 8/6
Invalid Bed Tables from 6/«
Invalid Carrying Chair (light and strong),
17/8
InvaUd Chairs and Carriages of every
description (see catalogue).
First Aid Cases aud Cabinets at special
prices.
Invalid Bed Rests, 6/U
Ward Bedsteads: 3ft., 13/9: 2ft. 6in., 12/9
Camp Folders : 6ft., 9/6 ; with pillow, 12/0
EO n OADDDIlin Telegrams: "Oarrould, London."
. & n. UHnnUULU, i50toi62 edcwarerd,, lo^don, w.
WATERLOO CENTENARY,
JUNE 18th, 1915.
Just Published.
2nd Edition Revised.
WATERLOO
BY
HILAIRE BELLOC,
With Coloured Map and Numerous Diagrams.
HUGH REES, Ltd., 5 Regent Street, London, S.W.
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIR
B Are you Run-down =
Sj When your system is undermined by worry or over-work ■■
■■ — when your vitality is lowered — when you feel "any- ■■
^g how" — when your nerves are "on edge" — when the least ^^
■■ exertion tires you — j'oti are in a "Run-down" condition. JJ
■■ Your system is like a flower drooping for want of water. ■■
MH And just as water revives adrooping flower — so 'Wincarnis' ^|
JS gives new life to a "run-down" constitution. From even JJ
■■■ the first wineglassful you can fed it stimulating and in- ■■
^W vigorating j'ou, and as you continue, you can feel it sur- JS
■■ charging your whole system with neiu health — tiew strength ■■
^1 — new vigour and new life. Will you try just one bottle ? |_
i Begin to get well FREE. 5
■■ Send for a liberal free trial bottle of ' Wincarnis ' — not a mere taste, ^S
^2 but enough to do you good. Enclose three penny stamps (to pay ^h
S postage). COLEMAN & CO., Ltd., W212. Wincarnis Works, Norwich. S
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
178
June 12, 1915
LAND AND WATER
t
•
THE GIRL
OF THE PERIOD
Br
Mrs. eric DE RIDDER
E\'ERYTHIXG in daily existence has undergone
a radical change, but nothing has been altered
so fundamentally as the life of the girl of eighteen
or twenty. For the first time for years she finds
herself in a world making no special arrangements
for her benefit. The events of a " coming-out " season,
which many a girl had grown to regard as a matter of course,
and her rightful due, are simply swept away. The customary
course of life has been altered out of all recognition ; there are
no precedents to guide, little to steer by. We are all living
a life which bears no resemblance to anything anybody has
lived before. . Older people learn adaptability with every
passing year, but it is not such an easy lesson for the younger
generation to digest. It has to be learnt, however, willy-nilly,
at the moment — of that there is no shadow of doubt.
To do the girl of the present day justice, however, she is
trying in every possible way to adapt herself to these new
conditions of fife. Things are too terrible, events too momen-
tous to permit of small considerations. The vista of a first
season has vanished for ever for numbers of girls, but what
does it matter ? An event which in past years would have
been of great magnitude has vanished away to a minute speck.
In less dread days it would seem a pity. In these it simply
does not count. All that counts is happening within sound
of the guns. All that is worth doing at home is to help the
country in one form or another. This is true now, but it
will become more true yet as days progress. Every girl now
has a chance she did not always possess in times of yore.
She can be of tangible use in the " scheme of things entire."
On Occupation
The most superficial observer must see that the main idea
of the great majority of girls is to be occupied. The gospel
of work is one, which has been preached for some time to
womenkind ; often in the past we have heard of some girl,
born of parents of comfortable means, who has left her home
to launch forth on her own elsewhere. We have shrugged our
shoulders, murmured something about the restlessness of
the age, perhaps gone a little further in thought and considered
it a pity that well-to-do people should compete with those
having their own bread to earn. But without doubt it was
a sign of the times, a reaching out for the realities of life.
Occupation is a blessing and a boon ; it always has been so at
all times and seasons, but now it is a veritable necessity.
Without occupation most women at this time would go out
of their minds. And if they are not seeking for it for them-
selves they are most certainly obliged to do so for their
daughters. Youth is an energetic thing ; vent must be found
for this energy, otherwise the results are bound to be harmful.
The wish for occupation is one thing, the finding of it another.
There are many signs, however, to show that opportunities
are increasing, and that every girl will have a chance of
proving her practical worth. War is a primitive thing,
and we are back in primitive times. It is with the very simplest,
yet withal the most important matters that every girl has to
concern herself. If she is an expert at invalid cookery she
should be hailed as a rara avis — she is a valuable asset to the
nation at large. If she can sew, if she can scrub a floor well,
if she can stay cheerfully at home, releasing a more valuable
member of the family for service abroad, she is a help to her
country ; there is occupation in abundance for those who have
the wit to see in which direction their owti special talents lie,
but it is occupation having little glamour about it. It is
a case of sheer hard work. In no other way is a girl of any
use at the present time, nor, indeed, from that point of view,
is any one else.
From Small Beginnings
Once having made up her mind, however, that she must
start from the beginning, and gain experience, the English
girl is a power in the land. We are waking up to the fact
that all that matters is efficiency. It is a pity we did not do
so ten months ago, but it is better now than never. The day
of the cheerful young creature, who did some " good work "
to help pass away her time is over and gone. It is surely
not too optimistic to hope it wUl never return. Girls are
going into hospitals, and working until their backs ache,
and they are limp with fatigue; they are running coffee
canteens at home and abroad, and not shrinking one iota
from the inevitable fatigue. From all accounts, life in a coffee
canteen at the big military centres (Rouen, for example),
is one of infinite variety. For a while there may be nothing
to do, then there is a rush of business, and a girl's power
is taxed to the uttermost. But all workers are agreed that it
is splendid work, well worth the doing, and with the gratitude
of customers for its crowning reward.
The need for training is one that most girls are sensible
enough to recognize, and if they do not do so themselves,
others are quick to recognize it for them. Heaps of girls
who had left schoolroom days behind have practically gone
to school again since the outbreak of war. The difference is
that instead of learning many things, which fail to do them
one ounce of practical good, they have gained most valuable
knowledge. The intricacies of a custard pudding have
baffled many an intelligence which made mincemeat of 'ologies
in the past. Heaps of girls have gained a practical training
of a kind, which would never ha\-e appealed to them before
the world was turned upside down. .And those who are
still meandering in the old path of amiable inefficiency will
ere long be forced to see the error of their ways.
The Girl of the Future
There is no one whom the present course of events wiU
affect more deeply than the girls of a family. At such a time
as this it is difficult to look for the briefest while ahead;
eveiy'thing is in the melting-pot, and the making of pre-
dictions is likely to be a waste of time. It is obvious, however,
that it is the generation just growing into womanhood who
will feel the change of conditions most. It also seems hkely
that many a girl who in the ordinary course of events would
have married and had a home provided will now have to
live her life alone, and depend upon her own resources. The
carnage amongst our manhood can mean no other thing.
And this being so, it is fortunate that it is the spirit of work
that is being spread broadcast amongst girls to-day. As
this year progresses we shall undoubtedly see girls in many
fields of activity, which were either closed to them formerly,
or in which they themselves had no previous interest. Women
will engage in much which has been considered exclusively
man's work. They will, from the sheer force of necessity,
start many businesses on their own, which previously they
would not have dared to attempt unaided. Posts will be
offered them for which in the past no women need have
applied. Already there are policewomen and messenger girls
as a sign of the times, and it is impossible to say with what
further deviations from ciistom we shall be confronted any
moment of the day.
Life will open in some directions for women even though
it closes in others. At any rate, the girl of the future will
be far removed from the helpless being she was apt to be in
the past, and the knowledge she has gained of nursing,
cooking, and such like occupations will be a permanent asset
to her.
179
LAND AND WATER
June 12, 1915
For the man on Active Service.
Suede or Pigskin Money Belt.
8/6
Solid Pigskin Map Case. Square
shape, with Note Block and Pencil
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Three-fold ditto, 25/-
Prismatic Cotnpass, Service pattern.
Mark VI. Cotnplete in case.
£3 10s.
Mark Vll.. £4 5s.
Solid Pigskin Writing Case.
Suitable for Active Service.
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The "CAMPAIGN " Watch.
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£2 10s.
Aluminium Mess Tin with Handle. Resulation size,
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Complete in khaki cover and strap.
14/-
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ngskin
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Nickel Box containing Shaving, Nail and
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£2 Ss.
Size when closed 8 X 6 X 2J in.
Hair Mattress in Striped Canvas . .
,, ,, in Green Rotproof Canvas
Marsh-proof Mattress Filled Kapoc
18/-
22/-
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180
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2771
rPUBLISHED AST PRICE SIXPENOB
CATTTPr»AV TTTMP t^ Tr.Tr rPUBLISHED ASH PRICK SIXPKNOB
oAlUKJJAY, J U IN Ji 19, 1915 La newspaperJ published webkly
M
[Co^yH^htt Ai/'MAsms, Dtvon^^rt,
ADMIRAL JOHN M. DE ROBECK
In charge of the Naval Operations in the Dardanelles
LAND AND WATER
June ig, 1915
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190
June 19, 1915
LAND AND WATER
THE LAKE
By J. D. SYMON
SOMEWHERE in the home counties it hes, sparkUng
in the June sunshine, the very eye of the landscape
and an everlasting refreshment to the sight of the
wayfarer. To the obvious charms of every pleasant
expanse of water it adds one more, of curious and
even whimsical suggestion, for this lake is not as other lakes.
Although it falls into the picture with perfect harmony, so
perfect as to proclaim it immemorial, this lake of ours is none
of Nature's making. Two years ago it was not. A gently
rolling countryside, sufficiently beautiful in itself, still lacked
the relief of water, save for one or two streams, too slender
to give any marked accent to the valley as viewed from the
neighbouring heights. It was the one thing wanting ; but
some genius of the Urban District Council — a body not usually
associated with genius, except in the practice of refined and
cumulative extortion — saw what the landscape required and
how it lent itself to this adaptation, worthy for once in a way
of the name " improvement." A wide marshy basin at the
confluence of several little rivers lay handily inviting. Per-
haps, although local tradition is silent on the point, a lake
may have shimmered here long ago. Probability hes that
way, for the appropriateness of the lake to its surroundings
makes it appear rather a skilful restoration than an arbitrary
device. Artificial waters, styled " ornamental " in guide-
books, seldom conquer their original sin of artificiality. Be
they never so venerable, they bear their characters on their
faces ; but this little inland sea flings no challenge to the critical
observer. He takes it for granted as a proper natural feature.
If it lies, it lies splendidly.
The engineer's task was simple. It sufficed merely to
remove some low barriers, and the waters of the neighbouring
streams overflowed the basin just to the right depth. A
httle skilful embanking here and there did the rest. But
the new embankment left no scar. The oozy ground already
held clumps and hues of osiers in plenty. Up to their roots
the flood lapped and paused, knowing its duty. Shy willow-
screened backwaters, tempting as those by Isis and by Cherwell
of happy memory, formed themselves without guidance,
and the lake added to its seductions the sweetest attribute
of boating rivers. Its charm became twofold. And there in
peaceful days, dwellers among the Chiltern uplands, far
removed from " Thames' broode backe," as Spenser sings,
recovered with new zest an ancient sport too long denied.
For the District Council aforesaid, ever thrifty amid its
enlightenment, did not omit to furnish the lake with toler-
able craft, wherein for a modest fee, on sunny afternoons
or moonht eves, you might " ply the oar with lusty limb "
and with small stretch of the imagination fancy yourself at
Pangbourne. The illusion is less fanciful than might appear,
for the waters creep up almost to the base of wooded heights,
very suggestive of Father Thames, and the configuration of
the lake, irregular and deeply indented, yields many a pleasant
surprise of vista. Here the oarsman is bound to no monotonous
course as on the Serpentine (not thatwehave ever condescended
to that rather dreary grind) and other less venerable " boating
lakes " ; he finds endless twists and turns, every one of which
affords some new grouping of hill and wood or mcadowland,
i\nd always there is welcome retreat, when a bout of strenuous
practice has earned an hour with book and pipe under the
willows.
But these are of the things that were. The mood of
flannels has small place to-day in our scheme of life. So
sensitive have we become on that head that some, it is whis-
pered, are afraid even to be seen beneath that oriflamme of
jubilant summer, the straw hat. Hence in these bright hours
the lake is lonelier than it was this time last year. Civilians
who put out upon its waters no longer seek after dolce
far niente, the willows whisper their enchantments to deaf
ears. Those who row, row in the strict meaning of the term,
and the exercise is made contributory to one end, physical
fitness. Otherwise it would not be approved or undertaken.
The drowsy charm of moored craft, rocking lightly in tlie
breeze, is pre-eminentlv an indulgence of peace, lo-day it is
grotesque, unseemly, a scandal in the able-bodied. Yet a
little " slacking " still lingers by the lake-side— do not make
haste to cry "shame!" it is perfectly lawful. For the
slackers have earned their little hour of ease, of undisiciplincd
paddling, of tea, tobacco, and chaff under the willows. They
are not m flannels, no gaudy blazer proclaims them butterflies.
they would be none the worse of the abandoned straw hat.
All the same they are hall-marked by their clothes, hall-
marked and thereby enfranchised. You will have guessed
who they are.
It is their hour of relief from the work that most of all
matters in these critical days, when the nation's fortunes
tremble on the razor's edge. All day these amateur water-
men have toiled on land under the strict eye of the instructor.
They are of that arm of the service with which in the first
instance victory rests ; it is theirs to lay the gun and direct
the puissant shell to the battering down of defences too long
opposed at fearful cost. They are, by the cliief paradox of
this strange war, the life-saving corps, in very truth the Ufe-
guards of the army. By the lake-side nestles the pretty village,
where for the moment these artillerymen have their home ;
the thin shaft of its church spire rises white against the
wooded hills, lending the last touch of the picturesque to a
landscape typically Enghsh and rural. The township took
on a new beauty when its spire and red roofs found their
reflection in these quiet waters. Over all broods the very
spirit of peace. Yet here, too, there is war, urgent and
imperious, emergent at certain hours upon those rural ways.
At early morn the guns and the ammunition column thread
the lanes, moving with a brisk jolt and jingle, very different
from the leisurely progress of the farm waggon, hitherto the
usual disturber of the fields. And by the woodside above the
lake, a sudden turn may bring you on a halted troop of horse,
intent on map-reading. They pore upon their charts, com-
pare the ground, dispute a httle perhaps, and then it is " files
about," and they are gone, phantoms of the summer afternoon,
left once more to its rightful owners, the questing bee and the
clamorous cuckoo, whose voice is now grown a trifle languid.
" In June he changes tune." Next June will he shout to a
valley restored to its ancestral peace, himself, rude bird, the
only peace-breaker ? Perchance, by the grace of God and the
gunner, it will be peace. So mote it be.
Leave the lake-side now (for none of us is in any mood
for boating, and the boats are of right our artillerymen's}
and come with me to the hifl-side, to that very break in the
coppice where the other day I surprised my map-reading
troopers at their work. The view rewards the chmb. It is
one of the fairest and perhaps the least known in all the
twenty miles around London, for the path that leads to this
precious coign of vantage is labelled " Private." It is very
wrong, no doubt, to commit trespass, but so you keeji the path
and do not stray into the coverts on either hand, the keeper
winks at your iniquity and even condescends to a pleasant
" good-day " as he passes on his lawful occasions. The view,
with the happy trick of its kind, breaks upon the wayfarer as
a surprise. iThe screening coppice ends suddenly, the ground
falls away, and the eye ranges unfettered over many miles
of delicious hill and dale. On the left twinkle the extreme
northern heights of greater London, then from the spur of the
Hill par excellence, rolling woodland sweeps encircling until
it fades into the distance that holds Windsor undescried.
Midway hes the wide valley where three rivers, flowing from
diverse uplands, at length make common cause. And for
centre and focus to the picture rises, embowered in fohage,
that keen shaft of village spire, warden of the little town,
whose name, if you are a curious student of Anglo-Sa.xon, will
record for you the meeting of the waters. Up through the still
air float chimes that mimic the very intervals and cadences
of Migdalen bells, whose lazy notes to-day have sounded the
tocsin for so many of her sons. .\mid this rural peace the
suggestion of war will not be denied. Even this English valley
is a perpetual reminder of the strife, for it resembles, with a
likeness more than fanciful, the valley of the Aisne. Line
for line, from this view-point, it reproduces the contours of that
hard-contested ground. The river, perhaps, is less insistent
here, but its thin silver thread, fitfully seen through fringing
pollards, is reinforced, right in the middle distance by what
might weU be the arm of a noble stream. For yonder beneath
the spire glitters, long and irregular, a broader belt of water,
the very jewel of the landscape, the last touch of its perfection,
so harmonious in its repose, so well-accordant with the scene,
that only the informed may know, and knowing gladly forget,
that it is none of Nature's handiwork, but the gracious
artifice of rate-gathering men, to whom much shall be
forgiven for their lovely lake.
191
LAND AND WATER
June 19, 1915
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192
djme 19, 1915.
LAND AND Wx\TER
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
ITOTE. — This article has been submitted tu the Press Burean, which does not object to the publication as censored, and takes n»
responsibility for the correctness ol the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illiistraiin.i» tliis Article must only be
regarded as approximate, and no dcSnite strength at any point is indicated.
THE PAST WEEK.
THERE has been no decisive action, even
of the smallest kind, during the course
of the past week.
The considerable moA'ements to be
expected in Italy have not yet matured. The work
there is still the work of comparatively small
bodies, well provided with artillery, preparing the
way for the main forces which are to come up
after full concentration is effected. Such as it is,
that work consists in an advance against the
Austrian railways system, as we shall see in a
moment.
Upon the Galician front there has been a
thrust back and forth that results in an undecided
position. At one moment — upon June 10 and 11
• — it looked as though matters here had reached
their turning-point, the last enemy offensive across
the Dniester having been thrust back with very
considerable losses of men and guns, but the effect
of this success is lessened by a counter-stroke
which took place within forty-eight hours to the
north, and brought the enemy forces well across
the San. The enemy even profess that our Ally is
upon this front in full retreat towards Lemberg.
But the situation had not sufficiently developed by
Tuesday evening to merit any conclusion.
In the West there has been no more than a
continuation of the slow but continually advanc-
ing pressure of the French concentration north of
Arras and east of Soissons, unless we except a
minor success in Lorraine. The Belgians have
thrown a certain force forward on Dixmude. The
role of the British containing the considerable
German concentration in front of them remains
the same.
In the Dardanelles there has been no change
at all up to the news last received at the moment
of writing; but the French Government have
thought it advisable to issue an official document
which tells us much what the general criticism of
that campaign had already decided — to wit. that
the task is very much more formidable than the too
facile expectations formed in this country at its
origin expected.
A statement of total casualties made by
the Prime Minister in the course of the week is
one of the most noticeable pieces of evidence we
have upon which to base our estimate of the
present phase of the war.
The chief of these points will be dealt with
in more detail later on, but we may, perhaps, as a
preliminary, this week consider tlie chances of
that renewed offensive in the West upon the part
of the enemy, wliich has spread like a sort of
rumour, though without direct evidence to back
it, during the last few davs.
A RENEWED ENEMY OFFENSIVE IN
THE WEST.
The chances of the enemy's abandoning quite
shortly his long-ma intaint-d and now perilous
defensive attitude upon the Western line have
been discussed much more among the general
public of Western Europe during the last week
than has been the case for many months past.
There is no official warranty for such an attitude.
It is not a case of expert or secretly instructed
opinion leaking out and informing the mass of
opinion. The expectation is rather due to the
great length of time that has passed since the
fuller operations of the dry weather began and
the absence during all that time of any big
German move in the West. This, coupled with
the continued postponing of a corresponding offen-
sive on the part of the Allies (which was expec-ted,
by opinion general and particular, to be due at an
earlier date than the present), has led to the sug-
gestion mentioned above.
What the intentions of the enemy may be in
the matter no mortal can tell. A mere prophecy
upon it would be inane. But we can at least esti-
mate the conditions under which such an offensive
would be undertaken, and show Avhat it would
connote elsewhere. The chief points seem to be
these :
(1) The enemy can undertake such an offen-
sive without wholly abandoning his effort upon
the Eastern front, thougli he would have to give
up his hope of a decision there. The accumulation
of shell which he has expended in that effort
cannot represent his total accumulation, for even
though, as is probable, the enemy is producing less
shell in proportion to his numbers than are the
Western Allies, yet the three millions odd which
he is supposed to have accounted for in the
Galician movement, even if this refers only to
heav}- shell, by no means represents his total pos-
sible' accumulation of the winter and spring
months.
(2) Since it is not lack of m.unitions that
will prevent his attempting a renewal of this
offensive upon the West, although, unlike his
Eastern effort, he will there be met by what our
Russian Ally can tin fortunately not meet him
with — -that is, a weight of heavy gun fire superior
to his own — the matter is rather a problem of
men.
Now we know pretty accurately what the
enemy's reserves of men are — at least, of men at
all useful for his purpose, and excluding the boys
and middle-aged people, whom popular jour-
nalism summons up to swell his figures; and from
these known figures it is certain that if he
attempts any great offensive in the West he must
do so entirely at the expense of the Italian fron-
tier. He can only concentrate men, sufficient for
an attack on even one principal sector of the
Franco-Belgian lines, by leaving everything south
LAND AND WATER
June 19, 1915.
of the Avatershed of the Alps to drift gradually
into Italian hands. An offensive in the West
must be tlie product of a deliberate policy — to
give up trying to break Russia and to let Italy
have her own way. Short of such a policy, his
main strategy must still consist in attempting to
break the Russian lines and to get at last his long-
deferred decision in the East : when, and only
when, tan he move men back in sufficient strength
to use them against both the Southern and the
Western fronts.
(3) We must not mistake the vigorous local
counter-ofi'ensive such as he will be virtually com-
pelled to undertake (if he has not already begun
it) by the increasing French menace to his main
lines of communication.
This local counter-offensive would be no more
than a defensive measure intended to maintain
the Western line, and not intended to achieve a
decision against those who contain him there —
not intended, that is, to break through.
A main offensive against the Western line
would mean the concentration upon one single
sector of it of certainly not less than ten, and
better, fifteen, corps over and beyond those that
are now standing from the Jura to the sea. That
he can in the course of the summer obtain such
forces by drawing upon all possible reserves and
by maintaining the results of his Eastern advance
without further attempting to pierce the Russian
line is conceivable. That he can make this effort
and at the same time undertake a sufficient defen-
sive, let alone an offensive, on the Austro-Italian
frontier is inconceivable. And when I say " he "
I mean, of course, the enemy as a whole, for there
is no distinction in this between the German and
the Austrian forces, the moving of many men to
one place meaning inevitably their absence from
another, whether for the purpose of Germany or
Austria is quite immaterial. Even in the matter
of a siege train, where Austria had such a great
advantage over Germany at the beginning of the
war, things must now be equalised; but there is
DO proof that the human material of the Austrian
service at this stage of the war is inferior to that
of its ally.
THE ITALIAN F.'K^NTIER : THE PRE-
LIMINARY MOVEMENT FOR THE
RAILWAYS.
Though it is already nearer a month than
three weeks since the Italian declaration of war,
the mass of the Italian Army has not yet brought
its pressure to bear upon the frontiers. We arc
still only dealing with the movements of what it
may not be technically correct still to call " cover-
ing " troops, but vvhat are in numbers and pur-
pose little more.
It is the business of this screen, as has been
repeatedly explained in these columns, to make
itself master of the issues from which the enemy
could threaten the main Italian advance upon
Trieste and the Istrian Peninsula. These issues
— the passes out of the Trentino and over the
Carnic Alps — were, when the frontier was drawn
up half a century ago, numerous, and each served
by a road. To-day they are still in their la.st
segments the same and still dependent mainly
upon road traffic. But these last segments are of
no use unless the nnich rarer railways behind
them are continuously open to receive men and
munitions from the Austrian bases.
You cannot supply a modern army with its
provision, especially of heavy ammunition, save
by a railway. If, therefore, you have roads, A,
B, C, D, issuing from mountain valleys and
enabling you to attack your enemy's communica-
tions M— N, these roads, A, B, C, D, are no use
to you unless the railway E — F behind them lead-
ing to your bases of supply is intact. If the enemy
works round and cuts it, as, say, at G, your roads
are useless. In other words, wherever the Italians
isolate any particular road system of the Aus-
trians from the railway system of Austria they
close that avenue of attack against themselves.
As was explained last v\eek and the week
before, there are three main groups of railway
with which the Italians must concern themselves.
First, that which feeds the Trentino; secondly,
the main line to Vienna and its tributaries
through the Pontebba frontier point; and thirdly,
the system serving the Istrian Peninsula.
The first is isolated if the Italians can isolate
the junction of Franzenfeste ; the second is iso-
lated in some degree if they can isolate the junc-
tion of Tarvis; and the union between these two
systems whereby one can help the other and troops
and munitions can be massed laterally upon one
or the other at will is destroyed if the line through
the Pusterthal is cut.
As to the third system, that which serves
the Istrian Penin.sula and the towns of Trieste
and Pola, it is a rather more difficult proposition.
The Istrian Peninsula and Trieste are served
by three main lines, each reaching to enemy bases
of supply. They may be put diagrammatically as
in plan III. The first runs up the Isonzo Valley,
through Goerz, past Tolmino, under the new great
Wochein Tunnel, and so up to the direct line to
Vienna. At Goerz itself is a bifurcation ; two
lines serve Goerz in its communication with
Trieste, the one through Monfalcone, the other
up the Branica Valley and across the plateau
which the Austrians call the Karst. The fiist line
is cut altogether if you cut it anywhere above
Goerz, but Goerz can be provisioned by the lines
reaching Trieste from the east unless hoth rail-
ways south of Gop.rz are also cut.
June 19, 1915.
LAND AND WATER,
^o Innsbruck
andnearest
'\lsfortherti
'Bases of
Austrums
Ponfebba
76 Vienna and
iij Central and
'Eastern 'Bases
ofAastrums
1/IaiiL ItaEan Cbnummirations
II
So far, the line as a whole has been cut at
Plava. The Italian advanced troops have there
crossed the River Isonzo, as well as seized the rail-
way (which at this point runs on the western
side of the stream). Trieste and Goerz and Pola
can therefore no longer use the main and most
direct line to Vienna. But Trieste is not cut off,
because the Eastern railways by Laibach remain,
and Goerz is not cut off from Trieste because,
ToVu
eana
Tolmino
/
,\,
rf
/Plavai
(line cut -ar
ky Italisuis) ■
MonfilconeX
(line cut ^
fyltaliatis)
Duino
a nearer junction at Divazza would isolate Pola
and Trieste, though it would not isolate Fiuma,
but it is probable or certain that this last junction
is protected by the works which, temporary and
permanent, will defend Trieste. It is only six or
seven miles away from the outskirts of that town.
We may sum up, then, and say that on this
third sector, that of the Istrian Peninsula, v/liat
the Italians have done so far is to cut the main
northern line from Vienna serving Goerz and
Trieste, but they have not as yet isolated the fir.st
of these places with its depots and garrison, still
served by the plateau railway; still less have they,
cut off Trieste, which is still amply supplied by
the great line from the east and Laibach.
In the second sector, that of the Carnic Alps,
the Italian advance along the railway has reached
Malborghetto. That fortified position must ba
t>oU-
Hume
although Mon Falcone has been occupied by the
Italians, who have, indeed, proceeded as far as
Duino, the second line across the plateau is still
open. The line serving Trieste from the east will
remain open until the junction at St. Peter is
held, and that is still a long way off. If that were
seized the whole Istrian Peninsula would be
isolated. But tlierc is no getting there until the
works at Goerz are reduced, and even then
the advance will liave to be made for nearly forty
miles over rather diflicult countrv, lending itself
Tbntibba'l
Tifvis
Prtlil Puss / "*'*'*>». rs,.
'■»' ■••»Ttfrglou
to a strong defensive. It is true that the seizing of
3»
reduced or masked before a direct advance can
continue upon the junction of Tarvis. But there
may be repeated what was said in these columns
three weeks ago, that every point upon the Telia
Valley can be turned by comparatively easy
marches across the southern boundary walfof thaJb
valley. All mountain positions lend themselves to
the defensive.
A X D WATER.
June 19, 1915.
There remains the third sector, the prime
objective in which is the Franzenfeste, the two
subsidiary objectiAes in which are the cutting of
the lines down the Valley of the Adige, above
Trent, and through the Pusterthal. At this point
we must carefully note, but not be misled by, the
position of Cortina. Cortina has been occupied
by the advanced Italian forces — in what strengtii
we do not know. Two roads lead from it. The
one to the Adige Valley, through the Falzarego
Vallej', and across the Tresassi Pass; another to
the Pusterthal northwards. The mere distance
from Cortina to the railways is tvventy-five miles
in the one case, as the crow flies, and only twelve
miles in the other, and the ob.servation of such
short intervals has led to hopes which may be dis-
appointed, or at least may be premature. The
\\
I
ft •
I':
CORTINA
XV
Italian advance posts have, indeed, penetrated up
both these roads for a few miles, but all the heavy
work still lies before them. It is^ as has been twice
repeated here, the worst possible country for an
offensive: a tangle of high mountains, and the
main ridge of these still in front of our ally in
either case. It is to be presumed that a very
vigorous effort will be made to reach the Puster-
thal and cut its all-important railway. There
are positions not six miles from Cortina whence
that line could conceivably be shelled, and a suc-
cessful action upon the pass at the head of ti-e
Euffredo would leave the advancing troops v.ith a
clear road before them dovrn into the valley. But
the task will be a hard one, and it is not yet
accomplished.
The other, much longer, road to the west has
this double drawback, that two ridges have to be
crossed; that under the Pordoi Peak, as well as
the Tresassi, and that even when the whole moun-
tain road is forced and the railway reached, one
only comes on to that railway at the lower end of
the Eisach gorge, nearly tliirty miles below the
point of Franzenfeste, with no chance of a turn-
ing movement upon either -iide of that deep cut
through the hills.
To get upon the railway near Bozen would,
indeed, isolate Trent, but it would leave the enemy
free to move troops f rora any one of his great bases
towards the Adige again. To cut the railway in
the Pusterthal would be to do much more, for it
would prevent the two main lines from backing
each other up, but it would still leave each of them
independently able to act. To seize the Franzen-
feste would paralyse the enemy altogether, but the
Franzenfeste is precisely what it is most diflleuit
to reach in all this system.
THE GALIGIAN POSITION.
It is too early j-et to say what exactly has
happened on the Galician front, but the news
received up to Tuesday evening presented the
following situation :
(1) The main crossing of the Dniester at
Zurawno, which tlie enemy liad forced upon
June 6, broke down badly, and the circumstances
of its breakdown point to a cause precisely
similar to that which has affected the successes as
much as the checks of the enemy throughout the
whole of this great offensive in the East — the
factor of heavy artillery.
When his gre^t guns are on a railwav or close
to a railway, and have behind them short good
roads from railhead, the enemy can at regular
inten'als, imposed by the necessity of bringing up
sJiell, pursue his advance. He does not break tlie
Russian line, as is his object, but he pushes it
further and fui'ther back with the spasmodic
effort of heavy artillery acting every few days
after it lias time to acquire a further local .accu-
mulation of munitions.
But once you put an obstacle between railway
and gun (even if it be only tiiat of the Upper
Dniester, v^ith its muddy banks and bottom, and
the absence of a good road upon tiie further side),
so that his tran.sport of big shell is ham.pered, the
effort l,)reaks down. We have had exactly the
*ime thing repeated half a dozen times since the
great GaUcian offensive began.
(2) Meanwhile, to the north, in front of
Jai'oslav, and as far north as Sienp.va and as far
south as Mosciska, there has been a sharp advance
upon the part of the enemy. Tie claims as many
prisoners as the Russians counter-claim in their
more southern success at Zurav,'no. But the im-
portant thing is not the number of wounded men
picked up as one advances over the belt through
which one's eneniy has retired, but the strategical
eff'ect one has produced by one's advance.
Xow, in this little sector in front of Jaroslav
there is no good natural obstacle between the San
and the district of Lemberg. The River Lubac-
zo^vka does not bend down southward enough to
form a barrier. The true line here, as was pointed
out when we analysed this front more than a
month ago, is the line of the San continued by
the line of the Wiznia. But the line of the Wiznia
is turned once the San is crossed in force at Jaro-
slav, and to the north of that tovrn, and the up-
shot of the matter is that if the German claim is
well founded it amounts to this :
The attempt to force the approaches to Lem-
berg from the south by Zurawno have failed.
Troops and munitions liave been brought round to
the northern sector, and a vigorous advance,
which is in prcnicss of succeeding, and has not
yet fully suc-ceedi^d, is taking place there. The
sector upon which the attack has been delivered
Jime 19, 1915.
LAND AND W A T K R .
JASiiSLAVJi \^'< TuchiJ
l£^C5ERC
PRZEMTtSL'
"Sussiios izz Calicui, \ v^'^r
^ — .^•....^— ... Old-Sirsscan.
Trottt before Jdrosiay, June lOfh.
«xxxX)ixx*^xx Old German Traitt
before luro-wrdsw. hetdJime 6^^. lostjiuie 10^12^
is further from Lemberg than the Zurawiw
sector; but, cm the other hand, there are no con-
siderable obstacles such as the Dniester in the
way.
(3) A long way off — nearly seventy miles to
the south — another crossing of the Dniester has
been effected at Zaleszky, backed up by the rail^ray
from Czernowitz, and the whole Russian line has
retreated from the Pruth to the Dniester, and, in
the immediate neighbourhood of Czernowitz, to
the frontier. But action down there, apart from
its political effect of separating the Russian from
the Roumanian forces and presumably delaying
the entry into the field of the latter, has very fittla
effect upon the general situation. The ultimata
objective is still the breaking of the Russian line,
or, alternatively, the gettirij^ well behind the line
of the Vistula. The immediate objective is Lem-
berg, and action on the far south-cast will not
greatly eiTect either of these central objects save
in so far as they retain troops occupied vrho might
have been used by the Russians in the centre.
MUNITIONS AND PANIC.
IN the columns of this journal, under the date
of March 6 (that is, three months ago),
tliere appeared four pages of close matter
under the title '" The Call for Ammuni-
tion," and these columns contained among other
phrases the following :
If you wers to ask off-hand a man of gocd observation
. . . " What is the prime factor in ths problem of the
troncJios ? "... a soldier anywhere near the higher
command would almost certainly reply: " Ammunition, and
e-periall^ Jieavy gun ammnnilion."
And again :
This is the point we have to consider most carefully from
novr onwards, and it is one of those points in which public
opinion and a grasp by civilians of the conditions abroad is
of great value.
And again :
Public opinion, confused or ignorant upon these
essentials, leaves the authorities without drivLiig power
behind them.
And again :
There is needed for the proper supply of the heavy guns
and, ther?fore, for the chief factor to a decision upon tha
West, all the heavy gun ammunition that the whole resources
of the nation can turn out at the utmost speed and with the
inn^t vigorous resolution and skill.'
And again :
There can only too easily be an insufficiency or a hitch,
and yet, on the continual in^'rease of supply, on the swelling
and further swelling of it'; stream, depends Che future of this
cou)ilry more than ttpon any other factor.
And again :
One could wish that half the energy devoted to voluntary
recruitment could be turned on to eniphasising and re-
emphasising tliis all-importance ol the supply for which tha
heavy guns are hungry . . . for there lies ths key.'
In the course of those four pages much more
was said to make clear and nmsonable these very
emphatic pronouncements. They appeared, f
repeat, more than three months ago, and so much
being said, perhaps there is no reason to say more
upon that particular head, so far as this journal
is concerned.
i5ut my readers will rightly demand that
reasonable criticism of the campaign shall include
some explanation of the situation at present
reached in the supply of big shell, which means,
of coarse, big shell charged with high explosive.
The elements are perfectly simple. I vv-ill
tabulate them :
(1) The preparation of an advance against'
an entrenched enemy is mainly a matter of high
explosive shell. When you' have thoroughly
drenched a belt of such and such a width by a
crushing bombardment, your infantry can occupy
that belt.
(2) In this preparation you not only enter,
but weaken, yonr enemy's line, for you make your
enemy lose very heavilv in men.
(3) The actual breaking of an entrenched
line (a thing not yet achieved in this war save
once — in December, before Warsaw — and then
rapidly repaired) is dependent upon hea\7' shell
charged with high explosive being discharged
continuously for many days against the enemy
after a fashion to which he cannot reply on
account of his inferior supply of similar muni-
tions.
(4) Even if you do not break your enemy,
but only drive him back from entrenched position
to entrenched position, your effort depends upon
the sam.e factor.
(5) If you can so drive him back, even with-
out at first breaking him, you leave him but little
time to prepare nevv- positions : you may hope to
break him at the end of the effort. That is what
the enemy has been tiying to do in Galicia against
the Russians for six weeks past.
The v/hole thing, then, is a question of high
explosive large shell.
Now, once a steady advance begins you get,
as the Austro-Germans have found in Galicia,
and as I have described elsewhere this week, a
very difficult problem, which is that of communi-
cations. It is not enough to have great quantities
of big shell; you must also be able to move it
forward as rapidly as your enemy retreats — and
that is a big business. For handling big shell is
like handling kitchen ranges or mill-stones. But
for the initial effort, what you have to consider is
your power of accumulating great masses of shell,
which in number shall be something to which the
enemy cannot reply, supposing, of course, that
5»
LA.ND AND WATER.
June 19, 1915.
you have sufficient weapons for the discharge of
60 much munition. It takes so very much longer
to make, turn, fill, and fit a shell than it does
to fire it off that the whole process of these
^ deluges " of bombardment is necessarily spas-
modic. To borrow a metaphor from hydraulic
engineering, you have to get a " head " of shell.
jITou have to accumulate shell for very many days
^"which will be discharged in a very few hours.
jtBefore undertaking a great offensive effort such
as the Germans and Austro-Hungarians have just
^mdertaken in Galicia, you must spend weeks or
months in stocking up shell at your advanced
bases of supply. Tlie more you stock up the better
chance you have of achieving your object. There-
fore the longer you vrait — in reason, and always
supposing that the enemy is still tangled up else-
^Hfhere — the wiser you are.
It follows from all this that to press the
production of shell to the utmost limits is the
chief and obvious duty of a community engaged
in modern war when met by siege conditions.
Whether it is wise to stimulate this produc-
tion by dull ofiicial rhetoric, newspaper panic, or
any other adventitious method I will leave it to
others to discuss. At any rate, you cannot have
too much supply.
Meanwhile, those who see the campaign as a
whole are asking them.selves such questions as the
following, and everyone who desires to judge the
position must ask himself the same questions :
Have we any proof that the enemy can pro-
duce shell, new linings for guns as those linings
pet worn out, new big pieces, &c., can fill and fit
the same at any greater rate than can the Western
'Allies? It is, to say the least of it, doubtful; and
until one has very good proof to the contrary one
would — knowing the character of the various
nations involved — doubt it. The enemy has made
a mighty effort in Galicia. In spite of that
effort he lias not succeeded in breaking the
liussian line, and therefore he has lost enor-
mously in nsen — certainly not less than half a
million — without so far having obtained anything
like a decision, and he has expended in six weeks
ammunition v^hich it took him, perhaps, twenty
weeks to produce. Italy alone has been for five
months producing munitions with a clear compre-
hension of what this type of warfare has become
and of what is needed for it. The French people
have devoted tlieir whole energy to the same end.
Have we any proof that the enemy have done
more? That they had an advantage over Eussia
in this matter, seeing that Eussia can only with
difficulty obtain supplies from abroad, that her
industrialisation is not that of the West, that her
communications and the rolling stock upon her
railways is not that of the West, we all know.
But would the higher command in the West
regard the enemy's supply and accumulation of
ehell as superior to its own ? I doubt it.
Next we must ask the question, can the pro-
'duction, such as it is, be increased in the West?
[Whether it can be increased in France or in Italy
may be doubted. Those nations are conscript for
war and are prepared with their utmost energies.
That it can be increased in this country is obvious,
for this country is highly industrialised, and is
making a great many things, apart from those
needed for the war. The economic support which
this country can give to the great alliance demands
active production in every field. But there is
obviously a margin for the increased production
of shell. What that margin is only the
authorities know.
Again, can the enemy obtain supplies from
outside his own territory for the production of
shell? If he can it is the fault of the blockade.
That he has got cotton through for his propellant
explosives we know. Why it has been allowed we
do not know. But has he also got his material for
shell ? Italy has allowed nothing to go in since
December, and if the enemy is getting for his pro«
duction what he cannot find within his own
boundaries, then it comes in through the North'
Sea, and the answer to that question is therefore
political. It will not be discussed here, because it
IS also highly controA'ersial, and depends upon
elements in the international problem of which
no layman has cognisance.
But the situation is quite clear. If the
blockade is fully enforced the enemy cannot get
supplies from outside his own territory, whereas
the Western Allies can, and do.
But the production of shell does not only con-
sist in the supply of shell cases, of copper bands,
and fuses. It also consists in the high explosive
for the bursting charge of a large shell.
Is there a shortage among the AVestern Allies
in these high explosives ?
In order to answer that question it can only
be suggested that one form of high explosive, and
one alone, can show some shortage, and that is
T.N.T. It is not the most violent, but it is the
safest form. It is that mainly used in the British,
German, and Austrian services. Its basis is the
destructive distillation of coal. In this country
it has not paid manufacturers and coal-owners in
time of peace to produce the raw material for this
explosive in sufficient quantities. That there is
any shortage in other forms of high explosive is
doubtful in the extreme, and no shadow of proof
that there is any such shortage has appeared.
AVithout some evidence, we do well to disbelieve it.
I repeat that a belated newspaper panic or
the commoner kind of political rhetoric may, or
may not, be necessary here as a spur to the produc-
tion of high explosive shell. One would have hoped
not. They are not necessary elsewhere. If such
means are necessary, by all means let them be era-
ployed for those upon whom they have useful
effect. But let sober judgment recognise that
while you cannot have too much of these munitions
— always supposing that the guns and their
repair keep pace with the possible rate of dis-
charge— the probability is against the enemy's
having in the West a superiority in munitions.
It is probable — I have not the authority to
say it is certain — that in this, as in every other
matter, the more developed and the more active
nations have the advantage over the enemy.
Whether this judgment is right or not only the
development of the offensive in the West, when it
takes place, can decide.
Meanwhile we may note that every very
hea\y and successful bombardment in the West,
followed by an advance, has come from the Allies
and has been agahist the enemy for weeks and
months past, while the single example of a con-
siderable enemy advance — that north of Ypres —
has taken place, not through superiority of high
explosive munitions, but through the unexpected
use of poisonous gases, which novel method is
now comprehended and met.
6*
June 19, 1915.
LAND AND AV' A T E R
AN ANALYSIS OF NUMBERS.
UPON Wednesday, June 9, the Prime
Minister made a statement in the
House of Commons of the utmost im-
portance for the comprehension of the
war in its present phase. He gave at once the
numbers and nature of the casualties suffered by
the British forces in France from the beginning
of the war to May 31.
Upon the wisdom or unwisdom of this pub-
lication of casualty lists no judgment is possible.
The matter is a very close one for or against. The
argument for is that a nation at war should know
and underst-and its sacrifice. The argument
against is that the enemy learns hov/ it stands.
That the arguments are strongly against such a
policy is clear enough from the decision of the
French and of the Eussians to keep the enemy in
ignorance. That the arguments in favour of such
a policy are strong is clear from the fact that the
Germans, and in a lesser degree the Austrians
(who act under orders from Berlin), give their
casualties — though in a belated form, and v/ith a
good deal of cooking and holding back of impor-
tant cases.
At any rate, the practical value of such
figures is that from them we can do something to
estimate the real position of the enemy, for the
British lists are rigidly accurate and brought
right up to date. We know that there is
such and such a ratio normally of wounded
to killed, of missing to wounded, and though
the lists tell us nothing of sick (who are
at least equal to the slightly wounded in numbers
at any given moment) they enable us to judge the
ndnimum of the enemy losses from his ov\'n im-
perfect figures. For the enemy is absolutely cer-
tainly suffering, counting the Eastern and the
Western fighting, more than the Allies, and im-
mensely more than France and England.
Having said so much let us see vrhat this
official statement teaches us.
The very first thing we note is that the trench
work of the last six months is much more expen-
sive than work in the open field. The proportion
of one in eight which was taken in all the earlier
calculations of this journal as roughly accurate
for the proportion of killed to total casualties
was a true estimate, and, indeed, an under-esti-
mate, before the war in the West became a matter
of siege work. It will still be found probably a
true multiple for the Eastern warfare during the
recent Russian retirement and enemy advance in
Galicia. But it clearly does not apply to the con-
ditions of trench warfare, pure and simple, in
which the' shelling of marked positions does, in
proportion to the total number of people accounted
for, a larger execution in disabled and dead than
does fire in the open field.
I believe it will be found true when an
analysis is made that the multiple of one in eight
for dead to total casualties up to, say, the middle
of November, was fairly accurate. Since then the
multiple has obviously lowered. And, I repeat,
the practical value of establishing this multiple
is that it enables us to gauge the enem3''s figures
— for upon a due comprehension of the enormous
enemy wastage our judgment of the campaign
and its chances must principally be based.
Since the trench work began, the multiple, as
J say, has fallen. How far has it fallen ? How
many men are really being put out of action as
judged by the number of killed in the trench
work upon either side?
The total number of casualties officially given
to May 31 in the Expeditionary Force as a whole
is 253,069, that is to date rather less than a third.
Of these one-fifth are killed, four-fifths the re-
maining casualties. The multiple is, therefore,
at the present day one to five in the particular
forces in question, and the total casualties are
exactly what general calculation has made them.
Alrea(iy som.ewhat over a quarter, but far less
than a third, of the total forces engaged in every
field.
At this point we shall do well^ — since our only
practical object in dealing thus coldly with such
sacred things is to judge the enemys position —
to note that a general list thus given after ten
months' leisure for the establishment of statistics
and with the very rapid final figures available to
the British Government (the Germans are often
months behindhand) gives the full total of those
who have died, and therefore includes all those
who have died of wounds or even of sickness in
hospital, and appreciably raises the proportion of
dead to woimded and missing com.pared with lists
drawn up in the field as are the German lists,
published most imperfectly after a great lapse of
time.
We have, I say, a multiple of dead to other
casualties of almost exactly one in five.
A¥hen we go into a fuither analysis we find
that of the officers the killed make up nearly a
third of the officer casualties, of the rank and file
just less than a fifth. Such a disproportion is
not abnormal and may pass without comment. It
is to be adversely judged in one of three cases :
(1) When the men need leadership beyond
the ordinary — in which case the officer losses are
exaggerated.
(2) Y.'hen, during a great retreat, an army
breaks down and the missing show ver\' few
officers in proportion to the rank and file.
(3) When there is heavy mortality from
causes other than battle casualties, such mortality
commonly falling more heavily upon the rank and
file than upon the officers.
None of these three elements have been pre-
sent in the case of the British Expeditionary
Force, and those who read these figu.'e^ have
reason to be proud of them.
The next point we note is that the rate of
loss is declining in proportion t-o the number of
men employed. There was a moment in mid-
winter, perhaps, when it was rising in proportion
to the number of men employed. But the curve
passed its maximum in the course of the winter.
Thus, it is instructive to note that as early as the
end of October more than a fxfth of the present
casualties had been experienced, although up to
that time the very largo reinforcement of the
Expeditionary Force bvad hardly begun.
The following three montlis only doubled the
casimlties. In other words, twice the amount of
time accounted for twice the amoiint of
casualties, althougli the amount of men present
was increasing continunlly. Tlie succeeding four
months rather m.ore than doubled the casual-
ties noted up to just after tlie end of January,
and the rate thus established was more or less
7»
LAND AND WATER,
June 19, TQIS.
normal to the type of vrarfare, for the reinforce-
ments provided were at about the ratio of the
increasing casualty roll. The latter period in-
cluded two or three considerable local offensive
movements with their heavy toll of men, and
(it is important to remember this) the deaths
in hospital of men ■\\ounded earlier, when
the larger reinforcements were just beginning to
come out.
We next turn to the proportion of missing.
iThese are very nearly exactly one in five, and give
us, as to the whole force, something like one in
seventeen. That also is important, because, in
estimating the results of the compaign, it is valu-
able to calculate as best we may the enemy miss-
ing, remembering that on the Western front the
form of capture is precisely the same upon both
sides, consisting, as it does, of wounded men
picked up by the opposing sides whenever the line
fluctuates and of small batches of unwounded
men surrounded and cut oft". Though even here
we must make the remark that the great pre-
ponderance is in favour of the Allies. With the
exception of the surprise due to the use of poisons
north of Ypres upon one particular day, the in-
dividual actions upon the whole Western front
have resulted in the capture of perhaps two Ger-
mans to one of the Allies.
This result has not been apparent upon the
British front, where things have lain more or less
even. But if you consider all the local French
actions in front of Alsace, in the Woeuvre, in
Champagne, and latterly north of Arras, I thinlc
this estimate will be found 'fairly accurate when
statistics are available.
Now let us put our conclusions together.
They mean, with regard to missing, that the
enemy cannot have lost less in his driblets of
prisoners upon the Western front since the trench
warfare began than 100,000 men. He has prob-
ably lost more, but he has not lost less.
They mean that he may safely multiply his
admitted killed in the official lists by six to get
his total casualties — tliere is no doubt that this
multiple of six is too low, for the names of his
killed often come in in very belated fashion. And
on the Eastern front the great mass of his work
has been done in the open field. Well, to appre-
ciate losses from this cause alone — wounded and
missing, excluding sick — we have only to discover
the Prussian lists of killed (which are published),
to add rather less than one-fifth for the non-
Prussian lists of the German Empire (which are
also published, though less easily obtainable), to
add eighty per cent, more to this total for the
Austro-Hungarian contingents (for that is aboufi
the proportion these Allies furnish to the Ger-
manic Powers as a whole), multiply the result by
six, and we shall get the enemy casualties, exclud-
ing sick, upon the basis of the British casualties,
which are the most accurate, detailed, and up to
date of any given in this great campaign.
I repeat, without fear of being belied by
actual statistics when these shall be fully avail-
able, that such a multiple of six is, for the enemy,
insufficient. The Austro-Hungarians have lost
enormously more in prisoners in proportion than
have the British; the German lists are belated,
and the lists of killed refer mainly on their side
to those immediately killed in action, &c., «S:c,
But take a multiple of six as a conservative esti-
mate, and excluding sick you have, before the big
and enormously expensive Galician adventure
was undertaken, about a million and a third in the
Prussian lists with killed to total casualties one-
fifth under the true ratio. Call the Prussian lists
a million and a half up to the big Galician efiort
and you are not in any great error. And, say,
300,000, or a trifle less, for the rest of i\\o Germ.an
Empire, and }"ou are near 1,800,000. Add eighty
per cent, for the Austro-Hungarians, and you get
about three millions and a quarter.
Now, that is excluding sick. It is cutting
down the very high rate of wounded in the open
manoeuvring of all the Eastern war. It is exclud-
ing the mass of the great Galician effort, which
cannot possibly account for less than half a million
men upon the enemy's side, counting the lighter
casualties and sick, and it is excluding the very
large proportion of Austro-Hungarian missing
through disaffection and capture in every stage
of the campaign, and particularly in the earlier
part of it.
Conclude that the enemy as a wh.ole has at
the present moment much nearer four million than
three million men permanently out of the field and
j'ou are making what is called in commerce a con-
servative estimate.
The mood of those who desire to control
public opinion in this country at this moment —
for what object I know not — is adverse to the
mildest and most just conclusions upon what is
called " the optimistic side." I cannot help that.
Arithmetic is arithmetic, and a sound judgment
based upon real things is worth all the sensa-
tionalism in the world. The enemy's potential
manhood for actual fighting within the first year
has probably been diminished by nearly one-half
from all causes. But it has quite certainly been
that I have quoted.
A GENERAL SURVEY.
{Continued.)
I SAID last week that after the German and
Austrian motive in preparing and launch-
ing this war the next point to be considered
was the theories of the coming war — i.e., the
■guesses as to its probable nature — with which the
enemy entered it. For on the Tightness and
wrongness of these guesses depended the issue.
The enemy's theories with regard to modem
■war in general and the coming campaign in par-
licular must be distinctly tabulated if we are to
grasp both the measure of his particular success
and of his general failure, and each must be
numbered so that we may refer to each and show
in what it was a just judgment or the reverse.
Those theories are as follows :
(1) Under the political conditions of the
French a blow struck at Paris would necessarily
have one of three effects, either of them fatal
upon the numerically inferior French forces.
Either (a) it would lure the French Army as a
whole to the defence of Paris, and therefore bring
it up against the numerical superiority of the in-
•8
June 19, 1915.
LAXD AND WATER
vader; or (b) it vvould divide the French forces
into an anny attempting to hold the frontier and
forces atteniptinc; to save the capital; or, what is
most likely of aU, (c) a plan having been finally
decided upon by the French General Staff and in-
volving the abandonment of Paris would, when
danger actually threatened, be overruled by poli-
tical considerations and would fall into chaos.
In either of these three contingencies the
French Army was doomed to destruction. In the
first it would be destroyed as an inferior force
pitted against a superior one. In the second", those
forces used for the defence of Paris would be
separated from the rest of the army and each
would be defeated in detail. (It was, in fact, this
situation upon which the Germans gambled and
lost just before the battle of the Marne.) In the
third, they would simply be an easy prey, which
they had been in 1870, at the mercy of a resolute,
superior, and united enemy.
(2) The march on Paris is obviously best
achieved through the Belgian plain from the
frontiers of Luxemburg to those of Switzerland,
the French having a fortified frontier, a reduction
of which would check an invasion whose success
was essential to the general scheme. No obstacles
as formidable threatened an advance through the
Belgian plain. Further, there was here the best
set of railway communications in especial, and
the whole advance v>-as backed by the best railway
communications in Germany— to wit, those
through the industrial districts and flat country
which forms the north of the German Empire.
Now to this advance through the Belgian
plain there existed as obstacles the fortresses of
Liege and Namur, and possibly some resistance
from the armed forces of Belgium in the open
field. But, in the first place, the enemy did not
believe that the Belgian trained forces, such as
they were, would offer resistance. In the second
place, supposing Belgium to make some sort of
resistance, he was av,-are that no sufficient body of
trained troops, particularly gunners with their
munitions, exi.sted for the defence of the Belgian
frontiers. In the third place, he believed he could
deal with tho.se frontiers after a fashion, which
concerns the next point in this table.
(3) The third theory upon which the war was
waged by the enemy was that modern permanent
fortifications would give way very rapidly— in
a matter of a few hours or days — in the bom-
bardment from great mobile howitzers, such as
the Austrian service especially had designed
and produced. All that was required was
a suflicient concentration of such fire upon one
sector of the ring defending the fortress, the long
range of the large mobile howitzer — Austrian, re-
member, not Prussian in its conception and design
• — rendering it almost invulnerable to the flat
trajectory of the guns of the fort.
(4) The fourth theory of the war upon which
the enemy relied was the power of modern
machinery, notably that of petrol traflic using
good roads. It seemed to the enemy obvious that
your modern advance, holding the enemy unit for
unit, would, with a superiority of numbers to
spare, always be able to come round in flank with
a good road system and with ample provision of
petrol vehicles with which to move troops.
(5) The fifth theory of the enemy was of a
negative type, and concerned both rifle and field-
gun fire. ,We must not exaggerate this theory,
but it is worth study in its true and moderate
form. In such a form it may be put thus : The
superiority of a really quick-firing field-piece, such
as the Fi'ench seventy-five; the supei'iority of good
fire discipline in your infantry and accurately
aimed shots from the same is an asset of the de-
fensive rather than offensive type. Other things
being equal, of course, the more rapid xout de-
livery of shrapnel against the enemy manoeuvring
with liberty, and the more accurate your rifle fire
against him the better for you. But these will
not be the deciding factors if, in reliance upon
them, one sacrifices that conception of attack
which is the soul of the Prussian system, and
which is at bottom the idea of a swarm. Better
a worse field-gun, with slower rate of firing and
a less accurate service; better infantry imperfect
in their training as riflemen, but withal men
trained to stand very hea\7 losses in close forma-
tion, than tlie very best field artillery in the world
and the most pei*fect fire discipline in the hands
of men who are compelled to de})loy thinly and
who fear the hea^■y losses of massed attack.
(5) Get your men to stand very heavy tem-
porary losses while they attack in swarms, and
those losses will be met amply, for they will be
a good investment. Because, though the trial will
be very severe while it lasts, it will be brief, and,
such a form of attack will be decisive.
(7) Finally, even against troops in the open
and for general purposes of war, as, for instance,
against trenches, let alone against more or less
permanent work and the more elaborate field for-
tifications, see that you have an ample supply of
high explosive shell. It will do more against
troops in the open than the French theorists have
allowed, and it is a sort of reserve power for all
sorts of unexpected conditions that may arise.
(8) On the defensive a well-handled and large
supply of machine guns will be your best st^Jid-
by. Those were the main theories upon which the
enemy relied as he went into action with, I repeat,
the moral certitude of immediate and decisive
victory.
As we shall see, he was right in some of these
theories, wrong in others, and those in which he
was wrong were precisely those which caused
his failure, but those in which he was right
brought grave embarrassment to the Allies,
strengthened his own power of resistance, and pro-
longed the war in the fashion we all know. Where
he was right and where wrong we will next dis-
cuss. After that we will proceed to the new and
unexpected developments of the campaign after
the enemy had failed in his first stroke, notably
to the development of trench warfare or siege
work, and to the corresponding novel necessity of
heavy artillery supply, three, five, ten times as
great within a given time as any previous student
of war had allowed for.
H. BELLOC.
(To be continued.)
MR. EELLOC'S I ECTURES ON THE WAR.
Mr. Hilaire Belloc will give a series of three lectures on the War
at Queen's Hall on Tuesday, June 22 ; Tuesday, July 13 ; and Tuesday,
July 27. Scats may now be booked at reduced prices for the series.
llr. Belloc wiU lecture at the Town Hall, Have, at 8 o'clock o^
MonJoy, June 21.
At 3.30, the Winter Gardens, Eoumcmoufh, Monday, June 28.
At 8 o'clock, the Speech Hall, Wycfnibe Abbey, High Wyconiba,
on Wednesday, July 7.
D W A T E E .
Juae 19, 19151
THE WAR BY WATER.
By A. H. POLLEN.
FjOTE Thi3 article his bees subicitUd to the Prus Bureaa, w&lch does not object to the pobllcatien u ceasored, and takes a*
responsibility tor tiie correctoesi of the sfatemccti.
SINCE Italy became a belligerent, and en-
tirely altered the iirospective role of the
Austrian fleet by threatening the territory
in which its ports are situated with inva-
sion, there has been no other change of any
moment in the naval situation. If the United
States becomes a belligerent, there will be an im-
portant change, because the strength of the Allies
in the North Sea will have reached a point as will
relieve the English military command of all
anxiety as to raids or invasions. And President
Wilson's Note seems to make the belligerency of
the United States far m.ore likely — a question
that I will discuss at greater length below. In
the meantime, there has been a certain amount of
activity in the Baltic, in the Adriatic and in the
Black Sea, but none of the actions have been of
first-class importance.
THE GERMAN THREAT TO RIGA.
We have now some further information as to
what took place north of Libau and between Goth-
land and the Gulf of Eiga, on June 3, 4, and 6.
The first stories that reached us led one to hope
that quite serious damage might have been done
to certain units of the German battle fleet. But,
while it is not specifically contradicted that no
battleship was hurt, it seems more probable that
the only casualties suffered by the respective sides
were the loss of the former mine-layer Yev.esci by
the Russians, and the loss of the transport Ilin-
denhurg and a destroyer by the Germans, and the
wounding of one other German destroyer and a
cruiser. The German occupation of Libau creates
a somewhat anomalous position, and seems to have
led the temporary holders of what is neither a
naval port nor an arsenal into certain adventures
which have not turned out very successfully. On
June 3 and 4 a squadron of ten battleships were
sent to operate in the neighbourhood of the Gulf
of Riga. This squadron was accompanied by
destroyers, cruisers, and other auxiliaries. But
the approaches to the Gulf were protected by
Russian submarines, who, on meeting this
Armada, fired several torpedoes at the ships and
dropped mines over the courses it was assumed
they were going to take. The submarines had to
dive before they were able to verify the effects of
their torpedoes. But explosions were heard, and
it is believed some battleships were struck. On
the following dav a second encounter between sub-
marines and Germ.an vessels took place due north
of Libau, between the Island of Gothland and the
small coast town of Windau. In this encounter
one Germ.an destroyer and transport were sunk,
a small cruiser and another destroyer hit and
damaged. The dam.aged cruiser was towed back
to Libau. Two days later, en the 6th, a German
reconnaissance, supported by " units of great
power," found submarines in its course and with-
drew, but not before the Yenesei had been tor-
pedoed. So much for the news.
It is difficult to give any connected explana-
tion of what these different manceuvrcs may sig-
nify. If the German battleship squadron con-
sisted only of pre-Dreadnoughts, it would hardly
have ventured to enter the Gulf of Riga, v. here
the more powerful Russian fleet could apparently
have trapped it. And one does not quite under-
stand why the Germans would risk their main
Dreadnought fleet in waters that are mined and
frequented by submarines, unless the military
object were of extreme importance. But the
occupation of Libau and its rumoured conversion
into a submarine base does seem to show that the
German invasion of Courland was intended to be
something more than a demonstration. It is pos-
sible, therefore, that Germ.any may be contem-
plating combined operations with a view to turn-
ing the Russian right. It is characteristic of the
extreme secrecy with which all naval operations,
if they are to be effective, should be conducted,
that neither side gives more than the slenderest
scraps of information about these exceedingly im-
portant events.
THE BLACK SEA.
The Russians have raised the Turkish cruiser
Medjidieh, which they sank just over two months
ago, and have taken her into Odessa. The Medji-
dieh is a ten-year-old American-built cruiser,
armed like our Glasgoiv class, but with a speed of
only 22 knots. It is quite possible that within a
very few months she will turn out to be a valuable
acquisition. In the meantime, the fastest of the
cruisers on tJie Turkish side, the Breslan, fell in
with two Russian destroyers on the night of the
11th, and was vigorously engaged. One officer and
six men were wounded in one of the destroyers,
and the Breslau was hit several times. A succes-
sion of explosions was observed on board, and the
bows were in flames before the action was broken
off. The general campaign against the smaller
Turkish ports, which has been carried on ever
since Russia got command of these waters by
putting the Goehen out of action, with a view to
cutting off Constantinople from all sea supplies,
continues vigorously. Samsun, Zunguldach, and
Kosla have been in succession bombarded and the
shipping sunk.
THE ADRIATIC.
Since writing last week Monfalcone has been
occupied by the Italians, so that the destroyer
bombardment may be assumed to have given effec-
tive help in this "operation. The only other news
is of the Italian intervention at San Giovanni di
Medua, undertaken to make the Albanians release
a coavoy of Montenegrin corn ships. Vigorous
shelling'^appears to have brought the Albanians to
their senses, and the ships were released. The
operation is interesting to us for the reason that
a cruiser of the Liverpool class was assisting the
Italians, and from the fact that an Austrian sub-
marine appeared to interfere with the operations.
io»
June 19, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
The cruiser appears to have been struck by a tor-
pedo in the ensuing encounter, but does not seem
to have been seriously damaged, as she was able
to make the journey across the Adriatic at seven-
teen knots, and is reported by the Italians to be
safely in harbour.
THE DARDANELLES.
From the Dardanelles there is no official
naval news at all, nor for that matter any mili-
tary news, except what is to be found in the
French official reports. They are silent as to the
co-operation of the Fleet. An Athens rumour
fctates that an enemy submarine has been sunk.
But a remarkable reference to the E>ardan-
elles operations has been made in Parliament.
Speaking last Saturday week at Dundee, Mr.
Churchill, it will be remembered, spoke of Sir Ian
Hamilton's army as being separated only by a few
miles from " such a victory as has not been seen in
this war." Mr. Runciman" speaking five days later
in the House of Commons, said he trusted that
•" the reopening of the Dardanelles would lead to a
rush of supplies into this country.'' Taking the
two statements together, there seems to be a very
optimistic feelingm official circles as to the course
which operations are taking.
GERMANY AND THE U.S.
President Wilson's final Note brings war
between America and Germany nearer, just
because it is final. The wording of the Note dis-
appointed many who gathered from Mr. Bryan s
resignation that it must contain some very per-
emptory sort of threat. Indeed, since the text
was published the resignation has been repre-
sented as inexplica,ble, for the Note contains
nothing that was not in the previous communica-
tion. But there is really no mystery in the matter.
Mr. Brvan has been "^nourished on words and
phrases— the " flapdoodle " of the immortal
O'Brien. In the mouth of the mob orator it is not
the meaning of words, but their comforting sound
that makes merit. But in the mouth of a states-
man speaking for a great country words mean
action. This is the uni:)leasant truth that Mr.
Bryan has discovered. So long as the submarine
campaign could be kept in the region of talk, the
late Secretary of State was in his element. It was
only when he discovered that Mr. Wilson meant
what he said that he resigned. Berlin may be par-
doned for not taking America seriously, when
America's own spokesman was so little serious
himself. Berlin is probably as astonished as ]\Ir.
Bryan at finding that the comedy is over. It is not
surprising that Herr Dernburg should be on his
way to Berlin — under a British safe conduct —
or that the Chancellor is delaying his reply until
that active soul has arrived safely. The decision
to be taken is a momentous one. The answer must
be explicit— as explicit as the Note itself. Ger-
manv must surrender or face a nevr belligerent.
The elements that will decide her one way or
the other are familiar. Desperate as Germany's
military position appears to be, the hopelessness of
her case at sea is beyond speculation. To add
another combatant where the strength against her
is already overwhelming might appear to leave
the main'issue entirely unaffected. She could not
be worse off if all the world joined in against her.
iThe submarine campaign is undoubtedly of a cer-
tain value. It is causing us a continuous and a
serious loss. In shipping alone we are losing a
million pounds a month. The cargoes may easily
be worth at least as much as the ships. It is true
that if we look at the vast total of the cost of the
war, twenty-four million pounds a year is a tiny
percentage." Viewed as a reduction of our ship-
ping, our losses are but 75 per cent, of our normal
annual output of new tonnage. It is not a serious
percentage of our sea-borne trade that is sunk, so
that whether we regard the thing as a, tax on our
financial resources, as a diminution of our trade,
or as an effort to reduce our shipping, the
blockade, as a war measure, is really harmless
enough. Still, it h a financial loss; it docs reduce
our shipping; it docs rob us of many valuable
freights; it has, therefore, a certain war value. If
American belligerency cannot greatly affect the
results of the land fighting in Europe, and if, as
one suppo-ses, the German General Staff must now
realise, nothing, in any CA'cnt, is to be hoped from
fighting at sea, then the German answer may be
an emphatic negative, let the consequence be what
it may. Other considerations will help to her
deciding in this direction.
It is to be remembered that Germany is extra-
ordinarily addicted to basing her policy on specu-
lations which are generally recondite and invari-
ably wrong. There is in the United States a
large and extremely powerful section of the in-
habitants that is German-born or of German blood
in the first generation. This section contains
many houses and firms, both Gentile and Jew, of
great wealth, and a considerable proportion of
them have maintained the closest kind of rela-
tions, not onlv with the Berlin financiers, but with
the Court. For the last ten months they have been
active propagandists of the German case in
America. In the eastern States it is not their
numbers, but their wealth and influence, that is
remarkable. But in the middle west their
numbers are very considerable — some cities and
country districts being as German as almost any
part of Germany. So long as America was
neutral, they have been able to do a great deal,
both indirectly and directly, to help the country
of their origin. It is possible that Berlin has been
led into supposing, first, that the number of pro-
Germans in the United States is very much larger
than it is — perhaps even into believing that all
persons of German descent are pro- Germans.
Secondly, they may suppose that those who have
been pro-Germans up to now will remain pro-
German — and so actively opposed to the national
Government— if war is declared between the two
countries. Both of these views I believe to be as
profoundly erroneous as the suppositions that
Ireland would rebel, that India would mutiny,
that the South African Dutch would rise as one
Boer, and that Australia and Canada would
throw oS the allegiance to the Mother Country
rather than face the inconveniences of being in a
war not of their own making. On the other hand,
Herr Dernburg has left for Germany, and it is
possible that he is charged with the mission of
cooling the undeceived but swollen heads of
German statecraft. If, then, the Germans were
inclined to risk a quarrel in the hope of internal
schisms in America disarming Americans, Herr
Dernburg might save her from so gross a blunder,
and bring her to a compliance with the American
demand.
One political consideration, and that neithei
u*
LAND AND WATER.
19, 1915.
recondite nor wroBg. should certaiuly make the
German leaders pause before looking on the
breath with America as inevitable. It is that
sooner or later she will have to treat or sue for
peace. It will be an ill day for her if she has no
one in the world to act as go-between.
On the other hand, an acceptance of Mr.
.Wilson's claim gees much further than an admis-
sion of an American right and a willingness to
pay the financial penalty for an invasion of it.
The issue raised by America is quite properly
raised out of the injuries inflicted on American
ships and American passengers. But it is not a
demand for compensation, nor merely a demand
that American ships and American passengers
shall not be injured in the future. From the
nature of the case, America has to ask for more.
She has to ask that tliis whole method of making
war by submarines on non-belligerent traffic shall
cease. It is only so that Americans can safely
exercise their right to travel in the trading ships
of belligerents. And she asks for it on the ground,
not that such w^arfare is incompatible with inter-
national law — although it admittedly is— but
because it is incompatible vvith the Ten Com-
mandments. If Germany, then, surrenders she
would admit a great deal more than that she
had proclaimed herself false to the honour she
had pledged in treaties and international conven-
tions. She would be proclaiming tliat she had
been false to the m.ost elementary of all social
laws, " Thou shalt commit no murder.'' Can Ger-
many make such an admission nov/? As it seems
almost impossible, it is a reasonable thing to con-
template the appearance of the United States as
a belligerent as inevitable, and to inquire into the
nature and character of the forces which she can
contribute to help the Allies.
THE U.S. NAVY.
What is the fighting value of the America,n
Navy? Its only experience of modern war was
against the Spaniards in the war for Cuba in
1898. It was, of course, completely successful.
But, take it for all in all, it was something of a
humiliating success. All the glory of Santiago
was quenched in an ignoble quarrel between the
admirals. The fleet's gunnery was appallingly
inefficient. The ratio of hits to rounds fired was
derisive. But it is doubtful if any other navy,
had it been tested at that date, would have come
out of the ordeal any better. The gunners
of our own Navy were not put to the proof
till the 4.7's were sent to defend Ladysmith.
So that they were not tested at sea. The
truth of the matter is that the great revival of
national interest in our Navy, which we owe to
Mr. Stead's agitation in the middle 'eighties, was
alwiiys limited to material, and never occupied
itself v/ith methods. Mr. Whitney's naAy, which
fought the Spanish- American War, was really
just as much a product of the Stead campaign as
the ships of our Spencer programme or of the
Naval Defence Act. But Mr. Whitney not only
built ships, but discovered Captain Mahan, and
by that discovery produced an influence which
affected the future of navies far more than any
lessons that could be culled from the Spanish-
American War. But it was not an influence on
technique. There was an effective demand
for more ammunition and better facilities
for practice. But it was left for Sir Percv
Scott to realise that neither lavish ammunition,
endless opportunity, nor boundless energy were
sufficient unless right methods were developed.
As all the world knows, it was on the China
station and after the Boer ,War that Sir Percy
Scott, still in command of the Powerful, worked
out with his torpedo-lieutenant: — the late Captain
Frederick Ogihy — the mechanical devices for
training men to keep their guns steadily laid
while the ship was rolling. Lieutenant Sims, of
the American Navy, was on this station at the
same time. A friendship arose between the two
men, and a common interest in the g-unnery
problem led to many an exchange of opinion. At
any rate, it was not long before the progress of
gun-laying skill in the United States Navy was
quite as marked as in our ov.-n. When we took
up long-range battle practice, in the fourth and
fifth years of this century, it fell to Lieutenant
Sims to introduce similar methods in America.
The two navies, therefore, have proceeded pari
passu, both in gun-laying and fire control, and
cjicept that the United States have not adopted
any form of director, I should imagine that in
gunnery there is very little to choose between
them.
AMEP.ICAN OFFICERS.
The Naval College at Annapolis, through
which almost all the officers enter the trnited
States Navy, is recruited by a system of Congres-
sional nomination. Each member of the Lov/er
House appoints in turn to the vacancies that
arise. Certain educational qualifications are
required, but the elementary teaching in America
is at once so thorough and so accessible to all, that
this rule hardly imposes any restriction at all.
The majority of Congressuien exercise their rights
very conscientiously, and nominate their candi-
dates after an informal, but very effective,
examination. The lads so chosen come from every
class of the population, and enter between the
ages of eighteen and nineteen, and remain four
years at the college. The education is very
thorough in all the technical subjects, and every
encouragement is given to the study of literature
and history. The type of young man produced is
of a high order, accompli'shed in mechanical and
scientific attainments, and, by the wise social
organisation of the college, trained to a level of
good breeding that astonishes those who think
the graces of life are a peculiarity of certain
social classes. It is not an uncommon thing, for
instance, to find that the midshipman who, quite
naturally, takes the lead in young society, is the
son of some thrifty mechanic, of very humble
station indeed. The truth of the matter is that
the professional impress is far stronger than the
family impress. In the early days there is much
to be gained by being fii*st on the register. A keen
competition is set up, which loses nothing of its
zest from the fact that the private origins of the
contestants are so dissimilar.
The weakness of the American Nary is that
once a lad is entered a midshipman, all further
promotion is by seniority only. In our owti Navy
there is accelerated promotion from midshipman
to lieutenant for those who pass brilliant
examinations. But from tlie Lieutenant-com-
m.ander's lists to Commander, and from Com-
mander to Captain, promotion is by selection only.
After that, seniority becomes the rule.
In America there are no facilities for
12*
June 19, 191?).
LAND AND WATER.
\»ronioting promising officers young. All have to
letire at the age of sixty-two. The admirals' and
captains' lists are small. There are few unem-
ployed, but no one reaches the captains' list till
late, and no one stays in it long. Men may still be
commanders at an age when many British officers
are rear admirals, lieutenant commanders at the
age of oiir senior captains, and there are many
lieutenants older than our junior captains. The
system is a thoroughly bad one, because it means
that the senior officers have exceedingly little ex-
perience of command. A man may become
capl-ain, get his flag, and retire in a third of the
period during which an English officer stays on
the captains'list. It also means that the senior
commanders and lieutenant-commanders have to
be a long time unem.ployed before getting com-
mands as captains.
It is po.ssibly another defect in the American
system that there is less specialisation. Every
capital ship in the British Navy carries specialist
officers for gunnery, torpedoes, and navigation.
These ofiicers have been sent, as young lieutenants,
to the navigation, gunnery, or torpedo establish-
ments for courses of one or two years, and when
qualified, serve the remainder of their time before
becoming commanders, in charge of the activities
of their departments. This system results in the
production of a numerous class of experts, with
the highest qualification in their particular line.
From these specialists are chosen the experts who
man the training establishments, ordnance depart-
ments, <S:c., andlheir existence guarantees a high
standard of scientific mastery of these subjects —
an asset which would be invaluable to any Board of
Adm.iralty that chose to embark upon the innova-
tion of letting expert opinion govern its policy in
expert matters. In the American Xavy all officers
receive more or less the same training. When a
ship is coramissioried, the duties of looking after
special branches are assigned to particular officers,
who master the problems of their task as best they
can. It is probable that the general resourceful-
ness is rather increased by this system, but it also
follows that the highest evpertlse is lacking.
Finally, the officers, as a whole, get far less sea
experience than do our own.
THE ENLISTED MEN.
On the other hand, no naval officers in the
world exceed Americans in general keenness, in
the thoroughness of their mastery in the scientific
side of their profession. The American officer has
one constant task before him, which is a liberal
education both in the undei-standing and the
management of men. The personnel — blue-
jackets, stokers, &c. — is enlisted for short
terms. It is seldom that a newly-commis-
sioned ship puts to sea with more than a
very small proportion of ratings who know
much alx)ut their business. There is, of course,
an established list of warrant officers. But
for the most part the commissioning of the ship
means a long and arduous task of converting
landsmen into seamen, and not only landsmen,
but men who have not the elementary conceptions
cither of what the sea is like or of what discipline
means. But, in spite of these difficulties, experi-
enced American officers who know the inner work-
ing, both of the British and of other navies, will
tell you that after eight or nine months' training
an American crew, though extraordinarily hetero-
geneous in its origin, shakes down into a very
efficient ship's company. For one thing, everyone
who is there is a volunteer. He is bound for that
commission only. He has joined for the sake of
seeing something of the world, to try a new life,
to have a taste of adventure. The pay is good,
the food excellent, and the discipline, though effec-
tive, is not burdensome. Three things contribute
to make this system succeed. The first is the
thorough understanding of the xVmerican officer
of the Ajnerican enlisted man. The next* is a
certain keenness to master technical problems,
which is a national characteristic. Lastly,
public opinion demands that anyone who
undertakes a job shall, in the slang of the day,
" make good." The enlisted man is turned
into a good sailor because he is at least as
anxious to become one as the officer is anxious to
make him so.
The weakest feature of the U.S. Xavy is
the supreme command and the organisation
for war — subjects I propose to discuss at a later
date.
A GLIMPSE OF WAR.
THE GROUSER.
By W. L. GEORGE.
THE sergeant, wLo was inEpectiiig the trench with
au air of suspicion, stopped by the side of Private
Langley. His dubious thumb and finger felt for
the °edge of the cottage door which, covered
with turf, formed the roof of the trench. It gave
a little to his hauJ, ineaacingly so :
" That's shaky," he said, " get a couple of props aud
•bore it up."
Private Langley scowled and tlie sergeant, who knew
hi.s way?, smiled: "It'll be down on your head in half a
tick if you don't."
Private Bradden, who stood next to Langley, was tickled.
" Shall I fetch them props for you 1 " he asked. " Nice
little job, ain't it ? "
Private Langley 's face assumed an air in which was too
mnch gloom for auger to crcf-p in. Speaking to hiinseif
rather than to Bradden, he began in the uncertain twilight
to shore up the roof with a slanting prop. As he worked he
talked :
" Just like 'im, nosin' about seein' if 'e can't find som*
damage. Call this soldjeringl It's more like jail, that'i
what it is, except that in jail you do get a bit o' quiet nosi
aud then, and you know when you're comin' out o' jug,
v/hich you don't 'ere." The prop, which was wet, slipped
through his hands. He pulled it up again; "What am I
doin' 'ere ? That's what I want t' know. What's the good
of it! I arsk you— wliat's the good of it! "
" I don't know," said Private Bradden.
" Didn't expeo' you would," said Private Langley.
" Then what d'you arsk me for? " said Private Bradden
n.nstily.
'■ To expose your gen'ral ignorance," said Private
Langley, with increasing gloom.
The prop flipped again, and tlie roof irritably sub-
sided on the top of his head; he put it back patiently^. U«
13*
J. A
L)
A .\ J ) W A T E K
June 19. 1915.
drove into the -kblU of tliq trencli a liUl.3 board into which
he cut a notch. Then with infinite care, having set the base
of the prop in the uotcli, he once more shored up the roof
which he still bcre upon the top of his head like a despondent
Atlas, and, as he so did, remarked:
" I didn't ort t' be 'ere, I ort t' be in Stourtou, that's
where I ort t' be, 'avin' a 'ot bath."
" That's what we all say about you," remarked a distant
voice. Private Langley could find nothing to reply to this
insult and went on steadily muttering under his breath.
When at last the roof was fixed and Private Langley,
who had no illusions left, waited for it to subside again under
shrapnel, a rumour reached him.
'■ D'you know what Sergeant says? " Bradden remarked.
" He says we're going to cut the wire-entanglements to-night.
You know, crawl out on the q.t. while they're not looking.
They're going to call for volunteerj to do the job."
"Oh, are they?" said Private Langley with delibera-
tion. " Well, I know one man who won't go." (Life to him
was so grave that he never swore.) " What do they take
me for? I ain't a plumber, 'tain't my job; wire-cutting's
obsolesete."
" Good word, obclcesete," said the ironic and anonymous
voice further down.
" Wire didn't ort t' be cut," Private Langley went on,
" it ort t' be brort down with explosive shell. An' if there
ain't no shell, it's an engineer's job, that's what it is, and
any'ow it ain't my job, and I ain't goln' ; too scratchy fer
me, an' they say the groun's full of titanic germs."
An officer walked along the trench. The men watched
him excitedly. He was a popular lieutenant, rather bluff,
very familiar, and as he had been wounded four times was
obviously destined to be hanged.
" Well, boys, we're going to have a little picnic in the
barbed wire. There's room for ten, don't all talk at once!
You, Bradden? one. And Jones? two. Aad — yes, three,
four. Good I Denny, too? That's five, six, seven. What?
Is that all? You too? " he said to the voico further down.
" Eight and, I can't see your face, that's nine."
There was a pause.
" Put me down, sir," said Langley darkly. . . .
He was crawling in the absolute blackness of a moon-
less night, slowly, so that not even a little stone should
rumble under him. He panted forward, face upon the
ground, painfully dragging himself along with hooked
fingers and gripping toes. He was faintly aware of Bradden
upon his left, of other men almost noiseless near by. It
seemed a very long way to tlie entanglement, and, as he
went quiet as some velvety weasel, he thought:
" Can't even talk. Stick a man in the mud on his
stomach and don't even give 'im a chance to express 'is feel-
ings. Call that a life ? " He removed a large stone which
suddenly chucked him under the chin. " It's a dirty
country; where it ain't too soft, it's too 'ard." He rubbed
the place on his chin and crawled on.
It seemed endless, for they went so slowly, and it was
so difficult to keep a straight line; sometimes he drew too
U3ar to Bradden and then thought:
'' Look at 'im, can't even crorl straight; it ain't a man,
it's a crab." Then a wire-cutter, which was slung acro.-^s h'u
shoulders, stuck one of its handles in his ear. He shifted
the ear: "Great, lumping thing," he thought. "I'd do it
with jny pocket-knife, I would, if it weren't against regu-
lations." And then, as he crawled on, he was filled with
venom at the thought of the King's regulations.
It was very silent out there by the entanglements. He
could just see them, their posts blacker than the night,
and the strands of barbed wire, with the spirals loose in the
middle, shining a little in the dark. Like ghosts round him,
the other men, flat upon the ground as he, unobserved
n-.r.de the tiniest little clicks as they snipped wire after wire.
The Germans did not know ; there was no firing, except that
new and then came a bullet sent on the chance from the
German trench towards the anywhere. Stolidly, one by one
he cut the wires. The manual work soothed him, and he
cculd not think while he had the pleasure of feeliug the
metal grow soft and part in the wire-cutter. The enemy
seemed unsuspicious, yet they fired a little more often; a
bullet buried itself behind him. He nearly exclaimed, for
another bullet had grazed his left hand; he felt the sting on
it. It was nothing, of course, for it had not even taken off
the skin. But as Private Langley methodically went on
cutting he thought:
"Them Germans! Them blishters ! Firing at vou on
the chance without knowing if yer there ain't playin' the
fame. When I want to 'it a man I pick 'im out. They
^ive nie the fair sick, they do." And as he went on cutting.
he elaborated in liis mind increasingly horrible tortures t9
which he would subject the Kaiser when he caught him.
Suddenly Private Langley dropped his wire-cutter, and,
half-blind, fumbled for it in the loose soil. He was strug-
gling; it was horrible, for he could hardly open his eyes, so
blinded was he with light. He turned his head away, only
to see his hand violently white under the searchlight. Head
dov/n to keep his eyes away from the bluish ray, he fumbled
for his wire-cutter, struggling, exposed, as if knocked down
by this violent light, half-dazed, like a moth against an elec-
tric bulb. Every now and then he glimpsed the men near
him; they, too, violently lit up as they hugged the soil. Ha
saw them as he had never seen them before, every detail of
their faces — wrinkles, new expressions — in this light so mucli
Uiore brutal than the sun's. He was all instinct as he struggled
so, and he did not think of the bullets which were now pock-
ing the ground all about him with a soft, wet sound. He
was light-mad ai;d conscious only of one desire^to find a
darkness wliich even his lowered eyelids could not give him.
The bluish light seemed to pierce right through to his brain.
He hexrd cries througli the tiring, for there was no rea.son for
silence now. A bur-t of shrapnel a little way off, and then
above the din the whistling lliat recalled his party. With
animal suppleness ho turned, trying to sink himself into the
soil as he crawled. He could see the British trench as the
searchlight touched it, like a long hutch with a black pole.
Then he heard his name called. He stopped.
" What's up? " he shouted.
"Hit in the leg! Give us a lift." It was Bradden'i
voice.
Langley said: " 'It in the leg, are you? Serve yoa
right! What d'you want to \vave yer leg about for? "
"Oh, hold yer jaw! " Bradden roared.
"That's what I'll do," said Langley, with great
dignity. " Some fellers are arskin' for it. What did you lift
yer leg for ? To scratch yer 'ead ? An' 'ow am I t' git
there? Where are you? Not that I'm comin'; it ain't my
job. Not fer me to bring in th' wounded ; I'll tell the
R.A.M.C. — that's all I can do for you. It ain't fair; I
ain't no odd-jobs man."
The eight men of the party who had regained the trench
watched the entanglement. Under the searchlight it shone
like frosted silver. The officer stared into his periscope.
" We seem to have lest two, sir," said the sergeant.
They were all very watchful in the trench. They could
now see in the middle of the entanglement a motionless
figure, black in the blue rays. That was one of them. Then
a little quiver of excitement went along the line, for they
saw a movement in the wires as if something at the edge of
the entanglement were struggling with them, pushing them
away, something that, crawling over the sharp spikes, worked
its way along the ground towards the wounded man. They
gasped; it was impossible. But, no; it was true. There
grovelled a man unhurt: he looked like a black snake worm-
ing its way under the full glare of the blue light, through
steady firing that somehow spared him. They could see the
bullets now and then strike the posts which had carried the
entanglement, sometimes a few inches from the man's head.
And still he went on, somehow unscathed, but uncertain
as if blinded by the light that was heavy as metal. They
saw him as if in full sunlight seize the wounded man's
shoulders and draw him along the ground through the cut
wires, and on, and still on, under the searchlight that fol-
lowed him like a malignant eye, and yet still on through the
storm of bullets that struck to the right and left, and
magically spared him and his charge. . . .
They nearly fell into the trench, rescuer and rescued ;
their clothes torn to rags by the wires, their faces soiled with
earth and sweat.
"Well done, Langley!" said the officer. "That's
Bradden you brought in, isn't it? "
" Yes, sir," said Langley, and sat down exhausted. Bub
he leaped up and remarked, aa he felt his trousers, "Of
course I picked the wettest place; they can't even drain their
trenches properly." He addressed the half company in
general: " What d'you think I'm up tot Taking the cold-
water cure, or what? Tell you what; this ain't fightin'. It
ain't a man's job — ar-skiug 'im to wallow about in the mud
like a bloomin' buffalo. Tell you what, I'm goin' to buy
myself out; that's what I'm goin' to do."
Two days later Private Langley waa informed that he
would be recommended for the V.C. Some weeks later,
after the investiture, he stood on the steps of the depot at
Stourton, a halfpenny picture paper in his hand. It related
briefly what it called the greatest deed of bravery of the war;
also it printed his photograph. Private Langley gazed ab
that photograph with growing fury and deepening gloom. Ha
was wondering whether he could sue the editor for libel.
14»
June 19, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
MR. BELLOG'S BOOK ON THE WAR.
By PROFESSOR SECGOMBE.
{Professor of English, E.il.C., Sandhurst.)
TELE present war has at last elicited a tract of English
prose comparable in many respects to some of the
books evoked by the great war of a hundred years
ago. National and racial contrasts, military his-
tory, topography and road-faring — these are Mr.
Belloc's subjects; he has not many subjects really, but within
the range of them he is versatile, his grip is sure, and his
vision subtle and penetrating. How people do love the im-
possible ! (Do not the proprietors of our weekly illustrated
papers tlirive on this fact?) They love to think that this
unique war has produced a miraculous author. Long before
the war, after a strenuous apprenticeship, Mr. Belloc had
shown himself one of the greatest masters of English idiom,
whether in prose or metre, that our country has ever pro-
duced. Like a well known comedian, whose son one has been
grieved to notice among the long roll of the wounded, he may
well say, '" I was quite as good, perhaps better, for years
before they found me out."
En\'y, hatred, and all uncharitableness in regard to Sir
Edward Grey, I more than suspect, precluded one section
from perceiving what it was specially to their own and to
the general interest that they should perceive, namely — that
class interest was not going to transcend nationality; and,
secondly, that some form of service insurance (the only re-
liable form) was becoming general everywhere. Instead of
noticing tliis they buried their heads and sought to nourish
democratic jealousy of the aristocratic talent for war. Some
of the politicians realised, but failed to communicate, the
danger. They provoked the Kaiser's risibility by sending
to Berlin to learn how to organise cur array " a lawyer, a
man who could not ride." When he got back he had little
clioicebut to acquiesce in the sentiment that the Germans would
hardly be so unreasonable as to anticipate the nest election
and one or two absolutely indispensable domestic alterations.
To return to Mr. Belloc. In the first part of his book he
envisages tlie general or historical causes of the war in a
manner which will command almost universal assent. He
interprets Germany's challenge convincingly. The data are
not new. Well-informed people had them at their fingers'
ends five years ago. Is it the atmosphere of the island that
makes us so myopic and retards the action of our historians
and publicists — cogent only after the event? Now, here is
the German brief. " Sad accidents, into which we need not
enter here, retarded our growth to nationhood. France, a
nation healthier formerly than now, but still of much baser
Btock than our own, has played the leading part in Western
Europe up to 1815; then came England, a 'Teutonic country
really, over-capitalised like France, with her vast oversea
Empire, possessing a far greater hold over the modern world
than her real strength warrants. Even the Slavs profited by
our disunion to generate power and endanger our Culture,
which, it need hardly be said, is by far the highest Culture
of all. Fifty years since our etatesmen achieved that un-
realised dream of centuries — German unity — defeating in the
most fundamental fashion the French whom the rest of
Europe then conceived to be the chief military power." It
will do less than justice to tlic author to continue the brief
in any but his ov/n words:
" From that moment [1370] we have incontesfcably
stood in the sight of all as the strongest people in the world,
and yet because other and lesser nations had the start of us,
our actual International position, our foreign possessions, the
security that should be due to so supreme an achievement,
did not correspond to our real strength and abilities. England
had vast dependencies, and had staked out the unoccupied
world as her colonies. France, though decadent, was a
menace to our peace upon the West. We could have achieved
the thorough conquest and dismemberment of France at any
time in the last forty years, and yet during the whole of that
timiS France was adding to her foreign possessions, while wa
were obtaining nothing. The barbarous Russians were increas-
ing con.=itantly in numbers, and somewhat perfecting their in-
suDTicient military macliine without any interference from n^,
grave as was the menace from them upon our Eastern frontier.
" It was evident that such a state of things could not
endure. A nation so united and so im.mensely strong could
not remain in a position of artificial inferiority'. The whole
equilibrium of Europe was unstable through this contrast be-
tween what Germany might be and what she was, and a
15»
struggle to make her what she might be from what she wai
could not be avoided.
" Germany must, in fulfilment of a duty to herself,
obtain colonial possessions at the expense of France, obtain
both colonial possessions and sea-power at the expense of
England, and put an end by camisaigns, perhaps defensive,
but at any rate vigorous, to the menace of Slav barbarism
upon the East."
To this luminous challenge England responds :;
" Unless we are all-powerful at sea our very existence is
imperilled (and if we do not stand up to this what will our
children say and think of us ?) : if you ask whether we will
allow any part of our colonies or dependencies to become
German the answer is in the negative." France observes:
We are by no means convinced as to our decadence, corrup-
tion, and the rest; but, if you ask will we submit to you as
masters and leave Alsace at your mercy, the answer is in the
negative." Russia protests: " We cannot help being nume-
rically the stronger; we are not proposing to reduce our-
selves, thank you; v.-e are not really so very barbaric, and,
if you persist in asking us to relinquish the Slav hegemony
and leave our co-raeials and co-religionists in the lurch, the
answer is in the negative."
So there is a real antagonism, no doubt. Was an appeal
feasible to anything mightier than the sword ? The lawyer
and trader States were inclined to say " Yes." But Geimany
said " No," and, in spite of all the peace-pipe-smokers in the
world, Germany was right.
The precision of Mr. Belloc in regard to this particular
war has been proved up to the hilt over and over again. He
has used the divining rod before in relation to politics and
other domestic aCairs, and his diagnoatic has nearly always
been proved sound. L.^nd axd W.4.ter is not the first paper
of which he has been the weekly oracle. But he has not
always used discretion — generally, indeed, preferring valour
— and he has not foreseen smooth things; and when
he has disclosed things, they have not always been
things agreeable for powerful people to hear. It
is little use telling plain people unpleasant things
they are not gradually and insensibly prepared to
hear — the shock of novelty may easily be too much
for them. But he would go on anticipating history, as ha
does in this book, and would never abandon his own stride
to please either the demagogues or tlieir political paymasters.
He was, in fact, a prophet without honour, until the out-
break of the war put such a premium upon information such
as he (almost alone among laymen who could give expression
to their knowledge) possessed that he became «n homme
nicissaire, an oracle that no man could afford to ignore. Ha
has certainly t-empercd strength with mercy and used hia
power with moderation. The grasp, the proportion, the
justesse. of his work as a war-guide and chronicler has been
appreciated at home and abroad, by English and French
readers. At the time of the fall of Namur he was, perhaps,
the one un-uniformed man in this country who realised the
full gravity of the situation. Happily, he never gave way to
despair; his weekly appreciations have given comfort to
thousands of half-despairing souls, whereby he has rendered
a service to this nation that neither of two generations can
ever possibly forget.
After giving the immediate occasion of the war — the
obstacle offered by Serbia to the German policy of the three
B's (Berlin, Byzantium, Bagdad), the author goes on (pp.
80-315) to illustrate, upon lines familiar to readers of Land
AND Water, the resources of the belligerents and the values
of the forces opposed. Then in Part III. (316-377), he de-
scribes the first Ehock, down to September 5 last. But the
surprise of the book comes in the last few pages, where, in a
passage characterised by superb historical vision, deep con-
viction, and emotional energy, Mr. Belloc deploys forces that
only an historian and a prosemaster, who is also a poet, can
ever dispose of. In thi.s passage ho describes not the causes
or questions in dispute, but the issues fundamentally at stake.
There is no room to do j-jstice to the beauty and insight of
this peroration here and now, but it raises questions of auch
deep import that, with the permission of the editor, I must
revert to it next week.
A Geneii.\l Sketch of tbk Eur.oi'EAK War. The First Ph-iae.—
B; Ei';ure Qelloe. Nelson, 68.
LAND AND WATER.
June 19, 1915.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED.
MARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the French by Douglas English.
THE lamplight dazed and blinded her, transpierced
the triple curtains of her eyes, whose thin trans-
lucent inner lids betrayed the fear behind them.
The lamplight filled her brain with night-
mare horrors, tossed sleep on swirls and eddyings
ef unrest, mocked at her v/aking helplessness. By fitful turns,
she dozed, and woke, and dozed again.
At last came darkne.ss, and she slept profoundly, and
'dreamt of forest lullabies, the night-songs of the sisterhood,
the Eurr and rustle of green leaves.
Her mind had no fense of contingencies; no instinct
counselled wakefulness, lest she should miss some loophole of
escape.
She woke with daybreak in a silent house; watched the
slow birth of form from formless shade ; took stock of things
inanimate, on floor and wall and ceilins. Man's lair had
this in common with her forest. It sheltered movin"
. . . ^
things and motionless — and moving things alone were to be
feared. So by slow reasoning worked her mind — a lifeless
room was harmless.
On this, her first long curious inquiry, a linger) '-i; fear
intruded. It left her as she ate. As though the fort'sL still
was round about her, not caring why, nor caring whence they
came, she gulped the food-scraps littered in her prison. She
pecked indifferently at seeds she knew, at tempting morsels
which were unfamiliar, at sugar, cake-scraps, biscuits, which
some strange chance had garnered in the cage.
She found drink ready also. A pannikin of water, stag-
nant, lake, on wliich a floating dust-film scrawled a spiral.
She crouched and stretched her neck to meet its level,
spread wide her beak, and gulped ; then, with closed mouth
and eyes upturned in ecstasy, gazed heavenward as she
swallowed.
So had she quaffed the forest springs and puddles on the
wayside.
With thirst and hunger slaked her hopes revived. Per-
haps these noisy humans yet might spare her. Were they
80 terrible indeed ? At least they brought her food and drink
in plenty. Was it some trap? Some scheme to capture her
afresh ?
Without cocks crew, dogs barked. She hastened to de-
vour the last small scraps, for fear they might be snatched
from her.
She knew dogs well enough — noisy, four-footed, shaggy-
plumaged things, who, in their maddest, wildest courje, kept
muzzle close to ground. They were no foes to winged folk.
She feared the voice of Chanticleer far more; this, close
at hand, was strange, and so disquieting.
But other sounds swept both these voices from her; the
growl, the heavy tread of Man behind the party wall.
And presently Man entered, boisterous, menacing.
For Margot he was simply Man — the counterfeit of him
who captured her. Even v/ith lapse of time, when she knew
every patron of the tavern, she could not mark with cer-
tainty the one who had laid hands on her the first and tugged
her from her rival and borne her from the frosted field to
the hot, smoke-grimed kitchen.
She eyed him cross-ways, curious, defiant, with beak
agape and half-curled claw. He paid small heed to lier
Effrontery. He saw the food had gone and laughed. And
laughter grated harsh on Margot's ears. The feathers
bristled on her neck, her beaded eye grew rounder, brighter,
fiercer.
The Man brought further store of grain, and tit-bits,
which he forced between the wires.
And Margot, with wide-sundered, flap2)ing .vin;;?i,
backed, beak in rest, against her farther wall.
The Man set to his work, plied busy broom. He flung
side-glances at the cage to note if she was tempted by tlie
food. But Margot sulked. The dust-clouds surged and
seetled. They puzzled her, but riddle more profound lay in
the Man's quiet eyes.
She thought herself the object of his toiling, and sought,
by scrutiny of his acts and gestures, to learn how they con-
cerned herself.
The problem seemed alternative.
Either the Man would kill her or would loose her.
His movements must be peaceable or hostile. There
w&B no third solution. Imprisonment was unimaginable.
Her present case was transitory, impermanent — a rest,
a halting-station on the road which led to death or liberty.
But there was ground for hopefulness. The Man would
surely loose her. He had not tried to capture her. He
brought her food — food which her forest sisters sought ia
vain. What use was freedom if one starved ?
The door flung open, and the Woman entered.
Her mind once more swung dubious.
What marked this uncouth monster from its mate? Its
size? Its form? Its plumage?
There seemed no sure distinction. Was one less dan-
gerous than the other ?
Hearing and scent inclined her to the Wom.an. No reek
of shag exhaled from her. Her voice, for all its harshness,
was gentler than the Man's. It had a bird-note ring in it.
The children met with kindlier recognition.
Their heads were barely table-high. She need nob
thrust and stretch her neck to follow their bright eyes.
She had no fear lest they should fall and crush her.
So stood, at first, her knoweldge of the household.
The children prattled round her cage, thrust tit-bits ia
between the bars, cajoled her with endearments.
She listened with her head aslant, half-frightened, half-
coquettish.
Sometim.es she pecked the food-scraps, and merry
laughter rippled out, and made her pause dumbfounded. Bub
no one tried to harm her.
Man came and went throughout the day, lolled on the
benches, swilled his drink, and sang and laughed and gos-
siped. He left her unmolested.
She soon gained confidence in those she knew.
By evening she took scraps of food from grimy, toil-
stained fingers. She tasted them and dropped them, for sha
had crammed her full. Some fell into the drinkingtrough.
Some she disposed in corners of her cage, a cage-born instinct
guiding her, an insurmountable distrust.
Days passed in slow accustomment to Man.
She soon knew all the inmates of the house, the adults
by their voices, the children by th.eir height. She gave to
each a different meed of confidence. She trusted more to
manners than appearance. She liked the Girl the best, the
Woman next. The Boy's wild mischief scared her, the Man'a
gruff voice, and, worse than this, the stench of smoke which
oozed from every pore of him.
It brought to mind the powder smell, and dripping,
clotting blood.
She counted always on escape. Youth's sanguine voice
forbade despair, and hope found new-born energy in fierce
discordant longings. Hourly she pecked and rattled at the
bars. Hourly she read, in trivial happenings, a message of
deliverance.
A single thought obsessed her mind, a passionate instinct
fevered her, and lent her spriglitlincss and voice.
Her gaolers misconstrued the change, thought that this
gaiety was real, that she was reconciled to fate, that sha
would settle down.
So danger grew from want of understanding and
hastened the inevitable end.
A storm from westward swept across the snow, and flung
a driving rain at it, and smirched its virgin whiteness.
This way and that the muddying thaw trailed zig-zag
down the plough, like toper v.-ho has foundered in the dit<;h,
and plants unsteady feet to save himself.
It drove mankind to shelter — and to boredom.
The leaden sky was matched by leaden faces. Margot
alone was lively. She danced and clacked, and so co.Tipelled
attention.
And, suddenly, her prii.on doer ^-as opened.
Was this her chance ? She leapt towards the gap. A'
liand outspread it,=-elf and barred the way. Five crooking
fingers groped for her, five monstrous fleshy fingers. They
forced her backwards, pinned her to the bars. Screaming,
she drove at them with beak and claw. They fixed, like
eagle's talons, round her body. grij)ped breast and back,
and tightened like a girth. The trough capsized and
drenched her, head to tail. The c.ige tiptilted, dropped away
from her.
(Ti) Ijf cor f I i:i' :■./.)
I'xhdod by llie ViCTOttXA IlonsK I'uiNTi.NG Co., J-ZD., Tudor Sueel, White'tiars, London, K.C.
June 19, 1915
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193
LAND AND WATER
June 19, 1915
T]
"ALLIES " WALLET
The "Sunday Times" says:— '* The neatest, handiest, and safest Wallet for
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Send him a Flask of
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194
June 19, 1915
LAND AND WATER
I AM leading the simple life," said an erstwhile
Frivolous Being in hackneyed phrase the other
day. " I like it, and it likes me, and I will never
lead any other as long as I live." People's ideas of
simplicity are as widely removed as the Poles, but the
Frivolous Being's notion of simplicity unravelled itself, after
some while, into a shortening of dinner, and a lengthening
of day. A domestic crisis from all accounts precipitated the
first, and the difficulty of spending the night anywhere but
in bed the second. No longer do these fine June mornings
witness a return from rout and ball and a seeking of bed
with the clear rays of daylight stealing into the room. No
longer is an after noon rising not only a necessity, but a
logical consequence.
This latest convert to the simple fife finds she is ready to
leave her bed at an hour when formerly she was fast asleep,
and is delighted with the experience. Otherwise to all intents
and purposes she is the same Frivolous Being stUl. One of
the few who remain. The fact that she has a husband en-
sconced in the safest of safe shore billets, and nobody fighting
of any moment to her helps to keep her so. That, and a
remarkably unimaginative disposition into the bargain.
This simplifying of Hfe, however, by no manner of means
begins and ends where she is concerned. We are all doing it.
Some from choice and others from necessity. It is becoming
the most regular of rules, and cannot but become more marked
as time proceeds.
The Simple Facts
Facts are simple enough things in all conscience, and it is
with facts we are confronted now. In consequence life has
automatically become a more simple thing. The compUcated
existence most people were leading this time twelve months
back has been simply obhterated. It is as if it never were.
It is with realities we are deahng, not with chimera. It has
been brought home to numbers that the countless little petty
annoyances, which in days gone past had such power to irritate
now do not matter. They are dwarfed in the sight of far
greater issues. No longer do we spend our days going here,
there, and everywhere, passing from one engagement to
another, few of which ever mattered a jot. Our lives have
undoubtedly been straightened out and simplified. A purpose
has been supplied to many people who never knew the meaning
of the word before. It is indeed one of the saving clauses of
the times that everything everyone is doing is on behalf of
some particular object, and the aim as a rule is clear and
definite.
Then again, everybody's outlets are narrowed and simpli-
fied. The richest man in the world has perforce to acknow-
ledge the many things his money will not buy. No longer can
he travel wherever his fancy takes him, many happy hunting
grounds abroad are denied him, scores of things which had
become a matter of course are now ruled out of being. The
power of money makes no difference, they are not there to
buy. So for the first time for years, to many, life has been
reduced to an almost incredible simplicity. Where we are we
stay, if we wander our wanderings are within a very curtailed
radius, and in any case rarely prolonged. Our activities and
interests revolve round very few, and those very simple
matters. Everything is at last condensed.
The Old Story
Look where we will, it is the same everywhere. There is
a touch of simplicity about everything people wear, evervthing
they do, everything they say. A few minutes in the" Park,
in the morning alongside the' Row. in the afternoon by Stan-
hope Gate, shows the truth of tliis. Things being as they are
the Park is the main place for meeting one's fellow kind. It
is depleted nevertheless, aU that is bright in it rests with the
flowers, and the girls who pass through in pale coloured frocks.
The English girl can still be seen at her best in the Park in
June. She is more attractive than ever this year, for she is
simplicity personified. Elaborate dressing being voted bad
taste is all in her favour. As she walks by in her cool summer
dress in a flutter of pale blue, pale pink or green, she is like
a breath of the peaceful past renewed. Almost, but not
quite, for with her there is often a companion who wears a
white cover on his dark blue cap, or is clad in khaki. Or
again it is someone, who walks rather slowly with the aid of
a stick or has an arm strapped to one side. Occasionally
it happens that such a couple are stopped by a passer-by, and
one hears sentences in which " congratulations " and " wed-
ding," and " When is it to be ? " occur. And generally the
bride-to-be is heard to say " Oh no ! Quite quiet " before
she takes her leave. That sentence is an almost inevitable
one. It sums up the present day marriage in a nutshell,
it is yet another sign of the simplification we are all under-
going under the stress of circumstances.
And thus the pair pass on to the future and the quiet
wedding, which will make them husband and wife. She in
her pretty frock and flower-trimmed hat, he in his navy blue or
khaki. The simplest of all stories is being enacted once again.
Time is being found for love and marriage though nations
rage and roar. There is still a moment for an idyll.
The Ultimate Hope
Then there is the simplicity of good fellowship as a power
in the land. We are more willing to extend the hand of
comradeship, more anxious to shoulder our brother's burden.
We are already without doubt infinitely superior to the race
of captious mortals, who existed but a few months ago. Our
soldiers out in France have shown us the value of the helping
hand. Stories have reached us of devoted attention given
by men hard pressed themselves to others all but done for.
.\ tale was told only the other day of a man looked upon as the
black sheep of a regiment, rough, brutal, and insubordinate.
Badly wounded himself, he nevertheless nursed a dying
comrade in the ambulance waggon, " as tenderly," said my
informant, " as a woman. I never could have believed the
red-headed ruifian had it in him."
Poor " red-headed ruffian." He is since dead and many
another like him. They have retrieved their misdeeds during
life, by the great manner of their dying. They are amongst
the many who are teaching us, who remain an endless lesson
of courage and simplicitj'.
It is simple enough to go out abroad " to some place
unknown," obey orders, bear the burden and heat of the day,
face the uncertain morrow. Simple as many heroic things
are. As far as that goes, it is a simple proceeding for us at
home to help the country and its cause in everv' way we can,
keep going, be brave, cheer and look after our men. Simple
but not always easy. That is the paradox of the thing.
Life, simplified though it be, does not grow any the easier.
But it is infinitely better worth the living, and will be so in
the future, which is all so many of us are living for or looking.
We have the Hope that makes —
'* Our noisy years seem niomenls in the Iieing
Of the eternal Silence: truths that wake
To perish never :
Which neither lisllessncss, nor mad endeavour.
Nor Man nor Boy,
Nor all that is an enmity with joy.
Can utterly abolish or destroy ! "
195
LAND AND WATER
June 19, 1915
BOOKS OF THE WEEK
A LITERARY REVIEW
"The English Countryside." By Ernest C. Pul-
brool<. (Batsford.) 7s. Od. net.
Mr. Pulbrook's book is assuredly a labour of love. He
does not teU us in what way he explored so many villages
and country towns, and the remoter hills and rivers and coasts,
but we may be sure that many a time he has wandered on foot,
travelling from day to day to new places, and lingering
where the attraction was strong. He is familiar with foot-
paths ; he knows the charm of ancient inns ; he has traced
rivers from their moorland origins to their outlets on the sea.
He has covered indeed a large subject, for England is a big
place for the man who travels on foot, who dallies for hours
in some inland creek or by the parapet of an old bridge, for
whom each new field and village is a fresh adventure, who
marks in his memory each stile, each stone-cross, and village
green. He has not attempted to take one locality after another,
exhausting each. In that way he might have filled a hundred
volumes. And yet, in generahsing, he is aware that the charm
of England lies in its infinite variety ; that the flats of the Fen-
land are not the flats of Somerset ; that the hills of Derby-
shire are not the hills of Surrey ; that the Severn and the
Thames, incomparable rivers both, are extraordinarily different.
He has started from the coast of England, playing on the
topic of its many varieties and its history, thence he has
pursued " quiet creeks," and lakes, to the ' running waters "
of rivers and streams. He considers in turn fords, bridges,
fields, sheep-pastures, foot-paths, by-roads, villages, towns,
inns, and wayside houses, and discourses on the seasons.
He makes the transition from generahty to detail with skill.
If it is fair to mention faults in a book so pleasing as tliis,
we should say that he too often bids us " pause and admire,"
that the wonder and sweetness of the country are too seldom
appreciated in silence. It is a book which, gentle and genuine
and intimate as it is, will charm those who know their country-
side, and should tell much to those who, living abroad, know
it rather through literature and hearsay. The illustrations
are a particularly attractive feature. They are mostly from
photographs which show characteristic landscapes — woodland,
field, river, lull and coast — and they are excellently reproduced.
"Napoleon in Exile: St. Helena (1815 1821)." By
Norwood Young. Illustrated. (Stanley Paul.)
2 vols. 32s. net.
It might have been supposed that there was no more
to be said about those last dismal years in which Napoleon
dragged out a mean existence in St. Helena. They Jiave
attracted the attention of many eminent historians, including
our own Lord Rosebery ; but there is no longer much grounJ
for serious controversy. Forsyth vindicated the reput?" on
of Sir Hudson Lowe more than sixty years ago, and Mr.
Norwood Young, after ransacking the reports in the Record
Office, and examining the contemporary evidence of diaries,
letters, and reports of the Foreign Commissioners, makes the
case for Napoleon worse rather than better. He has collected
every anecdote, every shred of evidence that any reasonable
person interested in the decaying prodigy can ever want ;
he has visited the island of St. Helena, spent five weeks at
Longwood, and prepared elaborate plans of the island and
of Napoleon's house. He has drawn largely upon the collec-
tions of Mr. A. M. Broadley and others who have enabled him
to reproduce prints and caricatures. Here then is the whole
of that " last phase," with every little detail set down labor-
iously and without ornament ; Napoleon plajnng reversi and
cheating at cards ; shutting himself up in his room and
giving himself airs when visited by the Governor ; making
his attendants stand till they were ready to drop, or revolt ;
plotting through O'Meara or any other wretch who would
lend himself to futile conspiracy ; drawing out elaborate
lists of petty complaints ; dictating his letters and losing his
temper ; stewing for hours in a hot bath ; making himself
troublesome and ridiculous to everyone. In the later years
of his Empire Napoleon had demeaned himself by monstrous
vanities and follies ; but the man-of-action dominated the
peacock in him. At the end it was the peacock only that
remained.
"The aermans and Africa." By Evans Lewin.
With Introduction by Rt. Hon. Earl Orey. (Cassell.)
los. 6d. net.
The question of the German colonies in South Africa is
one which deserves more attention than it has yet received.
Sir Harry Johnston has urged the necessity of stripping
Germany of her African Colonies ; Mr. Arnold Toynbee has
urged the contrary. Mr. Evans Lewin propounds iio policy.
He gives us the facts. He describes the founding of the
German colonial system in Africa and the " diplomatic and
sometimes pecuHar processes by which it was constantly
enlarged." He insists that the Germans have failed in their
native policy, because they have adhered to the " mailed
fist methods and sledge-hammer proceedings of the military,"
and because their colonial officials have not attempted to
understand or sympathise with the people. The results have
been incessant revolts, bloodshed, and a depletion of the native
labour reserves. On the other hand Herr Dernburg has
infused a new energy into Germany colonial policy which has
led to a revival of their South .\frican trade. "Less money
has been spent upon the trap.-'ings of officialdom : more money
has been devoted to providing avenues of trade." .A^n im-
portant point to bear in mind is this : " Unhke the British
The Next War
"War breeds war as money
begets money."
" The infection of war is with
us from the nursery."
" The invested interests of war
are gigantic."
"The price of nationality is war.
The boundaries of nations are
drawn in blood."
"The next war is fixed by the
life of the generation now being
born."
From Israel ZangwilV s powerful
article in the July number of '* Nash's
Magazine*' — Out to-day. Sixpence.
New Edition (18th), Cloth, la. 6d., Board.s Is. Of all Booksellers, or post free from
the Publishers.
THE DIETETIC CURE OF OBESITY.
WITH a CHAPTER on GOUT and its DIETETIC TREATMENT.
By Dr. Y0RKE-DAV1E8.
CONTENTS.— Evils of Corpulency. Dangerous conditions due to Corpulency, such H
Weak Heart, Gout, Ac. Diet the only safe and permanent cure at any age. Quack
Medicines to reduce weight dangerous and useless. Evils of Over-eating and
Sedentary Habits. Food in its relation to Work, Exercise, Ac. Analysis and com-
position of some largely advertised secret preparations for reducing weight.
LONDON: CHATTO & WINDUS, ill, St. Martin's Lane, W.C7
19b
The County Gentleman
AND
LAND&WATER
Vol. LXV No. 2772
SATURDAY, JUNE 26, 1915 [
PI.'BLInHED AST
A NEWSPAPERj
PRICK, SIXPENCE
PUBLISHED WEEKLY
{Copyright, Mandy,
THE KING OF ROUMANIA
LAND AND WATER
June 26, 1915
46
PICCADILLY, LONJON, W.
PHONE REGENT 189
13 Market Street,
MANCHESTER.
8 Castle Street,
LIVERPOOL.
Also
Branches at
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2o8
June 26, 1915
LAND AND WATER
OF CERTAIN GARDENS
By J. D. SYMON
IF the subject seem inappropriate to these days of
strife, defence may be found in the reflection that
it was in a garden that strife began, when a serpent
vain of his Kultitr, talked of " science over all,"
and found a listener. But the old story may rest for
the moment — enough of its consequences elsewhere — the
garden, even with the sword at the gate, remains true to its
immemorial fascinations, and this year, either by some
unwonted and compensating lavishness of summer or by
some trick of minds disturbed, it seems doubly delightful and
precious. Its spell is not to be denied amid the clash of
arms. We are told that in the very trenches, our soldiers
are making the wilderness to blossom as the rose ; and one
recalls from the earlier days of battle a snatch of verse written
by an officer on the Aisne, in praise of a garden he knew and
loved by the bridge-head of Venizel. No fragment of our recent
war-poetry rings more true, none carries with it a more
poignant note of contrast. In time of war, laws may be
silent, but the gardener's gentle legislation still flourishes and
becomes vocal in the poet's song.
Perhaps the most magical gardens of all are those we
shall never enter. The known enclosures are sweet enough,
but they always fall just one degree short of the unknown.
The variety, if not the fragrance of the known can be exhausted,
the unknown are inexhaustible, perennial in their wonder and
surprise. They need not be great and stately, ihe walled
sanctuaries of noble houses, it is enough th.it they be of ?ome
age and somewhat retired. London is rich in these retreats,
even in her districts accounted less favoured. As the train
whirls you through unpromising suburbs, there are continual
glimpses, at the most unlikely corners, of well-tended little
oases. A gap between unlovely lines of brick will suddenly
reveal a cloud of bloom, as thrilling as Wordsworth's sudden
vision of the daffodils, but far less enduring. For in a moment
it is gone, a memory only. Next time you pass, the distin-
guishing flower, cherry, or plum or May, will have fallen ;
you cannot recognise your garden any more. Next year
perhaps, with luck, you may find the place again, if you are
not reading your paper. For that garden's sake, it were weil
to absent thee from publicity awhile.
Others less hopelessly inaccessible, are inaccessible all the
same. Although one may come very near them, year in and
year out, they hover always on the verge of the unknown,
or rather the imperfectly known. Such are those of a littie
country town, still unspoiled in its quaint irregularity.
It is the very irregularity of its plan (or lack of plan), that
makes its gardens so happily mysterious. To one who has
not a single acquaintance there, they must remain perpetual
mysteries. That is, mysteries in the sum of their charm.
They reveal themselves in part at odd corners, they push
some of their clustering beauties over the edge of mellow-
toned old walls, their ancient trees break the red line of
gabled roofs with fine masses of contrast, especially at sun=ct,
when the greens are olive-deep and the reds a tawny gold ;
but still the paradise withholds itself. Try what coigns of
vantage you will, climb this little height or that, for the town
leans against a hill-side, and try for a better view, the
gardens keep their secret. You can only guess their
perfection, but you know it is there ; for generations,
ay, centuries sometimes, have gone to its making.
Your new garden is hardly worth the name, except
for what it holds of promise. That the gardener may
never enjoy, but to-day he toils with better heart, for his work
has become a symbol of the times. It is the hour when men
have learned to sow gladly for others to reap. And on the
scarred soil of Flanders they drive their trenches and water
them with blood that the tree of Liberty may come to new
strength and beauty. That, in effect, is the burden of
" La Braban^onne." But let us cry the reader's mercy for
this digression. Truce, it would seem, is impossible, even
with the gentlest of themes. It is part of the bargain of
these papers that they keep the echoes of war remote, and we
are conscious of lamentable failure hitherto. Yet the essay,
although it be only, as here, ah essay of sorts, is permitted to
digress down any alley that offers, and the best of gardens
are those where the walks and alleys take the least expected
twists and turns. Thereby, with good patience, the wanderer
may gain some new glimpses, no matter if the}' be, as a wicked
wit said of Jowett's philosophy, " glimpses into the obvious."
Whereby, it would seem, we have regained at length the
thread of our discourse.
For the next division of the subject, now deviously reached,
was to have been the praise of another pleasant trick of un-
known gardens. Such are . hose that lie c ose to the high-
way, but are jealously screened from the highwayman's
sight by high walls. Yet they are not quite obdura'.e in their
reserve, for they concede a single point to the inquisitive.
Therein they are happily distinguished from their fellows
who add to the blankness of their guardian wall the added
blankness of a closely boarded door, that last touch of the
inhospitable. But the kind I have in mind are kindlier and
great i their merit, for they permit some little glimpses of
their treasure through a fair and graceful gate of old wrought
iron. Much they may not give, but their little is a thing of
price. The path is, at the best, narrow and of irregular paving
stones, or, almost as good, of smooth brick, worn, it may be,
into occasional hollows by feet of many generations. If the
gate be a postern, and not an entrance of greater or less
ceremony, such a path may even be of velvet turf, the most
pleasing of aU paths to eye and foot, although the gardener
mislikes it and will tell you it is the breeding-place of slugs.
But the brick or paved app oach lends perhaps a
finer accent to the skirting flowers. It goes best with fines of
standard roses, backed by a high hedge of sweet peas on either
hand. And it is of the essence of such vistas that they be
self-contained. To right or left they should not give away
the further secrets of the ground, but lead the eye right
onwards to an indefinite end, or if definite, let it be but a
suggestion of the house which is the heart of the sanctuary.
That is good, but better still if the path ends in a
maze of flower and foliage, the shimmering intricacies of the
pergola, where the rambler twines luxuriant. Or the path
may widen for an instant, before it loses itself into a little
circular space centring on a lichened sundial. You can never
go close enough, stranger that you are, to read the warning
motto on that silent chronicler, but you may before you pass
on try to imagine it, or if you are in the mood invent one for
yourself. Try as you will you will never better that suggested
by D'Annunzio for a friend's sundial. Me lumen, vos umbra
regit.
Putting aside the tempting morality of that epigram,
which is its own best exposition, let us by way of relief turn
from the ordered sweetness of formal gardens to another
kind, equally pleasant in its way, but charming also in its
admired disorder, the garden of childhood. Stevenson
understood it well, when with deft implication he called his
most delicious medley of lyrics " A Child's Garden of Verses."
The child's garden is the medley in excelsis. No matter how
the little gardener toils, the result is always haphazard, here
a tuft of London Pride, there of pansies, and always the
pathetic failure of the attempt to trace a name in marjorara
or cress. The story books of another day had a beautiful
fable that told how on George's birthday, punctual to the
hour, George's name grew up clear and legible in his garden.
How many vanished springs saw small imitators of
George looking in vain for the perfect lettering of the picture !
But the experiment was always tried, the eternal hopefulness
of youth refused to be discouraged. If not this year then
next. And sometimes a few letters and parts of letters
rewarded faith and patience. In the child's garden, little
girls succeed best. The boy's garden is usually a joke. One
recalls how that joke appeared in its most amiable form at a
certain preparatory school, where prizes were given for the
finest efforts. One or two plots were, by rather more than
courtesy, gardens recognisable. But a passion for meretricious
ornament undid the rest. Stones of every sort, even the
roughest stones of the field, bits of broken bottles and shells
were introduced by way of decoration, and the result resembled
nothing so much as Zulu graves. And in one case, assiduous
digging left little or no space for horticulture. That garden
was like an abandoned field-work, torn by high-explosive
shells, and so it remained when the judges came round.
Yet to give the human boy his due, ingenuity sometimes
finds its account even here in unexpected ways. Once
upon a time, a handy youth, fascinated by the Japanese
garden at the White City, set about reproducing it in miniature.
The scheme succeeded, and the arrangement of the ornamental
waters did credit to a budding engineer, and showed a bent
that might one day guide the choice of a profession. But
in his garden the child sees far more than the blind grown up.
It is a microcosm. His scale is not the scale of his elders.
Here Stevenson has his word again, not of child's gardens
made with hands but of natural landscape in miniature.
" The very tiny dell " he found " beside a shining water well,"
was in itself a world. It became, was, actual and in relief,
a little picture ; in the original sense, an idyll.
209
Don't forget
THE PEN.
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friend on Active Service a genuine
Waterman's Ideal, or is he strug-
gling along with an imitation ?
LAND AND WATER
E= =
June 26, 1915
WatermansddeauR'untainPen
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Choose the " SAFETY " type for
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210
June 26, 1915.
LAND AND WATER.
THE WAR BY LAND.
By HILAIRE BELLOC.
NOTE. — This article has been sabmitted to the Press Bureau, which does not object to th; publication as censored, and takes a*
responsibility for the correctness of the statements.
In accordance with the requirements of the Press Bureau, the positions of troops on Plans illustratinit this Article mast only b*
regarded as approiimate, and no definite strength at any point is indicated.
THE fighting upon the West this week,
very important in its ultimate effect of
wearing down the line of the enemy and
proving the coming povvcr of the as
yet undeveloped offensive in the West, is not yet
upon a scale, does not yet comprise Jiiovements so
considerable as to permit of a general analysis.
We have, perhaps, not long tu wait before the
West will provide all the material for these pages.
The same is true of the new Italian front,
upon which in the past week no considerable
change has happened, because there has been no
massing i^ yet of the main Italian concentration.
The principal m.aterial of the week is still upon
the Eastern front, and concerns the fate of Lem-
berg.
THE BATTLE FC^ LEMBERG.
The evacuation of Lemberg and the with-
drawal of the Russian line behind that town must
not be represented, as has rightly been every pre-
vious retirement through Galicia upon the part of
our Ally, as a mere withdrawal from a geographi
Galicia which is partly Eussian by tradition.
Strategically, Lemberg is much more than this.
It is the point upon which all the railways
serving the Eastern section of Galicia con-
A'erge. He who has Lemberg possesses the power
of moving troops from north-west to south-east at
will. A commander defending Lemberg from the
east against an enemy advancing from the west
can move troops from Tomasov/ (1) through the
Rawa Ruska J unction, or, again, along the railway
which comes into that same junction from the
west (2); or, again, through the Jaworow Rail-
way, through Lemberg itself, (3) ; thence south-
ward and westward by the main line towards
Grodek (4); by the next line (5), which ultimately
leads to Sambor; by the next line again (6), which
ultimately leads to Stryji; and by the great main
lateral line (7) (it is true it is only a single one),
which goes all along the defensive line of the
Dniester as far as Halicz. Further, he can call
in men and munitions from behind his line by the
little railway to Sokal (8) ; by the longer one to the
frontier passing through Kavionka (9); by both
cal area. Lemberg is politically the capital of the great main line_s fron^. the Russian bases : that
Galicia, and particularly of that sole portion of passing - - -
coming
LAND AND WATER,
JtiBe 2e, 1915,
from Tarnopol (11) i while bis niovemcnt of
troops is further easetl by the cross line leading
from Tarnopol (12) to line No. 7 and by the junc-
tion between it and the main Lemberg line (13).
One has but to look at such a diagram as the
foregoing to note its position towards the frontier
and to obser\e the fact that beyond that frontier
there are only two single lines, A and B, con-
necting the Russian bases, to see what Lemberg
means in a modern war conducted upon Galician
soil. It is the very heart of the whole system of
ctrnimunicdtions, and the passage of it from one
commander to another means, after the brief
delay required for the restoring of broken bridges
aod^cut culverts, the passage of power over all
eomiHUJiicatioiis from one side to the other. A
aaiaii possessing rouglily the line C — D, with Lem-
berg at its centre, against a thrust coming from
along the arrow- is, so far as communications can
make him so, master of the movements required
f©r defence back and forth. Let him lose that line
C— D, and with it Lemberg. let him be compelkJ
to fall back to the line E— F, and he has at once
lost his power of lateral movement and handed
that advantage over to his enemy.
That is the really great strategical import-
aHfie of Lemberg which distinguishes this nodal
point from all the merely geographical points
hitherto acquired by the enemy in his advance
through Galicia.
As against this, however, there is one matter
worthy of remark. Heav>' as is the blow dealt to
the Russian forces by an enemy occupation of
Lemberg, there does not lie behind that position
any considerable opportunity for a further
Austro-German advance.
How true this is a further consideration of
the territory over a somewhat wider area will
easily prove.
Lemberg is Galicia. But the enemy's main
object must still be to break the Russian line,
and that task, when or if the Russians fall back
vet further behind Lemberg. is not made easier
by such a success, but, on the contrary, more
difficult, as will appear from the following
argument : —
The Austro-German offensive against the
Russian line has, as all the world knows, succeeded
wholly through an immense superiority in heavy
guns and the ammunition therefor. The bring-
ing forward of munitions for these pieces, and,
for that matter, the moving of the heavy pieces
themselves, demanded railways. All the main
advance has taken place along the great double
line railway, which is the backbone of Galicia,
and divorced from railways the German war
mac-liine can do nothing.
Now, w^hile the possession of Lemberg brings
the enemy a complete and concentrating system of
railways" for his supplies, the moment you reach
the frontier of Galicia not only does that advan-
tage disappear, but every accident of ground in-
creases the handicap.
How true this is will a])pear from the
annexed diagram. The frontier is here indicated
by dotted lines, and it will be seen how, across that
frontier, come the two main railways which lead
to the Russian bases in the south and east, and
converging upon Lemberg itself at L.
Trom Lemberg, as we have just seen, run all
those subsidiary railways which have been de-
scribed in the last few paragraphs, one of which
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only, that to Tomasow-, crosses the frontier. Now,
beyond that frontier there is absolutely nothing
in the way of railway communication until
we get to the single line railway which, from
Ivangorod, upon the Vistula (I), runs down past
Lublin (Lu). and so joins up to the first of the rail-
wavs to the Russian bases (1). In other ATords,
voii have all round Lemberg a sort of spiders, w^b
of railways (single lines, it is true, save the mam
one through Przemysl. Grodek, and Lemberg
itself) which make the movements of troops and
ammunitions easy. Beyond the frontier you have
nothing but this' one single line from Ivangorod
(I), past Lublin (Lu), to the fortified junction at
Rowno (R).
Now, it is clearly evident that a force Avhich
has had to fall back from the line of the River
San, and, roughly, from what we called in the first
diagram the defensive position C — D to the de-
fensive position, E — F, though it has sacrificed
the immense advantages of the Galician network
of railwavs converging on Lemberg (L), yet is
retiring parallel to, and ultimately supported by,
the main Russian railways coming up from the
south-east, and in particular by the line through
the junction of Rowno (R), past Lublin (Lu), to
Ivangorod (I.)
This disposition is particularly important
when we remember that once the line falls back
yet further, as along the line of dashes in the
"diagram, it is in ground full of woods and marsies
ancfoffering the greatest possible difficulties to the
advance of heavy guns and their munitions.
While the falling back upon this line and still
further retirement, dragging Avith it increasingly
difficult communications for the enemy— exactly
like the direct communications on the Niemen six
months ago — brings the Russians nearer and
nearer to the railway which can supply them along
a line almost exactly parallel with their front.
And the matter is further to be examinedln
the light of the position of Warsaw. It has been
sufficiently emphasised in these colunms for majay
months past that Warsaw, with its bridges and
the convergence thereupon of so many lines, of
railway from the interior of Russia, is the' capital
strategic point (for Russia upon the defexjgvve) of
June 26, 1915.
LAND AND WATKE
the whole Ea-stem front, just as Cracow is tlie
capital strategic point (for the Austro-C4ermans
on the defensive) of the whole Eastern front.
Russia, advancing, could only test the success
of her offensive by the taking or passing of
Cracow. She failed' The Austriaus and Germans,
advancing, can only test their real succes.s — their
power to prevent Russia from cjuickly coming
back — by their hold upon Warsaw.
If the Austro-Germans could so turn the line
of the Vistula that their capture of Warsaw could
at last be accomplished, then, although they should
not have broken the Russian line, but should only
have pushed it back Ijeyond Warsaw, they would
have done something almost as decisive as the
breaking of that line. But the pushing back of the
Russian forces from Galicia does not uncover
[Warsaiv.
That is the really important thing to seize.
The Vistula line, as it 'is called, but what it is more
proper to term the great fortified Vistula crossing
(which is Warsaw flanked by Ivangorod on the
south and Neo Georgievsk on the north), is not
turned by this advance through Galicia unless, or
until, the line of railway running from the forti-
fied point Rovno, in the south, north-westward to
Ivangorod, past the provincial capital of Lublin, is
in the hands of the enen\y. The point will be easily
grasped from the diagram already given. We see
in this the great nexus of railways, of which Lem-
l>erg (L) is the centre, and how the loss of Lem-
he will quite certainly find himself with every
mile of his progress more and more ham-
pered in the use of his heavj' artillery, while
behind the Russian front there will run the main
line from the fortified junction of Rorao (R). past
the provincial capital of Lublin (Lu), to the forti-
fied point of Ivangorod (I), which flanks Warsaw
(W) on the south, just as the fortified point of
Neo Georgievsk flanks it on the north. It is,
or should be, quite clear that such a line as, for
instance, the dotted line on the foregoing diagram
would give a Russian front strong against
a superiority of the enemy's heaxy pieces, and
confidently protecting the Warsaw crossing from
being turned by the south.
Meanwhile, before concluding with the
details of the attack on Leraberg, one can only
reiterate the obvious strategical truth, which
is none the less true because it has grown weari-
some, that the enemy has not cfi'ected his purpo.se
in the East until he has separated the Russian
forces and broken their line.
He has, as a political asset, by the clearing of
Galicia, delayed, if it were expected, the inter-
vention of Roumauia. He has. as a material
asset, got back his sources of petrol supply — a
really important point. He has, for what it is
worth, affected newspaper opinion, particularly,
it is to be feared, in this country. But luckily
the conduct of the war is in the hands not of
uew.spaper owners, nor even of politicians, but
berg means, as we have just been describing, the of the gx-eat General .Staff.
loss of Galicia -. but we also see beyond the frontier,
once the Galician railway .system is frankly aban-
doned, a great belt of Russian Poland absolutely
denuded of railways. It is also, by the way,
largely denuded of roads, and, as the summer in
this Eastern corner of Europe has been as wet as it
has been dry iii the West, we may regard that belt
of country as one over which the enemy could only
Now, in doing this he has already lost, for
the moment, at least 600.000 men, and perma-
nently, say, 400,000. He has also expended some
very ' large proportion — perhaps half — of the
great accumulation of shell, the " head " of shell
with which he undertook the task not quite two
months ago. If he does at last succeed in divid-
inc the Russian Army and of obtaining some
advance with the greatest possible difficulty. He definite victory against it, then that exceptional
is depending, as we have seen, entirely upon his expen.se may' just have been worth while,
superior munitionn^ent for heavy guns. That is Remember, it is still going on, and at what a
the one asset he has. His .soldiers, as soldiers, rate the daily lists in our own Press of our own
have no longer the moral value of the renewed casualties may give us, in their much smaller pro-
Russian levies which come from younger men portions, some sort of idea. If he does not obtain
and which feel indefinitely large .support liehind hjg main strategical object, then he has made the
them. His generalship has had no cau.se to expenditure in vain. 1 will deal with that point
come into play since he has had nothing to dc»
but batter, and whether it be superior or in-
ferior to that of the orderly Russian retreat only
an opportunity for his manoeuvring would show,
Whether his proportion of sick is higher or lower
we cannot tell. The one and the only form of
superiority he certainly has — and it is decisive
— is this immense numerical superiority in
munitions for his heavy guns.
But he has never been able to make use of this
of the enemy's expense in men further in a
moment. Meanwhile, let us conclude with the
details of the battle for Lemberg.
The general situation of tiie front defended for
some days liy the Russians in front of Lemberg i.s
that expressed in the following map. There
runs in front of Lemberg, rather more than fifteen
miles away on the average, a long chain of lakes
and mai'.shes, generally known as the position of
Grodek, from tlie town standing about midway
superiority at more than a day's march from a in the system; the largest agglomeration of houses
double line of railv.ay. There is no case in the ;« that rather deserted district. This town of
^ar, even upon the J'^astern front, of a German Grodek occupies an isthmus bet\\een two of the
success at any appreciable distance froni some shallow, swampy lakes which here afford a \exy
good double main line. Witness the faihire of narrow pas'tage of dry ground. It is this passage
the fir.st advance against the Nienien. the failure which carries the main road to Lemberg. Tlie
against the Upper Dniester, the failure against railway goes up by the north, through a similar
the Lower San. &c. His present movement c<n
Lemberg has been entirely dependent uport the
main line through Jaroslav (J) and Przemysl (P) :
even in this last turning movement, he is not a
day's march from that line, to the north.
narrow passage between two other of this chain
of lakes. The whole chain of lakes and niar.shes
from above Janow in the north to the beginning
of the great Dniester marshes in the south is a
matter of twenty-five miles. It is an exceedingly
Now, if he attempt to get beyond the frontier strong position /in fact, it is impassable to an
3^
LAND AND W A T E E
June 26, 1915.
rO'
'jh'Lemberg-
MAlovAn
KOAmRNO
iszMarshes all the waij
S5 txTtlie'Dniestcr.
' *
Miies.
JO
I
Jij
army attacking any properly equipped defensive.
iThere is a passage at Komarno, then no reason-
able crossing for eight miles; for at the humor-
ously named village of Grunt, upon the drainage
stream of the whole system there is only a path.
It is not till you get to Malovanka that you get
a very narrov^ bridge of dry land carrying the
.southern high road to Lemberg; four or five miles
further to the north you have the main town of
Grodek, carrying the main, or northern, high
road to Lemberg; then at the top of the shallow,
and largely swampy, lake of Grodek you have a
place where, though the marshes are continuous
(at A), the dry land comes sufficiently close on
either side to carry the railway across on an
artificial crossing. Beyond this the lakes extend
yet another four or five miles, and at their
extremity they are continued, rather to one side, by
a further little chain of lakes and marshes. Here,
then, is a front upon which a quarter of a million
men could deploy, and yet with only three roads
by very narrow defiles through the bogs and
shallow lakes and only one railway for supply.
ilt is as strong a position as any other which has
come into this great campaign, and resembles in
some of its difficulties the lake district where
Hindenburg won his great victory of Tannenberg
in the autumn of last year.
Now, unfortunately, it can be turned from
the north, where the advancing line is sufficiently
strong in numbers. There runs here on the north
a line of hills v.'hich I have marked A A, on the
diagram below, and behind them the road from
Lemberg, through Zolkiev to Rawa Ruska (and
ultiinately Tomasow on the frontier). Zolkiev was
at the time of writing (Tuesday evening) reported
by the enemy to have been in his hands since last
Sunday, and therefore Rawa Ruska as well. It is
evident that the whole of this northern road was
already grasped by the enemy upon that date (the
20th), and that the line of the Grodek lakes was
thoroughly turned. In other words, the only
To Tom&sov/
iwa Ruska
Zolkiew
:o
.^=^ - o
10
Great Ibniesljer
Marshes
Zyi&ciow
•TX
natural position for the defence of Lemberg had
gone.
There has not been received at the moment of
writing the news of the enemy's occupation of
the city.
A NOTE ON ENEMY LOSSES.
I have been approached by several correspon-
dents in the matter of what they believe to be an
exaggeration upon my part of the enemy's losses.
I fear that the mood which now tends to belittle
these losses is part of that uncalculating depres-
sion which has been created in this country mainly,
by one very insincere section of the Press, and
which is as significant in the eyes of serious study
and criticism as was the foolishly extravagant
hope months ago, when the Russians were to have
been in Berlin by October.
The calculation of enemy losses is, of course,
not an exact science, but it is something in which
4»
you can have two quite exact limits — a maximum
and a minimum. I do not know how many people
died in London last year, but I remember that
Greater London has, roughly, six to seven millions,
the death-rate, roughly, fourteen to fifteen per
thousand, and I conclude that the deaths in London
must be less than they would be if the death-rate
were sixteen per thousand for a maximum popula-
tion of seven and a half millions and less than they
would be for a death-rate of twelve per thousand
with a population of only six millions. I have a
maximum and a minimum such that above the one
and heloiv the other I am not guessing, but am abso-
lutely certain the figures cannot extend. The truth
must be somewhere within the limits.
It is exactly the same with enemy casualties.
iWe have not official statistics before us. The factors
for our judgment are various — the enemy's own
lists, our own known rate of wastage in compari-
son with our own average numbers, our type of
fighting compared with his, the known rate at
which men return to the front from hospital, the
known number of prisoners.
Germany has not armed less than six million
men since the beginning of the war; she has not
armed more than seven and a half millions. The
maximum that Austria-Hungary can add to Ger-
many in man power is 80 per cent. She has cer-
tainly not added less than 60 per cent. The Allies
hold about a million and a quarter prisoners, at
the very least, but not more than a million and a
half at the most. The figures of wounded and
missing to dead are, even in the severest trench
fighting, not lower than four to one. Of wounded
admitted to hospital and of some sick about
half are discharged as fit to fight again some day
or other, but of wounded only you cannot count
on more than a fifth getting back on the average of
all services within, say, two months.
Now put all this together, and what do vou
find ?
The average number of men in the British
Expeditionary Force is not a twelfth of the
numbers Germany has passed through in this
war. We had less than a hundred thousand men
in the field when Germany had more than thirty
times as much. We have perhaps now in the field
a sixth of what Germany has altogether put for-
ward. The average is certainly, I repeat, far less
than a twelfth. The German forces have been com-
pelled, or have chosen to undertake, the most
violent and prolonged offensive actions. They
have fought in the most expensive tactical fashion.
Our casualties give 50,000 dead. Who can
doubt that the total German dead must be over
600,000? It is absolutely certainly an under-
estimate; less than the lowest possible minimum.
Austria-Hungary cannot conceivably have less
than 60 per cent', of that total. It is certain that
she has added more than 60 per cent. In other
words, it is absolutely certain that your minimum
of enemy dead must — absolutely without escape
from the simplest laws of arithmetic — be over a
million. You have certainly well over a million
prisoners. Is it conceivable that disablement from
wounds and prolonged sickness should be less than
double the number of dead ? It is inconceivable.
Well, then, the figure of four millions, so far
from being an extravagant figure, is an extremely
modest one. And when I said that the total
number of enemy permanently out of action was
-' nearer four than three millions " I was putting
the figures far below even the strictest minimum.
It seems to me certain that they must be over
four.
THE HYPOTHESIS OF INVy\SION.
Current talk in the last fortnight and reports
from private travellers in the enemy's country
liave brought again under discussion the hypo-
thesis of invasion. It may be worth while, there-
fore, to -consider very briefly the political and
strategical position of the enemy in this connec-
tion. With the naval problem involved I cannot
deal. But the general military problem is simple
enough.
1. The principal military object of the enemy
in proposing an invasion of this country would
be the interruption of the aid this country can
afford to the general alliance. This interruption
would take four forms :
(a) The retention within the island of forces
that might otherwise be sent abroad.
(b) The hampering, in a greater or less
degree, according to the confusion created in the
public mind and in Government arrangements,
of supply to the Army abroad.
(c) The same with regard to financial assist-
ance to the Allies.
(d) The same with regard to the production
of munitionment, of equipment, and of goods for
export, which maintain the economic position of
this country.
2. The object of such an attack would be
partly attained if it could be maintained as a
serious threat without ever being put into execu-
tion. Now, this truth, which is almost self-evi-
dent, is, paradoxically enough, an argument in
favour of an actual attempt at invasion. For it
is manifest from experience that public opinion
in general in this country does not regard invasion
as a serious threat, and nothing but its successful
practice would have the effects just enumerated.
Therefore, those in the enemy's country who
perceive the advantages which might acerue to
them from the mere threat of invasion will equally
be armed with arguments for its actual prosecu-
tion. In other words, we may decide immediately
that, unlike the corresponding doctrine in con-
nection with aerial raids, the mere moral effect
of a threat is not in contempiation, but either a
serious attempt at invasion or none. For it ia
further obvious that an abortive attempt, whether
resulting in the defeat of the enemy's fleet and the
end of the whole business, or in the landing of a
small force which should be quickly destroyed or
repelled, would have a purely negative effect, and
would hurt the enemy by increasing public con-
fidence after such a success again.st him.
3. The argument that such an attempt would
be impossible, or unlikely, on account of the drain
of men it would entail holds under the immediate
circumstances of the campaign, but does not hold
with the same force in case of certain future pos-
sible developments. It is conceivable that during
or after a period of temj)orary defensive upon
the East as upon the West the enemy might
detach a sufficient force to effect in his judgment
the degree of disturbance which he regards as
sufficient. We must remember here that we are
dealing not with our own psychology' but with
the enemy's, and it is certain that he still estimates
too low the power of resistance that can be offered
once a landing is effected, and he rates the disturb-
S»
ance it would create in all public plaus too high.
4. The material for such an attempt is known
to be prepared and has been prepared lor man^^
months, nor is it of any very complicated kind,
seeing that the attempt, if made, would probably
be made by an insufficient number of men.
Now, it is self-evident that no invasion could
be of the least value, even as a raid, unless the sea
were clear behind it for some considerable space
of time. A landing force could briug with it
munitions for all the earlier part of the fighting
and could establish itself if it had command of
the sea, \vliether by a trick or by a victory, for
even three days. But unless that command were
more or less permanent, or at any rate could extend
over a calculable period of weeks rather than days,
the raiders would be doomed. They could do an
enormous amount of damage, and they could. ]>or-
haps, throw into confusion most of the national
plans; but the effect would be slight, because it
would be ephemeral, and the ultimate destruction
of the force landed would be, in the field of mere
moral effect, an asset of those against whom it had
been directed and a permanent loss to the enemy.
But if the sea were kept open for a time sufficient
to permit even a mere raid to effect its purpose and
to retire, tlien the advantage would be all in the
enemy's favour.
It is to the enemy's advantage that the blow,
if struck, should be struck late. He can hardly
strike it until there is something of a lull in his
Continental operations — until he has organised a
general defensive, for the moment at least. And
the later he strikes the better, because he is
staking his fleet. If he is completely defeated on
land in the long run his fleet is certainly forfeit;
but until he is completely defeated his fleet retains
its full value. It is, for instance, at the present
moment inconceivable even to his higher command
that his defeat shall be so complete as to iuA'olve
the surrender of his ships.
All this set of considerations tends to post-
]ione and fui-ther to postpone any such attempt as
that which we are considering.
On the other hand, the building power of
Great Britain as against that of the German
Empire is such that with every passing month the
disproportion between the two fleets increases.
The enemy must be balanced in this scheme of
invasion, between the picture of a desperate stroke
which would have its maximum effect quite late in
the war and a picture of a defeat which then
occurring would be more thorough than what he
might have suffered earlier in the campaign.
On the one hand, the enemy would at the very
end of a lost campaign rather risk his fleet in a
gambler's throw than see it disappear by the dull
method of a shameful treaty. On the other hand,
its proportionate power for offence, when we con-
trast the building potential of the two nations,
lessens regularly as the campaign draws on.
The argument is strongly in favour of delay
rather than an immediate trial. But that
such an experiment, with the odds admittedly
enormous against its success, may be risked as a
last desperate move does actually present it.self to
the German commanders is probable.
A GENERAL SURVEY.
{Conti
I HAVE in last week's issue tabulated the
enemy's view of the struggle he deliberately
provoked under eight heads :
I next propose to show how his rigiit
guesses and wrong led up to the present situation.
1. The most important guess of all, the guess
which was at the bottom of the enemy's grand
strategy as a whole, was wildly wrong. It was as
wrong as the idea the French Revolution had about
the state of England and of English political
opinion in the year 1793 : and it was the enemy's
utter miscalculation in this regard which, as much
as anything else, defeated his object and forbade
his final victory in the war he had provoked.
So far from the French General Staff' being
in peril of political confusion through the stroke
which would undoubtedly menace Paris, the enemy
were dealing, in the case of that Staff', with a
body of men, who, more than any other in Europe,
were determined to be utterly rid of the Parlia-
mentarians the moment war began, and to sacrifice
every civilian consideration Avhatsoever to purely
military ends.
Paris did not act as a lure. Tlie French Plan
was perfectly ready to sacrifice Paris, if by that
sacrifice the campaign as a whole could be won.
All three contingencies, therefore, which the Ger-
mans regarded as exhaustive, and as covering the
whole field of possibilities, were in reality elimi-
nated before war began.
(a) The French Army had no intention of
directing its plan to the mere defence of Paris.
(b) It thoroughly well foresaw the danger of
nued.)
dividing its inferior forces, and had no intention
under any stress of falling into that trap.
(c) The n^.tion was so organised, it was so
military in temper that, once hostilities had begun,
no politicians, even if anj' had had the desire to
counsel a bad military operation, would have been
listened to.
The major consequences of this error in the
enemy's judgment moulded the whole war. It led
the enemy to drive the mass of his men straight on
Paris. It com|ielled him, when too near the forti-
fications of that fortress, to swerve. He was
caught in the act of swerving. The disaster he
thereby suffered broke down all his provision of
lapid success in the West, which was essential to
his general victory.
2. In choosing the Belgian Plain as the line
of an advance on Paris, the enemy was, in the
military sense, justified. This line would give
him ample railway communications and the most
direct avenue of approach to the French Capital.
In his guess as to the nature of Belgium's resi.st-
ance the enemy was both right and wrong; right
in the calculation which depended upon material
and numerical factors, wrong, as he has always
been, in what depended upon psychology. The
fortresses could not resist him, the Belgian Army
could but slightly and imperfectly detain him in
the Field. But on the other hand he met with so
vigorous a National resistance, he was so far from
attaining an advance secure under a mere {irotest
(as at Luxembourg) tliat all his military action
from the outbreak of the war to the present day
June 26, 1915.
LAND AND AV A T E K
has been hainpereil by the necessity of treating
Belgium as a conquereil country. Tiiere are those
who have excused upon purely military grounds
the wholly novel and amazing procedure of
massacre,, pillage, rape — and worse — with which
the German Authorities treated a Nation whose
security they had themselves sworn to preserve.
These apologists, admitting, of course, whatever
moral blame you wull in such conduct, maintain
that in the purely militari/ sense it has
strengthened the German hands. They are quite
wrong. The violation of Belgiimi and the policy
of wholesale massacre and savagery has liad three
most important consequences, each adverse m
their various degree to the German arms :
(a) It delayed at first by hampering com-
munications the delivery of munitions, particu-
larly of heavy shell at the very end of the advance
on Paris;
(b) It has locked up in one way or another in
Belgium not less than 100,000 men as a garrison
of that unhappy country throughout the whole
period of hostilities;
(c) (most important of all) it has strategi-
cally tied the Germans through all the future of
this campaign to the corpse of that Belgium
which they have killed. A reluctance or inability
to retire with safety and rapidity through
Belgium, a growing necessity or desire to pretend
the annexation of that country leaves their grand
strategy to this day clogged, they are not free to
shorten their line where they will. They must
hang on in the north. Compare the effect in
Central and Eastern Spain uptm the Marshals of
Napoleon a hundred years ago, especially when
the necessity for retreat appeared.
3. In this third theory the enemy was right
and the Allies were wrong. Permanent fortifica-
tions were easily dominated by the modern siege
train, when that siege train and its munitionment
were in sufficient force. Note that it was to the
Austrian arsenals mainly, and to the Austrian
engineers that the enemy here owed his power.
4. In the fourth point, the power of modern
rapid road transit made good the very largest
flanking movement, the enemy was wrong.
Perhaps it was because the provision of suf-
ficient artillery was impossible; but at any
rate, with an enormous superiority in number, the
enemy's theory of enveloping here quite broke
down. I will suggest that it may perhaps have
been mainly due to his error in the fifth point —
the u.se of dense ma.sses in attack — which is of an
importance meriting longer discusion and which
I will analvse next week.
H. BELLOC.
{To be continued.)
MR BEl-LOC'S LECTURES ON THE WAR.
Mr. HiUiro Beiloc will lecture on the War at Qiieea'3 Hall on
Tuesday, July 13; and Tuesday, July 27.
Seats may now Ijc bfoked.
At 3.30, the Winter GardeiLs, Boumemoulh, Monday, Jane 28.
At 8 o'clock, Iho Speech Hall, Wycomba Abbey, High Wycombo,
on Wednesday, July 7.
THE WAR BY WATER.
By A. H. POLLEN.
ItOTE. This article has been submitted to the Press Rureau, (rliich does not object to the publicatioa as ceaso red, and takes do
responsibility for the correctness ol the statements.
T
THE NAVAL SITUATION.
HE account of the advance of the Allied
forces in the Gallipoli Peninsula, pub-
lished on Wednesday morning, mentions
the services of the French battleship, St.
Louis, in keeping down the fire from the forts on
the Asiatic side, but it m.akes no mention of any
co-operation of the ship's guns with the land forces
in the actual advance. The fact that the St. Louis
was engaged shows that it was not from any fear
of German submarines that the battleships have
abstained from participation. The probability is
that the fighting took place on ground that the
naval guns could not reach.
Tuesday's Temps announced that the Allied
fleet had bombarded the town of Gallipoli, but it is
not officially confirmed. It is possible that this
bombardment coincided with the successful ad-
vance officially announced on Tuesday. From
Gallipoli to Duhut Iskalessi, off which the ships
might lie, is well within the range of 12-inch guns,
and as the town occupies a great deal of ground,
there is no reason why, with the assistance of air-
craft, a very effective indirect bombardment should
not have been carried out. There are no hills pro-
tecting Gallipoli from such fire. To the ordinary
members of the public, the principal interest of
both items of news lies in the fact that it is evident
that Admiral de Robeck has the submarine menace
well in hand.
Beyond this, the official news of naval activity
from all quarters is slender. In the Baltic,
a German auxiliary cruiser has held up the
Swedish cruiser Thorsten. There is an uncon-
firmed report from Petrograd that the Hamadieh
has been badly injured in an encounter with the
Black Sea Fleet. Beyond this there have only been
some minor events in the Adriatic. One is dis-
tinctly curious. The Italian submarine Medusa
had the ill-luck to come to the surface in the im-
mediate neighbourhood of an Austrian submarine
that was showing her periscope only. The
Austrian had time to fire a torpedo before it was
itself detected, and the torpedo unfortunately;
proved fatal. It is almost inconceivable that one
submarine could torpedo another in any other cir-
cumstances than these. It is well that this ex-
planation has been given, for I notice that in an
article in the Nautical Magazine, a merchant
service officer holding a first mate's certificate
describes how a ship he was on was submarined.
He declares that the submarine fired when sub-
m.erged, without her periscope being above water,
and conjectures that the conning tower of the sub-
marine was fitted with a plate-glass window,
through which an observer could see to fire without
using any visible optical device. If any such feat
as this were possible, the submarine would be a far
more formidable weapon than it is. But under
water, even in the brightest light, it is not possible
to see more than a very few feet, certainly not at
LAND AND WATER.
June 26, 1915.
tenth part of the distance over which this officer
had the torpedo under view that sank his ship.
There nave been two small Austrian raids;
one on the coast railway between Rimini and
Ancona, the other at Togliaraento, at the mouth of
the river of that name, which is opposite Trieste,
and about five-and-twenty miles aAvay from it. In
neither case vrere the Austrian raiding forces
destroyed.
The French Admiralty has announced that
the English, French, and Italian naval forces are
co-operating in the Adriatic with a special view
to hunting out and destroying German and
Austrian submarine bases, but beyond this there
is no news, either of any success by the German
submarines at the Dardanelles, nor any successful
raids on the Turkish communications by our sub-
marines. There is, indeed, a story published in
Rome of the successful expedition of a British sub-
marine in the Sea of Mftrmara. But there has been
no official allusion to it, and it is probably merely
a repetition of the achievements either of El4 or
of Ell. There is a touch in the report of the land
attacks on the Turkish positions of June 6th that
is of naval intei'est. It seems that, amongst other
captures, officers of the Goehen and B redan were
taken, together Avith a macliine guu from the
latter ship. This is a little confusing, because we
know from Russian sources that the Brcslw was
engaged on Jiuie 11 v> itl) some destroyers. If any
naval acliieveriients had been looked for from
either of tliese sliips, surely neither a gun nor a
man Avould h.ave been removed from them.
I drew attention last week to the fact that.
judging by Mr. CluirchilFs Dundee speech and
Mr. Runciman's Parliamentary reference to the
forthcoming wheat supplies from Odessa, the
Ministers seem to be very optimistic about the
Dardanelles. This optimism has since been
ftrongly empliasised by the Prime Minister. On
tlie 15th Mr. Asquith declared that he was not in
the least indisposed, in due course, to explain and
justify what had been done (or was being done) at
the Dardanelles, but he asked the Hou.se to excuse
his doing so, because such a discussion was not in
the Ix>st interest of the country.
THE SUBMARLNE CAMPAIGN.
The inquiry into the loss of the Lnsitania
and the extraordinary increase in the number of
Bubmarine victims in the first two weeks of June
mal 3 it worth while to examine the whole of this
question a little more closely. There is, there-
fore, published on the opposite page a graphic
statement in chronological order of the
total number of submarine victims, ships and
trawlers, British, Allied, and neutral, each loss
being set down to its approximate date. I believe
both the numbers and the dates to be substantially
accurate, but it is impossible to make them abso-
lutely so. The record includes a great many more
ships than figure in the weekly return issued by
the Admiralty, which is limited to British ships
only, and excludes the twenty-four allied ships
and thirty-seven neutrals that have been either
attacked or sunk.
For this idea I am largely indebted to Mr.
CI ilkley, the editor of the Motor Boat, who was
the first to draw attention to the 'periodicity of the
Bubmarine attacks, and to suggest an explanation.
To understand the extraordinary intensity
of the subninrine attack on our merchant ships
and trawlers in the first fortnight in June it is,
it seems to me, necessary to bear in mind the main
facts of the naval position, for it is out of these
facts that this campaign arose. If Germany, pos-
sessing an inferior number of the capital ships
on which comni'^trtd of the sea depends, had deter-
mined to make war on Great Britain, as well as
on France and Russia, she would have taken
two precautions. There are certain measures
that she would have taken as a preliminary
to making war, and she would have waited
to make war until circumstances were favour-
able. She would have secured, if it had been
possible to do so, a concentration of the naval
forces available to her and to her Allies. Some
excuse would have been made for bringing the
three Austrian Dreadnoughts to Wilhelmshaven,
for their junction with tlie German fleet would
have made a very material difference to the rela-
tive strength of the battle squadrons. Besides this
she would have seen that every cruiser she could
spare was placed on the trade routes, and she
would have armed everv liner for which she could
s])are guns and men, and distributed these scien-
tifically over the world. Having made these pre-
liminary preparations, she would have chosen a
moment for making war when the British battle
fleets were scattered, so that a surprise attack of
the German Higli Seas Fleet, reinforced by the
Austrian Dreadnoughts, could have fallen upon
one or more of our squadrons and annihilated
every ship. A simultaneous attack would have
l)een made upon cur trading ships the world over.
We should tlien have found ourselves suddenly
involved in a naval war. with our strength in
battleships reduced either to equality or below
it. and with the whole command of the sea, and
with it security for our trade and communica-
tions, still to win. No inunediate military expedi-
tion abroad would have been possible. We should
have been useless as allies.
But what the German and Austrian staffs
intended in July last was not war on Great
Britain, but war on Europe, witii Great Britain
remaining neutral. So confident were they of our
neutrality that they precipitated the crisis at a
moment when, as they had known for some
months would be the case, the British Navy was
mobilised on a scale and with a completeness
entirely unprecedented in our history. It was not
necessary for the Chancellor Hollweg to express
his terrified incredulity when the British Ambas-
sador in Berlin informed him than an invasion of
Belgium would mean our participation in the war.
It was not due to any sudden act of genius by our
Admiralty. It followed inevitably from the situa-
tion. The German High Seas Fleet was instantly^
and for the rest of the war confmed to its harbours.
The fate of such cruisers as were at large, includ-
ing von Spee's China squadron and the Goehen,
was theoretically sealed. How soon they met their
fate, and what mischief they would be able to do
before meeting it, depended on the dispositions
of the British Admiralty and the skill and deter-
mination of the various British commanders-in-
chief. If the thing was badly blundered, their run
might be longer. But the final issue was never in
doubt. It came with the battle of the Falkland
Islands. Germany then had to face the naked
fact that the war found her without effective
naval force and faced by an unexpected enemy oa
land as weLU
Juae 26, 1915.
LAND AND WATER
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BRITISH. ALLIED. AND NEUTRAL VESSELS StJKK BY SI'BilARIKES.
YON TIRPITZ V. VON HOLLWEG.
It is not at all improbable that from the v^xv
beginning of tilings the military staffs of Ger-
many and Austria took the direction of national
affairs entirely out of the hands of the Chanoellor
and Ministers. There were many indications that
the political oversights which so affected the
German policy were the oversights, not of the
diplomats and Minivers, but of the soldiers. It
seems quite certain that it was the disappointed
rage of the sailors that resulted in the astonish-
ing departure which we now know as the " sub-
marine campaign." Von Tirpitz's threat of
December became settled policy early in the New
Year, and, in spite of American protests, the sub-
marine campaign began on the appointed date in
February. If we are to understand the course
which this campaign has taken we must realise
that it originated as a stroke of naval revenge.
Its professe^l object was to threaten an embargo
on the importation of foodstuffs into England;
it was used as a lever to get us to raise our em-
bargo on v.heat entering German ports. But it
mttst always have been obvious that it could never
be an effective embargo, and it is difficult to
believe that the Chancellor ever supposeil thai the
threat would achieve a diplomatic success.
This being the position, we should expect
the submarine campaign to have been in all its
earlier stages tentative, the naval party pushing
for the blind use of force, the statesmen urging
moderation in a course that was regarded as an
experiment, the effect of which was to be watched.
A superficial glance at tlie graphic and
chronological progress of the submarine campaign
seems to confirm this theory. Xcrfe, for instance,
that there is a considerable pause after the first
■opening of the campaign in the last ten days of
February- That campaign has interesting
features of its own. Nine sliijis were attacked
between February 19 and Fdjruary 26. inclusive.
Ail the attacks but two were made in the Channel
between Folkestone and the Channel Islands. The
other two were made in the neighbourhood of
Liverpool. From the 26th to the 7th there was
a ten days' pause. Was this pause made with a
view to watching the effect ? There is another of
four days at the end of the second week in April,
and but for two attacks in the North Sea, almost
a total cessation between April 18 and 28. There
is a long pause of nine days after the Lnsitania
campaign.
THE PERIODICITY THEORIES.
A theory has been propounded that these
pauses are due to the submarines being recalled to
fill up with stores, fuel, and torpedoes. But if
refitting only were in question, there would be no
occasion to recall all the boats together. If a
special effort had been made, as was the case with
the Lvsitanvi, to capture a particular ship,
obviously the more submarines that were devoted
to the purpose the greater the chances of success.
But if it is simply a question of running amok
nothing is gained by submarines working
together. They cannot support each other as sur-
face craft can do. They are exposed to less risk in
proportion as they arc isolated. The danger
from hostile destroyers must obviously be less.
A second theory has been propounded that
tliese long pauses are to be explained by the oc^a-
sioaal recall either of all the boats or all except
one or two. so that they could be available for
the discharge of their true military duties. The
primary duty of German submarines is, of course,
to attack the main units of the British battle fleet.
Once an attack was made on the Dardanelles those
waters obviously bceanje a field for at least some
of them. The attacks on the English battle fleets
in home waters have from the very beginning of
the war until to-day }>eea absolutely fruitless.
But thei^ was a secondary function — to protect
their own fleet in its occasional parades in the
North Sea. In going into t}>e North S&a at ail,
the German Fleet undoubtedly takis risks, and it
LAND AND WATER.
June 26, 1915.
would net take those risks unless it were
guarded by mine-fields, Zeppelins, destroyers,
and submarines. The mines and the sub-
marines can be, and have undoubtedly been,
disposed so that a British squadron attack-
ing the German Fleet could be drawn into their
zone as into an ambush. Whether the theory that
the submarines have been called off to act in this
way is true or not cannot be decided without know-
ledge of the dates on which the German Fleet has
come out — knowledge which is not available from
any public sources.
The knowledge which is available certainly
lends colour to the supposition that for the first
three months of the war diplomatists were hold-
ing the sailors back and limiting the activity of
the submarines so as to give diplomacy a chance of
using the situation which their successes had
created. Two things seem to be almost conclusive
on this point. First, the long pause after the sink-
ing of the Lusitania; next, the unprecedented
ferocity of the work carried through in the first
fortnight in June. After the Lnsitania was sunk,
everything depended upon the action which
America would take. Was she serious in saying
that she would hold Germany to strict account?
It looks as if the diplomatists had insisted upon
time for these questions to answer themselves. By
June it had become obvious that the American
situation had become serious. An insolent reply
had been sent, and had been recognised as insolent.
It was obvious that German prestige nnist be kept
up. Germany has only one prescription in this
matter. The campaign must be made more fright-
ful. Piracy and murder, then, were enlisted once
more to help — or embarrass — diplomacy.
During the first ninety-seven days of the
campaign ninety-five ships were attacked. In
the next twenty-two days fifty-four. From some-
thing less than a rate of one ship per day, it had
gone up to two and a half. High as this rate is
compared with what it was, the actual ratio of
ships lost to the shipping coming in and leaving
British ports is still unimportant. From the point
of view of an attack on the national Avealth or on
the national source of supplies, the campaign
remains as it began — completely ineffective as a
military measure. But it is worth asking our-
selves if this rate will be maintained or increased.
It depends upon two things — first, the political
iiotive which may actuate to supreme direction of
German policy; next, the facilities that Germany
possesses for carrying on the campaign.
THE FUTURE OF THE CAMPAIGN.
On the political side, a great deal will turn
upon the action of America. Nothing in the last
week throws any further light upon the state of
American opinion, which, on the whole, seems
resolute to supjwrt the President. Mr. Bryan's
efforts to create a [)cace party do not seem to be
succeeding. Tiie situation remains, therefore, that
America would have no choice between war and
the sacrifice of self-respect, so that the issue is not
in doubt. Germany must either cease the cam-
paign or be prepared to fight America as well.
Supposing she elects to fight, can she continue
the submarine camj^aign ? Can she make it more
intense? Undoubtedly, it seems to me, she can do
both. There is no doubt that her facilities for
manufacturing submarines will increase, and not
diminish, with time. But, while this is so, certain
facts are reassuring.
Practically no ship has been attacked in the
Channel — that is, between east of a line from
Portland to the Channel Islands and west of the
Straits of Dover — since the beginning of the
second week in April. In this limited area,
therefore, the defensive measures taken by the
Admiralty seem to have been perfectly successful.
The fact that not a single transport or Channel
steamer has been successfully attacked since the
beginning of the war has always been eloquent of
the effectiveness of the measures taken by the
Admiralty in these waters. But the public might
naturally suppose that these measures were
limited specifically to the protection of the trans-
ports and Channel steamers and not to making a
given area immune from submarine attention.
Although the Channel passenger traffic and the
Army transports have escaped, there was in the
first seven weeks of the campaign a very heavy,
toll taken of ships in the eastern half of the
English Channel. Indeed, the waters between a
line drawn from Dover to Calais and another
from Havre to Portsmouth witnessed attacks
of no less than eighteen ships between February
19 and April 8. But from April 8 on this part
of the Channel appears to have been perfectly
clear. It is also gratifying that, except for two
ships on June 12 that were sunk between Liver-
pool and the Isle of Man, there has been no
casualty in the Irish Sea north of St. George's
Channel since the second week in March.
It is, of course, obvious that precautions can
be taken in narrow waters which cannot be taken
where waters are more open. It will be remem-
bered that in the earlier days of the " Blockade "
the Admiralty announced that the North Channel
— that is, from Fair Head to the Mull of Can-
tyre — was closed to all traffic. Any submarine,
therefore, wishing to operate off Liverpool would
have to enter by St. George's Channel, which is
not fifty-three miles across, and would have to
make good its exit by the same way. Similarly,
the Straits of Dover were announced to be closed,
so that submarines, to operate in the Channel,
would have to go right round Scotland and Ire-
land and enter from the Atlantic. From La
Hogue to Portland Bill is about the same distance
as across St. Georges Channel. For practical pur-
poses, therefore, traffic between England and
France and between England and Ireland is safe.
But it is equally obvious that no preventive
measures have succeeded generally in mitigating,
the operations of submarines either in the North
Sea or on the. West Coast of Scotland and Ireland,
or in the approaches to the English and St.
George's Channels.
THE NEW WAR LOAN.
The new War L.iaii is bound to bo a sncoess, for it appeals to every,
clas.5 of investor, and is founded on the highest security in the world-—
the British Empire. It carries interest at 4j per cent., and profidea for
optional redemption in ten, or certain redemption in twenty years.
Holders of the First War Loan, of Consols, and certain Government
aiuiuities can convert their holdings into New War Loan Stock — but th«
soundest feature in this gigantic .scheme is the opportunity it affords to
tlie small investor to share in the great obligations which the war has
imposed on the country. There can be no better or more acceptable
form of thift for the working classes, whoso income has, generally speak-
ing, increased more than that of any other class in the commnnity, and
no better employment of capital than in the supreme interest of th«
State.
Those who knew Mr. McKenna's financial ability were greatly
pleased when he became Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the world at
large will approve the stat«£manlike basis of his finance at a time vlkeq
England has grave need of statesmen.
10»
June 26, 1915.
SEEN AT THE FRONT.
I.-NIGHT ON THE HILL.
By a Sub.
IT was time to start. Nor had I ever so reluctantly left
a squalid place. How warmly the firelight flickered
on tlie walls and beams of that wayside farm-kit-chen in
Picardy! How comfortable even the filthy farmyard
looked amid its enclosing lofts and byres ! And the
two mis-shapen rooms where we had billeted four days. Dirty
they were and difficult and cavernous, yet tonight so enticing.
Outside there had sprung up a little chilly evening wind. But
yesterday I should have sat by the window, reading. And
now there lies before us the three-mile walk to the trenches, a
long night's watching, four days and four nights in the firing
line.
We march off.
Into a wintry sunset. For it is the season of early
spring. The road is yet muddy after recent rains. The dank
fields lie cold and uninviting on either hand. Approaching
the cross-roads, we quicken step, for are not they marked by
the GeiTTiau artillery?
And of all the dreary places in all the dreary lands that
I have seen I picture this group of wayside houses as the
saddest. Always — except when the working parties hurry by
— an unnatural stillness reigns. Roofless skeletons of houses
and houses broken in a score of places; people creeping in
and out, French peasants who cling pitifully to the relics of
their homes; children peering out of the windows and door-
ways, too scared to play; heaps of ruins, and everywhere a
great lonely emptiness.
We turn off into the fields. Yet the sunset is still in
the sky, and it is too light to cross the open lands. We must
wait. The men smoke cigarettes and fall to talking after their
inconsequent fashion about the prospects of the night, also of
professional football, and — their suppers. Now darkness
creeps up and the sun dips beyond the grey rim of the
Flanders plain. It is twilight. We move on across tho
ploughed field. Not a sound, not a murmur of war. Until of
a sudden we are in the road again, a road congested with
troops. Battalion headquarters are here, and many transport
wagons unloading by the wayside. Long files of men in hoods
and caps and heavy equipment, the rifle slung over the
shoulder, move slowly along towards the trenches. There
are orderlies on horseback, sitting their horses like statues
silhouetted against the evening sky.
We crawl forward presently at snail's pace until clear
of the congested trench parties, then turn off to the left
down a path, following a light ammunition railway. On tho
one hand are overhanging trees, on the other ghastly wrecks
of houses. Soon we come to the little cemetery where our
comrades lie, H. T., with the unfailing laugh, and C. O., wliD
fell in action on the night of December 19, winning his
D.S.O. He was only eighteen. And many others, bearing
humbler names — they rest there, amid the shell-pits and the
ruined houses, under white wooden crosses. Nor can I pass
by that spot, melancholy as it is, without recalling the com-
pany sergeant-major's sly humour. Never would he bring
the nervous newlj -joined subaltern down that way but he
showed him with unction, with emphasis — and a twinkle in
his eye — that little cemetery of nameless graves.
Tha occasional bullet " ping-ing " across our path tells us
how near we are to the trenches. Some desultory rifle-fire in
front gives additional warning. Soon we are in the machine-
gun zone and, stooping low, we hurry along the ditch beside
the white strip of road, then across an open bit of plough
towards the shelter of a parapet. Suddenly a machine-gun
opens. We fall flat, and the bullets whistle overhead as the
devilish thing sweeps round. Then we creep along behind
the parapet which leads rather steeply to a ruined barn. Here
the troops in reserve are crouching over the fires they have
kindled, cooking their supper. The fire casts a strange glare
around. It is a place of shadows and passages and creeping
armed men. The company whom we are to relieve files out
of the trenches and we file in.
I place my sentries. I lay down my pack and equipment
in the dug-out. Carrying only my revolver, I walk along the
line of the breastwork, noting here an improvement, there a
defect. Climbing the rear face of a little hill, I sit
down behind the machine-gun emplacement, which is safe
and a vantage-point. From there towards the enemy I can
look across the plain.
I see a wide and shadowy country. The moon is rising
out of the calm night. A little wind whines and whispers
among the sandbags. I see dimly a land of poplars and small
trees (dwarf oaks), orchards, and plentiful willows. I see
flat fields and ditches and stagnant water, and red farms
whose roofs are gone, stark skeletons in the moonlight. I
see broad flat spaces and then a ridge — the ridge of Aubers.
Only the German lines are liidden from sight.
No sign of life. Silence and desolation reign. But here
and there the faint glimmer of a fire indicates the presence
of the enemy. Afar off, rockets, red and green and white,
fhoot up to the sky, star shells bursting above our trenches
cast their baleful light around. Strange twisted figures of
trees stand out against the horizon. There is no sound bnb
an occasional home-like mating-call of partridges in the fields
and the peculiar laughing cry of the little speckled owl which
here, as in England, dwells amongst the orchards.
How many nights have I watched that scene from my
post on the hill ! And suddenly out of the long silence there
have come the obscure reminders, the swift stirrings of war.
The faint clink of spades away down in the trench, stertorous
masculine breathing, a muttered exclamation. Sometimes a
stray bullet whistled out of the darkness and went singing
on its way; sometimes a party of soldiers, heavily burdened,
tramped by, crouching low. Often— about the middle of the
night — a machine-gun spoke with its metallic " clack-clack "
or the sharp crack of a rifle came from near at hand or some-
where afar off a great gun boomed sullenly. Then silence, and
I would listen intently. Only the " clink-clink, clink-cliuk-
clink,' of our own picks and shovels at work and eighty
yards away the answering "thud-thud" of the German
wiring parties driving in their stakes.
Then I would rise, and, creeping to the parapet of the
fort-, peer over, my head and body partly concealed by the
machine-gun. The ground sloped sharply away to the oon<
fused region of moonlight and shadows. At first the eyes
could not probe this dusky space. Yet after a few momenta
one found them out — flitting here and there, fetching, carry.'
ing, digging, working like little demons of men, bent figures
silhouetted in the moonlight. And occasion "lly the non-com.«
missioned officers could be heard cursing those grey soldiers ol
the Empire. There was a partial truce between us. By nighij
we all worked at that part of the line; by day we foughl
desultorily.
And night by night, as I watched, the strange silenf
mystery of it all overwhelmed me. Now and again a riSi(
cracked and at intervals there came to the ear the infema(
"clack-clack" of the machine-gun, than which there is nc
sound more terrible in war. It was on such a clear moonHI
night, when a fresh wind blew to the nostrils the first scent*
of spring, that a man working in the midst of his fellows feU
silently to the ground — dripping blood — nor ever spoke again.,
And thereafter I could not rest alone on the hill but the
horror of such things crept over me. The interminable lines
of watching men stretching away into the dim distance
towards the battlefield of Ypres, where the guns boomed and
the crackle of rifle-fire went on all night long — the intermin-
able lines of watching men awaiting their chance to kill, to
wound — for why ? None knew, none cared. The same blood,
the same God, the same humanity, the same mentality, the
same love of life, the same dread of death — I did not hate
then, but I pitied.
And sometimes, as I watched, there would come on the
wings of the night a weird low sound of singing. Strangely
it rose and fell and trembled on the wind, then died away^;
The solemn cadences of " The Watch on the Rhine," the
triumphal pasan of the Austrian National Hymn, and often
strains of wild windy music, like the soughing of pine forest*
— such songs as the Southern Germans love — these floated
across when all else was still. And often there came tha
sound of a mouth-organ, cheap and bizarre, to remind me of
a cafe chantant in Paris, or — why, I know not — of the ho^
midday in some London street.
Then would I make a tour of my posts and see the working
parties home to bed. And time and time again, as I crossed
the moonlit patches or the little plank-bridge near by, a rifle
cracked close at hand and a playful bullet whistled past my
head. They saw me, they waited for me; one day they would
get me. Finally the dawn broke across that dreary plain
more fresh, more beautiful than a woman's face. The night
wind sank, the moonbeams and the shadows fled away. And,
creeping into my little den, I fell asleep.
LAND AND .WATER
June 26, 1915.
MR. BELLOG'S BOOK ON THE WAR.
II.
By THOMAS SECCOMBE.
{Professor of English, E.M.C., Sandhurst.)
THE points left over from my last week's considera-
tion of Mr. Belloc's General Sketch of the
European War were mainly two. First, his
treatment of the numerical factor, and, secondly,
his eloquent vision in the form of a peroration, in
which he treats of the historical continuity of the German
menace. Like Napoleon and most other soldiers, he is
profoundly persuaded of tlie validity of big battalions.
Ultimately all Europeans have much the same potential
moral. " The most remarkable general discovery in the
war lias been the endurance and steadiness under loss
of conscript soldiers." It had been said during the long
^ peaca that short-service conscripts would not stand up to
professional or long-service soldiers. To this theory the
Manchurian and Balkan campaigns gave a sufhcient answer
if men would only have heeded it. The present war leaves
no doubt on the matter. " The short-service conscript army
has in tliis matter done better tlian anything that was known
in the past." No; it is left to the priest and the politician
to repeat the cynical old fable about the volunteer being
worth ten pressed men. Truly, as Matthew Arnold said,
Britain is a country invented for the beatification of cant and
claptrap — cant about " militarism," claptrap about tha
" volunteer." A breath of candour about our historic armies
and the methods used in recruiting them would blow away
for ever this cynical and enervating twaddle. When a small
band of genuine volunteers from the City of London, inspired
by heroic motive, went to the place of embarkation to take
shipping to defend Antwerp three and a quarter centuries
ago they were confronted by a crowd of sweepings from the
gaols, men recruited in FalstafiF's fashion. A letter from
the front asking for m.ore intimated that " our men perish
like flies, but our need for more is great; see that they may
be sent with dispatch, for it is urgent, and I pray thee that
these be not so lou.<iy as the last." It was the same with
the " volunteers " for Blenheim, wlio had to be kept in hulks
to prevent desertion. And what about genuine volunteers
for our American wars of the eighteenth century, among the
rank and file? It would need a microscope to discern them.
The two most dangerous armies we have ever had, Cromwell's
and Wellington's, can only be termed volunteer armies by
courtesy. They were replenished by pressed men, hardly, if
at all, less than was the navy. " They have given me an
infamous army, by God," said the victor of Waterloo. By
"they " apparently he meant the Justices of the Peace and
the sub.sidised allies. For if it has not been the compulsion
of the law that has given us our volunteers, past and present,
it has assuredly been the compulsion of brut-e circumstance
or a confidence trick based upon the most humiliating
cajolery, such as the assurance tacitly given to the T.F. that
Saturday afternoon soldiering would be all that God or man
could conceivably demand of them. On such maxims as
these, then, the revolting fallacy of which is exposed with
withering accuracy in " The Green Curve " [" The Limit "],
is the imposing fabric of our British Pacifism grounded and
reared. We satirise the unfairness of taxation and the privi-
leged class under the ancien regime, but what other nation
in the world has granted the privilege of exemption from the
supreme tax to all who merely take the tradesmanlike pre-
caution of protesting against war on principle, but have never
exhibited even a glimmer of aversion to grasping any conceiv-
able profit that the chances of war may throw in their way ?
The God of Blood and Iron is repulsive: agreed. But
have we not cherished the peace-idol too much in our hearts
for some time past ? Cant against war and cant against
soldiering has created an impression among presuming
folk that our feet were cold and that, whatever hap-
pened, we were not " for war." Yet, as a matter
of fact, we had already been in a state of war for a
period considerably anterior to August, 1914. Germany had
for a long time been bent upon our destruction, and from the
moment that a state of war is decreed by the predominant
sense of a nation it cannot end, really, until the will to war
ceases mutually and by consent. This we ought to have dis-
cerned, and our Western politicians cannot easily be forgiven
for the fact that they did their utmost to the la.st moment to
keep us blindfolded. But some said, "Yet a little more sleep,"
jrhile others, like the great farceur Pelissier, were convinced
that the absence of a tariff wall had cut away the ground from
an invader. When the Germans penetrated the English Home
in his delightful travesty they found it richly furnished and
inhabited by compatriots who damned them for their pains —
England was theirs already ! Every object in the house was
promptly turned upside down and discovered to be " made in
Germany," with the exception of a Bechstein piano. . . .
The book ends with a Michelet-flight of historical synthesis
recalling the fine work, unrivalled, so far as I know, that Mr.
Belloc has done in books like his " Marie Antoinette," " The
Girondin," and " The Eye- Witness." This war compels him
to conjure up the returning again of those conflicting spirits
— spirits like those in "The Dynasts" — which had been
seen over the multitudes in the dust of the Rhone Valley when
Marius came up from Italy and met the chaos in the North —
the clash between the ancient European civilisation and the
quickly growing, quickly dissolving outer mass which con-
tinually learns its lesson from civilised men and yet can never
perfectly learn that lesson. They had come this time in over-
whelming numerical superiority, in a flood, in a sweep that
has no parallel in the monstrous things of history. . . .
" And all along the belt of that march tlie things that
were the sacrament of civilisation had gone. Rheims was
possessed, the village churches of the ' Island of France ' and
of Artois were ruins or desolations. The peasantry already
knew the destruction of something more than such material
things, the end of a certain social pact which war in Christen-
dom had spared. They had been massacred in droves, with no
purpose save that of terror; they had been netted in drove-i,
the little children and the women with the men, into captivity.
The track of the invasion was a wound struck not, as other
invasions have been, at some territory or some dynasty; it
was a wound right home to the heart of whatever is the West,
or whatever has made our letters and our buildings and our
humour between them. There was a death and an ending in
it which promised no kind of reconstruction, and the fools
who had wasted words for now fifty years upon some imagined
excellence in the tilings exterior to the tradition of Europe
were dumb and appalled at the sight of barbarism in action —
in its last action after the divisions of Europe had permitted
its meaningless triumph for so long. Were Paris entered,
whether immediately or after that approaching envelopment
of the armies, it would be for destruction, and all that b not
replaceable in man's work would be lost to our children at
the hands of men who cannot make."
There was something in them always— these Germans —
of the back forest, averse to the life of the walled city. In
their moods there was often something pathetic as of Calibans
who aspired to lick the hands of Culture, or in sentimental
mood warbled bird notes and sought to catch and tame the
pretty grey squirrel of the pine woods. Their genius was in
the back rather than the brain, but their diligence and their
laboriousne-ss was limitless, and they thought by intellect
alone to solve the intimate riddle of the universe. Dij-
cipline, tJie Drill Sergeant, and the Science, which they
adapted rather than created, became their gods. The neutrals,
who knew them not, were dazed by the prosperity of this cult
of success and forgot to ask, when they propounded their Will
to Power doctrine. The Will to Power to what? And their idol
befitted them well : Bismarck, the grand carnivore, the worst
of the century aft-er Napoleon. The man without scruple, to
whom all means were good in the national lawsuit, who bent
the cornsrs of the cards T?hen luck did not serve him
("Blessed be the hand that falsified the Ems telegram"),
vindictive, cruel, insensible, jealous, already ready to invoke
the Frederick tradition. "Trust me to find a casus belli
within twenty-four hours. The sycophants of the study will
always justify a fait accompli. Whatever is, is might." It
is with the psychology of a people bred in this faith, wantonly
arrogant and aggressively rude by nature, that the Spirit of
the West in Europe is remorselessly at war.
After a vivid survey of the horrors of invasion by this
exulting horde last September, the author is in a position to
give to his Dixerat just a Swiftiau touch of the terrible, with
an added vagueness all Ms own. " That is the vision that
should remain with those who desire to understand the future
the war must breed, and that is the white heat of energy
which will explain very terrible things, still masked by the
future, and undreamt of here."-
Thomas Seccombb,
12*
wmmm
liV
June 26, 1915.
LAND AND .WATER
THE WAR IN THE AIR.
IS THE ZEPPELIN INVINCIBLE?
By F. A. Talbot.
THE recrudescence of a certain Zeppelin liveliness
upon the Eastern coast, and the escape of the
aerial invader, has once more revived the parrot-
cry, " AVhere are our defending aeroplanes and
anti-aircraft guns? " The fact that these corsairs
•f the skies invariably complet-e their fell work of distributing
death and destruction without suffering any mauling in the
process has created a distinct feeling of uneasiness in the
minds of the more timorous, who are beginning to wonder
whether, after all, the Zeppelin is not invested with extra-
or(Knary properties of invulnerability, and will be able to
exercise the command of the air ! As a matter of fact, it has
come to be regarded in some quarters as a kind of super-
dirigible, and a meed of abuse is being meted out concerning
the supiness of our authorities in accepting the general
opinion of this craft as a '' mechanical monstrosity," and
thereby underestimating its qualities.
The brilliant exploit of the late Lieutenant Warneford,
V.C., in successfully sending a Zeppelin and its crew to their
last account has served to revive drooping spirits to a certain
degree, and has proved that the Zeppelin is no more immune
from attack than any other vessel. Incidentally, it has been
responsible for the inquiry as to why our defending airmen
cannot do likewise.
No vessel is easier to destroy in theory than the Zeppelin,
owing to its enormous bulk. The latest craft measure 525
feet in length, by some 30 feet beam, so that a huge target
is offered to hostile fire. In actual practice, no airship is so
difficult to put hors t/e combat, the size of the target notwith-
Btanding. As a matter of fact. Lieutenant Warneford in his
feat demonstrated the only effective means of sending these
vessels to destruction — ?>y getting above them, and Idunchiiig
a bomb to ignite the gaseous charge with which the huge gas-
hag is inflated, which, owing to its pronounced lifting power,
is hydrogen. Parenthetically, it may be obsei-ved that
Warneford in his achievement exposed another German bluff.
The vessel he destroyed was one of the latest, which, accord-
ing to sedulously disseminated Teuton intelligence, was in-
flated with a non-inflammable gas !
From the meagre details which have been published, it is
difficult to realise how Lieutenant Warneford succeeded in
gaining the advantage of position — that is, a point above the
airship. It appears to be a straightforward operation to race
upwards through the air to gain paramount position. The
average individual would lay the odds upon the aeroplane,
in view of the extreme altitude to which a pilot has driven
bis machine, as, for instance, Hawker's record of 20,000 feet,
and from the fact that the heavier-than-air machine can
attain a far greater altitude than the Zeppelin, the safe limits
of which are about 12,000 feet. But in " climbing," if such
a term may be used, the speed advantage is with the airship.
The dimension in which the aiiship excels is the one in which
the powers of the aeroplane fall to the minimum. In other
words, the airship is able to take the utmost advantage of the
aeroplane's most pronounced weakness. The latest types of
Zeppelin have an ascensional speed of 3,000 feet per minute,
which is equivalent to an average of thirty-four miles an
hour. The mention of the latter figure may seem superfluous,
but the reason therefor I will explain later. Moreover, it
moves in this plane in a direct vertical line — that is, upon au
even keel. On the other hand, v.-hen the aeroplane desires to
make a rapid ascent, resort must be made to " spiralling,"
and in this operation, although the speed may be maintained,
progress in the vertical direction is relatively slow, as those
who have attended an aerodrome have observed when an air-
man sets out deliberately to climb as fast as possible to a
certain height, in order to " loop the loop."
The Germans have always recognised that the tactical
position for effective attack upon a Zeppelin is directly above,
and accordingly special attention has been devoted to nullify
the attainment of this position as much as possible. The
Zeppelins have been given as high an ascensional velocity as
the structure of the metal framework will permit, and, be it
noted, this maximum speed must not be approached except in
instances of dire emergency, inasmuch as the vessel, when
flying upwards at such a velocity, is submitted to enormous
strains, which exert severe shearing stresses upon the metallic
framework. All vessels are submitted to the ascensional test,
and these are of sufficient severity, according to my source of
information, aa to cause, occasionally, severe shearing of the
bolts holding the framework together. The various girders
are induced to move so seriously as to cut the heads and nuts
off the rivets as cleanly as if severed by a pair of shears.
An ideal position for attacking an airship which is
moving in the vertical plane is one immediately below the
airehip, since the guns and rifles on the latter cannot be
depressed sufficiently to hit the comparatively small target
offered by the heavier-than-air machine. On the other hand,
the men in the latter are not particularly hampered by being
forced to fire directly upwards; it is no more trying than
shooting at pheasant-s passing overhead. So far as the
men in the aeroplane are concerned, their objective, when
attacking from this position, is rather the disablement of the
propelling machinery and the killing of the crew than the
hitting of the gasbag itself. Tlie latter cannot be damaged
teriously hy gtnr^fire. The system of compartmenting, or sub-
dividing the vessel into eighteen compartments, each of which
contains a hydrogen-inflated balloon, nullifies this form of
attack very completely. A bullet will merely make two punc-
tures— one where it enters and the other where it emerges
from the balloon respectively. In its flight the missile will
not fire the gas. The punctures in the envelope will be so
small that, although a gas leak will be precipitated, the
exudation of tlie inflating agent will proceed so slowly as to
affect the airship very slightly, and even this loss can be
counterbalanced by the discharge of ballast.
On the other hand, if the machinery can be put out of
action, even only partially, success is imminent. Directly
the airship becomes deprived of its independent speed — that
is, the speed developed by the motors, and which exceeds the
velocity of the air-currents, thereby enabling the vessel to
move in any direction — it reverts to the status of the ordinary
balloon. It becomes the sport of the wind. Its pursuit,
attack, and ultimate destruction are simplified very appreci-
ably. It cannot dodge its pursuers because it is able to move
only in one direction — that of the wind. Its position is
rendered additionally precarious because, under such con-
ditions, its immense dimensions and weight contribute to its
peril. It will plunge and roll to such an extent as to set up
destructive internal strains, and, if it does not break its back,
it will tumble head foremost to the ground. The first Zep-
pelin loss in the war, which occurred in the Vosges as a result
of direct attack, was attributable to the disablement of the
machinery. Absolutely uncontrollable, the monster jilunged
finally into a forest to roll over and sprawl itself among the
trees.
But if the attacking aeroplane secures command of
position so that it get-s immediately above the Zeppelin, the
latter can scarcely hope to escape destruction, because it is
exposed to the only missile which is capable of firing the
hydrogen with which it is inflated — the bomb. Even in this
extremity the Zeppelin has one possible avenue of escape, but
it is of a desperate character. This is to take avail of its
speed in the vertical plane in the reverse direction — to
descend rapidly. This end can be consummated only by
releasing a vast volume of gas, and must be carried out care-
fully so as not to disturb the dynamic equilibrium or longi-
tudinal stability of the vessel. It must descend upon an even
keel. But this final move is made in the hope of catching the
aeroplane overhead napping. Fearing that his prey may
escape him, the aviator, in his attempt to keep within easv
distance or point-blank bomb-dropping range of his foe, may
overshoot the mark and thus lose his command of position.
Should this occur, the Zeppelin is arrested in its downward
descent, and by hurriedly discharging objects overboard pell-
mell, a sufficient reascending effort may be imparted to enable
the airship to regain superior position. This was evidently
the ruse which was put into execution by the commander of
the Zeppelin destroyed by Lieutenant Warneford. Unfor-
tunately for the Zeppelin the aviator kept his head, and
merely descended sufficiently to make sure of his bomb.
But manoeuvring under and also above a Zeppelin must
be conducted with extreme caution. In flying upwards at
the speed of 3,000 feet per second, a terrifying vortex is pro-
duced beneath the airship, and, if the aeroplane should be
engulfed, its own destruction is certain. Some idea of the
character of this vortex may be readily gathered by standing
upon tlie platform of a railway station to watch a train pass-
ing at the speed of 34 miles an hour, which is equivalent to
that of a Zeppelin ascending at 3,000 feet per minute. Tkd
13*
LAND AN D \V A T E R
June 26, 1915.
tumnlfc beliind tlie train is suffioieafc to whirl paper and other
liglit articles ia all directions, owing to the rush of the mole-
cules of air to fill the vacuum created immediately behind the
last carriage. If such an agitation and rush of air prevail
behind a raiKvay train where the over-all area is only about
10 feet in height by 6 feet in widtii, what must it be im-
mediately beneath an airship travelling at identical speed, but
where the surface measures 525 feet by 30 feet ! It is safe to
assert that no aeroplane could live within a considerable radius
of the centre of di:;turbance ; it would be drawn into the vortex.
If the aviator be immediately above the airship when a
rapid descent is made by the latter, the aeroplane would be
drawn downwards, and its equilibrium would be destroyed,
as in the case of Lieutenant Warneford's machine.
When the vulnerability of the Zeppelin from overhead
attack was first appreciated, an effort to remedy this disad-
vantage was made by mounting a quick-firing gun upon the
top of the vessel. Trials were made with this weapon, but it
was found that the recoil of the weapon caused a pronounced
vibration of the structural members of the rigid franieworlc.
Accordingly, the fixed quick-firer was abandoned, although
the pofition was preserved for the convenience of one or two
members of the crew arm.ed with magazine rifles, which it
was maintained would be adequate to repel hostile attack
during the period the airship was being prepared for a
hurried descent. This fact is worthy of mention, because it
is claimed that the gun position upon the top of the airship
was abandoned owing to the danger of the flashes from the
arm firing the hydrogen gas exuding from the envelopes of
the balloons within, but this escape of gas is just as observable
below as above the airship.
Until such time as artillery science produces a missile
which will act in a similar manner to the bomb depending
upon the force of gravity for its volition, and which upon
striking the envelope will disrupt the latter and fire the in-
flammable gaseous contents, the only means of bringing a
Zeppelin down in by securing a position overhead. This fact
lias been appreciated by Count von Zepp«Iiu and the German
m.ilitary department from the very first. But tiiore has
always been one saving factor. The aeroplane does not
possess the capacity to hover; it must travel at an appreciable
speed to maintain dynamic equilibrium in the air. Hurling
a bomb from a rapidly moving vehicle at a definite target is
one of the most difficult tasks ; a miss is more likely to be
recorded than a hit. The possibility of a dirigible being
pitted against a dirigible is too remote to be entertained, but;
if one such vessel sliouid get the position above another vessel
of this type, then the fate of the underdog is sealed. Conse-
quently, all things considered, it was accepted in Teuton
military circles that it would be an extremely difficult task
for the hostile aeroplane to secure the dominating position;
the possession of the speed gauge was against the enemy.
The destruction of the Zeppelin in Belgium has precipitated
a snarl of intense rage through Germany, not so much
because the Zeppelin was destroyed, but for the plain reason
that the British had discovered the tactical point of attack
and had proved the vulnerability of the mechanical mon-
strosity when assailed from such a point. In a word, the
Allies have learned the true significance of rfetting above, the
Zsppelin, and one may rest assured that in all future opera-
tions less effort will be expended upon the firing of rifles and
machine guns in the hope of disabling the jjropelling
machinery; the main object of attack will be to force the air-
ship to the under position, so as to bring it within bomb
range, because the bomb dropped from overhead is the only
known means of consummating the complete destruction of
this vessel.
To assail a Zeppelin from the ground with shrapnel, or
from a point below the airship with guns mounted upon
aeroplanes and firing the common typo of projectile, is a
waste of energy and ammunition, as I will explain in a future
article.
THE AERIAL OFFENSIVE.
MR. L. Bljy DESBLEDS was the first writer to svggest
a comprehensive and sustained aerial offensive as the
most effective means of shortcninr/ the war.
We publish on another parje a letter from Mr. II. (J .
Wells, uho shares Mr. Desbleds's views on this important
suhjevl.
The following extracts from Mr. Desbleds's articles ia
Land and Water are of interest at the present time :
" Without in the slightest degree criticising what has
been done by our com.manders, to whom the State has en-
trusted fhe task of carrying out the operations to enforce our
views and those of our Allies, the writer desires to press
home the point which he has already, on two occasions,
brought forward in these columns — namely, that a strong,
comprehensive, and sustained aerial offensive might result iv.
a much earlier victory than would otherwise be the case." —
Land a:;d Water, February 13.
" We are now, as regards military aeronautics, in
posse.ssiou of data which were not available when the war
broke out. Some preconceived ideas concerning tlie value of
aviation have received terrible blows and have met with a
quick destruction. Unforeseen uses of the aeroplane have
come into prominence. Our airmen have shown a greater
valour and adaptability than even the most enthusiastic sup-
porter of the new arm could have expected.
"A most important quality of the aeroplane has been
brought to light. This quality is its value for offensive
operations. . . . For offensive work, of permanent value,
it is not an air fleet of a few dozen machines that is required,
but one of about a thou.sand, or more, strong
" Now the question which presents itself is whether it
would !» possible for this country to build, in the space -A
a few months, 2,000 aeroplanes, train the men necessary to
pilot them, form the necessary contingent of mechanics which
would be required to accompany them at the front, and
organise an adequate transport service. The writer has gone
carefully into these questions, and he is convinced that,
though the effort would have to be a considerable one, the
formation of a powerful offensive aerial fleet, thoroughly
equipped and manned, could be produced in this country in
the time stated. It can, besides, be asserted that such a fleet
could be brought into existence without interfering with, or
hindering, in the slightest degree, the development of the
present air fleet v/hich is so necessary to our armies for
reconnaissance and kindred work. . . .
" If, therefore, the country decides to endeavour to
obtain an aerial supremacy whicli would enable us, almost
immediately, to carry the war right into the heart of th'j
enemy's territory, a special offensive air fleet must be created
at once." — Land and Water, March 6, 1915.
" In her ability to produce aircraft Britain stands
alone. . . . The occupation by the Germans of the highly
industrial districts of Northern France .... has reduced
the industrial resources of our Ally It is upon us
that the burden rests of creating such a fleet. It is a duty
which we are bound to perform, since it may, without inter-
fering with our other arrangements, lead to a much shorter
war and to a smaller sacrifice of lives.
" ... The writer estimates that the possession by
the Allies of an offensive air fleet, 1,000 aeroplanes strong,
and kept at this strength, would, in a very short, time, render
the maintenance of the German Army in the Western theatre
of war a matter of extreme difficulty, if not of impossibility.
Add to this the fact that with a disorganised railway traffic
the enemy would be unable to transfer quickly troops from
the Western to the Eastern theatre of war, and vice versa, anj
the damage which a strong offensive air fleet could do to the
German arsenals, and you will come to the conclusion that
a powerful air fleet could now not only prevent men, amma-
nition, and arms from being sent to the German front, but
could also interfere with the manufacture of those arms and
ammunition " — Land and Water, Mai/ S, 1915.
THE BLERIOT MANUFACTURING AIRCR.AFT
COMP.ANY.
We publish on another page the prospectus of the above comf»any, in
which £100,000 iliarea are ofieied for public subscription at par. The
object of this company, which is to provide additional aeroplanes (or lh«
use of the War Oflice and Admiralty, is one which must meet with
universal approval. It is, moreover, a need which h.is repeatedly been
emphasised in this journal. Probably no one has don« more for the
cau.se of aviation than M. Bleriot, and fortunately for the company ha
combines practical ability with inventive genius. This is shown by the
remarkable and increasing success which the business of M. Bleriot haa
achieved in the la.it five years, the English business alone having
made nearly £40.000 profit for the twelve months ending March 31,
1915. With the addition of further capital the company is likely to
make good use of the unique opportunity awaiting ib.
14"
IMAGINATION IN THE WAR.
By H. G. Wells.
To tbe Editor of Land and Water.
Dear Sir —I am entirely with Mr. Blin Desbleds upon
the question of a big effort to bring off a sustained
aerial offensive; to anyone with any imagination it is
the obvious thing for us to do now. It could be done.
It could end the war and it would end it decisively.
But neither our politicians nor our military authorities
are prepared to attempt anything so novel. By trial
and experience the Germans, after a year of warfare,
are fighting exactly as any imaginative person interested in
Euch things in 1900, say, could have told them they would
have to fi-'ht Our side is. of course, rather behind that and
fighting in the fashion of 1899. If you doubt this, read what
follows » It was written in 1899 and pubhshed in 1900. It
puts balloon for aeroplane, because in those days aeroplanes
were too extravagant an idea for sensible people to swallow,
and the whole passage is obviously "toned down" to the
digestive capacity of sensible people.
The gseal change that is workinR itself out in warfare is the same
ch*ii"e thai is working itself out in the substance of the sot:ial fabnc.
The essentu.1 change in the .social fabric, as we have analv-sed ,t is
the nro.'-essive supersession of the old broad labour base by elaborately
er-anis?d mechanism, and the obsolescence of the once vahd and neces-
kJv distinction of gentle and simple. In warfare, as I have already
indicated, this lakes the form of the progressive supersession of the
horse and the private soldier— which were the living and sole engines
of the old time- by machines, and the obliteration of the old distinc^-
tion between leaders, who pranced in a conspiciious.y dangerous and
encouraging wav into the picturesque incidents of battle, and the led
who cheer^ au'd charged and filled the ditches and were slaughtered
in a wholesale dramatic manner. The old war was a matter of long,
dreary marchess, great hardships of campaigning, but also of heroic-
conclusive moments. Long periods of campings-almost always with
an outbreak of pestilence-of marchings and retreats much crude
business of feeding and forage, culminated at last, with an effect of
infinite relief, in an hour or so of " battle." The battle was always a
very intimate tumultuous affair, the men were flung at one another in
vast, excited masses, in living fighting machines as jt were spears or
bayonets flashed, one side or the other ceased to prolong the climax.
and the thing was over. The beaten force crumpled as a whole, and
tbe victors as a whole pressed upon it. Cavalry with slashing sabres
marked the clowning point of victory. In the later stages of the old
warfare musketry vollcvs were added to the physical impact of the
contending regiments, and at last cannon, as a quite accessory method
of breaking these masses of men. So you "gave battle to and
defeated vour cnemvs forces wherever encountered, and when you
reached vour objective in his capital the war was done. . . . the
new war'will probably have none of these features of the old system of
fighting.
The revolution that is in progress from the old war to a new war.
aiflerenl in its entire nature from the old, is marked primarily by the
Bteadv progress in range and efficiency of the rifle and of the field-gun
—and' more particularly of the rifle. The rifle develops persistently
from a chnnsv implement, that any clown may learn to um in half a
day towards 'a very intricate mechanism, easily put out of order and
easily misa.'sed, but "of the most extraordinary possibilities in the hands
of men of courage, character, and high intelligence. Its precision at
long range has made the business of its care, loading, and aim subsi-
diary to") he far more intricate matter of its use in relation to the
contour of the ground within its reach. Even its elaboration as ati
instrument is probably still incomplete. One can conceive it provided
in the future with cross-thread tele3co)iic sights, the focussing of
which, corrected by some ingenious use of hygroscopic material, might
even find the range, aud so enable it to be used with assurance up to
a mile or more. It will probably also take on some of the characters
of the m.»chinc-gun. It will be used either for single shots or to
quiver and send a spiay of almost simultaueous bullets oui of a
m.icazine evenly and certainly, over any .small area the rifleman thinks
advisable. It will probably he portable by one man. but there is no
reason really, e.xcept the bavonet tradition, the demands of which may
be met in oilier wavs. why it should be the instrument of one sole
man It will, just "as probably, be slung with iU ammunition and
equipment upon bicycle wheels, aud be the common care of two or
more associated soldiers. Equipped with such a weapon, a smg.e
couple of marksmen even, bv reason of smoieless powder and care-
fully chosen cover, might make themselves practically invisible, and
capible of surprising, stopping, and destroying a vi.sible enemy in
quite consideiMble numbers who blundered withm a mile of them.
And a series of such groups of marksmen so arranged as to cover
the arrival of reliefs, provisions, and fresh ammunition from the rear,
migbl hold out against any visible attack for an indefinite period,
uuless tbe ground they occupied was searched very ably and subtly
by some sort of gun having a range in excess of their rifle lire. If
the ground tbev occupied were to be properly tunnelled and trenched,
even that might not avail, and thare would be nothing for it but to
at'ack tliem bv an advance under cover cither of the night or of dark-
neae caused b"v smoke-shells, or by the burning of cover about their
position. Even then thev might be deadly with magazine fire at close
eoar*e'-s Save for their liability to such attacks, a few hundreds of
a»ch men could bold poiritionB of a quit* vaat extent and a few
thousand might hold a frontier. Assuredly a mere handful of such
men 'flu'.d stop tbe moat mnltitudinous attack or cover the must dis-
orderly retreat in the world, and even when some ingenious, daring,
and hK*T night assault had at laat ejected them frem a position,
dawn would simply restore to them the prospect of reconstituting iB
new positions their enormous advantage of defence.
« » • •
Probably between contiguous nations tiat have mastered the art
of war, instead of the pouring clouds of cavalry of the old dispensa-
tion, this will be the opening phase of the struggle, a vast duel all along
the frontier between groups of skilled marksmen, continually being
relieved and refreshed from the rear. For a time quite possibly there
will be no definite army here or there, there will be no controUablo
battle, there will be no" Great General in the field at all. But some-
where far in the rear the central organiser will sit at the telephonic
centre of his vast front, and be will strengthen here and feed there
and watch, watch perpetually the pressure, the incessant remorsclees
pressure that is seeking to' wear down his countervailing thrust.
Behind tbe thin firing line that is actually engaged, the country for
many miles will be rapidly cleared and devoted to the business of war,
big "machines will be at work making second, third, and fourth hnea
of' trenches that mav be needed if presently the firing Ime is forced
back spreading out "transverse patlis for the swift lateral movement of
the cyclists who will be in perpetual alertness to relieve sudden local
pressures, and all along those great motor roads our first " Ant:c!pa-
tions" sketched, Uiere will be a vast and rapid shifting to and fro
of bi" and very long range guns. These guns will probably be fought
with the help "of balloons. The latter will hang above the firing lino
all along the front, incessantly ascending and withdrawn ; they wul
be continually determining the distribution of the antagonist s forces,
directing the"fire of continually shifting great guns upon the apparatus
and supports in the rear of his fighting line, forecasting his night plana
and seeking some tactical or strategic weakness in that sinewy Une of
battle.
It will be evident that such warfare as this inevitable precision
of "un and rifle forces upon humanity will Income less and less
dramatic as a whole, more and more a^ a whole a monstrous thri'st
and pressure of people against people. The battalion commander will be
replaced in effect bv the organiser of the balloons and guns by whictt
his few hundreds of splendid individuals will be guided and reinforced.
In th" place of hundreds of thousands of more or less untrained young
men Arching into battle, there will be thousands of sober men braced
up to their highest possibilities, intensely doing their best; in the
niace of charging battalions, shattering impacts of squadrons and wide
harvest fields of death, there will be hundreds of little rifle battles
fou-'ht up to the hilt, gallant dashes here, night surprises there, the
sudden sinister faint gleam of nocturnal bayonets brilliant guesses
that will drop catastrophic shell and death over hills and forests sud-
denly into carelessly exposed masses of men. For eight miles on either
s.ide"of the firing (ines-whose fire will probably never altogether die
away while the war lasts— men will live and eat and sleep under the
imminence of unanticipated death. . . . Such will be the opening
phase of the war tluit is speedily to come.
\nd behind the thin firing line on either side a vast multitude of
people will be at work; indeed, the whole mass of the etticients in the
State will have to be at work, and most of them will be simply at
the same work or similar work to that done in peace time-only now
as combatants upon the lines of com.Tiuuication. The organised sUffs
of the big road managements, now become a part of the military
scheme, wiU be deporting women and children and feeble people and
bringing up supplies and supports; the doctors will be dropping from
their civil duUes into preappointed official places, directing the feed-
ing and treatment of the shifting masses of people and guarding tbo
valuable manhood of the fighting apparatus most sedulously from
disease • tbe engineers will be entrenching and bringing up a vast
variety of complicated and ingenious apparatus designed to surprise
and inconvenience the enemy in novel ways; the dealers m food ^"^
clothina, the manufacturers of all sorts of necessary stuff, will ba
converted bv the mere declaration of war into public servants: a
practical realisation of socialistic conceptions will quite ineviUbly be
forced upon the fighting State. Tlw State tial has not incorporated
with its fighting organisation all its able-bodied manhood and a ita
material substance, its roads, vehicles, engines, foundries, and all its
resources of food and clothing ; the State which at the outbreak of
war ha* to bargain with railway and shipping companies, replace ex-
periMced station masters bv inexperienced officers, and haggle against
alien interests for every sort of supply, will be at an overwhe ming
disadvantage against a State which has emerged from the social con-
fu.sion of the present time, got rid of every vestige of our present
distinction between official and governed, and organised every element
in its being.
I imagine that in this ideal war as compared with the war of to day,
there will be a very considerable restriction of the nghU of the uon-
combatants. . . ^
If the things that were obvious to imaginative people in
1900 are only taken up slowly and reluctantly by practical
people in 1915, what earthly good is it for any one of imagi-
nation to put his facolty at such problems at all? If our
people will not deal with imagination they must work out
things in toil and bloodshed. Our people are not going to
attempt an aerial offensive at the suggestion of Mr. Blm
Desbleds; they will never attempt it until the Germans have
tried it and made successes with it. Then and then only will
it appeal to them as a rational proposition.— Very sincerely
y**""' H. G. Wells.
* A quotation kom
in 1900.
' Ajiticipations," by H. G. Wells, publUhwi
15^
THE COLLAPSE OF FORTIFICATION.
By COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, C.B.
ONE of the great surprises tliia war has brought to
the uninitiated is the sudden and complete
collapse of the many fortresses on which both
money and intellect have been lavished iu
Belgium, France, and Austria.
To the lay mind there is something majestic in the frown-
ing masses of masonry which normally form the charac-
teristics of all permanent fortifications, and it needs an
effort of imagination to realise that these imposing features
have so completely lost their defensive value in face of
modern artillery and liigh explosive shells that at present only
those fortresses still hold out in which the defenders have
succeeded, by means of hastily-constructed field entrench-
ments, in keeping the enemy out of range of their actual walls.
No one, however, notices that by so doing they have in fact
given away the whole case for expenditure in peace on per-
manent works, by increasing enormou.sly the numbers of men
required to defend the nucleus which the permanent works
were designed originally to protect.
The object of surrounding a certain town or junction
point of many communications (the two ideas are generally
identical) with permanent defences has always been,
primarily, to enable the few to dispute its possession against
the many. If £100,000 spent on great walls and ditches
made it possible for, say, two battalions of men to resist as
long as ten could have done without their support, its ex-
penditure was economically justifiable, because the interest
and depreciation of the capital sum sunk in such works was
very much less than the pay of the eight thousand men or so
which would have been needed to defend an unprotected posi-
tion. Not thirty years ago we still applied this reasoning to
the problems of defence arising in our coaling stations and
Colonial ports, and essentially the same idea underlay the
construction of the Belgian, as, indeed, of all other
defences.
But already the writing was on the wall for those to read
who had knowledge enough to perceive its interpretation.
The history of the evolution of warfare showed that the
ratio between the cost of construction and the cost of the
garrison which could be served by sinking capital in fixed
defences had been steadily falling ever since the invention of
gunpowder as a propulsive agent. With every yard gained
by the artillery in range we were approximating to a point
where the advantage of the defence would vanish and the
attack would finally secure the upper hand.
In other words, it became clear that a time was coming
when it would pay better to spend all money available from
the nation's revenues on the maintenance of mobile armies
which could carry war into the enemy's country rather than
on unproductive works intended to resist aggression.
The coming of the high explosive shell settled the ques-
tion. As a nation the Germans were the first to understand
what its arrival must mean. Seeing that the time was near
at hand when no amount of masonry, or armour plating, or
even deep earthwork trenches confined to a fixed position
could avail against the destructive power of the shells that
could be Irought against them, they began to abandon the
construction of new forts or fortresses and spent all moneys
they could obtain for engineer services on the construction
of roads and railways v/ithin their frontiers by which guns
heavy enough to destroy in a few hours the defensive
works they knew existed in their possible enemy's country
could be brought into action at the earliest moment possible.
In so doing they solved one of the most important problems
in national economy — namely, substituting productive
investment of capital for the unproductive sinking of huge
funds on which both interest and depreciation had to be paid,
for their strategic railways belonged to the State, as did
the commercial network of those already existing that acted
as feeders to the main lines, besides developing the districts
which they traversed, and thus becoming paying propositions
themselves in their turn. Substantially, though not quite so
thoroughly, we have pursued the same policy in India for tlia
last twenty-five years without finding a scientific explanation
for our practice.
It is thanks to this far-seeing policy that the Germans
have been able to develop the enormous power of aggression
and resistance which has so long held the Allies at bay. They
liave substituted everywhere the idea of men instead of stone
walls, and but for the immense disproportion in numbers of
troops and resources which the Allies are by degrees develop'
ing against them (a disproportion which never came any-
where within their calculations), they might well have suc-
ceeded in their dream of world conquest. Tliey only did no!
allow for their adversaries' possible equation. Fortunately,
neither the Russians nor the French were quite unprepared for
what has happened, and both have adopted a policy adapted
each to the special topographical conditions of their respective
frontiers, policies which discount to the utmost the advan-
tages their superior preparations had conferred upon the
Germans.
Had we succeeded in penetrating the enemy's territory
at an early period of the campaign we should have found our-
selves confronted by all the disadvantages that a want of
mobility entails, for the Germans, whilst keeping all their
own lines, would have destroyed everything as they retreated,
and we should have had difficulties to contend against which
now they are encountering in their raids into Poland and
Galicia.
Now, the fighting power of an army is never to be arrived
at by counting heads 4,lone, but is always a product of many
factors, the chief of which are numbers and mobility. Thus
in South Africa, because the Boers could at need cover twelve
miles in an hour against our four — or average thirty miles in
a day as against our ten — we had to maintain in round
numbers about nine British soldiers in the field for eacli
mounted Boer. Hence if we had invaded Germany whilst she
was still in possession of, say, four million men capable of
moving twice as fast as ours by means of her strategic rail-
ways, we should have required somewhere about sixteen mil-
lions of men to complete her overthrow.
Since, however, and viewing the problem in bulk, wa
could not destroy her power of mobility without invasion,
there was nothing left for us to do but to compel her to destroy
her own numerical siiperiorit;/ In/ fruitless attacks which in
the nature of things could never succeed. This well explains
the long delay that has occurred in bringing her Lo decisive
action.
We have had to suit our methods of warfare to the
different topographical conditions of each frontier and to
employ diplomacy as well to ensure her response to our call.
In the West, having checked her invasion, the rapidly
acquired ascendancy of our aircraft has been one of the most
important factors in our success.
Thanks to the better means of observation thus secured
— i.e., thanks to our airmen — the power of our artillery has
been nearly, if not quite, trebled. Secure in this superiority,
we next set about the approach, by siege methods, to points
from which we can at any time sever the enemy's lateral rail-
ways by which reinforcements can be rushed from one point
of the frontier to the other, and since the possession of this
power of lateral transmission is vital for the Germans, they
have been compelled to attack lis over and over aijain at
points of our own choice to prevent its destruction. In so
doing they have been uniformly losing men in the proportion
of not less than three to one, and this proportion, it is clear
from all the latest French reports, has been steadily growing.
Thus recently the French have been killing them off at tha
Tate of five to one.
On the East the Russians have had to adopt another
method, but one which is equally efficacious. Having hun-
dreds of miles of territory behind them, the temporary loss
of which matters nothing to the cause as a whole, they have
met the furious German offensive precisely as the Boers dealt
with our advances in South Africa. They have stood to draw
the German attacks, and then, since the possession of a par-
ticular trench was of no value to them one way or the other,
they ha ye withdrawn, exactly as the Boers used to retire
before us. Thus the Russians have gradually lengthened
the lines of the German communications, until these are be-
coming suitable targets for raids by their mounted infantry,
which, when the time comes, they will use as De Wet and
Botha used their commandos on the veldt.
Had we endeavoured to emulate our antagonists by try-
ing to " hack our way through " in their brutal and
blundering fashion, we might very well have taken three
years over the task, or more; but analysing the problem
skilfully and concentrating on the decisive factor, I think I
may safely prophesy on a speedy decision in our favour.
16»
June 26, 1915.
L
\ i)
A N D Vv .\ T E R
LIFE IN THE DARDANELLES.
From an Officer's Letter.
To tlie Editor of Land and Water.
Sib, — I send you the following account of my experi-
ences in the Dardanelles. I am writing this stretched out full
length, watching a battle line some six miles long. I am not
in the fight to-day, but an occasional shell comes along just
as a reminder. Before I describe this wonderfully inte-
resting sight I must tell you something of our lauding
in Gallipoli. We gained a footing at four points on
the toe of the penin.=ula (simultaneously), each spot a little
stretch of sandy beach some one mile apart.
The landing was most bloody work. No troops ia
tho world pave our ow^n would have faced the storm
of shot and shell poured on them from row upon row
of Turkish trenches. The guns of our Fleet smashed up
all the forts, but had little or no effect on the men
in the trenches. Little damage was done, so far as I
could see, to any Turkish trench by the ships' fire. Our men
had to do all the trench clearing with rifle and bayonet, and
they did it in fine style, too. But tho cost was great.
Personally I had several narrow squeaks while super-
vising the disembarkation of my men, as shells dropped
all round, and at my feet almost, but by a miracle
neither I nor anybody else was touched. I could give
you some interesting personal experiences, but as I am
now trying to give you a general idea of the whole landing,
I will leave personal things out.
To resume my story, the landing on the other three
points, W and X and Y Beaches, was carried out in
the face of fierce opposition by the Inniskillings, K.O.S.B.'s,
Border, and Worcester Regiments. For the first two
days a steady advance was made, and we held the
peninsula right across from the Dardanelles to the .^Egean
Sea, and in those two days won some three miles inland (up
the peninsula). All the way we had to face trench after
trcnct, and our fellows did extremely well in progressing so
far. The geography of the country is very interesting. Ex-
cept p.t the landing-places the cliffs rise abruptly from the
shore to a height of 100 to 150 feet, and from the cliffs the
country rises gently for about lialf a mile. Then you look down
83 it were from the rim of a saucer upon a beautiful green
valley full of olive trees, vineyards, and young green corn..
There are many wells like those we see in pictures in illustrated
Bibles, but there were no Rachels drawing water — all the
people have fled before us, not a man, woman, or child is to
be seen. Weil, imagine, if you can, a great tree-dotted
saucer some five miles in diameter, rising gradually on the
far side from where we landed to a considerable height, some
600 feet or thereabouts. It makes a grand stage for a fight,
and we can watch every move of man and gun.
The French are away on the right, and I wat<;li them
mass in hollov/s and ravines, then advance under the pound-
ing shelter of the 75 guns. The latter are served mag-
nificently. The French infantry, as they deploy, find
the ground to their immediate front swept yard by yard
by the guns fired by their comrades a mile or two in
rear of them. It is a stirring siglit to watch the officers
dash out and lead the men into a storm of fire. Then the
Turks run like hares. Now the French are retiring over the
hill, pelted by the Turks. The latter are in great force
apparently, and too strong for the French. The latter are
again reformed in the shelter of a cliff, and now they advance
again over the hill. Fortune go with them !
I must now look at the British. The 88th Brigade is in
touch with the French left and is near the right centre of the
saucer. The 87th and 86th Brigades of the 29th Division
extends across the rest of the saucer to the .^gean Sea. All
face the hill I have already mentioned, called " Achi Baba "
(good father), and march towards it in the face of fierce
opposition. The Turks are entrenched on Achi Baba and on
the slope up to it, and we barely hold half of the saucer. The
rattle of the rifles makes a continuous roll and crackle. The
Ghurkas are attacking the village now. I hope they will win
it, but it is growing dusk and the shells burst all round the
village. It is now on fire and looks well as a picture. It will
be my guide to-night, as I have to go out to the front trenches
with ammunition after dark.
ISSUE OF STOCK OR BONDS,
BEAJ^INQ INTEREST AT 4^% PE^l ANNUM, PAYABI.E HALF-YEARLY ON THS 1st JUNE AND THE 1«t DECEMCER.
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E.C., aiiU may bo fonvartied either direct, or through the medium of any Bunker or Stot-kbroker in the United K;ng<'om. App!icati&ns must be (or even
hundreds of pounds.
ArrangeuKMita are being mrde for the receipt cf applications fcr smaller amounts than. £100 through tho Post Office.
Further payments will be required as follows : —
£10 per cent, on Tuesday, ib« 20th July.
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-_ .. _ „ £10 per cent, on Tuesday, the 26th October.
THE GOVERNOR and COMPAJN'Y of the BANK OF ENGLAND are authorised to receive applications for this Loan, which will take- the form
either of lEecribed Stock, or Scf.da to Beoier. at the option of tie Subscribers.
If not prcvicusily retloemcd the Loan will bo repaid at par on the 1st December. 1945. but His Majeaty's Governmer.t reserve to themf'elves the
right to redeecn the Loan at pa-r at any time on, or nftor. the Ist December, 1925. on giving three calendar months' notice in tie London ilazette. Botii
Capital and Inter-ast will he a charge on the Consolidiited Fund of the United Kingdom.
Tho books of the Loan will bo kept et the Bank of England and at the Bank of Ireland. Dividend* will be paid half-yearly on (he Ut of June and
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The iridtalmenta may be paid in full on or after t!ie 20th July. 1915, urder discount ct the rnte of A] p^r cent, per annum. In case of default in the
payment of any inetalrcent by its proper date, tho deposit and the instalments previously paid will be liable to forfeiture.
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CONVERSION OF
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£2 10b. per Cent. Coasola. 1 £2 lOa. per Cent. Annuities.
Holdere of £4 10a. i>er Cent. War Loan, 1915-1945. will have the additional right, in respect of esch £100 Stock (or Bonds) held bv them, and
fnUy-peid in c^sh. to exercise one or other of the four following optione of ccnver«:on, provided application for conversion is made not later than ttw
3ftth October. 1915.
Option 1. CoKVEESioy or £3 !0s. per Cent. Was LoArf. 1925-1928.
To cirljMigo 8toc\ for Bonds) of £5 10s. per Cent. War I^an. 1975-1926. to sn
Amount not exceeding £100 nominal, for fully-paid Stock (or Eonfte) of £4 10b. wr
cfDt. War Loan, 1925-1945, at the rate of £100 of the former, with a caish payment
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Personi who exereiso thU option will receive th'i diTidend of £1 10«. lid. »^r
rent, payablo on tho 1st SeptcnilKr. 1915. in resprct of t!ie £3 10s. per c*nt. War
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payable on t!i« l«t De^-nbcr, 1915, in r««pact of the £4 lOa. per cent. Wax hoan,
1925-1945. iASKd in lieu tliercof.
Optioh 2. Conversion- op £2 10s. per Cext. Con'pols.
To exohanfo Stock for Stock Ortiftcatcs) of £2 10€. per cent. OonaolB. to nn
^mviitt not eiccedine £75 nominal, for lujiy-paid Stock (or Bonds) «>f £4 10s, pof
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P««cn« who excKiso this option will rooeive t-lie usual quarter'a diTld^iid of
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por c*iit. Ocneola Kuirendf-Tod, wid a full haIf-yf;ir"B dividrnd of £2 5s. nor nei>t..
parable on the 1st December, 1915. in respect of the £4 lOe. per coat. W:;r Loan.
1925-1945. Ifis'Jod in Itena thereof.
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To exrlisnee Stock (or Stc.-k O^-rtificitea) of £2 ISs. per cent. Annol^if*, *o
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per Cent. War Loan. 1925-1945, at the rate of £67 of the former for £50 of th«
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P<r«sEa who exerria* this option will reveJTe the oinial <i«.irter'j diTirffid of
1 's 9d per cenf.. payable on the 5th Octotrr, 1915. in rc«pect of ih*- £2 ISa. t»«
r*nt. Antir.iiioa Rurrejidwed. arid a full l.aif-yesr'a diviJ^nd of £2 5«. per reni^
ptT»ble <^n tJio l*t Dorcmber, 1915, In resp^t of the £4 10a. per Cent. War Ixad,
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To ex;:ltan^ Slock (or St->ck Ceriiiicst<j) of £2 10«. per Cent. Arrufifen fo an
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Persone ^h5 exercleo^ tbia option will rfre-\ff tlie usunl quartor's dividend of
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Oent. Annuitlpt surrendered, and R full halfyear'a diTJdend of £2 5i. »er oent.,
pavable on the l«i Dcocniber. 1915. In respect of the £4 10*. per Cent. War Loaa,
1925-1945. Issued in lieu fherw^-f.
In the event of future issuea (other than isstiefl inft<1e abroad or ie»uea of Exchequer Bonds. Tnea^ury Bills, or eimilar ithort-d«*ed Seeurilien) beinc
m»de by His Majesty's Government, for the purpose of cArr%'ing on the War, Slock and Bonde of tbia iasue will be accepted at par, plus accrued interoet,
as the eQuivaleni of cash for the purpose of PubscriTifiona, to such issues.
A oonunifiaion of ODC-«iKhib per cent, will be allowed to Bankers, Brokers, and Financial Houees on allofmenta made in respect of caeb applications
Eor Uiia ifimie bearing their Stamp; but no oommiesion will be allowed in respect of applications for conversion.
AnpUcation Forma for Cash Subscriptions may be obtaired at the Bank of KneUnd and the Bank r{ Ireland; at arjr Bank or Monaj Order Offic*
im the United Kini?dom; of lleasra. Mullena. Marnhall & C« . 13. Georee Street. Monaicn Houce, E.C. ; a.nd of the rrii^oip*' Stockbrokers.
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B^jsK OF Ekglakd^ London, 21st Jukk. 1915.
17*
LAND AND W A T E II June 26, 1915.
A copy of this Prospectus has been filed with llie Registrar of Joint Stock Companies.
The Subscription List will open To-day, Thursday, the 24th day of June, and will close on or before
the following Monday.
THE BLERIOT MANUFACTURING AIRCRAFT
COMPANY, LIMITED.
(incoporateil uade- the Companlct Acu. 1903 t> 1913.)
Manufacturers of Aeroplanes, Sea-planes, War-planes, Biplanes and Monoplanes.
CAPITAL: ;^200,000. divided into 180.000 Ten per cent. Cumulative and Pariicipating Ordinary Shares of ;^i eacli,
and ;£:20,000 Deferred Ordinary Shares of Is. each (400.000).
The Union of London and Smiths Bank, Limited, Head Office, 2, Princes
Street, London, E.G., are authorised, as Bankers to the Company, to receive Appli-
cations for the £100,000 now offered for Subscription at Par, as follows :
95,000 10 per cent. Cumulative and Participating- Ordinary Shares of £1 cacli, payable as follows, viz., 2s. 6d. per share
on application, 7s. 6d. per share on allotment, and the balance as and wiien recinircd.
'jf5,000 in Deferred Ordinary Shares of one sliilllng each, payable as ioi!o>vs, viz. : 3d. per Share on application and the
balance on allotment.
The 10 per cent. Cumulative and Piirticipating Ordinary Shares are entitled out of the available profits made in any
year to a Cumulative Preferential Dividend at th.e rate of ten per cent, per annum (10%) on the capital paid up thereon, and
also to th.irty per cent. (30"'.) of the further profits in any year available for distribution among the members, the remainder
belonging to the holders of the Deferred Ordinar}- .Shares.
Applicants for t!ie 10 per cent. Cumulative and Participating Ordinary Shares are entitled to apply for Fifty Is.
Deferred Ordinary Sh.'ires (part of the above-mentioned V^^5,000 Deferred Ordinary Shares), in respect of each 100 10 per
ccnt. Cunuilativc and Participating Ordinary ^"1 .Shares allotted to them.
DIRECTORS.
LIEUT. HIS GRACr: THE DUKE OF MANCHMSTI'.K. P.C., Kimboiton Castle, Huntingdonshire. Pn-siilenL NaUonal
Acre DcJl-v.cc League.
WILLIAM A. CASSON, iSarrister-at-Lav. (La/i- LocriJ 6V-j?rH>»u>!i/ Board Amlilor), Ckin House, Surrey Street, Strand,
London.
ADMIRAL THE HON. SIR EDMUND R. FREMANTLE, G.C.B., C.M.G.. 44, Lov.er Sloane Street, London, S.W.
SIR ALGERNON GUINNESS, Bart., " Aranmor," Kingston Hill, Surrey.
J. H. SWINBURN, F.C.I.S., 49, Old Bond Street, London, \V., Director', Army i:^' Navy Contract Corporaiion, Lhl,
Bankers.
THE UNION OF LONDON & SMITHS BANK, LIMITED, 66, Charing Cross, London, S.W., Head Office, 2, Priacflf
Street, London, E.C., and Branches.
Solicitors.
Mhssrs. J. J. EDWARDS & CO.. 28, Sackville Street, London, W.
Auditors.
Messrs. TURQUAND YOUNGS & CO., Chartered Accountants, 41, Coleman Street, London, E.C.
Accountants.
MtssRS. H. HACKETT& CO., Chartered Accountants, 44. Bedford Row, London, W.C.
Secretary and Offices (pro tern.).
G. T. HUNT. Clun House. Surrey Street. Strand, London, W.C.
The object (f ihh Company is to provids a much larger immij?r of Afi-op'.aR^s to the order of His Majo-sty's GovCnrnMrt for th» Fiyinj
Service* of the Admiralty anci the War Offio© by acqiiici'.-.g and esteiiding tha weU-kno.vn Aiicraft M.-miifactuihis "buiineau i-i thuj cou'itiv o! H.
Bleriot (a Contractor to the Bril!.Hh tJovernmenti. "
The Company will hai-e the rii;ht to raanufarturs and sell Bleritv!; Aeroplanes in tho United Kingdom of Groat Britain aiid Ireland and tti4
British Dominions, Co!onie.<i, aiid Possessioria, whilst M. B!er;ot is debarred from competing with this Company in the United Kingdom or u»
tha British Domiiiions, C^olonies, or Posse-ssions.
The rdcent viilo-rie.s over Zeppelins show that the secnrily of British homjs is best preserved by largely increasing the number of oar Aif-
crifl. Tli's is the supreme need of t!H> hoivr.
The War Office a now taking; the entiro output, ar-d it U intended largely to increase this output by means of extensions and new works,
designetl for the production of all types of Seiplanes, Warplanes, Biplanes, and Momipianes.
X'le field open for t!ie operulioi!S of the Ct«iipany U practically iu?limited, botli durinj War and Peace. M. Bleriot's figures prove it*
rapidly increasing pro.sperily indef>endent'y of the War, The in-luertce of Aiicr.->ft on tiia War apj -He 3dv:n>t.i.;.'j gain«! t-v 'H? .side po.t.ses'iln?
tuperi jritv in Aircraft is lx*ii!g daily demon.Hraie(l. as I'ield-Marshai Sir .Johii I'rcnch in a, Desnati h writes :—
" I feel iiure th«t no erfort should b« spared to iocrease their anmbers and perfect their equipment aad efficiency." — Quoted i*
Land and Wafer of the 3rd April, 1915.
COVERNMKNT DEMAND.
" We Want More Aeroplaoe?. The (ierman) have many more than we liave. One British Vviator goes a far a« ttro or
three (iermanj, Btit We Want .viore Machines, and the more you c.'^a torn out the better it will t»e lor our brave (ettowt ia
France."— Rt. Hji.. i». Li..yd Gx-rge. .Se^i /'a-/;/ Mai!, Jn.>e Mth. 1915.
Everything points to i.nimeri.>e forward s'iides for the Aircraft, Indiustry in 1915, and the present is an opportun? moment ft.r extending
•ad developing this busir-ess in order to manufacture machines as speedily as f.'ossih'e. The industry is now on a peinianenr basis, givin"
ampVjyment t^r. thousands of workers.
_ The C'ompany lia.s already receivetl proposals and offers of AerDDanlioal corjitrnctic>n,x! vrork for other Continjata! asd Amsrican types
of Aircraft-, of which atlvantage T/lll be t-aken when the pew works are complete.
The famous business of M. Bleriot is probably the oldest cstabiL^heil in the aviation indnstry. To his well-known inveiitionj must now
bo added his lal<-3t improved biplane artanged with two engines, so thai the risk of 3top{>ag« in flight is guarded against, one engine ooutinuiug
to operat-6 should the other stop.
Whilst the business of live Company, from having been one of the pioneers of aviation, is now Grmlv established, the aviation industry
may, nevertheless, be said to be yet in it.s infancy.
By reason of the experience that has !>een obtained and the capita! to be employed, this Company ahould be in a position to f-ak«
*dvMtage of any iraprovement-s which the future may show. It is vjcU known that "vast i.aiprru'enienU have already been effected since
M. Blenot made his— then— great flight, a little ovei five years ago. 8tart>;>g at Cahii> and ali..;htlng on the ClifVo at Dover. The news that
. * ?""i "*'' actually eown from France to England " v.'as cablo<l aU. over the world. Orders fur "Bleriots " began to pour in, and the sate*
•° *••' °J»l ye*r (j>» shown in M. B'.eriofs letter below) aniounfcd m value to no less a sum that £114,668. These tiare steadilv increa.wd,
Md M. Blenot now finds himself inundated with orders for aeropluises, and aircraft of various kinda.
Tbo following letter has been received from M. Bleriot:—
■" Gentlemen,
enti ntiich aro rww so argently needed,
18*
June 26, 1915. LA \T1 A i^ JJ VII A i
" I understand it would be more in accordance nitb th« practice of tbe British Admiralty and tbs War Office to give their crdei%
to an English Company than to a ^iranch o( my French business.
" The following figures I am pleased to gire you as showing the gradoai increase and sncceas of mj French bnainess since my flight
from Calais to Dover.
SALES OF BLERIOT AEROPLANES.
1910 £114,668\
1912 ,, £141904 NOTE.— These figures are prior to and
jgj3 £188072 f quite independent of the War.
1914 '.!'.'.'.'.!""'!!!'.""!!""!"'.!!!!!!"!!!'."""! £322,920)
" The last period covers 18 months ending January 31st of the present year, 1915.
" In conclusion, I have pleadure in saying that in concumng in placing my practical knowledge and expert experience at youJ
disposal, I do so with the utmost confidence in the future bnlliant success of your Company
" Yours faithfully,
(Signed) " L. Bleriot."
Some of the above-mentioned figures comprise sales of machines, parts of machines, and accessories delivered to the English works. The
f f urea have been verified by Messrs. Marwick, Mitcbell, Peat & Co., Chartered Accountanta, and are -.tk-ulated at the rate of 25 frs. to the £L
Mesrs. H. Hackctt and Co., Chartered AccountanLs, of 44, Bedford Row, London, W.C, certiiy as follows ; — •
"To the Directors of the Bleriot Manufacturing Aircraft Companv. Ltd., London.
" Dear Sirs, ' '• May 28th, 1915.
" In accordance with your instructions, we have examined the Books of Accounts of the BLERIOT business carried on in England,
*ad find that same have been regularly kept, and show cleoily the conduct and growth of the business since its foundation, and we hav*
caret uily auaiysed all capital outlay.
" The business, which was established in England in 1910 at the commencement of the aviation industry, increased to such an
extent, and the demand be«irae so great for Bleriot Aeroplanes, that, in order to save packing, freight, carriage and risk, and the delay
consequent on transmission of goods from Franco, works were establislied and equipped in this country in 1913, and the business of
mannfacturirg was in full working order in March of last vear.
"We ecrtilj that tbe act proBts lor the period el'l2 meaths eaiiiD^ 31st March, 1915, amounted to £39,3S3 17i. I»d.
" Yours faithfully,
(Signed) " H. Hackitt and Co.,
"Chartered Accountants."
The Directors are of the opinion that, having regard to the working capital to be introduced from this issue, allowing for extenskin
of works and laying down of additional machinery, the turnover will be materially increased without adding appreciably to the administration
ozpeuses. Iha future profits therefore should be largely in e.\cc33 of those certified, but the Directors are content to base their estimatea
on the actual profits made during the 12 raonth.s ending 31st March, 1915.
The returns to shareholders would therefore be
Certified profits £39,39.3 0 0
Leas proviiioD for Directors' Fees £1,500 0 0
£37,895 0 0
One qnarter of such profits payable to M. Bleriot. so long as he is the registered proprietor of
■hares of tbe total nominal value of £40,000 in tbe capital of the Companv £9,475 0 0
Cumulative dividend of 10% on sav 95.000 cumulative and " ) f EQUALS A
participating ordinarv shares ... " £9,500 0 0 : £15,176 0 0- RETURN OF
Participating dividend on such Shares £5,676 0 Oj ( OVER ISa'o
Dividcsd on tbe Deferred Ordinary Shares £13,244 0 0
£37.895 0 0
The above figures show to every slsarcholder who applies for the proportion cf Deferred Ordinary Shares to which he is entitled, a retnrn of
♦ver fifteea aod onebalf per cent. (15^j%) on the £1 Shares, and over sixty five per cent, on the Deferred Ordinary Shares.
These substantial profits earned by the English business, viz. : £39.393 17 10 for the year ending 31.st March, 1915, without the proposed
extensions show full and ample security to the Shareholders for payment of the Priority dividend: such fixed dividend being aheady covered
nearly three times over by the present earnings.
Bleriot aeroplanes have established a great reputation. It is claimed by thi.s Company that the latest improved Bleiiot biplane will htve
no superior, and with the excellence of the British and Allied flying m'n extraordinary results are confidently expected.
Agreeably with the terms of the sanction given by the Trca.=ury to this Capital Issue, application will be made after the distribution of the
ahare certificates for tbe permission of the Committee of the London Stotk Exchange for dealings in the shares now offered for subs-riptinn.
Tho Treasury has been consulted under the Notification cf the 18tti January, 1915, and raises no objection to this Issue. It must be dis-
tinctly understood that in considering whether they have or have not any objections to JCcw Issues the Treasury doe.s not take any responsi-
bility for the financial soundncos of any Schemes, or for the correctness of any of the statements made or opinions expressed with rcg.nrd to
them.
ACHIEVEMENTS.
The Royal .\ero Club for the United Kingdom report states that Bleiiot ma'iiines have made re<ords for the higliest altitude (nnmo'y,
t4,92A(t. la.st year) and speed in Great Britain. In the Paris to Rome flight Bleriot machines finished first snd scconil. In the circuit of Guat
Britain of 1,010 miles a Bleriot m.achine gained the Daily Mail prize, and in the Petrograd to Moscow flight a Bleriot machine finished first
M. Chereau, of the English Bleriot Works, states:
Tlie firat man to croaa tho En?l!::h Channel was M. Louis Bleriot. on a
BLERIOT, fitted with a 25 H.P. Engine.
The M>cond croasine of the Channel was made by Count de I^esseps, on a
BLERIOT, 50 HP. Engine.
The tirst man to cross tho English Channel with a passenger was Mr.
Moieant, also on a BLERIOT.
The first Non-Stop Journey from London to Paris was made en a BLERIOT
by Mr. Prier.
The first croasinp of the Irish Channel was made by Mr. Corbett Wilson,
on a BLERIOT.
The second creasing was also made by Mr. Corbett Wilson on a BLERIOT.
The fii«t croaeing of the Alps van also made on. a BLERIOT.
The first crossing of the North Sea from Englajid to Norway was made by
Lieut Gran on a BLERIOT.
The first I.*ady Pilot to cross the Channel was Miss Quimby, aUo en a
BLERIOT.
And a th^!rd crossing of the Irish Chsunel was made by Mr. Mellir.. aleo
on a BLEKIOT
The Record Fl'gl't from Ivondon to Paris stands Qnl*aten in tbe r.an:e cf
Mr. H. t'aJnief, on a BLEKIOT.
The Circuit of Great Britain fcr the £10.000 Daily Va-t prize w»« also
TTon on a BLEKIOT by M. Beaumont, who r^as afterwards rece:ve<i|
by His Majesty, King George, at B;ickingham Pa'ace.
The Circuit of Europe was also won by M. Besunicnt on a BLER'OT. and
he also won the Great Race from I.,ondon t.o Turin.
The BLERIOT wsa also the first machine to d*;uoni*.rate the pessibiii'.iee
of " Looping tlie Lo.3p " and " Upside Down FlTing."
Tlie great Non-Slop Flight from Do\*r to t-Ve ?cppc!in Sheds »t rolcsne
wae also acl-icved by M. Ha.mel with a ps^^cneor, on a BLERIOT.
AH the BLEEIOTS end BLEKIOT built mac);>.fcT. both Biplhne-- and
Monoplanes, are IjeiiiE taken by the Allies and r.s^l n 1h* War in
increasing numVjfrs. They are credited with msLy wcnder'u! ac-b:eve.
mcnts, ae seon in the Daily Pcpers.
This Application Form may bs used for Ten Per Cent. Cumulative and Participating Ordinirv Shares of £1 each.
THE BLERIOT MANUFACTURING AIRCRAFT CO., LTD.
i Inrorj^rjted » ndrr the C'«-mjf?i»ii>s Aetr. tff'S and IS.' .
€Sst,jp±-t.SL'L ■ - - ;55200,000.
Divided into ISO.OOOTen Per Cent. Cumulative & Participating Ordinary Shares of £1 each, and £20,000 in Deferred O.-dinary Sharei of I - each
ISSUE of 95.000 10% CUMULATIVE and PABTICII'ATINO ORDINARY Sn.iBP.S Ob' £1 E.\CH.
To the. DirrcfoTx of The Bleriot AUNnr.^crcRiNG Aircraft CoMi'Axr, LnjrrED.
Gentlemen, Having paid to your Bankers tho sum of £ being a deposit of 2 6 per Share on
, 10% CumnlativB and Participating Ordinary Shares of £1 each in the above-named Company, I request
you to aUot me that number of Shiircs on the terms of the Prospectus issued by j-ou, dated 21st June. 1915, an! of the Memorandum and Articles
of Association of the Company, and I hereby agree to accept the same, or any smaller number that may be allotted to me, and t* pay tho
balance of 17/5 per Share as provided by the said Prospectus, and I authorise you to place my name on the Register of Members in respect of
the Shares so allotted.
fXamt {in full) ...". ■ • ~
(Mr.. Mis., or Uise)
Pleaie
Write
Distinctly.
Address .■ • -
Descripfion .' -
Usual Signature
Date ......;.. .■..i.:..'.;.^...v.;.i..i:...;.-.....'«..:.i.u;-.'.j-'..-...,-.«.v.il..'.ii..>i./^j5.
Full Prospectuses and Form* of Application c«n be obta'ned at the Offices of the Com^^nrior from th<it Bankers 'or l^oliciton.
ZknUd !Ut JunA lais. • t" ..... .■■•> , ■ .N
.19*
LAND AND WATER,
June 26, 1915.
TALES OF THE UNTAMED.
MARGOT (continued).
Adapted from the French by Douglas English.
BUT, as tli9 enveloping hand squeezed past the open-
iug, the grip of it relaxed. Her wings slipped
clear; she made full use of them, dug beak deep
down into the palm, and, with one supreme effort,
wriggled free, and winged towards the sky.
A stunning crashing jar cut short her flight. With
wounded breast, with splintered beak, she fell, wings spread
across the sink.
The crockery danced and rattled, glasses spun round and
shattered on the floor — and she was once more prisoner. The
hand had pounced on her afresh and gripped her like a vic;».
Windows were things undreamt of in her world. The
outer sky had beckoned her. An unseen barrier, permeable
by sight, was past her understanding.
The Man was irritated. He gripped as though to
strangle her, and Margot strove against him.
Slie writhed and twisted in his hands, she sought to
use her beak again.
Her puny force was chilled and quenched by fear — fear
of the scissors In-andished by the Woman.
They poincc. ^ heir fierce blades at her. They opened
out and closed again, their edges grinning, raspinor,'
Would this cold, pitiless beak of steel be plunced into
her flesh ?
She was flung backwards, pinned by hands confederate;
and scream of agony proclaimed the wrenching of her tail-
quills from their sockets.
So steering power was torn from her.
The wings were crippled next. Nipped right and left
they numbed in pain, and right and left, chcked scissor-snip,
and pit-a-pat of feathers, lightly falling.
A stifled gurgle burst from her dumb lungs. She glucked
like blooded fowl. She waited for the finishing stroke, the
plunging of the steel into her throat; the last, the supreme
torture.
But suddenly the hands were lifted from her. Slie sat
dumb on the table's edge, her every nerve ajar with pain,
her every mu.scle smarting. And round her laughter spent
itself, and mockery, and railling.
Man and Man's friends had grouped to pay her homage.
The sky at least was there, the beckoning sky.
She spread her wings and leapt towards "the window.
The leap was limit of her course.
Like stone she fell and raised a mocking laugh again.
Yet she did not despair.
She flapped her crippled stumps of wings, and time and
time and time again essayed the lilting glide which leads to
flight.
The grace of it was gone. She toppled, stumbled piti-
ably. Feet, body, neck were out of gear, and mocking
laughter waited on her always.
She understood at last; she knew that her whole world
was changed, that an abyss impassable had sundered her
from freedom; that flight was now denied her, that she was
prisoner for life.
She shrunk behind the cage — its door was closed — she
circled it, she crouched against the side of it. She ducked
her head beneath her crippled wing, and till that day had
passed she neither ate, nor drank, nor moved.
Man, Woman, Child took curious note of her, like
visitors round a sick bed. They whispered, argued, threat-
ened. She paid no heed. Despair had laid a hand on her,
a chilly, numbing hand. A momentary rustle of her feathers.
a momentary flicker of her eyes, were the sole signs of life
in her maimed body.
But she was young. Her thoughts were fugitive. They
skimmed her brain and left small trace behind them. She
woke from sleep to find her troubles softened.
The pain was gone, and, in its place, two mastering in-
stincts held her, the need for food, the need for sheltered
roosting-place.
She ate the scraps and morsels that lay near her; she
drank fresh water from her pannikin, and, with her strength
renewed, commenced her search.
From bench to bench, from room to room she tripped.
Her innate curiosity now ordered all her "oin^s.
She questioned every stick and stone she met. She pried
in corners, sounded holes. With head aslant she eyed each
c'eft and crevice; took measure of the chinks between the
boards; appraised with care meticulous, the chance-found
treasures of the littered floors.
Were these close scrutinies casual or ordered by soma
mystic sense of profit ?
From time to time, no doubt, she chanced on food, but
glistening things allured her most. She worshipped the.se
as idols, caressed them, lingered by them, in morbid, spell-
bound ecstasy.
Most finds she quickly tired of. She prized them for
their novelty, their opportune presentment, their momentary
use.
She chose the serving-counter for headquarters.
Beneath it dropped tit-bits of fcod; behind it was the
dresser. And this was lit with gleam of polished metal,
knife-blades with steely sheen on them, dish-covers, spoons,
and forks.
She quickly learnt Man's feeding times. She mustered
her best manners then, and with coquettish beaks and nods,
sought and compelled attention.
She quickly learnt Man's call-note— the syllables of her
name — and linked it in her mind with food.
She fixed its distance instantly, and with giant heps
and fluttery wings made bee-line to its source.
And she had other company than Man: the dog whose
presence she took little lieed of; the cat whom she distrusted.
The cat's advances frightened her. She feared the twitching
of his ears, his lashing tail, his sleepy-stretching claws, the
down-drawn corners of his wliiskered muzzle. Yet there
was truce between them, truce after strenuous contest, where
each had learnt the other's qualities — and weapons.
The days trailed by monotonous.
Under two deadening influences, the frousty, heated
atmosphere, the incessant glut of food, her senses dulled.
The outer world had almost passed from her, though
every dawn she flapped her stumps of wings, as though soma
sleeping instinct woke in her and called her to the sky.
She learnt the quiet corners of the kitchen — behind the
stove, beneath the baking-range.
She knew safe spots from which to scold the cat, or tease
the dog without fear of reprisal. The latter sport was
friendly. The dog had smelt hor dubiously at first; had
thrust a curious muzzle at her plumage, and, by some mystic
test, been satisfied.
The strange wild captive thing was of the household.
It was uneatable. It could not harm him. Then why not
let it live? A game-bird might have tempted him (for'want
of hare or rabbit), but blackbirds, magpies, jackdaws, crows,
were no fit food for dog of quality.
So, when from stress of boredom or excitement, Margot
was stirred to mischief, she crept behind the dog and tweaked
his tail. He swung a drowsy head at her, and with round,
serious eyes and upcurled lip, growled disapproval.
As his head turned she nipped again, and so the game
went on.
He never lost his temper. He tore her teasing gladly,
like the children's.
But it was different with the cat. The cat sneaked food-
scraps which were hers by right, and, scorning her indignant
outcry, ate them.
Strangers she still was nervous of. She feared their
hands, feared handling altogether; for, every week at first,
then every fortnight, the ordeal of the scissors was renewed.
The menace of their crunching blades drove her dis-
traught to cover.
She dived beneath the furniture, crouched in dark holes
and corners. She even squeezed through wire-work of a
mattress, which meant unmaking of the bed and littering of
the bedroom.
And t/ien she fooled the clutching hands, and slipped
down-stairs, and for full fifteen minutes mocked pursuit.'
At length, worn out, she let the Girl lay hands on her.
The Girl had shown her kindness, but piteous upturned
eyes were unavailing. The Girl betrayed her to the Man.
Once more she had to face the pain, the indignity of
clipping.
Winter, disputing every inch of ground, at last retreated
beaten. The sun burst through the sullen clouds and flung
his lusty beams about the house.
(To be continued.)
Printed by the Victoria Housb Pmntino Co.. Ltd., Tudor Street. Whitcfriars, London, E.C.
June 26, 1915
LAND AND WATER
r
For
Writing
Home
The small size Onoto Pen
is specially suitable for
use on active service. It
fills itself rapidly without
the need of a glass filler,
and can be carried any-
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because when closed it
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Onoto Pens are the only
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SPECIALITY. — Light weight Gap for summer wear. Weight 4 oz
Very terviceahle against bad weather and thoroughly waterproofs cUt a protection
from the iun.
Badges 3/6 extra. Crease-proof Linings, 1/6 extra.
SERVICE CAPS FOR TROOPS, from 30/- per dozen.
BRITISH WARMS, 55/-. 63/- Lined Fleece, in all Sizes.
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SECURITY - £6,107,594.
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Apollinaris
Natural Mineral Water.
Profits belong to
4,500
British Shareholders
The Apollinaris Company is
and always has been a
British Enterprise
More than
£3,000,000
of British Capital
is invested in
Apollinaris
211
LAND AND WATER
June 26, 1915
"MAPWEB ' FLY TRAPS
are the outcome of tests of all available traps
and all ideas for traps. These tests were
made at the Zoological Society's Gardens.
PffKi'stfln-t/lv Pateritf'i
5/- each
(Packed and Post Free, 5/6).
Stnd for Illustrated Brochure.
Msmpin&W^bb
Silversmiths to His Maiesty King George V. Lii-I
158. 162 OXFORD ST.. W.. 2 QUEEN VICTORIA ST., EC
220 REGENT ST.. W.. ROYAL WORKS. SHEFFIELD.
1 RUE DE LA PAIX. PARIS.
Built on
H\o most
HYGIENIC
lines I
To study
HYGIENE
means the
PRESERVATION
of
HEALTH.
tSee each Blanker has ttils label on corner)
1916
The
Warmest I
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Lightest 1 1
The
Best 1 1 !
SLEEPING
BAG.
ALL WOOL!
PARTICULARS.
1. The Arctic Sleeping Bags
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2. The Bags are 3-ply.
3. Size about 7 ft. by 35 in.
4. Price 68/- each.
The Blanket Rug is the
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ARCTIC BAO, but is
SILK BOUND.
Size about 84 in. by 63 in.
Price 36/9 each.
NOTICE ! !
OFFICERS REQUIRING A PERFECT EQUIPMENT
WILL WELCOME THE ARCTIC SLEEPINO BAO.
Ao/tP ge.nuine witftout thf above labfl.
To be obtained from the
ARMY & NAVY CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, LTD.
105 VICTORIA STREET, LONDON, S.W.
and leading Stores, or from the Makers.
A. GRANVILLE MARTIN & CO., 96 Newgate St., London, E.C.
Wires : " Agraniart, Central London." 'Phone : 8018 Central.
Garrould's
To H.M. Wak Office, H.M. Coionial Offiob,
India Officf,. St. .Tohn Ambulance Assooiatios,
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CouNcii.. CiUY'b Hospital, Ac.
HOSPITAL NURSES' SALOON
Complete Equipment of Nur.ses for
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All Surgical Inplements and Appliances in Stock.
Writs for Garrould's Catalogue of Nurses' Uniforms,
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In Two Sizes —
Medium .. £.■» IK »
Uirite £t 1 »
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In best red lubbt-r.
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It i^ onlv necessTry to spriiiklc the
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Can he shaped to fit any face.
Price 1/6 each.
THE
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Made of good quality
West of England Serge,
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29/6
Also in fine Cravcnette,
yiiaranttcd fast dye,
specially suitattle for
Summer Wear,
31/6
All sizes in stock.
WATRR BEI»H.
5.<24in. 36x3610. 48x^6 in.
I 17 6 £:e 18 6 £3 15 0
72x36 in.
£S 5 •
AIR ltl<:i»<4. with Pil'ow, size54BX36 in.. £'j |-* 6
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■?6X34in. -56x3010.
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'i'elegrama : "Qarroitld, London."
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■llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllj
212
June 26, 1915
LAND AND WATER
FROM a feminine point of view there are few things
more interesting than finishing touches. Speaking
broadly, women may be divided into two classes —
those who deal in etceteras and those who disdain
them. And the latter, as a general rule, can
hardly be counted amongst the decorative portion o the
community. Soldiers' wives are frequently past mistresses
in the art, anyhow where th ir habitation is concerned.
Many a woman has arrived in a garrison town and been
confronted wi h the inevitable furnished house or lodgings
of hideous aspect. At first the dght is apt to appal, later on
it is taken as all part of the day's work and simply as a call
for immediate transformation . And here is where the finish ng
touch comes in. Clump of attractively coloured cushions,
bowls and pots of flowers, a few readable books, and a judicious
collect on of photographs have converted many a room to
civilization. That, and a careful weeding out of existing
hor ors.
This weeding out, however, essential though it is, is not
the principal factor in the creation of a temporary home.
It is the addition of trifles that seem inseparably mingled with
the personahty of certain people. There are a few gifted
women who have the enviable knack of creating a home-like
atmosphere anywhere. One may be very certain that they
would succeed in this object in a tent in the Sahara or a hut in
Labrador. It is a Fpecial faculty, just as it is the special
faculty of a cheeky little midinette in Paris to buy a hat for
one franc fifty, trim it scantily, or not at all, slant it on her
head to the psychological angle, and at once be well-hatted.
At this time numbers of women are concentrating their energies
on making a home far from their usual quarters. The creation
of the new army, and the turning of the civilian into the soldier,
has made many a woman "follow the drum' who never
dreamt of such a possibil ty. For the first time she has
realised what being moved from pillar to pos^ really means,
and that the process, amusing though it often is, is yet an
exacting one. It demands adaptability and the intelligent
use of the nsignificant trifle.
The Small Accessory
Where clothe are concerned, of course, accessories are an
all-important matter. Just at this time, perhaps, they are
more important than ever, for most people now-a-days are
s udying the principles of economy. It is wonderful what
can be imparted to a gown by just the right waistbelt, and the
latest idea in spotlessly white lawn collars. Something
that is a 1 ttle ou of the ordinary in the way of a veil will
bring a moderate hat into line once again ; a clever note of
colour given by a parasol, a pendant, or a corsage bouquet,
deliver a toilet from insignificance.
The woman who has a keen eye to detail is bound to
present an attractive appearance. She can hardly do other-
wise. It is not a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence alone,
as many things are in this work-a-day world, but a question
of taste and discernment. There are some fortunate mortals
who have a knack of imparting distindion to everything
they wear. They pos-ess uncommon things, things which
have often been picked up at odd moments in unexpected
places, and are unlike anything owned by anybody else. It
may be a handbag of some uncommon bead or leather work,
a pair of quaint o iginal hatpins, a long neck chain of beads
in fome exquisite colour or modelling. It may be some other
trifle of the sort, sometimes of intrinsic value, sometimes
worth nothing beyond its beauty in the eve of the beho'der.
At any rate, there they are, and by their claim to more than
ordinary distinction, they ticket their owner with the same
hall mark.
On Gardens and Gardeners
The small details in a garden also are delightful to study.
The interest over a new cutting, the gain of a fresh carnation,
or the latest ype of rose, the continual fight against green fly
and a myriad other pests, is a ceaseless entertainment.
And here again individuality makes itself felt. There are
some people with acres of gardens, and, even n these days
of war, an army of gardeners. Yet their gardens are
stereotyped, and give the beholder no particiilar pleasure,
on the contrary, often a feeling of positive dislike. And then
there are the people who manage o create a thing of beauty
out of nothing. In a garden hardly larger than the palm of
your hand they will have something of interest and charm,
something unusual and attractive in the way of bedding-out,
just the right kind of garden chairs, chairs that invite the weary
visitor to sink into them with a sigh of content, and not the
knobby, uncomfortable sort that greet one on many a palatial
lawn. Once again it is a question of the all-important detail
— minor matter though it be.
Quite one of the most successful gardeners for creating
something out of nothing lived in a London flat, and her
medium was a roof-garden. She had green painted boxes
filled with geraniums and daisies, and what is more astonishing,
some standardroses, which had unexpectedly taken it into their
beautiful but obstinate heads to thrive in London. On sunny
days she rigged up a green and white striped awning, and with
a couple of white enamelled wicker chairs and a table to
match, the garden was as comfortable and shady a spot as
could be desired. It was at any rate an infinite delight to the
owner and her friends, and through its means one of the hottest
summers ever known to London was made tolerable.
The Things That Tell
If we are honest with ourselves, most of us will admit
that it is the extra things in life we appreciate, not the mere
bread and butter of every-day existence. It is dull work
paying the butcher, the baker, and the candlestick maker for
the bare necessities of life ; the money we appreciate spending
goes on far less mundane considerations than these. It goes,
in fact, on the tiny extras which mean so much and yet so
little, and make life worth living to a greater proportion
than the severely practical party would have us believe.
Our wounded soldiers and sailors are a case in point.
Any visitor to any hospital will tell us that the things the
men delight in are not those falling to their lot as a regular
rule, but the tiny extras that come their way. Even the most
taciturn Tommy finds words of thanks for a bunch of roses,
newspapers, or games. As for the jig-saw puzzle, it is a com-
plete passport to favour, inconsiderable trifle though it is.
The care of the wounded, therefore, though it certainly
begins, does not end with housing, food, and nursing. These
are the big things, of course, but the little things count as
well, in the way they always have and always will to the end
of time unless human nature fundamentally alters. So the
people with stores of magazines, books, puzzles, and such like
distractions cannot do better than make a big bundle of
them at once, and dispatch them to the nearest military
hospital. Several of these in various parts of the country
would be grateful for gifts of the kind, and it is quite certain
this want needs but to be known to be immediately answered.
As for the inventive genius with a special facility for thinking
of new games suitable for convalescents, the chance of a life-
time has arrived. For there are many claimants for his wares
in every direction, and a ready-made market to his hand.
213
LAND AND WATER
June 26, 1915
HOW URIC ACID
WORKS.
GOUTY DEVELOPMENT.
C"^ OUT is latent in every human being by means of the
' fact that uric acid, its primal cause, occurs naturally
-_■ in every system. Thus it is that gouty suffering is
■ the most prevalent of all maladies in this country ;
— -^ and why anyone escapes gout at all is because
Nature, by means of the liver and kidneys, destroys and eUminates
the noxious poison as soon as it is produced.
A very slight cause, however, exposure to cold or damp, a
chill, an accidental blow or knock, even worry, mental distress,
or a sudden shock, may result in the retention of the uric acid
in the body to the detriment of the whole economy.
It impedes the circulation and contaminates the blood. The
results are seen in attacks of indigestion, \vith the distressing
attendant symptoms of flatulence, acidity, heartburn, headache,
and constipation. Scattered about here and there just under the
skin may be seen Uttle hard lumps, which are simply collections
of solidified uric acid.
Accompanying this early sta.ge of gouty development a
burnmg sensation in the skin with irritation is experienced,
twinges of pain in the joints frequently occur, and there is a
feeling of stiffness, pain, and tenderness in both joints and
muscles.
One of the most frequently occurring forms of gout is gouty
eczema, the direct result of the burrowing of uric acid into the
skin. There can be no more irritating or distressing ailment
than gouty eczema, and, strangely enough, it often attacks
persons apparently healthy and vigorous.
Another, and perhaps the most familiar of all forms of
gouty suffering, is that known as chronic or rheumatic gout, or
rheumatoid arthritis, when uric acid insinuates itself between
the articulations, buries itself in the crevices, and invests the
cartilages and ligaments of the joints, setting up pain, enlarge-
ment, inflammation, and stiffness. Uric acid is the one common
cause of all other forms of gout, whether they appear in gouty
rheumatism or lumbago, sciatica or neuritis, kidney stone or
gravel.
RATIONAL TREATMENT OF GOUT.
To overcome and expel uric acid naturally requires the
assistajice of an agent even stronger than the poison itself.
Scientific research into the whole subject of uric acid solvents
and ehminants, conducted for many years by an old-estabUshed
firm of manufacturing chemists of the highest repute, resulted
m the perfecting of Bishop's Varalettes, a remedy acknowledged
by the medical profession to be the most generally powerful
solvents and ehminants of uric acid known. Bishop's Varalettes
are a reliable and successful remedy for gouty suffering, because
their action is at once rational and scientific. When adrninistered
they are rapidly absorbed by the blood, and so are enabled to
follow uric acid into its remotest hiding places. The poisonous
acid is neutralized by the chemical action of Bishop's Varalettes,
the cement-Uke masses are softened and broken down, finally
dissolved, and swept right out of the body. With this removal
the nervous depression, the irritation, the low condition, and
the pain, stiffness, and inflammation pass away, and in their
place come a sense of the most grateful reUef, and a raising of
the whole tone of the system.
Bishop's Varalettes are perfectly safe. No harmful in-
gredient enters into their composition. They do not interfere
with the normal action of any organ of the body. Thev are a
preventive as well as a remedy, and prolonged use does not
lessen their effect or produce any ill results.
CHOICE OF DIET.
Discrimination is practically all that is required in this
respect. No self-denial of any sort is necessary, for the number
and vanety of foods that the gouty may eat with impunity are
sufficiently extensive to satisfy the most fastidious palate or the
most exacting appetite. Confirmation of this welcome fact will
be found in a booklet recently issued, which deals with the subject
°\ g9uty foods in an interesting and authoritative manner.
Uassihed hsts of foods are set forth, so that it may be seen at a
glance what to eat and what to avoid. A section of this booklet
IS devoted to the discussion of uric acid disorders, their nature
And treatment, and contains a mass of useful information of the
greatest value to aU who suffer from or are threatened by uric
acid. A copy of the booklet wiU be sent post free by the sole
makers of Bishop's Varalettes, Alfred Bishop, Ltd., Manu-
factunng Chemists (Est. 1857), 48 Spelman Street, London, N.E.
Please ask for Booklet N.
Bishop's Varalettes are sold in vials at is., 2s., and -is
(25 days treatment), or may be had direct from the sole makers"
as above.
BOOKS OF THE WEEK
A LITERARY REVIEW
"The Audacious War." By Clarence W. Barron.
(Constable.) 4s. 6d. net.
"The World in Crucible." By Sir Gilbert
Parker, M.P. (Murray.) 6s. net.
In Sir Gilbert Parker's book we see the lure of modern
history attracting an author away from his more usual
pursuit of fiction. Sir Gilbert has a command of popular
rhetonc which enables him to say with considerable vehemence
what we have all been saying about Germany. There is not
very much that is new. He rightly emphasises the importance
of Asia and the Near East in causing the war. From time to
time his quotations are apt, as when he reminds us that
Froissart " laments that it was impossible to teach the German
knights the principles of true knightliness ; " and when he
quotes Sir Ian Hamilton on the Russo-Japanese War : " The
Muscovites have not lifted so much as an egg even during the
demoralisation of a defeat."
Mr. Barron's book is more interesting, and more original.
He is not atteinpting to cover the whole ground, but is present-
ing a few aspects of the war as they occurred to him, an
American, writing from Europe. He has been in close touch
with diplomatic and government circles, and he is an expert
on finance. He is entirely sympathetic with the British and
the French, and states our case for the American pubhc as
vigorously as it could possibly be stated. He argues that
the immediate causes of the war are " connected with com-
mercial treaties, protective tariffs, and financial progress."
" Kultur " means " German progress," commercially and
financially, and it is this which German armies and armaments
exist, to support. During the Russo-Japanese War Germany
thrust commercial treaties upon Russia wholly unfavourable
to the latter. In 1914 these treaties had nearly expired.
Mr. Barron asserts that it was the policy and intention of
Germany to defeat the European Powers in succession with a
view to dictating tariff terms to the rest of the worid, including
America. He urges upon his own country, " the home of
protective tariffs," that " tariffs should be neighbouriy "
We could wish that he had developed the financial side of
his argument— with the information at his disposal he might
advantageously have filled a volume. The book is well worth
reading. Incidentally we light upon certain facts which
Bntish newspapers are not as a rule permitted to pubhsh.
The English Essay and Essayists. By Hush
Walker, M.A., LL.D. (Dent.) 5s. net.
Professor Walker is perhaps a little too much incUned to
think that Lamb is the only kind of essavist who is really an
essajast, and the examples which he cons'iders in this volume
are practically subjected to the one test : To what extent do
they conform to the model of Lamb ? But hterature is large,
and he is compelled also, in order to bring so many other
writers within his scope, to give place to essayists in a
secondary sense ; thus he includes all " compositions to
which custom has assigned the ... . name, but which agree
only in being comparatively short .... and in being more
or less incomplete." Bacon is the first author whom he
treats at length ; and it is worthy of note that in this and in
all cases Professor Walker has discussed the thought of his
writers, as well as their technique and historical place. Steele
he prefers to Addison. To Goldsmith, as essa3dst, he gives
the place that he deserves ; to Walter Pater, Jefferies, and
Savage he is less, and to Richard Middleton more, than
kind. The book is thorough, and it has the merit— rare in
historico-critical works — of being really interesting and
appreciative.
"A Lady of Russia." By Robert Bowman. (Heine-
mann.) 6s.
Mr. Bowman is an Englishman who has lived long in
Russia. He has not only become intimate with Russian life •
he has also evidently steeped himself in Russian fiction!
for we can trace the unmistakable influence in his style. It
is a very simple, direct story of the tragic fate of a gifted
Russian woman, interested in the welfare of the peasants and
the progress of her country, whom her husband, a high official,
niisunderstands, and whom the authorities consign to a
Siberian prison. The book is worth reading as an example
of an English novel about Russian life, written under Russian
influences.
214
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