Lectures on the philosophy of religion, together with a work on the proofs of the existence of God ... tr. from the 2d German ed. by ... E. B. Speirs ... and J. B. Sanderson, the translation ed. by ... E. B. Speirs ..

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L162

LECTURES

ON THE

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

BY GEOEG WILHELM FEIEDRICH HEGEL

""KOJi

TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION

BY THE REV. E. B. SPEIRS, B.D., AND
J. BURDON SANDERSON

THE TRANSLATION EDITED

BY THE REV. E. B. SPEIRS, B.D.

IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. II.

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER, & CO.

PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHAKJNG CROSS ROAD
1895

The rights of translation and of reproduction are reserved.

Printed by BALLANTYNR, HANSON & Co.
At the Ballantyne Press

: E

v .

CONTENTS

PART II

PAOE

DEFINITE RELIGION — continued 1-323

FIRST DIVISION

THE RELIGION OF NATURE — continued 1-65

II. The division of consciousness within itself — continued.

2. The religion of imagination or phantasy -. . 1-47

a. Its conception i

6. The general idea of the objective content of this

stage . . . , . . . .11
c. Worship or cultus 30

3. The religion of Being-within-self . . . 48-65

a. Its conception . . . . . . 48

b. The historical existence of this religion . . 49

c. Worship or cultus 59

III. The religion of nature in transition to the religion

of freedom 65-122

1. The religion of the Good, or of light . . 70-82

a. Its conception 70

b. This religion as it actually exists ... 77

c. Worship or cultus .82

2. The Syrian religion, or the religion of pain . 82-85

3. The religion of mystery .... 85-122

a. The characterisation of the conception or notion

of this stage 88

b. The concrete idea belonging to this stage . . 101

c. Worship or cultus . . . . . .109

CONTENTS
SECOND DIVISION

PAGE

122

THE RELIGION OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY

A The transition, to the sphere of spiritual indi-

123
viduality .

B. The metaphysical conception or noti
sphere . •

a. The conception of the One

140

b. Necessity .

i .140

c. Conformity to an end

, . . . 1 00

C The division of the subject .

170-219

I The religion of sublimity .
' A The general nature of its conception or notion
B The concrete general idea or popular conceptic
a. The determination of the divine particu

tion .

b. The form of the world .
c The end God works out in the world

. 205
C Worship or cultus

The transition to the stage which follows

224-288
II. The religion of beauty

A. The general conception or notion
B The outward form of the Divine .
' a The conflict of the spiritual and the natural . 229

239
b. Formless necessity .

r Posited necessity or the particular gods 243

n. • 256

C. Worship or cultus

a Inner feeling .

267
6. Worship as service .

c Service as reconciliation .
III. The religion of utility or of the Understanding

A. The general conception of this stage .

B. This religion as the Roman religion .
0. Worship or cultus .

CONTENTS

PART III

PAGE

THE ABSOLUTE KELIGION 327

A. The general aspects of this religion . . . 328

1. The revealed religion 328

2. The revealed religion known as revealed . -335

3. The religion of truth and freedom . . . 346

B. The metaphysical notion or conception of the Idea

of God 348

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KELIGION

PART II

DEFINITE RELIGION

II

THE DIVISION OF CONSCIOUSNESS WITHIN ITSELF
(continued")

2. The, Religion of Imagination or Phantasy.

(a.) Its Conception.

The second of the main forms of Pantheism, when this
latter actually appears as religion, is still within the
sphere of this same principle of the One substantial
Power, in which all that we see around us, and even
the freedom of man itself, has merely a negative, accidental
character. We saw that the substantial Power, in its
first form, comes to be known as representing the multi-
tude of esssential determinations, and the entire sphere
of these, and not as being in its own self spiritual.
And now the question immediately arises as to how this
Power is itself determined, and what is its content ?
Self-consciousness in religion cannot, like the abstract
thinking understanding, limit itself to the idea of that
Power known only as an aggregate of determinations
which merely are. In this way the Power is not as
yet known as real, as independently existing unity ; not
as yet as a Principle. Now the opposite form of this

VOL. II. A

2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

determination is the taking back of the manifold deter-
minateness of existence into the unity of inner self
determination. This concentration of self-deterrnmatio]
contains the beginning of Spirituality.

I The Universal, as determining its own self, and not
merely as a multitude of rules, is Thought, exists as
Thought It is in our thoughts alone that Nature, the
rulin° Power which brings forth everything, ex18ts as
the Universal, as this One Essence, as this One Power
which exists for itself. What we have before us in
Nature is this Universal, but not as a Universal,
is in our thought that the truth of Nature is brought
into prominence on its own account as Idea, or more
abstractly as something having a universal character.
Universality is, however, in its very nature Thought,
and as self-determining is the source of all determina-
tion But at the stage at which we now are, and where
the Universal appears for the first time as the determining
a^nt as a Principle, it is not as yet Spirit, but abstract
Universality generally. The Universal being known in
this way as Thought, it remains as such shut up within
itself. " It is the source of all power, but does not
externalise or make itself manifest as such.

2 Now to Spirit belongs the power of differentiation
and the full development of the difference. Of the systeni
of this complete development, the concrete unfolding of
Thoucrht on its own account, and that particular unfolding
which as manifestation or appearance is Nature and the
spiritual world, form an inherent part. Since, however,
the Principle which makes its appearance at the present
sta-e has not as yet got so far as to permit of this
untbldin" taking place within that principle itself, it
bein" rather held fast in simple abstract concentration
only° the unfolding, the fulness of the actual Idea, is
found outside of the Principle, and consequently d]rTeren-
tiation and manifoldness are abandoned to the wildest,
most outward forms of imagination. The specialisa-

DEFINITE RELIGION 3

tion of the Universal manifests itself iu a multitude of
independent powers.

3. This multiplicity, this wild abandonment, is once
more taken back into the original unity. This taking
back, this concentration of thought, would complete the
moment of spirituality so far as the Idea is concerned, if
the original universal thought resolved within its own
self upon differentiation, and if it were known as essen-
tially this act of taking back. Upon the basis of
abstract thought, however, the taking back itself remains
a process devoid of Spirit. There is nothing wanting
here, so far as the moments of the Idea of Spirit are con-
cerned, the Idea of rationality is present in this advance.
But yet those moments do not constitute Spirit ; the
unfolding does not give itself the perfect form of Spirit,
because the determinations remain merely universal.
There is merely a continual return to that Universality
which is self-active, but which is held fast in the
abstraction of self-determination. We have thus the
abstract One and the wildness of extravagant ima^ina-

O O

tion, which, it is true, is recognised in turn as remaining
in identity with what is primary, but is not expanded
into the concrete unity of the Spiritual. The unity of
the intelligible realm reaches the condition of particular
independent existence ; this last does not, however, be-
come absolutely free, but remains confined within universal
Substance.

But just because the unfolding does not as yet return
in a true way into the Notion, is not as yet taken back
into the Notion by its own inner action, it still retains
its immediacy in spite of that return, still belongs to
natural religion, and therefore the moments full apart,
and are kept independent and separate relatively to one
another. This is the curse of nature. Everywhere we
shall find tones that accord with the Notion, with the
True, which, however, become the more horrible in the
strain as a whole because they continue to retain the

4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

character of separateness or mutual exclusion, and
because the moments, being independent and objective
in their particularity, are looked upon theoretically.

The further question which now presents itself is,
What are the forms, the shapes in which this indepen-
dence appears ? We are actually in such a world, con-
sciousness finds itself in an existing world, of such a
mutually exclusive character — in a world of sense, and
thus has to deal with a world of many-coloured manifold-
ness. Taking it as a whole, it is thus just " these," these
individual things ; that is the fundamental determination
here. We call "these," Things, and this is the more
precise characteristic we assign to the Objective, and by
which we distinguish it from Spirit. In a similar way
we have in inner life to do with manifold forces, spiri-
tual distinctions and experiences, which the understand-
ing in like manner isolates; — as, for example, this incli-
nation, that passion, this power of memory, that power
of judgment, &c. In thinking, too, we have determina-
tions each of which exists for itself, such as positive, nega-
tive, being, not-being ; this, for our consciousness, which
takes things in their sensuous aspect, for our understand-
ing, is independence. In this way we have a view or
theory of the universe which is of a prosaic character,
because the independence has the form of what is a
thing, of forces, faculties of the mind, &c., and conse-
quently its form is abstract. The thought is not Eeason
here, but Understanding, and is present in that form.
But when we so regard the world, what we have is the
reflection of understanding, which appears much later,
and cannot as yet exist here. Not until prose, not until
thinking, has permeated all relations, so that man every-
where assumes the attitude of one who thinks abstractly,
does he speak of external things. The thinking in ques-
tion here is, on the contrary, this Substance only ; it is
merely this self-containedness or being at home with
self ; it is not as yet brought into exercise, not applied

DEFINITE RELIGION 5

thought, and has not as yet permeated the entire man. The
special Powers, which are partly objects, such as the sun,
mountains, rivers, or else are more abstract ideas, such as
origination, decay, change, assumption of form, and the
like, are not as yet taken up into Spirit, are not as yet
truly posited as ideal, and yet at the same time, too, are
not as yet intelligently distinguished by the understanding
from Spirit, and pure Being is still concentrated in that
undeveloped state of Substance which is not as yet spiri-
tual Substance.

Now we do not only say things " are" but we add in
the second place that they stand in manifold relation to
one another ; they have causal connection, they are de-
pendent on one another : this second moment of the
action of understanding cannot be present here. It is
the understanding only as pure self-identity, or as a self-
consistent process, which conceives of objects under these
categories. " Since the one is, therefore the other is,"
is its way of speaking; and without once turning back,
ic carries ihis chain of connection continuously on into
the bad or false infinite. Thus the independence we are
speaking of has not this form. The form of indepen-
dence which is present here is no other than the form
of that which is the form of concrete self-consciousness
itself, and this first mode is therefore the human or ani-
mal mode. At this stage there is a filling-up ; the con-
crete makes its appearance as existent, as something
which is actually perceived, no longer as Power. In
this last the Concrete is posited as merely negative, as in
subjection to the Power ; it is only the practical element
which is objective in the Power, not the theoretical. Here,
on the contrary, the theoretical element is set free.

Spirit, as being theoretical, has a double aspect. It
relates itself as within itself to itself, and it relates
itself to the Things, which " things " are for it universal
independence. Thus for Spirit the things themselves
break up into their immediate external varied form on

6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the one hand, and into their free independently existing
Essence on the other. Since this is not as yet a Thing,
nor represents, in fact, the categories of the Understand-
ing, and is not abstract independence produced by thought,
it is the free independence of ordinary conception ; and
this is the idea formed of man, or at least of what has
life, which consequently may be, in a general sense, called
the Objectivity of Imagination. In order to conceive of
the sun, the sky, a tree as existing, as self-sustained, it is
only necessary for us to have a sensuous picture or image
of it, to which nothing which appears heterogeneous has to
be added in order that it may be thus presented to us as
self-sustained or independent. But show or semblance is
a deception. The image, when represented to us as inde-
pendent, as having Being, and when regarded by us as
such, has for us just the character of Being, of a force, of
a causality, of a form of activity, of a soul ; it is in these
categories that it has its independence. But in so far as
the independence has not as yet advanced to the prose of
Understanding, for which the category of force or of cause
is the characteristic quality of objectivity generally, the
apprehension and expression of that independence is this
poetry, which makes the idea of human nature and out-
ward form the supporting basis and Essence of the external
world, or, it may be, even animal form, or the human form
in combination with the animal. This poetry is, in fact,
the rational element in imagination, for this rational ele-
ment is to be kept firm hold of, although consciousness, as
before stated, has not yet advanced to the category, and
thus the element of independence is to be taken out of the
world which is around us, and, in fact, in direct contrast
to what is not independent, to what is conceived as ex-
ternal. And here it is animal and human existence alone
which is the form, mode, and nature of what is free among
things. The sun, the sea, a tree, and the like, are, as a
matter of fact, without independence as compared with
what lives and is free ; and it is these forms of indepen-

DEFINITE RELIGION .7

dence which in this element of independent existence
constitute the supports of the category for any content
at all. A subjective soul is thus given to Matter, which,
however, is not a category, but is concrete Spirituality
and Life.

The immediate result is that as soon as objects gene-
rally and universal thought-determinations have this free
independence, that connection of things in the world
which is the work of understanding is dissolved; — it is
the categories of the relations of necessity, or the depen-
dence of things upon one another in accordance with
their quality, their essential definite character, which
form this connection ; all these categories, however, are
absent, and thus nature, with nothing to support or give
it stability, reels at the mercy of imagination. There
may be any sort of unregulated fancy, any kind of chance
occurrence and result ; the movement in connection with
any condition of things is not bound and limited by any-
thing whatever; the whole splendour of nature and of
imagination is available as a means of decorating the
content, and the caprice of imagination has absolutely
unbounded scope, and can follow whatever direction it
pleases.

Passion in its natural untrained state possesses but
few interests, and that in which it has an interest it
negates, while on the other hand it pays no attention to
whatever is void of interest. From this standpoint of
imagination, however, all distinctions are taken special
notice of and firmly clung to, and everything whicli has
an interest for imagination becomes free, independent,
and is exalted to the rank of fundamental thought.

But it is likewise owing to this very imagined inde-
pendence itself that conversely the peculiar position of
the content and of the definite outward forms disappears;
for since they have a definite finite content, they would
properly have their objective support, their return and
abiding renewal, only in that connection of the under-

8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

standing which has vanished, and by means of which
their independence, instead of being a reality, becomes
rather a complete contingency. The phenomenal world,
the world of appearance, is therefore drawn into the ser-
vice of imagination. The divine world is a realm of
imagination, which becomes all the more infinite and
manifold as it has its home in a region where Nature is
exuberant ; and this principle of passionless imagination,
of a fancy built on a theoretical foundation, has enriched
the character of the mind and its emotions, — emotions
which in this gently hatching warmth are permeated in
a pre-eminent degree by a strain of voluptuous and sweet
loveliness, but at the same time of feeble softness.

The objective content, too, is not apprehended here
in the form of Beauty : those powers, whether general
natural objects or the forces of individual feeling, as,
for example, love, are not as yet embodied in forms of
beauty. To beauty of form belongs free subjectivity,
which in the sensuous world and in concrete existence
is both free and knows itself to be so.

For the Beautiful is essentially the Spiritual making
itself known sensuously, presenting itself in sensuous
concrete existence, but in such a manner that that
existence is wholly and entirely permeated by the
Spiritual, so that the sensuous is not independent, but
has its meaning solely and exclusively in the Spiritual
and through the Spiritual, and exhibits not itself, but
the Spiritual.

Such is true beauty. In living human beings there
are many external influences which check pure idealisa-
tion, this subsumption of the bodily sensuous element
under the Spiritual.

Here this condition does not as yet exist, and for this
reason, that the Spiritual is as yet only present in this
abstract shape of Substantiality. It is, indeed, unfolded
into these particular forms, into special Powers, but
the substantiality still exists for itself; it has not per-

DEFINITE RELIGION 9

nieated and overcome these its particular shapes, this
sensuous concrete existence.

Substance is, so to speak, an universal space which
has not as yet organised, idealised, and brought under it
that with which it is filled up — the particularisation
which issued from it.

For this reason, too, the form of beauty cannot be
created here, because the content — these particularisa-
tions of Substance — is not as yet the true content of
Spirit.

Since, then, the limited content is the foundation, and
is known as spiritual, the subject — this definite spiritual
agent — becomes, owing to this, an empty form. In the
Religion of Beauty, the Spiritual, as such, constitutes
the foundation, so that the content, too, is the spiritual
content. In that religion, statues or pictures, as sensuous
^ A(*A matter, are merely the expression of the Spiritual. Here,
however, the content is not of a spiritual kind.

Thus, the art we find here is symbolical art, which
does indeed express essential characteristics, but not
characteristics of the Spiritual. Hence the uubeautiful,
the mad, the fantastic character of the art which makes
its appearance here. The symbolism is not the purely
Beautiful, just because a content other than spiritual
individuality is the basis. Free subjectivity is not the
permeating element, and is not essentially expressed by
the form. In this phantasy there is nothing fixed,
nothing moulds itself into forms of the beauty which
is given only by the consciousness of freedom. Speaking
generally, what we have here is complete dissolution of
form, the restless movement, the manifestation of the
self-importance of the individual. Devoid of anything
to give it stability, the inner element passes over into
external existence, and the unfolding of the Absolute — a
process which outdoes itself in this world of imagination
— is merely an endless breaking-up of the One into the
Many, and an unstable reeling to and fro of all content.

io THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

It is the s}Tstem of universal fundamental determina-
tions, the system determined in and for itself through
the Notion, as that of the absolute sovereign powers to
which everything returns, and •which permeate every-
thing through and through, which alone brings thorough
stability into this region of caprice, confusion, and
feebleness, into this measureless splendour and enerva-
tion. And it is the study of this system which is of
the most essential moment. On the one hand, we have
to recognise the presence of these determinations through
the perverted sensuous form of the capricious, externally
determined embodiment, and to do justice to the essential
element which lies at their foundation ; and on the other
hand, we have to observe the degradation which they
xmdergo. This degradation is partly owing to the mode
in which the indifference of those determinations toward
one another appears, partly owing to the presence of
arbitrary human and externally local sense experience,
through which they are transposed into the sphere of
the every-day life, where all passions, local features —
features of individual recollection — are joined on to them.
There is no act of judgment, no feeling of shame, nothing
of the higher mutual fitness of form and of content ; the
every-day existence as such is not made to vanish, and
is not developed into beauty. The inequality or dispro-
portion of form and content consist?, more strictly speak-
ing, in this that the fundamental determinations aie
debased, inasmuch as they acquire the semblance of
being similar to the disconnected facts of existence, and
that conversely the external sensuous representation
becomes depraved by means of its form.

From what has now been stated it will be already
clear that these determinations of the divine Essence
have their existence in the Indian religion. We have
here to look away from its vast and characteristically
endless mythology and mythological forms, in order to
keep to the principal fundamental determinations alone,

DEFINITE RELIGION n

which are on the one hand baroque and wild, and are
horrible, repulsive, loathsome distortions, but at the
same time prove themselves to have the Notion for their
inner source; while in virtue. of the development which
it gets in this theoretical region, they recall the highest
element of the Idea. At the same time, however, they
express that definite stuntedness under which the Idea
suffers when these fundamental determinations are not
brought back again into their spiritual nature.

What constitutes the principal point of interest in
this religion of India is the development or explication
of form in contrast with an abstract monotheistic re-
ligion, and so too with the Greek religion — that is to
say, in contrast with a religion which has spiritual indi-
viduality as its principle.

(b.) The general idea of the objective content of this
stage.

What is the first in the Notion, what is true, the
universal substantial element, is the eternal repose of
Being- within-itself ; this Essence existing within itself,
which universal Substance is. This simple Substance,
which the Hindus call Brahma, is regarded as the Uni-
versal, the self-existing Power; which is not, like passion,
turned toward what is other than itself, but is the quiet,
lustreless reflection into itself, which is, however, at the
same time determined as Power. This abidingly self-
enclosed Power in the form of Universality must be
distinguished from its operation, from that which is
posited by means of it, and from its own moments.
Power is the Ideal, the Negative, for which all else exists
merely as abrogated, as negated. But the Power, as that
which exists within itself, as universal Power, distin-
guishes itself from its moments themselves, and these
therefore appear on the one hand as independent beings,
and on the other as moments which even perish in the
One. They belong to it, they are merely moments of it,
but as differentiated moments they come forward into

12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

independent existence, and present themselves as inde-
pendent Persons — Persons of the Godhead who are God,
who are the Whole itself, so that that primary element
vanishes in this particular shape or form, but on the
other hand they again vanish in the one Power. The
alternations — according to which we have now the One,
now the distinction as entire totality — are the perplexing
inconsistencies which present themselves in this sphere
to the logical understanding, but they are at the same
time that consistency of reason which is in accordance
with the Notion, as contrasted with the consistency of
the abstract self-identical understanding.

Subjectivity is Power in itself, as the relation of infinite
negativity to itself ; it is not, however, only potentially
power, but rather it is with the appearance of subjectivity
that God is for the first time posited as Power. These
determinations are indeed to be distinguished from one
another, and stand in relation to the subsequent concep-
tions of God, and are also of primary importance to the
understanding of the preceding ones. They are therefore
to be considered more closely.

Power, in fact, at once in religion in the general sense,
and in the wholly immediate and crudest religion of
nature, is the fundamental determination, as being the
infinitude which the finite as abrogated posits within
itself. And in so far as this is conceived of as outside
of it, as existing at all, it nevertheless comes to be posited
merely as something which has proceeded out of that
finite as its basis. Now the determination which is all-
important here is, that this Power is, to begin with,
posited simply as the basis of the particular shapes or
existing forms, and the relation to the basis of the in-
herently existing Essence is the relation of Substantiality.
Thus it is merely power potentially — power as the inner
element of the existence ; and as Essence which has
Being within itself or as Substance, it is only posited as
the Simple and Abstract, so that the determinations or

DEFINi'lE RELIGION 13

differentiations as forms existing in their own right are
conceived of as outside of it. This Essence, which exists
within itself, may indeed be conceived of too as existing
for itself, as Brahma is self-thinking. Brahma is the
universal Soul ; when he creates, he himself issues as a
breath out of himself ; he contemplates himself, and exists
then for himself.

But his abstract simplicity does not at once vanish
owing to this, for the moments, the universality of
Brahma as such, and the "/" for which that universality
exists, these two are not determined as contrasted with
one another, and their relation is therefore itself simple.
Brahma exists thus as abstractly existing for himself.
The Power and the basis of existences and all things
have, in fact, proceeded out of him and vanished in him.
In saying to himself, " I am Brahma," all things have
vanished back into him, have vanished in him. Whether
as outside of him, existing independently, or within him,
they have vanished ; there is only the relation of these
two extremes. But posited as differentiated determina-
tions, they appear as independent existences outside of
him, since he is primarily abstract, and not concrete in
himself.

The Power posited in this manner potentially only works
inwardly without showing itself as activity. I manifest
myself as power in so far as I am cause and determine,
in so far as I am a subject, when I throw a stone, and
so forth. But this potentially existing Power works in
a universal manner, without this universality being a
subject for itself, a self-conscious subject. These uni-
versal modes of working, understood in their true char-
acter, are, for instance, the Laws of Nature.

Now Brahma, as the one, simple, absolute Substance,
is the neuter, or, as we say, the Godhead: Brahma ex-
presses this universal Essence more as a Person, as a
subject. But this is a distinction which is not constantly
made use of, and in the different grammatical cases this

14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

distinction already spontaneously effaces itself, for the
masculine and neuter genders have many cases which
are similar. In another respect, too, no great emphasis
is to be laid upon this distinction, because Brahma as
personified' is merely superficially personified in such a
manner that the content still remains this simple sub-
stance.

And now distinctions appear in this simple Substance,
and it is worth noting that these distinctions present
themselves in such a way that they are determined in
accordance with the instinct of the Notion. The First
is totality generally as One, taken quite abstractly ; the
Second is determinateness, differentiation generally ; and
the Third, in accordance with the true determination, is
that the differences are led back again into unity, into
concrete unity.

Conceived of in accordance with its abstract form, this
Trinity of the Absolute is, when it is formless, merely
Brahma, — that is, empty Essence. From the point of
view of its determinations it is a Three, but in a unity
only, so that this threeness is merely a unity.

If we define this more accurately and speak of it under
another form, the Second means that differentiations,
different Powers exist : the differentiation, however, has
no rights as against the one Substance, the absolute unity ;
and in so far as it has no rights it may be called eternal
goodness, implying that what has determinate character, —
this manifestation of the Divine, — should indeed exist ;
that differentiation too should attain to this, that it is.
This is the goodness through which what is posited by
the Power as a semblance or show of Being acquires
momentary Being. In the Power it is absorbed, yet
goodness permits it to exist independently.

Upon this Second follows the Third — that is, right-
eousness, implying that the existing determinate element
is not, that the finite attains to its end, its destiny, its
right, which is to be changed, to be transformed, in

DEFINITE RELIGION 15

fact, into another determinateness ; this is righteousness
in the general sense. To this, in an abstract way, belong
becoming, perishing, originating : for Not-being too has
no right ; it is an abstract determination in contrast to
Being, and is itself the passing over into unity.

This totality, which is the unity, a Whole, is what is
called among the Indians Tri murti — murti = form or
shape — all emanations of the Absolute being called murti.
It is this Highest, differentiated within itself in such a
manner that it has these three determinations within
itself.

The most striking and the greatest feature in Indian
mythology is unquestionably this Trinity in unity. We
cannot call this Trinity Persons, for it is wanting in
spiritual subjectivity as a fundamental determination.
But to Europeans it must have been in the highest degree
astonishing to meet with this principle of the Christian
religion here : we shall become acquainted with it in its
true form later on, and shall see that Spirit as concrete
must necessarily be conceived of as triune.

The First, then, the One, the One Substance, is what
is called Brahma. Parabrahma, which is above Brahma,
also makes its appearance ; and these are jumbled to-
gether. Of Brahma, in so far as he is a subject, all
kinds of stories are related. Thought, reflection, at once
goes beyond such a determination as Brahma, since one
having such a definite character is conceived of as One
of these Three, makes itself a Higher, which gives itself
a definite character in the distinction. In so far as that
which is absolute Substance again appears as merely One
alongside of others, Parabrahma is expressive of the need
of thought to have something yet higher ; and it is im-
possible to say in what definite relation forms of this
kind stand to one another.

Brahma is thus what is conceived of as this Substance
out of which everything has proceeded and is begotten,
as this Power which has created All. But while the one

1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Substance — the One — is thus the abstract Power, it at
the same time appears as the inert element, as formless,
inert matter ; here we have specially the forming activity,
as we should express it.

The one Substance, because it is only the One, is the
Formless : thus this, too, is a mode in which it becomes
apparent that substantiality does not satisfy ; that is to
say, it fails to do so because form is not present.

Thus Brahma, the one self-identical Essence, appears
as the Inert, as that which indeed begets, but which at
the same time maintains a passive attitude — like woman,
as it were. Krischna therefore says of Brahma, " Brahma
is my uterus, the mere recipient in which I lay my seed,
and out of which I beget All." In the determination, too,
" God is Essence," there is not the principle of movement,
of production ; there is no activity.

Out of Brahma issues everything, — gods, the world,
mankind ; but it at once becomes apparent that this One
is inactive. In the various cosmogonies or descriptions
of the creation of the world, what has just been thus
indicated makes its appearance.

Such a description of the creation of the world occurs
in the Vedas. In these Brahma is represented as being
thus alone in solitude, and as existing wholly for himself,
and a Being which is represented as a higher one then
says to him that he ought to expand and to beget him-
self. But Brahma, it is added, had not during a thousand
years been in a condition to conceive of his expansion,
and had returned again into himself.

Here Brahma is represented as world-creating, but,
owing to the fact that he is the One, as inactive, as one
who is summoned by another higher than himself, and
is formless. Tims the need of another is directly pre-
sent. To speak generally, Brahma is this one absolute
Substance.

Power as this simple activity is Thought. In the Indian
religion this characteristic is the most prominent one of all ;

DEFINITE RELIGION 17

it is the absolute basis and is the One — Brahma. This form
is in accordance with the logical development. First came
the multiplicity of determinations, and the advance con-
sists in the resumption of determination into unity. That
is the basis. What now remains to be given is partly
something of a merely historical character, but partly,
too, the necessary development which follows from that
principle.

Simple Power, as the active element, created the world.
The creating is essentially an attitude of thought towards
itself, an activity relating itself to itself, and in no sense
a finite activity. This, too, is expressed in the ideas of
the Indian religion. The Hindus have a great number
of cosmogonies which are all more or less barbarous, and
out of which nothing of a fixed character can be derived.
What we have is not one idea of the creation of the world,
as in the Jewish and Christian religion. In the Code of
Manu, in the Vedas and Puranas, the cosmogonies are con-
stantly understood and presented differently. Notwith-
standing this, there is always one feature essentially
present in them, namely, that this Thought, which is
at home with itself or self-contained, is the begetting of
itself.

This infinitely profound and true trait constantly re-
appears in the various descriptions of the creation of the
world. The Code of Manu begins thus : " The Eternal
with one thought created water," and so on. We also
find that this pure activity is called " the Word," as God
is in the New Testament. With the Jews of later times
— Philo, for example — cro<£/a is the " First-created," which
proceeds out of the One. The " Word " is held in very
high esteem among the Hindus. It is the figure of pure
activity, definite existence of an externally physical char-
acter, which, however, does not permanently remain, but
is only ideal, and immediately vanishes in its external
form. The Eternal created the water, it is stated, and
deposited fruit-bringing seed in it; this seed became a

VOL. II. B

1 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

resplendent egg, and therein the Eternal itself was born
again as Brahma. Brahma is the progenitor of all spirits,
of the existent and non-existent. In this egg, it is said,
the great Power remained inactive for a year ; at the end
of that time it divided the egg by means of thought, and
created one part masculine and the other feminine. The
masculine energy is itself begotten, and becomes again
begetting and active, only when it has practised severe
meditation, that is to say, when it has attained to the con-
centration of abstraction. Thought is therefore what brings
forth and what is brought forth; it is the briuger forth itself,
namely, the unity of thinking with itself. The return of
thinking to itself is found in other descriptions besides.
In one of the Vedas, some passages out of which Cole-
brooke was the first to translate, a similar description of
the first act of creation is to be found : " There was neither
Being nor nothing, neither above nor below, neither death
nor immortality, but only the One enshrouded and dark.
Outside of this One existed nothing, and this brooded in
solitude with itself; through the energy of contemplation
it brought forth a world out of itself; in thinking, desire,
impulse first formed itself, and this was the original seed
of all things."

Here likewise Thought in its self-enclosed activity is
presented to us. But Thought becomes further known as
Thought in the self-conscious Essence — in man, who repre-
sents its actual existence. The Hindus might be charged
with having attributed to the One a contingent existence,
since it is left to chance whether or not the individual
raises itself to the abstract Universal — to abstract self-
consciousness. But, on the other hand, the caste of the
Brahmans is an immediate representation of the presence
of Brahma ; it is the duty of that caste to read the
Vedas, to withdraw itself into itself. The reading of
Vedas is the Divine, indeed God Himself, and so too is
prayer. The Vedas may even be read unintelligently
and in complete stupefaction ; this stupefaction itself is

DEFINITE RELIGION 19

the abstract unity of thought ; the " I," the pure con-
templation of it is perfect emptiness. Thus it is in the
Brahmans that Brahma exists ; by the reading of the
Vedas Brahma is, and human self-consciousness in the
state of abstraction is Brahma itself.

The characteristics of Brahma which have been in-
dicated seem to have so many points of correspondence
with the God of other religions — with the true God
Himself — that it appears to be of some importance to
point out, on the one hand, the difference which exists,
and on the other, to indicate for what reason the logical
determination of subjective existence in self-conscious-
ness which marks the Indian pure Essence has no place
among these other ideas. The Jewish God is, for example,
the same One, immaterial Substantiality and Power which
exists for thought only ; He is Himself objective thought,
and is also not as yet that inherently concrete One which
He is as Spirit. But the Indian supreme God is merely
the One in a neuter sense, rather than the One Person ;
He has merely potential being, and is not self-conscious ;
He is Brahma the Neutrum, or the Universal determina-
tion. Brahma as subject, on the other hand, is at once
one among the three Persons, if we may so designate
them, which in truth is not possible since spiritual sub-
jectivity as an essential fundamental determination is
wanting to them. It is not enough that the Trimurti
proceeds out of that primal One, and also returns back
again into that One ; all that is implied in this is that
it is represented merely as Substance, not as Subject.
The Jewish God, on the contrary, is the One exclusively,
who has no other gods beside Him. It is because of
this that He is determined not only as Potentiality, but
also as what alone has Actual Being, as the absolutely
consuming or absorbing element, as a Subject having
infinitude within itself, which is indeed still abstract and
posited in an undeveloped manner, but which is never-
theless true infinitude. His goodness and His righteous-

20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ness remain so far also merely attributes ; or, as the
Hebrews frequently express it, they are His names, which
do not become special forms or shapes, although too they
do not become the content through which the Christian
Unity of God is alone the spiritual one. For this reason
the Jewish God cannot acquire the determination of a
subjective existence in self-consciousness, because He is
rather a subject in Himself. To reach subjectivity He
does not therefore require an Other in which He should
for the first time acquire this determination, but which,
because of its being in an Other, would have a merely
subjective existence also.

On the other hand, what the Hindu says in and to
himself — " I am Brahina " — must be recognised, in its
essential character, as identical with the modern sub-
jective and objective " vanity " — with that which the " I "
is made into by means of the oft-repeated assertion that
we know nothing of God. For the statement that " I "
has no affirmative relation to God, that He is a " Beyond "
for the " I," a nullity without any content, at once implies
that the mere independent " I " is the affirmative for " I."
It is of no use to say, " I recognise God as above me, as
outside of me ; " God is an idea without content, whose
sole characteristic, all that is to be recognised or known
of it, all which it is to be for me, is wholly and entirely
limited to this — that this absolutely indeterminate Being
is, and that it is the negative of myself. In the Indian,
" I am Brahma," it is not, indeed, posited as the nega-
tive of myself, as being in opposition to me. But that
apparently affirmative determination of God — that He is
— is partly in itself merely the perfectly empty abstrac-
tion of Being, and therefore a subjective determination
only, a determination which has an existence in my
self-consciousness only, and which therefore attaches to
Brahma also, and partly in so far as it still is to get an
objective meaning, it would already be — and not in concrete
determinations only, as, for instance, that God is a subject

DEFINITE RELIGION 21

iii and for Himself — something which is known of God,
a category of Him, and thus would be already too much.
Being, consequently, reduces itself by its own act to the
mere " something outside of me," and it is intended ex-
pressly, too, to signify the negative of myself, in which
negation nothing in fact remains to me but I myself. It
is thrashing empty straw to attempt to pass off that
negative of myself, that something outside of me or above
me, for an alleged, or at least a supposed, recognised
objectivity, for to do so is merely to pronounce a negative,
and to do this, in fact, expressly through myself. But
neither this abstract negation, nor the quality that it is
posited through me, and that I know this negation, and
know it as negation only, is an objectivity ; nor is it an
objectivity, so far, at least, as the form is concerned, even
although it is not an objectivity so far as the content
is concerned ; for the truth rather is, that is just the
empty form of objectivity without content, an empty
form and merely subjective supposition. Formerly that
which could be described as merely the negative, was
called in the Christian world the Devil. Consequently
nothing affirmative remains save this subjectively-supposing
"I." With a one-sided dialectic it has, by a process of
evaporation, sceptically rid itself of all the content of the
sensuous and super-sensuous world, and given to it the
character of something that is negative for it. All
objectivity having become for it vain and empty, what is
present is this positive vanity itself — it is that objective
"I" which alone is Power and Essence, in which everything
has vanished away, into which all content whatever has
sunk as finite, so that the " I " is the Universal, the master
of all determinations, and the exclusive, affirmative point.
The Indian " I am Brahma," and that so-called religion,
the " I " of the modern faith of reflection, differ from one
another in their external relations only ; the former ex-
presses the primitive apprehension of the mind in its
naive form, in which the pure substantiality of its thought

22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

comes into existence for self-consciousness, so that it
allows all other content whatever to exist beside it, and
recognises it as objective truth. In contrast to this, that
faith of reflection, which denies all objectivity to truth,
holds fast to that solitude of subjectivity alone, and
recognises it alone. In this fully developed reflection
the divine world, like all other content, is merely some-
thing posited by me.

This first relation of the Hindu to Brahma is set
down only in the one single prayer, and since it is itself
the existence of Brahma, the momentary character of
ihis existence at once shows itself to be inadequate to
the content, and consequently a demand arises that this
existence itself should be rendered universal and lasting
like its content. For it is only the momentary time
element which appears as the most obvious defect in
ihat existence, it being that alone which stands in rela-
tion with that abstract Universality, compares itself with
it, and shows itself to be inadequate to it ; for in other
respects its subjective existence — the abstract " I " — is
equal or commensurate with it. But to exalt that merely
single look into a permanent seeing means nothing else
than to stop the transition from the moment of this
quiet solitude into the full present reality of life, of its
needs, interests, and occupations, and to preserve oneself
continuously in that motionless abstract self-conscious-
ness. This is what, in fact, many Hindus who are not
Brahmans (of whom later on) virtually accomplish. They ^
give themselves up with the most persevering callousness '
to the monotony of an inactivity extending over years,
and especially to an inactivity of ten years' duration, in
which they renounce all the interests and occupations-
of ordinary life, and combine with this renunciation the
constraint arising from some unnatural attitude or posi-
tion of the body, as, for example, sitting even on, going JL?
with the hands clasped over the head, or else standing,
and never even in sleep lying down, and the like.

DEFINITE RELIGION 23

We now come to the Second in the triad, Krishna or
Vishnu ; that is, the incarnation of Brahma generally.
Many and various are the incarnations of this kind which
are reckoned up by the Hindus. The general meaning
here is that Brahma appears as man : it cannot, never-
theless, be said that it is Brahma who appears as man,
for this assumption of humanity is not actually held to
be the pure form of Brahma.

Monstrous poetical fictions make their appearance in
this region: Krishna is also Brahma, Vishnu. These
popular conceptions of incarnations appear partly to have
in them echoes of what is historical, and point to the fact
that great conquerors who gave a new shape to the
condition of things are the gods, and are thus described as
gods. The deeds of Krishna are conquests in connection
with which the course of events was sufficiently ungod-
like ; indeed, conquest and amours are the two aspects,
the most important acts of the incarnations.

The Third is Siva, Mahadeva, the great god, or Rudra :
this ought to be the return into self. The First, namely,
Brahma, is the most distant unity, the self-enclosed
unity ; the Second, Vishnu, is manifestation (the moments
of Spirit are thus far not to be mistaken), is life in human
form. The Third should be the return to the First, in
order that the unity might appear as returning into
itself. But it is just this Third which is what is devoid
of Spirit ; it is the determination of Becoming generally,
or of coming into being and passing away. It has been
stated that change in the general sense is the Third ;
thus the fundamental characteristic of Siva is on the
one hand the prodigious life-force, on the other what de-
stroys, devastates ; the wild energy of natural life. Its
principal symbol is therefore the Ox, on account of its
strength, but the most universal representation is the
Lingam, which was reverenced among the Greeks as
(^ctXAof, and it is this sign which is to be found in
most of the temples. The innermost sanctuary contains it.

24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Such are the three fundamental determinations : the
•whole is represented by a figure with three heads, which
again is symbolical and wholly without beauty.

The true Third, according to the deeper conception, is
Spirit. It is the return of the One to itself; it is its
coming to itself. It is not merely change, but is the
change in which the difference is brought to reconcilia-
tion with the First, in which the duality is annulled.

But in this religion, which still belongs to nature, the
Becoming is conceived of as mere becoming, as mere
change ; not as a change of the difference by means of
which the unity produces itself as an annulling of differen-
tiation and the taking of it up into unity. Conscious-
ness, Spirit, is also a change in the First, that is, in
the immediate unity. The Other is the act of judgment
or differentiation, the having an Other over against one
— I exist as knowing — but in such a manner that while
the Other is for me, I have returned in that Other to
myself, into myself.

The Third, instead of being the reconciler, is here
merely this wild play of begetting and destroying. Thus
the development issues only in a wild whirl of delirium.
This difference, viz., the Third, is essentially based upon
the standpoint of natural religion and based upon it in
its entirety.

These differentiations are now grasped as Unity — as,
Trimurti — and this again is conceived of as the Highest.
But just as this is conceived of as Trimurti, each person
too in turn is taken independently and alone, so that
each is itself totality, that is, the whole deity.

In the older part of the Vedas it is not Vishnu, and
still less Siva, that is spoken of; there Brahma, the One,
is alone God.

Not only is this principal basis and fundamental
determination in the Indian mythology thus personified,
but all else too is superficially personified by means of
imagination. Imposing natural objects, such as the

DEFINITE RELIGION 25

Ganges, the Sun, the Himalaya (which is the special
dwelling-place of Siva), become identified with Brahma
himself. So too with love, deceit, theft, avarice, as well
as the sensuous powers of nature in plants and animals,
so that Substance has the form, of animals and the like.
All these are conceived of by imagination as free and
independent, and thus there arises an infinite world of
Deities of particular powers and phenomena, which is
notwithstanding known as subordinated to something
above it. At the head of this world stands Indra, the
god of the visible heavens. These gods are mutable and
perishable, and are in subjection to the Supreme One ;
abstraction absorbs them : the power which man acquires
by means of these gods strikes them with terror ; indeed,
Yismavitra even creates another Indra and other gods !

Thus these particular spiritual and natural Powers,
which are regarded as deities, are at one time indepen-
dent, and at another are regarded as vanishing, it being
their nature to be submerged in the absolute unity, in
Substance, and to spring into existence again out of it.

Thus the Hindus say there have already been many
thousand Indras, and there will yet b3 more ; in the
same way the incarnations, too, are held to be transient.
The substantial unity does not become concrete because
the particular Powers return into it, but, on the contrary, it
remains abstract unity ; and it also does not become con-
crete although these determinate existences proceed out
of it ; rather they are phenomena with the characteristic
of independence, and are posited outside of that unity.

To form an estimate of the number and value of these
deities is wholly out of the question here ; there is nothing
which takes a fixed shape, since all definite form is want-
ing to this fantastic imagination. These shapes dis-
appear again in the same manner in which they are
begotten ; fancy passes over from an ordinary external
mode of existence to divinity, and this in like manner
returns back again to that which was its starting-point.

26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

It is impossible to speak of miracles here, for all is
miracle ; everything is dislocated, and nothing determined
by means of a rational connection of the categories of
thought. Undoubtedly a great deal is symbolical.

The Hindus are, moreover, divided into many sects.
Among many other differences, the principal one is this,
that some worship Vishnu and others Siva. This is often
the occasion of bloody wars; at festivals and fairs especially,
disputes arise which cost thousands their lives.

Now these distinctions are in a general sense to be
understood as meaning that what is called Vishnu even
says again regarding itself that it is All, that Brahma is
the womb in which it begets All, and that it is the abso-
lute activity of form, that indeed it is Brahma. Here
this differentiation represented by Vishnu is removed and
absorbed.

If it is Siva who is introduced as speaking, then it is
he who is absolute totality ; he is the lustre of precious
stones, the energy in man, the reason in the soul — in fact,
he too in turn is Brahma. Here all the Powers, even
the two other differences, as well as the other Powers,
gods of nature and genii, melt into One Person, into
one of these differentiations.

The fundamental determination of the theoretical con-
sciousness is therefore the determination of unity, the
determination of that which is called Brahma, Brahma,
and the like. This unity, however, comes to have an
ambiguous meaning, inasmuch as Brahma is at one time
the Universal, the All, and at another a particularity as
contrasted with particularity in general. Thus Brahma
appears as creator, and then again as subordinate to
something else, and he even speaks of something higher
than himself — of a universal soul. The confusion which
characterises this sphere originates in the dialectic neces-
sarily belonging to it Spirit, which puts everything in
organic connection, is not present here, and therefore if
the determinations never make their appearance at all

DEFINITE RELIGION 27

in the form adequate to Spirit, they have to be abrogated
as one-sided, and then a fresh form makes its appearance.
The necessity of the Notion manifests itself merely as
deviation, as confusion, as something which has nothing
within itself to give it stability, and it is to the nature
of the Notion that this confusion owes its origin.

The One shows itself as fixed or established in its own
right, as that which is in everlasting unity witli itself.
But since this One must advance to particularisation,
which, however, remains devoid of Spirit here, all differen-
tiations are called and are in turn Brahma, are this One
within itself, and thus also appropriate the epithet of
the One, and so the particular deities are all Brahma
likewise. An Englishman who, by a most careful in-
vestigation into the various representations, has sought to
discover what is meant by Brahma, believes that Brahma
is an epithet of praise, and is used as such just because
he is not looked on as being himself solely this One,
but, on the contrary, everything says of itself that it is
Brahma. I refer to what Mill says in his History of
India. He proves from many Indian writings that it is
an epithet of praise which is applied to various deities,
and does not represent the conception of perfection or
nnity which we associate with it. This is a mistake, for
Brahma is in one aspect the One, the Immutable, who
has, however, the element of change in him, and because
of this, the rich variety of forms which is thus essentially
his own is also predicated of him. Vishnu is also called
the Supreme Brahma. Water and the sun are Brahma.
Special prominence is given to the sun in the Vedas, and
if we were to reckon up the prayers addressed to it, we
might suppose that the ancient inhabitants of India found
Brahma in the -Sus\ e^We_J and that they had thus a
different religion from that of their descendants. The
air, too, the movement of the atmosphere, breath, under-
standing, happiness are called Brahma. Mahadeva calls
himself Brahma, and Sfva says of himself, " I am what

28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

is and what is not ; I have been everything ; I am always
and shall always be ; I am Brahma and likewise Brahma ;
I am the cause which causes, I am the truth, the ox,
and all living things ; I am older than all ; I am the
past, the present, and the future ; I am Eudra, I am
all worlds," &c.

Thus Brahma is the One, and is also everything inde-
pendently which is conceived of as God. Among other
prayers, we find one addressed to speech, in which it says
of itself, " I am Brahma," the universal supreme soul.
Brahma is thus this One, which, however, is not ex-
clusively held fast to as this One. He is not such a
Being as we have in our minds when we speak of one
God; this One God is universal unity; here everything
which is independent, which is identical with itself says,
" I am Brahma."

By way of conclusion, another description may be given
here, in which all the moments which we have hitherto
considered in their divided state and dialectic are ex-
pressed unitedly.

Colonel Dow translated a history of India from the
Persian, and in an accompanying dissertation he gives a
translation from the Vedas, and in it there is a descrip-
tion of the creation of the world.

Brima existed from all eternity in the form of im-
measurable expansion ; when it pleased him to create
the world he said, " Rise up, 0 Brima ! " What was
first had thus been desire, appetite. He says this to
himself. Immediately thereupon a spirit of flames of
fire, having four heads and four hands, issued from h s
navel. Brima looked around and saw nothing but his
own immeasurable image. He journeyed a thousand
years in order to attain a) (c^o^leM^^0^ his expansion
and to understand it. This fire again is Brima himself,
and he has himself alone for his object as immeasurable.
Now Brima, after the journey of a thousand years, knew
as little about his expansion as he did before. Sunk in

DEFINITE RELIGION 29

wonderment, he gave up his journeyings and considered
what he had seen. The Almighty, who is something
different from Brima, had then said to him, " Go, Brima,
and create the world ; thou canst not understand thyself ;
make something understandable." Brima had asked,
" How shall I create a world ? " The Almighty had
answered, " Ask me and power shall be given thee."
Tire had now issued out of Brima, and he had seen the
Idea of all things, whicli hovered before his eyes, and
had said, " Let all which I see become real, but how shall
I preserve the things so that they do not go to destruc-
tion ? " Upon this a spirit of blue colour proceeded out
of his mouth ; this again was Brima himself, Vishnu,
Krishna, the maintaining principle, and this he com-
manded to create all living things, and for their main-
tenance the vegetable world. Human beings were as
yet wanting. Thereupon Brima commanded Vishnu to
make mankind. He did this, but the human beings
which Vishnu made were idiots with great bellies, with-
out knowledge, like the beasts of the field, without
emotions and will, and with sensuous passions only ; at
this Brima was wroth and destroyed them. He himself
now created four persons out of his own breath, and
gave them orders to rule over the creatures. But they
refused to do anything else than to praise God, because
they had nothing of the quality of mutability or destruc-
tibility in them, nothing of the temporal qualities of
existence. Brima now became angry. His vexation
took the form of a swarthy spirit, which came forth from
between the eyes. This spirit sat down before Brima
with crossed legs and folded arms, and wept, saying,
" Who am I, and what is my dwelling-place to be ? ''
Brima replied, " Thou shalt be Eudra, and all nature thy
dwelling-place ; go and make men." He did so. These
men were more savage than tigers, since they had nothing
in them but the destructive quality; they destroyed
themselves, for their only emotion was wrath. Thus we

3o THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

see the three gods working separately from one another ;
what they produce is one-sided only and without truth.
Finally, Brima, Vishnu, and Eudra united their forces,
and thus created men, ten of them, in fact.

(c.) Worship.

Subjective religion — the comprehension of itself by
self-consciousness in relation to its divine world-
corresponds with the character of that world itself.

As in this world the Idea has developed itself to such
an extent that its fundamental determinations have
emerged into prominence though they remain mutually
external, and as in like manner the empirical world re-
mains external and unintelligible relatively to them and
to itself, and therefore abandoned to the caprice of
imagination, consciousness too, although developed in all
directions, does not attain to the conception of itself as
true subjectivity. The leading place in this sphere is
occupied by the pure equality or identity of thought,
which at the same time is inherently existing creative
Power. This foundation is, however, purely theoretical.
It is still the substantiality out of which indeed poten-
tially all proceeds, and in which all is retained, but out-
side of which all content has assumed independence, and
is not, so far as regards its determinate existence and
standing, made by means of that unity into an objective
and universal content. Merely theoretical, formal thought
supports the content when it thus appears as accidentally
determined ; it can indeed abstract from it, but cannot
exalt it to the connected unity of a system, and con-
sequently to a connected existence in accordance with
law. Thought, therefore, does not really acquire a prac-
tical signification here ; that is to say, activity and will
do not give the character of universality to its deter-
minations ; and though form develops itself potentially,
indeed, in accordance with the nature of the Notion, still
it does not appear in the character of something posited
by the Notion, and does not appear as held within its

DEFINITE RELIGION 31

unity. The activity of the will, therefore, does not arrive
at freedom of the will — does not arrive at a content
which, being determined through the unity of the Notion,
would consequently be rational, objective, and in accord-
ance with right. This unity, on the contrary, remains
the merely potentially existent substantial Power existing
in seclusion, namely, Brahma, which has let go actuality
as mere contingency, and now abandons it entirely to its
own wild caprice.

Worship here is first of all a certain attitude of the
self-consciousness Brahma, and then afterwards to the
rest of the divine world existing outside of him.

I. As regards the first attitude, that towards Brahma,
we find that it is specially marked off and peculiar
exactly in proportion as it keeps itself isolated from the
rest of the concrete, religious, and temporal fulness of
life.

i. Brahma is thought, man is a thinking being, thus
Brahma has essentially an existence in human self-con-
sciousness. Man, however, is essentially characterised
here as a thinking being, or, in other words, thought as
such, and in the first place as pure theory has universal
existence here, because thought itself as such, as in-
herently Power, is given a determinate character, and
consequently has in it form generally, namely, abstract
form, or the character of determinate Being in general.

Man, indeed, is not only a thinking being, but is here
essentially thought ; he is conscious of himself as pure
thought ; for it has just been stated that here thought
as such comes into existence ; here man has the general
idea of it within himself. In other words, he is actually
self-conscious thought, for thought is implicitly Power,
but Power itself is just that infinite negativity, that
negativity relating itself to itself, which is actual Being,
Being-for-self. But Being- for-self, enclosed within the
universality of thought generally, exalted in it to free
equality with itself, is the soul of a living creature only,

32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

not the powerful self-consciousness imprisoned within
the particularity of desire, but the self of consciousness,
which knows itself in its universality, and which thus
as thinking itself, as forming conceptions within itself,
knows itself as Brahma.

Or if we proceed from the determination that Brahma
is Essence as abstract unity, as absorption in self, he has
then his existence in the finite subject too, in the par-
ticular Spirit, as this absorption in self. To the Idea of
the true there belongs the universal substantial unity
and identity with self ; but in such a way that it is not
merely the Undetermined, not merely substantial unity,
but is determined within itself. Brahma, however, has
the determinateness outside of him. Thus the supreme
determinateness of Brahma, namely, consciousness, the
knowing of his real existence, his subjectivity of unity,
can only be the subjective consciousness as such.

This attitude is not to be called worship, for there
is here no relation to the thinking substantiality as to
anything objective, but, on the contrary, the relation is
immediately known along with the determination of my
subjectivity, as " I myself." In fact, I am this pure
thought, and the " I " itself is indeed the very expression
of it, for " I " as such is this abstract identity of myself
within myself as wholly without determination — " I " as
" I " am merely thought as that which is posited with
the determination of subjective existence reflected into
itself — I am what thinks. Conversely, therefore, it is
conceded, on the other hand, that thought as this
abstract thought has this very subjectivity which " I "
directly expresses as its existence. For the true thought,
which God is, is not this abstract thought, or this
simple substantiality and universality, but is thought as
the concrete, absolutely full or filled up Idea. The
thought which is merely the potential existence of the
Idea is just the abstract thought which has merely this
finite existence, namely, in the subjective self-conscious-

DEFINITE RELIGION 33

ness, and which has not relatively to the latter the
objectivity of concrete being in-and-for-self, and there-
fore is quite justly not held in reverence by it.

Every Hindu is himself momentarily Brahma. Brahma
is this One, the abstraction of thought, and to the extent
to which a man puts himself into the condition of self-
concentration, he is Brahma. Brahma himself is not
worshipped ; the One God has no temple, has no worship,
and no prayer is addressed to him. An Englishman, the
author of a treatise on " Idol- worship among the Hindus,"
makes a number of reflections on the subject, and says,
if a Hindu were asked whether he worships idols, he
would answer without the least hesitation, " Yes, I
worship idols." If, on the other hand, we were to ask
a Hindu, whether learned or unlearned, " Do you worship
the Supreme Being, Paramesvara ? Do you pray to
Him ? Do you bring Him offerings ? " he would then
say, " Never." If we were to inquire further, " What
is this tranquil devotion, this silent meditation which is
enjoined on you and which you practise ? " he would
then reply, " When I engage in prayer, sit down, cross
my legs over one another, fold my hands, and look
toward heaven, and concentrate my spirit and my
thoughts without speaking, I then say within myself,
' I am Brahma, the Supreme Being.' "

2. Since in this first attitude we have only one
moment of single prayer, of devotion, so that Brahma
is momentary only in his existence, and since this exist-
ence is thus inadequate to such content and its uni-
versality, the demand arises that this existence should
be made into a universal one, such as the content is.
The " I," abstractly as such, is the universal, only that
this itself is merely a moment in the existence of
abstraction ; the next demand therefore is that this
abstraction, this " I " should be made commensurate
with the content. This exaltation means nothing else
than the breaking off of the transition from the moment

VOL. 11. c

34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of still solitude into life, into the concrete present, into
concrete self-consciousness. With this, all life and all
relations of concrete actual life to the One are to be
renounced. The entire living Present, whether that of
natural life or of spiritual life, of the family, of the
State, of art, of religion, is dissolved in the pure nega-
tivity of abstract selflessness.

The highest point which is thus attained to in worship
is that union with God which consists in the annihila-
tion and stupefaction of self-consciousness. This is not
affirmative liberation and reconciliation, but is, on the
contrary, wholly negative, complete abstraction. It is
that complete emptying which makes renunciation of all
consciousness, will, emotions, needs. Man, so long as he
persists in remaining within his own consciousness, is,
according to the Hindu idea, ungodly. But the freedom
of man justs consists in being with himself — not in
emptiness, but in willing, knowing, acting. To the
Hindu, on the contrary, the complete submergence and
stupefaction of the consciousness is W7hat is highest, and
he who maintains himself in this abstraction and has
died to the world is called a yogi.

This state is found existing among the people of India,
because many Hindus, who are not Brahmans, undertake
and accomplish the task of making themselves into the
" I " which is in a completely abstract condition. They
renounce all movement, all interests, all inclination, and
give themselves up to a still abstraction ; they are re-
verenced and supported by others, they remain speechless
in rigid torpor, looking toward the sun or having their
eyes closed. Some remain thus during their whole life,
others for twenty or thirty years. It is related of one
of these Hindus that he had travelled for ten years with-
out ever lying down, having slept standing ; during the
following ten years he had held his hands above his head,
and then he intended to have himself suspended by the
feet to swing for three hours and three-quarters over a

DEFINITE RELIGION 35

fire, and finally to have himself buried for three hours
and three-quarters. He would then have attained to the
highest state, and he who succeeds in reaching such
motionlessness, such lifelessness, is, according to the
opinion of the Hindus, immersed thereby in the inner
life, and exists permanently as Brahma.

There is an episode in the Eamayana which places us
entirely at this point of view. The- story of the life of
Visvamitra, the companion of Rama (an incarnation
of Vishnu), is thus related. There was a mighty king,
who, as being such, had demanded a cow (which is wor-
shipped in India as the generative energy of the earth)
of the Brahman Vasischtha, as he had got to know of its
wonderful power. Vasischtha refused it ; the king there-
upon seized it by force, but the cow escaped back again
to Vasischtha, reproached him with having permitted it to
be taken from him, since the power of a Kshatriya (which
the king was) is not greater than that of a Brahman.
Vasischtha then imposed on the cow the task of assem-
bling a force for him wherewith to resist the king. The
latter confronted him with his entire army, and both
armies were repeatedly overthrown ; finally, however, Vis-
vamitra was conquered after his hundred sons too had
been destroyed by means of a wind which Vasischtha had
caused to issue from his navel. Full of despair, he hands
over the government to his only remaining son, and
departs with his consort to the Himalaya mountains,
in order to obtain the favour of Mahadeva (Siva).
Moved by the severity of his exercises, Mahadeva is
prepared to fulfil his wishes. Visvamitra asks to have
the knowledge of the whole science of archery, and this
is granted him. Armed with his bow, Visvamitra in-
tends to coerce Vasischtha ; with his arrow he lays
waste his forest. Vasischtha, however, seizes his staff,
the Brahmanical weapon, and lifts it up ; whereupon
the gods are filled with apprehension, for such a force
as this threatened the entire world with destruction.

36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

They entreated the Brahman to desist. Yisvamitra re-
cognises his power, and now resolves to subject himself
to the severest exercises in order to attain to that power.
He retires into solitude, and lives there a thousand years
in abstraction alone with his consort. Brahma comes
to him, and addresses him thus : " I recognise thee now
as the first royal sage." Yisvamitra, not content with
this, begins afresh with his penances. In the meantime
an Indian king had come to Yasischtha with the request
that he would exalt him in his bodily form to heaven.
The request, however, was refused on account of his
being a Kshatriya ; but on his haughtily persisting in
it, he was degraded by Yasischtha to the class of the
Tschandala. Upon this he repairs to Yisvamitra with
the same request. The latter prepares a sacrifice to
which he invites all the gods ; these, however, decline to
come to a sacrifice made for a Tschandala. Yisvamitra,
however, by an exercise of Ins strength, lifts up the king
to heaven. At the command of Indra, he drops down,
but Yisvamitra sustains him between heaven and earth,
and afterwards creates another heaven, other Pleiades,
another Indra, and another circle of gods. The gods
were filled with astonishment ; they repaired in humility
to Yisvamitra, and agreed with him about the place they
were to assign to their king in heaven. After the lapse
of a thousand years, Yisvamitra was rewarded, and
Brahma named him the head of the sages, but did not
as yet declare him to be a Brahman. Then Yisvamitra
recommences his penances ; the gods in heaven became
envious; Indra attempts to excite his passions (for it is
essential for a perfect sage and Brahman that he should
have subjugated his passions). He sends him a very
beautiful girl, with whom Yisvamitra lives five-and-
twenty years, but then withdraws himself from her,
having overcome his love. In vain, too, do the gods
try to irritate and make him angry. Finally, the
Brahmanic power has to be granted to him.

DEFINITE RELIGION 37

It is to be observed that this is no expiation for crime ;
nothing is made good by means of it. This renunciation
has not the consciousness of sin as a presupposition.
These are, on the contrary, austerities undertaken with
a view to attaining the state of Brahma. It is not pen-
ance entered upon for the purpose of atoning to the gods
for any kind of crime, transgression, or offence. Penance
of the latter kind presupposes the existence of a relation
between the work of man, his concrete existence, his
actions, and the One God — an idea which is full of con-
tent, in which man has the standard and the law of his
character and behaviour, and to which he is to conform
himself in his will and life. But the relation to Brahma
contains as yet nothing concrete, because he himself is
merely the abstraction of the substantial soul ; all further
determination and content lies outside of him. Thus a
worship, as a substantial relation which effectually in-
fluences and directs the concrete man, has no place in
the relation to Brahma. If such a relation were present
here at all, it would have to be sought in the adoration
of the other gods. But just as Brahma is conceived as
the solitary self- enclosed Being, so, too, the exaltation of
the individual self-consciousness which strives, by means
of the austerities just spoken of, to render its own abstrac-
tion something perennial for itself, is rather a flight out
of the concrete reality of feeling and living activity. In
the consciousness which says, " 1 am Brahma," all virtues
and vices, all gods, and finally the Trimurti itself,
vanish. The concrete consciousness of one's self and of
objective content, which, in the Christian idea of the
repentance and conversion of the universal sensuous life,
is relinquished, is not characterised here as anything sin-
ful or negative, as it is in the penitential life of Chris-
tians and Christian monks, and in the idea of conversion.
On the contrary, it comprehends on the one hand, as has
just been indicated, the very content, otherwise esteemed
as holy ; and, on the other hand, we see that the charac-

38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ter of the religious standpoint under consideration con-
sists just in this, that all the moments drop asunder,
and that the supreme unity casts no reflection into the
fulness of the heart and life.

If the Absolute be conceived of as the spiritually free,
the essentially concrete, then self-consciousness exists as
something essential in the religious consciousness only,
to the extent to which it maintains within itself concrete
movement, ideas full of content, and concrete feeling.
If, however, the Absolute is the abstraction of the " Be-
yond " or of the Supreme Being, then self-consciousness
too, since it is by nature what thinks, by nature good, is
that which it ought to be.

The man who has thus made himself into the continu-
ously existing Brahma holds a position equivalent to
that which we have already seen was held by the magician,
namely, that he has won an absolute powTer over nature,
and is that power. It is imagined that such a man can
inspire even Indra with fear and apprehension. In an
episode in Bopp's " Chrestomathie " the story of two
giants is mentioned, who came to the Almighty with a
request for immortality ; but as they had entered upon
their exercises merely with a view to attaining to such
power, he granted their petition only to this extent, that
they are to die only by some act of their own. They
then exert complete dominion over nature. Indra becomes
afraid of them, and employs the usual means of inducing
any one to give up such an exercise of power. He brings
a beautiful woman into existence ; each of the giants
wishes to have her for his wife. In the strife they put
each other to death, and thereby nature is delivered.

3. A characteristic which is quite peculiar remains to
to be considered, and that is, that every Brahman, every
member of that caste, is esteemed as Brahma, is regarded
as God by every other Hindu. This particular way of
viewing the matter, however, is in close connection with
the previous characteristics. That is to say, each of the

DEFINITE RELIGION 39

two forms which we have considered is, as it were, a
merely abstract, isolated relation of self-consciousness to
Brahma ; the first being only a momentary one, the
second only the flight out of life — lasting life in Brahma
being the lasting death of all individuality. The third
demand, therefore, is that this relation should not be
mere flight, mere renunciation of life, but that it should
also be posited in an affirmative manner. The question
is, How must the affirmative mode of this relation be
constituted ? It can be none other than the form of
immediate existence. This is a difficult transition.
What is merely inward, merely abstract, is merely out-
ward ; and thus this merely Abstract is the immediate
Sensuous, is sensuous externality. Since the relation
here is the wholly abstract one to wholly abstract sub-
stance, the affirmative relation is in like manner a wholly
abstract, and consequently an immediate one. With this
we get the concrete phenomenon implying that the
relation to Brahma, the relation of the self-consciousness
to him, is an immediate, a natural one, and thus an in-
born one, and a relation established by birth.

Man is a thinking being, and is such by nature ;
thought is a natural quality of man. But the fact that
he is a thinking being generally expresses a quality
different from the determination which is here under
consideration, from the consciousness of thought in general
as the absolutely existent. In this form we have in fact
the consciousness of thought, and this is then posited as
the Absolute. It is the consciousness of absolute Being
which is posited here as existing in a natural mode, or,
to put it otherwise, which is affirmed and supposed to be
inborn ; and its degradation into this form is based upon
the entire relation ; for although it is rational knowledge,
yet this consciousness is supposed to exist in an imme-
diate form.

Since, then, man is a thinking being, and since the
consciousness of thought, as the Universal, the Self-

40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

existent, is distinguished from human thought in general,
while both are something innate, it follows from this that
there are two classes of men, the one including think-
ing men, men generally, the other including those who
are the consciousness of man, as absolute Being. These
latter are the Brahmans, those born again, twice born
through birth, first naturally, and then as thinking men.
This is a profound idea. The thought of man is looked
upon here as the source of his second existence, the root
of his true existence, which he gives to himself by means
of freedom.

Brahmans come into existence as twice born, and are
held in unbounded reverence ; compared with them all
other men are of no value. The entire life of the Brah-
mans is expressive of the existence of Brahma. Their
deeds consist in giving utterance to Brahma ; indeed, by
right of birth they are the existence of Brahma. If
any one who is of a lower caste touch a Brahman, he has
by the very act incurred death. In the Code of Manu
penalties are to be found for offences against Brahmans.
If, for example, a Sudra utter abusive language to a
Brahman, an iron staff, ten inches long, is thrust glowing
into his mouth ; and if he attempt to instruct a Brahman,
hot oil is poured into his mouth and into his ears. A
mysterious power is ascribed to the Brahmans ; it is said
iii Manu, " Let no king irritate a Brahman, for if exas-
perated he can destroy his kingdom, with all his strong-
holds, his armies, his elephants, &c."

The culminating point always is isolated thought as
Brahma existing solely for itself. This culmination
comes into existence in that immersion in nothingness,
that wholly empty consciousness and contemplation already
spoken of. This Brahma, however, this highest conscious-
ness of thought, is independent, cut off from all else, and
does not exist as concrete actual spirit ; and accordingly
it likewise follows that there is no vital connection with
this unity present in the subject ; on the contrary, the

DEFINITE RELIGION 41

concrete element of self-consciousness is separated from
this region ; the connection is interrupted. This is the
leading characteristic of this sphere of thought, which, it
is true, has in it the development of the moments, but
iu such a way that they remain separate from one another.
Self-consciousness beiug thus cut off, the region in which
it is is devoid of spirit, that is to say, has a merely natural
character as something inborn, and to the extent to which
this inborn self-consciousness is different from the uni-
versal one, it is the privilege of certain individuals. The
individual " This " is in an immediate manner the Uni-
versal, the Divine. Spirit thus exists, but Spirit which
has merely bare Being is devoid of Spirit. By this
means, too, the life of the " this " as " this" and its
life in universality are irremediably separated from one
another. In the religions where such is not the case,
that is to say, where the consciousness of the Universal,
of essentiality, appears in the Particular, and is active
in it, freedom of the Spirit takes its rise, and upon
the fact that the Particular is determined by means of
the Universal depends the appearance of uprightness,
morality. In civil law, for example, we find freedom of
the individual in the use he can make of property. I
in this particular relation of actual existence am free ;
the object is held to be mine, as that of a free subject,
and thus the particular existence is determined through
the Universal ; my particular existence is co-related with
this universality. The same holds good of family rela-
tions. Morality exists only where unity is what deter-
mines the Particular, where all particularity is determined
by the substantial unity. In so far as this is not posited,
the consciousness of the Universal is essentially a con-
sciousness cut off from all else, inactive and devoid of
Spirit. Thus by this isolation the Highest is made into
something unfree and only naturally born.

II. Worship, strictly speaking, is the relation of self-
consciousness to what is essential, to that which exists

42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

in and for itself ; it is consciousness of the One in this
essence, consciousness of one's unity with it. The second
relation here is that of consciousness to these very mani-
fold objects. The many deities constitute these objects.

Brahma has no divine service, no temple, and no
altars ; the unity of Brahma is not put in relation to
the Real, to active self- consciousness. From what has
been stated, namely, that the consciousness of the One
is isolated, it follows that nothing is determined by
means of reason here in the relation to the Divine ; for
this would mean that particular actions, symbols, &c.,
are determined by means of unity. Here, however, the
region of the Particular is not determined by this unity,
and has thus the character of irrationality, of unfreedom.
What we have is merely a relation to particular deities,
which represent nature as detached or free. They are,
it is true, the most abstract possible moments implicitly
determined through the notion, but not taken back into
unity in such a manner that the Trimurti would become
Spirit. Their whole significance therefore is merely that
of a mode of some particular natural element. The
leading characteristic is vital energy or life force, that
which produces and which passes away, what returns
to life and is self-transformation, and to this natural
objects, animals, &c., are linked on as objects of reve-
rence. Thus worship is here a relation to those particu-
lar things which are cut off in a one-sided manner from
what is essential, and is therefore a relation to unessential
things in natural form. Eeligious action, that is to say,
action that is essential, a universal mode of life, is con-
ceived of and carried out in accordance with this, and
is known and realised here in this fashion. And here
religious action is a content which is unessential and
without reason.

Since this element, considered generally, is partly
objective, namely, the perception of God, and partly
subjective, namely, that which it is essential to do, and

DEFINITE RELIGION 43

seeing that what is of most importance becomes un-
essential, the worship is infinite in its range ; everything
comes into it, the content is of no importance, it has no
limit within itself ; the religious acts are thus essentially
irrational, they are determined in an entirely external
manner. Whatever is truly essential is stable ; is, as
regards its form, exempt from the influence of subjective
opinion and caprice. Here, however, the content is this
sensuous contingency, and the action is a merely char-
acterless action, consisting of usages which cannot be
understood, because there is no understanding in it ; on
the contrary, a latitude is introduced into it which runs
out in all directions. In so far as all this is trans-
cended, and in so far as there must be satisfaction in
these religious acts, we find this to be attained merely
by means of sensuous stupefaction. The one extreme is
the flight of abstraction, the middle point is the slavery
of unintelligent being and doing, and the other extreme
is capricious extravagance — surely the saddest possible
religion. In so far as flight or escape enters into this
cult, what is actually done represents mere purely ex-
ternal accomplished action, mere activity, and to this are
added the wildest intoxication and orgies of the most
fearful kind. Such is the necessary character of this
worship, a character which it acquires owing to the fact
that the consciousness of the One is broken up in this
way, for the connection with the rest of concrete exist-
ence is interrupted, and everything becomes disconnected.
In the region of imagination are found wildness and free-
dom, and here fancy has free scope. Tims we find most
beautiful poetry among the Indian peoples, but it always
rests upon the craziest foundation ; we are attracted by
its loveliness, and repelled by the confusion and nonsense
in it.

The delicate sensibility and charm of the tenderest
feelings and this infinite resignation of personality, must
necessarily possess supreme beauty under such conditions

44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

as are peculiar to this standpoint, because it is only this
feeling which, resting thus upon a foundation so devoid
of rationality, is moulded exclusively into forms of beauty.
But since this feeling of abandonment is without the
element of right, it, for this very reason, is seen to
alternate with the most extreme harshness, and thus the
moment of the independent existence of personality passes
over into ferocity, into forgetfulness of all established
bonds, and issues in the trampling under foot of love
itself.

The whole content of Spirit and of nature generally is
allowed to break up in the wildest way. That unity
which occupies the leading position is indeed the Power
out of which all proceeds and into which all returns ;
but it does not become concrete, does not become the
uniting bond of the manifold powers of nature, and in
like manner does not become concrete in Spirit, nor the
bond of the manifold activities of Spirit and of emotional
experiences.

In the first case, when the unity becomes the bond of
natural things, we call it necessity ; this is the bond of
natural forces and phenomena. We look upon natural
properties, things, as being, though independent, essen-
tially linked together ; laws, understanding, are in Nature,
so that in this way the phenomena are co-related.

But that unity remains in solitary and empty inde-
pendence, and accordingly that fulness which it acquires
is wild, extravagant disorder. In the spiritual world, in
like manner, the Universal, thought, does not become
concrete, determining itself within itself. Thought
determining itself within itself, and abrogating and pre-
serving the determinate element in this universality —
pure thought as concrete, is Reason.

Duty, right, exist in thought only. These determina-
tions when they appear in the form of universality are
rational in respect to the truth, the unity just spoken of,
and likewise in respect to the will. That One, that

DEFINITE RELIGION 45

solitary unity, however, does not become such concrete
unity, reason, rationality.

For this reason there is no right, no duty present here,
for the freedom of the will, of the Spirit, just consists in
being present with itself in determinateness. But here
this being present or at home with itself, this unity, is
abstract, is devoid of determinate character. And here
is one source of the fantastic polytheism of the Hindus.

It has been remarked that the category of "Being is
not found here; the Hindus have no category for what
we call independent existence in things, or what we
express when we say " they are," " these are." Man, to
begin with, knows himself only as existing independently,
he therefore conceives of an independent object of nature
as existing with his independence, in the mode of inde-
pendence which he has in himself, in his Being, in his
human form, as consciousness.

Here fancy makes everything into God. This is what
we see in its own fashion among the Greeks, too, where
all trees and springs are made into dryads or nymphs.
We are accustomed to say that the beautiful imagination
of man gives soul and life to everything, conceives
everything as endowed with life, that man wanders
among his like, anthropomorphises everything, by his
beautiful sympathy shares with everything that mode of
beauty which is his own, and thus, as it were, presses
everything to his heart as having animated life.

But the liberality of the Hindus in the wild ex-
travagance of their desire to share their mode of exist-
ence, has its foundation in a poor idea of themselves, in
the fact that the individual has not as yet within himself
the content of the freedom of the Eternal, the truly and
essentially existent, and does not as yet know his con-
tent, his true nature, to be higher than the content of a
spring or of a tree. Everything is squandered on imagi-
nation, and nothing reserved for life.

With the Greeks this is more a play of fancy, while

46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

among the Hindus there is no higher feeling of them-
selves present. The idea which they have of Being is
only that which they have of themselves ; they place
themselves upon the same level with all the productions
of nature. This is because thought lapses so completely
into this abstraction.

These natural powers, then, whose being is thus con-
ceived of as anthropomorphic and as conscious, are above
the concrete man, who, as having a physical nature, is
dependent upon them, and his freedom is not as yet
distinguished from this his natural aspect.

It is implied by this that the life of man has no
higher value than the being of natural objects, the life
of any natural thing ; the " life of man has value only
if it is in itself or essentially, higher ; but among the
Hindus human life is despised, and is esteemed to be of
little worth — there a man cannot give himself value in
an affirmative, but only in a negative manner.

Life acquires value only by the negation of itself. All
that is concrete is merely negative in relation to abstrac-
tion, which is here the ruling principle. From this
results that aspect of Hindu worship according to which
men sacrifice themselves, and parents their children. To
this is due, too, the burning of wives after the death
of their husbands. Such sacrifices have a higher value
when they take place with express reference to Brahma,
or to any god whatever, for the latter is Brahma likewise.

It is esteemed among the Hindus a sacrifice of high
value when they mount to the snow clefts of the Himalaya,
where the sources of the Ganges are, and cast themselves
into the springs. Such actions are not penances on
account of crime, nor are they sacrifices with a view to
making amends for any evil deed, but merely sacrifices to
give oneself value, and this value can be attained only in
a negative way.

With the position which is here given to man animal-
worship is closely connected. An animal is not a con-

DEFINITE RELIGION 47

scions spirit, but in this concentration of absence of
consciousness man is really not far removed from the
brutes. By the Hindus action is not conceived as definite
activity, but as simple energy which works through every-
thing. Special activity is despised ; it is only stupefaction
which is held in esteem, and in this state it is clearly
the animal life alone which is left remaining. And if
no freedom, no morality, no good customs be present, then
the power is only known as inward, torpid power, which
belongs likewise to the brutes, and to them in the most
complete degree.

Since man when he exists in this way is without free-
dom, and has no intrinsic worth, we find bound up with
this in the sphere of concrete extension that unspeakable
and infinitely varied superstition, those enormous fetters
and limitations above referred to. The relation of man
to external natural things, which is of little consequence
to Europeans, that dependence on them, becomes some-
thing fixed, something permanent. For superstition has
its foundation just in this, that man is not indifferent
toward external things ; and he is not so if he has no
freedom within himself, if he has not the true indepen-
dence of spirit. All that is indifferent is fixed, while
all that is not indifferent, all that belongs to right and
morality, is thrown away and abandoned to caprice.

Of this character are the directions which the Brah-
mans have to observe, and of a similar character, too, is
the narrative of Nala in the Mahabharata. Just as super-
stition is of limitless extent owing to this want of free-
dom, so too it follows that no morality, no determination
of freedom, no rights, no duties have any place here, so
that the people of India are sunk in the most complete
immorality. Since no rational determination has been
able to attain to solidity, the entire condition of this
people could never become a legitimate one, a condition
inherently justified, and was always merely a condition
on sufferance, a contingent and a perverted one.

48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

3. The Religion of Being -ivithin- self .

(a.) Its conception.

The general basis here is still the same as that which
is peculiar to the Indian religion ; what advance there is
merely consists in the necessity felt that the characteris-
tics of the Indian religion should be brought together
again out of their wild, lawless independence, out of
their merely natural state of dispersion, placed in their
inner relation, and have their unstable chaos reduced to
a state of rest. This religion of Being- within-self is the
concentration and tranquillisation of spirit as it returns
out of the arid disorder of the Indian religion into itself
and into essential unity.

The essential unity and the differences have hitherto
continued to keep apart to such an extent that the latter
were essentially independent, and only vanished in the
unity in order at once to reappear in all their indepen-
dence. The relation of the unity and the differences was
an infinite progression, a perennial alternation of the
vanishing of differences in unity, and their reappearance
in their own essential independence. This alternation is
now arrested, because that which is potentially contained
in it, namely, the coming together of the differentiations
in the catagory of unity, is actually posited.

In its character as this Being-within-itself, for which
all relation to another is now precluded, the essence is
essentiality existing within itself, reflection of negativity
into itself, and is thus that which is at rest within itself
and persists.

However defective this determination may be, for the
Being-within-itself is not as yet concrete, is only the dis-
appearance of the independent differences, yet we are on
firm ground here ; it is a true determination of God which
constitutes the foundation.

If we compare this general conception with the assump-
tion that we know nothing of God, then this religion,

DEFINITE RELIGION 49

however poor and mean it may seem, yet stands higher
than that which asserts that God cannot be known. For
in such a case there can be no possibility of worship, since
a man can only worship what he knows, what he has a
rational knowledge of. Is colit Deum qui eum novit, is an
example in frequent use in the Latin grammar. Self-con-
sciousness has at least here an affirmative relation to this
object, for the very essence of being- within- itself is thought
itself, and this is the real essential element in self-
consciousness, and therefore there is nothing unknown
in it, nothing which is " beyond." It is in presence of
its own essence in an affirmative form, since it at once
knows this essence as its own essential nature; but it
also conceives it as an object, so that it distinguishes this
being- within-itself, this pure freedom, from itself, from this
particular self-consciousness. For this last is contingent,
empirical, independent Being, being for self, determined in
a manifold way. This is the fundamental determination.

Substance is universal presence, but as essentiality
existing within itself, it must be known concretely too
in an individual concentration. This embodiment and
definite form is still in accordance with the standpoint
of natural religion, the immediate form of the Spiritual,
and has the form of a single definite self-consciousness.
Thus, as compared with the previous stage, there is an
advance made here from fantastic personification split up
into a countless multitude of forms, to a personification
which is enclosed within definite bounds, and is actually
present. A human being is worshipped, and he is as
such the god who assumes individual form, and in that
form gives himself up to be reverenced. Substance in
this individual existence is power, sovereignty, the creat-
ing and maintaining of the world, of nature, and of all
things — absolute Power.

(b.) The, historical existence of this religion.

It is as the religion of Foe that this religion has an
historical existence ; it is the religion of the Mongols,

VOL. II. D

50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the Thibetans in the north and west of China, also of
the Burmese and Cingalese, where, however, that which
is elsewhere called Foe is designated Buddha. It is, in
fact, the religion which we know under the name of
Lamaism. It is the most widely spread of religions, and
has the greatest number of adherents. Its worshippers
are more numerous than those of Mahomedanisin, which
again counts more adherents than the Christian religion.
As in the Mahomedan religion, a simple Eternal consti-
tutes the fundamental idea and the characteristic quality
of the inner element, and this simplicity of its principle
is of itself sufficient to bring diverse nationalities under
its sway.

Historically, this religion appears rather later than
that form in which the absolute Power is what rules.
The French missionaries have translated an edict of the
Emperor Hia-King by which he suppressed many monas-
teries, because those who lived in them did not till the
ground and paid no tribute. Here the Emperor says, in
the beginning of the edict, " Under our three famous
dynasties the sect of Foe was not heard of. Only since
the dynasty of Hang has it coine into existence."

The general conception of this religion in its more
definite features is as follows.

1. The absolute foundation is the stillness of being-
within-itself, in which all differences cease, in which all
determinations of the natural existence of Spirit, all
particular powers, have vanished. Thus the Absolute,
as being- within-itself, is the Undetermined, the annihila-
tion of all particularity, so that all particular existences,
all actual things, are merely something accidental, are
merely Form having no significance.

2. Since reflection into itself as the Undetermined (and
this too is in harmony with the standpoint of natural
religion) is merely immediate reflection, it is expressed
in this form as a principle ; nothing and not-being is
what is ultimate and supreme. It is nothing alone which

DEFINITE RELIGION 51

has true independence ; all other actuality, all particu-
larity, has none at all. Out of nothingness everything
has proceeded ; into nothingness everything returns.
Nothing, nothingness is the One, the beginning and the
ending of everything. However diverse men and things
may be, there is but the One principle — nothingness — •
out of which they proceed, and it is form alone which
constitutes the quality, the diversity.

That man should think of God as nothingness must at
first sight seem astonishing, must appear to us a most pecu-
liar idea. But, considered more closely, this determination
means that God is absolutely nothing determined. He
is the Undetermined ; no determinateness of any kind
pertains to God ; He is the Infinite. This is equivalent
to saying that God is the negation of all particularity.

When we consider the forms of expression which we
hear used, and which are current at the present day,
namely, " God is the Infinite, is Essence — pure, simple
Essence, the Essence of Essences and Essence only " —
we find that such expressions are either entirely or nearly
identical in signification with the statement that God is
nothingness. In like manner, when it is said that man
cannot know God, God is thus for us emptiness, inde-
finiteness.

That modern mode of definition is therefore merely a
milder expression for " God is nothingness." That, how-
ever, is a definite, a necessary stage : God is the Inde-
terminate, the indeterminateness in which immediate
Being and its apparent independence are abrogated and
absorbed, and in which they have vanished away.

3. God, although actually conceived of as nothing-
ness, as Essence generally, is yet known as a particular
immediate human being, as Foe, Buddha, Dalailama.
Such a conjunction may appear to us the most offensive,
revolting, and incredible of all, that a man with all his
sensuous needs should be looked upon as God, as He who
eternally creates, maintains, and produces the world

52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

When in the Christian religion God is worshipped in
human form, that is something altogether different ; for
the divine Essence is there beheld in the man who has
suffered, died, risen again, and ascended to heaven. That
is not man in his sensuous, immediate existence, but man
who has taken on the form of Spirit. The most startling
contrast, however, is when the Absolute has to be wor-
shipped in the immediate finite nature of a human being ;
this is an even more isolated individualisation than the
animal itself is. And what is more, humanity has within
itself the requirement that it should rise higher, and
hence it seems repugnant that this demand should be
suppressed, and man's aspiration tied down to continu-
ance in ordinary finite existence.

We must, however, learn to understand this general
conception, and in understanding it we justify it : we
show how it gets its foundation, its element of rationality,
a place within reason ; but it is also implied in this that
we perceive its defectiveness. In dealing with religions,
we must learn to perceive that what is in them is not
mere nonsense, mere irrationality. What is of more im-
portance than this, however, is to recognise the element
of truth, and to know how it is in harmony with reason ;
and that is more difficult than to pronounce a thing to
have no sense in it.

Beiiig-within-itself is the essential stage, so that we
may advance from immediate, empirical singularity to
the determination of essence, of essentiality, to the con-
sciousness of Substance, of a substantial Power which
governs the world, causes everything to originate and come
into being in accordance with rational laws of connection.
So far as it is substantial, inherently existent, it is a power
which works unconsciously ; and just because of this it
is undivided activity, has universality in it, is universal
power. And in order to make this intelligible to our-
selves, we must recall the expressions activity of nature,
spirit of nature, soul of nature. We do not mean by

DEFINITE RELIGION 53

these that the spirit of nature is conscious spirit, nor in
using them are we thinking of anything conscious. The
natural laws of plants, animals, of their organisation and
action, are devoid of consciousness : these laws are the
substantial element, are their nature, their notion ; they
are this implicitly, are the reason that is immanent in
them, but without consciousness.

Man is Spirit, and his spirit determines itself as soul,
as this unity of what has life. This its life force, which
in the unfolding of his organised existence is one only,
permeating and sustaining everything, this activity is
present in man so long as he lives, without his knowing
it or willing it ; and yet his living soul is the cause, the
originating agency, the Substance, which produces it.
Man, this living soul, knows nothing of this ; he does not
will this circulation of the blood, does not prescribe it
to himself ; yet he does it : it is his deed. Man is the
acting, working power in that which goes on in his
organism. This unconscious active rationality or uncon-
scious rational activity is the ruling of the M*orld by vovs ;
among the ancients the vov$ of Anaxagoras. This is not
conscious reason. By modern philosophers, especially by
Schelling, this rational activity has been also called per-
ception or intuition — God as intuitive intelligence. God,
intelligence, reason as intellectual intuition, is the eternal
creation of nature, what is called the maintenance of
nature ; for creation and preservation are inseparable.
In perception we are immersed in the objects ; they fill
us. This is the lower stage of consciousness, this im-
mersion in the objects ; to reflect upon them, to arrive
at general ideas, to originate points of view, to attach
certain determinations to certain objects — to judge — is
no longer perception as such.

Such then is this standpoint of substantiality, of intel-
lectual perception or intuition. This is really the stand-
point of Pantheism in the true sense of the word, this
Oriental knowledge, consciousness, thought of this abso-

54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

lute unity, of the absolute Substance and the activity of
this Substance within itself, an activity in which all that
is particular, that is individual, is merely something
transient, vanishing, and does not represent true inde-
pendence.

This Oriental conception stands in contrast to that of
tb.e West, in which man, like the sun, sets into himself,
into his subjectivity. Here individuality is the leading
category, the fact, namely, that it is the individual which
is independent. As with the Orientals it is the Uni-
versal which is the truly independent, so in this form of
consciousness we find the singularity or individuality of
things, of mankind, occupying the foremost place ; indeed,
the Occidental mode of conception is capable of going so
far as to assert that finite things are independent, that
is to say, absolute.

The expression Pantheism has the same ambiguity
which attaches to Universality. "Ei/ KOI Hav means
the One All, the All, which remains absolutely One ;
but Tlav means also Everything, and thus it is that it
passes over into that idea which is devoid of thought,
and is a poor and unphilosophical one.

Thus Pantheism is understood as meaning the divine
nature of all things, not the divine nature of all : for in
the case of all being deified, if God were All, there is
only one God ; in the All, particular things are absorbed,
and are merely shadows, phantoms ; they come and go,
the very nature of their being is to vanish.

Philosophy is, moreover, asked to confess that it is
Pantheism in the first of these two senses, and it is
theologians especially who use this kind of language.

The ambiguity of Universality is precisely the same.
If it be taken in the sense of the universality of reflec-
tion, it is in that case allness ; and in the next place, this
is taken to mean that individuality remains independent.
But the Universality of Thought, the substantial univer-
sality, is unity with itself, in which all that is indivi-

DEFINITE RELIGION 55

dual, that is particular, is merely ideal, and has no true
Being.

This substantiality is the fundamental determination
of our knowledge of God too, but it is only the funda-
mental determination, the foundation not being yet the
True. God is the absolute Power, we must say that ;
He alone is Power. Everything which pretends to say
of itself that it is, that it lias reality, is annulled,
absorbed, is only a moment of the absolute God, the
absolute Power. God alone is ; God alone is the One
true reality.

In our religion too this lies at the foundation of the
idea of God. The omnipresence of God, if it is no empty
word, directly expresses substantiality ; the latter under-
lies it. But stupidity continues to prate of these pro-
found religious expressions as a mere matter of memory,
and is not at all in earnest about them. As soon as true
Being is ascribed to the finite, as soon as things are in-
dependent, God is shut out from them ; then God is not
omnipresent at all, for if God is omnipresent, it will at
once be said that He is real, and not the things.

He is therefore not beside the things, in the pores,
like the God of Epicurus, but actually in the things :
and in this case the things are not real, and this pre-
sence in them is the ideality of the things. For that
feeble way of thinking, on the other hand, things are in-
vincible ; they are an impregnable reality. Omnipresence
must have a true meaning for the spirit, heart, thought ;
Spirit must have a true interest in it. God is the sub-
sistence of all things.

Pantheism is a bad expression, because it is possible
to misunderstand it so that Ilai/ is taken in the sense of
allness or totality, not as universality. The philosophy
of Spinoza was a philosophy of substantiality, not of
Pantheism.

God is in all higher religions, but especially in the
Christian religion, the absolutely One Substance. He is,

56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

at the same time, however, subject too, and that repre-
sents a further stage. As man has personality, the
characteristic of subjectivity, personality, spirit, absolute
spirit, enters into God. This is a higher characteristic,
but Spirit nevertheless remains Substance, is the One
Substance notwithstanding.

This abstract Substance, which is the ultimate prin-
ciple of the philosophy of Spinoza, this Substance which
is tlwught of, which is only for thought, cannot be the
content of the religion of a people, cannot be the faith
of a concrete spirit. Spirit is concrete ; it is only ab-
stract thought which remains in one-sided determinate-
ness of this kind, in that of Substance.

The concrete spirit supplies the deficiency, and this
deficiency is that subjectivity is wanting, that is to say,
spirituality or the spiritual element. Here at the stage
of natural religion, however, this spirituality does not
yet exist as such, is not yet thought-out spirituality,
universal spirituality, but sensuous, immediate spiritu-
ality ; here it is a man, as sensuous, external, immediate
spirituality, and therefore in the form of the spiritual life
of a definite human being, of an empirical, individual con-
sciousness. Xow if this man remains in contrast with
this Substance, with the inherently universal Substance,
then it must be remembered that man as living substan-
tiality is really this inherent substantial reality in him-
self, which is determined by his bodily existence ; it
must be possible to think that this life force is in a sub-
stantial way active life within him. This point of view
contains universal Substantiality in an actual form.

Here the idea presents itself that a man is universal
Substance in his act of meditation, when he is occupied
with himself, when he is absorbed in himself ; not merely
in his active life, but in his absorption in self, in the
centre of the vov$, of the vou? posited as the centre, but
in such a way that the you? is not conscious of itself in
its determination and development.

DEFINITE RELIGION 57

This substantiality of the vovs, this absorption repre-
sented in one individual, is not the meditation of a king,
who has in his consciousness the thought of the admini-
stration of his empire ; but rather implies that this ab-
sorption in self is as abstract thought potentially active
substantiality, the creation and preservation of the world.

The subjective form is not as yet exclusive here : only
in the interpenetration of spirituality, subjectivity, and
substance does God become essentially One. Thus Sub-
stance is certainly One ; but Subjectivity, these outward
embodiments, are several, and it is their very nature to
be several : for this assumption of outward form is con-
ceived of as itself in relation to substantiality, as some-
thing essential in fact, while yet at the same time it is
also conceived of as something that is accidental.

For opposition, contradiction, first appears only in
consciousness, in will, in a particular act of intelligence,
and for this reason there cannot be several worldly rulers
in one land. But this spirittial activity, although it has
spiritual form for its definite existence or actual embodi-
ment, is yet merely activity of substance, and does not
appear as conscious activity, as conscious will.

Thus there are several, that is to say, three principal
Lamas : the first, Dalailama, is to be found in Lassa, to
the north of the Himalayas. There is another Lama in
Little Thibet, in Tischu-Lombu. in the neighbourhood of
Nepaul. Finally, in Mongolia there is yet a third Lama.

Spirit can, indeed, have one outward form only, and
this is man, the sensuous manifestation of Spirit. But
if the inner element is not determined as Spirit, the form
at once becomes accidental or indifferent. The eternal
life of the Christian is the Spirit of God itself, and the
Spirit of God just consists in self-consciousness of oneself
as the Divine Spirit. At this stage, on the other hand,
Being-within-itself is still devoid of determination, is not
as yet Spirit. It is immediate Being-within-itself; the
eternal as this Being-within-itself has as yet no content,

58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

so that we cannot speak of the form as corresponding to
the inner nature. The indifference of the form extends
here even to the objectively eternal. Death even is no
interruption as regards the substantial Essence ; as soon
as ever a Lama dies, another is at hand at once, so that
the Essence is the same in both, and he can be sought
for directly, being recognisable by certain marks. Thus
we have a description by the English ambassador Turner
of the Lama in Little Thibet ; he was a child of two
or three years old, whose predecessor had died on a
journey to Pekin, to which place he had been summoned
by the Chinese Emperor. A regent, the minister of the
previous Dalailama, who is designated his cup-bearer,
took the place of this child in the affairs of govern-
ment.

There is a difference between Buddhism and Lamaism.
What they have in common has been already indicated,
and those who worship Eoe and Buddha worship the
Dalailama also. It is, however, more under the form of
some dead person, who yet has also a present existence
among his successors, that the latter is worshipped. Of
Foe, too, in like manner, it is related that he had incar-
nated himself eight thousand times, and had been present
in the actual existence of a human being.

Such are the fundamental determinations which result
from what is here the divine nature, and which alone
result from it, since this itself is still confined entirely
to the undeveloped abstraction of calm, characterless
Being- within-itself. On this account all further embodi-
ment and mental representation of it is made entirely
dependent, partly on the accidental element of empirical
historical events, and partly on that of ungoverned
imagination. The details of it belong to a description
of the countless confused imaginings about certain inci-
dents connected with, or things that have befallen these
deities, their friends and disciples, and yield material
which, so far as its substance is concerned, has but little

DEFINITE RELIGION 59

interest or value, and indeed, for the reasons already
stated, has not the interest of the Notion.

In regard to worship, we have not to do here with
external ceremonies and customs. It is the essential
element alone which is to be described here, namely, how
Being- within-itself, the principle of this stage, appears in
the actual consciousness.

(c.) Worship or cultus.

This religion of substantiality has influenced the char-
acter of the peoples who profess it in the degree in which
they have made exaltation above the immediate individual
consciousness a thorough-going requirement.

i. Since the One is conceived of as the Substantial,
this immediately involves elevation above desire, above
the individual will, above savagery — involves immersion
in this inwardness, this unity. The image of Buddha is
in this thinking position : the feet and arms are folded
over one another so that one toe goes into the mouth,
representing this returning into self, this self-absorption.
The character of the peoples who profess this religion is
that of calmness, gentleness, obedience, which is superior
to savagery, to passion.

But it is the Dalailama above all who is the manifes-
tation of perfect and satisfied Being-within-itself. His
leading characteristics are repose and gentleness, with
which he combines insight and a thoroughly noble man-
ner of existence. Nations worship him, regarding him
in the fair light of one living in pure contemplation, the
absolute Eternal being present in him. If the Lama
has to direct his attention to eternal things, he is then
exclusively occ\ipied with the beneficent office of bestow-
ing consolation and help ; his primary attribute is to
forget and to have mercy. That child which was in
Little Thibet when the English ambassador already men-
tioned arrived there, was, it is true, still being suckled,
but was a lively intelligent child, behaved with all pos-
sible dignity and propriety, and seemed already to have

60 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

a consciousness of his higher dignity. And the ambas-
sador could not sufficiently praise the regent for his
noble bearing and passionless repose. The preceding
Lama, too, had been a discerning, worthy, high-minded
man. That, however, an individual should have substance
concentrated in himself, and should outwardly display
this worthy and noble character, are two things which
are in close relation to each other.

In so far as the stillness of Being-within-itself is the
extinction of all that is particular, is nothingness, this
state of annihilation is the highest state for man, and
his destiny is to immerse himself in this non-existence,
eternal repose, in nothingness — in fact, in the substantial,
where all determinations cease, and there is no will, no
intelligence. By persistent immersion and meditation
within himself man is supposed to become like to this
principle, to come to be without passion, without inclina-
tion, without action, and to arrive at a condition in whicli
he desires nothing and does nothing.

There is no question here of virtue, vice, reconciliation,
immortality ; the holiness of a man consists in his uniting
himself in this extinction, in this silence, with God, with
nothingness, with the Absolute. The highest state con-
sists in the cessation of all bodily motion, of all movement
of the soul. When this level has been reached, there is
no descent to a lower grade, no further change, and man
has no migration to fear after death, for he is then
identical with God. Here, therefore, we have expressed
the theoretical moment that man is something substan-
tial, exists for himself. The practical element is that
he wills ; if he wills, then that which is is an object for
him whicli he alters, upon which he impresses his form.
The practical value of religious feeling is determined in
accordance with the content of that which is regarded
as the True. In this religion, however, this theoretical
element is still present, namely, that this unity, purity,
nothingness is absolutely independent in relation to con-

DEFINITE RELIGION 61

sciousness, that it is its nature not to act in opposition
to the objective, not to give it form, but to leave it to
itself, so that this stillness is produced in it. This is
the Absolute ; man has to make himself nothingness. The
value of man consists in this, that his self-consciousness
has an affirmative relation to that theoretical substan-
tiality. This is the opposite of that relation which, since
the object has no determination for it, is of a merely
negative nature, and for that very reason is only affir-
mative, as being a relation of the subject to its own
inwardness, which is the power to transmute all objec-
tivity into a negative, that is to say, is affirmative in its
" vanity " alone.

That still, gentle state of mind has, in the first place,
momentarily in worship the consciousness (A such eternal
repose as essential divine Being, and this gives the tone
and character to the rest of life. But self-consciousness
is at liberty too to make its entire life a permanent state
of that stillness and contemplation without existence ; and
this actual withdrawal from the eternal conditions of the
needs and activities of life into the tranquil inner region,
and the consequent attainment of union with this theoreti-
cal substantiality, must be considered as the supreme con-
summation. Thus great religious associations take their
rise among these peoples, the members of which live in
community in repose of the spirit, and in tranquil con-
templation of the Eternal, without taking part in worldly
interests and occupations.

If a man assumes this negative mental attitude, defends
himself not against what is external, but only against
himself, and unites himself with nothingness, rids him-
self of all consciousness, of all passion, he is then exalted
to the state which among Buddhists is called Nirvana.
In this condition man is without gravity, he has no
longer any weight, is not subject to disease, to old age,
to death ; he is looked upon as God Himself ; he has
become Buddha.

62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

2. If by transplanting himself into this state of ab-
straction, this perfect solitude, this renunciation, nothing-
ness, a man attains to this, that he is undistinguishable
from God, eternal, identical with God, then the ideas of
immortality and transmigration of souls enter as an
essential element into the doctrines of Foe, of Buddha.
This standpoint is, strictly speaking, higher than that at
which the adherents of Tao are supposed to make them-
selves Shan, immortal.

While this is given out as the highest destiny of man,
namely, to make himself immortal by means of medita-
tion, by returning into himself, it is not at the same
time asserted that the soul in itself as such is persistent
and essential, that the spirit is immortal, but only that
man makes himself for the first time immortal by this
abstraction, this exaltation, that he ought, in fact, to make
himself such. The thought of immortality is involved in
the fact that man is a thinking being, that he is in his
freedom at home with himself; thus he is absolutely
independent ; an " Other " cannot break in upon his free-
dom : he relates himself to himself alone ; an Other cannot
give itself valid worth within him.

This likeness or equality with myself, " I," this self-
contained existence, this true Infinite, is accordingly
what, in the language peculiar to this point of view, is
immortal, is subject to no change ; it is itself the Un-
changeable, what is within itself alone, what moves itself
only within itself. " I," is not dead repose, but move-
ment— movement, however, which is not called change,
but is eternal rest, eternal transparency within itself.

Since God is known as the essential, is thought of in
His essentiality, and since Being-withiu-itself, and self-
contained Being or Being-with-itself is a true determina-
tion, so in relation to the subject this Being- within-itself,
this essentiality is known as its nature, the subject being
inherently spiritual. This essentiality attaches to the
soul, to the subject too ; it becomes known that the soul

DEFINITE RELIGION 63

is immortal, that its natuie is to have a pure existence,
but not as yet to exist in the strict sense as this purity—
that is, not as yet to exist as spirituality. On the con-
trary, this essentiality still strictly implies that the mode
of existence continues to be sensuous immediacy, which,
however, is merely accidental.

Immortality, therefore, means that the soul which is
at home with itself or self-contained, as being something
essential, is at the same time existing. Essence without
existence is a mere abstraction ; essentiality, the Notion,
must be thought of as existing. Thus realisation, too,
belongs to essentiality, but the form of the realisation
is still sensuous existence, sensuous immediacy. Now
transmigration of souls means that the soul still persists
after death, but in another mode of existence, a sensuous
mode. The soul being still abstractly conceived of as
Being-within-itself, the form assumed is a matter of
indifference. The spirit is not known as concrete, is
only abstract essentiality, and thus determinate Being ;
the phenomenal appearance is merely the immediate
sensuous shape, which is contingent, and is human or
animal form. Human beings, animals, the whole world
of life, become the many-hued garment of colourless
individuality. Being-within-itself, the Eternal, has as
yet no content, and therefore, too, no standard for form.

The idea that man passes into such forms, is accordingly
united with the thought of morality, of desert. That is
to say, the relation of man to the principle, to nothingness,
implies that in order to be happy he must labour by means
of continuous speculation, meditation, musing upon him-
self, to become like to this principle, and the holiness of
man consists in uniting himself in this silence with God.
The loud voices of worldly life must become mute ; the
silence of the grave is the element of eternity and
holiness. In the cessation of all movement or motion of
the body, all movement of the soul, in this extinction of
oneself happiness consists. And when a man has reached

64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

tliis stage of perfection, then there is no more change, his
soul h;is no longer to fear transmigration, for he is
identical with the god Foe. The soul is exalted into the
region of nothingness, and thus delivered from bondage
to external sensuous form.

In so far, however, as a man has not, by renunciation,
by sinking into himself, attained to this felicity — though
this latter is indeed in him, for his spirit is this poten-
tiality— he is still in need of duration, and so of bodily
existence too, and in this way the idea of metempsychosis
takes its origin.

3. It is here, accordingly, that the aspects of power
and of magic combine with this idea, and the religion of
Being- within-itself runs out into the wildest superstition.
The theoretical relation, owing to the fact that it is,
properly speaking, inherently empty, is reversed and
changes into the practical one of magic. The mediation
of priests here comes in, and they represent at once the
Higher, and the power above the forms or shapes which
man assumes. The adherents of Foe are in this respect
superstitious to the utmost degree. They believe that
man passes into all possible forms, and that the priests
are those who, living in the supersensuous world, deter-
mine the form which the soul is to take on, and are
therefore able to keep it from assuming ill-omened
shapes. A missionary tells a story of a dying Chinese
who had sent for him, and complained that a Bonze
(these are the priests, those who know, to whom is known
what is happening in the other world) had told him that
just as he was now in the service of the Emperor, so
would he remain in it after death likewise; his soul
would pass into an imperial post-horse; he must then
perform his duties faithfully, not kick, not bite, not
stumble, and content himself with a small amount of
food.

The dogma of metempsychosis is also the point at
which the simple worship of Being- within-itself trans-

DEFINITE RELIGION 65

forms itself into an idolatry of the most varied descrip-
tion. In this dogma we have the foundation and origin
of that infinite multitude of idols and images which are
everywhere worshipped where Foe holds sway. Four-
footed beasts, birds, creeping things, in a word, the lowest
forms of animal life, have temples and are worshipped,
because the god inhabits each one of them in his new
births, and any and every animal body may be inhabited
by the soul of man.

III.

NATURAL RELIGION IN TRANSITION TO THE
RELIGION OF FREEDOM.

As regards its necessity, this transition is based upon
the fact that the truth which in the preceding stages
is potentially present as the foundation is here actually
brought forward and posited. In the Eeligion of Phan-
tasy and that of Being-within-itself, this subject, this
subjective self-consciousness, is identical, though in an
immediate manner, with that substantial unity which is
called Brahma or characterless nothingness. This One
is now conceived of as unity determined within itself, as
implicitly subjective unity, and at the same time as this
unity in its character as implicitly totality. If the unity
be inherently determined as subjective, it then contains
the principle of Spirituality in itself, and it is this prin-
ciple which unfolds itself in the religions which are based
upon this transition.

Further, in the Indian religion the One, the unity of
Brahma, and determinateness, the many Powers of the
Particular, this appearance of differences, stood in a rela-
tion to each other which implied that at one time the
differences were held to be independent, and at another
that they had disappeared and were submerged in unity.
The dominant and universal characteristic was the alter -.

VOL. II. E

66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

nation of origination and passing away ; the alternation
of the annulling and absorption of the particular Powers
in the unity, and of procession out of unity. In the
Religion of Being-within-itself this alternation was indeed
brought to rest in so far as the particular differences fell
back into the unity of nothingness, but this unity was
empty and abstract, and the truth is, on the contrary,
the unity which is concrete within itself and is totality,
so that even that abstract unity, together with the ele-
ment of difference, enters into the true unity in which the
differences are posited as annulled, as ideal, negative, and
non-self-subsisting, but at the same time as preserved.

The unfolding of the moments of the Idea, the self-
differentiation of the thought of absolute Substance, was
therefore hitherto defective, in so far as the forms or
shapes lost themselves on the one hand in hard fixity,
while on the other it was merely by flight that unity
was reached, or to put it otherwise, the unity was merely
the disappearance of the differences. Now, however, the
reflection of manifoldness into itself appears, implying
that Thought itself contains determination within itself,
so that it is self-determination, and determination has
only worth and substantive content in so far as it is
reflected into this unity. Together with this, the notion
of freedom, objectivity, is posited, and the divine Notion
thus becomes the unity of the finite and infinite. The
Thought which only exists within itself, pure Substance,
is the Infinite, and the finite, in accordance with the
thought-determination, is the many gods ; while the unity
is negative unity, abstraction, which submerges the Many
in this One. But this last has gained nothing by this ;
it is undetermined as before, and the finite is only affirma-
tive outside of the Infinite, not within it, and hence so
soon as it is affirmative it is finitude which is devoid
of rationality. But now the finite, the determinate in
general is taken up into infinitude, the form is commen-
surate with the substance, the infinite form is identical

DEFINITE RELIGION 6?

with the substance, which determines itself within itself,
and is not merely abstract Power.

The other equally essential determination is that with
this the separation of the empirical self-consciousness
from the Absolute, from the content of the Highest, for
the first time takes place, that here for the first time
God attains true objectivity. At the former stages it is
the empirical self-consciousness immersed in itself which
is Brahma, this abstraction within self, or, in other words,
the Highest is present as a human being. Thus sub-
stantial unity is still inseparable from the subject, and
in so far as it is still something imperfect, is not as
yet in its very nature subjective unity ; it still has the
subject outside of it. The objectivity of the Absolute,
the consciousness of its independence in its own right, is
not present.

Here this breach between subjectivity and objectivity
takes place for the first time, and it is here that objec-
tivity for the first time properly deserves the name of
God; and we have this objectivity of God here because
this content has determined itself by its own act to
be potentially concrete totality. The meaning of this
is that God is a Spirit, that God is the Spirit in all
religious.

When, as happens with special frequency at the present
day, we hear it said that subjective consciousness forms
a part of religion, the idea expressed is a correct one
We have here the instinct that subjectivity belongs to
religion. But people have an idea that the spiritual can
exist as an empirical subject, which then as empirical
consciousness can have a natural thing for its God, and
this means that spirituality can come into consciousness
only, and God, too, as a natural existence, can be an
object for this consciousness.

Thus, on the one side, we have God as a natural
existence ; but God is essentially Spirit, and this is the
absolute characteristic quality of religion in general and

68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

therefore the fundamental characteristic, the substantial
basis, in every form of religion. The natural thing is
presented in a human fashion, and also as personality,
as spirit, as consciousness ; but the deities of the Hindus
are still superficial personifications — the personification
by no means implies that the. object, God, is known as
Spirit. It is these particular objects, the sun, a tree,
which are personified. The incarnations of the deities,
too, have their place here ; the particular objects have,
however, an independence, and because they are particu-
lar and natural objects the independence is only a ficti-
tious one.

But the Highest is Spirit, and it is from the empirical
subjective spirit in the first instance that this spiritual
determination and independence is derived, either where
it gets a definite shape, or where Brahma has his exist-
ence in and through immersion of the subject in itself.
Now, however, it is no longer the case that man is God
or God is man — that God exists merely in an empirico-
human mode ; on the contrary, God is truly objective in
His own nature, is in His very Being totality, concretely
determined in Himself, that is to say, known as being in
His real nature subjective, and thus is He for the first
time essentially an Object, and stands over against man
in general.

The return to the thought that God appears as man,
as God-man, we shall find later on ; but it is here that
this objectivity of God has its beginning.

Now if the Universal be conceived as determination
of self within self, then it comes into opposition with
what is Other than itself, and represents strife with the
Other of itself. In the religion of Power there is no
opposition, no strife, for the accidental has no value for
Substance.

Power now determining itself by its own act, has not,
indeed, these determinations as something finite. On the
contrary, what is determined exists in its complete and

DEFINITE RELIGION 69

independent truth. By means of this, God is determined
as the Good ; goodness is not laid down as a predicate
here, but He is simply the Good. In what has no
determinate character there is neither good nor evil.
The Good, on the other hand, is here the Universal, but
with one purpose or end — a determinate character, which
is commensurate with the universality in which it is.

To begin with, however, the self-determination of self
is at this stage exclusive. Thus the Good comes into
relation with what is Other, the Evil, and this relation is
strife — dualism. Eeconciliation, here a becoming or
something that ought-to-be only, is not as yet thought of
as in and pertaining to this Goodness itself.

Here it is at once posited as a necessary consequence
that the strife comes to be known as a characteristic of
Substance itself. The Negative is posited in Spirit itself,
and this is compared with its affirmation, so that this
comparison is present in felt experience, and constitutes
pain, death. And here, finally, the strife, which dies
away, is the wrestling of Spirit to come to itself, to
attain to freedom.

From these fundamental determinations the following
divisions of this transition stage result : —

1. The first determination is that of the Persian
religion. Here the actual Being of the Good is still of a
superficial kind, consequently it has a natural form, but
a natural existence which is formless — Light.

2. The form of religion in which strife, pain, death
itself actually appear in the Essence — the Syrian religion.

3. The struggling out of the strife, the going onward
to the true destiny of free spirituality, the overcoming of
evil, complete transition to the religion of free spirituality
— the Egyptian religion.

Speaking generally, however, the characteristic com-
mon to these three forms of religion is the resumption
of wild, unrestrained totality into concrete unity. This
giddy whirl, in which the determinations of unity are

70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

precipitated into externality and contingency, where out
of unity, as out of Brahma, this wild notionless world of
deities proceeds, and where the development, because it
is not proportionate to the unity, breaks up into con-
fusion— this state, devoid of anything to give it steadfast-
ness, has now passed away.

This resumption into substantial unity, which is in-
herently subjective, has, however, two forms. The first
form of resumption is that seen in the religion of the
Parsees, and it takes place in a pure, simple manner.
The other is the fermenting process, seen in the Syrian
and Egyptian religions, where the fermentation of totality
mediates itself into unity, and unity comes into existence
in the strife of its elements.

i. The Religion of the Good or of Light.

(a.) Its notion or conception.

i. The resumption is as yet the pure simple one, but
for that reason it is also abstract. God is known as the
absolutely existent, which is determined wyithin itself.

Here the determinate character is not an empirical,
manifold one, but is just what is pure, universal, what is
equal to itself ; a determination of Substance, by which it
ceases to be Substance, and begins to be subject. This
unity, as self-determining, has a content, and that this con-
tent is what is determined by unity, and is in conformity
with it, is the universal content, is what is called Good
or the True ; for those are only forms which belong to
the further distinctions of knowing and willing, which
in the highest form of subjectivity are but one truth,
particularisations of this One truth.

The fact that this Universal is determined by the
self-determination of Spirit, and by Spirit and for Spirit,
is the side upon which it is Truth. In proportion as it
is posited by Spirit, is a self-determination commensurate
with its unity, is its own self-determination by which it

DEFINITE RELIGION 71

remains true to itself in its universality, and in conse-
quence of which no other determinations present them-
selves unless that unity itself, is it the Good. It is there-
fore the true content which has objectivity, the Good,
which is the same as the True. This Good is at the same
time self-determination of the One, of absolute Substance,
and in being such it directly remains absolute Power —
the Good as absolute Power, Such is the determination
of the content.

2. It is just in this determination of the Absolute, and
in the fact that it is self-determination and the Good, in
which even concrete life is able to behold its affirmative
root, and to become conscious of itself in a true manner,
that there lies the connection with the concrete, with the
world, with concrete empirical life generally. Out of
this Power all things proceed. We had this determina-
tion of the Absolute in the foregoing forms, where it
implied that this mode of self-determination, as a mode of
determination, contains abstract determination, is not self-
determination, what has returned into itself, what remains
in identity, the True and Good in the universal sense,
but is the act of determination generally. Power, as
such, is neither good nor wise ; it has no end in view,
but is merely determined as Being and Not-being ; it is
characterised by wildness, by modes of acting savouring
of madness in fact. For this reason Power is intrinsi-
cally what is without determination.

This moment of Power is also present, but as some-
thing subordinated. Thus it is concrete life, the world
in manifold existence ; but that which is all-important
is that in the Good, as self-determination, is contained
this absolute characteristic, namely, the connection of the
Good with the concrete world.

Subjectivity, particularity generally, is in this Substance,
in the One itself, which is the absolute subject. This
element, which belongs to the particular life, this deter-
ruinateness is at the same time posited in the Absolute

72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

itself, and in being so is an affirmative co-relation or
connection of the Absolute, of the good and true, of the
Infinite with that which is called the finite.

The affirmative connection in the earlier forms of
religion exists in part only in this pure absorption, in
which the subject says, " I am Brahma," but it is an
absolutely abstract connection, which only exists by
means of this stupefaction, this relinquishment of all
concrete actuality of Spirit, by means of negation. This
affirmative connection is merely, as it were, a simple
thread; for the rest, it is the abstract negative, this
sacrifice, this self-immolation ; that is to say, instead of
connection there is merely flight from the concrete.

But with this affirmative connection, where determi-
nate existence is taken up into universality, it is stated
that things themselves are good ; the Good is present
Substance in them, and that which is good is their life,
their affirmative Being. So far as they remain good,
they belong to this realm of the Good ; they are from the
very first received into favour ; it is not that a part only
are these twice-born, as in India. On the contrary, the
finite is composed of what is good, and is good. And,
indeed, good is taken in the proper sense, and is under-
stood with reference to an external end, an external
comparison. That is in accordance with an end which
is good for something, so that the end lies outside of the
object. Here, on the other hand, good is to be under-
stood as meaning that it is the Universal determined
within itself. Good is so determined within itself ; the
particular things are good, they serve their own purpose,
are adequate to themselves, not merely to an Other. The
Good is not for them a " Beyond," — Brahma again.

3. This Good, although it is indeed subjective itself,
is inherently determined as Good, and is commensurate
with substantial unity, with Universality itself, yet this
determination is itself still abstract. The Good is con-
crete within itself, and yet this determinate existence of

DEFINITE RELIGION 73

concrete Being is itself still abstract. In order that the
Good be not abstract, there must be the development of
form, the positing of the moments of the Notion. In
order to exist as rational Idea, to be known as Spirit, its
determinations, the negative element, the distinctions as
representing its powers must be posited, known, by means
of the thought in it.

The Good may be made use of in various ways, or, to
put it otherwise, human beings have good intentions.
Here the question presents itself, " What is good ? "
There is a demand for further definition and explanation
of the Good. Here we still have Good as abstract, as
something one-sided, and consequently as an absolute
antithesis to an Other, and this Other is Evil. In this
simple relation the negative is not as yet comprehended
wit 1 1 in what rightly belongs to it.

We thus have two principles, the well-known Oriental
dualism — the realms of good and evil. This is the grand
opposition which has here reached this universal abstrac-
tion. In the varied character of the deities previously
referred to, there is undoubtedly manifoldness, difference ;
but the fact that this duality has become the universal
principle is quite another thing, for the difference con-
fronts itself as this dualism.

The Good is indeed the True, the Powerful, but is at
war with Evil in such a way that Evil stands over against
it as an absolute principle, and remains standing over
against it. The evil ought, it is true, to be overcome, to
be equated, but what ought to be is not. The ought-to-
be, the ideal, is a force which cannot realise itself ; it is a
certain weakness and impotence.

This dualism, understood as distinction or difference
in its entire universality, is the interest alike of religion
and philosophy, and it is, in fact, when put in terms of
Thought that this opposition acquires its universality.
At the present time dualism is a form of thought too ;
but when we speak of dualism, the forms referred to are

74 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of a weak and slight kind. The modern antithesis of
finite and infinite is just that of Ahriman and Ormazd —
it is just the same Manicheism as we have here.

From the moment that we take the finite as indepen-
dent, so that the infinite and finite stand opposite to one
another in such a way that the infinite has no part with
the finite, and the finite cannot pass over to the infinite,
then that is the same thing as this dualism, only that
when we so conceive of the relation, we have not the in-
tention of forming, nor the heart to form a conception of
these opposites in accordance with their entire content.

The finite when, in its further determination, it asserts
itself as finite over against the infinite, the Universal,
and in so doing declares itself opposed to the infinite, is
the Evil. We find accordingly that some stop short at
this standpoint, which is marked by an utter absence of
thought, and in accordance with which a valid existence
is allowed both to -the finite and the infinite. But
God is only one principle, one power, and the finite,
and for that very reason Evil, has no true independent
existence.

But further, Good, by virtue of its universality, has
moreover a natural mode of determinate existence, a mode
of existence for an Other, namely, Light, which is pure
manifestation. As the Good, that which is self-identical
or commensurate with itself, is subjectivity in its pure
identity with itself in the spiritual sphere, so is Light
this abstract subjectivity in the sensuous sphere. Space
and time are the primary abstractions in the sphere of
externality or mutual exclusion, but the concrete phy-
sical element in its universality is Light. If, therefore,
the essentially Good, because of its abstract character,
comes to have the form of immediateness, and conse-
quently of naturalness (for immediateness is the natural),
then this immediate Goodness, which has not as yet
purified itself and raised itself to the form of absolute
spirituality, is Light. For Light is in the natural world

DEFINITE RELIGION 75

pure manifestation, determination of self by self, but in
an entirely simple, universal manner.

If Brahma had to be represented in a sensuous fashion,
he could only be represented as abstract space. Brahma
has not as yet, however, the force within himself to be
independently represented, but has as his realisation the
empirical consciousness of man.

The fact that the Good at which we have arrived is
still supposed to have essentially a natural form, although
certainly it is nature in the pure form of Light, presents
a certain difficulty. But Nature cannot possibly be left
out by Spirit ; it essentially belongs to Spirit.

God, too, as inherently concrete, as pure Spirit, is at
the same time essentially Creator and Lord of nature.
Thus the Idea in its Notion, God in His essential Being
itself, must posit this reality, this external existence which
we call Nature. The moment of naturalness, therefore,
cannot be dispensed with, only it exists here as yet in an
abstract form — in this immediate unity with the Spiritual,
the Good, just because the Good is as yet this abstraction.

The Good contains determinateness within itself, and
in determinateness is the root of natural existence. We
say, " God creates the world." Creation is this subjec-
tivity to which determinateness in general pertains. It is
in this activity or subjectivity that the essential charac-
ter of nature lies, and indeed in the more definite relation
which implies that that nature is something created.
This does not, however, as yet exist nere. What is pre-
sent here is abstract determinateness.

This determinateness has essentially the form of nature
generally, of Light, and of immediate unity with the
Good ; for the Immediate is itself just the Abstract, because
determinateness is merely this universal, undeveloped
determinateness.

Light, accordingly, has darkness standing over against
it. In Nature these two characteristics are separate from
one another in this fashion. This is the impotence of

76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

nature, namely, that light and its negation lie side by
side, although, indeed, light is the power to drive away
darkness. This determination in God is itself as yet
that element of impotence which, because of its abstrac-
tion, is not as yet able to contain and endure the oppo-
sition, the contradiction within itself, but has the Evil
alongside of it. Light is the Good and the Good is
light ; this is the indivisible unity which we have here.

But light is in conflict with darkness, with evil, which
it is to overcome, though ideally only, for it does not
actually succeed in doing this.

Light is an infinite expansion, it is as rapid as Thought ;
but in order that its manifestation be real, it must strike
upon something that is dark. Nothing is made manifest
by pure light ; only in this Other does definite manifesta-
tion make its appearance, and with this, Good appears in
opposition to Evil. This manifestation is a determining
but not as yet concrete development of determination ;
the concreteness of determination is therefore outside of
it, because of its abstraction it has its determination in
the Other. Without the opposition Spirit does not exist,
and in the development of Spirit the point of importance
is merely as to the position this opposition assumes rela-
tively to mediation and to the original unity.

Thus the Good in its universality has a natural form,
namely, this pure manifestation of nature, Light. The
Good is the universal determinateness of things. Since
it is thus abstract subjectivity, the moment of parti-
cularity or singularity, the moment, the mode, by which
it is for Other, is itself as yet in sensuous perception
something externally present, which, however, may come
to be adequate to the content, for all particularity is
taken up into the Universal ; particularity of this more
precise kind, in accordance with which it is the mode of
perception, the mode of immediateness, is then capable
of seeming adequate to the content. Brahma, for example,
is merely abstract thought ; looked upon in a sensuous

DEFINITE RELIGION 77

way, he would, as has been already stated, correspond
merely with the perception of space, a sensuous univer-
sality of perception which is itself merely abstract. Here,
on the contrary, the substantial element is commensurate
with the form, and the latter is then physical univer-
sality— light, which has darkness over against it. Air,
breath, &c., are also determinations which are physical,
but they are not in this way the Ideal itself, are not
universal individuality, subjectivity. It is in light which
manifests itself that we have the moment of self-deter-
mination, of individuality, of subjectivity. Light appears
as light generally, as universal light, and then as nature
in a particular specific form ; nature in the form of
special objects reflected into itself as the essential element
of particular things.

Light must not here be understood as meaning the
sun. It may indeed be said that the sun is the most
prominent light, but it stands beyond and above us as
a particular body, as a special individual object. The
Good, the light, on the contrary, has within itself the
root of subjectivity, but only the root ; accordingly, it is
not posited as thus individual, existing apart by itself ;
and thus light is to be taken as subjectivity, as the soul
of things.

(b.) This religion as it actually exists.

This Religion of Light or of the immediate Good is
the religion of the ancient Parsis, founded by Zoroaster.
There still exist some communities who belong to this
religion in Bombay and on the shores of the Black Sea,
in the neighbourhood of Baku, where those naphtha springs
are specially frequent, in the accidental proximity of which
some have imagined they find an explanation of the fact
that the Parsis have chosen fire as an object of worship.
Prom Herodotus and other Greek authors we derive some
information regarding this religion, but it is only in later
times that a more accurate knowledge of it has been
arrived at by the discovery of the principal and funda-

78 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

mental books (Zend-Avesta) of that people by the French-
man Anquetil du Perron : 1 these books are written in
the ancient Zend language, a sister language to Sanscrit.

Light, which is worshipped in this religion, is not a
symbol of the Good, an image or figure by which the
Good is represented ; it might, on the contrary, just as
well be said that the Good is the symbol of light.
Neither of the two is outward sign or symbol, but they
are directly identical.

Here among the Parsis worship makes its appearance.
Substantiality here exists for the subject in its particu-
larity : man as a particular form of the Good stands over
against the universal Good, over against light in its pure,
as yet undisturbed, manifestation, which the Good as
natural concrete existence is.

The Parsis have also been called fire-worshippers.
This designation is to a certain degree incorrect, for the
Parsis do not direct their worship to fire as devouring
material fire, but only to fire as light, which as the truth
of the material appears in an outward form.

The Good as an object, as something having a sen-
suous shape, which corresponds with the content which
is as yet abstract, is Light. It has essentially the
signification of the Good, the Ptighteous ; in human form
it is known as Ormazd, but this form is as yet a super-
ficial personification here. Personification exists, that is
to say, so long as the form as representing the content
is not as yet inherently developed subjectivity. Ormazd
is the Universal, which in an external form acquires subjec-
tivity ; he is light, and his kingdom is the realm of light.

The stars are lights appearing singly. "What appears
being something particular, natural, there at once springs
up a difference between that which appears and that

1 It was in 1754 that Anquetil du Perron saw a facsimile of four leaves
of the Oxford MS. of the Vendedad Sadah, and after years of heroic effort
and persevering toil, in 1771 he published the first European translation of
the Zend-Avesta— TK. S.

DEFINITE RELIGION 79

which is implicit, and what is implicit then becomes a
something Particular, a genius also. Just as universal
light is personified, so particular lights come to be perso-
nified too. Thus the stars are personified as genii; in
one aspect they are what appears, and then are personi-
fied as well ; they are not differentiated, however, into
light and into the Good ; on the contrary, it is the
collective unity which is personified : the stars are spirits
of Ormazd, of the universal light, and of the inherently
existing Good.

These stars are called the Amshaspands^ and Ormazd,
who is universal light, is also one of the Amshaspands.
The realm of Ormazd is the realm of light, and there are
seven Amshaspands in it. These might perhaps suggest
the planets, but they are not further characterised in
the Zend-Avesta, and in none of the prayers, not even
in those directed to them individually, are they more
particularly specified. The lights are the companions of
Ormazd, and reign with him. The Persian State itself,
too, similarly with this realm of light, is described as the
kingdom of righteousness and of the Good. The king,
too, was surrounded by seven magnates, who formed his
council, and were thought of as representatives of the
Amshaspands, in the same way as the king was conceived
to be the representative of Ormazd. The Amshaspands
govern, changing place day by day, in the realm of light
with Ormazd ; consequently what is posited here is merely
a superficial distinction of time.

To the Good or the kingdom of light belongs all that
has life ; that which in all beings is good is Ormazd ;
he is the life-giving element through thought, word, and
deed. Here we still have Pantheism in so far as the
Good, light, substance, is in everything; all happiness,
blessing, felicity meet together in it ; whatever exists as
loving, happy, strong, and the like, that is Ormazd. He
bestows the light on all beings, upon trees as upon noble
men, upon animals as upon the Amshaspands.

8o THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The sun and the planets are the first chief spirits or
deities, a heavenly people, pure and great, shielding all,
beneficent to all, shedding benediction upon all — being
rulers by turns over the world of light. The whole
world is Ormazd in all its stages and varied existence,
and in this kingdom of light all is good. To light
belongs everything, all that lives, all essential being,
all spiritual existence, the action, the growth of finite
things, all is light, is Ormazd. In this is not merely
sensuous life, life in general, but strength, spirit, soul,
blessedness. In the fact that a man, a tree, an animal
lives and rejoices in existence, possesses an affirmative
nature, is something noble, in this consists their glory,
their light, and this it is which is the sum and essence of
the substantial nature of every individual existence.

The manifestation of light is worshipped, and in con-
nection with this the element of locality has a value
for the Parsi. Advantage is taken, for example, of the
plains upon which naphtha wells abound. Light is
burnt upon the altars ; it is not a symbol, but is rather
the presence of the ineffable, of the Good. All that is
good in the world is thus reverenced, loved, worshipped,
for it is esteemed as the son, the begotten of Ormazd, in
which he loves himself, pleases himself. In like manner
hymns of praise are addressed to all pure spirits of man-
kind. These are called Fravashis,1 and are either beings
still in the body and still existing, or dead beings, and
thus Zoroaster's Fravashi is entreated to watch over them.
In the same way animals are worshipped, because they
have life, light in them. In worshipping these, the genii,
spirits, the affirmative element of living nature, is brought
into prominence and reverenced as the ideals of the par-
ticular kinds of things, as universal subjective forms,
which represent the Divine in a finite way. Animals
are, as already stated, objects of worship, but the ideal

1 The word which Hegel uses is Ferver, but he evidently means
Fravashis.

DEFINITE RELIGION 81

is the heavenly bull, which, among the Hindus, is the
symbol of procreation, and stands beside Siva. Among
fires, it is the sun that is specially worshipped ; among
mountains, too, there is a similar ideal — Alborg, the
mountain of mountains. Thus in the Parsi's view of
things there exists an active present world of the Good,
ideals which are not beyond this world, but are in exist-
ence, are present in actual things.

Everything that is alive is held in reverence as Good,
but only the good, the light in it, not its particular
form, its finite transitory mode of existence. There is
a separation between the substantial element and what
belongs to the perishable. A distinction is posited in
man too ; a something higher is distinguished from the
immediate corporeal, natural, temporal, insignificant char-
acter of his external Being, of his existence. This is re-
presented by the Genii, Fravasltis. Among trees, there
is one which is specially marked off — Horn, the tree from
which flow the waters of immortality. Thus the State
is the manifestation of the substantial, of the realm of
light, the prince being the manifestation of the supreme
light, while the officials are the representatives of the
Spirits of Ormazd. The above distinction is, however,
a surface one ; the absolute one is that between Good
and Evil.

It may ba also mentioned that one among the helpers
of Ormazd is Mitra, the yueo-/r>/?, mediator. It is curious
that Herodotus, even in his time, makes special mention
of this Mitra ; yet in the religion of the Parsis, the
characteristic of mediation, reconciliation does not seem
as yet to have become prominent. It was not until a
later period that the worship of Mithras was more gener-
ally developed in its complete form, as the human spirit
had become more strongly conscious of the need of
reconciliation, and as that need had become keener and
more definite.

Among the Piomans in Christian times Mithras-worship.

VOL n. F

8i THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

was very widely spread, and so late as the Middle Ages"
we meet with a secret Mithras-worship ostensibly con-
nected with the order of the Knights-Templars. Mithras
thrusting the knife into the neck of the ox is a figura-
tive representation belonging essentially to the cult of
Mithras, of which examples have been frequently found
in Europe.

(c.^ Worship.

The worship belonging to this religion results directly
from the essential character of the religion. The purpose
of it is to glorify Ormazd in his creation, and the adora-
tion of the Good in everything is its beginning and end.
The prayers are of a simple and uniform character, with-
out any special shades of meaning. The principal feature
of the cultus is that man is to keep himself pure as
regards his inner and outer life, and is to maintain and
diffuse the same purity everywhere. The entire life of
the Parsi is to be this worship ; it is not something
isolated, as among the Hindus. It is the duty of the
Parsi everywhere to promote life, to render it fruitful
and keep it gladsome ; to practise good in word and
deed in all places ; to further all that is good among
mankind, as well as to benefit men themselves ; to exca-
vate canals, plant trees, give shelter to wanderers, build
waste places, feed the hungry, irrigate the ground, which,
from another point of view, is itself subject and genius.

Such is this oue-sidedness of abstraction.

2. The. Syrian Religion, or the Religion of Pain.

We have just been considering the ideas of strife and
of victory over evil. We have now to consider, as re-
presenting the next moment or stage, that strife as Pain.
" Strife as pain" seems a superficial expression ; it im-
plies, however, that the strife is no longer an external
opposition only, but is in a single subject, and within
that subject's own feeling of itself. The strife is, accord-

DEFINITE RELIGION 83

ingly, the objectifying of pain. Pain is, however, in
general terms the course or process of finitude, and, from
a subjective point of view, brokenness of heart. This
process or course of finitude, of pain, strife, victory, is a
moment or stage in the nature of Spirit, and it cannot
be absent in the sphere under consideration, in which
power continuously determines itself toward spiritual
freedom. The loss of one's own self, the contradiction
between self-contained Being and its " Other," a contra-
diction which annuls itself by absorption into infinite
unity — for here we can think of true infinitude only — the
annulling of the opposition, these are the essential deter-
minations in the Idea of Spirit which now make their
appearance. It is true that we are now conscious of the
development of the Idea, of its course as well as of
its moments or stages, whose totality constitutes Spirit.
This totality, however, is not as yet posited, but obtains
expression in moments which in this sphere present them-
selves successively.

The content not being as yet posited in free Spirit,
since the moments are not as yet gathered together into
subjective unity, it exists in an immediate mode, and is
thrown out into the form of Nature ; it is represented by
means of a natural progressive process, which, however,
is essentially conceived of as symbolical, and consequently
is not merely a progressive process in external nature,
but is an universal progressive process as contrasted with
the point of view which we have hitherto occupied, and
from which not Spirit but abstract Power is seen to be
what rules. The next element in the Idea is the moment
or stage of conflict. It is the essential nature of Spirit
to come to itself out of its otherness and out of the
overcoming of this otherness, by the negation of the
negation. Spirit brings itself forth ; it passes through
the estrangement of itself. But since it is not as yet
posited as Spirit, this course of estrangement and return
is not as yet posited ideally, and as a moment or stage

84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of Spirit, but immediately, and therefore in the form of
what is natural.

This determination, as we have seen it, has acquired
a definite form in the religion of the Phoenicians and
in the religions of anterior Asia generally. In these
religions the Process which has been spoken of is con-
tained, and in the religion of the Phoenicians the succumb-
ing to death, the estrangement of the god from himself,
and his resurrection are brought into special prominence.
The popular conception regarding the Phcenix is well
known : it is a bird which burns itself, and from out of
its ashes there comes a young Phcenix in new vigour
and strength.

This estrangement, this otherness, defined as a natural
negation, is death, but death that is at the same time
annulled, since out of it there issues a revival and re-
newal of life. It is the eternal nature of Spirit to die
to self, to render itselif finite in Nature, and yet it is by
the annulling of its natural existence that it comes to
itself. The Phoenix is the well-known symbol of this.
What we have here is not the warfare of Good with
Evil, but a divine process which pertains to the nature
of God Himself, and is the process in one individual.
The more precise form in which this progressive process
definitely appears is represented by Adonis. This repre-
sentation has passed over to Egypt and Greece, and is
mentioned in the Bible, too, under the name of Thammus
(l^-D), Ezek. viii. 1 4, " And behold there sat women
weeping for Thammus." One of the principal festivals
of Adonis was celebrated in spring ; it was a service in
honour of the dead, a feast of mourning which lasted
several days. For two whole days Adonis was sought
for with lamentation ; the third day was a joyous festival,
when the god had risen again from the dead. The entire
festival has the character of a solemn feast of Nature,
which expires in winter and awakens again in spring.
Thus in one aspect this is a natural process, but looked

DEFINITE RELIGION 85

at in the other aspect it is to be taken symbolically
as a moment of God, as descriptive of the Absolute in
fact

The myth of Adonis is associated even with Greek
mythology. According to the latter, Aphrodite was the
mother of Adonis. She kept him as a child of tender
years concealed in a little chest, and took this to Ais.
Persephone, however, would not give back the child out of
the chest when the mother demanded it. Zeus decided
the dispute by ordering that each of the goddesses was
to keep Adonis for a third part of the year. The last
third was to be left to his own choice ; he preferred to
spend that time also with the universal mother and his
own, namely, Aphrodite. As regards its direct inter-
pretation, this myth, it is true, has reference to the seed
lying under the ground, and then springing up out of it.
The myth of Castor and Pollux, whose abode is alter-
nately in the nether world and upon the earth, has
also reference to this. Its true meaning, however, is
not merely the alternation of Nature, but the transition
generally from life, from affirmative Being, to death, to
negation, and then again the rising up out of this nega-
tion— the absolute mediation which essentially belongs
to the notion or conception of Spirit.

Here therefore this moment of Spirit has become
religion.

3 . The Religion of Mystery.

The form which is peculiar to the religions of anterior
Asia is that of the mediation of Spirit with itself, in
which the natural element is still predominant ; the form
of transition where we start from the Other as represent-
ing what Nature in general is, and where the transition
does not yet appear as the coming of Spirit to itself.
The further stage at which we have now arrived is where
this transition shows itself as a coming of Spirit to itself,
yet not in such a way that this return is a reconciliation,

86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

but rather that the strife, the struggle, is the object, as a
moment, however, of the Divinity itself.

This transition to spiritual religion contains, it is true,
concrete subjectivity within itself ; it is, however, the
free, unregulated play of this simple subjectivity ; it is
the development of it, yet a development which is still,
as it were, in a wild and effervescent state, and has not
as yet arrived at a state of tranquillity, at the true
spirituality which is essentially free.

As in India the parts of this development were seen
in an isolated state, so here the determinateness is in its
detached state, but in such wise that these elementary
powers of the Spiritual and the Natural are essentially
related to subjectivity, and so related that it is one single
subject which passes through these moments.

In the Indian religions, also, we had origination and
passing away, but not subjectivity, return into the One,
not One which itself passes through these forms and
differences, and in them and from out of them returns
into itself. It is this higher Power of subjectivity which,
when developed, lets the element of difference go out
of itself, but when enclosed within itself holds fast, or
rather overpowers the difference.

The one-sidedness of this form consists in the absence
of this pure unity of the Good, of the state of return, of
self-contained Being. This freedom which we have here
merely goes forth, merely impels itself forwards, but is
not as yet, so to speak, complete, perfect, is not as yet
such a beginning as would bring forth the end, the result.
It is, therefore, subjectivity in its reality, not as yet, how-
ever, in true, actual freedom, but in a state of fermenta-
tion going in and out of this reality.

The dualism of light and darkness begins to come to
unity here, and in such a way that this dark, this nega-
tive element, which, when intensified, even becomes evil,
is included within subjectivity itself. It is the essential
nature of subjectivity to unite opposite principles within

DEFINITE RELIGION 87

itself, to be the force or energy which is able to endure
this contradiction, and to dissolve it within itself.

Ormazd has always Ahriman confronting him ; we also
find the idea, it is true, that Ahriman is at last overcome,
and Ormazd alone reigns ; but that is merely expressed
as something in the future, not as anything that belongs
to the present. God, Essence, Spirit, the True, must be
present, not transported in idea into the past or the
future. The Good — and this is the most immediate
demand — must also be posited in actual fact as real
power in itself, and being conceived of as universal, must
thus be conceived of as real subjectivity.

What we have at the present standpoint is this unity
of subjectivity, and the fact that by means of these dis-
tinguished moments, affirmation passes through negation
itself, and ends with return into itself and reconciliation ;
in such a way, however, that the action of this subjec-
tivity is more the mere effervescence of it than the
subjectivity which has actually attained to itself com-
pletely, and already reached its consummation.

One single subject constitutes this difference, a some-
thing concrete in itself, one development. Thus this
subjectivity imports itself into developed powers, and so
unites them that they are set free. This subject has
a history, is the history of life, of Spirit, of movement
within itself, in which it breaks up into the differentia-
tion of these powers, and in differentiation this subject
converts itself into what is heterogeneous relatively to
itself.

Light does not become extinct, does not set, but here
it is one single subject, which alienates itself from itself,
is arrested in the negativity of itself, but reinstates itself
by its own act in and from out of this estrangement.
The result is the conception of free Spirit, not yet, how-
ever, as true ideality, but, to begin with, as merely the
impulse to bring the ideality into actual existence.

Here we have reached the ultimate determination of

88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

natural religion in this sphere, arid in fact the stage
which constitutes the transition to the religion of free
subjectivity. When we examine the stage of Parsiism,
we perceive it to be the resumption of the finite into the
essentially existent unity in which the Good determines
itself. This Good is, however, only implicitly concrete,
the determinateness is essentially simple, not as yet
determination made manifest ; or, in other words, it is
still abstract subjectivity, and not as yet real subjectivity.
Accordingly, the next moment is, that outside of the realm
of the Good, Evil has been given a determinate character.
This determinateness is posited as simple, not developed ;
it is not regarded as determinateness, but merely as
universality, and therefore the development, the differ-
ence is not as yet present in it as differentiated ; what we
find rather is that one of the differentiated elements falls
outside of the Good. Things are good merely as lighted
up on their positive side only, not, however, on the side
of their particularity also. We now, in accordance with
the Notion, approach more nearly to the realm of real
actual subjectivity.

(a.) The characterisation or determination of the Notion
of this stage.

Material is not wanting for the determinations ; on
tJae contrary, even in this concrete region that material
presents itself with a determinate character. The differ-
ence lies merely in this, namely, whether the moments
of totality exist in a purely superficial, external form, or
whether they have their being in the inner and essential
element ; that is to say, whether they exist merely as
superficial form and shape, or are posited, and thus
thought of as the determination of the content. It is
this that constitutes the enormous difference. In all
religions we meet with the mode of self-consciousness, to
a greater or less degree, and further with the predicates
of God, such as omnipotence, omniscience, &c. Among
the Hindus and Chinese we meet with sublime descrip-

DEFINITE RELIGION ?9

tions of God, so that higher religions have no superiority
over them in this respect : these are so-called pure con-
ceptions of God (such, for example, as those in Friedrich
von Schlegel's " Weisheit der Indier "), and are regarded
as survivals of the perfect original religion. In the
Eeligion of Light, too, we have already found that evil in
an individual form is everywhere done away with. Subjec-
tivity we have observed everywhere at the same time in
the concrete determination of self-consciousness. Even at
the stage of magic, the power of self-consciousness was
above Nature. What really constitutes the special diffi-
culty in the study of religion is that we have not to do
here, as in logic, with pure thought- determinations, nor
with existing ones, as in Nature, but with such as are not
wanting in the moment of self-consciousness, of finite
spirit in fact, since they have already run their course
through subjective and objective Spirit. For religion is
itself the self-consciousness of Spirit regarding its self,
and Spirit makes the different stages of self-consciousness
themselves, by which Spirit is developed into the object
of consciousness for itself. The content of the object is
God, the absolute Totality, and therefore the entire mani-
foldness of matter is never wanting. It is'necessary, how-
ever, to seek more precisely for definite categories, which
form the differences of the religions. This difference is
especially sought for in the mode of working of the
Essence ; this last is everywhere, and yet is not ; it is
further made to turn on the question as to whether
there is or is not one God. This distinction is just as
little to be relied upon, for even in the Indian religion
there is to be found One God, and the difference then
merely consists in the mode in which the many divine
forms bind themselves together into unity. There are
several Englishmen who hold that the ancient Indian
religion contains the idea of the unity of God as a sun
or universal soul. But predicates of the understanding
such as these don't help us here.

90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

When such predicates are given to God, we do not by
the help of these determinations get a knowledge of Him
in His true nature. They are even predicates of finite
Nature; for it, too, is powerful, is wise. Taken as re-
presenting a knowledge of God, they would be extended
over finite matter through the All. In this way, how-
ever, the predicates lose their definite meaning and are
transient, like the Trimurti in Brahma. What is
essential is contained in the One, in what is substantial,
immanent ; it is essential determination, which is con-
ceived and known as such. These are not the predicates
of reflection, not external form, but Idea (Idee).

Thus we have already had the determination of sub-
jectivity, of self-determination, but merely in a super-
ficial form, and not yet as constructing the nature of
God. In the Religion of Light, this determination was
abstract universal personification, because in the Person
the absolute moments are not contained as developed
or unfolded. Subjectivity is just abstract identity with
self, is Being-within-itseif, which differentiates itself, but
which is likewise the negativity of this difference, which
latter maintains itself in the difference, does not let it
escape out of itself, retains its sway over it, is in it,
but in it independently, has the difference within it
momentarily.

i. If we consider this in relation to the next form,
subjectivity is this negativity which relates itself to
itself, and the negative is no longer outside of the Good,
but rather it must be contained, posited in the affirmative
relation to self, and thus is, in fact, no longer the Evil.
Therefore the negative, Evil, must now no longer exist
outside of the Good. It is just the essential nature of
Good to be Evil, whereby of course Evil no longer re-
mains Evil, but as Evil relating itself to itself, annuls
its evil character and constitutes itself into Good. Good
is that negative relation to itself as its other by which
it posits Evil, just as the latter is the movement which

DEFINITE RELIGION 91

posits its negation as negative, that is to say, which
annuls it. This double movement is subjectivity. This
is no longer that which Brahma is ; in Brahma these
differences merely vanish, or, in so far as the difference
is posited, it is found as an independent god outside of
Brahma.

The first and essentially universal form of subjectivity
is not the perfectly free, purely spiritual subjectivity, but
is still affected by Nature. It is thus, it is true, universal
Power, but power which merely exists implicitly, such as
we have hitherto met with. As subjectivity it is, on the
contrary, posited actual power, and is so conceived of
when it is taken as exclusive subjectivity.

The distinction lies between power which is implicit
and power so far as it is subjectivity. This last is
posited power, is posited as power existent in its own
right. We have already had power under every form.
As a first fundamental determination it is a crude power
over what has a bare existence ; then it is the inner
element only, and the distinctions or differences appear
as self-sustained existences outside of it ; existences which
have, it is true, proceeded out of it, but which outside of
it are independent, and which would have vanished, in
so far as they were comprehended in it. Just as dis-
tinctions vanish in Brahma, in this abstraction, when
self-consciousness says, " I am Brahma" and from that
moment everything that is divine, all that is good, has
vanished in him, so the abstraction has no content, and
the latter, in so far as it is outside of it, moves unsteadily
about in a state of independence. In relation to parti-
cular existences, power is the active agent, the basis ;
but it remains the inner element merely, and acts in a
universal way only. That which universal power brings
forth, in so far as it is implicit, is also the Universal, the
Laws of Nature; these belong to the power which is
potentially existent. This power acts ; it is implicit
power, its working likewise is implicit, it acts uncon-

92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

sciously, and existing things, such as sun, stars, sea,
rivers, men, animals, &c., appear as independent exis-
tences ; their inner element only is determined by the
power. Power can only show itself in this sphere as in
opposition to the laws of nature, and here, accordingly,
would be the place of miracles. But among the Hindus
there are no miracles, for they have no rational intelli-
gent Nature. Nature has no intelligent co-relation ;
everything is miraculous, and therefore there are no
miracles. These latter cannot exist until the God is
determined as Subject, and as Power which has indepen-
dent Being, and works in the manner characteristic of
subjectivity. Where potentially existent Power is repre-
sented as subject, it is of no consequence in what form
it appears ; accordingly it is represented in human beings,
in animals, &c. That vital force acts as immediate
power cannot in any case be denied, since as power
which is implicitly existent it works invisibly without
showing itself.

From this power actual power must be distinguished ;
i/the latter is subjectivity, and in it two principal charac-
teristics are to be observed.

The first is that the subject is identical with itself,
and at the same time posits definite distinct determina-
tions within itself. There is one subject of these dis-
tinctions ; they are the moments of one subject. The
Good is thus the universal self-determination which is
so entirely universal that it has the very same undiffe-
rentiated extent as Essence; determination is, in fact, not
posited as determination. To subjectivity belongs self-
determination, and this means that the determinations
present themselves as a plurality of determinations; that
they have this reality in relation to the Notion, in con-
trast to the simple self -involved Being of subjectivity.
But at first these determinations are still enclosed within
subjectivity, are inner determinations.
- The second moment is that the subject is exclusive,

DEFINITE RELIGION 93

is negative relation of itself to itself, as power is, but in
relation to an Other. This Other is capable, too, of
appearing as independent, but it is involved in this that
the independence is only a semblance of independence,
or else it is of such a kind that its existence, its embodi-
ment, is merely a negative relatively to the power of
subjectivity, so that this last is what is dominant. Ab-
solute power does not hold sway; where there is the
exercise of ruling authority, the Other is swallowed up.
Here the latter abides, but obeys, serves as a means.

The unfolding of these moments has now to be further
considered. This process is of such a kind that it must
arrest itself within certain limits, and for this reason
especially, that we are as yet only in the transition to
subjectivity ; the latter does not appear in a free and
truthful form ; there is still an intermixture here of
substantial unity and subjectivity. On the one hand,
subjectivity does indeed unite everything; on the other
hand, however, since it is as yet immature, it leaves the
Other outside, and this intermixture has therefore the
defect of that with which it is still entangled, namely,
the religion of nature. In reference to the nature of
the form in which Spirit has its self-consciousness con-
cerning itself as the object of its consciousness, the stage
now before us presents itself as the transition from the
earlier forms to the higher stage of religion. Subjectivity
does not as yet exist on its own account or for itself, and
is consequently not yet free, but it is the middle point
between substance and free subjectivity. This stage is
therefore full of inconsistencies, and it is the problem of
subjectivity to purify itself. This is the stage of Mystery
or enigma.

In this fermenting process all the moments present
themselves. For this reason the consideration of this
standpoint of thought possesses especial interest, because
both stages, the preceding one of the religion of nature
and the following one of free subjectivity, appear here in

94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

their principal moments, the two being not yet severed.
Accordingly there is here merely what is mysterious and
confused, and by means of the Notion alone can the clue
be obtained which indicates to which side such hetero-
geneous elements tend to come together, and to wrhich of
the two sides the principal moments belong.

The God is still the inner nature here, implicit power,
and for that reason the form this power may wear is
accidental, is an arbitrary one. This merely implicitly
existent power may be invested with this or the other
human or animal form. The power is unconscious, active
intelligence, which is not spiritual. It is mere Idea, not
subjective Idea, however, but vitality void of conscious-
ness— in fact, life. This is not subjectivity, is not self, in
fact ; but if life is to be presented as outward form at
all, the form that lies nearest at hand for the purpose is
that of some living creature. Within life in general the
living, in fact, lies hidden ; what particular living creature,
what animal, what human being this may be is a matter
of indifference. We thus find zoolatry present at this
stage, and. indeed, in the greatest variety : in different
localities different animals are held in reverence or wor-
shipped.

From the point of view of the Notion it is of more
importance that the subject is determined immanently
within itself, is in its reflection into itself, and this de-
termination is no longer the universal Good, though it
certainly is the Good, and thus has Evil over against it.
The next stage, however, is that actual subjectivity posits
differences in its determination, that differentiated Good
is posited here, an inner content ; and this content is of
a definite and not of a merely general or universal char-
acter. Not until differences can exist for me, not until
possibility of choice is present, and only to the extent in
which this is the case, is the subject an actual subject,
or, in other words, does freedom begin. In this way the
subject stands for the first time above particular ends, is

DEFINITE RELIGION 95

free from particularity, when the latter has not the range
of subjectivity itself, is no longer universal Good. ]t is
another thing when the Good is at the same time made
determinate, and is exalted into infinite wisdom. Here
a plurality of Good is determined, and thus subjectivity
occupies a position of superiority, and it appeals as its
choice to desire one thing or the other; the subject is
posited as deciding, and it appears as the determining of
ends and of actions.

The God as substantial unity does not appear as acting ;
he annihilates, begets, is the basis of things, but does not
act. Brahma, for example, does not act ; independent
action is either merely imagined, or else pertains to the
changing incarnations. Yet it is only a limited end or
purpose which can come in here ; the subjectivity is
merely the primal subjectivity, of which the content
cannot as yet be infinite truth.

It is at this point, too, that the outward form is deter-
mined as human, and thus there is a transition of the
god from the animal to human form. In free subjectivity
the form which directly corresponds with such a con-
ception is the human one alone ; it is no longer life only,
but free determination in accordance with ends, therefore
the human character appears as the form, it may be a
particular subjectivity, a hero or an ancient king, &c.
Here where the particular ends make their appearance
as in the first form of subjectivity, the human form is
not of the indefinite kind represented by Ormazd. On
the contrary, specialised forms make their appearance,
which have special ends, and are characterised by an
element of locality. The principal moments coincide
with this. That is to say, to speak more precisely,
developed definite character must show itself in the
subject ; the definite ends of action are limited, defined,
are not determinateness in its totality. Determinate
character must, however, show itself in the subject in
its totality too ; developed subjectivity must be beheld

96 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

in it. The moments are not, however, the totality of
the form, but present themselves in the first place as a
sequence, as a course of life, as different states of the
subject. Not until later does the subject as absolute
Spirit arrive at the stage at which its moments are
potential or implicit totality. Here the subject is still
formal, still limited as regards determinate character,
although Form in its entirety belongs to it, and thus
there is still this limitation, that the moments are de-
veloped into form as states only, and not each one for
itself as a totality ; and it is not eternal history which
is beheld in the subject as constituting the subject's
nature, but merely the history of states or conditions.
The first is the moment of affirmation, the second is
negation, the third is the return of negation into itself.

2. The second moment is the one which is of most
importance here. Negation shows itself as a certain
state of the subject ; it is its alienation, death, in fact.
The third is restoration, return to sovereignty. Death is
the most immediate way in which negation shows itself
in the subject, in so far as the latter has merely natural
form generally, and also definitely existing human form.
Further, this negation has besides the further character-
istic that since what is here is not eternal history, is not
the subject in its totality, this death comes to individual
existence as it were by means of an Other, and from
without, by means of the evil principle.

Here we have God as subjectivity generally, and the
most important moment in it is that negation is not
found outside, but is already within the subject itself,
and the subject is essentially a return into itself, is self-
contained existence, Being which is at home with itself.
This self-contained condition includes the difference which
consists in positing and having an Other of itself — nega-
tion— but likewise, in returning into itself, being with
self, identical with itself in this return.

There is One subject ; the moment of the negative, in

DEFINITE RELIGION 97

so far as it is posited as natural in the character of what
belongs to nature, is death. It is therefore the death of
the god, and this characteristic presents itself for the first
time here.

The negative element, this abstract expression, has
very many determinations — it is change, in fact ; change
also contains partial death. In the natural sphere this
negation shows itself as death ; thus negation is still in
the natural sphere, and not as yet purely in Spirit, in
the spiritual subject as such.

If it is in Spirit, this negation shows itself in the
human being itself, in Spirit itself as this determination,
namely, that its natural will is for it another will ; it
distinguishes itself in its essence, in its spiritual character
from its natural will. This natural will is here negation,
and man comes to himself, is free Spirit, in overcoming
this natural character, in having the natural particularity,
this Other of rationality reconciled with rationality, and
so being at home with himself, not outside of himself.

It is only by means of this movement, of this course
of thought, that such inner harmony, such reconciliation,
comes to exist. If the natural will shows itself as Evil,
then negation shows itself as something found. Man, in
the act of raising himself to his true nature, finds this
natural determination to be something opposed to what is
rational.

A higher conception, however, is that negation is that
which is posited by Spirit. Thus God is Spirit, in that
He begets His Son, the Other, posits the Other of
Himself, yet in Him is still with Himself, and beholds
Himself, and is eternal love. Here the negation is like-
wise the transient or vanishing element. This negation in
God is therefore that definite essential moment. Here,
however, we have only the general idea of subjectivity,
subjectivity in the general sense. Thus it comes to pass
that the subject itself passes through these different
states as its own states, in such a way that this negation

VOL. II. G

98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

is immanent in it. Then this determination, in so far
as this negation appears as a natural state, enters as the
determination of death, and the god appears here in the
character of subjectivity in his eternal history, and shows
himself to be the absolute Affirmative, which itself dies
—the moment of negation. He becomes alienated from
himself, loses himself, but through this loss of himself
finds himself again, returns to himself.

In this religion, then, it is one and the same subject
which passes through these different determinations.
The negative, which we had iu the form of the Evil One,
Ahriman, implying that negation does not belong to the
self of Orrnazd, belongs here to the self of the god.

We have already had negation in the form of death
too. In Hindu mythology there are many incarnations ;
Vishnu especially is the history of the world, and is now
in the eleventh or twelfth incarnation. The Dalailama
in like manner dies ; Indra, too, the god of the natural
sphere dies, and there are others who die and come back
again.

But this dying is different from the negativity which
is in question here, namely, death in so far as it pertains
to the subject. As regards this difference, all depends
en the logical determinations. In all religions analogies
may be found, such ideas as those of God becoming man
and of incarnations. The name Krishna has even been
put side by side with that of Christ. Such comparisons,
however, although the objects compared have something
in common, some similar characteristic, are utterly super-
ficial. The essential thing on which all depends is the
fuller characterisation of the distinction, which last is
overlooked.

Thus the thousandfold dying of Indra is of a different
kind from that above referred to. The Substance remains
one and the same ; it forsakes merely the particular
individual body of the one Lama, but has directly chosen
ior itself another. This dying, therefore, this negation,

DEFINITE RELIGION 99

has nothing to do with Substance, it is not posited in
the Self, in the subject as such. The negation is not
an actual inner moment, an immanent determination of
Substance, and the latter has not the pain of death
within itself.

Here, for the first time, we have the death of the god
as something within himself, implying that the negation
is immanent in his essential nature, in his very self, and
it is precisely owing to this that this god is essentially
characterised as Subject. The nature of a subject is to
give itself this otherness within itself, and through nega-
tion of itself to return to itself, to produce itself.

This death appears at first as something undignified ;
we have the idea that it is the lot of the finite to pass
away, and in accordance with this idea death, in so far as it
is spoken of in connection with God, is only transferred to
Him as a determination out of the sphere of that finite
which is inadequate to Him. God does not in this way
get to be truly known, but rather is debased by the
determination of negation. Over against that assertion
of the presence of death in the divine stands the demand
that God should be conceived of as a supreme Being,
only identical with himself, and this conception is
reckoned as the highest and most honourable, so that
it is only at the end that Spirit reaches it. If God be
thus conceived as the Supreme Being, He is without
content, and this is the poorest possible idea of Him, and
quite an antiquated one. The first step of the objective
attitude is the step to this abstraction, to Brahma, in
whom no negativity is contained. Good, light, is like-
wise this abstraction, which has the negative only out-
side of itself as darkness. From this abstraction an
advance is already made here to the concrete idea of
God, and in this way the moment of negation enters, at
first in this peculiar or special mode as death, inasmuch
as God is now beheld in human form. And thus the
moment of death is to be ranked high, as an essential

TOO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

moment of God Himself — as immanent in Essence. To
self-determination belongs the moment of inner, not out-
ward negativity, as is already implied in the expression
" self-determination." The death which here comes into
prominence is not like the death of the Lama, of Buddha,
of Indra, and other Indian deities, whose negativity is an
external one, and approaches them as a power that is
external to them. It is a sign that there has been an
advance toward conscious spirituality, to knowledge of
freedom, to the knowledge of God. This moment of
negation is an absolutely true moment of God. Death,
then, is a peculiar special form, in which negation makes
its appearance in an outward shape. By reason of the
divine totality the moment of immediate form must
become recognised in the divine Idea, for to it there
must be nothing wanting.

Thus the moment of negation is immanent in the
divine Notion, because it essentially belongs to it in its
outward manifestation. In the other religious we have
seen that the essential nature of God is merely deter-
mined as abstract Being-within-itself, absolute substan-
tiality of Himself. There death is not thought of as
belonging to substance, but is regarded merely as exter-
nal form, in which the god shows himself. It is quite
otherwise when it is an event which happens to the god
himself, and not merely to the individual iu whom he
presents himself. It is thus the essential nature of God
which comes into prominence here in this determination.

3. But now, further, we have in close connection
with this the idea that God restores himself, rises from
the dead. The immediate god is not God. Spirit is
alone what, as being free in itself, exists by its own act,-
what posits itself. This contains the moment of nega-
tion. The negation of the negation is the return into
self, and Spirit is the e-ternal return into self. Here
then at this stage we come upon Reconciliation. Evil,
death, is represented as vanquished, God is consequently

DEFINITE RELIGION 101

once more reinstated, restored again, and as thus eternally
returning into himself is he Spiiit.

(b.) The concrete idea belonging to this stage.

In this religion, as it actually exists in the religion of
the Egyptians, there occur an infinite variety of forms
or figures. But the soul or animating principle of the
Whole is what constitutes the chief characteristic, and it [_
is brought into prominence in the principal figure. This
is Osiris, who in the first place, it is true, has negation
opposed to him as external, as other than himself, as
Typhon. This external relation is not, however, perma-
nent in the sense of being only a strife such as that
carried on by Ormazd ; on the contrary, negation makes
its entrance into the subject itself.

The subject is slain, Osiris dies, but he is eternally
restored again, and he is thus posited in popular con-
ception as born a second time, this birth not having a
natural character, but being posited as something apart
from what is natural or sensuous. He is consequently
posited, defined as belonging to the realm of general
ideas, to the region of the Spiritual, which endures above
and beyond the finite, not to the natural sphere as such.

Osiris is the God of popular conception, the God con-
ceived of or mentally represented in. accordance with his
inner character. Accordingly in the idea that he dies,
but is likewise restored, it is expressly declared that he
is present in the realm of general ideas as opposed to
mere natural being.

But he is not only conceived of in this way ; he be-
comes known too as such. That does not mean the same
thing. As represented in the form of idea, Osiris is
defined as the ruler in the realm of Amenthes ; as he is
lord of the living, so also is he lord of what no longer
continues in sensuous existence, but of the continuously
existing soul, which has severed itself from the body,
from what is sensuous, perishable. The kingdom of the
dead is the realm where natural being is overcome, the

102 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

realm of ideas or ordinary thought where what is pre-
served is precisely that which has not natural existence.

Typhon, Evil, is overcome, and likewise pain, and
Osiris is the judge in accordance with law and justice.
Evil is overcome, is condemned ; and with this the act
of judgment makes its first appearance, and does so as
what decides ; that is to say, Good has the power to
assert itself, and to annihilate the non-existent, the evil.

If we say Osiils is a ruler of the dead, the dead are in
'this case just such as are not held to be in the sensuous
natural sphere, but have independent continuous exist-
ence in a region beyond what is sensuous and natural.
Connected with this is the fact that the individual sub-
ject is known as continuous, as something withdrawn
from the region of the transitory, as something having
a fixed, independent existence, something distinguished
from what is sensuous.

That is a thoroughly weighty saying of Herodotus re-
garding immortality, namely, that the Egyptians were
the first to declare that the soul of man is immortal. We
find this continued life, this metamorphosis in India and
China, but this, like the continued life of the individual,
the immortality of the Hindus, is itself merely some%
thing subordinate and unessential. What is with them
highest is not an affirmative permanent duration, but is
Nirvana, continuous existence in the state of annihilation
of the Affirmative, or only a semblance of affirmation,
the being identical with Brahma.

This identity, this union with Brahma, is at the same
time a melting away into this unity, which is, it is true,
seemingly affirmative, and yet is in itself utterly devoid
of determination and without differentiation. But what
we have here as a logical deduction is this : the highest
form of consciousness is subjectivity as such ; this is
totality, and is able to exist independently in itself ; it
is the idea of true independence or self-existence.

We call that independent or self- sustained which is

DEFINITE RELIGION 103

not in a condition of opposition, which rather overcomes
that opposition, does not contain a finite over against
itself, but has this opposition within itself, yet at the
same time has conquered there. This determination of
that subjectivity which is objective, which pertains to
the objective, namely, to God, is also the determination of
the subjective consciousness. This consciousness knows
itself as subject, as totality, true independent existence,
and consequently as immortal. With this knowledge the
higher destiny of man dawned upon consciousness.

This negation of the negation, namely, that death is
slain, that the evil principle is vanquished, is thus a
determination of supreme moment. Among the Parsis
that principle is not overcome, but the Good, Ormazd,
stands opposed to the Evil, Ahriman, and has not yet
arrived at this reflection. It is here in the Egyptian
religion that the vanquishing of the evil principle is for
the first time posited.

Herewith, accordingly, that determination comes in
which was mentioned above, and which we have already
recognised, namely, that this one who is born again, is
represented directly afterwards as having departed ; he
is ruler in the kingdom of Amenthes ; as he is Lord of
the living, so also is he Judge of the dead in accordance
with right and justice. Here for the first time right
and morality come in, in the determination of subjective
freedom ; both, on the contrary, are wanting in the God
of substantiality. So then there is a penalty or punish-
ment here, and the individual worth of man, which de-
termines itself in accordance with morality and right,
comes into prominence.

Around this Universal play an infinite number of
popular conceptions of deities. Osiris is only one of
these conceptions, and according to Herodotus is even
one of the latest ; but it is principally in the realm of
Amenthes as ruler of the dead, as Serapis, that he has
risen above all other gods as an object of supreme interest.

io4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Herodotus, following the statements of the priests,
gives a series of Egyptian gods, and Osiris is to be found
here among the later ones. But the further development
of the religious consciousness takes place also within a
religion itself, and we have already seen in the Indian
religion that the worship of Vishnu and Siva is of later
date. In. the sacred books of the Farsis Mithras is put
among the other Amshadspans, and stands 011 the same
level with them ; but Herodotus already gives prominence
to Mithras, and at the time of the Romans, when all
religions were brought to Rome, the worship of Mithras
was one of the principal religions, while the service of
Ormazd had not anything like the same importance.

Among the Egyptians, too, in the same manner Osiris
is said to be a deity of later date. It is well known
that in the time of the Romans, Serapis, a special form
of Osiris, was the principal deity of the Egyptians, and
yet, although it was in later times that the idea of him
dawned upon the human mind, he is none the less the
deity in whom the totality of consciousness disclosed itself.

The antithesis contained in the Egyptian view accord-
ingly next loses its profound meaning and becomes a
superficial one. Typhon is physical evil and Osiris the
vitalising principle; to the former belongs the barren
desert, and he is conceived as the burning wind, the
scorching heat of the sun. Another antithesis is the
natural one of Osiris and Isis, the sun and the earth,
which is regarded as the principle of procreation generally.
Thus Osiris too dies, is vanquished by Typhon, and Isis
seeks everywhere for his bones : the god dies, here again
is this negation. The bones of Osiris are then buried ;
he himself, however, has now become ruler of the kingdom
of the dead. Here we have the course of living nature,
a necessary cycle returning into itself. The same cycle
belongs also to the nature of Spirit, and the fate of
Osiris exhibits the expression of it. Here again the one
signifies the other.

DEFINITE RELIGION 105

To Osiris the other deities attach themselves ; he is
the uniting point, and they are only single moments of
the totality which he represents. Thus Ammon is the
moment of the Sun, which characteristic also pertains
to Osiris. There are besides a great number of deities
which have been called the deities of the calendar,
because they have a relation to the natural revolutions
of the year. Particular periods of the year, like the
vernal equinox, the early summer, and the like, are
brought into prominence and personified in the deities
of the calendar.

Osiris, however, signifies what is spiritual, not only
what is natural ; he is a lawgiver, he instituted mar-
riage, taught agriculture and the arts. In these popular
conceptions are found historical allusions to ancient
kings : Osiris consequently contains historical features
too. In the same way the incarnations of Vishnu seem
to point to the conquest of Ceylon in the history of
India.

Just as the special characteristics represented by
Mithras as being the most interesting were brought into
prominence, and the religion of the Parsis became the
worship of Mithras, so Osiris has become the central
point here; not, however, in the immediate, but in the
spiritual and intellectual world.

What has been said implies that subjectivity exists at
first in the form of idea or ordinary thought here. We
have to do with a subject, with a spiritual being con-
ceived after a human fashion. This subject is not, how-
ever, a man in his immediate character, his existence not
being posited in the immediacy of human thought, but
in that of popular conception or ordinary thought.

It is a content which has moments, movement in it-
self, by means of which it is subjectivity, but is also in
the form, on the plane of spirituality, exalted above the
Natural. Thus the Idea (Idee) is posited in this region
of general conception, but is marked by the deficiency

Io6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

consequent on its being merely a conception formed by
subjectivity, by subjectivity as resting on an abstract
basis.

The depths of the universal antithesis are not in it as
yet ; subjectivity is not yet grasped in its absolute univer-
sality and spiritual nature. Thus it is superficial, external
universality.

The content which is in idea or ordinary thought is
not bound to time ; it is posited in the region of Univer-
sality. The sensuous particularity which implies that
a thing exists at a definite time or in definite space is
stripped off. Everything, since it rests on a spiritual
basis, owing to the presence of general ideas, has univer-
sality, although very little of the sensuous is stripped
off — as, for example, in the idea of a house. The Univer-
sality is thus external Universality only, the possession
of certain common features.

That external Universality is still the predominating
principle here, is intimately connected with the fact that
the foundation, this idea of Universality, is not as yet
absolutely immersed in itself, is not as yet a filled up or
concrete basis in itself, which absorbs everything, and by
means of which natural things are posited ideally.

In so far as this subjectivity is the Essence, it is.
the universal basis, and the history which the subject is
becomes known at once as movement, life, as the history
of all things, of the immediate world. And so we have
the distinction which is implied in the fact that this
universal subjectivity is also the basis for the Natural.
It is the inner Universal, that which is the Substance of
the Natural.

We have, therefore, two elements here, the Natural
element and the inner Substance, and in this we have
what characterises symbolism. To natural Being a
foundation other than itself is attributed ; what is im-
mediate and sensuous acquires another substance. It is
no longer itself as immediate, but represents or means

DEFINITE RELIGION 107

something Other than itself, which is its substance, its
meaning.

Now in this abstract relation of things the history of
Osiris is the inner essential history of the Natural too —
of the nature of Egypt. To this belong the sun, its
course in the heavens, the Nile, which fertilises and
which fluctuates. The history of Osiris is therefore the
history of the sun ; the sun goes onward till it reaches
its culminating point, then it returns ; its rays, its
strength, become feeble, but afterwards it begins to lift
itself up again — it is born anew.

Thus Osiris signifies the sun and the sun Osiris, the sun
being conceived of as this cycle. The year is considered
as the single subject, which in its own history runs its
course through these diverse states. In Osiris what
belongs to nature is conceived of as being a symbol of
the subject's history.

Thus Osiris is the Nile, which increases, renders
everything fruitful, overflows, and through the heat —
here the evil principle comes into play — becomes small
and impotent, then again recovers its strength. The
year, the sun, the Nile are conceived as this cycle which
returns into itself.

The special aspects of such a course are represented
as existing momentarily apart and in independence, as
a multitude of gods who indicate particular aspects or
moments of this cycle. Now, if it be said that the Nile
is the inner element, that the meaning of Osiris is the
sun, the Nile, and the other gods are calendar deities,
such a statement would not be without truth. The one
is the kernel, the other what outwardly represents it,
the sign, the signifier, by means of which this inner
element manifests itself externally. At the same time,
however, the course of the Nile is universal history, and
they may be taken as standing to each other in a reci-
procal relation, the one as the inner element and the
other as the form of representation or of apprehension.

loS THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

AVhat really is that' inner element is Osiris, the subject,
this cycle which returns into itself.

In this mode of representing the truth it is the symbol
which is the dominant factor. We have an independent
inner element which has an external mode of existence,
and these two are distinct from one another. It is the inner
element, the subject, which is free here, which has be-
come independent, in order that that inner element may
be the substance of what is external, and may not be in
contradiction with it, may not be a dualism, but be the
signification, the independently self-existing idea, in con-
trast to the sensuous mode of existence in which last it
constitutes the central point.

The representation of subjectivity in this definite
shape as the central point is closely connected with the
impulse to give the idea visible form. The idea as such
must express itself, and it is man who must bring this
meaning out of himself and give it a visible form. The
immediate has already vanished if it is supposed to
appear under the conditions of sense-perception or in
some particular mode of immediacy, and the general
idea is under the necessity of giving itself completeness
in this way. If the general idea thus integrates itself;
this immediacy must be of a mediated character, a pro-
duction of man.

Formerly we had visibility, immediacy in a natural
unmediated mode, where Brahma has his existence, the
mode of his immediacy in thought, in the immersion
or sinking down of man into himself. Such was the
case too where the Good is light, and therefore in the
form of an immediacy which exists in an immediate
mode.

Since here, however, the starting-point is ordinary
thought or idea, this must give itself to a definite sen-
suous form, and must bring itself to immediacy. It is,
however, a mediated immediacy, because it is an im-
mediacy posited by man. It is the inner element which

DEFINITE RELIGION 109

is to be brought to immediacy : the Nile, the course of
the year, are immediate existences, but they are symbols
only of the inner element.

Their history, as natural, is gathered up and comprised
within idea, this unification, this course appearing as one
subject, and the subject itself is intrinsically the return-
ing movement already spoken of. This cycle is the
subject, which idea is, and which as the subject is to
make itself perceptible by sense.

(c.) Worship or cultus.

The impulse just described may be regarded as re-
presenting in general the cultus of the Egyptians, this
endless impulse to work, to describe or represent out-
wardly what is as yet only inward, contained in idea, and
for this reason has not become clear to the mind. The
Egyptians worked on for thousands of years. First of
all they put their soil into order ; but the work which
has relation to religion is the most amazing that has
ever been accomplished, whether upon the earth or
under it. Think of the works of art still in existence,
but in the form of parched and arid ruins, which, how-
ever, on account of their beauty and the toil which their
construction represents, have been a source of astonish-
ment to all the world.

It has been the task, the deed of this people to pro-
duce these works ; there was no pause in this production ;
we see the spirit labouring ceaselessly to render its idea
visible to itself, to bring into clearness, into conscious-
ness, what it inwardly is. This restless industry of an
entire people is directly based upon the definite character
which the god has in this religion.

First of all we may recall how, in Osiris, spiritual
moments too are revered, such as justice, morality, the
institution of marriage, art, and so forth. Osiris is,
however, in a special sense the lord of the realm of the
dead, judge of the dead. A countless number of pictures
or representations are to be found in which Osiris is

1 10 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

delineated as judge, while before him. is a scribe, who is
reckoning up for him the deeds of the soul brought into
his presence. This realm of the dead, that of Amenthes,
constitutes a principal feature in the religious conceptions
of the Egyptians. As Osiris, the life-giving, was opposed
to Typhon, the annihilating principle, and was the sun
of the earth, so the antithesis of the living and the dead
makes its first appearance here. The realm of the dead
is just as fixed a conception as the realm of the living.
The realm of the dead discloses itself when natural
Being is overcome ; it is just there that what has no
longer natural existence persists.

The enormous works of the Egyptians which still
remain to us are almost entirely those only which were
destined for the dead. The celebrated labyrinth had as
many chambers above as beneath the ground. The
palaces of the kings and priests have been transformed
into heaps of rubbish, while their tombs have bid defiance
to time. Deep grottos extending several miles in length
are to be found hewn in the rock for the mummies, and
all the walls are covered with hieroglyphics. But the ob-
jects which excite the greatest admiration are the pyramid- '
temples for the dead, not so much in memory of them,
as in order to serve them as burial-places and as dwell-
ings. Herodotus says that the Egyptians were the first
who taught that souls are immortal. It may occasion
surprise that, although the Egyptians believed in the im-
mortality of the soul, they yet devoted so much care to
their dead : one might think that man, if he holds the
soul to be immortal, would no longer have special respect
for his body. But, on the contrary, it is precisely those
peoples who do not believe in an immortality who hold
the body in slight esteem after its death, and do not
provide for its preservation. The honour which is
shown to the dead is wholly dependent upon the idea of
immortality. If the body falls into the power of the
forces of nature, which are no longer restrained by the

DEFINITE RELIGION in

soul, yet still man does not wish, at least that nature,
as such, should be that which exerts its power and
physical necessity over the exanimated body, that noble
casket of the soul. Man's desire is, on the contrary,
that he himself should exert this power over it. Men
accordingly endeavour to protect it against nature as
such, or give it themselves, by their own free will, as it
w.ere, back to the earth, or else annihilate it by means
of fire. In the Egyptian mode of honouring the dead
and preserving the body, there is no mistaking the fact
that man knew himself to be exalted above the power of
nature, and therefore sought to maintain his body against
this power, in order to exalt it above it too. The me-
thods followed by peoples in their treatment of the dead
stands in the closest connection with the religious prin-
ciple, and the different customs which are usual at burial
are not without bearings of very great importance.

In order then to understand the peculiar position of
Art at this stage, we have to recollect that subjectivity
does, as a matter of fact, begin to appear here, but as
yet only so far as its basis is concerned, and that its
conception or idea still passes over into that of substan-
tiality. Consequently the essential differences have not
yet mediated and spiritually permeated each other ; on
the contrary, they are as yet mixed together. Several
noteworthy features may be specified which elucidate
this intermixture and combination of what is present
and of living things with the Idea of the Divine, so that
either the Divine is made into something present, or on
the other hand into something human ; and in fact here
even animal forms become divine and spiritual moments
Herodotus quotes the Egyptian myth that the Egyptians
had been ruled by a succession of kings who were gods.
In this there is already the mixing together of the ideas
that the god is known as king, and again the king as
god. Further, we see in the countless number of the
representations of art which portray the consecration of

ii2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

kings, that the god appears as the consecrator and the
king as the son of this god ; then the king himself too
is found represented as Ammon. It is related of Alex-
ander the Great that the oracle of Jupiter Ammon de-
clared him to be the son of that god. This is quite in
accordance with the Egyptian character, for the Egyptians
said the very same of their kings. The priests were
esteemed at one time as the priests of the gods, and then
as God himself also. Many monuments and inscriptions
remain even from later times, where the Ptolemaic king
is always and only called the son of god, or God him-
self. The same thing happened in the case of the Eoman
Emperors.

Astonishing certainly, yet considering the mixture of
the conception of substantiality with that of subjectivity,
no longer inexplicable, is that Zoolatry the practice of
which was carried out by the Egyptians in the most rigid
manner. In various districts of Egypt special animals
were worshipped, such as cats, dogs, monkeys, and so
forth ; and this worship was even the occasion of wars
between the various districts. The life of such animals
was held absolutely sacred, and to kill them was to incur
severe punishment. Further, dwelling-places and estates
were granted to these animals, and provisions laid up for
them : indeed, it even happened in a time of famine that
human beings were permitted to die rather than that
those stores should be invaded. The apis was most of
all held in reverence ; for it was believed that this bull
represented the soul of Osiris. In the coffins in some of
the pyramids, apis bones were found carefully preserved.
Every form of this religion and every shape taken by it
is mingled with zoolatry. This worship of animals is un-
doubtedly connected with what is most offensive and
hateful. But it has been already shown in connection
with the religion of the Hindus how man could arrive at
the stage in which he worships an animal. If God be
not known as Spirit, but rather as po^Yer in general, then

DEFINITE RELIGION 113

this power is unconscious activity — universal life, it may
be. This unconscious power then appears under an out-
ward form, and first of all in that of an animal. An
animal is itself something devoid of consciousness, it leads
a dull, still life within itself, as compared with human
caprice or free-will, so that it may appear as if it had
within itself this unconscious power which works in the
whole.

Especially peculiar and characteristic, however, are the
forms under which the priests or scribes so frequently
appear in plastic representations and paintings with
animal masks ; and the same is the case with the em-
balmers of mummies. This duplicate form, — an external
mask concealing another form underneath it, — intimates
that the consciousness is not merely sunken in dull,
animal life, but also knows itself to be separated from
it, and recognises in it a further signification.

In the political state of Egypt, too, we find the struggle
of Spirit seeking to extricate itself from immediateness.
Thus history frequently mentions the conflicts of the
kings with the priestly caste, and Herodotus speaks of
these even from the earliest times. King Cheops caused
the temple of the priests to be shut up, while other kings
reduced the priestly caste to complete subjection and
excluded them from all power.

This opposition is no longer Oriental ; we see here the
human free-will revolting against religion. This emerg-
ence from a state of dependence is a trait which it is
essential to take into account.

It is especially, however, in naive and highly pic-
torial representations in artistic forms that this strug-
gling on the part of Spirit and its emergence from Nature,
are expressed. It is only necessary to think of the
image of the Sphinx, for example. In Egyptian works
of art everything, indeed, is symbolical ; the significance
in them reaches even to the minutest details ; even the
number of pillars and of steps is not reckoned in accord -

VOI* II. H

U4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ance with external suitability to ends, but means either
the months, or the feet that the Nile has to rise in order
to overflow the land, or something of a similar kind.
The Spirit of the Egyptian nation is, in fact, an enigma.
In Greek works of art everything is clear, everything
is evident ; in Egyptian art a problem is everywhere
presented ; it is an external sign, by means of which
something which has not been yet openly expressed is
indicated.

Even if, however, at this standpoint Spirit is still in
a state of fermentation, and still has the drawback of a
want of clearness, and if even the essential moments of
religious consciousness are in part mingled with one
another, and partly in this intermingling, or rather on
account of this intermingling, are in a state of mutual
strife, yet it is still free subjectivity which here takes
its rise, and thus it is precisely here that art too, more
correctly speaking fine art, must of necessity make its
appearance and is needful in religion. Art, it is true, is
imitation, but not that alone ; it may, notwithstanding,
arrest itself at that, but it is then neither fine art nor
does it represent a need belonging to religion. Only as
fine art does it pertain to the Notion of God. True art
is religious art, but art is not a necessity where God
has still a natural form ; for example, that of the sun
or of a river. It is also not a necessity in so far as
the reality and visibility of God are expressed in the
outward shape of a man or of an animal, nor when the
mode of manifestation is light. It begins, it is true,
when, as in the case of Buddha, the actual human form,
has dropped away, but still exists in imagination ; and
thus it has a commencement where there is imaginative
conception of the divine form, as, for example, in images
of Buddha ; in this case, however, the Divine is regarded
as at the same time still present in the teachers, his
followers. The human form in the aspect in which it
is the appearance of subjectivity, is only then necessary

DEFINITE RELIGION 1 1 5

when God is determined as subject. The need begins
to exist when the moment of Nature, of immediacy, is
overcome, in the conception of subjective self-determi-
nation or in the conception of freedom — that is to say,
at the standpoint which we have now reached. Inas-
much as the mode of definite Being is determined by
means of the inner element itself, the natural form is
no longer sufficient, nor is the imitation of it sufficient
either. All peoples, widi the exception of the Jews
and Mahommedans, have images of their gods ; these,
however, do not belong to fine art, but are mere per-
sonifications of conceptions or ideas, signs of merely
conceived or imagined subjectivity, where this last
does not as yet exist as immanent determination of
the Essence itself. Figurate conception or idea has an
external form in religion, and from this what is known
as pertaining to the Divine Essence is to be essentially
distinguished. In the Hindu religion God has become
man ; it is in totality that Spirit is always present :
whether, however, the moments are looked upon as
belonging to the Essence or as not belonging to it, is
what makes all the difference.

It thus becomes a necessity to represent God by
means of fine art when the moment of naturalness is
overcome, when Spirit exists as free subjectivity, and its
manifestation, its appearance in its definite existence, is
determined by means of Spirit from within, and exhibits
the character of something which is a spiritual produc-
tion. Not until God Himself has the determination of
positing the differences under which He appears, out of
His own inner Being, not until then does art enter as
necessary for the form given to the god.

Iii connection with the introduction here of art, two
moments specially deserve attention : first, that God is
presented in art as something capable of being beheld
by sense ; secondly, that as a work of art the god is
something produced by human hands. To our notions,

n6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

both of these represent modes which are inadequate to
the Idea of God — so far, that is to say, as they are
supposed to be the sole mode ; for of course we are all
aware that God has been outwardly visible to sense,
though only as a transient moment. Art, too, is not
the ultimate mode of our worship. But for the stage
of that subjectivity which is not as yet spiritualised,
which is thus itself as yet immediate, existence which
is visible in an immediate way is both adequate and
necessary. Here this is the entirety of the mode of
manifestation of what God is for self-consciousness.

Thus art makes its appearance here, and this implies
that God is apprehended as spiritual subjectivity. It is
the nature of Spirit to produce itself, so that the mode
of definite existence is one created by the subject, an
estrangement or externalisation which is posited by the
act of the subject itself. That the subject posits itself,
manifests itself, determines itself, that the mode of
determinate Being or existence in a definite form is one
posited by Spirit, is implied when art is present.

Sensuous existence, in which God is visibly beheld,
is commensurate with His Notion ; it is not a sign, but
expresses in every point that it is produced from within,
that it corresponds with thought, with the inner Notion.
But it has the defect of being still a sensuously visible
mode, — that the mode in which the subject posits itself
is sensuous. This defect is the consequence of its being
as yet subjectivity in its first form, the primal free
Spirit ; its determination is its first determination, and
thus its freedom is that of what is as yet natural,
immediate, primal determination ; that is to say, the
moment of Nature, of sense.

The other point is that the work of art is produced
by human beings. This, too, is inadequate to our Idea
of God. That is to say, infinite, truly spiritual subjec-
tivity, that which exists for itself as such, produces itself
by its own act, posits itself as Other, namely, as its out-

DEFINITE RELIGION 117

ward form or shape, and this last is posited by means of
subjectivity itself, and produced freely. But this its
assumption of form, which to begin with as the 1 = 1, is
as yet reflected into itself, must also have the determina-
tion of differentiation expressly in such a way that this
differentiation is merely determined by means of subjec-
tivity, or, in other words, that it merely appears in this
which is at first still something external. This first free-
dom further comes to have an additional element, namely,
that the outward embodiment produced by the subject is
taken back into subjectivity. What is First is thus the
creation of the world ; what is Second is the reconcilia-
tion, namely, that it reconciles itself in itself with the
true First. In the subjectivity which is before us at this
stage, this return is not as yet present, its mode of exist-
ence being as yet of an implicit character ; its existence
as subject is found outside of it in the form of Being-
for-other. The Idea is not as yet there ; for to it belongs
that the Other should of its own act reflect itself into the
primal unity. This second part of the process which
pertains to the divine Idea is not as yet posited here.
If we consider the determination as end or aim, then the
primal action of subjectivity regarded as an end is still a
limited end ; it has reference to this particular people,
this definite particular end, and if it is to become uni-
versal, a truly absolute end, the return is essential, and
the doing away with what is merely natural in respect
of the outward form is essential likewise. Thus, the
Idea is first present when this second part of the process
is added to the first, the part which annuls the natural
character, the limitation of the end, and it is owing to
this that it becomes for the first time an universal end.
Here Spirit as regards its manifestation is only the half
way of Spirit ; it is still one-sided finite Spirit, in other
words, subjective Spirit, subjective self-consciousness ; it
is the outward form of the god, the mode of his existence
for an " Other." The work of art is merely something

ii8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

accomplished, posited by the finite spirit, by the subjec-
tive spirit, and for this reason the work of art must be
executed by man. This explains why it is necessary
that the manifestation of the gods by means of art is a
manifestation fashioned by human hands. In the religion
of absolute Spirit the outward form of God is not made
by the human spirit. God Himself is, in accordance
with the true Idea, self-consciousness which exists in
and for itself. Spirit. He produces Himself of His own
act, appears as Being for "Other;" He is, by His own
act, the Son ; in the assumption of a definite form as the
Son, the other part of the process is present, namely,
that God loves the Son, posits Himself as identical with
Him, yet also as distinct from Him. The assumption of
form makes its appearance in the aspect of determinate
Being as independent totality, but as a totality which is
retained within love ; here, for the first time, we have
Spirit in and for itself. The self-consciousness of the Son
regarding Himself is at the same time His knowledge
of the Father ; in the Father the Son has knowledge of
His own self, of Himself. At our present stage, on the
contrary, the determinate existence of God as God is
not existence posited by Himself, but by what is Other.
Here Spirit has stopped short half way. This defect of
art, namely, that the god is made or fashioned by man,
is also felt in those religions in which this is the highest
manifestation, and attempts are made to remedy the
defect, not, however, in an objective, but in a subjective
way. Images of the gods must be consecrated ; alike
by the Negro and the Greek they are consecrated, that
is to say, the divine Spirit is put into them by a process
of conjuration. This results from the consciousness, the
feeling of defect ; but the mode of remedying it is one
which is not contained in the objects themselves, but
comes to them from without. Even among the Catholics
such consecration takes place ; of pictures, for example,
relics, and the like.

DEFINITE RELIGION 119

This explains the necessity there is that art should
make its appearance here, and the moments indicated
are those from which it results that the god exists as
a work of art. Here, however, art is not yet free and
pure ; it is not as yet even in the process of transition
to fine art. In this perverted state it still presents itself
in such a way that outward forms which belong to im-
mediate nature, and which are not produced by Spirit,
such as the sun, animals, &c., do just as well as any
other for self-consciousness. The artistic form which
breaks forth out of an animal, the form of the Sphinx,
is more a mixture of artistic form and animal form.
Here a human countenance looks forth upon us from
the body of an animal ; subjectivity is as yet not clear
or manifest to itself. The artistic form is therefore not
as yet purely beautiful, but is more or less imitation and
distortion. The general character of this sphere is the
intermingling of subjectivity and substantiality.

The artistic activity of this whole people was not as
yet absolutely pure fine art, but rather the impulse towards
the fine art. Fine art contains this determination, namely,
that Spirit must have become in itself free — free from
passion, from the natural life in general, from a condition
of subjugation or thraldom produced by means of inner
and outer Nature ; it must feel the need to know itself as
free, and thus to exist as the object of its consciousness.

In so far as Spirit has not yet arrived at the stage of
thinking itself free, it must picture itself as free, must
have itself before itself as free Spirit in sensuous per-
ception. If it is thus to become an object for sensuous
perception in the mode of immediacy, which is a product,
this involves that its definite existence, its immediacy, is
wholly determined by means of Spirit, has entirely such
a character as implies that here it is a free spirit which
is described.

This, however, is precisely what we call the Beautiful,
in which all externality is absolutely significant and

120 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

characteristic, and determined by the inner element as
representing that which is free. We have here a natural
material which implies that the features in it are simply
tokens of the Spirit which is essentially free. The natural
moment must, in fact, be overcome, that it may serve for
the expression, the revelation of Spirit.

While the content in the Egyptian characteristic quality
is this subjectivity, the impulse present here toward fine
art is one which is worked out architecturally for the
most part, and has at the same time endeavoured to pass
over to beauty of form. Inasmuch, however, as it was
only impulse, beauty itself as such has not as yet actually
appeared here.

Such then is the source of this conflict between the
signification and the material of the external form in
general; it is only the attempt, the effort, to stamp
the inward Spirit upon the outward embodiment. The
pyramid is an independent crystal, in which a dead man
dwells ; in the work of art, which is pressing forward
toward beauty, the inner soul is impressed upon the exter-
nality of the form employed.

What we have here is simply the impulse, because the
signification and actual representation, the mental idea and
the actual definite form of existence, are in fact opposed to
one another in this difference, and this difference exists
because subjectivity is, to begin with, merely universal,
abstract, and is not yet concrete, filled up subjectivity.

The Egyptian religion thus actually exists for us in
Egyptian works of art, since what these tell us is bound
up with what is historical, and which has been preserved
to us by ancient historians. In recent times especially,
the ruins of the land of Egypt have been explored in a
variety of ways, and the dumb language of the statues, as
also, of the mysterious hieroglyphics, has been studied.

If we must recognise the superiority of a people which
has laid up its Spirit in works of language over one
which has only left dumb works of art behind it for

DEFINITE RELIGION 121

posterity, we must at the same time recollect that here
among the Egyptians no written documents are in exist-
ence, for the reason that Spirit had not as yet clarified
itself, as it were, but was struggling to clear itself of
alien elements, and this in an external way, as appears
in the works of art. At last, it is true, after prolonged
study, advance has been made in the deciphering of
hieroglyphics, but, on the one hand, there is still a part
of this work which is unaccomplished, and on the other
hand, they always remain hieroglyphics. Numerous rolls
of papyrii have been found beside the mummies, and it
was at first believed that a great treasure had been dis-
covered in these, and that we had come upon important
disclosures. These papyrii are, however, nothing else
than a species of archives, and contain for the most part
deeds of purchase regarding pieces of land, or have refer-
ence to objects which the person deceased had acquired.

It is, therefore, principally the extant works of art
whose language we have to decipher, and from which a
knowledge of this religion may be obtained.

Now, if we contemplate these works of art, we find
that everything in them is wonderful and fantastic, but
always with a definite meaning, which was not the case
among the peoples of India. We thus have the immediate-
ness of externality here, and the meaning, the thought.
We have all these elements together in the tremendous
conflict of the inner with the outer ; there is a tremendous
impulse on the part of what is inner to work itself free,
and what is outer exhibits to us this struggle of Spirit.

The form is not as yet exalted into form that is free
and beautiful, not as yet spiritualised into clearness,
transparency ; the sensuous, the natural, is not as yet
so perfectly transfigured into the spiritual as to be merely
an expression of the spiritual, so that this organisation
and its features might be mere signs, merely the signi-
fication of the spiritual. To the Egyptian principle this
transparency of the natural, of the external element of

122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

outward embodiment, is wanting ; what remains is only
the task of becoming clear to self, and the spiritual con-
sciousness as being the inner element merely seeks to
struggle out of naturalness and be free.

The most important representation by which the essen-
tial nature of this struggle is made perfectly plain is
the statue of the goddess at Sais, who was represented
veiled. It is symbolised in that statue, and in the in-
scription in her temple, " I nm what was, is, and shall
be ; my veil has been lifted by no mortal," it is expressly
declared that Nature is something differentiated within
itself, namely, an Other in contrast to its outward ap-
pearance as that immediately presents itself, an enigma.
It has an inner element, something that is hidden.
" But," it is stated further in this inscription, " the fruit
of my body is Helios." This as yet hidden essence there-
fore expresses clearness, the sun, the becoming clear to
oneself, the spiritual sun in the form of the son who is
born of her. It is this clearness which is attained to in
the Greek and Jewish religion, in the former in art and
in the beautiful human form, in the latter in objective
thought. The enigma is solved ; the Egyptian Sphinx,
according to a deeply significant and admirable myth,
was slain by a Greek, and thus the enigma has been
solved. This means that the content is man, free, self-
knowing Spirit.

SECOND DIVISION
THE RELIGION OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY.

The Religion of Nature is the most difficult to get a
grasp of, because it lies farthest from our ordinary thought,
and is the crudest and most imperfect form of religion.
The natural element has such a variety of shapes within
itself, that in the form of naturalness and immediateness
the universal absolute content is broken up.

DEFINITE RELIGION 123

A.

TRANSITION TO THE SPHERE OF SPIRITUAL
INDIVIDUALITY.

"What is higher is also deeper ; in it the separate
moments are grasped together in the ideality of subjec-
tive unity ; the want of connection which characterises
immediacy is annulled, and the separate elements are
brought back into subjective unity. For this reason it is
necessary that what has the quality of naturalness should
manifest such a multiplicity of outward shapes, which
exhibit themselves as indifferent and mutually exclusive,
as independent and individual forms of existence.

The general characteristic is free subjectivity which
has satisfied its impulse, its inner desire. It is free
subjectivity which has attained to dominion over the
finite generally, over the natural and finite elements of
consciousness, whether physical or spiritual, so that now
the subject, that is, Spirit as spiritual subject, becomes
known in its relation to the natural and the finite, while
the latter are in part merely subservient to Spirit, and in
part the garment of Spirit, and are present concretely in
Spirit. Further, as outwardly representing Spirit, the
natural and finite merely serve as a manifestation and
glorification of Spirit. Spirit in this freedom, power,
reconciliation with itself, exists on its own account, free
and untrammelled in the natural ; the external, the finite,
is distinguished from these finite-natural and spiritual
elements, from what belongs to the region of empirical,
changeable consciousness, as well as to that of external
existence.

Such is the general fundamental characteristic of this
stage. Spirit being free, and the finite only an ideal mo-
ment in it, it is posited as inherently concrete, and inas-
much as we look upon Spirit and the freedom of Spirit
as concrete, what we have is rational Spirit ; the content
constitutes the rationality of Spirit.

124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

This deterruinateness first referred to, looked at from
the point of view of its content, is in its formal aspect
this, namely, that the natural, the finite, are simply wit-
nesses to Spirit, are simply subservient to its manifesta-
tion. Here we have the religion within which rational
Spirit is the content.

The next step in advance, therefore, is that the free
form of subjectivity, the consciousness of the Divine,
comes into view in an unalloyed and independent form,
in the character of free subjectivity, so far as this can be
in the first form of spirituality which has become free.
That this last, however, is known exclusively for itself,
or, in other words, that the Divine is determined on its
own account as subjectivity, represents a purifying from
the natural, which has been already referred to in the'
previous discussion. The subject is exclusive ; it is the
principle of infinite negativity, and since as regards its
content it is universal, it leaves nothing existing inde-
pendently beside it which is devoid of Spirit, or is merely
natural ; and in like manner nothing which is merely
substantial, essentially devoid of form. Subjectivity is
infinite Form ; and as such, it no more leaves to Form
which is not free, that is to say external naturalness, any
independent existence along side of it, than it does to
empty, pure, undetermined substantiality. The funda-
mental determination is that God becomes known as
freely determining Himself within Himself ; still formally,
it is true, but yet already freely within Himself. We
fire able to recognise this emergence of free subjectivity
in religions and in the peoples to which such religions
belong, principally by observing whether among such
peoples universal laws, laws of freedom, justice, and
morality, constitute fundamental determinations and have
the predominance. God conceived of as subject is con-
ceived of as spontaneously determining himself, i.e., His
self-determinations are the laws of freedom ; they are
the determinations of self-determination, and are of such

DEFINITE RELIGION 125

a kind that their content belongs only to the form of free
self-determination, and with this is necessarily connected
the fact that freedom constitutes the content of the laws.
When we perceive this, the element of naturalness or
immediacy retires into the background, and inherently
universal ends show themselves — ends which are in-
herently universal, although externally they may be
quite unimportant, or, so far as their range is concerned,
are not yet universal, just as a man who acts from
ethical motives may perform his actions within a sphere
extremely restricted, so far as its general content is con-
cerned, and yet be essentially moral. The brighter sun
of Spirit makes the natural light pale before it. Thus
we pass outside of the circle of the Eeligion of Nature.
We come to gods who are essentially founders of states
and marriage, founders of peaceful life, producers of art
which originates solely with them, gods who preside over
oracles and states, and who originate and protect law
and morality. The peoples who have reached that stage
in the development of self-consciousness in which sub-
jectivity is recognised to be the ideality of the natural,
have thereby crossed over into the sphere of ideality,
into the kingdom of the soul, and have come to the
region belonging to the realm of Spirit. They have torn
from their eyes the bandage of sensuous perception,
escaped from the trackless maze which is devoid of
thought, they have laid .hold of thought, of the Intel-
lectual Sphere, and have made and secured for them-
selves the solid ground in what is inward. They have
laid the foundations of the sanctuary which in its very
nature is firm and stable.

The progress made up to this point has been as
follows : — We started from the natural desires as seen
in the religion of magic, from the authority and power
of these desires over Nature, gained simply by indi-
vidual will which is not determined by thought. The
second stage was occupied by the theoretical deterrni-

126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

nation of the independence of objectivity, in which
accordingly all the moments were set free and released,
and reached the state of independence. In the third
stage was found the theoretical or self-determining
element, which took back into itself these moments
thus released, so that the practical element is thus made
theoretical, the Good self-determination, and, finally, the
blending of substantiality and subjectivity.

If we now ask,— How has the idea of God been
defined so far ? What is God ? What have we learned
about Him ? The answer is as follows : —

In accordance with the abstract form of the meta-
physical Notion we began thus : God is the unity of
the Infinite and the Finite, and our sole concern is to
find out how particularity and determinateness, i.e., the
finite, is incorporated with the infinite. What result
have we as regards this point so far reached ? God is
the infinite in general, what is identical with itself,
substantial power. When we start by saying this, it is
not implied that fiuitude is as yet posited as contained
in it, and it is, to begin with, the purely immediate exist-
ence of the infinite self-consciousness. From the fact
that God is just infinitude, substantial power, it follows,
and it is consciously implied in it, that the substantial
Power alone is the truth of finite things, and that their
truth consists only in this, that they return into the
substantial unity. God is thus, to begin with, the Power
referred to, a definition which, being purely abstract, is
extremely imperfect. The second position is that God
is the substantial Power in Himself, pure Being-for-self,
separate from the manifoldness of the finite. This is
substantiality which is reflected into itself, and this is
the essential conception of God. With this idea of sub-
stantiality which exists within itself and distinguishes
itself from the finite, we have reached higher ground,
but here the determination of the true relation of the
finite to the substantial Power, whereby the latter would

DEFINITE RELIGION 127

itself corne to be tbe infinite, does not yet exist. This
inherently existing substantiality is accordingly Brahma,
and the independently existing finite is represented by
the many gods. The third position is that in which the
finite is posited as identical with substantiality, so that
its sphere is of similar extent to that of the latter, and
is pure universal form, as substantiality itself is. This
is God conceived of as The Good.

Spiritual subjectivity, the conception at which we
have how arrived, is the absolutely free power of self-
determination, so that this is nothing else than the
Notion, and has no content but the Notion ; and in this
self-determination there is nothing beyond the fact that
it contains itself. This self-determination, this content,
is accordingly as universal, as infinite, as the Power
itself. This universal Power, which now shows itself
active in the form of self-determination, we may call
Wisdom. In so far as we have to do with spiritual
subjectivity we have to do with self-determination, with
an end, and these are as universal as the Power, and are
thus wise ends. Determination in accordance with an
end is directly involved in the conception of free sub-
jectivity. Action which is in accordance with an end
is inner self-determination, i.e., it is determination by
means of freedom, by means of the subject, for there is
nothing within but just the subject itself.

This self-determination maintains itself in external
existence, natural being has no longer any worth in its
immediacy, it belongs to the Power, is a transparent
medium for it, and has no value for itself. In so far as
it takes on an external form — and it must externalise
itself, subjectivity must give itself reality — it is simply
free self-determination which maintains itself in realising
itself, in external existence, in the natural sphere. In
the case of action which is in conformity with an end,
nothing comes out of it unless what is already there.
Immediate existence, on the other hand, is bereft of power,

i;8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

as it were, is form only, is the mode only in which the
end is present in it, and it is the end which is the inner
element.

We find ourselves here accordingly in the sphere of
the End, and action which is in conformity with an end
is wise action, since wisdom consists in acting according
to ends which hold good universally ; and no other con-
tent is actually present in it, for it is free subjectivity
which determines itself.

The general conception here is that of subjectivity, of
power which works in accordance with ends, which is
active in fact. Subjectivity, speaking generally, consists
in being active, and the end must be a wise one, it must
be identical with what determines it, with the unlimited
Power.

i. What we have first to consider here is the relation
of the subject to Nature, to natural things, and more
particularly to what we previously called Substantiality,
the Power which has only potential being. This remains
something inward, but subjectivity is Power which has
independent actual being, and is different from Power
which has potential being and from its reality, namely,
Nature. This Power which has potential being, Nature,
is now degraded to the condition of something powerless,
something dependent relatively to the underived Power,
or, to put it more definitely, it is made a means. Natural
things are deprived of their own independent existence.
Hitherto they had a direct share in Substance, while now
they are in the subjective Power separated from substan-
tiality, distinguished from it, and are regarded as only
negative. The unity of the subjective Power is outside
of them, is distinguished from them. They are only
means or modes which have no more value beyond serving
for manifestation ; they are the material of manifestation
and are subject to what manifests itself in them ; they
may no longer show themselves directly, but must reveal
a something higher in them, namely, free subjectivity.

DEFINITE RELIGION 129

2. But what is the more definite determination con-
nected with the idea of wisdom ? It is, to begin with,
undetermined so far as the end is concerned. We do
not as yet know of what it consists, what the ends of
this Power are, and do not go beyond the undefined
phrase, the wisdom of God. God is wise, but what are
His ways, His ends ? In order that we may be able to
say what they are, the ends must be already before us
in all their determinateness and definiteness, i.e., in their
development as a distinction of moments. So far we
have here only determination in accordance with ends
in general.

3. Since God is above all things real, we cannot, in
considering Him, stop short at this indeterminateness in
wisdom. The ends must be determined. God as subject
manifests Himself, acts, which means that He comes
forward into actual existence, into reality. At an earlier
stage the unity of infinitude and finitude was regarded
as simply immediate, and was thus the first and best of
finite things, sun, hill, river, &c., and the reality was of
an immediate kind. Here it is also necessary that God
be in a definite place, i.e., that His end be definite and
determined.

In reference to the reality of the end there are two
points which call for notice. The first is contained in
the question, What is the sphere in which this end can
be present ? The end, as being something inward, is
merely subjective, is only thought or idea. God, how-
ever, as subjective Power, is not simply will, intention,
&c., but rather immediate Cause. This sphere of the
realisation of the actual existence of the end is self-con-
sciousness or the finite spirit. End is determination in
general, and here we have determinations which are
merely abstract and not as yet developed. The finite
spirit is accordingly the sphere in which the divine end
shows itself. Since it is only now that we first reach
the thought of the determination of wisdom in general,

VOL. n. I

130 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

we have not any content, anything definite, whereby to
express what is wise. The end is potential, is yet un-
determined in the notion of God, and so we have to take
a second and further step, and show that the end must
become actual, must be realised. There must, therefore,
be determination in it, but the determination is not as
yet developed. The determination as such, the develop-
ment, has not as yet taken an actual form within the
Divine Essence, and for this reason the determination
is finite, external, an accidental or particular end. In so
far as it exists, it exists in an undefined form in the divine
notion, but so far as it is determined it is an accidental
and entirely limited end ; or, to put it otherwise, what
constitutes it is something outside of the divine notion,
an end which can be distinguished from it, not the divine
end in all its completeness in and for itself, i.e., not an
end which would be developed from its own inner nature,
and would in its particular forms express the determi-
nateness of the divine notion.

In studying the Religion of Nature, we saw that in it
goodness was as universal as power; but speaking gene-
rally, it does not go beyond expressing the idea of sub-
stantial immediate identity with the Divine Essence, and
all things accordingly are good and full of light. Here,
in the determination of subjectivity, of Power which has
independent existence, the end is distinguished from the
notion, and the definite form given to the end is just for
this reason merely accidental, because the difference has
not yet been taken back into the divine notion, is not yet
considered as equivalent to it. Here, therefore, we have
only ends which, so far as their contents are concerned,
are finite, and are not as yet adequate to express the
divine notion. Finite self-consciousness is thus, to begin
with, the region in which they are realised. This is
the fundamental characteristic of the standpoint we have
got to.

DEFINITE RELIGION 131

B.

THE METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTION OR NOTION OF
THIS SPHERE.

It is the pure abstract thought-determination which
forms the basis here. We abstract as yet from idea or
mental representation, as also from the necessity of the
realisation of the Notion, a necessity which does not
exactly belong to idea, but is rather one which the
Notion itself renders necessary. Here we have the
metaphysical notion in its relation to the form taken by
the Proofs of the Existence of God. The special charac-
teristic of the metaphysical notion, as contrasted with the
foregoing, lies in this, that in the case of the latter we
started from the unity of the Infinite and the finite. The
Infinite was absolute negativity, undeveloped Power, and
the thought involved in the first sphere and its essence
were limited to this definition of infinitude. In that
sphere the notion, so far as we are concerned, was un-
doubtedly that of the unity of the finite and the Infinite ;
but in reference to this stage itself, the Essence was
defined simply as the Infinite. This latter forms the
basis, and the finite was merely added to it; and just for
this reason the determination assumed a natural aspect,
and was accordingly the Eeligion of Nature, because the
form required natural existence in order to show itself in
a definite actual shape. The Eeligion of Nature already
proved also the inadequacy of what is immediately ex-
ternal to express what is internal. In the conception of
the Immeasurable it passed beyond the immediate identity
of the natural and the Absolute, and also beyond that of
immediate Being and Essence. But the external form
when stretched out to the Immeasurable snaps, as it
were, natural Being vanishes, and begins to exist for itself
as the Universal. Infinitude is not yet, however, imma-
nent determination, and, in order to represent it, use is

132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

still made of natural forms which are external and inade-
quate. In proportion as the Natural is posited as exist-
ing negatively in the Immeasurable, is it also positive
looked at in its finite existence, as opposed to the Infinite.
Or, to put it otherwise, the Immeasurable, which, in pro-
portion as everything disappears within it, is in like pro-
portion also powerless, is the contradiction of Power
and powerlessness. In contrast to this, we have now
the Essence itself defined as the unity of the Infinite and
the finite, as true Power, as infinitude which is concrete
in itself, i.e., as the unity of the finite and the Infinite.
It is this, accordingly, that we have in the determination
of wisdom which is the Power which determines itself
within itself, and this determination is the finite aspect,
and thus the Divine is known as what is concrete in
itself, inherently infinite form. This form is the aspect
of the finite as potential, but posited here under the
aspect of the Infinite. In the concrete ideality of the
Essence the contradiction referred to as existing in the
Immeasurable is done away with, since the Essence is a
manifestation of itself for itself, and not an abstract being-
for-self. Posited as Power, it is the absolute negativity
which differentiates itself, but in such a way that the
differences are done away with, and are only a sem-
blance. That is powerful which has the soul, the Idea of
the " Other," which the Other is in its immediacy only.
Whatever thinks that which the " Others " only are, con-
stitutes their Power. The Essence (not a particular
Essence or one higher Essence) — i.e., the Universe as
absolute Power — is satisfied in itself and is Totality, since
all other determinations are taken up into and absorbed
in it. In order to be, it does not have recourse to natural
objects, but has a determinate character of its own within
itself, and is the totality of its appearance or semblance.

Since thus the determination of pure thought belongs
to the determining or characterisation of the Essence
itself, it follows that further advance in characterisation

DEFINITE RELIGION 133

is not connected with the natural mode or aspect of
things, but takes place within the Essence itself. If,
accordingly, we are to find three stages here, then they
constitute an advance within the metaphysical notion
itself. They are moments in the Essence, different forms
of the notion for the religious self-consciousness which
occupies this standpoint. At an earlier stage the ad-
vance was merely in the external form, here the advance
is within the notion itself. Now, the Divine Essence is
actual Essence, Essence for itself, and the differences are
its own reflection of itself into itself. We thus get three
conceptions. The first is that of Unity, the second that
of Necessity, the third that of Conforrnability to an End,
though of conformability which is finite and external.

We have (a.) Unity, absolute Power, negativity, which
is posited as reflected into itself, as existing absolutely
for self, or as absolute subjectivity, so that here, in this
particular form of essential being, the sense element is
directly abolished. It is Power which is actual, for itself,
and has within it nothing belonging to sense, for this
latter is the finite, which has not yet been taken up
into, is not yet absorbed by, the Infinite. Here, however,
it is in process of being absorbed. This subjectivity,
which is actual, which exists for itself, is accordingly the
One.

We have (5.) Necessity. The One is this absolute
Power, and everything is posited in it as merely negative.
This constitutes the conception or notion of the One.
But when we express it thus, development is not as yet
postulated. The One is nothing more than the form of
simplicity, and necessity then comes to be the process of
unity itself. It is the unity as inner movement, and is
no longer the One, the unit, but the unity. The move-
ment which constitutes the Notion is the unity, the
absolute necessity.

We have (c.) Conformability to an End. In absolute
necessity is posited or made explicit the movement which

134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the One is only implicitly. It is the process, and it is the
process of contingent things, for it is contingent things
which are thus posited and negated. In necessity, how-
ever, it is only the transition, the coming and going of
things, which is posited. But now it must be further
posited that these things exist and appear as distinguished
from this unity of theirs, from this process of necessity
which belongs to them. They must appear, at all events,
momentarily as existing, and at the same time as belonging
to the power out of which they do not pass. They are
thus means in general, and the unity consists in this, that
it maintains itself within this process which belongs to it,
and produces itself in these means. This is the unity of
necessity itself, but thought of as distinguished from what
moves itself, and within which it maintains itself, so that
it has the element of Being only as something negative.
Unity is thus End in general.

These three points stand in the following relation to
each other. Since the Essence is absolute negativity, it
is pure identity with itself, the One ; it is at the same
time the negativity of the unity, which, however, is in a
relation to the unity, and owing to this interpenetration
of both shows itself as necessity. In the third place,
the One returns into itself out of the isolation of its
difference, a unity, nevertheless, which, as being this self-
absorption of the Form into itself, has a finite content,
and in this way, by developing into the difference of the
Form as totality, gives us the conception of con for in ability
to an end, a conformability which is, however, finite.

When it is said that in this are contained the three
metaphysical notions or conceptions of the three religions,
it is not to be supposed that each of these conceptions
belongs to one religion only. On the contrary, each of
these three determinations or characteristics belongs to
all three. Where One is the Essence, there too is
necessity though only implicit, not in its determinate
quality ; and so, too, if the One determines Himself in

DEFINITE RELIGION 135

accordance with ends, then He is wise. Necessity is
One also, and conformability to an end is present here
also, only it lies outside of necessity. If conformability
to an end is the fundamental characteristic, we have along
with this the presence of the Power to carry out the
ends, and the end itself is Fate. The point of difference
simply is as to which of these determinations of the
object is to be regarded as the Essence, and whether this
latter is the One, or Necessity, or Power with its ends.
The point of difference is simply as to which of them is
to pass as the fundamental determination of the Essence
for each religion.

What we have now to consider more definitely is the
form in which these determinations appear as they have
been connected with the proofs of the existence of God.

(a.) The Conception of the One.

Here we have not got to do with the proposition,
God is only one ; for it is implied in these words that
the One is only a predicate of God ; we have the subject,
God, and a predicate outside of which He may have others
in addition to this. That God is only One is a proposi-
tion which it is not difficult to prove. Being passes over
into Essence, and this reflected into itself is what has
been frequently called an Ens, or Individuum. When
we say, God is the One, we mean something different
from what was expressed formerly in the words, The
Absolute Being is One, TO eV. Parmenides expressed it
thus : Being alone is, or the One only is. This One,
however, is only the abstract Infinite, not the Infinite
as reflected into itself, and is thus rather the Immeasur-
able and Powerless, for it is the Infinite only as com-
pared with actual existence in its infinitely manifold
forms, and its existence is necessarily dependent on this
relation. Power at first conceived of as the One is in
reality the Universal posited as Power. The abstract
One is the one side, and over against it is the manifold-
ness of the essence of the world. The concrete One, on

)3$ THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the other hand, is individuality, the Universal, \vhat is
reflected into itself, the other side of which itself com-
prises all being in itself, so that it has returned into its
own unity.

Reflection accordingly conceives of the unity of God
as a characteristic quality, and seeks to demonstrate it.
This, however, does not supply the form in which to
express a proof of the existence of God. The One is
distinguished from the substratum, and the point is
simply to exhibit the characteristic of Being as One.
Reflection lights upon this idea because One is just
reflection into self.

Accordingly this characteristic or determination that
God is only One has reference, to begin with, only to the
Many with which it is contrasted, and so far also to the
other Form, which will be dealt with as the second Form
belonging to this stage. The disproof of the determina-
tion which comes later is thus given here in advance.
This second form in itself and in the determination of
its notion is undoubtedly more concrete; but as definite
or determined Being in and for itself when it appears as
Necessity is only something that ought to be, an ideal,
and because it is only what ought to be is thus multi-
plicity, it has not as yet absolute reflection-into-self, and
it is wanting in the characteristic of being One. Doubt-
less the characteristic of the One is also as yet one-sided,
since it is only the abstract form in an actual state, for
itself, and is not the developed form in the shape of
content.

The development of the necessity of this characteristic
of the One, the rising up to this one Subject as the One,
is carried out thus. Being as One is conceived of as
predicate, while God is presupposed as subject, and it is
then shown that the characteristic of multiplicity is op-
posed to the presupposition of this subject. The relation
belonging to the Many can thus be considered as consist-
ing in their reference to each other; they are then thought

DEFINITE RELIGION 137

of as coming into contact with each other, and getting
into conflict with themselves. This conflict is, however,
the appearance of the contradiction itself in an immediate
way, for the different gods have to maintain themselves
in accordance with their own nature or quality, and it is
here that their finitude comes to light. In so far as God
is presupposed as being the Universal or the Essence, that
finitude which is involved in the multiplicity is inadequate
to express what is contained in that presupposition.

In the case of finite things we are accustomed to think
that substances may be in conflict without losing their
independence. It would seem, then, that it is only their
superficial elements which they send out to engage in
the conflict, while they keep their real selves in the
background. In accordance with this a distinction is
made between the inner nature of the subject and its
relations, between the substance considered in reference
to others and the substance as passive, without prejudice
to its aforesaid activity. This distinction is as yet un-
proved. What the many are so far as content and power
are concerned, they are only in contrast with something
else ; their Being, as reflected into self, is simply some-
thing devoid of content. If they are thus, so far as form
also is concerned, independent, they are, nevertheless,
finite so far as the content is concerned, and this succumbs
to the same process of dialectic as that to which finite
Being has to yield. In face of the presupposition of ab-
solute Power, of the universal negativity of all that has
Being, the multiplicity of such formal finite things accord-
ingly directly disappears. It is directly involved in the
presupposition of the Universal, that form and content
cannot be so separated that a quality can attach to the one
which is wanting to the other. Thus the gods by means
of their qualities directly cancel each other.

Multiplicity is, however, in this case taken also in the
sense of pure difference which does not come in contact
with itself. Thus we speak of a multiplicity of worlds

138 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

which do not come into conflict and are not in contra-
diction with each other. Ordinary thought obstinately
clings to this idea by maintaining that the truth of such
a presupposition cannot be controverted because no con-
tradiction is involved in it. It is, however, really one
of the ordinary bad forms of Reflection to say that it is
possible to form an idea of anything. It is certainly
possible to form to oneself an idea of everything, and to
conceive of it as possible ; but that does not mean any-
thing at all. If it be asked wherein the difference con-
sists, and if the answer is that the one is as powerful as
the other, and that no one of them is to have qualities
which the other also has not, then the difference is an
empty phrase. The difference must necessarily directly
advance till it becomes a definite or determined difference,
and in that case, so far as our reflection is concerned,
there is wanting to the one what is peculiar to the other,
but only in so far as our reflection is concerned. Thus
the stone, in so far as we reflect upon it, is not so perfect
as the plant, yet there is no defect in the stone considered
in itself ; it neither feels nor knows anything of its defect.
Thus the difference spoken of is only an idea in our mind,
in our reflection.

It is in this way, therefore, that Reflection reasons, and
its reasoning is correct, but all the same it is likewise
inadequate. The Universal, the Essence, is presupposed
under the form of Power, and it is asked if the predicate
of the One attaches to it. The determination of the One
is nevertheless already in harmony with the presuppo-
sition, for absolute Power is directly contained in the
determination of individuality, of oneness, or the One.
The proof is thus quite correct but superfluous, and what
is overlooked is that the absolute Power itself is already
contained in the definition or determination of the One.
To prove predicates of God is really not the business of
the Notion, nor is God in this way to be known philo-
sophically.

DEFINITE RELIGION 139

But as a matter of fact, the true meaning of this notion
is not contained in the proposition that God is One, but
rather in the statement that the One is God, so that the
One exhausts the meaning of this Divine Essence, and is
not a predicate. Nor is it a characteristic along with
other characteristics, but, on the contrary, it is one which
fully expresses the Essence in the sense of absolute
Power as subjectivity, as reflected into itself. God is
thus just this movement of the subject from itself and
back to itself, the self-determination of itself as the One
in such a way that subject and predicate are the same,
are this movement within each other, so that there is
nothing left which comes between them. This notion is
not adapted to be expressed in the form of a mediation
in which the notion will appear as a proof of the exist-
ence of God, for it is the Infinite, the absolute negativity
from which we start in order to reach the determination
of the One. The One is merely the determination which
is attached to it, and which expresses the thought that
this is subjectivity reflected into itself. The movement
proceeds, so to speak, only within the potential Being of
the Infinite. It is, therefore, not in the form of mediation
that we have to consider it here. We certainly might
say there is an advance from the Infinite to subjectivity
determined within itself, but the beginning is the- Infi-
nite, and this Infinite, moreover, as the absolute nega-
tivity, is the Subject reflected into itself, in which all
that is manifold is done away with and absorbed. If
we wished to look at the mediation more closely, we
would start from one thought and conceive of the Notion
in and for itself as Thought, and from this we would go
on to the Other, to Being. But here we cannot start
from the Notion, for a beginning in this form gives a
different proof of the existence of God, and one which
belongs to the Christian religion, and not to the religion
under consideration. The One is not yet thought of as
Notion, not yet thought of as Notion for us ; what is

140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

true, posited concretely in itself, such as we have in the
Christian religion, is not as yet present here.

Since the Absolute is thus denned as the One and as
Power, self-consciousness is merely a semblance of the
Absolute. It is certainly something for which the Abso-
lute manifests itself, and to which it stands in a positive
relation, for the reflection of Power into itself directly
gives repulsion, and this is self-consciousness, and thus
personality. Self-consciousness begins here to have a
certain value, but still it has only an abstract determi-
nation, so that self-consciousness in its concrete form
knows itself merely as a semblance of existence. It is
in bondage, has no extended sphere in itself, no room in
which to act ; heart and mind are hemmed in ; what feel-
ing it has consists only in feeling the Lord ; it has its
existence and finds its happiness only within this narrow
enclosure. Even if, as is the case here, the element of
difference comes to light, still it is held fast ; it does not
really break away, and is not set free. Self-consciousness
concentrates itself only in this one point, and though it
knows itself as essentially existing — for it is not killed
as in Brahma — it is at the same time the non-essential
element in the Essence.

(b.) Necessity is something which is self-posited as
mediation, and is here accordingly a mediation for self-
consciousness. Necessity is movement, implicit process,
implying that the accidental element in things and in
the world is definitely characterised as accidental, and
thus raises itself to and disappears in necessity. When
in any religion the absolute Essence is conceived of, or
known, or revered as Necessity, then this process is pre-
sent. It might seem as if we had seen this transition
already in the advance of the finite to the Infinite in the
fact that the truth of the finite was the Infinite, the
absorption of the finite in itself into the Infinite, and
that in the same way the accidental also returns into
necessity. Whether we regard the determination of the

DEFINITE RELIGION 141

advance of the finite to the Infinite or of the accidental
to Necessity, the distinction, so far as the advance is
concerned, does not seem at all to be an essential one.
As a matter of fact, both have the same fundamental
determination, so that, from one point of view, this is
correct ; but if we regard the matter from another point
of view, the difference or distinction is more concrete
than that of the earlier form of the process. That is to
say, if we begin from the finite, then the matter stands
thus ; but the first beginning is that it has real worth,
that it exists as Being, or, in other words, we take it to
begin with in an affirmative, positive form. Its end is
indeed involved in it, but at the same time it still pos-
sesses immediate Being. " Accidental " already suggests
something more concrete, for what is accidental can either
be or not be. The Real is accidental, for it may quite
as well be possibility, the Being of which lias the value
of Not-Being. Thus there is posited in the accidental
the negation of itself, and it is accordingly a transition
from Being into Nothing. Like the finite, it is inherently
negative ; but since it is also Not-Being, so too is it the
transition from Not- Being to Being. The characteristic
or determination of contingency is thus much richer and
more concrete than that of the finite. The truth of con-
tingency is necessity, and this is determinate existence,
which has arisen by mediation with itself through its Not-
Being. Eeality is a definite form of existence of this sort,
in the case of. which the process is-shut in within itself, and
which by means of itself domes into harmony with itself.

In connection with Necessity we have, however, to
make the following distinctions : —

i. External necessity is in a peculiar sense contingent
necessity. When an effect is dependent on causes, then
it is necessary ; when one or another set of circumstances
concurs, then one or another -result must follow. Only
circumstances which occasion this are immediate ; and
since, regarded from this standpoint, immediate Being has

1 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

merely the value of possibility, the" circumstances are such
as may or may not be, and so the necessity is relative,
and is related thus to the circumstances which constitute
the beginning, and which are accordingly immediate and
contingent. This is external necessity, which has no
higher value than that possessed by contingency. It is
possible to demonstrate external necessity in such a way
as to show that this or the other thing is necessary, but
the circumstances always remain contingent; they can
exist, but they can also not exist. A tile may fall from
the roof and kill a man, but the falling down of the tile,
the concurrence, may be or may not be ; it is contingent.
In this external necessity it is the result only which is
necessary ; the circumstances are contingent. These two,
the conditioning causes and the results, are for this reason
different. The one is determined as contingent, the other
as necessary ; this is the difference considered abstractly,
but there is also a concrete difference. Something results
quite different from what was posited ; and since the
forms are different, so too the content of the two sides is
different. The tile falls accidentally ; the person who is
killed, the particular concrete subject, his death, and that
act of falling down, are entirely heterogeneous, have a
perfectly different content ; something appears as result
which is entirely different from what was posited. When
life is considered according to the conditions of external
necessity as a result of soil, heat, light, air, moisture, &c.,
as a product of these conditions, what is implied is that
the matter is being looked at from the point of view of
external necessity. This latter has to be carefully dis-
tinguished from the true inner necessity.

2. The inner necessity consists just in this, that
everything of the nature of cause, occasion, occasioning
circumstance, is presupposed and definitely distinguished,
and the result belongs to One. The necessity puts to-
gether the two elements into one unity. All that takes
place in this necessity takes place in such a way that

DEFINITE RELIGION 143

nothing results from the presupposed condition, which is
different from these, but rather the process is of such a
kind that whatever is presupposed appears also in the
result, coincides with itself, finds itself; or, to put it
otherwise, the two moments of immediate existence, and
of its being posited, are posited as one moment. In
external necessity contingency is substantial or imme-
diate existence. What is, is not as being something
posited, the conditions do not belong to the unity, they
are immediate, and the result is only something posited,
is not Being. The effect is what is posited, the cause
is what is underived. In the true necessity these are
a unity ; the circumstances exist, but they not only are,
they are also posited by means of the unity, are, as a
matter of fact, contingent, but are this in themselves ; in
that they cancel themselves the negation of their Being
is the unity of necessity, so that their Being is one
which is implicitly negated. The result is, accordingly,
not only result, or only something posited, but it is just
because of what thus takes place that the result comes
to have Being. Necessity is thus the positing of the
conditions, they are themselves posited by means of the
unity; the result is also something posited, and is this
indeed by means of reflection, by means of the process,
by means of the reflection of the unity into itself; this
unity is therefore the Being of the result. Thus what-
ever takes place within necessity simply comes into har-
mony with itself. The unity projects itself outward,
disperses itself in circumstances which appear as if they
were contingent; the unity of itself projects its con-
ditions as if they were innocent of any connection with
it^— as if they were, so to speak, ordinary stones which
appear in an immediate way, and rouse no suspicion of
their being anything else. In the second stage they are
posited, they do not belong to themselves, but to an
" Other," to their result. They are thus broken up in
themselves, and the manifestation of their nature as

144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

posited is their self-abrogation, the production of an
" Other," the result, namely, which, however, appears as
an " Other " only as opposed to their existence in a scat-
tered form. The content, however, is one ; the result is
what they implicitly are, only the mode and manner
of their appearance are altered. The result is the sum
of what is contained in the circumstances, and the mani-
festation of this in a definite form. It is Life which thus
projects its own conditions, means of stimulus, impulses,
though in that form they do not look as if they were
Life, for the inner element, what is implicit, appears
first in the result. Necessity is thus the Process which
implies that the result and the preliminary condition are
different only as regards their form.

If we now consider this form and how necessity has
come to get the definite shape of a Proof of the exist-
ence of God, we see that the content is the true Notion.
Necessity is the truth of the contingent world. The
more detailed development of this thought belongs to
Logic. The notion of God is the absolute necessity ;
this is a necessary and essential standpoint, not indeed
the highest or the really true one, but one from which
the higher proceeds, and which is a condition of the higher
notion which itself presupposes it. Thus the Absolute is
necessity. The notion of absolute necessity does not yet
correspond to the Idea which we must have of God, but
which, however, is to be presupposed in the form of a
pictorial or general idea. The higher notion or grasp
has to grasp, to comprehend itself. There is here a defect
in this Proof of the existence of God. So far as the
form of the Proof is concerned in reference to absolute
necessity, we find it to be the well-known Cosmological
Proof, which is expressed simply thus : contingent things
presuppose an absolutely necessary Cause, but contingent
things exist, I and the World are such, therefore there is
an absolutely necessary Cause.

The defective element in this Proof is easily seen.

DEFINITE RELIGION 145

The major proposition runs thus : Contingent things pre-
suppose an absolutely necessary Cause ; this proposition,
taken in a general sense, is quite correct, and expresses
the connection between what is contingent and what is
necessary, and, in order to obviate captious criticisms
which would otherwise be made, one does not require to
say they presuppose an absolutely necessary Cause, for
this expresses a relation between finite things ; but we
can say they presuppose the absolutely necessary in such
a way that this is conceived of as Subject. The pro-
position, accordingly, further contains a contradiction in
reference to external necessity. Contingent things have
causes ; they are necessary, that by means of which they
exist in this form may itself be contingent only, and so
we are referred back from the cause to contingent things
in endless progression. The proposition cuts short this
style of reasoning, and is perfectly justified in doing
so. What is only contingently necessary would be no
necessity at all, and the real necessity stands in contrast
to that implied in this proposition. The connection is in
a general way correctly expressed too, contingent things
presuppose absolute necessity ; but the mode of the con-
nection is incomplete, the union being defined as some-
thing presupposed or demanded. This is a connection
belonging to untutored reflection, and implies that con-
tingent things are placed on one side and necessity on
the other, and thus while a transition is made from the
one to the other, both sides are firmly opposed to each
other. Owing to the fixity of Being in this form, con-
tingent things become the conditions of the Being of
necessity. This is still more plainly expressed in the
minor proposition : There are contingent things, conse-
quently there is an absolutely necessary Cause. Since
the connection is thus constituted in such a way that
one form of Being conditions the other, it would seem
to be implied in this that contingent things condition
absolute necessity ; the one conditions the other, and

VOL. II. K

146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

thus necessity appears as if it were something whose
existence is presupposed as dependent on or conditioned
by contingent things. Absolute necessity is in this way
put in a position of dependence, so that contingent things
remain outside of it.

The true connection is as follows. Contingent things
exist, but their Being has the value merely of possibility ;
they are and pass away ; they are themselves simply pre-
posited, or have hypothetical existence through the process
of unity. Their first moment consists in their becoming
posited with the semblance of immediate existence ; their
second moment consists in their being negated, in their
being therefore conceived of essentially as appearance.
In the Process they are essential moments, and so it may
be said that they are the essential condition of absolute
necessity. In the finite world it is true we start from
some such immediate form of Being, but in the true world
external necessity is simply the appearance referred to,
and what is immediate is merely something posited, de-
pendent on something else. It is this which constitutes
the defect in mediations of this kind which pass for
proofs of the existence of God. The really true content
consists in this, that the Absolute must come to be
recognised as absolute necessity.

3. Finally, absolute necessity actually is and contains
in itself Freedom ; for it consists just in this, that it
comes together with, comes into harmony with itself;
ife is absolutely for itself, is not dependent on another ;
its action is free, is simply the act of meeting with or
coinciding with itself, its process consists simply in its
finding itself ; but this is just freedom. Implicitly, neces-
sity is free ; it is only by an illusion that the distinction
is made between it and what results from it. We see
this in the case of punishment. Punishment comes upon
a man as an evil, as force, as the exercise of power which
is foreign to him, and in which he does not find himself.
It appears as external necessity, as something external

DEFINITE RELIGION 147

which falls upon him, and something different from what
he has done results from it ; punishment follows on his
action, but it is something different from, other than,
what he willed himself. If, however, a man comes to
recognise punishment as just, then it is the consequence
and the law of his own act of will which is bound up
with his act itself. It is the rationality of his act which
comes to him under the semblance of an " other ; " he has
not to submit to any kind of force ; he bears his own
deed, feels himself to be free in it, it is his own which
cornes to him, justice, the rational element in what he
has done. It is only, however, implicitly that necessity
contains freedom, and this is an essential circumstance.
It is only formal freedom, subjective freedom, and this
means that necessity has not as yet any content in itself.

Just because necessity is the simple act of coming
together with itself, is it freedom. We require in connec-
tion with it movement, circumstances, &c. This belongs
to mediation, but when we say, This is necessary, then
this is a unity; whatever is necessary, is; this is the simple
expression, the result, in which the process has come
together or coincided with itself. It expresses simple
relation to itself, the act of finding itself; necessity is
what is freest ; it is not determined or limited by any-
thing ; all mediations are once more taken up into it
and done away with. Necessity is the mediation which
freely yields itself up; it is implicitly freedom. The
feeling which finds expression in submitting to necessity,
as it existed among the Greeks, and as it still exists
amongst the Mohammedans, certainly contains freedom
in it, but it is only potential or formal freedom : in
presence of the necessity here, no content, no purpose,
nothing definite has any value, and it is in this that its
defect lies.

Necessity, according to the higher conception and notion
of it, real necessity, is thus just freedom as such, it is the
Notion as such ; or, more definitely characterised, it is the

148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

End. Necessity, in short, is without content, or, to put it
otherwise, the difference contained in it is not yet posited ;
it is the process which we have seen, simple Becoming,
which only is to contain differences, and therefore what
is contained in it, though it is certainly difference, is
difference which is not as yet posited. It is something
which coincides with itself though only through media-
tion, and in this way difference in general is posited.
It is, to begin with, only abstract self-determination ; the
determinateness or specialisation is merely something
which is to be. In order that the determinateness be
real, it is necessary that the specialisation and the dif-
ference should, in the act of coinciding with self, be
posited as being able to hold out against the transition
which goes on in the process, as maintaining themselves
in the necessity. To posit is to give determinateness,
and this determinateness, accordingly, is what coincides
with itself; it is the content which maintains itself.
This act of coinciding, thus characterised as content
which maintains itself, is End.

In this specialisation or determinateness which takes
place in the process of coinciding or coming together,
there are two forms of determinateness to be noticed.
The determinateness appears as content which main-
tains itself going through the process without undergoing
alteration, and in the act of transition remaining equal
to itself. Accordingly, so far as the determinateness is
that of Form, it appears here in the shape of subject
and object. The content is, to begin with, subjectivity,
and the process means that it realises itself in the form
of objectivity. This realised end is end, the content
remains what it was ; it is subjective, but at the same
time objective as well.

(c.) We have thus arrived at the idea of conformity to
an end ; it is in the end that the definite existence of
the notion in general begins, the Free existing as free
Being which is at home with itself, what maintains itself,

DEFINITE RELIGION 149

or, to put it more definitely, the Subject. The Subject
determines itself within itself; this determination, re-
garded from one point of view, is content, and the
Subject is free in it, is at home with itself, is free from
the content, it is its own content, and the content has
value only in so far as the Subject permits. This is the
Notion taken generally.

The Subject, however, also gives realisation to the
Notion. The particularity thus acquired is at first
simple, it is held within the Notion in the form of
Being which is at home with itself, and which has re-
turned back into itself. This subjectivity, although it
is totality, is still at the same time one-sided — subjective
merely, only one moment of the entire form. The char-
acteristic here is that the content is posited only in the
form of the equality of what coincides with itself. This
form thus defined as that which coincides with itself is
the simple form of identity with self, and the Subject is
the totality of Being as thus at home with itself. But
so far as the Subject is concerned, that specialisation
whereby it has an end is opposed to totality, and the
Subject accordingly seeks to do away with this form and
to realise the end. The realised end, however, remains
attached to the Subject ; the latter possesses its own self
in it, has objectified itself, set itself free from its single-
ness or simplicity, while at the same time maintaining
itself in its manifoldness. This is the conception or
notion of conformity to an end.

The world has now to be regarded as being in
conformity to an end. We had previously the charac-
terisation that things are contingent, but the higher
characterisation is the teleological view of the world, the
thought of its conformity to an end. It is possible to
accept the first of these characterisations and yet to be
in doubt as to whether we ought to consider things as
being in conformity to an end, whether some of them
are to be regarded as ends to which other things are

150 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

related as means, and it may be maintained that what
appears as an end may have been merely produced
mechanically under external conditions.

It is here, in fact, that characterisation of a permanent
sort begins. The end maintains itself in the process ; it
begins and ends, it is something permanent, something
exempted from the process, and which has its basis in
the subject. The contrasted points of view may, accord-
ingly, be put thus. Are we to keep to the point of view
from which things are regarded as determined by other
things, i.e., by the element of contingency in them, by
external necessity, or to that from which they are regarded
as determined by the end ? It has been already remarked
that external necessity stands in contrast to the end, is
something which is posited by, whose existence depends
on, an " Other ; " the concurrence of circumstances is the
producing factor, something different is the result; the
end, on the other hand, is what remains, what gives the
impulse, what is active, what realises itself. The con-
ceptions of external necessity and conformity to an end
are mutually opposed.

We saw that external necessity returns back into the
absolute necessity which is its Truth, that this is im-
plicitly freedom, and that whatever is implicit must be
posited. This characteristic appears as subjectivity and
objectivity, and thus we get the idea of End. "We must
therefore say, that in so far as things exist for us in im-
mediate consciousness, in reflected consciousness, they are
to be characterised as in conformity to an end, as having
an end in themselves. The teleological view of things
is an essential one ; but this way of regarding things is
at once seen to have in it a distinction, that between
inner and outer necessity, and the inner again can itself,
in accordance with its content, be a finite conformity to
an end, and thus it comes to be once more included within
the relation of external conformity to an end.

i . External Conformity to an End. — Suppose an end has

DEFINITE RELIGION 151

been posited in any kind of way and has to be realised, then
in so far as the subject together with its ends is something
finite, is an immediate definite form of existence, the
further characteristic of realisation lies outside of it. It is,
looked at from one point of view, immediate, and in that
case the subject, together with its ends, is immediate, and
the aspect under which realisation presents itself is an
external one, i.e., the realisation appears as material, as
something which has been got outside, and serves simply
to realise the end. It is, in fact, merely a means in
reference to the end, and it is the latter which firmly
maintains itself and is permanent. Being as an " Other,"
Being in the aspect of reality, the material, is, as com-
pared with the fixed end, something which has no inde-
pendence of its own, has no actual Being, but is simply
a means with no soul in it. The end is outside of it and
is first impressed upon it by the activity of the subject,
which realises itself in the material. External conformity
to an end has thus an objectivity outside of it which has
no independence, and in contrast to which the subject,
together with its ends, is what is permanent. The material
has no power to offer resistance, but is simply a means
for the end which realises itself in it, and in the same
way the realised end is itself merely an external form in
the material, for this latter is something which has been
immediately got, and is therefore dependent, though it is
independent as well. In their union, therefore, both of
them, means and end, remain external to one another.
Wood and stones are means, but the realised end is equally
wood and stones which have received a certain form ; but
all the same the material is still something external to
the end.

2. Inner Conformity to an End. — This is the confor-
mity which has its means in itself. Thus what has life is
an end for itself, it makes itself into an end, and here the
end is also the means. What has life is marked by this
simple inwardness, which realises itself in its parts or

152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

members; it is an articulated organism, an organism with
differentiated members. Since the subject produces itself
within itself, it has as its aim to have its means within
itself. Each is a part or member and maintains itself,
and is the means whereby the others are produced and
maintained ; it is consumed and consumes ; it is this form,
and not the material particles, which remains and main-
tains itself in this process. Life is thus an end in
itself.

But it now further appears that the end, which is end
for itself, stands at the same time in relation to external
conformity to an end. Organic life has relations to in-
organic Nature, and finds in it the means through which
it maintains itself, and these means exist independently
so far as this organic life is concerned. Thus inner con-
formity to an end has also relations to a conformity which
is outside. Life can assimilate the means, but they have
already been found for it, they have not come into exis-
tence through Life itself. Its own organs can produce
the life but not the means.

We are here iu the region of finite conformity to an
end ; absolute conformity we shall get to later on.

The teleological way of looking at the world thus con-
tains the different forms of the end in general. There
are fixed ends and means, and even the end which has
the end in itself is merely finite, dependent, standing in
need of help in respect to the means. This conformity
to an end is so far finite, and finitude in these relations
to externality is, to begin with, the means, the material ;
the end cannot continue to exist apart from these means,
nor, on the other hand, can it exist unless these means
are powerless in reference to the end.

3. The next element of truth in this relation of means
and end is to be found in that universal Power or Force
through which the means potentially exist for the end.
From the standpoint of conformity to an end, things which
are ends have the power of realising themselves, but they

DEFINITE RELIGION 153

have not the power of positing the means. Both the
end and the material appear as indifferent to each other,
both appear as having an immediate definite existence,
the means being something found for the end. Their
potentiality, accordingly, is necessarily the power which
posits the end, and brings the end, which has its end in
itself, into a unity with the means ; and in order that the
finitude of the relation may be done away with — the
finitude being what we have so far been dealing with —
we must proceed to the point at which the Totality or
whole of the process in its inner conformity to an end,
comes into view. What is living has ends in itself ;
it has means and material within its own existence ; it
exists as the power or force of the means and its material.
This we find present at first only in the living individual
existence. It has in its organs the means, and is there-
fore its own material too. These means are pervaded
and penetrated by the end, they do not exist indepen-
dently for themselves, they cannot exist apart from the
soul, apart from the living, unity of the body to which
they belong. This fact must now take on the form of
what is universal, i.e., the means and materials which
appear as accidental forms of existence as contrasted with
what the end implicitly is, have actually to be brought
under the sway of the Power in them, and to have their
soul only in the end, spite of their apparently indifferent
independent existence. The universal idea here is Power,
which exerts its power in accordance with ends, universal
Power. In so far as the end, which is an end in itself,
exists, and inorganic Nature is outside of it, this latter
as a matter of fact belongs to the Power which shows
its power in accordance with ends, so that those forms of
existence which appear immediately exist only for the
end. There are, it may be said, things which are im-
plicitly ends, and things which appear as means, but this
characterisation cannot be maintained, for the first men-
tioned may in their turn be relatively means, while the

154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

last mentioned may, on the contrary, exist in a permanent
form. This second class, that of those things which
appear as existing independently, is implicitly posited,
not by means of the Power of the end, but by means of
a higher essentially existing Power which conforms them
to the end.

This is the general conception or notion of Power which
acts in accordance with ends. The truth of the world
consists in this Power; it is the Power of Wisdom, the
absolutely universal Power, and since it is the world
which is its manifestation, the truth of the world is the
completely realised essential existence of the manifesta-
tion of a wise Power.

We have now more particularly to consider the proof
of the existence of God which is based on this thought.
Two points call for notice. The wise Power, namely, is
the absolute Process in itself ; it is the power of producing
effects, of being active. This wise Power has by its very
nature to posit a world which has ends in itself ; its nature
is to manifest itself, to pass into actual definite existence.
This actual existence is, speaking generally, the positing of
the difference, of the manifoldness which attaches to ex-
ternal existence. We thus get the element of difference
in a more important and more essential specialised form.
Power produces what it does produce in its character as
wisdom, what is produced is the difference ; this means
that the one is implicitly an end and the other a means
for the first ; it is merely something in conformity with
an end, contingent, and not an end in itself. This dif-
ferentiation, namely, that the one is the means of the
other, is the one side. The other side in this mediation
consists in this, that the mutual relation between these
two sides is Power, or, to express it differently, it is just
this which characterises those on the one side as ends
and the others as means, and is thus the maintenance or
preservation of the ends. This aspect of the differentia-
tion is Creation ; it proceeds from the Notion ; the wise

DEFINITE RELIGION 155

Power produces effects, makes distinctions, and thus is
Creation.

It is to be noticed that this part of the mediation
does not belong to the proof of the existence of God,
for this part of the mediation begins with the concep-
tion or notion of wise Power. "We have not here as
yet reached the point at which the proof starts from
the Notion, but that at which it starts from definite
existence.

I. It is at this point that we first get the conception
of Creation strictly so called ; it is not to be found in
any of the discussions which have gone before. We had
first infinitude, then Power as the Essence of God. In
the Infinite we have simply the negative of the finite ;
and in the same way in necessity finite existence is
something which merely goes back whence it came ; things
disappear in it as accidental. What is is only in so far
as it is a result. In so far as it is, all that can be
asserted of it is only the fact that it is ; nothing can be
said of how it is ; it can be in the particular way in which
it is, but it might be otherwise as well, right or wrong,
happy or unhappy. In necessity we get no further than
formal affirmation ; we do not get to the content ; here
there is nothing which is abiding, there is nothing which
would be an absolute end. It is in Creation that we first
come upon the positing and the being posited of affir-
mative forms of existence, not only as abstract, <is things
which only are, but as having content as well. It is just
for this reason that Creation is only rightly in its place
here. It is not the action of Power as Power, but of
Power as Power that is wise, for Power first determines
itself as wisdom ; wheat appears as finite is thus already
contained in it, and the determinations here get affirma-
tion, i.e., the finite existences, the things created get true
affirmation. There are ends which are valid, and necessity
is reduced to the condition of a moment in reference to
the ends. The end is what persists in the Power, as

156 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

opposed to it and through it. Necessity is there on be-
half of the end, its process is the maintenance and the
realisation of the end ; the end stands above it, and neces-
sity is thus posited as one side only of the process, so
that one part only of what is created is subjected to this
Power, and appears accordingly as contingent. It is from
the notion or conception of a wise Power that the act of
positing, along with the difference referred to, proceeds.

2. By means of the conception alluded to we get two
aspects of this truth ; on the one hand we have ends,
and on the other what is contingent. The second step
accordingly is the mediation between the ends and what
is contingent. They are, as a matter of fact, different; life
and what has not life, each exists immediately for itself,
they have an equal right to be — they are; the Being of
the one has no more justification than that of the other.
The ends are living ; they are thus individuals existing as
so many immediate single points which stand off from
each other, and in reference to which the other exists for
itself and to which it can offer resistance. The mediation
or reconciliation between these two consists in this, that
the two do not exist for themselves in a similar way.
The one class consists of ends, the other of what has
merely material independent Being, and has no higher
signification even when it is living.

It is this second characteristic or mediation which has
been put into the special form of the Proof of the exis-
tence of God known as the Physico-Theological.

What has life is in fact Power, though at first it is
this only implicitly ; in its organs it is the living Soul
which is the Power, though this power does not yet hold
sway over the inorganic, which also exists and is infinitely
manifold. We thus have, on the one hand, what is as
yet Quality, what is, to begin with, immediate Being, and
the living things in a condition of indifference to each
other. They use the material which also exists in this
definite particular form which they themselves come to

DEFINITE RELIGION 157

have, and the other side is first given when the living
things exist as power exercised over the material. It is
by regarding the matter from this point of view that
Understanding has constructed that Proof which is called
the Physico-Theological.

In definite existence there are, in short, elements of
two kinds which are indifferent to each other, and a third
element is required through which the end can realise
itself. Immediate existence is composed of elements
which are indifferent to each other. Here it is the Good
which is the ruling principle, and this means that each
determination is so related to itself as to be indifferent
towards what is other than it — that they are, in fact, dif-
ferent, though this does not mean that they are opposed
to each other, for such opposition is not present in im-
mediate existence. It is this inwardness, this poten-
tiality, which forms the notion or conception of wise
Power, and it is thus to this quality that the Proof after
its fashion attaches itself. The Teleological Proof consists
of the following moments as set forth by Kant, moments
which he has specially taken up and criticised, and which
he regarded as discredited. In the world are to be found
clear traces or indications of a wise arrangement in ac-
cordance with ends. The world is full of life, spiritual
life and natural life. These living things are implicitly
organised, and so far as these organs are concerned it is
possible to regard the parts as unrelated. It is true that
the life in them is their harmony, but the fact of their
existing in harmony does not seem to be based on their
actual existence. Then, again, living things are related
to what is external to them, and each form of life is
related to its own part of inorganic nature. Plants
require a particular climate or a particular soil, animals
are of particular species — things, in fact, have their
particular natures. Life is merely productive, and does
not pass over into the Other along with which it forms
part of a process. On the contrary, it continues to be

158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

itself while constantly altering and reconstructing the
process. Thus what strikes any one who begins to re-
flect, is the element of harmonious relation in the world
existing between the organic and the inorganic, and how
existing things seem to ba arranged with special reference
to Man. For, at first, Man has before him things which
have an independent existence, things which exist solely
for themselves, but which, all the same, are in harmonious
relation with his existence. What is really wonderful is
that those very things which at first seem totally un-
related are just the things which really exist for one
another, and therefore what produces wonder is the oppo-
site of that indifference or absence of relation, namely,
conformity to an end. We are thus in presence of a
principle which is entirely different from that involved
in unrelated existence.

This first principle is, so far as existing things are
concerned, merely accidental. Nature, things, could not
of themselves work harmoniously through so many forms
of existence towards a contemplated end, and for this
reason a rational arranging principle has to be forth-
coming, and this the things themselves are not.

That things exist in conformity to an end is not a truth
which is involved in or posited by the things themselves.
Life certainly is so active that it makes use of inorganic
nature, maintains itself by means of its act of assimila-
tion, negates it, identifies itself with the inorganic and
yet preserves itself in it. Its activity is certainly that
particular activity of the subject which constitutes itself
the centre point and uses the Other as a means, but the
second characteristic is external to the things. Men, it
is true, make use of things, they assimilate them, but the
fact that there are such things which they can use is not
involved in man's existence, is not posited by men. The
fact of their being externally unrelated or indifferent to
each other so far as their existence is concerned, as well
as the fact of their existence, are not involved in or

DEFINITE RELIGION 159

posited by the end. This indifference of things to each
other does not express their true relation, but is merely
an illusion. The true character of the relation is the
teleological characterisation of conformity to an end, and
it is in this, accordingly, that we have the absence of in-
difference in the relation between existing things. This
expresses the essential relation, the relation which is valid
and true. The Proof points to the necessity of having
one supreme principle of order or regulating essence, for
we infer from the unity of the world that the cause
is one.

Kant, in opposition to this, says that this argument
shows us God merely as an architect and not as a creator,
and that it is concerned merely with the contingent ele-
ments of forms and not with the substance. It is, in
fact, only the suitability of means to end which is de-
manded, the quality of objects in relation to each other
in so far as it is posited by or depends for its existence
on some Power. This quality, says Kant, is merely fbrrnj
and the Power which posits would be a Cause producing
forms merely, and not a Power creating matter. The
distinction upon which this criticism rests has no mean-
ing. There can be no positing of the form by the Power
without the positing of the matter. If we have once got
into the region of the Notion, we have got far past the
distinction of form and matter, and must know that
absolute form is something real, that therefore form is
something, and that apart from matter it is nothing.
When the word form is used in this connection it ex-
presses a particular quality. The essential form, how-
ever, is the end, the Notion itself which realises itself ;
the form in the sense in which it is the Notion is the
substantial element itself, the Soul ; what can be distin-
guished from it as matter is something which is formal
and entirely secondary, or it is merely a formal charac-
terisation in the Notion.

Kant says further that the syllogism starts from the

160 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

world and from an arrangement and conformity to an
end which have been reached merely by observation, and
which express a merely contingent existence — what is
said about existence is undoubtedly correct, the contingent
is reached by observation — and goes on to infer the exist-
ence of a Cause proportionate to these, which works in
accordance with an end. This remark is quite correct.
\Ve say that the arrangement in accordance with an end
which we observe cannot have sprung up of itself ; it
demands the existence of a Power acting in accordance
with ends ; it is the content of this Cause, though we
cannot know anything more of this wisdom than what
we learn of it from observation. All observation gives
nothing more than a relation ; but no one can reason
from Power to Almighty Power, from wisdom and unity,
to an all- wise and absolute Unity, and so the physico-
theological Proof gives us only a great Power, a great
Unity. The content desired, however, is God, absolute
Power, Wisdom ; but this is not involved in what is con-
tained in observation, a leap is made from what is great
to what is absolute. This is a point thoroughly well
established ; the content from which the start is made is
not that of God.

It is from conformity to an end that we start, and this
category is got at empirically ; these are finite contingent
things, and they are also ordered in conformity to an end.
What, then, is the character of this conformity ? It is,
of course, finite. The ends are finite, particular, and
are accordingly contingent also ; arid it is here that the
element of inadequacy which attaches to this physico-
theological Proof comes in, a defect which is felt at once,
and which raises a suspicion against this style of argu-
ment. Man uses plants, animals, light, air, water ; and
so too do animals and plants. The end is thus an
entirely limited one ; animals and plants are at one time
ends and at another means — they eat and are eaten.
This physico-theological way of looking at things is apt

DEFINITE RELIGION 161

to lead to trivialities and to direct attention to small
details. It may satisfy those who wish for edification,
and the heart may be impressed by looking at things in
this fashion. It is another thing, however, if we have
to get to know God by this means, and if we mean to
speak of absolute wisdom. A bronto-theology, a testa-
cean-theology, &c., have been discovered in this way. The
content, the active working of God, are here simply such
finite ends as may be shown to be present in existence
generally. Absolutely higher ends would be found in
morality, in freedom ; moral good would have to be an
end for itself in order that an absolute end of such a
nature might also be attained in the world. But here
we are in the region of actions in accordance with ends
in general, while it is finite, limited ends which present
themselves in observation. The Power which works in
accordance with ends is merely the life-force, and is not
yet Spirit, the personality of God. When it is said that
the Good is the end, then it may be asked, What is good ?
If it is further said that happiness comes to men in pro-
portion to their moral worth, that the end is that the
good -man should be happy and the bad man unhappy,
then, as a matter of fact, we see in the world what forms
a most cruel contrast to this, and we find just as many
incitements to morality as there are sources of tempta-
tion. In short, perception and observation, considered in
this aspect, do indeed give us conformity to an end, but
in an equal degree do they give what is not in conformity
to an end, and in the long-run it comes to be a matter of
calculating which of the two elements predominates. It
is, accordingly, some such finite end, speaking generally,
which constitutes the content of the idea of the wisdom
of God.

The defect of the proof consists in this, that the idea
of conformity to an end or of wisdom is defined in a
general way merely, and for this reason attention is
directed to those observations and to the knowledge

VOL. ir. L

362 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

gained by sense-perception, in connection with which
accordingly relative ends of this sort present themselves.

Even if God is conceived of as a Power working
actively in accordance with ends, still this does not give
what is sought after when we speak of God. A Power
which works in accordance with ends is, in fact, the life-
force of Nature, and not yet Spirit. The conception of
the life-force expresses something which is an end for
itself, an actually existing end and activity in accor-
dance therewith. In its content, accordingly, as thus
expressed, we have nothing beyond what is involved in
the conception of living Nature.

So far as the form of this Proof is concerned, we
have in it, speaking generally, that of the syllogism of
the Understanding. There are existing things charac-
terised by a teleological arrangement, i.e., there are in a
general way relations between things in conformity with
ends, and in addition to this there is the definite existence
of these objects which have the character of means, of
something accidental so far as the ends are concerned.
These objects, however, are at the same time not con-
tingent when standing in this relation to one another,
but rather it is implied in the notion or conception
of the end, in the conception of the life-force, that not
only have the ends been posited, but the objects too,
which are means. This is quite correct, but the argu-
ment is further developed as follows. The arrangement
of things in accordance with an end is composed, so far
as its inner, its essential nature is concerned, of a Power
which constitutes the connection or positing of the two,
and by means of which they come to suit each other.
Now, it is argued, if there are such things, here again
it is the Being of these things which constitutes the
starting-point. The transition, however, on the other
hand, contains the moment of Not-Being. The means
do not exist; they exist only in so far as they have
been negatively posited, and so far as they exist they

DEFINITE RELIGION 163

have merely a contingent existence in connection with
the end. What, however, is demanded by the argument
is, that they should not be forms of existence standing
in a relation of indifference to the end. When, there-
fore, it is said that such things do actually exist, it is
necessary to add to this the moment that their Being
is not their own Being, but Being which has been
degraded to a means. On the other hand, when it is
said ends do actually exist, they certainly do ; but since
there is a Power which arranges them in a certain way,
the existence of the ends in common with that of the
means is posited as well. It is not the Being of the
ends which, as positive Being, has the power of making
the mediation the transition, but rather it is just in this
transition that their Being is changed into a Being which
has been posited or made dependent on something else.

The minor proposition here, however, does not get
farther than the Being of things, instead of taking their
Not-Being also into consideration. The general content
of this form of proof is this : The world is arranged in
accordance with an end, leaving out of consideration
more definite ends. Conformity to an end is the notion
not only in finite things, but expresses also the absolute
essential character of the Notion, i.e., the divine Notion, the
essential characterisation or determination of God. God
is Power, self-determination, and this means that He de-
termines Himself in accordance with ends. The main
defect in the argument is that it starts from perception,
from phenomena. These supply a conformity to ends
which is finite merely, while the pure end is the universal
and absolute end.

We shall now pass on to the concrete or more definite
form of religion, to the concrete determination of God.
The notion or general conception is that of Power which
works actively in accordance with ends. In the region
of religion we occupy a different standpoint, that of con-
sciousness or the self-consciousness of Spirit. Here we

164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

have the Notion no longer in the form merely of life-
force, but as it determines itself in consciousness. We
now have religion as consciousness of Spirit, which is a
universal Power working in accordance with ends. In
the object of religion it is the idea of Spirit in general
which is present, but the point to determine is, which
moment of Thought or Spirit is actively present. The
content is not yet Spirit in and for itself; the object of
the idea does not yet express the content of Spirit, this
content being here a Power which works in accordance
with ends. Since religion is defined as consciousness,
here it is to be defined as self-consciousness. Here we
have divine self-consciousness in general, both in its
objective form as determination of the object, and also
in its subjective form as determination of the finite spirit.
Consciousness, Spirit, determines itself here as self-
consciousness. That is implied in what has gone before;
how it is so implied has now to be briefly indicated. In
power, which is wisdom, the determinateness is posited
as ideal in such a way that it pertains to the notion.
The determinateness appears as determinate Being, Being
for an Other. Along with consciousness difference is
posited first as difference in reference to the self. Here
it is posited as the individual difference of the self ; it is
relation to self, and consciousness is thus self-conscious-
ness. God is posited as self-consciousness in so far
as consciousness and its connection with the object are
thought of essentially as self-consciousness. Definite
existence, the objectivity of God, the Other, is something
ideal or spiritual. God is thus essentially for Spirit, for
Thought in general, and this fact that He as Spirit is for
Spirit is at all events one aspect of the relation. It
may constitute the Totality of the relation when it means
that God is worshipped in spirit and in truth, but it is
essentially, at all events, one characteristic. We have
further seen that the Notion must be characterised as
eud. The end must not, however, merely preserve this

DEFINITE RELIGION 165

form, remain shut up within itself and belong to itself ;
on the contrary, it has to be realised. The question now
conies to be, supposing that wisdom has to act, that the
end has to be realised, what is to serve as the material
or sphere for this ? This can be nothing else than Spirit
in general, or, to put it more definitely, Man. He is the
object of the Power which determines itself, which acts
in .accordance with this determination, namely, wisdom.
Man, or finite consciousness, is Spirit in the character of
finitude. The act of realisation is a positing of the Notion
of a kind which is different from the mode in which the
absolute Notion realises itself, and consequently it assumes
the mode of finitude, which, however, is at the same time
spiritual. Spirit is only lor Spirit; it is here charac-
terised as self-consciousness, and the Other, in which it
realises itself, is the finite spirit, and there too it is equally
self-consciousness. This sphere or universal reality is
itself something spiritual. It must be a sphere in which
Spirit at the same time actually exists or is for itself.
Man is thus conceived of as an essential end, as the
sphere of divine power or wisdom.

Finally, Man thus stands to God in an affirmative
relation, for the fundamental determination is that he is
self-consciousness. Man, who constitutes this aspect of
reality, is accordingly self-consciousness ; he is conscious-
ness of the absolute Essence as being his own, conse-
quently the freedom of consciousness is posited in God,
and thus Man is here at home with himself. This
moment of consciousness is an essential one, it is a funda-
mental determination, though not as yet the complete
expression of the relation. Man exists for himself as a
self-constituted end, his consciousness is free in God, it
is justified in God, exists essentially for self, and is directed
towards God. This is the principle in a general form,
while the definite forms are the particular religions, those1
of Sublimity, of Beauty, and of Utility or Conformity to
an End.

166 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

C.
DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

We have on the one side power pure and simple and
abstract wisdom, and on the other a contingent end to be
carried out. Both are united, and wisdom is unlimited ;
.but for this reason it is indeterminate, and because of
this the end as real is contingent or finite. The media-
tion of the two sides to concrete unity, which is of such
a kind that the notion of wisdom is itself the content
of its end, already constitutes the transition to a higher
stage. The main determination here is expressed by the
question, What is wisdom ? what is the end ? It is an
end which is inadequate to the power.

(a.) The subjectivity which is inherently power has no
connection with sense ; the natural or immediate element
is in it negated ; it is only for Spirit, for Thought. This
Power, which exists for itself, is essentially One. That
which we have called reality, Nature, is only something
posited, negated, and passes away into independent self-
existent Being, where there is no Many, no One and the
Other. Thus the One is purely exclusive, having no
Other beside it, and not suffering anything alongside of
it which might have independence. This One is the
wisdom of The All ; everything is posited by means of it,
but is for it merely something external and accidental.
This is the sublimity of the One, of this Power, and of
Power which is wise. Since, on the other hand, it takes
on the form of definite existence, namely, self-conscious-
ness, and as Being exists for an Other, the end also is
only one, though it is none the less sublime, and still it
is a limited end which is not yet determined by means
of multiplicity, and is thus an infinitely limited end.
Both of these aspects correspond with one another, the
infinitude of the Power and the limited character of its
actual end. On the one hand there is sublimity, and on

DEFINITE RELIGION 167

the other the opposite, an infinite limitedness or restricted-
ness. This is the first form in reference to the end.
The One has what is infinite alongside of it, while, how-
ever, setting up for being the One.

So far as the relation between Nature and Spirit is
concerned, the Religion of Sublimity means that the
sensuous, the finite, the natural, what is spiritually and
physically natural, has not yet been taken up into free
subjectivity or transfigured within it. The characteristic
of this stage is that free subjectivity is elevated to the
condition of pure Thought, a form which is more adequate
to express the content than the sensuous is. Here the
natural element is dominated by this free subjectivity, in
which the Other is merely ideal, and has no true lasting
existence as against free subjectivity. Spirit is what
raises itself, what is raised above the natural, above fini-
tude. This is the Religion of Sublimity.

The Sublime is not, however, the Measureless, which,
in order to determine itself and to take on a definite
form, can make use only of what is immediately present
and of silly distortions of it, and has to do this in order
to produce a conformity with its inner nature. Subli-
mity, on the other hand, can do without immediate exis-
tence and its modes, and does not, like the other, get
into a condition of poverty which forces it to lay hold of
these modes in order to represent itself, but pronounces
these to be a mere show or illusion.

(6.) The other characteristic or determination is that the
natural or finite is transfigured in Spirit, in the freedom
of Spirit. Its transfiguration consists in this, that it is a
symbol of the spiritual in such a way that in this trans-
figuration of the physical-natural or spiritual-natural, the
natural itself stands over against the spiritual as finite,
as the other side of that essentiality, of that substantiality
which we call God. This last is free subjectivity, in
connection with which the finite is posited merely as a
symbol, in which God, Spirit, appears. This is the mode

i68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of present individuality, of Beauty. In respect of the
determination of the end, this mode means that the end
is not one only, but that there are many ends, and that
the infinitely limited end is elevated to the condition of
a real end. Here the real end is no longer exclusive, but
allows much — all, in fact, the right of existence along-
side of it, and a genial tolerance is here the fundamental
characteristic. There are subjects of various sorts which
have a valid existence alongside of each other, many
unities from which definite existence gets the means
it employs, and thus existence gets a certain friendly
character attached to it. Just because there are many
particular ends, multiplicity does not disdain to exhibit
itself in immediate determinate existence. The multi-
plicity, the kind or variety, possesses universality in itself.
The end permits the different kinds of things to have a
valid existence alongside of itself; it is on terms of friend-
ship with particularity and shows itself in it, and in its
character, as particular end, it permits the means to have
a valid existence alongside of itself, and manifests itself in
it. It is at this point that the determination or category
of Beauty comes in. Beauty is end existing potentially,
which allies itself with immediate existence, and in this
way establishes its own validity. Above the Beautiful
and the particular end there floats the Universal in the
form of a Power devoid of anything subjective, devoid of
wisdom, indeterminate in itself, and this accordingly is
Fate — cold necessity. Necessity is, indeed, that particular
development of the Essence which allows its phenomenal
manifestation or appearance to unfold itself in the form
of independent realities, while the moments of this outward
manifestation show themselves in the shape of distinct or
differentiated forms. Implicitly, however, these moments
are identical, and their existence is accordingly not to be
taken seriously. It is only Destiny, the inner identity of
the differences, which is to be taken seriously.

(c.) The third form of religion is equally represented

DEFINITE RELIGION 169

by a finite particular end, which in its particularity
represents itself as universality, and expands itself so
as to reach universality, but which is all the same still
empirical and external. It is not the true universality of
the Notion, but one which, comprising the world and the
peoples of the world within itself, extends them so as to
reach universality, while it at the same time loses its
determinate character, and has for its end the cold abstract
Power, and is in itself devoid of an end.

In external existence these three moments are repre-
sented by the Jewish, the Greek, and the Roman religions.
Power, as subjectivity, determines itself as wisdom acting
in accordance with an end ; this end is, to begin with, still
undetermined ; particular ends come into existence, and
finally an empirical universal end appears.

These religions correspond in reverse order to those
preceding them. The .Jewish religion corresponds to the
Persian, the element of difference common to the two
being that, regarded from this standpoint, the determinate-
ness represents the inner nature of the Essence which is
the end of self-determination. At an earlier stage, how-
ever, in the religions which precede, the determinateness
had a natural character. In the Persian religion this
was represented by light, this element being in its nature
universal, simple, and physical. This was accordingly the
final stage reached, taking the natural as a starting-point,
Nature being thus comprehended in a unity which was
similar to that of Thought. Here, in the Jewish religion,
particularity is represented by a simple abstract end,
namely, power, which is really only wisdom. Regarding
the question from the second standpoint, we have in the
Greek religion many particular ends and one Power
above them ; in the Hindu religion there are in the same
way the many natural realities, and above them Brahma,
the self-thinking One. Considering the matter from the
third standpoint, we have an empirical universal end
which is itself the selfless, all-destroying Destiny, not

170 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

true subjectivity, and corresponding to this we have
power as individual empirical self-consciousness. Thus,
too, in the Chinese religion there appears an individual
existence which represents itself as the Universal pure
and simple, as determining everything as God. The first
mode of natural existence is self-consciousness, individual,
natural. The natural, in its character as something single
or individual, is what actually exists as, and is determined
as, self-consciousness. Here, accordingly, the arrange-
ment is the reverse of what we have in the Eeligion of
Nature. In the present instance, what is primary is
Thought, which is concrete in itself, simple subjectivity,
which then advances so as to get determination within
itself. In the other case, in the Religion of Nature, it
was the natural immediate self-consciousness which was
the primary element, and which finally embodied itself
in the pictorial conception of light.

I.

THE RELIGION OF SUBLIMITY.

What this religion has in common with that of Beauty
is the ideality it ascribes to the natural, which it brings
into subjection to the spiritual, and further that in it
God is consciously known as conscious Spirit, as Spirit
whose determinations are rational and moral. God, how-
ever, in the Eeligion of Beauty has still a particular nature
or content, or, to put it otherwise, He is merely moral
Power in the manifested form of Beauty, and therefore
in a manifestation which still takes place in a sensuous
material, in the region of sensuous matter, the matter of
the idea or ordinary conception : the region in which the
manifestation takes places is not yet that of Thought.
The necessity for rising higher to tlie Religion of Sub-
limity is to be found in the fact that the particular
spiritual and moral forces are taken out of their state of

DEFINITE RELIGION 171

particularity and included within a spiritual unity. The
truth of the Particular is the universal unity, which is
concrete in itself in so far as it has the Particular within
itself, and yet has this in itself in such a way that in its
essence it is subjectivity.

The region for the play of this manifestation of reason,
which, as subjectivity, is, so far as its content is concerned,
universal, and is, so far as its form is concerned, free —
the region in which pure subjectivity shows itself, is that
of pure Thought. This pure subjectivity has been freed
from the natural, and consequently from what is sensuous,
whether this is found in the external world of sense or
is a sensuous idea. It is the spiritual subjective unity,
and it is this which first rightly gets from us the name
God.

This subjective unity is not substance, but subjective
unity ; it is absolute Power, while the natural is merely
something posited, ideal, and not independent. It does
not manifest itself in any natural material, but in Thought.
Thought is the mode of its definite existence or mani-
festation.

There is absolute power in the Hindu religion also,
but the main point is that it be concretely determined
within itself, and thus be the absolute wisdom. The
rational characteristics of freedom, the moral charac-
teristics, are united so as to form one characteristic, one
End, and thus the characteristic of this subjectivity is
holiness. Morality thus characterises itself as holiness.

The higher truth of the subjectivity of God is not the
determination or characteristic of the Beautiful, in which
the constituent element, the absolute content, is separated
into particulars, but the characteristic of holiness ; and
the relation between these two determinations is similar
to that between the animals and man : the animals have
a particular character, but it is the character of univer-
sality which is the human moral rationality of freedom,
and the unity of this, rationality, a unity which has an

172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

essential independent existence, is the true subjectivity,
the subjectivity which determines itself within itself.
This is wisdom and holiness. The content of the Greek
gods, the moral Powers, are not holy, because they are
particular and limited.

A.

THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE CONCEPTION.

The Absolute, God, is defined as the one subjectivity,
pure subjectivity, and, as a consequence, as subjectivity
which is universal in itself, or the reverse. This sub-
jectivity, which is universal in itself, is clearly One only.
The unity of God consists in this, that the consciousness
of God is the consciousness of Him as One. The point
here is not to show that the unity exists implicitly, that
the unity lies at the basis of things, as is the case in the
Indo-Chinese religion ; for God is not posited as infinite
subjectivity when His unity is merely implicit, and He
is not known and does not exist for consciousness as sub-
jectivity. God in the present case is, on the contrary,
consciously known as a personal One, not as One, as in
Pantheism. Thus the immediate natural mode of con-
ceiving of God disappears, the mode, for instance, which
appears in the Persian religion, in which He is thought
of as light, lleligion is conceived of as the religion of
Spirit, but only so far as its basis is concerned, only as
it exists in the region that specially belongs to it, that of
Thought. This unity of God contains itself One Power,
a Power which consequently is absolute, and within this
all externality, and consequently all that belongs to the
world of sense, that takes on the form of sense, or is a
picture, disappears.

God is here without form. He does not exist in any
external sensuous form. There is no image of Him.
He does not exist for the sensuous idea, but, on the con-
trary, He exists only for thought. The infinite subjec-

DEFINITE RELIGION 173

tivity is the subjectivity which thinks, and, being thinking
subjectivity, it exists only for thought.

(a.) God is defined as absolute power, which is wisdom.
Power in its form as wisdom is, to begin with, reflected
into itself as subject. This reflection into self, this self-
determination of power, is the self-determination which
is entirely abstract and -universal, which does not yet
] particularise itself within itself, the determinate character
being only determinateness in general. It is owing to
this subjectivity which makes no distinction within itself
that God is defined as One. Within this -One all par-
ticularity has vanished. It is implied in this that
natural things, the things which have a determinate par-
ticular character and constitute the world, have no longer
any valid independent existence in their condition of
immediacy. Independence is represented by One only.
All else is merely something posited, dependent for its
being on something else, something which is kept from
existing by the One, for the One is abstract subjectivity,
and all else is unsubstantial as compared with it.

• (b.) The next point is the determination of the end
followed out by the absolute Power. From one point of
view, God is Himself His end. He is wisdom. And it
is, to begin with, required of this determination that it
be equal to the power. It is itself, however, merely a
general end, or, to put it otherwise, wisdom is merely
abstract, is merely called wisdom.

(c.) The determinateness, however, must not remain
merely a determination within the Notion, but receive
the form of reality also. This form is, to begin with, an
immediate one. The end of God is, in fact, merely the
first reality, and accordingly is a wholly single or in-
dividual end. The next step is that the end, the de-
terminateness, should on its part be raised to the condition
of concrete universality. We certainly have here pure
subjectivity on the one side, but the determinateness is
not yet equalised with it. This first end is thus limited,

174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

but Man, self-consciousness, is the sphere in which it
shows itself. The end must, as being a divine end, be
universal, inherently and potentially universal ; it must
contain universality in itself. The end is thus merely
human, and as yet naturally the family, which widens
out into a nation. A definite nation becomes here the
end set before itself by wisdom.

That God should be thus characterised as One seems
to us a thought which is familiar, and not striking and
important, because we are accustomed to this figurative
idea of Him. The idea is formal, too, but of infinite
importance, and it is not to be wondered at that the
Jewish people put such a high value upon it, for the
thought that God is one is the root of subjectivity, of
the intellectual world, the way to truth. The essential
character of absolute truth is contained in it ; still it is
not yet truth as truth, for development is a necessary
quality of this latter, but it is the beginning of truth and
the formal principle of the absolute harmony of the
Absolute with itself. The One is pure power, and all
that is particular is posited in Him as negative, and not as
belonging to Him as such, but as inadequate to express
Him, as unworthy of Him, In the religion of Nature we
saw the determinateness under the aspect of natural
existence, as, for example, light, and the self-conscious-
ness of the Absolute appeared in this manifold manner.
In the infinite Power, on the other hand, all this exter-
nality is annihilated. There is, therefore, an essence
without form or representation which does not exist for
the Other in any natural mode, but only for thought, for
Spirit. This definition of the One is that formal defini-
tion of unity which forms the basis of the conception of
God as Spirit, and, so far as self-consciousness is con-
cerned, it is the root of its concrete, true content.

But it is, to begin with, nothing more than the root
merely. For the point to be determined is not how
many spiritual predicates — as, for example, wisdom,

DEFINITE RELIGION 175

goodness, mercy, are to be ascribed to the One, but what
He does and really is. What we are concerned with is,
the actual determination and reality. It must, therefore,
be determined whether or not the action expresses the
mode in which Spirit appears. If the activity is not
of the kind which develops the nature of Spirit, then
the subject may certainly pass for being Spirit so far as
ordinary thought is concerned, but it is not itself true
Spirit. The fundamental characteristic of activity here,
however, is, to begin with, Power, which does not assume
an outward form implying that the reality is its own
reality, but rather its attitude to reality is still essentially
a negative one.

B.

THE CONCRETE GENERAL IDEA OR POPULAR
CONCEPTION.

(a.) The Determination of the Divine Particularisation.

first Determination. — In the divine act of judgment,
God is wisdom ; God's self-determination, His differentia-
tion, or, to put it more definitely, His act of Creation, is
contained in it. Spirit is simply what mediates self within
self, what is active. This activity implies a distinguish-
ing from self, an act of judgment, which, in its original
meaning; is separation or division. The world is some-
thing posited by Spirit; it is made out of its nothing.
The negative element in the world, however, is the affir-
mative element, the Creator, namely, in whom what is
natural exists as the non-existent. The world, therefore,
in its nothingness has sprung from the absolute ful-
ness of the power of the Good. It has been created from
its own nothingness, which, as being its Other, God is.
Wisdom means that an end is present in the world, and
determines it. This subjectivity, however, is what comes
first, and is accordingly abstract to begin with, and con-

176 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

sequently the particularisation of God is not yet posited
as being within Himself, but rather His act of judgment
or separation means that He posits something, and what
is thus posited and gets a definite character exists at first
in the form of an immediate Other. The higher con-
ception is certainly that of God's act of Creation within
Himself, by which He is beginning and end in Himself,
and thus has the moment of movement, which is here
still outside of Him, in Himself, in His inner nature.

When wisdom is not abstract but concrete, and God
is thought of as self-determining in such a way that He
creates Himself within Himself, and preserves what is
created within Himself, so that it is produced and known
as permanently contained within Himself as His Son,
then God is known as concrete God, truly known as
Spirit.

Since, however, wisdom is as yet abstract, the act of
separation, what is posited, is something which has Being,
the separation or judgment has still the form of imme-
diacy, but it has this only in so far as it is form, for God
creates absolutely out of nothing. He alone is Being,
what is positive. He is, however, at the same time the
positing of His power. The necessity by which God is
the positing of His power is the birthplace of all that is
created. This necessity is the material out of which God
creates ; it is God Himself, and He therefore does not
create out of anything material, for He is the Self, and
not the immediate or material. He is not One as against
an Other already existing, but is Himself the Other in
the form of determinateness, which, however, because He
is only One, exists outside of Him as His negative move-
ment. The positing of Nature necessarily belongs to the
notion or conception of spiritual life, of the Self, and is
the sinking of intelligence into sleep. Since power is
conceived of as absolute negativity, the Essence, i.e., what
is identical with itself, is at first in a state of repose, of
eternal calm and seclusion. But this very solitude in its

DEFINITE RELIGION 177

own self is merely a moment of Power, and not its totality.
Power is in its very nature a negative relation to self, a
mediation within self; and since it is negatively related
to self, the abolition or annulling of abstract identity is
the positing of difference, determinateness, i.e., it is the
creation of the world. The element of nothing, out of
which the world is created, is the absence of all difference,
and it is in connection with this quality that Power,
Essence, is first thought of. If, accordingly, it is asked
where God got the material, the answer is, just in that
simple relation to self. Matter is what is formless, what
is identical with itself. This is merely a moment of the
Essence, and is thus something different from absolute
Power, and is accordingly what we call matter. The
creation of the world, therefore, means the negative rela-
tion of the Power to itself, in so far as it is to begin with
something which is defined as merely identical with self.

The creation by God is something very different from
the act of proceeding from God, or from the idea of the
world proceeding out of God. All peoples have had
theogonies, or, what comes to the same thing, cosmogonies.
In these the fundamental category is always procession,
not the fact of something being created. It is out of
Brahma that the gods proceed, while in the cosmogonies
of the Greeks, the highest, the most spiritual gods are
those which have finally proceeded from some source,
which have been the last so to proceed. This poor cate-
gory of procession now disappears, for the Good, Absolute
Power, is a Subject.

This procession does not express the true character of
what is created. What thus proceeds is what exists,
what actually is, and in such • a way that the Ground or
Essence from which it proceeds is thought of as the un-
essential element which has disappeared in something
higher. What proceeds out of God is not thought of as
something created, but as something independent, self-
subsistent, not as something which has no iuherent in-'

VOL. n. M

173 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

dependence. This, therefore, is the form taken by the
Divine self-determination, the mode of particularisation.
It cannot blunder, for wisdom is necessary to the very
idea of it. It is not, however, any kind of particu-
larisation of God in Himself, otherwise God would be
known as Spirit. The particularisation, just because
God is One, attaches to the other aspect of existence.
This particularisation is, to begin with, the Divine act of
characterisation in general, and is thus Creation. This
positing of the world is not transitory, but, on the con-
trary, what proceeds out of God preserves the character
of something posited, of the creature, in fact. Thus what
is created has upon it the mark of something which has
no independence. This is the fundamental characteristic,
and one which remains attached to it because God is
conceived of as Subject, as infinite Power. Here Power
exists only for the One, and thus it follows that what is
particular is merely something negative, something posited,
as compared with the subject.

Second Determination. — This determination means
that God is hypothetically Subject. If He is not, then
Creation is a vague popular conception which readily
suggests the mechanical and technical methods of pro-
duction used by man, and this is an idea which we must
keep out of our minds. God is the First: His act of
creation is an eternal creating, in which He is not a
result, but that which originates. When He is conceived
of in a higher way, namely, as Spirit, He is the self-
creating, and does not proceed out of Himself, being both
beginning and result. Here, however, God is not con-
ceived of as Spirit. Human production, technical produc-
tion, is an external process. The Subject, what is First,
becomes active, and connects itself with something other
than itself, and thus comes to stand in an external rela-
tion to the material which has to be manipulated, which
offers resistance and has to be overcome. Both actually
exist as objects which have a mutual relation to each

DEFINITE RELIGION 179

other. God, on the other hand, creates absolutely out of
nothing, since there is nothing which was before Him.

The mode of production, therefore, in connection with
which He is Subject, is intuitive, is infinite activity. In
the case of human production, I am consciousness, I have
an end, and know what it is, and I have, too, accordingly
the material, and know that my relation to it is a
relation to an " Other." Intuitive production, on the
contrary, the production of Nature, belongs to the con-
ception of Life. It is an inward act, inner activity,
which has no reference to something actually existing.
It is life-force, the eternal production of Nature, and
Nature, speaking generally, is something posited, some-
thing created.

God is in reference to the world the totality of His
determinateness, of His negation, and in reference to the
totality of immediate Being, He is what is pre-supposed,
the subject which remains absolutely first. Here the
fundamental characteristic of God is subjectivity, which
relates itself to itself, and as inherently existing permanent
subjectivity it is what is first.

The derivative character of the Greek gods, who repre-
sent the spiritual element, is something which belongs to
their finitude. It is this which gives them their con-
ditional character, in accordance with which their own
nature is considered as dependent on something previously
existing, as is the case with the finite spirit of Nature.

Tiiis subjectivity, however, is the absolutely First, the
Beginner of things, its conditional character being done
away with ; but it is only something which begins, and
this does not mean that the subjectivity is characterised
as result and as concrete Spirit.

If what was created by the absolute Subject were itself,
then the difference would in that case be done away with
and absorbed in this difference. The first Subject would
be the last, something which resulted from itself. But
this is a characteristic we have not yet got, and all we

l?o THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

can say is that this absolute Subject is something which
begins merely — that is first or primary.

The third determination of God in relation to the world.
— This is expressed by what we call the attributes of
God. These represent His determinate character, i.e., in-
asmuch as we have seen that there is a particularisation
of God, God's self-determination, and that this self-
determination is the creation of the world, it follows that
along with this there is posited the fact of a relation on
the part of God to the world, or to put it otherwise, the
attributes are the determinate element itself, only known
in the Notion of God.

The One is something which has got determinate char-
acter, which is known as being, as not returning into God,
the Other is God's being made determinate as a determinate
quality of God. It is this that we are in the habit of
calling by the name of attributes, God's relations to the
world, and to say that we know only this relation of God
to the world and do not know God Himself, is to use an
unfortunate expression. It is just this which is His own
determinate character, and it is this consequently which
is represented by His owri attributes.
, It is only when things are represented in an external
way and from the point of view of the. senses, that
anything can be said to be, and to be for self, in such a
way that its relations to other things, its attributes, are
distinguished from its existence, for it is just these which
constitute its own peculiar nature. The manner in which
a man stands related to others is just his nature. The
acid is nothing else than the particular character of its
relation to the base — that is the nature of the acid itself.
If we understand the relation in which an object stands to
other things, we understand the nature of the object itself.
These distinctions, therefore, are of a very inferior
character, since they directly coincide as being the product
of an understanding which does not know them, and is
not aware what it possesses in these distinctions. This

DEFINITE RELIGION 181

determinateness as something external, immediate, as a
determinateness of God Himself, is His absolute power,
which is wisdom, the definite moments of which are
goodness and righteousness.

Goodness consists in the fact that the world is : Being
does not belong to it, as Being is here reduced to the
condition of a moment, and is only a Being which has
been posited or created. This act of dividing, of differen-
tiation, represents the eternal goodness of God. What
is thus distinguished from God has no right to be ; it is
external to the One, something manifold, and because of
this, something limited, finite, whose essential character is
not to be, but the goodness of God consists just in the
fact that it is. Inasmuch as it is something which has been
posited, it also passes away, is only appearance. God only
is Being, the truly real ; Being which excludes any of its
elements, Being outside of God, has no right of existence.

God can be a Creator in the true sense only in so far
as He is subjectivity, for as such He is free, and His
determinate character, His self-determination, is set free.
It is only what is free that can have its determinations
standing over against itself as free and can give them
freedom. This differentiation, whose totality is repre-
sented by the world, this Being, is The Good.

The Being of the world, however, is only the Being
of Power, or, to put it otherwise, the positive reality and
independence or self-existence of the world is not its
own self-existence, but the self-existence of Power. The
world accordingly must, in relation to the Power, be
thought of as something incomplete in itself. The one
side is represented by the manifoldness of the differences,
the infinite realm of definite existence, the other side
accordingly by the substantiality of the world, though
this quality does not attach to the world itself, but is
rather the identity of the Essence with itself. The
world does not maintain itself independently ; on the
contrary, its Being-for-self, its real existence, is the

182 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Power which maintains itself in the differences, inas-
much as it remains Being-for-self, and thus represents
the Being of the world. The world is thus divided
within itself ; regarded from one side it is dependent,
selfless difference, and regarded from the other side it is
its own Being.

The manifestation of the nothingness, of the ideality
of this finite existence, of the fact that Being is here
not true independence — this manifestation in the form
of Power, is Kighteousness, and in this justice is done
to finite things. Goodness and righteousness are not
moments of Substance. These characteristics exist in
Substance in a state of being, and they also are immedi-
ately present in it as not being, as becoming.

Here the One is not thought of as Substance, but as
the personal One, as Subject, and here the determination
of the end is the determinateness of the Notion itself.
The world has to be, and so, too, it has to change, to
pass away. Here righteousness is thought of as deter-
mination of the Subject in its self-differentiation from
these determinations which belong to it, from this world
which is its own world.

Creation, preservation, passing away are, in the ordi-
nary conception of them, separated in time, but in the
Notion they are essentially moments only of one process,
namely, of the process of Power. The identity of Power
with itself is thus the Nothing out of which the world
has been created, being both the subsistence of the world
and the cancelling and absorbing of this subsistence or
independent existence. This identity of Power which
presents itself in the Being of things, too, is both the
Being of things and their Not-Being. In so far as good-
ness is concerned, the world exists only as having no
justification for its existence in itself, as upheld and
maintained in a contingent way, and in this fact is, at
the same time, contained its negativity, which owes its
existence to righteousness.

DEFINITE RELIGION 183

The characteristics indicated are certainly character-
istics of the Notion itself, but the subject which possesses
then) has not its real nature in them. The fundamental
characteristics are the One and Power, and the Notion,
the inmost nature of the subject, is posited as still existing
independently of the attributes. If they really belonged
to it, then they would themselves be Totality, for the
Notion is the absolute goodness, it shares with itself its
own characteristics. In the case of their belonging to
the Notion, it would be further implied that they them-
selves were the whole Notion, and thus it would be for
the first time truly real ; in which case, however, the
Notion would be posited as Idea and the subject as
Spirit, in which goodness and righteousness would be
totalities.

But although goodness and righteousness contain the
element of difference, they are not thought of as being
the abiding character of Power. Power, on the contrary,
is by its very nature what is without definite character,
what is undetermined, i.e., it shows itself essentially
powerful as against these very differences ; its goodness
passes over into righteousness, and vice versd. Each
being posited for itself excludes the other, while the
very nature of Power consists in this, that it simply
does away with or cancels the determinateness.

Righteousness is the moment of negation, i.e., it
makes manifest the nothingness of things. Righteous-
ness thus understood is a characteristic, just as origination
and passing away are in Siva. It simply expresses the
general aspect of the process, the aspect of contingency,
the nothingness of which is made plain. It does not
express negation as an infinite return into self, which
would be the characteristic of Spirit. Negation is here
nothing more than righteousness.

(&.) The Form of the World.

The world thus regarded is prosaic ; it exists essentially
as a collection of things. In the East, and in Greek

184 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

life particularly, a feeling of delight arises from the
friendly and joyous character of the relation in which
Man stands to Nature, since Man, in so far as he is
related to Nature, is related to the Divine. By taking
up this generous attitude he spiritualises what is natural,
makes it into something Divine, gives it a soul.

This unity of the Divine and the natural, this identity
of the ideal and the real, is an abstract characterisation,
and is easily reached. The true identity is that which is
found in infinite subjectivity, which is not conceived of
as neutralisation, as a kind of mutual blunting of the
characteristics of the two elements, but as infinite sub-
jectivity, which determines itself, and sets its determina-
tions free in the form of a world. At this stage these
determinations thus set free are, in their character as
things, at the same time unsubstantial or dependent, and
this is indeed their true nature. They are not gods, but
natural objects.

These particular moral Powers, which the higher Greek
gods essentially are, possess independence only in form,
because their content, owing to its particular character, is
unsubstantial. This is a false form ; the Being of these
unsubstantial things, which are immediate regarded from
the present standpoint, is really conceived of as something
formal, as something unsubstantial, which conies to have
Being not in the shape of absolute divine Being, but
Being which is abstract, one-sided, and since it gets the
character of abstract Being, it has attached to it the
categories of Being, and being finite, the categories of the
Understanding.

We are in the presence of prosaic things when the
world thus exists for us, in the presence of external things,
existing in accordance with the manifold connection of
the Understanding as expressed by ground and conse-
quence, quality, quantity, and all such-like categories of
the Understanding.

Nature is here undeified, natural things have no sub-

DEFINITE RELIGION 185

stantiality or independence in themselves, and the Divine
is only in the One. It might well seem to be a matter
for regret that Nature should in any religion be undeified,
and should get the character of what has no divine
element in it. We are wont rather to extol the unity of
the ideal and the real, the unity of Nature and God, and
where natural things are considered to be freely deter-
mined as substantial and divine, it is the custom to call
this the identity of ideality and reality. This is certainly
the Idea, but such a determination of identity is so far
very formal, it is cheaply got, and it is to be found every-
where. The main point is the further determination of
this identity, and the true one is to be found only in
what is spiritual, in God, who in a real way determines
Himself, so that the moments of His Notion are at
the same time themselves present as totality. Natural
things, so far as their particular existence is concerned,
have, as a matter of fact, an implicit existence ; looked
at through their Notion, their relation to Spirit, to the
Notion, is an external one, and so too Spirit as finite,
and appearing as this particular form of life, is itself
external. Life, it is true, is essentially something inward,
but the totality referred to, in so far as it is merely life,
is external relatively to the absolute inwardness of Spirit ;
abstract self-consciousness is equally finite. Natural
things, the sphere of finite things, purely abstract Being,
represent something which in its nature is external to
itself. It is here at this stage that things get the charac-
ter of externality ; they appear in accordance with their
Notion in their true nature. If regret be felt that such
a position is assigned to Nature, it must at the same
time be granted that this beautiful union of Nature and
God holds good for fancy only, not for reason. Even
those who object so strongly to the undeifying of Nature,
and extol that identity, will all the same certainly find it
very difficult to believe in a Ganga, a cow, a monkey, a
sea, &c., as God. It is here, on the contrary, that a

1 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

foundation is laid for a more rational way of looking at
things and at their connection.

This, however, is not as yet the place at which to give
to this form of conscious thought theoretic completeness
and make it knowledge. In order to do this, there must
exist a concrete interest for things, and the Essence must
be conceived of not merely as universal, but also as deter-
minate Notion. The definite theoretic view of things
cannot exist alongside of the popular idea of abstract
wisdom and of one limited end.

The relation of God to the world in general is thus
defined as His immediate manifestation in it in a parti-
cular, individual way, for a definite end in a limited sphere,
and it is at this point that the definite conception of
miracles comes in. In the earlier religions there are no
miracles ; in the religion of India everything has been in
a deranged state from the very start. The idea of miracle
comes in first in connection with the thought of opposi-
tion to the order of Nature, to the laws of Nature even
when these have not as yet been discovered, but when
there is only the consciousness of a natural connection
between things of a general character. It is here we
first meet with the miraculous, and the idea which is
formed of it is that God manifests Himself in some indi-
vidual thing, and does this at the same time in opposition
to the essential character of this thing.

The true miracle in Nature is the manifestation of
Spirit, and the true manifestation of Spirit is funda-
mentally the Spirit of Man and his consciousness of the
rationality of Nature, his consciousness that in these
scattered elements, and in these manifold contingent
things, conformity to law and reason are essentially pre-
sent. In this religion, however, the world appears as a
complexity of natural things which affect each other in
a natural way, and stand in an intelligible connection
with each other, and the necessity for miracles is present
co long as that connection is not conceived of as the

DEFINITE RELIGION 187

objective nature of things, i.e., so long as God's manifesta-
tion in them is not thought of as eternal universal laws
of Nature, and so long as His activity is not thought of
as essentially universal. The rational connection which
is first reached at this stage is only objective connection,
and what it means is that the individual thing as such
exists in its finiteness for itself, and is consequently in
an external relation.

Miracle is still conceived of as an accidental manifes-
tation of God ; the universal absolute relation of God to
the natural world is, on the other hand, sublimity. We
cannot call the infinite Subject conceived of in itself and
in its relation to itself, sublime, for so thought of, it is in
its essential nature absolute and holy. The idea of sub-
limity first comes in in connection with the manifestation
and relation of this Subject to the world, and when the
world is thought of as a manifestation of the Subject, though
as a manifestation which is not affirmative, or as one which,
while it is indeed affirmative, has yet its main characteristic
in this, that what is natural, what is of the world, is negated
as inadequate to express the Subject, and is known as such.

Sublimity is therefore this particular appearing and
manifestation of God in the world, and it may be defined
thus. This act of manifestation shows itself at the same
time as sublime, as raised above this manifestation in
reality. In the Religion of Beauty there is a reconcilia-
tion of the signification with the material, of the sensuous
mode and Being for an " Other." The spiritual mani-
fests itself entirely in this external way. This external
mode is a symbol of what is inner, and this inner some-
thing is completely known in its external form.

The sublimity of the manifestation, on the other hand,
directly destroys reality, the matter and material which
belong to it. In His manifestation God directly distin-
guishes Himself from it, so that it is expressly known to
be inadequate to manifest Him. The One has not there-
fore His complete Being and essential existence in the

iSS THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

externality of the manifestation as the gods of the Religion
of Beauty have, and the inadequacy of the manifestation
is not something of which there is no consciousness, but,
on the contrary, it is expressly posited along with con-
sciousness as inadequacy.

It is not accordingly enough to constitute sublimity
that the content, the Notion, be higher than the outward
Form, even if this latter be exaggerated and stretched
beyond its natural measure, but what manifests itself
must also be the Power which is above the outward form.
In the religion of India the representations of the Divine
are devoid of measure, and yet they are not sublime but
are rather a distortion, or, it may be, they are not dis-
torted, as, for instance, the cow and the ape, which express
the entire power of Nature, yet the signification and
the outward form are not proportionate to each other ;
they are not sublime, however, for indeed it is this want
of mutual proportion which is the greatest defect. It is
accordingly necessary that the Power be at the same time
put above the outward form.

Man in a state of natural consciousness can have
natural things present before him, but his spult does
not suit with such a content. The mere act of looking
around gives nothing sublime, but rather the glance
towards heaven which is above and beyond what lies
.around. This sublimity is in a special sense the character
of God in relation to natural things. The Old Testament
Scriptures are extolled because of the presence in them
of this sublimity. "And God said, Let there be light,
and there was light." Here we have one of the sublimest
passages. The Word represents the greatest possible
absence of effort, and this breathing is here at the same
time light, the world of light, the infinite pouring forth
of light ; and thus light is degraded to the rank of a
word, to something so transitory as a word. God is further
represented as using the wind and the lightning as ser-
vants and messengers, Nature is so obedient to Him. It

DEFINITE RELIGION 189

is said, " From Thy breath the worlds proceed ; before
Thy threatenings they flee away ; if Thou openest Thine
hand, they are filled with good ; if Thou hidest Thy face,
they are troubled ; if Thou boldest in Thy breath, they
pass away into dust ; if Thou sendest it forth, they
spring up again." Sublimity consists in this, that Nature
is represented as thus entirely negated, in subjection,
transitory.

C.

THE END GOD WORKS OUT IN THE WORLD.

First Determination. — The determination of the end
appears here as the essential one that God is wise, to
begin with — wise in Nature generally. Nature is His
creature, and He lets His power be known in it, though
not His power only, but His wisdom as well. This
wisdom reveals itself in what it produces by the presence
of arrangement in accordance with an end.

This end has rather the character of something inde-
terminate, superficial ; the conformity to an end is rather
of an external kind, " Thou givest to the beast its food."
The true end and the true realisation of the end are not
present within Nature as such, but rather they are essen-
tially to be found in consciousness. He manifests Himself
in Nature, but His essential appearing is that He appears
in consciousness, in His reflection or reappearance, in
such a way that in self-consciousness it reappears that
His end is just to be known by consciousness, and that
He is an end for consciousness.

Sublimity, to begin with, gives only the general idea
of power, and not as yet that of an end. The end is not
only the One, the truth rather being that only God Him-
self can be His end, and this means that His Notion be-
comes objective for Him, and that He possesses Himself
in the realisation. This is the universal end in. 'general.
If, accordingly, turning our attention to the : world, to

190 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Nature, we here seek to regard it as the end of God,
then we see that it is His power only that is manifested
in it, it is only His power that becomes objective to Him
in it, and wisdom is as yet quite abstract. When we
speak of an end, it must not be thought of as simply
power ; it must have a really determinate character.
Spirit is, in fact, the region in which it can be present,
and since God is end in Spirit as consciousness, in Spirit
which is posited over against Him, and here, therefore,
in the finite spirit as such, His end in the finite spirit is
His representation, His recognition. God here has the
finite spirit over against Him. Being-other, or other-
ness, is not as yet posited as having absolutely returned
into itself. The finite spirit is essentially consciousness.
God must, therefore, be an object of consciousness as
being the Essence, i.e., in such a way as to be acknow-
ledged and extolled. It is the glory of God which is, to
begin with, His end. God's reflex presence in self-con-
sciousness, taken generally, is not yet known. God is
only recognised, but if He is also to be really known or
cognised, then it is necessary that He, as Spirit, should
posit differences in Himself. Here He has as yet only
the abstract characterisations referred to.

Thus at this stage the thought that religion, as such, is
the end, is an essential characteristic, which means that
God becomes consciously known in self-consciousness,
that He is object in it, and has an affirmative relation to
it. He is God as being infinite power and subjectivity
in Himself. The second point is that He manifests
Himself, and that this should be essentially in another
spirit, which, as finite, stands in an objective relation to
Him. Thus the characteristic which comes in here is1
the acknowledgment and exaltation of God, the glory of
God, His universal glory, for not only the Jewish nation,
but the whole earth, all peoples, all nations are to praise
the Lord. This end, namely, that He should be recog-
nised, known, honoured by consciousness, may, to start

DEFINITE RELIGION 191

with, be called the theoretic end. Its more definite form
is that of the practical end, the peculiarly real end, which
realises itself in the world, but always in the spiritual
world.

Second Determination. — This essential end is the moral
end, morality, signifying that Man, in what he does, lias
present to his mind what is in accordance with law,
what is right. This element of law of what is right is
the Divine element, and in so far as it belongs to the
world, and is present in finite consciousness, it is some-
thing which has been posited by God.

God is the Universal. The man who guides himself
and his will in accordance with this universal is the free
man, and thus represents the universal will, and not his
own particular morality. The doing of what is right is
here the fundamental characteristic, walking before God,
freedom from selfish ends, the righteousness which has
worth before God.

Man does what is thus declared to be right in refer-
ence to God with a view to the glory of God. This
right-doing has its seat in the will, in the inner nature of
man ; and, in contrast to this exercise of will in reference
to God, we have the natural state of existence, of Man,
and of what acts.

Just as we saw that in Nature there was a broken up
or disjointed state of things, that God existed indepen-
dently while Nature had Being, but was yet something
in subjection, so too we see exactly the same distinction
in the human spirit ; we have right-doing as such, then,
again the natural existence of Man. This, however, is
equally something determined by means of the spiritual
relation of the will, just as Nature in general is some-
thing posited by the absolute Spirit.

The natural existence of Man, his outward worldly
existence, is placed in direct relation to what is inward.
If this will of his is a substantial, essential will, action
is right action ; and so, too, Man's external existence

i92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ought to be in keeping with this something which is
inward and right. It can go well with Man only accord-
ing to his works, and he must not only conduct himself
morally in a general way, respect the laws of his country,
and sacrifice himself for his country, happen what may,
but there arises a definite demand that it should also go
well with whoever does right.

An essential point here is that real existence, definite
Being in an external form, be made to correspond with,
brought into subjection to, and determined in accordance
with, what is inner, and right. This essential condition
enters here in consequence of, and on the basis of, the
fundamental relation of God to the natural finite world.

There is here an end, and one which must be carried
out, namely, this difference, which must at the same time
come to be in a state of harmony, so as to show that-
natural existence governs itself, and bears witness to
what is essential, to what is spiritual. So far as Man is
concerned, he must be determined, governed, by what is
truly inward, by right-doing.

In this way the well-being of Man is divinely guaran-
teed, but it is so guaranteed only in so far as it is in con-
formity with the Divine, the moral, divine law. This is
the band of necessity, which, however, is no longer blind,
as we shall see it is in other religions, where it is only
the empty indeterminate necessity from which the Notion
is absent, so that the Concrete is outside of it. The
gods, the moral Powers, are subject to necessity, but the
necessity is not characterised by the presence in it of
what is moral and right.

Here necessity is concrete, in the sense that what has
essential Being, Being in and for itself, gives laws, wills
the Right, the Good, and as a consequence of this, this
Being has an affirmative definite Being which is adequate
to it, an existence which is a state of well-being or welfare.
It is this kind of harmony of which Man is conscious in
this sphere of thought.

DEFINITE RELIGION 193

It is on this that is founded the belief that it must,
nay, that it ought, to go well with him. He is an end
for God, and he is this as being a whole.. And yet he,
as constituting a whole, is himself something differen-
tiated or distinct, since he has the power of willing and
an external existence. The conscious subject now knows
that God is the bond of this necessity, that He is this
unity which brings about a state of well-being propor-
tionate to the well-doing, and that this connection exists,
for the divine universal will is at the same time the will
which is determined in itself, and has consequently the
power to bring about that connection.

The consciousness that these are thus joined together
constitutes that faith, that confidence, which is a funda-
mental and praiseworthy trait of the Jewish people.
The Old Testament Scriptures, the Psalms especially, are
full of this confidence.

This, too, is the line of thought which is represented
in the Book of Job, the only book the connection of
which with the standpoint of the Jewish people is not
sufficiently recognised. Job extols his innocence, finds
his destiny unjust, he is discontented, i.e., there is in
him a contradiction — the consciousness of the righteous-
ness which is absolute, and the want of correspondence
between his condition and this righteousness. It is
recognised as being an end which God has that He
makes things go well with the good man.

What the argument points to is that this discontent,
this despondency, ought to be brought under the control
of pure and absolute confidence. Job asks, " What doth
God give me as a reward from on high ? Should it not
be the unrighteous man who is rejected thus ? " His
friends answer in the same sense, only they put it in the
reverse way, " Because thou art unhappy, therefore we
conclude that thou art not righteous." God does this in
order that He may protect man from the sin of pride.

God Himself at last speaks : " Who is this that talks

VOL. II. N

i94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

thus without understanding ? Where wast thou when
I laid the foundations of the earth ? " Then comes a
very beautiful and magnificent description of God's power,
and Job says, " I know it ; he is a man without know-
ledge who thinks he may hide his counsel." This
subjection is what is finally reached ; on the one hand,
there is the demand that it should go well with the
righteous, and on the other, even the feeling of discon-
tent when this is not the case, has to be given up. It
is this resignation, this acknowledgment of God's power,
which restores to Job his property and the happiness he
had before. It is on this acknowledgment of God's power
that there follows the re-establishment of his happiness.
Still, at the same time, this good fortune is not regarded
as something which can be demanded by finite man as a
right, independent of the power of God.

This confidence in God, this unity, and the conscious-
ness of this harmony of the power, and at the same time
of the wisdom and righteousness of God, is based on the
thought that God is determined within Himself as end,
and has an end.

We have further to consider in this connection this
fact, that Spirit becomes inward, the movement of Spirit
within itself. Man must do right. That is the one
absolute command, and this doing of what is right has
its seat in his will. Man is by this means thrown back
upon his inner nature, and he must occupy himself in
thus considering his inner life, and finding out whether
it is righteous, whether or not his will is good.

This examination into and anxiety about what is
wrong, the crying of the soul after God, this descent
into the depths of the spirit, this yearning of the spirit
after what is right, after what is in conformity with the
will of God, is something specially characteristic of this
form of religion.

This end further appears as being at the same time
limited. The end is, that men should know and acknow-

DEFINITE RELIGION 195

ledge God, that what they do they should do for the
glory of God ; that what they will should be in accord-
ance with God's will, and that their will should be a true
will. This end has, at the same time, a limitation attached
to it, and we have to consider in how far this limitation
belongs to the essential .nature of God, to what extent
the conception, the ordinary idea of God itself, still con-
tains this limitation.

If the ordinary or popular idea of God is limited,
those further realisations of the divine conception in
human consciousness are limited also. What is always
most essential, but is also most difficult, is to under-
stand the presence of the limitation in One, and to
recognise that it is at the same time a limitation of the
Idea, and in such a way that this latter does not yet
appear as the absolute Idea.

God, as the one who determines Himself in His free-
dom and according to His freedom in such a way that
what is spiritual is free, is wisdom ; but this wisdom,
this end, is at first merely end and wisdom in general.
The wisdom of God, His self-determination, have not yet
received their development. This development within
the Idea of God is first found in the religion in which the
nature of God is entirely revealed.

The defect of this Idea is that though God is the One,
He is this in Himself only in the determinateness of His
unity, and is not what eternally develops itself within
itself. There is not as yet any developed determination.
What we call wisdom is so far something abstract —
abstract universality.

The real end which we have is the first end. It exists
as an end of God in Spirit as actual, and thus it must
have universality in itself, it must be a divine and true
end in itself, and one which has substantial univer-
sality. A substantial end in Spirit means that the
spiritual individuals know themselves to be one, and act
towards each other as one and are in unity. The end is

196 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

a moral one, and it finds its sphere in real freedom. It
is that part of thought in which what is practical comes
into play, an end in actual consciousness. It is, how-
ever, a first end, and the morality connected with it is of
the immediate natural kind. The end is thus the family
and the connection of the family. It is this one particu-
lar family exclusive of all others.

The real immediate first end of divine wisdom is thus
still quite limited, quite particular, just because it is the
first end. God is absolute wisdom, but He is this in the
sense of being entirely abstract wisdom, or, to put it
otherwise, the end in the divine notion is one which is as
yet purely general, and is consequently an end devoid of
content. This indeterminate end thus devoid of content,
changes in actual existence into immediate particularity,
into the most perfect limitation ; or, in other words, the
state of potentiality in which wisdom still exists is itself
immediacy, naturalness.

God's real end is thus the family, and in fact this
particular family, for the idea of many single families
already gives proof of the extension of the thought of
singleness by means of reflection. "We have here a note-
worthy, and absolutely rigid contrast — in fact, the most
rigid possible contrast. God is, on the one hand, the God
of heaven and of earth, absolute wisdom, universal power,
and the end aimed at by this God is at the same time so
limited that it concerns only one family, only this one
people. All peoples, it is true, ought also to acknowledge
Him and praise His name, but His actual work and that
which has been really accomplished consists of this par-
ticular people only, regarded in their general condition
and definite existence, in their inner and outer, political
and moral actually existing condition. God is thus only
the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, the God
who has brought us out of Egypt. Since God is only
One, He is present also only in one universal spirit, in
one family, in one world. The families as families come

DEFINITE RELIGION 197

first, those which were brought out of Egypt are the
nation, and here it is the heads of the family who con-
stitute the definite element of the end. Universality is
thus still something natural, and the end is accordingly
only human, and is therefore the family. Religion is
thus patriarchal, and it is accordingly the family which
expands into the people. A nation means a people,
because, to begin with, it has its origin in Nature. This
is the limited end, and in reference to all others it is
exclusively the divine end.

The five Books of Moses start with the creation of the
world, and immediately after we come upon the Tall,
which has to do with the nature of man as man. This
universal element present in the creation of the world,
and next that fall of man, and of man in his generic
character, are ideas which, have had no influence on the
form subsequently taken by the Jewish religion. We
have merely this prophecy, the universal element in which
did not become a truth for the Israelitish people. God
is only the God of this people, not the God of men, and
this people is God's people.

It may be further remarked, with the view of making
more generally intelligible the connection between the uni-
versal wisdom of God in itself and the completely limited
nature of the real end, that when man wills the universal
good, and has this as his end, he has made his arbitrary
will the principle of his resolves and his acts. For this
universal good, this universal end, does not contain within
itself the Other, the Particular. When, however, it is
necessary to act, then this real end demands something
determinate, and this determinateness lies outside of the
Notion, since the latter has no such determinateness in
itself, but is still abstract, and the particular end is for
this reason not yet sanctified, because it has not yet been
taken up into the universal end of the Good.

In politics, if it is only universal laws which are to
hold sway, then the governing element is force, the arbi-

198 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

trary will of the individual. The law is real only in so
far as it is made particular, for it is through its being
made particular that the universal first becomes some-
thing living.

The other peoples are shut out from this single real
end. The People has its own peculiar nationality, and
.consists of certain families and the members of these.
This privilege of belonging to the People, and conse-
quently of standing to God in this relation, rests on
birth. This naturally demands a special' constitution,
special laws, ceremonies, and worship.

The peculiarity connected with the end is further
developed so as to include the possession of a special
district. This district or soil must be divided amongst
the different families, and is inalienable, so that the
excluding of other peoples results in gaining this wholly
empirical and external Present. This exclusion is, in
the first instance, not polemical, but, on the other hand,
it is the special possession which is the reality, the indi-
vidual enjoyment of this individual people, and the relation
of the individual people to the almighty, all-wise God. It
is not polemical, i.e., the other peoples can also be brought
into this relation to adore God in this way. They ought
to glorify the Lord, but that they should come to do
this is not a real end. The obligation is only ideal and
not practical. This real end appears first in Mohamme-
danism, where the particular end is raised to the rank of
a general one, and thus becomes fanatical.

Fanaticism, it is true, is found amongst the Jews as
well, but it comes into play only in so far as their posses-
sion, their religion, is attacked, and it comes into play
then because it is only this one end which is by its very
nature exclusive and will tolerate no accommodation to
anything different, no fellowship, no intercourse with it.

Tliird Determination. — Man is exalted above all else
in the whole creation. He is something which knows,
perceives, thinks. He is thus the image of God in a

DEFINITE RELIGION 199

sense quite other than that in which the same is true of the
world. What is experienced in religion is God, He who is
thought, and it is only in thought that God is worshipped.
In the religion of the Parsis we had dualism, and the
idea of contrast implied in this we have in the Jewish
religion as well. The contrast or opposition does not,,
however, occur in God, but is found in the spirit which
is His " Other." God is Spirit, and what He has produced,
namely, the world, is also Spirit, and it is in this latter
that He is in Himself the " Other " of His essence.
What is involved in finitude is, that in it difference
appears as division. In the world God is at home with
Himself; it is good, for the Nothing or non-existence
which belongs to it, and out of which the world has been
created, is the Absolute itself. The world, however, as
representing this first act of judgment, of separation, on
God's part, does not get the length of being absolute
contrast. It is only Spirit which is capable of being
this absolute contrast, and it is this which gives it its
depth. The contrast or opposition exists within the
other spirit, which is consequently the finite spirit. This
is the place where the contest between good and evil
goes on, and it is the place, too, in which this fight must
be fought out. All these characteristics arise out of the
nature of the Notion. This opposition is a difficult point,
for it constitutes the contradiction, which may be stated
thus : the Good is not contradictory in virtue of its own
nature, but rather it is by means of evil that contradic-
tion first enters, and it occurs only in evil. But then
the question arises : How has evil come into the world ?
At this stage such a question has both meaning and
interest. In the religion of the Parsis this question
cannot occasion any difficulty, for there the Evil exists
quite as much as the Good. Both have sprung from
something which is devoid of all definite character. Here,
on the other hand, where God is power and the one
Subject, and where everything depends for its existence

200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

solely on Him, evil is a contradiction, for God is certainly
the absolute Good. An old pictorial representation of
this, namely, the Fall, has been preserved in the Bible.
This well-known account of how evil came into the
world is in the form of a myth, and appears at the same
time in the guise of a parable. Of course when a specula-
tive idea, something true, is thus represented in a sensuous
figure, in the form of* something which has actually
happened, it can hardly miss having certain traits about
it which don'c fittingly express the truth itself. You find
the same thing in Plato when he speaks in pictorial
language of the Ideas, for there, too, the inadequacy of
the picture to express the truth is apparent. This is
how the narrative runs : — After the creation of Adam and
Eve in Paradise, God forbade the first human beings to
eat of a certain tree. The serpent, however, misleads
them, and gets them to eat of it by saying, "You will
become like God." God then imposes a severe penalty
on them, but at the same time says, " See, Adam is
become as one of us, for he knows what is good and evil."
Looked at from this particular side, man, according to
God's declaration, has become God, but regarded from the
other side, this means that God has cut off man's chance
of reaching Him by this path, inasmuch as He drives
him out of Paradise. This simple story may, to begin
with, be taken as embodying something like the following
meaning. God laid down a command, and man, impelled
by a boundless feeling of pride which led him to wish
to be equal to God (a thought which came to him from
the outside), transgresses this command, and for his
miserable silly pride it was ordained that he should be
severely punished. God laid down that command for-
mally only, with the view of putting him in circum-
stances in which his obedience might be proved.

According to this explanation, everything takes place
in accordance with the ordinary finite laws of cause and
effect. God, undoubtedly, forbids evil, but such a pro-

DEFINITE RELIGION 201

liibition is something wholly different from the prohibi-
tion to eat of a certain tree. What God wills or does
not will must represent His true eternal nature. Such a
prohibition is further thought of as having been imposed
only on a single individual, and man justly rebels against
being punished for guilt that is not his own — he will
only answer for what he has done himself.

On the other hand, in the story, regarded as a whole,
there is a deep philosophical meaning. It is Adam, or
man in general, who appears in this narrative. What is
here related concerns the nature of man himself, and it is
not a formal childish command which God lays on him,
for the tree of which Adam is not to eat is called the tree
of the knowledge of good and evil, and thus the idea of a
tree with an outward definite form disappears. Man eats
of it, and he attains to the knowledge of good and evil.
The difficulty, however, is that it is said God forbade
man to reach this knowledge, for it is just this knowledge
which constitutes the character of Spirit. Spirit is Spirit
only through consciousness, and it is just in this know-
ledge that consciousness in its highest form is found.
How, then, could this prohibition have been given ?
Cognition, knowledge, represents this two-sided danger-
ous gift. Spirit is free, and to this freedom good as well
as evil is referred, and it thus contains the power of
arbitrary choice to do what is evil. This is the negative
side attaching to the affirmative side of freedom referred
to. Man, it is said, was in a state of innocence ; this is,
in fact, the condition of the natural consciousness, but it
must be done away with as soon as the consciousness of
Spirit actually appears. That represents eternal history,
and the nature of man. He is at first natural and
innocent, and incapable, consequently, of having moral
acts attributed to him. In the child there is no freedom,
and yet it belongs to the essential character of man that
he should once more reach innocence. What is his
final destiny is here represented as his primitive condi-

202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

tion — the harmony between man and the Good. The
defect in this pictorial representation is that this unity
is described as a condition of immediate Being. It is
necessary to pass out of this condition of original natural-
ness, but the state of separation or disunion which then
arises has to pass into a state of reconciliation again.
Here this idea of reconciliation is represented by the
thought that man ought not to have passed beyond that
first condition. In the whole of this pictorial account,
what is inward is expressed in terms of what is outward,
and what is necessary in terms of what is contingent.
The serpent says that Adam will become like God, and
God confirms the truth of this, and adds His testimony
that it is this knowledge which constitutes likeness to
God. This is the profound idea lodged in the narrative.

But further, a punishment is next inflicted on man.
He is driven out of Paradise, and God says, " Cursed be
the ground for thy sake, in sorrow shalt thou eat what it
brings forth to thee ; thorns and thistles shall it bear to
thee, and thou shalt eat the herb of the field. In the
sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread, and thou shalt
return unto the ground, for out of it wast thou taken ;
for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return."

We have to recognise that here we have the conse-
quences of finitude ; but, on the other hand, the greatness
of man just consists in the fact that he eats his bread in
the sweat of his brow, and that through his own activity,
his work, and the exercise of his understanding, he wins
sustenance for himself. Animals have the happy lot,
if you like to call it so, of being supplied by Nature with
what they need. Man, on the other hand, elevates what
is necessary to this natural life to the rank of something
connected with his freedom. This is just the employment
of his freedom, though it is not the highest form in which
lie employs it, for that consists rather in knowing and
willing the Good. The fact that man regarded from the
natural side is also free, is involved in his nature, and is

DEFINITE RELIGION 203

not to be considered as in itself punishment. The
sorrow of the natural life is essentially connected with
the greatness of the character and destiny of man. For
him who is not yet acquainted with the loftier nature of
Spirit, it is a sad thought that man must die, and this
natural sorrow is, as it were, for him what is final. The
lofty nature and destiny of Spirit, however, just consists
in the fact that it is eternal and immortal ; still, this
greatness of man, this greatness of consciousness, is not
yet contained in this narrative, for it is said : God said,
" And now, lest he put forth his hand and take also of the
tree of life, and eat and live for ever" (iii. 22). Then
further (v. 19), " Till thou return unto the ground whence
thou wast taken." The consciousness of the immortality
of Spirit is not yet present in this religion.

In the entire narrative of the Fall these grand features
are present in what has the appearance of being an illo-
gical form, owing to the pictorial style in which the whole
is presented to us. The advance out of the merely natural
life, and the necessity for the entrance of the conscious-
ness of good and evil, constitute the lofty thought to
which God Himself here gives utterance. What is defec-
tive in the account is that death is described in such a
way as to leave the impression that there is no place for
consolation in regard to it. The fundamental note of the
account is that man ought not to be natural, and in
this is contained the thought expressed in true theology,
that man is by nature evil. Evil consists in resting in
this natural state ; man must advance out of this state
by exercising his freedom, his will. The further develop-
ment of this thought accordingly involves that Spirit
should once more attain to absolute unity within itself,
to a state of reconciliation, and freedom is just what con-
tains this turning back of Spirit into itself, this recon-
ciliation with itself. Here, however, this conversion or
turning back has not yet taken place ; the difference has
not yet been taken up into God, i.e., has not yet reached

204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

a state of reconciliation. The abstraction of evil lias not
yet disappeared.

It has to be observed farther that this story ceased to
have a living interest for the Jewish people, and that it
did not receive any further development in the Books of
the Hebrews. If we except some allusions in the later
apocryphal books, it is not mentioned, speaking generally,
in the others. For a long time it lay un worked, and it
was in Christianity that it was first to attain its true
significance. Still it cannot at all be said that man's
conflict within himself is something which did not exist
amongst the Jewish people. Ou the contrary, it consti-
tutes an essential characteristic of the religious spirit
amongst the Hebrews, but it was not conceived of in the
speculative sense as implying that it arises from the
nature of man himself, being represented rather as con-
tingent, as taking place in single individuals. In contrast
to the sinner and the man who is in conflict with him-
self, we get the picture of the righteous man, in whom
evil and the conflict with it are represented as not being
an essential moment in his life, but rather righteousness
is thought of as consisting in the doing of God's will, and
in being steadfast in the service of Jehovah by observing
the moral commandments connected alike with the pre-
cepts of ritual and the requirements of state law. Still
the conflict of man within himself is apparent every-
where, especially in the Psalms of David. Sorrow cries
out of the innermost depths of the soul conscious of its
sinf illness, and as a consequence we find the most sorrowful
prayers for pardon and reconciliation. This deep sorrow
is thus undoubtedly present, but it appears rather as
belonging to the single individual than as something
which is known to be an eternal moment of Spirit.

These are the principal moments of the religion of the
One, so far as they concern particularisation and the
determination of an end on the part of the One. This
latter determination brings us to worship.

DEFINITE RELIGION 205

D.
WORSHIP.

God has essentially a relation to self-consciousness,
since it is the finite spirit which constitutes the sphere
in which His end appears. We have now to consider
the religious sentiment or feeling of religion as seen in
this self-consciousness. The mediation which it needs,
in so far as it is feeling, is the positing of the identity,
which is potentially posited, and is thus the mediating
movement. This feeling represents the most inward
movement of self-consciousness.

i. Self-consciousness brings itself into relation with
the One, and is thus, to begin with, intuition, pure thought
of the pure Essence as pure power and absolute Being,
alongside of which nothing else of equal value can be
put. This pure thought, therefore, as reflection into self,
as self-consciousness, is self-consciousness with the charac-
ter of infinite Being for self, or freedom, but freedom devoid
of all concrete content. This self-consciousness is thus
as yet distinct from real consciousness, and nothing of all
the concrete characteristics of spiritual and natural life,
of the fulness of consciousness, of the impulses, inclina-
tions, and of all that belongs to the realm of spiritual
relations, nothing of all this has as yet been taken up
into the consciousness of freedom. The reality of life
has still a place outside of the consciousness of freedom,
and this last is not yet rational, it is still abstract, and no
full, concrete, divine consciousness is as yet in existence.
Since, therefore, self-consciousness exists only as con-
sciousness, while, however, in the way of an object for
the simplicity of thought there exists as yet no corre-
sponding object, and since the determinateness of con-
sciousness has not yet been taken up into it, the Ego is
an object for itself only in its abstract state of unity with
itself only as immediate particularity. Self-conscious-

2o5 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ness is accordingly devoid of expansion and extension,
devoid of all concrete specification, and God as infinite
power is also without determinate character in Himself,
and there is no third thing, no definite form of existence
in which they might meet. So far it is a condition of
unmediated relation, and the two contrasted elements
— the relation to the One in pure thought and intui-
tion, and abstract return into self, Being for self, — are
immediately united. Since, then, self-consciousness, as
distinguished from its object, which is pure thought
and can only be grasped in thought, is empty, formal
self-consciousness, naked and devoid of specific character
in itself, and since, further, all real concrete specification
belongs to power only, in this absolute contrast the pure
freedom of self-consciousness is turned into absolute
absence of freedom, or, in other words, self-consciousness is
the self-consciousness of a servant in relation to a master.
The fear of the Lord is the fundamental characteristic of
the relation which here exists.

I have a general feeling of fear produced by the idea
of a Power above me, which negates my value as a
person, whether that value appears in an outward or in
an inward way as something belonging to me. I am
without fear when, on the one hand, in virtue of possess-
ing an invulnerable independence, I disregard the force
above me, and know myself to be power as against it in
such a way that it has no influence over me ; and, on
the other hand, I am without fear too when I disregard
those interests which this Power is in a position to de-
stroy, and in this way remain uninjured even when I am
injured. Fear has commonly a bad meaning attached to
it, as if it implied that the person who experiences fear
did not wish to represent himself as power, and was not
capable of doing so. But the fear here spoken of is not
the fear of what is finite or of finite force. The finite is
contingent power, which, apart from any fear felt, can
seize and injure me ; but, on the other hand, the fear

DEFINITE RELIGION 207

here spoken of is the fear of the Uuseeu, of the Absolute,
the counterpart of my consciousness, the consciousness of
the self which is infinite as opposed to me the finite self.
Before the consciousness of this Absolute, as being the
one single purely negative Power, special forces of any
kind disappear, everything which has the mark of the
earthly nature upon it simply perishes. This fear, in
the form of this absolute negativity of oneself, is the
elevation of consciousness to the pure thought of the
absolute power of the One. And this fear of the Lord
is the beginning of wisdom, which consists in not allow-
ing the particular, the finite by itself, to have a valid
existence as something independent. What has a valid
existence can have this only as a moment in the organisa-
tion of the One, and the One is the abrogation of all that
is finite. This wise fear is the one essential moment of
freedom, and consists in being freed from all that is par-
ticular, in breaking away from all accidental interests,
and in general, in the feeling on man's part of the
negativity of all that is particular. It is accordingly
not a particular fear of any particular thing, but, on the
contrary, it consists in the positing of this particular fear
as a thing of nought ; it is deliverance from fear. Thus
fear is not the feeling of dependence, but rather it is the
stripping oneself of dependence of every kind ; it is pure
surrender of self to the absolute Self, in contrast to which
and into which the particular self melts away and disap-
pears.

In this way, however, the subject is only in the infinite
One. Absolute negativity, however, is relation to self,
affirmation ; by means of absolute fear the Self accord-
ingly exists, and exists in its self- surrender, in the
absolutely positive. Fear in this way changes inlo
absolute confidence, infinite faith. At another stage
confidence can take the form of a state in which the
individual relies upon himself. This is the stoical free-
dom in chains. Here, however, freedom does not as yet

208 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

take on this form of subjectivity, but rather self-con-
sciousness has to sink itself in the One, while this latter,
again, represented as the Other, is the principle of
repulsion, in which self-consciousness regains its self-
certainty. This process can be conceived of under the
following form.

The state of servitude is, in fact, self-consciousness,
reflection into self and freedom, which, however, is devoid
of all general extension and rationality, and finds its
determinateness, its content, in the immediate sensuous
self-consciousness. It is the " I " as this particular indi-
vidual, in immediate particularity, which is accordingly
end and content. In the relation in which he stands to
his Lord the servant finds his absolute, essential self-
consciousness, and in view of Him he annihilates every-
thing in himself. It is, however, just because of this
that he regains his position as existing absolutely for
himself, and his particularity or individuality just be-
cause it has been taken up into that intuition of the
Absolute and is made to form its concrete side, is, owing
to this relation, absolutely justified. The fear in which
the servant regards himself as nothing, gains for him the
restoration of his justification. But because the servile
consciousness rests obstinately on its particularity, and
because its particularity has been taken up into the
unity immediately, it is exclusive, and God is —
. 2. The exclusive Lord and God of the Jewish people.
It need not surprise us that an Oriental nation should
limit religion to itself, and that this religion should ap-
pear as absolutely connected with its nationality, for we
see this in . Eastern countries in general. The Greeks
and the Romans were the first to adopt foreign forms of
worship, and all kinds of religion were introduced amongst
the latter, and did not rank as national. In Oriental
countries, however, religion is essentially closely con-
nected with nationality. The Chinese, the Persians, have
their State religion, which is for them only. Amongst

DEFINITE RELIGION 209

the Hindus birth determines for every individual even
his rank and his relation to Brahma, and accordingly
they do not in any way demand that others should adopt
their religion ; in fact, amongst the Hindus, such a de-
mand has no meaning whatever, since, according to their
ideas, all the various peoples of the earth belong to their
religion, and foreign nations are reckoned collectively as
belonging to a particular caste. Still this exclusiveness
is rightly regarded as more striking in the case of the
Jewish people, for such strong attachment to nationality
is in complete contradiction with the idea that God is to
be conceived of only in universal thought, and not in one
particular characterisation. Amongst the Persians God
is The Good. That is also a universal characteristic ;
but it is itself still in the condition of immediacy, conse-
quently God is identical with light, and that is a form of
particularity. The Jewish God exists only for Thought,
and that stands in contrast with the idea of the limita-
tion of God to the nation. It is true that amongst the
Jewish people, too, consciousness rises to the thought of
universality, and this thought is given expression to in
several places. Psalm cxvii. I : " 0 praise the Lord, all
ye nations, praise him, all ye peoples. For his grace
and truth are great toward us to all eternity." The
glory of God is to be made manifest amongst all peoples,
and it is in the later prophets particularly that this
universality makes its appearance as a higher demand.
Isaiah makes God even say, " Of the heathen who shall
honour Jehovah will I make priests and Levites ; " and
a similar idea is expressed also in the words, " In every
nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is
accepted with Him." All this, however, comes later.
According to the dominant fundamental idea, the Jewish
people are the chosen people, and the universality is thus
reduced to particularity. But as we have already seen
above in the development of the Divine end how the
limitation attached to this is based on the limitation
VOL. ir. o

3ia THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

which is still involved in the characterisation of God, so
now this limitation is explained for us from the nature of
the servile consciousness ; and we see too, now, how this
particularity arises from the subjective side. This hon-
ouring and recognition of Jehovah is something which is
peculiar to them, those servants, and they have them-
selves the consciousness that it is peculiar to them.

This harmonises, too, with the history of the people.
The Jewish God is the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and
of Jacob, the God who brought the Jews out of Egypt,
and there is not the slightest trace of the thought that
God may have done other things as well, and that He
has acted in an affirmative way amongst other peoples
too. Here, therefore, it is from the subjective side,
from the side of worship, that the idea of particularity
comes in, and in any case it can be said that God is
the God of those who honour Him, for it is God's
nature to be known in the subjective spirit, and to
know Himself there. This is a moment which essen-
tially belongs to the idea of God. The act of knowing,
of acknowledging, belongs essentially to this characterisa-
tion or determination. This often comes out in what is
for us a distorted way, when, for instance, God is said
to be mightier and stronger than the other gods, exactly
as if there were gods besides Him ; for the Jews, however,
these are false gods.

There is this particular nation which honours Him,
and so He is the God of this nation, its Lord, in fact.
It is He who is known as the Creator of heaven and
earth, He has set bounds and limits for everything and
bestowed on everything its peculiar nature, and so too He
has given to man his proper place and his rights. This
expresses the characterisation according to which He as
Lord gives His people laws, laws which have to do with
the entire sphere of their actions, both the universal
laws, the Ten Commandments — which are the universal,
ethical, legal, fundamental, characteristics of lawgiving

DEFINITE RELIGION 211

and morality, and which are not held to be laws given
by reason, but rather laws written down by God — and
also all the rest of the State laws and regulations.
Moses is called the lawgiver of the Jews, but he was
not to the Jews what Lycurgus and Solon were to the
Greeks, for these two gave as men their own laws. He
only made the laws of Jehovah known ; it was Jehovah
Himself who, according to the story, engraved them ou
the stone. Attached to the most trifling regulations, the
arrangement of the tabernacle, the usages in connection
with sacrifices, and everything relating to all other kinds
of ceremonial, you find in the Bible the formula " Jehovah
saith." All law is given by the Lord, and is thus entirely
positive commandment. There is in it a formal, abso-
lute authority. The particular elements in the political
system are not, speaking generally, developed out of the
universal end, nor is it left to man to give it its special
character, for the Unity does not permit human caprice,
human reason, to exist alongside of it, and political change
is in every instance called a falling away from God ; but,
on the other hand, the particular laws, as being something
given by God, are regarded as eternally established. And
here the eternal laws of what is right, of morality, are
placed in the same rank and stated in an equally positive
form with the most trifling regulations. Tnis constitutes
a strong contrast to the conception which we have of God.
Worship is now the service of God ; the good man, the
righteous man, is he who performs this service, by keeping
and observing both the moral commandments and also the
ceremonial laws. This is the service of the Lord.

The people of God is accordingly a people adopted by
covenant and contract on the conditions of fear and
service. That is to say, the self-conscious community
is no longer an original and immediate unity in union
with the Essence, as is the case in the Religion of Nature.
The external form of the Essence in the Eeligiou of
Nature is only a pictorial representation of Nature, an

212 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

outer covering which does not truly separate the two
sides of what constitutes the religious relation, and is
therefore only an unessential separation of the two, only
a superficial distinction. The present standpoint, on the
contrary, is based in the first instance on absolute re-
flection into self as abstract Being-for-self, and it is
here accordingly that the mediation of the relation be-
tween self-consciousness and its absolute Essence comes
in. The self- consciousness does not, however, represent
man as man in the sense of universality. The religious
relation is something special, which, regarded from the
point of view of man, may be called contingent, for all
that is finite is external to Absolute Power, and contains
in it no positive character. This particularity of the
religious relation is not, however, a particularity amongst
others, but is rather a separate, infinite preference. Be-
cause of the character which thus attaches to the relation,
the latter finds expression in the thought that this people
has been adopted on the condition of its having the
fundamental feeling of its dependence, i.e., of its servi-
tude. This relation between the infinite Power and
what has independent Being is accordingly not one
which is posited essentially and originally, or has come
into existence only through the love of God to man, but
rather this unity has been established in an external
way through a contract. And, in fact, this adoption of
the People is something which has taken place once for
all, and occupies the place of what in revealed religion
in its completed form is known as redemption and
reconciliation.

Closely connected with the representation of God as
the Lord is the fact that the Jewish people gave them-
selves wholly up to His service. It is this which
explains, too, that marvellous steadfastness which was
n.ot a fanaticism of conversion like Mohammedanism,
which is already purified from the idea of nationality
and recognises believers only, but a fanaticism of stub-

DEFINITE RELIGION 213

bornness. It rests entirely on the abstraction of one
Lord ; the idea of vacillation comes into the mind only
when various interests and points of view exist alongside
of each other, and in such a struggle it is possible to take
one side or the other, but in this state of concentration
of thought on one Lord, the mind is completely held fast
to one side. The consequence of this is that in view
of the existence of this firm bond there is no freedom.
Thought is simply bound on to this unity, which is the
absolute authority. Many further consequences follow
from this. Amongst the Greeks, too, it is true, certain
institutions were held to have divine authority, but they
had been established by men ; the Jews, on the other
hand, made no such distinction between the divine and
the human. It was owing, too, to this absence of the
idea of freedom that they did not believe in immortality,
for even though it is perhaps possible to point to certain
traces of belief in it, still those passages in which they
occur are always of a very general character, and had
not the slightest influence on the religious and moral
points of view from which things were regarded. The
immortality of the soul is not as yet an admitted truth,
and there is accordingly no higher end than the service
of Jehovah, and so far as man himself is concerned, his
aim is to maintain himself and his family in life as long
as possible. Temporal possessions, in fact, are consequent
upon service, not something eternal, not eternal blessed-
ness. The conscious perception of the unity of the soul
with the Absolute, or of the reception of the soul into the
bosom of the Absolute, has not yet arisen. Man has as
yet no inner space, no inner extension, no soul of such an
extent as to lead it to wish for satisfaction within itself,
but rather it is the temporal which gives it fulness and
reality. According to the Law, each family receives a
property which must not be alienated, and in this way
the family is to be provided for. The aim of life conse-
quently was mainly the preservation of this bit of land.

214 .THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

This expresses the essential character of the family,
together with the land which belongs to it and from
which it derives its subsistence. The possession of a
country is what self-consciousness of this kind receives
from its God. It is consequently that very confidence
before referred to which is the absolutely limited con-
stitutive element of the individual family existence.
Just because man in the absolutely negative condition of
self-surrender exists in what is purely positive, and con-
sequently is once more in a condition of immediacy,
confidence, as expressing the surrender of finite interests,
turns into the surrender of the surrender, and thus
comes to represent in turn the realised finite individual,
his happiness and possessions. These possessions and
this people are identical, inseparable. God's people
possess Canaan. God has made a covenant with Abra-
ham, the one side of which is constituted by this posses-
sion, and it is the affirmative in this sphere of empirical
particular interests. Both are inseparable, the special
possession and the confidence, the piety. The possession
consequently gets an infinitely absolute authorisation, a
divine authorisation ; and yet at the same time the title
to the possession does not take the form of a juridical
right, of a property ; this latter, as being different from
possession, is not applicable here. Property has its
source in personality, in this very freedom of the single
individual. Man is essentially a holder of property in
so far as he is a person, but the possession, as expressing
the empirical aspect of property, is entirely free to take
any form, this being left to chance. What I possess is
a matter of accident, a matter of indifference ; when I
am recognised as a holder of property, I am a free sub-
jectivity and the possession is a matter of indifference.
Here, on the contrary, this definite possession as such is
identical with the feeling of confidence, and it is con-
sequently this possession to which an absolute title
attaches. The idea of property does not come in here,

DEFINITE RELIGION 215

and so the idea of free-will does not appear either. God,
the absolute Idea, and then property, and possession,
represent three different stages. Here the uniting middle
term, property, drops away, and the possession is taken
up into the divine will in an immediate form. It is
this empirical individual possession which is to have
value as such and as thus authorised, and it is taken
out of the reach of the free act of designation on the
part of the individual, who cannot sell it but can only
pledge it for some time, and always only until the year
of Jubilee.

The other side, namely, the negative relation, corre-
sponds to the affirmative side. The recognition of Power
as constituting the negative side must also be defined
empirically or externally in reference to property. Parti-
cular acts of conduct, real ways of acting, must in the same
way have their negative side as the acknowledgment of
the Lord. There must be a service, not simply fear, but
an act of surrender in particular things. This is the
other side of the covenant, which, on the one hand, has
possession as its effect, but, on the other, demands service
also, so that just as this particular country is attached to
this particular nation, the nation itself is bound by the
obligation of rendering the service required by the Law.
These laws, looked at from one side, are family laws,
have reference to family conditions, and have a moral
content ; but looked at from the other side, the main point
about them is that what is inherently moral in them is
regarded as something which has been laid down in a
purely positive way, and so naturally we have joined on
to this a large number of external accidental regulations
which are simply to be observed. The irrationality of
the service corresponds to the irrationality of the posses-
sion, and we thus have an abstract obedience which does
not require any inwardness in respect of any definite
character belonging to it, since its justification for exist-
ing is an abstract one. Just because God is absolute

2i$ THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

power, all actions are of an indeterminate character, and
for this reason they get their determinate character in an
entirely external and arbitrary way. The keeping of the
commandment which demands service, obedience to God,
is the condition upon which the nation continues in the
state in which it is. This is the other aspect of the
covenant. It is possible for individuals, or for the whole
nation, to fall away by self-will from the laws, but this
is a falling away merely from definite commandments
and from ceremonial service, and not a falling away from
what is original or fundamental, for this latter is some-
thing which has the authority of what ought to be.
Accordingly the penalty attached to disobedience is not
an absolute penalty, but is merely external misfortune,
namely, the loss of the possession, or its diminution and
curtailment. The penalties which are threatened are of
an external earthly sort, and have reference to the undis-
turbed possession of the land. Just as the obedience
demanded is not of a spiritual and moral sort, but is
merely the definite blind obedience of men who are not
morally free, so also the penalties have an external
character. The laws, the commands, are to be followed
and observed merely as if by slaves or servants.

If we consider those penalties which are threatened in
the form of frightful curses, the thorough mastery which
this nation attained to in the matter of cursing is worthy
of notice; and yet these curses have reference only to
what is external, and not to what is inward and moral.
In the third Book of Moses, in the twenty-sixth chapter,
we read : —

"If ye shall despise My statutes, and will not do all
My commandments, and break My Covenant, I will visit
you with terror, consumption, and the burning ague, that
shall consume the eyes and cause sorrow of heart. Ye
shall sow your seed in vain, and your enemies shall eat
it ; and they that hate you shall reign over you, and ye
shall flee when none pursueth you. And if ye will not

DEFINITE RELIGION 217

yet for all this hearken unto Me, then I will punish you
seven times more for your sins. And I will make your
heaven as iron, and your earth as brass ; and your toil
and labour shall be lost, so that your land shall not yield
her increase, and the trees shall not yield their fruits.

" And if ye walk contrary to Me, and will not hearken
unto Me, I will bring seven times more plagues upon you,
according to your sins. I will also send wild beasts
among you, which shall eat your children, and tear your
cattle, and make you few in number ; and your highways
shall be desolate. And if ye will not be reformed by Me by
these things, but will walk contrary to Me, then will I
punish you yet seven times for your sins. And I will
bring a sword upon you that shall avenge the quarrel of
My covenant. And though ye are gathered together within
your cities, yet will I send the pestilence among you, and
will deliver you into the hand of the enemy. Then will
I break the staff of your bread, so that ten women shall
bake in one oven, and they shall deliver you your bread
again by weight ; and when ye eat, ye shall not be satisfied.

" And if ye will not for all this hearken unto Me, then
I will walk contrary unto you also in fury, and will
chastise you yet seven times, so that ye shall eat the
flesh of your sons and daughters. And I will destroy
your high places, and cut down your images, and cast
your carcases upon your idols, and My soul shall abhor
you, and I will make your cities waste, and bring your
sanctuaries unto desolation ; and I will not smell the
savour of your sweet odours. And I will bring the
land into desolation, so that your enemies which dwell
therein shall be astonished at it. And I will scatter you
among the heathen, and will draw out a sword after
you."

We have already seen that amongst the Jews the place
of evil is in the subjective spirit, and that the Lord is
not engaged in a conflict with evil, but that He punishes
evil. Evil accordingly appears as an external accident,

5i8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

and this is bow it is represented in the story of the Fall,
according to which it enters in from the outside, in that
man is deceived by the serpent.

God punishes evil as something which ought not to be.
It is good only that ought to be, since it is what the Lord
has enjoined. There is here as yet no freedom, and there
is not even freedom to find out what the divine and
eternal law is. The characteristics of the Good, which
are undoubtedly the characteristics of reason as well,
derive their worth from the fact that they are rules laid
down by the Lord, and the Lord punishes any transgres-
sion of these ; this is the wrath of God. The relation in
which the Lord here stands to the Good expresses merely
the idea of something that ought to be. What He ordains
is what ought to be, is law. To the Lord belongs the
exercise of penal righteousness ; the conflict between good
and evil occurs within the subject as being finite. An
element of contradiction is thus present in finite con-
sciousness, and consequently there enters in a feeling of
contrition, of sorrow, caused by the fact that the Good is
only something which ought to be.

3. The third aspect of worship or cultus is reconcilia-
tion. It has reference essentially only to the particular
faults of separate individuals, and is brought about by
means of sacrifice.

Here sacrifice is not intended simply to signify that
the offerer is symbolically renouncing his finitude, and
preserving his unity with God, but it signifies more
definitely the act of acknowledgment of the Lord, a
testifying that He is feared ; and it has the still further
signification of being an act whereby what of the finite
remains has been redeemed and ransomed. Man cannot
look on Nature as something which he can use according
to his own arbitrary desires ; he cannot lay hold of it
directly, but he must get whatever he wishes to have
through the mediation of something foreign to himself.
Everything is the Lord's, and must be bought back from

DEFINITE RELIGION 219

Him ; and thus it is that the tithe is ordained, and that
the first-born has to be redeemed.

The expiation for sins accordingly takes place in a
peculiar way, namely, by bringing in the idea that the
punishment which has been merited, the merited mani-
festation of the nullity of him who has lifted himself up in
sinfulness, can be transferred to what is offered in sacri-
fice. This is sacrifice. The individual makes it plain
that his standing before God has no worth. It is thus
that the idea arises that the due manifestation of the
sinner's nothingness is transferred to what is offered,
since God acknowledges the sacrifice, and in this way
gives the self a positive standing, or, in other words, a
standing in itself.

The externality which thus attaches to the sacrifice
arises from the fact that the expiation is thought of as
being punishment, and not as purification as such ; rather
it is looked on as being an injury done to the evil will in
this sense that the will is supposed to suffer damage.
Closely connected with this idea is the fact that it is
the blood specially which is offered up by being sprinkled
on the altar. For if it is life which is to be yielded up
as representing the highest of all earthly possessions, it
follows that something must be surrendered to God which
is really living, and the blood, in which the life of the
animal is supposed to be, is given back to the Lord. We
saw that amongst the Hindus the whole animal world
was held in honour. Here again it is deprived of this
honour, but the blood is still regarded as something in-
violable and divine ; it is held in respect, and must not
be eaten by men. Man does not yet possess the feeling
of his concrete freedom which leads him to regard life
simply as life, as something inferior and subordinate to
what is higher.

220 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The Transition to the Stage which follows.

Speaking generally, we, as a matter of fact, find that
here we are in the region of free subjectivity, but still
the essential characteristic which belongs to free subjec-
tivity has not yet been fully carried right through the
totality of the religious consciousness in the Eeligion of
Sublimity. God was characterised for Thought as sub-
stantial Power, and as the Creator, but in this character
He is, to begin with, merely the Lord of His creatures.
Power is thus the cause which differentiates itself, but it
is something which merely puts forth its authority over,
exercises its lordship over, that in which it thus differen-
tiates itself.

A further stage of progress accordingly is reached, when
it is seen that this " Other " is something free — free from
external restraint, and God becomes the God of free men,
who, even while rendering Him obedience, are actually
free in their relation to Him. This standpoint, if we
look at it in an abstract way, contains within it the follow-
ing moments : God is a free, absolute Spirit, and mani-
fests Himself by setting His " Other " over against Him-
self. What is thus posited by Him is His image, for the
subject creates only itself, and that which it becomes
by self-determination is again nothing else than itself.
But in order that it may be really determined, or get a
specific nature as Spirit, it must negate this " Other," and
return to itself, for then only when it knows itself in the
" Other " is it free. But if God knows Himself in the
<; Other," it follows that the " Other " has an actual inde-
pendent existence, is for itself, and knows itself to be free.

This represents the release of the " Other " as being
now something free and independent. Tims freedom is
found first of all in the subject, and God is still charac-
terised as Power, which is for itself, has real existence,
and releases the subject. The differentiation or further

DEFINITE RELIGION 221

characterisation which is thus reached seems, in accor-
dance with what has been stated, to consist simply in
this, that the creatures are no longer merely in a state of
service, but rather find their freedom in the very act of
rendering service. This moment of the freedom of sub-
jects or persons for whom God is, and which is wanting
in the standpoint of the Religion of Sublimity which we
have been considering, we have already seen in a lower
stage of thought, in the sphere of the Religion of Nature,
in the Syrian religion, namely.

In the higher stage, to which we now pass, what in
the lower was represented in a natural immediate way
is transferred to the pure region of Spirit, and is as-
cribed to its inner mediation. In the religion of sorrow
or pain, we saw that God loses Himself, that He dies,
and exists only by means of the negation of Himself.
This act of mediation is the moment which is again to
be taken up here. God dies, and from this death He
rises again. That is the negation of Himself which we,
on the one hand, conceive of as the " Other " of Himself,
as the world ; and He Himself dies, which means that in
this death He comes to Himself. In this way, however,
the " Other " is represented as freely existing for itself,
and accordingly the mediation and rising again belong to
the other side, the side of what has been created.

Considered thus, it seems as if the conception of God
Himself underwent no change, but that the change is only
in the aspect in which the " Other " is regarded. That it
is just here where freedom comes in, and that it is this
side, namely, that of the " Other," which is free, is to be
explained from the fact that in the finite, this otherness
of God dies away, and so the Divine appears again in the
finite in an actual way, or for itself. Thus what is of
the world is known as something which has the Divine
in it, and the JBeing-other or otherness which at first is
characterised only as negation, is ngain negated, and is
the negation of negation within itself.

222 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

This is the kind of mediation which belongs to freedom.
Freedom is not pure negation, it is not merely an act of
flight and surrender. Freedom of that sort is not yet the
true affirmative freedom, but is negative freedom only.
Ii is the negation of what is in a merely natural state in
so far as this itself exists as something negative, which
first gives the affirmative determination of freedom.
Since the " Other," namely, the world, finite conscious-
ness, with its servitude and contingent character, is
negated, it follows that in this act of mediation the deter-
mination of freedom is to be found. The elevation or
exaltation of Spirit is thus this particular elevation above
the state of mere naturalness, but it is an elevation in
which, if it is to become freedom, the subjective spirit
must also be free in its own nature, for itself. This
accordingly is at first seen only in the subject or indivi-
dual. " God is the God of free men."

It is, however, equally true that any further determina-
tion or characterisation takes place quite as much within
the nature of God. God is Spirit, but He is Spirit in
any essential sense only in so far as He is known to be
the self-diremption of Himself, the producer of differen-
tiation within Himself, the eternal act of creation, and in
such a way that this creation of an " Other " is a return
to Himself, a return to the knowledge of Himself. It is
thus that God is a God of free men. Since it belongs to
the essential character of God Himself that He should
be in His very nature the " Other " of Himself, and that
this " Other " is a determination or quality within His
own nature, so that He thereby returns to Himself and the
human element is reconciled to God, it follows that we thus
get the determination which is expressed by saying that
Humanity is itself in God. Thus man knows that what
is human is a moment of the Divine itself, and conse-
quently he stands in a free relation to God. For that to
which he stands related as to his own essential being has
the essential characteristics of humanity in itself, and

DEFINITE RELIGION 223

thus, on the one hand, man is related, as it were, to the
negation of his merely natural life, and, on the other
hand, to a God in whom the human element is itself
affirmative and an essential characteristic. Man thus, as
occupying such a relation to God, is free. What exists
in men as concrete individuals is represented as being
something divine and substantial, and man in all that
constitutes his essential nature, in all that has any value
for him, is present in what is Divine. Out of his pas-
sions, says one of the ancients, man has made his gods,
i.e., out of his spiritual powers.

In these powers self-consciousness has its essential
attributes for its object, and knows that in them it is free.
It is not, however, particular individual subjectivity which
has itself as its object in these essential characteristics,
and which is conscious that the well-being of its particular
nature is based on them. This is the case in the religion
of the One where it is only this immediate definite exist-
ence, this particular natural existence of the particular
subject or individual, which is the end, and where it is
the individual, and not his universality, which constitutes
what is essential ; and where, further, the servant has his
own selfish aims. Here, on the other hand, self-con-
sciousness has for its object its specific nature, its uni-
sality as manifested in the divine powers. Self-con-
sciousness is' consequently raised above the need of
making any absolute claim to have its immediate indi-
viduality recognised, it is raised above the need of troub-
ling about this, and it finds its essential satisfaction in a
substantial objective Power. It is only the Moral, what
is universal and rational, which is held to be in and for
itself essential, and the freedom of self-consciousness
consists of the essentiality of its true nature and its
rationality. The sum and substance of the phase upon
which the religious spirit has now entered may be
expressed thus. God is in His own nature the mediation
which man expresses. Man recognises himself in God

224: THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

and God and man say of each other — That is spirit of
my spirit. Man is Spirit just as God is Spirit. He has
also, it is true, finitude and the element of separation in
him, but in religion he discards his finitude since his
knowledge is the knowledge of himself in God.
, We accordingly now pass to the Religion of Humanity
and Freedom. The first form of this religion, however,
is itself infected with the element of immediacy and
naturalness, and thus we shall see the Human existing
in God under what are still natural conditions. The
inward element, the Idea, is indeed potentially what is
true, but it has not yet been raised above the state of
nature, which is the first and immediate form of its
existence. The human element in God expresses His
finitude only, and thus this religion, so far as its basis is
concerned, belongs to the class of finite religions. It is,
however, a religion of spirituality, because the mediation
which, as separated and divided up into its moments,
constituted the foregoing transition stages, is now put
together so as to form a totality, and constitutes the
foundation of this religion.

II.
THE RELIGION OF BEAUTY.

This Religion of Beauty, as has been already indicated,
is seen in a definitely existing form in the religion of
the Greeks, which, both in its inner and outer aspects,
presents us with an infinite amount of inexhaustible
material, beside which, owing to its sympathetic attrac-
tiveness, its grace, and charm, one would fain linger.
Here, however, we cannot enter into details, but must
confine ourselves to the essential characteristics of its
notion or conception.

; "We must thus (A.) indicate the notion or conception of
this sphere of religious thought ; then (B.) consider the

DEFINITE RELIGION 225

outward form of the Divine in it ; and (C.) its form of
worship as the movement of self-consciousness in re-
lation to its essential powers.

A.

THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OB NOTION.

The fundamental characteristic here is subjectivity as
the self-determining Power. This subjectivity and wise
power we have already met with under the form of the
One who is as yet undetermined within Himself, and
whose end, as it appears in the sphere of reality, is
accordingly the most limited possible. The next stage,
now, is that this subjectivity, this wise power or power-
ful wisdom, particularises itself within itself. This stage,
just in consequence of this, is, on the one hand, the
lowering of universality, of abstract unity and infinite
power, to a condition of limitation within a circle of par-
ticularity, though, on the other hand, again, it at the same
time involves the elevation of the limited individuality
of the real end as against universality. In the region of
the particular, what shows itself here is both of these
movements, and this accordingly is the general charac-
teristic of this stage. "We have next to consider the fact
that from one point of view, the determinate notion, the
content of the self-determining Power, which is a particular
content owing to its being in the element of subjectivity,
makes itself subjective within itself. There actually are
particular ends ; they make themselves subjective, to begin
with, on their own account, and so we get a definite
sphere composed of a number of particular divine subjects.
Subjectivity, as end, is self-determination, and hence it
has particularisation in it — particularisation, in fact, as
such, in the form of a world of concretely existing differ-
ences which exist as so many divine forms. Subjectivity
in the Religion of Sublimity has already a definite end,

VOL. II. P

226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

namely, the family, the nation. But this end is only
realised in so far as the service of the Lord is not
neglected. Through this latter requirement, which
implies the abrogation of the subjective spirit so far as
the determinate end is concerned, this end becomes a
universal one. Thus if, on the one hand, through the
breaking up of the one subjectivity into a multiplicity of
ends, subjectivity is lowered to the condition of particu-
larity, on the other hand, the particularity is set over
against universality, and these differences in this way
here become divine, universal differences. This particu-
larity of the ends is thus the coming together of the
abstract universality and the individuality of the end —
their happy mean. This particularity thus constitutes
the content of universal subjectivity, and in so far as it
is posited in this element it gives itself a subjective form
as a subject. With this we enter upon a really ethical
stage, for when we have the Divine penetrating the
determinate relations of Spirit in an actual form, deter-
mining itself in accordance with the substantial unity,
we have what is ethical. And at the same time the real
freedom of subjectivity also comes into existence, for the
definite content is something which the finite self-con-
sciousness has in common with its God. Its God ceases
to be a " Beyond," and has a definite content which on
its determinate side is elevated to essentiality, and through
the abolition and absorption of the immediate indivi-
duality or singleness has become an essentially existing
content.

As regards the constituent element as such, the con-
tent that is, the substantial principle, as has been shown
in the context, is just rationality, the freedom of Spirit,
essential freedom. This freedom is not caprice, and
must be clearly distinguished from it; it is essential,
substantial freedom, the freedom which in its determina-
tions determines itself. Since freedom, as self-deter-
mining, is the principle or basis of this relation, what we

DEFINITE RELIGION 227

have here is concrete rationality which contains essenti-
ally moral principles.

That freedom is just this, namely, the desiring or
willing of nothing except itself, the desiring of nothing
else than freedom, and that this is the true moral element
from which moral determinations spring, or, in other
words, that the formal element of self-determination
changes round into the content, is a thought which cannot
here be further followed up.

"While morality constitutes the essential basis, still
what comes first is morality in its immediacy. It is the
rationality above referred to as absolutely universal or
general, and thus still in its impersonal or substantial
form. The rationality is not yet one subject, and has
not yet left the virgin unity in which it is morality, and
raised itself to the unity of the subject, or, in other words,
has not plunged into itself.

Absolute necessity and the spiritual human embodi-
ment are still separate. Determinateness, it is true, is
posited in a general way, but this determinateness is, on
the one hand, abstract, and on the other is left free to
take on determinateness in manifold shapes, and is not
yet taken back into that unity. That it should ever
be so taken back would be due to the circumstance that
the determinateness has developed into an infinite oppo-
sition or antithesis — as in the Religion of Sublimity —
and has gone on increasing till it became infinite ; for
it is only when it has reached this extreme that it
becomes at the same time capable of attaining to unity
in itself. The entire circle of the gods, as these take
on a definite form, must itself be taken up into and placed
within the sphere of necessity as in a pantheon. But
it is only capable of this, and is only worthy of attaining
this, when its manifoldness and diversity become general-
ised into simple difference. Not till this happens is it
adequate to that element, and so immediately identical
in itself. The different spirits must be conceived of as

228 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Spirit in such a way that Spirit is made to stand out
distinctly as representing their essentially universal
nature.

2. Because the unity of necessity is not yet carried
back to the ultimate point of infinite subjectivity, the
spiritual and essentially moral determinations appear as
disconnected or lying outside of one another ; the content
is the fullest possible, but its constituent parts are dis-
connected.

Ethics in general must be distinguished from morality
and ethics as the Greeks understood them ; and by ethics
in general is meant the subjectivity of ethics, that sub-
jectivity which can give account of its principles and has
an ethical intention, an ethical design and aim.

Morality is here as yet the substantial Being, the true
Being of what is moral, but not as yet the knowledge
of it. So far as the objective import is concerned, this
means that just because one subjectivity, the particular
reflection into self, is not yet present — and just in virtue
of this fact — the moral content has no connecting element
in it, its basis being constituted by the TldOtj, the essen-
tially spiritual powers, the universal powers of the moral
life, and chiefly of the practical life, life in the State, and,
in addition to this, justice, bravery, the family, oaths,
agriculture, science, and so on.

Closely connected with the fact that what is moral has
no inner connection as it appears in these particular
forms, is that other want of connection, namely, that the
natural appears as something opposed to these spiritual
powers. The determination of immediacy, which has
this disconnected condition as its consequence, involves
the further idea that the natural forces, the sky, the
earth, rivers, the division of time, appear as opposed to
the spiritual forces.

3. The last form of determinateness is that of the
antithesis between essential self-consciousness and the
finite self-consciousness, between the essential spirit and

DEFINITE RELIGION 229

the finite spirit In this determinateness the form of
the natural outward embodiment of subjectivity comes
into view, the natural outward form is imagined by self-
consciousness as something divine, and this divinity
accordingly stands over against self-consciousness.

B.

THE OUTWARD FORM OF THE DIVINE.

(a.) The Conflict of the Spiritual and the Natural.

Since the fundamental determination is spiritual sub-
jectivity, the power of Nature cannot be considered as
being the essential power in its own right. Yet it is
one of the particular powers, and as the most immediate
is the first of those through whose abrogation the other
spiritual powers first originate. We have seen the nature
of the power of the One, and how His real and actual
sublimity first resulted from creation. This one funda-
mental principle, as the self of the Absolute, is wanting
here. Thus the starting-point here is within the sphere
of what is immediately natural, which cannot at this
stage appear as if created by the One. The unity in
which these particular forms of the powers of Nature
repose is not spiritual, but is, on the contrary, an essen-
tially natural unity, chaos, in fact.

"But first of all," sings Hesiod, "was Chaos" (Theog.
v. 1 1 6). Chaos is thus itself something posited, but
what the positing agent is we are not told. It is only
said that it came into being. For the fundamental prin-
ciple here is not the self, but rather the selfless, the
pecessity, of which it can only be said that it is. Chaos
is the moving unity of the immediate, but it itself is not
yet subject, particularity ; hence it is not. said of it that
it begets, but as it only comes into being itself, so this
necessity comes into being in turn out of it, namely, the

230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

wide extended earth, the shades of Tartaros, the night of
Erebos, as also Eros, adorned beyond all with beauty.
We see the totality of particularity originating here ; the
earth, the positive element, the universal basis ; Tartaros,
Erebos, Night, the negative element, and Eros, the uniting
and active element. The particular elements are now
themselves productive ; the earth produces the heavens
out of itself, brings forth the hills without fructifying
love, the desolate Pontus, but when united with the sky
bears Oceanos and its rulers. She further brings forth
the Cyclopes, the forces of Nature as such, while the earlier
children, natural things, themselves exist as subjects. The
Earth and the Sky are thus the abstract powers which, by
fructifying themselves, cause the sphere of natural parti-
cular things to come into existence. The youngest child
is the inscrutable Cronos. Night, the second moment,
brings forth all that from the natural side has the moment
of negation within itself. Thirdly, these particular forms
unite in a reciprocal relation, and beget the positive and
negative. All these are conquered later on by the gods
of spiritual subjectivity; Hecate alone remains in the
form of Fate or Destiny as representing the natural side.

The primary power, that which rules over this circle
of natural forces, is the abstraction in general out of
which they have risen, Uranos; and inasmuch as he is
power only as positing his abstraction, so that this last is
alone what has valid worth, he drives away all his chil-
dren. But the main offspring of Heaven is inscrutable
Time, the youngest child. This latter conquers Uranos
through the cunning of the Earth. Everything here is
in the form of a subjective end, and cunning is the nega-
tive of force. But inasmuch as the particular forces
make themselves free, and set up on their own account,
Uranos calls them by a name suggestive of punishment,
calls them Titans, whose wrong-doing is one day to be
avenged on them.

These particular natural forces are also personified, but

DEFINITE RELIGION 231

this personification is, so far as they are concerned, super-
ficial only ; for the content of Helios, for example, or of
Oceanos. is something natural, and not superficial Power.
Thus, if Helios is represented in human fashion as active,
what we have is the empty form of personification.
Helios is not god of the sun, not the sun-god (the Greeks
never express themselves thus), and Oceanos is not the
god of the sea in such a way that the god and that over
which he rules are distinguished from each other ; on the
contrary, these powers are natural powers.

The first moment in this natural sphere is thus Chaos
posited together with its moments by abstract necessity ;
the second is the period of begetting under the rule of
Uranos, in which these abstract moments which have
proceeded out of chaos are the productive element ; the
third is the period of the sovereignty of Cronos, when
the particular natural powers, themselves just born, give
birth in turn to something else. In this way what is
posited is itself the positing factor, and the transition
to Spirit is made. This transition shows itself more
definitely in Cronos, in that he himself brings about
the downfall. He is sovereign pre-eminently through
the abrogation of the immediate divine forms. But he
himself is immediate, and thereby presents the contra-
diction of being, while in himself immediate, the abro-
gation of immediacy. He begets the spiritual gods
out of himself; yet in so far as they are at first merely
natural, he does away with them, and swallows them up.
But his abrogation of the spiritual gods must itself be
abrogated, and this is accomplished in its turn through
cunning working against the natural force of Cronos.
Zeus, the god of spiritual subjectivity, lives. Thus over
against Cronos there appears his Other, and there arises,
in fact, the conflict between the natural powers and the
spiritual gods.

However much, then, this breaking up may take place,
representing a state of things in which the natural powers

C32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

make their appearance as independent, still the unity of
the spiritual and the natural — and this is what is essen-
tial— appears more and more clearly, and this unity is,
moreover, not the neutralisation of the two, but is,- on the
contrary, that form in which the spiritual is not only the
predominant element, but is also the ruling and deter-
mining factor, and in which the natural is ideal and
brought into subjection.

The Greeks have expressed the consciousness of this
subjugation of the natural powers by the spiritual element
by telling how Zeus, through a war, founded the sove-
reignty of the spiritual gods, conquered the nature-power,
and hurled it from its throne. It is spiritual powers
accordingly that rule the world.

In this war of the gods we find the whole history
of the Greek gods and their nature expressed. With
the exception of this war, they have done nothing ; and
even when they take up the cause of an individual, or
say that of Troy, this is no longer their history nor the
historical development of their nature. But the fact
that they, as representing the spiritual principle, attained
to mastery over the natural and conquered it, is what
constitutes their essential act, and forms the essential
element in the ideas of the Greeks regarding them.

The natural gods are thus subdued, driven from their
throne ; the spiritual principle is victorious over the
religion of nature, and the natural forces are banished
to the borders of the world, beyond the world of self-
consciousness, but they have also retained their rights.
They are, while nature-powers, at the same time posited
as ideal, or as in subjection to the spiritual element,
so that they constitute a determination in what is spiri-
tual, or in the spiritual gods themselves. This natural
moment is still present in these gods, but is in them
only as a kind of reminiscence of the nature element,
only as one of their aspects.

To these old gods, however, belong not only nature-

DEFINITE RELIGION 233

powers, but also Dike, the Eumenides, the Erinyes ;
the Oath too and Styx are counted as amongst the
ancieut gods. They are distinguished from the later
ones by this, that although they are what is spiritual,
they are spiritual as a power existing only within itself,
or as a rude undeveloped form of Spirit. The Erinyes
are those who judge only inwardly, the oath is this
particular certainty in my conscience, its truth lies, even
if I take it outwardly, within myself. We may compare
the oath with conscience.

Zeus, on the contrary, is the political god, the god of
laws, of sovereignty, of laws definitely recognised, how-
ever, and not of the laws of conscience. Conscience has
no legal authority in the State. If men appeal to con-
science, one man may have one kind of conscience and
another another, and thus it is positive law alone which
has authority here. In order that conscience may be of
the right kind, it is necessary that what it knows as
right should be objective, should be in conformity with
objective law, and should not merely dwell within. If
conscience is right, then it is this as something recog-
nised by the State, when the State has an ethical con-
stitution.

Nemesis is likewise an ancient deity. It is merely
the formal element which brings down what is lofty,
what exalts itself ; it is the merely levelling principle,
envy, the putting down of what is distinguished or
exalted, so that it may be on a level with other things.
In Dike we have merely strict abstract justice. Orestes
is prosecuted by the Eumenides and is acquitted by
Athene, by the moral law, by the State. Moral law or
justice is something different from bare strict justice ;
the new gods are the gods of moral law.

But the new gods have themselves in turn a double
nature, and unite in themselves the natural and the
spiritual. In the real view of the Greeks the natural
element or nature-power was undoubtedly not the truly

234 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

independent or self-sufficing element. On the contrary,
this latter was found only in spiritual subjectivity.
Subjectivity as such which is full of content, the sub-
jectivity which determines itself in accordance with ends,
cannot have in it a merely natural content. Greek
imagination did not, accordingly, people Nature with gods
after the fashion of the Hindus, for whom the form
of God seems to spring out of all natural forms. The
Greek principle is rather subjective freedom, and hence
the natural is clearly no longer worthy to constitute the
content of the divine. But, on the other hand again,
this free subjectivity is not yet the absolutely free sub-
jectivity, not the Idea, which would have truly realised
itself as Spirit, i.e., it is not yet universal infinite sub-
jectivity. We are only at the stage which leads to this.
The content of free subjectivity is still particular ; it is
spiritual indeed, but since Spirit has not itself for its object,
the particularity is still natural, and is even still presented
as the one essential characteristic in the spiritual gods.

Thus Jupiter is the firmament, the atmosphere (in
Latin we have still the expression sub Jove frigido), what
thunders ; but besides being this natural principle, he
is not only the father of gods and men, but also the
political god, representing the law and morality of the
State, that highest power on earth. He is, moreover, in
addition to this, a many-sided moral power, the god of
hospitality in connection with the old customs at a
time when the relationship of the different states was
not as yet well defined, for hospitality had essentially
reference to the moral relationship of citizens belonging
to different states.

Poseidon is the sea, like Oceanos, Pontus ; he restrains
the wildness of the elements, but he is also included
amongst the new gods. Phoebus is the god who has
knowledge, and, in accordance with analogy and sub-
stantial logical definition, he corresponds to the light and
is the reflex or reminiscence of the sun-power.

DEFINITE RELIGION 235

The Lycian Apollo lias a direct connection with light,
and the ideas connected with him come from Asia Minor :
in the East the natural element, light, gets greater pro-
minence. Phcebus decrees the pestilence in the Greek
camp, and this is immediately connected with the sun.
Pestilence is the effect of the hot summer, of the heat
of the sun. The representations, too, of Phcebus have
attributes and symbols that are closely connected with
the sun.

The same divinities that were at an earlier stage
Titanic and natural appear afterwards possessed of a
fundamental characteristic which is spiritual and which
is the ruling one, and in fact there has been a dispute as
to whether there was any natural element left at all in
Apollo. In Homer Helios is undoubtedly the Sun, but
is at the same time brightness as well, the spiritual
element which irradiates and illumines everything. But
even at a later period, Apollo still has something of
his natural element left, for he was represented with a
nimbus round his head.

This is what we find to be the case generally, though
it may not be particularly noticeable in the case of the
individual gods. Perfect consistency is, however, not to be
found here. An element appears at one time in a stronger
and more pronounced form, and at another in a weaker
form. In the Eumenides of ^Eschylus the first scenes
are laid before the temple of Apollo. There we have
the summons to worship, and first of all the worshippers
are invited to adore the oracle-giver (Tafa), the principle
of Nature, then Oe//*?, already a spiritual power, though,
like Dike, belonging to the ancient gods ; next comes
Night and then Phcebus — the oracle has passed over to
the new gods. Pindar too speaks of a similar succession in
reference to the oracle. He makes Night the first oracle-
giver, then comes Themis, and next Phcebus. We thus
have here the transition from natural forms to the new
gods. In the sphere of Poetry, where these doctrines

236 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

originate, this is not to be taken historically as something
so fixed as to preclude the possibility of there being any
deviation from it.

Thus too the noise, the rustling of leaves, the light
noise of suspended cymbals, which represent the first
form in which the oracle was given, are mere natural
sounds. It is not till a later period that a priestess
appears who in human sounds, if not actually in clear
and distinct sounds, gives forth the oracle. Similarly
the Muses are first nymphs, springs, waves, the noise or
murmuring of brooks. In every case the starting-point
is some aspect of Nature, natural powers which are trans-
formed into a god with a spiritual character. Such a
transformation shows itself also in Diana. The Diana
of Ephesus is still Asiatic, and is represented with many
breasts and covered with images of animals. She has,
in fact, as the basis of her character, natural life, the
producing and nourishing power of Nature. On the
other hand, Diana of the Greeks is the huntress who
kills animals. She does not represent the idea of hunting
generally, but the hunting of wild animals. And indeed
by the bravery of spiritual subjectivity these animals,
which in the earlier spheres of the religious spirit were
thought of as having an absolute claim to exist, are
subdued and killed.

Prometheus, who was also reckoned amongst the Titans,
is an important and interesting figure. Prometheus is
the power of Nature, but he is also the benefactor of
men, for he taught them the first arts. He brought
down fire from heaven for them ; the power to kindle
fire already implies a certain amount of civilisation ; it
means that man has already got beyond his primitive
barbarism. The first beginnings of civilisation have
thus been preserved in grateful remembrance in the
myths. Prometheus also taught men to offer sacri-
fice in such a way that they too might have something
of the offering. The animals, it was supposed, did not

DEFINITE RELIGION 237

belong to men, but to a spiritual power, i.e., men formerly
ate no flesh. He, however, took the whole offering from
Zeus, that is to say, he made two heaps, one of bones,
over which he threw the skin of the animal, and another
of the flesh, and Zeus laid hold of the first.

Sacrifice thus became a feast in which the gods had
the entrails and the bones. This same Prometheus
taught men to seize animals and use them as their means
of sustenance ; animals, it was formerly thought, should
not be disturbed by men, and were held in high respect
by them. Even in Homer mention is made of the sun-
cattle of Helios, which were not to be interfered with by
men. Amongst the Hindus and the Egyptians it was
forbidden to slaughter animals. Prometheus taught men
to eat flesh themselves and to leave to Jupiter only skin
and bones.

But Prometheus is a Titan. He is chained to the
Caucasus, and a vulture constantly gnaws at his liver,
which always grows again — a pain which never ceases.
What Prometheus taught men had reference only to such
acquirements as conduce to the satisfaction of natural
wants. In the mere satisfaction of these wants there is
never any sense of satiety ; on the contrary, the need is
always growing and care is ever new. This is what is
signified by this myth. In a passage in Plato it is said
that Prometheus could not bring Politics to men, because
the science of politics was preserved in the citadel of
Zeus. The idea is thus here expressed that this science
belonged to Zeus as his own peculiar property.

It is, indeed, gratefully mentioned that Prometheus
makes life easier for men by introducing arts and handi-
crafts ; but, spite of the fact that these are connected
with the powers of the human mind, he still belongs to
the Titans, for these arts are not in any sense laws, nor
have they any moral force.

If the gods represent spiritual particularity looked at
from the side of Substance, which breaks itself up so as to

238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

form them, as a consequence of this, on the other hand,
the limitedness of the particular is advanced to substantial
universality. We thereby get the unity of the two ; we
have the divine end made human, and the human end
elevated to the divine. This gives us the heroes, the
demi-gods. Specially significant in this respect is the
figure of Hercules. He has human individuality ; he has
worked very hard, and by his virtue he has obtained
heaven. The heroes are thus not gods straight off; they
have first by labour to put themselves into the rank
of the Divine. For the gods of spiritual individuality,
although now at rest, are yet what they are only through
their struggle with the Titans. This potentiality or in-
herent nature of theirs gets an explicit form in the
heroes. Thus the spiritual individuality of the heroes
is higher than that of the gods themselves ; they are
actually what the gods are implicitly ; they represent
the carrying into effect of what is implicit, and if they
have also to struggle and work, this is a working off of
the natural element which the gods still have in them-
selves. The gods come out of the powers of Nature ;
the heroes, again, come out of the gods.

Since the spiritual gods are thus the result reached
through the overcoming of the powers of Nature, though
they exist in the first instance only through these, they
have their development or becoming in themselves, and
manifest themselves as concrete unity. The powers of
Nature are contained in them as their basis, although this,
their implicit nature, is likewise transfigured. Hence, in
the case of the gods, we have this reminiscence or echo
of the natural elements, a feature which Hercules does
not possess. There are, indeed, several signs that the
Greeks themselves were conscious of the presence of this
difference. In ^schylus, Prometheus says that he placed
his consolation, his confidence, and satisfaction in the fact
that a son would be born to Zeus who would hurl him
from his throne. This prophecy of the overthrow of the

DEFINITE RELIGION 239

rule of Zeus, to be accomplished through the manifested
unity of the divine and the human which belongs to
the heroes, is expressed also by Aristophanes ; for Bacchus
says to Hercules, " When Zeus dies and goes, thou wilt
succeed him."

(&.) Formless Necessity.

The unity which binds together the plurality of the
particular gods is at first superficial only. Zeus rules
them in fatherly, patriarchal fashion, which implies that
the ruler does in the end what the others on the whole
wish, while these give their assent to all that occurs.
But this sovereignty is not serious. The higher abso-
lute unity, in the form of absolute Power, stands over
them as their pure and absolute power. This power is
Fate or Destiny, simple necessity.

This unity, as being absolute necessity, has universal
deterrninateness within it. It is the fulness of all
determinations ; but it is not developed in itself, the fact
rather being that the content is divided in a particular
way among the many gods who issue forth from this
unity. It is itself empty and without content, despises
all fellowship and outward embodiment, and rules in
dread fashion over everything as blind, irrational, unin-
telligible power. It is unintelligible because it is the
concrete alone of which we can form an intelligent con-
ception ; but this necessity is still abstract, and has not
yet developed so as to have the conception of an end,
has not yet reached definite determinations.

Necessity, accordingly, essentially relates itself to the
world. For determinateness is a moment in necessity
itself, and the concrete world is developed determinate-
ness, the kingdom of finitude, of definite existence gene-
rally. Necessity has at first a merely abstract relation
to the concrete world, and this relation is the external
unity of the world, equality or uniformity simply, which
is without any further determination in itself, and is

240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

incomprehensible — Nemesis, in short. It brings down
what is high and exalted, and thus establishes equality.
But this equalising is not to be understood as meaning
that when what pushes itself forward or is too high is
brought down, what is low is, in its turn, raised up.
On the contrary, that which is low is as it was meant to
be; it is the finite which has no particular claims, and
no kind of infinite value in itself to which it could appeal.
It is thus not loo low. It has in it power, however,
to rise above the common lot and the ordinary limit of
finitude, and when it thus acts in opposition to unifor-
mity it is again thrust down by Nemesis.

If we now directly consider the relation of the finite
self-consciousness to this necessity, we see that under
the pressure of its iron power it is to have only an
obedience without inward freedom. But one form of
freedom is at least present when we look at the matter
from the side of feeling. The Greek who has within
him the feeling of the necessity calms his soul with that.
It is so ; there is nothing to be done against it ; with
this I must content myself; just in this feeling that I
must be content with it, that this even pleases me, we
have the freedom which is implied in the fact that it is
mine.

This mental attitude implies that man has this simple
necessity before him. In that he occupies the stand-
point, " It is so," he has set all that is particular on
one side, has made a renunciation of and abstracts from
all particular ends and interests. The vexation, the
discontent which men feel consists just in this, that they
stick to a definite end, and will not give this up ; and
then if things do not fit in with this end, or, as may
happen, go quite contrary to it, they are dissatisfied.
There is then no harmony between what is actually pre-
sent and what men wish to have, because they have the
" ought to be " within themselves — " That ought to be."

Thus discontent, division, are inherently present ; but

DEFINITE RELIGION 241

those who occupy the standpoint referred to cling to no
aim, no interest, as against actually existing circumstances.
Misfortune, discontent, is nothing but the contradiction
implied in the fact that something is contrary to my will.
If the particular interest is given up, then by this act I
have retreated into this pure rest, into this pure Being,
into this " is."

There is here no consolation for man, but then it is
not necessary. He requires consolation when he desires
compensation for some loss ; but here he has renounced
the inner root of worry and discontent, and has wholly
given up what is lost, because he has the power which
enables him to look into necessity. It is, accordingly,
nothing but a false illusion to imagine that consciousness
is annihilated when brought into relation to necessity —
that it relates itself to something which is absolutely
beyond its own world, and finds in it nothing having a
relationship with itself. Necessity is not one person, and
accordingly consciousness does not exist in it on its own
account, for itself, or in other words, it is not an in-
dividual or selfish oneness in its immediacy. In relation
to that which is one person it is independent, wishes to
be independent, to be for itself, and to stand on its own
basis. The servant or vassal, in performing his service,
in his condition of subjection, has fear, and in doing any
base. act against his master he has a self-seeking design.
But in relation to necessity the subject appears as some-
thing which does not exist independently, or as deter-
mined for itself, it has, on the contrary, surrendered
itself, retains no end for itself, and the revering of neces-
sity is just this indeterminate attitude of self-conscious-
ness, this attitude which is wholly devoid of the element
of opposition. What we now-a-days call fate is just the
opposite of this attitude of self-consciousness. We speak
of just, unjust, merited fate. We use the word fate by
way of explanation, that is, as suggesting the reason of
any condition in which individuals are, or of the. fate of

VOL. ii. Q

242 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

individuals. Here there is an external union of cause
and effect by which an inherited evil, an ancient curse
that rests on his house, breaks out in the individual.
In such cases fate implies that there exists some sort of
reason, but a reason that is at the same time away
beyond the present, and fate is here nothing but a con-
nection of causes and effects, of causes, which, so far as
the person is concerned upon whom the fate falls, should
be finite causes, and where there is nevertheless a hidden
connection between that which the sufferer is in himself
and that which befalls him as something unmerited.

The perception of and reverent regard for necessity is,
on the other hand, the direct opposite of the foregoing.
In it that mediation and the superficial reasoning about
cause and effect are done away with. We cannot speak
of a belief in necessity as if necessity were something
essentially existing, or were a connection of relations,
such as that of cause and effect, and as if it thus stood
opposed to consciousness in some objective outward form.
On the contrary, the expression " it is necessary " directly
presupposes the abandonment of all argumentative reason-
ing, and the shutting up of the spirit within simple
abstraction. Noble and beautiful characters are produced
by this attitude on the part of the human spirit, which
has thus given up that which, as the saying goes, fate
wrests from us. It produces a certain grandeur and
repose and that free nobility of soul which is also found
amongst the ancients. This freedom is, however, only
of the abstract kind, which merely stands above the con-
crete and particular, but does not actually come to be ill
harmony with what is definite, i.e., it is pure thought,
Being, Being-within-self, the relinquishment of the parti-
cular. In the higher forms of religion, on the contrary,
there exists the consolation that the absolute end and
aim will be reached even in misfortune, so that the nega-
tive changes round into the affirmative. " The sufferings
of the present are the path to bliss."

DEFINITE RELIGION 243

Abstract necessity, as this abstraction of thought and
of the return into self, is the one extreme ; the other
extreme is the singularity or individual existence of the
particular divine powers.

(c.) Posited necessity or the particular gods, their appear-
ance and outward form.

The divine particular powers belong to what is im-
plicitly universal, to necessity, but they come out from it
because it is not yet posited for itself as the Notion and
determined as freedom. Rationality and the rational
content are still in the form of immediacy, or, in other
words, subjectivity is not posited as infinite subjectivity,
and the individuality hence appears as external. The
Notion is not yet revealed, and its definite existence as it
here presents itself does not yet contain the content of
necessity. But it is at the same time made plain that
the freedom of the particular is merely the semblance of
freedom, and that the particular powers are held within
the unity and power of necessity.

Necessity is not in itself anything divine, or at least
is not the divine in a general sense. We may indeed
say that God is necessity, i.e., it is one of His essential
qualities, though it may be one which is still imperfect,
but we cannot say that necessity is God. For necessity
is not the Idea, but rather abstract Notion. But Nemesis,
and still more these particular powers, are already divine
in as far as the former has a relation to definitely existing
reality, while these powers again are in themselves charac-
terised as distinguished from necessity, and consequently as
distinguished from one another, and are contained in neces-
sity as the unity of the wholly universal and particular.

Accordingly, because particularity is not yet tempered
by the Idea, and necessity is not the fully concrete
measure of wisdom, unlimited contingency of content
makes its appearance in the sphere of the particular gods.

244 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

(a.) The contingency of form or outward embodiment. —
The twelve principal gods of Olympus are not arranged
in accordance with the Notion, and they do not constitute
any system. One moment of the Idea, it is true, plays a
leading part, to begin with, but it is not carried out in
detail.

The divine powers of necessity being separate from
it, are external and thus unmediated, merely immediate
objects, natural existing things, such as sun, sky, earth,
sea, mountains, men, kings, and so on. But they are
also still held fast by necessity, and thus the natural
element in them is abrogated. If no advance were made
beyond the thought that these powers were, in their
natural immediate form of existence, divine essentially
existing beings, this would be a reversion to the Eeligion
of Nature, in which light, or the sun, or some particular
king is as immediate, God, while the inner element, the
universal, has not yet reached that moment of the relation
which, nevertheless, necessity essentially and absolutely
contains in itself, since in the latter the immediate is
merely something posited and abrogated.

But even if it is abrogated and preserved, the element
of Nature is still a determinate characteristic of the parti-
cular powers, and because it is incorporated in self-con-
scious individuals it has become a fruitful source of
contingent determinations. The determination of time,
the year, the division of the months, still hang so much
about the concrete gods that some, as Dupuis, for example,
have even tried to make them into calendar gods. The
idea, too, of the productive power of Nature, of beginning
to be and ceasing to be, is seen to be operative within the
sphere of the spiritual gods in the many points of agree-
ment still existing between these gods and Nature. But
when thus lifted up into the self-conscious form of these
gods, those natural characteristics appear as contingent,
and are changed into characteristics of self-conscious
subjectivity, whereby they .lose their original meaning.

DEFINITE RELIGION 245

Tiie right to search for so-called philosophemes or philo-
sophical ideas in the actions of these gods, must be freely
granted. For instance, Zeus feasted with the gods for
twelve days amongst the Ethiopians ; Juno hung between
heaven and earth, and so on. Ideas such as these, as'
also the endless number of amours ascribed to Zeus, have
undoubtedly their primary source in an abstract concep-
tion which had reference to natural relations, natural
forces, and to the regular and essential element in these,
and thus we have the right to search after the concep-
tions aforesaid. These natural relations are, however, at
the same time degraded to the rank of contingent things,
since they have not retained their original purity, but are
changed into forms which are in conformity with sub-
jective human modes of thought. Free self-consciousness
no longer concerns itself about such natural characteristics.

Another source of contingent determinations is the
Spiritual itself, spiritual individuality and its historical
development. The god is revealed to man in what befalls
himself or in the fate of a state, and this becomes an
event which is regarded as an action of the god, as
revealing the goodwill or enmity of the god. We get
an infinitely manifold, but at the same time a contingent
content, when any event, such as good fortune or bad
fortune, is elevated to being the action of a god, and
serves to determine more definitely and in individual
instances, the actions of the god. As the God of the
Jews gave a particular land to the people and led their
fathers out of Egypt, so a Greek god is conceived of
as having done this or the other thing which happens to
a people, and which they look on as divine or as a self-
determination of the divine.

We have further to take into consideration also the
locality in which, and the time at which, the conscious-
ness of a god first began. This element of origin within
defined limits, united with the joyousness of the Greek
character, is the source of a number of delightful stories.

246 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Finally, the free individuality of the gods is the main
source of the manifold contingent content ascribed to them.
They are, if not infinite, absolute spirituality, at least
concrete subjective spirituality. As such, they do not
possess an abstract content, and there is not only one
quality in them, on the contrary, they unite in themselves
several characteristics. Did they possess only one quality
this would be merely an abstract inner element, or simply
a certain signification, and they themselves would be
merely allegories, i.e., would be concrete in imagination
merely. But in the concrete fulness of their indivi-
duality they are not tied down to the limited lines and
modes of operation belonging to one exclusive quality.
On the contrary, they can now go about freely in what
are voluntary but are at the same time arbitrary and
contingent directions.

So far we have considered the embodiment of the
divine as it is based in the implicit or potential nature
belonging to it, i.e., in the individual nature of these
deities, in their subjective spirituality, in their chance
appearances in time and place, or as it occurs in the
involuntary transformation of natural determinations into
the manifestation of free subjectivity. This embodiment
has now to be considered as it appears in its perfected
form united with consciousness. This is the manifesta-
tion of the divine powers which is for " Other," that is, for
subjective self-consciousness, and is known and embodied
in the conception consciousness forms of it.

(/3.) The manifestation and conceiving of the divine. —
The actual form which the god attains to in his appear-
ance and manifestation to the finite spirit, has two sides.
The god, that is to say, appears in externality, and owing
to this a division, a separation, takes place which deter-
mines itself in such a way that the manifestation has
two sides, one of which pertains to the god and the other
to the finite spirit. The side which pertains to the god
is his self-revelation, his showing of himself. Looked

DEFINITE RELIGION 247

at from this side, all that belongs to self-consciousness is
passive reception. The mode of this manifestation is one
which exists pre-eminently for Thought ; what is eternal
is taught, given, and its existence does not depend on the
caprice of the individual. Dreams, the oracle, are mani-
festations of this kind. The Greeks embodied this idea
in all kinds of forms. For instance, a divine image
fallen from heaven, or a meteor, or thunder and lightning,
are reckoned as a manifestation of the divine. Or it
may be this manifestation, as the first and as yet inarti-
culate proclamation of the divine to the consciousness, is
the rustling of the trees, the stillness of the woods in
which Pan is present.

Since this stage is only the stage of freedom and
rationality in their first form, the spiritual power either
appears in outward guise — and this is the basis of that
natural aspect which still attaches to this standpoint —
or if the powers and laws that make themselves known
to the inward thought of man are spiritual and moral,
they are this to begin with because they are, and it is not
known whence they come.

The manifestation is now the boundary-line of both
sides, which separates them and at the same time relates
them to each other. At bottom, however, the activity
belongs to both sides, and the true comprehension of this
undoubtedly constitutes a serious difficulty. This diffi-
culty also appears again later on in connection with the
idea of the grace of God. Grace enlightens the heart of
man, it is the Spirit of God in man, so that man can be
regarded in relation to its work in him as passive, and
in such a way that it is not his own activity which
is manifested in his actions. In the Notion, however,
this double activity is to be conceived of as one. Here
in the present stage, this unity of the Notion is not yet
made explicit, and the side of productive activity, which
belongs to the subject as well, appears as independent
and separate in this way, namely, that the subject pro-

248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

duces the manifestation of the divine consciously as Us
own work.

It is self-consciousness which grasps, interprets, gives
form to what was, to begin with, abstract, whether it is
inward or outward, and produces it in the form in which
it is held to be God.

The manifestations in Nature or any particular imme-
diate and external element, are not manifestations in
the sense that the Essence is only to be regarded as
a thought within our minds — as, for instance, when we
speak of the forces of Nature and of its outward effects.
Here it does not lie in the natural objects themselves,
does not lie in the objectivity in them as such that they
exist as manifestations of what is inward. As natural
objects they exist only for our sense-perception, and for
this they are not a manifestation of the universal.
Thus it is not, for example, in light as such that
thought, the universal, announces its presence. In the
case of natural existence we must on the contrary first
break through the husk behind which thought, that
which is the inward element in things, hides itself.

What is necessary is that the natural, the external,
should in itself and in its externality be directly ex-
hibited as abrogated and taken up into something higher,
and as being in its own nature manifestation, so that it
has only meaning and significance as the outward ex-
pression and organ of thought and of the universal.
Thought must be for sense-perception, that is, what is
revealed is on the one hand the sensuous mode of truth,
while on the other hand that which is perceived by the
senses is at the same time thought, the universal. It
is necessity that has to appear in a divine fashion, i.e.,
in definite existence as necessity in immediate unity
with this concrete existence. This is posited necessity,
i.e., definitely existing necessity, which exists as simple
reflection into itself.

Imagination is now the organ with which self-con-

DEFINITE RELIGION 249

sciousness gives outward form to the inwardly abstract
or to the external, which is at first something having
immediate Being, and posits it as concrete. In this
process the natural loses its independence and is reduced
to being the outward sign of the indwelling spirit, in
such a way that this latter alone is essentially allowed
to appear.

The freedom of Spirit here is not yet the infinite
freedom of thought ; the spiritual essences are not yet
in the element of Thought. Did man exercise thought
in such a way that pure thought constituted the basis,
there would be. for him only one God. Just as little,
however, does man come upon his essential beings as
present immediate natural forms; on the contrary, he
brings them forward into existence for idea or figurative
thought, and this bringing of them forward as repre-
senting the middle stage between pure thought and the
immediate perception of Nature, is imagination or fancy.

In this way the gods are formed by human imagina-
tion, and they originate in a finite fashion, being produced
by the poet, by the muse. They have this finitude
essentially in themselves, because so far as the content
is concerned they are finite, and in virtue of their indi-
viduality have no connection with each other. Tiiey
are not discovered by the human mind as they are in
their essentially existent rational content, but in so far
as they are gods. They are made, invented, but are not
fictitious. They certainly come forth out of the human
imagination in contrast to what actually exists, but they
do this as essential forms, and this product of the mind
is at the same time recognised as being what is essential.

It is in this sense we are to understand the remark of
Herodotus that Homer and Hesiod made their gods for
the Greeks. The same might be said of every priest
and wise " ancient " who was capable of understanding
and explaining the presence in the natural of the divine
and of the essentially existing powers.

250 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

When the Greeks heard the roaring of the sea at the
funeral of Achilles, Nestor came forward and explained it
as meaning that Thetis was taking part in the mourning.
Thus, too, in the case of the pestilence, Calchas says that
Apollo had brought it ahout because he was angry with
the Greeks. This interpretation just means that an
embodiment is given to natural phenomena, that they
get the form of a divine act. What takes place within
the mind is similarly explained. According to Homer,
for instance, Achilles would like to draw his sword, but
he calms himself and restrains his anger. This inward
prudence is Pallas, who represses anger. In this inter-
pretation originated those innumerable charming tales and
the endless number of Greek myths which we possess.

From whatever side we consider the Greek principle,
the sensuous and natural element is seen to force its
way into it. The gods as they issue out of necessity are
limited, and they have also still traces of the natural
element in them, just because they reveal the fact that
they have sprung from the struggle with the forces of
Nature. The manifestation by which they announce
themselves to self-consciousness is still external, and the
imagination which gives shape and form to this mani-
festation does not yet elevate their starting-point into
the region of pure thought. We have now to see how
this natural moment is wholly transfigured into a beauti-
ful form.

(y.) The beautiful form of the divine pmvers. — In abso-
lute necessity determinateness is reduced to the unity of
immediacy, " it is so." But this means that the deter-
minateness, the content, is rejected, and the stability and
freedom of the feeling which keeps to this sensuous
perception consists only in the fact that it abides firmly
by the empty " is." But definitely existing necessity is
for immediate perception, and indeed exists for it in its
character as natural determinate existence which in its
determinateness takes itself back into its simplicity, and

DEFINITE RELIGION 251

actually exhibits in itself this act of withdrawal or taking
of itself back. Determinate existence, which is only this
process, is in the state of freedom, or, to put it otherwise,
determinateness exists as negativity, as reflected into itself,
and as sinking itself into simple necessity. This deter-
minateness which relates itself to itself is subjectivity.

For this process of concretely existing necessity the
reality is accordingly the spiritual, the human form.
This is a sensuous and natural object and thus exists for
immediate perception, and it is at the same time simple
necessity, simple reference to self, in virtue of being
which it plainly announces the presence of thought. In
every instance of its contact with reality, of its externali-
sation, it is directly decomposed, dissolved, and merged
in simple identity ; it is an externalisation, a manifesta-
tion, which is really the externalisation of Spirit.

This relationship is not easily grasped, namely, that
the fundamental determination and the one side of the
Notion is absolute necessity, while the side of reality in
virtue of which the Notion is Idea, is the human form.
The Notion must, above all, have actual reality. This
determination accordingly is more directlv involved in

O J *

necessity itself, for it is not abstract Being, but what is
actual and determinate, determinate in and for itself.
Thus the determinateness, just because it is at the same
time natural, external, reality, is further directly taken
back into simple necessity, so that it is this necessity
which exhibits itself in this variegated sensuous element.
It is only when it is no longer necessity but Spirit, which
constitutes the Divine, that the latter comes to be regarded
as existing wholly in the element of thought. Here,
however, the moment of external perceptibility still re-
mains, in which, spite of its material character, simple
necessity nevertheless exhibits itself. This is only the
case when we have the human form, because it is the
form of the spiritual, and only in it can reality be taken
back for consciousness into the simplicity of necessity.

252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Life generally is tins infinitude of free existence, and
as what is living is it this subjectivity, which reacts
against the immediate determinateness and posits it as
identical with itself in feeling. But the life of the
animal, that is, the actual existence and externalisatiou
of its infinitude, has plainly a merely limited content, is
sunk in merely particular conditions. The simplicity to
which this determinateness is taken back is a limited and
merely formal one, and the content is not adequate to
this its form. For thinking man, on the other hand, the
spiritual is expressed in his particular conditions also ;
this expression of it lets us see that man even in any one
limited condition is at the same time above it, transcends
it, is free, and does not go outside of himself, continues
to be at home with himself. We can very easily judge
whether a man in the act of satisfying his wants behaves
like an animal or like a man. The human element is a
delicate fragrance which spreads itself over every action.
Besides, man has not only this element of mere life, but
has likewise an infinite range of higher ways of expressing
himself, of higher deeds and ends, the constituent element
of which is just the Infinite, the Universal. Tims man
is that absolute reflection into self which we have in the
conception of necessity. It properly belongs to physio-
logy to get a knowledge of the human organism, of the
human form as the only form truly adequate for Spirit,
but as yet it has accomplished little in this regard.
Aristotle long ago expressed the truth that it is only
the human organisation which is the form of the spiritual,
when he pointed it out as being the defect in the idea
of the transmigration of souls, that according to this theory
the bodily organisation of human beings was of a merely
accidental kind.

The individual actual man still essentially has, how-
ever, in his immediate existence the element of immediate
natural life, which makes its appearance as something
temporary and fleeting, as that which has fallen away

DEFINITE RELIGION 253

from universality. In accordance with this element of
finitude, there emerges a discordance or want of harmony
between that which man implicitly, in his real nature is,
and what he actually is. The impress of simple necessity
is not stamped on all the features and parts of the in-
dividual man. Empirical individuality and the expression
of simple inwardness are mingled together, and the ideality
of the natural, freedom and universality are, owing to the
conditions of the merely natural life and because of a
number of natural needs which come into play, obscured.
Looked at from this point of view, from which an " Other "
appears in man, the appearance of the outward form does
not correspond with simple necessity, but the fact that
on his existence in all its shapes and parts the stamp of
universality, of simple necessity is impressed — which
Goethe appropriately called significance, as representing
the essential character of classic art — renders it necessary
that the form should be planned only in Spirit, should
be produced only out of it, and brought into existence
only by its mediation, that it should in short be ideal
and a work of art. This is something higher than a
natural product. We are, no doubt, in the habit of
saying that a natural product is the more excellent,
just because it is made by God, while a work of art is
made only by man, as if, forsooth, natural objects did
not also owe their existence to immediate natural finite
things, to seeds, air, water, light ; as if the power of God
lived only in Nature and not also in what is human, in
the realm of the spiritual. If the real truth is that
natural products only flourish under the conditions sup-
plied by what for them are external and contingent
circumstances, and under their influence, an influence
which comes from without, then in the work of art it is
the necessity which appears as the inward soul and as
the notion of externality. That is to say, necessity does
not here mean that objects are necessary in themselves
and have necessity as their predicate/but that necessity

254 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

is the subject, that which manifests itself in its pre-
dicate, in external existence.

If in this process the manifestation belongs to the
subjective side, so that God appears as something made
by man, still that is merely one moment. For this
positing of God, the making of His existence dependent
on man, is, on the other hand, mediated by the abrogation
of the individual self, and thus it was possible for the
Greeks to see their god in the Zeus of Phidias. The
artist did not give them in an abstract way something
which was his own work, but presented to them the
appropriate and peculiar manifestation of the essential,
the outward form of actually existing necessity.

The form given to the god is thus the ideal form.
Previous to the time of the Greeks there was no true
ideality, nor was it possible for it to appear at any
subsequent time. The art of the Christian religion is
indeed beautiful, but ideality is not its ultimate principle.
We cannot get at the element of defect in the Greek
gods by saying that they are anthropopathic, a category of
finitude under which we may put the immoral element,
as, for example, the stories of the amours of Zeus, which
may have their origin in older myths based on what is
as yet the natural way of looking at things. The main
defect is not that there is too much of the anthropopathic
in these gods, but that there is too little. The manifesta-
tion and the aspect of the definite existence of the divine
do not yet advance so far as immediate actuality, in the
form of a definite individual, that is, as this definite man.
The truest, most proper form is necessarily this, that the
absolute Spirit which exists for itself should advance to
the point at which it shows itself as individual empirical
self-consciousness. This characteristic, consisting thus
in advance to the sensuous definite individual, is not
yet present here. The form made by man in which the
divinity appears has, it is true, a material side, but this
has still such pliability that it can be perfectly adapted

DEFINITE RELIGION 255

to tlie manifested content. It is only when separation in
God advances to its ultimate limit and appears as man,
as a particular empirical self-consciousness, that this
sensuousness, this externality, is, so to speak, set free as
sensuousuess, that is to say, the conditioiiateness of ex-
ternality and its want of suitability to express the Notion
actually come to light in the god. Here matter, the sen-
suous, has not yet this form. On the contrary, it keeps
true to its content. As the god, though spiritual, universal
power, issues out of Nature, he must have the natural as
the element of his embodiment, and it must be made
plain that it is just the natural which is the mode of the
expression of the divine. The god thus appears in stone,
and the material is still held to be adequate to the ex-
pression of the god as god. It is only when the god
appears and reveals himself as a definite individual that
Spirit, the subjective knowledge of Spirit as Spirit, is seen
to be the true manifestation of God, and it is not till then
that sensuousness is set free, that is to say, it is no
longer blended with the god, but shows itself to be in-
adequate as his form; the seusuousuess, the immediate
individuality, is nailed to the cross. In this process of
inversion, it is also shown, however, that this self-aliena-
tion, or self-emptying of God in the human form, is only
one side of the divine life, for this self-emptying, this mani-
festation, is taken back again in the One who then for the
first time becomes Spirit for thought and for the Church.
This single, existing, actual man is done away with and
taken up into something higher, and appears as a moment,
as one of the persons of God in God. Thus only is man
as a definite individual man truly in God, and thus the
manifestation of the divine is absolute, and its element
is Spirit itself. The Jewish idea that God essentially
exists for thought alone, and the sensuousness of the
Greek form of beauty, are equally contained in this form
of the divine, and as being taken up into something
higher, are freed from the limitation attaching to them.

256 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

At this stage, in which the divine still requires the
sensuous for its essential representation, it appears as
a multiplicity of gods. In this multiplicity, it is true,
necessity presents itself as simple reflection into self, but
this simplicity is only form, for the matter in which it ex-
hibits itself is still immediacy, the element of Nature, not
the absolute matter, namely, Spirit. It is thus not Spirit
as Spirit that is here represented ; the truth rather being
that the spiritual existence goes ahead of the conscious-
ness of the content, for this latter is not yet itself Spirit.

C.

WORSHIP OR CULTUS.

This is here a very big subject. Worship essentially
means that the empirical consciousness elevates itself,
and that man gives himself the consciousness and feeling
of the indwelling of the divine within him, and of his
unity with the divine. If the work of art is the self-
revelation of God and the revelation of the productivity
of man as the positing of this revelation by the abrogation
of his particular knowledge and will, on the other hand,
the work of art equally involves the fact that God and
man are no longer beings alien to one another, but have
been taken up into a higher unity. The positing or
bringing out of what is implicit in the work of art is
here accordingly worship, and this latter is hence the
relationship whereby the external objectivity of God is,
relatively to subjective knowledge, abrogated, and the
identity of the two set forth. In this way the external
divine existence, as something divorced from existence
within the subjective spirit, is abrogated, and thus God is,
as it were, called to mind within the sphere of subjectivity.
The general character of this worship consists in this,
that the subject has an essentially affirmative relationship
to. his £od.

DEFINITE RELIGION 257

The moments of worship are as follows : (a.) Inner
feeling or subjective attitude. The gods are duly recog-
nised and revered ; they are the substantial powers, the
essential, real content of the natural and spiritual universe,
the Universal. These universal powers, as exempt from
contingency, are recognised by man just because he is
thinking consciousness. Thus the world no longer exists
for him in an external and contingent fashion, but in the
true mode. We thus hold in respect duty, justice,
knowledge, political life, life in the State, family relation-
ships. They represent what is true, the inner bond
which holds the world together, the substantial element
in which the rest exists, the valid element, what alone
holds its ground against the contingency and indepen-
dence which act in opposition to it.

This content is the objective in the true sense, i.e.,
what is absolutely and essentially valid and true, not in
the external objective sense, but within subjectivity also.
The substance of these powers is the moral element
peculiar to men, their morality, their actual and valid
power, their own substantiality and essentiality. The
Greek people are hence the most human people ; with
them everything human is affirmatively justified and
developed, and the element of measure is present in it.

This religion is essentially a religion of humanity, that
is, the concrete man, as regards what he actually is, as
regards his needs, inclinations, passions, and habits, as
regards his moral and political relations, and in reference
to all that has value in these and is essential, is in his
gods in presence of his own nature. Or, to put it other-
wise, his god has within him the very content composed
of the noble and the true, which is at the same time
that of concrete man. This humanity of the gods is
what was defective in the Greek view, but it is at the
same time its attractive element. In this religion there
is nothing incomprehensible, nothing which cannot be
understood ; there is no kind of content in the god which

VOL. II. II

258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

is not known to man, or which he does not find and
know in himself. The confidence of a man in the gods
is at the same time his confidence in himself.

Pallas, who restrained the outbreak of wrath in the
case of Achilles, is his own prudence. Athene is the
town of Athens, and is also the spirit of this particular
Athenian people ; not an external spirit or protecting
spirit, but the spirit who is living, present, actually alive
in the people, a spirit immanent in the individual, and
who in her essential nature is represented as Pallas.

The Erinyes are not the Furies represented in an out-
ward way. On the contrary, they are meant to suggest
that it is man's own act and his consciousness which
torment and torture him, in so far as he knows this act
to be something evil in himself. The Erinys is not
only an external Fury who pursues the matricide Orestes,
but suggests rather that it is the spirit of matricide
which brandishes its torch over him. The Erinyes are
the righteous ones, and just because of that they are the
well-disposed, the Eumenides. This is not a euphemism,
for they really are those who desire justice, and whoever
outrages it has the Eumenides within himself. They
represent what we call conscience.

In the CEdipus at Colonos, (Edipus says to his son,
" The Eumenides of the father will pursue thee." Eros,
love, is in the same way not merely the objective, the
god, but is also as power the subjective feeling of man.
Anacreon, for instance, describes a combat with Eros.
" I also," he says, " will now love ; long ago Eros bade
me love, but I would not follow his command. Then
Eros attacked me. Armed with breastplate and lance, I
withstood him. Eros missed, but after that he forced his
way into my heart." " But," thus he concludes, " what is
the use of bow and arrow ? the combat is within me." In
thus recognising the power of the god, and in this re-
verential attitude, the subject is absolutely within the
sphere of his own nature. The gods are his own emotions.

DEFINITE RELIGION 259

The knowledge the subject has of the gods is not a know-
ledge of them merely as abstractions away beyond the
sphere of reality. On the contrary, it is a knowledge
which includes the knowledge of the concrete subjectivity
of man himself as something essential, for the gods are
likewise within him. Here we have not that negative
relation, where the relation of the subject to what is
above it, even if it is the highest form of relation, is
merely the sacrifice, the negation of its consciousness.
The powers here are friendly and gracious to men, they
dwell in man's own breast ; man gives them reality, and
knows their reality to be at the same time his own. The
breath of freedom pervades this whole world, and con-
stitutes the fundamental principle for this attitude of
mind.

But the consciousness of the infinite subjectivity of man
is still wanting, the consciousness that moral relations and
absolute right attach to man as such, that man, just be-
cause he is self-consciousness,possesses in this formal infini-
tude the rights as well as the duties of the human race.
Freedom, morality, is the substantial element in man,
and to know this as the substantial element, and to posit
in it his own substantiality, is what constitutes the value
and the dignity of man. But it is the formal subjec-
tivity, self-consciousness as such, the inherently infinite
individuality, and not the merely natural and immediate
individuality, which contains the possibility of that value,
i.e., the real possibility, and the one on account of which
the individual himself has infinite rights. Now, because
in the natural morality of the untutored man the infini-
tude of formal subjectivity is not recognised, man as such
does not attain to that absolute value according to which
he has worth in and for himself, whatever be his inward
qualifications, whether born in this or the other place,
whether rich or poor, whether belonging to this people
or to that. Freedom and morality have still a special,
particular form, and the essential right of man is still

260 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

affected by what is contingent, so that it is essentially at
this stage that slavery is found to exist. It is still a
matter of accident whether a man is a citizen of this
particular State or not, whether he is free or is not free.
And because, further, the infinite opposition is not yet
present, and because the absolute reflection of self-con-
sciousness into itself, that climax of subjectivity, is still
wanting, morality as individual conviction and rational
insight is not yet developed.

Nevertheless, in morality, individuality is in a general
sense taken up into universal substantiality, and thus there
here enters in — if at first only as a faint semblance, and
not yet as the absolute demand of Spirit — the idea of
the eternal nature of the subjective, individual spirit, the
idea of immortality. The demand for the immortality
of the soul could not make its appearance at any of the
earlier stages already considered, either in the religion of
Nature or in the religion of the One. In the former, the
immediate unity of the spiritual and the natural is the
fundamental idea, and Spirit is not yet self-conscious, or
for itself. In the latter, Spirit is, it is true, self-conscious
and exists for itself, but it is still unrealised ; its freedom
is still abstract, and its Being is still a natural form of
existence, the possession of a particular land and its wel-
fare. But that is not Being as the determinate existence
of Spirit within itself ; it does not yet imply full satisfac-
tion in the spiritual. The duration is only the duration
of the race, of the family, of natural universality, in short.
But here self-consciousness is complete and realised in
itself; it is spiritual. Subjectivity is taken up into uni-
versal essentiality and is thus known as essentially Idea ;
and here we meet with the conception of immortality.
But this consciousness becomes more definite when mora-
lity appears on the scene ; self-consciousness goes down
into itself, and hence it will recognise that only as good,
true, and right which it finds to be in harmony with itself
and its thought. With Socrates arid Plato accordingly

DEFINITE RELIGION 261

the question of the immortality of the soul is the one
expressly raised, while before their day this idea was
considered more as a merely general one, and as one
which had not absolute value in and for itself.

As infinite subjectivity, the absolute point of the unity
of the Notion, is still wanting to self-consciousness, it is
still wanting also to its essentialities, to what represents
for it real existence. This unity is found within that
which we have come to know as its necessity ; but this
lies outside the circle of the particular, substantial, essen-
tial beings. The particular essential beings, like man as
such, have no absolute justification, for any justification
they have they possess only as a moment of necessity,
and as rooted in this absolute unity which is reflected
into itself. They are many, though of divine nature,
and this their scattered and manifold character is at the
same time a limitation, so that divine nature is not attri-
buted to them in any really serious sense. Above the
many substantial essential beings there floats the ultimate
unity of absolute form — necessity, and self-consciousness,
which is in relation to the gods, is at the same time freed
by this necessity from them, so that their divinity is at
one time taken in a serious sense and at another in an
opposite sense.

This religion has, speaking generally, the character of
absolute joyousness ; self-consciousness is free in relation
to its essential beings, because they are its own, though
at the same time it is not chained to them, since absolute
necessity floats above them too, and they go back into it,
just as consciousness with its particular ends and needs
also sinks itself in it.

The feeling accordingly of subjective self-consciousness
in relation to necessity is this sense of repose which abides
in the region of calm, in this freedom, which is, however,
still an abstract freedom. It is so far an escape, a flight,
but it is at the same time freedom, inasmuch as man is
not overcome, weighed down by outward misfortune.

262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Whoever has this consciousness of independence may be
indeed outwardly worsted, but he is not conquered or
overcome.

Necessity has its own sphere ; it has reference only to
the particular element of individuality in so far as a
collision of spiritual powers is possible, and the indivi-
duals are affected by necessity and are brought into sub-
jection to it. Those individuals are in a special way in
subjection to necessity and have a tragic interest attach-
ing to them, who raise themselves above the ordinary
moral conditions, and who seek to accomplish some-
thing special for themselves. This is the case with
the heroes who through their own acts of will are sepa-
rated from others ; they have interests which go beyond
the ordinary peaceful circumstances in which the govern-
ment and action of God proceed. They are those who
will and act in a special way of their own ; they stand
above the Chorus, above the calm, steady, harmonious,
ordinary moral course of life. This last is exempt from
the influence of destiny, restricts itself to the ordinary
sphere of life, and rouses none of the moral powers against
it. The Chorus, the people, viewed in one aspect, has
its particular side too ; it is subject to the common lot of
mortals, namely, to die, to suffer misfortune and such-like,
but an issue of this kind is the common lot of mortal
men, and represents the course of justice relatively to the
finite. That the individual should suffer some accidental
misfortune, that he should die, is something which belongs
to the order of things.

In Homer, Achilles weeps over his early death, and
his horse weeps over it too. That would be regarded in
our day as a silly thing for a poet to mention. But
Homer could attribute to his hero this foreknowledge,
for it cannot alter anything in his life and actions ; it
simply is so for him, and otherwise he is what he is.
The thought can indeed make him sad, but only momen-
tarily ; things are so, but this disturbs him no further ;

DEFINITE RELIGION 263

he may indeed be sad, but he cannot be vexed or annoyed.
Vexation is the sentiment of the modern world ; the feel-
ing of vexation or annoyance presupposes an end, a de-
mand on the part of modern freewill, which considers
itself warranted and justified in indulging this feeling if
any such end should not be realised. Thus the modern
man easily gets into the mood in which he loses heart
with regard to everything else, and does not even seek to
reach other things he might quite well have made his
aim if otherwise unsuccessful All else that belongs to
his nature and destiny he abandons, and in order to
revenge himself destroys his own courage, his power
of action, all those ends of destiny to which he might
otherwise have quite well attained. This is vexation ; it
could not possibly have formed part of the character of
the Greeks or of the ancients, the truth being that their
grief regarding what is necessary is of a purely simple
kind. The Greeks did not set before themselves any end
as absolute, as essential, any end the attainment of which
ought to be warranted ; their grief is therefore a grief of
resignation. It is simple sorrow, simple grief, which has
for this reason the element of serenity in it. No absolute
end is lost for the individual ; here, too, he continues to
be at home with himself, he can renounce that which is
not realised. It is so ; and this means that he has with-
drawn himself into abstraction, and has not set his own
Being in opposition to what is. The liberation here is
the identity of the subjective will with that which is;
the subject is free, but only in an abstract fashion.

The heroes, as was remarked, bring about an alteration
in the course of simple necessity, in this way, namely,
that an element of division comes in, and the higher,
really interesting element of division, so far as Spirit is
concerned, is that it is the moral powers themselves which
appear as divided and as coming into collision.

The removal of this state of collision consists in this,
that the moral powers which are in collision, in virtue

264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of their one-sidedness, divest themselves of the one-sided-
ness attaching to the assertion of independent validity,
and this discarding of the one-sidedness reveals itself out-
wardly in the fact that the individuals who have aimed
at the realisation in themselves of a single separate moral
power, perish.

Fate is what is devoid of thought, of the Notion, some-
thing in which justice and injustice disappear in abstrac-
tion ; in tragedy, on the other hand, destiny moves within
a certain sphere of moral justice. We find this truth
expressed in the noblest form in the Tragedies of Sopho-
cles. Fate and necessity are both referred to there. The
destiny of individuals is represented as something incom-
prehensible, but necessity is not a blind justice ; on the
contrary, it is recognised as the true justice. And just
because of this these Tragedies are the immortal spiritual
productions of moral understanding and comprehension,
the eternal patterns or models of the moral Notion. Blind
destiny is something unsatisfying. In these Tragedies
justice is grasped by thought. The collision between
the two highest moral powers is set forth in a plastic
fashion in that supreme and absolute example of tragedy,
Antigone. In this case, family love, what is holy, what
belongs to the inner life and to inner feeling, and which
because of this is also called the law of the nether gods,
comes into collision with the law of the State. Creon is
not a tyrant, but really a moral power ; Creon is not in
the wrong ; he maintains that the law of the State, the
authority of government, is to be held in respect, and
that punishment follows the infraction of the law. Each
of these two sides realises only one of the moral powers,
and has only one of these as its content ; this is the
element of one-sidedness here, and the meaning of eternal
justice is shown in this, that both end in injustice just
because they are one-sided, though at the same time
both obtain justice too. Both are recognised as having
a value of their own in the untroubled course of morality.

DEFINITE RELIGION 265

Here they both have their own validity, but a validity
which is equalised. It is only the one-sidedness in their
claims which justice comes forward to oppose.

We have another example of collision in the case of
(Edipus, for instance. He has slain his father, is appar-
ently guilty, but guilty because his moral power is one-
sided ; that is to say, he falls into the commission of
his horrible deed unconsciously. He, however, is the man
who has solved the riddle of the Sphinx ; he is the man
distinguished for knowledge, and so a kind of balance is
introduced in the shape of a Nemesis. He, who is so
gifted in knowledge, is in the power of what is uncon-
scious, so that he falls into a guilt which is deep in
proportion to the height on which he stood. Here,
therefore, we have the opposition of the two powers,
that of consciousness and unconsciousness.

To mention still another case of collision. Hippolytus
becomes unfortunate because he pays honour to Diana
only, and despises Love, which accordingly revenges itself
on him. It is an absurdity to ascribe to Hippolytus
another amour, as is done in the French version of the
story by Racine, for in that case what he suffers is no
punishment of Love with any pathos in it, but is merely
a certain misfortune arising from the fact that he is
enamoured of one maiden, and gives no heed to another
woman ; for though the latter is indeed his father's wife,
still the moral hindrance implied in this is obscured by
the love he has for Aricia. The real cause of his de-
struction is the injury he has done by his neglect of a
universal Power as such ; it is nothing moral, but is, on
the contrary, something particular and accidental.

The conclusion of this Tragedy is reconciliation,
rational necessity, the necessity which here begins to
mediate itself; it is justice which is in this way satis-
fied with the maxim, " There is nothing which is not
Zeus," that is, eternal justice. Here there is an active
necessity, but it is one which is completely moral ; the

266 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

misfortune endured is perfectly clear ; here there is
nothing blind and unconscious. To such clearness of
insight and of artistic presentation did Greece attain at
her highest stage of culture. Yet there remains here
something unsolved in that the higher element does not
appear as the infinitely spiritual power ; we still have
here an unsatisfied sorrow arising from the fact that an
individual perishes.

The higher form of reconciliation would be that the
attitude of one-sidedness should be done away with in
the Subject, that the subject should have the conscious-
ness of his wrong-doing, and that he should in his own
heart put away his wrong-doing. To recognise this his
guilt, his one-sidedness, and to discard them, is not,
however, natural to this sphere of thought. This higher
point of view makes the outward punishment, namely,
natural death, superfluous. Beginnings, faint echoes of
this reconciliation, do undoubtedly make their appearance
here, but nevertheless this inward change or conversion
appears more as outward purification. A son of Minos
was slain in Athens, and its purification was thus
rendered necessary. This deed was declared to be
undone. It is Spirit which seeks to render what has
been done undone.

In the Eumenides Orestes is acquitted by the Areo-
pagus ; here we have, on the one hand, the greatest
possible crime against filial piety, while on the other we
see that he did justice to his father, for he was not only
head of the family, but also of the State. In one action
he both committed a crime and at the same time acted
in accordance with perfect and essential necessity.
Acquittal just means that something is made undone,
made as though it had not happened.

In the case of (Edipus Coloneus reconciliation is
hinted at, and more particularly the Christian idea of
reconciliation. He is taken into favour by the gods, the
gods call him to themselves. In the present day we

DEFINITE RELIGION 267

demand more, since with us the idea of reconciliation is
of a higher kind, and because we are conscious that this
conversion can occur in the inner life, whereby that which
is done can be rendered undone.

The man who is " converted " gives up his one-
sidedness ; he has extirpated it himself in his will,
which was the permanent seat of the deed, the place of
its abode ; that is, he destroys the act in its root. It is
congenial to our way of feeling that tragedies should
have conclusions which have in them the element of
reconciliation.

(&.) Worship as Service. — If the real point accordingly
is that subjectivity should consciously pronounce its
identity with the divine which confronts it, then both
parts must give up something of their determinateness.
God comes down from his throne of the universe and
delivers Himself up, and man must, in the act of
receiving the gift, accomplish the negation of subjective
self-consciousness — that is, he must acknowledge God or
take the gift with an acknowledgment of the essentiality
which is in it. The service of God is consequently a
reciprocal giving and receiving. Each side gives up
something of the particularity which separates it from
the other.

I. The outward relation of the two sides to one
another in its most extreme form is that God has in
Himself a natural element, and exists independently
relatively to self-consciousness in an immediate definite
fashion ; or, to put it otherwise, God has His existence in
an external, natural manifestation. In this relation the
service of God is on the one side an acknowledgment that
natural things are an Essence in themselves. On the
other side, the deity offers itself up, sacrifices itself in
the power of Nature in which it appears, and allows itself
to be taken possession of by self-consciousness.

If then the divine powers give themselves up as gifts
of Nature and graciously offer themselves for use, the

268 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

service in which man comes to have a consciousness of
unity with his powers has the following signification : —

As for those fruits, those springs, which exist in
Nature, they allow themselves to be used and drawn
upon without hindrance, or to be laid hold of and used
as nourishment. These gifts fall freely into the lap of
man ; man eats the gifts, drinks the wine, and gets from
them invigoration and stimulus, and this invigoration in
which they are an element, is their work, the effect they
produce. In this relationship it is not a case of mere
reciprocal action, the melancholy, continuous, self-pro-
ducing uniformity of what is mechanical. On the
contrary, these gifts are rendered honourable because
man eats them and drinks of them ; for to what higher
honour can natural things attain than to appear as the
inspiring force of spiritual action ? Wine inspires, but it
is man who first exalts it to the rank of an inspiring
and power-giving agent. So far the relationship of bare
need disappears. In connection with the sense of need
man gives thanks to the gods for the receiving of the
gifts, and these needs presuppose a separation which it is
not in the power of man to do away with. Need, strictly
so called, first makes its appearance owing to property
and the retention of something by one will, but man does
not stand in such a relation of need to the gifts of
Nature ; on the contrary, they have to thank him that
they come to be something, that anything is made of
them ; without him they would rot and dry up and pass
away in uselessness.

The sacrifice which is connected with the enjoyment
of these natural gifts has not here the sense of the
offering up of what is inward or of the concrete fulness
of Spirit; on the contrary, it is just this very fulness
which is affirmed and enjoyed. Sacrifice in this case
can only signify that acknowledgment of the universal
Power which expresses the theoretical giving up of a
part of what is to be enjoyed, i.e., the acknowledgment

DEFINITE RELIGION 269

here is a useless and aimless kind of giving up, a
renunciation which is not practical and has not reference
to the self ; as, for example, the pouring out of a bowl of
wine. The sacrifice is itself at the same time the en-
joyment of the thing ; the wine is drunk, the meat is eaten,
and it is the power of Nature itself whose individual
existence and external form are offered up and destroyed.
Eating means sacrifice, and sacrifice just means eating.

Thus this higher sense of sacrifice and the enjoyment
found in it attach themselves to all the actions of life ;
every occupation, every enjoyment of daily life is a
sacrifice. Worship is not renunciation, not the offering
up of a possession, of something belonging to oneself, but
is rather idealised, theoretical and artistic enjoyment.
Freedom and spirituality are spread over the entire daily
and immediate life of man, and worship is in short a
continuous poetry of life.

The worship of these gods is accordingly not to be
called service in the proper sense of the word, as some-
thing having reference to a foreign independent will from
whose chance decision is to be obtained what is desired.
On the contrary, the act of adoration itself already
implies a previous granting of something, or, in other
words, it is itself enjoyment. It is, therefore, not a
question of calling a power back to oneself from its place
beyond what is here and now, nor of renouncing what,
on the subjective side of self-consciousness, constitutes
the separation, in order that man may be receptive of
the power. It is thus not a question of deprivation or
renunciation, or of the laying aside of something sub-
jective belonging to the individual, nor does the idea of
anguish, of self-tormenting, of self-torture come in here.
The worship of Bacchus or of Ceres is the possession, the
enjoyment of bread and wine, the consumption of these,
and is therefore itself the immediate granting of these
things. The Muse to which Homer appeals is in the
same way his genius, and so on.

270 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The universal powers, however, in this case certainly
retire farther into the background again, so far as the
individual is concerned. The spring allows itself to be
drawn upon unhindered, and the sea allows itself to be
freely frequented, but it also rises in storm ; it and the
stars are not only not serviceable to man, but inspire
fear, and are a source of disaster. Nor is the Muse
always gracious to the poet either ; she goes away and
serves him badly, though, properly speaking, the poet
really appeals to her only when he is composing his
poem, and the appeal to and praise of the Muse is itself
Poetry. Even Athene — Spirit, God — is unfaithful to
herself. The Tyrians bound their Hercules with chains,
so that he should not desert their city, which represented
his reality and actual real existence ; and yet Tyre fell.
But such estrangement on the part of men from their
essentiality or embodiment of essential Being does not
lead to absolute division, not to that inward laceration of
heart which would compel men to draw down their deity,
so to speak, by the force of spirit to themselves in
worship, and with which the lapse into magic would be
connected. The individual cannot go on living in end-
less opposition to these particular powers, because as
particular ends they lose themselves in necessity, and are
themselves surrendered in this necessity.

Service hence consists in the fact that the universal
powers are given a place of honour on their own account
and are duly acknowledged. Thought grasps the essential,
substantial element of its concrete life, and hence is
neither sunk in a state of torpor in the empirical details
of life and dissipated amongst these, nor does it turn
from these merely to the abstract One, to the infinite
" Beyond." On the contrary, just because Spirit sets
before itself the true element, the Idea of its manifold
existence, it is, in the very act of acknowledging and
doing reverence to this universal, in the state of enjoy-
ment, and remains in the presence of its own nature.

DEFINITE RELIGION 271

This presence of Spirit in its essentialities is on the one
hand its truly valuable, thinking, theoretic relationship, and
on the other hand is that happiness, joyousness,and freedom
which is securely conscious of itself in this state, and is
here in presence of its self, or together with its own self.

2. Service as a certain relationship to the gods on
their spiritual side does not mean either that man appro-
priates these powers for the first time, or that man for
the first time becomes conscious of his identity with
them. For this identity is already present, and man
finds these powers already realised in his consciousness.
The spiritual in a definite form, as right, morality, law,
or in the form of universal essential beings, such as
Love, Aphrodite, attains actual existence in individuals,
moral individuals, who know and love. They are the
will, the inclination, the passion of these individuals
themselves, their own .willing, active, life. Consequently
what is left for worship to do is merely to acknowledge
these powers, to revere them, and together with this, to
raise the identity into the form of consciousness, and to
make it into theoretic objectiwty.

If we compare this objectivity with our idea, we at
the same time lift the universal out of our immediate
consciousness and think it. We can also go on to raise
these universal powers into the sphere of the ideal and
give them spiritual form. But when it comes to offer-
ing prayer or bringing sacrifices to such creations, we
reach the point at which we abandon the material view
referred to. We cannot go so far as to give those
images, which yet are no mere fancies but real powers,
individual separate independence and ascribe personality
to them as over against ourselves. Our consciousness of
infinite subjectivity as something universal absorbs those
particular powers and reduces them to the level of beauti-
ful pictures of fancy, whose substance and significance we
are indeed able to appreciate, but which cannot be held
by us to have true independence.

272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

In Greek life, however, poetry, the thinking imagina-
tion, is itself the essential Service of God. Viewed from
one side, these powers split up ad infinitum, and, although
they constitute an exclusive circle, just because they are
particular powers they themselves come almost to have
the infinitude of the qualities belonging to them when
they are thought of as actually existing. What a number
of particular relations are comprised in Pallas, for in-
stance ! Viewed from the other side, again, we see that
it is the human, sensuous-spiritual form in which the
ideal is to be represented, and as a consequence of all
this, this representation is inexhaustible, and must ever
continue to go on and renew itself, for the religious sense
is itself this continuous transition from empirical exist-
ence to the ideal. There is here no fixed, spiritually
definite doctrinal system, no doctrine ; we have not truth
as such in the form of thought ; on the contrary, we see
the divine in this immanent connection with reality, and
hence always raising itself up anew and producing itself
in and out of this reality. If this active production is
brought to perfection by ait, imagination has reached its
ultimate fixed form, so that the ideal is set up, and then
we find that there is a close connection between this and
the decay of religious life.

So long, however, as the productive force which char-
acterises this standpoint is fresh and active, the highest
form of the assimilation of the divine consists in this,
that the subject makes the god present through himself,
and makes the god manifest in his own self. Because in
this connection the recognised subjectivity of the god at
the same time remains on one side as a " Beyond," this
representation of the divine is at the same time the
acknowledgment and the adoration of his own substantial
essentiality. Thus accordingly the divine is revered and
acknowledged when it is represented in festivals, games,
plays, songs — in art, in short. For any one is honoured
in so far as a lofty idea is formed of him, and in so far

DEFINITE RELIGION 273

too as this idea is made visible through action and is
allowed to appear outwardly in his conduct.

Now since the nation in the productions of art, in the
honour paid in songs and festivals, allows the idea of the
divine to appear in itself, it has its worship in itself,
i.e., it directly shows what is really its own excellence ; it
shows the best it has, that which it has been capable of
making itself. Men adorn themselves ; pageantry, dress,
adornment, dance, song, battle — all are connected with
the desire to show honour to the gods. Man shows his
spiritual and bodily ability and skill, his riches; he
exhibits himself in all the glory of God, and thus enjoys
the manifestation of God in the individual himself. This
characterises festivals even yet. This general description
may suffice to show that man allows the idea of the
gods to appear to him through himself, and that he repre-
sents himself in the most splendid possible way, and thus
shows his reverential recognition of the gods. High
honour was ascribed to the victors in battle ; they were
the most honoured of the nation ; on festive occasions
they sat beside the Archons, and it even happened that
in their lifetime they were revered as gods, inasmuch as
they had given outward manifestation to the divine in
themselves through the skill which they had shown. In
this way individuals make the divine manifest in them-
selves. In practice individuals honour the gods, are moral
— that which is the will of the gods is what is moral —
and thus they bring the divine into the sphere of actual
reality. The people of Athens, for example, who held
a procession at the festival of Pallas, represented the
presence of Athene, the spirit of the people, and this
people is the living spirit which represents and exhibits
in itself all the skill of Athene and all that is done
by her.

3. But man may be ever so certain of his immediate
identity with the essential powers, and may thoroughly
appropriate divinity to himself and rejoice in its- presence

VOL. II. S

274 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

in him, and in the presence of himself in it; he may
continue to absorb those natural gods, and represent the
moral gods in morality and in the life of the State, or
he may in practice live a godly life and bring into view
the outward embodiment and manifestation of divinity in
i'estivals in his own subjectivity ; still there yet remains
for consciousness a " Beyond," that is to say, the entire
particular element in action arid in the circumstances
and relations of the individual, and the connection of
these relations with God. Our belief that Providence in
its action reaches even to the individual, finds its con-
firmation in the fact that God has become man, and
this in the actual and temporal mode within which
consequently all particular individuality is comprehended,
for it is owing to this that subjectivity has received
the absolute moral justification by which it is sub-
jectivity of the infinite self-consciousness. In the beau-
tiful form given to the gods, in the images, stories, and
local representations connected with them, the element
of infinite individuality, of particularity in its most
extreme form, is doubtless directly contained and ex-
pressed, still it is a particularity which in one aspect of
it is one of the chief defects charged against the mytho-
logy of Homer and Hesiod, while in another aspect these
stories belong so specially to the gods represented that
they have no reference to other gods or to men, just as
amongst men each individual has his own particular
experiences, doings, circumstances, and history, which
belong wholly and entirely to his particular life. The
moment of subjectivity does not appear as infinite sub-
jectivity, it is not Spirit as such which is contemplated
in the objective forms given to the divine ; and wisdom
is what must constitute the fundamental characteristic of
the divine. This, as working in accordance with ends,
must be comprised within one infinite wisdom, within
one subjectivity. The truth that human things are
ruled over by the gods is thus no doubt involved in that

DEFINITE RELIGION 275

religion, but in an indeterminate, general sense, for it is
just the gods who are the ruling powers in all that
concerns man. The gods too are certainly just, but
justice, so far as it is one Power, is a titanic power and
pertains to the ancient gods. The beautiful gods have a
valid existence of their own in their particular forms
and come to be in collision, and these collisions are only
settled by equal honour being given to all — a method,
however, which certainly gives no immanent settlement.

From gods such as these, in whom the absolute return
into self has not made its appearance, the individual could
not look for absolute wisdom and ordered design in con-
nection with what happened to him in life. Man, how-
ever, still feels the need of having above his particular
acts and particular lot, an objective determining principle.
He does not possess this in the thought of divine wisdom
and Providence so as to be able to trust it in general, and
for the rest to depend upon his own formal knowledge and
will, and to await the absolute and entire consummation
of these, or else to seek some compensation for the loss
and failure of his particular interests and ends, or for his
misfortune, in an eternal end.

When the particular interests of man, his happiness or
misery, are concerned, we find that this outward element
in what happens still depends on whether a man does
this or that, goes to this or that other place. This is his
act, his decision, which he, however, in turn knows to
be contingent. As regards the circumstances which I
actually know, I can doubtless decide one way or other.
But besides these thus known to me, others may exist
through which the realisation of my end is completely
defeated. In connection with these actions I arn thus
in the world of contingency. Within this sphere know-
ledge is accordingly contingent ; it has no relation to
what is ethical, and truly substantial, to the duties to
country, the State, and so on ; man cannot, however, get
to know this contingent element. The decision couse-

276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

quently cannot so far have anything fixed about it, nor
Le in any way grounded in the nature of things, but in
deciding I know at the same time that I am dependent
on what is other than myself, on what is unknown.
Now, since neither in the divine nor in the individual
is the moment of infinite subjectivity present, it does not
fall to the individual to take the final decision of himself,
to perform of himself the final act of will, for instance,
to give battle to-day, to marry, to travel ; for the man is
conscious that objectivity does not reside in this willing
of his, and that it is formal merely. To satisfy the long-
ing for this completion and to add on this objectivity, a
direction from without is required coming from one higher
than the individual, that is, the direction of an external,
decisive, and definite sign. It is the inner free will
which, that it may not be mere free will, makes itself
objective, i.e., makes itself inalienably into what is other
than itself and accepts the external free will as higher
than itself. It is, speaking generally, some power of
Nature, a natural phenomenon, which now decides. The
man, amazed at what he sees, finds in such a natural
phenomenon something relative to himself, because he
does not yet see in it any objective essential significance,
or, to put it otherwise, he does not see in Nature an
inherently perfect system of laws. The formal rational
element, the feeling and the belief in the identity of the
inward and outward, lies at the basis of his conception,
but the inward element of Nature, or the universal to
which it stands related, is not the connection of its laws ;
on the contrary, it is a human end, a human interest.

When, accordingly, any one wills anything, he demands,
in order actually to take his resolution, an external objec-
tive confirmation or assurance ; he asks that he should
know his resolution to be one which is a unity of the
subjective and objective, one which is assured and rati-
fied. And here this ratification is the unexpected, some-
thing which happens suddenly, a materially significant,

DEFINITE RELIGION 277

unconnected change in things, a flash in a clear sky, a
bird rising up in a wide uniform horizon, and which
breaks in upon the indeterminateness of the inner irre-
solution. This is an appeal to what is inward, an appeal
to act suddenly, and to come to a determination within
the mind in a chance way without a knowledge of the
connection and grounds, for this is just the point at which
the grounds or reasons stop short, or at which they are
in fact absent.

The outward phenomenon which is nearest at hand
for the accomplishment of the end in view, namely, the
finding out of what is to determine action, is a sound, a
noise, a voice, o/unpij, whence Delphi has got the name
o/x^aXo?, a supposition which is certainly more correct
than that which would find in it the other meaning of the
word, namely, the navel of the earth. In Dodona there
were three kinds of sounds — the sound produced by the
movement of the leaves in the sacred oak, the murmuring
of a spring, and the sound coming from a brazen vessel
struck by rods of brass moved by the wind. At Delos
the laurel rustled; at Delphi the wind which blew on
the brazen tripod was the principal element. It was not
till later on that the Pythia had to be stupefied by vapours,
when in her raving she emitted words without any con-
nection, and which had first to be explained by the priest.
It was the priest, too, who interpreted dreams. In the
cave of Trophonius the inquirer saw visions, and these
were interpreted to him. In Achaia, as Pausanias relates,
there was a statue of Mars, and the question was spoken
into its ear, after which the questioner went away from
the market with his fingers in his ears. The first word
heard by him after his ears were opened was the answer,
which was then connected with the question by inter-
pretation. To the same class of signs belong also the
questioning of the entrails of sacrificial animals, the
signification of the flight of birds, and several other such
purely external rites. Animals were slaughtered in sacri-

278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

fice till auspicious tokens were got. In the case of the
oracles, two things went to constitute the verdict — the out-
ward word and the explanation. With regard to the former,
the mind took up a receptive attitude, but with regard to
the latter, its attitude, as being the interpreter, was an
active one, for the outward element in itself was supposed
to be indeterminate. (At TU>V Saifj-ovutv (pooval avapOpol
etVti/.) But even as representing the concrete expression
of the decision of the god, the oracles have a double
meaning. Man acts in accordance with them while
taking the words in one of their aspects. The other
meaning, however, appears in opposition to the first, and
so man comes into collision with the oracle. The oracles
just mean that man shows himself to be ignorant, and
shows that the god has knowledge ; as ignorant, man ac-
cepts the utterance of the god who has knowledge. He
consequently does not represent the knowledge of some-
thing revealed, but the absence of the knowledge of this.
He does not act with knowledge in accordance with the
revelation of the god, which, as being general, has no in-
herent determinate meaning, and thus, where there is a
possibility of two meanings, it must be ambiguous. The
oracle says, "Depart, and the enemy will be conquered."
Here both enemies are "the enemy." The revelation of
the divine is general, and must be general ; man interprets
it as one who is ignorant, he acts in accordance with it.
The action is his own, and thus he knows himself to be
responsible. The flight of birds, the rustling of oaks, are
general signs. To the definite question, the god, as repre-
senting the divine in general, gives a general answer, for
it is only what is general, and not the individual as such,
that is included in the end aimed at by the gods. The
general is, however, indeterminate, ambiguous, capable of
a double meaning, for it comprises both sides.

(c.) What came first in worship was religious senti-
ment ; then, secondly, we had worship as service, the
concrete relationship, where, however, negativity as such

DEFINITE RELIGION 279

has not yet appeared. The third form of the service
of God is the divine service of reconciliation. The gods
must be realised in the soul, in the subject, which is hypo-
thetically estranged, i.e., negatively determined relatively
to the divine, and in opposition to it. The agreement
cannot take place in the immediate way characteristic
of the foregoing fortn ; on the contrary, it demands a
mediation in which that must be sacrificed which was
formerly held to be fixed and independent. This nega-
tive element, which must be yielded up in order that the
estrangement and alienation of the two sides may be
removed, is of a twofold kind. In the first place, the
soul, in its character as the natural or untutored soul, is
negative relatively to Spirit ; the second negative element
is accordingly the positive-negative element, so to speak,
that is, any misfortune whatever, and more definitely, in
the third place, a moral misfortune or crime, the extreme
alienation of the subjective self-consciousness relatively
to the divine.

I. The soul in its natural state is not as it should
be ; it ought to be free Spirit, but the soul is Spirit only
through the abrogation of the natural will, of the desires.
This abrogation, this subjection of itself to what is moral,
and the habituation to this so that the moral or spiritual
becomes the second nature of the individual, is, above all,
the work of education and culture. The thought of this
reconstruction of man's nature must accordingly come
into consciousness at this standpoint, because it is the
standpoint of self-conscious freedom, and come into it in
such a way as to show that this change or conversion is
recognised as requisite. If this training and conversion
are represented as essential moments, and as essentially
living, we get the idea of a road which the soul has to
traverse, and as a consequence we get the idea of some
outward arrangement in which it is supplied with the
pictorial representation of this road. But if the course
followed by this conversion, this self-negation and dying

280 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

to self, is to be set forth for perception or pictorial con-
templation as absolute and essential, it must be beheld in
the divine objects themselves. The -need for this has,
as a matter of fact, been obviated by means of a process
•which, in the pictorial representation of the world of the
gods, has been carried out in the following way.

It is a fact intimately connected with the adoration of
the many divinities, — which, however, just because they
are many are limited divine beings, — that there is also a
transition to the universality of the divine power. The
limited character of the gods itself leads directly to the
idea of a transcendence, a rising above them, and to
the attempt to unite them in one concrete picture, and
not merely in abstract necessity, for the latter is not
anything objective. As yet this transcendence cannot
here be the absolute inherently concrete subjectivity as
Spirit, but neither can it be the return to the pictorial
representation or perception of the power of the One and
to the negative service of the Lord. On the contrary,
the One which is the object for self-consciousness at this
standpoint is a unity which is in a concrete fashion
all-embracing; it is universal Nature as a whole, or,
a totality of gods, the content of the sensuous- spiritual
world united in a material fashion. Inasmuch as self-
consciousness cannot advance to infinite subjectivity,
which as Spirit would be inherently concrete, the per-
ception or picturing of substantial unity is something
already present so far as this stage is concerned and
preserved from the older religions. For the older ori-
ginal religions are the definite nature-religions, in which
this Spinozism, namely, the immediate unity of the
spiritual and the natural, constitutes the foundation.
But further, the older form of religion, however much it
may be locally defined and limited in its outward repre-
sentation and in the mode in which it is conceived of,
is, before it reaches its developed form, still inherently
indefinite and general. Each local god in its deter-

DEFINITE RELIGION 281

mination of locality has at the same time the significance
of universality, and since this is firmly clung to as
against the splitting up and particularisation into char-
acters and individualities developed in the Eeligion of
Beauty, it is in what is rude and primitive, in what is
unheautiful and uncultured, that the service of a deeper,
inner universal, maintains itself, a universal which is at
the same time not abstract thought, but which, on the con-
trary, retains in itself that external and contingent form.

This older religion may, on account of its simplicity
and substantial intensity, be called deeper, purer, stronger,
more substantial, and its meaning may be termed a truer
one, but its meaning is essentially enveloped in a kind of
haze, and is not developed into thought, that is, is not
developed into that clearness which marks the particular
gods in whom the day of Spirit has dawned, and which
have in consequence attained to character and spiritual
form. The service of this deeper and universal element
involves, however, in it, the opposition of this deeper and
universal element itself to the particular, limited, and
revealed powers. It is, regarded from one side, a return
from these to what is deeper, more inward, and so far
higher, the bringing back of the many scattered gods
into the unity of Nature, but it also involves the anti-
thesis which is expressed by saying that this deeper
element is as opposed to clear self-consciousness, to the
serenity of day and rationality, something dull and torpid,
unconscious, crude, and barbarous. The perception, or
pictorial contemplation, in this kind of worship, is accord-
ingly in one aspect the perception of the universal life of
Nature and of natural force, a return to inward substan-
tiality; but in another aspect it is equally the perception of
the process, of the transition from savagery to a state of
law, from barbarousness to morality, from mental torpor
to the clear growing certainty of self-consciousness, from
the Titanic to the Spiritual. It is consequently not a
god in his finished form who is beheld here, no abstract

282 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

doctrine is propounded ; on the contrary, the content of
perception is the conflict of what is original and primitive,
which is brought forth from its undeveloped state into
clearness, into form, into the daylight of consciousness.
This idea is already present in many exoteric and pic-
torial forms in mythology. The war of the gods and
the conquests of the Titans is just this divine issuing
forth of the spiritual from the overcoming of the rude
powers of Nature.

It is here accordingly that the action of the subjective
side and its movement receive their deeper determina-
tion. Worship cannot here be merely serene enjoyment,
the enjoyment of present immediate unity with the
particular powers ; for since the divine passes out of its
particularity over to universality, and since self-conscious-
ness is reversed or inverted within itself, opposition is
consequently present, and the union starts from a separa-
tion greater than that presupposed by outward worship.
Worship here is rather the movement of an inward im-
pression made on the soul, an introduction to and initia-
tion into an essentiality which is for it foreign and
abstract, an entrance into disclosures which its ordinary
life and the worship grounded on that do not contain.
Just because the soul enters into this sphere the demand
is made that it should give up its natural Being and
essence. This worship is thus at the same time the puri-
fication of the soul, a path to this purification, and a
gradual progress towards it, the admission into the high
mystical Essence, and the attainment of a contemplation
in pictorial form of its secrets, which, however, have for
the initiated ceased to be secrets, and can only still
remain such in the sense that the pictures thus con-
templated, and this content, are not introduced into the
sphere of ordinary existence and consciousness, that is,
into the sphere of ordinary action and reflection. All
Athenian citizens were initiated into the Eleusinian
.mysteries. A secret is thus essentially something known,

DEFINITE RELIGION 283

only not by all. Here, however, there is something
known by all, which is merely treated as secret, i.e.,
secret only to this extent, that it is not made the talk of
everyday life, just as we see in the case of Jews, who do
not name the name Jehovah, or, to take an opposite case,
just as in daily life there are things known to all but of
which no one speaks. But these pictures of the divine
were not mystical in the sense in which the public
doctrines of Christendom have been called mysteries.
For in the case of the latter the mystical element is the
inward and speculative element. What had been seen by
the initiated had to remain secret, mainly because the Greeks
would not have been able to speak of it otherwise than in
myths, that is to say, not without altering what was old.
But even in this worship, although it starts from a
definite opposition, joyousness or serenity still continues
to constitute the basis. The path of purification is tra-
versed indeed, but that does not represent the infinite
pain and doubt in which the abstract self-consciousness
isolates itself from itself in its abstract knowledge, and
because of this moves and pulsates merely within itself
when in this empty abstract form, is merely a kind of
inward trembling, and in this abstract certainty of itself
cannot absolutely reach fixed truth and objectivity, nor
come to have the feeling of these. On the contrary, it
is always on the basis of that unity that this traversing
of the path exists and has value as the actually com-
pleted purification of the soul, as absolution, and having
this original unconscious basis remains rather an external
process of the soul, since the latter does not go down into
the innermost depths of negativity as is the case where
subjectivity is completely developed and attains to infini-
tude. If terrors, frightful images, forms inspiring dread,
and such like, are already employed here, and if, on the
other hand, and in contrast to this dark side, bright and
brilliant representations, significant pictures full of splen-
dour are made use of to produce a deeper effect on the

284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

mind, the initiated is purified in the very process of pass-
ing through the experience of seeing these pictorial forms
and having these emotions.

These mystical perceptions or pictorial forms accord-
ingly correspond to those pictorial forms of the divine
life, the process of which is set forth in tragedy and
comedy. The fear, the sympathy, the grief represented
in tragedy, all those conditions in which self-conscious-
ness is carried away, and in which it shares, are just what
forms that process of purification which accomplishes
all that should be accomplished. In the same way the
pictorial representations of comedy, and the giving up by
Spirit of its dignity, of its value, of its opinion of itself,
and even of its fundamental powers, this entire surrender
of all that belongs to self, is just this worship in which
the spirit, through this surrender of all that is finite,
enjoys and retains the indestructible certainty of itself.

In public worship even the main interest is not so
much the paying of honour to the gods as the enjoyment
of the divine. Since, however, in this worship of mys-
teries, the soul is on its own account elevated into an
end and is regarded in this condition of contrast as
abstract, independent, and, as it were, sundered from
the divine, the idea of the immortality of the soul neces-
sarily makes its appearance here. The completed puri-
fication raises it above the temporal, fleeting, present
existence, and inasmuch as it is made permanently free,
the idea of the passing over of the individual as one dead
on his natural side, into an eternal life, is closely associ-
ated with this form of worship. The individual is made
a citizen of the essential, ideal kingdom of the under
world, in which temporal reality is reduced to the con-
dition of a phantom world.

Since then the mysteries represent the return of the
Greek spirit to its first beginnings, the form of what
constitutes these is essentially symbolical, i.e., the signifi-
cation is something other than the outward representa-

DEFINITE RELIGION 285

tion. The Greek gods themselves are not symbolical;
they are what they represent, just as the conception of
a work of art means the giving expression to what is
meant, and does not mean that what is inward is some-
thing different from what is outwardly seen. Even if
the beginnings of the Greek god are to be traced back to
some such ancient symbolic representation, still what this
is actually made into has become the work of art which
perfectly expresses what it is intended to be. Many
have sought, and especially Creuzer, to investigate the
historical origin of the Greek gods, and the signification
which lies at the basis of their character. But if the god
is a subject for art, that alone is a good work of art which
exhibits him as what he actually is. In the religions of
nature this is a mystery, something inward, a symbol,
because the outward form does not actually reveal the
meaning which lies in this mystery, the idea rather being
that it is merely intended to reveal it. Osiris is a symbol
of the sun, and similarly Hercules and his twelve labours
have reference to the months ; thus he is a god of the
calendar, and no longer the modern Greek god. In the
mysteries, the content, the manifestation, is essentially
symbolical. The principal symbols had reference to
Ceres, Demeter, Bacchus, and the secrets connected with
these. As Ceres, who seeks her daughter, is in the lan-
guage of prose the seed that must die in order to retain its
true essence and to bring it into life, so, too, the seed and
the germination of the seed are in turn something sym-
bolical ; ior, as in the Christian religion, they have the
higher signification of resurrection, or they can be taken
as meaning that the same holds good of Spirit, whose
true essence or potential nature can bear blossoms only
through the annulling of the natural will. Thus the
meaning changes about ; at one time this content signi-
fies an idea, some process, and then again the idea,
the signification, may itself be the symbol for something
else. Osiris is the Nile which is dried up by Typhon, the

286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

fire- world, and is again brought into existence ; but he is
also a symbol of the sun, a universal life-giving power
of Nature. Osiris finally is also a spiritual figure, and
in this case the Nile and the sun are in turn symbols of
the spiritual. Such symbols are naturally mysterious.
The inward element is not clear as yet ; it exists first as
meaning, signification, which has not yet attained to true
outward representation. The outward form does nt)t per-
fectly express the content, so that the latter remains in
a partially expressed shape at the basis of. the whole
without coming forth into existence. Hence it came
about that the mysteries could not give to the self-con-
sciousness of the Greeks true reconciliation. Socrates
was declared by the oracle to be the wisest of the Greeks,
and to him is to be traced the re^l revolution which
took place in the Greek self- consciousness. This pivot,
so to speak, of self-consciousness was not, however, him-
self initiated into the mysteries ; they stand far below
what he brought into the consciousness of the thinking
world. All this has to do with the first form of recon-
ciliation.

2. The other negative element is misfortune in general,
sickness, dearth, or any other mishaps. This negative
element is explained by the prophets, and brought into
connection with some guilty act or transgression. A
negative of this kind first appears in the physical world
in the shape, for example, of an unfavourable wind. The
physical condition is then explained as having a spiritual
connection, and as involving in itself the ill-will and
wrath of the gods — that ill-will and wrath which are
brought upon men by some crime and by some offence
against the divine. Or it may be that lightning, thunder,
an earthquake, the appearance of snakes, and such-like
are interpreted to mean something negative which essen-
tially attaches to a spiritual and moral Power. In this
case the injury has to be done away with through sacrifice,
and in such a way that he who has shown himself arro-

DEFINITE RELIGION 287-

gant by committing the crime, imposes a forfeiture oil
himself, for arrogance is an injury done to a spiritual
higher Power, to which accordingly humility has to sacri-
fice something in order to propitiate it and restore the
equilibrium. In the case of the Greeks this idea seems
rather to belong to primitive times. When the Greeks
wished to depart from Aulis, and unfavourable winds
held them back, Calchas interpreted the storm to be
the wrath of Poseidon, who demands the daughter of
Agamemnon as a sacrifice. Agamemnon is ready to give
her up to the god. Diana saves the girl. In the CEdi-
pus Tyrannus of Sophocles a certain disease is sent by
means of which the deed of the parricide is disclosed.
In later times such ideas no longer make their appear-
ance. During the pestilence in the Peloponnesian war
we hear nothing of the worship of the gods ; no sacri-
fice was made during this war ; we meet only with predic-
tions of its conclusion. The appeal to the oracle implies
that such a sacrifice has become antiquated. That is to
say, if counsel is asked of the oracle, the result is viewed
as determined by the god himself. Thus the result came
to be regarded as something which has to happen, as a
matter of necessity, a matter of fixed destiny, in connec-
tion with which no reconciliation could have a place,
which could not be averted and could not be remedied.

3. The final form of reconciliation implies that the
negative is really a crime, and is so regarded and declared
to be such ; not a crime which is only perceived to be
such by the help of the explanation given through some
misfortune. An individual, a state, a people commits a
crime ; from the human point of view the punishment
is the propitiation for the crime either in the form of
punishment or in the cruder form of revenge. The free
spirit has the self-consciousness of its majesty, whereby
it has to make what has happened as if it had not hap-
pened, and to do this within itself. An outward act of
pardon is something different, but that what has hap-

288 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

pened can within the mind itself come to be what has
not happened, is something which belongs to the higher
privilege of free self-consciousness, where evil is not merely
act, but is something fixed and settled, and has its seat
in the heart, in the guilty soul. The free soul can purify
itself from this evil. Faint resemblances of this inward
conversion do occur, but the general character of recon-
ciliation here is rather outward purification. With the
Greeks this too is something belonging to ancient times.
A couple of instances of this are well known in connec-
tion with the history of Athens. A son of Minos was
slain in Athens, and on account of this deed a purification
was undertaken. ^Eschylus relates that the Areopagus
acquitted Orestes ; the rock of Athena stood him in good
stead. The reconciliation here is regarded as something
outward, not as inward confession. The idea expressed
in (Edipus at Colonos savours of Christian thought ; in
it this old (Edipus, who slew his father and married his
mother, and who was banished along with his sons, is
raised to a place of honour among the gods ; the gods
call him to themselves. Other sacrifices belong still
more to the outward mode of reconciliation. This is the
case with the sacrifices to the dead, which are intended
to propitiate the Manes. Achilles, for example, slew a
number of Trojans on the grave of Patroclus, his inten-
tion being to restore the uniformity of destiny on both
sides.

in.

THE RELIGION OF UTILITY OR OF THE
UNDERSTANDING.

A.

THE GENERAL CONCEPTION OF THIS STAGE.

In the Religion of Beauty empty necessity was the
ruling principle, and in the Religion of Sublimity unity
in the form of abstract subjectivity. In the latter reli-

DEFINITE RELIGION 289

gion we find, besides unity, the infinitely limited real
end, and in the former again, besides necessity, we have
moral substantiality, the Eight, the present and real in.
empirical self-consciousness. In the bosom of necessity
repose the many particular powers and partake of its
essentiality. Represented as individuals, they are spiritual
concrete subjects, and each represents a particular national
spirit. They are living spirits, as, for instance, Athene
is for Athens, Bacchus for Thebes, and they are also
family gods, though they are at the same time transfer-
able, because they are in their nature universal powers.
Consequently the objects also with which such gods take
to do are particular towns, states, and, speaking generally,
a mass of particular ends.

Thus this particularity when brought under a " One "
or Unity represents determinateness in its more definite
form. The next demand of thought is for the union of
that universality and of this particularity of these ends,
in such wise that abstract necessity has its emptiness
filled within itself with the particularity, with the end.

In the Eeligion of Sublimity, the end, when it took
on a realised form, was an isolated end shutting off one
particular family from others. A higher stage is accord-
ingly reached when this end is widened so as to corre-
spond to the compass of the Power, and when at the
same time this Power itself is further developed. The
particularity which is developed in detail as a divine
aristocracy, and together with this the real national spirit
in its various forms, which as an end comes to form part
of the essential character of the Divine and is preserved
within it, must get a place also within the unity. This
cannot, however, be the truly spiritual unity such as we
have in the Religion of Sublimity. The characteristics
of the earlier stages are rather merely put back into a
relative totality in which, it is true, both the religions
which preceded lose their one-sidedness, but in which at
the same time each of the two principles is also perverted

VOL. II. T

290 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

into its opposite. The Religion of Beauty loses tlie con-
crete individuality of its gods, as well as their independent
moral content or character. The gods are degraded to the
rank of means. The Eeligion of Sublimity again loses its
tendency to occupy itself with the One, the eternal, the
supernatural. Their union, however, is a step in advance
in this, that the single end and the particular ends are
broadened out so as to form a universal end. This end has
to be realised, and God is the Power which is to realise it.

Action in accordance with an end is a peculiarity not
only of Spirit but of life in general. It is the action of
the Idea, for it is an act of production which is no longer
a passing over into something other or different, whether
it is now characterised as other, or, as in the case of
necessity, as potentially the same, though in its outward
form, and as existing for others, it is an " other." In the
end, any content, as being what is primary, is indepen-
dent of the form which the transition takes, and of the
alteration which takes place, so that it maintains itself
within it. The impulse of this flower-like nature, which
may take on an external form under the influence of the
most manifold conditions, shows itself in the production
only of its own development, and only in the simple form
of the transition from subjectivity into objectivity. The
form which reveals itself in the result is that which was
formed before or pre-formed in the germ.

Action in accordance with an end is closely allied to
the form of spiritual manifestation which we last con-
sidered ; but spiritual manifestation in that form is, to
begin with, only the superficial mode in which anything
having a definite nature and any spiritual determinate-
ness appears, apart from the existence of this determinate-
ness as such under the form or mode of the end or Idea.
The abstract characterisation and the basis of the religion
which went before were expressed by the idea of neces-
sity, and outside of it was the fulness of Nature, spiritual
and physical, which accordingly is broken up so as to

DEFINITE RELIGION 291

have definite quality and to exist in definite time ; while
the unity is in its own nature devoid of content, roots
itself within itself, and receives that serenity or joyousness
which at once raises it above its determinateness and
renders it indifferent towards it, only from the spiritual
form and from ideality. Necessity is freedom potentially
only, is not yet wisdom, and is devoid of an end. In it
we find freedom only in so far as we yield up the con-
tent of freedom. Anything that is necessary, doubtless,
represents something having a content, some occurrence
or other, condition and consequence, &c. ; but its con-
tent as such is something contingent. It may take this
particular form, or it may take some other form ; or, to
put it otherwise, necessity is just a formal mode of
existence, and its content consists merely in the fact that
it is, but suggests nothing of what it is. It consists only
in holding fast to this abstract form of existence.

Necessity, however, buries itself in the Notion. The
Notion, or freedom, is the truth of necessity. To grasp
anything in thought means that we conceive of it as a
moment of a connected whole, which in its character as
a connected whole has the element of difference in it, and
has thus a definite and substantial nature. The con-
nection between things which is expressed by cause and
effect is itself as yet a connection of necessity, i.e., it is
as yet formal. What is wanting in it is that a content
be posited as determined for itself, traversant ce change-
ment de cause en effect sans change, a content which passes
through the change of cause and effect without alteration.
In this case, in fact, the external relation and reality as
embodied in different forms are degraded to the condition
of means. In order to the carrying out of an end it is
necessary to have means, i.e., something external with
the power of producing effects, the essential mark of
which consists in its being subordinate to the movement
of the end, which preserves itself in its movement,
and does away with its transitional character. In cause

292 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

and effect we have potentially the same content, but it
appears in the form of actual independent things which
mutually affect each other. The end, however, is this
content which is posited as identity with itself in con-
trast to the apparent difference between reality and the
form in which reality appears. Accordingly, in the case
of action carried out in accordance with an end, nothing
can come out of it which was not already there.

So far as the end is concerned, it is just in this that
the difference between the end and the reality is found.
The end maintains itself, mediates itself only with itself,
coincides only with itself, brings about the unity of itself
in the form of the unity of what is subjective with reality ;
but it does this through means. It is the power which is
above reality, the power which has at the same time a
primary content determined in and for itself, and this con-
tent is what is first and continues to be what is last. The
end is thus the necessity which has taken into itself the
external, particular content, and holds it fast as against
reality, which has a negative character and is degraded to
a means.

This unity of the content which ever dominates reality,
freeing itself from its power, and maintaining itself in
opposition to it, is accordingly present in life. The con-
tent, however, is not free in its own nature, free for
itself in the element of Thought ; it has not been given a
higher form in the mode of its identity, it is not spiritual.
The same unity exists in the spiritually formed ideal ; but
inasmuch as it is represented as being present in a free
form and as beauty, it belongs to a higher stage than
what has life. The quality of this unity is, so far, to be
regarded as an end, and what it produces is action in
accordance with an end. Its qualities, however, are not
represented under the mode of the end — e.g., Apollo and
Pallas do not set it before them as an end to produce
and extend science and poetry ; Ceres and the mystic
Bacchus do not make the production and the teaching of

DEFINITE RELIGION 293

laws an end. They take under their protection what con-
stitutes the laws, it is their special care; but here the
separation between end and reality does not exist. These
beings which have divine nature are those very powers
and activities themselves ; the Muse is herself the com-
position of poetry ; Athene herself is Athenian life — the
happiness and well-being of the city is not her end ;
but, on the contrary, these powers rule in as immanent a
way in the reality with which they are connected as the
laws act within the planets.

And further, as the gods in the stage of thought repre-
sented by beauty are in no sense means, they are just as
little mutually opposed as independent; rather, they them-
selves disappear in necessity. If they do at a time act
on their own account, they soon submit again and allow
themselves to be put in their right place. While, ac-
cordingly, in necessity one determination depends on
another, and the determinate character passes away, the
end is posited as identity with difference and reality in
it, the unity which is determined in and for itself, and
which maintains itself in its determinate character as
against the determinate character of something else.

The Notion, accordingly, in so far as it is posited as
free in its own nature, or for self, is at first confronted
by reality, and this is characterised in reference to it as
negative. In the absolute Notion, the pure Idea, this
reality, this hostile element, melts away into unity, and
gets to be on a friendly footing with the Notion itself ;
it throws off its peculiar individual character, and is itself
freed from the position of being merely a means. It is
this which is the true conformity to an end in which is
posited the unity of the Notion, of God, of the Divine
Subject or person, with that in which the Notion realises
itself, namely, objectivity and realisation, and it is the
very nature of God Himself which realises itself in ob-
jectivity, and is thus identical with itself viewed under
the aspect of reality.

294 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

At first, however, the end itself is as yet immediate,
formal ; its first determination consists in this that what
is thus determined in itself should, in reference to reality,
be for itself, should exist independently, and realise itself
in it as something offering resistance to it. It is thus
at first a finite end, and the relation between things ex-
pressed by it is a relation of the understanding, and the
religion which is founded on such a basis is a religion of
the understanding.

In the religion of the One we have already had an
end somewhat of this sort, and something which had a
close resemblance to this religion of the understanding.
The religion of the One is also a religion of the under-
standing in so far as this One maintains itself as end
as against reality of every kind, and the Jewish religion
is on this account the religion of the understanding in
its most rigid and lifeless form. This end consisting,
as it does, in the glorification of the name of God, is
formal, it has no absolutely definite character, but is only
abstract manifestation. The people of God, it is true,
represent a more definite end as an individual people ;
but this is a kind of end which it is wholly impossible
to form a conception of, and is an end only in the sense
in which the servant is an end for his Lord. It does
not represent the nature of God Himself; it is not His
end ; it is not divine determinateness.

When we say that God is the Power which works in
accordance with ends, and in accordance with the ends
of wisdom, we are speaking in a sense different from
that which at first attaches to this characterisation as
applied to the stage of the development of the Notion at
which we have arrived. What we mean is that those
ends are undoubtedly also limited, finite ends, but that
they are essentially ends of wisdom in general, and ends
of one wisdom, i.e., ends of the Good in and for itself,
ends which have reference to one supreme final end.
These ends are consequently subordinate simply to one

DEFINITE RELIGION 295

end, or aim. The limited ends and the wisdom in them
are of a subordinate character.

Here, however, the limitation of the ends is the funda-
mental characteristic, and this has no higher one above it.

Religion of this sort is consequently in no sense a
religion of unity, but rather of multiplicity ; it is neither
one Power nor one wisdom, one Idea, which constitutes
the fundamental determination of the divine nature.

Thus the ends which constitute the content of those
forms of existence are definite ends, and these ends are
not to be sought for in Nature ; but, on the contrary, we
find that amongst the many forms of existence, and of
the relations between things, those that have reference
to man are undoubtedly the really essential ones. What
is human is inherently possessed of thought, and man,
in pursuing his end, however unimportant it may be in
itself, as, for instance, in seeking nourishment, &c., has
the right of using up natural things and animal life
without further ado and to whatever extent he may
choose. Just for this very reason the ends are not to be
sought for as if they existed objectively in the gods and in
and for themselves. On the contrary, this religion, in so far
as it is a definite religion, owes its origin to human ends,
to human need or fortunate events and circumstances.

In the religion which went before this one, it was
necessity which was the universal, and which floated
above the particular.

This cannot be the case at the present stage ; for
in necessity finite ends disappear as in a higher form,
while here, on the contrary, they represent what gives
definite character to things and persists. At this stage
the universal represents rather the consent to or agree-
ment with particular ends, and, in fact, consent in general ;
for here the universal must remain undefined, because the
ends remain individual ends, and their universality is only
of the abstract sort, and is thus Happiness.

This happiness, however, is not to be distinguished

296 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

from necessity as belonging to the class of contingent
things, for in that case it would be the necessity itself,
in which those very finite ends are merely contingent ; nor
is it foreordination in general, and the directing of finite
things in accordance with an end ; but, rather, it is happi-
ness with a definite content, with certain definite elements.

But a definite content, again, does not mean any
kind of random content in general. On the contrary,
although it is finite and actually present, it must be
universal in its nature, and its existence must be justi-
fied on higher grounds — justified in and for itself. And
this end accordingly is the State.

The State, however, as representing this end is, to
begin with, only the abstract State — the union of men
held together by some bond, but in such a way that this
union is not yet in itself in the form of a rational
organisation, and it does not yet take this form because
God is not yet a rational organisation in Himself. Such
conformity to an end as there is, is external ; if it were
conceived of as existing inwardly, it would represent the
peculiar nature of God. Just because God is not yet
this concrete Idea, because He does not yet represent
in Himself the true fulness of Himself reached through
Himself, this end, namely, the State, is not yet a
rational totality in itself, and does not therefore deserve
the name State, but is merely a kind of dominion or
sovereignty, the union of individuals, of peoples, held
together by some bond under one Power. Since, too,
we have here the distinction between end and realisa-
tion, this end exists at first only in a subjective form,
and not as end which has been carried out, and the
realisation of it is represented by the acquiring of
sovereignty, the realisation of an end which is of an ft
priori character, which, in the first instance, lays hold
of the peoples and carries itself out.

As this quality of external utility or action in accord-
ance with an end is different from the moral substan-

DEFINITE RELIGION 297

tiality of Greek life, and from the identity of the divine
Powers and their external existence, so, too, this sove-
reignty, this uni'tersal monarchy, this end is to be distin-
guished from that of the Mohammedan religion. In this
latter, sovereignty over the world is also the end sought
after ; but what is to exercise sovereignty is the One of
Thought, the One of the Israelitish religion. Or when,
as in the Christian religion, it is said that God wills that
all men should come to a consciousness of the truth, the
nature of the end is spiritual. Each individual is thought
of as a thinking being, as spiritual, free, and actually pre-
sent in the end, it possesses in him a central point, it is
not any kind of external end, and the subject embraces
within himself the entire extent of the end. Here, on
the contrary, it is still empirical, a sovereignty of the
world which embraces it in an external way. The end
which exists in this sovereignty is one which lies outside
of the individual, and the more it is realised the more
external does it become, so that the individual is brought
into subjection simply to this end, and serves it.

The union of universal power and universal indivi-
duality is, to begin with, implicitly contained here, but
it is, so to speak, only a crude union, devoid of Spirit.
The power is not wisdom, its reality is not a divine end
in and for itself. It is not the One who derives his
fulness from himself ; this fulness is not conceived of
as existing in the realm of thought ; the power is worldly
power, worldliness merely as sovereignty, and power in
this aspect is virtually irrational. In presence of the
power all that is particular accordingly crumbles away,
because it is not taken up into it in a rational way,
and it takes on the form of self-seeking on the part of
the individual, of satisfaction in an ungodly way in par-
ticular interests. The sovereignty is outside of reason,
and stands coldly, selfishly, on the one side, just as the
individual does on the other.

This is the general conception of this religion. The

298 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

demand for what is highest is implicitly stated in it,
namely, the union of what has pure Being in itself and
of particular ends ; but the union here is of the ungodly,
undivine, crude sort just described.

B.

THIS RELIGION AS IT APPEARS OUTWARDLY IN HISTORY
IS REPRESENTED BY THE ROMAN RELIGION.

It is customary to take in a superficial way the Eoman
religion along with the Greek religion ; but the spirit of
the one is essentially different from that of the other.
Even if they possess certain outward forms in common,
still these occupy quite a different place in the religion
we are dealing with ; and the religions as a whole, and the
religious sentiment connected with them, are essentially
different, as is indeed already evident from an external,
superficial, and empirical examination of them.

It is allowed in a general way that the State, the
constitution of a State, the political destiny of any people,
depends on its religion, that this is the basis, the sub-
stance of its actual spiritual life and the foundation of
what we call its politics. The Greek and Roman spirit,
culture, and character are, however, wholly and essentially
different, and this fact must of itself bring us to the dif-
ference in the religions which form the substance of these.

The divine Beings belonging to this circle of thought
are practical and not theoretical gods ; prosaic, not poeti-
cal ; although, as we shall presently see, this stage is
the richest of all in the constantly new discovery and
production of gods.

I. So far as regards abstract religious sentiment and
spiritual tendencies, the earnestness of the Romans is
what first calls for remark. Where one end exists, and
that an essentially solid one which has to be realised, the
understanding referred to comes into play, and along with

DEFINITE RELIGION 299

it the earnestness which clings firmly to this end, in
opposition to a great deal else which is present in feeling
or in external circumstances.

In the religion which comes before this one, the
religion of abstract necessity and of particular individual
beings who are beautiful and divine, it is freedom which
constitutes the fundamental character of the gods and
which gives to them their joyousness and bliss. They are
not exclusively attached to any single form of existence,
but are essential powers, and represent at the same time
the irony which governs all that they seek to do; what is
particular and empirical has no importance for them.

The joyousness of the Greek religion, which is the
fundamental trait of the sentiment pervading it, is based
on the circumstance that although an end certainly exists
and is regarded with reverence, as holy, still there is pre-
sent at the same time this freedom from the end, and
it is directly based on the fact that the Greek gods are
many in number. Each Greek god has more or less
substantial attributes, moral substantiality ; but just be-
cause there are many particular attributes, consciousness
or Spirit is something above and beyond this manifold
element, and exists outside of its particular forms. It
abandons what is characterised as substantial and which
can also be considered as end, and is itself the irony
referred to.

The ideal beauty of these gods, and their universal
character itself, is something higher than their particular
character ; thus Mars can find pleasure in peace as well as
in war. They are gods of fancy existing for the moment,
without consistency, now appearing on their own account,
independently, and now returning again to Olympus.

Where, on the contrary, one principle, one supreme
principle and one higher end exist, there can be no room
for this joyousness or serenity.

Further, the Greek god is a concrete individuality, and
each of these many particular individuals has itself ngain

300 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

many different characteristics within it ; there is here a
rich individuality which must necessarily possess and give
evidence of the existence in it of the element of contra-
diction, just because the two opposite elements in it have
not yet been absolutely reconciled.

Since the gods have in themselves this wealth of
external characteristics, we have a certain element of
indifference existing in reference to those particular
qualities, and they can be made sport of and be treated
with levity. It is with this side of their nature that the
element of contingency which we observed attached to
them in the stories of the gods, is connected.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in drawing a comparison
between the Greek and the Eoman religion, extols the
religious institutions of Rome, and points out the great
superiority of the old Roman religion to the Greek. It
has temples, altars, divine worship, sacrifice, solemn
religious gatherings, festivals, symbols, &c., in common
with the Greek religion ; but the myths with their
blasphemous features, the mutilations, the imprison-
ments, the wars, the squabbles, &c., of the gods, are
excluded from it. These, however, belong to the gods
in their joyous aspect, they lay themselves open to this,
they are made sport of in comedy, and yet in all this
they have a safe and undisturbed existence. When the
element of seriousness comes in, then the outward form
taken by gods, their actions and the events in their life,
must appear in a way which is in conformity with a
fixed principle. In free individuality, on the other hand,
there are no such fixed ends, no such one-sided moral
characterisations of the understanding. ^The gods, it is
true, contain within them the moral element ; but at the
same time, since they have a particular definitely marked
existence, they are possessed of a rich individuality, and
are concrete. In this rich individuality the element of
earnestness is not at all a necessary characteristic ; on the
contrary, it is free in all its separate manifestations, it

DEFINITE RELIGION 301

can roam about in a light-hearted way through every-
thing, and it remains what it is. The stories which
appear to be unworthy of gods have reference to the
general aspects of the nature of things, the creation of the
world, &c. ; they have their origin in old traditions, in
abstract views regarding the processes of the elements.
The universal element in these views is obscured, but it
is hinted at ; and in this external way of regarding things,
and in this want of order amongst things, a glimpse is
first got of the universal nature of the intelligence which
shows itself in them. In a religion, on the other hand,
in which a definite end is present, all reference to theo-
retical points of view from which intelligence may be
regarded disappears. No theories, and in fact nothing
universal, are to be found in the Eeligion of Utility. The
deity has here a definite character or content, namely, the
sovereignty of the world. The universality here is em-
pirical, not moral or spiritual, but is rather a real, actual
universality.

The Eoman god representing this sovereignty is to be
looked for in Fortuna publica, the necessity which for
others is a cold unsympathetic necessity ; the particular
necessity which contains the end concerned with Eome
itself is Boma, sovereignty, a holy and divine Being, and
this sovereign Roma in the form of a god who exercises
sovereignty is Jupiter Capitolinus, a particular Jupiter —
for there are many Jupiters, three hundred Joves in fact.

This Jupiter Capitolinus is not Zeus, who is the
father of gods and men ; but rather, he simply stands for
the idea of sovereignty, and has his end in the world,
and it is for the Eoman people that he carries out this
end. The Eoman people is the universal family, while
in the Eeligion of Beauty the divine end was represented
by many families, and in the religion of the One, on the
other hand, by one family only.

2. This god is not the truly spiritual One, and just
because of this the Particular lies outside of this unity

302 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of sovereignty. The Power is merely abstract, merely
Power, and is not a rational organisation, a totality in
itself, and just because of this the Particular appears as
something which lies outside of the One, outside of the
sovereign power.

This particular element appears partly, too, in the form
taken by the Greek gods, or else we find that later on it
was put side by side with them by the Romans them-
selves. Thus the Greeks, too, find their gods in Persia,
Syria, and Babylonia, though, at the same time, this repre-
sents something different from the peculiar way in which
they regarded their gods, and from the definite character
of these gods, and it is only a superficial universality.

Looked at in a general way, the particular Roman
deities, or at least many of them, are the same as the
Greek. But still they have not the beautiful free indi-
viduality of the Greek gods ; they seem to be grey, so
to speak. We do not know where they come from, or
else we know that they have been introduced in connec-
tion with some definite occasions. And besides, we must
distinguish the real Eoman gods from those Greek gods
which the later poets such as Virgil and Horace have in-
troduced into their artificial poetry in the form of lifeless
imitations.

We do not find in them that consciousness, that
humanity which is the substantial element in men as in
the gods, and in the gods as in men. They appear like
machines with nothing spiritual in them, and show them-
selves to be gods of the understanding which have no
connection with a free beautiful spirit, with a free beau-
tiful fancy. So, too, in those modern botches done by
the French, they have the appearance of wooden figures
or machines. It is, in fact, for this reason that the forms
in which the Romans represent their gods have appealed
more strongly to the moderns than those of the Greek
gods, because the former have more the appearance
of empty gods of the understanding which have no

DEFINITE RELIGION 303

longer any connection with the free and living play of
i'ancy.

Besides those particular gods which the Romans have
in common with the Greeks, there are many gods and
ways of worshipping God which are peculiar to the
Eomans. Sovereignty is the end sought after by the
citizen ; but the aims of the individual are not yet ex-
hausted by this — he has also his own particular ends.
The particular ends lie outside of this abstract end.

The particular ends, however, become perfectly prosaic
particular ends, and it is the common particularity of
man regarded in the manifold aspects of his necessities,
or of his connection with Nature, which comes to the
front here. God is not that concrete individuality above
referred to. Jupiter is simply sovereignty ; while the
particular individual gods are dead, lifeless, without mind
or spirit, or, what is more, they are got at second-hand.

Particularity thus bereft of universality, and existing
on its own account, is something quite common ; it is
the prosaic particularity of man, but it is an end for man,
and he uses this or that other thing to accomplish his
end. Anything, however, which is an end for man is in
this region of thought a characteristic of the Divine.

The end aimed at by man and the divine end are one,
but it is an end which lies outside of the Idea ; thus
human ends rank as divine ends, and consequently as
divine powers, and so we get these many particular and
supremely prosaic deities.

We thus see on one side this universal Power which
is sovereignty ; in it the individuals are sacrificed and
have no standing as individuals. Regarding the matter
from the other side, we see that the definite element, just
because that unity, God, is something abstract, lies out-
side of this unity, and thus it is what is human that is
essentially the end ; it is the human element which gives
fulness to God by creating a content for Him.

In the Religion of Beauty, which represents the stage

304 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

preceding the present one, free, universal, and moral
powers constitute the object of adoration. Although
they are limited, still they have an objective, indepen-
dently existing content, and in the very act of contem-
plating them the ends of individuality melt away, and
.the individual is raised above his needs and necessities.
They are free, and the individual attains to freedom in
them ; just because of this he glories in his identity with
them, he enjoys their favour and is worthy of it, for he
has no interests opposed to theirs, and in his needs and
necessities, and in general in his particular existence, he
is not an end to himself. Whether he will succeed in
carrying out particular ends or not is a question he re-
fers to the oracles only, or else he surrenders them
to necessity. The individual ends here have, to begin
with, a negative signification only, and are not something
having a complete and independent existence.

In this religion of happiness, however, it is the self-seek-
ing of the worshippers which is reflected in their practical
gods in the shape of power, and which seeks in them and
from them the satisfaction of its subjective interests.
Self-seeking has in it a feeling of dependence, and just
because it is purely finite, this feeling is peculiar to it.
The Oriental who lives in light; the Hindu who sinks
his self-consciousness in Brahma ; the Greek who yields
up his particular ends in the presence of necessity, and
beholds in the particular powers his own powers, powers
which are friendly towards him, which inspire and
animate him, and are in unity with him — lives in his
religion without the feeling of dependence. Far from
being dependent, he is free — free before his God. It is
only in Him that he possesses his freedom, and he is
dependent only outside of his religion, for in it he has
thrown away his dependence. Self-seeking again, need,
necessity, subjective happiness, the pleasure - seeking
life, which .wills itself, keeps to itself, feels itself op-
pressed, starts from the feeling that its interests are

DEFINITE RELIGION 305

dependent on the deity. The Power which is above
these interests has a positive signification, and has itself
an interest for the subject, since it is to carry out its
ends. So far it simply signifies that it is a means
for the realisation of its ends. This is the sneaking
hypocritical element in such humility ; for its own ends
are and must be the content, the end of this Power.
This kind of consciousness accordingly has no theoretical
position in religion, i.e., it does not consist in a free
contemplation of objectivity, in an honouring of these
powers, but only in practical selfishness, in a demand
for the satisfaction of the individual interests of this
life. It is the understanding which in this religion
holds fast by its finite ends, by something w.hich has
been posited jn a one-sided way by itself, and which is
interesting only for it, and it neither sinks such abstrac-
tions and individual details in necessity nor resolves
them in reason. Thus particular ends, needs, powers,
appear also as gods. The content of these gods is prac^
tical utility ; they serve the common good or profit.

Thus (3) the transition is made to gods who are wholly
single or particular.

The family gods belong to this or that particular citizen.
The Lares, on the other hand, are connected with natural
morality and piety, with the moral unity of the family.
There are other gods, again, whose conteut or character
has reference to utility pure and simple of a still more
special kind.

Since human life and action of this kind appear also
in a form from which the negative element of evil at all
events is absent, the satisfaction of those needs which
belong to life takes the shape of a simple, peaceful, primi-
tive, natural state. The time of Saturn, the state of
innocence, is the picture which floats before the mind
of the Roman, and the satisfaction of the needs proper
to such a condition of things is represented by a crowd
of gods.

VOL. n. u

3o6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Thus the Romans had many festivals and a crowd
of gods, which were connected with the fruitful ness of
the earth as well as with the skill of men, who appro-
priate for their own use the operations of Nature.
Thus we find a Jupiter Pistor ; the art of baking ranks
as something divine, and the power connected with the
art as something having substantial existence. Fornax,
the oven in which the corn is dried, is a goddess by her-
self ; Vesta is the fire used for baking bread ; for in her
character as 'Ecrr/a a higher meaning is attached to the
name, and one which has reference to family piety. The
Romans had their pig, sheep, and bullock festivals ; in the
rites connected with the worship of Pales they sought to
propitiate the goddess who caused the hay to thrive for
the cattle, and to whose protection the herds committed
their flocks in order to assure them against any kind of
injury. In the same way they had deities for the arts
which were connected with the State, e.g., Juno Moneta,
since coins play an essential part in the regulated life
of a community.

When, however, such finite ends as the circumstances
and various interests of the State and prosperity in what
belongs to the physical necessities, the progress, and
material wellbeing of man, are regarded as the highest of
all ends ; and when the main concern is for the prosperity
and existence of an immediate reality, which as being
such can, in virtue of what constitutes it, be merely a
contingent reality ; it follows that by way of contrast to
what conduces to utility and prosperity, we have what
conduces to injury and failure. So far as regards finite
ends and circumstances man is dependent ; what he has,
or enjoys, or possesses, is something having a positive
existence, and when he is conscious of some opposing
limit or defect, and that what he has is in the power of
another, and when further he finds this negated or denied
to him, he has a feeling of dependence, and the legiti-
mate development of this feeling leads him to revere the

DEFINITE RELIGION 307

power of what is injurious and evil, to pray to the devil
in fact. We do not at this stage get to the abstraction
called the devil, abstract evil and wickedness in an abso-
lutely definite form, because here the characteristics are
finite, present realities with a limited content. It is
only some special form of damage or defect which is here
an object of fear and is revered. The concrete, which is
finite, is a state, a form of reality which passes away, a
kind and mode of Being which can be conceived of by
reflection as an external universal, such as peace (Pax),
tranquillity (Tranquillitcu), the goddess Vacuna already
are, and which received a fixed form from the unimagi-
native Eomans. Such powers, which are partly allegori-
cal and partly prosaic, are however chiefly and essentially
of the kind whose fundamental character is represented
by the ideas of defect and injury. Thus the Eomans
dedicated altars to the plague, to fever (Febris), to care
(Angerona), and they revered hunger (Fames), and the
blight (Robigo) which attacked the grain. In the joyous
religion of art, this side of religion which consists of fear
of what brings misfortune, is put into the background ;
the infernal powers, which might be regarded as hostile
and powers to be dreaded, are represented by the Eume-
nides who are well disposed towards men.

It is difficult for us to understand how powers of that
kind should be honoured as divine. When we have
reached such ideas it is no longer possible to ascribe any
definite character to what is Divine, and they can become
objective only where the feeling of dependence and fear
exists. This state of things represents the total absence
of the Idea in any form, that decay of all truth which
can happen only in such circumstances. Such a pheno-
menon can be explained only by the fact that Spirit is
wholly shut up within the finite and the immediately
useful, as is evident when we consider how amongst
Eomans arts and crafts connected with the most immedi-
ate needs and their satisfaction, are gods. Spirit has

3o3 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

forgotten everything inward and universal connected with
thought, it has reached an utterly prosaic state, and what
it aims at, what it seeks to raise itself to is nothing
higher than what is supplied by the wholly formal under-
standing which puts together into one picture the cir-
cumstances, the character and mode of immediate Being,
and knows no other mode of substantiality.

When power was thought of as existing in this prosaic
condition, and when for the Eomans the power which
had to do with such finite ends and with immediate,
real, and external circumstances, represented the welfare
of the Eoman Empire, it was no great step to go further
and worship as God the actual present Power connected
with such ends, the individual present form of such wel-
fare, the Emperor in fact, who had this welfare in his
hands. The Emperor, this monstrous individual, was
the Power which presided over the, life and happiness of
individuals, of cities and of states, a power above law.
He was a more wide reaching power than Robigo ; famine,
and all kinds of distress of a public character were in his
hands ; and more than that, rank, birth, wealth, nobility,
all these were of his making. He was the supreme
authority even above formal law and justice, upon the
development of. which the Eoman spirit had expended
so much energy.

All the special deities, however, are, on the other hand,
again brought into subjection to the universal, real
Power ; they fall into the background before the uni-
versal purely essential power of sovereignty, the greatness
of the Empire, which spreads itself over the whole known
civilised world. In this universality the destiny of the
divine particularisation consists in the necessity there is
that the particular divine powers should be disposed of
and pass away in this abstract universality, just as the
individual and divine national spirit of the various peoples
is suppressed by being brought under the one sovereign
authority. This comes out also in several practical or

DEFINITE RELIGION 309

empirical features of the Roman spirit, and in Cicero we
find this kind of cold reflection on the gods. Here reflec-
tion is the subjective power above the gods. Cicero
institutes a comparison between their genealogies, their
destinies, their actions ; he enumerates many Vulcans,
Apollos, Jupiters, and places them together in order to
compare them. This is the kind of reflection which
institutes comparisons, and in this way gives the hitherto
fixed form belonging to the gods a dubious and vacillat-
ing character. The information which he gives in the
treatise J)e Natura Deorum is in other respects of the
highest importance, e.g., in reference to the origin of
myths ; and yet at the same time the gods are in this
way degraded by reflection, definite representation of
them is no longer possible, and the foundation is laid for
unbelief and mistrust.

If we regard the matter from the other side however,
we find that it was a universal religious necessity and
along with it the stifling power of the Roman fate,
which collected the individual gods into a unity. Rome
is a Pantheon in which the gods stand side by side, and
here they mutually extinguish each other and are made
subject to the one Jupiter Capitolinus.

The Romans conquer Magna Grsecia, Egypt, &c.,
they plunder the temples, and then we see whole ship-
loads of gods hurried off to Rome. Rome thus becomes
a collection of all religions, of the Greek, Persian,
Egyptian, Christian, and Mithra forms of worship. This
kind of tolerance exists in Rome ; all religious there
meet together and are mixed up. The Romans lay hold
of all religions, and the general result is a state of con-
fusion in which all kinds of worship are jumbled up, and
the outward form which belongs to art is lost.

C. The character of the worship connected with this
religion and its characterisation are involved in the
foregoing description. God is served for the sake of
an end and this end is a human one. The content does

3io THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

not start so to speak from God, it is not the content of
what really is His nature, but on the contrary it starts
from man, from something which is a human end.

For this reason the outward form taken by these gods
can scarcely be considered as distinct from the worship
paid to them ; for this distinction together with free
worship presupposes a truth which has a realised exist-
ence, a truth in and for self, something which is universal,
objective, and truly divine, and which by means of its
content rises above particular subjective necessities and
exists on its own account, and thus worship is the
process in which the individual gets for himself the
enjoyment of his identity with what is universal and in
which he commemorates this identity. Here, however,
the interest originates in the subject or individual ;
his needs, and the fact that the satisfaction of these
depends on another, produce piety, and worship is thus
the positing of a Power which will relieve him and
which exists because of his needs. These gods have
thus essentially a subjective root and origin, and they
have, as it were, an existence only in the worship paid
to them ; they possess substantiality in the festivals
though scarcely in the conceptions formed of them.
The truth, rather, is that the effort to overcome the need
by the help of the power of the gods, and to get from
them the satisfaction of the want and the hope of being
able to do this, are merely the second part of worship,
and the side which is otherwise objective cornes to be
included within the worship itself.

It is thus a religion of dependence and of the feeling
of dependence. The dominant element in such a feeling
of dependence is the absence of freedom. Man knows
that he is free ; but that in which he is in possession of
himself is an end which remains outside of the individual,
and this is still more the case with those particular ends,
and it is just in reference to these that the feeling of
dependence finds a place.

DEFINITE RELIGION 311

Here we have what is essentially superstition, because
we are concerned with limited finite ends and objects,
and those are treated as absolute which, so far as their
content is concerned, are limited. Superstition, put
generally, consists in giving to fmitude, externality,
common immediate reality as such, the value of power
and substantiality. It originates in the sense of oppres-
sion felt by the spirit, in the feeling of dependence it has
in connection with its ends.

Thus the Eomans were always conscious of a thrill of
fear in presence of anything unknown, anything which
had no well-defined nature or consciousness. Every-
where they saw something full of mystery and ex-
perienced a vague kind of horror, which led them to
feign the existence of something irrational which was
reverenced as a kind of higher being. The Greeks on
the contrary made everything clear, and constructed a
beautiful and brilliant set of myths, which covered all
the relations of life and Nature.

Cicero extols the Romans as being the most pious of
nations, since in all departments of life they think on the
gods, do everything under the sanction of religion, and
thank the gods for everything. This is as a inatter'of
fact actually the case. This abstract inwardness, this
universality of the end, which is the fate in which the
particular separate individual and the morality and
humanity of the individual are suppressed, and in which
they cannot be present in a concrete form and cannot
develop — this universality, this inwardness is the basis
of the Roman religion, and consequently since everything
is related to this inwardness, religion is in everything.
Thus Cicero, in complete accordance with the Roman
spirit, derives religion from religare, for religion in all its
relations has as a matter of fact become to the Roman
something which binds and sways.

But this inwardness, this higher thing, this universal,
is at the same time only form : the subject or content,

312 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

the end, in fact, of this power is the human end and is
suggested by men. The Romans revere the gods because
they make use of them and when they make use of them,
especially in the crisis of war.

The introduction of new gods takes place in times of
difficulty and anxiety or because of vows. It is distress
or trouble which in general constitutes with them the
universal theogony. Connected with this also is the fact
that the oracle, the Sibylline books are regarded as some-
thing divine, by means of which the people get to know
what they should do or what ought to happen if they are
to be benefited. Arrangements of this sort are in the
hands of the State or the magistrate.

This religion is not at all a political religion in the
sense in which all the religions already treated of are,
in the sense that the nation has in religion the supreme
consciousness of its life as a State and of its morality, and
is indebted to the gods for the general arrangements
connected with the State, such as agriculture, property,
and marriage. In the Roman religion, on the contrary,
reverence for and gratitude to the gods are closely con-
nected, partly with definite individual cases, e.g., deliver-
ance from danger, and partly with public authority of all
kinds and with state transactions, in a prosaic way, and
religious feeling is in general mixed up in a finite way
with finite ends and with the deliberations and resolutions
connected with these.

Thus speaking generally the character of empirical
particularity is impressed on necessity ; it is divine, and
from a religious feeling which is identical with superstition
there springs up a collection of oracles, auspices, Sibylline
Books, which on the one hand minister to the end aimed
at by the State and on the other to particular interests.
The individual on the one hand disappears in a universal
element, in sovereignty, Fortuna publica, and on the other
human ends are regarded as having value in themselves,
and the human subject or individual has an independent,

DEFINITE RELIGION 313

substantial, and valid standing. It is within these
extremes and within the contradiction involved in them
that Roman life moves restlessly about.

Roman virtue, virtus, consists of that kind of cold
patriotism according to which the individual gives him-
self wholly up to advance anything that is a matter of
state or of sovereignty. The Romans too gave a visible
representation of this disappearance of the individual
in the universal, of this negativitv, and it constitutes

o «/ *

an essential feature of their religious games.

In a religion which has no doctrine it is by means
specially of the representations given in festivals and
dramas that the truth concerning the god is brought be-
fore the eyes of men. In such a religion dramas have for
this reason a wholly different importance from what they
have with us. lu ancient times their essential object is
to bring before the imagination the process of the sub-
stantial powers, the divine life in its movement and
action. The adoration of the images of the gods, and the
worship paid to them are connected with this divine life
in its state of repose or Being, and the movement of the
divine life is contained in the narratives connected with
the gods, in the myth, though it is thought of as existing
only for the inner subjective mental representation of the
truth. And just as the idea formed of the god in his
state of repose comes to fin'd expression in some work of
art, in the manner characteristic of immediate imagina-
tive perception, so, too, the idea formed of divine action
comes to be represented externally in the drama. Such
a way of representing the god was not indigenous to the
Romans ; it was not something which sprang up on Roman
soil and Roman ground ; and thus in adopting what was
for them originally foreign, they turned it into something
empty, ghastly, horrible — as we can see in the case of
Seneca — without making the moral divine Idea of it
their own. So, too, it was really only the later Greek
comedy which they took to do with, and they gave repre-

314 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

sentations merely of vicious scenes, and of private affairs
springing out of the relations between fathers, sons,
harlots, and slaves.

Amongst a people thus absorbed in the pursuit of
finite ends, it was impossible that any lofty perception
of moral and divine action, any theoretical or intellectual
conception of those substantial powers could exist ; and
actions which might be theoretically interesting to them
as spectators, although they had no reference to their
practical interests, could have for them only an external
crude reality, or, if they were to move them, a hideous
reality.

In Greek drama it was what was spoken that was the
main thing ; the persons who acted retained a calm
plastic attitude, and there was none of that mimic art,
strictly so called, in which the face comes into play, but
rather it was the spiritual element in the conceptions
dramatised which produced the effect desired. Amongst
the Romans, on the contrary, pantomime was the main
thing — a form of giving expression to thoughts, which
is not equal in value to the expression -which can be
clothed in speech.

The plays which ranked highest consisted, in fact, of
nothing but the slaughter of animals and men, of the
shedding of blood in streams, of life and death combats.
They represent, as it were, the highest point to which
imaginative conceptions could be brought amongst the
Eomans. There is in them no moral interest, no tragic
collision in which misfortune or some ethical element
constitutes the essential part. The spectators, who sought
merely for entertainment, did not demand a representa-
tion of a spiritual history, but of one which was real and
actual — a history, in fact, which represents the supreme
change in what is finite, namely, barren, natural death —
a history which is devoid of any substantial element, and
is the quintessence of all that belongs to external life.
These plays attained amongst the Romans such enormous

DEFINITE RELIGION 315

proportions that hundreds of men, from four to five
hundred lions, tigers, elephants, crocodiles were butchered
by men who had to fight with them, and who in turn
butchered each other. It is, above all, the history of
cold, unspiritual death which is here brought before
men's eyes — a death willed in an irrational, arbitrary
way, and which serves to feast the eyes of others. It
is necessity, which is purely arbitrary, murder without
any substantial element or content, and which has only
itself for content. It is this and this way of represent-
ing destiny which occupy the supreme place, the cold
fact of dying, not a natural death, but a death brought
about by an exercise of empty arbitrary will. It is not
produced by some external necessity arising out of certain
circumstances ; it is not a consequence of the violation of
some moral principle. Dying was thus the only virtue
which the noble Eoman could practise, and he shared
this virtue with slaves and with criminals who were
condemned to death.

What is here pictured to the mind is that cold kind
of murder which serves merely to feast the eyes upon,
the nothingness of human individuality, and the worth-
lessness of the individual who has no moral life in him-
self. It is a picture of hollow, empty destiny, which
in its relation to men is something contingent, a blind
arbitrariness.

Contrasted with this extreme of empty destiny in
which the individual disappears, a destiny which finally
found a personal representation in the power of the
Emperor, a power which is arbitrary and takes its own
way, unhindered by moral considerations, we have the
other extreme, the assertion of the worth of the pure
particularity or separate life of subjectivity.

The power has, that is to say, at the same time an end
also, but this power viewed in one aspect is blind ; Spirit
is not yet reconciled to itself, brought into harmony with
itself in it, and both accordingly continue to occupy a

3i6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

one-sided position in reference to each other. This power
is an end, and this end, the human, finite end, is the
sovereignty of the world, and the realisation of this end
is the sovereignty of men, of the Romans.

This universal end, taken in its real meaning, has its
basis, its seat in self-consciousness, and this means that
the independence of self-consciousness is posited, since
the end is included within self-consciousness. On the.
one side we have a certain indifference in reference to
concrete life, and on the other we have this reserve, this
inwardness, which is an inwardness both of the divine
nature and of the individual, though so far as the indi-
vidual is concerned, it is a wholly abstract inwardness.

This explains what is a fundamental feature of Eoman
thought, namely, that the abstract person, the individual
abstractly considered, is held to be of so much account.
The abstract person is the individual regarded legally ;
and accordingly, the development of law, of the essential
characteristics of property, is an important feature of the
Roman way of regarding things. This law, or right, is
limited to juridical law, to the law or rights of property.

There are higher laws or rights ; the human conscience
has its law or right, and this is as much a right as any
other ; but the law of morality, the law of ethics is some-
thing far higher. Here, however, this right no longer
possesses its concrete and proper meaning, the truth
rather being that abstract right, the right of the person,
expresses merely what is contained in the definition of
property. It is certainly personality, but it is abstract
personality only, subjectivity in the sense just explained,
which is given this lofty place.

These are the fundamental features of this Religion of
Utility or Conformity to an End. There are contained in
it moments, the union of which constitutes the essential
character of the next and last stage of religion. The
moments which are isolated in the religion of outward
utility, but which are related to each other, and conse-

DEFINITE RELIGION 317

quently are in a condition of contradiction, are, though
present here in an unspiritual form, the moments out of
which, when united according to their true nature, arises
the essential characteristic of the Eeligion of Spirit.
. The Boman world forms the supremely important
point of transition to the Christian religion, the indis-
pensable middle term. It is that side of the Idea repre-
sented hy reality, and, together with this, its potentially
determinate character, which are developed at this stage
of the religious spirit. At first we saw this reality held
firm in immediate unity with the universal. Now, by
giving itself a definite character, it has come out of the
universal and detached itself from it, and has thus come
to be completely realised externality, concrete indi-
viduality, and has consequently reached, in this its
alienation carried to the furthest point, totality in itself.
What now remains to be done, and what is necessary is,
that this particularity or individuality, this determinate
determinateness should be taken back again into the
universal, so that it may reach its true determination,
strip off the externality from itself, and consequently
that the Idea as such may get its complete determination
in itself.

The religion of external conformity to end or utility,
viewed according to its inner signification, constitutes the
closing stage of the finite religions. What is implied in
finite reality is just that the notion of God should be
or exist, that it should be posited, i.e., that this notion or
conception should be the truth for self-consciousness, and
accordingly should be realised in self-consciousness, in its
subjective aspect.

It is the notion or conception as thus posited which must
develop itself on its own account until it reaches totality,
for only then is it capable of being taken up into uni-
versality. It was this advance of determinateness to the
stage of totality accordingly which took place in the
Roman world, for here the determinateness is something

3i 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

concrete and finite, it is particularity, something which
is inherently manifold, external, an actual condition, a
kingdom, present objectivity, not beautiful objectivity,
and consequently not complete or perfect subjectivity.
It is through the end, the determinate determinateness,
that the determinateness first returns into itself and is
found in subjectivity. At first, however, it is finite de-
terminateness, and owing to the subjective return into
itself, it is finitude without any measure or standard, the
false infinite-fmitude.

This measureless finite has two sides or aspects which
we must get to understand and have a firm grasp of, its
potentiality and its empirical manifestation.

If we consider perfect determinateness in its potential
form, we see that it is the absolute form of the Notion,
the Notion, namely, in its determinateness, when it has
come back into itself. x The Notion is to begin with only
the universal and abstract, the Notion in its potential
form and as not yet posited. It is the true universal
when, by means of particularity, it unites itself with
itself, i.e., when by means of the mediation of particu-
larity, of determinateness, by the act of going out of
itself, and by the doing away with and absorption of this
particularity, it returns to itself. This negation of the
negation is the absolute form, the truly infinite sub-
jectivity, the reality in its infinitude. -

In the Eeligion of Utility it is just this infinite form
which self-consciousness has come to represent to itself.
This absolute form is in a special sense the characterisa-
tion of self-consciousness, the characterisation of Spirit.
This is what constitutes the infinite importance of and
necessity for the Roman religion.

This infinite subjectivity, which is infinite form, is the
grand moment which has been gained for Power ; it is
what was wanting in the idea of God as Power, in the
God of substantiality. It is true that in Power we had
subjectivity, but Power has only single ends, or several

DEFINITE RELIGION 319

single ends, and its end is not yet infinite. It is only
infinite subjectivity which has an infinite end, i.e., it is
itself the end, and it is only inwardness, this subjectivity
as such, which is its end. This characterisation of Spirit
was accordingly gained for thought in the Roman world.
This absolute form, however, is here still empirical, and
appears as a particular immediate person, and thus what
is highest when conceived of in a finite way, is what is
worst. The deeper the nature of Spirit and genius, the
more monstrous are their errors. When superficiality
errs, its error is correspondingly superficial and weak, and
it is only what possesses depth in itself that can become
the most evil and the worst. Thus it is this infinite
reflection and infinite form which, since it is devoid of
content and without substantiality, is the measureless and
unlimited finitude, the limitedness which is itself absolute
in its finitude. It is what appears in another shape in
the system of the Sophists as reality, for to them man
was the measure of all things, man, that is, regarded
according to his immediate acts of volition and immediate
feeling, from the point of view of his ends and interests.
In the Eoman world we see that this thinking by man on
himself gets an important place, and is elevated to the
condition of the Being and consciousness of the world.
The act by which thought shuts itself up within finitude
and particularity means, to begin with, the total disappear-
ance of all beautiful, moral life, the falling away from
true life into the infinitude of the desires, into momentary
enjoyment and pleasure, and this stage in the entire
shape in which it appears, constitutes a human animal-
kingdom, from which everything of a higher nature,
everything substantial has been removed. Such a state
of lapse into purely finite forms of existence, ends, and
interests, can certainly be maintained only by the inhe-
rently measureless authority and despotism of a single
individual whose means for maintaining this authority is
the cold unspiritual death of individuals, for only by this

320 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

means can negation be brought to bear on them, and only
thus can they be kept in a condition of fear. The despot
is one, a real present God, the singleness or individuality
of will in the form of power exercising authority over all
the other infinitely many single individualities.

The Emperor represents the Divinity, the divine
essence, the Inner and Universal as it appears, and
is revealed, and is actually present in the form of the
singleness or particularity of the individual. This in-
dividual is the characterisation of Power advanced to the
state of particularity, the descent of the Idea into the
present, but it is a descent which means the loss on the
part of the Idea of its inherent universality, of truth, of
Being in-aud-for self, and consequently of its divine
nature. The universal has taken flight, and the Infinite
is impressed in such a way on the finite that the finite is
the subject of the proposition ; this as something which
has a fixed, permanent character, and is not negative, is
placed within the Infinite.

This completion of finitude is thus pre-eminently the
absolute misery and the absolute sorrow of Spirit, it is
the opposition of Spirit to Spirit in its most complete
form, and this state of opposition is not reduced to a
state of reconciliation, this contradiction remains unsolved.
But Spirit is what thinks, and so if it has lost itself in
this reflection into itself as externality, in its character as
thought it at the same time returns into itself through
the loss of itself; it is reflected into itself, and in its
depth as infinite form, as subjectivity, — but as subjec-
tivity which thinks, and not as immediate subjectivity, —
it has placed itself at the highest point which can be
reached. In this abstract form it appears as philosophy,
or speaking generally as the sorrow of virtue, as a
longing and seeking for help.

The resolution and reconciliation of the opposing
elements is what is everywhere demanded. This recon-
ciliation becomes possible only when the external finitude,

DEFINITE RELIGION 3:1

which has been set free, is taken up into the infinite
universality of Thought, and is in this way purified from
its immediacy, and raised to the condition of what has
substantial validity. So, too, this infinite universality of
thought which has no external existence or value of its
own must in turn receive a present reality, and self-
consciousness must at the same time come to be a con-
sciousness of the reality of universality, so that it may
see the Divine to be something with an actual definite
existence, something belonging to the world and present
in the world, and know that God and the world are
reconciled.

We have seen how Olympus, that heaven of the gods,
that region within which are found the fairest divine
forms that were ever created by fancy, represented at
the same time a free moral life, a free, though as yet a
limited, national spirit. Greek life was split up into
many small states, into those stars which themselves are
only limited centres of light. In order that the free
condition of Spirit may be reached, this state of limitation
must be done away with, and the fate which floats in
the distance above the world of the gods and above the
national life must make its true authority felt in them in
such a way that the national spirit of these free peoples
is destroyed. x The free spirit must get to know itself as
free spirit in the entirety of its nature, free spirit in-and-
for self. Its value no longer consists in its being simply
the free spirit of the Greeks, of the citizens of this or
the other state, but rather man must be known to be free
as man, and God is thus the God of all men, the all-em-
bracing, universal Spirit. This fate, accordingly, which
exercises a kind of corrective discipline on the particular
forms in which freedom shows itself and crushes the
limited national spirit of the various peoples — so that
the nations apostatise from their gods, and get to be
conscious of their weakness and powerlessness, since
their political life is destroyed by the one universal

VOL. II. X

322 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Power — was the Roman world and its religion. In this
religion of utility or conformity to end, the end was
none other than the Roman State, which thus represents
abstract Power exercising its authority over the national
spirit of the various peoples. The gods of all nations
are collected together in the Roman Pantheon, and
mutually destroy each other, owing to their being thus
united. The Roman spirit as representing this fate,
destroyed the happiness and joyousness of the beautiful
life and consciousness of the religions which went before,
and crushed down all the various forms in which this
consciousness showed itself into a condition of unity and
uniformity. It was this abstract Power which produced
the tremendous misery and the universal sorrow which
existed in the Roman world, a sorrow which was to be
the birth-throe of the religion of truth. The distinction
between free men and slaves disappears in the presence
of the all-embracing power of the Emperor ; everything
permanent, whether existing in an inward or in an out-
ward form, is destroyed, and we are in the presence of
the death of finitude, since the Fortuna of the one
Empire itself succumbs too.

The true taking up of finitude into the Universal, and
the perception of this unity, could not have their develop-
ment within those religious, and could not originate in
the Roman and Greek world.

The penitence of the world, the discarding of finitude,
and the despair of finding satisfaction in "what was
temporal and finite which gained the upper hand in the
spirit of the world, all served to prepare the soil for the
true, spiritual religion, a preparation which had to be
completed on the part of man, in order that " the time
might be fulfilled." Granting that the principle of
Thought was already developed, still the Universal was
not yet an object for consciousness in all its purity, as is
evident from the fact that even in philosophical specula-
tion, Thought was united with ordinary externality, as, for

DEFINITE RELIGION 323

instance, when the Stoics made the world originate in
fire. The truth is that the reconciliation could appear
only amongst a people who possessed the purely abstract
idea of the One for itself, and had completely cast away
finitude in order to be able to conceive of it again in a
purified form. The Oriental principle of pure abstrac-
tion had to unite with the finitude and particularity of
the West. It was the Jewish nation which preserved
the idea of God as representing the ancient sorrow of the
world. For here we have the religion of abstract sorrow,
of the one Lord, and because of this the reality of life
appears relatively to this abstraction and in this abstrac-
tion, as the infinite wilfulness of self-consciousness, and is
at the same time bound up with the abstraction. The
old curse is removed and becomes the source of salvation,
and this just because finitude has on its part raised
itself to the condition of something positive, has become
infinite finitude, and has gained for itself a valid
existence.

PAET III

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION

PART III

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION

WE have now reached the realised notion or conception
of religion, the perfect religion, in which it is the notion
itself that is its own object. We defined religion as being
in the stricter sense the self-consciousness of God. Self-
consciousness in its character as consciousness has an
object, and it is conscious of itself in this object ; this
object is also consciousness, but it is consciousness as
object, and is consequently finite consciousness, a con-
sciousness which is distinct from God, from the Absolute.
The element of determinateness is present in this form
of consciousness, and consequently finitude is present in
it; God is self-consciousness, He knows Himself in a
consciousness which is distinct from Him, which is poten-
tially the consciousness of God, but is also this actually,
since it knows its identity with God, an identity which
is, however, mediated by the negation of fiuitude. It is
this notion or conception which constitutes the content of
religion. » We define God when we say, that He distin-
guishes Himself from Himself, and is an object for Him-
self, but that in this distinction He is purely identical with
Himself, is in fact Spirit. This notion or conception is
now realised, consciousness knows this content and knows
that it is itself absolutely interwoven with this content ;
in the Notion which is the process of God, it is itself a
moment. Finite consciousness knows God only to the
extent to which God knows Himself in it ; thus God is
Spirit, the Spirit of His Church in fact, i.e., of those who
worship Him. This is the perfect religion, the Notion

327

328 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

become objective to itself. Here it is revealed what God
is ; He is no longer a Being above and beyond this
world, an Unknown, for He has told men what He is,
and this not merely in an outward way in history, but in
consciousness. We have here, accordingly, the religion
of the manifestation of God, since God knows Himself in
the finite spirit. This simply means that God is revealed. »
Here this is the essential circumstance. What the tran-
sition was we discovered when we saw how this know-
ledge of God as free Spirit was, so far as its substance
is concerned, still tinged with finitude and immediacy ;
this finitude had further to be discarded by the labour of
Spirit ; it is nothingness, and we saw how this nothingness
was revealed to consciousness. The misery, the sorrow
of the world, was the condition, the preparation on the
subjective side for the consciousness of free Spirit, as the
absolutely free and consequently infinite Spirit.

We shall confine ourselves, to begin with (A), to the
general aspects of this sphere of thought.

The Absolute Eeligion is — I. The Revealed Religion.
Religion is something revealed, it is manifested, only when
the notion or conception of religion itself exists for itself ;
or, to put it differently, religion or the notion of religion
has become objective to itself, not in the form of limited
finite objectivity, but rather in such a way that it is objec-
tive to itself in accordance with its notion.

This can be expressed in a more definite way by saying
that religion, according to its general conception or notion,
is the consciousness of the absolute Essence. It is the
nature, however, of consciousness to distinguish, and thus
we have two things, consciousness and absolute Essence.
These two at first are in a state of mutual exclusion,
standing in a finite relation to each other. We have the
empirical consciousness, and the Essence taken in the
sense of something different.

They stand in a finite relation to each other, and so far
they are themselves both finite, and thus consciousness

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 329

knows the absolute Essence only as something finite, not
as something true. God is Himself consciousness, He
distinguishes Himself from Himself within Himself, and
as consciousness He gives Himself as object for what we
call the side of consciousness.

Here we have always two elements in consciousness,
which are related to each other in a finite and external
fashion. When, however, as is the case at this stage,
religion comes to have a true comprehension of itself, then
it is seen that the content and the object of religion are
made up of this very Whole, of the consciousness which
brings itself into relation with its Essence, the knowledge
of itself as the Essence and of the Essence as itself, i.e.,
Spirit thus becomes the object in religion. We thus have
two things, consciousness and the object; in the religion,
however, the fulness of which is the fulness of its own
nature, in the revealed religion, the religion which com-
prehends itself, it is religion, the content itself which is
the object, and this object, namely, the Essence which
knows itself, is Spirit. Here first is Spirit as such the
object, the content of religion, and Spirit is only for Spirit.
Since it is content and object, as Spirit it is what knows
itself, what distinguishes itself from itself, and itself
supplies the other side of subjective consciousness, that
which appears as finite. It is the religion which derives
its fulness from itself, which is complete in itself. This
is the abstract characterisation of the Idea in this form,
or, to put it otherwise, religion is, as a matter of fact, Idea.
For Idea in the philosophical sense of the term is the
Notion which has itself for object, i.e., it is the Notion
which has definite existence, reality, objectivity, and
which is no longer anything inner or subjective, but gives
itself an objective form. Its objectivity, however, is at
the same time its return into itself, or, in so far as we
describe the Notion as End, it is the realised, developed
End, which is consequently objective.

Eeligion has just that which it itself is, the conscious-

330 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

ness of the Essence, for its object ; it gets an objective
form in it, it actually is, just as, to begin with, it existed
as Notion and only as the Notion, or just as at first it
was our Notion. The absolute religion is the revealed
religion, the religion which has itself for its content, its
fulness.

It is the Christian religion which is the perfect religion,
the religion which represents the Being of Spirit in a
realised form, or for itself, the religion in which religion
has itself become objective in relation to itself. In it the
universal Spirit and the particular spirit, the infinite
Spirit and the finite spirit, are inseparably connected ; it
is their absolute identity which constitutes this religion
and is its substance or content. The universal Power is
the substance which, since it is potentially quite as much
subject as substance, now posits this potential being which
belongs to it, and in consequence distinguishes itself from
itself, communicates itself to knowledge, to the finite
spirit ; but in so doing, just because it is a moment in its
own development, it remains with itself, and in the act of
dividing itself up returns undivided to itself.

The object of theology as generally understood is to
get to know God as the merely objective God, who is
absolutely separated from the subjective consciousness,
and is thus an outward object, just as the sun, the sky,
&c., are objects of consciousness, and here the object is
permanently characterised as an Other, as something
external. In contrast to this the Notion of the absolute
religion can be so presented as to suggest that what we
have got to do with is not anything of this external sort,
but religion itself, i.e., the unity of this idea which we
call God with the conscious subject.

We may regard this as representing also the stand-
point of the present day, inasmuch as people are now
concerned with religion, religiousness, and piety, and
thus do not occupy themselves with the object in
religion. Men have various religions, and the main

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 331

thing is for them to be pious. We cannot know God
as object, or get a real knowledge of Him, and the main
thing, what we are really concerned about, is merely the
subjective manner of knowing Him and our subjective
religious condition. We may recognise this standpoint
as described in what has just been said. It is the
standpoint of the age, but at the same time it re-
presents a most important advance by which an infi-
nite moment has had its due value recognised, for it
involves a recognition of the consciousness of the subject
as constituting an absolute moment. The same content
is seen to exist in both sides, and it is this potential or
true Being of the two sides which is religion. The great
advance which marks our time consists in the recogni-
tion of subjectivity as an absolute moment, and this is
therefore essentially determination or characterisation.
The whole question, however, turns on how subjectivity
is determined or characterised.

On this important advance we have to make the
following remarks. When religion is determined from
the point of view of consciousness, it is so constituted
that the content passes beyond consciousness, and in
appearance at least remains something strange or foreign
to consciousness. It does not matter what content re-
ligion has, this content, regarded solely from the stand-
point of consciousness, is something which exists above
and outside of consciousness, and even if we add to it
the peculiar determination of Eevelation, it is neverthe-
less for us something given and outward. The result of
such a conception of religion is that the Divine content
is regarded as something given independent of us, as
something which cannot be known but is to be received
and kept in a merely passive way in faith, and on the
other hand it lands us in the subjectivity of the feeling
which is the end and the result of the worship of God.
The standpoint of consciousness is therefore not the sole
and only standpoint. The devout man sinks himself in

332 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

his object, together with his heart, his devotion, and his
will, and when he has attained to this height of devout-
ness he has got rid of the sense of separation which
marks the standpoint of consciousness. It is possible
also from the standpoint of consciousness to reach this
subjectivity, this feeling that the object is not foreign to
consciousness, this absorption of the spirit in those
depths which do not represent something distant, but
rather absolute nearness and presence.

This doing away with the separation can, however, in
turn, be conceived of as something foreign to conscious-
ness, as the grace of God, which man has to acquiesce in
as something foreign to his own nature, and his relation
to which is of a passive sort. It is against this sepa-
ration that the formula is directed which says that it
is with religion as such we have got to do, i.e., with
the subjective consciousness which has in itself what
God wills. It is in the -subject accordingly that the
inseparability of subjectivity and of the Other or objec-
tivity exists ; or, to put it otherwise, the subject as
containing in itself the real relation is an essential
element in the whole range of thought. Regarded from
this standpoint, the subject is accordingly raised to the
rank of an essential characteristic. It is in harmony
with the freedom of Spirit that it should thus recover its
freedom, that there should be no standpoint at which it
is not in company with itself. That it is religion which
is objective to itself is a truth which is contained in the
notion or conception of the absolute religion, but only in
the conception. This conception or notion is one thing,
and the consciousness of this notion is another.

Thus in the absolute religion as well the notion may
potentially contain the truth referred to, but the con-
sciousness of this is something different. This then is
the phase of thought which has reached consciousness
and come to the front in the formula which says that it
is with relijrion we have to do. The Notion is itself still

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 333

one-sided, is taken as merely implicit or potential ; and
so it appears in this one-sided shape where subjectivity
itself is one-sided ; it has the characteristic of one of
two only, is only infinite form, pure self-consciousness,
the pure knowledge of itself, it is potentially without
content, because religion as such is conceived of only in
its potential character, and is not the religion which is
objective to itself, but is only religion in a shape which
is not yet real, which has not yet made itself objective
or given itself a content. What has no objectivity has
no content.

It is one of the rights of truth that knowledge should
have in religion the absolute content. Here, however,
what we have is not the content in its true form, but
only in a stunted form. Thus there must be a content.
The content in the present case has, as we have seen, the
character of something contingent, finite, empirical, and
consequently we have a state of things similar to what
existed in Eoman times. » The times of the Roman
Emperors resembled ours in many points. The subject
as it actually is, is conceived of as infinite ; but as ab-
stract, it changes into the direct opposite, and is merely
finite and limited. Its freedom consequently is only of
the sort which admits the existence of something beyond
the present, an aspiration, a freedom which denies the
existence of a distinction in consciousness, and conse-
quently casts aside the essential moment of Spirit, and
is thus unspiritual subjectivity, subjectivity without
thought.

Religion is the knowledge which Spirit has of itself
as Spirit; when it takes the form of pure knowledge
it does not know itself as Spirit, and is consequently not
substantial but subjective knowledge. The fact, however,
that it is nothing more than this, and is therefore limited
knowledge, is not apparent to subjectivity in its own
form, i.e., in the form or shape of knowledge, but rather
it is its immediate potentiality which it finds, to begin

331 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

with, in itself, and consequently in the knowledge of
itself as being simply the infinite, the feeling of its
finitude and consequently of its infinitude as well, as a
kind of potential Being beyond and above it in contrast to
its actual Being, or Being-for-self — the feeling, in short,
of longing after something above and beyond it which is
unexplained. «f The Absolute Eeligion, on the other hand,
contains the characteristic, the note, of subjectivity or
infinite form which is equivalent to substance. We may
give the name of knowledge, of pure intelligence, to this
subjectivity, this infinite form, this infinite elasticity of
substance whereby it breaks itself up within itself, and
makes itself an object for itself. Its content is therefore
a content which is identical with itself, because it is the
infinitely substantial subjectivity which makes itself both
object and content. Then in this content itself the finite
subject is further distinguished from the infinite object.
God regarded as Spirit, when He remains above, when
He is not present in His Church as a living Spirit,
is Himself characterised in a merely one-sided way as
object.*

This is the Notion, it is the Notion of the Idea, of
the absolute Idea, and the reality is now Spirit which
exists for Spirit, which has made itself its object, and
this religion is the revealed religion, the religion in
which God reveals Himself. Eevelation means this
differentiation of the infinite form, the act of self-
determination, the being for an Other, and this self-
manifestation is of the very essence of Spirit. Spirit
which is not revealed is not Spirit. We say that God
has created the world, and we state this as a fact which
has happened once and which will not happen again, and
we thus ascribe to the event the character of something
which may be or may not be. God, we say, might have
revealed Himself or He might not. The character we
ascribe to God's revelation of Himself is that of something
arbitrary, accidental as it were, and not that of some-

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 335

thing belonging to the Notion of God. But God as
Spirit is essentially this very self-revelation ; He does
not create the world once for all, but He is the eternal
Creator, this eternal self-revelation, this actus. This is
His Notion, His essential characteristic.

Eeligion, the revealed religion, Spirit as for Spirit, is
as such the Religion of Spirit. It is not something which
does not open itself out for an Other, which is an Other
merely momentarily. God posits or lays down the
Other, and takes it up again into His eternal movement.
Spirit just is what appears to itself or manifests itself ;
this constitutes its act, or form of action, and its life ;
this is its only act, and it is itself only its act. What
does God reveal, in fact, but just that He is this revela-
tion of Himself? What He reveals is the infinite form.
Absolute subjectivity is determination, and this is the
positing or bringing into actual existence of distinctions
or difference. The positing of the content, what He
thus reveals, is that He is the one Power who can make
these distinctions in Himself. It is His Being to make
these distinctions eternally, to take them back and at
the same time to remain with Himself, not to go out of
Himself. What is revealed, is, that He is for an Other.
This is the essential character, the definition, of revela-
tion.

2. This religion, which is manifest or revealed to
itself, is not only the revealed religion, but the religion
which is actually known as a religion which has been
revealed ; and by this is understood, on the one hand,
that it has been revealed by God, that God has actually
communicated the knowledge of Himself to men ; and, on
the other hand, that being a revealed religion, it is a
positive religion in the sense that it has come to men,
and has been given to them from the outside.

In view of this peculiarity which attaches to the idea
of what is positive, it becomes interesting to see what the
Positive is.

335 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

The absolute religion is undoubtedly a positive religion
in the sense that everything which exists for conscious-
ness is for it something objective. Everything must
come to us in an outward way. "What belongs to sense
is thus something positive, and, to begin with, there is
nothing so positive as what we have before us in imme-
diate perception.

Everything spiritual, as a matter of fact, comes to us
in this way also, as the spiritual in a finite form, the
spiritual in the form of history, and the mode in which
the spiritual is thus external and externalises itself is
likewise positive.

A higher and purer form of the spiritual is found in
what is moral, in the laws of freedom. This, however,
is not in its real nature any such outward form of the
spiritual as has just been referred to, it is not something
external or accidental, but expresses the nature of pure
Spirit itself. It too, however, comes to us in an outward
way, at first in education, training, definite teaching ;
there its truth or validity is simply given to us, pointed
out to us.

And so, too, laws, civil laws, the laws of the State, are
something positive ; they come to us, they exist for us,
they have authority or validity, they are, not in the sense
that we can leave them alone or pass by them, but as
implying that in this external form of theirs they ought
also to exist for -us as something subjectively essential,
subjectively binding.

When we get a grasp of the law that crime should be
punished, when we recognise its validity and find it to
be rational, it is not something essential for us in the
sense that it has authority for us only because it is posi-
tive, because it is what it is ; but it has authority for us
inwardly as well, for our reason, as being something
essential, because it is also inward and rational.

The fact of its being positive in no way deprives it of
its character as something rational, as something which

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 337

is our own. The laws of freedom, when they actually ap-
pear, have always a positive side, a side marked by reality,
externality, and contingency. Laws must get a specific
character, and into the specification, into the quality of the
punishment, there already enters the element of exter-
nality, and still more into the quantity of the punishment.

In the case of punishment the positive element can-
not at all be absent — it is absolutely necessary. This
final determination or specification of the immediate is
something positive which is in no sense rational. In the
case of punishment, round numbers, for instance, decide
the amount ; you cannot find out by reason what is the
absolutely just penalty. It is the irrational which is
naturally positive. It must get a definite character, and
it is characterised in a way which has nothing rational
about it, or which contains nothing rational in it.

It is necessary to regard revealed religion in the
following aspect also. Since in it there is present some-
thing historical, something which appears in an outward
form, there is also present in it something positive, some-
thing contingent, which may take either one form or
another. Thus it occurs in the case of religion as well,
that owing to the externality, the appearance in an out-
ward form which accompanies it, there is always some-
thing positive present.

But we must distinguish between the Positive as such,
the abstract Positive, and the Positive in the form of and
as the law of freedom. The law of freedom should not
possess validity or authority because it is actually there,
but rather because it is the essential characteristic of our
rational nature itself. It is not, therefore, anything
positive, not anything which simply has validity, if it is
known to be a characteristic of this kind. Pteligion, too,
appears in a positive form in all that constitutes its
doctrines ; but it is not meant to remain in this condition,
or to be a matter of mere popular ideas or of pure memory.

The positive element connected with the verification

VOL. II. Y

338 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

of religion consists in the idea that what is external
should establish the truth of a religion, and should be
regarded as the foundation of its truth. Here in this
instance the verification takes the form of something
positive as such. There are miracles and evidences
which it is held prove the divinity of the person who
reveals and prove that this person has communicated to
men certain definite doctrines.

Miracles are changes connected with the world of
sense, changes in the material world which are actually
perceived, and this perception is itself connected with
the senses because it has to do with changes in the world
of sense. It has been already remarked in reference to
this positive element of miracle, that it undoubtedly can
produce a kind of verification for the man who is guided
by his senses ; but this is merely the beginning of verifi-
cation, an unspiritual kind of verification by which what
is spiritual cannot be verified.

The Spiritual, as such, cannot be directly verified or
authenticated by what is unspiritual and connected with
sense. The chief thing to be noticed in connection with
this view of miracles is that in this way they are put on
one side.

The understanding may attempt to explain miracles
naturally, and may bring many plausible arguments
against them — i.e., it may confine its attention simply to
the outward fact, to what has happened, and direct its
criticism against this. The essential standpoint of reason
in the matter of miracles is that the truth of the Spiritual
cannot be attested in an outward way ; for what is spiri-
tual is higher than what is outward, its truth can be
attested only by itself and in itself, and demonstrated
only through itself and in itself. This is what has been
called the witness of the Spirit.

This very truth has found expression in the history of
religion. Moses performs miracles before Pharaoh, and
the Egyptian sorcerers imitate them, and this very fact

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 339

implies that no great value is to be put on them. The
main thing, however, is that Christ Himself says, " Many
will come who will do miracles in My name, but I know
them not." Here He Himself rejects miracles as a true
criterion of truth. This is the essential point of view in
regard to this question, and we must hold fast to the
principle that the verification of religion by means of
miracles, as well as the attacking of miracles, belong to
a sphere which has no interest for us. The Witness of
the Spirit is the true witness.

This witness may take various forms ; it may be
indefinite, general, something which is, broadly speaking,
in harmony with Spirit, and which awakens a deeper
response within it. In history all that is noble, lofty,
moral, and divine, appeals to us ; our spirit bears witness
to it. The witness may not be more than this general
response, this assent of the inner life, this sympathy.
But it may also be united to intellectual grasp, to
thought ; and this intellectual grasp, inasmuch as it has
no element of sense in it, belongs directly to the sphere
of thought. It appears in the form of reasons, distinc-
tions, and such like ; in the form of mental activity,
exercised along with and according to the specific forms
of thought, the categories. It may appear in a more
matured form or in a less matured form. It may have
the character of something which constitutes the neces-
sary basis of a man's inner heart-life, of his spiritual life
in general, the presupposition of general fundamental
principles which have authoritative value for him and
accompany him through life. These maxims don't
require to be consciously followed ; rather, they represent
the mode and manner in which his character is formed,
the universal element which has got a firm footing in his
spirit, and which accordingly is something permanent
within his mind and governs him.

Starting from a firm foundation or presupposition of
this sort, he can begin to reason logically, to define or

340 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

arrange under categories. Here the stages of intellectual
advance and the methods of life are of very many kinds,
and the needs felt are very various. The highest need
of the human spirit, however, is thought — the witness
of the Spirit, which is not present only in the merely
responsive form of a kind of primary sympathy, nor in
that other form according to which such firm foundations
and fundamental principles do exist in the spirit, and
have reflective thought built upon them, firmly based
presuppositions from which conclusions can be drawn
and deductions made.

The witness of the Spirit in its highest form takes
the form of philosophy, according to which the Notion,
purely as such, and without the presence of any presup-
position, develops the truth out of itself, and we recog-
nise it as developing, and perceive the necessity of the
development in and through the development itself.

Belief has often been opposed to Thought in such a
way as to imply that we can have no true conviction
regarding God and the truths of religion by any other
method than that of Thought, and thus the proofs of the
existence of God have been pointed to as supplying the
only method by which we can know and be convinced
of the truth.

The witness of the Spirit may, however, be present in
manifold and various ways ; we have no right to demand
that the truth should in the case of all men be got at in
a philosophical way. The spiritual necessities of men
vary according to their culture and free development ;
and so, too, the demand, the conviction that we should
believe on authority, varies according to the different
stages of development reached.

Even miracles have their place here, and it is inter-
esting to observe that they have been reduced down to
this minimum. There, is thus still something positive
present in this form of the witness of the Spirit as well.
Sympathy, which is immediate certainty, is itself some-

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 341

tiling positive in virtue of its immediacy, and the
process of inference which starts from something laid
down or given has a similar basis. It is man only who
has a religion, and religion has its seat and its soil in
thought. Heart or feeling is not the heart or feeling of
an animal, but the heart of thinking man, a thinking
heart, or feeling ; and what shows itself in the heart as
the feeling for religion, exists in the thinking element of
the heart, or feeling. In so far as we begin to draw
conclusions, to draw inferences, to suggest reasons,' to
advance to thought - determinations or categories of
thought, we do this always by the exercise of thought.

Inasmuch as the doctrines of the Christian religion
are found in the Bible, they are given in a positive
way ; and if they become subjective, if the Spirit bears
witness to their truth, this can happen only in a purely
immediate way, by a man's inner nature, his spirit, his
thought, his reason being impressed with their truth and
assenting to it. Thus, for the Christian it is the Bible
which is this basis, the fundamental basis, and which
has upon him the effect referred to, which touches a
chord in his heart, and gives firmness to his convictions.

We get a stage further, however, when it is seen that
just because he is a thinking being he cannot rest in
this state of immediate consent or witnessing to truth,
but turns it over by thinking, meditating, and reflecting
upon it. This accordingly leads to a further develop-
ment in religion ; and in its highest and most developed
form it is theology, scientific religion ; it is this content of
religion known in a scientific way as the witness of Spirit.

But here a principle which is the opposite of this comes
in, and which is expressed by saying that we should
simply keep to the Bible. Looked at in one aspect,
that is a perfectly correct principle. There are people
who are very religious, who do nothing but read the
Bible and repeat sayings out of it, and whose piety and
religious feeling are of a lofty kind, but they are not

342 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

theologians ; religion does not, so far, take with them a
scientific form, the form of theology. Gb'tze, the
Lutheran zealot, had a celebrated collection of Bibles ;
the devil, too, quotes the Bible, but that by no means
makes the theologian.

As soon, however, as this ceases to be simply the
reading and repetition of passages, as soon as what is
called explanation begins, as soon as an attempt is made
by reasoning and exegesis to find out the meaning of
what is in the Bible, then we pass into the region of
inference, reflection, and thought, and then the question
comes to be as to whether our thinking is correct or not,
and as to hoio we exercise this power of thought.

It is of no use to say that these particular thoughts
or these principles are based on the Bible. As soon as
they cease to be anything more than the mere words of
the Bible, a definite form is given to what constitutes
them, to their content ; this content gets a logical form,
or, to put it otherwise, certain presuppositions are formed
in connection with this content, and we approach the
explanation of the passages with these presuppositions
which represent the permanent element so far as the
explanation is concerned. We bring with us certain
ideas which guide us in the explanation given. The
explanation of the Bible exhibits the substance or
content of the Bible in the form or style of thought be-
longing to each particular age. The explanation which
was first given was wholly different from that given now.

These presuppositions consist, for instance, of such an
idea as this, that man is naturally good, or that we
cannot know God. Consider how any one with such
preconceived ideas in his mind must distort the Bible.
Yet people bring such ideas to the interpretation of the
Bible, although the Christian religion just means that we
know God, and is just the religion in which God has
revealed Himself and has shown what He is.

Thus here again the positive element may enter in

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 343

in another form, and in this connection it is a matter of
great importance to determine whether this content, these
ideas and principles, are true or not.

It is no longer the Bible which we have here, but the
words as these have been conceived of within the mind
or spirit. If the spirit gives expression to them, then
they have already a form got from the spirit, the form
of thought. It is necessary to examine this form which
is thus given to the content of these words. Here again
the positive element comes in. In this connection it
means, for instance, that the existence of the formal
logic of syllogistic reasoning, of the relations of thought
belonging to what is finite, has been presupposed.

According to the ordinary view of the nature of
reasoning, it is only what is finite, only what may be
grasped by the understanding, that can be conceived of
and known. Reason, as ordinarily understood, is not
adequate to deal with a divine element or content.
Thus this content is rendered totally useless.

As soon as theology ceases to be a rehearsal of what
is in the Bible, and goes beyond the words of the Bible,
and concerns itself with the character of the feelings
within the heart, it employs forms of thought and passes
into thought. If, however, it uses these forms in a
haphazard way so that it has presuppositions and pre-
conceived ideas, then its use of them is of an accidental
and arbitrary kind, and it is the examination of these
forms of thought which alone makes philosophy.

When theology turns against philosophy, it is either
not conscious that it uses such forms, that it thinks
itself, and that its main concern is to advance in
accordance with thought, or else its opposition is not
seriously meant, but is simply deception ; it wishes to
reserve for itself the right to think as it chooses, to
indulge in thinking which does not follow laws and
which is here the positive element.

The recognition of the true nature of thought lessens

the value of this arbitrary kind of thought. This sort
of thought, which is a matter of choice and does not
follow strict laws, is the positive element which comes
in here. It is only the Notion in its true nature, the
Notion for itself, which truly frees itself absolutely from
this positive element, for both in philosophy and religion
freedom in its highest form is thought itself as such.

The doctrine or content also takes on the form of
something positive ; it is something having a valid exist-
ence, and it passes as such in society. All law, all that
is rational, and in general all that has true value or vali-
dity, takes the form of something which exists or is pos-
sessed of being, and as such it is for each one something
essential, something having true value or validity. This,
however, is merely the form in which what is positive
appears ; the content or substance must be constituted by
the true Spirit.

The Bible represents the Positive in this form ; but it
is one of its own sayings, that the letter killeth, while
the spirit giveth life ; and here the important point is the
kind of spirit which is brought into connection with the
letter, what kind of spirit gives life to the word. We
must know that we bring with us a concrete spirit, a
thinking, reflecting, or feeling spirit, and we must have
a consciousness of the presence of this spirit which is
active and forms a conception of the content before it.

This act of apprehending or forming a conception is
not a passive reception of something into the mind, but,
on the contrary, just because the spirit forms a concep-
tion, this conceiving of something is at the same time u
manifestation of its activity. It is only in the mecha-
nical sphere that one of the sides remains passive in con-
nection with the process of reception. Thus Spirit plays
a part here, and this spirit has its ideas and conceptions, it
is a logical Essence, a form of thinking activity, and the
spirit must know this activity. Thought in this form,
however, can also pass into the various categories of fiuitude.

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 345

It is Spirit which after this fashion starts from what is
positive but is essentially in it ; it must be the true,
right spirit, the Holy Spirit which apprehends and knows
the Divine, and which apprehends and knows this con-
tent as divine. This is the witness of the Spirit, and it
may have a more or less developed form.

The main thing, therefore, so far as the Positive is
concerned, is that Spirit occupies a thinking relation to
things, that it appears in an active form in the categories
or specific forms of thought, that Spirit is active here
and may take the shape of feeling, reasoning, &c. Some
don't know this, and are not conscious when they have
impressions that they are active in receiving them.

Many theologians, while treating their subject exegeti-
cally, and as they imagine taking up a purely receptive
attitude to what is in the Bible, are not aware that they
are at the same time thinking actively and reflecting.
Since this kind of thinking is accidental, governed by no
necessary laws, it yields itself up to the guidance of the
categories of finitude, and is consequently incapable of
grasping the divine element in the content ; it is not the
divine but the human spirit which is actively present in
such categories.

It is owing to this finite way of conceiving of the
Divine, of what has full and complete Being, what is in
and for itself, and to this finite way of thinking of the
absolute content, that the fundamental doctrines of Chris-
tianity have for the most part disappeared from Dogma-
tics. At the present time it is philosophy which is not
only orthodox, but orthodox par excellence; and it is it
which maintains and preserves the principles which have
always held good, the fundamental truths of Christianity.

In treating of this religion we do not go to work his-
torically after the fashion of that form of mental action
which starts from what is outward, but, on the contrary,
we start from the Notion. That form of activity which
starts from what is outward takes the shape of some-

346 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

thing which apprehends or receives impressions only when
we look at it in one of its two aspects, while looked at in
the other it is activity.

Our attitude here is essentially an attitude of activity
of this kind ; we are, in fact, conscious that we are think-
ing on thought itself, on the course taken by the cate-
gories of thought, a kind of thinking which has tested
itself and knows itself, which knows how it thinks, and
knows which are the finite and which the true categories
of thought. That, regarding the matter from the other
point of view, we start from what is positive, is true in
reference to education, and is even necessary ; but here
we must abandon this mode of procedure in so far as we
employ the scientific method.

3. The absolute religion is thus the religion of Truth
and Freedom. For truth means that the mind does not
take up such an attitude to the objective as would imply
that this is something foreign to it. Freedom brings out
the real meaning of truth, and gives it a specific charac-
ter by means of negation. Spirit is for Spirit ; that ex-
presses its nature, and it is thus its own presupposition.
We start with Spirit as subject, it is identical with itself,
it is the eternal perception of itself, and it is at the same
time conceived of only as a result, as the end of a pro-
cess. It is the presupposition of itself, and it is at the
same time the result, and it exists only as the end of a
process. This is truth, this condition of being adequate,
of being object and subject. The fact that it is itself
the object makes it the reality, the Notion, the Idea, and
it is this which makes the Truth. So, too, it is the reli-
gion of freedom. Freedom considered abstractly means
that the mind is related to something objective which is
not regarded as foreign to its nature, its essential char-
acter is the same as that of truth, only that in the case
of freedom the negation of the difference of Otherness has
been done away with and absorbed in something higher,
and thus it appears in the form of Reconciliation. Ee-

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 347

conciliation starts from the fact that there are different
forms of existence which stand to each other in a rela-
tion of opposition, namely, God, who has opposed to Him
an estranged world, and a world which is estranged from
its own essential Being. Eeconciliation is the negation of
this separation, of this division ; it means that each recog-
nises itself, finds itself and its essential nature, in the other.
Reconciliation is thus freedom ; but it is not something in
a state of repose, something which simply is ; on the con-
trary, it is activity. All that we- mean by reconciliation,
truth, freedom, represents a universal process, and cannot
therefore be expressed in a single proposition without
becoming one-sided. The main idea which in a popular
form expresses the truth, is that of the unity of the
divine and human natures ; God has become Man. This
unity is at first potential only, but being such it has to
be eternally produced or brought into actual existence ;
and this act of production is the freeing process, the re-
conciliation which in fact is possible only by means of
the potentiality. The Substance which is identical with
itself is this unity, which as such is the basis, but which
as subjectivity is what eternally produces itself.

The final result of the whole of philosophy is that this
Idea only is the absolute truth. In its pure form it is the
logical result, but it is likewise the result of a study of the
concrete world. What constitutes the truth is that Nature,
life, Spirit, are thoroughly organic, that each separate
thing is merely the mirror of this Idea, in such a way that
the Idea exhibits itself in it as in something isolated, as
a process in it, and thus it manifests this unity in itself.

The Religion of Nature is the religion which occupies
the standpoint of consciousness only. This standpoint
is to be found in the Absolute Religion as well, but it
exists within it only as a transitory moment. In the
Religion of Nature God is represented as an " Other," as
present in a natural shape ; or, to put it otherwise, reli-
gion appears in the form merely of consciousness. The

348 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

second form was that of the spiritual religion, of Spirit
which does not get beyond finite characterisation. So
far it is the religion of self-consciousness, that is, of
absolute power, of necessity in the sense which we have
given to these terms. The One, the Power, is something
defective, because it is abstract Power only, and is not
iu virtue of its content absolute subjectivity, but is only
abstract necessity, abstract, simple, undifferentiated Being.
The condition of abstraction in which the Power and
the necessity are conceived of as still existing at this
stage, constitutes their, finitude, and it is the particular
powers, namely, the gods who when characterised in
accordance with their spiritual content first make totality,
since they add a real content to that abstraction. Lastly,
we have the third form of religion, the religion of free-
dom, of self-consciousness, which, however, is at the same
time a consciousness of the all-embracing reality which
constitutes the determirtateness of the eternal Idea of
God Himself, and a consciousness which does not go out-
side of itself, which remains beside itself in this objec-
tivity. Freedom is the essential characteristic of self-
consciousness.

B.

THE METAPHYSICAL NOTION OR CONCEPTION OF
THE IDEA OF GOD.

The metaphysical notion of God here means that we
have to speak only of the pure Notion which is real
through its own self. And thus the determination or
definition of God here is that He is the Absolute Idea,
i.e., that He is Spirit. Spirit, however, or the Absolute
Idea, is what appears simply as the unity of the Notion
and reality in such a way that the Notion in itself re-
presents totality, while the reality does the same. This
reality, however, is Ptevelation, actual manifestation,
manifestation which is for self. Since manifestation, too,

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 349

has in itself the moment of difference, it contains the
note or characteristic of finite Spirit, of human nature,
which being finite stands opposed to the Notion above
mentioned. Since, however, we call the Absolute Notion
the divine nature, the Idea of Spirit means the unity of
divine and human nature. But the divine nature it-
self is merely something which is to be Absolute Spirit,
and thus it is just the unity of divine and human nature
which is itself the Absolute Spirit. The truth, however,
cannot be expressed in a single proposition. The absolute
Notion and the Idea as the absolute unity of their reality,
are different the one from the other. Spirit is accordingly
the living Process by which the implicit unity of the
divine and human natures becomes actual and comes to
have a definite existence.

Thus the abstract character or description of this Idea
is the unity of the Notion with Eeality. One of the
Proofs of the Existence of God takes the form of a proof
which represents this transition or mediation according
to which the Being of God follows from the notion or
conception of God. It is to be observed that in the case
of the other proofs we started from finite Being as repre-
senting something immediate, and inferred from its exist-
ence the existence. of the Infinite, or true Being, which
appeared in the form of infinitude, necessity, absolute
power which is at the same time wisdom and has ends
within itself. Here, on the contrary, we start from the
notion or conception, and go on to Being. Both methods
are necessary, and it is necessary to point out the existence
of this unity, since we may start from either side with
equal propriety, for it is the identity of the two which is
the truth. The Notion as well as Being, the world, the
finite, are equally one-sided determinations, each of which
changes round into the other, and appears at one time as
a moment without independence, and at another as pro-
ducing the other determination which it carries within
itself. Their truth is to be found in the Idea only, i.e.,

350 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

both are to be regarded as things posited, as dependent
for their existence on something else. Neither of the
two can be characterised simply as something which
continues to begin or is permanently original, but must
show itself in the character of something which passes
over into the other, i.e., it must show itself to be some-
thing posited. This transition has two opposite meanings,
each is represented as a moment, i.e., as something which
passes over from immediacy to the Other, so that each is
something posited. On the other hand, it has the signi-
fication also of something which produces the Other, in-
asmuch as it posits the Other, or brings it forward into
actual existence. Tims one of these two elements re-
presents movement ; but so, too, does the other.

If, accordingly, the transition to Being is to be exhibited
in the Notion, it is necessary to point out, to begin with,
that the characterisation or determination we call Being
is of an utterly poor kind. It is abstract equality
with self, that last form of abstraction which is indeed
affirmation, but affirmation in its most abstract form,
purely indeterminate, characterless immediacy. If there
were nothing more in the Notion it would be necessary
to put into it at least this most extreme form of abstrac-
tion, namely, that the Notion is. Even when it is defined
simply as infinitude, or with a more concrete meaning as the
unity of the Universal and the Particular, as universality
which particularises itself and thus returns into itself, this
negation of the negative, this reference to self, is Being
taken in a purely abstract sense. This identity with self,
this characterisation just described, is directly contained
in the Notion as an essential element.

Still it is necessary to state that the transition from
the Notion to Being has a rich and varied character, and
contains what most deeply concerns reason. The under-
standing of this relation between the Notion and Being
is something, too, which very specially concerns our time.
We must indicate more definitely the reason why. this

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 35!

transition possesses such an interest for us. The appear-
ance of this state of contrast or opposition is a sign that
subjectivity has reached the furthest point of its Being for
self or independent Being, and has arrived at the condition
of Totality, in which it knows itself as infinite and absolute
in itself. The essential characteristic of revealed religion
appears in the form of something by means of which
Substance is Spirit. Of the two opposite sides one is
represented by the subject itself which is the realisation
of the Idea taken in its concrete meaning. The reason
why this opposition seems so hard to overcome and seems
to be infinite is that this particular side or aspect of
reality, the side of subjectivity, the finite spirit in itself,
has reached the point at which it is able to comprehend
its infinity. It is only when the subject is a totality,
when it has attained to this inner freedom, that it is
Being ; but then it is also the case that Being in this
form is indifferent relatively to this subject, the subject is
for itself, and Being stands above it as an Other which
is indifferent to it. It is this which more particularly
constitutes the reason why the opposition can appear to
be of an intinite kind, and it is because of this and as an
immediate result of this that there exists in all that has
life an impulse to reconcile the opposing elements. The
demand that these opposing elements should be reconciled
is directly involved in the totality which belongs to them ;
but the abolition of the opposition has become infinitely
difficult, because the opposition is of such an infinite kind,
and because the Other is so entirely free, being something
which exists in another sphere, in a sphere beyond.

Thus the grandeur of the standpoint of the modern
world consists in this going down of the subject into
itself whereby the finite knows itself to be the Infinite
and is yet hampered witli the antithesis or opposition
which it is forced to solve. For the Infinite has an
Infinite opposed to it, and thus the Infinite itself takes
on the form of something finite, so that the subject,

3?2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

because of its infinitude, is driven to do away with tins
antithesis or opposition which is just what has so deepened
it as to make it realise its infinitude. The antithesis
consists in this, that I am subject, free, a person existing
for myself, and therefore I leave the Other free as some-
thing which is in another sphere and remains there.
The ancients did not attain to a consciousness of this
antithesis or division, which can be tolerated only by
Spirit when it exists for itself. Spirit, in fact, simply
means that which comprehends itself in an infinite way
in antithesis or opposition. Our present standpoint
implies that we have on the one side the notion of God,
and on the other Being as opposed to the Notion.
What accordingly is demanded is the reconciliation of
the two in such a way that the Notion will force itself to
take on the form of Being, or that the nature of Being
will be deduced from the Notion and the Other, the
antithesis or contrasted element will proceed out of the
Notion. It is necessary to explain briefly the mode and
manner in which this takes place, as also the forms of
the understanding which belong to it.

The form in which this mediation appears is that of
the Ontological Proof of the existence of God, in which we
start from the Notion. What then is the notion of God ?
It is the most real of all things, it is to be conceived of
affirmatively only, it is determined in itself, its content
has no limitation, it is all reality, and only as reality is it
without limit, and consequently all that really remains
outside of it is a dead abstraction, as has been already
remarked. The possibility of this Notion, i.e., its identity
having in it no element of contradiction, is exhibited in the
form proper to the Understanding. The second point is
involved in the statement, Being is a reality, Non-being is
negation, defect, simply the opposite of Being. The third
point consists of the conclusion, Being is therefore realit}",
and this belongs to the notion or conception of God.

The objections, brought by Kant against this mode of

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 353

reasoning amount to an annihilation of the Proof, and
their correctness has come to be taken for granted.
Kant tells us that the Being of God cannot be got out
of the notion or conception of God, for Being is some-
thing different from the Notion ; we distinguish between
the two, they are mutually opposed, and thus the Notion
cannot contain Being, which is something outside of it
and beyond it. He says further, that Being is not in any
sense reality, it is to God that all reality is to be attri-
buted, consequently Being is not contained in the notion
of God, and thus it does not stand for any specific content
or determination of content, but, on the contrary, is pure
Form. I may imagine I have a hundred thalers, or may
actually possess them, but in either case the thalers are
not altered, and consequently the content is always the
same whether I have them or not. Kant thus under-
stands by the content what constitutes the notion or
conception, although the meaning attached to the latter
is not what is usually implied in the Notion. We may
certainly put it so, if by the Notion we understand the
determination of the content, and make a distinction
between the content and the form which contains the
thought, and, on the other side, Being. In this way
all content is referred to the Notion, and all that is
left to the other side is simply the characteristic of
Being. Put shortly, it amounts to saying that the
Notion is not Being, but that the two are different. We
cannot understand anything about God, or get any know-
ledge of Him ; we can, it is true, form notions or concep-
tions about Him, but this by no means implies that there
is anything actually corresponding to these notions.

As a matter of fact, we know that it is possible to
build castles in the air, which, all the same, don't exist.
Kant thus appeals to popular ideas so far, and in this
way he has, in the general judgment, annihilated the Onto-
logical Proof, and has won great applause for himself.
Anselm of Canterbury, a thoroughly learned theologian,
VOL. n. z

354 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

presented the Proof in the following form. God is the
most perfect of all existences, the substance of all reality ;
but if God is simply an idea, a subjective idea, then He
is not the most perfect of beings, for we only regard as
perfect something which we do not merely picture to our-
selves by an idea, but which has in addition Being. This
is perfectly correct, and it contains a presupposition
which everybody has in his iniiid, namely, that what is
merely represented in the form of a mental picture is
imperfect, and that that alone is perfect which has reality
as well, that that only is true which exists just as really
as it is thought of. God is thus the most perfect of
beings, and must therefore be as truly real and truly
exist as He is conception or notion. But it is further
implied in the idea, as thus understood, that the ordinary
idea and the notion are different, and consequently we
get the idea that what is merely pictured to the mind as
an idea is imperfect, while God, again, is the most perfect
of beings. Kant does not demonstrate the difference
between notion or conception and Being; it is under-
stood in a popular sense, its truth is granted, but the
healthy human understanding forms pictorial ideas only
in connection with imperfect things.

Anselm's proof, as well as the form given to it in the
Ontological Proof, contains the thought that God is the
substance of all reality, and consequently contains Being
as well. This is perfectly correct. Being is such a poor
characteristic or quality that it directly attaches to the
Notion. The other point is that Being and Notion are
also different from each other. Being and Thought,
ideality and reality, are different from and opposed to
each other ; the true difference is opposition as well, and
this contrast is to be done away with, and the unity of
the two characteristics is to be exhibited in such a way
that it will be seen to be what results from the negation
of the contrast. Being is contained in the Notion. This
reality when it is unlimited gives us only empty words,

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 355

empty abstractions. Tims it has to be shown that the
characteristic or quality of Being is affirmatively con-
tained in the Notion, and so we get the unity of the
Notion and Being.

They are, however, different, too, and thus their unity
is the negative unity of both, and what we are concerned
with is the abolition of the difference. The difference
must be discussed, and the existence of the unity must
be established and exhibited in accordance with this
difference. It belongs to logic to exhibit the unity in
this way — that the Notion is this movement according
to which it characterises itself and takes on the form of
Being, and that this dialectic, this movement in accord-
ance with which the Notion gives itself the characteristics
of Being, of its opposite, and which we may call the
logical element, is a further development of thought
which is accordingly not found in the Ontolopical Proof.
It is this which constitutes the defect of the latter.

As regards the form of Anselm's thought, it has been
remarked that it is implied in the content that the
notion or conception of God presupposes reality, because
God is the most perfect of beings. The real point is that
the notion gives itself an objective form on its own
account ; but God is thus the most perfect of beings only
in idea, or popular thought. It is when measured with
the idea of the most perfect being that the bare conception
of God appears defective. The conception of perfection
is the standard, and thus it is seen that God as simply
notion or thought does not come up to this standard.

Perfection is a merely indeterminate idea. What is
really meant when anything is called perfect ? The
essential quality of the perfect may be directly seen in
something which is the opposite of that to which it is
here applied, that is to say, imperfection represents
merely the thought of God, and thus perfection is the
unity of thought or the Notion with reality, and this
unity is therefore presupposed or pre-posited here. In

356 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

that God is posited as the Most Perfect. He has here
no further determination or characterisation, He is the
perfect one only, He exists only as such, and this repre-
sents His determinate character. It is clear from this
that the real point is only this unity of the Notion and
reality. This unity is the characteristic of perfection
and at the same time of the Godhead itself, and it is
in fact the characteristic of the Idea too. It certainly,
however, belongs still more to the determination of God.

The presupposition which really underlies the Notion,
as it was understood by Anselm, is that of the unity of
the Notion and reality, and thus we see why this proof
cannot satisfy reason, because it is just this very pre-
supposition that is in question. The view according to
which the Notion determines itself in itself, gives it-
self an objective form or realises itself, is one which is
reached later, and proceeds from the nature of the Notion
itself, and cannot exist apart from this. This is the
view which raises the question as to how far the Notion
can itself do away with its one-sidedness.

If we compare this view with that which belongs to
our own day, and which in a very special sense origin-
ated with Kant, it may be put thus : Man thinks, per-
ceives, wills, and his acts of will are connected with his
acts of thought, he both thinks and forms conceptions,
and is a being both with a concrete sense nature and a
rational nature. Then, further, the notion of God, the
Idea, the Infinite, the Unlimited, is, according to this
view, a notion merely which we construct ; but we must
not forget that it is only a notion which exists in our
heads. Why is it said that it is only a notion ? The
notion is something imperfect since thought is only one
quality, one form of human activity amongst others, i.e.,
we measure the notion by the reality which we have
actually before us in concrete individuals. Man is cer-
tainly not merely a thinking being ; he is a being with a
sense nature as well, and may have sense objects even

THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 357

in his thought. This is, in fact, merely the subjective
element in the notion. We find it to be imperfect on
account of the standard applied to it, because this stan-
dard is the concrete man. It might be said that we
declare the Notion to be nothing more than a notion, and
what is perceived by the senses to be reality, and assert
that reality means what we see, feel, or perceive in sen-
sation. This might possibly be maintained, and there
are many who do maintain this, and who recognise
nothing as reality unless what is felt or tasted ; only it
is not conceivable that men should fall so low as to
ascribe reality only to what is perceived by the senses,
and not to what is spiritual. It is the concrete total
subjectivity of man which is floating before the mind,
and which is taken as the standard, measured by which
the grasping of things in the Notion is nothing more
than a forming of notions or conceptions.

If, accordingly, we compare the two views — that of
Anselm, and that which belongs to the present time — we
see that what they have in common is that both make
presuppositions. Anselm presupposes indeterminate per-
fection, the modern view the concrete subjectivity of men
in general. As compared with that perfection, and, on
the other hand, as compared with that empirical and
concrete subjectivity, the Notion appears to be something
one-sided and unsatisfying. In Anselm's view, the char-
acteristic of perfection really means, too, that it is the
unity of the Notion and reality. With Descartes and
Spinoza, too, God is the First, the absolute unity of
thought and Being, cogito, ergo sum, the absolute Sub-
stance ; and this is also the view of Leibnitz. What we
thus have on one side is a presupposition, which is
in reality something concrete, the unity of subject and
object, and judged by this the Notion seems to be defec-
tive. According to the modern view, we must hold to
the thought that the Notion is merely the Notion, and
does not correspond to the concrete. Anselm, on the

358 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

other hand, tells us that we must abandon the thought
of regarding the subjective notion as something fixed and
independent, and that, on the contrary, we must start
from its one-sidedness. Both views have this in common,
that they contain presuppositions, and what is distinctive
in each is that the modern world makes the concrete the
basis, while, according to Anselm's view — the meta-
physical view — on the other hand, it is absolute thought,
the absolute Idea which is the unity of the Notion and
reality, that forms the basis. This old view is, so far,
superior, inasmuch as it does not take the concrete in
the sense of empirical men, empirical reality, but as
thought ; and it is superior to the other also, because it
does not keep to the idea of something imperfect. In
the modern view the contradiction between the concrete
and what is only notion or conception is not solved ; the
subjective notion exists, it has a real value, it must be
considered as subjective, it is what is real. Thus the
older point of view is greatly to be preferred, because its
keynote rests on the Idea. The modern view, again, has
one characteristic of a broader kind, since it represents
the concrete as the unity of the Notion and of reality ;
while, in contrast to this, the older view does not get
beyond an abstraction of perfection.

END OF VOL. ir.

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