Memoirs of the Comte Roger de Damas (1787-1806)

MEMOIRS OF THE
COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

(1787-1806)

MEMOIRS OF THE

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

(1787-1806)

EDITED AND ANNOTATED
BY

JACQUES RAMBAUD

TRANSLATED BY MRS. RODOLPH STAWELL

WITH A PHOTOGRAVURE FRONTISPIECE

LONDON
CHAPMAN AND HALL, LTD.

1913

RICHARD CLAY & Sous, LIMITED,

BRUNSWICK- STREET, STAMFORD STREET, S.K.,
AND BUNOAY, SUFFOLK.

INTRODUCTION

IN his Memoirs Saint-Simon has shown us, at the Court of
Louis XIV, a certain Marquis de Thiange, a lieutenant-general
attached to the household of Monseigneur (the Grand Dauphin).
He thus describes the marquis : " Damas is a man of distin-
guished birth and remarkable courage ; he has brains and culti-
vation ; and is highly honourable and upright." In these two
lines Saint-Simon has given us unawares the portrait of another
Damas, the author of these Memoirs. And indeed, a hundred
years later, the Prince de Ligne, who witnessed the Russian
victories on the Danube, wrote to a correspondent in Paris :
" I have before me a phenomenon from your part of the world,
and a very pretty phenomenon too : a Frenchman with the
good qualities of three centuries. He has the chivalry of one,
the charm of another, and the gaiety of the present one.
Francis I, the Great Conde, and the Marechal de Saxe would
have wished to have a son like him. In the middle of the
liveliest and most incessant cannonade he is as merry as a grig ;
he chatters and sings without mercy, and rattles out the
maddest quotations under a rain of bullets. Yet his judgment
is marvellously trustworthy all the time. Fighting does not
intoxicate him ; it merely warms his blood, with the pleasant
sort of warmth that one feels at the end of a supper-party.
It is only when he is conveying an order, or giving his modest
advice, or undertaking something, that he ever waters his
wine. He distinguished himself in Nassau's naval victories
over the Turkish High Admiral. I saw him in all the sorties
of the Janissaries and the little skirmishes with the Spahis : he
has already been wounded twice. He is still a Frenchman in
soul ; but he is a Russian in the matter of subordination and

vi INTRODUCTION

discipline. He is good-natured and popular with every one;
the sort of man we call un joli Frangais ; a polished gentleman
of quality from the Court of France. Such is Roger de
Damas." 2

The person thus held up for the admiration of his com-
patriots by a prince renowned for his talents belonged to an
ancient and noble family, which dates back to the end of the
eleventh century.3 It originated in the Forez, and first appears
in history at the time of the Crusades, which it commemorates
both in its name and its coat of arms. It was divided later
on into a great number of branches, which spread over the
surrounding country, especially Burgundy. Roger de Damas
belonged to one of the more recent of these : the Antigny
branch.

He was born in Paris on the 4th September, 1765, and was
the son of the Marquis Jacques-Francois and Zephyrine de
Rochechouart-Faudoas. His Christian name, Roger, which is
inseparably associated with him, had already been borne by
several members of his family, notably by a canon received
a hundred years earlier into the chapter of nobles connected
with the cathedral of Lyons. He was the fourth of six
children. Of his brothers the eldest, Charles, held a distin-
guished position both at the Court and in the army at the end
of the old regime and under the Restoration ; the next,
Alexandre, was destined from childhood for the Church and
the episcopate, like his first cousin the Abb£ de Perigord (the
future Talleyrand), and played a very obscure part after the
Revolution. He was eclipsed in every way by his most intim-
ate friend, the Abbe de Montesquieu, who was president of
the Constituent Assembly and a member of the provisional
government of 1814. A third brother, Gaston, died young
in 1803.

Young Roger, the last of the brothers, was fortunate in
having a precocious and decided vocation for the profession
that the times made almost inevitable, and in possessing, as
well, an all-powerful patron to secure him rapid promotion.
His uncle the Due du Chatelet, late ambassador in England,
and colonel of the King's Regiment, had no children. He

INTRODUCTION vii

interested himself in his motherless young nephews, and had
them enrolled in his regiment as supernumerary second-lieuten-
ants. This corps was so constituted as to include a very large
number of officers, and like the French Guards became a regular
school for the practical instruction of young men. Roger de
Damas followed in the steps of his elder brother, first as
lieutenant, then as captain of the compagnie colonelle,* which
secured him the rank of a colonel at the age of twenty-three.

Since he was unable to satisfy his warlike instincts at once
he at first divided his time between his garrison and the Court,
where he was presented on the 26th September, 1784. He
soon became known there for his wit and "sensibility." He
became one of the many adorers of the beautiful Marquise de
Coigny — the Queen of Paris, as she was called with some
asperity by the Queen of Versailles, Marie Antoinette. "The
affair of the rose," which involved him in a duel with the
Comte de Broglie and figured largely, for a short time, in the
conversation of the courtiers, made his reputation as a man
of the world.5 In the same year he made a journey to Berlin,
like other young soldiers of his day, to complete his military
education. Eighteen months later, being tired of waiting for
what he called "the sublimity of war," he suddenly embarked
on an adventure that was destined, with the help of the
Revolution, to lead him all over Europe and to last for many
a long year.

The scene was France ; the year was 1787 ; provincial
assemblies had become a mania, and the nation was running
gaily to meet the coming storm. But Damas went forth into
a distant land, in search of a war that might give him an
opportunity to emulate the paladins of old. One day he learnt
by chance from the pages of a gazette that the Russians and
Turks were fighting on the Danube, and he determined to join
the ranks of the former. Against the wishes of his family
and without the permission of his superior officers, without
any certainty, even, that the offer of his sword would be
accepted by the Russians, he set out upon his journey : much
as La Fayette, on hearing at a breakfast-table in Metz that
the American rebels were taking the field, slipped out of France

viii INTRODUCTION

and overcame a thousand obstacles to fight the English in the
New World.

It was then that Roger de Damas, in his own opinion, first
entered upon the life of a soldier, in an army to which he
won admission by a series of negotiations, carried on in the
course of his journey. Unlike such of his fellow-countrymen
as had been transplanted to Russia during the past hundred
years he would neither be a mercenary, nor a voluntary or
involuntary exile. He fought alternately in the white uniform
of his own country and the green one of his new leaders. His
position was that of some grand seigneur or knightly warrior,
and he held it by virtue of his reckless courage, his sagacity,
and his contagious enthusiasm in that most dangerous of all
forms of battle, the battle that is waged in the breach of a
besieged town- wall. His first exploit would have sufficed to
make him famous : while in the Russian fleet that was taking
part in the investment of Otchakof he captured the Turkish
flagship, a veritable floating citadel. For two years he
shared in all the military operations that took place between
the capture of Otchakof in December 1788, and that of
Ismail in December 1790. Between the campaigns he indulged
freely in the pleasures of society ; first at headquarters, where
Potemkine lorded it over a kind of female staff, composed of
Russian and Polish fine ladies ; then at Vienna, where he met
some compatriots who soon became his rivals — the Comte de
Langeron in 1789, and the Due de Fronsac (Richelieu) in
1790; and finally at St. Petersburg, where Catherine II
received him with eager cordiality. In France, where he was
considered to have earned promotion in spite of his absence,
he was first made a major and then a colonel ; while from the
Empress he received a sword of honour, the Cross of St.
George — first of the fourth class and then of the third — and,
with Louis XVI's consent, another commission as colonel.

In spite of these honours, or rather on account of them, he
was regarded askance by men who should have taken example
by him. "He was envied and detested," wrote his comrade
Langeron ; " and all the more that no one dared to show his
feelings openly. As for him, he thought little of the art of

INTRODUCTION ix

pleasing, and this very aloofness made him hated still more
heartily." 6 At the very moment that the Russo-Turkish
war came to an end the civil war broke out in France, and
the duty of defending the Monarchy recalled this hero of
twenty-four to his own country. In the winter of 1789-90 he
appeared in Paris, and saw at once that everything was
changed : the town, the Court, and the army. There is a
note among the archives of the police which shows him to
have attended the meetings of the royalists, "in a brown
riding-coat bordered with crimson velvet." 7 His desire was
to defend the King within the confines of the kingdom, and
this he believed to be the course that would best serve the
royal cause. But the Emigration was already sweeping the
nobility out of the country, and soon the current of that
stream would be irresistible.

In 1791 Roger de Damas left the service of Catherine II,
in which there was no longer any chance of distinction, and
returned to the service of France, which meant to him, as to
any other gentleman, the service of his King — then menaced
by the Revolution. On his way back from the East he joined
the army of the Emigration on the Rhine, and attached him-
self to the Comte d'Artois, who, with all his faithful adherents,
was under the orders of the Austrian and Prussian generals.
Damas entered France with the prince at the end of the
summer of 1792.

And now a new life began for him : a life of hazard and
mishap. His nearest kinsmen, remembering the family motto :
Et fortis et fidelis, had followed the King's brothers into exile.
His eldest brother, after his vain attempt to open a way with
his regiment for Louis XVI to escape to Montme*dy through
Varennes, had come to Coblenz to take command of Mon-
sieur's household troops; his second brother and his two
Damas-Crux cousins had gone to the Netherlands. His own
duty, all through the invasion of Lorraine and Champagne,
was to ride backwards and forwards between the Princes'
quarters and those of the Duke of Brunswick, as official mes-
senger. As his sword grew rusty in its scabbard he could not
shut his eyes to the powerless position of his leaders and the

x INTRODUCTION

duplicity of their allies, and he soon prophesied, though he
could not avert, the general disaster : that is to say, the retreat
of the Prussians and the dispersion of the little royalist army.

Later on, at a date that we cannot accurately determine, but
that was certainly soon after the events in question, he wrote
down, for his own satisfaction, his recollections and impressions
of this deplorable enterprise. His narrative, which he called
a sketch, was at the same time a kind of journal, an account
of his own share in various incidents of the campaign. After-
wards its author chose this episode in his life as the nucleus
of his Memoirs, the central point round which he grouped and
arranged the other episodes in chronological order.

During the winter of 1792-93 he reappeared in Russia, this
time in the suite of the Comte d'Artois. He was the only
one of the prince's intimate associates who persisted in believ-
ing that, on his return from this diplomatic expedition to
Catherine IPs Court, Louis XVI's brother would accept the
advice of the Empress and the aid of the English, and, taking
La Vendee as the base of his operations, would re-conquer the
ancient kingdom of France like a second Henri IV. To this
course he urged the prince with much warmth ; but the Comte
d'Artois yielded to other influences, or other considerations,
and insisted on waiting in Germany and England till the allied
armies should have achieved some degree of success. Roger
de Damas at once left the prince's service ; and for the next
two years fought in the European crusade against the "car-
magnoles," as he had fought in the Russian crusade against
the infidels, in the character of an independent knight errant.

Every one of his name, by this time, was in prison or under
arms. His father was imprisoned at Dijon; his brother the
abbe and his sister Mme. de Simiane were both prisoners in
Paris; his other brother Gaston was serving as a lieutenant
in the British Uhlans ; three others of his name were engaged
in the defence of the Netherlands. One of them, Comte
Etienne, had raised a little corps in the pay of Holland, of
which the last remnant was doomed to be destroyed in the
disaster of Quiberon. He himself had thought of leading a
cavalry regiment into battle, the pay of which was to be

INTRODUCTION xi

provided by England; but financial difficulties prevented the
fulfilment of the scheme. As an officer in the Russian army—
with a view to satisfying his curiosity and at the same time
increasing his knowledge — he gave his services successively to
the Duke of York at his headquarters, to Clerfayt at the siege
of Le Quesnoy, and to the Prince of Coburg on the battle-field
of Fleurus. He even set out to La Vendee, but went no
farther than Guernsey. And, as he had formerly spent his
winter leisure in Potemkine's " court " on the Danube, so now,
in the intervals of fighting, he sought diversion, sentimental
or social, in a cottage on the Thames, amid his frivolous
fellow-emigrants in Brussels, or at Bel-QEil with his friend the
Prince de Ligne. At last he became stationary in Switzerland,
at Lausanne, in the summer of 1795.

The revolution of the 9th Thermidor had just released his
relations from prison, and he hoped to be joined by his
brother the Abbe de Damas and Mme. de Simiane. The
former had taken part, at least in writing, in the schemes of
the Smigrts ; but none the less, by producing "certificates of
compliance " and taking the oath of liberty and fraternity,
he succeeded in having his name erased from the lists of the
proscribed. He retreated with his sister to the Chateau de
Cirey,8 a house that lay hidden among the woods of Cham-
pagne, and was theirs by inheritance from the Due du
Chatelet. It had formerly sheltered Voltaire from the wrath
of the authorities. Here they were soon forgotten ; while the
adventurous Roger, who by this time was once more pining
for the clash of arms, set off with his eldest brother to Conde's
army, to take command of Mirabeau's Legion.

The organiser of this corps had died in 1792, and it was
now held by his heir, who was still a minor. Roger de Damas
formally acquired the usufruct from Mirabeau's widow, as her
son's trustee. His military experience might have inspired
confidence in his new subordinates; but on hearing that he
meant to curtail their liberty, which had been carried to the
point of disorder, they gave him a very cold reception. " He
has degraded us ! " said these gentlemen-privates, jestingly;
for they had no taste for discipline nor obedience. Damas, as

xii INTRODUCTION

«

a man of honour, offered to give personal satisfaction to any
one who resented his authority, and two duels were the result ;
but he held his own against every attempt at resistance, and
finally won over the whole corps by his behaviour under fire.
In this respect no man could give a better example than he.

At this time Mirabeau's Legion was the most important
corps in Conde's army. The Comte Charles was the second-
in-command. During the campaign of 1796 it was in the
advanced guard under the Due d'Enghien, and played a
prominent part wherever it was engaged — at Oberkamlach,
at Steinstadt, and at Biberach. When these battles were at
their height the men shouted again and again : " Vive Mirabeau-
Damas! " in honour of their old chief and his successor. On
the other hand the republicans recognised in the Comte Roger
a warrior of their own race, and said to one another : " It's a
pity to kill him ! " There was no campaign in which Whites
and Blues tried each other's courage more, or were more
unanimous in praising it.

Some years ago 9 an historical fantasy was published under
the name Comme a Fontenoy, representing the advanced guard
of Gouvion Saint-Cyr as being commanded by the Adjutant-
General Dumont, and Conde's advanced guard by Roger de
Damas. In it the spirit of chivalry is depicted in excess, as
though a ruthless fight should be unexpectedly transformed
into a courteous tourney. Republicans and royalists shoot
each other through a wood, and when the former are obliged
to cease firing for lack of cartridges the Mirabeaux also lay
down their arms, refusing to kill a defenceless foe. An inter-
view takes place between the officers-in-command ; the two
staffs are introduced to one another ; a battle is arranged for
the morrow ; and Damas carries his generosity to the pitch
of offering the patriots a safe conduct to the position they
have selected. The Mirabeaux then line the road on both
sides, and present arms to the enemy ; and the fleurs-de-lys
upon their standard are lowered before the tricolour. Are all
these details authentic? Damas gives none of them in his
Memoirs. The story in any case serves as a poetical illustra-
tion of the truth, and bears striking witness to the state of

INTRODUCTION xiii

mind that more than once produced a reconciliation in time
of war between Frenchmen of the old and the new regimes.
Roger de Damas, like the Due d'Enghien and so many others
of both parties, knew the feeling well, and on more than one
occasion yielded to it generously during the fratricidal struggles
of the Revolution.

In July 1797 Conde's army ceased to serve under the
Austrian flag, and adopted that of Russia. In the course of
the autumn the troops reached the cantonments in Poland
where they were to be reorganised. Roger de Damas did not
accompany his Legion, which was to be merged in the new
regiment of the Bourbon Grenadiers. Either in obedience to
his desire for change, or because he recoiled from the idea
of serving under a capricious despot like Paul I, he calmly
went on leave for a time, and announced his intention of
travelling by the longest route, namely by the Mediterranean
and Black Seas. He then set off on a tour in Italy. He
found Rome invaded and Naples threatened by the French ;
and at the last moment he left the ship that was to take him
to Khersen — near the scene of his first exploits — and asked,
with the Russian Minister's consent, for a post in the Nea-
politan army. His request was granted ; and with a brigadier-
general's commission he entered the service of a cadet of the
House of Bourbon, and started on a new stage of his career,
which was destined to last — with two rather long intervals of
absence — for nearly eight years.

Roger de Damas first attracted attention at the Court of
Naples in much the same way as he had made his debut, years
before, at Versailles. A duel between him and the Chevalier
de Saxe became the talk of the town, and made him for some
days a hero of romance. He was of real use, too, at the council-
table and in the army. The King took no part in the govern-
ment, which was altogether in the hands of Queen Marie
Caroline, who was always willing to accept the support of
foreigners. Acton, who was of English extraction and a
native of France, had long been a power at the Court; and
recently another Frenchman, a refugee in Venice named
d'Antraigues, had aspired to become the director in partibus

xiv INTRODUCTION

of the policy of the Two Sicilies. He had even despatched an
official agent to Naples, one Marreux-Montgaillard, who sent
him a "portrait " of the new-comer, exaggerating his defects
and making the least of his good points.10 Damas had no
difficulty in gradually eclipsing his distant rival, who moreover
fell into disgrace at the same time with the French Bourbons.
As for Acton, though he gave Damas a good reception at
first, he afterwards endeavoured to counteract his influence;
but Damas paid him back in his own coin, and finally won the
entire confidence of the Queen. The numerous letters from
Marie Caroline that appear in the second volume of this work
are sufficient evidence of this fact. Moreover the serious
events that occurred at this time showed him in his true light
to the King and Queen, as an honest, far-seeing, and faithful
servant.

The invading army of the French revolutionaries was at the
gates. Damas received a command, under the Austrian
general, Mack, in the army that was sent to meet the invaders.
He greatly distinguished himself near Orbitello, and received
a wound on his face that left a lasting scar; but all he could
achieve was to save his troops, and effect a difficult retreat
to Palermo without waiting for the King and Queen. In
France the Directory avenged itself upon all his kinsfolk for
the services he had rendered to the enemy's Court. A decree
of the 23rd Niv6se, year VII (12th Jan. 1799), restored the
names of thirteen members of the Damas family to the list
of the proscribed, and drew special attention to their constant
and active hostility to the Revolution.11

When, in 1799, after the fall of the Neapolitan republic,
the Comte Roger returned from Palermo with the Court, he
was promoted lieutenant-general (4th Nov.) and deputed, as
one of the two inspectors-general of the army, to superintend
the reorganisation of the Neapolitan forces. At the end of the
year 1800, while the Queen was doing her best in Vienna to pre-
vail upon Austria to redeem her defeat in a fresh campaign,
Damas took a little army into Tuscany to support the imperial
troops. This expedition, like the last, was brought to a close
almost as soon as it began, with a well-conducted retreat that

INTRODUCTION xv

saved the greater number of his troops. He then took part in
the negotiations that preceded the peace with the French
Republic. The general with whom he had to deal was Murat.
This brilliant soldier, the future King of Naples, who had so
many of his own qualities, congratulated him on his talents and
courage.13 Shortly after the conclusion of the peace Damas
was obliged for a time to leave the Neapolitan service on account
of Acton's covert hostility, and went to live in Vienna with a
pension of three thousand crowns.

Being thus condemned, in his two-fold exile, to temporary
inaction, he spent his leisure like Monluc, who compiled his
Commentaries "when swords were at rest." He added the
story of his military adventures in Italy to the account he had
already written of the campaign of 1792; but he never gave
up the hope of returning to his life of wandering and battle.
Marie Caroline, whom he found in Vienna, intended him to
play a part in the revenge she was planning, the revenge she
hoped to bring about with the help of a new European coali-
tion. Both hated the Revolution : both, moreover, detested
Bonaparte, the man who was carrying the , Revolution into
foreign lands. Yet their admiration of his genius was bound-
less. Marie Caroline, both in conversation and letters, could
never say enough of the one great man of his day, the model
sovereign ; while Damas, in whom the soldier was always pre-
dominant, was fain to do homage to the incomparable general.
But neither thought he had finally won the day; and they
meant to work together in the new campaign that was being
organised, with the help of England and Russia.

When the times were ripe, in October 1804, Damas was
recalled by the Neapolitan government to complete the re-
organisation of the army, under pretext of protecting the
neutrality conditioned by the recent peace. Before adopting
this course Marie Caroline asked the French minister if it
would be displeasing to the government in Paris. The
minister — who was the ex-conventionist Alquier — answered
equivocally and not very encouragingly. His answer was
ignored : Damas laid down his pen, took the road to Naples,
and set to work. Upon this Alquier, who was kept informed

ft

xvi INTRODUCTION

of his words as well as of his deeds, accused him of bombast
and hostility to France, and denounced him in Paris as a
dangerous firebrand, determined to bring about a war.
Napoleon knew and appreciated the military qualities of the
old Condeen. " Whenever he spoke of the courage of the
Emigres," wrote Mme. d'Abrantes, "he always quoted the
Comte Roger de Damas." On this occasion, therefore, the
general who was so hastily bringing the Neapolitan army into
fighting order seemed to him all the more dangerous. Three
times Alquier urged in the Emperor's name, first politely and
then imperiously, that Damas should be exiled and discharged
from his post, as an 6migr6 who had borne arms against
France. It was in vain that Gallo, the Neapolitan minister
in Paris, contested the fact of Damas 's emigration ; in vain
that the Queen warmly pleaded for her faithful servant in
two letters personally addressed to Napoleon. Damas was
forced to give up his post temporarily (14th March, 1805 13) ;
and retired to Messina in Sicily, with a salary of 60,000 livres
and the Grand Cordon of St. Ferdinand, which made him the
equal of a grandee of Spain.

This concession did not long postpone the fate of the
Italian Bourbons. After Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz the
results of his success were felt at the farthest extremity of
the peninsula of Italy. Marie Caroline and her husband were
formally deposed ; their kingdom was invaded, and neither
England nor Russia struck a blow in their defence. Damas
was recalled from Sicily and entrusted with the defence of
Calabria. His troops were inexperienced militiamen ; the
inhabitants of the country were indifferent or hostile; and
when he reluctantly engaged in a defensive action at Campo
Tenese the day was lost at the outset by the disorder and
flight of his men.14 He returned to Palermo ; embarked
thence some time afterwards for Trieste; and finally reached
Vienna, where he remained this time for more than seven years.

It was in 1806 that Roger de Damas, having no immediate
prospect of returning to public life, carried out the task of
compiling his Memoirs, properly so called. At the request

INTRODUCTION xvii

of his brother the Abbe, and for the sake of those who were
to come after him, he gave an account of his adventures and
campaigns in various parts of Europe. After resuming and
completing the story of his life in the Two Sicilies he returned
to earlier days; his days at Potemkine's headquarters and in
Conde's camp. The military events in which he played so
prominent a part are his main theme, but the history of the
various Courts and of the policy adopted by Europe in the
face of the Revolution is constantly intermingled with it. As
the author belonged to the vanquished side he loves to make
it plain that he foresaw defeat, and that, if his advice had
been followed, his party would have been victorious or would
at least have resisted the conqueror. He declares that he
never believed in the possibility of the 6migr6s9 success, any
more than he believed in the sincerity of the politicians or the
ability of the foreign generals.

As for his impressions as a traveller, he says little of them.
Of all the capitals he visited Copenhagen was the only one, it
seems, that left him any pleasant or interesting memories.
The notable people with whom he came in contact are merely
described in a few lines, incorporated in his narrative ; and
with anecdotes and scandals he does not concern himself at all.
In this matter he is very different from his fellow-writers of
the Grand Army, who in many cases have been kind enough
in their Memoirs to give us a full account of their prowess in
the art of gallantry, and have even recorded the names of their
" victims," as a conqueror records the names of his victories
on the folds of his standard. Damas contents himself with
giving us a discreet glimpse now and then of the sentimental
distractions that formed the interludes to his campaigns. In
this, again, he shows himself a typically chivalrous French-
man. He is, moreover, a writer who is aware of his own talent,
and likes, in his easy, graceful, slightly precious style, to make
his merits evident, not only to his own family, but to the
soldiers of the future.

As soon as he had given an account of his life between the
years 1787 and 1806 Damas brought his manuscript to a close
— the manuscript that is reproduced in its entirety in the first
62

xviii INTRODUCTION

volume of this publication. But, by way of occupying some
of his enforced leisure, he continued to jot down, whenever
the fancy seized him, his impressions of the most important
events of the day and his most illustrious contemporaries.
Here there is no sustained narrative, but a series of stray
thoughts, of political and moral reflections, with a few personal
recollections of the past. He has ceased to take an active part
in affairs ; he is no longer full of himself ; he is but a dis-
illusioned and pessimistic witness of the events of his day. His
sad eyes dwell alternately on the ancient monarchies that are
crumbling under the empire of Napoleon, and on the land of
France, the home of all his dearest memories and deepest
affections, the country from which he is exiled, perhaps for
ever.

Damas, at the beginning of his sojourn in Vienna, was not
called upon to face absolute loneliness. The unknown mis-
tresses of his youth had been succeeded in his affections by the
friend of his mature years — Elizabeth of Thun-Hohenstein-
Klosterlohe, the wife of the Russian Ambassador in Vienna,
Count Andre Razoumovsky. Damas had constituted himself
her cavaliere servente during his first visit to Austria ; and she
accompanied him on his return to Naples, being attracted by
a climate that suited her delicate health, as well as by the
delights and consolations of affection. " She was a charming
woman," says her recent Russian biographer, " and attached
to her husband, though he made her unhappy. She was too
pale and sickly to be beautiful, but possessed a charm of her
own that won all hearts."15 — "She was an angel," Damas
wrote of her himself. " I became devotedly attached to her.
Her husband, her sister, her friends, all sanctioned my feel-
ings towards her. . . . Our life together was happy and
delightful for us both. ..." She returned to Vienna with
her adorer early in the autumn of 1806, and two months later
(23rd Dec.) succumbed to the decline that had been under-
mining her health for years.

From that time until 1814 Roger de Damas dragged out a
weary existence — suffering, according to his own phrase, like
a paralytic with a clear mind. Such of the emigres as had not

INTRODUCTION xix

returned to France, and the members of the Court circle whose
society he sought, seemed to regard him as a ghost from a
past age. One of the Empress's ladies of honour wrote of
him: "This name (Damas), which is associated with the best
days of chivalry, is borne to-day by a delightful man, who
has a great reputation for chivalrous valour. . . . His con-
versation, and his vivacious, petulant manner, are a quaint
mixture of age and youthfulness. ..."

At the cost of a few sacrifices of vanity Damas might have
returned to France, at all events as a private individual. His
nearest relations, attached as they were at heart to the Bour-
bons, had relaxed the rules that their loyalty had once im-
posed upon them, and adapted them to suit their present
interests. His eldest brother, whose name had been erased
from the list of Emigres, was living in obscurity on his pro-
perty. His sister-in-law, who had remained in Paris, had
suffered inconvenience at the hands of the police at the time
of Georges 's plot and the attempt with the infernal machine ;
but she had none the less kept up relations to some extent
with the official world. In 1806 his brother the Abbe had
again been banished from Paris for " showing a bad spirit
in various societies." 17 Three others of his family were with
the refugee princes in England. The name of Damas did not
figure in the list of the imperial household. Even the Prince
de Benevent, son of a Damas, agreed with his family in
welcoming the events of 1812, which led, thanks to him, to
the Bourbons' restoration. Doubtless he thought, after
deceiving every one, that he could at least pretend to have
betrayed no one.

Meantime Roger de Damas, far from his family and country,
and safe from all danger of being compromised, lived alone
with the ideas that had governed him for twenty years. He
had no intention of returning to Russia, where his abilities
were still appreciated. Alexander inspired him with no more
confidence than Paul I: he deemed him " feeble, false, and
unpopular," and would have no more to do with him after he
allied himself with Napoleon. He turned the key upon his
Russian uniform for good and all. He would gladly have

xx INTRODUCTION

donned his Neapolitan uniform again, if he had felt any con-
fidence in the future of Naples ; but where was there any room
for hope, when Russia itself had recognised Murat as King
of the Two Sicilies? But he was still attached to the service
of Marie Caroline, whom he met again in Vienna after 1810,
and he long awaited her orders, which never came.

So great was his longing to draw his sword again that, when
war broke out in 1809, he begged the Archduke Charles to
admit him to the Austrian army. All he was allowed to do
was to lay his views on the plan of campaign before the
minister Stadion : then, when the French were approaching
Vienna, he retired to Kaschau in Hungary and finally to the
borders of Poland. On his return he found a Court that was
resigned to its humiliation, and a society that was incurably
frivolous, while the last of Napoleon's opponents — Mme. de
Stael and Pozzo di Borgo — were beginning to yield. After
this he seems to have meditated joining Wellington in
Portugal; but in the end the only share he took in that
general's operations against Massena was to follow them upon
the map. His sympathies were with the conquered, but the
soldier still alive in him gave all his admiration to the con-
queror. One day he went from Vienna to the island of Lobau,
to tread in Napoleon's footprints. He was not thinking of
the Corsican then, but of the great general ; and on his return
from this pilgrimage he impulsively wrote these words, of
which he never repented : " Why is he not a Bourbon ! How
enthusiastically I should have devoted my life to winning dis-
tinction in his army ! ... It is only my repugnance to obey-
ing a man who does not belong to the line of my natural
leaders, though he has a thousand times the ability of my
former rulers, that has kept me from falling upon the necks
of all these Frenchmen who are such an honour to the
profession of arms. ..."

This perfectly sincere sentiment did not prevent him from
desiring the "usurper's " downfall. In 1813, while he pitied
Narbonne for serving under him, he abused Jomini for desert-
ing his standard. At this time he was conversing with Gentz
and corresponding with Metternich on the subject of coming

INTRODUCTION xxi

events : he was firmly persuaded that the victorious allies would
not dismember France. At the same time he began to hope
for a renewal of family life, for he already counted on return-
ing to his relations in new circumstances. The Abbe de
Damas had died at the end of 1812 ; the eldest of the brothers,
Charles, had only one daughter, a widow who was about to
be married again, to the Comte Cesar de Chastellux. It there-
fore devolved on the youngest brother to carry on the line.
In the summer of 1813 Roger de Damas spent more than two
months in Switzerland, whither his brother and sister had
come to meet him ; and no doubt it was decided at this time
that he should marry Louise-Pauline de Chastellux, the sister
of his new nephew. So the outlaw, whom the victories of the
allies, it seemed, were about to restore to his own country,
was also assured of a home of his own, a happy resting-place
for his old age, when France should be in the hands of the
Bourbons once more.

Roger de Damas left Vienna on the 17th February, 1814,
and joined the Comte d'Artois at Nancy the moment that the
Empire fell. Before setting out to Paris the prince appointed
his former aide-de-camp governor of Lorraine, Alsace, and
the Three Bishoprics (8th April) ; and the first person he saw
on entering the capital was Roger's brother Charles, at the
head of a guard of honour hastily raised to serve as an escort.
A few days later some commissioners-extraordinary were
charged with securing recognition of the royal authority in
the provinces, and the Comte Roger was installed in his post
at Nancy (22nd April).

Like the well-disciplined soldier he was, the man who was
considered the greatest glory of the emigrant army had placed
himself at the disposal of the Bourbons on their restoration
to the throne of France ; but at heart he felt himself an exile
in his own country, " more of a foreigner in his own land than
were the foreigners themselves." 18 After seven years of
private life he asked for nothing better than continued privacy
and retirement. His mind was fixed upon the marriage
arranged between himself and Mile, de Chastellux. The wed-
ding took place in the following August. It was about this

xxii INTRODUCTION

time that his rank as lieutenant-general — which he had
obtained in Naples — was confirmed in France, and before the
end of the year he received the command of the 19th military
division at Lyons, a post that was practically honorary. On
taking up his duties he held a review, and complimented the
troops placed under his orders. The proclamation by which
his appointment was made known to the country was printed
in the Moniteur. He then returned to Paris, to await the
birth of his heir.

At the end of the winter came the overwhelming news of
Napoleon's landing in the Gulf of Juan. Roger de Damas was
one of the first on whom it devolved, in virtue of his position,
to hold the road to Paris against the great soldier who had
returned from Elba like a ghost from the grave. He was at
Lyons twenty-four hours earlier than the Comte d'Artois,
and learnt, on his arrival, of an event that was a special grief
to him. Only a few weeks earlier he had secured employment
for his young brother-in-law, Colonel de Labedoyere, who had
been given the 7th line-regiment, at Chambery; and now he
heard that this impenitent follower of Napoleon had unfurled
the Eagle and joined the imperial army with his whole regi-
ment. This defection, after preventing any resistance at
Grenoble, weakened the defence at Lyons. Damas quickly
recognised the garrison's state of mind : all were eager to
acclaim the Emperor. Personally he fought to the last
moment, hoping against hope. He was in the suite of the
Comte d'Artois at the futile review in the Place Bellecour;
he was at Macdonald's side behind the barrier on the Pont
de la Guillotiere. Like both of them he was obliged to fly,
almost alone; and returned to Paris to place himself at the
King's disposal and accompany him to Ghent.

While there he was employed (24th May) to direct an attempt
at military organisation on the frontier near the Jura Moun-
tains, with a view to recapturing Franche Comte with an
armed force that should act independently of the allies. He
was to claim from the Swiss Confederation the four regiments
recently subsidised, which had refused to take the oath of
allegiance to Napoleon and had returned to their own country.

INTRODUCTION xxiii

These Damas was to make the nucleus of his army-corps.
He proceeded to Berne, where he found a supporter in the
ambassador Auguste de Talleyrand, who had been his aide-
de-camp in Naples in 1801 ; but he soon recognised the im-
possibility of the scheme. The Swiss wished to keep their
compatriots for their own defence; the Austrians desired to
have the entire direction of the operations in that region. The
Comte Gaetan de La Rochefoucauld, who had been deputed
to gather up the deserters and royalist emigres on the frontier,
was behaving at the head of his miserable little corps as though
he had an army at his disposal ; a few other troops, scattered
here and there, were making a half-hearted attempt at united
action ; everywhere there was a lack of arms and ammunition.
For a month Damas struggled against difficulties that were
too great for his zeal to overcome. On the 21st June, at the
first rumour of Waterloo, he left Berne. He was appointed
the King's commissioner in the Austrian army that entered
France by the Jura. He hoisted the white standard wherever
he went, and on reaching Lyons worked in concert with the
prefect and mayor to restore the royal authority in that
town.

When the second Restoration was an accomplished fact he
was sent to the Chamber of Deputies by the electoral colleges
of Haute-Marne and the Cote-d'Or, but he rarely attended
the sittings, being absorbed by his military duties, which
included the keeping of order in the second town of the king-
dom. He soon wearied of these duties, and at the end of
1816 took a holiday from which he never returned.19 He
aspired to nothing now but to take his ease as a veteran. His
services, however, were well rewarded in the persons of his
kinsmen. His brother was successively granted a peerage, the
command of the 18th military division (Dijon), the post of
first gentleman-of-the-chambers, the cordon bleu, and the
title of duke ; while his cousins were replaced in their con-
fidential posts in the Princes' households. As for himself, he
was content with the order of a Commander of St. Louis,
which took the place upon his breast hitherto occupied by the
Chevalier's cross he had won in the army of the emigration.

xxiv INTRODUCTION

Retiring to Cirey he devoted himself to the joys of domestic
life. He then had a fresh copy made of his Memoirs and
Journal — (the latter was brought to a close in February 1814)
— and began a careful revision of them, which was never
finished.

His last years were passed in voluntary obscurity. He was
taken from those who loved him, after a long and painful
illness, at the age of fifty-eight, on the 3rd September, 1823.
He was buried beside the Abbe de Damas in the village
cemetery. Their sister Mme. de Simiane followed them in
1837.

Since Roger de Damas was no longer a deputy, and was not
a peer of France, there were no official regrets expressed at his
grave-side. In 1828 a service was celebrated for the repose of
his soul in a church in Burgundy, and a priest whose name we
do not know made a short funeral oration. It was reported
in the Moniteur, and for a day France was reminded of a
name that had once rung from end to end of Europe. He
himself, in the narratives that follow, has claimed to be
remembered by posterity. At this moment, when nearly a
century has gone by, and so many events and characters of
the Emigration have been brought to light, the publication
of these Memoirs of his may well serve to revive his memory.
The task was undertaken by the Marquis Charles-Georges-
Henri-Marie, grandson of the Comte Roger, and was con-
tinued after his death (9th Oct. 1908) by the wish of Mme. la
marquise de Damas, who carried out her husband's intentions
by confiding the work to M. Jacques Rambaud. The son of
the latest French historian of Russia, and the author of a
book on Naples during the early years of the nineteenth
century, was well qualified by his experience and studies to
introduce the hero of Ismai'l and Orbitello.

The military career of Roger de Damas was unique and
unparalleled. Perhaps I may be allowed, before I close, to
give a brief summary of its various phases to the reader who
is about to follow it under his guidance. During the first
phase he was an ordinary officer, and had a share in the most
bloody victories of the Russian army over the traditional

INTRODUCTION xxv

enemies of Christianity. During the second he commanded
a regiment that was composed of Frenchmen, though it formed
part of an Austrian army in retreat. In the third we find him
in command, first of a division of Neapolitan troops, then of
a corps, and finally of a useless body of untrained men; and
in each campaign his defeat was more marked, more rapid and
more complete than in the last. After a brilliant and glorious
career he was forced to give way and fall back before the
advances of a new foe, but never unresistingly, and always
weapon in hand. During the last phase of his life, in Austria
and France, he was condemned either to idleness or to work
in other fields than the field of battle, work that made less
demand upon his proverbial courage than upon his tried
devotion. Despite his many disappointments his fidelity was
unshaken : he never failed in his devotion to an ideal that was
growing weaker and weaker in the minds of his contempor-
aries ; and he possessed one virtue that was of great rarity in
his day — he never was a turncoat. His Memoirs show very
plainly the unity of his whole life, as well as his brilliant
military and mental qualities. This unity is visible even in
his devotion to the feudal ideal of duty, as opposed to the
patriotic ideal. "He was always a Frenchman in his soul,"
said the Prince de Ligne ; and this remained true even when
old France was no more.

LlSONCE PlNGAUD.

The Memoires de Roger de Damas have always remained in
the hands of his direct descendants.

The manuscript, which is in a perfect state of preservation,
consists of four note-books of unequal size.

The first is called : Memories of Russia, of the war against
the Turks, 1787-1791, of several operations by the Austrian
and English armies, and of two campaigns with Conde9s army,
1795—1798. An allusion to the work of writing it enables us
to fix the date of this manuscript. It was begun during the
Count's first visit to Italy, and the rest was written in Vienna,
from 1806 onwards.

One of the manuscripts, which is here placed in the right

xxvi INTRODUCTION

chronological order, though it was written first, is named :
Sketch of the campaign in Champagne, 1792.

The third manuscript : Memories of Naples between the
years 1798 and 1806, was written during the Count's two
periods of retirement in Sicily, before his departure for Vienna.
It is, therefore, an absolutely contemporary document.

The last of the note-books, which bears the brief title :
Vienna, 1806 to 1814, is almost a journal.

The only autograph pages are those of the note at the
beginning of the manuscript. The latter, which the author
says he was unable to re-read "consecutively," contains only
a few corrections by his own hand. The copy was obviously
written uninterruptedly during the same period.

In the first volume nothing has been cut out of the text,
nor has the style been modified in any way. In the second
part of the M^moires there are numerous reflections inspired
by the course of events, and here and there are tedious
passages and repetitions. Nothing has been retained that does
not really concern the history of the times or the life of the
author.

In the case of proper names it has been thought best to
restore the usual orthography, more especially as the author
does not hold himself responsible for the form previously
adopted. In the case of Russian proper names, however, the
transcription of which is always a matter for hesitation, we have
retained the form adopted in the manuscript, except in the notes.

A considerable number of letters from Queen Marie Caroline
of Naples, King Ferdinand, and the Hereditary Prince, have
been preserved with the Memoir es. The most interesting will
be published in another volume. Other documents are given
in this volume, or are referred to in the notes : they are
derived from the same Archives, or from other public or private
Archives. Especially worthy of mention are the National
Archives, the records of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and
the Ministry of War, in Paris, the Archives of Naples, the
private library of H.M. the Emperor of Russia in the Winter
Palace in St. Petersburg, and the Archives of M. le marquis
de Scey, at the Chateau de Buthiers (Haute-Saone).

NOTE

IT was at the request of my brother the Abbe that I wrote,
at different times, the manuscripts contained in this portfolio ;
and when, in the last year of the interesting period I had
pledged myself to describe for him, I lost that well-loved
brother and incomparable friend, I should have burnt the
whole collection if the question of my marriage had not been
raised at that moment. The thought of leaving to my children
a sketch of my chief occupations during an exile of twenty-
six years prompted me to keep these Memoirs. To my
children, and to no one else, I hereby entrust them. I flatter
myself they will have sufficient delicacy to feel that neither
time nor death can justify the publication of observations
and reflections intended for one's own eye only, or at most
for one's closest and safest friends. In perfect confidence,
therefore, I leave these Memoirs to my children, together with
all the papers in the other portfolios : they are merely stray
records, some original and some illustrative, of the events in
which I was actively concerned while in Naples, or in the
Neapolitan service — the events briefly described in my paper
on that kingdom.

The smallest of the portfolios — the one that is locked —
contains some fragments of a long and confidential correspond-
ence with Caroline of Austria, Queen of Naples, and some
letters from the King and Hereditary Prince. I like to think
that my children will take some interest and pleasure in read-
ing my account of the difficult moments I lived through
between my first departure for Russia and my return to France.
If it seems to them that I have shown them the way to the
path of honour my life will be sufficiently rewarded.

Their career will not be subject to the disastrous circum-

xxvii

xxviii NOTE

stances that I have had to encounter, but whatever their fate
may be I trust I have won the right to hope that my memory
may always keep their feet upon the right path and their
honour unstained. This is the object of all my prayers and
blessings.

I have not re-read the Memoirs consecutively since they
were copied : the copyist, therefore, must be held responsible
for any verbal inaccuracies that may be found.

ROGER DAMAS.
Cirey, July 1819.

It is my desire that a portfolio that will be found in my
rooms in Paris — if I have not brought it hither before my
death — and contains all the commissions, letters patent, and
orders of the different Courts where I have been employed,
should be placed with those I have preserved at Cirey as heir-
looms to be handed down to my descendants, my children,
grandchildren, etc. There will also be found some official and
confidential registers, and letters of the same kind from
ministers, princes, and others, which should also be placed
with the documents I have already mentioned, and kept after
my death. These important communications, some of which
were telegraphic, may be of some use in placing the circum-
stances of my life clearly before my descendants.

ROGER DAMAS.

CONTENTS

PAOI

INTRODUCTION v

NOTE BY THE COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS XXvii

After an educational tour in Prussia the Comte Roger, an officer
in the King's Regiment, decides to serve in the Russian army
against the Turks — Obstacles in the way of the scheme — Meeting
with the Prince of Anhalt — Arrival at Elizabethgrad — Cordial
welcome from the Prince de Ligne — Potemkin — The author, as a
special favour, is admitted to the Russian army ....

II

The Prince de Ligne — The Prince of Nassau in command of the
flotilla in the Black Sea — Strange reception by General Souvorof —
The author's first engagement with the Turkish flotilla— Heroic end
of Captain Sacken — Misunderstanding between Paul Jones and
Nassau — Naval engagements of the Liman (June-July 1788) —
Damas boards the Turkish flagship — Anecdote of the Prince of
Nassau 22

III

The Russian camp— Imprudent ride with the Prince de Ligne —
Comparison between the Turkish, Austrian, and Russian armies —
Rewards conferred upon Damas by the Empress — Siege of Otcha-
kof : fierce sorties by the Turks : the author is wounded in one of
them, and again soon afterwards by a cannon-ball — Potemkin's
inaction : three more of his nieces come to the camp : the
Princes de Ligne and Nassau, being dissatisfied with the delays,
leave the Russian service — Cold and famine — First news of the

revolution in France : Potemkin's opinion 43

xxix

xxx CONTENTS

PA OK

IV

Picturesque attack on the island of Berezanne by the Zaporogians,
and energetic sortie by the Turks (18th-21st Nov. 1788) — Severe
cold — Preparations for the final assault — The Comte, who has
hitherto had no rank in the army, is made adjutant-general and
given the command of a column of picked grenadiers, the advanced
guard of Anhalt's corps — Capture of Otchakof (17th Dec.) — Re-
ception of the Comte, after the victory, by Potemkin and his
nieces — The prince takes him on a tour of inspection ... 65

Damas leaves the camp and arrives at Petersburg — Friendly
reception by the Comte de Segur and Count Cobenzl — Flattering
reception by Catherine II — The Russian Court : the Empress, the
Grand Duke, the principal ministers : Segur and Potemkin — The
favourite Mamonof — The author joins Potemkin's army on the
river Bug (17th May, 1789) 81

VI

State of the army — Misunderstanding between Russians and
Austrians, and Potemkin's delays — Damas colonel of the Voronezh
Hussars, and afterwards of the Toula Infantry Regiment — Capitu-
lation of Bender, of which the author is sent to take possession —
Visit to Marshal Roumiantzof — Damas goes to France on leave . 101

VII

Arrival in Paris (29th Dec. 1789).— First contact with the Revo-
lution— The new spirit in Society — Visits to the Court and to La
Fayette — Distressed by the changes that have taken place, the
author leaves Paris (10th May, 1790) and visits the Austrian army
(Clerfayt, Coburg, Lauer, Siege of Giurgievo), which makes a bad
impression on him — He returns to Potemkin 109

VIII

Damas colonel of the Arkhangelsk Infantry Regiment, and after-
rards of the light-horse of Alexandria — News of the Princes of

CONTENTS xxxi

PAGE

Anhalt and Nassau — Sieges of Akkerman and Kilia : strange panic
among the Russian troops — Death of General Miiller — Siege of
Ismail : final assault and carnage of the 22nd December, 1790 —
Charles de Ligne, Langeron, Fronsac — In order to be near his
relations the author leaves the Russian army, but keeps his rank in
it — Visit to Vienna — The Marquis de Noailles ambassador — The
author's opinion of the Emigration — Calonne's mission and the
Emperor Leopold's indecision — Visit to Aix-la-Chapelle . . . 127

IX

Negotiations and intrigues after Pilnitz — Breteuil and Calonne —
Bischoffswerder urges the invasion of France — Brunswick at Coblenz
— Criticism of his manifesto — First difficulties between the Prussians
and the Princes — The Comte joins the Prussian army at the camp
of Tiercelet — Capitulation of Longwy — Brunswick's plans and pro-
mises— Ridiculous siege of Thionville by the army of the Princes,
who are refused the necessary artillery — Wimpffen the governor,
however, is disposed to capitulate — The Comte d'Artois with the
Prussian army — Position of the French and Prussian armies —
Dumouriez decamps in the night of the 14th September : Brunswick
misses the opportunity of crushing him— Damas definitely accuses
Brunswick of behaving treacherously, through sympathy with the
revolutionaries — Bivouac at Sommetourbe (19th Sept.) — Valmy . 162

The retreat from Champagne is followed by the evacuation of
Aix-la-Chapelle by the Emigre's — Damas accompanies the Comte
d'Artois to Russia — Generosity and prudence of Catherine II —
Voyage to Copenhagen and secret reception of the Comte d'Artois
at Court — Elsinore — Disagreeable reception of the Comte d'Artois
in England — The author, whose point of view is different from the
prince's, asks for his liberty — Remains in England, then serves in
Clerfayt's army (Siege of Le Quesnoy), and in Lord Moira's
(Guernsey) — Proposal to command a regiment of dragoons in the
English army— Campaign of 1794 : Maubeuge, Fleurus— Remarks
on the Austrian and English armies — The author retreats to Maes-
tricht with the Due de Richelieu, and thence to Switzerland and
Italy — Visit to the Comte de Provence at Verona — Purchase of

Mirabeau's Legion 190

c

xxxii CONTENTS

PAQB

XI

Condi's army — Reorganisation of Mirabeau's Legion, now
Legion de Damas — Review by Louis XVIII — Moreau crosses the
Rhine — Serious accident to the author — Retreat through Bavaria :
fierce encounter with General Ferino at Kamlach — Moreau' s retreat :
battles of Schussenried, Saint-Blaise, Steinstadt — Moreau re-crosses
the Rhine — Reflections on the siege of Kehl by the Archduke
Charles — On Conde's army entering the service of Russia the
author decides to go to Italy 221

XII

The Comte arrives in Naples, February 1798 — Reflections on the
political situation of the kingdom, and severe criticism of Acton,
who is paving the way for the country's ruin by stopping the Baron
de Salis's work of reorganising the army, and by sacrificing Naples to
the policy of England — The author's travels interrupted by events
in Italy, which lead him to accept employment in Naples — He
begins by fighting a duel with the Chevalier de Saxe, and is seri-
ously wounded — The Neapolitan army : manoeuvres conducted by
Mack — March to Rome, without a shot being fired — The army
already in disorder. : '." 242

XIII

Advance of the army — Battle of Civita Castellana : troops of the
Chevalier de Saxe routed without fighting — Damas holds the
heights of Borghetto; then prepares to execute Mack's order to
make a fresh attack on Ponte Felice : a counter-order, dated three
days earlier, obliges him to retreat in the face of the enemy (13th
Dec. 1798) — Splendid retreat on Orbitello, where Damas, who is
seriously wounded, is able to embark for Sicily .... 259

XIV

Arrival at Palermo, where the King and Queen give the Count so
warm a welcome as to rouse General Acton's jealousy — Nelson and
Lady Hamilton — Cardinal Ruffo's expedition — Fall of the Neapo-
litan Republic, and cruel reprisals — Acton brings about Ruffo's fall —

CONTENTS xxxiii

PAQB

The Prince of Cassaro Viceroy of Naples — Damas and the Chevalier
de Saxe are entrusted, in the capacity of inspectors-general, with the
reorganisation of the army (Nov. 1799)— Financial trouble — Visit
of the Due de Berry to the Court of Naples — Russian garrison at
Naples — Prudent advice of the Council of Generals on the subject
of active co-operation with Austria after Marengo is badly received
by the King, who gives Damas the command of an auxiliary corps
in Rome, and afterwards in Tuscany — Operations against the Cisal-
pine general, Pino, and Miollis (Battle of Siena, 14th Jan. 1801) —
Negotiations with Murat — Armistice of Foligno .... 276

XV

Return of the army-corps to Naples, March 1801 — The Hereditary
Prince gives Damas a kind reception, and so does Acton, but the
latter is really hostile to him — Peace of Florence, 28th March, 1801
—Violent scene with Acton, after which Damas hands in his resigna-
tion— Goodwill of the King and Hereditary Prince — Damas visits
Battaglia with Bellegarde — Further reflections on the Austrian army
—Long visit to Vienna (Oct. 1801-Dec. 1803)— Damas is recalled to
Naples by the King and Queen, and returns on the 5th January, 1804
— Persistent hostility of Acton — Elliot and Alquier, the English
Minister and French Ambassador — Acton is sent to Sicily —
Conversation with the Queen of Naples, whose influence becomes
supreme 298

XVI

Queen Marie Caroline and public affairs— The ministers De'
Medici and Forteguerri — The Comte Roger made Inspector-General
of the army (12th Oct. 1804)— The reforms make the French
Ambassador uneasy — The Comte's relations with the latter —
Napoleon insists on Damas's dismissal : the Queen contemplates
resistance, even by force of arms, but finally yields — The Comte goes
to Messina (March 1805) — Visit of the English colonel, Smith, to
Sicily — The Cardito incident at Napoleon's coronation in Milan —
Secret mission of the Russian generals, Lascy and Opperman — A
quarrel arising from the expulsion of Prince Chtcherbatof ceases on
the arrival of the minister Tatistchef— Comte Roger gives prudent
advice in vain — Attitude of Austria, England, and France . . 314

xxxiv CONTENTS

XVII

Alquier's violence on his return — Naples adheres to the coalition
— Recall of Comte Roger — Severe criticism of the treaty signed by
Circello, and of the selfish behaviour of the allies — Treaty of neu-
trality with France signed, and retracted simultaneously — Inter-
view with Elliot — Letter from the Queen — 'Attempts to move
Tatistchef , and council held to discuss his strange suggestion — The
Queen's share in the determination to let the allies land at Naples
—Their arrival (19th Nov. 1805)— Alquier's departure . . .345

XVIII

The Anglo-Russian occupation — Lascy, who has the chief com-
mand, promptly sends the Neapolitan army, commanded by Damas,
into the Abruzzi — The allied generals hold an acrimonious con-
ference before Damas goes — Lascy and Opperman make a tour on
the frontier — The news of Austerlitz decides the English and
Russians to abandon the kingdom — Letters from the Queen and
Lascy — Vain attempts to help the Russians and to stave off the
French invasion 364

XIX

The invasion : the Neapolitan army, under Comte Roger, is only
entrusted with the defence of the Calabrian Provinces — Sketch of
the country — The General's plan — General Minutolo is surprised by
General Reynier — Damas withdraws to the strong position of
Campo Tenese, whence his troops are driven on the 9th March, 1806
— Hasty retreat of the Neapolitan army, and hostility of the inhabi-
tants— The Comte Roger resigns his post and prepares to go to
Vienna — Reflections on the loss of the kingdom, the expedition of
Cardinal Ruffo, and the sentiments and conduct of the King and
Queen of Naples — Forcible indictment of Acton, the chief cause of
the disaster ; and of the policy of England ; • '' .... 389

APPENDIX '",».. ,-,-,» » -»,r/ 7H*«ri"f;<f NWI-',*-- ---i • • • ^^
NOTES T'y j'w*(""- '•'• y*,\"-<'\ *'(1. . ' .' . . .435

INDEX 489

MEMOIRS OF THE
COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

After an educational tour in Prussia the Comte Roger, an officer in the
King's Regiment, decides to serve in the Russian army against the
Turks — Obstacles in the way of the scheme — Meeting with the
Prince of Anhalt — Arrival at Elizabethgrad — Cordial welcome from
the Prince de Ligne — Potemkine — The author, as a special favour, is
admitted to the Russian army.

IF it should be my fate in the course of my career to be long
parted from you, my dear brother,1 do not deny me the satis-
faction and consolation of feeling that you cannot be happy
unless you be kept informed of the events that fill my life. I
will especially describe those that I think likely to interest you ;
and if, unavoidably, there should sometimes be a long interval
between the records, or if circumstances should prevent me
from describing any special incident, I shall always have the
pleasure of hoping that my notes will enable me to recall every
period of my life, when Heaven grants me the happiness of
uniting it with yours. Wherever we may be when that time
comes, I shall take all the more pleasure in my peaceful exist-
ence from being able to pass in review all the vicissitudes I may
have experienced.

You will remember that, two years after my education was
finished, I made a tour in Prussia with my eldest brother.2 We
spent the whole of the season that is usually devoted to reviews
in inspecting the products of Frederick II 's reign and genius.
We visited the training-camps in every part of the kingdom,
and saw manoeuvres and all kinds of details carried on under
the best generals educated in Frederick's school. These

2 MEMOIRS OF THE

manoeuvres, which were more calculated than anything else
that one can see in Europe to give one an idea of the sublime
side of war, increased my taste for a profession for which I
had been intended since the age of twelve, though I had
hitherto had no opportunity of feeling its full meaning and
interest. When I returned to the King's Regiment 3 in France
I felt less enthusiasm for those minutiae of a soldier's duty
that are so irksome in garrison life, though very necessary for
the attainment of the great results achieved by the finest
profession in the world. On returning to Paris after the
summer months spent with the regiment, I found, during the
rest of the year 1786 and the winter of 1787, that I was less
intoxicated by pleasure than in the preceding years, and it
began to dawn on me that this kind of dissipation would not
long suffice for the happiness of my life.

The winter and summer were spent partly in town, partly
in the country, and partly at Nancy ; and the autumn restored
me to the bosom of my family, who were then living on their
property at Varennes,4 four leagues from Fontainebleau.

This was the time of the provincial assemblies, which
followed on the Assembly of the Notables, and preceded all
the changes and horrors that were on the point of taking place
in France, though at that time no one dreamed of the extent
to which they would spread. My relations were often obliged
by business affairs to stay in Melun, wrhere the assembly of
their province was held.

I spent my time in moving about, from the country to Paris
and from Paris to Melun, with no special object in remaining
anywhere except the satisfaction of my own feelings, my
affection for my family, and my desire for amusement.

One day at Melun I was reading the papers to relieve the
boredom of listening to the serious, monotonous conversation
peculiar to the provinces, when I came upon an article that
caught my attention. By a most curious and fantastic jest of
fortune this article that I read by chance, this gazette that I
had taken up in an idle moment, determined the whole course
of my career and life.

The article announced that, war having been formally

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 3

declared between the Russians and Turks and an alliance
concluded between Russia and Austria,5 operations were about
to begin, and that the Prince de Ligne was appointed to repre-
sent the Emperor Joseph II at the headquarters of Prince
Potemkin, who was to direct the campaign of the allied armies.
It was added that the Prince de Ligne had already set out,
with his horses and baggage, to Elisabeth-Gorod, a little town
in Tartary Nogai's.6

I was left in a kind of asphyxiated state by this article, and
when at last I raised my eyes I seemed to be awaking from a
dream. I knew the Prince de Ligne; 7 I had already observed
and learnt to value his lovable character, his excellent heart,
and his chivalrous spirit ; I instantly felt that he, with his
generous nature, would take a real pleasure in supporting an
act of impulse, and I encouraged myself in the belief that he
would not refuse to help me. At the same time it occurred
to me that, if I were to write to him, he would not be in a
position to agree to my wishes, since then his consent would
not depend on himself alone. It would be best, therefore, I
felt, to steal a march upon him, and arrive suddenly without
any consultation or warning whatever.

I was greatly excited, and indeed intoxicated by this idea ;
but feeling that it was too much opposed to the ordinary course
of my life, and involved too many risks to please my relations,
if I were to speak of it to them, I hid all my agitation in my
own heart and remained for a few more days at Melun. I then
made a pretext of some business in Paris, with a view to
securing solitude, and considering quietly the whole question
of the course I was about to adopt.

I had too little money at my disposal to undertake so long
and expensive a journey, and to procure any more without my
relations' help appeared impossible ; while to start off without
a single letter of recommendation or even a passport seemed
quite impracticable. It was necessary, however, either to sur-
mount these obstacles or to renounce a project that had become
my one and only ambition, and the desire of my whole soul.

I conceived the plan of secretly interesting some honest
banker in my scheme, and persuading him to help me without
B 2

4 MEMOIRS OF THE

any security but my good conscience and my honour. I had
heard Perregaux 8 spoken of as a distinguished man in his own
line, and I decided to go and broach the subject to him.

On thinking it over I saw that, as far as the passport was
concerned, it was not indispensable for the first part of my
journey ; and that if I could once reach Berlin I could prevail
on Prince Henry, who had been exceedingly kind to me during
my previous visit and had had all sorts of dealings with Russia
in the course of his life, to make my next step easy for me.

When this little ray of hope showed me a way out of my
difficulties I jumped for joy in my room, and definitely adopted
the course to which I afterwards adhered. I went to see
Perregaux ; confided in him frankly ; and told him that I had
nothing but my name to give him as a guarantee of my honour,
and that my whole fate and happiness depended on him alone.
I told him he might be quite sure that if my relations wrere
informed of my intention they would oppose it ; but I was
ready to swear that if he would apply to my sister first, and
then to the rest of my family, two months after the day of
my departure from Paris, he would at once be repaid and very
warmly thanked. Perregaux listened to me with all the good
nature and interest for which I had hoped, though I had no
claim whatever on his kindness. Never shall I forget the
sympathy with which this man whom I had never seen before
entered into all my motives. He said that in two days' time
he would let me know the sum he could advance to me; and
that I could count, not only on the money, but on his solemn
promise to wait for two months before applying to my rela-
tions. I embraced him rapturously ; and when I returned to
him at the appointed time he placed at my disposal a hundred
louis in gold, and five hundred in letters of credit on Berlin
and Warsaw. This sum, added to my own money, was all I
needed for a beginning.

My departure was now certain ; and having had the good
fortune of surmounting the chief obstacle I had time to think
over the various steps it was essential for me to take. In the
meantime it seemed necessary that some one, of whose dis-
cretion I was certain, should be able to inform my relations

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 5

of my absence, without at first enlightening them as to my
intentions. I had until then been entirely dependent on them,
and had always confided in them absolutely ; and I was afraid
that this first step I was taking on my own judgment would
make them very anxious. I had never in my life hidden any-
thing from my eldest brother, and I chose him as the guardian
of my secret. He took fright at first, and tried to turn me
from my course ; but when he saw that my resolve could not
be shaken, and that it would make me too unhappy to give up
my plan, he decided to leave me to my fate and promised not
to tell our relations about it until my absence had been dis-
covered. I then determined to set out in a few days' time, as
it was only thus that I could make sure of removing the
difficulties.

It is quite right to lay down as a principle that one should
think over a course of action very carefully before adopting
it ; but another principle is equally essential — to reflect
promptly, and learn to estimate at the first glance the various
advantages and inconveniences of a given resolution. I had
made all the preparations indispensable for so long a journey,
and a measure so foreign to all my previous experience, and
the eve of my departure had arrived, when it was delayed by
an incident that was as unexpected as it was curious : the
Comte Wall,9 who was in the King's Regiment and lived in
Paris with his wife, was killed in a duel in the Forest of
Fontainebleau. The meeting was so arranged that no one in
the world ever discovered exactly what took place, nor who
his adversary was : it was known that he left his carriage at
Fontainebleau, proceeded to the forest on foot, and dis-
appeared. This extraordinary adventure instantly became the
talk of all Paris ; every one was puzzling over the man's
identity ; there was no evidence whatever. Who, it was asked,
used that road habitually ? Attention was drawn to our family-
property ; it was pointed out that we were in the King's
Regiment, and that eighteen months earlier I had fought a
duel with the Comte de Broglie, the dead man's intimate
friend. Then it was said that perhaps I was the Comte Wall's
opponent. Great was my astonishment when my brother came

6 MEMOIRS OF THE

to tell me of this suggestion. At the same time I agreed with
him that I should give countenance to the ridiculous idea by
leaving France at that moment. I postponed my journey
without a moment's hesitation ; I showed myself everywhere ;
I went to pay my court at Versailles as often as usual ; and I
allowed ample time for people to make all the needful inquiries,
which could not fail to relieve me from the annoyance of this
absurd tale. At last, after three weeks had gone by, I was
in M. le comte d'Artois's apartments one day when he said in
a loud voice that the King knew all the secret details of the
incident in question. He would satisfy no one's curiosity, he
added, by mentioning the name of the Comte Wall's adver-
sary : he would merely say that it was not any one of his
acquaintance. It seemed probable, since so much mystery was
made about it, that the affair would long remain a secret ; and
therefore my brother and I came to the conclusion that I need
no longer take it into my calculations. I proceeded to carry
out my plans without any further reference to the episode that
had postponed them.

At midnight of the llth December, 1787, I embraced my
brother, stepped into my post-chaise, and, putting my trust in
my star — which was as yet quite untested — took the road to
Strasbourg. My postillion took me along at a very leisurely
pace, and the sluggishness of my progress, combined with the
darkness, brought forcibly before my mind how many paces
lay between me and Tartary, how uncertain I was of success,
how much colder I should be as every day went by, how bad
the roads would be, how my chaise would fall to pieces, and
how many miseries I should have to endure. My heart began
to beat violently, and I felt painfully lonely ; but I told myself
it was a disgrace to be so much agitated, I forced myself to be
firm, I shook off all my gloomy thoughts, and on the fourth
day I arrived at Strasbourg.

On the day after my departure from Paris, my brother set
out to Melun, feeling greatly embarrassed and very sad on
account of the news he had to tell. My relations were sur-
prised not to see me with him ; he stammered, and excused my
absence as best he could ; he was questioned more closely than

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 7

he had expected to be ; and finally, after being pressed and
srged to explain himself, he told the whole story. My relations
were wounded by my secrecy, and, above all, anxious and
anhappy about my enterprise, the results of which they could
not foresee nor estimate. My uncle,10 who had more authority
and influence over me than the others, decided to make a last
attempt to dissuade me, and wrote me the most loving, and, at
the same time, the most peremptory letter, bidding me return
to him. This he despatched by a courier, who reached
Strasbourg a few hours after my arrival. I was haunted by
a mysterious feeling that something of the kind would occur,
and with a view to leaving the place as quickly as possible I
hurried off in search of the German coach that was to replace
my post-chaise. My feelings were dreadfully harrowed, how-
ever, when I opened my letters. I passed the night in a painful
state of agitation : a letter from my aunt, more tactful and
touching than my uncle's, nearly made me sacrifice everything
to her wishes ; but I came to the conclusion that it would be
sheer folly to be governed by my heart rather than by my
head. I felt certain that I should be pursued by regrets for
the rest of my life, and that my return would be the end of
my independence : in short, an unconquerable instinct made
me refuse irrevocably to retrace my steps. In my answer I
expressed all the gratitude and affection that were in my heart ;
I promised my relations that the memory of their kindness
and goodness should be my guide as long as I lived ; and
twenty-four hours afterwards I sent away the courier. As
soon as my travelling arrangements were completed I drove
over the Pont de Kehl, and summoned all my patience and
hope to my aid.

We all know what it is to travel in Germany : the stoicism
that is required to match the postillions' apathy, the resigna-
tion that one has to cultivate, the intolerably sluggish pace
that makes one feel as though the goal were receding all the
time. These conditions, combined with my mental agitation,
made the first days of my journey very disagreeable ; but I
gradually ^rew accustomed to my circumstances, and was
conscious of nothing but the future,

8 MEMOIRS OF THE

One evening I arrived at a posting-house in the most appal-
lingly cold and snowy weather, and saw in the courtyard a large
travelling-carriage, which was a sufficient sign that I should
be unable to procure fresh horses, and should have a long time
to wait for them. I left my carriage, with the intention of
warming myself indoors ; but the only room that contained a
fire was occupied by my fellow-traveller, and I felt much
aggrieved at being inconvenienced by him in so many ways.
He and I, for want of something to do, inquired each other's
names at the same moment. His valet told me he was called
M. de Mayer. "Well," I said, "go and tell M. de Mayer
that a traveller, who is dying of cold and is prevented by him
from continuing his journey, begs to be allowed to warm
himself at the stove." The gentleman made me welcome at
once : judging from his face, he was an agreeable and reputable
person : his manners were polished and courteous. I simplified
the opening of our conversation by begging him to tell me in
what army he was serving. "In the Russian army," he
answered ; " and I am hurrying to join it now, for it is perhaps
fighting the Turks at this moment." It can easily be imagined
what a stroke of good luck it was for me to be able, owing to
this happy chance, to obtain all the information I required,
in a secret and indirect way. By dint of being very civil, and
showing a great desire to please this M. de Mayer, I lured him
into a conversation that was of incalculable interest to me, and
I was rejoicing in all the information I had already gathered
when wre were told that our horses were harnessed. "Mon-
sieur," said M. de Mayer, "I expect our valets will bore us
after a time. It seems to me we might put them both in your
carriage, and have a talk, ourselves, in mine." I accepted the
suggestion with the greatest delight, and we set off.

There are natures so engaging and sociable that they can
quickly overcome all the embarrassment and stiffness of a new
acquaintanceship such as this. My fellow-traveller possessed a
nature of this kind, and we had not covered half the first stage
before we were chatting like old friends, if not, perhaps, like
confidential ones. My new friend had such distinguished
manners, such a cultivated mind, so much knowledge of the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 9

usages of society, and such a luxurious carriage that the name
of Mayer did not strike me as representing him at all ade-
quately. I told him so, and he then informed me that he was
travelling incognito under this name, but was really the Prince
of Anhalt-Bernbourg,11 a lieutenant-general in the service of
his cousin, Catherine II.

This was indeed a stroke of fortune — an initial benefaction
on the part of my star ! At the same time it behoved me to
be more than ever discreet. It would be a good thing to make
him interested in me, but dangerous to let him know the object
of my journey. I gave him no hint beyond my intention of
visiting Berlin, where I had been so kindly treated in the
previous year, and my love for the profession in which I had
engaged so young, and to which I wished to devote my whole
life. However, while discoursing at large upon the different
European armies, the generals who had won renown in them,
and the various sovereigns and their ministers, I had no
difficulty in leading him to speak of Catherine II, Prince
Potemkin, and the special characteristics and customs of the
army and Court of Russia. I expressed so much admiration
for his way of dealing with the subjects on which I was indis-
creet enough to question him that at last he was induced to
say : "I regret extremely, monsieur, that Her Majesty the
Empress should have determined to admit no volunteers to her
army, for I cannot help thinking you would have liked to see
the reality of all these things that I can only describe to you."

I had sufficient self-control to avoid betraying the dismay I
felt on hearing these words, and I endeavoured to convince
him that any such idea was far from my mind. The more
resolutely the Empress had determined to admit no foreign
volunteers to her army the more certain it was that I could
only succeed in my object by preserving the strictest secrecy.

In the course of that night I obtained from the Prince of
Anhalt a great deal of information that was most useful to
me. At the outskirts of Leipzig we parted; he had some
business to do there ; and after many pretty speeches, which
as far as I was concerned were very flattering, we engaged to
meet in Berlin as soon as he arrived.

10 MEMOIRS OF THE

This incident, while it left me very uneasy as regards the
Empress's resolution, was very satisfactory in other respects.
I was less ignorant of what lay before me; I was on a more
open path, so to speak ; but my arrival in Berlin was a critical
moment, since it was here I had to force an entrance to the
road I wished to travel. As I have already said, I had no
letters of introduction, nor had I even a passport : I had
nothing to depend upon save my visit of the previous year,
and nothing to excuse my lack of credentials but the kind
reception that was given me then.

I arrived at last ; and on alighting at the hotel sent to
inquire of M. d'Esterno, the French Minister,12 at what hour
I should find him at home. He was away, of which circum-
stance I was ignorant ; but M. Falciola,13 his secretary of
legation, came to see me at once on reading my letter. I told
him I had been rather dull in Paris, where every one seemed,
that winter, to be absorbed in very melancholy and profound
affairs ; and I had therefore determined to spend the next few
months in travel. After a short sojourn in Berlin, however,
I could not make up my mind whether to go to Holland or to
Poland : I had no definite object, except to be quit of the
threadbare topics of conversation at present popular in Paris,
and the constant discussions on a future that promised to be
very stormy. In these approaching events, I said, neither my
age nor my position qualified me to take an active part ; and
I hoped that, as he knew me to have carried out all the needful
formalities when I was travelling in the previous year, he would
insist upon no further explanation and would give me all the
help and attention in his power.

He advised and requested me not to pay my court, as there
was a certain amount of friction between the two Powers, on
the subject of Holland. As is well known, it was in that year
that the Duke of Brunswick entered Holland with a body of
Prussian troops. The only opposition brought by the Arch-
bishop of Sens 14 was a futile measure not worth considering :
he despatched to the assistance of the patriotic party about
fifty engineers and artillerymen in disguise, who were taken
prisoners by the Duke of Brunswick. Jt is obvious that a

COMTE ROGER DE DAM AS 11

measure so unworthy of a great Power could only result in
ridicule, and it has since been sufficiently proved that if the
Archbishop of Sens had allowed France to play her rightful
part in European politics at this time, not only would the
Duke of Brunswick's attempt have failed, but a far more
important event, the French Revolution, would never have
taken place.15

I submitted, as was but right, to this official request, and
promised that my only visits should be to Prince Henry, either
in Berlin or at his place at Rheinsberg, and to Prince and
Princess Ferdinand, in whose house I had stayed on very
intimate terms when I was last in Berlin.16

Two days after my arrival I was greatly astonished to receive
a visit from one of the King's adjutants, who, after introducing
himself in the most courteous way, told me that the King had
seen my name on the list of arrivals, and was surprised and
pained that I had made no attempt to see him ; that the
change in his position had not made him forget the time when,
as Crown Prince, he had made my acquaintance ; and that he
hoped I should iiot stay in Berlin without renewing it. I
expressed the greatest gratitude; and it seemed to me that
there was no reason against my telling the adjutant why I was
deprived of the honour of making my court to the King : if
the French Minister had any real reason against my doing so
he would surely prefer the reason to be known. The adjutant
appeared much embarrassed, and promised me he would imme-
diately repeat to the King the information I had given him so
frankly. I begged him to assure the King of my profound
regret and respect ; and he then left me. Two hours later he
returned, with a message from the King. His Majesty assured
me he would be much distressed if M. Falciola believed him to
be anything but the friend of the King of France, and he felt
it very strange that his intentions and thoughts should have
been so little understood. He would write a personal letter to
the King of France, he said, to inform him of M. Falciola's
proceedings and mistakes in the matter, and in the meantime
he hoped I should feel there was no reason against my going
to see him. I again assured the adjutant of my great desire

12 MEMOIRS OF THE

to do so, and undertook to present myself at the palace at the
hour fixed by the King.

I hurried off to tell M. Falciola of the results of his advice.
He was very uneasy as to the consequences the affair might
have for himself ; but I plainly saw he was acting in accordance
with instructions, for he was unable to accompany me to the
Court.

The King received me with all the kindness he had pre-
viously shown me, when he was living quietly in Potsdam under
his uncle's severe regime ; 17 but he said nothing of the cir-
cumstances that had led to the incident of the morning. He
only spoke of Paris, his accession to the throne, and other
general topics. After half-an-hour's conversation he dismissed
me, expressing a desire to see me again ; but in my heart I
was devoutly hoping that my prompt departure from his
dominions would leave me no time to have that honour. After
dinner I presented myself at Prince Ferdinand's palace, where
I was kept the whole evening. There I found the Prince of
Anhalt-Bernbourg. We met as though the link between us
were several years old, and for a moment I felt a strong impulse
to confide in him, so great was my esteem and friendship ; but
he was on his way to Petersburg, and afterwards I felt very
strongly that I should have been most imprudent to place my
fate and my secret in the hands of any man. My only chance
of carrying out my scheme lay in keeping it a secret from
Petersburg until I was quite secure against a mere ministerial
refusal. The next day I set out to Rheinsberg,18 where Prince
Henry was spending the winter, in a state of great displeasure
with his nephew and with the new government, whose lack of
confidence in him had disappointed his hopes.

I had only spent four days in Berlin ; and as I hoped that
Prince Henry would help me to continue my journey I had
arranged to go on from Rheinsberg, if it were possible, without
returning to Berlin. "What!" said Prince Henry, as I
entered his room. " A Parisian at Rheinsberg in the heart of
the winter? " "Parisians who are too young to take part in
affairs of state," I answered, "and who ought to have no ties
save their profession, can have no greater pleasure than to pay

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 13

their court to Prince Henry ; and I entreat him to believe that
my admiration and homage are proof against all the seasons."
He presented me to the seven or eight persons who formed
his circle, and the conversation was resumed, on topics that
were of more or less importance, but of invariable interest.
This continued until he was told that his presence was awaited
in the theatre, whither he took me with him to hear the
opera Atys.1* His servants, in very fine costumes, sang the
choruses badly; the principal parts were taken by actors of
mediocre talent; and the whole performance could have had
no attractions for any one but the prince, and none for him
except at Rheinsberg. It pleased him because it was in French,
and because he loved music, however badly it was executed.
After the opera we repaired to another part of the palace for
supper ; and after supper half-an-hour's conversation on the
French theatre led us to the time that the prince retired. He
told me he hoped I should give him several days, and insisted
on it very kindly. Then we all separated.

The prince's adjutant told me that it was the custom here to
leave the guests free to dispose of the morning as they would,
that they all assembled an hour before dinner-time, and that the
routine of every day was the same. On the following morning,
therefore, I was able to rest until noon, and to think over the
best way of entering upon the subject of my own concerns. I
preferred, instead of consulting Prince Henry about my
scheme, to lay it before him as a settled matter, at the same
time pointing out the great advantage it would be to me to
have the help and protection of his support, and the special
pleasure it would give me to carry out my plans under such
happy auspices. This was the line I took when, on the first
favourable opportunity he was kind enough to give me, I
opened the subject on the following day. I cannot quite
account for the immense surprise that my project seemed to
cause him. He used this expression, among others : the whole
of Russia is not worth the trouble you intend to take.20 That
the matters of vast import which were being contested by two
armies of some size were not worth the attention of a youth
of twenty was not an objection nor a consideration, I felt, that

14 MEMOIRS OF THE

need intimidate me ; and I easily made him confess that a man
might risk a journey, even for a smaller object. " But indeed,"
he said, ' k I hardly see how I can be of any good to you, for I
have fallen out with all the important people in Russia." I
then explained to him that the Prince de Ligne's presence at
headquarters would serve as a base for all my future operations,
and that the great use he could be to me lay in helping me to
reach that spot. "I only see one means I can employ," he
said, " and I hope a good deal may be effected by it. It is to
give you a letter to Count Stackelberg,21 the Russian Ambas-
sador at Warsaw, who is still my friend, and will do his best
for you on my recommendation." I asked for nothing more;
this was all I could wish, and my heart began to beat quickly
in my joy at finding another obstacle surmounted. The prince
asked me if my hurry were so great that I could not sacrifice
a day or two to him. I knew better than to refuse so flattering
an invitation, and fixed the next day but one for my departure.
" Well," he said, "we will spend the time chatting over your
plan, and making some meat-lozenges and stew to keep you
from dying of hunger in the most villainous country you ever
saw." Everything showed me, during the rest of the time we
spent together, that he had a great grievance against Russia,
that he heartily disliked all its characteristics and inhabitants,
and that, for purely personal reasons, he, thought very poorly
of that Power. His grievances had no relation whatever to
my ambitions, and his abuse of the country did not in any
way lessen my curiosity to make its acquaintance. I was thank-
ful to him for encouraging my hopes, and bore him no grudge
for trying at the same time to damp my pleasure ; and I left
him with my heart full of gratitude for the four days during
which he had deigned to devote so much time to my fate and
my future.

I travelled from Rheinsberg to Warsaw as quickly as pos-
sible, by way of Frankfort-on-the-Oder, Meseritz, and Posen.
On my arrival I immediately waited on Count Stackelberg, who
combined a most dignified manner with an air of great courtesy
and a very agreeable address. I gave him the letter that I
had for him : thenceforward my progress would depend on the

COMTE ROGER BE DAMAS 15

amount of support that I received from him. The smiling
face with which he read the letter, however, gave me hopes
that he would consider the matter favourably ; and when he
had finished he said: "This wish of yours, monsieur, and of
H.K.H. Prince Henry, is totally opposed to the instructions
I have received from my Court, and you and I are both in a
very awkward position. However, we will do our best to get
out of it. You must choose between two alternatives : if you
intend to spend a few days here and learn something of Warsaw,
I hope you will honour me by coming this evening to a ball
and supper-party I am giving, where you will meet all the best
society of Poland ; but in that case I warn you I shall only be
able to give you a passport to Petersburg, where, I assure you,
your wishes will be very strongly opposed. Are you willing,
on the other hand, to show yourself nowhere and keep your
visit to Warsaw a secret? In that case I shall be delighted
to give you a passport to Elisabeth-Gorod, our headquarters.
It will take you into the very room of the Prince de Ligne, and
there you can settle all your affairs."

I had never met Count Stackelberg before : his manners, his
face, and his palace were all impressive : but, throwing all the
conventionalities to the winds, I fell upon his neck and
embraced him in my delight and gratitude. He gave some
orders to his secretary, and while they were being carried out
he discoursed to me on the most important facts for me to
know on reaching headquarters. The passport arrived; I
vowed eternal devotion and attachment to the Count ; and two
hours after leaving his room I was out of Warsaw.

In this short space of time the landlord of my hotel had
succeeded in finding me a Polish lackey, who spoke German
and Russian equally well, and turned out, by a lucky chance,
to be an excellent fellow. But it was during this last stage of
my long journey that my patience was tried the most. The
roads were shocking, the horses were screws, the postillions
were Jews, Prince Henry's meat-lozenges were my only food ;
my carriage, a sorry thing at best, was perpetually breaking
or upsetting in the snow-filled ditches; the nights were long
and bitterly cold; shelters were rare, and always disgusting.

16 MEMOIRS OF THE

In short, during the twelve days of my journey to that moun-
tain of Tartary Nogai's, which I desired to reach at any cost,
I met with all the inconveniences usually experienced on the
most laborious travels ; but my goal was too constantly before
my mind to leave room for any other thought, and the moment
that I set eyes on the first hovel of that pitiable town,
Elisabeth-Gorod, is the last moment I am ever likely to
forget.

It was eleven o'clock at night, on the 12th January, 1788,
when my postillions drew up before a sort of cafe or public
billiard-room in this little town. I inquired, through my
Polish lackey, whether the Prince de Ligne's dwelling were
known here. One of his servants happened to be playing
billiards at the moment, and I sent for him. He told me that
his master lived at the top of the mountain, in the fortress,
close to Prince Potemkin. I begged him to guide me to the
place, but as I did not wish Prince Potemkin to make inquiries
about the new arrival before I had seen the Prince de Ligne, I
left my carriage to follow me slowly and accompanied the
servant on foot. It took us half-an-hour to reach the summit
of the mountain : at last I entered the fortress, and the servant
took me into a house that contained two wretched, dirty little
rooms — the house of the Prince de Ligne. I begged his valet
to tell him he was entreated to return immediately; and I
impressed upon the man to give him no description at all of
the stranger who was awaiting him. A few moments later the
Prince de Ligne entered the room. It must be remembered
that he never forgot any one who reminded him of Parisian
society — the society he enjoyed the most ; and this will explain
the fact that he was as glad to see me as if he loved me to
distraction. I explained to him as tersely as I could what had
led me to join him in spite of every obstacle, and to count on
his incomparable kindness and help, either to secure my admis-
sion to the Russian army, or to allow me to don the grey coat
and follow him, with no object except to learn a soldier's duty
and to fight at his side. The Prince de Ligne embraced me,
and gave me his sympathy and consent, before I had finished
speaking. " Stay here," he said. " Brush yourself up a little

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 17

bit, and wait for me : I hope you will soon be pleased with me,
and rewarded for your folly." In a quarter of an hour I was
washed, combed, powdered, and equipped in the pretty uniform
of the King's Regiment ; ** and quite as ready to accompany
my charming mentor to headquarters as I had been, in the old
days, to go with him to the Opera Ball, for it always seemed
to me that his presence and favour portended pleasure in time
of peace, and success in time of war.

The Prince de Ligne was as active in rendering a service as
he was fortunate and ingenious in the means he employed, and
he came to fetch me a few moments later with an air that
seemed to promise rne success. I followed him across the
courtyard of the fortress, which was illuminated only by the
whiteness of the snow, and had a melancholy appearance that
was far from preparing me for what I was about to see. Two
sentinels, who were on guard near a very large wooden house,
showed us the door beyond which lay the end of all my anxiety
and doubt, and, I may add, the end of my fatigue, which
counted for something after so long and laborious a journey
at that season of the year. We entered an immense outer
hall, full of orderlies belonging to different regiments, and men
of all kinds of inferior rank. From this hall was visible a long
suite of rooms, all as brightly lighted as they would have been
on the day of a fete in some capital city. The first room
beyond the hall contained all the aides-de-camp and officers in
attendance on the prince ; in the second was a magnificent
orchestra, composed of the best musicians of Italy and con-
ducted by the famous Sarti ; 23 in the third was a billiard-
table, surrounded by thirty or forty generals of all ranks,
wearing their decorations above their coats. To the left of
the billiard-table was a card-table, at which Prince Potemkin
was seated with his niece 24 and one of the Russian generals.

The prince rose, and received me with the greatest courtesy.
I greeted him respectfully, and told him that I had dared to
count upon the Prince de Ligne's help, to secure me the happi-
of begging for his ; that I had been destined from child-
for the profession of arms, and should regard it as the

iatest advantage to my career to begin it in his school ; that
c

18 MEMOIRS OF THE

even supposing the Court to have decided against the admission
of foreigners I thought I was too insignificant to be included
in this prohibition, and in any case, if he would graciously
permit me to remain with him, I should be willing to serve
under him without any rank, and, if necessary, without any
uniform.

The prince told me, in very flattering terms, that he could
not respond to my overtures as he would wish, before receiving
the Empress's orders in the matter, but that a courier should
convey his request to Her Majesty that same evening. While
awaiting the courier's return he begged me to stay with the
Prince de Ligne — though he thought I should be very uncom-
fortable— and to come to his own quarters every day and spend
as much time there as I liked. He gave me a seat at his side
and conversed with me about my journey, and Berlin, and
Paris ; and when supper was ready he kept me at the table that
was laid for himself, his niece, the Prince de Ligne, and one
or two others, while all the generals went to a larger table.
He Avas kind enough to treat me with especially gracious atten-
tion, and when he dismissed us at midnight he again assured
me of the pleasure it would give him to fulfil my wishes.25

In the course of the evening the Prince de Ligne had
presented me to Prince Repnin 26 — commander-in-chief undei
Prince Potemkin — to Prince George Dolgorouky,27 who was L
command of the cavalry, and to all the other generals. I ha<
now surmounted the most difficult and embarrassing obstacl
in my path, and my heart was so light in consequence that n<
subsequent event of my life has ever made me forget th(
happiness and satisfaction of that moment, which I
recalled again and again with unfailing delight.

As soon as the Prince de Ligne and I had returned to oui
wretched little dwelling, which seemed to me to surpass all the
palaces of the world, we set to work upon a letter to the Comte
de Segur, the French Ambassador at Petersburg.28 He was
on terms of friendship with all my relations and I knew him
personally myself. I claimed his consideration and protection
as Comte de Segur (and even as my kinsman), in case he should
be unable to grant them in the capacity of French Minister :

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 19

I assured him that in one way or another I should take the
field with the Russians, and told him I trusted that his kindness
of heart, his friendship for my family, and the sympathy I
hoped he would feel for a Frenchman who had risked every-
thing through love of his profession, would lead him to watch
over my interests and clear away any difficulties that might
hamper my zeal. The Prince de Ligne sent our letters to the
secretary's office, and they went off with the courier. I slept
in peace for the first time since I had left Paris, thirty-one days
previously.

On the following day we entered upon a life of routine,
which continued for the three months that elapsed before the
beginning of hostilities. A part of every morning was devoted
to learning the Russian language with great ardour. We had
a military vocabulary drawn up for us, which the Prince de
Ligne and I repeated to one another, and soon committed to
memory by dint of this emulation. He insisted on my learning
the words bayonet and victory before the words bread and
wine, which seemed to us of very secondary interest. We
dined nearly every day with Prince Potemkin, and nearly
always at his own table, to which only five or six persons were
admitted. It was very rarely that he sat at the large table.
Sometimes we visited Prince Repnin or some of the generals,
but the evenings were invariably spent at Prince Potemkin ?s
quarters, where the variety of amusements, the society present,
and the luxury that reigned made one forget one was in Tartary.

Monotonous and solitary as a place like this corner of the
Empire may be, especially in winter, it is by no means necessary
to be wearied or dull there. There is sufficient occupation in
observing all the unfamiliar characteristics of the people, their
customs, and even their clothes ; and these interesting details
that are so constantly brought to one's notice are sure, in time,
to produce large results, and lead to most important employ-
ments. In this way my days fled past like hours. The Prince
de Ligne's goodness, Prince Potemkin's kindness and attention,
and the courtesy of all the generals, became more marked
towards me every day; and all through the war I had not a
single experience that did not show me the value of these first

2

20 MEMOIRS OF THE

days after my arrival. This period of my life is graven upon my
memory and heart for ever ; arid as I recall the hours of it, one
by one and quarter by quarter, I can remember none that did
not give me some cause for satisfaction and perfect happiness.
So wide was the range of Prince Potemkin's abilities and
character, that he gave us examples every day of all the vari-
ations and shades that lie between the gentleness, amiability,
and courtesy of a man of the most perfect breeding, and the
severity, arrogance, and hardness of the most absolute despot.
He had a supernatural power of giving exact expression to
every inward feeling, and while he persecuted those who
offended or displeased him, he would flatter and indulge every
one he admired and valued. His conceptions were profound,
but his methods of developing them inadequate ; he was quick
and ingenious in his work, but trivial in his amusements. He
would attend to everything at the same time ; would give orders
simultaneously on the most diverse subjects ; would turn over
in his head, at the same moment, a scheme for destroying the
Ottoman Empire and a plan to build a palace in Petersburg, a
project for changing the uniform of the entire army and
another for providing a trousseau for one of his nieces; but
he never mixed his ideas to the extent of confusing those who
had to carry them out. His inconceivable irregularities
followed a regular and imperturbable course. He had cleared
and captured all the roads of ambition and pleasure ; he knew
the difficulties and dangers of every step of the way ; he knew
the right moment to advance, to climb, to take a downward
course, or move aside, the sooner to reach his goal — to govern
without a rival and amuse himself without restraint. Prince
Potemkin subordinated the art of war, the science of politics,
and the government of the kingdom to his individual passions :
he was thorough in nothing, but knew something of every-
thing, and his marvellous instinct helped him to apply his
knowledge. His power was derived from his character and
mother-wit rather than from his talents; but the vitality and
strength of the former were so great that the inferiority of
the latter passed unnoticed, and he seemed to dominate by
right of conquest. He despised his compatriots, and exasper-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 21

ated them by his haughty ways; he loved foreigners, and
captivated them by the charm and delicacy of his attentions.
He finally brought the whole Empire under subjection by his
arbitrary method of blending European graciousness with
Asiatic arrogance.

Prince Repnin, who held the chief command under Prince
Potemkin, possessed neither talents nor character; but the
social gifts, and the dignified, agreeable manners that were his
in perfection, made him a very pleasant and interesting com-
panion. I will speak of the other generals when describing
the various events of the war.

A fortnight after my arrival the courier to whom I have
referred came back from Petersburg. Prince Potemkin in-
formed me with his usual graciousness that the Empress was
willing to make an exception in my favour, and would admit
me to her army. This act of indulgence was accompanied by
many flattering circumstances : she paid me the special com-
pliment of asking me to wear her uniform29 alternately with
that of the King, my master, and graciously undertook to write
to him on the subject herself. She was kind enough to accede
to my request with all the elegance and charm of expression
that she possessed to such a remarkable degree, and the spokes-
man who transmitted her consent to me added to it all the
graciousness that was so natural to him. The Comte de Segur
wrote to Prince Potemkin the most charming letter that he
ever penned. Without committing himself, he begged the
prince's support and care for a young man who would not fail,
he said, to redeem, in his master's eyes, the thoughtlessness of
his conduct by his zeal and excellent behaviour. He brought
the full influence of his romantic style of writing, his own
personality, and his special characteristics as a Frenchman, to
bear on the two Courts and on Prince Potemkin ; and while
his letter gave me the necessary support, he was careful, as was
only right for a man in his position, to repudiate all responsi-
bility as a minister.30 I received an equally charming letter
from him myself, and blameworthy as I feel some of his later
actions to have been, his mistakes can never efface my grateful
memories of him,

II

The Prince de Ligne — The Prince of Nassau in command of the flotilla
in the Black Sea— Strange reception by General Souvorof — The
author's first engagement with the Turkish flotilla— Heroic end of
Captain Sacken — Misunderstanding between Paul Jones and Nassau
— Naval engagements of the Liman (June- July 1788) — Damas
boards the Turkish flagship — Anecdote of the Prince of Nassau.

Now that I was compensated for all my anxieties, and rewarded
for coming straight to the army, by which method alone I had
saved myself from a refusal, I had no further thought except
to deserve all the approbation that I was receiving before I
had won it. I made a great effort to appear, as far as my
deportment, occupations, and words were concerned, ten years
older than I really was, in the hope of persuading the Russian
nation to believe (if it were possible) that there existed a
Frenchman of sober manners and moderate speech, who was
more disposed to be pleased than to grumble, and wras pro-
foundly grateful for the kindnesses lavished upon him. Some-
times, when we were alone together, that good fellow the
Prince de Ligne entreated me to be merciful, and spare him
the exhibition of my steadiness; upon which, after making
sure that no one was listening, I would begin to bawl opera-
tunes at him, which made him beg for mercy with more reason.
By way of a change we would make Parisian society our topic,
and would talk all sorts of nonsense, an art in which he excelled
while I was merely an amateur. The Prince de Ligne is so
conspicuous and well-known a character that if I were to
attempt to describe him I should be blamed for depreciating his
rare and delightful qualities. I shall therefore lay stress upon
one quality only, which no one can have observed as closely as I.
It is the rarest virtue in the world : the power of being, in
every circumstance of life, at every moment of the day or
night, perfectly equable and good-natured and witty, and of

22

MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 23

turning in a moment from frivolous matters to grave ones,
without being any the less gay when the serious interlude is
over. This social gift, which no man should make a virtue of
possessing, requires for its perfection, I think, the sort of
health that the prince enjoys : not a cold in the head, not a
single headache, not one attack of indigestion has he had in
his life. To this fact I would fain attribute his incomparable
good-humour, lest any one should find it oppressive.

Towards the end of March we were joined by the Prince of
Nassau-Siegen.1 When in Petersburg he had met Prince
Potemkin, who paid him the compliments that his career
deserved, and gave him a vague invitation, in the case of war
breaking out, to serve in the Russian army. The Prince of
Nassau, who is highly skilled in the art of calling attention to
himself, came in person to remind Prince Potemkin of the
invitation, which the latter had long ago forgotten. This
created a good deal of embarrassment on both sides, and the
Prince of Nassau spent a fortnight or three weeks at head-
quarters, in the uniform of a French general, without knowing
what would be the issue of his sudden apparition.

The Prince de Ligne, who has been his friend since they
were both young, spoke of him to Prince Potemkin, to whom
he easily proved that great advantage might be derived from
employing the Prince of Nassau in a war against the Turks,
since he was able to undertake all kinds of commands. His
fantastic star, indeed, had almost made a sailor of him, when
it led him round the world with M. de Bougainville. " Almost
a sailor, is he? " answered Prince Potemkin. "I have some-
thing that will suit him, then ! I'll give him the flotilla, and
prove to him that there is no other way of employing him so
usefully and successfully in the service of our cause and his
own vanity." In another hour the command had been offered
and accepted.

The flotilla of the Black Sea was to open hostilities in the
Liman, or estuary of the Borysthenes ; 2 Prince Potemkin 's
army of fifty thousand men was then to invest Otchakow and
lay siege to it ; and at the same time Marshal Romanzow's 3
army of the same strength was to take possession of Moldavia,

24 MEMOIRS OF THE

march upon the Dniester, capture the forts on that river, or
besiege the more important of them, and by this means reach
the mouth of the Danube. The Austrian army, under
Joseph II, entered Banat, crossed the River Temes, and turned
towards Mehadia, with a view to capturing the fortified towns
of that district, invading Wallachia, and besieging Giurgevo,
Vidin, Orsova, and Belgrade; while an army-corps composed
of Austrians and Russians, commanded by the Prince of
Coburg 4 and Count Soltikov,5 was to besiege Choczim.

It seemed reasonable to hope that this plan of operations, if
promptly begun and accurately followed, would oblige the
Turks to fall back upon the mountains in the course of the first
campaign, and give them occasion to fear for the safety of
Constantinople by the end of the second. We shall see, in
the sequel, the result of this scheme : it was with a view to
designing it, planning it, and celebrating it, that Catherine II
and Joseph II made their famous journey to the Crimea, on
which occasion every romantic device of imagination and luxury
was exhibited for their enjoyment.

Joseph II had adopted the scheme of the allied forces with
all his native impetuosity, and was giving a good example by
pressing forward his arrangements and the advance of his army.
Catherine was fulfilling her engagements in a more prudent
and leisurely manner; and Prince Potemkin, on whom it
devolved to carry out her orders, was directing the operations
with great skill, with one eye on his sovereign's interests and
one on his own. He was considering the former when he
allowed Joseph II to draw the Turkish troops in his own direc-
tion, and the latter when he conceived the secret intention of
paralysing Marshal Romanzow's actions, in order that he him-
self might monopolise all the success and achievement of the
war. It was with the object of harmonising the operations of
the Austrian and Russian armies that the Prince de Ligne was
living at headquarters, and I have often heard him groaning
over the futility of his efforts to bring more energy and good
faith into the proceedings — proceedings on which the repute
of the two Courts depended.

When the Prince of Nassau was definitely appointed to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 25

command the flotilla,6 I conceived a most earnest desire to go
with him, in order to start upon the campaign without delay ;
but it was a difficult matter to ask Prince Potemkin to separate
me from himself, without seeming ungrateful for what I owed
him. The Prince of Nassau was kind enough to express a
wish for my company, but from motives of delicacy was unable
to express it often. The Prince de Ligne repeatedly hinted
that I was impatient to prove my gratitude to Prince Potemkin
by seeking, as soon as possible, to justify his goodness to me ;
but at first Prince Potemkin would not allow the question to
be broached to him, and often repeated that it was with him
I was to take the field. However, as he was not to leave
until several weeks later than the Prince of Nassau, the Prince
de Ligne pointed out to him that I could join him on his
approach to Otchakow, and that he had no reason to doubt
my desire to do so. He consented at la^t ; and when he gave
me his permission in person made me pledge myself to join
him as soon as he should be near Otchakow.

My equipment was all ready ; I had as many horses as I
should need, and our departure was fixed for the 7th April,
1788. I had often sent news of myself to my relations, and
had heard from them that the banker Perregaux had been
reimbursed, and that they would take care not to let me be
short of money. This was what I had expected of them, as
soon as they knew of my admission to the army. But an
opportunity arose which enabled me, with Prince Potemkin's
help, to send them more details than I had ever dared to give
them through the post. The prince decided to send his
favourite aide-de-camp to Paris, to make a few purchases
conducive to his comfort, and to try and secure the services
of the best surgeon and the best engineer that France could
provide. The Prince de Ligne undertook to write the letters
of introduction necessary for procuring the engineer, while I
did the same in the matter of the surgeon and the purchases.

My relations showed their affection for me by receiving the
aide-de-camp as cordially and kindly as I could wish. They
asked him to stay with them, and gave him every assistance in
his business as well as his pleasures. They persuaded the Due

26 MEMOIRS OF THE

de Guiche to give leave of absence to the senior surgeon of his
company of the bodyguard, who happened to be one of the
first surgeons in France (and was given the order of St.
Michael 7 two years later, owing to their efforts) ; they super-
intended all the purchases that were designed to satisfy Prince
Potemkin's various tastes, and in this way did their best to make
some return for his many kindnesses to me. He was extremely
gratified, and became more than ever attentive to me.

On the 7th April, 1788, I parted from him, and set out
with the Prince of Nassau, who also seemed to take the liveliest
interest in me. I felt he was giving me the strongest proof of
this interest when he swore to me, as we started, that before
two months were past I should either be killed or should have
the Cross of St. George. It is not easy to win his friendship :
his character is not without its weaknesses, and his excessive
vanity makes him so sensitive that no young man can remain
on good terms with him without the exercise of tact and much
care. But his sense of honour is very acute, and I made such
a point of keeping mine up to the mark to match his, that
he ended by using it as though it were his own. Being a
warrior rather than a man of reason he cannot hold out against
this style of flattery, and I always found it successful. We
proceeded to Kherson, the port and dockyard where the greater
part of the flotilla had been built, as well as most of the ships
of the line, which can only be fitted out at the mouth of the
Dnieper. It was in this port, the inadequacy of which has since
been recognised, that everything was prepared for the arming
of the flotilla, which comprised eighty vessels of all kinds, both
with sails and oars.

This flotilla, while ill-suited for navigation in the open sea,
was formidable enough in the Liman, where the waves and
wind are always moderate in spite of its size. Our operations
were to extend as far as the point of the tongue of land on
which Kinbourn is situated, on the side opposite Otchakow.
General Souvarow 8 had saved Kinbourn by a feat of arms
that was one of the chief glories of his career, when the Turks
opened hostilities in the previous October by descending on
that town. The flotilla was to blockade Otchakow, and inter-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 27

cept any supplies that might come from Constantinople ; or
else to assist the ships of the line if a fleet should attempt to
effect an entrance into the Borysthenes.

The Prince of Nassau required a fortnight for making his
initial preparations — the needful provisioning and arming.
On the 24th April we left Kherson, and anchored in the little
port of Vesemsky, nearer to the mouth of the Dnieper ; and on
the 26th the Prince of Nassau received orders to confer with
General Souvarow at Kinbourn. He and I set out on Cossack
horses, which were changed at each picket, and we reached
Kinbourn the same morning. While the prince was having
his interview with General Souvarow I made a detailed examin-
ation of the fortress, and of its position with regard to
Otchakow, which was clearly distinguishable on the opposite
shore. Its position was a sufficient reason for the attempt
that the Turks had made to capture it in October ; for the
possession of this point, supposing Otchakow to belong to the
same Power, closes the entrance and exit of the Borysthenes.
The Turks had still with them, at that time, a few French
engineers who directed the attack ; but the determination of
General Souvarow 's character left no loophole for any other
result of the expedition than the destruction of those who
dared to undertake it.

The Prince of Nassau, who was dominated by his energy
and never yielded to fatigue, returned to his post the same
day, and continued to work day and night at the armament of
the flotilla, which he wished to be in a state of complete
efficiency as soon as possible. Prince Potemkin came to see
it on the 5th May, and after inspecting all the ships, receiving
the Prince of Nassau's requests, and giving his own orders,
went on to Kinbourn to review the troops. The extent of
his authority, the fear he inspired, and the prompt execution
of his wishes made his visits of inspection seldom necessary :
he returned very quickly, and before setting out to head-
quarters gave instructions to the Prince of Nassau to take the
flotilla to Globoca, another little port further down the Borys-
thenes, where the work could be carried on more conveniently and
we should be nearer the scene of the approaching operations,

28 MEMOIRS OF THE

I doubt whether the young men who go through their first
campaign with the army of their own country can experience
as many pleasures as I enjoyed at that time. Even in my
duty there was a great deal of variety, and this was combined
with all the novelty and charm of foreign travel : the climate,
the productions of the country, the style of warfare, the life
of the place, all seized my imagination simultaneously.
Nothing that I had pictured resembled what I saw. I was
on the threshold of the age of reason.

On the llth May the Prince of Nassau received a letter from
General Souvarow begging for two armed vessels, to cruise
about the point of Kinbourn and intercept communications
between Otchakow and the sea. "Here is an opportunity for
you," said the Prince, "in default of anything better. Will
you take two little gunboats carrying two 12-pounders each,
with five hundred chasseurs ? You shall be in command of
them : take them to General Souvarow and ask his orders.
If he does not get you killed or captured he will at all events
give you every opportunity of being so, and I will send a
stronger ship with orders to support you in everything, though
you will be independent of her." I could not help laughing
at the alluring hope held out to me by the Prince of Nassau
in perfectly good faith ; but I accepted the offer with rapture.
I set sail in my little squadron, and with the help of a fair
wind, which seemed to blow for the special benefit of my first
enterprise, I arrived at Kinbourn. General Souvarow was
asleep when I landed, and as I was therefore unable to see
him or give him the letter I had for him, I brought my
chasseurs ashore at once, and had the tents pitched on the
tongue of land. I arranged to be informed when the general
should awaken, and shutting myself up in my little tent I
calmly began to write.

I had not" seen General Souvarow on my last visit to Kin-
bourn, and did not know him. The prospect of presenting
myself to him made me feel a little agitated, and I was entirely
absorbed in the thought of it when my tent was unceremoni-
ously entered by a man dressed in his shirt only, who asked
me who I was. I told him, and added that I was waiting for

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 29

General Souvarow to awake, as I had a letter to give him
from the Prince of Nassau, who had sent me to be under his
orders. "I am delighted," he said, "to introduce you to
him. I am he. As you see, he is not a very ceremonious
individual." His manners and costume alike seemed to me
rather surprising. Seeing that I was embarrassed by the
fantastic apparition he said: "Pray be calm, and do not let
me disturb you. To whom were you writing when I came
in? " I came to the conclusion that one might be fairly at
one's ease with a general in his shirt, so I answered frankly
that I was writing to my sister,9 in the hope that the Prince
of Nassau might be able to send my letter on the following
day to Elisabeth-Gorod, whence it would be despatched to
France. "It is not the Prince of Nassau who will send it,"
he said. " It is I ; but I want to write her a letter too." He
seized some paper and a pen, sat down on a stool, and wrote
my sister a letter of four pages, the contents of which I never
knew. She received it safely with mine, but has since told
me that quite half of it was unintelligible. When the
envelopes were folded and sealed he rose and left the tent with
the letters in his hand, and I escorted him back to his quarters.
A few moments later he dismissed me, saying that he would
give me my orders the next day, that he warned me his in-
variable dinner-hour was six o'clock, and that he did not wish
me to dine anywhere but with him. At precisely six o'clock,
therefore, on that same evening, I arrived at his quarters for
dinner. "You have surely made a mistake, monsieur," said
his senior adjutant; "it is at six in the morning that his
Excellency dines, and he is now in bed." And he showed me
a straw hut on the seashore, the general's one and only room.
These two incidents, following one another so rapidly, made
me believe, I confess, that I had to deal with a lunatic ; and
the Prince of Nassau's hint, with regard to the chances he
would give me to get myself killed or taken prisoner, returned
to my mind with some force. However, as I felt far more
disposed to laugh than to be sad, I went off to see my little
corps, and then to bed very early.

At precisely six o'clock on the following morning I was at

30 MEMOIRS OF THE

the general's door. He received me with a series of leaps
and embraces that disquieted me a good deal ; made me swallow
a glass of liqueur that set fire to my throat and stomach ; and
drank some of the same liquid himself with grimaces that were
enough to make a vivandiere miscarry on the spot. He then
led me to a table that was laid for fifteen or twenty persons,
and bade me sit beside him. The soup that reigned alone
amid the guests was made of cucumbers ; spring onions,
common onions, chives, herbs, and veal and chicken-bones were
swimming in the great tin basin, and presented a most horrible
prospect to my senses. This wras the only time in my life that
I ever saw any justification for the silly doctrine of certain
teachers : When you go to the front you will see many worse
things than fighting. Nevertheless I ate some of everything,
lest I should seem to despise the food, which would doubtless
have displeased the general. I was secretly hoping that a
piece of beef would come to compensate me for my sacrifice,
but I felt my last hour had arrived when a dish of gudgeon
appeared, cooked in water and as white as they were in life.
They were followed by some tiny little sea-fish cooked in the
same sauce. The third course, which consisted of apples and
wild fruit, seemed to indicate the end of the repast ; and true
enough the general rose, turned towards a picture, and crossed
himself repeatedly, making a number of rapid genuflexions.
I must own that I felt myself dispensed from saying my grace.
When I omit to do so it is usually from inadvertence, but God
is just, and this time I owed Him nothing : He had done
nothing for me, for I was hungrier than when I sat down.

After dinner we followed the general to the seashore. He
took me aside and said : " Do you see, moored to the wall of
the lower battery of Otchakow, a one-masted vessel? She
arrived last night from Constantinople ; and I should like you
to go to-night and cut her cable, board her with your chasseurs,
and bring her away. It would be a very useful stroke of
business, in the first place because we should get some news
of the Turkish fleet, and secondly because we should have
some oranges: I know she has a cargo of them."

I could do no less than express my eagerness to obey him :

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 31

I promised him to do my utmost, but not without remembering
the words of the Prince oi' Nassau. He addea that he would
send a Greek gunboat to lead the way : I must allow her to
precede me, and must protect her all the time.

After giving me these orders he retired, and left me to make
my arrangements. I settled with the Greek captain to be
ready at ten o'clock that night, and ordered the chasseurs
and sailors to embark, but confided the scheme to no one but
my two pilots, who were both English and very intelligent.
They took a gloomy view of the matter, and when they left
me were very much depressed. All the day I- was hoping
ior a counter-order, but as it did not come I set sail, and was
resolved to do my best to succeed, though I deemed the enter-
prise a sheer absurdity. When we were about half-way to
our destination I took in the lateen sails and we plied our oars
in absolute silence. By about two o'clock in the morning we
were very near the shore. The Greek gunboat was ahead of
mine ; and creeping along by the shore, hardly touching the
water with our oars, we approached the walls so closely and saw
our prey so near at hand that my hopes began to revive. Alas !
they were not destined to live long : the Turks had seen our
approach quite plainly, but preferred to make sure of us.
No sooner did they think we were sufficiently near to be utterly
shattered than they opened fire from all their batteries, with
ball, grape-shot, and musket-shot : I could not attempt to
describe the hail that surrounded us. It seemed to me that
retreat was impossible, and that we must go on whether we
liked it or not ; but the Greek gunboat showed me there was
another course to take. The whole crew cried out with one
accord in Italian: " Scappiamo via, non c'e che fare,"10 and
made towards the open sea as fast as they could row. The
other gunboat — the one that I was not in — followed their
example, and there was nothing for me to do but to go after
them both. I merely remained under fire a little longer than
the others, and then retreated, accompanied by the abomin-
able din. Most of the shots passed over our ships without
touching them, but it seemed as though they must be sunk.
I returned to the neighbourhood of Kinbourn greatly embar-

B2 MEMOIRS OF THE

rassed by the fact that I had brought no oranges for General
Souvarow ; but none the less I was obliged to report myself
to him. What was my astonishment when he told me he had
thought the thing impossible himself, but he liked to have
such attempts made, because they accustomed the troops to
the fire of big guns. It was on this day, the 13th May, 1788,
that I was under fire for the first time in my life.11 The
general ordered me to cruise about every night off the point,
in order to try and secure some news from Constantinople,
but this fatiguing duty won me no honour, for I had nothing
to attack.

One day, however, a very small gunboat came out of
Otchakow, and sailed along close to the shore : she calculated,
quite correctly, that if she could reach the river mouth before
I left Kinbourn she could get away safely, while, if I were
beforehand with her, she could return to harbour under the
protection of the Otchakow batteries. As it happened I chose
to go in chase of her at the moment when she was likely to
hesitate between these two courses, and I did my best, with
the aid of both sails and oars, to come up with her ; but neither
I nor my English pilots knew that there was, at the point of
the tongue of land, an irresistible current that flowed out of
the river mouth, and bore upon a little island called Bere-
zanne,12 which lay opposite and outside the entrance to the
Liman, and was occupied by the Turks. This wretched
current swept me away, and all our encouraging cries to the
oarsmen were in vain : their utmost efforts were useless : we
could neither stop the ship nor change her course. The Turks
on the island, seeing the difficulty we were in, crowded into
their little boats and came out to capture us ; but General
Souvarow saw our danger, and sent a small body of infantry to
the end of the tongue of land. Then, by uniting all our
efforts, we succeeded in running aground upon the point,
protected by the infantry ; and the Turks abandoned the chase.
General Souvarow came to meet me. He reprimanded me a
little for my imprudence, but as he attributed it to my zeal
he only treated me even better than before.

The Prince of Nassau had sent a ship larger than my own

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 33

to protect me on my little expeditions. Her instructions were
to weigh anchor at the same time as myself and tack when I
tacked; but there was always some good reason against her
doing so. She was commanded by a certain Captain Sacken,
and carried ten 24-pounders ; but she never fired a shot until
the occasion to which I shall presently refer.

On the days when I was obliged to let my crew have some
rest I spent my time in watching General Souvarow manoeuvr-
ing his troops, which he did with all his native originality
and military genius. Sometimes he took his fortress by
assault, sometimes he formed squares and charged them in
similar squares, with fixed bayonets : his manoeuvres never
followed the ordinary laws of tactics, and were all the more
interesting to me on that account.

On the 1st June, at six o'clock in the morning, ninety-two
Turkish sail of all sizes 13 appeared on the horizon, within
sight of Kinbourn. This fleet was obviously designed to
attack Kinbourn or re victual Otchakow. The Prince of
Nassau, who was stationed at Globoca,14 sent orders to me
and to Captain Sacken to rejoin him at once. It was about
six o'clock in the evening when I received this order. I sent
to tell M. de Sacken that the wind would allow of my sailing
a little before midnight, and that, if he wished it, we might
go together : he answered that certain personal affairs would
delay his departure till the morning, and he begged me to tell
the Prince of Nassau that he would sail at about mid-day.
I therefore sailed without him. In the course of that night
the Turks, favoured by the darkness, brought up their small
craft to the mouth of the river, and at daybreak this little fleet
of Kirlandgis (as their boats are called) sailed into the estuary
with all their canvas set, in the hope of surprising Captain
Sacken 's floating battery — a hope that was only too well
founded. Sacken, perceiving their intention, set sail with all
possible speed for Globoca ; but the lighter vessels of the Turks
came up with him, and the unwieldiness of the floating battery
under sail prevented his fire from taking effect, and destroyed
all hope of escape. Captain Sacken, therefore, with the
greatest gallantry, put all his best men into a boat and devised
D

34 MEMOIRS OF THE

some pretext for sending them to the neighbouring shore.
He then set fire to his powder with his own hand : the ship
blew up, the surrounding vessels sustained a certain amount
of damage, and Captain Sacken saved himself from imprison-
ment by this courageous act of desperation.15 If he had done
his duty, and obeyed the orders of the previous day, nothing
would have happened to him. If I had followed his example,
and delayed to obey mine, I should have been in the same
plight as he. One is often reminded, by chances and reflec-
tions of this kind, that there is a straight line, a regular course
in a soldier's duty, from which he should never deviate at any
time of his career. I think experience has often shown that
the men who adhere to this principle are those whom fortune
favours the most.

On the 6th June the Prince of Nassau, desiring if possible
to see for himself the position taken up by the Turkish fleet,
set out with me from Globoca for Kinbourn, leaving orders
for the flotilla to come down the river as far as the mouth of
the Bug (formerly the Hypanis). We crossed the Liman, and
mounting some Cossack horses soon arrived on the tongue of
land where Kinbourn is situated. At that very moment the
Turkish fleet was preparing to enter the Liman. The Prince
of Nassau could not bring himself to believe it could make such
a blunder. However, a frigate entered ; she was followed by
three ships of the line and finally by the whole Turkish fleet.
We were on the little point of the tongue of land, and as each
ship appeared the Prince of Nassau said gaily: "There's one
of them for me! " and prophesied their fate with a degree of
penetration and coolness that did him the greatest honour.
All the ships that had entered the Liman drew up in line of
battle, with Otchakow on their larboard side and their bows
towards the mouth of the Bug.

It was at once arranged between General Souvarow and
the Prince of Nassau that a strong battery for guns of
large calibre should be constructed that night on the point
of the tongue of land; and we then returned to our flotilla,
which we found drawn up in line at the mouth of the
Bug, in accordance with the orders it had received. The

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 35

ships were lying with the river mouth on their starboard
side.

A squadron of three ships of the line and two Russian
frigates, commanded by the once famous Paul Jones,16 formed
another line behind our flotilla; but neither the Prince of
Nassau nor Paul Jones was under the other's orders. They
were requested to act in concert, but they declined to grant
the request and hated each other cordially. Paul Jones, dis-
tinguished as he had been when in command of a frigate, was
totally incapable of commanding a squadron. He made a
great display of usefulness, but never gave the smallest help
to the Prince of Nassau.

On the 17th June the Prince of Nassau made a very danger-
ous reconnaissance with three large gunboats, with a view to
discovering the best way to attack the enemy's flotilla, which
had anchored at a short distance away from the ships of the
line and the frigates. He perceived that this flotilla could not
receive any help in time from the large ships, as the shallow-
ness of the water would limit their movements to a small area.17
On the morning of the 18th we made the attack. So skilful
were the tactics of the Prince of Nassau that the Turkish
flotilla could neither defend itself nor retreat, and the ships
were dashed one upon another. The Prince of Nassau bom-
barded them with fireballs : three large ships were blown up,
several sank, and fifty or sixty were entirely disabled, while
the loss on our side was not worth considering. The engage-
ment lasted for four hours, after which the Russian flotilla
again formed up in line in front of Paul Jones's squadron,
to carry out the little repairs that were necessary and to
prepare for fresh successes.18

The Prince of Nassau was on board a very pretty yacht,
where he made me sleep in his own cabin. He showed the
greatest confidence in me, but did not like me to contradict
him. Sometimes he was sulky with me, but always thought
better of it, for I contrived to convince him of my very true
attachment by giving him many proofs of it. He possesses
more penetration and talent than real knowledge, but his
extreme courage, his enterprising character, and his indefatig-

D 2

36 MEMOIRS OF THE

able energy make him capable of great deeds. He finds out
by instinct what another man would have to learn gradually,
and when his vanity does not blind him he sees better, acts
more wisely, and decides more quickly than most of those
whose reputation is greater than his. He is one of those men
whose gifts especially qualify them for acts of sudden bravery
and expeditions that call for promptitude : his patience would
not suffice for the sustained effort of directing an extensive
plan of campaign, and I do not think him capable of doing
so, but as an independent volunteer or leader of a detached
corps he is one of the most remarkable men of our day. The
command of a flotilla in a gulf demands a knowledge of mili-
tary rather than of naval tactics, but the acquaintance with
the latter acquired by the Prince of Nassau by observing
M. de Bougainville throughout a long voyage certainly served
to increase his usefulness, and made him the best man for the
post that Prince Potemkin had chosen to give him.

At noon on the 27th the entire Turkish fleet set sail with a
view to attacking us. We knew from some of the prisoners
taken in the recent action that the intention of the enemy was
to grapple with us whenever an opportunity of engaging us
should arise ; and as they were to windward of us we expected
a terrible affair. They were already within range of our fire,
or nearly so, when one of their ships of seventy-four guns ran
upon a shoal, and heeled over to an appreciable degree. The
fleet hove-to in order to help her, and shortly afterwards we
saw them taking in their sails. If the wind had favoured us
the Prince of Nassau would have attacked them at this moment,
but that was impossible. The daylight was gone before the
Turkish vessel was righted ; but nevertheless we were expecting
the enemy to engage us every moment, all through that night.
The whole of the night the Prince of Nassau and I were
in a boat, hurrying from one ship to another, seeing that they
all were prepared for action, giving orders, arid putting every-
thing in a state of defence. Every man was at his post.
Suddenly, as we were traversing the short distance between one
ship and another, I saw the prince pull out his handkerchief,
and let it flutter in the wind. He exclaimed that it was now

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

37

favourable. "Now it is for us, my friend," he cried, "to
make the attack : our fortune has changed, and we must profit
by it ! ?! We returned to the yacht as fast as oars could take
us. He made his plans : told off a sufficient number of ships
to surround and capture the grounded vessel, if she were still
aground ; and others to account for the ships of the line ; and
yet others to cut off their flotilla and destroy it by driving it
ashore. He put me in command of eighteen gunboats, each
of which carried a 24-pounder in the bows and fifty armed
men. These were to lead the attack and cover the manoeuvres
of the flotilla. The orders were given and clearly understood ;
every man was in his place ; the signal was given and the sails
were set. When day dawned we were within range of the
Turkish guns, and I opened fire with my gunboats. The
grounded vessel was in the same position as on the previous
evening. The Turks, in their alarm and surprise, became
confused in their manoeuvres and collided with one another,
and their entanglement enabled our fire, especially the fire-
balls, to reduce them to a state of complete disorder. The
Prince of Nassau ordered Colonel Ribas 19 to board the
grounded vessel, and gave him for the purpose twelve gun-
boats similar to mine, as well as two large ones that were
meant to rake her from stem to stern ; but the colonel was
unsuccessful. I was at that time in a little six-oared boat
directing the operations of my gunboats through a speaking-
trumpet, and dashing as fast as my oars could take me to any
spot that my voice could not reach. The Prince of Nassau
called me, showed me the ship that was aground, told me that
Colonel Ribas had failed to carry out his orders, repeated them
to me, and urged me to execute them. I could not refrain
from making one remark: "Prince," I said, "you ought to
be sure that I shall die content if I can carry out your wishes,
but if I should find insurmountable difficulties do not suspect
me, I entreat you, of having omitted anything that was
humanly possible, for if you do I shall blow out my brains."
He reassured me, promised to trust me whatever might arise,
and I left him.

I approached the ship on the side where she had only one

38 MEMOIRS OF THE

broadside available ; I fired several rounds of grape-shot, and
the enemy's artillery and musketry killed a number of my men ;
I went from one gunboat to another, encouraging the troops,
and at last, giving the signal for a general shout of Hurrah!
I succeeded in boarding the ship. As I went up the side the
crew, who had been vainly trying in their confusion to haul
down the flag, cut the rope so that it fell, amid cries of
Amman! Amman! (the Turkish cry for quarter). I put
enough men on board of her to secure and disarm the crew ;
I demanded the flag, which turned out to be that of the
admiral in command (the capitana-pacha), and I took it to
the Prince of Nassau, who was already coming to meet me.
This moment, one of the happiest of my life, was estimated
at its full value by the Prince : he returned with me to the
captured vessel, and we went on board of her.

The capitana-pacha 20 himself was in a light Tcirlandgi, in
order to move about more freely, but he had already hope-
lessly lost the day. Another ship of the line and two frigates
were on fire ; the greater part of the flotilla was disabled and
aground, and we had not enough vessels left in ours to carry
out the work of destruction and capture at the same time.
Moreover most of the light craft of the Turks had run aground
near the fortress of Otchakow, where they were safe, as we
could not go and tow them away. This circumstance put an
end to the finest affair of the kind that could possibly take
place. Two ships of the line and two frigates were blown up ;
the rest were huddled under the batteries of the forts, and
the Russian fleet formed up again in line before nightfall, in
the midst of all the dSbris.21

On the morning of the next day, the 29th June, the Prince
of Nassau, who doubtless hoped to follow up his success of the
previous day with fresh triumphs, took the risks of another
engagement. He again surprised the Turks, who were
absorbed in an attempt to form a line of battle with the
remnant of their flotilla, and the reinforcements that had
arrived from the fleet anchored at Berezanne. His unexpected
attack renewed the enemy's confusion, but as the lower bat-
teries of Otchakow again prevented him from going near

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 39

enough to make any captures, he confined himself to destroy-
ing the ships by fire. Seven of them fell a prey to the flames ;
four thousand men perished by fire and water, but we contrived
to save the rest, who swam to our boats and clung to them.
One galley that was farther than the others from the shore was
cut off and captured ; and our flotilla did not retire till all the
vessels so imprudently and unwisely taken into the Liman by
the Turks had been completely destroyed.22

There is no doubt that if the Russian fleet then arming at
Sebastopol in the Crimea had been ready in time to attack
the Turkish forces at Berezanne, while we were so fortunately
engaging the ships under the forts of Otchakow, there would
have been no more left of the fleet that sailed from Constan-
tinople than would suffice to carry the news of its total
destruction back to the Divan. But it is through the want
of concerted action that wars are most commonly prolonged.
If the governments concerned were careful to neglect no pre-
caution nor plan that could advance their interests, there are
few contentions between Powers that might not be settled in
one campaign.

The land forces had now left their winter quarters, and
Prince Potemkin was encamped on the banks of the Bug.
When our action was over the Prince of Nassau deputed me
to take an account of it to Prince Potemkin, with the admiral's
flag captured on the previous day. He received me with the
most flattering signs of satisfaction: "It would distress you
too much," he said, "if I were to ask you to take this flag
to the Empress yourself : you would not like to be separated
from the army at this moment : I take it from you in her name,
and you may be sure she shall know everything that led to my
receiving it from your hands." I returned the same day to the
Prince of Nassau, who himself went to the camp on the
morrow. After that time we very often dined there, but
always returned in the evening to sleep on board.

One evening we had left Prince Potemkin 's tent very late,
and the night was extremely dark. We got into our boat,
and the Prince of Nassau fell asleep. I do not know what
chance prevented me from doing the same ; the monotonous

40 MEMOIRS OF THE

sound of the oars made me thoughtful rather than sleepy. I
observed that the distance between the shore and the flotilla
seemed longer than usual, though there were no obstacles in
the way that had not been there on the previous days. Yet
far away I thought I saw the yacht's light, the point towards
which we were in the habit of steering. The regular motion
of twenty-four oars was bringing us appreciably nearer, when
I idly turned my head to look astern of us, and thought I
could perceive a number of black objects forming a line. When
I' bent down I could see them more plainly, but neither the
coxswain nor the boat's crew noticed what I was doing. At
last my observations seemed to me so important that I ordered
the men to stop the boat and I awoke the Prince of Nassau.
He looked attentively at the objects in question, and fortu-
nately saw what I wished him to see. He ordered our course
to be changed at all hazards, and as we drew nearer to the
black spots at which we were looking our flotilla gradually
came into sight. The yacht's light had gone out : the cox-
swain of our boat — either because he missed the point by which
he was accustomed to steer, or because he was asleep — had
passed between the shore and the last vessel of the right wing
of the flotilla, and was steering straight for the light of the
Turkish guardship. The fate we had just escaped, with so
many chances against us, made our hearts beat violently ; and
even now, as I write, I am conscious of the same sensation.

The sight of the Prince of Nassau was still offended by a
line of Turkish vessels, for after each engagement the capitana-
pacha replaced his losses with ships from the fleet at anchor
off the Island of Berezanne. On the 12th July the Prince
decided to attack them again. He made the same disposi-
tions, showed the same audacity, and won the same success ;
but this time he was still nearer to the walls of Otchakow, and
under those very walls, so to speak, nine ships were burnt or
sunk. This time there were no ships of the line. The affair
lasted for eight hours. As soon as it was over I landed and
settled down on shore, as was Prince Potemkin's wish.

The uses of the flotilla were now secondary. On that same
day, the 12th July, the army set out upon its march across

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 41

the Bug, in order to encamp quite close to Otchakow, with the
Liman on its left and the road to Bender on its right. I had
been as happy as my heart could wish while under the orders
of the Prince of Nassau, but even this happiness could not
make me prefer employment at sea to the service for which I
was intended. It had been a delightful preliminary to the
campaign, and it was only thus that I could regard it, grateful
though I was to fate and to the Prince of Nassau for all their
favours.

Before parting from the Prince of Nassau I should like to
describe an incident that will throw some light upon his
character. A few days after the last engagement I was stand-
ing on the deck of the yacht when the prince came out of
the stern cabin looking very much annoyed. "I am going
ashore for a walk," he said ; " will you come with me, please? "
I had just been talking to a certain lieutenant-colonel who
was serving in the flotilla and was a Pole by birth. We all
three took our places in the yacht's boat, and the Prince said
to the coxswain : " Take us over to the opposite shore ! '' It
was by no means my habit to make any objection when he
did a dangerous thing, but I confess I was surprised and even
annoyed by his imprudence : so much so that I observed, if he
meant to land so close to Otchakow and so far beyond the
outposts of the army, he ought to let me take some armed
chasseurs on shore. "You are right," he said; and told the
coxswain to change his course and land us on Russian territory.
This ardent desire for a walk combined with so much in-
difference as to its direction struck me as very surprising,
especially in conjunction with so ill-humoured a countenance.
As we had some distance to go and I wished to sit at my ease,
I moved a cloak that his servant had placed between us :
beneath it were two large horse-pistols. " May I ask, without
being indiscreet," I said to him, " what we are going to do? "
" I am going to fight with monsieur," he answered, indicating
the Pole, who spoke French very well. " He came to my
cabin and spoke to me in a tone that I consider insufferable,
and I hope to make him adopt a different one." As I had
ien chosen to act as second I had a voice in the matter, and

42 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

took advantage of the fact. " I should never dream," I said,
" of attempting to interfere with your wishes in such a matter,
but nevertheless I have the right to observe that you are
ruining monsieur irretrievably and are too good-hearted to do
so. On the other hand I must make bold to add that you
have no right, seeing that you are to attack the enemy to-
morrow or next day, to expose yourself in this way without
first finding some one to take command in your place." I then
addressed the Pole. I swore that if he lent himself to this
unpardonably irregular proceeding, at so critical a moment as
this, I should make it plain to Prince Potemkin and the
Empress that I had given him fair warning. The wretched
man was in despair. He frankly represented his cruel position
to the prince, and begged that the affair might at least be
postponed. He hoped, he said, to convince the prince that
he could never forgive himself for doing so great a wrong to
him and to the whole army. Without further ado I gave
orders for the boat to return. The Prince of Nassau assured
the Pole that he would injure him on every possible occasion,
until he, the Pole, should come and demand satisfaction of
him, and that he would prevent him, by this means, from
forgetting to do so. I took my two combatants back to the
yacht as quickly as possible, and never really understood what
had occasioned their quarrel. For more than a month the
Prince of Nassau kept his word. He put every annoyance he
could devise on the Polish prince, but the latter behaved very
well in the last engagement, and as his subordinate rank
enforced silence on him and he had not dared to call attention
to himself the Prince of Nassau forgot his offence, brought his
name forward as he deserved, and ended by having him
promoted and rewarded.

Ill

The Russian camp — Imprudent ride with the Prince de Ligne — Com-
parison between the Turkish, Austrian, and Russian armies —
Rewards conferred upon Damas by the Empress — Siege of Otchakow :
fierce sorties by the Turks : the author is wounded in one of them,
and soon afterwards is wounded again by a cannon-ball — Potemkin's
inaction : three more of his nieces come to the camp : the Princes de
Ligne and Nassau, being dissatisfied with the army's delays, leave
the Russian service — Cold and famine — First news of the revolution
in France : Potemkin's opinion.

ALTHOUGH I had been with the army for six months I knew
nothing of it. In a country so sparsely inhabited as this the
cantonments and houses where the soldiers live are so widely
scattered and far away from one another that it is very difficult
to bring the men together during the bad season of the year :
and, except the garrison of the fortress of Elisabeth-Gorod,
I had as yet seen no troops. I leave it to the reader to imagine
how keenly I was interested in a camp that contained fift}^
thousand men, without counting ten or twelve thousand
Cossacks — for this light and irregular cavalry is always
reckoned separately from the regular troops, who are alone
considered to constitute the strength of the army.

The twenty-four hours of the day did not suffice me to
examine, and observe, and consider everything that struck me.
The pleasure of being constantly with the Prince de Ligne and
the Prince of Anhalt-Bernbourg — whom I had first met when
my fate was hanging in the balance and whom I have loved
ever since with my whole heart — the delight of camping out in
the finest weather in the world, and experiencing everything
that I had hitherto only seen shadowed forth and counterfeited
in my own country and in Prussia, all combined to make my
happiness greater than I had imagined possible. My tents

twere pitched in the part of the camp allotted to Prince
Potemkin and the Prince de Ligne : my leisure moments were
'

44 MEMOIRS OF THE

spent with them, and they both contributed every day to the
perfect felicity I was enjoying.

I must not forget to tell an anecdote of the Prince de Ligne,
which makes me laugh even now as I recall it, alone though I
be. He was as brave and enthusiastic as a man of twenty,
and as impatient as I to see the Turks. He suggested that
he and I should make a reconnaissance together in the direction
of Otchakow, and try our luck beyond the outposts : he said,
with a delightful mixture of boyishness and friendly feeling
for me, that he wished me to be with him when I saw the
enemy for the first time on land. I was charmed with the
suggestion, and we rode off side by side, accompanied only by
his Hungarian outrider, Sunta (the name is essential), and his
two hussars, who brought led-horses. As for me, I had only
a groom. We reached, and passed, the Cossack outposts ; and
after riding for some way beyond them came within sight of
the minarets of Otchakow and the gardens that surround the
town. The Prince de Ligne is not very long-sighted, and
never uses anything in time of war except an opera-glass. I
could already see some horsemen riding about at the outskirts
of the gardens, though not coming towards us ; but the Prince
de Ligne saw none of them, and continued to advance until at
last we came to a very slight rising ground, such as is called
a kourgan in these vast and absolutely level deserts. He
ascended it, dismounted, looked through his opera-glasses, and
assured me that what I took for men on horseback was merely
the movement of the fruit-trees in the wind. Being quite
convinced by his own eyes, without taking mine into considera-
tion, he chose that moment to attend to a certain urgent need
at the foot of the rising ground. The Turkish cavalry, whom
our proceedings made far livelier than the fruit-trees would
have been in any hurricane, grew tired of waiting for us, and
coming out of the gardens in crowds rode towards us. It
can easily be imagined how I shouted to the Prince de Ligne
to mount his horse without any regard for his appearance,
and how much ground was covered by the Turks before he was
in the saddle. At last, however, we were galloping towards
our outposts as fast as his horse could carry him; but the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 45

Turks were much quicker than he, and were visibly gaining
upon us. There seemed every chance of our being taken
prisoners in a very few moments. The Prince de Ligne, who
was disturbed by the alarming situation and at the same time
annoyed at being forced to fly, while recognising that there
was nothing better to be done, called out in Latin to his
Hungarian outrider, who understood no other language that
the prince could speak : " Sunta, vide si veniant ! " — " Veniunt,
serenissime princeps," answered Sunta. Then the prince be-
laboured his horse with spurs and stick, to make the beast
bestir himself ; and the sight of him repeating this performance
every moment, with exactly the same number of blows, sent
me into peals of uncontrollable laughter, in spite of the fate
that threatened me. At last the prince's horse allowed him-
self to be urged, and beaten, and persuaded into maintaining
a gallop, until the outposts, seeing our distress, came out to
help us and cover our flight. A skirmish followed, and we
were able to pull up, protected by the lances of the Cossacks.
"Don't you think, my dear prince," I said then, "that the
Turkish fruit-trees have very good legs? Luckily, however,
our own are not altogether valueless." "These little things
often happen in time of war," he answered, "but custom
prescribes that we should not brag about them." I took the
hint, and we never mentioned the adventure except to one
another. It served to moderate our youthful impetuosity
and give us a lesson, and we resolved in future to direct
our rides towards some other point than the fruit-trees of
Otchakow.

We were able to plume ourselves on having opened the
campaign, for until that time not a single pistol-shot had been
fired, and from that day forward till the town was regularly
invested on the 30th July there was a skirmish every morning
between the Ottoman civilians and the picked Cossacks of the
Don. Both sides were very numerous, and each in its own
way gave a most curious and interesting object-lesson in
guerilla warfare. Every morning brought us some Turkish
prisoners, whose horses were often very beautiful as well as of
excellent quality ; and for a very small price we bought animals

46 MEMOIRS OF THE

that would have been the envy and admiration of connoisseurs
in any country.

The Turkish cavalry is not in any way to be compared with
that of other European countries : 1 it exhibits drawbacks to
be avoided, but never any advantages to be imitated. It is,
however, courageous, rapid in movement, and adroit in the
handling of arms, and might perhaps show a certain amount
of talent in its tactics, if its actions were not always paralysed
by the want of discipline and training. It resembles a collec-
tion of volunteers, all equally desirous of injuring the enemy
but incapable of combining to that end. It never makes any
well-ordered attack or defence, but surrounds, harries, pur-
sues, retreats, and returns to the charge until the horses, which
eat nothing but oats and consequently have no wind, become
tired ; whereupon the cavalry retires, skirmishing. At any
moment of its manoeuvres a squadron properly formed in line
could defeat a body of this cavalry a dozen times as strong as
itself. Courage and imperturbable coolness are the only
qualities necessary for either officers or men when fighting the
Turks; but the army that lacked either of these qualities
might easily be — indeed certainly would be — exterminated by
them in a moment.

The inequality between the Turkish army and the armies
of all the European Powers is immeasurable. In discipline,
in armament, in tactics, and even in costume there is no com-
parison possible. Thence arises a problem difficult to solve :
why do the Russians invariably defeat the Turks, while the
Austrians' success against them is very uncertain? There is
no lack of honour nor of courage in the Austrian army : there
are good generals, excellent soldiers, and better cavalry of all
kinds than the Russians possess. Yet the Austrians often have
losffcs, the Russians never. Is there, I wonder, some mental
influence that one nation automatically exercises over another,
quite independently of any superiority that has been acquired ?
The Russian despises the Turk, while the Austrian officer
thinks he counts for something and the Austrian private fears
him. The Austrian general brings strategy to bear against
the Turks, and employs tactics, while the Russian general

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 47

simply advances : the former is often defeated, the latter
always defeats and routs the enemy. In vain I ask myself why
this should be, since the Austrian troops are generally good :
I can find no reason. I may be told that the Turks were
beaten by Prince Eugene, as well as by Laudon ; a but the
problem still remains unsolved, since, if such talents as theirs
were required to secure what can be won by any Russian
general, the inequality is more marked than ever. Since then
I have seen fifteen thousand Austrians beaten by four thousand
Turks at Giurgievo : there is not a single instance of fifteen
thousand Turks holding out against four thousand Russians.

It may arouse surprise that I should argue in this way and
speak of a problem, when the evidence leaves no room for
doubt; but a problem it is, none the less, for any one who
has seen the Austrian army in the field must have observed
that it possesses foundations and materials that should make
it one of the best armies in Europe. I think the Austrian
generals must fight in much the same spirit as a gambler shows
when he is discouraged by losing twice in succession. The man
who loses his head because he has been beaten in his first
rubber of whist will assuredly be beaten in the second. The
Austrians must have been beaten in the first encounter, owing
to some ill-advised plan or inevitable disadvantage in their
position : the after effects of this first check must then have
produced the second and made the third certain, for an army
cannot stop playing like a gambler who pays his debts and
goes away. The army pays, but remains where it is in all its
disgust and hostility ; and its moral inferiority has become an
accomplished fact.

At the time of which I am speaking the Russian army was
greatly inferior in tactics to the armies of the other first-rate
Powers. This was especially true of the cavalry, which was
positively ignorant ; but the steadiness of the men in the ranks,
their handling of arms, their deportment and discipline, were
perfect to the last degree. The prompt formation of squares
was the only evolution they employed against the Turks : this,
and their imperturbable steadiness made their success unfail-
ing. The inferiority of the Russian army in the matter of

48 MEMOIRS OF THE

training is counterbalanced by its discipline and steadiness, and
against the Turks these two qualities are more effectual than
the other.

The Austrian army, while it has more knowledge, hesitates
and vacillates at the moment of attack, and for this reason
receives the charge oftener than it makes it. This is a greater
disadvantage, perhaps, when fighting the Turks than when
meeting a European army, for special skill in manoeuvring may
be successful against an enemy that employs manoeuvres ; but,
in dealing with troops whose sole strength lies in numbers and
the force of their charge, manoeuvres are sheer waste of time.
The upshot of this discussion is this : the probability is that if
the Russian general and officers who defeated the Turks were
to change over into the Austrian army they would beat them
again, and if the contrary change were to take place the
Russians would perhaps be beaten ; while if the Russians and
Austrians were to make war against one another the issue wrould
be very doubtful and the successes equally divided. All this
shows how important it is to study the national characteristics
of the army with which one is at war. The political situation
of Europe may often change the enemies and alliances of all the
great Powers : they cannot have a new enemy without being
forced to alter their tactics and their methods of applying
them. The Power that refuses to do this will suffer for it.

I must now return to the camp, which I left to make this
digression. I accompanied it when it was moved, on the
morning of the 30th July, to invest Otchakow. The left and
right wings were both extended along the Liman in the form
of an arc, with the Liman as the cord, and the town in the
centre.

I should find it far more instructive, and certainly more
convenient, if I could at this point give a daily record of a
regular and persistent siege; and I should be only too happy
if it were possible. I should, at most, have to account for a
space of three weeks or a month — sufficient time to capture a
town that had no outworks except an entrenchment. This
entrenchment had been constructed by a French engineer called
Lafitte,3 who had a great repute in the French corps of

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 49

engineers, but had counted on a garrison of thirty thousand
men. The entrenchment, however, was only occupied by
fourteen thousand, and was weakened in consequence. Instead
of a simple and instructive report I have to write a discursive
account of seven months of siege, occupied in gaining time,
and in trying to appear to be always working for the end in
view. I must not compare this feat with that of a famous
French horseman called M. de Nestier, who made a bet that
he would spend eleven hours in going from Paris to Versailles
at a gallop, and won his money. All the methods adopted
were opposed to every rule of art, though few days passed
without some fresh work being constructed ; but they were all
so independent of one another, so little adapted to supplement
or strengthen one another, that many a man was wounded,
killed, or indirectly done to death without any improvement
or advance in the state of affairs. The first parallel having
been made several hundred yards further back than is usual,
it became necessary to make four or five others : its irregularity
and insufficient extent involved the daily construction, renewal,
improvement, or repair of a traverse, a battery, a breastwork,
or a redoubt. In short, it is impossible that so many blunders
should have been made unless Prince Potemkin had personal
reasons for having them made on purpose, in order to delay
matters ; and this is quite a likely supposition. No kind of
mistake can be made, however, without supplying exercise for
one's observation, and this is the form of interest that I take
in recalling these days. The unfortunate engineer who had
been sent from France at the request of the Prince de Ligne
turned out to be only a constructor of bridges and roads, and
was consequently dismissed as soon as he arrived.4 The works
were therefore entrusted to an old engineer belonging to the
Russian army, a Dutchman by birth, who had a fair amount
of knowledge but was always opposed by Prince Potemkin, in
whom he inspired no confidence.

In the evening of the 2nd August the Prince of Nassau came
gaily into my tent, and seeing that I was sleeping profoundly
it occurred to him to play me a trick, by way of making me
pay for what he was bringing me. He awoke me suddenly :

50 MEMOIRS OF THE

" Quick, quick — where 's your horse ! " he cried. " The Turks
have made a sortie in every direction, and are in our camp
already ! " I shouted to my men to bring my horse; I dressed
in haste; in a moment I had seized my sword, flung on my
coat, and was ready to go with him. Then, laughing at his
success, he fastened to my button-hole the Cross of St. George
that the Empress had just sent me. I have never received, and
never can receive, a greater pleasure in my life. I embraced
the Prince of Nassau with all the more gratitude that I owed
the possibility of winning it to his consideration alone, and
that he could easily have abstained from procuring it for me,
since I had no rank in the army. I slept no more that night :
I spent it in gloating over my new decoration : this kind of
happiness must be experienced at the age of twenty-one to be
fully enjoyed. Early on the following day I went to pay the
usual visit of thanks to Prince Potemkin, and found a fresh
sign of the Empress's kindness awaiting me, the form of which,
perhaps, made it even more precious to me than the other.
She sent me a sword of gold, with the following inscription in
Russian on the hilt : "For courage shown in the engagements
in the Estuary of Otchakow." 5 What delight and gratitude I
poured out to Prince Potemkin ! I succeeded, I think, in con-
vincing him that all my prayers and efforts would be directed
towards devising fresh opportunities to prove my devotion to
the Empress and himself.

The Prince of Nassau received, in addition to the Cross of
St. George of the second class, a sword of the same shape as
mine, studded with diamonds. These were the two first that
the Empress presented. She afterwards gave similar ones as
recompenses for the actions in this war; but the inscription
on these was merely : For valour.

On the 5th August the Turks, occupying the gardens that
lay outside their main entrenchment, considerably harassed the
right wing of the army, which faced them. Prince Potemkin
determined to seize these gardens and construct a redoubt in
them, which was the occasion of a very warm affair. I recall
one incident in which the hand of Providence very plainly
appeared. The prince went out a long way in advance of his

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 51

camp with a suite of more than two hundred persons. This
time he only advanced till he was within range of the big guns,
the details of the affair being left to the general commanding
in the trenches. A single ball, fired from a height, fell in the
midst of his numerous suite and killed no one but Ivan
Maxim [ief], Governor of Krementchoug, who had the well-
merited reputation, throughout the empire and the army, of
being a faithless, lawless scoundrel, the most cruel of all the
provincial governors. This judgment from heaven aroused
gratitude to divine justice and caused no regret whatever.6
The Turks were driven out of the gardens and the redoubt was
made.

On the 7th another affair occurred; and this time the left
wing was engaged. It was commanded by General Souvarow,
who had been summoned from Kinbourn by Prince Potemkin,
and was in despair at being under his orders. The Turks
made a sortie upon the left wing. After dinner Souvarow
was drunk ; 7 he attacked them, and recklessly pursued them
in absolute disorder as far as the entrenchment, where he
received such a sharp fire from their artillery and musketry
that he lost a large number of men. Then he wished to
retreat. The Turks followed him,8 still in superior numbers,
and cut off the heads of a great quantity of his best troops.
I ventured to point out to him what disasters might occur
unless he sent for reinforcements : but he was obstinate, and
lost half his men. I have seldom seen such a murderous affair.
At last the Turks, when they had driven him back nearly as
far as his camp, were stopped by the sight of the main line
of our troops; and this useless butchery came to an end. It

fas entirely caused by Souvarow 's imprudence and the irregu-
larity of the Russian works, which, from their failure to

>rotect one another all along the line of circumvallation,
enabled the Turks to make daily sorties, at fay greater cost
us than to them. The Prince of Anhalt, the Prince de
igne, and I spent all our time in groaning over the
blunders that robbed the army of so many precious lives, but
it was always impossible to make Prince Potemkin change his
system : he scattered redoubts everywhere without making
E 2

52 MEMOIRS OF THE

any regular trenches : he extended his operations, but made no
advance.

On the morning of the 9th August we saw that the fleet of
the capitana-pacha was largely increased. It was anchored off
the island of Berezanne. On the 12th, 18th, arid 19th, it
received further reinforcements, and brought so many light
vessels and floating batteries close under the cliff on which
Prince Potemkin's own tents were pitched that he was forced
to move them further away. I thought it preferable to hear a
few shells than to have the trouble of moving my establish-
ment, and was rewarded for my decision, for the Turkish ships
did nothing in that direction. We were always hoping that
the fleet at Sebastopol would come and attack them off Bere-
zanne, and would be joined by Paul Jones's squadron in the
Borysthenes, and that we should see a naval battle; but the
fleet never arrived, and that of the Turks incurred no damage
save from the Prince of Nassau.

From the 20th to the 29th the time was spent in construct-
ing four new redoubts at intervals along our front, without
any communication between them : they could only be reached
by running the gauntlet : they were on the open, level ground
of the steppes, and those who were enterprising enough to
pass from one to the other found the bullets dancing round
them, and in many cases went no further.

On the 29th, while we were at dinner with Prince Potemkin,
we heard a very brisk fusillade. At the same moment an
officer came to report that General Koutousof, who was in
command in the trenches, was mortally wounded in the head.9
The prince sent the Prince of Anhalt, who was with him, to
take command ; and I rose, and fetching my horse, hastened
to the right trench with the Prince of Anhalt, who was in as
great a hurry as I. The Turks had never made so furious a
sortie; and I must confess I never saw the Russian troops
waver as they did that day, especially the officers. The Turks
had taken the first battery opposite to their entrenchment,
had recaptured a mosque that the colonel of the Cossacks,
Plato w,10 had seized two days previously, and were making
such a fierce attack that they threatened to carry and over-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 53

row all the field-works (very defective, it must be owned)

at had been raised against them.

The Prince of Anhalt was in real difficulties and many of the
officers were absent from their posts. I observed to him that
unless we could beat back the enemy at once at the point of
the bayonet it would be too late to stop their advance. " You
are right," he said, "but at this moment our troops are
wavering so much that I dare not risk it. I leave it to you to
steady these two battalions, and as soon as I see you are ready
I will tell you to make the attack." As he finished speaking
a Turk, about fifteen paces off, shot at us : the bullet grazed
the right arm of the Prince of Anhalt, who was facing me,
and entered my left shoulder at the upper end.11 I did not
fall, but was obliged to retire from the field. The prince had
no time to help me : I dragged myself away, saying that as
soon as I had had my wound dressed and had taken off my
coat I should return. My deep feeling of friendship for the
Prince of Anhalt made me very anxious about his position,
and I determined to work miracles rather than be absent for
more than a few minutes ; but his difficulties were ended by
the Prince of Nassau. He was on board his yacht and saw
the immense numbers of the attacking force : he immediately
brought up some gunboats, fired upon the enemy's flank, and
killed every one within range. The Turks, repulsed by this
murderous fire and by the Prince of Anhalt 's wise and energetic
measures, retreated to their entrenchment, after losing a great
many men. Our loss was considerable also,12 but no one can
tell how great it would have been if the Prince of Nassau had
not acted on his own initiative as he did.

I was unable for ten days to use my arm or mount my horse,
ut, as there was nothing broken, my wound, though it in-

nvenienced me for two months, did not prevent me from
being as active as usual when those ten days were over.13

During the night of the 30th the field-guns in the batteries
were converted into siege-guns. The Turks, who suspected
that the affair of the previous day would make us careful and
give us a lesson, made no attempt to interfere with the work :
they carried out their own repairs and left us to deal with ours

54 MEMOIRS OF THE

without putting the smallest obstacle in our way. This peace-
ful state of things lasted for a fortnight, and the only thing
to show us that a siege was going on was an occasional salvo
of artillery : for it amused Prince Potemkin, now and then, to
fire upon the town with every gun and mortar in the batteries
at the same moment — the time selected being the hour of the
evening prayer, when the Turk, as his religion prescribes,
forsakes every kind of occupation.

All our minds were much exercised on the subject of Prince
Potemkin 's apparent indifference ; 14 and the ardent Prince of
Nassau on board his yacht, reduced as he was to thinking
instead of acting, conceived the idea of attacking the town by
a method that could not fail, he declared, to be successful.
He came ashore and confided his scheme to me. The principal
point in it consisted in landing two thousand men under the
lower battery of the town, on the side near the Liman — the
battery of Hassan Pacha, as it was called — and he made me
promise to undertake the disembarkation. I considered the
thing very difficult, for there were twenty-four 36-pounders in
the battery, without counting the little guns that surrounded
the foot of it, on a level with the water ; but I was too much
flattered by the Prince of Nassau's choice to think of raising
any objections on that score. After submitting his plan to
Prince Potemkin he begged him to make a reconnaissance of
the battery of Hassan Pacha on the Liman. This he could do
with the more security that the Turks, for the past fortnight,
had been so quiet that it was possible to approach much nearer
than we should hitherto have thought wise, for the sake of a
mere reconnaissance.

Prince Potemkin accepted the suggestion, and after dinner
on the 16th September he embarked in a twenty-four-oared
boat, taking with him the Prince de Ligne, the Prince of
Anhalt, the Prince of Nassau — who was steering — and myself.
At first we rowed about at a considerable distance from the
battery of Hassan Pacha; then the Prince of Nassau, with a
view to explaining his scheme more clearly, went within range
of the enemy's carbines, and lay-to while he enlarged on his
subject in detail. The Turks allowed us to carry on our

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 55

discussion undisturbed, but the moment they saw us preparing
to go away they opened a most terrible fire with all their guns.
We were surrounded by a hail of bullets, grape-shot, and shell,
and at the same moment numbers of Turks, who had apparently
been making ready while we were loitering about, flung them-
selves into boats of all sizes to come after us. We should
infallibly have been taken, since we had no means of defence.
Prince Potemkin, who was seated alone in the stern of the
boat, with his three orders plainly to be seen on his uniform,
wore an expression of cold dignity that was deliberately
assumed and was really admirable. The Prince of Anhalt
seemed chiefly disturbed by the thought that something serious
might occur to change his whole future life, and result in his
finding himself, before the end of the week, in the Seven
Towers at Constantinople. The Prince de Ligne cared little
for the danger, and met its attendant circumstances with a
touch of swagger : now fixing his eyes upon the battery, now
observing the prince, and smiling all the time with an affecta-
tion of contempt that did not really express his thoughts.
The Prince of Nassau, the person responsible for both cause
and effect of our expedition, was obviously much upset : he
urged, threatened, and shouted at the boat's crew and evidently
expected a terrible disaster to occur. As for me, in my lack
of experience I saw no possible means of escape, and had
already thought the matter out in detail. It seemed to me that
I should be fairly well received in Otchakow, since I should be
taken there in such good company ; and at Constantinople,
whither I should have to go next, I should find the Comte
de Choiseul,15 the French Ambassador and a relation of my
own. He would claim me, and would take the greatest care
of me. My course was plain and my future settled : I awaited
my fate.

In the meantime the shouts of the Prince of Nassau had a
stimulating effect upon the strength and perseverance of the
sailors : the distance between us and our pursuers was slightly
increased, and hope began to revive. Prince Repnin, who saw
our position from the shore, quickly brought up some field-
guns to protect us at the point to which we were steering.

56 MEMOIRS OF THE

At last we reached the shelter of our batteries, and, more by
good luck than good management, were safe. The Turks
abandoned the pursuit, and we landed under the eyes of four
or five thousand spectators, who were watching us with great
interest, and calmly discussing the chances of our escape as
individuals and our success as an army.16 When the danger
was over and the damage repaired the subject was dropped. It
was never mentioned to Prince Potemkin, nor — above all—
to the Prince of Nassau, whose plan, as may be imagined, had
evaporated in that hot fire. No one even asked what we had
been doing.

That same night the Turks — being evidently in working
order again — made a sortie at twelve o'clock, to attack the
battery on the extreme left. They were under Salunsky, the
officer in command of the Arnauts. I was present on the
occasion, but nothing of any importance occurred. General
Samoilof,17 Prince Potemkin's nephew, was in command of this
portion of the investing force, and was a very gallant officer.
He sent for reinforcements, opened fire from a neighbouring
battery, and repulsed the Turks. The affair was converted
into a heavy cannonade, which lasted for three hours, and
shook our parapets — which were insufficiently protected from
the enemy's fire — without doing any further damage. The
Prince de Ligne declared that, judging from the way our
trenches were protected, the chief engineer must be a sousliki
(a sort of little yellow rat, common in these deserts). Repairs
were always going on, and the men, unless they were lying
down, were no more sheltered than in the open plain.

The cold was beginning to be very severe. Prince Potemkin
distributed a great deal of money among the troops in the
field, which spoilt them and made them exacting, without
relieving their wants. The Prince of Nassau and Prince de
Ligne were greatly distressed by the inexplicable delays in the
operations, and could obtain no explanation from Prince
Potemkin. He hoped to make the place capitulate, and every
day flattered himself that it was about to do so ; but in the
meantime the increase of sickness, as well as of disaffection,
was growing alarming, At this time (about the $0th Sep-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 57

tember) forty or fifty men were dying every day in the hospital
tents, and the town was not yet sufficiently hard pressed for the
end of the siege to be within sight. The fleet of the capitana-
pacha was still lying off Berezanne, and whenever the wind
was fresh and favourable was able to revictual Otchakow with-
out any possibility of opposition from the Prince of Nassau's
fleet. Marshal Romanzow 18 was in possession of Choczim,
but had not advanced a step : the treaty between Joseph II
and the Empress was not in any way taking effect. The
Austrian army had suffered some reverses, but these had been
followed by successes, which had resulted in the surrender of
various fortified towns. It was difficult, therefore, to account
for the delay, which was not justified by any strategical
principle.19 The Prince de Ligne decided to make a final
effort, and to join Marshal Romanzow 's army if Prince Potem-
kin could not be induced to hurry matters forward.

But, instead of any means being employed to satisfy our
impatience, we were provided on the 27th September with a
charming reason for wishing to delay : Mme. Samoilof and
Mme. Paul Potemkin,20 the prince's nieces, arrived at the camp
and established themselves in tents near their uncle. This
incident, which increased the fury of the Prince de Ligne and
Prince of Nassau,21 gave me a little consolation. After
freezing for several hours in the trenches I was able to warm
my emotions in the company of these two pretty women. I
hoped that a more energetic siege would make them surrender
more quickly than the town ; and indeed my efforts and atten-
tions had some effect on one of them. I became more resigned
to the evils of our situation, and blessed my star for producing,
on my behalf, a state of things that had certainly never been
seen before in any war, nor in any European army.

On the 4th and 5th October the capitana-pacha's fleet
received considerable reinforcements : we could count eighty-
seven vessels of every strength and size. Prince Potemkin was
alarmed ; but to hasten the capture of the town could think
of no better means than general cannonades, which took the
roofs off the inhabitants' houses without making them any
more inclined to give them up to us,

58 MEMOIRS OF THE

On the 6th I was making a tour round the outer batteries
with a friend, when, as I was observing a Turkish battery that
was firing at one of ours — the very one behind which I had
taken up my position — I distinctly saw the round black form
of a ball strike the crest of the parapet. An instinctive im-
pulse, rather than any deliberate thought, made me pull my
horse quickly to the right, and the ball, which would have
cut me in two at its first ricochet, grazed my thigh. My leg
swelled as I looked at it — exactly as a soap-bubble swells as
one blows it. It became absolutely numb from the hip to the
foot, but I felt no acute pain and did not fall from my horse.
The man who was with me took me slowly back to the camp,
and I was put to bed. The French surgeon, after examining
the spot that the ball had touched, which was grazed and
inflamed, announced that he could not tell whether the thigh
were broken until the swelling had subsided, and that this
would take at least four days. My distress, I admit, was
excessive. Even supposing my life were in no danger I had
to face the possibility of being debarred from active service,
at all events for a long time, and subjected to a degree of
restraint that was more alarming to me than death itself.
That morning, strangely enough, when the French surgeon
came to dress my first wound, which was still suppurating, the
Prince de Ligne in his tent had heard me objecting to the
delay, for I was in a hurry to be out, and he had called to
the surgeon : " Leave him alone ; you are only wasting your
time. He'll go out and get another wound, and then you
can dress them both together." And it was in fulfilment of
this prophecy that the surgeon came to my tent a few hours
later.

I spent the first two days in a state of acute anxiety, having
no more feeling in my thigh and left leg, when I touched
them, than if I had possessed none. On the third and fourth
days the swelling began to go down, and on the fifth the
surgeon assured me there were no bones broken, and all I
needed, therefore, was a great deal of patience. The muscles,
he said, would recover their necessary powers in time. This
removed a great weight from my heart, and I determined to be

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 59

guilty of no useless imprudence as long as the siege remained
so dull, but to throw precaution to the winds if any decisive
action were resolved upon.

On the 8th October the entire fleet of the capitana-pacha
set sail and vanished. We hoped it had abandoned its position
for one of two reasons : either to fight the Russian fleet, which
might have arrived from Sebastopol, or else to make it possible
for the seraslcier 22 of Otchakow to surrender. We were much
perplexed ; but on the 9th the fleet came back to the same
anchorage and destroyed all our hopes.

On the 10th October the Prince de Ligne, who was greatly
bored and wearied, and justly exasperated by Prince Potem-
kin's refusal to adopt measures more in accordance with his
instructions, set out to Marshal Romanzow's headquarters, in
the hope that he might be more favourably disposed. Natur-
ally I felt the parting very much. His kindness, his support,
his unfailing courtesy, and his invariable good nature had until
now added a great deal to the interest and pleasure of my life.
The physical pain in which he left me was nothing compared
to my sadness at losing him, and losing, too, a great deal of
enjoyment, of which his companionship was at once the cause
and the effect. I was treated with the most consoling kindness
by officers of all ranks in the army. Prince Potemkin brought
another of his nieces to see me. She had come to spend a few
days with him on her way to Naples, where her husband was
minister ; and he did not wish, he said, that I should be
deprived of seeing one of the prettiest women in the Empire.
She was Countess Skavronsky.23 The Empress, too, was kind
enough to make inquiries as to my state of health, and to send
the general officer of the day to ask me for news in her name,
and express the interest she deigned to take in my condition.

On the 19th the prince again resolved to attempt a general
bombardment, concentrated on the town only. He ordered
the Prince of Nassau to take up his whole flotilla and surround
the lower part of the town ; and on the 80th this useless attempt
took place. The flotilla suffered great losses ; several ships
were disabled and a large number of men killed. It had been
rumoured that the attempt was to be a more important affair,

60 MEMOIRS OF THE

and was to be accompanied by an attack on the entrenchment
by the land forces. As soon as I heard of it I rose from my
bed, and conquering my weakness proceeded to Prince Potem-
kin's tent, leaning upon a stick. " You show a great want of
confidence in me," he said. " I should certainly not have made
any attack in which you could take part without telling you
about it ; this was never intended to be anything but a bom-
bardment. I insist on your going back and keeping quiet ; and
pray believe that the Prince de Ligne's departure will make no
difference in my care and my sincere friendship for you." I
retired, and devoted some more time to resting and curing
myself.

The Prince of Nassau came on shore after the bombardment.
He was in a very bad temper, and complained bitterly of being
made the victim of such ill-conceived and fatal measures as
those he had been forced to carry out. Knowing his character
I foresaw the storm that was about to break. And indeed he
had a very lively altercation with Prince Potemkin, after which
he shut himself up in a tent for three days, and never went
near the prince, whom he was expecting every moment to
make advances or promise to adopt some more resolute plan
of action. But Prince Potemkin 's character was incapable of
bending, or yielding to any one's remonstrances, especially
when they were made with vehemence. He made no advances
whatever to the Prince of Nassau, nor even asked what he was
thinking, nor yet what he was doing. The Prince of Nassau,
in a greater rage than ever, wrote to ask for his passport : he
received it in answer to his demand, and without any further
explanation or delay set out to Poland on the morning of the
26th October.

I felt the Prince of Nassau's departure very much, but I
was deeply touched by Prince Potemkin 's behaviour to me on
this occasion. That same morning I received a note from
him, referring in the kindest and most considerate way to my
natural regret at losing the Prince de Ligne and Prince of
Nassau, but begging me at the same time to believe that he
would only be the more anxious to replace them as my friend
and protector, and bidding me ask him confidently for any-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 61

thing I desired. This excellent illustration will show how
accurately I depicted his character at first. Prince Potemkin
was capable of the most perfect graciousness and courtesy, and
of the most morose rudeness and insolence : he was alternately
prompted by his vanity and his heart, and as he sometimes
yielded to them both simultaneously it was quite possible for
him to inspire gratitude, devotion, and hatred at the same
moment.

On the 1st November eighteen vessels left the fleet that was
anchored off Berezanne and entered the harbour at Otchakow,
in spite of the line of frigates and ships belonging to the flotilla
at the entrance to the Liman; for the squalls so common at
this season made all manoeuvring impossible and there was no
way of opposing this sort of enterprise. The only thing to
stop it was the departure of the Turkish fleet, and we could
only hope that the bad weather, which was continuous, would
prevent it from remaining at sea much longer. This fresh
relief that had reached Otchakow was a splendid justification
of the Prince of Nassau, who had several times declared that
at this season of the year it would be impossible to prevent the
repeated re victualling of the town, and that consequently the
flotilla was now absolutely useless.

I should find it hard to give any idea of the sufferings of
the army, and of every individual in it, at this period. There
was snow on the ground to a depth of two feet, accompanied
by twelve or fifteen degrees of frost and violent winds from
the sea, which often upset the tents. This accident had
become so common that Prince Potemkin had adopted the plan
of having holes called zemlankis 24 dug in the earth, in which
all the men who were off duty buried themselves ; and the
tents had been sent to the rear. In these immense deserts
there were no woods nor resources of any kind, and the inferior
ranks were deprived of wine, brandy, and even meat, since
they could not pay the price that was demanded. The
generals and colonels could only ameliorate their lot with a
few comforts by paying their weight in gold ; and all the pre-
cautions that instinct could suggest did not save a man, if he
slept in a tent, from awaking covered with snow. Of the few

62 MEMOIRS OF THE

horses that we had been forced to keep, when the complete
lack of forage had made it necessary to send three parts of
the cavalry into winter quarters, some died every day, and
men who had no tents for them could not save one. As for
me, though I had provided tents I had only two horses left,
and I put one of them under the awning of my own tent in
order to make it warmer for myself. All our baggage-wagons
had been broken up to furnish wood for the modest cooking
that was necessary, and for warming our finger-tips ; the
generals who had several vehicles had only kept one, having
sacrificed the rest for fuel.

Being young and less used to the cold than the Russians I
found my only means of obtaining a few moments of sleep
was to keep a spirit-lamp alight in my tent night and day,
though the spirits of wine that fed it cost two louis a bottle.
When I was ready to get into bed my men held a sack of my
own size over the lamp, and when it was well heated they put
me into it, laid me down in the bed, and covered me with
everything I possessed in the way of wraps and clothes. Then
I went to sleep, and in the morning my valet removed from
my face about a quarter of an inch of snow, which had made
its way into the tent during the night. All the men on duty
in the trenches had pelisses and furred boots, and non-com-
missioned officers were constantly going to and fro, in order
to awaken the men whom the cold was making torpid. If they
fell asleep the cold would congeal their blood, and they awoke
no more. It is impossible to give any idea of the misery of
our condition. I went to the trenches every morning and
evening, but I dined and spent my evenings with the prince,
and earnestly as I tried to discover his views I could make
no guess at his intentions as to our future.

Up to this deplorable time the prince's nephew, Count
Branicky, Commander-in-Chief in Poland, had been keeping
house for his uncle, and being within reach of his own property
was able to supply all the needs of the prince's establishment.
But now he wearied of his position of subjection, and left the
army. The prince, therefore, had to depend on his own
resources in this respect, and the usual luxury disappeared from

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

63

iis table. His niece was obliged to go off and camp with her
husband, who was in command of the left wing, while I was
forced to take my chance of being frozen in the snow, in order
to pay her the attentions that she had deigned to accept — more
conveniently for me — when we were nearer to her uncle's tent.
In short, our discomforts were accumulating ; it was impossible
that our painful situation should continue; our necessities and
our physical strength demanded an end to it, and yet there
was no appearance of an end at hand.

There was no other Court nor army in Europe that wrould
not have held the general in command responsible for the time
he was losing, for the useless discomfort and suffering he was
causing, and for the many men who daily succumbed to want
and sickness ; but the person of Prince Potemkin was inviolable ;
he was himself the Empress's soul, conscience, and authority,
and in consequence considered himself independent of all the
laws of duty and reason. No man would have dared to com-
promise himself by trying to enlighten his sovereign ; but those
who suffered did not do so without complaining and cursing
their fate, which forced them to submit to such a painful state
of things. The Prince of Anhalt and I secretly groaned at
what we witnessed, far more than at what we suffered ; and he,
who was esteemed by his cousin the Empress and adored by
the army, exercised his will in resigning himself and giving a
good example, instead of in freeing himself from the restraints
of the situation.25

On the 6th November a deserter from the town informed
us that our perpetual cannonades killed no one, and did no
harm except to the houses ; that it was to our deserters we
owed the seraskier's obstinacy in holding out, because they
told him of our state of distress; and that the seraskier was
expecting us to attack the entrenchment and was preparing
to defend it fiercely. The men gave us a great deal of infor-
mation on the subject of the mines, and the preparations that
were being made to utilise them : in short he gave us no hope
of a speedy surrender. This report put the prince into a
very bad temper, but occupied as his mind must have been
by his melancholy situation I can testify that he also con-

64 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

cerned himself with alien matters, for I shall never forget
that on that very day, when I went to dine with him, he kept
us waiting an hour for our dinner. When at last he appeared
he said to me : " Have you had any news from France lately ? "
I answered that none had reached me for some time, and that
I attributed the fact to the delays in the posts caused by the
bad roads at that season. "Do you think," he went on,
6 ' that when your King has assembled the States General that
he is now convoking he will dine at the hour that pleases him ?
I tell you he will only eat when they are kind enough to permit
it, and if I were in his place I should cut off M. Necker's head
so close to his shoulders that he should bring nothing more
out of it to be a curse to his country, and perhaps to all
Europe."

These words, which were uttered on the 6th November,
1788, were the first hint that I received of the approaching
Revolution. I had as yet heard nothing of it, but it is true
that, had I been of a more far-seeing age, the royal sitting in
the Parliament, which took place six days before I left Paris
and was followed by the exile of M. le due d'Orleans to Villers-
Cotterets, might have led me to expect something of a sinister
nature.

IV

Picturesque attack on the island of Berezanne by the Zaporogians, and
energetic sortie by the Turks (18th-21st Nov. 1788) — Severe cold
— Preparations for the final assault — The Count, who has hitherto
had no rank in the army, is made adjutant-general and given the com-
mand of a column of picked grenadiers, the advanced guard of
Anhalt's corps — Capture of Otchakof (17th Dec.) — Reception of
the Count, after the victory, by Poternkin and his nieces — The
Prince takes him on a tour of inspection.

ON the 15th November, at eight o'clock in the morning, we
saw the capit ana-pacha's entire fleet setting sail off the island
of Berezanne, where it was still lying. By three o'clock in the
afternoon it had entirely vanished. We presumed that the
difficulty of remaining at sea had forced it to go away, and as
a matter of fact it returned no more. The prince celebrated
this retreat with a salvo of all the artillery in our batteries,
and a simultaneous shout of hurrah! from all the troops. I
was at his side while this performance was going on, and he
said : " We must batter them with shot for two days more,

and then " Here he interrupted himself, leaving me to

hope that at last he was about to deal the final decisive
blows.

On the 18th the prince entertained us with the truly dramatic
spectacle of an attack on the island of Berezanne by the
Zaporavians.1 These people are an almost savage horde
numbering several millions, and are a branch of the Cossacks,
but are subject only to their own rules, laws, chiefs, and
customs, and dependent on no civil nor military authority
whatever. They live in huts on the banks of the Dnieper, and
fight for the Empress when called upon to do so ; but they
submit to no orders nor punishments that are not derived from
their own barbaric constitution. The government counts upon
F 65

66 MEMOIRS OF THE

them, and by lending itself to the formalities they demand is
able to secure their services.

The chief embarked fifteen hundred of them in the little
boats they use. Forming in a line, they left the shore near
our camp and approached the island, uttering menacing cries.
In spite of the fire of grape-shot that they had to face they
succeeded in effecting a landing, and forced the Turks to take
refuge in the fortress. The Turks cried out that they wished
to capitulate ; on which the chief answered that he could do
nothing without Prince Potemkin's orders, and suggested
taking back two of them to parley with that general, and
hear his conditions. They were conducted to the prince, to
whom they surrendered at discretion. Major-General Rach-
manof,2 who performed the functions of the personage known
in any other army as the Quartermaster General, was sent to
Berezanne to take possession of the island ; and I accompanied
him. The fortress contained three hundred men, a "one-
tailed " pacha,3 an aga of janissaries, and sufficient stores to
victual Otchakow for two months. Any nation but the Turks
would have made it an impregnable position. The island is
about 1600 yards long by 500 wide ; the fort is fairly good
and has a moat that extends across the wrhole island. The
garrison of Otchakow watched this expedition from the top of
the town-walls, but made no proposal to follow the island's
example before the same means of persuasion had been adopted.
On the 19th we saluted the imperial standard on the island
with another salvo of artillery.

In the night of the 20th the prince erected in front of our
left wing a battery of 24-pounders, which poured a crushing
fire at close quarters into the principal bastion of the town,
and made a breach. On the 22nd the Turks made a very
energetic sortie and gained possession of the battery for a
moment, but were repulsed by the reserve, though unhappily
they bore away with them, as a trophy of their valour, the
head of General Maxim ovitch, a man worthy of respect from
every point of view, whose death was keenly regretted by the
whole army. The prince made the Turkish prisoners inspect
the bodies of their compatriots. They recognised three agnx

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 67

of the janissaries, and some of the Anatolians who had come
with the last reinforcements put into the town by the capitana-
pacha, before he abandoned his position.

The behaviour of the garrison sufficiently indicated that they
would consent to no capitulation. The seraskier put his faith
in his own perseverance, and in the straits to which we were
reduced ; and his firmness showed us plainly that nothing but
an assault could save us from succumbing to the severities of
the climate. At that time there were from twenty to twenty-
four degrees of frost : all the army desired was to venture
everything, rather than endure the martyrdom of dying from
cold and want. But the prince was still immovable.

On the 3rd December some Jews brought us some relief,
and a gazette from Leyden which gave me a certain amount of
consolation. In it I read that my uncle 4 had just been made
colonel of the French Guards ; and although this favour came
at a moment when I felt rather doubtful of his deriving much
pleasure from it, my prevision of the future was not clear
enough to spoil my satisfaction in this brilliant tribute from
the King to my uncle's distinguished career.

I shall inspire pity, and at the same time envy, when I say
that the only flaw in my personal happiness was caused by my
physical sufferings. The cold I had been enduring night and
day for two months was more than my constitution was fitted
to bear; and, moreover, the discontent that surrounded me
and the cabals that were rife in the army added to the torments
of this arid and glacial region, where, it seemed, we were
destined to die of want and rage. Every one knows that the
winter of 1788 was exceptional all over Europe. It may be
imagined, then, what it was like on the shores of the Black
Sea, in a desert where not a single tree was to be found within

radius of fifty leagues, nor the smallest rising-ground, nor a

it, nor any kind of shelter — for a tent buried in snow can
ly be regarded as such. But it's a long lane that has no

•ning : heaven had still some happiness in store for me, and
fas very near it at this moment, when I thought myself one
the most wretched of men.

On the 15th Prince Potemkin decided to make the assault,

F 2

68 MEMOIRS OF THE

and to make it in such a way as to take the entrenchment and
the town at the same time. Five columns of five thousand
men each were to be employed for the purpose.

The column on the right, commanded by General Pahlen,5
was to attack the lower part of the town, the suburb and
battery of Hassan Pacha. The second column, to the left of
the first, under the command of the Prince of Anhalt, was to
enter the entrenchment at the point where it came to an end
in the suburb of Hassan Pacha, and having taken possession
of it was to advance on the town-gate known as the Gate of
Stamboul.

The third column, still further to the left, under the com-
mand of Prince Basil Dolgorouky,6 lieutenant-general, was to
enter the entrenchment in the centre, extend therein, and
advance into the heart of the town.

The fourth column, which formed part of the left wing and
was commanded by Prince Volkonsky,7 was to enter the
entrenchment and support the fifth column.

The fifth, commanded by Gorrich the Georgian,8 under the
orders of Lieutenant-General Samoilof, was to escalade the
bastion of the fortress — in which a breach had been made by
the new battery to which I have referred — to enter the town,
and facilitate the opening of the Gate of Stamboul, which was
to be attacked by the Prince of Anhalt 's column.

Prince Repnin was in command of the whole force. The
general attack was fixed to take place on the morning of the
17th December, the feast of St. Nicholas.

On the 15th General Rachmanof, the general-officer of the
day, came to me in the morning and said the prince wished
to inform me that he had made me one of his adjutants-general.
I answered that I was always grateful for everything he was
kind enough to do for me, but that I ventured to entreat him
to remember that, in that capacity, he could only employ me
near his own person, that it could not be for the general welfare
that he should be included in the storming-party, since it
devolved upon him to direct the whole attack, whereas it would
not be suitable for me, considering how much I desired to earn
his esteem, to abstain from taking an active part in the assault.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 69

General Rachmanof begged me to write, instead of giving him
this verbal message, and promised to give my letter to the
prince at once. I therefore wrote, specifying my motives,
and entreating the prince to take them into consideration. An
hour later I received the following answer : " I think I deserve
that you should still have confidence in me : I have never ceased
to consider what would be most conducive to your pleasure and
advantage. So be patient."

This kind and considerate answer reduced me to silence, but
did not remove my anxiety. It was, however, impossible to
take any further steps : I could only resign myself to the fate
the prince had in store for me, whatever it might be, and
build my hopes on the attention and kindness he had so con-
stantly shown me. It was not long before I had a fresh proof
of his care and thought of me, which affected me to the bottom
of my heart.

On the morning of the 16th the prince put the following
notice in the general orders : " M. le comte de Damas, having
as my adjutant-general acquired the rank of colonel in the
army, will take command, in the assault, of eight hundred
picked grenadiers, who will lead the Prince of Anhalt's
column."

The moment I heard of this order I hastened to the prince.
He greeted me with all the kindness and graciousness that I
was accustomed to receive from him, and that all my respect
and gratitude could never repay. He explained to me that he
could not give me a command unless I had a rank in the army,
and that, being unable to give me any rank without the
requisite formalities, he had made use of the post of adjutant-
general, because promotions of that kind were at his own
disposal. He told me the name of the regiment that was to
furnish my men (the Grenadiers of Ekaterinoslav), and allowed
me to go off at once and inspect it.

The Prince of Anhalt, who loved me as if I were his son,
took real pleasure in choosing my men and making up a good
corps for me. Having completed our preparations we both
returned to dine with the prince, with an expression of satis-
faction on our faces that seemed an omen of success. After

70 MEMOIRS OF THE

dinner I devoted some time to my personal arrangements ; for
though I had the happiest presentiments I was well aware that
the next morning's work would be very stormy. I therefore
gave my valet and grooms all the instructions and money they
would require if any harm should come to me, and wrote some
letters that were to be taken, in that event, to Paris.9

This is the letter I wrote to my sister before the storming
of Otchakof, and opened on the 1st August, 1789, at Olviopol :

14 December (sic).

I do not know, my dear and charming little sister, whether I shall be
killed in the assault that we are about to make ; if so, it will be in the
pleasantest way possible, for I shall be there at the head of eight hundred
grenadiers, whom the prince has been kind enough to entrust to me ;
you can well imagine that I am supremely happy. I give you my word
of honour that I am firmly persuaded I shall come out of it safe and
sound ; I have a presentiment of my own safety, and have, moreover,
your little face, which has not yet left off bringing me good luck and will
not play me false on the happiest day of my life.

Since, however, nothing is impossible, and I am far from every one I
love, I wish to entrust one of the persons I love the most with my little
sentimental will and testament, for I have no other kind to make, as you
know. If, then, you ever receive this letter, you will say to all the
assembled family — that is to say my aunt, my uncle, my brothers, and
even my father — we have lost Roger, who loved us all with his whole
heart, whose only happiness was his hope of seeing us again, who had
his faults, but must be forgiven for them because his heart never had the
shadow of one, and because he never thought lightly of any one of us.
Then you will break up the circle. The next day you will go to my aunt
and assure her earnestly that I adored her, and point out to her that, ever
since I was old enough to understand her, her advice and entreaties —
though I was sometimes too giddy to attend to them — always made more
impression on me than those of any one else, and you must not leave her
till she admits this and promises you to mourn for me as a son . You will
then go at once to my uncle, and tell him that I swear there has never
been a moment of my life when I was not sensible of his kindness and
affection, that I may have neglected his counsels too often, perhaps, but
that they have always been engraved on my heart, that I should never
have taken any step without thinking of its effect upon him, that though I
disregarded him sometimes when it only meant annoying him for a
moment, nothing would have induced me to do so if I thought it could
alter his affection for me, and that I loved and valued him more than a
father, since it was from choice and not from duty that he sometimes
regarded me as a son. You will embrace our eldest brother a thousand
times : he knows how much I loved him : you will embrace the Abbe a
thousand times — I loved him more and more every day. You will make
my father think better of me, if he should still think little that is good :
if I neglected him I loved him none the less. And do not forget Gaston
either, whom I also love.

Then, dear love, you will open all the letter-cases in the desk I send

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 71

you. All the letters the handwriting of which you recognise — for
instance all the letters from Mine, de Coigny — you must return to the
writers without letting any one read them. As for your own, keep them,
I implore you, with those I wrote to you. The little pocket-book that
contains some letters from Constance you must give to her as it is, with
my little watch that has the pansy on it ; talk to her about me, and do all
you can for her happiness, and, as her life goes on, do not let the family
blame her, if you can help it, for having loved me. All this only applies
if she still thinks of me, and I do not know if this is so.10 The letters of
which you do not recognise the writing you must burn. You must give
fifty louis to Marcandier : everything I owe him will then be paid, and
very liberally too. You must look in the desk to see if there are no
little things that should go to some one else, and give them to the right
person (for instance, the little steel ring to Mme. de Coigny).

That is all, my angel. As for you, I assure you that I have loved you
to distraction for the last two years, and only neglected you when I was
so young that I was incapable of appreciating your moral qualities, and
saw that I was not sufficiently important to you, since you showed no
more than a great interest in me. But since I have recognised that you
are the most accomplished creature that heaven ever made, and that none
the less you care more for me, you have satisfied my vanity and at the
same time awakened the love that I have always been ready to give you.
This letter, which is meant to show you when I am gone how much I
regret not to see you again, will, I hope, never be read by you, for I am
ready to wager anything in the world that no harm is going to happen to
me : but it was necessary to my peace of mind, and if my grenadiers be
as well disposed as myself, I hereby swear to the Turks that they have no
means of defending themselves against my attack.

ROGER.

If every one cries out against me for writing this letter to you, tell
them that I know all there is to be said on the subject, but that I
preferred to disturb your dear heart for a short time to disturbing my
own much more by not writing to you.

My eternal homage to the Princesse C. . . ., and my blessing to her
children.

I made every arrangement to prevent any difficulty in my
instructions being carried out. My valet was chiefly concerned
with his own interests and precautions; he repeatedly came
back to me with some new calculation of the expenses of his
journey to Paris, and while I satisfied all his demands I felt
that his rather heartless proceedings made me dislike him. But
he was quite unconscious of it, and was satisfied in every
respect.

The prince made his niece come back from her husband's
quarters, so that, if she should lose him — for he was in com-
mand of the left wing 1] — she would have help and shelter
close at hand. It was with her that I spent the evening ; and

72 MEMOIRS OF THE

at about two o'clock in the morning I returned to my tent, to
dress myself warmly enough, and at the same time lightly
enough, for the assault.

The breaching battery had been firing continuously on the
left bastion for thirty-six hours, and the breach was practic-
able; but the fire could not cease before the very moment of
the escalade, because in half-an-hour the latter would have
been rendered impossible by a film of ice, due to a slight fall
of snow and twenty-four degrees of frost.

In addition to the five principal columns that I have
described in detail, there were three others to fill the intervals
between them ; but these were flying columns and not so strong,
and were intended to support or assist the attack of the
others.

On the 17th,12 at four o'clock in the morning, the troops
assembled in front of the camp, and received the blessing of
the pope : the men had permission to leave the ranks one by
one, go up and kiss a relic held by the pope, leave a copper
coin on a dish, and return to their places. Three-quarters of
the troops conformed to this religious exercise. By six o'clock
the columns were formed, and each of them was at its appointed
starting-place. Absolute silence was enjoined, and was to be
observed throughout the advance from the trenches to the
entrenchment of the town. The firing of three shells was the
signal that was to set the troops in motion, at the first indica-
tion of the dawn. At the first shell the men were to throw
their pelisses and furred boots on the ground, and at the third
they were to advance.

Each column was supplied with a sufficient number of planks,
on which to cross the ditch of the entrenchment. The fifth, or
escalading column, was provided with ladders.

The prince, that night, came to sleep in the hole that had
been dug in the ground for the generals in the trenches ; and
his valet, who was posted at the entrance and was accustomed
to leave him undisturbed till he heard him call, on this occasion
actually made a difficulty about admitting Prince Repnin, the
general in command of the storming-party, who had come to
tell the prince that the assault was about to begin. This is

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 73

an example of passive obedience unimaginable in any country
but Russia.

When day was on the point of breaking the first shell was
fired ; we were all in our places ; we threw off our cloaks, and
held ourselves in readiness. On the firing of the third shell
the troops advanced, but not in the silence that is so necessary
in an attack and so difficult to obtain from the Russians.
Repeated shouts of hurrah I gave notice of our approach to the
Turks, whom, if it had not been for this irregularity, we should
have surprised.

In spite of the deep snow we covered the distance between
our own camp and the enemy's entrenchment in a few minutes,
which were employed by the Turks in making their guns ready
for our reception.

As I have already said, I led the advanced guard of the
Prince of Anhalt's column. I and all my men reached the
ditch of the entrenchment ; the planks by which we were to
cross it were at the rear of the column ; the fire of every kind
that we had to face left us no time for waiting. I knew, too,
that I had to cross, between the entrenchment and the gate
of the town, the mines of which I had been privately warned ;
and the terrible slaughter their explosion would have caused
made it all the more important to lose no time. I therefore
made my grenadiers jump into the ditch of the entrenchment.
I dragged the foremost men in with me, and the rest followed :
then, with the help of their bayonets they pulled one another
up, and aided by the firmness of the snow in the hard frost,
I succeeded in surmounting the palisades of the entrenchment,
and forming up within. Without waiting for the rest of the
column, who were following us closely, we proceeded at the
double towards the Stamboul Gate, with the irregular ranks
of the Turks who opposed our advance falling back before our
bayonets.

We thus reached, in close order, the extremity of the moat
near the gate. The Turks, hearing the sound of the attack
in all directions, had opened the gate in order to bring out a
strong column to aid the troops in the entrenchment, and
did not think we were so near. They were waiting, closely

74 MEMOIRS OF THE

packed, under the archway of the gate, which was about 200
yards long. Although I had now carried out all my instruc-
tions it seemed to me that the success of the general attack
would be greatly forwarded if I could force an entrance on this
side of the town. Without losing a moment I advanced upon
the archway in close order, with bayonets at the charge ; and
the most horrible and unparalleled massacre forthwith began.
The Turks were struck down and killed one upon the other ;
and my men, climbing, treading, and trampling upon the piles
of dead and wounded who had fallen before their bayonets,
forced their way through darkness and blood to the other side
of the archway. We found ourselves, covered with gore and
shattered brains, inside the entrance to the town.

The column that had scaled the breach in the bastion on the
left, in the meantime, had been entirely successful, and I could
see the head of it at the end of the street opposite to me. The
success of the assault was therefore certain.

As I crossed the bridge over the moat I had observed, in
the thick of the fight, the match burning near the saucisson
at the entrance to the mine, ready to explode it in an instant
if it should occur to a single Turk to set the powder alight.
I sent some one to extinguish the match, and the tail of the
column was saved from this danger.

One alarming accident occurred, and for a moment the
carnage and the tumult of voices ceased : a powrder-magazine
in an angle of the inner rampart was blown up, and so violent
was the explosion that for several seconds the air was thick
with the stones, dust, and smoke that rose around us. But no
sooner was the light restored than the massacre continued on
every side. It was not till every drop of Turkish blood was
shed that the Russian soldiers would consent to stay their
hands. We had left the trenches at seven o'clock precisely ;
by a quarter to nine absolute peace was reigning, the whole
town was in a state of submission, and eleven thousand Turks
had been put to the sword. There were only between two and
three thousand Russians killed and wounded.

My one and only wound was a bite upon the heel. As I
made my way through the archway, stepping from corpse to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 75

corpse, my left leg slipped into a gap three or four corpses
deep, and the man who was underneath, being still alive, seized
my Achilles tendon with his teeth and tore away a piece of the
boot and the stocking. The skin was merely reddened, not
broken. The Prince of Anhalt, who saw this curious wound,
said to me : "I shall give myself the pleasure of telling the
story, but you must say nothing about it yourself, for no one
will believe you."

The seraskier 13 was taken, and his life spared. The Prince
of Anhalt assembled his troops, and as we stood at attention
and listened to his final orders, we were full of joy and satis-
faction at the thought that the end of our troubles was at
hand. During that half-hour of waiting we suffered tortures
from the cold, which we had not felt during our two hours of
energetic action, but became very conscious of when stationary.
"How annoying it is," I said to the Prince of Anhalt, "that
we did not devise some means of bringing our cloaks with us.
Perhaps, on the whole, it is worse to be frozen than killed."
The words were hardly out of my mouth when my Polish
lackey, whom I had engaged on my way through Warsaw,
appeared with my cloak held open for me to put on. He had
thought it his duty, though he had received no orders, to
follow me silently all through the assault, as he would have
followed me to the theatre in Paris or Berlin. This shows a
degree of punctiliousness and faithfulness that one could not
have imagined possible, and could not on any account omit to
mention. Is there another man in the world, of any class
whatever, capable of such a disinterested, courageous, and
kind-hearted action?

The Prince of Anhalt received orders to take his column
back to camp. Only a few troops were told off to occupy the
town, as it was necessary to clear away the dead bodies before
taking the risk of quartering soldiers there. For several days
such of the inhabitants as had escaped death were employed in
conveying the dead to the middle of the Liman, for the earth
was frozen so hard that it was impossible to bury them. They
remained on the ice, at the mouth of the river, until the first
thaw of spring ; when the water, on resuming its natural course,

76 MEMOIRS OF THE

carried them out to sea with the ice. The sight of these
horrible bodies, frozen into the position they had assumed at
their last breath, was more ghastly, as they lay on the surface
of the estuary, than any words can possibly describe ; but it
was the severity of the frost that saved us from the tainted
air, which would otherwise infallibly have wrought havoc
among us.

The tactics adopted by Prince Potemkin for the assault were
excellent, as one could easily see on examining the entrench-
ment in detail. The French engineer, Lafitte, whom M. de
Choiseul, ambassador at Constantinople, had recalled before
the campaign began, had made the egregious mistake of not
carrying on the entrenchment into the waters of the Liman :
the gap that he foolishly left, between the shore and the
entrenchment, exposed the bastion and gave facilities for
breaching and escalading. Moreover, with less than thirty
thousand men in the entrenchment it was inevitable that several
points of defence should be weak ; and the whole garrison of
the town only comprised fourteen thousand men. It was this
that assured the success of every attack, whether on the suburb
of Hassan Pacha or on the entrenchment. The seraskier had
attempted to defend every point at once, and had consequently
made his defences too weak everywhere. It is all the harder
on this account to understand why the prince should have
wasted six months on a siege of this nature : the town, having
no exterior works but the entrenchment, demanded no more
than a fortnight's work after the completion of the trenches,
and indeed would have been more easily taken before receiving
the reinforcements that the fleet, as we have seen, brought to
it on several occasions. And yet, as I think I have already
made clear, not a day passed without a siege-work of some kind
being constructed or repaired. It required more skill to make
the siege last so long than to finish the whole affair in three weeks.

To explain the prince's conduct one must look for some
political or personal motive, and I believe he was actuated by
reasons of both these kinds. Moreover he desired to lay the
chief burden of the campaign on the Austrians ; he desired,
too, to paralyse the movements of Marshal Romanzow, who,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 77

for his part, was greatly to be blamed for not advancing
towards the Danube, whereby he gave Prince Potemkin an
opportunity of showing his hostility ; and in the third place
he desired to prolong the war with a view to retaining his
military supremacy — the position he preferred to all others —
and ending the campaign with an achievement that was made
to appear all the more difficult and notable by the faults of
inexperience, and the really unpardonable blunders that had
preceded it.

But nowhere, save in Russia, and to no general, save an
Empress's favourite, would this futile sacrifice of time and men
be permitted with impunity. And only a general who was his
sovereign's lover could arbitrarily bestow military commands
without any regard for order, seniority, or rank. Gorrich, the
man I mentioned as commanding the column appointed to
attack the breach, was a Georgian, who wore an Asiatic cos-
tume that made him sufficiently remarkable, and who had no
kind of rank in the army. It is true that he was under the
orders of Lieutenant-Generals Muller and Samoilof, but the
major-generals and colonels were offended, and not without
reason, by the prince's preference for a man who knew so little
of this kind of warfare. He showed how ill-suited to it he felt
himself to be, for he was seized by a presentiment, which is
noteworthy from the fact that it was fulfilled. The man who
went to warn him in the trenches that the signal for the assault
was on the point of being fired found him absorbed in thought,
with his head bowed upon his hands. It required several
minutes to bring him to himself; but at last he rose, saying
that he would do his duty, but that he felt he was going to
be killed. He advanced, steadily enough, to the foot of the
bastion, but while superintending the placing of the ladders was
struck by two bullets, and fell dead.

Prince Volkonsky, a major-general, who had given evidence
of the most reckless courage all through the siege, had a
similar presentiment and was also killed. This fate befell very
few of the generals, and not a single one of any prominence
in the army.

An hour after bringing the troops back to camp we reported

78 MEMOIRS OF THE

ourselves— the Prince of Anhalt and myself— to Prince Potem-
kin, who received us with all the graciousness that he knew so
well how to assume. We were charmingly greeted, too, by his
pretty nieces, one of whom it gave me the most intense — if
una vowed — pleasure to see again. This particular form of
happiness, which is well known to be especially sweet, has never
before rewarded any man so promptly for a morning of such
cruel joy. Most men have to wait for it till they return to
quarters or to the capital ; but it was granted to me to enjoy
it without delay, and this delight, I think, has never been
experienced by any one but myself.

When the prince's first demonstrations of kindness were
over he said to me : " And now we must think about Peters-
burg. Are you intending to go there? " I assured him that
I regarded it not only as a great pleasure, but as a duty, to
pay my court to the Empress as soon as possible. " Well
then," he answered, " I shall take you there myself. We must
not be separated : I will undertake all your arrangements. All
you have to do is to send away in advance everything you do
not need : let me take care of the rest."

I had already fared too well under his guidance to hesitate
about accepting his suggestion, and it was arranged that he
should spend a few days in making an expedition to Vitofka,
to inspect the wrorks connected with the new port he was
establishing there. He would then return to Otchakow for
three days; after which we would set out to Kherson, from
thence to Krementchoug, arid finally to Petersburg.

The prince did not return from his visit of inspection till
the 27th December, and was then installed in the town of
Otchakow, where the house that was least in ruins had been
made ready for him. Cold as I was, with twenty-three degrees
of frost in my tent, I bore it with resignation, knowing that
my patience would be tried only a very little longer ; but on
the 2nd January, 1789, the prince insisted that I and the
Prince of Anhalt should take up our abode in Otchakow. Poor
as was the shelter we found there it seemed a palace to me
after the one of canvas that I had just left ; and moreover
there is a certain piquancy in living in a town that one has

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 79

been besieging for a long time, and wherein one has bought
rest with very acute sufferings.

On the 6th January we left this horrible desert in sledges,
blessing the hour of our escape from it, thanking heaven for
saving us from all the dangers that had threatened us, and
turning our backs upon the past to fix our eyes upon a future
full of hope. On the morrow we reached Kherson.

There I sorted out my baggage and sent off to Petersburg
everything that was not an absolute necessity, together with
my carriage arid my valet. I kept with me only two of my
servants, and left everything else to be cared for by Prince
Potemkin.

After spending three days there we went to Elisabeth-Gorod,
the place whence I had set out on the 8th April. As I dwelt
on the past, and remembered all my doubts at the beginning,
and all that had resulted from my perseverance, the sight of
this place filled me with happiness and gratitude : I had
nothing to wish for but the Prince de Ligne, who had given
me hospitality here in such a charming way, and would have
shared my pleasure so sympathetically in this happy hour.

The prince's business here was promptly settled, and we
proceeded to Krementchoug.

We divided our time, during the fortnight we were there,
between the enjoyment of the greatest luxury, the finest con-
certs conducted by Sarti, the pleasures of love, assignations,
and repose. Every hour I encountered some fresh fantastic
instance of Prince Potemkin 's Asiatic peculiarities; there was
nothing, either in his amusements or in the exercise of his
authority, that resembled the customs of my country; every-
thing was new to me ; everything charmed me and made me
happy ; I found his arbitrary actions and proceedings intensely
interesting and attractive to watch. If I had examined them
philosophically I should have seen that they had their objection-
able side, but as it was not my business to reform his methods
I had nothing to do but observe and enjoy them. He would
move a government, demolish a town with a view to building

I it somewhere else, form a new colony or a new industrial centre,
and change the administration of a province all in a spare

80 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

half-hour, before giving his whole attention to the arrange-
ment of a ball or fete. For this strange but able man had
many sides : he could attend at the same time to the most
important affairs and the most juvenile amusements. I owe to
him the most instructive and the most agreeable moments of
my life. Above all I owre him those that were the furthest
removed from the natural course of my life. There is as much
food for thought in comparison and contrast as in the observa-
tion of methods that the judgment accepts as worthy of imita-
tion. Everything that is beyond and outside the ordinary area
of one's own career is so much material and training for one's
mind. As life goes on, experience classifies and distributes
these materials, and, directly or indirectly, they influence and
colour the whole course of one's occupations, actions, and
thoughts.

Damas leaves the camp and arrives at Petersburg — Friendly reception by
the Comte de Segur and Count Cobenzl — Flattering reception by
Catherine II — The Russian Court : the Empress, the Grand Duke,
the principal ministers : Se"gur and Potemkin — The favourite
Mamonof — The author joins Potemkin's army on the river Bug
(17th May, 1789).

THE Empress was impatiently awaiting the prince at Peters-
burg, and begged him to hasten thither.

He decided to set out. Three sledges were prepared for our
journey of six hundred leagues, the distance that we still had
to travel in addition to the journey from Otchakow : one sledge
for the prince, one for me, and one for the French surgeon *
who accompanied him everywhere. We were to cover this
distance at such a pace that a larger retinue would have been
inconvenient. It was in the evening that we started off from
Krementchoug in our sledges, with a lackey seated outside at
the back of each sledge, and a large escort of Cossacks holding
torches. As soon as we were packed up in a quantity of
pelisses and muffs and foot-muffs, and covered over with snow-
proof leather, the prince called to me from his sledge : " Are
you ready ? I have given orders that you are to stay close to
me." On my answering in the affirmative we shot away as
fast as any horse could fly in quest of freedom : for the first
moment I was frightened, for the speed was such as I had
never imagined likely, nor even possible. We reached the
first posting-house before I had hit upon a comfortable posi-
tion, and left it before I had time to move again.

As ill-luck would have it one of the traces of my harness
•oke, and we had to pull up ; and by the time it was mended
ic prince was several versts in advance of me. The road,
lich was covered with snow, and ill-defined at the best, was
to see without the help of the torches : the moujik (or
G 81

82 MEMOIRS OF THE

postillion) missed the track, left the road, and plunged me
into several feet of snow in the middle of the plain : the
horses were unable to drag the sledge out, and struck work
altogether : the driver began to pray, the lackey to cry, and
I to despair, for I saw no remedy for the situation. For three
hours I was a prey to the most acute anxiety : I could expect
no help from the man who was driving me, and not a traveller
is to be seen in that part of the world at that season of the
year, and especially at such an hour. There was nothing
before me, it seemed, but to die of cold and impatience. I
had at last resigned myself to await the dawn when I saw on
the far distant horizon a point of light that I took at first
for a shooting star ; but one moment of observation showed
me it was terrestrial, and another moment was enough to
indicate its distance and direction. I told my moujik to take
one of the horses, to make straight for that light, and to bring
some one back to me. After he was gone I was more lonely
and alarmed than ever ; but all evils have an end, and when an
hour had passed he brought back a peasant who had a close
resemblance to a savage, but who, by helping us to lift the
sledge, enabled us to proceed at a foot's-pace, and finally to
reach his house. I found an entire family sleeping on top of
a stove, in a little room six feet square, but I was only too
happy to be there : some black bread and some straw fulfilled
all my requirements, and when day dawned the peasant led
us back to the right road, from which I strayed no more.

At the posting-house I found evidences of the prince's
anxiety, and the orders he had left behind him to insure that
the accident should not be repeated. On the following even-
ing, without any further misadventure, I reached Mohilev, the
capital of White Russia, where the prince had already been
for twenty-four hours. At the first house in the town I met
one of his aides-de-camp, who had orders to await me there
and take me to the place where I was to alight. I never
doubted that I was to go straight to my bed, which the fatigue
of this novel experience had made my most pressing need. But
instead of this I was taken to a large house, whence I heard
sounds issuing that completely robbed me of all hopes of rest.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 83

I was led into a hall where the whole town and garrison were
assembled to take part in a magnificent ball, which the pro-
vince was giving for the prince. He came to meet me, and
refusing to accept any excuses on the score of my costume,
proceeded to introduce me to all the women. Then, without
further ado, he brought me a partner ; whereupon I made
up my mind to it, and danced without leaving the place till
six o'clock in the morning.

On that same day, at noon, we entered our sledges again.
The prince warned me as we started that he fully expected
to reach Petersburg twenty-four hours before me, but assured
me that he would at least see to it that I lacked nothing on
the journey. If he should gain on me so far, he said, he would
use the time to give notice of my arrival to the Comte de
Segur, and to find out for me where I was to stay.

At the third stage the prince began to leave me behind ; so
much so that he arrived in Petersburg thirty hours before me.
When I reached Tsarskoie-Selo, the Empress's summer resid-
ence, one stage away from Petersburg, I found a carriage that
the Comte de Segur had sent to await me there, with my valet-
de-chambre, who had been for the past month in the Comte
de Segur's house, where I was invited to stay. I left my
sledge, and an hour and a half later reached the French
Embassy in the Rue de la Millione (17th Feb. 1789).

I received from the Comte de Segur the welcome, the
courtesy, and the support that his natural kindliness gave me
reason to expect : I enjoyed in his house an amount of atten-
tion and comfort that I could only have claimed from my own
family. My star granted me another favour in giving me, as
my natural guardian in Petersburg, one of the men most cap-
able of securing for me all the privileges that were at that
time open to the French ; while the additional privileges that
I had earned in my recent campaign made my visit completely
satisfactory in every respect. Since my happiness was in the
hands of Prince Potemkin, the Comte de Segur, the Prince of
Anhalt, and all the distinguished people whose friendship I
had been fortunate enough to win, I could have no anxiety
as to my future fate.
0 2

84 MEMOIRS OF THE

I was hardly out of the carriage before the Comte de Segur
came into my room with Count Cobenzl,2 the Emperor's
ambassador, to whom he presented me. I was scarcely
allowed the time to dress myself before they carried me off
to supper with Count Cobenzl, whose pleasant, genial nature
soon removed all the stiffness of a new acquaintanceship. I
had just travelled six hundred leagues without rest, but I was
too much excited to think of that, and was ready in a moment.

All the best society in the town was assembled at the
Embassy, and I cannot deny that I was profoundly pleased to
appear in my French uniform, adorned with the Cross of St.
George and a sword of gold, the evidences of Catherine IPs
approbation and favour.

There was nothing here in the dresses, nor the manners, nor
the language, nor even the accent, to remind me that this
gathering was not in Paris. The customs and outward observ-
ances were so similar, the women in most cases so modish and
agreeable, the men so polished, the master of the house so
courteous that I was greatly struck ; for here, so far from my
country, was everything that had hitherto made me think it
preferable to all the other countries of Europe. The happy
auspices under which I was making my debut gave me every
advantage from the first moment, and secured for me a general
feeling of friendliness. If such moments as this were often
repeated in the course of a man's life his happiness might be
increased, but his character would suffer; for there are few
impressionable natures that are not spoilt by success, and after
due reflection I would nift answer for my own. I was very
sorry when that evening came to an end. It is engraved on my
memory by gratitude, and perhaps to a certain extent by
vanity ; and I frankly confess that when I returned to my
own room I was moved, by an involuntary impulse, to thank
heaven for all the happy moments I had been granted during
the past year.

On the following morning I waited on Prince Potemkin. I
found him enjoying all the evidences, new and old, of the
Empress's feeling for him, and as kindly disposed towards
myself as ever : he appointed an hour, that very evening, for

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 85

my presentation to her. I went to the prince's house in
Russian uniform, and he took me, by his private entrance, to
the Empress's room.

Every one who was ever in her presence was no doubt struck,
as I was, by the dignity and stateliness of her bearing, and
the kindness and gentleness of her expression; she had the
gift of impressing those whom she addressed, and at the same
time reassuring them; of inspiring respect but removing all
feeling of embarrassment. The first words she spoke to me
I have never forgotten, and I will repeat them here : "I am
charmed," she said, "to see you again: I say again, because
you have made yourself known too well for me to think I am
seeing you for the first time. In noble hearts valour is
independent of age."

She then deigned to go into every detail of the campaign,
to praise me in the most flattering terms, and to express, in
the kindest way, her wish that I might find sufficient amuse-
ment in her capital to compensate me for my sufferings in the
desert. Never had sovereign such a gift for elating men by
her words, and at the same time subjugating them by her
dominating personality. When I retired I left at her feet the
tribute of an undying devotion, and was deeply touched by
her winning way of accepting it. Prince Potemkin had taken
the greatest interest and special care in obtaining the Em-
press's favour for me, and he was equally gracious in intro-
ducing me to M. de Mamonof,3 the favourite at that time,
whom he begged to regard me and treat me as a relation of
his own.

On the following day the Comte de Segur, as French
Ambassador, presented me at Court in French uniform. I
have never doubted that I owed all the pleasures I enjoyed in
Russia to the incalculable advantage of possessing an inde-
pendent existence elsewhere. The character of the Russians
is suspicious, envious, and not very frank : they observe and
fear the foreigners who enter their service, and do their best
to thwart them. It would be unjust to be surprised at these
latural feelings, which one may honestly admit are permissible
their national vanity ; but they could not deny their cordial

86 MEMOIRS OF THE

indulgence to a Frenchman who had only come to their country
for a time, without any intention of renouncing his own, and
had no ambition but to acquire knowledge and possibly some
glory, without proposing to use the fruits of it as a means of
rivalling themselves. It was his recognition of this that made
the kind, good Prince of Anhalt insist, when I had worn the
Russian uniform for two consecutive days, on my spending
the third in a French coat, and this hint of his was remark-
ably useful to me. The Grand Duke,4 whose kindness to me
I owe mainly to his deep affection for the Prince of Anhalt,
begged me to enter the Russian service definitely. " Am I
to see that white coat many more times? " he said to me one
day. I told him the reasons that determined me against
making this change in my career, without omitting the polite
regrets that his kindness demanded of me. " Those are not
your best reasons," he rejoined; "I know what they are, and
I cannot say I disapprove of them." My affections, my duty,
my ties in France, were all equally good reasons against cut-
ting myself off from my country ; but, independently of these
predominant motives, it became plainer to me the more I
thought of it that I should put a sudden end to the attention
and kindness I was enjoying if I were to turn my services
into a duty, — services that at present I could perform
voluntarily, merely to satisfy my zeal and love for my
profession.

The Empress's Court combined a great display of magni-
ficence and state with the good taste and charm of the Court
of France. The splendour of the ceremonial was enhanced,
too, by Asiatic luxury, — by the costumes, for instance, of the
envoys of peoples tributary to the Crown, who were to be seen,
when Courts were held, in several rooms of the palace. To
see Catherine II, among her surrounding courtiers, bestowing,
with her unfailing tact, discretion, and dignity, a glance here,
a mark of favour there, and a few words everywhere, gave
one some idea of the great qualities, the genius, and the charm
with which she was endowed. Her manners, her kindly wit,
and her gaiety influenced Society in general, and Petersburg
was one of the pleasantest towns in Europe to live in. She

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 87

loved to amuse herself after dealing with public affairs; the
great nobles, encouraged by her example, gave fetes in which
she often condescended to take part. She had lovers ; and
other women became easy to win. It was the same in every-
thing : her character, her qualities, and her tastes were
reflected in others. This woman even retained her superiority
in her affairs of the heart, for none of her favourites acquired
sufficient empire over her to weaken her ascendancy. The
definite way in which she proclaimed their position as favourites
was exactly what limited the amount of honour that she
bestowed upon them, and showed the point beyond which
she would not go. They overruled her daily in small matters,
but never took the lead in affairs of importance.

Of all her favourites Prince Potemkin was the one who
influenced her opinions the most, and yet he knew that it was
never in the Empress's vicinity that his power was greatest,
since there he had to share it with her : this was why he pre-
ferred, latterly, to be away from her. When he was at a
distance from her all the details of administration and of
military affairs were in his hands. His absolute power ex-
tended only to domestic policy ; all foreign affairs were directed
by the Empress, and it was in the details of such matters, and
in details only, that it became apparent that a woman was on
the throne. Europe had to deal with a very virile, very resolute
spirit, which combined great firmness in negotiation with keen
pleasure in its results, and great determination in maintaining
them. A very versatile genius and a very despotic tempera-
ment are rarely found in conjunction with strict morality, and
the Empress had much with which to reproach herself. How-
ever, if she pardoned her husband's death she never ordered
it, and never gave her favour to its perpetrators. The
injustice, the severity, and indeed the cruelty of her dealings
with Poland are, morally, the darkest stain upon her memory.
The determination to make her lover King of Poland led her
into adopting measures that tarnished her greatness; but in
the whole course of her reign she committed no act of barbarity

tior of cruel severity against her rightful subjects.
If public opinion on the death of Peter III is unjust, and

88 MEMOIRS OF THE

the Empress is sometimes blamed for his assassination, it must
be remembered that she would infallibly have suffered the
same fate if it had not taken place ; and perhaps this alterna-
tive, while it is no excuse, may at least make one wish to
remain in doubt.

His memory overshadowed the life of the Grand Duke, her
son, who, all through her reign was absolutely powerless and
disregarded. He was reduced to leading the emptiest of lives,
with no distraction but the command of two battalions, whom
he tormented in the Prussian mode, invariably and unremit-
tingly. She detested him, which is not surprising, for he was
detestable. Yet he was not unintelligent.

In addition to a formidable war against the Turks the
Empress was engaged in another with Sweden ; and the first
campaign, which was just over, had been to Russia's advantage
both by land and sea. She was carrying on hostilities, more-
over, with Persia and several of the Caucasian peoples : there
was a cordon of her troops, therefore, stretching from Peters-
burg nearly to Ispahan, and everywhere her successes were
the same. She owed them, I think, to the well-concerted
and opportune measures she adopted, rather than to the talent
of her generals, who at that time were not very remarkable ;
but her foresight, prudence, and perseverance compensated
for the imperfections from which her army was not exempt,
especially as regards the way it was officered. Her character
never weakened in the face of difficulties, and she always
ended by surmounting them, with the help of her genius and
her lucky star.

The Empress worked with her ministers from six in the
morning till noon, and the first of them to interview her was
the Minister of Police. He informed her of the most minute
occurrences in her capital, which would have been no more
under her own eye if the houses had been transparent. I
shall never forget a certain day, when I was at my window
on the ground-floor, and watched two battalions of the Guards
marching past on their way to Finland. No one can have
been in my room but my servants, and in my admiration for
these splendid battalions I cried involuntarily: "If the King

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 89

of Sweden were to see those troops I think he would make
peace ! " I addressed this remark to no one, for I thought I
was alone. Two days later, as I was paying my court to the
Empress, she put her lips close to my ear, and said : " So you
think, if the King of Sweden were to inspect my Guards, he
would make peace? " And she began to laugh. I assured
her that I well remembered thinking that truth, but imagined
I had not put it into words, unless indeed I had been thinking
aloud. She continued to smile, and changed the conversation.
This opportune example served me as a lesson, and made me
very careful ever afterwards as to what I said.

The men who occupied all the most important posts at that
time were sufficient evidence in themselves of the Empress's
self-reliance in directing affairs and making decisions.

Count Osterman,5 the Vice-Chancellor, was a man of no
ability, and only held the office nominally.

Count Bezborodko,6 who worked under him in the depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs, was a man of routine, who carried
out the Empress's orders intelligently and accurately. He
had formerly been secretary to a general, and was accustomed
to hard work, but had no gift of imagination.

Prince Vesemsky,7 Comptroller-General of the department
of Finance, was considered worse than mediocre by his own
party.

Count Nicolas Soltikow, who was Minister of War, and at
the same time governor of the young Grand Dukes, was far
more suitable for the second office 8 than the first, with which
he concerned himself very little.

The Senate, who timidly noted and registered the Empress's
decisions, were originally intended to make representations
when the sovereign violated the laws ; but they meekly wrote
down whatever it pleased the Empress to dictate to them, and
would have subscribed to their own dissolution if she had given
them the word.

In the Ministry of Marine there were two departments, one
for the Baltic and one for the Black Sea. The Grand Duke
was the head of the first, and Prince Potemkin head of the
second, and they were entirely independent of one another.

90 MEMOIRS OF THE

The Grand Duke adhered to the old regulations drawn up by
Peter I ; Prince Potemkin made new ones every day.

In spite of this lack of ability among her agents, that of
the Empress herself, combined with her assiduous application,
was sufficient for the conduct of affairs, and her reign was
distinguished among the political influences of Europe by the
great conceptions which she successfully carried out.

Notwithstanding the intriguing temperament that prevails
in Russia, more than in any other European nation, intrigue
was less pernicious at this Court than elsewhere, because its
fires always died down in the Empress's presence. She was
superior to everything that tended to nourish it, and remained
untouched by the powerful influence of the secret and deceitful
dealings of which ministers and their underlings are capable
in every country. This pest, therefore, was kept in check,
and never rose to the upper strata of public affairs, nor affected
the reputation nor the fortunes of any man worthy of the
Empress's attention.

She proved a truth that many instances have since con-
firmed : namely that a sovereign, of more or less greatness and
more or less capacity, by looking into everything himself and
being his own prime minister will more easily prevent malversa-
tions and abuses, will make wiser decisions, and will govern
his dominions better, than a minister who is but a short time
in favour, and bases all his calculations on the probable dura-
tion of his power, without troubling himself about the future.

And there is another truth that was demonstrated by the
Empress : that the passions have not so powerful an empire
over a sovereign who is a woman as they have over a man, and
are infinitely less harmful in her case than in his. The
Empress's passions were strong, but she was never dominated
by any of her favourites to the extent that Louis XIV and
Louis XV were subjugated by their mistresses.

It is impossible to judge how many reigns must pass before
the different institutions in Russia assume the aspect of age
common to the rest of Europe : everything in the place looks
new. The effects of Peter I's haste to make himself a
European have not yet disappeared : everything resembles a

i

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 91

powerful sketch rather than a finished picture. The industries
are all young; the houses are all frontage; the officials have
had insufficient experience and have not learnt their business.
The costumes, which are Asiatic for the people and French
in Society, look as if they had never been quite finished;
ignorance still exists even among the upper classes ; the
national character is only muzzled, not tamed; the national
genius is imitative to perfection but not at all inventive. One
meets a great many intelligent people, but very few agreeable
ones. In short the past seems to be in the act of retiring in
favour of the present, and in consequence nothing is settled.

If some future sovereign were to withdraw from the enter-
prise, or were less great than the present one, it is plain that
there would still be time to return to the old order of things,
and I believe the majority of the nation would not be heart-
broken. There are numbers of Ninettes at the Court who
would have no objection to returning to their villages ; there
are shaven chins that would still be glad of the warmth of a
beard ; there are merchants who would deal in furs with more
satisfaction than in jewels or finery. However, now that the
change has been made several reigns must pass before it is
consolidated, and, if Catherine's successors should happen to
be much less remarkable than herself and her model, it will
take several centuries to accomplish the work.

It was my wish to observe all these interesting matters, so
remarkable in every way, that made me turn a deaf ear to
the Comte de Segur when he urged me to go and spend the
rest of the winter in Paris. His attempts to persuade me were
expressed in a language that I did not understand : " Mark
my words," he said, "and go off and enjoy the fruits of your
labours ; you have only time for a very brief glance at the
France that you know ; if you delay for a year you will not
find the country the same by a long way ; the States General
are assembling under the most alarming auspices ; we are on
the brink of events that may be fatal, and will, in any case, be
most extraordinary."

His constant prognostics could not have been more incom-
prehensible to me if they had been in Hebrew. Until I was

92 MEMOIRS OF THE

twenty-two my ideas had all been centred in the government
familiar to my fathers, while, since I left Paris, I had thought
of nothing but my new career. During the fourteen months I
had spent in the desert, moreover, I had been deprived of
regular news, and I could not bring my imagination to bear
upon an upheaval that I had no means of conceiving. Other-
wise I should certainly have gone. But at that time nothing
would persuade me to go ; I wished to continue fighting ; I
felt that as long as I lived I could never find a more favourable
nor delightful moment for a visit to Petersburg. I therefore
irrevocably determined to postpone my journey to Paris till
the end of the second campaign, and even, unless it were
absolutely impossible, to return and take part in the third.
Thenceforward I treated the Comte de Segur 's representations
with complete contempt, and thought of nothing but satisfy-
ing my curiosity as a traveller and amusing myself as a young
man. I concerned myself only with the Court, the town, and
the army; and France (except in the matter of sentiment)
seemed very far away. I had three mistresses and the pros-
pect of a campaign or two : this was all I needed to satisfy
my desires and my tastes, and to occupy all my time.

The Comte de Segur gave up all hope of persuading me,
and the question was dropped. I had solved a problem that
had been puzzling him and the Comte de Choiseul-Gouffier for
the past two years, in their respective Embassies at Constanti-
nople and Petersburg : on which side of the scale, namely,
France ought to put her weight with regard to the war.
"Pray tell me," said the Comte de Segur laughingly, "what
led you, since you have a mania for fighting, to join the
Russian rather than the Turkish army? For as yet we are
not quite certain, in the cabinet at Versailles, which side we
have the most sympathy with." "I had two reasons only,"
I answered ; " the first is that in case of failure I would rather
be beheaded than impaled. The second is that in case of
success and glory I am nearer, in Russia, to the journalists."

I had, moreover, to support me, an evidence of goodwill
between the Russian and French governments, in the form of
a commercial treaty that had just been concluded.9 Judging

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 93

from what I heard from several of the leading merchants I
came to the conclusion that it was disadvantageous to France ;
but it was very gratifying to the Comte de Segur's vanity, for
it had been discussed before, but never brought to a success-
ful issue, so the ambassador won the credit of achieving it,
as well as all the profit and advantage that accrued from it.
I had told the Comte de Segur the simple truth : as may easily
be believed, a Frenchman of twenty-two did not concern him-
self very much with the political aspect of the matter, in
those days, especially after a peace of thirty years' duration.
It would never have occurred to me to join the Turks, what-
ever their relations with my country had been ; but happily
France at that time was inclined to favour Russia, and the
Court therefore approved of my joining the Russian army.

In their methods of dealing with public affairs Prince Potem-
kin and the Comte de Segur, owing to the differences in their
characters and points of view, were not always in accord. The
prince thought that the count had not a sufficiently wide
outlook, and on the whole I agree with him. I saw evidence
of this want of harmony more than once, and if I ever in my
life had occasion to complain of Prince Potemkin's behaviour
it was owing to his irritation with the Comte de Segur.

I once saw the prince take revenge for some of the Comte
de Segur's diplomatic proceedings in a very whimsical and
amusing way. They had been having a conference that was
not satisfactory to the prince. The dealings between the two
Courts could not be direct, in the nature of things : they
concerned the influence that the Court of France might exert
to persuade Austria into more strenuous efforts against the
Turks, or the injuries that France might inflict on the com-
merce of Turkey. But on this occasion the Comte de Segur's
answers had been unsatisfactory or obscure, and the prince
was annoyed with him. The comte, he determined, should
be teased by a fool who was domesticated in his house 10 (for
this ancient custom was still kept up in many of the Russian
houses). This fool skilfully began by making the count believe
he was conversant with the most secret despatches of all the
Powers, and after gradually revealing the stage that the corre-

94 MEMOIRS OF THE

spondence had reached he ended by reciting to the Comte de
Segur the last despatches that had been received from his
own Court. The prince laughed at his fool's performance,
and the Comte de Segur was pale with rage and embarrass-
ment : he took leave of the prince with marked ill-humour,
and returned to the house no more till the prince himself
made conciliatory overtures to him. There was often friction
between them, which the Comte de Segur, I think, might
have avoided by taking a wider view of affairs, instead of con-
fining himself to minute details that the prince did not
understand.

However, the latter was always bewitched and conciliated
by the Comte de Segur 's charm, which will surprise no one.
My position forbade my sacrificing either of them to the other,
but none the less I was the victim of one of their tiffs. The
list of honours accorded for the storming of Otchakow was to
be published in a few days, when the prince sent a member
of his staff, a man in whom he had special confidence, to find
out from me what I should like to have. There was no doubt
about my answer : an opportunity of doing something to
deserve the kindness that the Empress and he had lavished
on me was all I desired : a command in the approaching
campaign was the most certain means of securing it : I asked,
therefore, for that and nothing else.

The officer declared that the Order of St. George, of the
class above the one that I already had, was not included in
Prince Potemkin's inquiry, because it was due to me for my
behaviour in the assault; that he had seen my name on the
list himself; and that on the following Sunday I should be
decorated with the order at the Court. After receiving the
customary thanks and protestations the officer left me, and
between that day and Sunday the constant congratulations
of every one in Court and town assured me that I should soon
be wearing round my neck the cross that I then carried at
my buttonhole. But, by a chance that was rather annoying
at the time, the Comte de Segur had another of his squabbles
with the prince over public affairs on the eve of the appointed
day ; and, when I arrived at the Court, the Empress, the whole

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 95

of the royal family, and every one present congratulated me,
with obvious embarrassment and surprise, on the promise I
had received of a command, without saying a word of a Com-
mander's Cross of St. George. I admit that inwardly I was
very much piqued, but the thought of public opinion fortified
me to such a degree that I was able to preserve an air of
resignation, and no one could see what I was feeling.

When the Court was over I went home, and found that the
Prince of Anhalt, under whom I had been serving when I
earned the distinction in question, had arrived there before
me. He was more offended and hurt than I was myself ; the
Comte de Segur was furious ; I took the affair more calmly
than either of them. The Prince of Anhalt said that he
would be entirely guided by me ; that the statutes of the order
gave him the right to protest to the chapter against this
injustice ; that I had but to say the word, and the result was
certain. I pointed out to him that, true as that might be, it
was still more certain that if I were to force Prince Potemkin's
hand by means of the laws I should fall out with him for good
and all. The support of public opinion was all I desired, I
said, and I was determined to take no steps in the matter. I
further observed that as a foreigner I had no rights at all,
that general approbation was the only reward I could claim,
and that I should demand nothing more.

The Prince of Anhalt approved of my decision, but the
Comte de Segur insisted on having an explanation with the
prince. The right moment had gone by, and I had become
indifferent ; but he was obstinate, and the interview took place.
He had a regular altercation with the prince, whom I knew
better than he, and who never explained his course of action.
As I foresaw, the Comte de Segur left him more irritated
than he found him, and achieved nothing. I put an end to
the embarrassing situation by affecting indifference and satis-
faction, which I contrived to assume quite successfully. I
treated Prince Potemkin with the same deference as before,
and he was equally kind and attentive to me; and so the
matter ended. Fortunately for my vanity on this occasion
every one knew that I had merely been the victim of a

96 MEMOIRS OF THE

momentary irritation with France, or with the French
Minister, and that I had lost favour neither with the Empress
nor the prince ; and I received fresh marks of general esteem
on account of having made no overtures to the chapter.

The Grand Duke, who detested Prince Potemkin, thought
it was safe to abuse him to me, since he must have alienated
me by this last incident. I answered every count of the
Grand Duke's indictment, however, one day when we were
chatting together, in a way that left no doubt of the lasting
nature of my gratitude. But I could not refrain from indulg-
ing in a joke, when replying to one of his questions. "In
which section of M. le marechal de Vauban's book did you
ever read that, to capture a town, it was necessary to have
one's nieces with one at the siege? " " Possibly in the section
on Jiornworks," ll I answered, " though, after all, nieces are
not indispensable." He ended this conversation, in which I
persistently upheld the prince, with a compliment that gratified
me very much. " I see that you only know one way of aveng-
ing yourself for an injustice : and that is to look for oppor-
tunities of having another to complain of, and the approaching
campaign will supply you with plenty of them."

He invited me to go and see the drilling of his two
battalions, which he commanded himself, and, a few days
afterwards, to dine at his little country-house at Pawlosky.12
With his troops he resembled a Prussian major, exaggerating
the importance of every trivial an4 minute detail, without
considering the end that might be obtained by more simpli-
city. In the country he was like a good bourgeois, a good
husband and father, with no further ambition ; and it was
thus that he showed to the best advantage. None the less,
when he was with the two or three persons he liked best, he
showed a tendency to hardness and revenge that filled them
with alarm. The Prince of Anhalt, for whom he had the
closest and most intimate friendship, once heard him say : " I
will teach these wretches what it means to assassinate their
Emperor! " in allusion to his father's death. The Grand
Duchess 13 moderated his violence, but could not wean his
thoughts from this subject, which made him beside himself;

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 97

she had a gentle and excellent nature, which for a long time
was useful to her husband. The Empress recognised this and
showed her gratitude by many marks of studied consideration.
The Prince of Anhalt said to rue several times at this period :
"Let us be happy in this country during this reign, but if it
should come to an end let us be off : the place would be
uninhabitable."

I never went to see Peterhof, the favourite residence of
Peter III, for I did not wish to speak of it to the Empress,
who often asked me what new things I had seen. It was
natural that the memory of this place should affect her pain-
fully, in spite of all her self-control ; and to spare her this
was but a small attention in return for her kindness. I owe
it to the friendly interest she took in planning my expeditions
that I never saw Cronstadt, one of the most interesting spots,
but though I several times fixed a day for going thither she
insisted on my postponing the visit till the ice should break
up, so that I might the better judge of the port. In the end
I left Petersburg unexpectedly, and was not warned in time
to complete, in this respect, my knowledge of the interesting
points of that town.

The winter slipped by, and the Comte de Segur's charming
house, the pleasures of society, the performances at the Hermi-
tage, and the delights of love, made every moment of it
happy. I often spent the evening at the house of M. de
Mamonof, the Empress's favourite, in the company of the
Comte de Segur, Count Cobenzl, and the Prince of Anhalt.
Mamonof would have been a distinguished man if he had not
been in a most degrading position. His office, the duties of
which were as singular as they were despicable, had been
constituted a post of honour, and conferred on him, as on his
numerous predecessors, rank, precedence, and the highest
honours at the Court, where he lived and had the Empress's
household at his beck and call.

This post, which was accorded with a glance, lost by a
tactless word or deed, and kept by skill or force of character,
always led to an immense fortune, the highest distinction,
and every decoration of the Empire. Those who held it were

98 MEMOIRS OF THE

assured of mingled deference and contempt ; and, though a
man might feel such a prodigy of scandal and immorality to
be inconceivable, yet he would not hesitate to bow down before
an idol that the Empress had adorned with a halo. A whole-
hearted admiration for the Empress destroyed all feeling of
disgust at the idea of paying homage to her tastes, to the
object of her choice, or even to her passions; which were
justified, in Mamonof's case, by his charm of manner, his
courtesy, and his handsome face. From devotion and respect
for Catherine II, those who recognised the importance of her
ministers of State did not blush to do the same for the minister
of her pleasures.

The relative worth of a courtier's character, however, was
revealed by his manner of cultivating the favourite : the
homage of some was expressed by deference of a comparative
kind that is impossible to describe, but is attainable by persons
of tact ; while others were simply and humbly servile. It must
be confessed that the majority were in the second class.

Mamonof at this time was nearing the end of his life at
Court, though no one (least of all the Empress) suspected the
fact. But he was secretly indulging in a passion for a certain
Princess Menchicoff,14 and a few months later he threw him-
self at the Empress's feet and confessed his feelings. Though
cruelly wounded she was too proud to complain, and gave her
consent to the marriage, which was celebrated, by her wish,
in her own chapel. She made Mamonof leave the Court, after
loading him with kindnesses.

He was regretted by most people, because he indulged less
freely than many another in the insolence that is appropriate
to this office. Yet I myself once saw him delay to pick up
his cards at the Empress's card-table while his collar was being
mended by a page, and this without making the least apology.
She talked to me while he was making his toilet, and then went
on playing without any sign of surprise.

As was only to be expected, the supremacy of Prince
Potemkin made it possible for him to show a far greater degree
of familiarity in every way. To illustrate the difference
between them I must describe an incident that happened one

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 99

morning when the prince was receiving, as was his habit, all
the great nobles of the Court at his lever. They were all wear-
ing their decorations upon their coats, while he sat in the
centre of the circle, with his hair unbound, and a great
dressing-gown round him, beneath which he had no breeches.
The Empress's valet-de-chambre came and whispered in his
ear : he quickly wrapped his dressing-gown more closely round
him, dismissed every one with a bow of farewell, and, disap-
pearing through the door that led to the private apartments,
presented himself to the Empress in this simple apparel.

The spring introduces many changes into the dissipations
of Petersburg, and also into its appearance. The melting of
the snow, the breaking up of the ice on the Neva, and the
softness of the air produce an extraordinary and very beautiful
transformation. The period when the nights are hardly per-
ceptible gives one a most curious sensation : one scarcely knows
how to distribute the twenty-four hours, and one feels an
embarrassing kind of vagueness in one's occupations. The
amusements hitherto concentrated in the palaces are now
scattered in various places out-of-doors : the pleasures and
games of the people in the public squares, the races and
pastimes on the river in boats of the most attractive appear-
ance, combine to form a very pleasing spectacle. Most of the
great nobles have country-houses on the road to Peterhof,
and the Empress at this season lives at Tsarskoie-Selo, at a
distance of eighteen versts from the town. There she gathers
together the whole of her own circle at the Hermitage, and
invites to dinner all whom she honours with her favour. I
had hardly tasted the pleasures of this new kind of life when
Prince Potemkin's departure to join the army was said to be
very imminent. I was beginning to await it with great im-
patience : the sufferings of the last campaign were forgotten,
and I felt myself no longer in my proper sphere.

On the 10th May the prince announced to me that he was
going to take me with him, and that I must be ready to start
at any moment. I went to take leave of the Empress and the
Grand Duke at Tsarskoie-Selo and Pawlosky. After dinner
the Empress took me into her private room, where I remained
H 2

100 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

for a quarter of an hour alone with her. I could not repeat
all the kind expressions she was gracious enough to use as she
promised me good fortune and success ; and I parted from her,
greatly touched by the cordiality of her wishes for my
happiness.

Kaminsky's Corps 15 had already had a successful encounter
with the Turks in April, when three pachas were captured.
Count Stedingk,16 too, a Swede who became known in France
at the same time as M. de Fersen, had just been defeated in
Finland.17 The Empress spoke to me of him, asked me if I
knew him personally, and what I thought of him. When I
had told her of the good opinions I had heard expressed of
him in France, she answered : "I shall repeat that to the
general who has just defeated him ; it is an additional satis-
faction to get the better of a distinguished man, and I shall
give him pleasure." This was a kind and delicate thought,
and was characteristic of the Empress, who deserved all the
ardour and enthusiasm with which she was served.

VI

State of the army — Misunderstanding between Russians and Austrians,
and Potemkin's delays — Damas colonel of the Voronezh Hussars,
and afterwards of the Toula Infantry Regiment — Capitulation of
Bender, of which the author is sent to take possession — Visit to
Marshal Roumiantzof — Damas goes to France on leave.

I SHOULD have preferred to go to the front by way of Moscow,
and it would not have delayed me at all. I had already missed
one opportunity of seeing this astonishing town, but the same
reason prevented me again from doing so : Prince Potemkin
wished otherwise. He insisted on my going with him, and I
was obliged to yield to his pressure.

On the 17th May I left Petersburg, and parted from the
Comte de Segur with all the regret that his consideration and
kindness demanded of a grateful heart. The three months I
had spent in Petersburg had slipped away like three days, but
this was not because I admired, beyond a certain point, the
manner in which the Russians employed their time. Their
very pleasures seem to show an artificial desire to imitate others
rather than a natural inclination of their own : they wish to
amuse themselves, it appears, because it is the custom in capital
cities, rather than because their tastes run away with them.
They give one the impression of saying : " Let us do this or
that, since people do it elsewhere." Otherwise it would prob-
ably not have occurred to them ; for in everything the genius
of the Russians is merely imitative. They have neither inven-
tive power nor initiative, as I think I have already said.

I met the prince at Doubrovna; thence I accompanied him
to Mohilef, Krementchoug, and Elisabeth-Gorod, where we
spent three weeks. During that time we made an expedition
—the prince, General Ribas, general-officer of the day, and
myself — to Kherson, Otchakow, and the banks of the Ingul.

1101

102 MEMOIRS OF THE

On our return from this little journey I had a very lively
conversation with the prince on the affairs of France. He
burst forth into a torrent of invective against the policy of
the cabinet and everything that was being done by it, and he
showed me very plainly why he had been so much irritated with
the Comte de Segur during the latter part of our sojourn in
Petersburg. He gave me what he considered to be proofs of
the duplicity of our Court in its dealings with Russia, and of
the fact that it was secretly aiding the Turks ; he roundly
abused the States General, which were then assembled ; and he
ended by saying that if I were taken prisoner in the course of
this campaign France would not dare to claim me, for fear of
being compromised. The country was in a state of decadence,
he declared, and could no longer be counted on. I made him
moderate his views, but could not deny that France was in a
violent state of crisis. I held out hopes to him, however, that
the meeting of the States General would only result in placing
the King's authority on a more stable basis, and enabling him
to give his whole-hearted adherence to the principles that his
own inclinations, as well as those of the cabinet, bade him
embrace openly.

The prince was in command, not only of his army of the
preceding year, but of the army that had then been under
Marshal Romanzow, from whom the command had been taken.
The troops were to muster first at Olviopol, a town situated on
the Bug at the point where the Russian, Turkish, and Polish
frontiers meet. Here the prince established his headquarters
in the early days of June. At Olviopol we first heard that the
favourite Mamonof had been replaced by Zoubof, and the
prince confirmed the news by choosing one of his brothers as
an envoy to Petersburg.

Poland at that time seemed disposed to break a lance with
Russia, and in the circumstances it required a great deal of
diplomacy to cope with the situation ; for if Poland had chosen
that moment to employ all her resources, to combine with
Turkey, and openly tp rise in arms, Russia would have been
in a very embarrassing position. Owing to the precautions
taken, however, and the prudent diplomacy employed, Poland

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 103

did not in any way hinder the operations of the Russian
army.

The Austrian army had suffered great losses, largely owing
to sickness. Joseph II 's interfering methods, moreover, had
brought all Marshal de Lascy's 1 wise plans to nought, and
there was plainly no hope of the Austrians taking any very
active part in the coming campaign. The frank satisfaction
shown at headquarters whenever the Austrian army received a
check was sufficient proof of the lack of union between the
allies, and of the prevailing desire to let the Emperor Joseph
bear the brunt of the war. The Prince of Anhalt and I soon
saw very plainly that the campaign would be confined to
demonstrations.

The news received by the prince on the 25th July, however,
to the effect that the Grand Vizier had crossed the Danube
with his army and that a considerable fleet had been seen by
the corsairs in the Black Sea, induced him to hasten the
assembling of the army. I was placed in command of the
Varonitch 2 Hussars, consisting of six squadrons ; and consider-
ing the style of warfare in which we were about to engage,
there was nothing I could have desired more. General Ribas
was sent to inspect the defences in the direction of Otchakow
and Hatchibey, whence a descent was feared, and General
Goudowitch started off to take up the command in that district.
The Troisky Regiment, which was cantoned near Vitofka on
the banks of the Bug, received orders to march in that direc-
tion, as well as the Kherson light-horse ; but these slight pre-
parations would have been very inadequate if the Turks had
attempted a descent. Happily this was not included in their
schemes.

At the end of July the formation of the lines and the stations
of the various generals were still undecided. It was said that
the centre was to be formed by the army-corps whose head-
quarters were at Olviopol ; that the Moldavian army-corps,
under Prince Repnin, was to form the left wing, and the Elmt
corps the right wing ; but nothing was certain. The regiments
had been restored to their full strength since the last cam-
paign, but none of them, whether infantry or cavalry, had

104 MEMOIRS OF THE

been drilled or trained. The colonels were forbidden by the
prince to give the smallest instruction to their men, or to carry
on any kind of manoeuvres, and beyond the art of shouldering
arms not a regiment so much as knew its right hand from its
left, a state of things that amazed the whole army equally. It
had been very differently drilled by Marshal Romanzow, who
perhaps carried the contrary method somewhat to an extreme.

As at this time the colonels were the contractors and pur-
chasers for their own regiments, and the uniforms and remounts
were supplied, in accordance with certain government regula-
tions, entirely at their expense, they fully appreciated this
regime : the horses and coats lasted longer and cost less. But
the service suffered in proportion, and right-thinking men took
alarm. Prince Potemkin was only led to adopt this method —
an absolute absurdity from a military point of view — by his
hatred for Marshal Romanzow, unlike whom in every respect
he delighted to be. His intellect and reason were dominated
by this antipathy, which he could not overcome, even in small
matters. It gave one some hope that, in order to make the
marshal the more blamed for his inactivity in the previous
campaign, the prince would adopt a diametrically opposite
course in the present one ; but the whole summer was passed
in skirmishing with the Turks, without a single encounter
worthy of mention.

The regiments remained as ignorant and inactive as ever,
and the colonels indemnified themselves for the hardships and
famine of the last campaign by indulging in luxurious living
and feasting, to which they were then very much addicted, and
which was greatly facilitated by the profits they made on their
contracts, especially in the cavalry. The kind of tent allowed
to the colonels and used by all the generals lends itself to all
the conveniences of a house. Enclosed in the ordinary awning
that covers the tents of all the officers in the army is what is
known as a domique: that is to say a little square house, with
corners of wood, and walls of stretched canvas concealed by
cloth. One or more glazed windows are made in it, a chimney
is added if it be late in the year, and it is often fitted with a
wooden floor. When the camp is moved everything folds up

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 105

like a screen, and is as easily erected again. The care of setting
up and taking down these houses devolves upon the first
squadron, or the first company in the infantry, who perform
the task, after stacking their arms, before thinking of their
own needs, or those of their horses. I have seen, and have
myself had, little houses of this kind taken down and set up
again day after day, and as well furnished as a pretty room
in a town. But I much doubt whether such a luxury would
be possible in an energetic campaign against a European army.

The private soldiers have a kind of two-wheeled cart for
carrying their tents, which is excellently designed and should
be imitated by every other army. The camp is pitched and
broken up more quickly than elsewhere, but on the other hand
the amount of baggage permitted is beyond all reason. A
great deal of latitude in this respect is allowed to all ranks in
a war against the Turks, on account of the facility of transport
and the abundance of forage furnished by the deserts ; but this
must lead to a habit of waste and luxury, which, in any other
war, must necessarily hinder the operations of a Russian army
in any country.

I was constantly alarmed by a habit to which I could never
accustom myself : the practice of sending the horses of a whole
regiment to feed in the desert with the taboun,3 even if the
enemy be close at hand. This custom takes the place, for the
whole army, of the foraging usual in every war. The horses
of one squadron in each regiment are all that are kept in the
camp : the rest are left out at grass as long as the camp
remains stationary, and are not even picketed at night. Only
the men who guard the pasturages are changed, and this pro-
ceeding is more or less frequent according to the distance the
horses are sent, which varies with the proximity of the enemy.
This strange and harmful custom can only obtain when the
Russians are fighting the Turks, but it is bad for the troops'
education in one of the most important departments of their
profession. It can profit no one but the horses, which are
always in perfect condition.

About the middle of the autumn Prince Potemkin made the
army cross the Bug and advance towards the Dniester, with a

106 MEMOIRS OF THE

view to investing Bender. The army remained for some time
at Doubossary, on the left bank of the Dniester, before a
portion of it crossed over to the right bank. It was here that
I learnt of the first insurrection of the French Guards and the
consequent sorrow of my family. The prince suggested sending
an officer to Paris to procure information for me, but as I
was on the point of accepting this immense kindness, a letter
from my relations rendered it unnecessary. The prince, to
distract my thoughts, took me alone with him on an expedition
to Otchakow : we travelled in a little two-seated vehicle, called
in Russia a drocliky, and returned to Doubossary on the sixth
day. Our light-horse and cavalry were engaged once or twice
in insignificant skirmishes, and we drove into the town all the
Turkish scouting-parties who had come out to observe our
movements. When the moment arrived for us to invest the
place, the prince took away the regiment of hussars of which
T was in command, and gave me the Toula Infantry Regiment,
an old and excellent corps. The place was blockaded for some
weeks before it was attacked at all, but at last, in November,
the trench was made, and after twelve days of a fairly regular
attack the town capitulated. The prince did me the favour of
sending me to take possession of it. I went in with my regi-
ment, posted guards at all the town-gates, and occupied the
inner guard-houses. The first of which I took possession was
connected with the seraskier 's harem ; but most unfortunately,
by the terms of the capitulation, covered carts were allowed
for the use of the besieged, and the seraskier had put all his
wives into them. I found their rooms and furniture, and all
their little possessions still in their places. I appropriated some
splendid pipes and embroidered tobacco-pouches belonging to
the seraskier, and the cup from which he daily drank his coffee ;
for I wanted a pledge of our success to take back to my friends
in France, whither I hoped to go as soon as possible. I wished
to spend the winter there, and return at the beginning of the
third campaign.

I was not likely to find a more convenient moment for this
journey, which I desired to make on many accounts. The
troops were about to take up their quarters in the newly-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 107

acquired towns and in Moldavia ; I was as near to Paris as to
Petersburg, and I had too many ties and too many interests in
France to abstain from at least putting in an appearance there.
Prince Potemkin, to whom I submitted my plans, quite
approved of them, and at the same time begged me to return
to him at the beginning of the summer. I set out with him
to Yassi, the capital of Moldavia, where I spent a fortnight.

Marshal Romanzow, who had fallen from favour and was at
daggers drawn with the prince, was living in a little country-
house near this town. The prince did not go near him, but,
being as much concerned with my affairs as any affectionate
relation, he told me it wrould not be at all seemly for me to
be so near the marshal without doing homage to his reputation,
and he suggested that the general-officer of the day should
escort me to the house. I found the marshal in his bed, from
which he had not risen for several months, but more from
eccentricity and caprice than on account of illness. He spoke
of the army with enthusiasm, but coldly of the prince, and
seemed anxious to think as little as possible of a subject that
disturbed him. I could discover nothing as to his real opinion
on the campaign that was just over, nor on the one that pre-
ceded it, much as I should have liked to sound him on the
reasons for his procrastination, for which there was no apparent
explanation. It seemed to me that he was equally disingenuous
and embittered, with an artificial veneer of shrewdness. In my
very brief interview with him he did not impress me favourably,
but I could not form a really accurate opinion of him, since
the presence of the general-officer of the day necessitated a
degree of discretion that hampered us both. I bade him fare-
well, and have never seen him since. I prepared to part from
Prince Potemkin with all the regret that was natural, consider-
ing the care and attention he had lavished on me for two years,
during which time my whole fate had been in his hands. But
he understood my reasons, and indeed urged them himself. I
left him during the last days of November, pledging myself to
return before the beginning of the campaign. He promised

I^hat, when the time came, I should have agreeable and active
smployment, and assured me that there could not fail to be

108 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

more opportunities for useful service than in the recent
campaign.4

I set out, therefore, to Vienna, taking the road to Galicia.
On arriving at Czernovitz, on the frontier of that province,
my valet, who was suffering from a slight catarrh, begged me
to let him spend the day there, as he wished to rest and employ
certain remedies. I summoned a doctor, who bled him. He
became worse after this treatment, upon which the doctor con-
cluded that it should be twice repeated. The same evening,
after being bled for the third time, he died. I was sorry to
lose this poor man, whom I had engaged in Paris and was
taking back with me ; and it was also very inconvenient to lose
his services. I continued my journey with my Polish servant
only, and fortunately his health and intelligence were enough
for all contingencies. On the eighth day after leaving Yassi I
reached Vienna. As I had a very cordial letter of introduction
from Prince Potemkin to Prince Galitzin, the Russian Ambas-
sador, and had the Marquis de Noailles, the French Ambas-
sador,5 for my natural protector, I spent ten days there,
enjoying splendid dinners, suppers,. balls, plays, and everything
that could give me a wide knowledge of the amusements and
etiquette of this capital. I saw a good deal of both, and in
that short time I perceived that the best way, in the end, to
amuse oneself there, would be to give up many of the large
gatherings, and chiefly frequent private circles. In the latter
one can always find consolation for the boredom of the former.

VII

Arrival in Paris (29th Dec. 1789)— First contact with the Revolution—
The new spirit in Society — Visits to the Court and to La Fayette —
Distressed by the changes that have taken place, the author leaves
Paris (10th May, 1790) and visits the Austrian army (Clerfayt,
Coburg, Lauer, Siege of Giurgievo), which makes a bad impression
on him — He returns to Potemkin.

ON the 29th December, 1789, I arrived in Paris. I was, un-
fortunately, doomed to be tormented by the effects of the
French Revolution in these its early days ; and at the very
moment of my arrival I was annoyed by one of its results.
As I entered the Rue Saint-Martin I found myself at the tail
of an enormous column of new cavalry, whose general had
just been reviewing them, and they kept me driving at a
foot Vpace for more than an hour ; for I had no means of
making these wretched bourgeois — who looked most uneasy
on horseback — understand my impatience to be in my own
home after an absence of two years. As I had as yet but a
very vague knowledge of this terrible Revolution, this was my
first important reason for being violently opposed to it ; and
I was still complaining when my postillions took me into the
courtyard of our house.

I shall not attempt to depict my feelings of delirious joy
when I found myself in the arms of all my nearest and
dearest : I was intoxicated, and the moment dwells in my
memory as a beautiful gleam of the purest happiness, amid
all the trouble and sorrows that were to come after this in-
comparable moment. My uncle was not present to receive my
first greetings, because he was, they told me, at a sitting of
the National Assembly (my second grievance against the
Revolution). He would not come home till four o'clock, be-
cause the dinner-hour in Paris was later than it used to be,

109

110 MEMOIRS OF THE

en account of this Assembly (a third grievance against the
Revolution). It was this whimsical succession of petty
annoyances that gradually prepared me to learn all the details,
and circumstances, and results of these fatal changes ; to face
the sorrows of my family, of France, of Europe, and of my
own life ; and to detest, until my dying day, the words revolu-
tion, insurrection, and all the abominable fury that has
embittered my heart for ever.

That same evening all my friends came to see me ; and the
conversation soon became general, and extremely noisy*
"Have you ever seen," said one, "a more extraordinary
apparition than a man who knows nothing about the Revolu-
tion?"— " We must post him up in it!" said another. —
"Nothing is easier," answered a third. "We will give him
Mounier's book 1 to read at once." On this there was a
general outcry. "Mounier's book! " shouted half-a-dozen at
once : " that is the very thing to give him the most untrue
and absurd notions imaginable!" — "Absurd?" retorted
another voice. " If the deputies had all had the same views
as he, how happy we should be ! " — " We have got past that
now," said some one else; " Mounier is behind the times;
Damas must read the Moniteurs since the 14th July, and he
will know all about it." One of the party very sensibly
suggested that it might be as well to find out exactly how
much I knew of the events of the day, before deciding upon
my course of reading. " What is your position," I was asked,
"and how much do you know?" — "I know," I answered,
"that there are some new horse-guards (very ill-at-ease on
their horses), who delayed my arrival by two hours ; I know
that there is a National Assembly, which meets every day and
is the reason for our dining at four o'clock instead of three ;
and I know that the King lives in the Tuileries instead of at
Versailles, where I expected to pay my court to him as usual.
That is all, ladies and gentlemen, that my observations have
so far enabled me to fathom." — "There is not a doubt,"
cried four voices simultaneously, " that he will be an aristo-
crat ! " Then the clamour became general : " Indeed, I trust
he will! "—"I trust he won't! "— " We shall see! " And,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 111

as no two people in this drawing-room seemed to be agreed,
I came to the conclusion that there would be still less agree-
ment in Paris at large. I promised to read Mounier and the
Moniteurs too, but pledged myself to be a royalist with all
my heart and soul, both before and after my studies.

I had imagined, as I alighted from my carriage in Paris,
that I was returning to the same place that I had left ; that
I should find the same things, the same minds, the same
characters ; that I should resume my old position, with the
additional advantage of a picturesque episode of two years,
which would serve to put me on a par with other young men
of my age. A very short time sufficed, however, to show me
that I was still wandering in a strange land, and that perhaps I
should find it even more strange than those other lands that I
had hitherto regarded as mere stepping-stones to bring me
back to my own, and make me appreciate it the more. Every
one had made a new career for himself, a new future, a new
hope of fame ; the gaiety of youth had been transformed into
a silly kind of rationality ; and the rationality of mature age
was replaced by chimeras. Those whom I had left absorbed
in thoughts of social success, or of women, or of their pro-
fessions, I found changed into legislators, or journalists, or
intriguers — a ridiculous combination, it seemed to me, of pre-
tension and incapacity. My language was no longer theirs :
I had been a Frenchman till I went away to Russia, and was
now nothing but a Russian in Paris. The events of the past
year, which were now disturbing me for the first time, seemed
to be accepted by every one, and so familiar that no one was
alarmed at the thought of what might follow ; conversation
had become habitually serious and profound, and the grace
and geniality that used to constitute its charm had altogether
vanished ; the conflict of opinions had killed all confidence and
intimacy ; the opposition of interests and the determination to
attain an end made men indifferent as to the means they
employed in achieving their object. Society had degenerated
into factions, conversation into debate, and pleasures into a
mere means of distraction. Everything was subservient to the
question of public affairs; and as for me, I had not been

112 MEMOIRS OF THE

gradually familiarised with this total subversion of Parisian
society, and did not know whether I were on my head or my
heels.

A few days after my arrival I went to spend a week in the
country with my aunt, whose affection, and care, and advice
had been dear to my heart all my life. I found her saddened,
preoccupied, and disturbed. My brothers had accompanied me
to her house, and it was in this intimate and affectionate circle
that I received an account of our fatal position, and of all
that might be expected to happen in the future, in consequence
of the disasters that had already produced so much evil. Every
step I took towards a deeper knowledge of the state of things
seemed to me like a dream, and with the greatest pain I
resigned myself to the loss of my illusion that my return to
Paris would be the very acme of satisfaction and joy. No
one, however, could have yet foreseen that this Paris of ours,
which was already so unlike itself, would in the future become
equally unlike any human abode — that it would produce yawn-
ing graves and a host of monsters, to destroy, and devour,
and swallow up all the habits, the principles, and even the
human beings that were the anchors of my soul and of my
very existence. It is true that the path by which we had
already travelled from the past to the present had covered
more ground than could possibly lie between us and any future
that was conceivable; but no one dreamt of the distance to
which we were fated to go. I will not attempt to describe
here the events that have never yet, in all the volumes that
have dealt with them, been portrayed in sufficient detail. At
the time of which I am speaking there were men so blind that
they had not yet lost hope, and many who did not even see
that when parties have become mere factions, and neither the
supreme authority, nor the basis of the government, nor the
law of the land is any longer immutable, there is no dyke left
to keep out the devastating waves. Events have shown this
to be only too true.

When I returned from staying with my relations in the
country I went to pay my court at the Tuileries. It was only
gradually, and with difficulty, that I accustomed myself to

findin

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 113

inding the royal family guarded by bourgeois, without any
bodyguard, or any of the impressive pomp and circumstance
that made Versailles distinguished above all the Courts of
Europe ; to seeing the apartments of the King and Queen
crowded with the kind of people who would not have been
allowed to enter them in the old days; to perceiving, in short
—though the observation could not be put into words — that
the remnants of dignity still apparent were merely the death-
throes of the monarchy, which had been too splendid and
too strong to be extinguished in a moment.

The kindness with which the King condescended to welcome
me I shall never forget : he took me into the embrasure of a
window, discussed every detail of my two recent campaigns
with as much accuracy as I could have shown myself, and
praised my behaviour. But he said nothing of the changes
around him. The Queen, who was at her card-table when I
saw her first, called me to her side with all her usual charm
of manner, and I thought her more attractive than ever. She
asked me for news of her brother Joseph II, and when I
hesitated to tell her of his real condition she begged me to
speak the truth frankly, in view of her many reasons for being
interested in the matter. I then admitted that he had but a
short time to live; probably, it appeared, not more than two
months. She seemed deeply affected by the news, though it
has since appeared very doubtful whether he would have taken
any measures to avert her fate. The Queen then bade me
observe a man in a black coat who was facing her beyond the
card-table, and told me that when she rose from her seat she
would say why she wished me to notice him. When the time
came she informed me that the man in question was M. de
Beaurepaire,2 the bodyguard who had saved her life at
Versailles at the risk of his own, by preventing the frenzied
mob from entering her bedchamber. The loyal and devoted
expression of the man's face, the gratitude with which the
Queen remembered his action, the thought of these past catas-
trophes combined with her submission and resignation to her
melancholy position, filled me with emotion. I hoped she
might be able to read in my face all that was in my heart, and
I

114 MEMOIRS OF THE

I was devoting far more attention to her troubles than to the
happiness her kind words should have given me, when she
deigned to praise me for the way I had been employing my
time since I parted from her. She spoke approvingly of every
little thing I had done during my absence. I left the Queen's
presence with my heart full of the deepest melancholy, and
found it hard to believe that such changes could have taken
place in the space of two years.

M. de La Fayette, who was the key to all the doors that
led to anything at that time, and had as yet by no means
reached the end of his activities in the Revolution, had shown
me marked kindness all through my boyhood, and had been
on terms of close friendship with my family. I went to see
him. I had always known him to be ambitious, and even
before my departure his ambition had begun to take a wrong
direction, but I was not prepared for the height to which it
was now soaring. His house, which resembled a general's
headquarters, exhibited so much of the paraphernalia of war
that it would have been impressive if the object in view had
been legitimate. During the few minutes that I was waiting
in his aides-de-camp's room I heard language of the most
incendiary and alarming kind, and phrases of which I did not
even understand the whole meaning, since the subjects of the
conversation were as yet very imperfectly known to me. M.
de La Fayette summoned me to his own study, and met me
there with all the cordiality that I should always have expected
him to show me. " What changes there have been," he said,
"since we met! What discoveries you will make! Do not
judge hastily, I beseech you ; the things you will see can
only be understood by following their progress in every detail
from their earliest beginnings." A remnant of the modesty
and trust that are so becoming in the young, in default of
experience, made me slow to form the opinion of him that I
have since been forced to adopt ; and I was making him revert
to a style of speech that he had long forsaken when I held
this simple, moderate conversation with him — a man who, for
more than a year, had been complicating and elaborating every
measure, to attain an end that was as chimerical as it was

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 115

wrong. He informed me that the decoration he wore was
the Order of the Bastille, a trophy of one of the first revolu-
tionary proceedings. Any further explanation would have
been embarrassing, and I was careful not to ask for one. I
left him ; and in future I preferred to remember him rather
than renew my acquaintance with him.

Thus every day brought me all kinds of surprises. A
number of musical instruments with all their strings transposed,
a town with all its sign-boards changed, would not have given
me a greater sensation of confusion and discord than I received
every moment of the day. I had heard far more of China
than of Paris as it then was, but, as the disastrous circum-
stances of the times had made me feel myself a visitor there
rather than an active citizen, it devolved upon me to observe
everything and see everything. And always, at the back of
my mind, was the thought of the life abroad that I had made
possible for myself, and that my fate, it seemed, would permit
me to enjoy, far from this stormy sea.

I followed, fairly closely, the doings of the National
Assembly, over which a spirit of evil presided. Providence
and chance had distributed the ability of its members so un-
justly and disproportionately that all the intellect was plainly
on the side of crime, and all the stupidity on the side of good
intentions. Owing to this unfortunate division, which was
almost invariable, every sitting had the most dangerous results,
and I attended very few meetings that did not conduce to the
dissolution of the Monarchy, and of all authority and every
kind of legal government. But the eloquence and talents that
sometimes sparkled so brilliantly round this fountain of disaster
illed one with involuntary curiosity and interest, and often,
ideed, with admiration ; for there are more kinds of admira-
;ion than one, seeing that genius, in whatever form it may

>pear, always commands respect.

The conversation in private circles was merely a summary
>f these meetings; for it was in the drawing-rooms that the
lebates of the various clubs were originated, and the clubs
fere the crucible and hotbed of the opinions that the Assembly
;urned into laws. It resulted from this devotion to public

116 MEMOIRS OF THE

affairs that every social gathering became a mere committee,
a series of discussions, which embittered all who took part in
them, divided society into factions, and severed the bonds of
friendship and the tie of blood. All the duties, sentiments,
and relationships of former days were reduced to the level
of mere political opinions, and the heart had no refuge left
but secrecy and solitude.

My relations, whose love for me was incapable of change,
had less time for showing their feelings than once they had ;
they were constantly preoccupied, and sad, and anxious, and
I always outdid them in demonstrations of affection ; it seemed
to me that the language of the heart, which I had learnt from
them, was stranger to their lips than of old. I am certain
that their thoughts were with me, but this did not satisfy
me, and I often found myself feeling isolated among the very
people whose influence, before I went away, had been the
motive-power of every action of my life. Surrounded as I
was by those whom the Revolution was burdening with many
different ills, this sorrow, I admit, was the one that troubled
me the most. As I look back upon my feelings at that time I
remember that the complete upheaval of my native land, the
probable loss of all hope of personal fortune, and my own
precarious future disturbed me not at all in comparison with
my more or less reasonable fear of losing the delights of a
dearly-loved home, which had always been, from my earliest
years, the centre of my happiness and my affections. Before
the age of twenty-three, however, one can find distractions
from such thoughts as these ; and the distractions I found
were very sweet. I was madly in love with an angel of good-
ness and enchantment, and my trifling infidelities to her were
mere distractions too, since I loved no one else with real passion.
All through that winter I never awoke in the morning without
being obliged to call up a vision of her, to dispel the dark
and troubled thoughts that tormented me — thoughts that were
all concerned with this outward alteration in my closest ties.

During the two years of my recent absence I never came
to any decision without considering how far it would receive
the approval of my relations ; and if I withstood their ascend-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

117

ancy over me sufficiently to separate myself from them it was
in the complete and unconquerable certainty that, when once
the first step was taken, I should acquire new claims upon
their unfailing interest and concern in my affairs. When I
was alone in my tent in the desert, near Otchakow or Bender,
I consulted them mentally on every step I took, and felt, so
to speak, that I was acting under their eyes and by their
advice. It seemed to me, therefore, that in the coming cam-
paign, for the first time, I should be obliged to face the words
absence and independence, the very idea of which wearied and
oppressed me uncontrollably. Even now, as I write, I can
recall the pain that this thought gave me.

The more deeply France was involved in trouble, however,
the less I could hesitate as to the part I had to play. When
the life that was natural to me, my life in my own land, was
perhaps on the point of being wrested from me, there was
all the more reason to foster and cherish the life that depended
on myself alone. It was this argument that made me firmly
refuse to take any step likely to hinder my return to Russia.

The kindness of the King and Queen and the efforts of my
relations secured for me the offer of a regiment of dragoons.
I expressed my desire to remain with the Russian army till the
end of the war, and begged that if I were appointed it should
be with the proviso that no obstacle was to be put in my way.3
When, however, a design was formed to create some new
regiments of chasseurs, composed of two battalions of infantry
and four squadrons of cavalry, it was thought advisable to
wait, and give me one of these. I gladly consented to the
change, and waited patiently ; but the course of events made
it impossible for these regiments of chasseurs ever to be
formed in the reign of Louis XVI.

Another command, of the most unpleasant description, fell
to my lot. The post was altogether a sinecure, if one wished
it to be so, and though there was no honour attached to it,
was styled honorary ; but it was impossible to refuse it without
risking the property, and even the lives, of those whose posi-
:ion was the cause of the appointment. At that time all the
>rovinces were forming corps of National Guards, which were

118 MEMOIRS OF THE

really nothing but agents of the Revolution, though the
ostensible approval of the King gave them a superficial kind
of legality. The province of Gatinais, where my uncle had
some property, proclaimed him commandant-general, with my-
self as second-in-command : he was obliged to accept the post,
and it was impossible for me to refuse when he had consented.
We were formally received into the corps at Montereau-faut-
Yonne and Varennes, and, if the ceremonial on the occasion
differed from the ceremony performed for the Bourgeois Gentil-
homme, it was because the persons concerned were transposed
into gentilshommes bourgeois. Since the day of that ordeal,
the memory of which makes me shudder even now, I have never
set eyes upon the province.

Every day I was revolted and wearied by everything I saw,
and more entirely persuaded that the new abuses — which had
replaced the old ones, the causes of the Revolution — would
lead to events as yet incalculable, but certainly terrible. I
was disgusted to see so many circles of friends, who had had
no thought, two years before, except to give one another
pleasure, now divided into factions ; and I cursed the day that
the charms of the most delightful country in the world had
been frittered away, and the finest kingdom in Europe allowed
to run to waste. For these reasons I began, very early in the
spring, to speak of my approaching departure, and with the
help of my relations, who were always interested in my welfare
and anxious to carry out my wishes, I found it quite easy to
make the necessary arrangements. On the 10th May, 1790,
four months after my arrival in Paris, I set out again to join
the Russian army, regretting nothing in the new Paris save
the vestiges of the old, feeling strong enough to renounce the
past while not strong enough to forget it, and being well
aware that I was now to shift for myself, without any of that
moral support that is such a help to the imagination. I was
leaving those I loved to sail a stormy sea, where there were
so many hidden reefs that they must inevitably be wrecked ;
they had no choice but to drift with wind and tide ; they could
not tell upon what shore their bark would be shattered, nor
to what spar they could cling to save themselves. If I could

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 119

have hoped to be of use to them, no personal considerations
would have made me leave them, but I had little real under-
standing of the situation, and was merely an additional cause
of anxiety and danger to them. The best thing I could do,
therefore, was to relieve them of all responsibility on my
account, and give them, in the fact of my absence, the one
consolation that was possible to their affectionate hearts.

I relieved my conscience by putting in an appearance at
Nancy with the King's Regiment, which I had joined at the
age of twelve. I spent four days there with my fellow-officers,
and inspected my company, whom I had not the least hope of
ever seeing again. I had attained to the rank of colonel at
the age of twenty-three, since I had parted from the regiment.
They all congratulated me very sincerely on my campaign in
Russia, and gave me the most cordial welcome. I parted from
them with the saddest feelings, and proceeded to Metz, to
Strasbourg, and thence to Vienna. At Metz I saw M. le
marquis de Bouille, who was in command there, and my eldest
brother, who was there temporarily with his regiment. I
accompanied him on parade, and saw the King's troops march
past for the last time in my life, though neither he nor I could
bring ourselves to believe it. I only remained in Strasbourg
for a few hours, and crossed the Pont de Kehl with my
thoughts full of the dream in which I had just been living in
my native land, a dream that was rendered very bitter and
very dark by the fear that I should never awaken from it.
My own personal future, for the time, fell into the background
of my mind ; I felt crushed, and bewildered by an outlook that
seemed insupportable. As time went on, however, I became
more resigned ; and with nothing but my own character to
support me, and nothing but my star to guide me, I reached
Vienna. The Queen had given me a letter for the Emperor,
who had ascended the throne since my last visit : 4 this I
delivered to him, and he discussed the last campaign with me,
and the one that was about to begin. Two army-corps of
msiderable size were occupying Banat, and were to attack the
Turkish possessions in the neighbourhood of the Danube.
M. de Clerfaytj5 who was encamped near Praiovo, on the

120 MEMOIRS OF THE

banks of that river, was to open the siege of Vidin, and
Marshal Coburg was to invest Giurgievo. The Emperor
suggested that, on my way to the Russian headquarters at
Yassi, I should make a detour and visit his own army. He
gave me his assurance that, if I could make up my mind to
lengthen my journey by four hundred leagues, I should arrive
at the very moment when General Clerfayt was beginning the
attack on Vidin.

The operations of the Russian army made this delay possible
for me, and the Emperor gave me orders of admission to his
camps. I left Vienna on the 26th May, taking the road
through Hungary, Transylvania, and Banat, which would lead
me finally to Moldavia by way of Wallachia. This route
showed me the whole theatre of the war between the Austrians
and Turks from its very beginning.

I saw the scene of the famous retreat from Mehadia, effected
so precipitately by Joseph II in 1787, which confirmed the
general opinion that military talent was not one of his strong
points. Mehadia lay on his left hand, and Weisskirchen on
his right, when he received warning that he was about to be
attacked by the army of the Grand Vizier.6 With the greatest
promptitude and definiteness he gave the command Sauve
qui pent! and hurried through the defiles of Mehadia. He
was unable to gather up the scattered fragments of his army
till he reached Sakal, where the river Temes lay between him
and the Turks, who had pursued him as far as Caremsbey.7

I saw the fortress of Orsova, one of the most interesting in
existence on account of its position, and one of the most
remarkable as regards its construction. It had been blockaded
by the Austrians from November 1789 till April 1790, and
only surrendered for want of provisions, after causing the ruin
of the Austrian forces from sickness, and obliging them to use
an incalculable quantity of ammunition.

Orsova is situated in the middle of the Danube, and is
dominated on one side by the mountains, whence the fortress
can be cannonaded without any power of retaliating on the
attacking batteries. The strength of the place consists in the
immense number of its casemates, which are especially well

I

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 121

constructed, and in the width of the Danube, which makes an
assault almost impracticable. All its fortifications are well
contrived, and even supposing a landing could be effected the
storming of the place would present the greatest difficulties.
It was reckoned that, in the two campaigns they had just
finished in this part of the world, the Austrians lost eighty
thousand men, of whom as many died of various diseases as
were killed by the enemy.

On leaving Orsova I proceeded to M. de Clerfayt's army,
which was encamped on the right bank of the Danube near
Praiovo, at the point where the Temes flows into that river.
This spot is only one good day's march from Vidin, including
the crossing of the Timok. M. de Clerfayt received me with
all the courtesy of which he was capable, but immediately
showed me an instance of the vacillation of the Council of War
at Vienna, in the form of a despatch he had received two days
earlier by courier, counter-ordering the siege of Vidin. He
begged me to spend a couple of days with his army, and we
employed the time in examining every detail of it, and of the
flotilla as well. The latter deserved the closest attention :
the boats were well built and well navigated, and presented a
very pretty spectacle. Being disappointed in my hopes of
seeing some active service with this army-corps I wished at all
events to justify my journey by taking part in the operations
of Marshal Coburg's forces. I set out, therefore, in Bucha-
rest, where his headquarters had been fixed during the winter ;
but, hearing on the way that he had gone off to invest
Giurgievo, I followed him thither directly. As a colonel in
the armies of two Powers allied with his own country I laid
claim to a welcome from him, and he allowed me to be present
at the siege. General Thurn,8 of the artillery, whom I had
met in Prague in 1786, escorted me to the trench, which had
been made at a distance of a hundred and twenty yards from
the covered way. He introduced me to General Lauer 9 of
the engineers, who was superintending the construction of the
siege works, and together they took me over all the works,
and explained all their projects, which plainly proved at that
time that the siege could not last more than six or eight days.

122 MEMOIRS OF THE

The place holds a strong position, if the besieging force
have not cut off its communications with Roustchouk, which,
being situated on the opposite bank of the Danube, can easily
revictual Giurgievo. It is very difficult to prevent supplies
from crossing, either by the river or by the bridge that con-
nects the two places, for the approaches to the bridge are
defended by all the batteries of the fortress ; and Marshal
Coburg, who was intending every day to take the measures
indispensable for success, had not yet made up his mind to
do so when a catastrophe occurred which I will now describe.

On the morning of the 8th June I had been round the
trenches with General Lauer. This man, who was full of
knowledge, but pedantic and slow to an unparalleled degree,
insisted on my closely observing the minuteness of his precau-
tions, and the correct construction of the works. When,
however, we reached the extreme left, I ventured to point out
that there was a considerable interval between the last boyau
and the Danube, which would make it easy for the Turks to
flank the works, should they succeed in seizing this gap by an
unexpected and energetic sortie. General Lauer was good
enough to approve of my remark, and said — so just was my
criticism — that he had already given orders for the construc-
tion in the course of the night, of a battery that should
command the river and the trench, and completely close the
gap.

When we had inspected everything from the right to the
left, and I was wearied and bored by the prosiness of this
man, I took my leave of him, and returned to dine with
Marshal Coburg.

On leaving the table the marshal mounted his horse, and
went off to see some Turkish caiques, which had come along the
Danube to fire a few shots at the rear of the camp, and try
to sink some armed boats that the Austrians kept at that point
to protect the right bank of the river. I accompanied him,
and we were less than a mile from the marshal's tents when
an aide-de-camp caught us up, and announced that the Turks
had just made a sortie. The marshal, who saw little cause for
alarm, and was too phlegmatic to agitate himself without very

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 123

good reason, continued on his way with the barest acknowledg-
ment of the news. Scarcely ten minutes had passed before we
were joined by another aide-de-camp — wild-eyed and distracted
— who informed the marshal that the Turks were in possession
of the trenches, that the guns were taken, that the general in
command in the trenches was wounded, that the general of
artillery, the Comte de Thurn, had had his head cut off, and
finally that all the troops were in a state of the greatest
confusion.

This time the marshal thought it worth while to repair to
the scene of disorder, and we galloped back to the outskirts
of the suburbs. I then witnessed the very climax of every-
thing that incapacity could produce in the way of disasters
and blunders. The marshal, having entirely lost his head,
appealed to any one who would come to the rescue, to tell
him what orders should be given, though he still clung to the
shame of the responsibility, it appeared, for he still wore the
uniform of his rank. Colonel Fischer, his adjutant-general —
an incapable governess for this wretched child ! — nominally
took the reins of authority into his own hands, but left it
open for every individual in the army, of whatever rank, to
come with his advice to the marshal. The marshal forthwith
laid this advice before Colonel Fischer.

The first measure decreed by this imposing council was to strike
tents, harness the horses, and drive the baggage-wagons out of
danger : the second was to put the fifteen thousand men of the
army-corps under arms, in case the four thousand who constituted
the whole garrison should wish to risk an engagement in the
open. The army, in consequence, was formed up in seven
squares in rear of the suburbs, with the cavalry in the intervals
and the pickets in advance of them. But the trenches had been
evacuated, all the ordnance was taken, and the Turks were
not mad enough to go any farther. Thus the army remained
without making any attack, from six o'clock in the evening
until the next morning, not a man being allowed to fall out
nor lay down his arms. At dawn an attempt was made to
disentangle the various regiments, which were mingled in hope-
less confusion : battalions of the Pellegrinis among the

124 MEMOIRS OF THE

Belgiojosos, of the King's among the Carl Toscanas, of the
Collar edos among the Anspergs, and so on.

Even when the troops had been reduced to order they
remained as they were until ten o'clock, ostensibly to show
their defiance of the enemy ; but the Turks had never dreamt
of following up their success, and were firing off powder from
all their batteries in token of rejoicing.

By mid-day the army was in full retreat, marching in
squares. They burnt the wooden hospital that they had built
in rear of the camp ; they set fire to their shells, as though
there were not time to carry them away ; and they went off to
a position on the heights, three leagues away from the town.
While this inexplicable manoeuvre was in progress I approached
the marshal, to question him with regard to his choice of a
position. He answered me coldly : "I think we are going a
very long way, for the first day's march." And he turned to
Colonel Fischer, to ask where he intended to pitch the first
camp. At that moment I recollected, with some surprise,
that when I was in Vienna I had seen shopkeepers trying to
attract customers by painting Marshal Coburg on their sign-
boards, and had also met with medals struck in his honour,
and several other forms of homage, all of which indicated the
gratitude of the public. And this was the man who thought
himself defeated by four thousand Turks, when he had fifteen
thousand men at his disposal ; the man who had lost his guns
and ammunition, and felt obliged to raise a siege that had at
first been reckoned as an affair of ten days' duration.

I was counting on having a conversation with General Lauer
on the subject of this strange event ; but though I addressed
him several times I failed to arouse him from the state of
stupor and depression into which he had sunk. At last, how-
ever, I succeeded in dragging from him the causes to which
he attributed this shameful affair. He complained that as the
streets of the suburbs had not been cleared away, nor indeed
a single house taken down, the troops who came to support
those in the trenches could not be deployed, and had only
served to increase the confusion ; and that the reserves were
not proportionate to the troops on duty. He admitted that

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 125

ie flanks of the trenches were not sufficiently protected, and
that the works were too weak there — a fatal mistake that I
had pointed out to him myself on the left flank, exactly at the
point attacked by the Turks. He assured me, too, that none
of the regiments in camp had received any instructions as to
the course they should pursue if the reserves were repulsed, and
that when he sent to ask for reinforcements no one could
decide which battalions should go to his help. By the time
a few battalions had at last made up their minds to advance
the mischief was done.

However important these blunders may have been there was
certainly not one of them that could justify raising the siege
of a fortress of the third order, with a garrison of four
thousand men, when the besieging force numbered fifteen
thousand ; and, supposing so fatal and extraordinary a course
of action to be inevitable, it was owing to the lack of discipline,
and to the indescribable confusion that reigned among the
troops, and to the want of ability in the commanding officers.
Their capacity was not even sufficient to enforce subordination,
essential as it is in every rank of the army.

Lauer, the general of engineers, deserved to be cashiered ;
since the man who conducts the siege can demand the troops
he requires and insist on any course of action that is necessary.

Marshal Coburg deserved to be pensioned off on the score
of incapability, as the most useless of all the Emperor's
generals. Yet I was to see both these men in full career later
on, and see them lose battles, moreover, that would have
caused less suffering to Europe if the generals in question had
sooner received their deserts.

When the army-corps was encamped in the new position I
went to take leave of Marshal Coburg. His manner was
somewhat embarrassed, and he asked me why I was leaving
him before seeing the reparation of the disaster I had wit-
nessed. I observed that it would be very imprudent to make
any fresh attempt before replacing some of his artillery, and
that I could no longer delay my return to the Russian head-
quarters. The marshal was afraid that I should give a poor
idea of the Austrian army's efforts to carry out the terms of

126 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

the alliance, and of the amount of success that they were likely
to achieve. As for me, I was distressed to think that, owing
to a few vicissitudes, a treaty between two Powers could lead
to such operations as this, which could have no effect on the
progress of affairs nor on the special projects in view, and
moreover involved an immense and useless expenditure of lives
and money by both empires.

I parted from the Austrians without gaining any advantage
from having lengthened my journey to see their methods of
warfare, beyond the disagreeable lesson they had just taught
me. This kind of experience is far from being useless, how-
ever. One can often judge of what ought to have been done by
the things that are left undone ; and there was nothing in the
episode that I had any personal reason to regret.

VIII

Damas colonel of the Arkhangelsk infantry regiment, and afterwards of
the light-horse of Alexandria — News of the Princes of Anhalt and
Nassau — Sieges of Akkerman and Kilia : strange panics among the
Russian troops : death of General Miiller — Siege of Ismail : final
assault and carnage of the 22nd December, 1790 — Charles de Ligne,
Langeron, Fronsac — In order to be near his relations the author
leaves the Russian army, but preserves his rank in it — Visit to
Vienna — The Marquis de Noailles ambassador — The author's
opinion of the Emigration — Calonne's mission and the Emperor
Leopold's indecision — Visit to Aix-la-Chapelle.

AFTER travelling across Wallachia and Moldavia I reached
Yassi on the 18th June, 1790. Prince Potemkin was not
expecting to see me : he was in a little country-house near the
town, and when I entered he seemed greatly surprised. His
greeting, it seemed to me, was not as pleasant nor as cordial
as usual. To make sure of this I observed him closely for
several days, and being confirmed in my opinion I wrote to
ask him for an explanation. His answer was as frank as it
was kind. He admitted that, having been told I was trying
to obtain permission to take part in the war with Sweden, he
had felt hurt, being conscious of never having failed in con-
sideration for me since we first met. But my letter, he said,
had put his mind at rest as far as that matter was concerned,
and he hoped to prove to me soon that his friendship for me
was not subject to change. And indeed from that moment his
goodwill showed itself in word and deed as plainly as in the
previous years. A few days later I was placed in command of
the Arkhangelsk regiment of infantry, one of the best and
finest corps in the army.

On the 1st July the prince issued orders for the army to
assemble near Bender, whither he was moving his headquarters.
On the 6th I set out with my regiment across the steppes that
lay between me and my destination, and found the march very

127

128 MEMOIRS OF THE

trying in the heat, which was extreme. On the 7th I crossed
the Pruth, and on the 22nd camped beside the Bye, a little
stream that flows into the Dniester. Here I was to await fresh
orders.

I do not believe that any troops ever suffered more in the
Egyptian desert, from the heat and the sand, than the Russian
army endured on this occasion. Several times, when we were
no more than a thousand paces from the camping-place where
our day's march was to end, I was obliged to let my regiment
rest, because the men were absolutely unable to take another
step; and I should have found it difficult to choose between
my sufferings then and the cold of Otchakow. The Russians
feel the heat far more than the cold, and are far more injured
by it. Their generals ought to take many more precautions in
this respect. Being unaccustomed to the harmful effects of
heat they make the mistake of doing nothing to counteract
them, and the soldiers in consequence suffer from maladies that
are unknown in their own climate — maladies that the doctors
no more know how to cure than the officers know how to avoid
them.

There were epidemics in all the regiments, and numbers of
the men died. In mine the mortality was less than in others,
owing to a few precautions that a little thought suggested to
me, and to my very strict enforcement of certain rules, which
I made the men follow for the sake of their health.

The distance from my camp to Bender was four leagues ;
and Prince Potemkin, without thinking of the torrid zone that
lay between the two places, begged me to visit him frequently.
It is, I believe, owing to the habit I acquired of mastering the
horrible heat in order to carry out his wishes that I have
never been so much afraid of heat since that time .as I was
before.

I spent two months isolated in this same camp, where I
settled down to lead as pleasant a life as possible. The regi-
mental band was perfect, and I made use of it a great deal :
I drilled my men when the sun was low. Every evening I took
a walk ; and being fortunately gifted with the power of trans-
porting my thoughts to the place where my affections were

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 129

centred, I always found the days very short. And yet, during
this campaign, I had none of the companions with whom I had
enjoyed, in the previous ones, the delight and consolation of
exchanging every thought and emotion of the heart.

Although, after the first campaign, I had lost the Prince
de Ligne and the Prince of Nassau, I still had the companion-
ship in the second of the Prince of Anhalt-Bernbourg, the most
accomplished man on earth. But I had been the first to advise
him, in the correspondence we carried on between Paris and
Petersburg, to accept the post of second-in-command of the
army that was being sent against the Swedes. He had every
reason to expect that all kinds of advantages would result from
this appointment, but to my great sorrow my affectionate
interest in his welfare had led me to approve of a course of
action that brought about his death ; for he fell a victim to his
zeal and courage. He was killed in an affair in Finland, and
was mourned by his sovereign and by the whole army, and still
more by the friends whom his goodness and lovable qualities
won for him wherever he went. I have already related how I
made his acquaintance. From that first moment we never
misunderstood each other for an instant, nor failed to consult
one another on every matter that concerned us.

Since the Prince of Nassau's departure from the camp during
the first campaign, while the siege of Otchakow was in pro-
gress, my correspondence with him had not been very regular :
he is not fond of writing, and an exchange of letters demands
absolute reciprocity. But at the period to which my recollec-
tions have now brought me I received a letter from him, in
which he told me with the greatest straightforwardness and
open-heartedness of the terrible battle he had just lost against
the Swedes in the Gulf of Finland, and of the destruction of a
part of the flotilla. The Empress had placed him in command
)f it, in the hope that the success he had won in the Black Sea
ld follow him in other waters ; but he found the Swedes
tore capable than the Turks, and his determination — his most
lotable quality — was the cause of his misfortune. I remember
that his letter began thus : "I have just been beaten, mon
iher, and beaten devilishly well." x

130 MEMOIRS OF THE

It was this unfortunate affair that brought about the most
generous and honourable treaty of peace that was ever made
between two sovereigns. After his victory the King of Sweden
made advances to the Empress, who responded in the same
conciliatory spirit ; and the peace was concluded.2

While a variety of advantages were gained by the Russian
army there was one moment when Gustavus, with a little more
foresight and promptitude, might have triumphed over the
Empress's persistent good fortune and caused her a great deal
of embarrassment, if her star had not always watched over
her. By a blunder Petersburg was left unprotected ; by a
blunder Gustavus failed to make himself master there; and
three days later the opportunity was gone and Petersburg was
safe.

If there was one reason more than another that should have
prompted the Empress to make peace as speedily as possible
with all her enemies, it was the deplorable state of her finances.
If she was not entirely without resources it was owing to her
personal credit, far more than to the credit of the Ministry of
Finance. The notes that represented the currency and were
used as money throughout the empire were depreciated as much
as sixty per cent., and all through the third campaign, as I
can bear witness, the troops of every rank, even the private
soldiers, were paid with them at the rate of their nominal
value. What a storm of indignation would be roused by such
a proceeding in any other European army ! And yet not a
word of complaint was heard, and I regarded this attitude of
resignation as the most convincing proof of the passive sub-
ordination peculiar to the Russians. Nothing could show it
more clearly than this.

Quite at the beginning of September certain movements on
the part of the Turkish army made the prince think that it
was desirous of engaging with us in a pitched battle, and was
about to approach us with that object. He begged me to
change my regiment, and take command of a corps of light-
horse, reminding me with perfect truth that, as he had always
guided me for the best, I could do no less than abide by his
decision. I did not hesitate to obey his orders, and was

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 131

appointed to the Alexandria Regiment of light-horse, which
numbered one thousand, and was excellently mounted and
equipped.

On the 22nd September a portion of the army set out upon
the march, in the direction of the mouths of the Danube. As
I was part of the advanced guard I was ordered to beat back
any bodies of Turkish troops I might meet, in order to
facilitate the approach to the little fortified town of Akker-
man, situated at the mouth of the Dniester. A few days
sufficed for the reduction of this little fortress, which capitu-
lated as soon as a shot or two had been fired at the suburbs.

I was immediately despatched to a place called Tatar-Bounar,
to act as an advanced guard to the troops encamped before
Akkerman, and it was not until early in October that the
prince decided that the fortress of Kilia should be invested.
We arrived there on the 15th, with our commander-in-chief
Baron Miiller, a brave and excellent officer, the general-
commandant of the artillery.3

This place, which is situated on an arm of the Danube, was
not even as strong as most of the Turkish fortresses, but had
a well-designed entrenchment and contained a garrison suffici-
ently large to make a regular attack necessary. General
Miiller did not hesitate to undertake it, and, having a great
dislike for Prince Potemkin's procrastination, was determined
not to imitate it as long as the direction of affairs was in his
own hands. The trench was made on the 15th and 16th, and
the attack on the entrenchment fixed for the following day.

The command of a regiment of light-horse gave me the right
of taking my turn in the trench, in accordance with my
seniority as a colonel, but did not entitle me to take part in
the attack on the entrenchment. However, General Samoilof,
who was second-in-command under General Miiller and had the
practical management of the enterprise, wished me to be
employed on the occasion, and suggested that I should ask
permission of the coinmander-in-chief to select three hundred
men from my regiment and lead one of the columns. General
Miiller refused my request, and would only allow me, if I
wished to be useful to General Samoilof, to accompany him

K 2

132 MEMOIRS OF THE

with fifty volunteers from my regiment. To this I agreed, and
had no reason to regret it.

On the night of the 16th the troops were formed in two
columns, with a view to escalading the entrenchment a few
moments before dawn. At the appointed moment and at the
prearranged signal the advance was made, and we arrived at
the ditch of the entrenchment.

The incident that then occurred has never been paralleled,
I believe; and this unique event should be remembered as a
warning whenever there be any possibility of its recurrence.

General Samoilof, an extremely fat, extremely tall, and very
heavy man, happened to fall as he entered the ditch, and
caused several other men to fall on top of him, trampling upon
him and bruising him. They called out to the men next to
them to keep back, lest the general should be crushed beneath
the entire column. These shouts were misunderstood by the
head of the column, who could see nothing clearly in the
darkness, and conceived the idea that the Turks were making
a vigorous defence. Without waiting for orders all the com-
panies at the head of the column opened fire on the palisades,
where there was not a single Turk. The men at the rear,
thinking that this was the enemy's fire, scattered in confusion,
and fired as soon as they believed it possible, without knowing
at whom they were firing. They took aim, as well as they
could, at the men they saw in front of them — none other than
the troops at the head of our own column, who had paused at
the edge of the ditch owing to the mistake I have just
explained. The most appalling confusion then became
general : bullets were whistling in every direction : men fell
dead, shot by their own comrades : it was impossible to hear
any word of command, for the cries of ourra! so conducive to
disorder among the Russians, combined with the noise of the
firing to drown the voices of the officer s. No one could foresee
how long this state of things would continue, and all the Turks
had retreated to the fortress. There was not a single one of
them within range of us.

General Samoilof, though he had been picked up, was not
in a condition to issue orders. He deputed me to carry out his

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 133

intentions, and implored me to set matters right in his name.
The only means I could devise, to put an end to the disastrous
uproar that was going on, was to disperse my volunteers among
the troops, with orders to slip quickly through the ranks,
upsetting and emptying the men's cartridge-boxes ; for this
curious performance was the only thing that could stop the
confusion. In this way I succeeded in making the men at the
head of the column cease firing, and as soon as they could
hear me I made them cross the ditch, and deployed them inside
the palisades of the entrenchment. Not a single Turk made
any opposition ; the only difficulty I had to encounter was the
confusion and bewilderment of our own troops. I set them to
work, with the few implements I could collect, to strengthen
the position ; and by the time the daylight was fully come there
was sufficient protection to serve as a defence against the
enemy's first attack.

As soon as order was restored among our troops each
regiment took up its post within the entrenchment, without
any opposition from the Turks save the fire from the batteries
of the fortress.

I have seldom seen, in the whole course of my life, an affair
so dangerous as this ; and certainly it is the only instance of a
fight in which the enemy played no part, and had an entirely
imaginary existence from first to last.

A trench was made at once round the whole town ; Miiller,
the commander-in-chief, came to superintend the works, and
being rash enough to show himself in the open without taking
any kind of precaution, he was struck by a bullet in the middle
of his badge of the Order of St. Andrew, and fell dead on the
spot. He was a real loss to the army.4 Although actually a
man of advanced age he had all the presence of mind and
activity of youth, and was perhaps the only general capable
of disregarding Prince Potemkin's various systems, and scrupu-
lously following the rules of his profession, of which he had a
profound knowledge.

The prince, on hearing of these events at Kilia, gave the
command of the troops to Lieutenant-General Goudovitch,5
and recalled General Samoilof. The regiment of grenadiers

134 MEMOIRS OF THE

that formed the head of the attacking column was deprived
of its distinctions. At the same time the prince thanked me
in the most flattering way for the trouble I had taken to repair
the mischief as far as was possible, though it was in no way
my duty to undertake the task that his nephew had so con-
fidently thrust upon me.

The siege was carried on without intermission. The bat-
teries were well managed, and the garrison, being reduced to
defending the fortress itself, seemed disposed to await an
assault. The breaching battery was already completed when,
on the 29th, twelve days after the construction of the first
parallel, I happened to be commanding in the trenches, and,
in the middle of the night, saw a light emerging from the fosse
of the fortress. I hesitated as to whether I should give the
order to fire upon it, but seeing that it was coming appreciably
nearer I fortunately waited till I could better distinguish its
destination. It transpired eventually that the light was carried
by an envoy from the pacha, who came to suggest terms of
capitulation : he had chosen this hour in order to conceal his
intentions from the garrison. The conditions were accepted
by General Goudovitch, and I received orders to take possession
of the place at break of day.

If General Samoilof — a very brave man — deserved any blame
with regard to the attack on the entrenchment, it was through
an excess of ill-directed zeal, the effect of which I foresaw, and
on which I commented to him at the time. When the troops
were formed up in column, and were awaiting the signal to
advance upon the palisades, he began to hold forth to them
in the most emphatic style, recalling their illustrious deeds in
the past, and stirring them up with a graphic account of the
dangers that lay before them, and of the courage they would
require to succeed in their enterprise. His speech must have
given the impression that they were expected, on this occasion,
to achieve something far more difficult than any of their
previous exploits. This form of encouragement is always
useless and very often harmful, and on the night in question
was the sole cause of the troops' imaginary peril ; for the
danger, by a very unusual chance, was absolutely non-existent.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 135

The result of seizing their imagination in this way was a
terrible panic, which led to the confusion I have described.
There is never any object in stimulating the troops when their
courage is on the point of being put to the proof : a few
encouraging words, while the fight is in progress, to help them
from one point of danger to another, can do no harm and
often acts as a spur, but it is wiser to give even the best
troops no opportunity nor time to reflect in cold blood, for I
can assure their generals that, ten times out of twelve, the
result will be very bad.

Prince Potemkin's contempt for the Turks made it very
easy to conclude terms of capitulation with them, for he never
refused to allow the garrison to march out, and serve else-
where : provided the pacha surrendered the fortress he made
no difficulties about the conditions. The great disadvantage
of this method was that there was always more resistance at
each siege than there had been at the last. Thus Ismail, a
much stronger and more extensive fortress than the three
others, had been reinforced by the garrisons that had
evacuated them, and the siege promised to be a very difficult
matter. The Russian Court hesitated for a long time before
giving orders for the investment, and the prince was not at all
anxious that it should be undertaken.

For some time operations were suspended. The Russians,
having reached the mouths of the Danube, were now in a line
with the Austrians, whose general, Marshal Laudon, had taken
Belgrade.6 But the Austrians, foreseeing that the affairs of
France would end in providing them with a new sphere of
action, were taking no further steps, and had been trying for
some time to make a separate peace. The treaty was actually
signed in the course of that summer, at Reichenbach.7

On the other hand, Prussia and England were beginning to
show a desire for the war to end. The Russian and Austrian
Courts were therefore reduced to aiming at an honourable
peace, and had absolutely renounced the ambitious schemes
they had at first entertained. Joseph II, in concert with whom

tfhe Empress of Russia had planned them, was now no more ;
he state of political affairs was changed ; and as the misfor-

136 MEMOIRS OF THE

tunes of France were likely to complicate the circumstances of
all the European Powers it behoved Russia to proceed with
great discretion, especially since the Emperor Leopold was
retiring from the alliance.

I returned to spend this period of indecision and idleness at
Bender, where Prince Potemkin, surrounded by women and all
the comforts of life, was waiting quite patiently till his
despatches should rouse him, perforce, to a state of more or
less activity. The end of November brought the certainty that
the Russians could not hope to conclude a peace on tolerably
good terms before taking Ismail ; and the Empress imperiously
bade the prince begin the siege and carry it to a successful
issue.

The fortress of Ismail was built of earth, but had been
newly repaired; and the outworks were very high and well
designed. The garrison, which comprised thirty-five thousand
men, was commanded by a seraskier 8 and four pachas of the
imperial family. The majority of the troops were janissaries,
the flower of the Grand Vizier's army, and as the season was
already advanced the siege presented difficulties that would not
have existed if it had been undertaken earlier, and if the gar-
rison had not been reinforced by the troops from other for-
tresses, who were allowed, as soon as they capitulated, to
increase our difficulties wherever they thought it advisable. In
this way Prince Potemkin created for himself many an obstacle
and labour that the ordinary chances of war might have spared
him. But the orders were definite: he was forced to obey.
General Souvarow was appointed to direct the siege, with
General Ribas as second-in-command. A little flotilla was to
co-operate with the troops, on an arm of the Danube which
represents the cord of the arc formed by the fortress on the
left bank ; and this flotilla, and all the troops on the right
bank — twenty-two thousand men — proceeded to the spot under
the orders of General Goudovitch. On the 1st December
General Souvarow arrived, and the place was invested.

The trench was made in front of the outworks of the main
body of the fortress ; and several batteries were constructed on
the right bank of the arm of the Danube, facing the whole

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 137

length of the building on that side, where the fortress presents
a plain surface, with no bastions nor outworks.

Prince Potemkin had made me hand over my regiment of
light-horse to another officer, and ordered me to take part in
the siege. He told me he had instructed Generals Ribas and
Souvarow as to the nature of my duty, but personally I knew
nothing of it as yet.

The first battery erected in the position I have described was
entrusted to me. It contained twenty-two pieces of ordnance,
and I was given two battalions of grenadiers for its defence.

The situation of this battery being important, and exposed
to all the attacks of the Turks, I requested and obtained
permission to remain on duty continuously : the troops were
changed every twenty-four hours, but I remained on the spot
throughout the siege, which lasted for twenty-two days. It
was when the army was on the point of leaving Bender that
it was joined by Prince Charles de Ligne 9 and MM. de
Fronsac 10 and Langeron,11 who had permission to take part
in the siege.12 Prince Charles, as a colonel of engineers in the
Austrian service, was given the command of the first battery
erected to face the right bastion, in view of an attack on the
left bank ; and the two others served as volunteers under
various commanding officers, and were near me for the greater
part of the siege.13

The surface of the fortifications being of earth it was impos-
sible to make a breach ; the guns merely crumbled the earth ;
the damage was repaired during the night ; and so no progress
was made. At last, on the nineteenth day, General Souvarow,
in accordance with Peter Fs regulations, held a council of war
with a view to hearing the opinions of the other generals. The
state of the fortress and its outworks having been considered
in detail, it was unanimously decided that an assault was out
of the question. When the decision of the council had been
ratified and signed by all the members General Souvarow rose
from his seat, and produced an order from the Empress to the
effect that the place was to be taken, whatever the cost. The
council was instantly dissolved, and General Souvarow made
his final dispositions.

138 MEMOIRS OF THE

When the place was closely blockaded, and had suffered all
the injury we could hope to inflict on it with our batteries, it
was formally summoned to surrender. In response to this
summons an aga of the janissaries came out of the fortress,
and announced in laconic and very definite terms that between
the Muscovites and Turks there was no intermediary but the
sword.

On the 20th December, therefore, General Souvarow made
his plans for the assault, and on the morning of the 21st
announced them to the army, the following words alone being
added to the official orders: "To-morrow the Turks or the
Russians will be buried in Ismail."

The attack from the landward side was to be made in six
columns ; the attack from the right bank in four. One of the
latter, composed of a regiment of Livonian chasseurs number-
ing two thousand men, was given to me : it was the last on the
right, with the exception of the right wing. The last column,
forming the right wing, was given to Colonel Valerian
Zoubof,14 brother of the favourite, a brave and excellent
officer. The centre column was entirely composed of Zapo-
rovians, led by one of their own chiefs. The column on the
left was commanded by General Ribas and Prince Charles de
Ligne. Of the twenty-two thousand men composing the
strength of the army, five thousand were to remain in reserve.

The whole of the 21st was spent in disabling the Turkish
batteries as far as possible, and in reconnoitring the points of
attack.

All the columns on our side of the river were provided with
a sufficient number of boats, which were to proceed to the
appointed spot in the night, to embark the troops. A quarter
to six, an hour before dawn, was the moment fixed for the
general attack by the six columns stationed round the fortress
on the left bank, and the four columns on the right bank,
who had to cross the arm of the Danube.

General Souvarow 's severe discipline made it certain that
his arrangements would be carried out to the letter. The
troops received the general benediction on the evening of the
21st, and had the whole night at their disposal for rest, or, if

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 139

they wished it, for the exercise of their various religious
observances.

At four o'clock every man was at his post, and by half-past
four the troops were embarked.15

As I did not know exactly the depth of the river on the
opposite side, beneath the escarpment on which the fortress
stood, nor whether it would permit of our landing easily, and
as I knew all the batteries would endeavour to prevent our
doing so, I had secured a four-oared boat, to convey only
myself. With this I was able to land without difficulty, and
avoided having to wade chest-deep through the water.

At a quarter to five, eight minutes after the pre-arranged
signal of three shells, fired by the attacking force on the river-
bank opposite to me, all the boats conveying my troops reached
the shore. But in the eight minutes occupied by the crossing
the grape-shot of the Turkish batteries ha4 robbed me of two
of the senior officers of my column, four junior officers, and
about fifty men. I then superintended the disembarkation :
the troops jumped out of the boats holding their muskets on
a level with their heads, for the water was nearly up to their
shoulders. I was already on the beach with fifty men, the
first to come ashore, who formed up round me ; and an instant
later we were joined by the rest. I then escaladed the escarp-
ment, which was extremely steep and slippery, and could only
be climbed by two abreast at the most.16 A few minutes
sufficed me, however, to reach the summit and form up my
men in line.

I was a few moments in advance of the general attack, and
when I found myself at my post on the height there was not
a sign on either side, not a single sound, to indicate that the
other columns had landed. I could hear nothing, in the
absolute darkness, but the voices of the Turks, and the sound
of their hurrying footsteps as they assembled in haste to attack
me. As may easily be imagined, it was an impressive moment,
and one not quickly forgotten. At last, after several minutes
of waiting, I could distinguish the shouts of the attacking
party on the other side, and the drum of the column that was
to be formed on my right side and support me with its left.17

140 MEMOIRS OF THE

At the same moment the Turks attacked me. I advanced to
receive them with bayonets fixed, and sent to ask for reinforce-
ments from Colonel Valerien Zoubof, who sent me, before his
troops were in line, two companies of grenadiers. I then
ordered the batteries on my left to be attacked in the rear,
and they were at once occupied. I had the guns turned upon
the Turks in the fortress, but could do nothing with them
before daylight, because the darkness had already occasioned
a certain amount of confusion. Some of the soldiers had been
killed by their own comrades, and I heard sounds of complaint
and anxiety in the ranks, on account of these mistakes.

However, when the daylight came everything was put right ;
and, as it was now possible to communicate with the column
on my right, we made an attack together, supported by the
batteries we had taken. The fight became terrible. After
repulsing the Turks for a considerable distance I thought it
indispensable, before pursuing them, to know whether the
attacking columns had been successful elsewhere. I therefore
called a halt. I heard a very lively fire and a sound of shout-
ing at the end of the town, but I did not know whether the
Russians had escaladed the ramparts.

The Turks, who had been repulsed by my fire and the
advance of my troops, now returned to the attack, and for a
moment my ranks wavered ; but I was able to rally them at
once and again secure the upper hand. However, it was plain
that the other columns were meeting with a resistance that
they could not as yet overcome, since I could not see a single
Russian coming from the other side to meet me. This showed
me that the issue of the affair was becoming extremely doubt-
ful. I was joined by an aide-de-camp of General Ribas, who
begged me to hold firm as long as was possible, because none
of General Souvarow's columns had as yet been able to descend
from the ramparts, though several had succeeded in reaching
the summit, after losing half their men and climbing from
corpse to corpse. They could not, however, beat back the
Turks, who defended themselves from the inner base of the
parapet, without losing ground. This murderous fight lasted
until half-past eleven. The whole of the Russian army was

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 141

engaged : even the reserve was brought up, led by a pope, or
army-chaplain. Seeing the difficulties encountered by the lead-
ing columns, he held up a crucifix before the troops, and made
them follow him to the aid of the attacking force.

At mid-day the issue was still quite undecided : the efforts
of both sides were redoubled, without any marked advantage
to either. At last, however, the column nearest to the town-
gate, which was closed and barricaded, succeeded in descending
from the ramparts and forcing eleven thousand men to lay
down their arms — troops whom the pachas were holding in
reserve. They were now entirely surrounded by the column
in question, my own column, and Zoubof's. I marched for-
ward, beating back all opposition, and established communica-
tions between the first of these three columns and my own.
Some workmen were immediately employed to clear the gate-
way; and as soon as the gate was opened General Souvarow
sent in two cavalry regiments, who completely assured our
success at every point. The most horrible carnage followed —
the most unequalled butchery. Two hours were employed in
a hand-to-hand fight, which only ended when all who made the
least resistance had been entirely exterminated. Every armed
man was killed, defending himself to the last ; and it is no
exaggeration when I say that the gutters of the town were
dyed with blood. Even women and children fell victims to
the rage and revenge of the troops. No authority was strong
enough to prevent it.

This butchery was followed by the pillage of the town.
Precaution was no longer needful, for there were no com-
batants left alive ; and the soldiers dressed themselves up in
every kind of garment that came their way. Calm was not
restored till four o'clock in the afternoon.

We received orders to assemble the regiments and take them
out of the town. There was not a man in the ranks who was
not wearing some article of Turkish attire, either masculine or
feminine, and the effect was more extraordinary than words
can describe.

By five o'clock the troops were in camp and guards posted
all over the town. Twenty-four thousand Turks — janissaries

142 MEMOIRS OF THE

and other soldiers — were killed; eleven thousand were spared
and taken prisoners ; a royal pacha, a relation of the sultan,
was killed, and four were taken prisoners. Nine thousand
Russians were killed and wounded, including several generals.18
Such was the result of the most memorable assault, I believe,
that ever took place.19 It gave me great satisfaction to have
been present and to have had good fortune, but I should be
extremely sorry if it were my fate to go through it again.

The twenty-two days of December that I had entirely spent
in the battery — where I slept at night in the angle of the
parapet, and even made my toilet — with this laborious day's
work at the end of them, had quite exhausted me. It was
absolutely essential for me to find some place in which I could
rest, but it was difficult to discover a single house in the town
that was not surrounded by dead bodies nor full of dying men.
General Marcof, who was seriously wounded, offered me a
refuge. I arranged a kind of bed for myself in a quiet little
room, and slept upon it for nineteen consecutive hours without
once awakening. When I recovered from this lethargy I was
dying of hunger, but there was nothing else the matter with
me ; and after I had had some food I was perfectly well.

In gratitude to my star, which protected me all through
this terrible massacre from even the slightest scratch, I must
describe the most striking instance of its watchfulness over me.
The day was won, the carnage over, and wre were engaged in
assembling the troops to leave the town. I was passing
through one of the narrow little streets, followed by some of
my men, when a janissary, who had taken refuge in a house
after the massacre and was drunk with blood and opium,
dashed out like a madman with his pistol in his hand, seeking
a way of escape from death. He met me in the street, and
rather than be taken tried to run past me, firing at me point-
blank, with his pistol at my chest. The powder ignited, but
the pistol did not go off. The poor wretch was killed at once
by the men who were with me, and I had the curiosity to look
at his pistol, to see whether it were loaded. It was so. How
curious it would have been, after escaping all the natural
dangers of the morning, to be killed by a useless chance of

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 143

this kind! But this favour on the part of fortune gave me
confidence in my future.

The Comte de Langeron was with me in the assault, and,
not content with the obvious dangers, had gone out of his way
to find another, having fallen from the top of the escarpment
to the bottom while escalading it. He had not, however, a
single wound; and equally unscathed was the Due de Fronsac,
who received his baptism of fire in the column commanded by
General Ribas and Prince Charles de Ligne. The latter was
wounded in the knee.

The success of the storming of Ismail did more than all the
arguments of the council of war to prove that it was a most
imprudent enterprise to undertake with twenty-two thousand
men. Had it been unsuccessful not a single foot-soldier would
have returned to tell the tale, since even the reserve took part
in the assault. General Souvarow and his cavalry would have
retreated alone. But if it be ever right to take the risks of
an attack of this kind it is with Russian troops, for when they
have confidence in their general their courage and perseverance
are enough to surmount any obstacle.

Two days after the assault I started for Bender, where
Prince Potemkin, in his pleasure and satisfaction, added greatly
to mine by giving me the most gracious and flattering recep-
tion. The campaign was over ; the troops were about to return
to their winter quarters ; it behoved me to decide whether it
were best to accompany Prince Potemkin to Petersburg or to
return to France.

If I had known the exact state of the circumstances, and
especially if I could have read the future a little more plainly,
my reason would have prompted me to go to Petersburg ; but
I had only a very vague knowledge of the beginnings of the
Terror in the French provinces, and of the emigration that
was becoming so general. I knew that my relations were still
in Paris ; I believed them to be in a precarious and alarming
position ; and it was my natural impulse to hasten to their side.
Moreover, if I must admit it to myself, I was deeply in love,
and at the age of twenty-four every argument is born of that

intiment : everything gives way to it, and a young man will

144, MEMOIRS OF THE

sometimes even think he is being governed by reason, because
he is blind to the fact that reason involuntarily yields to the
dictates of the heart.

I had certainly no doubt that on leaving Bender I should
proceed directly to Paris. As it happened, however, I never
returned to France at all. My love-affair kept me near the
frontier as long as it was in my power to cross it, and public
events very soon concurred in preventing me from entering
my own country. These circumstances robbed me of the
happiness of seeing those of my relations who fell victims to
the Revolution ; but perhaps it was all the better for my future
destiny that I did not join them at this time.

If I had only been concerned with my own interests, and
had preferred to consider my own advantage before everything
else, it would have been a favourable moment to profit by the
favour that my conduct in Russia had won for me, especially
at the storming of Ismai'1. I might have settled in that
country, and obtained from the Empress a sufficiently large
grant of money to make me altogether independent, and enable
me to cut myself off from France for good and all. In doing
so I should have acted wisely. But calculations of this kind
were quite foreign to my character and temperament : a natural
feeling of affection summoned me to my relations' side, while
an irresistible inclination summoned me to the side of my fair
friend : a certain sentiment of patriotism made me wish to
follow at close quarters all these events that meant so much
to the King and my country, and a touch of the volatile in
my nature cast a glamour over the course of action that would
bring the greatest amount of excitement and change into my
lite. It was not, therefore, owing to a false calculation that I
forsook, at this period, the road that would have been the
safest to follow. I can still recall the feelings that led me to
leave it, and I cannot regret my decision. Whenever I have
mentally compared the fate I might have chosen, at various
epochs of my life, with the fate I actually experienced, the
result has always been that I could find no reasonable cause
for regret. The pros and cons are always, in my opinion,
quite equally balanced ; and I have the satisfaction of feel-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 145

ing certain that if the decision had to be made again I should
make it in the same way.

Prince Potemkin gave me the choice of accompanying him
to Petersburg, or being free to act as I would. I did not
hesitate, but decided to go back with him to Yassi, and thence
to set out to Vienna, where the news I received should regulate
my future actions.

At the beginning of January 1791, we started for Yassi
from Bender; and about the 15th I parted from the prince.
He gave me his promise that, at any future time, I should find
him and the Empress as willing as ever to show me attention
and kindness, and that, in spite of any circumstances or length
of absence, I should never lose my rank nor my seniority in
the army. 1 gave places in my carriage to Prince Charles de
Ligne and Fronsac, and we travelled together to Vienna as
gaily and pleasantly as possible.

When we arrived there the Emperor was marrying the
archdukes to the princesses of Naples.20 The King and Queen
of Naples were in Vienna. The whole town was merry-making,
and, as I have never neglected any opportunity of amusing
myself that has happened to arise, I spent three weeks
there.

The Marquis de Noailles was still there as French ambas-
sador, but his deportment had entirely changed : his stock
phrase, the King my master, which had adorned his speech at
every turn when I was last in Vienna, was far seldomer upon
his lips. The words nation, decree, constitution, were much
more prominent : he ornamented the dishes on his table with
tricoloured ribbons, and insisted on all the French in Vienna
wearing the tricoloured cockade. I made up my mind to wear
the Russian uniform always, and thus be faithful to the white ;
but everything that came to my knowledge at this time made
it easier to foresee, in part, the sorrows that were on their
way to us.

Those who were the most alarmed had already left France,
and among them was the family that concerned me more nearly
than any other, except my own. My relations had remained
in their own country. The Emigration was beginning to be

146 MEMOIRS OF THE

preached by the Princes and necessitated by circumstances, if
indeed this important movement have ever been properly under-
stood. In my opinion, I confess, it was a movement in which
frivolity, lack of foresight, and fear played a large part, and
was only turned into a political measure as an afterthought,
when the first step had already been thoughtlessly taken. I
made no attempt at the time to fathom the matter, and later
events made me wish to leave the problem unsolved : uncer-
tainty is preferable to the pain of being enlightened, when
circumstances have such heartrending causes and memories.
But since one cannot dissemble to oneself — since the mind,
before it has time to reflect, forms a spontaneous opinion
founded on feeling and character and instinct — I will not deny
that from the first moment I regarded the Emigration, reduced
as it was to a system and a principle, as the first step towards
the destruction of the kingdom and the King. Since there
was no longer any law nor authority to counterbalance the
vacillation and fury of factions, the nobility of France, as a
body, was the only thing left to play this part in the country :
to remove this body was the greatest service that could have
been rendered to the ill-intentioned. The French nobility in
the mass, regarded as an Order of the State, was imposing
enough ; but when it had been distilled, so to speak, by the
process of the Emigration, and its moral, ideal, and political
force separated from its purely physical force, its essential and
useful qualities evaporated. All that left France was a few
thousands of brave fellows and bad soldiers — undisciplined and
impossible to discipline — and a few hundreds of idlers, bristling
with honour and other inconveniences, who were very often a
burden and, save for the exceptions, very seldom of use.

The Emigration was a way of escape from immediate danger,
and for that very reason should have had no attractions : it
destroyed the political significance of individuals whose strength
lay in their union, and for that very reason it was futile : it
made them dependent on foreign powers, and for that very
reason was a cause of weakness. It robbed the King of every
man on whom he could count. What then was its object, and
wherein lay its advantage? It must have required a great deal

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 147

of skill, I think, to present it to the Powers in the guise in
which, for some time, they accepted it ; for in itself it was
bad, and it is but just to say that the course adopted was the
only way of giving an appearance of brilliancy and romance
(in case of success) to an enterprise based on such a false and
harmful principle. But the sovereigns proved only too clearly
that they regarded the Emigration merely from the point of
view of their own interests, and paid attention solely to the
circumstances that might make it useful to themselves. How
could any intelligent man believe otherwise, even before it was
proved to be the case?

M. de Calonne 21 came to Vienna while I was there, and
the Emperor, who did not wish to commit himself so soon,
refused to hold a conference. He would only allow himself to
be addressed by M. de Calonne at the masked ball, and it was
under the stairs of the assembly-room that the first overtures
wrere made on the subject of a congress. M. de Calonne 's
energy and abilities, which had done so much harm of various
kinds since the Emigration began, evidently served in the end
to bring about the Treaty of Pilnitz, of which he merely laid
the foundations in this assembly-room. When he left Vienna
he had not yet persuaded the Emperor to decide anything.
The position of the King and Queen seemed at this time to be
the Emperor's only concern, and M. de Calonne 's outlook was
by no means limited to that.

The armies of Austria were exhausted by the unfortunate
war that had so recently come to an end, and they needed
time to recover themselves before beginning another. The
uselessness of all their efforts- against the Turks gave small
reason to hope that they would easily win any great success
gainst the French.

The Emperor Leopold, therefore, delayed as long as possible
ifore undertaking the defence of the royal authority of
ranee; and when the time came for him to act perforce, it
rould have been greatly to his advantage if, instead of adher-
to his system of moderation and economy, he had employed
his strength in stifling the flames at the first outbreak, in
>rdance with Marshal de Lascy's advice.
L 2

148 MEMOIRS OF THE

Early in February I left Vienna and went to Aix-la-Chapelle,
where numbers of my friends were already gathered.

The various motives that prompted me to go to Paris yielded
to those that bade me stay where I was : the latter were of the
kind that one cannot resist. For only here could I find any
consolation for sorrows that were becoming irreparable : the
ties that might have drawn me to Paris were equally strong,
but the circumstances and anxieties and agitations of the times
would have made them uselessly and intolerably galling,
whereas the cause that kept me at Aix sweetened every thought
and every moment of my life, and helped me to forget all the
miseries that I should have found so agonising in Paris.

I settled down at Aix-la-Chapelle, therefore. It was easy,
there, to correspond with other places : one was near enough
to Paris to be kept informed of the course of events, without
being involved in the commotion. With a view to keeping up
affectionate relations with my own people, and having the
pleasure of seeing some of them, I arranged in the spring to
meet my sister and two of my brothers in a chateau belonging
to the Prince de Ligne, called Beloeil (near Mons).22 My eldest
brother was unable to come, as were the rest of my relations.
During the week I spent there 23 I learnt to appreciate and
foresee all the disasters that were at hand, and congratulated
myself more than ever on having decided to remain beyond
the French frontier, since a general and rather incomprehen-
sible movement was sweeping out of the country the whole of
the class whose fidelity, perseverance, and time-honoured
influence might have served the Monarchy, and more especially
the King, within its boundaries. This class, which was
sufficiently influential and numerous to delay the explosion,
was also the only class in a position — at the last moment and
as a last resource — to decide upon civil war, the only measure
that could have saved France and kept the King upon the
throne, after the various factions and the spirit of Jacobinism
had been allowed to make so much progress. The King, it is
true, feared civil war and wished to avoid it : but this was an
occasion when some prince of his house should have risen in
revolt against his apathy and natural passivity, and tried to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 149

save him in spite of himself. If it were now too late to recover
the upper hand in the capital — an enterprise that a man of real
capability might perhaps have undertaken — he might at all
events have seized one of the frontier provinces, and from
thence have summoned the aid of the allied Powers. The
latter, in that case, would not have had to solve the problem
in the form it acquired after the nobles had abandoned the
country and appealed to them at their own Courts : there would
have been no need for them to consider and discuss whether
France in power or France in disorder would be the more
profitable to themselves. They would have decided the ques-
tion in favour of the royal family if their own advantage had
not been hanging in the balance.

The King, in the month of July,24 wished to carry out a
plan that had been arranged for him by M. le marquis de
Bouille, the Due de Choiseul, and Comte Charles de Damas 25
— a plan that ought to have been prepared and made absolutely
safe for him beforehand by a prince of his own house. The
story of his arrest at Varennes is too well known for me to
tell it here in detail : even if he had attained his object it is
very doubtful whether he would have been in time to reap all
the advantage from it that he expected. But his capture
decided his fate, the fate of the French nobility, and the fate
of the Monarchy.

Monsieur, the King's brother, was more fortunate, and
succeeded in leaving France. He was joined by M. le comte
d'Artois, and together they settled in Coblenz, in the territory,
and in one of the palaces, of the Elector of Treves.

This series of events made me renounce all idea of returning
to Russia. My relations wished me to return, but I refused.
The war was coming to an end : nothing occurred in this last
impaign but the affair at Matchen,26 and the treaty of peace
was signed on the 21st December, 1791. 27 I could not, of
course, determine, for the sake of a mere chance of active
employment that would soon be over, to leave the centre of so
many interests, all of which concerned me very nearly.

The Princes, when they passed through Aix-la-Chapelle on

ieir way to Coblenz, had no doubt that they were on the

150 MEMOIRS OF THE

point of beginning the campaign. M. le comte d'Artois
appointed me to a post near his person : there was no motive
that could have led me, in the face of their hopes, to part
from them. I received a most flattering letter from the
Empress of Russia, on the subject of the storming of Ismail ;
and with it the cross of a Commander of the Order of St.
George. So plainly did she see that my duty must keep me
in the neighbourhood of France that she authorised me,
through Prince Potemkin, to "give the preference to any
opportunity of serving the Princes that should commend itself
to my zeal, without prejudice to my rank in her army, and
even with the possibility of acquiring, in this manner,
additional claims upon her favour."

I waited at Aix-la-Chapelle while the circumstances desired
by the factious party were in course of development. The
King of Sweden 28 came to take the waters, and, in several con-
versations that I had with him, told me in his own enthusiastic
way how earnestly he desired to have a share in changing our
position, and to make common cause with Russia in improving
it. At the very moment of his departure he was gracious
enough to inform me of his plans in the matter, and of the
number of troops he could employ. There can be no doubt
that, if he had escaped his fate, his character and abilities
would have effected a great improvement in ours. His impor-
tunity, his principles, and his example would have prevailed
upon the Powers to take action, instead of hesitating and
delaying so long that the spirit of crime had full time to work
its will.

When France declared war upon the Emperor29 it seemed
that our prospects were improving, and though England was
still outwardly pacific it was presumable that this would not
last long. We had many reasons, then, to hope that a coalition
would completely gain the upper hand over a Power that was
disorganised and disunited by conflicting opinions, and shaken
to its foundations by disorder; especially since a certain pro-
portion of the troops was fighting under the standard of
rebellion through weakness rather than conviction.

This journal, however, is merely meant to be a brief sketch

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 151

of the events that filled my time after I first left France, and
I have neither the patience nor the courage to retrace, step
by step, all the little trifles and mistakes and blunders that
combined to rob us of the good fortune for which we had
every right to hope. I will describe neither the sorrows of
nations nor the errors of princes: I bitterly lament the results
of the latter, but that they should have had such results is not
surprising in view of their number, and of the persistency and
emulation with which they were made.

The treaty of Pilnitz, to which M. le comte d'Artois was
one of the signatories, decided the campaign of 1792. 30 Far
be it from me to give any account of the previous doings at
Coblenz : the method of employing the time there, the spirit
that reigned there, the false policy that was pursued there,
the proceedings that exasperated the Powers, and the conduct
that repelled the very people who should have been gained to
the party. All these things rise up before my mind, but to
describe them would pain me too much.

IX

Negotiations and intrigues after Pilnitz — Breteuil and Calonne — Bi-
schoffswerder urges the invasion of France — Brunswick at Coblenz
— Criticism of his manifesto — First difficulties between the Prussians
and the Princes — The Comte joins the Prussian army at the camp of
Tiercelet — Capitulation of Longwy — Brunswick's plans and promises
— Ridiculous siege of Thionville by the army of the Princes, who
are refused the necessary artillery. Wimpffen the governor, how-
ever, is disposed to capitulate — The Comte d'Artois with the
Prussian army — Position of the French and Prussian armies — Dum-
ouriez decamps in the night of the 14th September : Brunswick
misses the opportunity of crushing him — Damas definitely accuses
Brunswick of behaving treacherously, through sympathy with the
revolutionaries — Bivouac at Sommetourbe (19th Sept. ) — Valmy.

I FEEL the need, now that I have a quiet moment for the
first time since the beginning of this most strenuous and most
unfortunate campaign, of collecting my thoughts, and passing
in review all the recent events that have had such fatal results
for the cause we have at heart, as well as for so many indi-
viduals. It is only thus that I can form a clear judgment of
the consequent effects. It will be necessary to inquire into
the causes of these effects, but not to trace them back to their
original source; for it would be a pity to devote too much
space to a mere sketch of an ill-spent year. The time came
when the terrible fate that hung over the King, the disordered
condition of the chimerical government of France, and the
impossibility of allowing it to wipe itself off the political map,
brought several of the sovereigns to see the necessity of taking
definite measures to arrest the progress of the prevailing
anarchy, which, sooner or later, was bound to threaten their
own authority. Wishing to avoid the pedantic and intermin-
able forms and ceremonies of a congress they began to negoti-
ate the matter among themselves, for their object seemed to
them so urgent, and the decision so simple, that no guarantee
but their own honour was necessary. The representatives

152

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 153

they chose to carry out their schemes were not entitled
ambassadors, but confidential agents.

After the interview at Pilnitz, of which much was expected
but little came, Bischoffswerder * was deputed to arrange the
first treaty between Frederick William and Leopold. Count
Romanzof 2 was accredited by the Empress, and Count Oxen-
stierna 3 by the King of Sweden ; and their Imperial Miajesties
allowed the Princes to send representatives to their Courts,
to work in conjunction with their ministers for the furtherance
of King Louis's interests and the restoration of order in
France. M. de Roll 4 started for Berlin, M. d'Esterhazy 5 for
Petersburg, and M. d'Escars G for Stockholm. No one can
doubt that at this time it was one of the most important points
of the general scheme that the Empress should actively co-
operate in it, her troops being reinforced by a certain number
of Swedes, paid by herself and commanded by the King of
Sweden. Gustavus's own ardour and goodwill were a sufficient
guarantee of the excellent effect such a contribution of strength
and numbers must have had upon the cause, and judging from
subsequent discoveries it seems certain that Gustavus's assas-
sination was one of the greatest disasters that befell us. Forty
thousand men, whose instructions were issued at a distance of
eight hundred leagues and first arranged by treaty, could not
have been subject to variations in their plans, and must have
followed, fairly closely, the course traced out in concert with
the Empress at the time of the troops' departure. But, since
all the plans and intentions of the North were upset by
Gustavus's death, we must forget what might have been, and
consider only the events — alas ! — that actually occurred.

The very beginning of the enterprise, which was so essential
to the situation and gave such flattering promise of success,
was marred by an intrigue that was more harmful, and more
calculated to frustrate the end in view, than any other that
could have been devised. The consequences could not have
failed to be — as they were — fatal first and last; and to this,
without a doubt, must be attributed the immeasurable con-
tempt cast upon the representatives of the finest cause
in the world, and upon those who led its defenders to battle.

154 MEMOIRS OF THE

M. le baron de Breteuil,7 the exiled minister of a captive King,
believed that his good intentions sufficiently qualified him to
undertake the direction of affairs, in spite of his absence from
the scene of action and from the King ; while the latter,
being in a state of imprisonment, could not properly judge of
the best means of saving his country, nor bestow authority
on any agent outside its borders. Yet M. de Breteuil was
appointed to represent the King's interests, with plenipoten-
tiary powers, and nominated M. de Caraman 8 as his agent
at the Court of Frederick William. On the other hand M. de
Calonne, who was always prompted by his natural tempera-
ment, since he had no judgment to guide him, was to all
intents and purposes the plenipotentiary of the Princes. Now
the only possible aim, the only honourable role for the Princes
to adopt, was to defer in every conceivable way to the schemes
of which Louis XVI was the motive power : yet M. de Calonne
proceeded to convert Coblenz into an empire, the Princes into
reigning sovereigns, a collection of fugitive nobles into an
army, and himself into a minister, a general, and a chancellor.
His mind was naturally inclined to illusion : having set up an
illusory Power he supported it with illusory revenues, and
planned achievements for it that were illusions indeed. As for
his own ambition, it was so illusory that it more nearly
resembled dementia than simple want of judgment. He was
irreconcilably hostile to M. de Breteuil, and employed his wits
— sometimes at the expense of his object — in depreciating that
minister at the Courts where he tried to obtain a hearing.
He created divisions — at all events in appearance — where the
only possibility of strength lay in joining forces despite all
obstacles. He could never be made to see that by this method
he discredited the cause and all its ministers and agents, nor
that the very means he employed to further his ambitions were
fatal to them.9

Upon this mistaken policy were founded and carried out all
the measures on which the fate of France — possibly the fate
of Europe — was dependent. M. de Caraman, while agreeing
with M. de Roll in essentials, threw suspicion upon M. de
Roll's methods, and upon the Princes' council and associates,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 155

to a greater extent even than he desired ; for it was impossible
for foreign Courts to discover the exact point at which wishes
and aims became identical, when there were two points of view
and two agents working for the same end. M. de Roll, whose
character was less suited to the ambassador's trade than that
of M. de Caraman, worked more openly, and tried as far as
possible to be on friendly terms with him, even in society, in
order to avoid the appearance of a misunderstanding, which
his clear judgment showed him would be injurious to the cause
of the Princes. His frankness pleased the King and his
ministers, and inspired confidence. He was treated as a
minister by the government at Berlin, though M. de Breteuil
was still the representative of the King of France.

M. de Roll, who had been placed there with the sole object
of securing help, employed all his skill in begging. He made
every promise likely to hasten the government to a favourable
decision ; he declared that the introduction of troops into
France was an easier matter than it could possibly be, or, at
all events, easier than he could with any certainty know it to
be ; he had no thought for anything but the smoothing away
of every difficulty that arose. Finally, by dint of hard work,
he persuaded the Prussians to believe that their army was
eagerly awaited in France, and regarded as a band of libera-
tors ; that, on their arrival, the troops of the line would forth-
with declare for the King ; that the Prussians would not have
a single obstacle to surmount in their march ; and that the
public were only awaiting that moment to show their real
feelings. Bischoffswerder, the King's favourite, was much
impressed by these assertions, and being really devoted to the
King of Prussia and zealous for his honour, saw in this enter-
prise a means of securing a distinguished role for his master,
and at the same time indemnifying him for the expenses of a
campaign. He therefore put all the pressure at his command
upon the Emperor, and found Francis II more resolute than
Leopold. The coalition began to assume a definite form : the
Powers saw that, in their own interests, they should make
every effort to put an end to the sorrows of France, and felt
it obligatory upon them to support the dignity of the French

156 MEMOIRS OF THE

Princes, by supplying them with the means of livelihood till
they were restored to their rights. The King of Prussia gave
several millions : the Emperor and Empress also contributed
their millions : and the sums received were more than sufficient
for the political and military needs of the Princes. But M.
de Calonne, who always had very large ideas on the subject
of expenditure, however small the receipts might be, thought
that the money was of little use as long as it served only as a
means of subsistence, and invented ways of spending it that
were far more dignified than merely providing bread for people
who had none. With the sole object of advancing himself to
the position that he thought he deserved, he created corps
after corps — even in Illyria — and made a host of colonels —
even in his own family. At last he succeeded, by dint of
starving every one, discrediting the Princes, and disgusting
the Powers whose money was never enough for his needs, in
forming a little army — an army that was full of abuses of
every kind, and showed very plainly, by the extent of its
services when attached to the foreign armies, how foolish it
would have been to employ it independently.

The Powers, therefore, were already wearied by the Princes'
depredations and disorderly administration, and already pre-
judiced against their adherents, when the time came for the
troops to assemble on the banks of the Rhine. M. de Cara-
man, with a view to restoring to M. de Breteuil the influence
of which he believed him to have been robbed by M. de Roll,
did not fail to disclose the many abuses that existed, in spite
of all his efforts. M. de Roll left Berlin the moment the troops
received orders to march, leaving it to M. de Caraman to
carry on the game of politics, which seemed of less importance
now that the affair was in motion, but turned out unfortun-
ately to be disastrous in its effects.

The Duke of Brunswick,10 who had been appointed general-
issimo of the combined armies, reached Coblenz about the
20th July with the first of the troops : he was received with
the enthusiasm that his reputation deserved. He seemed, by
his bearing, his words, and even his modesty, to be pledging
himself to everything that was possible; but he will always

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 157

be remembered, not only in his lifetime, but by posterity,
for his ill-considered manifesto, which will be compared with
his conduct. He was led to sign it by his belief that the rebels
would make little resistance.11 As soon as it became apparent
that this impolitic manifesto was not to be backed up by an
imposing army and a fixed determination to carry it out, it
ceased to have any effect in France; and thenceforward the
duke began to fear the existence of a more obstinate spirit
in the country than he had been led to expect. But the
arrival of the King of Prussia, his review of his troops, his
resolute bearing at their head, and his reassuring words,
dazzled every one at Coblenz, and even carried away the duke
himself, intoxicated as he was with honours, until he found
himself at headquarters in Treves. It is here, always, that
the veil of illusion is torn away; it is here that a general,
whatever his position may be, is reduced to being himself,
and neither more nor less. It is at the moment of passing
into the enemy's territory that the difficulties begin to arise,
and are multiplied by the imagination, and that the glory
won in the past ceases to be confused with the glory that is
still to be earned.

The Duke of Brunswick, at this period, became the absolute
master of all the troops assembled in the cause of France, and
the independent arbiter of every measure taken : the Princes,
by their own wish, were as much subject to his will as was
the least important general in his army. On leaving Coblenz
he received from them what was supposed to be an accurate
list of the 6migr£s who were to form an army-corps under
their orders : he appointed a day for the Princes' arrival at
Treves, and, as it had long been written in the book of fate
that everything was to happen for the worst, the Princes
arrived two days earlier than the time agreed upon. This
entirely upset the arrangements made for their subsistence ;
and, moreover, they brought with them six thousand more
men than were expected. The King and the duke were much
annoyed, and began to ask if this were the way that the army
of the emigres intended to make themselves useful in the
field. Instead of answering frankly that there were many

158 MEMOIRS OF THE

more mistakes to come, the Princes promised that things
should be improved ; but no improvement was possible at any
time of the campaign. Apparently, however, the matter was
patched up ; and the Princes saw the King every day. He
reviewed the army of the emigres, which took the name of the
royal army, and he showed the most sincere interest in it.
He informed the Princes and the army of the amount of help
he was prepared to give, and as it was chiefly in kind rather
than in cash, there came a time when the artillery was on the
point of being kept back, to meet the debts contracted in
Treves. This would actually have occurred if the Prince of
Nassau had not removed the difficulty by pledging his
diamonds.12

The Prussian army left Treves on the 15th August, and
proceeded towards Montfort and Luxemburg ; the royal army
started on the 17th and marched on Stadt-Bredimus, where
the first offensive measure was planned. It was arranged
that the Princes' army should not march until the troops
under the Prince of Hohenlohe 13 had come up with it, and
that the corps commanded by M. de Clerfayt, which was
approaching from Mons through Namur, should advance upon
Arlon and combine with the whole Prussian army to invest
Longwy. It was this operation that was relied on to open
the door to France. The Prussian Prince of Hohenlohe,14
while the first marches were being planned, had already
entered the enemy's territory by way of Sierck, and the first
skirmish between the outposts took place near Fontoy 15 on
the day that the Prussian army arrived to occupy the camp
at Tiercelet. It was at this camp that I myself joined the
Prussian army. I arrived just as the King was starting off
to take up his position at Cutry, and was about to organise
the investment of Longwy, after a march that showed great
military talent. Since I was then in a position to know, in
every detail, the excellence of the forces that had mustered
to put an end to our troubles, I ought to have had no feeling
but joy ; but how could I repress a shudder of pain and alarm
when I saw the army celebrating its entry into French territory
by devastating it in the most cruel way, while the officers were

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 159

powerless to use their authority, or act with any severity, or
make any appeal? The first village was completely pillaged
and partly destroyed.16 Absolute neglect of the first con-
ditions of the manifesto, and an exercise of tyranny that was
quite futile, since there was no resistance deserving of reprisals,
were the form of rejoicing used on this occasion — an occasion
that would have been very significant and auspicious if the
means employed had been less violent. It was easy to see the
dangers of this first example, easy to see how it might effect
the success of the campaign and even the safety of the
Prussian army ; but it was difficult to persuade the men to act
differently, when their own officers considered the attempt
fruitless, and even unnecessary. Since the year 1786 I had
been aware of the excellent and thorough training possessed
by the Prussian army, and, despite my admiration for all the
new merits I observed in it during this march, I was more
concerned all through the day with what I feared, than
charmed with what I saw.

By the King's orders a considerable advanced guard pre-
ceded the main body of the army, to make a reconnaissance
of the place, and had been a long time at Cutry when the
cavalry and infantry arrived to take possession of the heights.
The position of the camp appeared very imposing from the
town, whence every single Prussian tent was visible. The
King himself camped above the village of Cutry, and the duke
on the farther side of the height, close to a little village
called Praucourt. At the same hour, and indeed the same
moment, Clerfayt arrived, after a most difficult and masterly
march, with his corps of Austrians. He came by the Arlon
road and the woods of Bazincourt, skirted the town on the
side of the Porte d' Allemagne, and camped in the plain above
the village of La Grandville, cutting off the Arlon and Luxem-
burg roads from the garrison by means of his light troops.
The Prince of Baden,17 with a detachment of the Prussian
ly, camped above the village of Neon, opposite to the

*orte de France, and cut off the road from Metz. The town

-ras completely invested.
The 19th and 20th were spent in reconnoitring and sum-

160 MEMOIRS OF THE

moning the town to surrender. The answer was arrogant;
and in the night of the 20th the duke sent M. de Clerfayt
several mortars belonging to his army, wherewith to bombard
the town ; for the approaches on the side occupied by M. de
Clerfayt are so easy that it is possible, in the case of a siege,
to make the first parallel quite safely, under cover of the woods
and the inequalities of the ground, at a distance of three
hundred and twenty yards. The bombardment that night
was, however, quite insignificant, and preparations were being
made for a more serious attack on the 2£nd, when, to the
great surprise of the army after the answers of the previous
day, the town made propositions of surrender. The duke
chanced to be in M. de Clerfayt's camp when the bearer of
the flag of truce came out of the town ; the arrangements were
made on the spot ; it was agreed that the Prussians should
enter the town on the following day, the 23rd August ; that
the severity of the manifesto towards commandants who failed
to open their gates at the first summons should become a dead
letter; and that the garrison should choose the spot to which
they desired to retreat. This was, it is true, accepting con-
ditions from those to whom terms ought to have been
dictated ; but it was the first occasion of the kind, and if this
act of tolerance should have the effect of producing prompter
submission in the future it was no great hardship. In any case
the attempt was worth while.

The duke left the Austrians' camp to return to his head-
quarters at about ten o'clock : so dark was the night and so
heavy the rain that, slowly as he was riding, his horse fell
twice and he walked a part of the way; it was past midnight
when he dismounted. He told me that he wished me to go to
the Princes on the following morning, with the news of the
Prussians' occupation of the town, and the plan of action
that he desired to submit to them. He was too much fatigued
to enlarge upon the subject at that moment : he bade me
come to him at nine o'clock the next morning, merely saying
as we parted : " I see my way very clearly now in the matter
of their Royal Highnesses' affairs : this day's work has
shortened the road to Paris by a great deal." This was

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 161

enough to make any Frenchman happy for the night. I left
him with a joyful heart.

At nine o'clock he sent for me, and showed me on the map
the outline of his initial project, the projected direction of his
first marches after leaving Longwy, and the route he desired
the Princes to follow with their army. He also told me to
beg one of the two Princes to come in person to the King's
camp, to decide finally upon the general plan of the campaign.
At this time the duke's design was that the royal army should
skirt the frontier, and enter France by Bouillon and Rocroi.
I represented to him how hard it would be for an army of
so little experience to march through such a difficult country,
and how much chagrined the nobles would be if they were
made to enter France later than the other armies. I took the
opportunity of pointing out to him the urgent necessity of
restraining the disorder and destruction in which the Prussian
troops were indulging, and the sadness of seeing the plain of
Longwy, which should have been able to supply three weeks'
food, incapable of providing enough for three days, so that
we were in the greatest want in the midst of plenty. He
assured me that it was necessary to tolerate a few abuses in
the beginning, but that in the future the most scrupulous
order should be observed. He informed me that on the
following day the King was going to degrade a colonel and
hang two men by way of an example to begin with. This was
more than sufficient to convince me of his good intentions,
for at that time I had no means of knowing that the only
way of stopping the disorder would have been to hang the
whole army. I left him, and in four hours reached the Princes
with the orders in my pocket and hope in my heart. The
importance of an initial success was so great that the Princes
and the royal army could not fail to be profoundly sensible of
it ; and it is certain that, as long as I live, I can never experi-
ice a happier moment than that of my arrival. We
secured a key to France, a necessary depository for pro-
visions and ammunition ; and supposing the door we had just
>pened were sufficiently large — from the geographical and
rategical points of view — to admit us and open out to us
M

162 MEMOIRS OF THE

the means of subsistence, we had attained a most desirable
position.

If I were to discuss this subject at large I might not, per-
haps, admit the inadequacy of this first step ; for if the duke's
intentions had been as good as we had reason to hope I think
he would have removed all the obstacles without injuring his
position, which at that time possessed advantages for assum-
ing the offensive which were altogether superior to those he
afterwards had. By deliberately frittering away a portion of
his strength every day he disturbed every calculation and every
idea that the circumstances warranted. Yet the Duke of
Brunswick, strengthened by his convictions, aided by his
reputation, and protected by the terror that his army inspired
— for its superiority was recognised by every army in Europe
— might have turned his very mistakes to greater advantage
than his enemies could have derived from their position, seeing
that they had no motive-power save fanaticism. I delivered
to the Princes the instructions I had received, and found, as
I expected, that they were opposed to the plan by which
they were sent to Bouillon. M. le comte d'Artois was so
much elated by this first success, and so much supported by
his hopes, that he instantly conceived the idea of earnestly
entreating the King of Prussia to put a French garrison into
Longwy. This would certainly have been a great advantage,
had it been possible for a moment to imagine that the King
would consent. An important matter was occupying Monsieur's
mind at the same time : the question of the Regency. A few
days earlier I had discussed this subject with Bischoffswerder,
who told me positively that he regarded it as useless to appoint
a regent as long as the constituted authorities in France con-
tinued to act in the King's name, but that the step would
undoubtedly be taken on the first occasion that any com-
manding-officer or any municipal body should fail to recognise
his Majesty's name, authority, and liberty of action. I did
all I could to induce Bischoffswerder to hasten this important
measure, for I thought every possible means should be em-
ployed to legalise summonses, orders, and demands. Mon-
sieur decided to go off and discuss all these matters himself.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 163

He set out on the following morning, and M. le comte
d'Artois remained at Stadt-Bredimus with the army, until
the departure of the Prussian army from Longwy enabled that
of the Princes to cross the French frontier.

On the 23rd Monsieur entered Longwy, and was received
with acclamation by the inhabitants.18 He then passed on
to the King's camp, where he spent three days discussing the
plan to be immediately followed, but was unable to introduce
the subject of the Regency, which M. de Caraman always suc-
ceeded in avoiding. On the 28th August Monsieur returned
to Stadt-Bredimus with an itinerary, and marching-orders for
the following day. He felt it his duty, too, to make a speech
to the generals, with a view to inculcating a spirit of tolerance ;
for it was beginning to be felt that the severity shown at
Coblenz in the matter of welcoming recruits might have its
inconvenient side, since it deprived the good cause of all those
who deserted the bad one. This speech, which was based upon
an essential truth, made only a momentary impression : it had
no result whatever. It was forgotten that a party can only
be formed at the expense of the party that it is desired to
destroy ; and that when the errors of the past do not detract
from present usefulness a wise leader will be blind to them,
since it is his business to derive profit from everything. This
unfortunate mistake, to which the army was determined to
adhere, did much to increase our woes; and the consolation
afforded by a refinement of honourable feeling loses some of
its charm when the struggle to live has become a practical
question.

It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm of the royal army
when it was proclaimed that on the 29th August we were to
enter France, to leave it no more. That day, which effaced
all the sorrows of the year and restored to every man his

learth and status, seemed to derive all its glory and elation

"om the troubles that had led to it. The words joy and
>piness give no idea of the nameless feelings of that moment.

'hey might have sufficed if it had been the result of a mere
>litical treaty ; but there was a hint of glory and conquest

tingled with the circumstances that restored this army of
M 2

164 MEMOIRS OF THE

outlaws to their country. The natural delight at seeing the
end of so many troubles was endowed with indescribable
charm by the fact that they were ended by forcible means,
without any obligation being incurred towards the ruffians who
had brought them about. Such a moment as this is unimag-
inable : the intoxication of it is derived from instinct as much
as from reason.

M. le marechal de Castries 19 took command of a division
of the army composed of infantry of the line, a few companies
of nobles, some troops of light-horse, and two Austrian guns ;
and advanced upon Sierck by the left bank of the river. The
rest of the army, at mid-day, entered French territory at Mon-
dorf, near Roussy. That memorable moment was celebrated
by the whole army with deafening shouts; and the past
month's unspeakably weary march was forgotten, with its
frequent lack of shelter and of all the necessaries of life. The
royal army camped that day at Roussy : some Austrian troops
had spent the night there, and left the place as we reached
it. The Prince of Hohenlohe, with the greater part of his
army-corps, was already occupying Richemont, and that very
day the rest, under General Wallis,20 reached his camp at
Guentrange, on the hill to the right of the woods of La
Grange, which face Thionville, and are parallel with the road
to Metz. The general position at that time was perfect from
the strategical point of view, and the advance on Thionville
was safely and wisely planned, in view of the number of troops
in the district. They amounted in all to 37,000 men, of whom
13,000 were French.

The Princes and their army only spent that one day at
Roussy; on the day following, the 30th, they marched upon
Thionville. M. le comte d'Artois preceded the rest by a few
hours, in order to make a reconnaissance of the town with
the Marechal de Broglie.21 The marshal, in this first lesson
that he gave the prince, made him disregard every recognised
rule for making reconnaissances in the face of the enemy. He
proceeded to the hill that dominates the village of La Grange,
accompanied only by a few horsemen ; and quite neglected to
search or reconnoitre the wood of La Tuilerie. If forty men

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 165

had been concealed in it they could have carried off the two
generals without any difficulty whatever. Hardly had they
cast a glance at the town when they thought they saw a body
of troops come out of the fortifications and advance towards
them. M. le comte d'Artois bade me investigate the matter,
and I went off into the village of La Grange, which I thought
could not contain any hostile troops as I found it so easy of
approach. I questioned several peasants, who assured me
that the enemy had left the place in the morning, and told
me repeatedly that I was perfectly safe. I took one of them
to guide me, on the left side of the village, to the nearest
possible point to the glacis, to which I approached sufficiently
near to obtain the information that was required. When I
had been at this spot for about three minutes, however, I
heard a very brisk fusillade being carried on in the village
through which I had just passed, three hundred paces away.
I saw all the vedettes of the Royal Germans making off as
fast as they could go, and at the same instant three hundred
men coming out of the town. I was thus caught between two
fires, and it was easy to see that my retreat would probably
be cut off. Without waiting to punish the peasant who had
led me astray and deceived me, I darted to the right, jumping
over all the hedges and ditches that bordered the gardens,
and at last succeeded in reaching the foot of the hill where
M. le comte d'Artois was awaiting me. He brought up
several companies of nobles to cover the army's entry into
the camp, which was bisected by the road from Thionville to
Luxemburg. The troops were encamped without any diffi-
culty, and the Princes retired to the little Chateau d'Etrange,
which had been chosen as their headquarters.

In the meantime the Prussian army left Longwy and
marched upon Verdun, ruining and devastating all the country
through which it passed. That town was invested, and sum-
moned to surrender on the same day ; and on refusing, was
bombarded for one night. On the following morning the
garrison began to parley, and in the evening expressed a wish
to capitulate. They were willing to surrender on condition
of being allowed the honours of war.22 It was a great mis-

166 MEMOIRS OF THE

take to consent to this condition : to grant honours to these
rebels was to give them the position of a Power. The
Prussians entered the town and found it entirely unpaved.
This precautionary measure had been taken by a battalion of
the Cote-d'Or Regiment, who had determined to defend the
place to the last, but owing to their lack of numbers had been
unable to withstand the influence of the inhabitants, who
were all bent upon surrender. The Duke of Brunswick will
not find it easy to account for the time he spent in that town ;
but I will take advantage of the delay to return to the siege
of Thionville.

M. de Calonne, who was in command, thought he knew
for a fact — through his niece Mme. Fouquet,23 then in the
town — that the garrison only wished for a plausible excuse
to hand over the keys to the Princes ; and this being the case
he thought it waste of trouble to give them a good reason.
M. de Wimpffen,24 who was in command of the garrison,
explained, whenever he was summoned to surrender, that it
was necessary to attack him with some energy if he were to
be of any use to the party of the Princes, to whom he was
apparently anxious to yield. Possibly the absurd measures
that were adopted might have been sufficient on the day of
the troops' arrival, but the week that was spent in inaction
had the usual effect of giving the enemy time to gauge the
strength of the attacking force. Generals would derive twice
as much benefit from their resources if they could make use
of them before the enemy had time to judge of their extent ;
but though they all recognise this fact they never act upon it.

The first attempt upon the town was made by the Austrian
troops. The Prince of Hohenlohe, who came in person for
the occasion from Richemont to General Wallis's camp, set
up two barbette batteries early in the night, some way in
advance of the camp and very close to the enemy's outworks.
It had been arranged with M. le marechal de Castries, who
was with his corps on the other side of the river, that he
should open fire at midnight with his two guns,25 and that the
first shot should serve as a signal ; but his little battery had
taken longer to construct, and he was slightly later than the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 167

hour fixed by the Prince of Hohenlohe and himself. The
Princes for their part, when the first shot was fired, were to
despatch several companies of nobles to create a diversion
beyond the village of La Grange. M. de la Charet, their
commanding-officer, laid his plans too late, or else the Prince
of Hohenlohe began too early : in any case the cannonade
had already failed of its effect when the troops left the camp.
The Princes sent me to inform the Prince of Hohenlohe that
the corps of nobles had set out, and on reaching his batteries
I found him giving the order to cease firing. He seemed to
me to be much annoyed because the plan had not been carried
out. I entreated him to continue firing, pointing out that
unless he diverted attention from the attack of the corps of
nobles the latter might have to encounter too numerous a
sortie. He would consent to nothing ; his losses had been
greater than he expected ; the Prince of Waldeck 26 had just
had his arm shot off. He refused all my requests, merely
agreeing that the Princes ought to recall their troops without
a moment's delay, since dawn was on the point of breaking.
M. le comte d'Artois and the Marechal de Broglie were
equally convinced that this step was necessary, and by four
o'clock the town was quit of the whole performance and all
the inhabitants were in bed, while we had not even the
satisfaction of hoping that they had suffered some annoyance.
This brilliant enterprise entailed summoning the garrison on
the following day; for this measure was the invariable result
of every deliberation and every act of folly ; it was Mme.
Fouquet's only form of artillery. M. de Wimpffen at last
declared positively that something more was required ; more
serious measures must be adopted or all hope of taking the
town must be abandoned. The first alternative was preferred.
A request was sent to Luxemburg for some heavy guns : the
commandant refused them. The same request was sent to
Longwy : the commandant refused to part with any guns
without orders from M. de Clerfayt : a courier was despatched
to the latter, who answered that the Duke of Brunswick's orders
must be ascertained. But all these journeys had consumed
so much time that the Duke of Brunswick, meanwhile, had at

168 MEMOIRS OF THE

last made up his mind to march, and far from consenting to
their request sent a positive order to the Princes to put a stop
to every kind of offensive measure, supposing such measures
had been adopted. This order only admitted of one inter-
pretation. It appeared clear that the duke intended to advance
with all possible haste, and risk everything in an attempt to
aid the King, attacking the patriots wherever he might meet
them, and descending upon Paris in forced marches. For the
duke added an order for the troops to be ready to march at
any moment. Both cavalry and infantry were to be in a state
of perfect order and discipline ; in a condition to follow the
operations of an offensive campaign. The duke being general-
issimo of all the troops, and absolute dictator of every project,
there was nothing to be done but to obey. Monsieur decided
to set out at once, without informing any one of his intention,
save those who were to accompany him. It was arranged
between him and M. le comte d'Artois that the latter should
set out to join him the next day, taking the cavalry and the
Irish Brigade.

M. le comte d'Artois 's departure was not at all pleasing
to some of his own followers. Those who disapproved of it
presented the news so unfavourably in the camp that a great
deal of discontent was aroused among the troops. There was
a regular mutiny, with riots, and groups of malcontents, and
arrests, and speeches, and emissaries despatched to the prince
to turn him from his intention ; and at last, so to speak, the
nobles conquered their prince, as M. Bailly said of the people
on a former occasion, when they took their King to Paris. A
deputy was sent from each company and coalition 27 to M. le
comte d'Artois, to point out to him how improper it was that
the nobility should be under the orders of any one but a son
of France, and he was assured that, notwithstanding the duke's
orders, he would not be allowed to separate himself from the
army. M. le comte d'Artois was placed in a very difficult
position, as his face betrayed. It was impossible for him to
seek advice as to the best remedy for a scandal of this kind,
but he found it in his own intuition and tact, which are always
unfailing when he contrives to act on his own initiative. He

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 169

decided to send on in advance all the troops who were to leave
Thionville and join the Prussians : he sent away all his aides-
de-camp, retaining only his captain of the guard and myself,
and determined to address the troops two days later and declare
his intentions.

M. de Bellegarde 28 had absurdly announced, for the follow-
ing day, a bombardment of the town with fireballs, and M. de
Calonne, in whose ears Mme. Fouquet's secret intelligence was
still ringing, hoped that the town would yield to this pro-
digious effort. The attempt failed : the balls fell short of the
outworks by four hundred yards. M. de Bellegarde, who is
too superior to submit to the recognised rules relating to
weight and impetus, had set up his battery at such a distance
that the fireballs — quite good in themselves, but a third of
the weight of ordinary balls — could not reach even the nearest
outworks. M. le marechal de Broglie, his patron, was greatly
disappointed and annoyed by this act of gross stupidity, but
none the less he dealt very fairly with M. de Bellegarde, and
finished the sentence about him that he had begun to write
before the attempt was made.

The time came at last when M. le comte d'Artois had to
appear at the camp. All the corps of nobles were awaiting
him, formed in brigades along the front of our lines. He
announced, with feeling, but without leaving any room for
doubt as to his intentions, that he would set out on the follow-
ing day. He was heard with respect and submission, except
by the Poitou Company, who opposed him in the most lively
manner ; but at last he secured silence, and spoke to the general
and every one else very kindly, but firmly. Without appear-
ing to give an account of his actions, he enlarged on the
essential points that made his departure right and necessary,
and at last the whole camp was convinced and resigned. He
munted his horse with a joyful heart, and arranged to set
it on the following morning, the 12th of the month. The

[•on de Roll arrived that same evening from the Prussian
irmy, and urged him again to delay no longer. He spent the
lext morning in a farewell conference with M. de Calonne, and

eleven o'clock mounted his horse and forsook, for the

170 MEMOIRS OF THE

remainder of the campaign, the shelter of a protective wing
that had not, by any means, always saved him from making
mistakes.

We reached Verdun at six o'clock the same evening, the
12th September. M. de Lucchesini 29 and M. le baron de
Breteuil were there. The prince, whose regrets at parting
from the baron's antagonist were still fresh, received him very
coldly, and only spoke for a few minutes on public affairs with
him and M. de Lucchesini. He treated him with no con-
sideration whatever, and allowed him to leave his presence like
a clerk in disgrace. Whatever grievances M. le comte d'Artois
may have had against the baron, there was no doubt that he
was, or was supposed to be, the King's man : to treat him so
coldly was to publish the divisions that existed in the party,
and was, therefore, the most impolitic and tactless measure
possible. But M. le comte d'Artois, supported as he was by
his conscience and irritated by the idea that any other man
could interpret his brother's wishes better than he, allowed
his feelings to run away with him, forgetting that he would
be judged by the conventions rather than by his heart. He
only remained in Verdun for a few hours, in the course of
which the townsfolk came to congratulate him on his return
to France and on his recent behaviour. He left Verdun at
midnight and posted to Landres, near to which place the
Prussian army had taken up its position opposite to the army
of Dumouriez.

The prince alighted at the cottage in which Monsieur was
living, and they went together to the King, who received them
with deference ; but all the proceedings at that time showed
the coldness of his personal feelings towards them, and his
embarrassment in their presence. It was quite plain that our
affairs could not possibly have a happy issue unless the chances
of war were to treat us better than they had treated us
hitherto. It seemed for the moment, however, that fate was
more favourably inclined towards us. For a long time the
duke had made no secret of his great desire to meet Dumouriez
in the field, nor of his belief that the issue of the campaign
would be decided by their meeting. His greeting of the prince

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 171

reflected the happy thoughts he wished to inspire, and the
compliments he lavished upon them both always took the form
of congratulations on the hopes they might justifiably entertain.
But he never revealed a single detail of his plans or tactics.

The respective positions of the patriots and Prussians were
equally formidable from the strategical point of view. The
patriots were on the summit of the steep heights of Grand-Pre,
with that village on their left flank, the river Aire in front of
them, and a detached corps of five thousand men on the
opposite bank. Their right flank was resting on a village
called Saint- Juvin,30 and the left extended over the plain,
near some woods. The centre of the Prussian army was at
Landres. The principal position of the patriots was almost
unassailable, and until M. de Clerfayt had dislodged them
from the woods of La Croix 31 after a very sharp engagement
and had seized the heights of Belleville, which dominated their
left flank, the Prussians could make no successful attack except
upon the corps posted at Saint- Juvin. This position they
would certainly have carried ; but, without resorting to con-
jecture, actual events placed the duke in a position to foresee
Dumouriez's future movements, for M. de Clerfayt's occupa-
tion of the heights of Belleville, by throwing the patriot's left
flank into complete disorder and making the position at Grand-
Pre untenable, made an immediate retreat probable. It would
seem, then, that every means should have been employed to
profit by the situation. The idea occurred to me first while
I was making a reconnaissance on the morning of the 14th,
with the King's aides-de-camp, with one of whom I offered to
wager that the camp of Saint-Juvin would have disappeared
by that very evening. I saw signs, indeed, which led me to
believe that the whole army was on the point of decamping.
It is true that there were many objections to this view; for
the army could not retreat to the plains of Champagne with-
out passing through the long and difficult defiles formed by

ic woods and the junction of the rivers Aisne and Aire. On
other hand its present position was full of danger. All

icse different contingencies should have led the duke to omit
10 possible preparation, either for an attack or for pursuit.

172 MEMOIRS OF THE

The hours of the 14th, which went by without a sign of
preparation, seemed to me to pass very slowly, and I never
closed my eyes that night. At two in the morning a despatch
addressed to M. le comte d'Artois made it necessary for me
to wake him, and I took the opportunity of asking his per-
mission to go as far as I could in advance of the outposts, to
see if the enemy had not moved during the night. I went
as near as I possibly could to the village of Saint- Juvin, and
awaited the dawn. The first ray of light showed me, without
possibility of doubt, that both camp and army had vanished
from the height, a circumstance that surprised certain hussar
officers at the outposts all the more that they had heard
musket-shots, all through the night, to the right of the
Prussian army. I returned to inform M. le comte d'Artois of
what had occurred, and he went without a moment's delay
to the Duke of Brunswick, whom he made sure was already
aware of it. He was greatly surprised to find that the duke
knew nothing whatever of the retreat. M. le comte d'Artois
told him that I had just returned with this important news,
whereupon the duke replied that I had certainly made a mis-
take, that Dumouriez was not such a lunatic as to leave that
position, and that he assured His Royal Highness the enemy
was still there. It seemed to me so incredible that the com-
mander-in-chief by that time — for it was a quarter-past six —
should not have received any report from the outposts, and
my confidence in him was so great, that I began to doubt the
evidence of my own senses. But my fears were short-lived :
the news of the retreat was known and made public at eight
o'clock, and the regiments selected to pursue the enemy were
on the march by nine.32

Dumouriez, never doubting that his army would be closely
pursued, had left word as he passed Grand-Pre that he was
prepared to rely on the clemency of the King of Prussia ; but
the retreat was already effected and the bridges over the Aisne
were broken down when the first portion of the advanced guard
reached the place. Nothing remained to be done but to
despatch some troops in pursuit, who brought back a couple
of guns and two hundred and sixty men, of whom sixty had

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 173

been left behind by Dumouriez at the outposts, to fire upon the
right flank of the Prussian army and cover the retreat as far
as Saint- Juvin.33 Such was all the advantage gained from
the duke's finest opportunity during the whole of that cam-
paign. The advanced guard was cantoned at Grand-Pre that
day, and the main body remained for another day at Landres.
As the troops sent in pursuit were in the act of starting, I
met the duke surrounded by all his generals. The moment he
saw me he called out to me that he owed me a thousand
apologies for doubting the truth of my information, and that
if he could have brought himself to believe me we should not
be in our present position. A few moments later, howevei,,
he was endeavouring to hide his shame beneath an air of gaiety
and satisfaction. On meeting M. de Pouilly,34 a general in
the French army who was then occupying a post under him-
self, he cried : " Well, monsieur, I can congratulate every
good Frenchman on to-day's affair ; it is worth more to us
than a battle won! J: M. de Pouilly answered that he could
not help wishing Dumouriez had stayed forty-eight hours
longer; and the duke, seeing that he would deceive no one
as to his waste of this fine opportunity, changed his tone, and
with a gesture of impatience expressed his chagrin that M. de
Clerfayt had not cut off the enemy's retreat. He duped no
one, however. Every one was persuaded, after that day, that
either the duke's integrity was not above suspicion, or his
reputation as a soldier was undeserved. But how can one
possibly believe that this absolute failure to seize so obvious
an opportunity was 'due to the Duke of Brunswick's incapacity ?
Does not everything point to his having deliberately intended
to make no use of it? I have seen too much of him and
observed him too closely to doubt that his talents are superior
those of the men who judge him unfavourably; when he
lows a lack of skill, foresight, and determination it is his
conscience that is at fault, not his military genius. I should

lot attempt to decide this question if there were even one em-
barrassing position to be considered, even one that resembled
the least awkward of the positions that Frederick II was always

ible to surmount so triumphantly, when he was contending

174 MEMOIRS OF THE

with so many Powers at once ; but when I compare the slight
difficulties that the duke had to overcome, and the simplicity
of the opportunities he wasted, with the transcendent talent
he has repeatedly shown, every time that he has conducted a
march or taken a position, and when I consider the way he
can manoeuvre an army, I am driven to accuse him of treachery
and falsity. I see in him a man tainted with all the errors that
the modern ideas of philosophy can suggest to an ill-organised
mind, but never an ignorant man ; for if he had been no more
than that we should be in France to-day and the King would
still be alive. It was always the Duke of Brunswick's ambition
to act as the mediator in the cause, but he had too much
respect for the doctrines of the other side to wish to overcome
them by conquest ; he believed he could overawe the brigands
by his manifesto, and influence and calm down their generals
without fighting them ; he persuaded himself that having
shown the enemy his strength he could safely offer them mercy,
and that in a war of fanaticism — the principle of which he
himself approved — he ought to be able to enlighten his
opponents, but should never attempt to crush them. The
Duke of Brunswick's failure in this campaign must be regarded
as achieved by his enemies' adroitness, not by their superiority.
He was enslaved by a new form of glory, and sacrificed every-
thing to his desire to possess it ; but he was reduced to con-
tenting himself with promises, for Dumouriez overreached him
by dragging out his empty negotiations.

The Princes, before the pursuit, had started for Dun, where
the cavalry of the royal army had alrea'dy arrived. They
carried with them instructions to march on the following day,
the 16th, and proceed to Buzancy and Vouziers, which orders
they duly executed. But at mid-day on the 16th an aide-de-
camp arrived from the Princes with a despatch for the duke,
who asked him where the Princes were. He answered that
they were on the march with the army, and expected to reach
Vouziers that evening ; whereupon the duke impatiently accused
them of having started a day too soon, and declared that their
march would interfere with that of M. de Clerfayt, who was
proceeding to the same point. He bade the aide-de-camp do

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 175

his utmost to intercept them on the way, and stop them at
Buzancy. Unfortunately for us the order was executed ; the
Princes were met at Buzancy and remained there, though it
was the opinion of M. le marechal de Castries that they should
continue their march and adhere to the first project. He even
undertook to ask M. de Clerfayt's consent to this step. M. de
Clerfayt, however, opposed it ; for he believed the country
could not furnish enough food for the two armies, and he was
not able to postpone his own march. It was decided, therefore,
to remain, and there are many reasons for believing that if
this had not occurred, the junction of the Princes' army with
the Prussian troops, which took place without difficulty on
the 20th September, would have forced a general engagement.
The Prussian army marched from Landres on the morning of
the 17th, passed through the defiles of Grand-Pre and the
Aisne on the same day, and camped at Vaux-les-Mouron,
exactly at the spot where the defiles open out upon the plains
of Champagne. It was very doubtful whether the patriots
would be found in an assailable position ; but as good luck
would have it, before two days were over the Duke of Bruns-
wick had another opportunity within his reach — such an oppor-
tunity as he had been longing for and begging of his star
since the beginning of the campaign, such an opportunity as
he had in his mind when, at the end of August, he led Louis
XVI to hope that his prison-doors would open before three
weeks were past.

On the morning of the 19th the entire army proceeded
towards an isolated farm called Les Maisons de Champagne,
and camped in a village hard by.35 It was only mid-day, and
the night was to be spent in this camp, but hardly were the
tents pitched before the King obtained information of the

icmy's position. He sent for the Duke of Brunswick and

mf erred with him as to the best way of marching upon them,
but the duke showed little enthusiasm and made many diffi-

ilties. The King forced his hand, however, and he pretended
consent : the order was therefore given to break up the

imp, and leave all the baggage, tents, provisions, and so on,
this same spot with an escort. The army set out at three

176 MEMOIRS OF THE

o'clock in the afternoon. If I wished to give an idea of the
wonderful training of the Prussian army I could choose no
better example than this day's performance. Never was a
march upon the enemy more perfectly organised and conducted,
nor more skilfully carried out : complete order and absolute
silence reigned in the ranks. The route was ingeniously
shortened, too, for the country to be traversed was thoroughly
known through the manoeuvres and reports of the light troops.
Every man's head was cool, owing to the intelligence with
which every step of the way was guarded and reconnoitred.
Not a word of command, not a single trumpet, not an officer's
voice was to be heard; every one was in the place that his
rank or post assigned to him ; every man's mind was bent on
his own particular duty. Nothing that I had seen in the
Prussian army under Frederick II made the impression on me
that I received at this time. The whole of the cavalry, as
well as the infantry, was formed in platoons ; and the distance
was so accurately maintained between the columns, battalions,
and platoons, that at a moment's notice they could have
adopted any formation that was dictated by circumstances. In
this order the army reached Sommetourbe at ten o'clock at
night.

The Prince of Hohenlohe, who was in command of the
advanced guard, had received orders to join the main body
of the army, and reached Sommetourbe at midnight, after an
excellently conducted march. The patriots were then at Hans,
three miles from Sommetourbe. By the King's orders the
troops bivouacked until daylight ; the night was fine and still ;
the King, the duke, the Prince of Nassau,36 M. de Lambert,37
and three or four others, of whom I was one, spent a part of
it in a peasant's cottage.38 This time was employed by the
King and duke in questioning the inhabitants on the nature
of the country and the behaviour and position of the enemy,
examining the map, and giving orders according to the various
reports. At two o'clock the King was left to rest until dawn.
Just before dawn M. de Clerfayt's approach was announced ;
and the King thought he ought to postpone the march for two
hours, in order to await him. But at seven, M. de Clerfayt

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 177

being still so far away that there was no hope of his arriving
in time, the infantry of the advanced guard set out in three
columns — intended to form the right wing in the line of battle
— and proceeded across the plain between Hans and the road
from Chalons to Sainte-Menehould.

All the infantry of the army-corps followed immediately,
and, as the duke's intention was that the right of his position
should extend beyond the high road, he was obliged to begin
by trying to dislodge a detachment of the enemy from their
post in a farm called La Lune, which stood by the wayside
at the point where the road in question is joined by the Rheims
and Chalons road.39 This detachment comprised several com-
panies of infantry, three squadrons of carabineers,40 and four
pieces of ordnance ; and two battalions of infantry and the
Saxe- Weimar Regiment were sent to make the attack. The
enemy's fire was so sharp that the Prussian detachment was
soon seen to be insufficient to dislodge them. The duke sent
some reinforcements, and after a fairly obstinate fight the
patriots retired, leaving very few dead behind them. The
King with the cavalry only left Sommetourbe at nine o'clock.
The patriots had employed the morning in taking up their
position. Their centre, forming the apex of a right angle,
was on the hill of Valmy, at the mill in the village of that
name ; they had entrenched a formidable battery there ; their
right stretched across the plain ; their left formed the side of
the re-entering right angle, and the extreme end of both wings
was composed of cavalry.41 Their whole force amounted to
about fifty thousand men.42

The position at La Lune having been carried, the general
advance of the Prussians began. The right of the line, com-
prising part of the infantry of the advanced guard, part of
the cavalry of the main body, and a formidable battery, was
protected by the position of La Lune, and the guns were
directed against the mill of Valmy. The centre was formed
in three lines, facing the mill of Valmy ; and in advance of
these lines were posted the Rifle Rangers and the Wolfradt
Hussars, who covered the batteries of the centre. The left
wing was composed of the remainder of the infantry and

178 MEMOIRS OF THE

cavalry, and extended into the plain. It was commanded by
the King ; and this would have been the position assigned to
the cavalry of the Princes, had it been able to arrive in time
to form part of the line. Six batteries were placed at intervals
along the front of the line, but the most useful were those
of La Lune and the centre, which were intended by the Duke
of Brunswick to break the patriots' line before the general
attack. The whole of the artillery moved forward to form
the centre of the left wing, with its right resting on the Prince
of Hohenlohe's left. Finally the cavalry left Sommetourbe
with the King at about eight in the morning ; and it was said
that the general movement of the troops was delayed by their
waiting for M. de Clerfayt's army-corps, which was expected
to join the Prussian army, but did not arrive.

At half-past twelve the position of the two armies was very
much as I have described it. The opposed lines were divided
by a distance of eight hundred yards ; there was a slight hill
half-way between the two lines, and the ground, after sloping
downwards, rose again to the patriots' feet, the whole centre
of the Prussian army being thus behind a kind of curtain.
The duke, when his lines were formed, galloped to- the crest
of the hill, and suddenly coming within view of the enemy's
lines cried: "The devil! What a lot of them there are! "
He observed them carefully for a moment, then retraced his
steps, and said to the Prince of Nassau : " What do you think
of their position, prince? " The latter answered that he
thought victory was certain. On the duke eagerly begging
him to explain himself the Prince of Nassau pointed out that
if a battery were so placed as to enfilade the right face of the
angle that formed the enemy's centre, they could not stand
against it for longer than a quarter of an hour.43 The duke's
adjutant 44 could not help saying that the Prince of Nassau was
right. The duke rode back to the crest of the hill to make
another reconnaissance, and on returning set the whole army
in motion — advancing with measured tread to the sound of
drums, trumpets, and the bugles of the light infantry. I can
only ask the reader to imagine the effect of such a movement ;
fifty thousand men advancing against fifty thousand; on both

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 179

sides a formidable fire, covering the march on the one side
and opposing it on the other. Such a sight could not fail to
arouse unbounded enthusiasm : no one doubted — it was im-
possible to doubt — that the attack was an absolute certainty,
and indeed had actually begun. But when the line had
advanced about a hundred paces it was ordered to halt : the
duke turned back and said to the little group that surrounded
him : " Before pursuing the attack I shall certainly break their
line with the artillery." The guns continued their fire, there-
fore, and on both sides it was very lively.

Though the centre of the Prussian army was protected by
the little slope, it was not sheltered from the ricochet of the
balls, and indeed the enemy's direct fire often reached the
battalions of the centre : the Kleist Battalion, among others,
was entirely destroyed.

This fatal and useless cannonade continued for five hours
without interruption. The patriots, though they were pro-
tected on the heights of Valmy by a little entrenchment,
seemed to be losing a good many men : two ammunition-wagons
that blew up had made considerable gaps in the ranks of the
centre. At last Tempelhof,45 who was commanding the
artillery, sent to say that the ammunition was nearly spent.
The cannonade gradually relaxed in energy until the battery
at the mill ceased firing at the battery at La Lune, where-
upon the other also discontinued its fire. The battery at the
centre followed suit, and the cannonade completely ceased.
It was now growing dusk : if the duke had still had any inten-
tion of making an attack he would have been forced to change
his plans, since by this time it must have been a night-attack.
There was already much reason to fear that a great deal of
time had been lost. At that moment the patriot army's left
made a movement to the left, towards the road to Vitry ; the
duke made a movement to the right, in order to gain ground
with his right. The fact that this manoeuvre of the Prussians'
was hidden from the French by the rising-ground may

ive led them to believe that this wing was retreating : from
11 ranks of the enemy there arose a shout of Vive la nation.46

The reciprocal manoeuvre was not of long duration ; the

N 2

180 MEMOIRS OF THE

French halted their left wing and the duke his right ; night
fell ; outposts and vedettes were stationed between the two
lines ; arms were stacked and fires were lighted. The weather
was abominable ; it was blowing, and cold rain was falling ; the
men were short of bread, and had no hopes of obtaining any
the next day ; it was a moment that gave one an idea of how
cruel the hardships of war could be. The Prince of Hohenlohe
suggested that a night attack should be made, but the duke
refused, and prepared to spend the night in a room in one
of the two farm-houses. The least dirty was reserved for the
King, who had had neither rest nor food during the past two
days. He retired to this room at about ten o'clock, and the
duke and the Prince of Hohenlohe occupied the other. They
had eaten no more than their men : not a scrap of food had
passed their lips. The duke flung himself on the straw beside
the Prince of Hohenlohe, and offered me a place between them.
After a few conventional civilities I accepted the suggestion,
for I was struggling with sleep as well as hunger, and hoped
that I should pacify the one by yielding to the other. The
duke fell into a deep sleep, and, as I listened to his snores and
leant upon my elbow to look at him, I said to myself : " How
is it possible that a man who has wasted so splendid an oppor-
tunity, and has, moreover, food for thought in the prospect
of the morrow, the sufferings of his troops, and the groans of
the wounded men in the next room, should be able to sleep
so peacefully? "

At last, however, the force of example led me to sleep till
dawn.47 I then awoke the two generals and told them that,
with their permission, I would mount my horse and ride to
the outposts, to find out whether the enemy, who were so
quiet when we left them, had made no movement. I then
set out, and awaited full daylight at the most advanced out-
post. When daylight came I saw the patriot army in exactly
the same position as before — every man motionless, his arms on
the ground before him. I returned quickly with my report :
the duke's opportunity for making an attack was as good as
ever, with the additional advantage that M. de Clerfayt's
army-corps had arrived on the previous evening at dusk. He

COMTE ROGER DE DAM AS 181

gave no orders, however, that pointed to a projected attack ;
and at ten o'clock in the morning the position of the two
armies was still unchanged. At eleven the patriots at last
began to make a movement with their right, which they drew
off in squares with a view to changing their position.48 It
\vas at this moment that a trumpeter arrived from General
Dumouriez, escorting the Duke of Brunswick's confidential
valet, who had been captured on the previous day, having
wandered away from his comrades, from motives of curiosity,
while marching with the baggage. They brought a very
courteous note from Dumouriez, who had been kind or ironical
enough to add a compliment on the talent shown by the duke
in the manoeuvres of the previous day. The duke responded
in a manner that was at least equally civil, by allowing the
patriots to continue their manoeuvres. He made no attempt
to interfere with them while they brought round their left
wing to rest on the village of Gizaucourt — in front of the
Prussians' right wing — and extended their right towards Sainte-
Menehould. The Prussian army never stirred, and throughout
the whole day not a gun was fired, while the troops had neither
tents nor food.

The Prussians' right rested on a little village called La
Chapelle (on the other side of the high road to Chalons), and
this village was itself protected by a height that stretched
along behind the enemy's flank. The Prince of Nassau and
M. de Lambert went at about six in the evening to point out
to the duke that, by all the recognised laws and principles of
warfare, that height should be in the hands of the Prussians,
since the only way of keeping it safe from the enemy was to
occupy it, and since it dominated the village of La Chapelle,
which for two days had been furnishing forage for the army
and was the only place where water could be obtained for
horses or men. The Duke of Brunswick agreed, but post-
poned taking possession of the height until the morrow. The
first part of the next day was occupied by the arrival of the
>aggage and provisions, and, as the refreshment of the troops
ippeared to the Duke the most urgent matter to be considered,
le again postponed until the following day the seizing of the

182 MEMOIRS OF THE

important position on the height. Finally, that very night,
Dumouriez stole a march upon the Prussians and took posses-
sion of it. He hastily erected a battery, and posted in it a
sufficient number of troops to defend the approaches.

Thenceforward it was impossible for the Prussians' right
wing to keep its position : it was dominated by the enemy's
guns. The duke thought of moving the whole wing, and
taking it back again over the high road to Chalons ; but after-
wards decided on a change in the general position. He made
M. de Clerfayt's corps occupy the position and village of
Valmy, and encamped his own army farther back, on the
heights of Hans. When this movement wras on the point of
being completed I was alone with the Prince of Nassau, with-
out a single aide-de-camp, or even a groom. We met a French
prisoner, whom the duke was returning with a trumpeter ; the
Prince of Nassau suggested that we should seize the oppor-
tunity of speaking to the outposts ; I followed him ; we passed
our vedettes and came to theirs, and in a moment were sur-
rounded by a hundred hussars and dragoons. The Prince of
Nassau asked for an interview with Colonel Stenger ; 49 a man
of the Bercheny Hussars went off to tell him of our presence,
and in the meantime I held forth to all the men. I explained
their situation to them and pointed out their errors ; they
asked me where their officers were ; I showed them the spot
where the royal army was encamped, and assured them that
there was room for them there, and that they must not
imagine they would be severely treated if they were to join
us, for we knew the source of their errors and should greet
them as brothers.

There was not a man in the crowd who did not give me as
good answers, nor whose views were not as sound as could
possibly be desired : they told me they could not come over
to us without some kind of incitement or opportunity, but
were ready to seize the first that offered, for they could no
longer give their support to the anarchy in their army. I
encouraged them, suggested that they should make proselytes,
and bade them remember their promise to seize the first oppor-
tunity of joining us. Colonel Stenger then arrived, with a

COMTE ROGER DE DAM AS 183

very old general. He was at first surprised to find us sur-
rounded by so many men, and sent them all away. He was
in command of the light troops whom Dumouriez had left in
that place when he effected his change of position. When
the Prussian army made its first movement the patriots' camp
had been broken up in great haste and disorder ; they thought
they were about to be attacked. Colonel Stenger told us so,
and added (with some affectation) that such an event would
disturb them very much now, since they were not expecting
it, but that none the less they would try to give us a good
reception.

As the conversation was on the point of coming to an end
Stenger drew near to the Prince of Nassau, and said to him in
a low voice : " We are expecting a convoy to arrive from
Chalons with bread : it is coming by the Vitry road ; if you
intercept it we are lost."50

On receiving this important and extraordinary piece of
news the Prince of Nassau cut short the conversation, and we
parted from these gentlemen (among whom was a young
Montjoie,51 aide-de-camp to the old general). The Prince of
Nassau at once informed the King of what Stenger had told
him ; and the King and duke made arrangements for the neces-
sary expedition, which was to be conducted by the Prince of
Hohenlohe.

The Princes' army was then encamped in rear of the Prussian
army at Sommetourbe, Somme-Suippe, and La Croix-de-
Champagne. The Gendarmerie were in a village that was
bisected by the road from Chalons to Sainte-Menehould. The
Prince of Hohenlohe thought that, as he would be passing by
them, he might as well take them with him, and M. d'Auti-
champ 52 received orders to hold himself in readiness. The
Wolfradt Hussars and five hundred unmounted rifles com-
posed the rest of the detachment, which set out at mid-day
with two pieces of light ordnance. The Gendarmerie joined
the column, which, after keeping to the Chalons and Sainte-
Menehould road for a distance of two leagues, turned off to
the left across some fields towards the Chalons and Vitry road,
to reach which it was necessary to cross the Roman road that

184 MEMOIRS OF THE

runs between the two others. There were no volunteers with
the Prince of Hohenlohe save the Prince of Nassau, the Comte
de Deux-Ponts, and myself. The detachment continued
marching for a league and a half in the same direction without
seeing a trace of the enemy, but at last we saw a village with
two vedettes posted before it. A squadron of hussars instantly
rode in that direction at the trot, and found an outpost of
fifteen men of the Flanders Chasseurs, who were made
prisoners. Through them we learnt that the Flanders and
Normandy Regiments were in another village, less than a mile
away, and were to form the escort of the convoy in question.
According to them the convoy had just passed, but they
assured us that by hurrying we could catch the two regiments
in this village, before they had time to mount their horses.
The Prince of Hohenlohe set off with all possible speed : he
ordered the cavalry to advance in two lines at the gallop. As
we approached the village we saw the two regiments riding
out of it : we quickened our pace in the hope of meeting them,
but between us and them there lay an immense and impassable
ravine, which forced the Prince of Hohenlohe to give up the
attempt altogether. The prince was in a very bad temper,
and did not treat M. d'Autichamp with the consideration that
his zeal deserved.

This was the last act of hostility in this campaign. The
duke wished to see if he could be as great a statesman as he
was a general, and concentrated all his attention on this new
career. And now his army was almost entirely ruined by
sickness, discouraged by delay, crushed by want, threatened
by the most terrible famine, and a prey to disorder and law-
less pillage ; his artillery horses were nearly all gone ; the cold
and rainy weather was adding to the miseries endured by both
men and officers, and doing much towards disheartening them ;
while the most unseemly attacks were being made upon the
object of the war and the brothers of the King of France,
even in the presence of the King of Prussia himself. In short
everything, both fundamental and accessory, that is necessary
for the execution of offensive operations, was absolutely lack-
ing. The duke undertook to employ the last melancholy

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 185

resource : negotiations. Dumouriez at once felt his own
superiority, and saw the duke's intentions : four days' delay
could not fail to reduce the Prussian army to desperation, and
Dumouriez was well aware of the fact. He flattered the duke's
hopes so skilfully that the latter thought himself master of
the situation. One day, when M. le comte d'Artois had been
dining with the King at Hans, the duke took him into
the embrasure of a window, and said to him : " Monseigneur,
I have a most important confidence to make to you ; but first
let us be sure that no one can overhear us." He then went
on : " I am deceiving every one here, but I do not wish to
hide anything from you. Let me tell you that Dumouriez is
ours : in two days' time he and all his troops of the line will
join our army." M. le comte d'Artois was shrewd enough
to be more alarmed than pleased by this chimerical tale; he
could not positively deny the truth of the duke's assertion,
but he adduced some obvious reasons that might have led
Dumouriez to deceive him. The duke overruled all objections
by what he called certainties, and closed the interview by say-
ing that M. de Manstein would return to the camp on the
morrow with a final answer, and that he therefore begged the
prince to send the Baron de Roll to him at four o'clock in
the morning. When the baron appeared the duke repeated
these confidences, which the baron refuted by bringing for-
ward the many objections that were only too palpable. He
pointed out that Dumouriez could not be unaware of the
critical position of the Prussian army, since during the past
five days he had sent as many as six emissaries to the camp,
under pretext of carrying on a correspondence. The con-
versation lasted until nine o'clock, when Manstein arrived with
the news that negotiations were entirely broken off, and that
France had been officially proclaimed a Republic.53

This news came as a thunderclap to the duke, though he
tried to conceal his feelings by affecting a renewed desire for
a battle. He expressed a wish for a council of war that
should include the Marechal de Castries and M. d'Autichamp.
The council was held in the house occupied by the King, and
every member of it voted for the attack, with the exception

186 MEMOIRS OF THE

of the duke, who, without expressing himself definitely,
brought forward all the difficulties that his ingenuity could
suggest. When he left his fellow-councillors he did not for
a moment intend to abide by their opinion. He was as firmly
resolved as ever to do nothing, but the aim of the negotiations
was changed : the only question that remained to be discussed
between Dumouriez and the duke was the speedy retreat of
the latter from France, and the best means of effecting it.
Dumouriez was quite willing to make every possible conces-
sion, but was also quite firm in reducing to a minimum the
time allowed for the retreat. The duke sent an order to the
Princes to retrace their steps, and he himself immediately
began his retreat — if retreat it can be called, for it soon
became a most terrible rout.54 The very soldiers whom the
Prussians should, and could, have defeated only twelve days
earlier were lent by their general to drag the Prussian guns
along roads that were too heavy for the few horses left to
them. The roads were strewn with the dead and dying, who
were alike deserted ; the Austrian, Prussian, and royal armies
were pillaging one another ; Verdun was abandoned rather
than surrendered to the patriots. In the conferences that
were held there between their generals and those of the
Prussians the latter took a shamefully submissive tone, and
were treated as vanquished foes by the others. All the
inhabitants who had shown themselves favourable to our cause
were pitilessly sacrificed to their loyalty.

The conditions were the same in the case of Longwy, which
the patriots entered before the Prussians had left it by the
opposite gate ; and in short, two months after the issue of his
arrogant manifesto, the duke was chased out of France con-
temptuously, with his shattered army at the mercy of the
rebels. The duke himself had an unpleasant day to spend in
Longwy. When he was dining with the King the Prince of
Hohenlohe, the general-in-command of a portion of the
Austrian army, treated him in the most humiliating way, and
the altercation was within an ace of becoming unpleasantly
lively. As they left the table on this occasion Major-General
Valerien Zoubof of the Russian army, the favourite's brother,55

COMTE ROGER DE DAM AS 187

arrived with a letter of introduction from the Empress, couched
in the most agreeable and courteous terms possible. The
Empress wrote as if the duke were the conqueror of the world
and the dictator of all the nations; and her words were read
at the very moment when he had just shattered Louis XVI's
crown, the crown that, until then, had only been laid low.
What hope is there for a man whom neither grief nor shame
can kill?

The Princes, since their departure from Sommetourbe, had
been abandoned to their own devices. The line of their retreat
was parallel to that of M. de Clerfayt, but nevertheless their
flank was exposed in the direction of Rheims, and they had
neither guns nor ammunition. Until the Meuse was crossed
they were in constant expectation of disaster ; and when they
were a day's march from Stenai, at a chateau called Sy, they
were involved in great danger by the imprudence and incapa-
city of the commandant of the main guard, and of a certain
company of nobles. The Princes and their troops, when on
the point of marching away in the morning, were attacked
by a detachment of the Sedan garrison, and fired at, point-
blank, with three guns, which the patriots had placed un-
molested within a hundred paces of the chateau where the
Princes had passed the night. During the whole of this
march they were harassed by armed peasants concealed in the
woods, of whom a certain number were surrounded and killed
by the Gendarmerie and the Irish Brigade, and about a
hundred others taken prisoners. The Princes' army reached
Stenai at last without any kind of baggage : the Prussians, and
even the Austrians, had robbed them of it all. All the carts
and wagons had been pillaged, and this luckless army, after
crossing the Meuse, found itself without either resources for
the present or hopes for the future. It was a moment of
terrible despair, which could only be restrained by continuing
the march as promptly as possible. They made their way to
Longwy and Arlon, where the disbandment began. The
Austrian armies separated, one returning to Brabant, while
the other went into cantonments near Namur; the Prus-
sian army proceeded towards Coblenz ; and such of the emigres

188 MEMOIRS OF THE

as were still banded in troops and corps marched to Liege,
and remained quartered in that neighbourhood till the Prus-
sians disbanded and disarmed them, and reduced their pittance
to the smallest possible.

At Liege the Princes found themselves literally without the
means of subsistence. They sent me to the headquarters of
the King of Prussia, who was then at Montabaur near Coblenz,
to come to some decision with him as to their fate, and ask
him for pecuniary aid.

I spent four days at Montabaur, where I was treated very
well, personally, by the King, but had great difficulty in
solving the problem of the Princes' affairs. I had several
conversations with M. de Lucchesini on the subject, and I
must admit that, whether owing to his sympathy for the
Princes or to his real animosity against the Duke of Bruns-
wick, whose conduct he condemned from first to last, both his
words and actions were all I could desire. I prevailed on him
to make certain arrangements in favour of the Emigres, and
to give me for the Princes the sum of a hundred thousand
francs, in the form of a bill of exchange on Frankfort, payable
on sight.

One day, while I was at Montabaur, I had just left the
King's dinner-table when the Duke of Brunswick asked me if
I could go to see him that afternoon. I agreed to go at the
hour that suited him best. As soon as we were alone he began
to ply me with questions, and implored me to tell him frankly
what had been said of him since all the recent misfortunes
had occurred. I hoped to save myself with a few conventional
phrases, but this did not satisfy him at all : he urged me in
the most pressing manner to tell him the whole truth. So I
proceeded to find fault with his conduct from the beginning
of the campaign, and whenever I came to any important
incident in the story I told him of all the complaints that
were brought against him, nor did I fail to lay especial stress
upon the terrible and unaccountable catastrophe of Valmy and
the retreat.

When I had passed in review every detail of his marches
and of his conduct generally, while he, meanwhile, leant his

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 189

head upon his hand and listened with an air of the deepest
depression and grief, he said to me : "I give you my word of
honour that if I were to set down an account of my conduct
in print, and could make it public, no man would be able to
reproach me : but I am bound hand and foot by my duty, and
I cannot do it. It is all the more unfortunate for me."

When I left him a few moments later he was lavish in his
protestations of regard and deferential bows, of which he was
never sparing. In spite of the so-called explanation he had
given me my opinion of his blunders remained unchanged.56

The retreat from Champagne is followed by the evacuation of Aix-la-
Chapelle by the Emigres — Damas accompanies the Comte d'Artois
to Russia — Generosity and prudence of Catherine II — Voyage to
Copenhagen and secret reception of the Comte d'Artois at Court —
Elsinore — Disagreeable reception of the Comte d'Artois in England
— The author, whose point of view is different from the prince's,
asks for his liberty — Remains in England, then serves in Clerfayt's
army (siege of Le Quesnoy), and in Lord Moira's (Guernsey) —
Proposal to command a regiment of dragoons in the English army —
Campaign of 1794 : Maubeuge, Fleurus — Remarks on the Austrian
and English armies — The author retreats to Maestricht with the Due
de Richelieu, and thence to Switzerland and Italy — Visit to the
Comte de Provence at Verona — Purchase of Mirabeau's Legion.

THE Princes, after retreating from Champagne by way of
Longwy and Arlon, and remaining for a time at Liege, were
forced by the swift advance of the French to leave that town,
and went to live at Hamm, in Westphalia. All the French
at Aix-la-Chapelle, too, were obliged to leave the place : the
greater number went to Diisseldorf, and I was among them.
Now that France was formally constituted a Republic and
the royal family confined in the Temple, there was no room
for hope with regard to the King's fate. Terrorism had
reached a climax : the massacre and proscription of every one
who adhered to the old Monarchy prepared the world to see
our unhappy sovereign fall a victim to his own resignation.
He had already drunk so deeply of humiliation that, of all his
sufferings, death was the least degrading and the least painful :
he was expecting it, and it put an end to his horrible fate on
the 21st January, 1793.

The Princes his brothers had fallen on evil days : being
deserted by Prussia, and treated with scant consideration by
Austria, they fell back upon Catherine IPs generosity, and
sought her counsel as a guide in their distress. M. le comte
d'Artois asked for her permission to visit her at Petersburg,

190

>*! H.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 191

to d^ ,- - future in person. The answer given to the
Princes Uiiough Count Romanzow, who was accredited to
Monsieur; (Regent of France since the King's imprisonment),
\\ us interpreted by them as an invitation, because it was ex-
pi^.. . a style that reflected the count's chivalrous
c-h'u-.acter a-i.id mind ; but if the wish had not been father to the
thought they might have read it differently. However, this
so-called invitation induced M. le comte d'Artois to make
arrangements for the journey, and he asked me to accompany
him.

I could not hesitate to accede to this proposal, though my
visit promised to be less agreeable than the previous one,
owing, partly, to the fact of Prince Potemkin's death, which
had occurred a short time before, and still more to the very
different circumstances of my arrival. None the less I felt
it both a duty and a pleasure to accompany M. le comte
d'Artois. Comte Francois d'Escars 1 and the Baron de Roll
were also bidden to be of the party, and the Bishop of Arras 2
was appointed the prince's mouthpiece and minister, to con-
duct the affairs that were to be under discussion. We set
out in mid- winter.

When we reached Mittau M. le comte d'Artois sent me on
in advance to Riga, because I was well acquainted with Prince
Repnin, who was governor there, and because he wished to
learn the Empress's orders with regard to his reception —
whether he was to travel incognito or under his own name.
It was here I was informed that the Empress had not really
encouraged the journey. Prince Repnin, in strict privacy,
told me so frankly, but said at the same time that since the
prince had come he must travel under his own name, as a son
of France, and that he would be received as such.

M. le comte d'Artois arrived on the following day. I met
him a mile away from the town, and told him of the honours
with which he was to be received. Indeed these were such
as the Empress might have paid to the King of France him-
self in the days of his prosperity. It was necessary, before
we could leave Riga, that the Empress should be informed of
M. le comte d'Artois's arrival in her dominions; and this fact

192 MEMOIRS OF THE

delayed us for a week, which Prince Repnin employed in enter-
taining M. le comte d'Artois in a variety of ways. The
Empress, who, while enthusiastic for the cause of the King
of France, was always alive to her own interests, had feared
that the presence of M. le comte d'Artois might commit her
more deeply than her reason approved. She had quite enough
wit and intelligence to moderate her promises and her be-
haviour ; but naturally found it more difficult to do so when
she was forced to deal with direct entreaties ; and the very
same reason that had led M. le comte d'Artois to interpret
her letter as an invitation, had prompted the Empress to
express herself ambiguously, while not definitely refusing his
request. The affair being decided as it was she had the tact
and wisdom to pay more honour to M. le comte d'Artois than
was really his due, and to show him every possible kindness and
attention, at the same time keeping him at a distance that was
accordant with the amount of support she intended to give him.

Two days after she was informed of our arrival at Riga
everything was ready for the journey. Royal carriages were
sent to meet us half-way between Petersburg and Riga, and
with them came Count Serge Romanzow, laden with compli-
ments for M. le comte d'Artois. All the posting-houses of
the entire route were supplied with so many horses, over and
above the prince's own equipages, that it was possible for
detachments of the Empress's own household to wait upon
him wherever he wished to eat or rest. Escorts of Cossacks
were posted at intervals along the road, and M. le comte
d'Artois, for the remainder of his journey, received the treat-
ment that Louis XVI might have expected ten years earlier.

On approaching Narva we met the royal carriages, of which
the first was large enough to hold six persons. We all seated
ourselves in it, and in the shortest time possible were in the
Peterhof Road, whither M. le comte Esterhazy, the Princes'
representative in Petersburg, came to meet M. le comte
d'Artois, to inform him of the ceremonies ordained by the
Empress for his entry into the capital. Six o'clock in the
evening was the appointed hour, and lest we should be too
early we were obliged to advance at a foot's-pace, and even

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 193

to halt from time to time. At last we alighted at M. Leva-
chef's house,3 where the prince was to stay. All the ministers
of state received him at the door : the anterooms were filled
with all the valets de chambre from the Court, and the salon
with all the gentlemen-of-the-bedchamber appointed to attend
upon the prince. As soon as the latter entered the room
the circle was formed, and M. le comte d'Artois spoke to
every one and expressed his gratitude with all his natural
graciousness.

When these first formalities were over we were left to rest
for the remainder of the evening ; and at ten o'clock on the
following morning the Empress's aide-de-camp and favourite,
Zoubof,4 came to announce to M. le comte d'Artois that the
royal carriages would arrive at mid-day to convey him to the
palace.5 The Empress, who knew very well how to play the
part of a sovereign, wished the prince to see that it was not
only at the Court of France that stately ceremonial, and
grandeur, and magnificence were combined with a cultivated
taste, and displayed in the most attractive way. Her reception
of M. le comte d'Artois was beyond anything that could be
pictured. She awaited him in the reception-room that was
farthest from the entrance : to reach her he was obliged to
pass through all the salons of the palace, which were filled
with the diplomatic corps, the Asiatic envoys, the bodyguard,
and all the women of the Court. The prince was impressed,
as he had good reason to be, by all this pomp, which was as
stately as it was dramatic.

Her greeting of M. le comte d'Artois, when he reached her,
combined majesty with graciousness, and the prince's bearing
was equally dignified and pleasing. These details, which as
a rule are merely tiresome, were in these particular circum-
stances a matter of special interest.

This was the only ceremony to which she subjected M. le
comte d'Artois throughout his entire visit. From that
moment etiquette disappeared : he went to the Hermitage with
us every evening, and we dined there twice a week. On the
other days of the week M. le comte d'Artois entertained guests
at his own house, where the attendants were of the Empress's

194 MEMOIRS OF THE

household. The early hours of the evening he spent at such
houses as the Empress brought to his notice, or in visiting
the Grand Duke.

Such was, in brief, the manner of his entertainment, but,
despite all these outward attentions, it is worthy of remark
that, during the six weeks he spent in Petersburg, not one
single opportunity did the Empress allow him to approach her
in private on matters of business. The conversation was
always general, and never was a moment set apart for the
interviews for which M. le comte d'Artois had hoped, and
which were the real object of his journey.

Neither could the Bishop of Arras succeed in obtaining
private interviews : his manners displeased the Empress and
her ministers as much as they displeased the whole capital, and
no one would listen to him. There were also a few customs
connected personally with M. le comte d'Artois which annoyed
both Court and town, and he made the little mistake of refus-
ing to alter them. This to a certain degree had a bad effect
on the success of his mission; but all the outward show of
respect remained unaltered.

When about half of his time in Petersburg had gone by I
fell ill with measles, on my return from the memorial service
for Louis XVI, which was celebrated, by the Empress's orders,
with a catafalque and every kind of magnificence. The Bishop
of Arras conducted the service. I was hardly cured when the
time came for the prince's departure ; for the illness, which is
usually so simple in its progress, wras complicated by the
circumstance that I was twice bled at an ill-timed moment,
before the rash appeared.

Some very favourable news from La Vendee fixed a date
for our departure, and apparently served to advance our affairs.
The Empress pledged herself to furnish a considerable body
of troops to land there, but unfortunately it was stipulated
that they should be paid by England. The Empress suggested
that M. le comte d'Artois should proceed to England to con-
clude the arrangements, and a corvette and a frigate 6 were
made ready. About the 15th April we set out, laden with
benefits, and promises, and all the kind and generous atten-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 195

tions that the Empress could bestow upon us. We embarked
at Revel.

As we sailed away upon a quiet sea, and were able to reflect
upon our situation at leisure, M. le comte d'Artois reviewed
the fruits of his visit to the Empress, and could not hide from
himself the fact that he had gained no positive advantage.
Among the presents that she had lavished upon him the most
notable was a sword encrusted with diamonds, which had been
blessed in the church of St. Alexander Newsky. He was
intended to use it in Vendee, at the head of his troops.7 But
before this could be done it was necessary for him to win over
the English government in the matter of the subsidy demanded
by the Empress. We shall see in the sequel the outcome of
this important condition. In the meantime we must continue
the voyage, merely adding that if there were one thing cal-
culated to strengthen the confidence that M. le comte d'Artois
wished to feel in the Empress's promises, it was this : that
she had genuinely intended to serve the cause by providing
a corps of troops, to be commanded by Gustavus III. The
execution of this project was only prevented by death. That
the project existed I could not doubt, seeing that Prince
Repnin had given me his word of honour in confidence at Riga
that he had received instructions to hold the corps in readiness
and to take command of it himself, under the King's orders.

After a voyage of three days we reached Denmark and
dropped our anchor. The approach to Copenhagen on the
Bornholm side presents a variety of scenery, and the town
with its two roadsteads is most attractive to the eye, especially
to an eye that has recently seen nothing but a wide expanse
of waters. The entrance to the town on the harbour side is
in no way very remarkable. The houses are regularly built,
but very low ; the streets fairly wide but not very lively, though
your cicerone will encourage you to fancy anything you please
as regards the population by assuring you that the inhabitants
are all at dinner at the moment, and that therefore you cannot
form any estimate of their numbers. In the centre of the

>wn there are two squares that would be thought very fine
some of the provincial towns of France, but are very

O 2

196 MEMOIRS OF THE

mediocre for a capital. In one of these squares your attention
is called to a statue of Christian V, whose mind, according to
history, was vast and profound, but whose body appears to
have been short and fat. The palace is fine, and is everything
that can be desired for a King of the second order : for a great
monarch the rooms would perhaps be a little low, but that is
the only fault with which this building can be reproached.

Among the most extraordinary of the striking sights to be
seen in Copenhagen are a King who performs tricks and capers
for the diversion of strangers ; a Crown Prince who has white
eyelashes and eyebrows, tow-coloured hair, and pink eyes, and
in every way resembles an albino ; and vaulted stables of great
beauty, where sixteen milk-white horses are all that remain
of the beautiful breed that once supplied mounts for all the
knights of Denmark.

As the gazettes had published the fact that M. le comte
d'Artois was travelling in Russia, and as it was most essential
that his return by sea should be kept a secret — since the French
could easily have sent vessels to cruise about in the North Sea
and intercept him — he landed in the strictest incognito with
the Comte d'Escars, the Baron de Roll, and myself. The
Bishop of Arras was left on board, as he was suffering from
a slight fit of apoplexy. No one but the Russian Minister 8
was supposed to be in the secret, and he showed the town and
palace, not only to us, but to some officers belonging to the
Russian frigate that lay at anchor in the roadstead. However,
on entering one of the rooms of the palace we found M. de
Bernstorff, the head of the ministry : 9 he greeted us all alike,
and as we never addressed M. le comte d'Artois by name it
seemed impossible that he should recognise him. M. de
Bernstorff showed us over the whole palace; and at last, as
we entered a very large room, he went up to a certain door,
and turning the key in the lock, very skilfully made M. le
comte d'Artois pass in before us. He then begged us to
await our friend a moment without following him.

We were left there for seven or eight minutes, during which
time the Comte d'Escars, who in his capacity as captain of
the guard was responsible for the prince's person, desperately

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 197

regretted that he had consented to M. de Bernstorff's request.
At last M. le comte d'Artois returned to us, and described to
us his astonishment when, on entering the room alone, with
his shabby grey coat, and great loose breeches over his boots,
and his hair all tumbled, he saw the whole of the royal family
in their gala clothes and their orders on their coats, coming
forward to meet him. The Crown Prince said that he knew
M. le comte d'Artois desired to be strictly incognito, and
that the secret should not go beyond the royal family; but
that neither he nor they could bear to have Henri IV 's
descendant and Louis XVFs brother so near to them, without
showing him their heartfelt respect. M. le comte d'Artois
must have been greatly embarrassed, but preserved, one may
be sure, the dignified and easy bearing that he has by nature.
No more tactful and graceful way could have been found to
do honour to a prince whose unfortunate circumstances obliged
him to forgo the amenities of the Court, and remain absolutely
unknown.

M. le comte d'Artois expressed his gratitude most court-
eously to M. de Bernstorff, who escorted him to the last
vestibule, where he took leave of him and retired. No further
allusion was made to the incident. Fortunately, before it
occurred, we had watched the royal family passing along a
gallery : otherwise only M. le comte d'Artois would have had
his curiosity satisfied.

We returned to our inn to make arrangements for our
departure, and afterwards were taken round the harbour in a
boat. It is certain that no Power possesses a finer harbour,
nor one that is kept in better order, or is more carefully
managed. The Admiralty storehouses are so vast and so well
distributed that each ship has her own arsenal and depot.
The royal navy and the merchant service are separated; and
no si^ht could be more impressive than the twenty-four ships
of the line that form the whole naval strength of the kingdom,
lying side by side in the harbour.

After this expedition we entered the boat that was to take
us back to the frigate, -and steered for the open sea. The sea
was very rough, and the wind absolutely against us. After an

198 MEMOIRS OF THE

hour's rowing we had made very little way, and could not
hope to reach the ship in less than six hours' time. Count
Golovkin, the lieutenant who wras steering us, suggested that
we should return and spend the night on shore, send word to
the frigate to sail round to Elsinore, and meet her in that
harbour, which is only six leagues from Copenhagen. This
idea was received with acclamation : we promptly rowed ashore,
and in the space of a moment exchanged the agonies of our
cruel tossing in the boat for the best supper the inn could
afford. The Russian Minister, who had not expected to see
us again, came to share it with us; and we spent two hours
at the table as gaily as though the times were happier. As
we grew rather sleepy at last, we went off to bed, leaving it to
Count Golovkin to make all the arrangements for the following
morning.

At five o'clock we rose. The little vehicles that were to
convey us were quite ready ; the frigate was already on her
way to Elsinore ; and we started.

In the outskirts of the town one sees a group of buildings
that are as important as they are interesting : the Sailors'
Institution. In two streets of perfectly regular construction
four thousand men are accommodated, each with a little house
and garden of his own, large enough for husband, wife, and
children. These houses are clean and well kept, and form an
ideal resting-place for men made prematurely old by long
voyages. On leaving the town one is struck by the excellent
condition of the fortifications, which I had not time to examine
in detail.

The road between Copenhagen and Elsinore, without exag-
geration, will bear comparison with all the loveliest scenery
of England and Italy. This smiling landscape, this uninter-
rupted expanse of "English garden," which is beautified and
varied at every turn by the inequalities of the ground,
resembles a royal park rather than an ordinary country scene
or public high-road. On either side are country-houses sur-
rounded by luxuriant woods and lakes; here and there are
picturesque views of distant landscape ; while the pretty and
prosperous villages testify to the wealth of the inhabitants and

the wise

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 199

ie wise administration of the government, and contrast in the
most attractive way with sudden glimpses of the sea. Every
step provides a new pleasure for the eye, and leads imper-
ceptibly, by a series of charming rural scenes, to the impres-
sive picture presented by the commercial activity of the Sound.
Here stand the town, fortress, and port of Elsinore. This
last, every year, receives tribute from twelve thousand
merchant-ships, which minister to the wealth of the North and
West by transporting their respective products from one clime
to the other. The town is small, is built in the Dutch manner,
and is extremely clean. The architecture of the fortress is
very massive in style, and recalls the romances of ancient
chivalry.

We alighted from our carriages at the English inn. Our
frigate had already arrived, and so good is the anchorage that
she was close to the steps of the jetty. We dined, went on
board, and set sail at about six in the evening.

A convoy of four hundred vessels, with an escort of two
English frigates, was occupying the whole width of the Sound,
and was simultaneously saluting the fortress of Elsinore and
that of Helsingborg in Sweden, on the opposite shore. The
captain of our frigate had to steer through all this crowd of
ships, like a coachman driving through a street ; and we
never touched one of them, though we were constantly within
an ace of doing so.

The charming country in which we had spent the past
thirty-six hours had chased away the gloomy thoughts that the
barren land of Russia always leaves in the mind. We had
a prosperous voyage : four days after leaving the Sound and
Cattegat we entered the river Humber in Yorkshire, and cast
anchor at Hull — an interesting moment, on which depended
the good or evil fortune of our future. M. le comte d'Artois,
in his eagerness to forward his affairs and know his fate,
landed immediately, and had all his possessions taken ashore.
We established ourselves in an inn, whence M. le comte
d'Artois despatched a courier to announce his arrival to the
Due d'Harcourt,10 who represented the Princes' interests in
London, and to Count Voron^ow, the Russian Minister.;1*

200 MEMOIRS OF THE

Two days later they both arrived ; but alas ! what was our
plight when they informed M. le comte d'Artois that he must
re-embark without a moment's delay, since the King could
not interfere with the laws of the land nor save the prince
from his creditors ! It was even possible, they said, that
there might be ill-will on the part of the government ; but in
any case, unless he passed the night on board his ship, he
would certainly be arrested.

The Princes had been obliged, during the past campaign,
to obtain many of the supplies for their troops from England,
and had been unable to meet all their liabilities. Hesitation
was therefore out of the question. The orders were given,
and we returned to the ship with all our baggage, to wait
for an indefinite time in the Humber, while the prince's affairs
were in progress. I confess that personally I never experi-
enced a more annoying mischance. My attack of measles in
Petersburg had made it necessary for me to be careful of my
health, and in these circumstances care was impossible.

A few days sufficed to make our position clear. England
refused to adopt the Empress's plan, and judging by the tone
and words of Count Voronzow, she probably guessed that this
would be the case when she made her alluring promises. La
Vendee, at that time, was at the height of its glory.12 What
course was M. le comte d'Artois to adopt ? I did not conceal
from him the course that I should have adopted in his place ; 13
but we saw the matter differently. It was impossible, perhaps,
that my point of view should have been his, seeing that he
was a prince born and brought up in the most absolute pros-
perity, and a man whose character and nature were such that
trouble suggested no remedy to him save patience and resig-
nation, unless ample means of resistance, of the kind his
education had fitted him to use, were placed in his hand. If
honour and good intentions were sufficient to smooth the way
to a desired goal, no one would be more fitted to reach it than
M. le comte d'Artois ; but to cut a path while the high-road
was still in the making, or to fight his way to the throne of
his fathers through every kind of chance and danger, were
not the sort, of resolves that were likely to be implanted in a

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 201

prince's mind at Versailles. It is foolish to waste regret upon
a thing that from the very beginning has been inherently
impossible. I have no reproaches to bring against M. le comte
d'Artois. I respect and love him as he is : he made every
effort that occurred to him as possible.

In spite of his certain knowledge, since reaching Hull, that
he would never see his schemes realised in the form contem-
plated— or apparently contemplated — by the Empress, it was
some consolation to him to be anchored in an English road-
stead, discussing his affairs ; but I confess that to me the
situation was boring to a degree that I could no longer bear.
As I walked up and down the deck of the frigate I could see
a pretty little house on the banks of the river, the situation
of which, it seemed to me, made it a delightful dwelling-place.
It came into my head to ask for shelter there, and to try and
hire the things I should require, for the time that M. le comte
d'Artois remained at anchor in this place. My attempt was
successful. The rich farmer to whom the house belonged
received me with the most perfect courtesy, and I begged M. le
comte d'Artois to send me his orders when his fate should be
decided.

A few days later I received a message from him, to the effect
that he was about to set sail, and to return to Hamm in West-
phalia,14 by way of Holland. I lacked the courage to accom-
pany him. I wrote to him that, since I could no longer be
useful to him, I begged him to restore me my liberty ; that he
might be very sure I should always be at his disposal ; that I
had business in London and wished to take this opportunity of
attending to it ; and that I desired to recover my health com-
pletely. The prince consented to give me my freedom, and
set sail.

After remaining for three more days with my good farmer,
and rewarding him well for his trouble, I set out to London.
Several French families of my acquaintance were living at
Richmond. I rented a little house near them, on the banks
of the Thames, and passed two peaceful months there, drink-
ig ass's milk. It was the finest summer that had been seen

England for many a year, and the charming situation of

202 MEMOIRS OF THE

Richmond is sufficient in itself to restore a man to health.
Mine became as good as ever. The Austrian and English
armies, at this time, were besieging Valenciennes, and I should
have been greatly tempted to join them if there had been any
hope that I could bear the exertion, before fully recovering
from the effects of my attack of measles. For I was not really
cured when I left Petersburg.

However, I left England in the middle of the summer, and
proceeded to Brussels. All of my friends who were not in
France were gathered here ; but those of my relations who had
remained in their own country wrere in such a wretched position
that nothing except my professional concerns could make me
forget my terrible anxiety on their account. Many of the
French in Brussels were in the same position as myself; but
this time, above all others, brought out the salient points of
the French character, the frivolous and careless habit of mind
of which they cannot rid themselves, whatever the circum-
stances of their lives.

Society in Brussels was far more like a gathering of friends
in search of pleasure than a concourse of exiles and outlaws.
The most brilliant country fete, the most delightful visit to
Spa, was never accompanied with so much gaiety and dissipa-
tion of every kind. It was at supper-parties, where the
merriment ran as high as in happier days in Paris, that the
Brussels newspaper was usually read — the sheet that recorded
the names, day by day, of the victims whom Robespierre sent
to the scaffold. Among them were always to be found the
names of relations, friends, or intimate acquaintances of some
of the guests present. It is only by comparing this astonish-
ing insensibility with the indifference one feels upon the field
of battle that I can understand the possibility of it : the
numbers of the dead and dying accustom the mind to the idea
of destruction, and the first feeling of emotion is quickly
effaced. The list of the guillotined appeared so unfailingly
and regularly, and the sorrows it caused were awaited with so
much certainty that the heart was inured to them. This, at
all events, is the only light I can throw upon the scene at
Brussels, which was revolting, whenever one allowed oneself to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 203

dwell upon it. The capture of Valenciennes 13 and the hopes
it roused might have served society as a pretext for further
merry-making, if the Austrian government's refusal to follow
it up had not at once made plain how little advantage would
be gained by the temporary successes of the allied armies.

Had the allies used the possession of Valenciennes as a means
towards re-establishing the crown and monarchy of France,
without making plans of invasion, or definitely expressing their
intention to make reprisals, and to dictate the extent and
frontiers of the kingdom, and even to choose the form of its
government, there is every reason to believe that the majority
of the nation would have combined to put a check upon the
horrors that were being committed in their country. A civil
war, to the advantage of the monarchy, would probably have
been the result. But the Austrian ministry insisted on flying
the imperial flag over the new conquests ; and the French in
their patriotism — a virtue that is always roused in our excit-
able nation by any attack on their honour or self-esteem — were
more intent on defending their country than on obtaining peace
and order. All the enemies that the Austrians made might
have been their partisans, had they offered France her laws
and her sovereigns with all their rights intact. The Austrians,
who make war with the deliberation of an act of justice rather
than with the energy of usurpation, would not so often have
failed in their projects if they had followed the promptings
of their own genius, as they were quite capable of doing.
Slow deliberate movements lead one to expect a loyal character
and profound views, but they were inept in every possible
respect. They ended, as might have been expected, by failing
in their object, and only fulfilling that of Robespierre.

After the capture of Valenciennes they should have alarmed
the French government by indefatigable activity. They should
either have attempted to seize other towns, or have conceived
some bold and useful project for penetrating to the capital,
at the same time supporting the weak garrisons of the second-
rate fortresses that are alternated with those of the first order
along that frontier. But to all the forces that Jacobinism
called into play they opposed nothing but the pedantry and

204 MEMOIRS OF THE

routine that are so familiar in the history of Austrian warfare.
They paid no heed to the difference of the circumstances, nor
to the variety of resources that a revolution may produce, and
they allowed the ranks of their enemies fo be reinforced by
time, whose tactics are far more successful and dangerous than
any of the others against which the Austrians had to defend
themselves daily.

The Prince de Ligne's chateau of Beloeil was in the very
heart of the scene of the war. I was often there. As soon
as Marshal Coburg decided to besiege Quesnoy I joined General
Clerfayt, who was appointed to take command on the occasion.
My rank in the Russian army enabled me to take, part in the
operations, and to act as a volunteer whenever it seemed good
to me.

A fortnight after the trenches were made and the cannon-
ading began, the commandant of the garrison capitulated (10th
Sept. 1793), after which I returned to Beloeil.

The taking of Quesnoy opened the way to Paris; and, had
not the importance of marching on the capital been altogether
forgotten, the capture of Cambrai might have followed very
soon, to make matters easier. At this period it was in the
power of the Austrian government to put an end to the
troubles of France ; but the revolutionaries were too energetic
in crime, too full of ability, and too well equipped to leave
their fate for long in the hands of their enemies. Their
ingenious diversions and skilful tactics soon robbed the good
cause of the hopes it had had every reason to entertain at the
beginning of the campaign.

Towards the middle of the autumn the progress made in
La Vende*e suggested to the English government the idea of
co-operating with the generals commanding in that province.
Lord Moira 16 was despatched to the islands of Jersey and
Guernsey with a corps of eight thousand men, in order to
make a descent on the coast of France as soon as the Vendean
generals, who were prepared for the event, should have made
their dispositions in accordance with it. Desiring to join this
interesting expedition I proceeded to London, and obtained
leave to embark with General Doyle,17 quartermaster-general

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 205

of the English army-corps. The Prince of Wales gave me
a letter of introduction to Lord Moira, and from the govern-
ment I received an embarkation-order. I at once joined
General Doyle at Portsmouth, and we set sail in the frigate
Vestal for Guernsey, where Lord Moira and his troops were
awaiting us.

On entering the open channel we encountered the most
terrific gale that had been experienced for a century, and after
enduring more than words can express, and being tossed at
the mercy of the waves for five days, we were forced to return
to Portsmouth. Two days later we set sail for the second
time, and in four days we reached Guernsey. All the prepara-
tions were already completed; the signals that the Vendeans
were to make upon the coast, to summon us thither, were
agreed upon ; and Lord Moira had no doubt, or at least seemed
to have no doubt, that the expedition would take place in the
course of a few days. We awaited it in vain, however, for a
month, at the end of which time it was decided that the season
was too far advanced for the ships to continue lying off
Guernsey ; and Lord Moira announced that he was going to
take his troops back to England. We embarked accordingly,
and in three days' time landed at Cowes in the Isle of
Wight.

It has always been doubtful whether the English govern-
ment acted in good faith in the matter of this expedition ; but
the circumstances pointed to it so clearly that it was very
easy for those who were engaged in it to be deceived as to the
intentions of the ministry. If it were really intended that the
affair should not be carried through, I am persuaded that Lord
Moira himself knew nothing of it. It could not have been
determined to make a feint at that time, with a view to carry-
ing out a genuine expedition later on, except by means of an
open and definite agreement between Mr. Pitt and the Vendean
generals. It seems far more probable that the undertaking
was really projected, but that the Vendean generals could not
direct their operations upon the point where a combination
with the English troops could be effected, that is to say the
coast opposite the two islands.

206 MEMOIRS OP THE

After spending twelve days at Cowes, to show my gratitude
to Lord Moira, who had heaped kindnesses upon me, I returned
by Southampton to London, and thence to Brussels. The
winter was passed — like all the winters that follow campaigns
by the armies of Austria — in regrets for not having done
better, and in hopes to do better in the coming campaign ; but,
as the character of this nation and ministry will never change,
they will never be conscious of their mistakes until after they
have committed them, and nothing but the mistakes of their
enemies will ever counteract theirs. The struggle that the
successive governments of France carried on against the
Austrian cabinet after the Revolution was extremely like a
fight between a monkey and a bear. The series of operations
executed in that war has been described by so many eye-
witnesses that my patience fails me at the thought of adding
to their number. I will confine myself to the allegorical com-
parison that I have just made ; and I appeal to every man who
cares to look closely into this interesting period of his life,
to support my contention that the disproportion between the
energy, talent, and intelligence of the two sides made it a
matter of course that the German forces should be altogether
at the mercy of the many resources possessed by France.

The campaign that followed this winter of 1794 was expected
to be the most decisive and energetic of all. The Austrian
and English armies, notwithstanding the time they had entirely
wasted or insufficiently employed, were again in a position to
deal mortal blows to France, and to engage with her armies
under the most favourable conditions. I wrote to the Empress
of Russia, to ask her for a very prompt letter of introduction
to the Duke of York ; 18 for it seemed probable that I should
have occasion to see a great deal of him in the course of the
campaign.

The English had adopted the system of levying foreign
regiments, with which to reinforce their own troops upon the
continent. Several Frenchmen had obtained commissions to
form such regiments, and in spite of the disadvantages attached
to service of this kind, I could not resist my wish to create a
corps for myself. I hoped to make my position agreeable by

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 207

regarding it from the military point of view alone, and not,
like certain other men, as a speculation.

I set out to London, with a view to seeking the consent of
the government and taking all the measures that were necessary
to my project. The Prince of Wales worked on my behalf
with the greatest energy and courtesy, and it wras owing to his
gracious support and prompt action that the government com-
missioned me to raise a regiment of light dragoons, six
squadrons strong.

I laid the terms of the contract before the War Office, with
my conditions and pledges ; and in a week the document was
approved and signed. I appointed the Comte de Serent (the
younger) 19 my lieutenant-colonel, and entrusted him with all
the business that was to be completed in England, such as the
equipment of every kind. I then returned to Brussels to make
arrangements for recruiting the men, buying the horses, dis-
tributing posts, and establishing depots. Hardly had the first
steps been taken, however, when a fresh discussion arose in the
English Parliament as to the usefulness of these corps, and an
order was issued to the Duke of York to suspend the organ-
isation of those for which commissions had been most recently
granted.20 I did not wish to waste, in a state of doubt that
I had had no reason to expect, the time that might be employed
in entertaining other plans ; and I therefore preferred to give
up the undertaking without further delay. The subsequent
course of events justified this prudent step, and I had every
cause to congratulate myself on having escaped this thankless
and laborious task. I was thankful to be free again, and in
a position to satisfy my curiosity in any quarter to which
circumstances should point.

Being armed with a letter of introduction from the Empress
of Russia to the Duke of York, and already known to the
Austrian army, I made my arrangements for following the
operations of the allied forces. This was a charming, as well
as an instructive, form of warfare; especially at a time when

ti combination of circumstances had brought the scene of the
var into a country like Brabant and the neighbourhood of a
;own like Brussels. Here those for whom I cared most were

208 MEMOIRS OF THE

living ; while my own relations were suffering from the crimes
of the Revolution, and struggling against the fate that had
recently befallen two of the dearest among them.21 All the
inactive periods of the campaign — which the Austrian system
tended to prolong only too often — I spent in Brussels ; and I
joined the allied armies whenever they engaged in active
operations.

Of the battles of Maubeuge,22 which were fought on three
successive days, I have nothing but mistakes to record. The
first, which was confined to some preparatory manoeuvres and
an insignificant cannonade, might have been made of more
consequence.23

The second was won by the Austrians, and decided by a
charge of the cavalry of the right wing, under General Belle-
garde,24 which broke the whole line of the French infantry as
it was in the act of deploying. This might have been a decisive
engagement if Marshal Coburg had profited by his success, and
pursued the enemy when the retreat began. But he contented
himself with the mere fact of victory, and remained on the
field of battle when it was deserted by the enemy, instead of
turning the defeat into a rout. His only trophies of victory
were twenty-five guns ; and he never concerned himself at all
with the possibility of the danger recurring.

While all the generals were exchanging the usual congratula-
tions on the battle-field I was walking to and fro not far away,
with a preoccupied and melancholy air. Several men came
gaily up to me, to interrupt my reflections and ask why I was
not taking more part in the general satisfaction. " Pray allow
me," I answered, "to be slightly dissatisfied, when I might
have had occasion to rejoice over a decisive result ; when I
might have seen the enemy made incapable of any further
enterprise for some time to come, and, consequently, Maubeuge
yours. Observe the lie of the ground," I added, "on your
late battle-field. Remember that you won your advantage in
the plain, where the superiority of your cavalry could not fail
to give you the victory ; but the centre of the army, under
M. de Clerfayt, is posted on broken ground, among woods,
and your success has not enabled him to move. Beware of

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 209

to-morrow, therefore. If you wish to send a courier to Vienna,
waste no time."

And indeed, when day dawned on the morrow, M. de Cler-
fayt was attacked by the whole mass of the French forces.
The battle raged throughout the day,25 and the Austrian right
wing was not engaged at all.

General Hadik,26 who was in command of the left, made a
successful resistance ; but at about six o'clock M. de Clerfayt,
finding that he was being driven back, said to one of his aides-
de-camp in my presence : " Go and tell Marshal Coburg that I
am beaten, and that he must consider the question of falling
back across the Sambre." Marshal Coburg accordingly gave
the order to the right wing, which began to retire.

M. de Clerfayt, who was all the time growing weaker and
gradually losing ground, was impatiently longing for the night
to bring him relief, and was in the meantime suffering con-
siderably ; but the left, under General Hadik, was more
fortunate, and forced the enemy to retire. As soon as his
success was assured he sent news of it to M. de Clerfayt and
Marshal Coburg. M. de Clerfayt instantly wrote to the
marshal : " Things are changed ; General Hadik has repulsed
the enemy ; I think the day might end well without our re-
crossing the Sambre." But the right wing was already carry-
ing out Marshal Coburg 's first orders : he found it easier to
allow this shameful retreat to continue, even though it was
not demanded by the circumstances, than to call back the
troops whose retrograde movement had begun. From mere
apathy he gave no counter-order.27 The army, therefore,
crossed the Sambre, a most important battle was lost, and
Maubeuge was saved ; while the French, believing themselves
defeated, retired with all possible speed towards the right.
It would be difficult to believe in such acts of warfare if one
lad not seen them ; but I will guarantee that any man who has
irved with the Austrians can produce a collection of speci-
iens as striking as mine. The truth of this statement is
>roved by the results, and by the various treaties of peace.

On the following day the entire Austrian army found itself
m the further bank of the Sambre, while not a soul could give

210 MEMOIRS OF THE

a really good reason for being there. The men exchanged
glances; every one was embarrassed by his position and the
part he was playing ; but there was no possibility of redeeming
this culpable blunder. My friends congratulated me on my
unhappy prevision, and, having enumerated all the actions in
which I had seen Marshal Coburg take part, they said jestingly
that I brought him ill-luck, and that he was always beaten
when I was present. This was unhappily only too true, and
if Marshal Coburg had made the same remark to me himself
I should gladly have repeated the comical answer of the aide-
de-camp at the battle of Hochstadt : ''Never mind, sir; you
might easily fight a hundred battles like that without winning
a single one ! "

I was curious to see something of the English army, which
seemed always to be useless and unlucky, and was only known
to me by report. As soon as I foresaw the probability of its
acting alone I joined the Duke of York. It was at Tournai
that I introduced myself to him for the first time, and pre-
sented the letter that the Empress of Russia had given me for
him. He received me with the utmost kindness, and even
then I gathered from what he said that he was on the point
of marching upon Menin. He decided to do so a week after
my arrival.

We left Tournai in the evening with the whole army, in
order that by the time day dawned we might reach the first
body of French troops that was to be attacked. When we
came to the point where the dispositions for the attack were
to be made the Duke of York dismounted, entered the house
of the local priest, and went calmly to bed. General Fox, his
quartermaster-general,28 with Lord Cornwallis,29 some other
officers of the staff, and an officer of the Austrian staff, held
a consultation in one of the rooms on the tactics to be adopted.
This discussion was a veritable lesson in indecision. The
attack was to take place at dawn, and no two persons were
agreed on the method to be employed. General Fox insisted
on the importance of waiting for the Esterhazy Regiment of
Austrian Hussars, who had promised to arrive in time and had
not appeared : others adduced difficulties of other kinds.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 211

Finally Lord Cornwallis, who was worried by the impossibility
of coming to a decision, said : " Where is His Royal High-
ness? " — "He is in bed," answered one of the aides-de-camp.
— " He is in bed, is he? " was the reply. " Well, if he is in
bed, I shall go to bed too." No sooner said than done; he
left the room ; all the others followed his example, and no one
was left but the Austrian officer (Orlandini) and myself to
laugh over this curious council of war and its important results.
It is quite certain that daybreak wrould have found them all
still sleeping, if another reason had not caused the expedition
to be abandoned.

At about four o'clock in the morning a letter arrived from
the Duke of Coburg, informing the Duke of York that he
was about to attack the enemy, with a view to saving
Charleroi : it was therefore decided to await the issue of this
battle before proceeding further.

As soon as I heard the news I took my leave of the Duke of
York, telling him that I was going to join the Austrian army
without a moment's delay, in order to take part in the battle.
I had at that time the most convenient and portable baggage
that a volunteer could possibly take with him on active service.
I had six English saddle-horses, all fine strong animals : two
carried my luggage, or saddle-bags, which contained every-
thing that was at all necessary, without any need for a
carriage : my valet rode another ; and the three others were
ridden by two grooms and myself. Every day each horse was
employed in a different way, so that none of them suffered
from sores or fatigue.

I reached the Austrian army on the evening before the
battle, and slept at Nivelle.

At three o'clock in the morning I visited the battle-field,
lely the plain of Fleurus.30 The Austrian army was com-

>sed of eighty thousand men under Marshal Coburg, with
ic Prince of Waldeck 31 as quartermaster-general. The Arch-
luke Charles, who was then young, was under the marshal's
rders. The French army comprised a hundred thousand men,

id was commanded by General Jourdan.32 The Dutch army
>rmed the Austrians' right wing, and acted separately,
p 2

212 MEMOIRS OF THE

The right wing of the French army was entrenched, and
the whole line presented a most imposing appearance. This
was the only battle in which I ever saw them use balloons :
there was one connected with each wing. They wrere attached
to the ground by a rope, by means of which a man sent down
his notes and remarks on the movements of the Austrian army.
The men in the ranks were greatly impressed by this novel
sight, which they did not understand. Many attempts were
made to aim shells at the balloons, but all in vain : not one
went near them.

In order to be in a better position to judge of the affair
and observe all its details I took up my post in the column of
the centre, which was commanded by General Kaunitz.33 The
plain of Fleurus is very wide and level, and the glorious sun-
shine of that morning enabled one to see the whole extent of
the two armies. A more splendid spectacle will never be seen
by any soldier in the whole course of his career. The Austrians
were bent on carrying the entrenchments of the enemy's right
wing : they encountered a very determined resistance, returned
to the attack several times, lost a great many men, and even
brought up the cavalry. At the first sign of success the word
of command was given to the whole battle-line to advance.
I was between General Kaunitz and Prince Charles of Lor-
raine,34 who was in command of the cavalry of the column,
when a staff-officer came up to General Kaunitz with an order
to advance, with drums beating and trumpets sounding. A
quarter of an hour passed after this order was received, and
still General Kaunitz had not carried it out. I went up to
Prince Charles of Lorraine and expressed my surprise. " You
will see plenty of that sort of thing," he said: "you do not
know this country yet." I wished to be quite certain that
General Kaunitz had heard the order, and I told Prince
Charles I was going to risk reminding him of it. I accord-
ingly approached him, and said: "Your Excellency surely
understood the order that came just now from M. le prince
de Waldeck?" — "Yes," he answered; "but do not let
us hurry; we have plenty of time." He added nothing
further to this strange answer, and left me in the bewildei

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 213

condition that deliberate disobedience cannot fail to
produce.

Three regiments of French cavalry, two of dragoons and one
of hussars, made a movement to the right to charge Prince
Charles of Lorraine's brigade. General Kaunitz called out to
him, to put him on his guard ; whereupon Prince Charles
wheeled to the left, formed up his two regiments in line, and
charged the three French regiments with the utmost intrepidity
and skill. His horse received a sword-cut on the head at the
moment of the shock, but did not fall ; the French ranks were
broken ; the melee was long, and at last decisive ; 35 Prince
Charles kept up the pursuit as long as was possible, and then
formed up again. This fine charge won him the Cross of
Maria Theresa. It was, however, executed by only one of his
regiments : the other halted at the moment of the attack, and
turned its back upon the enemy.

General Kaunitz did not stir, and I can only suppose that a
number of circumstances of the same nature combined to dis-
tract the Prince of Waldeck, for he lost his head 36 and all his
hopes of success before being driven to do so by the enemy.
The engagement had begun at daybreak, and the whole day
was spent in cannonades and partial attacks, without a single
decisive manoeuvre that could determine the issue of the battle.

It is said, though the matter has never been cleared up, that
the Prince of Waldeck heard of the surrender of Charleroi 37
while the battle was in progress. Even if this supposition be
true, it was no reason for failing to make every possible effort
to win a battle on which the fate of the Netherlands depended
— for the loss of it made the evacuation of that country cer-
None the less it is an undoubted fact that nothing was
lone to overcome the difficulties of the situation, and at about
mr o'clock the whole army received orders to retreat.

I accompanied the troops as far as the camps where they
rere to pass the night, but as soon as they had settled down I

irted for Brussels, with the object of warning my friends
pack up their possessions, and secure the horses necessary
>r their journey. For I had no doubt that the Netherlands
'ould be at once abandoned.

214 MEMOIRS OF THE

Thus the Austrian army, despite its admirable theories and
admirable administration, will always — until the national
character shall have changed — be markedly inferior to any
army that employs resolute and energetic tactics. It would be
foolish to deny talent to some of the Austrian generals ; but
their talents cannot be utilised like those of the French
generals, because the spirit of the nation is opposed to any
sudden innovation. The Austrian army, io all time, will be
old-fashioned and theoretical : brave, it is true, but slow, and
obstinately attached to its own methods. It will fight our
nephews as it fought our forefathers, and will consequently be
beaten by the former as it was by the latter. The Austrian
army is so well administered that after a campaign — or indeed
after ten — it is ready to resume operations sooner than any
other army in Europe. But the inertia, both mental and
practical, of the generals, the slavishness with which their
preparations are subjected to routine, the incapacity and in-
difference of their subordinates, especially in the commissariat,
and the apathy, both in success and failure, which prevents
them from redeeming their reverses or following up their good
fortune, are so many weaknesses and hindrances in the way of
their progress. They will always be forestalled in all their
schemes ; and as the disordered state of their finances long ago
led to their paying the soldiers both economically and irregu-
larly, the subordinate ranks cannot fail to contain a greater
number of corruptible individuals than those of other armies.
They will not derive as much advantage as they give, there-
fore, in this particular branch of secondary resources, a branch
that is unhappily too often employed, and has therefore become
indispensable. In the Austrian army one meets pride and
presumption more frequently than self-esteem and patriotism ;
enthusiasm and love of glory are unknown ; men of good birth
serve from motives of duty and honour, the others with a view
to earning their living. They take the field without any
special repugnance, are eager for peace, are resigned when
taken prisoners, do not press for an exchange, and are only
interested in the corps to which they are attached. If in a
pitched battle the left wing should happen to distinguish itself

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 215

notably, while the complete defeat of the right wing entails
the loss of the battle and ultimately the signing of a dis-
advantageous treaty, the left wing has reached the summit of
its ambitions : it has won distinction in the affair, and peace is
concluded.

I do not believe there is a single instance, in the annals of
the Austrian army, of a general giving succour to a corps in
danger from an enemy of superior strength, without an order
or suggestion from the commander-in-chief. Since the corps
in question is not under his orders it does not concern him.
From his own position he can see the corps yield and lose
ground, and at the moment of its repulse he could easily rein-
force it if he chose ; but it is not his business ; his duty is to
hold his own position. If he have held it he is completely
satisfied ; if the other general have been beaten it is all the
worse for him. There are faults that are inherent in the
national character, and these are some of them : they are
incurable. It would seem all the more important, then, to
cure those that can be affected by human efforts, and thus to
counterbalance, as far as possible, the incalculable differences
that exist at present.

A short time after the battle of Fleurus the combined
armies effected their retreat from the Netherlands. I left
Brussels as the French entered it, and proceeded to Antwerp,
whither the English army was marching on its way to the
ports of Holland. Its retreat, it seemed to me, was no better
organised than its offensive measures, and I shall never forget
a certain incident that happened near Antwerp, when the
army was on the point of crossing the canal. Seeing a great
cloud of smoke rising from the bridge I ran to discover the
cause of it ; I found the bridge on fire ; I sought the Duke
of York high and low ; but could only find his quartermaster-
general, whom I informed of the astonishing sight I had just
seen. This phlegmatic individual replied that he had given
orders for the bridges to be burnt after the army had crossed
them, and that some one had certainly made a mistake in
setting fire to them before. He despatched some officers to
make it quite plain that the bridges were not to be burnt till

216 MEMOIRS OF THE

afterwards. Happily they arrived in time to have the fire put
out, but several beams were already burnt.

The English army, having decided to proceed as quickly as
possible to the various ports, had no further attractions for
me : I left it at Antwerp and joined the Austrian army, which
was then falling back on Maestricht. I did not doubt that I
should have time to arrive before it ; and on this occasion, to
rest myself after my numerous exertions, I drove in a post-
chaise, while my saddle-horses followed me.

The Due de Richelieu, who was then at Antwerp, made the
journey with me. When we had passed Bois-le-Duc and were
approaching Maestricht we were told by the peasants in a
village that the Austrian army had already been through the
town, and that the French had now entered it. We did not
believe it, and continued our journey ; but as we proceeded
the rumour was so often confirmed that, when we were quite
near the town, our doubts began to seem unreasonable. By
that time, indeed, any doubt that we still entertained was
quite without foundation ; but we were so near that the idea
of turning back was extremely unpleasant, and we determined
to risk going on. The first vedette we saw was wearing a blue
coat and was facing the town, either because his horse would
not stand still, or because he himself was tempted by curiosity.
We felt no doubt, at that moment, that we should be captured
in our post-chaise : the colour of the man's uniform, his posi-
tion, and all the rumours we had heard, combined to make us
painfully anxious. Our perturbation was cruelly increased
when we saw the vedette call up his men, and come galloping
in our direction to reconnoitre us. Most fortunately it tran-
spired that they were, after all, Austrian Stabs Dragoons, the
only regiment in the Austrian army that wore a blue uniform.
We recovered from our agony, of which we said nothing ; and
made our way to Marshal Coburg, who was evacuating Maes-
tricht, in accordance with his usual custom when he undertook
to defend a town. He himself did not yet know where his
retreat would end.

It was at this moment that I heard of Robespierre's death.
A man at one of the French outposts called out to an Austrian :

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 217

" You have some good surgeons in your army, have you not? "
— " Why? " asked the other. — " Because Robespierre has just
cut his throat." I have seldom been more pleased by any
piece of news. In a flash it came to my mind that the people
I loved were saved from the terrors that had hung over them
so long, that they were free, perhaps, and even preparing to
leave France. From that moment my mind was constantly
occupied in wondering whether they had the means of escaping
from the abyss they were in, and weighing the difficulties they
would have to surmount before they were at liberty.

I conceived the idea of going to Switzerland to help them
and prepare a shelter for them, where they could rest after
all their alarm and suffering ; and I decided to set out as
quickly as possible. As soon as Maestricht was evacuated I
went to Diisseldorf, which I found all the French emigres of
my acquaintance were on the point of leaving, in consequence
of the renewed retreat of the troops. My special friends in
the place made ready to go to Munster, and I prepared to part
from them once more, and start upon my own journey. After
spending a few days with them I set out, leaving my saddle-
horses with two of my friends, from whom I found it extremely
difficult to wrest them again later on, when circumstances made
them necessary to me. They had grown used to having the
horses, and (quite in a friendly way) postponed their restitution
to the last possible moment.

I went straight to Lausanne, where I made a bargain with
two men to travel to Paris in two carriages, in the character
of merchants ; to take the orders of my sister and brother ; and
to bring them back if they agreed to come. While I was
awaiting the issue of this attempt I spent six weeks in resting
and recruiting my health, after the active life I had been lead-
ing for so long. At last I heard that my two emissaries had
returned, and were accompanied by some travellers. I had no
doubt that I was on the point of meeting my dear ones, and
should soon be expressing my delight at having helped towards
their escape from the general conflagration in France. But
private affairs had prevented them from consenting to my
suggestion ; they hoped that more peaceful times were at hand ;

218 MEMOIRS OF THE

they had just left the prison in which, for fourteen months,
they had lain in Robespierre's clutches, and, now that a happier
day seemed about to dawn, they preferred not to run any fresh
risks. On going to meet the two carriages I found, instead
of my sister and brother, Mme. de la Borde and her daughter
Mme. de Noailles,38 who had profited by this opportunity at
the entreaty of my relations.

During my stay at Lausanne I had had occasion to meet a
certain Mme. de Mirabeau,39 the widow of the man who, after
leaving France, had raised a legion of troops in Conde's
Army.40 On his death the Princes had granted the proprietary
honours to his son, without having any very definite views as
to the employment of the legion. I had often thought that,
since the Empress of Russia had given me leave, and indeed
had enjoined upon me, to quit her service in favour of the
cause that concerned me so nearly, it would only be right and
fitting, in the case of an improvement in our unhappy circum-
stances, that I should prove my zeal and devotion in the only
royalist army outside the borders of France. My meeting with
Mme. de Mirabeau gave me the idea of attaining this end by
securing the proprietorship of the legion in question, from
which her five-year-old son could derive no advantage. I
began by speaking vaguely of the matter to Mme. de Mirabeau ;
and little by little I learnt the conditions on which she would
consent to part with the proprietary rights of the corps, for
the term of her son's minority. I finally obtained her
authority to acquire the rights, subject to her conditions, if I
were still desirous to do so.

Monsieur, Regent of France, was then at Verona, where he
had established himself after his journey south — the journey
that was intended to put him in touch with the southern coali-
tion and the English expedition against Toulon. With him
was my eldest brother, whom I had not seen for two years. I
could not resist the pleasure of profiting by this opportunity,
and determined to pay him a brief visit at Verona, crossing
into Italy by way of the St. Bernard Pass.

This pleasant journey added the interest of novelty to the
leisured ease that I was justified in enjoying at that moment,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 219

The life of a soldier on active service demands occasional in-
tervals of relaxation, and there is nothing more restful, nor
more calculated to divert the thoughts in a quiet and healthful
way, than the scenery of Switzerland and Italy.

On reaching Verona I had the happiness of seeing my
brother, and was delighted by the kind reception that Mon-
sieur was gracious enough to give me. I remained for six
weeks, in the course of which I spent twelve days enjoying the
beauties of ancient Venice, then so near its end. The place
was strange to me at that time, and it is very interesting to
have seen it before its fall.

I must not omit to record the satisfaction that I secured for
Monsieur's unabashed greed on my return from this expedition.
I had arranged for my journey to take place during the freshest
hours of the day and to be as quickly performed as possible,
and I loaded my carriage with everything that Venice could
produce in the way of the finest and rarest fish. On reaching
Verona I at once sent my supply of provisions to Monsieur's
kitchen, with a request to his cook to substitute this dinner
secretly for the food already provided for that day. The cook
agreed, and prepared as good a dinner as any that Monsieur
could have eaten at Versailles. When we sat down to the table
the sight that met his eyes gave him the greatest surprise,
and an amount of pleasure that was only equalled by my own
pleasure at having thought of an amusing diversion for him.
He was even more charming and gay than usual. But indeed,
in spite of all the troubles that beset him, I cannot remember
that he ever, for a single day, yielded to the ill-humour that
his situation might well have roused. His equable temper,
his quick repartee, and his interesting conversation were
unfailing, and I often found my eyes suddenly filling with
tears, so deeply touched was I by his noble and courageous
way of bearing his own griefs and alleviating those of
others.

The Venetian government treated him for some time with
deference and respect, but this state of mind was of short
duration. Like all the other governments with whom the
Princes sought an asylum, that of Venice became afraid of

220 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

being compromised, and shortly afterwards Monsieur was
obliged to go elsewhere.

Towards the end of the time that I was able to devote to
paying my court to him, and seeing my brother, I told him of
my scheme with regard to Mirabeau's Legion. He adopted
the idea with the most gratifying eagerness, and authorised
me to inform M. le prince de Conde of his wishes in the matter.
He promised to send me the usual official patents as soon as I
should ask for them, and should have found out for certain
whether the acquisition of this corps were really desirable.

The rapid advance of the French having obliged a family in
whom I was much interested to leave Munster, I arranged to
meet them at Frankfort-on-Main, and set out from Verona with
that object.

While I was in Frankfort I made all possible inquiries with
regard to Mirabeau's Legion, and was confirmed in my desire
to command it in the campaign of 1795, and to buy the
proprietary rights attached to it. M. le prince de Conde 's
headquarters were near Bale, on the banks of the Rhine. I
made several expeditions thither, to discuss all the arrange-
ments with him, and the kindness he was good enough to show
me made me more than ever anxious to acquire the means of
serving, in an agreeable way, under his orders.

The business connected with the Legion was completed in the
winter, and early in the summer of 1795 I took up the com-
mand. Thenceforward it bore my name.41

XI

Conde's Army — Reorganisation of Mirabeau's Legion, now Damas's
Legion — Review by Louis XVIII — Moreau crosses the Rhine —
Serious accident to the author — Retreat through Bavaria : fierce
encounter with General Ferino at Kamlach — Moreau's retreat —
Battles of Schussenried, Saint-Blaise, Steinstadt — Moreau re-crosses
the Rhine — Reflections on the siege of Kehl by the Archduke
Charles — On Conde's Army entering the service of Russia the author
decides to go to Italy.

IF the proceedings of the allied armies had been more method-
ical and coherent I should have been loath to hamper my move-
ments by joining Conde's Army. I had so keenly enjoyed
following the movements and operations of the previous cam-
paign, with nothing to consider but the gaining of instructive
and interesting experience, that I should have thought twice
before binding myself in a way that could not fail to curtail
my liberty; but the lack of unity and harmony that prevailed
made it very difficult to fix upon any special line of operations.
I was fulfilling a most important duty, in any case, by dedicat-
ing a certain amount of time to the only French force that still
counted for anything with the Powers, and I pinned all my
hopes to the chances it might afford me, to prove my devotion
and zeal.

Conde's Army, while it was still greatly esteemed, was not
treated with proper consideration by the cabinet of Vienna, and
for a long time had only been maintained by the unconquerable
perseverance of its leader. Frequently it was reduced to the
most desperate expedients in its struggle to live, and it was
this very disregard for its own interests that sometimes made
it a burden upon the places where it was cantoned. The
indifference shown by all the nobles who served in it to their
lack of resources, and by the private soldiers to the irregularity
of their pay ; their absolute disregard of all personal advantage

221

222 MEMOIRS OF THE

and self-interest, and indeed of everything but the attainment
of their end; and their renunciation of every kind of minor
comfort, must to all time be a proof of their fidelity and
devotion to their cause. To M. le prince de Conde, therefore,
most of all, but also to every gentleman of quality and every
soldier in the ranks, a tribute of admiration is due. Through-
out the whole time of this army's existence it was always
entrusted with every burdensome duty from which the Austrian
generals wished to save their own troops, and always took the
initiative in every perilous and doubtful operation in all its
campaigns. In every single event that took place upon the
Rhine it fell to Conde 's Army to begin hostilities, and to
conclude them if they happened to turn out badly.

It is remarkable that this army was always reduced to the
greatest straits at the very times when it was making itself
most useful, and that the trifling relief it obtained was bought,
not with its weight in gold, but with its weight in shot. It
was only for a very short time that I had the honour of
sharing the miseries of these noble-hearted troops, for two
months after my arrival the English became alive to the
advantages that their policy might derive from Conde 's Army,
which they accordingly determined to maintain entirely.
Colonel Crawford was sent out by the English government
to grant M. le prince de Conde everything that he himself
thought necessary, to bring his army to a state of the greatest
possible efficiency and activity. He was given a sufficient sum
of money, not merely to supply absolute necessaries, but even
to compensate his companions in arms for the privations they
had endured ; and in a short time the army was as well
organised, equipped, and paid as that of England.

I took advantage of this fortunate circumstance to simplify
my Legion, to which M. de Mirabeau had given the most
complicated and inconvenient of all possible forms. It was
composed of four hundred hussars and twelve hundred foot-
soldiers, all well-drilled in the use of arms. There was the same
number of officers of all ranks as in the infantry and cavalry
regiments of the French army, and the two corps were able to
act independently of one another, so that the Legion was like

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 223

two regiments wearing the same uniform. The compagnie
colonelle of the infantry, and that of the hussars, were the
only privileged companies, and were composed of gentlemen -
volunteers, entrusted with the same duties as the rest, but
regarded as picked men, on whom it devolved to give an
example of good discipline and courage. This legion was a
difficult corps to reduce to the necessary state of absolute
discipline, but it was all the more gratifying when one had
succeeded in doing so. As regards everything connected with
military service these troops were incomparable, and the happi-
ness of winning their esteem and confidence and absolute
obedience was as great as any joy that fate has ever granted
me, at any time in my career.1 The changes that I felt it my
duty to make for its improvement naturally caused a good deal
of excitement, which was only what I expected. On two
occasions I turned a failure in discipline into a personal affair,
instead of dealing with it in a more drastic way; but the two
duels that resulted, while ending fortunately for me, were still
more fortunate in their consequences.2 They placed me in a
position of absolute power with regard to every kind of innova-
tion or other matter, without burdening me with the sorrow
of having done lasting injury to any exiled gentleman under
my orders.

The Austrian army, which in 1795 was commanded on
the Rhine by the Comte de Wurmser,3 formed a greater
number of projects than it carried out, though it had
many opportunities for the most important and desirable
operations.

On one occasion I had an unexpected visit from M. de
Wurmser in my quarters on the banks of the Rhine. I had
made his acquaintance when I was travelling in Germany for
the first time, in 1786. He remembered me, and while inspect-
ing the cordon of troops along the Rhine made a detour to my
village. Without a word of warning he came into my bed-
room with his whole suite, among whom, I may mention, was
General Bellegarde, at that time quartermaster-general of his
army. He confided some of his intentions to me, but not one
of them was carried out.

224 MEMOIRS OF THE

As my Legion, in these cantonments, occupied a consider-
able extent of ground, I chose for my own quarters a little
chateau that stood between the Bale road and Vieux-Brissac ;
and so charming were its situation and grounds that I conceived
the idea of adding another attraction — the presence of a friend
who was very dear to me. I was fortunate enough to persuade
her to spend some time with me there, and this is one of the
sweetest memories of my life : with the hours divided between
her and my Legion every moment was congenial to my tastes
and feelings. This was the time of the expedition to Quiberon,
in which so many of my fellow-countrymen were unfortunate.
Meanwhile I was enjoying the happiest days that I ever
experienced in my life.

The summer passed without any resumption of hostilities,
and the lady to whom I have just referred went to Constance
for the winter. Thither I followed her : and it was then,
immediately after she had been contributing so much to my
happiness, that I was culpable enough to trouble hers. I fell
in love with an angel of enchantment and charm, who returned
my affection ; and all through that winter I was guilty of
requiting with ingratitude and inconstancy the greatest
sacrifices that love ever inspired. Where is the man who is
guiltless in this respect? I must confess, to the honour of
my own heart and the shame of human nature, that I never
passed a day in my life without forming good resolutions in
this matter, and failing to keep them : the result being that,
while I never satisfied any one, and least of all my conscience,
I have always had the best possible fortune in this way.

Early in the summer of 1796 4 King Louis XVIII took
refuge with the army, the natural place for him to seek the
honourable asylum that he could find nowhere else. Nothing
could more plainly prove how persistent were the reverses
suffered by the allied Powers than the fact that, since 1793,
not one of them had been able to defy France so far as to
give hospitality, even in the most neutral and peaceable way,
to this distinguished sovereign whom a bloodthirsty revolution
had cast from his throne. They dared not risk their own
interests, by voluntarily adding to the burden of those who

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 225

had undertaken this war — a burden that was sufficiently heavy,
seeing that they had the most urgent reasons for wishing to
subdue the enemy, but had been at their mercy from the first.
And the irony of this sad situation was increased by the fact
that it was at the very moment when the Austrian army and
Conde's became most active, owing to the crossing of the Rhine
by the French under Moreau, that the King was forced to yield
to the objections raised to his presence. It was then that the
Emperor's express order obliged him to part from the army,
and take refuge in Germany, where, in spite of his seclusion,
an attempt was made upon his life.5

Some time after the campaign of 1796 he had reviewed all
the regiments in Conde's Army, and — particularly in the case
of my legion — had won the hearts and turned the heads of the
troops by his words of praise. How useful all this enthusiasm
might have been made, had the Powers employed it as a
political factor, instead of estimating Conde's Army according
to its mere numbers ! It is true that this kind of sentiment
could only have been used effectively in offensive tactics, and
it is hard to recall a moment in the war when these were
employed.

The summer was already partly gone. Condi's Army was
in cantonments on the banks of the Rhine, forming its allotted
portion of the cordon ; and my legion, the principal corps of
the advanced guard under M. le due d'Enghien, being part
of the same cordon, was posted at the farthest point of the
right wing of the army-corps, four leagues above Kehl. One
night the major entered my room, and told me that some
musket-shots were audible on the islands in the Rhine. I
observed, while doing justice to his attention to duty, that we
so often had to punish both officers and men for poaching in
those islands that the matter was not very important, and
might be inquired into and reported by daylight. I sent him
back to bed, and resumed my own slumbers. An hour after

Iie left my room I again heard some one entering : this time
he voice was unknown to me. On my asking who was there
he man answered that he was the sentry posted at my door,
nd had thought it his duty to tell me that he could hear a

226 MEMOIRS OF THE

great deal of firing cm the islands. I had for so long been
undisturbed in my cantonments that I never dreamed the shots
could be fired by any one but poachers. However, I rose, and
sent my adjutant to rouse the infantry to arms and sound the
call to saddle; for I felt it was better to accustom the corps
to false alarms than to omit any precaution. But I was hardly
sufficiently clothed to mount my horse when it was reported to
me that the French were attempting to cross the river in the
face of my line.

For the past three months, with a view to improving the
discipline and training of my troops, I had made them camp
out on a suitable piece of ground near the village where I was
quartered, instead of sleeping in the peasants' cottages. I had
also been constantly exercising them in manoeuvres adapted to
both infantry and cavalry, and there was, therefore, no delay
nor surprise caused by the suddenness of this change from
absolute calm to the most intense activity. When I arrived
at the front of the camp all the men were in transports of
delight, and might, judging from their state of mind, have
been engaged in the most fortunate of campaigns. I had sent
a message to M. le due d'Enghien, who was living in the next
village, and in the meantime had taken measures to repulse the
enemy as soon as they came within range of me. But their
demonstration at this point was merely a feint : the real attack
was at Kehl, where it was completely successful. They drove
back the troops of the German Circles by whom the approaches
to the town were guarded, and reached the right bank of the
Rhine, and Offenburg on the Kinzig, without encountering
much resistance.6

Conde's Army was promptly assembled ; and I do not doubt
that if it had descended on Kehl without delay it would have
prevented the success of Moreau's enterprise. But the short
time that was lost enabled him to reinforce his vanguard, which
had effected the crossing of the Rhine, and to advance to the
defiles of the Aar, which lead to the Black Forest ; and it was,
therefore, indispensable to reach these defiles before him, and
defend the entrance to them.

M. le due d'Enghien's advanced guard marched upon this

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 227

point, and it was at the entrance to this gorge that I nearly
lost my life by an accident.

Until the evening was very far advanced the enemy was
making the most strenuous efforts to dislodge us. By the
orders of M. le due d'Enghien, General Bethisy,7 General
Thumery,8 and myself dismounted, to give him our opinion as
to the best measures to employ. Having decided upon our
course of action we were on the point of remounting, when a
discharge of musketry on the part of our own troops startled
the horses of the regiment of hussars near which we were stand-
ing. The regiment involuntarily made a retrograde movement,
and threw us all to the ground. But I was more unfortunate
than the others : my horse broke away, and the regiment rode
over me : in the darkness no one saw at first that I was lying
unconscious on tKe ground, and it was only an hour later that
a man chanced to trip over me, and gave me all the help he
could. I was recognised by the light of a lantern, and placed
upon a gun, and in this way was dragged to the point, four
leagues away in the Black Forest, whither the troops retreated.
Thence I was taken in a carriage to Villingen. I lay uncon-
scious for eight hours, but after being bled recovered sufficient
strength to travel as far as Constance, where seventeen days
of nursing were necessary before I was fit to return to my
legion. Meanwhile the Black Forest was still held, and had
not been attacked; and by the time the renewal of hostilities
by the French obliged the armies of Austria and Conde to fall
back upon Donaueschiiigen and Uberlingen I was sufficiently
recovered to resume the command of my corps, which I joined
at Donaueschingen. All that this adventure left behind it was
a very noticeable hollow on my left temple, and a numbness
of the left thigh and leg. The first of these results is per-
manent, but entails no inconvenience ; the second gradually

liminished, month by month, and at last totally disappeared.

loth were caused, without a doubt, by the pressure and

-ampling of the horses' feet.9
From Donaueschingen the army retreated, by a night march,

ipon Engen. I was still weak and ill, and, profiting by M. le

luc d'Enghien's permission to the advanced guard to take
Q 2

228 MEMOIRS OF THE

some rest at this place, I went to bed. Hardly had I fallen
asleep, however, before M. le due d'Enghien sent to awaken
me, on the pretext of having something important to say to
me. When I went to receive his orders he said : "Is it
possible, when you are so near two women in whom you are
interested, that you can go quietly to sleep instead of warning
them to leave Constance before the arrival of the armies? I
had you awakened, because I was sure you would never forgive
me, if I were to let you forget such an obvious duty. Set out
at once ; meet us at tlberlingen ; and I promise you we will not
fire a shot till you return."

Full of gratitude for his kind thought I rode off without a
moment's delay, and reached Constance in three hours. I
helped my friends to pack up their possessions. The one whom
I loved like the dearest of sisters started for Switzerland ; the
other followed the army with me for a few days, and then,
when the enemy began to monopolise my attention, went off
towards Ratisbon.

At Weingarten, beyond Oberlingen, I was joined by my
eldest brother. The King had begged him to take the position
of colonel-commandant of the legion. Anxious as it made me
to see him so often exposed to danger, this feeling was eclipsed
by the pleasure of uniting my fate to his, and feeding my own
zeal and vanity with the additional glory his ability bestowed
upon the legion.

Beyond Memmingen, the army being closely followed by a
French army-corps under General Ferino,10 M. le prince de
Conde decided to give battle. His reasons for coming to this
decision were opposed to the views ordinarily adopted, for
there was nothing in his position to point to such a course.
He thought it right, however, and made his dispositions
accordingly.11

The main body was to attack the enemy's centre at Kam-
lach ; 12 M. le due d'Enghien, with my legion, combined with
seven hundred foot-soldiers, was to attack their left at Ober-
kamlach, while M. le comte de Viomesnil, with two regiments
of light-horse and a little infantry, harassed their right. We
set out before daybreak, and drove back the outposts at every

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 229

point; but when we reached the high-road to Munich, at the
spot where it rises through a thick wood, M. le prince de
Conde encountered a force of French infantry superior to his
own, in so strong a position that there was no hope of dis-
lodging it. He persisted, none the less, in making the attack ;
but the intrepid bayonet-charge of the Infanterie Noble made
no impression on the order and steadiness that reigned in the
enemy's ranks. Nearly seven hundred gentlemen of quality lt:
were killed or wounded in this attack, and many officers of
senior rank among them ; but not the smallest advantage was
gained.

In the meantime we were encountering an equally resolute
resistance on the right. As soon as the French general had
seen that his centre could stand against the force that was
attacking it, he had strengthened his left, which was opposed
to us. There was never a more murderous affair, from begin-
ning to end. Having made our way into the woods by sunken
roads that made the advance of the guns very slow and difficult,
we found ourselves in an open space, surrounded by the enemy
on every side ; and for over an hour we were fighting there at
close quarters. My brother's horse had been twice wounded,
and mine once very seriously, without having as yet refused to
do his work ; the artillery-horses and gunners were nearly all
killed or wounded ; several officers and a great number of men
had fallen ; and still, in spite of repeated and fierce bayonet-
charges, it was physically impossible to repel the numbers
opposing us. We sent to inform M. le due d'Enghien of the
difficulties we were encountering, to tell him that we could not
hear any firing at the centre of the line, and ask him for his
final instructions. At the same time we promised to continue
making every effort to hold our own, and even to repel the
enemy, until we had heard his decision, which would be formed,
we could not doubt, according as his grandfather were more or
less successful.

The guns were loaded and fired by officers,14 in default of
gunners ; and the fact that we did not lose an inch of ground
was due to the charges of grape-shot that were poured into the
enemy, whenever they advanced within fifty paces of the guns.

230 MEMOIRS OF THE

The French cried out tQ us to yield ; but our only answer was
to rush in upon them with the bayonet, and charge them —
even with hussars — through the wood, and sweep away, with
a well-directed fire, every one who advanced to take our guns.
My horse was shot with several bullets at once, and fell, with
me under him. I was dragged out from beneath him, and
continued, on foot, to direct this terrible and futile affair, with
which my brother's energy and my own efforts were hardly
sufficient to cope.15

At last we learnt to our sorrow that M. de Conde had
effected his retreat an hour earlier, and that in consequence we
had to deal with all the troops that the French general had
been able to send against us, as soon as he was relieved of
the attack on his centre. The aide-de-camp who had been
despatched to us three-quarters of an hour earlier, with the
order to retreat, had been wounded on the way, and the order
had, therefore, never reached us.16 I only received it by the
hand of the messenger I had sent to M. le due d'Enghien, to
inform him of my situation. Surrounded as we were, it was
by no means easy to retreat, especially as we had to return
by the same sunk roads, which our guns, on their first journey,
had made worse than they originally were.

We therefore once more advanced to the attack, in order to
facilitate the return of our guns, which we protected by retreat-
ing in squares behind them, while the hussars guarded their
flank by constantly making short charges through the wood,
on the French infantry and skirmishers. In this wa}' we suc-
ceeded in getting out of the wood ; and on reaching the plain
we found the whole corps of mounted nobles drawn up in line — a
spectacle that prevented the enemy from advancing farther.17

In order to leave the plain by way of the Munich road it
was necessary for the army to pass through a very narrow
gap, between two pools. M. le prince de Conde sent an aide-
de-camp to tell us that he was about to take the troops
through this pass, and wished us to act as rearguard. This
was an arduous addition to our day's work, and some other
corps than the worn-out legion should have been chosen for
the post ; but there was nothing for it but to obey.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 231

M. le prince de Conde set his troops in motion, and we
placed ourselves between him and the enemy. When the army
had reached the farther side of the pass we began our retreat,
with the last squadron of our hussars bringing up the rear, and
my brother and I riding last of all, so as to be ready for the
enemy beyond the defile.

Altogether this affair cost the legion eighteen officers and
three hundred men killed and wounded, but we did not lose a
single gun. One ammunition-wagon was left in the wood, for
want of horses to draw it.

The loss of my English horse was a great grief to me : I
never saw a finer nor a better one. Had I been wounded
myself I should have been far more easily consoled, provided
the wound had not disabled me.

After the troops had been allowed a rest of a few hours the
retreat before the enemy was continued through Landsberg.
With the enemy still upon our heels we crossed the Isar at
Munich, the point that had been fixed upon as the limit of
the general retreat by M. le comte de la Tour,18 who was in
command of the Austrian army to which we were attached.
The bridge at Munich was barricaded, and we prepared to
defend ourselves on the banks of the river opposite to the
town.

The Austrian cabinet had conceived the very fine plan of
limiting the army of General de la Tour to measures of
defence, on the right bank of the Isar, while the army of the
Archduke Charles assumed the offensive on the left bank of
the Danube.

General Jourdan, at the head of a considerable French army,
had taken up his position on the left bank of the Danube, with
that river on his right, and was threatening the Hereditary
States. The Archduke Charles marched upon him, defeated
him in a pitched battle, and after worsting him on several
other occasions 19 forced him to retreat, in a state of disorder
most unusual in the French army. This opened the archduke's
way to Franconia. It was, therefore, to his interest to leave
the Comte de la Tour's army on the Isar to contend with
Moreau's army, sufficiently long for him (the archduke) to

232 MEMOIRS OF THE

turn Moreau's flank, and reach the banks of the Rhine before
that general had guessed his intention. This operation, which
was very successfully carried out by the Archduke Charles,
would certainly have caused the undoing of General Moreau if
it had not been for certain blunders unconnected with the
general plan.

The Comte de la Tour's army remained for twenty-two days
on the banks of the Isar; and all that time the advanced
guard under General Devay, combined with that of Conde's
Army under M. le due d'Enghien — which included my corps —
was defending the bridge of Munich. Every day, morning
and evening, the artillery and musketry were engaged in
skirmishes of more or less importance.

When General Moreau arrived on the banks of the Isar he
certainly was aware of the archduke's movements, since he did
not force the bridge, and must at the same time have had some
hopes and doubts as to General Jourdan's operations, since he
delayed his retreat. But when he decided on that measure the
Archduke Charles had gained a considerable amount of time,
and it appeared probable that General Moreau would be too
late to retire across the Rhine. With the utmost ability and
promptitude, however, he succeeded in gaining a day's march
on us. M. le comte de la Tour was conscious of his mistake,
and tried to redeem it by forced marches, with a view to
approaching the French army sufficiently closely to profit by
its position, and hinder or check its retreat at will. His
advanced guard came up with General Moreau 's rearguard
near Aticha, where an insignificant skirmish took place ; but
M. le comte de la Tour, with the main body, diverged too
much to the right, and gave General Moreau time to rejoin
the rest of his troops. The latter was then able to follow the
high-road, after evacuating Neuberg, without any risk of being
intercepted by a larger force than he could deal with. As a
matter of fact he met none but the combined advanced guards
of the armies of Austria and Conde, under General Devay, who
had no alternative but to let him pass unhindered.

We made a movement towards the left of Moreau's army,
and watched it pass without molesting it : forty thousand

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 233

men went by, while we stood within range of their guns and
looked at them. But Moreau had no desire to delay his retreat
by a useless attack, for which he knew we should not wait ;
and he passed us without firing a gun. I do not think quite
such a curious situation was ever experienced before : it
could only be produced by a very unusual combination of
chances.

M. le comte de la Tour continued the pursuit, gradually
gaining ground on General Moreau, who was losing a great
many men, through the straggling and scattering of his detach-
ments. At last, when he was nearly in the centre of Swabia,
he came to the conclusion that the only way to conduct his
retreat to a happy issue was to repulse the Comte de la Tour's
army sufficiently to gain several marches on him.

Accordingly he faced round, took up his position with his
right towards Schussenried, and decided to attack us. Two
days later we were told by the abbot of that superb monastery
that General Moreau had said to him on the 2nd October, the
day he made the attack : " Prepare a large supper and a very
good one : if I should be beaten M. le prince de Conde and
his son will eat it : if I win, you and I will sup together, and
I shall be greatly in need of it."

He concentrated all his attention on his centre and left.20
The advanced guard under M. le due d'Enghien was opposed
to his right, in front of Schussenried. M. le due d'Enghien
had received orders from M. de la Tour to abstain from pro-
voking and harassing the enemy, but it was contrary to his
nature to obey so prudent a command. As soon as the sharp-
shooters opened fire he engaged the whole advanced guard.
Though he succeeded in holding his own he was unable to gain
any ground, and our losses were great, especially in officers.
But in this part of the field the object of the French was
merely to avoid repulse : it was the centre, under General
Saint-Cyr, and the left wing that were intended to repel M. de
la Tour and M. le prince de Conde, turn their flank, and
defeat them.

The Austrian troops, in this battle, behaved far from well.
Ten battalions, among others, threw down their arms, and left

234 MEMOIRS OF THE

a weak point by which the French could not fail to profit.
The right and the centre of the Austrian army were beaten
back in succession : some of the French then turned their flank,
and M. de la Tour was obliged to fly precipitately.

M. le due d'Enghien was still fighting on the hills of
Schussenried, with the infantry of the legion under my brother,
and the Hohenlohe Regiment 21 of Conde 's Army, while I and
my hussars were engaged with the French cavalry on the plain
below. M. le due received an order to retreat, which he
communicated to me ; but as I was unaware of M. de la Tour's
fate, and had no personal reason for yielding ground that I
could perfectly well hold, I waited for a second order before
obeying. M . le due d'Enghien brought me the order himself,
and told me the reasons that made it necessary. And truly we
had not a moment to lose. Had we been an instant later in
passing through the defiles that lay behind us, they would
have been occupied by the enemy, and closed to us.

M. le prince de Conde, whose army-corps was stationed in
the centre, rendered a most important service on this occasion
to M. de la Tour, by acting as his rearguard, covering his
retreat, and saving him from the incalculable disasters that
would have resulted from the disorder of his troops. M. le
prince de Conde held back the French with a degree of resolu-
tion and firmness worthy of all praise, until Moreau, seeing
that he would lose more than he gained by changing his plans,
reverted to his original intention, and retired.

In this affair great numbers of the Austrians were taken
prisoners — far more than were killed or wounded. Twenty-five
guns, too, remained in the hands of the French. The losses
of Condi's Army were smaller in proportion, but included a
remarkable number of officers.22 Not one of its guns or
baggage-wagons was taken.

As soon as M. le comte de la Tour had steadied his troops
we continued our advance. General Moreau, who was already
weakened by the partial dispersion that is inevitable in a
precipitate retreat, and had no aim except to avoid the prob-
able effects of his situation by re-crossing the Rhine, now
further diminished his forces by sending back through Switzer-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 235

land all the troops that were least fit to make rapid marches.
The neutrality of this country was recognised, and should
have protected it, but the Swiss were already resigned to the
future, and when Moreau's troops entered their territory they
put no difficulties in the way. General Moreau himself con-
tinued his retreat with his best troops, through the passes of
the Black Forest.

Until he came out upon the high-road from Bale to Frank-
fort, near Freiburg in Brisgau, his position was the most
unpleasant that a general was ever in. It seemed impossible
that he could avoid being caught between the Archduke
Charles's army and that of M. de la Tour, and forced, prob-
ably, either to capitulate, or to lose all his men in an unequal
fight. But his promptitude and skilful tactics saved him.23
The head of his columns only reached the opening of the
mountain-passes a day before the Archduke Charles. He left
a rearguard in the defiles to delay our advance, and we had a
very sharp encounter with it near the Abbey of Saint-Blaise.24
It fell to my brother and me to carry a certain height called
the Hollgraben (a position already well known in the cam-
paigns of the Marechal de Turenne).25 We were supported
by the Hohenlohe Regiment of Conde's Army, under General
Bethisy, and M. le due d'Enghien was in command of both
corps. This very strong position was a difficult one to take,
but nothing was impossible to the bravery of this legion. At
the very moment of the attack, which took place under the
eyes of Conde's Army — stationed at a little distance to the
rear of us — the Hohenlohe Regiment wavered ; whereupon the
legion redoubled its efforts, and carried the position at the
point of the bayonet. The French retired hastily, and we
spent that night in the territory of the Abbey of Saint-Blaise,
the point where we ceased our pursuit of the enemy.

In this affair several officers and some grenadiers wrere
wounded,26 but neither my brother, nor I, nor any of the
senior officers, was touched. M. le prince de Conde, who had
witnessed the attack, rode up to the legion after it had proved
successful, and cried in a loud voice : " Vive la Ugion! " This
cry was caught up and repeated on every hand, and served as

236 MEMOIRS OF THE

an ample reward to this brave corps, who never wished for a
reward of any other kind.

We had now but a short distance to traverse before entering
upon the plain of Brisgau. Between Saint-Blaise and the high-
road to Bale the roads are very narrow, with high, steep banks,
and the mountains form passes that are very difficult to cross.
The only way to advance, without running the risk of being
cut to pieces or shot down, is to take by way of the heights
a sufficient number of troops to ensure the safety of the whole
force, and allow only the remainder to march through the
passes.

I was greatly surprised when M. le prince de Conde, on
leaving Saint-Blaise, gave orders for all the troops to pass
through the ravines. I expressed my opinion on the subject
both to him and his grandson, and the latter entirely agreed
with me ; but M. le prince de Conde held to his decision, and
we set out in single file, for the paths would not admit of a
wider front. We had hardly covered half a league when I met
a peasant who told me that the enemy was coming over the
heights in the direction of Saint-Blaise. I had predicted this
event too confidently to be the first person to warn M. le
prince de Conde of the danger he was in : I waited till the
information had reached him. A few hundred yards farther
on I met him retracing his steps — making a way with the
greatest difficulty along the narrow path that the troops were
following. "Do 3^ou know that the enemy is turning our
flank by the heights?" he said. "What shall we do?"
"Turn to the right-about on the spot," I answered, "or you
will be shot down here before an hour has passed, without any
possibility of self-defence. We must turn back to the little
plain at Saint-Blaise without a moment's delay."

He gave orders to this effect, and when, after half-an-hour
of very hasty retreat, we found ourselves once more near the
abbey, the enemy were descending upon it from the mountains
on the left, and were already on our heels. The fusillade began
instantly, and we succeeded in repulsing them. We then
followed in their footsteps, which were far more wisely directed
than our own ; and at about four in the afternoon we came out

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 237

upon the high-road to Bale, at the exact spot where the Arch-
duke Charles was stationed with his advanced guard. He
greeted M. le due d'Enghien and M. le prince de Conde in
the most friendly and gratifying way. My hussars and the
Hungarian regiments marched on together ; and the Archduke
Charles and M. le due d'Enghien pursued the French rear-
guard, until night fell, with the fire of their light-artillery.

The place assigned to Conde 's Army in the line of battle
was on the right, on the banks of the Rhine. The massed
armies marched up the valley of the Rhine, with the intention
of meeting General Moreau before he should have had time
to cross the bridge of boats opposite Huningue, which was
protected by a tete-de-pont.

General Moreau's troops, however, were fatigued by their
rapid march, and he felt that his only hope of crossing the
river lay in reaching Huningue before us. He therefore faced
round upon the heights of Steinstadt, in a very good position,
and checked our pursuit. His light troops occupied the village
of Steinstadt, above which his army presented a very formid-
able front.

The Archduke Charles immediately prepared to take advan-
tage of this temporary suspension of Moreau's retreat. He
postponed the offensive measures of his right, while he
manoeuvred with his left, his object being to reach the tete-
de-pont at Huningue before the French army could begin its
passage over the Rhine.

The archduke's army was about sixty thousand strong ; that
of General Moreau was reduced to thirty-six thousand at most.
Despite the difficulties of the way, the archduke's left suc-
ceeded in turning Moreau's right wing ; and it devolved on
M. le prince de Conde to seize the village of Steinstadt.27 It
was surrounded by the battalions of nobles on the right, and
another regiment on the left ; and my legion was ordered to
take possession of it. In spite of a very hot fire from the
musketry in the village itself, and from the artillery posted
on the hills, we carried the place at the point of the bayonet.
The French battalions retired, in square formation and in good
order, keeping up an unremitting fire until a downpour of rain

238 MEMOIRS OF THE

put an end to it. Then darkness fell, and the fires of the
French were lighted, opposite to our own, on the height above
Steinstadt.

The archduke's attack was to be resumed at break of day,
but General Moreau, to whom it had been reported that his
right was being outstripped by the archduke's left, kept up
his fires to deceive us as to his intentions, and crept away in
the night.

On the following morning at dawn the archduke set out in
pursuit with his centre and right, and I am persuaded that he
did not make the most of the situation. He relaxed in his
pursuit at the very moment when he might have gained most
by it. We stood by while the French army passed, unmolested,
over the bridge at Huningue, and I shall always believe that
there was quite enough time for it to be partially destroyed,
in the plain that lies between the tete-de-pont and the escarp-
ment of the high-road to Bale.

General Moreau re-crossed the Rhine unhindered, but his
army had lost a third of its strength since he crossed it first.
His greatest losses were caused by the peasants of Swabia :
every man who fell out of the ranks on the march was lost to
him.

General Abbatucci,28 who had commanded one of the French
advanced guards during this campaign and had constantly been
engaged with ours, was left in command of the tete-de-pont
at Huningue. This was an excellent work of its kind, and
held out against all the efforts of the Austrians for over a
month : they once attempted to carry it by assault, and were
repulsed. General Abbatucci greatly distinguished himself
there, and finally was killed and buried there. It was not
until after his death that the work was occupied by the
Austrians, and the bridge broken down.

During the defence of this tdte-de-pont General Moreau
attempted a diversion on the left bank of the Rhine, and the
Archduke Charles was obliged to move all his forces towards
Kehl. The season was so far advanced that it seemed an
unpropitious moment to besiege the town, but the Emperor's
minister, M. de Thugut, insisted upon it, and sent Count Franz

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 239

Dietrichstein to the archduke with instructions to that effect.
The trenches were completed in November, and the place held
out till the middle of January 1797. 29 Never was a siege
conducted with more desperation on both sides. The Austrians
lost more men in it than in two campaigns ; and the fortress
was not of sufficient importance to justify such sacrifices, for
General Moreau, who had crossed the Rhine only a short time
before, could have crossed it again at some other point, if
circumstances had made it desirable. He proved this in
the following March, when he opened the operations that
were suspended by the preliminaries of the Peace of Campo-
Formio. '

Conde's Army took no part in the siege of Kehl, but retired
to cantonments in the valley of the Rhine. The campaign
of 1796 was the last in which it took part under the orders of
the Austrian generals.

The moment my legion was at liberty I went to Frauenfeld,
in Switzerland. I spent a week there, and then returned to
our cantonments.

As soon as the Austrians were in their winter quarters and
the campaign was really over I set out to Constance, where I
remained for some time, leaving my brother with the legion.
While I was there I fell ill, and it was more than six weeks
before I recovered from the effects of my exertions during the
past campaign. My sufferings were alleviated, however, by
the tender care I received. I have very seldom in my life been
fated to endure pain or fatigue without being granted com-
pensations of a kind to fill my heart with gratitude. What-
ever the future may hold for me, therefore, I shall always be
able to take refuge in my memories.

The Austrians spent the winter in recovering from the past
campaign and preparing to resume hostilities in the spring ;
and, as I think I said before, their military administration in
this respect is better than that of any other country in Europe.
General Moreau, for his part, was making arrangements to
open the campaign very early, and the means at his command,
combined with his genius, were quite likely to counterbalance
the superiority of the Austrian war department. As soon as

240 MEMOIRS OF THE

the season allowed of it, therefore, a resumption of hostilities
was to be expected.

We took advantage, my brother and I, of the last moments
of inaction, to meet my sister and two other brothers in
Switzerland. We rented a house near Berne, and spent four
'weeks there together.

The English government furnished Conde's Army with the
necessary funds to repair its losses. Every corps was made up
to its full complement; but the work of preparing for the
campaign was still in progress when Moreau, at the end of
March, began operations. He crossed the Rhine at a point
considerably below Conde's Army, repulsing the Austrian
troops that tried to oppose him.30 We were consequently on
the point of retiring into the defiles of the Black Forest, and
the legion had already received orders to form the rearguard
of the Austrian army, when a courier arrived with the
announcement that the preliminaries of peace were signed.
The movements of all the troops of both armies were instantly
suspended, and although several months intervened between
the preliminaries and the peace, hostilities were at an end.

The conditions of the peace were such that it could only
be reasonably regarded as a truce, but it was necessary to the
Austrians, and the cabinet of Vienna was wise to accept it as
it stood. The Austrian troops were discouraged to a degree
that could not fail to bring about their defeat; officers and
men alike required a respite ; the section of the army that was
in the neighbourhood of Franconia was in the most deplorable
situation, and according to all appearances must inevitably
have been destroyed at the outset. The Archduke Charles
himself was in favour of peace, and had every reason for being
so. Not only were the regiments disorganised, but mental
demoralisation was widespread, and that is a disease that cannot
be cured in one winter. The sluggishness and indifference of
the Austrians had been pitted for too long against the energy
and enthusiasm of the French. The former, indeed, were well
supplied with reasons and motives for concluding peace on this
occasion, though they were entirely lacking in them in all their
later truces and treaties. Speaking generally, I think it is a

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 241

fact, with regard to the history of the cabinet of Vienna since
the year 1787, that it has invariably chosen the wrong moment,
both for its declarations of war and its treaties of peace. Eye-
witnesses, however, will make an exception in the case of the
Peace of Loeben, on account of the indescribable distress that
the country was in at that time.

Conde 's Army received orders to go into cantonments near
Uberlingen, which became M. le prince de Conde's head-
quarters. The legion was quartered in the neighbourhood of
Warzach. But when the English were ready to conclude their
separate peace, and had, therefore, no further need of the
services of Conde's Army, they announced that it would be
disbanded in the course of the summer.

It was certain that the cabinet of Vienna would not again
be responsible for it : the dispersion, therefore, was likely to
be permanent. M. le prince de Conde begged all the Courts
to come to his aid, and Paul I offered him an asylum. He
sent a commissioner to M. le prince de Conde, and it was
arranged that the army should be transferred from the service
of England to that of Russia, as soon as the English had
completed the accounts and the disbandment. It was then to
set out at once upon the march to Volhynia, where it would
be organised in accordance with the Russian regulations. The
Emperor Paul sent all the necessary money, and made all the
arrangements with the sovereigns whose territory was to be
traversed ; and the army set out in October 1797.

Since it seemed I was to return to Russia, in whose service
I had been for the past ten years, and since, when I was once
there, my liberty would for a long time be curtailed, I deter-
mined to take advantage of my last days of freedom, and see
Italy. I decided to travel to Russia by way of Naples,
Constantinople, and Odessa.

It was this moment and this decision that changed my whole
career : I have recorded the sequel elsewhere.31 My path has
been sown with vicissitudes and joys. I have, therefore, no
complaints to bring against the past, and I await the future
with confidence.

XII

The Comte arrives in Naples, February 1798— Reflections on the political
situation of the kingdom, and severe criticism of Acton, who is
paving the way for the country's ruin by stopping the Baron de
ISalis's work of reorganising the army, and by sacrificing Naples to the
policy of England — The author's travels interrupted by events in
Italy, which lead him to accept employment in Naples — He begins
by fighting a duel with the Chevalier de Saxe, and is seriously
wounded — The Neapolitan army : manoeuvres conducted by Mack —
March to Rome, without a shot being fired — The army already in
disorder.

ALL that has been written on Naples since the beginning of
the present reign is more or less erroneous. The writers who
have attempted to describe the proceedings of the government,
its relations with the Courts of Europe, its intercourse with the
different orders in the State, and the principles on which the
wealth and prosperity of the nation can best be founded, have
often made mistakes. Those, however, who have read the
memoirs of Favier will have acquired a comparatively accurate
idea of all that is known of the essential points of the adminis-
tration— the means at its command, its resources, and its
fundamental principles.

It is no part of my object to correct the prevailing ideas on
the events that preceded my arrival in Naples. Favier 's
Tableau des cabinets de I'Europe * shows us Naples bound to
Spain by all the ties of custom and national temperament, and
following her lead in every detail and every measure, in all
branches of the government, but already craving to be free.
And the family compact to which the King of Spain formally
pledged his word that the King of Naples should subscribe
as far as in him lay — the compact to which the minister
Tanucci 2 refused to adhere — provoked the first important step
taken by the Neapolitan Court in the direction of independence.

From that moment every proceeding of the government

242

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 243

always tended to prove to the Court of Spain that the ties of
blood and the relations between the two kingdoms were in
future to have no influence on the policy of either country.
The kingdom of Naples, in shaking off the yoke, was eager to
prove itself emancipated ; as a boy who has been held in
tutelage by his family will sometimes indulge in acts of folly,
for the sole purpose of showing that he is his own master.

I should be glad if I could attribute this very natural desire
for freedom of action to the energy and determination of the
ministry, and its pride in the geographical position of the
country, the fertility of the soil, and the abundant resources
of all kinds at its command. With so many advantages Naples
might well aspire to outdo all the leading Powers of Europe
as far as the people's happiness is concerned, and might be
second to none in developing the means of maintaining it.

But I am forced to confess that the prosperity of the king-
dom was secured and maintained for forty years by the force
of circumstances, the hand of fate, and mere good luck. The
government never made the smallest attempt to prolong that
period of prosperity by any carefully considered, practical, or
persistent means.

When I arrived in Naples, in February 1798, its golden age
was on the wane. But as I sighed over the present and
trembled for the future I could see what its past had been.
The government, like the soil, contained fragments of the
antique ; the old administration lay in ruins, the new was too
unsound to take its place.

After a succession of ministers who were worse than
mediocre 3 the evil genius of the kingdom had placed General
Acton 4 in power. For the past eighteen years he had been
gradually but assiduously undermining all the foundations of
the country's prosperity, and at the period to which I refer
he was concentrating all his attention on the task of shattering
it completely.

I refuse to waste my time in enlarging upon this man, whose
mly claim to interest lies in his faults : every event upon
h he left his mark will serve to make his character known,
[e passed from the service of Tuscany into that of Naples
R 2

244 MEMOIRS OF THE

with the frigates that the Grand Duke gave to the King when
he suppressed his navy ; and very shortly afterwards he came
into favour.

The Queen,5 who was still young at that time, allowed
herself to be dazzled and dominated by this man, whom a
little reflection would have enabled her to estimate at his real
value. She dragged him from the obscurity into which he has
so often endeavoured, since then, to drag her. I do not wish
to tear aside the veil that screened his actions. It should have
had nothing worse than mistakes to hide, but it grew very
opaque in the course of the years, and finally concealed errors
that plunged the kingdom into a chaos of incalculable
miseries.

By the time two years had passed everything was submitted
to the decision of this incapable man. He was hated even
before his character was known. This premature judgment,
one would think, might have made him willing to let time
justify him ; but its only effect was to make him desire revenge.
This was his sole aim and object throughout the years he was
in power.

The constitution of Naples is, inherently, more despotic than
any other in Europe ; and its arbitrary nature was necessarily
more apparent when the authority of its natural head, the
King, was replaced by that of a favourite. Yet this was what
Acton achieved ; and every custom and convention went down
before his personality. He alienated the nobility, disgusted
the army, and, assuming an English name in the hope that his
father, the Besancon doctor, might be forgotten,6 gave all his
attention to the navy and adopted the English system to the
exclusion of all others.

I think that any one who knows the kingdom of Naples will
agree with me that England should always be treated with
consideration by the Neapolitan cabinet, but rarely with
special preference. If we consider the reasons that might
justify a government in sacrificing everything to the English
system, I do not doubt that Acton's lack of foresight will
become obvious.

One must suppose that he thought the frontiers of the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 245

kingdom were unassailable by land. He assumed, quite
wrongly, that a country situated in the remoter parts of Italy
and cut off by the Papal States from all contact with the con-
tinent, a country easily warned of any contemplated hostilities,
and difficult to invade on account of the configuration of its
frontiers, was more likely to be attacked from the sea than
from the landward side.

He had apparently forgotten, however, that it was impos-
sible for England to obtain the upper hand in the Mediter-
ranean at the first moment of a war; that only a series of
victories could give her that position ; that the Neapolitan navy
could never be formidable enough to lay down the law, and
that it must always be prepared to be used as a reinforcement
by any first-rate Power that might happen to be predominant
in those waters. Neither had he remembered that the many
changes then taking place in Europe must involve Italy in war,
and that in every war Naples must have a defensive force, since
the Papal States could only be regarded as a thoroughfare for
all the troops acting on the offensive.

Owing to its geographical situation the kingdom was in the
fortunate position of being able to claim absolute neutrality in
a continental war, but no government can wisely base and
regulate its precautions on a consideration of that kind. The
French Revolution and its consequences have shown only too
plainly that probabilities are of little value ; and even suppos-
ing that so extraordinary a conflagration had never taken
place, how many political chances might have arisen to turn
Italy into a battle-field ! It should not be forgotten, for in-
stance, that centuries must pass before the House of Austria
relinquishes its claims to that part of Europe.

What then, it may be asked, would be the right measures
for the government to take, in the case of any war in Italy
that should threaten the safety of the kingdom? It should
protect its frontiers, and take its army into the Roman States
as far as the river Nera. Fifty thousand men would be suffi-
cient, in that position, to defend the portion of the Papal
States that guards the kingdom ; and a force of that strength
should always be available.

246 MEMOIRS OF THE

With this support at his back the King could insist on the
neutrality of his realm, which he should never separate from
the Roman States, since they are the foundation of his safety.
If any of the Powers were to enter his territory he could
declare hostilities.

While the old order of things still prevailed in Europe the
Power that the kingdom of Naples had the most reason to fear
was Austria. But since the French Revolution replaced all
existing principles and natural relations by a system of inva-
sion, an alliance, or at least perfect harmony with Austria,
has been the fixed basis on which the Neapolitan government
should found all its policy. To make this alliance useful and
advantageous Naples should have an army of fifty thousand
men. Even if it never went beyond the northern frontier of
the Roman States this force would ensure equality in the
advantages enjoyed by the two Powers.

Supposing circumstances directly affecting Austria were to
force her to demand more activity from the Neapolitan army,
the government should only acquiesce so far as to let the
army form the left wing of the Austrian forces, so that in case
of defeat the south of Italy should never be left unprotected.

An examination of the dangers threatening the kingdom
from the sea will show that a bombardment of the capital is
the only thing to be feared ; and what hope is there that a
small fleet could long postpone that disaster? A few bombs
thrown into Naples need never reduce the King to despair, if
he were in a position to save his territory from invasion ; and
this he might easily be, if he did not exhaust his funds by
building ships, which he loses, in the first campaign, to one
of the great naval Powers.

The probability of a conflagration in Italy has sometimes
awakened Acton's vague mind to these truths, and to the
necessity of improving and increasing the land forces. He has
made attempts to that end, but those whom he has entrusted
with the task have always been prevented, by his suspicious
temperament, from finishing their work.

In 1786 he summoned the Baron de Salis to his aid,7 and
he in turn secured the help of several Prussian and French

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 247

officers. Sails was quite capable of doing good work ; he was
an excellent officer, a man of honour and ability. He arrived
on the scene with the intention of realising, in a perfect
army, all the ideals he had collected in the whole course of his
life. We all know that his work in France was chiefly con-
cerned with details ; and in Naples, too, the details of his labour
assumed too much importance. If he had taken advantage of
the favours and rights that are always accorded to novelty, and
had begun on a large scale, he might have rendered incalcul-
able services to the kingdom. He made excellent models in
every department of the army, but did not have them imitated
with sufficient promptitude ; and he used up, in the making
of these fragmentary patterns, all the time that Acton's
jealous and envious nature could endure to leave him in his
prominent, if insecure, position.

When cabals were formed against the changes that Salis
thought necessary they were fomented by Acton, who com-
promised the baron with the King, the Queen, and the public,
and finally drove him, by dint of mortifying and harassing him
perpetually, to resign his post. This occurred at the very
moment of the crisis that always results from unfinished
reforms.

Salis, when he resigned, left the whole nobility disgusted
with military service. The Swiss regiments had been sup-
pressed before the national regiments were fit to replace them ;
even the least incomplete corps were very imperfectly trained ;
and the army fell into a far worse state of demoralisation than
had existed before the attempt to reform it — a condition from
which it would undoubtedly have been rescued if Salis had
been allowed to achieve the task he had begun.

Acton replaced Salis with a German who was unequal to the
post,8 and was only appointed to it with a view to closing the
door to Salis's return. He was not long in it ; and then the
army oscillated, in an unsystematic, aimless way, between the
old and the new regulations, until the time of which I shall
presently speak, when General Mack 9 rashly accepted the
position of commander-in-chief .

In the days immediately preceding the French Revolution,

248 MEMOIRS OF THE

or rather when it was in its earliest stage, Acton had allowed
himself to be carried away by it. He saw that some of its
underlying principles were cognate with his own insatiable
ambition. We all know that the ill-fated Louis XVI was him-
self blinded by the chimerical idea of preserving a monarchy,
while lessening the power of the orders that intervened between
the throne and the people. It was only natural that Acton
should be attracted by this mistaken notion, and so great
was his ascendancy over the minds of the King and Queen that
he was able to modify the emotions that the outbreak of the
Revolution wras bound to arouse, one would think, in natures
such as theirs. This way of regarding the matter was main-
tained until 1792, to such a degree that Acton was permitted
to humiliate, and annoy, and even revile the leading orders
of the state, with perfect impunity.

In 1793 war broke out between England and France. The
English government, taking advantage of Acton's need of its
support in his claims on an English family and property,
assumed control of the policy of Naples, and thenceforward
held that Court in a state of absolute dependence.

The Queen, whose whole mind was bent on adding lustre to
this man's life, had secured his recognition as the heir of a
family with whom his only connection was through the letters
of the alphabet. But the English government was none too
eager to lend itself to this proceeding, and would only sell its
consent in return for the whole-hearted submission of the
Neapolitan cabinet.

The latter sent an army-corps to join in the English, Spanish,
and Piedmontese coalition against Toulon. This force shared
the fate of the allies, and the troops returned to the kingdom
without any reward for their losses save the approbation of the
coalition.

In 1796, when the Emperor was directing all his forces
against Italy, he asked the King of Naples to contribute a
contingent, preferably cavalry, to fight for the common cause.
Four regiments were sent, and behaved with distinction. But
at the end of that same year the Emperor, being crushed by
his reverses, began to think of peace. The cabinet of Naples

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 249

was informed of this, and entered into negotiations for a
separate treaty, which was soon afterwards concluded.10

The peace that was made at this time between the Austrian
Cabinet and France 11 can only have been intended, it seems
to me, for a brief truce. The war, however, could not be
resumed without involving Naples ; and, indeed, a war founded
on the principles that France was then preaching, was liable to
set, not only Naples, but the whole of Italy, in a blaze. And
the argument that follows is this : the maritime forces of
France had been greatly weakened, especially in the Mediter-
ranean, by the burning of Toulon, while her land forces were
being proportionately strengthened by her despotic and blood-
thirsty government : consequently the kingdom of Naples was
far more likely to be threatened on the frontiers than on the
coast.

It was essential, then, to employ the momentary lull in
repairing and provisioning all the fortresses, and in making
the army fit for active service within the confines of the
kingdom, if not beyond them.

But Acton thought of nothing of this kind : everything was
left dilapidated and neglected. At last, in the year 1797, the
French government plainly showed that it had no intention
of postponing its destructive plans any longer. Its forces
invaded the Paptil States, disinterred the skeleton of the Roman
Republic, and advanced so close to the frontiers of the kingdom
as to leave no doubt of its hostile intentions.

Certain circumstances that afterwards occurred may have
given rise to the belief that, if the Neapolitans had not made
the attack, the French would not have taken the initiative.
But, at the time, appearances did not favour this view : to
make the attack was the only prudent course, and it was more
the manner of it, and the time chosen, that were in fault,
than the actual enterprise itself. Two months later the
attempt would have been perfectly justified and likely to
succeed.

Acton, under pressure from the English, decided to prepare
for war. To this course he was urged by Nelson, who had just
been brought into the highest repute by his victory at Aboukir,

250 MEMOIRS OF THE

and threatened the minister personally with the displeasure of
his government. Acton made a forced levy in the provinces,
and in six weeks increased the strength of the army from fifteen
thousand to fifty thousand. That is to say he armed and
clothed fifty thousand men, but all he added to his fifteen
thousand soldiers was a great deal of confusion and
embarrassment .

General Mack was begged of the Court of Vienna by the
Court of Naples. The former agreed to dispense with his
services for the King's sake, while disapproving of the prefer-
ence shown for him.12 Mack arrived at the moment when all
the crowd of recruits wrere settling into their cantonments.

Acton welcomed Mack with all the cunning and falsity that
were natural to him. He inspired him with confidence,
appointed his staff in accordance with his own views, and filled
him with enthusiasm for the army, which he laid before him
on paper, being as yet unable to show him any portion of it
under arms. General Mack was always supposed to have
brought an assurance from the Court of Vienna that the
Austrian army should open the campaign simultaneously with
that of Naples. It is probable that Thugut,13 who was then
at the head of the ministry, and not only had no love for
Mack but detested Acton, had given this promise in rather
ambiguous words, which could be repudiated when the right
time and occasion should come. But vague words are not
usually regarded as a sufficient pledge by a wise government,
and it is incredible that they should have satisfied even Acton,
had they not served him as a pretext for his submission to the
pressure of the English government.

Every private letter that came from Vienna brought news
of Thugut's delays, and entreated the King and Queen to give
no credence to the report of the troops' advance. The
Austrian Ambassador even made an official request for a post-
ponement of the campaign ; but the die was cast. Nelson was
entreating and threatening ; and Acton was quite blind to the
aim of the English, which was simply to force the Emperor
into hastening his movements, on account of the hostilities in
which the Court of Naples was engaging. Combined with this

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 251

motive was the furtive hope that they might enjoy the pleasing
sight of all the continental Powers in arms, supposing serious
reverses were to result in the invasion of the kingdom of Naples.
But Acton, as I say, being blind to this aspect of the matter,
made no change whatever in his plans, and decided irrevocably
upon opening the campaign.

In the month of November Mack set out to San Germano,14
the spot where the army was to muster. I will return to this
period, after a digression on the events that led to my joining
the service.

When Conde's Army started for Russia I was at Constance.15
I had been in the Russian army for ten years, and had only
served with M. le prince de Conde by permission of the
Empress Catherine, and, after her death, of the Emperor Paul.
When Conde's Army went to Russia, therefore, I reverted to
my former rank and duties in the Russian service, and was
no longer in any way connected with Conde's Army. I foresaw
that, since the rules of the service had greatly increased in
severity since the accession of Paul I, I should be chained to
my regiment for a very long time. This being the case I
conceived a desire to return to Petersburg by a very indirect
route, and determined to indulge in an interesting journey that
I had been longing to make for several years. I resolved to
travel through Italy, embark at Naples for Constantinople,
and thence return to Russia by way of the Black Sea.

I proceeded to carry out my scheme in every detail. I spent
a fortnight in Milan, a fortnight in Florence, and twenty days
in Rome, where I saw the Vatican invaded, the Pope carried
off, and all the riches and antiquities of that magnificent town
seized by the French general Berthier.16 This disastrous event
made it impossible for me to make a longer visit than twenty
days, and I set out to Naples, where I only intended to remain
for a month, a sufficient time for me to see everything of
interest in the place.

I chartered a vessel to take me to the Levant, and was on
the point of embarking when it suddenly became plain that war
was imminent, and the projects for prosecuting it began to be
developed.

252 MEMOIRS OF THE

I had never missed a chance of fighting since I first left
France in 1787, and in spite of myself I bethought me of
various reasons why I ought not to let this opportunity slip
any more than the others. There is a pleasure in removing
imaginary obstacles, when at the back of one's mind one has
already unconsciously come to a decision. It pleased me to
think that this proof of my zeal would supply the Emperor Paul
with a good reason for increasing his good-will towards me,
and, having firmly persuaded myself that there was no rational
objection to the fulfilment of my wish, I wTote to the minister,
Acton.

I told him how earnestly I desired to witness the success
of his enterprise. I observed that the ties of friendship exist-
ing between the Courts of Russia and Naples justified me in
asking leave to follow the army in the field, and even make
myself useful, if I were fortunate enough to be placed in a
position to do so. I begged him to be kind enough to submit
my suggestion to the King.

I received his answer before twenty-four hours had passed.
He accepted my offer in the most flattering terms ; but I little
thought it would bring about a complete change in my whole
destiny.

A few days after his first letter Acton summoned me to a
personal interview. He told me that the King was extremely
anxious to employ me, but that there were difficulties in the
way, owing to the military customs with regard to foreigners
without rank in the army.17 He said that everything would
be simplified, and he would be entirely satisfied, if I would
consent to join the service; that the King would engage to
do as much for me as the Russian Emperor ; that the claims
to consideration that my campaigns had won for me would be
as much appreciated in the Neapolitan army as in that of
Russia ; that my fortune would be assured, and that I should
never regret the change in my circumstances. I asked for a
few moments for reflection. Acton begged me to give him
a prompt answer, and I promised to do so. I then went off
to consult the Chevalier Italiensky,18 the Russian charge
d'affaires, a man for whom I had a great regard, and one who

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 253

could not fail to inspire confidence in every possible way. He
listened to a detailed account of my situation with interest
and attention ; and then, after summing up all the circum-
stances of the moment, the character of the Emperor Paul,
Acton's eagerness in the matter, and the chances of a war
that he thought might prove advantageous, he advised me, in
confidencef to accept. On the following day I returned to
Acton, to whom I submitted several conditions. Among other
things I stipulated that, if I entered the service as a brigadier-
general, my name should not be the last on the list of promo-
tions that was then being drawn up. He subscribed to
everything in the King's name, and I therefore laid my decision
before Count Pouschkin, the Russian Minister, justifying it
with every reason likely to win the approval of the Emperor
of Russia. From that moment my career has run its course in
the service of Naples, more or less satisfactorily, as the
following pages will show.

The news that I had entered the service of Naples was heard
first as a rumour, before it was known to be true. Some of
the Neapolitan officers took fright, especially the Chevalier de
Saxe.19 I had been very careful, however, to pay due regard
to their self-esteem, by making no further condition than that
I should not be the last on the promotion-list. By this method
I had made it easy for the government to put a few distin-
guished general-officers above me, an act of foresight that was
prompted by my knowledge of the ties of blood, and of
intimacy, existing between the Queen and the Chevalier de
Saxe. However, the Princess of Hesse, the mistress of the
Chevalier de Saxe, was furious with me : she persuaded the
Queen, by dint of importunity, to oppose the King's decision,
and on every side I heard of intrigues being hatched to with-
stand my appointment. The Chevalier de Saxe, who was
exasperated to the last degree, sometimes showed me ill-will,
in indirect ways, when we met in society. The Princess of
Hesse 20 once stirred up an altercation that passed the limits
of my endurance : we fought a duel, and I received a sword-
thrust through the body.

As soon as I had recovered I paid a visit to Acton. I

254 MEMOIRS OF THE

observed to him that I had made no attempt to storm my way
into the service, that I was quite capable of dealing personally
with any intrigue or insult that emanated from private in-
dividuals, but that I was helpless against the Queen's dislike ;
and I begged him, unless she were willing to deny its existence,
to restore my liberty. Acton reassured me on this point,
renewed his protestations of the King's anxiety to employ me,
implored me to trust him and to consider the matter settled,
without allowing my zeal or my peace to be disturbed by any
underhand intrigue. I contented myself with these assurances,
packed up my baggage forthwith, and reached San Germano
two days after the arrival of Mack and the King.

Here, for the first time, I was able to form some idea of the
Neapolitan army. Twenty-four thousand men were encamped
in this place. Mack gave me an extremely cold reception, the
reason for which I have never discovered ; but it caused me no
inconvenience, nor even the least embarrassment. The pro-
motion-list appeared ; and my name was in the position I had
desired, as far as rank was concerned.21 My station was in the
first battle-line ; the other part of the same line was given to
General Metch ; 22 the second line to the Prince of Hesse ;
and the advanced guard and reserve to General Bourcard.23
The detached corps that was to march to Rome through the
Pontine Marches, that is to say the left wing of the army,
was entrusted to the Chevalier de Saxe ; the right wing, which
was to advance by way of the Abruzzi, was given to General
Micheroux ; 24 and the centre, in which I was stationed, was
placed under the command of Lieutenant-General the Due
de la Salandre.25 I never left the quarters that had been
assigned to me, except to inspect and manoeuvre my troops.
I never went to see Mack except when I was summoned. I
answered his questions laconically : I was as serious as he was
himself, and as punctilious as he could wish, but no more
communicative than his manner encouraged me to be. He
employed all his time in instructing and training his staff, and
teaching them his own method of manoeuvring, and other
things with which I was fairly familiar. On one occasion only
I dispensed with attending a particular drill that he had

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 255

ordained, as an object-lesson on one of his theories. He was
greatly upset, and on the following morning reprimanded me
severely as soon as he saw me. I did not answer him a word,
and my composure offended him still more. I was distressed
to see that three-quarters of the troops were merely peasants
in uniform, who had never been drilled before, and were afraid
to fire their muskets. Indeed they were hardly fit to appear
even in a review.

I had barely had a fortnight for attending to details when
the King and Queen asked Mack for some manoeuvres on a
large scale. Mack made his preparations. He assembled all
the generals and went over the ground with them. While
expounding his theories he never addressed a single word to
me, and I made not a single comment. I listened to his plans
with the closest attention, and concentrated all my thoughts
on the best method of carrying out his ideas in my own part
of the line ; but neither he nor I uttered a syllable. I do not
know, even now, whether his aim was to make the King and
Queen see how coldly he treated me ; but I was sure, at all
events, that his schemes were unsuccessful, for their Majesties'
marked kindness towards me left nothing to be desired.
Whenever they walked round the camp they plainly showed a
very special feeling of cordiality and preference as they passed
the front of my line; but Mack made no change in his be-
haviour, and treated me in exactly the same way until a time
to which I shall refer later on.

Two days after the reconnaissance the manoeuvre took place.
It lasted for twelve hours. The plan was good : the twenty-
four thousand men who composed the army were skilfully dis-
posed, in such a way as to facilitate strategical movements as
far as possible. General Metch, as I have already said, com-
manded the left of the first line, while I was in command of
the right; but we formed two separate columns until the
approach of our imaginary enemy. He was too late in leaving
the camp with his column, became entangled with the columns
of the second line, failed to carry out any of Mack's intentions,
and, as the evolutions proceeded, took up his position so
badly and attacked in such confusion that the King and Mack

256 MEMOIRS OF THE

vied with one another in rating him publicly. I was fortunate
enough to direct the movements of the right wing in accord-
ance with Mack's intentions ; and a charge of cavalry with
which I followed the infantry-charge, on my own initiative,
gave the liveliest satisfaction to the King. He came to me,
and overwhelmed me with praise and kindness. He added that
Mack had expressed as much satisfaction as he, and that he
had undertaken to tell me so.

This manoeuvre, unhappily, was little calculated to raise our
hopes of succeeding in real warfare. A quarter of the men
were trained : the rest hardly dared to pull the trigger, and
turned away their faces as they fired. The mules that drew
the guns were neither strong nor numerous enough, and it
was obvious that the artillery was unequal to a week's cam-
paign, and incapable of travelling on bad roads. It was easy
to guess that the fate of the baggage-wagons would be
proportionately unlucky, and that much inconvenience would
be the result. This is one of the things for which I think
Mack deserves blame. A smaller degree of penetration than
he possesses would have sufficed to show him the seriousness of
these deficiencies, and a little more wisdom would have led
him to put everything right before the departure of the army.
This he could certainly have done, since his will was the
King's, and all the revenues of the kingdom were at his
disposal. However, the campaign was to begin in five days.
On the morning of the 6th 26 the whole army set out at day-
break to invade the Roman States. The November rains,
which are very copious, had already begun : more than three-
fourths of the baggage-wagons stuck in the mud and could
not even be dragged out of the camp. We never heard another
word of them. After a march of two leagues we had to cross
the river Melfa.27 One would have thought, considering we
had been at San Germano for about a month, that this neces-
sity would have been foreseen, and a bridge thrown across
the river ; for it was most important to make this first march
as easy as possible, lest the new troops should be discouraged.
But, to my great surprise, far from having taken this useful
precaution, Mack gave the order to ford the river. I rode

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 257

into the water to sound its depth, and saw that the men
would be immersed up to their shoulders. The current was
so strong that it was all my horse could do to stand against
it. But the order had been given, and must be executed.
Two squadrons of cavalry were stationed in the stream, above
the ford, to break the force of the current, and the infantry
passed over in close order, a platoon at a time. The officers
were at their posts and perfect order was preserved, but a
great number of men lost their footing. Those who were able
to keep their feet were up to their chests in water; and the
columns that came after suffered even more. The King's
carriages and Acton's stuck fast in the mire; several relays
of mules attempted to drag them out ; but not a single wagon
was able to cross. Although we bivouacked for the night on
the other side of the river the army never set eyes again on
the few wagons that had contrived to leave the camp, and
not a single officer was able to change his clothes till the
campaign was ended.28

In the course of the third day's march the advanced guard
met the French. One cannot as yet say the enemy, for the
army had received definite orders to begin by begging them
to retire, and to use force only in the case of a refusal. This
they were very careful to avoid; preferring, quite rightly, to
take advantage of this unparalleled courtesy to concentrate
their forces, and to postpone resistance till they were stronger.
After a series of such compliments the army reached Rome,
on the sixth day. The French shut themselves up in the
fortress of St. Angelo to the number of four hundred,29 and
the rest evacuated Rome. The King entered the city amid
the acclamations of an immense crowd, and proceeded to the
Farnese Palace. Mack's one concern was to leave the place
as quickly as possible, in order to pursue his plans. 3i)

It is necessary to repeat that, when the army arrived in
Rome, it was in such a state of distress that no general except
Mack would have thought it possible to continue the campaign
without giving it time to recover. Arms were rusted by the
constant rain ; shoes were lost ; the artillery was scattered over
the roads, many of the mules being dead or disabled ; the
s

258 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

baggage-wagons were five days1 march in the rear. In short
the Seven Years' War had not impaired any of the armies
that took part in it to the extent that these six days of march-
ing had ruined the Neapolitan army. I appeal to every soldier
and every honest man for his opinion on this time, which was
the beginning of all our disasters. And surely we should
have been justified, after proving by our occupation of Rome
that we were capable of taking part in the general operations,
in waiting till the Austrians had shown what role they intended
to play? Surely we might have allowed them to reach the
point where their influence could have its effect ; while we,
meanwhile, were profiting by the painful march from Naples
to Rome, and learning how best to restore and strengthen an
army that could suffer so prodigiously ? But instead of taking
this wise, and indeed indispensable measure, our general ordered
us to be ready to march in two days' time. All the necessary
articles were requisitioned ; a commandant of Rome was
appointed,31 and a garrison to guard the King. Then Mack
made his plans. His intention was to attack the French in
the course of the second day's march, at the spot where they
had assembled, that is to say at Civita Castellana, a little
fortress in a good position on the Loretto road. It is sur-
rounded by a torrent that serves to protect it in winter, and
it is only five miles distant from Ponte Felice, which crosses
the Tiber below Mariano and Borghetto.32

XIII

Advance of the army — Battle of Civita Castellana : troops of the Chev-
alier de Saxe routed without fighting — Damas holds the heights of
Borghetto : then prepares to execute Mack's order to make a fresh
attack on Ponte Felice — A counter-order, dated three days earlier,
obliges him to retreat in the face of the enemy (13th Dec. 1798) —
Splendid retreat on Orbitello, where Damas, who is seriously
wounded, is able to embark for Sicily.

WE set out in a state of complete dilapidation.1 Mack divided
the army into four columns. The left, under the Chevalier de
Saxe, was eleven thousand strong, and followed the high-road
to Florence as far as its junction with the Loretto road,
between Monterosi and Ronciglione. Saxe's orders were to
attack the little town of Nepi with a portion of his right wing,
and take the rest of his troops across the plain of Falleri 2 to
the bridge of Felice, below Borghetto, with the object of
forcing the enemy to hasten their retreat from Civita Castel-
lana, and cross the bridge to Foligno.

The centre, which was ten thousand strong, was commanded
by Mack himself. Under him were the Due de la Salandre
and myself in the first line, and the Prince of Hesse in the
second. We took the old road to Florence, which goes directly
to Civita Castellana, on the nearer side of the river.

The third column, which comprised six thousand men under
General Metch, followed the left bank of the Tiber by way of
the Sabines,3 and was to take up its position on the heights
of Otricoli, with a view to destroying the French column as
it retreated on Foligno.

Finally, the fourth column, comprising six thousand men
and commanded by Marshal Micheroux, skirted the Abruzzi,
id was to join the rest of the army near Foligno.
The French, under Generals Rey, Kellermann, and Mac-
maid,4 numbered altogether about twenty thousand, of whom
s 2 259

260 MEMOIRS OF THE

eight thousand were in the neighbourhood of Civita Castellana,
four thousand opposite Metch, and eight thousand between
that district and the Abruzzi. They had chosen their positions
remarkably well. By turning round Civita Castellana as on an
axis they could make an effectual resistance on every side, and
would always be able to check one portion of our forces while
they fell upon another. Mack's plan would have been irre-
proachable if his troops and generals had been inured to war ;
but it was on too large a scale for an ill-trained army; he
entrusted the wings to the generals who had the least experi-
ence, and himself took command of the centre, which the
nature of the country made totally useless.

At the end of the first day's march Mack's headquarters
were in a convent near the camp, between Rome and Civita
Castellana. He sent for me, and I was shown into his cell,
where, contrary to all expectation, he loaded me with com-
pliments on the way I had carried out his orders ever since he
had taken up his command. I tried in vain to make the Due
de la Salandre responsible for everything he was praising :
he attributed to me the slight amount of order that existed in
the column, and announced his intention of retiring from the
chief command in my favour, placing the advanced guard under
my orders, and attacking the enemy on the following morning.
This sudden transition from marked coldness to absolute con-
fidence, at the very moment of the crisis, was extremely flatter-
ing, but roused no feeling of gratitude. I pointed out that
he would offend two generals whom he had appeared to value,
and who had done nothing to forfeit his esteem, and that this
might have a bad effect. The more I refused, the more he
insisted. He laid a positive order on me, and showed me all
his plans for the attack ; and before we separated we had made
all our arrangements, and had agreed to carry them out at
daybreak.

Two hours' march in column formation brought us to the
foot of the heights that dominate Civita Castellana. The first
line was deployed; the hills were carried at the point of the
bayonet, after an hour's fire from our artillery and musketry ;
and the French retired. This moment opened Mack's eyes to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 261

the probable uselessness of the simultaneous attack by the
Chevalier de Saxe. The embankment and bridge that carried
the high-road, and were the only means of crossing the torrent,
were, at this time of year, absolutely impassable. We were
forced to be passive spectators of the chevalier's attack, the
failure of which was soon made plain to us by the retrograde
movement of the smoke that rose from his musketry. We had
a further confirmation of his misfortune in an accident that
occurred to me. A ball struck the ground beneath my horse,
and raised such a mass of earth that both the horse and I were
thrown down. On rising and examining the ball I found its
calibre was 12, which showed me it did not come from the
French, as they had none of that calibre. It was easy to
conclude that they were firing on us with guns taken from
the Chevalier de Saxe, and this proved to be the case.5

When night fell, however, we were still in doubt as to the
result of the day. Mack, who was still uneasy as to the fate
of the Chevalier de Saxe, sent me round the foot of the
mountains, with five battalions and six squadrons, to support
him if it were not too late, or to take his place and reinforce
my troops with the remains of his, in the case of a real dis-
aster. To reach him I had to march for a night and a day
by abominable roads, which were quite inaccessible to the
artillery and nearly so to the cavalry. I set out ; and about
mid-day on the morrow I reached the edge of the plains on
which the left wing was stationed. I immediately found traces
of the complete rout of that army-corps. M. de la Tremoille,6
brigadier employe, who left its scattered remains when the
fight was over and carried the news to the King, met one of
my outposts, and gave him in writing the names of the villages
where the dispersed troops were to be found. The Chevalier
de Saxe was dangerously wounded ; no one could be discovered
to take command. It was quite hopeless, therefore, to think
of combining forces until I had taken up a strong position
with my troops, and until the artillery I was expecting had
arrived from Rome. I posted myself on the hill of Monterosi,
which crosses the road to Florence. My left was protected by
the lake, and to ensure the safety of my right I dislodged the

262 MEMOIRS OF THE

enemy from Nepi. In this position I awaited the artillery,
which arrived the next day ; and being now secure I devoted
several days to obtaining news of the scattered remnant of
the defeated force, and inquiring into the possibilities of
making it useful.

The total defeat of the Chevalier de Saxe was the result of
an error in the order of attack. Nepi, the enemy's position on
the right, was not seized before the ground that lay beyond it
was occupied, and therefore, as the enemy attacked the front
of the line, our troops heard a sharp fire from the musketry
behind them, and thought their flank was turned. They all
lost their heads on the spot, and took instant flight. Not a
man was killed or wounded except the general ; and of eleven
thousand men I could only recover three thousand.

On the third day of my sojourn at Monterosi Mack came to
see me there. He approved of all my dispositions, and gave
me his orders with regard to my future operations. I was to
hold myself ready, at a word from him, to achieve the aim
in which the Chevalier de Saxe had failed ; and I was in a far
better position to do so, since my right wing rested on the
position of Nepi.

As Mack was on the point of entering the carriage that was
to take him back to Rome an orderly came to tell us that the
enemy was advancing upon us. I expected Mack to throw
himself eagerly into the preparations for receiving them ; but
he was kind enough to think me sufficiently ready for them,
and went off to Rome.

The enemy merely made a reconnaissance, and then retired.
I posted the troops of the Chevalier de Saxe on the heights
above Borghetto, whence the enemy tried to dislodge them
every day, but were always repulsed. We were now at the
beginning of December. The weather was bad and nothing
was being done ; the Emperor's troops had shown no sign of
moving ; we had already had reverses ; our outlook was grow-
ing gloomy, and I was impatiently waiting for Mack to bring
his plans to a head, for the existing state of affairs seemed
interminable.

At last I received a letter from him, informing me that

.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 263

General Metch, who was posted near Otricoli on the left bank
of the Tiber, was going to drive the enemy towards the
Apennines, and directing me to make my movement in advance
at the same moment, and carry out the instructions he had
already given me. I set out at once, and marched by shocking
roads to Falleri. I left it to the brigadiers7 to pitch the
camp, and instructed them to leave it at daybreak and bivouac
at a spot five miles away from Borghetto, on the road to Civita
Castellana, after posting a battalion of grenadiers and two
squadrons as a guard upon the approaches to the fortress,
which was only two miles distant. I then went on to give
my orders to the troops that had joined mine, who were
cantoned on the hills, as I have already said, at a place four
miles farther on. There I spent the night. At daybreak I
made a reconnaissance in the direction of Borghetto. After
driving back the enemy's outposts I was able to discover the
position of their main body, on the other side of Ponte Felice.
I fixed the attack for the morrow at daybreak, and it was
agreed that I and the other troops should advance simul-
taneously, force the bridge, and pursue the enemy as they
retreated. I returned very quickly over the fields to the corps
stationed between Civita Castellana and Borghetto, and found
it bivouacked on the spot I had indicated. And then came
what I cannot but regard as the most dramatic moment of my
life. I appeal to any soldier in the world : let him recall
the moment when fate tried him to the utmost : let him
compare his experience with mine, and then judge of my
feelings.

It was five o'clock in the afternoon (13th Dec. 1789)
when I dismounted in the middle of the bivouac. The
brigadiers came up hastily to ask me if I had met one of
Mack's adjutants, who was looking for me, and had an impor-
tant missive to deliver. I had not seen him ; it was now dark ;
I was to attack the enemy the next morning ; it was absolutely
essential for me to read the despatch before making the attack.
But how could I find the bearer? I sent off my most active
officers on horseback to scour all the roads and paths that
nverged upon the bivouac, and, as there are limits to the

264 MEMOIRS OF THE

cruelty of fate, one of them brought back the adjutant. I
opened the letter. It was dated the 10th December, and this
was the evening of the 13th. The substance of it was "that
all was changed ; that Metch had been defeated ; 8 that I,
wherever I might be, must beat a retreat, and by the morning
of the 12th must be on the heights of Velletri (fourteen miles
on the farther side of Rome).'9 9

I repeat that this was the evening of the 13th ; I was fifty
miles in advance of the spot indicated ; the enemy was con-
fronting me, and was also in the rear of my right flank, in the
fortress of Civita Castellana, near which I had stationed an
outpost. I was abandoned, isolated, and cut off from all com-
munication with the army. I had reason to presume that the
French from the castle of St. Angelo were at large in Rome,
and were even reinforced by another corps. The Tiber cut
me off from my friends ; I was entirely without resources ; there
was not a circumstance in my favour. I was stupefied. I tried
to compose my countenance, lest those who stood by should
guess the awkwardness of their position. In short, I buried
the horrors of the situation in the depths of my sore heart ;
I collected my wits ; I thought out the best means of avoiding,
or at least delaying, the fate that I really thought inevitable ;
and having decided to adopt the only measure open to me, I
gave my orders.

I made the adjutant put his signature to the day and hour
that he gave me the letter. I wrote a circular note to all the
generals in command, adjuring them to effect their retreat as
slowly as possible until I should have joined them, and above
all not to evacuate Rome before my arrival. I made the
adjutant responsible for the letter being read by all the generals
he should meet, and I sent him away. The enemy's vedettes
were in front of mine ; the French general 10 had come in the
course of that evening to make a reconnaissance, and every-
thing pointed to the insurmountable difficulty I should have
in hiding my movements. I had a great number of fires lighted
in front of the troops, and made the men stand behind them,
under arms. I sent off the garrison artillery, with an escort,
by the road it had already traversed, which was already cut to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 265

pieces and presented difficulties at every step. I announced
that the first man to speak, or light a fire on the road, or lie
down, should be shot : and I allowed this first column to have
an hour's start. I sent an order to the brigadier ll in command
of the three thousand men posted on the heights of Borghetto
to march towards Monterosi without a moment's delay, and to
leave in every village, as he passed, a small detachment to pre-
vent any of the peasants from leaving the place before daylight.
Fortunately the officers of this column were intelligent and
trustworthy, and the order was very well executed. I collected
a sufficient number of peasants to keep up the fires all night,
and, leaving all the outposts and vedettes at their posts, with
orders not to retreat until dawrn, I gradually raked out the
fires. Then, in the most profound silence, I made the troops
file into the narrow road we had to follow, and, an hour later
than the artillery, we marched away.12

The battalion of grenadiers and the two squadrons who had
been guarding the approaches to Civita Castellana marched
away in a parellel line with our column. So profound was
the silence, and so careful was the officer who remained at the
bivouac in command of the outposts, that my departure was
not discovered. At this time the discipline of the French was
less strict than usual, and they were probably not nearly so
observant as they afterwards became. Day had dawned before
they had the least suspicion of my retreat. It was then that
the outposts began to retire. The French general sent some
troops in pursuit ; but the links of the chain of outposts, which
could hardly have been weaker, were all united and in safety
before the enemy's attempt to pursue them was discovered.
At the same hour I arrived at Monterosi with my troops, after
a night-march of twenty miles. Not a gun, nor an ammunition-
wagon, nor a single man was left behind.

The French general has since declared that I slipped through
his fingers like a piece of soap — those were his words — and my
self-esteem was quite satisfied. One of the dangers of my
position, then, was surmounted ; but how many were left ! I
fed my troops at Monterosi, and calculated that I could allow
them two hours' rest. I made Comte Auguste de Talleyrand 1S

266 MEMOIRS OF THE

go on before us to Rome, to inquire into the circumstances,
and find out what we had to hope or fear.

The column from the heights of Borghetto had just joined
me. I already had a rearguard, formed by my late outposts,
which were a night's march in my rear ; and we were on the
point of continuing our march when an officer of the staff came
to me from Mack's adjutant-general.14 He informed me that
the Neapolitans had evacuated Rome ; that Mack had left a
sufficient number of troops in the place to hold it till I had
effected my retreat ; that to his great surprise the command-
ant 1S of the troops in question had abandoned the town with-
out orders; that he had been cashiered in consequence; that
another corps had been brought from Frascati to occupy Rome
till my arrival ; that it had been repulsed by the French, who
were already released from St. Angelo ; 16 and finally that
Mack's adjutant-general had taken the responsibility of propos-
ing a truce, in order that my retreat might be safely effected.
The document had been signed, and he placed it in my hands.
I breathed again. I thought I was saved from a strait that
had seemed impossible ; but it will be seen in the sequel that I
was still far from being safely through this painful crisis.

I continued my march, and at mid-day, when I was within
two miles of Ponte Molle, I perceived in the distance a small
body of French dragoons, who seemed to be escorting a
general. When they drew near me a trumpeter sounded a
parley. I was in so great a hurry to discover the general's
object that I could not wait to send a messenger, but went
to meet him myself with the few orderlies I had with me.

I inquired of the soldiers their object in coming. The
general, or chief of the staff, whom I now know to have been
M. Bonnamy,17 began to hold forth. He told me that the
signed treaty I had been given was quite worthless ; that the
man who signed it had no right to do so; that General Rey,
who had entered Rome with his troops, after defeating General
Metch on the left bank of the Tiber, summoned me to lay
down my arms ; that I ought to know how I was placed ; that
I was hemmed in between that corps and those of Macdonald
and Kellermann, who were following me ; that my unfortunate

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 267

position was not the result of my own conduct, which had been
irreproachable ; that I had been abandoned to my fate, and
that consequently there was no doubt as to what I ought to do.
I tried to remind them of the claims of honour, the rights of
humanity, the sacredness of a treaty, the security of a signa-
ture ; but these men knew as well as I that my cause was just ;
their dishonourable conduct was quite deliberate. I added that
a Frenchman did not surrender as long as he had bayonets at
his command, and while I was still engaged in the dispute an
officer ordered the troops to surround me. This they did, and
I wras declared a prisoner of war.

It is only when a man is inspired by rage, I think, that he
realises how strong his imagination can be. Only rage such as
I felt at that moment could have produced the fervour that I
threw into my abuse of that execrable corps. I appealed to the
dragoons ; they were visibly impressed. Then, profiting by the
silence that my words had produced, I called them to witness
that such deeds were horrible, and bade them remember the
sacred laws of warfare ; I pointed to my troops, waiting at a
little distance by my orders, on the faith of their summons to
parley. And at last they were so much moved, and stupefied,
and bewildered by my wealth of invective that they broke the
circle and let me go free. I then asked for three hours, to
consider the course I should take. Since I could do nothing
effectual without gaining time I made a great point of those
three hours, but I could not persuade them to give them to
me. M. Bonnamy only granted me one. It was arranged that
our vedettes should remain on the spot, and that an hour later,
if I had not laid down my arms, I should expect to be attacked.
M. Bonnamy and his escort retraced their steps, leaving me
M. de Talleyrand, whom they had brought back to me with a
bandage over his eyes.

I returned to my troops; and the extreme celerity of my
movements raised a false alarm. The men thought I was
pursued. A 12-pounder became unharnessed, and the gunners
abandoned it. It took me more than a quarter of an hour to
restore order, but at last, as quickly as might be, I made the
troops take the Orbitello road. I made them step out well,

268 MEMOIRS OF THE

but in perfect order, and I formed a rearguard composed of
the best battalions and squadrons. In this way we advanced
until the hour was gone; but as soon as the time allowed me
had expired I took up a position 18 with my rearguard, and
awaited the enemy. The gentle slope that had concealed my
movements was soon covered with French troops, and the fight
began. The affair lasted until nightfall, without their having
gained an inch of ground. At last their fire ceased, and they
abandoned the pursuit. I then retreated along the road after
the main body of my troops, which was already at a consider-
able distance.19

My flanks were protected by the natural features of the
country, and the French general made no attempt to overcome
these difficulties in the darkness, for he never doubted that
Kellermann would cut off my retreat. He had every reason
to believe it, and I to fear it. A five days' march lay between
me and Orbitello, and there is a carriage-road that cuts across
from Viterbo to a little town through which I wras obliged to
pass on the third day, and another leading to a town that I
should pass on the second day. I marched all night, and at
daybreak halted, in a fine position, for the troops to have some
food and drink. I then continued the march, and at about
four in the afternoon passed the first cross-road from Viterbo,
without meeting with any opposition. I allowed my troops to
rest for four hours, in the course of which we had an alarm
that proved to be false. As night drew near I set out again
in perfect order, for I had succeeded in warding off the dis-
couragement in the ranks that is so fatal in circumstances of
this kind. That evening we had another false alarm; but a
genuine surprise was so extremely likely to occur that I dared
not neglect any precaution, though I allowed nothing to inter-
fere with the rapidity of the march nor with the order of the
ranks. A flying column of reserves was, all the time, protect-
ing the rest. Finally, at about eleven o'clock at night, I
passed the second road from Viterbo and marched into the
little town of Toscanella, which stood at such a height and
was so well protected that I felt safe. I served out plenty of
provisions, and gave the troops a rest of six hours.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 269

The remainder of that day sufficed to take me to Montalto,
the last halting-place but one before the Presidii of Tuscany.20
Leaving an officer and fifty men behind me, with orders to
warn me if they should see any signs of the enemy, I continued
my march.21

When we were within four miles of Montalto we encountered
as violent a storm as one is likely to see in the summer, which
produced a flood too deep for me to cross. I waited for six
hours at the brink, while the waters were sinking ; and at last,
in the evening, I entered Montalto.

I will take advantage of this moment of inaction to answer
a question that my reader will very probably put to me. Why,
he will ask, did I not force a way to Rome?

I am sure he will approve of my decision if he will be kind
enough to consider the surrounding country and the circum-
stances. In front of me lay the Tiber, with Ponte Molle to be
forced ; Rome was in insurrection and had an army-corps to
defend it; the armies of Generals Kellermann and Macdonald
were on my heels, only a day's march in my rear, and would
have come up with me before I could have hoped to gain any
advantage. To make my defeat certain they would have com-
bined their forces against my six thousand men — of whom three
thousand were inadequately armed — and would have left me no
loophole of escape.

By retreating to Orbitello I was strengthening an important
part of the King's possessions. I could safely wait there for a
convoy to take me back to Naples by sea, and, in the case of
the Neapolitan army recovering the upper hand, the five
thousand Neapolitan troops at Leghorn could combine with me
to form an army of eleven thousand men in the enemy's rear.22

Mack thought my column had been cut to pieces. He never
dreamt it possible that I could escape, and his eulogistic letters,
as well as certain other circumstances, left me in no doubt as
to his approbation.

When an army-corps cannot be cut off nor flanked its risks
are confined to the usual hazards of war, and its general need
only concern himself with the ordinary chances and dangers,
with which he is more or less able to cope. Such was my

270 MEMOIRS OF THE

situation at Montalto. I had crossed all the roads by which
the enemy could intercept me, including even the coast-road
from Rome by Civita Vecchia, which lay on my left hand. I
was not beyond the enemy's reach, but I could fight without
being at a disadvantage. I could safely decide, therefore, to
pass a whole day in my present position.

Kellermann, as we shall see, only missed his aim by a few
hours. He surprised Toscanella on the evening of the day I
left it.23 The officer in command kept an insufficient watch
upon the approaches : he was taken prisoner, with the little
detachment under his orders. Kellermann, in his impatience
to overtake my troops, whom he felt confident of defeating
the moment he appeared, came after me with a few squadrons
of chasseurs, leaving the rest of his corps behind him, in order
to gain time. He reached my outposts at six o'clock in the
morning. I refused to believe it when I was awakened ; but the
call to saddle was already sounded, and the infantry already
under arms. On reaching the scene of action I found Keller-
mann's squadrons within musket-range. The lie of the ground
made it possible for our cavalry to charge them. In a moment
they were beaten back, with a loss of several men, and I only
abandoned the pursuit when they were on the farther side of
the stream.

I had decided to spend a day at Montalto, and had no inten-
tion of allowing so slight a reason to interfere with my plans,
which I even thought might have a good effect upon the minds
of my men. I therefore sent to Orbitello to engage quarters,
and we returned to our rest.

At two o'clock in the afternoon I was again informed of the
enemy's approach, with some infantry. They were still at a
sufficient distance to allow of my retreating ; and the fatigue
of their terrible march would have prevented them from follow-
ing me any farther. But I could not have forgiven myself :
I preferred to strengthen my position and await them. I
occupied the time in assuring the troops that our success was
certain, and pointing out to them how shameful it would be
not to check the enemy's imprudence, since it could only be
founded on their opinion of us.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 271

Kellermann deployed his column as soon as the ground
allowed of his doing so, but owing to my artillery the evolution
was not very well executed. It was hardly completed, however,
before they beat the charge ; and, with the cries that are cus-
tomary in the French army, marched upon my line. Then the
musketry opened fire; and for a long time this fire was very
well sustained, while the Neapolitans behaved splendidly. The
enemy's drums were beating the charge all the time, but they
did not gain an inch of ground. I tried to attack their flank
with my cavalry; but I found the latter less responsive, and
gave up the attempt. Kellermann endeavoured to turn my left
with his right, but I went in person with a battalion of
grenadiers to oppose this manoeuvre. The officer in command
of the battalion might quite well have spared me this task if
he had been present, but at the moment he was not on the
spot. I received a terrible wound, but fortunately did not fall
from my horse. The engagement continued until it was nearly
dark, when the enemy retired. I followed them as far as the
spot they had occupied during the action, and there I halted.24

If I had not been wounded I might have tried to cut off
their retreat, but I admit I was reluctant to entrust the opera-
tion to any one else, since it was not conducive to my real
object and was quite unessential. I had no confidence in any
of my officers : the most experienced of the brigadiers had
been taken prisoner through mistaking a French battalion for
his own corps.25 I was incapable of speaking a word ; I was
swallowing gallons of blood. If I had been attacked the next
morning I should have been unfit to take command. I formed
up my troops, and retired on Orbitello (20th Dec. 1798), after
having my wound temporarily dressed at Montalto.

Kellermann occupied the place on the following day, and
sent me a letter by two officers who had formerly been in the
Damas Regiment, to ask me to grant an armistice. I allowed
the commandant of the place to arbitrate in the matter, and
he agreed to the armistice, subject to the consent of the
generals in command, who confirmed his decision.26 I sent
M. de Talleyrand to Naples by sea, to give a full account of
my retreat and obtain further orders.

272 MEMOIRS OF THE

Meanwhile Mack was retreating with his army towards
Naples, followed by the French. The column commanded by
General Micheroux had been beaten in the Abruzzi,37 while,
at the same moment, General Metch was defeated near the
Tiber ; and the disorder and discouragement that resulted made
it very difficult for Mack to redeem the situation, or even act
on the defensive. The enemy arrived before Capua, where for
some time Mack held firm.

Acton, who was responsible for all the trouble, lost his head
instead of mending matters. He believed his safety was
threatened, and it became his sole concern. He professed to
think the lives of the King and Queen were in danger; he
infected the people with his own fear ; and, at a moment when
it was essential to give an example of coolness, he gave an
example of terror. The Court and the diplomatic corps em-
barked in English and Portuguese frigates; and, when safely
out in the roadstead, the government took counsel as to the
best measures to adopt, thereby alienating public opinion,
instead of winning it over by mitigating or sharing the people's
danger. Prince Pignatelli was appointed lieutenant-general of
the kingdom.28 But the death of order always means the death
of authority : he had no control over the people. A very brief
time sufficed to decide the fate of Naples.

A short account of subsequent events will give some idea of
the resources that were still available. The French were in a
very painful situation : they had marched precipitately from
Rome, and found themselves before Capua without either
provisions or the means of obtaining them. They were
harassed in the rear by the armed peasantry, and if the
fortress of Gaeta had not shamefully surrendered would have
been entirely isolated, and in a worse position than the Nea-
politan army.

A corps of fourteen thousand men under General Gambs 29
was still intact, in the country between Naples and the Abruzzi.
This corps might yet have come to the help of the capital ; and,
even if it had not arrived in time to save Naples, might have
retired into Calabria to await the arrival of my column and the
troops from Leghorn, and thus have saved that fine province

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 27S

i'or the King. But I never heard that such an idea even
entered Mack's mind. He had completely lost his head, and
there was not the least chance that it would be replaced by
any one else's. Capua surrendered.30

This was not enough to secure the safety of the French.
To advance upon Naples seemed a great risk, and there were
no provisions at Capua. It transpired afterwards that they
had drawn up a conciliatory treaty which included their retire-
ment ; but the government of Naples foolishly forestalled them
by proposing an armistice. The man who was sent to Cham-
pionnet met his aide-de-camp on the way,31 also bearing in-
structions, and instead of taking him back to Naples to deliver
his message, hastened to announce his own. The French aide-
de-camp saw where his advantage lay : he held his tongue, and
took the Neapolitan to his general. Championnet was shrewd
enough to deduce, from the fact of this overture being made
to him, that the government of Naples was conscious of its own
difficulties and unaware of his. He therefore increased his
demands, and played upon the fears of his opponents. He
established his headquarters at Caserta, and from that moment
the people gave themselves over to excess and licence. Acton
did not neglect to add the last straw to their exasperation : he
set fire in the bay to two Neapolitan ships of the line and all
the gunboats. By thus destroying the maritime resources, at
the very moment when the royal family were deserting their
capital in foreign ships,32 Acton removed the last hope and
last restraint of the people. The King's palace was pillaged,
and the populace rose in open insurrection. While the King
was at anchor he had been visited every day by deputations,
begging him to stay. The lazzaroni swore they would defend
the capital, and could have done it; but Acton's fears pre-
vailed. It was Nelson who first suggested the burning of the
ships, in order to make it impossible for the French to descend
upon the shores of Sicily ; but how easy it would have been to
take them thither, instead of making them useless ! In short,
fear and folly reigned supreme. Mack, being in danger from
the people, bethought him of going to Championnet, and
claiming the right, as an Austrian general, of returning to

274 MEMOIRS OF THE

Germany ; but all he gained was an escort to take him to France
as a prisoner.33

Championnet, whose army did not comprise more than twelve
thousand men, attacked the suburbs of Naples and tried to
force an entrance into the town. The resistance he encoun-
tered was a sufficient proof that the lazzaroni could have saved
the capital for the King, and have rallied his troops. Cham-
pionnet never succeeded in overcoming the people's resistance
at Capo di Chino, and was unable to enter the town until
Prince Moliterno,34 who had assumed the supreme command,
undertook to let him in : he diverted the attention of the
people by a religious ceremony, and admitted the French
meanwhile. He proclaimed himself general-commandant, and
chose Duke Roccaromana as his second-in-command. The
kingdom,' in its need of a leader, recognised and obeyed their
authority. It was only gradually that corruption and the spirit
of independence gained ascendancy ; and Naples was proclaimed
a Republic while the rest of the kingdom still believed itself
subservient to the King.

Nothing could give a truer idea of the prevailing madness
than this republican constitution of Naples : it was directed,
authorised, and supported by no one but the general in com-
mand of a French army-corps. When the provisional govern-
ment wished for the support of France and sent envoys to
Paris with the object of obtaining it, the Directory refused to
listen, or to recognise the Parthenopean Republic. This pro-
ceeding, one would think, might have had a calming effect on
the public, and have shown the Neapolitans the instability of
their position. It was infatuation rather than enthusiasm that
was urging them forward; the people were intoxicated with
lawlessness ; the nobility were animated by hatred for Acton,
and were more intent on avenging themselves for the injustice
of the past than on launching themselves into unknown seas.
The majority of the insurgents were malcontents and youths ;
the rest were either resigned to the change, or compelled to
contribute to it, but never convinced. It was this fact that
made the restoration so easy. It was absurd to call the
changes in Naples a revolution. The unanimous will of the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 275

people, or their apparent concurrence, is necessary to anything
that can be called a revolution : this was simply an invasion,
which was dignified with the semblance of a revolution in order
to strengthen it. The weakness and ineptitude of its opponents
made it easy of accomplishment, and gave a false air of import-
ance both to its causes and its results.

Mack was still at Capua when he heard of my retreat to
Orbitello. He wrote me the most flattering letter, and pro-
mised me a convoy for the conveyance of my troops, whom at
that time he intended to reinforce his own. But shortly after-
wards Prince Pignatelli informed me of his appointment and
of other recent events, saying that I ought not to return to
Naples in ignorance of its condition. Lieutenant-General
Naselli,33 who was in command of the detachment at Leghorn,
had orders to join me at Orbitello and embark in the same
transports. Being disabled by my wound I placed all the
troops under General Naselli 's orders, on the authority of
Prince Pignatelli, and parting from the convoy set out to
Palermo. An appalling gale, similar to the one in which the
royal family were so nearly lost on their voyage, landed me at
Messina, after a very narrow escape from death. General
Naselli 's convoy, which was escorted by a frigate with a
treacherous captain, sailed into the harbour at Naples without
taking any precautions whatever : the people disarmed the
troops, and thereby deprived Calabria or Sicily of a force that
might have proved most useful, in defending the one or saving
the other. The lack of troops in Calabria had a very disturb-
ing effect on Messina. Public opinion was divided. If the
rancour that prevailed in the kingdom of Naples had crossed
the straits the whole of Sicily would have been infected by it,
and the peace of the royal family would have been disturbed
at Palermo. Most fortunately Championnet's troops were not
sufficiently numerous to be scattered : he overawed the Cala-
brians without occupying their territory. They were reduced
to submission, but, being farther from the capital than the
other provinces, they never completely succumbed to the
mtagion.

T 2

XIV

Arrival at Palermo, where the King and Queen give the Count so warm a
welcome as to rouse General Acton's jealousy — Nelson and Lady
Hamilton — Cardinal Ruffo's expedition — Fall of the Neapolitan
republic, and cruel reprisals — Acton brings about Ruffo's fall — The
Prince of Cassaro Viceroy of Naples — Damas and the Chevalier de
Saxe are entrusted, in the capacity of inspectors-general, with the
reorganisation of the army (Nov. 1799) — Financial trouble — Visit of
the Due de Berry to the Court of Palermo — Russian garrison at
Naples — Prudent advice of the Council of Generals on the subject of
active co-operation with Austria after Marengo is badly received by
the King, who gives Damas the command of an auxiliary corps in
Rome, and afterwards in Tuscany — Operations against the Cisalpine
general, Pino, and Miollis (Battle of Siena, 14th Jan. 1801); negoti-
ations with Murat — Armistice of Foligno.

AFTER resting for a few days at Messina I set out to Palermo
in a litter. I found the King's surgeon awaiting me on my
arrival, and, as soon as I was in a fit state to present myself
to them, His Majesty and the Queen gave me as kind a recep-
tion as my heart could desire. General Acton himself took me
to them, and overwhelmed me with attentions ; but he was
very soon affronted by the praises that were lavished upon me,
and the confidence placed in me.

I was asked to draw up a scheme for the defence of Sicily,
and especially of Messina. I did so, and when my plan was
laid before the council, it met with general approval. In the
flattering treatment I received Acton saw a means of removing
me from the Court : he sounded me through one of his devoted
followers, to find out whether I should accept the post of
commandant at Messina. I put forward no definite objection,
but pointed out that Calabria was not occupied by the French,
that the English fleet was at Palermo, that a regiment and an
English general 1 were occupying the fortress of Messina, in
which the chief defences of the island were concentrated, and
that consequently that town was in no immediate danger. I

276

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 277

should be uselessly depriving myself, I said, of the services of
the surgeon who was treating me, and should be risking life-
long disablement; for which reasons I hoped Acton would be
so kind as to postpone this mark of confidence, or appoint
some one else in my place. He was displeased by my answer,
and attributed it to a desire to cultivate the favour I had won.
From that time forward he did his utmost to mortify me. The
Queen warned me of his schemes, and graciously begged me
not to show my annoyance. For some time I pretended to
be unconscious of them, but at last I became weary of their
constant recurrence and had an extremely heated conversation
with him, in which I gave him excellent reasons for ceasing to
annoy me. I took the precaution of writing to him on the
subject, in order to secure in black-and-white the wrords he
had used when we were alone. The result was quite satis-
factory. Acton was perfectly aware that a very little thought
on the King's part would make it plain to His Majesty that
the loss of his kingdom was due to his minister's conduct, and
he therefore spared no pains in hiding from the King every-
thing likely to open his eyes. Recent events had given him
a guilty conscience, and he was afraid of every one. The
Queen's kindness might have reassured him as to her inten-
tions ; and in any case his mistrust was no excuse for speaking
of her to the King behind her back. He made it his business
to ruin her, to alienate the King from her, to rouse his sus-
picions in every way; and he finally succeeded in estranging
them. He contrived to keep up this mischievous discord
between them until the time of which I shall presently speak,
when he overreached himself.

Everything at this time — the policy and proceedings of the
government, every project that was put forward, and all cor-
respondence with other Courts — was subject to Nelson's ruling.
It would be unjust to deny that the King was under an obliga-
tion to him for insuring his safety in Sicily ; but Nelson would
have been hard put to it to redeem the harm he had done to
Naples, or to efface the memory — at a later date — of the

sorrows to which he contributed after the re-conquest of the

:ingdom.2

278 MEMOIRS OF THE

Nelson shared all his honours and triumphs with Lady
Hamilton.3 Her ambition rivalled Nelson's glory, and it was
the glory that took the second place. Nelson, with his one
eye and one arm, had never thought it necessary to be on
his guard against seduction — least of all the seduction that
emanated from himself. Lady Hamilton feigned a passion for
him, and became his mistress in every sense of the word. His
talents and virtues as a warrior were all in her hands, where
they became indistinguishable from his vices ; they had every-
thing in common — money, faults, vanities, wrong-doing of
every kind. Nelson had become a mere caricature of Rinaldo,
the slave of an Armida who had neither brains, nor modesty,
nor magic. The officers of the English fleet were mortified
and disgusted : there was a social mutiny among them, and
Nelson, whom they would have obeyed implicitly in a battle,
was treated by them everywhere else without any of the respect
and consideration that were his due. The Queen of Naples,
who was too kind-hearted to set limits to her gratitude,
encouraged the vanity of Nelson and his mistress : she gave
a magnificent fete, and exhibited effigies of Nelson, Lady
Hamilton, and her husband Sir William,4 in a temple of
Victory. Young Prince Leopold 5 himself led Nelson into the
temple, and crowned both him and his statue. Nelson came
out of the temple more vainglorious — if less truly glorious —
than he entered it. It is to his state of moral slumber that
we owe Buonaparte's career. There can be no doubt that, had
Nelson not been in this lethargic condition, his natural watch-
fulness and activity would have insured the capture of the
frigate in which Caesar and his fortune sailed from Egypt to
France. Buonaparte should build a shrine to Lady Hamilton :
she should head the list of all the happy chances that led him
to the throne. This fact is as true as it is curious.

The King presented Nelson with the Duchy of Bronte, which
brought in a yearly income of eight thousand ducats.6 Luxury
and intrigue reigned in one of the Two Sicilies, while drunken-
ness and violence were reigning in the other. As soon as the
advancing season allowed hostilities to be resumed Austria and
Russia united to attack Italy, and their first operations made

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 279

the position of the French in Naples very precarious. Cardinal
Ruffo 7 had been sent from Palermo, without either troops or
money, to discover the state of public opinion in Calabria, to
check the contagion of the principles that emanated from the
capital, and to fortify with encouraging promises such of the
King's subjects as had remained faithful. The Russian,
Turkish, and English fleets were stationed off the coasts of
Sicily : everything seemed to point to a speedy reparation of
the recent disasters. Cardinal Ruffo won over all the armed
inhabitants of the towns ; for the French, being hampered by
the movements of the Russian and Austrian armies, were pre-
vented from putting obstacles in his way. He was, therefore,
able to consolidate his work, and to bring back to their duty
such of the Calabrian towns as had strayed from it. While it
would be absurd to make too much of the cardinal's services,
it would be unjust to forget them : he did much to improve
the state of things at the moment, even if he worked mischief
afterwards. In all his peregrinations he never met a single
Frenchman. He made use of the loyal to win over the rebels ;
and he might have done this, I think, without laying so many
obligations on the King, or making so many promises in his
name.

He raised an army of peasants, and invested its leaders with
various ranks in the King's army. He procured money from
the different provinces by exempting them from taxation for
several years, and altogether his conquests would have entailed
more inconveniences than advantages if all his pledges had
been redeemed : they are still a burden on the kingdom, and
will be so for a long time. It would be impossible to estimate
the number of men derived from the lowest class whom he
created generals, colonels, majors, and captains.8 To break
faith with such as these is cruelty : to keep it is a monstrous
subversion of the natural order of things in a regular army.
The success of many of his labours was eclipsed by disadvan-
tages of this kind.

Championnet was recalled. Macdonald, who was hemmed in
on one side in the south of Italy by General Souvarow, and
hard pressed by the revolt of the Neapolitan provinces, was

280 MEMOIRS OF THE

making ready to leave the country, which he did four and a
half months after invading it. He left the kingdom at the
mercy of its outraged sovereign, and gave the Neapolitans the
first lesson they had received of late years, in remaining true
and loyal in misfortune.

The cardinal, aided by some Russian and Turkish soldiers,
appeared before Naples with his Calabrians in June 1799. The
insurgents opposed his entrance, but he overcame them.9 All
the forts capitulated : he was master of the capital, where he
found all the Neapolitans in fear of their lives, and doing their
best to palliate, or explain, or conceal the part they had
played.

The Calabrians vied with one another in pillage and violence,
and the remedy appeared to be worse than the disease. The
thought of Acton's vengeance struck terror to every heart.
The guilty could not doubt that they would be punished, while
the guiltless had no confidence that their innocence would be
proved, and feared that all would be condemned alike. Instead
of being restored to happiness, the capital was plunged into a
state of stupor and bewilderment that will continue for many
a day.

As soon as the news reached Palermo Nelson persuaded the
King to go on board his ship, and proceed to the Bay of
Naples. Acton and Lady Hamilton, being inseparable from
Nelson, accompanied them, and dictated the laws to which the
town was to be subjected. The King submitted all his decisions
to Acton ; Acton laid them all before Nelson ; Nelson referred
everything to my lady, in whose person all powers were united.
She was a far more relentless judge than a moody, violent
sailor would have been. Her point of view seemed to be : If
one listens to them all, not a man will be hanged! and she
coolly and light-heartedly selected the victims. I do not mean
to say that those who were condemned were blameless ; but
boys of sixteen, and only sons, were executed for yielding to
force, or to fashion, or to ignorance; and this I can never
recall without horror. The government set up two tribunals,
one conducted by the State, and the other by general-officers,
to decide the fate of civilians and soldiers respectively. The

I

COMTE DE ROGER DAMAS 281

former was a tribunal of blood ; the latter was one of justice,
I must admit, and I can declare it conscientiously.10 The
inquiry into past conduct having been confided to these two
tribunals the King returned to Palermo, to discuss the military
operations that were to be the next step.

It was decided to send an expedition into the Roman States,
and to occupy Rome. All the troops that could be gathered
together were placed under the orders of General Bourcard,
and M. le comte de Vintimille ll was appointed chief of the
staff. To this force were added the armed peasants ; and the
whole horde was despatched to occupy the Roman States,
where Lieutenant-General Naselli was appointed political and
military governor.

It devolved upon Acton to direct the restoration of the two
governments, since the Pope was not yet elected ; but he dared
not return to Naples. His well-founded terror of appearing
there so soon after the crisis obliged him to carry on the
government from afar, and since he was, therefore, forced to
leave the sentencing of compromised persons entirely in the
hands of the State Tribunal, Naples was delivered over to
cruelty and corruption solely on account of his egotism. Sen-
tences of banishment and confiscation were sold and bought
again for ready money; and the consequences of this traffic,
which will be felt for another century and more, are the most
practical evils caused by this time of upheaval.

It would have seemed natural for the cardinal to be placed
at the head of the restored state, for, if he was not without
faults, neither was he without ability. But he had made
himself useful ; he had won distinction ; Acton, therefore, must
needs fear him, and compass his ruin. He led the King to
mistrust his first measures, and look upon him as a subject
who had turned dangerous. He made the King refuse to
ratify the treaties concluded between rebel commandants and
the cardinal, and, by dint of covertly undermining His
Majesty's gratitude, he brought about Ruffo's removal and
disgrace.

For more than four months Naples languished in the tortures
of a venal inquisition. At last, however, the complaints and

282 MEMOIRS OF THE

sorrows of the public reached the King's ear, and Acton was
obliged to institute the phantom of a legal government. He
sent a Sicilian noble, the Prince of Cassaro, to Naples as
Viceroy — an honest, upright man, but one who had neither
enough ability to do any real good, nor enough character to
force Acton's hand.12 He was entirely dependent on Acton;
but his simplicity and gentleness, combined with even the
merest shadow of authority, were sufficient to restore order,
or at least to stop the persecution. It next occurred to Acton
that a new army should be formed from the fragments of the
old, and he entrusted the task to the Chevalier de Saxe and
myself. We were both made lieutenant-generals ; 13 one of
us was appointed inspector-general of infantry, and the
other inspector-general of cavalry ; and we proceeded to Naples
with the Prince of Cassaro in the early days of November
1799.

The future that evidently lay before Italy made the posses-
sion of an efficient army urgently necessary to the kingdom
of Naples, and we therefore embarked upon the difficult task
of reorganisation with all the energy at our command. It was
a matter of certainty that, if Buonaparte were to gain the
ascendancy in Italy, an attack on the kingdom of Naples would
follow; while if the Emperor of Germany were successful he
would beg a contingent of the King of Naples, to help him
in his operations. With these facts in our minds we set to
work, with all the necessary diligence, to bring order into the
terrible chaos that prevailed in the Neapolitan army when we
arrived. It will give some idea of our labours when I say that
we had to inquire — in conjunction with the Tribunal of
Generals, of which we were members — into the conduct of
all the officers in the army, which nominally numbered 60,000
men, though there were not ten private soldiers actually avail-
able. To sift out those whose behaviour had been blameless
during the period of the Republic ; to distinguish between
the various shades of guilt ; to select from the whole mass
the number necessary for the strength of the new regiments,
without omitting the men of all classes whom Cardinal Ruffo
had so arbitrarily invested with military rank ; to collect, from

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 283

all parts of the kingdom, soldiers and horses, arms and
uniforms, and every sort of camp-utensil ; to form regiments
of all these odds and ends, without wounding or injuring any
one for whose services the King had further use : such were
our duties. After ten months of arduous labour we had twelve
regiments of infantry and six of cavalry in fighting order.
We had intended each of the infantry regiments to comprise
fifteen hundred men, but could only muster a thousand, who
formed three battalions. Each cavalry regiment contained four
squadrons, and numbered four hundred troopers. They were
all well armed, well equipped, fairly well drilled, and ready to
take the field.

It was only natural that everything should be hampered and
delayed by the disordered state of the finances, due to the
occupation of the kingdom by the French, the exemption from
taxation granted by the cardinal to several provinces, and the
residence of the Court in Sicily. The government had been
obliged to issue paper-money, and from the very first so great
a loss was involved that the public gave the ministry neither
credit nor confidence. And yet Zurlo,14 the man who was then
in control of the finances, had certainly a talent for obtaining
money. If he had employed his abilities with greater modera-
tion he would have saved himself from subsequent disgrace,
but less money would have been forthcoming. It was necessary
to punish him for his tortuous dealings, but possibly he would
have been equally unfortunate if he had been guiltless.

His difficulties at this time were increased by an event that
caused considerable expense : the Queen's expedition to Vienna.
The King, under Acton's influence, had driven her to despera-
tion by his treatment of her. After trying every means to
bring him to reason she gave up the struggle in despair, and
expressed a wish to leave him. In any other circumstances the
expenses of the journey would have been a sufficient reason
against it, but Acton's hatred easily overrode so trivial an
obstacle. The Queen's generosity, which is one of her most
distinctive qualities, should perhaps have been kept in check
at this time, in view of the penurious state of the kingdom ;
but it was quite beyond her to deprive herself of the pleasure

284 MEMOIRS OF THE

of giving, and the controller of the finances of Naples supplied
money for all her generous deeds.

A short time before her departure M. le due de Berry visited
Palermo,15 for it had been previously arranged, in spite of
the Revolution in France, that he should marry one of the
Neapolitan princesses. I had seen him during the few days he
spent in Naples on his way to Sicily, and had taken the oppor-
tunity of giving him some hints on the characters with whom
he would have to deal. His own character, however, was
incapable of adapting itself to the requirements of the position.
He pleased no one but the Queen, who was charmed by his
noble sentiments and straightforward nature. But he offended
Acton, who never forgave him ; and the match was broken off,
to the great regret of the princess, who had looked forward
with pleasure to marrying this prince. M. le due de Berry
and the Queen left Sicily at the same time. He was granted
an allowance, but it was irregularly paid. As long as Acton
remains in power the prince need not expect to receive any
arrears.

The occupation of the Roman State effected no improvement
in the finances of Naples. Ten thousand piastres a month was
all the relief afforded to the King's coffers, a fact which has
always seemed to me unjustifiable and inexplicable. The King
did not take advantage of his temporary possession of Rome,
either to enlarge his territory, or to acquire Benevento, or
even to abolish the ancient and ridiculous feudal service of the
palfry,16 which is still a cause of dispute every year on the
same day. He was, therefore, considered to be rendering a
great service to the Pope, by preparing the way for his return
to Rome, and avoiding, by means of the intermediary govern-
ment, all the confusion that would have arisen when the Roman
Republic came to an end. The extent of these services might
have made it seem natural to His Holiness that part of his
revenues should be appropriated ; but it was not done, and the
accumulation of expenses crushed the kingdom of Naples.

Early in the summer of 1800 the reverses of the Austrians
began to cause anxiety. It was well known that France had
been meditating a descent on Naples ever since the republican

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 285

troops had evacuated the kingdom. The Russian and Austrian
armies were no longer united. Souvarow had crossed from
Italy into Switzerland at the end of the last campaign, and,
in accordance with an agreement between the King of Naples
and Paul I, had sent a detachment of three thousand men to
garrison Naples. Some time afterwards this corps was relieved
by another of the same strength, and General Borosdine, who
was in command of it, was deputed to form a regiment of
Italian guards,17 which is still in existence. Genoa was again
in the hands of the French ; and General Melas had been left
in Italy to follow up the first successes of the combined armies.
On the 14th June the famous Battle of Marengo restored to
the French the fourteen fortresses of which Souvarow 's descent
had robbed them. A portion of the Austrian army was occupy-
ing Tuscany : another portion, under General Bellegarde, was
in a splendid defensive position on the Mincio, between Mantua
and Pescara. But an Austrian army is always discouraged by
reverses, and if the minister Thugut had had more personal
knowledge of the troops and generals he would have felt that
the head of the imperial government would do well to make
peace at any price, whenever the army were unfortunate, at
all events until the time should come for another Eugene or
Laudon to be born.

Then came the request that had been expected. The Court
of Vienna begged for a corps of ten thousand men from Naples.
Acton wrote to Cassaro, the Viceroy, to consult him as to the
best means of furnishing it, and the best method of defending
the frontiers. The Prince of Cassaro summoned all the
generals, and asked each one his opinion on this important
subject. I was the youngest, and therefore was the first to
speak ; and I made the most of the resources that were still
left to us after all our misfortunes. The Chevalier de Saxe
supported me, but thought it wisest to negotiate. The advice
of the rest of the Council was still feebler. Finally the Prince
of Cassaro bade us commit our opinion to paper without delay,
as he wished to send it to the King that evening.

I observed that it was impossible (at least to me) to draw
up a paper at a moment's notice, to enlighten the King on the

286 MEMOIRS OF THE

subject of his resources. Such a report could be neither
exhaustive nor accurate, and I begged to be given until the
next morning. This respite was granted. It was arranged
that on the following morning each of us should take his
written opinion, under seal, to the Prince of Cassaro, and that
the Chevalier de Saxe should travel to Palermo to present them
all to the King.

I spent the night describing all the means of defence upon
the frontiers, the distribution and division of the troops, and
the points where the masses 18 could supplement the regular
troops. After allowing, as far as the numbers permitted, a
sufficient force for the defences, I came to the conclusion that
a corps of eight thousand men might be sent to the Austrians
without endangering the frontiers. I gave my paper to the
Prince of Cassaro, and the Chevalier de Saxe set out to
Palermo.

Acton gave the Chevalier de Saxe a very bad reception, and
the King was so much humiliated by the feeble counsels of
his generals that he treated him with scant courtesy. The
Chevalier handed in his resignation on the spot, and returned
to Naples to make ready for his journey to Vienna.

The King, in answering the Prince of Cassaro, explicitly
ordered him to follow, in every detail, the plan I had proposed
for the distribution of the troops on the frontiers, and to give
me a free hand in selecting the eight thousand men for the
auxiliary corps, of which I was to have the command, under
the Austrian general, the Comte de Bellegarde. He added
that the expenses were to be regulated by me, and that on no
account whatever was I to be left short of money. Such
unlimited powers as these made matters very easy for me. I
only took four thousand men from Naples, and I deputed the
Comte de Vintimille (du Luc), who was in Rome, and was to
be my chief of the staff, to choose two thousand from the
Neapolitan troops in that city.

Artillery, pontoons, baggage-wagons, uniforms, and camp-
utensils — everything was ready, and at the end of a fortnight
this army-corps left nothing to be desired. The Minister of
Finance promised that I should be credited with the necessary

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 287

funds in Rome, arid I laid great stress on the disrepute and
inconvenience that would fall upon the army-corps if it were
reduced to pecuniary straits. Every means was employed to
avoid it, and I had cause to congratulate myself on the
regularity with which we received our funds : to this alone I
attribute the discipline, order, and perfect subordination that
prevailed throughout this campaign. My instructions were to
recognise no authority save that of M. de Bellegarde ; to serve
the Austrian army in every way I considered right, to prove
the King's entire devotion and adherence to the cause ; and to
send despatches only when there was some important reason for
doing so, since the King had perfect confidence in me.

I left Naples on the 20th September. I spent four days in
camp at Capua, organising all the smaller matters connected
with the army-corps ; and on the 1st October I occupied the
villages on the hills of Albano, at Frascati, where I was to
await my first orders from M. de Bellegarde. I remained at
Frascati all the time that the Austrian cabinet was vacillating
as to the best course to pursue ; and it is well known how the
operations of the Austrian army are always delayed by this
irresolution, and by the dependence of the generals on the
deliberations of the Council of War. General Bellegarde at
this time was in an advantageous position for offensive
measures. Tuscany was in danger ; but the French force that
threatened it was widely separated from the main army, and
if General Bellegarde had been free to advance rapidly when
it was his wish to do so he would have saved Tuscany, destroyed
the army that was threatening it, and counteracted all the
subsequent hostilities of General Brune by his superior num-
bers. But the ministry at Vienna left him inactive for so long
that his army became weakened by a variety of maladies, and
exasperation and discouragement were the result. Meanwhile
I employed my time in manoeuvring on the Roman plains. The
King of Naples recalled General Naselli, the civil and military
governor of the Roman State, and appointed me in his place.19
The Pope had arrived. He was guarded by the King's troops,
and I was instructed to make it plain that, though the adminis-
tration would be nominally in the hands of the Holy Father's

MEMOIRS OF THE

ministers, I should retain the power of modifying and con-
trolling their decisions. The King's standard was still flying
on the Castle of St. Angelo, and I was careful to keep the papal
authority very much in subjection to that of the King, while
showing it every respect.

The Austrians in Tuscany were commanded by General
Sommariva.20 He wrote to me that, since his troops and mine
wrould naturally be associated during the coming operations,
he wished to have an interview with me; and he begged me
to appoint a meeting-place on the road between Rome and
Florence. As this overture on his part would give me an
opportunity of glancing at the country that was to be my
field of action, and judging for myself of the state of the
Austrian troops, I answered that I would set out on the follow-
ing day. I would not trouble him, I added, to come half-way
to meet me, but would go to him in Florence.

I never dreamed for a moment that anything would occur
to interfere with this plan : there was no question at the
moment of any movement on the part of the troops. But to
my great astonishment, when I was three miles from Siena,
an officer who was travelling one stage in advance of me came
back to meet me, with the news that the French had invaded
Tuscany and entered Florence. General Sommariva had
evacuated that town, and was falling back on Arezzo and
Ancona ; and the French were expected in Siena in two hours'
time. He had heard the news from an official of the Court
of Naples, who had left Florence at the same time as the
Austrians, and was waiting at an inn in Siena for horses to
take him to Rome. I could not bring myself to believe it,
and decided to go to Siena : I should be there in a quarter
of an hour, and the story was too improbable to be trusted.
It was confirmed only too unmistakably, however, by the alarm
that prevailed in Siena, and by the definite statement of all
the authorities of the town. I only remained there for an
hour, and then returned to Rome.21 I instantly sent off an
officer post-haste to General Bellegarde, to ascertain the course
he intended to adopt, and to obtain his orders. My messenger
was obliged to go from Ancona to Venice by sea, the March

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 289

of Ancona being already occupied by the French. 1 had to
wait three weeks for the return of this courier, and the interval
was a time of very pressing anxiety.

M. le general Dupont,22 who was in command of the French
troops that had just invaded Tuscany, sent two of his officers
to me with a very arrogant letter. He informed me that I
must evacuate Rome, and that the King must immediately give
up three Frenchmen whom he had held prisoners since their
return from Egypt, one of them being M. Dolomieu.2'5 Unless
both these demands were complied with, he said, he would
inarch on Naples.24 The real object of this mission was to
give the two officers who brought the letter an opportunity
of observing the Neapolitan troops in Rome, and on the hills
of Frascati : it was most unlikely that M. Dupont would incur
the risks of marching on Naples, as long as General Bellegarde
was on the banks of the Mincio and still in possession of
Mantua. I gave the two Frenchmen an escort of two officers
to accompany them everywhere, and, when they asked per-
mission to go and see the country round Rome, I told them
they should not leave the town before the return of the courier
whom I was sending to Palermo, to inform the King of their
mission.20 At the same time I sent an answer to M. Dupont
to the effect that I should not evacuate Rome, and that I
should return his officers to him when I was able to give them
an answer to his other demands. After waiting for a fortnight
they were sent off, accompanied for the first ten miles by an
escort, with a confirmation of my refusal of Dupont's first
demand, and some vague words with regard to the second.

The officer I had sent to General Bellegarde 2G returned to
me,27 with instructions to march instantly on Tuscany, and to
let nothing prevent me from reaching the Arno. Before I was
there M. de Bellegarde would have crossed the Mincio and
attacked the whole French force. I was to have further news
of him as soon as he had reopened communication between
himself and me ; and probably we should meet near Bologna
or Modena.

My army-corps was on the march the next day.28 During
the second day's march I received a message by courier from

290 MEMOIRS OF THE

General Bellegarde. It was merely a confirmation of his first
orders, and was only sent in case his first letter had not
reached me.29 In this second despatch, however, he added
"that if, contrary to his expectations, he should meet with
reverses (in which I was not to believe on a mere rumour, but
only on trustworthy information), I must either return to
Rome, or at all events must not cross the frontier of the
States of the Church."

On the fifth day I entered Tuscany,30 having as yet seen
no sign of M. le general Dupont. On the sixth day another
letter arrived from M. de Bellegarde, whose first act of hos-
tility had been to reopen communications with the March of
Ancona by way of Ferrara, which enabled his courier to travel
by land. He wrote : " The French have been beforehand with
me : they have crossed the Mincio in a fog. I am obliged to
retreat towards Tagliamento. I hold to the instructions I
gave you in case this should occur."

I consequently retraced my steps for a day, and took up a
position on the frontier of the Roman State, where I concen-
trated my troops, only placing outposts on the Tuscan border.

The reverses of the Austrian army on the Mincio were a
sufficient indication of the discouragement from which it was
suffering. Since it was superior in numbers to the French
army, and entrenched at every point of its line of defence, it
appeared most unlikely that it should be defeated in the
position it occupied. But not a single redoubt was defended.
There was only the feeblest opposition at the two fords of the
river ; and if General Brune narrowly escaped punishment by
the military authorities for not destroying the Austrian army
as it retreated, it was not without reason. Having overcome
the initial difficulties he could not possibly have met with the
slightest hindrance in following up his success. If I had been
on the Council I should have condemned him.

M. de Bellegarde's abilities, however, forbade me to give
up hope. In every part of Tuscany I had agents engaged in
watching the movements of both armies, and I learnt, in a
way that was calculated to inspire confidence, that the Austrian
army had made another effort, and had recovered the upper

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 291

hand. I also knew that General Pino, who commanded the
Cisalpine troops, was observing my movements. He was on
the Arezzo road, parallel to the road I was myself occupying ;
and at the same time I learnt that he was retreating in haste.
It might have been my advance that lured him thither in the
first place, but whether it were so or not I determined to make
an offensive demonstration. A movement of the kind might
be of service to M. de Bellegarde ; since, if General Brune
heard of my advance while still in danger from General Belle-
garde, he would be obliged to detach some troops from his
army to oppose me, and would not know the strength of my
force. Moreover, I might perhaps destroy General Pino's
corps, and give the Neapolitans a taste of success to reward
them for all the marching they had done since leaving Rome.
I took two thousand men, of whom six hundred were cavalry,
and advanced towards Siena.31 When I was within half a
day's march of that town I met a major sent by General
Gorup,32 who commanded the Austrians at Ancona. He
brought me a letter urging me to employ the greatest caution,
in view of the uncertainty of the future. I explained the cir-
cumstances to him : the possible utility of diverting Brune 's
attention to his rear, and the necessity, with this end in view,
of driving the French out of Siena and waiting there for news.
He entirely agreed with me, and I prepared to take Siena
(5th Jan. 1801). I sent a detachment of cavalry to the farther
side of the town in the night, to watch the Florentine Gate,
and at daybreak I attacked the Roman Gate. When this
gate was forced some of the French retired to the citadel,
and some endeavoured to retreat to Florence, but the detach-
ment of cavalry that was posted near the Florentine Gate fell
upon them, and killed or took every one who appeared. My
army-corps occupied the town, and on the third day the citadel
capitulated, on condition that the garrison should go free, after
pledging themselves to serve no more in that war. Lest the
fortress should prove an obstacle in the future — supposing I
were obliged to abandon Siena and recapture it, if General
Bellegarde should recover from his reverse and make a move-
ment in advance — I gave orders for the principal defences and
u 2

292 MEMOIRS OF THE

the walls of the gateway to be destroyed, by three thousand
workmen from the neighbouring country.

I remained in Siena, impatiently awaiting news from General
Bellegarde, whom I informed by courier of what I had done.
I could employ a small detached corps effectively and con-
veniently; but, without knowing something of his circum-
stances, I should not have liked to endanger the rest of my
troops, whose duty it would be to defend the frontiers of the
kingdom of Naples, supposing the Austrians were forced to
continue their retreat. With this possibility in view I had
left the rest of the army-corps a day's march in my rear. If
I were attacked by a superior force I could fall back upon it
and retreat.

In the evening of the 13th January I saw, on the hills that
border one of the roads between Siena and Florence, to the
right of the main-road, the fires of a hostile force. My spies
and other informants in the country assured me that it belonged
to the Cisalpine general, Pino,33 who had come to drive me
out of Siena with three thousand men. It would have been
an insult to the zeal and goodwill of my troops to evade so
feeble a foe. I remained where I was, in readiness to receive
his attack.

At dawn on the 14th he was still stationary. At about
nine o'clock my outposts were attacked. I went to reconnoitre,
and saw advancing, on the right of the Cisalpine column, a
column of French troops about twice as strong as the other.
Of this force, which was commanded by General Miollis, I
had heard nothing.34

I could not long contend, with an outpost alone, against nine
thousand men. Moreover, my expedition had been planned in
reliance on the Austrian army. Since I had received no further
news of General Bellegarde my hopes that he had recovered
his position faded away, and in accordance with his orders I
decided to retire. I instantly posted my troops on the farther
side of Siena, and remained myself in the suburbs on the road
to Florence, with no more men than sufficed to repel the first
attack. The lie of the ground was favourable to me. After
checking the first violence of the attack with three cavalry-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 298

charges and a well-directed fire from my musketry, I barricaded
the town-gate and joined the rest of the troops at their post
behind the town, which I skirted outside the walls. The enemy
forced the gate with their guns, but the time they employed
in doing so gave me the chance I required to improve my
position, and enable me to retreat in good order. The enemy
then renewed the attack, but I gained ground by retreating
in squares — which could not have been done in better order
on parade — while our artillery kept up a regular and constant
fire. As night drew near the enemy abandoned the pur-
suit, after eight hours' fighting. They took nothing of mine
away with them but a few troopers and a few wounded,
whereas they left many dead behind them, and many
prisoners.35

I had taken precautions against a very persistent pursuit,
by sending some troops to the Arezzo road at the beginning.
They had orders, supposing I were attacked in Siena, to appear
in the enemy's rear.

I rejoined the army-corps on the following day. Some letters
from Rome were awaiting me, and informed me that General
Bellegarde was in full retreat towards the gorges of Udine.
The campaign was, therefore, considered to be over. There
was nothing more for me to do in Tuscany, so I took back
the army to Rome, in great disgust at the Neapolitans being
disappointed in their hopes of forming the left wing of the
Austrian army, in a campaign that bade fair to be prosperous.
Their only satisfaction lay in having proved the goodwill of
the King and his troops.

I sincerely regretted having had so little opportunity of
responding to the enthusiasm of the people of Siena, and to
the warmth of their reception. The only proof of gratitude
that I could give was to avoid effecting my retreat within
their walls. Though this precaution added considerably to
my difficulties I felt it incumbent upon me to save this unfor-
tunate town, in accordance with the laws of warfare, from the
horrors of pillage ; and I succeeded in doing so. But I could
not save the bishop, an excellent and high-minded man,36 from
a fine of 20,000 piastres for singing the Te Deurn, I had

294 MEMOIRS OF THE

given him a hint not to do it, but he was too enthusiastic to
listen to me.

The Tuscan nation stands alone in its devotion to its former
sovereign. No persecution has ever been able to weaken its
fidelity and constancy. With the right leaders this country
might have been another invincible Vendee.37

General Brune, who knew that there were troops in Tuscany,
but could not, at so great a distance, estimate the importance
of their movements, had detached a corps of 20,000 men to
oppose them. General Murat was in command. He wrote
to inform me that the Austrian army was about to conclude
an armistice with the French, in which the King's troops
would not be included, but he suggested that I should make
one of my own. He was marching on Foligno, he said, and
we could carry on our negotiations there, or even, if I were
willing, have an interview.38

At that time the Hereditary Prince and Acton were daily
expected in Naples, and I had every reason to believe that they
had already arrived. It was so important, at this crisis, to
have definite and direct instructions, that I resolved to make
an effort to obtain them from themselves ; and I set out to
Naples, which I reached in eighteen hours.39 Neither the
Hereditary Prince nor Acton had arrived. The Viceroy had
not the least understanding of the interests involved, and being
always averse from committing himself refused to write a word.
I was reduced to suggesting that I should draw up some
instructions for myself, and that he should sign them ; and I
had great difficulty in winning his consent. The unpleasant-
ness of our position was increased by the Russian general, who
announced that he had no orders to protect the kingdom in
the case of an attack, and that he would retire to the islands
near Naples if the French should invade Neapolitan territory.

I assumed that the demands of the enemy would be the most
likely and obvious ones, and that our answers would be as far
as possible compatible with our interests. The Viceroy
assembled his councillors, to inquire of them whether he could
safely subscribe to what I had written. He signed his name ;
and after a visit of six hours to Naples I returned to Rome.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 295

I sent a courier to Murat, and told him I would consent either
to an interview, or to written negotiations for an armistice,
whichever he preferred ; that I should instantly warn my out-
posts that negotiations were in progress ; but that the first
condition was that his should not cross the Nera (a river
between Foligno and Narni), which should serve as a barrier
during the discussion.40 He consented ; and finally decided to
treat in writing.41

The Queen, as I have already said, was in Vienna. The
moment that the question arose of an armistice between the
Austrian and French armies she secured an official promise
in writing that the Ministry would consent to no treaty that
did not include her army and her States. The Emperor owed
this return to the King of Naples, after the active support that
the latter had given him. However, he signed this solemn
promise, and before the ink was dry put his name to an
armistice that entirely ignored us. M. de Bellegarde wrote
to me : "I have just concluded an armistice in which you do
not appear : I could only obtain a promise that you should
not be attacked, but you know how these people keep their
promises : take precautions." 42

By a chance that only the immorality of the century and
the weakness of Austria could produce, I received within the
space of two days this letter from M. de Bellegarde, and one
from the Queen, who assured me that her mind was quite at
rest, and enclosed a copy of the Emperor's promise on our
behalf. I sent both letters to the government at Naples,
where Acton had at last arrived.

General Murat sent me his first conditions, for an armistice
of a fortnight. He added others, the acceptance of which
would lead to a permanent peace.43

The most notable and the most insurmountable was the
immediate dismissal of Acton. I cannot here give all the
others, which were more or less acceptable; but I refused to
consider any of them until that was expunged. I definitely
rejected a condition that was fundamentally and directly offen-
sive to the King. I pointed out that every sovereign had the
right of choosing his own minister, the guardian of his con-

296 MEMOIRS OF THE

fidence, and that no motive whatever could justify the inter-
ference of a foreign government in the matter. Murat spoke
of it no more.

I sent Acton my opinion on the other conditions, and
mentioned the points on which I thought Murat seemed inclined
to be more or less tenacious. In his answer Acton objected to
some of the articles, and I saw very clearly, from his ambiguous
manner of complying with the conditions without positively
accepting them, that he intended the responsibility to be borne
by me alone. By this method he would have a refuge for his
vanity and reputation when the armistice was concluded, and
could save his credit at my expense. This perfectly just sus-
picion probably saved me from much mortification. I wrote
to Acton " that notwithstanding the desire shown by General
Murat to treat directly with myself, as between general and
general, I thought the matter involved too many complications
to be settled without proper diplomatic formalities ; that I
begged him to appoint a negotiator at once; and that I was
so sure of his approbation that I should write to General Murat
to that effect." My letter was quite definite: Acton was
displeased by it, and tried to compromise me in another way.
He chose M. de Micheroux 44 to carry on the negotiations,
and sent me a letter by him to Rome, saying that since the
generals of the two army-corps had begun the transaction it
would be more convenient if they were to finish it, at all events
ostensibly ; and that I must, therefore, give a signed carte
blanche to M. de Micheroux, who would fill it up at Foligno.

I refused, and told M. de Micheroux he might continue his
journey, since he need not hope to obtain anything of the
kind from me. For this Acton never forgave me. His tem-
perament was so suspicious and autocratic that, all through
his career (and on a score of notorious occasions), he behaved
with marked coldness and constraint to any one who was in a
position to expect his gratitude. He was ruffled because I
knew of the desire of the French for his dismissal, and still
more because I had done him the service of preventing any
mention of the subject. He knew that the terms of the
armistice or peace would be too unfavourable to do him credit.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 297

He intended to give the King the impression that the nego-
tiator had contravened his instructions, in order to save him-
self from the burden of the consequences. He selected me
for his scapegoat, because he thought I should not submit
to an unjust mortification, and should leave the Neapolitan
service.

Any one who really knows this man can testify that I under-
stand him fairly well. The fate of the Chevalier Micheroux
is a sufficient confirmation of the belief that saved me. After
the Peace of Florence he was totally and publicly disgraced,
and exiled for three years, for having — so it was said — signed
articles without authority.

Of all the conditions of the armistice 45 the one that Acton
most vigorously opposed was the closing of ports to the
English ; and he was quite right. But I had plainly seen that
Murat would not relinquish it altogether. I had partially per-
suaded him to except merchant-vessels, and confine the con-
dition to ships of war. I told Acton, at the very first, of this
concession. But when M. de Micheroux assumed the direction
of affairs Murat was annoyed, and held firmly to his first
article ; and the armistice, as it was signed, entirely excluded
every kind of English vessel. M. Murat at the last moment
added a secret article demanding a sum of 1,500,000 livres for
luck, which was granted.46 He never mentioned the subject
to me, and would not have dared, for very shame, to speak
of it when treating with me.

This armistice was merely the prelude to a still more un-
favourable peace. The article involving the residence of a
French army-corps in the kingdom was more important than
all the rest put together : it was the one that did the most
practical harm, and harm of an increasing kind, since it created
a precedent. It was stipulated in the treaty of the Peace of
Florence 47 that the army-corps should be removed on the
conclusion of a general peace : but in accepting the condition
its recurrence should have been guarded against. As will be
seen, no precautions whatever were taken in the matter.

XV

Return of the army-corps to Naples, March 1801 — The Hereditary Prince
gives Damas a kind reception, and so does Acton, but the latter is
really hostile to him — Peace of Florence, 28th March, 1801 — Violent
scene with Acton, after which Damas hands in his resignation —
Goodwill of the King and Hereditary Prince — Damas visits Battaglia
with Bellegarde — Further reflections on the Austrian army — Long
visit to Vienna (Oct. 1801-Dec. 1803)— Damas is recalled to Naples
by the King and Queen, and returns on the 5th January, 1804 —
Persistent hostility of Acton — Elliot and Alquier, the English
minister and French ambassador — Acton is sent to Sicily — Conver-
sation with the Queen of Naples, whose influence becomes supreme.

As soon as the armistice was signed the Neapolitan troops
returned to their own country in accordance with the terms
of the treaty. I left Rome with the army-corps, without
having seen General Murat. He had written to me very
courteously, asking me to expect him on a particular day, as
he wished to speak to me on matters of business. I consented
to see him, and invited him to dine with me, but he was
delayed by affairs of some kind, and after sacrificing several
hours to politeness l I left Rome and returned to Naples
(March 1801 2).

Acton's reception of me seemed to indicate the most perfect
satisfaction with my conduct and correspondence. The Here-
ditary Prince overwhelmed me with kindness, and with praises
of the discipline and behaviour of my troops, and of the excel-
lent administration of their affairs during the past six months.
I placed more confidence in his flattering compliments than in
those of Acton, whom I had only too much reason to mistrust.
The Peace of Florence was quickly concluded. The Chevalier
Italiensky, the Russian Ambassador, made use of his master's
influence in the matter, but was unable to save the kingdom
from conditions of the hardest description ; and yet, judging
by comparison, it must be admitted that they were by no
means as bad in proportion as the terms to which Austria, a

298

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 299

first-rate Power, was obliged to submit. Naples only lost one
tract of territory, which was interesting because of its con-
nection with the ancient customs and rights of the crown,
but was really more costly and burdensome than it was worth :
the Presidii of Tuscany. Three frigates were to be lent to
France ; and a division of the French army, numbering twelve
thousand men, was accorded the right of occupying the
Abruzzi and Puglia until the general peace.

The Neapolitan government was not called upon to reward
the army for martial exploits and memorable battles, but in
a new army encouragement is of the first importance, and on
this ground alone I called attention to the few individuals, and
the regiments, that had most successfully seized the oppor-
tunity of distinguishing themselves. For these I asked
moderate rewards, which Acton promised to give. Indeed,
he met me more than half-way, and himself very justly
weighed the claims of all whom I considered deserving of
encouragement. Three months went by, and still the most
important of his promises were unfulfilled. I importuned him
in vain. At last one day I went to his house, when a courier
had just arrived from the King with a letter that condemned
all his recent actions. He was beside himself; and from the
first moment I suspected that our conversation was going to
be of a most stormy nature. And, true enough, it was. The
tone of his voice lent much vivacity to the scene; while as
for mine, my displeasure was made known to all the surrounding
rooms. On leaving him I assured him that I should put it
out of my power to injure the King's subjects by my impor-
tunities on their behalf ; and as soon as I returned to my own
house I sent him my resignation, together with an unsealed
letter to the King, complaining openly of Acton. I gave a
copy to the Hereditary Prince, and sent to the Ministry of
War all the papers connected with my appointment.

The next day, at Acton's instigation, the Minister of War
wrote to beg me to reconsider my decision. But I held to it,
and awaited the result, which was delayed for six weeks.

The King accepted my resignation, and not only wrote me
the most flattering letters, but granted me a pension of three

300 MEMOIRS OF THE

thousand ducats. He also gave me an order to all his
ambassadors at foreign Courts, to the effect that I was on all
occasions to be treated and supported as a general in his
service, who had always deserved well of him and of the
country.

In the eyes of the Neapolitan it was a glorious deed to have
resisted Acton, and I was considered a hero, as the Hereditary
Prince made plain to me. I left Naples — or rather the ghost
of Naples — disfigured by the ill-treatment of her minister, and
trembling beneath his heavy scourge. I prayed that Time the
Restorer might one day enable me once more to serve a
country and an army that had always treated me with
confidence and kindness ; and I went away.

Here I was, then, for the first time in my life, a free agent,
without a duty in the world. I remained in Rome long enough
to see all the antiquities that I had not previously had time
to examine thoroughly, and the pictures of certain artists
whose work I had not studied in detail. A violent inflammation
of the eyes, from which I had been suffering for two months,
obliged me to be careful. I therefore left Rome, and went
to the wells at Battaglia, near Padua, where I spent six weeks.
During this time I saw a good deal of General Bellegarde, an
agreeable man, well grounded in the theory of his profession.
He would be more fitted for it if he were not extremely short-
sighted ; and he must be reckoned among the generals who
are never favoured by fortune. He is accustomed to reverses,
but is very skilful in mitigating their severity. It appears to
me, however, that he would be most advantageously employed
in the diplomatic service : he seems to be endowed with all the
special gifts of an ambassador. He pointed out to me all the
mistakes made by the Council of Vienna during the past cam-
paign— the opportunities that he had been made to miss, in
spite of his repeated entreaties to be allowed a free hand in
dealing with them. He confirmed me in the opinion that I
have since expressed to the Archduke Charles : that the
Austrian army will always be left at a disadvantage, on the
whole, at the end of two campaigns, as long as the generals
do not possess the entire confidence of the Council and the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 301

entire control of the commissariat. The object of the cam-
paign should be held in view from the beginning, and the
general should be able to attain that object in whatever way
he thinks best : the despatch of a courier to authorise every
movement always delays his operations till they are useless, and
very often till they are impracticable.

M. de Bellegarde entirely agreed with me as to the probable
brevity of a peace that left the Emperor of Germany with
the Adige for his frontier. This line of demarcation means
disaster for the State of Venice; for it is only natural for a
sovereign to neglect a State that he holds so precariously, and
must lose on the first rupture of peace. How can this unfor-
tunate people hope for the same attention from the govern-
ment as the hereditary States ? Moreover, this arrangement
leaves Tyrol exposed to the French whenever the German
Emperor is not the first to assume the offensive ; and even if
he should be so, where can he find a base, since he has now
neither Mantua nor Pescara ?

There was certainly no reason to make peace at the cost
of accepting such a frontier as this, unless it were the total
discouragement that existed in all classes of the army, as was
plainly proved by the Battle of Hohenlinden and the retreat
from the Mincio. Buonaparte will always begin a war with
five advantages to one. He has left the Austrians no resource
save the possibility of forestalling him : if they wait for him
to make the move I believe they are lost. They have gained
something in Germany in the Electorate of Salzburg : the
whole lie of the country there is in their favour on the
Bavarian side ; but this slight advantage does not compensate
for the other drawbacks, which are incalculable and cannot
continue. The administration and interior mechanism of the
Austrian army enable its losses to be repaired more quickly
than those of any other European army ; this is a matter of
certainty, and constitutes its main resource and strength ;
otherwise it would be inferior. The very excellence of its
administration hampers its operations ; the national character
and the slow brains of its leaders are a clog upon its strategy ;
the uncertainty of its movements renders them useless; and

302 MEMOIRS OF THE

the incurable German apathy places an insurmountable obstacle
in the way of its improvement. Hohenlinden repeated the
mistakes of Prague, and Neustadt those of Kollin. The
Austrians are either defeated through the slowness of their
movements, or are ineffectually victorious for want of decision
and activity. Moreover, they have shown no improvement in
their tactics since the earliest days of the empire.

The individuals of this army combine with these faults,
which are unfortunately notorious, an indescribable amount
of pretentiousness and self-sufficiency. They cannot preserve
harmony with any ally : they care for nothing but subsidies,
and this kind of assistance only serves to prolong their
struggles, without correcting their mistakes. Every war in
which they have been allied with the Russians has demon-
strated their lack of natural cordiality and sympathy, and the
most recent example makes one tremble for the future. Nearly
all the treaties made by the Court of Vienna during the past
century have proved its skill in laying all the burdens of the
partnership upon its allies, and the contracting Power is
always victimised both in the field and in the cabinet. Never
did any alliance begin more propitiously than that of 1799.
Paul's calculations and forecasts were the outcome of his
military mania; while his general's3 passion for warfare cut
a way through all difficulties and all countries ; but everything
that was done by the Austrian army undermined and shook
this alliance, and Thugut meanwhile was busied in breaking it.
The shameful treaty of peace was the result. I spent the
summer in the States of Venice. A convoy that was starting
from Trieste for the Levant gave me the idea of carrying
out my old design of visiting Constantinople. I went to
Trieste to make the necessary arrangements ; but the Queen
of Naples wrote that she wished me to go to Vienna, and I
obeyed (Oct. 1801).

The bad faith shown by the Court of Vienna in making an
armistice, under the Queen's very eyes, without including her
troops, and this in spite of a formal pledge to the contrary,
naturally created a good deal of coolness between her and her
daughter and son-in-law.4 In the matter of outward observ-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 303

ances, however, there was no change; the Queen's tact and
quick intelligence modified the embarrassments of her situa-
tion, and she was not even daunted by several indecorous
scenes that were made by her daughter. But she was by
nature incapable of concealing her feelings, and, as she
allowed her contempt for the government to be seen, she was
feared by the ministers and her presence was disliked. She
ought, however, to have conciliated the government tactfully,
and laid stress on the inclination of the Russian Court to pro-
tect that of Naples; but the need of sharing her thoughts
often made her indiscreet. With her the making of confid-
ences is — if one may use such an expression — a volcanic eruption
of the imagination, and where she has had no means of
insuring the rectitude of the mind in which she confides, only
time can save her from her mistake. M. d'Antraigues was
often the depositary of her most secret thoughts, and made
the worst use of them.5 This intriguing, inferior, and con-
sequently dangerous man was not suspected by the Queen till
her visit to Vienna was nearly over : he had therefore two
years in which to make mischief, and I do not doubt he made
the most of them.

The thirty months that I spent in Vienna ought to have
been among the calmest and happiest of my life ; and if, every
morning, I had thought of nothing but the day that lay before
me, I should have had nothing left to desire. But my concern
and anxiety for the future, the revolt that my past habits had
created against living an idle life, the discomfort of existing
without any motive but pleasure, or any home but those of
others, always prevented me from enjoying the present.

The Queen saw at last that her visit to Vienna was exceeding
all proper limits : the King felt it also, and begged her to
return to Naples.6 Acton invested her return with every
mortification he could devise ; he even prevented the usual
ceremonies, in order to show the people that the Queen's
arrival should not save them from his tyrannies. She patiently
endured this ungrateful behaviour ; not that she hoped for any
change, as long as Acton remained in power, but because she
was conscious of her own rights, and despised the insults of

304 MEMOIRS OF THE

this upstart, whom she herself had placed so high that his
yoke could gall her.

The Peace of Amiens had been concluded : the French,
more faithful to their engagements than could have been
expected, had returned the frigates, and evacuated the king-
dom. The right thing for Acton to do at this time, it is
obvious, was to take every possible measure to prevent their
return, in the case of the war being renewed. It seems
impossible for an Englishman to have imagined that his nation
regarded the peace as anything but a time for recovery and
preparation. Surely he must have recognised the likelihood
of the English breaking the peace before the Austrians, to
whom nothing but rest and forgetfulness could restore the
strength that their moral deterioration had impaired. Surely
he must have seen that, if a rupture were to take place, there
would be no restraint upon the French in Italy, and that a
resumption of their former attempts on Egypt, to which their
designs on India might easily prompt them, would render the
occupation of the Neapolitan coast advantageous to Buona-
parte. Acton, therefore, should have profited by his two
years of peace to organise the army, strengthen the weak points
of the frontier, and make it possible to prevent any invasion
of the kingdom ; but not a man was employed, not a redoubt
was built, not a fortress was repaired. In his enthusiasm for
English protection he thought the promises of England were
a sufficient safeguard. Is it possible that he can have been
blind enough not to see that England's one desire, when she
breaks with France, is to drag the whole continent into the
fray? It is her great hope that the French conquests may
rouse all the chief Powers ; and the temporary ruin of Naples
is nothing to her, if a general conflagration be the result of
it. In war and politics, moreover, everything is a matter of
compensation. If the French invade the kingdom of Naples
the English compensate themselves with Sicily, which their
superior navy enables them to occupy more easily. Conse-
quently, though the English may prefer the kingdom of Naples
to be an independent Monarchy when the war is over, it does
not matter to them at all whether it be more or less in disorder

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 305

while the war is going on, nor, at the end, whether one
dynasty or another be reigning over it.

Acton's mind was incapable of being enlightened by reason :
only actual events could open his eyes. The rupture of the
Peace of Amiens put all precautions out of the question : the
French sent an army-corps of twenty thousand men into the
kingdom, and the English sent Nelson into the Mediterranean.
The arrogance and insults of the French Ambassador 7 showed
Acton very plainly that he need not expect the losses of the
kingdom to be proportionate to its means : he was forced to
submit to the law in all its cruelty, and champ the bit from
which he had not had the sense to save himself.

There was still a shadow of resistance that might have been
employed in this miserable situation. When the French
entered the kingdom it would have been possible, not only to
set a limit beyond which they should not pass — which was
done — but also to place a cordon of troops parallel to their
cantonments. This measure would at all events have left the
government free in the interior of the kingdom, to take a
stronger hold on the principal strategical positions, of which
there are many in the central provinces. But even this simple
precaution was neglected : not a barrier was erected between
the French and the capital ; and when once they were in the
kingdom they were careful to protest against any idea of the
kind.

It was about the month of December 1808, when the King
and Queen recalled me to Naples.8 I arrived there on the
5th January, 1804. I was received by the King with the
greatest kindness, and by the army with a degree of friend-
liness that I shall never forget as long as I live. Men of every
rank and class in the town came to show me their goodwill.
Acton's feelings were terribly outraged. He went to the
Queen, and said angrily : " There's a great deal of jubilation
about M. de Damas's arrival ! I don't know who persuaded
him to come back to Naples." — "His health persuaded him,"
answered the Queen, " and his attachment to us, which made
him think this a pleasant climate to live in."

Acton, seeing that this answer denoted no coldness towards
x

306 MEMOIRS OF THE

me, tried to influence the King to treat me less cordially, and
succeeded, for the time being, as far as outward formalities
were concerned. But he was never able to keep the King
from greeting me with an air of satisfaction, and showing
me kindness whenever he met me. On the day that Acton
himself had fixed for me to pay my court to the King I pre-
sented myself at the private entree, which I had formerly been
privileged to use. I noticed that the officers of the guard
were somewhat embarrassed ; and one of them, who had been
my adjutant-general in the last campaign, came up to me
and said very apologetically that the orders were for me to
enter through the ordinary rooms. I submitted to this curious
alteration, and on arriving at the other entrance I found that
arrangements had been made to save me from waiting : the
King gave orders that I should be admitted at once.

I re-read the note in which Acton had appointed the hour ;
and a certain phrase, which had not previously struck me as
indicating so unusual a change, showed me on the second
reading that Acton had contrived to insert some ambiguous
words that might be so interpreted. I wrote to him to express
my surprise, but made no demand nor complaint ; and he never
answered me. The Queen at once sent to tell me of her
annoyance at this fresh instance of petty persecution on
Acton's part, and begged me not to be angry, but to feel
sure that she would put an end as soon as possible to a thing
that troubled her more than me. In short she was a thousand
times kinder than I felt to be necessary, as soon as I knew the
source of this insignificant mortification.

I lived in Naples as a mere visitor and spectator, following
the course of events, predicting them beforehand, and some-
times giving the Queen my opinion on the conduct of affairs.
She listened, sighed, find grew embarrassed when I touched
on the point where her influence was powerless, and I spared
her pride as far as possible, by avoiding a subject that could
not fail to move her profoundly.

I often saw Elliot,9 the English Minister, an extremely
pleasant and attractive man, with an active but ill-regulated
mind, and always two aims in viewr : the service of his govern-

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 307

ment, and his own advancement. If there be two ways of
attaining his desire he will always choose the one with the
more conspicuous effects. He is keenly imaginative, insincere,
unscrupulous and unprincipled : in short he is as dangerous
in public affairs as he is amusing in society. Every man in
office should fear him, and deal cautiously with him ; while a
man wiio takes an interest in affairs, and is free for the moment
but may be employed in the future, should conciliate him,
distrust him, and study him — but will certainly enjoy meeting
him.

My motives in returning to Naples caused Elliot much exer-
cise of mind. To save himself the trouble of finding out
whether I should forward or hinder his aims, or be merely
innocuous, he adopted the simple plan of hinting that he did
not wish me to be employed. I knew he had done so, and
spoke to him on the subject. I pointed out that he had done
well both for himself and me : for himself, because he had
avoided the trouble of trying to subjugate a new-comer, and
for me, because I found it far more agreeable to cultivate him
on the surface than to dig deeply into his mind. I saw him
every day; we chatted together as if I were a Swede or a
Pole ; we talked of Naples as if I were a tourist ; and when
he saw how loosely I was bound to the place he accustomed
himself to treating me with confidence. He adhered to Acton
because that minister was obnoxious to the French, and
because he thought it impossible that Acton should not yield
in the end to England's utmost desires ; but he was by no
means attached to him, and constantly complained of him.
Acton deceived him every day ; and he once showed me a report
that Acton had given him, on the strength of the forces that
Naples could add to the English troops, to drive the French
out of the kingdom and prevent them from ever returning.
When I looked at the total I saw 24,000 troops of the line
and 75,000 of the militia, ready to take the field.10 He
assured me that this was a most accurate estimate, and was
the lowest computation of the forces available. " You will
get me into trouble," I said, "if you say that I laughed at
your report; but I rely upon you." I reduced his reckoning

X 2

308 MEMOIRS OF THE

to 10,000 men in all, and explained that the militia was a
myth invented by one of Acton's tools in the war depart-
ment,11 and had never existed except on paper. It had cost
the recruits nothing but pen-and-ink, whereas they had gained
a variety of exemptions and privileges in return ; but the King
could not muster five thousand of them without the support
of a foreign army, and without the presence of a French
army to guard against any kind of combination. "I have
fifteen thousand English," he said, "and as much money as
the government requires." I denied the existence of the
fifteen thousand English, and assured him that he would not
gain his end by money. And what that end was, all our
conversations showed me clearly. It was always and invariably
the same : the end that Nelson had pursued in '98 and that
England would pursue to all time.

It always irritated Elliot that the French Ambassador was
allowed to lay down the law ; but he did his best to excel him
in that respect, when he insinuated himself into the Queen's
most intimate and private circle, and openly blamed her con-
duct. I made him see how he was misunderstanding his own
interests, both as a minister and an individual, and persuaded
him rather to conciliate the Queen, and learn to know her
better. I asked him to appoint a date when I might appeal
to his honesty, and make him confess the justice of my advice.
He believed me, and succeeded even better than I could have
wished. The Queen responded to Elliot's efforts to see her
oftener ; she fell under the charm of his conversation, and
allowed him more ascendancy over her than was discreet. He
began to extol the Queen, and her talents and abilities, and
to declare that she was the only person fit to rule. But what
was his object? To compromise her, and show Alquier that
he enjoyed her full confidence. He took care that Alquier
should always know when he was conferring with her, and
this unscrupulous abuse of the Queen's kindness was the origin
of the harshness and rigour that distinguished Alquier 's
relations with the government. He had force on his side, and
his severity knew no bounds. He forbade recruiting and the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 309

repairing of fortresses ; he put a veto on all the ordinary
measures, and exercised the most insolent despotism. Acton
was galled by his arrogance — which bade fair to equal his own
— and had several scenes with him. The last of these scenes was
Acton's undoing, for Alquier announced that either Acton or
himself must go, and was taken at his word more promptly
than he wished. Alquier would have regarded an apology as
a sufficient recognition of his superiority : this was all he had
intended. A formal victory of this kind would not have
robbed him of a minister who admirably served his crooked
purposes, and forwarded his secret schemes ; for Acton and
his methods of administration were so heartily hated that he
kept the kingdom always torn between love for the King and
Queen, and the desire for any change that would free it from
the ministerial yoke. But every class of person, in the govern-
ment, the Court, and the town, was clamouring for his depar-
ture; and though Elliot made a last effort to oppose it by
every means in his power — official notes, conferences, and
threats — it was of no avail. Even the King felt the restful-
ness of being rid of the inquisitor. The prayers of the people
carried him out to sea, and the nation's breath filled his sails.
He vanished (May, 1804). 12

The reader can imagine my surprise when I learnt that
Acton, in his last conversation with the Queen, had recom-
mended that the control and administration of the army should
be placed in my hands. I cannot doubt the fact.

Acton sailed out of the bay in the morning, and before
night the Grand Master of the King's Household came to tell
me that the privilege of the private entree was restored to me.
I was far more pleased to receive this public proof that I
owed the loss of this favour to Acton, than flattered by its
restoration. I resumed the use of the entree without any
expression of gratitude, and behaved as if I had never been
without it.

On the following day I visited the Queen, who took me
into her private room. I respectfully congratulated her on
her accession to the throne. "I take that as a compliment,"

310 MEMOIRS OF THE

she said, with some embarrassment. "The compliment," I
said, " is only to all your Majesty's subjects, and I am express-
ing their sentiments when I say that I am delighted to see you
in a position to employ all your talents and all the goodness
of your heart for the welfare of the kingdom." She changed
the conversation, and spoke of the army, the position of
affairs, and the obstacles that the vigilance of the French put
in the way of all progress and improvement. I opened her
eyes to the danger of being without a more accurate know-
ledge of her military forces. I observed that I could not
have let Acton think I had any desire to penetrate his secrets,
but that chance had put into my hands a report on the strength
of the army, which he had given to Elliot, and it was plain
that he was either deceiving himself or was deceived by all
the men in his employment. The Queen raised her eyes in a
way that expressed a world of anxiety as to what she would
next discover; but she went through the form of repeating
that Acton was an excellent creature, with none but the best
intentions. Finally she exhorted herself to patience, and
declared she would look into everything. I left her distressed
and sad, and was myself as much disturbed as she, but at the
same time full of admiration for certain qualities of mind which
she shows on every occasion. For twenty-five years the Queen
had been subjected to Acton's rule, while his ascendancy passed
from stage to stage : inclination had originated it, habit had
prolonged it, fear would have perpetuated it. He controlled
all these different situations, and made of them a firm basis
for his own career, which nothing but an external event
could have interrupted ; for he was above all danger of dis-
grace, and safe from every change that was not imposed from
without.

The government now began to suffer from the effects that
must invariably result from so marked and unexpected a
change, and from the sudden enfranchisement of all its
members from their strained and subordinate positions. Acton
possessed the key to all departments of public affairs, and
never entrusted it to any hands but his own ; for he preferred

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 311

to keep even the ministers, who were supposed to be his
colleagues, from acquiring any direct or fundamental know-
ledge of the situation. He would approach them with a vague
design, or suggestion, or scheme; then he would allow some
time to pass, in order that the minister whose department was
concerned might be put off the scent ; and finally he would
give an order on the subject in question, without referring to
the principle involved, with the result that his real aim was
rarely discernible. Acton had only gone to Palermo : his
shadow still remained as a menace to all the ministers whose
emulation, ambition, or self-interest might otherwise have
prompted them to suggest improvements in their own depart-
ments, or enlighten the King and Queen on matters with
which their Majesties were insufficiently acquainted. They
dared not divulge anything without knowing whether Acton
had gone for good and all, or only for a limited period ; and
this anxiety, which lasted for some time, though it became
less acute, introduced an element of uncertainty into public
affairs, which was almost more harmful than the iniquities of
the past. The departments had orders to send general reports
to Sicily ; he was consulted ; the King and Queen kept up a
very close correspondence with him ; the remains of the old
habits and the old deference paralysed everything. I ventured
to speak to the Queen on the subject. " Either bring Acton
back at any cost," I said, "or forget him, and above all make
others forget him. This uncertainty is making the state of
affairs worse than ever." She agreed with me, but could do
nothing as yet to improve matters.

Little by little the King's confidence in the Queen increased.
Her assiduous attendance at the Council, her care in preparing
its deliberations, her active imagination, and her intelligence,
enabled her to acquire knowledge of everything. She made
the mistake of trying to mend too many matters at once, and
especially of conferring with foreign ministers herself. It is
not without regret that I feel obliged to disapprove of this
method of negotiating : there is a very attractive side to the
idea of a sovereign discussing in person so important a matter

312 MEMOIRS OF THE

as foreign relations ; but reflection and experience prove it to
be a mistake. Conferences between a sovereign and a foreign
minister are undoubtedly fraught with the greatest danger,
when they are concerned with the details of policy : the head
of a department can listen to things that cannot be said to
a sovereign, things that no sovereign could answer personally
without harm resulting. A sovereign is more compromised
by listening than is a minister by answering ; and the Queen
had many a good reason for being convinced of this fact,
though she could not bring herself to make any change. In
spite of all her efforts it was impossible for the various
branches of the government to recover the necessary vigour :
they were thoroughly weakened, and the French ambassador
was a constant hindrance to their regeneration. The uncer-
tainty of the future relations between Naples and the French
was another source of weakness. The Ministry of the Interior
could not reform abuses, nor make innovations, without pro-
ducing temporary discontent in the provinces, and the help
of the people was required, in case of need, against the French.
The Ministry of War was powerless to develop or improve
anything, since the ambassador definitely forbade it ; and
though it might have been possible to cure certain long-
standing weaknesses in the army, a great number of individuals
would have been displeased thereby, and the effect would have
been injurious at this time. The public funds were so heavily
burdened by the maintenance of the French troops that any
unusual expense was out of the question.13 The ministry,
then, in its penury, could only endeavour to stave off further
decay, and to make its expenses proportionate to its resources ;
in the meantime cultivating foreign relations, in such a way
as to inspire general interest in case Europe should experience
another change. To this end the Queen constantly laboured ;
and she deserved to succeed.

The English Minister and French Ambassador were perpet-
ually in a state of antagonism, both outwardly and in matters
of intrigue. In their determination to secure personal success
they were constantly infringing the laws of neutrality, and

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 318

daily lodging complaints against one another, with which they
ought not to have troubled the government. The Queen's
patience was not always proof against the traps that were
laid for her at every turn ; but I doubt whether any prime
minister ever resisted the difficulties of such a position with
more perseverance, and honour, and dignity.

XVI

Queen Marie Caroline and public affairs — The ministers De' Medici and
Forteguerri — The Comte Roger made Inspector-General of the
army (12th Oct. 1804) — The reforms make the French Ambassador
uneasy — The Comte's relations with the latter — Napoleon insists on
Damas's dismissal — The Queen contemplates resistance, even by
force of arms, but finally yields — The Comte goes to Messina (March
1805)— Visit of the English colonel, Smith, to Sicily— The Cardito
incident at Napoleon's coronation in Milan — Secret mission of the
Russian generals Lascy and Opperman — A quarrel arising from the
expulsion of Prince Chtcherbatof ceases on the arrival of the
minister Tatistchef — Comte Roger gives prudent advice in vain —
Attitude of Austria, England, and France.

TO-DAY, on the 26th May, 1806, I take up the thread of these
memoirs. What a gulf lies between this moment and the 25th
of last September! How many varied events and how many
disasters have occurred since then ! I began to write during
the first time of leisure I have ever enjoyed since my youth.
It was suddenly succeeded by a time of the greatest activity
and stress that I have ever known. And now, after eight
months of every kind of occupation and vicissitude, I have
returned to the state of idleness that first induced me to begin
writing, and will probably permit me to continue doing so for
a long time. But I do not wish to move too fast ; I will take
up the story where I left it. It is a consolation, in this general
upheaval, to compose one's thoughts of the past, and recall,
in their proper sequence, the events that led to the present
state of things. The immediate past will figure in its right
place in these Memoirs ; I will now revert to the events of an
earlier time.

The Queen, I repeat, would have removed many difficulties
from her path and have avoided many a false step, if her
interviews with foreign ministers had been less frequent ; but
in this matter it was impossible to moderate her zeal. Her

314

COMTE ROGER DE DAM AS 315

imagination is stronger than her character, her energy greater
than her industry ; her mistrust of others leads her to do
everything herself ; there is too little persistency in her under-
takings and too much inconsequence in her schemes. These
weaknesses cripple the best and most kind-hearted of women,
and leave one in doubt as to her usefulness ; though useful
she might, and would be, if she were not constantly carried
away by her own impulsiveness.

The affairs of the nation were never at a standstill after she
took them in hand, but no important object was attained. The
two departments to which she should have given the most
attention were those of finance and war. The Chevalier de
Medici, who controlled the former, gave her every satisfaction,
and since entering the Ministry had raised his department to
a level that had not been thought attainable, especially in so
short a time.1 The Ministry of War was languishing in a state
of complete inanition, which M. Forteguerri, the minister,
allowed to become more marked every day.2 The Queen
suggested to the King that I should be made Inspector-
General of the army and other forces of the kingdom,
and found it easy — so great were the favour and kindness
with which he honoured me — to persuade him in the matter.
This was the first independent choice he had made for
twenty-seven years. I was appointed on the 12th October,
1804.3

The Queen wrote to me at once that she had ordered the
Minister of War to send me the Dispaccio in the course of
the same day ; and I knew, from another source, that I was
going to receive it.

I wrote to the minister that I had heard of their Majesties'
intentions towards me, but that I begged him to postpone the
matter until the following day. At six o'clock in the morning
I went to the Queen, and told her that I had taken the liberty
of having my appointment delayed till that day, as I wished to
owe it to her deliberate reflection rather than to her kindness
of heart. I desired to warn her beforehand that I knew that
Buonaparte hated me, on account of my having borne arms
against all the governments of France since the Revolution.

316 MEMOIRS OF THE

He had visited his wrath upon my family when the opportunity
arose ; 4 and consequently it was possible that my appointment
to so prominent a post might provoke remonstrances from
the ambassador, which would embarrass and annoy the Queen.
I should be sorry, I told her, to cause her any trouble for
which I was not sure that my abilities would compensate. But
she refused to listen to any objection. She answered that she
would contrive to smooth over and ignore any remarks that
might be made, but that she did not really believe anything
would be said on the subject ; and she wished me to be installed
that very morning.5

Seeing that her determination was not to be shaken I did
not persist, but proceeded to give her some idea of the deplor-
able state of the army, and of the essential matters that
required attention at once. We agreed as to the first steps to
be taken ; and I then left her, and went to express my gratitude
to the King.

I next visited the Minister of War, to ask that the matter
might be concluded at once ; and that same evening I received
so many expressions of goodwill and satisfaction from the
garrison of Naples that I was inspired with the greatest
enthusiasm for the work, and determined to do it as patiently,
and well, and thoroughly as in me lay.

During the nine months that I had passed in Naples since
my return from Vienna, I had so closely observed and studied
the abuses that existed, and so carefully considered the best
means of remedying them, that I was quite ready to introduce
all the regulations that were most urgently needed. I had
taken notes from time to time, and having always expected
to be employed sooner or later I was prepared for anything
that might arise, and was able to carry out my plans without
loss of precious time. All my first suggestions, all the bases
of formation I selected, and in short everything relating to
the various branches of administration, received the King's
approval. I simplified everything that seemed to have been
complicated on purpose to encourage disorder; and I think I
may say that, though a certain amount of severity was neces-
sary, and a little discontent was unavoidably roused among a

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 317

few individuals who were inimical to the public good, I won
the confidence and affection of the army.

I reviewed all the regiments of every kind. I reorganised
all the administrative councils ; and at the end of the first three
months I saw that I should be able to secure a high degree
of excellence for the army, and considerable satisfaction for
myself, as soon as the King should be master in his own
country, and able to have as large an army as the bases would
permit.

The French Ambassador made no objection to my appoint-
ment, but he spied upon me and watched me, and as soon as
he imagined, rightly or wrongly, that any of my proceedings
involved an increase of the army, he despatched a furious note
to the Council. His tyrannical threats were only silenced by
a fresh assurance, in writing, that not a single man would be
recruited or replaced.6 This despotic behaviour was all the
more annoying that the King could have increased his army
to a strength of forty thousand, with no additional charge upon
the funds beyond the pay of the private soldiers, since the
officers and all the accessories were already proportionate to
that strength. After the campaign of 1798 and the Revolu-
tion of Naples the King possessed no army at all; when the
Monarchy was restored he only set on foot a force of twenty-
four thousand men, but kept up the full complement of officers
of every rank, and all the old depots. To increase the forces,
therefore, only a slight additional expense would be necessary.
I could at least have replaced the missing men, in defiance of
the ambassador, but I could never persuade the government to
allow it. I was therefore reduced to keeping the existing —
but constantly decreasing — force of twelve thousand men in a
condition to receive an increase without any other change
being involved, so that there would be no difficulty at any
moment, if circumstances should deliver the King from the
yoke that France had laid upon him. I made the most of the
fact that this deliverance, if it should ever occur, would be
sudden, and persuaded the King on the strength of it to deter-
mine that the maintenance or increase of the army, in future,
should be effected by conscription and not by recruiting. The

318 MEMOIRS OF THE

gaining of this essential point consoled me for the actual state
of things.7

The presence of a French army-corps in the provinces,8 its
exacting behaviour, the activity of its generals, the ambas-
sador's determination to reduce the King's army to the lowest
possible degree of efficiency, and his repeated threats on the
smallest suspicion, whether just or unjust, left no room for
doubt that on the first opportunity these pretexts would be
transformed into valid reasons, and the kingdom would be
invaded. An opportunity occurred of taking a step on the
King's behalf, and I made haste to seize it. An epidemic
fever was spreading in Leghorn, and was sufficiently alarming
to oblige Tuscany and the States of the Church to take the
precautions generally used against the plague. I had an
opportunity one day, when dining with the Spanish Ambas-
sador, of observing that the French Ambassador, who was
present, was terribly frightened of this so-called plague, and
I took advantage of his terror as a means to my own ends.
I pointed out to the Queen how urgently the circumstances
called for a cordon of troops on the frontiers. The King
acquiesced, and I did not lose a moment in drawing up the
orders for the assembling of the troops. The orders were
despatched, the commanding-officers were appointed; and in
twelve days' time thirty thousand armed men were distributed
along the frontier-line in such a way that, if the French had
marched on the capital from the coast where they were can-
toned, they would have had thirty thousand men on their
flank, and the regular army in front of them. I have always
been surprised that it should have taken M. 1'ambassadeur
Alquier a whole fortnight to find out what was being done.
On the sixteenth day 9 he declared that he preferred the plague
to the precautions against it, and was even prepared to avoid
the infection by leaving the kingdom on the following day, if
the cordon were not broken up. Every means was employed
to resist or evade his decree : we pleaded the safety of the
country and the natural demands of the people : but nothing
availed. The choice of commanding-officers, which had fallen
on the men who had distinguished themselves the most at the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 319

time of the first invasion, was a source of much disquiet to
the ambassador. He thought himself safe from infection,
since every one avoided him and fled from him ; and his suspi-
cions made him insistent to a degree that there was no with-
standing. The cordon was broken up.

In order to make the means of defence more certain and
efficacious in the case of an attack, the King sent a secret
proclamation to all the provincial governors at the time the
cordon was removed (7th Dec. 1804).10 This proclama-
tion wras an urgent appeal to the people, in the case of the
enemy deciding to infringe the line of demarcation. All the
governors were instantly to assemble the " masses," and act
as circumstances should direct, subject to orders emanating
from myself. The knowledge of this proclamation would
doubtless have kindled a terrible war ; but the importance of
keeping the secret was so much impressed upon the governors,
and they were so conscious of their responsibility in the matter,
that it was never divulged.

The French Ambassador, when we met, treated me with cold
civility. He often expressed regret, I was told, that I was
not more cordial to him, and indeed I noticed that he was
always ready to meet me half way ; ll but our relations exactly
suited me, both personally and officially, and I always kept
them the same. On one occasion I was, in a way, associated
by chance with him and all his legation. A French merchant,
who was greatly respected by all his fellow-countrymen in
Naples, and indeed deserved their esteem, fell from his horse
as he was passing my door, and lost consciousness. I was not
in the house, but my adjutants were on the balcony, and
hurried to the assistance of the unfortunate man. They had
him carried into one of the rooms, and gave him all the atten-
tion he could desire. I was greatly surprised, on my return
home, to meet the whole of the French legation and all the
French officers then in Naples, and until I was informed of
the reason for their presence I was amused to see my house
invaded before the kingdom. The ambassador had just gone
away when I came in. As soon as all these gentlemen told me
the cause of their presence in my house I at once went off, as

320 MEMOIRS OF THE

may be imagined, to visit the invalid, whom I found already
surrounded by the best surgeons. I did all I could to ensure
his being as well cared for as if he were in his own house. I
went to see him several times daily, and always found him
surrounded by the French legation. Two of these gentlemen
attended to him at night, one of them being the secretary,
Beer,12 one of the greatest rascals alive; but my manner gave
him no clue to my opinion of him. The poor invalid never
recovered consciousness. At one of the consultations two of
the surgeons were in favour of trepanning him, and two were
against it. I wrote a line to M. Alquier to inform him of
this difference of opinion, and beg him to decide in the
matter : he sent for the Court physician : the operation was
postponed to the following day, but the unfortunate patient
died before it took place. After the funeral a whole band of
his fellow-countrymen came to pay me a visit of thanks, and
I received them as warmly as though their country had still
been mine also. The ambassador wrote me a letter, too, that
could not possibly have been more cordial and agreeable, in
the name of all the French then living in Naples. His personal
behaviour on this occasion, however, made no difference to his
ministerial anxieties : he still seized upon the most minute
circumstances, and tried to prove from them that I was raising
a formidable army.

Those who know Naples will remember, for instance, that
the only place for drilling the troops is the little piece of
ground near the Villa Reale 13 and its extension. The ambas-
sador lived exactly opposite to it, and was comically annoyed
by the drill, and especially by the firing-practice, which often
moved him to speak reproachfully to the Minister of War, on
the subject of the energy with which I persisted — so he
declared — in forming an army. His remonstrances could only
be met with laughter, and the drill continued ; while, un-
happily, the army was not increased by a man.

Who could foresee that there would emanate from Buona-
parte's cabinet representations on this subject that were even
more absurd than those of his ambassador, and unfortunately
less negligible?

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 321

At about the end of January Alquier sent the Minister of
War an official note, in which he positively demanded my
dismissal from the kingdom.14 The Emperor of the French,
he said, was displeased to see that the King's armies were
entrusted to an enemy of France, who had shown, by his past
and present actions, that he desired to rekindle the war. He
ended by calling upon the King to dismiss me from his service
immediately, and to give the control pf his army to a
Neapolitan general.

The answer to this note was a refusal, based on the circum-
stances of my position before joining the Neapolitan army.
I was not liable to any remonstrance of this nature, since I
had left France three years before the Revolution, and had
passed into the King's service from that of Russia.

Several days elapsed before the ambassador raised any objec-
tion to this answer. He then produced a second note very
similar to the first. It was refuted with more detail, and
the Queen wrote a letter with her own hand to Buonaparte.
This was forwarded by Gallo, who seems to have added some
very stringent remarks of his own, with regard to the tyranny
of attempting to dictate to the King and Queen of Naples
on the choice of their ministers and generals. The style of
the Queen's letter was firm, dignified, and friendly; and she
had no doubt that, unless Buonaparte were seeking for a
pretext to break the peace, he would adopt a more reasonable
and cordial tone, which would be perfectly compatible with
the position of supremacy that his pride demanded. But this
hope was short-lived : Buonaparte's answer to the Queen was
full of rancour and arrogance. He laid all the troubles of the
past at her door, and made her responsible for all that were
yet to come ; and he ended with a prophetic sermon and some
impertinent fatherly advice, to the effect that she would do
well to be careful, lest she should fall a victim to her own
actions and be reduced to begging for assistance at the Courts
of her kinsfolk.15 Several phrases in this letter clearly showed
that he believed a war was at hand, and part of his advice
aimed at keeping the Court of Naples from having anything
to do with it.

322 MEMOIRS OF THE

These were his final and least harsh expressions. The Queen
shed torrents of tears as she read this fatal letter, and if it
had the effect of increasing her bitterness and hatred towards
this man, who can wonder? In the daughter of Maria
Theresa these feelings were excusable. Her nature would
have needed to be either basely resigned or more than angelic
to endure, with any degree of calmness, the insulting patronage
of this greedy and perfidious usurper.

I talked to the Queen for a long time after reading this
letter. I tried to make it plain to her that as the greatness of
this man was only derived from force, so his style of writing
was merely the result of his education; that she must forget
his phraseology until she had transformed all the artillery
barracks into colleges; and I thought she seemed quite deter-
mined to give no sign to Alquier of her feelings with regard
to this ridiculous letter. But the ambassador, at the same
time, had sent a third note to the Minister of War, with an
intimation that I must leave the place on the spot, or General
Saint-Cyr, then stationed in Puglia, would march upon
Naples.

The King seemed even more offended than the Queen by this
act of despotism, and being of an irascible temperament, wished
to have a scene with Alquier or else go off to Sicily. The
Queen pacified him, and persuaded him to send a message to
General Saint-Cyr, to explain the facts and attribute the
difficulty to Alquier 's excitable character.16 General Saint-
Cyr appeared to know nothing of the matter, and to disap-
prove of it entirely ; he spoke with the greatest propriety and
respect of the King and Queen, and declared that he had
received no order to infringe the fixed line of demarcation, and
had no intention of doing so. This answer seemed to confirm
our idea that Alquier, on his own initiative, had added to
his instructions concerning me ; and several days passed in
Naples without any further demands being made on either
side.

It was amid all the amusements of the last days of the
Carnival that my fate was decided.17 We were at a concert
given by the Queen for the Electoral Prince of Bavaria, when

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 323

a courier arrived from General Saint-Cyr, and the Director
of Foreign Affairs 18 summoned the Queen to his official room.
General Saint-Cyr wrote that he had just received orders from
the Minister of War himself ; 19 that the orders were extremely
definite, and it was only his personal respect for the Court
that made him send this warning without delay. If I were
not gone before three days had passed, he said, and if Elliot,
the English Minister, had not also left Naples, he — Saint-Cyr
— must march upon the capital. At the same time he recalled
all the officers who were away on leave, and made his orders
known in the cantonments. The rupture was now a matter of
certainty.

The Queen returned to the concert-room with a greatly
troubled face, and I heard her whisper to the Hereditary
Prince : the French are coming. The prince repeated the
words to his sisters, and when the audience saw by the faces
of the royal family that bad news had arrived, the consterna-
tion became general. The Queen allowed the concert to go on
for a few minutes, and then dismissed her guests. I placed
myself so that she must pass me as she left the room, and
she said to me : " The French are going to march on Naples ;
prepare the troops, but do it quietly; give your orders this
very night."

I returned to my house and sent for all the colonels of the
garrison : I told them that the secrecy enjoined by the Queen
prevented me from writing to them, and I postponed until the
morning all the orders that might have created a panic if they
had been given at night. I waited on the Queen at daybreak,
and found her still resolved on resistance, but as firmly per-
suaded as ever that the preparations might be made secretly.
I combated her opinion, pointing out to her that it was impos-
sible to make the guns ready without taking them out of their
sheds at the arsenal ; but while reasoning like a woman she
insisted like a Queen, and I promised to do all that was
humanly possible to satisfy her.

With this object I did not write a single order : I gave my
orders verbally in Naples and the neighbouring garrisons. I
had the ammunition-wagons loaded inside the arsenal itself,
Y 2

324 MEMOIRS OF THE

and in two days' time the whole of this small and inadequate
army was ready for action.

Seven-eighths of the King's Council very reasonably thought
that my presence was too dearly bought with a rupture of the
peace that would probably ruin the kingdom, for they had
not sufficient sense of honour to see that Buonaparte's demand
was humiliating to the Court. An attempt was made, there-
fore, founded on this reasoning, to persuade the King and
Queen of the necessity for yielding. The Queen withstood
this party, for she made sure that the secret proclamation sent
to the provinces in the previous December would bring out the
whole population to oppose the French army, and that all the
regiments of militia and masses would present an imposing
front. The Council debated the whole morning without
coming to a decision, but in the end the King and Queen
consented to send me away to Messina. Alquier, who was
horrified to learn that Saint-Cyr had himself informed the
Ministry of his orders, had set out on the previous evening
to meet the general, and confer with him, at a spot half-way
between Naples and Saint-Cyr 's headquarters. On his return
Alquier made a great favour of having postponed the advance
of the French army and arranged with General Saint-Cyr that
the demand relating to Elliot should be abandoned, provided
that the one concerning myself were complied with. He was
informed that I was going away ; and the storm was over.20
It has since transpired that the Director of Foreign Affairs
saw him when he was starting for this interview, and took the
precaution of pledging himself that I should be sent away,
although the Council had not yet met. He was quite right,
for my departure was a matter of certainty ; and considering
the situation of Europe, and the prime importance of gaining
time to prepare really efficient means of shaking off the yoke,
I should certainly have voted with the majority if I had been
an adjudicator in the case instead of the bone of contention.

On that same day, at a ball given by Prince Leopold, I had
a long conference with the King. He spoke with extreme
bitterness of the humiliating position in which he was placed ;
he described his situation at the moment, the advantages that

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 325

he would gain by postponing hostilities, and those that the
French would gain by a total or even partial invasion of the
kingdom, which would enable them to seize all the finest
strategical positions in the country. He then pointed out how
useful I could be to him at Messina, if he were to give me
authority to combine with the Russians, when the right moment
should arrive, to secure his safety. I consoled him by heartily
agreeing with him, and describing the means I should employ
to serve him ; and I then parted from him, greatly gratified by
his kindness and all the proofs of his entire confidence in me.
The Queen observed this interview, and on the following day
she gave me a paper signed by herself and the King, which
invested me with powers that I shall describe later on. On
the morning of the 12th March I went to Caserta, to take
my leave of the King and receive his final orders. After
repeating in brief a good deal of our previous conversation he
said that he wished to give me a fresh mark of his regard,
and hung the Order of St. Ferdinand 21 round my neck. I
then left him, inspired with the deepest gratitude, and an
intense desire to give him fresh proofs of my zeal and devotion.
Elliot, the English Minister, disliked me because I was
aware of his personal insincerity and his perfidious diplomatic
system ; and also because, when the French government began
to persecute me, he had hoped to make me a partisan of
England, and had found I was as much disgusted by his views
as by the proceedings of Buonaparte. None the less he was
much annoyed by the course of action that had been chosen.
He had hoped that the fate of the kingdom would have been
decided by a determination to defend it, and that he could
then have realised his favourite project of seizing Sicily by
force of arms. We had an interview, in which I made no
secret of my opinion of him, and assured him once for all that
I was entirely devoted to the King's interests, to which his
wishes were quite as much opposed as was the tyranny of
France. We have not met since that day. The sequel will
show that his perseverance triumphed, because unhappily he
was seconded by the baseness and madness of the Russian and
English generals, who should have been the chief obstacle in

326 MEMOIRS OF THE

the way of his unworthy plans. The rest of these Memoirs
will show the development of his schemes, and their success.

I left Naples in the evening of the 12th March, 1805, in one
of the King's frigates ; and I venture to assert, without wishing
to be presumptuous, that I carried with me the regrets of the
whole army and of all honest folk.

The Queen wrote a second letter to Buonaparte,22 in spite
of the natural distaste that the style of his first letter had
aroused in her. She had yielded to his will, and she now
protested against its injustice ; but as she also appealed at
the same time to feelings of delicacy to which he was a stranger,
her letter remained unanswered.

At the time of my departure the Courts of the North seemed
already to be meditating combined action against Buonaparte's
political aggressions. There was much division of opinion
among the foreign governments, but they all appeared to be
equally displeased by Buonaparte's arbitrary acquisitions,
which fact gave reason to hope that they would combine to
put a stop to them. The Court of Naples, whose friendly
relations and intimate correspondence with the Emperor of
Russia had never ceased, drew these ties closer and closer as
Buonaparte's yoke grew heavier. The cabinet at Petersburg
had already promised, in definite terms, to seize the first
favourable opportunity of restoring independence to the king-
dom, and, without actually naming a date, announced that
two generals would be sent to acquaint themselves with the
locality. They were to pose as ordinary tourists, and would
begin by visiting Sicily, in order to remove all possible suspi-
cion as to their object. The Court was to appoint some one
to make all the arrangements and fix all the preliminary con-
ditions ; to amend, accept, or refuse suggestions ; and to give
information as to the Emperor's intentions. On leaving
Naples I was invested with all the powers for this important
mission. The King had made them absolutely independent of
Acton, who lived at Palermo : I was merely, as an act of
civility, to write to him as events developed. The King, by
putting this suggestion in the form of a mere request, left me
free to keep an eye on Acton's constant leaning towards the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 327

English ; and, as I was to be in direct correspondence with the
King and Queen, his intrigues in favour of that nation would
have no influence on the course of events. Castel-Cicala, the
Neapolitan Minister in London,23 had already put forward a
plea that the English Government should come to an under-
standing with Russia on behalf of the Two Sicilies ; but there
was not one of their measures or actions that did not clearly
show a strong preference and special solicitude for the Island
of Sicily, and Castel-Cicala expressed much anxiety in his
despatches on that account. I continued to be as well posted
in the affairs of Naples as though I were on the spot. The
Queen was kind enough to write to me twice a week, and often
in cipher ; and there was not a single gap in her interesting
and charming correspondence during the seven months that
I passed in Messina.

In the month of April we learnt that six thousand English
were daily expected in Malta, over and above the troops that
garrisoned the island ; and at the same time an English colonel,
a friend of Lord Mulgrave,24 was sent from London to Naples
to convey the good intentions of his government. After a
visit of only a few days he announced his desire to see Sicily,
and started for Palermo, whence he was to come by land to
Messina. I was informed that he was on his way thither, that
he would converse with me on certain subjects, and that he
was bringing some letters of introduction with him. He
brought letters from Acton and Elliot. Acton explained the
colonel's designs in such a confused manner, that all I under-
stood plainly was his intention to conceal them from me.
Happily the colonel's conversation was more lucid, and left
me in no doubt as to his real wishes. My first care was to
ask him if I might put him in communication with the
Russian generals whom I was expecting. He declined, saying
that his instructions were quite unconnected with the Russian
generals ; which naturally surprised me. I felt that the allies
would greatly detract from their usefulness if they did not
co-operate in their intentions as well as their actions ; and the
colonel's statement could not fail to confirm my opinion as to
the private designs of England.

328 MEMOIRS OF THE

Colonel Smith 25 added that the English troops expected in
Malta were intended to serve the cause of the King of Naples,
but he must warn me that Parliament would not consent to
pay them for an indefinite time for no purpose : it was im-
portant that the King should decide to use them sooner rather
than later. I reminded him of the interest that he had
expressed in the King's cause, and begged him to reflect that
to employ the troops too soon would defeat the King's object.
The troops being in Malta, within easy reach, it seemed to me
that the King's intention was probably to hold them in reserve
until circumstances should point to their employment. He
asked how many troops we had in Sicily, and offered to increase
the number I quoted, by sending us some English troops. I
had been expecting this offer, and answered positively that it
would be contrary to the King's wishes. We parted without
either of us being deceived as to the intentions of the other.
He only remained in Messina for a day, and then continued
his inspection of Sicily, which was nothing more nor less than
a military reconnaissance ; the end in view being to seize and
occupy the island at the earliest opportunity, even if the
kingdom of Naples were the price to be paid. I reported
everything to the Court and to Acton, who was not too much
pleased, I think, that I should be as well informed on this
point as himself ; but none the less he confessed to me in his
answer that several of Colonel Smith's ideas had disturbed
and alarmed him.26

The news from the foreign governments increased our hopes
that a coalition would shortly be formed in the North ; and
Buonaparte's haste to acquire and appropriate the Italian
principalities seemed to show that he himself thought there
was no time to be lost. At the end of March he proclaimed
himself King of Italy, and announced that he was coming to
Milan. Parma and Placentia were added to his possessions.
The generic title of King of Italy and the vagueness of its
meaning alarmed the Court of Naples, which, in view of its
weakness, could not dare to demand an explanation. Gallo,
the ambassador in Paris,27 had orders to regulate his conduct
by that of the Austrian Court, and to be more or less firm or

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 329

deferential according as the Powers involved were more or less
prepared for war. However well-prepared these Powers might
be, the Court of Naples was in imminent danger, seeing that
it was under the knife of the French army-corps stationed in
the kingdom, and that the operations of the Powers could not
possibly be sufficiently prompt to save Naples from an act of
despotism on the part of Buonaparte.

The behaviour of the King in this difficult situation was
worthy of all praise, in so far as the sovereign of a secondary
and subjugated Power can possibly maintain the dignity, firm-
ness, and ceremony appropriate to his rank. The fate of the
kingdom now hung in the balance, and depended entirely on
the comparative success of Buonaparte's attempts on the one
hand, and the enterprise of the northern Powers on the other.
The King believed that servility would avail nothing, and that
the appearance of fear would only encourage Buonaparte's
perfidy, while its absence might possibly have the effect of
postponing the evil day. Gallo was instructed to keep this
principle always in mind, and when he was first called upon
to recognise the King of Italy, he answered that the position
of the Court of Naples demanded that it should be neither the
first nor the last to make this recognition.

On arriving in Milan Buonaparte repeated this demand more
urgently, and requested further that the King's Orders and
his own should be exchanged. Buonaparte had himself spoken
to Gallo on the subject, in such a way that the latter thought
the request could not be refused. Alquier asked the Queen for
an audience, to discuss the matter. " I am opposed to it my-
self," said the Queen, "but I will talk it over with the King,
and he will decide. As for the exchange of Orders, do not
rely upon it. St. Ferdinand and the Legion could not possibly
meet above the same heart — they would fight! '' I doubt
whether even the recognition of the King of Italy would have
been made, unless — contrary to all expectation and all pro-
bability— the man who was most violently opposed to the
peace and interests of Naples had begged the Court to yield.
Elliot, the most inconsequent and insincere of men, actually
took this step : the Queen was bewildered, and thought he

330 MEMOIRS OF THE

must be mad or ill, but when once this overture had been
made by Elliot it was impossible to withhold consent, and
Gallo was ordered to acquiesce.28

It cannot be denied that the sarcastic allusions to Buona-
parte, in which the Queen often indulged in her conferences
with Alquier, vastly increased his bitterness and desire for
revenge. The Queen is agreeable and full of charm, and
Alquier often enjoyed his interviews with her. Perceiving
this, she gave the rein to her imagination, and indulged in
extremely free criticism of the newly-made Emperor. Alquier
went away laughing, without any intention at the moment,
perhaps, of abusing her confidence : but the next time that he
had a serious scene with her, and had suffered as much as his
master from her tongue, he would go away in a rage, and
would console his injured vanity by repeating in his despatches
everything that she had said against the Emperor and his
chagrined representative. Nothing would persuade the Queen
to deny herself this pleasure. She welcomed a conference with
Alquier as a vent for her bitterness : neither entreaties nor
counsels could move her in this matter, and there were a
thousand instances to show that, if she had only had Alquier
to deal with, she would have treated him like a Neapolitan
Minister in Paris. When he spoke of his master's desire for
my departure she said: "I have really decided to send the
general away; and I have just written to Buonaparte to ask
him to find me a Corsican. There is a Corsican to be found
everywhere, is there not, Monsieur Alquier? "

In every interview with her he heard things of this kind,
and was often amused; but the very first dispute in which he
himself was attacked led to the despatch of a general report.

When he came to present his letters of credence, as the
ambassador of the newly proclaimed and recognised Emperor,
the Queen made a point of humiliating Alquier personally.
It is well known that he is very republican at heart, that he
detests Buonaparte and is secretly furious at his elevation,
and that it caused him real anguish to make the formal entry
and speech with which he was forced to celebrate the accession
that he hated. The Queen, standing on the steps of a throne,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 331

received him with a dignity of bearing that was truly impres-
sive. When he had finished his speech, which he pronounced
in a very sad voice, it devolved upon her to answer him. She
therefore began : "The Emperor, your master," and pretend-
ing to hesitate for a word, repeated your master twice. She
ended with a vague and insignificant phrase, which proved that
her only object in speaking had been to begin and end with
your master. Alquier very foolishly admitted that he had
perceived her intention and felt its malice. This is assuredly
the only instance of the Queen's spite that he never reported
to his master. I often spoke to the Queen of the dangers of
this persecution, of which she never tired : it doubtless con-
tributed more to her undoing than the final pretext that
Buonaparte so cruelly seized.

As soon as the latter arrived in Milan Alquier and General
Saint-Cyr set out to that town, to contribute to the general
melancholy. On the day of their departure 29 they dined with
the King at Portici, and the Queen had an interview with
Alquier. On this occasion, however, she felt the necessity of
letting him carry away a pleasanter impression, and treated him
with all the graciousness at her command. She begged him
to assure the Emperor that if he would remove his troops from
the kingdom she would pledge herself to absolute neutrality,
and that, whatever the course of events might be, no foreign
troops should be admitted to the King's dominions. There
is not a doubt that, if this suggestion had been accepted, the
engagement would have been scrupulously kept. Alquier
promised to do all he could to pacify Buonaparte and persuade
him to employ gentler methods. He even undertook to make
an effort towards the repeal of the decree that concerned my-
self. We shall see how he executed his commission.

One of the courtiers, Prince Cardito, who was much attached
to the Queen and had more than once been employed by her
on missions to General Saint-Cyr, wished to attend the corona-
tion. She adopted the idea with pleasure, knowing his devo-
tion, and being uncertain as to whether the Marquis del Gallo
would be invited to attend, since the question of the recogni-
tion was not yet decided. Prince Cardito, however, found

332 MEMOIRS OF THE

Gallo in Milan, and therefore had no object in his visit but the
festivities. He was presented to Buonaparte, who spoke to
him, and in the course of his conversation lost his temper, and
finally worked himself up into a rage that culminated in an
unseemly and unbridled attack upon the Queen.30 Prince
Cardito was scared and bewildered, and losing his presence
of mind, listened to it all without replying a word — a sad pity !

This outburst against the Queen on the Emperor's part was
not calculated to increase the gentleness and calm to which
she was constantly being counselled by myself and several
others. Indeed her heart was now filled with undying hatred
towards him, which no motive of prudence could ever again
subdue. All her thoughts were now bent on seizing the right
moment to combine her efforts with those of the rest of
Europe, and on regulating those efforts by the interests at
stake, the distance of the other Powers, and the development
of events.

It appeared, from news that arrived in April, that the
foreign Courts were all in agreement, and that a coalition was
certain. We even heard of certain premature settlements and
conventions, relating to conquests and the distribution of
territory 31 — always a disquieting thought when one knows
the fatal results of similar hopes, which have so often fallen to
the ground in the past, England had already fixed the sub-
sidies that she would grant to the various Powers, but had
pronounced it impossible to assist Naples. She could only
undertake the defence of Sicily, an enterprise which, in the
case of reverses on the continent, carried with it the greatly
desired compensation. The English government, in making
this arrangement, bade Elliot protest very definitely against
any concession by the Court of Naples in favour of the French
and antagonistic to England, such as the closure of ports or
the dismissal of the minister. Any suggestion of the kind
must be rejected, on pain of immediate hostilities against
Sicily ; and yet it seemed hardly worth while to defy an enemy
on the spot, for the sake of pleasing a distant ally.

The Queen, however, had no hesitation as to her choice.
She depended upon her tact and her luck to help her in the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 333

weighing and removal of difficulties, and gained time by carry-
ing on a daily warfare against all the complaints and threats —
and often the insults — of the French cabinet. One event,
which was extremely likely to occur, might at any moment
place the Neapolitan Court in a most embarrassing position.
The French fleet, at that time, was daily expected to leave
the harbour at Toulon : if it escaped Nelson's notice (as it
usually did) and sailed along the Mediterranean, it might be
forced, by bad weather or an enemy in pursuit, to take refuge
under the forts of Naples. The same circumstances might
bring the English fleet to the same spot. In the first case,
supposing the forts did not defend the anchorage, the English
would take advantage of the pretext to occupy Sicily : in the
second, General Saint-Cyr would seize the opportunity of open-
ing hostilities. Ruin, therefore, was always threatening either
Naples or Sicily — possibly both of them.

Alquier would have roused ill-will in any one by his stupid
way of assuming that he inspired it. One day, before I left
Naples, there was a false rumour that the fleet was coming,
and I received orders to put all the forts in a state of defence
within twenty-four hours, and to keep the gunners at their
posts night and day. No one had told Alquier, nor given
him any reason to believe, that these precautions were especially
directed against his nation : it is laid down by all the rules of
warfare that any infringement of neutrality shall be forcibly
prevented. He appropriated our precautionary measures,
however, and insisted that they constituted a rupture of the
peace.82 It took several days to pacify his wrath, and a great
deal of trouble to prevent awkward consequences.

This brief description of the perplexity and slavery of the
Court of Naples will give some idea of the intense desire that
was felt for a change in the affairs of Europe, and of the
prudence that was required to save the Two Sicilies from being
cut up before the general movement took place. The secrecy
that should be so strictly observed in connection with official
despatches was extremely hard to secure among the Neapo-
litans, with whom corruption — the child of poverty — was a
habit, and a habit that had grown since the last revolution.

334 MEMOIRS OF THE

At any moment, therefore, the intentions of the government
might be divulged and published. It was merely a chance —
which I prefer to call Providence — that maintained the throne
of Naples so long, and kept it standing till it obtained the
support of foreign forces and so-called protectors, who took
advantage of its weakness to involve it in their blunders, and
finally in their reverses.

I was impatiently awaiting in Messina the arrival of the two
Russian generals, who had been so long expected. I heard
indirectly that they had already reached Trieste, but forty
days went by before any further news transpired. I then
received a letter from General Lascy, dated from Cotrone, a
little Neapolitan port in Calabria in the Gulf of Taranto
(May 1805). I had known him very well in Russia (we had
received the Cross of St. George on the same occasion) and he
was obligingly anxious to recall himself to me. He informed
me that a horrible voyage and a gale at the end of it had
forced him to land at Cotrone; that his intention had been to
go to Messina, but he had neither time nor strength for the
crossing ; that a litter had been provided to carry him to
Naples by land, and he had resolved to go thither. He hoped
to see me there very shortly, he said ; and added that he was
accompanied by General Opperman of the engineers.33 Never
was a change of plans more unfortunate. I could picture the
anxiety that his appearance would rouse in the King and Queen,
the embarrassments that he would cause, the interpretation that
Alquier's spies would put upon his actions, and the indiscreet
remarks that Elliot would enjoy making on the subject of his
visit. The Queen at once informed me of his arrival and her
own fears. It was some days before she saw him, and she
tried to persuade him to set out to Messina at once; but his
health forbade it. If this wretched old man had had the sense
to consult his health before leaving Russia he would never
have started on the journey. He was unable, not only to act,
but even to think. In these circumstances a man of really
good feeling would not have allowed public affairs to suffer
from his decrepitude. He would have won respect for it by
retiring into seclusion ; but as it was he made every one curse

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 335

it, by trying to lead an active life in defiance of the general
welfare and of all the difficulties that could not fail to arise.
The extremely undistinguished appearance of General Opper-
man and himself served to hide their rank and condition : as
they wore neither uniform nor orders they resembled bank-
rupt merchants rather than generals representing a great
Power. The Queen postponed giving them an audience as long
as possible, but she was obliged to find out their intentions
and act in accordance with their instructions. She therefore
saw them. Lascy stated the Emperor's views, and the initial
conditions on which he would insist before employing his
forces to support the Court of Naples : but the general
explained them so badly that they were unintelligible, and he
was asked to state them in writing, which he promised to do.
These two generals had had time to verify the reports furnished
by the Neapolitan Minister in Petersburg,34 as to the number
of troops; and when, instead of 24,000 troops of the line,
they could only discover 12,000, they were very naturally
annoyed. They asked for the last reports I had made before
leaving Naples, and finding them perfectly correct they refused
thenceforward to accept any statistics that had not been con-
firmed, and indeed signed, by me. They asked to see my
plans of defence, and my scheme for organising and augment-
ing the army. They approved of everything, and conveyed
the fact to me with kind expressions of regret for my absence.

So firm was their confidence in me, and so determined their
refusal to deal with any statements but mine, that the Queen
suggested to the King that I should be summoned, and hidden
in the island of Ischia or Procida. The King quite rightly
opposed the idea. There had never yet been a moment when
it was more important to avoid rousing Alquier's attention,
and the smallest pretext at that time would have served him
as a proof of his most ill-founded suspicions.

I devised a way of satisfying them. I sent them one of my
officers from Messina, a man in whose intelligence and discre-
tion I had absolute confidence. He was able to give them
correct information on every subject they wished to investi-
gate. Opperman made a tour of inspection with him in the

336 MEMOIRS OF THE

neighbouring provinces, reconnoitred the strategical positions
of the surrounding hills, and began to form a definite scheme
of operations. General Lascy laid before the Queen the
demands and conditions that he thought it right to make,
which he tabulated and numbered, leaving a space in the
margin for the answers — whether objection, consent, or refuta-
tion. The Queen sent them to me, and I inserted the answers,
which they thought rather severe, but were kind enough to
consider perfectly just, and I may even say perfectly fair (if I
am to quote their own words). Some of their propositions
involved great difficulties; others were ruinously expensive;
several were founded on their ignorance of the country ; and
many were quite practical. On the whole, there was nothing
to prevent their plans from being carried out, and they recog-
nised at once that no hindrances would be put in their way.
They inspected the troops in strict incognito,35 and were
genuinely pleased with them, especially with the cavalry and
artillery : a perfectly natural preference, since the Russian
infantry is inimitable, and, in the short time that had been
devoted to improving and reforming the King's troops, his
infantry had certainly not attained a degree of perfection that
can only be claimed, perhaps, by the Russian army. But the
cavalry was nearly all that could be desired. The whole army,
however, only numbered 12,000 at most, and this was quite
insufficient.

The King made the garrison of Capua execute some
manoeuvres in the presence of the Russian generals, who were
perfectly satisfied. It was here that I had established the
school of instruction. It had been arranged that this garrison
should change quarters every year with the garrison of Naples,
where there was no parade-ground large enough for drilling
two battalions, and where, therefore, only the most perfectly
organised and trained regiments could properly be stationed.

The secrecy maintained as to the presence of these two
generals in Naples was far from satisfying Elliot's turbulent
and unquiet spirit. Lascy, who was of Irish birth, was weakly
and fatuously gratified at being treated as a compatriot by the
English Minister, and submitted to his dictation on many

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 337

matters; but stoutly refused to cast off his disguise, in spite
of all Elliot's pressure. The two generals frequented the
minister's house, but had begged him to address them by
name, without the addition of their military rank. Elliot saw
no object in this essential precaution, and one day when he
was entertaining a large circle of guests he introduced Opper-
man to them all as General Opperman, to their great surprise.
Opperman was much annoyed, and from that moment was
more sparing of his visits to Elliot, whom he seemed to mistrust
profoundly.

Russia's first plan had been to devote 30,000 men to the
deliverance of the kingdom of Naples, without demanding the
assistance of any English contingent. Coalitions, whether
great or small, have such notorious disadvantages, and the
combination of troops of different nationalities entails so many
disputes over the prerogatives of the generals-in-command,
that all parties were of one mind in wishing this wise and
suitable scheme to be carried out as it stood. General Lascy 's
mission, he declared, was to be executed on this understanding
alone; and he was perfectly honest in this matter, I do not
doubt. Where is the plan, however, that remains unaltered
to the end, and is carried out exactly according to the original
forecast ? First thoughts are generally the best and the finest ;
but economy soon resumes its empire; the persons concerned
persuade themselves, on second thoughts, that they can attain
the same end with a smaller or divided outlay ; the advantages
appear immense; and finally that same outlay is found to be
quite inadequate. To men of small intelligence and foresight
there is compensation for this fact in the slight saving of
expense.

The cabinet in Petersburg, therefore, made a direct arrange-
ment with the cabinet in London that the English army-corps
stationed in Malta should be combined with the Russian army-
corps, and be under the orders of General Lascy. This plan
was presented to the King of Naples as a condition. General
Lascy, then, was to be commander-in-chief of all the forces in
the kingdom.

When the question arose of choosing a general to command

338 MEMOIRS OF THE

the King's troops, Elliot, who cherished the hope of con-
trolling everything through his ascendancy over Lascy, and
feared he would be unable to acquire any power over me, asked
the King very confidentially to entrust his troops to the Prince
of Hesse-Philippsthal or M. de Bourcard (lieutenant-generals
in his army). The Queen mentioned the subject to Lascy,
and if his opinion had been the same as Elliot's she knew me
well enough to be sure that I should not be offended, nor even
annoyed, in view of the immense importance of ensuring abso-
lute harmony in this limited coalition. But General Lascy
declared positively and repeatedly that if I were not placed in
command of all the King's own troops he would have nothing
to do with the affair ; and the King himself did me the honour
of preferring me. So Elliot gained nothing by this step,
which might have surprised me if I had respected him enough
to believe in his expressions of regard.

There was one thing that might well have caused surprise
to any one who was ignorant of Elliot's character : namely,
that when Lascy was complaining of not receiving all the
information he desired, the English Minister constantly urged
the King and Queen to send for me, even if it were only to
hide me in Ischia, supposing that unnecessary precaution were
considered essential. His only object in this act of condescen-
sion towards me was secretly to spread the news of my return,
in order to revive Alquier's persecution of me, and give him
a fresh pretext for invading the kingdom, if he desired one.
This event would have crowned Elliot's wishes by preventing
the co-operation of the English and Russian troops, and
favouring his dearest hope, the occupation of Sicily.

An incident that was insignificant in itself, but derived
importance from the intimate relations existing at that moment
between the Courts of Russia and Naples, created a certain
amount of stiffness, for a time, in the dealings of the two
generals with the King and Queen. Prince Sherbatow,36 who
had killed the Chevalier de Saxe in a duel two years earlier,
came to Naples under a false name, and was not presented by
the charge d'affaires of his Court. To have visited Naples at
all showed a lack of delicacy, while his method of trying to

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 339

avoid reminding the Queen of an event that she will never
cease to deplore showed an equal want of judgment. The
Queen knew that he was in the town, and regarded it as a
personal insult : she sent him a message to the effect that his
presence was displeasing to her. He insisted on remaining,
which was certainly imprudent ; but the Queen, on the other
hand, allowed her impulsive feelings to run away with her too
quickly. She sent an official from the police department to
remove him : he was put into a post-chaise and taken to the
frontier. The cliargi d'affaires quite rightly presented an
official note of protest against this proceeding ; but instead of
doing so firmly and at the same time with the respect that the
circumstances demanded, he employed a discourteous and
arrogant style. He received no answer. Upon this Elliot,
profiting by the opportunity of making mischief, took upon
himself to remonstrate as an ally of the Court of Russia, and
prompted the charge d'affaires and the two generals to mark
their displeasure by omitting to pay their court to the Queen.
This state of mutual offence continued for some time, and did
not altogether cease until the arrival of the Russian Minister,
M. Tatistchef,37 who smoothed matters over and brought about
a reconciliation.

This little quarrel, however, did not alter the intentions of
the two generals with regard to coming events. In all their
confidential discussions on the future they advanced the wisest
and most moderate ideas, which all tended to the welfare of
the kingdom and the safety of the royal family, and were
calculated to make the presence of a Russian army not only
an advantage for the moment, but also a lasting source of use-
fulness to the army in Naples. They declared that the King's
army could not act at a distance from the garrisons until it
had been enlarged, and proposed that the Russian army, on
landing, should proceed to the frontiers and form a screen
before the fortified towns, which would make it possible for
fresh levies to be undertaken, and for the troops to be organised
and perfected. They would then be in a position to guarantee
the kingdom permanently against aggression. By word and
deed alike the generals inspired hope and satisfaction in every

Z 2

340 MEMOIRS OF THE

respect; and their enthusiasm seemed all the more genuine
because their behaviour did not belie their fine speeches : their
plans were never divulged, nor indeed even suspected by the
public at large.

Great as were the satisfaction and hope of independence
promised by this measure, it would be still better, as I wrote
to the Queen, to be in a state of neutrality that was recog-
nised by the Powers. This would remove the French from
the kingdom, would prevent any other army from entering it,
and would ensure liberty for the King to increase his own
forces without hindrance. I was overjoyed when the Queen
wrote to me that this was precisely what the Powers desired,
and that if Buonaparte were to accede to this oft-repeated
suggestion of neutrality the allies would remove their field of
action to North Italy, and would protect the kingdom without
occupying it. The Neapolitan Ministers in London and
Petersburg both encouraged this prudential measure in their
despatches, and declared it was the only certain way of securing
prosperity for the kingdom without delay. For there could
be no doubt that, wherever the allies might land on the coast
of the kingdom, the provinces occupied by the French, even
though they might be evacuated, must expect a farewell
resembling that of Medea. If the French desired to remain,
even a successful issue to the efforts of the allies would not save
the kingdom from being the scene of war for some time, and
the recuperation so long needed by the country and the finances
would be indefinitely postponed.

The Queen seemed to accept this simple argument. She
was never deceived, either by her clear intellect or by her feel-
ings, as to the wisdom of any measure; but her character was
growing more bitter every day under the treatment of Buona-
parte, and the idea of making any treaty with him was un-
conquerably repugnant to her. She despised and hated him,
and perhaps allowed her policy, and her actions as a Queen
and a mother, to be too much influenced by her private
impressions.

Everything that made her feel it would be impossible to
avoid joining the coalition gave her pleasure and consolation

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 341

to a degree that she could not hide ; but I must hasten to add
—to her honour be it said — that she was incapable of agreeing
lightly to unsuitable conditions, and it is certain that there
was not a promise, nor a plan, nor a suggestion made by the
foreign generals and ministers that did not deceive her until
the very last moment. The circumstances, when a war in the
North began to appear imminent, were far from propitious.
The cabinet of Vienna only made very feeble protests and timid
preparations, and contented itself with half-measures. Buona-
parte's proceedings, on the other hand, were politic, but at the
same time audacious and even insolent : he was well aware of
his superior moral position, and used it as a weapon with
marked success, while awaiting the best moment to employ
arms of another kind. When the probability of fresh hostili-
ties first became apparent he shrank from the idea of war.
His designs upon England — whether practical or chimerical —
entirely occupied his mind : he wished to concentrate all his
attention on ruining that enemy, and disliked the thought of
encountering others. But he was too wise to be long uneasy :
an enemy who was so much afraid of throwing down the
gauntlet and measuring swords with him was not likely to
inspire much awe in a man of his character. The Emperor of
Germany, with one Cobenzl at the head of the ministry in
Vienna, and another in Paris — two samples of his feeble
resources, twro worn-out tools — was discrediting himself every
day in the eyes of his antagonist, who began to see the possi-
bilities of the future. Buonaparte cannot have forgotten that
on two occasions within a few years the Court of Vienna had
broken treaties, in complete disregard of its engagements and
of the welfare of its allies ; and he must have felt that he was
in no great danger, since the whole fabric of the coalition was
likely to crumble to pieces very shortly, owing to the defection
of the Power that formed its foundation. The weakness of a
coalition which Prussia refused to join was another point in
favour of his safety, and of his designs, which might well have
been regarded as foolhardy if they had not been directed
against a ministry incapable of resolution or energy. All
this plainly demonstrates that Europe was not subjugated by

342 MEMOIRS OF THE

Buonaparte's troops and military tactics, but rather by the
superior strength of his intellect and character. Such as they
were they had certainly no rival in this unhappy century.

The Court of Vienna never said a word in support of the
Court of Naples, but merely recommended discretion at all
costs, thereby proving that its own terrors were as much as it
could manage, without burdening itself with those of others.

England's willingness to protect Naples was tempered with
self-interest : she regarded the matter as an investment from
which she hoped to derive a handsome dividend. Russia alone
seemed to be straightforward in her wishes, or, at least, her
situation enabled her to veil her motives more decently than
the rest — for it has been decided once for all that in politics
there is no such thing as an unmixed advantage. If these
Memoirs tend to show that it was Russia, more than any other
of the allies, that ruined and deceived the Court of Naples, I
wish to make it quite plain that I bring no accusation against
the Emperor Alexander; for it is impossible that perversity,
immorality, and perfidy should have infected the mind of this
young sovereign, who owes his throne to the hatred that evil-
doing inspires, and who appears to be thoroughly upright.
But he has not yet been able to reform the character and
influence the opinions of all his subjects, some of whom,
unhappily, are deplorably corrupt.

During the last days of June the frigate in which the Russian
Minister, M. Tatistchef, was being conveyed to Naples,
anchored off Messina. I had orders from the King and Queen
to talk to him : to give him a hint as to the way he should
behave in the matter of Prince Sherbatow, enlighten him
indirectly on the subject of Elliot's character and point of
view, and briefly describe the state of affairs in Naples. I
had an interview with him, and was equally satisfied on every
point. The difficulties connected with Prince Sherbatow were
absolutely smoothed away; and M. Tatistchef expressed an
amount of devotion to the cause of right which, combined with
the influence he believed himself to possess with the Russian
generals (in the choice of whom he had had a share), seemed
to augur everything good. As I only spent an hour with him,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 343

however, my judgment was very superficial ; and it is well
known that, even in the most cultivated regions of Russia, the
slightest scratching of the ground will promptly reveal the
rock. I gave him a letter for the Queen, in which, of course,
I could only say that he appeared, on a first meeting, all that
was charming. On arriving in Naples he was subjected to a
fortnight's quarantine : it was therefore the middle of July
before he presented to the government his instructions with
regard to the projected operations. Those instructions were
founded on the supposition that the practical assistance of his
Court would be claimed. He left no room for doubt as to the
subjection of the generals to his control ; he stated that the
English troops in Malta were at General Lascy's disposal ; and
he declared himself ready to draw up the treaty as soon as was
thought desirable. He had come directly from Vienna, and
was in a position to speak with authority as to the real inten-
tions of the Russian and German Emperors.

The more certain the coalition became the greater were
the dangers that beset the kingdom,38 and the more was it
liable to be ruined by any trifling act of indiscretion or tact-
lessness. M. Tatistchef was fortunately shrewd enough to
see through Elliot and protect himself against him, and thereby
to obviate the harm he might have done, before doing the harm
he actually achieved.

It was the more necessary to be prudent because, at this
time, defensive measures were all that the cabinet of Vienna
proposed to undertake. It is probable that this limitation was
merely nominal, and was designed to secure more time for
preparation, but the evasive character of the Court of Vienna
gave reason to fear that it might really confine its efforts to
such measures ; and if the Court of Naples had revealed its
intentions it would infallibly have been crushed. There was
one method that could have been employed and was at first a
temptation. This was to bring a Russian army-corps into
the kingdom without declaring war, and to let it occupy the
forts in Naples and all the other principal fortresses until the
French should consent to leave the country and subscribe to
the neutrality of the Two Sicilies. M. Tatistchef pointed out,

344 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER BE DAMAS

possibly with reason, that since the reinforcements had not yet
reached Corfu the number of troops available was not large
enough to justify any risk of exasperating Buonaparte, before
the war had begun in North Italy. This reason had to be
accepted; although it was plain that the rage and hatred of
which Buonaparte daily gave the most unseemly proofs — either
in the behaviour of his ambassador or in the excesses of his
generals in Puglia — would achieve the ruin of the kingdom
before hostilities broke out.

XVII

Alquier's violence on his return — Naples adheres to the coalition —
Recall of Comte Roger — Severe criticism of the treaty signed by
Circello, and of the selfish behaviour of the allies — Treaty of neu-
trality with France signed, and retracted simultaneously — Interview
with Elliots-Letter from the Queen — Attempts to move Tatistchef ,
and council held to discuss his strange suggestion — The Queen's
share in the determination to let the allies land at Naples — Their
arrival (19th Nov. 1805) — Alquier's departure.

NOT only did Alquier, while in Milan, neglect to carry out
the promises he had made before going thither, but in the
first interview he had with the Queen after his return he made
use of such unseemly expressions and behaved so indecorously
as to make it obvious that he had received orders to treat her
insultingly. In the face of this unexpected attack the Queen
lost the power of speech, and even her dignity : she could do
nothing but burst into tears, and sob out between her con-
vulsions of grief : " And who is it that sends me these horrible
messages ? A Buonaparte ! And whom does he choose as his
mouthpiece? An Alquier — an Alquier!" The wretch was
alarmed at the Queen's condition. He turned pale; and the
Queen sent him away.1

The King was beside himself with rage when he heard of
Alquier's astonishing tirade. He wished to have the man
flung into the sea, and then to go off to Sicily and give up
everything ; and once more the Queen was obliged to soothe
him, and persuade him to be patient.

Since the storm that was gathering in Europe was bound
to be especially concentrated and direct in its action on the
kingdom of Naples, the latter was in a state of agitation that
bade fair to destroy it. The Russian pilots were consulted,
but could not tell how to avoid the breakers that seemed so
near and threatening. The movements of the foreign armies

345

346 MEMOIRS OF THE

were so slow that there was no immediate necessity for Buona-
parte to employ the troops quartered in the kingdom, nor to
transfer them to some other point. The number of the
German Emperor's troops in Italy was increasing, but only
gradually; and the reputation and proceedings of the cabinet
of Vienna still seemed to give Buonaparte the impression that
he would be unwise to break definitely with Austria. In
Naples, therefore, it was still feared that all these preparations
might end in nothing more than the defensive measures that
had been officially announced.

The Marchese Circello,2 formerly Neapolitan Minister in
London, had been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.
He is one of the least capable and most narrow-minded men
that ever lived, but his absolute loyalty — a valuable quality
that is very rare in Naples — was the reason for his being
chosen for the post. Buonaparte objected, and put a finishing-
touch to his despotism by declaring that he would regard all
friendly relations as broken off, would recall his ambassador,
and march on Naples, unless the Neapolitan Court appointed
a minister known to favour the French,3 and chose, as the
commander-in-chief of the army, a French general 4 belonging
to the French army and sent by the Emperor himself. Further
conditions were the removal of the English ship that had been
lying off Naples for the past two years, and the closure of the
ports to all vessels of that nationality.

Alquier, for his part, had at last discovered that the
Russian generals had not come to Naples for a holiday. He
had written an official note, to ask what the King intended
to do, if the foreign troops should descend upon his dominions,
and how he meant to behave during the coming crisis. Alquier
begged for a definite and immediate answer. At the same
time he repeatedly urged General Saint-Cyr to take upon
himself to infringe the line of demarcation ; but Saint-Cyr
had received no orders, and declared that Alquier had no
authority over him. The postponement of hostilities was
perhaps entirely due to the pretensions and conceit of these
two men. It was fortunate, perhaps, that these final vexations
took place during the short time that the Queen was absent,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 347

for in the confidence inspired by the activity and resolution
of the Powers, which were then quite firm, she would have
lost her self-control. But one of Elliot's secret intrigues had
roused the wrath of the King, who took the control of affairs
out of the Queen's hands ; upon which her Majesty went to
Castellamare for the sake of her health. The King's ill-temper
only lasted for six weeks, and the Queen on her return to
Naples was as influential as ever. The couriers from Vienna
and Russia assured her that the two emperors were perfectly
in accord, and that the cabinet in Vienna, on being urged
by Buonaparte to disarm and enter into an arrangement with
him, had answered by increasing the energy of their prepara-
tions, sending troops openly into Italy, Tyrol, and the
direction of the Inn, and publicly appointing the generals
of their different armies. The Queen, therefore, decided to
make a provisional and secret treaty with M. Tatistchef, which
was signed early in September.5

She wrote to me saying that, while she felt it was of the
greatest importance that the French Ambassador should
remain in ignorance of this treaty, she also thought it essential
to make everything ready for the opening of hostilities. The
operations would certainly begin suddenly, and might perhaps
continue for a long time. She informed me that the Russian
generals were demanding my return, but in the meantime she
wished me to send her a list of all the preparations she could
make without imprudence.

The need for secrecy made it impracticable to augment the
army by fresh levies : it was only possible to take the risks
of a few minor preparations. I wrote out a list for her,
and added all the means that should be employed to save
time.

At last, on the 26th September, a Russian frigate cast
anchor in the roadstead of Messina, and brought me a letter
from M. Tatistchef. The ship, he said, carried no instruc-
tions, and was entirely at my disposal. At the same time I
received an order from the King and Queen to proceed instantly
to Castellamare, where I should be met on landing, and shown
the house that was being made ready for me.

348 MEMOIRS OF THE

Their Majesties enjoined upon me to keep my departure
from Messina a secret from every one but the governor ; 6 to
leave my servants there and keep possession of my house; to
pretend I was merely going to see some of the sights of Sicily ;
and in short to take every precaution lest the French Consul
at Messina, or any of my friends, should find out that I was
leaving the island.

I carried out these instructions in every detail, and after
giving out that I was going to Catania and Syracuse, I hired
a speronare to take me thither by sea. The very evening of
the frigate's arrival I set sail in this boat of the country,
which had been paid and engaged for the little voyage I
professed to be making. But when I had sailed for a certain
distance in the wrong direction I ordered the helm to be put
over, and steered for the frigate. The boatmen received
orders to stay away from Messina for a fortnight : the secret
had been confided to the boat's owner, and he did not betray
it. In thirty hours' time I was in the Bay of Naples. The
frigate had spent so short a time in going and returning that
the King and Queen, who saw her sail in, were both positive
that she could not be the same ship. I tacked close under
the walls of Portici, hoping to be recognised ; and I cast anchor
off Castellamare in the evening. On landing with a Russian
officer I found no instructions, because I was not expected
until two or three days later ; and it was not till I had
despatched an express-messenger to Portici that some one
came to fetch me. I was taken to Portici itself, to a casino 7
that was sufficiently secluded to keep me more or less concealed,
and yet within reach of public affairs and conferences. I also
had a casino near the palace, for use in the evenings only.
It was there that I saw the people whom the Queen sent to
talk to me : the Russian generals, the Russian Minister, and
the King's ministers ; and, to enable me to give the necessary
orders, I had arranged with the Queen that she should tell
the Minister of War (the only member of the council who did
not know of my arrival), and the inspectors of the different
corps of the army, that every day a certain couple of officers
would take them her orders, which they were to carry out.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 349

In this way I controlled all the affairs of the army in the
Queen's name. My captivity lasted for six weeks, and I made
such good use of the time that when I recovered my liberty
all the preparations were well advanced, and in a condition
to be quickly completed.

The moment I arrived the Queen sent me the treaty that
had been drawn up and signed by the Marquis Circello and
the Russian Minister, and asked me to give her my opinion
of it in writing. I was amazed when I saw how absurdly it
had been framed, to the detriment of all the King's interests.
It was inconceivable that a man so devoted to his master as
the Marquis Circello — a man who had been concerned in public
affairs for thirty-five years — should have signed such a treaty.
Every line of it tied the King's hands and pledged him to
definite engagements, for which there was no compensation but
a purely optional reciprocity. It is always a dangerous thing
to throw oneself into the arms of an ally, and trust entirely
to his honour ; but there are compensating advantages, and, if
necessary, remedies, when the contracting Powers are at the
ordinary distance of one country from another. When, how-
ever, they are a thousand leagues apart, each of them is in
the hands, not of another Power, but of its minister and
generals, and is at the mercy of their good feeling. If they
should happen to have none it is impossible to obtain redress
under five months, and when the answer comes it is no longer
appropriate. In dealing with Russia, therefore, it was more
necessary than in the case of any other Power to weigh the
advantages on both sides, and the chances and dangers
involved in a treaty. A school-boy, or a twenty-year-old clerk
might have blushed to produce a treaty so overflowing with
blunders as this. I demolished it, article by article, and
begged the Queen to let me talk it over with her. She
admitted me to the palace one evening by a secret entrance,
and I proved to her by word of mouth, as clearly as I had
already demonstrated in writing, that advantage had been
taken of poor Circello 's piety and innocence, and that all her
interests had been sacrificed to arrange for a diversion that
should serve those of Russia. The latter had ensured having

350 MEMOIRS OF THE

an auxiliary corps, entirely free of expense, on her enemy's
flank, while all the essential means of permanently protecting
the weakness of the kingdom of Naples had been entirely
neglected. This treaty had been framed by very astute men ;
and misunderstood and signed by an idiot. It had won the
approval of the Queen because she was blinded by anger,
and weary of a state of dependence from which any change,
whatever it might be, seemed a consolation and a relief.8

The Queen agreed with all I said, but bade me hide this
melancholy fact from the Russians and from her own ministers,
since, the mischief being already done, she had no resource
save an appeal to the Emperor Alexander's honour. I must
forget the details I had been pointing out to her, she said,
and concentrate my attention entirely on making everything
go smoothly. I left her with an aching heart, but submitted
to her decree ; and on the following day the Russian generals
came to my house to discuss the preparations for hostilities.
Not all the cordiality and protestations usual between generals
who are about to take the field together could disguise from
me that the style of the treaty had already taken effect : they
were disposed to give orders rather than to discuss matters.
But I felt that this inclination must be nipped in the bud, and
curtly told them so.

General Lascy, who was still ill — weak in body and mind —
rarely attended our conferences ; and everything was arranged
through General Opperman, who was to be quartermaster-
general.

After we had had two interviews General Lascy sent me a
list of questions, which he begged me to answer in writing.
I will only give the most important.

" How long could I undertake to defend the kingdom, if
it were attacked before the landing of the allies? "

"At what points should the troops be disembarked to be
most efficacious? "

"How quickly could the government engage to supply
about three thousand horses, which the allies would require for
their artillery and baggage-wagons? "

" How many troops could the King furnish on the first

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 351

requisition of the commander-in-chief, to serve either within
or without the kingdom? "

I answered the first three questions, but had many objec-
tions to make to the fourth. I reminded the generals of their
own words when they so truly said that the King ought to
take advantage of the circumstances — the independence that
the support of his allies would give him — to increase and
reorganise his army, and make it capable of protecting the
kingdom, without assistance, from all future aggression. I
recalled the good intentions they had shown when they pro-
mised to protect the frontiers, in order to facilitate the fresh
levy of troops that the King proposed to make before becom-
ing an active member of the coalition.9 He was not in a
position, I pointed out, to play any useful part until he had
sufficient forces to garrison the fortified towns and the capital,
and to furnish in addition a flying column, which should be
at the disposal of the Emperor of Russia.

Until this could be done it was entirely contrary to reason
that the King should be dragged into the hazards of a war
by the descent of the allies. He could acquiesce in their
actions and even help them, without openly and actively
declaring himself ; and, if the intentions of the Russian Minister
and generals had been honest, they would surely have seen
that their conduct was irregular and self-seeking, and yet
would not forward their cause. The role filled by the King
was entirely to their advantage. They made use of his
resources, they compromised him, they made his ruin certain,
before it ever occurred to them to give him any relief, or to
compensate him for his losses.

If it were really true that the Russian army-corps was to
number 25,000 men and that of the English 7000, as had
been verbally promised by the ministers and generals — though
the Marquis Circello had never thought of including their
promise in the treaty — what advantage would they gain from
a premature demonstration on the King's part, when he could
only furnish 8000 men? But what an immense amount of
good they could do him, on the other hand, by granting him
time to form an army that would suffice to ensure his per-

352 MEMOIRS OF THE

manent safety, and enable him, when once it was formed, to
give his enthusiastic support to the cause of which he was the
most zealous and interested partisan ! The first coalitions
formed against France were lessons in prudence ; and more-
over, it was surely necessary to leave a certain number of
troops to keep order in the capital and the rest of the king-
dom? The King only had between eight and ten thousand
men. It was hardly likely, then, that when bhe necessary
number had been deducted for the capital and other towns,
there would be a sufficient surplus left to be of any use to the
allies, in the case of their carrying hostilities into the north
of Italy.

Another point worthy of consideration (supposing the
allies were really honest in their intentions) was that, if the
Powers were not successful, the fact that they had not involved
the Court of Naples in the struggle from the first might give
the impression that that Court had been coerced. The French
Ambassador, in that case, need not have gone away ; and this
would have been some equivalent for the circumstance that
it was always open to the allies to take to their ships again,
and leave Naples in its original plight. Supposing the King
of Naples had openly declared himself, on the other hand,
and the allies were defeated, they could not leave the kingdom
without handing it over to its enemies unreservedly and
irremediably.

To these observations, which were unfortunately only too
true, the Russian generals merely answered by pointing to the
absurd treaty signed by Circello.10 They would not have
used it as a weapon if the King's fate had been a matter of
the least concern to them, but it formed a useful tool for their
indifference. Preparations had to be made, therefore, for
mobilising the troops, which could not now be used as the
nucleus of a larger army. This circumstance destroyed, or
at least postponed, our hopes of securing a sufficient force to
make the kingdom independent of foreign aid.

This was not the only instance of the Russian generals'
barbarous exaction. Not content with a plan of operations
that enabled them to make an important diversion in the south

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 858

of Italy, nor moderate enough in their demands to consider
themselves well paid by England — which was pledged by
treaty to supply the pay of the Russian corps as soon as it
left Corfu — they made the King responsible for all the expenses
connected with their troops. High pay for the private soldiers,
fixed gratuities for the officers, cost of provisions, forage,
ammunition, transport, and horses for the artillery, cavalry,
and baggage-wagons — all was to be supplied by the King.
This was even to be the case, in certain conditions, outside
his own dominions, if the allied armies should go beyond them.

Every minute of the day I bemoaned the incalculable
grievances that were entailed by that rash treaty. The yoke
was changed, but not the situation. I made a last attempt to
persuade M. Tatistchef to alleviate it.

I obtained leave from the Queen to beg him to issue a mani-
festo at the time of the troops' disembarkation ; and I com-
posed a suitable model, which I gave to the Queen. In it
the Emperor Alexander reminded the King of the friendly
relations that existed between the two Courts, and of the
treaties and pledges that had maintained their alliance unin-
terruptedly. He declared that the presence of the French in
the kingdom gave him the right to attack them if they should
persist in remaining, while their admission to the King's
dominions gave him the right to claim the same favour : that
on both grounds he was sure of the King's consent to the
step he was taking ; but that, if he were mistaken in this, he
would be forced to secure that consent by force of arms.
Such, more or less, was the substance of my manifesto. And
as the French had deliberately crippled the King's army, and
had never allowed a single man to be recruited nor a gap in
the ranks to be filled, the French Ambassador could not exact
measures of resistance that he had himself made impossible.

The Russian minister absolutely refused to let it appear that
Naples was being coerced. He answered uncompromisingly
that if any attempt, of whatever kind, were made to keep the
treaty a secret, he would publish it in print.

Only two possibilities, therefore, remained : the allies must
persevere and the coalition in the North be successful, or the
A A

354 MEMOIRS OF THE

kingdom must be totally ruined. In this game of war the
Powers were risking, at worst, a portion of their territory, but
the King of Naples was staking his crown ; and this unpardon-
able disproportion was entirely due to the imbecility of one
of his own ministers, and the dishonourable character of the
two generals and the Russian Minister.

Since this step was irrevocably taken, the only thing left
to work for was that the two army-corps should be as strong
as possible, with a view to creating a more effectual diversion
in Italy, or at least defending the kingdom in the case of
reverses. But two disastrous pieces of news reached us within
the space of a few days. The first was that the two army-
corps, the Russian and the English, only comprised 15,000
men, and had been reinforced by a corps of 2000 Albanian
peasants, an uncontrollable horde of robbers who devastate
any country they may occupy : the second w7as the news of
Mack's defeat, and of the capture of Ulm with all its attendant
circumstances.

And yet, if ever Providence deigned to hold out a helping
hand to a sovereign on the point of ruin, it was at this
moment. A courier from the Marchese del Gallo arrived
from Paris, bringing a treaty of neutrality X1 to be signed
instantly. If it were accepted all the French troops would
leave the kingdom, and the King would be neutral, and free;
if it were rejected the French Ambassador would leave the
kingdom and General Saint-Cyr would open hostilities. The
moment the matter reached the ears of the Russian Minister
he hastened to declare that he would consent to no change
of plans : he would hold by the treaty without any modification
whatever.

The cruel state of perplexity into which the government
was thrown by this circumstance can easily be imagined. The
Russians had postponed their embarkation from Corfu so often,
in order to await the reinforcements (which never came), that
no one knew whether they had actually set out or not. It was
therefore impossible that they should arrive in time to prevent
the devastation of the kingdom, which was quite inevitable,
even on the supposition that Buonaparte had proposed the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 355

treaty of neutrality simply because he was forced to employ
his troops elsewhere at once. They had five provinces at their
mercy. These they could pillage and plunder on the march,
without any obstacle being put in their way ; and after Mack's
defeat and the loss of 70,000 Austrians it seemed very doubt-
ful wrhether such proceedings would be followed by reprisals.

The Queen wrote to ask my opinion as to the best course to
follow. I answered: "Do not sign: tell Alquier that your
acceptance of the proposed neutrality makes it incumbent on
you to communicate with the Powers beforehand, and that
you are despatching the couriers. By this means you will gain
time ; and you can let the Russians do what they please, for
Tatistchef will consent to no change."

The Council did not think this was a sufficient response to
Alquier 's very urgent note, and it was decided to sign the
treaty of neutrality, at the same time giving the Russian
Minister a contradictory reversal.12 The habitual bad faith
of the French was the excuse given for this dishonourable pro-
ceeding. The number of days to be allowed for the removal
of the troops was fixed on the spot ; and they began to march
out at once.

On the very day of this curious transaction Elliot asked the
Queen's permission to visit me in my retreat, and speak to me
alone. The Queen consented, and wrote to me that she wished
me to see him, which disturbed me considerably. An inter-
view with Elliot is at the best of times a dangerous thing : he
brings nothing with him — he is only concerned with taking
away as much as he can. His object is gained if he can
mislead you as to his intentions, and enlighten himself as to
yours. A conversation with him on public affairs is a kind
of fencing-match : to cross swords with him, and parry and
thrust, leaves one in a state of exhaustion, and in some uncer-
tainty as to whether one be wounded or not. "Well," he
said, as he came in, " so the Rubicon is passed ! " — " If Caesar
had had an ally like you," I answered, "he would not have
thought it such a dangerous step." — "In this case, however,"
he replied, "it is a very dangerous step indeed, and I should
never have advised it."

A A 2

356 MEMOIRS OF THE

How can one argue with a man who, after doing his best
to compromise a country while it was dependent on its own
resources alone, begins to recognise the danger when two of
the great Powers have promised it their support? I reminded
him of all he had said to me, before there was any question
of a coalition, to persuade me that we should not attempt to
conciliate Buonaparte, seeing that we were strong enough to
resist him alone. After proclaiming this silly or perfidious
doctrine during the peace, how could he reconcile his new
anxiety with it ? He wearied me with a host of futilities, but
I tried to disentangle the object of his visit. At last he began
to hold forth on the importance of perfect harmony between
the generals ; and, insisting on this truth in such a way as
to show me very quickly what was in his mind, he repeated
that the whole success of the enterprise depended on this
harmony, and that he had consented to the absurdity of an
English general being under the orders of a Russian with the
sole object of removing all possible cause of discord. He
begged that I would give a friendly reception to Sir James
Craig, the general-in-command of the English troops ; 13 and
he told me he would point out to the Queen that, as soon as
the troops had landed, everything must be decided and con-
trolled by the generals alone. I concluded without any difficulty
from these frank and honest words that he had quite decided,
if he should fail in bending us all three to his will, to set us
at sixes and sevens, in order to have a pretext, in case of
need, to remove the English troops if they were required else-
where. I knew him so well that I could not help laughing as
I listened to him, and I had the satisfaction of knowing that
he did not imagine me to be taken in. In spite of the wish
he had expressed to speak to me alone I had carefully
abstained from denying myself to other visitors : we were
fortunately interrupted, and he went off to seek more lucrative
occupation elsewhere.

The sacrifice that had been made of a certainty to an uncer-
tainty, the alarming news that continued to come in, and the
exacting ways of the Russian Minister and generals, gave the
Queen food for melancholy thought with regard to the future.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 357

As the time approached for the troops to land she was filled
with anxiety : her deliverance from the French was accom-
panied with other tribulations that might very easily become
equally unpleasant. It was too late for her to undo anything
officially, but she tried to persuade the Russian Minister to
make a change in some private fashion. Knowing one day
that M. Tatistchef was dining with me at Portici she wrote
me a letter intended for his eyes. It was so prophetic that,
in the light of subsequent events, it may interest the reader
to see the whole of it.

6th November, 1805.

I wish to speak to you with the frankness of a friend on a matter
that is occupying my mind a great deal, and fills me with a keen
sense of responsibility as a wife, a mother, and a queen with six
millions of subjects. I am assuming, as a matter of course, that we
shall be faithful to our engagements; and however onerous they may
be we shall carry them out : but allow me to make some observations
to be laid before M. Tatistchef.

Between the signing of our treaty and the present moment every-
thing has been changed and upset; I am not speaking of the French
neutrality, with regard to which I only feel remorse that I should
have been forced, with a pistol at my head, to sign it; still less am
I referring to the removal of the French army; I have no confidence
whatever in their good faith, and am certain that, as it suits their
convenience at this moment to go away, so, if it should suit them to
return, they would do so without hesitation. Moreover, as the original
pretexts of Malta and Corfu are still existing, it will be the same
reason that brings them back as soon as they can come. My observa-
tions, then, are not concerned with them, and I do not share the
egoistic delirium that makes the country believe itself safe because
the French are beyond the frontiers. No, what concerns me is the
terrible events of the war, of which we hear very confused accounts,
but enough to make us fear the worst. One more advantage gained
by Buonaparte will take him to the gates, and into the city, of Vienna :
a truce, a congress, a conference, the suspension of hostilities, and a
disadvantageous peace will be the results. If the conqueror at this
moment, in his resentment at our broken treaty of neutrality, should
add this fresh grievance to all that he already has against me, and
declare that in view of our treachery and bad faith he will not admit
us to the armistice and peace, the Emperor of Austria, who has
exhausted all his resources, will certainly not continue the war to save
us, and the whole French force will fall upon us and crush us.

There is a second supposition to be considered. The Austrian army
on the Rhine having dissolved and melted away so unaccountably, it
will probably be necessary for the Archduke Charles, with a portion
of the army in Italy, to withdraw into Germany, lest he too should
be cut off. Since Augcreau has already crossed the Rhine and is on
his way through Switzerland, on this second supposition Italy will be
left entirely unprotected, and we shall have to bear the whole brunt

358 MEMOIRS OF THE

of the shock. I have the highest opinion of the Russian troops and
the greatest confidence in them, but their numbers are far less than
was always believed and stated to be the case. The difficulties, at so
terrible a distance, of recruiting, and renewing, and replacing the men
who are lost, is a matter for consideration. As for our own military
resources, at this moment they are almost nil, and the greatest energy
and most assiduous care will be required to restore them, for which
I count entirely on your courage, intelligence, and activity, as you
can count on all the assistance I can give : but all this will need
time and labour, and for our part we will work wonders to push
matters on.

There is yet another consideration to which I would call attention.
It has become generally known that the Russian squadron has arrived
in Sicily, and a good deal of alarm has been aroused, especially by
the request that the Albanian legion should be landed. Their insub-
ordination is feared ; and the widely spread news that there is sickness
among the troops has scared the whole country. Put all these con-
siderations together, and you will see how disadvantageous the cir-
cumstances are for the Russians themselves, who at another time and
in other conditions would be welcomed as deliverers; whereas at this
moment they would be regarded as disturbers of the public peace.
But, I repeat, we shall be faithful to our engagements and fulfil them
all; but it will be well to consider and weigh the matter thoroughly,
and then decide whether a small body of troops would be able to save
Naples from invasion by the French. And we must not delude our-
selves : the hatred with which Buonaparte honours me, and has often
loudly proclaimed, is such that, if he should again take possession of
this fine kingdom, he will at once choose a king for it from among
his own relations or his Spanish allies. By this means he will attach
the whole nation to the new government, and will transform this rich
kingdom with all its resources into a tributary province of France, to
which country its ports, commerce, oil, corn, building-timber, and
other products will be most useful.

Such are the dangers; but what is the remedy? I have limited
myself to a very slight sketch of the ills we should most probably have
to endure; and I repeat for the third time that we shall stand by our
engagements and fulfil them. But the Emperor of Russia, our friend
and ally, wished us well and could not foresee the reverses and
appalling events that have actually taken place. The terrible distance
that lies between us has prevented the prompt communication that is
so necessary; but listen to my ideas. The Russian convoy might
return to Corfu and the English one to Malta, to await events that
perhaps, even as I write, may have already occurred; and might go
later on, when the situation is less obscure, to the point where they
can be most useful, either to help the archduke near at hand, or to
Puglia, or Ancona, or even Naples. If this either cannot or will not
be done, or if this suggestion be thought to betray feelings that are
discreditable to us, and not our real ones — our only true motive being
the desire to do what is best — then the troops must land, unless there
should be some contagious disease on board the ships, in which case
it would be our sacred and unavoidable duty to place the lives and
the health of our beloved subjects before everything else, even before
our own lives. The disembarkation will take place, then, and the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 859

manifestoes must be carefully drawn up, lest they should contain
anything to humiliate or wound the king, friend, and ally whom the
troops are professedly coming to aid.

I think that General Lascy and all these other gentlemen, although
they are masters of the situation, should undertake nothing, absolutely
nothing, without consulting the King, or those whom the King shall
appoint : nothing should be considered or arranged without our
approval and consent, for these are auxiliary troops granted in accord-
ance with our request, by a sovereign who is our friend and ally.

The Albanian legion, I think, will be paid by us as was arranged,
but considering the state of insubordination in which they already are,
they are a gift of doubtful value.

Such, in few words, are my thoughts on the subject : the decision
will not rest with me, but with the allies. I am and shall always
remain equally their friend, ready to fulfil our engagements, even if
my observations should carry no weight with them. A vessel can be
sent to them in forty-eight hours, to take them back to Corfu and
Malta for a time, to await more certain news of the events of which
we have such confused accounts, but which give us reason to fear the
worst.

If the troops should come later on I shall expect sincerity, con-
fidence, and perfect and entire agreement in every step that is taken :
in everything we must be consulted beforehand, and asked for our
opinion and consent, and, in short, treated like allied sovereigns who
are bearing the weight of the enterprise. I know your sentiments
and your devotion : you will explain it all. This letter is scribbled in
the enthusiasm of honesty and truth, etc., etc.

I read this wise and prophetic letter to M. Tatistchef, and
was convinced, as I did so, that the responsibility he was
taking upon himself in risking the safety of the kingdom so
lightly had already been forcibly put before him by various
well-disposed persons of devoted loyalty. He had heard com-
plaints that touched his conscience, and had some suggestions
of an accommodating nature ready in his pocket. He pro-
duced a memorandum for me to read. He offered to change
the destination of the troops and guard the kingdom without
occupying it, and at the same time to make no alteration in
the King's claims to the protection of his master and the allied
Powers, on these conditions —

"That he should immediately be paid the sum of five
hundred thousand Neapolitan ducats ; 14 that the government
of Naples should further engage to pay for the same number
of horses — to be supplied at a given spot — as had already
been furnished in the interior of the kingdom, but at the price
of a hundred and twenty ducats apiece ; and that to these

360 MEMOIRS OF THE

sums a monthly subsidy should be added " (the amount of
which I do not now remember).

So a Power as great as Russia, the ally of the Court of
Naples — a Power that was already paid by England in accord-
ance with a special article of the treaty relating to these
operations — was offering to save the kingdom at a price beyond
its means !

I made this observation to M. Tatistchef, but he refused
to modify his demands in the least. He declared he had
already made them as moderate as possible, and that he would
not alter them by one iota. I sent his memorandum to the
Queen, who wrote to me the next morning that it was her
private opinion that the suggestions could not be entertained,
but that we must find out where the Russians intended to land,
since this new memorandum promised that they should guard
the kingdom. M. Tatistchef, who had apparently feared he
had shown too much clemency, answered that the Russian
army-corps would disembark at Venice. The Queen, in her
letter to me, added that she was about to assemble the Council,
to whom she would not mention her own view, but would
request that every member should write down and sign his
opinion ; and she would then send their decision to the King.

The Council met that same morning (7th Nov. 1805)
for this important discussion.15 I knew the character of all
the members,16 and their way of thinking, and I can safely
assert that there was not one of them who would not willingly
have starved himself and gone unclothed to contribute to the
subsidy that would stave off the scourge of war. I did not
doubt that two hours would suffice for the discussion, nor that
M. Tatistchef 's memorandum would be accepted as it stood.
I was already resigning myself to an indefinite prolongation
of my exile and was making plans in my own mind, without
dreaming for a moment that there could be any issue but one,
when I received a line from the Queen, telling me that the
Council had voted unanimously against the memorandum, and
had signed their decision, which had been laid before the
King for confirmation.

The Council argued " that so large a sum could not be given

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 361

secretly; that the French Ambassador must therefore know
of the transaction ; and that the granting of this subsidy to
the enemies of France would be as compromising as the pre-
sence of the army-corps, while lacking in the advantages that
its bayonets would give. If the Russians were in Venice,
moreover, they would be no protection to the kingdom, and
comparing one expense with the other their immediate services
appeared preferable."

This decision proves that it never entered any one's head
that the allied troops would break all their pledges and delive
the kingdom into the hands of the enemy. But I shall deal
more fully with this subject later on. What is certain is
this : the opinion that the Council expressed so reasonably was
not the opinion of a single one of its individual members.

If, in a Council composed of the most distinguished men
in the kingdom, there was not a member who dared to make
a stand against the admission of the troops, since they all well
knew that the Queen would never forgive them, was it possible
for me to dash into the lists and offend the Queen's prejudices
with an opinion that I could only give in writing (being then
concealed in my casino at Portici), in order to point out the
danger of receiving the allies ? I was born in France ; and
the Queen, when carried away by mistrust and passion, would
not have failed to make me suffer for it. I should never have
been able to justify myself, for the events that were to come
were still unrevealed ; and if she had lost her kingdom in any
other way she would always have believed that the allies would
have saved it for her. They would not have been backward
in telling her so, and reproaching her for the decision that
kept them away. There was but one man in the Council who
could have dared to remind her of the situation of the Austrian
army, of the probability that it would not recover from its
losses at Ulm, and of the likelihood that the change in the
circumstances would also change the influence and good inten-
tions of the Russians, and would therefore put an end to the
coalition and the war, which would mean the ruin of the
kingdom of Naples. If this protest had been made an appeal
might have been sent to the Emperor of Russia, who would

362 MEMOIRS OF THE

certainly have withdrawn the demand for money put forward
by M. Tatistchef.

The Queen's preternatural repulsion against every arrange-
ment that tended to restore ordinary relations between herself
and Buonaparte must have affected her manner unconsciously
when she put the question before the Council ; and the magic
of her influence had a compelling effect upon characters that
are naturally pliable, not to say servile. When they left the
council-room the members seemed hardly to realise what they
had done, and appeared half petrified.

The Queen is a most remarkable woman, and there never
was one more completely dominated by her emotions : pride,
and rectitude, and goodness of heart are the foundation of them
all, but her personal feelings invariably influence her decisions.
She would be in despair if she thought the opinion professed
by the Council had been dictated by herself, but she was quite
misled if she thought otherwise. Her lips asked the question
and her face gave the answer : any one who knows her is as
sure of this as I am myself. Is this inconsistent with the
letter I have quoted above? Never mind — if you know her
you will agree with me.

The King ratified the decision, and on the 19th November
the convoy was signalled. Her Majesty had entrusted to me
all the details connected with the disembarkation. Three or
four days were required for the various arrangements, and it
was thought that Alquier's annoyance at my reappearance
would be quite forgotten in the explosion caused by the trans-
ports' arrival. I was accordingly authorised to emerge from
my retreat, as though I had just arrived from Messina, on
the day that the convoy was expected to leave the shores of
Sicily and cast anchor in the Bay of Naples. Although the
treaty of neutrality excluded me from all employment, it did
not forbid me to live in Naples : and indeed it was indirectly
assumed that I should do so, though I was not actually named
on this occasion. Armed with all these rights I repaired to
Naples and established myself in my former house ; and wish-
ing to observe all the usual courtesies I left cards at the doors
of the whole diplomatic corps, not forgetting Alquier. He

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 363

was furious. He declared I had intended to snap my fingers
at him ; and he was only diverted from his rage when he
looked through his telescope and saw a fleet carrying eighteen
thousand men, who could have snapped their fingers more
effectually than I, had they been better managed. He spent
the whole morning disputing the evidence of his eyes. The
convoy sailed in before a gentle breeze in perfectly correct
order, passing Capri by the wide entrance ; and cast anchor
at about five o'clock in the afternoon.17

Alquier did not explode until the next day. He then
removed the escutcheon from his door and wrote to the
minister that, since a convoy hostile to France had been
allowed to anchor in the roadstead, he must ask for passports
for himself and his whole legation. He was remonstrated
with as a matter of form, and regret was expressed for his
departure. None the less he persisted in going ; and demanded
an escort as far as the frontier.18 All his requests were
granted, and he left Naples on the 21st November.

XVIII

The Anglo-Russian occupation — Lascy, who has the chief command,
promptly sends the Neapolitan army, commanded by Damas, into
the Abruzzi — The allied generals hold an acrimonious conference
before Damas goes— Lascy and Opperman make a tour on the fron-
tier— The news of Austerlitz decides the English and Russians to
abandon the kingdom — Letters from the Queen and Lascy — Vain
attempts to keep the Russians and to stave off the French invasion.

THE French yoke, then, was altogether shattered. We will
now consider that of our so-called protectors and allies. A
yoke of the latter kind is the more painful of the two, for it
weighs upon the heart; it affects every sentiment and every
principle ; it destroys the consoling thought of the strong
protecting the weak, and deprives one of the pleasure of being
grateful to one's defenders.

Never were the headquarters of a general established in a
hostile country with so many exactions as were practised by
the allied generals in Naples. Generals Lascy and Opperman
rented an inn for their own use, and made the King pay all
their expenses. Facing this inn is the Hereditary Prince's
casino, which he and the princess * constantly visit. The
generals demanded it, for use as a chancellerie, and when it
was refused to them were as much offended as if their troops
had been denied barracks.

From this insignificant example of their demands in matters
that were quite outside their rights, it will be easy to judge
of their insulting methods of exacting their due. I had gladly-
undertaken to supply all their wants; my enthusiasm for the
Russians was well known ; and they themselves had wished that
their affairs might be placed in my hands; but I soon found
that I had neither the time to attend to their importunities,
nor the foresight to be prepared for all the devices that came
into their heads for increasing the expenses of the government.

364

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 365

The English general was infinitely more moderate, and made
a point of paying for everything that was supplied to his
troops, in order to emphasise the sordid avarice of the Russian
general. One day, when dining with Elliot, the Englishman
said in a loud voice that " if he had known, he would not
have let himself be associated with mere merchants, who were
not satisfied with being paid by his government, but insisted
on Naples paying them as well." The Cross of St. George
that I wore, my unvarying attachment to Russia, my belief
that I could really be useful to the Russians, and my hope
that the future independence of the kingdom might be won
by them, made me do my best to keep the public unaware of
their indiscretion, and of their surprising indifference to all
the expense they were bringing upon the King. It was most
important for the success of the operations that the Russians
should be regarded as saviours, rather than oppressors, of the
kingdom, since they had been careful to publish that they
came at the King's request. The most effectual way of reliev-
ing all departments of the government was to mobilise the
Russian troops as quickly as possible, and send them off to their
cantonments on the frontiers. In order to complete the grant
of horses that was due to them a requisition was made in the
town of Naples itself, with the result that their artillery was
supplied with the carriage-horses of private persons of every
rank. In short, by hook and by crook, by dint of unceasing
complaints on their part and unceasing outlay on the part of
the King, they were made ready to leave their cantonments
near the capital at the beginning of December.

The King reviewed the Russians, regiment by regiment, and
the English in a single corps. Of the former there were about
nine thousand under arms, without including the tAvo thousand
Albanians, who were a band of savages and a scourge to any
army. Of the English there were six thousand.

The Russian generals declared that in less than a week they
would be reinforced by twelve thousand men, including a regi-
ment of dragoons and one of Cossacks; but, whether they
deceived the government or were themselves deceived, this
much-desired reinforcement never came, and from first to

366 MEMOIRS OF THE

last the number of troops was less than the circumstances
demanded.

As soon as the French left the kingdom I had prevailed
upon the King to send 3500 men to occupy the most important
positions in the Abruzzi, and Generals Lascy and Opperman
were both of opinion that this number — taken from the
Neapolitan army — was sufficient. They had agreed to leave
the rest in the garrisons, in order that after the levies were
completed — they were already announced and begun 2 — the
army-corps might at once be fit for active service, since no
delay for forming the cadres would be necessary. I had pro-
mised in the King's name that this army-corps should be ready
to take the field by the 1st March. It was to comprise between
fifteen and eighteen thousand men, over and above the number
necessary for garrisoning the castles, the fortresses, and the
capital. T?rom the 19th November to the 5th December I had
been entirely absorbed by the affairs of the Russians and
English, while all the time the conscripts for the King's army
were coming in. I was intending to devote myself to their
training and formation into corps as soon as the Russians
should have gone away to the positions assigned to them.3

I had received General Lascy 's written consent to this
arrangement 4 on the very day that he received the Dispaccio
reale appointing him to the chief command of the allied armies.
It was on this 4th December,5 therefore, that the King
definitely proclaimed himself an active member of the coalition,
and that his army, of which I was commander-in-chief, was
placed under the orders of General Lascy. The government
had postponed Lascy's appointment as long as possible, and
had shown great wisdom in doing so ; but Tatistchef , Elliot,
and he had been daily writing official notes to complain of the
delay, and their persistent importunity had at last won the
day.

Two days later, on the 6th December, I received orders
from General Lascy to take the Neapolitan army to the
Abruzzi, and occupy the right side of that province, from
Popoli, at the centre of the line, to the shores of the Adriatic.

The moment, therefore, that General Lascy was appointed

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 367

commander-in-chief of the allied forces he took advantage of
the fact to send the King's troops to the farthest extremity of
the kingdom — the point where they could least easily be aug-
mented. All the arrangements made by the King with a view
to winning his confidence were upset in a way most prejudicial
to His Majesty's interests: all the plans for organising and
employing the conscripts were made useless by the absence of
the regiments in which they were to have been enrolled. The
cantonments on the frontier nearest to the capital were reserved
for Lascy's own troops and those of the English ; and Lascy
established his headquarters and those of the English general
at a spot five leagues from Naples.

This behaviour was too extraordinary to lack a motive. To
divine that motive fully was no easy matter : but when this
measure was combined with keeping all the transports in the
bay there appeared to be sufficient reason for alarm.

On receiving M. Lascy's order I went instantly to Portici
with the news. The Council was assembled; and I read the
order aloud. The Queen and all the other members of the
Council were dumfounded by this unexpected change, but
were one and all agreed that it should be carried out without
remonstrance, in order that the Russian generals should have
no pretext for complaint or blame.

I therefore said in answer to General Lascy's order that
on the 8th December, two days later, the first column would
march.

Before we parted I invited Generals Lascy, Opperman,
Anrep,6 and the English general, Craig, to meet at my house
and discuss our future actions. The result was a great deal
of acrimony on both sides — a miniature version of all the
coalitions of the world, with one of the parties downtrodden,
one of them dominant, and the general good sacrificed to
individual interests. Sir James Craig said to me among other
things : " The King ought to be very thankful to me, mon-
sieur, for coming here, and I shall expect him to show his
gratitude by giving me everything I think necessary." — "I
have no doubt," I answered, "that the King will feel himself
to be under an obligation to your government ; but you, mon-

868 MEMOIRS OF THE

sieur, are not the government. As a general you carry out
the orders you receive, and if you demand more than any
body of troops can require to make it efficient, and more than
the King can give (and in this matter I am something of a
judge, having seen as much active service, I imagine, as most
men), it devolves upon me, monsieur, to point out the fact."
He assured me that the English troops were on a different
footing from any others, and mentioned such ridiculous and
unsoldierly requirements that I gave up all hope of imbuing
him with the common sense he had always lacked. The whole
conference was carried on in this style. Opperman's bearing
and opinions gave promise of all that he has since done. We
continued our discussion in a state of mutual dissatisfaction,
and felt some embarrassment in having met to no useful end.
I saw that the introduction of dinner between our discussion
and our decisions was quite indispensable. I gave orders
accordingly, and kept the gentlemen at the table as long as
I possibly could. I afterwards began another argument with
Opperman on the course to be followed if the French were
to attack the kingdom on the shores of the Adriatic, a side
that he insisted on leaving in my care alone. I made him
see that, in these circumstances, if I were to fight them I
could not at the same time hem them in by the sea with my
right wing, and keep my line close to the centre of the Russian
line of battle; but I only referred to this kind of manoeuvre
because he absolutely refused to strengthen this district writh
a few Russian regiments, for which I had asked him. And
yet, not only every principle of strategy, but the very nature
of the country should have prompted him to give them to
me. If I could have made him see the advantages of doing
so, my position would have been impregnable, owing to the
configuration of the ground ; but I must not enlarge upon the
undeviating principle that underlay the Russian generals'
refusal. Nothing could shake their resolution to remain
between the Apennines and the Mediterranean, and as near
as possible to Naples, in order that they might be able to
embark without delay, if any pretext or subterfuge should
warrant their doing so.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 369

I left Naples on the llth December to cross the Apennines
in snow that was four feet deep, and parted from the pre-
cautionary allies on this side of the bleak passes that lead to
the Abruzzi. Only one Russian regiment and the Albanian
Legion were sent to Sulmona, at the extreme left of my
position, and placed under my orders. I set up my head-
quarters at Chieti, at a distance of seven Italian miles from
the fortress of Pescara-on-Sea, and at the foot of the
Apennines.

Every one knows the loss and labour and fatigue that are
involved when troops open a campaign with a march in winter,
upon a road that presents constant difficulties to the artillery
and baggage-wagons. Neither Tyrol nor Switzerland con-
tains passes more dangerous than are those of the Abruzzi
when snow is on the ground. It is one thing to surmount
endless difficulties of this kind in the course of a campaign,
and quite another to begin with them ; and the very fact that
the Neapolitans are so little used to war makes it the more
desirable that they should be gradually accustomed to the
sufferings that an army often has to undergo. On the fifteenth
day, however, the troops reached the cantonments that had
been assigned to them ; and I had only been at Chieti for three
days when Generals Lascy and Opperman came to inspect the
lines between their headquarters and mine.

I received them at Chieti, and on the following day took
them to Pescara. This fortress on the sea was supposed to
protect my right wing. It has always been neglected, how-
ever, in spite of its important position on the river of the
same name, because during the twenty-seven years of Acton's
ministry there was no branch of the administration that he so
completely disregarded as the fortification of the towns.

I took the generals to see the works and repairs that had
been undertaken, and the troops and means of defence; and
I gave, in their presence, all the orders that their comments
seemed to call for. I then took them back to Chieti. On
arriving there they asked if all my artillery had succeeded in
traversing the horrible roads, and had already reached its
destination. The field-artillery had arrived, but the guns of
B B

370 MEMOIRS OF THE

position and many of the wagons were still on the way.
"Send some one to meet them at once,'5 said General Lascy,
" and let everything that has not yet arrived remain where it
is. I think our line of defence is too long, and wish to shorten
it by placing your right wing in the position that is now
occupied by your left." — " What ? " I cried ; " and what about
the space that I shall leave, which includes the finest country
in the kingdom — Puglia, for instance : who will occupy that? "
— "No one. The fortress of Pescara will defend itself, and
your battalions of chasseurs on the Tronto will do their best to
defend the river and the town." — "What can the town do,"
I objected, " when the river is fordable at several points? The
fortress contains two thousand men : if the enemy should wish
to invade the country they could easily repulse the light troops
posted on the Tronto in such inadequate numbers, and, by
placing a covering force between the town and the rest of
their troops, could march unopposed on Naples itself through
the most fertile province in the kingdom, completely turning
your line of defence." — "No matter," he said; "we cannot
spread ourselves out so far." — "Well then," I went on, "let
some less important point be left undefended, but remember
the great importance of this spot, and before deciding let me
take M. Opperman on a tour of inspection along the Tronto
frontier." This suggestion was accepted: poor old Lascy
returned to his headquarters, and I set out with his factotum
Opperman to inspect the frontier.7

Quite apart from his inherent disadvantages I never had
such a dull travelling-companion in my life. For four days
we spent twelve hours daily in the saddle, but never once did
I win a sign of life from him. Every evening we reached a
little town or an abbey, and each place entertained and feted
us more lavishly than the last : but nothing roused him. He
was a bundle of dry sticks, neither more nor less, and the
sticks were covered with thorns. Unfortunately this metaphor
even applies to his riding, for every day he gave another of
my horses a sore back ; and this trifling inconvenience was not
counterbalanced by any pleasantness or interest of the smallest
kind.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 371

The province we saw could only be defended by a combined
force of masses and chasseurs, who might harass the enemy
within its borders. We had not enough troops at our disposal
to admit of defending the Tronto, but the more this was the
case the more indispensable it was to keep Pescara, and the
more important to guard the entrance to the Apennines with
a sufficient force to prevent the enemy from invading Puglia
after passing the town. This wretched man filled me with
foreboding. We parted on the fourth day : he returned to
the headquarters of his poor invalid, and I returned to my
own to await the result of their reflections — or rather of their
lack of reflection.

I was greeted on my arrival with the sad news of the Battle
of Austerlitz, and with the announcement that a French army 8
was about to attack the kingdom. Disastrous battle ! — melan-
choly and terrible result of blindness and vanity and presump-
tion— how long, I wonder, will your influence be felt? More
than one branch of European administration has its roots in
the soil of Austerlitz, and will flourish or not according to the
memories that water it.

As long as the previous reverses in Germany had only obliged
the Archduke Charles to divert a portion of his troops the
French could spare none for the invasion of the kingdom ; but
when Italy was evacuated by the archduke there was no doubt
that a considerable army of observation would approach our
frontiers, while awaiting vaster enterprises. The peace con-
cluded by the Emperor of Austria,9 of which we did not hear
until some time later, made anything possible. I received
orders from General Lascy to change my position, and take
my troops to the point then occupied by my left, as he had
already arranged ; while my Russian regiment was to be posted
on the central frontier, in the defiles of Aquila. I carried
out this movement without delay, thereby retracing my steps.
My troops, therefore, might have been spared the second half
of their exhausting march, from the effects of which they had
hardly recovered. If M. Opperman had inspected the frontiers
in some other way than on the map, he would surely not have
made the unpardonable blunder of wearing out an army-corps
B B 2

372 MEMOIRS OF THE

with marches and counter-marches : but the last march was
the most surprising of all. The following order is copied word
for word from the original.

I had sent off the troops from their cantonments, and was
waiting at Chieti to join them as soon as they had reached
their new position. At daybreak on the 25th December I was
leaving my house and was about to drive away, when I saw a
Russian courier approaching me with some letters in his hand.

Here they are :

Naples, 23rd December— 4th January, 1806.

GENERAL,

I have the honour to send Your Excellency the copy herein
enclosed of a protocol signed by an assembly of generals, who met
here yesterday.

We know for a fact that the French troops now approaching the
frontier are between thirty-five and thirty-eight thousand in number.
You are aware, General, of the strength and composition of our army-
corps, and you know that, as soon as the enemy thinks it necessary,
we must expect to see some more troops coming in from North Italy.
We cannot flatter ourselves, therefore, that there is any possibility of
our saving the kingdom, except by waiting for the time when the
great Powers will save it. Since, then, the retreat of our army-corps
is definitely decided upon, you will have the goodness, immediately
on receiving this letter, to summon all the troops under your orders
to Chieti, and thence, when the enemy shall have crossed the frontier,
to march along the coast-road. As they will be traversing very fertile
and populous provinces I suppose they will be able to 'march sufficiently
quickly to avoid encountering the enemy. You must collect, and cart,
and bring away from Puglia as much corn, flour, and forage as is
absolutely necessary for the subsistence of your corps and ours.
These transport wagons must be sent with all possible 'speed to
Gravina and Matera,10 and it is here, too, that Your Excellency will
endeavour to take up a position for the time being, until something
better can be contrived. As General Gerduc's Russian regiment is
to form part of the garrison of Gaeta he is receiving orders by the
courier of to-day to leave Sulmona at once.

I have the honour to be, etc., etc.,

LASCY.

Copy of the protocol enclosed in this letter.11

Generals Lascy, Craig, Anrep, Stuart,12 Opperman, and Campbell,13
together with Commodore Greig,14 Captain-Commandant Sotheron, and
Lieutenant-Colonel Bunbury,15 having met together on this 22nd day
of December (3rd January), 1806, to deliberate upon the very critical
situation of the Russian, English, and Neapolitan corps in the King-
dom of Naples, these naval and military officers have discussed and
considered — each in his own capacity — the following points :

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 373

The two foreign army-corps were summoned when General Saint-Cyr
was still in the Kingdom of Naples, but the chances of the sea
prevented them from arriving until after the French troops had left
the country.16

Shortly after the disembarkation of the Russian and English troops
the news arrived of the successive disasters in Germany, and of the
retreat, to the frontier of Hungary, of the entire army commanded by
the Archduke Charles.

Thenceforward the general-officers of the Russo-English army-corps
could not fail to see, to their great regret, that their object in coming
into the Kingdom of Naples — namely to make a diversion 17 in favour
of the operations in North Italy — could no longer be fulfilled, and
that the French, profiting by the time of repose necessary to the
Austrian troops in their winter quarters, could easily send a consider-
able force into the Kingdom of Naples; and the said general-officers,
seeing that the situation of their respective corps must shortly become
very critical, made a point of securing more detailed information with
regard to the frontiers of the Kingdom of Naples, especially on the
side of the Abruzzi, and a tour of inspection in that country showed
them that the province in question is much more open than it appears
to be in the maps.

Hardly was this tour over when the news arrived that between
thirty-five and thirty-eight thousand French troops were marching
rapidly on the Kingdom of Naples. At the same time we knew that
the English corps still lacked nearly six hundred horses to make it
effective, and the Russian corps more than three hundred; 18 that the
depots had not yet been formed by the Neapolitan government; and
that not a single district except Calabria contained any really advan-
tageous positions for a force that was weak in cavalry.

The opinion of the majority was in favour of retiring into that
province, taking the Russo-English corps, with two Neapolitan cavalry
regiments, to Reggio by the high-road from Naples, and the Neapolitan
troops to Cassano by the Taranto road; and placing an Russo-English
garrison in Gaeta. It was further resolved to inform Messieurs the
Russian and English Ministers of this decision, and beg them to lay
it before Their Sicilian and Sardinian Majesties.19

Signed: LASCY, ANREP, STUART, OPPERMAN, BUNBURY.

Personal opinion of General Craig, written below this
protocol.

My opinion is absolutely opposed to that of the majority of the
assembled general-officers. I think that, by adopting this measure of
retiring into Calabria, we shall be putting ourselves into a position that
can be of no possible utility to the operations in general, nor to this
kingdom in particular, and I should think it incumbent on me to
withhold my consent if it were not that I consider myself bound, by
every sentiment of honour and duty, to support and stand by the
Russian army under the orders of H.E. General Lascy; and it is this
consideration alone that induces me to face the risks and dangers that
will, I foresee, result from the measure in question.

374 MEMOIRS OF THE

It is my opinion that we ought to embark,20 and preserve the troops
of our sovereigns for occasions when we can be of more real service
to them. Signed : CRAIG, general.

I am of the same opinion.

Signed: CAMPBELL, brigadier.

My blood froze as I read these two fatal missives. I was
placed in an awkward position with regard to my troops : it
distressed me greatly to be forced to give orders, for the third
time, for a march of which every man in the ranks must be
heartily sick and tired. The only authority that the men
understand is that of their own commanding-officer; and not
unnaturally in this case he was the person they held responsible,
when in their bewilderment they cursed these burdensome
marches.

I could picture the grief and the remonstrances of the King
and Queen, when they discovered that their treacherous allies
were handing over unresistingly to the French ten out of the
twelve provinces that composed the entire kingdom. I could
not account for the haste with which this resolution had been
taken, nor for the ignorance in which I had been kept ; for it
had been previously arranged that no important discussion
should take place without the three generals being summoned
and assembled for the purpose. I was all the more surprised
because General Lascy had said to me many a time " that if
eighty thousand men were to come against us we should be
vanquished together, but that if there should be no more than
forty thousand he would confidently accept the challenge.
Why, then, should the news that thirty-five thousand men
were on the march involve so disastrous a retreat, when we
ourselves had an equal number of troops in impregnable posi-
tions, to say nothing of the militia, the masses, the resources
of the towns, and a large population, all prepared to make
resistance? All these considerations decided me to go to
Naples, visiting the cantonments on my way. I set out at
once, and with my own lips gave the orders embodied in that
terrible despatch, blushing, as I did so, that I should have
such orders to give.

When I had covered three-quarters of the distance I received

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 375

a letter from the Queen, summoning me to Naples as I had
expected.

I am writing in haste, my good General, wrote Her Majesty, at
half -past eight, in the hope that this letter may find you still at Teano.
The King wishes to speak to you : if you can, contrive to be at
Belvedere 21 early in the evening. He wishes to talk to you, and
consult you as to what should be done, and he is going to try to take
his army into Calabria, and thence, if resistance be impossible, into
Sicily. He will talk to you, and you must listen to him and tell him
what you think, and then you must come to Naples to talk to me
this evening and to-morrow morning, and make arrangements for
Naples. I do not know what the Russians have decided, and do not
even understand how they can stay after receiving orders. Cardinal
Ruffo has gone off to negotiate : 22 God grant he may succeed. In
short, our position is very painful, and in this century one need not
look for men of honour. Farewell, and believe me, with much esteem,
your grateful friend.

But news of a still more fatal description was awaiting me
in Naples.

An adjutant had arrived from the Emperor of Russia, with
orders for his troops to set sail for Corfu. This harsh order
could not fail to be taken literally by timid generals, but it
was quite capable of being interpreted with more intelligence
and judgment. I cannot question, without throwing doubt on
the truth of M. Tatistchef s statement to that effect,23 that
the orders were to retire only if the enemy had not arrived,
to do nothing to compromise the dignity and honour of
H.M. the Emperor's arms, and to restore neutrality to the
Court of Naples. If the generals had not thought the enemy
so close that they might be regarded as having arrived, what
was the meaning of this precipitate flight into Calabria ? And
if they had arrived, why disobey the Emperor, and betray the
country that was counting on his protection and had broken
its neutrality through confidence in his honour ?

But Generals Lascy, Craig, and Opperman were only too
glad to see their own desires authorised : there was nothing to
be hoped from them. Opperman, especially, was imperturb-
able. General Anrep, and the English General Stuart (who
both held the principal command under their respective com-
manders-in-chief), loudly protested against so humiliating a
measure : all the major-generals in the army, and the colonels,

376 MEMOIRS OF THE

and the naval officers, remonstrated publicly against a proceed-
ing that disgraced their uniform. M. Tatistchef had already
made an official protest, which he had drawn up with M. Pozzo
di Borgo,24 a clerk in the department of Foreign Affairs,
employed in matters connected with the army. But Lascy,
Opperman, and Craig, inspired and encouraged by Elliot,
clung firmly to their shame and were irrevocably resolved on
departure.

The King and Queen were in despair. There was a great
deal of public excitement : the most offensive attacks were
openly made in the streets upon the generals, and upon the
government that had been credulous enough to trust in such
allies. In short, the scene was most alarming, and filled one's
heart with the fear of some sudden upheaval.

The generals remained in their own quarters : they dared not
show themselves in the capital. I received this letter from
M. Lascy :

Teano, 28th December (Qth January).

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

An adjutant from H.M. the Emperor, my master, has just
brought me a positive order to leave Italy instantly with the imperial
troops of Russia, and to inform the English general-in-command of the
step I am about to take.

Your Excellency already knows that for some time past I have
feared that the unfortunate turn taken by the events of the war would
make it impossible for us to be of use to His Sicilian Majesty and
his Dominions, and my regrets that I was ever brought into this
kingdom have now reached a climax.

The English corps will retreat beyond the Volturno to-morrow, the
29th December / 10th January, the Russian corps on the following
day, the llth; and in consequence of the order mentioned above I
can no longer consider myself in command of the three army-corps.

Your Excellency has probably already received orders from H.M. the
King with regard to the Neapolitan troops. As for me, I can only
repeat that I am truly grieved that Your Excellency and all the other
brave soldiers in the King's service should be in a more painful
situation, even, than my own, in consequence of a most unfortunate
concatenation of circumstances.

I have the honour to be, etc.,

LASCY.

I suggested to the Queen and the Hereditary Prince that I
should go to General Lascy *s headquarters to make a final
effort : though I could not urge him to remain in the kingdom

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 377

for an indefinite length of time, it was really essential to
persuade him to assume a defensive position — even if it were
only on the banks of the Volturno — until fresh negotiations
had been opened with the French. This strategical position is
formidable, and could not be carried by the number of troops
that the French could devote to the purpose, if it were
defended by the number we had at our disposal. The pro-
posal that I intended to lay before Lascy, then, was in every
way conducive to his master's dignity, and could not possibly
result in misfortune.

Fortified with arguments that were strategically, politically,
and morally irresistible, I suggested to M. Tatistchef that he
should come with me to Teano, to give my proposition the
support of his presence. General Anrep was with him, and
said to me with tears in his eyes as we were on the point of
driving away : "I give you full authority to express to the
commander-in-chief how earnestly I hope that he may yield
to your just desires. Tell him from me that if he wishes for
the support of my opinion in writing, I am quite willing to
write it in conformity with yours. The good of the public
is at stake, as well as our own interests and the honour of
our uniform, which has become too embarrassing to wear since
this infamous suggestion was made. And add, too," he said,
" that it is all the more incumbent upon us to support you,
that we made use of your army-corps by sending it to the
most remote corner of the kingdom, and have, moreover,
deprived you of your own resources." I embraced him grate-
fully, and we drove away. We went first to Opperman's
quarters, because old Lascy was asleep : we found Opperman
in bed, but his conscience had not permitted him to sleep.
Only a word was required to prove to him that the King's
crown was in his hand ; but a good deal more was needed by
his debased nature before he could be induced to hold that
crown in its proper place on the King's head. And yet he
agreed that everything I advanced was true, but pretended to
fear the opposition of the English. "However," he said, "it
is a sacred duty.1" But a man's expression will betray him:
his face showed no desire for a change of plans, but only a

378 MEMOIRS OF THE

deep and earnest concern lest the decision should be imputed
to him. I could not arm myself with his sentiments — the man
never had an honourable sentiment in his life — but I seized
upon his words and determined to make good use of them
with the venerable infant who was entirely guided by him.
We were taken, Tatistchef and I, to see M. Lascy when he
awoke, that is to say at three o'clock in the morning. I talked
as though he were a hero who could not endure to stain the
end of his career ; I pointed out how easy it would be for him
to bring his influence to bear upon the French, and insist that
the King should be restored to the position of neutrality from
which he had dragged him. I described the strategical position
that he could occupy, and impressed upon him that his master
would be under a deep obligation to him if he would save his
honour and conscience without incurring any danger, and
would promise to open negotiations in the King's name on the
very next day, and even consent to make fresh sacrifices, if
necessary, to hasten matters. " I look upon all that you are
saying as a duty," he said. " We shall do it ; yes, I tell you,
we shall do it ; why not? Yes, we shall do it." — " Can I rely
upon it?" I asked (without relying in the least). — "Why
not? we shall do it." — "I can reassure the King, then? "
"Why not? we shall do it." It was useless to hope for a
more eloquent guarantee. I made it as effective as possible
by my expressions of gratitude, and returned with his promise
— such as it was — to the King and Queen. I presented it to
them under the. guise of a mere hope.

The Queen spoke of the matter to Elliot, who declared that
Sir James Craig asked for nothing better, but that the Russian
generals would not depart from their first intention. He pro-
ceeded to do his best, in secret ways, to prevent any mutual
understanding. With Sicily so nearly in his grasp, would he
have allowed it to escape?

The retreat that M. Lascy had announced to me in his last
letter took place, accordingly, on the following day. But what
a retreat ! No one could picture it without having seen it.
The enemy was still on the farther side of Rome : only very
small detachments, as yet, had appeared near the March of

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 379

Ancona, about two days' march from the frontier, when the
English were seized with panic. They decamped in confusion
from their cantonments, and fled towards Naples. After cross-
ing the bridge of boats over the Garigliano they set fire to it,
and flung the burning planks and beams into the middle of the
stream, and the officers of the Neapolitan pontooniers had the
greatest difficulty in preventing them from sinking the copper
pontoons. I was discussing matters of business with M. Lascy
when he received from Sir James Craig a report of this prudent
expedition, which must, therefore, have been undertaken by
M. Lascy's orders, or at least with his consent. He and M.
Opperman both felt my presence very embarrassing. "Now
that the Neapolitans," I said, "must try to carry out alone
the task they were to have shared with famous troops, this is
an unfortunate lesson for them ! " I was speaking of the
English only ; but on the following day we heard that the
Russian regiment which was retreating on the road from the
Abruzzi, having been informed of the flight of the English
without learning its true cause, sank the ferry-boats of the
Volturno after using them.

What might I not have to suffer from the effects of this
panic? When the allies arrived I had been counting on hold-
ing them up as models to soldiers who had but little experience
of war ; but I was reduced to hoping that this shameful example
might be forgotten.

The English marched to Castellamare in a day, and began
to embark the same evening. This was quite enough to make
MM. Opperman and Lascy forget all about the half-promise
that they had given me, and authorised me to give to the
King : 25 however, they tried to make it serve their own ends.
M. Tatistchef came to me, and said that it would be necessary
for the safety of the generals' position that the King should
place at their disposal all the castles and fortresses they
required. I assured M. Tatistchef that no difficulty whatever
would be made. I told him that he had only to name those
for which he wished, and that I would instantly lay his request
before the King and Queen. He named Capua, and the castles
of Baioe and Pozzuoli.

380 MEMOIRS OF THE

Only those who know Naples will recognise that the two last
have no connection whatever with the Russians' possible line
of defence; but the worthy generals were also afraid of the
Neapolitan populace. They did not wish to risk embarking at
the spot where they had landed, and in order to be safe from
the stones and muskets of the lazzaroni they thought it would
be as well to embark at Baioe, and to secure the protection of
the fort. I whispered this suggestion to Tatistchef, who
exclaimed against so base a thought ; but it was also the
thought of the King and Queen, who, to prove to the generals
that they were not deceived, granted all the fortresses that
were desired, except the two connected with this precautionary
policy. The idea of postponing their departure by a day had
never occurred to the Russians, who marched to Baioe without
passing through Naples, and were protected from injury by
the government police without having recourse to their own
insulting precautions. They set sail in the night of the 12th
January, taking with them the crown they had come to guard.
May the Emperor Alexander in his justice watch over it ! Its
loss must not be attributed to him, and knowing, as wre did,
that if the subordinate generals had held the chief command
events would have followed another course, we ought to have
felt still more certain that, if the Emperor had not been too
far away to hear what was taking place and to make his will
known, the King would have had no reason to complain of his
ally.

That this was true was proved by the sequel ; for the
Emperor Alexander felt the harshness of the order to re-
embark soon after he despatched it from Holitsch 26 (near
Austerlitz), and sent off a counter-order, enjoining upon the
generals to return to Naples, if they should already have
evacuated the kingdom, even if they were at Constantinople.
And it was at Constantinople that this counter-order reached
the generals, who contrived to evade it again.

But, in view of all the ties that necessarily bind a great
Empire to the fate of its allies, the Emperor Alexander must
be held guilty of carelessness, in that he placed his confidence
in agents incapable of justifying it and unworthy of possessing

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 381

it. General Lascy, who is quite worn out and more or less
doting, is no longer fit even to preside over a commission under
the government's own eyes ; and is naturally far more incapable
of exercising the unlimited powers and deserving the unlimited
trust that a great distance and a variety of circumstances
render necessary.

General Opperman, as quartermaster-general of the three
army-corps, was intended to supplement the ability and activity
of the commander-in-chief, but has none of the requisite
qualities, nor even enough brains to blind other men to his
deficiencies. Indeed, he is unable to support his pretensions
for a single day. At a glance he inspires equal mistrust of
his talents, his principles, and his conscience ; and little by
little his methods and opinions and words show the full depths
of his incapacity and immorality. For a moment his character
was regarded as a possible advantage : it occurred to the Queen
that he might be bribed to postpone the embarkation until
negotiations had been opened. A secret agent was deputed
to offer him a gift of five hundred ducats (2000 fr,) for every
day that the army's departure was postponed ; and for thirty-
six hours the agent held out great hopes. But it was too late ;
half of the troops wrere already embarked, and it would have
been too difficult to devise a pretext. So the scheme ended
in an attempt upon his honour, without any profit to those
who planned it.

How seldom a throne is occupied by one who can meet great
tests with great abilities ! Was there anything to be done in
such circumstances as these? Those who know what the cir-
cumstances were can consider the question : for myself, I admit
that I perceived a remedy for these unexpected troubles, but
was not moved to give advice in quarters where there seemed
to be insufficient energy to carry it out. If I had been king
the allies would not have left the country. I feel it to the
depths of my heart. I should have saved my power or ruined
myself beyond redemption. I submit this thought to my
readers : whether they approve or condemn, my opinion will
remain unchanged.

But one must not try to fly too high : this century, which

382 MEMOIRS OF THE

in the west permits a man to rise, forbids it in the south and
north. We must spend our lives in submission and mediocrity,
and be content with the courage that heaven has given us,
whereby we may suffer bravely when half-measures are not
enough to save us from suffering.

The King had sent Cardinal Ruffo to Paris,27 and several
couriers had been despatched to the Marquese del Gallo, with
a view to calming the storm.

The Duke of San Teodoro 28 had been sent to Rome to
sound Cardinal Fesch, and talk to Saint-Cyr on the subject
of their hostile intentions. Every inquiry revealed their
determination to invade the country.

Buonaparte had been entreated by the Emperor and Empress
of Germany to spare the kingdom : his answer was that if he
had to fight for thirty years he would do nothing to alleviate
the fate of the reigning dynasty. He had issued his orders
that the King of Naples should be dethroned, and that the
army of Italy should carry out the task. Not a vestige of
hope was left, since the throne of Naples was not adorned by
the genius of Frederick II, Charles XII, or Gustavus-Adolphus.
It was nevertheless decided to make a defence, though it
seemed impossible to determine on the kind of defence that
should be adopted. All the debates at this critical moment
were merely inconclusive discussions : the King and Queen
held Councils every day, in which we settled nothing. The
question was whether the kingdom should be given away or
sold at a high price. The Queen alone never hesitated between
these alternatives, but her influence was not sufficient to decide
the matter. The discussion oscillated between the principle
involved, the minor points, and the means to be employed ;
and nothing was accomplished.

I laid before the King two alternatives in writing, with a
most detailed description of the methods to be employed in
each case : the defence of the amphitheatre of hills round
Naples on the one hand, or, on the other, the defence of
Calabria and surrender of the ten other provinces, with the
exceptions of the garrisoned towns of Gaeta and Capua, the
former of which is capable of making a firm resistance. These

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 383

were the only courses open to us, in view of the small number
of troops at our disposal ; and even then we should need the
help of the population at large.

I pointed out all the measures that must instantly be taken
in the case of the first alternative being chosen : the points
that should be strengthened, the troops required at each, and
the distribution of the surplus. I begged that the Hereditary
Prince might visit the provinces adjoining the hill-range of
Naples, with a view to arming, inspiring, and mustering the
people ; and that Prince Leopold 29 might go to Calabria and,
with the help of trustworthy persons, assemble the masses.
His task would then be to descend with them upon any position
that should be threatened by the French, while the Neapolitan
troops attacked their front.

If it were decided to defend the Calabrian Provinces alone
I begged that commissioners might be despatched at once to
collect food and forage at the principal points ; and that the
English should be persuaded to send warships to coast along
the shores of the Mediterranean, while the Russians guarded
the shores of the Ionian Sea, in order to facilitate operations,
contract the line of defence, and favour the arrival of pro-
visions. 1 never said a word to disguise, nor to exaggerate,
the dangers of these two alternatives. I never pretended that
there was any certainty of saving the kingdom. I only sug-
gested that a fight should be made, that possibly some com-
promise might be effected, and that at all events it was well
to be spared the remorse that a cowardly desertion of the
kingdom would bring upon us ; but in the depths of my heart
there was a faint hope that the whole nation would rise, if an
attempt were made to rouse it, and that then the French could
not possibly enter the kingdom.

It had been decided, supposing the army were to retire into
Calabria, to leave a sufficient number of troops in Naples to
maintain order until the entry of the French. The whole of
the available force, then, amounted to no more than eight
thousand regular troops and four thousand armed peasants;
for conscripts who had not had the time to be provided with
uniforms, nor even to be taught how to handle their arms,

384 MEMOIRS OF THE

could not be dignified with the name of recruits. But it was
declared that the whole population of Calabria would muster,
and on this ground I ventured to hope that some kind of
defence might be made. It was desired by all classes in the
capital that the army should retreat into Calabria.

The superintendent of police,30 who, when there was no
apprehension of danger, had assured us that the town of Naples
could furnish a large number of armed men, now declared the
contrary ; and the opinion of the public was so much in accord-
ance with this second statement that there seemed to be every
chance of seeing Naples torn by conflicting intentions, and in
a state of general confusion, when the French were actually
at the gates. This would have been fatal for the town, for
there was no doubt that the French, before making an attack
on the amphitheatre of hills, would have cut off the possibility
of retreat into Calabria, and in so doing would have closed
the roads from Naples to Puglia. The town and the army
would thus have been left without any means of subsistence.

Every day I reported the situation to the Council, and dis-
cussed every detail of it. The government still imagined that
Buonaparte would consent to some kind of compromise. The
King had sent orders to all the Sicilian ports to fire upon the
English if they should make any attempt to land ; and, indeed,
Sir James Craig, who, on leaving Naples, had anchored off
Messina with his whole convoy, did not for twenty-eight days
obtain permission for a single man to land.

It was hoped that the certainty of seeing the English in
possession of Sicily as soon as Naples were invaded by the
French, and the equal certainty of their being repulsed if
the French did not cross the frontiers, might induce Buona-
parte to restore its neutrality to the Court of Naples; but
every day it was more clearly proved that the invasion was
irrevocably decided upon. Seeing that General Saint-Cyr had
been replaced by Massena, that Joseph Buonaparte's arrival
had been announced as imminent, and that Cardinal Fesch 31
met every proposition with insult, it was every hour more
impossible to be blind to the fact that the invasion was near
at hand.

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 385

The Neapolitan army-corps, which had left the Abruzzi by
way of Fuglia, received orders to wait at the junction of the
roads from Naples and Calabria, until a decision had been
made with regard to the plan of defence.

It was provisionally arranged that this corps should approach
the entrance of Calabria, and defend that province against the
French or attack them in divisions ; while the rest of the King's
troops — supported by the masses, the field-fortifications in
the Caudine Forks and elsewhere, the fortress of Capua, and
the forts in Naples — should defend the circle of hills.

It is characteristic of non-military countries like the king-
dom of Naples to recognise no difference between an armed
peasant, a member of a popular corps like the masses, a
recruit, and a soldier. Every man who shoulders a musket
and receives pay is dubbed a soldier.

From this point of view the projected plan of defence was
not unreasonable. From any other point of view, however, it
was impracticable, since the most important point of defence
was entrusted to newly-levied troops, the army-corps of tried
soldiers having been sent elsewhere — to the entrance to
Calabria, a post which was no less useful, it is true, than
the other, but was quite unconnected with it, and in such a
position as to preclude all mutual help. Greatly daring, I
ventured to throw some doubt on the value of the masses,
with whom the royal family were infatuated, though they
could not make up their minds to use them. But, as the result
of our preparations was in any case extremely doubtful, I
devoted all my energies to making the most of such advantages
as we possessed. In three days the batteries were erected in
all the passes, the positions chosen, the commanding-officers
appointed, and all dispositions made for the defence.

The King, who was bored by all these discussions and uncer-
tainties, set sail for Sicily.32 He invested the Queen and the
Hereditary Prince with full powers.

The French under Massena,33 to the number of thirty-five
thousand men, had now advanced as far as Terracina, and had
occupied Velletri and other places commanding the passes on
the frontier,
c c

386 MEMOIRS OF THE

I importuned the prince to delay no longer to adopt the
final and the strongest measure. For what were we waiting?
When could the assembling of the masses be more urgently
needed than at this moment? But the local landowners in
whom the prince placed most confidence were alarmed for the
safety of their property, and regarded the levy of the masses
as an occasion of disorder and pillage. They used all their
influence with the prince, therefore, to prevent it, and had
intimidated the leaders of the masses — already sufficiently
timid and even cowardly by nature — to such an extent that
they openly declared it impossible to raise more than a few
hundred men. They further announced that even these could
not be mustered in less than a fortnight, and some demanded
a month. Certain persons had even suggested to the prince
that he would exasperate Buonaparte to the last degree if he
were to levy the masses , and that the only hope of persuading
the Emperor to come to an agreement of some kind lay in
abstaining from this form of opposition.34

At last I declared openly that Naples could not possibly be
defended without the help of the people. I pointed out that
a few days of massacre was the best for which we could hope.
Since the English and Russians had not left a single transport
at the disposal of the government, it would be impossible in
the case of a defeat — a practical certainty in view of the dis-
proportion between the forces — to take refuge in Sicily, or even
in the islands of the bay. I returned to the Calabrian scheme,
which at least offered a shadow of hope, supposing the popula-
tion to be more enthusiastic than the rest, as their country
and character made probable. I begged that supplies and
means of transport might be made ready ; and this scheme was
finally adopted.

The Queen was inconsolable when she found herself forced
to abandon the palace and ten provinces to the enemy. Her
regrets were as natural as they were futile : she was in despair,
but could not muster enough resolution to remedy matters.
She spoke to me on the subject, with tears in her eyes. "Are
you prepared to do anything and everything," I asked her,

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 387

k* to remedy this thing that is, very naturally, making you
miserable? Will you take it on yourself to make an appeal
to the people? Will you make the prince ride out and take
the lead? Will you show yourself to the people?" Her
answer showed me all the impetuosity of her character and all
the fine impulses of her heart — but they were not sufficiently
strong to drive us from the seclusion of her room, for her
imagination takes her an immense distance in the twinkling of
an eye, whereas her mind cannot concentrate itself upon the
matter in hand.

Joseph Buonaparte had arrived in Rome, and the Duke of
San Teodoro had been sent to parley with him. The duke
was empowered to agree to anything that would tend to
a settlement of any kind; even to the King's abdication,
provided that the Hereditary Prince were left upon the
throne.35

San Teodoro returned from his first expedition with hopes
of a truce, but without any certainty that it wrould be observed.
His second mission (for he posted backwards and forwards)
revealed the conditions : Gaeta and Capua were to be ceded as
hostages for a truce of twenty days, and a certain tract of
territory, including Naples, was to be declared neutral. But
the duke brought no authorisation to conclude this truce. His
third journey resulted in a formal demand for the surrender
of Naples and even of the forts.

San Teodoro reported that he had had an intimate conversa-
tion with Joseph, who had expressed profound and genuine
distaste for the task that his brother had laid upon him. He
had advised the royal family to be patient ; to take refuge in
Calabria with the army, and fortify their position; and to
wait until circumstances, or his brother's calmer reflections,
should produce some change in a situation which Joseph
himself, apparently, sincerely deplored.

This gradual increase in the enemy's demands after each

conference aroused in the Queen a deep sense of distrust in

San Teodoro. There were various proceedings and incidents,

too indefinite for description, which seemed to show that he

cc 2

388 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

was not serving the legitimate Court of Naples so much as the
Court of the usurper ; and his acceptance, later on, of a post
in the latter appears to confirm the suspicion.36 The French
crossed the frontier simultaneously with his last return, and
two days later the advanced guard reached Capua. The force
numbered forty thousand men.

XIX

The invasion — The Neapolitan army, under Comte Roger, is only en-
trusted with the defence of the Calabrian Provinces — Sketch of the
country — The General's plan — General Minutolo is surprised by
General Reynier— Damas withdraws to th.e strong position of Campo-
Tenese, whence his troops are driven on the 9th March, 1806 — Hasty
retreat of the Neapolitan army, and hostility of the inhabitants —
The Comte Roger resigns his post and prepares to go to Vienna —
Reflections on the loss of the kingdom, the expedition of Cardinal
Ruffo, and the sentiments and conduct of the King and Queen of
Naples — Forcible indictment of Acton, the chief cause of the
disaster ; and of the policy of England.

I RECEIVED orders to march into Calabria with the troops,
who were to be accompanied by the two princes. A regency
was appointed,1 and the Queen fixed the following day for her
departure to Sicily. All the spare guns from the arsenal and
all the machinery from the workshops went with her, as well
as all the valuables from the Court : in short, nothing was
left for the French but the place over which they had
tyrannised once before.

I set out on the 10th February, 1806, with the third
column, the two first having started three days earlier.2
Hearing a false report that a courier had come from Paris
to Joseph with reassuring despatches, I had waited for further
news ; but unfortunately nothing could be more ill-founded
than my hopes. I therefore delayed no longer, and the days
that followed were full of trouble and vexation.

It had been settled that the princes should join me on the
following day ; but when they were on the point of parting
from the Queen a false rumour led them to believe that the
road to Calabria had been cut off by the enemy. This was
not the case, and indeed could not be so, but the princes1
movements were changed in consequence. They embarked with
the rest of the royal family, with the intention of separating
from them at a certain point of the voyage, and landing at

389

390 MEMOIRS OF THE

the first place where I could make a stand in the mountains
of Calabria. A violent gale from the south delayed a portion
of the transports, laden with military stores and property of
various kinds from the Court ; and a great number fell into
the hands of the French. The same fate befell a frigate and
a corvette. For nine days the royal family were at the mercy
of a head- wind, and all the time I was awaiting the princes
at the appointed spot. It was necessary, too, to take pre-
cautions for their safe landing, and in my position this was a
very difficult task. Moreover, I had found no arrangements
made for our food-supply; and M. De Medici, the Minister
of Finance, who had given orders in the matter, and who, I
had reason to believe, could save me from the difficulties that
appeared imminent, was with the princes.

The administration of food-supplies for an army calls for
experience and energy as well as intelligence, and though
M. De Medici may have been quite capable of transferring
stocks and funds, he knew nothing about transporting pro-
visions. He thought he had done all that was required in
bringing enough money to pay for the supplies, and had taken
no steps to bespeak food in advance, nor to secure means of
transport. I could only hope, therefore, — if we were not to
lack provisions — that the enemy might not oblige me to make
a movement of any kind, nor to assemble more troops in one
position than in another. The idea of an army-corps at a
distance from its cantonments had never occurred to M. De
Medici. He had roughly calculated how many bodies of men
were stationed between one given point and another, and how
many men each force contained, and on this basis he argued
that we might die of old age in Calabria, without having
wanted for anything in the whole course of our career.
Attacks, manoeuvres, successes, and reverses, were all beyond
the grasp of his imagination. In a country that possessed
no roads I did not find a single mule ready to transport
supplies, when four hundred would hardly have sufficed.

I ask you, my fellow-generals, you who take command of an
army-corps, do you think you care little enough for your own
reputations to undertake a task that offers nothing but

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 391

humiliation and hard work ? Admit that in this one respect I
am your superior. If my vanity had been greater than my
zeal for justice, and my reason stronger than my disinterested-
ness, should I have undertaken to dispute the ground with a
French army, when I was entirely without supplies of any
kind, had quite an inadequate force at my disposal, and was
hampered by the presence of two princes ? Listen to my story,
and then judge me if you will.

A slight sketch of the Calabrian Provinces is indispensable,
and will give the reader a clear idea of the position of an
army-corps while occupying them ; supposing that corps to be
composed of only twelve thousand men, four thousand of them
being raw recruits.3

There are only three practicable ways into Calabria. One
of them skirts the shores of the Ionian Sea, and is a good
carriage-road. Another road runs along the shores of the
Mediterranean, and is practicable for infantry and cavalry,
but not for artillery. The third way, by which the province
is entered at its centre, can only be used by infantry. Here
cavalry is only available for scouting and purposes of observa-
tion. The distance, as the crow flies, between the coast-road
on the Ionian Sea and the central road is forty Italian miles,4
over very difficult country : and between the central road and
the road that skirts the Mediterranean lie twenty-five miles
of almost inaccessible ground.

The road beside the Ionian Sea is entered by a single very
short defile; but the fort that protects it, Castel Rosetto, is
a very slight obstacle, because it can easily be turned by light-
infantry, the mountain-paths being quite good. This defile
leads into a very wide plain, where thirty thousand men, and
cavalry in proportion, could easily be deployed.

The length of the central pass, by Lagonegro, is forty-six
Italian miles ; and from one end of it to the other there is a
succession of strong positions at very short intervals, each
of which might be used as a means of checking the enemy.
The road then approaches the tract of country to which I
referred above.

The third pass, by way of Sapri, is on the shore of the

392 MEMOIRS OF THE

Mediterranean, on the Gulf of Policastro, and like the first
can be guarded by gunboats or warships. It therefore can be
held with a smaller number of troops.

These three roads continue in the same way, at the same
distance from one another, and with the same advantages and
drawbacks, all through Lower Calabria and half-way through
Upper Calabria. At this point the two seas draw nearer to
each other, and for several miles the distance between the
two coasts is no more than twenty miles. The land then
becomes wider, and continues so as far as Reggio and the toe
of the "boot."

At the end of the plain that I mentioned in connection with
the first pass there runs a river called the Crati, which rises
in the mountains of Upper Calabria, follows the central road,
and then crosses obliquely to empty itself into the Ionian Sea,
and form the boundary of the plain in question. This river
is fordable at several points, and before it reaches the sea is
swelled by another river, called the Coscile.

After this short description it will be easy, I think, to
understand the measures I had to employ and the country
through which I had to march.5

Since the army-corps was divided into two classes, composed
respectively of good and of very bad troops, it was necessary
to reserve the good ones and the cavalry for the open country,
and to station the bad ones in the shelter of the mountains,
with only a few good battalions to support them. And as the
protection of the plain demanded more troops than I could
furnish I determined to use for that purpose the organised
masses, whom the Hereditary Prince imagined capable of
being formed into corps. He had pledged himself to produce
fifteen thousand men, ready to take the field, in the course of
three weeks.

It seemed to me that the only possibility of resistance lay
in acting on the offensive whenever the enemy should give me
a chance of so doing. This was especially the case at the
central position, where I could descend from the mountains
and make an attack, and in the case of a reverse could with-
draw to my posts, which the enemy would have some difficulty

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 398

in finding, and to which they might hesitate to follow me.
This wing of the army-corps, relatively to the whole, was the
left wing, and was cantoned in echelons so close to one another
that quite a short march would enable it to reinforce the
advanced guard. In the case of a reverse each echelon would
serve as an excellent rallying-point for the troops.

I had succeeded, by sheer physical force, in bringing the
guns of position and the field-guns to the last echelon ; 6 and
had made some redoubts on the Campo Tenese.7 Here I
intended to place my recruits, supposing the enemy were
successful in all the first encounters and it should become
necessary to hold this position for a day or two, while the two
wings were effecting a junction on the banks of the Coscile
or the Crati. It was there that the greater part of the army-
corps was to assemble.

Between the right and left wings, in the mountains, I had
placed a small flying column composed of my best troops,
whose office was to fall upon the enemy's flank or rear, if
they should attack one of our wings. This corps was never
to join either of the wings, but was always to act inde-
pendently.

The road along the coast of the Mediterranean was defended
by two battalions and a squadron, which were quite sufficient
for that part of the country, in the circumstances that I have
described. But every day I wrote to the Hereditary Prince,
begging him to prevail upon the English (now established in
Sicily) to guard the two shores with ships of war ; for if I
were obliged to retreat to the farthest extremity of Calabria,
and to divide my troops between the three roads, I should
never have enough men at one point to regain the upper hand.
The prince answered : " You may give up all hope of persuad-
ing the English or Russians to do anything for us : if I were
to ask for a single gunboat at Palermo I should be refused,
and you know why."

I did indeed know why. General Acton and Elliot were
cursing the day that the prince entered Calabria, and the
pains to which we were putting ourselves to hold that pro-
vince. They were awaiting a disaster that should drive us

894 MEMOIRS OF THE

from the country, as eagerly as the King and Queen were
awaiting the news of a victory.

The disposition of the troops, then, being completed, I
established my headquarters at the fork of the roads, at
Castrovillari, in rear of the two wings. Here I was within
reach of them both, if either seemed to require my presence.
The prince, after inspecting all the cantonments, settled down
in the little town of Cosenza,8 forty miles in rear of my
headquarters.

The generals-in-command of the two wings had orders to
attack the enemy as soon as they should advance with the
same intention. I had impressed upon them the importance
of this point, and they had promised to follow my instructions
to the letter.

It was near the end of February when the three French
divisions under Reynier, Compere, and Verdier 9 left the
neighbourhood of Naples and advanced by the central road
towards Calabria, while General Duhesme's lc division
approached my right wing by the road that skirted the
Ionian Sea, I was able to judge roughly of the strength of
General Duhesme's force, but all my information with regard
to Reynier 's was false. Even if I had known the truth I
could have made no change in my position, nor in my instruc-
tions to the generals, for — since the English refused to guard
the two shores with warships — I should still have had a large
tract of country to protect, in any position to which I could
have fallen back. If, on the other hand, I had concentrated
all my troops on the central road I should infallibly have been
outflanked by detachments sent by the French generals from
the coast-roads. I was occupying the points that were most
easily defended. My best chance, then, lay in awaiting events,
and holding myself ready to unite my two wings in rear of
the Crati. It might become necessary to do this at once, if
the advanced guard of my left wing should be forced to fall
back, or should become too much extended to preserve the
separate formation I had adopted, except by endangering the
junction of the troops.

Contrary to all expectation Reynier surprised the left wing

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 895

at its post; ll and the general, who was betrayed by his spies
and had taken no proper precautions, found it necessary to
retreat. So fierce was the onslaught, indeed, that this general,
Marshal Minutolo Canosa,12 completely lost the small amount
of head that Heaven had given him. His orders became con-
fused, and the confusion soon spread to his troops. He
thought himself obliged to abandon the finest natural position
in the world, and allowed the enemy to take possession of
points that had seemed impregnable. The most extraordinary
thing is that, for two days, he had been preparing to make
the attack himself : he had brought up some battalions from
the rear for the purpose. The enemy had been in his mind,
but he had only been considering what the enemy might have
to fear from him, without giving a thought to what he might
have to fear from the enemy.

The loss of this position being irrevocable he should have
rallied his troops at the next, at Lauria, which had all the
advantages of the first and was equally inaccessible : he allowed
himself to be followed thither, and driven back. As soon as
I heard of the first attack I hurried to join him, and found
the troops retiring in confusion. They had already been
retreating for two days, and had reached the Rotonda. It
became necessary for my right wing to retire without delay ;
and the position of Campo Tenese, which I had fortified and
furnished with artillery, I determined to use in the way I
have already described, to check the enemy with my left and
effect a junction of the two wings. This was a very good
position : it could only be turned by crossing almost inaccess-
ible mountains, for the defence of which we were prepared.
It was here that the enemy attacked me at two o'clock in the
afternoon of the 9th March, in weather for which I can find
no words, — deep, half-melted snow, a fog that was all the
thicker that wre were on the mountain-tops, mud into which
one sank up to the knees. These were great disadvantages for
both sides, no doubt, but were incontestably less disastrous
for the troops that were making the attack, since they knew
their own object and were acting deliberately, whereas their
intentions were quite unknown by the other side. The enemy.

396 MEMOIRS OF THE

however, met with resistance wherever they appeared; but it
was the resistance of untried and weary troops. Two battalions
of seasoned troops bore the shock of the charge with perfect
steadiness, and lost a number of men, but, on being deserted
by the battalions that should have protected their flank, they
were turned and surrounded. One of the two was led into
imprudence by one of the generals (the Canosa to whom I
have already referred), who, either from foresight or mere
vice, had made himself drunk and did not know what he was
doing. Finally all the recruits who were occupying the
curtains and redoubts turned tail and fled : the troops who
were defending the hill on the right followed their example,
and the enemy was then able to turn the rest of the force. I
gave the order to retire, and tried to effect a methodical
retreat, but the fog was so thick that I could not see nor
control the movement of the troops. A portion of them
lost their way in the mist, and several battalions fell into the
enemy's hands. I returned, with those that had been able
to carry out my orders, to the appointed position on the banks
of the Crati.13

The right wing had to cross this same river by a trestle
bridge, which was constructed in rear of our first position
behind Cassano, and was protected by a tete-de-pont. By
despatching my orders promptly I had given this wing con-
siderably more time than was necessary to effect its retreat.
The general, indeed, joined me with some of his troops, but
was in so great a hurry to be safe that he had broken down
the bridge between himself and his advanced guard, sending
a message to the officer-in-command to cross the river by a
bridge much lower down. (He declared, at least, that he had
sent this message, but the officer in question never received
it.) The advanced guard consequently followed the original
instructions, and arrived at the bridge, only to find it use-
less. So much time was lost in reaching the other that the
commanding-officer thought it was too late to make any
attempt at joining the army-corps, though there was nothing
whatever to give rise to this opinion. He therefore retreated,
by the road that skirts the Ionian Sea, to Catrone; and by

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 397

iis mistaken, and indeed culpable, action rendered his troops
completely useless for any further operations that might have
been undertaken. Not that there was now any hope of holding
the Calabrian Provinces for long ; but the ground might have
been disputed inch by inch. This was the only possible object
of the campaign, since the population refused to make any
resistance. My position at this moment was most unfortunate
and most disturbing. Since, as I have already said, no means
of transport had been provided for the food supplies, the
contractors declared it had been impossible to carry out the
orders they had previously received from me, and reduced in
numbers though my troops now were, I had nothing wherewith
to feed them.

The people of the country, who had always been represented
to the prince as ready to shed their last drop of blood for their
sovereigns, had not furnished a single armed man to fight for
them. In the hope of saving themselves from pillage by
giving the French a good reception they hid all their provisions
from us.

I suppose, at a time like this, every private soldier has his
moments of self -communing and hesitation ; but it is not
common to see generals and other officers influenced by any
calculations but those of honour. In this instance, however,
the foresight of the two classes was identically the same. They
saw that the only chance of holding Calabria, even for a time,
lay in fighting every day, and that the only possible end to
the struggle was a retreat to Sicily. Since they disliked
the idea of leaving their country and abandoning their
families I lost by desertion, in the course of thirty hours, five
battalions of infantry and a regiment of cavalry, with their
commanding-officers and staff, and three-fourths of the other
officers.

I had now but a few troops left. I was harassed and pur-
sued by the three divisions under General Reynier : I had no
resources and no means of defence : and it was a five days'
march to that narrowing of the land to which I referred in
my description of the country. Here, I hoped, the troops
from which I had been separated at the passage of the river

398 MEMOIRS OF THE

Crati would join me by the road from Cotrone to Catanzaro,
and help me to make another stand against the enemy.

I wrote to the prince that I was retreating, but that he
need have no fears for his safety while effecting his own
retreat, since I would undertake to remain between him and
the enemy.

The entire population declared for the French, who were
pursuing me unremittingly. I had to occupy the town of
Cosenza, where the prince had already been very badly
received, but where I was absolutely obliged to give my troops
twenty-four hours of rest. I found it necessary to protect
myself from the inhabitants as much as from the enemy. The
principal townsfolk came to assure me that, if I should make
any attempt at resistance under their walls, the people would
join the French against me ; 14 but these threats did not pre-
vent me from remaining as long as I had intended. When I
left the town the French advanced guard entered it; where-
upon the inhabitants carried out their threats and formed
themselves into a body of infantry, to support the enemy's
advanced guard of cavalry in attacking my rearguard. The
end of this day's march brought me to so rough a tract of
country, where the defiles were so narrow and so well-protected
by inaccessible mountains, that I was able to divide my
column without danger. I made one half of it take the coast-
road and join me at the end of two days' march, in order to
facilitate the transport of the baggage, and not only protect
my flank but cover the prince's retreat more effectually.

The field-guns could not be taken beyond Cosenza : I there-
fore had six guns spiked and the gun-carriages broken up. A
few pieces of heavy ordnance had been sent by the excellent
road on the coast of the Ionian Sea, to be embarked at Cotrone
for Sicily.

I arrived at Monteleone, a little town situated at the point
where the neck of land is narrowest.

My hopes of being joined by the troops that had separated
from their corps at the Crati were very far from being realised.
Their commanding-officer, it is true, arrived on the scene,
but did not bring a single foot-soldier with him : two hundred

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 399

of the cavalry composed his whole force, and these, in this
mountainous country, were more troublesome than useful.
He had suffered great losses by desertion (especially among
the officers), and at last, instead of bringing me all the troops
that were left to him, he took upon himself, without any
orders that could be so interpreted, to embark the remnant
at Cotrone and send them off to Sicily. This last proceeding
was the end of everything. Nothing remained to be done but
to embark the wretched fragments of the army-corps.

The prince made arrangements for the disembarkation.
Some transports from Messina anchored off three different
points of the opposite coast; and, although I had not made
a single forced march and had been incessantly attacked by
the enemy, I embarked men and horses and all without any
opposition. The troops that passed the lighthouse amounted
to four thousand : the same number came to Sicily from
Cotrone. Some gunboats that were sent from Messina to pro-
tect the transports fired several times upon the enemy as the
ships set sail ; and with a heart full of bitterness I left the
kingdom of Naples (19th March, 1806), from which, two
months earlier, the seasoned troops of the foreigners had fled
so shamefully, leaving it to be the prey of an insatiable foe.15
I am recalling this incident because the picture I have just
painted requires a pendant; and for this purpose nothing
could be better than a view of the Russian and English troops
waiting to land in Naples until the French should be gone,
and flying — with the bridges in flames behind them — on the
first news of their return.

This later fall of the Monarchy is very different from that
of 1799. The weak, the discontented, the indifferent, and
the timid regard Joseph Buonaparte as a king ; and a nation
becomes more quickly accustomed to a change of dynasty than
to a republican constitution. The imbecile will have the joy
of seeing a Court ; the proud and lazy will have places there ;
the soldiers will have the false hope that they need fight no
more ; the priests will be able to live openly as they have long
lived in secret ; starving younger sons will have equal shares
with their elder brothers ; the women will have French lovers ;

400 MEMOIRS OF THE

the people, perhaps, will pay lower taxes, and Acton cannot
return. All these reasons will accustom the country to the
new state of things.

The only reason, I think, that could lead the people to
wish for the return of their former rulers is that use is second
nature. It is to be hoped, then, that the predominant
cabinets of Europe may recover the power to shake off the
yoke that burdens them. Perhaps they may feel that, after
contributing to the fall of three branches of the Bourbons, it
might be to their own interest to restore at least one of them.
Till that day dawns I cannot hope to live any more in the
most delightful climate of the world.

Yet Gaeta still holds out ; but the royal standard that floats
above its walls seems to prolong our regrets, I think, rather
than our hopes. Heaven grant that the garrison's determina-
tion may prove of use! But, without a war in the north, I
see no chance of it.16

If Buonaparte, who is thought at this moment to be very
ill (15th June, 1806), should happen to die, it may prove
most useful to have kept Gaeta — as it would have been to
keep Calabria had that been possible. But I appeal to all
experienced and fair-minded soldiers : they will admit» I do
not doubt, that success was impossible when I was entirely
without resources or accessories of any kind.

If the people had been in favour of the enterprise, if all
the troops had been equally good, if the least care had been
taken to supply us with food and means of transport — however
inadequate — the task would still have been difficult, seeing
that the attacking force outnumbered us in the proportion of
forty to twelve. But from a practical point of view any one
who accepts my account as accurate must regard the enter-
prise as a chimera, a forlorn hope, a mere salve to the con-
science, which no general could undertake save from devotion
and gratitude, and every motive that is as far removed as
possible from vanity and common sense.

When, in 1801, the gazettes reported that Cardinal Ruffo
had reconquered the kingdom with the Calabrian masses,17
no sensible person, surely, accepted the story as anything but

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 401

a newspaper-tale. He began his expedition at a time when
there was no enemy to oppose him except Jacobinism, the
rallying-word of unbridled pillage. Two poor villages accused
a rich one of Jacobinism, whereupon the Cardinal promised
that the two should combine to pillage the third. Without
seeing a single Frenchman he advanced from province to
province, till he was reinforced by detachments of English,
Russians, and Turks, who all landed from their ships. Thus
supported he reached Naples, whence the French had gone to
oppose the advance of Souvarow : so he handed over the
capital to be devastated by his acolytes.

But I have said enough to show the difference between the
two situations. The kingdom is lost, and nothing can restore
it to its sovereigns but some very remote and very com-
plicated combination of circumstances. The Powers are no
longer in a condition to regulate their own efforts at will : if
they should be moved to further exertions their object will be
to check the progress of Buonaparte's plans, and not to drive
him back. Nothing more is possible in their present physical
and moral state.

What would have happened had the Court of Naples pre-
served its neutrality ? It is possible that the King might still
be reigning, if one can apply the word reign to a state of
complete dependence in every detail upon a foreign govern-
ment, and upon the will of a foreign Court. And if a
sovereign who has wielded absolute power for forty years
could not be happy on a throne that he must share, how much
it would have added to his misery that he would be ignorant
to-day of the events by which he was actually overthrown !

Certainly, if it were proposed to the King at this moment
that the hands of the clock should be put back to the hour
when he consented to the landing of the allies, and broke the
treaty of neutrality, he would think himself a happy man.
But supposing he had preserved his neutrality, the rupture
of which seems so deplorable in the light of subsequent events,
how could he have known that the allies would come in such
small numbers? How could he have known that their rein-
forcements were altogether mythical? How could he have
D D

402 MEMOIRS OF THE

known that, after signing a treaty — which, if it was ill-con-
ceived, was perfectly in order, and absolutely bound them to
defend the kingdom at all costs — they would fly at the enemy's
approach and abandon him to his own resources? He
would have known nothing of all these calamities that were
heaped upon him — they were without parallel : he could not
have believed they were reserved for him alone.18

His only feelings to-day, in his torment, would be regret
and repentance. The Queen, owing to her special tempera-
ment, would be even more unhappy than she is : no one who
knows her can doubt it. The idea of having been the victim
of bad faith, and dragged into disaster by others and with
others, is less painful to her than it would have been to live
in a state of humiliation, with her mind full of doubts both
as to the past and the future. She would have reproached
herself unceasingly, and would, moreover, have heaped re-
proaches on every one who had counselled her to cling to the
yoke of France.

The heart that must be suffering the most from the present
state of things is that of the Russian Minister, M. Tatistchef,
who is an honest man ; and the heart of General Opperman
would be even more torn, if he possessed one. Every one else
may find some reason for resignation : in the one case we have
been killed by a thunderbolt : in the other we should have been
killed by a slow fire : in both cases wre should be dead. But
the measures that seemed at first such infallible remedies for
our ills would have caused no more regret, had we failed to
adopt them, and therefore never discovered their results, than
any of our present sorrows.

Such is the consolation that wisdom dictates in our calmer
moments. But wisdom is cold comfort when the trouble is
one's own. One must have a great deal of leisure to inquire
into what might have been, when the actual present is so
distressing; and I feel that all these considerations are prob-
ably of little comfort to any one but myself, or those who,
like myself, have been in a position to observe the course of
events and make a close study of the characters concerned.19

And now here I am in this melancholy island of Sicily, the

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 403

trophy of Elliot's intrigues and plots and the wretched remains
of Acton's dominion. Here I am again under the influence of
a man whose mere memory was baneful to Naples, even when
his absence had delayed the country's ruin. The King looks
upon him here as a port after a storm. This man ruined
Naples at a time when there was no thought of invasion : no
matter, that time is forgotten. That catastrophe took place
seven years ago : this one affects us at the moment. Acton
will save us. But how? Is he trying a change of method, a
modification of his system ? Is he making the interests of the
English serve those of his master? Is he considering the
King's claims upon Russia, and the promises made to him by
that country ? Is he using these things as a means of moderat-
ing the views of England ? Is he making England understand
that the King is not unprotected, that Sicily is his property,
and that Russia will guard it for him ? Is he trying to divide
the defence of Sicily between Russia and England, so that
each may answer for the disinterested conduct of the other?
Not he ! He has handed the island over to the English without
conditions and without limitations; he has rejected all the
Russian Minister's proposals in the matter ; he has turned
the King into an Indian nabob ; Sicily is no more than an asylum
for the King, a mere weight in the balance of compensations,
and a source of comfort to England.

But how does he succeed in blinding the King to the im-
prudence of his policy ? The Queen may try to enlighten the
King ; the Hereditary Prince may seek to win his confidence,
and discuss his future policy with him ; but these are trifling
obstacles to Acton. He makes mischief between the King
and his wife and son; he instils distrust of them into his
Majesty's mind ; in short he rules supreme. He destroys all
family intimacy and all legitimate authority, in order to
display his own.

I was still in Calabria when the Queen wrote to me : " Sup-
posing you should find resistance impossible in Calabria, as is
only too likely, it may be best for you, on reaching Messina,
to write to the King to relieve you of your command. . . ." 20

I partially followed the Queen's advice, but only asked for
D D 2

404 MEMOIRS OF THE

permission to travel. The King answered me in a most flatter-
ing letter, pitying me for having been placed in such an
unpleasant situation, entering into my distress at the futility
of all my labours, and approving of all the dispositions I had
made to secure a happier result. He consented, since my
active command was at an end, to my temporary absence,
and added that not only my pension, but also all the emolu-
ments of my military rank should be paid while I was away.

When thanking the King I asked if I might go to Palermo
to bid him and the Queen farewell. Acton knew of my request,
and wished it to be refused. The King was angry, and,
although it was his custom to give way to this man in every-
thing, he answered that he would never do anything of which
his conscience disapproved, that he had nothing but praise
for my conduct, that he thought my desire to see him and
the Queen was most natural, and that certainly he would not
oppose it. He wrote to me: "My dear Damas, I am going
to Messina on such-and-such a day ; meet me at such-and-such
a place, where I am to stay. We will have a talk, and then
you can go on from there to Palermo, and I to Messina." 21

I spent an evening with the King at the place in question,
and I should find it hard to describe the extreme confidence
and kindness with which he treated me. After a rapid review
of all the recent events, with their causes, consequences, and
most minute details, but without a single reference to Acton,
he said to me : "I have consented to let you go away, as you
wish, but only with sincere regret. As we are alone I may
tell you that the reason for my consent is my certainty that
everything that is taking place in Sicily would make you
unhappy : I therefore prefer that you should be away for a
time. But where do you think of going?" — "To Vienna,
sire," I answered, "whence I shall always be ready to come
at a word from your Majesty, if there should be anything
that I can do to serve you. I do not think I have ever done
anything to deserve personal enemies. I have always shown
outward respect to those whom my duty to your Majesty bade
me treat with deference. As long as I thought I could be
useful to you I did everything in my power, I think, to win

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 405

the esteem of all who were attached to you. Now that unfor-
tunate circumstances have made active service impossible I
think I am giving your Majesty a proof of my devotion by
saving you from the friction that my presence would cause.
The moment that your Majesty thinks otherwise I shall hasten
to your side."

The King overwhelmed me with kindness, and we parted
without mentioning Acton's name. I am persuaded that we
were both actuated by feelings of delicacy. It is inherent in
human nature to be bound by custom, and though the King
had easily shaken off Acton's influence when circumstances
parted them, it was not likely that eighteen months of absence
should have altogether effaced the deference of twenty-seven
years.

How could Acton, Elliot, and the English have hatched
their plots if I had remained in Sicily? They knew that I,
being neither English nor French, was solely, irrevocably,
and entirely devoted to the King's interests ; and that I could
no more doubt the necessity of making the alliance and the
services of England useful to those interests, than I could
doubt the iniquity of allowing the King to be subservient to
the interests of England. The English party knew well
enough that I should open the King's eyes to the dangers of
the situation, in so far as my zeal could venture to take
advantage of his confidence in me, and that I should do my
best to save the King's dignity by opposing the tyranny of
the English government. For it was by the exercise of
absolute despotism that England paid herself for her services,
which were, properly speaking, merely measures directed to
her own ends. I was the last person, therefore, that these
intriguers would care to deal with in military matters.

When I reached Palermo Acton was not there : he had
started for Messina by sea. I was curious to learn the reason
of his renewed hostility towards me. I was quite aware that
he could not feel himself under any obligation to me, seeing
that I had often been obliged to point out the harm he had
done in my own department, that it had often been my duty
to call attention to the carelessness with which he did his work,

406 MEMOIRS OF THE

and that I had even broached this question to the English
Minister, his principal agent. But I felt that some very
special reason was required to account for his fresh access of
bitterness. The Queen supplied me with the clue.

When I was recalled from Messina to Naples in September,
for the military operations, Acton concluded that he would
be recalled from Palermo. He accordingly made arrangements
for his departure, bade farewell to the whole town, turned his
telescope on the approach from Naples, and whenever a ship
was signalled had all his luggage carried down lest a moment
should be lost. Finding that all his hopes were vain he at last
began to bear me a grudge for his humiliation.

And before that, when Buonaparte insisted on my leaving
Naples', Acton had been offended because I was sent to Messina
instead of Palermo. He thought that, as I was empowered
to deal with public affairs, the Court had preferred to spare
me any supervision on his part by sending me to Messina.

Since, after all the events of every kind in which I have
been a witness and an actor, I am still regarded with con-
fidence by the King, the Queen, and the Prince, with attach-
ment by the army, and with hatred by Elliot and Acton, my
heart and conscience are satisfied, and my conduct is justified
to those who do not know me (27th June, 1806). 22

It grieves me to the bottom of my heart that after a reign
of forty years the King, a man of upright character and just
mind, should owe it to the head of his own Ministry that he
was deserted by the most influential classes in the kingdom
of Naples, who showed, only too obviously, their satisfaction
at being delivered from the tyranny of this man. So deeply
did they hate him, indeed, that they were blind to the new
yoke that was offered them. This cause does not justify their
conduct, but it explains it. The Marquis del Gallo, King
Ferdinand's ambassador to Paris, behaved inexcusably when
he became Minister for Foreign Affairs under King Joseph
Buonaparte. He should have gone to Palermo to return the
portfolio of his previous embassy. But he had been quarrel-
ling with Acton for twenty years, and is suspected of having
plotted his dismissal with Buonaparte in Paris. If he had

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 407

gone to Palermo, then, he would have been disgraced, and
some people think imprisoned. Was he a man of such fine
feeling as to prefer it?

I repeat, not one of those who have recently accepted posts
can possibly be excused ; but can a single one of them be
mentioned who did not hold Acton in horror and fear ?

Cardinal Ruffo, who was absent by the King's orders, wrote
to the Queen from Trieste that, while no one could doubt his
devotion, no one, either, could doubt that nothing would
induce him to take refuge in Sicily. He would prefer to take
any risk, and go to Rome. When he landed near Ancona he
received an order from the Pope — who was acting at the
request of the French — to remain where he was ; and his fate
is still undecided. When a king is good, but weak, it is his
minister's duty — and it is within his power — to make loyalty
to the Monarchy inseparable from loyalty to the King. If he
alienates all classes in the kingdom from the individual who
holds the sceptre, a change of dynasty makes everything right
in the eyes of the malcontents.

A decree dictated by the present circumstances has just
been issued in Sicily : the confiscation of the property of
absent Sicilians,23 in retaliation for the confiscation of the
property of the few Neapolitans who followed the King. But
among those who came from Naples to Sicily some were
relations of the absent Sicilians to whom the decree applies,
and when in Naples enjoyed a share of the Sicilian revenues.
But Acton does not exempt them from the decree : their
fidelity has robbed them of their property in Naples, but that
same fidelity is not regarded as giving them a claim to live
in Sicily. Such proceedings as these show a distorted mind,
and a heart that is hardened against the world's contempt.
For these things there is no remedy.

No reflection will furnish any comfort in the face of such
ills as these, both active and passive. Immorality, strength,
and ability will take a man far. Immorality, weakness, and
folly will take him equally far in the other direction. Luck-
less King — to be subservient to such a minister ! He must
be held responsible for everything. He is the keystone of the

408 MEMOIRS OF THE

arch that is falling on our heads to-day, in spite of all my
efforts to prop it up. For several years I have been watching
the progress of the destructive torrent that sweeps away every-
thing before it : and had it not been for this man I could
have played the part of a dyke, and have resisted the stream
for some time. I held the chief command in the army of a
Power that was a secondary one, it is true, but was richer
than Sweden, Denmark, or Portugal, and even than Frederick
II at the height of his glory. The geographical position of
the country gives it a phenomenal degree of security in the
interior, and makes its protection important to most of the
European Powers. They should have supported me, then, in
proportion to their resources, and I should have had at my
disposal all the means of defence necessary for the country's
safety; whereas the kingdom was lost simply for want of a
sufficient army, of garrisoned towns in a state of defence, of
provisions, and of all the munitions of war. I found no loyalty
among the people, no integrity among the ministers, no
fidelity among the officers of the army, and no knowledge
among the generals : everything fell to pieces when I touched
it : every branch to which I tried to cling was rotten.

I cannot be mistaken in my contention. It is impossible
to be under any misapprehension as to the origin of the
German Emperor's troubles. The term of his power is more
easily foreseen and estimated than was the downfall of the
King of Naples. The latter had a far greater power of resist-
ance : his concentrated strength might have been incalculable if
it had only been supported by goodwill. But it is only by cease-
less vigilance that due advantage can be taken of even the
most favourable conditions, and in this case the lack of that
vigilance cannot be excused by the sudden changes in the
state of Europe, and especially of France. In any case the
conduct of the King of Naples was marked out for him. He
had the great Powers to fear; any war between France and
Germany necessarily involved him : he could count on nothing
better than a state of armed independence.

I say nothing of the possibilities of conquest. A man of
genius on the throne of Naples might doubtless have had

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 409

aspirations of this kind, with great likelihood of success. But
even without any ambitions beyond the preservation of his
own dominions the King of Naples should have had a well
organised army, fortified towns in a state of defence, and a
sufficient revenue. The population, the soil, and the commerce
of his country made all these things attainable.

What one actually saw, however, was exactly the opposite
of everything that seemed desirable or probable. And yet the
King was well-intentioned, and, if he paid but scant attention
to public affairs, had a decided character at the back of his
excessive confidence in others. As for the Queen, her only
desire was to act for the best, and if she sometimes failed to
attain that goal it was because she was too eager to reach
it without delay. She often, it is true, renounced her right
to contribute to the public welfare, but she never gave up
the consolation and joy of thinking of it perpetually. Whom
can I blame, then, but the minister who for twenty-eight
years was the depositary of all their aspirations, of all their
authority, of their very conscience, and of all the means that
could raise or ruin them ?

No, I cannot feel any remorse for holding up a minister of
this kind to universal contempt. I cannot endure this mongrel
breed of men, who usurp power without really being usurpers,
show the weakness of others without proving their own
strength, and steal authority only to drag it in the dust. A
man of this kind at the helm must enfeeble any Power what-
ever : he makes it like himself, brings it into disrepute, and
sullies its brightness with his own reflection.

Gaeta surrendered at the beginning of July, after the Prince
of Hesse-Philippsthal was wounded. It was he who com-
manded the garrison ; and it was more by obstinacy and
tenacity that he delayed the capitulation than by skill and
ability. If his behaviour be carefully examined it will be
seen that he did nothing to add to the distinction of his
career. He sustained a siege for four months,24 during three
of which the place was only partially blockaded. For three-
fourths of the time he merely had to keep the gates shut.
But this is a churlish criticism. I am no churl; and I am

410 MEMOIRS OF THE

glad that he should have the full benefit of his compensation
for the dull and melancholy life he led before the defence of
Gaeta.

The English, of whom there were ten thousand in Sicily,
bethought them towards the end of June of making a descent
upon Calabria. As Sir James Craig, the general-in-command
of their army-corps, had been recalled to England, an insur-
mountable barrier to every kind of enterprise was now
removed ; and General Stuart, who was less ignorant and less
infirm than he, and was now in command, was free to attempt
a few bold and effective strokes. He made the attempt, but
neither I nor any one else could guess the object he had in
view, nor the result he expected in the case of success. Did
he wish to make Sicily safe by occupying Calabria, while
abstaining, for political reasons, from reconquering the king-
dom? In that case he did more than he should have done.
Did he, on the other hand, aim at the smaller advantage,
with the intention of seizing the greater if he could get it?
In that case his ability, his judgment, and even his integrity
were at fault, for his actions had greater results than he
could have hoped to obtain ; and everything combined — con-
ditions, chances, means, and every trifling circumstance — to
favour all his schemes, even the most precarious.

The political and military character of the English, quite
as much as their personal characteristics and their geographical
position, makes them unique as a nation. One can discuss the
projects, plans, and interests of every European Power except
England : at least, in discussing the latter, one must base
one's calculations on entirely different principles. It was in
their power to conquer Naples — it is so still. They overcame
all the obstacles that might have made it impossible, and
deliberately retraced their steps as soon as those obstacles were
safely passed. Their inexplicable conduct cannot fail to give
them a reputation for being very dangerous allies.

Not one of their calculations is ever influenced by higher
considerations. Their whole policy is a rule of mercantile
algebra, and we have not yet seen an English general whom
self-respect, or honour, or enthusiasm can move to go beyond

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 411

his orders. They do not regard mere glory as sufficient pay-
ment for anything. I pity any French general who should
enter their service.

General Stuart, in command of the troops in Sicily, and
Admiral Sidney Smith, in command of the fleet, combined to
attack the two Calabrian Provinces at the end of June 1806.
General Stuart landed in the bay of Santa Eufemia on the
1st July, while Admiral Smith cruised along the coast,
threatening various points, until he reached the Bay of Naples
and seized the island of Capri.25

On the 4th July General Reynier, who was occupying the
country near Santa Eufemia with seven thousand men, attacked
General Stuart near Maida. The position chosen by the
English general was as bad as possible, considering the lie of
the ground, but in spite of his want of foresight he com-
pletely defeated General Reynier, whom he drove back on
Catanzaro after taking three thousand prisoners. Some inter-
cepted letters, written by General Reynier 's staff, show that
the French were seized with panic.26 The result was a defeat
and a precipitate retreat, which it lay with General Stuart
to turn to the best advantage ; but he either could not or
would not profit by it. The population, whom he had sum-
moned by proclamation to rally round him, and — to use his
own words — " restore to the provinces their legitimate
sovereign," rose in arms as one man, and prepared enthusi-
astically to support him in every way. They were ready to
facilitate his advance by supplying him with abundant pro-
visions, or to clear his way before him when his pronounced
success seemed to them to call for further action. All the
masses of Calabria pushed on in advance of him, for it never
occurred to these poor creatures that he was not following
them. Reynier was pursued by them, and forced by them
to abandon Catanzaro and take refuge in the wretched fortress
at Cotrone, which was not even secure from a surprise. Stuart
sent a detachment of English and Neapolitan troops to attack
it from the sea, and as soon as they entered the harbour
Reynier evacuated the place and fell back along the coast on
Cassano, still harassed by the masses, who thought they were

412 MEMOIRS OF THE

supported by the English. They hardly looked behind them,
so sure were they that General Stuart, after his proclamation,
would advance and follow up his victory. They begged him
to hasten his advance, in order to prevent General Reynier
from joining General Verdier, who had only reached the
borders of Calabria; but when they asked him to hurry, they
never thought of asking him to start. Three weeks passed
before they could be persuaded that General Stuart, far from
supporting them, had been marching away from them towards
Scilla and Reggio, and had no intention whatever of advancing.
These wretched men whom he had dragged into the fray were
attacked daily, and ran short of ammunition. They found
themselves withstanding the French entirely alone, instead of
serving as a strong auxiliary force to a body of disciplined
regulars acting on the offensive.

While their leaders were begging and appealing for the
help they had themselves been asked to give, General Stuart
and Admiral Smith were disputing bitterly over the powers
that the King of Naples had bestowed upon one of them at
the expense of the other. This war entirely nullified the
progress and effects of the larger war.

Smith attacked and took Scilla and Amantea,27 while Stuart
refused to move an inch in advance. The unwholesome air,
which is dangerous to the inactive, spread sickness in his ranks ;
and neither the entreaties of the Sicilian Court nor the rewards,
promises, and full powers that were lavished upon him would
induce him to stir. He allowed the French to surround the
insurgents and avenge themselves on every one who had de-
clared for the English, and to burn and devastate the whole
country; nor ever moved a finger to extinguish the fire he
had himself lighted. General Stuart, it seems, came to
Calabria with the sole object of erecting scaffolds and pre-
paring tortures, to which from that fatal moment the unfor-
tunate and too-credulous Calabrians were abandoned.

After this brief account of the English attack upon Cala-
bria where does the thoughtful reader lay the blame? Are
General Stuart's abilities and common sense and conscience to
be held responsible, or the barbarous and personal policy of

COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS 413

the English government? I blame both general and govern-
ment, for if the one had not been a party to it all the other
would not have been guilty of this atrocious treachery and
cruelty. It was in virtue of the policy and instructions of his
government that Stuart dared to rest upon his feeble laurels ;
and it was in virtue of the general's character that the English
government dared to prescribe such treacherous and cruel
conduct.

When Stuart was making ready in Messina for this dis-
graceful expedition he refused to let any Neapolitan general
be associated with him on equal terms, a fact that sufficiently
shows his intentions. How could he have said to a Neapolitan :
You are in a position to recapture Naples and the kingdom,
but you shall not do it? It is quite certain that he would
have been treated with as much disregard as contempt; and
he was afraid that he might even be persuaded against his
will. It was perfectly consistent with his principles and con-
duct from first to last when, seventy days after his defeat of
Reynier, he re-embarked with all his troops for Sicily, leaving
only a few hundred men distributed between Scilla, Amantea,
and Capri, which Sidney Smith had taken.28 Cotrone and
the two Calabrian Provinces he altogether abandoned. The
insurgents are still keeping it, and long will .keep it, in a state
of agitation and riot, but no good will accrue to the Crown
thereby, nor will any end be served that can profit the general
situation.

How many times has this scene been enacted, with the
English in the role of allies, since the year 1793 ! This was
a second edition of Quiberon, and the natural sequel to their
flight from Naples, in January of this same year, 1806.

The King, when he gave me permission to leave, for a time,
this scene of sorrow and oppression, could not make me
resigned to see him under so terrible a yoke. Sicily occupied
by the English is merely a kind of maintenance-allowance
granted to a Nabob : a refuge in which Acton and the English,
with their intrigues and underhand dealings, give the Nabob
and the Queen many a sad day. The English are not only
shameless in their exactions, but even pitiless in matters of

414 MEMOIRS OF COMTE ROGER DE DAMAS

outward observance, and every moment some fresh bitterness
is added to the discomforts of the unfortunate sovereigns.
The tenth performance of the political farce played by Fox
in July and August — the attempted peace with France —
served as a pretext to remain in statu quo until the negotia-
tions were over. When they were broken off, however, and
Napoleon showed his intention of taking all his available forces
to Prussia, and it was clearly proved that he could send no
reinforcements to Naples, where his brother had no more than
ten thousand men at most, what was there to prevent the
English from restoring the King to the throne?

It is as easy to embark from the Bay of Naples as from
Calabria, and how many reasons there are for trying to keep
a footing there ! Buonaparte's troops, successful though they
be, are fully occupied in the North. A peace may result, from
which Russia may derive advantages, unless very improbable
events should occur. In that case many circumstances might
arise to favour the preservation of the Neapolitan kingdom,
under the protection of Russia, of which there would be no
question if the kingdom were not in the hands of the King,
Russia's ally.

I leave you,29 unhappy land, with no prevision of your fate !
Within you are the germs of death, but they are foreign to
your nature : may time make them powerless to harm you !

APPENDIX

THE documents published here are all connected with the
period of the comte's life that is embraced by the present
volume. The letters of the King, and more especially of the
Queen of Naples, form an important collection, and will be
published in full in another volume.

List of Comte Roger de Damas's Services.1

Joseph Elizabeth Roger de Damas.

Born, 4th September, 1765, in Paris, Rue du Bac.2

Supernumerary second-lieutenant, without pay, in the regi-
ment of the Roi-Infanterie, 9th February, 1777.3

Ensign in the compagnie colonelle, 21st April, 1778.

Captain en second of the same company, 28th March, 1784.

Absent from 1787 to 1791, but none the less promoted major
en second (1st May, 1788) ; and colonel (31st December,
1789).

Enters the service of Russia ; receives the Order of St. George,
4th class (22nd July, 1788), and a gold sword as a gift
from the Empress (19th October, 1788); St. George,
3rd class (25th March, 1791).

Is granted the privilege, in France, of keeping his name on the
roll of his regiment (10th February, 1791), with 720 fr.
of pay.

Between the years 1792 and 1806 he took part, he says, " un-
interruptedly— with the army of the Princes, the army
of Conde, and every European army without exception,

415

416 APPENDIX

in the senior ranks — in as many campaigns as there were
years of war." (Extract from a note dated 1st August,
1818.)

After commanding the Legion de Damas, formerly Legion de
Mirabeau, he enters the service of Naples. Brigadier-
General, 8th November, 1798; Lieutenant-General, 4th
November, 1799 ; Inspector-General of the Neapolitan
Forces, 12th October 1804 ; General Commandant of the
army, 3rd December, 1805.

Grand Cross of the Royal Order of St. Ferdinand and of
Merit, 8th March, 1805.

In 1814 returns to France. The Comte d'Artois appoints him
Governor of Lorraine, Alsace, and the Three Bishoprics,
8th April, 1814. Louis XVIII appoints him King's Com-
missioner in the 4th military division, 22nd April, 1814,
Lieutenant-General, 13th August, 1814, and Governor of
the 19th military division, 26th November, 1814.

Goes to Ghent with the King on the 20th March, 1815, and
is sent on a mission to Switzerland. Commissioner Extra-
ordinary to the Austrian Army ; hoists the white standard
in the departments of the Haut-Rhin, Doubs, Jura,
Haute-Saone, and Rhone. Again Governor of the 19th
division, 26th October, 1815-lst December, 1817.

Grand Cross of St. Louis.

Knight of the Legion of Honour.

Dies in the Chateau de Cirey (Haute-Marne) 3rd September,

II

Potemkine to the Comte de Damas (translation).

1
MONSIEUR,

The courage and distinguished valour that you showed
on the occasion of the defeat of the Turkish fleet on the
Liman, in June last, have earned you the goodwill of Her
Majesty, my august sovereign, who, to prove it, has graciously

APPENDIX 417

made you a Knight of the Military Order of St. George of the
fourth degree. I have the sincerest pleasure in forwarding
the insignia to you, and in assuring you of my full apprecia-
tion of your merits, and of the esteem with which I have the
honour to be, Monsieur, your very humble servant,

PRINCE POTEMKINE OF TAURIDA.
22nd July, 1788.

(Damas Archives, translation.)

MONSIEUR,

Her Majesty, as a mark of distinction for the courage
you displayed against the Turks on the Liman of Otchakow,
and as a sign of her favour, has graciously sent you a sword,
with an inscription alluding to your valour. I have the
honour to forward it to you, and I feel sure that this royal
act of kindness will only move your zeal to seek still further
distinction. I remain, with the profoundest esteem, Monsieur,
your very humble servant,

PRINCE POTEMKINE OF TAURIDA.
19th October, 1788.

(Archives of the Ministry of War, translation.)

Ill

The Empress of Russia to "our colonel the Comte
de Damas " (translation).

Your zeal for your duty, and the distinguished valour you
displayed at the capture of the town and fort of Ismai'l by
assault, and the destruction of the whole Turkish army, when,
with the troops entrusted to you, you seized the position
assigned to you with so much valour and promptitude that in
spite of the enemy's vigorous resistance you endured the full
heat of their fire, occupied the bank of the river in accordance
with your instructions, driving the enemy therefrom, and also
from the ground beyond it — all these exploits have entitled
E E

418

APPENDIX

you, according to its statutes, to our Military Order of the
holy martyr and victor George. We hereby make you a
knight of the third class of that order, and instruct you to
wear the insignia in the customary way. We are persuaded
that this encouragement on our part will prompt you to con-
tinue your efforts, and to deserve a constant increase of our
imperial favour.

CATHERINE.

POTEMKINE OF TAURIDA.
At St. Petersburg, this 25th March, 1791.

(Damas Archives ; original in Russian.)

IV

Nomination to the command of the Mirabeau Legion.

Louis, by the grace of God, King of France and of Navarre.

In view of the accounts we have received of the services and
military talents of the Comte Roger de Damas, and of the
arrangements made by him with the widow of the Vicomte de
Mirabeau, to whose heir we had assigned the proprietary rights
of the Legion that bore his father's name, we hereby transfer
the said rights to the Comte Roger de Damas, together with
all the authority, honours, and prerogatives enjoyed by his
predecessor. We consequently enjoin upon all the officers,
non-commissioned officers, private soldiers, and dragoons of the
Legion, which shall take the name of Damas, to obey all the
orders he shall give for the good of our service.

We therefore call upon our cousin the Prince de Conde,
colonel general of our infantry, both French and foreign, to
give orders for the reception of the Comte Roger de Damas
as proprietary colonel of the said Legion, formerly of
Mirabeau.

Given at Verona on the 5th July of the year 1795, the first
of our reign.

Louis.

In the King's name, the Baron of FLACHSLANDEN.

(Damas Archives.)

APPENDIX 419

Transfer of the Mirabeau Legion.

Lausanne,

8th May, 1795.

M. le comte Roger de Damas, having obtained permission
from Monsieur le Regent to become the proprietor of the
Legion of the late M. le vicomte de Mirabeau, applied to
Mme. la vicomtesse de Mirabeau for the proprietary rights,
she being the maternal trustee of her son, at present under
age, and being authorised to watch over his interests by the
will of her late husband ; and with a view to winning her
consent he proposed the following conditions :

1st. To pay and deliver punctually to Mme. de Mirabeau
in the capacity of trustee (to take the place of the pay due
to her son, who holds a captain's commission in the legion,
until such time as he shall take possession of the said com-
pany, to be hereinafter stated), the sum of three thousand
livres in cash per year, for the space of ten years, payable at
Basle in the house of M. Merian senior : namely fifteen hundred
livres when taking possession (in lieu of the last periodical pay-
ment of the said ten years), and fifteen hundred livres at the
end of six months, the payment of this sum to be repeated
every six months for ten years.

M. le comte Roger de Damas not only gives his word of
honour to fulfil the said conditions, which he regards as sacred,
but further pledges all his emoluments as a general-officer,
whether in the Russian service or elsewhere, and is willing to
be deprived of the proprietary rights of the said legion, if he
shall delay for more than four days to pay the said sums at
the appointed times.

2nd. The son of the late Vicomte de Mirabeau shall have
the right, on reaching the age of sixteen, to take a company
in any kind of corps he shall prefer in the said legion, to
bestow his name upon it, and to receive the pay of a captain
at the accepted rate. M. de Damas for his part will place him
in possession of the said company as soon as he applies for it,

EE 2

420 APPENDIX

and will have no power to make any objection; and thence-
forward he will no longer pay the sums referred to in article
1, supposing there should still be any payments due.

M. le vicomte de Mirabeau, son of the deceased, shall keep
the said company till he have reached the age of twenty-three,
at which time M. le comte de Damas is bound to restore him
to his father's position, unless M. le vicomte de Mirabeau fils
should then prefer to dispose of the rights finally to M. le
comte Roger de Damas, on the terms that he considers the
most advantageous.

3rd. If Mme. la vicomtesse de Mirabeau should succeed
before ten years have elapsed, counting from this day, in
obtaining a portion of her property in France equivalent to a
capital sum of a hundred thousand livres, the payments will
cease, as regards the sums still due, but M. de Damas will be
unable to demand the return of the sums already paid.

4th. If M. le comte de Damas should die while in possession
of the said rights the young Vicomte de Mirabeau shall at once
enter into possession of his father's legion, and the family or
heirs of M. de Damas shall have no power to make objections.

5th. Whatever may be the fate of the said legion within
the next ten years there shall be no suspension nor cessation
of the payments of three thousand livres, as stipulated in the
first article of this deed in favour of M. de Mirabeau, minor.

6th. M. le vicomte de Mirabeau, when taking possession
of his father's legion on attaining the age of twenty-three,
shall have no right to demand or claim any arrears 4 or sums
fallen due during the time that M. le comte de Damas shall
have been in possession.

Such are the terms I have proposed to Mme. la vicomtesse
de Mirabeau, in the course of which there are eight words
struck out and rendered null and void.

Lausanne, 8th May, 1795.

For Mme. de Mirabeau.

The Comte Roger DE DAMAS.

Being desirous to conform to the wishes expressed to me by
Monsieur le Regent, I am willing that M. le comte Roger de

APPENDIX 421

Damas should take possession of the proprietary rights of my
late husband, M. le vicomte de Mirabeau, subject to the
approval of Mgr. le prince de Conde, and the fulfilment of the
conditions proposed above by M. le comte Roger de Damas.

Lausanne, 8th May, 1795.

Vicomtesse DE MIRABEAU, nee DE ROBIEN.

(Archives of the Imperial House of Russia.)

VI

The Comte Roger to the Vicomtesse de Mirabeau.

Bingen,

Wth Aug. 1795.

You are doing me an injustice, Madame, if you think your
requests require any further support. The interest shown by
MM. de Chasseloir and de Gaubert in your claims cannot, I
assure you, increase my desire to be of use to you. There are
large numbers of debts in the legion, and they are all more
or less bound to be paid shortly. M. le prince de Conde 's staff
will assign certain sums for the reduction or settlement of
these debts, each in its turn. The money owed to the Jew
Wolfe is likely, I think, to be paid first : and then, Madame,
it will be in my power to keep back, from the total due to the
Jew Wolfe, the sum that you claim from him. You can feel
certain of being repaid when that time comes, but I have
neither authority nor power to hasten it : I have only power
to seize the opportunity, and I can certainly assure you, I
repeat, that it shall be done without fail. Please believe,
Madame, that the Legion de Damas cannot regard M. de Mira-
beau's wife as a stranger to the corps, and that its command-
ing-officer will lose no opportunity of proving the attachment
and respect with which he has the honour to be, Madame,
Your very humble and obedient servant,

Roger DAMAS.

422 APPENDIX

^o date.
MADAME,

It now devolves upon me, Madame, to ask your permis-
sion to do all that in me lies to prove my respectful and entire
devotion, and I hope you will be kind enough to tell me which,
among the friends you still have in the Legion, are those to
whom I may offer any services it may be in my power to render
them. You may rest assured, Madame, that my first care will
be to remind the officers of the corps very frequently that I
owe a duty to the memory of M. le vicomte de Mirabeau.

Pray accept, Madame, every assurance of the respectful
devotion with which I have the honour to be, Madame,
Your very humble and obedient servant,

Roger DAMAS.

I herewith enclose, Madame, the bill of exchange, which I
hope you will accept as it is, payable in Frankfort itself, in
order to avoid additional expense.

I told M. de Chasseloir, Madame, that I was going to do
my best to recover for you a sum of money that was raised on
some diamonds belonging to you. I think I can do it, but
it will be necessary for you to explain the circumstances to
me, if you will be so kind. It was in the accounts of the
Legion that I found this claim of yours. But the matter must
be cleared up by yourself, while the individual concerned is
still within our reach. (Arch, of the Imp. House of Russia.)

VII

Louis XVIII to the Comte Roger de Damas.5

Blankenburg,

ZthJan. 1797.

When I granted you the proprietary rights of your Legion,
Monsieur, I was not unaware of the responsibility I was placing
upon you : you have fulfilled all my expectations, and it gives

me sin

is pnii'

APPENDIX 423

me sincere pleasure to express all my satisfaction. My pleasure
is equally great in bidding you tell the whole Legion, both
officers and men of every corps and every rank, how delighted
I am that they have kept up in this campaign the glorious
reputation that they so fully earned in 1793. They do not
need my praise to make them serve me equally well in the
future, but I myself feel the need of giving it.

Pray believe, Monsieur, in the sincerity of my regard.

Louis.
(Damas Archives.)

VIII

General Championnet to the Directory.

Rome,
26th frimaire, year VII. (16£/i Dec. 1798).

... I had received no news of Kellermann nor of the corps
opposing him, but I was informed that a detached column of
the Neapolitan army, numbering 3000 men, was advancing on
Rome with a view to forcing its way through the town. I
instructed General Rey, commanding the cavalry, to go and
meet it. In the meantime my aide-de-camp, Romieu, whom I
had sent to Rome on the 24th to tell the garrison in the Castle
of St. Angelo that they were relieved, heard of the approach of
this column, and taking 200 men and two guns out of the
fort, seized the Porta del Popolo and the Ponte Molle and
checked the enemy's advance. The aide-de-camp, Rey, brought
him about thirty chasseurs in the morning of the 25th ; they
summoned the officer-in-command, General Damas, to sur-
render ; my aide-de-camp kept me informed of what was taking
place ; the enemy's general wished to parley ; the adjutant-
general, Bonnamy,6 my chief of the staff, went up and told
him simply that if he had not laid down his arms at the end
of an hour he would be attacked. The delay was necessary, to
give time for the reinforcements to arrive. I joined them with
200 cavalry. The hour expired. I ordered Adjutant-General
Bonnamy to make the attack. The infantry was only just

424 APPENDIX

coming out of Rome ; time was precious ; the enemy turned and
fled. General Rey and Adjutant-General Bonnamy took some
squadrons of the 7th and 25th Regiments of Chasseurs, and
the 16th Regiment of Dragoons followed the enemy at the
gallop. They charged across the ravines and came up with
the enemy beyond Storta. The fight became terrible. Not-
withstanding the fire of their artillery they were completely
routed ; seven guns were captured ; 1200 prisoners were taken ;
all the transport-wagons fell into our hands ; and the re-
mainder of the column was dispersed among the mountains. . . .

CHAMPIONNET.
(Arch, of the Min. of War. Armees d'ltalie et de Naples.)

IX

Order issued by the Directory.

23rd nivdse, year VII. (12th Jan. 1799).

The Executive Directory, on the grounds that the Damas
family is one of those belonging to the ci-devant haute
noblesse, which have from the beginning shown themselves
most bitterly opposed to the subversion of the monarchical
tyranny and have never ceased working for the restoration
of the Monarchy ; that its members, nearly all of whom held
military commands, abandoned their posts on the downfall of
the throne, when their country was in danger; that it is
notorious that they have rallied to the standard of the ci-
devant Monsieur, one of them being his gentleman-in- waiting,
that their devotion to the royalist party has won for Louis
Etienne Damas, ex-Comte de Crux, a brigadier-general's com-
mand in the army of the Emigres, and that a regiment in
the Pretender's army bears the name of Damas ; that the
Puisage correspondence proves that Charles Damas was sent
into the departments of the West by Monsieur, whose prin-
cipal agent he was for the royalist-catholic counter-revolution,
and that it appears from this same correspondence (see vol. II)
that the Baron de Damas was one of the Emigre's killed at

APPENDIX 425

Quiberon; and in view of the fact that, in conformity with
Article 373 of the Constitution, all idea of return must be
abandoned by the individuals inscribed on the list of emigres
under the name of Damas, whose emigration has been so per-
sistent, and so openly acknowledged by themselves, that they
have not even dared to put forward a claim nor to produce
any legal documents, in spite of the act of sequestration,
whence it follows that they are liable under Article 31, Section
III, of the law of the 25th Frimaire, Article 3 of the law
of the 26th Floreal, and Article 1 of the law of the 4th com-
plementary day of year III ; having heard the report of the
Minister of General Police,
Issues the following order :

ARTICLE 1

The names of the following persons are to remain perma-
nently on the list of emigres:

1. Charles Damas, inscribed by the department of Paris,
June 7th, 1793 ;

2. Alexandrine- Victor-Eleonore Duniet-Damas, inscribed by
the department of Paris, April 13th, 1793 ;

3. Damas, wife of Groslier (Fouligny) inscribed by the
department of Paris, August 29th, 1793 ;

4. Damas-Cormaison (sic), inscribed by the department of
the Cote-d'Or, July 20th, 1793 ;

5. Claude-Francois Damas, inscribed by the department of
Paris, September 20th, 1792 ;

6. Henry- Antoine Damas, inscribed by the department of
the Cote-d'Or, November 20th, 1792 ;

7. Louis-Etienne Damas, ex-Comte de Crux and ex-
Chevalier of St. Louis, inscribed by the department of the
Nievre, June 25th and September llth, 1792 ;

8. Charles Damas fils, inscribed by the department of the
Cote-d'Or, October 3rd, 1793 ;

9. Roger Damas fits, inscribed by the department of the
Cote-d'Or, October 3rd, 1793 ;

426 APPENDIX

10. Jean-Francois-Louis-Charles-Cesar Damas, ex-Comte,
and gentleman-in-waiting to Louis-Stanilas-Xavier Capet, in-
scribed by the department of Paris, August 2nd, 1793 ;

11. Damas, ex-colonel of the 72nd Regiment of Infantry,
inscribed by the department of the Cote-d'Or, 10th brumaire,
year II ;

12. Gaston Damas fils, inscribed by the same department,
October 3rd, 1793 ;

13. Anne-Francois-Henry Damas, ex-captain of dragoons,
inscribed by the same department on the same day.

ARTICLE 2

Their property, both personal and real, is confiscated, and
will be sold for the benefit of the Republic, in conformity
with the laws.

ARTICLE 3

They are forbidden to return to the territory of the
Republic, on pain of being treated as Emigres who have
enf ringed the law of banishment.

ARTICLE 4

It is the duty of the Minister of General Police to satisfy
himself of the legality of the documents and the validity of
the evidence produced to prove the residence in France of
any persons of this name who shall be permitted to have their
names struck off the list by order of the Executive Directory
or the Committee of Legislation.

ARTICLE 5

This order shall not be printed ; it is the duty of the
Ministers of General Police, Justice, and Finance, each in so

APPENDIX 427

far as it concerns his own department, to see that it be
executed.7

Passed as correct,
The President of the Executive Directory,

LAREVELLIERE-LfiPEAUX .

(National Archives. F7 5882.)

Nomination of the Comte Roger to various appointments in
the Neapolitan Army.

I. — NOMINATION TO THE RANK OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL.
(8th November, 1798.)

FERDINANDO IV per la grazia di Dio Re delle Sicilie, Geru-
salemme, ecc., Infante di Spagna, Duca di Parma, Piacenza,
Castro, ecc., Gran Principe Ereditario di Toscana, ecc.

Essendo venuto ad ammettere al mio real servizio Voi, conte
don Ruggiero di Damas, a riguardo de' vostri talenti e cogni-
zioni militari, di cui avete dato saggio nel servizio di altre
potenze, come delle altre vostre distinte circostanze, vi ho
quindi nominato per maresciallo di campo de' miei Eserciti,
nella quale classe pero dovrete prender rango in appresso con
quegli altri marescialli di campo, che io venissi a nominare tra
gli attuali brigadieri de' detti miei Eserciti. Pertanto vi do
e concede tutta I'autorita, azione ed incumbenza che corri-
sponde a tal impiego, per cui comando ed ingiungo al coman-
dante generale della provincia o dell' esercito ove servirete,
agli altri uffiziali maggiori e minori ed a' soldati tutti di
qualsivoglia grado e condizione essi sieno, che vi abbiano,
riconoscano e reputino per maresciallo di campo de' miei
Eserciti, vi conservino e faccian conservare quegli onori e quelle
preeminenze, prerogative ed esenzioni, che per la divisata carica
vi spettano e debbonvi esser conservate e mantenute esatta-
mente, poiche tal' e la mia volonta, e che nelle officine di conto

428 APPENDIX

e razione dove spetti si faccia registro di questo dispaccio e
vi si formi 1'appuntamento del soldo di 298 ducati e grana 82
mensuali, che vi si dovra liberare e pagare nel tempo che in
virtu di lettere di servizio vi troverete impiegato in campagna ;
giacche senza di quelle e servendo Voi in quartiere o in altro
luogo, ove io vi destini, vi si dovra soltanto pagare in ciascun
mese il soldo di 149 ducati e grana 41, ed affinche tutto cio
venga puntualmente adempito ho comandato di spedirvisi il
presente titolo firmato di mia real mano, munito del suggello
segreto delle mie armi e roborato dall' infrascritto mio segre-
tario di Stato pel dipartimento di Guerra.

Dato nel campo di San Germano, agli 8 novembre 1798.

FERDINANDO B.
Giov. Maria ARIOLA.

II. — PROMOTION TO THE RANK OF LIEUTENANT-GENERAL.
(4th November, 1799.)

DON FERDINANDO per la grazia di Dio Re delle Sicilie. . . .
Avendo presco in considerazione gli ottimi servigi ordinart e
straordinari renduti da Voi alia mia real corona, maresciallo
di campo conte don Ruggiero di Damas, in pace ed in guerra,
non che le cognizioni militari e le altre distinte e plausibili
circostanze, che in voi concorrono, son venuto a darvi un nuovo
contrassegno del mio sovrano gradimento, promuovendovi a
tenente generate de' miei reali Eserciti, con dover voi prendere
rango secondo 1'anzianita della vostra precedente graduazione.
Per tanto comando ai capitani generali, comandanti generali,
ai governatori delle armi, agli altri uffiziali maggiori e minori
ed ai soldati de' miei Eserciti che vi reputino ed abbiano,
riconoscano e tengano per tenente generate de' miei Eserciti,
conservandovi e facendovi conservare tutti gli onori, grazie,
preeminenze e prerogative che vi spettano e debbonvi essere
conservate e mantenute, essendo tale la mia volonta : ed ordino
che nelle reali officine, cui spetti, si prenda ragione, ossia
notizia del presente real titolo. Ed affinche tutto cio venga
puntualmente adempito, ho comandato di spedirvisi il detto
real titolo firmato di mia real mano, munito del suggello

APPENDIX 429

segreto delle mie armi e roborato dall' infrascritto segretario
della mia Real segretaria di Stato e Guerra.
Palermo, ai 4 novembre 1799.

FERDINANDO B.

Pietro LANZA.

III. — APPOINTMENT TO THE POST OF INSPECTOR-GENERAL OF

ALL THE KING'S FORCES.

(12th October, 1804.)

Eccellentissimo Signore, Sua Maesta, riconoscendo neces-
sario un sistema di maggiore uniformita nella tenuta de' corpi
di linea del suo reale Escercito e volendo che 1'istruzione de'
medesimi si estenda a conoscere le operazioni riunite per le
different! armi, ha preso nel tempo stesso in considerazione i
talenti, esperienze e cognizioni militari, che concorrono nella
persona di V. E., e percio e venuta a nominarla Ispettore
generale di tutte le armi e truppe esistenti nel regno di Napoli,
con tutti i poteri e prerogative assegnate a quell' impiego,
restando sino a nuov' ordine gl' ispettori e comandanti di
divisione nella loro attuale situazione sotto il di Lei comando.
Relativamente al corpo reale di artiglieria e del genio ed al
corpo delle milizie s'intende che V. E. li abbia sotto la sua
direzione per 1 'impiego ed uso militare da farsi di detti corpi,
dipendendo pel resto dalle loro rispettive ispezioni, le quali
degli ultimi risultati della loro operazioni renderanno conto
all' E. V. Resta considerate fuori della sua ispezione il corpo
delle guardi de' granatieri reali. La M. S. e venuta ad accor-
darle il soldo di tenente generale impiegato con le corrispon-
denti razioni diarie e ducati 100 mensuali per le spese di
segretaria.

Nel R. nome lo participo a V. E. con mio piacere per sua
intelligenza ed adempimento corrispondenti.

Palazzo, 12 ottobre 1804.

Bartolommeo FORTEGUERRI.

430 APPENDIX

IV. — APPOINTMENT TO THE POST OF GENERAL-COMMANDANT

OF THE ARMY.
(3rd December, 1805.)

Eccellentissimo Signore, La Maesta del Re, dopo molte
riprove del particolare attaccamento e delle militari cognizioni
che 1' E. V. li ha date in ogni occasione di guerra e di distinte
commissioni eseguite nelle passate campagne, con infinita sod-
disfazione, fissa nella sua persona la scelta di stima e di fiducia
che corrisponde alle attuali significant circostanze, e viene a
nominarla Comandante generale dell* armata napolitana con
tutte quelle prerogative e facolta che le furono accordate nella
campagna di Toscana, nelle quale 1' E. V. sostenne con sommo
impegno e successo 1'onore e decoro delle sue R. truppe ;
rimettendo queste un' altra volta sotto il suo comando, vive
la M. S. nella sicurezza di vederle agire nell* istessa traccia
della bravura e dell' onore. Nel R. nome lo participo all'
E. V. per sua intelligenza.

Palazzo, 3 dicembre 1805.

Bartolommeo FORTEGUERRI.

(Damas Archives.)

XI

Louis XVIII to the King of Naples.
" Copy sent by His Majesty to M. le comte Charles de Damas."

Mittau,
ZQth February, 1800.

Monsieur my brother and cousin, it is a great satisfaction
to me to think that the zeal and services of the Comte Roger
de Damas have won Your Majesty's approval. He comes of
a family that has always been distinguished for its loyalty, of
which it gave a very striking example during the Revolution,
for in all its branches (and they are numerous) there was not
a single individual whose conduct was unworthy of a true
knight of France.

APPENDIX 431

Your Majesty's kindness to the Comte Roger encourages
me to speak to you with regard to the Comte Charles, his
eldest brother. I love all the Damas, but if there be one of
them for whom I have a special predilection it is the Comte
Charles. Since he has been attached to my household from
his earliest youth I have had every facility for learning to
know his character, which is honour itself. I must add that
he is an extremely distinguished officer, and in recommending
him to Your Majesty in case he should be able, as I wish, to
go to Italy, I am giving the generous hearts of Your Majesty
and the Queen your wife the satisfaction of distinguishing a
faithful and devoted servant of my unfortunate brother.

At the same time I believe I am giving Your Majesty an
undeniable proof of the tender and sincere friendship with
which I remain, Monsieur my brother and cousin. . . .

(Damas Archives.)

XII

The Comte Roger to the Queen of Naples.

Messina,
18th May, 1805.

MADAME,

It gives me the greatest surprise and real distress to
see that the loyal and honourable intentions expressed in the
letter enclosed with the little book, and Your Majesty's 20th
letter, only reached you in the month of May, though they
left the hand that signed them on the 3rd January last. I
am still more distressed when I consider that even now, when
the letter has at last reached Your Majesty, all the means we
require are still at a great distance from us, and the discussion
is only beginning, so that it seems to me we are a long way
from realising our object.

It seems surprising, too, that so fine and simple a letter as
the one written to the King should be accompanied by a series
of questions so complicated as most of those that General L.8
has sent to be answered by the government.

432 APPENDIX

However, we must start from the point at which we have
arrived, and if, by good fortune, such measures as this general
will permit us to take should not be much too late, and the
excitement roused by his arrival should not create difficulties
— as it easily may — we must smooth the way for such advan-
tages as we can secure, by answering all these questions that
he has thought it necessary to draw up, and co-operating with
him whenever he decides to help us.

General L. imagines the finances of the country to be in a
very flourishing state, since he asks for an amount of money
that appears likely to prove as burdensome as the other sum
with which he deals in detail. But I cannot dispute the
matter : the government and M. de Medici alone can decide
this important point, and I greatly hope that, if this payment
be an indispensable factor in extricating us from our present
position, it will not be regarded as an insurmountable obstacle.
We shall be fortunate enough if this matter of money, which
is being discussed so prematurely, can surmount the difficulties
of such a critical and precarious situation. None the less
we must do our best to husband our resources and employ
means to increase them, at the same time trying in every way,
and using all our skill and prudence to make them unnecessary.
I am grateful to the bottom of my heart for the confidence
with which Your Majesty honours me : I shall never abuse it,
and I accept it proudly and confidently as a recognition of
my devotion to your cause.

I do not think it possible, unfortunately, if the proposed
reinforcements be still in the Black Sea, for them to be here
in less than two months, and everything will be decided in
Milan in a month, and perhaps earlier. If Your Majesty's
straightforward request to Napoleon, supported by the efforts
of the Marquis del Gallo and Cardito, should be granted and
the troops removed, he will be only too glad for the Russians
to land in the north of Italy instead of in Naples; but, I
repeat, we must not build upon this hope when discussing the
matter with General L. If it should be realised we must of
course profit by it, but in the meantime we must answer his
proposals as secretly and quietly as possible, for this general

APPENDIX 433

is too late to quell the storms that his intentions would rouse,
if they were known.

Yesterday I despatched Lieutenant La Rocca, in accordance
with what Your Majesty wrote in your last letter. I can
assure Your Majesty that you will find him able to answer
every question accurately and minutely ; he has a very clear
head, and if Your Majesty will let him talk to General L. he
is sure to be pleased with him. I have entrusted several im-
portant details to him for Your Majesty ; and Your Majesty
will find enclosed the answers to the questions posed by the
traveller.9

I can well imagine that Your Majesty's courage and patience
must be nearly worn out, and that you must have been greatly
agitated by little Sherbatow's adventure. It is to be hoped
that the Emperor will not take it ill. I think he will attribute
it to Your Majesty's tenderness for the memory of a friend.
It would certainly have been as well that such an incident
should not have occurred in the present circumstances.

I notice, in the letter to the King, a request that his troops
should be under the orders of the foreign general. We are
not in a sufficiently secure position to make difficulties on this
point. At any other time we might have remarked on the
strangeness of an auxiliary force being in command of the
national army, but provided the results be favourable, we
must make no objection in a matter of this kind.

Your Majesty did not enlarge, in your letter, on the reverses
that you think the English may have sustained. I wondered
whether that could mean that they had really been defeated.
If it were so, Elliot would not consent to treat. Your Majesty
will of course recognise the importance of being extremely
circumspect with him.

(Damas Archives.)

434 APPENDIX

XIII

Letter written by General the Comte Mathieu Dumas.19

Villepintel,
18th January, 1825.

It was with the keenest interest, monsieur le marquis, that
I read the note you did me the honour of confiding to me,
on the plan adopted for the defence of Calabria by the Comte
Roger de Damas at the time of our invasion in 1806.

The general showed perfect judgment and skill in seizing
the central position, the key to the only means of communica-
tion between the roads on the shores of the two seas. His
dispositions for an active defence were excellent ; for the inter-
mediary corps acting on the flank of our columns would at the
same time have retarded our march and covered the concen-
trating movement of your wings. All the general lacked was
what he had no power to create : good troops, and officers
trained to this sort of warfare and deserving of his confidence.
A French army-corps would not have been beaten, would not
even have been attacked, at Campo Tenese, and if the English
and Russian auxiliaries, instead of re-embarking in such a
hurry, had put themselves under the orders of the Comte de
Damas, and had covered the retreat of the government and its
remaining resources into the northern province of Calabria,
our conquest of the capital would have been useless. With
this nucleus of trustworthy troops and your strong position
between the two seas, where you could not, in view of your
abundant means and your maritime superiority, be in any
want of supplies or ammunition, you could have long disputed
the possession of these two provinces, and have made us pay
very dearly for them.

This was sufficiently proved by the course of events until
after the taking of Gaeta.

Pray accept my sincere thanks, General, and the assurance of
my most profound regard, with which I have the honour to be
Your very humble and obedient servant,

The Comte Mathieu DUMAS.

(Damas Archives.)

NOTES

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

Page v, note 1. — SAINT-SIMON, Memoires (Boislisle's edition), X,
146. Cf. IX, 253.

Page vi, note 2. — Lettres sur la derniere guerre des Turcs (Letter
III, from the camp before Oczakow, 1st August, 1788).

Pago vi, note 3. — Their genealogy appears in L'Histoire geneo-
logique de France, etc., by PERE ANSELME, VIII, 317 et seq. IX
(supplement, 2nd part), 808.

Page vii, note 4. — The first company of an infantry regiment
(Translator).

Page vii, note 5. — Correspondance secrete inedite, published by
DE LESCURE, 24th and 29th January, 1786, II, 9-10. — Prince DE
LIGNE, Deuxieme lettre de Crimee.

Page ix, note 6. — Journal de mes campagnes (Archives of foreign
affairs, Russia, Memoires et documents, vol. XX). Langeron appar-
ently wishes to protest against the Prince de Ligne's "liked by
every one."

Page ix, note 7. — Archives nationales, FT 3374.

Page xi, note 8. — A signed paper written by him, called Fragment
important sur la politique autrichienne , which apparently belongs to
the year 1793, is preserved in the private library of the Emperor of
Russia in the Winter Palace (Lobanov collection).

His arrete de radiation is dated 13th Fructidor, year IV.

Page xii, note 9. — In the Gaulois of 9th September, 1895. A great
part of this story was reproduced by BITTARD DES PORTES in his
Histoire de Varmee de Conde (p. 299, note).

Page xiv, note 10. — This portrait was published (1st August, 1911)
in the Feuilles d'histoire, where it was wrongly attributed to the
notorious Abbe de Montgaillard. It must have been derived from a
letter from Marreux-Montgaillard to d'Antraigues, dated 1st December,
1798 (Dijon Library, under d'Antraigues, MS. 1547).

Page xiv, note 11. — Archives nationales, F7 5882. It was to this
decree that Louis XVIII indirectly referred in his letter of the 20th
February, 1800, to the King of the Two Sicilies: "I love all the
Damas. . . ."

F F 2 435

436 NOTES

Page xv, note 12. — Letter of the 18th February, 1801, in the first
volume of Murat's Correspondance now in process of publication.

Page xvi, note 13. — Alquier wrote to Paris on the 23rd Ventose,
year XIII: "There is no important affair that H.I.M. could depute
me to negotiate which would be as unpleasant and difficult as this.
. . . The whole kingdom thought for several days that the French
army was going to march on Naples, and there is no doubt that the
Court was prepared, inconceivable as it may seem, to risk this disaster
rather than dismiss M. de Damas."

The Queen's letters to Napoleon have been published by M. Boulay
de la Meurthe, in Quelques lettres de la reine Marie Caroline, etc.
(Revue d'histoire diplomatique, II, 559 and 562).

Page xvi, note 14. — The emigre Louis de Bouille\ who fought in
the French ranks on this occasion, expresses himself (Souvenirs et
fragments, III, 7) malevolently on the subject of Damas 's tactics.
Napoleon, who took a juster view from a distance, wrote to his
brother Joseph (Correspondance, No. 10043): "General Damas could
do nothing of any use with such bad troops as the Neapolitans."

Page xviii, note 15. — Portraits russes, by Grand Duke Nicolas

MlKHAILOVITCH, I, 129.

Page xix, note 16. — Baronne DU MONTET, Souvenirs, 57-58.

Page xix, note 17. — Archives nationales, F7 6470, dossier 187.

Page xxi, note 18. — Mme. DE CHASTENAY, Memoires.

Page xxiii, note 19. — A letter from Damas to his friend Lieut. -Col.
Pion (9th July, 1817), kindly shown to me by M. Maurice Chipon,
thus explains his reasons for retiring : " Lyons is quite quiet. At the
time of the disturbance I did my best to make them send [General
Vionnet, Vicomte de] Maringone thither, but could not succeed. I
pointed out to all the ministers that the lieut. -general, who cannot
leave the town, is unable to keep an eye on the other places in the
department. . . . The civil police will always do all they can to under-
rate the military police, and it is always the latter who make all
the discoveries. . . . My leave ends in September, but I shall do my
very best to obtain leave again, if they do not pay more attention to
me than to the agents of the police. . . ."

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

Page 1, note 1. — The author is addressing his brother, the Abbe"
de Damas.

Page 1, note 2. — Charles-Francois-Louis- Joseph-Cesar, first Comte
de Damas and afterwards Due; born 28th October, 1758, died 5th
March, 1829; officer of artillery under Marshal Rochambeau in America,

NOTES 437

Colonel of the Dauphin Dragoons (1783) and afterwards of Monsieur's
Dragoons (1788), Brigadier-General in Condi's army, Lieut. -General
and peer of France in 1814, Duke in 1825.

Page 2, note 3. — Comte Roger was at that time captain en second of
the colonelle company. He seems to regard his promotion to this rank
(28th March, 1784) as marking the end of his education. His regiment
had been garrisoned at Nancy since 1783.

Page 2, note 4. — Varennes (Seine-et-Marne) in the canton of Monte-
reau. The chateau belonged to the Due du Chatelet. It was destroyed
in the Revolution, except for some offices and an annexe (the present
Chateau de Varennes) belonging to Mme. H. Carre, who kindly gave
us this information.

Page 3, note 5. — It was on the 16th August, 1787, that Turkey
declared war by confining the Russian Ambassador in the castle of the
Seven Towers. The Austro-Russian alliance was founded on an ex-
change of letters between the sovereigns, begun in 1781 and completed
by the famous " Greek project."

Page 3, note 6.— The Nogais Tatars inhabited the S.E. of Russia.
Elizabethgrad (we retain in the text the form that was usual at that
time) is in the province of Kherson. On this country see the Comte
de Se"gur, Souvenirs et anecdotes (edited by F. Barriere, vol. II, p. 53
et seq.).

Page 3, note 7. — The famous writer and general, Charles- Joseph,
Prince de Ligne (1735-1814). Cf. an account of him by another
Frenchman who knew him about this time, his companion on the
journey to the Crimea — Se"gur. (Op. cit., vol. I, p. 422 et seq.;
vol. II, p. 13 et seq., 43 et seq., etc.)

Page 4, note 8. — Alphonse-Claude-Charles Perregaux of Neuchatel in
Switzerland, a descendant of some French Protestant refugees (1750-
1808). He had attained some repute as a banker under the old regime,
and was a partisan, though a moderate one, of the Revolution. Bona-
parte appointed him chairman of the directors of the Banque de France
(cf. L. DE LANZAC DE LABORIE, Paris sous Napoleon, vol. VI, p. 139),
and afterwards made him a senator and a count. He was Marshal
Marmont's father-in-law, and his son, the Emperor's chamberlain,
married Marshal Macdonald's daughter. Laffite was his employe, his
colleague, and his successor.

Page 5, note 9. — Patrice de Wall was descended from a very old
Irish family. He was born in Paris in 1764, was lieutenant in the
King's Regiment, 1785, and married Adele de Rohan a short time
before his duel, which took place on the 26th November, 1787 (accord-
ing to Despres, who devotes a most eulogistic article to Wall in the
Biographic Michaud). — See the Introduction on the subject of the
Damas-Broglie duel.

Page 7, note 10. — Florent-Louie-Marie, Due du Chatelet-Lomont

438 NOTES

d 'Haraucourt , colonel of the King's Regiment, in which he had placed
his nephew before the requisite age. He was born at Se*mur in 1727,
was a son of the celebrated Marquise du Chatelet, became duke in
1777, was colonel of the Navarre Regiment at the age of 16, and
afterwards of the King's Regiment, was made lieutenant-general, and
soon afterwards (1788) colonel of the French Guards. He made him-
self unpopular by trying to enforce discipline. He was a deputy for
Barrois in the States General. He refused to emigrate, and died
on the scaffold in 1793, as did also his wife, Diane- Adelaide de
Rochechouart.

Page 9, note 11. — Victor Amadeus, Prince of Anhalt-Bernbourg-
Schaumbourg (1744-1790). He entered the Empress's service in 1772
and was made lieutenant-general in 1782. After the campaign against
the Turks he fought in Finland, where he was mortally wounded.
The Prince de Ligne gives a brilliant and eulogistic description of him
in his famous letter of 1st August, 1788, which also contains portraits
of Potemkin, Nassau-Siegen, and Roger de Damas himself. Corberon
writes that his face "expresses frankness and sensibility," and that
"every one likes him" (Souvenirs, vol. I, p. 156).

Page 10, note 12. — Antoine-Joseph-Philippe-Re'gis, Comte d'Esterno
(1741-1790), began life as a cornet in the light-horse of the King's
Guard. His marriage-contract with Mile. d'Ecquevilly was signed by
the King, 27th March, 1769. He was plenipotentiary at Liege in
January 1782, and in Berlin in February. He held the latter post till
his death (1st August, 1790). Dieudonne Thiebault eulogises him in
Souvenirs de vingt ans de sejour a Berlin , ed. Barriere, vol. II,
p. 59.

Page 10, note 13. — Mathieu Falciola, otherwise Dumontchoisy, was
appointed secretary to the French legation in Berlin in 1782, and
charge d'affaires on the 23rd August, 1790. Mirabeau taxes him with
"heaviness." (La mission secrete de Mirabeau a Berlin, ed. Wel-
schinger, p. 461.)

Page 10, note 14. — Lome*nie de Brienne, the minister at the head of
affairs in 1787 and 1788.

Page 11, note 15. — "France has had a fall," said Joseph II, "and
I doubt if she will ever rise again."

Page 11, note 16. — Henry and Ferdinand were the uncles of the
reigning King, Frederick William II. Henry was the famous Prince
Frederick Henry Louis (1726-1802), the companion in glory of his
brother Frederick II : his Life was written, in French, in 1809. Ferdi-
nand was the youngest (1730-1813) : he was an infantry-general, and
was very brave, and devoted to Frederick II. He suffered from ill-
.health.

Page 12, note 17.— The Great Frederick.

Page 12, note 18. — Frederick II 's favourite residence before his

NOTES 439

accession. It is described by E. LAVISSE, in Le Grand Frederic avant
Vavenement, Paris, 1893, p. 55 et seq.

Page 13, note 19.— By Piccinni, 1780.

Page 13, note 20. — To the Comte de Segur, who was also well
received by him (Souvenirs et anecdotes, vol. I, p. 295 et seq.), the
prince spoke of Russia in much the same way as this.

Page 14, note 21. — Otto Magnus (1736-1800), created a count by
Joseph II (1775). He took a very active part in the partition of
Poland.

Page 17, note 22. — Light grey coat, with lining, collar, facings, and
revers of royal blue, which was also the colour of the waistcoat and
breeches. The officers had gold-lace round the buttonholes. This
regiment wore helmets.

Page 17, note 23. — Giuseppe Sarti, of Faenza (1729-1802), Cheru-
bini's master. Langeron gives examples of his ingenuity. He formed
an orchestra of horns, each of which only emitted one note; and he
introduced cannon into the Te Deum of Otchakof.

Page 17, note 24. — Potemkin's affection for the daughters of his
sister Helen and Vassili Engelhardt was carried to excess. There
were six of them: Anna (1740-1820), who married M. Joukof;
Alexandrina (1754-1838), married in 1781 to Count Xavier Braniki,
hetman of the Crown of Poland; Varvara (1757-1815), married to
Prince Serge Galitzine; Nadejda (1761-1834), married to P. Ismailof;
Catherine (1761-1829), married to Count Paul Skavronski, who was
ambassador at Naples; Tatiana (1767-1841), married to Lieut. -General
M. S. Potemkin, and afterwards to Prince N. Youssoupof. Catherine
Troubetzkoi, too, Prince Serge's daughter, had married Potemkin's
nephew, his sister Marie's son, Alexander Nikolaievitch Samoilof, a
lieutenant-general and one of the Empress's councillors (1744-1814).
She is said to have been equally favoured by the Prince of Taurida,
in whose camp she appeared with most of his other nieces. The Prince
de Ligne wrote a letter to her in verse. The Collection de portraits
russes, the publication of which we owe to the Grand Duke Nicolas
Mikhailovitch, contains portraits of nearly all of them. We shall
see that at least one of them was favourably disposed towards the
Comte Roger.

Page 18, note 25. — There is a whole literature on the " Prince of
Taurida." See the accounts of him by Ligne (letter of August 1788)
and S^gur (op. cit., vol. I, p. 347, 361; vol. II, p. 16), and Langeron 's
very severe appreciation (Foreign affairs, Russia, 20). Waliszewski
describes the camp before Otchakof in Autour d'un trone, p. 124
et seq.

Page 18, note 26. — Nicolas Vassilievitch (1734-1801), the last of the
Repnins. He served as a volunteer in the French army during the
Seven Years' War. He was ambassador in Poland, where he con-

440 NOTES

stantly plotted against the government and made himself hated (1764-
1768), and in Turkey, where he signed the treaty of Kamardji. He
was disgraced in 1792 at Potemkin's instigation, in spite of the decisive
victories over the Turks. Paul I made him a field-marshal, and then
suddenly degraded him from that rank. Waliszewski (Autour d'un
trone, p. 51) judges him severely; Se"gur (op. cit., vol. I, p. 346) calls
him "a polished courtier and brave general."

Page 18, note 27.— George Vladimirovitch (1740-1830). He fought
in the Seven Years' War and the campaign of 1813, as well as in the
campaigns against the Turks.

Page 18, note 28. — Louis-Philippe de Se"gur (1753-1830), the famous
author of the Souvenirs et anecdotes. He refers to Roger de Damas
in terms of eulogy (vol. II, p. 137), but says nothing of his arrival.
Ambassador in Russia from 1784 to 1789.

Page 21, note 29. — See the frontispiece.

Page 21, note 30. — Namely in becoming a constitutional monarchist,
and afterwards an adherent of Napoleon, who made him Grand Master
of the Ceremonies. He even returned to the Emperor during the
Hundred Days. He entered the Chamber of Peers, however, in 1819.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

Page 23, note 1. — Charles Nicolas Otho (1745-1809). He was most
original and adventurous — had been round the world, had undertaken
to found a kingdom in Dahomey, and had served in the French army
as colonel of the Royal Germans before being employed in the Russian
service as an admiral. The Prince de Ligne praises him highly.
Se*gur, who became his brother-in-arms after having been on the point
of fighting with him without any reason, writes of him thus: "He
was a courtier in every Court, a soldier in every camp, a knight in
every adventure" (Souvenirs, vol. I, p. 63). The Due DE LEVIS
(Souvenirs et portraits, p. 185) declares he had no brains and no talent.
A. CHUQUET (La premiere Invasion prussienne, Paris, 1886, p. 120)
gives a portrait of him as a soldier. Since then the Marquis D'ARAGON
has published Le Prince Charles de Nassau Siegen, d'apres sa corre-
spondance . . . de 1784 a 1789 (Paris, 1893). Several passages in the
prince's letters to his wife relate to Damas, as do the following
pleasant words: "Roger de Damas is a very good fellow. He has
none of the self-sufficiency and foppishness common to most French-
men who have been, like him, a little spoilt. He is very good-
tempered, and has one of those prepossessing faces that make one like
a man even without knowing much of him. He is very enthusiastic,
and on the alert for any chance of distinguishing himself " (p. 201).

Page 23, note 2.— The Dnieper. The Liman is the estuary common

NOTES 441

to that river and the Bug. Otchakow is 30 versts south of Kher-
son, and faces Kinbourn. The latter had belonged to Russia since
1774.

Page 23, note 3. — Peter Alexandrovitch, Count of Roumiantzof
(1730-1796). Fought in the Seven Years' War and the campaigns that
forced Turkey to accept the treaty of Kainardji. Catherine II made
him a field-marshal and conferred on him the name of Zadonaiskol
(the Transdanubian). In the campaign with which we are here con-
cerned he was so seriously annoyed by Potemkin's deliberate inaction
that he resigned his command and retired once for all to his country
place. Langeron declares he had brilliant abilities, which were spoilt
by his want of heart.

Page 24, note 4. — The famous field-marshal, Frederick Josias of
Saxe-Coburg (1737-1815).

Page 24, note 5.— Count Ivan Petrovitch Saltykof (1730-1805), major-
general after the Seven Years' War, and lieutenant-general in Rou-
miantzof's army against the Turks. Made a brilliant assault on
Khotyim.

Page 25, note 6.— Official appointment 26th March, 1788 (old style).

Page 26, note 7. — No doubt the surgeon Massot is here referred to.

Page 26, note 8. — The future field-marshal, Alexander Vassilievitch
Souvorof (1729-1800), "one of the most extraordinary men of the
century," "a great warrior and great statesman," as Langeron writes
in his unpublished memoirs, giving at the same time some remark-
able instances of his simulated madness. Alfred Rambaud, in a lecture
on Souvorof given at the school of Saint-Cyr, gives a select biblio-
graphy (L'Armee a travers les ages, 2e se'n'e, Paris, 1900).

Page 29, note 9. — Diane-Adelaide de Damas, born 25th January,
1761, married the 12th August, 1777, to the Comte Charles -Fran Qois
de Simiane, died 9th April, 1835.

Page 31, note 10. — "Let us fly : we can do nothing! "

Page 32, note 11. — "It is a great pleasure at his age," wrote Nassau
on this occasion (D'ARAGON, op. cit., p. 225).

Page 32, note 12. — A little island in the Black Sea, 12 versts S.W.
of Otchakof, facing the estuary of the river Berezanne.

Page 33, note 13. — The principal vessels were ten ships oi the line
and six frigates

Page 33, note 14. — Glouboki Liman, a little port further down the
Dnieper than Kherson.

Page 34, note 15.— In a letter to Grimm (18th September, 1790)
Catherine mentions the admiration of the Grand Duke Constantine for
this heroic action.

Page 35, note 16. — The famous Scotsman, who was first a corsair
and then an American commodore, died in Paris (1747-1792). SEGUR
speaks of him in his Souvenirs (vol. I, p. 45) and he left some short

442 NOTES

memoirs of his own, which end in 1787. He had arrived on the
4th June.

Page 35, note 17. — In the midst of the cannonade with which the
Turks greeted this reconnaissance Nassau — so he says — was holding
his wife's portrait. "So the Comte de Damas looked at the portrait
of his sister, and one of the officers declared that never, in any sea-
fight, had any one looked at two such pretty portraits" (D'ARAGON,
p. 232).

Page 35, note 18. — On the following day Nassau described the
engagement to his wife and praised every one who took part in it :
"They all behaved like heroes " (Ibid., p. 235).

Page 37, note 19. — Joseph Boujon, otherwise Ribas, was born at
Naples, the son of a Spaniard employed in the Ministry of Marine.
He was patronised by Orlof and then by Potemkin, and became an
admiral in 1789. Juign6 the French Ambassador, and Langeron
recognised his ability and talents. Langeron depicts him — in spite of
his base compliance towards Potemkin, with whom he filled the part
of "confidant, go-between, and favourite," — as one of the bravest and
most active leaders of the Russian army : " He was gifted with the
rarest talents. ... I have never seen such a combination of skill,
intelligence, and energy."

Page 38, note 20. — A rough man called Hassan the Algerian, and
known as "the crocodile of the sea of battles." He escaped from the
disaster of Tchesme by swimming away with his sword between his
teeth. He was appointed Capitana Pacha in order that he might
reform the Turkish fleet. "We are still Osmanlis," he said, "and I
hope to make it evident ! " At Constantinople he conceived the idea
of making a companion of a lion, which one day took part unceremoni-
ously in an interview between the Capitana Pacha and the French
Ambassador, Choiseul-Goufi&er. Hassan was said to be comparatively
enlightened and favourably inclined to the French (L. PINGAUD,
Choiseul-Gouffier, p. 84, Paris, 1887). "One of the most intrepid
soldiers in Europe, as well educated as a Turk can be, active, enthu-
siastic, with a heart on fire for the service of his country " (LANGERON).
He was Grand Vizier in 1789.

Page 38, note 21. — There is a miniature on porcelain, representing
the scene, in the possession of the count's family. Roger, standing
up in his boat, is presenting to the Prince of Nassau, who is in his
own boat, the green flag surmounted by a crescent. Upon it is this
inscription: "Naval engagement of the 17/28 June, 1788, in the
Liman. The Comte Roger de Damas, who was deputed to board the
Turkish flag-ship, presents to the Prince of Nassau the flag of Mahomet,
captured for the first time since the creation of the fleet." This
miniature, which was a gift from Nassau, must be a reduced copy of
the picture given to the latter by the King of Poland.

NOTES 443

Page 39, note 22. — Langeron admits that such fights as these "had
an element of the prodigious/' Potemkin attributed them to the in-
tervention of his patron-saint, St. Gregory.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

Page 46, note 1. — It is interesting to compare the Count's reflections
on the Russian and Turkish armies with those of Langeron in his
memoirs, and with the Prince de Ligne's description of the Turks as
"the most dangerous and most contemptible of enemies" (Letter of
1st September, 1788).

Page 47, note 2. — Eugene of Savoy-Carignano, Louis XIV 's opponent
(1663-1736), and Gedeon-Ernest, Baron de Laudon (1716-1790), who
were both field-marshals in the service of Austria.

Page 48, note 3. — Segur speaks of him (Souvenirs, vol. I, p. 383),
and L. PINGAUD (Choiseul-Gouffier, p. 98, 184, 193, et seq., 212) gives
an account of his undertaking, which he carried out in spite of all
obstacles, with a degree of energy and courage that won the respect
of the Turks. On his departure they gave him a sword of honour,
and the King of France promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-
colonel and gave him a pension. He was only sent to Otchakow,
where everything was still to be done, on the 5th April, 1787. He
was wounded in a bold attack on Kinbourn. He was recalled in June
1788 on account of a change of relations between France and Turkey.

Page 49, note 4. — This was Marolles, a half -pay captain of Engineers
and a protege of La Fayette (L. PINGAUD, Les Frangais en Russie,
p. 138) : the Prince de Ligne describes how he took him into Potem-
Icin's tent to present him to the prince, and how Marolles addressed
Potemkin quite unceremoniously, pledging himself to capture Otcha-
kow, but begging to be first allowed to run through Vauban, Cohorn,
and Saint-Remi, and "refresh my memory about all that sort of
thing, which I have rather forgotten, and indeed never knew very well,
for as a matter of fact I am only an engineer of Bridges and Roads "
(Letters to the Emperor, May 1788).

Page 50, note 5. — The sword is still in the possession of the Count's
family. See in the Appendix the letters written by Potemkin, request-
ing that these two rewards should be sent.

Page 51, note 6. — Langeron mentions this incident, but relates it of
"the ugliest rascal in Russia, a certain General Seletnikof, Governor
of Ekaterinaslav," who had arrived in the camp that very day with
a view to exculpating himself. The Prince de Ligne calls him Ivan
Maxime.

Page 51, note 7. — The Prince de Ligne gives the same explanation of
this senseless move, which Potemkin deplored without attempting to

444 NOTES

profit by it or redeem it. Langeron thinks that Souvorof wished to
force Potemkin into supporting him and making an attack.

Page 51, note 8. — "With a degree of fury that none but Russians
could withstand " (LANGERON).

Page 52, note 9. — This was the renowned Michel Lavrinovitch
Golemnitchef Koutousof (1745-1813), the generalissimo of 1812. His
wound "in the head, below the eyes," appeared to every one to be
mortal, and the Prince de Ligne, when declaring that Koutousof must
die "to-day or to-morrow," recalled that he had received a similar
wound across the head in the previous war (Letter to the Emperor,
August 1788). His recovery seemed miraculous. The doctors are
reported to have said : "It looks as if Providence were keeping him
for something extraordinary."

Page 52, note 10. — Hetman of the Cossacks of the Don; the same
who made himself so redoubtable to the French in 1812 and 1814.

Page 53, note 11. — Nassau describes this wound : "It is giving him
a certain amount of pain; but though it will not be healed in a fort-
night he will be out again in two days, and off to any place where
there is something going forward . . ." (D'ARAGON, p. 261). He
dates this action the 30th August.

Page 53, note 12. — Six officers and eighty men killed (LiGNE).

Page 53, note 13. — The Prince de Ligne wrote to inform the
Emperor of this attack by the Turks, and told him of Damas's wound
and of the contusion he received shortly afterwards.

Page 54, note 14. — "We are nearly as much besieged as besieging,"
wrote the Prince de Ligne to the Emperor. Potemkin, it appears,
thought the Turks were inclined to surrender.

Page 55, note 15. — The famous Choiseul-Gouffier, concerning whom
L. Pingaud has written a book that has already been quoted.

Page 56, note 16. — "Praying that we might be captured," says
Ligne.

Page 56, note 17. — Alexander Nikolaievitch (1744-1814) was made
a lieutenant-general after Otchakow. He wrote a Life of Potemkin,
who was the brother of his mother, Marie, wife of the Senator Nicolas
Borissovitch Samoilof.

Page 57, note 18. — He commanded the army of Podolia.

Page 57, note 19. — At this very time the Austrians had just taken
Khotin (19th September), but their principal army, commanded by
the Emperor himself, had been completely routed in Banat (14th and
20th September).

Page 57, note 20. — Mme. Paul Potemkin, nee Zakre"efski, the
"favourite sultana" at this moment, is represented by Langeron as
having "an ugly figure but a glorious face, a skin of dazzling white-
ness and very beautiful eyes, little intelligence but a great deal of self-
sufficiency."

NOTES 445

Page 57, note 21. — See the remarks made by the latter in d'Aragon,
p. 265.

Page 59, note 22. — General in command of an army.

Page 59, note 23. — See above. Ivan Dolgorouki says she was "the
nicest " of Marie Engelhardt's daughters. Her husband, Count Paul
Martinovitch Skavronski (1757-1793) , seems to have been chiefly known
for his eccentricities. A portrait of the Countess by Angelica Kauf-
mann is reproduced in the Portraits russes des XVIIIe et XIXe siecles.

Page 61, note 24. — Zemlianka, an underground dwelling used in
that country.

Page 63, note 25. — Langeron (not an eye-witness) estimates that,
by failing to make the assault in June, owing to the prince's indeci-
sion, the army lost 15,000 men (altogether 20,000) : "I am not afraid
to say that this siege was a perfect illustration of the absolute absurdity
and extravagance that can result from the military ignorance and the
caprice of a satrap."

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

Page 65, note 1. — The Zaporogians, the Cossacks of whom Mazeppa
was the hetman. Catherine II transplanted them to the banks of the
Kouban.

Page 66, note 2. — "He had an immense amount of ability, and was
not lacking, it is said, in military talent; but he was full of preten-
sion and absurdity " (LANGERON).

Page 66, note 3. — The rank of a pacha was indicated by the number
of horses' tails that were carried before him. A pacha of the highest
grade had three (Translator's note).

Page 67, note 4.— The Due du Chatelet-Lomont.

Page 68, note 5.— Peter Alexievitch (1745-1826). "A man of
exceptional ability and great courage, capable of undertaking anything
and of carrying anything out " (LANGERON). He was the leading spirit
in the plot against Paul I.

Page 68, note 6.— Basil Vassilievitch (1752-1812) had been a lieu-
tenant-general since 1783. "A great gambler, a great libertine, and
not much of a soldier ... a coward to a laughable degree "
(LANGERON). His wife was in great favour with the prince.

Page 68, note 7.— Gregory Semenovitch (1742-1824) fought in both
the Turkish wars, and in the second was a lieutenant-general. He
was a son-in-law of N. Repnine.

Page 68, note 8. — See what the Comte himself says of him, p. 77.

Page 70, note 9. — Although it has already been published by L.
Pingaud (Les Frangoia en Russie, Appendix I, p. 439) we must place
here, in its proper context, the beautiful and touching letter that the

446 NOTES

comte wrote to his sister the Comtesse de Simiane. The original,
crumpled and stained, is still preserved by the family as a sacred relic.

Page 71, note 10. — Florence Constance de Rochechouart-Faudoas
(1771-1865) was married in 1789 to the Prince de Carency, and after-
wards to the Vicomte de Cayeux. She was Comte Roger's cousin.

Page 71, note 11. — The hetman Branicki.

Page 72, note 12.— 17th December, 1788.

Page 75, note 13. — Se"gur, who saw him at Petersburg, praises kis
intelligence and dignity (Souvenirs, vol. II, p. 157).

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

Page 81, note 1. — Massiot.

Page 84, note 2. — Louis de Cobenzl, the celebrated ambassador,
afterwards Minister for Foreign Affairs (1753-1808).

Page 85, note 3. — Count Alexander Matv46vitch Dmitrief-Mamonof
(1758-1803), aide-de-camp to Potemkin, who himself suggested him
as the successor of the favourite Ermolof (1786). Most of his con-
temporaries judge him rather indulgently, as does Damas himself
further on.

Page 86, note 4. — Afterwards Paul I.

Page 89, note 5. — Ivan AndreeVitch (1725-1811. It was Catherine
who made him a privy councillor, a senator, and, in 1775, vice-chan-
cellor. He had the reputation of possessing very mean abilities.

Page 89, note 6.— Alexander Andre"e"vitch (1742-1799). His influence
in matters of diplomacy was very great, especially in the period
between Panin's ascendancy and that of Zoubof.

Page 89, note 7.— Alexander Alexe"e"vitch Viazemski (1727-1793).
He had held his post since 1764. Later on Catherine wrote of him
(to Grimm, 22nd October, 1791) that he had been "literally doting
for two years."

Page 89, note 8. — Yet he was a singular person for the post, seeing
that he had been one of Catherine's favourites.

Page 92, note 9. — The treaty of the llth January, 1788, of which
the author's opinion does not seem very correct. See, for instance,
E. JAUFFRET'S Catherine II, vol. II, p. 291.

Page 93, note 10. — Mosse. Segur gives another of his sallies, and
on that occasion answered with a neat repartee (Souvenirs, vol. II,
p. 153).

Page 96, note 11. — A kind of fortification. The allusion is to the
expression porter des comes, i.e. to wear horns, which is applied to
a deceived husband (Translator's note).

Page 96, note 12. — Pavlosk, at a distance of 28 versts from Peters-
burg, was a village given by Catherine to her son in 1775. The

NOTES 447

prince's country-house, which was built in 1780, was burnt down in
1803, and rebuilt on a new plan.

Page 96, note 13. — Sophia Dorothea of Wiirtemburg, also called
Maria Feodorovna, married the Grand Duke in 1776 as his second
wife. His first wife was Wilhelmina of Hesse-Darmstadt.

Page 98, note 14. — The lady in question was Daria Chtcherbatof,
maid of honour to the Empress.

Page 100, note 15. — Michael Fedorovitch Kamienski (1738-1809) was
specially famous for his brutality to his men (see WALISZEWSKI'S
Autour d'un trone, p. 51. Langeron calls him a real "monster.")
The successful engagement had taken place near Galatz.

Page 100, note 16. — In the MS. the name is given as Stelin, but
the person intended is Count Curt de Stedingk (b. 1746), who served
in the French army as lieutenant-colonel of the Koyal Swedes, and
colonel of the Royal Alsace Regiment, fought in America with Fersen,
and was, like him, in the intimate circle of Marie Antoinette. He
left France in 1787, and became a field -marshal in the Swedish army.
He wrote his own memoirs in French.

Page 100, note 17. — At Kiros or Kirs, by Michelson, who was soon
afterwards defeated in his turn.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

Page 103, note 1. — Joseph Francis Maurice, Comte de Lascy, was
of Irish origin (1725-1801). He was reputed to be more successful
as an administrator than as a general.

Page 103, note 2. — Evidently Voronezh, the capital of a govern-
mental district, on the Don.

Page 105, note 3. — The taboun is a herd of horses, wandering at
large upon the steppe.

Page 108, note 4. — Shortly after this, on 12th February, 1790,
Catherine II wrote to Grimm: "I hope M. Roger de Damas is not
having his head turned among you, and that you will send him back
to Prince Potemkin the same as he went " (Letters from Catherine II
to Grimm, published by Grote, p. 48).

Page 108, note 5. — Emmanuel Marie Louis, Marquis de Montclar,
afterwards (1762) de Noailles (1743-1822). He was Governor of
Vannes and d'Auray (1762), envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary to the Princes and States of Lower Saxony (1768), ambas-
sador in Holland (1771), in London (1776), and in Vienna (1783); was
recalled (1792), and forced to defend himself before the Legislative
Assembly. He was in prison on the 9th Thermidor; and then retired
to Maintenon. He was the second son of Louis, Due d'Ayen, after-
wards de Noailles, Marshal of France (1713-1793).

448 NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

Page 110, note 1. — Considerations sur les gouvernements et princi-
palement sur celui qui convient a la France (1789).

Page 113, note 2. — Evidently Guillaume Francois1 Tardivet du
Repaire, who tried to keep the mob from reaching the staircase, and
was half murdered.

Page 117, note 3. — A letter from the Due du Chatelet to the minister,
the Comte de la Tour du Pin (3rd January, 1790), reminds him of
the King's promise to the duke's nephew of a colonel's commission.
The commission was "attached" to Damas's position as captain of
the compagnie colonelle, and he was only a few months younger than
the required age. The letter lays stress upon the count's conduct in
Russia, where he had had the command of regiments (Archives of
the Ministry of War).

Page 119, note 4.— Leopold II.

Page 119, note 5.— Joseph de Croix, Comte de Clerfayt (1733-1798),
one of the ablest of the Austrian generals. He became a field-marshal
in 1795.

Page 120, note 6. — Youssouf Pacha, a man of energy and ability.
Mehadia is in a little valley that opens at the Iron Gates.

Page 120, note 7. — No doubt Karansebes, on the Temes.

Page 121, note 8. — Franz Joseph, Count Thurn and Valsassina, a
major-general.

Page 121, note 9. — Franz, Baron Lauer (1735-1803), who joined the
service in 1755, was considered — as was his son Joseph after him — one
of the ablest military engineers. He was major-general in 1789,
F eld-mar echal-lieuten-ant in 1795, director-general of engineers in
1797, and chief of the staff in 1801.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

Page 129, note 1. — Langeron records that on thii occasion, when
Potemkin's courtiers were rejoicing over Nassau's defeat, Damas
cried: "Gentlemen, you are Russians, the Empress of Russia has
lost a decisive battle, and eight thousand Russians have been killed :
this is indeed a stroke of good fortune; I congratulate you; I am as
much delighted as yourselves" (Memoirea inedits, quoted by L.
PINGAUD in Les Frangais en Russie, p. 150). The battle had taken
place on the 9th July, 1790, near Svensk-Sund. After ten hours of
fierce fighting Nassau retired, having lost 53 vessels and 6000 men. In
the same waters, eleven months earlier, he had won a brilliant victory.

Page 130, note 2. — The peace of Verela, 14th August, 1790. It was
Catherine who made the first advances.

NOTES 449

Page 131, note 3. — A Livonian, who at that time was over seventy
years old. Langeron declares he was "heroic." During this same
siege his two sons were wounded, one of them mortally.

Page 133, note 4. — By whom he was " universally regretted "
(LANGERON).

Page 133, note 5. — Ivan Goudovitch, a "cold and methodical " man,
according to Langeron, who also declares he had "a reputation for not
liking danger." (No doubt he was thinking of the brutal letter
addressed by Potemkin to the general in September 1790.)

Page 135, note 6.— 8th October, 1789.

Page 135, note 7. — 27th July, 1790 : status quo, save for certain
changes of frontier. The Austrio-Turkish armistice was signed at
Giurgievo on the 19th September, on the eve of an action near
Bucharest, which would doubtless have been decisive.

Page 136, note 8. — Mechmed Pacha, "an old warrior, who had
twice refused the position of vizier " (E. JAUFFEET, Catherine II,
vol. II, p. 376).

Page 137, note 9. — Charles Joseph Emmanuel du Plessis de Ligne,
the eldest son of the famous general and writer. He was killed in
1792 in the French campaign.

Page 137, note 10. — Armand, Due de Fronsac : the future Due de
Richelieu, Governor of Odessa and President of the Council under
Louis XVIII.

Page 137, note 11. — Louis Alexandre Andrault, Comte de Langeron
(1763—1831), whose Memoirs have been published in part. Of the
unpublished portion many passages are quoted by us. He only left
France at the beginning of 1790, and at first served under Nassau in
the Baltic fleet.

Page 137, note 12. — They hastened from Vienna at the first news
of the siege, posting night and day, as Langeron relates (cf. L.
PINGAUD, Les Fran$ais en Russie, p. 150).

Page 137, note 13. — Langeron says that his first visit on reaching
Bender was to Damas, who showed him the greatest kindness. He
adds that others tried to make them quarrel, but in vain. Langeron
always expresses the greatest esteem for Damas, recognising in him,
"independently of his courage, a vast amount of perspicacity and the
germs of a great talent for his profession." He accuses him of
"unbridled vanity, which does him a great deal of harm with those
who do not know him intimately," and of a certain coldness of
manner (Memoir es inedits).

Page 138, note 14. — Valerien Alexandrovitch, younger brother of the
favourite (1771-1804). He took part in the campaigns against Turkey,
1790-1792 (promoted major-general), Poland, 1794, and Persia, 1796
(promoted lieutenant-general). Zoubof and Damas were under the
orders of Major-General Nicolas Arsenief.
GG

450 NOTES

Page 139, note 15. — We have compared this narrative with the
unpublished account of Langeron, who accompanied Damas's column
as a volunteer.

Page 139, note 16. — A few days later Langeron failed to climb it,
even with help.

Page 139, note 17. — This attempt, according to Langeron, lasted for
more than an hour and a half, under a very lively fire. He speaks
with great admiration of Comte Roger, who "showed on this occasion
as much intelligence as courage."

Page 142, note 18. — Langeron gives rather different figures :
Russians, 429 officers killed and wounded, 4100 men killed and 4000
who died of their wounds, 2000 wounded. Of the 500 Livonian
chasseurs 63 were killed and 190 mortally wounded, including 9 out
of 13 ofl&cers! Of the Turks 22,700 were buried, and others fell into
the Danube. Langeron estimates the total loss of the Turks as 28,000 !

Page 142, note 19. — "The most extraordinary event that has occurred
in any war for many a century " (LANGERON).

Page 145, note 20. — The princesses Marie Th^rese and Marie Louise
of the Two Sicilies had married, respectively, Francis and Ferdinand,
the sons of Leopold II. The double marriage had been celebrated at
Naples by proxy on the 15th August, 1790; but the King and Queen
had accompanied their daughters to Austria, and did not leave Vienna
till the 10th March, 1791.

Page 147, note 21. — Charles Alexandre de Calonne, formerly Louis
XVI 's chief minister (1734-1802).

Page 148, note 22. — In the arrondissement of Ath (Hainault). It
was the "Versailles of Belgium." The Prince de Ligne himself
describes it in his Coup d'ceil sur Belceil.

Page 148, note 23. — With his sister Mme. de Simiane, and the
Abb6 de Damas.

Page 149, note 24. — June (Translator).

Page 149, note 25. — The author's eldest brother, gentleman-in-
waiting to the Comte de Provence, and colonel of his dragoons. He
drew up a Relation sur Vevenement de Varennes.

Page 149, note 26.— The Battle of Matchin, 9th July, 1791, between
N. Repnin and the seraskier Ahmed. Matchin is on the right bank
of the Danube. Langeron describes the battle.

Page 149, note 27.— 9th January, 1792 : the Peace of Jassy.

Page 150, note 28. — Gustavus III, who was assassinated in the same
year, 28th March, 1792.

Page 150, note 29.— 20th April, 1792.

Page 151, note 30. — The author adds : "An account of which I have
written elsewhere," and at the end of this paragraph he said : " I will
now transport myself to the end of the campaign, to the point where
I left off in the private Journal I wrote of this affair." The interview

NOTES 451

at Pilnetz, between the King of Prussia and the Emperor, took place
on the 27th August, 1791.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX

Page 153, note 1. — John Rodolph Bischoffswerder, a native of Saxony
in the service of Prussia. He had a great influence with Frederick
William II, and favoured the Austrian alliance (1737-1803).

Page 153, note 2. — Count Serge Petrovitch Roumiantzof, son of the
field-marshal.

Page 153, note 3.— Count John Gabriel Oxenstierna (1732-1818).
He was a descendant of the chancellor, and was afterwards ambassador
in Portugal (1792) and Minister for Foreign Affairs (1793).

Page 153, note 4. — Baron Francois de Roll of Emmenholtz, born at
Soleure in 1743, brigadier-general in 1788. He was the Comte
d'Artois's agent.

Page 153, note 5. — Comte Valentin Ladislas (1740-1806), colonel
of the hussar regiment bearing his name (1764), brigadier-general
(1780). He left some memoirs, which were edited by E. Daudet
(Paris, 1905). His mission to Petersburg is described in Chap. X.
The same editor published some Nouvelles Lettres, 1792-1795 (Paris,
1909) also concerned with this mission.

Page 153, note 6. — Jean Francois de Perusse, successively Chevalier,
Baron (1782), Comte (1815), and Due (1816), des Cars (1747-1822),
and brigadier-general in 1788. After the death of Gustavus III, he
was sent to Berlin. He was promoted lieut. -general in 1814 and
became first maitre d'hotel to the King on the death of his eldest
brother in 1815. He wrote some memoirs (Paris, 1890), which ceased
with the end of his mission in Sweden.

Page 154, note 7. — Louis Auguste de Tonnelier, Baron de Breteuil
(1733-1807). He soon afterwards retired (1792). Returned to France
in 1802.

Page 154, note 8. — Victor Louis Charles de Riquet, Comte, Marquis,
and then Due de Caraman (1762-1839). His mission to the Prussian
army was very secret : he was given the rank of major. He returned
to France in 1801, and was arrested, and afterwards kept under
surveillance. Louis XVIII made him Prussian minister (1814), and
ambassador in Vienna (1816-1828). He became a peer in 1815, and
a lieut. -general in 1820, and at the age of seventy-two took part in
the siege of Constantinople as a volunteer. He left some fragmentary
memoirs, quoted below.

Page 154, note 9.— FEUILLET DE CONCHES, in Louis XVI, vol. IV,
p. 318, quotes a letter from Nassau to Catherine II (17th December,
1791), deploring this rivalry, but upholding Calonne.

GG 2

452 NOTES

Page 156, note 10. — On the subject of this famous general, Ferdinand,
Duke of Brunswick-Lunebourg (1735-1806) we advise the reader to
consult La Premiere Invasion prussienne, pp. 121-128, by A. CHUQUET.

Page 157, note 11. — The manifesto was dated 25th July, 1792, at
Coblenz, and was the work of the emigres Limon and Mallet du
Pan.

Page 158, note 12. — Nassau to Catherine II, 3rd September, 1792.
FEUILLET DE CONCHES 's Louis XVI, vol. VI, p. 329.

Page 158, note 13. — Louis Aloys Joachim, Prince of Hohenlohe-
Kirchberg (1765-1829). He was colonel of the light-horse of Linange
(Palatinate), 1784; then in the Austrian service, and later in that of
France, in which he became a field-marshal.

Page 158, note 14. — Frederick Louis, Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingel-
fingen (1746-1818), who was defeated at Jena.

Page 158, note 15. — 19th August, 1792, between Luckner's advanced
guard and that of Hohenlohe. Cf. A. CHUQUET, La Premiere Invasion
prussienne, Chap. IV. The first engagement really took place on the
llth at Sierck.

Page 159, note 16. — Tiercelet wras pillaged on the day after the
King's departure, as well as Brehain-la-Ville, and other places suffered
the same fate afterwards.

Page 159, note 17.— Charles Frederick (1738-1811), Grand Duke
in 1806.

Page 163, note 18. — It was really the 26th, and his reception seems
to have been cold (A. CHUQUET, La Premiere Invasion prussienne,
p. 287).

Page 164, note 19. — Charles-Eugene-Gabriel de la Croix, Marquis de
Castries (1727-1801), Minister of Marine in 1780, and field-marshal
in 1783.

Page 164, note 20.— Michel- Jean-Ignace, Comte Wallis (1732-1798),
field-marshal, 1789.

Page 164, note 21. — Victor-Francois, Due de Broglie (1718-1804).
Was a lieut. -general in 1748, prince of the Empire, 1759, field-marshal,
1760, Minister of War, 1789. After Conde's campaigns he served in
the English army, then in the Russian.

Page 165, note 22. — Capitulation 2nd September, 1792.

Page 166, note 23. — The Marquis and Marquise de Fouquet lived
near Verdun, in the Chateau de la Malgrange, where the King of
Prussia was then staying.

Page 166, note 24. — Baron Felix Louis de Wimpffen. Born in the
principality of Les Deux-Ponts in 1744, lieutenant in the regiment of
that name (1757), brigadier-general in 1788, afterwards a general in
the army of the Girondins. The Empire restored his rank; he died
in 1814 (cf. CHUQUET, Campagne de VArgonne, p. 502).

Page 166, note 25. — Two 4-pounders, served by officers of the

NOTES 453

Colonial Artillery. They killed no one. One of the Emigres called
this siege "a hoax" (CHUQUET, loc. cit., p. 505, et seq.).

Page 167, note 26. — Christian- Augustus (1744-1798). He was in
the service of Austria.

Page 168, note 27. — The nobles of a particular province, in many
cases, banded themselves into a corps, and these were called
"provincial coalitions" (Translator).

Page 169, note 28. — Was this Le'onor-Maximilien de Bellegarde,
brigadier-general in 1788?

Page 170, note 29. — Girolamo Lucchesini, a native of Lucca, and a
diplomatist in the service of Prussia (1752-1825). He was Bischoffs-
werder's brother-in-law, but was hostile to Austria and opposed to the
invasion of France.

Page 171, note 30. — In the Ardennes : arrondissement of Vouziers.

Page 171, note 31. — La-Croix-aux-Bois, one of the denies of the
Argonne, between Vouziers and Montmedy.

Page 172, note 32. — 15th September. It was the Prussian general
Massenbach — on returning from the French camp, where he had not
seen Dumouriez — who gave the information to Brunswick. The latter
proceeded to the outposts, acting, no doubt, on Damas's warning.

Page 173, note 33. — Chazot's division, after being repulsed at La-
Croix-aux-Bois, marched to join Dumouriez, but encountered the
Prussian cavalry near Montcheutin, was seized with panic, and
allowed (according to CHUQUET in the Campagne de V Argonne, p. 139)
283 prisoners and 4 guns to fall into the enemy's hands, in addition
to the 80 men of the Saint-Juvin detachment.

Page 173, note 34. — Albert-Louis, Comte de Pouilly and de Roussy,
promoted to brigadier-general in 1784. He was the father of the
famous Emmanuel de Pouilly-Mensdorff, who accompanied him to
the Prussian headquarters and afterwards became a general in the
Austrian army.

Page 175, note 35. — Massiges.

Page 176, note 36. — Nassau-Siegen, who figures earlier in this
volume.

Page 176, note 37. — Marquis Henri-Charles-Joseph de Lambert, born
in the Chateau d'Ancey near Pontorson (1738), brigadier-general (1780),
and commissary of the Comte de Provence.

Page 176, note 38. The inn of Sommetourbe. There is a picturesque
account of the bivouac by A. CHUQUET (op. cit., p. 179).

Page 177, note 39. — The building at La Lune was an isolated inn,
beside the high-road from Sainte Menehould to Chalons.

Page 177, note 40. — This body of troops, which was sent by Keller-
mann and commanded by the Comte de Valence, possibly saved, by
its resistance, the army that was in the act of forming into battle
order.

454 NOTES

Page 177, note 41. — The words are transposed : it was the left of
the French that extended across the plain : their right was on the
hill of Yvron.

Page 177, note 42.— There were only 36,000, against 34,000
Prussians.

Page 178, note 43. — Nassau, in the fragment of his memoirs pub-
lished by FEUILLET DE CONCHES (Louis XVI, vol. VI, p. 355), gives his
full answer, which is very accurately epitomised here.

Page 178, note 44. — Von Griiber, quartermaster-general.

Page 179, note 45. — George -Frederick von Tempelhof (1787-1807),
died a lieutenant-general.

Page 179, note 46. — This was not the famous shout raised by
Kellermann's army three hours earlier, but the shout with which they
responded, after 4 o'clock, to the Prussians' attempt to carry their
troops beyond the Paris and Chalons road, near La Lune.

Page 180, note 47. — The Comte de Caraman says he went into the
room in the night and found the duke " sitting by the fire with a
nightcap on his head, in the attitude of a man lost in reflection."
Apparently Brunswick pleaded the disproportionate numbers, and the
deceptive account he had received of the disposition of the inhabitants
(Revue contemporaine, 15th November, 1853).

Page 181, note 48. — This passage on the retreat of the French does
not agree with Kellermann's account (cf. A. CHUQUET, op. cit., p. 226).
He declares that the French left their camp in the night, leaving
their fires alight and some troops to bury the dead and remove the
wounded.

Page 182, note 49. — This must be intended for Henri Christian
Stengel, colonel of the 1st Hussars (ex-Bercheny) , born at Neustadt
in the Palatinate, 1744, killed at Mondovi, 1796. He was promoted
brigadier-general 13th September, 1792. Stengel was suspected of
" fayettism," but this admirable leader of the advanced guard, the
ablest soldier under Dumouriez, who praises him enthusiastically (as
did Bonaparte later on, cf. CHUQUET, Campagne de VArgonne, p. 63,
note), could not possibly have given the information referred to below,
except as a ruse.

Page 183, note 50. — Nassau records the same incident (FEUILLET
DE CONCHES, Louis XVI, vol. VI, p. 358), but does not name the officer.
This is the only attempt at recruiting by the emigres of which we hear,
and this was fruitless (A. CHUQUET, op. cit., p. 216).

Page 183, note 51. — Henri-Maximilien Montjoye, adjutant-general
and lieutenant-colonel (3rd September, 1792), but not aide-de-camp.
The old general was perhaps Duval.

Page 183, note 52. — Jean-Therese-Louis de Beaumont, Marquis
d'Autichamp (1738-1831); Colonel in the Seven Years' War; Conde's
equerry. After the Champagne campaign he took part in the rising

NOTES 455

at Lyons. Later on he entered the Russian service. Lieutenant-
general in 1815. His son Charles fought in Vende'e.

Page 185, note 53. — Dumouriez had only promised to grant an
interview : as for the words by which both Manstein and Brunswick
were taken in, the proclamation of the Republic gave him an excuse
for recalling them (CHUQUET, Campagne de VArgonne, p. 351 et aeq.).

Page 186, note 54. — The retreat began on the 30th September.

Page 186, note 55. — Possibly a favourite himself. He fought in
Poland and Persia.

Page 189, note 56. — Langeron explained the fact that he wrote no
memoirs on this melancholy campaign by saying: "The best thing
to do is to forget it, if possible."

NOTES TO CHAPTER X

Page 191, note 1. — Francois Nicolas Ren£ (1759-1822). He was the
duke's first cousin, and had succeeded him as colonel of the Dragons
d'Artois (1782), and afterwards as the Comte d'Artois's captain of the
guards (1791). He was entrusted with secret missions to Paris,
Russia, and Sweden. Became lieutenant-general in 1814.

Page 191, note 2. — Louis Francois Marc Hilaire de Conzia (1732-
1804) became Bishop of Arras in 1769. As a negotiator he was a
failure : he was thought, says Langeron, "to look and speak too much
like a grenadier," a comparison that is also made by the Due de
Le"vis (Souvenirs et portraits, p. 204), who is very hard on him : "He
did nothing but harm," he says, "to his party." According to
Langeron (Memoires inedits) and the Comte de Vauban (Memoires
pour servir a Vhistoire de la guerre de Vendee, p. 9), the impression
made by his companions was no better.

Page 193, note 3.— Vassili Ivanovitch Levachof (1740-1804). Aide-
de-camp to the Empress, 1777, governor of Finland, 1789, commander-
in-chief, 1797.

Page 193, note 4.— Plato Zoubof (1767-1822). Afterwards one of
Paul I's murderers.

Page 193, note 5. — This interview took place on the 24th March,
1793. Esterhazy (Memoires, p. 350) describes it, as do also Langeron
and Vauban. Cf. PINGAUD, Les Frangais en Russie, p. 183.

Page 194, note 6. — The frigate Venus, taken from the Swedes, and
the cutter Mercury, bought in England, two of the finest vessels of
the fleet. The Comte d'Artois sailed in the former with General
Korsakof : Comte Roger seems to have been in command of the other.
Vauban gives a very detailed account of the whole voyage; and it is
remarkable that, though he often refers to Comte Roger, the latter

456 NOTES

does not allude to him once, even in connection with the visit to
Copenhagen, when Vauban declares he was present.

Page 195, note 7. — On it was the inscription : " Given by God for
the King," and an exhortation to be, on this occasion, "a good and
valorous partisan."

Page 196, note 8.— Baron de Kriidener.

Page 196, note 9.— Andrew Peter, Count Bernstorff (1735-1797).
The King was Christian VII (1766-1808), and his mind was much
impaired.

Page 199, note 10.— Francois Henri, due d'Harcourt (1726-1802),
lieutenant-general 1762 ; governor to the Dauphin 1786 ; emigrated 1790.

Page 199, note 11.— Count Simon Woronzof (1744-1832).

Page 200, note 12. — The letter from La Bochejaquelein and the
other Vendean leaders of the Comte d'Artois is dated 18th August, 1793.

Page 200, note 13. — Vauban, who declares he spoke to the same
effect himself, says of Comte Roger, "that he was full of good feeling
and courage, and spoke several times to M. le comte d'Artois with
frankness and energy. He was the only person who opposed the
return to Hamm . . ." (p. 40). Here again Comte Roger appears
to know nothing of Vauban.

Page 201, note 14. — Where he spent the whole summer of 1794, in
a very precarious situation.

Page 203, note 15.— 28th July, 1793.

Page 204, note 16. — Francis Rawdon, Earl of Moira, afterwards
Marquis of Hastings (1754-1829), one of the most sincere friends of
the emigres.

Page 204, note 17.— Sir John Doyle (1750-1834), served as an officer
in the American War, and afterwards entered parliament. Later on
he served in Egypt, and then became Governor of Guernsey.

Page 206, note 18. — Frederick, Duke of York (1763-1827), second
son of George III.

Page 207, note 19.— Bernardin (1764-1796), younger brother of
Comte Armand (1762-1796). They were both sons of Due Armand
(1736-1822). The Comte (ex-colonel of the Nivernais Regiment), and
his brother, were both captured in an audacious enterprise near Saint-
Brieuc, and shot.

Page 207, note 20. — Nevertheless a Damas Legion figured among the
French corps in the English army : the Legion of Comte ^tienne de
Damas-Crux. It perished at Quiberon (BITTARD DBS PORTES, Les
emigres a cocarde noire).

Page 208, note 21. — Perhaps rather a premature allusion to the
execution of the Due and Duchesse du Chatelet (13th December, 1793,
and 22nd April, 1794).

Page 208, note 22. — More commonly called the Battle of Wattignies
(14th-16th October, 1793).

NOTES 457

Page 208, note 23. — While the French under Jourdan numbered
50,000, the Austrian army, which was scattered in detachments, was
composed of only 18,000 men.

Page 208, note 24. — Henri Joseph Jean, Comte de Bellegarde
(1756-1846), was a native of Savoy, served in the army of Saxony
and then in that of Austria; was field-marshal in 1806, and governor
of Venetian Lombardy in 1814.

Page 209, note 25. — "With indescribable fury," says Langeron —
who was also present — of the attack by the French at Wattignies
(Memoires 8ur les guerres de la premiere coalition, L'Invasion austro-
prussienne, 1792-1794, published by L. PINGAUD, p. 28).

Page 209, note 26.— Charles Joseph, Count Hadik of Futak (1756-
1800), son of the field-marshal, an officer in his father's regiment of
hussars, a volunteer in the Turkish War, major-general 1794, Feld-
marechal-lieutenant 1796.

Page 209, note 27. — Langeron says exactly the same, loc. cit., p. 29.

Page 210, note 28. — Henry Edward Fox, nephew of the famous
orator (1755-1811).

Page 210, note 29. — No doubt the illustrious Charles Cornwallis
(1738-1805), who was defeated at Yorktown and vanquished Tippoo
Sahib. He had just been entrusted, on returning from India, with a
mission in Austria.

Page 211, note 30.— 26th June, 1794.

Page 211, note 31. — Christian Augustus (1744-1798).

Page 211, note 32. — The figures are slightly exaggerated : there were
70,000 Austrians and 80,000 Frenchmen.

Page 212, note 33. — Count Kaunitz, F eld-mar ecnal-lieutenant.
Championnet was his opponent.

Page 212, note 34. — Charles Eugene, Prince of Lambesc, known as
Prince of Lorraine (1751-1825). Brigadier-general 1788; emigrated
after the storming of the Tuileries; Austrian major-general in 1791.

Page 213, note 35. — The French cavalry, under General Dubois,
took some of Kaunitz 's artillery for a time.

Page 213, note 36. — Langeron uses the same expression (Memoires
sur lea guerres de la premiere coalition, p. 78).

Page 213, note 37. — Langeron is a notable witness to this fact.

Page 218, note 38. — Mme. de La Borde (nee Nettine) was the
widow of the King's celebrated banker, Jean Joseph de La Borde,
Marquis de Mer^ville, who had just been guillotined (April 1794).
Her daughter, Nathalie Luce Le"ontine Josephine, had married, in
1790, Arthur de Noailles, Due de Mouchy, Prince de Poix.

Page 218, note 39. — Daughter of M. de Robien, procureur -syndic of
the nobles of Brittany.

Page 218, note 40. — The Vicomte Andre Boniface Louis de Mirabeau,
Mirabeau-Tonneau, brother of the orator (1754-1792). His Legion

458 NOTES

is described by T. Muret : It "combines every kind of corps:
grenadiers, hussars, riflemen, uhlans. It contains some companies of
volunteer nobles. . . . Most of the other companies are composed of
non-commissioned officers and privates who have followed their leaders.
To these are added some republican deserters, some young men who
escaped the requisition, and a considerable number of Alsatians. . . ."
The uniform was black, with sky-blue facings and collar. At that
time it was commanded by the Marquis de la Fe*roniere (Histoire de
Varmee de Conde, vol. I, p. 91 et seq.).

Page 220, note 41. — The deed of conveyance was signed at Lausanne
on the 8th May, 1795, and appears in the Appendix.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XI

Page 223, note 1. — R. Bittard des Portes (Histoire de Varmee de
Conde', pp. 214-215) speaks of Damas's acquisition of the legion, and
says that in Russia he "had amazed the bravest by his mad intre-
pidity," but appeared too much of a soldier to his new subordinates.
Several officers wished to leave the corps, but were resolutely opposed
in this by the Marquis de Bouthillier, while Damas offered " to give
satisfaction, as from one gentleman to another, to any one who desired
it." " The undoubted military talents of M. de Damas," adds this
author, "could not fail to make him quickly esteemed and loved
by all."

Page 223, note 2. — Muret (vol. I, p. 338) mentions the duel with
M. du Chaffault, and also shows how soon the Comte's character put
an end to all discontent. One jest that the malcontents had indulged
in was to say that the Mirabeaux were now degraded.

Page 223, note 3.— Dagobert Sigismund (1724-1797); an Alsatian
noble. He fought Bonaparte in Italy.

Page 224, note 4. — At the end of May. The army was then at
Riegel.

Page 225, note 5. — Louis XVIII parted from the army on the 14th
July, and went to Blankenburg in Brunswick. The attempt on his
life took place during the journey, at Dillingen on the Danube, on the
19th July. Cf. E. DAUDET, Histoire de VEmigration, vol. II, p. 161.

Page 226, note 6. — This was the famous crossing of the Rhine by
the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, 6th Messidor, year IV.

Page 227, note 7. — Comte Eugene Eustache de B^thisy (1739-1823)
was promoted brigadier-general in 1781. After Condi's campaigns he
entered the Austrian service, and became lieutenant-general in 1814.
His brother and son also served in Condi's army.

Page 227, note 8. — The Marquis de Thumery, brigadier-general in
1788.

NOTES 459

Page 227, note 9. — Meanwhile some skirmishes had taken place near
Kinsingen, and the legion had behaved very well. The Austrians
accused the Condemns of not fighting energetically enough. See the
Due d'Enghien's letter to the Prince de Conde" (8th July, 1796) in
Cre"tineau- Joly 's Histoire dea trois derniers princes de la maiaon de
Conde, vol. II, p. 145.

Page 228, note 10.— Pierre Marie Barth&emy (1747-1816), an Italian
by birth, lieutenant-general since August 1793. He treated the
emigres magnanimously.

Page 228, note 11. — It is well known that the Battle of Oberkamlach
was fought to save the honour of the Conde'ens, in consequence of the
Austrians' unjust accusations. See the note above; and cf. MURET,
vol. I, p. 228; the Marquis COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, Souvenirs tires des
papiers du Comte de la Ferronnays, p. 43; PUYMAIGRE, Souvenirs,
p. 50, etc. Even the republicans knew the reason : DEDON, Precis
historique des campagnes de Varme'e de Rhin-et-Moselle pendant Van
IV et Van V, p. 114 et seq. These three authors, and Bittard des
Portes (op. cit., Chap. XVII), describe this battle, which seems to
have been even more confused than appears here. It took place on
the 13th August, 1796.

Page 228, note 12. — Kamlach is the name of the river. There were
two villages, less than a kilometre apart : Oberkamlach and Unter-
kamlach. The valley is half a league wide, and lies between wooded
hills. On one of these were the Conde'ens, who wished to drive the
republicans back to the other.

Page 229, note 13. — The author means privates. These are Muret's
figures : gentlemen, 94 killed and 446 wounded (of whom about 40
died afterwards) : paid troops, 67 killed and 113 wounded : altogether
720, and 25 prisoners. Dedon, however, states that "572 emigres,
including 50 knights of St. Louis and 18 officers of high rank, were
buried on the field of battle." The republican troops that Damas
praised were, especially, the 3rd half -brigade of light-infantry and the
89th regiment of the line. The Due d'Enghien says of them in his
letter, already quoted, of the 16th August: "They are not our men
of '93, they are gods." On the other hand, General Abbatucci, who
was in command of the French, apparently wrote to the duke in terms
of enthusiastic admiration. Dedon says in his Precis: "It was a very
hot engagement, and for a long time the issue was uncertain."

Page 229, note 14. — The heroic conduct of Louis Poilloue de Bierville
is well known.

Page 230, note 15.— The Due d'Enghien wrote to the Prince de
Conde" : "Roger de Damas 's horse was killed by four bullets at once :
Charles de Damas 's received one bullet in his eye and one in his
crupper : neither of the men themselves had a scratch " (16th August,
1796).

460 NOTES

Page 230, note 16. — It is said that the order was repeated three
times, but that the fury of the battle was such that none but a written
order was obeyed.

Page 230, note 17.— The battle of Oberkamlach did great credit to
the Comte de Damas, and to "his rapid and intelligent decision in
the midst of danger" (BITTARD DBS PORTES, op. cit., p. 281). From
this moment, Muret thinks, complete harmony reigned between the
colonel and his corps (vol. I, p. 338). Enghien said of them all : "As
for my column, no one else could possibly fight like those brave
Mirabeaux."

Page 231, note 18.— Maximilien Baillet de la Tour (1737-1806).

Page 231, note 19 .—The Battles of Amberg, Wiirtzburg, and Alten-
kirchen.

Page 233, note 20.— This was the Battle of Biberach, 30th Septem-
ber— 2nd October, 1796. In this account there is no distinction made
between the fight of the 30th, when the Legion Damas and the Hohen-
lohe regiment carried three posts near Schussenried, with a loss of
300 killed and wounded, and the battle of the 2nd, when Conde's army
covered La Tour's retreat.

Page 234, note 21.- — Prince Louis of Hohenlohe-Bartenstein and
Prince Charles of Hohenlohe-Schillingfurst commanded two regiments
that were made into one.

Page 234, note 22. — Muret gives a list of them (vol. I, p. 374); and
so does Ecquevilly (vol. II, p. 130).

Page 235, note 23. — The Comte returns to this subject in his account
of his visit to Vienna, and, this time, blames the archduke's indecision.

Page 235, note 24. — 18th October, 1796. The abbey is usually known
as St. Peter's. It is to the north of the Hollgraben valley. The
heights are opposite to the valley of St. Mergen.

Page 235, note 25. — When Turenne and Conde", after defeating
Mercy's Bavarians at Freiburg, tried to cut off their retreat by reach-
ing St. Peter's Abbey before them, the enemy escaped by the heights,
leaving all their baggage behind.

Page 235, note 26. — Four officers and 17 men killed, 5 officers and
26 men wounded (ECQUEVILLY, vol. II, p. 151).

Page 237, note 27. — Battle of Schliengen, 24th October.

Page 238, note 28.— Jean Charles (1770-1796). Pupil at the Military
School, 1768; adjutant-general and major-general, 1794; lieutenant-
general, 1796.

Page 239, note 29. — It was defended by Desaix and Gouvion-Saint-
Cyr, and surrendered on the 9th January. The Austrians had lost
12,000 men.

Page 240, note 30.— He crossed on the 1st Floreal, year V (20th
April, 1797).

NOTES 461

Page 241, note 31. — The account of Condi's campaigns, therefore,
was written after the chapters that follow.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XII

Page 242, note 1. — The exact title is Politique de tons les cabinets
de VEurope pendant les regnes de Louis XV et de Louis XFI, Paris,
1793, 2 vols., in-8° (2nd edition, 1802). The author, Jean Louis Favier
(1720-1784, had been employed in the diplomatic service, chiefly in
the Secret du Roi. It is in the second volume that he deals with Naples
(p. 188-200). He foresaw that after the death of Charles III of Spain
the Austrian influence would triumph in Naples, and he thought
France should make every effort to counteract it.

Page 242, note 2.— Bernardo Tanucci, a Tuscan (1698-1783), was a
minister who carried out many reforms under Charles de Bourbon and
Ferdinand IV, who dismissed him in 1776.

Page 243, note 3. — Tanucci was succeeded by the Marquis della
Sambuca, a worthless creature, truly; but the Marquis Caracciolo, who
distinguished himself as an economist while viceroy of Sicily, had
shown both energy and talent.

Page 243, note 4. — Sir John Francis Edward Acton was born at
Besanc.on, 1736, and died at Palermo, 1811. He was first an officer
in the French navy, then at the head of the Tuscan navy, and in
1779 entered that of Naples. He soon became a member of the
Council, and was successively Minister of Marine, Minister of War,
and, on the death of Caracciolo, head of the Ministry. His constant
policy was to detach Naples from France and Spain, and make her
subservient to England. Whatever Comte Roger may say, it appears
he was really a member of the well-known family of Acton, but his
father, Edward, had set up as a doctor in Besanqon, where he had a
riding-school that attracted his compatriots to that town. Sir John's
mother was Catherine Louis, daughter of the chief greffier of the Cour
des Comptes of Franche-Comte*.

Page 244, note 5. — Marie Caroline was born in 1752 and married in
1768.

Page 244, note 6. — This accusation is often repeated (notably in the
Biographie Michaud), and it is true that the name of his brother
Joseph — who also became a Neapolitan general when he left the
French army at the time of the Emigration — appears in the register
of baptism as Hecton. This was probably, however, an attempt to
reproduce the pronunciation. John Acton's succession, in 1791, to
the title of his cousin, Sir Richard Acton, was perfectly regular.

Page 246, note 7. — Rodolph Antoine Hubert de Salis-Marchlius
(1732-1807) was Swiss, a native of the Orisons, and a brigadier-

462 NOTES

general (1780) in the French army. Among the officers he brought
with him were Emmanuel Burckhardt, of Bale, who entered the
Neapolitan service, the French Colonel de Pommereul, who reorganised
the artillery, and Lieutenant-Colonel de Gambs and his son. Eble,
the future general, and Augereau, the future marshal, were respectively
second-lieutenant and sergeant. Salis arrived in October 1787 — to be
accurate — and returned to his own country in 1790.

Page 247, note 8. — Joseph von Zehenter (1733-1812), a Hungarian;
F eld-mar echal-lieutenant in 1790; inspector-general of the Neapolitan
army from January 1793 to September 1794.

Page 247, note 9. — Charles Mack of Leiberich (1752-1828), who was
defeated at Ulm.

Page 249, note 10.— The Peace of Paris, 10th October, 1796.

Page 249, note 11. — The Treaty of Campo Formio was not signed
till 17th October, 1797, a year later.

Page 250, note 12. — "Two years before this," wrote Chastellux to
Louis XVIII (16th October, 1798), " M. Acton had told me that His
Majesty was begging his services of the Emperor. . . ." The quota-
tions from Chastellux and Vernegues are taken from the Aff. Etr.,
Fonds Bourbon, Suppl. 6.

Page 250, note 13. — Francis Maria, Baron Thugtit, who replaced
Kaunitz as Chancellor in 1794.

Page 251, note 14. — Now Cassino, at the foot of Monte Cassino.

Page 251, note 15. — The announcement of the army's departure
appears in the order of the day of 18th September, 1797.

Page 251, note 16. — The future marshal. The French entered Rome
15th February, 1798; Pius VI was arrested on the 25th February.
Milan, it may be observed, was in the hands of the French.

Page 252, note 17. — At the end of the year the Comte de Chastellux,
Louis XVIII's agent in Naples, wrote: "The services of the French
have not been accepted. ... I asked, as a favour, that my son might
be made a supernumerary aide-de-camp to General Mack . . .; my
request was refused " (5th November, 1798).

Page 252, note 18. — Andre laovlevitch, born 1743, secretary of
legation 1781, ambassador at Naples 1796.

Page 253, note 19. — Joseph, born 1766, son of Xavier Francis
Augustus, second son of the Elector Augustus III, King of Poland.
He was cousin german to Ferdinand IV and Louis XVI. He had
been a colonel in the service of Catherine II, who dismissed him for
quarrelling with Prince Chtcherbatof, "a mere child," Saxe himself
being "a great lanky fellow . . . who was beginning to be more
popular here with the women than with the men " (Catherine II to
Grimm, 12th June, 1795). Saxe entered the Neapolitan army in 1795
as a major-general, and left it soon after his promotion to lieutenant-
general (10th October, 1799). He was killed in a duel with Prince

NOTES 468

Chtcherbatof in 1802. The Chevalier de Cussy says of him : "He was
an agreeable and remarkably handsome man, famous all the world
over for his amorous adventures, his charm, and his numerous sword-
fights " (Souvenirs, Paris, 1909, vol. I, p. 356). A very inaccurate
account of the death of "this gallant and courageous young man" is
given in the Diario napoletano dal 1798 al 1825 (vol. II, p. 123), which
says that Damas was his second. "Beloved in his own country and
adored by our soldiers," says the Queen of him, in connection with
the expulsion of his murderer, who went to Naples a few years later
(16th May, 1805. M. H. WEIL, Correspondance inedite de Marie
Caroline avec le marquis de Gallo, vol. II, p. 587). At the time of
his death she praised him even more enthusiastically : "This perverse
and selfish century has ceased to produce such men as he, such souls
as his. I regret him unspeakably, and shall never forget him as long
as I live" (to the Comte d'Antraigues, 8th July, 1802, BOULAY DE
LA MEURTHE'S Revue hist, diplom., 1888).

Page 253, note 20.— Prince Louis of Hesse-Philippsthal (1766-1816)
was the son of the Landgrave William II of Hesse-Philippsthal, and
was a lieutenant-general in the Neapolitan service. His wife, whom
the Comte H. d'Espinchal calls a "handsome and majestic German
countess," was Maria Frederica, Countess Berghe of Trips, born 1771,
married 1791, died 1805. Her sister had married Marshal Acton, the
minister's brother.

Page 254, note 21. — Ferdinand's dispaccio, dated from the camp of
San Germane, 8th November, 1798, made Damas a brigadier-general.
His pay, on active service, was 288 ducats a month, and in garrison
149 ducats. The ducat was worth 4 fr. 25 in 1806.

Page 254, note 22. — Baron Mcetsch, a Prussian brigadier. Appar-
ently he came to Naples with Salis. In the field he showed himself
incapable. "There is no doubt," Vernegues declares, "that he was
won over by the other side." He was imprisoned in '99 on suspicion
of republicanism, and was afterwards banished.

Page 254, note 23. — We leave this name as Damas always wrote it.
It should be Burckhardt. Emmanuel Burckhardt came of an old
family in Bale (1744-1820). He entered the French army, in which
his father was serving, at the age of 10. Though he fought in the
Seven Years' War he was only a captain in 1787. He went to Naples
with Salis, and was successively instructor, brigadier (1797), and
lieutenant-general (1800). He was in command of all the Sicilian
forces from 1802 to 1815, and at the Restoration (1815) became
commander-in-chief of the Neapolitan troops. Jomini had a high
opinion of his tactics. His Life was written by D'Ayala, in his Vite
de' piii celebri capitani e soldati italiani (Naples, 1843); and by T.
Burckhardt-Bidermann, in the Easier Jahrbuch (1883).

Page 254, note 24. — Antonio Alberto Micheroux, brother of the

464 NOTES

diplomatist Antonio. They were of Flemish extraction, and served in
the Walloon regiment in the Neapolitan army.

Page 254, note 25. — Delia Salandra, lieutenant-general 16th Novem-
ber, 1798.

Page 256, note 26. — 22nd November, 1798.

Page 256, note 27. — A tributary of the Liris.

Page 257, note 28. — Mack is severely blamed for his want of fore-
sight by the most complete historian of this campaign, Marulli.
Ragguagli storici sul regno delle Due Sicilie dal 1789 al 1815 (Naples,
1845, 3 vols. Vol. I, p. 154).

Page 257, note 29. — Under Major Walter, whom the Neapolitans in
vain summoned to surrender. This was on the 28th November, 1798 :
the King entered the city on the following day.

Page 257, note 30. — I cannot refrain from mentioning an irrelevant
detail that will give some idea of the men with whom I had to do.
My chief, Lieutenant-General the Due de la Salandre, Chevalier des
Ordres du Roi, a man of sixty, asked me, as we rode into Rome by
the road that leads from the Gate of St. John Lateran to the Gate
of the Corso, what was the name of the old building under which we
were passing — the one that had so many more windows than was
usual. I was obliged to introduce him to the Coliseum — he had never
been to Rome. It may be imagined how much use his experience was
likely to be to me (Note by the Author).

Page 258, note 31. — Emmanuel Burckhardt. The Marquis del Vasto
was appointed governor, with a council of Roman nobles.

Page 258, note 32. — The scene of these operations and of Damas's
retreat is one of the most picturesque parts of Latium, between the
middle Tiber, the Soracte, and the lakes of Bracciano and Bolsena —
the Maremma. It is very rough and hilly, is intersected by a number
of streams, tributaries of the Tiber, and its massive rocks are of
volcanic origin. Civita Castellana is entirely surrounded by ravines,
one of which is 39 metres in depth. The bridge was there before
this date. The castle replaced that of Falerii, of which the con-
siderable ruins still stand in the neighbouring plain, and bear the
old name. We have verified all these places on a splendid map,
drawn and painted by hand, which belonged to General Bonnamy,
Championnet's Chief of the Staff (communicated by Comte filie de
Froidefond des Farges). The best maps to consult for this period are
those of Cassini and Ricci-Zannoni.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII

Page 259, note 1. — On the 3rd December.

Page 259, note 2.— Falerii, the capital of the Falisci.

NOTES 465

Page 259, note 3. — The Sabine Hills.

Page 259, note 4. — Macdonald, the future marshal, spoke of the
Neapolitans with great contempt in his Souvenirs; Kellermann
(Francois-Etienne, 1770-1835) was a son of the marshal of that
name; Key (Antoine-Gabriel-V&iance, 1768-1836).

Page 261, note 5. — Saxe had been surprised, on leaving the woods
of Falerii, by the Polish and Roman legions, which contained a good
many Neapolitans, including Prince Pignatelli-Strongoli, who com-
manded them. Cusani, Saxe's second-in-command, was unable to
rally the troops.

Page 261, note 6. — Prince de la Tremoiille, the title borne by the
younger sons of the Dues de la Tremoille. This must be Prince Louis
(1768-1837).

Page 263, note 7. — Brigadier in modern French is a corporal. In
Damas's day the word was applied to a rank above that of colonel,
but not quite answering to brigadier-general (Translator's note).

Page 264, note 8. — It was on the 9th that Metch capitulated, having
been surrounded by Maurice Mathieu's troops at Calvi; the King left
Rome on the 10th.

Page 264, note 9. — Prince Pignatelli-Strongoli, in L'Apergu historique
complementaire du memoire du General Bonnamy (Berne, year VIII),
which was reproduced in La Rivoluzione napoletana del 1799 illustrata
(Naples, 1899), says that Mack's first order to Damas was intercepted
by Manthon^, an officer who became a minister in the Parthenopean
Republic. There were other treacherous "patriots." Colletta declares
that Mack's aide-de-camp, Orazio Massa, and this same Gabriele
Manthone, suppressed orders they should have delivered (Storia del
reame di Napoli, pub. Manfroni, vol. I, p. 249). Gaetano Rodino, in
his Racconti Storici to his children, boasts of throwing away the flag
he was carrying.

Page 264, note 10.— Kellermann.

Page 265, note 11. — Cusani. Altogether Damas had 6000 or 7000
men, and 8 guns.

Page 265, note 12. — Roger de Damas deserved the greatest credit
for this retreat. All the Italian historians, who are usually very hard
on foreign generals, do him honour: COLLETTA, Storia del R. di N.,
vol. Ill, 36; BOTTA, Histoire d'ltalie, vol. Ill, p. 327; MAEULLI,
Ragguagli, vol. I, p. 172, et seq.: "Having exposed the disgrace of
our troops I must be equally sincere in praising them." " M. de
Damas behaved very well " (VERNEGUES).

Page 265, note 13. — Comte Auguste-Louis de Talleyrand, son of
Louis XVI's ambassador in Naples, remained in Italy when the
Revolution broke out, and became Napoleon's chamberlain and his
minister in Switzerland, where Louis XVIII also employed him (1770-
1832). He and one of his brothers were "incorporated" as majors
H H

466 NOTES

in the King's cavalry regiment : the other brother served as a
volunteer.

Page 266, note 14. — This is doubtless Brigadier-General Emanuele
Parisi, quartermaster-general.

Page 266, note 15. — Brigadier Barone.

Page 266, note 16. — This corps, which was sent from Frascati under
Brigadier-General Diego Pignatelli, fell into an ambuscade near the
Gate of St. John Lateran. Its leader was wounded, and taken prisoner
with 200 men.

Page 266, note 17. — Bonnamy, who was chief of the staff of the
Armee de Naples, and wrote a Coup d'ceil rapide sur les operations de
la campagne de Naples (Paris, year VIII), describes his meeting with
Damas (p. 83), but not the attempt of which the latter accuses him.
44 1 met Brigadier Damas," he says, "and asked him his intentions.
' I intend to get leave for my troops to pass,' he said, ' or make a
way for them at the point of the bayonet.' I pointed out that his
first suggestion was ridiculous, and that the soldiers of the Republic
would make him regret the insolence of the second : at the same time
I ordered him to lay down his arms. ' When one has cartridges and
7000 men,' he replied, ' one does not lay down one's arms.' ' Very
well, monsieur,' I said, ' we will fight.' He asked for six hours to
think the matter over ; I gave him one. At that point the commander-
in-chief arrived on the scene, and ordered me to attack with the
cavalry : but the brigadier had made off." In the Appendix we give
Championnet's unpublished report.

Page 268, note 18. — At La Storfca, 6 miles from Rome.

Page 268, note 19. — Bonnamy declares (p. 37) that Rey took 8 guns
from the Neapolitans.

Page 269, note 20. — On the high-road from Leghorn to Rome by the
Maremma.

Page 269, note 21. — The strength of this outpost appears to be
underestimated. Marulli describes it as a Calabrian battalion, under
Lieutenant- Colonel Mirabelli.

Page 269, note 22. — Marulli (vol. I, p. 176) gives this as the plan
contemplated by Damas, even after his wound. He mentions the
officer who conveyed and urged the suggestion, which was rejected
by Diego Naselli, lieutenant-general in command of the troops at
Leghorn.

Page 270, note 23. — Kellermann wrote to Macdonald from Tosca-
nella, 19th December (Archives of War), after marching 30 miles in
the hope of surprising the enemy : 4'I have promised 25 louis to the
man who captures Damas."

Page 271, note 24. — 19th December. Marulli declares that the
commanding-officer of the only battalion of grenadiers, Colonel Milano,
Duke of Santo Paolo, was also wounded. He refers enthusiastically

NOTES 467

to the "rare courage" of the wounded general, who refused to leave
the field till the enemy was in retreat (vol. I, p. 176). Bonnamy
says that Damas lost the rest of his artillery in this action, but saved
the greater part of his troops (p. 40), and in his report to the Minister
of War, dated 23rd December, says : " General Damas, one of the
bravest generals in the Neapolitan army, had his jaw shattered "
(Archives of the Ministry of War).

Page 271, note 25. — Championnet mentions him in his report to the
Directory from Frascati, 22nd December. We give the most important
passage : "On the 29th frimaire General Kellerinann attacked the
Neapolitans and insurgents of the district at Montalto : after a very
fierce and bloody fight he beat back the enemy, taking 2 guns and
900 prisoners, among whom was General Ferrola. General Damas
had his lower jaw shot away. The rest of his column retreated to
Orbitello, whither Kellermann did not think he ought to pursue it,
thinking it best to go to Viterbo and reduce that rebel town, which
is defended by 6000 armed and organised insurgents, with 12
guns."

Page 271, note 26. — Damas 's troops were able to embark in peace,
with their arms and baggage. The place had no means of resistance
(COLLETTA, vol. Ill, § 36; MARULLI, vol. I, p. 176).

Page 272, note 27. — Micheroux. had first defeated General Casabianca
at Torre di Palrna, near Fermo, but had paused on the march in
default of instructions, and the French, having had time to secure
reinforcements, surprised him on the 27th November.

Page 272, note 28. — Francesco Pignatelli, Prince of Moliterno,
capitaine -generate, was appointed Regent by the King, with pleni-
potentiary powers. He surrendered Capua for fear of the Neapolitan
populace, and fled almost at once to Palermo, where he was imprisoned
in a fortress.

Page 272, note 29. — Jean-Daniel de Gambs, of Strasburg (1744-
1823), was second-lieutenant in the Lowendal Regiment (1757), lieu-
tenant in the Anhalt Regiment (1760), fought in the Seven Years'
War, became captain (1772), major in the Bourbonnais Regiment
(1777), and lieutenant-colonel of the Auvergne Regiment (1784) during
the American War. He went to Naples with Salis. He became
brigadier-general in the French army (1791); lieutenant-general in the
Neapolitan army (1797); entered the service of the Napoleonic Kings
of Naples; in October 1815 was governor of the Hotel des Invalides
in Naples, and inspector-general of the veterans. He remained in the
service under the Bourbons.

Page 273, note 30. — 12th January, 1799; but not without making an
honourable defence, unlike all the other fortified towns, by order of
the Regent.

Page 273, note 31. — The two envoys who met so opportunely were
H H 2

468 NOTES

the Prince of Migliano and the Duke of Gesso. The armistice was
signed at Sparamisi, 12th January, 1799.

Page 273, note 32. — Nelson's fleet; 23rd December, 1798.

Page 274, note 33. — Thiebault, who was then adjutant-general,
describes this singular interview (Memoir es, vol. II, p. 362).

Page 274, note 34. — Girolamo Pignatelli di Moliterno, who was
proclaimed "the people's general" after the Regent's departure.
Lucio Caracciolo, Duke of Roccoromana, was associated with him in
the post. Both were colonels : the former had distinguished himself
in the campaign against Bonaparte; the latter had just been wounded
at Caiazzo. Colletta (vol. Ill, § 43) describes the procession that was
designed to calm the violence of the mob. The two "commandants"
were forced to hide : they adhered to the Republic, which Roccoromana
deserted in time. He became Murat's captain of the guard. Moli-
terno, having been sent to Paris on a mission, remained there; and
in 1808 was restored to the favour of the Bourbons.

Page 275, note 35. — Diego Naselli, Prince of Aragona, military and
political commandant of the Roman States in 1800, Regent of the
Kingdom in 1806, at the time of the second French invasion.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIV

Page 276, note 1. — James Craig.

Page 277, note 2. — An allusion to the cruel reprisals of the counter-
revolution.

Page 278, note 3. — The famous Emma Lyons (1761-1815).

Page 278, note 4. — Emma's husband, Sir William Hamilton (1730-
1803), wa§. ambassador at Naples from 1764 to 1800.

Page 278, note 5. — Ferdinand's second son, born in 1790.

Page 278, note 6.— A ducat =4 fr. 25.

Page 279, note 7. — Fabrizio Ruffo di Bagnara, born at S. Leucio
(1744-1847), made cardinal in 1794. MORONI (Dizionario eccles.
enciclop., vol. LIX) and von HELFERT (Fabrizio Ruffo, in German)
describe his active and varied career.

Page 279, note 8. — The most famous was "Colonel" Pezza, called
Fra Diavolo. The only general was the Calabrian Rodio, who belonged
to the lesser nobility.

Page 280, note 9. — On the 13th June, 1799, after a fierce battle at
the Bridge of the Maddalena. The Castel del Carmine was taken by
storm on the 15th, the Castel Nuovo and Castel del Ovo capitulated
on the 27th, and Fort St. Elmo on the llth July.

Page 281, note 10T. — General Spinelli presided over the Junta of
Generals, which included Generals de Gambs, Ripa, Burckhardt, de

NOTES 469

Bock, and Acton. Colletta — who, it is true, was an ardent patriot —
merely says that this tribunal was surpassed in cruelty by the Junta
of State. The latter has given notoriety to the names of the judges
Guidobaldi, Speciale, La Rossa, Di Fiore, Damiani, and Sambuti.

Page 281, note 11.— Du Luc de Vintimille (Charles-Fe'lix-Re'ne'?)
was a cadet at the Military School in Paris (1779-1781), and was to
have succeeded his father as proprietary colonel of the Royal Corsican
Regiment, and afterwards of the Berry Regiment. He emigrated,
joined Prince John of Lichtenstein's light-horse, and was appointed
to Prince Charles's staff. He returned to France after Campo-Formio,
but left it in Fructidor, and served in Naples as a brigadier: he
was Burckhardt's chief of the staff in 1798, and Damas's in 1801.
He afterwards consented to serve in Joseph Bonaparte's army
as a major-general. He died of fever in Calabria, 3rd September,
1806.

Page 282, note 12. — The Prince of Cassaro and Spaccaforno was
Minister of Justice before his mission in Naples, and was afterwards
Councillor of State (1801). "A dignified, wise man, and accessible
to pity as far as the times allowed," says Colletta (op. cit., vol. I,
p. 394). The Queen says of him: "He is a firm and honest man,
with a reputation for justice, but he is entirely without education,
and without any knowledge of the affairs or even of the position of
Europe. I can never believe him likely to succeed " (Correspondance
inedite de Marie Caroline avec le Marquis de Gallo, vol. II, p. 127).
The King did not return to Naples till 27th June, 1802.

Page 282, note 13. — The document appointing Comte Roger appears
in the Appendix, dated 4th November, 1799. The Queen expressed
herself strongly on the difficulties of this task : " Saxe, Damas, and
Hesse are being sent to Naples at once, as inspectors. They are
honest men, but they will have a great deal of mud to wade through,
for all the officers in the army are infamous, without exception " (to
Gallo, 13th November, 1799, Correspondance already quoted, vol. II,
p. 127).

Page 283, note 14. — Giuseppe Zurlo was afterwards Murat's minister
(1759-1828). The Queen thought very highly of him at this time :
"Here he is a star, an eagle that has no equal" (Corresp. de M. C.
avec le Marquis de Gallo, vol. II, p. 352).

Page 284, note 15. — See the Souvenirs of Hippolyte d'Espinchal,
published by F. Masson, vol. I, chaps. Ill and IV.

Page 284, note 16. — A white palfry carrying a tribute of gold,
presented by the King of Naples to the Pope every year as an act of
homage. Ferdinand practically dispensed with it.

Page 285, note 17. — There had been one formerly, but the Baron de
Salis abolished it.

Page 286, note 18. — Irregular troops that had been raised during

470 NOTES

the popular movement of 1799, and were responsible for the eventual
combination : the cadres, at all events, were drawn up beforehand.

Page 287, note 19. — A document published by the Comte Boulay
de la Meurthe (Documents sur la negotiation du Concordat, vol. I,
p. 232) gives the 27th November as the date of Naselli's recall. The
events that follow were anterior to that date.

Page 288, note 20. — Hannibal, Marquis de Sommariva, a Lombard
(1755-1829). Major-general 1799. He was entrusted with the defence
of Tuscany; left Florence 14th October. General of cavalry 1817.

Page 288, note 21. — Ghisleri, the Austrian minister, mentions his
return, 17th October, 1800, and also Damas's departure the next day
to Frascati, to secure the earliest news from his Court (Letter to
Thugut; Rome, 18th October; given by BOULAY DE LA MEURTHE,
Documents sur la negotiation du Concordat, vol. I, p. 185).

Page 289, note 22. — Pierre Dupont de 1'fitang, Bonaparte's chief of
the staff at Marengo. He was defeated at Baylen.

Page 289, note 23. — The famous geologist, Gratet de Dolomieu,
member of the Institut d'Egypte and the Acad^mie des Sciences. He
died of the effects of his terrible captivity. The two other prisoners
were Generals Manscourt and Alexandre Dumas.

Page 289, note 24. — The letter is given by Boulay de la Meurthe
(op. tit., vol. I, p. 204). It was dated from Florence, 19th Brumaire,
year IX (10th November). The summons was followed by these
words : "If you do not comply with my demands I assure you that
I shall invade Neapolitan territory." But a letter from Brune, the
commander-in-chief, dated the 9th, denied the rumour of an invasion
of Naples, and was expressed in a tone that, as Damas pointed out
to Dupont 's envoys, was very superior to his. It decided him to
postpone the transmission of a very energetic answer from the Court
of Naples (Ibid., vol. I, pp. 224, 226, 235).

Page 289, note 25. — Lieutenant Maurice Dupin and Major Charles
His. The latter protested to Cardinal Consalvi against this surveil-
lance (15th November) (Ibid., vol. I, p. 208). See another letter of
Damas, p. 213, note.

Page 289, note 26. — Comte Auguste de Talleyrand, Damas's aide-de-
camp.

Page 289, note 27. — 20th December, 1800. The letter was dated
30th November.

Page 289, note 28. — "The excellent dispositions already made by
M. de Damas have enabled him, this very day, to give orders for the
march of his whole army-corps, which will advance on Viterbo
to-morrow " (GmsLiERi, 20th December. BOULAY DE LA MEURTHE,
op. tit., vol. I, p. 247). The Neapolitan troops, seven thousand
"very well equipped" men, marched through Rome 21st-23rd
December, and Damas himself set out on the 24th (Ibid., p. 248).

NOTES 471

Page 290, note 29. — Confirmed by Ghislieri, who says this letter was
received by Damas at Ronciglione on the 25th (Ibid., p. 248).

Page 290, note 30. — On this campaign see General MATHIEU DUMAS,
Precis des evcnements militaires, vol. V; Victoires et conquetes,
vol. XIII; MARULLI, Ragguagli storici, vol. I.

Page 291, note 31. — MARULLI, Ragguagli storici, vol. II, p. 65, gives
i>he composition of this corps.

Page 291, note 32. — Ghislieri gives this officer's name : Marlonitz,
major of engineers. The general was Franz Mathias Gorup von
Besanez (1749-1835). He was F eld-mar echal-lieutenant in 1808.

Page 292, note 33. — Domenico Pino, a Milanese (1767-1826), entered
the Cisalpine Legion, of which he became general in 1798. He was
Minister of War of the Kingdom of Italy (1804-1806), and took part
in the Spanish, Russian, and German campaigns. He deserted his
party in 1814.

Page 292, note 34. — Miollis had come from Florence by way of
Poggibonsi.

Page 293, note 35.— 14th January, 1801. Colletta does justice to
Damas 's firmness in keeping back the French (op. cit., vol. I, p.
416).

Page 293, note 36. — Antonfelice Zondadari, of Siena, was Archbishop
of Siena from 1795 till his death in 1823. He was made a cardinal.

Page 294, note 37. — During the insurrection of Arezzo Damas sent
a detachment of troops to support it.

Page 294, note 38.— Murat, in his letter of 21st January, 1801,
published by the Comte Boulay de la Meurthe (Documents sur la
negotiation du Concordat, vol. I, p. 342), merely expressed surprise
that the Neapolitans had entered Tuscany, and asked if they still
had hostile intentions. But the officer who delivered it was told to
persuade Damas to propose an armistice. In General Leopold
Berthier's answer, as Murat 's representative, to Damas 's letter of
the 22nd, from Viterbo (Ibid., p. 342), which answer was dated from
Foligno, on the night of the 24th, he mentioned the fact that Belle-
garde's armistice contained no mention of the Neapolitans. Damas
was bidden to evacuate the States of the Church at once, and his
Court was to liberate the French prisoners and close the Neapolitan
ports to the English (A. LUMBROSO, Correspondance de Joachim
Murat, p. 45).

Page 294, note 39.— The Diario napoletano dal 1798 al 1825 (vol. II,
p. 7) records his arrival on the 23rd January, and his departure on
the 24th.

Page 295, note 40. — The letter, dated from Viterbo, 25th January,
is given by Boulay de la Meurthe (vol. I, p. 362, note) : he informed
Murat that he had entirely evacuated Tuscany. Murat assured
Bonaparte that the officer sent by Damas entreated him to bring

472 NOTES

about a peace, which alone could prevent another civil war (Ibid.,
p. 362).

Page 295, note 41. — Murat wrote on the 28th January that he could
not consent to an interview. It was in this letter that he called upon
Damas to persuade the King to avoid certain ruin "by sending away
those people who are sold to England " (Lettres et documents pour
servir a I'histoire de Joachim Murat, vol. I, p. 139, et seq.).

Page 295, note 42. — The armistice was concluded at Treviso, 16th
January, 1801.

Page 295, note 43. — Murat had again written to Damas, on the
7th February, 1801, to repudiate the engagements of his aide-de-camp,
who had promised the count more than he was authorised to grant,
and to repeat that he would only suspend hostilities when the Court
had appointed a negotiator; again on the 10th, to refuse to sign the
armistice suggested, and to propose another; and once more on the
16th, to announce that, since the allotted time had expired, he would
invade the kingdom unless the armistice were signed and the embargo
placed on English vessels (Lettres et documents, vol. I, pp. 154, 159,
171; and LUMBROSO, op. cit., p. 58). On the same day he wrote
Damas another letter, full of praises and assurances of his "esteem"
and "admiration," and explained that if he had refused him an
interview it was because he believed him to be an emigre: he was
now quite willing to meet him (Lettres et documents, vol. I, p. 179).
Finally, on the 18th, he announced that he had concluded an armistice
with Micheroux, which he hoped might lead to a permanent peace;
and on the 26th he sent an aide-de-camp to see to the execution of
the document. "I am sorry that circumstances should have robbed
me of the pleasure of seeing you, and repeating my assurances of the
warmest esteem" (Ibid., pp. 180 and 189).

Page 296, note 44.— Antonio Micheroux (1755-1805) had been
Neapolitan Minister at Venice (1785-1797) and to the Cisalpine
Republic (1798-1804). In 1804, after Acton's departure, he became
Director of Foreign Affairs.

Page 297, note 45. — It was signed at Foligno, 18th February, 1801.
All the French prisoners were liberated, and all the special tribunals
abolished, the King even engaging to listen to representations from
France in favour of the accused.

Page 297, note 46. — This is confirmed in a letter from the Queen
of Naples to Gallo, but she only says 500,000 francs (llth March, 1801,
Correspondance, etc., vol. II, p. 216). This letter seems to justify the
count's mistrust: "You have seen the fatal armistice concluded by
Micheroux and Damas."

Page 297, note 47. — 28th March, 1801, between Alquier and
Micheroux : the ports of the kingdom to be closed to the English
and Turks; the Presidii of Tuscany to be given up; the French to

NOTES 473

be indemnified for their losses ; an amnesty to be proclaimed , the
western provinces to be occupied by the French.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV

Page 298, note 1. — Damas was equally courteous to Murat's aide-
de-camp, Beaumont, when he brought the treaty to Naples : the Diario
records that they appeared in the same box at the theatre (vol. II,
p. 22). The same publication mentions the martial bearing of the
army-corps when it returned to Naples.

Page 298, note 2.— 9th March, to be precise.

Page 302, note 3. — Souvarof.

Page 302, note 4. — The Emperor Francis II, who had married
Maria Theresa of the Two Sicilies.

Page 303, note 5. — Louis Emmanuel Henri Alexandre de Launai,
Comte d'Antraigues (1753-1812), concerning whom L. PINGAUD has
written a well-authenticated account : Un agent secret sous la Revolu-
tion et V Empire (Paris, 1893). The Comte BOULAY DE LA MEURTHE
has published some letters from the Queen to this agent; Revue
d'Histoire diplomatique, vol. II (1888). Antraigue appears to have
been in favour from 1796 to 1803. Does Damas blame him for incit-
ing the Queen to hold out against France to the last?

Page 303, note 6.— She returned on the 17th August, 1802. She
had left Naples on the 3rd June, 1800.

Page 305, note 7. — Charles Alquier (1752-1826), the ex-convention -
ist and regicide.

Page 305, note 8. — The Queen had sounded the French Ambassador
on this subject. He bade her "consider if it would not be wise to
avoid any measure that could for a moment seem to point to military
schemes " (Alquier to Berthier, Minister of War, 31st December,
1803, in CH. AURIOL'S La France, L'Angleterre, et Naples de 1803 a
1806, vol. I, p. 481). Alquier regarded Damas's return, and even the
Queen's caution, as an indication of military preparations. (Letter
to Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 14th February, 1804,
Ibid., vol. I, p. 539.)

Page 306, note 9.— Sir Hugh Elliot (1752-1830), an active but not
very scrupulous diplomatist, had been minister at Munich, Berlin,
Copenhagen, and Brussels, before being accredited to the King of
Naples (1803-1806). The Comte D'HAUSSONVILLE has described the
beginning of his diplomatic career (Etudes biographiques et litteraires,
Paris, 1886). On the part he played in Naples see O. BROWNING'S
article Hugh Elliot in Naples, in the English Historical Review, vol.
IV (1889). Lady MINTO wrote a Memoir of the Rt. Hon. Sir Hugh
Elliot.

474 NOTES

Page 307, note 10. — Elliot's report to his government, 15th June,
1804 (AURIOL, op. cit., vol. I, p. 620), gave the figures as 24,308
regular troops, and 50,951 militia, for Naples alone, without counting
the irregular troops called masses.

Page 308, note 11. — Giambattista Colajanni, a Sicilian, was raised
by Acton from the position of a clerk in the Ministry of War, to be a
colonel, and the head of the department. He died in 1818.

Page 309, note 12. — He embarked on the 25th May : the manu-
script gives July by mistake. Acton continued to correspond with the
English Minister, and kept his title of Chief Minister.

Page 312, note 13. — The Minister of Finance was the Chevalier
Luigi De' Medici; the Minister of War and of Marine, Lieutenant-
General Bartolomeo Forteguerri; the Grand Master of the King's
Household, Francesco Seratti; the Minister of Justice, Francesco
Migliorini. There was no special Ministry of the Interior.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI

Page 315, note 1. — Luigi Medici or De' Medici (1760-1830), while
still very young, exercised the important functions of Regent of the
Vicaria, the Neapolitan Court of Appeal (1790-1795). Owing to
Acton's hostility, it seems, he was twice imprisoned; first on suspicion
of Jacobinism, 1795-1799, and again at the time of the counter-
revolution, until the Peace of Florence. Yet he had played no part
during the Republic, and it is even said the republican government
kept him as a hostage. Alquier was pleased with his moderation : he
very nearly succeeded Acton.

Page 315, note 2. — Bartolomeo Forteguerri, born in Siena, 1750,
died at Naples, 1808, was capitaine -general in 1797, and after holding
the chief command in the Navy, became Secretary of State in 1802.
"His tiresome old routine," was the Queen's expression. "His routine
is tiresome, indiscreet, and expensive " (Corresp. inedite de Marie
Caroline avec le marquis de Gallo).

Page 315, note 3. — It was in his despatch of the 25th August, 1804,
that the French Ambassador, to show the complete effacement of
Acton, announced that Damas was appointed "inspector-general of
all the forces, with powers that made him the absolute controller of
the whole Neapolitan army" (AURIOL, op. cii., vol. II, p. 73). The
official document, which is preserved among the family papers, is
dated the 12th October.

Page 316, note 4. — This may be an allusion to the arrest of Roger's
sister-in-law, the Comtesse Charles de Damas, nee Langeron, at twenty
leagues' distance from Paris (Plieviose, year XII). She was placed
under surveillance on suspicion of conspiring with Hyde and even
with the " bande de Georges."

NOTES 475

Page 316, note 5. — According to the official document Damas had
under his direct orders all the "inspectors and divisional command-
ants " of the regular army. In military matters he controlled the
Royal Regiment of Artillery, the Engineers, and the Militia, which in
other matters adhered to their own customs. The Royal Grenadier
Guards were independent of him. In addition to the pay he already
received he was given 160 ducats a month for his official expenses.

Page 317, note 6. — It is quite true that Alquier, since the 23rd
November, 1804, had been formally complaining of the bellicose attitude
of the Court; and Gouvion Saint-Cyr, who commanded the army of
occupation in the Eastern provinces, spoke of the provisioning of
towns, the concentration of troops, and the depots of arms destined
for the masses.

Page 318, note 7. — Elliot observed that Damas 's statistics of the
army differed greatly from Acton's : at the end of 1804, 7000 foot-
soldiers and about 1000 cavalry ready to take the field were all that
the kingdom contained. Elliot spoke with praise of the new energetic
reforms (despatch of 7th December. AURTOL, vol. II, p. 104).

Page 318, note 8. — Puglia and the Abruzzi, where 18,000 French
were quartered at the end of 1804. Gouvion Saint-Cyr 's headquarters
were at Barletta.

Page 318, note 9. — It was on the 14th December that Alquier in-
formed his government of these movements, when "it is well known
that the infection is over at Leghorn." Saint-Cyr heard the news the
same day from one of his agents, who gave him the names of the
officers chosen to levy the troops. The ambassador appears but
slightly anxious as to the meaning of these preparations, but very much
so with regard to the state of mind of the Queen, who was excited by
Elliot's insinuations and "the blustering of M. de Damas" (AumoL,
op. cit., vol. II, pp. 96, 107, 111).

Page 319, note 10.— If the date be really 7th, and not 17th, it applies
to the making of the cordon and not to its breaking up.

Page 319, note 11. — This may explain Alquier 's change of opinion
with regard to the comte, whom he called at first "about the only
good officer in the Neapolitan army," and later on a mediocre general,
who need not have caused so much alarm (Letters to Talleyrand, 12th
February and 14th March, 1803. AURIOL, op cit., vol. II, pp. 167
and 190).

Page 320, note 12. — Louis de Beer, afterwards governor of the
principality of Benevento, for Talleyrand. He was an Alsatian, born
about 1778. The Queen called him " a mad fellow."

Page 320, note 13. — Now the Villa Nazionale, between Chiaia and
the sea. It has a public garden, ornamented with statues.

Page 321, note 14. — It was in a conversation with the Queen that
Alquier demanded Damas 's dismissal (16th November, 1804). On the

476 NOTES

3rd January, 1805, Talleyrand wrote to the minister : " The persistence
of the Neapolitan government in protecting M. de Damas is a positive
insult : M. de Damas ought to be banished and degraded " (Alquier's
note was dated 22nd January). Napoleon himself attacked Damas in
a letter to the Queen of Naples, 2nd January, 1805, Marie Caroline
answered that the Emperor was misinformed on the subject of an
officer "whose uprightness and moderation should command his
esteem. This general left France long before the horrors of the
Revolution, and served in Russia, whence he entered our service before
the war. The King, my husband, knowing his honesty and devotion,
is at this moment employing him as inspector-general, not with the
object of raising troops . . . but to put some order into the few
troops that remain to him, and were on the point of vanishing alto-
gether, for want of a vigilant and honest supervisor. I hope that
your Majesty, after this frank explanation, will no longer insist on a
step that would be extremely disagreeable and painful to us " (25th
January, 1805). Cf. AURIOL, vol. II, pp. 121, 127, 131, 138, 141, 142.
On the Queen's energy in defending Damas see her letters to Gallo
(Corresp. inedites de M. C. avec le marquis de Gallo, vol. II, pp. 532,
536, 550, 556, etc.). She thinks that the animosity is due "to the
Talleyrands rather than Buonaparte," and dates from "some quarrel
in Paris between relations or so-called friends. . . ." "This persecu-
tion has given me the highest opinion of him as an incorruptible and
able man, and I shall not sacrifice him." It seems that this affair
increased the Queen's regard for Damas, of whom she said to Gallo :
"I have never been enthusiastic about Damas . . ." (25th January,
1805). It must be remembered that Talleyrand was Damas 's
cousin.

Page 321, note 15. — "Will Your Majesty listen to this prophecy,
and listen without impatience . on the first war that you bring about,
you and your posterity will cease to reign : your wandering children
will beg for relief from their kinsfolk, in the different countries of
Europe." These words are in the letter of the 2nd January, in answer
to the Queen's first letter, which is not in existence. Napoleon's
second letter (21st February, 1805) is less violent. "Is it so hard,
then, to be quiet? "

Page 322, note 16. — Prince Cardito's mission to Barletta : the
Queen had sent him thither before, in December 1804.

Page 322, note 17. — The ultimatum arrived in the evening of the
15th February : the Queen's answer is dated the 16th.

Page 323, note 18. — It was Micheroux who bore this title : the
Minister was the Prince of Luzzi.

Page 323, note 19. — These orders are given in Gouvion Saint-Cyr's
Memoires pour servir a Vhistoire militaire, vol. II, p. 415: "You
must urgently insist on General Damas 's dismissal, on M. Elliot

NOTES 477

leaving Naples and at least being sent to Sicily, and on complete
disarmament . . ." (Berthier to Saint-Cyr, 21st January, 1805).

Page 324, note 20. — Alquier refers to an interview with Saint-Cyr
(despatch of 14th March, 1805) which must have occurred a little
later than this, since it is not mentioned in Saint-Cyr 's report to the
Minister of War (20th February, 1805). It was Prince Cardito who,
when he visited Saint-Cyr 's headquarters with the aide-de-camp who
had brought the ultimatum, promised that Damas should be sent
away, "in spite of the pain that it would cause to the King." The
short space of time that had elapsed confirms what Damas says of
the part played by Micheroux. But in the letter delivered by Cardito
the Queen was still trying to postpone the decision: "He is not an
emigre, and has done no harm : he is an officer of honour." She
wished to await an answer to her letter to the Emperor, which came
at last, dated 21st February. With regard to foreigners "carrying
their portfolio and their sword all over the world," she could say
nothing. It was then, and not till then, that Damas went.

Page 325, note 21. — It carried with it the privileges of the Grandees
of Spain. Damas not only kept his salary, but Alquier declares it
was increased to the sum of 60,000 francs.

Page 326, note 22. — A letter of great dignity, announcing Damas 's
departure, but defending him with a degree of energy that does honour
to both: "prudent, circumspect, and honest," she calls him, and
" so conscious of his own rectitude " that he had contemplated spending
his leave in France. "I confess that we are deeply grieved to be
forced to lose this officer" (13th March. AURIOL, vol. II, p. 180
et seq.). She wrote to Gallo on the same day (Corresp. inedite avec le
marquis de Gallo, vol. II, p. 569): "Damas left us yesterday, and
carried with him our profoundest regret, and that of all honest
people."

Alquier, for his part, wrote to Talleyrand : " M. de Damas at last
left Naples yesterday morning; and I hope that the most important
matter I ever have to transact for his Imperial Majesty may involve
less unpleasantness and difficulty than this " (14th March). He
declares that the Court was on the point of risking war rather than
yield.

Page 327, note 23.— Fabrizio Buffo, Prince of Castelcicala (1755-
1832) was ambassador in England during the greater part of the
Revolution and Empire, and in Paris in 1815.

Page 327, note 24. — Became Foreign Minister in Pitt's cabinet,
January 1805.

Page 328, note 25. — Lieutenant-Colonel George Smith.

Page 328, note 26. — The object of the mission was frankly stated to
the English Minister, and was exactly what Damas thought it to be :
"To make all the preliminary arrangements, after a minute inquiry,

478 NOTES

for the adoption of such measures as will secure the occupation (of
Sicily) when it becomes necessary " (Instructions of the 20th March.
AURIOL, vol. II, p. 200).

Page 328, note 27.— Marzio Mastrilli, Marchese del Gallo (1753-
1833), began his diplomatic career at Turin, 1782, was ambassador in
Vienna, 1790, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1798, ambassador in France,
1801. He was one of Joseph Bonaparte's first adherents and became
his Minister for Foreign Affairs, and afterwards Murat's.

Page 330, note 28. — Ferdinand's letter of recognition is dated 10th
June. Elliot explains in his despatches that, before advising acquies-
cence, he asked General Lascy whether he would support Naples in
the case of the refusal leading to a rupture, and that Lascy answered
he could give no support (18th June, 1805, AURIOL, vol. II, p. 323).
Page 331, note 29.— 1st May, 1605.

Page 332, note 30. — In the course of this diplomatic audience (3rd
June) the Emperor declared that "if, after reigning all these years,
the Queen could not contrive to act and speak with any degree of
calm and moderation, the English ship she kept in the Bay of Naples
should not save her " (Talleyrand's circular to the ambassadors). The
tone was such that Gallo begged the Queen to make Cardito give
her an exact account of the interview ( AURIOL, vol. II, p. 353).

Page 332, note 31. — For instance, on the llth April, a treaty was
signed in Petersburg between Russia and England, with the special
object of defending the kingdom of Naples from French enterprise.

Page 333, note 32. — This is doubtless the incident to which Alquier
refers in his despatch of 1st February, 1805. "It is quite certain that
the orders were given by M. de Damas after he left the Queen, a few
hours after the arrival of the English frigate Seahorse."

Page 334, note 33. — A despatch by Alquier ( AURIOL, vol. II, p. 438)
gives some information on these two officers. Lascy was of Irish
extraction and born in Livonia. He was a nephew of the field-marshal
in the Austrian army, and~ had fought in Turkey and Poland. He
was considered "one of the best generals in the Russian army," but,
being over sixty years old, had been living for some years on his
property near Grodno. Langeron calls him a good general, but so
eccentric that he might easily be thought "a little cracked." Hoper-
man (as he writes it) was an Alsatian of forty, or forty-five, who had
served in Russia for twenty-four years. He was "said to be a very
good engineer officer."

Page 335, note 34. — Antonino Maresca-Donnorso, Duke of Serraca
priola (1750-1822). He had been Minister Plenipotentiary in Russia
since 1782, and had married there. He was unemployed from 1807
to 1812.

Page 336, note 35. — It was on the 15th June that fidouard Lefebvre,
the French charge d'affaires, informed his chief of Lascy 's presence

NOTES 479

— he had been there at least since the 7th May — and on the 31st
August that Alquier said ho bad at last discovered what the general
was doing.

Page 338, note 36. — The Chtcherbatof incident gave a good deal of
trouble in the Chancelleries. Lefebvre tells the story (15th May, 1805,
AURIOL, vol. II, p. 274), and the Queen expresses her indignation to
Gallo (Corresp. inedite avec le marquis de Gallo, vol. II, p. 587). The
prince seems to have been unceremoniously packed into a carriage in
the night, and taken off to the Roman frontier. The Russians kept
away from the Court, and Karpoff, the charge d'affaires, declared he
would break off all communication. Elliot sided with the Russians,
and blamed the Queen and "the contemptible French emigres who
surround her."

Page 339, note 37.— Dmitri Pavlovitch Tatistchef (1767-1845) was
accredited to Ferdinand in 1802, and again from 1805 to 1810.

Page 343, note 38. — If any one should be surprised at this statement
and object that it was precisely a coalition that would make it im-
possible for the French troops to remain in the kingdom of Naples,
I would point out that when 20,000 men are in a position to overrun
a kingdom before being forced to evacuate it, it is far harder to drive
them out after the invasion has actually occurred, especially when
the kingdom in question has an army that is about 20,000 men short
of the right number for the task (Note by the author).

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVII

Page 345, note 1. — On reaching Naples on the 6th July, 1805,
Alquier seems to have heard for a fact that orders had been issued
to arm the masses. He left no record of his scene with the Queen,
but he appears to have threatened that Saint-Cyr should march on
Naples and proclaim the Hereditary Prince as King. Elliot says the
Queen was quite ill after this interview.

Page 346, note 2. — Tommaso di Somma, Marchese Circello (1737-
1826); colonel (1772); minister in Denmark (1775); in Austria (1777);
in France (1786); in London (1793). Succeeded Micheroux (August
1805) as Director of Foreign Affairs, and later as Secretary of State.
He was reputed to be a warm partisan of the English.

Page 346, note 3. — The person thought of was the Duke of San
Teodoro, of whom we shall hear presently.

Page 346, note 4. — This condition does not appear in Alquier 's notes
of this date : in his despatches at this time he went so far as to
advise the downfall of the dynasty (31st August, 1805).

Page 347, note 5.— The 10th. The Marquis B. MARESCA was the
first to publish the text (Archivio storico per le province napoletane,

480 NOTES

vol. XXII, p. 598), which is also given by AURIOL, vol. II, p. 525. The
King pledged himself to oppose all attempts of the French to extend
or strengthen their occupation of the kingdom. It was left to the
Russian general to choose the time and place for the landing of the
troops, to control the affairs of the Neapolitan forces, and to arrange
the composition of the garrisons. The kingdom was to furnish the
allies with horses and mules, submit to any other necessary requisi-
tions, pay all the expenses of the Russian troops — including the
legion raised in the Ionian Islands — and supply the Russian fleet
with provisions. The Emperor only engaged that the kingdom should
remain intact when peace was concluded.

Page 348, note 6. — Brigadier-General Guillichini, whom the English
later on accused of betraying them.

Page 348, note 7. — A little house.

Page 350, note 8. — The note to p. 347, note 5, shows the truth of this
criticism.

Page 351, note 9. — It will be seen that I secretly foresaw the events
that have happened since. If the intentions of the allies had been
really honest they could have allowed us to remain neutral and made
a show of coercing us when they landed, only asking for our support
when active hostilities were actually breaking out. Then, if circum-
stances had arisen that obliged them to evacuate the kingdom, we
should not have been so deeply compromised. The French Ambassador
might have remained in Naples, and some means of defence have
been devised against the two treacherous Powers (Author's note).

Page 352, note 10. — It is only right to say that nothing in the
treaty pointed to the possibility of the allies' departure. Their unvary-
ing resolve to restore independence to the kingdom or to defend it
was expressed in the most positive and unqualified terms. Nothing
but utter shamelessness could release them from this engagement
(Author's note).

Page 354, note 11. — The treaty of the 21st September, which the
King ratified on the 8th October, 1805.

Page 355, note 12. — A declaration to the contrary. This curious
document is given by AURIOL, vol. II, p. 603. It is dated 8th October
and signed by Firrao and Circello.

Page 356, note 13. — Sir James Henry Craig (1748-1812) was an
ensign at the age of fifteen, and served in the American War and
the war in Flanders (on the Duke of York's staff). He was major-
general in 1794, conquered Cape Colony and was its governor till 1797,
and became lieutenant-general in 1801. He was in command in the
Mediterranean in 1805; in Sicily until March 1806; and in 1807
became Governor-general of Canada.

Page 359, note 14. — A ducat = 4 fr. 25. The text of these conditions
is given by AURIOL (vol. II, p. 645). The 500,000 ducats represented

NOTES 481

the cost of the horses that were to be supplied; and for provisions
and forage 276,100 ducats were to be paid in advance every two
months.

Page 360, note 15. — While the Council was deliberating, General
Opperman came to see me. "Our advent is at this moment being
discussed," he said, "and I believe we are not wanted any more." —
"My dear general," I answered, "if you come in force I shall be
sorry, I admit; but if you come in small numbers — a thing that only
you can tell, since M. Circello was mad enough to leave it unsettled
in the treaty that he signed with M. Tatistchef, so that nothing has
been stipulated with regard to that important matter — you yourselves
must hope and trust that your coming may be prevented, for you can
do us a great deal of harm and very little good " (Author's note).

Page 360, note 16. — MARESCA, loc. cit., reports the discussion. The
Council comprised Luzzi, Seratti, Forteguerri, Migliorini, De' Medici,
Secretaries of State; Circello, Director of Foreign Affairs; Ascoli,
Director of Police; and Cardinal Fabrizio Buffo, ex-Generalissimo.

Page 363, note 17. — Alquier was perfectly aware of the sailing of the
Russian fleet, but thought it was bound for the island of Elba (despatch
of 9th November).

Page 363, note 18. — These two documents are in AURIOL, vol. II,
pp. 657 and 658.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVIII

Page 364, note 1. — This was Francis Xavier Joseph, who was born
in 1777, was married to Charles IV 's daughter, the Infanta Maria
Isabella, in 1802, and reigned as Francis I from 1825 to 1830.

Page 366, note 2. — An edict was passed 4th December, 1805, calling
out eight men in every thousand of the inhabitants between the ages
of 20 and 40.

Page 366, note 3.— It was not till 3rd December, 1805, that the
minister informed Damas of his appointment as " General- Commandant
of the Neapolitan army, with all the prerogatives and faculties accorded
to him for the campaign in Tuscany, in which Your Excellency
maintained, with great credit and success, the honour and dignity
of the royal troops " (cf. the Appendix).

Page 366, note 4. — To facilitate this arrangement General Lascy
had begged that four battalions might be brought from Sicily, to
replace the troops that he was moving from the rear to the van; and
his wishes had been carried out. Moreover, when I suggested
making a tour of inspection on the frontier with the quartermaster-
general, M. Opperman, Lascy had answered that he thought I should
remain where I was at that moment, and devote all my time to the
I I

482 NOTES

formation of the army, which it was so important to accomplish
promptly (Author's note).

Page 366, note 5. — The Act is dated 27th November, 1805.

Page 367, note 6. — Second-in-command of the Russian expedition.

Page 370, note 7. — The fact of this tour, and everything concerning
Damas's troops, were soon known by the French (AtraiOL, vol. II,
p. 724).

Page 371, note 8. — The order to form it (30,000 men under Gouvion
Saint-Cyr) is dated 9th December.

Page 371, note 9. — The Peace of Presburg was concluded on 26th
December : this must be the armistice signed after the interview
between Napoleon and Francis II, on the 4th.

Page 372, note 10. — Gravina (in the Bari district) is near Matera,
at that time the capital of the Basilicata.

Page 372, note 11. — The original is in French.

Page 372, note 12.— Sir John Stuart (1759-1815) fought in the
American War, in Flanders (1799), and in Egypt (1801); was pro-
moted major-general 1802; succeeded Craig 1806, and won the aston-
ishing victory of Maida against the Frencn. In 1808 he was made
commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, with the rank of lieutenant-
general.

Page 372, note 13. — Sir James Campbell (1763-1819) joined the
service in 1780, as an ensign in the 1st Royal Scots; served in
America, the West Indies, and the Mediterranean (1805-1814); major-
general (1808), lieutenant-general (1813).

Page 372, note 14.— Alexis Samoilovitch Greig (1775-1845) was born
in Cronstadt. He became an admiral in the Russian service, like his
father.

Page 372, note 15. — Henry Bunbury, quartermaster of the English
corps, was the author of an important account of these events :
Military transactions in the Mediterranean, 1806-1810 (London, 1851).

Page 873, note 16. — An unspeakable imposture, since Generals
Lascy and Opperman were at considerable pains to make the convoy
wait at Augusta in Sicily until the French had left the kingdom. It
was no chance, therefore, but a positive and deliberate order, that
postponed their arrival in the Bay of Naples (Author's note).

Page 378, note 17. — It was shameful and deceitful to give this as
the reason for the coming of the allied troops, since the treaty that
was so advantageous to the Russians and English made no mention
of the word diversion. Nothing was stipulated, asked, nor, unfortun-
ately, granted, save with a view to the defence and security of the
kingdom — the one and only object, either for the present or the
future (Author's note).

Page 373, note 18. — This was absolutely false, since everything
essential that was capable of being drawn by horses was provided

NOTES 483

with horses. The things that were held back, owing to lack of the
time necessary for requisitions, were useless accessories or luxuries.
The King, however, had undertaken to have them conveyed by relays
of horses taken from the provinces, by a method that was perhaps
more effectual than real requisitions (Author's note).

Page 373, note 19. — Charles Emmanuel IV had been in the kingdom
since May 1801.

Page 374, note 20. — In this disgraceful opinion one sees a hint of
Elliot's favourite and dishonourable scheme for Sicily (Author's note).

Page 375, note 21. — A villa on the Vomero.

Page 376, note 22. — Fabrizio Ruffo set out on the 7th to Borne and
the French headquarters.

Page 375, note 23. — Since then I have received positive confirmation
of this from Prince Czartbrisky, who was first minister in Russia at
that time, and was with the Emperor when the order was despatched
(Author's note).

Page 376, note 24. — This was the famous Charles Andre" Pozzo di
Borgo (1764-1842). This was his first mission in the service of
Russia.

Page 379, note 25. — Lascy assured Tatistchef that he had done all
he could to persuade Craig to postpone his departure; and declared
that as the French seemed to be delaying their advance he thought
it best not to put obstacles in the way of the negotiations.

Page 380, note 26,— The chateau to which the defeated Emperors
retired after the battle.

Page 382, note 27. — He never succeeded in arriving there, and hii
journey was entirely fruitless (Author's note).

Page 382, note 28. — Carlo Caracciolo. He had just been made
ambassador to Spain.

Page 383, note 29. — The King's second son : born 1790; married the
Archduchess Marie Clementine 1816; died 1851. He was his mother's
favourite.

Page 384, note 30.— The Duke of Ascoli, Trojano Marulli (1761-
1822). He was at first considering the question of preventing popular
disorder.

Page 384, note 31. — Ambassador to Rome.

Page 385, note 32. — On the 23rd January.

Page 385, note 33. — Officially the commander-in-chief was Prince
Joseph, "the Emperor's lieutenant."

Page 386, note 34.— It was not till the 27th February that the
masses were called out.

Page 387, note 35. — Although the confidence placed in me by the

King and Queen enabled me to give my frank opinion on every

subject, I could hardly presume, as may be imagined, to say what

I thought of this suggestion. If there were anything, however, likely

I I 2

484 NOTES

to induce Buonaparte to come to terms, it was the immediate departure
of the Queen : everything else was beside the point. Any other
proposition would have cheated him of one of his main objects —
vengeance (Author's note).

The best account of these negotiations is in Baron von Helfert's
Konigin Karolina von Neapel, 1790-1814 (Vienna, 1878).

Page 388, note 36. — Grand Master of the Ceremonies.

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIX

Page 389, note 1. — The Prince of Canosa, Diego Naselli, and
Michelangelo Cianciulli. The royal family embarked on the llth.

Page 389, note 2. — The troops that left Naples amounted altogether
to 5000 men — mere half -clothed conscripts. The 7000 who were
coming from the Abruzzi through Puglia were to meet me in Calabria
(Author's note).

Page 391, note 3. — Not including, probably, the corps under Marshal
Bosenheim, which was estimated by General Duhesme to contain
7000 men.

Page 391, note 4. — An Italian mile equalled 1850 metres.

Page 392, note 5. — Those who know the country, and even those
who have good maps, may wonder whether it would not have been
more strategically correct to begin the line of defence in rear of the
Crati, where the troops could have been more concentrated. They
may think it was dangerous, with such widely-scattered troops, to
attempt the simultaneous defence of Lagonegro and Castel-Rosetto on
the Ionian. I have no objection to make to this criticism. I had at
first intended to adopt this plan, but was not free to do so. As I
said before, the prince was still hoping (only too plainly without
grounds) that Buonaparte would agree to a settlement, and therefore
wished to keep as much territory as possible, and to hold the pass
that was nearest to Naples. In the case of the defence being
successful this would secure a larger population with whom to oppose
the French. I was obliged to fall in with these views, and indeed
my precautions obviated most of the bad effects that might have
been expected (Author's note).

Page 393, note 6. — The achievement surprised the French (DuTHii/r,
Memoir es).

Page 393, note 7. — An elevated and enclosed plain, only accessible
by narrow gorges. It is on the outskirts of Calabria, between the
border and Morano.

Page 394, note 8. — Capital of northern Calabria.

Page 394, note 9. — Only Reynier (Jean Louis Ebenezer, of Lausanne,

NOTES 485

1771-1814), and Verdier (Jean Antoine, 1767-1839), were major-
generals. Compere (Louis Furci Henri, born 1768, entered Neapolitan
service 1807) was a brigadier, and commanded the advanced guard.
Reynier, who held the chief command and played a prominent r61e
in Calabria, was a fine soldier and a man of great originality.

Page 394, note 10.— Pierre Guillaume (1766-1815).

Page 395, note 11. — In the pass of Gauro, and then at Lagonegro.

Page 395, note 12. — Marshal Raimondo Capece-Minutolo, one of the
Princes of Canosa.

Page 396, note 13. — P. L. Courier's letter about this action is well
known (9th March, 1806). About 2000 Neapolitans were taken
prisoners, more than 100 being officers : 250 is the number given by
Marulli. The defeat was followed by a regular dispersion of the
troops. See, in connection with this campaign, the references in the
notes to pp. 409 and 411.

Page 398, note 14. — I proclaimed publicly that at the first riotous
meeting, or the first musket-shot fired by the people, I should set
fire to the town, and should shoot the deputation who had dared to
bring me the message (Author's note).

Page 399, note 15. — Countess Razoumovski in a touching letter
(which will appear in vol. II) expressed her confidence that even
the enemy would do justice to Comte Roger's conduct. Later on
justice was done to it by Comte Mathieu Dumas, King Joseph's
minister in Naples (see Appendix), and by Napoleon himself, who, in
answer to an ill-considered criticism by his brother, said : " General
Damas could do nothing effectual with such bad troops as the Nea-
politans " (to Prince Joseph, 31st March, 1806). Luigi Blanch, a
Neapolitan belonging to the patriot party, was more just than the
courtiers at Palermo, and wrote in his souvenirs (Napoli al, 1806, in
the Museo di Scienze e Letters, 1848) that Damas was "a brave and
honourable man, and a gentleman in the fullest sense of the word . . .
a perfect knight of the days of Franqois I."

Page 400, note 16. — Quite recently the Queen secretly bought, with
her own money, some powder and other ammunition, and had it
taken to Gaeta by a vessel that she chartered herself, because General
Acton declines to prolong the expense of a useless defence, as he
calls it. Elliot, the English minister, considers it of no importance.
Such iniquity is almost incredible (Author's note).

Page 400, note 17. — In 1799, with the Army of the Holy Faith,
after the evacuation of Naples by Macdonald.

Page 402, note 18. — Supposing the neutrality had been preserved
and the allies had not landed, can one doubt that Napoleon, after
making peace with Germany, would have replaced his troops in
Puglia, exactly as they were before the renewal of hostilities? He
would then have pointed out to the Court of Naples that it was not

486 NOTES

strong enough to secure Sicily from the influence or presence of the
English, and should therefore ask him to station a garrison at Messina.
The King would have been helpless in the matter, and by the end
of three months would have lost both kingdoms (Author's note).

Page 402, note 19. — It -may be asked how the King, when his throne
was shaking beneath him, could evade the dangers that surrounded
him and fly to Sicily; how the Hereditary Prince, when he retired
to Calabria with the troops, could determine to remain always at a
considerable distance from the scene of action and to be always in
advance of his retreating army; and how courage and devotion can be
expected of officers, privates, or population, when their sovereign is
certain they are going to fail. These questions are futile. Buonaparte
may perhaps teach the sovereigns of the world that the art of taking
risks is part of their stock-in-trade. But they have not yet learnt it,
and the royal family of Naples should be no less dear on that account
to those who serve them. They are sovereigns by the grace of God,
and to confirm their confidence in His grace they depend entirely
upon Him to maintain their power. This has been the general practice
of sovereigns for a thousand years, and the more the exceptions have
excited admiration the more plainly it is proved that this confidence
in the divine goodness has been deeply implanted in the heart of
kings — the first principle of their lives, and a matter of course.

Judging from recent events it would appear probable that this con-
fidence in God will soon be regarded as insufficient by itself. This
will be the most notable and remarkable revolution among all the
changes that have taken place (Author's note).

Page 403, note 20. — The author gives further quotations from the
Queen's letter, but they were only an analysis. The text will be
published (letter of the 2nd March, 1806). It was a strange way of
encouraging a general to warn him that his situation at the Court had
become untenable, and advise him as to the best thing for him to
do after he had been beaten I

Page 404, note 21.— The letter, dated from Palermo, 26th March,
1806, is not quite so laconic as this. The King suggested meeting
Damas at Patri. Damas was to bring some notes on the generals
and troops who had served in Calabria (Papers of the Damas Family).

Page 406, note 22. — This is evidently the date at which the passage
was written.

Page 407, note 23. — More accurately, the Sicilian property of Nea-
politans who had not accompanied the Court, and of absent Sicilians.

Page 409, note 24.— llth February to 19th July, 1806. It is true
that, for lack of proper means, the French made no serious progress
in their siege-works till the end of May. The bombardment lasted
for eleven days. Cf. the account of General MATHIEU DUMAS, Precis
dee evenements militaires, vols. XV and XIX; General KOCH'S

NOTES 487

Memoires de Massena, vol. V; Baron Du CASSE'S Memoires du roi
Joseph, vol. Ill; and E. GACHOT'S recent work: Histoire militaire de
Massena, la troisieme campagne d'ltalie (Paris, 1911).

Page 411, note 25.— Capri had been taken on the 12th May, 1806.

Page 411, note 26. — There are accounts by eye-witnesses (GRiois,
REITZEL) of this battle of Maida or Santa Eufemia, and of Beynier's
retreat; and several studies, which we have been able to compare
with one another (Naples sous Joseph Bonaparte, Paris, 1911. Also
SEEEAO DE GREGORY'S La Battaglia di 8. Eufemia, Rio. Milit., 1909).

Page 412, note 27. — The latter had been occupied, since the landing
of the English, by Fra Diavolo.

Page 413, note 28. — Amantea was not retaken till the 7th February,
1807, SciUa till the 17th February, 1808, nor Capri till the 17th
October, 1808 (under Murat).

Page 414, note 29. — The count did not set out to Vienna, by way
of Trieste, until the 6th September, 1806.

NOTES TO THE APPENDIX

Page 415, note 1. — Published by A. Chuquet : L'Alsace in 1814,
pp. 399-400. We have made a few additions, derived from the original
documents in the Archives of the Ministry of War.

Page 415, note 2. — The dossier contains no certificate of birth. The
minister informs Damas, in a letter of 5th October, 1818, that a search
made in the municipal register has proved fruitless.

Page 415, note 3. — His uncle the Due du Chatelet, the colonel of
the regiment, reassured the minister as to the legality of this appoint-
ment, though Roger was not fourteen. There were precedents, the
regiment being regarded as a school. Moreover, Roger had been a
page in the Grand Stables (Letter dated llth February, 1777).

Page 420, note 4. — Attached to the post of proprietor. R. D.

Page 422, note 5. — Entirely in the King's own handwriting.

Page 423, note 6. — He was promoted brigadier-general for this
affair.

Page 427, note 7. — This list was evidently very carelessly drawn
up. No. 10 is certainly Charles-Franc.ois-Louis-Joseph-Ce'sar, the
Comte Roger's eldest brother, but apparently he reappears as No. 8.
Gaston Damas fils is Gaston-Emery, their youngest brother (1771-1803).
The Abbe" (Charles Alexandre) is perhaps intended by No. 8, though
his name was provisionally erased by the district of Arnay sur
Arroux as early as the 12th Prairial, year III. It is true that a
month before the Order was issued, in Frimaire of the year VII, the
police were occupying themselves with his concerns, and his arrest
was contemplated; and in fructidor, after the issue of the Order, he

488 NOTES

begged the Directory to have his name finally erased. He could
prove that he had been in France since 1st January, 1792. Claude
Francois is perhaps Jacques Francois, the father, whose name was
provisionally erased. No. 11 is doubtless fitienne- Charles de Damas-
Crux, brother of Louis-fitienne. He had been colonel of the Vexin
Infantry Regiment, which became the 70th half-brigade.

Page 431, note 8. — Lascy.

Page 433, note 9. — The answers to the ten questions asked by
Lascy ; effective force very weak ; artillery insufficiently supplied ;
militia "guaranteed, but not organised" (it required two months);
Gaeta in a fair state of defence, but not Capua; the troops to be
landed at Naples itself.

Page 434, note 10. — A note, contemporary with this letter, shows
that the family of Comte Roger received it from the Comte de
Chastellux, who must have been the original recipient, notwithstand-
ing the title given to him. Ce"sar Laurent, Comte de Chastellux
(1780-1854) entered the service of Naples about 1799; in 1804 he is
described as an exempt in the Guards; in 1810, when he returned to
France, he was Deputy-Chief of the General Staff.

INDEX OF NAMES

[The summary of the chapters, at the beginning of the book, will be found
to serve the purpose of a subject-index.]

ABBATDCCI, General, 238

Acton, General, 246-257, 276, 277,
281, 283, 294-300, 304, 306-311,
326-328, 393, 404-407, 413

Alquier, General, 308, 309, 318,
320, 322, 324, 330, 331, 333,
338, 345, 346, 355, 362, 263

Anhalt-Bernbourg, Prince of, 9,
12, 43, 51-56, 63, 68, 69, 73,
75, 78, 83, 86, 95-97, 103, 129

Anrep, General, 372, 373, 375,
377

Antraigues, M. d', 303, 308

Arras, Bishop of, 191, 194, 196

Artois, Comte d', 6, 149-151, 162,
163, 165, 167-172, 185, 190-
201, 416

Autichamp, M. d', 184, 185

Baden, Prince of, 159
Bavaria, Electoral Prince of, 322
Beaurepaire, M. de, 113
Bellegrade, General, 169, 208,

285-295, 300, 301
Bernstorff, M. de, 196, 197
Berry, Due de, 284
B^thisy, General, 277
Bischoffswerder, 153, 155, 162
Bonnamy, Adjutant-General, 267,

424

Borde, Mme. de la, 218
Borgo, Pozzo di, 376
Bougainville, M. de, 23
BouilW, M. de, 119, 149
Bouillon, 161

Bouviard, General, 254, 338
Branicky, Count, 62
Breteuil, Baron de, 154-156
Broglie, Marshal de, 5, 164, 167,

169

Brune, General, 287, 290, 291,

294

' Brunswick, Duke of, 10, 156, 157,

162, 166, 167, 172-175, 181, 188

Bunbury, Lieut. -Colonel, 372, 373

Calonne, M. de, 147, 154-156, 166,

169

Campbell, General, 372-374
Canosa, Marshal, 395, 396
Caraman, M. de, 154-156, 163
Cardito, Prince, 331, 332, 342
Cassaro, Prince of, 282, 285, 286
Castel-Cicala, 327
Castries, Marshal de, 164-166,

185
Catherine II, 9, 10, 24, 84-100,

113, 114, 190, 192-195
Championnet, 273, 275, 279, 424
Charles, Archduke, 212, 213, 231,

235, 237, 238, 240, 300, 355, 371
Chasseloir, M. de, 422
Choiseul, Comte de, 55, 76
Choiseul-Coumer, Comte de, 92
Circello, Marshal, 346, 349, 351,

352
Clerfayt, M. de, 119-121, 158,

160, 167, 173-178, 180, 182,

187, 204, 208, 209
Cobenzl, Count, 84, 97, 341
Coburg, Marshal, 120-125, 204,

208-211, 217
Coigny, Mme. de, 71
Compere, 394
Conde", Prince de, 218, 220-222,

225-233, 234-237, 240, 241, 251,

415, 418, 421
Cornwallis, Lord, 210, 211
Craig, Sir James, 356, 367, 372,

374-379, 384, 410

489

490

Crawford, Colonel, 222
Crux, Comte de, 424, 425

Damas, family of, 425, 426
Deux-Points, Comte de, 184
Devay, General, 232
Dolgorouky, Prince, 18
Dolomieu, M., 289
Doyle, General, 204
Duhesme, General, 394
Dumouriez, 170, 173, 174,

182, 185, 186
Dupont, General, 289, 290

Elliot, 306-310, 323-325,
330, 334, 336-338, 343,
355, 376, 378, 393, 433

Enghien, Due d', 225-230,
237

Escars, M. d', 153, 191, 196

Esterhazy, M. d', 153, 192

Esterno, M. d', 10

Eugene, Prince, 47

Falciola, M., 10, 11, 12
Favier, 242

Ferdinand, Prince, 11, 12
Ferdinand, Princess, 11
Ferino, General, 228
Fersen, M. de, 100
Fesch, Cardinal, 372, 384
Fischer, Colonel, 123, 124
Flachslanden, Baron de, 418
Forteguerri, Bartolommeo,

429, 430

Fouquet, Mme., 167, 169
Fox, General, 210
Francis II, 155
Frederick, Emperor, 1, 153,

173, 176

Fronsac, Comte de, 143, 145
Fronsac, Mme. de, 137

Galitzin, Prince, 108

Gallo, 321, 328-332, 354, 382,

432

Gambo, General, 272
Golvolkin, Count, 198
Gorog, General, 291*
Gorrich, 77
Goudovitch, General, 133,

136

Greig, Commander, 372
Guiche, Due de, 26

INDEX'

Gustavus, 130, 153, 195

Hadik, General, 209
Hamilton, Lady, 278, 280
Harcourt, Due d', 199
Henry, Prince, 4, 11-13, 15
Hesse, Prince of, 254, 259, 338,

409

Hesse, Princess of, 253
Hohenlohe, Prince of, 158, 164,
181> 166, 167, 178, 180, 181, 183,

184, 186

347

Italiensky, Chevalier, 252, 298

Jones, Paul, 35, 52

Joseph II, 3, 24, 57, 103, 113,

120, 135
Jourden, General, 211, 232

Kaminsky, 100

Kannitz, General, 212, 213

Kellermann, General, 259, 266,

269-271
Koutousof, General, 52

La Fayette, M. de, 114
Lafitte, 76

Lambert, M. de, 176, 181
Langeron, Comte de, 137, 143
Larevilliere-Le'gaux, 427
Lascy, Marshal de, 147, 334, 336-
315, ;338, 343, 350, 359, 364, 366,

367, 369-374, 376, 378, 379,

381, 430, 431
Laudon, Marshal, 135
Lauer, General, 121, 122, 124
154, Leopold, Prince, 147, 153, 155,

278, 324, 383
Levachef, 193
Ligne, Prince Charles de, 137, 138,

143, 148

Ligne, Prince Henry de, 3, 14-
406, 19, 22-24, 43-45, 51, 54-60, 79,

129, 137, 204
Louis XIV, 90
Louis XV, 90
Louis XVI, 117-119, 153, 154,

175, 187, 192, 194, 197, 218
134, Louis XVIII, 224

Lucchesini, M. de, 170, 188

Macdonald, General, 259, 266, 269

INDEX

491

Mack, General, 247, 250, 251, 254-

262, 266, 269, 272-274, 354
Manstein, M. de, 185
Marcof, General, 142
Marrionof, M. de, 85, 97, 98, 102
Maxim, Ivan, 51
Maximovitch, General, 66
Mayer, M. de, 8-9
Medici, M. de, 390, 432
Melas, General, 285
Menchicoff, Princess, 98
Marian, 419
Metch, General, 254, 255, 259,

260, 263, 266, 272
Micheroux, General, 254, 259, 272,

296, 297

Mirabeau, 220, 222, 416, 419-422
Mirabeau, Mme. de, 218
Moira, Lord, 204-206
Moliterno, Prince, 274
Moreau, 225, 226, 231-235, 237-

239

Mourner, 110, 111
Mulgrave, Lord, 327
Muller, General, 77, 231
Murat, General, 294-298

Naselli, General, 275, 281, 287
Nassau-Siegen, Prince of, 23-42,

40, 50, 52-61, 129, 158, 176,

178, 181, 183, 184
Necker, 64
Nelson, Lord, 249, 273, 274, 277-

280, 305
Nestier, 49
Noailles, Marquis de, 108, 145,

218

Opperman, General, 334-335, 337,
350, 364, 366-372, 375, 377, 379,
381

Orleans, Due d', 64

Osterman, Count, 89

Oxenstierna, Count, 153

Pahlen, General, 68

Paul, Emperor, 241, 251-253, 285,

302

Perregaux, 4
Peter I, 90, 187
Peter III, 87, 97
Pignatelli, Prince, 272, 275
Pino, General, 291, 292
Pitt, 205

Potemkin, Mme. Paul, 57
Pouilly, M. de, 173

Eachmanof, Major-General, 66-

68, 69

Regent, M. de, 419, 420
Repnin, Prince, 18, 19, 21, 72,

103, 192, 195

Rey, General, 259, 266, 423-424
Reynier, 394, 397, 411, 412
Ribas, Colonel, 37, 101, 103, 136,

138, 140, 143
Richelieu, Due de, 216
Robespierre, 202, 203, 216-218
Rocca, Lieutenant la, 433
Roccaromana, Prince, 274
Rocroi, 161
Roll, Baron de, 153-156, 169, 185,

196
Romanzow, Marshal, 23, 24, 57,

59, 76, 102, 104, 107, 153, 191,

192

Romien, 423
Ruffo, Cardinal, 279, 282, 375,

382, 400, 401

Sacken, Captain, 33, 34
Saint-Cyr, General, 322-324, 331,

333, 346, 382, 384
Salandre, Due de la, 254, 259, 260,

261

Salis, Baron de, 246, 247
Samoilof, General, 56, 69, 77, 131-

134

Samoilof, Mme., 57
San Teodoro, Duke of, 382, 387
Saxe, Chevalier de, 253, 254, 259-

262, 286, 388
Se"gur, Comte de, 18, 21, 83-85,

91-95,97,101,102
Sens, Archbishop of, 10, 11
Se"rent, Comte de, 207
Sherbatow, Prince, 338, 342
Skavronsky, Countess, 59
Smith, Admiral, 411, 413
Smith, Colonel, 328
Soltikov, Comte, 24, 89
Sommariva, General, 288
Sotheron, Captain, 372
Souvarow, General, 26-34, 51,

136-141, 279

Stackelberg, Count, 14, 15
Stedingk, Count, 100
Stenger, Colonel, 182, 183

492

INDEX

Stuart, General, 372, 373, 375, Vesemsky, Prince, 89

410-413

Vintimille, Comte le, 281, 286
Volkonsky, Prince, 77
Voronzow, Count, 199, 200

Talleyrand, Comte, 265, 267, 271

Tanucci, 242

Tatistchef, 339, 342, 343, 347, 357, Waldeck, Prince of, 167, 211, 213

359, 360, 362, 375-380, 402
Tempelhof, 179
Theresa, Maria, 322
Thugut, 238, 250, 285
Thurn, General, 121, 123

Tour, Comte de la, 231-235

Vauban, Mare"chal de, 96
Verdier, 394, 412

Wall, Comte, 5, 6
Waffls, General, 164, 166
Wimpffen, 167
Wolfe, 421
Wurmser, 223

Zoubof, Colonel, 102, 138, 140,

141, 186, 193
Zurlo, 283

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