Lord Lytton and the Afghan war

LOED LYTTON

THE AFGHAN WAR.

LOED LITTON

THE AFGHAN WAR

BY

CAPTAIN W. J. EASTWICK,

FORMEELY DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY i
AND, SUBSEQUENTLY, MEMBER OP THE COUNCIL OP INDIA.

THIRD EDITION.

Kantian :

R. J. MITCHELL & SONS,

52 & 36, PAKLIAMENT STEEET,

AND 52, BUCKINGHAM PALACE KOAD, S.W.

1879.

Price One Shilling.

LORD LYTTON

AND

THE AFGHAN WAR

The importance of England's mission in the East can hardly be
exaggerated, nor the results dependent upon its right apprecia-
tion by British Statesmen. Those Statesmen are responsible to
the British people, who themselves ultimately share the respon-
sibility, if they sanction the acts of their representatives. We
have entered upon a war, the political consequences of which no
one can foresee ; but it will most probably entail a great loss of
life, and certainly a large expenditure of money. In this crisis
any individual, however humble, who, like the writer of this
pamphlet, has been employed on the scene of action in former
days, and has filled official situations which have given him the
opportunity of studying the question, may be pardoned if he ven-
ture to place before his countrymen the conclusions at which he
has arrived. If he can contribute in the slightest degree to the
formation of a sound public opinion, if he can enforce caution, or
correct error, his object will be attained. He has no party purpose
in view. The honour, the justice, the interests of England, and
the welfare and prosperity of India, are too dear to him to allow
of his descending into the arena of party strife. He feels assured
that the majority of thoughtful Englislimen only desire to have

brought before tbem the real facts of the case, to throw their
influence into what they beHeve to be the right cause. But they
must have the whole case, and all the documents necessary to
enable them to form an impartial judgment upon it, and not a
mere statement of the case on one side. Has the whole case —
have all the requisite documents — been laid before the public?
Iso unprejudiced person can answer these questions in the affirma-
tive. Is it not a fact that authentic and official documents were
long withheld, while one-sided statements and memoranda by
men holding high positions under the Government, and therefore
supposed to have access to the best means of information, were
put forward from time to time to bias the public mind ? Have not
inspired telegrams, containing exciting intelligence calculated to
arouse public indignation, been transmitted from India only to be
diluted or explained away shortly afterwards ? We were told, for
instance, that the letter of Sher Ali, the full text of which was
conveyed in the Viceroy's telegram of the 19th of October, but not
published until recently, was of an insolent and defiant nature.

Why was it not given to the public at once, so as to enable
competent persons to judge for themselves whether the interpre-
tation put upon it by Lord Lytton was borne out by its tone and
language, and why were not the letters from our officers to his
officials to which Sher Ali referred also given? Without these
letters of which he complained no fair judgment could be come to
as to the provocation which led to the Amir's conduct. We have
Sher All's letter now at page 252 of the "Afghanistan Papers,"
and it is characterized by Lord Lytton as " intentionally rude,
conveying a direct challenge, and that any demand for an apology
would only expose us to fresh insult." In order to form a correct
opinion upon it, in common justice to the Amir, the Persian text
ought to be submitted to ripe Oriental scholars, of whom there
are several in the Council of India. But taking the English
translation as it stands, few impartial persons will, it is believed,
support Lord Lytton' s view ; and even the Ministers themselves,
by very properly directing that a further communication should
be forwarded to Sher Ali, would seem to have cast doubt on the

/"'"\
,u.uc;

Viceroy's hasty conclusion. We have not before us, even now, all
the information which would enable the English people to form a
judgment as to the principles and policy which have plunged the
country into what many consider to be an unuecessary, impoHtic,
and unjust war. Without having any voice on a question in
which their interests are so deeply concerned, the nation has been
compelled to take a tremendous leap in the dark. The most
complete success must be attended by all the horrors and evils
which follow in the train of war. (July the clearest and most
undoubted necessity could justify the recourse to that extreme
arbitrament. Did that necessity exist ? and if it did exist where
is it going to lead the country? Will not our difficulties be
increased rather than diminished by the attainment of the ends
proposed by the policy of the present Government ? Shall we not
be in a worse position, both in a mihtary and a political point of
view, even if the most entire success crown our efforts? These
are questions of paramount importance to the people of England,
requiring the utmost calmness and impartiality to come to a wise
and right decision. But can a calm and deliberate judgment be
hoped for, when some of the noblest of our citizens, and those
the best capable of giving advice, are denounced with bitterness
because they venture to resist the popular feeling, and strive to
instruct the public mind ? Such efforts are not incompatible with
true patriotism ; on the contrary, they have their origin in a
sacred jealousy of their country's honour and reputation, and in
a solemn sense of Christian duty.

But independently of the great principles of justice and
morality, which are involved in this question of the War in
Afghanistan, there are other questions of the highest importance,
in relation to the new mode of governing India, which it behoves
the EngHsh ParHament and people to look in the face, and at
the proper time to exact a full explanation. Every day more
and more startling disclosures are made of information withheld,
of constitutional forms infringed and disregarded, and of a
system of personal government inaugurated in the highest degree
dangerous to our Indian Empire. We have the letters of those

eminent Indian functionaries, Sir Arthur Hobhouse and Sir

Henry Norman. We have the suppressed minutes of Sir

William Muir, replete with sound sense and ripe experience of

our Indian administration.

What does Sii' Arthur Hobhouse write? —

"Whether the mode of conducting Indian affairs during Lord
Salisbury's tenure of office has been in accordance with law, with
previous practice, or with public policy, is a question traught, as I think,
with interest and importance to the nation, but quite apart from
personalities."

What food for reflection, what cause for anxiety, does not
this pregnant sentence (emanating from one who has held with
distinction the highest legal office in India) suggest to the minds
of those conversant with Indian aff'airs.

John Mill said truly : —

"The great constitutional security for the good government of India
lies in the forms of business.'" '"The Minister, placed in office by the
action of political party, except in very rare cases, can possess little or
no knowledge of India,"

The Viceroy, selected from similar party considerations, is,
generally, equally inexperienced in Indian aff'airs. Both are
assisted by Councils composed of eminent men, who have fiUed
the highest offices in India, and bring to their work a thorough
knowledge of aU branches of Indian administration and of the
peculiar usages, ' feelings, and prejudices of the people of India.
English Statesmen of large minds, and comprehensive European
experience, collect the opinions of their distinguished Councillors,
weigh them well, and come to their own conclusions. This has
hitherto been the practice of the greatest Indian Viceroys, and of
the ablest Secretaries of State for India. Where diff'erences of
opinion have existed, the dissentients in the Councils have had
the opportunity of recording their views, and in this manner both
sides of the various important questions which constantly arise
in the government of India have been placed before Parliament
and the country. Even the bitterest opponents of the East
India Company always admitted its excellence as a Government
of record.

It appears that this salutary check on hasty and inconsiderate
action has been lately set aside, or at all events greatly curtailed,
both at home and abroad, and the evil results are already too
apparent. Lord Salisbury testifies, in the House of Lords, that
" in industry, caution, and sound hard discretion Lord Lytton has
not been exceeded by any Viceroy who preceded him." Gibbon
writes : — *' Abu Rafe, servant of Mahomet, testifies to the wielding,
as a buckler, by Ali of the ponderous gate of a fortress, which he
and seven other men could not lift." Gibbon adds : — " Abu Eafe
was an eye-witness, but who will be witness for Abu Rafe ?"
After a perusal of the "Afghanistan Correspondence," especially of
the conversations of the Viceroy with Nuwab Atta Mahomed
Khan, it will require more than Lord Salisbury's testimony to
convince the thinking portion of the English people of the
"caution and sound hard discretion of Lord Lytton."

All sorts of doctrines have been put forward by the Press, and by
the writers who support the Imperial policy of the present Govern-
ment, in reference to our relations with the Amir of Cabul, and,
by implication, with the Native States of India. Some of these
doctrines, enunciated by men of great intellectual power, appear to
be so erroneous, and so opposed to the principles which have
hitherto generally guided the policy of the Biitish Government,
that it behoves every man who has been connected with the
administration of India, and who holds strong opinions of their
dangerous tendency, to protest against their promulgation and
adoption. Amongst erroneous assumptions it has been persistently
affirmed that the Amir of Cabul has no claim to independence,
because his father Dost Mahomed and he himself have received
subsidies from the Indian Government. Has England never sub-
sidized European States? What of Prussia and Portugal?
Frederick of Prussia, in the seven years' war, through our subsidies
kept the French armies employed near their own frontier, and
thus enabled England to maintain her superiority in India and in
America. Lord Chatham himself said: — "I have conquered
America in Germany " Portugal preserved her very existence
by the aid of the subsidies of England, but neither Prussia nor

6

Portugal on that account ceased to be regarded as independent
Powers. There is, however, an illustration nearer at hand to Cabul.
The Shah of Persia, through a long series of years, received sub-
sidies from the Indian Government, but no one ever maintained
that Persia therefore forfeited her independence.

Sir James Stephen, in his discussion of the Afghan question,
has laid down principles which would seem to override the rights
of every Asiatic State, and place them entirely at the mercy and
discretion of the British Government. " Our relations with these
States," he writes, " must be determined by the fact that we are
exceedingly powerful and highly civilized, and that they are
comparatively weak, and half barbarous." But it will be
better to quote the whole passage, which is couched in a tone
of national self-assertion calculated to wound the feelings and
excite the resentment of all Native Princes and Asiatic Rulers,
whether within our own territories or in countries adjacent to
them.

If an Englishman, on perusal of these paragraphs, feels his
blood tingle and his pulse beat high with indignation at such
despotic doctrines, what must be the feelings of Princes like Sindia
and Holkar, or of such enlightened Statesmen as Sir Salar Jung
and Sir Madava Rao, or of the Amir of Cabul, who look at such
questions from quite a different point of view, and take their stand
upon the obligations of treaties and the broad rules of moraHty
and justice, which are as applicable to the weak as to the strong ?
These rules, as John Mill says, " are as binding on communities
as on individuals ; and men are not warranted in doing to other
countries, for the supposed benefit of their own country, what they
would not be justified in doing to other men for their own benefit."

Sir James Stephen writes : —

*' I do not admit that England, Russia, China, the Amir of Cabul, the
Khan of Khelat, the Aklioond of Swat, the Nono of Spiti, and the Khan
of Khiva, form an assemblage of practically equal moral persons, whose
relations are to be discoveied by consulting Grotius and his successors.
Fictions cannot be stretched beyond a certain point. England, Eussia,
and China may treat on equal terms, but the other llulers whom I have
mentioned are simply the chief Rulers of clans, more or less extensive and

powerful, who, though not dependent upon us in the sense of any defi-
nite duties or allegiance to the Queen, must be dealt with on the under-
standing th it they occupy a distinctly inferior position— their inferiority
consisting mainly in this, that they are not to be permitted to follow a
course of policy which exposes us to danger. This is the footing on
which every State enclosed in the British dominions is practically
treated. It appears to me that it is the only principle on which the
adjacent Powers can be treated. Our relations with Sindia are, of course,
different from our relations with the Amir of Cabul, as they are different
from our relations with Holkar and the Nizam ; but, at bottom, our rela-
tions with all of them stand on the same basis. They are all determined
by the fact that we are exceedingly powerful and highly civilized, and
that they are comparatively weak and half barbarous."

It is very convenient for this sort of argument to lump
together powerful nations and insignificant states, and to drag in
personages whose names, perhaps even in India, are not known to
one man in a thousand unless specially connected with them.
Who, until lately, except officers employed on the North-West
frontier, or those whose official duty it is to supervise Indian
affairs, could give you authentic information as to the power and
position of the Akhoond of Swat ?

And who is the Nono of Spiti ? The very mention of such
a potentate seems to throw a shade of ridicule over a very grave
question. It was a source of amusement to frontier officers a few
years ago, when the Supreme Government penned a despatch,
intimating to the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab that the
penal code was to be introduced into the territories of the Nono
of Spiti. The Lieutenant-Governor had a sketch made of this
redoubtable potentate in his primitive costume, of a single cloth
round his loins (commonly termed a langoti), with his plough
on his shoulders, and his two little daughters carrying the seed,
on their way to their agricultural labours. This sketch he sent
into Government, and nothing more was heard of the introduction
of the penal code. To place this head man of a wild valley in
the Himalaya mountains, with an income of probably not more
than three pounds a month, in the same category as the Amir
of Cabul, requires great confidence in the ignorance of those to
whom the argument was addressed.

Mr. Elphinstone writes that the Afghans appear to have been

8

entirely independent until the beginning of the seventeenth
century. They then paid tribute to Persia; but at the com-
mencement of the eighteenth century they conquered Persia, and
established a short-lived Afghan dynasty, which was overthrown
by Nadir Shah. In 1747, ten years before Clive won the battle
of Plassey, Ahmed Shah Abdallee was crowned King of Cabul.
Half-a-century later, one of the first political questions with
which Lord Wellesley had to grapple, on his arrival at Calcutta,
was the advisability of forming a defensive alliance between all
the existing Powers of Hindostan, to resist an expected invasion
of India by Zemaun Shah, King of Cabul.

On the 17th of June, 1809, the British Government con-
cluded a treaty of alliance and co-operation with Shah Shuja.
Then came the ill-omened tripartite treaty between Shah Shuja,
Runjeet Sing, and the British Government, dated 20th July, 1838.
On the 30th March, 1855, another treaty was made with the
Amir, Dost Mahomed, on terms of perfect equality. There was
no infringement of his independence, no implied understanding
that he occupied a " distinctly inferior position," or the British
officers entrusted with the negotiations might have found greater
difficulty in bringing them to a favourable conclusion. Have we
treaties of this nature with the Akhoond of Swat or with the
Nono of Spiti ? The principles put forward by Sir James Stephen
are full of danger, and tend to destroy confidence in the good
faith and fair dealing of the British Government. They would
not have been tolerated in the days of the East India Company,
and they would have found no favour in the eyes of the great
Statesmen like Malcolm, Munro, and Elphinstone, who illustrated
the Company's rule. It is not too much to say that those States-
men never could have won their diplomatic triumphs in their
dealings with Native States if such principles had guided their
conduct. A distinguished member of the Council of India, Sir
Erskine Perry, possessing a knowledge of Indian affairs, and, it
may be added, of European politics, surpassed by few, thus re-
cords his protest against these principles : —

♦' I will only say, as a jurist, that I have been shocked at the doctrine

lately put forth by high legal authority, that the main principles of in-
ternational law are not applicable to the East. Those principles are
founded on large views of morality and justice, and if it is forbidden to
a civilized Power in Europe to use poisoned weapons, to shell defenceless
towns, to massacre or enslave prisoners, to invade a weak State because
the possession of it uould be convenient to the captor — according- to my
judgment these proceedings are equally forbidden to a civilized Power
in Asia."

This doctrine of the unlimited attributes of the British
Government, as the paramount Power of India, to deal as it
chooses not only with every Native State enclosed within its
dominions, but also " with adjacent Powers," to be, in fact, sole
judge in its own cause when disputed questions arise, which are
to be decided " according to its own interests," was, soon after its
promulgation, justly repudiated by Lord Northbrook, whose ad-
ministrative ability, prudent, well-balanced mind, and long official
training in the study and supervision of Indian affairs, pointed
him out as one peculiarly fitted to preside over our Indian
Empire. It is right to observe that Sir James Stephen subse-
quently explained and considerably modified the language of his
first letter, and, to show his feelings about justice, quoted from a
speech made by him in Calcutta, in which he says : —

" I believe that the real foundation on which the British power in
this country stands, is neither military force alone, as some persons
cynically assert (though certainly military force is one indispensable
condition of our power) ; nor even that affectionate sympathy of the
native population, on which, according to a more amiable, though not,
1 think, a truer view of the matter, some think our rule ought to rest
(though it is hardly possible to overrate the value of such sympathy,
where it can by any m^ans be obtained). I believe that the real founda-
tion of our power will be found to be an inflexil»le adherence to broad
principles of justice, common to all persons, in all countries, and all
ages, and enforced with unflinching firmness in favour of and against
every one who claims their benefit, or who presumes to violate them, no
matter who he may be."

It is not intended to impute to Sir James Stephen any in-
difference to justice. But his original statement conveyed to
such acute and practised minds as those of Lord Grey and of Lord
Northbrook (and therefore, it may be supposed, to many European
and Asiatic minds) a meaning utterly repugnant to that " affec-

10

tionate sympathy," to which he justly attaches so much value,
and seemed to be a defence of high-handed principles of despotism,
put forward for the sake of justifying our invasion of Afghanistan.
The very fact of explanation being required demonstrates the
necessity of caution, on the part of those capable of influencing
the public mind. Opinions thus hastily given, which are liable to
misconstruction, may lay the foundation of distrust and disaffection
in the minds of the Chiefs and Princes of India. Even now the
sting remains, and the doctrine is laid down, that with regard to
the Native States of India, and to the adjacent Powers, no law
nor rule exists to regulate the relations between them and the
British Government but that which the British Government may,
to the best of their judgment, deem most conducive to the happi-
ness and lasting peace of its subjects and its neighbours, the
grounds for this Imperial doctrine being that "none of them is
strong enough or civilized enough to be really or permanently
independent."

This is no new doctrine. In the days of annexation it was
propounded, time after time, by those who supported the poHcy of
absorbing the Native States, and bringing al] Hindostan under
British rule. But even Lord Dalhousie himself, whose Imperial
proclivities were unmistakeable, in his minute of the 27th May,
1851, on the affairs of the Nizam, recorded his strong opinion in
reprobation of so dangerous a doctrine. He writes : —

" I recognize no mission confided to the British Government which
imposes upon it the obligation, or can confer upon it the right, of
deciding authoritatively on the existence of native independent Sovereign-
ties, and of arbitrarily setting them aside, whenever their administra-
tion may not accord with its own views, and although their acts in no
way afi'ect the interests or security of itself or its allies. Still less can
I recognize any such property in the acknowledged supremacy of the
British Government in India, as can justify its rulers in disregarding
the positive obligations of international contracts, in order to obtrude
on Native Princes and their people a system of subversive interference,
which is unwelcome alike to people and to Prince."

It has been well observed that ^'the eternal principles of
right and wrong should influence us in all parts of the world."
The acts of England are not done in a corner. The eyes of aU

11

nations are upon her. The millions of India are as sensitive to
the infringement of the unalterable laws of justice as the more
enlightened communities of Europe. Not only in Europe and in
Asia, but even in Africa, deeds which redound to the credit or
discredit of the British nation are discussed. Shortly after the
unjust annexatiou of Sinde, Dr. Richardson, a traveller in Central
Africa, relates the following circumstance : —

"■ The conversation was stopped by the entrance of a remarkable
personage, the quasi Sultan of Ben Walid. Having heard that I was
present, he said : * Christian, do you know Sinde ? ' ' Yes,' I said. He
then turned and said something to the people in the Ghadamsi
language. I afterwards learned it was, ' You see these Christians are
eating up all the .Mussulman countries.' He then abruptly turned to me,
' Why do the English go there, and eat up all the Mussulmans ?
afterwards you will come here.' I replied, * The Amirs were foolish,
and engaged in conspiracy against the English in India, but the Mussul-
mans in Sinde enjoyed the same privileges as the English themselves.'
' That is what you say,' he rejoined; and then continued, 'Why do you
go so far from home to take other people's countries from them ? ' I
replied, ' The Turks do the same : they come to the desert.' ' Ay, you
wish to be such oppressors as the Turks ' He then told me not to talk
any more, and a painful silence continued for some time.''

But if bad deeds make their mark for evil, and cast discredit
on the British name, good deeds exercise a sovereign influence
for good, and pave the way for the blessings of civilization and
Christianity in a manner little imagined by superficial observers
of the course of events. The wisdom of British Statesmen, the
heroism of British soldiers, the self-devotion of British mission-
aries, have all, under God, contributed to build up our magnificent
Empire in the East. The moral force of individual character
exercises unbounded sway over impulsive, half- civilized Asiatics.
The line of demarcation is broken down between races,
antagonism subsides, prejudices melt away, and it may be said of
these benefactors of mankind, ''Fragrance on their footing treads,"
and their good deeds live after them. Outram won the hearts of
the Bheels ; Edwardes subjugated, without bloodshed, the wild
tribes of the valley of Bunnoo. In the same manner the gran-
deur and simplicity of the character of Mountstuart Elphinstone
created, as a native author states, " a most wonderful and noble

12

reversion of respect for the generosity, truth, and justice of the
British nation in the minds of the Afghan Chiefs and people."
Those who conversed with Afghans, forty and fifty years ago,
can well remember the honour awarded to the name of " Ulfrish-
teen," the traditions of whose splendid mission had been handed
down from father to son amongst these wild but impressionable
mountaineers.

Alas ! the more bitter memories of the unfortunate Cabul
expedition changed the currents of thought, and heaped
up a wealth of hatred and execration on the British name
in Afghanistan, while '' disasters, unparallelled in their extent,
unless by the errors in which they originated," seventeen
milKons of treasure wasted, thousands of lives fruitlessly expended,
left traces in British recollections not to be wiped out even by
the brilliant victories which restored the lustre of British arms.
A long interregnum ensued, during which Afghanistan remained a
sealed book to British influence, until, on the 30th March, 1855,
a treaty was concluded with Dost Mahomed by Sir John Law-
rence, under the instructions of Lord Dalhousie. Subsequently,
in January 1857, in consequence of the war between England
and Persia, an agreement was entered into with Dost Mahomed,
by which he undertook to defend Herat against Persia; and
for this purpose the British Government furnished him with
money and arms.

It was Lord Canning's desire that these negotiations should
be intrusted to Sir Herbert Edwardes, who, as Commissioner of
Peshawur, had taken a leading part in bringing about a reconcilia-
tion with the Afghans. Lord Lawrence, in whose character
magnanimity and self-abnegation are conspicuous, entertaining, as
he did, the affection of a brother for Sir Herbert, and placing the
highest value upon his ability and services, was quite willing to
give way, although the conduct of negotiations of such moment
would naturally have devolved upon him, as Chief Commissioner
of the Punjab. But an unexpected obstacle arose to this arrange-
ment. Dost Mahomed, with whom the name of John Lawrence
was as a household word, would treat with no one else, and

13

refused to attend the meeting unless this was conceded. No doubt,
besides the feeling of personal regard, there was the idea that
his dignity would be compromised if he met an ofi&cer of in-
ferior grade. These negotiations were therefore carried out by
Lawrence and Edwardes, and the important consequences resulting
from them were patent to all the world during the eventful years
of the Sepoy mutiny, when a formidable inroad of x\fghan hordes
might have added greatly to our difficulties. It was at this
meeting that the following affecting incident occurred : —

" See these coarse garments, said Dost Mahomed, opening his vest,
how old and patched they are. Are these the proper robes for a ruling
Prince? This shawl around my liead is the sole piece of finery I possess.
I have no money whatever. My sons and my Chiefs take everything I
have. They leave me nothing, and they tear me into pieces with their
dissensions. I live from hand to mouth among them, a life of expedients.
I wish to Heaven that I could turn Faqueer, and escape from this heavy
lot."

Dost Mahomed remained our staunch friend until the day of
his death, on the 9th of June, I860. He had made himself
master of Herat by a vigorous attack, not altogether unaided by
the garrison, on the 27th of May. On the death of Dost
Mahomed, Sher Ali commenced to rule, having been nominated
heir- apparent some years before, on the demise of his brother,
Gholam Hyder; but from the very beginning of his reign he met
with determined opposition from a party headed by his elder
brothers, Mahommed Afzal Khan and Mahommed Azim Khan.
Then succeeded a revolutionary period in Afghanistan, lasting
about five years, on which it is not necessary to dwell.

The Government of India, in accordance with the settled
policy of the Government at home, kept aloof from any inter-
ference with Afghan internal affairs. Dost Mahomed himself
counselled this line of action. " Tf you wish," he said, " to be
friends with the Afghans, beware of meddling with their intestine
quarrels." The object of the British Government was to leave
the choice of a Ruler to the Afghan nation ; the probability was that
the most popular, the most able, and the most powerful of the
Barukzye Chiefs, the fittest for the position, would gain the
ascendency. Ostensible British aid would not increase his popu-

14

larity. It might contribute to his temporary success, but it
could not maintain him upon the throne without a continuous
and exhausting drain of British resources, both of men and
money. Moreover the proverbial fickleness and faithlessness of
Afghan Chiefs would probably render him a broken reed very
likely to pierce the hand in the hour of need. Except where
their own interests are materially concerned, all history and all
experience are against the notion that Afghan Rulers will ever
prove " grateful and efficient allies." It must be recollected also
that many of the acts of Sher Ali, though quite in accordance
with the Afghan character, were not such as the British Govern-
ment could approve. It was not at all improbable that he might
have so conducted himself as to have estranged the majority of
the Afghan Chiefs and people. If we had espoused his cause
in the earlier part of the contest, we might have found ourselves
supporting a tyrannical Ruler against the wishes of the Afghan
nation. In 1868 Sher Ali finally established his authority in
Afghanistan. The Yiceroyalty of Lord liawrence was then
coming to an end ; but one of his last acts before he quitted India
was to enter into friendly relations with Sher Ali, by inviting
him to a Durbar, and by promising to aid him with money
and arms. The important letter of Lord Lawrence, of the
9th January, 1869, written on this occasion, shows the basis of
our subsequent diplomatic relations with Sher Ali. Lord
Lawrence writes : —

" I am leaving tlie country almost immediately, and am handing over
the high office of Viceroy and Governor-General to my successor. But
the jjolicy which I have advisedly pursued with regard to the affairs of
Afghanistan is one which I have entered on with anxious deliberation,
and which has commanded the assent and approval of Her Majesty
the Queen of England, and as long as you continue, by your actions, to
evince a real desire for the alliance of the British Government, you have
nothing to apprehend in the way of a change of policy, or of our inter-
ference in the internal affairs and administration of your kingdom."

Syed Noor Mahomed, at the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly,
quotes passages from this letter,^ and refers especially to Lord
Lawrence's knowledge of "the circumstances of Afghanistan."
" Its good and evil were clearly known to him." He states

* p. 207.

16

expressly " the acquiescence and satisfaction of the Amir in the
policy of Lord Lawi-ence and of Lord Mayo.'*

"Our opinion," he says, ''is the same as that from the time of the
late Amir and Lord Lawrence to the time of the Umballa Durbar, and
till the arrival of the present Viceroy has always been mentioned in our
past correspondence, and we are firmly of those opinions now. There-
fore how can we consent to the addition of such hard conditions, the
performance of which in Afghanistan will be impossible, as we can show
by many proofs ? "

These hard conditions were the location of British officers in
Afghan territory, on which Lord Lytton peremptorily insisted.
It was left to Lord Mayo, who succeeded Lord Lawrence on the
12th January, 1869, to carry out the arrangements with Sher
Ali. Hence the Umballa Durbar which took place in March
1869. Sher Ali preferred a great many requests with which
Lord Mayo did not think proper to comply. The object the Amir
had chiefly at heart was the recognition of his son Abdulla Jan
as his heir. To this the Viceroy would not listen, neither would
he consent to make a Treaty ofi'ensive and defensive, nor grant a
fixed subsidy ; but he promised that British officers should not be
stationed in Afghanistan, and on this point Sher Ali, like his
father before him, laid the greatest stress. ^N^ot, perhaps, that
he had personally so great an objection ; but he knew well that
such a concession on his part would do him harm in the eyes
of his ignorant and fanatical Chiefs and people. The power of
Afghan Rulers is never sufficiently stable to allow of their giving
a handle to insurrectionary movements, especially in the direction
of religious bigotry. Although disappointed in many respects,
there is no doubt Sher Ali returned to Cabul from the TJmballa
Durbar more friendly to the British Government than before.
Lord Mayo's princely courtesy and frank genial demeanour made
a deep impression on the Barukzye Chief, and produced the
happiest results. That this friendly feeling lasted until Lord
Mayo's death, the touching letter Sher Ali wrote on the occasion
of that mournful event sufficiently testifies. This letter was
addressed to the Acting Viceroy. In it Sher Ali writes : —

'' The unvarying friendship and kindness displayed towards me by

16

him who is now no more had induced me to determine, if the affairs of
Afghanistan at the time permitted the step, to accompany His Excel-
lency on his return to England, so that I might have obtained the
gratification of a personal interview with Her Majesty the Queen, and
derive pleasure from travelling in the countries of Europe. Before the
eternally.predestined decrees, however, men must bow in silence."

No one can peruse this letter without the conviction that
sympathy and right feehng are not wanting in the Amir's
character, and that by wise forbearance and treatment he might
have been moulded to our own purposes, and our relations with
him placed upon a satisfactory footing. The defenders of Lord
Lytton's policy have endeavoured to show that the estrangement
of Sher Ali dates from a period much earher than the Umballa
Durbar. A certain feeKng of resentment probably did at one
time exist in his mind, because the British Government had not
aided him in his contest for the throne. It is clear, however, from
the tone of this letter, and from other evidence, that this feeling
had almost entirely disappeared, owing to the measures initiated
by Lord Lawrence, and carried out with such tact and judgment
by Lord Mayo. Soon after the Umballa Durbar the mission of Sir
Douglas Forsyth to St. Petersburgh occurred, and a lengthened
diplomatic correspondence was commenced, which ended, during
the Viceroyalty of Lord Northbrook, in the Russian Government
accepting the definition of the territory of Afghanistan, as pro-
posed by the Government of India, by which arrangement Sher
Ali acquired a greater security with respect to the Northern
boundary of his dominions than he had ever before possessed. It
is desirable here to draw special attention to the wise step adopted
by Mr. Gladstone's Administration, at the suggestion of Lord
Lawrence's Government, in initiating these friendly negotiations.
A frank interchange of the views of England and Eussia on the
affairs of Central Asia and Afghanistan ensued, which resulted in
a distinct understanding that both Governments should exert
all their influence to introduce peace and order into these troubled
regions. The fruits of this good understanding were manifest on
many occasions. We read, in Sir John Strachey's minute, dated
30th AprH, 1872 :—

17

" To Russian influence in Bokhara was due the j)rompt withdrawal of a
party of Bokhara troops who had crossed the Oxus in the winter of 1869.
To the restraining hand kept by Russia on the Afghan refugees in
Turkestan is to be attributed the absence of any attempt on their part to
shake the throne of the Amir. When the most formidable of those
refugees, Abdool Ruhman, once openly represented that it would be for the
interest of Russia to assist him in conquering the throne of Cabul, General
Von Kaufmann replied that hospitality had been afforded him on con-
sideration of his destitute circumstances, and not as an enemy of England,
cr a pretender to the throne of Cabul. General Von Kaufmann himself,
in the spring of 1870. commenced a direct correspondence, which has
been renewed from time to time, and has conveyed to the Amir assurances
of the neighbourly sentiments entertained by the Russian authorities
towards the Afghan Government.''

On being informed by Sher Ali of the first communication
from General Kaufmann, Lord Mayo, on June 24th, 1870, wrote
back to tbe Amir : —

" These letters will doubtless be, when rightly understood, a source of
satisfaction and an additional ground of confidence to your Highness."

It does not appear from these extracts that the morbid dread
of Russian machinations, which has led Lord Salisbury and Lord
Lytton to depart from the wise poKcy of their predecessors, had
at that time any influence on the minds of those intrusted with
the Government of India.

Lord Mayo lost his valuable life, by the hand of a foul
assassin, on the 8th of February, 1872. Lord Northbrook
succeeded him on the 3rd of May, 1872. The most important
incident connected with .Afghanistan during the period of his
Yiceroyalty was the dispatch to Simla, in 1873, by Sher Ali of
a Special Envoy, Syed Noor Mahomed Shah.

Alarmed at the fall of Khiva, the Amir sought more intimate
relations with the British Government, and desired to ascertain
how far he could rely on British aid in the event of his territories
being threatened by Russia. His demands however, in the first
instance, were so extravagant that it was impossible for Lord
Northbrook to comply with them, more especially as Sher Ali was
unwilling that Afghanistan should be called upon to make any
return for the assistance rendered by the British Government.
In fact, the Amir, professing to believe that our interests were as

B

18

much concerned or more so than his own, sought an unconditional
guarantee of protection and very large payments of money for
the fortification of his frontier and the equipment of his army.

Lord Northbrook very properly objected to these requests,
which would have entailed unlimited responsibility and expen-
diture, without our being able to exercise any control over the
course the Amir might choose to pursue. But Lord Northbrook
was quite willing to give a guarantee with reasonable conditions
attached to it, and ultimately he assured the Envoy tha,t the
British Government, in the event of any actual or threatened
aggression, would assist the Amir " with arms and money, and
also, in case of necessity, with troops," A letter to this effect
was addressed by Lord Northbrook to the Amir, to which the
"Record of Conversations" with the Envoy was appended.
This record was a formal document officially communicated to
the Envoy, and signed by him, and in Lord Northbrook's opinion
was binding on the British Government. The Envoy doubting
how far his instructions justified him in committing himself to
any definite arrangement, it was considered desirable to postpone
the final settlement to a more favourable opportunity, when so
important a matter might be discussed with the Amir in person.
That the Amir accepted this promise of assistance as a binding
engagement on the part of Lord Northbrook, in the same manner
as he accepted the letters and assurances of friendship and
support from Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo, is abundantly
evident from the constant reference made to these assurances by
Syed Noor Mahomed, at his conference with Sir Lewis Pelly.*
The Envoy says : — " It is far from the welfare of States if there
should be the possibility of objection to the promises made by
such religious Governments, and such Ministers and Viceroys."
Again : — " Therefore, I earnestly hope, for the welfare of the two
Governments, that his Excellency the Viceroy, through your good
offices, will with great frankness and sincerity of purpose act in
conformity with the course of past Viceroys." And again, with
mournful earnestness, he says : — "Your Government is a powerful
and a great one, ours is a small and weak one. We have long

* p. 213.

19

been on terms of friendship, and the Amir now cKngs to the skirt
of the British Government, and, till his hand be cut off, he will
not relax his hold of it." But Lord Lytton, with the giant
strength of British power at his back, is determined to press his
obnoxious conditions, and is deaf to all other considerations.
He does not even shrink from dealing with the acts and promises
of his predecessors in a manner hitherto unknown in India, thus
inflicting a serious blow on the confidence of every iS^ative Prince
in the assurances of Her Majesty's Representatives.

Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and Lord Northbrook had all
given solemn promises in writing to the Amir ; but, according to
Lord Ljirton, these were "only verbal understandiDgs," as if
formal official letters and written engagements were of no account
unless embodied in definite treaties. Sir Lewis Pelly tells the
Envoy : — "Your Excellency, however, appears to be under an im-
pression that obligations and liabilities of this kind, though not
contracted under treaty, have been none the less incurred by the
British Government, through certain written and verbal assu-
rances received by the Amir in 1869 from Lord Mayo, and by
His Highnesses Envoy from Lord Noi-thbrook ; this impression
is entirely erroneous." It is of importance here to note that, in
Lord Salisbury's Despatch of the 28th February, 1876, this verbal
understanding of 1869 is spoken of as a " solemn and deliberate
declaration approved by Her Majesty's advisers ;" and it is admit-
ted that, " to the Amir who had -^received that declaration under
circumstances of some solemnity and parade, it appears to have
conveyed a pledge of definite action in his favour." In reference,
also, to the declaration of Lord Xorthbrook, in 1873, Lord Salis-
bury writes : — " The terms of the declaration, however, although
sufficient to justi^" reproaches on the part of Sher AH, if, in the
contingency to which it referred, he should be left unsupported
by the British Government, were unfortunately too ambiguous to
secure confidence or inspire gratitude on the part of His Highness."
Lord SaHsbury is pleased to characterize Lord Northbrook's decla-
ration as " ambiguous," but the Amir himself did not so accept
it, as His Highness's Envoy repeatedly affirmed. It was left to

20

Lord Lyttoii, and to Sir Lewis Pelly under Lord Lytton's instruc-
tions, to repudiate the written engagements of previous Viceroys.
>Sir John Malcolm's maxim, inculcated upon political officers in
the olden time, was more generous and more worthy of the British
Government : — " When any article of an engagement is doubtful,
I think it should be invariably explained with more leaning to
the expectations originally raised in the weaker than to the inte-
rests of the stronger Power." It is difficult to conceive anything
more calculated to sow doubt and distrust in the minds of the
Envoy and of the Amir than this conduct of Lord Lytton. Lord
Northbrook has stated that " he endeavoured, to the best of his
ability, to carry out the policy of Lord Lawrence and Lord Mayo,
not only because he thought it right to carry on a successive
policy, but because he entirely believed and concurred in that
policy, and the reasons on which that policy was founded." In
the conference with Sir Lewis Pelly, the Cabul Envoy affirmed
that, from the time Lord Northbrook came to India to the time
he left, although there were discussions on the subject, still he
left the friendship without change, in conformity with the conduct
of his predecessors, and with preceding usage.
Sir Henry Norman also writes : —

'' My opinion was, and is, that up to the time of Lord Nortbbrook's
departure the Amir had no feeling of hostility to us, though he was
somewhat out of temper and was disquieted by writings which more or
less pointed at measures distasteful to him. Any real resentment he may
have subsequently shown is entirely due, according to my belief, to
measures taken from April 1876 to the present time."

Lord Lytton succeeded to the Yiceroyalty on the 12th of
April, 1876, and agitating rumours began immediately to be cir-
culated at home and abroad as to important changes about to be
adopted in the policy that had hitherto been pursued on the
North-West frontier, and in the management of our relations
with the Amir of Cabul. Lord Lytton took to India Lord Salis-
bury's despatch of the 28th February, 1876, which prescribed a
line of policy entirely opposed to that which had been carried out
by previous Viceroys under instructions from successive Adminis-
trations at home. That poKcy had been pressed upon Lord North-

21

brook's Governinent, but weighty reasons had been given in
opposition to it, showing the evils to which it would inevitably
lead. Lord Salisbury himself, it would appear, had his mis-
givings, as he writes that, in case of " the irretrievable ahenation
of the Amir, no time must be lost in re- considering, from a
new point of view, the policy to be pursued in reference to
Afghanistan."

Lord Lytton, it is understood, kept this important despatch
to himself for a considerable period without communicating its
contents to his Council. It will be observed that it is addressed
simply to the Governor-General of India, and not to the Governor-
General in Council. According to law, the Government of India
is vested in the Governor-General in Council, and it is not legal,
nor has it hitherto been the practice, that the Governor- General
ghould be recognized apart from his Council. This is, probably,
one of the innovations alluded to by Sir Arthur Hobhouse, when
he draws attention to Lord Salisbury's new mode of governing
India. It may be further remarked, in reference to this despatch
of the 28th February, 1876, which Lord Lytton carried to India,
that, as far as can be discovered from the published correspondence,
no reply to it was sent home until" the 10th May, 1877.

During this long interval, when successive steps were being
taken to inaugurate a complete change of policy, and when Par-
liament and the country were designedly kept in ignorance of the
course of action pursued, the Government of India must have been
carried on, as regards its foreign relations, in demi-o^cM letters
exchanged between Lord Salisbury and the Viceroy. This system
of personal government may be in perfect accordance with the
peculiar idiosyncrasies of Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton ; but
the evils that are likely to flow from the exercise of unchecked
authority by Viceroys and Ministers, and from the absence of due
record and publicity, in such an important dependency as India,
are patent to all who have studied the history of their country.
John Mill writes : —

" The government of dependencies by a Minister and bis subordi-
nates, under the sole control of Parliament, is not a new experiment in

22

England. That form of Colonial Government lost the United States, and
had nearly lost all the Colonies of any considerable population and
importance."

Our proceedings on the frontier began at this time to excite
interest in Europe, and various articles in the Continental Press
drew attention to our dealings with the Khan of Khelat, and the
apparently wider range of our general frontier policy. The fol-
lowing extract from Le Temps shows that, in these days of rapid
communication and spread of intelligence through '' our own cor-
respondents," everything that takes place in India is made
subject of comment, and its bearing upon European politics
weighed and discussed. Le Temps writes : —

" Nos lecteurs auront sans doute remarque dans les depeches d'hier
une nouvelle que la derni^re lettre de notre correspondant de I'lnde faisait
pr^voir. Le gouveriiement Anglo-Indien vient de signer avec le Klian
de Relate un traits qui recule les frontieres militaires de I'Inde-Anglaise
vers le Nord Ouest, ou en d'autres termes les rapproche de celles du
Turkestan russe. La politique Indo-Anglaise rompt par cet acte
avec des principes qu'elle professait depuis un assez grand nombre
d'aan^es. Elle s'etait preoccupee k j)]usieurs reprises dans ces derniers
temps de divers projets du genre de celui qui vient d'etre adopte, et mis
k execution, mais une idee prevalait dans ses conseils, C'^tait que la
domination Britannique ne devait pas etre poussee au dela des limites
atteintes. La politique opposee qui prend aujourd'hui le de^sus, politique
d'initiative, " spirited policy " disent les Anglais, n'aurait ni but, ni raison
d'etre, s'il ne fallait y voir le temoignage d'une mefiance en eveil et le
programme meme de precautions que 1' Angleterre juge iudispensables
pour dejouer d'avance les plans supposes de la Russie, sa voisine dans
TAsie Centrale L'envoi d'un Resident Anglais a Caboul pour sur-
veiller TEmir accuse d'intriguer avec les Russes parait decide. Ces
mesures qui sont interpr^tees k Moscow et a Saint Petersburg dans un
sens defavorable n'ont pas {'approbation de tout le monde en Angleterre.
On fait valoir notarnment centre Toccupation armee de nouveaux
territoires, outre les considerations d'econoinie des raisons politiques et
militaires dont la moins specieuse n'est pas que le meilleur moyen de
rendre service de son ennemi, c'est d'aller a son rencontre, parceque cela
lui epargne la moitie du chemin."

Had Lord Northbrook remained at the head of affairs in
India, his measures would have been understood to have been
directed solely to the settlement of the Khelat disputes, to the
protection of the commercial traffic through the Bolan Pass, and
to the pacification of the Belooch tribes in that vicinity. They

23

would neither have given rise to any distrust or apprehension on
the part of the Amir of Cabul, nor would they have afforded any
grounds for the belief, that we were taking the first step to throw
down the gauntlet to Russia, and were preparing for a further
advance, with a view to the rectification of our North-Western
frontier. But Lord Lytton made no secret of his ultimate in-
tentions, nor of the Imperial scope of the poHcy which he had
come out to India to inaugurate. Afghanistan must be brought
within British influence ; to this end British officers must be
stationed in Afghan cities, and to use his own words, "having
regard to probable contingencies in Central Asia," frontier affairs
must henceforth be regulated with a view to more important
objects than the temporary prevention of plunder on the British
border."

Here we have a distinct change of policy enunciated, and the
object declared without reserve, that object being the rectifying
of the British frontier, to counteract the advance of Russia in
Central Asia. This departure from a line of policy which the
British Government had pursued for so many years was con-
trary to the spirit, if not to the letter, of our understanding with
the Russian Government, and as the writer in Le Temps says,
could have no possible aim or reason except as a countermove
and measure of precaution against the supposed designs of Rus-
sia. The Russian Government had several times assured England
that "Afghanistan was outside the sphere of Russian action." We
learn from Sir John Strachey's minute, and Lord Northbrook has
confirmed the statement, that Russia had shown on many occa-
sions that it had " no desire to depart from its engagements in
that matter." Of course this compact could exist only on the
supposition that England and Russia continued on terms of amity,
and that England herself preserved her neutral attitude.

When the discussions in Europe assumed a threatening aspect,
and native troops were brought from India, and when all sorts of
rumours were afloat in reference to the hostile intentions of Eng-
land, Russia naturally felt absolved from her tacit understanding.
We must look at these matters from a Russian as well as from

24

an Englisli point of view. Russia is as jealous and suspicious of

us as we are of her, and is as much entitled to take precautions

with regard to her possessions in Central Asia as we are with

regard to India. The warlike preparations of Lord Lytton on

the banks of the Indus, which alarmed the Amir of Cabul, were

currently reported to be preparatory to a movement, through

Afghanistan, upon the dominions of Eussia in the countries

beyond the Oxujs. What did General Skobeleff say to Colonel

Brackenbury ? —

" I cannot make out what has become of that column of ten thou-
sand men, organized by your people to raise Central Asia against us."

As in Russia, so in England there is a class of people, gifted
with facile pens and fertile imaginations, who are constantly
employed in sounding the alarm, and prognosticating evil results
from the advance and progress of what they are pleased to term
rival nations. France, America, Russia, at different intervals, have
come under this category. These men, while loud in their profes-
sions of patriotism, by fostering a spirit of antagonism, and pander-
ing to national prejudices, are the worst enemies of their country,
the real substantial interests of which depend mainly on the
continuance of peace, and on the cultivation of friendly relations
with all the world. Every thoughtful Englishman must lament
the bitter state of feelino^ against Russia which pervades England
at the present moment, and all who estimate aright the dreadful
calamities a conflict would entail on both countries must desire to
remove any causes of misunderstanding which would tend to
precipitate such a catastrophe. There may not be any danger of
immediate collision, but the worst feature of our present policy in
Europe and in Asia is that it enlarges the area of prospective
antagonism, and is pregnant with future mischief.

The real questions are, were the proceedings of Russia in
Central Asia, including the dispatch of General Stolietoff's
Mission to Cabul, such as to give England just cause of serious
complaint ? Have the explanations afforded by Russia been of
a character to satisfy the British Government ? We have the
statement of the Prime Minister that, looking to the strained

25

relations that existed between England and Russia at a certain not
very distant period, the expedition which Russia was preparing
in Central Asia at that time, with which the Mission to Cabul was
connected, was perfectly allowable. Lord Salisbury also is quite
contented to accept the explanations of M. de Giers, and takes
for granted that " all the former assurances of the Russian Govern-
ment in regard to Afghanistan have now recovered their validity."
Russia is therefore entirely absolved, and Lord Beaconsfield
declares her conduct to have been "very satisfactory;" but
he adds: —

" After all that had occurred it was totally impossible for us to leave
things as they were ; you could not go on after you had found Kussian
armies almost in sight of Cabul, and an Embassy within its walls ; you
could not go on on the old system. It was absolutely necessary to con-
sider what course should be taken."

Tt is to employ somewhat figurative language, to speak " of
Russian armies almost in sight of Cabul," but it was necessary to
make out a case of British interests iu jeopardy. It was politic
to accept the explanations of Russia, but a danger had been
disclosed against which it was imperative to provide. ^Yhether
that danger was real or unreal, or whether, if real, it was best
met by the course adopted, are the points at issue. In pursuance,
however, of his object, the obligations of justice, of reciprocal
treaties, and of the rights of an independent nation to preserve its
freedom, which it had enjoyed for hundreds of years, were
apparently of small moment to Lord Beaconsfield. In a similar
spirit Prince Bismarck, on the occasion of the annexation of
Hanover, declared ''that to attend to like considerations would
be to substitute the superficial for the essential, and that his
objects must be carried through ly blood and iron. Upon those
who venture to rem nstrate against such imperial doctrines. Lord
Beaconsfield strives to .\ffix the stigma " of peace at any price
advocacy," and backed by his present large majorities in both
Houses of Parliament, he is enabled to snatch a temporary
triumph ; but it remains to be seen whether, when the whole case
is before the country, this verdict will be confirmed.

26

Mr. Burt, the honest and able representative of the working
classes in the House of Commons, stated : —

" He had many opportunities of ascertaining the feelings of the
working classes, and he did not know a single man who believed that we
wei e right in this war. He had not met with any working man who did
not believe that we were engaged in an unjust and cowardly war.""

The instincts of the working men of England, in favour of
justice and fair play, are as strong and as true as of many of those
who, by the accidents of outward position, exercise a more
authoritative voice in determining the policy of the country. Lord
Canning, when he set his face like a flint against the ravenous
cry for blood, and earned, to his immortal honour, what was then
considered by the unthinking many, the opprobrious epithet of
" Clemency Canning," lived to witness the revulsion in his favour ;
and the illustrious names of Gladstone and of Lawrence, in com-
mon with hundreds of England's most distinguished citizens, can
afford to fling back with scorn the " peace at any price " stigma
sought to be cast upon them by Lord Beaconsfield. It may be
stated, once for all, that those who are the foremost in condemning
the injustice and impolicy of the present Afghan war, would be
the first, in the event of unprovoked aggression by Russia, or by
any other Power, to advocate the putting forth the whole strength
and resources of England to avert any real danger from our Indian
Empire.

The conduct of Russia having been so " very satisfactory,"
according to Lord Beaconsfield, where was the necessity of driving
Sher Ali into a corner, so that he could not but stand at bay, or lose
his influence with the ignorant and fanatical tribes over whom he
exercised a precarious sway ? Was the danger to India so pressing
and imminent that we were obliged to act "with breathless haste?"
to use Sher All's expression. We learn from Lord Northbrook
that when he left India, " though Sher Ali would have disliked any
interference on the part of England, he would have disliked any
shown on the part of Russia to a far greater extent." Sir Henry
Norman confirms this statement. What induced Sher All's change
of feeling ? It was owing to the various measures adopted by Lord

27

Ljrtton, which, step by step, were inevitably leading up to the
present calamitous war. This was foreseen by the most expe-
rienced members of Lord Lytton's Council, while those best
conversant with Indian affairs at home watched the progress of
events with undisguised alarm. Under this aspect the subject
was brought before both Houses of Parliament, in order to eUcit
explanations from the Ministers who are primarily responsible for
our Indian policy. Before the attempt is made to trace the suc-
cessive measures adopted by Lord Lytton, which have culminated
in the present disastrous results, it will be important to point out
the nature of the Ministerial explanations which have proved so
much at variance with the real facts of the case. It will be
advisable also to state clearly the distinctive features of the past
and present poHcy in reference to the North- Western frontier of
India.

On the 9th of August, 1877, in answer to Mr. Grant Duff,
Sir Stafford Northcote spoke thus : —

" My honourable friend, the member for the Elgin Burghs, with the
knowledge he has, and the clearness with which he alwaj's speaks on
these subjects, speaks of two schools in respect to this frontier question,
the one which is called the forward policy, and the opposite school which
is rather for looking back, and not committing ourselves to advancing
beyond our frontiers. \Yell, I have, as my honourable friend reminded u?,
always leant to the policy of the second of those schools. I have always
demurred to the idea, which has been put forward by some, that the best
way to meet danger is to advance beyond our own frontier ; and I have
always maintained that the true lines we ought to lay down for ourselves
are those to strengthen ourselves within our own frontiers, and to do so
by a combination of measures moral and material."

Then, after giving a rapid sketch of the measures that com-
mended themselves to his judgment, Sir Stafford added : —

" In all these views, which I have been always led to hold, as to the
best mode of protecting India from direct attack, I believe there is no
change whatever in the policy of Her Majesty's Government."

Lord Salisbury spoke to the same effect, in answer to the

Duke of Argyll, in the House of Lords. Sir Stafford Northcote,

having himself filled the office of Secretary of State for India,

must hav3 been well aware that, for years past, there have been

two antagonistic schools of opinion, with reference to the policy to

28

be pursued on our North- Western frontier. He must bave had
before him the recorded views of all the eminent servants of the
Government on both sides of this much vexed question. He must
have studied and weighed theee views, and having come to
deliberate conclusions, he must have brought them before the
Cabinet of which he was a member, and then, as the organ of
that Cabinet in regard to the affairs of India, he must have
embodied the decision of himself and his colleagues in the various
despatches transmitted to the Viceroy. Sir Stafford Northcote,
therefore, speaks with authority upon a question with which he is
familiar, on which he has had the best opportunity of forming a
correct judgment, and in the right decision of which the most
important results to India and to England are involved. There
is no doubt also that the views he expresses have been held and
acted upon by successive Administrations, through a long series of
years, and have been recommended and enforced by all the
eminent Viceroys from Lord Dalhousie to Lord Northbrook.
What then is the policy which has received the sanction of so
many distinguished Statesmen, both at home and in India, which
has been acquiesced in with satisfaction by the British nation
generally, and from which Lord Lytton has been the first to
depart, in obedience to instructions from the Ministry who
appointed him to the Viceroyalty ? It is not, as one of its
opponents states, in an elaborate article, written in defence of
Lord Lytton, in Blackwood's Magazine, of August 1877, " absolute
inaction withm, and indifference without, the border." It is not,
as a distinguished ofB.cer, Sir Henry Havelock, wrote in a letter
to the Daily News, " to do nothing, sit still, fold your arms, let
matters gHde, and let us hope that it wiU all come right in the
end." It is not a timid, hesitating, half-hearted policy, blind to
the march of events, ignoring possible dangers, wrapped in a
fool's paradise, without prevision of the future, or apprehension
of any change of circumstances which might necessitate modifi-
cations, or even an entirely new course of action. Its main
features are dehneated in the following pregnant paragraphs of
Lord Ellenborough's proclamation of 1st October, 1842 : —

29

" Content with the limits nature appears to have assigned to its Em-
pire, the Government of India will devote all its efforts to the establish-
ment and maintenance of general peace; to the protection of the
Sovereigns and Chiefs, its allies ; and to the prosperity and happiness of
its own faithful subjects. The rivers of the Punjab and Indus, and the
mountainous passes and barbarous tribes of Afghanistan, will be placed
between the British array and an enemy approaching from the west, if,
indeed, such enemy there can be. and no longer between the army and
its supplies. The enormous expenditure required for the support of a
large force in a false military position, at a distance from its own
frontier, and its resources, will no longer arrest every measure for the
improvement of the country and of the people. The combined army of
England and of India, superior in equipment, in discipline, in valour, and
in the officers by whom it is commanded, to any force which can be
opposed to it in Asia, will stand in unassailable strength upon its own
soil, and for ever, under the blessing of Providence, preserve the glorious
Empire it has won in security and honour."

These paragraphs sketch in hroad outhne the frontier policy-
adopted at that date, and persevered in until Lord Lytton's
accession to the Viceroyalty. No doubt, in the thirty-six years
that have elapsed since that period, vast changes have taken
place. England and Eussia have advanced to meet each other
across the continent of Asia with giant strides. As Sir Eobert
Peel stated in the debate of June 23rd, 1842, " between civilized
nations and nations very much their inferior there is a great
tendency in the former to extend their empire in order to give
security to what they possess." England on her part has added
to her dominions the country of the Amirs of Sinde, a conquest
designated by Sir Henry Pottinger as " the most unprincipled
and disgraceful that ever stained the annals of our Empire in
India." Sir James Outram also spoke of it " as most tyrannical,
positive robbery." Colonel Meadows Taylor writes: — "I do not
believe that Lord Ellenborough ever desired the conquest or
annexation of Sinde ; but he was in the hands of a man who, led
on by personal unscrupulous ambition and daring, formed, as it
appears to me, from the beginning, the resolution of displacing
the Amirs, and regarding its strategic importance of converting
Sinde into a British province." In the Contemporary Review of
November 1876, Mr. Gladstone states : — " The organization of the
Empire (Russian), efficient for many purposes, does not appear

30

to secure effective control from the head over the more distant
members. At different periods our own Central Government
has had occasion to feel the insufficiency of its restraining force.
A notable example occurred in 1843, when Sinde was conquered
by Napier, under the auspices of Lord Ellenborough. That
conquest was disapproved, I believe, unanimously by the Cabinet
of Sir Robert Peel, of which I can speak, as I had just entered
it at that time. But the Ministry were powerless, inasmuch as
the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning
it, and it remains an accomplished fact." This weakness of the
extremities is, as Burke writes, "the eternal law of extension
and detached empire." It is scarcely needful to point the moral
of this incident to the case of Khiva. Russia has her Kauf-
manns, as we have our Napiers.

In 1848 we conquered the Punjab, the land of the five
rivers, with its area of 95,768 square miles, and its population
of 17,500,000 souls. In 1856 the fertile and flourishing king-
dom of Oude was brought under British sway. In striking
contrast to these rich acquisitions of territory it is curious to
read Mr. Schuyler's account of the Russian possessions in
Central Asia. He writes : —

" Central Asia has no stores of wealth, and no economical resources;
neither by its agricultural, nor by its mineral wealth, nor by its com-
merce, nor by the revenue to be derived from it, can it ever repay the
Russians for what it has already cost, and for the rapidly-increasing ex-
penditure bestowed upon it." Again — '' Of the whole of Russian Central
Asia (excluding the late annexed Kyzilkum desert), only ly^^ per cent,
is cultivable, which speaks plainly as to the value of the recently-
acquired possessions." Again — " Owing to the actual insufficiency of
the local production, most of the grain for army use has to be brought
from Vierny, Kopal, and Southern Siberia."

A well-informed writer, in the Quarterly Bevieiv, of January
1879, states : —

*' Russian Turkestan, notwithstanding its great extent, is not in any
point of view, in productiveness, in trade, in population, or in military
power, to be compared with one single province of the Punjab."

In addition to the Punjab and Oude, year after year witnessed
the annexations of Sattarah, Jhansi, Nagpore, Pegu, and other
small Native States. Lord Dalhousie thus announced his policy : —

31

*' It is my strong and deliberate opinion that, in the exercise of a
wise and sound policy, the British Government is bound not to
neglect or put aside such rightful opportunities of acquiring
territory or revenue as may, from time to time, present them-
selves." Although there is no case so flagrant as that of the
unfortunate Amirs of Sinde, yet, weighed in the scales of
justice, some of the annexations under the rule of Lord Dalhousie
will scarcely be deemed by impartial judges to merit the designa-
tion of " rightful." It behoves an Englishman, therefore, "to cast
out the beam out of his own eye, and then he will see more
clearly to cast out the mote out of his brother's eye." While
England was gradually absorbing native kingdoms and princi-
palities in the Indian peninsula, and pushing forward her
territories to the great mountain border line beyond the Indus,
Russia was overrunning large tracts of country in Central Asia,
and subduing Mohammedan States, where tyranny and misrule
prevailed to an extent, equalled perhaps, but never surpassed, in
the history of the world.

What British heart does not throb with indignation at the
recollection of the sufi'erings of Stoddart and Conolly in the
dungeons of the fiendish Nasiroollah Khan, Amir of Bokhara,
who reigned from 1826 to 1860 ? The common saying
was, "In Bokhara nobody knows what is to be done, to-day
you are alive, to-morrow they behead you." One of
Nasiroollah's last acts was to order the execution of his
wife. "The executioner tied her hands, and shot her with a
pistol in the back of her head.* He did not kill her at once ; she
fell, and struggled for some time. The executioner kicke 1 her
twelve times on her breast and back tiU she died." Yambery
states " that she was executed close to the dying Amir, and
the abominable tyrant breathed his last with his glazing eye
fixed upon the gushing blood of the sister of his detested enemy."
What a picture Mr. Schuyler gives of another Ruler, Khadayar
Khan, of Khokand : — " Under him, neither virtue nor life was
safe." "By the wholesale butchery of 20,000 Kiptchaks he
excited the hatred of his subjects."

* Schuyler, Vol. I. p. 97.

32

As a contrast to these Eulers, Sir Bartle Frere writes thus of
the Kajah of Sattarah : — '' The late Rajah having been a liberal
and humane, a just and popular, Ruler, any supposed want of
equity in the appropriation of his dominions will lack the
popularity which a similar measure, whatever its grourds,
would always find amongst the industrious and peaceful inhabit-
ants of a State delivered from anarchy and oppression." In
spite of the remonstrances of Sir Bartle Frere, and of other
eminent men, Sattarah, a model of good native administration,
fell a victim to the dominant passion of annexation, which
then prevailed in Indian councils.

Not to enlarge more on this branch of the subject, sufficient
to say that, exemplifying the truth of Sir Robert Peel's statement
thirty-six years ago, instead of the two Empires of England
and Russia being divided by half the continent of Asia,
there is now intervening between their political frontiers a
mere narrow strip of territory a few hundred miles across.
By the force of circumstances, as some would say, but rather
under the control of a Higher Power, who mysteriously works
out His own purposes known from the beginning, through the
instrumentahty of war, and who regulates all things to subserve
one great end, step by step two mighty Christian nations seem to
be closing in upon the Mohammedan kingdoms of the world, and
bringing them under Christian domination.

There is no foundation for the oft-reiterated assertion that the
various Indian Governments which preceded Lord Lytton were
blind to the results that might flow from the gradual advance of
the Russians in Central Asia. In his despatches of the 3rd of
September, 1867, and of the 4th of January, 1869, Lord
Lawrence draws the attention of the Home Government to this
question, and suggests the course to be pursued. But the
proceedings of Russia were not viewed through an exagge-
rated medium; they were not regarded with a petty selfish
reference to British interests alone, but under the broader aspect
of the benefits that would accrue to mankind generally by the
substitution of a great Christian and improving Government in
lieu of the oppression and barbarity of Mohammedan tyrants.

33

In the same spirit, Sir Herbert Edwardes wrote twenty years ago,
" Can anyone say that to substitute Russian rule for the anarchy
and manstealing of Khiva, the dark tyranny of Bokhara, and the
nomad barbarism of Khokand would be anything but a gain to
mankind ? "

England has preceded Russia in her mission of introducing
civilization and Christianity into Asia, and, in spite of many
drawbacks and shortcomings, her rule has been a beneficent one,
and she has given order, and security for hfe and property, and
respect for law, where formerly anarchy and misrule for the most
part prevailed. Our conquests have been generally the result of
unforeseen circumstances, and frequently carried out against the
express orders of the Home authorities. There was no settled
policy of territorial aggrandizement. In the pursuit of commercial
advantages the East India Company from an insignificant factory
built up a magnificent Empire, and bequeathed it as a legacy to
the Crown. Wherein lies the great difference between the conduct
of Russia and that of our own country ? Even admitting that
the impelling force is stronger in Russia, including as it does the
religious element, and that the restraining force is less powerful
and persistent, from the absence of free discussion, and indepen-
dence of thought and action, still, without having recourse to the
apocryphal Will of Peter the Great, every thoughtful reader of his-
tory wiU recognize the same causes which underlie the advance both
of England and Russia, and in like manner forbid retrogression.

Is it then for England with her Colonies and possessions,
and vantage strongholds snatched from other nations in all quarters
of the globe, to arrogate the right to say to another great nation,
" Thus far thou shalt go, and no further" ? Would England her-
self submit to such dictation ? Why should England look at these
questions only in the light of a jealous rival of Russia, watching
each movement with jaundiced eye, putting the most unfavour-
able construction on every act, and thus creating a state of angry
feeling which must inevitably, sooner or later, lead to colHsion,
and thereby entail immeasurable evil on both countries?

In a despatch of Lord Mayo, dated June 3rd, 1870, he

34

recognizes the fact of England and Russia having "a com-
mon mission in Asia, namely, the establishment of good
government and the civilization of the mighty nations com-
mitted to their care," and recommends a course of action which
Sir Henry RawHnson pronounces to he " thoroughly unselfish,"
but " hardly practical." Would to heaven that British policy
with regard to this question could at all times have merited the
epithet of ''thoroughly unselfish." There is little doubt that
eminently practical results would have followed. But then the
unselfishness must have been real, without spot or blemish, patent
to the world. There must have been no secret conventions, no
sharp practice, no attempt to over-reach other nations. Lord
Carnarvon told us recently that the old jealousies and sources of
irritation between England and America had died away; and
how has this been brought about ? " By the right intention of
each Government, and by the exercise of tact, judgment, good
feeling and sense, on the part of their representatives."

Alas ! such is not the position of England and Russia. To
the hindrance of progress, to the misfortune of mankind, to the
opprobrium of our common Christianity, these two mighty nations,
with no conflicting interests, no conceivable reason why they should
interfere with each other, have drifted into an antagonistic attitude
fraught with the direst evils to themselves and to the world.

Let it be admitted that there are classes in all countries
which, from ignorance, inertness, or interested motives, are blind
to the tremendous consequences and calamities of war. Still, the
government of the world is not carried on by these classes.
Rulers and Statesmen, it may be charitably supposed, are actuated
by higher impulses, and have a deeper sense of their responsi-
bilities. Attila, Tamerlane, Nadir Shah, and Napoleon have
passed away, and have left the brand of infamy attached
to their names in the world's annals. Can it be believed
that Russian Rulers and Russian Statesmen, in defiance of
all laws human and divine, are bent on a settled and
deliberate course of territorial aggrandizement? Is it credible
that the Czar, with whom the chief power rests in such

35

matters, like the Oriental Despot held up to execration in the
burning words of Burke, "resolves, in the gloomy recesses of
a mind capable of such things, to compound all the materials of
fury, havock, and desolation into one black cloud, to pour down
the whole of its contents" on the peaceful and fertile plains of
India ?

Russia has ample work before her for a long time to come,
to apply a healing salve to the bleeding pores of her wide-spread
territory, to allay internal disorder, to restore her impoverished
finances, and to consolidate her conquests in Central Asia. But, of
course, if England adopt towards her an irritating pohcy in
Europe and in Asia ; if so many English pens, dipped in gall,
constantly hold her up to scorn and indignation, and sow hatred
broadcast between the two nations, but one result can follow.
Years ago, Montalembert wrote : — " L'insupportable arrogance
de la diplomatic Anglaise en vers les faibles, et de la presse Anglaise
envers tout le monde, a souleve la juste indignation d'une foule
d'honnetes gens." There are noble exceptions in the EngKsh
press, but their voice is drowned in the general chorus of exciting
language and indiscriminating abuse.

Granting, however, the fact, that Russia means mischief,
what course ought England to pursue? We should not, I
presume, "idly and stupidly gazing on the menacing meteor,"
fold our arms, sit still, and let matters glide. We should
prepare to meet the danger. We should, in fact, have
been in a state of preparation long before the crisis. There
is not the smallest probability of Russia being able to steal a
march upon us, so as to take us unawares. The measures of
defence to be adopted would depend on the nature of the attack ;
the whole strength of the British Empire would be put forth to
maintain the security of our Indian dominions. There is no
difference of opinion on this vital point between the advocates of
a forward policy and the supporters of the opposite school. The
only question is as to the means by which this end is to be
sought.

Until lately the Governments at home and in India have held

36

the opinion of Sir Robert Peel, when he stated : — " Whatever may
be the conduct of Russia, I believe that the Governments of
England and of India are sufficiently powerful to protect them-
selves. I do not think that we are, as a nation, dependent on the
co-operation or good faith of Russia or of any other Power." These
few words contain the germ of a great truth, which it would be
well if England's Ministers of the present day, and England's
citizens, would take to heart. We need no entangling alliances
with unknown future responsibilities as a bulwark to India or to
any other portion of British territory. England relies upon her-
self; in quietness and confidence is her strength. She seeks not
to give offence, and is not easily provoked ; but, while apparently
passive, she silently concentrates her power, and is not the less
ready in a just cause, if, unhappily, such cause should arise, to
defend her rights, and to preserve unsullied the rich inheritance
of fame and dominion transmitted to her from her forefathers. In
the case of undoubtedly aggressive measures on the part of Russia
in regard to India, England would not hesitate to accept the chal-
lenge ; but the main brunt of the shock of conflict would not be
on the banks of the Indus, but in Europe ; and God forbid that
the necessity should arise for such a gigantic trial of strength
between the two nations. To avert this calamity, the greatest
wisdom, prudence, and forbearance on the part of the States-
men and representatives of Russia and England are imperatively
required ; and herein Kes the essential distinction between the
advocates of what Sir Stafi'ord North cote designates ^' the forward
policy " and the policy pursued up to Lord Lytton's Viceroy alty
by the British Government.

It is now time to ask. What is this forward policy? How
did it originate ? by whom has it been chiefly advocated ? Let
us endeavour to trace its rise, progress, and development in
the recorded opinions of its chief supporters. Foremost
in the controversy we have two distinguished servants of
the Indian Government, Sir Henry Rawlinson and Sir Bartle
Frere ; Major-General Jacob, however, preceded them in the
field, a born soldier, with true military instincts, but not

37

on that account best fitted to determine a great political question.
His suggestions towards the permanent defence of the North- West
frontier were submitted for the consideration of Government five
and twenty years ago. " The Queen of England formally to
assume the style and title of Empress of India " was one of his
recommendations, and his policy may well be called an Imperial
policy, requiring Imperial resources. He states that "England
committed an egregious error in not driving every Russian back
to the Caucasian range," a task more easily spoken of than
accomplished. He was a strong advocate for the advance to
Quettah ; and having occupied that post, and located a large force
there, he would under certain circumstances, have subsidized all
Afghanistan with money and arms. In a previous minute he
had stated that ''the Afghans were utterly faithless and untrust-
worthy, that he never even admitted one of their nation into the
ranks of the force he commanded." Further, " looking onward
to a great European war, he would garrison Herat with
20,000 men, which would not necessarily, he stated, cause any
increase to our Indian army, or at least to its cost." It may be
here observed that it is a favourite argument with the advocates
of a forward policy, that our military expenses would not be
increased, as the garrisons and troops stationed in Sinde and the
Punjab might be diminished, and an improved frontier line
obtained with little additional outlay. The same argument was
put before the Russian Government. Mr. Schuyler teUs us : — "It
was said that the diminished expenses of Orenburg and Western
Siberia would furnish sufficient funds for the Government of
Central Asia, but it was found that the expenses of Orenburg
and Western Siberia had rather increased than diminished."
After specifying other details. General Jacob concludes : — " Unless
these and other subsidiary arrangements are speedily applied,
and manfully carried out, our Indian Empire will be lost within
the next generation of men." In reference to General Jacob's
recommendations, Sir Herbert Edwardes, to say the least, an
equally eminent authority, wrote at the time : — "So vast a pile of
impracticable schemes seems more like some dream of conquest

38

than a sober system of Imperial defence. The meaning of
distances, the necessity of support, the physical difficulties of
countries, the moral difficulties of races, past experience of
them all, the future outlay involved, and present financial
position of India, seem alike defied or ignored in such astounding
speculations."

Sir Henry Rawlinson, a disciple of Sir John McNeill,
is the most powerful and persistent advocate of the forward
policy. His views are stated at length in his book, '' England
and Eussia in the East," which he published as a sort of
manual for students of the Eastern question. It is indeed a mine
of information on all questions connected with Central Asia and
the North-West frontier of India. But it is written entirely from
the standpoint of a thorough, and doubtless sincere, conviction of
Russian intrigue, perfidy, and settled purpose of territorial
aggrandizement, undertaken with the ultimate object of hostile
designs upon our Indian dominions. Sir Henry writes : — " I take
some credit to myself that at so early a period as 1865 I forecasted
the development of Russian power very much as it has since
occurred, and I then suggested the policy to which I now recur,
of proceeding on the approach of real danger to man the outposts
of our Indian Empire at Herat and Candahar, in order to prevent
their falling into the hands of the enemy." " Real danger." A
great deal depends upon the interpretation put upon these words.
Lord Sandhurst, a man eminently qualified for the task as a
soldier and statesman, with large Indian and European experience,
controverted Sir Henry Rawlinson's views in an article which
appeared in the Edinhurgh Review of July 1875. He had
previously, as Commander-in-Chief in India, recorded his dissent
from Sir Henry Rawlinson's memorandum on the Central Asian
question, dated 20th July, 1868, which had been forwarded to
India by order of the Secretary of State. All the other members
of the Indian Government, which it may be remarked was at that
time exceptionally strong in ability and in Indian experience,
expressed, at great length, their deliberate judgment upon this
memorandum. The opinions also of officers holding high employ-

39

ment on tlie ^S'orth-'West frontier were collected and sent home
with the minutes of the Government to the Duke of Arg}^ll as
accompaniments to the Government despatch of the 4th January,
1869, of which it will be sufficient to quote the two following
paragraphs : —

" The various proposals brought forward in that memorandum, in
order to counteract in some measure the advances of Russia in Central
Asia, and to strengthen the influence and power of England in
Afghanistan and Persia, have received from us that careful consi'ieration
which is due to the well-known career and abilities of the writer, and to
the magnitude of the events and interests of which he has treated. A
careful perusal of the memorandum forwarded to us, and a further dis-
cussion of the subject in all its bearing, has not led us to recommend any
substantial alteration in the course of policy to be adapted on the frontier
or beyond it. On the contrary, the closer and more constant the atten-
tion which the subject receives at our hands, the more settled is our con-
viction that any serious departure from the principles which we have
already enunciated would be the cause of grave political and financial
embarrassments, and would probably involve us in doubtful under-
takings, the issue and duration of which no Statesman would venture to
predict."

To one who has been associated with Sir Henry Rawlinson in
pubHc life, and who has always entertained a high opinion of his
ability, industry, and rare knowledge on all topics connected with
the East, but has still felt it his duty to oppose his views, it is
matter of surprise, and it may be added sorrow, to find that, in
spite of the overwhelming weight of authority whicb so long
resisted his forward policy, as unsound and dangerous, that policy
has at length obtained the ascendency in the Councils of the
British Empire. It is to be hoped that Sir Henry and the abler
advocates of his side of the question will be moderate in their
triumph, and give no countenance to the schemes of annexation,
and large extension of frontier, which find support in many
quarters, and which it is understood Lord Lytton favours. Sir
Henry Rawlinson has himself denounced "the iniquity of
extinguishing independent States for the mere purpose of obtaining
a convenient line of territorial demarcation." On every question
connected with Persia, Sir Henry Eawlinson speaks with bigh
authority ; but his suggestion, that it would be better for England
to meet Russia (coming as an invader of India) in Persia rather

40

than upon our Indian frontier, Lord Sandhurst pronounces to be
"one of the wildest which ever crossed the imagination of a
military diplomatist labouring under a fixed idea."

Sir Henry Rawlinson would also make the Russian advance
to Merv a casus belli. He writes : — " So long as she held aloof
from Merv we should hold aloof from Herat; but if she deliberately
threw down the gauntlet, she must expect it to be taken up."
He attaches paramount importance to Herat, as the key to India,
and considers that an expeditionary column detached from India
to hold it need not exceed a strength of 10,000 men, 5,000 only
being allotted to the garrison of Herat, the remainder for the
occupation of Gerishk, Furrah, Candahar, Quettah, and Pisheen.

Lord Sandhurst considered this force too small to occupy so
many forts, and protect such a long line of operations. In order
to subdue a single tribe of Afghans, General Wilde, an ex-
perienced frontier officer, demanded 20,000 men. In the Umbeyla
expedition in 1863, we lost 36 British officers, and 871 British
and native soldiers killed and wounded. It should be recollected
that convoys, with supplies and munitions of war for the troops,
must constantly be passing to and fro, exposed to attacks from
hostile tribes, and that, at such a distance from our base, provision
must be made for unwonted sickness, which very often in these
countries greatly reduces the strength of regiments. Lord
Sandhurst estimated the force required at 31,000, instead of
10,000 troops, and the number deemed necessary for our present
advance into Afghanistan exceeds even this larger estimate.

Sir Henry Eawlinson, however, professed to believe that we
should be able to carry out the policy he recommended in concert
with the Afghans and with the Amir ; but he was prepared for
the other alternative, as he added : —

" Of course if the perversity of the Amir were to continue, and he
were inclined to thwart the expedition, from feelings of jealousy, or from
a mistrust of our intentions, the difficulties of the march would be much
increased, and our preparations would require to be made upon a larger
scale, including, perhaps, a demonstration at the mouth of the Khyber;
but under no circumstances need the expeditionary column, as far as I can
form an opinion, exceed a strength of 10,000 men."

41

With regard to the occupation of Quettah, Sir Henry
RawHnson also assumed that we had the concurrence of the
Amir, and his language deserves to be weighed in reference to
the causes that have led to the present war : —

" It is doubtful,'' he writes, " how far such a proceeding would be re-
garded at Candahar and Cabul. If our position were already secured
with Sher Ali Khan, and he could thus be led to look upon the Quettah
post as a support to his own power, then we should hardly be deterred
from undertaking it by mere considerations of expense; but if, as is more
probable the tribes in general regarded the erection of a fortress above
the passes as a menace, or as a preliminary to a further hostile advance,
then we should not be justified for so small an object in risking the
rupture of our friendly intercourse.''

This is a very significant admission in respect to one of Lord
Lytton's measures on the part of a strong advocate of the forward
policy. All Statesmen, from the time of Mountstuart Elphinstone,
have been of opinion that we should go to Afghanistan as defend-
ers, and not as invaders. The Afghans would receive aid against
invaders with gratitude, and if they needed aid they would be
quick enough in asking for it ; for, as Sir Harry Lumsden writes,
''modesty has never been an Afghan weakness;" but whatever
Power invaded their country they would be glad to seek the
alliance of any other Power to drive them out.

Sir Bartle Frere's views may be gathered from his
elaborate letter to Sir John Kaye^ of June 12th, 1874,
and from an important memorandum, dated 10th Novem-
ber of the same year. In opposition to Sir Henry Rawlinson,
he deprecates the idea of making the advance of the Russians
to Merv a casus belli: — "The place is nothing to us except
as a necessary step towards Herat and Cabul, and it is not a
necessary step to either." He emphatically condemns our *' negative
policy," but he admits that " a defensive policy is not necessarily
inactive, nor merely stationary, still less is it necessarily weak."
This is the very point for which those who stand on the ancient
ways contend. The active measures which seem to him to be
essential are — 1st, the placing of an advanced post at Quettah ;
2ndly, well-selected English agents should be stationed at Herat,

42

Cabul, and Candahar, thus establisliing a perfect intelligence de-
partment of European officers in Afghanistan. He would not
attempt the subjugation of the country nor its military occupa-
tion, nor would he hold Herat by a force of our own troops ; at
least, not until we had tried the effect of such measures as Todd,
and Pottinger, and Rawlinson proved could be so effectual in like
cases." These instances, adduced by Sir Bartle Frere in support
of his argument, appear to be singularly unfortunate. The politi-
cal assistant to Sir Henry Pottinger, stationed at Shikarpore, in
Sinde, in 1838 — 1840, had access to all the correspondence,
official and non-official, connected with the period Todd and Pot-
tinger were at Herat. Pottinger's heroic conduct in saving that
city from the Persians ought to have ensured him the eternal
gratitude of the Herat Chief and his people. But not two months
after the siege Pottinger was subjected to the grossest treatment,
insulted in the presence of the King, and ordered to leave the
Herat territory. He was then asked to remain, but was again
insulted, his house attacked, and one of his servants seized and
publicly mutilated.

The amouni of Todd's expenditure at Herat used to startle
the officers of the Sinde Residency, for they had the means of
knowing what was going on from the Shikarpore merchants,
through whom many of the bills were cashed. Sir John Login,
who was attached to Todd's mission as surgeon, states that the
advances amounted to £190,000 in a short period. They have
been estimated at upwards of £300,000, Yar Mahomed Khan
received £2,500 a month, and during aU this time he was carry-
ing on a treacherous correspondence with the Persian Governor of
Mushed, having for its object the expulsion of the infidel English
from Afghanistan. Just as Sultan Mahomed Khan, the
brother of Dost Mahomed, whom we loaded with benefits,
requited us by betraying to the Sikhs our officers who
had taken refuge with him after the outbreak at Peshawur.
Finally, Major Todd, unable to submit any longer to the
humiliating insults of an ungrateful miscreant (to use the
words of Sir John Login), withdrew the mission to Candahar.

i

43

Under these circumstances, what Sir Bartle Frere can mean,
by affirming that the measures adopted by Todd and Pottinger
proved effectual, it is difficult to understand. Sir Henry
EawKnson was shut up in Candahar with Sir Wm. Nott's
division of the Cabul army. There is no analogy between his
position under the wing of a large military force and that of
officers stationed in isolated situations, like Herat and Balkh,
dependent upon their individual influence, and the prestige of
distant British power.

This question of stationing British officers in Afghanistan may
not seem of great moment to those unacquainted with the
Afghan character. The English mind can scarcely understand
the repugnance exhibited by Dost Mahomed and Sher Ali. Lord
Salisbury, having no knowledge on the subject, dismissed it in the
House of Lords with the remark, "If an ally could on such
a ground exhibit any soreness of feeling, I cannot think he can
be an ally about whose temper we need trouble ourselves much.'*
Syed Noor Mahomed, Prime Minister of Cabul, who was
more immediately concerned, says : — " Grey Sahib wrote me a letter
recently, referring to my acquiescence, when at Simlah, to the
coming of British officers to Cabul. It was as much as an order
for my death."* The atmosphere of Cabul in such matters is very
different to that of the House of Lords, as Lord Salisbury would per-
ceive if he were suddenly transported to the Capital of Afghanistan.

Lord Lytton also, looking at the question from a purely
English point of view, considers that "the presence and every-
day acts in their midst of earnest, upright English gentlemen "
was the one thing required to civilize the Afghans. To those who
know the Afghans from the habit of daily intercourse with them,
these words of the Viceroy denote an ingenuous simplicity, and
tend to provoke an involuntary smile. " Earnest, upright
English gentlemen " would have little chance of influencing Chiefs
like Yar Mahomed Khan, unless endowed with other and rarer
qualities ; and their " every-day acts " would be as distasteful to
fanatical >Ioollahs, Mouluvees, and Mohammedans, as the every-
day acts of Afghan Chiefs and people would be distasteful to
* " Afghanistan Correspondence," p. 195.

44

English minds. Sir Bartle Frere says : — '' Train up men like
Malcolm, Elphinstone, and Metcalfe ; " but such men are not as
plentiful as blackberries, even in services of which Mr. Canning
long ago said " that no monarchy in Europe had produced
within a given time so many men of the first talents in civil and
military life within the same period."

Dost Mahomed may be supposed to have known the
temper of his countrymen better than Lord Lytton, and with
all his desire to cement a friendly union with the English,
the one thing he shrank from was a British ofiicer, as
dry-nurse, at his Capital. Gholam Houssein Khan, whose fidelity
to British interests has never been doubted, and whose oppor-
tunities for forming a judgment must be allowed to have been
exceptional, gave the same advice. Sir Harry Lumsden also
writes : — " Unless under the most pressing danger to Afghan-
istan, and at the spontaneous and urgent demand of that
Government itself, no proposition involving the deputing British
officers into the country should, for a moment, be entertained."
It has been the fixed and settled opinion of the various eminent
men who have ruled India before Lord Lytton, that " one of
the best securities for success and harmony in our dealings
with the Afghans, and for the avoidance of embarrassments,
consisted in our having as few points of contact with them as
possible."

We have in previous paragraphs passed rapidly in review some
of the main features of the recommendations and suggestions
advanced by the most eminent advocates of " the forward pohcy."
Following in the train of these greater luminaries are numerous
sateUites of inferior brilliancy, whose schemes for the preservation
of our Indian Empire from Russian aggression take a wider
range, and embrace measures which would seem to require a
fathomless exchequer and a perennial supply of soldiers, w^hich
our Crimean experiences would scarcely give us warrant to
believe that the British Islands could furnish. Many of these
writers are not satisfied with rectifying our frontier in India by
obtaining a footing in Afghanistan, and by garrisoning Herat,

46

Candahar, Balkh, and Cabul, but they would push our outposts
to the Oxus, and some even contemplate with complacency hostile
expeditions to the deserts of Central Asia. As a specimen of
the Imperial scope of such projects, it will be sufficient to quote
from a recent letter, published in the Scotsman, and transferred
to the Morning Post, of the 11th October, 1878. After alluding
to the possibility of a Russian advance "by Persia and the
valley of the Attreck to Herat," the writer goes on : —

"In the meantime, what should England be doing? Carrying out
heartily the Anglo-Turkish Convention ; constructing a railway from the
Bosphorus to Bagdad, another from the Mediterranean to join it, and
another branch to Erzeroum ; making roads in all directions, both for
commercial and strategical purposes ; encouraging, and creating if neces-
sary, a large seam flotilla on the Tigiis; possessing ourselves, by
purchase or otherwise, of the Island of Karrack. With all this, preparing
by every means a strong military position near Erzeroum."

It is worthy of remark, and of serious consideration, that the

Prime Minister endorses this proposition in his speech at the

Mansion House, in which he stated that " the city of Erzeroum

will in all probability be the scene of the strongest fortifications

in Asia Minor." But to return to the work that the

writer of the letter in the Morning Post cuts out for

English brains and English money : —

" Surveying all the passes leading from Asia Minor into Persia,
aiding in every way in the regeneration of the Turkish army by lending
British officers, &c."

Again : —

" If we make proper use of the time we shall have at our disposal, we
ought to be able to collect in that country (Asia Minor) at short notice
(shorter than Russia could collect 10u,00u men at Herat) 50u,0U0 men-
British, Turks, and Indians. With such a force at our disposal, we
ought to be able to hold in check the Russian army of the Caucasus, and
in addition to form columns which could enter Persia in different
directions through the Western frontier, and attack the rear as well as
the communications of any Russian army in its advance on India." (This
is Sir Henry Rawlinson's idea, commented on by Lord Sandhurst.)
"Further, another force, dispatched from India to the Persian Gulf,
could operate from the South, while from Beloochistan a force could act
from the East — in fact, holding Asia Minor, we could absolutely paralyze
Persia from the West and from the East and from the South."

46

A little farther on, in the same letter, we find : —
" In spite of every opposition on the part of many eminent men, the
Indian Government has been induced to occupy Quettah, in Beloochistan,
which position is being turned into a powerful ''place d'armes^'' in which
a British army could assemble with all the resources of England and
India at its back, and meet the advance of a Russian one."

Again : —

" I have now tried to point out that if we carry out the Anglo-
Turkish Convention, and have as a condition, absolutely essential, the
alliance of Turkey, we have nothing to fear from Russia. But Russia
knows as well as we do the necessity of a Turkish alliance to us, and
every effort will be made by her to prevent its being realized. She holds
in her hand a fearful weapon to use in her favour— the indemnity, and it
would be worth our while to pay it ourselves sooner than lose the
alliance of Turkey ! "

This last proposition, surely, is a climax. It is piling Pelion
on Ossa with a vengeance on the shoulders of British tax-payers.
As we read, with bated breath, the startling list of all we ought
to undertake to preserve ourselves from the machinations of
Russia, the reflection could not but arise. Who is sufficient for
these things ? But when we are told that we are to pay the
Turkish indemnity, there is a feeling of relief, because we may be
certain that even the blandest and most audacious of Chancellors
of the Exchequer, however imbued with Imperial doctrines, would
hardly venture, especially after the experiment of the Rhodope
grant, to make such a proposition to Parliament. Money, the sinews
of war, is the great want of Russia, and we ourselves are to
supply this want, and for what purpose ? to secure the alliance of
Turkey. It does not seem at all incredible to those who have
studied the cavernous workings of the Asiatic mind, that before
any great length of time we may be brought to loggerheads with
our friends the Turks. Mountstuart Elphinstone, no mean
observer of the teachings of history, wrote long ago : — '* I never
knew a close alliance between a civilized and an uncivilized State
that did not end in mutual hatred in three years. Our payment
of the Turkish indemnity would be worse than our pouring thou-
sands into the lap of Yar Mahomed Khan of Herat, all the time
that the wily Afghan Chief was chuckling in his sleeve, and
telling the King of Persia, the Asylum of Islam, that " he merely

47

tolerated the presence of the Englisli Envoy from expediency, as
he (the Envoy) was by no means niggardly in the expenditure,
jewels," &c. If this sort of language is used to the Turks, they
must indeed believe that we are in great straits for their alliance,
and that no demands which they could make would be too onerous
for us to grant. "Capital fellows these Feringhees" (the
Belooches used to say on the occasion of our first advance to
Afghanistan.) " We sell them our camels one day, steal them
the next, and sell them again to them on the third day." All
these suggestions must appear, one would imagine, to soberminded
practical Englishmen as dreams, vague unsubstantial dreams, like
those put forward in former years, that England should go to war
with France to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice, or step
in with armed interference to forbid her acquisition of the left
bank of the Rhine ; or, at a still later date, that Germany should
be coerced into the relinquishment of any claim she might make
to the possession of French territory. But these are not the sug-
gestions of '' anonymous paragraph writers," nor " the harebrained
chatter of irresponsible frivolity;" they are the deliberate and
matured recommendations of General Sir Henry Green, a dis-
tinguished military and political officer, who has done excellent
service on the Sinde frontier, and has always been one of the
busiest and most persistent advocates " of the forward policy."
His letter was published in the Scotsman, as was said, at the
request of the Duke of Sutherland, who endorsed its sentiments as
emanating from an Officer who had spent his Hfe in India, chiefly
in Afghanistan and Beloochistan, and who was weU able to judge
of the effect of European politics on the minds of the natives of
India.

Moreover, these views are to a certain extent recognized and
sanctioned by the Prime Minister himself, as we can gather from
his speech at the Mansion House, and from other utterances.
They are built up on the same foundation as the secret Anglo-
Turkish Convention, which gave us *' peace with honour ;" they
are conceived in the same spirit which would fain make us believe
that Cyprus was an outlying bulwark of the British Empire, and

48

a defensive post for our Indian territories. The Prime Minister
tells us that '' if Asia Minor and the valley of the Euphrates were
in the possession of a very weak, or a very powerful State, it
would be by no means impossible for an adequate army to march
through the passes of Asia Minor, and through Persia, and
absolutely threaten the dominions of the Queen/' Here we
have the germs of the suggestions of Sir Henry Green, of the new
Imperial policy, which Lord Lytton was sent out to India to
inaugurate, and which no doubt found a responsive echo in his
ardent and poetical. imagination. The same master mind which
has linked free and enlightened England, teeming with life and
progress, to an effete and decaying Sovereignty, approaching the
last stage of decomposition, which has pledged British resources
to fight the battle of the Turks, and meet a formidable adversary
on her own ground in Asia Minor, no doubt contemplated with
satisfaction the rectification of our Indian frontier, and the loca-
tion of British troops in the midst of a hostile population, on the
confines of the Hindoo Koosh mountains, or on the edge of the
Turkuman deserts. In this lies the grand distinction between
the old policy of Lord Canning, Lord Lawrence, Lord Mayo, and
Lord Northbrook, and of the successive Ministries under whom
they served, and the new Imperial policy of Lord Lytton, Lord
Salisbury, and Lord Beaconsfield. The marvel is that, with this
broad distinction existing, which must be patent to all men now
that it is revealed, Lord Salisbury and Sir Stafford Northcote
should have both stated, so late as June 1877, " that there was
no change in the policy of the Grovernment."

The first result of the new policy is an unnecessary, impolitic,
and unjust war ; but before we proceed to substantiate this
charge, and to show that the measures adopted by Lord Lytton
have been the main cause of this great calamity, it will be
necessary to explain the state of affairs on the North- Western
frontier at the period of Lord Lytton's arrival in India. One of
the first questions Lord Lytton had to decide was connected with
the Khan of Khelat, and the tribes which owe him more or less
real allegiance. This question had been constantly before Lord

49

Northbrook's Government throughout his administration, and
had given rise to voluminous correspondence. At length matters
had reached such a state that the Commissioner in Sinde, Sir
William Merewether, had recommended armed intervention.
To this Lord JN'orthbrook would not consent, but at the same
time he determined that a complete change of policy must take
place. We had hitherto endeavoured to deal with the frontier
tribes entirely through the Khan, giving them to understand
that they were regarded solely as his subjects. This policy, after
long and patient trial, had failed. It was now decided to make
our own arrangements direct with the frontier tribes, or rather
to mediate between the Khan and the Chiefs of the tribes, thus
treating the Khan more as primus inter pares than the absolute
Ruler of the country. Before the measures requisite to inaugurate
this new policy were completed. Lord ^orthbrook quitted India,
and Lord Ljiton succeeded him, and proceeded to carry out the
details in a different spirit, and with a different object. In
order to bring out the striking contrast between the measures of
Lord Northbrook and Lord Lytton, a reference may be made to
one of Lord Lytton's speeches (commenting on Sir John Strachey's
financial statement of March 1877), in which he uses the
strongest condemnatory language in regard to the poHcy of his
predecessors in the Yiceroyalty. He says : —

" Those neighbouring regions, after twenty-five years of the closest
geographical contact between us and them, remained almost the only
ones in the whole world which are forbidden ground to British footsteps,
except on some mission of vengeance, and tor the purpose of burning
the homes and destroying the property of our neighbours, in retaliation
for outrages committed by them upon our own territory. Surely this is
not a state of things which any Englishman can contemplate with
unmitigated satisfaction, or which any English Statesman would wish to
perpetuate. . . . I do not think that, consistently with its high duties
to God and man, as the greatest civilizing Power, this Government can
watch, coldly and immoveably, its closest neighbours floundering in
anarchy and bloodshed without extending to them, in their hour of need,
a kindly and a helpful hand, if they seek its assistance and invoke its
guidance. Such a policy would be, in my opinion, an atheistic and
inhuman one."

What the exact meaning the Viceroy intended to convey by

D

60

the use of the word " atheistic " it is difficult to determine, but
the word *' inhuman" is easily understood. Lord Lytton had
only been a few months in India ; his previous training and
experience had given him no acquaintance with Indian affairs, or
quahfied him in any way to pronounce an authoritative judgment
on a difficult administrative problem, to the solution of which the
best intellects and the largest practical experience of officers of
the Indian civil and military services had been devoted since the
time when the Punjab came under British rule. Lord Lytton
had evidently not read carefully the despatches of the Home
Authorities, nor the reports of the officers employed on the
frontier, but formed a hasty opinion from imperfect information,
and clothed it in strong expressions. Had he studied the question
he would have found that the orders sent out by the various
Secretaries of State, and acted upon by the Lieutenant-Governors,
and the able officers employed under them, inculcated anything
but " an atheistic and inhuman " policy. The following para-
graphs from a despatch by Lord Halifax, dated 16th January,
1864, after the Umbeyla campaign, gives in detail his views of
the poKcy to be pursued towards the tribes on the Korth-West
frontier : —

"Our true course ought to be not to interfere with their internal
concerns, but to cultivate friendly relations with them, and to endeavour
to convince them, by our forbearance and kindly conduct, that their
wisest plan is to be on good terms with us, in order that they may derive
those advantages from intercourse with us whicli are sure to follow the
interchange of commodities and mutual benefits." Again :- " Advantage
should be taken of every opportunity to conciliate the Chiefs of these
tribes, and to create and improve a friendly feeling in the minds of these
hereditary leaders, whether religious or otherwise, who in semi-barbarous
communities usually exercise so great an influence over the minds of their
followers, and whose own conduct, when not influenced by caprice, is gener-
ally determined by self-interest." Again : — "It is of paramount importance
that these Chiefs should be made to understand that our policy is peace,
and, w^hile resolute to repel and chastise any aggression upon our own
territories, we do not seek to extend our frontier, nor do we desire to
interfere with our neighbours."

These we believe to have been the principles which animated
and directed our officers from the earliest period after the annex-
ation of the Punjab.

51

Can any exception be taken to this policy of conciliation
mingled with firmness — the determination to uphold British
supremacy, in order to afford protection to British subjects living
in the vicinity of the frontier, and yet at the same time to use
every effort to cultivate friendly relations with the wild and
independent tribes inhabiting the mountain ranges ? Is it just to
brand such a poHcy with the epithets of atheistic and inhuman ?
If rumour is to be credited, Lord Lytton soars above details, and
he has probably, therefore, never turned his attention to the deeply
interesting and instructive reports of the Punjab administration,
nor even to the published statements of the moral and material
progress of India, presented annually to Parliament. These
statements are not exhaustive of the numerous subjects of which
they treat, and they are very unequal, depending on the industry
and abihty of the officer selected to prepare them ; but they are
founded on authentic documents at the India Office, and are
generally compiled with care and judgment. An attentive perusal
of them shows a gradual improvement in our relations with the
frontier tribes, that the border has of late years become decidedly
more peaceable, and that there are causes at work, certain, if not
interfered with, to produce, in course of time, most important
results. The establishment of hospitals and dispensaries, the
offer of waste lands on liberal terms, the interchange of friendly
visits, and, above all, the admittance into the ranks of our army,
pohce, and civil establishments, of large and increasing numbers of
these border tribes, are measures tending gradually to create
respect for our power, and confidence in our good feehng and
justice. The philanthropic efforts of British officers employed on
the frontier are beyond all praise ; they are known to few, but
they reflect the highest credit on the officers and on their country.
Many of them, no doubt, read with pain Lord Lytton's hasty
and unjust remarks, betraying such a want of knowledge of the
subject, and such an absence of due appreciation of their
persevering and self-denpng labours. The same precipitation
and inexperience in Asiatic modes of thought, usages, and
prejudices characterize Lord Lytton's conduct in reference to the

52

affairs of Afghanistan, and have mainly contributed to the present
rupture with the Amir of Cabul.

All the proceedings, however, of Lord Lytton have met with
the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government, and both
Houses of Parliament have ratified that approval, after a very
brief time afforded them for studying the correspondence connected
with this important question. It remains to be seen whether the
people of England when they have had the opportunity of examin-
ing the whole case will confirm the verdict. Those who believe
that the new poKcy adopted by Her Majesty's Government, and
carried out in such a hasty and inconsiderate manner by Lord
Lytton, has plunged the country into an impolitic and unjust war
are bound to use their best endeavours to place the facts of the
case before their countrymen. In furtherance of the instructions
conveyed to him by Lord Salisbury in his Despatch of the 28th
February, 1876, the first step taken by Lord Lytton on his arrival
in India was to send his Native Aide-de-Camp Eesaldar Major
Khanan Khan, with a letter to the Amir dated 6th May, 1876,
barely twenty-five days after his assumption of the Viceroyalty,
announcing a proposed British Mission to Cabul. Sher Ali
declined to receive this Mission ; and we learn from Lord Lytton's
Despatch of 10th May, 1877, that his grounds were " that he
desired no change in his relations with the British Government,
which appeared to have been defined by that Government to its
own satisfaction at the Simla Conference. If the British Govern-
ment had now anything new to say about them, he would prefer
to send his own Agent to the Viceroy, in order that the subjects
of discussion weighed by a minute and exact investigation, might
be committed to writing." Sir William Muir has recorded his
opinion that Sher Ali's refusal was couched "in as courteous
terms as the case admitted." But Lord Lytton took offence
immediately, as if he desired to seize the first opportunity and pre-
text for pushing matters to extremities. It must be borne in
mind that Sher Ali firmly believed, that under the solemn promise
of Lord Mayo, he might consider himself safe from having British
Ofiicers forced upon him against his will, and against the wishes
of his Chiefs and people.

53

Lord Northbrook distinctly states, when Syed ]N'oor Mahomed
objected to the step on similar grounds, that " he felt he had no
right under the assurance that had been given by Lord Mayo,
that British Officers should not be sent against the opinion of the
Amir, to consider that any offence had been committed against
the British Grovernment." Lord Lytton was of a different
opinion, and but for the interposition of the more experienced
members of his Council, he would have written to the Amir in
such menacing terms that a favourable answer could hardly have
been expected, and the British Government would then have
been placed at the very outset in the embarrassing position either
of sitting down quietly under an open affront, or of being com-
pelled to have recourse to measures of coercion. Eventually a
modified letter was addressed to Sher AH, dated the 8th July,
1876, closing with the intimation amounting to a threat, that if
he hastily rejected the hand of friendship, the Viceroy would be
obliged " to regard Afghanistan as a State which has voluntarily
isolated itself from the alliance and support of the British
Government." Lord Lytton writes at this time : — " We authorized
Dr. Belle w and others to address the Amir and his Ministers
letters, unofficially explaining our sentiments, and the importance
of the opportunity then offered to the Afghan Government for
materially strengthening its position at home and abroad." This
appears to have been a very unusual and illadvised step, as it
would only tend to confuse and perplex the Amir, and to make
him suspicious of his Ministers. The thought would occur to
him that underneath all this pressure there was some deep-laid
scheme, which threatened his o^vn interests, and boded ill for
Afghan independence. Asiatics are naturally suspicious, especially
the Afghans, and to negotiate successfully with them it is important
to pursue a simple straightforward course, and to deal with the
Chief, and not with his subordinates. Finally, the Amir sends
an answer submitting two alternative propositions. Lord Lytton
accepts the second, that the British Yakeel at Cabul should
proceed to Simla, charged with a confidential explanation " of
the personal views and sentiments of the Amir on the subject
of his relations with the British Government."

54

The British Agent, Nawab Atta Mahomed Khan, reached
Simla on the 6th of October, 1876, and on the next day Sir
Lewis Pelly, Lieut. -Colonel 0. T. Burne, and Captain Grey had
an interview with him. A summary of the conversation that
took place is given in the Afghanistan Papers (p. 180). Atta
Mahomed assigns eight reasons for the estrangement of the Amir.

1. The decision on the Seistan boundary.

2. Our recent proceedings in Khelat territories.

3. Our remonstrances, in 1874, on behalf of i akoob Khan.

4. The transmission of presents to Wakhan.

5. The results of the mission of Syed Noor Mahomed in
1873.

6. Matter contained in a recent letter from the Commissioner
of Peshawur to the British Agent at Cabul.

7. The Amir's impression that our policy is one of self-
interest, irrespective of the interests of Afghanistan.

8. Our refusal to sign a definite treaty of alliance in 1873.
Lord Lytton, in his letter to Lord Salisbury, of 10th May,

1877, alludes to only four of these grievances — the first, third,
fourth, and eighth, — all of which occurred before his accession to
the Viceroyalty. It is not necessary to dwell on each of these
four grievances, but it may be observed that not one of them
afforded any just ground of complaint against the British Govern-
ment. Much of the ill feeling, therefore, manifested by Sher Ali
must be attributed to his own morbid temperament. Sir Harry
Lumsden described him, twenty years ago, '^ as a man of violent
temper and cruel disposition," but " possessed of intelligence
and aptitude for business." He is prone to fits of depression,
causing, at times, the belief in his insanity. His conduct, on the
death of his favourite son, Mahommod Ali, at the battle of
Kujbaz, gave countenance to this belief. In dealing with a man
of this disposition, a Viceroy, desirous of promoting peace, would
have been slow to take offence, and would have exercised more
than usual forbearance. The decision with regard to the Seistan
boundary in 1872, no doubt excited a deep feeling of resentment
in the mind of Sher Ali. The objects of the British Government

55

were wholly disinterested. They desired to remove a cause of
quarrel between Persia and Afghanistan, and to avert, if
possible, the chance of colHsion and bloodshed. No of6.cer better
fitted to carry out their wishes could have been selected as Com-
missioner than Sir Frederick Goldsmid, but he was thwarted
throughout by Mirza Maasim Khan, the Persian Commissioner,
whose conduct afforded sufiB.cient ground for breaking up the
Commission, and leaving the question for settlement at Tehran.
This would have been the wisest plan, as, although the decision of
the British Commissioner was perfectly equitable, it gave offence
both to Persia and to Sher Ali. The less we interfere with the
internal affairs and disputes of Asiatic Rulers the better.

Lord Lytton makes no mention of the second alleged griev-
ance— " the recent proceedings in the Khelat territories.'' These
included the occupation of Quettah, which the Amir described to
the Tiu^kish Envoy as " placiQg an armed man at the back door
of his house," adding, " what can be his motive, except he wants
to find his way in when you are asleep?"^ Under an article in
our treaty with the Khan of Khelat, we had a perfect right to
occupy Quettah, as it is situated in Khelat territory. But Lord
Northbrook has stated that its occupation did not form part of his
contemplated arrangements for the settlement of Khelat affairs.
As a significant step in the direction of Lord Lytton's rumoured
policy, combined with the threatened advance of Kashmir troops
towards Chitral, at our instigation, and the opening of new rela-
tions with the Chiefs to the north of the Cabul river, it naturally
alarmed the Amir. At this period, also, preparations were being
made on the banks of the Indus in the collection of supplies and
means of transport ; a bridge of boats was thrown across the river
at Kooshalgur, and the air was full of warhke rumours. No
wonder the Amir became anxious and distrustful. Sir Henry
Eawlinson suggests that " it was the Amir's consciousness of his

* This forcible expression of the Amir, uttered to the Turkish Envoy in the
confidence of private intercourse with a co-rehgionist, is strong e\ddence of his
feehngs on the subject of the occupation of Quettah. It is related in Mr.
Grattan Geary's Work, " Through Asiatic Turkey," Vol. II., page 323, as com-
municated to him by a Turkish politician at Constantinople.

56

own disloyalty whicli made him regard the movement on Quettah
as a menace." But up to the time of Lord Lytton's aggressive
measures, Sher Ali had shown no symptom of disloyalty to us. As
a weak State between two mighty Powers, he naturally felt sus-
picious both of England and of Russia. Sir William Muir, when
endeavouring to prevent the Viceroy from sending his menacing
letter, writes: — "Hitherto his whole line of conduct has ex-
hibited an alarm and distrust of Russia, which has, up to the
present time, made him entirely dependent upon us. What the
effect of the present menacing letter may be it is impossible to
foretell." Lord Northbrook and Sir Henry Norman both support
this statement.

Had we adhered to the wise policy of keeping within the
boundary line which had marked the limits of our Indian
territories for so many years, no cause of distrust could have
arisen; and, on the first serious difficulty with Russia, Sher
Ali would most probably have sought the protection of the
British Government. It would seem evident to all unpre-
judiced minds that, under the old aspect of aff'airs, Sher Ali
and the Afghans would naturally cHng to England rather than
to Russia. Since the withdrawal of our armies from Cabul, the
British Government has conferred nothing but benefits upon the
Chiefs and people of Afghanistan. Constant intercourse must have
made known generally the advantages of a British alKance, while
the contrast between an aggressive and a non-aggressive Power
must have tended to inspire confidence in us, and increasing
distrust of Russia. The Afghans are a manly race, and admire
manliness in others. The attachment shown by many of them
who have enhsted in our ranks to their officers is remarkable.
Personal friendships have also existed between British Officers
and Afghan Chiefs. All these elements of goodwill are in our
favour in comparison with Russia. One deeprooted feeling, how-
ever, separates alike the Englishman and the Russian from these
Mohammedan nations — religious fanaticism, " the springs of which
are as obscure as the effects are tremendous." Baron Jomini, in
arguing that he saw no reason for " mutual jealousy " between

57

England and Russia, remarked " that, should the two Govern-
ments act more together, in the interests of general progress and
civilization, it might be the means of strengthening both in their
respective Eastern dominions, where a powerful antagonistic
element existed in the Mussulman population, a menace to both
Governments, and should at any time a leader of daring character
arise, much was to be feared by such an event. "^ There is great truth
in this observation, and Lord Lytton would do well to bear it in
mind in his dealings with the contingents of Native Princes to
further schemes of territorial aggrandizement. We are a handful
of foreigners ruling over conquered millions, and it would be a
fatal error to fritter away our military strength and resources, more
especially our European troops, in the distant regions of Afghan-
istan. Wo can never trust to India as a secure base of operations
as we would trust to England in the event of an European
emergency. In any struggle with an European Power our mili-
tary strength in India must be increased rather* than diminished.
It was a vain flourish of trumpets, which deceived no one
acquainted with the true state of afi'airs in India, to bring native
troops at a vast expense to Europe witli the view of intimidating
Hussia.

On the 10th of October another meeting was held with
Atta Mahomed Khan, at which the Viceroy was present. Sir
Lewis Pelly, Colonel Burne, and Captain Grey also attended. It
wiU be observed that the Foreign Secretary of the Government
was absent from both of these important meetings, that is to say,
the responsible head of the o£B.ce through which the Viceroy's
communications with ah Chiefs and Princes are invariably con-
ducted, was not present at discussions which had an important
bearing on orders that he would eventually have to carry out. If
the Foreign Secretary was unable to attend through ilhiess, or any
other cause, the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department
could have attended. This was done in Lord Dalhousie's time in
a similar contingency. Thus, also in regard to the afi'airs of
Khelat, it will be remembered that the Viceroy deputed his own
Mihtary Secretary to be the bearer of confidential communications

* " Central Asia Papers," p. 45.

58

to the Khan, and to the British political Officer at that Court. In
the despatch of the 2'3rd of March, 1877, in vol. 2 " Beloochistan
Papers,*' paragraph 27, it is stated that " Colonel CoUey carried
out his mission with care and judgment." Admitting fully the
qualifications of Colonel Colley, it is clear that he was only one
of the officers of the Viceroy's own staff, and had no official or
responsible position connected with the Government of India,
neither had Colonel Burne as Private Secretary. The advice and
assistance of these officers in their proper sphere are calculated to
be of great value to the Viceroy, but that is not a solid ground
for allowing them to supersede the regularly- appointed officers of
the Government of India, who are the responsible advisers of the
Government, and who possess, what officers on the personal staff
of the Viceroy generally do not, trained experience in the working
of our Indian Administration, and are therefore better fitted to
carry out the decisions of the Government. One of the disad-
vantages of this irregular proceeding was, as will be remarked in
this case, that there is no official record of instructions to Colonel
Colley, nor any formal report from him. Under the old system
of government, these irregularities would have been animadverted
upon by the Homo Authorities. In connection with this new
mode of transacting business we have, in the published
"Afghanistan Correspondence," extracts from private notes and
memoranda put forward to establish certain important points (the
details, for instance, of what passed at the Umballa Conference)
which have been shown to have been positively incorrect. In fact,
in one instance, a gentleman not present at an interview is
allowed, years afterwards, to put his own interpretation on what
passed at the time, and what was really recorded then and there
by the Under-Secretary in the Foreign Department.

At the second meeting with Atta Mahomed, Lord Lytton
took occasion to explain to him, as he said subsequently,
" without reserve all that he had in his mind ; he had no doubt
that the British Agent would convey this faithfully to the Amir."
How Lord Lytton, holding as he did in his hand the momentous
issues of peace and war, could conceive that the use of language,

59

so calculated to provoke the bitterest feelings of hatred and
indignation in the breast of the Amir, was becoming the dignity
of his high office, it is difficult to understand. Let us select a
few of the choice expressions of this conciliatory message to Sher
Ali : — " Our only interest in maintaining the independence of
Afghanistan is to provide for the security of our own frontier.
But the moment we cease to regard Afghanistan as a friendly and
firmly-allied State, what is there to prevent us from pro\'iding for
the security of our frontier by an understanding with Russia,
which might have the effect of wiping Afghanistan out of the
map altogether? If the Amir does not desire to come to a
speedy understanding with us, Russia does, and she desires it, at
his expense." " If the Amir remained our friend, this military
power (the British) could be spread round him as a ring of iron,
and if he became our enemy, it could break him as a reed.''
" His own son is his opponent, conspiracies are rife in favour of
his son, the people are discontented, the treasury is empty. The
Amir's position is surrounded with difficulties. This is the man
who pretends to hold the balance between England and Russia,
independent of either. His position is rather that of an earthen
pipkin between two iron pots." This latter homely illustration,
although, perhaps. Lord Lytton is not aware of it, is a term of
low abuse amongst Orientals, and conveys a gross insult. Imagine
Atta Mahomed's astonishment at such language in the mouth of
the Viceroy. A chord of sympathy pervades the hearts of all
Mohammedans. With many high qualities, and capacities for
rule, they are a haughty, unforgi^-ing, fanatical race ; they
cherish the memories of their glorious Past ; and, doubtless, in his
inner mind, Atta Mahomed felt the insult offered to the Amir,
and commented upon it, in no friendly spirit to the British nation,
when closeted with his co-religionists.

" Is He the Angel Gabriel come down from heaven that he
should talk to me in this manner ?" said an old Mohammedan
Chief on the banks of the Indus forty years ago, when addressed
in somewhat similar language by a young political Agent, whose
careless words bore bitter fruit in after times of trouble. Mr. E.
Schuyler tells us " that the Russians personally have not so much

60

of that contemptuous feeling wliicli is so marked in the dealings
of the Anglo-Saxon race with people of lower culture and civiliza-
tion." The evil effects of such a pernicious example on the part
of a Viceroy are incalculable. We read in Gibbon of the haughty
message of the Mohammedan Caliph to the Kuman Emperor in
the Ylllth century, and its barbaric grandeur strikes the imagi-
nation. ''In the name of the most merciful God, Harun Al
Rashed, Commander of the Faithful, to Nicephorus the Roman
dog. I have read thy letter, 0 thou Son of an unbelieving
mother. Thou shalt not hear, thou shalt behold my reply."
" It was written in characters of blood and fire on the plains of
Phrygia." In the XlXth century we look for more measured
language and Christian humility from a Viceroy, who, Lord
Salisbury has the hardihood to tell the House of Lords, "in
caution and sound hard discretion has never been exceeded by any
Viceroy." The same Minister, when pressed home to explain his
misleading and unsatisfactory replies, says boldly, with true
Strafford ring, " In the future no answer at all shall be given to
questions of that kind." Let Englishmen who love the liberties
of their country beware of such '' Grand Viziers of government by
prerogative." On the 11th of October Lord Lytton addressed a
letter to Sher AH, and intrusted it to Atta Mahomed Khan, who
returned to Cabul at the end of that month. In this letter Lord
Lytton sent an invitation to the Amir to attend the assemblage at
Delhi on the 1st of January, 1877, for the proclamation of Her
Majesty's Imperial title. This was a mistake. It was not likely
that the Amir, as an independent Sovereign, would be flattered by
the invitation, or would accept it, as it would place him on a level
with the feudatory Princes of India. He returned no answer.
Lord Lytton also intimated that Sir Lewis Pelly would meet Sher
All's Prime Minister at Peshawur, if the Amir still desired to
enter into a treaty engagement.

Various letters from Atta Mahomed, after his arrival at
Cabul, state the result of discussions by Sher All's Ministers on
the question of receiving British officers. " Such an arrangement
filled them with apprehension." " Their opinion was that this

61

request of the British Government should be declined." In the
end, however, " owing to helplessness," " though considering that
the residence of British ofi&cers would not at all be advantageous
to the two Governments," the Amir consented, and his Prime
Minister, Syed ^oor Mahomed Shah, was despatched to Peshawur,
where he arrived on the 27th January, 1877, in very ill health.
Sir Lewis Pelly met him, and it may be remarked, without any
imputation upon that officer, who has filled many responsible
situations with credit, that his selection for this duty seems to
have been unfortunate. His Sinde antecedents were not Hkely to
prepossess the Afghans in his favour, nor his previous connection
with the Persian Mission at Tehran. He was a well-known sup-
porter of the aggressive policy of General Jacob and Sir Henry
Rawlinson. His name, too, had been prominently associated with
the deposition of the Guikwar. He was a new man on the
Punjab frontier, having had no dealings with the Afghans, nor
they with him. The Amir had been informed that he was the
Special Envoy whom Lord Lytton had brought out with him
from England, and intended to send to Cabul, and whose mission
the Amir had declined to receive.

The previous measures of the Viceroy were calculated to
alarm Sher Ali, and it was very probable that he would connect
Sir Lewis PeUy in some way with these measures. Syed Noor
Mahomed Shah had suggested the name of Colonel Pollock as
Commissioner to meet him : — *' On account of our former intimacy
they would be able, when they met, to talk over all matters
frankly and fully together." Sir Henry Rawlinson calls Syed
Noor Mahomed "the Amir's evil genius," and says, "he was
bitterly opposed to us." But this desire to meet an old friend is
rather proof to the contrary. The conditions sought to be im-
posed upon the Amir by Lord Lytton were, many of them,
entirely inconsistent with Sher Ali's independence. The Viceroy
certainly ojffered to become the jailer of Yakoob Khan, a conces-
sion, one would imagine, scarcely in accordance with the dignity
of Her Majesty's Representative. Even such a concession was not
likely to reconcile the Amir to proposals for the establishment of

62

telegraphic communication through his dominions, to the indis-
criminate admission of Englishmen, official and non-official, into
Afghanistan, and to the location of British Agents in Herat,
Balkh, and other Afghan cities.

There were other solid advantages no douht, if only Sher Ali
could be brought to appreciate them, and that he would do so in
the end Lord Lytton, looking at the matter from a purely English
point of view, apparently believed, as he states in his telegram of
the 2nd August, 1878: — ''We believe we could correct situation,
if allowed to treat as a question between us and the Amir, and
probably could do so without recourse to force.'^ No opportunity,
however, occurred of ascertaining whether the Amir would accept
the conditions proposed by Lord Lytton, as the prel'minary con-
dition on which Sir Lewis Pelly was directed to insist as a sine
qua non (viz., that of stationing British officers in Afghanistan)
occupied the whole time of the Conference, until the death of
Noor Mahomed Shah, which took place on the 26th March, 1877.

It is impossible to read the proceedings of the Conference,
without perceiving that one single question was uppermost in the
mind of the dying Envoy, charged as he was to convey the
sentiments of the Amir, and of the Afghan Chiefs and people.
" Why all this pressing," he says, " to send British officers to
Afghanistan, when you declare that you have no wish to interfere
in the internal affairs of Afghanistan ? It has roused the suspicion
of the Amir, and his suspicion is confirmed by the arbitrary acts
of your Government, and he is now convinced that to allow
British officers to reside in his country will be to relinquish his
own authority, and the lasting disgrace thus brought on the
Afghan people will be attached to his name, and he will sooner
perish than submit to this. The British nation is great and
powerful, and the Afghan people cannot resist its power, but the
people are self-willed and independent, and prize their honour
above Hfe." * What are Afghan honour and Afghan independence
to Lord Lytton? The distant and unreal danger of a Russian
advance on India overleaps such minor considerations. What are
villages burned, and homes destroyed, and women and children
"Afghanistan Papers," p. 195.

63

starved, and misery and hatred and despair sown broadcast
throughout the land, in comparison with ideal British interests
and the scientific rectification of a frontier ? Yes, the British
nation is great and powerful, as the dying Envoy said, with
marked earnestness and gravity, and the Afghan people are
weak, and Lord Lytton can break them as a reed, and trample
them under foot as an earthen pipkin, if they venture to stand in
the way of his Imperial policy. But God resisteth the proud ;
and this temper of mind, whether in indi\TLduals or in nations,
makes to itself great reverses.

On the death of Syed Noor Mahomed, Lord I^ytton lost
no time in closing the Conference, although he was aware
that a fresh Envoy was on his way from Cabul, who, it was
reported, had authority to accept all the conditions of the British
Government. Instead of exercising forbearance, and seizing on
every opening which afforded a prospect of bringing about a
peaceful settlement. Lord Lytton seems on all occasions to have
taken the exactly opposite course, and to have determined to cut
the Gordian knot of difficulties with the sword. At this critical
juncture, when it was especially desirable that some representative
of the British Government should be near Sher Ali, to take
advantage of any propitious moment to soothe his angry feelings,
to allay his suspicions, and to place matters in as favourable a
light as possible, not only with the Amir, but with the Chiefs
about his Court, Lord L}i:ton withdrew the British Agent from
Cabul. It is dif&cult to imagine a more ill-advised step. If
Russian intrigues were dreaded, this was to act precisely as they
would wish, and to throw the game entirely into their hands.
It deprived the Amir of all moral support, removed every check,
and, with a Chief of his moody and sullen disposition, sharpened
his sense of wrong, and gave him additional grounds for appre-
hension. It discouraged the well-wishers of the British Govern-
ment, and left them without a rallying point to make head
against the fanaticism of the anti-British party. They could not
trust each other, but they could trust a British Agent of rank of
their own creed, who would report favourably on their conduct,

64

and ensure them a reward. It was indeed a hostile measure,
and calculated to provoke hostility. It had the further disad-
vantage of leaving the British Government in ignorance of what
was going on at Cabul. Intelligence from that quarter hence-
forth only reached India through questionable and uncertain
channels of communication.

From March 1877 until July 1878 there appears to have
been no correspondence between the Viceroy and Sher AH.
Then came the news of the arrival of a Russian Mission at Cabul,
" the true purpose of which," Sir Henry Rawlinson tells us,
" was to confirm Sher Ali's hostility to England, and to provoke
us to enter on an armed conflict with the Afghans, the benevolent
aim of Russia being to lead us on to exhaust our strength in
what she hoped would be an endless and profitless struggle at
Cabul." This is mere conjecture ; we know little or nothing of
the real relations between Sher Ali and the Russian Mission, one
of the mischievous consequences of the withdrawal of the British
Agent at Cabul. We know that the Russian Mission was
detained a month on some pretext before it was permitted to
proceed through Afghan territory. The Amir declared he did
not, in the first instance, invite it. Lord Northbrook says '' that
he tried to prevent its going ; " but he gave it permission to come
on when he had no alternative. Its object, he said, was only to
exchange civilities. " He had no desire to give Russia a right of
way through his country." It was a source, no doubt, of embar-
rassment to him, and led to the postponement of the British
Mission, which it will be recollected he did not reject, but only
postponed. If, however, it was the " benevolent aim " of Russia
to involve us in war with the Afghans, she succeeded. One of
Napoleon's maxims in war was " never to do what the enemy
wished you to do, for this reason alone, that he desired it."
Lord Lytton seems to have acted on the contrary principle. This
Russian Mission of four or five Europeans, and a few Cossacks,
which Lord Beaconsfield admits was quite allowable, and which
was withdrawn immediately on a representation being made at
St. Petersburgh, fills Lord Lytton with alarm, and is the basis of

65

the violent poKcy subsequently pursued towards tlie Amir. He
despatches an urgent telegram, dated the 2nd of August, to the
Secretary of State, announcing " his intention to insist on
reception of suitable British Mission at Cabul, that he did not
anticipate serious resistance, that to re-establish the preponderance
of British inflaence in Afghanistan was necessary for the safety of
India," that influence apparently, in the Viceroy's opinion, being
endangered by the temporary presence of a few Russian Officers
at Cabul. If such were the case the safety of India must indeed
rest on a very sandy foundation. Lord Metcalfe certainly did
say " that we were sitting on a barrel of gunpowder in India, and
never knew when it would explode ;" and again, "that we should
wake up some morning, and find that we had lost India." But
Lord Metcalfe pointed to danger from within, and not from
without. In reference to the present state of affairs, that eminent
Statesman made another striking remark. " Depend upon it," he
said, " the surest way to bring Russia down upon ourselves, is for
us to cross the Indus, and meddle with the countries beyond it."

Lord Lytton, ignoring alike the lessons of history and of past
experience, fixes his eyes on Russian machinations, and seems
blind to other contingencies. It is decided by the Yiceroy that
Sir Neville Chamberlain shall be deputed to Cabul, as British
Envoy, and Kawab Gholam Hussein Khan is directed to pro-
ceed in advance with a letter to the Amir. On the 17th of
August, AbduUa Jan, the heir apparent, dies; and a delay occurs
before the Mission can commence its journey. Meantime Lord
Lytton telegraphs to the Commissioner of Peshawur, to inform one
of the Amir's principal officers that the Mission will, in any case,
leave Peshawur about the 16th of September; that a refusal of
free passage and safe conduct will be considered " an act of open
hostihty." Nawab Gholam Hussein Khan reached Cabul on the
10th of September. He was well received on the journey, and
hospitably entertained on arrival. On the 12th he had an inter-
view with the Amir, and reported him to be very much displeased,
and as saying, "It is as if they were come by force. I do not
agree to the Mission coming in this manner. It is as if they wish

E

66

to disgrace me. I am a friend, as before, and entertain no ill
will.'' If Mission advance now, " resistance anticipated." Again,
" that the Amir intimated that he would send for the Mission to
clear up mutual misunderstandings, provided there was no attempt
to force the Mission upon him without his consent being first
granted, according to usual custom, otherwise he would resist it, as
coming in such a manner would be a slight to him.""^ In a later
letter, dated Cabul, 15th September, Gholam Hussein states :— " If
Mission starts on 18th, without waiting for Amir's permission,
there would be no hope left for the renewal of friendship or recon-
ciliation."! On the 19th of September, Sir Neville Chamberlain
telegraphed to the Viceroy, that it was now quite evident that the
Amir was determined on asserting his claims to total independence
of action with regard to the Mission; but that he held out the
hope that hereafter he would receive it honourably. " Unless
your Lordship accepts this position, all chance of a peaceful solu-
tion seems to me gone." Under instructions from the Yiceroy,
the Mission moved out of Peshawur to Jumrood on the 21st of
September, and Major Cavagnari was sent forward with a small
escort in the direction of Ali Musjid, to demand a passage through
the Khyber from the commandant of the fort, Faiz Mahomed,
who declared that, without orders from the Amir, he could not
allow the Mission to pass his post, but " who from first to last,"
Major Cavagnari writes, " behaved in a most courteous manner,
and very favourably impressed both, Colonel Jenkins and myself."|
Major Cavagnari asks, " Shall I make another attempt to-
morrow morning, and try to bring Faiz Mahomed to reason, or
make him fire upon us ?" Sir Neville Chamberlain does not wish
to push matters to this extremity, and returns to Peshawur, and
the Mission is dissolved. He writes in his report : — " The Mission
had failed ; it had been turned back at the threshold of the Amir's
dominions mth an afi'ront delivered before all the world." The
affront was the more pointed, as two scions of the noble families
of Tonk and Jeypore accompanied the Mission. But whose con-
duct led up to this afi'ront ? Was it not that of Lord Lytton ? He
knew well beforehand that the Mission would not be allowed to

*p. 243. 1243. J p. 249.

67

pass without the Amir's previous consent, and he had every reason
to beHeve, also, that if he waited a short time that consent would
be obtained.

Eugene Schuyler says justly, with reference to the Khokhan-
dians, what apphes equally to the Afghans : — " Asiatics do not
practise common sense, which would forbid them to begin a strug-
gle disproportionate to their means/' With the overwhelming
strength of British power we could have afforded to wait. It was
as certain as anything could be that by hurrying matters we
should bring on a conflict, and that that conflict would entail the
shedding of blood — the blood of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of
innocent persons, inhabiting the hills and valleys where their
forefathers had dwelt for ages in freedom, owning allegiance
neither to the Amir, nor to the British Government, nor to any-
one except to their own Chiefs. With our improved arms of pre-
cision, our mountain guns, and formidable field artillery, our
almost unlimited resources in men and money, there was no doubt
that we could coerce these wild, undisciplined mountaineers. We
could carry fire and sword throughout their homes ; and if we
chose, we could, as some have recommended, exterminate whole
tribes. But is such conduct worthy of a great Christian nation ?
Will it commend itself to the millions of Asiatics over whom we
rule in India ? Will it tend to allay the feehngs of dishke and
disafi'ection with which there is little reason to doubt, unfortu-
nately, that the larger portion of our Mohammedan subjects regard
British domination ?

There is a Hp service founded on fear, and there is a deeper
service of the heart based on justice, which all men in all
countries can reverence and appreciate. Sir Henry Eawlinson
writes : — " War with the Afghans is to be deprecated beyond all
other wars, because, however it may end, it will leave behind it a
heavy legacy of debt, and the hatred of a people who ought to
be our friends." Again : — " Our old blood feuds with the
Ghilzyes and Duranis will be revived and intensified, so that it
will be next to impossible to restore that mutual confidence,
which could alone warrant our placing in the hands of the

68

Afghans the permanent defence of our extreme Northern
frontier." There are not only present evils, but the seeds of
future evil sown, to bring forth a plentiful harvest of trouble
hereafter. All this is done, according to the Viceroy's proclama-
tion, in order that " the British Government may find the best
security for its Indian frontier in the friendship of a State whose
independence it seeks to confirm." In the same strain Sir
Neville Chamberlain writes : — " The object of the Mission was to
promote peace, and to bring about, if it was possible, a return to
friendly and close relations with the Amir."

Surely all this talk of peace and friendship is a strange
perversion of language taken in connection with what was
evidently to be the result of the course Lord Lytton was pur-
suing. But to blame Lord Lytton is not to exculpate the Amir.
Everyone can see that Sher Ali behaved like a madman, and
hurried on to his own destruction. An individual may behave
badly when a quarrel is forced upon him, but if he is not the
aggressor, allowances are made for his conduct. In Sher All's
case, we have on the one side Christianity and a boasted higher
civiHzation, and on the other a half-civilized Ruler and a still
less civilized aggregate of ignorant and fanatical tribes, and quasi
independent Chiefs, on whose fitful support the Amir could place but
Httle reliance. *' Had there been no Hussian Mission at Cabul,"
Sir Henry Eawlinson writes, " no indication of a desire on the
part of the Turkestan authorities to interfere in Indian poKtics,
we might have allowed the Amir to be sulky and grumbhng, and
even insolent, for the term of his natural life."

Here we have stated in plain and direct terms the real grounds
of our forward movement into Afghanistan. Sher Ali and the
Afghan nation were powerless by themselves to cause any anxiety
or alarm, unless backed by Russian troops and Russian resources.

Now it may be asked with confidence whether it was in the
smallest degree probable that Russia, at the close of an exhausting
war with a comparatively feeble antagonist, where her losses in
men and officers had been so great, and her expenditure so heavy,
would have been likely to provoke a fresh contest with one of the

most powerful nations in tlie world. If the Russian Mission was
pregnant with disastrous consequences to India, as has been so
persistently affirmed, but which remains to be proved, we had
only to demand its withdrawal, and Russia would have acquiesced,
as in fact she did acquiesce. We could have then dealt with
Sher Ali at our leisure. Lord Lytton's course of action had no
doubt complicated the question, alarmed the Amir, and thrown
obstacles in the way of friendly negotiations. But with the dis-
appearance of the Russian Mission the greatest difficulty would
have been removed. Sher Ali declared that on the departure
of the Russians he would receive the British Mission, and he
might have been persuaded to meet the Yiceroy at Peshawur, or
elsewhere, where by an interchange of friendly courtesies, as at
UmbaUa in 1869, a better state of feehng might have been
brought about. But to effect this, the obnoxious condition of
stationing British officers in Afghan territory must have been
withdrawn. This, however, was a cardinal point in the policy of
Lord Salisbury and Lord Lytton to be forced on Sher Ali at aU
hazards, and on the Afghan people, who were more averse to this
measure than Sher Ali himself. We find, at page 367 of M.
Ferrier's " Caravan Journeys," a narrative of the risk he ran at
Candahar, though under the protection of Kohundil Khan, a
brother of Dost Mahomed, then Ruler of that city. The people
were dying of cholera. One of the TJlemas declared that "while
Candahar was sullied by the presence of an infidel, the enemy of
God and man, there would be no cessation of their affliction."
M. Ferrier's house was besieged for three days ; Kohundil Khan
himself was obhged to take refuge in the citadel until a rein-
forcement of troops arrived and put an end to the insurrection.
The same spirit of fanaticism stiU exercises unbounded sway
over the large majority of the Afghan population, and though,
under the coercive influence of a British force, it may be quiescent
for a time, any favourable opportunity would bring its dormant
elements into dangerous activity.

On the dissolution of Sir NeviUe Chamberlain's Mission, Lord
Lytton directed the assemblage of troops, with a view to early

70

ulterior operations. Shortly afterwards the answer of the Amir,
dated 6th October, to the Viceroy's letter, conveyed by Nawab
Gholam Hussein, was received. This answer of Sher Ali was
couched in a tone of indignant remonstrance, complaining of
letters transmitted to the Cabul Officials by the Commissioner of
Peshawur, and of the harsh and breathless haste of the pro-
ceedings of Lord Lytton, but it was neither defiant nor insulting.
The Viceroy, however, considered it as conveying a direct chal-
lenge, and would have immediately commenced hostihties.

Lord Canning's reluctance to enter upon warlike operations
against Persia forms a marked contrast to Lord Lytton' s precipi-
tancy in hurrying on a collision with the Amir. Lord Canning
writes to Mr. Vernon Smith, April 22nd, 1856 : — " Do not be
afraid of my being unduly hasty to punish Persia. Unless the
Shah should steam up the Hooghly with Murray swinging at his
yard arm, I hope that we shall be able to keep the peace until
your instructions arrive." Lord Lytton sent a telegram to the
Secretary of State counselling instant action, but her Majesty's
Government very properly determined to make another effort to
avert the calamities of war, and the Viceroy was directed, before
crossing the frontier into Afghanistan, to demand an apology from
Sher Ali in temperate language. Unfortunately the Ultimatum
was not drawn up in a conciliatory tone, the acceptance of a
permanent British Mission was still insisted upon, and a very few
days were allowed for the Amir to make up his mind. Sher Ali
returned no answer to the Ultimatum within the appointed time,
the 20th of November, and on the 21st of that month the
Viceroy issued his Proclamation of War. On the same day the
British troops advanced and, as was to be expected, complete success
crowned their operations. In spite of advantages of position, and
the great natural obstacles of the country, the Afghan undisci-
phned tribes have always succumbed easily to the valour and
discipline of a British force when well handled, and have never
made any determined resistance like the Goorkahs or Sikhs, or
even the Rajpoot and Mahratta armies. Many of the Afghans
are individually brave, but they have no cohesion, no trust in

71

their leaders, who possess little military capacity. Each Afghan
fights for his own hand, and they have always proved themselves
contemptible enemies when they have been met in the open plains.

The Cabul catastrophe casts a dark shadow over past cam-
paigns in Afghanistan ; our constant easy victories during years
of warfare faded out of sight, and Afghan prowess was much
exaggerated. Sir WiUiam Nott wrote : — " The Army at Candahar
has defeated the enemy in some sixteen actions, tranquillized the
whole country, made every Afghan bend the knee, never met with
a reverse, however outnumbered by the enemy." * It must be
recollected also, in Sir Wm. Nott's days, the range of the British
musket in the hands of the Sepoy was inferior to that of the
Afghan weapon (the Jezail). It is a very different matter at the
present time, when the superiority of our arms of precision gives
us an immense advantage.

Any danger from an invasion of India by Afghans, which
has been held up by some as a reason for an advance of frontier,
may be dismissed as undeserving of serious consideration. Sir
Henry Rawlinson tells us that " Aryans, Greeks and Scythians,
Turks, Persians and Afghans, have, at different periods of history,
swept down upon India, and that it has never been found possible
to arrest the progress of the invader before he crossed the Indus."
Sir Henry does not add, what is an important element in the cal-
culation, that invaders of the present day would have to meet a
very different enemy to those of former periods of history — a
well-disciplined, well-equipped British army, composed of as fine
troops as any in the world, and furnished with the latest arms of
precision, and any amount of artillery and munitions of war.
These troops, led by ofScers of the highest professional skill and
capacity, acting under a strong united Government, abounding in
all the resources that vast wealth can provide, in complete con-
trast to the Governments that existed at the time of successful
invasions of India, which were, without exception, weak, corrupt,
and divided amongst themselves, with traitors in their camps and
Councils, who looked more to their own interests than to the defence

of their country.

" Sir W. Nott's Life," Vol. II., p. 66.

72

In 1868, Sir Henry Eawlinson drew " an alarming picture of
50,000 Persian Sirbaz, supported by a Russian column, and
hinted that it might be successful, owing to the prevalent dis-
affection of the Mohammedan population of India." In like
manner, quite recently, he brings to notice the rumoured project of
the Russian Minister of War to transfer bodily across the Caspian
to Asterabad the army of the Caucasus for an attack on Herat ;
but in subsequent paragraphs he demolishes this scheme, " as all
the Yolga steamers would be quite insufficient to move 70,000
men," and, " without the co-operation of Persia, which could not
be relied on, neither carriage nor provisions could be obtained for
the march through Khorasan." If these important elements for
the success of an invading army would not be available in
Khorasan, the want of them v^rould be likely to be still more
felt in Afghanistan, where, as Sir Henry Lawrence wrote in
1856, " a large army would be starved in a week." In
reference to Sir Richard Temple's statement of Mohammedan
disaffection in India, Sir Henry Rawlinson characterizes the
language used as " alarmist in tone, and exaggerated in sub-
stance." Many persons will be inclined to think that the threat-
ened danger of 50,000 Persian Sirbaz in 1868, and of 70,000
Russians in 1878, may well be classed in the same category.

The immeasurable superiority of the power of the British Empire,
compared with the petty disorganized kingdom of Cabul, is beyond
dispute. When the season permits of a renewal of warlike opera-
tions, if the Afghans have not previously submitted, at more or
less cost of life and money, according to circumstances, it is clear
that we can overrun, and, if we choose, subjugate the country.
But, as the Duke of Wellington said in reference to the cam-
paign of 1839, "our difSculties will commence where our military
successes end." The important question then arises. What do we
intend to do ? Has the Government any fixed policy, or is it
drifting along, the creature of circumstances, to find itself, at no
very distant period, saddled with responsibilities political and
financial, which, at the outset, never entered into its calculation,
and which may prov^e disastrous to the welfare and prosperity of

73

our Indian Empire ? Lord Wellesley always spoke contemptu-
ously of the folly of occupying a land of " rocks, sands, deserts,
ice, and snow." Is this what Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Lytton
have in contemplation ? Lord Lytton states in his Proclamation
that "with the Sirdars and people of Afghanistan this Govern-
ment has still no quarrel, and desires none. They are absolved
from all responsibility from the recent acts of the Amir, and as
they have given no offence, so the British Government, wishing
to respect their independence, will not willingly injure or interfere
with them." General Roberts's announcement that the districts
occupied by his troops are henceforth to be considered British
territory is scarcely in accordance with the Proclamation of the
Viceroy ; but how far this apparent pledge of annexation commits
the Government remains to be seen. Sher Ali has fled from
Cabul, whether, like Dost Mahomed, to appear again upon the
scene, time will show. Lord Northbrook's Government tells us
in their despatch of 28th January, 1876, " there can be no ques-
tion that the power of Amir Sher Ali Khan has been consolidated
throughout Afghanistan in a manner unknown since the days of
Dost Mahomed. jSTowhere has intrigue or rebellion been able to
make head in the Amir's dominions."

It was foreseen by those acquainted with Afghan politics that
our advance into Afghanistan would shatter the Government. Our
object was to have a strong and friendly State upon our Xorth-
Westem frontier. The first result of our present policy is to weaken
and disintegrate the cohesion, which, for the last ten years, had been
assuming a more permanent fi)rm, and to let loose the elements of
disorder, which have so generally prevailed in Afghanistan. Besides
breaking up their Government, we have made the Afghans our
enemies. As long as they believed that we had no intention of
annexing any territory beyond the passes, they would have felt more
fear of Russia than of ourselves. Our advance to Quettah alarmed
them, and our present proceedings will have confirmed them in the
view that it is our determination eventually to occupy their country.
This is not a good foundation for a safe frontier. We desire to
raise up a barrier against Russian intrigues. There could not have

74

been a better barrier than Afghan jealousy of interference and
love of independence : all those feelings are now enlisted against
us, and on the side of Russia. We may build fortresses at great
cost, but unless we hold the country in strength, with a hostile
population, our posts would be always in danger, and useless for
the purpose for which we profess to advance them. And to what
point are we to advance ? A recent writer in i\iQ Quarterly Review,
evidently master of the subject, sketches out what we may have
to do : — " It might be necessary to take up strong and command-
ing positions in front at Mymeneh, at B ami an, and on the river
of Badakshan, so as to overawe Turkestan, and compel the Rus-
sians to act on the defensive rather than the offensive."

If we contemplate the relative distances of Mymeneh, Bamian,
and the river of Badakshan, how far removed they all are from
our base, how great the difficulties must be of obtaining sup-
plies, how vast the expense of maintaining garrisons in these
remote provinces, and, after all, how inadequate such precautions
must prove to overawe Turkestan, the British Government may
weU pause before it embarks upon such a crusade. Moreover,
should these advanced posts be really threatened by Russia, rein-
forcements must be hurried up at all hazards, stores of all kinds,
especially munitions of war, must be transported at enormous cost.
Major Wood states that every round shot brought to Central Asia
by the Russians is computed to have cost nearly two pounds ster-
ling in transport. The difficulties of obtaining carriage and sup-
plies for the convoys, regular communication with the rear being
certain to be interrupted, would be almost insurmountable.

Those who are opposed to the present advance into Afghanis-
tan do not believe in the wisdom of a policy that would seek to
overawe Turkestan. They do not consider that Russia has either
the power or the resources to undertake so gigantic an enterprise
as a hostile invasion of India. Her hold on Central Asia requires
consolidation. She has overrun rapidly a vast extent of territory
sparsely inhabited, the inhabitants being chiefly nomad hordes
— poor, fanatical, as hkely as not to break out into insurrection
should a favourable opportunity occur. India does not afford us

75

35 secure a base of military operations as we could wish, but it is
much more secure than Turkestan to the Eussians ; and all the
resources of the British Empire are nearer and more easily avail-
able on the banks of the Indus than the resources of Eussia on
the banks of the Oxus. Mr. Schuyler tells us '' that the revenues
of Central Asia are insufB.cient to meet the expenses of adminis-
tration, more and more taxes are demanded, and since the
occupation of the country by the Russians, the condition of the
population has not only not grown better, but on the contrary is
every day getting worse and worse."

We may put aside any prospect of present danger from Russia,
but it is said we must provide for the future. We must convert a
haphazard into a scientific frontier. Until lately this so-called
haphazard frontier was considered the best adapted for our security
by the highest military authorities. At the present moment, it is
believed that the preponderance of military authority is against
an advance of frontier, even on purely strategical grounds. Ad-
mitting, however, that there may be a question on this point, as
there are doubtless names of great weight on either side, there
can be no question of the political and financial disadvantages
that must result from a further extension of our Indian territories.
These disadvantages, will, of course, prove of greater or less mag-
nitude, according to the final arrangements made by Her Majesty's
Government for the settlement of Afghanistan. If we are
moderate in our demands, and forbearing in our hour of triumph,
we may yet limit our responsibilities, and spare India a financial
burden she is ill fitted to support. If, on the contrary, the easy
success which has hitherto attended our arms becomes a
snare and a delusion to lead us on to the permanent
occupation of Afghan territory, and to direct intervention in
the fathomless gulf of Afghan politics, the wisest Statesman
may be at fault in rightly estimating future difficulties.
Prominent among these difficulties is the establishment of
satisfactory relations with the independent Afghan tribes
inhabiting the mountain ranges between our present border,
and the country owing allegiance to the Amir of Afghanistan.

76

These tribes have enjoyed their independence for hundreds of
years ; strong in their mountain fastnesses, inured to arms from
their youth upwards, their hand against every man, and every
man's hand against them, they cHng \Ndth tenacity to their
republican institutions, and have never bowed their necks to any
settled government. They were a thorn in the side of the Mogul
Emperors, and on several occasions inflicted severe defeats on
armies sent against them.

In a night attack, for which the Afghans have always been
famous, the Eusofzyes killed Bir Bal, one of Akber's favourite
Generals, and destroyed many thousands of his troops. Mr.
Elphinstone writes : — " They were never more formidable than in
the reign of Aurungzebe ; they resisted repeated attacks from the
Kings of Persia and Cabul, and retain their turbulent independence
undiminished to the present day." When E-unjeet Sing pushed
his dominions beyond the Indus, these tribes carried on an i'nter-
necine war with the Sikhs, who vainly strove to coerce them, by
building forts, and punishing them with Draconian severity.
General Avitabile, Governor of Peshawur, dared not leave his
capital, except accompanied by a large force. On the annexation
of the Punjab the country afSicted with this chronic state of dis-
order passed under our rule, and ever since it has been the endea-
vour of the British Government to place our relations with these
border tribes on a better footing. Progress in this work of concilia-
tion and improvement has been necessarily slow ; the habits of
centuries are not overcome in a few years, and the administrative
exigencies of a vast Empire are so various and extensive that
attention could not be concentrated on one corner of our territories,
so as to produce very rapid effects. But all acquainted with the
subject will admit that very tangible results had been produced,
the chief dif&culties had been overcome, and greater results would
have followed. Now, however, we are to commence afresh on a
new course of action, we are to take all the passes into our own
hands, and keep down by force of arms tens of thousands of these
warlike and independent mountaineers. With this object we are
to place isolated posts in exposed positions, where they will have

77

enough to do to take care of themselves, and will exercise little or
no influence over the mountain fastnesses on every side of them,
from whence the predatory tribes will have the opportunity of
issuing forth to plunder convoys which must be continually passing
to and fro to supply the garrisons.

While these tribes were in front of us, we could always meet
them at an advantage, when they ventured into the plains. We
generally had timely notice of their approach, and could collect a
sufficient force to preclude the chance of any untoward accident ;
but with an immensely extended area of operations, it will be
more difficult to use the same precautions, and to provide against
aU contingencies. Although they owned no allegiance to the
Amir of Cabul, and set his authority at defiance whenever it
suited their purpose, plundering the baggage of Dost Mahomed
and Sher AH, as they plundered the property of every one who
trespassed on their confines whenever they saw an opening, still
the rulers of Afghanistan had a certain amount of influence,
which when exerted in favour of peace and order was not
without its value. In rendering the Afghans hostile to us we
add another disturbing element to the task of conciHating the
tribes and pacifying the frontier, and also another element of
discontent with our rule, which may prove contagious at a
moment when we are least prepared with means of repression.
The native army, reorganized since the mutiny, contains within
its ranks a larger proportion of Mohammedan soldiers, many of
them enhsted from the tribes on the frontier. When stationed
amongst their own native hills, and employed to coerce their own
countrymen, the loyalty of these troops will be put to a test to
which in its full extent it has not hitherto been subjected, and
which is not without danger. Twenty years ago we passed
through a tremendous ordeal, and through God's mercy emerged
from it triumphantly. What has happened may happen again. If
at that period large bodies of our troops had been stationed in
forts and garrisons far distant beyond the passes in Afghanistan,
it may be left to any reasonable person to determine whether our
difficulties would not have been greatly increased.

78

WMe there is danger in tliis respect, on the other hand service
in Afghanistan will always be unpopular with natives of Hindostan
of all castes and classes. The Sikhs and Goorkhas will view with
inveterate dislike any prolonged residence at such a distance from
their homes, which involves separation from their wives and
families, in an uncongenial climate where all the necessaries of
life are so expensive. The Goorkhas are especially sensitive in
regard to separation from their families. If the service in
Afghanistan is distasteful to native troops, much more so must it
prove to the numerous class of camp followers so essential in
India to the well-being and efficiency of an army in the field.
The sufierings of these poor creatures in our last advance to Cabul
and in the disastrous retreat were dreadful, and if rumour speaks
truly, the heaviest burden has also fallen upon them in the present
campaign.

All these causes of future embarrassment and difficulty
connected with an advance of frontier are overlooked by
many persons who have neither the time nor the opportunity
to study this important question. In the lapse of years
the lessons of the former war in Afghanistan have been
forgotten by the people of England, but its baneful eflTects have
left a deep impression on the minds of the people of
India. This impression is not Hkely to be efi'aced, or to conduce
to their contentment, when, according to the decision of Her
Majesty's Government, they are called upon to pay additional
taxes in order to defray the expenses of the present war. At the
time Lord Canning was leaving India, Raja Dinkur Rao wrote a
memorandum for him, full of suggestive remarks, from a native
point of view, as to the policy the British Government should
pursue towards its native subjects. He says : — " To every Govern-
ment the foundations of security are twofold — 1st, the strength of
the army ; 2nd, the contentment of its subjects. Both these are
essential. Then after enumerating the benefits conferred upon
India by British rule, he writes : — " While all these things are
before the subjects in favour of a Government which does so
much for their comfort, they are still greatly dissatisfied with the
severity of some of the regulations which are against their

79

customs, and with various kinds of stamp duties and taxes, almost
all classes are very mucli bewildered from being harassed in all
the ordinary occupations of their lives. By this means the people
have forgotten the goodness of the British Government, the love
which they once entertained for it, and have begun to prefer the
tyranny of Native Princes." He goes on to complain of the
income tax, the license tax, and the heavier salt tax, as especially
obnoxious to the people, and adding to causes of former discontent.
All those acquainted with India are aware that increased taxation
becomes more and more dangerous to the tranquilhty of the
country. Several of the distinguished Statesmen who have filled
the high oflB.ce of Viceroy have brought this subject, of late years,
to the notice of the Home Authorities in forcible language. Owing
to the recurrence of famines, the depreciation of silver, the general
depression of trade, and other causes, India, at the present
moment, is less able than ever to support additional financial bur-
dens, and the cost of an unnecessary war is not likely to render
them more palatable to native opinion. What would entail a very
light pressure on England might prove of serious moment in India.
Lord Salisbury has himself stated : — " The difiference between
England and India in matters of finance is this, that in England
you can raise a large increase of taxation without in the least
degree endangering our institutions, whereas you cannot do so in
India." According to a statement in ParKament by the Under
Secretary of State for India, based upon a calculation made by the
Indian Government as to what the war was hkely to cost, the
expenditure to be incurred within the present financial year, which
closes on the 31st of March, 1879, was put down at £950,000.
And as there is an estimated surplus of £1,550,000, the Secretary
of State adds: — "It must be perfectly obvious that the Indian
Government could pay the whole cost of the war during the pre-
sent year without adding a shilling to the taxation or the debt of
the country."

It may be observed that the gist of the matter is not what may
be actually expended from the Treasury on the war up to the 31st
of March, but what wiU be the whole expenditui-e by the time the

80

war is brought to a conclusion. It is to be hoped that the san-
guine expectations of the Government may be realized, but those
who recollect the expenditure incurred in the last war in Afghan-
istan may be permitted to express a doubt upon this vital point.

From the published Parliamentary papers, it appeared there
were ten millions of accumulated surplus in the various treasuries
of India, when the war in 1839 began. Not only was this entirely
expended by the end of the year 1841, but a loan of five millions
had to be raised at an unusually high rate of interest. Sir Eobert
Peel stated in Parhament, on the 23rd June, 1842, that there had
been a surplus revenue, just before the commencement of the war,
of a million and a half, which, in 1840-41, was converted into a
deficit of £2,324,000. In his letter to Lord Aberdeen, of Sep-
tember 1841, Sir Henry Willock stated that so severely were the
finances of Calcutta pressed, that a stoppage of payment at Fort
"William was at one time contemplated by the Supreme Council.

On the 6th April, 1842, the Court of Directors brought to
the notice of the President of the Board of Control, that the
Government of India had intimated their intention '' to discon-
tinue their remittances for the supply of the Home Treasury, by
means of advances upon goods hypothecated to the Court. The
Local Government have been compelled to adopt this course by
their financial difiiculties, which have been wholly caused by the
expensive operations in which they have been engaged beyond the
Indus."

The total military expenditure of India, during the five years
ending with 1837-38, amounted to a little more than thirty-eight
millions sterling; in the following five years it exceeded forty-
eight milhons. It was affirmed, on good authority, that nearly a
miUion sterling was expended on camels alone — 70,000 of these
animals were reported to have perished during the campaign.
The loss of horses also was very great. Major Hough states that
in one day it was requisite to shoot fifty-three horses. Want of
forage for the cattle, and want of provisions for the troops and
followers, characterized the former advance into Afghanistan. It
is well known that in many parts of the country the population

81

itself is constantly in a state of semi-starvation. There is no
reason to believe that the productiveness of Afghanistan has
increased of late years, but, on the contrary, that it has diminished.
What must, therefore, be the difficulty and expense of procuring
supplies for men and cattle during a long campaign? British
energy, and a lavish expenditure of money will, no doubt, over-
come these difficulties; but all this Avill contribute to swell the cost
of the war, and lead to further embarrassments.

Sir James Outram writes, in his rough notes, on 29th April,
1839 : — '' The army is in great distress for want of provisions, six
days' supplies only remain in the Commissariat stores, and
the merchants of Candahar, who profess to have nothing in
reserve, retail wheat flour in small quantities, at the rate of two
seers (4 lbs.) the rupee, everything else being proportionately dear."
Again: — "Provisions are daily becoming scarcer, and more dear,
and flour has actually attained the exorbitant rate of a single seer
for the rupee, a price which is, of course, quite beyond the
means of our impoverished followers. Xo grain has as yet been
obtained hr the horses." " The effects of the unwholesome food
which the wretched followers have been obliged to consume, is
everywhere painfully manifest."

He had previously written: — "The followers of the army
were compelled to eke out their subsistence by picking up
weeds." Subsequently the followers received their rations from
the Commissariat in the same manner as the native troops, a very
merciful measure; but the enormous expense entailed upon the
Government by such a concession, with provisions at famine prices,
may well be imagined. The effect of the exorbitant price of food
of all descriptions, and the consequent increased scarcity, must
have been to inflict great hardship and suffering on the poorer
classes of the population of the country, and on classes with fixed
stipends ; and Sir William Macnaghten states that this was one of
the causes of British unpopularity. In the present campaign it
is believed that the native troops who have crossed the frontier
receive rations from the Commissariat, as in the previous war.
When it is recollected that the number of troops in the three

82

armies now employed exceeds those sent forward on tlie former
invasion of Afghanistan, some idea may be formed of the expendi-
ture likely to be incurred. In order to reduce this expenditure to
the lowest point, Lord Lytton has not shrunk from the risk of
denuding India of its garrisons, resorting to the questionable
expedient of being indebted to Native Princes for contingents of
troops to fill their places. Lord Dalhousie, in his minute of 28th
February, 1856, observed : — "ISTo prudent man who has any know-
ledge of Eastern affairs, would ever venture to predict the main-
tenance of continued peace within our Eastern possessions.
Experience — frequent, hard, and recent experience — has taught us
that war from without, or rebellion from within, may at any time
be raised against us, in quarters where they were the least to be
expected, and by the most feeble and unlikely instruments."

As far as can be ascertained, we have now seventeen regiments
of British cavalry and infantry, and thirty-eight regiments of
native cavalry and infantry, and about twenty-five batteries of
artillery employed in Afghanistan, or on the very confines of our
North- West frontier, in support of the troops in advance. In order
to replace this large portion of the garrison of India, two
regiments of British infantry, which were to have come home,
have been detained, and fifteen thousand recruits have been added
to the native army. If trouble should arise in the interior, or at
the other extremity of our dominions, the Government might find
itself in a dilemma to provide troops to meet the emergency. By
the proposed advance of frontier, we multiply greatly the chances
of collision both from within and from without, and impose upon
India the absolute necessity of paying for a larger proportion of
European troops, as any force stationed in Afghanistan must be
chiefly composed of British regiments. On a very moderate
estimate, even the occupation of posts above the passes would
entail an additional burden on the revenues of India of more
than a million sterling a year ; and, in the event of a further
advance, which would most probably occur, enhanced expendi-
ture would of course follow. The want of means has been the
real reason why important works connected with the strengthen-

83

ing of our North-Western frontier, whicli have been for a series of
years recommended by the highest military authorities, have not
been executed. The completion of our railway communication to
Peshawur, the construction of bridges across the Indus, the
erection of fortifications in suitable positions, have all been con-
stantly before the Government, and only delayed from financial
considerations. These works relate only to the frontier ; but how
many undertakings of the highest utility throughout India are
obhged to be indefinitely postponed from the same cause? Already,
at the very outset of the present war, the local Governments have
been compelled to issue resolutions suspending the execution of
aU pubhc works and grants of money until the state of the
finances will permit of sanction being accorded.

To use the words of Lord Sandhurst, " it cannot be too often
repeated that the occupation of Afghanistan, on account of the
financial diflB.cult}^, is the stoppage of progress in India." Her
Majesty's Government, it is but fair to conclude, have an equal
interest with previous Governments in the welfare and prosperity
of India, and in undertaking the grave responsibility of an advance
into Afghanistan, they must beHeve that such a step is impera-
tively necessary for the safety of our Eastern dominions. But they
cannot be blind to the impoverished state of India, nor to the
political risks to be incurred by any attempt to impose additional
taxation. They must therefore desire, as much as the strongest
opponents of their present policy, to reduce to a minimum the
burden about to be thrown on the Indian finances. It is clear
that, however costly the expenditure incurred in the advance into
Afghanistan, the permanent occupation of the country will entail
a far heavier pressure upon the revenues of India ; those revenues,
according to Sir John Strachey, possessing " no true surplus o\'er
expenditure to cover the many contingencies to which a great
country is exposed." What, then, is the course to be pursued ?
What is the solution of the present dif&cult conjuncture of afi'airs,
which is likely to be attended with the fewest political responsi-
bilities, and the smallest probable future expenditure ?

It must be admitted that the dif&culties to be surmounted are

84

very great, aud depend to a certain extent upon contingencies not
to be foreseen. The beginning of strife is as wben one letteth
out water, the end is often beyond our own control. The first
thing to be achieved is to bring the war to an honourable con-
clusion. The brilliant success that has attended the operations
already undertaken bear ample witness to the gallantry and
endurance of our troops, and to the promptitude, skill, and judg-
ment of the generals in command. Whatever our armies may be
called upon to perform, it is quite certain they will do their duty
with the same valour and efficiency which they have always
shown in all previous campaigns in every quarter of the globe.
Peace, therefore, will be secured, either by an early submission of
the Afghan leaders, or, after a short delay, as soon as the season
permits of warlike movements. Hostilities being ended, and our
power vindicated, the grand feature of our policy should be
moderation in our demands.

Lord Lytton has proclaimed to the world that "with the
Sirdars and people of Afghanistan the British Government has
no quarrel, and desires none ; " and that " it will respect their
independence." Let us act up to this declaration by insisting
upon nothing that will wound the national feeling, and thus tend
to keep alive a spirit of bitterness, and sow the seeds of future
dissension. Meanwhile, now is the time to place our relations
with Russia, in regard to these countries, upon a permanent and
definite footing. We have hitherto never gone to the root of this
great question with Russia, we have dealt with things on the
surface in a vague undecided . manner. Mr. Schuyler, who, it
may be observed, is perhaps not wholly impartial, but whose
opinion nevertheless carries weight, writes : — " The attitude of
England towards Russia, with regard to Central Asia, can hardly
be called a dignified one. There are constant questions, protests,
demands for explanation, and even threats, at least in the
newspapers, but nothing is ever done." Subsequently to the
understanding entered into at the period of Mr. Gladstone's
administration, Russia certainly endeavoured to fasten upon
England the responsibility of controlling Sher AH, but this was

85

entirely repudiated by Mr. Gladstone in his important speech of
23rd April, 1873. iiussia then let it be understood that, if
England had preserved her freedom of action, Russia had done
the same. Again, Mr. Schuyler writes, evidently speaking from
a Russian point of viev/ : — " Unless some new arrangement
should be made, Russia has a perfect right, in case of troubles on
the Oxus, to cross it and inflict punishment on tiie troops and
provinces of Sher Ali." A new arrangement should undoubtedly
be made between the two Governments, not a mere understanding,
but a binding engagement. In order, however, that negotiations
should have the best prospect of a happy termination, England
should bear in mind the advice of a friendly French Minister
(quoted by Sir Charles Dilke in a recent speech): — "It is of the
most essential importance that the English Government should
avoid, both in attitude and in language, everything in the least
like arrogance.'' We should approach the discussion of this
important question in no spirit of dictation nor of jealous rivalry,
but on the footing of the perfect equality which belongs to two
of the greatest nations in the world. We require nothing more
from Russia than that she should enter into permanent and
definite engagements, in accordance with her former assurances,
with regard to Afghanistan, we on our part binding ourselves
to respect the integrity and independence of the Afghan kingdom,
and to abstain from all interference with the affairs of Central
Asia beyond the Oxus. We should also undertake to exercise
our influence to prevent the Ruler of Afghanistan from giving
offence to Russia, or embroiling himself with his neighbours, and
we should seek no commercial advantages to the prejudice of
Russia. It is so much to the interest of both countries that such
an engagement should exist that it is difficult to imagine that
any serious obstacle could arise to prevent its conclusion.

We proceed, then, to deal with Afghanistan. Weighty
arguments have been put forward by the highest military
authorities against any advance of frontier in that direction.
General Sir Henr}^ Norman, himself a high authority, writes in a
recent number of the Fortnightly Revieiv : — *' While many opinions

86

have been given as to the folly of advancing our frontier, it
seems an undoubted fact that no opposite opinion ever was
expressed by any of the able Governors-General who have held
sway in India up to the arrival of Lord Lytton, by any Com-
mander-in-Chief in India, by any Lieutenant-Governor of the
Pimjab, the officer through whom, imtil 1876, all Cabul affairs
used to be transacted, or by any member of the Supreme Council,
before which all important questions affecting the Indian Empire
come. Many officers in these positions have left on record the
strongest possible objections to a forward movement except as an
operation of war.'' In reference to the occupation of any post
beyond the Khyber, General Hamley writes: — "There is much
to be said against it, nothing for it. It would be a source not of
strength but of weakness." He then goes on to say on the
question of meeting danger from invasion : — " I should feel con-
fident of the result even in the Valley of the Indus, I think our
position vastly improved by the occupation of Quettah, but I
should think it all we could desire if we occupied Candahar."
There is no doubt that Candahar, converted into a strong fortress,
and held by an adequate garrison of British troops, would prove
a formidable obstacle to an invading army. Its situation in the
most fertile portion of Afghanistan, commanding the three roads
to India, offers great advantages in a purely military point of
view. But cogent political and financial reasons forbid the
extension of our frontier, and enjoin the preservation, if possible,
of an independent Afghan Kingdom intermediately between our
own boundary and that of the Russian possessions in Central
Asia. It is a subject of regret that we advanced to Quettah,
more particularly without the consent of the Amir, who, if
properly approached in the first instance might have acceded to
our wishes ; but having done so, and having, under treaty with the
Khan of Khelat, an undeniable right to locate troops in his
territories, it may not be advisable that we should withdraw from
a position of strategical importance, both with reference to the
control of the Afghans and Belooches and to ulterior contingen-
cies. Whether the town of Quettah itself in respect to salubrity

87

and other considerations fulfils all the conditions needed to render
it the most eligible position we could occupy can only be deter-
mined by competent professional advisers on the spot. If not,
there could doubtless be found in its vicinity some other locality
where a large entrenched camp could be formed, which, held in
strength, would secure all the required objects defensive and
offensive. Our first duty should be to complete the communica-
tions with our base, including the railroad to Dadur, and a bridge
across the Indus at Sukkur, with posts in support of adequate
strength along the Kne to the rear.

These works, essential on military grounds, would be highly
beneficial also commercially. Our domination of the Bolan and
the other passes near at hand, and our necessarily more intimate
connection with the countries beyond, by rendering traffic more
secure, and by guaranteeing freedom from vexatious imposts and
restrictions, would give a great impulse to trade. Amongst
the measures to be taken on the cessation of hostilities, and the
renewal of relations with the Ruler of Afghanistan, there should
be an arrangement for placing British commercial interests on a
proper footing, and for protecting them against any hostile tariffs
or immoderate transit duties. In the absence of official infor-
mation it is difficult to determine how far the Government is
committed to annexation by the reported announcement of General
Roberts that the inhabitants of the Khost and Khurum YaUeys
were henceforward to consider themselves British subjects. These
raids upon outlying districts of the Amir's kingdom, which have
been the cause of an immense amount of human suffering,
without exercising any perceptible influence on the main purpose of
the war, are to be lamented. The annexation of this territory,
which is not likely to produce sufficient revenue to pay the cost of
administration, and is certain to require additional troops to protect
that portion of the population which is peacefully disposed, would
prove a source of future trouble and increased expenditure. It
would be well that the British garrisons should be withdrawn
within the original border-line of British territory on the right
bank of the Indus. In fact, we should eschew aU annexation of

88

Afghan territory. Our object should be to conclude a treaty with
whatever Ruler the Afghan nation may select, without interference
-with the integrity of their dominions or with their independence.
We should beware of setting up a nominee of our own, but leave
the choice to the Afghans themselves. In order to afford them a
convincing proof of our desire to maintain their independence, we
should make the concession to their prejudices of withdrawing
our demand for the residence of British Officers at Cabul, and in
other Afghan cities. We should be content with a Mohammedan
Envoy of rank and influence at Cabul. His salary should be
increased and his establishment placed on a much more liberal
scale than has hitherto been the practice. Selected Native Agents
of intelligence might also be stationed at Herat, Balkh, or in any
other Afghan towns which might appear desirable.

It was a cardinal maxim of the policy of the Nepaul Govern-
ment for many years to keep the secrets of their own fastnesses
unspied into by us, and a great jealousy of Europeans still exists
in that country ; in Burmah, also, and even in Kashmir, there is
an undercurrent of dislike to the presence of British officers. Why
should we then insist on the compliance of the Afghans with a
condition which it is clear is so repugnant to the feelings and pre-
judices of the Chiefs and people? The time may come, and in the
interests of humanity and civilization all will desire to hasten it,
when the Afghans themselves may be willing to waive the objec-
tion on which they have hitherto so strongly insisted, and when
this wild fanatical people will be brought under the ameliorating
influences which British rule exercises on the population of India.
Much has been done within the last half-century, but there is still
sufficient work to tax to the utmost British energies, and to satisfy
British ambition, without adding more territory to our already
overgrown Eastern Empire. It remains to recapitulate the points
which it has been sought to establish in the foregoing pages.

1st. That the settled policy of former Administrations, com-
posed of both parties in the State, in regard to the defence of the
North- Western frontier of India, has been, without sufficient
cause, departed from by Lord Lytton, acting under instructions of
the present Ministry.

89

2n(i. That the danger apprehended from Russian aggression
has been greatly exaggerated, and that the measures adopted in
consequence are calculated to prejudice the best interests of our
Indian Empire.

3rd. That the hasty, inconsiderate action of Lord Lytton pre-
cipitated hostilities, and led to an unnecessary, impolitic, and
unjust war.

4th. That any annexation of Afghan territory would increase
our political and financial difficulties, and entail a grievous burden
on the revenues of India.

5th. That an attempt to secure more eJffectual hold on the
passes lying between our border hne and Afghanistan, and to
coerce the mountain tribes by placing military posts in their fast-
nesses, would fail in its object, except at a cost too burthensome to
be sustained.

6th. That the expenses of the present war wiU far exceed the
estimate of the Government, and that in the impoverished state
of India, increased taxation may be attended with most serious
results.

The essential condition of progress and improvement in
India is the continuance of peace. However erroneous the poKcy
enjoined by Lord Salisbuiy, it is possible that more temper,
prudence, and forbearance, on the part of Lord Lytton, might
have averted its worst consequences. In Lord Lytton's hands it
culminated in war, and it contains the germs of future wars.
Mr. Gladstone wrote of our Indian Empire, in a recent number of
the Contemporary Bevieio : — " This astonishing fabric was in the
main built up by a mercantile Company, with secondary aid from
the counsels and control of the Government, and under the
guidance of the practical good sense which is so remarkable in
our countrymen, except when some peculiar Ate bewilders and
misleads them." And again : — " The Company deKvered India
from the flighty genius of Lord Ellenborough, who leant to the
ostentatious policy that has lately received, upon more dangerous
ground, a more serious development. The toleration they estab-
lished was one only too wide. They boldly gave education to the

90

people. They established a Free Press half a century ago. They
laid the foundation of the railway system. They discouraged to
the best of their ability aggression on the Native Princes and on
neighbouring territories. Their policy was, in the best sense,
Conservative, and at the time when they handed over their high
office to the Government, there was not a point, in the whole of
our case with India, at which we could say they had neglected
duty or precaution, or had either feigned or courted dangers."
The East India Company may well be proud of this meed of
praise from England's greatest and noblest living Statesman.
Its calm, equable, sagacious, administration typified admirably
English sobriety, moderation, and practical good sense. The
names of its illustrious servants are enshrined in the foremost
roll of EngHsh Worthies. Mr. Gladstone's allusion to the "flighty
genius of Lord Ellenborough " suggests an apt parallel to the dis-
tinguishing feature of the intellectual constitution of the present
Viceroy. In a letter to the Duke of Wellington, dated 21st
January, 1844, conceived in the same spirit of pride and self-suffi-
ciency which dictated Lord Lytton's haughty message to the Amir
of Cabul, Lord Ellenborough, wrote of the Court of the Directors
of the East India Company : — ** I am satisfied that if they were
left to themselves they would lose the country in three months."
In little more than three months the Court of Directors, in the
interests of the good Government of India intrusted to their
keeping by the nation, took upon themselves the grave responsi-
bility of recalling Lord Ellenborough from his high office. Par-
liament and the people of England ratified the act. It may be
confidently affirmed that, imder the East India Company's direc-
tion of Indian affairs, where party prejudices and prepossessions
never intruded, Lord Lytton's impulsive action, disregard of estab-
lished forms of procedure, and tendency to personal Government,
would not have been lightly passed over. In the fulness of time
it is believed that the practical good sense of the English nation
will pronounce a just judgment on this second Afghan War, and
on the merits of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration.

*page 411) of Lord Colchester's " Indian Administrations of Lord Ellenborough."

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