554
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS
/^VE0 ^
C'
° ^ 'I » »n it/T 0?^^^
linv a i AKTiitMf 'Institution.
7 6-7
VOLUME VII.
//// «^yr
WOOLWICH :
PRINTED AT THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
Ift.DCCC.Lipfl.
CONTENTS.
PAGE
Annual Eeport and Abstract of Proceedings of a General Meeting of tlie
Eoyal Artillery Institution, held on May 18, 1870. Colonel C. J.
Wright, E.A., in the Chair . . . 1
Our Eifled Projectiles and Puzes : Present Construction and Probable Efficiency
on Service. A Paper read at the E.A. Institution, Woolwich, March 8,
1870, by Captain C. Orde Browne, E.A., Captain Instructor, Eoyal
Laboratory...,,.. . 19
Remarks on Captain Nolan’s Bange-hnding Apparatus. By Lieut. C. E. B.
Leacock, E.A . 40
The Examination and Proof of Gunpowder, as carried on at the Eoyal Gun¬
powder Factory, Waltham Abbey. By Captain F. M. Smith, E.A.,
Assistant Superintendent . , . 50
English Guns and Foreign Critics. By Captain Vivian Dering Majendie, E.A.,
Assistant Superintendent, Eoyal Laboratory . 60
The Mobility of Field Artillery ; Past and Present. By Lieut. PI. W. L.
Hime, E.A. (No. II.) . 127
A Proposal for a Very Heavy Breech-Loading Gun of Novel Construction.
A Paper read at the E.A. Institution, Woolwich, April 12, 1870, by
Captain J. P. Morgan, E.A . . . • . 145
Camel Guns. By Colonel IP. IP. Maxwell, E.A., Superintendent Cossipore
Gun Foundry . 165
On Axle-Tree Seats for Field Batteries. By Captain IP. L. Balfour, E.A. ... 168
On the Ee-Armament of Gibraltar. By Captain J. B. Eichardson, E.A . 172
A Proposal for the Drill of Gunners of Field Batteries at other than Eegi-
mental Exercises. By Captain and Brevet-Major H. L. Geary, E.A.,
Adjutant 14th Brigade (Field) . . . 182
Some Observations amongst German Armies during 1870. By Colonel
PI. A. Smyth, E.A . . . . . 184
IV.
CONTENTS.
The Story of the 36-inch Mortars of 1855-8. By Major-General Lefroy,
C.B., F.R.S., R.A . 203
The Beform of Prussian Tactics. A Lecture delivered at the R.A. Institution,
Woolwich, December 13, 1870, by Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesney, R.E.... 240
The Puture Armament of our Field Artillery. A Paper read at the B.A.
Institution, Woolwich, January 16, 1871, by Lieut. C. Jones, B.A.,
Captain Instructor, Boyal Gun Factories . . 252
The Merits of a Large Bore and Small Bore Contrasted, with reference to
Rifled Artillery and Small-Arms. A. Lecture delivered at the B.A.
Institution, Woolwich, February 17, 1871, by Lieut. J. Sladen, B.A.,
Assistant Instructor, Boyal Laboratory . 273
Mounting of Twelve 12-ton Guns at Malta, 1870, by 10th Brigade, B.A. ... 293
Annual Report and Abstract of Proceedings of a General Meeting of the Boyal
Artillery Institution, held on May 23, 1871. Colonel A. Benn, B.A.,
in the Chair . . . . . 299
List of Members of the Boyal Artillery Institution (arranged Alphabetically).
April 1871 . 320
The Minor Tactics of Field Artillery. By Lieut. H. W. L. Hime, B.A.
The B.A. Institution Prize Essay of 1871 . . . . . . 328
A few Notes on the Handling of Horse Artillery and Cavalry. By Captain
I. Ketchen, B.H.A . . . . . 343
The Prussian Mode of Conducting Large Manoeuvres. A Lecture delivered
at the B.A. Institution, Woolwich, February 7, 1871, by Lieut. -Colonel
E. W. Bray, 4th King’s Own Boyal Regiment of Infantry . 347
Tables of Remaining Velocity, Time of Flight, and Energy of various Pro¬
jectiles, calculated from the results of experiments made with the Bashforth
Chronograph, 1865-70. By the Rev. F. Bashforth, B.D., Professor
of Applied Mathematics to the Advanced Class, Boyal Artillery . 367
Development of Artillery Missiles during 1870. By Capt. C. O. Browne, B.A.,
Captain Instructor, Boyal Laboratory. A Paper read at the B.A.
Institution, Woolwich, January 31, 1871, to supplement the Paper on
Rifled Shells and Fuzes read by Capt. C. O. Browne, March 8, 1870 ... 393
The Determination of the Explosive Force of Gunpowder. A Paper read at the
B.A. Institution, Woolwich, March 15, 1871, by Capt. J. P. Morgan, B.A. 413
Breaching by Indirect Fire. By Colonel II. II. Maxwell, B.A., Superintendent
Cossipore Gun Foundry . . . . . 440
Extracts from Major Kodolitscli’s Report on the Abyssinian Expedition.
Translated from the German by Lieut. Douglas F. Jones, B.A . 448
The Mobility of Field Artillery ; Past and Present. By Lieut. H. W. L,
Hime, R.A. (No. III.) . . . . . 455
CONTENTS.
V.
PAGE
Kemarks with reference to Mobility of Light Field Artillery. By Lt.-Col.
G. Carleton, R.A . 477
The Clock Signal-Yane. By Captain W. L. Yonge, R.A. . 479
The Multiplying Alidade, or Practice Register. By Major A. Innes, Aberdeen¬
shire Artillery Volunteers. (Communicated by Lt.-Col. C. F. Young,
R.A.) . / . . . 483
System of Iron-Plating a Cruising Ship. By Captain M. Tweedie, R.A . 486
Entrenchment of Field Artillery. By Captain G. B. Macdonell, R.A . 489
A Sketch of the Autumn Manoeuvres of 1871. By Captain W. S. M. Wolfe,
R.A., Brigade-Major, School of Gunnery . 496
Index . 513
LIST OF PLATES.
PAGE
The Densimeter . 54
Plates I., II., III., and IV., illustrating Captain J. P. Morgan’s Paper, “ A
Proposal for a Very Heavy Breech-Loading Gun” . . 164
Camel Guns . 166
Axle-Tree Seats for Sir W. Armstrong’s 12-pr. gun of 8 cwt., as designed
by Captain H. L. Balfour, R.A . . . 170
Mallet’s 3 6 -inch Mortar, Front elevation . 203
do. do. Section . 206
do. do. Lateral elevation . . 212
Diagram of practice with shells from 36-inch mortar, 1857-8 . 221
Proposed formation for a brigade of six battalions . . . 242
Counter-proposal for formation of the brigade . 243
Mounting of twelve 12-ton guns at Malta. Plates I., II., III., IV., V., and
VI . 293
Figs. 1 to 10, illustrating Captain J. P. Morgan’s Paper on the “ Explosive
Force of Gunpowder ” 438
The Clock Signal- Vane . 479
The Multiplying Alidade, or Practice Register . 483
Map of country round Aldershot, illustrating the Autumn Manoeuvres of 1871 498
Sets of Lithographs referred to on page 5 of Annual
Report , 1870.
Royal Gun Factory.
*Nos.
2 Ordnance W.I. B.L. gun (breech screw) 40-pr. G-. pattern, 35 cwt. B.
3 « u » n n Details.
| Ordnance W.I. B.L. guns, 7 -inch 82 cwt. B., and 40-pr. G. pattern,
35 cwt. B. Sighting.
7 Ordnance W.I. B.L. gun (breech screw), 12-pr. 8 cwt. B.
20 n n 64-pr. wedge, 61 cwt. B. (E.O.C).
23 Ordnance C.I. M.L. guns. 32-prs. of 58 cwt., 56 cwt., and 50 cwt.
24 n 68-pr. 95 cwt., 10-inch 86 cwt., and 8-inch
65 cwt.
27 h u 32-prs. 40 cwt. and 25 cwt., and 24-pi\
50 cwt.
2J * 18-pr. 42 cwt., 8-inch howitzer 22 cwt., and
32-pr. carronade, 17 cwt.
33 Ordnance brass M.L. guns, 9-pr. 13 J cwt., 24-pr. howitzer L.S. 12^- cwt. >
and 12-pr. howitzer L.S. (light) 6-§- cwt.
34 Ordnance brass M.L. guns, 6-pr. gun (light) 6 cwL, coehorn howitzer
2-| cwt., and Boyal mortar 1| cwt.
40 Mortars, cast-iron, pattern I. 13-inch L.S. 36 cwt., 13-inch S.S. (new
pattern), 100 cwt., and 8-inch L.S. 9 cwt.
41 Ordnance W.I. M.L. gun, 12-inch 23 J tons, B.
47f Ordnance converted rifled 64-pr., 71 cwt., mark I. (from 8-inch gun,
65 cwt).
48+ Ordnance steel M.L. gun, 7-pr., 150 lbs., B., mark III.
And the small series of 3 guns each — viz. 7} 8, 9 -inch, and 64-pr.
Royal Laboratory.
Metal powder case.
2 Boxer fufces for common, diaphragm, and mortar shells.
5?’ Tubes.
7 Pettman percussion fuze for land service*
0 & $«+ Lights, long, signal, and coast guard.
9 i lb. signal rocket.
10 Hb. t a
11 r Cartridges for Armstrong B.L. guns.
12 H li tt
191 Life-buoy portfire.
* In giving an order it is enough to quote the Number only*
f These lithographs were published during the past year*
$ Natal only;
2
20 Carcasses.
24 Boxer diaphragm shrapnel shell.
25 Manby life-saving apparatus.
26 Ground light-balls.
34 Common shell.
35 Mortar shell.
36 Boxer 9 seconds time fuze for B.L. rifled ordnance,
39** Bursters.
43 Breech-loading projectiles.
44 Fuze, percussion, Pettman, general service.
45 Fuze, time, wood, Boxer, 9 seconds, M.L. ordnance.
47 » ii " 10 seconds, 7-pr. M.L. ordnance.
49 n Armstrong E, Freeth’s modification.
50 n wood, Boxer, 20 seconds, B.L, ordnance.
51 a a a a M.L. ordnance.
53 Bockets, war, Hale.
5|a* Machines for firing rockets, war, Hale.
55t Case, brass, rectangular, corrugated.
56 Boxer shrapnel shell for rifled ordnance.
5 7a* Boxer ammunition for Snider rifle.
5§ Cartridges, drill, rifled B.L. ordnance, leather.
Royal Carriage Department.
1 Abyssinian equipment. Carriages for mountain service.
\a
u
II
Carriage on mule and draught.
1*
Si
II
Boxes, &c., on mule.
i°
II
II
Steel carriage for 7-pr. gun.
\d
tl
II
« fitted for draught.
1«
II
II
Ammunition boxes.
if
II
II
Boxes for miscellaneous stores.
\g
II
II
Portable forge.
Is
II
II
Packsaddle.
1 j a H i, Otago pattern.
9 a Field carriage for 12-pr. B.B.L. gun.
10« Ammunition wagon for 12-pr. B.B.L. gun.
11 a Limber for „ „
12 Field carriage for 9-pr. B.B.L, gun,
22 Small-arm ammunition wagon.
23 Forge wagon.
24 a Store wagon, new pattern.
43 Block trail carriage for 64-pr. B.B.L. gun.
45 Limber for heavy batteries, plan.
50 Carriage, travelling, 13-inch mortar.
(jjja Traversing platform, new pattern casemate,
6()6 a i, dwarf.
61 a Transporting arrangement for dwarf and casemate W.I. platforms for
7 and 9 -inch guns.
Note. — In consequence of the alteration of the charge of 64-pr. breech-loading rifled guns
(see §. 1828 of “List of Changes in Materiel, &c.”) the Royal Laboratory lithographs, Nos. 11, 12,
and 58 require correction.
* These lithographs were published during the past year,
f Naval only.
3
(j|^ W.I. carriage and casemate platform for 9-inch gun of 12 tons.
(jj/i W.I. carriage and dwarf platform for 9 -inch gun of 12 tons.
§\Jc W.I. carriage and casemate traversing platform for 12-inch gun of 25 tons.
612 W.I. carriage and dwarf traversing platform for 12-inch gun of 25 tons.
(J4 64-pr. W.I. garrison standing carriage.
Strengthened triangle gyn.
79 Tangye’s hydraulic lifting jack.
81 5 Wrought iron 7 -inch naval double plated carriage and slide. Mark II.
81* Details of W.I. double plated naval carriage, with nomenclature of the
various parts.
816 Details of W.I. slide, with nomenclature of the various parts.
Instructions.
13 Hydraulic buffer for checking the recoil of guns.
14 Self-acting compressor fitted to W.I. carriages and slides.
List of Lithographs published since last Annual Report,
Royal Carriage Department.
Larue Series.
7 26 W.I. triangle gyn.
Small Series.
21 Ammunition wagon for 9-pr. brass gun.
26 Store cart.
44 Limber for heavy batteries, plan.
51 Platform wagon.
726 W.I. triangle gyn.
73 Dell’s and Gibraltar gyns.
74 Large and small drugs.
List of War Office Photographs received since last
Annual Report.
These photographs will in future be printed by the permanent carbon process, and will be
charged for as follows *
s. d.
Demy pictures, mounted . 2 6
u n unmounted . 2 0
Quarto n mounted . 1 8
n n unmounted . 1 4
2800 — 2800® The Martini-Henry arm.
2809 Masonry wall, strengthened by armour plates, after 13 rounds from 7 -inch
M.L. rifled gun, to ascertain comparative value of different kinds of
backing for armour plates on fortifications. Jan. 15, 1869.
2834 View after explosion of the shell caused by firing one 9-inch Palliser shell
into them.
4
2835 Western end of casemate, after the explosion.
2836 Iron cramp wall, or eastern end of casemate, after the following rounds *
Nos. 1623 to 1631, 7-inch M.L. rifled gun, charge 9 lbs.; and 1632
to 1639, 7-inch M.L. rifled gun, charge 18 lbs. Feb. 16, 1869.
2842 Front of No. 30 target after four rounds from 9-inch M.L. rifled gun,
with Palliser shell. March 3, 1869.
2843 Lack of do. do. do.
2864 Front of target representing Plymouth Breakwater Port, after three rounds
from 15-inch Eodman gun, March 31, 1869, to test Dr. Price’s shot.
2865 Back of do. do. do.
2866 9-inch wrought-iron howitzer, No. 357. April 2, 1869.
2893 Front of 8-inch plate, 13' x 3' (unbacked), after six rounds with
Palliser’s cored shot from 7 -inch M.L. rifled gun. May 21, 1869.
2894 Back of do. do. do.
2895 Front of 9-inch plate 8' 1" x 4' (unbacked), after two rounds with Palliser’s
cored shot from 8 -inch M.L. rifled gun. May 21, 1869.
2896 Back of do. do. do.
2897 Front of 10-inch plate, 19' 5" x 3' 6J", after two rounds with Palliser
cored shot from 9-inch M.L. rifled gun. May 21, 1869.
2898 Back of do. do. do.
2905 Front of Chalmers’ portion of No. 30 target (the lower plate haying been
removed, and iron concrete introduced in lieu of the original backing),
after six rounds from 9-inch M.L. rifled gun. April 4, 1869.
2906 Back of do. do. do.
2907 Front of Chalmers’ portion of No. 30 target, after three rounds from 9-inch
M.L. rifled gun. June 7, 1869.
2908 Back of do. do. do.
2909 Front of Chalmers’ portion of No. 30 target, after two rounds with Palliser
shell from 9-inch M.L. rifled gun. June 14, 1869.
2910 Back of do, do. do.
2911 Front of 8-inch portion of No. 30 target, after nine rounds with Palliser
shell, of different manufactures, from 9-inch M.L. rifled gun. June 14,
1869.
2912 Back of do. do. do.
2913 Front of “Sandwich” target, consisting of three 5 -inch plates with iron
concrete between, having a total thickness of 1' 11", after round No. 1664
with Palliser cored shot, from 12-inch M.L. rifled gun. June 4, 1869.
2914 Left side of do. do. do.
2915 Front of “Sandwich” target, after round No. 1679 with Palliser cored
shot from 12-inch M.L. rifled gun. June 14, 1869.
2916 Bight side of do. do. do.
B.A. Institution, Woolwich,
18th May, 1870*
MEMOIR
MAJOR ROBERT WORSE LEY HAIG, R.A., F.R.S.
MAJOR-GEN. .T. H. LEFROY, R.A., F.R.S.
Robert Wolseley Haig, late Secretary to this Institution, was one of whom it
is difficult for friends to speak without using language which may seem exaggerated
to those to whom he was not personally known. His endowments of intellect
were unusual ; but those who admired his talents most, were in one sense least
conscious of his superiority, because they had even more prominently before them
that lovable simplicity of character, that inborn manliness, modesty, and humble
estimate of himself, which is not always an attribute of genius, and which, when it
exists, makes genius command lifelong affection. His character was as pure as it
was elevated — full of playfulness, until bodily suffering laid its hand on him;
but even then, brave, patient, and cheerful under it, submissive to that all-wise
decree which cut so early the brightest ties of domestic happiness, and apparently
unconscious how many would look long round the horizon of life before such
another light to them would rise above it. He was, perhaps, one of the best
mathematicians who ever entered the Artillery in the pre-competitive period.
Applications of analysis were to him so easy, that he was hardly aware how
exceptional his powers were ; and they were at the service of all his friends, or at
the command of the numerous committees with which he was associated from time
to time, without a pretension on his part. They were never, indeed, adequately
brought out ; for as Astronomer of the North-West Boundary Commission, precise
observation was more requisite than analysis; but if a question requiring the
calculus of probabilities arose,* or some mechanical fact were wanted — such as
the place of the centre of gravity of a solid of irregular form and density f — Major
Haig was ready at once, not with a “practical” or tentative solution, but with a
precise one ; and he handled his integral tables as other people do logarithmic
ones. It is to be regretted that he did not write more ; but this was very much an
effect of that total absence of pretension already remarked. His early contributions
* See secs. 134-143 of Captain W. H. Noble’s second Report on Ballistic Experiments. 1865.
f See Vol. VII. p. 212, where the determination in the note is Major Haig’s, who however would
not attach his name. 1871.
MEMOIR OF MAJOR HAIG, R.A., F.R.S.
to the “Proceedings” of this Institution were of no great importance, and as Secretary
his life was not spared long enough for him to impress, as he would have done,
his character upon them ; but those who had most to do with difficult questions in
artillery between 1860 and 1870, best know how often his clear head and scientific
attainments helped them.
Among other qualities significant of natural powers, he was a first-rate chess
player — but so good-natured and unconscious that it was almost a pleasure to be
beaten by him. The proximate cause of the lingering and fatal heart disease to
which he fell a victim, was itself characteristic. He must needs enter for the
“Veteran Pace” at the Garrison Games at Woolwich, in 1868, and the over¬
exertion developed aneurism, the true nature of which was not detected in time.
Allusion has been made to his temporary employment on the Commission for
laying out the boundary between British Columbia and the territory of the United
States, under the treaty of June, 1846. Colonel J. S. Hawkins, R.E., the British
Commissioner, has kindly furnished the following notice of this service : —
Major Haig left England with the Commission in April, 1858, and returned
home with it in July, 1862, when he was employed upon the astronomical com¬
putations connected with the operations and the preparation of the boundary maps,
until appointed Assistant -Secretary to the Ordnance Select Committee, in 1864.
He had joined the Commission as Assistant- Astronomer, but on Colonel Hawkins’
recommendation he was appointed Chief Astronomer, in which capacity he shewed
a natural aptitude for the practical application of his very high mathematical
talents, and for which appointment, in Colonel Hawkins’ opinion, “ no officer more
competent could have been found throughout the services and as he also possessed
health, strength, and energy, he was peculiarly well fitted for an expedition of the
kind the Commission was engaged upon. When difficulties arose, he was always
sanguine ; and he impressed the same spirit upon the men under him, who were
much attached to him, and willingly undertook whatever he required of them ;
while the energy he showed in everything which he entered into — whether
shooting, fishing, canoeing, taking his turn with the axe, or the laborious duties
which devolved upon him — the good temper and cheerfulness with which he bore
hardships, and his unfailing high spirits and kindly nature, endeared him to 'all
the officers of both the British and American Commissions.
Major Haig was appointed Secretary to the B.A. Institution on the 11 th Dec.
1871, and performed his duties evidently under great bodily suffering (though he
rarely complained) till the 6th June, 1872, when he was taken from the scene
where it was hoped his eminent talents would have conferred great benefit on the
Establishment which, by this brief memoir, records the loss it has sustained.
^rtillerg fttMiMmt
The Committee regret that the circulation of No. 12, Yol. VI. of the “ Proceedings ” has
been unavoidably postponed, consequent on some of the diagrams to accompany one of the
papers having only recently been received, and which now have to be lithographed.
The paper in question having been printed off and paged, could not be withdrawn from
the number ; the delay in the non-receipt of the diagrams not having been anticipated.
Woolwich,
21 . 6 . *70.
% ordel-,
A. D. BURNABY,
Capt. R.A.,
Secretary,,
.
.
1 .
*4
ANNUAL REPORT
AND
ABSTRACT OF PROCEEDINGS OF A GENERAL MEETING OF THE ROYAL
ARTILLERY INSTITUTION, HELD ON MAY 18, 1870.
Colonel C. J. Weight in the Chair.
1. The Committee of the Royal Artillery Institution has the honor
to present to the Annual General Meeting its Report and the Abstract
of Accounts for the year ending 31st March, 1870.
It will be seen by the accompanying table, that during the past year
42 officers have joined the Institution.
RANK.
| April, 1869.
| Additions
due to pro¬
motion, &c.
! New
members.
Promoted,
withdrawn,
and deceased.
April, 1870.
EFFECTIVE LIST.
£ s.
d.
General and Regimental Field Officers
paying annually .
’ 1 5
0
193
+ 7
+ 1
-11
190
Captains . .
0 16
0
456
+ 21
+ 9
-25
461
Lieutenants .
0 10
0
527
0
+ 31
-45
613
Paymasters .
0 16
0
9
0
0
— 2
7
Quarter-Masters . .. ..i .
0 10
0
12
0
0
- 2
10
Riding-Masters .
0 10
0
5
0
0
0
6
Surgeons-Major .
1 5
0
6
0
0
- 1
5
Surgeons .
0 16
0
2
0
0
0
2
Assistant- Surgeons .
0 16
0
20
0
0
— 4
16
Veterinary Surgeons .
0 10
0
4
0
+ 1
0
5
RETIRED LIST.
General and Regimental Field Officers 1 5
0
46
+ 2
0
— 3
45
do . do .
0 16
0
1
+ 2
0
0
3
do . do .
0 10
0
7
+ 2
0
- 1
8
do . do .
0 7
6
-3
0
0
- 1
2
Captains .
1 5
0
1
0
0
0
1
do . . .
0 16
0
20
+ 10
0
0
30
do .
0 10
0
9
0
0
- 3
6
do .
0 5
0
6
0
0
0
6
Lieutenants .
0 10
0
5
0
0
- 1
4
Surgeons-Major .
1 5
0
1
+ 1
0
0
2
Surgeons .
0 16
0
0
+ 1
0
0
1
Chaplains .
1 5
0
1
0
0
0
1
Quarter-Masters .
0 10
0
0
+ 1
0
0
1
1334
+ 47
+ 42
-99
1324
Honorary Members .
0 10
6
43
o 1
0
— 1
42
2. . With regard to the funds, the Committee is glad to inform the
meeting that they are in a sound and flourishing state, and that a
[yol. vii.] 1
2
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
further sum of £150 (realising £161 Is. 6d.) has been invested in
3 per cent. Consols Stock during the past year.
The abstract of the year's income and expenditure is shewn on the
opposite page, and it will be seen by the Dr. and Cr. account, which
is attached thereto, that the Institution has now a Balance Cr. of
£2423 4s.
3. Printing and Publication . — Four numbers of Volume VI. of the
“ Proceedings " have been issued (Nos. 8, 10, and 11 being double
numbers), and the papers enumerated in the annexed list have been pub¬
lished during the past year, very many of them being of great interest ;
and the Committee begs to express its thanks to those gentlemen who
have contributed to the “ Proceedings." In addition to the four
numbers of “ Proceedings," three pamphlets on promotion, and a
lecture by Dr. Buskin, have been issued to each member.
List of “ Proceedings " printed during the year .
Organization for the Transport of large bodies of Troops on Bailways. By
Captain J. T. Barrington, B.A.
Old Woolwich. By J. Hewitt, Esq.
The Field Artillery of the Great ^Rebellion; its nature and use. By Lieut.
H. W. L. Hime, B.A.
Heaton’s Steel Converting Process. Communicated by Captain E. Keate, B.A.
A Table of the Names of the Great Ordnance now used, extracted from “ The
Complete Souldier,” Auctore Thomas Smith, 1628. Communicated by Colonel
H. Clerk, B.A., F.B.S.
Annual Report and Abstract of Proceedings of a General Meeting of the Boyal
Artillery Institution, held on May 19th, 1869. Colonel A. Benn, B.A. in the chair.
The new Field Artillery of Mattei-Bossi, translated from the Italian of
<c L’Opinione,” 23rd-26th October, 1868, with a note by the Translator. By
Colonel H. H. Maxwell, B.A.
The Theory of Gun Architecture. By Captain F. S. Stoney, B.A., Captain
Instructor, Boyal Gun Factories.
Austrian Mountain Artillery. By Friedrich Muller, Captain I. and B. Austrian
Artillery Staff. Second edition, Vienna, 1868. Translated from the German, by
II. II. Maxwell, Lieut. -Colonel B.A., and Brevet-Colonel.
Central Asia, and our Military Position on the North-West Frontier of India.
A paper read at the B.A. Institution, Woolwich, by Colonel John Adye, C.B., B.A.
January 20th, 1870.
The Construction of our Heavy Guns. By Captain F. S. Stoney, B.A., Captain
Instructor, Boyal Gun Factories.
Short Notes on Professional Subjects , 1869.
Trial of improved Chassepot’s, fired in comparison with the Martini-Henry arm
for accuracy, at 500 yards range.
Experiments to ascertain the Penetration of Small-ann Bullets into various sub¬
stances.
Mallet’s 3 6 -inch Mortar.
“ In Memoriam” of the late Lieut. H. E. Baines, 10th Brigade, B.A.
On Lyson’s improved signals for rifle practice. By Captain and Adjutant
F. Duncan, B.A., M.A.? D.C.L., F.G.S., F.B.G.S.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
s
6-. H. VESEY, Lt.-Col. R.A. and Colonel, President Sub-Committee. A. D. BURNABY, Capt. R.A., Secretary & Treasurer.
Woolwich, 12th April, 1870.
4
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OP
Description of a method of taking Heavy Weights over broad and deep Ditches.
By Lieut. G-. Mackinlay, 1LA.
Hints on Shoeing Horses.
The Chronograph.
Mitrailleur Christophe et Montigny.
Dogwood Charcoal.
Small-arm Ammunition in the British Service. 1869.
Arms in use in the British Service. 1869.
While thanking the contributors to the “ Short Notes on Professional
and other Subjects/* the Committee hopes for continued co-operation
in this method of imparting information on subjects of professional
interest.
The Committee has great pleasure in informing the meeting, that
the revised edition of “ Kane*s List ** has been published, and many
copies have already been disposed of, and copies have been presented
to—
II.E.H. the Colonel of the Regiment.
H.R.IL Prince Arthur.
Secretary of State for War.
„ for India.
The Under Secretary of State for War.
Director General of Ordnance.
Deputy Adjutant- General.
In a work which includes so many names and dates, it is possible
that notwithstanding every precaution minor errors may have crept in,
and the Committee will be glad to receive communications regarding
any that may be discovered, with a view to corrections being made in
a future edition.
Particular attention is called to a new feature in this publication — -
viz. the short biographies of some of the more distinguished officers.
Every endeavour has been made to render them as complete as possible,
with the materials at the disposal of the Committee, but some of the
biographies are rather incomplete, and the names of officers who have
rendered valuable services may have been altogether omitted. As
regards this part of the book, the Committee invites further co¬
operation.
The Committee purposes publishing similar lists of the late
Hon. East India Comp any* s Artillery, from the time of its formation
to the date of amalgamation ; as also biographies, tables of strength,
distribution, changes in battalions, troops, and companies, and any
other statistics of interest.
Many officers have already signified their intention of subscribing to
this last named work, and others who may wish to add their names, are
requested to notify the same to the Secretary. The expense of this
book will certainly not exceed that of the new Kane, and will, it is
hoped, be considerably less.
The Committee has decided on not publishing the u List of Service
Guns and Ammunition ** for this year till the 1st June next ; consequent
on the number of changes in Laboratory and other stores.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
5
A copy of this list, when published, will be sent to each member, as
well as to all commanding officers and batteries, as heretofore.
4. Library. — A work on “ Exotic Ornithology,” containing figures
and descriptions of new or rare species of American birds, has been
purchased, and is a most valuable addition to the library.
A scrap book, containing extracts from the newspapers on professional
subjects, is now kept in the reading room.
Photographs of Abyssinia, taken by 10th Company, Eoyal Engineers,
during the late war, have been kindly presented to the Institution, by
the Secretary of State for War.
There has been a sale of 185 War Office photographs and 1000 litho¬
graphs during the past year.
A list of the more important lithographs issued by the different
departments, and arranged in sets, accompanies this report.
These, as well as others not included in the sets, and photographs of
various drills and exercises, can be obtained singly as heretofore by
members.
Boohs , 8fc.} presented.
i
Index to the several articles in the
Periodical Publications received in the
War Office Library, during the year
1868 . J
Index to the Periodical Publications 1
received in the War Office Library, [■
Nos. 1, 2, and 8. 1869
Elec- )
ses,” C
Monthly Notices of the Eoyal Astro- 7
nomical Society . . . )
Diagram illustrating the course of Pro- 7
motion in the Corps of Eoyal Engineers, >
by Lieut. G. E. Grover, E.E . )
Hart’s Quarterly Army List, October, 1868,1
and January, April, and July, 1869 ... )
Pamphlet on “ Some applications of Elec¬
tricity to Naval and Military Purposes
by E. A. Abel, E.E.S .
Contribution to the history of Explosive 1
Agents, by E. A. Abel, F.E.S. . . j
Laboratory Teaching, or Progressive 1
Exercises in Practical Chemistry, by >
C. L. Bloxam, E.C.S . }
The Orbs of Heaven, or the Stellar Worlds, 1
by 0. M. Mitchell, A.M . j
MS. Copy of Eepository Exercises, by Col. 7
Congreve, 1800 . )
Stereoscopic Yiew of the Moon, by Warren 7
De La Eue . . j
2
2
j-The Librarian, War Office.
The Author.
C The Council, Eoyal Astrono-
( mical Society.
The Author.
The Committee, E. A. Library.
The Author.
The Author.
The Author.
•j
>■ Lieut. J. C. Greene, E.A.
6
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
War Department Photographs .
B.L. Lithographs .
B.C.D. Lithographs .
B.C.D. Photo-Lithographs .
Set of Photographs taken by the 10th )
Company, Boyal Engineers, in Abys- >
sinia .
Beport of the Committee appointed to
enquire into the construction, condi¬
tion, and cost of the Eortifi cations
erected, or in course of erection, under
80th and 31st Yict. and previous
statutes . ^
Notes on the manufactures of the Boyal 1
Carriage Department, 111. Arsenal, 1869 )
Beport of the Universal Exhibition at
Paris, 1867, by the Executive Com¬
mittee. Vol. I .
Beport of Her Majesty’s Commissioners'!
for the Exhibition of Works of In- /
dustry, Agriculture, and Pine Arts, f
held at Paris, 1867 . )
Index to Yols. II., III., IV., and Y. of)
Beports of the Paris Universal Exhi- >
bition . )
Beport on the Mitrailleur of Colonel)
Claxton, by Major Eosbery, FC., >
Bengal Staff Corps . )
Extracts from the Beports and Proceed- )
ings of the Ordnance Select Conpnittee, >
Part 4, Yol. VI . )
Extracts from the Proceedings of the)
Department of the Director-General >
of Ordnance, Parts 1 and 2, Yol. VII. )
Extracts from various Beports relative )
to the merits of Segment as compared >
with Shrapnel Shells, for field guns ... )
Beport and Proceedings of the Gun- )
Cotton Committee, 1864 to 1868 . j
Table of Small-arm Ammunition in the)
British Service . )
Arms in use in the British Service .
Beport of the Special Committee on Shrap- )
nel v. Segment Shell, 1869, with plates [■
and appendices .
Summary of Experiments made with cast-
iron Guns converted on Major Palliser’s
system, since January, 1868 .
Besults of Experiments made with Armour*)
Plates in the Boyal Gun Factory in
1869, and investigations by Sir W
Eairbairn, during the years 1861-4, for
the Special Committee on Iron . . .
Preliminary Beport of the Committee on
Explosives, with plates . .
■\
J
29
5
2
7
-Secretary of State for War.
6
6
3
4
-Director-Gen. of Ordnance.
6
3
3 ^
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
7
Third General Report of the Council of 7
Military Education . 3
Reports on the Examinations for admission S
to the Royal Military Academy at >
Woolwich, July 1869, and January 1.870 )
Smithsonian Report, 1867 .
Astronomical Observations, 1867 .
Proceedings of the National Academy of 1
Sciences, 1866—7 . )
Monthly Report, Treasury Department . . .
The Sanitary Commission of the United^
States; its work and purposes. 1868 \-
Do. do. do. 1864 J
History of the United States Sanitary")
Commission . j
Series of Medical and Surgical Mono- \
graphs. A to T . 3
Memorial of the Great Central Fair for the 3
United States Sanitary Commission, >
held at Philadelphia, June 1864 . )
History of the Brooklyn and Long Island 7
Fair, February 1864 . ..3
Record of the Metropolitan Fair in aid of J
the United States Sanitary Commission, >
held at New York, April 1864 . )
The application of Photography to Military 7
Purposes, by H. Baden Pritchard . 3
Proceedings of the Zoological Society of)
London. 1869 . 3
Some observations on the Mobility of Field 7
Artillery, by Lt.-Col. F. J. Soady, R.A. 3
Six Lectures on Water-wheels and Machi- 7
nery for Raising Water, byW. C. Unwin, >
Esq . * . )
Lectures on the Steam Engine, by W. C. 7
Unwin, Esq . 3
Pamphlet on the Duties of a Royal Engi¬
neer Officer in time of Peace, with a few
suggestions for the Organization of the
Staff of the Army . . .
Russian Artillery J ournal, N os . Stoll, 1869 7
„ Small-arms „ „ 1,2, 8,4, „ >
1, Military „ „ 1 & 2, „ )
Journal of the Royal Geographical Society. 7
Yol. XXXVIII . {
Proceedings of the Royal Geographical 1
Society . 3
Second Report of the President of the")
Ordnance Select Committee . 3
View of the Docks of Sebastopol . 7
Plan of the Graving Docks of Sebastopol >
17 MS. Military Plans . . . . )
5 sheets of Artillery Atlas . 7
Work entitled, “ Rapport du Departement ±
de la Guerre.” . . )
I The Council of Military Edu-
( cation.
j
’Smithsonian Institution.
The Author.
j The Council, Zoological So-
ciety of London.
The Author.
1
j
The Director, Rl. Engineer
Establishment, Chatham.
Capt. C. E. Webber, R.E.
Maj. - General N. de Novitzky.
The Council, Royal
graphical Society.
Geo-
1
[-Maj. -Gen. J. H. Lefroy, R.A.
Netherlands Government.
8
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Summary of Experiments with Palliser ^
converted cast-iron rifled M.L. Guns, >
since January, 1868 . J
Beport of the Special Committee on Shrap- ^
nel v. Segment Shell, with appendices >
and plates, 1869 . . . )
Brigade and General Order Books of the S
Boyal Artillery, forming a part of the £
force under Gen. Sir Balph Abercrombie 1
in the year 1800 . )
Military Breech-loading Bifles and Ammu- 1
nition, by Capts. Y. D. Majendie, B.A., >
and C. 0. Browne, B.A . )
Proceedings of the Institution of Mechani- ^
cal Engineers, 1861 to 1869 inclusive. >
Do. do. Newcastle Meeting, Parts 1 and 2. )
Proceedings of the Institution of Civil )
Engineers, Yols. XXVII. and XXVIII. J
Administration of the Austrian Army,"]
translated by Lieut. E. H. Wickham,
B.A . . J
Series of 12 Photographic Views of the"')
Neighbourhood of Niagara, North )•
America . J
Collection of Curious Old French Maps...
Examination Papers, Boyal Military 1
Academy, June and December, 1869... )
Pamphlet on Helmets in the Botunda,']
from the Turkish Arsenal at Bhodes, \-
by J. Hewitt . J
Address to the Mathematical and Physical ^)
Section of the British Association, [
Exeter, 19th August, 1869, by f
J. J. Sylvester, LL.D., F.B.S . j
Notes on the Great Pyramid of Egypt'')
and the cubits used in its design, by \-
Colonel Sir Henry James, B.E., F.B.S. J
Standing Orders for Woolwich Garrison.
Professional Papers of the Corps of Boyal 1
Engineers, Vols. XVII. and XVIII. ... J
Journal of the Boyal United Service'']
Institution, Nos. 51, 52, 53, 54, and
55, Vol. XII . J
The Bussian approach towards India, ex- 1
plained and exposed . j
Military Work by. Military Labour, with']
a few remarks on Mr. Hanbury Tracey’s !
motion before Parliament, by an Officer f
of Boyal Engineers . J
Journal of the East India Association, 1
No. 2, Vol. Ill . j
Moncrieff System of working Artillery, 5
as applied to Coast Defence . j
The Deputy Adjt.-General,
Boyal Artillery.
2 Qr.-MasterH.Behenna, B.A.
The Authors.
The Council, Institution of
Mechanical Engineers.
The Council, Institution of
Civil Engineers.
Lieut. E. H. Wickham, B.A.
Lt.-Col. C. E. Burt, B.A.
Lt.-Col. H. L. Chermside,
B.A.
The Inspector of Studies,
Boyal Military Academy.
The Author.
The Author.
The Author.
The Brigade Major, Wool¬
wich.
The Officers of Bl. Engineers.
The Council, Boyal United
Service Institution.
Anonymously.
The Author.
The Council, East India
Association.
Capt. A. Moncrieff.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
9
The Constitutional Forces of Great Britain, "»
by Capt. C. B. Brackenbury, B.A. ... j
The Engineer’s and Machinist’s Assistant, \
2 Yols . j
Coloured Engravings (framed) of : —
Artillerie Boyale, Anglaise .
„ « Prussienne . . I
« Imperiale, Franchise . *
„ „ Autrichienne .
« u Busse . ^
Pamphlet, “Colonel Boxer and the War"£
Office,” by Maj.-Gen. E.M. Boxer, B. A. j
Notes on the Gunpowder Works at"/
Bouchet, by F. A. Abel, F.B.S . )
Photographic View of Malta (in frame)...
The Author.
Lieut. T. Jesson, B.A.
Major-General Sir J. L, A.
Simmons, K.C.B., B.E.
The Author.
The Under Secretary of State
for War.
Lieut. J. Speranza, Boyal
Malta Fencible Artillery.
Booh purchased.
Anthropological Beview. Nos. 25, 26, 27.
Hackney Carriages. Fares, and Abstract of Laws in force within the Metropolitan
Police District, and City of London.
Monograph of the Kingfishers. Parts IV., V., VI., VII., and VIII.
Gould’s Birds of Asia. Parts XXI. and XXII.
The Ibis. Nos. 18, 19, 20, and 21.
Bevue Maratime et Coloniale. January, February, and March, 1869.
Bevue Militaire Franchise. Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 — 1869; 1, 2, 3-—
1870;
Les Phenomenes de la Physique, par Amedee Guillemin.
Mutiny Act and Articles of War, 1869.
Chambers’ Etymological English Dictionary. Two copies.
Molecular and Microscopic Science, by Mary Somerville. Two Vols.
The Soldier’s Pocket Book for Field Service, by Colonel G. J. Wolseley.
Cavalry Begulations. August, 1869.
The Operations of War, by Colonel E. B. Hamley, B.A. Second Edition.
Practical Hygiene, by Dr. Parkes. Third Edition.
Commission des Conferences Begimentaires. Parts I. to XII.
100 Specimens of Nature-Printed Butterflies.
Gould’s Birds of Great Britain. Parts XV. and XVI,
First Beport of the Boyal Commission appointed to enquire into the present state
of Military Education.
British Imperial Calendar, 1870.
Nautical Almanack, 1870.
Exotic Ornithology, by Sclater and Salvin.
Hand List of Genera and Species of Birds. Part I.
Army Estimates, 1870-71.
The Amateur Mechanic’s Workshop.
Beport of a Committee appointed to enquire into the arrangements in force for the
Control of Business in the Army Departments. Two copies.
Boscoe’s Lessons in Elementary Chemistry.
The Natural History of Man, by the Bev. J. G. Wood. Two Vols,
Monograph of the Capitonidee, or Scansorial Barbets. Part Is
Constanceau’s French Dictionary.
%
10
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
Arundel Society Plates.
Judges and Warriors — Hermits and Pilgrims.
Portraits of Judocus Vyts, Lord of Pompele, and his wife Isabelle de Borhut, with
their patron saints.
The Ordination of St. Lawrence.
5. Museum. — During the past year, some additions have been made
to the natural history collection of the Institution, consisting of birds
from India, by Lieut. J. Biddulph, 19th Hussars (through Lt.-Col. R.
Biddulph) ; of animals and birds also from India, by Captain J. S.
Stirling; and of Lepidoptera from Barbadoes and Trinidad, by Lieut.
Gr. S. Parry ; and for which the best thanks of the Committee are due.
It is most desirable to complete the collection of British birds and
eggs. As a guide to those members willing to assist, a list is given of
specimens required to complete this part of the museum.
There has been no addition of shells to the museum, many families of
which are deficient, and some not even represented. There are hardly
any specimens of British insects, and the Committee trust that members
who have the opportunity will assist in the completion of this most
interesting part of the museum.
A very valuable addition has been made to the museum of a coffin
and mummy, found with about thirty others in the course of some
excavations undertaken by H.E.H. the Prince of Wales, at Old
Grourneh, near Thebes, in 1869. The existence of the tomb was
known to an Arab, whose grandfather had discovered it, and probably
when first found, the mummies were partially opened in search of
scarabaBi and other ornaments.
The thanks of the Committee are due to the Rev. J. Gf. Wood,
M.A., PiL.Si, for his arrangement of the collection of weapons of
uncivilized races, and for information regarding some of them ; as also
for a list he has drawn up of weapons required to complete the
collection *
Presentations to Museum .
Fossils from the Coal Measures .
Echina from Brighton Flint . .
Shark’s teeth, &c., from Brighton Chalk .. J
Specimen of Great Northern Diver .
Photograph of Deer’s Head, shot by I
Lt.-Col. Burt, B.A . )
40 Objects for the Microscope .
A View of Gibraltar, taken from the"!
Devil’s Tongue Battery in 1804, by j-
H. A. Barker, Esq. (in frame) . J
4 Animals from India . ^
2 Birds „ . }=•
1 Skull . . ......J
16 Birds from India .
Venus’ Cup, from the Phillipine Islands.
43 Butterflies from Peru .
Lt.-Col. H. L. Chermside,
B.A.
Lieut. J. F. Owen, B.A.
Lt.-Col. C. E. Burt, B.A.
Capt. B. O’Hara, B.A.
Lieut. H. A. Barker, B.A.
Capt. J. S. Stirling, B.A.
(Lieut. J. Biddulph, 19th
\ Hussars.
Lieut. C. H. Spragge, B.A,
H. Whitely, Esq., jum
THE liOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
11
Bandolier for holding cartridges, worn"')
round the waist by the Amazons of the !
West Coast of Africa, in the army of {
the King of Dahomey . J
44 Specimens of Halloysite from India...
1 Specimen of Stalactitic Peroxide of
Iron . J
Model in Soapstone, of the Monument")
erected to the memory of Sir Henry !
Lawrence, K.C.B., and those who fell j
in defence of the Residency, 1857 . J
2 Specimens of Hang Nests . . .
Collection of Pottery from Madagascar ...
145 Insects from West Indies .
Portable Pocket Gunner .
Chinese Dice Box .
Japanese Compass .
Lieut. P. PI. Eardley-Wilmot,
B.A.
Major W. A. Boss, B.A.
Major J. G. Clarke.
Major PI. Le G. Geary, B.A.
Lieut. J. C. Bobinson, B.A.
Lieut. G. S. Parry, B.A.
Qr. -Master D. Hoge, B.A.
Capt. C. J. M'Mahon, B.A.
Lieut. W. E. Sharp, B.A.
Birds from India , presented by Lieut . J. Biddulph, V^th Hussars .
Nectarinia mahrattensis. <? 9
Ceriornis melanocephala. £
h satyra.
Pucrasia macrolopha. $ 9
Euplocamus albocristatus. d 9
Arboricola torquata. $ 9
Lerwa nivicola. $ 9
Numenius arquata.
Plydrophasianus sinensis. $ 9
Dendrocygna ansuree.
Animals and Birds from India } presented by Captain J. S. Stirling , B.A.
Chaus lybicus.
Yiverra civetta.
Viverricula indica.
Herpestes griseus.
Skull of felis leopardus.
Bubo bengalensis.
Athene brama.
B resented by Lieut. J. F. Owen} B.A.
Colymbus glacialis.
Fresented by Major H. Le G. Geary , B.A .
Two nests of weaver finch.
Fresented by Lieut. G. S . Farry} B.A .
Lepidoptera from Barbadoes and Trinidad.
Presented by Captain B. O’Hara , B.A .
Specimen of ant lion.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Specimens required for the Collection of British Birds and Eggs,
Hooded crow.
Mealy redpole and egg.
Griffon vulture.
Egyptian „
Golden eagle.
Spotted „
Osprey.
Cinereous eagle.
Hough-legged buzzard.
Honey „
Kite.
Swallow- tailed kite and egg.
Jerfalcon.
Peregrine falcon.
Hobby.
Merlin.
Eed-footed falcon.
Goshawk.
Hen harrier.
Ash-coloured harrier.
Marsh „
Great-eared owl.
Hawk «
Snowy „
Tengmalm’s „
Short-eared „
Little „
Sparrow «
Tawny «
Long-eared „
Barn „
Nightjar.
Hoopoe.
Hartford warbler.
Blue-throated warbler.
Alpine accentor.
Crested titmouse and egg.
Bearded u «
White wagtail.
Grey „
Hay’s /;
Grey-headed wagtail and egg.
Eichard’s pipit and egg.
Tawny „ „
Hed lark and egg.
Bipper.
Hock thrush.
Hing ouzel.
Blackbird.
Golden oriole.
Pied flycatcher.
Great grey shrike and egg.
Nutcracker and egg.
Haven.
Jackdaw.
Siskin „
Serin finch „
Painted bunting „
Lapland „ „
Ortolan „
Cirl
Short-toed lark and egg.
Calandre „ „
Crested „ „
Wood u
Shore „
Pine grosbeak and egg.
White-winged crossbill and egg.
Parrot „ „
Three-toed woodpecker „
Downy « „
Hairy „ „
Great spotted „ „
Lesser „ „
Great black «
Green ,,
Yellow-billed cuckoo and egg.
Great spotted ,, „
Eing dove.
Eock i,
Palla’s sand grouse and egg.
Pheasant.
Barbary partridge.
Quail.
Andalusian quail and egg.
Capercaillie.
Ptarmigan.
Buffed bustard and egg.
Little n a
Great „
Little ringed plover.
Kentish „
Golden „
Oyster catcher.
Crane.
Buff-backed heron.
Great white „
Purple „
Squacco „
Common bittern.
Little /,
Night heron.
Spoonbill.
Black stork and egg.
White „
Glossy ibis.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
13
/
Whimbrel.
Esquimaux curlew and egg.
Eartailed godwit.
Black-tailed u
Spotted redshank and egg.
Yellow-shanked sandpiper & egg.
Green « «
Green-shank « «
Buff-breasted « «
Bar tram’s « «
Wood «
Spotted i,
Avocet.
Black-winged stilt and egg.
Ruff.
Knot and egg.
Bonaparte’s sandpiper and egg.
Purple w «
Pectoral „ «
Temminck’s stint and egg.
Little « «
Broad-billed sandpiper and egg.
Curlew ,, a
Sanderling and egg.
Brown snipe and egg.
Great snipe.
Woodcock.
Grey phalarope and egg.
Red-necked phalarope.
Little crake and egg.
Moor hen.
Coot.
Spurwinged goose.
Egyptian „
Bernicle „
Red-breasted „
Canada „
Grey lag
Bean „
Pink-footed „
White-fronted „
Hooper.
Be wrick’s swan and egg.
Polish „
Shieldrake.
Ruddy shieldrake and egg.
Wigeon.
Wild duck.
Teal.
Bimaculated duck and egg.
Garganey.
Gadwall and egg.
Shoveler.
Red-crested duck and egg.
Eerruginous „ „
Tufted duck.
Golden eye.
Buffle-headed duck and egg.
Harlequin ,, „
Western « «
Eider u
Velvet scoter and egg.
Common „ „
Surf « «
Goosander.
Hooded merganser and egg.
Red-breasted „
Smew and egg.
Great northern diver and egg.
Black-throated „
Red-throated „
Red-necked grebe.
Sclavonian „
Great crested „
Eared „
Puffin.
Brunnich’s guillemot.
Black „
Little ank and egg.
Dusky shearwater and egg.
Greater ,,
Manx a
Eorked-tailed petrel and egg.
Wilson’s „ u
Stormy „
Eulmar „
Bulwer’s u
Pomarine skua and egg.
Common „
Arctic „
Buffon’s «
Great black-backed gull.
Lessei u «
Black-headed „
Bonaparte’s gull and egg.
Little „ ii
Sabine’s „ „
Ivory „ i,
Caspian tern and egg.
Gull-billed« „
Whiskered „ „
Sooty ,, „
Sandwich „
Roseate „
Common „
Arctic „
Lesser „
Gannet.
Cormorant.
Green cormorant,
14
MINUTES OE PKOCEEDINGS OF
6. Classes. — The classes for German and French have met as
usual.
The Drawing Class has been particularly well attended, the present
instructor, Mr. Needham, giving great satisfaction.
7. Surveying and Practical Astronomy . — During the past year the
Surveying Class has been attended by several officers, all of whom
have been instructed in military sketching and measuring distances,
Lieut. -Colonel Dray son having attended twice in each week for this
purpose.
8. Photography . — The photographic department is in good working
order, and continues to prosper. Five officers have received instruc¬
tion in photography since the last report. 450 negatives have been
taken during the year, from which over 4000 copies have been printed.
Thanks are due to Lieut. -Colonel Burt, for twelve views of Niagara,
taken by himself.
9. Chemistry.— The laboratory has been in constant use by the
Advanced Class, and also by officers working independently.
10. Instruments. — The instruments are in working order, and have
been in constant use by the Advanced Class, and also by officers pre¬
paring for examination.
The maximum and minimum temperature of the atmosphere, together
with the direction of the wind, is taken daily, and a register of the same
is kept in the reading room.
11. Model room. — Since the last meeting, a large number of service
projectiles and other stores have been deposited in the model room,
and many now obsolete returned into store. A catalogue of these
stores has been carefully compiled, so that members can now without
any difficulty make themselves acquainted with them.
The following cases have also been re-arranged : —
(1) Boxer small-ann breech-loading ammunition* showing construction and
progressive stages of manufacture.
(2) The different fuzes at present in use in the service, arranged by gauge of
fuze hole.
(3) Tubes.
(4) Kockets, long lights, &c.
12. Workshop. — The turning lathes and carpenter's tools for the
use of members in this shop are in good working order.
13. Lectures. — Lectures have been delivered weekly in the Theatre
of the Institution by Mr. Bloxam, F.C.S., on General Chemistry, and
by Dr. Percy, F.R.S., on Metallurgy.
TSE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
15
The following list contains a statement of Evening Lectures which
have been given during the past winter ; and the Committee has to
express its thanks' to Mr. S. Brandram, Professor Maclean, Mr. W. H.
Preece, Dr. Buskin, and especially to Mr. C. L. Bloxam, for devoting
so much of his valuable time to the Institution.
Dr. Buskin . .
S. Brandram, Esq., M.A..e„ .
Bev. H. Martyn Hart, M.A. ...
W. H. Preece, Esq., C.E .
Professor Maclean .
C. L. Bloxam, Esq., E.C.S .
The Future of England.
. Readings from various authors.
C“Wave Motion:” as illustrated in Tides,
I Sound, Light, and Earthquakes.
. f The Application of Electricity to Railway
I Purposes.
. British Rule in India.
. Chemical Lecture. — “ The Breath of Life.”
14. Afternoon Meetings . — These meetings, for some time discon¬
tinued, have been resumed with every promise of continuance, and
some interesting discussions have taken place.
The thanks of the Committee are due to the undermentioned officers
for the papers read by them : —
Colonel J. M. Adye, C.B . . .
Colonel H. H. Maxwell .
Captain C. 0. Browne .
Captain J. P. Nolan . . . . .
Lieut. J. A. S.M. Davies, B. A., E.E.A.S.
Central Asia, and our Military Position on
the North-West Frontier of India.
The Field Gun for India.
Our Rifled Projectiles and Fuzes.
C Measuring Distances, as applied to Military
1 Purposes.
On a New Method for rendering Turret
Ships Sea-going Vessels.
Colonel Adye*s paper has been published in No. 11, Yol. YI. of the
“ Proceedings.”
In compliance with Buie Y., the following officers retire from the
Committee, and are not eligible for re-election : —
Colonel G. T. Eield. | Captain C. Orde Browne.
Captain E. A. Whinyates. | „ J. C. J. Lowry.
Lieut. A. B. Brown.
The following members have left the Garrison, and the vacancies
thus occasioned have been filled up by the Committee : —
Colonel J. M. Adye, by Colonel W. J. Smythe.
Lieut. -Colonel H. T. EitzHugh, « „ G. H. Yesey.
Captain J. S. Stirling, „ Lieut. -Colonel G. A. Milmam
n C. E. S. Scott, „ Captain E. de Winton.
Lieut. 0. E. T. Annesley, „ Lieut. E. Kensington.
16
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
The members of the Committee cannot allow Colonel Adye's retire¬
ment to pass without some record of their appreciation of his devotion
to the welfare of the Institution, and of the great assistance he rendered
them in the performance of their duties.
The following resolutions were passed : —
1. Proposed by Captain Morgan, seconded by Major Geary, —
“ That the Report of the Committee be adopted and printed; ”
2. Due notice having been given, in accordance with Pule XVIII., the
following alterations and additions in Pule II. were submitted by the
Committee : —
(1) “That paragraph 2 be struck out, and paragraph 3 become paragraph 2. 53
(2) “ * The Director of Naval Ordnance to be an honorary member, ex-officio /
to be inserted after paragraph 2/ 5
(3) “ * The naval and military attaches at the different embassies in London, may
be elected honorary members at the discretion of the Committee,
during the time they are thus employed/ to be inserted after
paragraph 3.”
(4) “Paragraph 4 to become paragraph 5, and to read as follows : —
‘ The Committee may submit to the annual meeting the names of
gentlemen, whether officers in the army or navy, or civilians, for
election as special honorary members of the Institution, the names of
these gentlemen having been exhibited at the Institution for fourteen
days previous to the meeting. Gentlemen thus elected, may receive
the periodical publications of the Institution without any payment.
The total number of special honorary members shall not at any time
exceed 20.’ ”
3. l)ue notice having been given, in accordance with Pule XVIII., the
following addition to Pule III. was submitted by the Committee
“ and Veterinary ” to be inserted after “ Medical.”
4. Due notice having been given, in accordance with Pule XVIII., the
following alterations in Pule V. were submitted by the Committee : —
(l) “ That the * Director of Artillery and Stores ’ be substituted for c Director-
General of Ordnance.’ ”
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
17
(2) “That the * Secretary, Department of the Director of Artillery and Stores/
be substituted for * Secretary, Committee on Inventions.’ ”
5. Due notice having been given , in accordance with Rule XVIII., the
following addition was submitted by the Committee
“ That the following rule be inserted as Rule XVIII. —
‘At the discretion of the Committee, assistance will be afforded from the
general funds in support of all voluntary classes at the Institution ; such
assistance not to exceed one-third of the whole amount.
‘ Members wishing to join any class, are to give notice in writing to the
Secretary.
‘ Any officer who may be prevented, by duty or sickness, from attending any
class, is to intimate the same in writing to the Secretary. He will otherwise
be charged as if present.’ ”
6. Due notice having been given, in accordance with Rule XVIII., the
following addition was submitted by the Committee : —
“ That the following rule be inserted as Rule XIX. —
* The Institution will bear a share of the expense of a class at any out-station
at which as many as three of its members will combine for the purpose.
‘ The share of the expense borne by the Institution shall not exceed one-third
of the whole expense of the class.
‘ The number of lessons to which the Institution will contribute shall not exceed
one per week.
‘The class to designate one of their number, who will engage to furnish a
return of the members present at each attendance of the master, and to
manage the payments. An account to be sent quarterly to the Secretary of
the Institution.’ ”
“ That Rule XVIII, and the remainder of the rules be re-numbered consecu¬
tively to XX.”
7. The following officers were elected to serve on the Committee,
viz. : —
Lieut. -Colonel O’B. B. Woolsey. Captain J. P. Morgan.
// C. H. Owen* ,> M. C. Newall.
Lieut. J. Sladen.
8. Proposed by Lieut. -Colonel Young, and seconded by Colonel Field:—
“ That the thanks of the meeting be voted to the Chairman.”
18
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The Committee for the current year will stand thus : —
PATRON AND PRESIDENT:
Field Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge, K.G,
VICE-PRESIDENTS :
The Commandant of the Garrison, Woolwich,
The Director of Artillery and Stores.
The Deputy Adjutant-General.
MEMBERS :
The Assistant Adjutant-General.
The Director of Artillery Studies.
The Brigade Major.
The Secretary, Department of Director of Artillery and Stores.
Colonel W. J. Smythe.
„ G. H. Yesey.
« G. Rotton.
Lieut.-Colonel O’B. B. Woolsey.
„ G. A. Milman.
» C. H. Owen.
Major H. Y. Timbrell.
Asst. -Surgeon F. R. Hogg, M.D
Captain T. B. Strange.
„ F. de Winton.
„ J. P. Morgan,
ti F. Duncan.
M. C. Newall.
J. Sladen.
a
Lieut
E. Kensington.
Captain A. D. Burnaby, Secretary and Treasurer,
(Signed) C. J. WRIGHT, Colonel, R.A.,
ERRATA,
Page 60, note 2, omit “ Russian.”
„ 62, note 2, should read “ The exact weight is 14650 kilogrammes — 14 tons, 8 cwt. 2 qrs.”
„ 71, 20th line from top, for “ powder,” read “ power;”
„ 71, 11th line from bottom, after “ greater ” insert “ than.”
,, 79, 2nd line from top, for “ Redsdale,” read “ Ridsdale.”
„ 98, note 5, for “ almost exactly 9 ins. (9-1735 ins;),” read “ almost exactly 8£ ins;
(8-779 ms.)”
THE ROYAL ARTILLBRY INSTITUTION.
19
OUB
RIFLED PROJECTILES AND PUZES;
PRESENT CONSTRUCTION AND PROBABLE EFFICIENCY ON SERVICE,
A PAPRR READ AT THE R.A, INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, MARCH 8, 1S7Q?
BY
CAPTAIN C. OBDE BROWNE, R.A., j
CAPTAIN INSTBECIOB, BQYAL I14BOI^ATOBY,
Colonel J. M. Adye, C.B., R.A, in the Chaib,
It will be my aim to-day, without going into details, to bring before
you a short summary of the actual condition of our service rifled pro^
jectiles, in order that officers who may not have time and opportunity
themselves, may, without waste of labour, have them brought before
them, and so may be induced to give us the benefit of opinions
rendered specially valuable by being based on actual experience,
Were it the practice, from time to time, for officers engaged in any
special branch of work to do this, without necessarily pretending to
anything beyond that knowledge of facts which their work nmst give
them ; and were this really taken up by yon, I say, soberly, that I see
no reason why discussions here might not be the best of their kind in,
the world.
I hold our artillery materiel to be, at all events, inferior to none.
In ancient times we were the first European nation to use cannon \
the very name of Congreve rockets and Shrapnel shell — well known
in all civilized armies — prove that we have in modem times also taken
the lead ; while recently, when allied with the French in the Crimea,
we may recall the fact of their borrowing onr iron guns when their own
bronze pieces failed ; and when, in answer to a request for fuzes, we
sent them some about as good as and much like their own, some of us
may remember their bringing them back and throwing them down,
saying, “ Nous ne voulons pas ces choses , nous voulons la fuzee de Boxer”
I naturally have pleasure in calling to mind an incident like this, when
the retirement of General Boxer from the head of my Department
enables me to notice such things without any feeling of awkwardness.
At the present time, England has been manufacturing materiel so
largely for Sweden, Russia, Italy, Denmark, Turkey, Egypt, America,
Ac., that she has become a sort of arsenal to the world. Certainly,
[vol. vii.] 3
20
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
in Woolwich, if we cannot discuss these matters well, we ought to be
ashamed of ourselves.
To commence my summary, the systems we have will group them¬
selves very fairly under the three heads of — 1. Projectiles for heavy
guns. 2. Those for siege guns and guns of position. 3. Those for
field guns.
To commence with
Heavy Guns .
These are 13", 12", 9", 8", and 7"-— all Woolwich guns.
Now with these, and indeed all rifled ordnance, it will be found,
speaking generally, that shells will, in the long run, supersede solid
shot, and probably all shot (case excepted), and the reasons are obvious.
With smooth-bores, shot had certain peculiar advantages which
enabled them to hold their own — viz., from the fact that all spherical
projectiles were of one form, and all fired from the same gun were one
size instead of one weight, it followed that the momentum of solid shot
was greater than that of shell ; and hence they kept up their velocity
better, and had a flatter trajectory. Besides this, there was something
to be said for the ricochet of a round shot as compared with the
bursting of a shell. But neither of these advantages hold in the case of
rifled projectiles; for by increasing the length, the shell may be made
up to the same weight, and so given the same momentum and tra¬
jectory as the shot. This power of bringing all projectiles for each
gun to the same weight, is one of the numerous advantages possessed
by rifled guns over smooth-bores ; but it is also obviously a great
advantage for the shell as compared with the shot. The ricochet of
rifled projectiles in all cases being nearly worthless, deprives the shot
of the other advantage ; and, in addition to this, the weight of the
shell being distributed round the outside, gives it a longer radius of
gyration, and hence a more powerful rotation and increased accuracy.
May we not, therefore, conclude that such unequal competition must
eventually end in favour of the shell, where it has not already so
terminated.
I may further notice, with reference to the Woolwich guns, that the
calibre, charge, and pitch of rifling are such that the length for accurate
shooting necessitates a hollow in the projectile ; for a solid projectile
properly proportioned for shooting with these guns — that is, from two
to three calibres in length — would exceed the weight intended for them,
and would strain them.
The projectiles for these guns at present stand as follows : — •
Common shell,
Double shell,
Boxer shrapnel shell,
Palliser shell,
« cored shot,
Case shot.
The double shell is simply a common shell prolonged so as to take
an increased bursting charge. Being too long for good shooting, it
is intended chiefly for firing at wooden ships at short ranges. It exists
only for the 7" calibre, weighs nearly 160 lbs., and contains about
12|lbs. of powder. I mention it first in order to be able to consider
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
21
its power and effects together with those of common shell ; the main
feature to notice in both cases being the very great explosive power,
especially great when compared with smooth-bore shell, which always
were under the weight that would seem to belong to their name.
To give some comparison. The 13" shell contained nearly 11 lbs.,
while the Woolwich 12" shell will take 35 lbs. ; the 68 -pr., or 8" shell,
has a bursting charge of 2 lbs. 9 ozs., and the 7" rifled shell 8J lbs. of
powder.
The exact effects of these shells in bursting has never been thoroughly
investigated; but Admiral Key, on February 2nd, 1866, reports on 7"
double shell fired at the “ America” to test its effects. One burst 6 ft.
inboard the lower deck, entirely destroying one-half of a main-deck
beam, with about 8 ft. square of planking, and cutting severely into
the planks and beams of the lower deck. Another struck the chain
cable on starboard quarter, and burst before passing through, making
a clear hole inside about 26 ins. square, and laying eight planks on the
side open to the extent of 28 ft. by 8 ft. ; the damage in this case was
very close to the water-line. These shells have been fired up to more
than 2000 yds., the committee report, with satisfactory accuracy.
Such being the power of 12 Jibs, of powder, what may we expect
from 35 lbs. ? To this I cannot give an answer ; for I know of no
experiments to quote, either as to breaching of masonry, earth, or the
destruction of ships5 sides.
Next, as to incendiary power — although targets and backings are
sometimes ignited with the double shell — Admiral Key remarks : —
“ In no instance did they set the ships on fire.55 This being so, I may
call attention to the fact that, though a comparatively recent order
extended the application of carcasses to all calibres of smooth-bore
guns down to the 12-pr., there exists no kind of incendiary projectile
for rifled ordnance of any calibre; which is the more remarkable,
because, for obvious reasons, as to studs, coats, &c., red hot projectiles
could not be fired ; and further, carcass rockets have ceased to exist,
and even shell rockets have been made into shot by having the head
plugged up with wood.
There is a curious fact connected with the strain on a shell in the
bore of the gun that I should notice — viz. the great pressure of the
gas escaping past the shell, on its sides. The specimen on the table is
a comparatively mild example of the effects of this. It will be seen
that in that shell the diameter in the middle is only 8*55 ins., while that
at the base is 8*92 ins., and close to the head 8*9 ins. ; this is due to the
pressure of the gas in the gun having told more on the part of the shell
furthest from the support afforded by the metal at the head and base.
I need hardly say before firing, the shell was of one diameter throughout ;
from this the value of the longitudinal flanges or ribs in the interior of
the double shell may be seen. I may also call attention to the curious
nature of the action of the flash of exploded gas firing a shell by entering
at a porous place through a tortuous hole. I believe some remarkable
results might be quoted by officers who have experimented as to this at
Shoeburyness, but I would only notice the singular conditions of the
question. You have gas at a great heat forced through a mass of metal
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
&&
whose conducting power is so great that it might be expected to act
with the cooling effect of a system of gauze burners, and, on the Davy
safety lamp principle, only allow the flame to enter in the form of a
rush of cool gas, effective only as to its pressure ; but it is probable that
the velocity is too great to allow the conducting power of the metal to
act, so that the flame enters with heat, as well as enormous pressure.
Common shells are issued filled for sea service, with Pettman general
service percussion fuzes in them ; they have also Boxer time fuzes, for
use if required. For sea-fronts of forts they have these time and per¬
cussion fuzes also, but for land-fronts only time fuzes; the Pettman
general service fuze being peculiar in its action, and not generally
suited for land service rifled guns — for it is constructed not to explode
on striking water, even at a high velocity, yet to explode on a ship's side,
even at a low velocity, and to act before it crosses the vessel's deck.
It is alike available for smooth-bores as well as breech-loading and
muzzle-loading rifled guns; it is therefore an efficient fuze, especially
for sea service — for it is very necessary that in aiming to hit a ship near
the water-line, the accidental contact with a wave should not explode
the shell prematurely ; but for land service these very conditions rather
tell against it — for it will not act on graze unless the falling angle be
Very great, and the blow consequently more direct than usual. This
being so, and the time fuze being driven into the shell, and so made to
fire it by direct impact, it follows that there is no use in issuing the
Pettman percussion fuze for the land-fronts. It seems unlikely that a
fuze to act on graze would be required for the heavy guns, but at all
events it is well that its non-existence should be noted.
Boxer Shrapnel .
You see on the table this shell for the 7" calibre. It is not necessary
to discuss its construction further than to say, it has a bursting charge
in its base, a wood head lightly attached and easily blown off, and sand
shot varying in weight from 4 to 2 ozs., according to the calibre, and
numbering 580 in the 12" and 227 in the 7".
This description of shell has been preferred to the segment shell
beyond question for the large calibres ; the effect is good when opened
even as much as 500 yds. short of an object. Hence, with the 9 seconds
Boxer wood fuze, shrapnel are available for ranges up to about 3000 yds.
(nearly a mile and three-quarters). The fuze is used with a primer
beneath it to prolong its flash.
It is so important, in the firing of these shells, to watch and under¬
stand the indications of the effects that are being produced, that, at the
risk of being tedious, I would just call attention to them, believing as
I do that the disappointment occasionally following the employment
of shrapnel, is commonly due to an over sanguine estimate of these
results.
It is necessary not only to note the position of the burst of the shell,
but also, if possible, the graze of the balls — which on water give splashes,
on dry ground puffs of dust, on ice (so I am informed) very distinctly
scored marks, but on boggy ground, I fear, no marks whatever. The
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
23
importance of this is obvious, from the fact that it is impossible to
estimate from the firing point the longitudinal position of the burst,
which is seen as a cloud in the air.*
We next come to
Palliser Projectiles .
To point out clearly the condition of these projectiles, I must explain
generally the principles of manufacture, and must apologise for bringing
together some well-known facts. Iron is hardly to be obtained as pure
iron — that is, wrought-iron — in the molten condition, but in contact
with some form of carbon it is readily melted, the carbon so far com¬
bining with the iron as to form cast-iron ; the carbon either remains
combined with the iron, or separates from it more or less in cooling,
according to its nature. In very white iron it is nearly, if not all, in
the combined state of some form of carbide of iron ; in very grey iron
it is an intimate mixture of particles of carbon — termed graphite —
and particles of iron, and intermediate irons range between these
extremes. Further, it is found that the carbon has a better opportunity
of separating when the iron is cooled slowly than when quickly cooled ;
hence, iron which might be mottled if cooled slowly, is obtained as a
species of white iron when cooled suddenly, or chilled. This, in the
case of Palliser projectiles, is effected by running it into metal moulds,
or chills, which, by their great power of conducting heat, carry off that of
the molten metal so rapidly as to cause it to solidify before the carbon can
separate from the iron ; hence we get the chilled form of white iron.
I have called it the chilled form of white iron , because it is not
exactly in the same condition as iron which, from its own tendencies,
became white, even when cast in sand. If the specimens on the table
be examined, it will be seen that the chilled specimen is close and more
silky in its texture than the harsher looking white iron proper ; it is
believed that it exceeds white iron in the degree in which it exhibits
qualities common no doubt to both, to some extent ; these are — intense
hardness, great crushing strength , and density . Both chilled and white
iron are brittle, being deficient in tenacity.
Examined chemically by Eggertz* test, with nitric acid, the carbon
would probably be found in much the same condition in both.
To, bring all these matters to practical results : the crushing strength
and hardness are found to be exactly what is required to pierce armour-
plates, with such a form given to the head by Major Palliser as to
prevent the ill effects of the want of tenacity.
The action of piercing armour-plates may be compared to the ordinary
work of punching sheet-iron with a steel punch ; when, if enough force
is used, something must give way. The punch itself may crush, but the
crushing or flattening of the sheet-iron is not sufficient to give relief ;
it is necessary that the part in front of the punch should come away
from the rest, and so let the punch through. Hence the two forces
opposed to each other are the crushing strength of the punch, and the
tensile strength of the plate. In piercing armour, the work is done
* Vide paper by Major-General Gardner, Vol. VI. p. 33.
24
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
suddenly, and tlie conditions are altered, but still there is much
resemblance ; so that we find crushing strength a great desideratum in
the projectile, and tensile strength equally important in the plate.
I have mentioned hardness and crushing strength as distinct pro¬
perties. They may at first appear to be the same ; but while the former
expresses rigidity in each projectile, the latter refers to rapid connection
of a mass of particles. Thus glass is harder than iron, and will scratch
it ; but iron has greater crushing strength than glass, and may be made
to crush it.
We naturally look for proofs, or at all events indications, of the
projectiles having exhibited the qualities we ascribe to them in the act
of performing their work.
In picking up fragments of Palliser shot after impact against armour,
two things may be specially observed; one, that the point, however
much broken, is never flattened, owing to its intense hardness; the
other, that the fragments are most remarkably cool as compared with
those of other projectiles, and this seems to prove that its structure has
been less crushed — for almost all material becomes heated when pressed
out of shape, or set up.
There is, however, a disadvantage in having metal in the constrained
or unnatural condition produced by chilling. I made experiments to
ascertain the respective densities of shot from the same ladle of metal,
in chill and in sand, and found the former to be perhaps as much as
3^ per cent, the denser of the two. Now, the power of molecular forces
— that is, of the tendencies of particles of any substance to assume any
condition that circumstances encourage — is gigantic. Thus we know
shells may be split by water freezing in them, so a Palliser shell may be
split by filling it with molten iron and allowing it to solidify in the shell.
Hence it is not very surprising that chilled metal should, under some
circumstances, assert its right to so far take a more natural form as to
split or crack the projectile. This frequently occurred with solid shot
formerly made, and it occurs with shell also. The specimen on the table
is a shot found cracked so as to be hardly visible until it was split open,
when the extent of the injury became manifest. Hence it is not sur¬
prising that shot and shell should occasionally have broken in the guns —
the shot, of the two, being perhaps the more likely to wedge in the bore
and do serious injury.
For this reason chiefly, it has been found an improvement to chill
only the head, and form the body of the mould in which the shot is cast
of sand. This was, I believe, suggested some considerable time ago,
both by G-eneral Boxer and Mr. Davidson, the manager of the Royal
Laboratory ; and I would especially mention that to Mr. Davidson is
due in a great measure the actual efficiency of the Palliser projectiles
as they now exist in the service ; and I think I may say that Major
Palliser is anxious to accord to him the credit of having worked the
subject out in a way that, perhaps, could hardly have been done by
anyone else.
I am not aware of the relative tendencies of white and chilled iron to
split, but I feel confident that mottled bodies cast in sand are less liable
to this evil than either*
THE KOYAL ARTILLEKY INSTITUTION.
25
The projectiles cast with sand bodies are superior in penetration to
those entirely chilled ; because, as may be seen, while the pressure round
the head towards a centre does not test its tenacity, the base is in a
very different condition. The metal there, having lent its force to some
extent to the head, shivers away to the front, generally indenting the
plate round the hole made by the head. Any increase of tenacity in the
material at the base, is therefore clearly an advantage.
Palliser shells are fired without any fuze by impact against armour ;
they would only act as shot against wooden vessels. Hence it was pro¬
posed by Lieutenant Boxer, R.N., to use percussion fuzes in them, in
case of mistakes as to the character of an adversary in active service ;
but this has not been adopted.
Penetration of plates at an angle, I will not attempt to discuss here ;
but I may notice the strong conviction that every one I meet who ought
to understand the matter seems to feel, that the Palliser projectiles —
on every theoretical and practical ground — are better for this and all
purposes than the Whitworth, or any other that is known.
Case Shot .
It will be seen that, far from this being the simple subject many
suppose it, it is a very difficult one, if we may judge by the imperfect
state of development of case shot. The difficulties are — liability to
injure the bore of the gun, and liability of soft metal to conglomerate
into masses.
Lieut. Reeves proposed the case first adopted in the service, in which
the balls were packed, either in wood discs recessed to hold them, in
sawdust, within a wood lining, or in an experimental case shot, in rosin,
all interstices being first filled with buck-shot.
General Boxer designed a case shot which carried closer and gave
better results on targets, when fired by the Armstrong and Whitworth
Committee ; this had an iron casing.
The present service case shot contains 8 oz. sand shot for Woolwich
projectiles, packed in coal-dust, within a lining of iron segments or
curved plates, which, laid inside an envelope of sheet iron, protect the
bore.
The Committee have laid down the weight of the case as follows : —
For 7" and under, it is to be two-thirds the weight of any other service
projectile ; for guns over 7", it is to be the weight of a solid round shot
of the same calibre.
And here I cannot refrain from expressing an opinion — viz; that these
case shot are far from being efficient. The sand shot are much too large.
At one time they reached the ridiculous size of 2 lbs. weight a-piece in
the 9" case.
Lieut. Reeves, to the last, continually protested against their size ;
urging that for long ranges shrapnel were more effective, and for short
ranges, small shot would both disable men and boats more effectually.
General Boxer wrote that 6 oz. sand shot were as large as would
ever be required for any penetration, and protested against the employ¬
ment of the large balls,
26
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
General Wilmot, when Commandant of the School of Gunnery, sup¬
ported the opinion expressed by Lieut. Reeves ; and finally, Capt. Hood,
on behalf of the Naval School of Gunnery, recommends smaller balls
than those employed, and the Director-General of Naval Ordnance
writes to support General Boxer in asking for a decrease in size. One
is at a loss to find the individual who really has succeeded — in the teeth
of so many authorities on the subject— in keeping these large sand
shot in the service ; and perhaps one is at just as great a loss to find
anything but objections to them.
They are much more liable to injure the gun ; therefore the iron
linings have to be absurdly heavy, and hence take up a disproportionate
share of the very limited weight allowed to case shot. Again, the larger
balls do not pack nearly as close ; hence the projectile is longer than
necessary, and this again increases the weight of the lining and decreases
the quantity of the case shot.
It may be urged that, for large guns, the ground in front is generally
known to be flat, and suited to ricochet of balls, and hence the range
may be extended very greatly ; to which it may be replied, that any
troops who would leave trenches and expose themselves to the fire of
case shot, for a longer distance than 300 yds., would not only be
lunatics, but might be considered as nearly harmless lunatics.
But, indeed, while I wish to praise the service projectiles, I cannot
say that case shot appear to me to have been satisfactorily worked out
yet. I think the actual use of case on active service has been to some
extent lost sight of. Surely case may be said to be used only at critical
moments, and questions of slight fouling — an objection urged against
rosin — hardly deserves consideration, while increase of smoke would be
a positive advantage ; for the infantry would be at a range at which
their fire would be most deadly, and case require little aim and
no elevation — in fact, as the committee observe, they graze better and
closer to the ground when delivered horizontally.
So, again, expense is a very dubious objection to urge strongly
against lead and antimony balls ; for the objection amounts to this — we
cannot afford to fire the best and heaviest balls against infantry who
are within 300 or 400 yds. of us, and perhaps rushing at our guns,
because they cost £25 a ton ; we must rather fire sand shot, at £14 a ton.
I now speak more especially with reference to the smaller calibres, and
I would say that of all projectiles — considering the moments when
it is used — expense should carry least weight in the matter of case
shot.
Then again, why is the weight to be cut down to the limits pro¬
posed? Take, for example, the 8" case. This will weigh 68 lbs. and
contains seventy-five 8 oz. sand shot — that is, it fires 37 lbs. weight of
balls; the other service projectiles for the same gun weighing 180 lbs.
each. In spite, no doubt, of a greatly inferior velocity, I hold the old
smooth-bore 42-pr. — which fired exactly nine more of the very same
sand shot — just as good a projectile. With a 42-pr. cast-iron gun com¬
peting against a 180-pr. rifled gun, I think I am justified in saying
that case, for rifled ordnance, are in a very imperfect state of development.
But I may be told that two case shot may be fired at once. Certainly,
THE BOYAL ABTILLEEY INSTITUTION.
27
I have no hesitation in saying many of us would fire three without being
told at all. With infantry within 300 yds. of us, we should not carefully
consider Army Circulars and Changes in War Stores; but the propor¬
tions of stores issued are based on the supposition that one case shot
only is used, and the supplies are made accordingly. We are told that,
after all, case are hardly required for these guns. If true, that might be
a reason for having none, but hardly a good reason either for having a
bad case shot, or for acting on the supposition that we have more
rounds of case than we really are provided with.
It is true that the segments, or lining, cause the shot to carry close
and make better target practice, and also that something is found
necessary to protect the bores of the guns ; but in the pattern before us
this is done at a very great sacrifice.
But to crown all, what is the name of this case shot ? It is termed
the “ Koyal Laboratory pattern.” This is really very hard. There was
once a form of point tried with Palliser shell which we termed the
“ committee point,” but when it began to do badly we took to calling
it the “ Belgian point ;” * and I suggest that this case shot be called the
“ Belgian case shot.” As yet we have not heard it much found fault
with ; but I am quite satisfied it will do very badly, and think its name
ought to be changed at once.
Materiel for Siege Guns and Guns of Position .
Under this head come the 7", 64-pr., and 40-pr. breech-loading guns,
and the muzzle-loading 64-pr. shunt takes the same projectiles, segment
shell excepted, and we may therefore consider it at the same time.
The projectiles for siege guns and guns of position are : —
Common shell, Segment shell,
Boxer shrapnel shell, Case shot.
Hollow shot have disappeared, and solid are fast following them, though
batteries of position still retain the 40-pr. solid shot. Shrapnel have to
a great extent superseded segment shell, which are stated by Sir W.
Armstrong to have been specially constructed with a view to wooden
shipping, &c. We retain them for our siege equipments, although we
have no percussion fuze to cause them to act on graze, which we shall
see hereafter is their natural associate. It should be observed, with
reference to our siege equipment, and still more our guns of position,
that we have no means of firing shell to act on graze. The time fuze
(Boxer B.L.R.O.) acts on direct impact; hence there would be no
advantage in issuing the Pettman G.S. fuze, for, as noticed before, it
would not act on graze. There exists a means of firing a small field
service percussion fuze from old pattern segment shells ; but it is not
* This, I think, was really due to a similar point having been tried in Belgium ; not to any wish
to connect bad materiel with that country.
4
ss
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
intended to do this, and probably there are not a dozen people in the
service who know of it, and would think of it, even where they had it.
The shrapnel and case differ only in size and in details from those of
the Woolwich guns.
Field Equipment.
This we must look upon as in a state of transition — our breech-loading
field equipment having had its foundations thoroughly shaken.
The introduction of the 7-pr. mountain gun has been followed up by
the much more important decision in favour of the muzzle -loading gun
for India, described to us by Colonel Maxwell.
The Dartmoor Committee declare that we have as yet failed to get any
reliable percussion fuze ; and on the production of that most desirable
store seems to depend the efficiency of the segment shell, once the sole
projectile of the system.
However, let us review the equipment exactly as it stands at present —
that is, with common shell, segment shell, solid shot still for the 20-pr.,
and case shot for breech-loading guns ; common shell, shrapnel shell,
and case shot for the 7-pr. muzzle-loading; and common and shrapnel
for the 9-pr. muzzle -loading gun. The case I may briefly dispose of by
saying that they are of the Eoyal Laboratory pattern, lead and antimony
balls being grudged even to the poor little 6-pr. — it has got them at
present, but a pattern has gone forward in which sand shot are substi¬
tuted. The 20-pr. contains 9 lbs. 12 ozs. of sand shot ; Reeves* pattern
— which it superseded — contained 13 lbs. 12 ozs. of the same; the total
weight of the two projectiles being 15 lbs. and 14 lbs. 14 ozs. respec¬
tively. The common shell are not so powerless as they are generally
considered. The 20-pr. contains 1 lb. 2 ozs. of bursting charge, against
1 lb. contained by the 24-pr. howitzer, and 1 lb. 5 ozs. by the 32-pr.
howitzer; still the regular field gun shell — the 12-pr. — only contains
9J ozs. of powder.
Hence the wish for a howitzer.
In Abyssinia, with the 7-pr., a double shell was used for vertical
firing — that is, at high angles approaching the conditions of vertical
fire; and here I believe a great step in advance was made, if not
unconsciously, at all events without perhaps fully realising all the
bearings of the question.
It may be observed that vertical fire is in a very crude condition. So
little touched has it been by the march of rifled guns, that this is the
only point at which a discussion of rifled projectiles even approaches
the subject. Rifled mortars have hardly been made experimentally;
and so little promise of decided success has appeared, that it seems
almost necessary to attempt it, even with the hope of little beyond the
improvements that follow the employment of wrought-iron instead of
cast.
It appears to me that the difficulties are greatly aggravated by the
employment of a charge varying with the range ; because this entails a
varying velocity, and hence a varying rate of rotation, and to give a
pitch abrupt enough to keep the projectile point-first with the smaller
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
29
charges necessary for short ranges, becomes very difficult. I have gone
so far, therefore, as to suggest the trial of some fixed charge, the mortar
being laid at angles varying from 45° ttpwards, the greater elevations
being thus used with the smaller ranges. I believe this to be worth a
trial, because, in addition to the constant velocity so desirable with a
rotating projectile, the velocity on impact would become enormously
increased at the shorter ranges, and perhaps would be such always as
to make it well worth while to fire vertical Boxer shrapnel — which I
recommend with the more confidence because it has been proposed both
by General Shrapnel and General Boxer, and its power, under the
circumstances I describe, would become very much increased. I read
that a very crude experiment was made in this direction in the late
American war — that is, shrapnel were tried, fired on the regular old
mortar system, with good effect.
The advantage of having such a projectile might be very great — certain
systems of fortification have depended almost entirely on vertical case ;
but though the moral effect is considerable, they have faults. They
cannot be fired over the heads of one's own troops ; they scatter too
widely for good effect on any particular spot ; the striking velocity is
but small, and they cannot be used at long ranges. Even at 260 yds.
range I remember a man getting a stiff knee for life from the impact of
a vertical sand shot ; but at shorter ranges its effects would be less*
Vertical shrapnel would be liable to none of these defects. Its range is
not limited ; it might be fired over the heads of one's own troops ; it
would not scatter too much, and its striking velocity might be, probably*
all that need be desired. Does it not appear — in these days of gun-pits
and extended cover — that some effective vertical missile for troops is
required ? Probably most officers who have been under the vertical
fire of mortar shell will confess that their moral effect wears off ; and as
to the actual effect, it is surprising how many shells will burst harmlessly
on the ground, with men stooping or lying within a few feet of them.
It requires a little careful thought to see why it is that so many shells
may burst in a battery and injure no one at all ; and I would put the
question to any officer, whether he thinks it likely that if half a dozen
of the mortar shell that fell closest to him had been replaced by shrapnel
opening near the ground, he could have escaped.
But to pass at once to the last point I have to touch on—
Segment and Shrapnel Shells , and their Fuzes*
The Armstrong and Whitworth, the Ordnance Select, and the Dart¬
moor Committees have all had this question before them. While Boxer
shrapnel have come in for heavy guns and siege guns, and have to a
great extent superseded segment shells, with field guns the matter is
hotly contested.
The shrapnel has a comparatively close cone of dispersion, and the
shower of its bullets is therefore effective for a greatly prolonged dis¬
tance, and is consequently less affected by slight errors in boring the
fuze — hence it offers great advantages as compared with the segment for
time fuzes; besides, the momentum and penetration of its bullets are
30
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
mncli greater than those of segment. On the other hand, it may he
urged that should a shell hurst by actual impact on an object, such as
a column of infantry, the immediate wide dispersion of the segments
tends to distribute them well ; and those who advocate the use of
segment shells will be found almost invariably to be also advocates for
the use of percussion fuzes.
The discussion of the relative advantages of time and percussion fuzes
is such, that I do not wish here to attempt it, but rather to keep more
closely to the work of bringing facts together for those who have not
time to collect them for themselves.
It should be said in favour of the segment, that, under certain cir¬
cumstances, it has given good results on active service. Oapt. Mercer
reported its action in bursting into the rifle-pits of the Maories to have
been very good ; some officers reported well of it in China. The report
to lay most stress on is that of Major Hay, describing its action on
troops placed behind brick walls. No doubt, also, against wooden
ships it would, with percussion fuzes, exhibit a good union of pene¬
tration and dispersion.
It will be seen that all these cases are such as favour its action with
percussion fuzes, without bringing out the disadvantages of its effects
being very local — that is, confined very closely to the bursting spot.
This arises from the segments being of comparatively low specific
gravity, and of a form unsuited to keeping up their velocity or to
ricochet on the ground. Moreover, the bursting charge, from its
position, tends to disperse the segments, which are already predisposed
to scatter from the centrifugal force due to the rapid twist. This, in the
cases above quoted, caused no ill effect, for the ordinary conditions of
firing in the open were almost reversed. I believe the Committee on
Field Gluns for India were interrupted in certain experiments made
to investigate carefully the respective cones of dispersion of segment
and shrapnel shell.
I would now endeavour to illustrate the matter by a few diagrams I
have made, to exhibit results of experiments at Dartmoor.
Fig. 1 gives the best result obtained by 12-pr. segment with percussion
Fig. l.
Aemsteong Segment.
Percussion Fuze (only). Range 1670yds.
-1-1 PREMATURE 2 BROKE UP BEYOND.
1194-
fuzes acting on targets in column. It is so striking, that before entering1
into odious comparisons^ let us congratulate ourselves that such a result
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
31
should be obtained under any circumstances, with our present service
ammunition. It is satisfactory to contemplate the possibility, under
any circumstances, of striking a column of infantry in anything like
1194 places at nearly a mile range, in firing fifteen rounds.
Looking at the exact character of the action, it may be noticed that
every single effective shell bursts within five yards of a target, and
nearly all burst through one of the targets on to those behind it. Judging
from many results, this is the most effective action of the segment shell,
but of course it can only be employed on columns.
Fig. 2 is the best result of the same day's firing,* on a column,
Fig. 2.
Segment 9-pr.
Time and Percussion. Range 1000 yds.
with time and percussion fuzes — and these are not fuzes made in the
Laboratory, but the genuine article, fresh from Elswick. In this,
although ten shells burst and one breaks up within 60 yds. of the front
of the targets, the effect is comparatively small, being very nearly the
same effect as is produced on the front target by nine shrapnel bursting
* A better result was obtained with segment shells fired with time and percussion fuzes on
another day, but it happened that the chief effect was due to four shells bursting by percussion fuzes
through the second row on to the third and fourth rows {vide Pig. 3), the first two rows having
Eig. 3.
Armstrong Segment.
Time and Percussion Fuzes. Range 1700 yds.
*
120 110 100 90 80 70 60 SO 40 30^ 20 io
*
THROUGH
TO
21
\<n
m
25
9
LODGED
24
14
51
58
22
5
STRUCK,
2S
33
36
I3S
36
IS
/
049
tiit few scores on thein; and this being so, the result bears out rather than contradicts the
principle laid down — viz. that the action of the segment shell requires a percussion fuze to develope
it to advantage.
32
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
within 70 yds. in front of the column, on Fig. 4. These two last
Fig. 4.
Boxer Shrapnel 9-pr.
Range 1000 yds.
703
are the results of the 9-pr. shells ; but still, making allowance for the
difference, both are inferior to the 12-pr. result on Fig. 1 ; the shrapnel,
where time fuzes are used, beating the segment shell decidedly.
Figs. 5 and 6 are the best results obtained with shrapnel and time
Fig. 5.
Shrapnel 9-pr.
Range 1000 yds.
isi ;
Fig. 6.
Segment 9-pr.
Percussion (only). Range 1450 yds.
a ROUNDS ONLY
PP WHICH'l-j-S PREMATURE
THROUCbl — 1 14.
EODCEO . IS
struck _ _ 14-
fuzes, and segment with percussion fuzes, at a target with a bog in
front. The segment here only fired nine rounds, the result being
exceedingly bad. It is fair to remember this nature of result, when
looking at the action of percussion fuzes at their best ; and it is also to
be borne in mind that the segment, for the most part, had exactly two
trials against each single trial of the shrapnel ; so that if the shrapnel
THE 110 YAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
33
stands in an intermediate position, it may be doing quite as well, and
liave quite as high an average as the segment. Figs. 7 and 8 shew
Fig. 7.
Shrapnel 9-pr.
(Advancing from 1700 to 800 yds.)
THROUGH 23s
LODGED 42
STRUCK 44
324
Eig. 8.
Segment 12-pr. (Retiring from 800 to 1300 yds.)
Time and Percussion Fuzes.
f 1 Premature.
f 1 Burst Ibeyond.
THROUGH 143
LOO CED 59
STRUCK 93
295
the best results of independent firing with each nature of shell. This
happens again to occur with the 12-pr. in the case of the segment,
and the 9-pr. in the case of the shrapnel ; nevertheless, the latter is the
better result. I would especially notice the wonderfully accurate
bursting of the shells with the time fuzes in this independent firing,
which was a race against time.
One sometimes hears the idea of time fuzes being properly set in
action jeered at by people who claim to take the real practical view of
the matter. Now while, as I say, I do not wish to take up the question
of time and percussion fuzes, I would just remark that I object to being
called upon to believe that the presence of mind of a whole detachment
is not sufficient to get a fuze bored. Of course there may be cases
where a shell with a percussion fuze already in it might be fired more
quickly ; but where there is the time, I cannot but believe there will be
the presence of mind required to bore the fuze. We need to guard
against a sort of slovenly, plausible cry of “ rough and ready 33 things
for service ; ready of course we want, but why rough ?
For greater readiness with time fuzes, General Boxer advocated the
34
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
lengths being marked with the range which each suited, and this was
carried ont at Dartmoor.
One word on onr fuzes.
“We have no reliable percussion fuze;”* then, after ten years5 expe¬
rience, it seems high time to try something else. For such shells as are
fired from our muzzle-loading guns, and are intended to be exploded on
graze, a concussion fuze is the natural alternative; that. is, a fuze which
contains no detonating powder, being lit and burning like a time fuze till
impact opens a passage for the flame into the bursting charge of the shell.
As you may be aware, there are many fuzes of this class now submitted
for trial. In such we avoid the evils which are entailed by the presence
of percussion powder, and which render the percussion fuze unreliable.
Unreliable because it deteriorates in store, especially in hot climates ;
and unreliable because it is prone to cause accidents in handling, such
as that which blew up our men at Malta.
But where — as in our present breech-loaders — there is no windage,
every single fuze is obliged to be lit by percussion, and so every one is
liable to deterioration and accident. The condition of some of the field-
service percussion fuzes returned from out-stations to the Royal Labora¬
tory, may be understood from the fact that a very simple operation —
which effectually prevented the danger of prematures with the Dyer
fuze — was suspended because the fuzes did not even seem worth the
cost of such a trifling job. Much might be given in detail, but I will
conclude a paper, already longer than I originally intended it to be, by
observing that although it is probable at this moment our field artillery
would, whenever they might be brought to the test, hold their own
against all comers, yet it is most desirable that much should be done to
simplify their materiel , and I believe that this will be rendered far easier
whenever the muzzle-loader is introduced generally.
At the conclusion of the reading —
Colonel An ye invited discussion upon the subject of the paper, and
said that if any officer wished to ask a question, no doubt the lecturer
would have pleasure in answering.
Captain Strange, R.A., said : If his brother officers would have
patience with him, he should like to make a few observations; not
perhaps on the subject under discussion — for that had been so fully and
clearly explained by Captain Browne that he could add nothing to it —
but suggested by some observations made in the course of the lecture.
* Since the date of the lecture, many concussion fuzes have been tried ; but all have, as yet,
proved too slow in their action. Cap composition, however, which is at ail events far more reliable
than phosphorus composition, has been substituted for it experimentally.
th£ royal artillery institution. 35
It was a subject which had been long upon his mind, and upon the
minds of other officers of experience, and he hoped that at some future
time they would join in placing it before those who had the power to
enforce their ideas. During the time he had held the position of
instructor, the fact had been forced upon him — and the report of the
Dartmoor Committee specially alluded to it — viz. that in gunnery prac¬
tice, whenever the conditions approached nearest to those of actual
warfare — he meant by that, when the range was unknown and the firing
rapid — the results were exceedingly indifferent. This ought not to be,
considering the general excellence of the projectile they had heard
described. How about the animated materiel? Of course, as far as
instructors were concerned, they were admirably paid — (a laugh) — and
had much to be thankful for. He might venture to observe they had
seen to-day that some of them did not fail in intelligence, or in an
anxious desire to do their duty. (Applause.) The case was different,
however, with the people who received instruction. No pay or induce¬
ment was held out to the rank and file as a reward for extra intelligence
and proficiency as gunners . The School of Musketry had exercised an
amazing influence on the British infantry, and the study of “ Tommy
Atkins* ** weapon would always be a favourite pursuit with the British
soldier, because it was paid for and made honourable. But he had met
with great apathy in receiving instruction, especially on the part of the
older soldiers of the Royal Artillery ; the recruits were more eager,
until they found they got no good by it — a circumstance which he
attributed to the fact that nothing in the shape of rewards and badges
for extra intelligence were held out to the gunner. His promotion,
even, did not depend on his knowledge and skill as a gunner . To
remedy this, he should be put on a level with his red brother in the
infantry, and prizes given for extra efficiency. It was not necessary
that the pTize should be given to the gun detachment, and any attempt
in that direction would be a failure. It must be given to the man
himself who combined knowledge and skill ; and, as a proof that this
was practicable, it had been tried in India with very beneficial effect,
whenever the commander of the battery was in favour of the system.
The plan was one which recommended itself on the ground of economy,
and in these days economy was everything; competitive trials in
pointing guns could be carried on without ammunition. According to
the present system, ammunition was wasted through putting a careless
or a short-sighted man to lay the gun — a duty which in the French
artillery was entrusted only to certain men called pointeurs, detailed for
the duty on account of their special aptitude. He believed that the
introduction of this plan in the British army would be very beneficial.
The want of some improvement in the accuracy of artillery practice, was
a subject which had long weighed on his mind. The success of Lieut.
Nolan* s range-finder made it more than ever necessary we should have
picked marksmen skilled in its use. Improvements in artillery, when
not accompanied by skill in their use, were simply a disadvantage ; and
he trusted that he should be pardoned for introducing the subject on
this occasion. (Applause.)
Captain J. P. Morgan said that some of Captain Browne*s suggestions
5
36
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
came very near his own experience, and he could confirm many of his
excellent observations. He referred to the very high estimation in
which the productions of the Royal Arsenal were held in foreign
countries, quoting the observation he had heard of by a foreign officer,
that if an angel from Heaven came down to say that a certain projectile
was good, he would not believe it unless the article had been adopted
at Woolwich. (Laughter.) Captain Morgan also confirmed the obser¬
vations of Captain Browne as to the density of white metal as compared
with grey, having himself had to examine shells of French pattern at
Elswick, which he found to be heavier than others of similar bulk — a
fact explained by the metal being whiter and denser. He referred,
also, to the manufacture of chilled shells of the new pattern, expressing
an opinion that the holes near the base are not so readily detected
by the men engaged in their manufacture as the holes near the nose3
and should be carefully watched , as a possible means of danger . As
to the percussion fuzes made at Elswick, he said that there the manu¬
facturers steadily adhered to Pattern No. 2, and that in proving their
own guns, even at sea, he had never seen one fail on striking the water.
He concluded by expressing an opinion that the service modifications
in percussion fuzes had not been always attended with advantage.
(Applause) .
Colonel Adye said he was sure the meeting would unanimously agree
With him in thanking Captain Browne for his excellent and interesting
lecture. (Applause.) They would no doubt also cor^pur with him in
the opinion that discussions of this character were very desirable in an
institution like that of the Royal Artillery ; and that, in these days of
scientific advancement, they were much indebted to any officer — espe¬
cially those employed in the Royal Arsenal — who had the means of
gaining information, and was ready to impart it to those who, in the
exercise of their regimental duties, had not the same opportunities.
They would esteem it a great favour and kindness on the part of any
officer similarly situated, who would come forward and tell them of the
various improvements and alterations which were taking place in the
manufacturing and scientific departments of the service ; and he hoped
that all present would concur with him in again thanking Captain
Browne for his valuable paper. (Applause.) Colonel Adye continued
to observe that Captain Browne had spoken upon so many subjects, that
he should not attempt to follow him through the whole of his discourse,
but he was desirous of asking him for information on one or two points.
One was with respect to chilled shell. It was well known that latterly
some of these shells had split, and injured the guns from which they
were fired. They all knew that the “ Hercules 33 had come home with
one out of the very few guns she had on board injured ; and he believed
there was a projectile now upon the table, the fracture in which must
have existed for some time before it was discovered. Now, it was not
satisfactory to think that the Palliser shells — in many respects so
excellent — were liable to this serious defect, and he should like to know
from Captain Browne whether there was a probability of overcoming
the difficulty ? They had heard a great deal lately of Sir J oseph
Whitworth's metal ; perhaps the lecturer would tell them whether, by
THE KOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
37
employing that, or some other description of metal, there was a hope of
avoiding these premature fractures in future ? Again, Captain Browne
had given an interesting account of the Dartmoor experiments, where
a good deal seemed to hinge on the degree of perfection attained by the
fuzes. He would ask the lecturer — than whom no one could speak
better on the subject — whether they were likely to overcome the great
difficulty they met with in this respect ; for it would become a serious
question, if they could not get a proper fuze, whether they should not
return to the muzzle-loading gun. Captain Strange had spoken with
regard to promoting accuracy of firing by giving prizes for good
shooting in the artillery, as in the infantry. To some extent he
(Colonel Adye) agreed with the suggestion, but he did not think the
plan so easy as his gallant friend seemed to suppose. They had tried
it in India, and the late Sir George Barker had written to him on the
subject, but they had found it very difficult of operation. In the
infantry one man fired a musket, but in the artillery there were half-a-
dozen to a gun. It was very easy to say that the prize should be given
to the man who laid the gun ; but that would be a very expensive affair,
because it would require many shots each to test the ability of each
individual. The plan had been tried in India and given up, probably
on financial grounds. If Captain Browne would now offer a few obser¬
vations on the questions he had put, he should feel obliged.
Captain Browne expressed himself much pleased at the complimentary
remarks made respecting his paper, the chief aim of which was simply
to submit a few facts, in the hope that those who had practical experi¬
ence would form their own opinion thereon. Colonel Adye had spoken
of the advantage possessed by officers engaged in the Arsenal ; but there
was another side to the question. The other day, Captain Majendie
was remarking that any officer attached to the Laboratory was
under a great disadvantage as to the* designing fuzes and the like,
because they were out of the way of actual experience ; though no doubt
it was true that many persons, possessing a thorough acquaintance
with gunnery in the field, might fall into some mistake for want of
practical knowledge of the manufacture. As an instance of this, he
stated that an officer (Major Dyer) had invented a fuze which acted
upon graze, but failed from a simple defect, which produced a fatal
rebound, and frequently caused premature explosion ; a defect which
Mr Pettman — a practical mechanic — stopped by merely inserting a
small piece of lead behind the pellet; Mr Pettman having — like Sir
William Armstrong — a manufacturing experience, and well knowing
the great value of lead for such a purpose, owing to its total absence of
elasticity — a little bit of working experience unknown to most officers.
On the other hand, however, there was a converse to this exhibited in
the mistake made by Sir William Armstrong, in the employment of
lead, not only as a cushion, but as a support to the pellet ; the practical
test of service showing that he had not calculated on the result pro¬
duced on his fuzes by vibration and jarring in the limber boxes. With
reference to the unsatisfactory condition of the percussion fuze. Captain
Browne said the difficulty was in enabling detonating powder to stand
climate. Pettmaffis general service fuze was on the whole a good fuze,
38
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
but those hitherto issued had failed to stand the climate ; an operation
was, however, now being carried out with the object of sealing up these
fuzes so as to render them water-proof, and if this was successful, there
was no reason why the same plan should not be carried out with any
other percussion fuze that might be adopted. But the danger in hand¬
ling all percussion fuzes must to a certain extent remain, simply from
the fact of their containing detonating powder. As for concussion
fuzes, which were only adapted to muzzle-loading guns, being lit by
the flash, there was no reason why they should not be as safe and
reliable as any time fuze.
Colonel Adye said his question referred to fuzes for breech-loaders.
Captain Browne said the question in that case was more difficult, and
he thought that for the present they must await the result of the im¬
provement in the Pettman fuze, that was in the operation designed to
ensure its security from damage by damp. Captain Morgan had stated
that the people at Elswick had great confidence in their percussion
fuze, and they had at all events this reason for their opinion — viz. that
in the Dartmoor experiments, not one of the Elswick shells exploded
prematurely, though many more broke up on touching the ground than
those of the Laboratory pattern. The best result of all was made with
the Laboratory fuzes ; but there were a number of premature explosions
— so many that the fuzes were considered unreliable. He thought, in the
case of the independent firing, in which by far the largest number of
prematures occurred, this may have been frequently caused by the time
fuzes not being screwed home, so as to come in contact with the per¬
cussion fuze and prevent rebound. There were, however, still a large
number of prematures which could not be so accounted for; and, in
explanation of the different behaviour of the Ereeth fuze, made in the
Royal Laboratory, and the Elswick fuzes, he would note the fact that
in the former the detonating powder was only covered by thin paper,
while in the latter it was protected by sheet brass. Hence it was not
difficult to see that the former, being much more readily fired by the
needle, was more liable to premature explosion ; while the same thing
told in its favour, in enabling it to act upon graze — for it appears to
have allowed the shell to burst properly on hard rocky ground, when
the shells with the Elswick fuzes were split in half. As to the splitting
of Palliser shell from cracks developed in store, he observed that these
cracks may have not been noticed, because they would not be looked
for ; a shell which was sound yesterday, would not be expected to be
found split to-day. This defect had, however, he hoped been remedied
to a great extent, if not entirely, by casting the bodies of the shell in
sand, and chilling only their heads. When metal was “ coaxed,” as it
were, by chilling to solidify in an unnatural, or rather a delicately
balanced state, it was only reasonable to suppose that it might seize any
opportunity of making an effort to re-adjust itself. By having only the
head chilled, there was therefore much less danger of the shell breaking
up in store or in the gun. Respecting the shells referred to by Colonel
Adye as having actually burst on board the “ Hercules,” he added that
the issue of those shells had been under exceptional circumstances ; in
fact, the question had been raised by the Department whether they
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
39
should be issued at alb owing to their having been constructed in con¬
formity with an order which had been regarded as overstepping the
limits ensuring safety, and the pattern approved for future manufacture
had been altered accordingly. With regard to these individual shells,
it had been ruled that they should be issued, and it was thought that
they would stand ; but the result showed the evil of allowing any ques¬
tionable projectile to get into the service, and it was satisfactory to
know that no more would be manufactured. (Applause.) He hoped,
therefore, he had shewn, with regard to the chilled shot at present in
the service, that they were not all fairly represented by those in
question ; and with reference to those which would be manufactured
for the future, that they stood altogether on different ground, for they
would have their bodies cast in sand ; and this, it was confidently hoped,
would fully meet the difficulty. (Applause.)
Colonel Adye thanked the lecturer for his explanations, and the
proceedings terminated.
40
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGrS OE
REMARKS ON
CAPTAIN NOLAN’S BANGE-HNDINI} APPARATUS.
BY
LIEUT. C. E. B. LEACOCK, R.A.
Captain Nolan's range-finding apparatus consists of two angle-finders,
a measuring tape, and a calculating roller.
The angle-finders are identical in general construction, but inverted in
details, one instrument being right, and the other left-handed.
Each angle-finder consists of a long telescope, round each end of which
is a band, turned truly round. The bands rest on two Y's fixed on
the outer side of the barrel of the gun, so that when the telescope
is laid in them, the axis of the telescope is parallel to that of the gun ;
above the telescope is an index plate, graduated in a manner which will be
hereafter described ; at the rear of the index plate is a pivot, on which a
steel limb revolves. Above the steel limb at the pivot, is fixed a short
telescope, which revolves with the limb, and remains constantly at right
angles to it. The limb and short telescope receive their motion from a
screw fixed to the index plate, and working through a nut on the steel limb.
The short telescope is protected by means of a tin case, to the inner lip of
which is pasted a white paper ring. This case does not revolve, but is
fixed at right angles to the index plate, a hole being cut in its side so as
not to interfere with the index bar.
The tape is an ordinary measuring tape, working on a reel. At the loose
end is a hook, which, when the tape is used, is hooked to the inner trail-
handle of one gun, and the reel is then carried over to the trail of the
other.
To measure the range by means of the instrument, two guns are used.
They are drawn up at an interval of about 40 yds., and dressed so that the
object will be directly in front of some point in the interval. Each gun is
then laid on the object, and the interval from inner trail-handle to inner
trail-handle measured. The short telescope of each finder is then turned on
the vertical axis of the white ring on the lip of the case of the other. This
axis is marked by a red spot on the highest and lowest points of the circum¬
ference of the ring. The angles between the long and short telescopes will
consequently be the base angles of the triangle ABC, formed by the object
and the two guns, and their sum will be the supplement of the angle BAC.
(See Diagram I.)
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
41
Now, as we may fairly assume our range over 500 yds., AB and AC are
very large in proportion to BC ; and as the point A is directly opposite
some point in the base BC, the length of the sides BA, CA, will be much
the same for any particular magnitude of the angle BAC, whether the
triangle BAC be isosceles or not; and we may therefore treat the triangle
BAC as an isosceles triangle of known base and known angles, of which it
is required to find the sides. (The error resulting from this assumption,
will hereafter be proved too small to matter in practice) .
Our formula will be
sin a
a
. cosa
sin(/3 + y)
r = range = AB = AC,
3 = base = BC,
a = ABAC.
Now, as a is very small— for it cannot exceed 5°, as an isosceles triangle
with base 40 yds. and apex 5° will have sides only 456 yds. in length — we shall,
as will hereafter be proved, incur but slight error from making sin ~~ or
cos ~ equal to one, and writing our formula
b
t = - - ,
sin (/3 + y)
"We shall hereafter see that from this formula is derived the principle
on which the calculating roller is constructed.
We now proceed to read the base angles by means of the index plates of
the angle-finders.
On these plates the circle is divided into 144 divisions (of 2° 30' each),
which are again subdivided into 100 subdivisions (of 1' 30" each). The
actual portion of the circle graduated on the index plate is only about eight
divisions, or 20°. Tenths of divisions only are graduated on the plate, but
the angles may, by means of a vernier on the steel limb, be read to as little
as half a subdivision. At each of the divisional graduations is 0, the sub-
divisional graduations being marked from 1 to 99 — the numbers running
from left to right on left-handed instruments, from right to left on right-
handed ones. The instruments will consequently show, not the exact
magnitude of the angles ABC and BCA, but merely their excess over the
next lowest round number of divisions. Thus, if the steel limb EB, be
immediately over the long telescope, the lines EB and AB will coincide,
and therefore the angle ABC coinciding with the angle EBC, will be a
right angle, or 36,00 (thirty-six divisions no subdivisions). A zero must
therefore be marked on the index plate, immediately above the axis of the
long telescope, to serve as a starting point, from which the plate is graduated
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OP
42
right and left. If we turn the short telescope so as to diminish the angle
ABC to say 3 5 ,,71, the arrow-head E will point to 71, and if we diminish
ABC to 35,00, the arrow-head E will again point to a zero. (See Diagram I.)
Now, let ns suppose that, having laid our instruments in the manner
above described, we have read 60 at B, and 80 at C ; adding these two
together, we have 140. This being more than a division, we cut off the first
figure, and read 40. We now know that the sum of the base angles exceeds
some exact number of divisions by 40 subdivisions, or to use a symbolical
expression, that
/3 + y = 100m + 40.
Now, we may assume that a lies between 20 and 2,00 ; for with the latter
of these values a base of 40 would give a range of 456 yards, and with the
former a range of 4560. Hence m must be either 70 or 71 — the latter
value being rejected when the readings add up to more than 80. Eeadings
below 80 render possible two different values of m} and consequently two
apices of different magnitude, and two ranges. The two ranges, however,
will be so different that it will be impossible to fail to distinguish the true
from the false ; for let us have read n subdivisions, then our two ranges
will be
b
sin (2,00 — n) *
b
sin (1,00 — n) '
But 2,00 — n is more than double 1,00 — n, and small angles vary almost
as their sines ; therefore the greater of the two ranges will at least be double
the less.
We now proceed to describe the calculating roller, and shew how, by its
means, the formula
sin + y)
may be solved, and the sides of the triangle BAC obtained without actual
computation.
The roller is a built-up cylinder consisting of a body and two rings, these
rings being free to rotate round the axis of the cylinder. The lower rim of
the body and the upper rim of the lower ring are marked from left to right
with 100 equal graduations, corresponding to the number of subdivisions in
a division ; by means of these rims the readings at B and C may be added
together, and if their sum exceed 100, the first figure will be cut off. At
the zero point of the lower ring is marked the word “ breech.” This is
brought opposite the reading of the first angle-finder (60), when the reading
(80) of the second angle-finder on the lower ring will come under (40)
— the sum of the two readings less 100 — on the body.
This will be seen in Diagram II., where the two rims are represented as
if in one plane, in order that all parts of them may be visible at once.
On the lower edge of the upper ring is graduated from left to right a
b
sin (70,00 + n)
sin (71,00 + n)
THE 110 YAL AliTILLEliY INSTITUTION.
43
scale giving the differences of logarithms of all numbers between 400 and
4000, each logarithm being marked with the number to which it belongs.
The size of the graduations is so proportioned to the size of the roller that
log 4000 — log 400 or unity is exactly one circumference of the circle, and
the points 4000 and 400 consequently coincide; while, as all powers of ten
have logarithms free from fractions, the point at whieh 1000 is marked will
be the true zero point of the logarithmic scale.
On the upper edge of the body is graduated from right to left a scale
giving the differences of logarithms for the sines of all angles between 71,80
and 70,00, which are the greatest and least values the sum of the base
angles can have. As the sines of very small angles are proportional to the
angles themselves,
sin 2,00 = 10 sin 20 ;
sin 70,00 = 10 sin 71,80.
Hence the difference between their logarithms will be unity, or one circum¬
ference.
Each logarithmic graduation in this scale is marked with the number of
subdivisions in the angle to whose sine it belongs.
As sin 71,77* 1 8 = *01, log sin 71,77*18 = — 2, and it is at 77*18 that
the zero point of the lower logarithmic rim will fall, an arrow-head is
marked here, and the word “ tape ” written beneath it.
Erom the figures on the lower rim of the body to the corresponding
figures of the upper rim, diagonal lines are drawn. These in no way affect the
principle of the instrument, and serve only to guide the eye.
We will now describe the use of the roller.
As soon as the number of yards in the base is known, the upper ring is
turned round until that number comes opposite the arrow-head marked
“ tape.” The two readings of the angle-finders are then added together,
as already described, by means of the lower ring. The number representing
their sum on the upper rim of the body will be opposite the range on the
upper ring.
Eor by the formula,
b
1 sin (/3 + y) ’
. * . log r — log 1) = — log sin (J3 + y).
But log r — log b is the distance from the point on the upper ring gra¬
duated r to that graduated b; and — log sin (/? + y). is the distance from
the arrow-head to the point on the upper rim of the body graduated
(/? + y) ; the difference in sign corresponding to the contrary directions in
which the two logarithmic scales are graduated. Therefore these two
distances must be equal.
But the graduation b coincides with the arrow-head ; therefore the gradua¬
tions r and (/3 + y) must also coincide.
We have already stated that for readings less than 80 two values of
(/? + y) are possible, and that we have consequently two ranges given ; but
that one being more than double the other, they were easily distinguished.
A reference to Diagram II. fig. 2, will show this to be the case.
0
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
44
We now proceed to the method by which the range is ascertained with
one finder only.
The guns are dressed so as to be in line with some object to the right or
left, and laid on the object aimed at. The angle-finder is then placed first
on one gun and then on the other, and the short telescope is each time laid
on the object to the flank, the long one on the object aimed at. We thus
read the angles fi and 8 (Diagram I.)
Let ft = 100 m +
8 = 100 n + q.
Then
P + y = 72,00 — a,
= 72,00 — (8 — /3),
= 72,00 - {(100 n + q) - (100 m + p)},
— (72 + m — n) . 100 — (q —p).
Hence we have the rule—
“ Prom the gun-number of the gun nearest the square object, take the
gun-number of the gun furthest from the square object, and subtract the
difference from 100.”
In working without a tape, we have to lay one angle-finder first on the
breech and then on the muzzle of the other gun; then taking the triangle
BCH as an isosceles triangle of very small apex, we calculate h , knowing
the length of our gun, from the formula
l = l
sin 0 sin (y — <j>) *
There is a special scale for solving this formula on the top of the roller.
Its general principle is similar to that of the scale on the body of the roller.
We have, in the course of the foregoing demonstration, made use of four
assumptions, none of which are strictly true, and from each of which an
error will consequently result.
These are : —
(1) That when in a triangle BAC, the apex A is directly opposite some
point in base, and the angle a is small, the length of the side
AB will be much the same, whether the triangle be isosceles or not.
(2) That when a is small
(3) That sin 2,00 = 10 sin 20.
(4) That the angles read by finders are the true base angles of the triangle
BAC.
We will first examine the errors produced by each of these assumptions
separately, and afterwards see how their combined result affects the range in
practice.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
45
With regard to the first assumption, since the points at which the
angle a is subtended by the base BC all lie in the arc BHAKC} therefore if
A
perpendiculars be drawn from B and C to meet the circumference again
in H and K, all points directly opposite the base BC, at which that base
will subtend an angle a} lie in the arc HAK .
Join BK, IIC; then their intersection will be G, the centre of the circle*
Join AG and produce it to L. Then BL is equal to LC, and the angles at L
are right angles*
By our method of working, our actual range taken is AB , and our shortest
possible range is IIB, our longest KB ; for it may be easily shewn that K
and K are the points in the arc HAK nearest to and furthest from B.
Hence the greatest error in excess we can have will be
Et&AB^HB
= BC 1
^ 2 * . a
sin —
- BC
COS Ct
sin a
BC /a, \
- ( COS -T- — cos a J
sm a \ 2 /
, , a n 9 a
BC 1+ cos- -2 cos*-
1 — cos2 ^
2 a /
C0S2V
_BC ( 1 + a cos |) (l — CQS |)
2 a / n
COS-.y 1_C0S2_
= X'(2 + ^|)^i
+ cos|
*31 3
46
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Now, this error will be greatest when cos ^ is least ; that is, when
= 100, its greatest value. Taking BC = 40 yds. ^-=100, we have
e = 1*31 yds., which is not sufficient to affect our elevation.
Tor our greatest error in defect we have
e = BK — AB>
_ BO_ _ 1 BC
~~ sin a 2 . a
sm-
2
BO
2
BC
2
cosl “cos2l
1 1 — cos |
cos ^ 1 + cos i
This also is greatest when ^ — 100.
Taking BC = 40 yds. = 100, we have e = *44 yds., which is not suffi¬
cient to affect our elevation.
We now proceed to consider the second cause of error.
In solving an isosceles triangle of known base and apex, the formula to
use is
r
sill a
Instead of this, we made sin - - = 1, and used the formula
2
h
sm a
This will give us an error,
e = 5 “ 2sin|)
i a
l-cos-
cos
a 1 „ a
W1-0032!
_b jl_ Z1 - 003 !
”2'cos“' l+«»£
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
47
This is greatest when ~ = 100.
Making b = 40 yds. ~ = 100, we have 0 = *43678 yds.
This error is too small to affect our elevation.
With regard to the third error, we find by actual reference to the tables,
that sin 200 = 9*99 sin 20 ; so that we should only have an error of 1 per
1000 if our roller could be graduated with perfect accuracy.
A
Our fourth error is that of assuming that the angles read by the finders
are the true base angles. This error is not at first sight very apparent, but
may be seen by reference to the above exaggerated diagram. When the
long telescopes are laid in the directions BA and CA , the red spots on the
paper discs will be at X and Z, ABX and ACZ being right angles. Our
short telescopes will consequently be laid in the directions BZ and CX, and
we shall have read the angles ABZ and ACX, giving us respectively as
errors CBZ and BCX, which we may call </> and
Draw AM perpendicular to BC. Let BAM = ^ + 0, CAM = - — 0t
Then
2?C£ = |-0S
CBX = 5 + 0\
Kf
48
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
Now, CX and BZ are the distances from the face of one angle-finder to
the pivot of the other, and this may be taken in practice as equal to the
base, or 40 yds., or 1440 ins. CZ and BX are the distance from the faces of
the angle-finders to their own pivots, equal to 3 ins.
Hence,
and therefore, as small angles vary as their sines.
Similarly,
9 480 \2 J
Y 480 \2 /
, 1
or we shall have an error of about two per thousand in our apex, and con¬
sequently in our range. This, again, is too little to affect our elevation.
Let us now assume a case, and see what will be the difference between
the sides of the triangle, as obtained by the calculating roller, and as
obtained by the ordinary method.
A
Let BC = 40 yds.
ABC = 35,82 a= 89° 83'
ACB = 35,46 = 88° 89'
71,28 178° 12'
.-. BAC = 72= 1° 48'
and will be read by the angle^finders
DIAGRAM I
rig. i.
Tig. 2.
DIAGRAM II.
Pig. 3.
Pig. 4.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
49
Prom tlie method employed by the finders we shall have
40
AC = AB =
sin 71*85
40
71*85
20
800
71*85
= 1275*9.
By the ordinary method we have
sin C
sin 20
114*593
AB = BC
— 40
AC— BC
sin^
sin 35,46
sin 72
sin B
1273*1 ;
sin A
_ 4Q sin 35,82 _ 1373.4_
sin 72
Here we see our error is less than 3 yds., but we cannot change our
elevation less than one minute, which, at 1275 yds., gives 6 J yds. ; hence
our range is practically exact.
It may often happen in the field that, owing to bad ground, the guns
cannot be drawn up so that the object is directly in front of the interval;
but as long as the object is not much to the flank, the ranges obtained by
the angle-finder will be sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes.
If the dressing of the guns is much oblique, it will be at once detected
by the steel limb of one finder running off the index.
*■
7
50
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE
EXAMINATION AND PROOF OF GUNPOWDER,
AS CARRIED ON AT THE ROYAL GUNPOWDER FACTORY, WALTHAM ABBEY.
CAPTAIN F. M. SMITH, K.A.
ASSISTANT SUPEEINTENDENT.
The examination and proof of new gunpowder, as now carried on at
Waltham Abbey, has for its object to ascertain : —
(1) If the powder have a proper colour ; a proper amount of glaze ;
a sufficiently hard and crisp texture ; and if it be free from dust and
perfectly clean.
(2) If it has been properly incorporated.
(3) If the grains be of the proper size and shape, and if the different
sizes of grains present be in the proper proportion.
(4) If the powder be of the proper density.
(5) If the action of the powder, when fired, be uniform and up to a
fixed standard.
(6) If it contain the proper proportion of the three ingredients ; and
(7) If it possess a sufficient power to withstand the absorption of
moisture.
The two latter points have hitherto been determined in the Chemical
Department, Eoyal Arsenal.
Each stoving of powder is proved separately. The stoving — that is,
the total amount taken out of the stoves each morning — is taken as the
unit, as it is the result of one day's work. The powder, therefore, of
which it is composed, has not only been made under exactly the same
conditions, but has been to a great extent intermixed throughout in
the granulating, dusting, and glazing processes, and is therefore prac¬
tically uniform.
Taking the various divisions of the proof seriatim : —
I. Colour ; glaze ; hardness and crispness ; and freedom from
Dust and foreign matters. — In the case of powder made at Waltham
Abbey, the above points would of course be well attended to in the
course of manufacture, and any variations in them would be checked at
the time, so that the finished powder would not be subjected to proof
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
51
till quite up to the standard in such particulars. But in the case of
powder supplied by contract, some description must be given of the way
such points are judged. The qualities enumerated can be judged by
eye and hand alone, and require of course a considerable amount of
experience to enable an observer to come to a trustworthy opinion.
(al) Colour . — The colour of finished powder depends on two points
principally — viz. first, the colour of the charcoal of which the powder has
been made ; and secondly, the amount of moisture that has been added
to the charges before leaving the incorporating mills. The more under**
burnt the charcoal is, the browner will be the powder. Some powders
made with very slack-burnt charcoal, have a very decidedly red tint,
which is easily detected on crushing the grains to dust. It is needless
to say that, as regards colour, the powder under examination must be
the same as the standard powder of the particular class to which it
belongs. Any great variations in the charcoal would no doubt be
detected in the subsequent processes of proof ; for powder made with
under-burnt charcoal will give a decidedly higher velocity to a bullet
than that made with a more highly burnt, and consequently denser
charcoal; and it will absorb moisture more readily than the latter.
Nevertheless, under-burnt charcoal appears to offer certain advantages
in small-arm powders ; so that the reader must remember that there is
no absolute rule to lay down — all examinations of the colour of powder
must be comparative. As regards the other point — the amount of
moisture which has been added to the charges in the mills — it is found
that when the charges are taken off the mill-beds with an excess of
moisture in them, and are subjected to pressure soon afterwards, the
resulting powder is harder and of a blacker colour than if made other-*
wise. If two powders, therefore, be found to be of equal density, and if
the one be blacker in colour and harder than the other, it has been
worked heavier ; that is, it has been taken off the mill -bed with a
greater amount of moisture in it. There is no test for hardness, which
can only be estimated by crushing the grain between the finger and the
thumb. A powder which has been worked with a great amount of
moisture, may be expected to give indifferent results when flashed;
but, practically, the differences which powders present in this respect
are seldom of any consequence.
(b.) Glaze. — Examination as to this point must also be comparative, as
must also be that for
(c.) Crispness and hardness of grain . — In these matters, experience is
the only safe guide. It must be remembered that it is not the pro¬
vince of the manufacturer to decide what is the best description of
powder to turn out, to what extent it shall be glazed, or what is the
proper amount of hardness that the grains should have. 8uch matters
are decided by the experimental committees, who, after trying various
powders submitted to them by the manufacturer, make choice of a
powder which fulfils best all that is required of it. Once the pattern
of powder — so to speak — has been settled, it is the manufacturers duty
to make all future issues as nearly identical in all points with the
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
pattern sample as possible. Therefore, as before remarked, all exa¬
mination of powder should be mainly a matter of comparison.
(d.) The quality of freedom from dust or foreign matters can be more
easily tested. All powders should be absolutely free from dust. The
only way to make sure of this, is to pour rapidly a quantity of the
powder from a bowl held two or three feet above the barrel, in a good
strong light. Even this simple operation requires a little practice to do
it dexterously, without spilling the powder over the floor of the examining-
room. If there be any loose dust, it will be readily detected. Powder
that is glazed with black-lead, should be perfectly free from loose
particles of the black-lead, and should in no case soil the fingers. The
presence of other foreign substances in powder, need not be alluded to
here, as none such could occur in new powder ; they are of common
enough occurrence, however, in returned powder.
II. Incorporation. — This is tested by “ flashing that is, by
burning a small quantity of the powder on a thick plate of glass.
8 ozs. of the powder are generally flashed. This quantity is put into a
small copper cylinder, resembling a thimble in shape, and the cylinder
is then inverted on the flashing plate. This provides for the particles of
the powder being always arranged in pretty nearly the same way — •
which is an all-important point in flashing. The decomposition of the
powder will be more thorough if it be thrown together in a small
conical heap, them if it be spread out in a thin layer on the plate ;
hence, when comparing two powders, they should be placed on the
flashing plates as nearly as possible under the same conditions.
If the powder be thoroughly and effectually incorporated, the small
charge placed on the plate will “ flash ” or puff-off when touched with
a hot iron, leaving only some smoke marks on the plate. A badly
incorporated powder will, on the other hand, leave specks of undecom¬
posed saltpetre and sulphur, and will therefore leave a dirty residue.
But the flashing test, though apparently most simple, is one which, like
the examination by eye and hand, requires experience to enable an
observer to form accurate judgments. Though a very badly incorporated
powder may be detected easily enough, it is by no means easy to judge
between two powders, both tolerably good, as to which has been most
thoroughly incorporated. Flashing should therefore be constantly
practised with all classes of powder; and it is useful to keep some
samples of specially bad powders (there are few foreign powders which
will not afford plenty of samples), to flash occasionally for comparison.
Powder which has once been subjected to damp, will be found to flash
very badly, no matter how carefully its incorporation may have been
performed. This arises from a partial solution of the saltpetre having
taken place, causing a consequent disturbance of incorporation.
III. Size, shape, and proportion oe the grains. — The shape of
the grains can, of course, be judged by the eye alone. The principal
point to observe is whether there be many elongated flat scales amongst
them. If this be the case, the powder will be rapid in its action, from
the much greater surface exposed to ignition, and therefore injurious to
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
53
all calibres of our modern artillery. The grains should be as compact
in shape as possible, approaching as nearly to the cube or sphere as
granulated powder can be expected to come.
The size and proportion of grain can be readily ascertained with the
sieve. The limits of size of each powder being known, all that is
required to decide if the powder be of the proper size, is to sift it on
the two sieves which define its size ; it must all pass the one, and all
be retained on the other. For example, if the powder be ft.L.G. — the
size of which is between a 4 and an 8 mesh — the powder, when
sifted on a 4 mesh sieve,* must all pass through it, and when placed
on an 8 mesh sieve, must all remain on it. We say all retained on it,
but practically a small quantity will always pass the lower size of sieve.
This arises from the fact that, in the granulating machines, the powders
are separated on sloping sieves, which do not allow the smaller particles
to pass through so easily as horizontal ones would. The quantity, how¬
ever, which passes should be very small; in the B.L.G., for instance,
it must not exceed one- sixteenth of the whole.
The sifting we have described, though it shows that the powder
is within the limits fixed for its size, does not however convey any
information as to the proportion of different sized grains contained in the
powder. To explain what is meant : — A sample of B.L.G. must
pass a 4 mesh and be retained on an 8 ; but the sample may either
consist entirely of grains just small enough to pass the 4 ; or, again,
of grains just large enough to he retained on the 8. In the first
case, the sample would consist entirely of large grains ; in the second,
entirely of small , the effect of which would be very different when fired.
Powder made in the granulating machine, generally presents a tolerably
regular gradation of sizes in the grain ; and it is the object of the proof
officer to discover if this gradation of grain be properly preserved in the
sample before him ; for too great a proportion of small grains may have
been either accidentally or purposely introduced. The sample must
therefore be sifted into the different sizes of grains of which it is com¬
posed. Thus, R.L.G. is sifted on a 4 mesh, a 6 mesh, and an 8 mesh;
and the proportion of grain retained on them should be as follows : —
t should he retained oil the 6 mesh.
4 a a 8 n
But, as said above, a small quantity will generally pass the 8 mesh,
which must not however exceed ^ of the whole quantity sifted.
If 1 lb. be sifted, it should therefore be distributed nearly as follows : —
ozs.
4 mesh to 6 mesh . 12
6 „ 8 „ . 3
Pass 8 „ . 1
Total . 16
* It is perhaps hardly necessary to say, that by a 4, an 8, a 16 mesh, &c. sieve, is intended a
sieve with 4, 8, or 16 divisions to the inch linear ; not 4j 8} or 16 openings in the square inch*
Thus, a 4 mesh sieve has 16 openings in the square inch; an 8, 64; a 16, 256; and so on*
54
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
It will not be necessary to describe the siftings of all powders. The
above will sufficiently explain tbe system followed.
IV. Density. — This is tbe most important quality of gunpowder,
and must therefore be accurately determined, which can only be done
by means of the mercury densimeter. The old gravimetric test — that
is, “ cubing” or weighing a cubic foot of the powder — gives a fair
indication of considerable variations in density, but may mislead, from
differences in shape and size of grain. It is, moreover, perfectly useless
to attempt to detect slight variations in density — variations which,
though slight in degree, yet exercise immense effect on the qualities of
the powder — by means of it. The cube-box is therefore no longer used
at Waltham Abbey, being entirely replaced by the densimeter, with
which the density of every pressing is ascertained before the manufac¬
ture of the powder is carried further.
The Densimeter.
The densimeter consists of a barometer-tube B, supported on a stout
metal stand JD, and having a cock E at the bottom, by means of which
it can be closed or opened. Attached to the top of it is a flexible tube
1 \ leading to the air-pump P, by means of which the air can be rapidly
exhausted from the barometer-tube. A glass globe, fitted at each end
with metal collars, on which again are screwed other collars provided
with stop-cocks f and g, can be attached to the bottom of the barometer-
tube, by means of a closely fitting screw. The lower collar of the globe
is provided with a nozzle, which dips into an iron bowl C, filled with
mercury. If then the lower cock g be kept closed, and the other ones
opened, the air can be exhausted from the barometer-tube and globe ;
and the lower cock being then opened, the mercury will rush in and fill
the globe, and continue to rise in the tube till it has attained the same
THE HOYAL AETILLEliY INSTITUTION.
55
height from the surface of the mercury left in the bowl as the column
in an ordinary barometer stands at the same time.
The process of taking the density of a sample of powder, is as
follows : — The air is first exhausted from the tube and globe, and the
mercury allowed to fill them. The upper and lower cocks of the globe
are then closed, the nozzle is screwed off, and the globe then un¬
screwed from the tube and weighed. This weight — the weight of the
globe full of mercury, which will of course vary with the specific gravity
of the mercury, which again varies with the temperature — is registered.
The globe is then emptied, and a definite weight of the powder
(generally 100 grammes), is introduced into it. It is then attached to
the barometer-tube, the air is exhausted, and the mercury allowed
to enter and to rise in the tube as before. The stop-cocks at each end
of the globe are provided with diaphragms — the lower one of wire gauze,
the upper one of chamois leather — which allow a free passage for the
mercury, but prevent any particle of powder being carried out of the
globe. As soon as the mercury has risen to the proper height, the
stop-cocks are again closed, the nozzle unscrewed, and the globe taken
off and again weighed. This second weight — that of the globe full of
mercury, plus the weight of the powder, and less the weight of the
volume of mercury displaced by it — is also registered.
The density of the powder is then calculated by the following
formula : —
D x 100
(P'-P) + 100 5
specific gravity of mercury at the time of experiment,
weight of globe, full of mercury and powder,
weight of globe, full of mercury alone,
weight of powder employed.
The specific gravity of mercury is
At 50° Tahr. ......
60° .
70° .
80° .
90° .
An actual example worked out is subjoined.
Grammes.
Weight of globe, full of mercury . 4188 = P'
„ „ mercury and powder ... 3434 = P
Difference . 704
Temperature at time of experiment 60° ; consequent specific gravity
of mercury 13*56 = D. Then
D x 100 = 1356*00
(P'-P) + 100 = 804.
804) 1356 (1*686 = Density required.
13*57
13*56
13*54
13*53
13*52
Density =
where D =
P =
P' =
100 =
56
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
V. Action of the gunpowder when fired. — This is decided by the
firing proof. It is of course impossible to predict, from observations
made with one gun, what the action of different charges of powder will
be in different calibres of guns. But this does not in any way affect
the accuracy of the firing proof now employed ; the only object of which
is to ascertain whether certain samples of powder, when fired in equal
charges and under the same conditions from the proof-gun, produce the
same effects as have been previously obtained with standard powder of
the same class. The present firing proof is not intended, and could not
be employed to decide what nature and charges of powder are suitable
for all arms, but is merely a means of comparing samples of powder with
the standard fixed by previous experiment. The powders made must
be not only identical in physical qualities, but must produce the same
results, when fired in equal charges and under the same conditions.
The firing proof now employed affords a very perfect means of com¬
paring the action of different powders. The old proof consisted in firing
a 68-pr. shot with a charge of 2 ozs. (3 ozs. in the case of R.L.Gf.) from
an 8-inch mortar, and comparing the ranges obtained. So much abuse
has recently been heaped on the old proof mortar, that it is perhaps
unnecessary to say anything on the subject. But it must be remembered
that its advocates did not intend it to be used for the purpose of com¬
paring the effects of different descriptions of powder, any more than the
supporters of the new proof make use of the perfect appliance at their
command for the same purpose ; but only for comparing various samples
of the same piowder with a standard. A proof mortar, if properly used,
would probably afford a rude but tolerably exact means of comparing
the strength of different samples of the same kind of powder. We say
probably ; because there are so many disturbing elements in the mortar-
proof, which were never properly eliminated, that it never received a
fair trial. Now, of course, such a trial would be useless, as far more
accurate and delicate means of proof are at our command.
The firing proof now in use at the Boyal Glunpowder Factory, consists
in measuring the velocity imparted to a projectile fired from a gun by
a fixed charge of the powder under examination. The two different
classes of powder — that is, powder for cannon and powder for small-
arms — are tested as nearly as possible under the conditions under which
they would be used; powders of the first class being tested in a 12-pr.
gun, those of the latter in a Snider-Enfield or Henry rifle.
The arrangements of the proof range are shown in the accompanying
figure.
. .V-dVYrA
- >
TV
~^.s7i=v~ q
< - ~ I2CLF7 ~ ^
1S.P*
The muzzle of the gun is 180 ft, from the face of the butt, The latter
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
57
is filled with loose sand, and has an opening at the side, to admit of
the 12 lb. projectiles being dug ont. The first wire screen or target is
45 ft. from the gun, there being a screen of wood between them, with a
hole for the passage of the shot. The second wire screen or target is
120 ft. from the first, and therefore 165 ft. from the muzzle of the gun,
and 15 ft. from the face of the butt. The gun used for proving powder
of the R.L.G. class, is a 12-pr. M.L. wrought-iron gun, with Whitworth
steel tube, rifled in three grooves ; rifling (1 turn in 25 calibres) and
vent special. It is used with 12-pr. shot (sometimes shot turned down
9 lbs. have been employed), and a 1 lb. charge.
The small-arms used are a Snider-Enfield and a Henry rifle ; both
fired with the service ammunition.
The chronoscope used is one of Le Boulenge's, and has recently been
so fully described in a separate pamphlet by Lieut. Charles Jones, It. A.,
Instructor in the Royal Cun Factories, that it is unnecessary to say
more on the instrument here. The results obtained with it are ex¬
cellent. Three shots are fired from each sample of cannon powder
subjected to proof, and from five to ten from each sample of small-arm
powder. The observations of velocity agree very closely. Indeed, it
may be predicted with tolerable safety, that if the powders fired have
been made of the same materials (particularly of the same description
of charcoal), under the same conditions, and are of equal density and
of equal size of grain, they will give very nearly the same velocities*
Any variation in density will tell at once.
YI. Analysis. — This is generally conducted under the superin¬
tendence of the Chemist of the War Department, in the Royal Arsenal.
Generally, a mixed sample from a number of stovings is submitted for
analysis, as it is unnecessary to analyse the work of every day. It
would be out of place here to enter into the details of the analysis, which
will be found fully discussed in various chemical works.
The quantity of moisture in the sample submitted is first of all ascer¬
tained, and the powder is then analysed. The process is a very simple
one, and may be readily performed by any one— first, by dissolving
out the saltpetre^ keeping up the process till the water which passes
through the residue shows no trace of a deposit when evaporated, and
taking special precaution against loss of charcoal in filtering; and
secondly, by dissolving out the sulphur from the dried residue with
bi-sulphide of carbon. The three ingredients can thus be separated
and weighed.
The proportion of ingredients which should be found in the gun¬
powder made at Waltham Abbey, is nearly- —
Saltpetre . 75*248
Charcoal . 14*850
Sulphur . 9*900
The excess of saltpetre is due to the fact that it has been for many
years the practice to put in \ lb. extra to every 50 lb. charge which
goes to the incorporating mill, to guard against loss in manufacture*
8
58
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
But in almost every instance, the charcoal will be found a little below,
and the sulphur a little above the figures given ; probably caused by
the fact that charcoal always contains a certain quantity of moisture,
for which no allowance is made when weighing out the ingredients.
The question as to the best proportion of the ingredients, is one which
cannot be too soon taken up by the Committee on Explosives.
VII. Hygroscopic test.— This, like the analysis, has recently been
conducted in the Chemical Department. It consists merely in subjecting
dried specimens of powder to a damp atmosphere, in a closed box, kept
at a uniform temperature, and weighing them at regular intervals, to
ascertain the rapidity with which they absorb moisture. Powders are
found to vary very much in this respect. Generally speaking, a hard
texture is unfavourable to absorption; a highly burnt charcoal also
renders the powder less absorbent of moisture than a less burnt, and
consequently less dense one. As a rule, contract powder — of which the
charcoal is generally under-burnt — absorbs about twice as much as
Waltham Abbey powder. The density of the powder affects the results
to a considerable extent — at least with black charcoal powder, the
absorbing power of which is diminished as its density is increased ; but
the comparatively high absorbing power imparted to the powder by
red charcoal, is little if at all reduced by an increase of density. The
quality of non-absorption of moisture, is of course a most important one
for powders to possess.
Having now gone over all the proofs to which gunpowder is subjected,
it may be as well to show the form in which the results of examination
and proof are recorded at Waltham Abbey.
The following is a copy of the heading of the proof-book of R.L.G.
powder, with an entry. Similar books are kept for all other powders : —
Proof of P.L.G ., manufactured at Waltham Alley .
Date of
stoving.
No. of barrels
in stoving.
Remarks on
flashing.
Sifting of 16 lbs.
Density.
Analysis;
In 100 parts of dry powder.
Moisture;
4 to 6
6 to 8
pass 8
Saltpetre.
Sulphur.
Charcoal.
-
35
very clean
lb. oz.
12 2
lb. oz.
3 10
lb. oz.
0 4
1*680
75*51
10*01
14*48
0*90
( Continued .)
Thermo*
Velocity of 121b. shot at
Date of
firing proof.
1
meter.
105'. Charge lib.
4)
8*1
Remarks.
g
*4
1 Wet
bulb.
cS
n
1
2
3
Mean.
S £
-
30'*12
60° j
1 60°
ft.
1002
ft.
1000
ft.
1007
ft.
1003 '
’ 1007*8
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
59
As all new powder has the date of stoving painted on the barrel heads,
and as every barrel in a stoving is also numbered, it follows that the
fullest information can at any moment be had respecting any barrel of
powder issued from Waltham Abbey, about which any complaint or
correspondence may arise. But, from the great care now taken to
manufacture powder of uniform density, and owing to the severe and
searching tests to which it is subjected, there is little chance of any
complaint being made as to the quality of the powder which will in
future be issued from the Boyal Gunpowder Factory.
60
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
ENGLISH GUNS AND FOREIGN CRITICS.’
BY
CAPTAIN VIVIAN DERING MAJENDIE, R.A.,
ASSISTANT SUPKBINTENDENT, EOYAL LABOBATOEY.
Du choc des opinions jaillit la lumiere.
I.
Introductory.
In 1868 some interesting gunnery experiments took place at Tegel, near
Berlin. The object of these experiments was ostensibly to determine on the
pattern of heavy rifled gun to be adopted for the Prussian iron-clads.
They were, however, undertaken and conducted under peculiar circumstances.
The Prussian Artillery Committee, which, like our own Director of Artillery's
Department, is charged with the experimental trial and final selection of the
1 1. “A critical Comparison of the Prussian cast-steel Breech-loading Rifled Guns of large calibre,
and the English ‘ Woolwich’ Muzzle-loading Rifled Guns,” on the basis of the experiments at Tegel
in the year 1868. By C. von Doppelmair, Captain in the Imperial Russian Horse Guard Artillery.
From the 2nd No. of the “Russian Artillery Journal” for 1869. Translated by G. H. Penton.
London : Read, Brooks, & Co. 1870.
2. “ A comparison of Erupp’s Breech-loaders with the Armstrong Muzzle-loaders, with reference
to their use at sea.” By W. Wilhelmi, Lt.-Col. in the Imperial Russian- Austrian Marine Ordnance
Corps. London : Read, Brooks, & Co. 1868.
3. “ Comparative Gunnery Experiments with heavy Muzzle and Breech-loaders at Berlin, 1868.”
Fried. Erupp, Essen, Prussia, and 11 New Broad Street, London. London: Read, Brooks, & Co.
1868.
4. “ On the trials in the Prussian Artillery in the course of the Summer and Autumn of 1868
with the 9-inch Armstrong gun, and with the 96-pr. and 72-pr. steel guns by Erupp.” Article in
" Invalide Russe,” January 30, 1869.
6. “ Remarks of the firm Erupp, in Essen, regarding the bursting of a steel 72-pr. at the trials
in Berlin.”
6. “ Erupp and Armstrong.” Translated from “ Archiv fur Seewesen.” Vienna, Feb. 1869.
7. “ A criticism of Col. Wilhelmi’s ‘ Comparison of Erupp and Armstrong.’ ” Translation of
articles in “Neue Militar Zeilung,” February and May, 1869.
8. “ The North German Navy, &c.” Translation of article in the “ Wehr Zeitung” of Feb. 20,
1869.
9. “ Bursting of a Erupp cast-steel 72-pr.” Translation of article in the “Wehr Zeitung ” of
Feb. 17, 1869.
10. “ From the age of Iron into the age of Bronze.” Translation of article in “ Neue freie
Presse ” of Jan. 22, 1869.
11. “ Canons de Marine et de Cotes.” Paris : Broise, Rue de Dunkerque, No. 43.
12. “ Trial of an .11-inch Erupp’s Cast-steel Breech-loading Gun, fired against the Hercules’
shield in Russia.” Translated from the “ Russian Artillery Journal,” No. 12, 1869. London :
Read, Brooks, & Co.
13. “ Report of a trial with a 9-inch Breech-loading Cast-steel Cannon, made by Fried. Erupp,
Essen.” London : Read, Brooks, & Co.
14. “ Recent experiments with Heavy Rifled Guns in Russia.” Translated from the “ Russian
Military Journal,” in “ Proceedings Royal Artillery Institution,” Vol. V. p. 59.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
61
naval guns, as well as of those for land service, had already expressed
themselves strongly in favour of Krupp's breech-loaders. This was not
surprising. The name of Krupp stands deservedly high all over Europe as
a manufacturer of steel, including steel guns, of great excellence ; in Prussia
it is more than a name— -it is a power. National prejudices, national vanity,
and material interests of various descriptions all enlist themselves on the
side of the great steel manufacturer of Essen. An instinctive preference on
the part of Prussian officers for Prussian guns to those of English production
is natural, and it is unnecessary to seek for more recondite explanations of
the bias in favour of the Krupp system, which, at the outset of the Tegel
trials undoubtedly prevailed in the War Ministry of Berlin. But in Prussia,
as in England, the Admiralty and War Office are not always in perfect
agreement on the question of naval ordnance; and it happened that in
this instance the Prussian Marine Department were desirous of seeing the
efficiency of the Krupp guns established upon some more substantial basis
than was afforded by the mere expressed preference of the Prussian War
Ministry, or by the comparatively limited practical experience of these
weapons to which those who favoured them were able to appeal.
With regard to the preference of the Prussian War Ministry for Krupp
guns, it is to be noticed that the experiments with these weapons as armour-
piercing guns had up to that time been limited to the penetration of iron plates
4 1 ins. thick, and as Captain von Doppelmair observes, “ The question of guns
intended to attack iron-clads was not solved by this result."1 Of the nature
and extent of the practical experience of Krupp's guns then available, we
shall speak more fully hereafter. It will be sufficient for the moment to
observe that at the time when the Prussian naval authorities were pressing
for a trial of some other system of ordnance in comparison with the Krupp,
no European nation, except the Russians, had adopted the Krupp system on a
large scale. Austria had a few 8-inch Krupp guns ; she had four times as
many Armstrong 7-inch guns. The Spanish iron-clads were armed with
Armstrong guns. Italy had English guns ; Prance had French guns ;
Sweden had Swedish guns; Norway, Denmark, and Holland had Armstrong
guns; Turkey, Egypt, and Greece were fast arming with English guns.
Finally, even Prussia herself had not ventured upon the formal adoption of
Krupp' s guns. Two or three breech-loading Krupps had been placed on
board the Prussian men-of-war, with this result — that the Prussian navy
were crying out for muzzle-loaders and another system. Under these
circumstances, the anxiety of the Prussian naval authorities to obtain some
more complete and satisfactory assurance of the suitability of Krupp's
ordnance for the Prussian iron-clads appears intelligible.
Intelligible or not, that anxiety existed and was expressed to the extent
of inducing the Prussian War Ministry to sanction a full trial of some
Krupp guns, and to pit against these guns a representative of the
“ Woolwich muzzle-loading system." A 9-inch l^J-ton “ Woolwich"
gun, made by Sir William Armstrong, was purchased of the Elswick firm
for the purposes of this trial, for £1500. A supply of projectiles and
English powder was purchased, and the gun was to be required to adhere
Doppelmair, p. 1,
62
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
rigidly to the English service conditions ; that is to say, to fire 2501b.
Palliser projectiles, with 431b. battering charges of “rifle large grain”
powder.
It is hardly necessary to observe that for a competitive trial between two
systems of ordnance, the object of which is the selection of one of those
systems, the weights and calibres of the guns should be exactly the same ;
and whatever variation is permitted to one gun in respect of those elements
which go to make up ballistic conditions — such as wTeight of shot and
charge, description of powder, nature and form of projectiles — the same
variations should be permitted to, and in certain cases imposed upon, the
other. If, however, the object be to discover whether a given service
system furnishes as powerful and useful a weapon as another given service
system, it is permissible, of course, to place two dissimilar guns in com¬
petition. If it is desired, for example, to measure the relative merits of the
armament of a particular English and the armament of a particular Russian
iron- clad, it is proper to take from each ship one representative gun as it
stands, with its charges, projectiles, carriages, and fittings.
In this case, no departure from, or slightest variation of, the service con¬
ditions should be permitted.
We recognise, therefore, two distinct classes of experiments : —
(1) Competitive trials, which have for their object the determination
of the relative merits of abstract systems ; the determination, for example,
of the relative merits for naval purposes of wrought-iron muzzle-loading
rifled guns and steel breech -loading rifled guns. Eor the purposes of such
trials, the competing guns should obviously be placed throughout the
competition on exactly equal terms in respect of weight, calibre, charge, &c.
(2) Comparative trials between definite embodiments of particular systems,
such as trials between any two given service guns, the details of which are
fixed and fully adopted.
In both classes of experiments, two things should be observed. Eirst,
if the trial is to be complete and conclusive, the comparison must be made
at all points, as to range, accuracy, ballistic power, shell power, handiness,
endurance, safety, price. Secondly, if the results are to carry weight and
conviction, the trial must be conducted by an impartial body — a body im¬
partial either in the sense of being composed of men absolutely free from
bias and judicially disposed, or of men confessedly partisans, and repre¬
senting the contending interests with equal force on opposite sides.
The object of the Prussian trials having been stated to be the selection
of a heavy rifled gun to be supplied to the Prussian iron-clads, these
experiments obviously belong to the first of the above classes, and should
therefore have been made with two guns, which in weight, calibre, charge,
&c., were equal. As a matter of fact, however, the Prussians brought against
the English muzzle-loading 9-inch 12|-ton gun, a Krupp breech-loader of
9J ins.1 calibre, which weighed 14 \ tons,2 and was 32 ins.3 longer in the
1 The exact figures are 235*4 millimetres = 9*26 ins.
2 The exact weight is 14,700 kilogrammes — 14 tons, 9 cwt. 7 qrs.
3 The exact measurements are ; Krupp, 4*002 metres = 157*56 ins. ; Woolwich, 3*188 metres
= 125*61 ins.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
63
bore than the English gun. The price of the Prussian gun was £3450 ;
that of the English gun, as before stated, was £1500. With regard
to the charge and projectile, the same inequality prevailed. Against
the 2501b. Palliser projectiles, and 431b. charges, the Prussian gun
fired projectiles which weighed variously from 211 lbs. up to 336 lbs., with
charges from 43 lbs. to 53 lbs. — principally the latter; against chilled iron
shot, were brought into competition both chilled iron and steel ; while the
English test for endurance was carried out with the brisante E.L.G. powder,
the Prussian test was made with the mild Eussian prismatic powder.1
Purther, this powder strain was largely increased by the use in the English
gun of a forward vent, as against the Prussian rear vent.2
The English gun was placed at an important disadvantage in another
respect. While the Krupp was allowed repeatedly to vary not merely its
charge and its shot, but even the details, the form and the method of lead
attachment; while we find it raising its charge from 43. lbs. to 49 Jibs.,
and again to 53 lbs. ; reducing its projectiles from 336 lbs. to 292 lbs., and
again to 279 lbs.; reducing the lead coating from 63 lbs. to 28 lbs. ;
removing the lead coating altogether, and substituting lead rings ; abandon¬
ing the rings, and reverting to a lead jacket attached by the English service
process; abandoning Prussian powder for Eussian prismatic powder;
altering the length and diameter of the head of the shot ; increasing the
initial velocity by a combination of these various devices from 11 15 *3 to
1413 ft. per second ; substituting a new breech wedge for one which had
become injured when a few rounds of English powder were fired, and
twice cutting out incipient fissures which had appeared about the vent — no
change whatever was permitted in the English gun.
In fact, while we find the Prussian gun feeling its way during the trials,
step by step, to the successful development of its full power, taking advan¬
tage of and applying on the spot the experience which the experiments
afforded, and making any change which might be deemed likely to prove
favourable to its efficiency, the English weapon was rigidly pinned down to
its one charge of 43 lbs. of “ poudre brutale,” its 250 lb. Palliser projectile.
1 The strain exerted by R.L.Gr. has been estimated by the Prussians at about 6000 atmospheres,
and that exerted by Russian prismatic at only about 3000 atmospheres.
The following table gives the figures deduced by the Prussians from some trials which were
made at Essen : —
Nature of $un.
Charge.
Shoti
Velocity.
Pressure in
atmospheres
Nature of powder.
Russian 9-in. gim. — Calibre, 9 ins. ;
length of powder space, 30’ 25 ins. ;
diameter of powder space, 9*33 ins. ;
length of rifling, 112 ins. 5 length
of twist, 540 ins.
IBs.
43
43
43
43
46
46
lbs.
275
275
275
275
275
275
ft.
1160
1172
1270
1260
1230
1320
3170
3160
3070
5950
2050
3070
Prussian gunpowder,
a »
Ritter prismatic.
English R.L.G-.
Belgian powder.
Russian prismatic.
Whatever may be the exact figures which represent the relative destructiveness of the English
powder as compared with the prismatic, the far greater violence of action of the former is fully
admitted by artillerists of every nation.
2 Everyone acquainted with the subject will readily appreciate this difference.
64
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
its one forward vent, and subjected to no repair or renewal of any description.
Indeed, so numerous wrere the alterations in the Prussian gun, that in the
course of the trials almost every feature of the original combination became
altered, and from firing a heavy, thickly-leaded, obtuse-headed shot with a
low charge of comparatively rapid powder, the gun came to fire light thinly-
leaded sharp -pointed projectiles with high charges of superior powder ; the
breech arrangement and system of venting having meanwhile also undergone
reconstruction and repair.
If under these circumstances the Prussian gun had largely surpassed the
English gun in penetrative effect and other qualities, such a result would
hardly have afforded justification for any very marked expression of satis¬
faction on the part of those who were favourable to the Prussian system.
If one gun is pitted against another which is bigger and longer and one-
sixth heavier, which fires charges nearly one-fourth heavier, and projectiles
generally from one-eighth to one-third heavier, and which, according to the
estimates of its own maker, has a resulting theoretical superiority of power
of from 30 to 33 per cent.,1 and if the heavy gun beats the lighter gun,
does that prove that the system which the heavy gun represents is superior
to the system which the light gun represents? But if, in the event, the
heavy gun barely succeeds in holding its own against the lighter gun, what
shall then be said of attempts to deduce from the trials a conclusion
favourable to the heavier weapon ?
And this is exactly what happened. The relations of the two com¬
peting guns at Tegel were as we have stated them. The result, broadly
expressed, was — as will presently appear — that the Krupp gun barely held
its own — if indeed it did that — against the English gun. And yet, since
the Tegel trials, pamphlet after pamphlet, article after article have appeared,
setting forth, on the basis of those trials, the superiority, not merely of a
particular Krupp gun to a particular English gun, but of the Krupp steel
breech-loaders generally to the English wrought-iron muzzle-loaders. The
“ Woolwich” system has been tried at Tegel and found inferior to the
Prussian system ; muzzle-loaders are inferior to breech-loaders ; wrought-iron
is inferior to steel; English projectiles are inferior to Krupp's steel shell;
English chilled iron is inferior to Gruson's ; English powder is inferior to
[Russian ; the English system of venting is inferior to the Prussian system of
venting. In fact, on the basis of these Tegel trials, the English system of
heavy rifled ordnance has been subjected, comprehensively and in detail, to
an amount of destructive foreign criticism which is probably unexampled.
That it should have suggested itself to so many foreign critics — to Prussians,
and Austrians, and Russians^ — to erect a structure of this character and extent
upon such a foundation as the Tegel experiments, is remarkable; that it
should have seemed to them possible or probable that when erected it would
have any sort of stability, or be otherwise than as a pyramid standing
upon its point, is almost inconceivable. But the fact remains — the criticism
1 See Mr. Krupp’s pamphlet, “ Comparative Gunnery Experiments,” Table III., where the
“energy” or theoretical penetrative power of the two guns is given as 16£ to 16f metre-tons per
centimetre of the shell’s circumference for the Prussian guns, against 12,35 metre-tons for the
English gun.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
65
is there ;l and the phenomenon is sufficiently curious to invite investigation.
On approaching the object of our investigation, a great part of the
difficulty disappears ; we discover that the effect produced is, in a great
measure, an optical illusion, which is obtained on the principle which has
been ingeniously applied to the production of a popular toy, known as the
“ wheel of life,” where a number of fixed figures in various postures, or
gradations of the same posture, become blended by rapid revolution, when
seen through openings prepared for the purpose, into an appearance of a
single figure, accomplishing a definite result. And those who would have
us believe, on the evidence of the Tegel trials, that the English system of
heavy rifled ordnance is inferior to the Prussian, are aware that their only
hope lies in skilfully mixing up things which have no necessary connection
with one another — in confusedly blending together metal and breech
mechanisms, long bores and prismatic powder, steel projectiles and steel
guns, and thus producing an appearance of certain results accomplished by
a definite system of ordnance, which has been elaborated into a symmetrical
whole by Krupp of Essen; a system so homogeneous that no separation of its
component parts is possible. When all the points which tell in favour of
the English guns — such as the destructive character of the powder which
they fire, their less weight, as well as that of their charges and projectiles,
to say nothing of the less cost of the system — are artfully kept in the
background, or shown, if at all, only in shadow, it is not difficult to
understand how, even from the Tegel trials, it may be possible to deduce
conclusions apparently destructive of the English system of ordnance.
It follows from the above, that if we would assess the true value of this
foreign criticism of our English guns, we must examine it in close and
critical detail. The very circumstance that, unless so examined, it is liable
to produce an erroneous impression and to lead to conclusions opposed to
the fact, renders it desirable that some one should undertake the task.
Pamphlets such as those of Captain von Doppelmair, and Lt.-Col. Wilhelmi
— officers of the Russian and Austrian services — -and published with a certain
parade of professional, if not official sanction, carry weight with those who
only read them superficially, or who are not familiar with the facts which
furnish an effective answer to the various conclusions which the writers
have endeavoured to establish. Without inquiring how many of those who
read these pamphlets belong to this class, we may reasonably assume that a
large proportion of professional readers will want the time necessary to read
these pamphlets critically, while non -professional and foreign readers can
hardly be expected to have that intimate acquaintance with the details of
the question without which an intelligent examination of those criticisms is
impossible. The pamphlet of Captain von Doppelmair appears on several
accounts to be the one which it is most important to consider. In the first
place, the paper is a more recent, a more comprehensive, and a far more
able pamphlet than that of Lt.-Col. Wilhelmi; in the second place, Lt.-Col.
Wilhelmfis pamphlet has been very effectively and completely answered by
a writer in the (( Neue Militar Zeitung ;” lastly, Captain von DoppelmaiEs
1 The extent and variety of this criticism are in some degree indicated by the names of the
pamphlets and articles of which it is in part composed, which are printed at the beginning of this
paper.
9
66
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OE
pamphlet is perhaps the most remarkable example which could be selected
of that system of skilfully blending together things not necessarily connected,
so as to produce an appearance which is wholly artificial, of keeping out of
sight inconvenient facts and considerations, and of assigning undue prom¬
inence to others, which is characteristic, more or less, of the whole of the
foreign remarks on these trials which we have read. It is also a good
example of the insufficiency of the information out of which men may be
tempted to construct a theory favourable to a particular view. We shall,
therefore, proceed to examine the account of the Tegel trials as given by
Captain von Doppelmair, supplying, as we proceed, such comments and
omissions as may occur to us ; rectifying such errors as we may observe ;
disentangling, as far as may be possible, the issues which Captain von
Doppelmair has contrived to confuse ; and, finally, observing how far the
facts warrant the conclusions at which that officer has arrived.
II.
Comparative Penetrative Power of the Woolwich and Krupp Guns .
Captain von Doppelmair commences his pamphlet with a description of
the competing Krupp and Woolwich guns. We have already given the
principal weights and dimensions of these weapons; but the more detailed
information contained in Captain von Doppelmair^s pamphlet may be useful.1
Krwpps 9 \-inch Gun.
Calibre . 235*4 millimetres
Length of bore . 4*002 metres
i, rifled part . 2*929 „
Total length of gun . 4*708 »
Number of grooves . 32
Greatest outside diameter . 1020 millimetres
Weight of gun2 . 14650 kilos.
Woolwich 9-inch Gun.
Calibre . 228*6 millimetres
Length of bore . 3*188 metres
a rifled part . 2*642 «
Total length of gun3 . 3*962 «
Number of grooves . 6
Greatest outside diameter . 991 millimetres
Weight of gun . 13100 kilos.
9*26 ins.
157*56 «
115*40 „
185*31 „
40*18 „
14a9<M> tons*
9*0 ins.
125*51 „
103*98 /,
154*23 «
39*016 /,
12f£$ tons.
It will be observed that the maximum battering charge adopted for the
Krupp guns at the outset was 46*30 lbs. of Prussian powder; and it is
important to notice this, because it will hereafter become necessary to
observe how far this condition was departed from when the inability of the
Krupp gun to hold its own became apparent. With this charge and a
1 Doppelmair, pp. 2, 14.
2 With breech-piece (weight of breech-piece, 600 kilos.)
3 With cascable.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
67
projectile of 336 lbs., an initial velocity of 1140 ft. per second was obtained.
The English maximum charge was 43 lbs. of B.L.G. powder, and this
charge was never increased or varied during the trials.
Three shields, the plates for which had been obtained from Sir J. Brown,
of Sheffield, had been erected for the purpose of the experiment, representing
ships' broadsides covered with 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9-inch plates. No. 1 shield,
which represented the broadside of the Prussian “ Eriedrich Karl," consisted
of 6-inch plates upon a backing similar in general features to the well-
known composite, Chalmers' backing. Over the upper part of the target
a 5-inch plate was substituted for the 6-inch. No. 3 target, which repre¬
sented the broadside of the “Konig Wilhelm," was similar to No. 1, but
stronger, the lower plate being 9 ins. and the two top plates 8 ins. thick*
Both shields had a stout iron skin at back. No. 2 target consisted of
7 -inch armour upon 30 inches of wood backing, without any iron struts or
strengthening.
The practice against the shields was commenced on March 31, 1868, by
the Krupp gun firing 46*30 lb. charges, and both Gruson's and Krupp's
steel projectiles. Out of 7 rounds, only 4 struck the target without
ricochetting p a result which, at ranges of 1028 and 782 yds*, is hardly
compatible with Captain von Doppelmair's statement, that the Krupp gun
had “ a very satisfactory accuracy."3 The result of this trial, as far as
penetration went, was very unsatisfactory. Even the 6 -inch shield was not
completely penetrated — a failure which is attributed to the shot having
" struck on a particularly strong place."8 However this may be. Captain
von Doppelmair frankly admits that the Prussian gun “ would have proved
too weak against ships with 7, 8, and 9-inch plating, not only at great but
also at smaller distances. The result of the trial consequently was, that the
gun was not sufficiently powerful to fulfil the conditions under which the
trial was held, and therefore could not satisfy the requirements of coast and
marine artillery."4 This result occasioned, as may easily be understood, the
keenest mortification in Prussia. The established power of the English guns
was already well known to be largely in excess of that which the representative
Prussian gun had exhibited.
Something must be done — and three expedients were proposed. The
charge might be increased ; some of the lead coating might be removed, so
as to facilitate the passage of the shot through the bore; or a quicker
powder might be employed. So we find the Prussians increasing their
charge from 46 lbs. to 49J lbs., then to 53 lbs., and again to 55 lbs. of
Prussian powder; the velocities being thus increased to 1151*6, 1170*9,
and 1184*7 ft. per second. But with heavier charges than 49J lbs. the
accuracy, fortunately perhaps for the endurance of the guns, began to
diminish, and it was therefore decided to continue the trials with this charge
as a maximum.6 The proposed reduction in the lead coating was not
attended with advantage, either as regards velocity or accuracy, and it was
not adopted.6 Then came an experiment which is worthy of particular
attention. An attempt was made to improve the velocity by employing
1 Doppelmair, pp. 7, 8.
4 Ibid. p. 9.
2 Ibid. p. 6.
5 Ibid. p. 11.
3 Ibid. p. 8.
6 Ibid. p. 12
68
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
English powder. A few rounds were fired of R.L.G. powder in charges of
43 lbs., and with this result — that the breech mechanism was broken,1 2 and
the use of English powder was hurriedly abandoned. The breech action
was renewed, and the construction improved.3 The significance of this
effect of a few rounds of English powder upon the Prussian gun, we shall
have occasion again to refer to.
At this point the English gun came upon the scene, and, in the trial
which followed, it is admitted that it “ evinced a considerable superiority
over the Prussian gun for use against armour plates;”3 while the com¬
parison of the Prussian and English projectiles led to “ several necessary
alterations in the previous construction ” of the former.4
Before proceeding to record the results of these trials, it is necessary to
correct one or two errors into which Captain von Doppelmair has fallen at
this part of his narrative. Exception might be taken to the expression that
the escape-hole in the Woolwich guns is provided “to prevent unexpected
bursting,” as tending to convey an erroneous impression of the general
behaviour of the guns. But a more decided objection must be made to the
statement that “the selection of this energetic powder (R.L.G.) for the
English 9-inch gun was necessary in order to obtain high initial velocities
with the comparatively short length of the gun.”5 This passage is incorrect
in two important particulars. It is incorrect because it implies that this
powder was deliberately selected for use with our heavy rifled guns ; it is
also incorrect because it states that such a powder is “ necessary ” for those
guns. This double error will be found running all through Captain von
Doppelmair* s pamphlet.6 The same error underlies the remarks of other
critics,7 and it is important to correct it, because if admitted, it points to
this conclusion — that whatever advantages the Prussian guns may derive
from the use of a slower and milder powder, in respect of decreased strain
upon the gun with increased charges and initial velocities, reduced scoring
of the bore, &c., those advantages cannot be enjoyed by the English guns,
which are too short to use a slow powder effectively. In fact, we have here
a good illustration of the system on which we have remarked of blending
together things not necessarily connected, in a way to produce an effect
favourable to the Krupp and unfavourable to the Woolwich gun. More¬
over, as will presently appear, while our system gets the discredit of
employing a brisante powder, it nowhere gets the credit which attaches to
1 This result may be best given in Captain von Doppelmair’s own words : — “ After the termina¬
tion of this firing, two cracks appeared in the hollow turned out in the wedge for the obturating
plate. Whether these cracks had been already started by the previous firing, or were exclusively
the effect of employing the English powder, could not be decided. But these cracks, as well as a
crack that had previously appeared in the female screw of the breech of the Prussian gun, the
bending of the obturating plate, and of the metal of the wedge behind it, induced the determination
to renounce the use of descriptions of powder of rapid combustion and more destructive effect.” —
Doppelmair, p. 13.
2 Doppelmair, p. 13, note. 3 Ibid. p. 13.
4 Doppelmair, p. 13. Compare this statement with that at p. 79, that Gruson’s works "had
determined the shape and construction of these projectiles on which their depth of penetration
depends.”
5 Doppelmair, p. 15. 6 See, for example, Doppelmair pp. 24, 62.
7 See Krupp’s pamphlet, p. 3.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
69
its use, as in the endurance of the increased strain which this powder
imposes, and in the less uniformity of the granulated powder.1 To avoid,
however, breaking the narrative of the Tegel trials, we reserve the full dis¬
cussion of this important subject; contenting ourselves with recording, in
passing, an emphatic contradiction of the correctness of the statement quoted
above, which seeks to establish the existence of a necessary and indissoluble
connection between English guns and a violently destructive powder.
Eurther, we must object incidentally to Captain von Doppelmair’s con¬
venient desire to disregard the trials which were made at this time for
accuracy with the “ Woolwich*” gun, and which he admits were “perfectly
satisfactory,”2 on the grounds that, “ as only four rounds were fired, we
cannot draw from them a conclusion as to the accuracy of the Woolwich
system.”3
We now come to the account of the trials of June 2, 1868. Eour rounds
were fired from the Woolwich gun — one at the 6 -inch plates, two at the
7-inch plates, and one at the 8-inch plates. “These projectiles struck the
targets at undamaged places, and went right through them.”4
Two rounds were fired from the Krupp — both with Gruson's projectiles,
and 46-30 lb. charges. One of these projectiles struck and penetrated the
5 -inch target, though why it was fired at this target at all is not very clear.
The other struck the 8-inch plate, pierced the plate, and went 190 milli¬
metres (Krupp says 229 millimetres) into the wood backing,5 and remained
sticking in the target. “The result of this trial, as well as that of March 31,
was, therefore, that the English 9-inch Woolwich rifled muzzle-loader gun
was considerably superior to the Prussian 9j-inch6 rifled breech-loader gun
as regards execution done to armour-plated shields. Krupp's and Gruson's
9i-inch7 rifled breech-loader projectiles only just pierced the 6-inch target,
and were entirely powerless against shields with 7 -inch and 8-inch plates.
The Palliser shells pierced all the shields completely.”8
Considering that the Prussian gun was now firing charges 3^ lbs. heavier
than those originally assigned to it,9 with a resulting increase of initial
velocity from 1115 to 1130ft. per second, and that the gun was now
therefore decidedly more powerful than it would have been if the Prussian
navy had blindly accepted it, as first proposed, without trial ; considering
also, that, after some months' manipulation, the Prussians had been only able
to get the gun up to the point of exhibiting a lamentable inferiority to a
1 Captain yon Doppelmair’s description of the English powder is also incorrect. He asserts that
resin is used in glazing it ; and elsewhere he tells us that this powder burns more rapidly and is
more violent in its action in warm weathei*, because the resin becomes detached (pp. 14, 26). As a
matter of fact no resin is employed.
2 Doppelmair, p. 15. 3 Ibid. p. 15.
4 Ibid. p. 16. We notice, in passing, that Captain von Doppelmair’s record of this experiment
enables us to correct an error in one of the tables in Mr. Krupp’s pamphlet, in which the perform¬
ance of the English gun is erroneously credited to the Krupp gun. — Krupp, Table II. Round 2,
column of effects.
5 Krupp, Table II. Round 2, column of effects.
6 In Captain von Doppelmair’s pamphlet, this gun is spoken of as a “ 96-pr. but this nomen¬
clature (which is that commonly used in Prussia, and which refers to the size of the bore in
relation to the weight of spherical shot which it would fire), being liable to confuse, the calibre
of the gun has been substituted.
7 See note next above.
8 Doppelmair, p. 16.
9 Ibid. p. 11.
70
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
smaller, lighter, cheaper weapon, it is not surprising that the result, while
it amply justified the action of the Prussian Naval Department, and saved
it from the fate which had overtaken the Russians — who had already
embarked largely in these guns — should have occasioned considerable
disappointment and annoyance in Prussia. The resignation of the Presidency
of the Prussian Artillery Committee by General Neuman — one of the most
distinguished of continental artillerists, who had more or less guided the
labours of the Committee for thirty years— -marks at least his view of the
completeness of the failure.
What was the cause of this failure ? Captain von Doppelmair answers
the question. The initial velocity was too low. The lead jacket was too
thick. The form and dimensions of the projectiles were unsatisfactory.1
These defects must be remedied, and in applying the remedies the
Prussians necessarily at each point approximated the main features of
their system nearer to those of the English system. With regard to
the increase in initial velocity, the passing admission of Captain von
Doppelmair, that “ high initial velocities had not been looked upon
as particularly necessary in experiments with guns intended for firing
against iron ships,”3 implies that the Prussians had a good deal to
learn when they entered upon this competition. But the readiness with
which they now copied each detail of the English system, relieves them
from the reproach of being slow to learn. We have seen that it
had been found impossible to obtain any considerable increase in the
initial velocity by increasing the charge of Prussian powder without loss of
accuracy ; we have seen also that the Prussian guns would not stand the
English powder. It was therefore wisely determined to try Russian
prismatic powder, and the result was — by using a charge of 52 lbs. the
velocity, with a chilled shell of 386 lbs., was increased to 1286 ft.; with
a shell of 292 lbs., to 1366 ft.; with Krupp's light steel, of 279 lbs., to
1413 ft. per second.3 The accuracy of the gun with this charge of prismatic
powder also proved satisfactory, and superior to that obtained with Prussian
powder — a result due, as Captain von Doppelmair explains, and as may be
admitted, to the more uniform combustion of this powder.4 5 The observation
here naturally suggests itself, that whatever advantage in respect of greater
accuracy and uniformity may be due to the use of a superior powder, would
also accrue to the English gun if the same powder were employed. But the
way to this conclusion is blocked by the convenient foreign theory, upon
which we have before commented, that the English gun can use no other than
English R.L.G. powder. The fallacy of this theory has been already referred
to,6 and will presently be more fully exposed ; we now only call attention to
it that it may be observed what an important and valuable theory it is for
the foreign critics to maintain. In its way, it is almost as useful as
another favourite and equally baseless theory of Captain von DoppelmaiPs,
that “it is not possible for the English to make cast steel guns,” and that
therefore we are “ compelled ” to employ inferior materials and modes of
construction, the use of which renders breech-loading “ not available ” for
England.6
1 Doppelmair, pp. 16-19.
3 Ibid. pp. 20, 28.
5 See p. 68.
2 Ibid, p. 22.
4 Ibid. p. 22.
c Doppelmair, p. 24
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
71
The charge of 53 lbs. of prismatic powder was now substituted for the
46 J lbs. of Prussian powder1 2 — conditions vastly different, we need hardly
observe, from those which the guns had been originally designed and proved
to meet.3
The next point was the reduction of the lead jacket of the shot. Captain
von Doppelmair argues at great length, and Mr. Krupp in his pamphlets
is very emphatic in the same direction, to prove that the lead jacket of the
shot is unfavourable to penetration.3 We are disposed to admit the sound¬
ness of this reasoning, with this qualification — that as the lead coating adds
to the weight of the projectile, it increases the vis viva of the shot, and must
not therefore be altogether thrown out of the account.4 5 But that a thick
lead coating is to a very large extent unproductive in penetration trials, and
actually obstructive of the passage of the shot — an absorbent, so to speak,
of the shot's energy, and a bar to its progress through the plate — is indis¬
putable. It was shown conclusively to be so in the Tegel trials,6 and theory
would of course point to the same conclusion. But when we have admitted
this, is the admission favourable or unfavourable to the Krupp system of
ordnance, with which a lead coating of some sort is indispensable ? Is it
not an admission of the necessity on Krupp' s part to produce a large margin
of ballistic powder in order to accomplish the same penetrative results as a
gun which is not saddled with this dead weight of projectile ? Is it not an
admission of an inherent defect in the system, to say that it entails the use
of a projectile of which from one-fifth to one-fifteenth (according to the
thickness of the lead jacket) is declared by its supporters to be useless for
penetrative purposes ? Have we not here, indeed, some explanation of the
fact which will appear more clearly as we proceed, that with a large
theoretical excess of penetrative power, Krupp's gun produced penetrative
effects not greater, if so great, as those produced by the English gun?
Then, again, there is the question of accuracy, and Captain von Doppelmair
is driven to admit that the inferior accuracy of projectiles with a thin
coating may have been due to the reduced quantity of lead.0 Finally, have
we any assurance that the thin lead coating, upon which Captain von
Doppelmair shows conclusively so much depends, can be applied to the
Gruson chilled projectiles at all ? On the contrary, it appears that each
attempt to apply the new jacket to these projectiles without detriment to
the casting was, if not actually a failure, far short of a successful result.7
And while the importance of this point is fully admitted, and indeed
insisted upon with great emphasis by Captain von Doppelmair, he can give
1 Doppelmair, p. 27.
2 It should also be observed that 53 lbs. of prismatic is admitted by Krupp to be more than
equivalent to 43 lbs. English, which charge is stated to be equal to 46 lbs. prismatic. — Krupp, p. 5,
and Table VI. It is also worth while noting that, although prismatic powder is used in Russia
with the Krupp guns, the maximum charge for a 9-inch Krupp, heavier by 4cwt. than the Tegel
gun, and firing a light shot, is only 46 lbs. — Krupp, Table VI.
3 Doppelmair, pp. 17-19, 25. Krupp, pp. 9, 10.
4 See Doppelmair, p. 18, where the lead coating is altogether thrown out of the calculation.
5 Doppelmair, pp. 32, 43.
6 “ Perhaps also the absence of the heavier lead jacket lessens the stability of the axis of rotation
of the shell, and so influences the accuracy of fire.” — Doppelmair, p. 33,
7 Doppelmair, pp. 29, 36, 40, 49,
72
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
us no further information as to its actual accomplishment than a vague note,
which states that “ Gruson' s Works have since executed large orders for
chilled shells with thin lead jackets for various Governments.-”1
With respect to the form of the shot, the Palliser form was closely-
observed and copied3 — the length of head and its diameter at junction with
the body being increased. In fact, the Gruson shot was made externally as
like the Palliser as possible. Considering what an important influence the
form has upon penetration, this, again, was not an unimportant departure
from the original pattern. Before applying these alterations to the large
gun, they were tried in an 8-inch (“72-pr.") Krupp gun,3 which was
present on the ground, and which during the trials played the useful part
of a pioneer to the heavier weapon.
On July 7, after a month's private experimenting, we find the Prussians
prepared once more to enter the lists against the English gun, in which no
change of any sort had been made during the interval. The effect of the
various experiments and united alterations had been to give to the Krupp
gun an initial velocity of from 1286 to 1414 ft. per second, according to
whether a 336 lb. or 275 lb. shell was used;4 and this velocity, according to
Mr. Krupp,5 gave a momentum to the Krupp projectiles of from 16*26 to
16*78 metre-tons per centimetre of circumference, as against 12*35 metre-
tons for the English shot. In other words, the Krupp resumed the contest
with a theoretical ballistic superiority of from 30 to 33 per cent.6 The
Prussian official report also gives a superiority of momentum of about 33 per
cent, to the Krupp. If other formulae and modes of calculation be adopted,
the figures representing the relative ballistic powers of the two guns will vary.
Thus, Captain von Doppelmair assigns a theoretical superiority of momentum
to the Prussian gun of from 17 to 15 per cent., according to whether the
heavy or light shell is used.7 The theoretical superiority of penetrative
power will depend upon the range and upon the value assigned to the lead
jacket. The Prussian official report on these trials gives the Krupp gun a
theoretical penetrative superiority8 of from 29 to 21 per cent., if calculated
by the English formula, and of from 25 to 17 J per cent, if calculated by
the Prussian formula. Sir William Armstrong estimated it at about 18 per
cent.9 Without attempting to assign a precise figure to the theoretical
1 Doppelmair, p. 49, note. 2 Ibid. pp. 19, 25. 3 Ibid. pp. 25, 26, 63.
4 Ibid. pp. 28-63. 5 Krupp, Table III.
6 In a later pamphlet, Mr. Krupp estimates the ballistic power of his 9|-inch guns at from
15 to 34 per cent, superior to that of the English 9-inch gun, according to whether the Krupp
guns are of 14,000 or 15,500 kilos. See “ Canons de Marine et des Cotes,” Tables I., IV.
7 Doppelmair, p. 30. 8 Range not stated.
9 Captain W. H. Noble, R.A., has kindly furnished the following interesting observations on the
subject : — “ In any comparison of guns where the conditions are so different, it is very difficult to
assign values to different parts of the same projectiles. Thus, the 96-pr. Gruson shot, of 336 lbs.,
consisted of a lead jacket of 63 lbs. and an iron shot of 273 lbs. It is an open question which
weight we should assume in making a comparison of vis viva. There cannot be a doubt that
the 63 lbs. of lead is less effective than if it were 63 lbs. of iron ; but has it no effect whatever ?
On the whole, the fairest way is to take the absolute weight of projectile which strikes the target.
If the Prussian system necessitates the use of 63 lbs. of useless material on a 3361b. shot, it is a
decided disadvantage to the system. In the same manner, we have no data to guide us as to the
diameter of the iron part of the Prussian shot. We know the calibre of the gun, and we know
also that the shot with its lead jacket must be of the same diameter as the calibre of the gun,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
78
penetrative superiority of the Krupp gun, a superiority due solely to its
greater weight and length and higher charge — in fact, to its being a bigger
gun — it is clear that that superiority was considerable. Under the stress of
defeat, the Prussians had developed the power of their gun, although, we
observe in passing, without having satisfied themselves that the gun was
capable of doing this increased work for any considerable number of rounds
— without, in fact, subjecting it to any trial of endurance with the increased
charges. Por the matter of that, it could hardly be worse to burst the gun
than to accept without further effort the defeat which had been endured in
the trials of March 31 and June 2. And there was always the hope, as the
prismatic powder was mild, that the gun might not burst ; wdiile, as the
English gun might fail in some way or another — might fall somewhat short
in some particular of the Prussian gun — there remained the hope of snatching
a victory if the contest were continued ; on the other hand, if it were now
abandoned, the victory belonged too obviously to the English gun to be
disputed.
When the trial recommenced, on July 7, the position was this The
English gun, having proved its superiority, had been heavily handicapped — -
to an extent which is estimated at from about 18 to 30 per cent. As that
superiority was obviously not inherent in the Prussian system, but had been
obtained only by repeated alterations in that system, carried out during the
trials, it was necessary for Captain von Doppelmair to explain why no
alterations— of weight of charge and nature of powder— and no attempted
improvements were permitted to the English gun; and this he does by
quietly begging the whole question in a passage to which we have before
referred, but which it will be as well here to quote : — “ If we consider the
English system of guns of large calibre, we must admit that its arrangement
is perfectly rational — that the proportion of charge, the construction of bore,
the description of powder, are so combined with the material of the guns
and the mode of manufacture, that, as a result of the whole, the greatest
possible effect of the projectile is obtained as a combination of its accuracy
and momentum* The whole arrangement of the English system follows, as
a matter of necessity, from the material selected and the mode of manu¬
facture.”1 We do not quote this passage for the purpose of calling attention
to the curious contradiction involved in the statement that the “ description
of powder” — which is admitted by Captain von Doppelmair, in common
with the rest of the world, to be of an exceedingly destructive character,
and which, on account of the violent strain which it imposes upon the guns,
has earned the designation of poudre brutale — is a powder which it is
“ perfectly rational ” to employ with guns made of a material which Captain
von Doppelmair is anxious above all things to show to be inferior to steel.
but we do not know the diameter of the iron part irrespective of its lead jacket. We must, there-
fore, in any comparison, assume that the diameter of all the projectiles are identical with that of
the gun from which they are fired . The English 9-inch gun, 43 lbs. charge, initial
velocity 1324ft., reduced to 1237ft. on striking” (at 514 yds.), “weight of shot 260 lbs.; total
striking energy 2652 foot-tons, or 94 foot-tons per inch of circumference of calibre. The Prussian
96-pr., 53 lbs. charge, weight of shot 336 lbs., velocity (at 51 yds. from muzzle) reduced to 1217 ft. on
striking at 614 yds.; total striking energy 3390 foot-tons, or 116 foot-tons per inch of circumference
of calibre.”
1 Doppelmair, p. 24.
10
■74
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Nor do we quote the passage with a view to gibbeting the confusion of
thought which can thus trace an inevitable connection between the English
proportion of charge to calibre and the mode of gun manufacture, and
between the metal of our guns and the system of muzzle-loading. Nor is
it our immediate object to expose the reckless inaccuracy of statements
which follow: that we are unable to make cast-steel guns; that we are
unable to make breech-loaders ; that we are compelled to employ a powder of
rapid combustion, because our guns are short : that we are compelled to use
short guns, because we cannot make breech-loaders ; that “ the uncertain
stability of the guns remains as a prejudicial consequence of the selection of
the metal ;” that our guns are so weak that we are compelled to adopt the
increasing twist; that with our guns there is no security against a sudden
bursting.1 These points will call for some remark hereafter ; for the present,
it is only necessary to observe that they afford so many examples of the
worst possible form of begging the question — so many examples of the
“ wheel of life ” system in full play. The passage above has been quoted
here, however, rather to show upon what grounds and by what sort of
reasoning the indisposition of the Prussians to give the English gun the
same opportunities as the Krupp for developing its penetrative power is
attempted to be justified.
When the guns were now fired, the following results were obtained : — -
Bound 1, with .Krupp, firing a Gruson shell, struck the 8-inch target, but
without penetrating it. An explanation of this failure is ready at hand.
“The shell was not of the usual excellence.”2 Mr. Krupp ascribes the
failure to another cause— -the shell struck “ obliquely against the plate.”3
Whichever explanation be accepted, the round was a failure.
Bound 2 was a Krupp steel shell, which penetrated the 8-inch target. Both
Captain von Doppelmair and Mr. Krupp neglect to state, however, that this
shell struck actually on the junction of two plates, and therefore on what is
always considered in target experiments a weak place. Indeed, Mr. Krupp
ventures to affirm that this round struck on a less favourable place than the
Woolwich projectiles. The plans of the practice, and the testimony of an
eye-witness in the “ Times,” clearly contradict this assertion.
Bound 3. A fair hit with a Gruson 336 lb. shell, and a fair penetration
a result, however, which it is proper to notice had also been accomplished
by the Woolwich gun with Palliser 250 lb. shell and 43 lb. charges.
Bound 4 Captain von Doppelmair omits altogether. Erom Mr. Krupp'’ s
pamphlet,4 we learn that this was a Gruson shell, which stripped its lead
coating in the gun, made several ricochets, and struck obliquely — affording
an illustration of the difficulty attending the desired alteration of the lead
jacket.
Bound 5. This round also Captain von Doppelmair omits, which is the
more remarkable since Mr. Krupp writes “through” against it. It is,
however, clear from Mr. Krupp's detailed record of the effects, that the shot
only went “ partly through the inner skin.”5' It is not equally clear why
Captain von Doppelmair has left this round out altogether, especially as the
1 Doppelmair, pp. 24, 25.
4 Krupp, Table IV.
2 Ibid. p. 29;
6 Ibid;
3 Krupp, Table IV.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
75
projectile was a Gruson of the same construction as had done well in
Bound 3. Either this round was a failure or a success. If a failure,
Mr. Krupp ought not to have recorded it as “ through /* whether a failure
or a success. Captain von Doppelmair should have included it in his account
of the experiments.
Bound 61 was a Krupp steel shell, against the 9-inch plate. It went
over 5 ins.2 into the wood backing, where it stuck, and was shaken out on
the following day by the concussion of a succeeding round. Both Captain
von Doppelmair and Mr. Krupp affirm that this shell struck on an excep¬
tionally strong place ; whereas, in fact, the unsupported balk of timber at
the back would not materially add to the resistance when the target clearly
overmatched the gun.
Bound 7 3 was fired at the 9 -inch target from the Woolwich gun, with a
shell made by Gruson in exact imitation of a Palliser,4 but slightly heavier.
The shell did fairly, penetrating about ins. into the wood backing. At
the same time, it is doubtful if this round should be included in the com¬
petition, having been supplied by the Prussian Government without the
concurrence of Sir William Armstrong.
Bound 85 was a Palliser shell proper from the Woolwich gun, at the
9-inch target. It penetrated about 4 ins. into the backing — about 1-| in.
less than the Krupp steel shell in Bound 6. Mr. Krupp states that this
shot “ struck the 9-inch plate between two bolts and struts (favourable
spot) .**6 An eye-witness of the trials, writing in the “ Times/'’ says : —
“ Krupp’ s pamphlet is incorrect in stating that this shell struck on a
favourable spot. It struck on a strut/*7 The same eye-witness comes to a
conclusion with regard to these trials which every impartial witness must
arrive at, that ec no advantage can fairly be claimed for either side/* The
same conclusion, in point of fact, was arrived at by the Prussian Com¬
mittee, which reported that no definite superiority had been established on
either side.
What, then, had become of the large theoretical penetrative superiority of
the Krupp gun — the 18 to 33 per cent, excess of ballistic power? It had
become absorbed apparently by the inherent disadvantages of the system ;
and this result was as distinctly a substantial victory for the Woolwich
system, as would be a dead heat between two horses of which the smaller
was heavily handicapped.
And this conclusion we reach without any reference to the question that
the only Krupp shell which produced results comparable with those obtained
by the Palliser was a steel projectile — and steel, Mr. Krupp affirms, is vastly
superior to chilled iron for penetrating purposes.**8 If this be so, the
victory of the English system becomes still more marked, and Mr. Krupp is
on the horns of this dilemma — he must either maintain the superiority of
his steel shell, in which case he has a further excess of non-productive
penetrative power on the part of the Prussian gun to account for ; or he
1 No. 4 in Captain von Doppelmair’ s account.
2 Mr. Krupp sets it down as 5‘9" ; another account gives it as 5‘3".
3 Round 6 in Captain von Doppelmair’s pamphlet. 4 Doppelmair, p. 29.
5 Round 6 in Doppelmair. 6 Krupp, Table IV.
7 “ Times,” J anuary 23, 1869. 3 Krupp, p. 9,
76
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
must give up the superiority of his steel shell, in which case he must explain
why he has recourse to a material at least four times as costly as chilled
iron.
Captain von DoppelmaiFs conclusions from these trials are — First, that
the Prussian gun can pierce the 8-inch target “ with a surplus of power,”1 —
a conclusion which, in view of the decided failures at rounds 1 and 5, and
the circumstance that round 2 was on a weak place, is hardly likely to
receive unqualified acceptance; secondly, that the English 9 -inch gun also
pierces the 8 -inch shield, “ but that the destruction of the target at the
back is much less considerable.”3 This last is rather a strong conclusion
to arrive at on the evidence of so few rounds, and we are disposed to doubt
if the effect upon the back of the target of a blind Gruson or steel shell,
which breaks into few pieces, is at all equal to that of a Palliser shell, which
breaks into many pieces. But if we admit it, what does it amount to ? — that
the Palliser projectile, instead of expending itself in producing comparatively
useless destructive effects, enters the ship in a shower of fragments which
carry havoc and destruction among the crew. This is a naval question,
upon which English opinion has long since pronounced itself. The real
object in the attack of iron-clads, as of other ships, is less the disablement
of the vessel than of the men and guns which it contains ; to destroy the
vessel, when we can, if we choose, reach the men and guns, is a tedious and
roundabout way of accomplishing our object. “A ship, its guns, and its
crew, constitute in combination an active fighting power. Destroy or
paralyze one of the elements, and you destroy or paralyze the combination.
. . . . In making choice of the direction and nature of attack, it is
important to endeavour to effect the object in the shortest time, in the
easiest manner, and with the least possible expenditure of men, money, and
material . The ship represents a passive agent in the combination
of fighting power. The men are the active and vital agents — the soul of the
system ; and while the passive agent, constructed as it now is, will stand a
vast deal of battering without becoming disabled, comparatively few shells
will serve to disorganise and paralyze the best crew ever brought together.
. . . . This view, we conceive, embodies the whole merits of the shell
system of attack. The great primary advantage of the use of shells is, that
they wreak a tremendous destruction within the vessel, carrying terror and
confusion between decks, creating smoke and wounds, and accomplishing
a demoralising effect, such as shot produce, only in a very much less marked
degree.”3 This view we hold to be a perfectly sound one, and it is an
answer to Captain von DoppelmaiEs depreciation of the English projectiles
on the ground that they break up into a greater number of pieces than the
Prussian shells,4 since these pieces are effective, and serve as so much
mitraille among the crew. It is worth while also to point out, in passing,
that it is only externally jagged holes — not those which are internally
jagged — which are difficult to plug, and therefore especially damaging to
ships. Externally, the hole produced by the English shell is of the same
character as that produced by the Prussian shell.5
1 Doppelmair, p. 30. 2 Ibid.
8 “ Pall Mall Gazette,” November 6, 1867. 4 Doppelmair, pp. 30, 62.
5 We notice, in passing, an apparent contradiction in Captain von Doppelmair’s narrative. At
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
77
We now reach an important point in the narrative of the Tegel trials.
Hitherto, as we have seen, the Prussian gun had proved itself at first
inferior to the English gun, and afterwards — when the charge of powder had
been largely increased, the projectiles altered, and the initial velocity im¬
proved — it had succeeded in equalling the performances of the English gun,
but not in surpassing them. And this equality had been obtained at the
cost of an expenditure of ballistic power on the part of the breech-loaders,
which, as has been explained, left the substantial advantage with the English
system.
It was now determined to try the two systems with live shells. But
before doing this, the Prussians satisfied themselves, by actual trial against
the 8-inch target, that the “ large capacity ” Palliser shell — i.e. a shell
containing a bursting charge of 5 Jibs, instead of 2-| lbs., and having there¬
fore thinner walls — was less .effective than the “ small capacity ” Palliser
against a strong target. That this was so, hardly needed an experiment to
prove. The large capacity shells were intended to develope high explosive
effects when the target was well within the power of the gun. The inferior
penetrative power of the large capacity shell had been expressly declared
upon the ground by the representatives of the English gun, and the small
capacity shell had been expressly prescribed for maximum penetrative
effects. It is worth while also to notice that the Prussians themselves fully
recognised the value of thick walls for high penetrative effects ; because we
find presently that when a Krupp steel shell failed, the failure was ascribed
to the “ thinness of wall consequent on their large chamber for bursting
charge,”* 1 2 and Captain von Doppelmair is careful to tell us that this is
" not in disfavour of steel for projectiles, but of the construction of this
particular shell.”3 That therefore the large capacity Palliser shell should
fail when it struck a strong place on the 8-inch target, was only what might
have been anticipated ; and yet this shell actually, as Captain von
Doppelmair admits, did “ about the same”3 as the only round from the
Krupp with which it could be compared. This performance is very in¬
structive; because not merely had the Krupp projectile, according to
Captain von Doppelmair, a striking momentum of 117 as against 100 for
the Palliser shell,4 but it was a small capacity Gruson shell ; nay, more, it was
a 336 lb. Gruson shell, which had a chamber only large enough to contain
as much powder (2 \ lbs.) as a small capacity 250 lb. Palliser.5 It was,
therefore, or should have been, a stronger shell than an English small
capacity shell ; the comparison is still more in its favour when made, as in
this case, with a large capacity English shell adapted for carrying 5 lbs. of
powder. And yet the two shells did about the same. Captain von
Doppelmair is only able to account for this result by throwing the blame on
p. 3 lie states that “the Krupp steel shells with hardened point and thin lead jacket were
excellent.” At. p. 32 he says “ Both the Krupp steel shells were set up on penetrating into the
target.” At p. 31 he speaks of the great accuracy of the steel shells with thin lead jacket. At
p. 33 he speaks of the inferior accuracy of these shells.
1 Doppelmair, p. 63.
2 Ibid. p. 47. 3 ibid. p. 34. * Ibid.
* Indeed the Prussian shell contained a rather less charge than the small capacity Palliser—
viz. 2-420 lbs. against 2-464 lbs. — Doppelmair, p. 3o.
78
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the lead jacket. He observes, “ The proportion between these two numbers1
is as 1 to 1*17. These numbers are in contradiction to the results of the
trial, which showed that the effect of both guns is about the same. This
trial serves thus as a further proof that the momentum of the lead jacket is
almost entirely lost as regards the effect desired from the projectile,”3 — a
conclusion, as we have before pointed out, exceedingly unfavourable to the
Krupp system, as imposing the necessity for an excess of ballistic power to
produce penetrative effects equal to those obtainable with the muzzle-loader.
The comparison obtained in this trial of August 4, if it added nothing to
the reputation of the Krupp gun, but rather further marked its inherent
inferiority, had for the Prussians one useful result. It showed that the
power of the English gun might be minimised against a strong target by
using large capacity shells ; and this piece of practical information deter¬
mined the course of the subsequent experiments. We have seen already how
the Prussians had opposed themselves to any attempts to increase the power
of the English gun by using large charges of other powder, or by other
means, such as had been adopted for the Krupp gun. But when it became
a question of reducing the power of the English gun, by using against a
strong target a shell specially designed for use only against weak targets —
a shell designed not for producing great penetrative but great explosive
effects — then all hesitation about breaking the rule disappeared. There
was no longer a question of strictly adhering to one pattern of English
shell.
But, as we shall see, the selection of a large capacity English shell for
use on this occasion, in competition with small capacity German shells, was
not the most remarkable incident of the trials of August 4. The experiments
were made against the 7-inch target, at 782 yds. range. Seven rounds
were fired in all — viz. five from Krupp, consisting of two Gruson chilled
and three Krupp steel shells ; two from the Woolwich gun. Three out of the
seven rounds were thrown out of the comparison. One of these,3 a Gruson,
struck the wood at the bottom of the target ; one Krupp shell4 struck on the
top of an old live shell which was sticking in the target, and exploded it ;
and one Krupp5 grazed the edge of a plate and carried it away. Mr. Krupp,
we observe, takes credit for both the two latter shells as “ through.”6
Captain von Doppelmair most properly throws out these rounds. This
leaves us with the four following effective rounds :7 —
Bound 1. There is very conflicting evidence about this round — a Gruson
shell. Captain von Doppelmair says that it “made a clean hole right
through the target.”8 Krupp* s pamphlet does not give it as “ through,”
but states that it stuck in the wood backing, where it exploded — " explosive
effect principally in the direction of gun.”9 The “Times” correspondent
says the shell “burst backwards in the backing ”10 'It seems clear, there¬
fore, that the shell did not act as perfectly as readers of Captain von
Doppelmair* s pamphlet might be led to suppose.
1 About 2*34 metre-tons per square centimetre of the cross section of the Palliser, and about
2*75 metre-tons per square centimetre of the Gruson. — Doppelmair, p. 34. 2 Ibid,
3 Round 1 in Krupp ’s pamphlet. 4 Round 4 in Krupp’s pamphlet.
5 Round 3 in Krupp’s pamphlet. 6 Krupp, Table X.
7 No. 2 in Krupp’s pamphlet. 8 Doppelmair, p. 35.
9 Krupp, Table X, 10 “ Times,” January 23, 1869,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
79
Round 2.1 2 This was an English shell, and a small capacity shell, but it
was one which ought not to have been fired. It was made of pure Redsdale
iron. Experiments in England had shown that iron to be unsuited for
penetrative purposes ; and the shell had been, at the request of the repre¬
sentative of the English gun, withdrawn from competition.3 The shell was
painted brown to distinguish it from others ; and on account of its having
been withdrawn from the penetration trials, it had been ordered by the
Prussian Artillery Committee not to be used at all, even for the endurance
trials. The firing of this shell was in flat disobedience of this order. It
occurred “ during the absence of Armstrong’s agent from his gun, and it
was only on picking up the pieces that the mistake was discovered/'’3 The
shell, as it happened, produced very much the same effect as the Gruson
shell in Round 1. That is to say, it penetrated the plate, lodged in the
wood backing, and burst backwards.4 The circumstances under which this
shell was fired gave rise to a good deal of discussion and angry feeling at
the time, for which what we have stated of those circumstances affords
sufficient justification. It was impossible for anyone in Captain von
DoppelmaiPs position, and with his knowledge of these trials, to be ignorant
of all this. And we may therefore fairly ask, why does Captain von
Doppelmair omit all mention of the fact that this shell was experimental —
that it had been improperly fired? And a further justification is needed of
his misleading statement, that the shell was a “ small capacity Palliser shell,”
when it was, as we have seen, not a Palliser shell at all. It is with regret
that we observe the grave error which was committed at Tegel, reproduced
and apparently sanctioned, in a pamphlet which professes to give an accurate
account of those trials. We are afraid, however, that it must be admitted
that Captain von DoppelmaiEs narrative has by this time reached a point
at which there is no longer any pretence of impartial criticism. The
neutral tints which appeared to prevail for a few pages, soon brightened
into the warm colouring of the partisan ; and, pressed on all sides by the
difficulties which necessarily attended an attempt to evolve conclusions
unfavourable to the English gun and favourable to tbe Krupp out of the
Tegel trials, Captain von Doppelmair seems, even before this crucial
experiment (as the Prussians chose to consider it) of August 4, to have
abandoned in despair the impossible task of keeping up his self-imposed
role of a candid critic, and to have found it necessary, if he would
cut his way at all through the difficulties which lay between him and his
desired conclusions, to throw off every encumbrance, and to rely upon the
ignorance or carelessness of his readers for effecting his escape from a false
and inconvenient position.
Passing to Round 3, 5 we find a Palliser “ large capacity” shell — which, as
has been explained, was not the proper . shell to use for this purpose— getting
through the plate and into the backing, where it exploded without producing
any very great destructive effect.6
1 Round 6 in Krupp’s pamphlet*
2 The shell had been sent to Berlin confessedly as experimental, pending the result of some
trials at Shoeburyness. Those trials showed that shells of this iron were too brittle, and it had
therefore been at once formally withdrawn from trial.
3 “ Times,1 ” January 23, 1869* 4 Doppelmair, p. 35.
5 No. 7 in Krupp’s pamphlet* 6 No. 5. in Krupp’s pamphlet.
80
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Bound 4 was a Krupp steel shell from the Prussian gun, which did good
execution. It penetrated the plate, exploded in the backing, and blew a
hole clean through the target. This, without doubt, was the best result
obtained on this occasion. At last — when, by the adoption of frequent
alterations and improvements in the Prussian gun; when, by the use of
53 lbs. instead of 43 lbs. of powder, of an improved construction of pro¬
jectiles, and of steel shell, the effective penetrative power of that gun had
been brought up to its maximum, while the effective penetrative power of
the English gun had, by the use of improper shell, been brought down to a
minimum- — the former weapon was able to snatch a victory ; the only victory
which it had scored throughout the trials, and not substantially a victory at
all, if we take into account the disparity in the two guns, and in the
conditions under which they had been fired. “ The case stood thus/” says
the “ Times ” correspondent: — “ The Gruson chilled shell from the Krupp
gun penetrated the plate and burst backwards. Both the Armstrong chilled
shell of the wrong pattern did the same. One shell only of the three steel
ones struck a sound place. It passed through the target with good effect.
This was the first success (so called) of the Prussian system.”1 2 This was
the point at which the Prussian Artillery Committee determined to make
their report. The representatives of the English gun pressed, over and over
again, for a trial of proper English shells (i.e. small capacity Palliser) before
any decision was come to. They reminded the Committee that it had been
proved in England — not by one or two rounds, but by a long series of
experiments — that the bursting charge does not diminish, but rather increases
the penetrative power of Palliser shell ;3 they appealed to the results of the
trial on June 2 to show that the English gun with empty small capacity shell
was capable of penetrating the 8-inch target, and that it followed that the
same shell if fired loaded against the 7 -inch target, were not likely to fail.
Equally cogent were the arguments that the Gruson shell of proper and
latest pattern had failed to penetrate both the 8-inch and 7-inch targets;
that in England live Palliser 9 -inch shell had pierced the 8-inch target at
Shoeburyness,3 and that the failure to penetrate the 7-inch target at Tegel
could therefore only have been due to the shell being, as it had been
expressly declared to be, too weak. Finally, no argument was needed to show
that — considering the previous performances of the Woolwich gun, the
advantages which the Krupp gun had enjoyed in the matter of alterations
of charges, shell, & c.} and the fact that this was the first occasion on which
the Prussian gun had succeeded in even slightly passing the English gun,
notwithstanding its two tons greater weight, its greater weight of projectile^
its greater charge, and its resulting greater ballistic power — it was manifestly
improper to bring the contest summarily to a conclusion, and to render a
report at this particular stage. But it appears that the Prussian Artillery
1 “Times,” January 23, 1869.
2 See “Extracts of Report and Proceedings of O.S.C.,” Vol. V. p. 44. “The results of this
practice appear to warrant the following practical conclusions : — 1. That the bursting charge in a
Palliser shell evidently assists the penetration to a certain extent. . . .” And again, Ibid.
Yol. V. p. 47 : — “ The bursting charge in the Palliser shell assists penetration j” so much so, indeed,
that we find the Ordnance Select Committee recommending an increase of the bursting charge.
3 See, inter alia , Round 1248. “ Extracts of O.S.C.,” Yol. IY. p. 374.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
81
Committee considered that the report could be no longer delayed. Political
reasons required that an order for the guns for the Prussian iron-clads should
be given out. The small capacity shells, it was stated, would be fired here¬
after, but a report must now be made.
We do not know whether it will occasion surprise or not when we state
that the report was favourable to the Krupp guns. But so it was.
In passing, we would here remark that Captain von Doppelmair* s con¬
clusion-derived from the result, be it remarked, of two rounds with shell
of improper construction — that “ loaded Palliser chilled shell on striking
armour plates explode comparatively early,' ” is not in accordance with the
results of the extensive trials which have been made in this country, and
is another example of the danger of jumping at foregone conclusions on
insufficient evidence. Further, Captain von Doppelmair ought to be aware
that it is possible to retard the explosion by various special dispositions of
the bursting charge; and this objection, if it existed, could not be regarded
as a permanent or important one. As a matter of fact, however, it does
not exist.1 2
No less than four months were allowed to elapse before the practice
against plates was resumed. On November 28, however, the desired trial
of small capacity live Palliser shell against the 7-inch target took place.
The result was remarkable enough. Captain von Doppelmair, however,
omits to record it; just as he omits all reference to the rendering of the
report at a time when the trials were incomplete. He merely refers to the
trial in general terms, and sums up with the conclusion that “ the new
Palliser chilled English shell were not better than the previous ones.”3
Let us see what really happened. The account given by the “ Times ”
correspondent, and which we have verified from other sources, is as follows : —
“Then came the long-hoped-for Palliser live shell at the 7-inch target;
range the same as in the old experiments. Two rounds were fired. The
first struck near the left lower corner of the target and went completely
through, bursting as it passed through the backing; the point of the
projectile struck 1 ft. from the left of the plate, and 8 ins. from the bottom.
The corner was torn off, and a ragged blackened hole would have been made
through the ship. The second hit fairly on a very sound spot on the middle
7 -inch plate ins. from the top, and 4 ft. from the left ; it penetrated
1 It is worth while here to call attention to the fact, that when the Krupp steel shells are found
not to explode quite quickly enough — sometimes not at all — Captain yon Doppelmair has a specific
ready at hand, and promptly proposes to insure and accelerate the explosion by only partially filling
the shell, or by roughening the interior. — Doppelmair, p. 36. The suggestion is well meant, no
doubtj and the effect of its adoption would be so far successful that explosion would certainly take
place. But the explosion would be even more rapid than that complained of in the Palliser shell —
since a shell partially filled with powder, or roughened internally, would in a large majority of cases
explode in the gun.
2 Doppelmair, p. 49. But we have not merely an omission, but a contradiction ; for while we get
this confident condemnation of the new ( i.e . small capacity) Palliser shell, we get, almost in the same
paragraph, the statement that {{ unfortunately this trial did not give quite decisive answers . . *
as all the targets . . . were already so far injured by previous experiments that all the pro¬
jectiles struck on damaged parts of the shield ” (p. 49). Nevertheless we are told, on the evidence
of this trial, that the new English shells were as bad as the old. We are further told, that the
new Gruson projectiles fired on the occasion gave unsatisfactory results, but “ this result does not,
however, speak against the new projectiles.”
11
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
8^
the plate, and exploded on its way through the backing. The plate was
split right across, far from any previous holes ; a piece 4 ft. 4^ ins. by 3 ft. 3 ins.
was torn off and thrown down. Much force was necessarily expended in
performing the work, yet there was enough left in the shell to blow in the
backing and inner skin, so that a terrible wound would have been inflicted
in the side of a ship carrying this armour. Thus, both the Palliser shells
from the English gun made holes through the target — a feat which the Krupp
gun had failed to perform with chilled shell, and only once with the costly
steel shell.”1
In other words, directly the English gun was fired with the projectile
designed for use against strong targets, it not only equalled but surpassed
its rival — notwithstanding the advantages, already more than once enumerated,
which that rival enjoyed.
This is the experiment of which Captain von Doppelmair thinks it proper
to omit all details. It is upon this experiment that he asserts that the
small capacity shell were no better than the others. It is with this experi¬
ment before him that he ventures still to maintain the superiority of the
Krupp system.
III.
Comparative Accuracy of the Woolwich and Krupp Guns.
The Tegel trials, then, if they established anything, plainly established the
necessity for the possession of a large margin of power on the part of
Krupp' s guns to produce penetrative effects comparable with those obtained
with English guns. Captain von Doppelmair, having out of such un¬
promising materials attempted to frame a conclusion favourable to the
Krupp guns, proceeds to deal with other points upon which these experi¬
ments appeared to him to throw some light.
On the question of accuracy, he observes : — “ The superior accuracy of
breech-loading guns, firing projectiles with a coating of soft metal, is incon¬
testable. The reason for this is the A B C of artillery service*”3 And he
proceeds to give certain figures which show a superiority on the part of
the Krupp guns. We have here, therefore, at once an axiom and its
application.
With regard to the comparative accuracy of the tWo guns which were
tried at Tegel, we believe the facts to be as follows : — During the 300 rounds
of chilled projectiles which were fired at Tegel, on only two occasions was
1 Times,” January 23, 1869.
2 Doppelmair, p. 67.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
88
the accuracy of the guns compared with any degree of care,
this practice are shewn by the annexed diagrams.
Fig, 1. — Range 1200 paces.
Woolwicli gun. PalHser shell, filled with sand,
Fig. 2, — Range 1200 paces.
Krupp gun. Gruson chilled shot.
The results of
Si
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Fig. 3. — Range 1200 paces.
No, 1 round fired for elevation,
Fig. 4. — Range 1200 paces.
Krupp Gun. Chilled shell.
^8
til
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
85
Fig. 6.-— Range 1200 paces.
Woolwich gun. Chilled shell.
8 <
W
®T
°
fK _
1
i
P?
>4
*
?
L
EBSCT
1
Fig. 6.— Range 1200 paces.
Krupp gun. Steel shell.
It will be observed that in the first instance the practice was in favour of
the Woolwich gun. This advantage was attributed by the Prussian Artillery
Committee to the use of an inferior powder in the Krupp gun. On the
second occasion, the advantage was in favour of the Krupp gun firing
steel shell — to an extent, however, which is inconsiderable, but which it
is not difficult to explain. It may have been due, for example, in a great
degree, to the more accurate make and homogeneity of the carefully tooled
steel shell, as compared with the relatively rude cast-iron chilled projectiles ;
and it may probably in part be accounted for by the greater uniformity of
the prismatic powder — a uniformity which Captain von Doppelmair admits,
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
upon which indeed he insists,1 2 but on account of which he makes no
allowance for the English gun.3 Here, once again, we find ourselves
face to face with the convenient fallacy upon which we have before
remarked, that the English gun could not fire prismatic powder, and
therefore could not improve its accuracy by this means.
But, independently of this, attention must be called to this attempt to
solve the question of accuracy by such a limited trial — a trial which, when
compared with the vastly more extensive experiments which have taken
place in England on this particular point, is ridiculously insignificant. From
these very limited Tegel trials, we appeal confidently to the accumulated
results of an extended series of carefully conducted and scrupulously
scientific experiments in this country, in proof of the fact that the English
guns, when skilfully handled, are capable of an accuracy of fire which leaves
nothing to be desired. The following table gives, in a concise form, the
results of practice with 7", 8", and 9" Woolwich guns by the late Ordnance
Select Committee, who reported, when presenting these tables in 1867, that
“the practice of these guns is quite unexampled. It has never, within the
Committee's experience, been exceeded by that of guns on any other system
of rifling whatever."3
This practice therefore surpassed in accuracy not merely all known practice
at that date (1867) with muzzle-loading guns, but it also surpassed all
practice with breech -loading guns, field and heavy, “on any system of
rifling whatever."
Calibre
of gun.
N ature of projectile.
Mean
range.
Mean
difference
of range.
Mean
reduced
deflection.
Remarks.
yds.
yds.
yds.
7-inch .
Common shell
766
13-5
0-3
II
n
3880
31-4
2-2
II
Palliser shell
1129
12-0
0-3
II
8-inch .
n
n
II
Common shell
II
2240
751
1123
2258
12-2
11*3
10-7
25-7
0-8
0-4
0-5
0-6
In each case the figures
are the means of ten
rounds with R.L.G. pow¬
der.
n
II
3716
25*8
2-0
9-inch .
II
731
14*7
0-3
n
II
4056
31-1
2-1
n
Palliser shot
1110
11*0
0-3
n
II
2326
10-1
0*8
With regard to the broad question of the “ incontestable " superiority of
breech-loading to muzzle-loading guns, it is difficult to know how within
the limits of courteous discussion to reply to an artillerist who gravely
1 Doppelmair, pp. 22, 23.
2 See text above, where it is stated that the want of accuracy of the Krupp gun was attributed
by the Prussian Committee to the inferiority of the powder. If the use of a superior powder made
the Krupp gun shoot better, it is reasonable to assume that the English gun would have been
benefited to the same extent if it had enjoyed the same advantage.
3 “Report of Ordnance Select Committee,” No. 4443, January 9, 1867. See Parliamentary
Papers, “ Army Whitworth Guns,” June 6, 1867. It may be noticed, in passing, that the Com¬
mittee show that these results were vastly superior to those obtained with the Whitworth guns,
about the accuracy of which much has been said.
ME ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
87
advances a statement of this character at the present time. This fallacy,
which rests upon purely theoretical considerations, and which can be main¬
tained. only by deliberately ignoring the published results of actual practice,
has long since been exploded in England ; and in England we may at least
claim to speak authoritatively on this point, having had an experience of both
the breech and muzzle-loading systems unequalled for variety and extent by
that of any other country. The remarkable accuracy of the breech-loading
Armstrong guns has not been disputed, and yet we find that whenever
these breech-loaders have been carefully compared for accuracy with muzzle-
loaders, the result has invariably been favourable to the latter. Thus, both
the reports of the Armstrong and Whitworth Committee of 1865 show that
the superiority in point of accuracy and uniformity of range rested with the
muzzle-loading Armstrong shunt and Whitworth guns, as compared with
the breech -loading Armstrong guns.1 The following passages bear upon this
point : — 12-pr. Eeport : “ The advantage of the Whitworth gun in respect
of accuracy with solid shot, as compared with the breech-loading Armstrong
gun, is very marked throughout. . . . The muzzle-loading Armstrong
gun has a marked superiority over the breech-loading Armstrong gun.”3
“All the three guns may be considered as practically equal as regards
accuracy with segment or shrapnel shell.”3 70-pr. Eeport : “Up to a range
of about 1700 yds., the accuracy of the muzzle-loading Armstrong is supe¬
rior to that of the other two guns. . . . At a range of about 3500 yds.
. . . the accuracy of the breech-loading Armstrong is decidedly inferior
to that of both the muzzle-loading guns. At ranges greater than about
3500 yds., the Whitworth gun exhibits a decided superiority over the
muzzle-loading Armstrong gun, and this latter a very marked superiority
over the breech-loading Armstrong.”4 “Up to a range of about 1600 yds.
the breech-loading gun exhibits (with shrapnel and segment shell) a decided
superiority over the muzzle-loading guns, which, however, it soon loses, as
at 1900 yds., and at all higher ranges, it is far inferior to them both.”5
The probable relative accuracy of the three systems, irrespective of the
projectile, is stated by the Committee to be as follows Up to a range
of about 1500 yds. the accuracy of the breech-loading Armstrong and the
Whitworth guns may be considered as equal, and up to that range the
accuracy of the muzzle-loading Armstrong gun is superior to both. At
greater ranges than 1500 yds. the accuracy of the breech^] oading gun is
inferior to that of both the muzzle-loaders.”6
More recently a comparison has been made between the bronze 9-pr.
muzzle-loading gun, recently adopted for India on the recommendation of
General Wilmoths Committee, and the breech-loading Armstrong 9-pr. and
12-pr. guns, which has shewn that the breech-loaders have no advantage
whatever in point of range, and that they are at a decided disadvantage in
respect of flatness of trajectory.7
Einally, the 9-pr. muzzle-loading gun above mentioned has given the
following results when fired for accuracy : — 8
1 This Committee fired over 1800 rounds to test accuracy.
2 “Armstrong and Whitworth Report,” p. 23. 3 Ibid. p. 24.
4 Ibid. p. 57. 5 jbid> p> 58t 6 ibid. p. 58i
7 Captain W. H. Noble, R.A., has recently made a full report on this subject to the War Office.
8 “ Report of Special Committee on Field Artillery Equipment for India,” p. 22, Appendii.
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
Date of
practice.
No. of
rounds.
Charge.
Projectile.
Eleva¬
tion.
Mean
range.
Mean
difference
of range.
Mean
reduced
deflection.
Jan. 13, 1870
10
lb. oz.
1 12
Common shell, plugged
2°
yds.
1176
yds.
14-2
yds.
0-5
Jan. 13, 1870
10
1 12
n
3°
1652
17*1
0’8
Jan. 17, 1870
10
1 12
it
7°
2665
18'9
0*8
Jan. 18, 1870
10
1 12
it
15^°
4221
25-0
8*0
It is unnecessary, in view of the figures which we have quoted, to consider
the theoretical side of the question of the assumed superior accuracy of
breech-loaders. The question is essentially a practical one ; and practically,
as we have seen, not only does the advantage remain with the muzzle-
loaders, heavy and light, but the accuracy of which good guns of this class
have proved themselves capable — even with a powder of admitted comparative
irregularity of combustion — is all that the artilleryman could possibly desire ;
nor is it possible to conceive any real practical advantage resulting from
the introduction of a weapon capable of greater precision and uniformity of
fire than the English muzzle-loading guns.
IV.
Comparative "Rapidity of Fire and Facility of Manipulation of Woolwich
and Krupp Guns .
Captain von Doppelmair's mode of dealing with the question of the
relative rapidity of fire of the Woolwich muzzle-loading and the Krupp
breech-loading guns, is in principle similar to the system which he has
adopted in dealing with the question of accuracy. He dissolves his facts in
theories.
His theory in this case is, that no comparative trial between the two
systems was possible, because the carriages employed were different.1 The
facts which he has to get rid of are, that at Tegel the English muzzle-
loader largely surpassed the German breech-loader in rapidity of fire.
Having bridged over this difficulty, Captain von Doppelmair proceeds to
construct another theory, which he employs as a sort of tete de pont . He
enumerates the operations required for the two guns, omitting, however, one
or two which form part of the manipulation of the breech-loader ; he com¬
placently accepts the dressing of the lead-coated projectile with tallow or
with wax dissolved in benzine as a serviceable condition ; he makes every
1 Doppelmair, p. 69.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
89
operation with the breech-loader simple and easy, and with the muzzle-
loader long and heavy ; he begs the whole question by informing us that
the loading of the Prussian gun is “ much more convenient ;" and he is
thus finally (e led to assume 33 that the Prussian gun can be more rapidly
and conveniently loaded than the English gun, and with less danger to the
gunners.1 By this means he easily arrives at the conclusion that a gun,
which actually proved itself in open competition more rapid in manipulation
than its rival, is slower, more difficult, and more dangerous to load. If
Captain von Doppelmair's conclusions could be depended upon, it would
follow apparently that a 14^-ton gun is generally easier to handle than
one of 12^ tons. Further, while up to this point the whole English
system had been kept rigorously together — dealt with as a whole, and
not permitted to be resolved for the purposes of comparison into its
elements — we suddenly find that system broken up into different parts.
If the English gun proved rapid in manipulation, the merit did not belong
to the gun, but to the carriage. It is no longer a question of a complete
system, but of a system composed of many elements. If Captain von
Doppelmair had adopted this mode of comparison throughout, there would
be no reason to complain — only in this case his pamphlet would probably
not have been written. But to refuse on one page to recognise any separa¬
tion of the parts of the system, and to reserve a right of separation when
convenient, is plainly inadmissible.
It is a common error, similar to that which assumes an “ incontestable "
superiority of accuracy for breech-loaders, to assume an incontestable
superiority of rapidity for the same class of guns. This theory is put
forward indifferently with regard to breech-loaders of all sizes and calibres.
It has been well observed on this point, that “ it is forgotten that the
strength and skill of men are limited, while the size of guns, and
consequently the weight and complexity of the breech mechanism, are
comparatively unlimited. Men can work small breech-loaders very quickly ;
mere men cannot work quickly the mechanism of such breech-loaders as the
Krupp 1000-pr. With muzzle-loading guns there is no such wide difference
between guns of different size, because the labour peculiar to muzzle-loaders
— that is, the labour of sponging and ramming, does not increase in any¬
thing like the same ratio as the labour peculiar to breech-loaders — that is,
the working of the mechanism. Thus, there may be a point where the
muzzle-loader will overtake and pass the breech-loader in rapid fire ; and the
question is wholly practical."3
Turning from theory to fact, what do we find ? That the rapidity of fire
of the English 9-inch muzzle-loading gun was at Tegel nearly three times
as great as that of the Krupp 9i-inch breech-loading gun ; that the former
gun has been proved at Shoeburyness to be capable of being fired with
accuracy at a rate of 5 rounds in 3 minutes 22 seconds; that the 9-pr.
muzzle-loading bronze gun has fired 50 rounds in 7 minutes;3 and that
with the 9-inch Woolwich gun the following practice for rapidity and
accuracy is officially recorded
1 Doppelmair, pp. 60, 61. 2 “ Neue Militar Zeitung.”
3 “ Report of Special Committee on Field Artillerv for India,” p. 10.
12
90
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
“ Result of ten rounds fired at Shoeburyness for tbe Inspector-General of
Artillery, February 28, 1868, to test the 9-inch Woolwich muzzle-loading gun,
fired at a moving target 5 ft. by 5 ft., distant 1000 yds. The detachment con¬
sisted of 1 officer and 18 men. Charge, 80 lbs.; common shell, of 250 lbs.
Target moving at the rate of 3| miles an hour. Elevation 2° 4' —
Fired in
Round. Minutes. Seconds.
1 . O O
2 . . 1 17
3 . 1 17 struck target.
4 . 1 8
5 . 1 10
“ Target moving at the rate of 6 to 7 miles an hour. Elevation 2°—
Fired in
Round. Minutes. Seconds.
1 . O O
2 . 1 2
3 . O 45
4 . O 45 struck target.
5 . O 30
“ Every one of these rounds would have struck a ship’s launch.”
'With. 12-inch 23-ton Woolwich muzzle-loading gun, firing 6001b. shell
and 60 lb. charges, the result was : —
“ Time of fire, rounds taken from * load ’ to c ready ’ — •
Fired in
Round. Minutes. Seconds.
1 . 1 40
2 . 1 36
3 . 1 25
4 . 1 33
5 . 1 25
These results contrast remarkably with the following account by a writer
in the “ Engineer ” newspaper, of the time occupied in opening and closing
the breech arrangement of a Krupp breech-loading gun: — “ On the 31st
October, 1867, three men — being those in charge of the gun at Paris1 —
the writer caused to manoeuvre the breech-closing arrangements before him.
The result of actual trial — the men being requested to do their utmost as to
speed — was that it required a few seconds more than ten minutes to withdraw
the closing arrangements and to get the gun open ready to receive a projectile
and cartridge, and instantly to recommence the movements for closing the
The great 60-ton “ Exhibition ” Erupp gun is tbe one here referred to.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
91
breech again, without waiting a moment, and restore all to place. If we
add, then, to the above, three or four minutes more for getting into place
through the breech cavity the ponderous and thus awkward-to-handle pro¬
jectile, and the powder cartridge, we shall not be far wrong in saying that
four rounds an hour would be about the best practice that could be expected
from this gun ; and we think we shall not exaggerate in saying that at least
double that number might be loaded and fired from the same length and
calibre of gun, if muzzle-loading. There are no less than eleven distinct
movements and adjustments to be gone through or made merely to open and
close the breech, and half as many more, about, to insert the projectile and
charge. It, of course, might possibly be urged that the three men who
manoeuvred the gun on 31st October were not trained gunners; that was
possibly so, but they were trained mechanics, and knew all the parts they
handled perfectly/”1
These facts establish that both with heavy and light muzzle-loading guns
a rate of fire has been attained equal, if not superior, to the rapidity yet
accomplished with breech-loading guns of corresponding calibre. It is
evidently safer, in dealing with questions of this sort, to adopt a system
precisely the reverse of Captain von Doppelmair' s, and to dissolve, if
possible, theories in facts.2
It is a relief, after so much special pleading, to find Captain von
Doppelmair admitting that, as regards the handling of the guns and pro¬
jectiles and the training of the gunners, “ the preference is due to the
Woolwich system,”3 and that “the breech-piece of the breech-loading gun
requires careful handling, preservation from rust, strict training of the gunners,
and in certain cases consideration and full knowledge of the movable apparatus
of the breech-piece. The lead-coated projectiles require to be more carefully
dealt with, and, under some circumstances, to be more carefully stowed than
shot with bronze studs. On board ship the shot must be well stowed, in
order that the lead jacket may not suffer. The more careful training of the
gunners, called for by guns on the breech-loading system, will take time,
especially in the case of seamen-gunners, who have to be taught their duties
1 “Engineer,” April 3, 1868.
2 It is worth while remarking that, having on purely theoretical grounds established that the
Krupp gun can be fired more rapidly than the English gun, Captain von Doppelmair proceeds, by
way of adjusting his facts to his theories, to state that the difficulties of muzzle-loading have obliged
English artillerists to adopt various devices to overcome them. Thus we are told that “ costly
turntables ‘have been introduced’ for greater convenience of loading ” (p. 61), and that it has been
found necessary to place the studs nearer the centre of gravity, and to experiment with a view to
the introduction of one row of studs, for the same reason (p. 61). If this were so, the argument
could not be admitted as against the system of muzzle-loading, abstractedly. It is no reproach to
a system that those who employ it have recourse to various minor alterations with a view to
its improvement. Still less is it a reproach when those minor alterations are distinctly advan¬
tageous in other ways. In reality, however, the arguments in favour of turntables and the single
row of studs rest upon other considerations. The turntables wholly withdraw the men from the
enemy’s fire, and their use will assuredly not be limited to muzzle-loading guns. The single row
of studs has been proposed on grounds quite independent of facility of loading — such as the greater
length of shot- chamber which can be left unrifled, and the convenience which may attend the use
of projectiles which can be fired in guns having' different twists of rifling.
3 Doppelmair, p. 56.
92
MINUTES OF PllOCEEDINGS OF
as seamen besides those appertaining to gunnery.”1 But having made these
important admissions. Captain von Doppelmair hastily explains them away.
He does not “ attach any particular importance ” to these points. These
defects are (e unimportant they “ exist in the case of all things of improved
construction.”3 In other words. Captain von Doppelmair is forced, by the
pressure of his own reasoning, to the admission that in his opinion simplicity
is a matter of no practical value, and that no particular credit ought to
attach on this account to a system which possesses this characteristic in a
pre-eminent degree. How far an officer who holds this view is a trust¬
worthy guide in artillery questions, practical artillerymen will best be able
to judge.
Y.
Comparative Cost of Woolwich and Krupp Guns.
On one point — the relative cost of the Krupp and Woolwich guns —
Captain von Doppelmair is silent. Whether he thought that a difference
of 100 per cent, in favour of the English gun was, like the greater
simplicity of the weapon, a matter of “no particular importance,” and
therefore not ■worth mentioning, or whether he found the fact insoluble
by any available theory, he has assigned to this point no place in the com¬
parison of the two systems. And yet the question of price is surely one of
great importance. Is it nothing that the English gun should have cost
only £1500, as against £3450, which was paid for the Krupp? The
subject appears to be one of sufficient interest to make it worth while to
supply the details which Captain von Doppelmair has omitted to furnish.
The following table gives the prices of the heavier Krupp guns and pro¬
jectiles. We have included in it other particulars, respecting the calibres,
&c., of the Krupp guns, which may be useful.
I Doppelmair, pp, 56, 57,
2 Ibid. p. 57,
Krupp’s Cast-steel Guns.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION
93
With regard to the English guns, carriages, and projectiles, the following
table gives the trade prices and other particulars of the principal natures of
* The carriages are, as a rule, exact copies, down to the minutest details, of the carriage supplied by Sir William Armstrong for the Tegel experiments.
94
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Woolwich guns, carriages, and projectiles, as supplied at Sir William
Armstrong's Works at Elswick.1
C>
£
£
• <s>
Jfc
CQ
Is
Remarks.
Car¬
riage.
•0OIJJ
£
350
450
560
750
070
_
1250
Charge.
lbs.
30
35
50
70
85
85
120
•pojCoTdxno JopAiod jo sotoadg
\iapA\od 0iqq©d
Projectile. ||
*(qOBO) 0OI.TJ
Palliser
shot.
£ s. d.
16 6
2 5 0
2 11 0
4 2 6
5 8 0
7 0 0
Palliser
shell.
£ s. d.
19 6
2 6 6
2 13 0
4 6 0
5 12 0
7 6 0
(-Xpoq .i0Ao) .Tajaurntd
<N <M 03 C3 <N ©5
^ CD 05 Oi CD CD Ci US
£ <£> t- <X> CD O r^-l rH
•'-< ^ t ^ yH r— 1 i-H
•ap^oafojd jo
jqStaAV oj un'S jo jqSioAi jo opjey;
126-6
136-3
112
104- 3
100-8
105- 66
93-33
112
•jqSi0_^
lbs.
115
115
180
250
400
530
600
700
1
•0OIJJ
£
830
1140
1540
2125
3218
4200
•jqSpM.
cwt.
130
140
180
250
360
500
500
700
♦0,ioq jo qjSuod
calibres
15-85
18
14-75
13- 89;
14- 55
13-18
12
14
ins.
Ill
126
118
125
145-5
145
146
162-5
•qqSuoi IBJOJQ
calibres
18
‘20-2
17
16-3
17
15- 59
14-29
16- 5
ins.
126
141-5
136-5
147
170- 75
171- 5
171-5
191-75
•a.ioq jo .T0^0mei(j
ins.
i:
8
9
10
11
12
11-6
•unS jo uoxqdijoso(j
7- inch .
8- inch .
9- inch .
10- inch .
11- inch* ...
12- inch f ...
11-6-inch ...
1 The prices at which the Woolwich guns, projectiles, &c. are manufactured in the Government
factories are of course considerably less than the Elswick prices, which are here quoted; hut it has
seemed fairer to put trade prices in comparison with trade prices. It should also be noticed that
the trade prices are subject to reduction for discount, and according to the extent of the orders given,
TItE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
05
Thus the Krupp guns are more costly than the Woolwich by at least
100 per cent., to say nothing of the far greater cost of the projectiles of
the former.1
VI.
Comparative 'Endurance of Woolwich and Krupp Guns .
Hitherto, as we have seen, Captain von Doppelmair has contrived so to
confuse the issues as to convey a superficial impression that throughout the
contest at Tegel not merely did a particular Krupp gun prove superior to a
particular English gun, but that the Prussian system of heavy rifled ordnance
established on that occasion a complete superiority at all points to the
English system of heavy rifled ordnance. Directly the knot which Captain
von Doppelmair has so elaborately tied is disentangled, his argument, as we
have seen, falls to pieces. In the same way, when we reach the question of
the relative endurance of the English and Prussian guns, Captain von
Doppelmair, instead of strictly limiting the comparison to the respective
merits of steel and coiled wrought-iron as materials for ordnance, and
eliminating as far as possible all conditions foreign to the comparison,
proceeds to envelop the subject in so much smoke and darkness, that the
difficulty of seeing one's way to a clear and just conclusion becomes greater,
if possible, than ever. Captain von Doppelmair's attack at this point,
partakes of the character and confusion of a midnight sortie. It ought to
have been an essentially plain, philosophical discussion. Eor it may be
said that herein resides the fundamental, the permanent, and characteristic
difference between the two systems of ordnance, and here, if anywhere,
temperate and judicial criticism was desirable.
The test determined upon for the Tegel guns was 600 rounds, with
1 The “ Times correspondent, from whose admirable article on the Tegel experiments we have
already made one or two extracts, makes the following calculations with regard to the relative cost
of the two systems : — “ The question of cost is not to be measured by the difference between that
of the projectiles actually fired, but between the cost of the whole quantity of ammunition to be
provided for all the guns in a battery. W e were informed that by using Siemen’s furnaces, and
otherwise cheapening the manufacture, M. Krupp can make steel projectiles at the cost of one
shilling per pound. A 280 lb. shell would, then, cost £14 — or, roughly speaking, about £10 more
than the Palliser shell. Let us suppose that the Krupp gun is reduced in price to £3000. We
know that the Armstrong can be sold at £1300. Let us further suppose only 200 rounds per gun
to be provided. We believe the selling price of Palliser 9-inch chilled shell is £4 10s. each. Against
the 10s. we will put the cost of the extra powder used in the Krupp gun and shell, and the neces¬
sary renewals of the breech-loading apparatus. Then, a battery of ten Prussian guns will cost
£17,000 more than ten Armstrongs of 9-inch calibre, and the difference in the cost of shells will be
£20,000 — or £37,000 altogether in the battery. To leave no margin for possible exaggeration, the
difference may be put at £30,000— or £3000 per gun — enough to provide Moncrieff’s carriages and
the whole of the magazines and building of the fort. If these considerations have no value in
the eyes of the Prussian War Office, it must be rich or extravagant beyond anything we can dream
of in England.” — “Times,” January 23, 1869.
96
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
battering charges, viz. 43 lbs. of R.L.G. powder, fired from the forward
vent of the English gun; 53 lbs. of Russian prismatic powder, fired from
the rear vent of the Prussian gun. No artillerist will need to be told that
this comparison wras absolutely worthless. The difference in the force
hrisante of the two powders is so great, that the trial was no more com¬
parative than would be a trial of two guns with totally different descriptions
of detonating compositions. In what exact relation the destructive action,
or maximum pressure, of the English powder stands to that of the prismatic
powder, it may be difficult to say positively. The Prussians themselves
have estimated it, as already stated, at twice as great.1 This estimate
is probably excessive. At all events, it is unreliable, as it was arrived at
by means of an instrument — the Rodman pressure-gauge — which recent
experiments in England have shewn to be practically worthless for the
purpose for which it is intended.2 The English estimate of the maximum
pressures exerted by the two powders, as determined by the chronograph,
is as follows
R.L.G. Russian prismatic.
Tons per square in. Tons per square in.
8-inch gun . 29 20
10-inch gun . 28 19
Whether we accept these figures as absolutely correct or not, it is certain
that the hrisante character of the English powder is vastly greater than
that of any other known powder. Indeed, this fact has been most distinctly
and emphatically recognised in general terms by nearly every artillerist —
among others by a Prussian officer, whose authority Captain von Doppelmair
will hardly dispute. Captain Sallback, “ Reporter on Artillery Experiments
at the Prussian War Office,” states that the English powder is so exceed¬
ingly racking and destructive (“ si enormement hrisante ”) that “ no gun in
the world can resist it during a long number of discharges.”3 The Russian
prismatic powder, on the other hand, has recommended itself on account
mainly of its mild character — its progressive inflammation — by which the
maximum strain on the gun is immensely reduced. To subject guns to a
comparative trial of endurance, with powders differing so widely in their
destructive effects upon the gun, was therefore manifestly an absurdity.
Put this was not all. The English gun was saddled with a still heavier
burden : while the Krupp was fired with a rear vent, the English gun was
fired throughout with a forward vent. No artilleryman will fail to appre¬
ciate the importance of this difference. With the forward vent, the maximum
pressure exerted by the R.L.G. powder is of course greatly increased, in con¬
sequence of the more rapid inflammation of the whole charge. The increase
of pressure due to the position of vent, has been estimated by the Com¬
mittee on Explosives as : —
Forward vent. Rear vent.
R.L.G. powder . 28 18
More than this, in computing the number of rounds fired at Tegel, it
1 See p. 63, note 1.
2 This instrument has been entirely discarded on this account by the Committee on Explosives.
3 “ Journal des Armes Speciale.” We have already seen what the effect of only a few rounds
of the English powder was on the Prussian gun. (See p. 68).
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
97
was assumed, on the evidence of the Eodman pressure-gauge, that 43 lbs.
of Prussian cannon-powder was equal in its effect upon the gun to 53 lbs.
of prismatic powder; and therefore all the rounds fired with charges of
43 lbs. and upwards of Prussian powder, were included in the test for
endurance of the Krupp gun.1 Now, it is quite possible that 43 lbs. of
Prussian powder are equal in pressure to 53 lbs. of prismatic, although we
are not prepared to accept the indications afforded by the Eodman gauge
as trustworthy evidence upon this point; but if it be so, then, as the
English powTder is admittedly much more destructive than the Prussian, and
as the English gun fired throughout 43 lb. charges, it follows, on the
evidence of the Prussian instruments and by the arguments of those who
conducted the experiments, that the test advisedly adopted for the English
gun was much more severe than that adopted for the Krupp gun.
Einally, the endurance test of the Prussian gun was conducted in, to say
the least, a most extraordinary manner. Captain von Doppelmair states
that, “ after 430 rounds, a guttering, 22 millimetres long, appeared at the
bottom of the vent. The metal at the bottom of the vent was on this
account removed spherically to a depth of 75 millimetres; but as the
guttering again appeared after the subsequent 30 rounds, the metal was
further removed to a depth of 25 millimetres.2 At the 176th round, the
breech-piece was also damaged, as before described, by a few rounds of
English powder fired experimentally,3 and had to be replaced with one of
“ somewhat different construction, and a new Eroadwell ring.”4 Captain
von Doppelmair also states that some further partial failure of the second
Eroadwell ring occurred after 445 rounds had been fired from it.5 Eurther,
after 662 rounds, a serious crack, 267 millimetres long, ultimately appeared
in the chamber of the gun,6 which was developed another 90 millimetres
by 14 more rounds.7 “ After this,” says Captain von Doppelmair, “ the
trial of endurance, which the gun had hitherto sustained in the most
brilliant manner, was discontinued.”8
The “ Times” correspondent gives a somewhat different account of these
proceedings. He says : — “ If our information be correct, the wedge, or
breech-loading apparatus, had to be changed so long ago as September 29.
After the firing on that day, a crack was discovered at the base of the old
upper vent. Mr. Krupp's workmen were allowed to cut away the surface
of the bore, at the seat of the incipient danger. Part of the breech-loading
apparatus was again renewed on October 15. After the practice on the
same day, the crack appeared again, and was again cut out. On Nov. 19
there was a considerable escape of gas. Before firing on November 21,
the whole breech-loading apparatus was renewed, both Broadwell ring and
wedge. On December 3, so serious a crack appeared, that the chief advo¬
cates of the gun desired that no further experiments should be made with
it.”9
1 Doppelmair, p. 53. 2 Ibid. p. 53. 3 Ibid pp. 12, 13.
4 Ibid. p. 54. 6 ibid. p. 64).
6 Ibid. pp. 54, 55. 7 ibid. p. 54.
8 Ibid. p. 54. The gun subsequently endured thirty-six more rounds with no further increase
of the crack, and it was then sent back to the factory for repair, pp. 85, 86.
9 “ Times,” J anuary 23, 1869.
13
98
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
It is clear, therefore, whether we take the “ Times” account or that
given by Captain von Doppelmair, that the Krupp gun was very carefully
nursed throughout — that whenever any injury appeared which could be
remedied or removed, Mr. Krupp's workmen were at hand with their tools.
The removal of an incipient crack is to a gun, what the removal of a speck
of decay is to an unsound tooth. It is the proverbial “ stitch in time and
the advantage which Krupp's guns derived in an endurance trial from this
treatment is incalculable. This cutting out of the crack, twice repeated,
meant nothing less than the rescuing of the patient from destruction by the
prompt application of the surgeon's knife. The renewal of the breech¬
loading apparatus speaks for itself. With regard to the final crack in the
Krupp gun, Captain von Doppelmair is careful to assure us that it was
occasioned by the bursting of a shell in the bore. In his extreme anxiety
to save the reputation of Krupp' s steel, he is at this point betrayed into an
unfortunate argument. He declares that this serious injury — the splitting
of the gun so severely as to necessitate the discontinuance of the endurance
test — was occasioned by the explosion within it of a single shell;1 but he
has elsewhere, by way of making a point against the English projectiles,
informed us that seven shells2 broke up in the bore of the English gun,3
but “no damage was thereby occasioned" to the gun.4 What grounds
Captain von Doppelmair has for so confidently asserting that the Prussian
gun was injured by a single shell, while the premature bursting of seven
shells in the English gun caused no damage, we do not know ; but if his
statement be correct, we have only to observe that it tells not for but against
the Krupp gun. The premature explosion of a shell is an accident which
must be expected to occur sometimes on service, and if the Krupp gun is
liable to be put hors de combat by one accident of this sort, it is pro tanto
inferior to a gun which can endure seven such premature explosions without
injury.
What conclusions, then, may we draw from this test for endurance of the
Prussian gun? These: that with a mild powder, a rear vent, careful
nursing, the prompt application of tools to any incipient injury, a single
Krupp gun can be made, at an extravagant cost, to exhibit a very fair, but
by no means extraordinary, endurance. And behind all this is the signi¬
ficant fact, that the weight and dimensions of the Krupp 9 J -inch gun have,
since these Tegel trials, been increased from 14 \ to 16 \ tons.5 The weights
now adopted for the different calibres of Krupp guns are given in the table
at p. 93. Why, we may ask, has this increase of weight been made, if the
Tegel trials were wholly satisfactory? Mr. Krupp surely would not add
two tons of steel for mere caprice.
Let us now turn to the English gun. This weapon fired 43 lb. battering
charges of the severe English powder, with a forward vent. At the
1 Doppelmair, p. 54.
2 "We say “shells,” although Captain yon Doppelmair does not expressly state that they were
shells ; hut as he suggests that the friction of the powder against the insides may have caused the
failures (p. 66), it is clear that shells are intended.
3 Doppelmair, p. 66. * ifad, p# 53,
5 In a Krupp gun recently supplied to Belgium for experiment, of which the calibre is only 223
millimetres — almost exactly 9 ins. (9*1735 ins.), the weight is 17,000 kilos., or about 17 tons;
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
99
203rd round1 a crack appeared in the steel tube. Was this crack (which
Captain von Doppelmair states expressly was small in the beginning
and less than that which first appeared in the Krupp) ,2 at once cut away, like
the crack which twice appeared in the Krupp gun ? Not at all. The firing
was continued for another 78 rounds with battering charges , and 30 rounds
with reduced charges, until the injury had become developed to such an
extent that it was impossible to repair it except by the removal of the gun to
the factory for re-tubing. Such removal the Prussian authorities refused to
sanction. They informed Sir William Armstrong that he might cut out
the crack if he could on the ground, as Mr. Krupp had done ; but the
permission was worthless, because it came too late. It is important to put
this matter in a clear light. What had happened, then, was this : a crack
appeared in the English gun, which could, like the crack in the Krupp gun,
have been readily removed at first, but, after the existence of the injury was
well known to the Commission, it was developed by continued firing to an
extent beyond the possibility of repair, except with larger mechanical
appliances than were available on a practice ground. When a similar crack
appeared in the Krupp gun, its removal was at once authorised — a proceed¬
ing, as we have seen, which was also successfully repeated on a second
occasion. The flaw in the Krupp gun was precisely similar to that in the
English gun, and originated, as did that in the latter, at the vent. The
treatment of the two guns under these circumstances should have been exactly
the same. It was, however, as different as possible. The Krupp gun was
promptly and efficiently repaired ; the English gun was not repaired at all,
but subjected to about 100 more rounds of heavy charges, and with a
severe powder, after which repair on the ground — the only repair permitted
— had become impossible.
But this treatment, although it placed the English gun at a serious and
improper disadvantage in the competition, did, in fact, and perhaps contrary
to the anticipations of its opponents, establish an important merit of the
construction. It showed that even after the steel tube has cracked, the
gun might still be fired a considerable number of rounds without danger.
Is there anything in the Tegel or any other trial of the Krupp guns which
will enable Captain von Doppelmair to affirm the same of those weapons ?3
We may here state, also, that the English gun has since been re-lined
and re-proved, and is at this moment in the service of a foreign Government,
which, knowing its history, purchased it at the same price as if it had been
a new gun.
There is another circumstance about the cracking of the English gun to
which, as bearing upon the question at issue, attention must be called, viz.
that the part of the gun which failed — the part which behaved, when com-
1 Captain von Doppelmair says, at the 138th round a guttering, 20 millimetres long, appeared
(pp. 50, 61),
2 See note above, where the guttering in . the English gun is given as 20 millimetres ; while at
p. 53, the original Krupp crack is stated to have been 25 millimetres.
3 It is not beside the subject to compare this behaviour with that of the 8 -inch Krupp gun which
burst explosively, at Tegel, into many pieces (see Doppelmair, pp. 84, 85). Captain von Doppelmair
will say that this was a solid gun ; to which we reply, that the solid guns were originally advo¬
cated by Mr. Krupp just as confidently as his hooped guns are now.
100
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
pared with the performances of scores of similar guns, abnormally and
treacherously, was the steel, and not the wrought-iron. Captain von
Doppelmair will easily believe us when we state that no pains had been
spared in the selection for this gun of a perfectly sound steel tube of
superior quality ; and the material exhibited what we may call its charac¬
teristic defect — the defect of uncertainty. Whereas the tube ought,
according to the evidence of former experiments, to have stood the test,
severe as it was, of 600 rounds of battering charges of English powder, with
a forward vent, it failed after a comparatively small number of rounds.
But surely, as the tube was of steel, this can hardly be used as an argument
in favour of that material. The conclusion to be derived from this expe¬
rience would be not, as Captain von Doppelmair would argue, to make the
whole of your gun of steel, but, on the contrary, to employ as little of that
treacherous and uncertain material as possible. On the other hand, the
wrought-iron portion of the gun acquitted itself well and loyally. With a
split steel tube, it resisted about 100 rounds, of which the greater part were
with battering charges. In this portion of the gun — the portion which is
peculiar to the English system of gun-making — there was no failure
whatever.1
Such results as these obviously afforded too insecure and insufficient basis
on which to attempt to establish the superior resistance of the Krupp to the
Woolwich gun; and this consideration presented itself to Captain von
Doppelmair with so much force, that he immediately set to work to collect
from the highways and byeways of controversy, facts and fictions wherewith to
eke out the slender means at his immediate command. With an appearance
of great pomp and circumstance, he proceeds to consider the relative durability
of the cast-steel and coiled wrought-iron systems of ordnance, and their
liability to burst. But Captain von Doppelmair can never travel far without
a theory ; and the theory which he adopts on this occasion consists of two
terms. It is as follows : — With regard to wrought-iron guns, he says,
“ Erom the trials of one gun, a conclusion cannot be come to as to all guns
of the same description;” as to steel guns, he says, “Prom the trial of one
specimen, a judgment can be formed as to all guns of the same description.”2
It is hardly necessary to observe that this, for a writer who has undertaken
1 The gun as a whole, if we except the steel portion, acquitted itself so well, that it is hardly neces¬
sary to press into the argument the consideration — notwithstanding that it is an important and legi¬
timate one — that the gun which was tried at Tegel was not of the present service construction, which
is believed to afford double the resistance tangentially to the exterior of the tube. If we were so dis¬
posed, we might with perfect fairness throw overboard the endurance test of this gun altogether,
in the same way as Captain von Doppelmair gets rid of the original (solid) construction of Krupp’ s
guns when it serves his purpose to do so (p. 74), although elsewhere we find him including some
of these solid guns among his examples of the successes of Krupp (pp. 72-74). The Woolwich
gun tested at Tegel was really no more a representative of the existing English service system, than
was the Krupp 8-inch solid gun which burst, a representative of Krupp’s present service system.
But, happily, we are not under the necessity of playing fast and loose with our different types of
gun manufacture in this way. The performance of the English gun at Tegel, in firing 100 rounds
after its steel interior had failed, was, we repeat, exceedingly good, and will compare advantage¬
ously with any result obtained with Krupp’s guns — whether solid or hooped — that we are acquainted
with.
2 Doppelmair, p. 69,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
101
to defend steel guns and to disparage wrought-iron guns, is an exceedingly
convenient theory. Having got one steel gun to exhibit, under the excep¬
tional circumstances above described, a fair amount of endurance, it is of
course important to make the most of this result ; and in no way can this
be more conveniently done than by laying down as an axiom that “ from
the trial of one specimen, a judgment can be formed as to all guns of the
same description.”
The application of this theory must immensely facilitate the introduction
of the Krupp guns. Prove one Krupp gun, and you have proved all.
There is no occasion for going to the expense and trouble of a number of
tests to destruction — which, looking to the enormous cost of Krupp guns,
is an advantage. Nurse one steel gun carefully, minimise the strain to
which it is exposed by the employment of a mild powder and a rear vent,
promptly cut away any incipient injury, renew the breech mechanism
whenever it requires it, and if a crack appear which cannot be repaired,
explain it, if possible, by the explosion of a shell within the bore ; and in
this way you may establish not merely the endurance of a single specimen,
but of all steel guns of the same description. That is, in fact, the method
which Captain von Doppelmair recommends when we have to deal with
Krupp guns. Nor is the method peculiar to Captain von Doppelmair,
although to him is due the credit of thus bluntly enunciating it. It is the
method which, more or less, has governed the introduction of Krupp^s system
of heavy artillery, and against which we desire strenuously to expostulate.
If we seek for the source of that system, we always find ourselves referred
back to some one single performance. An 11-inch Krupp gun has done
well; therefore all 11-inch Krupp guns must do well. The 9-inch Krupp
gun gave satisfaction at Tegel ; therefore all 9-inch Krupp guns must give
satisfaction. If we enquire in Belgium for their warrant for the purchase
of a few heavy Krupp guns, we are referred to the Prussian experience ;
and the Prussian warrant for the adoption of these guns, if we except a few
isolated and partial trials, is the Kussian experience; and the Kussian
experience, to which we always come back, is so remarkable as to be worth
relating in some detail.
In 1865, a report was made by a Kussian Artillery Commission which
had been appointed to inquire into the provision of ordnance for fortresses
and naval service.1 A most important point must be noticed in connection
with this report — viz. that a large order for steel ingots, out of which guns
were to be carved, had been given to Krupp by the Kussian Government
before the trials which the Committee were required to conduct had com¬
menced. This circumstance is stated to have been due to the political
exigencies of the moment ("the political aspect of the moment called for
immediate armament, and did not allow of loss of time,”)2 and Cronstadt
had suddenly in 1864 to be placed "in a condition to oppose the attack of
an armour-plated squadron.”3
However unavoidable this order for a material for making guns before
its suitability for the purpose had been established, the circumstance can
1 A translation of this report will be found in the “Proceedings of the Royal Artillery
Institution,” Yol. V. pp. 59-73.
2 “ Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution,” Yol. Y. p, 63. 3 Ibid. Yo!. Y. p. 64.
102
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
hardly fail to have hampered the officers who were called upon to report
upon the merits of this class of ordnance. Supposing the guns to fail in
the experiments, what was to be done with all these costly steel blocks?
The order had been given — an order, like everything else Russian, on a
large scale. As a matter of fact the guns did fail, and this is what the
Committee did : — When they found that the steel ingots would not stand
as rifled guns with heavy charges, they tried them as rifled guns with light
charges ; and when they failed under these conditions, they tried them as
smooth-bores ; and when in their smooth-bore state they stood a test, which
certainly did not err on the side of severity, the Committee gravely reported
“ that Krupp' s cast-steel cannon are of very great resistance."1 As, how¬
ever, they declare in the same breath that “ rifled guns possess very
important' advantages over smooth-bored guns ... as regards their
effect upon armour-plates,"2 and as the Cronstadt armament was expressly
required “ to oppose the attack of an armour-plated squadron," this was
not a conclusion which could be accepted as final or satisfactory. Even
as a piece justicatif, the report was incomplete. So further trials were
made, and at last one breech-loading 8k -inch Krupp gun fired 400 rounds
of 27J lbs. of prismatic powder and 2001b. shot, and 25 rounds of 22 lb.
charges of “ common " powder; upon which the Committee reported that
the 84-inch breech-loader gun was “ perfectly suitable for the armament of
coast batteries."3 In this way the great order to Krupp was sanctioned.
To anticipate a possible objection that this account of the proceedings of
the Russian Committee is deficient in detailed -information, it may be well
to state somewhat more precisely what occurred, observing that the weights
given are in Russian pounds, which are 10 per cent, less than ours, and
that the charges were of comparatively mild Russian powder.
The Committee selected from the steel gun-blocks ordered to be supplied
by Mr. Krupp, eight, with which to experiment. The first block was tried
as a 94-inch muzzle-loading rifled gun. It was fired with 45 lbs. of
prismatic powder and 2691b. shot. It burst badly at the 66th round.
No. 2 block was bored out to 84 ins., and fired with 33 lbs. of powder and
2201b. shot. This gun burst at the 109th round. That these bursts,
notwithstanding the Committee's suggestion that they were perhaps due to
the jamming of the projectiles in the bore, were really in the Committee's
opinion attributable to the simple fact that the guns were unequal to the
strain imposed by these charges,4 seems to be proved by the circumstance
that the next step w^as to effect a further reduction in the charge and weight
of shot.
Nos. 3 and 4 blocks were bored out to 84 ins., and fired with 2741b.
charges5 and 200 lb. shot. After 169 rounds with No. 3, and 240 rounds
1 “ Proceedings of tlie Eoyal Artillery Institution,” Yol. Y. p. 68.
2 Ibid. Vol. Y. p. 68. 3 Ibid. Vol. Y. p. 72.
4 “The reasons assigned for the bursting of the guns, seem prompted by a needless desire to save
the reputation of Krupp’s steel. They evidently burst from over-work, and the misgivings of those
unnamed persons who conceived thereupon doubts as to the resistance of large steel guns, cannot
be regarded as altogether unreasonable.”' — Proceedings of the Eoyal Artillery Institution, Vol. V.
p. 60.
5 One of these guns fired 46 rounds with 33 lb. charges.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
103
with No. 4 gun, it was deemed prudent to discontinue the experiment, on
account of the erosion of the bore, “ due to the mechanical action of the
gas ” and the Committee express their opinion that the service of muzzle¬
loading steel rifled guns of large calibre “ cannot be rated higher than 250
rounds without danger ;”1 2 this conclusion having been arrived at, be it
observed, with an extremely mild powder. By this time half the experi¬
mental blocks had been expended, with results which it was impossible to
regard as satisfactory. At this point, it appears to have struck the Committee
that the endurance of the guns could be more conveniently established if
they were smooth-bored merely. Blocks Nos. 5 and 6 were therefore bored
out to 8£ and 11 ins. The first fired 1025 rounds of 27^ lb. charges
and 80 lb. round shot, the second fired 790 rounds with 44 lb. charges
and 1981b. shot. This test the Committee chose to accept as establishing
the “ great resistance " of Krupp's steel guns. Two blocks remained ;
No. 7 was tried as an 8^-inch muzzle-loading rifled gun, with a Parrott cup
to stop windage. After 50 rounds the practice was stopped, the results having
been unsatisfactory. No. 8 block was tried as an 8^-inch breech-loading
gun. After, as has been stated, 400 rounds of 27 ^ lbs. powder and 200 lb.
shot, and 25 rounds of 22 lb. charges, the Committee reported that guns of
this description were “ perfectly suitable for the armament of coast batteries
they decided upon the immediate introduction of this class and calibre of
gun, and upon converting all the 84-inch guns already made, and all those
which remained to be delivered, into breech-loaders.
This is how the Krupp guns came to be introduced into Eussia. Upon
this evidence the reputation of that class of ordnance may be said really to
rest. How far the foundation is equal to the support of the superstructure
■which has been imposed upon it, we leave to competent judges to determine.
It might be supposed that Captain von Doppelmair would be embarrassed
by the circumstance that the Eussian trials, upon which the whole fabric of
the reputation of Krupp' s heavy ordnance rests, were conducted with solid
steel guns — a construction which is now abandoned as admittedly unreliable.
It might also be supposed that the circumstance of one or two of these solid
guns having in the first instance given' results which were deemed satis¬
factory, while subsequent trials have so far contradicted the earlier experience
as to show the necessity for abandoning that construction, scarcely dovetails
into the theory that “from the trial of one specimen (of steel guns), a
judgment can be formed as to all guns of the same description." But
Captain von Doppelmair does not for a moment allow difficulties of this sort
to obstruct his progress. Nay, he even boldly takes credit for the perform¬
ances of these solid guns,3 and he trusts here, as he has trusted elsewhere,
to the carelessness of his readers to overlook this inconsistency, and to
overlook also the disastrous failure of a solid 8 -inch Krupp gun at Tegel,
when he is pressing upon them his theory that from the behaviour of one
specimen the behaviour of all steel guns of the same sort may be safely
inferred. Captain von Doppelmair conducts his arguments on the turret
system of warfare. It is no inconvenience to him to swing round and fire
1 “ De crainte que si l’on continuait le tir, les projectiles ne produissent une obturation dans
l’ame du canon.” — Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution, Vol. Y. p. 67.
2 Doppelmair, pp. 72-74.
104
MINUTES OF FllOCEEDINGS OF
in the opposite direction, leaving his theory for the time to take care of
itself as best it may. Thus we find that out of seven Krupp steel guns of
large calibre, which is all that he can enumerate in testimony of the
endurance of this ordnance,1 no less than four are of the solid construction
—the construction which is admitted to have failed, and which is now
abandoned.2
This leaves us, on Captain von Doppelmair* s own showing, with only
three heavy Krupp guns of which the endurance test has been in his opinion
markedly satisfactory. One of these was the Tegel gun, and in what manner
the endurance of that weapon was established, and how far the gunmakers
themselves are satisfied with the performance, we have already seen. The
second was another 9 J- -inch 14J-ton gun, which fired no charges heavier than
43 lbs. of prismatic powder3 — a charge which it was proved at Tegel left the
gun far behind its lighter and smaller English rival in penetrative effect.
The third was the Krupp 11 -inch gun, which has fired 400 rounds of heavy
charges of prismatic powder.4 It is therefore easy to understand why
Captain von Doppelmair insists so emphatically upon his convenient theory
that “from the trial of one specimen, a judgment can be formed as to all
guns of the same description.-” We shall presently consider from another
point of view how far this principle may properly be applied to steel guns.
With regard to the English guns, Captain von Doppelmair lays down a
totally different axiom, viz. that “ from the trial of one gun, a conclusion
cannot be come to as to all guns of the same description.” With this view
we so heartily concur, that we do not care to trouble ourselves with com¬
menting on the unfairness of applying to the English guns a touchstone
which is rejected when we are dealing with steel guns.
Taken by itself, then, we have no sort of objection to make to the principle
here enunciated, beyond the obvious objection that it is one of universal
application, and that it is not open to Captain von Doppelmair to except
from its operation the guns which he has made it his business to extol.
The principle of basing our confidence in any system of gun, on the trials,
not of isolated specimens, but of a large number of guns, and feeling our
way by repeated and careful experiments until our confidence is fully and
fairly established, is the only sound, the only safe and rational system upon
which to proceed. It is to the application of this very principle that we
are ever anxious to appeal, for evidence of the superior character of the
English guns. It is at this point that we are most distinctly at issue with
partisans like Captain von Doppelmair, who desire us to recognise the
safety and durability of guns, whether of steel or any other material, upon
exceptional trials of a few specimens, and who enunciate the extraordinary
theory that the particular class of guns which they advocate needs no
extended trials. We shall presently show that steel guns, more than any
others, require to be subjected to the test of extended experience, before they
1 Doppelmair, pp. 72-74.
2 “ The Prussian artillery are having hoops added to the solid steel guns in stock.” — Doppelmair,
p. 85.
3 Doppelmair, p. 73.
4 Ibid. Also, pamphlet giving result of trial of the 11-iricli gun.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
105
can be accepted as satisfactory. But, for the moment, we are concerned
with our English weapons, and with observing how far they have satisfied
the test which Captain von Doppelmair very properly desires to impose upon
them. That officer, it is perhaps hardly necessary to observe, conscientiously
believes that the English guns have failed to satisfy such a test. He states
this, indeed, in express terms, and labours through several pages to prove
it. He assures his readers that “the English artillery can only bring
forward two guns” which have stood a satisfactory endurance test;1 he
gives us a table of twelve English guns, which he says have failed;2 he
quotes seven passages from the reports of the Ordnance Select Committee
to prove how frequent have been the failures, and how numerous the
difficulties with the English guns;3 and, finally, he condemns the whole
English system of gun-making, stating that, “in the English guns there is no
scientific arrangement of metal ;”4 that “ the scientific arrangement may be
there, but it is only accidental;”5 that “the tension of the wrought-iron in
the coils, according to their different diameters, is left entirely undetermined ;”6 *
that “ great accuracy in making the coils is not observed, and no trouble is
taken to fulfil any of the requirements of the theory of the resistance of
guns;”? that the durability of wrought-iron guns depends “on the con¬
scientious and technical knowledge of the individual workman .”8
It is hardly necessary to inform anyone who knows anything about the
subject that, if the case were as Captain von Doppelmair represents it, no
defence of the English heavy guns would be possible. If we really had for
all these years been blindly groping our way by rule of thumb — making
guns on no definite or scientific arrangements, bursting one specimen after
another, adopting innumerable and hap -hazard modifications of construction,
and in the result producing only two guns of satisfactory endurance — we
should deserve not merely all the hard things which Captain von Doppelmair
says of us, but many besides, and our heavy artillery would be simply a
disgrace to our service. Indeed, assuming, as we are bound to do, that
Captain von Doppelmair sincerely believes what he tells us, we must render
a tribute to his comparative moderation of language, and esteem it in some
sort an honour that he has thought it worth while seriously to discuss an
artillery which is in so deplorable a condition.
But let us examine the several statements upon which this lively attack
upon our heavy guns rests.
1st. “ The English artillery can only bring forward two guns ” of any
considerable endurance.9
We do not remember to have met, in any work on artillery, a statement
at once so broad and so inexact as this. Only two English guns which have
stood severe endurance tests ! If Captain von Doppehnairjs information
1 Doppelmair, p. 74 2 Ibid. p. 69. 3 ibid. pp. 75-77.
4 Ibid. p. 71. 5 Ibid. p. 71. « ibid. p. 71.
7 Ibid. p. 72. s i^d. p. 69.
9 Ibid. p. 74 This extraordinary passage is as follows: — "Against these seven Rrupp guns
of large calibre which have stood the test in the most brilliant manner ” (see ante, p. 103, where
it is shown that four of these were solid guns), " the English artillery can only bring forward two
guns, one of which, of only 7-inch calibre, cannot strictly be reckoned as belonging to guns of large
calibre.”
14
106
MINUTES of proceedings of
respecting the English artillery on so important a point be so limited and
incorrect as would appear from this statement, we cannot be surprised at
the opinions which he has formed ; we can only be surprised that he has
ventured on such data to form an opinion at all. Eor what are the facts?
"Without insisting too emphatically on the circumstance that over six
thousand guns have been made for the English service on the system which
Captain von Doppelmair so strenuously condemns, without a single explosive
burst after the guns have been admitted into the service, notwithstanding
that they have all been fired with the severe English powder which a Prussian
officer declares no gun can resist for many rounds,1 we would pass at once
and confidently to the performances of the heavy rifled guns.
Of these guns, we find that the following had been made and passed into
the service up to October 31, 1870 2
13 -inch 23 tons . 2
12 „ 25 and 23 tons . 19
10 w 18 tons . 60
9 // 12 a . 494
8 „ 9 w . 119
7 n 7 // 113
7 a 6£ „ . 676
1383
And what have been the results obtained with these weapons ? There is,
in the first place, the important result which we have already mentioned,
that no single instance has occurred of a gun bursting after its admission
into the service ; and, with regard to the number of rounds which have been
fired, while it is of course impossible for us to give the exact endurance of
each of the 1383 guns, the following table will furnish a sufficient contra¬
diction of Captain von DoppelmaiPs statement that only two English heavy
rifled guns have exhibited a satisfactory endurance.
Number of Rounds fired by Woolwich Guns of different calibres .
Muzzle-loading Guns*
Nature
of gun.
12-inch
11 -inch
10-inch
9 -inch
C 1 gun has fired 262
( 1 w n 200
(1 „ // 119
1 1» „ ,i 304
(1 ,i ,i 534
(.1 n n 163
f 1 // // 1107
1 /, // 1070
I 1 n i, 1049
1 1 . // // 945
1 " „ 600
U /, /, 500
rounds.
//
n
a
n
n
n
n
n
a
n
n
Nature
of gun.
9-inch
8-inch
7 -inch
ji
{i
i
i
i
i
i
i
1 gun has fired 500 rounds.
500
370
433
408
1729
1061
1009
986
637
636
1 See ante, p. 96.
2 In addition to these, there have keen made 457 64«prs., which are hardly entitled to rank as
e( heavy rifled guns.”
9 A 1 Of -inch gun,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
107
7-inch Breech-loading- Guns.
1 gun has fired 1949 rounds.
1 n i) 1457 n
1 n n 1296 w
1 „ „ 1246 „
1 // n 942 //
1 i) n 918 a
1 n it 918 a
1 a a 860 „
1 i> n 836 a
1 gun has fired 792 rounds.
1 a a 756 a
1 n // 751 n
1 n n 700 w
1 n n 687 n
1 // // 647 „
1 n a 636 //
1 a a 630 //
It may further be added, that “ the experimental firing at Shoeburyness
has, in a great measure, consisted of trials of the service guns; and it may
give some idea of the extent of these trials to state that more than 50 tons
of gunpowder have been expended there annually in this manner.”1 How
far the above table bears out or contradicts Captain von BoppelmaiEs state¬
ment about the “two English guns,” our readers will be able to judge.
2nd. Captain von Hoppelmair gives a table2 of twelve English guns
which have failed. With one exception, these were all experimental guns,
tested for the purpose of ascertaining particular points in their respective
structures ; to say nothing of the fact that, without a single exception, these
guns are all of a construction which has long been obsolete, the trials
having fulfilled their object.3
3rd. We next come to several passages from the Reports of the late
Ordnance Select Committee, which Captain von Hoppelmair cites to show
howr numerous have been the failures and difficulties with the Woolwich
guns.4 The only way of dealing satisfactorily with these extracts is to
reprint them seriatim, with such comments as suggest themselves.
Extracts from the Reports and Pro¬
ceedings of the Ordnance Select
Committee , Vol. IF.
Captain yon Hoppelmair' s
Paraphrase.
“Page 133. — The Committee re¬
ports that the 9*22-inchgun,No. 222,
rifled on the shunt system, burst on
May 19, 1866, after 402 rounds with
shot of 100 to 118 kilos. (220*46 lbs.
and 260*14 lbs.) ; of these 402
rounds, 266 were fired with charges
RemarJcs.
Instead of “assuming” that the
steel tube had received damage, the
Committee state distinctly that “from
the appearance of some fragments of
the steel tube, it would appear the
latter had given way some rounds
before the explosion.”5
Captain von Hoppelmair omits
also to quote the statement of the
Committee that the iron used was
“of a quality which has since been
discontinued, and as such the gun
1 Captain Haig’s paper in “Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” Yol. VI. p. 468. Fuller details of
the trials of the Woolwich guns are given in Captain Stoney’s admirable paper on “ The Construc¬
tion of our Heavy Guns.” — Proceedings, R.A. Institution, Vol. VI. p. 406.
2 Doppelmair, p. 69.
3 Captain von Doppelmair does not hesitate to state, nevertheless, “ The material and the mode
of manufacture of English guns have not been altered since that time” (p. 69).
4 Doppelmair, pp. 75-77.
6 Extracts, Ordnance Select Cqnmiittee, Vol. IV. p. 134.,
108
MINUTES OE PKOCEEDINGS OE
of 19’5 kilos. (48*0 lbs.) of rifle
large-grained powder, and the rest
with smaller charges. The gun was
made on the Armstrong system, and
had a steel inside tube. The gun
burst into forty-two pieces. The
Committee assumes that after the
first few rounds before the explosion,
the inside steel tube had received
damage. Nothing is said of the
possibility of the shot having got
jammed.”1
can hardly be considered a fair type
of the present service gun of 9 -inch
calibre.”3
He omits also to quote the state¬
ment that “ the gun was known to
be considerably scored, and had been
ordered up for re-tubing; but as
there was an urgent programme to
be completed, to try the possibility-
of dispensing with a pivot in mount¬
ing 12-ton guns, the Committee
directed fifty more rounds to be fired
from it before sending it up. It was
at the thirteenth of these rounds that
it burst.”4
It appears, on reference to the
Committee’s report, that the charges
which Captain von Doppelmair states
were all “ smaller ” than 60 lbs. and
7 0 lbs., were, on the contrary, every
one of them, in excess of 70 lbs.,
viz. two of 87| lbs., one of 80 lbs.,
one of 90 lbs., and nine of 100 lbs.6
The Committee also expressly call
attention to the “ exceptionally large
charges ”6 which this gun fired, and
there is therefore the less excuse
for this inaccuracy in Captain von
Doppelmair’ s statement.
Further, this was wholly an experimental gun — a 13 -inch bore in 23 tons
of metal, and with an untempered steel tube.
Finally, the gun did not “ burst” at all. What happened was that the
steel tube split, and when at least nine more rounds had been fired, the outer
tube split also, but not explosively. In fact, the failure of the steel interior
was merely succeeded by the non-explosive disintegration of the surrounding
wrought-iron mass.7
“ Page 136 to 138. — Particulars
are here given of the bursting of the
13-inch gun, No. 300, which is in¬
cluded in the table at page 69. The
gun burst on March 27, 1866. Of
the fifty-two rounds fired from the
gun, twenty-four were with charges
of 31'8 kilos. (70*10 lbs.), fifteen
withchargesof 27*2kilos. (59’961bs.),
and the rest with smaller charges ;
the shot, 259 to 304 kilos.”3
“ Page 188. — They here speak of
the bursting of the 9-inch gun,
No. 287, rifled on the Woolwich
system, after 368 rounds, of which
322 were fired with the battering
charge of 19*5 kilos. (43*0 lbs.) of
rifle large-grained powder, and the
remainder with smaller charges.
Instead of 322 rounds with 43 lbs.,
as stated, the gun had fired 136
rounds with 45 lbs., and 260 lb. shot ;
and 186 rounds with 44 lbs.; all above
the service battery charges.
Captain von Doppelmair omits also
to mention that the Superintendent of
the Eoyal Gun Factory knew that
1 Doppelmair, p. 75. 2 Ibid.
3 Extracts, Ordnance Select Committee, Vol. IV. p. 192.
4 Ibid. p. 133. 5 Ibid. p. 35. 6 Ibid. p. 196.
7 Ibid. pp. 136, 138.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
109
This gun appears in the table, at
page 70, as damaged after 104 rounds.
The inside tube had been replaced
by a new one of wrought-iron, rifled
on the Woolwich system. In this
altered state it burst after 368 rounds;
but it cannot be discovered from this
description whether the previous 101*
rounds are included in this number.
The inside tube and the coils gave
way, but only two parts separated
from the actual body of the gun — a
part of the trunnion ring and a part
of the outer coil."1
the coiled iron inner tube was a bad
one, and that he reported that " had
it not been desirable to see in what
manner the gun would give way, lie
would have proposed to remove the
tube after the fiftieth round and re¬
place it."3 He also thought “ the
result favourable to Mr. Erasers
mode of construction,"4 and that it
showed "the advantageof iron barrels,
which yield gradually in place of
suddenly, as is the case with steel."5
The failure was, in fact, due solely
to an acknowledged defect in the
workmanship of the tube.
The 104 rounds which the gun had
previously fired as a shunt rifled gun,
are not included in the 322 rounds
which it fired subsequently with a
wrought-iron barrel.
“ Page
is
The particulars which Captain
von Doppelmair complains are not
given, are in fact given in great
detail;6 and from these particulars
it appears that the gun had fired
400 rounds, of which 350 rounds
were with charges of 44 and 45 lbs.,
which gave a total consumption of
“ no Jess than 17,124 lbs. of powder,
or very nearly 8 tons," and an aggre¬
gate weight of projectiles of 43J tons.7
The Committee further observe
“ that they are not aware of any
guns having consumed a quantity of
powder and shot comparable with
the above in such large charges."8
Attention is further specially called
by the Committee to the circumstance
—which Captain von Doppelmair
also omits to notice — that the failure
was entirely due to the giving way of
the steel tube, and that the gun “ held together at least fourteen rounds after
the tube was split, during part of which the water was seen to pass through
the gun when it was sponged"9 — a circumstance which appeared to the
Committee to afford “ an indication of very great strength in the material
191.— Here mention
made of the bursting of the 9-inch
gun, No. 286, of cheap construction.
The particulars are not given. As
regards bursting, the Committee
arrived at the opinion that the cheap
construction is probably little inferior
to the Armstrong system, and that it
has the advantage of the latter, that
in case of bursting the number of
pieces is considerably less. In order
to decide the question of the con¬
struction of the guns, and material
for the inner tubes, the Committee
recommended that four 9 -inch guns
made on the two systems, and fitted
with wrought-iron and steel centre
tubes, should be submitted to a trial
of endurance."3
3 Extracts, Ordnance Select Committee, Vol. IY. p. 76.
5 Ibid. 6 ibid. pp. 75, 76.
9 Ibid.
1 Doppelmair, pp. 75, 76.
3 Ibid. p. 190.
7 Ibid. p. 76.
4 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
110
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
and in the construction. ’n The Superintendent of the Royal Gun Factory
observes also : — “ The bursting of this gun is in no way to be attributed to
the method of its construction, but simply to the failure of the steel tube.”2
We have no hesitation in saying that
this passage is calculated to produce
a wholly incorrect impression of the
transaction in question. The facts are
as follows : — The Superintendent of
the Royal Gun Factory was anxious to
establish by testing three guns of each
calibre — 7 -inch, 8-inch, and 9-inch —
to destruction, what these guns were
capable of standing.4 * The Com¬
mittee did not think it necessary to
incur “the enormous outlay” which
this experiment would entail,6 and
they thought that their experience of
these guns enabled them to assign
temporarily a limit to the number of
rounds to be fired from the guns, and
to draw a line well within the limits
of safety, beyond which the practice
should not be pushed. The Com¬
mittee distinctly and pointedly
state (but this passage Captain
von Doppelmair omits) that “they
are satisfied that the guns, as at
present constructed, are fully equal
to the requirements of the service,
and are not exceeded in strength and
durability by those of any other known construction or material ;”6 but in
the absence of definite data as to the final limits of resistance of these guns
— data which could only be obtained by “ an enormous outlay,” data,
moreover, which would gradually accumulate in the natural course of the
experiments with these weapons — it was determined, as an extreme pre¬
caution,7 to limit for the time being8 the service of the 9-inch guns to 400
rounds, of which not more than 150 should be with battering charges. It
was the intention of the Committee, as their experience of our heavy guns
became developed, to advance the limit then imposed on the number of
rounds — the line being always kept well within the limits of ascertained
safety. This intention has been fully realised. Since 1866 our experience
of our guns has vastly increased; and at a meeting of the Heads of the
“Page 192. — In consequence of
the repeated bursting of guns of large
calibre with ordinary charges, the
Committee recommended that, as a
precautionary measure, the service
number of rounds from the 9-inch guns
should be limited to 400, and that of
this number not more than 150 should
be fired with the battering charge;
and that a circular should be issued
containing this order. This im¬
portant acknowledgment by the
English Ordnance Select Committee
of the unreliable durability of English
guns of large calibre, runs as follows,
in the language of the original: —
‘ They think, however, that as a
matter of precaution, the service of
the 9-inch guns should be restricted
for the present to 400 rounds, of
which no more than 150 should be
with the battering charge, and that a
circular should be issued to this
effect/ ”3
1 Extracts, Ordnance Select Committee, Yol. IY. p. 76. 2 Ibid. p. 78.
3 Doppelmair, p. 76. 4 Extracts, Ordnance Select Committee, Yol. IY. p. 191.
6 Ibid. p. 192. 6 Ibid.
7 “As a measure of precaution.” — Extracts, Ordnance Select Committee, Vol. IY. p. 192.
3 “ For the present,” — Ibid. p. 192,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
Ill
Department, held at "Woolwich in the beginning of June 1870, the following
rules for the firing of the heavy Woolwich guns were adopted : —
All service rifled muzzle-loading guns up to 9-inch inclusive, may be fired
without restriction as to the number or nature of rounds.
10-inch guns to be carefully examined in the Eoyal Gun Factory or by
skilled persons after 500 rounds, of which 250 may have been with battering
charges. 12 -inch guns (of which our experience is at present necessarily
small), to be examined in the Royal Gun Factory or by skilled persons after
250 rounds, of which 100 may have been with battering charges.1 2
How far Captain von Doppelmair* s account of the circumstances attending
the adoption of a limit for the .service of the 9-inch guns, and his statement
that the adoption of such a limit was “ in consequence of the repeated
bursting of guns of large calibre with ordinary charges,” can be reconciled
with the actual facts, our readers will now be able to judge. What was, in
fact, a mere precautionary and admittedly temporary measure — the adoption
of which affords, indeed, an excellent example of the cautious and prudent
manner in which our authorities have felt their way through the terra
incognita of heavy ordnance — becomes, in Captain von Doppelmair's hands,
an incident of the gravest significance, an interposition by the Ordnance
Select Committee, to which they had been driven by the “ repeated bursting
of guns of large calibre.”
It is necessary to make two further observations upon this subject.
Captain von Doppelmair is probably unable to appreciate the cautious
development of a large subject — the philosophical and prudent progress,
step by step, the making good each position before occupying it — -which has
characterised the English treatment of the heavy gun question, and which
justifies the impatience with which English artillerists regard alike the
laudations of systems of heavy artillery, such as Krupp's, which rest upon
no such basis, and the easy theories on the subject, such as that which
affirms that “from the trial of one specimen (of steel guns), a judgment
can he formed as to all guns of the same description.”3 The second obser¬
vation which it occurs to us to make, is this : — Why, if Captain von
Doppelmair sees an indication of mistrust, and an admission of failure in
the circumstance that the service of the English 9-inch guns was temporarily
limited to 400 rounds, of which 150 might be with battering charges of
43 lbs. of the severe English powder* — why has he nothing to observe on the
limitation of the service of the 8i-inch Krupp by a Russian Committee
to 250 rounds, the maximum charge being 27-| lbs. of comparatively mild
Russian powder?3
From our point of view, this precaution on the part of the Russian
Committee was a proper and judicious one to take, and one which has been
amply justified by subsequent experience. But clearly it is not open to
Captain von Doppelmair to make use of the precautionary recommendation
of our Artillery Committee as an argument against the English guns, while
he ignores the far more stringent and less favourable recommendation of the
Russian Artillery Committee with regard to the Krupp guns*
1 “ List of Changes in Artillery Stores, &c.” § 1919.
2 Doppelmair, p. 69* 3 sf Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” Yol. V. pp. 67, 68, §§ 12, 16,
112
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OP
Page 196.-— Here mention is
Prom this extract, it would appear
that another 13 -inch gun, besides
that referred to in Captain von
DoppelmaiPs second extract, had
burst. This, however, is the same
gun (No 300) — an experimental
13-inch bore in 23 tons of metal,
and with an untempered steel tube.
It is the gun about which Captain
von Doppelmair had already made
the curious blunder of stating that
the charges used besides the service charges were all “ smaller” than 70 lbs.
and 60 lbs. ; whereas, in fact, they were all, as we have seen, and as Captain
von DoppelmaiPs own extract now informs us, exceptionally heavy charges
— all heavier than 70 lbs., and nine of them of 100 lbs. each.
made of the bursting of a 13 -inch
gun. The number of rounds is not
stated, but it is mentioned that the
gun was fired with very heavy charges,
and that, among others, nine rounds
were fired with 45*1 kilos. (99*43 lbs.)
of powder.”1
This failure was due, again, to an
original defect in that portion of the
gun which is made of the material
which Captain von Doppelmair
especially favours, viz. steel. The
proof of guns is established specially
to bring to light any such defects,
and to prevent untrustworthy guns
from passing into the service.
The proof, therefore, in this instance exactly answered the object for which
it was established ; and it is not necessarily a reproach to a system when a
gun fails at proof.3 The reproach attaches when a gun fails after proof —
after admission into the service. The failure in question proved two things :
It afforded a further and striking indication of the capricious character of
even the best steel ; and it showed that even an English gun, with a split
steel tube, would not stand j^00/ charges. The result of this experience has
been the introduction of a slight modification in the construction, by which
the quantity of steel is reduced, the thickness of the steel tubes having been
diminished ; while the single outer iron coil has been divided into a double coil.4
With regard to Captain von DoppelmaiHs statement that of four 13-inch
English guns “ three burst,”5 it will be sufficient to observe that not one of
these guns burst. They became unserviceable. The whole of these guns
were of an experimental construction, with wrought-iron tubes, or tubes of
untempered steel.
4th. Not content with making a number of statements with regard to the
English guns more or less specific, but all, as we have seen, more or less
inexact. Captain von Doppelmair seeks to strengthen his case by a sort of
wholesale condemnation of the English system of gun-building which hardly
admits of categorical reply. He states that English guns “are not guns
with scientific arrangement of metal ; the arrangement may be there, but it
Captain von Doppelmair, in a note,
and in an appendix, gives some par¬
ticulars of the bursting, in September
1868, of an English 9-inch Wool¬
wich gun.2
1 Doppelmair, p. 76. 2 Ibid. p. 77 note, and pp. 81-84.
3 Sir Thomas Blomefield burst no less than 496 cast-iron guns in proof in one year, 1780-81,
(See General Lefroy’s Catalogue of Museum of Artillery).
4 “Changes in Artillery Materiel, &c,” §§ 1905, 1906.
5 Doppelmair, p. 74.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
113
is only accidental.”1 “ The tension of the wrought-iron in the coils, accord¬
ing to their different diameters, is left entirely undetermined, great accuracy
in making the coils is not observed, and no trouble is taken to fulfil any of
the requirements of the theory of the resistance of guns ;”3 with more to the
same effect,3 which it would be unprofitable to quote. We are above all
things desirous to conduct this controversy with every possible respect for
the officer to whom we are replying, and carefully to observe throughout
the limits of courteous discussion. It is therefore not open to us to meet
these broad assertions with an equally broad and positive denial. And yet
nothing can be more certain than that the construction of the Woolwich
guns is based upon an intelligible principle, which may or may not appear to
Captain von Doppelmair to be a “scientific” one, but which in any case
admits of precise definition. The principle is well explained in Captain
Stoney's paper on the “Theory of Gun Architecture. 4 “Sir William
Armstrong's main principles of gun architecture,” says Captain Stoney,
“ consist essentially : — First : In arranging the fibres of the iron in the
several parts so as best to resist the strain to which they are respectively-
exposed ; thus, the walls or sides of the gun are composed of coils with the
fibres running round the gun, so as to enable the gun to bear the transverse
strain of the discharge without bursting, whilst the breech end is fortified
against the longitudinal strain, or tendency to blow the breech out, by a
solid forged breech-piece, with the fibre running along the gun. Secondly :
In shrinking the successive parts together, so that not only is cohesion
throughout the mass ensured, but the tension may be so regulated that the
outer coils shall contribute their fair share to the strength of the gun, in
accordance with the theory .... that a gun should, if possible, be
constructed in such a manner that each part of its mass would do its due
proportion of work at the instant of firing.”5 Here, at any rate, is a dis¬
tinct principle at the foundation of the construction of the English guns.
Such modifications as have been adopted have been in the direction of a
fuller application of that principle, and of the reduction to a minimum of
the employment of the material which in practice has proved the most
treacherous and the most difficult of control — viz. steel. In short, in the
latest designs of English guns, the quantity of steel has been so reduced
that, in point of strength, the guns are independent of it under the most
trying conditions of service.6
To this, as a further reply to Captain von Doppelmair' s statement, that
the arrangement of the metal of our guns is wholly “ accidental,” may be
added the fact already mentioned — that of 6000 guns made on this con*
struction, not one has burst on service.7 The “ accident ” which can pro¬
duce such satisfactory and uniform results must at least be admitted to be a
happy one, and perfectly unobjectionable.
1 Doppelmair, p. 71. 2 Ibid. pp. 71, 72. 3 ibid. pp. 68-70;
4 “Proceedings, R.A, Institution,” Vol. VI. p. 335.
6 Ibid. pp. 336, 337. Eor fuller details on this subject, the reader is referred to the paper from
which these passages are extracted.
6 See ante, p. 112. Also, “ Proceedings, R.A. Institution,” Yol. YI. p. 411, where the adoption of
a steel tube only 2 ins. thick is recorded. Also, “Changes in Artillery Materiel,” §§ 1905, 1906.
The main reason for the retention of steel, is the superior hardness and surface which it presents
for the bore.
7 See what has been said, ante, pp. 106, 107, respecting the endurance of the Woolwich guns.
15
114
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
VII.
General Comparison of Woolwich and Krupp Systems of Heavy
Artillery .
Thus far we have been content to parry Captain von Doppelmair’s several
attacks on our English system of heavy ordnance. We have confined our¬
selves as much as possible to examining the statements upon which those
attacks rest, and to showing that the Tegel trials really furnished no
comparison between the Krupp and Woolwich guns, for the reason that the
former weapon was much bigger and longer and heavier ; that it fired far
heavier charges and projectiles, with a large resulting theoretical ballistic
superiority ; and for the further reason, that in the endurance tests it was
not only fired with a far milder pow^der than its rival, but enjoyed special
advantages whicli the English gun was not permitted to share. We have
sliowm also, we believe, that, despite these disadvantages, the English gun,
wdien fired with proper projectiles, actually surpassed the Prussian gun in
penetrative effects ; that it exhibited an endurance which was practically —
notwithstanding the failure of its treacherous steel tube— more valuable and
excellent than that obtained by the skilful nursing of the Krupp gun; that
in accuracy of shooting it was not inferior to the Krupp ; while in rapidity,
simplicity, and economy, it was vastly superior to it. And these conclusions
justify, we think, the surprise which we have already expressed at the
attempts on the part of foreign critics to derive from the Tegel trials a
verdict unfavourable to the English system of heavy ordnance and favour¬
able to the Krupp.
But before quitting the subject, it is desirable to make some general
remarks respecting the issue which Captain von Doppelmair and his fellow-
critics have raised. That issue is not limited to the disparagement of the
English ordnance. On the ruins of our system, it is proposed to erect
another system — that of Krupp. The proximate object, no doubt, is the
destruction of confidence at home and abroad in English guns. The ultimate
object is the adoption at home and abroad of steel breech-loaders, manufac¬
tured at Essen. The road to this conclusion lies through the English
ordnance. There is no byeway through bronze or cast-iron. The one real,
substantial obstacle is the English wrouglit-iron gun. Until that obstacle is
removed, the desired conclusion cannot be reached. We have written to
little purpose if we have not shown that there is here no right of wray — that
English heavy ordnance rests on too broad and solid a basis of experimental
approval to be thus easily disturbed.
But our defence of the position wrnuld be to some extent incomplete, if wre
wrere to stop here.
Let us briefly consider, then, in general terms : 1st. What is this system
of artillery which it is nowr proposed to destroy ; and 2nd, What is the
system which it is proposed to establish in its place.
The Euglish system of heavy artillery is a system which has been gra¬
dually and carefully developed by successive experiments, and which is
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
115
compounded of all that seemed to us best. Elswick and Woolwich, Major
Palliser and the French, have all contributed to it ; even Sir Joseph Whitworth
complained in his evidence before the Ordnance Council that “ of late the
heavier guns have been made to approximate more nearly to my proportions ;5'
and this development has been effected at a cost of money and labour with
which no foreign experiments can compare. From the small field guns
which were introduced in 1858, we have advanced step by step to our
12-ton, 18-ton, and 25-ton guns; we are now busy with the manufacture
of a gun of 35-tons. Can any foreign critic point to any failure — to any
breach of continuity — in this gradual development and advance? Is it
not a fact that, on the contrary, the English wrought-iron guns have
uniformly exhibited the qualities which have been claimed for them? It
is worth while again to repeat, that out of about 6000 of such guns, not
one has burst on service. What other system of artillery, we may confidently
ask, can produce such credentials ?
It is altogether beside the purpose to argue — as Captain von Doppelmair
and others have done — that the 9-inch Woolwich gun is, in respect of
penetrative effect, inferior to the 9J-inch Krupp gun. We have seen that,
as a matter of fact, it is not inferior. But if it were, would that prove
anything against the Woolwich system? Captain von Doppelmair does not
need to be reminded that the penetrative power of a gun resolves itself
ultimately into a measure of its endurance. It is happily not our practice
iu England to subject our guns to exceptional charges, with a view
to producing sensational effects. Mr. Krupp's 9j-inch gun was designed
to fire 43 lb. charges ; it was purely an afterthought, due to stress of
circumstances, which prompted the adoption of a 531b. charge, and this
before any trial had been made of the endurance of the gun with such
charges. Why, we would ask again, was no increase of the English charge
suggested or permitted ? And why, again, was a Krupp gun of 14J tons
pitted against a gun of 12| tons ? And why has the former, since the Tegel
experiments, been increased in weight to 16 J tons? What took place was,
in fact, a trial of a very big, heavy, costly gun, against a smaller, lighter,
and far less expensive weapon. In this trial — as far as penetration was
concerned — the smaller, lighter, and less costly weapon held its own ; and
Captain von Doppelmair thinks the occasion suitable for instituting an
elaborate comparison unfavourable to the English gun !
But, more than this. There is a strange fatuity in these attempts to
determine the value of two systems of ordnance mainly by measuring the
penetrative power of any two guns of those systems. In England we have
ever sought to produce a gun which, taken all round , would be for its size
the most suitable for purposes of war. If mere penetration is to be the test
of success, this can easily be secured. It is merely a question of increasing
the power of a gun, without reference to its weight or cost, its handiness or
safety. But the Woolwich gun which was tried at Tegel was submitted
on other grounds than these. It was never supposed that the value of
the two systems would be judged exclusively — or nearly so — by the results
obtained against iron plates; for if this had been the declared intention,
assuredly another description of English gun would have been submitted.
There is, from an artillerist's point of view, something monstrous in this
attempt to decide the issue mainly by penetrative results, and in the circum-
116
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
stance that such a trial should be deliberately conducted with guns of
admittedly different penetrative power.
A still more serious objection to Captain von Doppelmair* s criticism, must
be taken on the ground that he has mixed up a variety of things which have
no necessary connection with the subject. He treats the question as if—
nay, he expressly declares that — breech-loading is impossible with English
guns,1 because of the inferiority of our material ; he assumes, moreover, that
we are tied down to one particular description of powder ; and he throughout
conveys the impression that our calibre, length, and weight of guns are so
inseparably mixed up together as to become, in fact, fixed beyond power of
alteration. This is not, we make bold to say, fair or reasonable criticism ;
just as it is neither fair nor reasonable to claim for steel projectiles fired
from Krupp guns a special advantage, as if such projectiles could not be
fired from wrought-iron guns.
If breech-loading be better than muzzle-loading, there is nothing to prevent
the English artillery and navy from adopting it;2 if prismatic powder be
superior to E.L.G., the former powder could be used here as well as in
Prussia ; if a long gun be preferable to a short one, there is no reason why the
English guns should not be made longer — and heavier, if that be an advan¬
tage — or 9J ins. in calibre instead of 9 ins. ; there is no inherent incapacity in
English ordnance to fire the same sized projectiles and the same weight of
charge as the Prussian guns, notwithstanding Captain von Doppelmair's
statements to the contrary.3 These are details which are open to all the
world, of which neither Prussia nor Krupp possesses the patent, and which,
if it seemed to us desirable to change them, could be changed to-morrow.
Between these details there is no absolute or permanent connection ; and
arguments directed, like Captain von Doppelmair* s, against these things
en masse, without any such distinction as an artillerist ought to know how
to make, must when handled fall to pieces. An English artilleryman,
indeed, will smile at the statement that our system is so compact as to
permit of no changes in detail without injury to the whole, when he thinks
of the almost too numerous changes to which these details are continually
being subjected. As an answer to Captain von Doppelmair* s argument on
this point, it will be sufficient to mention that at the present moment wre are
introducing a powder which has been proved to possess superior advantages
to the prismatic powder, without its inconveniences; that the weights of our
guns, and the relation of weight to calibre, undergo occasional modification ;4
that the amount of charge for each gun is not fixed by any unalterable law,
but is susceptible of variation as circumstances may dictate — as is proved by
the revision of the whole of the charges for our heavier rifled guns, conse¬
quent upon the introduction of pebble powder ; that the material of the
projectile is obviously quite independent of the nature of guns, and has been
1 Doppelmair, p. 24. An effective and complete refutation of this statement is afforded by the
circumstance that some experiments at Vienna are now (November, 1870) about to be carried on
with an English gun, which is in every respect an exact imitation of Krupp’ s 95-inch breech-loader,
except that it is made of coiled wrought-iron instead of Krupp’s steel.
2 See note next above.
3 Doppelmair, pp. 24, 25.
4 Witness the recent adoption of the 11-inch instead of the 12-inch calibre for the 25-ton gun,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
117
already once changed from steel to chilled iron., of which latter several
descriptions exist in the service ; that, finally, even the more comprehensive
question of breech-loading for heavy guns has been more than once officially
and keenly discussed, and only abandoned in consequence mainly of the
heavy expense which such experiments — conducted, as they must be, with
guns of the heaviest class, and on an extended scale — would entail, coupled
with the consideration that there is no apparent necessity for the change.1 2
The question of breech versus muzzle-loading for heavy guns is one of
exceeding complication. We hesitate to pronounce decidedly on one side
or another. We are free to admit that under certain circumstances breech¬
loading is an advantage. It may be conceded that the breech-loading gun
enables a weapon of greater length to be employed than is convenient with
a muzzle-loading gun; but, on the other hand, it must be remembered that
the breech-loading arrangement by which this advantage is gained greatly
increases the weight of the gun. It is certainly a fact that the Krupp
breech-loaders are relatively much heavier than the English muzzle-loaders ;3
and a lighter gun, it must be remembered, is not only more manageable, but
admits of being carried in greater numbers by any given ship. The advan¬
tage which is claimed for breech-loading guns on the ground that they
afford superior protection, disappears when the guns are used on board
turret ships, in which case the guns while being loaded are turned away
from the enemy. It is also more convenient in turret ships to bring the
ammunition to the muzzle than to the breech of the gun. We have already
shown that, in precision and in rapidity of loading, the muzzle-loading heavy
gun is in practice not merely equal to the breech-loader, but that the
muzzle-loader really leaves nothing to be desired. The assumed theoretical
advantages in respect of accuracy are not corroborated by actual comparative
practice, of which England, as we have before observed, has had more than
any other nation, and before which the partial and limited results obtained
at Tegel fade into complete insignificance. Of the superior simplicity of the
muzzle-loader, there are no two opinions ; and breech-loaders of which the
shot have a lead coating require, as we have seen, an excess of ballistic
power to produce penetrative results equal to those of the muzzle-loader.
Kespecting the efficiency of the particular system of breech-loading which
Captain von Doppelmair advocates, opinions are sharply divided. In Belgium,
for example, where the Krupp steel is employed for all the field guns, the
breech mechanism is that of Wahrendorf.
1 The Ordnance Select Committee were, indeed, in favour of making some experiments in this
direction. But the minimum expense was set down at £10,000 for testing even two or three of the
best systems. Admiral Key, the Naval Director of Ordnance, expressed himself against the
experiments (15. 9. ’68), on the grounds: — 1st. That no system of breech-loading has proved
itself so efficient as to be worthy of adoption. 2nd. That the cost of the experiment would be
enormous. In this view the Admiralty concurred, as did also the Director of Ordnance, General
St. George (27. 9. ’68), with the further observation that the prospects of success were not
sufficient to justify the expense; and General Lefroy (the late Director-General of Ordnance)
subsequently agreed with General St. George on similar grounds. Lord Northbrook also expressed
his opinion that “ it is out of the question to consider the suitability of Krupp’s system for large
guns.”
2 See table at p. 126, where it is shewn that the power of fhe Woolwich guns per cwt, of gun is
greater than that of the Krupp guns.
118
MINUTES OE PEOCEEDINGS OF
For these reasons, and in view of the consideration that some change in
artillery materiel — as, for example, the more general adoption of the
Moricrieff carriage or of the turret ship — might subtract from breech¬
loading every one of the advantages which are claimed for it, while leaving
as a residuum all its disadvantages, England may well pause before em¬
barking in the large expenditure which would be entailed by the experiments
which must necessarily precede the adoption of any breech-loading system.
But, in any case, it should be distinctly understood that, supposing such
experiments to be undertaken, they would in no way prejudice or interfere
with our system of gun-majang. Whether we have reason to hesitate or not
about the adoption of breech-loaders — whether it be or be not necessary for
us to alter our calibres, to adopt steel projectiles, to use Russian prismatic
powder, and to increase our charges — no one has yet been able to show the
slightest grounds for abandoning our wrought-iron guns. Upon what basis
that part of our system stands, we have already shown. It is too solid to
be shaken. It is certainly unassailable by the advocates of steel.1
What do those who write like Captain von Doppelmair propose to give
us in place of our present system ? Do they propose that we should enter
anew into a careful investigation of the various systems of foreign artillery
-—examining, rejecting, selecting ? Do they propose that we should engage
in a fresh gunnery competition, inviting a comparative trial of all the various
elements which go to make up the artilleries of Europe? Not at all. All
they desire is, that on such partial and imperfect evidence as a few isolated
experiments, like those of Tegel, may have afforded — experiments, moreover,
which, when carefully examined, appear to furnish conclusions diametri¬
cally opposed to those which Captain von Doppelmair has endeavoured to
draw from them — that, on such grounds as these, and absolutely without
any reference to the results of our long continued trials at home, we shall
hand ourselves over, tied and bound, to the Krupp system. We are to
exercise no independent judgment. Our own experiments must count for
nothing. The voices of our own artillerists must be silent. Nay, we may
1 In passing, we would observe that Captain von Doppelmair makes a great mistake in supposing
that, if England were by any unfortunate chance driven to use steel guns, instead of coiled
wrought-iron, she would have to apply to Essen. Steel guns, if we require them, can be made in
England as well as abroad. Indeed, Mr. Peed, the late Chief Constructor of the Navy, goes so far
as to express an opinion very unfavourable to the Krupp system of steel manufacture. In a
report dated January 12, 1870, he observes : — “ Some time ago I visited some of the steel works in
Prussia, and was much impressed with the insufficiency of the means then and there existing for
securing soundness and uniformity in large castings, in combination with that ductility which is so
indispensable in many articles made of steel. I was particularly impressed with this at the great
steel works of Mr. Krupp, at Essen ; the more so, probably, on account of the enormous scale upon
which the manufacture of steel guns, and other articles, was there carried on. Close observations
of the operations of steel-making at that firm convinced me that, while the method of casting must
necessarily be attended by the risk of unsoundness in the cast ingot, the subsequent process of
forging the metal under heavy steam-hammers gave no guarantee of soundness . The
method of manufacture was seriously defective, and experience has, in fact, shown that great inter¬
nal unsoundness frequently exists in castings so produced. In one instance that came under my
notice — and was, indeed, notorious at the time among engineers — a very large cavity existed in the
interior of a marine crank-shaft, and caused its speedy failure.”
To this it may be added, that England certainly uses, and probably produces, more steel than
any other country ; and it is in the last degree unlikely, if coiled wrought-iron were to fail us as a
material for ordnance, that we should be driven to purchase our steel ingots at Essen.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
119
not even reason on the foreign experiments to which appeal is made, but
must blindly accept them, and whatever conclusions the partisans of Essen
may be pleased to derive from them. Do we prefer muzzle-loaders ? We
are wrong. Do we prefer chilled iron projectiles to steel? We are wrong.
Do we prefer 12J-ton guns for general purposes to guns of 14| tons? We
are wrong. Briefly, do we prefer Woolwich guns to Krupp's? We are
wrong — from beginning to end, in large things as in small. The foreign
critics know our wants better than we know them ourselves. A few hundred
rounds fired at Tegel have exposed our errors. The hundreds of thousands
of rounds fired in England are of no value.
As regards this system which is being pressed upon our unconditional
acceptance, we have already considered some of its more salient points, and
have shown that — as far as penetrative effect, rapidity, accuracy, and facility
of manipulation are concerned — we are able to produce with our English
system equal or greater results at about one-third the cost.1 2 The question
of absolute endurance we have also discussed at some length, and shown
that, while the Tegel trials afford no evidence whatever of the relative
endurance of the two systems, which were tried with dissimilar weapons
under totally dissimilar conditions, there have gradually through many years
been accumulating proofs of the endurance of the English guns which are
incontestable, and beside which the instances which are adduced of the
endurance of Krupp's guns3 are rare indeed.
There is another side of the question, to which we have before referred,
but about which something more must be said. Captain von Doppelmair
asserts that “from the trial of one specimen (of steel guns) a judgment can
be formed as to all guns of the same description/'’3 To this axiom we
desire to take unqualified and emphatic exception. No more unsafe rule
could be adopted for the introduction of any system of artillery than this ;
for steel guns it is an especially false and dangerous principle, because an
essential feature and radical fault of steel is its uncertainty. Here, indeed,
we touch at last the heart of the question which Captain von Doppelmair
has raised. That question, as regards gun structure, when divested of
the complexity with which Captain von Doppelmair has succeeded in
surrounding it, is simply one as to the fitness of certain materials to resist
dynamic strains. It is a common fact that steel is remarkable for its lack
of uniformity in its power of resistance to dynamic strains. Its most
inveterate advocates are obliged to make their steel approximate to wrought-
iron as nearly as the nature of the former will admit, before they dare employ
1 It is unnecessary seriously to discuss the pretensions put forward by Captain von Doppelmair and
Mr. Krupp on behalf of the 8-inch Krupp gun — as being superior in penetrative power to the 9-inch
English gun. If what we have said be correct, as to the 95-inch Krupp gun being at most only just
equal in its penetrative effects to the English 9-inch gun, if not actually slightly inferior to it, it is
surely asking of us too much to believe that the 8-inch Krupp gun is more powerful than the 9-inch
Woolwich. This is proving too much, for it amounts in effect to a statement that the 8*inch Krupp
gun is superior also to the 95-inch Krupp — a conclusion from which we are sure Mr. Krupp would
dissent, although it is one in which his own arguments, if accepted literally, land him*
2 Captain von Doppelmair only adduces seven such instances ; of these, four must be rejected as
being solid guns (see ante, pp» 103, 104).
3 Doppelmair, p. G9;
120
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
it for ordnance. The most suitable material for resisting dynamic strains is
that which offers the greatest resistance through the greatest space, and not
that which shows the highest statical cohesion. This is denied in language,
but admitted in fact, whenever steel is used for guns; for it is only the
weakest, the least tenacious and elastic, and the softest descriptions of steel,
which the advocates of the material venture to employ for gun-making.
Mr. Mallet, in his “ Treatise on Artillery,” makes the following remarks
on this subject : — “ A gun formed of cast-steel, or of harsh, strong wrought-
iron, provided it have an enormous surplus of strength above the highest
strain to which it is to be exposed, will be very safe; but if its proportions
be reduced within a narrower limit of balancing the final resistance with the
bursting strain, or if the latter be brought up, accidentally or otherwise, so as
to approach such balance, the cast-steel or the hard wrought-iron will be
the most unsafe gun possible, while in all cases the gun of ductile iron will
be the safest. This might be popularly illustrated by saying that the
former gun approximates to one of enormous strength, but made of glass,
while the latter approximates to a gun of sufficient strength, if conceivable,
of leather, or of india-rubber, or to the silk-wrapped guns of the Chinese.
. . . . The attempts, therefore, recently made at a great expense to
fabricate guns of German steel, seem to be a step in the wrong direction,
and made in ignorance or in defiance of the first principles that should guide
us.”1
Nor is this at all a question of theory. We have ample facts to warrant
the statement that steel is above all else a treacherous material, and liable
when it fails, to burst without warning and with explosive violence — points
of even greater importance than the ultimate resistance of the material. It
is far better to have a gun which will endure only 509 rounds, and will then
give ample -warning of its approaching dissolution, than one which will
endure 5000 rounds, and then explode suddenly, without notice. And
when, as in the case of the steel guns, this latter quality is aggravated by
the fact that the material lacks uniformity, and may endure 5000 rounds, or
may not endure 500 — -its only uniformity consisting in the manner and
suddenness of its disruption — then the unsuitability of the material for
ordnance becomes great indeed, and the importance of refusing to admit
Captain von Boppelmairs principle, that from the trial of one steel gun you
may infer the behaviour of all, becomes sufficiently apparent.
As to actual examples of the bursting of steel guns, there lies before us a
list of failures with weapons of that material, which we do not quote in etttenso
only because we are anxious to avoid the innumerable discussions and explana¬
tions and replications to which the publication of that list would inevitably
give rise. It will be sufficient to state that that list includes guns large and
small — from 4<-prs. to 9-inch — and by various makers, including Fletcher,
Morgan, Lynal Thomas, Mushat, Beaulieu, Brown, Yavasseur, and Krupp.2
And these examples are culled from an experience of steel guns which is
small, compared with the experience to which we have appealed as establish¬
ing the safety of our wrought-iron guns.
But other examples of the unreliability of steel are not wanting. Such
examples are even furnished by the history of our own guns, and notably by
1 Mallet’s “ Treatise on Artillery,” p; 74;
2 See also “ Engineer,” October 29, 1870.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 121
the behaviour of the Woolwich gun at Tegel, the steel portions having been
the parts which have generally and most unexpectedly failed.1
Then, again, there is the instructive history of the vent-pieces of the
Armstrong guns, which were originally made of steel, but which material
had to be given up for this purpose in the larger guns, in 1862, in conse¬
quence of the numerous failures which occurred. Sir William Armstrong
has said on this subject :■ — “ In breech-loading guns, I pertinaciously adhered
to steel for the screws and for the vent-pieces, until I was completely driven
away from the material. I could not depend upon it, the material was so
various in quality ; and all subsequent experience has shown that, for those
purposes, wrought-iron stands incomparably better than steel.”2
We have, further, the recent failure of, and absence of uniformity exhibited
by, the Whitworth steel shell which were fired at Shoeburyness on March 2,
1870. These shells had all been specially prepared for experiment with great
care : one was good, one went to pieces on the target, and the third went to
pieces in the gun.3
As an example of the impossibility of inferring from the statical resistance
of steel, its power to sustain dynamic strains, we have the failures which
attended the attempt which was made by Sir William Armstrong and others
to employ steel for armour plates, and which illustrates the unfitness of steel,
even when of the best and toughest quality,4 to resist violent shocks or
concussions.
The fact is, that between the strains exerted by the ordinary tests and
those imposed on the material of a gun, there is no analogy. In the former
case, it is a mere dead quiet pressure put on and relieved ; in the gun, it is
a sudden and violent blow, setting up a violent vibratory action; and
experience goes to show that steel is much less adapted to resist a strain
of this kind — however it may behave under a strain of the former kind — -
than wrought-iron. It is really not so much a question of dead strength or
ductility, but of fitness for resisting violent concussions.
It is no answer to these objections to urge that the lack of uniformity in
steel may be corrected and overcome by careful tempering; for, in fact>
although the steel may be more or less improved by tempering, its normal
variableness of nature is not annihilated, or even materially altered, by the
1 “ All the failures, whatever failures there are, have been, not in the part which has been made
of coil, but in the part which has been made of steel. All our experience shows that the steel is
much more liable to fail than the wrought-iron part, and it appears to me that, if yod alter the
pattern, so as to discard the wrought-iron coil in favour of steel, you are really discarding that part
which has never failed . As far as my experience goes, I should certainly avoid thes
use of steel to the very utmost in guns, because I consider it the only part that is not fully to be
depended upon. I only introduced it originally as material for the bore, on account of its superior
hardness, but I depend far more upon the strength of the coil than I do upon the strength of the
steel, as far as the safety of the gun is concerned.” — Sir "William Armstrong’s Evidence before War
Office Council.
2 Sir William Armstrong’s Evidence before War Office Council.
3 It may be well to state that these shells were fired without powder in them, and their failure
cannot therefore be attributed to the action of the bursting charge.
4 The steel tried by Sir William Armstrong for this purpose was toughened in oil. It waS
subjected to the ordinary statical tests, and “ exhibited the most extraordinary strength and ex¬
traordinary toughness and ductility, far exceeding that of any specimen of wrought-iron I evei:
saw.”— Sir William Armstrong’s Evidence.
10
122
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
operation, while the operation itself may be said to introduce another
element of uncertainty, since upon its careful performance, as even Captain
von Doppelmair admits,1 the ultimate result will depend.
Nor, again, is it to the purpose to instance the partial supersession of
wrought-iron by steel in the domain of civil engineering, for tyres, locomotive
and carriage axles, &c.,3 the strains to which those articles are exposed being
of a wholly different character to the strain which has to be borne by a gun.
It would be more to the purpose to instance the case of steam-boilers, where
the analogy is somewhat closer, an elastic fluid having to be resisted ; and
for steam-boilers wrought-iron is preferred to steel — the latter, after a lengthy
and persistent trial, having been more or less abandoned.
This is the material, the reliability of which, we are told, may be con¬
fidently accepted on the trial of a single specimen. This is the material
for which Captain von Doppelmair desires us to abandon our wrought-
iron guns. Waving a garish light, and pointing to a few imperfect
continental experiments, he invites us to leave the terra firma of our
own experience, and to migrate to the terra incognita of steel. To this
invitation we would make a twofold reply. We have good cause to be
satisfied with our guns as they are. In no single instance have they failed
us on service. We do not admit their inferiority — nay, we claim for them
a superiority over any other guns in the world. The appeal which is made to
the Tegel trials only strengthens our satisfaction with our own weapons ; for,
read aright, those experiments proved that with our English gun, firing not
sensational but service charges, we could equal, if not surpass, the results
obtained with a far heavier weapon of Krupp* s manufacture, even when the
latter was fired with charges considerably in excess of those for which it had
been designed, and with which it had been proved. Nor do we know of any
other experiments which point to any other conclusion. Secondly, of the
Krupp guns, even if we desired them, there exists no sufficient experience to
warrant their adoption. The statement that steel is statically stronger than
iron may be accepted, but not as bearing on the relative strength of the
two when the strain to be endured is not statical but dynamic. In the
criticisms of our system, we can find nothing to satisfy us that the charac¬
teristic lack of uniformity in steel lias been overcome by Mr. Krupp; on the
contrary, in his complete abandonment of solid guns, once as confidently
recommended as his present weapon, and in the adoption for all calibres,
from 24-prs. upwards, of the multi-hooped system,3 we find evidence of a
failure with Krupp guns of the earlier construction not anticipated by the
maker. While, as for the principle that “ from the trial of one gun a
judgment can be formed as to all guns of the same description," we dis¬
tinctly and energetically repudiate it as unsafe of application to guns of any
material, and doubly false and unsafe when that material is steel. And,
except such trials of single specimens, the critics are unable to advance any
proof that the present Krupp guns are more trustworthy than the solid
Krupp guns, which, despite all the good things which were said of them in
their day, have had to be given up. The present guns may or may not be
1 Doppelmair, p. 69. 2 Ibid. p. 68.
3 “ The Prussian artillery are having hoops added to the solid steel guns in stock.” — Doppelmair,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
123
all strong and enduring — let us say that we hope they are so ; certainly,
when we consider their cost they ought to be so — but of their strength and
endurance there exists at present no sufficient proof.
Finally, this change of system which is pressed upon us — ’this abandon¬
ment of guns of satisfactory and established excellence, in favour of weapons
whose character as yet rests upon no sufficient basis of experience — could
be effected only at an increased outlay for the guns themselves of two to
one,1 to say nothing of the loss of a national plant of gun-making machinery
and of a thriving department of national industry.
We may then fairly ask, in whose interests are these propositions made ?
— for assuredly they cannot be made in those of England, whether we consider
them from the point of view of the artillerist, the economist, or the manu¬
facturer.
YIII.
Conclusion.
Relative powers of Krupp and Woolwich Guns , with the Descriptions
and Charges of Powders now officially adopted .
It is important to observe that, apart from other entanglements, the
solution of all the difficulties which foreign critics have discovered in the
Tegel trials really lies in the powder question. It is to the arbitrary
assumption of Captain von Doppelmair and others that the use of E.L.G.
powder is necessary to the English system,2 while the Prussian system is free
from any such restriction, that the confusion which affects all the foreign
criticism is due. We have before taken exception to this fundamental
error.3 Fortunately, we can appeal to actual experiment to exhibit the
truth. The following are the facts : —
Far from the E.L.G. powder having been selected specially for use with
heavy rifled guns, it was provisionally introduced in 1860 (before a single
heavy rifled gun had been made), for use with the smaller natures of breech¬
loading Armstrong guns. It was one of the first experimental powders
tried by the Special Committee on Gunpowder, of which Colonel (now
Major-General) Askwith was President ; and Sir William Armstrong having
observed that it fouled less than ordinary L.G. powder, recommended its
adoption. The Gunpowder Committee consented to its temporary employ¬
ment, pending the completion of the experiments upon which they were
then engaged with a view to the introduction of a powder better adapted
1 A glance at tlie tables, at pp. 93, 94, will show that the Krupp guns are twice as costly as the
English guns.
2 “ The selection of this energetic powder for the English 9-inch gun was necessary in order to
obtain high initial velocities with the comparatively short length of the gun.” — Doppelmair, p. 15.
See also pp. 24, 62.
3 See pp. 68, 69,
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
124
than E.L.G. for large charges, of which the defects were at that time, and
have ever since been, distinctly recognised. What was required, was a
powder at once less destructive, more uniform, and of at least equal efficiency.
Thus, E.L.G. powder was not only not introduced specially for use with
large guns, as stated by Captain von Doppelmair, but its employment was
purely provisional, and for heavy charges it was provisionally superseded
in 1866 by pellet powder, which in its turn has now been superseded
by pebble powder. With regard to the alleged necessity which exists
for the employment in the English guns of an “energetic” powder,
it will be sufficient to quote some figures which are given in the Pre¬
liminary Eeport of the Committee on Explosives,1 2 from which it appears
that in the 8-inch gun not only pellet and pebble powders, but even the
Eussian prismatic powder — the use of which is made by Captain von
Doppelmair and others to appear as inseparably connected with the use of
Krupp guns — give higher velocities than E.L.G., with greatly reduced
maximum pressures.
Nature of powder.
Charges.
Muzzle
velocity.
Maximum
pressure.
lbs.
ft.
tons.
R.L.G . . . . .
30
1324
29-8
Russian prismatic .
32
1366
20-5
Service pellet .* .
30
1338
17*4
Pebble, No. 5 . . .
35
1374
15*4
With, the 10-inch gun, again, a slow, mild pebble powder has been
found to give a velocity of 1474 ft. against 1321 ft* with E.L.G.3 Further*
when the 9-inch Woolwich gun (precisely the same gun, be it observed, as
was used at Tegel), was fired with a charge of 46 lbs. of Eussian prismatic
powder (precisely the same powder as was used by Krupp at Tegel, and
which Captain von Doppelmair states cannot be employed effectively in a
Woolwich gun), a velocity of 1365 ft. was obtained, as compared with
1336 ft. with 43 lbs. of E.L.G. Finally, experiments have shown that
by employing a suitable pebble powder instead of E;L.G., the velocities
of all the service Woolwich guns may be increased as follows, and pebble
powder has in consequence been adopted
Gun;
R.L.G.
Feet per second;
Pebble.
Feet per second.
7-inch .
1430
1543
8-inch . . .
1363
1410
9 -inch .
1336
1410
10-inch . .
1298
1400
It follows from the above, that the natural development of the powder
question in England has produced exactly the same beneficial results for
1 Preliminary Report of Committee on Explosives, p. 9.
2 Mem. of Committee on Explosives, July 12th, 1870, p. 2.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
125
English ordnance as were achieved for the Krupp ordnance in the emergency
of Tegel ; and the convenient assumption of the Prussian authorities and
foreign critics that the English gun was unable to realise such benefit,
is therefore completely disproved. And, as the Woolwich guns exhibited
an equality in actual penetrative effect when confessedly from 18 to 30
per cent, inferior in theoretical ballistic power,1 now that they are brought
up to the Krupp guns in ballistic power, without any other change than
that of using a suitable powder, it is clear — from the very theories,
arguments, and tables admitted on both sides — that the English system, as it
now stands, must be actually at least 18 to 30 per cent, superior to the
Prussian system as it stands.
We append a table which shows the relative powers of the two systems,
with the descriptions and charges of powder now officially approved.
1 See pp. 72, 73.
Comparative Ballistic Bower of Woolwich and Krupp Heavy Rifled Guns .
126
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Foot-tons.
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calibres
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THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
127
THE MOBILITY OF FIELD ARTILLERY;
PAST AND PRESENT.
BY LIEUT. H. W. L. HIME, R.A.
[No. II.]
“ La qualifce distinctive de l’artillerie de campagne (est) la mobilite.” — The JEjnperor Napoleon, III .
Shortly before the close of the Thirty Years* War, the Great Rebellion
broke oat, and field artillery made its appearance for the first time on English
ground. The guns, although ponderous, were not powerful ; the carriages,
although massive, were not strong ; the ammunition was in fit keeping with
the guns and carriages ; and an army pursued its tedious march, encumbered
with a train of artillery
“ 'That, like a wounded snake, dragged its slow length along.’*
Between the Restoration and the expulsion of James II., the artillery
appears to have been entirely withdrawn from the public gaze ; for when
William of Orange landed in England, “ the apparatus which he brought
with him, though such as had long been in constant use on the con¬
tinent, excited in our ancestors an admiration resembling that which the
Indians of America felt for the Castilian harquebusses."1 Before the
invasion, some attention had been undoubtedly paid to the artillery by
Charles II. ;2 but whatever improvements the king introduced were confined
to the fire of the guns— for as far as related to their mobility, they were in
much the same state as the guns of the previous century. As late as the
battle of Sedgemoor, 1685, the last battle fought on English soil, the horses
and harness provided for the transport of the artillery were so bad, that the
field pieces intended to act against the rebels were only dragged to the spot
where the fight was raging by coach-horses and traces belonging to the
Bishop of W inchester.3
The artillery which accompanied the invading army of the Prince of Orange
was almost as cumbrous and slow as that which it was intended to oppose.
When the Prince's force of ordnance arrived, it was found to consist of
1 Lord Macaulay’s “Hist, of England}” Yol. I. p. 317.
2 Dry den’s “ Annus Mirabilis.”
3 Lord Macaulay’s “ Hist, of England,” Yol. II. p. 189.
] 7
[yol. VII.]
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
128
“21 huge pieces of brass cannon, which were with difficulty tugged along
by sixteen cart-horses to each. Much curiosity was excited by a structure
mounted on wheels. It proved to be a moveable smithy, furnished with all
tools and materials necessary for repairing arms and carriages.”1 2 That the
disorganised state of the personnel of the artillery attracted the new king’s
attention is sufficiently proved by the formation of companies in 1693, and
the regimental organisation of 1698. I am unable to detect any evidence
that the materiel of the arm underwent change, for better or worse, in fire
or in mobility, during his reign. It is said, indeed, that he was the first to
introduce travelling carriages into this country; but such cannot be the case,
for Chamberlayne, in his “ State of England,5’ 1687, a year before the
invasion, states that the train of artillery in the Tower consisted of “ 50 brass
pieces on trauling carriages, besides several mortar pieces, some whereof are
of an extraordinary bigness.”
The state of the artillery was so bad during the latter half of the 17th
century, that it is strange that it did not entirely disappear from the battle¬
field. As yet it was by no means universally allowed that fire-arms, great
and small, were superior to the weapons of the knights and archers, and the
ancient arms had not yet fallen entirely into disuse. Field guns were all but
useless, from the difficulty of moving them ; and not only was the fire of
muskets slow and uncertain,3 but they were unequal to withstand a charge
of cavalry until the introduction of the bayonet in 1693. The pike was
consequently still largely employed,3 and bows were not unknown. Shortly
before the period I speak of, Charles I. had granted two special commissions
for enforcing the use of the long bow — the first in the fourth, the second in
the ninth year of his reign ; and Essex issued a mandate in 1643 for the
formation of companies of Roundhead archers.4 A full century afterwards,
Benjamin Franklin wrote to General Lee, advocating the suppression of fire¬
arms and the re-introduction of archery,5 and the Chevalier de Folard was
employed, about the same time, in proving the superiority of the machines
of the ancients over modern artillery.6
The degradation of the artillery, at the time I speak of, was chiefij owing
to two causes — a reaction that set in on the death of Gustavus Adolphus,
and the rise and progress of standing armies.
It was only in the nature of things that the reforms of Gustavus Adolphus
should be forgotten on his death. Dulness abhors change; mediocrity
detests reform; and men of average understanding seized with avidity the
opportunity, which the unexpected death of the king placed within their
1 Lord Macaulay’s “ Hist, of England,” Vol. III. p. 230. I am compelled to rest content
with. Lord Macaulay’s account of the artillery of the day, as I have sought in vain for his original
authorities, in the British Museum and elsewhere.
2 “ The muskets were such miserable machines, that in the middle of the 15th century it took
a quarter of an hour to load and fire one.” — 'Buckle’s “Hist, of Civilisation,” Vol. I. p. 190.
Hallam’s “ Middle Ages,” Vol. I. p. 342. In an action fought during the Thirty Years’ War,
which lasted from noon till evening, it is recorded that “ each man fired, at the least, seven times;”
—Gen. M. Smith’s “Modern Tactics,” p. 36.
8 Sir E. Cust’s “Lives erf the Warriors of the Thirty Years’ War,” Yol. I. p. 218;
4 “ Encyclodedia Britannica.” Art. Archery.
5 Franklin’s Works, edited by Jared Sparks, p. 169.
0 In his edition of Polybius.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
129
grasp, of suppressing changes in field artillery which they could not
comprehend. The king's military talents and acquirements were far in
advance of his cotemporaries, and his reforms were proportionally above
and beyond their ken.1 His attempt to introduce admirable, but radical,
reforms into the artillery not only failed, but produced a reaction which left
the received opinions stronger than ever, and rendered hopeless for the
moment any effort to improve the mobility of the arm; for artillerymen
were not educated up to the king's standard, and no reform can produce
real and permanent good in any society unless it be the work of public
opinion, and unless the members of the society itself take the initiative.2
While forty days in the year was the longest period for which a feudal
chief could claim the military services of his retainers,3 long wars and
permanent forces were alike impossible. In the revolution of time, however,
feudal obligations became gradually relaxed and nugatory, and, like other
rules, the rule of military service fell into disuse. The formation of standing
armies, which the decline and fall of feudalism thus rendered possible, the
rise and progress of fire-arms rendered necessary.4 The bow, or sword,
which under the old system every man possessed, were simple and inexpensive
weapons, and their use was mastered without loss of either time or money.
The arms of the new system were cannon, the musket, and the pistol, which were
costly and difficult to manage. There arose, too, as time rolled on, mortars,
howitzers, and the like ; and these things made it necessary to set apart and
train up bodies of men for the sole purpose of war, and to separate them as
much as possible from those other employments in which hitherto all soldiers
were engaged. There were other influences, no doubt, which tended to
produce the same result, but the use of gunpowder was the most effectual ;
because, by increasing the difficulty5 and expense of war, it made a separate
military profession indispensable. Thus it was that there arose standing
armies. The first of these was formed in the middle of the 14th century,
immediately after the invention of cannon;6 but they did not come into
general use until the 17th century, nor was it until the 18th century that
they began to influence to any extent the fortunes of the artillery. During
the latter part of the 17th century (and, indeed, long afterwards), this service
was looked on as something quite separate and distinct from the army proper,
and the rise and progress of standing armies affected directly neither its
efficacy of fire nor its mobility. But while the artillery slumbered on in an
undisturbed repose, isolated, and unchanging, the efficiency of cavalry and
infantry uninterruptedly advanced, in proportion to the superior steadiness
and cohesion of the permanent forces. The artillery, therefore, by standing
1 Sir E. Cast’s “Warriors of the Thirty Years’ War,” Vol. I. p. 219.
2 Buckle’s “Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. IY. p. 132,
8 Hallam’s “ Middle Ages,” Yol. I. p. 262.
4 Buckle’s “ Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. I. p. 190.
5 “ The art of war, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so in the progress of improvement it
necessarily becomes one of the most complicated among them.” — Adam Smith’s “ Wealth of
Nations,” Bk. Y. ch. 1, p. 314. “Through the mere necessity of self-preservation war becomes
continually, and must become, more intellectual.” — De Quincy’s Works, Vol. IY. p. 218.
6 Blackstone’s “Commentaries,” Vol. I. p. 413. “(Euvres de Turgot,” Yol. VIII. p. 228.
Quoted in Buckle’s “ Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. I. p. 190.
130
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
still,1 comparatively retrograded, and at the time I speak of was little short
of useless.
So ended the 17th century, during the latter half of which no improve¬
ment of importance, except the general use of limbers, was introduced into
the field artillery. They were limbers destitute of any means of carrying
either men or ammunition, but I regard their introduction as the third
epoch in the history of the mobility of the arm.
Ere long, that spirit of doubt, of enquiry, of reaction, which forms
the eminent characteristic of the 18th century, and which pervaded alike
the literary, the scientific, the religious, and the political worlds,2 began
to be felt in the military world. A furious battle had been fought in
England, during the closing years of the previous century, on the relative
merits of ancient and modem learning;3 the most liberal of all studies, the
study of physical science, was advancing, although with tottering and unequal
steps, and was dissipating the mists in which theology had enveloped
physics ; a bitter and deplorable crusade against Christianity had been begun
in Erance; and dark clouds were gathering on the political horizon, which
were to burst in the American War of Liberation, and the Erench Revolution.
Men began to suspect that the possession of great power did not necessarily
involve the possession of great wisdom, and they more than suspected that
they had inherited some bad old customs and some false old beliefs from the
good old times ; for knowledge was diffusing itself through the masses of
the people, and was undermining the brazen towers of protection and tradition.
Nothing could escape scrutiny when men were in such a temper, and a thrill
of liberalism shot through the most conservative of institutions — the army.
Change was the god of the hour, and it ran riot in the arsenals as it did
elsewhere. As might be supposed, disorder and confusion were the first
effects of the new movement ;4 but there can be no reasonable doubt that had
it been allowed to act without interference or interruption for a few years,
order would have succeeded disorder, regularity would have followed con¬
fusion, and after the first rude burst of license was over, some system of
artillery — as light and effective as the state of chemistry and metallurgy
permitted — would have come into use. But the work of reform was opposed
by two powerful influences — the system of battalion guns, and the wars of
position — both of which had now reached a high degree of development.
The battalion guns, which had been in use in Germany since the Thirty
Years* "War,5 6 attracted the notice of the Erench Court, where military
1 “ L’Infanterie avait fait de grands progres . . . L’Artillerie etait restee stationnaire.”— -
“ Conference sur l’Artillerie de Campagne.” Paris, 1869, p. 11.
2 Buckle’s “Hist, of Civilisation,” Yol. III. p. 174, Leipsig Ed.
3 See Dean Swift’s “Battle of the Books,” and Dr. Bentley’s “Letters on the Epistles of
Phaleris.”
4 Taubert, “On Field Artillery,” p. 9. Fave’s “Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” p. 113.
“ Conference sur l’Art. de Campagne.” Paris, 1869, p. 12.
6 Gustavus Adolphus is responsible for the battalion gun system. Had the king lived long
enough to see the pernicious effects of these guns in practice, he would no doubt have abolished
them; but as a matter of fact he did establish them, and they remained in existence for nearly a
century and a half after his death, always exerting an influence for evil so strong as to counteract
almost entirely the effect of the improvements he introduced into the artillery service. As regards
the leather guns, I cannot agree with the Emperor Napoleon III. (“Etudes, &c., &c.,” Tom. IY.
p. 83) ; — “ Ces canons . . , n’ont aucune interet au point de vue dc Phistoire de l’art.” Ap
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
131
questions were settled by the intrigues of courtiers, in 1736 j* 1 2 and they were
finally introduced into the service in 1756 by order of the Marechal de
Eig. 1.
Belle-Isle, in spite of the opposition of all the officers of note in the French
artillery, except M. du Brocard.3 The attempt to merge into one such
different services as the artillery and infantry, proved abortive. In the first
place, to prevent these guns from impeding the movements of the infantry
to whom they belonged, their weight was reduced to an extent which made
their fire, under the most favourable circumstances, all but useless.3 Secondly,
as a matter of fact, they did seriously encumber their infantry.4 For infantry
compelled to drag guns along with them could not be expected to march,
even on smooth and level plains, with the same order and rapidity as infantry
who marched free from such a hindrance ; and in a cultivated country, inter¬
sected with ditches, hedges, and walls, the guns had to be abandoned
altogether.5 In this latter case, they not only failed to fulfil the very object
far as the fire of these guns is concerned, His Majesty’s position is unassailable ; but taking into
consideration not only their efficacy of fire but their mobility, I maintain that under the guidance
of so great a military genius as Gustavus Adolphus, they proved themselves to be the most effective
guns known up to his time. Eig. 1, taken from Eolard’s Polybius, shows a battalion gun.
1 “ Ce fut alors que la cour prit en consideration les pieces dites a la Suedoise.” — “ Lettres d’un
Officier du Corps Royal de l’Artillerie au Lieut.-Col. du Regiment D. . . ” Paris, 1774. p. 3.
2 Ibid. p. 10.
3 “ Tout l’effet (des pieces a la Suedoise) se reduit seulement a faire du bruit.” — “ Memoire et
Observations sur l’Art. a cheval,” par T. Durtubie, Chef de Brig. d’Art. Paris, 1795, p. 12.
4 “ Lettres d’un Officier du Corps Royal,” &c. Paris, 1774, p. 5. “ Notice sur l’emploi de
l’Art.,” par Capt. Maze, in the a Etat Actuel de l’Art. de Campagne Anglaise,” par Lieut. G.
Jacobi, p. 7. “Ces pieces mal servies et presque toujours placees dans des positions defavorables,
furent en general plus nuisibles qu’utiles aux Regimens dont elles embarrassaient les mouvemens.”
5 “ La meilleure infanterie etait designee pour garder Tartillerie, et aider a son service ; mais
ce service toujours tres penible, et d’ailleurs momentane, n’etait pas de nature a inspirer aux
troupes beaucoup d’attachement pour le materiel qu’elles etaient chargees de defendre et de
proteger. Aussi arrivait-il d’ ordinaire que dans une bataille perdue toute l’artillerie restait au
pouvoir du vainquer.” — Ibid.
“ In der Schlacht bei Erefeldt waren die, auf dem rechten Elugel vorgeriickten Infanterie-
Regimenter bei dem Korps des Erbprinzen von Braunschweig ohne Regiments- Geschutz, als sie
von der iiberlegenen Kavallerie angegriflfen wurden ; es war zwischen den Graben, die sie vorher
passirten, zuruckgeblieben.”— 1 Ueber Reitende Artillerie; was sie 1st, sein sollte, und sein konnte.”
Lcipsig, 1818, p. 32.
132-
MINUTES OF PROCEEDIN GS OF
of their existence, but left a gap in the line,1 2 which, as they were generally
placed in the centre of the battalion,3 might produce fatal consequences.
Thirdly, as it was necessary for them to take part in all the manoeuvres of
their battalion, the necessary time was not afforded to the gunners for placing,
loading, or laying their guns carefully.3 No guns could have been effective
under this system, which violated both the fundamental principles of field
artillery tactics — namely, that the movements of a battery in action should be
minimum in number, and should be made at a maximum speed. Fourthly,
their constant presence with their infantry led the latter to look upon the guns
as necessary to the safety of the battalion,4 and thus diminished that self-
confidence which infantry must possess to be successful. Fifthly, as these
guns were practically useless, not only was the money spent on their
construction wasted, but the regular columns or trains of artillery were
deprived of a corresponding number of guns, which might have been turned
to good account by their own officers.5 In fine, this bad system weakened
the artillery without strengthening the infantry,6 and raised a general
prejudice against the use in the field of what was regarded as a complicated
and useless mechanism.7 This feeling tended to retard the progress of
mobility ; for its development essentially depended on experience, and an
arm which was meanly thought of was not likely to be greatly used.
In a widely different, but in a no less prejudicial way, did the wars of
position affect the progress of field artillery.
In the wars of Henri IY. of France there sprung up a system of tactics
the spirit of which consisted in selecting and fortifying strong positions and
in awaiting there the attack, which could only be made under great disadvan¬
tage.8 From various causes, which it would be foreign to my subject to
enumerate, this mode of fighting gained ground as time passed on, cul¬
minated in the epoch of Fontenoy,9 and, finally, only gave way before the
1 “ In der Schlacht bei Minden waren die Regiments-geschiitze, als die Englisclie und Hanno-
veriscbe Infanterie vorriickte, wegen der hohlen, ob wokl nicbt selir beschwerlicben Wege, zuriick-
geblieben und bei dem ersten Angriff der feindlichen Kavallerie befanden sie sicb noch hinter
der Fronte, wodurch es sich dann ereignete, dass ganze Trupps durch die Intervallen setzten.” —
“ Ueber Eeitende Artillerie, &c.,” p. 32.
2 “ Memoirs of Capt. Creichton,” by Dean Swift. Nimmo’s Ed., p. 529. “ Hist, of the Military
Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan.” London, 1799, Vol. I. p. 368.
3 “ Essai sur l’usage de 1* Artillerie.” Amsterdam, 1771, p. 7.
4 “ Ce malheureux sentiment n’est deja que trop repandu.” — “ Reflexions sur la pratique du
Pointement du Canon.” Amsterdam, 1771, p. 58. A few general and vague directions for the
handling of battalion guns may be found in Muller’s “ Elements of the Science of War.” London,
1811, Vol. II. p. 169.
5 “ Cinquante pieces de 4 ajoutees a 1’ artillerie d’un pare . . . feront plus de mal aux
ennemis et contribueront plus a la reussite des actions de guerre que les 160 attaehees constamment
aux Bataillons.” — “ Reflexions sur la pratique, &c.,” p. 57.
6 Notwithstanding the disasters in which the adoption of this system involved the Royal Artillery
during our Flemish campaigns of 1793-4, some benighted artilleryman, only a few years after¬
wards, describes battalion guns as “ a late and admirable invention !” — “ Hist, of the Royal Art.,”
in the “ British Military Library.” London, 1799, Vol. I.
7 The Chevalier Folard, in his edition of Polybius, protests against this notion: — “L’ Artillerie
n’est pas un pur mechanisme, comme on le pretend, et il importe aux Generaux d’ avoir au moins
une idee de cette partie de la guerre.”
8 Fave, “Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” p. 64. Jomini, “Precis de 1’art de la guerre,” p. 135.
American Trans.
9 The battle of Fontenoy is the finest illustration I know of the old tactics. Marshal Saxe’s
dispositions were a masterpiece of tactical skill, according to the old method,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
133
new tactics which the French Kevolution brought forth. Nor did it yield
then without a struggle. Men were wedded to the old system round which
Frederick's genius had thrown a glory; they believed it to be unchanging
and immutable ; .they persuaded themselves it was the be-all and end-all of
military art. There is one system of tactics, said soldiers, and Frederick is
its Prophet. They learned in time how grievous was their error, but they
learned it in the school of adversity. It was only in his dying moments
King Arthur saw clearly how —
“ The old order change th, yielding place to new,
Lest one good custom, should corrupt the world
it was only after a long train of disaster and defeat men learned that
war, like everything human, is subject to the “ imperishable change that
renovates the world."
It is not difficult to trace the influence exerted upon field artillery by
this system of tactics. The guns of a defensive army generally occupied
entrenched positions, and were seldom called on to move during the whole
course of an action. Mobility, therefore, was of no moment, and efficacy of
fire was the attribute on which all attention was rivetted. In fact the
artillery acted not as field, but as garrison artillery.1 2 Things were not very
different in the offensive army. Certain that nothing but some extraordinary
contingency would tempt the adversary from his fastness, the attackers
moved at their leisure. They marched and countermarched, broke into
column and wheeled into line, with a gravity and solemnity that in our
times would provoke a smile. There was this difference, indeed, between
things before and after the Seven Years' War — that while the slowness of
manoeuvre before the war was to a certain extent a matter of necessity, after
the war it was a matter of principle. Before Frederick's time, the want of
drill and discipline compelled armies to move slowly and cautiously; after it,
cavalry and infantry were carefully drilled, and only moved slow because it
was thought incorrect to move fast. For men had mistaken the letter of
Frederick's system for its spirit, his drill for his tactics, his means for his
end. They set up a false god, and the whole military world fell down and
worshipped it. Frederick moved his army after a fashion of his own, and
gained countless victories; therefore, it was said, the king's method is
correct, every other method is incorrect, and no future method that may be
devised can be correct. The oblique order was believed in with such
unquestioning faith, that at Jena General Buchel thought he could save the
army by giving an order to advance the right shoulder!3 4 Frederick showed
his disapproval of the inversion of a brigade at the battle of Prague,3 and
inversions were in consequence looked on with such superstitious horror,
that at the battle of Laswarree a brigade of British infantry was wheeled
with its back to the enemy by an orthodox Brigadier, and then calmly
countermarched under a tremendous fire of grape, in order to avoid the
proscribed and dreaded formation P The rapidity of Napoleon's movements
1 “ Le canon sert extr&mement a la defense des lignes d’un camp fortifie.” — “ Memoires de Monte-
cuculli.” Amsterdam, 1756, p. 216.
2 Jomini, “Precis, &c.” p. 57.
3 The contre-temps at Prague is amusingly described by Capt. Nolan in his book on Cavalry,
p. 198.
4 This unfortunate brigade, “in obedience to the rules and regulations, wheeled into line and
stood with its back to the enemy, requiring to be countermarched under a storm of grape shot.
134
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
was looked on as indecent, and Napoleon himself was considered a barbarian,
unworthy of the name of soldier. “ In my youth,” exclaimed a correct old
Germau, “ we used to march and countermarch all summer without gaining
or losing a square league, and then we went into winter quarters. But now
comes an ignorant, hot-headed young man, who flies from Boulogne to Ulm,
and from IJlm to the middle of Moravia, and fights battles in December.
The whole system of his tactics is monstrously incorrect.”* 1 2 The evolutions
of an army were necessarily dilatory and protracted under this extravagant
and pedantic system, and its spirit was eminently prejudicial to the progress
of field artillery, for it produced a tendency to increase efficacy of fire to
the detriment of mobility; and, if my reasoning be correct, the movement
in favour of large calibres which took place in Prussia about 1759/ far
from being exceptional and abnormal, as it is generally regarded, was a
natural consequence of the prevailing system of tactics.
But potent as were the two influences which I just described in coun¬
teracting the effect of the spirit of reform, they were unable to extin¬
guish it altogether. They might crush it, but they could not kill it ; and
the successive efforts to create an artillery that could move as well as fire,
which T shall now briefly describe, are a sufficient proof of its vitality
during the first half of the 18th century.
The first unmistakeable symptoms of reaction were the establishment of
organised bodies of gunners in Prance, Germany, and England,3 towards the
close of the 17th century, and the general tendency to diminish the weight
of guns, observable during the early years of the 18th.4 This latter move¬
ment was in the right direction, but it was imperfect, and necessarily involved
failure ; for it was founded on the false assumption that mobility was attain¬
able by merely lightening the guns, without any corresponding improvement
in the carriages and the mode of draft. So long was the mistaken notion
received in England that the guns were of all importance and the carriages
were of none, that the Carriage Department was not founded until 1806, 5
although the Royal Arsenal was established in Woolwich Warren in 1716.
While the century was yet young, the Chevalier Polard proposed a gun of
his own invention, which, if it was not the very first, was one of the first
attempts to construct an artillery that could move. “ Le Chevalier de
Polard,” says Pere Daniel,6 “officier de beaucoup d'esprit et de capacite .
. . . a entrepris de trouver le secret qu'on cherche depuis longtemps, de
diminuer la longeur des canons, et par consequent leur poids immense, aussi-
bien que celui de leurs affuts, sans prejudice de leur portee et de leur effefc.”
The Chevalier’s gun was a 24-pr. (length, 2 ft. 4 ins.; weight, 15‘lcwt. ;
charge, 6 lbs.), and compared with the ordinary 24-pr. of that time (length,
lift.; weight, 45*5 cwt. ; charge, 12 lbs.), it was no doubt “infiniment
and leaving, by this delay, all the brunt of the action upon the 76th Regiment, and about two
battalions of Sepoys.” — Cob Hamilton Smith’s “ Sketch of the Science and Art of War,” in the
“ Aide-Memoire to the Military Sciences,” Vol. I. p. 27.
1 “Lord Macaulay’s Essays; Lord Byron,” Yol. I. p. 330;
2 Taubert, “ On Field Artillery,” p. 9.
3 Fare, “Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” pp. 105, 114. “Die Beziehungen Friedrich des
Grossen zu seiner Artillerie.” Yon Troschke, p. 6.
4 Taubert, “ On Field Artillery,” p. 7;
5 MS. Notes on the History of the Royal Carriage Department, by an Officer of the Royal
Artillery.
6 “Hist, de la Milice Francaise;” Paris, 1724, Tom. I. pp; 327, 330.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
135
plus leger que ceux de ce calibre.”1 The gun failed, however, and the
Chevalier appears to have been so chagrined at the unhappy result, as to
come to the unwarrantable conclusion that it was impossible to improve
either the fire or mobility of modern artillery. Certain it is that in his
dreary “ Commentaries on Polybius,” he virtually proposed to abolish artillery
altogether, and to supply its place by the ballista and catapulta of the
ancients.1 2 This proposal, made in open day to the whole military world, is
1 Fig. 2 shows the Chevalier’s gun.
2 Fig. 3 shows the Chevalier’s “ catapulte de campagne.” The catapult was his favourite
18
136
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the most striking proof I am acquainted with of the low position occupied
by the artillery of the time. Had the Chevalier's theory been worked out
secretly, had he been unsupported by a single friend, had his book been
received from the first with contempt, had he himself at once become the
object of public derision — then, indeed, we might have looked on the Chevalier
as a Quixote in the fiesh, and regarded his theory as the offspring of a dis¬
ordered imagination. But far different was the real state of the case.
Published in 1727, the book was soon in everyone's hands,* 1 * and gained for
its author an immense reputation.3 Although a costly work, within a few
years it went through a second edition,3 was translated into German, both at
Berlin and Yienna,4 and was so highly thought of in England that the
Chevalier was made a member of the Boyal Society.5 He was warmly
attacked, it is true,6 but he was as warmly defended;7 and he was only
finally defeated after a whole library had been written on his system of
tactics. In what a degraded state must the artillery service have been
when attention was paid, even for one moment, to the pedantic heresies of
the Chevalier Eolard !
While the Chevalier Eolard was constructing a light field artillery in
Erance, the Germans were busying themselves at the same task. In the
“ Maximes et Instructions sur l'Art Militaire," published at Paris in 1726,
the Marquis de Quincy speaks of newly-invented guns, “ courtes et cara-
binees," which were then in use east of the Bhine.8 They were of two
calibres, 8-prs. and 4-prs., and were mounted on carriages, without limbers,
constructed in such a way that the guns could be fired without detaching
the carriages from the horses. Their efficacy of fire was inferior to that of
ordinary guns of the same calibre, and their use entailed other inconveniences ;
but the Marquis inclines to the opinion that the balance of advantages was
in their favour, because their lightness more than compensated for the weakness
of their fire : — ■" On peut manoeuvrer ces pieces devant un ennemi sans
avantrain, en y attelant quelques chevaux qui les traineroient avec facilite en
quelque terrain que ce fut. . . . Cette nouvelle maniere donneroit le
moyen a un Commandant d'Artillerie de suivre la Cavalerie, quand meme
elle iroit au trot. . . . Ce moyen seroit encore d'une utilite merveilleuse
machine. “ II avait fait construire une catapulte dont les experiences le transporterent d’admira-
tion.” — Biog. Universelle.
In the attack on Dalimkote, in Bhotan, 1864, some loss was inflicted on the British force by the
catapults of the Bhoteahs who defended the place. The occasion was an exceptionally favourable
one for the catapults, for the fort stands on the top of a hill, and the British force lay in a valley
immediately beneath it.
1 The author of the “ Essai sur l’usage de l’Art.,” speaking of Folard and his supporters, says
(p. 3), “ Leur ouvrages sont entre les mains de tout le monde.”
3 “Une grande reputation.” — Biog. Universelle. Art. Folard.
s 1759.
4 “Polybs Geschichte a. d. Gr. ubersst, mit Folard’ s Anmerk a. d. Franz.” Berlin, 1755.
“ Polybii Geschichte . . . mit Bemerkungen des Ritters von Folard.” Wien, 1760.
5 “ Cet ouvrage le fit admettre dans la Societe Royale de Londres.” — Biog. Universelle.
« “ Memoires Militaires,” par Col. Guischardt. Paris, 1758* “ L’Esprit du Chev. Folard,”
Berlin, 17 61 ; written by command of Frederick the Great*
7 “Recherches d’antiquites militaires, avec la defense du Chev* Folard, &c,” par Loolooz.
Paris, 1770.
8 pp. 323, 325.
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
137
dans de certains occasions, parceqne rien n'impose tant aux troupes que
l'artillerie, particulierement lorsqu'elles ne s'y attendent pas."
The galloper guns, which came into use some years afterwards, were pro¬
bably a development of this system. It is said, I know not with what truth,
that Frederick the Great used 3-pr. gallopers, “ which answered very well,”1 2
and it is certain that in 1747 in Germany the Duke of Cumberland had six
gallopers, IJ-prs., “such as are now (1799) fired in St. James's Park on
rejoicing days."3 The carriages were “made with shafts, so as to be drawn
without a limber,"3 the shafts acting as a trail when the gun was in action.
The cheeks of the carriage terminated in a splinter-bar, on which the coin or
elevating screw rested. This system furnishes a remarkable illustration of
the difference between mere lightness and mobility. Light to excess, it yet
possessed no real mobility ; for if the guns were pushed forward into action
at a faster pace than that at which the ammunition, carried in country
carts, and the gunners, marching on foot, could move, namely, a walk, the
1 James’s “ Military Dictionary.” London, 1802. Art. Carriage.
2 “ British Military Library.” London, 1799, Vol. I. Hist, of the Eoyal Eegiment of Artillery.
3 James’s “Mil. Diet.” Fig. 4 shows a galloper carriage. It is taken from the “Artillerie
Pratique, employee sous les regnes de Louis XIV, et de Louis XV.,” par le Baron Espiard de
Colon ge. Plate 14,
138
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
batteries were exposed to the enemy's fire without any means of returning it.
In 1732 the French king, infected with the prevalent spirit of reform, and
desirous of putting a stop to the confusion which reigned in his arsenals,1 *
ordered M. de Yalliere to reorganise the artillery. The king could have
hardly selected a man fitter to establish order and uniformity in his
factories; he could not have chosen a man more incapable of carrying
out the gigantic task of reorganising an artillery; for de Yalliere was
emphatically a “safe man/' who could never achieve a brilliant success
or make a signal failure, because he never dared to attempt what was
great. His narrow, bigoted mind revelled in paltry and insignificant
details, but shrunk from reforms of any magnitude as doubtful, if not
dangerous. In any case, failure stared him in the face ; for he had under¬
taken the impossible task of fusing the siege and field artillery services into
one system. His work possessed the merit of solidity and simplicity, and
many of his alterations were undoubted improvements ; but his innovations
were exclusively confined to matters of detail, and he introduced no new
principle. He whited a time-worn sepulchre, he propped up a tottering
house; but the storms would deface the one, and time would undermine the
other. Efficacy of fire received no new impetus in his system, and mobility
was completely neglected.3 The changes he effected in the carriages were
not important. The means of transport for the ammunition were deficient ;
the horses still worked in single file ; the drivers were unorganised ; and
the harness was not thought of. De Yalliere lacked genius to sieze the
splendid opportunity Fortune had thrust upon him. It is for genius to
create, it is for mediocrity to arrange ; and while he arranged everything,
he created nothing. In accomplishing the task of reorganising the artillery
he failed ; he succeeded too well in staving off reform in the French artillery
for a quarter of a century.
Marshal Saxe's attempt to improve the artillery was neither a very
trenchant nor a very happy one. No one had a higher opinion of that
service, as it might be,3 than he ; but he seems to have despaired of any
successful effort to confer greater mobility upon it, as it was. It is most
unlikely that the artillery will ever move faster, thought the Marshal; it is
impossible that it can ever move slower.4 Having come to this conclusion,
he virtually proposed to convert the existing guns into guns of position, and
to create a light field artillery to supply its place, armed with a piece
invented by himself, called an “amusette" — somewhat more than a blunder¬
buss, somewhat less than a cannon. The amusette carried a | lb. lead ball,
1 Fav6, “Hist, et Tact, des Troia Armes,” p. 113. “ Conference sur l’Artillerie de campagne.”
Paris. 1869, p. 12. “ La confusion dtait grande dans les calibres, les formes, les dimensions des
pieces.”
3 «. Complement negligee.” — “ Conference sur l’Art. de camp.” p. 12. It may be necessary to
say that in the above remarks I speak only of M. de Yalliere as an organiser of artillery; for by
all accounts be was a good soldier in tbe field.
3 “ L’Artillerie de campagne feroit la principale force des armees aujourd’hui, si Ton y donnait
plus d’ attention.” — Marshal Saxe, quoted in tbe “ Esprit des Loix de la Tactique,” parde Bonneville,
Tom. I. p. 40.
4 “Combien de fois les equipages restent-ils en arriere, aussi-bien que le train d’artillerie, ce qui
vous met dans la necessity de rester-la tout court !” — '“Reveries, &c.,” Tom. I. p. 147.
TTIE ROYAL ARTILLEEY INSTITUTION.
139
and was mounted on a light carriage drawn by hand.1 2 These pieces were to
Eig. 5.
be distributed in large numbers in front of the line of battle.3 As to the
guns with which the ordinary batteries should be armed, he is by no means
explicit, but he seems to incline towards 16-prs. He distinctly insists,
however, upon all guns of the ordinary artillery being drawn by oxen,3 and
for the following reasons : — Firstly, oxen cut up roads less than horses ;
secondly, oxen cost less; thirdly, they can live upon almost anything;
fourthly, they require little harness and no grooming ; and lastly, “ si un
bceuf s'estropie, on le tue, on le mange, et en prend un autre au depot.”4
Fig. 6.
Deplorable must have been the state of the artillery, if, indeed, these changes
would have been improvements !
1 Eig. 5 represents an amusette.
2 See Plates 22, 23, 24, of the “Reveries,” Paris ed. of 1757.
3 “Le canon et les chariots doivent etre attelees de boeufs.” — “Reveries, &c.” Paris, 1767,
Tom. I. p. 53.
4 Ibid. p. 148. Fig. 6, taken from the “ Reveries,” shows a flying bridge drawn in the manner
proposed for the artillery by Marshal Saxe. It would be absurd in 1870 to re-open the question of
horses versus oxen, but I may mention that on one occasion, during the Central India campaign of
1858, Sir Hugh Rose’s artillery took 12^- hours to march 10 miles, in consequence of the invincible
sloth and obstinacy of the bullocks. — Lowe’s “ Sketches of the Central India Campaign,” p. 65.
140
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
A few years later, a breech-loading system of field artillery was proposed
by M. de Bonneville, a French officer of Engineers.1 The gun, which
Fig. 7.
weighed 1*6 cwt., carried a 1 lb. lead ball, and, according to M. de Bonne¬
ville, it could be loaded and fired while on the move : — “ Les canonniers
pourront toujours servir leur pieces, quand meme les chevaux iraient au
galop ”
While these movements were taking place in western Europe, Captain
von Holtzman was endeavouring to construct for Frederick William of
Prussia a gun which would combine in itself the rival attributes of mobility
and efficacy of fire. Like all his cotemporaries, Holtzman overlooked the
fact that the nature of the gun carriage and limber, and the organisation of the
means of draft, drivers, horses, and harness, are most important considerations
in constructing any system of artillery, and he devoted all his energies to the
impossible task of lightening to a great extent the gun without diminishing
its efficacy of fire in a corresponding degree. It was evident that the charge
must be lessened in the same proportion as the length and weight of the
gun ) but Holtzman imagined he could compensate for the reduction of the
1 “ Esprit des Loix de la Tact./’ a la Haye, 1762, Tom. II. pp. 75-78. In tlie early part of the
18th century breech-loading guns were by no means so uncommon as is generally supposed. Father
Daniel, when describing Sieur de la Chaumette’s breech-loader (“Hist, de la Mil. Fran.,” Tom. II.
p. 331), says the idea was not a new one. See also the Emperor Napoleon’s “ Etudes, &c.”
Tom. IV. p. 4, and the “Diet. Militaire,” par M. A. D. L. C., Dresden 1751 : — “ II y a eu et il y a
encore des canons que l’on charge par la culasse ; cette idee de charger un canon n’est pas nouvelle.”
Breech-loaders had fallen into disuse before the end of the century, for reasons pointed out by
M. Durtubie in his “ Memoire et Obs. sur l’Artillerie a cheval.” Paris, 1795, p. 18.
Fig. 7 represents M. de Bonneville’s gun and carriage.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 141
charge by the construction of a chamber in the gun, cylindrical or conical,
which would increase the effect of the charge. Thus arose the chambered
guns which were introduced into the Prussian service in large numbers
between the years 1740 and 1758. After this latter period they fell into
disrepute, partly from their small effect and partly from the difficulty of
loading them; and before the close of the Seven Years* War they had
dropped entirely into disuse.1 2
I am unable to give any details of the changes which took place in the
Eussian field artillery about this time; but the invention of the much-
vaunted Schuwalows,3 and the organisation of these guns which enabled
them to act with cavalry,3 prove conclusively, not only that the causes I
have enumerated were operating so strongly in Eussia as to draw great
attention to the artillery service, but that the value of mobility was begin¬
ning to be appreciated in that country.
It was in Austria, however, that the movement in favour of a mobile
field artillery produced the most decisive results ; and at the breaking out
of the Seven Tears* War she could boast of possessing, what she probably
possesses still, the finest artillery in the world. In reply to a series of
questions sent to him to Yienna by the Trench Government in 1762,
Gribeauval gave a minute description of the Austrian artillery,4 which, as
Frederick the Great truly said, reflected honor upon its organiser, Prince
Lichtenstein. “ Wir haben -wahrend dieses ganzen Krieges,** writes
Frederick, “ die osterreichische Armee .... von dieser furchtbaren
Artillerie unterstiitzt gesehen. Die Flanken sind mit Kanonen gespickt
wie besondere Citadellen. Jeder ldeine Yorsprung des Terrains wird
benutzt, um Geschiitze aufzustellen.** 5
In the foregoing pages I have attempted to describe the various forces
that acted on the field artillery during the first half of the 18th century.
On the one hand, its progress was retarded by the battalion guns, the wars
of position, and the prejudice raised against the arm by its own immobility.
Its progress was accelerated, on the other hand, by the spirit of enquiry
which characterises the 18th century, and by the moral force generated by
its increasing efficacy of fire. To form a correct notion of the resultant
effect of these conflicting influences on the mobility of the arm, it is necessary
1 “Die Beziehungen Friedrich des Grossen zu seiner Artillerie.” Von Troschke, pp. 7, 28.
“Etudes sur le passe et l’avenir de T Artillerie,” par TEmp. Napoleon III., Tom. IV. p. 93.
2 Schuwalows — so called after their inventor — were small chambered guns, with a charge of 5
or 6 lbs., exclusively intended for firing grape or canister. Their bore was elliptical, the minor axis
being vertical — an arrangement which (it was supposed) considerably increased the lateral spread
of the canister. At the beginning of the Seven Years’ War the Russians threw a veil of deep
mystery round these guns and their belongings — like the French and their Mitrailleur in 1870 — and
Frederick the Great, to relieve the public mind, placed one of them which he captured at Zorndorf
in a public thoroughfare in Berlin, with the inscription — “Hier ist das grosse Mysterium der
Russen zu sehen!” — Von Troschke’s “Die Beziehungen, &c.,” p. 10. Scharnhorst’s “Manuel dea
Officiers sur les pratiques de 1’art militaire.”
3 “ Zu den voriibergehenden Erscheinungen dieser Art (Horse Artillery) muss man auch die
wunderlichen Geschiitze (Schuwalows) zahlen, welche sich im 7 jahrigen Kriege bei der russischen
Kavallerie befanden.” — “Die Koniglich Preussische Reitende Artillerie, vom Yahre 1759 bis 1816.”
Von General-lieutenant von Strotha, p. 1. Von Troschke, p. 38.
4 “Etudes sur le passe &c. &c. de TArt./’ par l’Emp, Napoleon III. Tom. IV. p. 98.
5 Von Troschke, p. 34*
142
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
to consider what estimation it was held in at the time I speak of, and how it
behaved on the field of battle.
One of the most noticeable features of the military books written between
the Thirty and Seven Years' Wars, is the almost unbroken silence in regard
to the artillery observed by the majority, and the unsatisfactory account of
it given by the rest. Montecuculli seldom mentions the arm, except in the
two short chapters he has specially devoted to it; and he evidently sets
little store by what he calls “ la principale machine de l'armee."1 Feu-
quieres contents himself with referring to St. Remy on the few occasions he
has to speak of the artillery.2 St. Remy's excellent work deals rather with
the technical than the tactical side of the subject; and while it leaves
nothing to be desired regarding the weight and dimensions of the materiel ,
it throws but little light on the state of the personnel, or the use of
the arm in action.3 The Marquis de Puysegur casually mentions the
position of a train on the march and in camp ; but he says no more of the
artillery throughout his book, and he does not include it among the troops
that compose an army.4 Prom the short chapter devoted to the artillery in
the “ Reveries ” of Marshal Saxe, absolutely nothing is to be learned ; and
the Chevalier Polard was so engrossed with the wars and military machines
of the Israelites, the Ammonites, the Greeks, and the Romans, that he had
no time to devote to modern artillery.5 The scanty information afforded us
by Pere Daniel, of the Society of Jesus, is intelligible, because he had little
faith in modern artillery, and he openly says, “II est certain que le canon,
soit dans un siege, soit dans une bataille, tue ordinairement tres peu du
monde . . . Ce n'est pas une chose si certaine qu'il le paroit d'abord,
que les Francoises combattant avec les armes des Romains dussent etre
defaits par les Anglois, ou les Allemans, qui se serviraient d' armes a feu."6
“Le Jesuite est excusable de l'avoir pense," exclaims the author of the
admirable “ Essai sur Tusage de TArtillerie,"7 bursting with wrath at the
flippant contempt with which the father treats the artillery, “il n'avait
peut-etre jamais vu tirer de fusil qu' a la chasse, et de canons qu' aux
rejoiiissances publiques." Other military writers treated the subject in the
same manner as those I have mentioned, and the spirit which pervades the
military literature of the age shows that field artillery occupied a mean and
subordinate position in the line of battle.
The low estimation in which field artillery was held was owing, not to the
weakness of its fire, but to its want of mobility; for there can be no
manner of doubt that if, by a happy combination of good fortune and great
exertion, the field artillery was dragged into the decisive position at the
decisive moment, its fire was by no means ineffective. “II est arrive
1 “ Memoires de Montecuculli.” Amsterdam, 1756, p. 53.
2 “Memoires du Marquis de Feuqui&res.” Londres, 1736.
3 “Memoires d’Artillerie, tant par mer que par terre.” Paris, 1697.
4 “L’Art de la Guerre.” Paris, 1749, Tom. I. p. 115. “Les troupes en France se distinguent,
scavoir l’infanterie, en Francoise et l’etrangere ; la cavalerie, en gendarmerie, cavalerie legere, et
dragons.”
5 In the 1st vol. of the “ Abrege des Com. de M. de Folard,” p. 319, may be found a military plan
of the “bataille sur deux fronts ” delivered by the Israelites to the allied armies of the Syrians and
Ammonites, accompanied (as usual) by an elaborate commentary,
6 “Hist, de la Mil. Francaise,” Tom. II. pp. 432, 436.
7 Preface, p. xviii.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
143
quelque fois dans une bataille,” says Father Daniel, from whom such an
admission could have been only wrung by undeniable facts, “ qiPune artillerie,
bien placee et bien servie, a beaucoup contribue a la faire gagner ; mais pour
Tordinaire ce n'est pas par-la qu’on la gagne.”1 A glance at the military
history of the time will dispel any doubt that may still hang round this
point.
At Eontenoy, 1745, our unhappy infantry, massed in a deep column,
were hampered in their movements and delayed under a shattering fire of
cannon and musketry by their field pieces, which they had to drag by hand.3
“We have not lost any colours, standards, or kettle-drums,” says the
“Gazette” of the day, “but have taken one standard; and the cannon lost
was left behind for want of horses, the contractors with the artillery having
run off with them so early that they reached Brussels that day.”3
At Preston Pans, in the same year, the guns were not served by regular
gunners, but by seamen, “hastily collected from the ships;” and when
Lochiel led the Camerons and Stuarts straight on the guns, “ the countrymen
whose horses had been seized to bring them into position ran away.”4
Seven guns were lost at Ealkirk in the following year. “ At the beginning
of the engagement,” says the “ Gazette Extraordinary ” of the 23rd January,
1746, “the horses of the artillery ran away, and some of the dragoons in
the left wing immediately gave way, as did some of the infantry in the same
wing.” “Of our cannon,” says General Wolfe, who was present,5 “not one
would have been lost if the drivers had not left their carriages and run off
with the horses.”
In India, where the country is generally favourable for the movements of
artillery, field guns were as ill able to keep pace with infantry as in Europe.
In a battle fought between the Erench and English near Tritchinopoly in 1753,
“ the English, for more expedition, marched without any field pieces ;” and
when the infantry advanced against the Erench in an action fought shortly
afterwards, “ the artillery in the hurry could not keep up with the battalion.”6
The conduct of some Prussian drivers at the battle of Zorndorf, 1758,
was so disgraceful, that Erederick the Great at once issued orders that when
the guns were in action the teams and limbers should be taken charge of by
cavalry officers specially detailed for this duty.7
1 “Hist, de la Mil. Francaise,” Yol. II. p. 432.
2 Carlyle’s “ Hist, of Friedrich the Great/’ Yol. 1Y. p. 118.
3 "Whitehall, 11th May, 1745, in the “Annual Register.”
4 Cust’s “Annals of the Wars of the 18th Century.”
5 Wright’s “ Life of General Wolfe.” It is satisfactory to know that Capt. Koningham, who
had charge of the artillery drivers, and who led them in their flight, did not belong to the Royal
Artillery. No such name is to he found in “ Kane’s List.” It is not true, as stated in Ray’s
“ Compleat History of the Rebellion,” 1749, p. 265, that Capt. Koningham committed suicide
and “made his escape by going out of the world/’ for the “Annual Register,” Yol. XYI. p. 168,
proves that he was shortly afterwards dismissed from the service with ignominy by sentence of
Court Martial, his sword being broken over his head in presence of the whole army.
6 “ Hist, of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan,” Yol. I. pp. 312, 368.
Yon Troschke, p. 33. “Abweichend von der bisherigen Regel, der Geschiitze im Gefecht
durch Menschen zu bewegen, hatte man seit einiger Zeit versucht, die Gespanne mit ins Feuer zu
nehmen. Bei der Beschaffenheit der Knechte, welche auf alle mogliche Weise zusammengerafft
und aus Kriegsgefangenen gepresst waren, ist es nicht unerklarich, wenn dieser Tross beim
plotzlicken Yorbrechen der russischen Kavallerie nicht stand hielt. Ungliicklicber Weise wurde
J9
144
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
It was as clear to soldiers then as it is now that mobility was impossible
until the weight of the guns and carriages was considerably reduced, and
until the drivers were to some extent organised; and the disasters of the
artillery called forth loud, although unheeded remonstrances. “ *Tis sur¬
prising,” says a writer in the “ Annual Begister,” referring to the battle of
Ealkirk,* 1 2 “ as this is not the first loss of artillery by bad horses, or by the
country people going off with the horses, that one out of several remedies
that might be thought of is not provided against suffering again by such
defects. . . . But it seems the old way is supposed to be the lest ;
without explaining whether the good old way be that of staying for the
cannon till the enemy gets off, or that other of leaving it behind when the
enemy comes on. . . . Horses of strength ought to be as much bought
up and appropriated to draw a train of artillery as for carrying our troopers
and dragoons,3 and the drivers ought to be enlisted under the military oath.
. . . Several other methods, slighted as irregular (though on that
account the more useful) might be mentioned ; but it may not be proper,
lest we should be first taught the use of them at a multiplied expense
from the wisdom of our enemies, who have catched at inventions disre¬
garded here, and whose principles of economy do not condemn the
extravagant practice of having two anchors to a ship.” But these just
complaints fell upon dull ears. Ignorance and obstinacy ruled where
liberality and wisdom should ever reign, and the artillery was hardly more
disorganised than the infantry and cavalry. “ As to the English army,”
says Mr. Carlyle, writing of this melancholy period of our military history,
“ we may say it is, in a wrong sense, the wonder of the world, and continues
so throughout this History, and further ! Never before, among the rational
sons of Adam, were armies sent out on such terms — namely, without a
General, or with no General understanding the least of his business. The
English have a notion that generalship is not wanted; that War is not an
Art, as playing chess is, as finding the Longitude and doing the Differential
Calculus are (and a much deeper Art than any of these) ; that War is taught
by Nature, as eating is ; that courageous soldiers, led on by a courageous
Wooden Pole with a Cocked Hat on it, will do very well. In the world I
have not found opacity of platitude go deeper among any people.”3
Such was the state of things on the eve of the creation of horse artillery.
Aldeeshot,
July, 1870.
die Infanterie dadurch in Vc-r winning gebracht imd das Resulfcat des sons! so herrlichen Sieges
verkiimmert.
“ Dei* Konig (Frederick the Great) gab in Folgo dessen der Artillerie Kavallerie-Kommandos,
um die Gespanne in Ordnung zu kalten.”
1 Vol. XYI. p. 28.
2 Before tbe breaking out of the Great Rebellion, the price of horses in England varied from
30s. to 50s. In 1643 it had risen to £4. (See Warburton’s “Hist, of Prince Rupert and the
Cavaliers,” Yol. I. p. 291). From the Pretender’s Proclamation to the Commissary of Supply for
the Shire of Linlithgow, 30th Dec. 1745, it appears that the price of horses for military purposes
was then £10. In Charles I.’s time, money was three times as valuable as at the present day.
3 “ Hist, of Friedrich the Great,” Yol. III. p. 121.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION".
145
A PROPOSAL POP A
YEBY HEAYY B11EECH-L0ADING GEN
OE NOVEL CONSTRUCTION.
A PAPER READ AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, APRIL 12, 1870,
BY
CAPTAIN J. P. MORGAN, R.A.
Colonel W. J. Shxthe, R.A., in the Chaib.
In making a proposal for a new gun, it is necessary to prove three
things : —
1. That a new gun is needed.
2. That it is not advisable to make it on any of the present systems.
3. That it ought to be made on the system I now propose.
I. Necessity for a very Heavy Gun .
In order to shew the necessity for a very heavy gun, I cannot do
better than quote from the very interesting book on “Our Iron-clad
Fleet/' by Mr. Feed, the Chief Constructor of the Navy. Talking of
the “ Hercules/' he says, at page 3 0 : —
“ The total thickness of iron (neglecting the girders and frames) is 11 J ins., and of
this 9 ins. are in one thickness ; the teak backing has a total of about 40 ins. The
trial at Shoeburyness of a target constructed to represent this part of the ship’s side,
proved that it was virtually impenetrable to the 600-pr. gun; and perhaps no better
idea of the increase of the resisting power of the sides of our iron-clads can be
obtained than that derived from a comparison of the 68-pr. gun, which the
‘ Warrior’s ’ side was capable of resisting, with the 600-pr. tried against the
‘ Hercules ’ target. But the limits of the thickness of armour carried must not
be considered to have yet been attained. Coast defence vessels and rams are being
built to carry 11 and 12 -inch armour; the new turret ships ‘Thunderer’ and
‘Devastation/ lately designed, will carry quite as great thicknesses, and ships
have been designed for sea-going purposes, and may yet be constructed, which are
to carry even 15 ins. of armour. There can be little doubt that, as improvements
are made in the manufacture and working of heavy guns, corresponding additions
will be made to the resisting powers of iron-clads built. It is hardly possible to
foresee in what way the competition between guns and ships will terminate ; but,
146
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OE
having the experience we possess of the successful accomplishment of what only a
few years ago were regarded as impossibilities in the construction of iron-clads, it
would be folly to set a limit to the results that will be attained in the future. The
Admiralty have long been in possession of a design for a turret-ship with sides
plated with 15 -inch armour, and turrets with 18 -inch armour. I have also prepared
outline designs, not on extravagant dimensions, to carry 20-inch armour, both on
broadsides and on turrets.”
Mr. Reed also quotes from Captain Scott, R.N., in a foot note, page
68: —
“At the Boyal United Service Institution, in 1863, Captain Scott made the
following interesting remarks : — ‘ The size of the gun is of vast importance — more
than is generally assigned to it — and for this reason : 20 guns, each a 1-pr., are
fired at a target l^ins. thick, and produce no effect; one gun, a 20-pr., is fired
and smashes it ; the velocities in both cases being equal, in both cases the same
amount of metal is used ; and on this principle an official record of experiments at
Portsmouth states that one 68-pr. produced more destruction than five 32-prs.
Arguing thus, it appears that one 150-pr. is more effective than ten 68-prs., one
330-pr. is equal to seven 150-prs., and a broadside of three 330-prs. is more
destructive than 10^ c Warriors/ In this last statement the * Warrior’s ’ broadside
is taken at twenty 68-prs.’ ”
Arguing thus, I may say that a ship carrying two 1200-prs. would
be nearly equal to one-half of the British Navy.
II. The present Systems of Gun Manufacture .
A very heavy gun, therefore, being necessary, let us examine the
sufficiency of the present systems for producing it.
1. Preliminary Remarks.
a. Longitudinal Strain.
The two great strains to which a gun is subjected are the longitudinal
and the circumferential. Of these, the latter is undoubtedly the greater,
but the former is that which has given most trouble to know how to
meet it.
Mr. Rigg, C.E., in the end of 1867, read “A paper on the connexion
between the Shape of Heavy Guns and their Durability,” before the
Society of Engineers, in which he shows that the mass of the breech
is of great importance in meeting the difficulty.
He says, at page 3 : —
tc If the breech, or that portion of the gun behind the base of the bore, be heavy,
it opposes a considerable resistance to the shot, absorbs the force of the blow, and
so reduces the longitudinal strain upon the barrel. If the breech be light in
weight, the first impact is delivered upon a mass of metal, perhaps not greater
than the shot itself. The breech in this case does not absorb the blow, but
transmits it at once to the barrel. Time is not given for so heavy a mass to begin
its recoil ; the longitudinal strain is greater than the tenacity of the metal will bear,
and fracture is inevitable. It may happen that the breech is blown off, or that
the barrel bursts ; but in either case it is the double cross strain that causes great
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
147
weakness, and any means by which either of them can be reduced will not fail to
be beneficial.
“ The relief which a heavy mass affords in receiving and absorbing the force of
a blow, admits of many familiar illustrations. The different feelings with which a
heavy or a light stone may be struck when held in the hand are well known, but
perhaps the most singular instance of this law may be found in a case which
excited much wonder in the last generation — namely, that of a man who was accus¬
tomed to exhibit himself sustaining a very heavy stone on his chest while lying on
the floor. Several large sledge-hammers were freely used upon the stone, but
although so much force was applied, there was no injurious effect upon him who
submitted to such an ordeal. The relief afforded by simple weight in these
examples gives just the same immunity to a gun. Such a conclusion would lead
to the inference that the greatest durability will be associated with the heaviest
breech, and the following examples will prove this deduction to be well founded.”
Mr. Bigg gives illustrations of various guns in support of this idea,
and mentions specially that at the siege of Charleston —
“One gun, a 30-pr., showed most extraordinary and unique powers of endurance.
Through some accident in its construction, the wrought-iron reinforce was shrunk
firmly on the breech, and not on the body of the gun ; consequently its weight and
inertia became available to resist the first impact of the discharge ; the longitudinal
strain was thereby diminished, and the gun relieved from much of its usual
load .
“After firing 4606 rounds, this gun burst into seven pieces.” ....
Mr. Bigg also quotes from Major Palliser as follows, page 11 *—
“ The same idea lurks in the following remarks by Major Palliser, although the
last sentences contain the gist of the whole argument : — c There are two ways in
which a gun can burst — viz., by the bursting of the barrel, or by the end being
blown off. In an ordinary cast-iron gun, the whole longitudinal pressure acts on
the end of the bore. If the bore be 8 ins. diameter, this pressure will, in round
numbers, be distributed upon 50 square inches. If, however, the gun be bored up
to 13 ins. and lined with a barrel 2^ ins. thick, the longitudinal pressure will act
upon 50 square inches, as before, but will be transferred to a surface of about
130 square inches, and thus the longitudinal strength of the gun becomes more
than doubled. In fact, every way of regarding the subject shows that the circum¬
ferential strength should be applied internally, and the longitudinal strength should
be borne by the outside ; and this is precisely the reverse of the principle upon
which the wrought-iron guns of the service are made.’ ”
Mr. Bigg adds
“ The idea of separating the forces into circumferential and into longitudinal is
very correct in theory, and practical, as well as the assignment of a special share of
duty to each part of the gun. . . . *
“ In conclusion, it is evident that there can be no reason why English guns shall
not always reliably exhibit the same endurance that was shown by the solitary
Parrott gun that bore 4606 rounds. It is simply a question of correct principles of
construction, and if it be desired still further to enhance the powers of the guns
which Major Palliser has begun so well, the question of longitudinal strain is that
to which attention must be given.”
These remarks by Mr. Bigg are very valuable, and it is to this
very question of longitudinal strain that my proposition is mainly
148
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
directed. Allow me, however, before stating what my proposition is,
to shew yon that the longitudinal strain, in addition to the injury it
causes in itself, also injuriously affects all the endeavours in the present
systems of gun manufacture to meet the
/?. Circumferential Strain .
In Fig. 1, the solid lines represent the inner and outer surfaces of a
hollow cylinder before extension — the dotted lines after extension.
Supposing the most favourable case of the metal being perfectly dense,
the area between the two solid lines will equal the area between the
two dotted lines j and the area between the inner solid line and its
dotted line will equal the area between the outer solid line and its
dotted line. But as the outer area is further removed from the centre
than the inner, its length is greater, and consequently its breadth less
in proportion. The absolute amount of extension of the outer surface
will thus be to that of the inner inversely as their radii. Owing, how¬
ever, to the greater length of outer area, it is capable of extending more
instead of less in proportion to the radius. The total proportionate
extension, therefore, of outer to inner surface is inversely as the squares
of their radii ; and as the tension increases directly with the extension,
the tension or useful effect decreases as you recede from the centre,
and is inversely as the square of the distance from the centre.
If the metal be not dense, the decrease is even more rapid than this.
Fig. 2 represents the tensions at different distances from the centre
on the principle above stated. The horizontal distances are the dis¬
tances from the centre, the vertical distances are the tensions. Notice
how rapidly the tension diminishes as the thickness increases, when the
radius is small.
The following equation shows the actual amount of useful effect
which can be obtained by one thickness of metal, as compared with
what it would be if all the metal could be made to do its work ; —
Let r be the radius at any point,
t be the tension at that point*
a be the internal radius,
b be the external radius,
T (total useful
s=s - between limits a and b
r
(f - a).
If the tension were uniformly equal to that at a , it would give a total
m
m
strength -g (b — a). Therefore
actual tension
ab a 0
= r* bo
total strength of metal m b
that the value of any hollow cylinder may be represented by the ratio
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
149
of its internal to its external diameter multiplied by its thickness.
The more nearly this ratio is unity, the greater will be the proportion
of work obtained ; also, as the calibre increases, so may the thickness
be advantageously increased.
By taking the internal radius as the unit of thickness, we can readily
see the very small addition of strength which is gained by increasing
the thickness. A thickness of \ calibre gives a strength of \ of \
calibre ; a thickness of 1 calibre gives a strength of J of 1 calibre or §
of i calibre; a thickness of calibres gives f of \ calibre. So that
we have | for the first \ calibre, § - | or i for the second J calibre,
-fa for the third, and so on ; the total is therefore | + 374 4* 473-
+ ad injin . for an infinite thickness. Now, as the sum of this series
can never reach unity, it follows that, even with an infinite thickness,
we can never obtain as much useful effect as we shall from \ calibre of
thickness if all the metal could be made to do its work. This law is
fatal to a very heavy gun ever being made of one homogeneous piece
of metal.
2. Armstrong Guns.
It was for the reason above stated, that Sir William Armstrong gave
initial tension to the successive coils adopted in his system, so that, if
properly arranged, they should have all their interior surfaces at their
greatest tension at the moment of maximum strain. The great amount
of strength gained by this method will be seen in Fig. 3, which repre¬
sents a 9 -inch gun, on the Armstrong plan, with all the coils extended
so that the inner surfaces are all at the elastic limits of the iron.
The area below the continuous curve is all the strength that could
be obtained if the whole gun were of one piece. The areas between
the continuous and discontinuous curves are the additional strengths
obtained by initial tension. It will be noticed that more waste power
is rescued as the distance from the centre increases. But this also
involves greater initial tension; and for this purpose, at one calibre
thickness, the initial tension must be eight-ninths of the strain the coil
is to bear. If so much initial tension as this is put on, there is a
danger, on the one hand, of overshooting the mark and overstraining
the coil so much that it may break ; and this was actually the case in
a 600-pr. which burst one of its coils, while the barrel and all the
other coils remained sound. On the other hand, if too little tension be
put on, it may so happen that the iron beneath is more compressible
than usual, and the greater part of the tension may be absorbed without
compressing the bore. These two dangers both increase as the thick¬
ness of the metal increases; and, for this reason, Major PalliseFs
remarks are very appropriate — viz., that the circumferential strength
should be obtained as near the bore as possible. This useful maxim,
however, cannot be carried out in the Armstrong gun, on account of
the breech-piece, which surrounds the most vital point at the powder
chamber (see Fig. 11). The breech-piece has its fibre arranged longi¬
tudinally, for the sake of longitudinal strength, and gives in consequence,
circumferentially, only half the strength coiled iron would give, inas-
150
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OP
much as iron across the fibre is only half as strong as it is along the
fibre. The breech-piece, also, is very thick, and undergoes a still
further loss of strength on that account. Altogether, we can only
count on one-half of the tension of bar iron for the inside of the breech-
piece, and something like one-sixth or one-eighth for the outside, and
on a total strength of not much more than one-fourth of the useful
effect of the iron. In Fig. 3, the shaded portion of the diagram shows
how much strength is lost.
When we come to the outside coils, the conditions are apparently
much more favourable, for there seems to be very little strength lost.
But these coils are far removed from the bore, and, as we have seen,
there is not the same certainty of their doing their work as there would
be if they were near. Also, since the bursting of the 600-pr., the
initial tension has been very much reduced, and the same amount is
not now given, as shown in the diagram. Owing to the large diameter
of these coils, they are expensive to make, so that this is not an
economical way of getting up the strength.
Another fault may be added. The longitudinal strain is, to a con¬
siderable extent, borne by the steel barrel, contrary to Major Palliser's
principle and Mr. Bigg's objection to the cross strain on the bore. It
is, however, to be remembered that, at Elswick, these guns were first
made with a loose end, which avoided the cross strain on the bore, and
threw all the longitudinal strain on the breech-piece. The advantage
thus gained is, however, very questionable ; for if the longitudinal strain
be not partly borne by the steel tube, it is necessary to have a thicker
breech-piece, which leads to even greater errors, as we have seen.
None of these guns are now made with loose ends, but they are some¬
times made at Elswick with thinner breech-pieces.
3. Fraser Guns.
a. With one Triple External Coil.
Fig. 12 shows the first pattern that was made without a longitudinal
breech-piece. So far, this is a very important step ; for if the gun be
all coiled iron, it will much better resist the most dangerous circum¬
ferential strain. In the construction of this gun there has evidently
been a due regard paid to longitudinal strain, as well as to economy;
for there is a good thick steel tube, as well as a very thick coil, brought
to bear on it. If the thick coil be properly welded, the longitudinal
strain may be fairly considered as met.
But mark the other objections which this involves. Owing to the
great thickness of the external coil, j- of its useful effect only can be
obtained for circumferential strength, seeing that the internal and
external diameters are as 2 to 5. Also, on the one hand, if the welds
are not properly made, there will be a deficiency of longitudinal
strength ; and, on the other, if to make sure of longitudinal strength
the iron be strongly heated, there is a danger of the iron becoming
deteriorated by overheating. These are the two dangers which have
to be avoided in manufacture ; and though, with one exception, they
THE EOYAli AETiLLEEY INSTITUTION.
151
may have been successfully avoided, a great risk is run should there be
any carelessness, especially when it is considered that there is only one
coil to depend on.
On the subject of overheating iron. Dr. Percy says, in his “ Metallurgy,
Iron and Steel,” pp. 8-10 : —
“The crystallisation of iron has excited much attention, especially amongst
engineers ; and although much has been talked and written about it, yet no small
confusion respecting it still prevails. However, a careful examination of the
subject will tend to remove this obscurity. Bar iron acquires a largely crystalline
structure by long exposure to a temperature which, though high, is yet very far
below the melting points of the metal. On the application of a certain amount of
heat, the particles have sufficient freedom of motion to arrange themselves in
crystals. We have previously had a striking illustration of this fact in the anneal¬
ing of sheet zinc, at a temperature bordering on, yet sensibly below its melting
point. Hence we can readily understand why iron which has been frequently and
strongly heated, or iron which has been forged into large masses, and which must
necessarily have been subjected during a considerable time to a high temperature,
should tend to become largely crystalline in structure. The operation of hammering
iron while strongly heated and during cooling, to a certain degree will obviously
interfere with the action of the forces which determine crystalline arrangement, and
may consequently be expected to diminish the size of the crystals. But in the
case of large masses, it will be difficult to affect the metal far below the surface,
unless a very heavy hammer is employed, and very powerful blows are applied ;
and even then it is hardly possible to conceive that uniformity in the size of the
crystals should be produced through the mass. For, when the exterior may be
cooled down to redness, the interior must still be at a much higher temperature —
it may be white hot ; so that on subsequent cooling, after the cessation of the
blows, the particles in one part of the mass will be in a condition to assume a
more largely crystalline structure than those in another part. It is this which
constitutes the difficulty in large forgings ; and it cannot be overcome by continuing
the hammering until the metal in the interior is sufficiently reduced in temperature
to prevent the formation of large crystals in that part ; for if the metal on the
exterior were hammered at too low a temperature, as would certainly be the case
in the condition supposed, it would become brittle and tender. It must be borne
in mind that these remarks relate to iron, and not to steel, or iron containing any
sensible proportion of carbon. With reference to the size of the crystals, it should
here be stated that the presence of phosphorus favours the formation of large
crystals ; and this element occurs in most commercial varieties of British iron.
The rapid cooling of large forgings by immersion in water, might be expected to
render the interior less largely crystalline.
“ When iron is hammered cold — especially in various directions — the crystals of
which it consists will obviously become more or less disaggregated, and therefore
the strength of the metal will be diminished. The larger the crystals, the more
easily will the iron break ; for, as fracture will occur in the direction of least
resistance, which is that of the cleavage planes, and of the planes of junction of
contiguous crystals, it will be facilitated in proportion to the size of these planes.
I have buttons of fused iron, in which the crystals are so large, that the cleavage
planes extend completely across the fracture. On the other hand, when the crystals
are comparatively small, they are, so to speak, more interwoven with each other;
there are no large cleavage planes, and consequently there is less tendency to
fracture. Whether the foregoing considerations be correct or not, it is well
established in practice that largeness of crystal in a bar of iron indicates facility
of fracture.”
20
152
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Mr. Kirkaldy’s 56 th concluding observation on experiments on
wrought-iron and steel is : — •
“Iron is injured by being brought to a white, or welding heat, if not at the
same time hammered or rolled.”
My own experience corroborates these views. While employed in
the duty of inspecting the conversion of guns at Elswick, on Major
PalliseFs system, a portion of one of the tubes got accidentally over¬
heated, and the fault was not discovered until the tube was tested by
water pressure of 3 tons to the inch before being put into the gun. It
then broke into two pieces, and on examination the fracture was found
to be largely crystalline, as described above by Dr. Percy.
There is another objection, which must always hold good against
these very thick coils. It is claimed in the Armstrong system that, if
the interior of a coil be cooled more quickly than the exterior — and
that is always done by water from the centre during the building up of
the gun — the interior will be in a state of compression, while the
exterior is in a state of extension, so that a more regular succession of
tension obtains than by steps from coil to coil. The increased tempera¬
ture from which the coil is cooled after forging, will make this law act
more powerfully in the case of the Fraser coil. It will cool from both
outside and inside; so that both outside and inside are in a state of
compression, while the interior is in a state of extension. The ten¬
dency is thus to separate into two cylinders, the outer of which will
not support the inner.
This tendency is very much increased if, after once cooling as above,
it be again heated and cooled ; for the second heating commences at
the surface, and causes it to swell out before the interior is softened.
The internal extended portion remains as it was, and, on the whole
mass again cooling from the surfaces, the bad effects double themselves.
I have seen a case of this. A large Morrison hammer was being made.
A Saturday night intervened, and it was allowed to cool in a half-
finished state. On Monday it was again heated and completed, but on
being turned, it was found to contain a hole in the interior so large
that it had to be condemned. This second heating happens in the thick
Eraser coil ; for the trunnion-piece, with its fore and after coil, having
been made separately, are all allowed to cool. They are then joined
together, all heated a second time, and welded into one piece.
If we consider all these various objections, it is not surprising that
one of these guns should have burst at proof.
/3. Pattern with hoo External Coils.
Eraser* s latest pattern, Fig. 13, is perhaps as good a pattern as is
ever likely to be arrived at for 9 -inch guns, unless the system which I
am about to propose, and which introduces an entirely new principle,
be adopted. It has no prominent faults. All the difficulties are so
evenly balanced, that it is hardly possible to improve on it. Hone of
them are, however, removed, and any serious fault in manufacture
might bring one or other into prominent play. Instead of the thick
THE KOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
153
coil, we have two thinner coils. Thus, very much strength is gained
by the second shrinkage, as shown by a comparison of Fig. 5 with
Fig. 4. There is much less risk from overheating, and from second
heating; for the inner coil is thinner, and not joined on to the coil in
front. The outer coil is still heated a second time ; but not being
thick, and, besides, being outside, the danger is not so great. There is
a slight disproportion in the increasing thickness of the coils, as shown
in the diagram. The first might be slightly thinner with advantage, if
circumferential strength only be considered, but this might detract
from the longitudinal strength.
Captain Stoney, R.A., Assistant- Superintendent Royal Gun Factories,
appears to be aware of the risk run, for he says in Yol. YI. page 411, of
the “ Proceedings of the Royal Artillery Institution : ” —
“ With respect to the precise pattern for future construction, it would perhaps
have been the safest course to have continued firing No. 332 gun (of the pattern
under consideration), and then if it did not blow its breech off (its tube being so
thin), or burst explosively without giving ample warning, to adopt it as the pattern
for all the heavier natures. The authorities, however, have decided on constructing
7-inch and 8-inch guns as before, on the No. 368 type (the pattern with triple
coil), but to make 9-inch guns and upwards on the 332 type.”
Thus the principle is recognised that the heavier the gun, the greater
the necessity for coming to true scientific principles of construction ;
for as the size of the gun increases, our power is tested to confine and
restrain the enormous pressure which is called into play. With the
heaviest gun no fault can be tolerated. Though I admit that the Fraser
gun is well suited for 9-inch guns, and guns even much bigger may be
made on this principle, especially if the pressure of the gunpowder be
reduced, yet I do not believe that it is capable of supplying the heaviest
gun that can be made. It may stand up to a 1000-pr., but I am doubtful
of its being able to exceed this, for the following reasons.
From Captain Stoney^s remarks it may be inferred that, on account
of the longitudinal strain, it will not be safe to reduce the proportion
of thickness of the first coil. It will be necessary rather to increase it ;
for the pressure of the gunpowder on each square inch of the base of
the shot must of necessity increase, on account of the column of metal
in front of each square inch of base increasing in length. With the
1000-pr., therefore, the actual thickness of this coil will be at least
equal to that of the triple coil, which failed in the 9 -inch gun. The
proportion of power gained will thus be reduced. The danger, too,
of Dr. Percy's law of crystallisation coming into play will increase.
External compression will manifest itself, and the tendency to split into
two cylinders.
4. Palliser Guns.
These guns will never be able to compete as heavy guns, but they
afford a wonderfully practical illustration of the value of the laws I have
noticed. Instead of having the outside contracted on the inside, the
inside is expanded on the outside, and this can be done by using
154
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
wrought-iron for the bore (see Fig. 14). If we take a 32-pr.,
whose internal and external radii are roughly 3 ins. and 10 ins.
respectively, we have a strength of yh of 7, or 2 ins. of cast-iron.
But if the internal radius be bored up to 5 ins., and a wrought-iron
tube 2 ins. thick be put in place of the cast-iron bored out, we have,
for the strength of the remaining cast-iron, -fa of 5, or 2£ ins. So
that the cast-iron is actually stronger than it was before. The strength
of the wrought-iron tube has to be added, so that these guns are
probably at least twice as strong as they were before conversion for
circumferential strain. See Fig. 6, where the unshaded portion repre¬
sents the strength before conversion. The slightly shaded part repre¬
sents the gain by conversion.*
III. New Proposed Pattern.
I have now to examine the pattern proposed by myself, and to show
that it is the system which ought to be adopted for very heavy guns.
The principle consists in receiving the longitudinal strain on a solid
block of metal not rigidly connected with the rest of the gun. There
is thus no longitudinal strain on the gun, and consequently no cross
strain on the bore. Mr. Eigg^s views are thus perfectly met. Major
PallisePs maxim is also fully carried out ; for, the longitudinal strain
being entirely removed, it is quite easy to turn our whole attention to
getting circumferential strength as near the bore as possible. The iron
can be used in the best possible condition, and under the best form
of arrangement. I have already noticed that near the bore the coils
ought to be thin, but that they may increase in thickness towards the
outside. A reference to Figs. 7 and 15 will show how this is carried out.
About one-fourth only of the useful effect of the iron is lost. In addi¬
tion to this, the iron need not be over-heated. All the coils may be made
short, and the inner ones could be well hammered, which is a matter of
great importance. They could even be rolled out like tyres of railway
wheels. The outer coils, which are thicker, could, without danger, be
on the side of under-welding rather than over-welding. Their short¬
ness would be favourable to perfect manufacture, and at least the two
ends of each coil would always be sound. No second heating is neces¬
sary; so that there would be no tendency to form cavities in the iron,
or to split into two cylinders.
Sir William Armstrong last year, in his address as President of the
Manufacture Institution of Mechanical Engineers, at the Newcastl
meeting, says : — -
“ Krupp and Whitworth — both great names in gunnery — though differing widely
in their views in other points, agree in this, that steel is the right material for the
entire gun. I, on the other hand, have always advocated wrought-iron in the form
* The diagram is to he considered as representing strength, and not elasticity. Cast-iron is
quite as elastic as wrought-iron, or more so ; hut it is probable that wrought-iron, owing to its
malleability, allows the tube to be extended beyond its elastic limits without rupture or great loss
of strength.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
155
of welded coil for the chief mass of the gun, limiting the use of steel to the internal
tube, which has abrasion to resist, as well as tensile strain. The expression of my
opinions upon this point may, probably, not be considered impartial ; but I will,
nevertheless, state the grounds upon which my preference of wrought-iron, thus
applied, is based.
“ It has been found both in Elswick and Woolwich guns, that whenever failure
takes place, it almost invariably originates with that part which is made of steel. It
is the steel tube which is nearly always the first to crack. So also when the vent-
pieces, or closing blocks of the breech-loading guns were made of steel, their
fracture was alarmingly frequent ; but since wrought-iron has been substituted, such
occurrences are rare. The conclusion, therefore, at which I long since arrived, and
which I still maintain, is that, although steel has much greater tensile strength than
wrought-iron, it is less adapted to resist concussive strain. This conclusion is in
strict harmony with the fact that armour-plates made of steel have proved, on every
occasion of their trial, greatly inferior to plates of wrought-iron. The experiments
which I made some years ago, on the toughening of steel in large masses by
immersion, when heated, in oil, led me to expect that this fragility would be
obviated by that process ; and I felt sanguine that I should be able by such
treatment to produce steel armour-plates of extraordinary resisting power. An
armour-plate of steel was accordingly manufactured for experiment, and was tem¬
pered in a large bath of oil. Its quality was tried by test pieces cut off after tem¬
pering, and proved by tension and bending. The result showed a very high tensile
strength, combined with so much toughness that I was unable to match its bending
power by any sample of iron I could compare with it. The plate was then sent to
Portsmouth for trial, in the fullest confidence of its success, but two shots from a
68-pr. sufficed to break it in various directions, and it was justly pronounced a
failure. With these experiences before me, it is impossible that I can hold any
other opinion than that the vibratory action attending excessive concussion is more
dangerous to steel than iron ; and were it not necessary to provide a harder and
more homogeneous substance than wrought-iron for the surface of the bore, I
should entirely discard steel from the manufacture of ordnance.”
I do not wish to trench on the much-vexed Armstrong and Whit¬
worth controversy, but in investigating this subject I have arrived at
a very curious result. Fig. 8 represents my gun made wholly of steel.
The lower margins of the faintly shaded portions give the strains on
the gun in its natural state. Above the horizontal line is the tension,
below the compression. The tension must balance the compression,
and therefore, on the supposition that within the elastic limits the
tensile and crushing strengths are equal, the area above the line is
equal to that below. OA and OA! are the elastic limits of iron ; OB
and OB' of steel. The compression area is necessarily limited, so as
not to exceed the elastic limits of the metal at the bore. The amount
of tension must therefore also be limited, and the result is that, when
the whole are extended, the outer coils are by no means strained to
their utmost.* If the crushing strain were greater than the tensile
* Even in the Armstrong gun, with steel tube and wrought-iron coils outside, it is not possible
to put any great amount of shrinkage in the iron coils; for it is invariably found that at proof the
steel tube not only becomes diminished in diameter, but also springs forward at the muzzle, thus
shewing that it has taken up a new position, in which its compression balances the initial tension
of the wrought-iron coils. The fact that both these guns and the Eraser guns stand heavy firing
after the steel tube has failed, is thus readily accounted for.
156
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
strain, the conditions would be more favourable ; but in the case of
wrought -iron, where the crushing strain is less, the conditions would
be less favourable. It would not, therefore, be advisable to discard
steel entirely from wrought-iron guns. There must be some strongs
metal to bear the crushing strain which initial tension brings on the
bore. It is not necessary, however, that the steel be at the bore itself.
It may be used much more advantageously in the second course.
Fig. 9 represents my gun with the second course of steel in the
region of the powder-chamber. The result shows much greater
strength. In calculating the strength, it is necessary to multiply the
steel area by 4, as the elasticity is only half, while the tenacity is twice
that of wrought-iron.
Fig. 10 shows both 2nd and 3rd courses of steel. The result is
equally satisfactory.
The absolute mathematical strengths of these three constructions
may be given in the order in which they have been considered, as 9,
8, 10. This, however, does not take into account any errors of manu¬
facture, which will tell more severely against steel than iron, as an
error of tttooo^ in dimensions represents a loss of 1 ton per square
inch in iron, and 4 tons in steel.
In the all-steel construction, there would be no gain by increasing
the thickness of metal beyond calibres. It might be made in two
pieces, the inner \ calibre, and the outer 1 calibre thick, giving \ of
the useful effect of the metal. The explosion would thus be resisted
by steel, equal in value to times the dimensions of the bore j and
thus by working the steel up to 20 tons, or its elastic limits, the pres¬
sure in the bore might be 30 tons, if gradually applied. A large
reduction, however, has to be made on account of the suddenness of
the strain, as shown in the following calculation : —
Let P = pressure in the bore suddenly applied, i.e.} uniform during
the time of expansion.
r = radius of bore.
s — space described from the centre by the mass of metal m, in
the time t.
T = tension caused by the extension of the metal, and which,
varying with s} may be put = y- s.
We have —
P =
T , dh
T + mdT*
dh
dfi
ds d2s P ds fxs ds
dt dfi m dt rm dt
rr rr%
==2P — ~ —
fxm fjirm,
THE EOYAL ARTILLEliY INSTITUTION.
157
Now, when 3" is a maximum,
ds
dt
2 P
i.e.} in accordance with the rule laid down by engineers, we can only
meet half the pressure when it is suddenly applied.
The Gunpowder Committee gives, with the new gunpowder, the
maximum pressure in guns of 8 ins. calibre as 15 tons per square inch,
and not suddenly applied. With a 10-inch gun, the pressure is about
24 tons. Supposing it, therefore, to be 15 tons suddenly applied, or
30 tons slowly applied, to cover any margin of error in calculation or
manufacture, or to allow an extension to heavier guns, the result is that
a steel gun would be worked up to its elastic limits of 20 tons per
square inch. Now, it is laid down in engineering, that in no case will
metal stand 900 vibrations, if worked up to its elastic limits, or one-
half its breaking strain ; but, if worked up to one-third of its breaking
strain, 10,000, or even 100,000 vibrations will produce no visible bad
effects. A wrought-iron tube reduces the diameter of the bore nearly
one-third, without affecting the useful employment of the steel behind
it, and the possible effect might be that it would give the necessary safe
margin within the elastic limits, and thus produce a beneficial effect
out of all proportion to the reduction of strain which it would cause.
Taken in connection with the new gunpowder, it might therefore increase
the endurance even of very heavy guns from 1000 or 2000 rounds to
10,000, or even 100,000, if the bore were renewed so as not to wear out.
These good results are owing to the great elasticity of wrought-
iron, which, if used for the bore, not only allows a greater thickness of
steel to be employed advantageously behind it, and, as a consequence,
greater initial tension, but also brings into play twice the extra tension
beyond the initial tension. There seems to be nothing to prevent this
plan being carried out with heavy guns, if my system of construction
were adopted ; for a hard surface would not be necessary with lead
coating, and the absence of longitudinal strain would make the welds
safe. My gun might thus be made a Palliser gun of enormous strength,
and the amount of steel which it is possible to employ usefully would
almost make it a Whitworth gun, while the coils, wrought-iron, and
initial tension, make it essentially an Armstrong gun. It is a Fraser
gun, too, with a thick outer coil, where a thick coil ought, and ought
only, to be. The only novelty I claim is the new principle whereby it
is possible to reconcile all these great authorities.*
Breech-Loading .
In addition to the advantage of great strength, breech-loading comes
in as a most important element in the gain which will be obtained by
this method of construction.
■* No doubt these advantages might be combined in any breech-loader which had a wrought-iron
barrel and steel breech-piece, but not so effectually as in this gun. I may, however, claim the
combination independently of my system of breech-loading.
158
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Lead coating is the only method that has been used in our service
with breech-loading guns, but it is not a necessary consequence ; for
we find that on the continent, where breech-loading prevails, though
the Russians, Prussians, and Austrians use lead coating, the French do
not. In deciding between these two systems, it is a point of great
importance to know what is the maximum initial pressure of gunpowder
in the bore. One of the chief dangers, in using lead-coated projectiles
with very heavy guns, will be the stripping of the lead. It can hardly
be doubted that the moment of first starting is that at which this is
most likely to take place, when the shot begins to take the grooves,
and when the pressure is the greatest. Not only does the pressure per
square inch increase with the size of the gun, but another law acts
adversely ; for the mass rotated increases as the cube of the calibre,
while the lead-coated surface which produces rotation increases only as
the square of the calibre. We know, however, that lead coating is safe
with a 7-inch gun and our present gunpowder. If the initial pressure
can be reduced to one-half, a 15-inch gun could be made as safe in this
respect as a 7-inch gun at present is. A committee is now sitting on
the question of gunpowder, and has already issued a preliminary report
showing that, by a modification of the size and shape of the grain, the
initial pressure can be reduced to about one-half. This is for smooth¬
bore guns and windage. It would be very useful to know whether the
same results hold good with lead-coated projectiles where there is
rifling and no windage. The gun I propose would be a useful means of
determining this ; for, as designed for service, it will fire out its breech
at the rate of 15 miles an hour. By reducing the size of the breech to
one-fourth, it could be made to retire along a railway at the rate of
60 miles an hour ; and, while it retired, a record could be obtained
from it on a revolving cylinder, which would give a curve, continuous
throughout, from which the spaces described in given times could be
measured, and so the velocities and pressures deduced.*
Before adopting rifling by lead coating with a very heavy breech¬
loading gun, it would be necessary to know what is the initial pressure
under the exact circumstances to be used. The initial pressure should
be as much reduced as is consistent with the maintenance of initial
velocity. In itself, however, lead coating has the effect of increasing
the initial pressure ; for it gives no relief by windage, and the com¬
pression and friction of the lead coating give considerable retardation,
so as still further to increase the pressure. There is also to be added
the resistance which is produced by the necessity of having an uniform
twist. All these causes act, not only in a degree which can be mathe¬
matically calculated, but also, in an uncertain degree, by affecting the
explosion of the gunpowder, so that nothing but experiment can be
depended on.
Lead coating has one very great advantage. It is the best method
of preventing windage ; and, as windage has the effect of scoring the
* This was suggested to me three years ago by the Rev. F. Bashforth, Professor of Mathematics
to the Advanced Class of Artillery Officers at Woolwich.
THE .ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
159
bore of tbe gun to such an extent as to render the gun unserviceable
from this cause alone, this is a matter of some moment. It would espe¬
cially be an advantage with a very strong and heavy gun, such as the
one I propose, for, as a rule, the bigger the gun the greater the scoring;
and if the strength of the gun were such that it would wear out in this
manner before bursting, this would be the point most requiring to be
attended to. No doubt, with breech-loading, greater facility would be
given for stopping the windage than in muzzle-loading guns, by using
a tight-fitting wad between the powder and shot ; but it would not do
this so effectually as lead coating.
At present, windage has one advantage, owing to the difficulty of
providing a suitable fuze for breech-loading guns. It is not probable,
however, that this will long be a serious objection, now that attention
has been directed to the difficulty. Captain Nolan and myself have
proposed a method of using muzzle -loading fuzes with breech-loading
guns, by making a channel through the projectile, so that the flash of
the discharge may pass through and ignite the fuze.*
Construction.
I have dwelt at some length on these principles, because it is on
them that I depend for the success of my gun. The mechanical details
are merely the means of carrying them out, and may possibly have to
be modified. They seem very simple and natural when embodied in
this model, with which I was furnished by the kindness of Sir William
Armstrong and Company, while employed at their works at Elswick*
It took me fourteen years, however, to arrive at this result. What
puzzled me most was to provide for the elevation. I first thought of
having a joint between the plug which closes the breech and the
weight which absorbs the blow ; but that would soon have been smashed
to atoms. The next idea was to butt the plug against a dead weight ;
but, from the varying elevation, the force would not have acted through
the centre of gravity, which is a necessity with such an enormous
pressure. The present idea is to make the plug and weight in one
piece, and let it slide along bars which are rigidly attached to the sides
of the gun.
When loaded, the gun is balanced on the trunnions with only a slight
preponderance, sufficient to cause the breech always to rest on its car¬
riage. Elevation or depression is given by running the breech carriage
backwards or forwards.
When the gun is fired, the shot and breech move in opposite direc¬
tions, with velocities inversely as their weights. The shot will thus
have left the bore long before the breech is opened. The method of
preventing any escape of gas at the breech is shown in Eig\ 15, where
a steel disc fits on to the front of the plug, and has a paper wad in
front of it. This will become tightly jammed so long as the pressure of
gas acts on it, and will afterwards be withdrawn by the momentum of
* This experiment has since been carried out successfully at Shoeburyness.
21
160
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the breech.* The breech-carriage also recoils, and this, together with
some play between the breech and the bottom of the guide bars, pre¬
vents any alteration of elevation during the instant of firing.
The weight of the breech is kept as small as possible, and this no
doubt will have the effect of reducing the amount of pressure of gas on
the shot ; but it will only be to a very slight extent. I have taken the
breech as fifty-six times the weight of the shot ; so that the pressure
would be about 1 per cent, less than in ordinary guns, which are about
112 times the weight of the shot. The initial velocity of recoil will
thus be twice that of an ordinary gun, and this would require four
times the amount of resistance to pull it up in the same space. Twice
the resistance, however, would pull it up in double the space ; and
I propose doing it in this manner, so as to give sufficient room for
loading. There are two sets of compressor bars which act on the
breech, one on each side immediately inside the guide bars. There
would, besides, be compression between the breech carriage and slide,
so as to pull up the carriage when it had recoiled to a suitable distance.
The construction of the carriage would also bring the action of gravity
to bear at the most suitable moment to produce the same effect.
Breech ropes are added for greater security. It may be supposed that
this double strain would be apt to injure the pivots with a very heavy
gun ; but it will be seen that this is not likely to happen, when it is
considered that what injures the pivots is not the compressors, but the
friction which is brought to play between the carriage and slide during
the impact of discharge. In an ordinary gun, the whole weight of the
gun rests on the carriage, but in the case of this gun it does not ; so
that the carriage can more readily slip away.
When the breech-piece is back, the gun is loaded at the breech.
The compressors are then released, but not before the breech has been
secured to its carriage, in the position it may then occupy, by chains, or
some other contrivance. This prevents the breech from descending,
and is useful, because the higher the breech, the more readily will it run
forward. For if the guide bars are above the horizontal, they tend to
help the breech forward ; but if below, they tend to retard it in running
forward. Should the breech accidentally get low on its carriage, it
would have to be run up the bars by means of the running-out-and-in
gear. Wheels would be brought into play between the breech and
guide bars, and between the breech carriage and slide ; but they are not
shown in the model, as their action is well known in the Working of
heavy guns.
This breech action is very simple, and suited to very heavy guns,
where great weights must necessarily be moved. The explosion opens
the breech, and alters the position of the gun from that shewn in
Fig. 16 to that shown in Fig. 17. Gravity brings it back again to its
original position.
A much smaller breech carriage can be used, which provides for only
# Or the wad might remain in the bore after the pressure had ceased, to prevent any escape of
smoke, and could be withdrawn at leisure.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
161
sufficient motion of the breech to allow of elevation and depression ;
but the large one has the advantage of causing the muzzle to dip after
firing. This dipping would be useful in allowing the muzzle to hide
itself behind a shield or counterscarp, where it would remain sheltered
during loading and running up, and need only be exposed at the instant
of firing. Another shield or turret could be placed about the position
of the trunnions, so as to protect the most vulnerable parts in rear.
The model is designed for a 15 -inch gun, and with some alterations,
for greater convenience, and to suit the new powder, it represents a
very powerful gun firing 200 lbs. of powder, and a projectile of 1200 lbs.
The body of the gun could be made wholly of coiled iron, with the
usual steel tube ; or, if the suggestions I have made could be carried
out, it might have a wrought-iron coiled barrel, and a second course, or
a second and third course of steel, in the region of the powder-chamber.
It would weigh about 40 tons. The breech would be almost wholly
of cast-iron, with a wrought-iron hoop to support the trunnions and
the plug of steel, and would weigh about 30 tons. The total weight
of the gun would, therefore, be 70 tons, and this is about one-sixth
heavier than the proportion of gun to shot, if we consider the present
service guns of smaller calibre ; but it would probably not be more
than the proportion which would be necessary if the present patterns
were extended to such a heavy gun. At all events, any excess of
weight would be more than counter-balanced by its being divided into
two, and by having so large a proportion of the material of cast-iron.
I am doubtful, however, if a gun of this size could be made to stand on
any of the present patterns, and it is for this reason I have chosen this
particular size, though it is impossible to say to what extent the modi¬
fication of the pressure of gunpowder may extend the limits to which
any pattern of gun may be carried. But if, on any of the present
systems, a 15 -inch gun can be made, I am confident that, on this
system of mine, a 20-inch gun might be obtained, firing a 1-ton shot,
with a breech-piece and barrel of 50 tons each. If Mr. Reed makes
ships carrying 15 and 20-inch armour, both guns will be needed, for it
will require 15 and 20-inch guns to pierce them.
At the conclusion of the paper —
The Chairman invited discussion, saying that Captain Morgan would
be very happy to hear suggestions or answer questions on the subject
of his gun.
Captain Noble said that Captain Morgan had not explained how the
gun was to be loaded.
Captain Morgan said the projectile and ammunition would be lifted
by a crane and inserted at the breech. There would be a space of 4 ft.
when the breech was open.
In answer to other questions, the lecturer showed by his model how
he proposed to draw the breech-piece backwards and forwards.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
162
Captain Noble asked if the breech would act as a rammer ?
Captain Morgan said it might be so adapted.
Captain Browne said he understood Captain Morgan to say that
there would be no windage at the breech ; in fact, that there would be
no room for escape of gas until the shot had left the muzzle. How,
then, he would ask, would he contrive to effect this ? How tight would
he make the piston to fit ?
Captain Morgan said the plug would have from one-tenth to one-
quarter inch play. A steel disc would be screwed on to the face of it,
having less play, and in front of that he would put a paper wad. By
this means he had every confidence that any escape of gas would be
prevented. The recoil of the breech would be about 3 ins. during the
discharge, but the plug was in point of fact a foot and a half long, so
that there was at least 9 ins. to spare before there could be any danger.
In reality it would be a safety-valve, escaping only when a shot got
jammed in the bore, and thereby preventing the destruction of the tube.
Even in case of such an escape of gas, the breech would be so con¬
structed that the gas would be thrown forward.
Captain Browne said that, under those circumstances, it would seem
that there was danger from the gas escaping at the breech ; and he
asked if it was not saving the gun at the expense of the gunners ?
Captain Morgan said the gunners would be protected behind the
breech, which would direct the flash against the turret.
Colonel Shaw asked what was proposed to be the battering charge of
powder ?
Captain Morgan. — About 200 lbs.
Colonel Shaw. — And would a breech of that size resist the explosion
of such a charge ?
Captain Morgan. — Yes ; it is the strongest form for resistance I can
think of.
Colonel Shaw. — How would the gun be sighted ?
Captain Morgan explained, by reference to the model, that it might
be done by means of a small hole in the face of the turret. He added,
however, that he should prefer having the gun and carriage to rise and
fall, on something like the Moncrieff principle, having already prepared
a model for that purpose.
Captain Harrison asked if the extra 10 tons in the weight of the gun
was an absolute necessity ? Ten tons of dead weight, in comparison
to the weight of a service gun, seemed a very heavy addition.
Captain Morgan replied that, with good compression, it might be
possible to keep within what would be the service limit — 60 tons, but
he would not recommend it. He calculated that about one-sixth of the
grnfls weight would have to be added as a sacrifice for this arrange¬
ment of the breech. Thirty tons, however, are cast-iron.
Captain Harrison. — You do not think your arrangement is possible
without sacrificing that weight ?
Captain Morgan. — I do not say that. What I mean is, that I would
not risk my gun by trying experiments to reduce the weight ; but I
think it might possibly be reduced.
Captain Harrison said he did not recommend such a reduction if the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
163
weight was essential, but it seemed a considerable sacrifice to lose so
much attacking power as 10 tons,
Lieut. Jones said he had understood Captain Morgan to explain that
the gun, being in two divisions, would be easier to move than a gun of
less weight ; so that the extra 10 tons would be of no disadvantage in
that respect.
Captain Harrison said his objection was, the ship would lose power
by the sacrifice of this 10 tons. Another ship might be met, armed with
a gun of the service weight, and another 9 -inch gun in addition.
Lieut. Stewart said it was very doubtful whether they could make
a gun so large as a 1200-pr. yet.
Captain Harrison said there need be no difficulty on that ground.
He thought they would find Colonel Campbell quite prepared to make
a gun of that weight if necessary.
Colonel Miller. — What is the weight of the heaviest gun made ?
Captain Harrison. — Twenty-five tons.
Captain Noble. — We can make them up to 37 tons at present.
Colonel Miller asked if he was to understand that there was a demand
for a 15 -inch gun, or that they ought to anticipate such a demand, and
provide for its construction before they required it ?
Captain Morgan said he believed that they must advance to that
weight, and they must consequently provide for the emergency.
Colonel Miller said it seemed to him that there were two questions
involved. First, was it necessary to have these very heavy guns ? for
if so, they must consider how to make them. But if there was no reason
to expect that they would be required, it was doubtful whether it was
worth while to proceed in a proposal which would involve so much
expense and such loss of power.
Captain Browne said : Captain Morgan had already stated that such
a gun was required for piercing armour-plates ; for that, if they had
15 and 20-inch plates, they must have 15 and 20-inch guns to pierce
them. As to the objection raised by Captain Harrison respecting
the weight of the gun, he thought the additional 10 tons was but a
small consideration in comparison with the weight necessarily entailed
by the plating, fittings, carriage, ammunition, &c., belonging to each
gun on board ship.
Captain Harrison said his objection had been misunderstood. He
believed that if they employed a service gun, the spare room could be
more profitably employed by putting another gun in the same turret.
Thus, supposing they had a 7-inch gun of the service pattern in the
turret, they might find room for a 9 -inch gun besides. This he thought
would be preferable to “putting all the eggs in one basket.”
Captain Strange said, if he comprehended Captain Morgan's design,
it was to save material in the gun rather than add to it, because
there was no necessity for a breech-piece.
Captain Morgan said he could not take credit for any saving of
material. He calculated that in a gun of the size proposed, 10 tons
would be added to the service weight.
Captain Browne said it should be shown that a 9 -inch gun could
be put into the same turret with a 15-inch, before basing arguments
on such an arrangement.
164
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Captain Morgan said the principle of his design was this : — He
assumed that they could not make a gun larger than a 1000-pr. by the
present plan; they must stop short there for want of the means of
constructing a larger gun sufficiently strong. It would then be a
consideration whether it would not be advisable to sacrifice a large
proportion of weight to attain their object, seeing that there was every
probability of larger guns being required, owing to the great increase
of force obtained relatively by every increase of size.
Colonel Smythe, in the name of the meeting, thanked Captain Morgan
for his interesting paper, saying that whatever results his design might
lead to, it had been evidently well considered ; and that, at all events,
the proper place for the discussion of that and all other suggestions on
the subject of gunnery was the Koyal Artillery Institution. (Applause).
The proceedings then terminated.
I
pim
Txg.ll
CAS CHANNEL
12
GAS CHAN N EL
Fig 14:
THE EOYAL AETILLERY INSTITUTION.
165
CAMEL GUNS.
BX
COLONEL H. H. MAXWELL, ft. A.,
StTPERIKTEIfDEIfT COSSIFORB QUIT FOUNDRY.
In those parts of Asia where the camel, or, more correctly, the
dromedary, is the chief beast of burden, and where no made roads
exist, the “ ship of the desert ** has, ever since the invention of gun¬
powder, formed the ordinary means of transport of artillery. The
camel swivel-gun, however, appears to have been of Affghan invention ;
for we find that “ Mohammed Affghani, having crossed the deserts of
Seistan and Kerman with 15,000 men, for the most part mounted on
camels, and having with him, in lieu of ordinary artillery, a number of
camel swivel-guns, on the 8th March 1722, encountered the Persian
army numbering 60,000 men with 24 guns, at Groul-Nabat within
ten miles of Ispahan. On the Persians* approach, the left wing of the
Affghans giving way, the former pursued with ardour; but soon their
enemy* s ranks open, and disclose a line of 100 camels kneeling down,
each with a gun on its back. The fire knocking over the leading ranks
of the column, the Affghan horse charged, and put them completely to
the rout.***
Tahmasb-Kouli-Khan, better known under the title of Nadir Shah,
the invader of India and the author of the Delhi massacre, introduced
the camel gun into the Persian service. It was under this famous
warrior that the camel gun received the name of “ zumbooruk,** from
“zumboor,** a wasp. After making good use of this species of artillery
in various campaigns in Asia, the invader of India appeared before
Delhi with 250 zumbooruks, his 12 pieces of artillery having been left
at Umballah.
Since his day, almost without interruption, camel artillery has formed
a portion of the Persian army.
Some thirty years back a regular organisation was given to the corps
of Zumboorukchees, under the order of Hadji Mirza Aghassi, the then
Prime Minister.
The gun of twisted iron was 27*6" long, and carried a wrought-iron
ball of 14 ozs. in weight, and consequently of about 1*8" in diameter.
* “ Les Zemboureks.” By Colonel F. Colombari. Paris, 1853*
166
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
The piece had a flint lock. Two saddle bags contained 50 cartridges
of round balls and grape shot,, besides 20 blank cartridges for salutes.
The following are the weights of the camel's load : —
lbs.
Weight of piece, swivel, and sponge . 8085
Saddle, numdah, girths, bridle, schabraque, and ornaments 97' 02
Ammunition and saddle bags . 122-89
Eations of the gunner, consisting of 3 lbs. of bread ; and
of the camel, 6 lbs. of flour, mixed with barley, made up
into balls ; and 12 lbs. of hay or straw . 22-64
Weight of the gunner (11^- stones) . 161-70
Total . 485-1 lbs., or 4-3 cwt .*
The subjoined table gives some idea of the rate of marching of a
camel : —
Nature of load.
Weight of
load.
|
Number of
paces at a
walk, per
minute.
length of
pace.
Distance
travelled
in an hour.
cwt.
ft.
miles.
Camel laden with provisions or baggage, ")
that is with full load . )
6-93
80
2-63
2-39
Camel, with camel gun .
4-33
90
3-61
3‘69
Camel, with rider and plain saddle . .
1-73
100
4‘27
4-84
As to length of march* most camels are capable of making forced
marches of 85 miles a day. Lightly loaded* they can cover 70 miles.
Napoleon* during his occupation of Egypt* employed camel corps* to
enable him to cope with his fleet antagonists* the Arabs.
* The accompanying lithograph will give some idea of the appearance of the camel artillery of
Persia.
'OO
-CD
co
JE!
ro
-i — ^
- •*!
■ QJ
3
O
re
3
rsi
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
167
Sir Charles Napier, in the year 1842-3, mounted a company of the
13th Light Infantry on camels, each soldier being seated behind a
native camel driver. The infantry, man was armed with his musket, and
was provided with 60 rounds of ball-cartridge. Sir Charles* object was
to give this company a highly increased power of locomotion. The
troops under his command were few, as compared with the area of the
ground he had conquered and had to hold. By this means, he greatly
increased the value of a small portion of them. This idea was doubt¬
less borrowed from the camel-gun corps of native states, and from the
usual method of fighting of the Beloutchees.
At Sobraon, many of these camel guns were captured in the Sikh
entrenchment, after having been vigorously used against us.
In the mutiny of 1857, in India, and for some time subsequently,
two camel corps, on Sir Charles Napier's model, were organised — one
company being taken from the Rifle Brigade and another from the
92nd Foot,
Could such corps, in addition to their power of locomotion, be
endowed with increased power of musketry fire, their value, from a
strategical and tactical point of view, would be vastly increased. Com¬
bined with cavalry, they would be more especially suitable to such
operations as reconnaissances, as they would provide the reconnoitring
force with precisely the element in which reconnoitring parties are
usually deficient — viz., missile power and capacity of resistance in case
of surprise; further, for suddenly seizing important strategic points,
such as the junction of a number of ordinary roads or railroads, fords,
bridges; or for making requisitions, covering forage parties, seizing
boats in a river, escorting convoys, and the like.
As we have, in the north-west of India, a splendid breed of camels,
it seems desirable to adapt their locomotive and carrying power to
military purposes, in combination with the latest invention in firearms.
The Catling gun having met with the approval of a mixed committee
of officers at Shoeburyness, it may be worthy of consideration whether
a light gun on this system could not be made of a weight suitable for a
camel gun.
The data may be taken from the figures above quoted. From these
we may gather that a Persian camel can carry, in the form of gun
and ammunition, about 180 lbs., leaving a margin of 20 lbs. for saddle
bags, &Ci One hundred rounds of Martini-Henry ammunition weighs
10J lbs. But the load of the ordinary stamp of Indian camel is known
to be 5 maunds, or about 400 lbs. — that is, 85 lbs. less than the Persian
gun-camel. With picked camels the weight might be such as to admit
of carrying 152 lbs. of gun and ammunition. This would give a gun of
112 lbs. and some 400 rounds of ammunition. A spare camel would
carry some 1500 rounds more.
With a gun of 112 lbs. weight on his back, the camel would not feel
the discharge. Being on the ground with his legs tucked under him,
and the upper arm lashed to his shank, he forms a steady platform for
firing.
n
188
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
ON
AXLE-TREE SEATS FOR FIELD BATTERIES.
BY
CAPTAIN IT. L. BALFOUR, E.A.
The want of some means of mounting a certain number of the detach¬
ments of field batteries, and conveying them rapidly to the front when
required, is generally acknowledged.
The subject has been much discussed, not only in the corps, but by the
press and other writers, and has been again brought forward quite recently,
in consequence of the prominent part taken in the present war by the
Prussian field artillery, a large proportion of which are field batteries. They
differ in many respects from those in our service, but principally in the
manner in which they are manoeuvred. They move more rapidly, unac¬
companied by ammunition wagons, and they are enabled to convey a sufficient
number of men to the front to work the guns by carrying three men on
the limbers and two on the axle-tree seats.
The Special Committee assembled to report on Pield Artillery Equipment
for India, recommended that the height of the axle-tree boxes of the new
9-pr. M.L.E. gun should be reduced, and rails added to render them
available for carrying two gunners. This, however, was not approved of
by the Director-General of Ordnance, who stated in his reply to the Com¬
mittee forwarding their report, “The proposal to provide means for mounting
two men on the gun axle-tree boxes, is a matter of minor importance, and
Mr. Cardwell does not consider it desirable to adopt the Committee's
recommendation in this particular." The question, therefore, has been
brought under consideration, but the final approval not yet obtained. It is
understood, however, that the axle-tree boxes for the new field gun are to
be constructed so as to admit of being easily fitted for seats.
The axle-tree seats in the accompanying sketch were made in 1868, at the
time of the Eenian raids in Canada, when the field batteries were required,
under the circumstances, to perform duties which in our service are not
considered as properly belonging to them.
An instance of this occurred at the time of the first Fenian raid, when
two guns of the 4th Brigade were disembarked off a train at St. Arm and,
in Lower Canada, and ordered to proceed as rapidly as possible with an
escort of cavalry to Pigeon Hill, about three or four miles distant.
The officer in charge could only mount three men on the gun limbers,
leaving the remaining numbers of the detachment to keep up on foot. The
ammunition wagons, fully packed, and horsed with teams of only four
instead of six horses, followed at a walk. The guns consequently were
brought into action with only three numbers besides the No. 1, giving an
instance of the incomplete footing on which our field batteries are kept, and
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
169
the uselessness in attempting to make them, in their present state, move
rapidly from place to place, which they are frequently called on to do.
The same description of raid occurred again in 1868, and authority was
obtained to increase the mobility of the field batteries, by making use of the
axle-tree boxes for carrying two men of the detachments. Temporary seats,
therefore, were constructed by one of the batteries, a short description of
which is here given.
The present pattern of axle-tree box for the 12-pr. Armstrong gun not
being sufficiently wide for a seat, the additional width is obtained by a
wooden movable ledge and extra side, fastened together and strengthened
with corner plates ; it is shaped to fit over the nuts of the bands fastening
the axle-tree boxes, and two small stop plates let in on the inside to catch
the box underneath. It is kept tight to the box by an iron retaining band
passing round both, and screwed to the extra side by nut-headed bolts and
plates. The ledge, therefore, does not in any way interfere with the lid or
other part of the box. A guard iron is fastened on outside, of sufficient
height to allow its being also used as a handle for mounting. An extra
rail is added, nearly as high as the top of the wheel ; this is covered in with
painted canvas or leather, which supports the arm, and protects it from the
wheel. A support for the back is given by a wide leather strap, fastened to
the top of an upright iron rod let into sockets on the side of the gun
carriage, and passing across to the lower guard iron, to which it is fastened.
The stirrup is an iron band, secured on one side to the cheek of the gun
carriage by a nut and bolt, and on the other, to the extra side of the box,
by a bolt and key on the outside. This description of stirrup is much to be
preferred to the breast chain of the gun, which is recommended to be used
for the purpose. The advantages of it are, that it is fixed, and serves also
as a step for mounting; it does not project below the bottom of the axle-
tree bed, and cannot touch when going over rough ground. The disadvan¬
tages of making a stirrup of the breast chain are, that it sways inconveniently
for mounting, hangs down below the axle-tree bed, and may touch uneven
ground. Hand-straps are fastened on outside each cheek of the gun carriage,
and crossed over the top of the gun, for the inner hands of each man.
With these appliances nothing short of the gun upsetting could throw a
man off the seat. A battery has been drilled over rough ground with men
on these seats, and they are preferred to those on the gun limbers.
This plan of putting seats on the present pattern of axle-tree box admits
of the required fittings being removed in a few minutes, which is not
advisable for many reasons. The box and seat should of course be made all
complete. The circumstances under which this description was made neces¬
sitated it to be movable without interfering with the box.
It has been the practice of many officers in command of field batteries to
utilise these axle-tree boxes, in some way or other, for mounting men on the
line of march ; and until new boxes and fittings are issued, the above method
will be found to answer all purposes, and the workmanship required can be
easily executed by battery artificers.
It may be noticed here what great importance is given to these seats in
the Prussian service. Their field gun carriages, horse artillery not excepted,
are carefully fitted so as to make the best possible seat for two axle-tree
gunners. Means are provided to lessen the concussion by buffers, made of
170
MINUTES OF PllOCEEDINGS OF
layers of india-rubber and iron. The boxes underneath are almost sacrificed,
nothing being carried in them but a few small stores. The back rests
against a frame of wire net-work, supported by iron stays fastened to the
trail in rear, and there are fixed stirrups for the feet. They are consequently
used for carrying men at all times, as much as the gun limbers.
Having brought this subject forward, it may be advantageous to consider
one or two points connected with it.
The Special Committee in their report referred to the system of carrying
men on the off-horses, in addition to two on the axle-tree seats.
On this point there is much difference of opinion ; but it appears indis¬
pensable to adopt the plan to some extent, in conjunction with other available
means, for conveying detachments of the required strength. By doing this
they might be made to consist of seven gunners besides the No. 1, and
distributed in the following manner : — -
Nos. 2, 3, and 6 would be mounted on the gun limber. This third
number, wdien seated, facing the usual way, throws much additional weight
on the shaft-horse. If, however, he sits reversed, and facing the gun, the
shafts are very little heavier than vrhen two men only are on the limber. It
seems practicable to arrange a seat for that method, by putting additional
rails on the ammunition boxes, and a rest for the feet on the trail of the gun.
Nos. 4 and 5 would be carried on the axle-tree seats.
No. 7 would be mounted on the marker's horse, which is allowed to each
subdivision on service. The horses of this number and the No. 1 might be
held by a spare driver, riding the off-centre horse of the gun team, and dis¬
mounting when in action.
No. 8 might be mounted on the off-horse of the spare pair that would
accompany each gun when available. The occasions on which it wrould be
necessary to hook in eight horses are very exceptional ; and it is generally
considered best to keep the fourth pair as spare horses.
It is evident if a certain number of the gun detachments of a field battery
can thus be conveyed with the gun alone, and moved rapidly when required,
it wall be necessary to accustom the men and horses to move accordingly.
It appears to be a tradition in our service, though unknown in any other,
that field batteries should not be moved faster than at a walk, except at
regimental drills; and that when the ammunition wagons are sent away from
the battery, the detachments must keep up on foot, as well as they are able,
should the guns be ordered to the front at an increased pace.
It is scarcely credible that a well-known instance, on service, of the serious
results attending such a system should have happened sixteen years ago, and
no effort yet made, either by our own or other officers in authority (with
the exception of the Special Committee here referred to), to put the field
batteries on a better footing.
One result, therefore, of carrying a sufficient number of men with the guns,
unaccompanied by ammunition wagons, will be to acknowledge the necessity
of their being moved rapidly when required, and manoeuvred accordingly.
Much difference of opinion exists as to the degree of rapidity at which
field artillery should manoeuvre. Foreign writers of authority consider all
descriptions of that arm should be organised so as to be able to move
rapidly when required.
In the “ Beglcment sur les Manoeuvres et les Evolutions des Batteries
GUN OF
rUoy.Arti
i/
f Feet
ADE
AXLE TREE SEATS
FOR SIR WILLIAM ARMSTRONG’S 12 POUNDER GUN OF 8 CWT.
As designed, by Gzptourv H.L Badfour. Roy. Ar UHL
i1?; m
d Feet
ENLARGED DETAILS
OF THE IRON AND WOOD WORK REQUIRED & MADE
BY THE BATTERY ARTIFICERS.
EnZcvrc/eds Scale far details
T-nrJsx^-r- 1 ? i i * i i 1 i i f 2\ — j 7?Wr
K Howard, del. Limerick. 3 r.d Sept? 1S70.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
171
Attelees,” Paris, 1864, it is laid down that galloping is to be regarded as an
exceptional pace, and the “ trot” and “grand trot” are to be the standard paces.
In our own service, it would appear, one branch takes the maximum, while
the other is given the minimum pace as their standard.
The following table shews that, as far as the weight behind the teams is
concerned, there is no reason why our field batteries should not move as
rapidly as those of other armies
Number
Nature of gun.
Weight,
gun and
of men
carried
Weight of
men and
carriage
on gun
two kits.
complete.
and
limber.
Prussian 6-pr. . . .
/; 4-pr .
French 4-pr. . .
Austrian 4-pr. . .
English 12-pr. B.L.R...
cwt. qrs. lbs.
35 2 15
30 2 0
25 3 0
2 14
23
37 0 0
Indian 9-pr. M.L.B. ...| 33 2 0
cwt. qrs. lbs,
9 3 0
3
1
0
2
1
0
3
2
1
0
3
9
Total weight
behind
te'ams.
cwt. qrs. lbs.
Remarks,
Weight of each
man taken at 14
stone.
Weight of kit, &c.
taken at 56 lbs.
Only two kits are
allowed.
But it is urged, if greater mobility is required to be given to field batteries,
it would be far better to increase the horse artillery than have recourse to
a make-shift and inefficient plan for carrying gun detachments. This is
unanswerable ; and it is much to be regretted that no considerable increase
has yet been made to this arm of tire service. It is, however, manifest that
the proportion of field artillery to other arms of the service will in future be
so large, that a considerable portion of it must, under the most favourable
circumstances, remain field batteries. It seems absolutely necessary, there¬
fore, that some plan should be adopted and recognised by which they could
attain a certain degree of mobility.
It is again urged, if field batteries are put on this proposed footing, they
may be required to act as horse artillery, and a rivalry would be engendered
between the two branches detrimental to the service. The mobility of the
two differs so widely, both in degree and character, that it is difficult to
understand the grounds on which such a result is expected.
Moreover, it is considered by the best authorities the field batteries will
in future be armed with a still heavier gun. This increased weight, together
with the make-shift plan of carrying their detachments, would quite preclude
the possibility of their attaining mobility by which they could at all simulate
the present rapid manoeuvring of horse artillery.
If, therefore, their special requirements are impartially considered and
defined with more modernised views than hitherto, their mobility might be
increased without risk of interfering with the distinctions that exist between
the two branches of field artillery.
The well-established superiority of the horse artillery over that of other
powers is indisputable ; but many changes are needed to place the field
batteries even on an equality with those of continental armies.
172
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
ON
THE RE-ARMAMENT OF GIBRALTAR.
CAPTAIN J. B. RICHARDSON, R.A.
Gibraltar is about to be armed with 9-inch guns. The guns, indeed,
have been for some years lying on skidding in various parts of the
Rock ; but until lately, when owing to the present outbreak of war, the
attention of the public was prominently directed to the comparatively
defenceless state of our fortresses and forts, caused by the modern
improvements in both artillery and armour-plated vessels of war, it has
been thought unnecessary to provide for mounting them, and just now
our Engineers are busy preparing sites on which these guns will be
placed.
The choice of good sites is a matter of the utmost im-
Stes 06 °f portance — not only to the artillery, who will have to work
and take care of the guns, but to the country, from an
economical point of view. Immense expense is incurred in building
adequate protection, and the large sums so spent will be more or less
thrown away if the works are erected in faulty positions. Sooner or
later, in spite of their strength on paper, they will be abandoned for
better position's, and the labour and money expended on them be in
vain regretted.
Having paid considerable attention to the subject, I have
Plan fixed on arrived at the conclusion, right or wrong, that the general
ment faulty, plan oi re-armament, as iar as heavy guns are concerned, is
faulty, and that the situations in which they are about to be
placed are bad. If I am wrong, it will no doubt be easy to expose the
fallacy of what I advance ; if the sites now chosen be really- the best
available, discussion in these papers will but confirm the judgment of
those who fixed on these positions ; while should my view of the matter
be correct, there is yet time to curtail a useless outlay.
At present it is chiefly intended to dot the 9 -inch guns
over the north-west portion of the Rock, in no particular
order — few close to the level of the water’s edge, but in
sites varying between this and the height of the Queen's Road, which
runs along the western face of the Rock at a considerable height, some
630 ft. j and it is this arrangement which I take exception to.
Plan now
adopted.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
173
I maintain that this armament of heavy guns should be
bemounted1 disposed in two lines along the side of the Rock — one at a
on a definite very high, and the other at a very low altitude, each line
system. having a perfectly distinct duty to perform. By the word
“ line,” I do not wish to convey one exact level along the face of the
Rock, but I do mean to state that it is an error and waste of strength to
place guns in the intervening space between the maximum height of a
lowest and the minimum height of a highest line. The limits of this
maximum and minimum could not be safely pointed out without careful
calculations, observations, and drawings, and I should be sure to err if
I attempted arbitrarily to fix such limits; indeed, without practical
experiments added to such theoretical investigations, I should be dis¬
posed to regard with suspicion any definition of the minimum height
of the highest line ; but if I can satisfactorily shew that there is a
space in which it is not possible to place a gun so as to obtain from it
the greatest effective work of which a gun of its nature is capable, I
think it will be admitted that there is scope for such calculations, and
that my views are worthy of a thought.
I may fail in my reasoning ; I only desire that what I advance should
be taken as the common-sense view of a practical artilleryman, not as
the logical argument of a theorist; but I claim a certain amount of
attention to what I urge, however feebly, inasmuch as I have enjoyed
opportunities of learning the practical work of a garrison artilleryman
which have fallen to the lot of few of my brother officers. I was one of
the first batch of gunnery instructors trained at Shoeburyness in 1859,
and the instruction I received there has naturally directed my attention
to all gunnery proceedings which have come under my observation
since ; while, from having been quartered at our chief artillery stations
in three different garrison brigades, I have had unusual opportunities of
observing the progress of garrison artillery without falling into one
groove.
I assume the following, none of which I believe are open to objec¬
tion : —
Axioms 1 .A, That para. 7, Part IV. “ Artillery Manual,” is
' 1U il correct in supposing that, u against ships in motion the rate
of firing cannot be too rapid, provided the pointing be careful.”
2 . B. To obtain rapid firing, the utmost efficiency, both in ordnance,
stores, and men is required.
3. C. That it is impossible to fire as rapidly from a gun whose line
of fire is at a depression angle, as from a gun whose axis is horizontal
or slightly elevated. (Because an additional operation is required to
bring the gun horizontal to assist loading) .
4. D . That none, or at any rate very few, of the systems in vogue
render armoured ships impervious to even weak vertical, or nearly
vertical, fire.
(Ships of war have at all times been exceedingly averse to taking up
positions, or passing any place in which they were exposed to the fire
of guns, even field guns, if stationed on heights overlooking them.
Numerous instances could be mentioned) .
5. E, That there are, or may in future be, iron- clads so constructed
174
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
as to be practically invulnerable to horizontal fire at moderately long
ranges.
6. F. That with our present knowledge of naval architecture, it is
impossible so to arm a ship that it shall be equally impervious to artil¬
lery fire in every part ; the weight of iron armour being too great for
flotation.
7. G. That if an armour-plate be struck in reverse (as in the case
of a shot passing through the deck, or open port, on one side of a
vessel, and striking the far side), a comparatively weak projectile will
break away the armour-plates, and in so breaking them do far more
damage than a similar shot either racking or penetrating them directly.
8. II. That one shot opening a large jagged hole in a plated ship's
bottom, where she is unprotected, would probably disable her, or at any
rate do more damage than several punched holes above the water-line.
9. 1. That a shot which would just penetrate an iron plate if it struck
it at right angles, would fail to do so should it strike at an acute angle.
10. J. That iron-clads cannot fire their guns at a very considerable
angle of elevation ; and that even if in future they are so constructed
that their guns shall be capable of great elevation, their elevated firing
will probably be far less accurate than their horizontal fire.
11. K. That no instrument is in use, or from the nature of the cir¬
cumstances can ever be in use, which will as accurately and instantly
follow the motions of a ship, and read off the corresponding eleva¬
tion, &c. for the gun, from a low battery, as will an instrument placed
in a very high battery, reading off the range with the assistance of the
varying angle of depression. The greater the height the greater the
angle of depression, and consequently the greater the correctness of
the estimate of distance.
(The instrument known as the “ Malta instrument " can be so sighted
and marked that an officer in a battery can follow the motions of a ship,
and constantly read off, without the slightest calculation, the angle of
elevation required for the guns in the battery, without referring to the
distance in yards or anything ; but there is not one of these instruments
in Gibraltar so sighted, and very few “ Malta instruments 99 of any sort) .
I proceed to compare the advantages of guns situated in
Comparison very high and very low sites, together with their disadvan-
of P^UTl S 1 n VGfV ^ ( i/ ' o
High and very tages relatively, each to each, and for the purposes of corn-
low batteries, parison, suppose two 9-inch guns a and w ; the gun a placed
in position on the terreplein of the Signal Battery — a height
of about 1220 ft., and about the centre of the Rock — -the gun <o some¬
where in the neighbourhood of the Saluting Battery, immediately below
the gun a, but as close to the water-line as possible. On this comparison
being instituted, I shall compare both guns, a and «, with the merits
and demerits of a similar gun 0, situated in some intermediate position
— say below Ferdinand's Battery (620 ft.) on the Queen's Road, and above
the level of the Alameda. Tha,t the positions of guns a and w are as
nearly extreme as can be, will be granted, while that of gun 0 is a
mean, taken if anything rather low ; because, as I have stated, I have
not determined any minimum altitude for the high line of guns, and I
might err in placing it as low down even as the Queen's Road. My
Tl tEj KOYAL AIITILLEEY INSTITUTION,
175
conviction is that the extremes taken are the best positions ; but I may
be unable to convince others of this, particularly as I feel that I am
alone in my opinion, many most distinguished officers having suggested
the armament of the Queen's Road.
Gun to. The gun o> (in the low line) would have the following : —
1. a. A very horizontal line of fire, causing its pro-
overgim™ jectile to have a fair chance of hitting a ship in spite of its
distance being but roughly determined.
2. b. It would be nearer the ship.
3. c. It would fire horizontally, or at only a slight
elevation, obtaining the advantages mentioned in (A) and ( C .)
4. d. It is placed in the best situation for penetrating
the side of an armour-plated ship, the shot striking direct (/.)
5. e. It could be cheaper worked, less transport being
required for projectiles, stores, &c.
6. f. In firing at night, its low horizontal fire gives it a
great chance of striking a ship, firing at random in its sup¬
posed direction.
Disadvantages
of gun <d com¬
pared with
gun a.
1. g. It is exposed to more accurate fire from a ship
of war (/.)
2. Ji. In consequence of this, it requires strong pro-
tection.
3. i. The constantly changing distance of a ship is
harder to determine (K.)
4. j. With the march of science, this gun is more apt
to lose its relative power, for the reasons given in (F) ; while
gun a retains its superiority (F} 6r, 77.)
5. 7c. Owing to its being mounted in some sort of
cover (unless mounted on some system similar to that of
Moncrieff, which is not in use in Gibraltar), the gun has
less lateral range.
6. 1. Its detachment of gunners is exposed to fire,
and will not perhaps work as coolly and accurately as at
ordinary practice. (Our men get so little practice at rapid
firing, or in firing at moving objects, that I have always
found them get much flurried and their pointing very in¬
accurate, when attempting to fire quickly. This fault would
increase, I imagine, under fire) .
Gun a.
The gun a (on the high line) would have the following
Advantages
over gun w.
1. m. Range accurately and quickly ascertained (see K.)
(A “ Malta instrument 99 should be near each gun, properly
sighted and marked) .
2. n. From its great height the decks of vessels are visible,
enabling plates to be struck in reverse (see 7), F, G, 77),
23
170
MINUTES OF PllQCEEDINGS OF
a fire almost equivalent to vertical mortar fire, but much
more accurate, being obtained. With a properly and
specially made carriage, a gun in this position would also
have a considerable chance of damaging a ship below the
plating and water-line, on the side nearest to the gun.
3. o. The gun itself could not be touched by the enemy's
fire (/.)
4. Consequently, little or no protection is required.
5. q. And therefore much smaller expense incurred.
6. r. Almost unlimited lateral range.
7. s. The gun detachments never under fire, and con¬
sequently working cooler and more accurately — to say nothing
of the saving in men.
Disadvantages
of gun a com¬
pared with
gun 0).
1. t. It is difficult to hit a ship with plunging fire,
unless the range is accurately known.
2. u. Its projectile strikes the vessel's plates at a small
angle (I.)
3. v. It is further from the ship.
4. w. It cannot fire rapidly (see A, C.)
5. x . Greater expense in the transport of projectiles
and stores.
6. y. It would be almost impracticable to hit a ship at
night, if firing at random in its supposed direction, owing to
its plunging fire.
7. £. Owing to its height up the Rock, unless barracks
are built there for gunners, it would not be so well kept in
order as gun w, and (A) stands a chance of being infringed.
The work expected from the low line of guns, therefore,
Gener of low lna?r generally stated as being penetration, by directly
lmeofguns!" striking the armour-plates ; and to aid this, the guns are
considerably nearer their target than the high guns, and
are capable of very rapid firing. They are also specially useful in
opposing a night attack of iron- clad ships, which the higher guns are
not capable of doing effectually. Their principal disadvantage is the
very strong protection they require, and the consequent enormous
expense of placing them in position.
The object of the guns in high sites would be to sink
Object of opposing ships by striking them in vulnerable parts, such
m^igh sites3. as the deck; and to strike plates in reverse through the
deck, which their great height, and consequent angle of
depression, enables them to do with accuracy. They possess the great
advantage of requiring no fort, no armour, no protection, in fact, and
consequently cost but little to place in position. Their principal dis¬
advantage being slow fire, and the expense and labour of supplying
them with projectiles. The necessity of this supply, however, ceases
with the war, while the elaborate protections of the low guns require
constant repair in peace as well as in action.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
177
I have shown that each gun has a distinct duty to perform,
a distmot tas eac^ doing something which cannot be done by the other,
duty. m and therefore guns at high altitudes and guns close to the
waters edge are both necessary; and I now proceed to
consider whether a gun in an intermediate situation can do work distinct
from either of these — whether a special duty can be assigned to it ; or,
failing this, whether it is capable of excelling either high or low guns
in any one of their peculiar functions. Because, if it does so, such a
gun might be well worth mounting ; but if a gun in this intermediate
position has no advantage of any sort over either the high or low guns,
and possesses disadvantages peculiar to itself, why not at once move it
to either the high or low line ? Want of space cannot be pleaded, for
there is ample room for any number of guns in either of the lines I
have chosen.
I can discover no special advantage for the gun 6 , nor
mediategun e. have I ever heard one stated, over either guns a or a>, taken
separately; and it cannot be worth while to mount the gun
in its intermediate position unless it in a greater degree combines the
advantages of guns a + w, than the disadvantages of guns a + w ;
otherwise, having no peculiar advantages and plenty of space, it would
be better to place it in one of the two lines of guns I have detailed.
Its fire is not horizontal (a) ; nor is its height sufficient to
of°mim0Swith ena^^e ^he range of its moving target to be accurately and
guns™ andw. rapidly ascertained (m) . It holds about a mean position, as
to distance from its target — a mean, in fact, between advan¬
tage ( b ) of the gun <o and disadvantage { v ) of the gun a. It can fire with
little greater rapidity than the gun a, for its axis has to be brought
nearly horizontal after each round, entailing the second operation (see C '.)
It partakes of disadvantage (w) and loses advantage (<?, A.)
Its projectile strikes the ship's plates at a*n angle, to some extent losing
advantage [cl), and partaking of disadvantage (I.) (A careful study
of past experiments, with a view to seeing at what angles the projectile
would penetrate the armour opposed to it at all at given ranges, with a
calculation of the angles at which projectiles from intermediate guns 0
would strike a ship’s armour-plates or deck at such ranges, might
determine how much it loses of the advantage (d), and it might probably
be found to possess all the disadvantages (u) ; but not having calculated
this, I can form no opinion.)
It would be in an intermediate position with regard to ( e ) and (.r),
and this may be left out of account.
Its fire is too plunging to be available for night attacks, losing the
advantage (/) but holding. to disadvantage (^) ; to say nothing of the
danger of firing by night over the heads of the artillerymen in the lower
batteries.
It entirely loses the great advantage (n), of seeing on to the decks of
vessels, unless indeed they are so close as to enable the gun <o to pene¬
trate their plates — a course which it is highly improbable they would
adopt, as it would give the higher guns an almost certain chance of
sinking them, to say nothing of the difficulty a ship in action experiences
in manoeuvring in shallow water,
178
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The gun would not be out of the way of the enemy’s fire ; indeed it
would probably suffer more from it at night than the low guns, as an
iron-clad firing at the Rock at random in the dark would probably point
high, as was done by the gun -boats during their most annoying attacks
in the great siege. Even if she fired low, many shots would ricochet
from the water, striking the Rock among the intermediate guns, while
it would have no chance of effectively returning their fire. It would
require protection therefore, though perhaps of not quite so strong a
nature as the low guns. It loses, under this head, the advantages (o, py
q, r, s) of the high guns, and partakes of disadvantages (y, h, i, j, l) of
the low guns.
It is evident, too, that by dotting the guns at all heights
Guns dotted about the Rock, even if the enemy fire inaccurately, some
Rock subject guns may be hit; both faulty elevation and faulty line on the
to accidental part of the enemy being of little consequence. For the low
b.ioi.s. fine of guns, the correct elevation, at any rate, must be ascer¬
tained by the enemy — not an easy matter in a night attack.
From the above it will be seen, then, that while the gun 0 has no
advantage peculiar to itself, it in a great measure loses the peculiar
advantages of guns a and o>, while it partakes of the whole of their
disadvantages.
As I have said, had the gun 6 any peculiar function of its own to
perform, there might be a question of placing such a gun in position ;
but if my exposition of its faults is correct, there can no longer be a
doubt of the positive waste of power in not moving a gun such as 0 to
either of the positions, a or w, in which the greater weight of metal is
required at the moment of action.
It will be seen that the weak point of my argument is an
Weak point inability to state any special function for the gun 0. not
5 shared and even better performed by the guns a and to. If
there is any design in the present mode of arming the fortress, some
such special function can doubtless be stated by those who planned the
placing of nearly all the 9 -inch guns in what I have taken as an inter¬
mediate position; and should the reasons for so placing them out¬
weigh the advantages I claim for high and low lines of guns, my
argument at once fails. But I think it would be very difficult to show
that any definite plan has been pursued — positions for the guns having
been chosen apparently more with reference to easily-built-on spots of
ground than any combination of action among the guns themselves,
and this I hold to be false economy.
Between guns mounted on very high sites and those
case of iron- near the water-line, an iron-clad attacking would lead a
clad attack- poor time of it. From up the Rock, the almost bird’s-eye
ing‘ view enables each motion of the ship to be watched, and
all the advantages of accurate vertical fire to be obtained. While the
low guns were rapidly firing, and racking or penetrating her armour-
plates on the side of the ship nearest them, the guns at a high altitude
would, though firing slower, be firing at a better determined, if greater
range ; one successful hit doing incredible damage, and making up for
all disadvantages ; tearing away large portions of her plating from the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
179
side furthest from the guns, which they strike in reverse, or penetrating
below her water-line ; and this the gunners are doing without flurry,
almost, if not quite, secure from the enemy’s fire. Indeed, I believe
that to engage the batteries of Gibraltar successfully, if guns are only
placed high enough, a new form of iron-clad would have to be devised,
proof against both horizontal and vertical fire of the heaviest descrip¬
tion ; so that, leaving out the probability of any nation incurring the
enormous expense of building such vessels without certain advantage,
I think it will be allowed that the solving of such a problem would
require a great increase of knowledge in naval architecture.
Intermediate I do n°I in anything I have urged wish it to be under¬
guns not en- stood that I hold guns in intermediate sites entirely useless ;
tn-eiy useless. .par from -ft, they would aid in the destruction of opposing
ships. But the enormous expense of mounting these guns cannot but
render it desirable that they should be, at the outset, placed in positions
where their great power can be made to tell with the greatest effect.
Space is not such an object on this vast Rock, that in order to mount
many guns, some must be placed in faulty situations. The number of
guns which it is at present proposed to mount, could readily be placed
in situations differing entirely from the intermediate one which I have
endeavoured to show to be bad.
Remarks All the above remarks apply to heavy guns intended
apply to guns solely to resist shipping, and only partially to such guns as
se^defence1* conA>ine this duty with that of land defence. There may
s ‘ c e enc * be, and indeed I believe are, positions in which, though
“ intermediate,” it would be highly desirable to place guns of this
nature.
An admirable opportunity lately presented itself for testing
the views obtained of the decks of iron-clads from the heights
of the Rock ; and could any theoretical artilleryman have
been induced to ascend to the Signal Station and look
down on the decks of the large ships composing the combined Channel
and Mediterranean squadrons, he would have agreed with me that a
very few guns, situated on the place he stood, would have rendered the
whole number of these powerful men- of- war very insecure habitations.
It must be borne in mind that, to avoid too accurate fire
Ship must from the low batteries, a ship must circle, and so occasionallv
accurate fire, lie end-on — a most favourable position for the high line of
guns. The low line of guns would strike her with terrible
accuracy if she remained motionless, broadside on, returning their fire,
but would be puzzled by her circling; while immediately she did so, she
opens an opportunity for the high guns to sink her.
I should have been unwilling to have brought my ideas on the
armament of Gibraltar so prominently forward, had they not been
confirmed by many officers, capable of forming an opinion, to whom I
have spoken on the subject. The opinion of a distinguished naval
officer of high rank, who was good enough to examine my rough notes
on the subject, is so valuable, that I append a portion of his remarks.
To a great extent, it will be seen, they bear me out in what I advance ;
the chief difference being the minimum altitude at which the high
Iron-clad
squadron at
Gibraltar.
180
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
line of guns should be placed. I shall afterwards state why I think
he has hardly fixed on a sufficient elevation : —
<c It is very difficult to ascertain tlie exact distance of a ship from a
navalofficei^ low battery, unless you know the height of her mast-heads, and my
belief is that with practice (which is indispensable), the same accuracy
and rapidity of fire can be obtained from a high battery as from a low. The
alteration of elevation spoken of as necessary while loading, should not involve any
appreciable loss of time.
“ Two disadvantages of the medium height 6 are omitted : — 1. The danger of
firing shell over the heads of the gunners in the front line. 2. The low angle at
which the shot would strike the deck of a ship would not suffice for penetration.
“ Some experiments carried out at my suggestion last year, showed that 9-inch
shot striking our 1-inch or 1^-inch iron decks would glance at an angle of 8°.
“ I would, as soon as possible, place 9 -inch guns in suitable positions, at heights
of from 500 to 800 ft. — not more than two in each position (if this is practicable),
placing the magazines away from the guns in safety. Each of these guns would
command the whole anchorage, and be in comparative security from the enemy’s
fire.
“ The low batteries are of less importance, and must be made very secure against
close attack by iron-clads.
“ We should fire common shell with large bursting charges and time fuzes at the
high guns, but would concentrate two or three ships on the low batteries at close
quarters, and use Palliser shot and shell.
“ In the low batteries, nothing less than 10-inch guns should be placed ; in the
high batteries, 9-inch guns would be nearly equally efficacious.”
Ferdinand’s Battery, in the Queen’s Road, is about
Reason for 620 ft. high; and this I have taken in the outset as the
asTii^h as118 height below which guns become intermediate guns, corres-
possible. ponding to gun 0. I have also stated that I believe the
extreme height a better than any lower site. Gibraltar is
almost the only fortress in which guns can be placed at a great height,
and it appears to me to be an error to throw away the advantage
thus obtained.
The line of fire of a gun in Ferdinand’s Battery would form an angle
of less than 8° with the deck of a ship at 1500 yds., while the ship
would require to be 3000 yds. distant from the gun a before the line
of fire of that gun would diminish to the same angle ; yet the com¬
parative distance would be but a very little greater, while the gun in
Ferdinand’s Battery would not be secure from the fire of a ship at that
comparatively short range. Why, therefore, reject the higher site,
where absolutely no protection for the gun itself would be needed ?
I view with alarm the positions of the magazines, as now
Positions of being made near the 9 -inch guns. The idea of so placing them
magazines. seems to be, that as a gun is no use without its ammunition,
should the magazine be blown up, the gun may as well go too ! The
magazines throughout the Rock are not so well chosen as to give
confidence in the infallibility of our Engineers in choosing positions for
these structures, and it would be well if the arm of the service which
is chiefly called on to work in their dangerous proximity, should have a
leading voice in the matter. The rapid working of the gun would not
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
181
be curtailed if the cartridges were deposited at some little distance-— a
distance which should be sufficient to prevent the gun from being more
than temporarily disabled in the event of an accident to a magazine.
Barrows on rails would bring up ammunition from thence as quickly
as a gun is now supplied by hand from a less remote magazine; and
this applies to projectiles also. The magazines being some way from
the guns and well hidden, would be free from the ill effects of the heavy
fire directed at the gun itself in action.
Attention might be directed also with advantage to the
batteries system of sinking the guns as much as possible in the solid
rock, instead of, as at present, building up stone batteries.
Strength would be gained and expense saved.
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
182
A PROPOSAL
FOB THE
DRILL OP GUNNERS OP FIELD BATTERIES
AT OTHER THAN REGIMENTAL EXERCISES.
BY
CAPTAIN AND BREVET-MAJOR H. L. GEARY, R.A.,
ADJUTANT 14-TH BRIGADE (FIELD).
In submitting the accompanying proposal for the drill of field battery
gunners in action, the intention is by no means to abrogate the present field
exercise, which appears well adapted to provide efficient drivers and well-
trained horses. The necessity for a more special drill for the gunners lias
been suggested by the experiences of the present Pranco -Prussian war, and
the great advance made of late years, both as regards the accuracy and
range of artillery fire and rapidity of manoeuvring.
Prom these considerations we may expect : (1) that the limbers as well as
the gun carriages will be exposed to a more accurate, and therefore more
damaging fire ; (2) that a greater amount of ammunition will be expended.
To meet this, every effort should be made to husband the wagon limbers,
which would be required to replace disabled gun limbers; and a precise
method appears to be desirable of replenishing the gun limbers whilst in
action.
Inasmuch as the equipment of field guns with axle4ree box seats lias
been recommended by two separate committees of artillery officers, who,
from their experience and attainments, may be said to have commanded the
concurrence of the regiment at large, we may assume that in future wars
axle-tree seats will be provided. We have, therefore, a gun detachment
consisting of the mounted No. 1, 2 and 3 on the gun limber, 4 and 5 on
the axle4ree seats— 4otal 5 men, who, sufficient alone to bring the gun
into action and commence firing, will be able to accompany the gun for any
distance, at any pace it may be required to move.
It is proposed that the usual position of a gun detachment be as at
present in order of march. At the command “trot,” 2 and 3 mount on
the gun limber, 4 and 5 on the axle-tree seats ; the remainder of the
detachment, at the word “march,” wait for the gun to clear them, then*
closing inwards on the centre detachment, are marched by the serjeant-major,
by the shortest and most direct route, to overtake the battery and rejoin
their subdivisions.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 183
The wagons should invariably be under the command of an officer—
usually a 2nd Captain. This is most necessary, as the experience of the
Waterloo campaign showed that wagons may be for days separated from
their batteries, when the absence of an officer has led to their being hustled
to the rear and obstructed on a narrow line of march.
In action, the 2nd Captain, having taken up a position with his wagons
in as sheltered a situation as a due regard to supplying the battery with
ammunition will permit, should, after say 10 rounds a gun have been fired
send forward one wagon per half battery. Each wagon, having one mounted
non-commissioned officer, and two gunners on the limber, should reverse
and then halt in rear of 2 and 5 subdivisions, and the two gunners proceed
to replenish the limbers, commencing with the rear boxes of the wagon body ;
and when emptied, return immediately to rejoin the second line o^ wagon s^
their places in the first line being taken by those covering them in the second
line. The object of this is to preserve the wagon limbers as much as
possible from the enemy's fire.
It is suggested that the foregoing be adopted as a frequent exercise, so as
to teach the men a system of working in action, and to accustom the gunners
to handle with rapidity and accuracy the various projectiles, fuzes, &c. used
by a field battery.
The absence of a system similar to this has hitherto left the supply of
ammunition to a battery in action entirely dependent upon the exertions and
ability of the officer or non-commissioned officer in charge of the wagons ;
and should that individual be put hors de combat , confusion and uncertainty
must inevitably be the result.
The foregoing is suggested as the drill for field batteries when
manoeuvring with other troops ; for notwithstanding that no axle-tree seats
have yet been fitted, the drill, with the omission of carrying Nos. 4 and 5
can still be practised, though of course with some sacrifice of efficiency.
For the better instruction of the gunners, it will be advisable sometimes
to leave part of the limber ammunition in quarters, and to change the numbers
at the gun, so that every man may have an opportunity of becoming
experienced at packing and unpacking the ammunition with rapidity and
care — a knowledge which is too frequently confined, except theoretically, to
the non-commissioned officers and Nos. 2.
It seems expedient that the four men mounted on the gun and limber
should be selected men, capable of taking the No. l's place if requisite.
If Captain Strange's scheme be adopted, they would be selected from the
marksmen of the battery.
It has been proposed that men should be mounted also on the off-horses
of the guns — drivers, sufficiently instructed in the duties of a gunner to
assist in serving the gun. They would likewise be available to replace
casualties occurring in action amongst the regular drivers. This system
obtained in India for many years, until the amalgamation of the Indian with
the Royal Artillery; and under it the Bengal Horse Artillery achieved a
world-wide fame. Several continental armies copied it, with more or less
success.
It is believed that our field batteries must do so eventually, in order to
keep the field against European rivals.
24
184
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
SOME OBSERVATIONS
AMONGST GERMAN ARMIES
DURING 1870.
BY
COLONEL H. A. SMYTIL, R.A.
Haying been enabled through the kindness of General Von
Zastrow, commanding the 7th corps of the Prussian army, to be
present at the bombardment of Thionville, to examine the fortifi¬
cations and neighbourhood of Metz, and to make some observations
of novelties in Prussian tactics, I beg to offer my account of the first,
together with my remarks on the remainder, to the consideration of
such officers as may be interested therein.
Thionville ,
Situation a I°WI] °f about 5,000 inhabitants within the walls,
1 Uc 1 ' and some small suburbs outside the “ zone of clearance/5 is
situated astride the Moselle at a point where the valley of this river,
generally some five miles wide and remarkable for its fertility and
extreme plainness, is narrowed, by the intrusion of the prevailing hilly
country, to within two miles ; and was no doubt originally intended
to control the passage up and down the valley, as the hills are of a
somewhat mountainous and difficult character : at the present day it
commands two lines of railway as well as a slight navigation on the
Moselle, on which small steamers ply upwards as far as Metz. The
configuration of the ground furnished the cause for the origin of this
fortress, the incentive to its sieges, and, in these last days, the
means for its capture.
Having around it, for a mile more or less, an almost
01 1 ca 10n’ theoretical plain, fortified by Vauban somewhat after his
first system, but with the addition of a labyrinth of counterguards
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
185
and outworks, having more recently been girdled with an advanced
glacis with permanent lunettes, and last of all having had the body
of the place finished with large earthen traverses and raised
batteries a l’Haxo, — all the ditches and the space between the
inner and outer glacis being susceptible of alternate flooding and
draining at the will of the garrison,-— well provisioned and armed
with the newest cannon, — the place must be regarded, according to
old methods of attack, as capable of a very protracted, and perhaps,
considering the lateness of the season, (the besiegers opened fire on
the 22nd of November), a victorious resistance. But it was reduced
to capitulate by 2^ days’ easy firing from rifled guns placed on the
neighbouring hills.
T , j Thionville was first loosely invested on the 25th of August
* by a regiment of lancers (about 600 troopers), assisted
originabyby 12 pioneers, and afterwards by some 300 hussars: the
garrison was supposed to contain more than 1,000 regulars and
several thousands of the Garde Mobile, (the numbers at the
capitulation were found to be about 2,000 regulars and 3,000 Mobiles) ;
and the work on the hands of the lancers was very arduous. The
country being much intersected, the line of communication joining
the various posts round the place was about thirty miles long ; and
though at night the vedettes were pushed forward, occasionally as far
as the foot of the glacis, the troopers were in reality little qualified
to meet any active hostility on the part of the garrison, who ought
undoubtedly to have driven them quite away. On one dark night
the garrison did restore a part of the railway which had been torn
up, and so receive a train of munitions from Luxemburg, but this
seems to have been their only exploit ; and the cavalry, armed with
lance, sword, and old pistol, by means of intense assiduity, the
maintenance of an imposing appearance, and extreme boldness,
assisted always by the 12 pioneers, who fortified various farm¬
houses and were multiplied in effect by having a four-horse coach
contrived for their conveyance to threatened points, succeeded in
imprisoning 5,000 men armed with Chassepots and not without some
cavalry and field-artillery.
Infantry was added, during October, to the investing force, which
increased during November to some 12,000 of all arms; and siege
Sie e Train ar^eiT was brought up in large quantities by railway
1 to a station about four miles from the town : so that on
the morning of the 22nd the besiegers were prepared to open fire
from about fifty heavy pieces (with a reserve of, apparently, about
half that number, and ammunition which appeared to be about 500
rounds a gun), which were to be assisted by some 30 field guns,
to which various horse and field batteries of the investing force,
though posted with regard to serious sorties, might be considered a
reserve.
The heavy pieces were all, (with the exception of two bronze 12-inch
mortars of French construction brought from Metz), what the
Prussians call 24-prs., throwing shells of 56 lbs. weight, breech-
186
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OP
loading, of two patterns, viz. of wrought iron weighing 60 cwt., and
of steel about 40 cwt., mostly of the wedge system, but some of the
cylindrical. The charge of the gun was lbs. of powder, of the
shell 3 lbs.; the fuze was invariably percussion, of a very simple
pattern, wherein the plunger with the needle was quite loose but for
a transverse iron pin passed through it from outside ; this pin, on
discharge of the gun, is thrown out laterally by the rotatory force of
the shell.
Moreover, with the reserve was a battery of what they called the
Mew Mortars, from which very great effect was anticipated. They
would be more strictly described as “ cannon for vertical fire,55 inas¬
much as their charge remains fixed, and their elevation varies with
the range. It is claimed for them that their shell always descends
point foremost, even when fired at 80° elevation ; they are breech¬
loading, of bronze, with some 20 grooves resembling the original
Armstrong, hardly three times as long as their shell, and weigh
about 82 cwt.; the lead-coated shell weighs 160 lbs., and appears to
have a diameter of 8 or 9 in., and a length of 2 ft. 6 or 8 in. Their
wrought-iron carriages were much like those of the other siege
guns.
The field guns were 4 and 6-prs., throwing shells of 10 and 15 lbs,
weight with a charge of one-tenth.
The heavy guns were mounted on the same carriages on which
they had travelled hither, (some, I was told, all the way from
Spandau), a few of wood, but more of wrought iron, weighing
30 cwt., very similar in form to our own siege carriages, but having
the important innovation that the firing trunnion holes were raised
above the brackets on two strong iron arms, so as to carry the
trunnions, when in action, at 6 ft. above the ground. The advantage
of this height, in connection with breech-loading siege-guns, is very
remarkable ; the lowest part of the parapet being kept at least 6 ft.
high, no man of the detachment is ever under the direct fire of the
enemy, with the exception of the very trivial exposure of the Mo. 1
in laying, who stands on a step of the carriage, and of course, in
order to see, must be seen; and as these guns are almost invariably
used at angles of elevation, the breech comes conveniently down
within reach of the proper numbers.
The position of the batteries was perhaps the most note-
ferSs.Bat~ worthy thing in the whole transaction. On every wooded
knoll that jutted into the plain, all round the town except
on its north side, at distances varying from 1,400 to 8,600 yards,
was prepared a battery for 4 heavy guns, the trees between it and
the place being only taken down at the last moment; generally
rather behind the crest of the knoll, so that moderate excavation for
the terreplein left the natural surface of the ground for a parapet :
the distance, the woods, and this use of the natural surface rendered
them all but invincible to the garrison. Only one battery, for six
24-prs., was in the plain, in order to perfect the convergence of fire :
it was about 2,000 yards from the town, and was arranged behind
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
187
an old embankment some 20 ft. high ; in action the pieces were laid
by points similar to those nsed with mortars.
The batteries for the field-guns were adjacent and subsidiary to
those of the more advanced heavy guns.
In most cases no embrasures were used, the elevation of the guns
allowing them to be fired over a solid parapet ; but in some of the
batteries nearest to the place, owing to the depression of the line
of fire, shallow and open embrasures, perhaps 1^ ft. deep, had to
be cut. The field-guns, in order to enjoy somewhat similar ad¬
vantages of parapet, were raised on planks laid under the wheels
and trail.
The platform arrangement included two inclined planes to take
the wheels in their recoil. Each gun takes these with it from its
original arsenal. They are made of stout plank faced with sheet-
iron ; are 8 or 9 ft. long, and rise about 1 in 6. On discharge of the
piece, the wheels quietly ran up the ascents for about two-thirds of
their length, and then as quietly returned to their former place. The
remainder of the platform consisted merely of planks laid across
under these planes, and receiving the trail of the gun ; there is so
little stress on them that planks picked up in the neighbourhood are
generally good enough.
The magazines offered little peculiarity beyond that they were
very small ; they were generally in the epaulement ; but a great
deal of ammunition was kept in the cellars of adjacent houses out of
the line of fire.
In loading, the shell was put into the bore of the gun by means
of a cradle fitting on to the breech ; after each discharge the gun
was sponged out, a bucket of soapy water being at hand to dip the
sponge in ; and twice in the 24 hours the breech-closing apparatus
was taken to pieces and oiled ; but these two precautions, the com¬
manding officer told me, might be omitted without inconvenience for
an indefinite time.
In laying, the guns with much elevation (some had 14°), got the
line first point-blank and the elevation afterwards ; the others were
laid at one operation.
The bombardment had been ordered to commence at 7 a.m., and
at that hour, objects being still but dimly visible, the harsh crack
0 oenin fire ^rom a s^ee^ gun broke the stillness, and after some seconds
penmg re. a kittle cloud of smoke and dust in the town declared the
effect and sent back a muffled report ; then a gun in each of the
next batteries right and left took it up, acknowledged after a like
interval by each battery successively in the circle. But the second
gun in the first battery did not give its first fire till 4 minutes after
the first gun ; and such was the rate of succession in each battery; for
the (to me, very curious) order on the subject was, that each gun
should fire but once in a quarter of an hour by day, and each battery
(of 4 guns) once in the same time by night.
Whether the continued and regular recurrence of a crash amongst
the houses of the town, at unswerving intervals, was supposed to
188
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OF
bring a more effectual strain on the nerves of the inhabitants than
the full roar of destruction from 80 or 100 guns in full play, as the
dropping of water sometimes effects more than a stream ; or whether,
as was no doubt the case to some extent, it was humanely desired to
let the garrison see well how many, what, and where, were the batteries
environing them, and recognise their own powerlessness to resist,
the rule was steadily adhered to; nor only that, but even from 12
o’clock till 1 each day the firing ceased, and the men got their
dinners s partly, perhaps, to give the governor of the place time to
reflect, but certainly allowing him unusual opportunity to repair
damages.
I am aware that the Luxemburg people, listening to the reports,
recorded the rate of firing at eighteen discharges a minute; they
must have added in the discharges from the fortress, as well as the
actual explosions of the shells, thereby doubling the number of
rounds. The only projectiles fired which did not explode were the
shells from the two French mortars in Prussian use ; it is worthy of
notice that the time-fuzes of these shells could not be got to act
properly by their new masters ; the shells would either fall blind or
else burst at the muzzle, so that the Prussians quickly gave up using
them altogether.
The fire was principally directed on barracks, arsenals, and other
military buildings in the town, their position being well ascertained
from the maps in possession of the Prussians ; only when some
particular work of the fortress forced itself into notice by continued
efforts to disturb the besiegers, would several batteries attend to it
conjointly and soon quiet it ; but always with the same deliberation,
and at the prescribed rate of fire. The gunners were of the Landwehr,
formed men, mostly fathers of families I was told, broad, stout, and
lasting-looking ; rain fell more or less continuously, and many of the
batteries became literally ankle-deep in mud, but the methodical
manner of the men took no count of external circumstances. They
were divided into two reliefs, of twelve hours each ; but many of their
officers chose to remain at the batteries the whole time ; for which
choice I failed to find satisfactory reason.
The little fire that came from the French was wild, and their fuzes
were very irregular; but every shell from the Prussian batteries
declared itself home in its appointed spot by its jet of smoke and
dust ; and as the afternoon wore on, the dark cloud which had been
forming above the town began to show the red light of flames,
though as yet no incendiary shells had been used ; but as evening
came down, and as yet no message had arrived from the place, the
order was given to use incendiary shells (explosive, but containing
also incendiary composition) exclusively, so that the town at night
began to light up the neighbourhood ; and all the next morning the
same relentless pounding was continued. It had been intended
to get some of the new mortars into position during the night,
at a sort of advanced work or parallel which the Prussians had
constructed about 1,000 yards from the place; and formal siege
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
189
works from thence were proceeded with to aid the bombardment in
convincing the garrison ; but, owing to the rain and the plain, the
trenches got full of water and the country so deep that the pieces
could not be got across it, either that night or the next; though
it appeared to me that no contrivance beyond main force had been
applied.
In the afternoon of the second day a flag of truce was shown by
the town, the firing ceased, and an envoy arrived about 4 p.m. at
the Prussian head-quarters, asking for a cessation of hostilities, for
the purpose of sending away the women, children, and old men ; this
the General refused, alleging the difficulty of seeing it fairly carried
out ; but he said that firing would not recommence before six o’clock,
and that such as chose to get out in that short time, might : he also
gave notice that the next display of a white flag by the town would
not procure a cessation of fire, but only the actual arrival of an
envoy empowered to propose terms. And the French officer took his
leave, gallantly assuring the General, “At 6 o’clock we shall be
prepared to receive your fire.”
Nobody appears to have left the town during the very short
interval allowed, and the Prussians, thinking they had been robbed
of a little time, increased the night firing up to the day rate. The
town consequently burnt fiercely in many places (but without serious
explosions) until about 11 a.m. next day, when the tricolor flag
on one of the towers of the principal church (which was used as a
granary), was replaced by a white one; too late, however, to save
the roof of the church, which burst out in flame shortly after, and
fell in during the negotiations which followed.
There was very little delay over the terms : “ the
apmaion. con(j^qong 0f ]\£etz and Sedan,” the sole offer of the
Prussian general, was soon accepted for the garrison, and it was
arranged that the next day at noon the troops should march out of
the town by its eastern gate, pile arms in the plain, and place them¬
selves at the.’disposal of Prussian escorts as prisoners of war : after
which the besieging army would march into the town. Next morn¬
ing, however, the Governor sent to beg the Prussians to take over
the various guards in the town forthwith, as his men were in such
disorder that he could not otherwise answer for the fulfilment of the
stipulations, —or even against treacherous attempts on the magazines.
The guards were sent in accordingly, and instituted order in parts ;
but it seems to have been a rough night in the town, with a great
deal of drunkenness and danger : some rejoiced at the capitulation,
some were in despair ; but all, soldiers, mobiles, and inhabitants,
concurred in condemning the Governor, though for opposite and
incompatible reasons.
The Prussian army was formed to receive the prisoners at 11 a.m.,
in two lines nearly perpendicular to one another, and meeting in a
re-entering angle about a mile on the road from the town, some
batteries of artillery forming part of one of the lines close to the
angle. Only a little before 1 o’clock the lively French bugles were
190
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
heard at the head of their column, which then emerged from the
gates and marching smartly and very quickly, right up to the
re-entering angle, descended from the road, piled arms fifty yards
off, returned to the road, and stood easy. These were the regulars ;
then came battalions of the Garde Mobile, more slowly, with enor¬
mous gaps and many stragglers ; they were very tedious, but as each
battalion after piling arms arrived at the re-entering angle, it was
taken charge of by its escort, and its officers returned, wearing their
swords, to the town to surrender themselves individually afterwards.
Long strings of country people, mostly women, passed and repassed
in rear of the Prussians to the angle of exit, where, many of them
convulsed with sobbing, they took leave of their relations, sons and
brothers, in the Garde Mobile, probably expecting never to see
them more ; the men concerned wept and wailed quite as demon¬
stratively as the women : next morning, however, at a moment’s
notice, they were all released to their homes, on condition of serving
no more against Germany during the war ; they mostly belonged to
neighbouring villages, and the roads were covered with joyous lads
in red trousers, half “ Prussifies ” in spirit already. The regulars
had mostly left by railway trains for the East the night before.
As soon as the prisoners were all received, the German troops
filed through the town, to see what they had done and what they
had won, and, leaving sufficient garrison in the place, passed to their
various billets in outlying villages, many of them receiving orders
the same night for their onward movement towards Paris, Montmedy,
&c., the next day. The streets were densely crowded with people,
who, after the French manner, had flocked into the fortress on the
original approach of the invaders ; provisions had been plenty with
them, but their wild and haggard faces, still set with the stare of
confronting mortal peril, together with the panorama of shattered
buildings, with black ragged holes, some as large as doorways, in all
directions, masses of still burning ruin, and other ready to fall, gave
one some idea of the consternation which must have prevailed in
such a crowded centre of fire.*
It is true that inhabitants as well as soldiers (fire* picquets
excepted) lived mainly in cellars during the bombardment, and in
such wine-growing countries the cellars are plentiful and substantial;
but they felt each shock and heard each explosion, and feared to be
eventually buried alive by the burning ruins. Therefore they prayed
* I happened to be detained a night in Thionville about a week after the capitulation, and
found the condition of the houses not much restored, but that of the inhabitants nearly entirely
so : owing to the movement of troops westward, many soldiers were billeted on all such houses as
remained efficient, and I could not but be struck by the easy and confident relations existing
between the householders and their guests : these latter were as good-tempered and orderly as if
amongst their own people ; cramped up for space, I saw children, too young to act a part in such
matters, already playmates with enormous cuirassiers : and I take this occasion to declare, that
everything that I saw and heard from either side at all places which I visited, causes me to believe
that the German armies in this war have been more moderate, orderly, and civilised, than ever
was invading army before; and to look with intense distrust on all tales attributing to them
wanton outrage or irregularity.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
191
the Governor to surrender, and not because, as was stated by some
papers, the rising Moselle drove them up from below, for the man¬
agement of the river was in their own hands ; though it is true that
rain-water did collect in some of the cellars. The story was current
amongst both French and Germans that the Governor, having
married a Prussian lady, and having been accordingly denounced by
local patriots as quite likely to make a treacherous capitulation, had
declared that he would never surrender till the inhabitants on their
knees should beg him to do so ; and that they thus obtained two
days more bombardment than would have been otherwise necessary,
as the Governor himself was sufficiently convinced by the first mani¬
festation of the number and nature of the besiegers’ batteries. But
this statement I had not opportunity to verify.
The actual damage inflicted on the besieged amounted
daced.pr0" 8 men killed and 66 wounded (two only of these
being civilians) : on the ramparts, where most of the
casualties took place, from enfilading shells descending at very
rapid angles, a few gun-carriages were knocked about by fragments
of shell, but I did not see any guns actually dismounted : in the
cellars nobody was hurt.
Of the houses, hardly one escaped without some serious injury ;
about a quarter of the town was burnt, including nearly all the
Government buildings ; and much of what remained standing would
have to be taken down and built up again. A great many
splinter-proofs of timber had been set up in front of the ground-
floors of the houses, but they were of not much avail against the fire
employed.
Where shells had fairly met the brickwork escarps, the effect was
small, generally a shallow excavation of 3 or 4 feet in diameter, with
a funnel-shaped hole in the middle between 2 and 3 feet deep ; but
the houses, with stone walls averaging about 2 feet in thickness,
seemed exactly calculated to call forth the best powers of these
projectiles. I only saw or heard of one blind shell, though the
inhabitants for a week after were busy collecting relics.
The expense to the besiegers was 27 men killed and
xpen 1 ure‘ wounded, and 7,000 or 8,000 rounds of ammunition, or
about 100 rounds a gun. I think it must be allowed that the ap¬
plication of this “ ultima ratio regis ” (so it is inscribed on some
Prussian guns), was neat and effective, and more convenient to both
sides than any other argument known, whether regular siege, storm,
or starvation.
The result might have been opposite if, on the first
news of the German approach, the Governor had sent
all civilians away from the fortress, and devoted the remaining
energies and material to the construction of bomb-proof accommoda¬
tion — the one want of the place ; but the French custom has been
the reverse of this. He might, moreover, have broken up the earlier
investment by the active use of his infantry ; though it is probable
that would not have much altered the end ; he explained afterwards
25
192
MINUTES OP P PROCEEDINGS OP
that his troops, when first collected, had been very unformed and
unreliable.
As the denouement was so thoroughly artilleristic, I may perhaps
here remark, without intruding my opinion on the general question of
muzzle and breech-loading, that the working of these breech-loaders
with this projectile and fuze, against this object, and at the rate
here ordered, seemed nearly perfect : the ease of loading and security
to the men could hardly be equalled, and the smoothness and clock¬
work regularity of the whole operation not easily surpassed.
I may add, as details, that the copper ring gas-check in the
breech-closer answers perfectly, and seems as good as ever after
100 rounds ( slow ones) ; and that the lead coating seems to adhere
firmly to the shells ; I did not hear the sound of any detached pieces
on discharge, and I noticed in the town various shell-fragments
which had passed through stone walls and kept their lead complete.
Metz,
in itself a kind of magnified Thionville, that is to say, fortified by
Yauban in his first manner, with more added outworks, with higher
ramparts and deeper ditches, finished with more commanding
cavaliers and more massive traverses, enclosing a very much larger
and remarkably handsome city of 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants, having
the same unlimited command over the running water of its ditches, — •
all which contributed to its name for impregnability in the old days, —
possesses, in addition, the following advantages of vital importance in
the present day, and probably also for the future ;
It is furnished with a fair supply of good bomb-proof accommo¬
dation ;
It can inundate and drain at will a large part of the adjoining
country ;
On the ground not inundable, it is protected by a chain of mutually
supporting permanent detached works, (amongst them the original
D’Arcon’s lunette), forts, crown-works, redoubts, &c., of very im¬
portant size and profile ;
Lastly, on the commanding heights which approach the
Eorts?Ced 'tow11 and constringe the valley at this point, there are
established self-supporting advanced forts of the newest
French design ; four principal ones, St. Quentin, Plappeville, St. Julien,
and Queuleu, at an average distance of 3,000 yards from the enceinte,
and at heights of 500, 470, 190, and 150 ft above it, with two subsidiary
ones at heights of 130 and 50 feet. Until two adjoining forts from
amongst those four be taken, Metz cannot be regularly attacked, nor
even much seen ; and the ground before them is rather unfavourable
to a besieger ; though much more nearly level with them than is that
behind, it generally falls away so as to leave but a narrow front for
the attack : yet there is nothing at all impossible about the place, to
a besieger with plenty of time and means.
These forts were yet unfinished when the German armies drew
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION-.
193
near to Metz ; their escarps were complete on all but some of the
more retired faces, some of their counter-scarps, and the bulk of the
earthwork : on the approach of the enemy they were rapidly com¬
pleted by various field expedients, and armed with a profusion of
guns, all rifled, and all of bronze, as usual in the French service :
these were of all calibres and patterns, throwing shells of from 100
down to 8 lbs. weight, and curiously intermingled in many instances
where I could discern no purpose to be served by the mingling, unless
to please some taste the reverse of ours.
As these works must be considered the very latest examples of
French permanent fortification, I may describe that the prevailing
design encloses within an irregular bastioned fort of good relief, a
raised earthwork of simple trace parallel to the principal fronts, and
which, serving as cavalier, central traverse, or keep, is of such
enormous proportions as to discourage any idea of levelling it by fire
and at the same time to exercise very important command over any
possible approaches : for example, I reckoned the interior work in
Queuleu to have its terreplein 40 feet above the level of the country,
with complete exterior and interior earthen slopes at 45°, and on the
top a full parapet finished with many massive traverses, and here and
there Haxo batteries. Within its earthen mass was built a bomb¬
proof stone barrack of 3 floors, fitted for some 500 men, which,
fronting the gorge of the fort (where the cavalier was discontinued),
commanded a charming view of the city and of the valley of the
Moselle, and appeared more cheerful and salubrious than the case¬
mate of ordinary experience. The outer bastioned trace is so fitted
to the ground as to present its greatest frontage to the enemy ; it is
of moderate depth, with no outworks but a small ravelin to cover the
entrance on the side next the Place (where the revetments are coun-
terarched with extensive casemate accommodation), and it has a
demi-revetment all round with chemin-des-rondes and guerites.
With such forts, become, as they had, keeps to the connecting
lines of strong field fortifications erected between them by the French
army, I could find but little fault, though the Germans condemned, as
usual, the bastion trace : of the Fortress proper I may observe that
the multiplicity of its works must be in some cases rather an incon¬
venience than a strength, and that a large portion of them, either
interior or exterior, might be fairly razed with advantage to the
communications, accommodation, and sanitation of the place.
The French field-works were everywhere beautifully constructed,
like models from plates on field fortification, of good profile, and
very abundant. Passing from what had been their out-
Son.UmValla" posts to the German works of circumvallation, I found the
latter certainly less pretty, and not very formidable, taken
individually, but possessing, when grouped together, from their
disposition with regard to successive increments of strength and of
mutual support, a kind of elasticity which would enable them,
without rigidly resisting the first shock of attack, to receive it within
their meshes, gradually to absorb it, and eventually with combined
194
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
force to throw it hack as fast as it came. This system, on the level
plain from Metz towards Thionville, was 2-J miles in depth, from the
first slight shelter trenches of the advanced posts opposite Ladon-
champs, through many intermediate supporting works of increasing
development hut always of easy communication in all directions,
with lines of gun-pits and roads prepared for the rapid advent of
field-guns nearer home, up to the main strength of the well-prepared
position w'hich rested on the fortified village of Mezieres. This
waiting method of defence, coupled with the amount of notice of
large movements necessarily yielded by the bareness of the ground
between the hostile lines, enabled the investing army, though
guarding a circuit of thirty miles, invariably to collect troops enough
to the point of pressure to ruin the fierce efforts of the beleaguered
to break out.
Bazaine There is no doubt (in the German army, at any rate) that
Bazaine did his best to get his forces away, though by the
time when he attempted it, the preparations against it had left him
no chance : the Germans believe that he could not try earlier than he
did, owing to the disorganisation of his army by its enormous losses.
They know that his army was starving at the last ; and that though
some quantity of provisions had been privily hoarded by the citizens,
the amount would have made but little difference if divided amongst
all the besieged. They believe that, though Bazaine may have desired
to unite certain political conditions to his capitulation, he was no
traitor, the use of which epithet they assign to the French manner :
and they think that the patriots of Metz would have scolded but little
at the capitulation if Bazaine had only billeted a few soldiers in every
house with orders to share and share alike.
As I had previously read the statement of a correspondent of one
of the daily papers that he had seen, after the capitulation, vast
quantities of provisions in one of the advanced forts, I inquired of
various staff officers if they had known of this untouched store of the
enemy’s ; they told me that, though in the confusion of the latter
days of the defence some special batches of provisions might have
been overlooked or even forgotten after storage, they knew that
nothing of consequence for 180,000 men had been found. With
regard to the correspondent’s vision, (as the Governor of Metz told
me that I was the first Englishman who had received permission to
enter the advanced forts), I think it possible that his zeal may have
led him to observe what he could from the outside ; everywhere tall
traverses of sandbags and revetments of casks would have met his
eye, and quickly filled, by inventive wit, with flour and pork, have
become crushing evidence of the treachery of the unfortunate French
Commander.
The Battle-field of Gravelotte ,
™ -i to the west of Metz, offers a region of rolling hills with
large woods and ravines interspersed ; one principal
ridge, its nearest point about three miles from the advanced forts
THE E0YAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
195
of Metz, extends from south to north about eight miles, and
dominates, by 100 feet more or less, the nearest approaching
hill-tops on the west, from 2,000 to 3,000 yards away. On this
ridge the French were in position on the 1 8th of August, having
been pushed back from their line of westerly retreat by the battles
of Yionville and Rezonville on the 16th; their left flank, almost
in contact with the Prussian advance, was protected by a deep
wide and wooded ravine, and by the Moselle, which united it to
Metz; the greater part of the front was covered by the same
difficult ravine; and the right, which might be considered to
be much refused from their former east and west line of battle,
rested on the strong village and ground of St. Privat. In rear,
some hundred yards from the crest, the ground fell away steeply
into ravines and woods, with a good road from each flank into
.Metz.
The French had slightly intrenched themselves along most of the
ridge; and in front of their intrenchments, descending at gentle
slopes to the difficulties in front, lay an unbroken tract of bare and
even ground, 1,000 yards wide on the left, 2,000 on the right : this
arrangement, appropriate to the action of the Chassepot, turned out
to be the real strength of the position.
. At noon the German right (being the 7th corps), which
perations. jia(j ]^een feeling its way and the enemy since the 17th,
having first occupied the village of Gravelotte with some hussars,
and massed supports in the neighbourhood, threw up on to the
adjoining plateau, 2,000 yards from the French left, and 100 feet
lower than it, battery by battery as fast as they could get up from
the head of the ravine at a gallop, the whole of their 84 guns, into
action against the French artillery, which in somewhat similar
numbers was in position opposite. The German batteries weTe not
exactly in line, but rather, alternately, 100 yards in advance or rear
of one another ; the pieces were also somewhat crowded together, in
order to avoid extending in front of Gravelotte and drawing the
enemy’s fire that way, as it was intended to use the village as a field
hospital ; (the design was successful; I saw Gravelotte quite uninjured,
whilst the farm buildings on the opposite French position were cut
down nearly even with the ground by the Prussian fire). As the bat¬
teries gallopped up, vast numbers of French shells burst short in the
air, or on the ground in rear, but struck nobody ; a continuous rain of
mitrailleuse bullets also fell into one particular hollow behind them
where nothing was ; but the German commander of the first three
batteries in action directed their whole fire to be given together on
the first French mitrailleuse on the right; thereupon a confused
storm of explosions was seen to spring all over where that mitrailleuse
had stood, succeeded only by a vacant space with some wreck on the
ground : the same treatment was adopted with the second and third
mitrailleuses, on which the fourth vanished of its own accord, and
the process of successive concentrations of fire was carried on upon
the guns: with such effect that by 2 p.m. the French artillery of
196
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
tlie left wing was completely silenced.* Then the German infantry,
prepared in the ravine between the two positions, were sent on, and
tried in their steady determined manner to reach the French lines ;
but, exposed to the full effect of the Chassepot, were brought to a
stand and driven back shattered, to be reinforced in the wood, to try
again, and be again and again utterly overpowered by the fire : a
corps which had been sent round farther on the right, under
General Manteuffel, to try to turn or shake the French left was
quite unable to get on, owing to the difficulty and defence of the
narrow ground between that left and the Moselle : and towards
4 p.m. the gloomy aspect presented itself to the Germans that their
most costly efforts failed to make the slightest impression on the
hostile infantry in their intrenchments. Some cavalry also, massed
in the ravine below, had tried to get into effective action against the
French position, ascending by a good road which led across the
ravine, but the head of their narrow column was received with such
a fire that they were immediately ordered down again.
At 4 o’clock General Yon Zastrow ordered some batteries across
to try the effect of case shot at 600 yards : the first that got up, a
field battery, had so many men and horses struck down that it could
only get two guns into action, to be withdrawn again as soon as
practicable. The next battery, of horse artillery, getting some little
advantage from inequalities of ground, opened fire at between 700 and
800 yards from the French intrenchments and kept it up till 6 p.m.,
with great gallantry and loss to itself but with doubtful effect on the
enemy : it was just in advance of some small quarries cut into the
side of the hill which concealed its horses, and in the sudden advance
of the French (hereafter described), two of its guns which could not
be got away quickly enough, were thrown over into these quarries to
prevent the French taking them. This was supposed by some of my
informants to be the origin of the tragic history of German losses in
the quarries of Jaumont.
The result arrived at by the German right was, at 4 p.m., generally
the same for all the rest of the line ; and at St. Privat in particular
(opposite to which the left had arrived after a very laborious march,
being on the outer flank in this change of front of the whole line of
battle, and having, by its arrival in position, given the signal for the
others to engage), the long exposed slope of bare earth had proved
insurmountable ; and from 4 o’clock till nearly 6 there was generally
silence except where, on the extreme left, the artillery still ham-
* The guns about Gravelotte also silenced some artillery of the French centre posted rather
strongly in the farm called Leipsic, at a range of from 8,000 to 3,200 yards ; this distance would
have been considered too great, but that no nearer point afforded a satisfactory view, and that there
was urgency to quell the artillery defence thereabouts by artillery. There were many very long
ranges on that day; men and horses were killed by Chassepot bullets which must have travelled
at least 1,400 yards ; but such hits were neither purposed nor perceived nor utilised by their
authors : of all the far-ranging missiles, only the large percussion shells from the German guns,
bursting with unmistakeable evidence, enabled their distant masters to recognise and to follow up
or to adjust their action.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
197
inered at the tough village of St. Privat. But as dusk was settling
down a little before 6 o’clock, of a sudden an enormous and con¬
tinued roar of fire burst from the French lines, a storm of bullets,
such as had not been all day, whistled through all parts of the German
lines, the French infantry leapt from their intrenchments, and,
shouting and running their utmost, and loading and firing all the
way, rushed in an immense but irregular swarm, with astonishing
speed and noise and fire, towards the ravine held by the German
infantry. Thereabouts they met the latter, no ways disposed to go
back though hitherto unable to get on ; and for a short time these
opposite masses fired volleys into one another at close range. Just
about this period however, an additional corps d’armee was brought
up from the rear to the left of the 7th corps, and the whole German
line thus reinforced, receiving the order to advance (the left being at
last enabled to do so by the action of a Hanoverian corps which,
having gradually forced its way round the French right, had estab¬
lished batteries playing on the flank and rear of St. Privat), pressed
forward in imposing numbers and drove the French infantry back
to and past their intrenchments and headlong down the reverse
slope of the hill.
By this time darkness had arrived, which saved the French from
enormous losses in their descent of the tortuous roads towards Metz ;
but their army was so disorganised that the Germans, who com¬
menced some sort of works of investment the same night, had time
to get everything prepared for them before they could make any
fresh attempt to break away from the place.
These movements of the troops were detailed to me by various
officers of the staff of the 7th corps, partly on the field and partly
over maps $ the account of the ground I am ni3Tself responsible for.
The Hill of Spicheren ,
three miles west of Saarbrlick, stands out at the turning-point of a
ridge of hills from 300 to 400 ft. high, of which the right branch (as
the Germans looked at it, nearly end on), retiring westwardly
towards Forbach, overlooked the road thither from Saarbriick, whilst
the left branch, directly facing them, extended for two or three miles,
wooded and somewhat steep, nearly to the Saar river on the south.
On this ridge the French had taken up position, apparently to
check German pressure on their own westward retreat from Saar-
briick, whence they had hurriedly broken up during the night, in
consequence of the discomfiture of the right of their grand line at
Weissenburg, and the threatening advance thence of the army of the
Crown Prince of Prussia. Their left, on the retiring branch of the
ridge, was rendered difficult of access by their occupation of some
villages in front ; but the hill of Spicheren, the salient point of the
position, rested mainly on its own merits, viz., its bold sides, at
inclinations of from 30° to 40°, and its perfect command of the bare
plain in front, which, for the last 1,000 yards of. its approach, had
198
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
sufficient ascent in it to moderate tlie pace of any assailant ; a small
breastwork was made all along its exterior crest, and it received some
flanking defence from guns on either, but principally on the left or
retiring, side.
The German forces on the opposite side of the Saar, on finding
Saarbriick evacuated, crossed at once in pursuit, and coming upon
the French position before noon, immediately attacked, and, as their
forces gradually arrived, assailed it about 2 or 3 p.m. along its whole
front; they advanced with a thick line of skirmishers supported by
company columns, and lost very heavily whilst crossing the plain, so
that the first columns that got up on to the slopes of the hill, being
too shattered to go on, lay down waiting for reinforcements and
breath, the fire of the defenders passing over their heads ; and with
reinforcements which arrived they tried and tried again to get to the
top, being always stopped with heavy loss but not driven back : until
at last, pushing persistently everywhere, getting always more and
more men to the work, and a Prussian field battery having, with the
loss of more than half its men and horses, got into a kind of flanking
position amongst the wooded hills on the left and begun to make
itself felt, the columns finally rushed over the crest and cleared the
whole hill- top with the bayonet. The ground in rear was very
defensible by the French, and they did, assisted by the approach of
evening, make fight enough on their retreat to get all their guns
away ; but their pace was continually quickened by the German
pressure, and before nightfall the whole of them had become dis¬
ordered fugitives, who, falling precipitately back on Forbach, found
there, instead of succour, a fresh German attack mastering the whole
of that strong position. As this was on their left flank and rear,
the complete rout of everything French in that connection was the
immediate result : night and the fatigue of the victors saved the
whole force from being taken.
It is probable that at Spicheren the assailants lost many more
men than the defenders, but the success was well worth buying
dearly, as it rendered practicable, and also utterly decisive, the
isolated yet concentric attack delivered by the neighbouring German
corps upon Forbach. This corps was called, during the action, from
a day’s march distance, and measures concerted with it, by field
telegraph.
The storming of such a bold height with the bayonet in broad day¬
light is, in these days of improved musketry, a remarkable feat. How
much the credit is due to mere perseverance and courage, how much
to the arrival of the battery on the enemy’s ground, (one of the aides-
de-camp engaged told me that the French began to give ground
directly that the shells from their own level began to flash amongst
them), and how much to the gradually increasing development of
the German right, I could not precisely learn ; but as I looked from
the commanding crest to the bare slopes below I was convinced that
English infantry, of the present kind, would never have been stormed
away from it as long as they had a cartridge remaining.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
199
In Tactics,
the Germans declare the theory that regular cavalry, so far from
having had its scope diminished by the power of the new
' u musketry, has become more than ever necessary in pitched
battle : for since the unsupported attack of infantry, by infantry,
has become almost impossible, owing to the assailants suffering
such loss during the time of transit as to become inefficient before
they can arrive, the speed of cavalry offers the most ready means of
delivering an attack in a fraction of the time and consequently with
a fraction of the loss. Good cavalry, they reckon, attacking formed
infantry in the open, will, in its charge, leave half its numbers on
the ground, but will arrive to the infantry, and there dispose of it :
a grave measure, only to be adopted in emergent cases 5 but then,
though expensive, beyond all price.
In this connection, Count von Schmettow, who led the charge of
the Bismarck Cuirassiers at the battle of Vionville-Besonville, told
me that he would feel confident of being able to deliver a cavalry
charge home to any French infantry (such as it had then become) in
the open, commencing from the farthest range of their weapons ;
but that he would not feel so sure against infantry such as it was at
the beginning of the war, with its morale yet unshaken. As to the
particular charge named, on the 1 6th August the one German corps
that had struck Bazaine’s retreating army being exhausted and
sorely pressed, orders had been issued for all the cavalry that could
be got forward anyhow to attack at once wherever it could ; the
Count, with a regiment of cuirassiers and one of hussars, passing
along a hollow perpendicularly through his own lines, emerged
forming to his right about 1,000 yards in front of them, and at once
led, across the front of the army, for a French force coming into
position opposite to its right ; he had 800 or 1,000 yards to go, a
wood full of French skirmishers touching his left all the way, but he
got on to the first line (guns, as it happened) before more than two
or three of them had been brought fairly to bear on him, and sabred the
gunners, a line of French infantry some 300 yards in rear of the
guns firing at best speed into the melee of friends and foes ; he had
soon ridden over this infantry also, (which partially got up again and
opened fire on him when past), and on over another line of guns
which was ready for him about 600 yards off with infantry behind
it of the same distance, behaviour, and fate as the first : he charged
back again over the same two lines, receiving a damaging attack
from French cuirassiers on the way and having now the wood full of
skirmishers on his right instead of his left, and regained his original
position with the loss of half his rank and file, and with only one
officer uninjured in person or in horse ; but having achieved the
object of relieving, for the time, the German right from French pres¬
sure : if that right could only hold on there until the arrival of the
26
200
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
other corps hastening np from the rear, Bazaine5s army must stop,
must go hack, and must be shut up in Metz.
I heard also, that in the cavalry attack next on the left of this, a
regiment of cuirassiers with one of lancers rode down two formed
squares of French infantry ; but I had uot the good fortune to con¬
verse with any of the officers actually concerned.
It may be remarked, with regard to the first of these affairs, that
the multiplicity of the hostile lines certainly facilitated the cavalry
exploit ; and with regard to the second, that squares hardly appear to
be the most effective formation nowadays for resisting cavalry $ and,
as to the success, generally, of the attacks by the German cavalry in
this war, that the latter universally accuse the French of firing too
high when the assailant begins to close rapidly : it is noticeable
that the charge so gallantly delivered at Sedan by the French cavalry
upon Prussian infantry utterly failed i and against fire like that of
the English infantry, the experiment remains a very questionable
one for any cavalry to essay.
The opposite idea of the use of cavalry, as mounted rifles, or real
dragoons, is not very popular in the German army, owing to the
supposed difficulty of training short- service men to the double
action. A Prussian major of lancers, who had served in the Russian
dragoons in Asia Minor during the Crimean war, stated that the
system had the best chance with the Russian 26 years5 term of
service ; but that even there, the men, being first made good cavalry,
could never be got beyond the most helpless condition as infantry.
This may be true of Russians ; but the Prussian hussars are trained
to act, and have done good service in the present war, both mounted
and dismounted.
In infantry tactics they have less novelty : they incline
to the opinion that good infantry with fair space for the
play of its weapons can hardly be successfully attacked by infantry,
without combinations ; and that, if the assailed have a breastwork,
something more than direct artillery fire is needed to help the
attack home to it.
But the German infantry advance is very steady and slow ; meant
to be quick at the finish, but it may happen that none of them reach
it : they blame the French for the opposite extreme, of running up
from such a distance as to be quite exhausted on arriving at the
decisive ground. And it must be remembered that their usual front
line of battle is simply a very strong line of skirmishers, supported
by battalion columns of companies, all with a strong idea towards
using the bayonet, which they invariably carry fixed. Perhaps
when they are armed with improved muskets they will adopt an
order more powerful in, and less vulnerable to, musketry fire, will
carry the bayonet in its scabbard, and get rid of the short sword so
many of them carry in addition. They carry large loads now, and
march very lastingly.
In field artillery the main idea seems to be to move
quickly and fire accurately, concentrating the fire if pos-
Infantry.
Artillery.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
201
sible. They appear to consider it proven tliat their own system,
including the breech- loading, is superior to any other, and refer
triumphantly to effects produced; which, however, must also be
much attributed to the bold handling of batteries in this campaign,
whereby the production of a certain effect has been made of more
importance than the security of the battery. And I think it cannot
be denied that their system, including, as it does, but the one most
appropriate projectile to breech-loading, viz., a capacious percussion
common shell, (appropriate because it demands only accuracy, not
great projectile force, nor even ignition of fuze, from the gun), if it
never yields any astounding results, yet allows a certain average
satisfactory effect to be fairly reckoned on, (except of course on boggy
ground) . They say that nothing ever goes wrong about their guns ;
the shells, held fast by screw fittings, are carried loaded and fuzed
with the exception of the small igniting cap, securely kept apart to
be added at the last moment ; trial shots with these shells are more
definitive of the range than with anything else ; and the guns are
very handily worked behind small cover— but they desire to use some
form of shrapnel. There trouble and change loom in their future s
they believe that they possess already a very perfect time fuze (not
yet issued on service), and that the reason the English have so much
difficulty with fuzes is, that they do not insist sufficiently on having
them always newly made.
They carry 10 rounds of case per gun, of which, however, they have
no opinion : also a proportion of small cartridges with special
charges for pitching shells just over covering crests— a practice in
which they have some confidence.
Their guns (field) will by-and-by be all of bronze, instead of iron
and steel, partly for convenience of manufacture, and partly because
it “ allows some use to be made of guns captured from an enemy.”
Of mitrailleuses the Germans have a high opinion,
especially against cavalry attacks, horses, they say, being
more alarmed by its horrid noise than by any other ; but they have
not made up their minds as to their fit place with an army t they are
decided that, in fortresses, they are exactly suited for the flanks,
permitting of very long lines of defence : and some officers desire to
see them adopted as battalion guns in the field ; which, however,
appears to me to be throwing them away, in a place where they are
not wanted.
Finally, it is very worthy of notice that the Germans
servadon^ seem to agree in assigning their success generally to
two causes,— the exactness of their drill, and their superior
discipline : the French their reverses (when not repeating the popu¬
lar cry of “ treachery ”) to their own in-discipline ; which they declare
to have sprung mainly from the efforts of the higher officers to gain
popularity amongst the private soldiers at the expense of the autho¬
rity of their subordinates, and also from the determined efforts of
the Press to wield power within the army. I, as a looker on, cannot
but put in the first place the moral forces acting beneath the above
202
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OF
causes, to wit, the German love of truth, and the French addiction
to romance, generating respectively, in war, determination and ex¬
citability : after which, as to details, I agree with the above.
To compare our army in the above particulars, I would say that
our system of drill has much in common with that of the Germans,
and that in steadiness we may become equal to them, in quickness
superior : but that in military discipline — that spirit in which all,
from the prince to the peasant, give immediate and entire supremacy,
in all service matters, to pure military authority, without prejudice
whatever to their social or private relations, — -even the English, as
well as all the other armies of the world, may learn something from
the system of Prussia.
London, December 17, 1870.
ERRATA.
Page 186, 3rd line from bottom, for “ invincible,” read “invisible.”
„ 194, the side note “ Bazaine ” should not have appeared.
MiALLET’S 36-INCH MORTAR.
Front Elevation.
[The author is indebted to the kindness of the Council of the United Service Institution for the use
of this block, and of the side view at p. 212.]
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
203
THE
STORY OF THE 36-INCH MORTARS OF 1855-1858.
liY
MAJOR-GENERAL LEFROY, C.B., F.R.S., R.A.
1. “I AM SO FULLY SATISFIED OF THE PROBABLE SUCCESS OF MR.
Mallet’s scheme, that I am willing to take upon myself, as
First Minister of the Crown, the full responsibility of carrying
IT INTO EXECUTION; AND I THEREFORE REQUEST THAT YOU WILL, WITHOUT
THE SLIGHTEST DELAY, TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS FOR THE IMMEDIATE
CONSTRUCTION OF TWO MORTARS UPON THE PLAN PROPOSED BY MESSRS.
Mallet and Barry.*
“ Time is an essential element in this matter, and months have
already been lost in needless hesitation.”
Such were the memorable words, addressed to the Lieutenant-General of
the Ordnance, May 1, 1855, by which Lord Palmerston broke through the
obstructions of routine and the cautious counsels of his usual advisers, to
take upon himself the responsibility of .a step which was worthy of the
mechanical pre-eminence of Great Britain, and the energies she developed in
the Crimean War. It is a fact hardly known that had a similar decision
been exerted on another occasion, we should have had a field battery of rifled
guns before Sebastopol in the same year ; for its equipment was ordered by
Lord Panmure, although the order was subsequently cancelled.
2. It is somewhat remarkable that, with such an historical interest attaching
to them, we should still be without any account of the 36-inch wrought-iron
mortars of 1855, except the paper read by Mr. Mallet before the United
Service Institution in May, 1858. As part of the practice made with one
of them was subsequent to that date, this paper is necessarily incomplete.
It is needless to dwell on the military interest of the subject. They not only
eclipsed all previous monster mortars — such as the long 'range 13-inch
mortars employed by the French at the siege of Cadiz in 1810, one of which
may now be seen in St. James's Park, and the Liege 24-inch mortars
employed at the siege of Antwerp Citadel in 1832f — but they remain un¬
surpassed as pieces of ordnance, in respect to the weight of metal they were
intended to throw, and did actually throw in the course of the experiments,
* See Mi*. Mallet’s note subjoined, as to Mr. Barry’s connection with the subject,
t This piece had a calibre of 24 ins., but weighed only 7 ton3i
[VOL. VITiJ 27*
204
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
to a distance exceeding a mile and a half. This weight reached 2986 lbs. ;
• in the shells thrown furthest it was as much as 2400 lbs.
3. The following paper is prepared from notes which have long been
lying by me, extended by consulting the original records, and by information
kindly given to me by Mr. Mallet himself, and Sir Charles Wheatstone, who
in his then official capacity of member of the Ordnance Select Committee,
took, as will be seen further on, an important part in the experiments. I
propose to record the facts exactly, and then to see what conclusions can be
based upon them.
4. It will first be convenient to say something of the origination of the
mortars — a matter which gave rise to a warm controversy between the late
Captain Blakely and Mr. Mallet, in 1860, on the claim to priority by
the former as the alleged inventor of “ ringed structure” in guns* The
latter gentleman expressed himself thus, in controverting the claims of
Captain Blakely : —
“ Now as to the dates of my own proceedings. The general principles of the
construction of built-up guns — the fact that an enormous accession of strength
could be attained by external rings with initial tension — were known to me from
about the year 1850, and were first suggested to my mind by reading certain
passages in Mr. Edwin Clarke’s book on the Britannia Bridge, where (Yol. I. p. 306,
and note to p. 311) facts may be found containing the germ of the whole theory.
I, however, gave no publicity to my notions until the year 1854. In October,
1854, I made my original design for the 36-inch mortars since constructed by
Government. That design, made and then dated by my own hand, lies now before
the Academy.”f
The mortar as designed (See Eig. 5, p. 227) was composed of a massive
cast-iron base, containing a chamber of comparatively small capacity,
hooped externally with wrought-iron, in one thickness of 9 or 10 ins., upon
which rested a chase in three lengths, each of two thicknesses, tied down to
the base by longitudinal bars. The resources of the day were unequal to the
production of rings of such size and thickness, and the contractor actually
contemplated at one time cutting them out of thick hammered plates.
Happily for his reputation and the success of the mortars, this was not
* See “Proceedings of 'the Royal Irish Academy,” Yol. YII. p. 355.
f “Proceedings, Royal Irish Academy,” Yol. YII. p. 334. The provisional specification of
Blakely’s Patent, No. 431, of August 14, 1855, hears date February 27, 1855. His first pamphlet
appeared in July of that year. Sir W, Armstrong’s provisional specification is dated February 11,
1857; but Professor D. Treadwell, who submitted a plan for the construction of cannon to the
British War Office in 1855, was so satisfied that the ground was then preoccupied, that in a letter
dated May 28, 1855, addressed to the author, he says : — “After you mentioned to me at our inter*
view last week, that the Government were already pursuing experiments upon the construction of
cannon on a plan similar to that proposed by me, I abstained from occupying your time with many
mechanical principles and details connected with it which would go far, I believe, to strengthen the
design that I proposed, and amongst others those that form the subject of the accompanying
paper.” — To Captain Tefroy, R.A. These dates, while confirming Mr. Mallet’s claim to priority,
are important in any review of that epoch of mechanical activity, and are in no degree inconsistent
with the claims of Professor Treadwell to the employment of coiled wrought-iron over steel barrels
as early as 1842. These claims, after a full investigation by the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences in 1865, were recognised by the award of that rare honor, the Rumford gold medal — the
fourth only which that learned body had awarded in seventy years.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
205
permitted by the designer, who then resorted to the plan of building up
the component parts of rolled iron, the billets composed of old rails,
piled alternately with “ puddle bars,” lap or double \ welded into hoops,
with a species of dove-tailed joint, which hoops were shrunk over one
another to the requisite thickness.
The mortar to which the present paper refers, may be described as
follows : —
(1) There was the cast-iron base, 30 ins. thick, weighing about T^tons,
which carried the trunnions, and the flange for holding the longitudinal bars,
and the chase for the quoin wedges, forming at that side of the axis the
fulcrum for elevating. A hole 37 ins. in diameter and very slightly coned
was bored through this base, and enlarged by a recess at the top to 48 ins.,
forming a recess about 13 ins. deep.
(2) There was a wrought-iron chamber or breech-piece, nearly 70 ins.
long, formed of a solid forging, much after the manner of the Mersey
Company's great cannon of the same epoch.* Its largest external diameter
was 36 ins., reduced by three steps to 24 ins. It was strengthened externally
by two layers of wrought-iron hoops over the body, and one heavy ring
towards the mouth, the whole turned with a slight cone, to fit the cast-iron
base. The chamber proper, which was bored in this, was 48*5 ins. deep,
and coned from a diameter of about 14 ins. at the cup to 9 ins. at the
further end. The front was cupped to fit the shell. This piece weighed
altogether about 7 tons.
(3) There were three great compound rings of wrought-iron, which,
together with a muzzle ring, made up the chase 80 ins. long. They were
built up respectively of 21, 19, and 11 sectional hoops, so disposed as to
break joint — the inner or A tube of each being in one length, the remainder
in two or three. The largest of these hoops was 67 ins. in external diameter,
made out of a bar about 19 ft. long; the smallest was 40 ins. in diameter.
The greatest thickness of the chase was 16 ins., the least 9 ins.
(4) A heavy muzzle ring and moulding, having a sectional area of about
78 square inches. It was turned with a flange to fit over the top of the
chase.
(5) Six wrought-iron longitudinal bolts, nearly square in section, con¬
necting the above-named ring with the cast-iron base. They had a sectional
area of 21 square inches each, and were secured at the bottom by gibs, and
keys (cotters). The top of each bolt was provided with a head, resting on a
sort of circular iron washer ; and to prevent the transmission of a violent
jar on discharge, a thin ring of wood was interposed between the exterior
* Two experimental malleable iron guns of 13-inch bore were ordered of Mr. Nasmyth in the
early part of 1855. One of them was actually welded up, to a weight of upwards of 31 tons, when
insuperable difficulties in the then state of manufacture compelled its gifted projector, with bitter
reluctance, to give it up. Messrs. Horsfall were more successful, and in the summer of 1856 com¬
pleted and presented to the Government the 13-inch gun of 22 tons now mounted at Tilbury
E ort. The Royal cypher and a commemorative inscription were cut on this gun by order of Sir
John Pakington, Secretary of State, in 1868, and it is to be regretted that Mallet’s mortars have
ndt yet been similarly honored;
206
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
ring and the muzzle ring. The subsequent fracture of one of the longi¬
tudinal ties was partly attributed to the employment of a wood so hard and
inelastic as beech for this washer, in one of the repairs of the mortar, instead
of elm. The longitudinal bolts were fitted into square recesses cut in the
muzzle ring, and to keep them in their places an external clip ring went
round all. The entire weight was 42 tons.
(6) The axis of the trunnions was 3 ft. from the end of the piece. This
hinder portion went into a cavity in the wooden bed.
(7) The mortar bed carried an iron plate, which served as a bed plate to
two heavy beech-wood quoins, which permitted any elevation between 40°
and 50°. A strong elevating screw served at once as an attachment and as a
means of adjustment. The centre of gravity of the shell in the loaded
position, at 45°, was vertically over the axis of the trunnions, and the centre
of gravity of the system was behind it, so as to counteract the tendency of
the mortar to topple forwards from the reaction of discharge. The platform
had. a slope of 12°, and the recoil never exceeded 15 ins.
All these details will be readily understood by referring to the subjoined
woodcut.
Fig. 1.
Mallet’s 36-incli Mortar No. 1, of 4-2 tons, tried at Woolwich, 1857-8.
3 6 7 e 3 10 II 12 FEET.
Note. — The hatching of the chamber-piece should have denoted longitudinal fibre in the iron,
and of the rest circumferential fibre. The trunnion-piece is cast-iron.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
207
5. Mr. Mallet read a paper before the Institution of Civil Engineers in
1859* on the coefficients of Elasticity and Rupture in massive forgings
(Te Tr), in which we find much information respecting the metal used in
his mortars. A sum of £50 had been granted by Lord Panmure in 1856
towards the expenses of the investigation. The samples tested are described
as follows
Class I.
“Mark 3 H., No. 1. — Wrought-iron, fagotted, forged slabs, drawn out under the
steam hammer, 11 ins. by 2' 5 ins. rough section; prepared for the chase rings of
mortar No. 1.
“ Mark 4 H., No. 2. — The same, drawn out under the steam hammer for the
chase rings of No. 2.
“Mark 1 R., No. 3. — Wrought-iron, rolled slabs of the same iron as Nos. 1
and 2, of the same dimensions, and for the same purpose. Mortar No. 1.
“Mark 2 R., No. 4. — Wrought-iron, rolled slabs, the same in all respects as
No. 3. Prepared for mortar No. 2.
“All these irons were prepared at the Thames Iron Works, London. Specimens
Nos. 1 and 2 were intended for the internal rings, and Nos. 3 and 4 for the
external rings of mortars 36 ins. in diameter. The slabs were welded into rings
or hoops of various sizes, from 7 ft. diameter down to 3 ft., reduced to equal
thicknesses of 2 ins. Eight plies of these hoops, shrunk one upon the other,
according to a determinate law of tension, constituted the thickness of the chase
of these mortars. t The object in testing the iron of these hoops was not only to
obtain absolute measures of the ultimate resistance of the material employed ; but
also to determine whether the same malleable iron afforded a greater resistance to
forces of tension and compression, when prepared by means of hammering- or by
means of rolling the dimensions being the same in both cases. . . .
“Mark 1 0., No. 5. — Eagotted and forged slabs, prepared for exterior reinforce
hoops, or rings shrunk upon the central core pieces of the chamber of the mortars.
The iron for these was prepared from puddled balls of the best selected Scotch and
North Wales pig iron. The rough bars were hammered into slabs, which again
were piled and welded up into the required size under the hammer. Each slab,
when complete, was about 5 * 5 ft. square by 1 ft. thick. The test bars were cut
out parallel with the broad surfaces of the slab.’5
Class II.
“MarkP 2, No. 6. — Eagotted, forged bars, welded and drawn under the
steam hammer, and prepared for the purpose of being again fagotted and welded
into the great masses intended to be used for the Mersey Company’s gun, and for
the central or core pieces of the chambers of the mortars of 3 6 -inch calibre. This
iron, constituting the integrant material for all the large forgings, has, therefore,
comparative reference to both Class II. and III. It was piled and prepared in the
following manner, and was fagotted into rough bars averaging about lOins. by
* “ Minutes of Proceedings,” Vol. XVIII. p. 296.
f This is apparently a clerical error. The drawing only shows seven, — J. H. L,
208
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
3 ins. in section. Puddled rough bars were made from the best selected Scotch
and North Wales pig iron, and were worked as little as possible before being sent
to the forging department. The puddled bars were hammered, then rolled into
No. 1 bar iron, and that was cut up, piled, and again rolled into No. 2 bars.
“Mark C 1, No. 7. — A bar, cut by the planing machine from the exterior
of one of the large cylindrical masses forged for the mortar chambers (but which
turned out to be defective in the interior), in a line parallel with the axis of the
mass.
“Mark C 2 , No. 8. — A similar bar, cut in the same way from another mass,
defective in the interior, for the other mortar chamber. These specimens afford
measures of the longitudinal strength of great cylindrical forgings. . . .
“ Mark C 3, No. 9. — A hoop of about 3 ft. in diameter, cut out in the lathe
from the circumference of one of these massive forgings. The hoop was cut
through transversely, gradually made red hot, and then opened out straight by
bending back, without hammer blows, so as to give a straight bar that should
afford measures of the circumferential or tangential strength of the mass.
“ Mark C 4, No. 10. — A hoop similarly prepared in all respects to the preceding,
but from another forged mass — viz., that from which No. 7 was cut. Sections
were, in fact, obtained from massive cylindrical forgings in three directions — viz.,
on the outside parallel with the axis, across the end transverse with the axis, and
circumferentially by an annular ring from the end,”
Class III.
“ Mark L 4, No. 11.— -A bar, cut by the planing machine from the muzzle-
end of the surplus length of the cylindrical mass, forged for the Mersey Company’s
13 -inch gun. This bar was cut transversely, or square to the axis of the cylinder,
and in a line parallel to the diameter; it therefore gives a measure of the strength
of the mass in a radial direction, or in the normal, in a piece of ordnance exposed
to bursting strains.
“ No. 12. — A bar, carefully fagotted in a charcoal fire, from the heavy cuttings
out of the interior of the Mersey Company’s gun.”
The subjoined woodcut explains the maimer in which the various specimens
above referred to were cut out of the masses subjected to test.
Fig. 2.
Diagram to shew the three directions in which Test Specimens were taken.
а. Circumferential specimen.
б. Transverse specimen.
c. Longitudinal specimen.
6. The paper proceeds to explain at length the mode of building up the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
209
great forgings, and to account in a highly instructive manner for the trans¬
verse fissures developed in cooling, the result of contractile strains : —
“ These powerful contractile strains within the mass in cooling, exercise con¬
siderable influence upon the arrangement of the crystalline axes and planes of
separation of the iron. Bearing in mind the general law, that the principal axes
of the crystals of a cooling, and therefore a contracting mass, are found to arrange
themselves in the direction of minimum internal pressures, it will be obvious that
the grasp of the external rigid ring upon the internal nucleus will tend to place the
crystallising axes of the former in tangential directions, and those of the nucleus—
if at a temperature sufficiently low for its crystallisation to take place — in radial
directions, during the first periods of cooling. When the contractile forces of the
external ring have ceased to be tensile circumferentially, and have become tan¬
gentially compressive (in virtue of the radial pull of the contracting nucleus), and
when, at the same time, radial compression of the nucleus by the exterior has
given way to the contractile tension of the former, pulling away from the latter, as
also from itself, then the tendency will be to arrange the external crystalline axes
radially, and the internal ones tangentially. The change of sign or direction of
the respective tensile and compressive forces, tends to alter the directions of all the
crystalline axes during the cooling process. This is the cause of the varied direc¬
tions in which the integrant crystals are found in the vast mass of such forgings,
when broken into, or otherwise examined.
“ The remedy for this unfortunate play of molecular forces, which was adopted
with respect to the large forgings at Liverpool, and was at last in a great degree
successful, was to build up and work them hollow from the commencement.
When a cylinder has a large concentric cylindrical hole along its axis, it cools at
the same time, though not equally, on both the internal and the external surfaces ;
and thus the extremes of internal strains are avoided, and the hollow centre yields
more readily to the forcible compressive grasp of the exterior.”
7. The value of this quotation will be an apology for its length. Mr*
Mallet's results are given in six tables, from which I extract a few of the
particulars as bearing directly on the structural strength of the mortars,
and interesting for comparison with similar data since made public, for the
irons in use in the Koyal Arsenal at the present day. See for example the
elaborate tables printed in “ Extracts of Proceedings of the Department of
the D.G.O.,” Yol. VII. p. 234, from trials made by Mr. Kirkaldy in 1869,
with iron and steel, from 9 -inch gun No. 281.
“The coefficients Te and Tr were designed by Poncelet, to express the ‘work
done’ by an extending or compressing force upon any elastic prismatic body at
the point where its elasticity becomes permanently impaired and its form distorted,
and the further point where rupture occurs.” (“ Minutes, &c.,” p. 298).
where i ~ extension in terms of length, assumed to be uniform
throughout its range.
P == force in lbs. applied per unit of section.
7)- is arrived at in the same way.
28
Table I.
Physical data for the Irons employed in Mailed s 3$ -inch Mortars 3 1856., compiled from Tables I. to VI. of his Paper on the
coefficients of Plasticity and Rupture in Massive Forgings. (“Min. of Proc. Inst, of C.E., Vol. XVIII P)
aio
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
<*>
42*00
42-00
82-50
39-00
29-90
36-00
31-00
19- 80
27-00
20- 70
20-90
27-50
428-00
•UOT^TOXStp 0}0jd
•raoo !jT3 -sut gx 110
uoissaidcaoo X'B^°dC
.TSt'.O'^O^OCOCOCGiraClr-f
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•S666666666o66rH
*!}TIXII[ Oipsnp
ys ’saxgx no
uoissaidnioo pxftli
1 ins.
0-36
0-36
0-31
0-36
0-32
0-36
0-37
0-26
0-32
0-28
0-26
0-30
0-91
•notxjoxsip ©^{d
-UIOO pH 0.IUSS0.IJ;
tons.
28-58
28-58
27-68
27-68
27-68
27*68
24- 20
23-22
25- 00
25-00
25-00
25-90
66-00
!
oixsbjo
pn 0.1ns se.xj;
tons.
25-00
25-00
22- 32
23- 22
20- 54
21- 42
17-86
16-08
17-86
16-08
16-96
19-64
53*6
ft"
20-579
31- 850
33-993
20-416
22-740
32- 789
22-050
11-229
6- 125
7- 758
1-225
40-833
38-220
•0.inxdn.x *snt gp {
uo ttoisuo^xq
ins.
2-2166
1-6333
1- 8290
2- 1667
0-0924
0-6600
1-0100
0-5200
0-0772
0-1040
0-0424
0-9280
0-6700
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ins.
0-0143
0-0240
0-0333
0-0200
0-0156
0-0292
0-0240
0-0110
0-0100
0-0152
0-0040
0-0800
0-0288
•0.mxdn.x
!}B UOISU0J]
tons.
24-062
22-969
22-969
22-969
18- 594 |
21- 875
i
19- 688 !
17-900
16-406
16-716
6-562
22- 321
42-300
•pimp; OTqsBj©
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ft O
THE ItOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
211
8. Puddled steel — which is introduced for comparison in the last line,
and which is frequently met with in Iron-plate and other Beports of the same
date — was at the time a new material ; so far, at least, as regards its appli¬
cation in England to constructive or artillery purposes, and was considered
to possess very remarkable properties. Mr. Mallet regarded it as “ precisely
the material wanted for the production of artillery of the largest calibre;”
and the anticipation has proved correct if we regard the material and not
the mode of production. The puddling process has long been abandoned.
Bessemer* s and other processes produce a mild steel which is essentially the
same thing, but far more uniform in quality, and cheaper in manufacture.
9. The late firm of Mare, of Black wall, tendered on May 7, 1855, to
supply the two mortars in accordance with Mr. Mallet* s drawing and specifi¬
cations, within ten weeks of the date of order, for a sum of £4900 each,
including the mortar beds ; any weight in excess of 35 tons was to be paid
for at the rate of £140 a ton. The offer was accepted by the Board of
Ordnance the very next day — an instance of promptitude for which we
probably have to thank the vigorous interposition of Lord Palmerston, as
related at p. 203. But alas for good intentions and contractors* vows ! The
mortars were only reported on the eve of completion in March, 1857, nearly
a year after the unexpected termination of the war, and ninety-six weeks
after the order. They were really delivered in May. The bankruptcy of the
contractors, and the physical difficulties encountered in the execution of
parts of the order, combined to produce this great disappointment. They
were then partly the work of Mare & Co., partly of Horsfall & Co., of
Liverpool, and partly of Eawcett, Preston & Co. The latter did the turning,
boring, and finishing of the large forgings supplied by Horsfall & Co. Some
delay was due to the unsoundness detected in one of the largest of these
when it came to be bored. No one who recollects the constant failures in
the Boyal Arsenal some years later than this, while the use of Yorkshire
iron was persisted in, will feel . any surprise at such mishaps ; on the
contrary, it is to the honor of all parties that the mortars were produced at
all.
10. With them-— or, properly speaking, before them— were delivered
fifty shells, contracted for by Messrs. Hood at £16 a ton, and a couple of
steel gauges at a cost of £25. The shells were tested, by Mr. Mallet*s
advice :■ — -
(1) As to their gauge, and marked H.G. or L.G. The windage varied
between 0*38 and 0*40 in.
(2) As to the perfect sphericity.
(3) As to soundness of casting, by trial with blows of a heavy hammer,
especially at the parts opposite the fuze hole.
(4) As to weight.
212
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
(5) As to the true position of the interior cavity, according to specifi¬
cation. The failure of many of the 24-inch cast-iron shells fired at the
siege of Antwerp suggested a doubt to some officers whether that material
could be trusted for 36-inch shells; and to meet this objection, a plan
was devised for casting them over wrought-iron cores, made of two
hemispheres, rivetted to a flat ring ; the lower half was to have been of
0*5 in. iron, the upper of 0*25 in. This intention was, however, abandoned,
and they were made wholly of cast-iron; but the core was placed in the
mould so as to give a greater thickness at the bottom of the shell than at
the fuze hole. The latter dimension was 2*0 ins., the former was about
5*0 ins. in the heaviest, and 4*6 ins. in the lightest shells; and at 30 cubic
inches to one pound of powder, their internal capacities would have varied
between 405 and 487 lbs. Mr. Mallet calculated to throw a bursting charge
of 480 lbs. If we suppose that the sand and sawdust with which they were
filled set up or consolidated as much as gunpowder does, we shall have a
degree of eccentricity of the shells when fired which must have materially
influenced their flight.*
11. The following extracts from a letter of Mr. Mallet's, dated 2nd May,
1857, will explain some of the difficulties attending the actual completion of
the contract : —
“ I submit the following resume of that part of my own views which refers to
mode of delivery, and of the primary trials, &c. : —
tc (1) Each of these mortars weighs about 40 tons; the heaviest pieces upwards
of 12 tons.
“ (2) They will require strong and peculiar tackle to put them together, and
they will be endangered if attempted being put together by even skilled persons,
if not familiar with their construction. The same applies to taking asunder.
“ (3) They will require a firm foundation or platform to be made to put them
together upon, wherever done.
“ (4) The shells (50) and the two cranes for loading them into the mortars are
all now at Woolwich.f
“ (5) The contractor for the mortars is bound to deliver and put them together
once at Woolwich Arsenal, but only once. Subsequent taking asunder will cost a
considerable sum.
* The centre of gravity of the empty shell would be 1-5 in. from the centre of the outer sphere,
and the compression of the bursting charge on firing the mortar would add to this eccentricity
about 0-2 in,; so that the centre of gravity of the shell when fired would be as much as 1*7 in,
distant from the centre of the sphere.
f The cranes were supplied by Messrs. Fox, Henderson & Co., at a cost of £150 each.
lateral Elevation,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
213
“ It therefore appears to me that much waste of time, labour, and money would
be avoided by now deciding that these mortars shall be delivered, and at once put
together by the contractor, upon two suitable platforms to be immediately prepared
for them in the Practice Range, Woolwich Marshes. This will avoid taking down
and a subsequent second putting together, and will retain the contractor still
responsible for any possible defect in work, material, or fitting, upon the first pre¬
liminary proofs, with small charges, but from which he would be relieved if the
mortars be handled or put together by any other parties.
“ (6) The peculiar construction of these mortars makes it likely that some parts
may, after the first round or two, require some slight readjustment demanding
lathes, &c. These are at hand at Woolwich (as are the contractor’s tools) but
not at Shoeburyness, to or from which the delay and cost of carriage of such masses
would be serious.
“ (7) The preliminary proofs of these mortars should be made with low charges,
and not with live shells, nor at ranges exceeding half a mile, if so much ; so that
no difficulty or danger can arise in conducting such trials at Woolwich.”
Mr. Mallet proceeded to remind Lord Panmure of a stipulation he had
already made that the control of these proofs should rest with himself, as the
designer of the mortars, and that no experiments should be made with them
until after their final proofs, without his having previous due notice and
being present.
12. The Commanding Loyal Engineer at Woolwich reported that it
would cost about £300 to lay a foundation of Dartford gravel for one
platform. The platform was estimated by Lieut. -General, then Lieut. -
Colonel Tulloh, R.A., Superintendent of the Royal Carriage Department,
to cost £150, and it was finally decided by the Minister for War — very
much against Mr. Mallet’s remonstrances — -to limit the experiments to a
trial of one mortar, for which the preparations were not completed until the
15th October, 1857. It will be convenient to give the practice in its
entirety, before referring to successive accidents which caused interruptions,
and led to its being discontinued at so early a stage, premising that it was
fired by a piece of Bickford fuze passed in through the vent and inserted
into the neck of one powder bag in the centre of the charge, and ignited
by the usual method. The vent was bored through the lower chase¬
ring in advance of the chamber. The charge itself was at first introduced
in 51b. bags, afterwards in 101b. bags; and it was not the least curious
part of the spectacle to see the artilleryman standing in the mortar to arrange
these bags.
The shells were provided with a metallic fuze, which was well primed, and
ignited separately by the flash or by a leader of Bickford fuze. It was
supposed possible that in consequence of the comparatively small charge and
the large diameter of the shell, the flame might fail to do so. This return
to a practice of the infancy of artillery is one of the many singular circum¬
stances attending the trial.
214
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
13. — Table- II.
Abstract of all the Hounds fired from Mailed s 36 -inch Mortar No. 1.
(No importance attaches to the defections, as there ivere no means of
directing the mortar. See p. 218 as to the shells).
No.
Date.
1857-8.
6
Charge.
Shell.
t.
Eange.
Def
tic
L.
lec-
m.
E.
e
O /
lbs.
kilos.
lbs.
kilos.
secs.
yds.
metres.
yds.
yds.
o /
1
Oct. 19
48 20
10
4-53
2376
1075
?
370
338
—
—
2
it
it
20
9-05
2362
1069
13-0
900
823
5,
—
—
3
a
48 30
30
13-57
2596
1174
17-0
1277
1168
11
—
_
4
a
a
40
18-10
2352
1064
19-0
1711
1565
6
—
, —
5
a
n
60
22-62
2986
1351
20-0
1732
1584
5
—
—
6
n
„
60
27-15
2604
1178
24-0
2270
2077
78
—
_
7
a
70
31-67
2548
1153
—
2644
2418
94
—
—
8
Dec. 18
42 30
40
18-10
2660
1204
17-3
1623
1484
—
15
52 0
9
n
a
40
18-10
2660
1204
17-5
1681
1537
12
—
64 52
10
„
40
18-10
2940
1330
16-9
1525
1394
—
13
65 58
11
n
i,
40
18-10
2940
1330
16-1
1491
1363
—
35
59 55
12
n
n
40
1810
2940
1330
15-0
1468
1342
—
24
58 55
13
„
40
18-10
2940
1330
16-8
1439
1316
19
—
49 52
14
July 21
45 0
40
18-10
2419
1093
17-75
1700
1554
—
60
65 30
15
a
n
50
22-62
2403
1087
21-5
2120
1938
—
11
52 0
16
July 28
45 0
50
22-62
2373
1074
20-0
2100
1920
—
68
58 0
17
/;
i,
60
27-15
2385
1080
21-0
2323
2124
—
115
65 0
18
n
a
70
31-67
2400
1086
24-5
2758
2522
—
123
_
19
n
"
80
36-20
2395
1084
23-0
2759
2523
—
72
62 0
14. Rounds 1 and 2, with 10 lbs. and 20 lbs. respectively produced no
effect on the piece.
At round 5 it was seen that the rear retaining screw was not strong
enough to resist the shock it received. It was slightly bent, and some of the
threads cracked. At round 7, charge 70 lbs., a crack 4 ins. long appeared
externally in the second hoop of the outside ply of the centre ring, and
the Committee, as a measure of precaution, and as there was no urgency of
time, deemed it necessary to have this ring removed and repaired, or
replaced by a new one, before the practice should proceed. Mr. Mallet
would have preferred to disregard the accident. The mortar was now
minutely examined. The crack above referred to was found to run through
the hoop, a thickness of 2*4 ins., and was about *03 in. wide. There were
no other defects of any consequence, but numerous small and superficial
marks or striae, such as forged iron always developes, had been brought
to light by the gas. One of six 0*875-inch diam. screw pins, by which
the clip-ring at the muzzle was attached, was broken, and the wedges
or cotters of the longitudinal bolts were generally bent* some of them as
much as 0*6 in.
Mr. Mallet claimed the fracture of an exterior ring as a satisfactory proof
that the bursting strains were actually transmitted truly through the whole
thickness of metal in the chase, so that the outside bore equally with the
interior, and it was found on examination that the lap-weld of this ring was
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
215
very imperfect. It had, in fact, hardly any attachment. A superficial longi¬
tudinal mark now shewing in the chamber on both sides, about 16 ins. long
and *05 in. in greatest depth, he regarded as the last trace of one of those
transverse fissures referred to at p. 209, which are apt to occur in the heart
of all large forgings. Much difficulty, he remarked, had been experienced in
obtaining sound forgings for the centre piece of the mortar chambers, and in
every forging a rent extending more or less across a diameter in the axial plane,
was found to exist when the forging was bored into. The gibs and cotters
had been, he said, intentionally reduced in strength to a minimum, that they
might spring a little, and so ease the jar of recoil upon the holding-down
bolts ; but this had been carried a little too far. He attributed the bending
of the rear retaining screw to the misfit of the quoins, which had warped
and shrunk in the many months that had elapsed since they were fitted, and
only bore at one end, being free about 0*3 in. at the other.
Fig. 3.
Lower outer ring ply. 2nd segment of cliase.
Examination made on 26th October, 1857, after firing of the 19th October, and mortar taken
asunder.
15. The mortar was repaired, at a cost of £56, in about two months,
and the practice was resumed on the 18th December, when two medium
and four heavy shells were fired, with a charge of 40 lbs. (Table II.) After
the sixth discharge it was found that the centre hoop of the exterior ply of
the bottom ring of the chase was broken through. This hoop was 3*9 ins.
thick and 8*75 ins. wide. The joint between the bottom and centre ring
was a good deal opened, to a maximum width of 0T25 in., and filled with
hard fouling. A few more superficial marks had appeared, but in other
respects the mortar was uninjured.
29
216
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Fig. 4.
Middle exterior ring ply, lowest segment of chase, broken 18th December, 1857.
The section containing the defective ring, which weighed nearly 7 tons
6 cwt., was again removed, and Lord Panmure sanctioned its repair, at Black-
wall, at a cost of £156. He sanctioned also the casting of twenty lighter
shells, of about 2400 lbs. each, in the Loyal Laboratory, at a cost of £11
each.
This is the place to remark that the great weight of some of the shells
first fired was not intended, and arose altogether out of the unusual density
of the Lowmoor iron — a fact not familiar to Mr. Mallet when he designed
the shells. A curious illustration of it was presented when the Loyal Gun
Pactories first began to make cast-iron 68-pr. guns in 1858. They mostly
turned out to be 2 cwt. lighter than the Lowmoor patterns. (See the
Report of the Ordnance Select Committee, dated 29th December, 1860, on
this subject. No. 1339.)
The practice was resumed for the second time on 21st July, 1858, and
nothing unusual occurred except the fracture of one of the wedges, or cotters,
at the second discharge, and a crack in the slot, or keyway, through which
another of them passed. These damages having been repaired in the Loyal
Gun Factory, and a wrouglit-iron cotter substituted for the broken steel
one, the practice was, for the fourth and last time, resumed on the 28th July,
1858.
At the second discharge, charge 60 lbs., another steel cotter broke, and
was replaced by a wrouglit-iron one, driven home forcibly by an extemporised
ram. At the third discharge, charge 7 0 lbs., two other cotters were found
bent and loose; it took thirty-five minutes to tighten them.
At the fourth discharge — charge intended to be 80 lbs., but perhaps only
70 lbs., as the range was not increased — one of the six longitudinal ties
broke short off through the cotter hole, and started forwards 10*25 ins.
This caused necessarily a discontinuance of the practice.
16. Mr. Mallet urged the repair of this injury and a renewal of the
practice, at least so far as to ascertain the greatest practicable range of these
shells; but “a King had arisen who knew not Joseph." General Peel had
succeeded Lord Panmure as Minister for War, and although his estimate
for the repair and the practice asked for was only £150, General Peel
refused to sanction any further expenditure. A year later Mr. Sidney
Herbert — who had in the meantime succeeded to office — directed the
Ordnance Select Committee to reconsider the question, and the Loyal Gun
Pactories furnished an estimate amounting to £214 for a complete repair,
THE BOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
217
including six additional longitudinal bolts, at Mr. Mallet's suggestion.
This would have doubled the longitudinal strength of the chase, and they
would still have been about 13 ins. from centre to centre. The Committee,
however, reported their opinion that no practical advantage to the public
service was likely to be obtained by the continuation of the experiments.
They expressed no opinion as to the interest or value of any theoretical
results to be expected, and the Secretary of State decided to proceed no
further. There was a probable reason assigned for the breaking of the tie.
In driving in the new wredges already referred to, the workmen extemporised
a ram, slung from the loading crane ; the position of the particular tie which
broke was such that its wedges received a more direct and therefore more
violent blow than any of the others, and it was probably overstrained. The
effect was analogous to what has been since observed on some occasions
from overstraining armour-bolts in screwing home the nuts.
17. With regard to the other 3'6-inch mortar, it was, after some interval
of time, put together in the Boyal Arsenal, of which it still forms one of
the most conspicuous objects. It has never been fired.
18. I have said nothing of the service of the mortar, or of various
minor mishaps that befel the bed and platform. The latter are quite unim¬
portant. The platform, as before stated, had a slope of 12°, and the mortar
recoiled on it 15 ins. with the largest charge. The momentum of so great
a mass naturally tried all attachments, and some of them proved insufficiently
strong, the cardinal rule of providing at first strength in excess, having been,
as it so frequently is, neglected. The entire detachment detailed on the
second occasion amounted to four non-commissioned officers and twenty
gunners, who were able to load and fire about four shells per hour.
19. The platform was destined, however, to be heard of again; for it had
fallen into such a state of decay by 1869, that it was thought necessary by
the Control Department to take some steps to prevent its giving way under
the mortar. It is not so obvious what harm would have happened in that
event ; but “ as it would have entailed considerable expense to dismount the
mortar, and then to remount it on a new bed and platform, it was decided
to destroy the decayed bed by means of a small charge of gun-cotton, and
thus allow the mortar to subside on to the ground." “The mortar” (after
a discharge of gun-cotton) “swayed for an instant or two, and then fell
slowly forward on its muzzle. The great feature of novelty connected with
this operation was the accomplishment of great mechanical work by per¬
fectly unconfined gun-cotton, the force of which was instantaneously
developed through the agency of a small initiative detonation. The total
amount of gun-cotton used in the operation was 7 lbs. 6*5 ozs., the cost of
which was ]2s. lOd.”-* Whether the mortar is injured or not, is unknown
to the writer. The operation was attended with the complete destruction of
valuable iron work connected with the bed.
20. It will have been noticed in Table II. that the 19 shells fired are to
be distributed in three classes — as heavy, medium, and light — and do not
vary in weight within those classes more than about per cent. The
ballistic coefficient C for each class is as follows : —
See a fuller account, " Short Notes,” No. 62, p. 83. 1869.
218
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Mean
Tn English
In metric
weight.
measure.
measure.
C.
C.
lbs.
ft.
metres.
Five heavv shells .
. 2949
12,883
3926-0
Five medium shells .
11,420
3480-3
Nine light shells .
10,419
3175-3
Mean of all .
. 2594
11,332
3453*1
These weights include in each case a charge of sand and sawdust of about
equal weight with the proper bursting charge of the shell, viz. 405 lbs. to
487 lbs. (p. 212). If the resistance of the air to masses of such weight,
projected with low velocities, were negligible, we should expect to find the
ranges of shells of dissimilar weight projected at the same angle and by
equal charges, as exactly proportionable inversely to their weights. Jfor in
vacuo, if X and Xx represent the ranges of two shells, whose weights are
P, P2 and V, Vi their respective initial velocities, then
V s , '
rp
A
p '
We have the data for four comparisons of this nature ; but as the angles of
elevation were not identical, a correction must first be applied to reduce
them all to 45°. If the resistance is nil, or very small,
X _ sin 2 (J>
Xt ~ sin 2 0, '
Table III.
Comparison of Ranges of Shells of different Weights fired with the same
Charge .
Charge.
Shell.
Angle
Observed
range.
Range
reduced to
45°.
V
p
X
■Zi
lbs.
lbs.
degs.
ft.
ft.
40
2352
48|
5133
6153
—
—
40
2416
45
5100
6100
—
—
Mean .
2384
—
5116
5126
1-233
1-146
40
2660
4869
_
_
_
40
2660
42-i-
5043
—
—
—
Mean .
2660
—
4956
4993
1-105
1-116
40
■ 2940
42£
4575
_
__
_
40
2940
42i
4473
—
—
—
40
2940
42i
4404
—
—
—
40
2940
42i
4317
—
—
—
Mean .
2940
—
4440
4473
1-000
—
* 50
2403
45
6360
_ _
—
50
2373
45
6300
6330
1-250
1-214
50
2986
48i
5196
5213
1-000
—
60
2385
45
6969
6969
1-092
1-019
60
2600
48i
6813
6839
1-000
—
70
2400
45
8274
8274
1-061
1-039
70
2548
48i
7932
7962
1-000
—
Means ...
—
—
—
1-150
1-107
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
219
With one exception the ranges decrease in a less ratio than the weights of
the shell increase, indicating a less mean resistance to the heavier and slower
shells, and proving an appreciable effect of resistance by the fact. On the
mean of the five comparisons.
0'962 ^i;
the differences of weight ranging from 6 per cent, to 25 per cent.
21. There is another criterion of the existence of an appreciable resist¬
ance afforded by the observed times of flight. If the resistance is nil,
T = /Xtanft.
v i 9
and if it is appreciable, this quantity requires to be multiplied by a co¬
efficient (B) greater than unity, which has been computed by General Didion
for all the cases which usually occur in practice.'* The observed times of
flight are rather irregular, and present discrepancies which prevent our
relying implicitly upon them. Thus we have t — 15 secs, for a range of
1468 yds., and t = 16*8 secs, for a range of 1439 yds. at the same elevation.
The former is certainly an error, perhaps for 16 secs. And on one occasion,
when Professor Wheatstone's chronoscope was employed, it gave, on the
mean of five good comparisons, a time of flight of 16*30 secs, as against
16*95 secs, observed by the watch. Nevertheless, if we suppose the watch
intervals uniformly 4 per cent, too long, there will still remain an appreciable
retardation of the shells, due to the resistance of the air.
Table IY.
Observed Times of Flight compared with the Times due to the same
Ranges in vacuo .
Range
X.
0
Observed time.
D.
Range
X.
0
Observed time.
D.
/Xtancp
v'TY
/Xtancp
By
watch.
By chro¬
noscope.
B7
watch.
By chro¬
noscope.
V a 9'
yds.
degs.
secs.
secs.
sees.
yds.
degs.
secs.
secs.
900
m
13-0
—
13-73
0-947
1711
48*
19-0
—
18-98
1-001
1277
48*
17-0
—
16-40
1-034
1732
48*
20-0
—
19-10
1-057
1439
42*
16-8
16-0
15-68
1-071
2100
45
20-0
—
19-78
1-011
1468
42*
—
16-1
15-84
—
2120
45
21-5
—
19-99
1-075
1491
42*
16-1
16-0
15-96
1-009
2270
48*
24-0
_
21-88
1-097
1525
42*
16-9
16-6
16-14
1-047
2323
45
21-0
—
20-81
1-009
1623
42*
17-3
16-3
16-65
1-039
2758
45
:24‘5
—
22-67
1-081
1681
42*
17-5
16-6
16-95
1-032
2759
45
23-0
_
22-68
1-014
1700
45
17-75
17-80
0-998
—
—
—
—
—
T) = ratio of the observed time of flight to time in vacuo taken as unity.
* See C[ Traifce do Ballistique,” Table XIII., or Table CXXXYIL of Captain W. H. Noble’s
Second Report on Ballistics. 1865,
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
220
22. The recorded ranges in Table II. are, as a series, confused by a slight
difference of angle, and by considerable differences in the weight of the
shells ; but by correcting, as we have already done, for some of the former,
and expressing the charges in proportionate parts of the shells they fired
respectively, we reduce the whole to one series, as follows
Table Y.
Ranges of Shells of?&'§ ins, diameter, and an average weight of 2594 lbs,
at 45°, for charges bearing given proportions to their weights.
Weight
of
shell.
Charge.
Range
Round.
Weight.
Prop.
C
P
reduced
to
$ = 45°
Observed
t .
Observed
e
1
lbs.
2376
lbs.
10
•0042
vds.
“373
secs.
degs.
2
2362
20
•0085
907
13-0
—
3
2596
30
•0115
1287
17-0
— .
10
2940
40
•0136
1531
16-9
66-0
11
2940
40
•0136
1497
16-1
59-9
12
2940
40
•0136
1474
15-0
68-9
13
2940
40
•0136
1444
16-8
49-9
8
2660
40
•0150
1629
17-3
62-0
9
2660
40
•0150
1687
17-5
64-9
14
2416
40
•0165
1700
17-75
65-5
5
2986
60
•0167
1738
20-0
_
4
2352
40
•0170
1718
19-0
—
15
2403
60
•0208
2120
21-5
52-0
16
2373
50
•0210
2100
20-0
58-0
6
2604
60
•0230
2280
24-0
—
17
2385
60
•0251
2323
21-0
—
7
2548
70
•0275
2654
—
_
18
2400
70
•0292
2758
24-5
—
19
2395
80
•0338
2759
23-0
62-0
23. The range of the first shell, with only 10 lbs. of powder, which
astonished every one who witnessed it, is greatly out of proportion. It
should apparently have been about 290 yds. only. The range of the last
shell, with a nominal charge of 80 lbs., is also unaccountable, except on the
supposition that a mistake was made in the number of cartridges counted
in, which, on consideration of all the circumstances, I believe to have been
the case. The charge was contained in serge bags, each containing 5 lbs. or
10 lbs. of powder; the space left in the chamber was filled with sawdust,
and a rope wad or mat was placed at the top for the shell to rest on. The
pressure on the sawdust would have a tendency to compress it into a solid
wad ; and it is conceivable that a charge of 10 lbs., overcoming very slowly
the inertia of a mass of 2876 lbs., would produce this effect, and close all
escape of gas more perfectly than any larger charge. With these two
exceptions the observed ranges fall into a very regular series, beyond what
could be expected from single shells, with such small increments of velocity.
24. The angles of descent ( 0 ) were measured on a plane 14Jft. below
ScaZe of yards, for Ranges due lo idle propordoneele chargee marked, on, either side.
Thus , Charge one hrcndredih, the weight; of the shell,, or ahoul 25 lbs, Range 1100yds.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
221
the muzzle of the piece. The soil was so soft that most of the shells pene¬
trated to great depths.
No. 1 was found entire at 6 ft. 6 ins.
No. 2 was not found on digging down 12 ft., and could not be felt with a
9 ft. probe.
No. 3 was not found on digging down 18 ft., and could not then be felt
with the 9 ft. probe.
No. 4 was found broken into 44 pieces, one of them only 5 ft. 9 ins. from
the surface, but the great bulk of it at a depth of 14 ft. 6 ins.
No. 14 was not found on digging 20 ft. Sin., but was thought to be felt
with a 9 ft. probe.
No. 15 was found at a perpendicular depth of 19 ft. 4 ins., giving a
penetration of 28 ft. No others were found, and the Commanding Engineer,
Colonel Walpole, estimated that they had buried themselves fully 30 ft. It
would have cost about £21 each to recover them, and there they remain, to
astonish, perhaps, geologists hereafter. The angles 6 entered in the table
were determined approximately by the apparent inclination of the passage
made by the shell.
25. I do not attempt to base any conclusion on the lateral deviations of
the shells recorded, as the mortar was imperfectly sighted, and the means of
preserving uniformity of direction were also imperfect. If we refer the
seventeen observed ranges — rejecting the first and last ( vide Plate) — to a
mean curve drawn through them on a large scale, their mean difference of
range is ± 36 yds., for a mean range of 1808 yds. This is a considerable
degree of regularity for single shells.
26. An attempt was made by Professor, now Sir Charles Wheatstone — *
at that time a member of the Ordnance Select Committee — to determine the
initial velocity of some of the shells fired on the 18th December, 1857, with
an electro-magnetic chronoscope of his own invention ; and although the
results were not entirely satisfactory, they deserve the fullest record, as the
first application of electric agency to this purpose on any practice ground
in England. The apparatus consisted of a delicate clock motion of BreguePs
carrying two hands, which were started and stopped by the breaking in suc¬
cession of two circuits produced by induction coils. The start was given by
the shell displacing an iron rod placed across the mouth of the mortar. This
was effected when the shell had travelled about 4 ft. The second was effected
by a key acted upon by the tension of a cord of 100 ft., attached to the shell.
The arrangement failed in rounds 8 to 10 (Table I.), in consequence of the
cord snapping; it succeeded in rounds 12 and 13, which gave respectively
Round. Seconds.
12 . 0-266
13 . 0-277
for the time occupied by the shell in travelling 100 ft., and gave as the
mean velocity at a point about 50 ft. from the muzzle —
Round.
12 ..
13 ..
Feet.
376
410
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
222
As the charges and weights were identical, this large difference must be
mainly attributable to the imperfection of the instrumental arrangement,
and makes a reduction to the muzzle — which at the most would amount to
an additional foot or two — of no importance. It is probable that the
longest interval, giving the slowest rate of translation, or least value of V,
is nearest the truth. There is so much that is historically interesting in
this part of the story that I shall be excused for going a little more fully
into it.
27. The subject was brought before this Institution so early as July 17,
1841, when Professor Wheatstone, on the introduction of the late Captain
Chapman, E.A., E.E.S., delivered a lecture, Lieut. -General Lord Bloomfield
being in the chair, upon the properties of his electro-magnetic chrono-
scope, “and the likelihood of its application to the practical purposes
of artillery — viz., to ascertain the time of flight at different ranges, as also
the initial velocities of shot.” There were twenty-two officers present, and
I extract an account of the instrument from the unpublished minutes of that
year, which is anterior to the first volume of published “ Proceedings.”* The
invention of the instrument only dates from the beginning of 1840, and this
was very nearly its first publication. The only earlier account will be found
in the Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences, Brussels, for October 7, 1840.f
Not long after — in April, 1843 — one of the chronoscopes was presented to
the physical cabinet of the Eoyal Military Academy. It cannot now be found.
That the enquiry made no progress at Woolwich, at that time, was no
fault of the Professor's ; the causes would not be difficult to unravel, but no
useful purpose wrould result from the attempt. The first actual application
of one of these instruments to a ballistic purpose seems to have been in
Sir James South's grounds at Camden Hill, October 6, 1842, when a number
of determinations were made of the velocity of a bullet fired with a single
and a triple charge, from a pistol furnished by Purday, of Oxford Street,
which gave respectively 630 ft. and 1177 ft. per second. Unfortunately, the
memorandum before me does not state the weight of the charges or bullet ;
the velocities deduced are, however, not far from the ratio of */3 to 1 if we
take the higher velocity as standard.
28. The instrument employed in 1857 was not identical with that of
1842, being a great improvement on it, but it resulted from the development
of the same idea. It was tested previously, by observing the time of falling
of a body in air through spaces of 1*5 ft. and 6*0 ft. respectively. These
times, by the well-known formula, are 0 ’30 5 27 second and O’ 6 1054 second.
The instrument gave on different days the following measurements
6 ft.
September, 1857, before Sir J. Burgoyne and Sir W. 7 n^~
Reid, R.E . j bU> dir‘
October 15, 1857, before the Ordnance Select Com- 7 o 1 1 a
mittee. Eardley-Wilmot observer . ) 0 "
October 24, 1857, before Mr. Mallet . 607| n
November 3, 1857, before Prof. H. Lloyd and Major- 7 an>7 '
General Cator . ’ . \ "
1-5 ft.
300| div.
SOdJ n
303f „
311* »
* See Appendix to this paper.
f See “ Handbuch der Angewandten Electricitatslelire,” by Rarl Kuhn, Lcipsig, Voss, 1866,
for a chronological abstract of the successive applications of current electricity.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
223
The means are generally of six records, and the mean error of a single
observation varies between one division and three divisions, according to the
observer. On the whole, it is about 1*66 divisions, or O' 00 15 second — a large
quantity compared with the precision since attained ; but we* are discussing
the infancy of the subject, when it was regarded as very close observation.
It would be foreign to the subject of the present paper to enter into any of
the controversies to which the invention of the chronoscope gave rise. A
single extract from a declaration of Lieut. -General Konstantinoff, dated
July 11, 1847, may be given, to show that the genius of our countryman
was not long in finding appreciation among scientific officers abroad : — -
ctEn 1842 M. Wheatstone me livra un appareil de son invention pour mesurer
le temps du mouvement d’un. projectile entre deux points de la trajectoire.
C’etait un appareil a echappement pouvant etre rendu dependant du mouvement
d’un projectile par l’effet d’un electro-aimant faisant partie de l’appareil et de
courants voltaiques. Ce fut le premier appareil base sur l’application des electro*
aimants dont je me servis dans mes recherches balistiques que d’abord n’eurent
pour but que la determination empirique de la loi de la resistance de l’air.’*
The rest of the paper — which is a vindication of the priority of Sir
C. Wheatstone against M. Breguet, of Paris, who had been subsequently
employed by Konstantinoff to make him an apparatus — is scarcely connected
with our subject, and I proceed with the experiments of the 3 6 -inch mortar.
29. The slow and majestic motion of these great globes through the air,
suggested irresistably to all who witnessed it the possibility of laying down
their trajectory in some graphical manner. Accordingly, on the 18th
December, Mr. Cooke, Secretary to the London Photographic Society,
attended with his camera, and made several attempts. The weather was
most unfavourable for the purpose — the temperature low, the light dull ;
but he succeeded partially with one shell during a momentary gleam of
bright sunlight, as it was passing across a patch of clear sky. The impres¬
sion was extremely faint, and of no practical value, but it encouraged a belief
that, under more favourable circumstances and with apparatus specially
prepared, the thing would be feasible. The same gentleman tried another
method with better success. He divided the ground-glass plate of the camera
into squares, and with the point of a fine pencil tried to follow the path of
the shelb In this manner two foreshortened curves were obtained, nowhere
(as was thought) more than two diameters of the shell in error. The camera
was considerably behind the mortar, but if its place had been exactly central
and perpendicular to the plane of the trajectory, it seems probable that real
representations of it might have been obtained, although it would have
required much greater quickness of eye and hand. These experiments were
but preliminary, and are an example of the many highly interesting enquiries
which were cut short by the decision of the Secretary of State not to repair
the mortar.*
30. On comparing the ranges in Table IV., where the charges are
expressed in terms of the weight of the shell with those of the 13 -inch land-
* A sort of open-air screen of larger squares mounted on a stand, was also prepared, on Mr.
Mallet’s suggestion, but I believe not tried.
30
224.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
service mortar, a remarkable difference will be noticed. 5 lbs. with the
latter is almost the exact equivalent to 60 lbs. with the former; but the
tabular range for a 13-inch shell of about 204 lbs. weight due to 5 lbs. is
only 1520 ydsv, whereas 60 lbs. gave a mean range of 2300 yds. to two
shells averaging in weight 2466 lbs. There is, however, no occasion to
refer to the tables. Six 13-inch shells were actually fired for comparison,
on the 18th December, 1857, with the following result : —
Table VI.
Comparative Practice with a \2>-inc7i Land Service Mortar of 36 act.
Length of bore 2 ft. 8* 5 ins. <\> = 45°.
Rounds.
Weight
of shell.
Charge.
Observed
range.
t.
Deviation.
e
lbs.
oz.
c
p
L.
R.
lbs.
yds.
secs.
yds.
yds.
degs.
1
204
5
8
•0247
1846
—
57
—
57-9
2
206
5
O
•0243
1574
18-0
70
—
47-0
3
204
5
O
•0245
1610
17-9
10
—
48-9
4
204
5
0
•0245
1609
_
—
11
59-9
5
203
5
0
•0246
1660
18-8
—
40
54-0
6
205
5
0
•0244
1537
—
2
—
50-0
31. The velocity due to a 5 lb. charge is by calculation 428 ft.-* If we
may place confidence in the mean of Professor Wheatstone's two results,
the velocity given to a 36-inch shell of 2940 lbs. by a charge of 40 lbs. was
408 ft.; and consequently the initial velocity of a mean shell of 2495 lbs.
with 60 lbs. (Table IV., rounds 6 and 17), which bears the same proportion
to it as 5 lbs. to 204 lbs., would be 547 ft. This immense excess of initial
velocity in the larger shell for the same proportionate charge, fully accounts
for its greater range. It is the velocity due to a charge of 8T81bs. in the
13-inch, for which the tabular range is 2600 yds., and may doubtless be
attributed to the following causes : —
(a) Windage of the 36-inch shell, in relation to the sectional area of
the bore, less than that of the 13-inch shell in the proportion of *01 to ’03.
(b) Partial stoppage even of this reduced windage, by the use of sawdust
in the chamber.
(c) More complete combustion of the powder.
(d) A smaller relative resistance from the air.
Comparing the observed time of flight of the 13-inch shell with the time
due to the same range in vacuo, it is greater whichever equation we employ.
tan 0
2 9
secs.
= 17-35
C cos <fr
= 16-02
a)
(2)
* Sefe W. H. Noble, 2nd Report on Ballistics, p. 18, for the data;
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
225
where V is taken as 428 ft,, and X is 1615 yds. A slight decrease of range
in (1), or of velocity in (2), would bring the two equations to agreement.
The observed time was 18*2 secs., making P (X. V) or I) 1*05 in one
case, or 1*14 in the other.
32. It is almost idle to speculate on the effects of shells weighing from
2300 lbs. to nearly 3000 lbs., and with bursting charges of 487 lbs. to
405 lbs. The experiment was not tried, and in the interests of humanity
we may hope that it never will be; but few will doubt that if the mortars
had been completed in time, and Lord Palmerston's intention to send one to
the Baltic and another to the Black Sea been carried out (and designs for
mortar rafts had been actually prepared by Mr. Mallet), it would have
been perceived that a new power had entered the European arena. Those
heroic soldiers who prolonged the defence of Sevastopol against a feu d’enfer
had no resources which could have prevented all the defences on the south
side, up to Dockyard Creek, from being devastated by a succession of such
mines sprung within them, or those on the north side, including the North
Port and Battery No. 4, from sharing the like fate, without the exposure of
the mortar vessel to any destructive fire. The casemates of Cronstadt, like
everything else of masonry, probably, which the hand of man has put
together since the Pyramids, must have crumbled under bolts as irresistible
as those which “ fulminanlis magna manus Jovis” discharges; bolts which,
according to Horace, only the soul of the upright man can defy.
My admiration for the bold policy of Lord Palmerston, ultimus Romanorum ,
and for the energy and skill of Mr. Mallet, has led me to enter more fully
into the history of this great experiment in artillery than I at first intended,
but I venture to hope that artillerymen will find it worth narrating. That
gentleman has at my request related in the subjoined note some particulars
which do not appear in the papers I have consulted, and which will complete
the narrative of an enterprise which must always be memorable in the
history of British artillery.
J, H. LEFEOY.
January, 1871.
226
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
APPENDIX.
Description of the electro-ballistic chronoscope, exhibited and explained
before the Boyal Artillery Institution by Professor Charles Wheatstone,
P.B.S., 17th July, 1841. Extracted from the unpublished Proceedings of
the Institution
“The first hand of the instrument makes 73 revolutions in a second of time;
and as the dial is divided into 100 equal parts, the °f a second (*000137 sec.)
is indicated.
“The second hand performs one revolution while the first makes ten, and in
like manner the third hand performs one revolution while the second makes ten.
Thus 10,000 units of time are registered, each unit being, as above stated, 7-jVo
of a second.
“ The expense of this instrument (the first that has been made) has been £10 ; a
more accurate one might be made for £20. The gun and butt being provided,
about £5 would defray the expense of adapting the instrument to projectile experi¬
ments.
“In an instrument so totally new as mine, many proof experiments will be
required, and probably some alterations in the construction, before its minute
indications can be relied upon ; but the principle is capable of great accuracy, and
I am confident that, when everything is properly arranged, the error in a single
observation would not attain the -jpoTr Pai't °f a second.
“ Perhaps an instrument which would record the time in tenths of seconds, and
in which the error in a single observation should not attain the tenth of a second,
would be sufficient for most practical purposes. I could construct such an instru¬
ment, which would require no proof experiments, and could be used by any person
with ordinary care.
“ The chronoscope for measuring the duration of flashes, such as those produced
by the ignition of powder, is an instrument constructed on a principle entirely
different from the preceding. By its means the TirJy-g- part of a second may be
estimated.”
Such was the description given by Sir Charles Wheatstone of his chrono¬
scope in 1841. The instrument of 1857 so far resembled it that it was
also a delicate clock movement, started and stopped by successively breaking
two currents, as already described in the text; but it differed in its details.
An account of the latter has been given by Professor Pepper, of the Poly¬
technic Institution, in one of his popular works, and a similar one was
employed by Mr. Mallet in his experiments on the rate of transmission of
earthquake waves. Sir Charles Wheatstone has not published it.
THE IlOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
227
NOTE, APPENDED BY MR. MALLET,
20th January, 1871.
I avail myself of tRe permission of the Committee of the Royal Artillery
Institution and of General Lefroy, R.A., to record a few facts less directly
within the cognizance of the distinguished author of the preceding paper,
with a view to removing obscurity and making more complete the early
history of the 36-inch mortars.
In the passage above quoted from Lord Palmerston's letter, 1st May,
1855, to the Lieut.-General of Ordnance, the words occur: “two mortars
upon the plan proposed by Messrs. Mallet and Barry." At the commence¬
ment, however, his Lordship rightly attributes the scheme to me. At about
the above period I had arranged to take as a partner Mr, Frederick Barry,
then Ass. Ins. C.E., and he accompanied me on, I think, three occasions
when I waited on Lord Palmerston ; hence his Lordship's expression.
I am alone responsible for the conception, designs, and direction of the
execution of the 36-inch mortars, to which Mr. Barry contributed nothing.
His brief connection of a few months with me terminated before the mortars
were completed.
My original design for those mortars was completed prior to October,
1854 ; and the original drawing, made and dated by my own hand (October,
1854), was laid before and scrutinised by the Royal Irish Academy in June,
1860, upon the occasion of the controversy referred to by General Lefroy.
The engraved transcript of this, produced by the Academy, is subjoined.
o.
CThe author is indebted to the kindness of the Council of the Royal Irish Academy for the useof this woodcut,]
228
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OP
It will be seen that at that period I purposed placing the mortar, without
any bed, directly against a platform formed of three layers of crossed
baulks, bedded at a slope of about 45° against a bank scarped into the
ground.
The chamber is shown small for my earliest notion was that these mortars
could be established within a few hundred yards, and that by a very small
charge these great shells could be easily “ lobbed " in over the parapets of
Sebastopol. The construction shown presents essentially, however, every
feature to be found in the design as carried out.
The cast-iron chamber and base are ringed with wrought-iron, shrunk on.
The chase, in three segments, consists of two plies of wrought-iron rings —
the outer shrunk or driven down upon the conical inner ones, and all held
together by eight longitudinal bolts, hooked over the muzzle. This design
was exhibited by me in December, 1854, to Captain Boxer, B.A., to the late
Colonel Portlock, R.E., and to several other authorities at Woolwich.
I am not aware that any design for the adoption of ringed structure with
initial tension to ordnance, with a clear conception of its value, can be
shown to have been produced earlier than this. As to the late Captain
Blakely's claims, I refer, for the complete refutation of them, both as respects
Dr. Hart's, E.T.C.D., priority in mathematical investigation of the laws,
and my own priority to the method itself of “ringed structure," to the
“Proceedings of the Boyal Irish Academy," Yol. Y1I. p. 316, et seq., May
and June, 1860.
Mr. Longridge's, C.E., wire-wrapped gun dates, I believe, from early in
1855 ; and Professor dread well's, United States, claim as a proposer of
“ ringed structure," by a letter in my possession from himself, dated
Cambridge, U.S., December 3, 1857, dates from Eebruary, 1856. The
late Mr. Brunei's communications to Sir W. Armstrong would appear, from
the biography of the former, lately published, to date from April, 1855.
(Life of I. K. Brunei, Civil Engineer. By his Son, Isambard Brunei.
London, 1870, p. 453.) Letter to James Nasymth, April 1855 : —
ec A cylinder of hardish material, wrapped round with iron wire, laid on with a
certain amount of tension proportioned to the diameter — such a barrel ought to
be strong ; whether practically successful is another thing."
Mr. Armstrong's earliest gun in ringed structure was, I believe, posterior
to the design and even to the construction of the mortars.
Captain Tierry, of the Erench artillery, in a work published as early as
1834, appears to have been the earliest to propose strengthening cast-iron
guns by wrought-iron rings shrunk upon their exterior in one ply. He
does not show himself, however, to have clearly grasped the value of the
principle of initial tension, as distinct from a mere superposition of addi¬
tional material, which alone was the notion of the ’fabricators of the ancient
ringed “ bombards," thus constructed by them as a matter of necessity.
Early in January, 1855, I had seen the importance of being able to
employ these mortars at sea, and with greater convenience and with extended
ranges on land, and therefore designed a movable bed for them, with means
for altering the angle of elevation, &c.
My first communication as to those mortars, accompanied by a rather full
memoir on the powers of 36-inch shells, was laid before the Ordnance
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
229
Select Committee at Woolwich, on the 8th February, 1855; but although
this was acknowledged, and an interview I believe took place early in
March, nothing was done; and finding no likelihood of a speedy decision, I
wrote for the first time to Lord Palmerston on the 24tli March, 1855, and
within a day or two had my first interview. On that occasion I presented
my design for the 36-inch mortar and bed, full-sized sections of the shells,
and the model to scale of the design, which is still in my possession.
Lord Palmerston, with great readiness, grasped the leading features and
the value of the proposal, realised to himself the scale of the mortar, by
causing me to measure the height against the wall of his study that its
muzzle would reach from the floor, and used a term for the shell that has
since become common. He said, “ What you propose to throw is a flying
mine, that by its fall shall bury itself and explode.” He appointed me to
wait upon him the next day but one, and he then stated that the late Prince
Consort, to whom he had mentioned my scheme, was desirous I should wait
upon him with the design, which his Lordship requested me to do without
loss of time.
Within a day or two the Prince gave me an audience at Windsor, and
devoted more than two hours to a searching and patient investigation of
almost every point bearing importantly upon the project.
It may not be impertinent that I place here on record the strong impres¬
sion left upon my mind as to the clearness of thought on mechanical
questions, and the range and extent of technical knowledge evinced on that
occasion by Prince Albert.
On my next interview with Lord Palmerston, it was evident to me that he
had decided upon having the mortars tried, and that his intention was that
their construction should be carried out through the ordinary channels of
the Board of Ordnance.
It would be useless now to trace the causes of the great and needless
delay that occurred in those channels, and which at length caused Lord
Palmerston to write the official letter with an extract from which General
Lefroy's memoir commences. But as ignorant newspaper writers and others
subsequently ventured to comment upon the alleged rashness, &c. with which
his Lordship passed over routine in favour of a project then and since sup*
posed chimerical, and maligned through ignorance or prejudice, I may also be
permitted to place upon record some proof of the genuine combination of
caution and courage with which Lord Palmerston really acted. Corroborated
in his own first conceptions by the carefully formed favourable conclusions
which he told me Prince Albert had expressed, he was yet not satisfied to
go on without better scientific advice than the very meagre Eeport at last
obtained by himself from the Ordnance Select Committee.
I had mentioned to hi in that I had laid my designs and calculations
before my venerable friend, Dr. Thomas ft. ftobinson, E.R.S., Astronomer
Royal, Armagh, who had carefully considered the subject with me. Lord
Palmerston requested that I should produce to him Dr. Robinson's written
opinion upon certain points, as well as generally upon the design, and his
judgment as to the correctness of my views relative to the extent of range
that might be obtained with these great shells ; and it was not until I was
enabled to present him with that formal document that, under the peculiar
and urgent circumstances which precluded any other course for rapid action,
230
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OE
lie took the bull by the horns, and commanded the mortars to be instantly
proceeded with, and under my entire control. All honor be to his memory.
The original design for these mortars, as above described, was that laid
before Mr. C. Mare, then of the Thames Iron Works, Blackwall. Those
works at that date (1855), with the exception of the Mersey Steel and
Iron Company (now Messrs. Horsfall), at Liverpool, possessed the largest
and best forging appliances in England. It was for other reasons desirable,
if possible, to execute the work in the Port of London.
The work being explained to Mr. Mare and to his forge manager, Mr.
Hardy, and rapid execution urged as essential, it was represented by them
that the making, bending, and welding of these broad and heavy rings must
prove a work of difficulty and delay. They proposed to forge great square
slabs, and to cut the rings out from these in one piece, and avoid bending
and welding ; and intimated that they would only undertake the work in
that way.
With reluctance I consented to this being tried ; and upon this basis the
contract for execution was made, 11th June, 1855, and the work at once
commenced.
After two or three weeks had been spent in attempts to forge the huge
slabs out of which the rings were proposed being cut, and to forge one
of the chamber pieces, during which I was frequently present, it was obvious
to me that the contractors were quite in error as to their notions of pro¬
ducing these large pieces of wrought-iron, and that their method must be
abandoned.
Hot long after, the contractors bankruptcy occurred, and it became neces¬
sary to arrange with his assignees for the completion of the Contract. The
beds, &c. were in progress, the cast-iron base pieces cast, other work done,
and instalments paid on account prior to the above event. I now there¬
fore reverted, as regarded the construction of the chases of the mortars, to
my original design, with this modification — that to obviate any difficulty as
to bending and welding the rings of heavy scantlings, and to hasten the pro¬
duction of the rings themselves by rolling the iron for them in place of
forging it, and so at the same time to improve its quality and fibre, I reduced
the thickness and width of the rings, and built up the entire thickness of
the lowest segment of the chase in seven plies in place of only in two, there
being four plies at the muzzle. The rings, from their now manageable
scantlings, all admitted of “scarph and lap” welding under the steam
hammer, thus embracing the best conditions for sound welding.
The execution of all parts of the mortars in this way was then entrusted
to Mr. C. Mare's assignees under a new contract, which included the fitting
into place of the chamber pieces — a contract for the production of which
was made, as stated in General Lefroy's memoir, at Liverpool, and was
efficiently carried out there.
In reviewing after this lapse of time these changes, and this mode in which
these mortars have been built up in so many thin plies, it must be borne in
mind that we were then in pre-armour-plating and Eraser gun days ; that
forge work upon the scale now familiar, was but just coming above the
horizon ; and that, besides the limited forging appliances then to be had,
there were none of those Herculean tools for bending and shaping, as well
as for rolling enormous masses of wrought-iron, now become common.
THE ItOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
23l
Hence I was compelled to adapt my designs, not as the best conceivable
for their final object, but having regard to how they should be executed with
rapidity, or at all.
Were I now called upon to design a 36-inch mortar, I should not only
modify its proportions, but greatly simplify its details, and construct its
chase, as I first designed it, in not more than two or three thicknesses.
And here is the place where I ought to mention how it came to pass that
the chases of these mortars were designed in three separable segments, and
separate from the base, and the whole of these held together by bolts.
Before I ever put pencil to paper 1 had conversed with several friends,
military and otherwise, as to the effect of shells of a yard in diameter on the
forts of Sebastopol, and said I thought I could make a mortar to throw
them that need not exceed some 30 or 40 tons weight, which I also thought
might, without insuperable difficulties, be got to the front from Balaclava.
All my military Engineer and Artillery friends, however, seemed to concur in
the view that to move such a mass was out of their way at any rate, and
that nothing heavier than say two 8-inch (smooth-bore) guns together, need
be thought of as of any practical utility.
Upon this I proposed to dissect the mortar— make it in pieces, none
exceeding 10 or 11 tons — and so carry it to the front piecemeal. At every
stage I found amongst military authorities this same view as to transport
maintained. The result, however, was greatly, and as I am now satisfied
most needlessly, to complicate the construction of the mortars and weaken
their endurance.
Now-a-days, probably, even military men would not attach so much
importance to the difficulty of transport of heavy masses ; and for myself, I
should, if called upon now, construct a 36-inch mortar in one permanently
united whole, and find no difficulty in providing the means for transporting
it over any country over which heavy siege artillery can be passed. As to
transport by sea, of course there is no difficulty.
There are great advantages in the form of base plate adopted, in relation
to the mortar bed. The forward trunnion running right across the bed in
advance of the axis, and the coin wedges right across in rear of it, well
diffuse the powerful shock of recoil upon the material of the bed itself, and
greatly simplify the construction of the latter. The bed, as shown in Eig. I
of General Lefroy’s memoir, and as actually constructed, is only the top
portion of the complete bed as designed by me ; the lower portion was a sort
of inclined slide or racer, upon which the top portion was to run between
guides in recoil, the lower portion resting upon a level platform. Eor the
trials at Plumstead the top portion was deemed sufficient, resting upon an
inclined platform. This platform, as described in General Lefroy's memoir,
proved very insufficient to withstand the component of the recoil perpendicular
to it. The gravel became compressed and the baulks sprung into the hollow
beneath, after the first three or four rounds. This placed the mortar at a
great disadvantage, and unquestionably was a potential element tending to the
fracture of the longitudinal tyebolts and cotters.
The stress upon these bolts is not that due to the projectile force of the
charge, but is simply that due to the mass of all parts of the mortar above
the cup in which the shell rests. The inertia of this mass, bolts included,
has to be overcome and motion suddenly given to it, at the velocity with
31
23:2
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
which all parts of the mortar below the cup with the bed are driven backward
and downward on discharge. If the material below the cup, the bed
included and the platform, were perfectly rigid and unyielding, then the
stress upon the longitudinal bolts would be a minimum ; but with a
springing and yielding platform, the mortar approximates to the same state
of things as if it were fired suspended in mid air, when the stress on these
bolts -would be a maximum. Platforms on land for such mortars, should
consist of at least three layers of well fitted and united whole baulk timber,
very solidly laid upon uniformly dense material well compacted beneath them.
In another point, also, those mortars were placed at a great disadvantage.
In 1855-6 the coarsest grained powder known in our service — I believe
also then in any other — was the L.G., or large grain cannon powder. Its
rapid combustion and brisante qualities I was not ignorant of, and saw how
much these must be exaggerated when such then unexampled charges as
from 40 to 80 lbs. were fired. I accordingly made application through
Colonel Pickering, B.A., Secretary of the Ordnance Select Committee, to have
some of what is now known as “pebble powrder” made specially for the trial
of these mortars ; but I found that if the tedious routine of application were
formally gone through, that then probably this coarse powder might after
much delay be directed to be made at Waltham Abbey works; but that in
the end, unless the mortars could be served with the ordinary cannon powder
of the service, they probably would not be deemed satisfactory. I was there¬
fore reluctantly obliged to use a powder far too fast burning either to give
fair play to the mortars or the best ranges to the shells.
As a palliative, I proposed and was permitted, to divide the charges into
5 or 10 lbs. flannel close bags, as stated in the memoir; but at the intensely
high temperature of flame produced by such heavy charges, the rate of
burning did not appear to be sensibly diminished by this mode of sub¬
division.
At the present day, no artillery officer would propose to fire charges such
as those of these mortars, unless composed of pebble or of prismatic powder.
It is necessary I should also offer a few words of explanation as to how
and upon what principles the superimposed integrant rings of these mortars
were shrunk upon each other, so as to give the required initial tension.
This was called into doubt, for his own objects, by the late Captain Blakety,
who unauthorisedly published, in appendix E to his pamphlet “On con¬
structing Cannon, Ridgeway, London, 1858 (see also “Proceedings
Boyal Irish Academy,” Yol. VII. p. 338), a private note in reply by
Dr. Hart to a letter from Capt. R, in which Dr. Hart rather incautiously
and quite incorrectly states that he believed I had “ utterly neglected to
apportion the tensions of the successive rings to calculation.”
The circumstances will be best explained by subjoining a copy of a letter
addressed by me to Dr. Hart himself
{Copy).
Delyille, Co. Dublin,
September 9, 1858.
My dear Sir,
I have sent you by this post (open ended) a copy of a pamphlet by Captain
Blakely, K.A., which I recently chanced upon in London. I know not whether
you have before seen it.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
233
In a letter bearing your name (Appendix E, p. 50), some injustice is done me.
If the letter be yours, unintentionally I am quite sure.
The statements therein which I have marked are to the effect that my 3 6 -inch
mortars are not constructed at all upon the principle of graduated compression of
the inner and tension of the outer rings, the theory of which you investigated for
me, but the general principles of which had been known to me a long time — before
even the first day that Professor Downing, C.E., and I called upon you on the
subject. Let me assure you that you are quite mistaken in supposing that I have
utterly neglected the principle of graduated strain, &c. in those mortars. The
graduation, however, was not effected by difference of temperature in the successive
rings, as you proposed, and which I soon saw would be quite impracticable to
carry out, but by the requisite nice adjustment of the diameters, when cold, of the
successive rings, so that when all heated to about the same temperature they
should grip differently, as required.
That the effect has been practically pretty much what was intended, the last
day’s practice showed, when a charge of 80 lbs. of powder, which threw a shell
about a mile and three quarters, produced no effect upon chase or chamber.
I may have myself led you into this error (which, however, I am sorry to find
published), for I recollect telling you that I had shrunk on all the rings at one
temperature. May I ask if you gave Captain Blakely permission to publish your
letter? He don’t say so.
Believe me, dear Sir,
Very truly yours,
Dr. H. S. Hart, F.T.C.D., EGBERT MALLET.
Trinity College, Dublin.
It is impossible within the limits of a note already too long, to enter
fully upon the complicated question of the relations that take place between
all the parts in a system of rings superimposed with initial tension, keeping
in view all the conditions which in nature are operative.
The mathematical investigations which have been made all neglect some
of the most important of these conditions, and the laws of successive tensions
and compressions as thus fixed are, in fact, impossible to be realised rigidly
in practice.
For a statement of some of the reasons of this, I may refer to my work
“ On the Physical Conditions, &c., of Artillery,” p. 152-156, and to note W,
p. 266 ; but there are many other circumstances besides those there referred
to, which render uncertain the mutual strains brought into play between
such superimposed rings, some of which Mr. Longridge (“ Const. Artill.”
Proc. Ins. C.E,, Yol. XIX., p. 301), has well pointed out.
If two equal rings only, each of some considerable thickness, have the
internal diameter of the outer so adjusted to the exterior of the inner — both
being cold — that after heating and superposition of the external one a very
moderate tension, say not exceeding one ton per square inch, shall result, it
will be found that not only is the actual compression of the interior ring
less than corresponds to the assigned tension of the outer, but the circum¬
ferential tension of the latter is less than would be assigned by the differences
of diameters of the gripping surfaces. The rings, in fact, cling together
at their opposed surfaces. As the absolute strain is augmented, the trails-
234
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
mitted compression seems to approximate much, more nearly to that due to
the tension.
Every ring, after it has been shrunk on, has its thickness altered (like a
stretched piece of india-rubber), and the amount of alteration is not always
uniform or certainly predictable. As is the case in all extended prisms of
a metal, its density is diminished, and with that its compressibility orthogonal
to the line of tension is increased. Hence the next outer ring, if previously
bored to a size to give an assigned tension (on the supposition of unaltered
thickness and physical condition), gives less than required.
In large rings, errors in dimensions below those capable of being always
avoided in the best and most careful practice, materially affect the result.
In very large rings, differences in atmospheric temperature, in the workshop
or outside it, may have sensible effects. Erom these and other such con¬
siderations, Sir William Armstrong, with his habitual acumen, soon saw
that any attempt at great precision in apportioning the strains upon the
successive rings was practically impossible, and publicly stated in 1860
(Proc. Ins. C.E., Yol. XIX. p. 419) that in his guns “ the outer layers
and rings were not put on with any calculated degree of tension; they were
simply applied with a sufficient difference of diameter to secure effective
shrinkage.”
As respects the 36-inch mortars, I did not so completely cast aside theory.
What I actually did do was as follows: — Having fixed, partly by theory
partly by judgment, the assumed maximum strain of discharge and the
possible maximum excess of temperature that might arise between the
interior and the exterior of the mortar; and ascertained, by a few
tolerably accurate experiments made at the works, Blackwall, most of the
disturbing elements that hinder intended tensions and compressions in a
number of superposed rings from being precisely attainable in practice; I
then, starting from the middle point in the thickness of the chase, deter¬
mined the theoretic compressions within and tensions without that, for each
of the plies of rings, and the successive differences of dimensions which, if
given the rings, should upon that theoretic view produce these respectively ;
I then modified the results empirically, or by a mere exercise of judgment,
in every case, so as to eliminate at .least some of the dirturbances, and
more or less considerably to increase the tensions and compressions.
In this I chiefly had regard to — 1st, presumable errors in workmanship ;
2nd, stretching of the substance of the ring reducing its assumed grip ;
3rd, alterations in the cross sections of the rings after shrinking on.
The dimensions when cold — i.e., at the atmospheric temperature of the
time — inside and outside for every ply, were then tabulated, and steel
gauges made by this, to which the rings were bored or turned. The whole
of the rings were heated to a low red heat, visible in daylight, and were
permitted to adjust themselves, being cooled rapidly by a stream of cold
water, to prevent another source of disturbance — viz., the heating of the
ply in the act of being hooped, by heat radiated first and then conducted
to it from the red hot ply in the act of being superposed.
With every precaution taken, some three or four of the rings, when struck
by a light hammer, were found to be too loose, and had to be cut off and
readjusted ; and in one or two others it turned out that the want of grip
was due to defective welds. The result of the operation has been that.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
235
although with most probably some inequalities, the tensions and compres¬
sions have so adjusted themselves that the whole thickness of the chase is
more or less effective, and that perhaps a somewhat undue strain of the
explosion is transmitted to the exterior plies ; a far better fault than that it
should be concentrated towards the interior.
In April, 1855, whilst those mortars were in progress, Lord Palmerston
sent for me and asked what was doing as to mortar vessels to carry them.
No orders for anything of the sort had been given. His Lordship directed
me to consider the design of mortar vessel I should propose, and to place
myself in communication with Sir Charles Wood, Bart., then First Lord of
the Admiralty, which I did on the 20th April, 1855, having a good while
previously worked out the scheme of mortar float which I then designed and
submitted, and as to which I had several interviews with Admiral. Sir
Baldwin Walker, B.N., and Mr. Watts, Constructor to the Admiralty,
resulting from which I was requested to obtain tenders for the construction
of two of these floats.
Obstacles of official routine prevented anything further being done until
so late as nearly the end of July, 1855, when I deemed it right to inform
Lord Palmerston of the fact. Peace soon after put an end to the matter.
No account of these large mortar floats has before been published. A
model of one of them, as well as an accurate model of the 3 6 -inch mortars
themselves, as finally constructed, have been placed by me, on loan, in the
museum of the United Service Institution, Scotland Yard, London.
The general idea of one of these floats may be conceived as a hollow, flat¬
decked, square slab, built of iron, made up chiefly of horizontally aggregated
hollow cubes, each of 8 ft. on the side, the outer ranges all round these being
of half cubes, with prismoidal spaces outside these again to be filled with
sand and sawdust mixed. The mortar in the centre of the deck, ranging
diagonally, and its bed, with elastic material beneath it, bearing not upon
the deck but upon the keelsons at the bottom. In rear of the mortar and
below deck a pair of high-pressure engines, with independent twin screws,
their shafts set at angles of about 35° to each other, so as either to propel,
steer, or shift in azimuth only.
The following is the general description of those designs submitted by
me
{Copy).
General description of Floating Mortar Batteries, upon a new construction, proposed
to carry the 3 Q-ineh Mortars now preparing. Submitted to the Admiralty by
Robert Mallet, C.F., 1855.
Each mortar battery may be viewed as a square redoubt afloat, 7 5 ft. square
over all; armed with one very powerful mortar, and with five 32-pr. long guns ;
having a draught of water, in fighting trim — with engines at work, fuel, stores,
ammunition, armament, and crew on board — of only 7 ft.
The principal objects held in view in designing this form of floating battery
have been : —
1. The greatest obtainable steadiness upon the water, so as to admit the best
practice at long ranges with the 36-inch mortar.
236
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
2. The lightest possible draught of water, to enable this powerful weapon to be
brought into very shoal water in shore or in shallow seas.
3. Perfect impossibility of foundering at sea through any combination of causes.
4. Being so. constructed as to be shell-proof from any but the largest shells ; and
so that if pierced right through from top to bottom in several places, the vessel
shall still float safely, and be capable of continuing in action.
5. A construction such that, at the distant range intended for the use of the
3fi-inch mortar, the sides and bulwarks of the vessel will be practically shot-proof;
that below water, where capable of being reached by shot, the sides will be
perfectly shot-proof;* and that even if pierced with shot, no serious damage will be
sustained.
6. That while her bulwarks rise a sufficient height efficiently to protect the men
on deck, the whole mass lies so low in the water as, at the distance required for
mortar practice, to present a very thin line to the enemy; and the hull being
painted of a greyish sea-green colour, will be scarce discernible as .a mark ; and as
respects the liability of the deck to receive shells, as compared with the floating
batteries (“ Meteor,” &c.), the actual surface exposed to such vertical fire is less
than that of the “ Meteor” in the ratio 5560 to 6678, or presents about one-
sixth less area.
7. The battery is so arranged as to present two of her sides and one angle
always to the enemy, so that all shot reaching her from thence will strike her sides
at an angle of 45° to the surface of the hull, and hence have small penetrative
power.
8. As the long range of the 3 6 -inch mortar precludes the necessity of ever
bringing the battery within suitable range for effective horizontal fire, so it is not
proposed to arm her with any very heavy guns.
Bive long 32-prs., however, form part of her armament, for the purpose of
giving an efficient defence to attempts at boarding or capture by gunboats. These
guns, however, might occasionally also be serviceably employed in battering, or
might be exchanged for an equal or smaller number of heavier guns.
9. It is proposed that the battery be always attended by one or more tug-boats,
to tow her into and out of action, or rapidly change position, &c. ; and hence the
engine-power put on board is very moderate — its action upon the two screws with
which she is provided being chiefly intended to be used in shifting the mortar
battery (when at anchor) in azimuth, so as to avoid the labour and loss of time in
changing the direction of the heavy mortar itself. The engine-power and screws,
however, will probably ensure a speed of from three to four knots an hour unaided.
10. The surrounding bulwarksf being higher than the men’s heads above the
deck, and standing rather more than 7 ft. above the deep water-line, free from all
standing rigging or any other thing upon which a grasp may be maintained, render
the battery extremely difficult to board, more especially from light vessels which
are low in ilie water; and the bulwarks may be most efficiently defended by
musketry from loop-holes, or from the top, by a wooden ‘'banquette” running
round. Such of the ports as may not be in use are provided with stoppers of a
peculiar construction, which will be equally shot-proof with the rest of the
bulwarks.
* Against 68 lb. round sliot, the most powerful projectile then in use.
f The bulwarks were of heavy scantlings of teak, iron-plated,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
£37
11. There is no top gear or standing rigging of any description to be cut by the
enemy’s shot. Nothing stands above the level of the bulwarks, except a small
part of the muzzle of the great mortar, and the upper part of the crane for loading
it. The latter (provided in duplicate) is so secured by secondary guy ropes, that
in the event of being cut down by a chance shot, the parts would not fall upon the
men around it.
12. Although the great strength and stability on the water, and incapability of
foundering, by division into Water-tight compartments, together with the extremely
light draught of water, amounting (when light, or with only the large mortar, crew,
and stores on board) to no more than 5 ft. 6 ins., are obtained by the use of a
wrought-iron hull, yet the disadvantages incident to iron vessels when exposed to
shot are in this instance fully met and provided against. The whole of the iron¬
work is below the heavy timbered deck, and within the timber sides and bulwarks ;
so that torn or splintered iron can never injure or touch those on board.
13. The vessel is so constructed that it is scarcely possible to burn her, while in
possession of her crew; and even if all her woodwork were burnt off, the hull
would float and carry her mortar safely, and be capable of perfect restoration — and
of a temporary restoration, with means at hand, in a very short time.
14. As the bulwarks stand so high above the deck that a man standing thereon
cannot see the horizon, a special instrument has been devised for the purpose of
directing the 36-inch mortar, consisting of a telescopic sight, so combined with an
azimuth compass of power and accuracy that shelling can be carried on at night
as well as by day, when the distance and azimuth of the object have been once got
by daylight. The telescopic sight is such that the directing officer sees his mark
without being exposed to fire.
15. The extreme outside range of water-tight compartments, all round and
immediately inside the timbering of the sides, is filled for the upper half of its
depth, or to 3-| ft. below the load water plane, with three-fourths sawdust mixed
with one-fourth of sharp sand by bulk, which, while much lighter than sand alone,
being only 45 lbs. to the cubic foot, appears to resist shot nearly as well as sand
alone.
Within this, the next range of water-tight compartments form a continuous
wing or passage all round the vessel, of 4 ft. wide and 6 ft. high, divided by a
bulk-head at every 8 ft., provided with a water-tight door, and forming a ready
means of access to any perforation, if made by shot, and to all the separate com¬
partments in the inboard side forming the
Two magazines,
Shell rooms,
Bread rooms.
Store rooms,
Armouries,
Cordage and cables, &c. &c.
The spaces between the iron beams beneath the great mortar form the water tanks,
and give storage for above 11,000 gallons of fresh water.
16. Any of the compartments below deck may be used as sleeping places, each
being 8 ft. square by ft. in clear height ; but it is proposed that these mortar
batteries be considered as fighting platforms rather than as vessels intended for
large crews to live on board for lengthened periods ; and hence shelter under
canvas for sleeping on deck at night might perhaps be found the best and
healthiest mode in which the complement of men could live while on board.
17- The following are the calculations of weight and displacement
238
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OE
Weights toe Displacement.
Hull {including beams under mortar bed).
Tons.
Bottom, thick, 69' square, 4761 x 20 lbs . = 43
Top, f" thick, 71' square, 5041 x 15 lbs . = 34
4 sides, f" thick, 71' x 7' 6" deep . = 14
12 vertical divisions, thick, 71' x 6' 3" deep . = 24
8 „ /, i" /, 23' x 6' 3" // . = 5
10 a n n 24' x 4' 0" n . = 9
32 deck-connecting pieces, 3 x 1 x f thick . = 1
Engine floor fastenings . = 2
Doors . = 2
9600 lin. ft. 3 " L iron, ■§" thick, at 12 lbs . = 52
528 „ „ at 10 lbs . = 2
Add for rivets jL whole . == 19
207
'Recapitulation of Timber.
844 cubic feet teak, at 35 cubic feet = 1 ton . = 24
11125 n oak n 37 n n . = 301
7221 n fir „ 64 „ „ . = 113
Add for fitments . = 20
458
Armament »
36-inch mortar, with buffing . 45
5 guns, 32-prs . 25
Arm for mortar . 3
Anchors, chains . 60
3 windlasses or capstans . 6
2 boats and davits . 5
2 cylindrical tubular boilers, 2-pr. engines, and 2 screws . 75
Ammunition and Fuel.
50 shells for 36-in. mortar (filled) . 85
Shot and powder for 32-prs . 5
Coke, &c . 25
Crew . 8
Sand and sawdust . 27
369
Calculated Displacements.
Depth.
Superficial.
Cubic contents.
Weight.
Total tonSi
feet.
feet.
cubic feet.
tons.
tons.
1
4900
136
. 136
tl
5041
140
276
3
72
5184
144
. 420
4
73
5329
148
568
5
74
5476
152
720
6
75
5625
156
876
t « . .
5700
158
1034
8
75| .
5700
158
1192
Iron in hull .
... 2071
Timber in decks, &c .
... 458 > In fighting trim.
Armament, power, stores,
&c .
... 369 )
Total tons .
... 1034
The battery will consequently draw 7 ft. water.
Iron in hull .
... 2071
Timber in decks, &c .
... 458 >■ In light trim.
Armament, power, stores,
&c .
... 131 J
Total tons,
796
The battery will therefore draw 5£ ft. water.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
£39
■ The naval Constructors of the Admiralty fully admitted the important
advantages presented in several points of these designs.
It was objected^ however; by one of the Naval Lords, that such large,
square, flat floats would prove unmanageable in being towed out to the Black
Sea and the Baltic. I could not myself coincide.au this view, the futility of
which, the experience since had in towing out to Bermuda and elsewhere
far larger and heavier iron floating docks, has amply proved. With a
view to meet the objection, however, I pointed out the readiness wTith which
each float could be divided into three pieces, each of only 75 ft. by 25 ft.
beam, which, with or without temporary bows and rudders, could be towed
anywhere and united at the destination of the battery. This was admitted
to have met the supposed difficulty.
This design for placing these mortars and guns upon low floating iron
unsink able rafts, was thus anterior in date by several months to that con*
structed at Woolwich Dockyard, from a design it was understood, of the
late Captain Coles, R.N., which was not completed before nearly the end of
1855 (see the “ Times/' 14th Nov. 1855); and was long anterior to the
proposal of rafts, in several respects the same, by Mr. H. Conybeare, C.E.,
which first appeared in the “ Times of the 10th October, 1855.
ROBERT MALLET,
January, 1871,
240
minutes of Proceedings oE
THE
REFORM OF PRUSSIAN TACTICS.
A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, DEC. 13, 1870.
BY
LT.-COL. C. C. CTIESNEY, K.E.
Major-General E. M. Eardley-Wilmot presided, and expressed Lis
regret at Laving to do so wlien there were present so many well known
officers distinguished in active service. He was glad, Lowever, to see so
large a meeting to do lionour to Colonel Chesney, who was personally
known to many present, and wlio Lad been long and Lonourably esteemed
through Lis writings and lectures. He was at present in tlie garrison, filling
the post of an officer of artillery who was charged with an important duty
among the sick and wounded abroad, and Lad consented to favour tliem
with a lecture on a subject which would at any time be valuable and
interesting, but was under present circumstances peculiarly so. Tlie lecturer
was most anxious that tliere should be some discussion on this paper, and
that those who took an interest in the subject should make such remarks
and enquiries as the occasion prompted, and thereby assist in the examination
of the principles enunciated. One other observation lie wished to make,
and that was to remind the audiencn that, in speaking of the Erencli and
the Prussians in connection with this subject, they must be understood to
refer to them simply as pawns upon the chess-board to illustrate the moving
incidents in the great drama of war, without being supposed to entertain
prejudice or predilection towards one side or the other. With this under*
standing to prepare the ground, he would introduce the lecturer, Colonel
Chesney. (Applause) .
Colonel Chesney commenced his lecture by saying that the Prussian
nation had acquired a reputation in military matters before all others, chiefly
because of the attention which its people had devoted to military science in
preference to any other study. Nearly a hundred years ago (in 1772),
Harris, first Lord Malmesbury, was impressed with the great devotion of
Prussian officers of the day to their profession, using words which, though
not accurately representing the circumstances of the present time, were still
essentially true, in that the Prussians did now, as even then, keep up a closer
acquaintance than others with all the higher details, and among the rest, with
military tactics, the immediate subject of this evening. He would first say,
speaking of tactics as a special subject divided from that of strategy, that
the Prussians were fully aware of the impossibility of teaching tactics by rule.
The well known Prussian writer. Yon Verdy, had declared that tactics could
not be reduced to any absolute and definite rule, but must vary in a great
measure, according to the circumstances of the moment, the object sought
to be attained, and the means at hand for the purpose. To demonstrate
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
24]
this, they had to take only the first case which suggested itself — the position
of an officer in command of troops about to engage the enemy. It was a
most difficult matter, without information, for an officer so placed to ascer¬
tain the strength of the force opposed to him, and upon the extent of his
knowledge in that respect it was clear that his tactics must depend. It
would be easy to quote more than one incident from the war of 1866 in
which an Austrian officer in command had been led into the use of improper
tactics by inferring that the number of the enemy was larger than it really
was, because he was opposed to a better weapon, and possibly to better troops.
If, however, they could not teach tactics by rule, Yon Yerdy had added,
they could lay down certain leading principles which the military mind could
acquire and apply in practice, according to circumstances. As, for instance,
iri that same war of 1866, at Sadowa, a General of Division (Fransecky) in
the Prussian First Army, seeing the exact position of affairs, felt bound to
occupy the enemy at whatever loss to his own division ; and, on the other
hand, another General of Division in the same service had not long before
to do just the contrary — namely, to spread out his men as much as possible,
and show a large front, so as to draw upon him the attention of the enemy,
while, at the same time, he suffered no more loss than he could not possibly
avoid. So, whatever principles were laid down for their instruction in this
part of the Art of War, they must vary in application according to different
circumstances.
Passing now directly to the subject of his lecture, Colonel Chesney said
he had been long in the habit of treating such subjects not theoretically,
but historically ; or rather, instead of following the whole course of history,
he preferred to take one or two cases and discuss them minutely in all
their details as affecting the question in hand, and that was the course
he proposed to pursue in illustrating the Reform of Prussian Tactics.”
He thought that any sound writer would lay down what Yon Yerdy
has, as the chief great principles in moving great bodies of men, the
two following : — first, clearness in what one sees ; and secondly, energy
in the conduct of the business. Neither of these could certainly be
taught by rule, but the example of what others had done, and the
experience of other men in certain circumstances must, if carefully studied,
be of advantage to the soldier. In practice, one special condition must
always be considered. If an officer commanding a division was acting as
part of a corps, and receiving his orders from the General in command,
he would have little independence or discretion ; but if, on the other hand,
he were acting independently with his division, the whole course of his
tactics, under apparently precisely similar circumstances, might be very
different.
They would now go back to the early history of their subject — the reform
of Prussian tactics. The later school of Frederic had often been com¬
mented on rather harshly ; but it was not so contemptible as was generally
supposed. The extremes to which drilling and dressing were carried were a
necessary consequence of the exercises then in vogue, and especially of the
system of marching in what is now termed “ open column of companies,”
absolute precision in distance being essential to bring the troops into line
immediately at the word, and so find them ready for action. It was true
that in Prussia, as well as in other countries which followed her, the system
was carried to an absurd extent, even to the distance between a man’s
242
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
buttons and the length of his pig-tail; and so precise did we become in
England, that it had been usual to rouse out the troops two, or even three
hours before the time fixed for parade, because it was supposed to take that
time to get the parade properly ready. However, the Prussian system, with
all its defects, was the model adopted generally on the continent until the revo¬
lutionary wars, both in America and Europe, brought its well known collapse.
The Prussians drew out of the war with the Republic before they had time
to test their system of line and open companies against the Prench system
of column; but after remaining at peace for ten years, there came the war of
1806 and the meeting of the two schools. One's mind naturally recurs to
the battle of Jena; but the lecturer prefers selecting for illustration a
skirmish which took place four days previous to that engagement at Saalfeld.
The advance guards met in a small plain, and what happened showed how
ineffectual were the tactics of the Prussians. The Prussian force was com¬
manded by Prince Louis, a relation of the King of Prussia, who posted his
main force in a line, with detachments to the right and left, sending a
battalion and a half to occupy an eligible position on a hill to the right,
and skirmishers to a small muddy stream which offered a kind of boundary
on the left. Whilst he was so employed. Marshal Lannes, the officer in
command of the Prench, saw his advantage, and prepared to overthrow the
Prussians by a simple process. Deploying from a mountain pass to the
right and left, he sent out skirmishers, who, having plenty of cover, kept up
a good fire on the line until it was thoroughly shaken. In a short time the
line was almost broken by their sharp fire, when the skirmishers ceased firing,
and columns came suddenly up through them, captured the guns, and broke
through the line. Louis being killed, his small army retreated with great
loss. Prom that hour the Prussians adopted the Prench model, resorting to
the use of skirmishers in every advance; and if the details of any battle
(Ligny, for instance) were analysed, it would be found that, from May
1818 to the close of the war, there was practically no difference between
the mode of warfare on the one side or the other. Taking another stride
in history, the lecturer said that after the battle of Waterloo there was
no further change, until the introduction of rifled artillery and the needle
gun rendered certain alterations unavoidable. It was a singular fact that
Dreyse discovered the needle gun, and presented it to the King of Prussia
as early as 1830, as perfect as it now was; but he could not make way
against the conservatism which is generally found to exist in military
matters, and it was not until 1849 that his invention was practically
adopted, and used with considerable execution against the Baden insur¬
gents. That, however, was a small affair, and no great change followed
in Prussian tactics, which remained much as they were left at Waterloo,
until the Prench fought and won the battle of Solferino in 1859. That
event, as far as he (Colonel Chesney) could judge from being amongst
them as a traveller, made the Prussians feel anxious and uncomfortable —
a feeling intensified by the fact that Prussia had just found considerable
difficulty in mobilising her army. Then came the well known lecture
of Prince Precleric Charles, who showed the principles upon which the
Prench had acted, and how they might be adapted with advantage by
the Prussians. The lecture filled a great want, and the suggestions were
well received, not because they were the suggestions of a prince, but because
they met the demand of the age. The Prince pointed out that the Prench
PROPOSED FORMATION for a BRIGADE
of SIX BATTALIONS.
Baoeo_ SEnenyfs I/zne. ^
350
<
4-00J?asC&s X
4- 00 Bouse# y
X--
1st Ccrmpajvf
100
30
X
27
X
IstBoott:
3rd C ? 2nd Cl
cut open* orcter
4-th C?
WO
2 nd Boott-
X -
27 — .
X -
30
X -
27 ~
x -
1st Corrupctfv^
4- dvB oott '
3rd Cl 2ndC<?
out open? order
4th C?
5 thBcott:
zoo
T>ruyaxloer.
3 rd Boott: 6 thBaBt:
X - — - - - - - -
27— nmm 1 . • • — 1 -
x - — - — - — - - - -
COUNTER-PROPOSAL for FORMATION of
the BRIGADE.
Tcoces J37iem/fs Frord/.
A
4-00J?ou>es x 4-OOlPooeee
STdrvuehiny
Itemodnder of 'X
STcirmisTmvg Ccrmf? codes
150
Centre Cornpotntes
Tiuree IBcoCCaiUarLS in/ seoond Zone,
( Shewn/ deployed/ , buf may be formed in/ ooUcmro.)
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
243
fought on apparently loose principles,, but yet with a degree of design which
was not at first apparent ; and his argument was, “ If we take the best of
the Erench system and apply it to the best of our own, we shall infallibly
beat the Erench whenever we meet them.” That advice, “How to beat
the Erench,” as it was popularly called (though that was not the real title
of the lecture), was put into practice for the instruction of the Prussian
ofiicers in tactics in 1861. In principle, the “Tactical Instructions” was
essentially different from any drill-book hitherto published. The Erench, as
late as four years ago, hacl a secret guide book in use among their staff,
something similar in intention, but in execution totally different, and of an
effete, antiquated type, as Colonel Chesney could assert from personal know¬
ledge of it. Putting aside the minute details of drill in the field, instead
of attempting to tell a man exactly what he was to do under all conceivable
circumstances, the new Prussian tactics assumed that an officer in command
of any force was possessed of certain intelligence, and gave him considerable
latitude. He was taught to study and to reason, and to work out the result
of his knowledge and his theories in practice. At the same time the drills,
especially of the infantry, were modified, and made more elastic by breaking
up the large and unwieldly battalions into four companies each, allowing the
troops to work more independently, to manoeuvre at times out of step, and
the like. The increased elasticity was great, and the Prussians had made an
improvement from which they saw no necessity to go back.
The new tactics were brought into practice with vast success in the
Austrian campaign, but that was too short and too one-sided to afford a test
of their efficiency. However, the Prussians made two remarkable failures,
both on one day, the 27th of June, and in one case were fairly beaten by
equal numbers of the Austrians. The other case was that of Langensalza ;
and in enquiring the cause of that failure they would find that the Hano¬
verians occupied three villages with three of their four brigades, having one
in reserve behind a river running below a steep hill. * In front, the Prussians
approached to fight in their favourite company columns, and it was found
that each officer naturally tried to get a good ground for himself. Thus, though
they approached in regular order of battle, the main body and the reserve
advancing together at the usual interval, it happened that when they came in
contact with the enemy, and were in that fidgety state which men always
were in under fire, the companies took up ground to right and left as they
could, the reserve had dissipated itself, and the whole at last formed a
complete line of single companies. The Hanoverians thereupon massed
their troops, made a direct charge upon the centre, and in a few minutes
the line was cut in two and the Prussians in full retreat. It was more
difficult to understand how they lost the second battle of that day — the
battle of Trautenau. The Prussian General, Bonin, was approaching Trau-
tenau in two columns, with 30,000 men, expecting to meet the Austrians in
the neighbourhood ; and the Austrian General, Gablenz, with a similar corps
cV 'armee, was coming to meet him in the other direction. The breaking of a
bridge delayed the first of the Prussian columns, and the second waited
some time for it to come up. The Austrians meanwhile pushed on to
Trautenau, and the Prussians came forward to meet and drive them back
with their first division. A portion of the other division was advancing to
the south, and the commanding officer, seeing that the country was more
open, advanced his force of eight battalions unsupported in a thin line in
MINUTES OE PKOCEEDINGS OF
244
that direction. Owing to the delay, it was getting late in the afternoon.
The Austrian General, getting his troops together, made a determined attack
on the Prussian line, and drove it back over the ground so far that it got
into confusion ; it was too late in the day to alter the result, and it ended in
a decided retreat.
In speaking of this event, the lecturer remarked as a notable fact in the
Prussian system, that the General who suffered this defeat was now high in
command in the Prussian service, and that the march before the disaster
of Trautenau was taken by Yon Yerdy as a special object of study; showing
that the Prussians were neither ashamed to acknowledge being beaten, nor
above turning the lesson to their own advantage. It should be remarked
also of Trautenau that the loss of the Austrians was immense, notwith¬
standing their victory, showing the immense superiority of the Prussian
weapon; and the action led to nothing, because on the next day its result
was decisively reversed by Benedek's inferiority elsewhere.
That these two defeats were due to special causes the lecturer said was
evident from the different results of the same tactics in the rest of the short
campaign, and he instanced the battle of Kissingen as a striking illustration
to show how readily the Prussians developed their tactical plans. The town
was defended by a brigade of Bavarians, with some cavalry, when the main
force of the Prussians came upon them. A bridge across the river in a
pleasure garden outside the town had been destroyed by the defenders, but
the piles were left, and in a few minutes the engineers broke up the floor of
a house and laid the planks across the piles, so as practically to rebuild the
bridge. The infantry, profiting by their company formation, were able to
cross the bridge and deploy beyond it rapidly, though they were shot down
in numbers; and as soon as they got over they took ground by companies to
the right, and with overwhelming force turned and drove the Bavarians out.
When the war was at an end, everyone in Prussia was well pleased with
the new system. They 'thought they had got to perfection until the well-
known work the “ Tactical Retrospect” appeared, criticising freely the
various events of 1866, and pointing out especially that there was still a
great deal wanting in Prussian infantry tactics to accommodate them to the
increased elasticity of the company formation. It was only natural that the
anonymous author should be challenged to give his remedy for the defects
he had indicated, and to state what he would substitute for the system which
he had derided and condemned ; and at length another pamphlet, also anony¬
mous, under the title of the “ Prussian Infantry in 1869,” appeared from
the same pen; and a translation by Colonel H. Aime Ouvry, C.B., had
recently been published in England . The author, the lecturer said, was plainly
a man of really great talent, but he did not the least believe it was Prince
Erederick Charles, as some asserted, for the internal evidence was entirely
opposed to such a conclusion. The pamphlets certainly made the Prussian
military authorities very angry, and an elaborate reply was published only
last April by Colonel Yon Bronsart — the tactical ideas of which, it was well
understood, were those of Yon Moltke himself — in which the writer made
distinct proposals of his own in opposition to the plans of the anonymous
author. The lecturer proceeded to explain, by two diagrams, the two
systems; on the one hand that advocated by the author of the “Tactical
Retrospect,” and on the ether that of Yon Moltke. The plans of the
former appeared (for they were not shown by any sketch of his own)
royal artillery institution.
245
to condemn columns altogether. He had thought it was impossible (writing
last year) to bring troops into action in that form in the face of the breech¬
loader ; neither did he approve of the line formation, because no line could
be effective without volleys, and volleys could not be expected now. What
he proposed was, to open the ordinary line so as to allow two paces between
man and man. Applying this to practice, he said that skirmishers were not
effective enough for a charge, but he would have them approach to within
350 paces of the enemy and open fire ; the leading company would throw
out skirmishers, and he would have no supports, but at 100 paces behind
he would have two companies in open column, and a fourth at 200 paces
behind in close column. Opposed to this was the plan of Yon Moltke,
which would probably have been ere this adopted but for the breaking out
of the war with France. Yon Moltke proposed to throw out a line of
skirmishers from the two leading companies, with two-thirds of each com¬
pany in support, the remainder of the battalion forming double column
400 paces behind. The lecturer explained this part of his subject in detail
by reference to the diagrams, and expressed his own opinion that, theoreti¬
cally, reason was on the side of Yon Moltke ; but Colonel Bronsart's strong
point was that the open order system would not work, for the open order
line must (admittedly by the proposer's own words) close upon the centre
in charging, just as skirmishers would have to do if used to charge under
fire, and this attempt to close would be fatal. In fact, he showed that the
plan had been tried in Prussia many years before, and that, as the closing
on the centre would be disastrous to the forward movement, the principle
had been condemned as utterly impracticable.
The Prussians made the behaviour of officers and men in action and on
the march the subjects of careful study, and the lecturer cited Yon Yerdy's
“ Conduct of Troops ” as a remarkable example of the careful study of staff
duties. Yon Yerdy took as his particular subject the march leading to that
disaster of Trautenau of which they had been speaking; and his most im¬
portant point was, that subordinate officers in command of any body of
troops should invariably be informed, as far as it could affect their own
action, of what the enemy was doing, and also of what was in the mind of
their own commanding officer. This was so much like the advice given by
the Archduke Albert on the same subject, that they might have supposed
Yon Yerdy borrowed the idea, but that we knew Yon Yerdy's suggestion
was published in a lecture privately first ; and the only conclusion they could
come to was, that two able men, in pursuing the same subject about the
same time, had arrived at similar conclusions.
The lecturer went on to say that there was as yet great difficulty in reviewing
the tactics of the present war, owing to the impracticability of obtaining
precise information ; but there were, nevertheless, certain facts on which
they might found certain deductions. At the first important engagement of
the campaign — the battle of Woerth — they knew that columns were formed
by brigades, probably nearly contiguous battalion columns ; at all events
there was good evidence that the Prussians did charge in large, heavy
columns, and so carried their point. In some of the late actions it had
been said that all that had been done Avas done by company columns ; but
at all the larger actions, and in a most important degree at Porbach, the
companies were supported and fed from reserves behind. Porbach, indeed,
was won mainly by company columns charging up a hill so steep that the
24 6
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OP
men could not fire tlieir muskets. At the more recent affair of the 30th of
October, the infantry and artillery were combined by the Prussians with great
effect. The plan was, to take the railway station and village of Le Bourget ;
and the General in command, although by no means a specially distinguished
officer, afforded a remarkable instance of an officer's carefully preparing his
tactics. He divided his force into three columns, one advancing direct for
the scene of action, another to occupy some houses on the right, and the
third advancing by a different road on the left upon the little village of Drancey,
and making for the railway station behind the village, to cut off the Prench
in that direction from Paris. In making this detail the commanding officer
also divided his batteries between the columns. The lecturer proceeded to
describe the successful attack upon Le Bourget and Drancey, which he said
had been ably delineated by a correspondent of the “ Daily News/' from
information gleaned from a Prussian officer, and which information Colonel
Chesney said he had found, by comparison with other sources, was very
correct. The admirable tactics displayed on the 30th of October he had
quoted especially, because they were the work of an ordinary Prussian
officer, no more eminent or able, perhaps, than other officers occupying
similar positions in the same service, and therefore an illustration of the
valuable training those officers received. The lecturer further showed, by a
review of the action in which Garibaldi was repulsed, on the 26th of Nov.,
in his feeble attempt to get into Dijon, how carefully the plans of the
Prussians, even on a small scale, were laid, and how skillfully they were
executed. Those who had read the “ Tactical Retrospect " would see how
the criticisms of the anonymous writer had been fulfilled in this present war.
It was especially due to the better combination of artillery, cavalry, and
infantry, that the results of the war had been achieved ; and more than one
prophecy of the “ Tactical Retrospect" had been thereby fulfilled in a
remarkable manner. As the author of that work had predicted, artillery
had not been used so much to beat down the artillery of the enemy as to
weaken the opposing line, so as to prepare the way for the attack of the
infantry, which would instinctively make for the weak point. In that
respect the “ Retrospect " had been right, though in others it was clearly
quite wrong. The author had settled the right use of artillery, and expe*
rience had so far confirmed his judgment.
The lecturer said he need not go any further into details to illustrate his
subject, but he would just say a word in defence of lecturing publicly at
all on these subjects. It might be said by some that the officers of the
British army had better not study the higher branches of military science, and
a knowledge of tactics might possibly never be required of them ; but for his
part he could not help the conviction that their fleet upon “ the silver streak
of sea'* around them could not be always depended upon for the complete
protection of the land. It might be that they would have to resort to the
army for ultimate defence, and if this were in any case so, the British army
ought not to be behind any other army in any branch of knowledge. It
ought not to be, if it ever had been, that Brigadiers should be found in
command of mixed bodies of troops with the most trifling knowledge of
artillery and cavalry, and utterly unacquainted with their uses in combination
with infantry. It ought not to be that they should wait to learn these
things until the enemy came upon them. Indeed, to completely avert
invasion, England should be prepared, if necessary, to fight her battles
THR ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
Ml
abroad. The advice which Shakespeare had given her in "King John” was
as true now as in the days of Queen Elizabeth : —
“ Whafc ! shall they seek the lion in his den
And fright him there ; and make him tremble there ?
Oh, let it not be said ! Eorage, and run
To meet displeasure further from the doors;
And grapple with him ere he come so nigh.”
Colonel Chesney resumed his seat amid long-continued applause.
Major-General Wilmot then invited any officer present to discuss the
subject, and after a few moments' pause, said the duty devolved upon him
of proposing a vote of thanks to Colonel Chesney, with whom he was sure
they all agreed as to the necessity for study in those higher branches of
military science and organisation which this war was teaching us. England,
however, in his opinion was, with regard to such matters, the most wretched
country in the world. (Applause, and a laugh.) If we want to make any
military change, we go to Prussia or Prance, or some other place, for our
models, and we never had a man rise amongst us to take into consideration
the peculiar features of our country, our national character, constitution,
and requirements, and cause our army and national defences to rest upon
one basis. (Applause.) He believed that the universal feeling in the service
was an anxious desire that our defences should not rest wholly upon the
army, but that the army should preserve an intimate connection with the
nation — that the soldier, in becoming a soldier, should not cease to be an
Englishman. (Applause.) What we required was some one to bring before
the country a scheme of defence which should embrace in one head the
army, militia, and volunteers, all intimately connected with and depending
upon each other. There is a little nation in Europe, but little thought of,
which offered us a great example in this respect — a nation which, small
though it be, was able on the first rumour of danger to send an army of
40,000 men to the frontier, fully armed and equipped — a feat which he did
not think that a nation which prided itself upon being one of the greatest in
Europe could do. More than that, he believed that in six weeks the little
nation he spoke of could, if the danger increased, have sent forward an army
of 200,000 men, to do which the larger nation would, according to present
indications, require a very considerable time. The country which had set
us this example was Switzerland, where they had a national army always
ready organised, without interfering with the national industry. (Hear,
hear.) It appeared to him that in the organisation of any true military
system, including one of defence, our ordinary industrial character must be
taken into consideration. He did not think it was requisite for England to
adopt (if he might use a strong term) a despotic system. She wanted a
system of defence suited to her character as a commercial country, and there
was no reason why a commercial country should not — and we know that it
does — produce men as able and patriotic as any nation in the world, even
where the people wei| all soldiers. (Applause.) He hoped the lecture
they had heard vmuld convince them, if they had any doubts, of the value
of an advanced education for officers of the army. It was the extent of his
knowledge which made the Prussian soldier formidable in the field; and he
hoped that every officer present, and especially those who were young and
would have to meet the requirements of future years, would take the lesson
33
248
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
to heart, and make the army as perfect as possible. It was the duty of
every officer personally to inform himself of every advance made in military
experience at home or abroad, and by his conversation, his writing, and
speaking, to make the national requirements thoroughly understood ; so as
to render it impossible for any Government long to delay in placing the
defences of the country on a sound basis. There was a strong feeling in
civil life that the officers of the array were opposed to all advancement.
The military profession was to a certain extent conservative, not caring to be
the frequent subject of the wonderful nostrums and experiments frequently
tried and more frequently recommended. It -was always jealous of any
innovation which was bad, but its conservatism was not opposed to the
introduction of anything that was good, and likely to be of advantage to the
service and to the nation. (Applause.) He regretted that there did not
appear to be a disposition to fully discuss the subject before them, but he
desired to ask Colonel Chesney a question. In speaking of Le Bourget, the
lecturer had commended the system adopted of breaking up the artillery
into three divisions. Would that principle be generally adopted by the
Prussians on a larger scale ?
Colonel Chesney replied that at Le Bourget the artillery was divided
because there -were three separate attacks. In any engagement the arrange¬
ment of the attack and the disposition of the artillery must depend upon
circumstances.
Major-General Wilmot asked, further, if there was not some advantage
on the Prussian side in their system of keeping the artillery behind the
infantry. It appeared to him that the French had always been in haste to
bring up their artillery to the attack, while the Prussians, relying on their
long range, kept their artillery more in the background.
Colonel Chesney said the Prussian tactics in regard to artillery certainly
had the advantage, and posting the guns behind infantry was especially
serviceable when fighting on a hill. In connection with this subject he
invited the attention of officers to the question of percussion shells, in rela¬
tion to which they had gained remarkable experience out of the present war.
Thus, at Gravelotte, where they were firing up hill, the Prussians wasted
a considerable proportion of their shells by their flying out of range before
bursting; whereas at Sedan, which was fought in a hollow, every shot told.
In answer to Colonel Wright, Colonel Chesney gave some further
explanations of his diagram illustrating the propositions laid down in the
“ Tactical Retrospect.”
Colonel Domville said he thought it should be noted that in the Prussian
army the company consisted of 250 men, and the large and unwieldly
battalions in which they formerly manoeuvred having been broken up into
half battalions of four companies each, it would become a question whether
we, in the British service, had not in our present battalions of ten small
companies each, a force in point of numbers about equal to the Prussian
half battalion; one that would be found equally flexible, whilst at the same
time it would retain that cohesion which, enabling the whole body to act
in concert under one commander, would render a defeat from similar
causes to those that caused the Prussian reverse at Langensajza to be im¬
possible. He thought the. principle of throwing out a line of skirmishers
from the leading companies, with supports formed from two-thirds of each
of the remaining companies, was one which would never work as well as the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
249
practice of forming the skirmishers entirely from one or more whole company,
with the companies in support and in reserve unbroken. In the same manner,
in covering the advance of a brigade or larger body, he thought entire regiments
should be employed, and not parts of several. Unity of action Avould thus
be obtained, and they would work under their own regimental officers,
captains as well as field officers. In the Prussian system it would seem as
if these latter officers are almost entirely ignored, and thus a very important
link in the chain of responsibility appears to be wanting in field operations.
Colonel Chesney replied that the point raised by Colonel Domville was
an open question. The object of taking skirmishers from separate portions
of the line was to get a larger proportion of commanding officers among
them; for the Prussians 'thought that with only one commanding officer to a
very long line of skirmishers, there was more than one man could well do.
Colonel Domville said his opinion was that it was certainly better to
have the line of skirmishers all under one commander, and they would
necessarily have their due proportion of officers, whether the skirmishers be
composed of one company or more.
Colonel Wright said there was a pamphlet lying on the library table
proposing a plan of skirmishing by sending out skirmishers right from the
front, and thereby avoiding the delay involved in getting skirmishing com¬
panies out of the way of the advance.
Colonel Chesney said that was apparently merely theoretical; but he
had not read the scheme proposed, and was not prepared to praise or
condemn it.
Major Geary said that in the pamphlet referred to by the lecturer, viz.
the “ Retrospect/' of 1866, it appeared to be under consideration by the
Prussians whether the escort for the artillery should not be formed of
cavalry rather than of infantry, as heretofore. The writer, as far as he could
recollect, said that when a battery commander gave the word “Trot,” he
looked down with dismay upon the anxious faces of his infantry escort.
In reading this, he could not but be struck with the applicability of this
situation to the commander of an English field battery, should he find
himself in action called upon to trot, when he looked down upon the faces
of his gun detachments. (Laughter and applause.) He remarked that the
distinguishing feature of field artillery upon which the German author
insisted should be its mobility. Doubtless our horse artillery was the finest
in the world ; but, after all, the field batteries formed our artillery of the line.
The Prussian field artillery, he was informed, carried gunners on the axle-
tree boxes, as "well as on the limbers — a plan we had found to work well for
so many years in India, and which system many of his brother officers agreed
with him, he believed, in considering might well be adopted in our field
batteries at the present time. He could not help feeling that to lecture to
field artillery officers on tactics, so long as they did not possess the means
of moving with their gun detachments beyond a walk, though interesting
and improving to their minds, was likely to be practically as futile as teach¬
ing a bear to dance with his hind legs tied together. (Loud applause.)
Captain Strange said he was astonished to see at Chalons last year that
the French artillery had no me^ns of carrying its gunners except on the
wagons. It was to such mistakes, combined with their imperfect tactics,
such as advancing their artillery with or before skirmishers, and (to enable
them to bring up gunners) getting their wagons into impossible positions,
250
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
that the disastrous results of the campaign to the French were in some
measure to be attributed. Besides this, the men were handicapped, so to
speak, by having to carry their packs and carbines, and hampered to such
a degree that he had seen them fall off the wagons. In reference to the
study of tactics in the British army, he should like to ask Colonel Chesney
whether he thought it was practicable to learn it until a law was passed
permitting troops to go across country ?
Colonel Chesney said other nations had the same difficulty to contend
with ; and for want of all the opportunities they would like for practice, they
must be content to use discussions such as this, and instruct one another
and the public mind, which was generally perfectly indifferent about such
things until a time came when the subject was forced upon it by the
course of events. Those who had studied the matter should strive to teach
the country what was needed, and he would encourage them by referring to
Belgium, where, chiefly by the efforts of one able and energetic man, the
army of the country had been put upon an excellent footing. (Applause.)
Major-General Sib Lintorn Simmons said he had hesitated to speak
on the subject of the very able lecture they had heard ; but, encouraged by
the discussion, and by the very favourable reception of his brother officer,
Colonel Chesney, he would venture to say a few words. The term “ column,”
unless explained, was, he thought, liable to be misunderstood. In the
French and most other armies, a column, as generally formed, consisted of
several lines of men behind each other, in all twenty or more deep ; but the
Prussian company column was a different thing altogether, more approximating
to a line, and one, moreover, of extreme flexibility. The Prussian formation
is in three ranks ; the company column, therefore, is either six or twelve
deep — more generally the former, when, if the third rank is skirmishing, as is
the custom with the troops in immediate contact with the enemy, the
column is in reality only four deep. In this formation, if he understood the
matter, they might either deliver their fire, the two front ranks kneeling, or
they might deploy into line, the movement being so simple and rapid as to
be capable of being executed in close proximity to the enemy. In the
Bussian war the enemy used columns so deep that the men could not make
use of their arms. As an instance he would mention the attack on Kars,
when the Bussian columns were completely crushed by the fire of musketry,
aided by a very feeble artillery ; their loss in killed and. wounded, as since
given to him by the Chief of the Bussian Staff, was equal to the whole force
opposed to them. He regarded the advance of a line of Prussian company
columns as that of a very powerful though flexible line, and reminded the
meeting that our own troops fought in line against the first Napoleon with
admirable success. Now, however, when it has become necessary to give
up the deep column formation, and deploy out of the range of rifled artillery
at some 1400 or 1500 yds. from the enemy, he feared that an advance in
line as practiced by us — which is perhaps the most difficult movement an army
can be called upon to perform — will be found almost impossible of execution;
whereas the Prussian line was so broken up into a number of short lines that
the advance was much less difficult, and therefore he thought these small
pliable columns were better than any other formation for an advance. (Hear,
hear.) There was one thing, however, above all others tha't the present war
was teaching us, and that was the necessity of a thorough education of the
officers of the army. (Applause.) The Prussians were educated to the
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
251
fullest extent in the knowledge necessary for the duties they had to perforin.
This education not only favoured the column formation, but even that
of the smallest columns ever known' — sometimes no more than the two
Uhlans with which the records of the war had made them so familiar.
(A laugh.) The Prussians knew the roads and the formation of the
country better than the natives, and everyone possessed a general know¬
ledge of what he had to do that had been found of immense service in this
campaign. And not only were the officers well educated, but the officers
taught the men, and he attributed very much of their success in this war to
cultivation of intellect and the high order of instruction that all had received.
(Applause) .
Captain W. S. M. Wolfe said they had just been shown, how the tactics of
the Prussian infantry answered when it was successful, but he should like to
know how the system would stand a repulse. It appeared to him that
either of the formations displayed in the diagrams would, if compelled to
retire, get into such a state of confusion that they could never be sufficiently
reorganised to effect a creditable retreat. One had always heard in lectures
and read in books how the Prussian infantry was to be taken into action,
but one was never told how it was to be brought out again. (A laugh.)
He begged to differ from the opinions expressed by some of the previous
speakers as to the cause of the Prussian successes in this campaign, as he
believed that the victory was simply the result of superior brute force.
(Hear, hear.) He considered that our system of small battalions would
have achieved the same results, and believed that the Prussian infantry
would have been, in the event of a repulse, as thoroughly disorganised as
they were at Langensalza in 1866.
Colonel Cheseey said he must admit that the Prussian troops did get
a good deal mixed up at Langensalza, as one square was composed of portions
of five regiments, but that he did not think it was a fair case from which to
judge the efficacy of the Prussian system.
Major-General Wilmot said nothing remained for him, as president of
the meeting, but to return thanks to the lecturer, for his valuable and
interesting lecture, and to those who had taken part in the discussion. He
was sure that everyone would agree with the remarks which had fallen from
General Simmons as to the necessity of educating the army, and they
were heartily glad that so able an officer had charge of the instruction of
their young men. (Applause.) With regard to the remarks of Colonel
Domville upon the selection of skirmishers, he might offer an opinion that,
with the enemy in front of them, men would be more likely to pay attention
to their officers than in mere practice, whether the skirmishers were all of
one company or detailed from several. As regards the important point
mentioned by Captain Wolfe, the formation was scarcely so peculiar as to
render retreat more dangerous than usual. Whatever formation they might
have been in before, if thoroughly routed they generally did the movement
in one way, and that was in the best way they could. (A laugh.) He
assured Colonel Chesney that the officers of the Royal Artillery appreciated
his kindness in finding an opportunity, amid his numerous avocations, to
come and give them the advantage of his careful study; and if at any future
time he could give them another lecture, they would heartily rejoice. (Much
applause.)
The proceedings then terminated.
252
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE FUTURE
ARMAMENT OF OUR FIELD ARTILLERY.
A PAPER READ AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, JANUARY 16, 1871,
BY
LIEUTENANT C. JONES, It. A.,
CAPTAIN INSTRUCTOR, ROYAB GUN FACTORIES.
Colonel Phillpotts, B.H.A., occupied the chair, and introduced the
lecturer to the meeting, stating that if at the conclusion anyone
present wished to offer any remarks, the meeting would be happy to
hear him. t
Lieut. Jones then read the following paper : —
That the equipment of our field artillery is not in a satisfactory
condition is allowed on all sides. The subject has, for some years past,
attracted considerable attention, and we have lately been awakened to
its importance by the total overthrow of the French artillery in the
earlier battles of the present war, which overthrow has been very
generally attributed to the inferiority of their artillery. The steps
which have lately been taken by our authorities have gone far towards
improving our position in this respect, as I hope to shew in the course
of this paper. I do not propose to go into the whole question of
equipment : it is not one which can be fairly dealt with in the space of
one short lecture, even if I were in a position to do it justice. I wish
to speak more particularly of the gun, and the question which I
propose for discussion is this ; “ What are the best guns with which we
can arm our field artillery V 3 The subject would appear to be one
suitable for discussion in this Institution, and I hope to be able to
bring forward some facts which may materially assist us in fairly
discussing the matter, and possibly in arriving at a just conclusion.
Now the first question which suggests itself in connection with the
armament of field artillery, is one which, though of the greatest im¬
portance, has long since been worn threadbare, I mean the question
of the relative advantages of a breech-loading and a muzzle-loading gun.
It would be waste of time to recapitulate the well known arguments
on both sides, suffice it to say that the balance of opinions seems for
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
253
some time past to have been on the side of the muzzle-loader ; every
committee of artillery officers that has gone into the subject having
reported strongly in its favour, and a gun of this description having
been lately adopted for the armament of our batteries in India, and our
horse artillery at home. We may therefore assume for our present
purpose that the future field gun will be a muzzle-loader, and any who
are inclined to dissent from this assumption will, I hope, favour us with
their opinions during the discussion which is invited at the conclusion
of this paper.
It being assumed then, for the present, that our field guns should be
muzzle-loaders, the next question which presents itself is, “ What is the
most suitable metal of which to construct them Now until the
present year the whole of our rifled field guns, with the exception of a
few mountain guns required on an emergency for Bhootan, were made
of wrought -iron or steel, or of a combination of both, but the mountain
7-prs. for Bhootan were improvised by rifling bronze 3-prs., and, for
obvious local reasons, the gun lately adopted for India was made of
bronze.
W e have then four metals, or combinations of metals, to choose from,
viz. : —
1. Steel alone.
2. Wrought-ir on alone.
3. Wrought-iron lined with steel.
4. Bronze.
A great deal may no doubt be said in favour of each of the four.
The question is however not what will make a good gun, but what
will give us the very best gun with which to arm our batteries for
home service. Let us see then what are the merits and demerits
of each.
And 1st, as regards steel alone. — The only gun in the service
which is made of this material alone is the 7-pr. mountain gun of
150 lbs. weight, commonly known as the Abyssinian gun. The
charge of this piece is so small that it can be fired with perfect
safety, but steel has not been introduced for larger natures on
account of the undoubted liability of guns made of that material,
unstrengthened with iron coils, to burst explosively when firing our
ordinary service charges. This is greatly due to the want of uniformity
exhibited by masses of steel, a defect which has driven even the cele¬
brated Krupp to give up attempting to make heavy guns homogeneous
in structure, and to adopt a system of building up, similar to that which
has been in use in this country for years, though he still adheres to this
treacherous metal for every portion of his guns.
The bursting of steel guns, to which I have referred, has happened
in a number of instances ; one of the most notable being the destruction
of six of the Prussian 9-prs. in the campaign of 1866.
As it is a first essential that our guns should be perfectly safe, this
material by itself must be discarded.
2nd. Wrought-iron. — The original Armstrong 6-pr. gun had a steel
254
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
tube with coiled iron exterior, but the quality of the steel could not
at that time be depended on, and the guns which were introduced into
the service in 1858-9, were therefore made entirely of coiled wrought-
iron, this construction being adhered to for the greater number of our
B.L. guns.
We have therefore had the. experience of about twelve years in judg¬
ing of the suitability of wrought-iron as a material for field guns, and,
as far as safety from rupture is concerned, it may be stated to be
absolutely perfect, for no gun of this nature has ever burst explosively
on service, or from fair usage.
However, for some time past, the plan of making the whole gun of
wrought-iron has to a great extent been abandoned, for, though per¬
fectly safe from any danger of bursting, the imperfections inherent in
this material, and the great difficulty experienced in making the inner
barrel sufficiently sound, satisfactorily to resist the corrosive action of
the powder gas, have led to the adoption of steel for the core, coils of
iron being shrunk on the outside to strengthen and support it. We
have thus, as far as the inner barrel is concerned, reverted to Sir W.
Armstrong's original construction, as exemplified in his first experi¬
mental gun (the 6-pr.) and we are enabled to do so from the
improvement in the manufacture of steel since 1858. The advantages
of the change are obvious : defects in the material which are of no
consequence whatever in the outer portions of a gun, are very detri¬
mental in the surface of the bore, where the gas acts directly on them
and eats them out rapidly, particularly if they occur in rear of the
trunnions. Steel therefore, being entirely free from such defects, has
been adopted for the tubes of guns in order to obtain a hard and sound
surface capable of resisting the friction of the shot and the action of the
gas, but it is found even then that the tube is the more perishable
portion of our heavy guns, and that it sometimes fails while the iron
exterior remains intact, thus affording conclusive evidence of the
superiority of good wrought-iron in resisting the dynamical strains to
which a gun is subjected on firing, and the danger of trusting too much
to the results obtained when specimens of metals are tested by statical
strains only.
Wrought-iron lined with steel having then been proved, by a series
of costly experiments unequalled in the annals of artillery, to be the best
construction for our so-called iron guns of the service, let us now see
what advantages or disadvantages would result from the substitution of
bronze in its place for field guns.
The following are the principal points of comparison between the
two metals, iron and bronze, viz. : —
1. As regards security from bursting.
2. Qualifications for the inner barrel, i.e . (a) hardness, (b) soundness,
and (c) capability of resisting expansion.
3. Deterioration from exposure.
4. Economy.
5. Facility of manufacture.
6. Facility for changing the system, i.e. facility of remanufacture
and value of old metal.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
255
1. As regards security from bursting. — Bronze (unalloyed) will not
burst, and it has been stated in a lecture in this Institution * that “ no
known metal, or combination of metals, gives such absolute security
from bursting as bronze.” That “an individual steel gun, with or
without wrought-iron coils , may be stronger perhaps than an individual
bronze gun of the same size; but take 1000 bronze guns, and you may
be perfectly certain that not one will burst. It remains to be seen if
the same is the case with steel guns, with or without wrought-iron coils”
I beg leave to take exception to this statement, and more particularly
that part of it which includes steel tubes covered with iron coils, and
steel guns without iron coils, in one sweeping condemnation ; for it
cannot but be a condemnation of a gun to say that it is liable to burst
on service.
As I have already stated, steel by itself is untrustworthy, we have
ample evidence ‘of the fact ; but as regards wrought-iron coils the case
is very different, and I maintain that, with the evidence of the last
twelve years before us, there is not the shadow of reason for the
slightest mistrust, either of guns built up entirely of iron coils, or of
those constructed of this material over a lining of steel.
I am not now speaking of our heavy guns which are (as is well
known) built up upon the last-mentioned method, and the wonderful
endurance of which under enormous strains has gained them a world¬
wide celebrity. (See Table I.) ' But I am referring solely to guns of
Table I.
Table of Endurance of Heavy Muzzle-Loading Rifled Guns .
12-inch 25 tons j
» 1
gun
fired
262
rounds.
9 -inch
1
(1
gun
fired
500 rounds.
Li
n
rr
200
ff
12 tons •<
1
//
ii
402
II
11 « 25 „
l
it
, ii '
119
„
1
u
n
„
307
II
10 „ 18 ,, ■
j i
n
n
n
n
514
163
ff
a „
9 « •
fi
u
ii
II
II
433
408
II
II
ri
it
n
1107
ff
f 1
ii
II
1729
II
1 1
„
1070
„
1
ii
II
1061
II
i
it
it
1049
„
1
ii
II
1009
II
9 « 12 „ •<
i
ff
„
945
ff
7 /,
6f5 n <
1
„
„
986
II
i
w
600
ff
1
ii
II
908
It
i
ti
ff
500
,,
1
ii
II
637
II
U
it
ff
500
ff
i
Li
n
II
636
II
comparatively small calibre such as are used for field and siege purposes,
and of which we have, during the last twelve years, introduced into
the service nearly 4000 ; and I confidently affirm that it does not remain
to be proved that guns built up on this system afford “ absolute security
from bursting as it has been amply proved already. This confidence is
founded on th q fact that no single instance can be referred to in which
one of these guns has burst with fair usage, while numbers of them
have fired thousands of rounds, and some are still, as far as the body of
the gun is concerned, in a serviceable, or at worst, repairable condition,
as the guns have not burst, but only the tube or some portion of them
failed.
* “Proceedings R.A. Institution,” Vol. VI., p. 482.
34
256
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Table II.
List of Built-up Guns which have fired a large number of Bounds.
M.L.
12-pr. guns, ,
8 cwt. »
No.
C 52
t 10
f 38
337
B.L,
.4
40-pi*, guns, B.L.,
32 and 35 cwt.
7
8
18
243
125
610
631
98
206
54
114
174
237
363
j 446
| 459
| 532
| 585
1JL23
No. of
rounds.
. 2955
. about 2000
. 2864
C With iron tube . 1067 7 one i
l With steel tube . 2197 >
. 4417
. 1085
. 1515
. 2629
. 2695
. 1038
. 2353
C With coiled tube . 1276 7 0907
I With forged tube . 1961 $
. . . 1615
. 5615
. 2512
. 1754
. 2461
. 1998
. 1176
. 3605
. 1116
. 2960
. 2059
Moreover the Report of the Armstrong and Whitworth Committee is
most conclusive on this point : — After the three 12-pr. (8 cwt.) guns,
viz., the Armstrong M.L. and B.L. and the Whitworth M.L. guns, had
each fired about 2800 rounds, the M.L.’s with 1 lb. 12 ozs. powder and
12 lb. shot, attempts were made to destroy them by firing greatly
increased charges of both powder and shot, with the following result: —
At the 42nd round the B.L. Armstrong gun split open, but did not
burst ; at the 92nd round the Whitworth steel gun burst violently into
eleven pieces ; while the M.L. Armstrong gun failed at the 60th round,
one of the outer coils having cracked and fallen off without flying into
pieces.
The Committee consequently reported iC that guns fully satisfying all
conditions of safety can be made with steel barrels strengthened with
superimposed hoops of coiled wrought-iron, and that such guns give
premonitory signs of approaching rupture; whereas guns composed entirely
of steel are liable to burst explosively without giving the slightest warning
to the gun detachment."”
They also reported that all the guns exhibited a degree of “ strength
far surpassing the possible requirements of the service.” It would be
difficult to express in stronger terms confidence in our present service
construction of guns.
I have laid great stress upon this point, not only because it is of vital
importance that our gunners should have the most perfect confidence
in their weapons, but also because of the statements which have been
made, which, without drawing any distinction whatever between steel
alone and coiled iron lined with steel, have tended to depreciate the
THE KOYAL AllTILLEKY INSTITUTION.
257
safety of every rifled gun we have in the service, he it big or little ;
for, assuredly,, a construction which is not capable of firing with safety
charges of two or three pounds of powder, cannot for one moment be
trusted to fire charges of 100 and 120 lbs.
2. The next point to be considered is the relative merit of steel
and bronze as materials for the inner barrel of a gun, i.e. the capa¬
bilities of each to resist the wear caused by continued firing. It is
not necessary to enter at length into this question. The staunchest
advocates of bronze allow that it is deficient in hardness, the first
quality which is required to resist the scoring action, due partly to the
friction of the shot when passing through the bore, and still more to
the heat of the combustion of the charge, and the rush of the gas over
the shot.
Again, it is found practically impossible to produce wholesale per¬
fectly homogeneous bronze castings, that is castings in which the
quality of the metal is the same throughout, and which are quite free
from tin-spots and porous patches. Mr. Abel, the Chemist to the War
Department, in a minute dated August 28, 1869, accounts for this in
the following way. He says : —
“ The difficulty attending the production of thoroughly sound and sufficiently
uniform bronze castings arises out of the circumstance that a mixture of copper
and tin, which is sufficiently soft to constitute a material for ordnance, does not
consist simply of one definite alloy of copper and tin ; and that, when these
metals are melted together, there exists a great tendency to the formation of alloys
of definite composition in which the proportion of tin is comparatively high, and
which, from their tendency to separate from the liquid mixture in a crystalline
form, give rise to the production of cavities or porous patches in the castings,
on the one hand, and of spots or veins of comparatively hard metal on the
other.” ....
Now these porous patches may occur in the interior of the mass
where they are of little consequence, or they may occur in the surface
of the bore, in which case they are even more important than those
defects which, as already stated, have led to the abandonment of
wrought-iron for the inner barrel of guns, inasmuch as tin is much more
fusible than iron, and is consequently more rapidly acted on by the
heated gases. None of us, I think, have the slightest conception of
the enormous heat generated by the combustion of even comparatively
small charges of powder, but some idea can be formed of it from con¬
sideration of the following fact. If a 12-pr. B.L. gun be fired for
fifty rounds very rapidly, say in ten minutes, it will be so much heated
that the hand cannot be placed on the outside. Now the total time
that the heated gas has been in contact with the bore of the gun
amounts in fifty rounds to only \ of a second, as the time for each
round is Joth °f a second. Therefore the gun has been cooling in the
intervals between the rounds for 9 minutes 59 § seconds and heating for
i second, and still at the end of the series water will almost boil in it ;
it is needless to remark that the heat even of an oxyhydrogen blow¬
pipe would be quite incapable of producing this result. Now the local
heating at the seat of the shot is far greater in a rifled than in a S.B.
258
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
gun, on account of the greater weight of shot in proportion to the area
acted on, and also the reduced windage. In fact the rush of gas over
the shot may be said to approximate somewhat to the conditions of a
blow-pipe flame, a large quantity of heat being concentrated on a small
surface.
It can therefore be readily imagined that spots of such a fusible
metal as tin will be at once eaten away when separated from the
copper; this occurs even at proof, and holes are developed which
rapidly increase with repeated firing and render the gun unserviceable.
Out of the three guns used in the late trial at Aldershot two have been
condemned from this cause, having only fired 242 rounds each, while
another bronze gun has become unserviceable at Shoeburyness from a
like reason, having fired about 700 rounds. I have g’utta-percha im¬
pressions of these guns on the table and also those of iron and steel
guns which have fired various numbers of rounds with which to com¬
pare them.
There can be no doubt then that steel is superior to bronze in
hardness and soundness, and the advantages of these qualities for
the inner barrel of a gun are obvious. We are not driven to
resort to “an artifice ” so as to “isolate” the cast-iron of the
projectile from the bore, and we are not limited as regards the hard¬
ness of the studs ; in fact ribbed shells can be fired without material
injury, such shells being stronger, less liable to injury, and, I believe,
more economical and simpler to manufacture than those having soft
studs. Moreover double shell can be fired without any danger of
injuring the gun, and the case shot is not so liable to damage the bore
and grooves.
Again the soundness of the material, offering as it does no cavity or
defect upon which the powder gas can lay hold, causes the erosion to
be more uniform and gradual, while the higher melting point of the
material has probably a tendency in the same direction.
But there is a third point in which steel is superior to bronze for the
barrel of a gun, viz., in its greater power to resist expansion. In our
service iron guns the weight of shot and charge of powder are only limited
by their capability of consuming the powder effectively. But in guns
made of a soft metal, like bronze, the expansion of the bore at the seat
of the shot is so considerable that, however secure from bursting the
gun may be, the charge (including shot) must be restricted within com¬
paratively narrow limits, otherwise the efficiency of the gun becomes
rapidly reduced by loss of velocity, and there is a tendency for the studs
to override the grooves. The bronze gun referred to before which
became unserviceable after about 700 rounds, had actually lost 100 ft.
velocity in that number of rounds, fired with 91b. projectiles only,
while the iron gun of the same weight was designed for, and is capable
of, firing a 121b. projectile with a sufficient charge to give it an
efficient velocity, and such a gun has actually fired nearly 3000 rounds,
with a comparatively small loss of velocity, in the Armstrong and
Whitworth experiments.
There are several other instances of the failure of bronze guns on
account of the softness and expansibility of that material. In 1867 a
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
259
5 -inch gun was rifled for some valuable experiments regarding the
resistance of the air by Professor Bashforth, but was found to be totally
unserviceable after a few rounds of Jth charges, the studs on the pro¬
jectiles having preferred to cut channels for themselves through the
metal of the gun rather than follow the grooves prepared for them.
Thus the gun was rapidly converted from a three groove into a multi¬
groove piece, and an iron gun had to be substituted in its place. It is
worthy of remark that this same iron M.L. gun made the most accurate
shooting of any gun ever fired at Shoeburyness, due probably to some
fortunate suitability of the twist of rifling to the length and calibre of
the projectiles.
Again the 20-pr. bronze howitzers lately under trial were assigned a
charge of 2 lbs. or Toth (that of our iron guns being Jth) and one of
them when fired with 2*5 lbs. or Jth expanded in the chamber over Toth
of an inch, and the studs have consequently left the grooves and cut
their way through the soft metal. Looking then at all these causes of
failure, bronze, in its present state, cannot be considered suitable for the
inner barrel of a rifled gun, and the only method of adapting it for this
use appears to be by alloying it with some foreign matter, or by
devising some means for procuring a sounder, harder and more homo¬
geneous structure throughout the casting ; at present we are unable to
do so, and experiments carried out for this purpose in Prance, Belgium
and America have I understand resulted only in failure, though the
results obtained are not conclusive.
3 . Deterioration from exposure . — Bronze is undoubtedly a less oxidizable
metal than iron, and will consequently deteriorate less from exposure to
the weather uncared for . However the care required to prevent any
deterioration whatever of an iron gun from this cause is so very slight
that it practically amounts to keeping the gun clean ; and, so far from
neglecting to clean the material in their charge, the only accusation on
this score that is ever brought against our field artillerymen is that
they are, if anything, inclined to polish too much. Be that as it may,
the fact remains that iron is the material of which both our small-arms
and our heavy guns are made, and they appear quite capable of sus¬
taining, without perceptible deterioration, even greater rough usage
and exposure than our field guns are likely to be called upon to endure.
4. Economy. — This is an argument which at the present time carries
great weight, and there can be no question that bronze is cheaper than
iron for guns, simply because it is worth more when old. But to what
does this economy amount ? It has been carefully ascertained how
much it would cost, taking into consideration the value of the store of
old bronze guns, to re-arm the whole of our field artillery, navy, reserve
forces and reserves in store with iron and bronze guns respectively, and
the saving in adopting bronze amounts to just £30,000, being con¬
siderably less than the cost of maintaining one battery on a war
footing for one year. Is such an amount worthy of consideration in a
question like this upon which the efficiency of our artillery in a great
measure depends, and which, as we have seen lately, may greatly
influence the fate of an army ?
260
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
5. Facility of manufacture. — Considerable stress Has been laid upon
the greater simplicity of manufacturing bronze guns, and undoubtedly
the operation of casting is simpler than that of coiling and forging. In
practice however the casting of bronze is not found to be such a simple
matter as it at first sight appears. On reference to the records of the
Royal Grun Factories we find that even in its best days, the casting of
sound bronze guns was accomplished with considerable difficulty, as, on
an average, nearly one out of every three blocks had to be condemned
even for smooth-bored pieces ; while the fact that at the present time
the rough casting for an 8 cwt. gun requires 24 cwt. of metal in order
even to approximate to soundness, indicates that the process is not an
extremely easy one, nor can it be said to have been brought to perfec¬
tion. Moreover the difficulties which have always attended the casting
of bronze guns even when new metal was used are greatly increased
when it is attempted to utilise old gun-metal. Mr. Mallet points this out
at page 86 of his work on the “ Construction of Artillery,” and, arguing
from experiments, attributes the uncertainty of the result to the unequal
oxidation of the two metals copper and tin, which leads to a change in
the proportions of the metals present after each re-melting. This neces¬
sitates the addition of from 10 to 15 per cent, of new gun-metal to the
old guns when being re-cast, as well as additional tin to compensate for
the greater oxidation of that metal. So that before we can practically
utilise the existing stock of old guns a considerable outlay has to be
made for new metal to mix with them, and even then the result is not
satisfactory.
On the other hand the whole of the difficulties which have at any
time interfered with the rapid and certain production of good iron guns
have, thanks to the genius and perseverance of our Civil Engineers
and mechanicians, been entirely overcome, and we would appear to
be throwing away the whole of the advantages we possess in this
respect over other countries should we adopt an inferior metal for
our guns on the ground that the manufacture is less complicated.
We are now in possession of the whole of the appliances necessary
for the manufacture of thoroughly sound and trustworthy iron guns
from two cwt. up to thirty-five tons , and, with our existing plant and
machinery we are in a position to turn out field guns of this material
quite as rapidly as, if not more so than, those of bronze. Is there then
any sufficient reason why we should fall back for home service upon a
system which, though apparently simple, has never been really satis¬
factory, and which must consequently require experiments and time to
bring it to perfection.
These remarks do not of course apply to India, where the method
of building up iron guns is quite unknown, while that of casting
in bronze, such as it is, has been familiar for ages to the Hindoos ;
neither are the materials for iron and steel guns obtainable in the
country. As therefore it has been decided that India should make
her own field guns and thus be independent of this country (and
this can only be done by making them of bronze), it would appear
advisable to try if it be possible to make good and trustworthy guns of
this material, and to experiment with this view. For home service, on
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
261
the other hand, we have guns which, however perfect bronze may
become, cannot with onr present knowledge be improved upon, and
which would consequently appear to answer the question, “What are
the best guns with which we can arm our field artillery V} The gun
they have now is a very good one, but it is not the best we can give
them, and the same argument applies in this case as that which has
led to the decision to re-arm our infantry with the Martini-Henry rifle,
although we are well aware that the Snider-Enfield is superior to every
rifle in use on the continent. When this re-armament is carried out
the infantry will possess the best weapon the country can produce;
whilst our ships and garrison artillery are already furnished with the
best heavy guns in existence. Should not then our superb field artillery
be armed with a weapon worthy of them ?
6. Facility for changing the system of armament , Sfc. — This, the last
point of comparison between the two metals, is altogether in favour of
bronze. That material is always worth as much in the form of old
metal as it cost when new, and can, with the addition of a proportion
of fresh metal, be re-cast. Consequently, if it should appear desirable
at any future time again to re-model our field guns, we could do so
with greater facility and less cost in the case of bronze than in the case
of iron. It is only reasonable to suppose that, had our present B.L.
guns been bronze, the change to muzzle-loaders would have been
carried out much more rapidly, as, no doubt, the heavy sacrifice entailed
by the supersession of our present guns has delayed a step which the
majority of us have been' anxiously looking for. But after all it is only
a matter of money, and the question still stands, whether the wealthiest
nation in Europe is prepared to sacrifice one iota of efficiency for the
sake of a few thousand pounds — a trifle compared to the total cost of
her army and navy ?
We have now discussed the various points of comparison between
bronze and iron combined with steel as materials for field guns, let us
recapitulate the results arrived at.
(1) As regards security from bursting, both are perfectly trust¬
worthy, and there is nothing to choose between them.
(2) As regards qualifications for an inner barrel, steel is undoubt¬
edly greatly superior to sound bronze, if we could g*et it, — much more
therefore to the unsound stuff that is now produced.
(3) A bronze gun will deteriorate less from exposure uncareclforj
but the iron M.L. gun requires simply to be kept clean.
(4) Bronze is cheaper than iron, taking into consideration the value
of the old metal.
(5) Bronze guns, if we could make them sound and serviceable,
would be simpler to manufacture than the compound guns.
(6) Bronze affords greater facilities for a change of armament if
deemed advisable.
Balancing all the points which bear on the one side or the other it
is evident that the decision to stop the further manufacture of bronze
guns is necessitated by the results arrived at up to the present time,
262
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
while in the meantime experiments are carried out with a view to
perfect the manufacture of bronze by alloying it with phosphorus or
iron, or by casting it after some new method, so as to meet the question
of the supply of guns for India.
For the present however the best guns we can make are muzzle-
loaders built up of wrought-iron and steel, and, assuming that this is
to be the construction of our future field guns, what data have we for
determining the weight of projectile to be thrown, the consequent
weight and calibre of the gun, and the weight of draught and total
equipment, having due regard to that first essential “mobility” And
first, as regards the weight of the projectile ; this, it would appear,
taken together with the number of rounds which it is considered
necessary to carry, should regulate the whole equipment. Now it will
probably be allowed that the heavier the projectile the better, provided
it can be thrown with a sufficient velocity without injury to the gun
and carriage, and also, that a sufficient number of them can be carried
in the limber and wagon to prevent the possibility of the supply failing
in action. This statement scarcely admits of question, but, in case any
person should entertain doubts on the subject, it is only necessary to
point out that the advantages of weight of metal have been so apparent
that, in every war which has taken place during this century, and which
has lasted a sufficient time to enable a new gun to be introduced, the
calibre of the guns in use at the termination of hostilities has been
greater than that of the guns taken into the field at the commencement.
For instance ; the artillery at the beginning of the Peninsular War were
armed with 6-pr. guns of 6 cwt. and 5 J-inch howitzers of 4f cwt., while
at the end they, had 9-pr. guns of 13^ cwt., and a few years afterwards,
acting on the experience of this campaign, the 12-pr. and 24-pr.
howitzers, of 6 and 12J cwt., were introduced ; the latter, with the
9-pr. of 13J cwt., being the heaviest pieces with which our field batteries
have ever been armed.
Again in the Crimea the siege train consisted at first of 24-prs.,
32-prs., and 8 -inch guns, which were gradually reinforced with 10-inch
guns and 68-prs., as the value of the heavier natures became more and
more apparent. The important part played by the two 18-prs. in the
defeat of the Russians at Inkermann is matter of history, and, if
Dr. Russell's report is to be believed, the fallen Emperor himself
attributed the overthrow of his artillery at the battle of Sedan to the
greater “ range, precision, and weight ” of the Prussian guns, alluding
no doubt to their field battery guns throwing 15 lb. projectiles. I
think we may safely say then that the heavier the projectile we can
throw the better, with the provisos before stated.
Now what limits this weight ? It is limited;
1st. By the weight of the gun necessary to fire with perfect safety a
charge sufficient to give the shot the required velocity,
2nd. By the total weight which can be allowed to the equipment.
And 3rdly. By the number of rounds considered absolutely neces¬
sary to be taken into action with the gun.
These limitations are so intimately connected with and dependent
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION
263
upon one another that it is almost impossible to discuss one of them
without introducing the others. I have therefore compiled a table (see
Table III.) shewing the weight, and some other particulars, of the
equipment of horse artillery and field battery guns which are (or have
been) in use in this, and some continental armies ; and, taking this table
as our basis, I shall endeavour to show what are the most efficient guns
we can now produce.
s
M
<1
Eh
s
<45
§5
pq
s
<45
*55
Remarks.
j- Proposed equipment.
•spuno.t
jo Jaquinu
194
128
136
84
120
122
157
123
156
124
100
112
•uoScm. ut
spnno.i jo jaqumjhj
148
96
100
60
90
90
108
93
112
90
72
84
•nr.S t^iaa.
spttnoj jo .xaqninjsj;
46
32
36
24
30
32
49
30
44
34
28
28
•a^ajdmoo
‘uoSuai jo iqSia^
cwt.
37
38
35-5
39- 25
40- 25
43
43
43-75
26-7
335
33-5
40
-qqSnuxp jo qqSia ;y\
cwt.
30- 5
40
31- 5
41-75
31-5
37
30-5
35-64
25-76
33-5
33-5
40
•a^8{dnioo
hraqraq jo ^qSia^
cwt.
14
14-5
14-25
14-75
14-5
16-25
16-75
16-25
10-1
14-5
14-5
16-75
•aSBij.i'eo
tmS jo ^qgia \\
cwt.
105
12
11- 25
14
10- 5
12- 25
9-35
11- 12
8-42
11
11
11-25
'tmS jo qqgtaM
-la IOIOU5U3 >| « Ifl
^cosbcboxoootboocbooQOCq
«5 r~i rH tH
•T^toopA jmquj
ft. per sec.
1485
1614
1145
1222
1058
1239
1184
1066
1400
1300
1350
‘W jo jqSia^
lbs.
6
9
9
17-5
9
12
8-96
14-8
9
9
12
16
iO
* to C3 rH VO
.gqaipoqiprHipfHajqqjj-
,—lTHCXfHC:Xi^iHTHtHrHTHC'XCO
d
S
Om
O
l
6-pr. M.L. smooth-bore")
(bronze) . . . )
9-pr. M.L. smooth-bore 7
(bronze) . . )
12-pr. howitzer (bronze) ...
24-pr. howitzer (bronze) ...
9-pr. B.L. rifled gun (iron 7
and steel) . . . )
12-pr. B.L. rifled gun (iron 7
and steel) . )
4-pr. Prussian B.L.R. 7
(steel) . . . >
6-pr. Prussian B.L.R. \
(steel) . . . . . j
4-pr. French M.L.R. 7
(bronze) . . )
9-pr. Indian M.L.R. 7
(bronze) . j
12-pr. M.L. rifled gun (iron 7
and steel) . . )
16-pr. M.L. rifled gun (iron £
and steel) . . )
3 oi
51
I 8
a "
I |
co
r^S 0>
A 3
"Ha
S o
O <U
02 t3
® rt
•2 <“
-0 a
HO
35
264
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
And first as regards the liorse artillery. The bronze gun lately
adopted for both horse artillery and field batteries in India has a calibre
of 3 ins. and fires a projectile 9 lbs. in weight, while the iron gun of
the same weight and calibre (as previously stated) will fire efficiently a
12-pr. shell, having been designed in 1867 as a 12-pr. It has been
decided to give the horse artillery an 8 cwt. gun of 3 in. calibre : let us
see then whether it be possible also to give them 12-pr. ammunition,
and what advantages would be gained thereby. Of course we must
not increase the weight of the equipment above what it is at present,
viz., 33^ cwt., neither must we put too much strain upon our carriage.
124 rounds of 9-pr. ammunition are now carried in the limber and
wagon, and we can only carry about 100 of 12-pr. without raising
the weight. Taking into consideration the advantages of the increased
weight of projectile, can this number of rounds (100) be considered
sufficient for the expenditure in modern warfare ?
Unfortunately we have no reliable information of the expenditure of
ammunition, or of any artillery details, in the campaign now going on,
as until lately we have had no artillery officers attached to either army,
as was the case in 1866 in Bohemia, and now that we have sent some
able men, their hands seem tied, and those who are not made prisoners
tell us little or nothing of scientific interest. We can therefore only
take the war of 1866 as our guide, and extract the information required
for our purpose from Colonel Reilly's valuable report.
Now this report shews that on one occasion only, at the battle of
Pressburg, did a battery expend more than 100 rounds per gun, viz.,
110 rounds; and in the same action two other batteries fired 100 each
per gun.
At the four engagements of Nachod, Skalitz, Schweinschadel and
Gradlitz, which preceded the decisive battle of Koeniggratz, no single
gun of the artillery of the Prussian 5th Corps fired .more than 89
rounds altogether, that is, an average of about 22 rounds per action.
Having been thus engaged four times, this corps was, as might be
expected, put into the reserves at Koeniggratz and did not, I believe,
fire a shot.
Again, in the last-mentioned general action of about ten hours*
duration, Colonel Reilly states that the greater number of rounds
fired by any individual battery was about 81 per gun ; the next greatest
expenditure of a battery was 37 rounds per gun, while the rest of the
artillery engaged fired considerably less. He also informs us that the
average expenditure of the whole of the artillery engaged throughout
the campaign was only 1 1 rounds per gun per action !
Remembering then that we would be able, in the interval between
one action and another, to refill our limber and wagon from the spare
wagons of the second line and the reserves, 100 rounds appear suffi¬
cient to be carried with the gun, as they would more than cover the
average expenditure in a general action such as that of Koeniggratz.
As then we can only carry 100 rounds of 12-pr. ammunition as com¬
pared with 124 rounds of 9-pr., and keep the weight of our equipment
within the required limits, what advantages would we gain, by the
substitution of the heavier shell, to compensate for the reduction in
number?
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
265
Firstly tlie heavy projectile, when moving even with a much lower
velocity than the light one, will have more work stored up in it and
will consequently have greater penetration and destructive effect when
fired against houses, field works, or artillery carriages, for, firing
against troops, though the principal work of field guns, is not all that
they may be required to perform.
Again the segment and shrapnel shell will contain a larger number
of pieces or bullets, in the proportion of 56 to 42 or -Jrd more, not
taking into consideration the greater number of fragments from the
body of the shell.
But the most important point is that the projectile retains its velocity
for a longer time. The 9-pr. projectile, fired with special powder, has
an initial velocity of rather over 1400 ft., and the 12-pr. fired with the
same charge of 1 lb. 12 ozs. would start with a . velocity of about
1250 ft. a second ; if the charge be increased to Jth, or 2 lbs., the
velocity would then be about 1300 ft. a second. Now the diameter of
both being the same, the lighter shot will lose its velocity, from the
resistance of the air, much more rapidly than the heavy one, so that
the respective velocities at 1000 and 2000 yds. would be in round
numbers those shewn in the following table : —
Table IY.
Table shewing the Velocities of 9-pr. and 12 -pr. Projectiles ,
Charge.
Weight of
shell.
Velocity at
Muzzle.
1000 yds.
! 2000 yds.
lbs.
lbs.
•
1-75
9
1400
1000
840
1-75
12 i
1250
980
860
2
12
1300
1010
880
This shews that, supposing the two projectiles to be fired with the
same charge If lbs., the 9 lb. one will start with a much higher velocity
(150 ft. more) than the 121b. one, but that its velocity falls off much
more rapidly, so that at 1000 yds. range the difference is only 20 ft, and
at 2000 the tables are turned and the 12 lb. projectile will be moving
faster than the 9 lb. one.
Practically both shot will have sufficient velocity to be effective at
short ranges, but the 12-pr. will actually surpass the 9-pr. at between
1400 and 1500 yds., and will consequently be far superior to it at all
ranges above that, and, the longer the range, the more will this
superiority tell. If the charge with which the 12 lb. projectile is fired
be increased to 2 lbs. or -|th, you see that it will actually have a higher
velocity than the 91b. one even at 1000 yds., and therefore be very
much more effective at all ranges above that distance.
Now, in these days of accurate B.L. small-arms, will it be advisable.
266
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
not to say possible,, to maintain artillery in action at ranges much
under 1000 yds ., with any probability of being able to bring it out
again ? I think we may safely say that the ordinary fighting ranges
of artillery commence at about 1000 yds., and it appears that at these
ranges the larger projectile will not only have the advantage of a larger
number of bullets and splinters, but that this larger number will be
moving at a higher velocity, so that the probability of striking the
object aimed at will be greatly increased. This is when used as a shell.
If used as a shot against guns, houses, &c. &c., the superiority is even
more marked, as the energy or work stored up in a shot is represented
by the mass multiplied by the square of the velocity. In fact all the
advantages claimed, and established, for the M.L. 9-pr. gun over our
present service 9-pr. and 12-pr. B.L. guns, apply with equal force to
this same gun used as a 12-pr. instead of a 9-pr.
The drift of the whole argument is this. A 3 in. calibre cannot be
equally suitable for firing a 91b. and a 121b. shot, and, as it appears
that better results can be obtained from this calibre with the heavier
projectile, it follows that to fire the lighter one with perfect efficiency
its diameter should be reduced. I am now only speaking of the advan¬
tage gained in velocity. There are undoubtedly practical advantages
to be gained by having one gun for both horse artillery and light field
batteries, but it does not necessarily follow that the same ammunition
should be fired, as, on an emergency, the different ammunitions would
be interchangeable.
I may mention here that it is very doubtful whether the bronze 3-inch
gun can be made into an efficient 12-pr., on account of the expansion
of the bore with the heavy charge, and the consequent danger of the
studs leaving the grooves. This is an argument which applies as much
to sound as to unsound pure bronze, and bears against the introduction
of that material, for home service, and in favour of the compound iron
and steel gun.
It may be objected that the carriage adopted for the 9-pr. gun will not
be strong enough to stand the additional strain thrown on it by the
extra charge, and that the recoil will be excessive. Now the endurance
of the carriage can only be determined by actual experiment, but, con¬
sidering the test to which it was subjected by Major-General Eardley-
Wilmoks Committee, I cannot think that there need be any fear of
its failing. The Committee report that 3026 rounds were fired from
one carriage, and 3746 from another, and that “ during the firing of
500 rounds with ^th and Jth charges, the (latter) carriage was lashed
to posts in front of the platform, so as entirely to stop recoil. The
only injuries caused were — one spoke cracked, and the right axle-tree
band broken through at angle.”
This brings us to the question of recoil, which would undoubtedly
be considerable if unrestrained. As however we have not been
deterred from introducing into the service our enormous heavy guns
by the difficulty of restraining their recoil, but have worked out
the problem so satisfactorily that we can now safely bring up a
2 5 -ton gun firing 70 lbs. of powder in the space of two or three
feet, surely, if it be an object to do so, some simple means can be
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
267
devised whereby the recoil of a field gun may be checked without
damage to the carriage ! Whether this be possible or not, a matter
of two or three feet more recoil would scarcely seem a sufficient
argument against our increasing the power of our guns in the manner
proposed, for the arguments in favour of a 12 lb. projectile would
appear to be irresistible, provided that it be allowed that 100 rounds
are sufficient for horse artillery to carry in their limber and wagon.
If, on the other hand, it be considered that the evidence of the one
campaign in Bohemia is not sufficient to justify us in reducing the
number of rounds below what it at present is, it would seem from the
foregoing table of velocities that the 9-pr. gun should have a calibre of
less than 3 ins.
The field battery gun next claims our attention.
As it has been considered advisable to give the horse artillery an
8 cwt. gun, and the advantages of increased calibre and weight of pro¬
jectile being well recognised, we should undoubtedly give our ordinary
batteries as heavy a piece as is consistent with celerity of movement.
And here I would point out that the weight of the equipment of our
present B.L. rifled 12-pr. is considerably less than that of the smooth¬
bore gun and howitzer which it was intended to replace, viz., the 9-pr.
gun and 24-pr. howitzer, though I am unable to discover any com¬
plaints of the weight of these guns and their equipments being
excessive. Moreover by the introduction of rifled guns we have up to
the present time lost entirely one important projectile, viz., an efficient
common shell ; in fact we have nothing to take the place of the old
24-pr. howitzer in this respect. Seeing then this want, can we now
give our batteries a rifled gun of sufficient calibre to fire an efficient
common shell, and still keep the weight of draught within that which
has previously been allowed to our field battery carriages ?
A gun has lately been made, weighing 12 cwt., which *will fire a 161b.
shell with a charge of 3 lbs. of powder, the calibre of the gun being
3‘6 ins. A common shell of this calibre and weight, and of the proper
length for good shooting, will contain a bursting charge of over ljlb.,
that of the 24-pr. common shell being only 13 ozs. The shrapnel shell
will contain 134 bullets, that for the B.L. 12-pr. containing 56. Both
these projectiles, moving with the high velocity which it is proposed to
give them (1350 ft.), will be much more efficient and destructive than
any missiles taken into the field by any artillery at the present time.
The question is can we carry a sufficient number of them ? Now the
average weight of one round will be 19 lbs., so that six rounds will
weigh about 1 cwt. The iron carriages now used can be made much
lighter than the former pattern made of wood, which has the double
advantage of both causing the carriage to be less injured by the shock
of discharge, and also of enabling us to carry the reduced weig'ht in the
shape of more ammunition.
Now the carriage designed for the 16-pr. gun is very little heavier
than that for the 9-pr. of 8 cwt., and will probably be about 11^ cwt.
The limber is the same weight 10 \ cwt., and, assuming that we can
allow the same weight to our equipment as that of the old 9-pr. S.B.
gun, viz. 40 cwt., we have 6^ cwt. to devote to stores and ammunition.
268
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
The stores for the 9-pr. M.L. weigh about 1 cwt., and therefore If cwt.
would appear to be sufficient to allow for the 16-pr. This leaves
4f cwt., which represents 28 rounds of ammunition, 12 in each limber
box and 2 in each axle-tree box. Similarly, the wagon body and
limber when empty weigh 23f cwt. : the stores probably not more
than 2% cwt., giving 14f cwt. for ammunition, which represents 84
rounds, or 14 rounds in each box. We should thus carry with the gun
and wagon 112 rounds while the draught of each would be about
40 cwt., or 3 cwt. less than that of the present 12-pr. B.L. wagon :
this of course only includes the stores which are allowed for in the
statement of the weights of the 9-pr. M.L.R. equipment.
The recoil of this 16-pr. gun will probably be as great, if not greater,
than that of an 8 cwt. 12-pr. fired with a charge of 2 lbs., and any
objection which applies to one, will apply with equal force to the other.
But, as has been before stated, the question of recoil appears to be one
which ought to be readily overcome by the mechanical skill of the
present age.
And now, gentlemen, I have reached the limit of what I proposed to
say, and also, I greatly fear, of your patience. I have endeavoured, as
stated at the outset, to bring before you some facts bearing upon the
question under discussion, and also to draw from them only such con¬
clusions as they would' appear undoubtedly to warrant, avoiding, as far
as possible, the introduction of any new theories or hobbies of my own.
The armament of our field artillery is a question which admits of
such diversity of opinion, and is moreover one of such importance, that
it should be approached with an unbiassed mind, and be discussed
without “fear, favour, or affection.” If to-day I have been fortunate
enough to bring forward even one piece of information which was not
previously known to all of you, and which may in any way assist in the
solution of the question, I shall feel amply rewarded for my labour.
At the conclusion of the reading, which was warmly applauded,
Colonel Phillpotts again invited discussion.
Lieut. -Colonel Miller, 'FC.j R.A., asked the lecturer if the size as
well as the weight of the projectiles for the 16-pr. shell gun had been
considered in estimating the number of rounds to be carried ?
Lieut. Jones replied that this had been considered. The ammunition
boxes for the 16-pr. gun are, he understood, the same size as those for
the 9-pr.
Major-General Leeroy, C.B., R.A., asked whether the statement made
by the lecturer as to one in every three bronze guns being spoiled in the
casting was borne out by the books of the Department of a date prior
to 1815 ? There were comparatively few guns cast after that for many
years, and the art seems to have been in some measure lost, for there
were many failures when casting was resumed at the time of the Russian
war, as there was said to be now.
Lieut. Jones. — I cannot fix the date, but it was at the end of last
century.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
Colonel Phillpotts. — And also in the days of Mr. Schalch and Mr.
King’.
Major- General Leeroy said it seemed remarkable, considering’ the
tenor of the lecture they had heard, that in the present war nearly all
the field g’uns in use, both by the French and the Prussians, were of
bronze, and also that the Admiralty are constantly making’ very large
bronze castings for ships* screws, without failure. When he was at
Spandau, in 1869, the Prussians were re-casting their old smooth-bore
bronze guns into new rifled guns, being dissatisfied with steel. He
should not like to have it said that other nations could make bronze
guns, and that we could not.
Captain Strange, R.A., said, with regard to the Prussian use of bronze,
their guns being breech-loaders, they got oyer the difficulty as to the
rush of the gas over the shot, by covering the projectile with a lead
coating which fitted the grooves and allowed no space for the escape
of gas. He had noticed, however, in the section of the horse artillery
gun, that the guttering was not so much in the grooves as in the lands,
and it surprised one to hear that in other cases the failure had been in
the grooves, because the stud resting in the grooves prevents a rush of
gas between them and the surface of the groove. Then as to equipment.
In the short campaign which the lecturer had quoted on the subject of
proportions of ammunition, the artillery arm of the service had been
terribly abused, but the fact was that it had not been brought suffi¬
ciently into action. So the Prussian “ Retrospect** stated; and this
ought to be taken into consideration before the experience gained in
that war was taken as a datum to show the number of rounds it was
necessary to take into action. And while on the subject of equipment,
he submitted for consideration whether we do not now carry with our
field guns a good deal of useless rubbish on the gun and its limber
which ought to be left behind with the wagons — (laughter) — soldiers*
valises, knapsacks, camp-kettles, and twenty-four carbines — he need
not go on. (Laughter and applause.) Bell tents might be exchanged
for “ tente d’ abri.” He might answer the question of Colonel Miller as
to the packing of the limber boxes, by saying that the 12-pr. shell
for the 9-pr. gun occupied no more space on the bottom of the box,
being longer, but of the same diameter as the 9-pr. projectile. They
only formed a higher wall round their cartouch-box. (Applause.)
Captain Strange also asked the lecturer whether it had ever been
thought desirable to line bronze guns with steel or wrought-iron, on the
Palliser principle ?
Captain C. Orde Browne, R.A., wished to remind the lecturer that the
number of rounds each gun might be expected to have available for
firmg in action bore only a certain proportion to the number of shot or
shell it was necessary to carry ; because while it was desirable to be
prepared for every emergency with case shot, common shell, and
shrapnel, the particular circumstances in which the gun is placed
probably render one description only suitable. Thus it is not to be
expected (unless under exceptional circumstances) that a gun would be
called upon to expend the whole of its ammunition of all kinds. For
instance, case shot cannot be used at long ranges, and even before the
270
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
supply of ammunition is reduced to this the gun would have been firing
common shell, which he would remind his hearers would form a very
poor substitute for shrapnel for use against troops. (Heap, hear.)
Lieut. Jones, in reply, said that Captain Strange's observations as
to the deterioration of the bronze guns having, according to his
experience, been caused by scoring in the lands rather than in the
grooves , was due to the fact that the windage over the body of the
projectile is much greater than that over the studs. Therefore the gas,
rushing over the shot, eats out the defective spots in the lands, while
the studs prevent this occurring to the same extent in the grooves.
This difficulty would be avoided if the metal could be cast sound, but,
even if sound, the defect of expansion remained, causing a tendency of
the studs to leave the grooves, as happened in the 20-pr. howitzer,
a plaster cast of which he exhibited. The wear of the driving side of
the grooves near the seat of the charge is also shewn to be considerable
by the gutta-percha impressions of sound bronze guns laid on the table.
On this account he considered that bronze, however sound, was inferior
to steel for an inner barrel. Then, as to lining bronze with iron or
steel ; the subject had certainly been considered, but the proposition
was really impracticable, owing to the variation in the expansion of the
different metals when subjected to heat, which would soon render the
tube loose and the gun unserviceable. (Hear, hear.) With regard to
the proportion of ammunition to be carried, he must not be understood
as attempting to lay down any law respecting the number of rounds
necessary to be carried. He submitted the statements in his paper in
order that those who were better capable of judging might recognise
the advantages of the heavy projectile.
Colonel Milward, C.B., B.A., said a good reason why the guttering
was more over the lands than in the grooves was that the windage
was much greater over the lands than over the studs. The practice
now going on proved more clearly every day that the windage allowed
over the studs of the 9-pr. muzzle-loading ammunition was too small,
as the tendency of the projectile to jam was constantly experienced.
Colonel Phillpotts. — This applies equally to the iron gun.
Colonel Milward. — I spoke of either the steel or bronze.
Lieut. Jones. — But was not the windage fixed in order to save the
bronze gun ?
Colonel Milward. — Certainly ; that was so.
Colonel Phillpotts said he differed from Captain Strange in one
remark, and that was his proposed abolition of bell tents and camp*
kettles. (Laughter.) He quite agreed with him as to the inutility of
carrying twenty-four carbines, and the desirability of reducing the
soldiers' kit, but rather than discontinue the use of bell tents and have
recourse to tente d’abri , he would do even more if necessary to save the
men from exposure on service. (Hear, hear.) It would take rather a
large tente d}abri to cover a tall soldier like Captain Strange. (Laughter
and applause.)
Major-General Leeroy said, as a reduction of the equipment had
been referred to, he would call attention to one way of getting rid of
some of the surplus weight. They now carried their spare wheels on
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
271
the wagon, which was about as reasonable as carrying their spare horses.
(Laughter.) Each of these wheels represented nearly 2 cwt., which
they had to carry because no one had been ingenious enough to make
them run after the guns, with the spare horses to drag them. (Hear,
hear, and a laugh.) There was no reason why this should not be done,
and the best means of effecting it was very well worthy of the attention
of officers.
Lieut. Logan, R.A., said another plan, not of reducing weight, but of
saving the shaft horse by the introduction of some kind of break, was
desirable. The shaft horse at present was unduly worked in comparison
with the rest of the team, and now that axle-tree seats were likely to
be allowed, the break could be easily worked, which would not only
save the shaft horse in halting and going down hill, but would avoid
frequent damage to the harness, as also the delay caused by having to
apply the drag -shoe.
Colonel Phillpotts said that about twelve months ago a self-acting
break was proposed by a Plymouth man, but he supposed it was thought
too complicated for gun-carriages.
Lieut. H. B. R. Harvey, R.A., asked if General Lefroy could give them
any information as to the proportion of failures in the manufacture of
bronze guns for the Prussian army, and also the failures in the bronze
castings of screws for vessels for the Admiralty, to which he had referred.
Major-General Leeroy replied that he was unable to give any facts
on the subject, except that when he was in the arsenal at Spandau he
had a great deal of conversation on the subject of bronze guns, and
heard nothing of failures or difficulties of manufacture.
Lieut. Harvey. — And were there no cases of failure in the bronze
castings for the Admiralty ?
Major-General Leeroy. — I cannot say.
Colonel Younghusband, R.A., said he thought it was a mistake to say
that the service guns in the Prussian army were of bronze. He should
say, on the contrary, that all the field guns now in use by the Prussians
were of steel. He believed that they had certainly decided upon adopt¬
ing bronze, but the whole of their field batteries were still composed of
steel guns.
Major-General Leeroy said, if that were so, what had the Prussians
done with the bronze guns which they were casting in large numbers
in 1869, for the gun department of the arsenal at Spandau was full of
them ?*
Colonel Younghusband said his belief was that the Prussians had
* Extract from a letter of Major-General Beauchamp Walker, dated 28th January, 1871.
Communicated by Major-General Lefroy : — “I saw a battery of bronze 6-pr. guns (141b. shot)
yesterday parked near Virofiag. I think that there were 600 new bronze field guns ready before
the campaign. The number is just as likely to have been 900. If I see anybody who can tell me
how many batteries were brought with the army, I will write again. The one I saw yesterday
belongs to the lltli Army Corps.” In a subsequent letter, dated 20th February, General Walker
said : — “ One bronze field battery has been with the 3rd Army from the commencement of the war,
and four or five more have come at different times, so that there are now 30 or 40 of these guns
with this army.” See also the “Times” military correspondence, February 20, 1871, for evidence
to the same effect.
36
272
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
made no bronze field guns except for tbe purposes of experiment.
When he was at Spandau, in 1869, he saw none but those made for
experimental purposes.
Colonel Domville, R.A., asked whether this apparent discrepancy of
evidence did not arise from a difference of date ; one officer speaking
of 1869 and the other of 1870. (Hear, hear.)
The discussion being ended —
Colonel Pbillpotts, in the name of the meeting, returned thanks to
Lieut. Jones for his lecture, the meeting endorsing the sentiment by
loud applause.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
273
THE MERITS OF A
LARGE BORE AND SMALL BORE CONTRASTED,
WITH REFERENCE TO
RIFLED ARTILLERY AND SMALL-ARMS.
A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, EER. 17, 1871,
LIEUTENANT J. SLADEN, R.A.,
ASSISTANT INSTRUCTOR, ROYAL LABORATORY.
Major-General J. H. Lefboy, C.B., R.A. in the Chair.
Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen : — The subject which it is proposed to
consider to-day is one which is calculated to provoke a good deal of
discussion ; and the opinions of individual officers on these controverted
points are so many and so numerous, that I cannot hope that everything
I bring forward for your consideration will meet with the approbation
of all parties ; but I do hope that the discussion of these matters by
officers who are most concerned in them, will have practically the good
effect of merging onr different notions into one harmonious whole,
which is, I believe intended by ns all ; viz., the good of the service.
In order to obtain the. best results with any gun or rifle, the diameter
of the bore must bear a certain proportion to the weight of the projectile
intended to be carried on service, due regard being paid to the mobility
and efficiency of the various parts of the equipment ; and the power of
the gun depends considerably upon the selection of the best proportions.
It is necessary to fix upon one of these elements as a standard to
judge by, e.g., either the diameter or weight. The weight of the pro¬
jectile seems to be the most practical standard to start from, since upon
that, mainly depends the number of rounds that can be carried into
action.
This will then be considered first with regard to small-arms. For
range, penetration and accuracy the heaviest bullet should be used
consistent with the requisite number of rounds of ammunition which
the soldier can carry into action. The weight of the bullet in the
Martini- Henry, Snider, and the needle gun is about 480 grs. ; and this
is about the heaviest that can be carried with efficiency. Sixty rounds
of Boxer ammunition Pattern VIII, for the Snider-Enfield packed as
274
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
for service weigh. 6 lbs. 4 ozs. 7 drs., while sixty rounds of the Boxer
Henry cartridge for the Martini-Henry rifle weigh 6 lbs. 10 ozs. 10 drs.
Any increase of weight beyond this, would be likely seriously to affect
the carrying of a sufficient number of rounds into action.
The question now becomes ; what diameter of bore should be given
to a rifle, so as to produce the greatest effect with this 480 gr. bullet ?
The Committee on Small-arms, from experiments extending over some
considerable period of time have answered the question practically and
conclusively — viz., *45 in. for the Martini-Henry, rather than *5 or *577 in.,
which latter is the diameter of the bore of the Snider-Enfield.
What has been the result ? Simply this ; increased range, greater
accuracy, flatter trajectory, and greater penetration, besides other im¬
provements not connected with the subject matter in hand. Thus, the
Martini-Henry is a much more powerful rifle than the Snider although
firing the same weight of bullet. In the Snider, we have an instance of
adapting a certain weight of bullet to suit a rifle already made ; while
in the Martini-Henry the rifle was made to suit the weight of bullet.
It is evident in the case of the Snider, that power is sacrificed, on
account of having such a large bore.
The same principle applies to guns — a gun may be made with too
large a bore to project effectively a certain weight of projectile.
Now let us consider a method of determining the comparative “ poiver 33
of different guns with reference to the weight of projectile and diameter
of bore. This “ power 33 means (other things being equal), greater
accuracy, flatter trajectory, greater penetration and greater range, — or
it may be stated in other words to be the power which a gun has of
hurling a projectile through the air, so as to lose the least velocity
over a given range.
This must not be confounded with the “energy” of the projectile,
i.e.} the work stored up in it "at any given time.
In Table I. a comparison is made of the power of different rifles and
guns (supposing them to have the same muzzle velocity) i.e., the power
which the projectiles they throw have to overcome the resistance of the air.
I need hardly remind you that the velocity of a projectile is continually
being reduced by the resistance whidh the air opposes to its motion —
whence it follows that the less resistance which the air opposes to a
projectile, the greater will be its remaining velocity, and consequently it
will travel faster and range farther. Just on the same principle if two
trains of the same weight are travelling at the same rate, and steam is
shut off both at the same instant, and to one the break is applied, so as
to cause resistance to motion, this one comes to rest sooner than the
other, and travels over a shorter distance. This by the way, serves to
illustrate the importance of determining experimentally the actual resist¬
ance of the air to projectiles in motion.
There are two mechanical reasons which affect this question of
velocity, which should be kept distinct from one another.
(1) The resistance of the air ; which to similarly shaped projectiles
varies as the square of the diameter , thereby tending to reduce the velocity
in that ratio.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
275
(2) The weight of the projectile ; in proportion to which it is enabled
to overcome the resistance opposed to it, so that the greater the weight
the more power the projectile has of overcoming the resistance. For
instance, a heavy train requires more resistance to bring it np than a
light one, supposing both to be travelling at the same rate.
Combining these two reasons into one statement, we say that the
power of overcoming the resistance of the air for any gun varies directly
as the w eight of the projectile it throws, and inversely as the square of
the diameter of the bore.
Thus,
T, c weight of projectile in lbs.
rower or gun a - n - ; — : — - —
square of the diameter m inches
supposing the projectiles to have the same muzzle velocity. (See
Table I.)
Table I.
m
Table shelving the relative Tower of Guns in the Service.
Nature of gun.
Weight of
shot.
Diameter
of bore.
I
Weight in lbs.
Square of dia¬
meter in inches.
Snider-Enfield . . .
480 grs.
ins.
0-577
206
M artini- Henry .
480 it
0-45
339
9-pr. M.L .
9 lbs.
8-0
1000
12-pr. M.L .
12 „
3-0
1333
16-pr. M.L . . . .
16 «
3-6
1234
20-pr. B.L .
20 »*
3-75
1422
64-pr. M.L .
64 ,,
6-3
1613
7-inch M.L . . .
115 «
7-0
2347
9-inch M.L. . .
250 b
9-0
3083
10-inch M.L .
400 d
10-0
4000
16-pr. M.L .
16
3-4
1384
16-pr. M.L .
16
•
3-3
1469
I know that practical men place very little faith in mathematical
formulae, and I believe they are right to a certain extent, for the basis
of many mathematical formulae is only a hypothetical condition not pre¬
cisely true in actual practice ; but this does not belong to that category,
for it is the expression of an actual experimental fact, verified by
Professor Bashforth in his experiments at Shoeburyness on this parti¬
cular subject.
Now let us compare by this method the “power” of the Martini-
Henry and Snider rifles, both of which throw a 480 gr. bullet.
Martini-Henry
w _ -06857
d2 “ (-45)2
w _ *08857
d 2 " (-577 f
= -0339
= *0208
Snider
276
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Thus the Martini-Henry bullet has more than half as much power
again to overcome the resistance of the air than that of the Snider-
Enfield, and consequently does not lose its velocity so quickly ;
whereas, the weight of bullet to be carried is the same.
One of the chief reasons of the superiority of the French musketry
over that of the Prussians in the present war has been their quickness
to discover the advantages possessed by a small bore over a large bore
for small- arms ; although unhappily for them their foresight did not
extend to their field artillery. The Chassepot has a bore of about *44 in.
in diameter and fires a 380 gr. bullet. Comparing this with the Martini-
Henry, we have
w _ *05428
d 2 ~~ (-44)2
= *0280
i.e., the power of the Martini-Henry is to that of the Chassepot as 339
to 280.
Here, it may be said is an instance of a larger bore *45 in. beating
a smaller one *44 in., in power &c. To which I reply, it is not, small
bores as small bores that I advocate, but the proper relation of the
weight of the projectile to the square of its diameter. Much controversy
has arisen between the advocates of large bores and small bores, as well
as between the advocates of breech-loading and muzzle-loading’, from
not distinguishing between things that differ, and not considering that
these questions are only means to an end , but are not the end itself, which
of course is the greatest efficiency possible under existing circumstances.
For instance, the “ Times ” correspondent writes “ those miserable
French mazzle-loaders,” and is ready to indulge in an invective at
what he is pleased to call “ Woolwich-ism 33 — apparently not knowing
that at present we have muzzle-loading guns at least equal to any
breech-loader that could be brought against us.
But to return, it has been suggested that a 380 gr. bullet would be
heavy enough to fire from the Martini-Henry rifle, i.e., a bullet 100 grs.
lighter than the present one. No doubt the soldier would be able to
carry a few more rounds into action ; but firing that weight of bullet
out of the same bore as the Martini-Henry would make the rifle inferior
in power to the Chassepot ; so that now is the time before the rifle is
definitely introduced into the service to settle absolutely the weight of
the bullet that should be carried, taking all things into consideration ;
for any decrease from the present weight will decrease the power of the
rifle. To make it of corresponding power with the reduced weight of
the bullet, the diameter of the bore must be reduced proportionally.
The grand maxim to remember is this ; that the weight of the projectile
must be absolutely fixed upon, before a sound basis of construction can
be found in order to obtain the greatest power out of any gun or rifle.
Any deviation from this rule, i.e., any attempt to make a gun shoot a
particular projectile must always be attended with loss of power. The
mistake of adopting a rifled small-arm of comparatively large bore has
already necessitated, the introduction of a new arm.
Table II. shows the comparative velocities of the Martini-Henry,
Chassepot, Snider and needle gun, from which it may be seen how the
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
277
ratio of tlie diameter of tlie bore to the weight of the bullet affects the
velocities of the various rifles.
Table II.
Comparative Table of Velocities of Rifles used by the English, French,
and German Infantry .
Distance.
Chassepot.
Martini-
Henry.
Snider-
Enfield.
Needle gun.
yds.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
0
1391
1334
1262
991
50
1288
1254
1147
951
100
1199
1182
1054
914
150
1120
1119
992
882
200
1054
1064
946
—
250
1009
1021
905
—
300
971
988
868
—
350
938
958
—
—
400
908
932
—
_
450
880
908
—
—
500
855
885
—
—
The Snider has a muzzle velocity of 1262 f.s., but owing’ to its large
bore, the resistance of the air reduces the velocity to 1147 f.s. in the
first 50 yds., thus losing 115 f.s. in 50 yds. ; while the Martini- Henry
starts with a muzzle velocity of 1334 f.s. and only loses 80 f.s. in 50 yds.
The distances at which the velocities of the respective bullets would
be reduced to about 880 f.s. are for
yds.
Martini-Henry . 500
Chassepot . 450
Snider-Enfield . 284
Needle gun . 150
This will give some idea of their respective ranges. The 'Martini-
Henry and Chassepot rifles fire the same weight of charge (85 grs,), but
different weights of bullets (the Chassepot bullet being about 100 grs.
lighter) — consequently it is projected with a greater velocity, viz._>
1391 f.s. as against 1334 f.s. in the Martini-Henry : but the bore being
larger proportionally to the weight in the Chassepot than in the Martini-
Henry, that velocity is more quickly reduced; so that at 150 yds. from
their muzzles, they have the same velocity (1120 f.s.), and at about
350 yds. the Martini-Henry bullet catches up that of the Chassepot,
and goes ahead of it increasingly ; and so ranges farther.
The same state of things takes place when two projectiles of different
weights are fired with the same charge of powder out of the same gun.
For instance, the 3-inch wrought-iron and steel muzzle-loading gun of
8J cwt. if fired with a charge of 1 lb. 12 ozs. and a 91b. shell, has a
higher muzzle velocity than when fired with the same charge and a
12 lb, shell; but in the former case the velocity is more quickly reduced
by the resistance of the air on account of the greater sectional area it
278
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
opposes to it in proportion to the weight of the shell — so that for an
extended range the 12 lb. shell has the greatest advantage even in
f atness of trajectory, while at all ranges it has the advantage both for
shrapnel (in having a larger number of bullets) and for common shell
(in having a larger bursting charge), besides having greater “ energy.”
This brings us to the consideration of the second branch of the
subject with reference to field artillery. The same principle, which I
have before stated with regard to small-arms, holds for field guns.
The first thing to be determined is the weight of the projectile which
can be conveniently carried in the limbers of a battery, — and the heavier
the better consistent with the mobility both of gun and carriage.
This is a question which I think should be decided absolutely before
the gun is constructed by the general consent of officers who have had
practical experience in actual campaigning, and should have the greatest
possible ventilation, so as to collect the opinion of all who are capable
of giving one: always remembering this, that (c ceteris paribus) the heavier
the projectile the greater the power of the gun ; so that it is very
important to carry the maximum weight of projectile consistent with
the mobility both of gun and carriage.
This being done, the calibre of the gun should be determined so as
to give on the whole the best practical results ; and this is a point
which requires the closest consideration before the matter is definitely
settled. The tendency of all improvements in rifled arms is to increase
the ratio of the weight to the diameter of the projectile.
Table I. shows the comparative power of many of the service rifled
guns, from which it appears that the power of the gun generally increases
as the projectile increases in weight.
Comparing field guns and small- arms, it is evident that the latter can
never compete in power and range with field artillery ; hence mitrailleuses
although useful in their way up to 1200 or 1400 yds. can never compete
with field guns when properly constructed; but it becomes imperative
on us to get the greatest mechanical advantage out of the guns that we
possibly can. To neglect this is to throw away an advantage which a
heavy projectile puts us into the possession of.
But it may be said, if this is the case, where will you draw the line
in reducing the diameter of the bore ? It is only reviving Sir J.
Whitworth’s notion. He tried it and failed ?
Perhaps it is not very generally known that we have in the service a
Whitworth rifle of *45 in. in diameter introduced in the year 1863 — in
fact, so far as bore and twist is concerned, much the same as the
Martini-Henry, so that to Sir J. Whitworth is mainly due the credit
of first pointing out the advantage of small bores.
But then what about his guns ? Well, he carried his notions beyond
practical limits.: being a good mechanician he saw the advantage to be
obtained, but being an indifferent artillerist he overlooked the practical
difficulties — one of the principal of which is the burning of the powder
in the bore — he could not burn enough powder to project his shot with
as much velocity as his rival, and so for comparatively short ranges
failed in the competition. Hence we arrive at a practical limit to the
reduction of the bore, it must not be so much reduced as to fail in
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
279
burning the greatest charge with which the projectile is to be fired: —
but it should be reduced to that limit; and no doubt as there is consider¬
able surplus strength in the field guns,, a quicker burning powder might
be made if necessary. Sir J. Whitworth seems to have corrected his
mistake in the 12-prs. he has recently supplied to the French Govern¬
ment. He fires a 121b. shell with 2 lbs. of powder out of a 2*75 in.
bore with a twist of about 1 turn in 18*2 calibres. Another practical
difficulty in the reduction of the bore is the consequent decrease in the
capacity of the shell for bursting charge — no doubt we can go too far
in that direction, but the juste milieu in this, and other matters is the
great thing to be obtained. On the other hand, it is easy to have a
shell with a large bursting charge, by sacrificing the range accuracy
and penetration of the gun — and a great deal has been said about the
advisability of introducing howitzer batteries, as in the old smooth-bore
equipment. „
It was necessary in those days to have howitzers to throw a shell with
large bursting charge, because there was no means of increasing the
internal capacity of shell, otherwise than by increasing the diameter of
the bore — but now when by increasing the length of the shell, the
bursting charge can be increased proportionately, there seems to be
only the necessity of having two shells of different lengths, with dif¬
ferent capacities for bursting charge, to perform all the functions of the
old howitzer and gun batteries, without the disadvantages consequent
thereon. In fact, with a properly constructed rifled gun, i.e.} one with
sufficient twist to spin a long projectile, the specialities of the old
howitzer and field gun would be imitated in one gun by a variation in
the length and weight of the projectiles, thus having a common shell
for use as a gun battery, and a double shell for use as a howitzer
battery. It does not seem advisable to make a compromise between
the two, i.e.3 between a gun and a howitzer ; which would in reality
effect neither purpose to the greatest advantage.
How comes the question of mobility; (1) for horse artillery acting
with cavalry, (2) for field batteries and horse artillery of the reserve,
(3) for heavy field batteries or field batteries of reserve.
The weight of the projectile being fixed upon in each case ; what is
the maximum weight of gun and carriage that can be allowed so as to
keep within the bounds of efficient mobility ?
This point was I think well and ably determined by a “ Committee
of Superior Officers of the Royal Artillery appointed to consider whether
the rifled field guns to be hereafter constructed should be on a breech¬
loading or a muzzle -loading system, and to report what calibres are
desirable to be introduced Tor the various branches of field service.”
Sir Richard Dacres was President, and Colonel Miller Secretary to
the Committee. Their report was published on the 4th of December,
1866 — an extract from it is as follows : —
“ For Horse Artillery.- — The Committee recommend a gun of not less than 3 ins.
calibre, length of bore not to exceed 60 ins., and weight not to exceed 6 c?vt. ; weight
of projectile to be 9 lbs., or thereabouts.
“ For Field Batteries. — A gun of not less than 8 ins. in calibre, length of bore not
37
280
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
to exceed 7 2 iris., and weight not to exceed 8 cwt., weight of projectile to he 12 lbs.
or thereabouts.”
All the above guns to be of one uniform calibre.
“Heavy Field Batteries, or Field Batteries of Reserve. — The Committee unani¬
mously agreed that it is necessary to have in the field some batteries of more powerful
guns than the rifled 9 or 12-prs., not because they would command a greater range,
or possess superior accuracy to those pieces, but on account of their throwing larger
common shells, more formidable shrapnel (or segment) shells, and more destructive
case shot. Such guns would be certainly more effective for the attack or defence
of entrenched positions, and frequently for covering important movements, or for
co-operating with reserves at the critical moment of a general action.”
They also reported “ that the balance of advantages is in favour of
muzzle-loading field guns, and that they should be manufactured here¬
after.”
I will next quote an extract from a letter written to me on the subject
by Major W. Stirling, R.A., with regard to mobility : —
“ I expect officers differ very largely on the point of weights for field artillery,
but the way I look at it is this — six horses are as many as can work together in a
team over broken ground without great loss of power, and therefore in calculating-
weights I think they should be what six horses can manage.
“In the ‘Handbook of Field Service’ I see 5 cwt. per horse is the maximum
weight allowed for a team, and consequently this would fix the weight for the team
of six at 30 cwt. This however I would hardly call the maximum weight for this
reason, that I see the present horse artillery gun moving with cavalry (i.e., the 9-pr.
Armstrong breech-loader), and over rough ground, tolerably easily , with six horses ;
and its weight is according to the Report of the Indian Committee in the autumn
of 1869 — 36 cwt. 2 qrs. 3 lbs. or over 6 cwt. per horse.
“ In the same way our field battery gun weighs behind the team 41 cwt. 0 qrs.
14 lbs., or nearly 7 cwt. per horse of team of six ; and I think it is a fair specimen
of the maximum weight for our field batteries.
“I think 36 cwt. quite the maximum for horse artillery; I do not mean that
necessarily all the horse artillery should be armed with this gun ; but all that part
which has to work with cavalry should not exceed, and if possible should be 3 or
4 cwt. under 36 cwt.
“ The horse artillery in the reserve might have a gun the same weight as that of
field batteries with advantage, on the same principle, and with the same object,
that we had 9-pr. troops of horse artillery at the close of the Crimean war.
“Eight horses are allowed to the 12-pr. on service, and properly so; when the
draught is straight, and the ground fairly even, the extra pair may be worked with
advantage ; and where circumstances do not favour the four pair being worked,
they may relieve the weaker horses of the team here and there, and so enable you
to carry on farther. I think however that our horses could not manage a heavier
load , nor do I think our gunners could handle a heavier gun than this 12-pr.
Armstrong in the field ; consequently I say 41 cwt. is the maximum for field bat¬
teries. There is one special point I think should be brought to the front just now
in discussing these points, and it is the great difference in the weight of gun and
wagon, both in the horse artillery and field batteries. In both of these I think the
wagons are too heavy .
Guns. Wagons,
cwt. qr. lb. cwt. qr. lb.
9-pr. B.L., R.H.A . . 36 2 3 48 0 16
12-pr. B.L., Field Batteries . 41 0 4 54 3 15
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
281
“ Wagons have to go where guns go ; they get the worst drivers, the worst horses,
and are allowed a smaller number of them, and yet their weights are in each case
Jrd more. It will be objected that this is including the men (mounted) ; so it is,
but removing the men’s weight throughout, we still find that the horse artillery
wagon exceeds the weight of gun by ith of the gun’s weight.
“ The battery wagon exceeds the weight of its gun by ^th the gun’s weight.
“ At present the gunners in a field battery must be carried on the wagon, when
moving at any pace exceeding a walk from one position to another ; and 9 cwt. per
horse is more than we find they can manage. In China the wagons of Armstrong
batteries stuck in the mud, and the wagon bodies had to be detached from the
limbers, and left till next day ; fortunately the limbers carried all the ammunition
that was required at “Sinho;” but this was a terrible mess for a field battery to
be in, and we should have heard more of it, if enterprising Uhlans or Cossacks
had been hovering on our wake. I think the weight of the wagons, either in horse
artillery or field batteries should not exceed the weight of the gun (in neither case
including the weight of men.)”
The weights behind gun team given by Major Stirling for the 9-pr.
and 12-pr. Armstrong include the weight of two men mounted and
their kits : but in Table III. which I have prepared from various sources
(principally from the Report of the Indian Gun Committee, and Captain
Majendie’s Report on his official visit to Belgium), the weights behind
gun team in no case include the weight of the men. The table shows
at a glance, the nature and weights of guns used by various continental
powers in comparison with our own.
Thus, the weight of the 9-pr. muzzle-loading gun for the R.H.A.
behind team is 35 cwt., i.e., nearly 3J cwt. heavier than the 9-pr.
Armstrong and 4J cwt. heavier than the Prussian horse artillery gun ;
and the gun itself (8 cwt.) more nearly coincides in weight with the
present 12-pr. breech-loader and with the Prussian 15-pr. (canon de
6 raye) ; so that it is nearly the same in weight as the heaviest field
battery gun in the Prussian service, and therefore more adapted, so
far as weight is concerned, for field batteries than for horse artillery
generally.
And here I would notice briefly that the capabilities of different guns
should be measured by their weights, or rather by the weights of the
gun and carriage, than by the weight of the projectile they throw. It
is all the same, so far a£ the weight of the gun is concerned, whether a
heavy projectile is fired with a low charge, or a light projectile with a
heavy charge. It is no great wonder for an 8 cwt. gun to shoot better
than a 6J cwt. gun ; therefore it is not fair to compare the 9-pr. muzzle-
loader with the 9-pr. breech-loader, but it should be compared with
the 8 cwt. 12-pr. breech-loader, which has been done by a Special
Committee on Muzzle-loading and Breech-loading Field Guns who
repgrted on the 25th of last November “ that judging from the results
of practice in the hands of the troops at Aldershot, the 9-pr. muzzle¬
loading and the 12-pr. breech-loading guns appear in respect to shooting
to be much on a par. In conclusion the Committee cannot refrain
from expressing their opinion that the present 9-pr. breech-loading gun
of 6 cwt. is not an efficient weapon for horse artillery/'’
Now it is a question I believe with officers whether the present weight
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
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A wrought-iron and steel gun adapted to throw a 121b. shell. t Experimental, the weights as estimated by Lieut. Jones, R.A.
The howitzers are added to the table at the request of Major-General Eardley-Wilmot, E.A. § Exclusive of limber gunners and their kits.
.B. — Mobility is not a question of what can be carried, as in the days of smooth-bores; but of what can be carried with efficiency in the exigencies of modern warfare.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
283
of the 9-pr. breech-loading gun and carriage, viz. 31*75 cwt. behind team,
is not the maximum weight for horse artillery when acting with cavalry ;
in fact it is thought by some that the weight should be reduced to
30 cwt., i.e., about the weight of the light 6-pr. smooth-bore, the former
equipment of the horse artillery. This would more nearly correspond
in weight with the horse artillery equipment of continental powers.
The Belgian horse artillery gun (canon de 4) weighs about 29 \ cwt.
behind team. The gun throws a 9*4 lb. shell, with a charge of 1*16 lbs.
of powder with a muzzle velocity* of 1221 f.s. ; the gun itself being
under 6 cwt. This gun is almost identical with the Prussian horse
artillery gun (canon de 4). Colonel Maxwell, R.A., in his “ Report on
Experiments carried on in Belgium with Phosphoric Bronze as applied
to Field Artillery,” compares this gun with the 9-pr. muzzle-loader
(page 19) thus : —
“ Both these guns (i.e., the canon de 4 and the canon de 6) appear to be inferior
to the British 9-pr. muzzle-loading bronze gun.
“ (l) In flatness of trajectory.
“ (2) In the necessary complication of breech-loaders.
“ (3) In accuracy of practice and efficiency of two projectiles (shrapnel and case
shot).
ee (4) In a detonating fuze.
“ (5) In the necessity of lead-coated projectiles.
“ (6) Lesser height of wheels.
“The canon de 4 (i.e., the Belgian horse artillery gun of less than 6 cwt.) is on
the other hand, superior to the 9-pr. muzzle-loading bronze gun.
“(1) In the larger provision of ammunition especially in the limber (viz., 50
against 34 in limber, 108 against 90 in wagon.)
“ (2) In the smaller load for the gun team (nearly 6 cwt.) *
“ (3) In a common shell which bursts into a large number of pieces.
“ The rapidity of fire is the same in both cases.”
With regard to the inferiority stated by Colonel Maxwell, if we intro¬
duced a muzzle-loading gun of 6 cwt. to fire a 9 lb. projectile with a charge
of about 1 lb. 6 ozs., the only objection of any moment would be the
flatness of trajectory due to about 109 f.s. more muzzle velocity (and
remember the Belgian gun is only 5*78 cwt. and the 9-pr. muzzle-
loader 8 cwt.) ; and with regard to the superiority , they seem to be
precisely the points which of all others are necessary for an efficient
horse artillery gun, viz., greater number of rounds in limber, much
greater mobility and a common shell bursting into a large number of
pieces.
Surely with the mechanical knowledge we possess in this country we
should at least be able to build a gun to rival the Belgians, i.e., a
muzzle -loading steel, or steel and wrought-iron gun, weighing about
6 cwt. (according to the recommendation of the Committee of Superior
Officers of Royal Artillery in 1866), of 3 ins. in calibre to throw a 91b.
* See “ L’ Artillerie de Campagne,” by Captain Nicaise, of the Belgian War Office.
284
MINUTES OF PKOCEED1NGS OF
projectile with a muzzle velocity of at least 1221 f.s. (the same as the
Belgian gun).
Such a gun would be much superior to the present 9-pr. breech¬
loader in every way; it would have 151 f.s. more muzzle velocity ; also
a greater number of rounds of ammunition in the limber and wagon :
while the inferiority to the 9-pr. muzzle-loader would be about the same
as you would get by firing that gun with a charge of 1 lb. 6 ozs. instead
of 1 lb. 12 ozs., with a clear gain of 3 or 4 cwt. in mobility. If it were
found advisable to reduce the bore to 2*8 ins., the gun would range
nearly, if not quite equal to the 9-pr. muzzle-loading Indian gun.
For field batteries the Committee of Superior Officers recommended
that the weight of the gun should not exceed 8 cwt., and that the weight
of projectile should be about 12 lbs. This is exactly the weight of the
muzzle-loading wrought-iron and steel gun ; only it throws a 9 lb. shell
instead of 12 lb.
This gun would perhaps bear a 2 lb. charge (if we may judge by the
Prussian canon de 6, which throws about a 151b. projectile with a
charge of 11b. 13 ozs., the gun only weighing 8*37 cwt.), and in Table III.
I have estimated the weight behind team owing to the additional weight
of ammunition to be about 36 cwt., i.e., about 1 cwt. less than the weight
of our present 12-pr. breech-loader. This gun (so far as weights are
concerned) would then closely correspond with the Prussian and Belgian
canon de 6, with this exception that they throve a 151b. projectile with
a smaller charge of powder, but it would be superior in range to both
of them. It may be noticed that at present we throw a 9 lb. shell out
of an 8 cwt. gun with a large charge, while the Prussians throw a 15 lb.
shell out of the same weight of gun with a small charge ; illustrating
extremes on both sides : I venture to submit that the golden mean
viz. a 12 lb. shell out of an 8 cwt. gun would be found the best for
practical purposes.*
We next come to heavy field batteries or batteries of reserve which
the Committee of Superior Officers unanimously recommended should
fire a heavier projectile than 12 lbs. This recommendation is being
practically carried out by a committee, who have already experimented
on a gun weighing about 12 cwt., and firing a 161b. shell with 3 lbs. of
powder. The calibre of this gun is 3*6 ins., and projects a shell with a
bursting charge of about 16 ozs., i.e.} 3 ozs. more than the bursting
charge of the old 24-pr. howitzer.
Now on comparing the power of this gun in table with the 12-pr.
muzzle-loading gun, it will be seen that if projected with the same
velocity, it would not range so far (the power of overcoming the resist¬
ance of the air being only 1234 to 1333 for the 12-pr.) ; when it ought
to be more powerful on account of the heavier shell. This is owing to
its relatively large bore to the weight of the shell.
* The only advantage of a 9 lb. shell would be a slightly flatter trajectory for short ranges ; but
as it seems likely that mitrailleuses will be more than a match for artillery at short ranges, it is not
of much importance. The disadvantages are less effective shrapnel in having a smaller number of
bullets, less effective common shell, only having 7 ozs. bursting charge instead of 11 ozs. ; besides
having less “ energy ” or power of penetration at any distance.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
285
In fact having* so large a calibre is a retrograde step even with refer¬
ence to the present service breech-loading guns, as you will see by
comparing it with the 20-pr. breech-loader of 3*75 ins. in calibre, and
the 12-pr. breech-loader of 3 ins. in calibre ; and it is the very reverse
of the plan we are about to adopt in small-arms, and is not adapted for
getting the greatest mechanical power out of a gun designed to throw
a 16 lb. shell, taking all practical considerations into account. These
considerations are the burning of 3 lbs. of powder in a smaller bore; the
slight corresponding decrease in shell capacity, and the avoidance of
undue lengthening of the shell.
If it were found advisable to reduce the calibre to 3*3 ins., the ce power ”■
of the gun would be increased from 1333 to 1469, as compared with 1000
in the Indian gun ; the bursting charge would still be about the same,
and the length of the shell would be increased about an inch. Experi¬
mental shell for the 3*3 in. have been recently made in the Royal
Laboratory, which are compared with the 3*6 in. thus : —
Shrapnel.
Common shell.
Calibre.
Length.
Weight.
No. of bullets.
Calibre.
Length.
Weight.
Bursting charge.
ins.
3’6
3-3
ins.
9-36
11-55*
lbs. ozs.
16
16 7*
63 at 18 per lb. and
66 at 84 per lb.
72 at 18 per lb.
ins.
3-6
3-3
ins.
10- 30
11- 55*
lbs. ozs.
16 0
16 5
ozs.
15
16*
The shrapnel and common shell for the 3*3 in. bore would be thus the
same length — and the shrapnel would contain a greater number of larger
bullets, and therefore be more effective, against carriages, materiel, &c.
The increased length of projectile could be met by slightly increasing
the length of the gun, and diminishing the length and thickness of the
iron jacket at the breech, so as to keep the gun the same weight ; and
also by increasing the twist of the gun, making it 1 turn in 90 ins., instead
of 1 turn in 108 ins. At any rate it might be easily tried, by boring
out a new gun first for 3*3 in. calibre, and then if found unsatisfactory
to go to. 3*6 ins.
A double shell, weighing about 22 lbs., fired from this gun would
perhaps answer all the purposes of a howitzer battery. The tendency
also of reducing the bore would be towards the prevention of excessive
recoil.
The French have a 12 cwt. gun for their heavy field batteries with a
bore of 4*77 ins., throwing a 251b. shell with a charge of 2\ lbs. of
powder — with its low relative charge of powder and its large calibre,
the gun can only be effective at very moderate ranges, and would hardly
be able effectively to return the fire of the Prussian canon de 6 at
3000 yds., besides labouring under the great disadvantage of greater
weight for the gun team. Indeed, Captain Nicaise,f of the Belgian War
* Both these shell, i.e. shrapnel and common for 3-3in., might be reduced 25 in. m length, bringing
their weights to about 16 lbs.
f See L’Artilierie de Campagne.” Nicaise.
286
MINUTES OF PBOCEEDINGS OF
Office, states that the want of mobility of this gun has prompted the
French to adopt a lighter gun for their field batteries.
Now this French gun is 2 cwt. lighter than the weight which Lieut.
Jones, It. A., estimated in his recent lecture for thel6-pr. when carrying
28 rounds in the limber (and this is a very moderate estimate) ; it is
also rumoured that the gun is to be increased in weight to 12^ cwt., so
that it seems likely it will be found necessary to limit its employment to
the field batteries of reserve.
In conclusion, it seems advisable in the selection of a new gun to
consider first the weight of the projectile to be used, and the number of
rounds requisite to be carried into action, due regard being had to
efficiency and mobility. That being decided upon, the next step is to
determine what calibre is best adapted to throw that shell with the
greatest practical advantage, balancing the merits of long range, supe¬
rior accuracy and flatness of trajectory against that of large shell
capacity. With regard to the trial of new guns before introduction
into the service, it has been the custom for some years past to determine
the muzzle velocity of the projectile. This was all that could be done
with accuracy* till the invention of Professor BashfortlPs chronograph
in 1865, to whom we are indebted for having determined with great
precision the law of the resistance of the air to the motion of spherical
and elongated projectiles ; in fact all these tables of remaining velocities
before you, have been calculated from his experiments carried on at
Shoeburyness from October 1867 to May 1868. This chronograph has
been reported upon by a Committee of Reference, consisting of Pro¬
fessors Stokes and Adams of Cambridge, and Captain Andrew Noble
of Elswick, who state “ that the instrument is simple in principle, easy
to work with, and not readily liable to get out of order, and we think
it well adapted for general employment at schools of instruction in
gunnery A
This instrument measures the velocity at ten or more different in¬
tervals — so that it not only determines muzzle velocity, but also the loss
of velocity over successive equal distances. This loss of velocity is due
to the resistance of the air (which of course will increase with the
unsteadiness of the shell), and affords a true criterion whereby the
shooting powers of the gun (so far as range, accuracy and flatness of
trajectory is concerned) may be estimated, which the determination of
a single muzzle velocity does not .
I may add that I have used an instrument designed by Mr. Bashforth
similar in principle to the above at the rifle range in the Marshes to
determine the velocity of the Martini- Henry, Chassepot, Snider and
needle gun for the Small- Arms Committee, the results of which are
embodied in Table II.
But to return to the construction of guns : there are two methods of
obtaining a powerful shooting gun to fire a shell of given weight : —
(1) By getting a great muzzle velocity, i.e., by using a high charge
of powder and comparatively light shell.
(2) By lessening the resistance of the air, i.e., by using a smaller
bore.
* Vide p. 161 Reports on Experiments with Bushforth’s Chronograph.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
287
The first method necessitates a heavy gun in proportion to projectile
in order to prevent excessive recoil, thus sacrificing mobility to a great
extent.
The second method necessitates a slightly diminished bursting charge
in common shell, but enables us to obtain the same practical range out
of a lighter gun by projecting it with less muzzle velocity ; so that with
greater mobility the same effect can be produced with the gun. The
proper combination of these two principles will give the best gun for a
given weight of shell. Our artillerists at present are very strong on
the first method — as you will see by the relative charges of powder to
weight of projectile in the table.
The charge of powder in the Indian 9-pr. muzzle-loader, and the
proposed 16-pr. is nearly -J-th the weight of shell, while all continental
guns, and our own breech-loaders have a charge from yth to -rrth
weight of shell.
The penalty is increased weight of gun in proportion to shell, and
consequent loss of mobility : it is a method of obtaining range by a
“force brutalef just as we have been using till lately a “ poudre brisante ”
for obtaining velocity from our heavy guns, and exhibits more of the
character of the national bulldog than the wisdom of the serpent.
The light 6-pr. smooth-bore bronze gun, formerly used by the horse
artillery had a greater muzzle velocity than our present 9-pr. muzzle-
loader, but owing to its large calibre (8*66 ins.), and light shell (5 lbs.)
the resistance it met with was so great that it would not range farther
than the Martini-Henry rifle. The great advantage in rifled guns is
caused by increasing the ratio of the weight of the shell to the diameter
of the bore, and by the use of pointed projectiles, i.e., by diminishing
the resistance of the air for a given weight of shell ; and all further
improvements in artillery practice will be made on the same principle
when the practical objections, which I have briefly touched upon, are
overcome.
Table IY.
Table showing the relative Velocity of our Service Rifled Guns.
Distance
in feet.
Indian. 9-pr.’
M.l| 12-pr.
B.L. 12-pr.
Ph
P-
CO
iH
P
Ph
t-h
CO '
H
1
M.L. 7-incli.
| M.L. 8-inch.
1
M.L. 9-inch.
4
a
6
i-4
M.L. 35 ton.
Martini-
Henry.
Chassepot.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s. |
f.s.
0
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
1700
_
1000
1483
1537
1527
1522
1561
1603
1618
1625
1642
1648
_ i
_
2000
1290
1386
1369
1360
1430
1510
1539
1553
1586
1597
_
_
3000
1138
1253
1233
1221
1311
1421
1463
1483
1531
1547
At?r:
_
4000
1027
1143
1120
1108
1207
1338
1390
1416
1477
1498
_ l
_ i.
5000
957
1055
1034
1024
1119
1262
1323
1352
1424
1450
b'-'i-y;
G000
903
994
976
968
1047
1194
1260
1292
1374
1404
1400
1400
7000
855
947
930
922
996
1133
1202
1237
1327
1360
990
949
' 8000
—
907
890
881
955
1079
1150
1186
1282
1317
- 1
_
9000
871
853
844
920
1035
1103
1139
1239
1277
~
_
10000
—
—
— 1
888
1001
1061
1097
1199
1239
_ !
_
11000
—
■H
— ‘
9
HS— .
971
1026
1059
1162
1203
_
_
12000
m
—
—
JH
1
945
999
1027
1127
1169
_
_
13000
—
—
—
—
—
921
974
1002
1095
1138
_ 1
. _
14000
■
"
-
—
899
952
979
1066
1108
1
— ■
38
288
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
At the close of the lecture —
Major-General Leeroy, C.B., R.A., said the meeting would be very happy
to hear any gentleman who wished to make observations on the subject of
the paper, and he hoped that the gallant officer on his right (Major-General
Sir Edward Warde, K.C.B.), who had been, as they had been already
informed, a member of the “ Committee of Superior Officers” by whom this
subject was considered in 1866, and was so highly qualified to advise on all
subjects connected with the movement of field artillery, would favour them
with some remarks.
Major-General Sir Edward Warde said the subject which they had met
to consider was one of great importance, although to his mind it was a very
simple one, and he thought the lecturer had shewn an accurate appreciation
of the requirements of the service in submitting three different natures of
field gun for their consideration, which in his opinion would always in
future be required to form an efficient artillery with an army in the field.
He would say nothing with regard to the able manner in which his young
friend Lieut. Sladen had placed this subject before them, because he felt
satisfied that the Chairman would, when he addressed the meeting, fully
express the feelings of all those who were present, with his usual ability ; but
he must express the pleasure that he had himself personally derived in seeing
an officer who had joined the service under the shadow of his own wing
when he commanded the 6th Brigade, entering on a course which was so
eminently calculated to reflect credit on himself and on the corps to which
he belonged. Mobility, as regarded field artillery, was in his opinion the
paramount consideration. It was of course most important that our field
guns should be as hard hitting, as far ranging, and should carry as large
and damaging a shell as was consistent with facility of transport, and the
certainty of being enabled to place them in the positions indicated at the
exact moment when they would be there required. We required a gun for
the horse artillery sufficiently light to ensure great rapidity of movement,
and the certainty of being enabled to overcome all difficulties and inequalities
of ground, however great; a rather heavier and more damaging gun for our
field batteries, but still not so heavy as to cause doubt or uneasiness as to
being enabled to ensure its being in its proper place at the proper time; and
we also required as heavy a gun as could with safety be taken into the field,
and accompany the movements of the force, of which it would form a com¬
ponent part, for special purposes — such, for instance, as destroying any
temporary cover with which the enemy might have provided himself, or for
silencing the fire of his artillery. The 16-pr. gun now submitted for con¬
sideration appears well calculated to meet these requirements. There must
be many present who remembered the effect that was produced by the two
18-pr. guns at Inkermann, which were brought into action at a critical moment,
and by subduing the heavy fire of the Russian artillery, contributed very
largely to the glorious success of the day. He would only detain them
further to say that, in his opinion, mobility with regard to field artillery was
the first consideration, as it would be far better to have a light gun that
could always be put into the right place at the right time with certainty,
than a heavier and more damaging one about which there would be doubt
and uneasiness as to its being at all times available when required.
Lieut. -Colonel E. Miller, FC, B.A., who was next called upon by the
Chairman to address the meeting, said he would make a few remarks upon
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
289
the quantity of ammunition likely to be required in action. Since it had
been proposed to have a 16-pr. gun for field batteries, he had had much
conversation with officers on the subject, and had found that opinions varied
considerably with respect to the number of rounds which were practically
requisite to be carried with each gun, and that there was a difficulty in
finding good data to furnish as safe basis. If they adopted the 16-pr. he
had understood that they could only carry into action 104 rounds against
the 124 rounds which the 12-pr. carried, and this diminution was to his
mind a serious consideration. On the table before them the 16-pr. was
shown as carrying with it 112 rounds, which would be a loss of only 8 rounds
as compared with the 12-pr., but he believed that 112 was rather an exces¬
sive estimate. He saw the Secretary of the Shell Gun Committee present ;
perhaps he could inform the meeting on the point.
Captain W. E. Lluellyn, E.A., said the subject had not yet been worked
out.
Lieut.-Colonel Miller. — May I assume the number of rounds to be 104 ?
Captain Lluellyn. — My impression is that the number of rounds will
be 112, but the Committee have not yet decided.
Lieut.-Colonel Miller said he would assume, for the sake of argument,
that the number of rounds would be 104, which he thought more probable.
That would involve a loss of 20 rounds, and the question was, would there
be sufficient for a long day's work ? He might take it for granted that the
amount of ammunition available was only that carried by the gun and one
wagon; for the second line of wagons must be regarded as a reserve
which could not be brought near the enemy, or at all events there would be
such an uncertainty about its being at hand when wanted that it could not
always be depended upon. Then came the question as to how many rounds
were fired in one day's engagement. The experience of the Prussians in
1866 had been often quoted on this point, but the evidence about its expen¬
diture was very incomplete. They had a valuable report from Colonel
lieilly, E.A., who was sent out on that occasion by the Government, but the
only absolute information he could give on this point related to the 2nd
Prussian army, under the Crown Prince; whereas it was the 1st Army, under
Prince Prederick Charles, that had had its artillery most severely engaged.
At Kueniggratz it carried on a regular fire from seven in the morning until
three in the afternoon. He could give them no detailed facts as .to the expen¬
diture of ammunition on that occasion ; but a German writer, Colonel Eiistow,
who received a great deal of credit on the continent as a military historian,
said that during the day the field batteries had twice to be replenished from
the reserves; and Captain Brackenbiny, who was with the Austrians, and
who attended to give evidence before the Committee of Superior Officers
of which Sir Eichard Dacres was President, when questioned as to the
amount of ammunition expended, was unable to give tables or statistics, but
stated that some of the guns fired away all their ammunition, and that he
knew as a fact that some had fired about 157 rounds by twelve o'clock in
the day. Colonel Eeilly's report contained a table showing that the highest
expenditure in the 2nd Prussian Army under the Crown Prince at Kcenig-
gratz, was by a battery of the Guard Artillery, which fired 81 rounds per gun ;
on which occasion, judging from the report of the Guards' movements,
they probably opened fire about noon and ceased at about four o'clock, giving
290
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
an average of 20 rounds per hour. At the battle of Bluraenau they were
informed that one battery fired 113 rounds per gun, but that was neither an
action of any serious importance, nor one upon which they could base any
reliable calculation as to the total amount required; for though it began
early in the morning, it was interrupted by the truce at mid-day. The
number of rounds fired, however, was as great as that proposed for the
16-pr., even if they accepted the highest estimate for the equipment of that
gun. Reverting to our own experience, before rifled artillery was introduced,
he found again great difficulty in getting reliable statistics. He had referred
to several accounts of Waterloo, but looked in vain for information as to the
number of rounds fired per gun. It was true he had an extract from a
note-book belonging to Sir Hew Ross, which stated that the total number
of rounds fired at Waterloo was 9467, but then he did not know to how
many guns that applied. He believed that there were about 78 British
guns on the field, which would give an average of about 122 rounds each.
In General Mercer's diary, recently published by his son, it was said that
the number of rounds fired at Waterloo in his troop averaged 700 per gun;
but that must be an error, for it was hardly possible that every gun should keep
on firing at the rate of 90 rounds an hour for eight hours together. (A laugh.)
Coming a little later, he found that at Inkermann “B” Pield Battery fired an
average of 84 rounds per gun, “G” Battery 82, and the two 18-pr. guns
about 84 each. That battle began early in the morning, and the troops
were out of fire by mid-day, so that the artillery combat lasted probably
five or six hours. At Alma the expenditure was small. The total number of
rounds fired was 880, to be divided among 54 guns, according to the number
of batteries present, but six certainly of the guns — the battery to which he
belonged — did not fire a shot, and he believed that there were two other batteries
which fired very little, if at all. That battle lasted two and a half or three
hours, and he should say the expenditure averaged about 24 rounds per gun
for the guns actually engaged. Then at Balaclava he found that “ I” Troop
of Royal Horse Artillery fired 43 rounds, “E” Pield Battery 33, “W”
Battery 31, and “P” Battery 28. On the whole he thought that an
estimate of 20 rounds per gun per hour would be a fair one for calculating
the requisite equipment ; for the greatest speed at which they were likely to
fire would not exceed two rounds per minute, and that would be only kept
up for a fewr minutes together, to check an advance of troops or before the
assault of a position. The presumption was that in firing regularly “from
right to left,”, and after making allowances for change of position, one
round per gun every three minutes or thereabouts wras a fair average for
well-contested encounters, and that would give the 20 rounds per gun per
hour which he took as his basis. Of course they had to consider how long
an action was likely to last, and he thought that, considering past experience,
they might fairly assume five hours as the likely duration of a regular battle.
If so, he might be asked why 100 rounds would not be sufficient to take
with the gun; and his answer was, that the gun might be in action' for
two or more successive days, and that they ought to consider the chance of
the reserve wagons missing their intended direction, or being blocked up
and detained in the road, or of their falling into the hands of the enemy,
or, again, of arrangements being disorganised by a retreat ; in any of which
cases there was a great doubt as to their joining their guns in time. There-
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
291
fore lie regarded 120 rounds as the very lowest provision that could prudently
be allowed for each gun ; even that would only give them' enough for five
hours' engagement on one day and leave but 20 for the operations of the
next. Some batteries in a division might fire more rounds, and some less,
than others, in which case they could replace one another as they had oppor¬
tunity; but he thought 120 rounds per gun was the very lowest supply
which would give the artillery sufficient fighting power. If the question at
issue was a choice between a 12-pr. (muzzle-loading) and the new 16-pr.,
supposing they had equal initial velocities, he should say that the 12-pr. was
quite effective enough against such obstacles as are met with in ordinary
field engagements. For his own part, he would rather go through a cam¬
paign with the 12-pr. and 124 rounds per gun than with the 16-pr. and
any less number per gun. (Applause.)
Lieut.-Colonel R. Biddtjlpij, R.A., observed that in discussing the number
of rounds to be carried with a gun, the number in the limber should be
borne in mind instead of in the wagons, for it was just as easy to bring up
two wagons as one when a gun required more ammunition. Colonel Miller
had referred to the fact that at Balaclava “ I " Troop of Royal Horse
Artillery fired oidy 48 rounds. That was true, but the explanation was that
the guns had to cease firing for want of ammunition, having expended all
that they carried in the limber boxes. It was the only case of the kind with
which he was acquainted, and arose from the horse artillery having been im¬
properly retained in action when the field batteries should have been engaged.
He saw from the figures in the table before them that our horse artillery
was, with respect to the number of rounds per gun, in a worse position
than any on the continent, and he hoped that they might at least adopt
some plan of carrying more rounds in the limbers ; horse artillery being
much more liable to get separated from its wagons than field batteries.
Our old 9-pr. used to carry 32 rounds in the limber and 96 in the wagons,
making 128 in all — oidy 2 rounds worse than the present 12-pr. For field
batteries he thought 32 rounds in the limber would be sufficient. (Applause.)
Major-General Leeroy said that Colonel Miller, in his enquiry as to the
number of rounds liable to be expended in a single engagement, had, he
thought, overlooked one source of information — the Report of the Committee
of Revision in 1819, which in calculating the ammunition “ required to
sustain an action of some duration," reckoned 166 rounds for the 9-pr. gun,
144 rounds for the 24-pr. howitzer, and a great deal more for the Royal
Horse Artillery — namely, 223 per 6-pr. gun and 236 per 12-pr. howitzer,
ile wished also to point out what he considered a slight error in Colonel
Miller's figures; for in taking the average expenditure of ammunition in
certain cases, he appeared simply to have divided the total consumption per
battery by six, the number of guns ; whereas it should be remembered that
the guns usually expended considerably more than the howitzers. Thus at
Inkermann the expenditure of gun ammunition of “E " Battery was 369
rounds, or 92 per gun, and of howitzer ammunition 183 rounds, or only
67 per howitzer, and these quantities were not exceeded in any of the engage¬
ments of the Crimean war. The distinction of guns and howitzers no longer
exists, and all future provision must be on the higher scale for guns.
Lieut.-Colonel Miller said he had a table in his hand which furnished
the exact figures he had quoted, showing the total in the last column.
292
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Major-General Lefroy said that was probably correct, but the figures led
to an erroneous inference by reckoning guns and howitzers as all one. He
agreed however with much that had fallen from Colonel Miller as to the
importance of carrying enough ammunition into the field, but he thought
his calculation of an expenditure at the rate of twenty rounds per hour an
extravagant one. (Hear, hear.) Twenty rounds, or at the rate of twenty
rounds per hour might doubtless be reached for a spurt, especially in firing
case shot, but they could not take it as an average for continuous firing.
Major-General Sir Edward Warde. — It would never be realised.
Major-General Lefroy said, at all events he was not afraid of that of which
their fathers in artillery were not afraid. (Applause.) The Committee of 1819
to which he had referred actually contemplated equipping 12-prs. of IBcwt.
as horse artillery of reserve. There' is of course a line to be drawn some¬
where, but nothing in his opinion would turn on a cwt. or two, more or less.
But in discussing this question, there was one thing to be borne in mind.
"Were they talking of home defences? If so, they must remember that they
had in every part of Great Britain excellent roads over which they could
transport heavier materiel and move their guns in all directions more readily
than in any former military experience, and much the same might be said of
the roads all over Europe — the last few years had seen them greatly im¬
proved. This fact ought to have some bearing on the question as to the
weight of their artillery equipment. (Hear, • hear.) As to the general
question of large bore and small bore, light guns or heavier guns, he supposed
it was a point upon which they must agree to differ; and to show how
impossible it was to reconcile all minds upon such matters, he referred to
the committee which met to discuss the very question in 1866, where two
officers stood out against all the rest of their colleagues in favour of having
the same gun for horse artillery and field batteries, but when enquiry was
pushed a little farther it was found that one wanted to have a gun of 6 cwt.
and the other preferred one of 8 cwt. for both services. (A laugh.) How¬
ever, he would not detain the meeting longer, but discharge the one remaining
duty of returning thanks to Lieut. Sladen, in the name of the meeting, for
the interesting information he had given them, remarking that the benefit of
such papers was not confined to those who had the advantage of hearing
them. Their chief value was in disseminating correct information through
the service in print, thus helping to create a well-informed public opinion ;
and it was impossible not to contrast the advantages of officers at the
present day in this respect with the state of things that prevailed at no
remote period. Lieut. Sladen had delivered himself very clearly of his
subject, and had elucidated the matter with a mass of figures the preparation
of which must have involved considerable labour. (Applause.) He had
pleasure in congratulating him oil his success, and expressing the gratifi¬
cation of the meeting. (Applause).
Major-General E. M. Eardley-Wilmot, R.A., E.R.S., said it might be
satisfactory to Lieut. Sladen to know that the Royal Laboratory had been
called upon to make a shell such as he had described.
The Chairman then closed the meeting.
THE IlOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
293
MOUNTING OF TWELYE 12-TON GUNS
AT MALTA, 1870,
BY IOtii BRIGADE, K.A.
The work was begun on the 4th January, and completed on the 4<th
May following.
The guns parked in the Military Store Yard at the Bight Marina
Wharf, were conveyed to the following works : —
to St. Lazarus* Bastion, East Yaletta.
to the English Curtain, West Yaletta.
to Bdl”tSlS Bastion 1 Fort St. Elmo Yaletta.
to Fort Tigne, Yaletta District,
to No. 3 Battery, Fort Bicasoli
to No. 2 Battery, Fort St. Angelo
}
Cottonera.
Valetta. — The five guns for Yaletta were conveyed singly by land, on
a special drug, about 12 ft. long by 6 ft. 4J ins. across the axle-trees,
having rear trucks 3 ft. and front trucks 2 ft. in diameter, with tires
8 ins. wide; the weight of the drug being about 3|tons. ( Vide par.
1662, “ Changes in Artillery Materiel/* 1. 10. 68).
A gun was placed on the drug by means of an 1 8 ft. strengthened
gyn, and then removed from the yard beyond the Bight Marina Gate.
The following day 180 to 200 men, assisted by eight or ten mules,
drew it to the battery for which it was intended — a distance of two or
three miles — in about two hours.
The bridges on the road to St. Elmo were carefully shored up by the
Boyal Engineers, and gave no sign of yielding when this great weight
— about 15 tons — passed over them.
The drug answered well, the roads being exceedingly firm, solid rock
coming to within a few inches of the surface, which was macadamised ;
but dampness in the atmosphere, or a fall of rain, made a considerable
difference in the draught.
The drug was taken through gateways and across bridges barely 8 ft.
wide ; through a cutting at the entrance of Fort Tigne only 7 ft. wide;
ascents as much as one in fourteen, and descents as great as one
in ten, were accomplished in safety, the drug having no break, by
means of from 60 to 100 men holding on to check drag-ropes in rear.
294
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
On a dry day, a declivity of about one in thirty was sufficient to allow
of the drug, when once started, keeping itself in motion ; about twenty
men were required in rear to keep it in check.
The drug turned with the greatest facility in streets running at right
angles to each other, as well as in the most cramped places.
Owing to the badness of the road on the glacis at Fort Tigne, it was
found necessary to raise the drug by means of hydraulic jacks and
levers, and place planks under the wheels ; and also at the bottom of
Strada Forni Valetta, a street having a descent of one in ten, with the
English Curtain rising from it at a slope of about one in three ; in which
case it was also necessary to use strong tackle to draw the drug up the
short but steep ascent.
On two occasions the weight of the gun and drug broke in the top
of a drain, and also a stone about 9 ins. thick, forming part of the
covering of a tank ; but no delay occurred on account of this.
The mules were taken out of the shafts and replaced by six men on
entering the gate of the town, and in some places at Sleima ; but on
passing over rough ground, it was found necessary to assist them. by
four or five extra men holding on to steadying-ropes attached to the
point of each of the outer shafts.
The washers of the drug were found to be too small for the hooks
of the parbuckle-ropes used as drag-ropes; iron shackles were made
and fitted for the purpose.
On arriving at the battery, the drug was run with the gun muzzle
foremost into the embrasure. The gun was then lifted by an 18 ft.
strengthened gyn, and the drug withdrawn. The platform was run
under the gun by means of a common transporting axle and wheels, on
which it was balanced so as to allow of the front trucks being dropped
at once on the front racer. The weight of the rear end of the platform
was taken by a lever and fulcrum, the wheels and axle withdrawn, and
the rear trucks were then gradually dropped in their place.
The carriage, placed on a general service drug, was next run up and
hauled on to the platform, and the gun dropped into its trunnion holes.
The operation of mounting the gun took three-quarters of an hour.
On one occasion an attempt was made to run the platform with its
carriage on the racers by means of its own special transporting axle ;
but although carried out, the attempt, in point of time, proved a failure,
owing to the cramped nature of the ground, the great weight to be
moved — nearly 5 tons — and the width of the axle being too great to
work easily under the gyn.
To facilitate the balancing of a platform on an axle and wheels, small
movable iron bands might be attached to and under the side pieces of
the platform, in such a way as to allow of their working on a hinge,
and being easily opened or thrown back.
The gyn falls of 5-inch rope appear too weak for guns of this weight ;
54-inch rope would be better adapted.
The guns were slung by a chain in lieu of rope, as the 9 -inch rope
sling was found to stretch considerably.
Fort Tigne (Plate I.) — The two guns for Fort Tigne were brought
PL I.
SECTION of TOWER & SHEERS at FORT T/GNE .
PL 1.
■
'
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
295
round by road on the drug, a distance of about four miles, and dropped
on skidding at the entrance gate of the fort. Time occupied being
about four and a half hours.
The guns were then taken across the drawbridge, through the tower,
and on to the inner bridge by means of skidding and rollers.
They were then lifted about 16 ft. on to the causeway of the fort, by
means of the cheeks of a strengthened gyn rigged as sheers.
The back guy, as well as the fore guy, consisted of 4 J -inch tarred
rope; the former rove through two double 15 -inch blocks, the latter
through two single 12 -inch blocks.
The main tackle was a coil of 5 \ -inch rope, rove through a double
15 -inch and two single 18 -inch blocks at the head of the sheers, and
through a treble 15-inch block at the gun ; both ends of the fall being
led to and worked by iron winches secured on the causeway.
The feet of the gyn pivoted in wooden shoes, specially made on the
ball and socket principle. They were about 18 ins. square by 8 ins. deep,
cupped out in the centre to a depth of 6 ins. by lOins. in diameter, to
receive oak caps made to fit over the spike and on to the foot of the
gyn. These shoes answered very well.
On taking the weight of the gun, the sheers were inclined outwards
about 7 ft. (Plate I.)
A gun was raised and landed on the causeway in the course of an
hour and a quarter.
Embarking (Plate II.) — The two guns for Port Picasoli, and the three
for Fort St. Angelo, were embarked on a Government lighter lent from
H.M. Dockyard. The lighter was 45 ft. long by 15 ft. 6 ins. beam,
about 4 ft. 6 ins. deep, flat-bottomed, with a fluCsh deck, and with two
guns on board drew about 8 ft. of water.
The guns were embarked by means of a strengthened gyn, rigged as
three-legged sheers ; but owing to the dryness of the atmosphere and
the heat of the sun, the shakes in the cheeks of the gyn had opened
considerably, and it was considered advisable to strengthen each cheek
by means of three iron bands ins. wide and \ in. thick, which effec¬
tually answered the purpose.
The back guy was similar to that at Fort Tigne.
The main tackle (Plate II.) consisted of a coil of 5^ -inch rope, rove
through two treble 15 -inch blocks, the running end of which was
worked by an iron winch.
The plan of operation was to place a gun in position the previous day,
with the muzzle projecting well over the wharf, and then erect the
sheers over it with a heel outwards of about 18 ins.
On embarking, the weight of the gun was taken by the winch, and
then by easing off the back guy and hauling on the foot tackles, the
sheers received the necessary heel outwards — about 7 ft. — and the gun
was lowered 8 ft. on board of the lighter. The operation took one hour.
The lighter was then trimmed by lowering a 68-pr. on board by
means of a crane close to the sheers, but only available for weights of
10 tons and under.
On embarking a second gun the same day, the gun was brought up
39
296
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
under the sheers and hauled out by the main tackle on rollers. In
doing this, great care is necessary to adjust the rollers so that the
weight of the gun should be taken before swinging it clear of the
wharf ; otherwise, on the front roller coming to the edge of the wharf,
the gun would drop with it, and break or strain everything by the jerk
which is sure to follow.
Two guns were embarked in four and a half hours.
When a day intervened, the sheers were struck, a gun placed in
position, and the sheers erected over it.
Disembarking (Plate III.) — The guns were disembarked on the rocks
below the forts by the same arrangement ; but in this case the gyns
were stepped on a lower level than the top of the rocks on which the
guns were to be landed. This allowed of the lower bar of the gyn
being conveniently used, and the guns were swung in over it. On
embarking, the bars of the gyn were not used.
A messenger of 3|-inch rope, rove through a single 12-inch block,
assisted the iron winch, and was worked by a. capstan. The messenger
was also useful when stoppering the fall.
No front foot ropes were used on disembarking the guns, but were
employed on embarking them.
Two guns were landed in the course of three and a half hours, but
one gun could be landed in an hour.
The height to the top of the rocks was 6 ft. to 10 ft.
Besides the above, one gun at the Marina was raised by the gyn used
as three-legged sheers with its own windlass, over which it was brought
in, and dropped on the drug for conveyance to St. Elmo.
This was done as it was considered probable that the guns might
have to be landed in that way at the foot of the ramp at Fort Bicasoli,
the landing place at that point being very small.
The gyns stood well, and were sometimes inclined outwards about
8 ft.
Fort Bicasoli (Plate IY.) — The two guns were raised from the rocks
into Fort Bicasoli — a height of 36 ft. — by means of large sheers, the
spars for which were obtained from the Dockyard, and were old jib-
booms, about 16 ins. in diameter at the butts and 49 ft. long. Iron
chain of T9g- in. link was used in lashing them.
The back guy consisted of two coils of 5 ^ -inch white rope spliced
together, and rove through two double 15-inch blocks.
The fore guy was one coil of 5 -inch tarred rope, rove through two
15-inch double blocks.
The main tackles — of which there were two — consisted of a coil of
6 -inch rope, rove through two double 18 -inch blocks, and were hooked
into an iron chain sling of 1-inch link at the head of the sheers.
The falls were led to iron winches, and were also assisted by a
messenger of 3J-inch white rope, rove through 12-inch single blocks,
and worked by capstans.
The two guns were raised 'in the course of three and a half hours.
The actual time of raising the first gun was one hour ; the second was
ELO
W, Carey. CajotV'H.A
]
PL III
SECTION SHOW/NC the LANDING of GUNS at FORT ST ANGELO
On the ROCKS OPPOSITE the MORTAR or N? IB.
MaZteo 4-*Mecreh 1870
W.Cccrey. Cajot n H. A
PL IV.
SECTION SHOWING the OPERATION OF LIFTING A 12 TON CUN at FORT RICASOLI.
M-ttUai* M (it MZ(1.
• W Carey CafffR.A .
S&cfum, of JUse from/ N° If after y.
ORT ST ANGELO.
^T
i
B
W. Carey Capt>?.R.A..
PL VI.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
297
raised tlie 36 ft. in 50 minutes. The inclination of the sheers at the
time of taking the weight was 13 ft.
The guns were mounted in No. 3 Battery by means of the gyn, but
were moved across the fort slung under two sling wagons, which travelled
easily on firm ground, but owing to the narrowness of the wheels, sank
at once in soft ground, when it was found necessary to lay down planks.
Fort St. Angelo (Plate Y.) — Two of the three guns for this fort were
raised from No. 1 into No. 2 Battery — a height of 43 ft. — by the same
means as at Fort Ricasoli. One gun was raised in an hour and a quarter,
the second in an hour.
As both guns were brought in at the same embrasure, the first had
to be removed out of the way before the second was raised. In doing
this, it had to be lowered about 2 ft. into the work. This was done by
easing it down from the sill of the embrasure on an inclined plane of
skids, by means of rollers and a 5 -inch gyn tackle, which was secured
to a 9-inch beam lashed across the sheers about 3 ft. above the feet.
The second gun was rolled back on to its platform, and both guns
were then mounted by means of the gyn.
15 -inch and 18-inch single blocks were very much required for
leading off the falls of the tackles, and as only two 18-inch both-ways
blocks had been received with the 'heavy gear, wire-strapped blocks
were obtained from H.M. Dockyard.
The third gun for St. Angelo (Plate YI.) was taken up through
the sallyport leading from No. 1 to No. 2 Battery.
The sallyport, for about two-thirds of its length, is tunnelled in the
rock, and consists of two flights of steps from 6 ft. 6 ins. to 7 ft. wide,
which meet about half way up, and are nearly at right angles to one
another. A flag’ stone 7 ft. square in the angle forms a landing. The
length of the lower portion was about 60 ft., the incline one in 3’35 ;
the upper portion is 100 ft. long, with an inclination of one in 3*5.
The gun, placed on skids and rollers opposite the gate, was steadied
by a temporary cradle, formed of two 14 ft. skids, bolted together in
such a way that it might be taken to pieces as required.
An iron chain was used as a gun- sling, into which a main and two
side or preventor tackles were hooked.
The main tackle consisted of a 6 -inch coil of rope, rove through two
double 18-inch blocks, the standing block being secured to a 20ft.
skid placed diagonally across the wall at the landing, one end resting
in a recess, the other butting in a hole cut in the second flight of steps.
This beam was also secured by a strut against the opposite wall.
A leading block led the running end of the tackle from the beam to
a winch at the top of the sallyport.
The side tackles were 3J-inch rope, rove through double and treble
blocks, the standing blocks of which were secured to a 13 ft. beam
placed horizontally a little above the stone in the landing. The falls of
these tackles were also led to the top of the sallyport, and thence to
capstans. The rollers, 9 ins. in diameter, were 6 ft. long.
Skidding was laid down over the steps, and the gun was brought
up from its position at the entrance of the sallyport to the landing —
298
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
a distance of about 80 ft. — in about two hours. When within 18 ins.
of the landing, it was found that the blocks of the main tackle would
not fleet, owing to the way in which the standing end was secured.
Another tackle was applied from the top of the sallyport to the
cascable, which was about 8 ft. beyond the corner, and the gun was
landed and partly turned; but in doing* this it was jammed on the
cradle, and could not be extricated that day. It was afterwards cleared
by means of hydraulic jacks, &c., and the gun was brought up the
remaining 100 ft. of sallyport in two hours.
There was ample space for turning the gun in the angle ; the failure
originated in an oversight of not noticing the way in which the standing
end of the tackle was secured, and then in allowing the gun to jam on
the cradle in turning before it was safely landed.
Had it not been for this, the gun would probably have been clear of
the sallyport in five or six hours.
W. CAREY,
Captain, R.A.
Front and Sectional Elevattcns of the Casemates at the Western,
e adremUg of Fort TtocUleoombe , showing the plasi adopted, for
hoisting in, the 3 ML R guns, of fl tons , by
Coopt* CF.Ccchburn R A
Scale- ? inches =15 feet
GENERAL ABSTRACT
OS THE
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE OE THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
From Is* April, 1870, to 3 Is* March, 1871.
'Wages
Type and Materials .
Printing ■ Paper .
Woodcuts
.Lithography
Chemistry .
r Attendance and Instruction
Photography •< Chemicals and Apparatus ...
(. Printing and Mounting .
t, _ • _ ( Instruction .
Drawing | Materia]s .
1 Lectures .
Taxidermy .
Mathematical Instruction .
Library, and Books for Sale .
Museum . . .
Instruments .
Carpenter
Furniture and Repairs .
Subscriptions to Societies .
Stationery . . . . .
Postage and Parcels .
Incidental Expenses .
Wages to Clerks and Orderlies .
War Office Photographs and Lithographs ...
Paid for £325 4s. Id. Consols .
Premium for Fire Insurance of £5000 .
Cash in hand, f Secretary .
31st March, 1871, l Messrs. Cox & Co .
ItfCOME.
Cash in hand, 1st April, 1870 .
Printing .
Chemistry . . .
Photography {p^ShgLg'MounKDg".'.'.'
”»*<■« fstggsr~==
Taxidermy .
Mathematical Instruction .
Books sold . i..
Carpentry and Wood .
("Entrance .
Subscriptions 4 Annual . —
(For 1871-2 .
2 9 1
18 3 I
62 0 0 •)
1037 9 0k
11 19 0 ;
Stationery .
Postage and Parcels .
War Office Photographs and Lithographs
Dividend on £1361 Is. 6d. Consols .
Do. £1680 6s. 7d. do .
£ ». i.
Ill 19 6
337 14 1
0 6 9
111 6 1
70 1 .0
13 15 0
11 11 0
96 12 11
19 3 1
1111 8 0
181 3 7
36 13 0*
48 6 9
20 2 3
24 17 6
£2194 18 4*
De.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR ACCOUNT, 31st MARCH, 1871.
£ s. <*.
By Accounts with : —
Mr. Gould, for “ Birds of Australia ” . 110 15 0
Controller, Woolwich, for War Office Photographs and Lithographs... 16 5 1
Messrs. Boddy and Co., for Stationery, Books, &c . 28 18 8
„ Tapling and Co., for Furniture . 29 7 7
Balance Creditor . . . . . . 2208 4 7$
£2393 10 Hi
Examined and found correct,
JOHN DESBOROUGH, Colonel R.A., President Sub-Committee.
Woolwich, 29th April, 1871.
Balance ( Cash in hand .
Cr. j. Consols Stock .
C Books for Sale
Value of
Stock.
Amount
owing by
Members
and otherB
for
Stationery .
Printing Paper .
“Handbooks” (unbound) .
“ Kane’s Lists” do .
.Chemicals in Laboratory .
Kane’s Lists ” .
“ Handbooks ” .
Printing .
Chemistry .
Photography .
Taxidermy .
Mathematical Instruction .
Books .
Carpentry and Wood .
Annual Subscription .
Stationery .
Postage .
.War Office Photographs and Lithographs.
£
1686
31
62
164
100
20
14
41
48
0
20
6
1
29
69
17
15
A. D. BURNABY, Capt. R.A., Secretary and
t. d.
12 1*1
5 7 J
9 11
18 6
1 0
15 9
12 10*
8 1*.
£ s. d.
1088 17 8*
Treasurer.
*
8. d.
£ s. d.
Ill 19 6
337 14 1
0 5 9
0 0
5 1
U8 2 9
1 18 3
!2 0
. . 19
0 ^
3
57 9
0
- 1111
8
LI 19
0 j
•
. 181
3
36
13
. 48
6
20
9,
111 6 1
70 1 .0
13 15 0
11 11 0
96 12 11
1
£2194 18 4*
Cb.
£ $. d.
2 12 1*
86 5 7
31 16 8
62 1 6
48 13 6
L64 3 4
L06 16 9
20 0
0
14 17
0
41 6
0
48 14
4
0 6
8
20 12
2
5 1
9
0 9 11
5 18
6
1 1
0
29 7
8
3 16 10
26 14
0
59 15
9
17 12 10*
15 8
li
£ s. d.
I- 1688 17 8£
- 413 11 8
*
* 291 1 7
£2393 10 Ilf
* ind Treasurer.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
299
* ANNUAL REPORT
AND
ABSTRACT OP PROCEEDINGS OF A GENERAL MEETING OF THE ROYAL
ARTILLERY INSTITUTION, HELD ON MAY 23, 1871.
Colonel A. Benn in the Chaie.
1. The Committee of the Eoyal Artillery Institution has the honor to
present to the Annual General Meeting its Eeport and the Abstract of
Accounts for the year ending 3 1st March, 1871.
It will be seen by the accompanying table that during the past year 51
officers have joined the Institution ; and, after allowing for casualties caused
by deaths, withdrawals, & c., there is a net increase of 19 members.
Rank.
April, 1870.
Additions during the
year, due to
| Total addition.
Deductions during the
year, due to
Total deduction.
April, 1871.
Promotion.
Retirement.
j Re-election.
| Removal from
j retired list.
New members. |
Promotion.
Retirement.
Removal to
effective list.
Resignation.
"Withdrawal.
Names written off
by Committee.
1 Deaths. |
EFFECTIVE LIST.
General and Regimental
Field Officers .
190
11
—
—
—
1
12
—
6
—
—
1
—
2
9
193
Captains .
461
6
—
1
1
9
17
n
2
—
2
1
2
5
23
455
Lieutenants . .
513
—
—
1
—
37
38
6
1
—
8
1
1
5
22
529
*D 4-
7
Quarter-Masters .
10
—
—
— .
—
1
1
—
2
—
—
—
1
3
7
8
5
itiamg-iviasters .
Surgeons-Major .
5
5
5
Slll’O'AOTIQ
2
_
_
1
1
3
16
5
1
15
Veterinary Surgeons .........
5
RETIRED LIST.
General and Regimental
Field Officers . . .
58
—
6
6
2
2
62
43
4
4
4
o
3
A A.
Tiipntpii^nt^
1
1
2
a
Surgeons-Major .
2
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
-
-
O
2
1
1
iYssisianu-oiLi geon . . .
1
Oh ^.pl n
Quarter-Master .
1
-
-
-
-
_
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1
1
Honorary Members .
42
-
u
-
-
2
L _
2
-
-
-
-
-
A
L
43
■ Total .
1366
17
11
3
1
51
83
17
11
1
11
3
3
18
64 !
13S5
•
1 !
[vol. vii.]
40
300
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
A list of members accompanies this Report.
2. With regard to the financial condition of the Institution, the Com¬
mittee is glad to inform the meeting that it is in a sound and flourishing
state, and that a further sum of £300 (realising £325 4<s. 1 cl.) has been
invested in Three per Cent. Consols Stock during the past year.
The general abstract shows the income and expenditure for the past year.
3. Printing and Publication . — Yol. YI. of the “ Proceedings” has been
completed, and four numbers of Yol. YII. have been issued, the papers
enumerated in the annexed list having been published during the past year.
Many of them are of great and permanent value.
List of a Proceedings” printed during the year.
The Mobility of Field Artillery ; Past and Present. Py Lieut. PI. W. L. Hime,
R.A. (No. I.)
On the Arrangement of Expense Magazines, Shell Rooms, Small Stores, and
Side-Arm Sheds for Batteries of Pleavy Rifled Guns. Communicated by the
Director-General of Ordnance.
On the Construction of Batteries. Bv Major Griffith Williams, R.A. ( Circa
1780). Communicated by Major-General Lefroy, C.B., R.A.
Heavy Rifled Guns. By Captain Haig, R.A., E.R.S.
The Field Gun for India. A paper read at the R.A. Institution, Woolwich,
February 22, 1870, by Colonel H. 11. Maxwell, R.A.
A Description of the “ Scale of Shade,” for representing Ground in Relief.
By Captain G. A. Crawford, R.A.
Our Rifled Projectiles and Phizes; Present Construction and Probable Efficiency
on Service. A paper read at the R.A. Institution, Woolwich, March 8, 1870, by
Captain C. Orde Browne, R.A., Captain Instructor, Royal Laboratory*
Remarks on Captain Nolan’s Range-finding Apparatus. By Lieut. C. E. B.
Leacock, R.A.
The Examination and Proof of Gunpowder, as carried on at the Royal Gun¬
powder Factory, Waltham Abbey. By Captain F. M. Smith, R.A., Assistant
Superintendent.
English Guns and Foreign Critics. By Captain Yivian Dering Majendie, R.A.,
Assistant Superintendent, Royal Laboratory.
The Mohilitv of Field Artillery ; Past and Present. Bv Lieut. II. W. L. Hime,
R.A. (No. II.)
A Proposal for a Yery Heavy Breech -Loading Gun of Novel Construction.
A paper read at the R.A. Institution, Woolwich, April 12, 1870, by Captain
J. P. Morgan, R.A.
Camel Guns. By Colonel H. PI. Maxwell, R.A., Superintendent Cossipore
Gun Foundry.
On Axle-tree Seats for Field Batteries. By Captain II. L. Balfour, R A.
On the Re-Armament of Gibraltar. By Captain J. B. Richardson, R.A.
A Proposal for the Drill of Gunners of Field Batteries at other than Regimental
Exercises. By Captain and Brevet-Major IT. L. Geary, R.A., Adjt. 14th Brigade,
R.A. (Field).
Some Observations amongst German Armies during 1870. Bv Colonel II. A.
Smyth, R.A.
The Story of the 36-inch Mortars of 1855-58. By Major-General Lefroy,
C.B., F.R.S., R.A.
The Reform of Prussian Tactics. A Lecture delivered at the R.A. Institution,
Woolwich, December 13, 1870, by Lieut. -Colonel C. C. Chesnev, R.E.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
801
The Future Armament of our Field Artillery. A Paper read at the R.A.
Institution, Woolwich, January 16, 1871, by Lieut. C. Jones, R.A., Captain
Instructor, Royal Gun Factories.
The Merits of a Large Bore and Small Bore Contrasted, with reference to Rifled
Artillery and Small- Arms. A Lecture delivered at the R.A. Institution, Woolwich,
February 17, 1871, by Lieut. J. Sladen, R.A., Assistant Instructor, Royal
Laboratory.
Mounting of Twelve 12-ton Guns at Malta, 1870, by 10th Brigade, R.A.
Short Notes on Professional Subjects , 1870.
Experiments with an 8 f -inch Krupp’s Steel Gun at the Polygon of Brasschaet.
Experiments with a Krupp’s Steel Gun at the Polygon of Brasschaet against
iron-plated Targets of the “Warrior” and “ Bellerophon” types.
Boxer Shrapnel Shells for Rifled Guns.
Table of Electro-Ballistic Experiments.
Account of Experiments with Gun-cotton and Nitro -glycerine.
Description of a Scale to be attached to instruments for finding the Distances
of Ships at sea from elevated Coast Batteries.
Memorandum, dated July 12, 1870, relative to the progress of experiments by
the Committee on Explosives since Preliminary Report.
The Line of Sight employed in laying Field Guns.
Abstract of a Report of an Experiment carried out at Colombo, by Colonel Cox,
Commanding Royal Artillery, Ceylon, to determine the penetration of round shot.
Demolition of No. 87 Martello Tower by Gun-cotton, May 81, 1870.
Pocket Sextant.
Electro-Ballistic Experiments.
On the best means of ensuring Accurate Practice at Shipping from elevated Coast
Batteries.
Piling of Shot and Shell — Elongated Projectiles.
Picric Powder.
Time and Percussion Fuzes for Field Artillery.
Directions for the use of Captain Tracey’s Range Scale.
Method adopted for hoisting in the 9 -inch M.L.R. Gun at Fort Picklecoinbe,
Plymouth.
Captain J. P. Nolan’s Range-finder.
Much interesting information has been published in the a Short Notes on
Professional Subjects,” which have accompanied each issue of the “Pro¬
ceedings” since the last report, and it is hoped that an increasing number
of members will aid in support of this means of imparting to their brother
officers the observations and experience of individual members on subjects
of professional and scientific interest.
A revised copy of “ List of Service Ordnance and Ammunition,” cor¬
rected to 31 st March, has been issued to each member, and it is gratifying
to know that this publication has proved eminently useful.
A copy of the monthly Regimental Lists is now circulated to members
with each number of the “ Proceedings.”
A memoir of the late Field-Marshal Sir Hew Dairy in pie Ross, G.C.B.,
compiled from original MSS. in possession of his family, is in course of
publication. There are few chapters in the history of the regiment more
interesting than the military biography of this distinguished officer, extending
as it* does over a period of 73 years, during which time the Royal Artillery
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
302
took a prominent part in many important campaigns. The services of Sir
Hew Boss in the Peninsula were the commencement of a career which was
as distinguished as it was beneficial to his corps. The Committee rejoices
that the Institution has been permitted to be the means of laying before
the officers of the regiment a record of such honourable and brilliant service.
As this memoir extends over 100 pages, the Committee has decided on
only printing off a limited number of copies. Any member can obtain a
copy on application to the Secretary.
The constant demands upon the printing press for other work for mem¬
bers, show the general usefulness of this part of the establishment, and also
the necessity of enlarging it. The Committee trusts that this want will
be overcome by the additional accommodation about being given to the
Department of Artillery Studies, and the space vacated being handed over to
the Institution.
Since the last meeting, complete sets of the “ Proceedings ” have been
presented to the Director of Naval Ordnance, the National Artillery Asso¬
ciation, and the Secretary of State for India.
The Committee has great pleasure in informing the meeting that the
sum of £10 10 s. has been placed at its disposal yearly for five years by
an officer of the regiment, for the purpose of founding a medal for the
best essay on matters connected with artillery; and in the event of his
proposal being successful in its results, this officer is further prepared to
place in its hands £100, on the condition that £5 10s. be taken out of
the funds of the Institution yearly to make up the amount necessary for
the purchase of this medal.
This liberal offer was unanimously accepted by the Committee, and the
following are the conditions of competition, which were drawn up and
circulated to members in September last : —
(1) The candidates must be officers on full pay, and members of the
E.A. Institution.
(2) The essays shall be in alternate years, on matters connected with
(a) the duties and position of artillery, and ( b ) the manufacturing depart¬
ments.
(3) The essays, which must not exceed 16 octavo printed pages, must
be forwarded to the Secretary on or before the 1st of April in each year.
The essays to be strictly anonymous, but each to have a motto, and be
accompanied by a sealed envelope with the motto written on the outside,
and the name of the candidate inside.
(4) The name of the successful candidate shall be announced at the
Annual Meeting, and medallists shall be distinguished as such in all lists,
&c., issued from the Institution ; and in the event of a University man
gaining the medal, a report of his success will be made to the University of
which he may be a member.
(5) The essays will be submitted for decision to three Eeferees, chosen
by the Committee.
(6) The successful essay will be printed and circulated to members by
the Institution.
The subject for the essay to be rendered before 1st of April, 1871, shall
be any point the candidate may select, connected with the duties and position
of artillery.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
303
Eight essays have been received, and submitted to the Referees — viz.,
Major-General Eardley-Wilmot, R.A., E.R.S., Colonel Hamley, E.A., C.B.,
and Major Geary, R.A. — who have decided in favour of the essay bearing
the motto “ Trunnion,” which proves to be that selected by Lieut. II. W. L.
Hime, 11th Bde. R.A.
4. Library . — “ Gould’s Birds of Australia,” in eight volumes, has been
purchased at a cost of £158 15s., and the Committee has arranged for this
sum being paid off at the rate of £20 yearly. This work has been pub¬
lished in the same admirable style as the companion works already possessed
by the Institution, and is a most valuable addition to the library. The
balance of the debt of £63 for “ Gould's Humming Birds,” agreed on to
be paid by instalments, has been paid in full.
The scrap book, containing extracts from the newspapers on professional
subjects, is still kept up.
A list of the more important lithographs issued by the different depart¬
ments, and arranged in sets, accompanies this report.
These, as well as others not included in the sets, and photographs of
various drills and exercises, can be obtained singly as heretofore by members.
The “List of Changes in Artillery Materiel” can now be procured gratis
by members, the Secretary of State for War having kindly placed at the
disposal of the Committee a certain number of copies for distribution.
Among the works presented during the past year, one is specially worthy
of mention — the “ Official Record of the Abyssinian Expedition,” presented
by the Secretary of State for War; a handsome and valuable addition to
the professional branch of the library.
In the following list of presentations it will be seen that very many maps
have been received from the War Office, 17 of which illustrate the Peninsular
battles from 1804 to 1810.
Booh, Sfc., presented .
Journal of the Royal United Service^)
Institution, Nos. 55 to 61, and |
Appendix . . . . }-
Medical, Military, and Surgical Essays... |
Ilinde’s Discipline . J
Proceedings of Institution of Mechanical
Engineers, Nov. 1869, Jan., Apr., >
Aug., and Nov. 1870 . . ... )
Lecture on the Construction and Main- 1
tenance of Telegraph Lines, by R. S. >
Gulley, Esq . )
Analytical Tables, &c., for use in the"')
Laboratory, School of Military En- j
gineering . j
Lecture on “Building Materials.” by
W. D. Dent, Esq . |
Lecture on Railway Construction, bv j
W. C. Unwin, Esq . .‘.J
Report on the present state and condition )
of Prehistoric Remains in the Channel >
Islands, by Lieut. S. P. Oliver, R.A. )
10
( The Council, Royal United
Service Institution.
The Council, Institution of
Mechanical Engineers.
i "i
[The Commandant, School of
Military Engineering.
3 J
The Author.
304
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
; of Lieutenants, )
dent. H. W. L. V
Megalithic Structures of the Channel*)
Islands, by Lieut. S, P. Oliver, 11. A., >
E.B.G.S. *. . )
The Geology of St. Helena, by Capt. )
J. B. Oliver, E.A . j
Artillerie Practique employee sous les*
regnes et dans les Guerres de
Louis XIY. et Louis XV., par le J-
Baron Espiard de Cologne. With
Plates . . .
Notes on the Prospects of Lieutenants
Boyal Artillery, by Lieut
Hime, E.A .
Napier’s History of the Peninsular War, *)
in 6 Volumes . . )
Die Venvaltung des Norddeutschen )
Bundesheeres . j
Hart’s Army List, October, 1869, and)
January, April, and July, 1870 . )
Eussian Artillery Journal, No. 12 of 1869, )
and 1 to 4 of 1870 . )
Journal of the Boyal Geographical Society, \
Vol. XXXIX . J
Proceedings of the Boyal Geographical )
Society, Nos. 3, 4, and 5... . j
Journal of the East India x\ssociation, 1
No. 1, Yol. II . j
A Brief Account of some Travels in )
Hungaria, Servia, &c., by Edward !•
Brown, m.d . )
Proceedings of the Scientific Meetings
of the Zoological Society of London,
Parts 2 and 3 .
Smithsonian Beport, 1868 . . *)
u Contributions to Knowledge,
Vol. XIV . y
u Miscellaneous Collections,
Vols. VIII. and IX. ...J
Astronomical and Meteorological Obser- \
vations made at the United States (
Naval Observatory during the year (
1867 . . )
Popular Science Beview, Vols. I. to V.... 1
Wells on Dew . . . )
Envers du Marquis Be Cliambray. Three*)
Vols. and Atlas . !
Ilistoire de Napoleon et de la Grande j
Armee. Two Vols . J
Notes on the Great Pyramid of Egypt, *)
by Colonel Sir H. James, B.E . )
Table showing the fall by Gravity in )
the Atmosphere, by Major-General >
P. Anstruther, C.B., E.A. . . ;
Beport on the Cartographic Application 1
of Photography, by Lieut. J. Water- >
Louse, E.A . )
The Author,
1 The Author
Lieut. II. W. L. Hime, E.A.
The Committee, E.A. Library.
Maj. -General N. de Novitzky.
( The Counci
l graphical i
Council, Boyal Geo-
ical Society.
C The Council, East India
(_ Association.
Gunner W. J. Pilley, E.A.
( The Council, Zoological So-
( ciety of London.
.The Council, Smithsonian In-
' stitution.
Lieut. N. S. Perceval, E.A.
1 Lieut.-Colonel Milman, E.A.
1 The Author.
1 The Author.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
305
Maps of England, Wales, and Scotland, *)
showing the Railways and Military > 2
Stations . )
Duplicate sets of 17 Plans, illustrating*)
the Peninsular Battles from 1804 to > 17
1810 . )
Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia. 7 -j
Two Yols. and Plates . j
Copies of Maps of France, in 7 parts, 7 «
viz., 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19 ... )
Copy of Map of France, in 3 sheets, and \ ^
one copy of Map of Paris . 3
Sheet Maps of Paris, Berlin, Brussels, 7 0
Basil, Hanover, and Munich . ) °
Sheet Map of Mezieres .
Carte Hydrographique du Department de 1 ^
la Seine . . . j
Photo-Lithographs, complete set of .
Treatise on Ammunition, Part 2 . 1
Ideas on our Military Position in a war 7 ^
with Russia, by an Austrian Officer... )
Accounts of the Systems of Military!
Education in France, Prussia, Austria, > 1
Bavaria, and the United States . )
Strength and Organisation of a North } ^
German Army Corps . )
Report of a Special Committee on Am- !
munition for Martini-Henry Breech- >■ 1
Loading Rifles . )
Handbook of the Manufacture and Proof 7 %
of Gunpowder . j
R.G.F. Lithographs . 16
R.L. Lithographs . . . 3
R . C . D . Li th ographs . 88
War Office Photographs . 64
Description and use of Le Boulenge’s 1 g
Chronograph, by Lieut. C. Jones, R.A. j
Memorandum relative to the progress of S
Experiments by the Committee on £ ^
Explosives since Preliminary Report f
of Februaiy, 1870 )
Report of Special Committee on Field 1
Artillery Equipment for India, 1869 3
Experiments made with the Bashforth 1
Chronograph, 1865 to 1S67 3 1
Captain Majendie’s Report on an Official 7 ^
Ten Months in the Fiji Islands, by 7 n
Mrs. W. J. Smythe . 3
Eclipses of the Sun, bv Lieut. Collins, 7 t
R.E . I . ,...3 1
Our Effective Artillery ; a Pamphlet, by |
Mr. Basliley Britten . j 1
The last Campaign of Hanover, by Capt. 7
H. Brackenbury, R.A . 3
Secretary of Slate for War.
The Author.
The Author.
The Author.
The Author.
306
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The British Army and Reserves . .
Examination Papers, Royal Military 7
Academy, June and December, 1870 j
Report of the Central Committee on the 7
Soldiers’ Industrial Exhibition, 1870 j
Institution of Civil Engineers. Minutes 7
of Proceedings, Catalogue of Library )
Metals : their Properties and Treatment, 7
by Professor Bloxam . j
“ Canada a Lecture by Captain 7
E. Duncan, R.A., M.A., &c., &c., &c. j
History of Alsace and Lorraine, in Ger- 7
man, by Gustave Gotting . j
Imperial Strategy, by Captain J. C. R. 7
Colomb, Adjutant Limerick Artillery >
Militia . , . )
Reorganisation of our Military Eorces, 7
by Capt. J. C. R. Colomb . . j
Cours D’Administration Militaire, par. A
Yauchelle. Three Yols . £
La Guerre de Sept ans Atlas . T
Plates — Macaulay’s Eield Fortification... )
Netherlands Artillery Atlas .
Sheet Drawings of the Netherlands Artil- 7
lery Material . . . )
Tide Observations at Otaheite or Taheti, 7
by Capt. Sir E. Belcher, Il.N . j
A National Army; or, How to Solve 7
tlie Problem of the Day, by Major >
J. Bevan-Edwards, R.E . )
Jackson’s Woolwich Journal, from 1857 7
to 1862. Bound . )
Preliminary Experiments on the Mechani- 7
cal and other Properties of Steel . j
1 Anonymously.
( The Governor, Royal Military
(. Academy.
C The Council, Institution of
C Civil Engineers.
1 The Author.
1 The Author.
1 The Author.
. 5
1
The Author.
3 Mrs. II. E. Strange.
1 )
„ > Netherlands Government.
6 j
1 The Author.
The Author.
0 f Major-General J. H. Lefroy,
1 l C.B., R.A.
, C The Committee of Civil
\ Engineers.
Boohs _ purchased .
Minutes of Evidence taken before the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into
the present state of Military Education, &c., with appendix.
Revue Militaire Erancaise. April, June, July, and September, 1870.
Manual of Artillery Exercises. Parts I. & II., and III.
The Ibis. Nos. 22, 23, and 24, Yol. YI. No. 1, Yol. I., new series.
Military Eorces of the Crown. Two Yols. ** '
Monograph of the Barbets. Parts II., III., IY., Y., and YI.
Monograph of the Kingfishers. Parts IX., X., XI., XII., XIII., and XIV.
Gould’s Birds of Great Britain. Parts XVII. and XVIII.
Monograph of the Pheasants. Parts I. and II.
Gould’s Birds of Australia, in 8 Yols.
Gould’s Birds of Asia. Part XXIII.
Witney’s Metallic Wealth of the United States.
Record of the Expedition to Abyssinia. Two Yols.
The Student’s Text Book of Electricity.
Instruction in Military Engineering. Yol. I.
Eield Exercises and Evolutions of Infantry for 1870, with key.
Notes on Electricity. Tyndall.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
307
Report of the Committee on Promotion and Retirement of Officers of the Ordnance
Corps. Two copies.
The Campaign of 1866 ; A Tactical Retrospect. Translated from the German, by
Colonel H. A. Ouvry.
Regulations for the Great Manoeuvres of the Prussian Army, 29tli June, 1861.
Manual of Gunnery for Her Majesty’s Fleet.
Colonel Frome, R.E., on Surveying.
Text Book of Science. Elements of Mechanism.
Nautical Almanac of 1871-72-73.
Prussian Work on Rifled Field Guns, by Major Roerdansz.
O’Byrne’ s Collection of Army Circulars and General Orders for 1867-68-69.
The British Army and its Reserves.
Prussian Infantry, 1869.
Lessons of War, as taught by the Great Masters. By Lt.-Col. J. F. Soady, R.A.
Publication of the Palseontographical Society for 1870.
Polygonal Fortification, and Atlas ; treatise on.
The Imperial Calendar.
Owen’s Modern Artillery. Two copies.
Manual of Electricity, by H. M. Noad.
Lavallie’s Physical, Historical, and Military Geography.
Percy’s Metallurgy of Lead.
The Military Resources of Prussia and France.
Researches on Diamagnetism and Magne-crystallic Action, by Tyndall.
A System for forming the Regular Troops, Militia, and Volunteers into an Army.
Taubert’s Field Artillery. Translated by Lieut. H. H. Maxwell, Bengal Artillery.
Arundel Society Plates.
Jesus and His Disciples at Emaus.
Christ and Mary Magdalene in the Garden.
The Triune God, the Virgin Mary, and St. John the Baptist.
5. Museum . — A list of the various donations to the museum accom¬
panies this report.
During the past year the following additions have been made to the
natural history collection — viz., a white tiger skin, very valuable and rare
(shot at Mowlee, Jynteeah Hills, India) by Capt. C. Wr. Wilson, R.A. ;
head and horns of Thibetan and Indian antelopes, by Lieut. J. Biddulph,
19th Hussars; a very interesting collection of animals and birds, with a few
shells, from Madagascar, by Lieut. J. C. Robinson, R.A.; a pair of Bengal
florikens, by Brig.-General Bourchier, C.B., R.A.; insects and eggs from
Australia, by Capt. Sandilands, R.A. ; some birds from Canada and India,
by Lieut. A. G. Yeatman, R.A., and Lieut. Beadnell, R.A., respectively ; a few
fine specimens of birds from Australia, by Asst. -Surgeon Fiddes, M.B., R.A. ;
16 birds from China and 41 hummingbird's, by Mr. H. WThtely ; 7 birds
from Alderney, by Lieut. G. Montgomery, R.A. For all these the best
thanks of the Institution are due to the donors.
Of British birds only one new specimen has been presented — viz., a male
capercaillzie, by Capt. J. S. Stirling, R.A. The Committee has been
enabled to obtain, by purchase, 23 choice specimens, it being most desirable
that the collection of birds of the British Isles be made as complete as pos-
41
308
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
sible. As a guide io those members willing to assist, by sending skins or
complete specimens, a list is given of the desiderata in this part of the museum.
More than 100 typical specimens of birds have been added to the
mounted collection, the whole of which have been named and labelled. A
catalogue of all the mounted specimens has been completed.
The antelope heads, horns, as also the reptiles arranged round the
museum, have been labelled, and the donors' names attached.
Twelve officers have received instruction in Taxidermy during the year.
Consequent on the long connection with, and valuable services rendered
to the Institution by Mr. Whitely, the Curator of the Museum, and also
in consideration of the many donations given to it, the Committee has
granted him, subject to the approval of the general meeting, an increase
of £10 yearly, commencing on the 1st January, 1871.
Presentations to Museum.
Frogs . . .
Chinese Summer Shirt and Slippers . .
Large Chinese Drawings in Water ')
Colours, mounted on rollers . j
Mineralogical Specimens, consisting of)
Gold, Silver, Copper, and Lead Ores §
Japanese Fishing Bod .
Skin of White Tiger . . .
Antelopes’ Heads and Skins . .
Collection of Birds and Minerals, 4 Horn")
Spoons, Horn Drinking Utensil and ‘
Dish, and Bamboo Snuff-box, from f
Madagascar . . . . )
29 Birds and 1 Fish from Canada .
Type Specimens of rare China Birds ...
Humming Birds . . . .
Birds from India . . .
Birds from Scotland . . . . . .
Birds shot at Alderney . . .
Birds from India. . . .
Australian Birds . . . .
Armstrong E Time Fuze, whole section^
n B a a a
i, Concussion „ A „
/, Percussion „ C „
i, Pillar
„ Percussion
Moorsom’s Fuze, whole and section .
Boxer’s Time Fuze, section only .
Pettman’s Land Service, „
(The whole in a mahogany case.)
Obsolete Copper Coins from Gibraltar...
Begulation Helmet for Officers, It. A., in
india, from 1864 to 1870 .
C Plug & thimble,
l N aval Service.
2 Pev. A. C. Fraser.
Yice- Admiral Gold smith, C.B.
4 Capt. J. B. Dyce, Tt.A.
14 Lieut. A. B. Brown, It. A.
1 Maj. -General Buchanan, It. A.
1 Capt. W. Wilson, It. A.
2 C Lieut. J. Biddulph, 19th
I Hussars.
Lieut. J. It. Itobinson, It. A.
30 Lieut. A. G. Yeatman, It. A.
| Mr. Whitely.
2 Lieut. Beadneli, E.A.
2 Capt. J. S. Stirling, It. A.
7 Lieut. Montgomerie, It. A.
9 C Brig.-General G. Bourchicr,
* l C.B., E.A.
1 0 Asst.-Surg. Fiddes, M.B.,E. A .
Mrs. H. F. Strange.
75 Capt. J. B. Eichardson, B.A.
1 Lieut. T. H* Lloyd, E.A.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
1I.B.H. Prince Arthur.
^2 | Capt. Sandilands, E.A.
80 Colonel Lewes.
8 Mr. Whitely.
Birds from India, presented by Lieut. -Colonel Bourchier , C.B., R.A .
Sypheotides bengalensis. $ * $ f
Birds from America, presented by Lieut. A. G. Teatman , R.A.
Picus villosus. ^
Melanerpes ery throcephalus .
Colaptes auratus.
Ceryle alcyon. £
Tyrannus carolinensis.
u n
My iarcliu s crinitus .
Turdus solitarius. <y
ii a $
a a ?
„ migratorius.
Mimus polyglottus.
„ carolinensis.
Silia sialis.
Setophaga ruticilla. ^
Birds from India, presented by Lieut. Beadnell, R.A.
Hydrophasianus sinensis. | Hydropliasianus sinensis, younj
Dolichonyx oryzivorus. $
Quiscalus major.
Cyanocitta californica.
a a
Demiegretta ludoviciana.
Garzetta candidissima.
Tringa alpina.
,i wilsonii.
a ii
n it
a a
a bonapartii.
II II
Limosa fedoa.
1 Converted Enfield Kifle and Bayonet,-'')
1 United States Cavalry Sword, and |
1 Coat and Cap of a Eenian taken in
a skirmish at Eccles Hill, Missisquoi, |
Canada, 25th May, 1870 . . . J
Insects (various) from Australia .
Eggs t « .
Glass Case containing Eighty Medallion }
Casts, illustrating various victories >
during the Peninsular Campaign . )
Snouts of Saw Fish . . .
Birds from Scotland, presented by Capt. J. S. Stirling, R.A.
Tinnunculus alaudarius. $ | Tetrao urogallus. £
Birds from China, presented by II. Whitely.
Megalsema nuchalis.
Lanius shach.
„ lucionensis.
Anthus agilus.
Corydalla richardi.
Calliope camschatkensis.
Dicrurus macrocercus.
Leucodioptron sinensis.
Humming
Pomatorhinus musicus.
Spizixos semitorques.
Pericrocotus griseigularis.
Oriolus chinensis.
Gracupica nigricollis.
Dendrocitta sinensis.
Treron formosse.
Turtur humilis.
birds, 41.
$ Male.
1 ^ Eemale,
309
310
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Birds and Animals from Madagascar , presented by Lieut. T. C. Robinson, JR. A.
Bieds.
Milvus parasiticus.
Eurystomus madagascariensis.
// II
Centropus tolu.
Dicrurus forficatus.
Hypsipetes ourovang.
Hartlaubia madagascariensis.
Leptopterus viridis.
Vinago australis.
Ardea rufi crista.
Gallinago bernieri.
Dafila erythrorhyncha.
Phaeton plia3nicurus.
young.
Animals.
Propithece diadema.
Lemur niger.
Birds from Australia, presented by Asst.-Surg. T. M. Fiddes, M.B., JR. A.
Pomatostomus superciliosus.
Meliornis sericea.
Grallina picata.
Todirhamphus sanctus.
Platycercus eximius.
Trichoglossus multicolor.
II II
Calyptorhynchus xanthonotus.
Thalassoica g'lacialoides.
Daption capeusis.
Birds from Alderney , presented by Lieut . G. Montgomery, JR.. A.
Upupa epops.
Charadrius hiaticula.
Hsematopus ostralegus.
II II
Alca torda.
Eratercula arctica.
Larus canus.
British Birds Furcliased.
Archibuteo lagopus. $
Ealco peregrinus. $
Circus seruginosus. $
Syrnium aluco. $
Otus brachyotus. $
Anser brachyrhynchus, $
Tadorna vulpanser. $
Casarca rutila. $ %
Mareca penelope. $ $
Dafila acuta. $
Querquedula crecca. $
Pterocyanea circia. $
Pranta rufina. $
Euligula cristata. $
Nyroca leucophthalmos. $
„ ferina. £
Somateria mollissima. £
„ spectabilis. ^ £
Oidemia fusca. $
Mergus cucullatus. $
„ albellus. ^
Puffinus anglorum. j
Sula bassana. $
Presented by Captain C. W. Wilson, R. A., from India.
White tiger skin.
Presented by Lieut. J. Biddulph, 19 th Hussars.
Head and horns of Thibetan and Indian antelopes.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
311
Presented hj Captain Sandilands3 B. A., from Australia ,
99 Insects, various. | Australian bustard egg.
Black swan egg.
Specimens required for the Collection of British Birds and Bggs.
Griffon vulture.
Egyptian „
Golden eagle.
Spotted u
Osprey.
Cinereous eagle.
Bough-legged buzzard. $
Honey „
Kite.
Swallow-tailed kite and egg.
Jerfalcon.
Peregrine falcon.?
Hobby.
Merlin.
Bed-footed falcon.
Goshawk.
Hen harrier.
Ash-coloured harrier.
Marsh „ <j>
Great-eared owl.
Hawk H
Snowy „
Tengmalm’s „
Short-eared « $
Little ,,
Sparrow ,,
Long-eared „
Barn „
Nightjar.
Hartford warbler.
Blue-tliroated warbler.
Alpine accentor.
Crested titmouse and egg.
Bearded „ „
White wagtail.
Grey • ,,
Bay’s u
Grey-headed wagtail and egg.
Bichard’s pipit and egg.
Tawny „ „
Bed lark and egg.
tDD
Bock thrush.
Bing ouzel.
Blackbird.
Golden oriole.
Pied flycatcher.
Great grey shrike and egg.
Nutcracker and egg.
Baven.
Jackdaw.
Mealy redpole and egg.
Siskin „
Serin finch «
Painted bunting „
Lapland „ «
Ortolan „
Cirl u
Short-toed lark and egg.
Calandre „ „
Crested „ „
Wood
Shore „
Pine grosbeak and egg.
White-winged crossbill and egg.
P arrot « «
Three-toed woodpecker „
Downy ,, „
Hairy „ „
Great spotted „ «
Lesser „ „
Great black „
Green „
Yellow-billed cuckoo and egg.
Great spotted #, «
Bing dove.
Bock h
Palla’s sand grouse and egg.
Pheasant.
Quail.
Andalusian quail and egg.
Capercaillie, o
Ptarmigan.
Buffed bustard and egg.
Little „ „
Great „
Little ringed plover.
Kentish „
Golden „
Crane.
Buff-backed heron.
Great white „
Purple „
Squacco «
Common bittern.
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Little bittern.
Night heron.
Spoonbill.
Black stork and egg.
White u
Glossy ibis.
Whimbrel.
Esquimaux curlew and egg.
Bartailed godwit.
Black-tailed u
Spotted redshank and egg.
Yellow-shanked sandpiper & egg.
Green u u
Green-shank „ „
Buff-breasted „ „
Bartram’s „ „
Wood u
Spotted «
Avocet.
Black-winged stilt and egg.
Knot and egg.
Bonaparte’s sandpiper and egg.
Purple „ «
Pectoral „ „
Temminck’s stint and egg.
Little „ „
Broad-billed sandpiper and egg.
Sanderling and egg.
Brown snipe and egg.
Great snipe.
Woodcock.
Grey phalarope and egg.
Bed-necked phalarope.
Little crake and egg.
Moor hen.
Coot.
Spurwinged goose.
Egyptian
Bernicle «
Bed-breasted „
Canada „
Grey lag „
Bean „
White-fronted ,,
Hooper.
Bewick’s swan and egg.
Polish u
Shieldrake. $
Wild duck.
Bimaculated duck and egg.
G arganey. $
Gadwall and egg.
Shoveler.
Bed-crested duck and egg. $
Tufted duck. $
Golden eye.
Buffle-keaded duck and egg.
Harlequin „ «
Western „ „
Eider $ „
Velvet scoter and egg.
Common „ „
Surf „ H
Goosander.
Hooded merganser and egg.
Bed-breasted „
Smew and egg. $
Great northern diver and egg.
Black-throated „
Bed-throated „
Bed-necked grebe.
Sclavonian „ $
Great crested „
Eared „
Brunnich’s guillemot.
Black «
Little auk and egg.
Husky shearwater and egg.
Greater „
Eorked-tailed petrel and egg.
Wilson’s « u
Stormy „
Eulmar „
Bulwer’s «
Pomarine skua and egg.
Common «
Arctic i,
Buffon’s a
Great black-backed gull.
Lesser « «
Black-headed /,
Bonaparte’s gull and egg.
Little a a
Sabine’s a «
Ivory H B
Caspian tern and egg.
Gull-billed/, „
Whiskered « „
Sooty „ „
Sandwich „
Boseate „
Common „
Arctic „
Lesser „
Cormorant.
Green cormorant.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
313
6. Classes. — The Classes for Drawing, Mathematics, Trench, and
German have met as usual; the former has been very well attended, the
instructor, Mr. Needham, giving every satisfaction.
7. Observatory . — The rotatory dome of the equatorial room, manufac¬
tured in 1852 by Messrs. Eansom & May, of Ipswich, had latterly become
so stiff as to require several men with tackle to turn it. An application
to the Secretary of State for War for funds to place it in a proper
state of efficiency was liberally responded to, and the work has been most
satisfactorily executed by Messrs. Troughton and Simms. In addition to
the re-adjustment of the running gear of the dome, the shutter has been
made to slide with ease and smoothness, and the interior of the room has
been cleaned and painted.
Under these circumstances, and looking at the prosperous state of the
funds, the Committee is of opinion that the time has arrived for carrying
out the intention, so long entertained, of procuring a telescope adequate
to the requirements of the Institution. The cost of such an instrument
properly mounted would be about £500, and the Committee proposes to
ask the sanction of the meeting to this outlay.
8. Photography . — The photographic department requires much altera¬
tion and improvement, and a Sub-Committee has been appointed to ensure
this being done thoroughly and economically.
9. Chemistry . — The laboratory has been in constant use by the classes
of officers under the Director of Artillery Studies, as also by officers working
independently.
10. Instruments . — One of the principal objects for which the Institution
was founded, was to place within reach of its members instruments of a
character often too expensive Tor private purchase. The Committee, in
keeping this object steadily in view, has recently added to the supply of
instruments a Grove's battery of 40 cells, and has ordered an electric
lantern and lamp* of the most recent construction, by Browning. The
acquisition of this apparatus will admit of a great extension being given
to the lectures, many interesting subjects having been omitted hitherto from
the want of it.
11. Model Room. — A stand of arms with bayonets (consisting of “ Brown
Bess" and the different carbines and rifles that have been in the service
down to the Martini-Henry), has been deposited in the model room;
also several service projectiles and other stores, a catalogue of which has
been carefully kept up, so that members can now without any difficulty
make themselves acquainted with them.
The Committee has purchased a Chassepot rifle ; a needle gun also has
been placed at its disposal.
# Since received.
314
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The arrangement by which all stores supplied by the War Department are
on local charge only, is a most advantageous one, as the Committee is
enabled to procure direct from the Royal Arsenal the latest projectiles and
stores in the service, and so make the model room one of the most
instructive features of the Institution.
12. Workshop. — This shop is in good working order, and has been
much enlarged.
13. Museum of Artillery . — The Secretary of State for War, in con¬
currence with ILR.IL the .Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief, having
approved of the Museum of Artillery at the Rotunda being entrusted to
the Committee of the Royal Artillery Institution, the transfer took effect
on the 1 7 th May, 1870.
A Sub-Committee has been appointed to assist the Secretary in its manage¬
ment, and every endeavour will be made to render it as instructive, and
attractive to the general public, as possible.
14. Lectures . — The lectures enumerated in the following list have been
delivered in the Theatre of the Institution to members and their friends
during the past winter, and they have been largely attended. Thanks are
due to S. Brandram, Esq., M.A., Admiral Sir E. Belcher, K.C.B., Lieut. -
Colonel A. W. Drayson, R.A., Lieut. W. H. Collins, R.E., Capt. M. C.
Newall, R.A., and Lieut. J. R. Slade, R.H.A., for gratuitous service ren¬
dered in this matter.
Rev. A. J. D’Orsey, B.T) .
Rev. Martyn Hart, M.A .
S. Brandram, Esq., M.A .
Lt.-Col. Drayson, R.A., E.R.A.S. ..
Admiral Sir E. Belcher, K.C.B .
Lieut. W. II. Collins, R.E., E.R.A.S
Captain M. C. Newall, R.A .
“ On Elocution as applied to Public Speaking.”
“The World of the Sea.”
Readings from various authors.
" On the coming Transit of Venus.”
( “ The great Equatorial Current, misnamed the
l ‘ Gulf Stream.’ ”
“ The Eclipse of December, 1870.”
“ An Hour with the Poets.”
The excellent geological collection of the Institution has not hitherto
yielded all the results of which it is capable, from the absence of a qualified
instructor. The science of geology is of such practical value, and officers
in visiting remote and unexplored countries have such special opportunities
of contributing to its progress, that due facilities should be offered in the
way of its study. Before however making definite arrangements on this
head, the Committee has resolved to ascertain by the experiment of a short
course of lectures, the extent of interest taken by members in the subject.*
These lectures are now in course of delivery.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
315
In consideration of the number of lectures given at the Institution
gratuitously by Mr. C. L. Bloxam, E.C.S., as well as his prompt willingness
at all times to give assistance to members studying chemistry, the Committee,
on the part of the members, presented him with a silver salver, bearing the
following inscription : —
PRESENTED TO
C. L. BLOXAM, Esq.,
Professor of Chemistry in the Department of Artillery Studies, and at the
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich,
&c. &c. &c.,
BY THE MEMBERS OR
&jri Unpl IrtiUmj Institution,
As a mark of then* esteem, and in grateful acknowledgment of the many valuable
services rendered by him to the Institution.
Woolwich, June, 1870.
15. Afternoon Meetings . — These meetings have been well attended, and
some very interesting professional discussions have taken place. Their
success during the past year argues well for their continued usefulness.
The thanks of the Institution are
for the papers read by them : —
Captain J. P. Morgan, K.A .
Lt.-Col. C. C. Ckesney, K.E .
Lieut. C. Jones, K.A .
Captain C. 0. Browne, K.A .
Lt.-Col. E. W. Bray, 4th King’s Own
Koyal Kegiment .
Lieut. J. Sladen, K.A. . .
Captain J. P. Morgan, K.A .
due to the undermentioned officers
f “ A Proposal for a Very Heavy B.L. Gun of
{ Novel Construction.”
“ The Reform of Prussian Tactics.”
“The Future Armament of our Field Ar¬
tillery.”
C “ Development of Artillery Missiles during
1 the past year.”
"I. “ Prussian mode of conducting large manoeu¬
vres, and the manner in which a Staff of
Umpires is used for the purpose of con-
J trolling and regulating such manoeuvres,
j II. “ The necessity of introducing a more in¬
telligent system of manoeuvre, and a higher
system of training amongst the Officers of
the English Army.”
The Merits of a Large Pore and Small Bore
{ Contrasted, with reference to Rifled Artillery
P and Small- Arms.”
“The Determination of the Explosive Force
of Gunpowder.”
Eour of these papers have been published in the “ Proceedings,” and the
remainder will appear as soon as possible.
4s%
316
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The following members have left the Garrison, and the vacancies thus
occasioned have been filled up by the Committee, subject to the approval
of the general meeting : —
Colonel G. T. Field,
« Gr. Eotton,
Captain G. B. B. Hobart,
„ F. A. Whinyates,
„ C. O. Browne,
„ J. C. J. Lowry,
„ F. W. de Winton,
Major H. Y. Timbrell,
Captain J. P. Nolan,
Lieut. A. B. Brown,
by
a
It
it
Colonel O’B. B. Woolsey.
„ J. Desborough.
Major H. Y. Timbrell.
Lieut. -Colonel C. II. Owen.
Captain J. P. Morgan.
„ M. C. Newall.
„ J. P. Nolan.
„ E. Oldfield.
„ A. Ford.
Lieut. J. Sladen.
In compliance with Rule Y., the following officers retire from the Com¬
mittee, and are not eligible for re-election : —
Colonel G. II. Yesey.
Lieut. -Colonel G. A. Milman.
Captain T. B. Strange.
Captain F. Duncan.
Lieut. E. Kensington.
Asst.-Surg. F. E. Hogg, M.D.
The following officers were elected to serve on the Committee, viz. :
Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Tull oh.
Major H. Le G. Gearv,
Captain Le Mesurier,
/, E. H. Cameron,
Lieut. II. Geary,
Surg. -Major S. H. Fasson,
vice Colonel Yesey.
„ Captain Strange.
„ „ Duncan.
„ Lieut.-Colonel Milman.
i, Lieut. Kensington.
„ Asst. -Surgeon Hogg.
The following resolutions were proposed : —
1. Proposed by Colonel Domville , seconded by Colonel Phillpotts , and
carried unanimously : —
"That the Eeport of the Committee be adopted and printed.”
2. Due notice having been given , in accordance with Pule XX., the
folioicing alterations and additions to the Pules were submitted by the
Committee : —
Change in Pule II. ( printed in italics ) proposed by the Committee : —
“ II. Officers of the Eoyal Engineers, and of the Militia Artillery, and professors
and masters of the Eoyal Military Academy, and officers who have passed
through the Staff College , or studying there , are eligible to become honorary
members. They may obtain the future periodical publications of the Insti¬
tution on the annual payment, in advance, of the sum of 10s. 6<A”
THE 110 YAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
317
Colonel Domvtlle proposed as an amendment to the alteration in Rule II. now-
submitted to the meeting, that the words, and officers who have passed through the
Staff College , or studying there , be omitted, and that the first paragraph stand as
at present; and instead thereof, that the second paragraph of the same rule be
altered so as to give power to the Committee to extend the privilege now proposed
to be conferred upon the officers of the Staff College to any officers of the Army
or Navy who, from their scientific or literary acquirements, the Committee might
deem it desirable to have as honorary members of the Institution, and who should
notify their wishes to the Committee so to become honorary members, without
reference to the accidental circumstance of such officers residing temporarily in the
Garrison or neighbourhood. He did not desire that the number of honorary
members should be inconveniently increased, but he thought that the hands of
the Committee should not be tied to the election of honorary members from one
particular class only, to the exclusion of many officers of both services who, although
it might not be desirable to bring them in under the provisions of the last paragraph
of Rule II., yet it might be nevertheless both an honour to the Institution and a
valued privilege to the officers in question to have their names enrolled as members
thereof.
The Chairman ruled that an amendment affecting the Rules of the Institution
could not be proposed at a general meeting without previous notice of 14 days had
been given.
Colonel Domville thought it was quite within the power of this general meeting
to adopt any amendment to a proposed alteration, although such amendment might
not have been posted for 14 days ; indeed, that a rigid adherence to such rule would
be exceedingly inconvenient, and prevent business being done at general meetings ;
but in deference to the decision of the Chairman, he would with all respect with¬
draw the proposed amendment, and give his vote for the rejection of the alteration
proposed. In so doing he did not wish to oppose the election of officers of the
Staff College as honorary members temporarily, but did not think it desirable that
they should be permanent members.
After considerable discussion, the proposed change in Rule II. having been put
to the vote was negatived.
Addition to Rule IF., proposed by the Committee and carried unanimously : —
“ Members failing to pay their annual subscription after two applications , shall
have their names removed from the list of members at the discretion of the
Committee.
“No numbers of the “ Proceedings 55 will be sent to any member who is one year
in arrear of his annual subscription V
Addition to Rule F. [printed in italics), proposed by the Committee and
carried unanimously : —
“ V. H.R.H. the Field Marshal Commanding-in-Chief to be Patron and President
of the Institution. The Inspector -General of Artillery , the Commandant of
the Garrison, the Director of Artillery and Stores, and the Deputy Adjutant-
General to be Vice-Presidents. The affairs of the Institution to be under
the direction of a Committee, consisting of the above officers, the Assistant
Adjutant-General, the Director of Artillery Studies, the Brigade Major, the
Secretary, Department of Director of Artillery and Stores, and fifteen officers
elected at the annual general meeting, of whom four shall be Colonels or
Regimental Field Officers, and one Medical Officer, the senior to take the
318
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
chair. The Medical Officer to retire every two years ; one Colonel or Field
Officer, and four members to retire annually, by rotation, and none of these
to be eligible for re-election until the expiration of one year after leaving
office.”
Alteration in Rule XV. ( printed in italics), proposed by the Committee and
carried : —
“ XV. No alterations shall be proposed, or discussions allowed at special meetings,
whether general or of the Committee , on any subjects not specified in the
written notice of meeting.”
Addition to Rule XVII. ( printed in italics ), proposed by the Committee
and carried unanimously : —
tc XVII. The Committee to appoint the days on which meetings are to be held
. for the communication of reports, or papers on professional and scientific
subjects. At which meetings , no address or discussion is to be allowed on
any subject not specified in the preliminary notice issued by the Committee A
Addition to Rule XVIII., to be inserted after 2nd paragraph, proposed by
the Committee and carried unanimously : —
“ Honorary members joining any class will pay double; officers of the Royal
Engineers excepted , who will only pay one-third more than members. And in
the event of their requiring the use of the surveying or other instruments , they
must make application to the Secretary A
3. Proposed by the Committee : —
“ That a refracting telescope of 7 inch aperture, equatorially mounted, be pro¬
cured for the Observatory of the Institution, at a cost of about JB500.”
Colonel Smythe explained, on the part of the Committee, how unusually favour¬
able present circumstances were for entertaining such a proposition, and gave some
details of the intended instrument and of the means that would be taken to ensure
its excellence.
The proposition was carried unanimously.
4. Proposed by Colonel Phillpotts, seconded by Colonel Domville, and
carried unanimously : —
“ That the thanks of the meeting be voted to the Chairman.”
Colonel Benn expressed his acknowledgment of the compliment paid him, and
brought the proceedings to a close.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
319
The Committee for the current year will stand thus : —
PATRON AND PRESIDENT:
Field Marshal H.R.II. the Duke op Cambridge, K.G,
VICE-PRESIDENTS :
The Inspector- General of Artillery.
The Commandant of the Garrison, Woolwich.
The Director of Artillery and Stores.
The Deputy Adjutant-General.
MEMBERS:
The Assistant Adjutant-General.
The Director of Artillery Studies.
The Brigade Major, Woolwich.
The Secretary, Department of Director of Artillery and Stores.
Colonel W. J. Smythe.
„ J. Desborough.
Lieut.-Colonel O’B. B. Woolsey.
„ J. S. Tulloh, C.B.
„ C. H. Owen.
Major H. Le G. Geary.
Captain 11. Oldfield.
Captain C. B. Le Mesurier.
u A. Ford.
u J. P. Morgan.
u M. C. Newall.
o E. H. Cameron.
Lieut. J. Sladen.
a II. Geary.
Surg.-Major S. H. Fasson, M.D.
Captain A. D. Burnaby, Secretary and Treasurer.
(Signed) A. BENN, Colonel E.A.,
in the Chair.
23rd May, 1871.
320
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
LIST OF MEMBERS
OF THE
ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH.
[ARRANGED alphabetically.]
APRIL 1871.
COLONEL.
Field Marshal H.E.H. the DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE,
Patron and President.
COLS. COMMANDANT.
Bell, Sir W. kcb., Wi Ig
Bloomfield, Sir J. kcb., Ig
Burn, R., Ig
Chesney, F. R., g
Cuppage, B., ig
Dacres, Sir R. J., gcb., g
England, P. V., Ig
Flude, T. P., Ig
Griffith, J. G.,' g
Higgins, T. G., Ig
Ingilby, Sir W. B. kcb., Ig
Sabine, Sir E., kcb., g
Teesdale, H. G., mg
Thorndike, D., Ig
Warde, F., » Ig
■Williams, Sir W.F., kcb. Bt., g
Willis, B., Ig
Wylde, W., cb., g
GENERAL OFFICERS.
Abbott, J., mg
Anderson, J. R., CB.
Anstruther, P., cb., mg
Arbuckle, B. H. Y., Ig
Askwith, W. H., mg
Aylmer, n., mg
Black, B. W., cb., mg
Boxer, E. M.
Brind, Sir J., kcb., mg
Buchanan, G. J. L., mg
Burnaby, R., Ig
Burrows, A. G., mg
Campbell, H. A. B., cb., mg
Christie, H. P., mg
Coekburn, C. V., mg
Crawford, R. F., mg
Crofton, R. H., mg
Dennis, J. B., mg
Devereux, Hon. G. T., mg
Dick, F., mg
Dickson, Sir C., kcb., Hj&mg
Dixon, M. C., mg
Dunlop, F., CB., Ig
Eardley-Wilmot, F. M., mg
Fitzmayer, Sir J. W., kcb., mg
Forster, H., cb., mg
Francklyn, J. H., cb., mg
Freer, J. H., mg
Gambier, G., cb., mg
Gardner, W. B., mg
Graham, A. H., mg
Graydon, G., mg
Hanwell, J., mg
Huyshe, D. F., mg
Knox, T., mg
Lucas, C., mg
Maclean, P., mg
Marriott, T. B. F., mg
Mountain, R. F., mg
Paynter, D. W., cb., mg
Riddell, C. J. B., cb., mg
Romer, R. F., Ig
Rowan, H. S., cb., mg
Sandham, G.
Simpson, G. W. Y.
St. George, Sir J., kcb., mg
Stow, H., Ig
Taylor, A. J., Ig
Tuite, H. M., mg
Tulloh, A., cb., Ig
Turner, F., cb., mg
Warde, Sir E. C., kcb., mg
Wingfield, C. W., mg
Wood, Sir D. E., kcb., mg
COLONELS.
Adair, A. Shafto
Adye, J. M., cb., bg
Barrow, J. L., cb.
KG., KP., GCB., GCMG.,/rn.
Benn, A.
Brougham, T.
Cadell, A. T.
Campbell, F. A.
Carleton, H. A., cb.
Clerk, H.
Clifford, M.
Colomb, G. H.
Cox, C. Y.
Cox, W. H.
D’ Aguilar, C. L., CB.
De Teissier, H. P.
Dixon, W. M. H.
Domviile, J. W.
Douglas, C.
Du Plat, C. T.
Eaton, G. P.
Elgee, J. L.
Elwyn, T.
Fisher, E. H.
Franklin, C. T., cb.
Gardiner, H. L.
Gibbon, J. R., cb.
Gilbert, W. R.
Goodenough, H. P.
Grant, W. J. E.
Green, A. P. S.
Hammond, H.
Hatch, W. S.
Hawkins, A. C.
Kaye, E., bg
Kemball, Sir A. B., cb., KCSI.
Lefroy, J. H., CB., mg
Lennard, J. F.
Lewis, H.
Lovell, C. N.
Maberly, E., cb.
Maude, F. C., cb.,
Maude, G. A., cb.
Middleton, W. A., cb.
Milward, T. W., cb.
Morgan, E.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
321
O’Connell, R.
Paget, L.- G.
Petrie, J. G., CB.
Phillpotts, A. T.
Price, E., cb.
Radcliffe, R. P.
Romer, R. C.
Selby, Gr., bg
Shakespeai*, G. B., bg
Shakespeai*, J. D.
Smyth, J. H., cb.
Smythe, W. J.
Spencer, Hon. R. C. H.
Taswell, E.
Thompson, B.
Turner, J., cb.
Tylee, A.
Ward, P. B.
Williams, E. A., cb.
Woollcombe, J. D., CB.
Worgan, J.
Wray, E., CB.
Wright, C. J.
Wynne, C. R.
Younghusband, C. W.
LIEUT.-COLQNELS.
Anderson, D. G.
Anson, A. E. H.
Arbuthnot, C. G., cb., c
Atlay, E., cb., c
Barry, W. W., cb., c
Barton, C. J.
Bedingfeld, P.
Bent, H.
Biddulph, M. A. S., c
Bolton, J. L.
Bond, P. W., c
Boothby, J. G.
Bourchier, G., cb., c.} bg
Bowie, C. V., c
Bradford, W. J.
Brown, G. G.; c
Cadell, R., c
Calvert, A. M.
Campbell, J., c
Carleton, G.
Carthew, E. J.
Chandler, G. L., c
Chermside, H. L., c
Col dough, G., c
Connell, A. F., c
Conybeare, P., c
Couchman, E. H.
Desborough, J.
Drayson, A. W.
Dumaresq, W. L.
Elgee, C. W.
Evans, C. R. 0., c
Parmer, R. O.
Field, G. T., c
Fitz Hugh, H. T.
Forde, M. B.
Fraser, Hon. D. M., cb., c
Fraser, G. H. J. A.
Preeth, R. K., c
Gage, Hon. E. T., cb., c
Gibb, J. S.
Glanvilie, P. R.
Gleig, A. C.
Godby, J.
Gordon, S. E., cb.
Gosling, W. C. F.
Go van, C. M.
Grant, E. F.
Gray, W. J.
Greene, D. S.
Greville, H. L. F.
Haggard, T. T., c
Hamilton, A. G. W., c
Hamilton, F. S., c
Hamley, E. B., cb., g
Harrison, E.
Hastings, F. W., c
Haultain, F. W., c
Hay, R. J.
Henry, C. S., cb., c
Heyman, H.
Holmes, G. B. B., c
Hoste, T>. E., cb.
Ingilby, C. H.
Inglefield, S. H. S.
Johnson, G. V., c
Lennox, A. F. F., c
Leslie, G.
Light, A.
M'Crea, R. B., c
Macintyre, J. M. K.
Magrath, J. R.
Maxwell, H. H., c
Michell, J. E., cb., c
Milman, G. H. L., c
Moubray, E.
Murray, A. M., c
Newall, D. J. F.
Newton, H. P., c
Ommanney, F. M. M., c
Ord, F. W. C.
Phillipps, P. W., c
Pigou, A. C., c
Pipon, P. G., c
Reilly, E. M., cb.
Robinson, S., c
Rotton, G., c
Russell, W. C.
Saunders, W. B.
Shaw, G., c
Shekleton, J.
Singleton, J.
Sladen, J. R.
Smith, C. H., CB., c
Smyth, H. A., c
Soady, J. F.
South, 0., c
Spur way, J.
Stallard, S., c
Stewart, A., o
Talbot, H. L.
Thring, J. E.
Travers, J. F. E.
Tulloh, J. S., cb.
Tupper, G. Le M.
Yesey, G. H., o
Yoyle, G. E., e
Wallace, H., cb., c
Williams, W. J.
Wintle, A., c
Woodcock, C. S., c
Woolsey, O’B. B.
Yates, H. P., cb., c
CAPTAINS.
Addington, Hon. L., m
Alderson, H. J.
Alexander, J. H.
Anderson,, H.
Anderson, J. H. P.
Andrewes, W. G., Ic
Anley, F. A.
Annand, J. H.
Arbuckle, C. Y.
Arbuthnot, G., m
Arbuthnot, H. T., m
Archdall, A. M.
Armstrong, H. L.
Auchinleck, J. C.
Bainbridge, A. P.
Baker, R. A.
Balfour, H. L.
Barlow, W. R.
Barrington, J. T.
Basevi, C. E.
Battiscombe, E. G.
Bay lay, F. G.
Bayly, A.. A.
Beamish, E. S.
Behenna, H.
Beresford, D. W. P.
Berthon, T. P.
Betty, J. F.
Biddulph, R., Ic
Bishop, H. P., le
Blackburne, H. B.
Blackley, J. H.
Blackwell, J. E.
Blackwood, G. F.
Blunt, A.
Bolton, E. C.
Bolton, W. J.
Bonar, A. M.
Bond, H.
Bonham, J., m
Booth, W.
Borton, H. M.
Boyle, E. Y.
Boylin, W.
Brackenbury, C. B.
Brackenbury, H.
Brancker, W. G.
Bredin, E. G., Ic
Brendon, A., Ic
Briscoe, H. W.
Broadrick, E.
Brown, J. H.
Brown, J. T. B.
Browne, C. O.
Browne, M. G.
Bruce, E. J., m
Budd, G.
Budgen, W. T.
Burn, J. M.
Burnaby, A. D.
Burnett, E. S.
Burt, C. E., Ic
Byrne, T. E., m
Caine, W. H., adjt.
Cairnes, R. J.
Callander, G. E.
Cameron, D. R.
Cameron, E. H.
i Campbell, G. M. L.
Campbell, J. McC., Ic
j Campbell, Sir J. W., Bt.
3£2
Campbell, P. J., m
Campbell, It. C. W.
Candy, G. H.
Cane, E. E.
Cardew, H.
Carey, F.
Carey, T. P.
Carey, W.
Carey, W. D.
Carpenter, C.
Chaldecott, M. A.
Chalmers, C. I).
Chambers, Gr. E. S.
Chamier, S. H. E., in
Chancellor, F. H., in
Chichester, H.
Childers, E. W.
Clarke, H. S.
Clarke, J. L.
Clarke, T.
Close, F., in
Cockburn, C. F.
Collington, J. W.
Collingwood, C.
Cooke, J. E. D.
Cookes, C. H.
Cottingham, E. E.
Craster, W. E.
Crawford, G. A.
Cruikshank, A. E.
Cuming, T.
Cumberland, W. B.
Curtis, E., Ic
Curzon, W. S.
Dames, T. L.
Darling, A.
Darwall, H. P.
Davidson, A. C.
Davidson, A. EL
Davis, G., Ic
Davis, T. A.
Dawson, A. H.
De Cetto, L. C. A. A.
De Havilland, J., Ic
De Moleyns, T. A.
De Montmorency, Hon.
Deedes, G.
Denis-de-Vitre, W.
Denne, L. H.
De "Vismes, H. A. D.
De Win ton, F.
Dillon, Hon. E. V.
Dirom, T. A. Pasley-, in
Downes, M. F.
Drysdale, E. C.
Duncan, A. W.
Duncan, F.
Dunlop, S.
Dvce, J. E.
Dyer, H. C. S., m
Eden, M. P.
Edmeades, H.
Edwards, J. G.
Elliott, E. D.
Ellis, C. H. F.
Ellis, W. B. E.
Elton, F. C.
Engstrom, G. L.
Eveleigh, J. E.
Farrell, H. C.
Field, T. S. P., Ic
Finch, W. J.
FitzGerald, M. M.
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
.. B.
Fletcher, T. C.
Forbes, G. H. A., Ic
Ford, A.
Ford, J.
Forster, B. L., in
Forster, W. D.
Franklen, C. E.
Fraser, E.
French, W., m
Frith, J. S., Ic
Gallwey, P. F. G.
Garrett, N. D.
Geary, H. Le G., m
Gillies, G. J.
Gilmour, C. D.
Gilmour, W.
Girardot, H.
Gloag, A. E.
Gloag, H. D.
Goodenough, O. H.
Goodenough, W. H., Ic
Gordon, E. S.
Gore, J., m
Gore, E.
Gorham, C. A.
Gossett, A., m
Graham, W. H.
Griffiths, L.
Grimston, W. J., in
Gubbins, J. E.
Haig, E. W., in
Hall, L. F.
Hall, W. B. E.
Hall, W. J.
Hamilton, A. H. C.
Hamilton, T. B.
Hamilton, Sir W., Bt.
Hannen, G. G.
Hanwell, J.
Hardy, C.
Hardy, J. B.
Hare, Hon. E.
Harness, A.
Harris, N. H.
Harris, T. M.
Harrison, T. A. J.
Harvey, J. S.
Haughton, J.
Heberden, H.
Henry, G. C., Ic
Heyland, A. S.
Hickes, H. J. F. E., in
Higgon, J. D. G.
Hill, C. E., m
Hill, F. J. G.
Hill, P. E.
Hills, J., IT® Ic
Hobart, G. B. B.
Holberton, T. N.
Holcombe, F., m
Holds worth, J. E.
Hollist, E. O.
Hope, J. E., Ic
Hope- Johnstone, C. J.
Hoskins, A. E.
Howlett, F.
Hoyes, J.
Hughes, T. E., in
Hume, E. T.
Humfrey, B. G.
Hunter, A. S.
Hunter, C.
Hunter, J.
Hutchinson, A. H.
Hutchinson, W. F. M.
Irvine, H., Ic
Isaacson, H. de S.
Isacke, H. W.
Izod, W. H.
Jackson, C. S.
Jervis, H. J. W., Ic
Johnson, A. C., Ic
Johnson, C. G.
Johnson, C., in
Jones, H. L.
Jones, E. E.
Joy, A. P.
Kaye, N. L.
Keate, E.
Kelly, J.
Kemmis, W.
Kerrich, W. D’O.
Ketchen, J.
King, A. H.
King, J. E.
King-Harman, W. H.
Kinsman, H. J.
Knox, G. U.
Kyle, S. C.
Lascelles, C. G. W.
Law, F. T. A.
Lawrence, W. H.
Le Cocq, H.
Le Grice, F. S.
Leishman, J. T.
Le Marchant, H. St. J. T.
Le Mesurier, C. B.
Le Mottee, O. F.
Lempriere, H., m
L’ Estrange, C.
L’Estrange, P. W., Ic
Lewes, F. E.
Lewes, H. C.
Lindsay, A. H.
Lloyd, F. T.
Lloyd, J. H.
Lloyd, W.
Lluellyn, W. E.
Lowis, E. F.
Lowry, J. C. J.
Lukin, W. W. A., Ic
Lumsden, H. W.
Lyle, H. C.
Lynes, S. P.
Lyon, F.
Lyon, F. L. H.
Lyons, E.
Macartney, A. S.
Macdonell, G. E.
Macfarlan, D., in
Mackenzie, H. M.
Mackenzie, B., Ic
Maclachlan, T. J., Ic
MfCausland, W. H.
McGrigor, D. J.
M'Laughlin, E.
M‘Mahon, C. J.
Magenis, H. C.
Mahon, T.
Maitland, E.
Majendie, V. D.
Manderson, G. E.
Mant, F. A.
Markham, E.
Martin, H. E.
Martin, W. G.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION
Marvin, W., m
Maule, G. E.
Maule, H. B.
Mannsell, W. S.
Maynard, C. W.
Miller, A. G.
Miller, F., V® lo
Milman, E. S.
Milman, G. A., Ic
Mitchell, H. L.
Molony, C. M.
Monckton, M. L.
Montague, W., m
Montgomerie, W. H.
Morgan, J. P.
Murdoch, W. W.
Murray, A. H., m
Murray, A. H.
Murray, H.
Nangle, W. C.
Nelson, G. G.
Newall, M. C.
New bolt, R. H.
Newman, W.
Nicholson, S. J.
Nicolls, O. H. A.
Nisbett, F. H. W.
Noble, A.
Noble, W. H.
Nolan, J. P.
O’Connor, G.
Ogilvie, A. J.
O’Hara, R.
Oldershaw, C. E., Ic
Oldfield, R.
Oliver, J. R.
Ouchterlony, E. T.
Ouchterlony, T. H.
Owen, J. F.
Owen, C. H., Ic
Palliser, H. J.
Palmer, E m
Papillon, A. F. W., m
Parry, S.
Parsons, L. H. H.
Pasley, M. W. B. S.
Pearse, A. T. G.
Pearse, G. G., Ic
Peile, J. H.
Pemberton, D. S.
Penn, L. W., cb., Ic
Penny, S.
Pennycuick, J. F., CB., c
Percival, H.
Persse, W. N.
Phelips, H. P. P.
Phelips, R.
Phillips, C.
Phipps, R. W.
Pickering, C. H.
Pitt, H. D.
Pitt, T. H.
Porter, H. R.
Price, J. A.
Price, T. C.
Purvis, H. M. G.
Raikes, C.
Ravenhill, F. G.
Rawlins, A. M.
Renny, G. A., lo
Penny, H., m
Rice, W. B.
Richardson, J. B.
Rideout, A. X.
Ritchie, J.
Roberts, C. F., m
Roberts, F. S., Ic
Roberts, T. W.
Robinson, C. G.
Rooke, W.
Rotton, A.
Rowley, R. H. R.
Ruck-Keene, J. E.
Russell, G. A.
Ryan, E. H.
Ryan, T. R.
Rogers, H.
Reid, C. E.
Sadleir, R.
Sandham, R.
Sandham, W. H.
Sandilands, P. H.
Sandy s, E. W.
Schalch, A.
Schreiber, B. F.
Scott, C. E. S.
Scott, W.
Seccombe, T. S.
Sexton, M. J.
Shakerley, G. J.
Shakerley, H. W.
Shea, H. J. F.
Simpson, W. H. R.
Sinclair, J., Ic
Slessor, E. A.
Smart, G. J.
Smith, F. M.
Smith, J. J.
Smith, R. C.
Smith, W.
Spring, F. W. M.
Staveley, E.
Stevenson, R. A.
Stewart, Hon. A.
Stewart, A. A.
Stewart, J.
Still, T. L.
Stirling, C. E.
Stirling, J. S.
Stirling, W. G.
Stirling, W., m
Stocker, M. E. C.
Stokes, O. R., m
Stoney, F. S.
Strahan, G. C.
Strahan, W.
Strange, T. B.
Strangways, W. A. F.
Stratton, J. H.
Straubenzee, T. Y.
Strover, H., m
Stubbs, F. W.
Studdy, T. J. C. A.
Swanson, F.
Swinton, A.
Talbot, F. S.
Tarleton, E. H.
Tayler, J. C.
Taylor, G. K.
Taylor, J.
Taylor, M. Le Fer
Teesdale, C. C., cb., USE Ic
Theobald, C. P.
Thomas, L. F. C., Ic
Thompson, J. B.
Thornhill, C.
Thornhill, H.
Thornton, H. J.
Thurlow, E. H.
Tierney, E.
Tillard, J. A.
Timbrell, H. Y.
Torriano, C. E.
Tottenham, R. L.
Tracey, H. A.
Traill, G. B.
Tremlett, E. J.
Trench, C.
Trevor, F. C.
Tupper, JE. l)e V.
Turbervill, T. P.
Turner, E. P. B.
Turner, N. O. S., cb., c
Tweedie, M.
Twiss, A. W., m
Twiss, G., m
Tyler, C. J.
Yachell, H. T.
Vaughan, E. C.
Yibart, J. M. C.
Wake, A. J.
Walker, E. W. E., Ic
Walker, J. B.
Waller, W. N.
Walsh, L. P.
Walton, W. M. B.
Ward, E. J.
Ward, F. W.
Ward, W.
Warde, C. A. M.
Wardell, W. H.
Warren, F. G. E.
Warren, W. A.
Warry, E. T.
Warter, H. He G.
Watson, W. H.
Welsh, H. J.
Wharry, C.
Whinyates, A. W. O.
Whinyates, F. A.
Whinyates, F. T.
Wilkinson, G. A., m
Williams, A. H. W.
Wilson, C. W.
Wilson, W., Ic
Wilson, W. J.
Windham, J. C. Smyth-
Wodehouse, A. T.
Wolfe, W. S. M.
Woodward, W. W.
Wortham, H. Y.
Wyllie, W. A. P.
Wynch, A.
Yaldwyn, B.
Yonge, W. L.
Young, C. F., Ic
Young, H. G.
Young, R. N.
LIEUTENANTS.
Alexander, A. G.
Allen, G. B.
Alleyne, J.
Allsopp, R.
Alves, J* M.
823
43
324
Anderson, A. J.
Annesley, O. F. T.
A rbuckle, B. Y.
Archer, F. L.
Armytage, A. H.
Auchinleck, W. H.
Baddeley, P. F. M.
Bainbridge, E.
Baker, J. V. Y.
Baker, E. H. S.
Baldock, Yf. S.
Baring, E.
Barker, F. Yf. J.
Barker, H. A.
Barron, H.
Bayly, G. C.
Bazett, B.
Beadnell, C, E.
Bell, J. L.
Bernard, J. Yf.
Bernard, W. H.
Best, G.
Bevir, E. L.
Bigg, F.
Bigge, A. J.
Bircham, F. T.
Bingham, E. G. H.
Blackburn, P.
Blackwood, P. F.
Blake, C. J.
Blaeksley, E.
Blandy, Yf. P.
Bomford, S. S.
Bouwens, L. H.
Bowen, H. St. J. C.
Bowen, P. H.
Brackenbury, E. F.
Brandy, J. II. J.
Bridges, J. S.
Brinkley, F.
Broadfoot, A.
Brough, J. F,
Browell, E. T.
Brown, A. B.
Brown, A. M.
Brown, C. E.
Browne, A.
Browne, II. W.
Browne, H. E. Y.
Browne, J. H. G.
Buckle, D. Yf.
Buckle, E.
Buckle, J. W.
Buller, E. W.
Burgess, H. M.
Burgmann, G. J.
Burnett, T.
Burridge, F. J.
Bury, J. T.
Cambier, E. F.
Campbell, A.
Campbell, J. A.
Campbell, Yf. M.
Carey, F. Yf.
Carlile, Yf. O.
Carr, T.
Carre, G. T.
Chapman, E. F.
Clarke, F. C.
Clarke, F. C. H.
Clarke, M. J.
Clarke, W. J.
Clayfield-Ireland, E.
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS
Clayton, E.
Cobbold, E. St. G.
Coke, E. B.
Colquhoun, J.
Collen, E. JET. H.
Congdon, J. J.
Connolly, A.
Cooke, T. C.
Cooper, A. B. A.
Corbett, E.
Corbett, E. C.
Costobadie, H. H.
Cotton, E. T. D.
Cotton, W.
Craufurd, H. E. G.
Crawley-Boevey, E. B.
Cripps, E. W.
Crofton, H.
Crosthwaite, C.
Cruikshank, F. H. G,
Cullen, A. J.
Cundill, J. P.
Cunningham, A. B.
Curling, H. T.
Curtain, J. A.
Dalton, J. C.
Davidson, W. L.
Davie, G. C.
Davies, A. B.
Davies, J. A. S. M.
Day, F. H. E.
Day, J.
De Marylski, E.
Denison, W. E.
Denison, Hon. H. C.
Denny, H. A.
Denny, Yf. T. G.
Des Barres, A. H. J.
Desborough, S. H.
Deshon, C. J.
Disney, T. E.
Ditmas, F. F.
Ditrnas, F. E.
Dixon, C. F.
Dodswortli, G. E.
Dolphin, H. E.
Domvile, B. F.
Douglas, J. M.
Downes, L.
Downing, C. M. H.
Dugdale, A. G.
Dunlop, H. D.
Dunnage, A. J.
Duthie, W. H. M.
Duthy, A. E.
Eardley-Wilmot, F. H.
Ellaby, H. L.
Elies,' E. E,
Eiwyn, C. E.
Empson, C. A.
England, A. E.
Evans, E. B.
Evans, II. D.
Ewing, J. P.
Eustace-AIalpas, F.
Fairtlough, S. G.
Fanshawe, G. D.
Fawkes, L. G.
Feilden, H. M. J.
Fenton, L. L.
Ferrier, A. Yf.
Firebrace, G.
FitzEoy, E. A.
OE •
Fletcher, A. F.
Ford, C. E. II.
Fowler, Yf. J.
Fox, F. C.
Freeman, E. P. Yf.
Freeth, J. P.
Freeth, S. P. F.
French, G. A.
Fulton, S. M£K.
Gaimes, H. F.
Galloway, F.
Gambier, G. E.
Gamble, K.
Gardiner, S.
Gaskell, T.
Gataker, H. W.
Gattey, E. G. B.
Geary, H.
Georges, W. P.
Gerard, M. G.
Gillespie, J. C.
Goodeve, H. H.
Gower, G. H.
Graham, C. S.
Grant, E. H.
Gratton, J. A.
Graves, B. C.
Greene, J. C.
Greenfield, J. T.
Greer, C.
Gregory, W. Y.
Greig, B. E.
Grey, C. F. B.
Griffiths, A. S.
Grubb, A.
Gwyn, H. L.
Gye, L.
Gyll, F. G.
Hadawray, G. E.
Hallett, F. C. H.
Hallett, W. H.
Halliday, S. C.
Hamilton, Chas. H.
Hamilton, Const. H.
Hammond, P. H.
Hare, E. P.
Harrison, P.
Harrison, W. J. E.
Hart, J. H.
Harvey, C. S.
Harvey, H. B. E.
Ilaverfield, H. W. B. T.
Hawkins, G. W.
Hay, E. O.
Hayes, M. H.
Hazlerigg, T. M.
Hellard, H. B.
Hemans, Yf. B.
Henderson, H. G.
Hepburne, E. G. Yf.
Hewitt, J. E. S. 0.
Hezlet, E. J.
Higginson, H. S.
Hill, D. St. L.
Hime, H. Yf. L.
Hitchins, T. M.
Holbeche, E. N.
Holley, E. H.
Hopkins, S.
Hubback, H. Yf. J.
Hussey, P.
Hunter, Yf.
Hutchinson, Yf. L.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
o.’L'J
Huy she, D. F.
Inge, J. AY.
Innes, P. N.
Irwin, J. de la C.
Jackson, H. M.
Jervois, H. N.
Jesson, T.
Johnson, E. A.
Johnson, P.
Jones, C.
Jones, D. P.
Jones, H. N.
Jones, T. J.
Josselyn, J. E.
Keith, J.
Kelly, W. P.
Kelsall, T. A.
Kelso, J. A.
Kensington, E.
Kingscote, H. 33.
Knight, H.
Knollys, H.
Knox, P. B.
Knox, AY. G.
Lacy, S. de L.
Lake, E.
Lane, M. M.
Lanning, R. A.
Larcom, C.
Lavie, A. J.
Law, E. F.
Law, AY.
Lawrence, J. B.
Lawrie, J. A.
Leach, J.
Leacock, C. E. B.
Legard, J. D.
Legge, W. Y.
Lewes, P.
Lewis, H. P. P.
Little, F. L. G.
Lloyd, T. H.
Loch, J.
Lockhart, R. D. E.
Lockyer, E. S. B.
Lodge, P.
Logan, A.
Long, C. J.
Long, C. AY.
Longcroft, P. M.
Loraine, P. E. B.
Loyd, A. K.
Lya.ll, H.
Mackenzie, R. S. M.
Mackey, II. A.
Mack inlay, G.
Mackintosh, AY. J.
Maclachlan, K. P.
Maclaverty, A. J.
Maclean, A. H.
M‘Causland, M. P. H.
M‘Clintock, AY.
Mainwaring, A. R.
Mallins, AY.
Mallock, R.
Marshall, G. H.
Marshall, R. G. S.
Martelli, T. C.
Martin, G. B.
Martin, AY.
Maurice, J. P.
Maynard, AY. A.
Millett, R. T,
Milner, F. II. AY.
Molesworth, A. O.
Molesworth, St. A.
Monckton, P. E.
Montgomery, G.
Montgomery, R. A.
Moore, G. M. J.
Moore, G. R.
Moorsom, H. M.
Morgan, P. C.
Morgan, H. R. L.
Morgan, T. L.
Morley, C.
Mortimer, P. J.
Mulloy, W. G.
Mulrenan, T.
Mundy, R. E.
Murray, H. S.
Murray, J. C. D’U.
Murray, J. M.
Murray, J. G.
Nash, E. AY.
Nelson, AY. F.
Newcome, H. G.
Nicholas, H. L.
Nicolas, F. C.
Nicolson, F.
Nind, P. ML
Nixon, A. J.
North, D.
North, R. C. E.
Noyes, G. A.
Noyes, L. II.
Nutt, J. A. F.
O’Callaghan, D. D. T.
O’ Grady, Hon. H. S.
O’ Grady, R. AY.
Oliver, S. P.
Ollivant, E. A.
O’Malley, G. H.
Ormsby, J. B.
Palk, AY. G.
Palmer, G. H.
Parks- Smith, C. D. E.
Parlby, G. C. H.
Parry, G. S.
Parsons, L. AY.
Pearse, A. N.
Pemberton, S. E.
Pennethorne, L. P.
Perrott, T.
Perry, L. F.
Phibbs, R. R.
Phillpotts, H. P.
Pickard, A. P., U(£
Pipon, H.
Place, R. B.
Platt, AY. P.
Playfair, G. J.
Plunkett, R. H. AY.
Pollard-Urquhart, F. E. R.
Poole, J. R.
Poole, AY. S.
i Porter, M. L.
j Power, G. B.
Pownall-Beaty, G. A.
Pratt, S. C.
Pretyman, G. T.
Price, R. L.
Purdy, R.
Pym, S. M.
Quayle, J. S.
Radeliff, P. AY,
Radford, A.
Rainbird, A.
Rainsford-Hannav, R. AY.
Rait, A. J.
Ramsay, G. S.
Rawle, H. J.
Rawlins, A. J. C.
Reeves, T. B.
Reilly, C. H.
Repton, H. T. H.
Revill, J.
Riall, W. A.
Rich, C. C.
Richardson, T. A.
Richmond, P.
Riddell, AY.
Roberts, P.
Roberts, H.
Roberts, AY. A.
Robertson, H. M.
Robertson, R. H.
Robinson, F. M.
Robinson, J. C.
Robson, J. C.
Rogers, J. P.
Rooke, H. AY.
Ross of Bladensburg, J. F. G.
Ross, R. H. K.
Rothe, G. AY.
Roth well, J. S.
Rowley, Hon. AY. C.
Rudge, S.
Rudge, AY. R.
Russell, F. B.
Salmond, J. M.
S almond, R. A.
Sandeman, J . F.
Sandes, H. T. T.
Sandys, C. B.
Saunders, A. A.
Saunders, A. J.
Saunders, J. M.
Saunders, R. P.
Saward, M. H.
Scarlett, R. L.
Sclater, J. R. C.
Scott, C. H.
Sealy, C. AY. H.
Selfe, S. G. F.
Shafto, E. D.
Sharp, AY. E.
Sheil, H.
Shippard, AY. 0. C.
Shore, Hon. F. AY. J.
Shuttleworth, A. J.
Simpson, S.
Skinner, P. L. M;G.
Slade, J. R.
Sladen, J.
Smith, C. M.
Smith, R. \Y.
Smith, S.
Smith, VY. O.
Smith, AY. AY.
Smith, AY. AV. M.
Snodgrass, J. D.
Soames, H.
Sorell, AY. II. P.
Souper, C. E.
Spencer, J. AY. T.
Spragge, C. H.
Stace, E. Y.
Stephenson, K.
326
Stevens, G. M.
Stewart, C.
Stewart, H.
Stewart, IE. T.
Stewart, E. M£G.
St. George, AY. B.
Stirke, AY. E.
Stone, J. G.
Stopford, A. B.
Swinley, G.
Symonds, F. C.
Tabor, J. M.
Tatkam, W. J.
Taylor, D. N.
Taylor, F. H.
Taylor, L. W.
Thompson, C. H.
Thomson, C. W.
Tillotson, L,
Tollner, B. L.
Toogood, S. H.
Torkington, H.
Townsend, C. W.
Townsend, G. E.
Trollope, E. C.
Trotter, J. K.
Tupper, B. de B.
Turnbull, G. W. M.
Turnbull, H. J.. L.
Turner, A. E.
Turner, F. M.
Twynam, F. E.
Tyler, T. B.
Uppleby, J. G.
Vibart, F. M. E.
Wace, E.
Wade, A. G. S.
Walford, 1ST. L.
Walker, A. G.
Walker, E. H.
Walker, H. J. O.
Walker, T.
Walkey, E.
Wall, J.
Wallace, E. H.
Walter, F. E.
Warry, A.
Watkin, H. S. S.
Watson, E. S.
Wemyss, M. W.
West, M. E.
Whalley, P. C.
Whateley, W.
Wheatley, C. E. E.
White, A. W.
Whitehorne, A. H.
Wickham, C. B.
Wickham, E. H.
Wildig, H. B.
Williams, E. F.
Wilmer, J. E.
Wilson, D. M.
Wilson, G. F.
Wing, Y.
Winn, E. J.
Wintle, A. T.
Wodehouse, E. F.
Wood, T.
Woodland, Y. E.
Woolcombe, E.
Woolley, A. S.
Wright, W. H.
Wymer, G. B.
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS
Wynne, G. C.
Yates, H. T. S.
Yeatman, A. G.
Yerbury, J. W.
Yorke, F. A.
Younger, J.
PAYMASTEES.
Higginson, T. C., m
Hunt, T., capt.
Kidd, W. A., m
Piers, C. B.
Stewart, 1)., Ic
Yyner, H. W., capt.
EIDIN G-MASTEES.
Bacchus, H.
Haley, J.
Dann, G.
Donald, W.
Eitchie, T.
QUAETEK-MASTEKS.
Cochran, J.
Fyfe, J.
Gibson, T.
Gunn, W.
Nelson, H.
Stanford, W.
Steven, E.
Thomson, J. E.
Wishart, W.
SUEGEON8-MAJOE.
Bone, G. F., hid.
Briscoe, H., md.
Combe, M., md.
Duff, J., MD.
Fasson, S. H., md.
Fogo, J. M. S.
Gilborne, E.
Parratt, J. E. T., Ins'p.-Gen.
Army Hospitals.
SUEGEONS.
Barker, J.
Eeid, T. B.
ASSISTANT-SUEGEONS.
Clifton, E. W.
Comyn, J. S., ab.
Fiddes, J. M., mb.
OF
Gaye, A. C.
Griffith, C. AY.
Hodgson, D. F. de, md.
Hogg, F. E., md.
Jones, M. G.
M Farland, F. E.
Pope, J. J.
Prescott, A. S. K.
Eichmond, A.
Tanner, W.
Temple, W., MB. U(£
Wales, J.
Whitla, G.
VET.-SUEGEONS.
Durrant, G.
Dwyer, J. C.
Evans, G., md.
Meyrick, J. J.
Oliver, G. A, A.
CHAPLAIN.
Scott, M. E., Eev.
HONOKAEY MEMBEES.
Akers, C. S., m. E.E.
Baily, J. F., capt. Kent Mil. Art.
Bethell, W., It. E. & N. York
Mil. Art.
Bland, E. L., capt. E.E.
Boddy, Eev. G. Y.
Clarke, A., Ic. E.E.
Collins, W. H., It. E.E.
Elphinstone, H. C., Ic. CB.
E.E.
Edwards, F. J., It. E.E.
Fyers, H. T., m. N. York Mil.
Art.
Gallwey, T. L. J., c. E.E.
Grover, G. E., It. E.E.
Hill, J. E., It. E. & N. York
Mil. Art.
Hozier, H. M., capt. 4th D.G.
Inglis, T., Ic. E.E.
Jones, E. O., capt. E.E.
Keith, AY., m. E.E.
Leahv, A., m. E.E.
Lennox, W. O. c. E.E.
Lewis, J. C., capt. Kent Mil.
Art.
M£Callum, J., capt. Kent Mil.
Art.
Martin, C. N., capt. E.E.
Mascall, F. C., It. E.E.
Maud, W. S., capt. E.E.
Mitchell, E., capt. E.E.
Mutch, J., capt. (Aore.) E.E.
Pain, G., Surq. lith Hussars.
Pasley, C., Ic. E.E.
Pemberton, E., cb., capt. E.E.
Portelli, M., capt. E.M.F.A.
Pratt, F. E., cayt. E.E.
Eoberts, E. A., capt. E.E.
Eutter, J., It. E.M.F. A.
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
327
Scotfc, H. Y. D., e. E.E.
Scratchley, P. H., m. E.E.
Simmonsj Sir J.L. A., kcb. E.E.
| Sorel, P., m. EL J ersey Mil. Art.
Speranza, J\, It. E.M.F.A.
I Stuart, W. J., m. E.E.
Tickers, C., It. Kent Mil. Art.
Waring, W, T., cajpt. do.
Abel, E. A., Esq., fes.
Armstrong, Sir W., cb.
Baskfortb, Eev. F., bd.
Fairbairn, Sir J., fes.
SPECIAL HONOEAEY MEMBEKS.
Gordon, Captain H. W., CB.
Hewitt, T., Esq., fsa.
Mallet, E., Esq., pks.
Moncrieff, Captain A.
Palliser, Major W., cb.
Percy, J., Dr., pes.
Whitworth, Sir J.
32S
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
THE MINOR TACTICS OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
BY
LIEUT. H. W. L. IIIME, E.A.,
[“ TRUNNION.”]
THE R.A. INSTITUTION PRIZE ESSAY OF 1871.
(( Dio vennekrte Feuenvirkung del* Geschiifcze auf weitere und die verminderfce auf nahero
Distanzen hat die Artillerie gezwungen deni Kampf auf weitere Entfernungen mehr Aufmerk-
samkeit zuzuwenden, den auf niihere zu rermeiden.” — Boguslawski. “ Entwickelung dev TaJctik.”
The officer commanding a battery of field artillery in action is called
upon to solve a series of questions which may be classed under six
heads, namely —
1. Where to fire.
2. When to fire.
3. What to fire at.
4. What to fire.
5. When to move.
6. How to move.
There are many other questions of the highest importance connected
with the use of artillery in the field — such as the proportion which the
artillery of reserve ought to bear to the artillery of division, the proper
constitution of the artillery of reserve, the circumstances under which
artillery ought to be used in masses, &c., &c. But with such questions
I am not at present concerned, because they belong to grand, not
to minor tactics, and present themselves for solution rather to the
Commander-in-Chief of an army in consultation with the officer com¬
manding’ the artillery than to officers commanding batteries.
It remains, then, to consider successively the six great problems on
whose correct solution the safety and success of a battery in action
essentially depend.
1. Where to fire.
In selecting the position for a battery, the ground must be considered
both in plan and profile.
As regards the profile of the ground, the guns must be placed neither
THE royal ARTILLERY institution.
329
too high nor too low. If they are placed in a hollow, not only are they
confined in what may be looked on as a shell-trap, but all view of the
surrounding country and the movements of the enemy is cut off, and
any attempt to carry on an effective fire is hopeless. Fig. 1 will
illustrate my meaning.
Fig. l.
Nor should the guns, even when otherwise well placed, be brought
into action on ground very much below the level of the position occu¬
pied by the enemy, as in Fig. 2 ; first, because while the enemy has a
clear view of every part of the battery, his own position is entirely
Fig. 2.
hidden from sight ; secondly, because even if his position be partly
visible, the velocity of projectiles on reaching such heights is necessarily
reduced to some extent, and the success of such projectiles as shrapnel
depends almost entirely on the velocity of the fragments on striking
the object fired at.
The evils which result from perching guns on the highest eminence
at hand are sevenfold. In the first place, as Frederick the Great pointed
out in his Potsdam Regulations, all the advantages of a flat trajectory
are lost by this “ pernicious practice.” Secondly, solid shot, shell with
percussion fuzes, and shell with time fuzes bored somewhat too long,
will stick fast in the ground and prove almost innocuous, owing to their
very great final velocity, especially if the ground be in any degree soft.
It was to this circumstance that Wellington's Light and 7th Divisions
owed their escape from destruction at the crossing of the Huebrain 1812.
To protect the English artillery, which was crossing the river, from the
attacks of the French cavalry, these divisions were placed in columns
on the bank, exposed to a heavy fire from the French artillery ; yet
they “ suffered little loss, because the saturated clayey soil swallowed
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS 0£
the shot and smothered the shell."1 If, in the third place, the enemy
occupies hard ground, solid shot and blind shell will break up on the
first graze, or rebound to such heights as to render their ricochet of no
value. Fourthly, if the inclination of the height on which the guns are
posted, BAC (Fig. 3), greatly exceeds the extreme depression that can
be given to field guns, DBF- — about 5° in the British service — the
Fig. 3.
JL _ _ D
enemy can form in perfect security for an attack on the guns, at the
base of the height G. This happened to the Russian artillery at
Kunersdorf, 1759, 2 and, by an accident that could not have been fore¬
seen, to our own guns at Waterloo. “ The enemy rushed down the hill "
(having been driven back by the fire of the English infantry and artillery)
“ forming again under its shelter, and in a great measure covered from
the fire of our guns, which by recoiling had retired so as to lose their
original and just position. But in a deep stiff soil, the fatigue of the
horse artillerymen was great, and their best exertions were unable to
move the guns again to the crest without horses ; to employ horses was
to ensure the loss of the animals.''3 Fifthly, a battery posted as in
Fig. 3 may happen to form a target for a number of the enemy's guns.
Solely from this cause, Senarmont was forced to order a battery which
he had at first placed on a hillock into lower ground, at the beginning of
the battle of Eylau.4 Sixthly, the ineffective fire of the guns, enfeebled
by these . causes, will raise the courage of an advancing enemy and will
proportionally depress the spirits of our own men ; and seventhly, the
ammunition, which. is worth its weight in gold, is uselessly frittered
away.
The most obvious lesson to be learned from the campaigns of 1866
and 1870 is, that it is not alone desirable but necessary to cover the
guns and horses of a battery from the enemy's fire, either by field
entrenchments or by the accidents of the ground ; for it is only when
so covered that the battery can be ensured against destruction from the
enemy's infantry and artillery fire, and that the men can preserve that
sang froid which is essential for carrying on an effective fire.
1 Napier’s “ Peninsular War,” Vol. IV. p. 385.
2 De Ternay’s “ Traite de Tactique,” Tom. I.
3 Frazer’s “Letters during the Peninsular and Waterloo Compaigns,” p. 588.
4 “Memoires sur 1c Gen. Senarmont,” pp. 26, 27.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
301
The most favourable position for guns is a gentle hillock, sloping
gradually to the front and more abruptly towards the rear, with a
command over the ground occupied by the enemy of about 1 in 100 —
such as is shown in Fig. 4. In case the ground does not rise in front
Fig. 4.
of the guns, as in Fig. 4, it is by all means desirable to throw up a small
entrenchment, or form a gun-pit, to supply the necessary cover, as in
Fig. 5.
Fig. 5.
If the top of the hillock be flat and its command sufficient, as in
Fig. 6, the guns will not require any .epaulment.
Fig. 6.
If the top of the hillock be rounded off sharply, as in Fig. 7, a small
level platform must be dug out on the rear slope \ for otherwise it
Fig. 7.
would be not only impossible to give sufficient depression to the gun,
but the force of the recoil would drive the gun down the back slope
of the hill.1 This course might be adopted with success in case the
guns occupy a railway embankment, where the breadth and command
are not sufficient to defilade the guns in the way shown in Fig. 6.
If a canal, a sunken road, or a railway cutting be at hand, parallel to
the front of the battery, the guns should be run close up to the edge^
1 This actually happened to a battery in Bhootan in 1864, at the attack on Dewangiri.
44
332
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
as in Fig. 8 ; because all shot or shell falling slightly short are caught
by the slope in front and prevented from ricochetting.1 2
Fig. 8.
A low bank, a hedge-row, or a furze-bush may be made use of in
the same way as the epaulment in Fig. 5 ; and even a slight irregularity
of ground, as in Fig. 9, may prove highly useful.3 *
Fig. 9.
As regards the ground in plan, guns may be drawn up with good
effect behind a marsh, a pond or river, or a ravine ; provided always
that such obstacles do not render an advance to the front impossible,
and that in the case of the ravine, it is not occupied by the enemy.
Such ground is not only unfavourable to the enemy's artillery fire, but
secures the guns against any sudden rush of cavalry or infantry. The
flanks of the battery are secured in the same way as the flanks of other
troops. If the guns are placed in the neighbourhood of woods, brush¬
wood, or other cover of which the enemy's skirmishers may take
advantage, these positions must be attacked and occupied by our own
infantry, or the gunners will be annihilated. Heavy, muddy ground,
as well as stony ground, should be avoided ; as it is difficult to move
the guns by hand in the former, and the men and horses may be
wounded by fragments of stones in the latter. In fine, the ground for
50 to 100 yds. in front of the battery should be as unfavourable as
possible to the enemy's artillery fire, and the ground both in front and
flank should be of such a nature as to render a coup-de-main impossible.
The importance of a thorough knowledge of a position cannot be over¬
estimated by officers of the field artillery ; for the security of a battery
depends almost entirely, and the efficacy of its fire to a large extent,
upon the use that is made of the accidents of the ground.3
2. When to fire.
If the ground and atmosphere be favourable, and there be means in
the battery of finding the range accurately, the guns may open fire at
1 Decker’s “Artillerie a ckeval, &c.,” p. 107. Jervis’ “Manual of Field Operations/5 p. 114.
The American “Field Artillery Tactics/’ p. 43.
2 “ Memoire sur Senarmont/5 p. 22.
3 Thiroux, “Instruction de 1’ Artillerie,” p. 365. I need liardly say that guns should never be
posted near combustible materials, such as wooden houses, haystacks, and the like.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
333
2500 yds.1 2 Under exceptional circumstances, they may commence firing
at 3000 yds. ; but practice ought not to be carried on beyond this limit,
not because the guns cannot reach greater distances, but because it is
impossible even with a good telescope to ascertain the effect of projectiles
at longer ranges.
Frederick the Great directed that in case the general of the brigade
or division ordered the artillery to open fire before the enemy came
within effective range, the order was to be obeyed, but the guns were
to be fired as slowly as possible.3 No well-ordered battery, as Decker
remarks,3 should pay attention to the outcries of staff officers who,
while the enemy is still many thousand yards distant, gallop wildly
among the guns, shouting out amain to open fire. There is not an
artillery officer in France, says the Marechal de Peretsdorf, commenting
on this sentence, who has not a hundred times witnessed such humi¬
liating scenes. I dwell on this subject, because staff officers destitute
of all knowledge of artillery tactics and of all control over their own
feelings are not confined to Germany and France. It is so much the
more necessary for artillery officers to bear in mind that success in
battle depends now more than ever upon the efficacy of their fire, and
that the efficacy of that fire depends almost entirely upon the gunners
preserving their self-possession and calmness.4
I have laid it down that if the atmosphere be in a favourable state,
and if there be means in the battery of accurately finding the range,
fire may be opened at 2500 yds. Nothing remains to be said on the
first of these conditions, but I must strongly insist on the importance
of the second. The probable, errors in judging distances from a fixed
spot by the eye are, practically speaking, directly proportional to the
distance of each object from the observer ; the greater the distance of
the object, the greater being the probable error. It is therefore of
the greatest moment that a range-finder of some description be issued
to the field artillery without delay; because the campaigns of 1866 and
1870 prove clearly, as Boguslawski says, that while the importance of
artillery fire at long ranges has been largely increased by the recent
improvements in guns, its value at short ranges has considerable fallen,
partly from the diminished calibre of the guns and the proportionally
1 See the sensible and excellent remarks of the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Commandant
of the Artillery of the Prussian Guards, in his “Ideen fiber die Verwendung der Feld- Artillerie,”
Berlin, 1869, p. 10, et seq. ; Taubert’s “ Gebrauch die Artillerie im Feldkriege,” Berlin, 1870,
p. 23; Boguslawski’s “ Entwickelung der Taktik,” Berlin, 1869, p. 124; Witte’s “ Artilleristisches
Taschenbuch,” Berlin, 1870, p. 231; Field-Marshal von Moltke’s “ Bemerkungen iiber den
Einflusz der verbesserten Schutzwaffen auf das Gefecht,” in the “ Beilage zu Nr. 27 des Militair-
Wochenblattes, fur den 8 Juli, 1865;” “ Aide-Memoire portatif de campagne a l’usage des officiers
d’ Artillerie,” Paris, 1864 (the last edition), p. 174.
2 Taubert’s “Field Artillery” (Maxwell’s Trans.), 1856, p. 78.
3 Decker’s “ Cavalry and Horse Artillery” (Begbie’s Trans.), p. 82.
4 “ In order to take advantage of the increased powers of modern firearms, the following con¬
ditions are necessary; — the object aimed at should be well defined, the range accurately determined,
and .the fire delivered with calmness and deliberation.” — Field-Marshal von Moltke’s “ Bemerkungen,
&c.” Translated by Lieut. H. R. G. Craufurd, R.A. See also von Hoffman’s “ Feld-Kanonier,’
Berlin, 1869, p. 265,
334
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
diminished efficacy of canister/ and partly from the greater range and
greater effect of infantry fire.
3. What to fire at,
“ In the different phases of an action/’ says Taubert, t( one arm is
wont to be of predominant importance.”* * 3 It is on this arm of an
enemy’s force, be it his cavalry, his artillery, or his infantry, that the
captain of a battery should bring his guns to bear. Should any doubt
arise as to which arm of the opposing force is really predominant, then
as a general rule, to which there are many more exceptions when our
own army is acting offensively than when acting defensively, the guns
should be directed on the enemy’s cavalry and infantry, and not on his
artillery. The reason is that if the cavalry and infantry of the enemy’s
army are broken by artillery fire, the artillery is almost sure to be
captured, while infantry and cavalry may succeed in escaping after
their artillery has been silenced. That no doubt may remain on this
subject, I shall quote the opinions of a number of generals and military
writers on it.
Napoleon said at St. Helena that the chief object of the artillery
ought to be the enemy’s infantry and cavalry.3 The Marquis de Ternay
almost repeats Napoleon’s words;4 Jomini lays down that at least two-
thirds of the guns should exclusively confine their fire to the opposing
infantry and cavalry;5 and Vial supports Jomini.6. These may be
regarded as representing the general convictions of French officers.
The Russian General Okouneff,7 and the Swiss General Dufour,8 ex¬
press a similar opinion, which is coincided in by the American General
Halleck,9 and the American Colonel Lippitt.10 The Italian General
Giustiniani agrees, as far as defensive battles are concerned.11 *
Colonel Hamley supports the principle I have laid down,13 followed
by Colonel Macdougal13 and Lieut. Steward;14 it is approved of by the
Prussian General Taubert,15 by Boguslawski,16 and by Witte;17 and it is
1 “Ranges, and Nolan’s Range-finder,” by Capt. Nolan, R.A., in tbe “Journal of the United
Service Institution,” Vol. XIV. No. 57, p. 6. “ L’ Artillerie de campagne Beige,” par. Cap.
Nicaise, p. 37-42; and Field-Marshal von Moltke’s “Observations” in the “Beilage zu Nr. 27 des
Militair-Wochenblattes fur den 8 Juli, 1865.”
2 “ On the use of Field Artillery” (Maxwell’s Trans.), p. 54.
:t Las Cases’ “Memoires,” Vol. II. p. 285.
4 “ Trait e de Tactique,” Tom. I. pp. 298, 348, 349.
5 “ Precis de 1’art de la guerre,” ch. 7, art. 46.
6 “ Cours d’ Artillerie et de l’Hist. Mil.,” p. 228.
7 “ On the use of Artillery in the Field,” p. 31.
8 “ Strategy and Tactics,” p. 313.
8 “ Elements of Military Art and Science,” p. 129.
10 “ Tactical use of the Three Arms,” p. 71.
n “Essai sur la Tactique,” p. 252.
12 “ Operations of War,” p. 334.
13 “ Theory of War,” p. 237.
14 “ Elementary Treatise on Artillery.” Bombay, 1864.
15 “ Gebrauch der Artillerie im Feldkriege.” Berlin, 1870, p. 20.
16 “Entsvickelung der Taktik.” Berlin, 1869, p. 151.
17 “ Artilleristisches Taschenbuch.” Berlin, 1870, p. 231, et seq.
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
335
implied by the Austrian Captain Muller,1 2 if I rightly understand his
remarks on this subject.
It may be concluded, then, that guns should bear on that arm of the
enemy^s force which threatens us most, and that if doubt should arise
as to which the predominant arm be, our artillery should devote its
attention to the infantry and cavalry, rather than to the artillery of the
opposing force.3
4. What to fire.
The nature of the object fired at determines the ammunition that is
to be used.
Common shell is used, with time fuze set long, against ordinary
buildings, wooden houses, earthworks, and combustible materials. It
is laid down in most books that common shell may also be used against
troops in mass or behind cover, with time fuzes so adjusted as to burst
the shell on the first graze. This is one of those rules which it is so
easy to preach and so hard to practice, and I have heard some of our
best officers say that they had no confidence in such a fire, because it
demands a delicacy of fire almost unattainable.
The Prussians made good practice against troops with common shell
in 1870 ; but they used percussion, not time fuzes.3
The difference between segment shell and shrapnel is so fine as in
no way to compensate for the complication to which the supply of both
descriptions of ammunition to a battery gives rise ; and there can be no
doubt that either kind should be withdrawn, and the proper number of
projectiles made up by a corresponding increase of the other. Segment
or shrapnel may be used with time fuzes against skirmishers, or with
time or percussion fuzes against troops in line or column. They may
be used with time fuzes against artillery, if it be desired to kill the
gunners, drivers, and horses ; or with percussion fuzes, or blind, if the
intention be to smash the carriages.4
The extreme useful range of canister from rifled guns is about
350 yds. Its use, therefore, has become rare and exceptional ; for if
the campaigns of 1866 and 18 70 teach anything, they teach us that a
battery is in danger when the enemy^s infantry has arrived within
1 “Das Oesterreichische Eeld-und Gebirgs-Artillerie.” Wien, 1868, p. 114. “ Studie iiber die
Taktik der Artillerie bei der neuen Infanterie-Bewaffnung.” Wien, 1868, pp. 26, 27. I believe I
have not misrepresented Captain Muller’s principles. The apparent contradiction between his
statements and mine arises principally from the fact that he looks at the question as one of grand
tactics, while I look at it as one of minor tactics.
2 I merely lay down general principles on this subject. It would be unpardonable impudence
to lay down definite rules on a question which must be practically decided almost entirely by the
peculiar circumstances of each individual case.
3 The use of percussion fuzes depends, of course, to a great extent on the nature of the ground
on which the enemy stands; for if the ground to his immediate front be marshy, or even soft, shells
with percussion fuzes will do him but little damage.
4 See Capt. C. O. Browne’s remarks on shells and fuzes in the “'Proceedings of the E.A.
Institution,” Vol. VII. p. 29 et seq. When possible, percussion fuzes should be invariably used
with segment shell, and time fuzes with shrapnel.
336
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
900 yds. from it, and tliat it is in extremis when the enemy’s infantry is
350 yds. from it.1 2 An Austrian rifled battery which galloped up to
case range from the Prussian infantry at Sadowa, suffered such terrible
losses that not a single shot was fired from it f and a Prussian field
battery which unlimbered at 600 yds. from the French infantry at
Grravelotte, for the purpose of firing case, had so many men and horses
struck down that only two guns could be got into action, and these
guns were withdrawn as soon as practicable.3 Each subdivision of our
field batteries is at present supplied with 16 rounds of case — a much
too large proportion in the present state of tactics. Six rounds, three
in each axle-tree box, would be amply sufficient, and room would thus be
gained in the limber boxes and wagon-body for twelve additional rounds
of segment or shrapnel ; either of which are infinitely more useful than
case.4
By depriving it of its most destructive projectile, canister, rifled small-
anns have inflicted a heavy blow upon the field artillery. But the evil
is not an irreparable one, for the mitrailleur is capable of delivering a
fire of case far more extended and deadlier than anything before known
in the artillery service. By adding two mitrailleur s to our present
6 -gun batteries, or by equipping one of the divisions of our batteries
with mitrailleurs instead of guns, our field artillery would be enabled
to deliver a destructive fire of case up to 1500 yds.5 A certain number
of mitrailleurs should also be equipped on the horse artillery system, to
act as batteries of reserve.
To distribute mitrailleurs among the infantry as battalion guns would
be to revive a system which for a century and a half, from the Thirty
Years’ War to the close of the 18th century, exerted a most pernicious
influence on the progress of field artillery.6 As the innumerable evils
entailed by the battalion guns are so well known that it would be waste
of words to re-state them, it seems incredible that a return to this system
should be advocated at the present day by professional military men in
Prussia, Austria, and England.7 Yet such is the case — a further proof
that “in this age the quiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by
attempts to resuscitate past evils, as to introduce new benefits.”8
Unless mitrailleurs are recognised to be what they really are, powerful,
although complicated pieces of artillery, and organised as such, the
1 “ Ideen iiber die Verwendung der Feld-Artillerie.” By the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen.
Berlin, 1869, p. 5.
2 General Soudain de Niederwerth, in the “ Journal de l’armee Beige,” No. 213.
3 “Observations amongst German Armies during 1870.” By Col. H. A. Smyth, E.A., in the
“ Proceedings of the E.A. Institution,” Vol. VII. p. 196.
4 The Prussians carry ten rounds of case per gun, of which, however, they have no opinion.”
Col. H. A. Smyth’s “ Observations, &c.,” p. 201.
5 “ Machine Guns,” by B. J. Gatling, in the “ Journal of the Eoyal United Service Institution.”
Vol. XIV. p. 520.
6 See “Proceedings of the E.A. Institution,” Vol. VII. p. 130 et seq.
7 “Mitrailleurs, and their place in the Wars of the Future,” by Major Fosberry, 'F(£., in the
“Journal of the Eoyal United Service Institution,” Vol. XIII. p. 560. “Proceedings of the E.A.
Institution,” Vol. VII. p. 201. “Das Jahr 1870, und die Wehrkraft der Monarchic,” Vienna,
1870, p. 27 — said to be written by the Archduke Albrecht of Austria.
8 Mr. J. S. Mill’s “Essay on Liberty,” p. 18.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
337
advantages that arise from their invention will be almost neutralised
by the ills their defective organisation will give rise to.
Rockets have never been largely used in the field since their inven¬
tion, and it cannot be said that their success, on the whole, has warranted
a more extensive use of them ; for, like the elephants of the ancients,
they are occasionally as dangerous to friend as to foe.
English rockets were successfully used at the battle of Leipsig, at
the passage of the Adour in 1814,1 and at the battle of Toulouse ;2 and
the failure of Capt. Mercer’s rockets during the retreat on Waterloo3
was amply atoned by the success of Major Whinyates’ rockets, under
Serjeant Dunnett, at Waterloo.4 They were used, with effect occa¬
sionally, during the Italian war of 1848-49,5 and the Hungarian
campaign of the same date ;6 and our troops suffered much annoyance
at the siege of Delhi from English rockets discharged from the city by
the natives. The Austrians used them at Solferino, without effect
according to the French account ;7 but they seem to be falling gradually
into disuse, and little is to be heard of them in the campaigns of 1866
and 1870. They may be used against infantry, but are especially
useful against mounted troops, as they terrify horses and throw them
into great disorder.
5. When to move .
1 have laid it down that 2500 yds. is the extreme useful range of our
field guns under ordinary circumstances. In case, therefore, the enemy
be falling back, it will be necessary to limber-up and advance when
the enemy’s line has reached that distance from the guns. On the
other hand, if the enemy be advancing, it should be laid down as a
rule, to which there is only one exception, that the battery should
limber and retire when the enemy’s infantry has arrived at a distance
of 900 yds. from the guns ; for at that range the fire of infantry becomes
effective, and the campaigns of 1866 and 1870 have proved beyond
question that artillery cannot live under infantry fire.8 The enemy’s
infantry may be looked on as an ironbound coast, bordered by a belt of
deadly rocks that stretch out 900 yds. from the shore; and to attempt
to navigate within that fatal line is to court certain destruction.
The exception I have alluded to is the case of guns occupying a
1 Napier’s “ Peninsular War,” Vol. VI. p. 91.
2 Ibid. Vol. VI. p. 64,4.
3 Mercer’s “ Diai’y of the Waterloo Campaign,” Vol. I. p. 279.
* Siborne’s “Hist, of the Waterloo Campaign,” Vol. II. p. 105.
5 “ Military Events in Italy.” Translated by Lord Ellesmere, p. 108.
6 “Memoirs of the War in Hungary,” by the Baroness von Beck, Vol. I. p. 150. “Histoire
de Hongrie,” par Balleydier, pp. 52, 54, 94.
? A French staff officer, describing the effect of the rockets, says: — “Nous avons ete exposes
au feu d’une batterie de fusees, qui nous a convert de ses saletes.”
8 I do not lay down dogmatically that 900 yds., to an inch, is the exact effective range of
infantry at the present time. I am obliged to select some definite distance, and I select 900 yds.
approximately, as being in all probability the minimum distance at which artillery should fight
infantry.
838
MINUTES 03? PROCEEDINGS OE
position which the general has determined to hold to the last. In this
case, let the distance of the enemy be what it may, the gunners must
stand by their guns, and, if so be, die by them.
6. How to move .
In dealing with the movements of field artillery, three questions
must be settled : first, the pace ; secondly, the number ; and thirdly,
the direction of the movements that should be -made. The third ques¬
tion belongs rather to grand than to minor tactics, and is a function of
three variables — the position and spirit of our own troops, the nature of
the ground, and the position and spirit of the enemy’s troops. With it
I have but little to do. It is a problem which lies beyond the sphere
of artillery commanders, and must be dealt with by the generals of our
own force. Were artillery officers ever called upon to take command
of brigades and divisions in the English army, it might be interesting
to touch briefly on this subject ; but under existing circumstances it
would be a waste of time and thought to discuss a question in theory
which we shall never be permitted to solve in practice.
The axiom that guns are useless when limbered-up, underlies the
whole theory of the movements of field artillery, as far as their rapidity
and number are concerned.
From this axiom it follows, in the first place, that all the movements
of a battery ought to be executed at as rapid a pace as the nature of
its equipment will permit ; for the slower the pace of manoeuvre the
longer the guns will remain limbered-up. It is therefore evident that
the French and English field batteries fail to fulfil one of the primary
conditions of a good field artillery. In both systems the guns are
capable of moving at a brisk trot ; in neither system would a trot be
practicable in actual warfare. For in the present state of tactics, as
everybody knows, artillery wagons dare not accompany their guns
under fire ; and if the wagons do not accompany the guns, the gunners
must be dismounted, and it is a physical impossibility for men on foot
to keep pace with horses moving at a trot. There is no alternative,
therefore, between bringing field battery guns into action at a walk, and
bringing them into action without their gunners. If a walk be a suffi¬
ciently rapid pace for field batteries to move at, then 12-prs. should be at
once withdrawn, and 40-prs., or some such gun, should be given to them.
On the other hand, if 12-prs. are indeed the fit guns for this branch
of the field artillery service, then let the gun-carriage be fitted with
seats for the conveyance of the gunners, so as to confer upon the
system the mobility which 12-prs. are capable of attaining. This is
not a question which is now raised for the first time, nor is it one
which involves either experiment or expense. We have only to cast
our eyes around us and imitate the Prussian, the Austrian, the Swedish,
the Belgian, or the Italian system, or to reproduce that used for half a
century by the Bengal Artillery. We have, indeed, to look no further
than our own volunteer artillery, among whose carriages the latest
continental improvements may be found.1
1 I refer to the 1st Middlesex Artillery Volunteers. .
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
339
Until a step be taken in either one direction or the other, onr field
batteries, with the French, will remain, as far as mobility is concerned,
the most inefficient field batteries in Europe.
From the axiom that guns are useless when limbered-up, it follows,
in the second place, that the movements of a battery should be mini¬
mum in number j1 for in order to move, the guns must cease firing and
limber-up. If an advancing enemy reaches 900 yds. from the battery,
it should at once limber-up and retire, unless it be necessary to hold to
the last the position which it occupies ; and if a retiring enemy reaches
a position much beyond 2000 yds. from the guns, they must be rapidly
advanced to within 900 yds. of the enemy's line ; but within these
limits it is undoubted that the calmer, the steadier, and the less inter¬
rupted the fire of the guns is the better.
At the present day, the old principle that guns must move when¬
ever the brigade of infantry or cavalry to which they are attached
moves, is still in full action in the English army. Field guns must be
aligned on the infantry, must move when they move, and must fire
when they fire ; or to use the ordinary phrase, they must C( conform to
the movements of the infantry." This mode of handling guns is utterly
and diametrically contrary to the whole spirit of modern tactics ; for
1 Baron von Moltke lays down this principle witli admirable clearness: — “Rifled guns are not
in themselves wanting in mobility, but their peculiarities require that they should keep a position
as long as possible when once they have taken it up ; for every change of position demands a fresh
calculation of the ranges, on the accurate knowledge of which the result chiefly depends. On
account of their extensive range, it is possible for properly placed rifled guns to be effective from
one and the same position in all the different stages of a battle. It is not necessary to advance a
few hundred yards in order to reach the enemy, for this object is gained by altering the eleva*
tion, without essentially diminishing the efficacy of the fire.” — “ Beilage zu Nr. 27 des Militair-
Wochenblattes, fur den 8 Juli, 1865.” Translated into English by Lieut. H. R. G. Craufurd, R.A,
45
340
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OE
nothing can be more certain, if my facts be indeed facts and if my
reasoning be correct, than that the action of modern field artillery
ceases just where the action of infantry begins. For example, if AB
represent the enemy’s infantry, in Fig. 10, then onr artillery wonld, as
a general rule, open fire at EF, and wonld gradually advance to CD ,
beyond which line it could not advance, without the risk of annihilation,
as long as the enemy’s' infantry stands firm.1 2 On the other hand, CD
is the extreme position at which infantry could commence firing upon
AB, without risk of wasting their ammunition. It is therefore clearly
evident that if our infantry and artillery are to fight with effect they
cannot fight in line, and that, although co-operating to effect the same
end, they must for the future act far more independently than in the
past.
The independent action of artillery, necessitated by the introduction
of arms of precision, makes it the more important that guns should be
accompanied on all occasions by strong and well-instructed escorts.
The duty of an escort, be it cavalry or infantry, is a simple one — to
protect the battery from sudden attacks on its vulnerable parts, its
flanks and rear. With the front of the battery it has nothing whatever
to do; Yet at the present day, it is not unusual to see the escort in
the intervals between the guns, impeding and obstructing the move¬
ments of the officers and gunners, occasionally putting a stop to the
fire altogether by getting in front of the muzzles,3 and, worse than all,
absent from the positions where its presence is really required — the
flanks and rear of the battery. Far from being in the battery, the
escort should be well in its rear, and well to a flank, as in CD (Fig. 11).
Kg. ll.
ill Hi
It should be well to the rear, in order to be able to take in flank any
1 The Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen’s “Ideen liber die Verwendung dev Feld-Artillerie,”
p» 5 et seq. “ L’Arfcillerie de campagne Beige,” par Capt. Nicaise. Bruxelles, 1870, pp. 40, 41.
2 This happened to the horse artillery at the battle of Vittoria. See Frazer’s “ Letters during
the Peninsular and Waterloo Campaigns,” p. 160.
THE liOYAL AllTILLEJJY INSTITUTION.
311
body of the enemy, such as AB, which endeavours to outflank the
guns ; and well to the flank, in order to watch and give notice of any
attempt on the part of the enemy to creep round the flank of the
battery and attack it in rear.1 2
A cavalry escort should lose no time in charging an enemy who
attacks the flanks or rear of the battery, but it should never pursue.
If the gunners are annoyed by sharpshooters, the escort, of whatever
arm, should endeavour to drive them off, or at least to occupy their
attention. In case the enemy attacks the battery in front, the escort
should form in line immediately in rear of the limbers, and there await
the result of the attack. If it be successful, the escort will rush in
to protect the defenceless gunners and save the guns.3 If it be un¬
successful, the escort will resume its former position. It is almost
needless to say that in posting an escort every advantage should be
taken of the accidents of the ground.
If it be necessary to subdivide a 6-gun battery, it should be broken
into divisions,3 not half batteries ; for the half battery formation violates
every principle on which the formation of a 6-gun battery is founded.
In 4-gun, and 8-gun batteries, half batteries are, on the contrary, con¬
venient and useful.
On the formation of guns when manoeuvring it is not necessary to
say much. The nature of the ground will occasionally necessitate the
use of column, but as a general rule, line at full intervals is the best of
all orders.4
What I have endeavoured to prove in the foregoing pages may be
summed up in a few words.
As regards the mobility of field artillery, its movements in action,
although made at the maximum speed which its equipment renders
possible, ought to be minimum in number, and executed beyond the
effective range of the enemy’s infantry.
As regards the fire of the guns, field artillerymen require time to
choose their position ; they require time to determine their object ;
they require time to select their ammunition ; they require time to find
their range ; they require time to load their guns ; and they require
time to lay their guns. They require time to do these* things ; and
unless time be given to do them, it is vain to hope that, in our next
war, our batteries will gain that superiority over those they will
encounter which, from the excellence of our materiel and the stubborn
courage of our gunners, we might reasonably expect.
1 Giustiniani’s “ Essai sur la Tactique,” pp. 80, 206. The directions given in Eobins’ “ Cavalry
Catechism” for the position of an escort are absurd, and it is unsatisfactory to iind them quoted
with approval in Sir Sidney Cotton’s “ Field Exercises of the Peshawur Brigade,” p. 104.
2 An excellent example of this principle is afforded by the conduct of the cavalry escort
(15th Hussars) of the guns attacked in the action fought on the 2nd Dec. 1799 in Holland. See
the C£ British Military Library,” Vol. II.
a “ Les deux canons d’une meme section ” (division) “ sont des camarades de combat qu’on ne
doit jamais separer.” — <£ Instruction du General Le Boeuf pour le camp de Chalons.”
4 The reason is explained by the Prince of Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen in his pamphlet before
quoted, p. 42.
342
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Such is a brief outline of tbe minor tactics of modern field artillery.
If tbe principles I have laid down be untrue, let their falseness be
exposed ; if they are true, let them be practically adopted, or let us
take for our motto —
Deteriora sequor.
video meliora proboque,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
343
A FEW NOTES ON THE
HANDLIN8 OP HORSE ARTILLERY & CAYALRY.
BY
CAPTAIN I. KETCHEN, R.H.A.
I feel strongly tliat a great many officers already know all that is
contained in the following sentences, and that it seems presumptuous in
me to ask a place for them in the Institution papers ; but they are not
meant for such officers, but for the few who, although I feel sure they
will assent to what I have written, have not thought much on the
matter before.
Simple although the ideas are, they certainly are not generally acted
upon ; in fact I have never yet seen them acted upon at any brigade
parade I have taken part in. For these reasons, possibly some few
may think them worth reading.
Except when preparing for an attack, horse artillery and cavalry
should never be in motion in the same line.
By “ preparing ” is meant, advancing in good open country together
to meet an enemy, but at such a distance from him as would be beyond
the proper limit for commencing actual fighting.
In advancing to attack, the horse artillery should do so as soon as
the order is given, and, if the ground admits, at full gallop. (By “ full
gallop ” here and throughout this paper is meant, as fast as the nature
of the ground will allow with safety.) The cavalry escort should move
off at the same time, and follow on the outer flank at a trot, but never
remain quite so far away from the guns as the enemy is from them ; so
that should the guns be suddenly charged by the enemy, the escort may
intercept and at least check him.
By the time the guns have come into action, or very soon after, the
escort will have arrived at its proper position (on the outer rear of the
guns), men and horses perfectly fresh and fit for work if really required.
When the horse artillery have advanced about one-third of the
distance between the cavalry and the enemy, the cavalry should
then move off at a trot, watching the guns, and should on no
account go past them (in fact, keep out of the enemy's fire as long as
possible) until the guns are actually in danger by the rapid advance of
the enemy, or the latter thoroughly thrown into confusion. In either
case it will be the duty of the commander of the cavalry to decide ivhen
he should pass the guns and charge the enemy ; and the officer
commanding the horse artillery should always be held to be intelligent
enough to know that when the cavalry advance so far as to be in danger
844
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
from the fire of the guns — but not one second before then — firing must
cease.
The horse artillery horses may become regularly blown by their rapid
advance, and although while galloping to the front the guns were
perfectly useless, yet now, standing still in action, they are doing their
work in their proper place, and the horses are being rested ; i.e., horse
artillery when in motion are of no use against an enemy, they are of
use only when “ standing still.” The longer they are kept standing
still, the greater the number of rounds that can be fired, of course, and
the longer the breathing time for the horses. Hence, position should
be changed as seldom as possible ; but when necessary, it should be
done at full gallop, for until the change is completed the guns are quite
useless — until, in fact, they are “ standing still ” again.
It is therefore quite clear that the gallop, when practicable, is the
only horse artillery (proper) pace during an engagement.
On the other hand, with the cavalry nearly the opposite holds good.
If the cavalry are working with horse artillery, they should endeavour
to obtain from the guns as much work as possible ; and the more damage
the guns are allowed to perpetrate on the enemy, the more successful
is the cavalry charge afterwards likely to be. The guns, therefore,
should be permitted to go ahead to do their work ; and while this is
going on, the cavalry commander, saving his men and horses, should
come up at the very slowest safe pace. By galloping now, he would
only “wind” both men and horses, and if he passed the guns (and
how very often this is done), they would, for his safety, have to cease
firing before they had (possibly) given the enemy one round; and
further, his men and horses would be “ done ” at the very moment
when they should be at their best.
In actual warfare, as a rule, except in the charge over about the last
100 yds., and the canter for about the previous 50, cavalry should never
go beyond a trot.
A sort of rivalry now exists, most pernicious, as to which, goes the
faster. This would be thoroughly put an end to if the absurdity of
horse artillery and cavalry advancing together were stopped, and the
following rules borne in mind : —
At the time of actual conflict with the enemy, cavalry should be at
full gallop.
At the time of actual conflict with the enemy, horse artillery should
be standing still.
In advancing to the attack, cavalry should not go faster than a trot
(so that men and horses may be fresh for the “ clash.”)
In advancing to the attack, horse artillery should go at full gallop
(so as to get into “ standing still,” and therefore use, as soon as possible;
for the sooner in action, the greater the number of rounds the guns can
fire before the cavalry pass) .
Were these points attended to, there could be no rivalry. The one
would then see that a distinct part has to be played by the other,
and that both combined make a splendid whole ; and were this feeling
once secured, it would more than ever be the object of the officers of
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
34-5
tlie one brancli to try to become acquainted witb tbe details of tbe
other, with the ultimate view of being able to act at the proper moment
and in such a manner as to obtain the greatest possible advantage by
the correct combination of the powers of the two arms.
To return, then, to the subject.
The guns should remain unlimbered after the cavalry have passed
on to the charge, so as to be ready to open fire, should a favourable
opportunity offer, in the case of their being beaten back.... As soon,
however, as it is seen that the cavalry have got the best of the affair,
the horse artillery should limber up and advance to the front, so as to
give the retreating enemy a few farewell shots on the cavalry desisting
from further work.
Then in retreating, a brigade of horse artillery and cavalry should be
worked on the same principles.
On the order being given to retire, the guns of that part of the
brigade which is to go back first should do so — about 200 yds. — at full
gallop (an exception must be made in favour of the horse artillery to
the general rule that all retirements should be done at a walk, or at
most at a trot), so as to bring the guns into use again as soon as
possible ; but the cavalry of this retiring part of the brigade should go
back at a walk, and the guns in front should not cease firing until the
retiring cavalry have fronted in line with their own guns.
It is now usual for the guns in front to cease firing as soon as the
retired guns have opened fire, but this should not be done. The retire¬
ment, as a whole, should be accomplish ed slowly — that is, at a walk by the
cavalry ; but by allowing the horse artillery to gallop back, it is evident
that a great deal more effect is gained than by the usual way of making
them walk back in line with the cavalry ; for during the whole retire¬
ment every gun is actually in action, except for the few minutes taken up
in the 400-yard gallops (200 to the already retired guns and 200 beyond
them), whereas, as a rule, at present only one gun out of every two is
actually in use during the whole time taken up in walking to the rear.
The slow retirement of the cavalry next the enemy is well covered
the whole time by the first retired guns, and nearly the whole time by
its own guns as well. The cavalry should not get the order to go about
until the horse artillery with which it is associated has actually moved
off to the rear* As a rule now, the cavalry commander forgets that
after the order to retire is given, the horse artillery haYe to discharge
their guns, sponge them out, limber up, and mount their horses before
they can start j and very frequently he goes off leaving the guns behind
him, instead of seeing them clear off before he moves.
By this method of retiring, should an opportunity offer for the cavalry
to charge, their men and horses are quite fresh and fit for such work at
any moment ; and the horse artillery horses have abundance of breathing
time while standing still between the successive gallops to the rear.
The reason for the horse artillery being made to gallop to the rear
should not only be known to the horse artillery themselves, but pub¬
lished to the army; so that, should retreat ever become necessary, no
panic would be occasioned by the now unusual sight of a portion of an
army going back at a dashing pace.
346
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The same arguments apply to all changes of front in the face of an
enemy, except to meet a sudden and unexpected flank attack ; in which
case it will be necessary for the cavalry to get into their new direction
at a gallop. As soon as that is gained, however, the guns should be
allowed to do all they can before the cavalry pass them ; in fact, all the
foregoing then again comes into full force.
To sum up. During an engagement, horse artillery and cavalry
should never be in motion in the same line ; the pace for horse artillery
is the gallop ; cavalry should rarely (except when charging) go beyond
a trot.
What I have written in no way refers to the conduct of the drilling
of either the horse artillery or cavalry. Of course, the horse artillery
must in great part be taught and exercised at a walk and trot, as the
best of all means leading to safe galloping ; and the cavalry, too, must
very frequently be manoeuvred at a gallop, to ensure their being able to
do so on an emergency.
I may add that the horse artillery should expect great assistance
from good Rifle skirmishers. They are generally to be found in the front,
and when the horse artillery come up the protection that might be
afforded by such men would be immense; for the enemy's sharpshooters
have always been a thorn in the side of the horse artillery, whereas, if we
could only keep down their fire by our own skirmishers, many a shot
that now has at least the chance of disabling one of our teams could
never be fired at all. I cannot, however, pretend to any knowledge of
the manner in which this protection may be best afforded ; that may
safely be left in the hands of our Rifle officers.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
347
THE
PRUSSIAN MODE OF CONDUCTING LARGE
MANOEUVRES.
A LECTURE DELIVERED AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, EEB. 7, 1871,
BY
LXEUT.-COLONEL E. W. BRAY,
4th king’s own royal regiment of infantry.
Major-General C. Dickson, C.B., V.C., Inspector General of Artillery, in the Chair.
Subjects : —
I. — Prussian mode of conducting large manoeuvres , and the manner in which a staff of
Umpires is used for the purpose of controlling and regulating such manoeuvres.
II. — The necessity of introducing a more intelligent system of manoeuvre and a higher
system of training amongst the Regimental Officers of the English army.
Captain Alexander Dickson Burnaby, R.A., Secretary of the
•Royal Artillery Institution, having introduced the lecturer to the
meeting,
Lieutenant-Colonel Bray said : Gentlemen, I visited Berlin and
Pomerania in the autumn of 1868, with Major-General Sir Charles
Staveley and three other officers, for the purpose of witnessing the
field manoeuvres of the Prussian army, which I had long been
anxious to do from what I had read of the practical teaching
given to the troops, superior officers, and staff, by the peculiar
manner in which their sham battles, campaigns, and attacks were
carried out. I was, at the time, greatly impressed with the skill
and military science with which these manoeuvres were carried
out — the wonderful similarity and reality to war itself which was
made apparent by the manner in which the work was executed,
and the great practical results attained by the high training in the
higher branches of military knowledge of the art of war which was
given to the troops — cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and intendance
or control departments — and the immense advantages conferred on
generals, colonels, majors, captains, lieuterfants, and staff officers of
every degree.
The instruction conferred on officers by witnessing the execution
of manoeuvres in a time of peace by the Prussians is so great, that I
46
348
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
consider I learnt more of my profession in Prussia in six weeks than
in the previous many years of peace training in the English army.
Of course I exclude the training of actual service, which is the true
training of an officer ; as in one campaign a man learns more than in
ten years of common barrack-yard training, which is so unlike real
war, that General Trochu says in his pamphlet on the then state of
the French army in 1867 (three years ago), “that the exercise of
troops in time of peace gives them absolutely no conception of a real
struggle in real warfare.”
This is, I am afraid, to a great extent, perfectly true ; and the only
exercises that I have ever seen, in my tolerably wide experience,
that can possibly make troops, and especially officers — and by
officers I mean leaders of troops — are such exercises as are con¬
ducted in Prussia either on the Prussian system or one founded upon it.
When I speak of officers I mean commanders or leaders of men ;
for, on looking into the English dictionary, I find an officer defined
as a “ commander ” or “ leader of men.”
This should be borne in mind ; for I find English people have
strange ideas of an “ officer.” Some think him a man finely dressed,
with nothing to do ; others, again, think anything an officer in a sash
and gold lace, There are officers, again, who write “ Captain ” on
their cards on the strength of having been lieutenants in the
“ Bungay ” militia ! The officers I speak of are commanders or
leaders of men ; and the instruction of all officers should be to make
them leaders of men.
In the piping. or, more correctly speaking, in the pipe-claying times
of peace, the object of an officer’s training is greatly lost sight of ;
and his time is taken up principally with small regimental duties
and small regimental details, many of which have been invented to
give him occupation and fill up his time.
In war-time, about one-half of these regimental duties and details'
go by the board, and officers are thus all at once and suddenly
thrown on their natural resources — their energy, and their real pro¬
fessional knowledge. Then comes the time for the exhibition of
military talent and professional training. It is too late then to look
at books, and study the art of war ; generally, on a campaign, no
books are to be had. A perfect knowledge of the “ Queen’s Regu¬
lations,” “Royal Warrants,” and “ Regimental Standing Orders,”
though all good and necessary books in their way, will not help you
out of a mess, nor make you a commander or leader of men !
Officers must be taught the higher branches of the profession — as
well as the lesser and smaller parts — in time of peace, and before they
arrive at the rank of field officer.
If there is one thing we pride ourselves upon more than another it
is this, that our “ regimental system is perfect.” How a system
can be perfect which neglects the training of regimental officers in
the highest branches of the profession (which is admitted now to be
one which requires the highest and best qualities which an educated
man can possess), I cannot understand ; in fact, such a regimental
system must be allowed to be imperfect in one of its most im¬
portant parts.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
349
Object of Lecture.
The object of my lecture is therefore to try and explain the
Prussian mode of conducting their manoeuvres, and so to interest my
audience as to get the matter thoroughly discussed in Woolwich (the
head-quarters of the Royal Artillery) and in Aldershot (our English
military school), where all changes and improvements are expected to
be initiated and tried, and, if possible, such changes and improve¬
ments made in the existing system as may appear desirable, and at
the same time practicable, and introduce a more intelligent system of
manoeuvring.
I am not myself an advocate for adopting every novelty introduced
by Prussia, Prance, Austria, or Russia, as we have very many good
points in our military system which should not be changed : and in
considering the organisation of armies, the temperament and pecu¬
liarities of the nation must be considered, of which the army is but a
part, after all.
In the Prussian army I did not see many things worth copying ;
and in many things I thought we were better, and ahead of them;
but the one very important point in which they were decidedly
superior to us was, in the training of their officers. And this is
the subject of my lecture.
The introduction of an efficient system of higher training for the
officers of the English army, and especially the captains and field
officers, I consider a matter of such vast, in fact, I may say, of such
vital, importance to our army, that I trust I may be able to use a
sufficient amount of eloquence to fix your attention, and to convince
even those who are sceptical and think “ we are very well as we are.”
I think myself that we have much to learn — that we must march
with the age — that we must recognise the great changes in the art
of war. We must study these changes. We must modify our dress,
our equipments, our drill, our training, our organisation, to meet the
changes which are demonstrated to us from day to day by the graphic
descriptions of the war now raging in Prance. If we do not do so —
if we move with the sluggishness peculiar to this nation, with the
sluggishness peculiar to us in matters military — then depend upon it
the day of retribution is drawing nigh ; a huge disaster will fall upon
this country, similar to that which has fallen upon Prance, and from
which we should suffer more, as we have not a population trained to
arms, no organisation to meet an invasion, no fortresses to stop an
enemy. Our collapse -would be sudden and terrible, rapid and
astounding.
Our part, as soldiers, is to recognise the military facts of these
great questions, and to prepare ourselves by study and training to
make the military machine — the army — as perfect as we can ; so that,
when the day comes, we may play our part with credit.
I must mention that some parts of the Prussian system cannot be
introduced without special Acts of Parliament and an expenditure of
money for damage to property. In Prussia, everything gives way to
the army ; in .England, the army gives way before everything — u a
pretty considerable difference,” as Jonathan would say.
350
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Sir Charles Staveley7 s Booh .
In 1861, all tlie orders, instructions, and traditions of tlie
Prussian army were embodied in a book of regulations, wbicb, by
order of the King of Prussia, dated June, 1861, became the rules and
regulations of his army for the exercise of “ troops in large bodies.55
This is the handbook ; and I now hold a translation of these
orders in my hand, made by Major-General Sir Charles Staveley, K.C.B.,
who now commands at Plymouth, and who is an ardent and distin¬
guished soldier, eager in everything connected with his profession,
and who was the senior officer with our small party of English
officers in August and September, 1868, and who was also greatly
struck with the practical knowledge of war attained by the Prussian
officers and troops, by their intelligent and scientific mode of working
their troops across country in mimic war. This book I have care¬
fully read over, and I will take it as the foundation of my lecture,
filling it up with my own personal experience and recollection of
what I saw myself.
I must mention that last year Major Milligan (late A.D.C. to Sir
Yorke Scarlett) visited Berlin, on which occasion there were, I
believe, twenty-five English officers present at the reviews, and some,
I hear, are now at Aldershot. Major Milligan, on his return, pub¬
lished a translation of the same regulations. Sir Charles Staveley’s
and Major Milligan’s translations are very similar up to a certain
point ; but Sir Charles Staveley has gone further, and translated the
orders for outpost duties, encampments, drawing up troops in order
of battle, &c., &c.
I found, on asking some experienced and intelligent colonels, last
autumn, what they thought of Milligan’s translations ? they said,
“ The rules are good, the principles are correct ; but we do not see
how the Prussians work it out in the field, or how the umpire staff
can regulate or improve matters. In fact, we cannot see how it
works.” This was my own opinion ; and I feel that no officer will
understand the “ working of these rules,” unless he has seen it for
himself, or the working has been explained to him by one who has.
Review of the Prussian Guards .
On the 7th of August, 1868, the whole of the Prussian Guards,
cavalry, artillery, and infantry, and numbering nearly 20,000 men,
were drawn up in grand review order for the inspection of the King,
on a sandy plain, three miles beyond the gates of Berlin. At this
review our small party of five English officers were present. We
were furnished with horses and orderlies by the 2nd Dragoons of the
Guard ; and Lieutenant Count Seckendorff, of the 2nd regiment of
Guards, was attached to us as our guide. This officer is now A.D.C.
to the Crown Prince, and took the greatest pleasure in repaying to
all of us in Prussia the attention which he had received from English
officers in Abyssinia.
I will merely here say of this review, that we were most favourably
impressed with the bearing, physique, and general appearance of the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION".
351
Prussian Guard corps, and we were much surprised to see what
well- trained soldiers could be turned out in three years. The men
are not so well set up as English or French soldiers ; but it must be
remembered that their service is very short. The officers and sergeants
are very smart and well set up. The officers are a strikingly fine
body of men.
The morning after the review all Berlin seemed to be on the
move, as the whole of the Guards marched out early to their various
rendezvous, about twelve miles from Berlin, for a week’s campaign
in the open, without tents and in war- service order.
Maps and Plans. — General Idea .
We joined the head-quarters staff at about ten o’clock next morn¬
ing, at an appointed place, at some village ; and here maps of the
surrounding country, and the printed u general idea ” of the day’s
work, were distributed to the officers.
I must mention here that at the field manoeuvres every officer —
from general to lieutenant — carries his map in his belt, which is
consulted at every halt, and at every opportunity. And every officer
carries an opera glass, the maps and glasses being considered much
more essential than swords. And in this particular we might, with
great advantage, at once , and without further delay, take a leaf out of
the Prussian book.
In Abyssinia, most of the regiments packed up their red sashes,
and substituted opera glasses of all colours and sizes ; so, in prac¬
tice, the opera glass is carried ; and therefore it might be well to
recognise it at once as an absolute and necessary part of an officer’s
dress.
When we arrived on the ground occupied by our army, the other
army was miles away, quite out of sight ; and it was only known
that the enemy was trying to outflank our army and seize the road
to Berlin.
Cultivated Land.
The country about Berlin is sandy, with plenty of villages, woods
and ditches, small lakes, and very few hedges ; the fields being open
and large, but defined by ditches, instead of hedges. All fields
under cultivation which may be damaged by the passage of troops
are marked with poles, and bunches of straw stuck upon the top of
them. This means, “ Avoid this field, if you can ; ” but if unavoid¬
able, the troops pass where they please ; and at the end of the day’s
work all damage done to property is assessed by a board of staff
officers and civilians, and the amount paid by the government. This
is the law of the land ; and it is done in a regular and methodical
way, and, I heard, did not cost very much, as in the autumn, when
the crops are down, there is not much to injure.
I cannot myself see why some attempt should not be made in this
neighbourhood to introduce some such plan, as the surrounding neigh¬
bourhood, farms, and estates must benefit largely by the cantonment
of such a large body of troops in Aldershot ; and therefore the land-
352
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
lords should allow the troops to pass over the lands and farms for ten
or twelve miles round. The damage done would be slight, as the
pioneers follow the troops, and repair at once any damage done to
ditches, fences, &c. The manoeuvres could be confined to a week or
a fortnight at such time of the autumn as would do least damage.
Any way, the subject might be seriously considered, and the co-ope¬
ration of the landlords tested.
Our army was drawn up, with its front towards the expected
advance of the enemy ; the troops all posted according to the nature
of the ground, and as much under cover and out of sight as possible ;
arms piled ; dragoons and artillery dismounted ; and animated discus¬
sions with maps in hand going forward everywhere, as reports came
in of the enemy’s movements from the cavalry outposts, which had
started early in the morning, to feel for the enemy, and were spread
out like a fan for miles in our front and flanks. Every wood, every
hillock, every village, every farm, every bridge, every road, every
steeple, every railway station, was occupied by cavalry videttes of
one, two, three, four, or more, men ; officers, cavalry, and staff looking
out with the greatest earnestness and interest for the movements of
the enemy, which were reported rapidly to the main body in writing ;
the supports to these outposts — consisting of troops, half-troops,
sections, squadrons — were concealed all over the country, behind
haystacks, farms, barns, wToods, &c., receiving reports from the front,
and communicating them to their reserves. In fact, so perfectly,
intelligently, and earnestly was this duty carried on, that nothing
could escape the u eyes and ears ” of this army, and every movement
of the enemy was brought back.
The duty is varied by enterprises and constant attempts to capture
videttes, patrols, officers, and orderlies carrying messages ; and it is
so earnestly executed, that it is common to see officers, patrols, or
single dragoons riding as for their lives, pursued at racing pace by
single lancers, or parties of horse.
So it will be seen that the rules of war are strictly carried out,
and that the information acquired by the outposts, or staff officers,
must be obtained, as in the field, at the risk of capture.
Infantry outposts are thrown out, also, where necessary. The
Prussians have an excellent plan, by-the-bye, which should be
adopted by us : that is, having two or three dragoons with every
advanced infantry piquet. I think myself that an officer’s piquet
should never be without one dragoon or hussar, at least.
At our exercises at Aldershot it is common to see generals and
staff officers surveying the positions of their enemies under a deadly
rifle fire, or under the immediate fire of field guns. Such things are
not allowed in Prussia. They soon let slip a party of hussars, or
lancers, at any officers attempting to get a near view. I saw a
general and his staff who had, in this way, gone forward in their
eagerness, charged by a party of lancers at full gallop. The general
fled, followed by his staff — a most exciting pursuit, which ended by
some officers, who were not given to hard riding across country,
being captured by the Uhlans, and carried off in triumph to their
own side !
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
353
Cavalry Outpost Duty .
Nothing struck me more than the splendid manner in which the
duties of the cavalry outposts were carried out in a real, intelligent,
skilful, and soldier-like style, which I have never seen even ap¬
proached. I may say the same of the manner in which the cavalry
was handled in these mimic wars by the Prussian officers throughout.
And the skill displayed gave me a new idea of the power of cavalry
in war, and which I certainly had not realised before. When I
found, in the present war, particularly at the beginning, the French
troops out-manoeuvred, surprised, and deceived by the Prussian
cavalry, I was not in the least surprised ; it was to be expected from
their very high training in the most important part of a dragoon’s
duties — outpost duty.
I would strongly advise every English cavalry officer to carefully
study the Prussian rules for outpost duty, contained in Sir Charles
Staveley’s translation, and to thoroughly recognise and understand
the most important duty of this branch of the service ; for as our
cavalry are few in number, so they should be perfect in this know¬
ledge of how to be the cc eyes and ears ” of our army.
A Prussian colonel of cuirassiers, when we were going through the
bivouacs, after a heavy and long day’s work, when told that we had
observed that their horses were badly groomed and the saddlery only
half-cleaned, according to our notions, even for bivouacs, replied thus:
“We Prussians try in three years to make a thorough dragoon, a
perfect outpost soldier, a reliable and intelligent vidette. Our
horses are sufficiently groomed for war purposes, and as much as
they ever can be in the field. Our saddlery is clean enough for war.
You English pass your time in turning your officers and troopers into
grooms, polishing bits and stirrup -irons, and covering yourselves
with pipe-clay. We don’t — and we don’t want to; for we know that
such things are useless in war.”
Whether this Prussian cavalry colonel was right or not, I leave
those to judge who read a few days ago a description of the Prussian
cavalry, evidently from the pen of an English dragoon, in the advance
from Orleans on Tours and Le Mans. This English officer said that
their horses were in perfect condition after five months’ hard cam¬
paigning, and that the troopers looked as if they had only just left
their barracks in Berlin. Yet it must be remarked, notwithstanding
the Prussian cuirassier colonel’s opinion, that we have twelve years
to make a dragoon instead of three years, and consequently we are
able to turn out our cavalry in a style that must excite the envy of
a Prussian dragoon ; for our cavalry are certainly in beautiful order,
and the attention which is paid to dress, appearance, equipment,
riding, and horses, has great advantages too, and is most useful to
discipline. I question whether any army in the world could turn
out such a splendid division of cavalry as that at Aldershot last
summer — viz., 1st Life Guards, 3rd Dragoon Guards, 6th Inniskilling
Dragoons, 9th and 12th Lancers, and 10th Hussars.
Now, it is as well to see ourselves as others see us. I have the
highest opinion of the English cavalry, and I am a great admirer of it.
354
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
I think the material of which both officers and men is composed is
splendid — first-rate — and that they can hold their own with any
cavalry in Europe, in point of appearance, officers, men, and horses.
I have always, however, thought that our cavalry outpost duty was
imperfectly performed in the field. There is a want of elasticity,
quickness, and intelligence 5 but I am certain that when these facts
are thoroughly understood and recognised by our cavalry, there will
be no difficulty in getting cavalry officers to study the new duties of
this branch of the service.
From my experience, I would say that some of the Indian irregu¬
lar horse regiments perform outpost duty better than we do ; they
are quick, intelligent, and much more alert on piquet than English
soldiers. I would say that the 12th Punjaub Cavalry and 23rd Pun-
jaub Pioneers performed outpost duties better than any troops in
Lord Napier’s army in Abyssinia. This is my opinion, and I had
good opportunities of judging.
The written and verbal reports from the outposts enable the com¬
manding general to guess pretty well the intentions of the enemy
long before his main body is seen, and preparations for attack or
defence are made accordingly.
Umpires.
The business of the umpire staff now begins. The chief umpire is
the senior general commanding in the absence of the king or com-
mander-in- chief. At Aldershot, the commander-in-chief would be
the umpire ; in his absence, the lieutenant-general commanding.
The commanding general selects other officers, in sufficient numbers,
of sufficient rank and acknowledged excellence as soldiers. They
all wear a white band round the right arm, their names are pub¬
lished in orders, and they are attended each by a couple of intel¬
ligent dragoons on fast horses, who also wear the white band of
neutrality.
The following are rules for the umpires :
Rules for Umpires.
1. The umpire-in-chief will be the lieutenant-general, or other senior
general officer commanding at Aldershot.
2. All orders from the umpire staff to be considered as directly emanating
from the lieutenant-general, and to be carried out and obeyed with alacrity.
3. The umpire staff to be under the orders of the lieutenant-general.
The staff to consist of four, five, or six selected officers, as many as possible
being colonels and lieutenant- colonels. No officer under the rank of major
to be so employed.
4. The umpire’s staff to be distinguished by a broad white silk band
round the right arm, above the elbow. Each umpire to be accompanied by
two dragoon orderlies, who will also wear the white band above right elbow.
5. No general or other commanding officer of regiments, brigades, or
batteries, is, on any account, to enter into a discussion with the umpires.
6. The umpire staff will report any officer infringing this necessary rule
to the lieutenant-general.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
355
7. The opposing files are to be either dressed differently (dress and
undress), or one side to be distinguished by wearing forage caps.
8. The umpires may halt any body of troops, and order them to retire
behind the first line, or to any position indicated.
These officers scatter themselves along the front between the
contending armies, placing themselves on high ground, or where
they can get a good view, and can watch the movements on both
sides. They are thus ready to check any breach of the rules and
regulations as contained in Sir Charles Staveley’s book. This is
done by the umpire at the spot halting any body of troops on either
side, ordering it to retire a certain distance, or not to move or
advance further for a given time. A note of the umpire’s decision
is at once forwarded to the general commanding on either side, as
may be necessary.
Umpires prevent the attacking troops advancing too quickly, and
not allowing sufficient time for the effect of the fire of the defence.
They prevent lines getting too close, skirmishers from closing,
cavalry from making absurd or ineffective charges, or placing them¬
selves under the fire of artillery or infantry. They prevent artillery
from taking up exposed positions, or placing themselves under the
effective fire of infantry, or where they are liable to immediate capture.
The umpires decide whether a position has been carried — a
bridge, or village, or wood, for instance — with sufficient force ;
whether a battery has been fairly captured; whether a cavalry
charge has been effective and properly timed. While the umpire is
looking at the positions and making his notes, the troops order
arms, officers return swords, and cavalry dismount, until the decision
is given ; when matters either go on, or cease.
I will read a summary of some of the principal rules which must
be learnt by heart, and thoroughly recognised by all, in order to
work this system of manoeuvring. The Prussians know these rules
as well as they do their catechisms — perhaps better.
Rules to be Observed by the Troops.
1. Infantry and cavalry are not to approach each other nearer than 60
yards. If they come nearer, the officers halt, order arms, return swords,
until the umpire decides which is to retire.
2. Lines are not to exchange volleys nearer than 250 yards.
3. Skirmishers must not fire when within 200 yards of each other.
4. Cavalry charges, to be considered effective by the umpires, must be
delivered with proper energy, and halted within 60 yards of infantry.
5. Cavalry and artillery must not remain halted under effective fire of
infantry.
6. Skirmishers and artillery must not move across a plain commanded by
enemy’s cavalry.
7. Guns limbered-up may be captured by cavalry or skirmishers if unsup¬
ported or weakly protected.
8. Beaten cavalry must retire at a trot. The victorious cavalry may
follow at a walk at 500 yards interval, if they think proper to do so.
9. A battalion in square (unshaken) can not be attacked by single
squadrons of horse. Three or four squadrons may do so, if the square is
so placed as to be assailable from different sides.
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
10. When infantry are defeated by infantry (according to the umpire’s
decision), the victors may pursue at a reasonable distance.
11. Obstructions are only to be considered tactical obstructions when they
form actual natural obstructions.
It must be borne in mind that no officer is allowed to interfere
with, or enter into discussions with, the umpires, who report to the
umpire-in- chief.
Now the effect of the umpires is this, that the crisis of the battle
is delayed, and individual commanders are not permitted to go
careering forward, and upsetting all arrangements, refusing to halt,
or to retire, or to cease firing, and doing, in fact, just as they please,
regardless of the general plan, and the necessary regard to combi¬
nations and the probable effects of the fife.
With us, at all our sham fights and battles, the crisis is precipi¬
tated ; and almost as soon as the engagement commences there is a
jam, and the whole often ends in confusion and no intelligible result
— because each commander tries to ivin, and there is no controlling power,
I maintain that such always must be the case, as no game can be
played successfully without umpires ; and war is the greatest and
most difficult game of all.
Strange to say, we English use umpires for every game, except the
most difficult game — war.
I will give you two cases which occurred last season at Aldershot
to show the absolute necessity of using umpires when two bodies of
troops are pitted against each other in a sham fight. I might give
you many cases, but I will take two only.
In taking these two cases, I beg distinctly to disclaim any inten¬
tion whatever of criticising these two manoeuvres. I only take them
as two cases requiring umpires ; and allowing that the greatest skill
and talent were exhibited on both sides, and that the attack and
defence were both perfectly carried out, does not alter the two eases
as examples for illustration. I do not criticise any part of the move¬
ments ; I only use them to show how the inevitable jam occurs
without umpires.
General Ly sons’ brigade took up a strong position last autumn, on
the Erimley Eidges, near the railway bridge, which was barricaded,
and he was attacked by the rest of the division. The position was a
very strong one. The 4th regiment defended the bridge ; the 42nd
regiment the railway, with 33rd and 67th regiments in reserve, also
a cavalry regiment in reserve under cover. The two field batteries
were in good commanding positions, from which they could pound
the attacking brigades. The attacking troops, after reconnoitring
our position, advanced to the attack ; and as we had received orders
from our general not to yield an inch, as our position was so good,
we held on. The attacking troops continued to advance, until the
two forces crossed rifles, amidst loud cries from the staff officers of
the attack of “ Why don’t you retire ? “ You ought to go back ! ”
— “ You’re beaten! — you’re outflanked and outnumbered!” We
replied, “We won’t go back! — we are ordered to hold our ground.
If you come to c going back,’ you had better 6 go back ’ yourselves ! ”
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
357
Here was a difficulty. According to Aldershot practice, we should
have given up our position as soon as the attacking force got within
a hundred yards of us ; but, as we did not, the whole thing ended in
a jam. The troops got mixed up, and the affair collapsed.
Can there be anything more absurd than the general of the attack
ordering the general of defence to retire, and abandon his position !
Here was u clear case for umpires. They would have halted the
attacking regiments before they got jammed, examined the position;
the numbers of men on each side, and then decided whether we
should give up our position and retire, or whether the attacking
force should retire, and commence the attack from another direction,
and make us let go our hold.
General Ly sons’ camp at Sandhurst was attacked by the remainder
of the division on the right of our camp, with a faint attack on our
front. I covered the concentration of our brigade by two companies
of the 4th regiment in a very strong position, with plenty of wood
and cover, while Colonel Wilby brought up the remainder of his
regiment ; and while the 4th King’s Own held the enemy in check,
the remainder of our brigade was assembled in our rear. The enemy
came on, as usual, without a check, refused to be repulsed, or even
stopped; and of course the usual jam very soon occurred, when it
was necessary to stop the fight.
There were no umpires to regulate the advance, or give us credit
for our position and dispositions. Moreover, with us the troops are
never evenly divided. One brigade is generally attacked by the rest
of the division, always outnumbered two or three to one.
I think myself that we only require to lay down certain necessary
rules for general guidance, like the Prussians, and we should very
soon take to the system. The Prussians only use umpires when
troops are divided, and placed in opposition, to manoeuvre against
each other.
Crisis of the Battle.
When the crisis of the battle has arrived, and the reserves have
been brought into action, and it is clear that nothing more can be
done, the halt and officers’ call is sounded by the commanding
general, which is repeated all over the field. The movements are
then criticised by the commanding, general, and either the troops
march to their bivouacs, or an interval of time is allowed for the
withdrawal of one side and the renewal of the fight. By this
means a premature jam, or block, on any part of the field, can be
rectified, without spoiling the whole morning’s work and marching
home, as we do.
Advance of Prussian Troops.
Standing on a hill, and watching a Prussian army advancing to
attack, is highly interesting. They attack with heavy broken lines
of skirmishers, supported by company columns, which keep close to
the skirmishers to give them moral support, and even the advantage
of volley firing, by getting into the skirmishers’ line, when they think
it necessary to increase the fire.
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MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The company columns certainly get under cover when they can do
so close at hand ; but they do not commit the error that English
supports do, of remaining under cover so far in rear of the skirmishers
as to be unable to give them much assistance, as they are generally
too far behind to come up with a rush in time to save or help the
skirmishers. We use skirmishers to cover a movement, the Prussians
use them to fight ; which is a great difference, and requires different
management.
The company columns are scattered all along the first or fighting
line, acting under their different captains, who are always trying to
improve the occasion, and make a gap in the enemy’s line ; and these
companies (250 men in number) are doubtless sacrificed in large
numbers, to “ make the running,” as a jockey would say.
But the colonel of the regiment — that is, three battalions — is in
reau, watching the advance ; and he can keep one or two battalions
in hand, to send help.
Certainly, the first line has a very elastic look, from being worked
in small bodies, under so many skilled leaders ; and it appears to
advance very quickly, seizing every available spot as it comes on.
The second line comes on in double company columns ; but they
deploy with great rapidity, when necessary, in attacking or trying to
outflank. They lose no unnecessary time, as we do , in dressing lines
which are going to advance immediately.
I would offer as a suggestion here that lines about to advance
immediately should be deployed without points; the order being,
“ Deploy without points on the leading company.”
When Prussian infantry are advancing to storm or attack, all the
drums in rear of each company take up the attack, and beat the
attack step, which throws all the lines and columns into step, even
over the worst ground, and makes the men advance in perfect order
and with spirit.
It is very curious to see the effect of the drum on several thousand
men advancing to attack in every direction. An Austrian officer who
had served in Bohemia told me that the effect of the Prussian
advance with the drum was very imposing, and by no means calcu¬
lated to exhilarate the attacked !
Cavalry .
The cavalry commanders, I observed, ride well in front of their
regiments several hundred yards, with their staff officers (adjutants),
to watch the progress of the fight, the regiments being kept under
cover as much as possible ; and the moment they saw a favourable
opportunity they sent back full gallop or signalled back to an officer
who was looking out, and down came the regiment at a gallop, and
generally in the nick of time.
The cavalry, as I have already said, appeared to be beautifully
handled, and their charges most brilliant, full gallop for long dis¬
tances, to be up in time ; and it did not appear to me that they
troubled themselves much about a few men going down, as, after the
successive charges of several regiments, a good many men went down.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
359
I observed, also, that the cavalry, when advancing rapidly, had
officers a good way in front, to see the ground they were coming to,
and who made signals to the advancing squadrons, who steered clear
of obstacles by this means.
The cavalry throughout played a very important part in these
manoeuvres, and required to be very closely watched by the opposing
generals.
I would give two instances which I myself saw. A field battery
and a regiment of dragoons were being pressed by infantry towards
a bridge across a small stream with marshy banks. Suddenly, three
regiments of cavalry swooped towards the bridge from behind some
cover at full gallop. The battery got across, but followed by a
regiment of hussars, who surrounded them at the other side. The
regiment of dragoons first tried to get across the morass ; several got
bogged in trying to cross, and the whole regiment was surrounded
and captured by two regiments of cuirassiers.
An umpire was on the spot, of course, to give his decision.
I saw three batteries of artillery captured behind a village, where
they had taken up a position under cover ; and somehow they allowed
a regiment of cavalry to creep round their flank, and fall on them at
full gallop.
The mistake and error on the part of the artillery colonel were so
glaring and unpardonable that the halt was sounded all over the
field, the colonel was called into the middle of a large circle of staff,
and required to explain the loss of his batteries. His explanation
not being deemed satisfactory, he was most severely rebuked before
all the generals and staff officers.
After an interval of half-an-hour, to allow for the correction of the
mistake, the fight was resumed.
Artillery .
The Prussian artillery appeared to keep more out of infantry fire
than with us. They take up good positions, and remain there as
long as possible, and pound and demoralise the enemy’s infantry at
distances where they are safe from infantry fire.
We thought their artillery inferior in appearance. There was a
want of finish and smartness about the gunners, and the guns and
harness were not so bright and clean as we are accustomed to see
them. But we* must recollect that their term of service is short, and
they cannot afford time for cleaning and polishing of iron- work and
brass-work. They have done their work, in the campaign in France,
in a way that shows that they are masters of the essential parts of
their profession.
Finish .
When the battle has terminated both armies retire to their diffe¬
rent bivouacs, when piquets and outposts are at once taken up for
the night, as in the presence of an enemy. The next morning opera¬
tions begin again, but over new ground, and several miles away from
where they were executed the day before. The operations generally
last one week for each corps d’armee.
360
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
The operations near Berlin lasted one week; and we then went
wTith the Crown Prince to Pomerania, near Stettin, and saw the
operations of BC.R.H. the Crown Prince’s corps d’annee — that of
Pomerania — which lasted one week.
Twenty thousand men complete in 4 4 all arms,” and differing very
little indeed in height or appearance from the guard corps d’armee.
These movements were carried out in the same way. The troops
bivouacked in the open fields,; but it was much colder up near the
Baltic, and there was sufficient rain to make the bivouacs very un¬
comfortable.
On this occasion, the Crown Prince and his adjutant-general were
the principal umpires.
The successes of the Prussians in the present war against the
French have been attributed to various causes. I attribute them to
four principal causes, viz. (1) better organisation; (2) perfect out¬
post duty ; (3) the practice of great manoeuvres every year on an
intelligent and scientific system; and (4) superior application of
artillery power.
On the advantages derived from their system of practising large
manoeuvres — an intelligent system — I am positive, and to it I
attribute much of their present success in war : for their generals,
their colonels, their captains, their staff officers, are only practising
in reality in Prance what they have been practising for years past
in Prussia !
In proof of what I say, the Prussian generals now commanding
and leading their troops in Prance are the very men we saw two
years ago handling their troops so skilfully in Prussia.
I would name the Crown Prince (the most popular man in the
Prussian army), Prince Frederick Charles, Prince Albrecht, General
Yon Blumenthal, General Yon Alvensleben, the Duke of Treskow, Yon
Steinmetz, Yon Goeben, Yon Lowenthal, and many others whose
names are now familiar to the English reader.
These men have been carefully and intelligently practising war
every year for several years past, and the result of such training is
“ magnificent success.”
I hope I have succeeded in interesting my audience, and drawing
particular attention to the two subjects I have tried to work out,
viz. (1) practical, scientific, and intelligent manoeuvring of large
bodies of troops, and (2) the use and practice of umpires. I hope,
further, that I may succeed in making an impression, and demon¬
strating the necessity of some change in our manner of doing things ;
as I am myself — a soldier of thirty- two years’ experience — absolutely
impressed with the necessity of our changing many of our ways to
meet the requirements of modern war.
Since the Battle of Waterloo and the Peninsular campaigns, our
wars, with the exception of the Crimean campaign, have been against
Chinese, Burmese, Kaffirs, Maories, Affghans, Sikhs, natives of India,
and Abyssinians ; in fact, against semi-civilised or barbarous nations.
I need scarcely say that tactics which have been successful in
such wars would .not succeed against a European army, led by
highly-trained officers, and using all the appliances of modern science
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
361
and skill, including railways, 'telegraphs, and rifled artillery and
small arms.
English Officers.
Taken as a body, English officers are as good as any body of
officers in Europe, and I think ready enough to receive instruction,
if properly administered ; but, as matters now stand, they are pro¬
fessionally “untaught officers,” as the great majority of officers of
the army know nothing of their profession beyond what may be
called “barrack-yard knowledge;” that is, drill, interior economy
of regiments, some military law and practice of courts-martial, and
certain experiences of military practices and customs ; and it is the
general knowledge of things, good liberal education, large amount
of travel and experience of foreign countries, hunting and shooting
experiences all over the world, and mixing with general society, which
make the English officer a better man “ all round ” than the officers
of most continental armies.
His natural energy, dash, and high temper and spirit, pull him
through war generally successfully.
There can be no reason why the English officer should not be made
as good at his profession as he is at other things.
Captains should be responsible and highly-trained officers ; but, in
order to make them so, the companies, of infantry especially, must be
increased considerably in strength. An English captain with a weak
company feels that he is a cypher in the battalion, with nothing to
command, and scarcely any responsibility or power.
Staff College.
If Aldershot is to be a real military school, all military informa¬
tion ought to be obtainable at Aldershot. I would therefore advocate
the transfer of the Staff College to Aldershot, and the turning of the
Staff College at Sandhurst into a barrack. The officers at Aldershot
would then be able to attend the lectures of the Professors of Military
Science, and see the model works of all kinds constructed ; and the
officers training for the staff would have the advantage of practical
work with the troops on the staff of the generals, which they lose at
Sandhurst, seven miles off.
SJceleion Army.
The Prussians use a skeleton army differently from us. At Aider-
shot we use sometimes a small skeleton army, which is attacked by
the division, and driven from position to position. This is infinitely
preferable to manoeuvring at nothing ; a visible enemy is necessary
to excite interest in the troops ; but, with us, the skeleton army is
an independent command.
With the Prussians the commanding general orders the different
movements of the skeleton army and manoeuvres against it ; in fact,
it is used as a target. The skeleton army, from want of troops, may
be represented by lines of flags, placed by an intelligent staff officer,
assisted by a few men.
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MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Deductions,
My lecture may be reduced to the following practical points : —
(1) That an improved system of large manoeuvres should be tried
on the Prussian model.
(2) That the u umpire system 55 should be tried.
(3) That outpost duty should be rigidly practised, both by cavalry
and infantry. That, in the summer months, the troops should take
up long lines of outposts (without tents), and that those outposts
should be attacked with skill.
(4) That every officer should be obliged to carry a map of the
country (on a large scale, larger than is now obtainable), and in¬
structed in the use of it by lectures from the educational staff
officers.
(5) That every officer should carry a field glass as a part of his
equipment.
(6) That every colonel and lieutenant-colonel at Aldershot should
command brigades in succession, according to a divisional roster.
(7) That all the field officers of regiments should command their
battalions in succession on divisional days.
(8) That an improved system of half-yearly inspections should be
adopted ; and that the capability of captains should be tested as to
their ability to manoeuvre one body of infantry against another ; and
that the field officers (majors) of cavalry and infantry should be
required to show their power of commanding and manoeuvring a bri¬
gade (composed of the three arms) against another brigade of similar
strength and composition ; and that, in fact, a higher standard of
efficiency should be exacted from all regimental ranks —especially the
higher ranks — as upon their training depends our success in war.
The “ general idea ” of the operations of the day should be printed
in larger numbers, and distributed to every officer in the field on
division days, and communicated by the captain to their men, as
no officer or troops can be expected to take an interest in matters
which are not even communicated to them, and which they do not
understand. I think this very essential. Officers and troops should
always be informed, as much as possible, of what is really happen¬
ing, or what is supposed to be happening, at a sham fight or large
manoeuvre.
At the conclusion of the lecture, which was frequently and warmly
applauded,
Major-General Dickson, as president of the meeting, invited discussion,
saying that there were many points in the admirable lecture they had heard
calculated to improve their knowledge and induce remarks by officers who
might be able to give their information on the subject, or by others who might
desire further details. Any officer, therefore, who wished to make observa¬
tions on the subject would now be at liberty to do so, and the meeting would
be happy to hear him.
Lieutenant- Colonel Biddulph, ft.A., said : There was one point which
Colonel Bray had not exactly explained in describing the week’s peace
campaign of the Prussian army. They were informed that at the end of the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
363
first day tlie troops returned to their bivouacs, and that on the second day
another series of operations took place some miles distant ; but they were not
told how both army corps moved to the new ground, so as to begin a new and
separate series. He should like to hear this explained, and also another point.
In mimic engagements like those described, villages would generally constitute
points d’appui for the opposing forces ; but, if they established batteries of
artillery there, and kept up an ordinary fire, it appeared to him that there
must be a considerable destruction of glass and other property. He asked
whether it was usual for the Prussians to fire the whole of their guns as in
real warfare, or to adopt the Austrian system of firing one gun and hoisting
a flag to show that they were in action ?
Lieutenant-Colonel Brat replied to the first question that at the end of
the first day’s operations the successful force bivouacked on the ground, while
the beaten army had to march four or five miles farther, ready for the
manoeuvres of the next day, when the plan of operations might be quite
separate and distinct, and altogether different, or it might be a continuation of
Gie same operation — the beaten army retiring, for instance, on another position,
wherei t might be attacked next day, or from which it might assume the offen¬
sive. In reference to the other question, he explained that really the destruction
of property by artillery fire was very small, for the officer commanding the
batteries, as soon as he took up his position, fired a gun to show that he was in
action, and perhaps two or three guns when he was being attacked, but there
was neither the waste of ammunition nor damage to property which would result
from a heavy fire. The same thing had been copied at Aldershot last year,
and it was now usual for the artillery to go out with four rounds of ammunition
to do the work in which they would formerly have expended twenty rounds.
The same system was adopted in the infantry, it being found possible to carry
out the same manoeuvres with an expenditure of much less ammunition.
(Applause.) In fact, with breech-loaders, if the old system of infantry firing —
rapid volleys, followed by file firing, on the completion of each manoeuvre —
were continued in these days, the consumption of blank ammunition would
be enormous.
Lieutenant- Colonel Vesey, R.A., asked how the Prussian troops were fed
during these campaigns ?
Lieutenant- Colonel Bray said : Their control department did all that for
them. (Laughter and applause.) Each of the two armies had its military
train and intendance complete. The military train, in fact, did as much
work as any infantry regiment. (Applause.) The military train and com¬
missariat worked as they would in war ; they fed the troops and horses, and
carried everything requiring transport. The military train was supplemented
with country carts when necessary, as, being on a peace establishment,
they were unequal to the performance of the whole duty. Besides, even in
war time, country carriage is always used by an army to increase its power
of transport.
Major-General Sir Lintorn Simmons, K.C.B., B.E., governor of the Royal
Military Academy, said : There was one argument which was often used in
opposition to the introduction of the Prussian system of field manoeuvres
into England, which had, he thought, been much exaggerated. This was,
that there would be great difficulty in finding a sufficient tract of flat country
suitable for carrying on extensive manoeuvres in time of peace without a very
great destruction of property ; and, therefore, that this nature of instruction
must necessarily be neglected. It appeared to him, however, that this was a
difficulty which ought to be capable of being overcome. (Hear, hear.) A
day or two since he saw a return prepared for Parliament by the Inclosure
Commissioners, which showed that twenty per cent, of all the land in the
48
364
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
country was uninclosed, and that even around the Metropolis, within a few
miles of Charing Cross, the uninclosed land] was four and a half per cent, of
the whole area. He thought that out of all this common, or uninclosed land,
sufficient space could be found for manoeuvring large bodies of troops. The
country in the neighbourhood of Aldershot was suitable for the purpose, but
great parts of it were strictly inclosed, and if any of the troops engaged in a
particular manoeuvre chanced to go out of the beaten track, they heard
immediately of actions for trespass. There was an important result of the
Prussian system to which the lecturer had not referred. It not only trained
the officers, but enabled the government to discover and select the officers best
qualified to command. (Hear, hear). This experience alone had enabled
Yon Moltke to obtain the officers who had carried out the grand achievements
of the present war. He had himself seen a similar system in the Russian
army, where opposing forces of 25,000 or 80,000 a-side were handled to
perfection ; and he had also seen it in Switzerland. The Swiss system was
very similar to that described by Colonel Bray as having been witnessed by
him in Prussia, the manoeuvres extending over a tract of country twenty-five
miles in one direction and forty miles in the other, lasting for several days,
and the men bivouacking at night as in an actual campaign. The effect of
these manoeuvres was good in other ways ; it settled many moot points of
detail about which in England there are endless discussions, such as the
best mode of supplying troops with ammunition, the efficiency of their
control system, the supply of provisions to the army in the field, the removal of
sick, the establishment of field hospitals, and so on. All these subjects might
be thoroughly tested by the practice the lecturer had described and advocated,
and the experience which would be gained thereby would be most valuable.
The expense of the manoeuvres would be amply repaid by the settlement of
many of these moot and contested points, the discussion of which was so
subversive of discipline and disparaging to the position which our army ought
to occupy. (Applause.)
Lieutenant- Colonel Bray, in reply, said he could fully bear out the
remarks of Sir J. L. A. Simmons, for when he asked an officer of the Prussian
service to explain the extraordinary earnestness which the officers displayed in
this duty, the answer was, that the capacity of an officer for command and
employment in high and important offices was tested by his efficiency in
practice. A brigadier or colonel who made serious and inexcusable mistakes
in the field, and showed incapacity for command, want of energy, and want
of knowledge of his profession, had little chance of promotion. He did not,
however, wish to dwell too strongly upon this part of the subject in his
lecture, because his object was to have the system introduced, and its
probable consequences referred to might not favour that result. (Laughter
and applause.)
Major-General F. M. Eardley-Wilmot, R.A., said that an obstacle to
adopting in England the Prussian system of campaigns in time of peace was
the well-known fact that the English farmers were in the habit of working
their land all the year round. In most cases, as soon as the crops were off
the plough was on, and the seed was put in for next year. There was, there¬
fore, seldom more than a week during which troops could pass over the
ground without doing considerable damage. Sir Lintorn Simmons had spoken
of the acres of waste or uninclosed land in the country ; but could he tell
them where there was sufficient at one spot for the purpose required ? He
knew there were a number of small open spaces scattered about here and
there, but they were seldom more than a few acres in extent, and could not
afford room for extensive manoeuvres. A main point of the admirable lec¬
ture they had heard was one which many officers had striven for years past,
namely, a better and higher class of instruction for themselves and their
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION".
365
men. It might strike some of those present as remarkable, after the educa¬
tion to which they had been subjected, that they should still complain of the
want of instruction ; but that they did want such instruction especially in
the higher ranks, no man who had not taken leave of his senses would deny.
(Hear, hear.) His observations amongst officers, and especially the junior
ranks, convinced him that there was a great desire for better information as
to the duties of their profession ; and he regretted that scarcely anyone of
sufficient authority had come forward to impress upon the country what was
necessary to be done in this direction. (Applause.) It was certain, how¬
ever, that nothing would be done unless the men who led the army exerted
themselves. They might hear and see in the newspapers all sorts of quack pro¬
positions— (laughter) — for increasing, controlling, re-organising, and bother¬
ing the army in all manner of ways. (Laughter and applause.) The army
wanted to improve itself — (applause) — and what it needed most was some
directing power in each branch, which would take officers and soldiers by the
hand, to supervise and assist them in becoming efficient, instead of grasping
to itself all the credit and all the power. (Applause.) They wanted
greater enlightenment throughout the service, and improvements in their
organisation and efficiency would then emanate from themselves. (Hear,
hear.) That royal commission appointed to enquire into these subjects,
of which he was a member, had sat for more than twelve months, and had
done good service to the cause; but everything considered by that com¬
mission might and ought to have proceeded from the army itself, and
not have required a royal commission to point it out. (Applause.) The
army wanted leading men who understood its requirements, and would
come forward and show, clearly and forcibly, what ought to be, and where
national confidence was eminently deserved it would not long be withheld.
(Applause.)
Major-General Sir L. Simmons said he was not personally acquainted
with any particular locality out of the uninclosed land he had spoken of
which would be suitable for the purpose indicated, but he had no doubt that
there were some districts, called mountainous, but no worse than the country
over which an army would have to operate in time of war, which might
be available. He believed that Wales especially had such districts, and
there were some in Yorkshire ; certainly there were among the moors of
Scotland extensive districts, to which there need be no difficulty in conveying
the troops by rail or steamer, and where the principal sacrifice would be a
few fat bags of grouse. (A laugh.) As to the duty which devolved upon
those in high positions to force on the education of officers, he quite agreed
with General Eardley-Wilmot. The monstrous difficulty was to bring sufficient
pressure to bear to induce those in authority to see the necessity which
existed for improvement. (Hear, hear.) General Eardley-Wilmot well knew
that officers who saw defects in the system, and desired to press upon the
government the need of a change, must first make a representation to the
authorities ; and he was sorry to say that changes almost invariably involved
expenditure of money, which was the great obstacle to their adoption. Unless
an idea was well written up in the papers — and he doubted very much whether
such a proceeding was within the province of an officer — (hear, hear) — it was
difficult to press it home. Ho one had felt this difficulty more than his friend
General Eardley-Wilmot, who had been the anxious and energetic advocate
of higher professional instruction among, the officers of the army, and to
whom were due, in a great measure, the advantages in this respect enjoyed by
the officers of his own corps, it being through his exertions that had origi¬
nated many of the opportunities afforded to them to improve themselves, and
thus to maintain and raise the position of the royal regiment to which they
belonged. (Applause.)
366
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Major-General Dickson said that, as no other gentleman rose to offer any
remarks, it became his pleasing duty to propose that the thanks of the
meeting be returned to Colonel Bray for his valuable and interesting lecture.
(Applause.) The subject was a most important one, as it dealt with the
much-desired improvement of the British army, and the lecturer had given
them much to think about, which he hoped would hereafter conduce to the
well-being of the nation. (Hear, hear.) Colonel Bray had well described
and ably commented on many points of interest in the Prussian system, and,
although in some small essentials they might differ as to their advantages,
they must acknowledge that in the main point — the instruction of their officers
— the Prussian plan was excellent beyond doubt. (Applause.) The Prussian
government had given itself up to make an army, and for that purpose they
had an advantage which we have not, and that was a military despotism.
(Hear, hear.) It was fortunate for this country in some respects that they
had not a despotic form of government, but for the advancement of the army
there was no government so useful. Here, if any vital improvement is
proposed, it has to be submitted to parliament, and then the money question
cropped uffi Very properly perhaps, and the result was that nothing was
done. (Applause.) And they never heard one word concerning how and
where they were to get the proper men to do the work that would be required.
(Hear, hear.) The system such as Colonel Bray proposed would remedy
many defects and introduce valuable improvements in the army. Ho one
could doubt that it was the desire of everyone present, and of the young
men especially, to get on in their profession, and try to become the men of
the future ; and he hoped that Colonel Bray, General Wilmot, General
Simmons, and other officers of position and ability who had engaged in the
work, would still persevere, and that it would be taken up by others, and
never cease until they had put the army into such a position that, instead of
the cry being “ What will become of us when the Prussians come ?” it would
be, “ What shall we do with them if they do come ? ” (Applause.) While
they had been discussing suitable places for large manoeuvres he had in his
mind Dartmoor, where a committee, of which he was president, had recently
carried out a series of dangerous experiments with shell at long ranges. On
that large and open tract of land, about twenty- two miles long and fourteen
wide, embracing every description of country — bog, morass, and mountain —
a very large corps of all arms could be manoeuvred ; and General Staveley,
when he was there during the experiments, represented to him how desirable
it would be to have all the troops under his command instructed there every
year or every two years on the Prussian system. The land was all open, and
the only difficulty would be with the owners of cattle ; but the cattle could be
driven off as they were during the experiments, and very little would satisfy
the owners. The important garrison of Plymouth was close by, and alto¬
gether the place offered such advantages that he hoped it would be further
considered. In concluding the proceedings he thanked Colonel Bray, in the
name of the meeting, for the enlightenment he had afforded them by his
lecture, and expressed a hope that he and others, in bringing these reforms
under the notice of the authorities, would continue perseveringly until they
had accomplished complete success. (Applause.)
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
367
TABLES OF
REMAINING VELOCITY, TIME OF FLIGHT, AND
ENERGY OF VARIOUS PROJECTILES,
CALCULATED FROM THE RESULTS OF EXPERIMENTS MADE WITH
THE BASHFORTH CHRONOGRAPH,1 1865-1870:
BY
The Rev. F. BASHFORTH, B.D.
PROFESSOR OF APPLIED MATHEMATICS TO THE ADVANCED CLASS, ROYAL ARTILLERY.
Although the amount of the resistance of the air to the motion
of spherical and elongated projectiles has at length been satisfactorily
determined for ballistic purposes for all practical velocities above
800 or 900 f.s., it unfortunately happens that no simple law can be
found to express the resistance of the air to the motion of a pro¬
jectile in terms of the velocity of that projectile. For ogival-headed
elongated shot, the resistance of the air may be considered to vary
roughly as the sixth power of the velocity for velocities 900-1100 f.s.;
to vary as the third power for velocities 1100-1350 f.s. ; and to vary
as the second power for velocities above 1350 f.s. ; which last is the
Newtonian law of resistance, and is based on the supposition that
the shot is at every moment penetrating an undisturbed medium ,,
which supposition only holds for velocities higher than the velocity
of sound.
Under these circumstances the resistance of the air to the motion
of projectiles has been expressed by the help of a variable coefficient,
which depends (1) upon the form of the projectile and (2) upon the
velocity with which it moves. Table 1 gives the values of the
variable coefficients for velocities of 900 f.s. and upwards, for both
spherical and ogival-headed elongated projectiles for both the cubic
and Newtonian laws of resistance.2 As the coefficients given for
elongated shot were derived from experiments made with muzzle¬
loading guns, in calculating resistances, no further allowance will be
necessary on account of the studs of shot. Also it appears that the
coefficients derived from experiments with ogival- heads struck with
radii of one and a half diameter, may be used without much error
for all ogival-heads of practical utility, and for other approximate
forms, differing only in a more or less pointed apex, for it was found
1 For a description of the Basliforth Chronograph, see Vol. V. p. 161.
2 Reports on Experiments made with the Bashforth Chronograph, pp. 114 and 152.
49
368
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OF
from experiments made with a 40-pr. gun, that the coefficient did
not sensibly differ for a hemispheroidal-head (prolate) and for
ogival-heads struck with radii of one and of two diameters.1
When the resistance of the air is expressed by the help of a
variable coefficient of some power of the velocity, it is a mere ques¬
tion of convenience what power shall be used. In the reports on
experiments made with my chronograph the retarding effect of the
air was expressed by 2 b'v3, where v is the velocity of the shot, and b'
a varying coefficient. The cubic law has been preferred, because of
the simplicity of the formulae to which that law gives rise, for cal¬
culating the velocity and time of flight. The tables of the values
of the coefficient b' were arranged to give 2000 b'w~d 2, because
that quantity is independent of w9 the weight in lbs. of the projectile,
and of d its diameter in inches. The values of this quantity have
been found for all velocities ranging from 900 to 1700 f.s., for
elongated shot, and from 850 to 2150 f.s. for spherical shot. The
following tables of remaining velocities, &c., have in each case been
carried to the limits for which the values of V have been experi¬
mentally determined. It is not likely that the extremely high ex¬
perimental velocities, which were obtained by using high charges
and hollow shot, will be employed in practice, while velocities below
900 f.s. are not of great importance.
Tables of Initial Velocity. — The experiments made with the 3, 5, 7,
and 9 -inch guns were carried out with a view to determine the
resistance of the air, and for this purpose great care was taken to
secure accuracy in weight and in diameter of projectile. As there
was considerable variation in the weights of charges and of shot
employed, the opportunity was taken to deduce systematic tables of
initial velocities of the shot used, for all practical charges within
the limits of our experiments. But inasmuch as the lengths of the
experimental guns followed no particular law depending upon their
calibres, and it is probable that the amount of windage varied ac¬
cording to the age and wear of the several guns used, the results
cannot be expected to agree when different guns are compared.
The initial velocities of the 3-inch gun appear to fall much below
the average. The tables of initial velocities here reprinted may be
looked upon as examples of the purely practical manner in which
the subject of initial velocities should be treated when the service
guns, and the kind of powder to be used, have been finally decided
upon. It has been the custom to carry out costly experiments
merely to determine isolated initial velocities, but here we have
determined the law of initial velocity for each particular gun with
great accuracy, and at the same time have secured other most im¬
portant results from our experiments. The following will suffice as
examples of the practical use of these tables. Suppose that it was
required to find the charge which must be used to give an initial
velocity 1300 f.s., to a 5-inch elongated shot weighing 47*68 lbs.
1 Reports. &c. pp. 10-17 ; and Phil. Trans. 1868, p. 417.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
369
Referring to Table 2, it appears that a charge of 7 lbs. gives an initial
velocity of 1306 f.s., and a charge of 6*75 lbs. gives 1292 f.s. ; or
4 oz. of powder additional gives an increment of 14 f.s. in velocity.
By proportional parts, it follows that 2\ oz. of powder gives an in¬
crement of 8 f.s. in velocity, and therefore the charge of 6 lbs.
12 oz. + 2^ oz. — 6 lbs. 14£ oz. of powder gives an initial velocity of
1292 -+8 f.s. = 1300 f.s. Again, suppose it required to find what
charge must be used to give an initial velocity of 1260 f.s. to a 250-lb.
shot fired from a 9-inch gun. It appears that 36 lbs. of powder
gives an initial velocity of 1257 f.s., and that an addition of 1 lb. to
the charge gives an increment of 9 f.s. in the initial velocity, and
therefore an addition of ^ of a lb. would give an increment of 3 f.s.
in initial velocity. Hence, 36J lbs. of powder would give the re¬
quired initial velocity of 1257 + 3 = 1260 f.s.
Further, when tables are prepared for three different weights of
shot, as for the 3-inch gun, it is possible to calculate with great
exactness the initial velocity which would be given to any interme¬
diate weight of shot by any given charge. Thus, a charge of 1 lb.
8 oz. gives initial velocities of 1050, 1176, and 1394 f.s. to shot of
12, 9, and 6 lbs. respectively. Here the differences are too large to
allow proportional parts to be used. But by interpolation we find
that the charge of 1 lb. 8 oz. would give initial velocities of 1050,
1102, 1176, 1273, and 1394, to shot of 12, 10|, 9, 71, and 6 lbs.
respectively. By a new interpolation we might find what velocities
would be given to other intermediate weights of shot. For the
larger guns it would be desirable to make experiments with four
different weights of shot of the kind indicated. Thus, by a purely
practical process, the law of initial velocity can be found, which
may lead to some useful formulae.
Calculation of Resistances. — The coefficients given in Table 1 may
be used to calculate the resistance cf the air to spherical and
elongated shot. If the Newtonian law be used, the resistance
= 2c'v2w-+-g lbs.; or if the cubic law be used, the resistance = 2b'vhv-+-g
lbs. In all cases 'w denotes the weight of the shot in lbs. ; v the
velocity of the shot in f.s. ; d the diameter of the shot in inches ; and
g the ftnce of gravity =32T91. Suppose that the shot is spherical,
and that d — 8 inches. In Table 1 we find opposite 1200 f.s. the
value of 20Q0b/w-~-d2= +001534 ; and 2000c'w~~d2= T841. By the
w _ *0001534 x 82 x (1200)3
cubic law, the resistance of the air = 26V
9
1000 x 32-191
= 527 lbs. and by the Newtonian law the resistance
2cV- = +41 * 82 +12M2= 527 lbs.
9
1000x 32*191
And in precisely the same way, using the proper coefficients, we
may calculate the resistance of the air to ogival-headed projectiles.
In this manner Tables 3 and 4 have been calculated. As the re¬
sistance varies as the square of the diameter of the shot, the
resistance of the air to a shot one inch in diameter has been given
370
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
with great exactness to facilitate the calculation of resistances of
the air to other shot besides those specified in the tables. For a
velocity of 1200 f.s. the resistance of the air to a round shot one
inch in diameter = 8*2335 lbs., and therefore the resistance to a
round shot 8 inches in diameter = 8*2335 x 82 = 526*944 lbs. = 527
lbs. nearly, as before and as in Table 3. This method can be
usefully employed for diameters not given in the table (as for a
round shot 7*5 inches in diameter), moving with a velocity of 1450
f.s. specified in the tables. The required resistance = 13*0393 x (7*5)2
= 733*455 lbs. Suppose, in the next place, that we have the given
diameter specified in the table, but not the velocity, we may then
proceed by proportional parts. Thus, suppose the projectile of the
ogival form 9 inches in diameter, moving with a velocity 1320 f.s.
The resistance to an elongated shot 9 inches in diameter, for a
velocity 1300 f.s. is 596 lbs., and for a velocity of 1350 f.s. it is 659
lbs., showing an increment of 63 lbs. in the resistance, correspond¬
ing to an increment of 50 f.s. in the velocity, or there would be an
increment of 25*2 lbs. in the resistance, corresponding to an incre¬
ment of 20 f.s. in the velocity. Hence the resistance to the ogival¬
headed 9-inch shot moving with a velocity 1320 f.s., would be
= 596 + 25*2 lbs. = 621*2 lbs. Lastly, if neither the diameter nor
the velocity be specified in the table, find first by proportional parts
the resistance of the air to the motion of a similarly-formed shot
one inch in diameter moving with the given velocity, and then
multiply this by the square of the diameter given, and the result
will be the required resistance.
Calculation of Remaining Velocities. — The simple formulae of the
cubic law of resistance, previously referred to, are the following. Let
v and v denote the velocities of a shot at two points of its course s
feet apart, and t the time in which this space is described under the
action of a retarding force 25' x (vel3) acting in a direction opposed to
the motion of the shot, then
1000
V
1000 H
V
2000 b's
•
*
•
(1-)
and
1000 t=
1000s
V
1000 b's2
•
•
«
(2-)
When the above formulae were used to calculate the following tables
for intervals of 100 feet, s was replaced by n x 100 feet, so that
1000 _ 1000 200,000 b'n (3), where n was made equal to 1, 2, 3,
&c., in succession, and thus the values of v were found for intervals
of 100 feet. The value of V requires to be varied to suit approxi¬
mately the value of v. The values of V used for elongated shot were
those given in Table 1 for velocities 1700, 1650, 1600, 1550, 1500
f.s., &c., and they were changed when v was nearly equal to 1675, 1 625,
1575, 1525 f.s. &c. Thus making v = 1700 f.s., w= 700 lbs., and cl—
11*52 inches ; for v=1700 f.s. we find by Table 1, 20005' = *0000839
x d2-+-w = *00001591, and for 1650 we also find 20005' = *0000854
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
371
x d2-~-w = *00001619. For values of v from 1700 to 1675 f.s. we have
1000 = 1000 20 000 6/m = .588 235 + -001 591», and ifV, v,, v v., &o.,
denote the values of v corresponding to n — 1, 2, 3, 4, &c., respec¬
tively, we have
i^ = -588 235 + *001 591 = -589 826, or ^ = 1695*4.
1000
•588 235 + -003 182 = *591 417, or v2 = 1690*8.
1000
^3
1000
= •588 235 + *005 773 = *593 008, or ^ = 1686-3.
^4
1000
= •588 235 + *006 364 = *594 599, or v4 = 1681*8.
•588 235 + -007 955 = *596 190, or ^ = 1677*3.
Here, as v6 will he less than 1675, we must change the co-efficient
5', and treat v5 as the initial velocity, thus
1000 -596 190 + *001 619 = *597 809, or v6 = 1672-8.
V6
1000
&c. = &c. See column headed v in Table 6.
■596 190 + *003 238 = *599 428, or ^ = 1668*3.
It must be remarked the value of V for a given velocity varies as
d2-~w, consequently when a table of values of vl9 v2, v3, &c., has
been calculated for a given value of d2-^-w, that table serves equally
well for all other shot of similar form which have the same value of
d2~w.
If the law of resistance be supposed to be the cubic, and if the
time over a given distance be measured by a chronograph, then the
velocity at the middle point of that distance in feet per second will
be found exactly by dividing the space in feet by the time in seconds.
Calculation of the Times of Flight of Shot. —In the following tables
the numbers in the column t denote the time occupied by the shot
in passing over the distance standing opposite in the column of dis¬
tances, the shot being supposed to have started with the velocity
opposite the distance zero. They have been calculated by the help
of the formula (2), where s=100w feet. This gives
t= (1C^° + 100 0006'ra) A
where the values of V must be varied to agree with the correspond¬
ing velocities. Let n — 4, v = 1700 f.s., t = tv then, as we have seen,
10005' = -00000796 ; tA = (;588 235 + *000 796) x *4 = 0"*236 : see
column t , Table 6, opposite distance 400 feet.
372
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Tables of values of t made for a given value of d2-+-w apply equally
well to all other shot of similar form which, have the same value of
d2-i-w.
Calculation of Energy. — The numbers in the columns headed E
denote the energy of the shot moving with the velocity placed oppo¬
site. E equals one-half of the vis viva of the shot due to translation
= iyt?2H-448(k/. The numerical values of E denote that if a shot
struck an object which opposed a uniform resistance of E tons to the
shot, it would penetrate one foot before it was brought to rest. If
the uniform resistance opposed to the shot’s motion was J E tons,
then it would penetrate just two feet. If the uniform resistance was
E-i -n tons then the shot would penetrate n feet. And generally if
the shot penetrated a medium which opposed a uniform resistance of
P tons, it would penetrate m feet, so that E =mxP. The energy of
the shot due to rotation is usually neglected, as being small com¬
pared with the energy due to translation. It also probably con¬
tinues nearly constant during the flight of the shot. As the energy
of a shot depends upon its weight and velocity, it is plain that the
numbers in column E will be the energy of a shot of equal weight of
any form when moving with the velocity placed opposite. Thus,
referring to Table 7, 5503 will be the energy of a 6001b. shot of any
form when moving with a velocity of 1150 f.s. Also 2652 is the
energy of a 2501b. shot of any form when moving with a velocity
1237 f.s. Strictly speaking, these tables of values of v and t are
calculated on the supposition that the shot, having been projected,
is acted upon by the resistance of the air alone, and is therefore not
drawn out of the straight line by the action of gravity. When,
therefore, the initial velocity of the shot is high, and the angle of
elevation of the gun is not great, as in attempts to pierce iron
plates, the following tables will be applicable for ranges of 1000,
2000, or 3000 yards, according to the weight of shot. But if the
elevation of the gun be considerable, and the path of the shot much
curved, the following tables will only serve to give a general idea of
the comparative powers of different guns and projectiles. In the
case of vertical fire and long ranges recourse must be bad to other
and more extensive tables, which are in preparation, and to calcula¬
tions which require considerable mathematical knowledge. But the
following tables may be used with great facility and profit by all
artillery officers and by many non-commissioned officers.
These extended tables have been adapted, as far as possible, to
guns permanently in the service or likely to be adopted. It is, how¬
ever, already contemplated to bore out the ll*6-inch gun to make it
a 12-inch gun. Also it is urged that a bore of 3*6 inches is too large
for a shot of 161bs., and that a bore of 3*3 or 3*4 inches would be
more in accordance with the rules which govern the service bores
and shot. It has been already pointed out that in the following
tables the columns v and t apply exactly to all other shot of similar
forms which have the same value of d?-+-w. Often, for a limited range,
in such cases it will suffice to take the table having the value d2-v-w
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
373
nearest to that of the sliot whose loss of velocity is required. So .that
if some of the guns for which tables have been prepared should be
abandoned, the' tables might still be of use. But to facilitate calcu¬
lations respecting tbe powers of any other guns, General Tables have
been prepared for both spherical and elongated ogival-lieaded shot.
Use of the Tables for calculating the remaining Velocity. — The elon¬
gated shot are in general supposed to start with a velocity of 1700
f.s., and the spherical shot with a velocity of 2100 f.s., and the cal¬
culations are continued till the velocities are reduced to 1000 or 900
f.s., because the coefficients of resistance have been accurately deter¬
mined within those limits. It is not, however, intended that the
full extent of the table should be used on any one occasion, but only
so much as corresponds to ranges which the shot may be supposed
to describe approximately in a straight line. Any velocity within the
limits of the table may be supposed to be the initial velocity. For
instance, suppose the initial velocity of a 9 -inch elongated shot be
1310 f.s. ; this is found in Table 9, opposite 5700 feet in the distance
column. Let it be required to find the loss of velocity in 1000 yards
= 3000 feet. Adding 3000 to 5700 the distance opposite the given
initial velocity, we obtain 8700, and opposite this number in the
distance column we find 1153 f.s., so that the loss of velocity in
1000 yards = 1310 — 1153 = 157 f.s. If the given initial velocity be
not exactly found in the table a little calculation is required. Thus
suppose that in the above case the given initial velocity had been
1300 f.s., by proportional parts it is found that the shot would have
a velocity of 1300 f.s. at a distance 5867 feet, and adding 3000 to
this, we get 8867, and the velocity at this distance = 1145, and the
loss of velocity in 1000 yards would be 1300 — 1145 = 155 f.s. It
may be remarked that in simple cases of this kind it will suffice to
adopt the velocity nearest to the given velocity. In this case it
would be 1298 opposite 5900 in the distance column, and adding
3000 as before, we obtain 8900, and opposite this number in the
distance column we get 1144. So that the loss of velocity in 1000
yards = 1298 — 1144= 154 f.s. If the initial velocity be supposed
1310 f.s., as before, opposite this we find 3//*830 in the column t ,
and 2973 in the column E ; and adding 3000 to 5700 we get 8700,
opposite which in the distance column we find 1153 in the column
v, and 6//#277 in the column t, and 2305 in the column E. So that
the time of flight =6"*2 77 ~^-3//a830 = 2//*447, and the loss of energy
= 2973— 2305 = 668 foot-tons.
Suppose it to be required to find with what velocity a 7001b.
elongated shot, 11*52 inches in diameter, fired with an initial ve¬
locity of 1400 f.s. would strike an object at a distance of 500 yards
= 1500 feet. Turning to Table 6, we find the velocity 1400 f.s.
opposite 7100 feet in the distance column, to which, adding
1500 feet, we obtain 8600 feet. Opposite 8600 feet in the distance
column we find 1344 f.s. for the striking velocity. The energy of
the shot on striking would =8768, and the time of flight = 5"*699 —
4//*606 = l"*093. The energy lost in 500 yards = 9518 — 8768= 750
374
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OP
foot-tons, -which represents the work consumed by the resistance of
the air in a range of 500 yards.
Let now a Rodman spherical shot weighing 452 lbs. be supposed
to be fired with an initial velocity of 1400 f.s. and strike an object
500 yards from the gun. Referring to Tabled, we find 1396 f.s.
= 1400—4 f.s. opposite 4100 feet in the distance column, and adding
1500 feet, we obtain 5600 feet. Opposite 5600 feet in the distance
column we find the velocity 1212 f.s. = 1216 — 4, or the striking
velocity would be 1216 f.s. As the energy has not been tabulated
we must calculate it independently from the formula E — wv^-r-^SOg.
We thus find the initial energy = 6143 and the striking energy =
4604; giving a loss of energy in 500 yards = 6143 — 4604= 1539 foot-
tons, which work is consumed by the resistance of the air in a range
of 500 yards.
For experimental purposes suppose that it is required to fire a
2501b. elongated shot from a 9 -inch gun with such an initial velo¬
city that it may strike a target at a distance of 200 yards = 600
feet, with the same velocity as if the shot had been fired with a
charge of 43 lbs. from a distance of 1000 yards. Referring to Table 2,
the initial velocity given to an elongated shot of 250 lbs. by a charge
of 43 lbs, of powder is found to be 1314 f.s. When the shot has
passed over 800 yards = 1000 — 200 yards, it has that velocity which
ought to be the initial velocity of the shot fired from the experi¬
mental gun at a distance of 200 yards from the target. Referring to
Table 9, we find a velocity 1315 f.s. = 13144 1 opposite 5600 feet in
the distance column, to which we must add 800 yards = 2400 feet,
making 8000 feet, opposite which we find 1186 f.s. = 1185 41. So
that the velocity given by the distant gun 800 yards in advance of
the gun, or 200 yards from the target, is 1185 f.s. The initial ve¬
locity to be given by the nearer or experimental gun is 1185 f.s.
Referring to Table 2, we find that a charge of 29 lbs. gives an initial
velocity of 1171 f.s. and that an addition of 1 lb. to the charge causes
an increment of 16 f.s. in the initial velocity. It is plain, therefore,
by proportional parts, that 14 oz. would give the required increment
of 14 f.s. Thus the charge to be used by the experimental gun is
29 lbs. 14 oz., which will give an initial velocity of 1171 4 14 = 1185 f.s.
Again, turning to Table 9, opposite 8000 feet we find 1186 = 1185
4l, and 200 yards or 600 feet further on, i.e. opposite 8600 feet, we
find 1158 = 1157 41. Therefore 1157 f.s. is the striking velocity.
In the same manner if we reckon from the distant gun fired with a
charge of 43 lbs. we shall obtain a striking velocity at a distance of
3000 feet = 1157 as before.
Calculation and Use of the General Tables 20 & 21. — These tables have
been most carefully calculated, the value of U having been changed
for every change of 10 feet in the velocity. Since (Y-v)-~Yv = 2Us
= (a number given in Table 1) xsx d2~-w, if we suppose d2- r-iv = l we
can calculate the values of (Y— v)-r-Yv for intervals of 10 feet in
range. Afterwards, if we wished to know in what range any other
similarly-shaped shot would lose a given velocity, we should have to
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
375
find from the General Table in what space the given velocity is lost,
and then dividing this space by the value of d2 w for the given shot,
the space is found in which the given shot would lose the specified
velocity. In this way the tables adapted for particular shot have been
tested. In the General Table 21 for elongated shot ^ = 1400 f.s.
corresponds to s = 1348*5 feet, and vx = 1300 f.s. corresponds to sx —
1865 feet, and va = 1200 f.s. corresponds to s2 — 2455 feet. Hence the
space in which the velocity of an elongated projectile, where d?-~
w~ 1, would be reduced from 1400 to 1300 f.s. = 1865 — 1348*5
= 516*5 feet. Again the space in which the same shot would have
its velocity reduced from 1300 to 1200 f.s. = 2455 — 1865 = 590 feet.
Suppose now we wished to know in what ranges the velocity of a
6001b. ll*52-inch elongated shot would have its velocity reduced by
the resistance of the air from 1400 to 1300 f.s. This will = 516*5
-=-*2212 = 2335 feet. Also the velocity of the same shot would be
reduced from 1300 to 1200 f.s. in a range of 590-h*2212 = 2667.
If now we refer to Table 7, we find a velocity of 1400 f.s. opposite
6100 feet, and 1300 f.s., about 8425 feet — showing that the velocity
is reduced from 1400 to 1300 f.s. in a space 8425 — 6100 = 2325 feet.
Opposite a velocity of 1200 f.s. we find in the distance column 11100,
showing that the velocity of the shot is reduced from 1300 to 1200 f.s.
in a distance = 11100 — 8425 feet = 2675 feet. In the same manner
all the other tables may be tested, by simply dividing 515 feet by the
proper value of d2~-w , which would give the distance in which the
velocity of the shot would be reduced from 1400 to 1300 f.s.
Suppose it was desired to compare the powers of a 161b. elongated
shot of 3*52, 3*32, and 3*22 inches in diameter. The corresponding
values of d2—w are *7744, *6889, and *6480. Hence the shot fired from
the 3*6, 3*4, and 3* 3-inch bores would have their velocities reduced
from 1400 to 1300 f.s. in the ranges 516*5-^*7744 = 667 feet; 516*5
— •6889 = 750 feet, and 516*5-=- *6480 = 797 feet respectively; and
from 1300 to 1200 f.s. in ranges of 590-?-*7744 = 762 feet; 590-h*6889
= 856 feet, and 590-f-*6480 = 911 feet respectively. Thus there is a
fall in velocity from 1400 to 1200 f.s. for the 3* 6-inch gun in a range
of 667 + 762 = 1429 feet; for the 3*4-inch gun in a range of 750 +
856 = 1606 feet; and for the 3*3-inch, in a range of 797 + 911 =
1708 feet. The General Table for spherical shot is used in precisely
the same manner.
Suppose it be now required to find, by the use of the General
Tables, what velocity a shot starting with a given velocity would
lose in a certain range. First multiply the given range by the value of
d2-~w to obtain a reduced range. Find, then, in the usual manner by
the help of the proper General Table 20 or 21, what would be the
loss of velocity in this reduced range with the given initial velocity.
This would be the same as that which the given projectile would lose
in the given range. For example, let an elongated projectile of
400 lbs. be fired from a 10-inch gun with an initial velocity of
1270 f.s., and let it be required to find what would be the velocity at
a distance of 1000 yards = 3000 feet. Here cZ2h-w = *246 and the
reduced range = 3000 x *246 = 738 feet. Referring to General Table 21,
50
376
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the initial velocity 1270 f.s. is found corresponding to the distance 2033
feet, to which adding the reduced range 738 feet, we get 2771 feet,
and at this distance the velocity =1 152*6 f.s., which is the velocity
which the 4001b. shot would have at a distance of 1000 yards from
the gun. Or, the loss of velocity of the 4001b. shot in 1000 yards = 1270
— 1152-6 = 117*4 f.s. By the help of the Special Table 8, the loss of
velocity is found to be= 1270 — 1152 = 118 f.s. in a range of 1000 yards.
In cases where great exactness is required the results given
by the General Tables are to be preferred, because the coefficients
have been changed for every change of 10 f.s. in the velocity, and
the results have been given to one place of decimals. But it was
deemed sufficient to change the coefficients for the Special Tables
for every 50 f.s. in the velocity, and to neglect fractions of a foot in
stating the velocities.
Small Arms. — The following Tables for Small Arms are calcu¬
lated by the coefficients obtained from experiments with guns of 3 to 9
inches in calibre. They are given with some little doubt, as the
leap from a 3-inch to a ^inch bore is too great. Considering, how¬
ever, that the experiments made by Hutton with round balls of small
diameter gave very fair results when applied to large shot, the fol¬
lowing tables may be of value until proper experiments are made : —
Snider: — d — O’ 577 in.; w = 480 grs. = 0-06857 lb.; <22-r-w = 4’855.
Chassepot: — <2 = 0-44 in.; w = 380 grs. = 0-05428 lb. ; d2-~w = S’566.
Martini-Henry: — <2 = 0-45 in.; w = 480 grs. = 0-06857 lb. ; d2-i-w = 2-953.
Distance
Snider
Chassepot
Marti
ni-Henry
feet
V.
t.
V.
t.
V.
t.
f.s.
a
f.s.
f.s.
u
O
1400
0-0000
1400
0-0000
I400
o-oooo
50
1352
0-0364
1364
0-0362
1371
0-0359
IOO
1306
0-0740
1330
0-0733
1342
0-0728
150
1262
0-1130
1297
0-1114
r3H
0-1105
200
1222
0-1532
1265
0-1504
1287
0-1489
250
1183
0-1948
1235
0-1904
I26l
0-l882
3°°
II48
0-2377
1206
0-2314
I236
0-2284
350
III4
0-2820
1179
0-2733
1212
0-2691
400
I083
0-3275
II52
0-3162
II89
0-3108
450
IO56
0-3742
1127
0-3601
H67
0-3532
5°°
IO3I
0-4221
II04
0-4049
1145
0-3965
55o
1012
0-4708
1081
0-4506
1125
0-4405
600
993
0-5209
1061
0-4974
IIO5
0-4853
650
976
0-5718
1043
o-5449
1086
o"5310
700
960
0-6234
1026
o-5933
1068
o-5774
75o
946
0-6759
IOII
0-6424
1053
0-6247
800
93i
0-7292
998
0-6922
IO38
0-6725
850
918
0-7832
985
0*7427
1025
0-7209
900
90S
0-8381
973
o-7938
1013
0-7700
95o
892
0-8938
961
0-8455
IOOI
0-8197
1000
880
0-9503
95o
0-8979
991
0-8699
1050
—
—
939
0-9508
980
0-9207
1100
—
— -
929
1 -0044
970
0-9720
1150
—
—
919
1*0585
961
1 -0238
1200
—
—
909
1-1132
952
1 -0761
1250
— . I
—
900
1-1685
943
1 -1289
1300
—
—
890
I -2244
934
1-1821
377
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
Table of Values of b' and c' corresponding to Velocities at intervals of 50 feet
per second , for the Cubic Law of Resistance 2 b' v3, and also for the
Newtonian Law of Resistance 2 d v2.
Cubic Law
Newtonian Law
Cubic Law
Newtonian Law
Velocity
r / W
2000 b —
/ W
2°°OC' -
Velocity
2000
b
da
, w
2000 c-a
f.s.
Spherical
Elongated
Spherical
Elongated
f.s.
Spherical
Elongated
Spherical
Elongated
shot
Ogival Hd.
shot
Ogival Hd.
shot
Ogival Hd.
shot
Ogival Hd.
850
•0001384
. —
•1176
—
1500
•OOO 1 34 1
•OOOO972
•2012
‘H58
900
•OOOI382
•OOO0644
•1244
•0580
1550
•OOOI308
•OOOO930
•2027
•1442
950
•OOOI388
•OOOO674
•I319
•0640
1600
•OOOI275
•OOO0890
•2O4O
•1424
IOOO
•OOOI4II
•OOOO750
•I4II
•0750
1650
•OOOI 241
•OOO0854
•2048
•1409
105°
•OOOI461
•OOOO928
'1534
•0974
1700
•0001208
•OOO0839
•2054
•1426
1100
•0001514
•0001060
•1665
‘Il66
1750
•0001 1 74
—
•2055
—
1150
•OOOI536
•0001082
•1766
•I244
1800
•0001 142
—
•2056
—
1200
•OOOI534
•OOOI089
•1841
•I307
1850
•0001 1 13
—
•2059
—
1250
•00015 1 1
•OOOI087
•1889
•1359
1900
•OOOI087
—
•2065
—
1300
•OOOI478
•OOOIO79
•I92I
•I403
195°
•OOOI063
—
•2073
—
1350
•OOOI447
•OOOI064
•1953
•1436
2000
•OOOIO39
—
•2078
—
1400
•OOOI413
•OOOIO4O
•1978
•1456
2050
•QOOIOI7
—
•2081
—
1450
•OOOI377
•OOOIOO9
•1997
•1463
2100
•OOOO992
—
•2083
—
Table showing the connection between Lnitial Velocity and Weight of Charge
for each Gun and Shot used in the Experiments made with the Bashforth
Chronograph , 186 7-9.
ELONGATED SHOT
3-inch Gun
5 -inch Gun
7 -inch Gun
9-inch Gun
Charge
12-lb.
shot.
9-lb.
shot
6-lb.
shot
Charge
47 '68-lb.
shot
23 '84-lb.
shot
Charge
123-lb.
shot
61-lb.
shot
Charge
250-lb.
shot
lbs.
ozs.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
lbs.
f.s.
f.s.
lbs.
f.s.
f.s.
lbs.
f.s.
O
12
614
693
815
3-00
—
1179
7 0
—
mi
22
IOI9
O
13
658
745
876
3*25
—
1246
8-o
865
1208
23
IO46
O
14
700
794
935
3'5o
—
1308
90
933
1293
24
IO71
O
15
741
841
991
375
—
1364
10-0
995
1367
25
1095
I
O
782
886
1044
4-00
IO39
1416
10-5
1023
1402
26
III7
I
I
820
928
io95
4-25
IO72
H63
no
1050
1435
27
1137
I
2
857
969
1144
4-5o
II03
1505
n-5
1075
1466
28
1155
I
3
893
1008
1191
475
II3I
1543
120
1099
1495
29
II7I
I
4
927
1045
1235
5-00
II58
1577
12-5
1122
1522
30
H87
I
5
960
1080
1277
5-25
Il82
1608
13-0
ii43
1549
31
1202
I
6
991
1114
1318
5-5o
1205
1635
135
1163
1575
32
1215
I
7
1021
H46
1357
575
1225
1659
14-0
1182
1601
33
1227
I
8
1050
1176
1394
6-oo
1244
1680
14-5
1200
1626
34
1238
I
9
IO77
1205
1429
6-25
I26l
1698
15 0
1218
1651
35
1248
Is
10
1103
1233
1463
6-50
1277
1715
155
1235
—
36
1257
I
11
1127
1260
1495
675
1292
1730
i6*o
i25i
— -
37
1266
I
12
II5I
1285
1525
7-00
1306
1743
16-5
1265
—
38
1274
I
13
1173
1309
1554
7-25
1319
1755
17-0
1279
—
39
1282
I
14
1194
1333
1582
7'5°
1331
1766
i7*5
1293
—
40
I29O
I
i5
1213
1356
1609
775
1342
1776
18-0
1307
—
41
1298
2
0
1231
1378
1634
8-oo
1353
1785
18*5
1320
—
42
1306
—
—
—
—
—
—
19-0
1333
—
43
I3H
—
—
—
—
—
—
19-5
1346
—
44
1322
—
—
—
—
—
—
20 -o
1357
—
45
I329
y378
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
3
Tables showing the Resistance of the Air in lbs. to Spherical and Ogival-headed
Elongated Shot, from 1/015 inches in diameter, for specified Velocities , cal¬
culated by the help of the Coefficients in Table 1.
js
Diameters of Projectiles.
SPHERICAL SHOT.
>
1-in.
2-in.
3-in.
4-in.
5-in.
6-in.
7-in.
8-in.
9-in.
10-in.
11-in.
12-in3
13-in.
14-in.
15-in.
f.s.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
lbs.
900
3-1293
13
28
50
78
113
153
200
254
313
379
451
529
613
704
950
3-6964
15
33
59
92
133
181
237
299
370
447
532
625
725
832
IOOO
4-3827
18
39
70
no
158
215
28l
355
438
530
631
741
859
986
1050
5-2533
21
47
84
131
189
257
336
426
525
636
757
888
IO30
1182
IIOO
6-2592
25
56
100
156
225
3°7
401
507
626
757
901
1058
1227
1408
1150
7-2560
29
65
116
181
261
356
464
588
726
878
1045
1226
I422
1633
1200
8-2335
33
74
132
206
296
403
527
667
823
996
1186
1392
1614
1853
I250
9-1666
37
82
i47
229
330
449
587
743
917
1109
1320
1549
1797
2063
1300
io-o86o
40
91
161
252
363
494
646
817
IOO9
1220
1452
1705
1977
2269
1350
11-0582
44
99
1 77
277
398
542
708
896
II06
1338
1592
1869
2167
2488
I4OO
12-0432
4^r
108
i93
301
434
590
771
976
1204
1457
1734
2035
2361
2710
1450
I3'0393
52
117
209
326
469
639
835
1056
1304
1578
1878
2204
2556
2934
1500
14-0579
56
126
225
351
506
689
900
ii39
1406
1701
2024
2376
2755
3163
1550
15-1293
60
136
242
378
545
741
968
1226
1513
1831
2179
2557
2965
3404
1600
16-2213
65
146
260
406
584
795
IO38
1314
1622
1963
2336
2741
3179
3650
1650
I7’3i57
69
156
277
433
623
849
II08
1403
1732
2095
2494
2926
3394
3896
1700
18-4344
74
166
295
461
664
9°3
Il8o
1493
1843
2231
2655
3ii5
3613 4148
1750
I9-5433
78
176
3i3
489
704
958
1251
1583
1954
2365
2814
3303
3831
14397
1800
20-6871
83
186
33i
5i7
745
1014
1324
1676
2069
2503
2979
3496
4055 4655
1850
21 -8890
88
197
350
547
788
1073
I4OI
1773
2189
2649
3152
3699
4290 4925
1900
33*i583
93
208
37i
579
; 834
ii35
1482
1876
2316
2802
3335
39H
4539
5211
1950
24-4823
98
220
39i
612
! 881
1200
1567
1983
2448
2962
3526
4138
4799
5509
2000
25-8179
103
232
413
645
i 929
.1265
1652
2091
2582
3I24
37i8
4363
5060
5809
2050
27-1609
109
244
435
679
978
1331
1738
2200
2716
3287
39ii
4590
5324,6111
2100
28-5355
114
257
457
7i3
1027
1398;
1826
2311
2854
3453
4109
4823
5593I642I
4
ELONGATED SHOT (Ogival Head).
900
1-4584
5-8
13
23
37
53
72
93
118
146
176
210
246
286
328
950
I-795I
7-2
16
29
45
65
88
ii5
145
180
217
258
303
352
404
IOOO
2-3299
9-3
21
37
58
84
114
149
189
233
282
336
394
457
524
1050
3-3373
13-3
30
53
83
120
164
214
270
334
404
481
564
654
751
1 100
4-3829
17-5
39
70
no
158
215
281
355
438
530
631
74i
859
986
1150
5-1121
21-4
46
82
128
184
250
327
414
511
619
736
864
1002
1150
1 2QO
5-8457
23-4
53
94
146
210
286
374
474
585
707
842
988
1146
K3*5
1250
6-5952
26-4
59
106
165
237
323
422
534
660
798
95o
1115
1293
1484
1300
7-3641
29-5
66
118
184
265
361
47i
596
736
891
1060
1245
1443
1657
1350
8-1322
32-5
73
130
203
293
398
520
659
813
984
1171
1374
1594
1830
1400
8-8650
35-5
80
142
222
3i9
434
567
718
887
10731277
1498
1738
1995
1450
9'5556
38-2
86
153
239
344
468
612
774
956
1156
,1376
1615
1873
2150
1500
10-190
40-8
92
163
255
367
499
652
825
1019
1233
1467
1722
1997
2293
1550
10-759
43-o
97
172
269
387
527
689
871
1076
1302
1549
1818
2109
2421
1600
11-325
45'3
102
181
283
408
555
725
917
1132
1370
1631
1914
2220
2548
1650
11-917
47-7
107
191
298
429
584
763
965
1192
1442
1716
2014
2336
2681
1700;
12-805
51-2
ii5
205
320
461
627
820
1037
1281
1549
1844
2164
'2510
2881
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
379
5
Table showing the Velocities of Spherical Solid Shot for the undermentioned Guns
at intervals of ioo feet , supposing the Shot to move in a straight line , subject
only to the Resistance of the Air.
Dis¬
tance
15 -in.
150-
pr.
100-
pr.
68-pr.
32-pr.
24-pr.
18-pr.
12-pr.
9-pr.
6-pr.
3-pr.
Dis¬
tance
ft.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
■f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
ft.
o
2100
2100
2100
2100
2100
2100
2X00
2100
2100
2X00
2100
0
IOO
2079
2072
2067
2059
2048
2043
2038
2030
2022
2011
1990
IOO
200
2058
2044
2033
20x9
1998
1988
1978
1962
1947
1926
1886
200
3oo
2037
2016
2001
1980
1948
I93S
I92O
1896
*875
1845
1788
300
400
2017
1988
1970
1942
1900
1883
1863
1833
1806
1768
1696
400
500
1996
1962
1938
1905
1854
1833
1808
1772
1742
1694
1606
500
600
1976
193s
1907
1868
1809
1784
1755
1713
1679
1623
1527
600
700
1956
1909
1877
1832
1764
1737
1704
1656
1618
1555
1450
700
800
1937
1883
1848
1797
I72I
1691
1654
i6ox
1560
1490
1377
800
900
1917
1858
1819
X763
1679
1646
1606
1548
x5°4
I429
1309
900
1000
1898
1833
1790
1729
1637
1602
1559
1497
1450
I37I
1245
XOOO
1100
1879
1808
1762
1696
1598
1559
1514
1448
1398
X3l6
1186
1100
1200
i860
1784
1734
1664
1559
1518
1470
140X
x349
1264
1x31
1200
1300
1842
1760
1707
1632
1521
1478
1428
1356
1302
1215
xo8x
1300
1400
1823
I737
1680
1601
1484
I439
1388
1313
1257
1169
1035
X4OO
1500
1805
1714
1654
IS7I
1449
1402
1349
1272
1215
1126
994
1500
1600
1787
1691
1628
1541
1415
1366
1311
1233
xx75
I086
957
1600
1700
1769
1668
1603
1512
1381
i33x.
1275
1196
ii37
IO49
925
I7OO
1800
1752
1645
1578
1484
1349
1297
1241
xx6i
IIOI
1015
897
1800
1900
I73S
1623
1553
1456
13x8
1265
1208
1x28
1068
984
873
I900
2000
1717
1601
1529
1429
1288
1234
1x76
1 °97
1036
956
2000
2100
1700
1580
1505
1403
1258
1204
1x46
1068
1007
93°
—
2100
2200
1683
1559
1482
1377
1230
1175
1117
1040
980
906
—
2200
2300
1 667
1538
1459
1352
1203
ii47
1090
1014
955
884
—
23OO
2400
.1650
1518
*437
1327
1176
1121
1065
990
932
—
—
24OO
2500
1633
1498
1415
1303
1151
1096
104X
968
911
—
—
2500
2600
1617
1479
‘ 1394
1280
1127
1672
1018
946
892
—
—
2600
2700
1601
1459
1373
1257
H04
X050
997
926
2800
1585
TA A O
T9Q £
1082
007
OD
V//
y'-Y
2900
3000
. 157°
1554
1422
1403
1385
i33x
13x1
1214
1193
1061
1041
1009
990
958
940
889
871
854
Dis¬
tance
15-in.
150-
Pr.
100-
pr.
3100
XS39
1292
X172
1022
9 72
922
3200
1524
1367
1273
1x52
1004
955
905
—
ft.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
3300
1509
1349
1254
H33
987
938
888
--
5700
1201
1022
933
3400
1494
1332
1236
x-xiS
97i
922
872
5800
1191
10X2
924
3500
1479
1316
1219
1097
955
906
857
__
5900
XI 80
1002
9X5
3600
1465
1299
1201
1080
940
891
— '
_
6000
1170
993
906
37oo
1451
1282
1x84
1064
925
— .
—
—
6100
1160
984
—
3800
1437
1267
1168
1048
911
—
—
1 ~ 1
6200
1150
_ 975
—
3900
1423
1251
1x52
1033
897
—
—
6300
1140
966
—
4000
1409
1235
1136
X019
884
—
■ — r
—
6400
1130
958
— •
4100
1396
1220
1121
X005
sk
— .
— t
6500
1X20
950
—
4200
1382
1205 •
1106
992
—
—
6600
XIII
941
—
4300
1369
1x91
1092
979
— • .
— ,
__
— ,
6700
1102
933
—
4400
1356
1177
1078
966
"
— .
\\ '■
6800
XO93
925
—
4500
1343
1163
1065
954
— •
— ■
—
6900
1084
9X7
—
4600
1330
1149
1052
942
—
■ — ■
— * ..
7000
XO76
910
—
4700
1318
1136
1040
93°
— ■
__
—
—
7100
1068
—
—
4800
130S
1123
1028
919
—
—
* —
--
7200
1059
— -
—
4900
1293
ITIO
1016
908
stp
— i
7300
I05I
—
—
5000
1281
IO98
X005
898
I S3
~
—
7400
1043
—
—
5100
1269
1086
994
— •
__
— . .
--
—
7500
IO36
_
5200
1258
1075
983
—
■ggar
■ —
■ —
—
7600
1028
- — •
— ■
5300
1246
1064
97 2
_
" —
“
__
7700
1021
“
—
54oo
1235
IO53
962
—
—
—
—
7800
IOI3
—
— -
S5oo
1223
IO42
952
, — .
—
— -
—
7900
IO06
■ —
— -
5600
1212
IO32
943
M
■ ■
~
*
8000
999
—
380
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
5a'
Table showing the Values of w. and d. employed in calculating the preceding Table .
Gun
w.
d.
d2-rw.
Gun
W.
■
d.
d2vw.
1 5 -in.
150-pr.
100-pr.
68-pr.
32-pr.
24-pr.
lbs.
452*35
163-50
102 -OO
66-20
31-38
23-55
ins.
14-885
10-400
8-900
7-925
6-177
5-612
'4898
•6615
•7766
•9487
I -2161
1-3373
18-pr.
12-pr.
9-pr.
6-pr.
3-pr.
lbs.
I7-75
12-25
9-I3
6-oo
3-00
ins.
5-099
4-523
4-IOO
3-568
2-823
I -4648
I -6696
1 - 8422
2"I2l8
2- 6564
5 a
Table showing the Work done by each pound of the Charge on Elongated
Rifled Shot.
(From ‘ Reports on Experiments made with the Bashforth Chronograph,’ p. 51.)
Gun
Cal.
Shot
Charge
Work
done by
each lb. of
Charge
Gun
Cal.
Shot
Charge
Work
done by
each lb. of
Charge
Gun
Cal.
Shot
Charge
Work
done by
each lb. of
Charge
ins.
lbs.
lbs.
Foot lbs.
ins.
lbs.
lbs.
Foot lbs.
ins.
lbs.
lbs.
Foot lbs.
3
12
2 0
142,911
5
47-68
7-945
170,534
7
61-156
20-383
— -
3 3
33
1-5
135^87
3 3
33
5*961
192,071
3 3
33
•5-285
171,934
33
3 3
I 0
II7,o6l
3 3
33
4-969
199,242
33
33
IO-I9I
176,885
33
9
2-0
133,904
33
23-84
3-973
200,834
3 3
5-098
146,697
3 3
3 3
1-5
129,687
5
7-945
147,921
9
250
41*668
158,381
33
33
I 0
110,230
3 3
33
5-961
177,268
33
33
36-461
169,779
33
6
2-0
125,062
3 3
33
3-973
187,032
33
31-250
182,090
33
33
i-75
I3C95I
33
2-980
170,964
3 3
33
26-262
187,278
33
i-5
121,363
3 3
„
1-949
159,875
33
„
20-832
179,109
33
3 3
1 0
102,106
7
33
3 3
123-125
33
3 3
20-383
15-285
10-191
175,273
187,292
190,692
33
125
33
I5-625
10*414
151,933
140,590
The following Tables show the Velocities , Time of Flight, and Energy of Ogival¬
headed Elongated Service Shot at intervals of 100 feet , supposing the Shot to move
in a straight line , subject only to the Resistance of the Air.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
381
4)
ir<
6 j
5-inch Gun
11-
7
6-inch Gun
10
8
-inch Gun
9-
9
•inch Gun
*a
w = 700
lbs. ;d = ]
1 "52-in.
w=6oo
lbs. ; d =
11 '52-in.
w=4oo
lbs.; d=
9 ’92-in.
W = 250
lbs.; d=
8 "92-in.
d2
-rW= '1896
d2
-r-W= '2212
ds
'4-W= '2460
d5
:-**w= -3183.
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E
V.
t.
E.
O
1700
//
0-000
14028
1700
//
0-000
12027
1700
0-000
8016
1700
//
0*000
5010
IOO
1695
0-059
13953
1695
0-059
11951
1694
0-059
7961
1692
0-059
4964
200
1691
0-118
13878
1689
0-118
11875
1688
o-n8
7906
1685
0-118
4919
300
1686
0-177
13803
1684
0-177
1 1 800
1682
0-177
7851
1677
0-178
4875
400
1682
0-236
13729
1679
0-236
11726
1677
0-237
7796
1670
0-238
4831
500
1677
0-296
13655
1674
0-296
11653
1671
0-297
7742
1662
0-298
4788
600
1673
o-356
13582
1668
0-356
11580
1665
o-357
7688
1655
o-358
4745
700
1668
0-416
13509
1663
0-416
1 1 507
1659
0-417
7635
1647
0-419
4703
800
1664
0-476
13437
1658
0-476
II435
1653
o-477
7582
1640
0-480
4661
900
1659
0-536
13365
1653
0-536
11364
1648
0-538
7530
1633
o-54i
4620
1000
1655
0-596
13293
1648
0-597
1 1 294
1642
o-599
7478
1625
0-602
4578
1100
1651
0-656
13222
1642
0-658
1 1224
1636
o-66o
7427
1618
0*664
4537
1200
1646
0-717
13152
1637
0-719
III55
1631
0-722
7375
1611
0-726
4496
1300
1642
0-778
13083
1632
0-780
1 1086
1625
0-783
7324
1603
0-788
4456
1400
1637
0-839
I3OI4
1627
0-841
11017
1619
0-845
7273
1596
0-850
4416
1500
1633
0-900
12945
1622
0-903
10949
1614
0-906
7222
1589
0-913
4376
1600
1629
0-961
12876
1617
0-965
10881
1608
0-968
7171
1582
0-976
4336
1700
1625
1-023
12807
1612
1 -027
10813
1602
1-030
7121
1575
1-039
4297
i8ocr
1620
1-085
12738
1607
1-089
10745
1597
1-093
7071
1567
1-103
4258
1900
l6l6
1 -147
12669
1602
1-151
10678
1591
1-156
7022
1560
1-167
4219
2000
l6ll
1 -209
12600
1597
1 -214
1061 1
1586
1-219
6973
1553
1-231
4181
2100
1607
1-271
12532
1592
1-277
10544
1580
1-282
6924
1546
1-296
4143
2200
1603
i-333
12465
1587
i-34o
10478
1575
1-345
6875
1539
1-361
4105
2300
IS98
1-396
12398
1582
1-403
1041 2
1569
1-409
6827
1532
1-426
4068
2400
1594
1*459
1 233 1
1577
1 -466
10346
r563
1-473
6779
1525
1-491
4031
2500
1590
1 -522
12265
1572
1-530
10280
1558
i-537
6731
1518
1-557
3994
2600
IS35
1-585
12199
1567
1-594
102 1 5
1552
i-6oi
6683
1511
1-623
3957
2700
1581
1-648
12134
1562
1-658
10150
1547
1-666
6636
1504
1 -689
3921
2800
1577
1-711
12068
1557
1 -722
10085
i54i
1-731
6589
1497
1-756
3884
2900
1573
i-775
12002
1552
1-786
1 002 1
1536
1-796
6543
1490
1-823
3848
3000
1568
1-839
1 1937
1547
1 '85 1
9957
i53i
1 -86 1
6497
1483
1*890
3812
3100
1564
1-903
11871
1542
1 -916
9893
1525
1-926
645 1
1476
i*957
3777
3200
1560
1-967
1 1 806
1537
1 -981
9830
1520
1-992
6405
1469
2-025
3742
3300
1555
2-031
1 1 741
1532
2-046
9767
I5I4
2-058
6359
1462
2-093
3707
3400
1551
2-095
11677
1527
2 "i 1 1
9705
I5°9
2-124
6313
1455
2*162
3672
3500
1547
2-159
11613
1522
2-177
9643
I5°3
2-191
6268
1449
2-231
3638
3600
1543
2-224
11550
1518
2-243
9581
1498
2-258
6223
1442
2-300
3604
37oo
1538
2-289
11487
1513
2-309
9520
H93
2-325
6179
1435
2-370
357i
3800
1534
2-354
1 1425
1508
2-375
9459
1487
2-392
6i35
1429
2-440
3538
3900
1530
2-419
11363
1503
2-441
9398
1482
2-459
6091
1422
2-510
3505
4000
1526
2-484
11301
1498
2-508
9338
1477
2-526
6048
1416
2-580
3473
4100
1522
2*550
1 1239
1493
2-575
9278
1471
2-594
6004
1409
2-651
344i
4200
1518
2-616
1 H77
1488
2-642
9218
1466
2-662
596i
1402
2-722
3409
4300
1513
2-682
11115
1484
2-709
9159
1461
2-730
5918
1396
2-793
3378
4400
1509
2-748
1 1053
1479
2-776
9100
1455
2-799
5875
1389
2-865
3347
4Soo
1505
2-814
10992
1474
2-844
9041
1450
2-868
5833
1383
2-937
33i6
4600
1501
2-881
1093 1
1469
2-912
8982
1445
2*937
579i
1377
3-010
3286
4700
1497
2-948
10871
1464
2-980
8923
1440
3-006
5749
1371
3-083
3256
4800
1492
3*015
1081 1
1460
3-048
8864
1435
3-075
57o8
1364
3'!56
3226
4900
1488
3-082
10752
1455
3-n7
8807
1430
3-145
5667
1358
3-229
3196
5000
I484
3-149
10694
1450
3-186
8750
1425
3-215
5627
1352
3-303
3167
382
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
o
1
| {corit
)
7
(coni
•)
3 (conL)
1
9 (cont-)
c3
11-
6-inch
Gun
li-
6-inch
Gun
10-inch Gun
9
-inch Gun
Q
w = 700
lbs. ; d =
1 1 '52-in.
w=6oo lb
s. ; d =
: ii '52-in.
w = 4oolbs. ; d =
= 9 '92-in.
w=25o lbs. ; d =
= 8'Q2-in.
d
2-r-w= '1896
d
W= *2212
d2-r-w= '2460
d2-rW= '3183
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E*
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
5IOO
1480
3/;2i6
10635
1446
3
/
•255
8694
I4I9
3-285
5587
1346
3*377
3138
52°°
1476
3*284
10577
I44I
3
•324
8638
I414
3-356
5547
1339
3-452
3110
5300
1472
3-352
10518
1436
3
•393
8582
I409
3-427
55o8
1333
3‘527
3082
54OO
1468
3*420
10459
1432
3
■463
8527
I404
3-498
5469
1327
3-602
3054
5500
1464
3-488
IO4OO
1427
3
■533
8472
1399
3-569
5430
1321
3-678
3027
5 600
1460
3-556
10342
1422
3
•603
8417
1394
3-641
539i
1315
3-754
3000
5700
1456
3-62S
10285
1418
3
•673
8362
1389
3-7i3
5352
1310
3-830
2973
5800
1432
3-694
10228
1413
3
•744
8308
1384
3-785
53H
1304
3-907
2946
5900
1448
3'763
IOI7I
I409
3
•815
8254
1379
3-857
5276
1298
3-984
2920
6000
1444
3-832
IOH5
1404
3
•886
8201
1374
3-93o
5239
1292
4-061
2894
6100
1440
3-901
10059
1400
3
•957
8148
1370
4-003
5202
1286
4-138
2869
6200
1436
3-97I
IOOO3
1395
4
•029
8096
1365
4-076
5165
1281
4-216
2844
6300
1432
4-041
9948
X39J
4
IOI
8045
1360
4-149
5128
1275
4-294
2819
6400
1428
4-in
9894
1386
4
•173
7994
1355
4-223
5092
1270
4-373
2794
6500
1424
4-181
984O
1382
4
•245
7943
1350
4297
5056
1264
4-452
2769
6600
1420
4*25i
9786
1377
4
•318
7892
1345
4-37i
5021
1258
4-53i
2745
6700
1416
4-322
9732
1373
4
•39i
7841
1341
4-445
4986
1253
4-611
2721
6800
1412
4-393
9678
I369
4
•464
7791
1336
4-520
495 1
1248
4-691
2698
6900
1408
4-464
9624
1364
4
•537
774i
1331
4-595
4916
1242
4-771
2675
7000
1404
4-535
9571
1360
4
-610
7692
I327
4-670
4882
1237
4-852
2652
7100
1400
4-606
95l8
I355
4
•684
7643
1322
4-746
4848
1232
4-933
2629
7200
1397
4-678
9466
I35I
4
•758
7595
1318
4-822
4814
1226
5-014
2607
7300
1393
4-75o
94H
1347
4
•832
7547
1313
4-898
4781
1221
5-096
2585
7400
1389
4-822
9362
1343
4
•906
7499
1308
4-974
4748
1216
5-178
2563
7500
1385
4-894
93ii
1338
4
•981
7452
1304
5*051
4715
121 1
5-260
2542
7600
1381
4-966
9260
1334
5
•056
7405
I299
5-128
4682
1206
5*343
2521
7700
1378
5-038
9209
1330
5
•131
7359
1295
5-205
4650
1201
5-426
2500
7800
1374
5-no
9i59
1326
5
•206
7313
I29O
5-282
4618
II96
5-5io
2479
7900
1370
5-183
9109
1322
5
•282
7267
1286
5-36o
4587
II9I
5-594
2458
8000
1366
5-256
9059
1317
5
•358
7221
1282
5-438
4556
1 186
5-678
2438
8100
1363
5-329
9010
1313
5
•434
7176
12 77
5-5i6
4525
Il8l
5-762
2418
8200
1359
5-403
8961
1309
5
•5IG
7i3i
1273
5-594
4494
1176
5-847
2399
8300
1355
5-477
8912
1305
5
•587
7087
1269
5-673
4464
1172
5-932
2380
8400
I351
5*55i
8864
1301
5
•664
7043
1264
5*752
4434
1167
6-oi8
2361
8500
1348
5-625
8816
1297
5
•741
6999
1260
5-831
4404
1162
6-104
2342
8600
1344
5'699
8768
1293
5
•818
6956
1256
5-9ii
4375
1158
6-190
2323
8700
1340
5-774
8721
1289
5
•895
6914
1252
5-99i
4346
ii53
6-277
2305
8800
1 337
5-849
8674
1285
5
•973
6872
1248
6-071
4317
1148
6-364
2287
8900
1333
5-924
8627
1281
6
■051
6830
1243
6-151
4289
1144
6*451
2269
9000
133°
5-999
8580
1277
6
-129
6788
1239
6-231
4261
1139
6-539
2251
9100
1326
6-074
8534
1273
6
•207
6747
1235
6-312
4233
ii35
6-627
2233
9200
1322
6-150
8488
1270
6
-286
6706
1231
6*393
4205
1131
6-715
2216 .
93°°
i3J9
6*226
8442
1266
6
‘365
6665
1227
6-474
4177
1126
6-803
2199
9400
i3IS
6-302
8397
1262
6
’444
6624
1223
6-556
4149
1122
6-892
2182
950°
1312
6*379
8352
1258
6
■523
6584
1219
6-638
4122
1118
6-981
2165
9600
1308
6-456
8308
1254
6
•603
6545
1215
6-720
4095
1114
7-071
2149
9700
I3°5
6-533
8264
1250
6
■683
6506
1211
6 ‘802
4068
1109
7-161
2133
9800
1301
6-6io
8220
1247
6
•763
6467
1207
6-885
4042
1105
7*25i
2117
9900
1298
6-687
8176
1243
6
■843
6428
1203
6-968
4016
IIOI
7-342
2101
10000
1294
6-764
8133
1239
6
■924
6390
1199
7-o5i
3990
1097
7-433
2085
IOIOO
1291
6-842
8090
1237
7
-005
6352
1 196
7-134
3964
1093
7-524
2070
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
383
<D
0 {cont.)
^ ( cont . )
8 («»4)
0 {cont.)
g
11
■6 -inch
Gun
11
■6-inch
Gun
10-inch 1
Gun
!
3-inch Gun
t n
w=?oo lbs. ; d =
-11 -52-in.
w=6oolbs. ; d =
11 -52-in.
w=4oo lbs. ; d
= 9*Q2-in.
w= 250 lbs. ; d
=8"Q2-in.
0
[2-7-W= 'I
896
1
l2 -r W = *2212
<
l2-rW= "2460
d2-rW= -3183
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
10200
1288
6^20
8047
1232
7 -086
6314
II92
7-2l8
3939
1089
7-6l6
2055
I0300
1284
6^98
8005
1228
7-167
6277
Il88
7-302
39H
1085
7-708
2040
IO4OO
1281
7-076
7963
1225
7-248
6240
1184
7^87
3889
Io8l
7-800
2026
I0500
1278
7-155
7921
1221
7-33o
6203
1180
7^72
3864
10 77
7-893
2012
10600
1274
7^35
: 7880
1217
7-412
6167
1177
7-557
3840
1073
7^86
1998
I0700
1271
7-3I4
7839
1214
7*494
6131
“73
7-642
3816
1069
8-079
1984
I0800
1268
7-393
77 98
1210
7'577
6095
1169
7-728
3792
1066
8-173
1970
IO900
1264
7^72
77 58
1207
7-660
6059
1166
7-8I4
3769
1063
8-267
1957
I IOOO
1261
7-552
7718
1203
7-743
6024
1162
7-900
3746
1059
8-361
1945
moo
1258
7-632
7678
1 20Q
7 -826
5989
“59
7-986
3723
1056
8-456
1933
1 1200
1254
7-712
7638
II96.
7-909
5955
“55
8-073
37oo
io53
8-551
1921
1 1300
1251
7-792
7599
1193
7-993
5921
“5i
8-i6o
! 3677
1049
8-646
1909
1 1 400
1248
7^73
7560
II90
8-077
5887
114&
8-247
3655
1046
8-741
1897
1 1 500
1245
7-954
752i
Il86
8-161
5854
“44
8-334
3633
1043
8-837
1885
1 1 600
1242
8-035
7483
II83
8-245
5821
1141
8/422
3611
1040
8-933
1873
11700
1238
8-n6
7445
1179
8-330
5788
1138
8-509
3589
1037
9-029
1862
1 1 800
1235
8-197
7407
II76
8-415
5755
“34
8-597
3567
io33
9-126
1851
1 1900
1232
8-279
7369
1173
8-500
5723
“31
8-685
3546
1030
9-223
1840
12000
1229
8-361
7332
1170
8-585
5691
1127
8-773
3525
1027
9-320
1829
12 IOO
1226
8-443
7295
1166
8-671
5659
1124
8-862
3504
1024
9*4i7
1819
12200
1223,
8-52-5
7258
II63
8-757
; 5627
1121
8-951
3483
1022
9-5I5
1809
I23OO
1220
8-607
7221
Il6o
8-843
5596
1117
9-040
3463
1019
9-613
1800
I24OO
1217
8-689
7184
1157
8-929
5565
1 1 14
9-130
3443
1017
9-711
1791
12500
1214
8/771
7148
1153
9-016
5534
IIII
9-220
3423
1014
9-809
1782
12600
1211
8-854
7112
1150
9-103
5503
1108
9-310
3403
1012
9-908
1774
12700
I2o8,
8-937
70 77
1147
9-190
5473
1105
9-4oi
3383
1009
10-007
1765
12800
1205
9 -020
7042
II44
9-277
5443
IIOI
9-492
3364
1007
10-106
1756
12900
1202
9-I03
7007
II4I
9*364
5413
1098
9*583
3345
1004
10-205
1748
13000
1199
9-186
6973
II38
9-452
5384
1095
9*674
3326
1002
10-305
1740
I3IOO
H96
9 *270
6939
“35
9’54o
5355
1092
9766
3307
IOOO
10-405
1732
13200
1193
9*354
6905
1132
9-628
5326
1089
9*857
3288
997
10*505
1724
13300
1190
9-438
6871
1128
9-717
5297
1086
9‘949
3269
995
10-605
1716
I34OO
H87
9-522
6837
1125
9-806
5269
1083
10*041
3251
993
10*706
1708
13500
H84
9-606
6803
1122
9-895
5241
1080
10-133
3233
990
10-807
1700
I360O
1181
9-690
6770
1 1 19
9-984
5214
1077
10*225
3215
988
10-908
1692
13700
1178
9*775
6737
1117
10-073
5^7
1074
10-318
3199
986
1 1 *009
1684
I3800
ii75
9 -86o
6705
1114
10-163
5160
107 1
10-411
3183
983
ii-in
1676
I39OO
II73
9-945
66 73
mi
10*253
5i33
1068
10-505
3167
981
11*213
1668
I4OOO
1170
10-030
6641
1108
10 ‘343
5106
1066
10-599
3151
979
11-315
1660
I4IOO
1167
10-116
6609
1105
10-433
5080
1063
10-693
3135
976
11-418
1653
14200
1164
10-202
6577
1102
10-524
5054
1061
10-787
3i2a
974
11-521
1646
14300
1161
10-288
6546
1099
10615
5028
1058
10-882
3105
972
1 1 -624
1639
I44OO
ii59
JO-374
6515
1096
10-706
5002
1056
10*977
3090
970
11-727
1632
14500
1156
10-460
6484
1094
10-798
4976
1053
11-072
3075
968
1 1 -830
1625
I460O
ii53
io-547
6453
1091
10-890
495i
1050
11-167
3060
966
“•933
1618
14700
1150
10-634
6423
1088
10-982
4926
1048
1 1 -262
3045
964
12-037
1611
I480O
1148
10-721
6393
1085
11-074
4901
1045
“•358
3031
962
12-141
1604
I49OO
1145
10-808
6363
1083
ii-i66
4877
1043
“‘454
3016
960 ;
12-245
1598
15000
1142
10-895
6334
1080
11-258
4853
1040
“•550
3002
958 :
12-349
1592
1 5 100
1140
10-983
6304
10 77
11 "351
4829
1038
1 1 -646
2988
956 :
t2-453
1585
15200
1137
11-071
6275
1074
1 1 -444
4806
1036 :
ii 742
2974
954 ]
[2-558
1578
15300
ii34
n-159
6246
1072 :
“•537
4783
1033 ;
[1-839
2960
952
[2-663
i57i
15400
1132
n -247
6217
1070 :
11-630
4761
1031 ]
“‘935
2947
95° :
[2-768
1565
15500
1129 :
”•336
6188
1067 ]
[1-724
4739
1028 :
12-032
2934
949 ■
12-873
1559
51
884
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Distance
fj {font. )
11’6-inch Gun
w =700 lbs. ; d = 11 '52-in.
d2-j-w= '1896
{cont. ) j
11’6-inch Gun
w=6oolbs. ; d= 11 -52-in.
d2rW= "2212
g (cont.)
10-inch Gun
w =400 lbs. ; d = 9 -92-in.
d2-^-w— "2460
9 (cont.)
9-inch Gun
w= 250 lbs. ; d= 8 -92-in.
d2-^w= -3183
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
*• I
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
15600
1126
1 1 ’425
6160
1065
1 1 -818
4717
1026
12*129
2922
947
12-979
1552
15700!
1124
11 *5I4
6132
1063
11-912
4696
IO24
12-227
2910
945
13-085
x546
15800
1 121
1 1 -603
6104 I
1060
12-006
4675
1022
12-325
2898
943
13-191
1540
15900
III9
1 1 -692
6076 |
1058
12*100
4655
1020
12-423
2886
941
13-297
1534
16000 j
IIl6
1 1 781
6048
ioc;6
12-195
4635
IOl8
12-521
2875
939
13-403
1528
l6lOO
I 1 14
11-871
6021
1053
12-290
4615
IOl6
12-619
2864
937
13-510
1522
16200
IIII
11-961
5994
1051
12-385
4595
IOI4
12-718
2853
935
13-617
1516
163OO
IIO9
12-051
5968
1049
12-480
4576
1012
12-817
2842
933
13-724
1510
164OO
IIO6
12-141
5942
1047
12-575
4557
IOII
12-916
2832 |
93i
13-831
1504
16500
IIO4
12-231
5916
1044
12-671
4538
IOO9
13-015
2822 |
9 30
i3'938
1498
16600
1102
12-322
5890
1042
12*767
4519
1007
13-114
2812
928
14-046
1492
16700
IO99
12-413
5864
1040
12-863
45oo
IO°5
13-214
2801
926
I4'i54
i486
16800
1097
12-504
5839
1038
12-959
4481
1003
I3-3I4
2791
924
14-262
1480
16900
IO94
12-595
58H
1036
13-056
4462
IOOI
i3'4i4
2780
922
14-370
1474
170OO
1092
12-686
5789
1033
13-152
4443
999
I3-5I4
2770
921
I4-479
1468
1 7 IOO
I089
12-778
5764
1031
13-250
4425
998
13-614
2760
919
14-588
1463
172OO
I087
12-870
5740
1029
13-347
4408
996
I3-7I4
2750
917
14-697
1457
17300
I085
12-962
57i6
1027
i3'444
439i
994
13-815
2740
9i5
14-806
1452
17400
1082
i3-o54
5692
1025
i3-54i
4375
992
I3-9I5
z73°
914
14-915
1447
17500
I080
13-146
5668
1023
13-639
4359
990
14-016
2720
912
15-025
1441
17600
IO78
13-239
5644
1021
I3-737
4343
988
14-117
2710
910
I5-135
1436
17700
1075
I3-332
5621
1019
13-835
4327
987
14-218
2700
909
I5-245
1430
17800
1073
13-426
5598
1018
i3'933
4312
985
14-320
2690
907
I5-355
1425
17900
1071
I3-5I9
5576
1016
14-031
4297
983
14-421
2680
905
15-465
1420
18000
I069
13-612
5554
1014
14-130
4282
981
14-523
2670
904
15-576
1415
l8lOO
I067
13-706
5532
1013
14-229
4267
979
14-625
2661
902
15-687
1409
18200
1065
13-800
55io
IOII
14-328
4252
978
14-727
2651
900
15-798
1404
18300
I063
i3-894
5488
1009
14-427
4237
976
14-829
2642
899
15-909
1399
18400!
Io6l
13-988
5467
1008
14-526
4223
974
i4-93i
2633
897
16-020
1394
18500
1059
14-082
5446
1 1006
14-625
4209
973
15-034
2624
895
16-132
1389
18600
1057
14-177
5425
\ 1004
14-725
4195
971
I5-I37
2615
894
16-243
1384
18700
1055
14-272
5404 1
| 1003
14-825
4181
970
15-240
2606
892
i6-355
1379
18800
1053
14-367
5383
1 1001
14-925
4167
968
I5-343
2598
890
16-467
1374
18900
1051
14-462
5363
999
15-025
4152
966
I5-446
2589
889
16-579
1369
19000
IO49
14-557
5343
998
15-125
4139
965
i5-55o
2581
887 116-692
1364
19IOO
1047
14-652
5323
996
15-225
4125
963
I5-654
2573
| I920O
IO45
14-748
5303
994
15-326
4111
962
I5-758
2564
19300
1043
14-844
5284
993
i5'427
4098
960
15-862
2556
I94OO
IO42
14-940
5265
99i
15-528
4085
959
15-966
2548
19500
IO4O
15-036
5246
989
15-629
4072
957
16-070
2540
19600
IO38
15*132
5227
I 988
i5-73o
4059
956
16-175
2532
19700
IO36
15-229
5208
986
15 831
4046
954
16-280
2524
19800
IO34
15-326
5190
984
15-932
4033
953
16-385
2516
I99OO
IO32
i5'423
5i7i
983
16-033
4020
95i
16-490
2508
20000
1030
15-520
5152
981
16-135
4007
95o
16-595
2500
20100
1028
15-617
5135
980
16-237
3994
948
16-700
2493
20200
1027
I5’7i4
5ii9
978
16-339
3982
947
16-806
2485
20300
1025
15-81 1
5103
977
16-441
3970
945
16-912
2477
20400
1024
15-909
5087
975
i6-543
3958
944
17-018
2469
20500
1022
16-007
5071
974
16-646
3946
942
17-124
2462
20600
1021
16-105
5056
972
16-749
3934
941
17-230
2454
20700
1019
16-203
5041
971
16-852
3922
939
I7-336
2447
20800
IOl8
16-301
5026
97°
i6-955
3910
938
i7'443
2439
20900
IOl6
16-399
5° 1 1
| 968
17-058
3899
936
i7-55o
2431
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
885
Distance
0 (< cont .)
11'6-inch Gun
w = 700 lbs. ; d = 1 1 "52-in.
d2-i-w= "1896
7 {coni.)
11.6-inch Gun
w = 600 lbs. ; d •= 1 x "52-in. ;
d2-r-W= "2212
g {cont )
10-inch Gun
w= 400 lbs. ; d=9"92-in. ;
d2^-w= "2460
Dis¬
tance
10
rfJs S d
0 ^ VO
10 0 VO
IT*'"
-d ... •’'vo
8 w g 'S'
HH 1 VO
_ ftsn
g H
•.So l II +
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
Feet
V.
y.
2IOOO
1015
1 6"49 7
4997
967
17-161
3888
935
If
17-657
2424
O
1200
1200
2IIOQ
1013
16-596
4982
965
17-265
3877
933
17-764
2416
IOO
1194
1194
21200
1012
16-695
4968
964
17-369
3866
932
17-871
2408
200
1189
1189
21300
IOIQ
16-794
4953
963
17-473
3855
931
17-978
2401
3°°
1183
1183
214OO
IOO9
16-893
4939
961
17-577
3844
929
18-086
2394
400
1178
11 77
21500
1007
16-992
4925
960
17-681
3833
928
18-193
2387
500
1172
1172
21600
1006
17-091
4911
958
17785
3822
926
18-301
2380
600
1167
1166
21700
1005
17-191
4897
957
17-889
3811
925
18-409
2373
700
1161
1161
21800
1003
1 7 -291
4883
956
17-994
3800
924
18-517
2366
800
1156
1156
21900
1002
17-391
4869
954
18-099
3789
922
18-626
2359
900
1151
1150
22000
IOOO
17-491
4856
953
18-204
3778
921
18-734
2352
IOOO
1145
ii45
22100
999
17-591
4842
952
18-309
3767
920
18-843
2345
1100
1140
1140
22200
997
17-691
4828
950
18-414
3756
918
18-952
2339
1200
1135
ii35
22300
996
17791
4814
949
18-519
3745
917
19-061
2332
1300
1130
1129
22400
995
17-891
4801
948
18-624
3735
916
19-170
2325
I4OO
1125
1124
22500
993
17-992
4787
946
18-730
3724
914
19-279
2319
1500
1120
1 1 19
22600
992
18-093
4774
945
18-836
37i3
913
19-389
2312
1600
1115
1115
22700
990
18-194
4760
944
18-942
3703
912
T9’499
2305
1700
iiio
IIIO
22800
989
18-295
4747
942
19-048
3693
910
19-609
2299
1800
1105
1105
22900
988
18-396
4733
941
19-154
3683
909
19-719
2292
I9OO
1100
1100
23OOO
986
18-497
4720
940
19-260
3673
908
19-829
2285
2000
1095
1095
23IOO
9^5
18-599
4707
938
19-367
3662
906
19-939
2279
2100
1091
1091
23200
983
18-701
4694
937
19-474
3652
905
20 -049
2272
2200
1086
1086
233OO
982
18-803
4681
936
19-581
3642
904
20-160
2265
23OO
1081
1081
234OO
981
18-905
4668
934
19-688
3632
902
20-271
2259
24OO
1076
1077
23500
979
19-007
4655
933
I9-795
3622
901
20-382
2252
25OO
1072
1072
23600
978
19-109
4642
932
19-902
3612
900
20-493
2246
2600
1067
1068
23700
977
19-211
4630
930
29 -009
3602
899
20 -604
2239
2700
1063
1065
2380O
975
I9-3I3
4618
929
20*116
3592
897
20-715
2233
2800
1058
1061
239OO
974
19-416
4606
928
20-224
3582
896
20-827
2226
29OO
1054
1057
24OOO
973
I9-5I9
4594
92 7
20-332
3572
895
20-938
2220
3000
1049
1052
243OO
969
19-828
4559
923
20-656
3543
3100
1045
1049
2460O
966
20-137
4525
919
20-982
3515
3200
1041
1045
249OO
962
20-449
4493
916
21-309
3488
33°°
1036
1042
25200
959
20761
4460
912
21 -637
346i
3400
1032
1038
25500
955
21-075
4427
909
21 -967
3434
35oo
1028
1034
25800
952
21-390
4394
905
22 -297
3408
3600
1024
1031
26100
948
21-705
4362
902
22 -630
338i
37oo
1020
1027
264OO
945
22 -023
433i
898
22-963
3355
3800
1015
1024
26700
941
22-341
4300
895
23^98
3329
3900
XOII
1021
27000
938
22-660
4269
891
23-634
3303
4000
1007
1018
273OO
935
22-981
4239
888
23-971
3278
4100
1003
1016
27600
93i
23-302
4209
885
24-3iO
3253
4200
999
1013
279OO
928
23-625
4179
881
24-649
3229
4300
995
1010
28200
925
23*949
4150
878
24-991
3206
.
4400
991
1007
28500
921
24-273
4121
875
25733
3184
4500
988
1004
28800
918
24-600
4093
871
25-677
3160
4600
984
1001
29IOO
915
24-927
4066
4700
980
999
294OO
912
25'255
■ 4039
4800
976
996
29700
909
25-585
4013
4900
972
993
30000
906
25-915
3986
5000
968
990
386
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Distance
11
8-inch Gun
w= 180 lbs. ; d = 7*92 in. ;
d3-=-w= '3485
12
7-inch Gun
w= 115 lbs. ; d=6"92-in. ;
d2n-w= *4164
13
6'3-inch Gun
w = 64lbs. ; d =6 "22-in. ;
d2-^w= "6045
14
3 '6-inch Gun
w=i61bs. ; d = 3 52-in. ;
d2-r-w='7744
Feet
V.
t.
E.
Y.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
O
1700
O’OOO
3607
1700
0-000
2305
1700
0-000
1283
1700
0-000
321
IOO
1692
0-059
3572
1690
0-059
2278
1686
0-059
1261
l68l
0-059
3*4
200
1683
0118
3537
1680
0-118
2251
1671
0-119
1240
1663
0119
307
3°o
I67.S
0-178
3502
1670
0-178
2224
1657
0-179
1219
1645
0-180
300
400
1667
0-238
3468
1660
0-238
2198
1643
0-239
1198
1627
0-241
294
500
1659
0-298
3434
1651
0-298
2172
1629
0-300
1178
1609
0-303
287
600
1651
o-358
3400
1641
o-359
2146
1616
0-362
1158
159I
0-365
281
700
1642
0-419
3367
1632
0-420
2121
1602
0-424
1138
*574
0-428
275
800
1634
0-480
3334
1622
0-482
2096
1588
0-487
1119
*557
0-492
269
900
1627
o-54i
3300
l6l2
o-544
2071
1574
o-55o
1100
1539
o-557
263
1000
l6l8
0-603
3268
1603
o--6o6
2047
1561
0-614
1081
1522
0-622
257
1100
l6lO
0-665
3236
1593
0-669
2023
1547
0-678
1062
1505
o-688
252
1200
1602
0-727
3204
1584
0-732
*999
1534
o-743
1044
1488
o-755
246
1300
1594
0-790
3172
1575
o-795
J976
1521
0-809
1025
1472 i
0-822
241
1400
1587
0-853
3Hi
1565
0-859
1953
1507
0-875
1007
1455
0-890
235
1500
1579
0-916
3110
1556
0-923
*93°
1494
0-942
989
*439
o-959
230
1600
1571
0-980
3079
1547
0-987
1907
1481
1-009
972
1423
1-030
225
1700
1563
1-044
3048
1537
1-052
1884
1468
1 -078
956
1407
1 -ioi
220
1800
1555
1 -108
3018
1528
i*n7
1861
1455
i**47
940
*39*
1-172
215
I9OO
1547
1-172
2988
1519
1-183
1839
1442
1 -216
924
*375
1-244
210
2000
1539
1-^37
2958
1510
1-249
1817
1430
1-286
908
1360
1-3*7
205
2100
1532
1-302
2928
1500
I-3I5
1 795
1418
1-356
892
*345
1-391
201
2200
1524
1-367
2899
1491
1-382
1773
1405
1-427
876
*33°
1 -466
196
2300
1516
1-433
2870
1482
1-449
*752
1393
1-499
861
1316
* -542
192
24OO
1509
1-499
2841
1474
I-5I7
1731
1381
i-57i
846
1301
1-618
188
2300
1501
1-566
2813
1464
1-585
1710
1369
1-644
832
1287
1-695
184
26 OO
*493
1-633
2785
1455
1-654
1690
13.57
1-717
818
1274
*773
180
2700
i486
1 -700
2757
1447
1-723
1670
1345
1-791
804
1260
1-852
176
2800
1478
1-767
2729
1438
1-792
1650
1334
1-866
790
1247
1-932
172
2900
1471
1-835
2701
I429
1-862
1630
1322
1-941
777
1234
2-013
169
3000
1463
1-903
2673
I42I
1-932
1610
1311
2-017
764
1221
2-094
165
3 100
1456
1-971
2646
I412
2-003
i59i
1300
2-093
75 1
1209
2*176
162
3200
1448
2-040
2619
1403
2-074
1572
1289
2-169
738
1197
2-259
159
33oo
1441
2-109
2592
1395
2-145
1 553
1278
2-246
726
1185
2-343
156
3400
1434
2-179
2566
1387
2-217
1534
1268
2-324
714
ii73
2-428
*53
35oo
1427
2-249
2540
1378
2-289
1515
1257
2-403
702
1162
2-5*4
150
3600
1419
2-319
2514
1370
2-362
1497
1247
2-483
690
1150
2-601
H7
3700
1412
2-390
2488
1362
2-435
H79
1237
2-564
679
ii39
2-688
144
3800
1405
2*461
2463
1354
2-509
1462
1227
2-645
668
1129
2-776
142
3900
1398
2-533
2438
1346
2-583
1445
1217
2-727
657
1118
2-865
139
4000
I39i
2-605
2413
1338
2-658
1428
1207
2-8lO
647
1108
2-955
136
4100
1384
2-677
2389
1330
2-733
1411
1198
2-893
637
1098
3-046
*34
4200
1377
2-749
2365
1322
2-808
1394
1188
2-977
627
1088
3-I38
132
4300
1370
2-822
2341
I3H
2-884
1378
1179
3-061
617
1079
3-230
130
4400
1363
2-895
2318
1306
2-960
1362
1170
3-146
608
1070
3-323
128
4500
1356
2-968
2295
1299
3-037
1346
1161
3-232
599
1062
3*4*7
126
4600
1349
3-042
2272
1291
3-ii4
1330
1152
3-3I9
590
1054
3-5*1
124
4700
1342
3-116
2249
1284
3-192
1314
1144
3'407
58i
1046
3-606
122
4800
1336
3-191
2227
12 77
3-270
1299
1135
3-495
572
1038
3-702
120
4900
1329
3-266
2205
1269
3 ’349
1284
1127
3-584
564
1031
3’799
118
5000
1323
3-342
2183
1262
3-428
1270
1119
3-673
556
1025
3-896
116
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 887
Distance
U (font.)
8-inch Gun
w=i8olbs. ; d = 7'92-in. ;
d24-w— ‘3485
(con*-)
7 -inch Gun
w= 115 lbs. ; d =6 '92-in. ;
da-rw= '4164
13 (conL)
6‘3-inch Gun
w=64 lbs. ; d=6'22-in. ;
d2-fw= '6045
14 (cont-)
3'6-inch Gun
w=i6 lbs.; d=3"S2-in. ;
d2-rw=-7744
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
Y.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
5100
1316
3-4I8
2162
1255
3-507
1256
mi
3763
548
1019
3 ‘994
114
5200
I3IO
3-494
2141
X248
3-587
1242
1103
3-854
540
1013
4-092
113
5300
1303
3-57I
2120
I24I
3-667
1228
1095
3-946
532
1007
4-191
hi
54OO
1297
3-648
2099
1234
3-748
1214
1088
4'039
525
IOOI
4-291
no
5500
1291
3-725
2079
1227
3-829
1201
1080
4-132
518
995
4'39i
109
5600
I284
3-802
2059
1220
3”9ii
1188
1073
4-225
5”
989
4-492
108
5700
I278
3-880
2039
1213
3’993
ii75
1066
4-318
505
984
4-593
107
5800
1272
3-958
2019
1207
4-076
1162
1060
4-412
499
978
4-695
106
5900
1266
4037
2000
1200
4 159
1149
1054
4-507
493
973
4-797
105
6000
1260
4-II6
1981
1194
4-243
1136
1048
4-602
487
968
4-900
104
6lOO
I2.S4
4-196
1962
H87
4-327
1x24
1041
4-698
481
963
5-004
103
6200
1248
4-276
1944
Il8l
4-411
1112
1035
4-794
475
958
5 'io8
102
6300
1242
4-356
1926
1175
4-496
1100
1029
4-891
470
954
5-213
101
64OO
I236
4-437
1908
Il68
4-581
1088
1024
4-988
465
949
5-3i8
IOO
6500
I23I
4-5i8
1890
Il62
4-667
1077
1019
5-086
460
944
5-424
99
6600
1225
4-600
1872
1156
4-753
1066
1014
5'i84
456
940
5-53o
98
6700
1219
4-682
1855
1150
4-840
1055
1009
5-283
452
935
5-637
97
6800
1214
4-764
1838
1144
4-927
X044
1005
5-382
448
931
5-744
96
6900
1208
4-847
1821
II38
5-oi5
1033
1 000
5-482
444
926
5-852
95
7000
1202
4-930
1804
1133
5-103
1023
996
5783
440
922
5-960
94
7100
1197
5-oi3
1788
1127
5-I9I
1013
99 1
5-684
436
917
6-069
93
7200
1192
5-097
1772
1 12 1
5-280
1003
987
5785
432
913
6-178
92
7300
Il86
5*181
1756
IIl6
5-369
993
982
5-886
428
909
6-288
9i
7400
Il8l
5-265
1740
IIIO
5*459
983
978
5-988
425
905
6-398
90
7500
II76
5-350
1725
1105
5-549
973
974
6-090
421
901
6-509
90
7600
1170
5-435
1710
I IOO
5-640
964
97°
6-193
418
897
6-620
89
7700
II65
5-42I
1695
IO94
5-73I
955
96 7
6-296
414
893
6-732
89
7800
Il6o
5-607
1680
I089
5'823
946
963
6-400
41 1
889
6-844
88
79°°
1155
5-693
1665
I084
5-9I5
937
959
6-504
408
885
6-957
87
8000
IISO
5-78o
1651
IO79
6-oo8
929
955
6-6o8
405
881
7-070
87
8100
1145
5-867
1637
IO74
6-ioi
921
952
6713
402
877
7-184
86
8200
1140
5-955
1623
I069
6-194
9i3
948
6-8i8
399
873
7-298
85
8300
H35
6043
1609
I065
6-288
905
944
6-924
396
870
7-4I3
84
8400
1131
6-131
1595
1060
6-382
897
941
7-030
393
866
7-528
83
8500
1126
6-219
1582
io56
6-477
899
937
7-137
390
862
7-644
83
8600
1121
6-308
1569
1052
6-572
882
933
7-244
387
858
7-760
82
8700
1116
6-397
1556
1047
6-667
875
930
7-351
384
855
7-877
81
8800
IIX2
6-487
1543
1043
6-763
868
926
7-459
381
851
7-994
v 81
8900
1 107
6-577
1530
1039
6-859
861
923
7-567
378
848
8-112
80
9000
1103
6-668
1518
1035
6-955
854
920
7-676
375
844
8-230
79
9100
IO98
6-759
1505
1031
7-052
848
917
7-785
372
9200
IO94
6-850
1493
1027
7-149
842
9i3
7-894
370
9300
IO9O
6-942
1481
1023
7-246
836
910
8-004
367
9400
1085
7-034
1469
1020
7-344
830
907
8-114
365
9500
Io8l
7-126
1457
1017
7-442
824
904
8-224
362
9600
1077
7-219
1446
1014
7-54o
819
900
8-335
360
9700
1072
7-312
1435
1010
7-639
814
897
8*446
357
9800
[069
7-405
1425
1007
7-738
809
894
8-558
355
9900
IO65
7‘499
1415
X004
7-837
804
891
8-670
352
10000
1061
7 '593
1405
1001
7-937
799
888
8-782
349
IOIOO
IO58
7-687
1395
998
8-037
794
885
8-895
347
388
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Distance
22 (cont.)
8-inch Gun
w=i8o lbs. ; d=7‘92-in. ;
d2-7-w = ’348s
12 ^cont )
7 -inch Gun
w = ii5 lbs. ; d = 6"g2-in. ;
d2-f-w="4i64
15
Cubic Law of Resistance
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
O
O
1
CO
s
r vo
0 VO
dtf
vrj
2 w
U . <N
O Qh .
8* 0
0
H l>»
m vo
co 00
CJ
. N *
& <D N
b3<j
G Qh
”0 LO
G VO
cJ 00
1-1 g
0) "(3
Xu
10200
I0300
IO4OO
IO500
10600
I0700
10800
IO9OO
I IOOO
moo
1 1 200
1 1300
1 1400
1 1 500
1 1 600
1 1 700
1 1 800
I I9OO
12000
1 2 1 OO
12200
I23OO
I24OO
I2509
12600
12700
12800
12900
13000
1 3 100
13200
13300
13400
13500
13600
13700
13800
13900
14000
14100
14200
14300
14400
14500
14600
14700
14800
14900
15000
15300
15600
15900
16200
16500
16800
1054
1050
1047
1043
1040
1036
1033
1029
1026
1023
1021
IOl8
1015
1012
IOIO
1007
1004
1002
999
997
994
991
989
986
984
981
979
976
974
972
970
967
965
963
961
959
957
954
952
95°
948
946
944
942
940
938
935
933
93i
925
920
914
908
903
897
7782
7-877
7- 972
8- o68
8-164
8 -260
8-357
8-454
8-552
8-650
8-748
8-846
8- 944
9- 043
9-142
9-241
9-340
9-440
9'540
9-640
9-740
9-841
9-942
10-043
10-144
10-246
10-348
iO'45i
10-554
10-657
10-760
10- 863
10.966
1 1 -070
ii’i74
11- 278
1 1 -382
11-487
11-592
11- 697
1 1 -802
1 1 -908
12- 014
12-120
12*226
I2332
12-439
12-546
12- 653
12*977
13*302
13- 629
13- 959
14*290
14- 623
1385
1375
1366
1357
1348
r339
i33i
1323
1315
1307
1300
1293
1286
1279
1272
1265
1258
1252
1246
1239
1232
1226
1219
1213
1207
1201
1195
1190
1184
1179
1173
1168
1162
ii57
1152
1147
1142
ii37
1132
1127
1122
1117
1112
1107
1102
1098
1093
1088
1083
1069
1055
1042
1030
1017
1005
995
992
989
986
983
980
977
973
971
969
966
963
961
958
956
953
95i
948
945
943
941
938
936
933
93i
928
926
924
921
919
917
914
912
910
908
! 906
903
901
899
897
895
893
890
888
886
884
882
880
878
872
8-138
8-239
8-340
8-441
8-543
8-645
8747
8-850
8- 953
9- 056
9-159
9-263
9-367
9-471
9775
9-680
9-785
9*890
9-996
10-102
10-208
10-315
10-422
10-529
10-636
10-744
10-852
10- 960
1 1 -068
11 -177
1 1 -286
1 1 -395
1 1 -504
11- 614
11- 724
1 1 -834
1 1 -945
12- 056
12-167
12*278
12-390
12-502
12-614
12-726
12-839
12- 952
13- 065
13-179
I3-293
13-636
789
784
779
774
769
765
761
756
752
748
744
740
736
732
728
724
720
717
713
709
705
701
69 7
694
691
68 7
684
680
677
673
670
667
663
660
6 57
654
651
647
644
641
638
635
632
629
626
624
621
618
615
606
Feet
V.
V.
V.
O
IOO
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
900
IOOO
1100
1200
1300
I4OO
1500
1600
1700
1800
1900
2000
2100
2200
23OO
24OO
2500
260b
2700
2800
29OO
3000
3100
3200
3300
3400
3500
3600
3700
3800
3900
4000
4110
4200
4300
4400
4500
1500-0
1486-3
1473-0
1460 -o
1447-0
1434-3
1421-9
1409-6
1397-6
1385-8
1374-2
1362 -8
I35I-5
I340-5
1329-6
1318-9
1308-4
1298-0
1287-8
1277-8
1267-9
1258-2
1248-6
1239-2
1229-9
1220-7
1211 -7
1202 -8
1194 -o
1185 ‘4
1176-9
1168*5
1 160 -2
1152-1
1144-0
1136-1
1128-3
1120.6
1113-0
1105-5
1098-1
1090-8
1083*5
1077*6
1070*5
1063 *6
1500*0
1486-4
1473-0
I459-9
1447.0
I434'3
1421 *8
1409*6
1397-6
1385-8
1374- 1
1362-7
I35I-4
1340-4
1329-5
1318-8
1308-3
1297-9
1287*7
1277-6
1267.7
1258.0
1248 -4
1239-0
1229*6
1220-5
1211-5
1202 *6
1193-8
1185-2
1176*6
1 168 *3
1160-0
1151-8
1143-8
1 135 *8
1128*0
1120*3
1112*7
1105 *2
1097*8
I090-5
1083 -2
1076-1
1069*1
1062 -2
1500-0
1491-5
1483-2
1474-9
1466-7
1458-6
1450*5
1442*7
1434-9
1427*2
1419-5
1411-9
1404-4
1397-0
13897
1382 -4
1375-2
1368*1
1361.1
1354-1
1347-2
1340.4
1333-6
1326-9
1320.3
1313-8
1307-3
1300-8
1294-5
1288-2
1281 *9
1275-8
1269 -6
1263 -6
1257-6
1251 -6
1245-7
1239*9
1234. 1
1228-4
1222-7
1217-1
1211-5
1206 -o
1200-5
1195-1
THE- ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
ss§
Distance
16
3‘45-inch Gun
w = 16 lbs. ; d = 3 “372-in. ;
d2-f-w= “7105
17
3 -inch B„L. Gun
w=i2lbs. ; d=3-in. ;
d2-i-w= *7500
18
3-inch M.L. Gun
w = 1 2 lbs. ; d = 2 -93-in. ;
d2-rw='7io5
19 1
3-inch M.L. Gun. ;
v=9lbs.; d = 2-Q4-in.;
d2-4-w="96c>4 !
Feet
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E. ■
V.
t. I
E.
Y.
t.
E. ' ;
o:
1700
O “GOO
■321
1700
0-000
240
1700
0-000
240
1700
. 0 -000
l8o :
IOO
1683
0“0S9
314
1682
0-059
235
1683
0-059
235
1677
0-060
175 1
200
1.666
0*119
308
1664
0-119
230
1666
0-119
230
1655
0-120
170
300
1649
0*179
302
1647
0-179
225
1649
0-179
226
1632
0-181
t 1.66 :
400
1633
0'240
296
1629
0-240
220
1633
0*240
221
l6lO
0-242
l6l :
500
I.617
0-302
290
l6l2
0-302
216
l6l7
0*302
217
1589
0*305
157 ;
600
l6oi
0*364
284
1595
0-365
212
l60I
0*364
213
1567
0-368
153 :
700
1585
0-427
278
1578
0-428
20 7
1585
0-427
209
1546
0*432
149 ;
809
IS69
0*490
273
1561
0-492
202
1569
0-490
205
. 1525
0*497
145 ;
900
1553
0-554
267
1544
0*556
198
1553
0*554
201
1504
0*563
141
1000
1537
0*619
262
1527
0-621
194
1537
0-619
197
1483
0-630
137
1100
1521
0-685
257
I5II
0-687
190
1521
0-685
193
1462
0-698
134
1200
1506
0*751
252
1494
0*753
186
1506
o*75i
189
I44I
0-767
130
1300
1490
0-818
246
1478
0-820-
182
1490
0-818
185
I42I
0-837
126 ;
1400
1475
0-885
241
I462
o-888
178
1475
0-885
181
I4OI
0-908
123. :
1500
1460
0*953
236
1446
o*957
174
I460
o*953
178
1382
0-980
. 119 |
1600
1444
I -022
231
1430
1*027
170
1444
1 *022
174
1363
1*053
116 i
1700
1430
I -091
226
I4H
1-097
167
H3°
1 -091
170
1344
1 -127
• 113. 1
1800
1415
i -161
222
1399
1 -168
163
1415
1 -161
167
1326
I *202
no 1
1900
1400
1*232
217
1384
1 -240
159
1400
1 *232
163
1308
1-278
107
2000
1386
1*304
213
1369
i*3i3
156
1386
1-304
160
I29O
i*355
IO4 ;
! 2100
1372
i*377
209
1354
1*387
IS2
1372
i*377
156
1273
i*433
102 '
: 2200
1358
1*450
205
1340
1 -461
149
ISS8
1-450
153
I257
1*512
99
1 2300
1344
1-524
201
IS26
1*536
146
1344
1*524
150
I24O
1-592
96
; 24OO
1330
1*599
197
1312
1 -612
143
1330
i*599
147
1225
1-673
94 ;
j 2500
1317
1 -675
193
1298
I -689
140
1317
1*675
144
1209
1*755
91
1 2600
1304
1*751
189
1284
I -766
137
1304
1 '751
141
1194
1-838
89 j
j 2700
1291
1 -828
185
1271
1-844
134
1291
1-828
138
1179
1 -922
87 !
: 2800
1278
i *906
181
1258
1*923
131
1278
1 -906
136
II65
2-008
85 j
2900
1266
1 ‘985
178
1245
2-003
129
1266
1*985
133
II5I
2-094
83 ;
1 3000
1253
2 -064
174
1233
2*084
127
1252
2*064
I3I
II38
2-182
. 8l '
1 3io°
1241
2-144
171
1220
2*165
124
1241
2-144
128
1125
2-270
79 !
: 3200
1230
2*225
168
1208
2-247
122
1230
2-225
126
1 1 12
2*360
77 i
3300
1218
2*307
165
1197
2*330
xi9
1218
2*307
123
IO99
2*451
■ 75
1 3400
1207
2-390
162
H85
2-414
117
1207
2*390
121
I087
2-542
74
350°
1196
2*473
159
1174
2*499
115
1196
2*473
119
IO76
2*634
72
: 3600
1185
2*557
156
H63
2-585
113
1185
2*557
117
IO65
2-728
7i
3700
ii74
2-642
153
1152
2-671
in
1174
2-642
115
1055
2 -822
70
3800
1163
2-727
150
II4I
2*758
109
1163
2727
113
IO45
2-917
68
3900
n53
2-813
147
II3I
2-846
107
H53
2-813
in
IO36
3*oi3
67
4000
ii43
2-900
144
1120
2*935
105
1143
2-900
109
1027
3*iio
66
4100
ii33
2-988
142
IIIO
3-025
103
1133
2-988
107
IOI9
3-208
65
4200
1123
3*077
139
IIOI
3*06
101
1123
3*077
105
ion
3*307
64
4300
1114
3-166
137
1091
3*207
99
1114
3-166
103
1004
3-406
63
4400
1104
3*256
135
1082
3*299
97
1104
3-256
102
996
3*5°6
62
4500
1095
3*347
133
1073
3*392
96
1095
3*347
100
989
3-607
61
4600
1087
3*439
131
1065
3*486
94
1087
3*439
98
982
3*7o8
61
4700
1078
3*532
129
1057
3*58o
93
1078
3*532
96
976
3-810
60
4800
1070
3*625
127
1049
3*675
92
1070
3*625
95
97o
3*9i3
59
4900
1063
3*719
125
1041
3*77i
90
1063
3*7i9
93
963
4-017
59
5000
1055
3*813
123
1034
3-867
89
1055
3“8i3
92
958
4*!2I
58
390
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Distance
16 («*?*•)
3‘45-inch Gun
w=i6 1bs.; d=3. 372-in.
d2-Hw— '7105
17 ( c°nL )
3-inch B.L, Gun
w=i2 lbs. ; d=3-in. ;
d2-r-w= ‘7500
10 {font.)
3-inch M.L. Gun
iv=i2lbs. ; d = 2"g2-in. ;
d2-s-w— '7105
19 (cont-)
3-inch M.L. Gun
w=9 lbs. ; d = 2"94-in. ;
d2-r\v= -9604
Feet
V.
t.
1 E<
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
V.
t.
E.
5100
IO48
3-908
121
1027
3-964
88
IO48
3-908
9i
952
4*226
57
5 200
IO4I
4-004
120
1021
4-062
87
I04I
4-004
90
946
4-33I
57
5300
IO34
4-101
118
IOI5
4-160
86
1034
4-101
89
940
4*437
56
5400
1028
4-198
117
IOO9
4-259
85
1028
4-198
88
935
4-544
55
5500
1022
4-296
”5
1003
4-358
84
1022
4-296
87
929
4-651
55
5600
IOl6
4394
114
998
4-458
83
IOl6
4-394
86
924
4-759
54
5700
IOIO
4-493
112
992
4758
82
IOIO
4-493
85
919
4-868
53
5800
1005
4-592
hi
987
4-659
81
1005
4-592
84
9i3
4-977
53
5900
999
4-692
no
981
4761
80
999
4-692
83
908
5-087
52
6000
994
4-792
109
976
4-863
79
994
4792
82
903
5-197
5i
6lOO
989
4-893
108
971
4-966
79
989
4-893
81
898
5-3o8
5i
6200
984
4-994
107
966
5-069
78
984
4-994
80
893
5-420
5o
6300
979
5-096
106
962
5-173
77
979
5-096
80
888
5-532
5o
6400
974
5-I98
105
957
5-277
77
974
5'i98
79
883
5-645
49
6500
969
5-3oi
104
952
5782
76
969
5'30i
78
878
5758
49
6600
965
5-404
103
948
5-487
75
965
5-404
77
874
5-872
48
6700
960
5-5o8
102
943
5 793
75
960
5-5o8
77
869
5*987
48
6800
956
5-612
IOI
939
5-699
74
956
5612
76
864
6-102
47
6900
952
5-7I7
IOO
934
5 "8o6
73
952
5717
75
860
6-218
47
7000
947
5-823
99
930
5-9i3
73
947
5-823
75
855
6-335
46
7100
943
5-929
99
926
6-021
72
943
5-929
74
7200
939
6-035
98
922
6-129
71
939
6-035
73
7300
935
6/142
97
917
6-238
7i
935
6-142
73
7400
93i
6-249
96
9i3
6-347
7o
93i
6-249
72
7500
927
6-357
95
909
6-457
69
927
6-357
72
7600
923
6-465
95
905
6-567
69
923
6-465
7i
7700
919
6-574
94
901
6-678
68
919
6-574
7i
7800
9i5
6-683
93
898
6-789
67
9i5
6-683
7o
7900
911
6-792
92
894
6-901
67
911
6-792
70
8000
907
6-902
92
890
7-oi3
66
907
6-902
69
8lOO
903
7-013
9i
886
7-126
66
903
7-oi3
68
8200
900
7-124
90
882
7-239
65
900
7-124
68
8300
896
7-235
89
879
7-353
65
896
7-235
67
84OO
892
7-347
89
875
7-467
64
892
7747
66
8500
889
7'459
88
871
7-58i
64
889
7-459
66
8600
885
7-572
87
867
7-696
63
885
7-572
65.
8700
881
7-685
86
864
7-81 1
63
881
7-685
65
8800
878
7799
86
860
7-927
62
878
7799
64
8900
874
7-9I3
85
857
8-044
62
874
7-9I3
64
9000
871
8-028
84
853
8-161
61
871
1 -028
63
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
391
A General Table for facilitating the Calculation of the Range corresponding
to a given loss of Velocity of any Spherical Shot.
Dis¬
tances
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
feet
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
O
2100 *0
2095 -6
2091 -3
2086 -9
2082 -6
20783
2074-0
2069 -6
20653
2061 -O
IOO
20567
2052-5
2048 -2
2043-9
2039-7
2035-5
2031-2
2027-0
2022 -8
2018-6
200
2014-4
2010-2
2006 -o
2001 -9
I997-7
1993-6
1989-4
19853
I981 '2
1977-1
30°
1973-0
1968 ‘9
1964-8
1960-7
19567
1952-6
1948-6
1944-6
I940-5
I936-5
400
1932-5
I928-5
I9247
1920-5
1916-6
1912*6
1908-7
1904-7
I900-8
1896-9
500
1893-0
1889-1
1885-2
1881-3
1877-4
1873-6
1869*7
1865-8
1862 -o
1858-1
600
1854-4
1850-5
1846*7
1842-9
1839-1
l835'4
1831-6
1827-8
1824-1
1820-3
700
1816-6
1812-8
1809-1
1805 -4
1801 -7
1798-0
I794‘3
1790-6
1786*9
1783-3
800
1779-6
1775-9
I772-3
1768-7
1765-0
1761-4
1757-8
1754-2
I750'6
1747-0
900
I743-4
1739-8
17367
1732-7
1729-1
1725-6
I722-I
1718-5
I7I5-0
1711-5
1000
1 708 -o
1704-5
1701 -o
1697-5
1694-0
1690-5
1687-1
1683-6
l68o -2
1676-7
1100
16733
1669-9
1666*4
1663 -o
1659-6
1656-2
1652-8
1649-5
1646T
16427
1200
1639-2
1636-0
1632-7
1629-3
1626-0
1622-7
1619-3
1616-0
l6l2-7
1609-5
1300
1606 -2
1602 -9
1599-6
1596-3
I593-I
1589-9
1586-6
1583-4
1580-2
1577-0
1400
1573-8
1570-6
1567-4
1564-2
1561 -O
I557-9
1554-7
I55I-5
1548-4
1545-3
150°
I542-I
i539-o
1535-9
1532-8
1529-7
1526-6
I523-6
1520-5
I5I7-4
1514-4
1600
I5II-3
1508-3
I505-2
I 502 -2
1499-2
1496-2
1493.2
1490-2
1487-2
1484-2
1700
I481 -2
1478-3
1475 -3
I472-3
1469-4
1466-4
I463-5
1460-6
I457-7
1454*8
1800
I45I-9
1449-0
1446-1
1443-2
1440-3
H37-5
1434-6
I43I-7
1428-9
1426-1
I9OO
1423-2
1420-4
1417-6
1414-8
1412-0
1409-2
1406 -4
1403-6
I400-8
1398-1
2000
13953
1392-6
1389-8
I387-I
1384-4
1381-6
1378-9
1376-2
1373-5
1370-8
2100
1368-1
1365-4
1362-8
I360-I
1357-4
1354*8
I352-I
I349-5
I346-B
1344-2
2200
1341-6
1339*0
I336-4
1333-8
1331-2
1328-6
1326-1
I323-5
I320-9
1318-4
2300
1315-8
I3I37
1310-8
I308 -2
1305-7
1303-2
1300-7
1298 '2
1295-7
1293-2
24OO
1290-8
1288-3
1285-8
1283-4
1280-9
1278-5
1276-O
1273-6
1271 -2
1268-8
25OO
1266 -4
1264-0
1261 -6
1259-2
1256-8
I254-4
1252*1
I249-7
I247-3
1245 -o
2600
1242-6
1240-3
1238-0
1235-6
1233-3
1231-0
1228-7
I226-4
I224-I
1221 -9
2700
1219-6
1217-3
1215-1
1212-8
1210-5
1208-3
1206-1
I203-8
1201 -6
II99-4
2800
1197-2
1195-0
1192-8
II90-6
1188-5
1186-3
1184-1
1182 -o
1179-9
II77-7
29OO
1175-6
II73-5
1171-4
II693
1167-2
1165-1
1163-0
1160-9
1158-8
II56-8
3000
II54-7
1152-7
1150-6
II48-6
1146-6
1144-6
1142 -6
II40-6
1138 -6
II36-6
3100
1134-6
1132-6
1130-7
II28-7
1126-8
1124-8
1122-9
1 121 -O
1119-1
III7-2
3200
iii5-3
1113-4
1111 "5
1109-6
1107-8
1105-9
1104-0
1102 -2
1100 -4
1098-5
33°°
1096-7
1094-9
1093-1
I09I-3
1089-5
j 1087-7
1085-9
1084-2
1082-4
1080-7
3400
1078-9
1077-2
1075-4
1073-7
1072 -O
1 IO703
1068 -6
I066-9
I065 -2
1063-6
350°
1061 -9
1060 -2
1058-6
1056-9
1055-3
1053-7
1052-1
1050-4
1048 -8
1047-2
3600
1045 -6
I044-0
1042-5
1040-9
1039-3
1037-5
1036-2
1034-7
1033-1
I03I-6
3700
1030-1
I028-5
1027-0
I025-5
1024-0
1022*5
1021 -o
IOI9-5
1018-0
1016-6
3800
1015-1
IOI3-6
1012 "2
IOIO-7
1009-3
1007-8
1006-4
1005 -o
1003-5
1002 -i
3900
1000-7
9997
997-9
996-5
995-1
993-7
992-3
990-9
989-5
988*2
4000
986-8
985'4
984-I
982-7
981-4
980 -o
978-7
977-3
976-0
974-7
4100
9733
972-0
970-7
969-4
968-1
966*8
965-5
964-2
962 -9
961 -6
4200
960-3
959-o
957-8
956-5
955-2
954-o
952 A
951-5
950-2
948-9
43°°
9477
946-4
945 '2
944-0
942 -8
94i-5
940-3
939-1
937-8
936-6
4400
935-4
934-2
933-o
931-8
930-6
929-4
928-2
927-0
925-8
924-6
4500
923-4
922-3
921 -i
919-9
918-8
917-6
916-4
915-2
9I4"1
912-9
4600
911-8
9107
909-5
908-3
907-2
906-1
905 -o
903-8
902-7
901 -6
4700
900 -4
8997
898-2
897-1
896-0
894-9
893-8
892-7
891 -6
890-5
4800
889-4
888-3
887-2
886-1
885-0
883-9
882 -9
881 -8'
880-7
879-7
I 4900
878-6
8777
876-5
875-4
8743
1
873'3
872-2
871 '2
870-1
869-1
1
52
392
MINUTES OP PROCEEDINGS OF
21 A General Table for facilitating the Calculation of the Range corresponding
to a given loss of Velocity of any Elongated Shot ( Ogival Head).
Dis¬
tance
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
feet
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
f.s.
O
1700*0
1697*5
1695*1
1692*7
1690*3
1687*9
1685*5
1683.2
1 680 *8
1678*4
IOO
1676*0
1673*7
1671*3
1668 *9
1666*6
1664*2
1661 *9
I659-5
1657*2
1654*8
200
1652*5
1650*2
1647*9
1645 "6
16433
1640*9
1638*6
1636*3
1634-0
1631*7
300
1629*4
1627*1
1624*8
1622*5
1620*2
1617*9
1615-6
1613*3
i6iit
1608 *8
400
1606*5
1604*2
1601 *9
1599-7
1597-4
I595-I
1592*8
1590*6
1588*3
1586*0
500
1583-8
1581-5
1579*2
1577*0
1574-7
I572-5
1570 *2
1567*9
1565-7
I563’4
600
1561 *2
I558-9
I556-7
1554-5
1552-2
1550-0
1547-8
1545-5
1543-3
1541*1
7°o
I538-8
1536*6
1534-4
1532*2
1530*0
1527*8
I525-6
I523-3
1521 *i
1518*9
800
15167
I5I4-5
1512*3
1510*1
1507*9
I505-7
I503-5
I50I-3
1499*1
1497*0
900
1494*8
1492 *6
1490*4
1488*3
1486*1
1483-9
1481 *8
1479*6
H77'4
1475-3
1000
1473*1
1471*0
1468*8
1466*7
1464*6
1462 *4
1460*3
1458*1
1456.0
I453-9
1100
1451*8
1449*6
I447-5
1445 -4
I443-3
I44I *2
I439-I
1437*0
1434-9
1432*8
1200
1430*7
1428*6
1426*5
1424*4
1422*3
1420*3
1418*2
1416*1
1414*1
1412*0
1300
1409*9
1407*9
1405 *8
1403*8
1401*7
I3997
1397*7
1395-6
1393-6
1391*6
1400
1389*6
I387-5
1385-5
1383*5
1381-5
I379-5
I377-5
1375-5
1373-5
I37I-5
1500
I369-5
1367*6
1365-6
1363*6
1361*7
1359-7
13577
1355-8
1353-8
I35I-9
1600
I349-9
1348*0
1346*1
I344-I
1342*2
1340*3
1338-4
I336-5
1334*6
1332*7
1700
1330*8
1328*9
1327*0
1325-1
1323*2
1321*3
I3I9-5
1317*6
I3I5-7
I3I3-9
1800
1312*0
1310*2
1308*3
1306*5
1304*6
1302 *8
1301 *o
1299*2
1297*3
1295*5
1900
12937
1291 *9
1290*1
1288*3
1286*5
1284*7
1282 *9
I28l *2
1279*4
1277*6
2000
1275*9
1274*1
1272*3
1270*6
1268*8
1267*1
1265*3
1263 *6
1261 *9
1260*1
2100
1258*4
1256*7
1255-0
1253*3
1251 *6
1249*9
1248*2
1246*5
1244*8
1243*1
2200
1241-5
1239*8
1238*1
1236*4
1234*8
1233*1
1231-5
1229*8
1228*2
1226*5
2300
1224*9
1223*3
1221 *6
1220*0
1218*4
1216*8
1215*2
1213*6
1212*0
1210*4
2400
1 208 *8
1207*2
1205*6
1204*0
1202 *4
1200*9
1199-3
1197*7
II96*2
1194*6
2500
1193*1
II9I-5
1190*0
1 188 *4
1 186 *9
1185*4
1183-8
1182*3
n8o*8
1179*3
2600
1177*8
1176*3
1174-8
1173-3
1171*8
1170*3
1168*8
1167*3
1165*8
1164*3
2700
1162*9
1161*4
II59-9
Ln
00
1157*0
II55-6
H54-I
1152*7
II5I-3
1149*8
2800
1148 *4
1147*0
1145*6
1144*1
1142*7
1141*3
1139*9
11387
1137*1
II35-7
2900
II34-3
1133*0
1131*6
1130*2
1128*8
1127-5
1126*1
1124*7
1123*4
1122*0
3000
1120*7
1119*3
iii8*o
11167
III5-3
1114*0
11127
1 1 1 1 *4
1110*1
1108*7
3100
1107*4
iio6*i
1104*8
1103-5
1102 *2
1 101 *o
10997
1098*4
1097*1
1095*8
3200
1094*6
1093*3
1092*1
1090*8
1089*6
1088 *3
1087*1
1085*8
1084*6
1083*4
330°
1082*2
1081 *o
1079*8
1078*5
1077*3
1076*1
1074*9
1073*8
1072*6
1071*5
3400
1070*3
1069 *2
1068 *o
1066 *8
1065*7
1064*6
1063*5
1062 *4
1061 *3
I060 *2
35oo
1059*1
1058*0
1056*9
1055-8
1054-7
10537
1052*7
1051*7
1050*6
1049 *6
3600
1048*6
1047*6
1046*6
1045-5
1044-5
1043*6
1042*6
1041 *6
1040*7
1039*7
3700
1038*8
1037*8
1036*9
1035-9
1035*0
1034*1
1033*2
1032*3
1031*4
1030*5
3800
1029*6
1028*7
1027*8
1027*0
1026*1
1025*2
1024*3
1023*5
1022*6
1021 *8
3900
1021*0
1020*1
1019*2
1018*4
1017*6
1016*8
1015*9
1015*1
1014*3
1013-5
4000
1012*7
1011*9
IOI I *I
1010.3
1009*6
1008 *8
1008 *o
1007*2
1006 *4
1005 *6
4100
1004*8
1004*1
1003*3
1002 *6
1001 *8
IOOI T
1000*3
999*6
998*8
998*1
4200
997 '3
996*6
995-8
995-1
994-3
993-6
992*9
992*2
991-5
990*8
4300
990*1
989-3
988*6
987-9
9877
986*5
985-8
985-1
984’4
983-7
4400
983*0
982*3
981 *6
981 *0
980*3
979*6
979-o
978-3
977*6
976*8
4500
976*2
975-5
974*8
974*2
973-5
972*9
972 *2
971-5
970*9
970*2
4600
969*6
969*0
968*3
967*7
967*0
966*4
965-7
965*1
964'4
963*8
4700
963*1
962*5
961*9
961*3
960*6
960*0
959*3
9587
958*1
957-5
4800
956*8
956*2
955-6
954 '9
954-4
953-7
953'i
952-5
951-9
951-3
5100
938-7
938*1
937-6
936-9
936-4
935-8
935-2
934-7
934-1
933-4
5400
921*7
921 T
920*6
920*0
9I9-5
918*9
918*3
917*8
917*2
916*7
S7oo
905-4
904*8
904-3
903*8
903'3
902*7
902 *2
901*7
901 T
900*7
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
893
DEYELOPMENT OP ARTILLERY MISSILES
DURING 1870.
BY
CAPTAIN C. 0. BROWNE, R.A.,
CAPTAIN INSTRUCTOR, ROYAL LABORATORY-.
A Paper read at the R. A. Institution, Woolwich , January 31, 18J1, to supplement the Paper
on Rifled Shells and Buzes read by Capt. C. 0. Browne , March 8, 18JQ.
Colonel W. J. Smythe, R.A., presided, and Captain A. D. Burnaby,
Secretary of the Royal Artillery Institution, introduced the lecturer and
his subject to the meeting.
Captain C. 0. Browne then read the following paper : —
I propose to-day to place before you typical specimens of all the
projectiles and fuzes connected with our rifled equipments now in the
service. Those that have- come into the service during the last year or
seem likely to be adopted, I propose to describe briefly, explaining as
far as I can the general character and design of each without entering
into unnecessary detail. The remainder I merely mean to enumerate j
in fact I only attempt to supplement the summary T gave last March,
by taking a short review of any new features assumed by our equip¬
ments, besides discussing a few questions of special interest, with the
hope that an opportunity may be afforded of hearing the opinions of
officers who have not leisure to bring their views forward in a formal
manner, and this the more because I am going to touch on matters of
which my own knowledge is most imperfect.
On the table are specimens of each class of service projectile, so that
I may say in a manner that all the skill and science of every branch of
the regiment culminates in effectively striking the personnel or materiel
of an enemy with one or another of the projectiles now before us.
To begin with the heavy ordnance.
In the equipment of the Woolwich guns there is little change, so
that the guns stand — 13", 12", 10", 9", 8", and 7" (besides the experi¬
mental 11 *6" gun). These guns have for their complete equipment —
Common shell, | Palliser shot,
Boxer shrapnel shell, j Case shot,
Palliser shell, *
(the 7 -inch only firing double shell),
394
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Their fuzes are placed opposite to them. The common and double
shell are generally fired with the Pettman Gr.S. fuze for sea service,
but as I noticed last year it is most important to recollect that this
fuze (which is excellent for sea service) will not act on graze and is
therefore useless for land service, for on direct impact the time fuzes are
driven in so as to explode the shells ; hence while only occasionally used
at sea, the sole fuzes issued for land service are the 9 and 20 seconds
Boxer M.L.O. time fuzes.
The common shells, though at present unchanged in any way, are
likely to have their explosive power greatly increased by the introduc¬
tion of
Picric Powder,
This is the first substance partaking of the nature of a detonating
composition that has offered a reasonable prospect of safety against
premature explosion when used as a bursting charge for a shell, and
while it is very stable in its chemical character, it possesses in common
with fulminates very much greater explosive force than gunpowder
(probably about double the force) . I need not attempt a discussion of
the chemical composition of this substance, which has been worked
out by Mr. Abel in his department and recommended by him in a form
which seems to be free from the defects generally belonging to com¬
positions of a similar character hitherto used by the French and other
governments.
The products of explosion are the same generally as those of gun¬
cotton — viz. carbonic acid, nitrogen gas, and water, without the genera¬
tion of the volatile sulphates and sulphides which mainly contribute to
the formation of the dense smoke accompanying the explosion of
gunpowder. Picric powder would generally have less smoke than
gunpowder, but this is no recommendation for the purposes for which
it is likely to be adopted.
Palliser and Steel Projectiles .
Passing next to Palliser projectiles, I may notice the introduction of
serge bags now inserted in the shells to prevent friction of powder
against iron in case of the coating of lacquer in the interior being
imperfect, and also in case of the presence of any iron particles cut
from the wrought-iron bush in the operation of tapping, and adhering
to the lacquer. The operation of lacquering these shells is specially
difficult, because the shells must not be re-heated after they once cool,
and it is difficult to catch them in the process of cooling at the precise
temperature which favours the adhesion of the service red lacquer.
To avoid the presence of iron in any form, a cold lacquer will be
applied to these shells for the future, and as an additional precaution
the bag will be used.
A more interesting question is that of the relative powers of our
service chilled projectiles and rival shot of the same class. Good steel
projectiles have been made, but some of the processes of manufacture
are very tedious, and in the present state of development of the art
the work is apt to fail : thus they are not only outrageously expensive,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
395
but also difficult of rapid production on a large scale, and besides there
is no promise of superiority to justify any special efforts in this direction
at present. Beautiful chilled projectiles have been supplied from
Finspon in Sweden. The processes of manufacture are not fully
known to us probably. The iron is softer than ours, the shot bear the
marks of a cutting tool all over them. I believe that projectiles quite as
good or even better can now be manufactured in the Royal Laboratory
at about half the price charged for the Swedish shot as delivered. I
do not say that all our service projectiles have been so good. As perhaps
most officers present are aware, there have been manufacturing diffi¬
culties which have led to the condemnation of considerable numbers of
projectiles ; but I believe these are now overcome, and I feel sure that
we may place great confidence in the mechanical talent and ability of
all the hands to whom the work of our manufacture is entrusted. As
to our future issues, the Ridsdale iron supplied from Elswick seems to
promise even better results than the iron we have employed up to this
time.
I should like for a few moments to consider the action of shot on
impact against armour. The powers of a projectile are generally
estimated —
1st. By the actual penetration in the plate.
2nd. By its own behaviour ; that is whether it stands up well to its
work or breaks away.
The first mentioned test is plain and fair where calibres and charges
are the same. The second indication is less distinct ; the supposition
is that when a shot shivers, the fragments commonly carry away in them
a certain part of the work stored up in the projectile, which part clearly
becomes unprofitable, except in the case of complete penetration. It is
to be noticed however that the target is the agent by which the shot is
broken, and the actual work of fracture is bond fide reaction of ivorlc
impressed on the target as truly as the setting up a shot ; in fact a shot
may be so fractured that before the fragments separate from the head,
they have lent nearly all their striking power to the work : only while
in this case we may say that we cannot quite estimate how little work
was carried off in an unprofitable form, in the case of a shot which
remains entire we are sure that none at all has been so wasted. May
I call your attention to the 9 -inch Finspon Palliser shot before you,
which penetrated 14 ins. into solid iron plate and bounded back several
feet, slightly set up and cracked but intact. In the case of complete
penetration, when of course the penetrative powers are not taxed to the
full, it is rather an advantage for a shot to break as it comes through.
Perhaps while on the subject of penetration of armour, it may not be
wasting our time to consider a few statements concerning flight and
penetration which have been made by those who have specially studied
these questions.
Lieut. Sladen on Resistance of the Air.
Lieut. Sladen, after taking part in Professor Bashforth's investigations
as to the resistance of the air, by means of the professor's chronograph,
remarks that, in addition to the pressure on the head there is a powerful
396
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
retarding force in the shape of minus pressure or suction, from the
partial vacuum formed behind the base of any projectile moving rapidly.
To this suction must be attributed a fact brought out by these investi¬
gations — viz. that the actual retarding pressure on a spherical 9 -inch shot
AMBN in fig. moving at a velocity of 1130ft. per second is 555 lbs., while
that on an elongated 9 -inch shot with a hemispherical head AMBBC
moving at the same velocity is only 48 7 lbs. But the anterior portions AMB
being identical, the decrease of pressure of 68 lbs. on the elongated shot
must be due to the air closing in more easily behind it. I now speak
of the question of actual resistance , which must not be confounded with
the greater power of overcoming resistance possessed by the elongated
shot as compared with the spherical, which may generally be about
3 to 1.
Further, the service ogival-heacled 9 -inch shot AM' BBC meets with
98 lbs. less pressure on it than a hemispherical-headed one. So that the
advantages in keeping up velocity possessed by the service form of
shot as compared with a spherical one are more than would at first
appear ; for while the pressure of air against the latter is 555 lbs., it is
only 389 against the former, and to meet that pressure there is three
times the weight and momentum.
General Maievshy on the Blight of Projectiles.
The investigations of General Maievsky, as to the forces acting on
projectiles in flight and penetration, are such that they form a study of
great magnitude, involving peculiar applications of the highest mathe¬
matics. It would be idle to attempt to take up the pursuit of this
subject without making it a regular course of study. A few of
Maievsky^s results quoted by Mr. Mallet in his papers in the “ Engineer,”
as well as notes on the subject of penetration, as discussed by Mr. Mallet,
may be found valuable although briefly given in general terms.
1st. As to the irregular spiral path described by rifled projectiles in
flight : —
General Maievsky supposes the projectile to be proceeding on a path
not absolutely coincident with its axis, and shows that the point where
the resultant of the resistance on the anterior part of the projectile
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
397
intersects its axis (which he terms the “ centre of resistance ”), not
being exactly opposite to the centre of gravity, the force of projection
and that of resistance act so as to form a couple BC which tends to
deflect the head of the shot. This being opposed by the centrifugal force
due to rotation and the effect varying continually, the axis of the pro¬
jectile constantly describes in space a form approaching a cone, the
path of its centre of gravity being a helix or spiral.
General Maievsky arrives at the conclusion that the helix becomes
wider and wider as the projectile proceeds further and further on its
path.
Facts seem to contradict this, and though General Maievsky gives
reasons in support of his conclusions, it seems likely that the conditions
of the question are affected by the velocity of translation (and hence
the disturbing cause — viz. the resistance of the air) decreasing much
more rapidly than the velocity of rotation.
The small diminution of the velocity of rotation, as compared wTith
that of translation, is a fact that has been frequently overlooked, and
the strong reasons there are for believing that the flight of the pro¬
jectile increases in steadiness suggest the doubt whether General
Maievsky has sufficiently considered these disproportionate rates of
decrease in his investigations.
Mr. Mallet on Partial Penetration of Armour .
Mr. Mallet in his paper discusses the actual effects which are pro¬
duced by various forms of projectiles in piercing armour, on the
supposition that it is “ a homogeneous plate of parallel thickness of a
malleable material,” which is not completely penetrated by a rigid pro¬
jectile.
The greatest resistance is made by tough and moderately soft wrought-
iron, but even this behaves as a more or less brittle body whenever the
velocity of impact reaches about 560 ft. per second. The entrance of
projectiles into armour, Mr. Mallet considers then as accompanied by a
certain amount of direct fracture and a certain amount of lateral displace¬
ment, the metal behaving to some extent as a plastic and flexible body.
The ogival form of head is specially adapted to perform this work
effectually.
Probably the direct punching of the flat-headed shot compares better
with the wedging open of the ogival head if the plates are very hard.
The cylindro- ogival shot, if the angle of incidence be greater than
that made with the axis of the shot by a tangent to the curve of the
head at the point, digs its point in at once and “ the centre of gravity
of the shot at the same time goes forward, turns round more readily
at first than the flat-ended shot upon an equatorial axis, and slides in
the direction of a line making an angle, more or less, towards the
internal side of the face struck. The forward part of the shot thus cuts
out and partly pushes before it, normally to the face towards which it
slides, the plastically distorted part of the iron, and bulges or not the
opposite face in an umbo , whose conditions are such as referred to in
fig. below.”
398
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Mr. Mallet, however, considers that the shot of this form soon becomes
e'ncastre at its point as regards rotation in the plane of the figure, so that
further rotation is prevented by the support at the left side of the
head, and also near the point on the right side, the shot finally assuming
the position shown in fig. following.
Mr. Mallet further considers that friction may even cause a shot of
ogival form to turn, catch its point and penetrate when impinging on a
target at an angle of incidence slightly less than that of a tangent to
the ogival curve at the axis.
Passing on to the question of still more oblique impact as against
convex plates, Mr. Mallet shows that the ogival-pointed shot may
THE liOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
399
glance off point first, .when there is not enough plastic distortion to hold
the point,
and base first when the point is caught but not held.
Lastly, Mr. Mallet notices the conditions which cause a shot to
ricochet on water (in spite of the slight tendency there is to turn down¬
wards before the head becomes immersed, owing to the inequality of
the resistances on the front of it), the coefficient of resistance being much
less on the upper side.
Comparing the wave AA to that caused by an earthquake ( vide the
53
400
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
“Engineer,” 1867, January 4th, 11th, 18th, and 25th), I would ask
you to observe the beauty of the effect of the inelastic medium water on
the lower side pressing against the bottom and superincumbent mass,
and on the upper side lifted in a wave, as shown in fig.
I conclude the ricochet will be repeated until the difference of the
pressures caused by the resistance of the water against the lower half
and upper half of the anterior surface of the projectile, which is a
function of its velocity, becomes less than the vertical downward com¬
ponent of the shot.
To return to armour, it may be observed that the power of turning
in instead of glancing off point first when striking on armour at an
oblique angle increases with the radius of the circle with which the
ogival head is described, inasmuch as the limiting angle of penetration
is approximate to that made by the tangent to the ogival curve at the
apex with the axis of the projectile, i.e.} the limiting angle of pene¬
tration with ogivals of various radii may be said to be approximately
as follows : —
For 1 diameter . 60°
n H // 53° 8'
v li // 48° 12'
Captain Nolle on Complete Penetration of Armour Plates .
In a report on the experiments relative to the penetration of armour
plates by steel shot, printed in 1866, Captain W. H. Noble, It. A.,
discusses the means that exist of comparing the thickness of armour up
to 4J ins. of plate, pierced by various projectiles, and also of calculating
the probable effect that may be expected from any projectile. He
WV2
shows that the formula — ^ — which he expresses in “ foot tons,” gives
the “ work ” done by the shot on striking very correctly, whether of a
light projectile with a high velocity, or a heavy one with a low velocity ;
further, he considers that penetration is in inverse proportion to the
circumference of the shot.
It must be observed that the calculation only applies to the question
of complete perforation, when the plate may be supposed to be sheared
along the line corresponding to the circumference of the projectile.
This would be most nearly correct in the case of flat-headed shot.
To conclude with something more practical ; Captain Noble considers,
speaking roughly, that at 200 yds., 7-inch, 8-inch, and 9 -inch projectiles
may be expected to penetrate armour plates whose thickness does not
exceed their respective diameters by more than lin.; i.e., the 7-inch
may pierce 8 -inch armour, the 8 -inch may pierce 9 -inch armour, and
the 9-inch shot, armour lOins. thick. The powers of projectiles of
larger calibre are less thoroughly tried, but they appear to correspond
generally to those of the smaller ones.
Following naturally on such matters comes the question as to the
manner in which fire may be directed on a vessel in action with best
effect.
THE ROYAL AETILLERY INSTITUTION.
401
Now here I am entering on the discussion of a subject which I
do not understand. May we hope that some officer who has mastered
it may give us his opinion ? It is desirable that we should all know
something about firing at ships — work which we, as well as the navy,
might have to perform on service.
The old-fashioned method of fighting pursued by English ships (as
far as I comprehend it) was by some means to get to windward of the
enemy, and then engage hotly ; the range in old days having been so
short as to lead to the introduction of carronades, and afterwards having
been extended (chiefly during our American war) . Fighting from the
windward side was I believe the same thing as getting that mysterious
desideratum, the “ weather gauge ” of the enemy ; it gave the power of
closing to better advantage, and also, fighting as vessels then did under
canvas, it frequently gave the opportunity of hitting a ship heeling over,
“ between wind and water,” and making shot-holes which might prove
dangerous leaks, especially when she changed her tack. (The fig.
shows a cross section of the “ Favourite ” * at an angle of 20°, the side
* Taken from “ Eairbairn on Iron Ship-Building.’
402
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
below B is between wind and water) . I should think this can hardly
be better illustrated than by Mr. Froude's account of the effect of our
fire on the great ships of the Spanish Armada : —
“ Being always to leeward and the wind blowing hard, the hulls of
the galleons as they heeled over were exposed below the water-line.
The massive timbers which were to have furnished so secure a shelter,
added only to the effect of the shot. The middle decks were turned
into slaughter-houses, and in one ship blood was seen streaming
from the lee scuppers. Their guns were most of them dismounted, or
knocked in pieces, and their chief work was to save themselves from
sinking by nailing sheets of lead over the shot-holes.” — Froude,
Yol. VI. p. 481.
This plan of attack has done good service, but I believe its day has
passed away, and that for more than one reason.
In endeavouring to learn the “ soft places ” of armour-plated vessels
generally from the study of Mr. Reed's works on naval architecture, it
is discouraging to find that the “ vital parts,” so to speak, are specially
protected, and it seems peculiarly unlikely, unless the circumstances
were very favourable, that one would succeed in seriously injuring a
heavily -plated vessel along her water-line, about her engines, or even
in her rudder or screw. The question then suggests itself as to the
possibility of attacking a ship from the leeward side, and so obtaining
an opportunity of striking her deck, which appears to be really a weak
place ; but this is met by the fact that vessels no longer fight under
canvas, so that there is no constant heel on them, but all that remains
is the quick roll of a vessel in a rough sea. Any chance so afforded would
be offered alike by both ships, and I was informed by one of the
gunnery lieutenants of the “ Excellent ” (Lieut. Dowding) that very
little opportunity is so given. In fact on this matter I can add but
little to the answer which was given me by an American naval captain
whom I questioned as to where he considered one should endeavour to
strike an armour-clad — “ You must hit her where you can !”
When I say little is to be added to this, I would remark that a vessel
in most positions presents some part of her armour nearly at right
angles to one's fire, even when other portions may be at a considerable
inclination. Failing a more definite object, would it not be well to aim
at this part, whether near bows, stern, or midships ?
So it occurs to the mind that a vessel in action might with advantage
engage so as to fire her guns at an oblique angle with her keel (as shown
in fig. below in the position of the “ Naughty Child.”) Further, she might
change her position so as to turn away a damaged part of her armour ;
only in a rough sea it may be harder to take good aim when thus engaging
obliquely, because the line as well as the elevation would alter with the
roll of the ship. In the fig. below it may be seen that while the
“ Favourite ” receives all the fire of the “ Naughty Child” direct on
her sides, the latter is so placed than unless the “ Favourite ” strikes
her near her bows the shot are received at an angle of 50°, so that
penetration seems out of the question j and it may be observed how
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
403
little, comparatively speaking, a vessel will appear to be foreshortened
when thus turned to the glancing angle of service projectiles. Here
however I am getting beyond my province, so I will now come to our
siege and field equipments, considering the former to consist of 64 and
40-pr. B.L. guns, and the latter of 20, 12, and 9-pr. B.L. and 9-pr.
M.L. guns. The 7-inch B.L. is rather hard to classify; I need not
however notice it beyond mentioning that it fires the same projectiles
as the 64-pr. Besides these there is a 16-pr. proposed as a heavy field
gun, and there is also our 7-pr. mountain equipment, all firing —
Common shell, | Segment shell,
Boxer shrapnel shell, | Case shot,
except the 9 and 7-pr. M.L., which have no segment shell, and the
20-pr., which for some reason has as yet no shrapnel. The 40 and
20-pr. still have solid shot also, and the 7-pr. a double shell.
The time fuzes for service generally are the 5 secs, and 9 secs. M.L.O.
fuzes for the muzzle-loaders, except the 7-pr., which has a special gauge
fuze hole and set of fuzes which I trust are shortly to be abolished.* The
* Abolition since ordered to be carried out.
404
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
5, 9, and 20 secs. B.L.B.O. fuzes are used for the breech-loaders. As
to percussion fuzes for B.L. field service, the one that has come in and
is now issued is the original pattern of Armstrong fuze with the phos¬
phorus composition replaced by cap composition, which in the form of
a cap as proposed by Colonel Milward, is much more reliable than its
predecessors. This is of the pattern which is dropped into the B.L.
segment and common shell, being used beneath the screw plug ; the
F and F time fuzes being called in from land service equipments but
not from the navy, so that the segment and common shell for boat
service are fired as formerly with time and percussion fuzes, but for
land service with percussion fuzes and screw plugs. But this arrange¬
ment sometimes leaves a little play so as to allow the fuze to rattle ;
to obviate this, therefore (which might cause premature explosion), a
lead disc is served out to field batteries to press home into the bottom
of each segment shell, the burster being replaced in the shell over it.
The use of time and percussion fuzes together in segment shells I believe
is a mistake, and it has led to misconception. It may be seen by
anyone who cares to analyse results that all the success of shells so
fired has been due to those which were burst by the percussion fuzes,
in fact for good effect segment shell should be burst within a very
few yards of the object. No time fuze can be set accurately enough to
effect this, and hence it commonly either spoils the effect by opening
the shell too soon, or else simply plays the part of a plug.
A screw pattern of “ cap ” percussion fuze is likely to come in for
field service shells, with the general service gauge fuze hole, which I
shall notice presently.
The segment and common shell remain unchanged, except that the
sockets in the common shell have been found too weak, and are being
replaced by sockets of a stronger pattern. Shrapnel shell of the
pattern used at Dartmoor and elsewhere experimentally have been
since introduced into the service equipments.
Again we are brought face to face with the question of what shell
to use in the field, considering the results obtained at Aldershot and
those of the gigantic trials in actual service in the French and Prussian
war. It is impossible to ignore the great results achieved by the
Prussian artillery fire, but what conclusion do they justify ? If we take
the Prussian view of the matter, apparently to the adoption of common
shells with percussion fuzes for the chief projectiles used in the field ;
so that whereas last year after Dartmoor the decision had still to be
made between segment and shrapnel, we this year have competing
with them, common shell fired with percussion fuzes.
It is well, then, first to see on what grounds the common shell, which
we have found to be so inferior in effect on the personnel of an enemy, is
to be preferred, and chiefly what results have been obtained with it. The
most striking I believe were those produced at Sedan, where we read of
appalling havoc ; that the dead lay in heaps, and that the ground was
covered with men blown into “ masses of flesh and rags.” This result
was no doubt produced by common shells fired with percussion fuzes ; in
fact it is needless to quote the Prussian report on this matter, for nothing
else would effect this result. Some officers here may remember a heap
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
405
of Russian dead precisely in this condition close to the salient of the
Redan at the fall of Sebastopol, who no doubt had been mangled by
common shells burst close to them (a common shell with a time fuze
occasionally but not frequently acting in this way) . Colonel Enderly
Gordon informs me that at Inkerman a soldier near him was blown into
the air, and fell such a mass of flesh and blue cloth that he was unable
to pronounce whether the man was a Turk or a gunner.
Then comes the question, is it necessary to blow an enemy into flesh
and rags ? Is it even desirable ? The moral effect is no doubt consider¬
able on those who are close to a man so mutilated, and moral effect is
something ; but common sense tells us that each human body so torn
asunder represents a large share of the power of a shell, and the choice
consequently seems to lie between killing or wounding perhaps a dozen
men with bullets, and blowing one or two into .fragments. It will no
doubt be urged that the number destroyed by the Prussians in the time
was very great ; but to this may be answered that the circumstances
were exceptional, and when the conditions on active service, as in this
case, at all approach those of ordinary practice firing, the slaughter
must always be frightful. The range at Sedan probably varied little
during the day, the ground was hard, the men were in close formation,
the fire was converging. We might discharge any kind of projectile
into masses of men penned up in a corner, with great confidence in
being able to kill large numbers.
-j-l PREMATURE
II 9 *1*
May I again show you the diagram which represents the fifteen best
rounds of segment fired at Dartmoor at targets representing a regiment
in column partly concealed behind the crest of a hill? 1194 hits were
produced ! At this rate, each field battery would annihilate an entire
infantry regiment in about a minute and a half ; but continue the fire
at half that rate, and the bare conception of each field battery killing
or wounding 20,000 men per hour, is enough to show us that it is only
necessary on service to approach the conditions of practice with segment
or shrapnel, to cause results such as we may well hope we may never
see. I suppose we can hardly look forward to a time when we shall
disable an enemy so skilfully that we come to look on it as an awkward
mistake when we kill men, but still there seems something savage in
revelling in the idea of not only disabling men but also blowing them
into fragments. The natural feeling of dislike to mutilate our fellow-
creatures may seem to savour more of sentiment than real humanity,
but still I think humanity is in favour of striking men rapidly with
shrapnel bullets rather than blowing them to pieces slowly and tediously
with common shell, especially as in the latter case it is possible that
the battle may last longer; but at all events, looking at the result as
406
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
“ work done/* the former appears decidedly to be in the more profitable
shape.
The Prussian common shells and percussion fuzes are I believe not
doing so well this winter, and it is not wonderful ; even ploughed fields
may become hard in the sun, but battles may be fought, like Waterloo,
under circumstances which would render it very doubtful if percussion
fuzes would act at all. If we are to imitate the Prussians, let it be in
the way in which they form their own conclusions, and when well
founded, hold to them in spite of the opinions of other nations (as for
example in their adoption of the needle gun), rather than in the servile
copy of what we have proved to be bad.
Since writing the above. Captain Majendie has informed me of the
news that the Prussians are dissatisfied with their common shells and
percussion fuzes, and are endeavouring to get a supply of shrapnel and
time fuzes. This, however, can hardly be said to affect our decision in
this matter, for we have worked this question out for ourselves in a
way that may be relied on. Supposing then that the choice lies
between the segment with its wide-spread and telling action on graze
or impact, and the shrapnel with its close cone of dispersion and great
penetration, so admirably suited to time fuzes ; are we to take both,
or which of the two ? This is still a matter open to speculation and
opinion, but I hope there may yet be found a satisfactory solution.
The wide spread is desirable for action on impact or graze, the close
cone for bursting in the air. Can the same shell be made to act in
both ways ? It hardly appears probable that the segment could be
made to open with the close prolonged action of the shrapnel in the air,
but is it not evident that the immediate wide dispersion so desirable on
graze might be given to the shrapnel by simply inserting a second burst¬
ing charge in the socket beneath the percussion fuze, which, with it,
would be removed when a time fuze was to be used, so that the design
and action of the shell in its own way would not be interfered with. I
proposed this before the Aldershot trial took place, and some time since
Mr. Forest brought it forward, using a tin burster to contain the powder,
and it has given good results.
It appears also that the advantage of great speed in action may be
obtained by carrying the shell with a percussion fuze and bursting charge
in a tin burster beneath it. This is fired as quickly as a shot, for it is only
necessary for the man bringing it up to the gun to pull out the safety
pin, which in the form of fuze now brought forward by Colonel Milward
is clear above the apex of the shell.
Should an officer consider he can fire time fuzes with advantage, the
screw percussion fuze and burster may be nearly as quickly removed as a
screw plug.
Does it not appear that we might under these circumstances depend
mainly on Boxer shrapnel supported with case shot and a few common
shell ; and thus, while fully owning what the segment has taught us,
make the shrapnel perform duty for it in the way just described ?
As to case shot, there is a much better pattern likely to come in
for the 9-pr., containing lead and antimony balls packed in clay and
sand, which seems to travel well and give remarkably good results.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
407
I believe Colonel Wray has chiefly worked out this question, with some
suggestions of Mr. Widgery, a foreman in the Royal Laboratory.
Mitrailleuses.
It is impossible here to do more than notice the probable powers of
the mitrailleuse in general and the part it plays in the field. In order
to do this we must know the ammunition it is to fire. Should it be
decided to employ with it the same ammunition as the infantry, its
powers become very limited, and its place easily defined ; its extended
use with heavier ammunition need not now be discussed, for it appears
that the authorities have decided on the lighter nature for our service.
We may say then, since it is obviously unsuitable for firing at
skirmishers, and cannot injure materiel , that its work must be limited
to firing on masses of men within rifle range . When will it have the
opportunity of doing this ? Chiefly we may suppose in the defence of
bridges, breaches, and whenever it can be masked and brought to bear
suddenly on bodies of men, or when it can be specially protected by
cover : for it clearly cannot be expected to work generally with
skirmishers in an open field, for its men or horses would be killed,
its limited range making it impossible for it to work from artillery
positions.
Thus I think it will appear :
1st., that the mitrailleuse is decidedly adapted for defence rather than
attack, speaking generally.
And 2ndly, that it is specially adapted for a closed country rather than
an open one.
Hence it is an arm that England, of all nations, should adopt ; we
may expect before long to find it taken up by the volunteer corps.
The fire of mitrailleuses compares best with that of guns at long case
or short shrapnel ranges (say between 200 and 700 yds.)
The skilful disposition of mitrailleuses is a kindred science with (but
must not be supposed to be the same as) the handling of field artillery.
RocJcets.
If time permitted, much that is interesting might be said about
rockets ; just at present they are not in a satisfactory condition. Sir W.
Congreve introduced them for incendiary purposes, but shell rockets
have been condemned and carcass rockets have dropped out of the
service almost un
favourites.
It surely cannot be thought satisfactory to use rockets which, if fired
at much beyond half the full range of the old Congreve, fall dead with
no more incendiary power and nothing like the striking force of a shot.
Again, though Hale's principle is good, the accuracy is now nothing to
boast of ; and here I may notice a very curious fact as to ranges of
Hale's rockets fired in different winds. Captain Majendie advised me
to classify results according to the direction of the wind, and in doing
so it appears that the average range of Hale's rockets during the year
54
perceived, yet these were Sir William's special
408
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
1870, fired with the wind blowing across the range from right to left,
is half again what it is when the wind is blowing from left to right.
This may be a coincidence; bnt if so it is a very remarkable one; for
not only is it arrived at by the comparison of a large number of rounds,
bnt the maximum and minimum as well as the mean range obtained in
each wind conform to the apparent rule. Mr. Forest informs me he
should have expected this result, or at all events a tendency to it, from
the direction of the rocket's rotation ; and certainly when it is
remembered that the velocity of rotation is very rapid and that of transla¬
tion comparatively slow, it seems quite reasonable to suppose that the
greater pressure of air against the side turning rapidly upwards tends to
make the rocket as it were roll itself downwards ; but the matter needs
investigation. It is, I am glad to say, proposed to introduce carcass
rockets again, so as to restore to the rocket its incendiary power.
I might notice that there have been manufacturing difficulties which
have caused large numbers of the war and life-saving rockets issued to
the service to fail. Such difficulties are it is hoped now overcome, and
the old store is being replaced by rockets of stronger and sounder
make.
I believe our rocket system is capable of great improvement. Let
no one suppose that we have solved the problem of how to discharge
rockets satisfactorily. My own private opinion on this matter is that
we have been beating about without a sufficiently definite object. We
have adopted troughs for our land service machines. Now, since a
rocket discharges itself feebly from a trough as compared with a tube,
it must be supposed that the recommendations of a trough are simplicity
and non-liability to foul. As to simplicity, although one trough may
discharge more than one size of rocket, for the rockets we have decided
to retain in the service — viz. the 24-pr. and 9-pr. for land service, and
the 24-pr. for sea service — we have two sizes of trough and one tube ; it
would be difficult to have more ; and as to fouling, it is quite a question
whether even a foul tube would discharge a rocket in a worse manner
than a clean trough. In Abyssinia a tube was used which was sponged
and acted excellently.
Then the method of giving elevation is absolutely false, both for the
land and sea service machines. Its recommendation appears to be
simplicity. Is it to be wondered at that Mr. Hale should have
protested against the trough and present method of treating his rockets,
which Major Geary aptly terms looking on them as “ some sort of
dangerous wild beast V9
Do I greatly exaggerate if I say that the most successful performance
expected with the service rocket appears to be to discharge it with¬
out bursting charge, without incendiary power, without a fair force
of propulsion, with much less range than the old Congreve, without
any particular aim, and with a false elevation ? In fact we are
reminded of the sailor at Sebastopol who fired a shot from a gun, sunk
in a pit, at 45° elevation, and who, as it went far beyond his ken,
complacently remarked that it had gone “ somewhere into Booshia."
I will close the subject of war rockets by mentioning that the navy
(so Lieut. Dowding informs me) have sometimes obtained enormous
THE EOYAL AETILLEEY INSTITUTION.
409
range and power by closing the rear of a rocket tube. This seems
reasonable but decidedly dangerous ; but it might I think be interesting
to try how the 9-pr. Hale rocket propels itself out of a gun — the
12-pr. B.L. at a high angle might be very suitable. The rocket
should have some quick match fagoted in its vent, and then might be
entered in the gun and the latter fired by a friction tube in the vent-
piece in the usual way (no cartridge of course being used) . It must
however be clearly borne in mind that this can never be more than a
possible expedient, for if rockets were habitually discharged from guns
instead of light tubes, &c., the chief advantage that led to their
introduction would be sacrificed, to say nothing of the injury that might
be caused to the rifling of the gun.
Life-Saving Rockets..
The science of communicating with ships in distress is a very
interesting one, and there must be something very satisfactory in having
to employ science to save life, but I am only calling your attention to¬
day to the curious conditions of flight of the rocket. The stick is placed
on one side, hence the centre of gravity and centre of resistance are not
opposite to each other, and we have Maievsky's question of spiral flight
again, the arrow-like action of the stick being the steadying power
corresponding to the rotation of the projectile, and tending to keep the
point to the front ; but the flight would be very bad and unsteady
were it not for the pull of the line which the rocket carries ; indeed it
would fly so badly as to be nearly worthless. I believe more use might
be made of the pull of the line, and possibly the rocket might carry
without either stick or rotation by its means, and so it might be fired
in a more advantageous way than at present.
One thing should be specially noticed — viz. the great importance of
taking advantage of any momentary lull to get the rocket off in a true
direction, for the pull of the line soon acquires great force and tends to
draw the axis of the rocket into the line of flight it has up to that time
taken ; thus it causes the rocket's gas to propel it into the prolongation
of the same line ; hence the importance of its commencing on the true
direction.
I have now touched on a great many points, and have certainly done
justice to none. It might have been more satisfactory to myself to have
spent the time on one subject, but I think that it must be more
generally useful to notice the features of our equipment as a whole than
to deal more fully with one or two questions, although the latter
proceeding might be the more interesting one.
At the conclusion of the reading, which was much applauded —
Colonel Smythe invited discussion, saying that Captain Browne would be
happy to answer any questions which might be put to him.
Colonel Phillpotts, B.II.A., asked how long the serge bags for holding the
bursting charges in shells had been introduced?
410
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Captain Browne replied that they were first adopted some months ago.
Captain E. II. Cameron, E.A., said the lecturer had quoted from Captain Noble
as to the penetration of an ogival-headed shot into armour being estimated at
one inch in excess of its diameter. He wished to enquire if that law applied to
chilled shot only?
Captain Browne answered that it applied to chilled shot or steel, which was
nearly as good.
Major Campbell, B.A., said he had not exactly understood the lecturer’s remarks
as to the objections against time fuzes.
Captain Browne said the principal objection to time fuzes with segment shell
was that they could not be set so accurately as to make sure of that shell being
effective ; and the chances were a hundred to one that the round was spoilt. If
they could set the fuze so that it exploded the segment shell at 10 yds. from
the object, the effect would be good, but if 50 yds. in advance or 50 yds. beyond
it would be bad; and the fuze was much more likely to operate 50yds.
away than close to the target. In fact, in firing time fuzes, every alternate shell
would probably burst 50 yds. in front, and every other shell would go through
the target like a mere shot. In the Dartmoor trials, officers were perfectly aware
of this peculiarity, their intelligence being actually in advance of their morals —
(a laugh) — for they purposely set their time fuzes long, so as to give the shells their
percussion action against the target. They fired in fact with percussion fuzes,
while the shell had the credit of acting with time fuzes.
Major Campbell. — Then you would reject the time fuze altogether?
Captain Browne. — With segment shell.
Captain Majendie, B.A., Assistant Superintendent lloyal Laboratory, said it
might interest some officers to know that the experiments to test the relative
advantages of segment and shrapnel shells, used with percussion fuzes in the
manner described by Captain Browne, would take place next day at Shoeburyness.
It was, he considered, an experiment of very great importance ; for, as Captain
Browne had justly said, there was a greater necessity for getting rid of their surplus
material and simplifying their equipment, than there was of new inventions. As
to the merits of the two systems, his own opinion was that the shrapnel shell, fitted
with a fuze which burst on graze, was so little inferior in effect to the segment burst
in the same way, that he very much questioned whether, for the sake of such a
slight difference, which would hardly be sensible at all on service, they ought to
maintain the two shells. (Hear, hear.) He knew there were officers who could see
no objection to having two, three, or any number of different kinds of projectiles
with the gun, but he held complication and multiplicity of projectiles to be a valid
and practical objection, and he hoped the results of these experiments would show
that the shrapnel shell, with a percussion fuze, was practically able to answer all
the purposes of the segment, while as a time shell the shrapnel was admitted to be
very superior. Another thing might be said of the shrapnel : that although its want
of quick scattering effect might be disadvantageous when burst very close to an
object, if it burst 50 yds. in front of the object, that action was rather an advantage
than otherwise ; but with the segment shell, if it burst 50 yds. in front, the round
was almost thrown away. These, however, were points still under discussion, and
soon to be put to the test. Some objectors argued that segment shells were better
than shrapnel against materiel — an advantage which he could certainly not appre¬
ciate. What materiel did they mean ? They would surely not fire either one or
the other shell against a house ; and if they did, one would be of just as much or
as little use as the other. It was said that the segment was better for cutting away
the branches of abattis , but it was not the segments with which the shell was
charged, which only cut the twigs, by which an effective destruction was caused,
but the body of the shell itself which cut away the big branches ; and the same could
be said of stockades — one shell would do for such a purpose as well as the other.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
411
In analysing that objection, lie was therefore unable to know what materiel was
meant. Did it mean gun carriages ? If so, they could be cut up by the body of
either projectile ; but there was no such real, substantial, or considerable advantage
on the side of the segment shell as would warrant its retention as a separate
projectile. (Applause).
Captain Strange, R.A., said that in spite of the opprobrium cast upon inventors
or anyone who introduced anything new, he would ask Captain Browne whether he
did not think it was desirable to have a percussion fuze for the siege ordnance ; and,
again, whether they had a good reliable percussion fuze which would act on newly
turned earth ? He knew they had the Pettman fuze, both for land and sea service,
but that required the resistance of 8 ins. of oak to make it act, and as they were
not likely to have wooden ships to fight against, nor wooden fortifications, he did
not see much virtue in a test like that. (Applause).
Captain Browne replied that beyond doubt the seige equipment was in a pecu¬
liar position. He would especially notice that there was no fuze adapted for
graze with heavy projectiles, but he considered that the C percussion screw fuze,
if introduced, would answer for large as well as small shells. Another peculiarity
which he observed in the siege equipment was, that they used a segment shell with
a time fuze or a Pettman general service percussion fuze. Now, the time fuze they
could only set at ranges 185 yds. apart, which would be quite unsuitable for the
action of segment shell. They had no fuze to act on graze with such a shell, and
the only use he could see for it was to drive troops out of a building. The wood
fuzes and the Pettman percussion fuzes would sometimes go off on impact against
earth, but he did not know whether they would be effectual against newly turned
earth ; so that there might be a want in that respect at present, as well as in the
matter of action on graze. Both wants he believed would be met by the screw per¬
cussion fuze, if introduced.
Captain Strange added, that in firing at batteries armed with unserviceable
guns, as they did at Shoeburyness, they found that the ordinary Boxer wood time
fuze was driven in on striking a gun or platform, and acted as a percussion fuze, but
would not explode on the newly turned earth of the exterior slope of the battery ;
and earthwork was mostly what we would have to fire at.
Captain Majendie said that Mr. Pettman had anticipated the want spoken of
by Captain Strange, by a plan for rendering his land service fuze more sensitive,
and the suggestion had been officially put forward by Mr. Pettman. As to the
proof of the Pettman land service fuze, he might say that they did not now fire them
at oak butts, but at sand bags, and that the result was quite satisfactory. It must
be admitted, however, that they would not burst on graze, and in that respect they
were capable of improvement. But if a very sensitive percussion fuze to burst on
graze were required with our heavy guns, the C cap percussion fuze, with its outer
case screwed to fit the general service fuze hole, would no doubt answer all our
requirements.
Major Geary, B.A., said : One sentiment of the lecturer’s he cordially re-echoed
— viz. that we should so rely upon our own ingenuity as not hurriedly to adopt
every novelty exhibited by foreign powers. It was to be regretted that this feeling
of confidence was not more general. Those who had read the newspaper corres¬
pondents’ accounts of the battle of Sedan, and notably that of Dr. Bussell, would
remember how graphically the effect of the Prussian shells had been described—
blowing men to atoms, &c., &c. Prom thence the deduction had been made
that this country should introduce a similar projectile. It had, however, transpired
since, that the Prussians had had recourse to this shell with a percussion fuze simply
from their want of segment shell or of shrapnel shell with time fuzes — a deficiency
they are now strenuously endeavouring to make good. With the tables before
them of the practice carried on at Dartmoor, together with the estimate made
by Captain Browne as to the number of men which a battery might be expected to
412
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
put hors de combat in an liour, he apprehended that no more destructive effects
against troops could be desired ; so that for that purpose a larger shell than the
12-pr. now in the service would appear to be unnecessary. He admitted that it
might be desirable in the attack of an entrenched position ; but could not guns
of position, whether 16, 20, or even 40-prs., be brought up during the time occu¬
pied necessarily by the general in reconnoitring and making his dispositions for
the attack ? As England was already, as regards shells, in a superior position to any
foreign power, he deprecated more heavily arming the ordinary field batteries for the
sake of a larger shell. At a recent lecture delivered in this Institution by Lieut.
Jones, many officers had been somewhat alarmed to hear that the proposed 16-pr.
would bring into the field only 100 rounds per gun; and it appeared that in
repelling the last sortie from Paris, the Prussians had twice sent to the rear the
caissons of their field batteries to be replenished. Being on their own ground, as
it were, this had not much signified ; but he put it to the meeting, how great
would have been the inconvenience under any other circumstances, or to use an
Americanism, in the case of a free fight. He submitted that the adoption of a
larger shell for field batteries, involving as it did a heavier gun and a reduced com¬
plement of ammunition, was a matter demanding very grave consideration.
Lieut. Jones, E.A., said that Major Geary had referred to his lecture on
Field Artillery, and seemed to think that if 100 rounds was all that could be
conveniently carried with the 16-pr. gun, it would be far too little. Why he
(Lieut. Jones) advocated the larger shell was, because he considered that at long
ranges it would be far superior to the smaller one, and that, consequently, fewer
rounds would do more work. (Hear, hear.) Practically he believed it would over¬
throw the smaller and less powerful artillery ; for though the latter might carry a
larger number of rounds, it would never have the opportunity of letting them off.
Lieut. Sladen, B.A., said he proposed in a lecture about a fortnight hence
to go fully into the question of equipment, in the hope that it might be properly
ventilated, and decided once for all what weight of projectile could be carried in
the limbers of a field battery; and (having due regard to mobility) the heavier
that projectile was the better. (Applause).
The discussion being ended,
Colonel Smythe returned thanks in the name of the officers present to Captain
Browne for his interesting and instructive lecture, and the proceedings terminated.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
413
THE DETERMINATION
OF
THE EXPLOSIVE FORCE OF GUNPOWDER.
A PAPER READ AT THE R.A. INSTITUTION, WOOLWICH, MARCH 15, 1871,
BY *
CAPTAIN J. P. MORGAN, R.A.
Colonel W. J. Shythe, R.A., E.R.S., in the Chaik.
This subject Has been investigated by some very able men, botli theoreti¬
cally and practically ; but though the facts thus elicited are very valuable,
the conclusions which have been derived from them are not sufficiently
harmonious to warrant us in believing that the question has been completely
solved.
I. Wiiat has been done.
1. Theoretically .
The explosive force of gunpowder may be calculated from the products
of combustion, on the assumption that certain laws hold good, such as that
the tension of a gas varies with its density and also with its temperature.
It must, however, be borne in mind that these laws have been verified only
within certain limits of pressure and temperature, and, therefore, when we
come to such very great pressures and temperatures as are met with in the
explosion of gunpowder, any conclusions founded on them must be received
with caution until the results have been confirmed by experiment.
Robins, about the middle of last century, endeavoured to calculate the
force of gunpowder from the amount of elastic fluid produced. He found
that the gaseous products would occupy 244 times the bulk of the powder,
at the temperature and pressure of the atmosphere. If this amount of gas
were confined in a space of the same size as that occupied by the powder,
the pressure would be 244 atmospheres, without making any allowance for
the enormously increased temperature at the moment of combustion. By
heating a piece of musket barrel to “ the extremest degree of red hot iron ”
— his assumed temperature of exploded gunpowder — and cooling it in water
with certain precautions, he found that the heated air it contained contracted
to one-fourth of its bulk, and concluded that the increase of heat increased
the elastic force of the gases fourfold. Thus the 244 volumes of gas at the
temperature referred to would possess an elastic force of 1000 atmospheres,
or 6*7 tons per square inch.
414
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS' OF
Gay-Lussac obtained 450 volumes of gas, and, estimating the temperature
at 1000° C., deduced a pressure of 2137 atmospheres (14*3 tons).
Piobert accepted Gay-Lussac's determination of the quantity of gas pro¬
duced, but estimated the temperature at 2400° C., and thus deduced a
pressure of between 4000 and 5000 atmospheres for the permanent gases
alone. Counting the other products, which at this temperature he con¬
sidered would be in a state of vapour at a high tension, he estimated the
total pressure at 9600 atmospheres (64 tons).
With regard to the solid products, he says : — *
“There thus exist two very distinct periods during the continuance of the
phenomenon of explosion ; the first during which the products are in the state of
elastic fluids, the tension of the vapours adding themselves to those of the per¬
manent gases ; and the second period during which the permanent gases alone
act, the vapours being condensed, and forming those residues of combustion termed
1 crasse,’ and which deposit themselves on the sides of the chamber in which the
powder is shut up, because these products have not been able to escape during the
time they were in the gaseous state.
“The explosion of powder may thus present great anomalies in the effects
produced from one point of action to another, when the elastic fluids act only
during the first period, which is that of greatest effort, and this should be taken
into consideration every time the circumstances of firing do not remain identically
the same ; also the force of powder measured during this period has given rise to
a great many valuations very different from one another. When, on the contrary,
the force of the powder is measured after these effects, during the second period,
it is estimated at much less than it is in reality, because in this case no account is
taken of the tension of the vapours which no longer exist.”
Bunsen and Schischkoff obtained 193*1 volumes of gas, the production
of which was attended by the development of 619'5 units of heat, and from
this, taken in conjunction with the known capacities for heat of the products,
they concluded that the temperature of the flame of powder, exploded in a
closed space so that the gases cannot freely expand, is 3340° G. With
regard to the residue, they say : — f
“ Although a slight volatilisation cannot be denied, it may be shown from the
calculation of the temperature of the flame that the tension caused thereby cannot
amount to one atmosphere. The temperature of the flame of hydrogen burning in
air is 3259° C. A fragment of powder residue fused on a thin platinum wire
was gradually volatilised in a jet of hydrogen burning in air, but it never reached
ebullition, and hence the tension of its vapour could never have attained one atmo¬
sphere.”
They conclude that the pressure can never reach 4500 atmospheres
(30 tons).
Mr. AbelJ remarks : — ■
“ The conclusions to which Bunsen and Schischkoff have been led by their
elaborate investigation of the products of decomposition of gunpowder are, in the
* “ Traite d’Artillerie theorique et pratique.”
f “ Occasional Papers, R.A. Institution,” p. 310;
J Chemist to the War Department.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
415
most important respects, so greatly at variance with the views hitherto adopted
respecting the general nature of the chemical changes involved in the explosion of
gunpowder, and consequently, with reference to the several conditions which
influence the degree of force exerted by the explosion, that all who are interested
in the considerations embraced in the research of these chemists, will be inclined
to scrutinise closely the means by which they have arrived at their results before
accepting them as likely to represent correctly the effects obtained by the employ¬
ment of gunpowder in practice.’*
Their errors lie in their supposing that the products they obtained are
the same as exist in the gun during the time of maximum effect. The solid
residue, which forms about two-thirds of the total charge, is mainly carbonate
and sulphate of potash. Mr. Bloxan# informs me that, from the appearance
of this residue after deposition, he is decidedly of opinion that it has been
deposited from the gaseous state. Further on we shall see that Rumford’s
experiments support this view. We are therefore at liberty to assume with
Piobert that there are two actions, one during the time of greatest heat and
pressure, and one afterwards. We may even go further than Piobert, and
suppose that the solid products are not only in the gaseous state, but to a
certain extent decomposed by the high temperature, in accordance with
a chemical law, of which there are numerous examples, such as the
decomposition of carbonic acid into carbonic oxide and oxygen at a high
temperature, or of water into hydrogen and oxygen by the heat of the
electric spark.
Keeping these considerations in view, I have prepared a formula which
appears to be a very reasonable one. In the opinion of Professor Bloxain,
to whom I have submitted it, we know so little of the effects of such
extremely high temperatures upon the substances remaining after the ex¬
plosion of powder, that the supposition is as allowable as any other. It is
this : —
English powder, with one- quarter per cent, less nitre, gives an exact
chemical formula which we may suppose to decompose thus : — ■
*' 6 (KO,NOs) + 20 C + 5 S = 20 CO + 5 S02 + 6 KO + 6 N.
The method of calculating the amount of gas produced, with the tem¬
perature and resulting pressure, is as follows : —
Constituents.
Units of
heat
evolved.
Products.
Volumes .
of 23-3
cub. in.
Weight
in
grains.
Specific
heat.
Units of
heat required
to raise
1° C.
20 C .
297720
20 CO
40
280
•174
48-72
5 S .
176000
5 S02
10
160
•11
17-6
6N
12
84
•174
14-616
6 (K0,N05) ...
... )
l
6KO '
282
•174?
49-068
473720
62
806
130
* Professor of Chemistry, King’s College, London, Advanced Class of Artillery Officers, &c., &c„
55
416
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Thus 806 grains of powder produce 62 volumes or 1444*6 cubic inches
of gas at 0° C., and 1 atmosphere pressure; and, consequently, 1 cubic
inch, or 240 grains, will produce 430 cubic inches of gas at the same
temperature and pressure. The temperature of the products occupying
430 times the powder space will be
473720
130
3644° 0.,
and the pressure.
supposing the solid potash to occupy one-third and the gases two -thirds of
the powder space, will be = x 430 (1 + *00366 x 3644) = 9250 atmo¬
spheres, or 62 tons per square inch.
Exception may be taken that no heat is here allowed for the decomposi¬
tion of the nitre, nor for the latent heat of the gases evolved from it. But
I may observe that, in all compounds containing nitrogen, the elements are
very readily decomposed, and in some cases, such as nitrous oxide, heat is
actually evolved by the separation of the atoms. The units of heat were
obtained by Bunsen and Schischkoff with the gases expanded and much
latent heat absorbed ; but, in passing from the liquid to the gaseous state
under great pressure, the law has been established that no latent heat is
absorbed, and vice versa. We may therefore consider the temperature
arrived at as not very different from that which exists at the moment of
explosion, for any absorption of heat by decomposition would probably be
more than counterbalanced by the heat which would be evolved if we were
to reduce the 430 volumes to f- of a volume.
It is possible that the temperature may even be higher, and the pressure
deduced is by no means the limit which might be attained, but is rather to
be considered a minimum than a maximum, seeing that the products may
be in a still further state of decomposition than has been assumed ; for it is
well known that at a high temperature carbon will reduce potassa; the
tendency also of potassium to pass into vapour is well known. It is possible
therefore that in the presence of carbonic oxide, and at such a temperature,
the elasticity of the two vapours of potassium and oxygen may be sufficient
to cause decomposition, and thus we should have all the products in the
state of vapour with a corresponding augmentation of pressure.
This is not at all unlikely, for in the cases of gun-cotton and nitro¬
glycerine, the products of decomposition are much more dissociated by
being exploded in a confined space than when burned in the air. In their
case the products, being carbonic acid, carbonic oxide, nitrogen, and aqueous
vapour, have no tendency to reunite, and can be recovered in the very state
in which they were at the time of maximum pressure ; but, in the case of
gunpowder, one of the products is potassium or potassa, whose strong basic
attraction causes recombination, so that none of the other products, nitrogen
only excepted, can remain free until it is satiated.
These considerations show, almost with absolute certainty, that the pro¬
ducts obtained by the combustion of powder are not the same as exist in
the gun during the time of greatest action; and we thus get rid of a difficulty
which would tend to prevent our accepting the high pressures which we
shall see are obtained by experiment.
Another consideration in favour of a possible high pressure is the limit
to which the laws applicable to gases can be carried. At some point the
liquid form would be assumed; and, though with low temperatures the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
417
increment of pressure diminishes as the liquid form is approached, the same
does not appear to hold good as the temperature is increased. Carbonic
acid gas, so far as is known, cannot be liquefied above 80° R. With high
temperatures the pressure may increase very greatly when the density is
great. It may even approach the law of water pressure, which we know
increases enormously with a small diminution of bulk. Thus even theoreti¬
cally, the pressure may attain an amount which it would be impossible for
us to restrain with all the appliances at our command.
It is necessary that we should have clear ideas on this point, as we shall
see it is the slowness and regularity of the combustion of gunpowder that
are the elements which make it possible to utilise its enormous pressure and
keep it under control ; and, to be of any practical use to us, even were we
to know exactly what are*the products of combustion, we must also know
The Rate of Combustion,
Robins made a very ingenious experiment to determine whether the
explosion of gunpowder was instantaneous or not. He says : — *
ec If part only of the powder is fired, and that successively, then, by laying a
larger weight before the charge (suppose two or three bullets instead of one) a
greater quantity of powder will necessarily be fired, since a heavier weight would
be a longer time in passing through the barrel. Whence it would follow that two
or three bullets would be impelled with a much greater force than one only. But
the contrary of this appears by experiment; for, firing two and three bullets laid
contiguous to each other with the same charge respectively, I have found that their
velocities were not much different from the. reciprocal of their sub -duplicates of
matter.”
Though Robins, in accordance with his deductions of a small initial
pressure, might have been prepared to accept the result he here states, yet
others, who knew that his estimate was much too low, could not accept his
conclusion, seeing that, if gunpowder were burnt in its own space, no possible
gun could withstand its explosive effects. It is to be remembered, however,
that Robins made all his experiments with small-arms, where the nature of
the powder used would make the actual facts of the case approximate so
closely to his deductions as to defy detection by the rude method he em¬
ployed. Any windage would allow a greater escape of gas as the number
of bullets increased, and, though the pressure might be greater at the
commencement of the bullets motion, such a loss would give rise to a
diminished pressure afterwards. Sir W. Armstrong mentions another
circumstance in connection with this : — t
“ By using a slower burning powder, less heat and pressure are evolved at first,
and the waste of heat in the stage of initial pressure being less, more heat remains
for expansive action. Hence the slower burning powder is weaker at first but
stronger afterwards, and, although the total quantity of gas be only the same, and
the pressure not so great at any point, yet the aggregate pressure throughout the
bore may equal that of the more energetic and more dangerous powder.”
* “ Eney. Brit.” Gunnery.
f Address, as President of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers, Newcastle Meeting, 1869,
418
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
It is not surprising that Eobins should have failed to detect all the points
of a most difficult question on which long experience alone has succeeded in
shedding but even yet a faint light. The wonder is that, living in the time
he did, he should have discovered so much. When he took up the question,
gunnery was not a science, but was very much in the state in which Newton
found astronomy. The subject had to some extent been treated in a rude
practical way, and wild speculations had been made as to the nature of the
forces at play, but the matter had never once been scientifically approached.
The fact, too, that all his results, obtained with the aid of small-arms, have
in the main been found to extend to the biggest guns without the discovery
of any new law, must always make ,Eobins occupy the first place in the
estimation of every artilleryman.
The question of the instantaneous explosion -of gunpowder is one of
extreme importance ; for, independently of the increase of the actual amount
of pressure which it would cause in a gun, it has another bearing on the
subject of almost equal importance. In a paper read here last year, I have
given a rigid mathematical demonstration which shows that a sudden
pressure has twice the destructive action on a gun that the same pressure
would have if slowly applied. Mr. Mallet* also has illustrated this point
very clearly, by showing that a weight would bend a support twice as much
when suddenly applied as it would when slowly applied. Anyone can test it
with a spring balance.
Long experience has shown that it lies in our power to vary the rate of
combustion of gunpowder, and in this gunpowder differs very much from
gun-cotton. In gun-cotton the instability which renders explosion possible
is brought about by chemical action, so that atom finds atom in closest
proximity ready for immediate recombination if only sufficient temperature
be attained. In gunpowder, on the contrary, the instability is produced by
mechanical mixture, and, on a minute scale, the particles of charcoal are
burned like coals in a fire. With gunpowder in its rude state, the .difficulty
wras to get the particles close enough together to make the combustion
sufficiently rapid, and it was not till the importance of thorough incorporation
was understood that any real progress was made in rendering it a destructive
agent. Even with thorough incorporation, it was necessary to provide for
the rapid ignition of the various particles, for the combustion could not
travel with sufficient rapidity through the entire mass. To make the action
energetic enough, it was necessary, as it were, to light the fire in a great
many places. Granulation effects this by allowing the flame from one point
of ignition to spread throughout the charge and ignite all the grains very
nearly simultaneously. It also has the good effect of preventing any separa¬
tion of the ingredients when once thoroughly incorporated. Thus the action
depends on the rapidity of ignition of the grains, and the rate of combustion
of each grain. The rapidity of ignition of the grains depends on the size of
the spaces between the grains, and the rapidity of combustion on the small¬
ness of the grains themselves ; but as- these are opposed to one another, we
can readily see that with some size of grain which is most favourable to
both requirements the combustion of the whole charge will be the most
rapid. Small grains will burn rapidly, but the spaces between them being
^ “ Construction of Artillery.”
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
419
also small, the ignition will not be so rapid. Large grains will burn slowly,
but will admit of rapid ignition. The shape of the grain is another element
to be considered, but one of still more importance is the density ; for, if the
grain be porous, the flame will not only pass between the grains, but also
penetrate into their mass. We shall obtain the most rapid combustion,
therefore, by combining a certain size and shape of grain with a certain
density of grain ; and, if we wish to moderate the rate of combustion, we
must not only increase the size of the grain, but also increase its density,
especially in large guns, where the pressure is very great.
The objects to be attained in regulating the size and density of the grains
are, the greatest possible velocity of projectile combined with the least strain
on the gun. These cannot be obtained by one set of conditions for all
natures of ordnance. A small projectile moves quickly, and relieves the
strain in a still greater ratio. A heavy projectile not only moves slowly,
but even a considerable motion does not relieve the strain in a proportionate
manner, because the column of powder is longer in a large than a small
gun. With small-arms consequently we must use fine grain powder, but
large grain powder with heavy guns. Owing to the effect heat and pressure
have in accelerating the combustion, we cannot determine a priori what
size or density of grain will suit any particular gun. This, and as a conse¬
quence the actual pressure in the gun itself, can only be determined
2. P radically .
Eumford was the first who attempted to obtain the pressure of gunpowder
by actual experiment. Not being able to find any material strong enough
to confine it when exploded in its own space, he measured the pressure when
exploded in closed spaces bearing various relations to the bulk of the charge,
and had it been possible to combine this method witli a knowledge of the
rate of combustion, he would have completely solved the question. The
plan he adopted was to make a small, short, strong gun, the muzzle of
which he confined with a heavy weight, varying the charges and so regulating
the weight that the force of explosion was just sufficient to lift it.
In this way he obtained the various pressures, and made a calculation of
what the pressure would be if the charge were exploded in its own space.
No vent or escape of any kind was allowed. The charge was fired by means
of a red-hot ball, which communicated the heat through the walls which
contained a long narrow chamber at the base of the charge. Tig. 1 shows the
method used ; the enclosing weight was placed on the top, and is not shown.
The bore was J inch diameter at the top, and the actual capacity of the
whole gun was 25J grains.
The following table gives the pressures obtained with a varying quantity
of powder in grains. The first column gives the actual pressures, the second
the pressures calculated according to what appeared to be a law. Some¬
times the weight was lifted with an explosion like that of a gun, at others
it was not raised at all. The result wras taken when it was just lifted with
a very small escape of gas.*
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1797.
420
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Charge in
grains.
Ratio of
charge to
space.
■j
Pressure in tons per
square inch.
Measured.
Calculated.
1
•039
0-5
0-5
2
•078
1-2
1-1
3
•117
1-5
1-8
4
•156
2-5 •
2-6
5
•195
3-7
3-6
6
•234
4-6
4-8
7
•273
5-4
6-2
8
•312
7-8
7*8
9
•351
10-3
9-8
10
•390
12-6
12-1
11
•429
14-8
14-9
12
•468
17-1
18-1
13
•507
21-9
22-0
14
•546
26-7
26-5
15
•585
31-5
31-9
16
•624
47*3
38-2
17
•663
45-6
18
•702
73*2
54-3
19
•741
64-5
20
•780
76-5
26*
1*
194-5
The curve in Tig. 2 shows the calculated pressures. They agree very
well with the measured pressures up to 15 grains. The pressures afterwards
are calculated without taking into account the higher pressures, which
appeared to manifest themselves as the cannon began to fail. If these
higher pressures were taken into account, Bumford considered that* 10 0,0 00
atmospheres, or nearly 700 tons, would not be too great an estimate of the
force of powder exploded in its own space.'* Piobert, however, considers
that the higher pressures were probably due to the yielding of the metal at
the top as it began to fail.
Observing that when the space is three times that of the charge the
pressure is, in round numbers, 10 tons; when it is twice, 20 tons; once
and a half, 40 tons ; and once and a quarter, 80 tons; a very simple empirical
formula, applicable to guns, may be given, founded on the supposition that
* Some experiments have been made on this point by Captain Noble, of Elswick, who has fired
by electricity as much as fib. of powder confined in cylinders of steel tempered in oil. The cylinders,
which were 2 ins. internal diameter and If calibres thick, usually expanded •002// or •003",
and one as much as ,02// external diameter. To produce this effect would, I consider, require an
internal pressure of at least 100 tons per square inch; for the outside, where the tension would
necessarily be least, would not yield permanently with a less strain than 30 tons, while the internal
portions, being more expanded, would be under a greater strain. Some “ crusher gauges” were placed
inside, and from them, I believe. Captain Noble deduced a maximum pressure of 40 tons. I do not
know, however, what reliance is to be placed on their indications under such extreme pressures as
they must have been subjected to ; nor can I reconcile their indications with the expanding of the
cylinders, which is more in harmony with Romford's results.
THE BOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 4$1
the pressure varies inversely as the amount of extra space which is added to
that of the charge consumed : — ■
If P = pressure in tons,
l — length of charge,
y — proportion of charge consumed,
x = distance moved by the shot,
j _ 2Q.y .
X
j + l~y
te What was very remarkable in all the experiments in which the generated
elastic vapour was completely confined, was the small amount of expansive force
which the vapour appeared to possess after it had been suffered to remain a few
minutes, or even only a few seconds, confined in the barrel ; for, in raising the
weight by means of its lever, and suffering this vapour to escape, instead of
escaping with a loud report it rushed out with a hissing noise hardly so loud or
so sharp as the report of a common air-gun, and its effects against the leathern
stopper by which it assisted in raising the weight were so very feeble as not to be
sensible. On examining the barrel, however, this diminution of force in the
generated elastic fluid was easily explained; for what was undoubtedly in the
moment of explosion in the form of an elastic fluid, was now found transformed
into a solid body, as hard as a stone.
“ That this hard substance, found in the barrel after an explosion in which the
generated elastic fluid had been completely confined, was actually in a fluid or
elastic state in the moment of explosion, is evident from hence, that in all those
cases in which the weight was raised and the stopper blown out of the bore,
nothing was found remaining in the barrel. It was very remarkable that this
hard substance was not found distributed about in all parts of the barrel indif¬
ferently, but more of it was always found near the middle of the length of the
bore than at either of its extremities ; and the upper part of the vent-tube in
particular .was always found quite filled with it. It should seem from hence that
it attached itself to those parts of the barrel which were soonest cooled ; and hence
the reason, most probably, why none of it was ever found in the lower part of the
vent-tube, where it was kept hot by the red-hot ball by which the powder was set
on fire,”*
A better plan than that adopted by Eumford for measuring the actual
pressure cannot be conceived. We have considered the nature of a suddenly
applied pressure in doubling the strain on yielding material, but a suddenly
applied pressure in this case would make no difference, for the absolute
weight keeping the powder enclosed would not yield to any pressure less
than itself, and so would show the same result whether the pressure were
suddenly or slowly applied.
There is, however, another kind of pressure to be considered. It was
investigated by Eobins in the following manner. By firing a musket charged
with a light wad against a pendulum, he considered the velocity of forced
gunpowder to be 7000 f.s. He says : —
“ From these determinations may be deduced the force of petards, since the
action depends entirely on the impulse of the flame, and it appears that a quantity
* Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, 1797;
422
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
of powder, properly placed in such a machine, may produce as violent an effect as a
bullet twice its weight moving with a velocity of 1400 or 1500 ft. per second.”*
In order to discover what effect this action had on the velocity of the
bullet, Bobins placed 12 pennyweights of powder at the bottom of a musket
and a bullet 11 J ins. from the bottom of the bore, and found that the velocity
imparted was 1400 ft. per second instead of a calculated velocity of 1200 f.s.
without the action in question. When the same quantity of power was
scattered through the whole space, the velocity was only 1100 f.s.
By placing a bullet 16 ins. in front of the charge in a “ good Tower
musket,” he found that “ the part of the barrel just behind the bullet was
swelled out to double its diameter, like a blown bladder, and two large
pieces 2 ins. long were burst out of it.”
We have every reason to believe that the action here referred to does
exist, and also that it is local and does not extend throughout all the space
in which the pressure of the powder acts. Under these circumstances, the
thinner the confining surface at the point of action the more injurious would
be the effects produced. With a thick wall, as in a gun, the action would
be more distributed, and, though it might indent the surface of the bore as by
a blow, it might not succeed in endangering the structure of the gun. Bor
the same reason it is more than likely that any action of the sort would not
appreciably interfere with Branford' s results, as well on account of the great
mass on which he received the pressure as on account of the fact that a
small motion of the weight had to take place before any gas could escape.
It will be observed, however, that though Bumford's experiments are most
valuable in showing the extraordinary force of fired gunpowder and its
pressure when occupying various spaces; yet, because they leave out of
account the rate of combustion, on which mainly depends the amount of
relief given by the motion of a shot in a gun, they do not help us practi¬
cally. We consequently find that succeeding experimenters have turned
their attention to some method of determining the explosive force of powder
which includes this most important element.
Bodman is the next whose experiments we must consider. He endea¬
voured to measure the pressure in the bore from the recoil of the gun,
swung as a pendulum, by causing it to trace a curve on a revolving cylinder.
As, however, the whole space of recoil was less than an inch, nothing more
than a general outline of the pressure could be obtained. He says : — f
“ The curves described show that the gun and shot had acquired one-half of
their final velocity in about one-fourth of the time required for the shot to pass
from its seat to the muzzle of the gun ; therefore the mean pressure in the bore of
the gun, during the first fourth of that time, must have deen double that for the
whole time, or = 18,182 lbs. (8 tons) per square inch. They further show that
the shot and pendulum had acquired one-fourth of their final velocity in about
one-sixteenth part of the whole time aforesaid, and that the mean pressure during
the first sixteenth part of that time was = 86,264 lbs. (16*2 tons). And the
pressure will be still greater during the lower rates of velocity, amounting to
probably 50,000 lbs. (22*3 tons) per inch; and this estimate is for a statical
^ “ Ency. Brit.” Gunnery.
f “ Experiments on Metals for Cannon and Cannon Powder.” Bodman.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
423
pressure, the strain due to which, as will be shown further forward in this report,
must be considerably less than the actual strain, the rate of application of the force
affecting the strain to which it subjects the resisting body so far as even to double
it in the extreme case, or when the application of the force becomes instantaneous.”
He conducted a much more elaborate and valuable series of experiments
to ascertain in the very bore itself what was the actual pressure at each
point. In order the better to judge of the value of his deductions, it is
necessary to give a short account of some preliminary experiments which
were made with hollow cylinders to test their strength.
Major Wade gives the hydrostatic pressures necessary to burst cast-iron
hollow cylinders cut from the chase of a 6-pr. gun, of one-quarter and one-
half calibres thickness, compared with the tensile strength of the iron.-*
Tons per
Tenacity. square inch.
By direct tensile force . 14-8
t, i f Thickness equal to half a radius . 1T1
By water pressure [ TMctuoss ^ to radius . 8-9
Eropor*
tion.
1
0742
0-602
These pressures agree so well with what might be expected from the law
of decrease of proportionate strength as the thickness increases, that I have
no hesitation in accepting them as correct. The law of decrease only holds
strictly as far as the elastic limits up to which the extension is uniform ;
beyond the elastic limits the extension increases more rapidly than the
strain. Thus there is a slight increase of the proportion of strength given
when the thickness was one-half calibre, which by calculation would other¬
wise be equal to half the tensile strength of the metal.
Bodman tested similar cylinders with gunpowder. The cylinders, like
the last, had the column of metal in the walls of the same length as the
bore on which the pressure acted. The length was 12 ins., and the calibre
2 ins. The thickness of metal was varied. The following table shows the
actual pressures measured when these cylinders were burst by powder ex¬
ploded in the interior. Alongside the actual pressures is given a set of
pressures calculated according to the law which regulates the strength of
hollow cylinders, and made to agree with the instance in which the thickness
of metal was one-half calibre in Bodman' s experiment, the particular thick¬
ness being chosen because it required two charges to burst it, and may
therefore be considered as just burst, and no more. (See Eig. 3.)
I have given Major Wade's hydrostatic bursting pressures for comparison.
Thickness of metal.
Mean bursting
pressure by
experiment.
Computed
bursting
pressure.
Hydrostatic
bursting
pressure.
tons.
tons.
tons.
0-5 in .
. 16-9
11*4
5-5
1*0 „ .
17-1
17-1
8-9
1*5 /, .
28*3
20-6
_
2-0 „ .
35-8
22-8
_
2-5 „ .
41-2
24-4
3-0 /, .
41-8
257
_
Tenacity .
12-0
—
—
* Reports of Experiments on Metals for Cannon, by Officers of the Ordnance Department U.S.
Army.
56
424
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
It will be noticed that even in the most favourable case for comparison,
viz., that in which the cylinder was just burst, the pressure obtained by
gunpowder was about double the hydrostatic pressure. This is a very serious
discrepancy, and is sufficient to cast a doubt on the accuracy of his method
of measuring the pressure, which was by fixing a “ pressure gauge 3* in the
gun at various distances along the bore. The pressure was inferred from
the distance an indenting tool was pressed into a wrought-iron or copper
specimen, the force necessary for any particular indentation having first
been obtained by statical pressure.
Tig. 4 shows this gauge.
Bodman tried the effect of varying the charge and shot in a gun. He
fired a 43 lb. round shot with charges varying from 3 to 12 lbs., and found
that the pressure varied very accurately as the charge ; he also fired from
the same gun, with a fixed charge of 5 lbs., shot varying from 35 to 85 lbs.,
and again found that the pressure varied with the shot. He says : — *
fC The nearest approximation to any regular law of variation of pressure due to
variation of charge and projectile, discoverable in the results obtained from the
series, with a constant weight of projectile and variable weight of charge, and that
with a constant weight of charge and variable weight of projectile is, that with, a
constant diameter the pressure increases directly as the product of the weight of
the charge by that of the projectile.”
This law is much severer than that of Bumford, and, unless we account for
it by his method of measurement being inaccurate, we must do so by con¬
cluding that the rate of combustion increased with the charge and projectile
on account of the greater heat and pressure developed.
He next tried varying the bore, with the following results j —
“ Table showing the velocity of shot in feet per second, and pressure of gas per
square inch (in tons) due to equal columns of powder behind equal columns of
metal, when fired in guns of different diameters of bore, each result being a mean
of ten fires.
o
•
a3
hC
O .
43 cu
. •
Velocity, f.s.
Pressure at different distances from bottom of bore.
o §
P
i
Weigh
charg
Weigh
shot
At
bottom.
-4-3
<1
CD
03
03
-*3
<5
b
to
+3
<1
o
00
<1
ins.
7
ins.
•07
lbs.
6-13
lbs.
74-44
904
16-3
7-1
3-7
2-9
3-1
3-6
3-0
9
•09
8:48
124-42
888
30-0
9-4
7-9
6-7
13-1
9-4
10-2
11
•11
12-67
186-03
927
38-7
13-1
12-4
10-0
12-7
15-1
11-2
“ The points most worthy of note in these results are the very marked increase
in the pressure of gas as the diameter of bore increases, and that the indications of
pressure are greater at 56, 70, and 84 ins. than at 42 ins., especially in the 9-inch
and 11-inch guns.”
* “ Experiments, &c.’
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
425
The former, Bodman accounts for by the greater heat developed in a large
than in a small charge. The small bore, too, abstracts a greater proportion
of heat by means of the walls of the gun, and also allows a greater propor¬
tion of gas to escape by means of the vent. The increase of pressure towards
the muzzle he believes “ to be due to the more violent and sudden contrac¬
tion in the thin than in the thick part of the gun. . . . Eor in the
thick part of the gun the pressure is much less rapidly developed, and
subsides much more gradually, the contained gas forming an elastic cushion,
which would, if the bore were long enough, allow this part of the gun to
return from its strained to its free condition, without any vibration at all :
while in the model used in these experiments the pressure is almost instan¬
taneously developed and as suddenly subsides in the chase of the gun, so
that while the indenting piston is on its way outward, it is suddenly met by
the returning specimen, which is drawn in along with the housing by the
contraction of the gun, with such violence as to amount in effect to a smart
blow of the indenting tool against the specimen. Close examination shows
a number of marks or cuts of the indenting tool on the specimen in this
part of the gun, caused by the tool not striking in the same place at each
vibration of the gun."
If this explanation be the true one, it may account for the unsatisfactory
results given by his gauge as to absolute pressures. That it does not give
the absolute pressures is manifest, for in the 11-inch gun we find the pres¬
sure per square inch throughout the bore more than double that of the
7-inch, and yet the resulting velocities remain the same, or nearly so. It
is possible that it may represent the destructive action on the gun, and may
be accounted for by a sudden pressure which sets up vibration in the
powder-chamber to be continued throughout the bore, the greater intensity
towards the muzzle being due to the same cause which makes the waves of
the sea more violent as they come into shallow water.* That, however, the
destructive action on the walls is the same in amount as that indicated by
the gauges cannot be relied on, because the action shown by the gauges is
the result of the compound vibration of both walls and indenting tool.
He also tried the effects of varying the size of the grain of powder with
the following results : — ■
“ Table showing the velocities of shot and the pressure of gas, due to equal
charges of powder, of the same composition, and differing only in size of grain —
each result being the mean of five fires — with the 11-inch gun, the same shot being
used in all the fires.
1
1
i Diameter
Weight of
Weight of
Initial
Pressure of gas in tons.
j of grain.
charge.
shot.
velocity.
At bottom.
At 14".
I
At 28".
! ins.
•6
lbs.
| 12-67
lbs.
186-3
f.s.
933
9-5
4-6
3-6
; -5
//
n
932
9*5
5-0
3-3
j *4
n
II
881
11-4
4-8
3-2
1 '3
u
II
890
15-8
4-8
3-0
j -3f
a
II
912
29-4
6-6
3-7
* I have heard Professor Rankine give the explanation in a lecture on waves, at Newcastle-
on-Tjne.
f Powder of 1859, hut not so hard pressed as that of 1860.
426
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
This is one of the most important points Bodman has drawn attention to,
for in this way the maximum pressure can be reduced, and yet the initial
velocity maintained.
As, however, there is a danger of carrying even this advantage to an
extreme, I shall premise another set of experiments made by Bodman, which
will serve to illustrate the point I refer to.
He tried statical pressure through the medium of soft wax in cylinders
bored out like a gun on a small scale (see Big. 5). Yarious lengths of the
bore were filled with the wrax and the bursting pressures obtained. The
calibre was B128 ins., and the thickness of metal one calibre. The follow¬
ing are the results : —
Length pressed.
Mean bursting
pressure.
Length pressed.
Mean bursting
pressure.
ins.
tons.
ins.
tons.
6
24-0
7
27-1
5
26-8
2
33-0
4
32-0
2
29-4
3
34*8
2
40*3
2
39*1
2-6
42-0
Bodman considers that these pressures are high, owing to the want of
perfect fluidity in the wax. They serve, however, to show a law which is
represented in Big. 6, where the horizontal and vertical co-ordinates of the
curve = represent the lengths of bore and bursting pressures respectively.
The benefit to be derived from the operation of this law may be shortly
stated thus : with two calibres the circumferential strength is increased by
one-half, while beyond five calibres no advantage is gained by it. It will be
noticed, that if the powder burn very slowly, the shot will move during the
first and most important part of its course under a much smaller pressure
than the gun is capable of sustaining, with a corresponding loss of velocity.
The maximum pressure should be obtained as soon as possible, and should
not be allowed to subside too rapidly, but should be continued as nearly as
possible in accordance with the curve given above. The maximum pressure
ought not, however, to be obtained so rapidly as to partake of the nature of
a sudden pressure, i.e., it should not be obtained so rapidly as not to give
the metal of the gun time to expand before it has reached its maximum.
The law above given has also a very important bearing on the size of the
bore of the gun ; for, in addition to giving a smaller pressure per square
inch, a larger bore will not throw the pressure so far forward with the same
charge of powder.
Committee on 'Explosives.
Somewhat tardily in our own country this Committee has been appointed
to consider, amongst other things, the question of most pressing importance
before proceeding with the manufacture of very heavy guns, viz., to find a
powder which, in the monster ordnance we are about to construct, will give
the greatest initial velocity of projectile with the least strain on the gun.
In our heavy service guns, when B.L.G. powder is used, we find the
initial velocities .decreasing with the size of the gun ; thus —
Nature of gun . 7 -inch, 8-inch, 9-inch, 10-inch, 600-pr.
Initial velocity . . 1458, 1368, 1386, 1298, 1180.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 427
This result is entirely due to the use,, with these guns, of powder suitable
only for smaller natures ; for, if the guns are of the same construction and
equally perfect manufacture, they will stand the same strains, and if the
strains he the same throughout corresponding lengths of bore the initial
velocities ought to be identical.
It is true no doubt that in heavy guns the manufacture slightly deteriorates
and the length in calibres has to be decreased ; but these are reasons, if we
wish to retain the velocity and at the same time not overstrain the gun,
for making the law of pressure conform more instead of less closely to
the strength of the gun as the various lengths of bore come under the
influence of pressure. Any departure from this will result either in a loss
of initial velocity, or cause an undue strain on the gun at some particular
point.
Perfection would be attained by having a special powder suitable for each
nature of gun, but practically this cannot well be carried out. It is of all
the more importance therefore that we should be provided with the fullest
information on the subject, that we may be able to decide on some single
powder suitable to all heavy guns, or on two or more sorts, the mixture of
which will best answer the purposes required.
To a great extent the Committee have, in their investigations, followed in
the footsteps of Rodman, i.e ., they have endeavoured to obtain the pressures
as they actually occur in the bore; and, like him, they have adopted two
methods of doing so.
Instead of his “ pressure gauge ” they use a “ crusher gauge,” a repre¬
sentation of which is given in Fig. 7 ; and, instead of estimating the pressure
from the velocity of recoil of the gun, they do so from the velocity of the
shot in the bore.
For this last purpose they make use of a “ chronoscope,” invented by
Captain Andrew Noble, late R.A., of Elswick. It notes the moments of
passing various points in the bore by electric sparks which arise from the
shot in its course causing projecting tools to shear wires in succession, as
shown in Fig. 8.
Their experiments have been confined to four kinds of powder, viz.,
R.L.G., prismatic, pellet, and a new sort called pebble. The following
results have been obtained with the 8-incli gun by the chronoscope *
Nature of powder.
Charge.
Initial
velocity.
Maximum
pressure.
lbs.
f.s.
tons.
R.L.Gr . . . . .
30
1324
29-8
Russian prismatic . .
32
1366
20-5
Service pellet .
30
1338
17*4
Pebble No. 5. Density1)
178 . 5
35
1374
15-4
The pressure curves during the initial stages of the shot's motion are
given in Fig. 9.
* Preliminary Report, Committee on Explosives.
428
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
By the empirical formula I have derived from Kumforcfis experiments put
in the form of —
y
20 + P
G+1)
I deduce the respective proportions of each of those powders which are
consumed at the time of the maximum pressure to be : B.L.G. 60 per cent,,
prismatic 57 per cent., and pebble 43 per cent.
The comparison of the prismatic and pebble curves is most suggestive ;
for though the prismatic charge is only 32 lbs. while the pebble is 35, and
though the prismatic begins to burn more slowly than the pebble, yet not
only does the prismatic very nearly maintain its velocity, but actually shows
a greater pressure than the pebble, and that too at a point further forward
in the gun.
It does not follow from this that at any point as regards time more
prismatic than pebble is consumed, as will be evident by a reference to the
time curves given in Big. 10; but, as regards space moved by the shot, it
does. It may to a great extent be due to the shape of the grain, which
allows of greater acceleration of combustion. The fact that at the time it
occurs the shot is moving less rapidly may also have something to do with
it. But it is not to be left out of consideration that it may be due to
another cause ; for the low initial pressure would be favourable to ignition,
and thus in the case of the prismatic, the whole charge may become more
thoroughly ignited than in the case of the pebble, and though the combustion
be less rapid at first, it may proceed with greater intensity afterwards. The
greater velocity and less pressure of the pellet as compared with the B.L.G.
may be similarly accounted for.
That there is room for an increased acceleration of combustion, is evident
from the moderate amount of powder consumed at the time of the maximum.
This supposition would also appear to explain the unaccountable fact of
unconsumed grains being blown out of the gun when large charges are used,
for the truth of which I can vouch. It is probable that the violent com¬
motion set up in the chamber on first ignition of the charge is such that,
more especially in long charges, portions are driven to the extremities and
become so packed together by the enormous pressure, as to prevent thorough
ignition of some of the grains.*
* In the discussion which follows, Professor Abel explains that the unburnt grains, when expelled
from the gun, are in a state of combustion, and are afterwards extinguished by the expansion of the
gas. This fact is in accordance with the view put forward in the text, on the supposition that the
ignition of some of the grains is delayed in the manner suggested. An experiment will be familiar
to many, especially to those who have attended Professor Bloxam’s lectures at the Royal Military
Academy. A charge of 5 grs. F.G. is put in a miniature cannon with a projectile consisting of
a cylinder of press cake V x *25". The latter seems to leave the muzzle of the gun unignited,
and may be caught in a box ; but if a paper target be placed over the box to show where the
projectile hits, it not uncommonly happens that the press cake ignites in going through the paper
screen, perhaps from the heat resulting from the arrest of its motion, since it must have a very
high temperature when it leaves the gun, and requires little more to raise it to the igniting point.
The size of the grain is not the only cause of unburnt grains being blown out, for the same effect
is produced with R.L.G. when large charges are used. It is probable that, in some cases, the
passage of the flame is either prevented, or at least so filtered and cooled down in passing through
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
429
I am aware that it is usual to consider that the amount of powder con¬
sumed depends on the burning of each grain from the surface towards the
centre, and that most of these curves might be explained in this way.
Sir William Armstrong we have seen explains the anomaly of the pellet
maintaining its velocity against R.L.G., by the loss of heat which the latter
sustains during the initial stage of combustion. There are, however, as we
shall see, other points not so easily explained on the theory usually adopted.
Whatever be the cause, the pebble is undoubtedly a better curve than the
prismatic, and shows some advantages in addition to its less maximum ; for
the maximum pressure of the pebble takes place before that of the prismatic,
and also there is less appearance of suddenness in the former than in the
latter. The prismatic gets up the pressure very slowly at first, but, when
about to reach the maximum, it takes a sudden rise, which may possibly be
rapid enough to produce partially the effect of a sudden pressure. Its
maximum is 20’5 tons; but suppose the pressure rises slowly up to 12 tons,
and then suddenly becomes 20, we should have a pressure of 20 tons met
by a resistance of 12, 13, 14, — 20 tons in succession, during which time
the walls of the gun have acquired a velocity outwards, requiring a resist¬
ance of 20, 21, 22 — 28 tons in succession to bring them to rest. The
walls would again vibrate back to 1 2 tons, and out to 28 tons, increasing
the injurious effects on the gun.
With the 10 -inch gun,
<e The principal average results, in various series of six rounds each, are shown
in the following abstract, the pressure given being the highest as indicated by the
crusher gauge.* *
Nature of powder.
Density.
Charge.
Velocity.
Pressure.
Remarks.
lbs.
f.s.
r 1-742
60
1318
51
R.L.Gr .
\ 1-733
60
1321
48
(.1*67
60
1313
53
Pellet . . .
1-677
64
1364
25
Prismatic Russian .
1-66
<61
) 68
1335
1425
19
29
One round.
Prismatic Ritter .
1-66
5 61
?70
1349
1416
21*
24
One round.
fl-732
70
1474
29
Uniform grain.
Pebble .
> 1-782
70
1432
21
1 1-732
60
1359
21
One round.
U-782
60
1298
15
One rotind.
We here see the remarkable fertility of the subject, the initial velocity
being increased by more than 150 f.s. when pebble powder is used, while
the strain is very much reduced. The great importance of density is also
the spaces between the grains, that the portions at the extremities are not ignited at the same time
as the bulk of the charge. On the other hand, should the extremities become ignited before the
maximum jamming action takes place, then the crushing up of the grains will make their com*
bustion very much more rapid. The uncertainty of this action may thus account for the very irregular
results which are obtained, both as regards pressure and velocity* when large charges are used.
* Memorandum, 12th July, 1870, Committee on Explosives.
430
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
shown, leading us to believe that this is one of the most important points
to be taken into consideration in the manufacture of powder for very heavy
guns.
With slow burning powders, the Committee state, the indications of pres¬
sure given by the “ crushers " have been found to correspond very closely
with those deduced from the chronoscope ;* but this is not the case with
quick burning powders, nor even with slow burning powders when fired in
large charges in very heavy guns. Prom Rodman's v experience with his
pressure gauge, we cannot doubt that the crusher is not in all cases to be
relied on. It seems to indicate intense local pressures which are greater
as the point of their action is more distant from the point of ignition of
the charge, greater at the extremities of the chamber than at the point of
ignition in the middle, and greater when the crusher is at a distance from
the bore than when close to the bore, amounting in some cases to double
the pressure deduced from the “ chronoscope," or even more. As an
instance, the Committee state that, with R.L.G. in an 8-inch gun, when
the “ crusher" was close to the bore, the pressure indicated was 22J tons,
but when at a distance, it was 40 tons per square inch.
The occurrence of these pressures would appear, in the estimation of the
Committee, to correspond with the notion already mentioned as having been
investigated by Robins, of the gas first formed being suddenly arrested
when at a high velocity and converted as by a blow into pressure. But
when the crushers are put in a second time, little or no further setting up
takes place, as would be the case if the action were due to a blow produced
by the mass of gas in motion. Under such a supposition the intense pres¬
sures would take place before the general maximum is attained, and it is
difficult to conceive that the necessarily small mass of gas is sufficient to
produce the results manifested.
It is more reasonable to suppose that they occur at the moment when
the general maximum exists, and may be superadded to it. In addition, it
appears both from Rodman's experiments and those of the Committee, that
when once the action is set up, it is continued throughout the bore, which
would not be the case were it due to the velocities of the gases first ignited.
This continuance of the action is also unfavourable to the supposition that
it is due to an intense general pressure of the amount indicated, which, as
shown by Rodman, would gradually subside as the gas expanded and pro¬
duce no further vibration. It might, however, be explained were the general
pressure of the nature of water pressure, which would suddenly subside with
a very small motion of the shot, and so produce vibration by sudden
cessation ; and in support of this view it may be said there is a marvellous
harmony in the fact that Rumford, Rodman, and the Committee all find
these pressures manifesting themselves somewhere about 30 tons.
The apparently local nature of the pressures might be accounted for by
the relief which would be given at those points where the gas could escape,
such as the vent and the base of the shot. The vibration, however, would
equally be set up by a moderate general pressure if it were suddenly applied,
* This can only refer to the chronoscopic pressures at and after the maximum. During the
ascending branch of the curve the crushers can only show the maximum pressure.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
431
and which, acting on the “ crusher 99 and walls of the gun would, in the
first instance, produce effects on each varying with their masses, the spaces
described, and the resistances, and afterwards set up an action which would
be most felt by the “ crushers,” because they would partake both of their
own motion and that of the walls of the gun.
There is yet another supposition which would account for these pressures.
If the charge when ignited burn uniformly, the grains nearest the point
of ignition will naturally be in a more advanced state of combustion than
those further away.
A great pressure and temperature will arise, causing increased combustion,
which will be most felt where the greatest amount of powder remains to be
consumed, and where it may be supposed to be a mass of half-burnt grains
crushed to dust by the pressure proceeding from the point of ignition — a
condition most favourable for intensely rapid combustion. Thus sudden
local pressures would be manifested at these points and be continued through
the chamber by a sort of wave motion, which, passing backwards and for¬
wards, would manifest the greatest effects where the direction of its motion
was changed, viz., at the base of the shot and at the bottom of the bore.
The facts that indentations are found in the bore at the base of the shot,
and also that so much trouble has been found in preserving the bottom of
the bores from the action of the powder, appear to favour this view. The
continued action throughout the bore also accords with it. On this sup¬
position the pressure would be often repeated, but the whole of the chamber
would not be under its influence at the same time, and the structure of the
gun would not be so injuriously affected as the more limited surfaces of the
crushers.
These anomalous pressures would thus appear to be due to one or other
of two causes — either a wave motion in the gas originated somewhat in the
manner described, or a vibration or wave motion in the walls of the gun, set
up either by a very intense water pressure, or by a less intense gaseous
pressure suddenly applied.
I have long been favourable to the notion that the wave motion exists in
the gas ; but a consideration of the enormous pressure of which gunpowder
is capable, and the exceeding rapidity with which it is augmented, make me
doubtful if the action be not due to vibration in the walls of the gun, and
of a very dangerous character. The practical point is to decide between
these two view's, and to determine whether the destructive action in the gun
is comparable to the indications of the crushers.
The.se questions, though very necessary, are of such extreme delicacy that
the chronoscope must fail to detect them, owing to the fact that it does not
note the motion of the projectile continuously throughout the bore, but only
from point to point; so that a pressure of great intensity but very short
duration, may occur between two points of observation which cannot be
separated from the general law of pressure, but .must be absorbed in it,
causing a modification.
The action in question we may assume to be originated during the initial
stages of the shot’s motion, wrhere the wires of the chronoscope are 2 ins.
apart. The maximum pressure is attained even with the slowest burning
powder before the third wire is cut, so that only two spaces of time are
measured at this important point. If we take into consideration that the
57
432
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
pressures may vary very irregularly and very greatly during this part of
the action, it will be seen that the difficulty of tracing it must be very great.
The difficulty of determining the pressure by the chronoscope, during the
initial stages, is still further increased by the fact that the shot has to move
some distance before shearing the first wire, and that no record of time can
be obtained between the first moving of the shot and the shearing of the
first wire. Any error in assuming the space through which the shot has
moved or the velocity it has acquired when passing the first wire, must
affect the calculation of the pressure afterwards, up to the point at least
where the maximum occurs.
In addition, any uncertain action of the cutters or deflexion of the sparks,
might be sufficient to throw it out, and would not readily be detected because
the velocity would be the same at any point, provided the area below the
curve of pressure were the same up to that point. There would, however,
be a difference in the total time ; but, as has been noticed, the chronoscope
does not note the time from the first starting of the shot, where the differ¬
ence mainly arises.
It will be seen by reference to the pressure curves with the 8-inch gun,
how closely the pebble curve would approximate to that of the prismatic,
were the density increased so as to make the combustion slower at the
commencement, and if this increase of density had also the effect of making
the ignition more perfect, and the combustion afterwards more rapid.
Density is considered by some as the most, if not the only important
element to be considered in the manufacture of powder for very heavy guns.
Drom a consideration of the various principles I have brought forward, I
was quite prepared for the manifestation of some very high pressures in the
proof of the 35-ton gun. I am indebted to Colonel Miller* for the following
particulars of pressures obtained by crushers in the base of the shot »
Charge . 75 100 110 120 130 lbs.
Pressure . 17 25-4 31-8 46-3 63*7 tons.
Velocity . 1163 1237 1303 1364 1348 f.s.
Length of cartridge . 22 27§ 30 32| 35 ins.
As the crushers in the base of the shot do not usually correspond in their
indications with those of any crusher in the gun, a crusher plug was substi¬
tuted for the vent and the charge fired by electricity. The following results
were obtained when the powder was the service pebble, and the tube in the
service position of vent : —
Charge. Velocity. Vent crusher. Shot crusher.
120 1300 28-6 40-4
120 1357 20 21*7
Colonel Miller considers from these indications that a powder which will
give in charges up to 80 or 90 lbs. a pressure evenly distributed over the
powder chamber, is liable to give severe local pressures in such charges as
were used with the 3 5 -ton gun. Now the point yet to be determined is
how far we can afford to disregard these pressures ; for unless we can dis-
# One of the Committee on Explosives.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
433
regard them, the gun, although undoubtedly the most powerful gun in the
world, must either fail to accomplish its intended object, or a new powder
must be provided. We may, indeed, advantageously increase the calibre so
as to reduce the columns of powder and shot; but alterations of this
description with such a very heavy gun entail considerable expense, and
may perhaps be avoided by a systematic series of experiments beforehand
to determine not only the best sort of powder to be used, but also the
weight and calibre of the gun to be adopted.
II. What remains to be done.
What remains to be done, is therefore to determine with greater certainty
the law of pressure during the first part of the shot's motion through the
bore, in order that it may be made to approximate as closely as possible to
the law of strength of the gun, without running any risk from sudden
pressure or anomalous pressures of whatever description. No method of
accomplishing this has as yet met with entire success. Rodman's veloci-
meter failed for want of delicacy. The chronoscope of Captain Noble
cannot be relied on for the reasons given. Another attempt was made by
General Mayevski, of the Russian artillery, who attached to the base of the
shot a rod which he passed through a hole in the breech of the gun. As
the shot moved, the end of this rod was made to break two electric currents
at varied distances with different rounds. It seems strange that he did not
make it trace a curve on a revolving cylinder, for he would thus at least
have obtained what is most required, viz., a tracing for a very short space
from the very starting point of the shot. The connecting rod, however,
broke, and his results are of no practical importance.^
Particular care must be given to determine, as far as possible, the nature
of the anomalous pressures so often referred to, so as to know whether they
are due to length of cartridge and position of point of ignition, or to some
chemical or physical law. If the former, they may probably be prevented;
but if the latter, they may be expected to manifest themselves on the attain¬
ment and in continuation of some definite pressure, and will have to be
avoided.
The experiments, however, will not be complete if they merely tell us
what is best adapted to any existing service gun. By a comparison of the
results obtained with varied powders, bores, charges, and projectiles, some
laws must be established which will enable us to determine beforehand what
powder, calibre, charge, and projectile will be best adapted to any contem¬
plated new gun ; for if, when we make a new gun, we have not only to alter
the bore, but also the powder, we shall land ourselves in an expenditure of
money which will very soon ring the knell of our future monster artillery,
and the ships will beat us in the race.
The precise nature of the powder to be adopted is not by any means to
be considered as definitely settled. The pebble powder which has been
recommended by the Committee has given satisfactory results only as far as
* “ Memoire sur les experiences faites a l’establissement de M. Krupp a Essen, au mois de
Novembre 1867, pour determiner les pressures des gaz de la poudre dans l’ame des bouches a feu,”
par M. Mayeyski, General Major, Membre du Comite de l’Artillerie Russe, 1869.
434
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
the 600-pr., and there is reason to believe that with the 700-pr. a new
description will be required. It is not improbable that it will be found
necessary to adopt two sorts of different densities, one of which shall be
suitable for the smallest of our heavy guns, and the other for the heaviest.
Mixtures in different proportions, it may be conceived, will meet the require¬
ments of the intermediate natures. Prom past experience we should take a
lesson not to rush on too hastily in an old groove, making large quantities
of a powder which, though well adapted to present requirements, may soon
become obsolete as the art of gun-making advances ; for if we do, we may
again find ourselves with plenty of powder, but with very little of the precise
nature we require.
III. How TO DO IT.
The importance of determining the questions I have briefly sketched out
will readily be recognised, but the question may be asked. How are we to
do it when so many have failed? We must benefit by the experience of
those who have gone before us, and, if possible, improve on it, taking care
to avoid their failures. Bodman had a clear idea of how a systematic series
of experiments ought to be carried out when he varied the length of charge,
column of shot, and diameter of bore. It is because Mr. Bashforth followed
a similar principle when he carried out his experiments with varied bores,
charges, and projectiles, to determine the resistance of the air, that he has
met with such marked success. Had Bodmaids pressure-gauges been as
accurate and as sensitive to determine pressures as Mr. Bashforth's instru¬
ment was to determine time, we should not have had much more to do than
accept his conclusions. But Bodman failed for want of an instrument to
carry out his ideas. He has, however, shown us what is to be done. Let
us but carry out his notions on the plan laid down by him, and we shall
obtain results which will well repay a little trouble and some expense.
It would be necessary to have experimental guns of the strongest possible
form of construction, and of varied calibres — say 3, 5, 7, 9, and, possibly,
11 ins.
Pebble powder being most likely to give satisfactory results, should first
be tried. Density, also, appearing to be the most important element, should
first be investigated. Two densities of this powder might be used, 1*74 and
1‘84. Commencing with density 1*74, it should be fired first from the
3-inch gun, with varied charges and projectiles, noting the increase of
pressure for each increase of charge and each increase of projectile, and
taking care to note any manifestation of anomalous pressure.
The same powder should then be tried, in the same manner, with the
5-inch gun, and the pressures noted, with the view to find out whether they
increased with the lengths of charge and projectile in the same way as in
the 3 -inch gun, or at a more rapid rate.
The same should be done with the 7-inch gun, to see if the pressures
were the same, or increased at a still more rapid rate, and so on with the
9-inch and 11-inch guns if necessary.
Density 1*84 should be tried in a similar manner, and in all probability
will show that the pressures are less under similar circumstances, and that
longer columns of powder and shot can be fired with this powder than with
density 1*74.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
435
Any other density can be tried, if necessary, in order more satisfactorily to
elucidate the allowability of increase in column of powder and projectile with
increase of density.
If equal columns of powder and projectile in all the guns give similar
pressures, then the size of gun for any particular density of powder will be
given by the length of the columns; but if not, a modification must be
made according to the influence of the size of the bore on the pressure. In
the latter case much light will be thrown on the relative values of big and
small bores, especially if taken in connection with the known laws of the
resistance of the air and the penetration of armour plates.
In this manner we shall not only be able to say what the pressure is
with varied charges, calibres, and densities of powder, but we shall be able,
from the laws which may be established, to calculate with tolerable accuracy
what will be the pressures with larger charges and bigger guns, and what
density of powder is suitable for each.
Lastly, having fixed certain densities which are to be manufactured,
and what guns they are suitable for, we may, if thought advisable, make
some experiments to determine what mixture of these densities would give
better results with intermediate guns.
This method of proceeding is founded on the supposition that density will
not fail us, but it may not be all that we require. If it fail us, other
methods of regulating and moderating the combustion of gunpowder might
be tried.
It is possible that with our heaviest guns we may have not only to search
for the very best description of powder, but also for the very best description
of gun. We can obtain some very good practical information to guide us
in fixing what is the maximum pressure which it is safe to use; for, by firing
the battering charges of our service guns in these experimental guns, we can
note the pressure given, and adopt that as the maximum, which must not be
exceeded in any new gun of similar construction.^
I am indebted to Mr. Bashforthf for the suggestion that a gun with a
movable breech, on the plan proposed by me a year ago, would be the best
means of carrying out these experiments. I may observe that of late I have
very much improved its construction, my object being to allow the breech to
move right away, so as not to disturb the elevation. In this way there
would be no shock on the carriage, and, with a 15-inch gun firing at 15°
elevation, the strain would be reduced from 1000 tons to 100 tons at most.
This enormous reduction of strain would make it exceedingly well adapted
to the small gun-boats now being constructed to carry heavy guns on
platforms, which can be raised or lowered at will, on the plan invented by
Mr. Bendel, of the firm of Sir W. G. Armstrong & Co. Eig. 11 shews
an elevation of the gun. The breech is run home on the guide bars, and
thus the hollow part of the curve is bridged over.f
* Some very valuable information could also be obtained during these experiments by firing
through the Bashforth chronograph, which would show the amount of steadiness given to varied
lengths of projectile with varied velocities.
f Professor of Applied Mathematics to the Advanced Class of Artillery Officers.
J A small model 1 in. to a foot has been made for me at Elswick and fired. The shot was 11 ozs.
and charge 2 ozs. of powder. The action was perfect. A leather gas check entirely prevented the
escape of gas at the breech, and could be used over again.
436
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
-Fig. 11.
For the general law of pressure throughout the bore the gun could he
used in the form shown, for the slipping away of the breech without resist¬
ance would give an accurate measure of the pressure which impelled it. It
would have four times the delicacy of Rodman's velocimeter, because the
space it would move would be more than 3 ins. while the shot traversed the
bore. It would have this great advantage over Captain Noble's chronoscope,
that the tracing which could be obtained from it on a revolving cylinder
would be a continuous curve from the very starting of the shot, and not
merely indicated by several points. It would also show the effect of lead-
coating and rifling on the pressure.
But the great advantage to be gained by this method would be the
possibility of determining exactly the nature of the anomalous pressures.
The breech could be reduced in weight to any amount necessary to give
the desired sensitiveness, and the pressure could without difficulty be
distinctly traced during the first stages of- the shot's motion. For this
purpose it might be necessary to use a short gun, so as not to get
up an extreme velocity. It would even be possible to have breech and
projectile of the same weight, and each double the weight of an ordinary
shot, and the conditions of pressure would remain very much the same,
because the two would move in opposite directions, each with a velocity
equal to half that of an ordinary shot. And if the gun were not too long,
a record could be obtained from both projectiles. This would be a means
of detecting even successive impulses of waye motion, if any such existed in
the elastic fluid. It is probable, however, that such extreme delicacy would
not be necessary, but that the law of pressure would be so traced during
the initial stages as to give us all the information we desire.
But if it were desirable to test enormous pressures, so as to trace
Rumford's law as far as possible, this method could be adopted ; for, by using
a very short column of powder, and two very long columns of shot, the
pressure would be very high, but, by virtue of Rodman's law of increase of
strength with diminution of length of chamber, our very strong guns would
withstand the explosion, and we should be able to go far above Rumford's
pressures.
There is yet another use to which such a gun could be applied, and which
would be of very great advantage as confirming the results obtained in the
way first indicated. For this suggestion I am again indebted to Mr. Bashforth.
We have seen how very satisfactory Rumford's method of measuring the
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
437
pressures was, as far as he was able to go, because it takes account only of
absolute pressure, and not of sudden pressure or wave motion.
There is a difficulty in applying Bumford's method to an ordinary gun,
because the recoil of the gun would prevent the arrangement of the heavy
weight on the top of the stopper ; but in a gun with a movable breech this
difficulty would not occur, because the barrel does not recoil.
If these two methods of measuring the pressure coincide, as I am con¬
fident they must, not only on my own mature consideration, but also because
they meet the approval of so able and successful an experimenter as
Mr. Bashforth, the results might be safely relied on, and laws would be
established which would allow of extension, so as to tell with certainty what
would be the probable fate of any proposed new gun; and in future we
should be able to justify our preference for big or small bores, not by the
opinion of any individual, however eminent, but by the invariable laws of
science, deduced from experiment. No doubt such experiments would
require a considerable expenditure of public money, but if we go on with
big guns, as go on with big guns we must, they will result in a gigantic
economy ; and, if these investigations were combined with what we already
know, and what yet remains to be determined in the other branches of
gunnery, our English artillery would, as heretofore, maintain its position as
the first in the world.
At the close of the lecture —
Colonel W. J. Smythe invited gentlemen present to make any remarks they
thought fit on the subject, or to ask Captain Morgan any questions.
Captain C. Orde Browne, E.A., Captain Instructor Boyal Laboratory, asked
for an explanation of the mode in which Captain Morgan proposed to register what
he understood as local pressure by a movement of the breech. He thought the
breech would fail to indicate any sudden local pressure, or slight variations in
pressure, from the momentum it must necessarily possess ; and hence in registering
such pressure he thought there was a great advantage in having something
stationary, although he admitted the advantage of obtaining a continuous trace of
a curve over registered points ; but perhaps he had not understood the lecturer.
Captain Morgan said the local pressure was due to the wave-like motion of the
gases, and by his plan he thought these waves could be detected, if the breech was
light enough, as clearly as if they were successive blows.
Captain Browne expressed a doubt whether any decrease in the pressure could
be truly ascertained by that means.
Captain Morgan said a decrease of pressure would give a less increment of
velocity. The variation in velocity of the recoil of the breech would be more or
less according as the pressure was greater or smaller.
Captain W. H. Noble, B.A., asked what Captain Morgan meant by the indica¬
tions of the crusher gauge being affected by the vibration of the gun.
Captain Morgan stated that the explanation was not his, but was Bodman’s.
Captain Noble did not consider the explanation satisfactory. He could under¬
stand the effect of a vibration in the gas, but he could not see how the vibration of
the metal of the gun could sensibly affect the dimensions of the copper cylinder
upon which the amount of pressure depended.
Captain Morgan said the effect upon the crusher did not depend entirely upon
438
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the pressure. The result was a compound of pressure and vibration. The crusher
moved backwards and forwards in its casing from the effect of the vibration of the
walls of the gun. The crusher would thus to some extent act as a hammer.
Professor Abel, the Chemist of the War Department, said so many points had
been raised in the very interesting lecture they had heard, that he scarcely knew
which to speak of first. Everyone present must be struck with the remarkable
progress which had been made in the investigation of this subject within a very
recent period ; but, although very much information had been gained, he hoped and
believed that further researches would elicit still more valuable results. Captain
Morgan had laid before them many interesting facts and ideas on the subject which
could not be controverted, but on several points which he had touched upon opinions
varied. With regard, for instance, to the unexploded powder which is sometimes
thrown out of the gun, he (Mr. Abel) believed that beyond doubt the particles 1) ad
been in a state of ignition, and, indeed, were burning at the instant of their projec¬
tion from the gun, but that the sudden expansion of gas had the effect of
extinguishing them. The condition of the surfaces of these particles indicated that
the most inflammable portions of the masses had been burning, and the fragments
of pellet powder especially afforded convincing evidence of having been burning
and of its extinguishment being accidental. He thought they could not avoid the
conclusion that during the explosion of a charge each particle of powder remained
isolated from the others, through the agency of the gases evolved from their surfaces.
The theory adopted by the lecturer that the particles composing the two extremities
of a charge became jammed up in a solid mass, did not therefore appear to him (Mr.
Abel) to be one which he could accept ; in fact, experiment appeared, as far as it had
been carried, to demonstrate the opposite. He would not enter into a controversy
concerning the precise effects to be ascribed to the density of gunpowder, simply
remarking that there were abundant proofs that the properties of gunpowder might
to a considerable extent be regulated by variation of density. There was another
variable property of gunpowder which had perhaps not attracted the attention it
deserved — perhaps because it was so difficult of comparison in different powders —
and that was the property of hardness. Some powders were very hard though their
density was low ; and as hardness, apart* from density, no doubt exercised an
important influence on the rate of burning of a powder, it was highly desirable, if
possible, that reliable means should be devised for registering this quality. The
production of a powder thoroughly suitable for the large guns of the present day
was unquestionably a difficult problem. There was no doubt that theoretically they
ought to have a distinct powder for each kind of gun ; but that being obviously
impracticable, they must endeavour so to regulate and balance the various properties
of the powder as to obtain, with as little sacrifice of power as possible in the smaller
of the guns, a powder which can be safely used in the heaviest charges. His name
had been mentioned by the lecturer as objecting to deductions founded on the experi¬
ments of Bunsen and Schischkoff ; he would therefore wish to state that his objections
■were specially directed against the mode of operation pursued in their investigations.
He considered the method of experimenting to be fallacious, firstly, because they
did not explode gunpowder under pressure, when collecting the products ; and
secondly, because some of the products were submitted to treatment which must
involve secondary changes before they were examined, and hence one might expect
to obtain analytical results which would not fairly represent the original products of
explosion. The experiments which were now being made in reference to the
character of the decomposition of gunpowder by Captain A. Noble, were likely to
furnish very important results. Captain Noble, in conducting his investigations,
was exploding charges of considerable amount in strong vessels either absolutely or
nearly closed, and was thereby likely to arrive at results approximating much more
closely to those of actual practice than any which hitherto had been obtained. The
physical and chemical results attending the explosion of gunpowder constituted a
f
•7
■8 food
I
Fz^ 10,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
439
most fruitful subject of investigation, worthy of engrossing the attention not only
of artillerymen, but also of purely scientific investigators.
Colonel Smythe, in expressing the thanks of the meeting to Captain Morgan, said
that nothing was more remarkable than the way in which the properties of gun¬
powder were now considered as compared with what had been the case up to a
recent period. The forces generated by fired gunpowder under different conditions
had been discovered to be so complex as to require the most delicate instruments
for their determination. Captain Morgan had shown that there was yet much to be
done, both experimentally and instrumentally, and probably an instrument constructed
on the principle of his proposed large gun would be the best for settling the question
of pressure. It was very gratifying to find a subject of such great artillery
importance taken up by an officer of Captain Morgan’s high mathematical ability,
and he (Colonel Smythe) had no doubt that before long the properties of the forces
of gunpowder, so far as they were of practical import, would be ascertained and
usefully applied. (Applause.)
93
440
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
BREACHING BY INDIRECT EIRE.
BY
COLONEL H. II. MAXWELL, R.A.
SUPERINTENDENT, COSSIPORE GUN FOUNDRY.
The first instance on record, to my knowledge, of breaching by
bigfi-angle fire is that at Woolwich in the years 1822 to 1824,* when
experiments were carried on under the then Master- General of the
Ordnance, the Duke of Wellington, to determine whether it was possible
to breach walls protected by earthen counterguards, as proposed by
Carnot in his “ System of Defence,” by firing over the crest of such
counterguards. The inner edge of the top of the counterguard was
31 ft. from the face of the wall ; the height of the crest of the counter¬
guard was 24 ft., and the point intended to be struck was 12 ft. above
the level of the ground.
Fig. l.
The ranges to the interior crest were 500 yds. As a rough approxi¬
mation, the angle of incidence of the projectile would be that whose
tangent is -J-f, or 21° 10'. Supposing the muzzle of the piece were
4 ft. above the level, calculating by the Russian formula hereafter given,
the angle would be 21° 26'. On the 5th August, 1824, a year after
the completion of the wall, eight 68-pr. carronades, in battery 500 yds.
from the crest of the counterguard, three 8-inch and three 10-inch
howitzers at a distance of 400 yds. — in all fourteen pieces — fired
100 rounds each in about six hours, the howitzers firing live shells filled
with powder and the carronades solid shot. The 8-inch and 10-inch
* See “ Aide-Memoire to the Military Sciences,” article Fortification, Permanent. Appendix
A, p. 62.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
441
howitzers fired with charges of 3-3-th and ^h of the weight of their
projectiles respectively, the 24-pr. gun with a charge of -/^rd, and the
68-pr. carronade with one of -gyth and ^-th. A practicable breach
14 ft. in width was made by their fire, and the buttresses were much
injured.
On the 6th August the firing recommenced from eight 68-pr. car-
ronades at 500 yds., two 8-inch iron howitzers and four 10-inch
howitzers at 400 yds. Fifty rounds per piece were fired in two hours,
when the breach was examined and found to be complete in every
respect, and the buttresses to be in a ruinous state.
There is no rifled piece in existence, which fires with a small charge
with accuracy, capable of dropping its shell at such an angle from a
range so short as 500 yds.; but the Russian 12-prs. (321b. common
shell) could attain this angle at ranges of from 1120 to 1266 yds. ; and
the same might be effected by their larger pieces from greater ranges.
This case — that of a wall covered by a counterguard at a distance of
only 31 ft. — is an extreme one ; no instance of CarnoFs system, as far
as I am aware, having been actually constructed. The distance between
the wall to be breached and the covering mass in ordinary fortifications
is usually very much greater than 31 ft.
At the siege of Strasburg by the Prussians in 1870, a breach was
made in one of the bastions of the enceinte from a battery of four short
B.L. 24-pr. guns,* firing common shells weighing 61 lbs., inclusive of
a bursting charge of 4*4 lbs. ; the range was about 900yds., and the
escarp breached was invisible from the battery. An eye-witness who
examined the breach after the siege, describes the wall as fairly down,
but the earth of the rampart and parapet so far intact that a good deal
had yet to be done to render the breach practicable.
As this system of breaching is, I believe, practically unknown in
England, some description of the method by which this result is
attained may be of service.
The Russian “ Handbook for Artillery Officers,” published in 1870,
and Prelnds “ Schiesskunst,” Berlin, 1867, give full details of this
system. From these sources I purpose to describe it.
The problem resolves itself into this : — At what angle and with
what charge must a certain piece be fired from a given distance, so
as to send its shell just clear of the covering work which intercepts the
view — whether glacis, counterguard, or counterscarp — and to strike
the escarp wall at the proper height above the bottom of the ditch
with the maximum velocity ?
As the range, the height of the covering work, and its distance from
the escarp, as well as the height of that escarp, may all vary, it is
* This piece had just bedn introduced into the Prussian service for the above purpose. It is a
howitzer to all intents and purposes, and worthy of imitation. The following are some of the
details of the piece: — Calibre, 5,866//; length of piece, 14-4 calibres; length of bore rifled, 58,7//;
number of grooves, 24 ; pitch of rifling, ^ ; weight of piece, 29 cwt., or 53 times the weight of its
projectile; maximum charge, 3*3 lbs. ; load-ratio (powder to projectile), length of shell, 14,2//;
weight of shell, 61 "07 lbs. ; weight of bursting charge, 4*4 lbs. See “Artilleristisches Taschenbuch,”
Witte, Berlin, 1870.
442
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
evident that the elements of the shooting of the piece with various
charges must be known, to enable the artilleryman to give an answer
to this question. For this purpose a series of tables of fire for each
piece is thus constructed : —
The gun is fired with its service charge at upright wooden targets
at 500, 1000, and 1500 yds. ; further, practice is made with such eleva¬
tions as shall give ranges of about 2000, 2500, 3000, and 4000 yds.,
the ranges being measured on the plane. At the shorter ranges fifteen
rounds are fired at each elevation, exclusive of trial shots ; at the longer
ranges twenty rounds are fired, as the disturbing influences acting on the
projectile increase with the range. The positions of the mean points
of impact are calculated, the elevations being corrected so as to bring
them to what they would have been had the ranges been measured on
a horizontal plane through the muzzle of the gun.
In Prussia no notice was taken of the angle through which the gun
jumped on discharge ; in Russia it seems to have been taken into
account, the angles of elevation being corrected accordingly.
The positions of the seven mean points of impact are laid down on
lattice-paper, the angles of elevation being taken as ordinates and the
ranges as abscissae; the origin being at the muzzle of the gun. A
curved line is traced connecting the seven points as advantageously
as possible with the origin; that is, if a continuous curve, starting
from the origin, cannot pass through the seven points, it should leave
as many points above it as below it. The elevations for intermediate
ranges can now be read off at will.
The gun is next fired with about the lowest charge with which it
will fire with accuracy. For guns intended more especially for flat
shooting, the charge is found to vary from 43-th to -g-^th of the weight
of the shell. Finally, it is fired with two charges equidistant between
the service and the lowest charges. The elevations are such as will
give ranges of about 500, 1000, and 1500 yds. ; fifteen rounds being
fired at each elevation. If the angles of elevation and projection are
found to be the same, no correction is required beyond that due to the
height of the gun above the plane, as in the previous case. The points
are plotted on lattice-paper as before. The elevations for intermediate
ranges can be found by inspection.
The elevations for the fundamental charges are used to obtain eleva¬
tions for all intermediate charges as follows : — For four fixed ranges of
500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 yds., four separate curves are struck,
elevation and charge being taken as abscissa and ordinate. Having
thus got four elevations giving fixed ranges for any charge we please
between the lowest and the service charge, a curve is traced for each
proposed charge, elevation and range being taken as ordinate and
abscissa.
In the Russian tables there are fifteen or sixteen charges for each
gun ; the increase of charge being at first one-half what it is as the
service charge is approached. Thus, on the same sheet of lattice-paper
the whole of the fifteen curves are traced/ and from these curves fifteen
tables are made out of the shooting of each gun.
The following is a specimen of the Russian tables : —
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION,
443
A,
Fire of Siege and Garrison Steel 1 2-pr. Common Shell .
Charge/ 2-08 lbs.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Iuj
hi 3
5 §
a ^
.2 .a
-g V
d
CD
$
Cw §
Distance.
Height oi
tangent sig
a ^
o
•-S.S
o
CD
5F)
CD
fi
^ % m
•S in -g
a 6 g
.Soto
■e 43 a
ro5 rH
I6 o
£ s o
a <D
^ nd
a p|
Angle
of elevatioi
Angle
of incidenc
Tangent o
ngle of incid
Kl o
a
yds.
tenths'
of in.
tenths
of in.
yds.
ft.
0 /
o /
■
59
13
0
45
0-5
0 12
0 13
0-0038
117
2-6
0
44
1*0
0 25
0 27
0-0079
175
4-0
0
42
1-6
0 38
0 42
0-0122
233
5-4
0
. 41
2-0
0 51
0 58
0-0169
292
6-8
0
40
2‘5
1 5
1 14
0-0215
350
8-3
0-1
39
2-9
1 19
1 31
0-0265
408
9*8
0-1
38
3-4
1 34
1 48
0-0314
467
11-4
0*2
37
3-9
1 49
2 5
0-0364
525
13-0
0-3
36
4-4
2 5
2 22
0-0413
583
14*7
0-4
34
4-9
2 21
2 40
0-0466
642
16-4
0'5
33
5-4
2 37
2 58
0-0518
700
18-2
0-6
32
5-9
•2 54
3 16
0-0571
758
20-0
0-7
32
6-3
3 11
3 34
0-0623
817
21-8
0-8
32
6-8
3 28
3 52
0-0676
875
23-6
0-9
31
7-3
3 45
4 10
0-0729
933
25-4
1-0
31
7-8
4 3
4 29
0-0784
992
27-3
1-1
30
8-3
4 21
4 48
0-0840
1050
29-2
1-2
30
8-8
4 39
5 7
0-0896
1108
31-2
1-3
29
9-3
4 58
5 27
0-0954
1167
33-2
1-4
29
9-8
5 17
5 47
0-1013
1225
35-2
1-5
29
10-2
5 36
6 8
0-1075
1283
37-2
1 1-6
29
10-7
5 55
6 30
0-1139
1342
39-3
1-7
28
11*2
6 14
6 54
0-1210
1400
41-4
1-9
28
11*7
6 34
7 20
0-1287
1458
43-5
2-0
28
12*2
6 54
7 48
0-1370
1517
45-6
2-2
28
12-7
7 14
8 18
0-1459
1576
47-8
2-3
27
13-2
7 34
8 50
0-1554
1633
50-0
2*5
27
13-6
7 54
9 24
0-1656
This table is obtained thus : —
Column 1. — In this column are set down the ranges at convenient
equidistances.
Columns 2 and 6. — One of these columns is obtainable from the other.
If the tangent-sight bar is divided to degrees and minutes, and the
curves previously described have been plotted accordingly, the height
on the tangent-sight bar is obtained by multiplying the tangent of the
angle of elevation by the radius for sighting (in this piece 35*9") ; or
in symbols
h == r tan 0 ;
h being the height on the tangent-bar required,, r the radius for sight¬
ing, and 0 the angle of elevation. If, on the other hand, the tangent-
sight bar is divided into inches, the angle of elevation is obtained from
the formula reversed,
h
444
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Column 3. — The figures in this column are obtained by plotting the
deflections at five ranges, deflection being taken as ordinate and range as
abscissa, striking a curve and reading off intermediate deflections.
Column 4. — If we take the difference between two adjacent heights
on the tangent-sight bar from column 2, say 18*2 — 164 = 1*8 tenths
of inch, and the difference of the corresponding ranges from column 1,
that is 700 — 642 = 58 yds., we get the proportion
t. t. yds.
1-8 : 1 :: 58 : a? = 32 yds.
Column 5. — To find the deflection of the projectile due to 0*1" on
the deflection scale, we have the proportion
yds.
35*9'7 : 0-1" :: 700 x 3 : ^ = 5*9 ft.
Column 7. — The angles of incidence in this table seem to have been
calculated from the height on the target of the mean point of impact
and the distance behind the target of the mean range from
tan 6 =
a {A — a) ’
where 6 is the angle of incidence, h' the height above the plane of the
mean point of impact, A the range up to the graze of the projectile,
a the distance of the target from the gun. Five such angles being
calculated and taken as abscissae, the ranges being taken as ordinates, and
the points obtained being joined by a continuous curve, the intermediate
angles for intermediate ranges can be read off by inspection. The
angles in this column are slightly less than those obtainable by calcula¬
tion from the ordinary formula.
Column 8. — The figures in this column are obtained from a table of
natural tangents.
The following extracts from similar tables will be of use further on
in working out an example.
B.
O s
rd
to d
M
O H
•J3 «
be
§ S'
s ° •
c3 ©
"rS
d
S °.S
3$ -g
03 5 S3
f-< R <D
rO rtf
a <3
Hi o
r2 +
S C
'c
fcUCTS
'o
4s
o
Hi a
11
i's
EH ®
be
a
yds.
1225
1225
tenths
of in.
39-1
44-4
tenths
of in.
1-8
2-0
yds.
ft.
Charge, T9 lbs.
26-8
10-2
6 13
Charge, 1*7 lbs.
23-3 I 102 7 3
6 65
7 54
0-1213
0-1388
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
445
In addition to tlie above table, a small table of the mean quadratic
deflection is required ; that is, the mean lateral and the mean vertical
deflections are assumed to be identical.*
C.
Mean quadratic deflection and amount by which the height of the mean
point to be struck in breaching should be diminished .
12-pr. Steel Gun.
Distance in yds.
Charges.
2-48 lbs.
1-8 lbs.
1*13 lbs.
0*68 lbs.
ft.
ft.
ft.
ft.
233
0-3
0-3
0-2
0-6
467
0-8
0-8
0-6
3-5
700
1-4
1-4
1*4
8-5
933
2-2
2-3
2-9
14-0
1167
3-3
3-9
6-1
20-0
1400
4-7
7-1
12-2
—
1633
6-5
13-2
21*9
—
With a series of tables such as above described, the gunner can
easily find an answer to the problem proposed at the beginning of this
paper.
The Eussian formula is as follows :=~
tan 6 =
A — a
(h ± H) =p H
where A — horizontal range in feet up to face of wall,
a = horizontal range in feet up to crest of covering work,
h = height of crest of covering work above muzzle of gun,
II = height or depth of point to be struck on the face of the
wall to be breached, above or below the horizontal line
through the muzzle of the gun.
The upper signs in the formula are to be used when the point to be
struck is below the horizontal line through the muzzle of the gun ; the
lower signs when the point to be struck is above the horizontal line
through the muzzle of the gun.
* This assumption, if assumption it be, though perhaps not absolutely correct, seems to be
sufficiently- so for all practical purposes. See Helie, “ Traite de Balistique Experimental, ” Paris,
1865, p. 600, The Russian tables show them to be alike, or very nearly alike, up to 1200 yds.
range.
446
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OE
Tig. 2.
N
O
To apply this formula, let" it be supposed that an escarp wall covered
by a counterguard (Fig. 2) is to be destroyed. Let the revetment be
at a distance of 3640 ft., and the crest of the covering breastwork at a
distance of 3521 ft. from the gun ; let the vertical height of the crest
of the breastwork be 7 ft., and that of the revetment 16 ft. ; the height
of the cordon being 5 ft. above the horizontal plane.
The most favourable height to make a good breach is about J of
the total height of the wall from its base ; the point of aim will then be
5*67 ft. below the horizontal plane and 12*67 ft. below the crest of the
counterguard. The horizontal distance between the crest of the
counterguard and the wall to be breached will be 119 ft. The ratio
12*67
— - - = 0*1065 will give a first approximation to the tangent of the
angle of incidence. On examining the practice table above given (A),
we find that the tangent of the angle of incidence 0*1075 at a range of
1225 yds. = 3675 ft,, with a charge of 2*08 lbs. is the nearest. But as
2*08 lbs. is almost midway between 2*48 lbs. and 1*8 lbs., we may expect
3*3 _}_ 3*9
to have a mean vertical deviation of - ^ - = 3*6 ft. (see Table C),
midway between the mean vertical deviations with a 1*8 lb. and a
2*48 lb. charge at a mean range of 3640 ft. But as the height of the
wall to be breached is more than double the above deviation, and as
| of the wall is to be fired at, we may take § of 3*6 = 2*4 ft. and add
it to 5*67 ft. — the height of the point to be hit below the horizontal
plane — to obtain the height H = 5*67 x 2*4 = 8*07 ft. below the hori¬
zontal line through the piece. To obtain the tangent of the angle of
incidence we have
A = 3640 ft. ; « = 3521 ft.; L/=8*07ft.; h = 7 ft.
^(7 + 8*07) — 8*07
tan 0 = — - - = 0*1287.
3521
On referring to the table (B) we find that at a range of 1225 yds.,
with charges of 1*9 and 1*7 lb., the tangents of the angle of incidence
are 0*1213 and 0*1388 respectively ; that is, that with a mean charge
of 1*8 lb. we may expect to have a tangent of 0*1300, approximating to
0*1287. The mean height on the tangent scale (Table B) will be
THE BOYAli AETIELEEY INSTITUTION.
447
44*4 + 39*i
- ~ - = 41*8 tenths of inch; or the mean angle of elevation
LA
f50 1Q; + 7° V
will be - - - - = 6° 38'. If we use the quadrant we must
u
5. 67
deduct the ground angle of which ^ = 0*0016 is the tangent ; or an
angle of 5', since the object to be hit is below the level of the piece.
We have, by means of the tables and the formula, learnt what the
angle of elevation and charge of a certain piece, firing at a given range*
should be, so as to throw its shell clear of the crest of a covering work
and to strike the escarp wall at the proper height to make the best
breach. Q. K F.
When we come to consider what an advance in ballistics we have in
this system of breaching, what saving of life there would be under such
a system as compared with the old system of breaching from batteries
erected on the crown of the glacis, I believe I shall have most artillery¬
men with me in expressing the hope that tables such as I have described
for all guns of the siege train should be drawn up from careful practice
carried out for this purpose; further, that similar tables for all field
guns should be constructed, for use in shelling occupied villages and
field fortifications.
59
448
MINUTES OE PKOCEEDINGS OF
EXTRACTS PROM MAJOR KODOLITSCH’S
REPORT ON THE ABISSINIAN EXPEDITION.
TRANSLATED EROM THE GERMAN BY
LIEUTENANT DOUGLAS E. JONES, E.A.
Lord Napier, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Army, was entrusted
with the command of the army of Abyssinia. He was the head, body, and
soul of this undertaking, which was so glorious of its kind, and crowned with
as complete a success as could have been expected.
Lord Napier possesses the requirements of a great general. Beloved
by his troops, he combines with the simplest, kindest, and most engaging
manners, great energy and independence of character. He is able to watch
over and carry out his plans with the most determined consistency. The
first in rank, he is also the first in energy. He shares all fatigues, labours,
and privations with his troops ; the same ration, the same camping-
ground, is measuredi out for all. The want of spirituous liquors among the
soldiers, during the days preceding and following the fall of Magdala, was
equally perceptible at the table of the Commander-in-Chief.
A thorough knowledge of the Hindoo languages, a high respect for the
religious and national customs of the Indian troops, and a proper apprecia¬
tion of their worth, won for him the most unconditional submission on their
part; but notwithstanding this, he never lost sight of the superiority of the
English troops, which secured for him their affections also. To extraordinary
theoretical knowledge of war, he added a practical experience gained on the
battle-fields of India, Persia, and China.
On the first sign of the possibility of an expedition to Abyssinia^ Lord
Napier, with the help of his staff, immediately instituted the fullest enquiries
regarding the nature and condition of the country and people against whom
war was to be made, the resources they might hope to find, and the diffi¬
culties that were to be dreaded; the political, religious, and statistical
condition; the topographical, geographical, climatic, and meteorological
aspects, &c. — in short, on all points bearing on the preparation of a campaign.
He personally superintended these researches. There can be no doubt but
that the necessary information concerning the resources of this country was
obtained in the most practical, cautious, and discreet manner, and that
this information was on the whole accurate, and the plan of campaign based
on these data marvellously correct. At the same time, all questions of detail
were thoroughly discussed— a sure characteristic of a great general.
Another point which received particular attention from the Commander-
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION-.
449
in-Chief deserves to be brought to light, as it exercised a great influence
over the successful termination of the campaign. It is the treatment of the
natives, and the clever use made of the political relations existing between
the several chiefs ; so that, among other things, they were kept from every
offensive demonstration, and were unwittingly made useful in furthering the
entire undertaking. To effect this, the greatest care was taken to prevent a
collision between the troops and the natives. The most liberal payment
was ordered for all services rendered and goods delivered, and thereby
the great result was obtained that one always received trustworthy infor¬
mation and messengers, and had the full resources of the country at one's
disposal.
In regard to the chiefs, the general had obtained all possible information
concerning their feelings, interests, and inimical or friendly relations between
one another, which, cleverly used, enabled him to paralyze those who were dis¬
posed to be unfriendly, and cause the indifferent to help him by their actual
support — which in fact happened when the two rival Gallas queens helped
to surround Magdala with their armies, and thereby rendered impracticable
any attempt at flight Theodore might have made. Lord Napier, in his
personal dealings with these native chiefs, displayed the greatest discri¬
mination and tact; for they were thoroughly impressed with the power and
greatness of the nation which he represented, and yet convinced of his
personal friendliness and kindly feeling towards them individually.
Erom the moment in which he was given the command of the Abyssinian
expedition, he devoted his chief attention to the organisation of the Land
Transport Corps. Be knew that this was the greatest difficulty of the whole
undertaking, and that success chiefly depended on its thorough organisation
and successful working. The .Commander-in-Chief, and other generals in
the English and East Indian armies, have the right to choose their own
staff, which has a very great advantage, and when not the case often leads
to unfortunate results. In the English army there is no regular organised
staff corps. The members which would form such a corps in other armies,
are in this always chosen from their various regiments. The purely
scientific and technical duties which belong exclusively to the staff in
continental armies, in this fall to the lot of the Artillery, Engineers, & c.
This certainly has the advantage, especially if the officers generally be well
instructed ; for amongst such men, many may always be found who have been
entrusted with the practical management of troops, and who have a facility for
winning the affections of their men, while,' on the other hand, one is less liable
to fall into the mistake of considering a mere technical and scientific educa¬
tion as a sufficient qualification. This last-named mistake is especially liable
to occur after a long peace in those armies to which the choice of the staff
is confined to a distinct corps, for too great importance is placed on the above-
named qualities, and too little stress laid on force* of character, self-reliance,
an enterprising spirit, &c.
This system is well organised. Officers who have served five years with
their regiments, after giving proof of the necessary attainments in a severe
examination, become eligible for the staff, but when thus employed they
return to their regiments at the end of every five years. This good principle
must not, however, be adhered to too strictly ; for it would be disadvantageous
if it were not possible in certain cases to retain special abilities on the staff
450
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
beyond the appointed term of five years, though it would be detrimental
to keep individuals permanently on it.
It is a striking fact that there remained much to be wished for in carry¬
ing out the service of the Quarter-Master-General' s department. It was
especially perceptible that those entrusted with the duties of getting the
columns into marching order did not exercise sufficient influence, neither
did they do so during the march. The only explanation I can offer for this
is the general character of the English officer, which itself arises from that
of the nation. The English officer is not sufficiently accustomed to enter by
direct surveillance and personal dealing into the details of the service ; too
much is left to the discretion of a few. So long as you have to deal with
bodies of troops consisting of old non-commissioned officers and old well-
trained soldiers, this answers very well ; in the Abyssinian army, however,
the Land Transport consisted of heterogeneous elements thrown together on
the spur of the moment, so that an accurate conformity to regulations and
a constant watchfulness became necessary. Here a mere supervision did not
answer, and disorders on the marches were the necessary results.
Cavalry .
The saddlery and equipment of the cavalry is excellent, though the saddle
might be a little lighter and smaller, and the total weight (322 lbs.) the horse
has to carry is enormous ; in fact it was found necessary to lighten this weight
from Tocado, and reduce it to 210 lbs. The remainder of the men's baggage
was carried on mules, which increased the length of the train to an undue
proportion ; however, it was the only means of making a march possible in
such a country, and I firmly believe that if the cavalry of the future is to
maintain its position against the improved arms of the day, great though
the disadvantage may be, it will be necessary to resort to like means for
European cavalry in European wars — namely, to carry the men's baggage
in carts, and only to allow absolute necessaries to be carried by the horses.
Their manoeuvres appeared clumsy, and similar to the Austrian Drill
Regulations of 1854. However, trials are now being made in England of
the new Austrian drill, which is certainly by far the best in existence. It
was impossible to form an opinion as to their value, capabilities, and rapidity
in marching, in a column consisting of men and animals of all races and
descriptions.
Artillery .
The artillery consisted of twenty-four guns, two mortars, and fourteen
rocket troughs. The whole of this artillery was brought as far as Magdala,
except two Armstrong guns left behind in the entrenched camp at Addigerat,
and the six S.B. mountain guns, which did not advance beyond Senafe.
The two 7-pr. steel batteries, of which I received as accurate a description
as it wras possible for me to obtain, have answered very w^ell. The materiel ,
ammunition, and service of the guns w^ere excellent. In regard to accuracy
and range, I hold that they are inferior to our 3-pr. mountain guns. The
excellent qualities which characterise these batteries are : —
1. Their portability.
2. They are arranged for vertical as well as horizontal fire.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
451
3. The change from pack to draught can he made in the shortest time,
and the mules set free by this arrangement can then be employed for
mounting the gunners.
The sight consists of a rectangular steel bar on the right side of the gun,
inclined so as to give 3° deflection. The fore-sight consists of a cylindro-
conical stud, on the right side of the piece, which is screwed into a
projection tapped with a screw thread. This arrangement wras not found
to be practical; for, from the frequent mounting and dismounting, the
fore-sight constantly broke off close to the screw socket, and considerable
delay was caused in extracting the end left in the socket. In order to
remedy this defect the sight had to be removed during transport, which
caused a delay in getting the gun ready for action. The incendiary power
possessed by the double shell issued to these guns is very great, and by
their introduction into our service the main defect in our mountain guns
would be remedied.
Two rocket Y's for Haleys rockets, which had never been used on active
service before, were attached to each 7-pr. mountain battery, and gave very
satisfactory results under the circumstances existing in Abyssinia. These
rockets produced a certain moral effect on these barbarous tribes, partly
through the fact of their being visible throughout their flight, and partly
on account of the noise made by the escaping gas ; but their actual effect
is insignificant, chiefly because they have only solid heads. The heavier
natures of naval rockets have hollow heads, which are filled and used as shells,
and this principle might perhaps with advantage be applied to the lower
natures. If such a rocket strikes a hard object before being burnt out, it
will burst and set fire to any combustible material in the vicinity. As
yet, the question of rockets has not been solved. In their present state they
will not be of much use in European wars, but with a few improvements they
may yet be introduced for mountain service and for flying cavalry columns,
on account of their great portability, range, and tolerable accuracy. One
horse can easily carry a Y and from fifteen to twenty rockets.
Special pack-saddles were made for the transport of the 7-pr. guns, with
their carriages and stores. The gun is placed transversely on the mule's
back, and the carriage lengthwise. No delay ever occurred, even in the
narrowest passes, and the advantage gained by bringing the load nearer
to the animal's back outweighs all disadvantages.
The men who served these guns consisted of English artillery soldiers, all
old hands, and for the most part intelligent men; the non-commissioned
officers especially, not to mention the officers, gave one the impression of
a scientifically instructed corps.
The Englishman is with justice proud of his sailors, and the Commander-
in-Chief, witli a proper estimation of their qualities and of the national
feeling in their favour, decided to form a so-called Naval Brigade, to be
employed in serving two 6-pr. rocket batteries, thus giving them the
opportunity of showing their countrymen at home that the British sailor
knows how to behave like a man on shore as well as at sea. Nor did they
cause any disappointment, for they were quite at home in their new occu¬
pation, and formed, in a word, a first-rate corps.
The most interesting circumstance connected with the 12-pr. Armstrong
battery was that four of its guns (two remaining at Addigerat) were carried
452
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
from Antalo, whence there was no road, on the backs of elephants, over
the most difficult ground — the steepest, stoniest, and narrowest passes and
mountain gorges.
The elephants possessed a wonderful degree of training, not to say intelli¬
gence. These animals, so docile and obedient to their keepers, made an
immense impression on the inhabitants, who only knew them in their wild
state. It was a bold experiment to employ these animals, accustomed
as they were to the hot Indian climate and good roads, on such vile roads
and in such a variable temperature as that of Abyssinia, but they would
have been of material service if Magdala had been more vigorously defended ;
for there is no doubt that if Theodore had not given up the positions of
Tala and Islamgee, in consequence of his unaccountable attack on the
10th of April, and the consequent demoralisation of his troops, a severe
bombardment would have been necessary. This circumstance alone made it
possible to bombard Magdala from the dominating position of Islamgee,
and to take this almost impregnable position. The experiment, however,
succeeded capitally, and the elephants, in spite of all obstacles, arrived before
Magdala with the troops, in a surprisingly good condition.
These animals wrere treated with the greatest care, and even if the whole
army had been obliged to suffer from hunger, the Commander-in-Chief would
yet have given the elephants their full rations. They had, however, to suffer
great privations in some places, in consequence of the enormous quantity of
water they require, and where it was impossible to give them sufficient to
drink. They suffered most before and after the capture of Magdala, as
there, as well as on the plateau of Arrogy, there was no water, and the
poor beasts had to go six miles to drink the wrater o‘f the Bashilo, which was
tainted with the carcasses of dead animals. At first it was feared that the
stony roads would cut their feet, and in consequence thick leather shoes
were provided for them. It was soon seen, however, that this precaution
was unnecessary, as the elephants picked their way so cleverly, and even
pushed stones on one side with their trunks, that their feet suffered little
— much less than the camels, which, notwithstanding the climate agreeing
with them better, could not on this account have Borne the march as far as
Magdala. Their saddles wrere very cumbersome, and the wThole arrangement
struck me as very primitive. To mount the guns on them, the elephants
were made to kneel down, when two skids were placed resting against them,
and the gun pinched and parbuckled up. The two 8-inch mortars were
carried in a similar way.
The gunners of the Armstrong battery were very muscular, fine, soldier¬
like men; many had taken part in several previous campaigns, and some
had as many as five medals.
Infantry .
There was no opportunity of forming an accurate opinion of the power of
manoeuvring of the English infantry, as the only time I saw them formed up
and exercised was at the review held at Senafe in honour of the birthday of
Her Majesty the Queen. The English infantry is formed up in two ranks,
three (?) paces from one another. On the march, the rear rank closes up
to the front rank to such an extent, that the feet of the rear rank men can
only tread in the intervals of the feet of the front rank, which of course
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
453
hinders their advance very much, and struck me as incredibly unpractical.
The movements are rather complicated, and devoid of that pliancy and
lightness which are such prominent qualities of good infantry, and which
are found to such an extent in our riflemen, and in the French light infantry,
and are very properly admired. This arm in general gave the impression
of great solidity, and of as great moral and physical courage and steadiness
as is to be expected from the descendants of those troops who won such
immortal fame in Spain, and who were considered by Napoleon and Marshal
Bugeaud as the best in the world — -which, however, refers more to their
actual fighting power than to movements.
The English infantry were armed with the Snider rifle. The disadvantages
of this rifle appear to be the extra motion entailed by drawing back an
extractor used to disengage the old cartridge, and the recoil is very great.
It has the appearance of our Wangel rifle, has a similar simple construction,
only it is more clumsy and heavier.
Land Transport Corps.
The success or failure — yea, the very possibility of carrying out the under¬
taking at all, depended upon the organisation of the Land Transport Corps.
Lord Napier, with a true military eye, foresaw the importance and diffi¬
culties of this department, and his most earnest attention was devoted to
the organisation of this corps.
Unfortunately, at the very commencement, he met with the greatest diffi¬
culties from the Bombay Government, which consisted of five members,
amongst whom Lord Napier was the only military authority. His very
proper demands met with no adequate consideration, but in the end his
wishes had to be complied with. However, this was not done till the last
moment, in the greatest hurry, and in consequence the arrangements were
of necessity defective, which gave rise to many difficulties.
The train had drivers of all nations, and the pack animals consisted of
camels, mules, donkeys, horses, and bullocks. The camels and bullocks did
not answer at all well. The pack-horses answered well ; they carried nearly
as much as the mules, and their mortality was less. It is impossible that
horses, mules, oxen, and camels can march together without one delaying
the other. I consider this the chief cause of the bad and straggling marches,
and the unnecessary weariness of the troops. There were pack-saddles of
every description — the Otago, M ‘Mahon, Jacob, Hungarian, Punjaub, &c.
The one which I consider the best, on the whole, is the Otago saddle,
with a few modifications, only it is rather heavy and expensive. As the
improvement of pack saddles and cavalry saddles is of special importance
to the military profession, it would really be worth while to offer a prize for
the best pack and the best cavalry saddles, which would probably be the
means of making some forward step in this question. At the close of the
expedition many of the beasts were sold, others shipped off to India, and
some given as presents to the Prince of Tigre.
So ended the Land Transport Corps, the raising of which had cost so
much in trouble and money. Yet the sad experience it taught will not
have been lost ; for repeatedly have I heard the question mooted of giving
this corps a permanent organisation for the Indian army, of which the cadres
at least should be always maintained.
454
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Commissariat .
The Commissariat of the Indian army is stated by all competent officers
to be much better than the English one. Yet its organisation was not
sufficiently elastic for such a variety of circumstances — from what cause I
am unable to say ; perhaps it was short in numbers, or perhaps the Civil
Government of Bombay wished purposely to cut down the materiel with
which the Commander-in-Chief had to carry out this difficult task ; but
there is no doubt that the personnel and materiel were too small for such
a gigantic undertaking.
The whole had the character of great looseness. It was often difficult to
decide where the desirable independence ceased and the wrant of organisation
began. The want of a regulated administration and organisation was
perceptible, like that which caused the unfortunate results which happened
in the Crimean vrar.
Sanitary Arrangements.
The arrangements of the hospital ships could not be called good. They
wrere old wooden boxes, with bad ventilation and defective arrangements,
and howrever wonderful this may sound of English ships, much was to be
desired in the wfay of cleanliness.
Postal and Courier Arrangements.
Altogether it cannot be said that these were sufficient. One of the most
important defects was, that no Post-Masters were sent out from England, who
would at least have set it all in good working order in a short time. Another
evil was, that the packets of letters were allowed to be opened at every
station. At the Post Office at Zoulla all letters should have been sorted
and divided, and so sent direct to their proper stations.
:nW
ximate rules for
g length of fuze
onds for a given
9 /,
20
Pettman’s g
Eemarks.
5 seconds le range by 2,* and
L000 add 1.
,e range by 2,* and
b 1000 . 1
to 2000 ... 2
to 3000 ... 3
| Painted red.
'.These fuzes, when issued for field or boat service,
[ have increased priming round the head.
5 seconds I. e range by 2,* and
L000 add 1.
9 /,
20
e range by 2,* and
|> 1000 . 1
to 2000 ... 2
to 3000 ... 3
Pettman’s g(
“ C ” percusi
Time, diaplir
Painted red.
t 6 from the
Time, commct 5 from the
9 seconds M
20 »
Mortar, larg<
n smal
Pettman’s lar
/; gei
do.
do.
7 to range.*
4 to range.*
Por ranges below 750 yds., double the range plus 10.
ie same remark will apply.
leconds.
1
laval ” shell, for S.B. ordnance, are distinct projectiles*
T-A-BIjEI OB SERVICE
Name of fuze.
Length of
composition,
inches.
Time of
burning,
seconds.
Shells used with.
Gauge of fuze-hole.
Other natures that the fuze can be
used with on an emergency.
Approximate rules for
obtaining length of fuze
in £ seconds for a given
1
Remarks.
M.L.E. C
IRDNANCE.
5 seconds M.L.O .
f 2
\ Mealed powder
X 5
)
Shrapnel for M.L.E. field guns.
General service.
C All shells for M.L.R.O. and S.B. naval
< shell, when time of flight does not
(. exceed 6 seconds.
1 Divide range by 2,* and
j if over 1000 add 1.
| Painted red.
10
All shells for M.L.E.O.
do.
_
Divide range by 2, # and
20
Do., except shrapnel.
do.
add —
• Up tc
1000
> 1000 . 1
to 2000 ... 2
'.These fuzes, when issued for field or boat service,
[ have increased priming round the head.
'
2000
to 3000 ... 3
J
Pettman’s general service .
Percussion.
Do., except shrapnel.
do.
-
B.L.E. ORDNANCE.
5 seconds B.L.E.O .
( 2
X Mealed powder.
} 6
Shrapnel for 12 and 9-pr.
General service.
f All shells for B.L.R.O. or M.L.R.O.,
< when time of flight does not exceed
(, 5 seconds.
/ Divide range by 2* and
j if over 1000 add 1.
| Painted red.
fCommon, segment, or shrap-
J ncl for 7-inch, 64 and
) 40-pr. ; common for 20-pr.
t S.S.
C 7-inch, 64 and 40-pr. coin-
< mon, and 20-pr. S.S.
(. common.
L do.
f Shrapnel for 12 and 9-pr. and all shells
Divide range by 2, # and
20 n n
4
20
J
j do.
l for M.L.R.O.
Do., except shrapnel.
> UpU
1000
2000
) 1000 . 1
to 2000 ... 2
to 3000 ... 3
3
Pettman’s general service .
Percussion.
4;
do.
do.
-
| -
“C”
do.
( Common or segment for 20,
X 12, 9, and 6-pr.
> Field service.
P
)
S.B. ORDNANCE.
Time, diaphragm, shrapnel ...
i
5
All diaphragm.
Common.
( Any S.B. common shell, if time of
| flight does not exceed 5 seconds.
■) Subtra<
j rang<
:l 6 from the
_ _ w
2
10
All S.B. common. §
Naval.
do.
C Subtrac
it 5 from the
9 seconds M.L.O .
2
10
General service.
_
( i'ang<
do.
20 n i, .
4
20
do.
do.
(24' and 12-pr. common shells, when
< fired from bronze mortars and time
}
do.
C of flight exceeds 10 seconds.
Mortar We
6
30
C13, 10, and 8-inch mortar
X shells.
| Mortar.
Add
17 to range.*
For ranges below 750 yds., double the range plus 10.
n small £ .
3
15
f 24 and 12-pr. common, when
fired from 6£ and 4§-inch
mortars, at times of flight
j over 7 seconds with 6£,
L and 10 seconds with 4|-inch.
^ Common.
Any S.B. common shell.
Add
14 to range.*
Pettman’s land service .
Percussion.
-
( All S.B. shells having a x on
\ the plug.
} do.
-
-
ii general service .
do.
-
Naval.
General service.
-
-
* In hundreds of yards in each case. These rules are not in every case suitable for very short ranges.
f The numbers on all fuzes, excepting mortar fuzes, denote £ seconds ; in the mortar fuzes, if the figures be multiplied by 10 the same remark will apply,
t This fuze must be packed when used with the 4|-inch shell.
§ Including 24 and 12-pr. common shells, when fired from the bronze mortars and the time of flight does not exceed 10 seconds.
N.B.—All the rifled ordnance time fuzes can he used as percussion, against earthworks, ships, $c. It should he remembered that "common” and "naval” shell, for S.B. ordnance, are distinct projectiles*
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
455
THE MOBILITY OF FIELD ARTILLERY;
PAST AND PRESENT.
BY LIEUT. H. W. L. HIME, E.A.
[No. III.]
“ Die Scbopfung del* reitenden Artillerie .... kann als kein zufalliges Ereigniss angeseben
werden, sonde rn war unzweifelkaffc ein Ausdruck der tief empfundenen Nothwendigkeit, die ver-
geblick angestrebte Beweglicbkeit der Feldar tiller ie auf einem andern als dem bisberigen Wege
zu erreichen.”' — Gen. von Taubert. “Der Gebrauch der Art. im Feldlcriege.”
The close of tRe first half of the 18th century left the military world
actively engaged in the attempt to construct some system of artillery that
could move as well as fire, and the beginning of the second half of the century
found it engaged in the self-same task. The matter was one which received
the greatest attention; for men were impressed, and justly impressed, with
the conviction that that state which first became possessed of a powerful
artillery would obtain a marked preponderance in the affairs of Europe,
and the feeling was daily growing stronger and stronger that, in the words
of Erederick the Great, “ Partillerie fait dans tous les temps le destin des
etats.” The system of artillery so eagerly sought after would naturally be
first constructed in that country in which circumstances were most favourable
for its invention. The seed had been sown broadcast over Europe, and the
flower would necessarily spring up first where the soil was best suited to its
growth. The successful state, in short, would be that in which the five
following conditions were most perfectly fulfilled: — Eirst, the nation should be
involved in some great war, which would render the possession of a powerful
artillery a matter of imperative necessity. Secondly, it should possess a well*
disciplined cavalry and infantry, which could move with such precision and
celerity as to throw the immobility of the artillery into striking relief. Thirdly*
circumstances should exist to render a closer connection between the artillery
and the other arms desirable, if not necessary. Eourthly, the state should
contain at least one man of ability devoted to the artillery service. Eifthly,
this man should possess the power to enforce the adoption of his plans.
Most countries in Europe fulfilled the first of these conditions, but none
so perfectly as Prussia. In the Silesian wars she fought for conquest, but
there were moments during the Seven Years'’ War when she fought for
existence. No nation at the time I speak of was engaged in so gigantic
a struggle.
As regards the second condition, Prussia far outstripped all competitors.
By some freak of fortune; Erederick William, who ruled during the earlier
[vol. vii.] 60
456
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
part of the century, was born a king, not a corporal. With many hateful
eccentricities, which in later times would have consigned him to a madhouse,
he possessed one ungovernable passion — a passion for drill. A detestable
martinet, like most martinets he had no claim to be called a soldier, and his
gigantic troops would have been probably overborne had they engaged in
war under his leadership ; for his whole life had been devoted to insignificant
details, and like Bunyan's “ Man with the Muck Rake,” he became so
engrossed with the dust at his feet that he was unable to lift up his eyes
and look around him. He was profoundly skilled in the dimensions of a
shako, the rolling of a strap, the fitting .of a buckle, and the position of a
knapsack ; yet he was contemptibly ignorant of everything connected with
■war. He was a saddler, he was a tailor — he was anything but a soldier.
Happily for his country and for his successor, Frederick William's love of
drill was coupled with a love of peace, and he consequently handed over
to his son intact the best drilled cavalry and infantry in Europe.1 In no
army, therefore, was the slowness of movement of the field artillery so
conspicuous; in no army did it clog the motion of the other troops to so
great and so palpable an extent;2 and it was but natural for Frederick the
Great on his accession to regard the artillery as little more than a necessary
evil.3
The third condition was fulfilled only in Prussia. On his accession to the
throne, Frederick the Great found that his cavalry had been drilled to fire in
line at the halt.4 The pernicious consequences of this system were so evident
at the battle of Molwitz that he abolished it without dela}q and by so doing
rendered a closer connection between the artillery and the cavalry a matter of
essential importance to the latter. The cavalry had been deprived of their
fire, and the necessity thus arose for the creation of a branch of artillery that
could manoeuvre with that arm.5
In the fourth condition Austria rivalled Prussia, and France equalled her,
if she did not surpass her; for if Prussia possessed Frederick, Austria owned
Prince Lichtenstein,6 and France could boast of Gribeauval. But in the fifth
condition Prussia outstripped both ; for wdiile Frederick was an absolute
monarch, whose will 'was law, Lichtenstein's influence, although great, was
by no means supreme, and Gribeauval w7as for years exposed to the attacks
of stupidity and the accusations of calumny.
Thus, while all the powers of Europe fulfilled some of the five conditions,
Prussia alone fulfilled them all. In Prussia., therefore, by the principle of
Natural Selection, the invention would be made, and there as a matter of fact
it was made.
1 “Die Entwickelung der Taktik,” von Boguslawski. Berlin, 1869, p. 187.
2 “Als impediment der Heeresbewegungen hatte er (Frederick) die Artillerie vorgefunden.”
“ Die Beziehungen Friedrich des Grossen zu seiner Artillerie,” yon Troschke, p. 3.
3 “ Er die Artillerie geradezu fur ein notwendiges Uebel erklarte.” — Ibid. p. 5.
4 Nolan’s “ Cavalry Tactics,” p. 30.
5 “ La Cavalerie ne rend pas de feux, et ne peut se battre qu’ a l’arme blanche. C’est pour
Subvenir a ce besoin qu’on a cree 1’artillerie a cheval.” — Napoleon, in Montholon, Tom. III.
p. 261.
“ Friedrichs II. Kavallerie verlangte eine feuerwaffe. ‘ Ihr sollt sie haben und zwar die beste
Von der Welt,’ erwiederte der Konig, und er gab ihr die reitende Artillerie.” — Von Troschke,
p. 39.
6 For a brief description of the improvements introduced into the Austrian artillery by Prince
Lichtenstein, see “Die Kriegsmacht Oesterreichs.” Wien, 1871, p. 35.
THE 110 YAL ABTILLEEY INSTITUTION.
457
But to render the invention of horse artillery a signal one, it was necessary
that some means should be devised of carrying on the gun-carriage or
limber such a quantity of ammunition as would make the gunners and their
gun independent, to a certain degree, of the wagons, and would enable them
to make rapid movements, within certain limits, without the contingency of
being perplexed and delayed by ammunition carts ; for to enable the guns and
their detachments to move with rapidity unaccompanied by the ammunition,
would be as glaring an absurdity as to render the guns and ammunition
capable of rapid movement unaccompanied by their gunners. Field artillery
consists of three elements — -the gunners, the guns, and the ammunition, and
I have already defined its mobility to be the capacity of moving, not one or
two of these elements, but the three combined in one whole, from point to
point of a battle-field. The want in question was supplied by the invention
of limber-boxes, shortly after the beginning of the Seven Years’ War.
Whether Captain von Holtzman of the Prussian artillery stumbled across
this invention independently,1 or whether it was suggested to him by the
small limber-boxes of the French battalion guns,2 or by the trail ammunition-
boxes of the Austrian 3-prs.,3 I know not; but certain it is that about
the beginning of the Seven Years’ War, limber-boxes were known in Germany.
This invention is the fourth landmark in the history of the mobility of field
artillery.
The artillery of the army which Frederick led into Silesia in 1741 consisted
of 42 pieces — viz., twenty 3-prs., eight 12-prs., four 18-pr. howitzers, and
ten 5 O-pr. mortars.4 At the very first battle of the war, Molwitz, Frederick
saw for himself that the fire of his guns was ineffective, and that the guns
themselves could only be moved from position to position with extreme diffi¬
culty. To remedy the first of these evils, he commanded the captains and
lieutenants of artillery to spare no pains in placing and laying their guns, for
the efficacy of whose fire lie made them exclusively responsible,5 and he after¬
wards framed rules to protect his artillery officers as much as possible from
the ignorant, irritating, and mischievous interference of generals and staff
officers, by whom gunners in all ages have been sorely let and hindered in the
execution of their duty.6 To remedy the second evil, the king saw clearly
that extensive and radical changes were required, and of such pressing
1 “ Ausser den bereits erwahnten Xammerstucken ist" die hochwichtige Erfindung der Hasten -
protze von ihm ausgegangen, welcke in der Zeit bis zum siebenyahrigen Kriege diejenigen
Yeranderungen erlitt.” — Von Troschke, p. 10.
2 “Ladite piece a la Suedoise sera montee sur son affut et un avant-train; elle sera garnie d’un
coffre qui contiendra les munitions neeessaires.” — Second Article of an Ordonnance of the French
king, 20th January, 1757, given in the Emp. Napoleon’s “Etudes, &c.” Tom. IY. p. 95.
3 Ibid. Tom. IY. p. 100.
4 Von Troschke, p. 20.
5 “ The Captains and Lieutenants of Artillery shall point their guns themselves, and not trust
the duty to the gunners.” — Extract from General Orders issued the day after Molwitz by Frederick
the Great, in the “ British Military Library.” London, 1801, Yol. II.
6 “ It likewise happens that the general in command, or some other general, is himself forgetful,
and orders the guns to open fire too soon, merely to astound his own troops, without considering
what injurious consequences may result from it. In such a case an artillery officer must certainly
obey, but he should fire as slowly as possible, and lay the guns with every possible accuracy, in
order that all his shots may not be thrown away.” — Frederick, in Taubert, “On the use of Field
Artillery,” p. 78. This order was published some forty years after Molwitz, it is true, but it shows
the bent of the king’s mind, and the Potsdam Peg illations were probably elaborated from some
earlier code.
458
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
necessity did lie consider it to commence these changes without delay, that on
the 11th Aug. 1741, only four months after Molwitz, he communicated to
Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau a scheme for the re-organisation of the field
artillery. The king proposed to suppress 6-prs, altogether, and to supply
their place with 3-prs., because the latter were easy of draught and could be fired
rapidly.1 2 Prom the king^s letter it is evident that he had been revolving in
his mind the whole question of the equipment, if not the organisation, of
field artillery, and the most natural and reasonable solution of this profound
problem, viewed from his standing point, was undoubtedly the adoption of
3-prs. In our days, when we can read the present by the light of the past,
and when the field artillery question has been discussed again and again, it
would be easy to criticise with a remorseless criticism the proposals of
Frederick. Let us remember, however, that in his time military history can
scarcely be said to have existed, and that field artillery was still in a state of
puling infancy ; that the organisation of the means of draught — the drivers,
the horses, and the harness — was so bad that even the lightest guns had to
be moved by hand when under fire; and that the field artillery question is at
once so extensive, so complicated, and so variable, that a final solution of it
is impossible. It may be solved to suit particular times, and particular
places ; but, I repeat, it can never be solved generally and finally. Por the
state of artillery at any given period is ultimately dependent upon the state
of chemistry and metallurgy at that period; and who can fix the bounds, or
determine the course, of the arts and sciences ?
The first point to be settled in organising a system of field artillery, is the
means of draught available for the guns. There are but five known-means of
draught for artillery purposes — men, oxen, elephants, traction engines, and
horses. If the guns are to be of any effective calibre, the accumulated
experience of ages proves that men are too feeble for the work ; and if the
guns are to move at a rapid pace, it is no less certain that oxen are too
slow. Elephants are too timid,3 and the question of traction engines is still
in embryo.3 The horse, therefore, remains as the last and best means of
draught at the present time.
The nature of the means of draught being settled, the next question to be
determined is the greatest number of horses that can work together effec¬
tively at the three paces available for draught which the horse possesses — the
walk, the trot, and the gallop.4 On such matters as these there will always
1 “Ich bin gesonnen . . . dass solche aus 60 3-pfiindern bestehen soil, hingegen ich
alle die 6-pfunder abschaffen und umgiessen lassen will, weil erstere besser zu traktiren sind und
damit gescbwinder gefeuert werden kann.” — Fred, to Prince Leopold, in Troschke, p. 22.
2 It is said that the difficulty of bringing elephants under fire arises as much from the un- .
willingness of the drivers as from the timidity of the elephants; and I am informed that during the
action of Meeah Gunj, in Oudh, 1858, where the drivers were threatened with instant death unless
the guns were brought up without delay, the elephants showed little signs of reluctance.
3 See Mr. H. Bessemer’s letter, in the “ Railway Times” of the 15th Oct. 1870, and an account
of experiments carried on at Lincoln on the 30th Nov. 1870, in the Dublin “Daily Express” of the
26th Dec. 1870. Mr. I. Brunei concludes a lengthened comparison of the horse and traction
engines with the following words : — “ There is not at present any substitute for horse power on
common roads, and, as far as the public ‘is concerned, nothing has yet been done.” — “ Essay on
Draught,” in Youatt on “ The Horse,” 1859, p. 543. I believe the introduction of traction engines
for heavy field artillery to be merely a question of time.
4 “ The canter is a pace of ease, quite inconsistent with any exertion of draught.” — Brunei’s
“ Essay on Draught,” p. 547,
THE EOYAL AllTILLEEY INSTITUTION.
459
be a diversity of opinion; but perhaps the majority of officers will agree that
12 horses, 4 abreast, are the greatest number that can draw together effec¬
tively at a walk ;l that 8 horses, 2 abreast, are the greatest number that can
draw together effectively at a trot ;2 and that 6 horses, 2 abreast, are the
greatest number that can draw together effectively at a gallop.
The third step is to consider, first, what is the maximum load that
12 horses, 4 abreast, can draw effectively at a walk; secondly, what is the
maximum load that 8 horses, 2 abreast, can draw effectively at a trot; and
thirdly, what is the maximum load that 6 horses, 2 abreast, can draw effec¬
tively at a gallop. The answer to the first question is, in round numbers,
80 cwt. ; that to the second, 40 cwt. ; and that to the third, 30 cwt.
And here the question abruptly leaves the province of mobility and enters
that of efficacy of fire, the next consideration being the proper weight of the
projectile for field artillery that walks, field artillery that trots, and field
artillery that gallops — or in other words, for heavy, medium, and light field
artillery. The weight of the projectile being settled in each case, the
number of rounds that ought to be carried in the gun-limber must be
determined. This is a difficult question, and on its solution depends the
weight of the limber, which must be reduced to a minimum. The sum of
the weights of the ammunition and the limber being subtracted from the
total weight behind the horses, in each of the three cases, the remainder
gives the total weight of the gun and carriage. The diameter of the shot,
and consequently the calibre of the gun, is determined by the equation —
Power of gun = Jj-
where w is the weight of the projectile, and cl its diameter. The value of the
equation must be made, within certain limits, a maximum. The calibre of
the gun being thus found, and the sum of the weights of the gun and
carriage, being known, the ratio of the weights of the gun and carriage must
be calculated, on the principle that the weight of the gun should be maximum,
and the weight of the carriage minimum.3
1 I have seen 24 horses, 2 abreast, employed to drag guns through the deep sand on the hanks
of the river Chumbul, in Central India, but I believe 12 horses, 4 abreast — certainly 16 horses,
4 abreast — would have done the work more efficiently. In the case I refer to, none of the wheel
harness gave way, but several traces belonging to the foremost pairs of horses snapped, and one
of the lead horses burst a blood-vessel in his head.
2 I am inclined to think the Swedish mode of draught with 8 horses the best — i.e., 3 horses in
the lead, 3 in the centre, and 2 in the wheel. See Jacobi’s “Etat actuel de l’Artillerie de campagne
Suedoise; traduit de l’Allemand par Lenglier.” Paris, 1849, p. 88. By shifting the shafts from
double to single draught, and hooking swingle-trees to the outside trace-hook-eyes, we can work
three horses abreast in the English field artillery — the lead driver riding the centre leader, and the
wheel driver the near wheeler. The leading rein of the off wheeler can be lengthened by the
swingle-tree strap.
3 I do not venture even to suggest a solution to these problems, because they lie beyond the
bounds of the subject I am writing on — the Mobility of Field Artillery. Let them be solved by those
who have studied them carefully and understand them better than I do. See Col. H. H. Maxwell,
on “The Field Gun for India,” in the “Proceedings, E.A. Institution,” Yol. VI. p. 479; Lieut.
C. Jones, E.A., on “The Future Armament of our Field Artillery,” Ibid. Yol. VII. p. 252 ; and
Lieut. J. Sladen, on “ The merits of a Large Bore and Small Bore contrasted, in reference to
Bided Artillery,” Ibid. Yol. VII. p. 273,
460
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The matter again enters within the sphere of mobility at this point, and
now must be arranged the means of conveying the gunners with their guns
and ammunition, and of thus combining into one whole the three elements
of whicli field artillery is composed ;x for though, the gun be never so light,
and though the horses be never so swift, the arm possesses no real mobility
unless the guns, gunners, and ammunition are bound together by indissoluble
bonds.
There are but five modes of establishing a connecting link between the
guns and ammunition and the gunners : — First, by mounting the gunners on
horses, or the detachment system ; secondly, by mounting them on the off-
horses of the gun and wagon teams, or the off-horse system ; thirdly, by
mounting them on the gun-carriage and limber, or the gun-carriage system ;
fourthly, by mounting them on carriages specially constructed for their con¬
veyance, or the car system ; and fifthly, by mounting them on the ammunition
wagons, or the wragon system.1 2 3
Such is a rough outline of the formidable problem, or group of problems,
with which Frederick suddenly found himself face to face, and which he
endeavoured to solve practically by adopting an equipment of 3-prs. He
proposed 3-prs. for the reasons I have already mentioned, and his scheme
certainly fulfilled the two conditions which the best writers of the day con¬
sidered essential to the success of the arm. “Un Commandant d'Artillerie/'>
says the Marquis de Quincy, “ doit avoir deux buts principaux dans une
bataille. Le premier est de rendre son artillerie si legere qu'il puisse
la conduire partout avec diligence. Le second, de pouvoir s'en servir
frequemment et vivement."3 The Prussian king and the French marquis
alike fell into the double error of mistaking lightness for mobility and
rapidity of fire for efficacy of fire ; and further, they confined their attention
to one head only of that Hydra-headed monster, field artillery. We shall
judge their errors with the more lenity if we consider that they have been
carefully perpetuated, and may be met with, not only in our daily newspapers,
but in some standard Works on artillery.
Prince Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau was an able man, and his answer to the
king's letter proposing the adoption of 3-prs. and the suppression of 6-prs.
was at once reasonable and firm. The 3-prs., the prince thought, might be
doubled in number; but no train of artillery, in his opinion, would be
complete without two or four howitzers, six 12-prs., and ten 6-prs.4
The king's correspondence on artillery matters, which thus began with
Prince Leopold, wras not only continued with him, but gradually extended
itself to other officers, and as time passed on and the king's desire to improve
his artillery became more generally known, changes were proposed by many of
them in the materiel of the arm, and a series of experiments was set on foot.
These discussions and experiments finally resulted in the entire separation of
1 This question, it is almost needless to say, arises only in the medium and light field artillery,
where the rate of motion of the gun and ammunition exceeds that of men on foot. Dismounted
gunners can keep pace with heavy, or position artillery.
2 There are, of course, innumerable combinations of these five systems ; hut in a paper of limited
length, like the present, it would be impossible to descend into such details. I venture to do
nothing more than state the question broadly and generally.
3 “ Maximes et Instructions sur l’Art Militaire.” Paris, 1726, p. 323.
4 Von Troschke, p. 22.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
461
field from garrison artillery, and the organisation of the former into brigades
of ten guns each, instead of the old system of massing the guns in three or
four huge unmanageable trains.1 2
Throughout these discussions may be clearly, perceived the tendency of
the king towards mobility, and the counter-tendency of his officers towards
efficacy of fire. His thoughts were continually directed towards the care of
the teams,3 and so convinced was he of the value of light guns, that he caused
a number of 1-prs. to be constructed for the Tree-Battalions.3 Had Frederick
been one of those men whom Mediocrity loves to call her own, or had his
naturally powerful mind been narrowed by prejudice and dulled by routine,
his influence on the fortunes of the artillery at this critical period of its history
would have been as pernicious as it was great. But his exalted position
enabled him to soar above the mists of ignorance and custom, and his eagle
glance penetrated through the paltry intrigues and petty factions of men
in office and men seeking office. Beset by the arguments of his officers,
and moved, perhaps, to a certain extent by the results of experiments, the
king at length gave way before public opinion, and during the second year
of the Seven Years'’ War he ordered a large number of field guns, and among
them the obnoxious 6-pr., to be constructed — writing, however, to General
von Linger at the same time, “Ihr wisst, dass Ich vom 6-pfiinder nichts
halte.-” 4
Although doubtless they little dreamed that their movements were
determined by forces which had come into operation before they were born,
yet Frederick and his officers were but the agents of those large general
influences which, as I have pointed out in a previous paper, brought about a
return to heavy calibres towards the year 1759, and which directed the course
of field artillery, not in Prussia only, but in every country of Europe.
Frederick was the representative of the spirit of reaction ; his officers were
the representatives of the spirit of statu quo ; and it is to the conflict between
the two, carried on by free discussion and honest experiment, that we owe
the invention of horse artillery. The end which the king proposed to gain
was good, but the means by which he sought to reach it were bad, and in as
far as related to the 6-prs., the movement of the party represented by
Prince Leopold was undoubtedly in the right direction. The king gave way
before their calm and reasonable arguments, but he gave way exclaiming,
“ Ihr wisst, dass Ich vom 6-pfiinder nichts halte.” He was persuaded by
the beneficial opposition of his artillery officers of the badness of the means
by which he sought to reach the desired end ; but he remained convinced
beyond persuasion of the supreme goodness of that end, and he was thus led
to apply his splendid intellect to the task of devising some new and better
1 Von Troschke, p. 24.
2 Ibid, p* 20; Frederick's “ Secret Instructions;'’
8 Ibid. p. 28.
4 Ibid. p. 29. I cannot admit the comparison which Gen. von Troschke draws between the
suppression of the French 4-prs. and 8-prs. by Napoleon in his Italian campaigns, and the suppres-
sion of the 6-prs; by Frederick ; because if Napoleon’s account of the matter be accepted, there is
no analogy between the two cases: Napoleon says : — “L’Empereur a supprime les pieces de 4 et
de 8 ; il y a substitue les pieces de 6 ; 1’ experience lui avait d&nontre que les generaux d’infanterie
faisaient usage indistinctement de pieces du calibre de 4 ou de 8, sans avoir egard a l’effet qu’ils
voulaient produire.”- — >“ Correspondance de Napoleon I.” Tom. XXXI. p. 326.
462
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
method of increasing the mobility of his artillery. Years passed over before
the matter came to a definite issue, and it was not until the 21st April, 1759,
that Frederick communicated the result of his meditations to his minister,
von Schlabrendorf, in a Cabinet Order given at the camp of Landshut, 1 2
directing him to issue from his treasury the sum of money required to equip
a battery of light guns on the first, or detachment system.
So sprang into existence horse artillery, a branch of the field artillery
service which owes its origin to no sudden inspiration, no happy accident,
but to patient thought and a series of experiments extending over a period
of 18 years.3 Its invention forms the fifth landmark in the history of
the mobility of the arm.
Little is known of the details of the carriages of Frederick's first horse
battery. A large amount of ammunition, however, appears to have been
carried in the limber — eighty rounds of round shot and twenty rounds of
1 “ Mein lieber Etatsminister von Schlabrendorf !
Weil nach der Einlage zur Bedienung 6 6-pfiindiger Eanons das darin specificirte erfordert
wil’d, so kann ick es nicht andern, als dass Ihr die dazu erforderlichen Gelder mit 2227 Thlr. 12 Gr.
aus Eurer unterhabenden Militair-Casse bezahlen, auch deshalb mit dem Obersten von Erusemark
correspondiren miisset, weil alles gemacht werden muss, und er solches und das uebrige schaffen
soli. Alles dieses aber pressirt sekr. Ick bin Euer wohlaffectionirter Ednig,
FRIEDRICH.
Landshut, den 21 April, 1759.
An den Etatsminister
von Schlabrendorf.”
Die in der Einlage aufgestellte Bedarfs-und Eosten-Nachweiweisung lautets — •
“ Zur Bedienung 6 6-pfiindiger Eanons werden erfordert,
3 Unterofficiere,
42 Eanoniere.
Summa, 45 mann.
Dieser beritten zu machen kostet
45 Stuck Pferde a 40 Thaler . . . 1800 Thlr.
45 Sattel nebst Zubehor a 6 Thaler... . 270 „
45 Paar Stiefeln a 3 Thlr. 12 Gr.. . 157 „ 12 Gr.
Summa, 2227 Thlr. 12 Gr.”
See “Die koniglich preussische reitende Artillerie vom Jahre 1759 bis 1816,” von Strotka,
p. 577.
2 According to the bombastic tract, “ Ueber reitende Artillerie, was sie ist, sein sollte, und sein
konnte,” Leipsig, 1818, the author of which has wisely concealed his name, the invention of horse
artillery was due to a kind of revelation: — “Herrlicke, vortreffliche Waffe! die in dem Geiste des
grossten Eoniges empfangen und geboren wurde, wie einst Minerva aus dem Hampte des J upiters
hervorging!” (p. 3).
With regard to the claim of the Russians to the invention of horse artillery, supported by
Behrenhorst, Ealkreuth, and Seyfartk, I entirely agree with Gen. von Strotha (p. 1) ; “ es ist
jedoch moglich, dass die russischen Eavallerie-Geschutze Friedrich den Grossen auf die Idee
gebracht haben, eine reitende Artillerie zu errickten; er gab ihr aber dureh entspreckende
Organisation die Befahigung zu einer koheren Bestimmung, und ist als der Schopfer dieser Waffe
zu betrachten.” See also Gen. von Troschke’s excellent brochure , p. 38.
The French claim rests upon a weaker foundation than the Russian ; for even if Capt. Yregille
independently invented horse artillery in 1762, he was three years behind Frederick. See the
appendix of Nollet’s “ Memoire de Gen. Drouot”— ~ the worst of bad biographiesj
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION. 463
canister, both fixed, according to General von Strotha.1 There were six
draught horses and three drivers for each gun, and the detachment con¬
sisted of seven or eight mounted gunners, one of whom acted as horse-
holder. The riding horses of both teams and detachments carried dragoon
saddles, behind which were fastened a corn-sack, a forage-cord, a bundle
of hay, and a picketing-peg — an arrangement which made mounting and
dismounting most serious operations, not lightly to be undertaken. The
off-horses of the teams carried pads, and the officers and men were dressed
much the same as the rest of the artillery. Each division of the battery was
commanded by an under-officer, and the whole by an officer. A wagon-master
and an artificer were responsible for the completeness of the carriages, and the
drivers and horses were entrusted to the care of a commissary of horse. As
the said commissary was generally some debilitated old drunkard (“ halbin*
valide Trunkenbolde”), and the drivers were selected from the scum of
the army (“die Proletarier des Heeres ”), one can easily understand how
it happened that the Prussian horse artillery was destroyed in the first two
great battles in which it took part, Kunersdorf and Maxen.2
Fig. l.
Nothing can be further from the truth than to suppose that the new
1 “ Die in der Protze mitgefiihrte Munition scheint, wie bei der Fussartillerie, 80 Kugel und
20 Kart&tsch-Schusse betragen zu haben.” — Von Strotha, p. 3. The author of the “ Ueber reitende
Art. &c.,” p. 20, mentions 90 rounds as the number carried in the earlier horse artillery. During
the wars of the French Empire the number had decreased to 60. The English then carried 40.
“ Die Englander fuhren etwa 40 Schuss auf der Protze ; wir wollen eine Mittelzahl annehmen und
50 sagen.”
2 For the particulars of Frederick’s first horse battery, see Von Strotha, pp. 1-3, 577-599 ;
von Troschke, p. 36 et seq.; and Seyfarth’s inaccurate description in his £c Leben und Regierungs
Geschichte Friedrich des Andern,” Vol. II. p. 543.
Fig. 1 is a sketch of Frederick’s horse artillery, from “ Die Soldaten Friedrichs des Grossen,”
von E. Lange, p. 320;
I have to thank Lieuts. Place, Costobadie, and Craufurd, R.A., for the willing assistance they
gave me in translating my German authorities. To Lieut. Lorraine, R.H.A., I am under very
great obligations, for his never-failing help and advice;
61
464
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
invention was received with universal approbation. It was met with decided
opposition, and the opponents of change were again the officers of artillery.1 2
Again the upholders of stolid Conservatism were in violent collision with the
champion of Liberalism, but on this occasion they were discomfited and
overthrown; for the king, luckily for the artillery service, would brook no
further opposition, and who could break down the fixed resolution of that
iron will ? Instead of entrusting the trials of the new battery to some
captious and dilatory committee, the king in person undertook the task, and
an English officer “ saw him nearly every morning exercising this new corps
himself, and directing its manoeuvres.”3 The king was satisfied with what
he saw, and horse artillery was assigned a permanent place in the unwilling
ranks of the Prussian artillery.
It was not in Prussia only that the artillery were opposed to the new
invention ; for so infatuated were all the gunners in Europe with the
lumbering materiel of a by-gone time, that for thirty years the Prussian was
the only horse artillery in Europe.3 The artillery was in those times a far
more isolated and a far less educated service than it is at the present day,
and, buried in prejudices and the worship of the past, the artillery officers for
a dreary succession of years slept a sleep that knew no waking. A German
writer, who never writes sensibly when speaking of the horse artillery, but
who seldom writes foolishly in treating on other subjects, describes the
gunners of EredericL’s time as overwhelmed in ignorance, stupidity, bigotry,
and self-conceit, both in his own country and in England,4 and Gribeauval
paints matters in Prance in even darker colours.5
1 “Die Officiere der Artillerie waren dagegem” Gen. von Kalkreutk, in the “Hist.-Biog.
Nachrickten zur Gesckt. der Brandenburghisck-Preussischen Artillerie,” von. Schoning, 2 Tlieil.
The opposition encountered in its earlier days by the horse artillery, which he regards with
Superstitious veneration, calls forth unmeasured sympathy from the author of the “ Ueber reitende
Art. &c.” p. 7; — “Herrliche Waffe,” he exclaims, “du hast eine freudenlose Kindlieit verlebt!”
General Xalkreuth says, “much falsehood has been written about the horse artillery he might
have added, much trash.
2 “British Military Library,” Vol. I. p. 19.
3 Yon Strotha. — Yorwort, p. YII.
4 “ Ueber reitende Art. &c.” “Die Artilleristen der damaligen Zeit waren unglcich befangenei4
alsjetzt; die Laboratorienarbeiten, das meehanische Ausiiben einer Wissenschaft, die eben nicht
seit langer Zeit erst dazu erhoben worden war, und deshalb einen ansehnlichen Antheil von
zunft-und handwerksmassigem Stolf kinterlassen hatte, - ein gewisser unausbleibliclier Scklendrian,
und endlich die zu hohe Meinung, welche die Nicktartilleristen vOn der Artilleriewissensckaft hatten,
alle diese Dinge legten der Freiheit des Gedankens,” &c., &c. — $. 6;
“Von den Offizieren” (of the English artillery) “wird fast gar kein Tkeorie, aber desto mehr
Praxis gefordert. Die hohe commission in Woolwich versiigt iiber alles, was irgend nur zu dem
theoretischen . Theile gehort. Der Artillerist weiss wenig mehr, als dass die Xugel bei dieser
Riclitung so weit und bei jener so weit geht. Um alle iibrige Mysterien der Geschiitz wissenschaft
kiimmert er sich nicht. Er halt fest an den Glauben, dass die in Woolwich es am besten wissen.
‘Denn,’ sagt er, ‘ware diese, oder jene Einrichtung nicht gut, so hatten wir sie nicht.’ ” — p. 64.
The state of the English artillery in the middle of the 18th century may be judged from this
account of its condition in the beginning of the 19th.
5 “ Un homme eclaire, sans passion, qui connoitroit bien les details, &c., prendroit dans ces deux
artilleries ” (the French and Austrian) “ de quoy en composer une qui decideroit presque toutes les
actions dans la guerre de campagne: mais l’ignorance, T amour-propre, ou la jalousie s’en mdlent
toujours; c’est le diable, et Ton ne peut changer cela comme la fapon des habits.” — Gribeauval
to M. de Choiseul, French War Minister, 3rd March, 1762 ; in the Emperor Napoleon IIL’s
“Etudes, &c.” Tom. IY. p. 96.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
465
In 1787 Frederick the Great died. No reaction, however, similar to that
which occurred on the death of Gustavus Adolphus, took place in the artillery
world. For Frederick had lived long enough not only to force upon the
Prussian service, and compel the officers to accept for a number of years,
the innovations of which he was author, but to educate his army to so great
a degree as to convince them that his innovations were improvements ; while
Gustavus, appearing with the suddenness of a winter torrent, disappeared as
suddenly into the realms of death—
“ Ins Baverland, wie ein gescliwollern Strom,
Ergotz sich dieser Gustav . .” 1
The Prussian artillery, therefore, did not retrograde, although perhaps it
did not progress, after the death of Frederick.2
About the middle of the century the Austrians betook themselves to the
task of creating a light field artillery, and, rejecting the detachment system
which had been adopted in Prussia, they chose the fourth, or car system.3
Owing, no doubt, to the feeble fire of the 3-prs. with which these batteries
were armed, and to the inherent inconveniences of cars, the Austrians re¬
organised their cavalry artillery in 1773, and introduced the third, or gun-
carriage system.4 The new batteries consisted of six 6-prs., drawn by six
horses each, and one 7-pr. howitzer, drawn by four. The carriages differed
only from those of the medium guns in having a longer trail, on which was
constructed an ammunition box which contained fourteen rounds for the
gun and six for the howitzer.5 Astride of this box rode five gunners, one
behind the other, while a sixth gunner rode on the off-centre, or off-wheel
horse of the team. The howitzer was commanded by a mounted bombardier,
and each division of the guns by a corporal. On the limbers there were no
ammunition boxes, but to each piece were attached two drivers and four
pack-horses, which carried in their pack-saddles eighty rounds for the guns
and forty for the howitzer.
In 1792 General Cardell organised a light artillery in Sweden after the
Prussian fashion;6 but owing probably to its costliness, the Swedes grew
1 Schiller’s “Death of Wallenstein,” III. 13.
2 “ Preussen stand still . . . Preussen war gezwungen fremde Erzeugnisse sich anzueignen,
anstatt den Eremden ein Vorbild zu seyn.” — “ Ueber reitende Art. &c.” p. 5.
3 “Die Kriegsmacht Oesterreichs,” Wien, 1871, p. 40. Scharnhorst, “Handbuch der Artillerie,”
Hanover, 1806, Band. II. p. 645.
4 “Die Xriegs. Oesterr.” p. 40. The “British Military Library,” London, 1799, Yol. I. p. 19,
gives the date as 1783; Carl von Decker says 1780; “ Geschichte des Geschutzwesens und der
Artillerie in Europa,” Berlin, 1822, p. 150. I am quite unable to explain these contradictions.
In a note on a paper, “ Ueber den ersten Gebrauch und die allgemeinere Einfuhrung der reitenden
Artillerie,” which appeared in the Berlin “ Militair- Wochenblatt,” Part 30, p. 21, the editors make
the following remark: — “ In dem baierschen Erbfolgekriege, 1778, erschien sie schon als ein Haupttheil
der preussischen Eeld- Artillerie und die ostreichsche Armee setzte ihr eine ahnliche leichte Artillerie
entgegen.” Erom this it might be inferred that the Austrians possessed a light field artillery on the
detachment system in 1778. It is quite certain, however, that such was not the case. The only-
resemblance between the Austrian and Prussian light guns at the time in question lay in their
lightness.
5 Decker says the trail ammunition box contained only ten rounds for the gun. “ Geschichte, &c ”
p. 150.
6 Ibid. p. 147.
466
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS Of
dissatisfied with it in 1797, and adopted a system which was a combination
of the detachment and off-horse systems. The following table shows the
constitution of the Swedish light artillery at the time I refer to : — 1 2
Gunners
mounted
on
Horses.
Under officer;
Bombardiers
j Trumpeters.
Draught horses.
Detachment horses.
Drivers.
Draught.
Detachment.
Remarks.
6-pr. guns (6) .
4
2
1
J-
36
30
—
36
37
Wagons (3) .
—
—
—
—
6
9
18
6
7-pr. howitzers (1) .
1
5
—
3
—
3
6
6
Wagons (1) .
—
_
_
2
3
6
2
1 Surgeon . "1
1 Collar-Maker '
3
The number of gunners
available for the guns was
much less than might be
imagined at first sight, as
1 Shoeing- Smith J
Spare gun-carriages (1) . . .
3
6
-a certain proportion were
necessarily employed as
drivers and horse-holders.
Train Wagons (1)
—
—
—
—
—
2
4
—
Spare wagons (1)
—
—
—
—
-
3
6
—
Reserve .
1
1
—
—
—
4
8
2
Total .
6
8
1
39
^ _
38
__ j
27
90
56
Grand total .
6
8
1
w r
77
27
146
The partial rejection of the detachment system by Sweden and Hanover/
and its absolute rejection by Austria, did not escape the observation of the
orthodox, and the apostacy of these powers called forth loud lamentations
from a fanatical horde of horse artillerymen, who believed that the detach¬
ment system had been stolen from heaven by a modern Prometheus, and
1 Gen. von Strotlia. “Die koniglich preussische reitende Artillerie vom jahre 1759 bis 1816/’
Beilage XI.
2 C. yon Decker positively states tbat the Hanoverians followed the Prussian system ; Scharn-
horst as positively declares that they did not. The truth appears to he that the Hanoverian
system was a compound of the detachment and gun-carriage systems. One N.C. officer and four
gunners (including two horse-holders), were mounted on horses; two gunners were seated on
the limber, and two on the trail. See Decker’s “ Geschichte der Geschutzwesens, &c.” p. 150 ;
Scharnhorst’s “ Handbuch der Artillerie,” Band II. p. 533.
THE 110 YAL AKTILLEKY INSTITUTION.
467
that horse artillery was a branch rather of the cavalry than of the field
artillery service.1 2
When Gribeauval returned to Paris from Germany in 1763, where he had
studied all the details of the Prussian and Austrian artilleries,3 he found the
Prench artillery in a deplorable condition.3 The French could only reap as
they had sowed, and they were now reaping the bitter fruit of de Yalliere' s
system. De Yalliere jt oere died in 1747, and was immediately succeeded by
de Yalli&re fils, who inherited all his father's failings in an aggravated form
and maintained all the vices of his father's system with a blind obstinacy
which has happily been rarely equalled in military history : —
“ Aetas parentum, pejor avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiorem.” 4
But his hour was fast approaching. The house was built upon the sands,
and when the storms of war descended upon it it fell, and great was its fall.
“ La situation dans laquelle se trouve l'artillerie est effrayante ; il est certain
qu'il faut avoir du courage ef de la fermete pour oser en faire l'exposition."
Such are the words in which. M. Dubois described the state of the French
artillery in an official report drawn up by order of the War Minister in 17635
Such a terrible pass, indeed, had affairs come to, that in spite of his
unblushing effrontery and court influence, de Yalliere fils was suspended in
1765, and Gribeauval was ordered to re-organise the artillery. To this
formidable undertaking Gribeauval brought a powerful mind, a rare talent
for organisation, and a large experience in the field. He drew out a compre¬
hensive and able plan of reform without delay, and was about to carry it into
execution when the intrigues of de Yalliere and his disciples prevailed against
him, and his star set : —
“ Still her old empire to restore she tries,
Eor, horn a goddess, Dulness never dies.” 6
His star set, but only to rise again in redoubled brightness after the lapse
of a few years. For civilisation, with the attendant arts and sciences, was
1 “ Oesterreich und Schweden verletzten ihn,” cries the author of the “ Ueber reitende Art. &c.”
p. 4, “und wiirdigten das Gotterkind zum Kruppel herab ; sie raubten der Vaffe ihre schonsie
Eigenthiimlichkeit, und unter ihren Handen wurde sie ein gebrechliches Zwitterwerkzeug ohne
Einklang, Kraft, und Geist.”
2 He commanded the Austrian artillery (or portions of it) on many occasions during the Seven
Years’ War, and he further visited Berlin for the purpose of making himself acquainted with the
details of the Prussian artillery. Fave’s “Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” p. 145. Von Troschke,
p. 15.
3 Speaking of the disasters of the French arms in the middle of the 18th century, the Emperor
Napoleon III. says: — “L’Expose de 1’etat desastreux ou se trouvait notre materiel d’artillerie sert
a la fois a faire comprendre l’inferiorite hontense des armees frangaises a cette epoque et l’import-
anee des changements qui ont suivi.” — “Etudes, &c.” Tom IV. p. 103.
4 Horace.
3 “Etudes, &c.” Tom. IV. p. 103.
6 Pope’s “Dunciad.”
“The dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods
which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience
refutes. History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution. If not suppressed for
ever, it may be thrown back for centuries.” — Mr. J. S, Mill’s “Essay on Liberty,” p. 16.
468
MINUTES OF PKOCEEDINGS OF
advancing with swift and irresistible progress in Prance;1 the spirit of reform
was fast undermining the strongholds of Dulness; and her chief priest, de
Valliere was laid with his fathers in 1776. On his death, Gribeauval
was recalled to office.
Judged by his work, taken as a whole, Gribeauval was the greatest
reformer, certainly in the materiel , probably in the personnel , the artillery
world has yet seen ; and the uniformity, simplicity, solidity, and lightness of
his system, which was founded upon the complete separation of field from
siege artillery,2 have deservedly gained for him an honourable and enduring
reputation. But his system by no means attained to that absolute perfection
which critics whose criticism consists of either unqualified praise or unmixed
blame would have us believe. His carriages, though lighter than those of
the Yalliere system,3 were still too heavy; his gunners were afoot; not a shot
could be fired on coming into action until his guns had been shifted from
the travelling to the firing trunnion holes;4 and holding fast by the antiquated
notion that guns should be dragged about by men when under fire, he laid,
much stress on the man-harness he constructed for that purpose. Finally,
thwarted by the irrational and malicious opposition of a self-interested faction,5
he was unable to force into the French service the two great inventions of
1 Buckle’s “ History of Civilisation,” chaps. 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.
2 “ L’Artillerie de compagne n’avait ete reellement separe de l’Artillerie de siege que par
Gribeauval.” — “ Etudes, &c.” par l’Empereur Napoleon III. Avant propos, p. IX.
W eight of 12-pr.gun.
Weight of 12-pr.
carriage and limber.
Total.
Weight of 8-pr. gun.
Weight of 8-pr.
carriage and limber.
Total.
[ Weight of 4-pr. gun.
Weight of 4-pr.
carriage and limber.
Total.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
cwt.
He Valliere’s system .
28-5
15-7
44-2
18-8
13-2
32*0
10*2
11-5
21*7
Gribeauval’s u .
16-0
17-4
33-4
10-7
15*4
26-1
5-3
10-8
16-1
Difference .
12-5
-1-7
10-8
8*1
-2-2
5-9
4-9
•7
5*6
“ Etait ce la peine de faire tant de depense et tant de bruit, pour perdre d’un cote et gagner
si peu de 1’ autre?” Such is the comment of a supporter of Yalliere on these conclusive figures !
“ Lettre d’un Officier du Corps ftoyal de l’Artillerie au Lieut. -Colon el du Begiment D . ”
1774, p. 34. Scharnhorst’s “Handbuch der Artillerie,” Band II. p. 589.
4 With the carriages of the 18th century it was necessary, before limbering-up, to change the
gun from the firing to the travelling trunnion holes. The prolonge was consequently highly
thought of and extensively used, because it saved a long and laborious operation.
5 “ Allein die meisten Officiere von der Artillerie, und insbesondere die beiden Yaliere, Yater und
Sohn, welche bisher an der Spitze des Artillerie-Corps sich befanden, und grosse Yerdienste urn
dasselbe hatten, waren mit dieser Erleichterung nicht zufrieden.” — “ Handbuch der Artillerie,”
von Scharnhorst, Band II. p. 588.
THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
469
the century — limber-boxes and horse artillery.1 2 His system thus failed to
fuse into one whole the three elements of which field artillery consists — the
guns, the gunners, and the ammunition — and its mobility was, consequently,
of necessity limited ; but, taken all in all, the changes effected by Gribeauval
were a gigantic stride in the right direction, and his system, which forms the
sixth landmark in the history of the mobility of field artillery, remains to the
present day the most important and the most conspicuous of all.3
But three short years had passed away after the death of the great reformer,
when France found herself at war with Europe, single-handed and without
an ally ; and the imperious necessities of the case compelled the French to
adopt that light field artillery which the senseless, unpatriotic, and odious
opposition of a faction had prevented Gribeauval from introducing. The
hand of the age was upon these. evil councillors, and they could no longer
resist. They could not turn back the stream of reform ; they could not even
stop it ; they could not prevent it from rushing onwards and overwhelming
them in its irresistible course. They were struck down, and humbled, and
silenced ; they were cast into outer darkness ; and the work of reform was
recommenced by a man who was equal to the occasion.
On the 21 st April, 1792, General Lafayette addressed a letter to M. de
Grave, the French War Minister, urging in strong terms the importance of
introducing horse artillery into the French service.3 The minister lost no
time in carrying into effect the recommendations of the general, and during
the month of May two batteries of horse artillery were equipped and took the
1 “ Erx 1762, M. de Clausen, campe vers Wolfenbuttel, ayant une expedition a faire qui exigeait
une grande celerite, se plaignit a M. de Vregille . . . de la pesanteur de 1’ artillerie, et lui
demanda de la seconder dans son operation, qui devait etre executee rapidement. M. de Vregille,
officier d’artillerie distingue, ne prit qu’un caisson par piece, doubla ses attelages, fit monter Sur
les cbevaux les cannoniers, partit, arriva a dix heures du matin, fut trois heures en batterie et
revint ayant fait seize lieues dans la journee. L’ Artillerie a cheval la mieux exercisee ne serait pas
plus ceRre. Cet officier parla depuis cette operation au General Gribeauval, et du projet d’organiser
une artillerie a cheval en consequence. Ce general lui repondit; ‘vous voyez la peine quej’ai
k detruire d’anciens prejuges, et les ennemis que m’ont suscites les changements que j’ai operes ;
un jour nous exdeuterons votre projet, prepared -le; pour le present ce serait trop vouloir!’”—
“ Aide-Memoire de l’Officier d ’Artillerie,” par Gassendi.
Colonel Durtubie refers to the unreasonable opposition raised against the introduction of limber-
boxes, in his “ Memoire, &c., sur I’ Artillerie a cheval,” p. 6, note — an essay which has only one
fault, its shortness.
Limber -boxes do not appear to have been adopted in France as late as 1825. See “ Traite
Elementaire d’ Artillerie,” par E. Decker. Traduit de l’Allemand, par Col. R. de Peretsdorf et
Capti Nancy. Paris, 1825, pp. 315, 337.
2 For a full account of Gribeauval’s system, see the Emperor Napoleon III.’s “ Etude sur le
passe et 1’avenir de 1’ Artillerie,” Tom. IV. ; Favd’s “ Hist, et Tact, des Trois Armes,” pp. 145-155 ;
“ Conference sur T Artillerie de Campagne,” Paris, 1869, pp. 14—19.
3 “Permettez, Monsieur, a unhomme qui a cause sur cet objet” (the formation of horse artillery)
“ avec le feu roi de Prusse” (Frederick the Great), “le Prince Henri, le Due de Brunswick, le
General Miillendorf, avec les Marechaux de Landon et de Lasey, enfin avec les principaux
generaux de Prusse, d’Autriche, et d’Allemagne, qui a bien examine et bien reflechi sur cette
institution ; permettez lui de representer que le prompte formation d’une artillerie a cheval est
un des plus grands service que le ministre de la guerre puisse rendre a l’armee fran^aise.” —
“ Memorres du Gen. Lafayette,” Tom; III. p. 430.
The question was laid before a committee by M. de Narbonne, and it was decided that the horse
artillery was only to differ from the rest of the field artillery by the rapidity of its movements.-^
Grose’s “Military Antiquities,” Vol. II. p. 197.
470
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
field — the one with Luckner's, the other with Lafayette's army.1 2 Lafayette
was at first undecided as to the proper armament of the horse artillery, but
a month's experience in the field convinced him that there are limits to
mobility as well as to weight of metal, and that the gun best suited for the
purpose was the 8-pr.3 The wisdom of this decision was proved ere long, for
the Trench 8-pr. showed its superiority over the Prussian 6-pr. almost
immediately.3
Although the Trench had adopted the detachment system, they were far
from being blind to its inherent defects, and three years after the introduction
of the flying artillery appeared a pamphlet, written with almost judicial calm¬
ness, in which an artillery officer discusses the relative merits of the detachment
and wagon systems, and sums up in favour of the latter.4 Colonel Durtubie's
pamphlet in Trance forms the complete counterpart of the memorandum
sent in to the Master-General of the Ordnance, three years previously, by the
Woolwich Committee in England; with this difference, that while the Trench
officer only discussed the relative advantages of two systems — the detachment
and the wagon — the English officers balanced the advantages of three — the
detachment, the wagon, and the gun-carriage.
The state of the artillery in England on the close of the Seven Years' War was
as bad, if not worse, than in Trance.5 The English field artillery had taken
a part, and a most distinguished part, in the final campaigns of that war, under
the four celebrated captains, Phillips, Drummond, Toy, and Macbean —
Phillips being one of the ablest officers that ever led a battery of British
artillery into action ;6 and on their return to England they exerted themselves
1 “ Memoires du Gen. Lafayette,” Tom. III. p. 297.
2 “ Je balan9ais d’abord entre des pieces de 8 et de 4 ; mais j’ai reconnu par 1’ experience que
celles de 8 et les obusiers sont tres-preferable.” — Ibid. p. 440.
3 (L’Artillerie a cheval) “ est notre seul point de superiority sur les Prussiens.” — Ibid. Lafayette
says (Memoires, Tom. III. p. 430) that the Prussian horse artillery was armed with 3-prs. ; but it
is probable that he is mistaken, as Gen. von Strotha positively states that it was armed with 6-prs.,
“ Die koniglich preussische reitende Artillerie,” p. 28. To the best of my belief, the only 3-prs.
ever possessed by the Prussian horse artillery were those belonging to the Potsdam Horse Artillery
Depot in 1772. See von Strotha, p. 14.
4 “ Memoire et Observations sur P Artillerie a cheval, et Remarque sur P Innovation des machines
proposees pour F equipages de cette Artillerie,” par T. Durtubie, Chef-de-Brigade d’ Artillerie, Paris.
L’an troisieme de la Republique. “Notre opinion,” says the author, when expressing his preference
for the wagon system, “ est toujours subordonne a Pexperience de la guerre.” — p. 10.
5 The train of artillery which served in Germany during these campaigns, under General
Belford, consisted of 32 guns, 2 howitzers, and 6 "small mortars. For the draught of these 40 pieces
of ordnance 1415 horses were employed, in the following proportions : —
For each 12-pr . 15 horses.
a u 9-pr . 11 //
/, /, 6-pr. (long) . 7 //
n n 6-pr. (short) . 2 u
n the flag gun (a 12-pr.) . 17 n
The number of horses in the teams is odd, because the horses drew in pairs, with the exception
of the shaft horse, who drew single. — See Muller’s “Treatise on Artillery,” London, 1780, Vol. I.
p. 192. These figures show that, as far as mobility was concerned, the field artillery of the Seven
Years’ "War was certainly not a century in advance of that of the Thirty Years’ War.
6 “ Superlative practice on our right by Capt. Phillips,” says Mr. T. Carlyle, describing the
effect of the British artillery at Minden, 1759. — “Hist, of Fred, the Great,” Yol. V. pp. 451,452.
At the battle of Warbourg the following year, Gen. Mostyn was obliged to trot the English cavalry
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
471
to convince those in power of the necessity of introducing into the English
service the improvements that had been adopted on the continent. But
far from being able to accomplish the positive good of forcing these improve¬
ments into the service, their combined influence was not strong enough to
effect the negative good of keeping out of the service some extravagant and silly
inventions that were made about this time. Thus it happened that in 1774,
one Colonel Weidemann, a German, abetted by the Duke of Cumberland,
succeeded in foisting upon the country a number of 6-prs. of 2*5 cwt., “ con¬
structed of pieces of copper rolled up and soldered together/’* 1
Cut off from the continent by a silver streak of sea,” the English military
authorities slumbered and slept until they were rudely awakened from their
dreams by the thunder of the Erench Revolution, and then fear wrung from
them concessions which neither the dictates of common sense nor the
entreaties of their artillery officers could induce them to yield. The first low
mutterings of the storm that was brooding over France became unmistakeably
audible in 1788, and the Master-General of Ordnance, the Duke of Richmond,
sent instructions in that year to Woolwich to equip a number of field guns
which would be “ capable of accompanying cavalry” in the field.2 To obtain
this object the Duke considered it would be necessary to mount the gunners on
horseback ; but the artillery officers, like their brethren in Austria some years
before, objected to the detachment system. The Woolwich Committee3 fully
appreciated the advantages of constructing a field artillery possessed of great
mobility. They objected, not to the end proposed by the Duke, but to the
means he suggested of gaining that end, and they pointed out with con¬
siderable acuteness the vulnerable points of the detachment system. “ Royal
howitzers, or long 3-pus. upon new-pattern carriages,”4 says Major Adye,
in his account of the proceedings of the Committee, “can make rapid
movements at a much less expense than such pieces as require the
artillerymen to be mounted on saddle-horses. As, for instance, the new-
pattern carriages allow four men and fifty-six rounds of ammunition to be
carried upon the gun-carriage and its limber, which can be drawn by four
near five miles to enable them to share in the battle, yet Phillips, who was attached to the cavalry,
“ made so much expedition with his cannon as to have an opportunity, by a severe cannonade, to
oblige the enemy — who had passed the Dymel and were formed on the other side — to retire with
the utmost precipitation.” — “ Gentleman’s Mag.,” Vol. XXX. p. 387. “ Capt. Phillips,” says an
eye-witness, “ brought up the English artillery at a gallop, and seconded the attack of the cavalry
in a surprising manner.” — “ Operations of the Allied Army, 1757 to 1762, under H.S.H. Prince
Ferdinand,” by an officer of the British forces, London, 1764. Phillips’ conduct on this occasion has
drawn forth the eulogies of even a French writer, the Marquis de Ternay. — “ Traite de Tact.” Tom. I.
p. 601. For Phillips’ services in America, see “Proceedings R.A. Institution,” Yol. IV. p. 248.
1 Muller’s “ Treatise on Artillery,” Introd. p. 4. Speaking of the righteous resistance made
by the Royal Artillery to the introduction of these guns into the service, this writer impudently
remarks: — “It was not without great difficulty that they were received, and no less than the
express command of H.R.H. the late Duke of Cumberland could have prevailed over the servile
attachment for an old-established custom, though ever so erroneous, which, when once covered
by the veil of time, becomes in a manner sacred.”- As may be guessed from the turn of the phrase
about the Duke of Cumberland, Mr. Muller held a subordinate office in H.R.H.’s household. The
Duke would have done well to leave artillery questions to be settled by those who understood
them.
2 MS. Notes, by Major S. P. Adye, R.A., in the Library of the R.A. Institution, Woolwich.
3 Colonel D. Drummond, Major W. Congreve, and Major T. Blomefield.
4 In this system of carriages, two gunners sat upon the limber-boxes, and two gunners upon
seats on the gun axle-tree boxes.
62
472
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
horses at the rate of six miles an hour, and if six horses be used, they can
travel ten miles an hour; whereas a gun which is mounted so as not to
allow the artillerymen to ride upon its carriage,1 2 will require at least two
horses to draw it, two to an ammunition cart, four for its artillerymen to
ride, and one for a person who is to hold the saddle-horses when the gun is
inaction; which is five horses more than is required when the artillerymen
ride upon the gun-carriage and are drawn by four horses, and three when
six horses are used to draw the field-piece with four men riding upon the
gun-carriage. This makes a difference in the first case of £321 Is. 3d.
for one gun, and £1944 7s. 6d. for a brigade of six pieces; and in the
second case, £194 8s. 9d. for one gun, and £1166 12s. 6d. for a brigade of
six pieces per annum in favour of the new carriages, supposing Government
to pay Is. lOd. per diem for each horse, including the driver, and for
keeping each horse ]s. 5d. per diem for 245 days, and 2s. per diem for
120 days, which was the price paid in the last German campaign.”3 A
discussion thus arose between the Duke and the Committee which lasted until
1792. In that year war was virtually declared with Trance,3 delay became no
longer possible, and the Duke called upon the Committee for their ultimatum.
Upon this the Committee forwarded to his Grace on the 19th August, 1792,
the three following schemes, A, B, and C, which correspond closely, the first
with the present English field battery system,4 5 the second with the present
English horse artillery system, and the third with the present Prussiau field
battery system; the Committee strongly recommending the fast. “We
cannot,” they said, “ but prefer upon every consideration the men being carried
on the guns, as they are thereby attached solely to the use of them. W e appre¬
hend much embarrassment in the case of the horses” (in the detachment
system) “while the guns are firing. We would propose the artillerymen to
be armed with pistol and pushing sword. We leave to your Grace whether
the artillery soldier should not have the same security for his head and
shoulders as a dragoon.” Some further correspondence ensued, and on the
20th Dec. of the same year the Committee explained more fully their views
as to the tactical use of the brigade. “ We conceive this brigade ought never
to be stationary, and scarcely ever to act on the defensive . . . and in
all rapid manoeuvres four horses only should be used, the third pair accom¬
panying as spare. . . . The artillerymen” (in A and C) “are to march
on foot until the service requires them to advance with greater expedition.”3
The Duke lost little time in coming to a decision on the difficult and compli¬
cated question before him, and guided probably by the example of the Trench
in the preceding year, he ordered two troops to be organised according to
scheme i?, in January 1793. 6
1 These carriages were of the same character as the galloper carriage, a sketch of which I gave
in my last paper.
2 Major Adye’s MS. Notes.
3 First coalition against France, 26th June, 1792.
4 The comparison of course only holds good in a general way, for the equipment and organisation
of one division of a battery in the A scheme was entirely on the horse artillery system, Colonel
Williams’ carriages affording no means of carrying gunners.
5 Major Adye’s MS. Notes.
6 “ Bei der Englischen Armee gab man den Kanonieren bei der Artillerie des Emigranten-Korps
Fferde, urn sie nur einigermassen zweckmassig gebrauchen zu konnem” — “ Ueber reilende
Artillerie, &c.” p. 40.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
473
The construction of gun axle-tree seats in the “ new pattern gun-carriages/*
proposed by the Committee in scheme C3 forms the seventh and last landmark
in the history of the mobility of field artillery.
So ended the 18th century, a century distinguished before all others by
the radical and signal changes that took place during its progress in the field
artillery service.
Brecon.
September 1871,
474
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
A,
The Plan of a Brigade of Artillery to accompany Cavalry , manned by a
Company of the Royal Artillery | the guns and carriages being on the
principle established by His Grace the Duke of Richmond, M.G.O. ,
in 1788.
a
o
Distribution of
detachment.
Detail.
| Horses
Drivers
’3
3
3
a
<
Captains.
Lieuts.
N.C.O.’s.
Gunners.
m
U
V
2
a
3
ft
fi
O
Remarks.
5^-inch howitzers (2) .
12
67
160
18
Wagons (21 .
12
65
1
1
2
—
—
3-prs. (2) .
12
67
480
2
18
Wagons (2) .
12
6 j
1
1
—
—
6-prs., Col. Williams’ (2) ...
Tumbrils (2) .
4
4
2)
160
_
1
2
18
The detachment
Horses for detachment .
n n two supernu-")
meraries to each 3-pr. >
and howitzer . j
1 Tfnvgp Pflvf,
20
#
8
3
l
was necessary for
Colonel Williams’
gun’s, because the
carriages did not
afford seats for the
men. For the how¬
itzers and 3-prs.,
2 men were carried
on each limber and
4 on the body of
the wagon.
1 Wagon for artificers’ stores
Serjt.-Maj. & Clerk of Stores
3
2
1
2
Drummers with bugle horns
2
—
—
—
—
—
—
2
—
2 Conductors of horse .
2
2
1 Cnllar-Mfiker
1
1
1 W heeler ...
1
1
1 "R1 fi ct STYI 1 fill
1
1
1 Farrier .
1
1
Civil List.
1 Commissary of horse .
1
1
Total .
101
30
800
2
3
8
60
2
1
DUNCAN DRUMMOND,
Colonel.
THE 110 YAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
475
The same j the Gunners being mounted on Horseback .
Detail.
Horses.
Drivers.
Ammunition.
Distribution of
detachment.
Civil List.
Remarks.
Captains.
| Lieuts.
1
d
d
ft
Gunners.
Drummers.
5^-inch howitzers (2) .
Wagons (2) . . . .
3-prs. (2) .
Wagons (2) .
6-prs., Col. Williams’ (2) ...
Tumbrils (2) .
Horses for detachment .
2 Serjts. — Serjt.-Maj. and)
Clerk of Stores . j
Drummers, to have bugle
horns and act as >
orderly men . }
8
8
8
8
4
4
66
2
2
3
3
1}
!}
l
1
160
480
160
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
20
20
20
2
—
( 4 men held the
(_ horses in action.
Ditto.
Ditto.
1 Wagon for artificers’ stores
Officers’ horses not included.
—
—
—
—
_
—
—
Civil List.
1 Commissary of horse .
1
1
2 Conductors of horse .
2
2
1 Collar-Maker .
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
1 Wheeler .
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
1 Blacksmith .
1
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
1
1 Barrier . , .
1
1
Total .
123
22
800
2
3
8
60
2
7
DUNCAN DRUMMOND,
Colonel.
476
MINUTES OE RLIOCEED1NGS OE
0,
Plan of a Brigade of Artillery to accompany Cavalry ; substituted for
Colonel Williams3 6-prs.} two light 6-prs. mounted on 3-pr. carnages .
Detail.
Horses.
Drivers.
Ammunition.
Captains.
Disti
deti
m
2
ributi
achm
o
d
on of
ent.
s
O
§
PS
O
Drummers.
Civil List.
Remarks.
51-inch, howitzers (2) .
12
6 ]
1
1
i
2
18
W agons (2) .
12
65
3-prs. (2) .
12
67
1
i
2
18
Wagons (2) .
12
65
6-prs., light (2) .
12
67
o a n
i
2
18
Wagons .
12
65
Four men rode
upon each gun and
Horses for 2 supernume- h
wagon ; and the
rary men for each >
12
N.C. officer and
howitzer and gun . )
-
another super¬
numerary upon
1 Wagon for artificers’ stores
3
1
horses, which were
held by the drivers
Serjt.-Maj. & Clerk of Stores
2
—
—
2
—
—
—
in action.
Drummers with bugle horns
2
I
2
—
.
2 Conductors of horse .
2
—
—
—
—
2
—
—
l
1
1 Wheeler .
1
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
1 Blacksmith .
1
—
—
—
—
1
—
—
1
1
1 Forge cart . . .
3
1
—
—
—
—
—
Civil List.
1 Commissary of horse .
1
—
—
.
—
—
—
1
Total .
101
38
880
2
3
8
60
2
1
DUNCAN DEUMMOND,
Colonel,
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
477
REMARKS WITH REFERENCE TO
MOBILITY OF LIGHT FIELD ARTILLERY.
BY
LIEUT. -COLONEL G. CARLETON, R.A.
It may be assumed that our present light field battery system will be
changed before long. A system that either necessitates gunners
accompanying light field guns in action on foot, or else requires them to
be carried for the most part on the ammunition wagons of their battery,
is surely far behind the requirements of an age of such improved small-
arms and rapid and open infantry manoeuvring as the present.
It is a question whether all light field artillery should not be organ¬
ised as horse artillery ; but even should this not be done in future, we
may at least take for granted that our light field artillery will have its
gunners all carried into action with their guns, while none will, under
any circumstances, be mounted upon the ammunition wagons. We
have now, perhaps, arrived at as high a degree of perfection in our
light field guns and their projectiles as the present condition of science
and the mechanical arts admits of; and attention, stimulated by the
events of the late war, is at last being turned to the imperfect mobility
of our light field batteries. It is hardly too much to say that organised
as at present, none of them can be pronounced thoroughly fit. In
addition to the defect above referred to it may be added that, packed
as light field limbers and wTagons now are with knapsacks, camp-
kettles, tents, &c., they are injuriously over-weighted and hampered;
and yet with all this, the manoeuvres laid down in the field artillery
exercise book are drawn out on the supposition that the wagons move
with and conform to their guns. Surely all drill instruction ought to
be given with a view to adaptability on service.
The want of mobility due to three-fourths of the gunners having to
walk, is now so thoroughly appreciated that it is unnecessary to dwell
upon it; but there is another point of hardly less importance concerning
this defect upon which I beg leave to offer a few remarks, in the hope
that the attention of others better able to discuss the matter may
be attracted. I allude to our present form of ammunition wagons.
It is obvious we must include in the term mobility the mode in which
ammunition can best be kept supplied in action, no less than the manner
in which the men can be brought up to work the guns.
As a chain is no stronger than its weakest link, so the mobility of
light field artillery is no more perfect than its least perfect detail; and
to be able to move men and guns promptly from one position to another
will be of comparatively small avail, unless the guns can be readily
supplied with ammunition under fire beyond what accompanies them in
the gun-limbers. In this respect we appear capable of improvement
quite as much in our horse as in our light field battery artillery — nay
478
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDTNGS OF
even more so, considering the more rapid movement required from the
former. I believe, in order to ensure perfect efficiency in this respect,
it will be found necessary to give up our present system of composite
four-wheel carriages, drawn on service by six horses — that is to say, our
wagons with limbers — and to substitute a system of two-wheel carts
drawn by one or at -most two horses.
What can be more cumbrous or less scientifically arranged for draught
than our ammunition wagons, limbered up as they now are ? The only
excuse for retaining limbers elsewhere than with the guns is, that in the
event of a gun-limber becoming disabled, that of its wagon may be used in
moving off the gun ; but it would be easy to adapt the proposed carts to
this purpose, and if necessary to have a proportion of spare gun-limbers
in each battery. The advantages of the two-wheel over the four-wheel
carriage appear sufficiently great to warrant at least the experiment.
Among them may be noted the greater ease with which a pair of
horses can be managed by their driver than three pairs harnessed in
team can be managed by three drivers. Another is the greater ease
with which the two-wheel carriage can be moved over bad or confined
ground. Again, there is the greater safety and rapidity with which
exhausted limbers could be relieved in action ; and lastly, there is the
greater economy, both in men and horses, and the saving of much of
the present wear and tear of harness and carriages incident to the
constant manoeuvring at ordinary regimental parades of wagons along
with their guns. This last, irrespective of the change here suggested
as to wagons, would no doubt be gained to a great extent by the
impending change in the tactical organisation of our light field bat¬
teries; but so long as the plan of having three pairs of horses harnessed
in one team is maintained, the difficulty of getting three drivers to act
together in draught is so great that it is necessary to have them fre¬
quently practised in the .driving of the wagons.
The system here suggested of double-wheel ammunition carts, drawn
by one or two horses, would also probably be found more suitable to
the adoption of an organisation for field batteries in time of peace that
would most readily admit of expansion in time of war.
June 24, 1871.
Note. — We know that in a team of six horses harnessed in pairs, the front and centre pairs each
draw less than ^rd of the weight; the wheel pair, therefore, has more than its fair share, and what
the front horses do not draw may he considered as in a measure waste of their power. But it
is evident that under fire each pair, though not doing equal work, is equally exposed with its
driver. It seems then that with three separate carts, each drawn by one pair of horses with one
driver, as each pair is equally close to its work there is less waste of power, and therefore more
weight maybe drawn with the same amount of effort; how much move is matter for experiment and
calculation, but if the Prussian General Scharnhorst’s estimate be correct — viz., that the centre pair
of horses in a team of six draws fths and the front pair only ^ths of what the wheel pair draws, it
would appear that the total weight distributed in three separate two-wheel carts, to be drawn by two
horses each, might at all events be equal to that now drawn in one cart (for practically the wagon
with limber is one cart) by three pairs of horses, and that too with less exertion on the part of each
pair than is under the existing system exacted from the wheel pair; the driving at the same time
being simplified, and the exposure of drivers, horses, wheels, &c. &c., in replenishing ammunition
Under fire being lessened. — G. C.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
479
THE CLOCK SIGNAL-YANE.
BY
CAPTAIN W. L. YONGE, R.A.
The following proposal for a new system of signalling is based upon
the fact, which will scarcely be disputed, that every soldier in the army
is able to read the clock. Armed with this fact, I would place
Instruction before ^ie soldier a representation of a clock, as in Eig. 1.
To avoid complications I dispense with the minute hand.
I then remind the pupil that the first hour is in progress while the hand of
the clock passes from the figure XII. to the figure I., which period of time
is represented by the space between the figures XII. and I. This constitutes
the first hour space, or one. In like manner, the interval between the
figures I. and II. constitutes the second hour space, or two, and so on
through the series of the twelve hours. These several hour spaces are
shown divided off in Eig. 1, and numbered accordingly. I would then
Fig. 1.
point out that the several spaces are identical in outline, and differ only
in their relative positions as regards the centre and circumference of the
imaginary clock dial. The segments are then detached from the circle
(Eig. 1) and shown singly, each in its own relative position. Each segment
then becomes a representative of the signal vane.
I venture to assert that no man who has once mastered these rudiments can
63
480
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
ever again forget them, and by the aid of the accompanying diagrams any
soldier may be converted into a skilled signalman in a few minutes, and
whenever he sees the. signal vane he can immediately name the numeral
indicated by asking himself the question, “ What's o'clock ?" I have said
the numeral indicated, but it will be observed there are twelve signs,
which need not all be used ; they are only there if wanted ; and it is
thought that XI. and XII. will be found useful.*
Such being the system, the signal vane is constructed as follows : — The
“ Handbook for Field Service" (p. 346), states that cones with 2ft. base
and 4 ft. side transmit signals five miles with great rapidity and facility,
and this is the size adopted for field service in the army. If this be the
case, a vane of the same dimensions should also be visible at the same
distance. (To make it more conspicuous, I would attach a small disc to
the tail of the cone, to avoid its termination in a mere point).
The vane can assume three cardinal positions in each quarter of the
circle, viz.
1. One side may be vertical.
2. One side may be horizontal.
3. Both sides may be inclined to the horizon.
There is nothing more remarkable than the facility with which the eye can
recognise the vertical or horizontal position of a line or straight-edge, and
if one of the sides of the vane be placed either vertical or horizontal (as
hereafter provided for), the fact will be at once recognised by the observer.
From this it will follow that the negative of this assertion will be equally
true. If the sides be neither vertical nor horizontal, they must be inclined,
and therefore the three cardinal positions can be identified and named.
The ordinary signal is of course intended for use in one direction, but if
seen from the rear it may still be interpreted, for it will then indicate a number
which, with the proper number, will make the number 13. Thus, if 4 be indi¬
cated to the front, the same signal will be read 9 when seen from the rear,
and may be interpreted at leisure. In like manner, 8 to the front will be
Fig. 2.
report what he sees, leaving it to the responsible officer to interpret the
sign. I would indicate the proper front by some conventional sign, as in
* A reference to Fig. 1 will show that three additional signals are available for special me —
such as Attention, Affirmative, and Negative.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
481
the old semaphore, by a horizontal bar thrust out to the " proper right.”
Those who see this bar on the “ proper left ” will know that they are in
rear of the vane/and must interpret the signal accordingly.
Tor ordinary field purposes, such as for practice ranges (artillery and
infantry), and for moderate distances, I am inclined to adopt the dimensions
recognised as sufficient in the present flashing system — viz., a vane measuring
4 ft. by 2 ft. Tor permanent works and for communicating with detached
forts, the size can be increased according to circumstances, still retaining
the same proportion. Tor field work no mechanism is necessary, but in
the larger sizes for permanent stations a simple crank and lever, connected
with an index finger below, can be adjusted so as to work the vane at any
moderate height above the parapet.
The vane may be used with any existing code. The foregoing remarks
presuppose the use of a code, but if spelling be required, a simple method
of converting figures into letters will at once suggest itself. The above
provides for 12 numerical signs, while the alphabet for telegraphic purposes
can be reduced to 24 letters ; thus, by the aid of a repeat signal — such
as the complete rotation of the vane — the ordinary numeral indicated
can be augmented by 12 and represent a letter. Thus 5 with a repeat
would signify 5 + 12 = 17, which, according to the key used, may
indicate any letter or cipher. A spelling system is, however, not so rapid
as a code.
The vane may conveniently be made of sheet zinc, sufficiently thick to
prevent bending, and pivoted at the centre of the figure by means of a ball
and socket joint, which permits the vane to rotate in one vertical plane. Such
a vane weighs about 3 lbs., if of the dimensions already stated, but the weight
is so very inconsiderable that the dimensions might be increased with advan¬
tage. If perforated with holes, it would offer less resistance to 'the wind.
The post or standard may be made of a few feet of iron gas-pipe, into which
the socket of the vane may fit. They can be made for about five shillings
each. A more portable vane may be made on a framework similar to the
frame of an umbrella. The umbrella should open quite flat, and the vane
be painted in white on the black background of the umbrella, which can be
closed when not in use.
A modification of the vane can be made available for night signals, as
shown in Tig. 3, which consists of a frame of three arms pivoting at the
Fig. 3.
48a
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
centre. To the outer end of each arm a lamp is suspended on gimbals,
the whole apparatus being accurately balanced. As the three lamps form
a figure of the same shape as the vane for day signalling, and as the
lights at the circumference are nearer to each other than to the third and
central light, the position of the signal can always be ascertained ; for one of
the lights at the circumference may either mark a horizontal or vertical line
in connection with the centre light. It has, however, been found that lights
cannot be distinguished from each other unless they are at considerable dis¬
tances apart, according to the range at which they are to be visible. White
lights are far superior to coloured lights, and three white lights, arranged
as in Fig. 3, may be made to assume any of the forms indicated in
Fig. 1, as also the three or four extra signals available for special use. When
these extra signals are used at night, the two lights nearest each other (at
the circumference), would assume the vertical or horizontal positions, and
thus be easily distinguished from the ordinary clock-signals when these
lights are never either in a horizontal or vertical line.
October 7, 1871.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
483
THE
MULTIPLYING ALIDADE, OE PEAGTICE EEGISTEE.
BY
MAJOR A. INNES,
ABERDEENSHIRE ARTILLERY VOLUNTEERS.
[COMMUNICATED BY LIEUT.-COLONEL C. F. YOUNG, R.A.]
The multiplying alidade is an optical instrument for recording
mensural observations, and is constructed on a principle not hitherto
applied to purposes of gunnery. It is intended to fulfil the following
requirements : —
1 . That it shall be under the easy management of one person, pivoting
on the eye of the observer and capable of the most exact and
instantaneous alignment.
2. That it shall have the power of multiplying the angular measure¬
ment as shall best suit the scale adopted for the register.
3. That the observations shall be spotted at regular intervals by
successive perforations of the register, without removal of the eye of the
observer, or disturbance of the line of collimation of the instrument
with the target.
4. That the scale of the alidade, laid down in minute subdivisions,
shall be capable of affording the most perfect comparative measurement
of the results of practice, whether individual or in cumulo .*
5. That it shall possess the properties and be applicable for all the
purposes of a level and range-finder.
484
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The multiplying alidade affords the means of recording the position
of every shot as it falls on the water around the target in succession,
with the utmost precision and expedition, so as to obviate the possi¬
bility of the mistakes and inaccuracy which must prevail in the absence
of this or some similar instrument of measurement.
The alidade, as at present constructed, consists of two telescopes,
quadrant, eye-piece, diaphragm, hood, and cross wires, mounted on a
superior radial arm AA , 6 ft. long, connected with and acted on by an *
inferior radial arm BB, pivoting at any distance, as may be adjusted, for
recording the practice upon the register according to any convenient
scale that may be required by the range.
The record is made on a register of one or more thicknesses or sheets
of paper, by means of perforation by a steel point, acted on by a
spring and trigger attached to the index of the inferior radial arm.
The register is stretched on a table, mounted on a traversing bed i),
acted on by a guide screw F, advancing the register at regular intervals
for receiving the successive observations.
The observations taken under the cross wires at the extremity of the
superior radial arm are thus brought back to the hand of the observer
at the recording apparatus attached to the inferior radial arm, with a
power of angular measurement which may be multiplied or reduced
by the position of the pivot C, the inferior radial arm, to suit the
nature and range of the observation.
When practice is about to commence, the alidade, secured to a gun
or other support, is to be carefully aligned upon the target, the index
being secured at zero. The back sight and cross wires being then in
collimation with the target, the eye-piece and cross wires of the telescope
will also be found in collimation ; if not, the necessary adjustment is also
to be made. The line of collimation being now marked on the register,
the index liberated, and the hammer raised, the instrument is ready to
register the position of the first shot as it falls.
This operation is effected by bringing the falling shot or bursting
shell under the cross wires, by moving the alidade index to the right or
left, and spotting the position on the register by touching the trigger*
thus marking the position of the shot in or out of the line of collimation
above referred to. For the second shot, nothing further is required than
to raise the hammer as before, advance the register one-tenth of an inch
by one turn of the guide screw, spotting the second shot, and so on to
the end of the practice.
The second telescope, mounted with the quadrant, is required when
the instrument is to be employed as a range-finder.
There being at present no system of prize competition with heavy guns
established for the practice of the Eoyal Artillery, the necessity with
which I have been familiar for the last ten or eleven years, for an
accurate and reliable test of the relative value of the practice of com¬
peting detachments and gunners will not be so apparent ; but if we con¬
sider the admirable materials of the Eoyal Artillery, both in guns and
gunners, the importance of any system leading to the improvement and
accuracy of practice is so apparent that an attempt promising in any
degree to aid in its development will sufficiently commend itself for
examination.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
485
Having liad occasion to undertake the superintendence of shot and
shell practice, and to organise for the first time a system of competition
with heavy guns at sea ranges, I became impressed with the want of
some means of accurately recording practice, and constructed the multi¬
plying alidade for the purpose of instructing the eye and testing the
powers of the pointers in laying guns of position.
The use and value of it were sufficiently demonstrated to me in the
result of the competition at Shoeburyness, in August, 1866 — one of the
detachments I took up, which was trained with it, having some thirty
points above the highest average of some eight days* practice during that
competition. Since that time some improvements increasing the
facilities in its use have been made, while the first principle of its
construction remains the same.
The application of this instrument for recording practice
on occasions of artillery competitions, suggests some im¬
portant means for getting over difficulties that always present
themselves from the- want of this or some other effectual
mode of measuring range and deflection of artillery fire at
floating targets ; so as to obviate the necessity for a constant
reference to the arbitrary decisions of an umpire, formed of
necessity on some empirical law or rule of thumb, inconsistent
with the just appreciation of the relative value of the practice
of competing detachments.
The merit of the alidade consists in its power of measuring
the exceedingly small angular distance of a shot falling near
a target moored, it may be, at 1800 yds. or 2000 yds. from the
observer, and of bringing back the result of the observation
to the hand of the observer, to be spotted on the register
with a considerable multiplying power with the greatest
facility and despatch.
The simple principle of the construction of this instrument
may shortly be described as follows : — When the alidade is in
collimation and aligned on the target C the index is at zero, but
on measuring a distance to the right or left a triangle ABB
is formed, of which one side BB , as extended from the cross
wires at B to the index at B, forms the exterior angle ABE \
equal to the interior opposite angles at A and B ; or in other
words, in the case where the sides AB, BB are equal, the
angle ABE formed by the line of the index is double the
angle BAB to be measured ; much more then, as in the case
of the present construction, where the angle at B has been
designedly increased, does it multiply the result, which has
been calculated as most convenient for the size of register of
ranges between 1500 and 1800 yds. The instrument for the
use of the range party is of simpler construction, with an angular
measurement on a more restricted scale.
March, 1871..
486
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
SYSTEM OF
IRON-PLATING A CRUISING SHIP.
BY
CAPTAIN M. TWEEDIE, R.A.
Vessels of war in the present day, owing to the peculiar services
required of them, may advantageously be classed as “ ships of the fleet' 9 9
(iron-clad), “ cruising ships for the protection of onr commerce and
colonies ” (more especially in times of peace), and “ harbour and coast
defence ships” (virtually movable batteries).
It is with regard to the second class of ship — the cruising ship — that
I venture to treat.
The requirements of a ship of this class are : that she must be a first-
class sea boat, comfortable, and fit for the accommodation of a crew
during a long commission, probably in a great diversity of climates,
capable of repair in foreign parts, and in the event of a sudden out¬
break of hostilities, neither liable to become an easy prey to any
iron-clad nor liable to be sent to the bottom by the first shot fired at
her.
Now, I think it will be at once admitted that neither the iron-clad
nor the wooden ship fulfil these conditions — the iron-clad on account
of the injurious action of the salt water upon her iron plating exposed
to it, the difficulty of repair in foreign parts, and doubtful qualities as
a sea boat ; the wooden ship on account of her being an easy prey
to any iron-clad enemy on a sudden outbreak of hostilities, and her
liability to be sent to the bottom by the first shot fired at her.
It appears to me, with regard to iron-clad ships, that seeing we
have got almost if not quite to the limit of thickness of iron plating
that can be put on the outside of a ship, and yet can make a gun to
penetrate it, we must now look for additional strength not from extra
thickness, but by (if possible) altering the position of the armour on
the ship.
It is this principle that I venture to recommend as applicable to
cruising ships, and am inclined to believe that iron armour may be
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
487
so applied to a ship as not to entail any of the disadvantages apper¬
taining to iron-plated vessels, at the same time allowing her to he a
comfortable sea-going ship, fairly capable of holding her own with any
iron-clad on an emergency, and almost if not quite unsinkable.
Figs. 1 and 2 represent roughly the transverse midship and longi¬
tudinal sections respectively of a ship of about 3000 tons. Trace a line
(a, a , a) round the hull of the ship at such a distance below water-line
that it will never be exposed above water during the roll of the ship in
any weather that a ship can fight her guns in, and from a parallel trace
to this on the inside of the hull spring an arch of iron plating (b, b, b),
the top surface of the arch being above water-line. The advantages of
this system would be somewhat as under : —
1. The plating would be all inboard, free from the action of salt
water, and the hull would be wooden, coppered, and capable of repair
on foreign stations. The plating, owing to its position, even should it
be fractured, could quickly be repaired by bolting plate-iron over it,
and be just as strong as ever.
2. The plating would be placed in its most advantageous position
for resistance ; every shot striking it must glance off.
3. The plating would be most advantageously placed for the load
of the ship, making her by its position a good sea boat, and in place
of straining her by hanging on to her sides, actually give additional
strength.
4. The ship would be well protected from vertical fire.
5. No fire could get into the lower part of the ship, and all above
the plated iron arch, on occasion of the ship clearing for action, would
be divided into fire-proof compartments by light iron shutters, and
each compartment supplied with water laid on through the arch.
64
488
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
6. The engines would be completely protected below the arch, and
any necessary openings through the arch could be secured by iron
shutters being drawn over during action if necessary, and in such a
way as to admit of the air required being drawn down through them.
7. The ship, however much she might be knocked about, unless this
arch were penetrated (and this would be almost impossible), could not
sink ; and as an additional security, of course all below the arch would
be divided into water-tight compartments by light iron bulk-heads.
The ship would carry an armament of sufficient weight for ordinary
cruising purposes, and in addition could have one heavy gun on each
side in a box battery, iron-plated, for engaging an iron-clad with, in
case of meeting such a ship.
The above views are, it must be borne in mind, only suggestions, not
matured plans. I am fully aware that the danger from fire and splinters
will be urged against a ship so plated, but these disadvantages appertain
to a still greater extent to the present wooden cruising ships. The chief
advantage claimed is that the ship, though a cruising ship, shall be
virtually unsinkable.
POKTSMOUTH,
June 1, 1871.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
489
ENTRENCHMENT OF FIELD ARTILLERY.
BY
CAPTAIN G. B. MACDONELL, R.A.
The latest edition of the Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry ”
contains instructions for carrying out a system of entrenchment for that
arm of the service — a system which, if somewhat wordy and smacking
rather of the drill-serjeant and his love of minute descriptions in uncom¬
fortable positions, is on the whole, when mastered by the trained soldier,
excellent, and enables him to rapidly construct good, safe, and bullet¬
proof cover.
In our branch of the service, taking a retrospect through the last few
years, since the introduction of breech-loading small-arms in the
infantry has rendered the service of guns in the field to be far more
difficult and dangerous than it formerly was, and has prevented field
artillery from asserting its proper position and preponderance among
the arms, we find that little or nothing has been done — a few isolated
experiments excepted — to establish a system of entrenchment to protect
our field guns from the destructive effects of the fire of improved small-
arms, and thereby increase their efficiency. There may be some who
will object to the adoption of entrenchments, and will hold that any such
system would tend to destroy the mobility of the arm, and reduce it to
the role of artillery of position ; and also a few others may say, “ Best
leave well alone ; if entrenchment is wanted it can easily be done.” Of
course it can ; but the disadvantage of this latter plan is that the men
must be untrained, and any experience that may be required will have
to be acquired in presence of the enemy, where failures may be disas¬
trous, and modern warfare cannot allow of any disasters arising from
want of preparation or previous instruction.
As regards the decrease of mobility, such an objection hardly needs
an answer ; since the extended and accurate range of modern ordnance
render the movement of batteries during an action less necessary than
formerly with the S.B. guns, whose inaccurate and feeble fire necessitated
the assembly of the batteries close to the points where the effect was
required to be produced. In an ordinary battle-field of the present day,
the fire of the guns could be massed on any given point without entailing
the very frequent movement of the batteries. Besides, the practice of
making and using artificial cover would only come into operation in
defensive positions, while the power of passing to the offensive would be
unimpaired, and the advantage would remain that while acting on the
offensive, the result of previous instruction would appear in the increased
ability that there would be to rapidly take advantage of inequalities and
accidents of ground — which would mean so many projectiles arrested or
diverted, so many lives saved, so much longer effective life to the batteries.
So far is it from the wish of the writer to see the mobility of field
artillery decreased, that he hopes that the day is not very far off when, by
490
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
the adoption of improved axle-tree seats, and arrangements for carrying
the detachments, the field gnn may be enabled to go anywhere at good
speed, and always attended by its full complement of men.
Field entrenchments would enable a force armed with inferior weapons
to oppose a prolonged resistance to another possessing those of superior
power and range ; and in England it must be borne in mind that the great
majority of batteries in India are armed with the antiquated S.B. bronze
9 pr. guns — for the most part unserviceable, and with the very best of
which it is a matter of much wonder and congratulation if the lucky gunner
manages once in 40 rounds to hit a 5 ft. x 5 ft. target at the very moderate
range of 700 yds. — guns which, taking a most partial view of them, are
only fit for firing case or salutes, more especially the latter, or better
than all, are only fit for that limbo of antiquity, the marine store shop.
Should it ever be found necessary to send an auxiliary Indian army,
say of two corps, to Egypt, Asia Minor, or Turkey, the greater part of
the artillery contingent that would accompany this force would be armed
with the above weapon ; and it would be needless to point out that
without resorting to some expedient, such as entrenchments, portable
mantlets, &c., these S.B. guns would easily be overpowered long before
they could fire an effective round.
The necessity of some authorised instruction in entrenchment may
therefore be considered as established.
The question is, how to obtain the best cover with the least amount
of labour. Two methods of obtaining cover present themselves : —
1. The sunken, or gun-pit battery.
2. The elevated, or gun battery.
It is assumed that at least 6 ft. of good cover must be obtained. The
sunken or gun-pit battery seems to be the best expedient for obtaining
this cover : —
(1) As it supplies its own parapet from the interior excavation.
(2) The parapet and trench increase simultaneously, thus halving
the labour.
(3) It presents a very small target, and half of the parapet is per¬
fectly impenetrable to any projectile.
(4) The labour of construction is not excessive.
While on the contrary, the elevated or gun battery —
(1) Requires double the labour to construct.
(2) Presents a larger mark.
(3) Is pervious to shot or shell at its strongest part.
In comparison with the gun-pit, it has the advantage of being tenable in
all weathers, while the gun-pit is liable in wet weather to get filled with water.
But then positions for action are seldom held for longer than five or
six hours, and even should the pits become filled with water during an
action, the guns can be run back and fought in the rear with advantage,
as in the case of a screen battery.
The gun-pit, with a parapet the maximum thickness of which is 6 ft.
only, requires about 300 cubic feet to be excavated; while the gun
battery, with a parapet of the same thickness as the gun-pit, requires
about 600 cubic feet of excavation.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
491
Thus the balance of advantage remains with the gun-pit.
It was intended by the writer to have carried out the experiment of
gun-pits versus gun batteries with his battery at Cannanore ; but in
India the time in which Europeans can work in the . open air is so very
short, that experiments were only made in the formation of gun-pits.
The battery having marched a distance of four miles into the country,
formed line on an open plain sloping very gently to the front, and proper
points for entrenchment being selected, echellons of subdivisions were
thrown forward from both flanks, and the order was given to entrench.
The ground was light, arable, and sandy, and covered with roots of
coarse bent grass, as is common in the plains of India. The pick was not
required to be used.
Previous to breaking ground, the men, in order to obtain the trace,
were instructed in a preliminary drill devised for the occasion. Working
drawings were issued by division officers to Nos. 1 the day before.
Fig-. 1.— Gun-Pit.
SECTION o?t A B
492
MINUTES OE EEOCEEDINGS OF
Fig. 1 is a fac simile of the drawing issued to No. 1 subdivision.
Only four subdivisions were practised, as, on account of the paucity of
men in a single battery station where duty is heavy and absorbs so many
effectives, it was impossible to get full detachments ; so the gunners of
the centre division were sent to complete the flank divisions, and bring
up their numbers to full strength.
The right division was commanded by Lieut. Ditmas; the left by
Lieut. Hepburne.
The drill was as follows : —
Prepare to
entrench.
Eight turn,
Left wheel,
Double march.
Halt — dress.
Instruction.
Words of command.
On the command “prepare to entrench,” the detach¬
ments will dismount and provide themselves with tools as
follows : —
Nos. 2 and 3 a pick each.
Nos. 4 and 5 a shovel each.
Nos. 6 and 7 a spade each.
Nos. 8 and 9 two gun buckets each (to be used as earth
carriers) .
And having done so, fall in at “ detachment front.”
The points for entrenchment having been selected and
indicated to the Nos. 1, these will order their detachments
“ right turn,” “ left wheel,” “ double march ;” and when
they arrive at the point determined on, will give the com¬
mand, “ halt — dress,” to their men.
Nos. 1 will dress their men in prolongation of the line of fire.
The dressing being completed, Nos. 1 will order their
Outwards turn, detachments to “ outwards turn ;” and having done so, the
ranks will be directed to close up to each other, back to back,
Take two paces, and ordered to “ take two paces,” when each rank will step
two long paces of a yard each direct to its front, and then
all will turn to the rear.
Hos. 2 and 3, Nos. 2 and 3 will mark the distances they have paced, and
Outwards turn. jfos. 1 will then order them to “outwards turn,” when each
will turn outwards 30°, and Nos. 1 will see that this turn is
done correctly, and will resume their' position in front on the
central line, then step 5 yds. directly to their rear, halt and
front, and then will, at right angles to the central line, pace
1 yard to the right and 1 yard to the left, and mark these points.
Having done this, Nos. 1 will order, “Nos. 2 and 3, Two
paces — march,” when these numbers will step 2 yds. in the
direction they have been facing, and mark these points.
The above being done. Nos. 1 will give the command,
“ connect the trace,” upon which Nos. 2 and 3 will cut a
line through all the points marked out.
When this has been satisfactorily completed, Nos. 1 will
give the order to “commence work,” upon which all the
numbers will commence excavating, throwing the earth
the distance of the length of a sword-blade, or 2 ft. 11 ins.,
clear of the trace, so as to form a small banquette.
Nos. 2 and 3
Two paces —
march.
Connect the
trace.
Commence
work.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
493
The depth of excavation in front must be 3 ft., sloping up to a depth
of 18 ins. in rear. When this depth has been reached and the interior
of the pit clear, a slope of 1 in 1 is made in rear into the pit to serve
as a ramp, and the inner banquette ledge of the sword’s blade length
is halved and sloped down to form the interior slope of the pit. A
small embrasure is formed, with a breadth at the neck of 15 ins. and
a slight outward splay at the mouth. The pit is now ready for service.
In stiff soils the breadth of the banquette ledge may be reduced, and
the solid interior slope of the pit cut down perpendicularly.
The following table will show an abstracted account of the works : — •
rrl tTrid
No. of
subdivision.
No. of men
t work per gu
Time occupie<
in constructio
after the orde
ommence wor
Nature of
ground.
Nature of
cover.
Interior
accommodation.
os
2 i
minutes.
1
9
43 ^
Detachments
2
9
50
Light, arable,
sandy, and
covered with
totally invisi¬
ble from the
Ample in every
5
9
52
>
front parapet,
18 in. thick at.
case.
bent grass.
top.
6
|
9
41 _
|
An experimental pit was made on the previous day by some of the
officers, N.C. officers, and volunteers of the battery in 58 minutes ; but
this was finished off with care, the slopes being neatly smoothed and
dressed. As a field work, it was not more efficient than those mentioned
above. Two mounted detachments of six men each were moved to the
front, under an officer, with orders to advance to the attack as cavalry,
and furnish objects to point the guns at. They advanced in line, with
an interval of 100 yds. between each, and orders were given to the
Nos. 1 to point their guns on each party in succession from right to
left, and back from left to right.
Firing was ordered to be commenced as the object party came into
sight on rounding a hillock about 900 yds. distant, and five deliberate
rounds per gun were fired before the party came within 250 yds. of the
leading guns. This shows that the pits were quite roomy and commo¬
dious enough for quick firing.
The rapidity of fire was then increased, and ten rounds per gun were
fired, in order to test the stability of the parapets and embrasures,
which on examination were found to be in good order, the earth stand¬
ing firmly and apparently little affected by the concussion.
The officer in command of the mounted object party reported that
the entrenched detachments were quite invisible to him during the
whole of his advance. At the termination of the firing, the guns were
easily run back for limbering up.
494
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
In a bare, level country it will be necessary to construct limber pits..
This would be done by the infantry escort, who in addition should run
a line of shelter trenches between the gun-pits.
The horses would be disposed as shown in Fig. 2 ; where the
Fig-. 2. — Limbek-Pit.
D
SECTION on C D.
limber is backed on to the parapet, the wheel horses remain hooked in,
the centre unhooked and held heads to the front on either side of the
limber, by the leading driver on near side and centre driver on off
side. The leading driver will also hold his riding horse, head to the rear.
The off-lead is held in the same manner by the centre driver. The
leading driver will also hold the officer's or staff-serjeant's horse, while
the marker will hold his own and No. l's horses outside of the off-lead
and centre horses. The whole of the drivers, horses, &c., will thus be
Under cover*
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
495
The pit may also be made so that the limber and horses will stand
at right angles to the line of fire ; but unless some rise or inequality of
ground, the direction of which may favour this method of construction,
be at hand and be taken advantage of, the plan shown in the drawing
would seem the more preferable of the two.
The addition of four short planks to the equipment of a battery
would be of great advantage in damp, marshy positions, where the
wheels and trail are liable to embed themselves. They would be used
— one under each wheel, one under the trail and at right angles to it,
and the fourth over this last in the direction of the line of fire. These
would greatly facilitate the traversing, and could be easily carried
strapped to the trail without materially increasing the weight.
On attentively considering the subject, the question will arise : is
not the present allotment of carbines rather in excess of the require¬
ments of a battery ?* Two per subdivision would seem ample for
everything ; indeed the number of men equipped with cartridge-pouches
would point that two per subdivision, or twelve per battery, is the
proper number that should be carried. The two others now carried
could be replaced with two spades, at a saving of about 11 Jibs, less
to carry per subdivision. Two shallow leathern baskets might also
be carried as earth trays, as the gun buckets are too clumsy to be useful
as earth carriers.
The necessity for adopting entrenchments as proposed may not be
so seriously felt with batteries armed with rifled guns, whose long
range enables them to have a greater choice of ground, and to take
advantage of any intervening cover that may occur; but, as already
remarked, it must be remembered that a very large portion of our
batteries serving in the Bast are still armed with S.B. guns ; and
taking our very intermittent and uncertain energy of production into
consideration, these batteries will remain so armed, or unarmed, for
many years yet to come ; and should in the meantime any emergency
arise in which it may be necessary to place a force meeting the modern
requirements of magnitude in the field, we will be sadly deficient in
power; and unless some expedient to ensure the safety, and thus
increase the effective fighting value, of our gunners be devised, we will
lay ourselves open to the risk of having a great portion of our artillery
arm paralysed by an enemy who, in addition to being better armed,
may also be superior to us in many essential points, although perhaps
inferior in the observance of the petty and trifling details towards
which we have directed so much of our attention, to the detriment of
those of more vital importance.
June, 1871.
* Perhaps some readers of the above would kindly inform the writer, through theso pages, when
and where have field batteries been reduced to the use of their carbines, and what was the result ?
65
496
MINUTES OE PROCEEDINGS OF
A SKETCH
OF
THE AUTUMN MANffiUYBES OP 1871*
BY
CAPTAIN W. S. M. WOLFE, B.A.,
B HI GAD E -MAJOR, SCHOOL OF GTJNNEEY.
“ L’Artillerie prend sa place.” — Napoleon I.
The motto before you was one of the tersest, and most comprehensive
of the military aphorisms that Napoleon I. ever uttered ; and now,, at a
time when the power of artillery has increased so immeasurably, and
the results of the recent campaign were mainly attributable to the
scientific use of artillery, its repetition comes somewhat strangely ;
more especially as the motto, in French, was to. be seen emblazoned on
the triumphal arches that were erected to welcome home the victorious
army of Germany, after the conquest of the descendants of that army,
with the ancestors of whom, the originator of the maxim had crushed
their forefathers.
Let us see how the motto applies to the recent campaign at Aldershot.
For years, a constant agitation had been kept up by artillery officers
as to the greater development of their arm, but unsuccessfully, and up
to this summer was to be seen the senseless practice of what was called
“ artillery conforming to infantry.” No one knew what was meant by
this process, and the result was that field artillery with accurate and
long shooting rifled guns were “ sentenced” (and I use the word
“sentenced” advisedly, as it meant complete destruction), to march
side by side — i.e., the leaders' heads in line with the front rank of the
lines of infantry ; halt when they halted, and move when they moved*
This pernicious system had become so fixed, that no ordinary authority
had apparently the power of changing it ; but at the outset of the cam¬
paign, the “cry of lamentation” from captains of batteries and others “went
up,” and on the recommendation of Sir Collingwood Dickson, K.C.B., V C,
who was appointed Major-General Commanding the Artillery for the
manoeuvres, His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-
Chief was pleased to cause the following order to be promulgated to the
commanders of corps, divisions, and brigades.
* Lecture at Shoelmryiiess on the 2nd October, 1871.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
497
Memorandum relative to the employment of Horse and Yield Artillery .
Memo General officers commanding divisions or detached brigades should
indicate to the officers commanding artillery under their orders, the
general object of the movements about to be executed, and these officers should
give directions to the captains of batteries as to the best mode of co-operating with
and supporting them.
Officers commanding batteries should be permitted (under the direction of their
own commanding officers) to use their own judgment in selecting the best positions
to enable them to operate with advantage either in covering an attack or retreat,
conforming of course as much as the nature of the ground will permit with the
movements of the corps to which they are attached.
Any special directions received by the officer commanding artillery from the
general or other officer in command of troops, relative to any change in the disposi¬
tion of the batteries during the movements, will of course be promptly carried out.
No battery ought to be exposed to the risks of infantry fire, unless under
unavoidable circumstances which occasionally occur in action.
Aldershot, 17th September, 1871.
By command,
C. B. EGEBTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant* General o
I fancy the memo, was not kindly received in all quarter s, yet the
advantage of it was most apparent ; as it not only allowed the commanders
of batteries to cover the movements of their infantry in an effectual,
professional, and scientific manner, but it released the infantry com¬
manders from having to drag about with them an “ incubus” which they
could not get rid of, and knew not how to use.
As I had the honor of serving on the staff of Sir C, Dickson, I had
the opportunity afforded me of collecting matter for the following few
remarks, which I hope will interest you, and at the same time give some
a clearer insight into the execution of the scheme than could have been
gathered by the daily and desultory reading of the newspapers. Of
course all the movements and operations of which I propose to make
mention did not come under my personal observation ; but from subse¬
quent conversation with officers who were eye-witnesses of those I did
not see myself, I hope I shall be able to place before you concisely the
manner in which the plan of the campaign was executed.
It is generally allowed that the actions of all public men are liable
and open to fair criticism, and general officers cannot claim exemption
on this point ; but at the same time, the first duty of a soldier, namely
discipline, forbids anything like offensively hostile criticism, and I
venture to hope that nothing I shall say may be construed in the
smallest degree to a want of strict discipline and subordination on my
part.
I propose to follow as nearly as possible the daily movements of each
corps ; and I use the word corps, because each separate force represented
more nearly in its composition a corps d’armee, although a small one,
than a division, which does not usually contain portions of all branches
498
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
of an army, but generally signifies a large force of a separate arm- —
as e< divisions of infantry ," or “ divisions of cavalry," to which may be,
however, and nearly always is, attached a proportion of artillery.
Towards the close of my remarks I shall make allusion to what has
been generally admitted as shortcomings in our first attempt, which I
would premise, as a first attempt, may be pronounced a success, and
more than carried out what our facetious friend Punch " designated
recently as a albs pretty well.”
The map before you represents upon a large scale the country over
which the operations took place. The ground was limited in area, as you
probably know, by an act of Parliament, and although before the
manoeuvres commenced some critics took exception to the small extent
of ground, yet it proved quite large enough for the force employed, and
rather too large for the powers of the transport service. As you will
observe, the ground assumed every phase — mountain, moor, bog, wood,
cultivated land, parks, and villages, intersected by railways, canals,
streams, and roads of all natures, from the good level turnpike to the
merest forest or moorland track ; at the same time several lakes and ponds,
whilst adding to the difficulties of the country, facilitated the watering of
large bodies of cavalry.
Aldershot Camp lies as nearly as may be in the centre of this tract of
country, and as from it principally supplies were drawn, I think the
locality was well and judiciously chosen as the site of our first attempt.
W e must' walk before we can run, and it was at least prudent to guard
against the contingency of an utter collapse.
The troops began to assemble at Aldershot about the commencement
of the month, and the earlier period was consumed in teaching the
militia to drill, the cavalry to picket their horses, and the staff — many of
them entire strangers, not only to the country, but to the troops with
whom they were called upon to serve — to make acquaintance with their
new duties. Some difficulties presented themselves from the want of
transport, which as you all know is the most vital necessity in a campaign,
and one that is most neglected in England, for it has been truly said
that an army marches not upon its feet but upon its belly.
As soon as the transport began to assume some form, two corps were
formed and left the camp of Aldershot on the 8th September, one for
Hartford Bridge Flats, another for Woolmer Forest, leaving enough to
form another corps at Aldershot pending the further organisation of the
Control Department. For some time it was doubtful whether this corps
could march further than half-a-day's march from Aldershot (returning
thither every night), but everyone was rejoiced when on the 12th inst.
the force under Sir Hope Grant left Aldershot and marched to Pirbright
Common.
The positions of the three corps were on the evening of the 12th inst.
as follows : —
1st, Grant's Corps ... Pirbright (subsequently to Chobham).
2nd, Carey's n ... Hartford Bridge.
3rd, Staveley's u ... Woolmer.
Everyone felt that the presence of three distinct bodies in the field,
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Scale
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THE EOYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
499
and in almost immediate presence of one another would render tho con¬
ception of a scheme of operations very difficult, as under any circum¬
stances, from the equalisation of the bodies, the forces opposed to one
another would be in the proportion of two to one.
Head-Quaetebs Akmy Corps,
Aldershot, 13th September, 1871.
General Sketch of Manoeuvres.
General order. The enemy having effected a landing on the south coast of England,
has refused the direct roads upon London, and is endeavouring to turn
the strong positions between Eeigate, Dorking, and the Hog’s Back, and so to gain
the valley of the Thames, and march upon London.
His advanced corps (the 2nd Division) has reached Hartford Bridge Elats, and
the main body (the 3rd Division) is at Woolmer.
A defending force (the 1st Division) has been collected in the vicinity of London,
and has moved to Chobham.
Such is the position this day.
On the evening of the 13th the programme appeared, and it was, at
a glance, clear that it was based upon false premises, but this was
unavoidable, owing to the want of water, transport, and many other
incidental matters of that sort. For instance, if the 2nd Corps had ever
reached Hartford Bridge, and commanded the passage of the Blackwater,
nothing short of a general action would have forced it to retreat,
situated as it was on the high road, and as near to London as the 1st
Corps ; nor would the latter have ever thought of holding Fox Hills or
the Hog's Back, were the 2nd Corps where it was, viz. almost in his
rear. Again, the 3rd Corps would never have attacked the position of
the Hog's Back, but would have advanced to its left front, and have
assisted to maintain the 2nd Corps in the position it was fortunate
enough to find itself in — a very easy operation, as the capture of a small
chain of hills and Farnham would have effected the double purpose of
reinforcing the 2nd Corps and turning Grant's position on the Hog's
Back and Fox Hills. However, circumstances, as I have before told
you, led to the selection and adoption of the scheme by the highest
authorities, and it only remained for us to carry it out.
Each corps contained—
3 batteries of artillery,
3 (1st Corps 4) regiments of cavalry,
11 battalions of infantry.
The corps were numerically nearly equal as well as similar in their
composition, if you except the 1st Corps, that had no light cavalry and
was forced to perform its outpost duties with the heavy cavalry of the
guard, who, however, showed themselves quite equal to the occasion.
Five batteries of artillery were at first left, for reasons of supply, at
Aldershot, and were called generally “ the reserve," but on the 16th they
were dispersed — three batteries to the 1st Corps, and two batteries to
the 3rd Corps,
500
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDINGS OF
Umpires were appointed to give their opinions, to decide questions
as to who were beaten on occasions of collision, and to prevent troops
crossing bridges over railways and canals after they had been blown up
or destroyed, until sufficient time, as in their opinion, had elapsed
for their repair.
General order. Thursuay, 14tli. — The officer commanding defending force having
got information of the position and estimated strength of the enemy’s
advanced corps, breaks up his camp at Chobham, and advancing to Chobham
Eidges, threatens its communications, throwing out cavalry to Frimley, Tarn-
borough, and across the canal to Pirbright.
The enemy (the 2nd Division) ascertaining this move by his scouts, falls back
across the Basingstoke Canal, and takes up a position near Caesar’s Camp, sending
information of the advance of defending force to the main body, which moves to
his support, and encamps at Frensham.
Friday, 15th. — The enemy’s advance corps continues its retreat, and effects a
junction with its main body near Frensham.
The defending force continues to advance, and encamps at Pirbright, throwing
out advanced posts to occupy the commanding ridge of the Hog’s Back.
Saturday, 16th. — The opposing forces being now in contact, the general opera¬
tions will commence.
By command,
C. E. EGEETON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant-General.
The encampments of these corps up to this time had been made upon
no fixed principles of offence or defence, but solely with the view of afford¬
ing the greatest facilities for water and transport, and if you except a raid
made by the cavalry of the 2nd Corps upon the outposts of the 1st
Corps, before war was declared, near to Bagshot, peace reigned every¬
where. In conformity with the programme, the 2nd Corps retired to
Frensham Great Pond on the 15th, and the 1st Corps advanced to
Pirbright Common, the latter holding the line of the Hog^s Back with
his outposts, which consisted of cavalry and weak picquets of infantry.
The 3rd Corps threw out videttes as far as the high ground overlooking
Crooksbury Hill and Puttenham Common.
Head-Quaeteks Aemt Cokps,
Aldershot, 15th September, 1871.
Continuation of General Sketch of Manoeuvres .
General order. Saturday, 16th. — It is assumed that on the morning of Saturday,
the 16th, the 1st Division (defending force) having failed in intercept¬
ing the enemy’s advanced corps (2nd Division), and preventing its junction with the
main body, has occupied a strong defensive position on the Hog’s Back, his right
being in the direction of Hungry Hill.
The division has been reinforced during the night by three batteries of artillery,
and his right will for the day consist of a skeleton force of cavalry and infantry,
representing 2000 men.
The 2nd and 3rd Divisions have effected their junction, and finding themselves in
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
501
superior force, will make a combined attack on the position held by the defending
force.
The 3rd Division will attack to its front, and the 2nd Division will endeavour to
turn the enemy’s right by a flank movement.
The senior officer of these divisions will regulate the advance.
The operations of the day must not extend beyond the Puttenham and Wan-
borough Road on the left of the position, and the Beacon Hill on the right.
The main bodies of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions will not move from their camping
ground till 8 a.m., nor are the outposts to be thrown beyond the positions occupied
during the night till that hour.
By command,
C. B. EGERTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant- General.
Sept. i6th. At daylight, the corps began to move: the 1st Corps to
a strong position on Fox Hills, with ontposts strengthened
upon the Hog's Back and at Tongham Railway Station. This corps had
been reinforced by a detachment composed of odds and ends picked up
in the camp, consisting of about 2000 men and six guns. This little force
was directed to hold the position of Hungry Hill and Csesar's Camp,
and so at a long distance protected the right of the 1st Corps and the
main Farnham Frimley Road from any attempt of the cavalry of the
2nd or 3rd' Corps, and had orders, on retiring, to blow up all the bridges
across the canal. This flanking force were truly enfans perdus , for it
was separated by about three miles from its main body, and would
have had the greatest difficulty to escape at all from the grasp of the
2nd and 3rd Corps, let alone to hold the Caesar's Camp position, which
is' really one of no strength from the south side.
2 nd Corps. — The 2nd Corps left its camp, and passing through Farn¬
ham, sending its cavalry by a wide detour to its left, stormed and
carried the line of Caesar's Camp and Hungry Hill, and afterwards
descended into the Long Yalley and Aldershot Camp and Common,
until it was checked by all the Basingstoke Canal bridges being blown
up. Owing to the wide detour, and the time necessary to repair the
bridges, together with the want of arrangement for its earlier departure,
this corps never took part in the affair, but received orders, in the
evening, to encamp on Cove Common for the Sunday.
3 rd Corps . — This corps marched early, and crossing the Wey at
Tilford and Elstead, took up with its right brigade of infantry and a
portion of its cavalry, the high ground by Hampton Lodge and Putten¬
ham Common, while the left infantry brigade and a portion of cavalry
tried to effect a turning movement by Moor Park and Tongham ; but
owing to the bridges over the S.W. Railway being destroyed, this
flanking force also failed to act in concert with its main body.
That is now the position of the three corps at the moment of collision,
in which some of you may recognise a similarity of position with that
of the French and Austrians before the battle of Magenta, 1859 ; only
that MacMahon arrived in time, and succeeded in his turning move¬
ment.
502
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
The 3rd Corps advanced, covered by skirmishers, and drove in the
advanced posts of the 1st Corps on the Hog's Back, who retired
rapidly, destroying the railway arches and bridges on the main position
of Fox Hill ; and so cleverly did it manage to effect its retreat that the
advance of the 3rd Corps failed to keep it in view, and lost its trail
entirely. The right brigade and some cavalry of the 3rd Corps advanced
in seeming security, without any feelers, until it found itself within
the easy range of the artillery posted on Fox Hill, which opening fire,
in a short time destroyed and demoralised this attacking force round
Ash Church. The left brigade came up shortly after, and was treated
in a similar manner.
The 1st Corps had, up to then, only engaged with its artillery,
without calling on its supports in any way ; and the umpires decided
that the 1st Corps had succeeded in repelling and destroying the
3rd Corps.
Owing either to the want of transport or the want of organisation
of it, the 1st Corps was compelled to fall back — leaving the strong
position it had so successfully held — to Bisley Common, where it
encamped for the night and for Sunday ; and here came one of the
ridiculous episodes of the campaign — the defender and invader march¬
ing peacefully side by side, sometimes actually on the same road, in
order that the latter might find its forage and commissariat stores
that had been deposited overnight four miles in rear of the defenders'
position, and which of course they had too much good feeling to destroy,
or to carry off if they could ; which however was impossible, seeing that
they could hardly transport their own stores.
We have now seen how the first day's manoeuvres were rather a
fiasco , and boded badly for the future.
Sopt. 17th. Sunday was a day of perfect rest ; not even outposts or
picquets were placed.
Head-Quarters Army Corps,
Aldershot, 17th September, 1871.
Continuation of General Sketch of Manoeuvres .
General order. Monday, 18th. — The 2nd and 3rd Divisions will continue their
operations ; their object being to reach the valley of the Thames.
The area of operations is restricted on the north by the London and Southampton
Road, and to the east by the BrookwOod Station, London and South-Western
Railway.
By command,
C. R. EGERTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant-General.
Sept. 18th. On Monday hostilities commenced. Again was to be clearly
traced the pernicious tendency of the existence of three corps.
For had the affair been real instead of what it was, the 1st Corps, having
the command of the bridges of the canal, could and would have fallen
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
503
upon the 3rd Corps, and either have beaten it off its. junction with the
2nd Corps or destroyed it altogether ; and it would have had yet time,
under coyer of the broken bridges on the north loop of the canal, to
have turned round and smashed the 2nd Corps, as Napoleon I. did in
1814 when protecting his capital. It had the very great advantage of
acting on interior lines to either of the others, and was in a position to
fight either, without exposing its line of retreat by the Bagshot or
Chobham roads to London. However, no such advantage was taken,
and it remains only to relate the adventures of this day.
Again the 2nd Corps may be left out of the question, either from
its marching too late, or the 3rd Corps attacking too soon ; the cavalry
only of the 2nd Corps arrived in time to see the end of the action, but
not to take part in it, as it become considerably entangled in the
swamps of Coldingley Moor.
As soon as eight o'clock — the conclusion of the armistice— struck,
the horse artillery of the 1st Corps commenced to shell the camp of the
3rd Corps, which had not then been struck. Stung by this insulting
demonstration, the skirmishers of the 3rd Corps advanced and drove
those of the 1st Corps across, not only the railway but the canal, the
bridges over both of which were blown up ; and supported by a fire of
artillery — principally at Brook wood Railway Station, where it was well
sheltered in pits improvised with sleepers and railway iron — -the pioneers
and the engineers commenced making a bridge and repairing the others
across the canal, but they were compelled to desist until the main body
of the infantry of the 3rd Corps had been brought up to their assist¬
ance, when they were allowed to cross the canal. And now comes a
question whether it was expedient to attack the right flank of the
1st Corps; by attacking that flank, as the 3rd Corps did, the 1st
Corps were not only forced back upon their line of retreat, but were
driven further away from the flanking movement of the 2nd Corps ;
whereas, had the attack been pushed on the left flank of the 1st Corps,
it would have thrown its line of battle into the most disastrous possible
position — namely parallel to, and in prolongation with, or off its line of
retreat, and still more, would have tended to jam it effectually between
the attack of the 3rd Corps and the flanking or turning movement of
the 2nd Corps,
At any rate, the right of the 1st Corps began to fall back, and
eventually was compelled to change front in retreat, harassed by the
rapid advance of a demi-brigade of the 3rd Corps. After some desul¬
tory fighting, the 1st Corps took up an intermediate position on
some rising ground in front of the cultivated lands of Bisley and Lucas
Green, where it held its own until the cavalry and some infantry of the
left of the 3rd Corps, ever pushing their success, began to outflank,
when a general retreat, covered by cavalry was ordered, and entangled
as it was in the narrow lanes of the village of Bisley, it is probable that
a large portion of the corps would have been destroyed ; however, the
retreating force took up a very strong position, well garnished with
artillery, on the New England and Three Barrows Hills, which being
too strong for an attack in front, and the 2nd Corps not arriving
in time to operate, if you except a portion of their light cavalry, the
66
504
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
operations ceased for tlie day, and the 1st Corps drew off unmolested
to its entrenched position of Chobham Redoubts.
The encamping grounds were that day as follows : — -
The 1st Corps at Chobham Redoubts.
n 2nd n Wishmoor — cavalry at Sandhurst.
n 3rd n Barrows Hill and Bisley.
It is very doubtful whether in this day's fighting the 1st Corps could
have ever been dislodged from the line of the canal, or that the canal
could have been forced by an enemy numerically inferior, let alone
been driven from one position to another; and excepting “common
rumour," nothing as yet had been heard of the 2nd Corps being in
co-operation with the 3rd to compel a retreat, and it would have been
better perhaps if the appearance on Frimley Ridges of the 2nd Corps
had been allowed to be made, before the 1st Corps was supposed to be
driven from the strong position of the Basingstoke Canal. As it was,
it had too much the aspect of a preconcerted field-day than a repre¬
sentation of real war.
Head-Quarters Army Corps,
Aldershot, 18th September, 1871*
Continuation of General Sketch of Manoeuvres .
General order. The 1st Division having on Saturday retired from the Hog’s Back,
and occupied a new position on the Chobham Ridges, was attacked in
it this morning and forced further back in the direction of Chobham, where it is
supposed to be entrenched.
The 2nd and 3rd Divisions will continue the advance to-morrow, and attack the
1st Division in position, moving from the camping grounds not earlier than 8 a.m.
There will be no limit to the area of operations except those laid down by the
<c Military Manoeuvres Act,” and land interdicted by the Commissioners, as clearly
shown in the maps which have been furnished to general officers commanding
divisions and brigades.
By command,
C. R. EGERTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant- General.
Sept. 19th. The 1st Corps having fallen back the previous evening to the
fortified position already selected, and reinforced by volunteers
and artillery, determined to give battle to the now nearly united 2nd and
3rd Corps, although the opportunity yet offered itself of attacking, by a
sally from its lines, the two corps in detail. Morning broke with a slight
affair of outposts in front of Ribs Hill and Sunningdale Railway Station ;
for the 2nd Corps, determining this time not to be out of the fight, had
taken the initiative, and reinforced by nearly all the cavalry of the 3rd
Corps, began to feel their way early across the main Bagshot road. The
1st Corps reinforced their outposts on the right flank, and for a time,
supported by their cavalry and artillery, held their own, thereby com¬
pelling the 2nd Corps to deploy and unmask all their forces, and drew
them on under the fire of the entrenchments.
Perhaps this forenoon's operations was, as a spectacle, the most
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
505
perfect, as the weather added much to the brilliancy of the scene, and
from the knolls could be seen the advances of infantry, the charges of
cavalry, and the play of the guns. Still nothing had been heard of the
3rd Corps, which was really the corps to attack in front, and up to
mid-day the flanking or 2nd Corps had been the only one to make
any demonstration against the entrenchments; suddenly, however, a
detachment of the 3rd Corps menaced the left of the position, and
without advancing, drew off the defenders5 attention from a junction
that was being effected with the 2nd and 3rd Corps. It was felt
that although the entire and now united force of invaders would pro¬
bably have made no impression upon the works, yet that on the
occasion of so many troops being assembled together, and taking into
consideration the splendour of the day and the favourable nature of the
ground for working over, that the attack had not been allowed to
develop itself further, but in consideration of the distances marched
over, and the distance back to the encamping grounds, that the troops
had had enough, and they were ordered back to their encampments.
The nature of the works that sheltered the 1st Corps are worthy of
some remarks. They roughly resembled a Y with their flanks resting
on the railway cutting and woods, and were shallow trenches connecting
works, sometimes redoubts, sometimes small bastions, with emplacements
for field guns. The right face of these works were strengthened with
detached redoubts, which would have been better had they been open at
the gorge, and not exposed to be all of them directly enfiladed by guns
placed upon a hill about 1700 yds. distant. The apex of the work was
a knoll with triple lines of slight parapet and rifle pits, with a sand-bag
screen for a couple of guns, and ill provided with flanking fire. Some
of the works were not finished, and the tracing tape and profile had to
do duty for earthworks. The lines of defilade had also received slight
consideration.
sept. 20th. This day was one of repose, which the troops, more espe¬
cially the cavalry, much required.
Head-Quarters Army Corps,
Aldershot, 20th September, 1871.
Continuation of General Sketch of Manoeuvres.
General order. Thursday, 21st. — The defending force (1st Division) having
yesterday maintained its position, has been reinforced and will this day
advance.
The enemy (3rd Division) will endeavour to check the advance, and cover
Aldershot.
There will be no limit to the area of operations except those laid down by the
“ Military Manoeuvres Act,” and such lands as have been interdicted by the
Commissioners.
Each corps will move at such hour as will bring it into the position selected by
the general officer commanding, from which to commence his operations, by 9 a.m.
The baggage of both forces is to be considered as neutral to-morrow.
By command,
C. R. EGERTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant-General.
508
MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS OF
Army Corps Orders.
Aldershot, 20th September, 1871.
No. I.— ARMY CORPS.
The 2nd Division will for the operations of to-morrow bo broken up and divided between the
other Divisions, which will be constituted as follows : —
1st DIVISION— DEFENDING FORCE.
Major-General G. J. Carey, C.B., Commanding.
Cavalry.
General His Royal Highness the Prince or Wales, K.G., Commanding.
Colonel Baker, 10th Hussars.
1st Brigade.
Colonel Marshall, Commanding.
1st Life Guards.
2nd Life Guards.
Royal Horse Guards.
2nd Brigade.
Colonel Wombwell, Commanding.
10th Hussars.
12th Lancers.
Hants Yeomanry.
2 Batteries Royal Horse Artillery.
Infantry.
Major-General His Serene Highness Prince
Edward of Saxe Weimar’s Brigade,
with 1 Field Battery.
Major-General Lyson’s Brigade, Major-General Maxwell’s Brigade,
with 1 Field Battery. with 1 Field Battery.
2 Field Batteries from the Reserve Artillery.
The whole of this force to wear green leaves or heather in their head dress.
3rd DIVISION— THE ENEMY.
Major-General Sir Charles Staveley, K.C.B., Commanding.
Cavalry.
Major-General Sir T. M'Mahon, Bart., C.B., Commanding.
1st Brigade.
2nd Brigade.
Colonel Seymour, Commanding.
2nd Dragoon Guards.
3rd Dragoon Guards.
7th Dragoon Guards.
Colonel the Hon. I. Fiennes, Commanding.
7th Hussars.
9th Lancers.
1 Battery Royal Horse Artillery.
Infantry.
Major-General Brownrigg’s Brigade,
with 1 Field Battery.
Colonel Stephenson’s Brigade, Colonel Smith’s Brigade,
with 1 Field Battery. with 1 Field Battery.
1 Battery Royal Horse Artillery and 2 Field Batteries from the Reserve Artillery.
These arrangements will be carried out on Thursday morning, the troops moving at such hours
as the general officers commanding the divisions which they are to join may direct.
The baggage will return direct to Aldershot to-morrow morning.
From Chobham, by Pirbright.
From Bisley, by Brookwood.
From Sandhurst, by Frimley.
By command,
C. R. EGERTON,
Major-General,
Deputy Adjutant- General.
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
507
Sept. 21st. The 2nd Corps was for this day's manoeuvres divided
between the other two, and the programme left almost
absolute liberty to the commanders of these corps. The 3rd Corps,
strengthened by a portion of the 2nd Corps under General Staveley,
were to prevent the return of the 1st Corps, reinforced by a portion of
the 2nd Corps, to Aldershot.
Cavalry,,
Infantry
Artillery
Opposing Forces.
1st Corps.
. 6 Regiments.
. 17 Battalions.
. 42 Guns.
3rd Corps.
Cavalry . 5 Eegiments.
Infantry . 16 Battalions.
Artillery ...... 42 Guns.
In order to do this, a long line had to be taken up or observed — viz.,
from the line of the Frimley Bagshot road on the left, to the Pirbright,
Ash, Aldershot road on the right — a front of at least seven or eight
miles, over nearly all of which every arm could be manoeuvred.
I shall for simplicity still call the corps the 1st and 3rd.
The 3rd Corps held strongly the position of Chobham Ridges, with
their left on Golden Farmer junction, with a brigade in Frimley and
another on Frimley Green, with outposts along the top of the ridges
overlooking Bisley Green and the Brookwood Railway Station. These
detachments were formed of the reinforcements from the infantry of
the 2nd Corps that were joining the 1st Corps from their camping
ground at Wishmoor Cross. These detachments were subsequently closed
in to their right on the main body, but hardly in time to save being
cut off by an enterprising body of lancers who had appeared on their
left flank as they were on the march. The commander of the 3rd Corps
had rather prejudged the course of events, and had massed his forces
on the south end of Fox Hills, as he conceived that the 1st Corps
meditated a flank march by Ash into Aldershot, and his idea was at the
first borne out by large columns of dust that were seen moving in that
direction ; but of these we must speak when following the movements of
the 1st Corps.
The 1st Corps, moving from their camp, and reinforced by cavalry,
artillery, and infantry of the now broken up 2nd Corps, advanced their
cavalry until they ascertained that there was no force in their immediate
front ; then suddenly withdrawing them, they passed them over the
canal and railway by the bridges at Woking and Cowmoor, and com¬
menced an advance in three columns towards their left front ; these
columns caused the dust I have above alluded to, and tended to deceive
the 3rd Corps. After the cavalry had made a demonstration to turn the
right of the 3rd Corps, the infantry crossed the bridges lower down,
and which were now repaired, and marched through woods and
eventually deployed across the left flank of the position taken up by
the 3rd Corps, whilst a portion moved round their left and rear, and
hidden by woods awaited the attack. During the whole of this time
the cavalry of the 1st Corps performed their duty so well, that whilst at
the same time being perfectly aware of the position they were about to
attack, from repeated small dashes up nearly to the guns, they entirely
masked the movements of their infantry, and prevented any exploration
508
MINUTES OF PEOCEE DINGS OF
on the part of the cavalry of the 3rd Corps, who remained dismounted
in second line. On a sudden, a rattle of firearms announced that the
attack had begun, and troops hurrying from right to left proclaimed
that the position was attacked in flank. Some infantry had been
hidden very skilfully, and made, a dash at the wooded extremity of the
position, and although numerically weak they effected a lodgment,
and were speedily supported by others, while their cavalry slipped round
in rear and commenced to show on and to protect their right flank.
The attack developed, and the fire of guns showed that the position
was turned. The cavalry of the defenders attempted to support their
left flank, but were beaten by the ever-increasing cavalry of the attack ;
and in spite of the concentration of the fire on the part of the reserve
artillery of the defence, they were forced to change front and bring up
their infantry of their right flank in support towards their left in second
line, and so prolong their front. This entirely denuded their right
flank, and at an instant the brigade of invaders, that had been waiting
for orders, crowned the heights almost unopposed, and completed the
rout of the 3rd Corps, who retired to a second position with their
backs to the canal, where destruction was inevitable. At this period
all operations stopped, and the troops returned to their quarters, huts,
and encampments in Aldershot; and so ended the first attempt at
manoeuvring British forces in the field.
sept. 22nd. The following day there was a march past, at which all the
foreign officers assisted, and were in loud praises of the manner
in which the troops turned out, and marched, after the toils of the past
ten days.
Sept. 23rd. On the 23rd several regimentsdeft for their own stations,
among others the cavalry regiments of the guard, who marched
to London in 7J hours, a distance of thirty-four miles, thereby showing
that they can not only look superb in the park, but can make long
marches, as well as their comrades in the light cavalry. A battery of
Royal Horse Artillery also marched to Woolwich in one day, a distance
of forty-four miles.
It would ill become me, as holding a very subordinate position in the
campaign, to presume to criticise the actions of the generals in command,
yet I feel that the subject upon which I am now speaking would hardly
be completely treated unless I were allowed to make some deductions
from what came under my observation.
As you all know, it was an attempt at copying the Prussian system
of manoeuvres ; but tied down as we soldiers are, by what is called “ the
liberty of the subject,” it became impossible to assimilate to, or to copy
their system absolutely, or to act as would be done in war time. I allude
more particularly to the inability that the military authorities have
in this country of billeting troops on the inhabitants. Now this simple
want tends to diminish very vastly any similarity between mimic and
real war, and it acts very hardly upon the newly formed and somewhat
chaotic system of control, by forcing it to find transport for tents
and camp equipments, which' is perhaps the most bulky of all the
materiel carried with an army. In future wars it is doubtful whether
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
509
time will ever be given for the encampment of large bodies of troops,
as was the case 100 years ago. If these manoeuvres are to be
repeated, it might be worthy of consideration whether any very
great hardships would be enforced on the inhabitants of a district by
the billeting officers and soldiers upon them for one, or two nights at
most. At any rate, the country at large would be the gainer ; and to
judge by the business done in the villages during the recent manoeuvres,
the natives themselves would have no objection whatever to the society
of the soldiers for a night or two. At any rate, no real experience can
ever be gained by the control branch until the conditions of actual war
are more closely imitated.
As you may doubtless have heard, there have been shortcomings, and
the bringing of them to light can do no possible harm, if done in a
fair and proper spirit. It has been too much the fashion to call out,
“ The control broke down,” without waiting to enquire exactly what
is meant by the sentence. If it be meant that the system broke
down, that was impossible, for there was no system, it is in course of
creation ; if it be meant that the controllers and their subordinates
were lazy or stupid, I beg to offer my distinct contradiction, as no
department worked harder, and more cheerfully from before daylight
until sometimes long after dark, at the end of which time, they were
generally only received with grumbling, as a reward for their exer¬
tions; and I may with pride allude here to the self-denial and the zeal
shown by the detachment of our own Regiment, lent for the occasion,
without whose cordial co-operation the manoeuvres could never have
taken place.
It was always a difficulty to know where the duties of the control
ended, and that of the regiments began, with reference to supply, and
this was an endless source of discomfort to everybody. Again, there
was a tendency on the part of the Control Department to assume the
position of a separate body, responsible only to their own chiefs, and
ignoring all military chain of authority. This is an item of most con¬
siderable importance, and as soon as that department act under and
through the staff of the general, some progress may be made in the
administration of the army, but as long as the body assert an inde¬
pendent and irresponsible position, with regard to the military author
rities, so long will chaos and confusion exist, besides failing to secure
for themselves, the support of the staff, and the confidence of the troops*
Some regiments adopted a system of regimental transport which
answered very well ; the artillery always did, and I think on the whole
fared the best of all the arms employed. I need hardly say that the
various tea carts, vans, drays, and shandy drans of sorts, supplied by
civil contract broke down utterly in all directions, and were useless, or
worse, to the army, whilst their drivers were subject to no discipline
nor control whatever ; although some of the drivers did their duty con¬
scientiously, and to the best of their ability, they could however never
bo relied on, and their pace averaged from one to one and a half miles
an hour.
I am afraid to think that the staff were hardly free from all blame ;
as a rule, the country was hardly thoroughly explored and known, and
510
MINUTES OF PEOCEEDTNGS OF
the constant collisions of troops on the march betoken a want of care,
both in the selection of the routes to be followed, and the times of
departure ; whilst the absence of all co-operation in the first two days
of the campaign of the 2nd Corps, showed clearly, how disastrous to an
army, might and would be the ignorance and the neglect of the primary
rules of logistics, by the close adherence to which, the Prussians owe in
a very great measure, their successes in their last campaign in France.
The mounted portions of the corps were often widely separated from
one another, and from their forage, and often had to go an unnecessary
distance for water ; while the entire encampments were often needlessly
extensive, thereby rendering the circulation of orders tedious and em¬
barrassing. The campaign also showed the advantage that would be
derived in having one staff corps instead of three departments — viz.,
Adj ut ant - Genera? s, Quarter-Master- Genera? s, and personal.
Such maps as were issued were worse than useless ; as besides being
incorrect in the general features of the ground, they were obsolete, as
far as roads and boundaries were concerned, the face of the country
having altered so much since the date of their manufacture.
The cavalry, with few exceptions, clung to the traditionary move¬
ments in masses, sometimes under the close fire of infantry, and neglected
the more important duties of being the eyes of the army : this more
particularly referred to that belonging to the 3rd Corps, on the first and
last days of fche campaign.
The artillery and engineers appeared, if I may be allowed to say so,
more at home at their work than the other branches, and this was
remarked to me by more than one foreign officer ; the issue of the
order I read to you at the commencement of the lecture tended mate¬
rially to develop our freedom of action, whilst it freed the generals
from the constant restraint that the presence of artillery seems always
to exert on their plans, and their mode of execution.
The infantry of the line marched and went through their work
cheerfully and well, and if you except an entire disregard for availing
themselves of cover, and a tendency to open fire at very long range,
appeared to leave nothing to desire.
The militia showed their very marked inferiority in training, and
physique to the line ; though, probably, with an improvement in the
professional knowledge of their officers, and a severer course of training
on the part of the men, they might be reasonably looked to to supply
vacancies in, and indeed be brigaded with, the line. But it is to be
remembered that the militia at Aldershot could hardly be considered as
a fair sample of the force.
Of the yeomanry little can be said, either for quantity or quality. Out
of the large and much-talked-of body of this force in England, only about
170 put in an appearance, and these were ill-drilled, unsoldierlike men,
badly mounted on unbroken, underbred horses, and could not be relied
on either for moving as a body or for getting about the country. The
force in the field Was a direct contradiction to the generally received and
ill-founded notion, that every man in the yeomanry is young, active,
eleven stone, rides a £200 hunter, and that no country can stop him.
Of the volunteer infantry, such a very small force ever took part in
THE ROYAL ARTILLERY INSTITUTION.
511
the operations that one can form no judgment of the value of the force.
Suffice it to say, that what were there did very well, and kept up the
credit of their stay-at-home brethren. The handful of this force were
volunteers of volunteers , should be taken as the very pick of this force,
and no criterion whatever of what might be expected of it when called
out in any numbers.
In conclusion, I am sure you will agree with me in hoping that the
manoeuvres may become annual, and that such a good beginning may
not be allowed to drop ; also, that the next may be more assimilated to
actual war operations. In order to secure this, it must be an absolute
necessity that they be removed for the future from even the atmosphere
of Aldershot, and also to a site, where the nature of the country is less
difficult to work over. I hope also that the “ autumn manoeuvres”
may induce us to leave off the pernicious system of always crying down
our own army to the extolling of other nationalities, any one of whom
would have found it hard to have put 33,000 men of such quality in
the field ; and moreover force every thinking soldier to the fact, that
now more than ever, there is reason for the maxim of the great Napoleon,
that “ I/Artillerie prend sa place.”
October, 1871.
67
-
•
•
'
♦
*
.
•
■
INDEX
PAGE
A.
Abel, Professor, on tbe non -ignition, &c.,
of gunpowder ... ... ... ... 438
Abstract of Proceedings of a General
Meeting of the E.A. Institution, held
May 18, 1870 . 1
Do. do. May 23, 1871 . 299
Abyssinian expedition, extract from
report on the ... ... ... ... 418
Additions to Pules IV. and V. of the
E.A. Institution ... ... ... 317
Do. do. XVII. and XVIII. 318
Admiral Key’s remarks on experiments
with 7-inch double shells ... ... 21
Adye, S. P., Major E.A., on the or¬
ganisation of field artillery ... ... 471
Afternoon meetings at the E.A. Institu¬
tion during the year 1869-70... ... 15
Do. do. < 1870-1 . . 315
Alidade, description of ... ... ... 484
Alterations and additions to rules of
E.A. Institution ... ... ... 16
Alteration in Eule XV. of the EA.
Institution ... ... ... ... 318
Ammunition, expenditure of, by field
guns ... ... ... ... ... 289
“Amusette,” field piece invented by
Marshal Saxe ... ... ... ... 138
Analysis of gunpowder ... ... ... 67
Annual Eeport E.A. Institution, 1869-70 1
1870-1 299
Armament of our field artillery in the
future, by Lieut. C. Jones, E.A. ... 252
Armstrong segment shell, experiments
with at Dartmoor ... 30
Guns, manufacture of ... 149
Army corps orders, autumn manoeuvres,
1871 ... 506
Artillery draught, various modes of ... 458
Artillery in the autumn manoeuvres of
1871 497
Artillery in the battle of Sedgemoor, 1685 127
Artillery missiles, development of dur¬
ing 1870, a paper read by Captain
C. O. Browne, E.A. ... ... ... 393
Arundel Society Plates, lists of . . . 10, 307
Autumn manoeuvres of 1871, a sketch of,
by Capt. W. S. M. Wolfe, E.A. ... 496
Axle-tree seats for field batteries . . . 168
B.
Balfour, H. L., Capt. E.A., on axle-tree
seats for field batteries . ... 168
Bashforth chronograph, results obtained
with ... ... ... . 286
Bashforth, Professor, tables of remain¬
ing velocity, time of flight, and energy
of various projectiles ... ... ... 367
Battalion guns, introduction of . . . ... 130
Billeting of troops . 609
PAGE
Birds, British, purchased during the
year 1870-1 ... 310
... ... Kequired to complete
E.A.I. collection ... 311
... And animals from Madagascar,
presented by Lt. J. C. Eobinson,
E.A . 310
... From Alderney, presented by
Lt. G. Montgomery, E.A. ... 310
... From America, presented by Lt.
Yeatman, E.A. ... ... ... 309
... From Australia, presented by
Asst.-Surg. J. M. Fiddes, M.B.,
E.A . 310
... From China, presented by Mr.
Whitely... ... ... ... 309
... From India, presented by Capt.
J. S. Stirling, E.A. 11
... ... presented by Lt.
Beadnell, E.A. ... 309
... ... presented byLt.-Col.
Bourchier, c.B. E.A. 309
resented by Lt.
. Biddulph, 19th
Hussars ... ... 11
... From Scotland, presented by
Capt. J. S. Stirling, E.A. ... 309
Books, &c., presented during the year
1869-70 . . 5
Do. do. 1870-1 . 303
Books purchased during the year 1869-70 9
Do. do. 1870-1 . 306
Boxer, Major-General, case shot de¬
signed by ... ... ... 25
Shrapnel shells . 22
... Shrapnel, experiments with at
Dartmoor ... ... ... 32
Breaching by indirect fire, by Colonel
H. H. Maxwell, E.A. ... ... ... 440
Breech-loading arrangement proposed
by Capt. J. P. Morgan, E.A.... ... 157
British birds and eggs required to com¬
plete E.A.I. collection... . 12
Bronze and steel, relative merits of, for
inner barrel of a gun ... ... ... 257
Bronze M.L. rifled guns . 254
Browne, C. Orde, Captain E.A., on our
rifled projectiles and fuzes... 19
... On the development of artillery
missiles during 1870 ... 393
Built-up guns which have fired a large
number of rounds . 256
Built-up mortars, 36-inch ... ... 205
C.
Carleton, G., Lt.-Col., on the mobility of
light field artillery . ... 477
Case shot, described . ... 25
Camel guns, by Col. H. H. Maxwell, E.A. 165
Camel’s load, detail of, with weight ... 166
Camel’s rate of marching . 166
514
INDEX.
PAGE
Catapult, modern use of . ... 136
Chambered guns, introduction of ... 141
Changes in E.A. Institution Committee
during the year 1869-70 ... ... 15
Do. do. 1870-1 . 316
Chesney, Col., E.E., on the reform of
Prussian tactics ... ... ... 240
Chilled projectiles, manufacture of ... 23
Chronoscope, invented by Capt. A. Noble 427
Chronoscope, invented by Prof. Wheat¬
stone, described ... ... ... 226
Clock signal-vane, by Capt. W. L.
Yonge, E.A . 479
Colour of gunpowder ... ... ... 61
Column formation defined ... ... 250
Committee of E.A. Institution for the
year 1870-1 . ... ... 18
Committee of the E.A. Institution for
the year 1871-2 . . ... 319
Committee on Explosives, experiments
with gunpowder by ... ... ... 426
Common shells, rifled, described ... 22
Comparative accuracy of the “ W oolwich”
and Krupp guns ... ... ... 82
Comparative ballistic power of “Wool¬
wich” and Krupp heavy rifled guns... 124
Comparative penetrative power of the
“ Woolwich” and Krupp guns ... 66
Comparative rapidity of fire and facility
of manipulation of “Woolwich” and
Krupp guns ... ... ... ... 88
Comparison between effects of rifled and
smooth-bore pr oj ectiles ... ... 20
Comparison of guns in very high and
very low batteries ... ... ... 174
Competitive trials of “Woolwich” gun
and Krupp’s B.L. gun, at Tegel in
1868 ... > . 62
Control system, in autumn manoeuvres
of 1871 ... _ . 508
Cost of “ Woolwich” and Krupp guns... 92
Crystallisation of iron . 151
D.
Dartmoor experiments with segment and
shrapnel shell, illustrated ... ... 30
Densimeter, as used at Waltham Abbey,
description of ... ... ... ... 64
Density of gunpowder, to determine ... 64
Development of artillery missiles during
1870, by Capt. C. O. Erowne, E.A, ... 393
Diagrams of practice with segment and
shrapnel shells at Dartmoor ... ... 30
Diagram of practice with shells from
36-inch mortar, 1857-8 ... ... 221
Diagrams of practice with “ Woolwich”
and Krupp guns . 83
Discussion after lecture delivered by
Capt. J. P. Morgan, E.A., on the
explosive force of gunpowder. . . ... 437
Discussion after lecture on Prussian
tactics, delivered at the E.A. Institution
by Lt.-Col. C. C. Chesney, E.E. ... 247
Discussion after Lieut. Sladen’s lecture
on a large bore and small bore con¬
trasted ... ... ... ... ... 288
Discussion upon Capt. G. O. Browne’s
paper, “Our rifled projectiles and fuzes” 34
Discussion upon paper read at the
E.A. Institution by Capt. J. P.
Morgan, E.A. ... . 161
Discussion on paper read by Lieut. C.
Jones, E.A., on the future armament
of our field artillery
Dismounting Mallet’s 36-inch mortar ...
Disposition of field battery detachments
Doppelmair, C. von, Capt., on the compe¬
tition between Krupp and “Woolwich”
guns at Tegel in 1868 ...
Double shell, described ...
Experiments with, against
the “America”
Draught, various modes of, for artillery
purposes .
E.
E arly field artillery
Economy in metals for guns .
Education of officers advocated ...
Eggs, British, required to complete
B.A.I. collection
Endurance of “ Woolwich ” and Krupp
guns .
English guns and foreign critics, by
Capt. V. D. Majendie, E.A. ...
Entrenchment of field artillery, by Capt.
G. B. Macdonell, E.A.
Equipment, field .. .
Equipment of field batteries and horse
artillery ...
Essay, E.A. I. Prize, 1871
Expenditure of ammunition per gun by
horse artillery and field batteries
Explosive force of gunpowder ...
Exposure, deterioration of guns from . . .
Extract from the “ Engineer ” news¬
paper on the time occupied in opening
and closing the breech arrangement of
the 50-ton Krupp gun .
E.
Field artillery, employment of, in the
autumn manoeuvres of 1871
... ... Entrenchment of, by Capt.
G. B. Macdonell, E.A. ...
... ... How to move
... ... The future armament of, by
Lieut. C. Jones, E.A. ...
... ... The minor tactics of, by
Lt. H. W. L. Hime, E.A.
... ... The mobility of, by Lieut.
H. W. L. Hime, E.A. ...
... ... What to fire
. What to fire at .
... ... When to fire
... ... When to move
... Where to fire
Field equipment .
Flashing of gunpowder ...
Floating mortar batteries for 36-inch
Mallet’s mortars, general description
of .
Fraser guns, manufacture of
Fuzes for segment and shrapnel shells...
G.
Galloper guns, introduction of . . .
Geary, H. Le G., Major, on a proposal
for the drill of gunners of field bat¬
teries at other than regimental exer¬
cises
PAGE
268
217
170
66
20
21
458
134
259
250
311
95
60
489
28
263
328
291
413
259
90
497
489
338
252
328
455
335
334
332
337
328
28
62
235
150
29
137
182
INDEX.
515
PAGE
General comparison of “Woolwich” and
Krupp systems of heavy artillery ... 114
Gibraltar, re-armament of, by Captain
J. B. Richardson, R.A. ... ... 172
Grains of gunpowder, patterns of ... 51
Gravelotte, the battle-field of ... ... 194
Gun and carriage, invented by M. de
Bonneville ... ... ... 140
... Manufacture, present system of .. . 146
... Pit, proposed by Captain G. B.
Macdonell, R.A. ... ... 491
... Suitable for field batteries . 267
... Very heavy, proposed by Captain
J. P. Morgan, R.A . 145, 154
... With movable breech, proposed
by Capt. J. P. Morgan, R.A.... 436
Gunpowder, analysis of ... ... ... 57
Determination of the ex¬
plosive force of, by Capt.
J. P. Morgan, R.A. ... 413
... Examination and proof of,
by Capt. F. M. Smith, R.A. 50
... Experiments, by Captain
A. Noble ... ... ... 420
... Experiments with, by Com¬
mittee on Explosives ... 426
Practical experience with ... 419
... Rate of combustion of ... 417
Size and shape of ... ... 52
Theoretical experience with 413
TJnburnt on leaving gun ... 428
Guns, Armstrong, manufacture of ... 149
... Chambered, early introd uction of 141
... Comparative accuracy of the
“ Woolwich” and Krupp ... 82
... Comparative cost of do. .. . ... 92
... Comparative endurance of do. ... 95
... Comparative penetrative power
of do. ... ... ... ... 66
... Comparative rapidity of fire and
facility of manipulation of do... 88
... Fraser, manufacture of ... ... 150
... “ Galloper,” explained ... ... 137
... Heavy rifled, projectiles for ... 20
... In the service, relative powers of 275
... Krupp’s breech-loading ... ... 61
... Of position, materiel for... ... 27
... Of steel alone ... ... ... 253
... Of wrought-iron alone ... ... 253
... Of wrought-iron lined with steel 254
... Palliser, manufacture of ... ... 153
... Siege, materiel for ... ... 27
... Superiority of muzzle-loading
over breech-loading ... ... 87
... Woolwich, projectiles for ... 20
Gustavus Adolphus, effect on artillery
by the death of... ... . 128
H,
Handling of horse artillery and cavalry,
by Capt. J. Ketchen, R.H.A.... ... 343
Heavy guns, mounting of ... ... 293
... Necessity for ... ... 145
Projectiles for . 20
Proposed by Capt. J. P.
Morgan, R.A. ... ... 154
Heavy M.L. rifled guns, table of
endurance of ... ... ... ... 255
Heavy rifled ordnance, competitive trials
with at Tegel, in 1868... . 62
PAGE
Hime, H. W. L., Lieut., on the minor
tactics of field artillery (R.A. I. prize
essay of 1871) . 328
Hime, H. W. L., Lieut. R.A., on the
mobility of field artillery, past and
present . 127, 455
Horse artillery, employment of, in the
autumn manoeuvres, 1871 ... ... 497
Horse artillery, invention of ... ... 462
Horsfall 13-inch gun of 22 tons. . 205
Hygroscopic test for gunpowder ... 58
I.
Innes, A., Major, description of the multi¬
plying alidade or practice register, by 483
Insects and eggs from Australia, pre¬
sented by Capt. Sandilands, R.A. ... 311
Instructions for entrenching by field
artillery ... ... ... ... ... 492
Instruments, purchase of new, for R.A. I. 313
Iron-plating a cruising ship, system of,
by Capt. M. Tweedie, R.A. t... ... 486
J.
Jones, C., Lieut. R.A., on the future
armament of our field artillery ... 252
Jones, D. F., Lieut., translation of
Major Kodolitch’s report on the Abys¬
sinian expedition, by ... ... ... 4L8
K.
Ketchen, Captain, on the handling of
horse artillery and cavalry . 343
Kr up p’s breech-loading guns ... ... 61
Krupp’s cast steel guns, cost of . 93
L.
Large bore and small bore contrasted,
the merits of a, by Lieut. J. Sladen, R.A. 273
Lectures delivered at the R.A. Institution
during the year 1869-70 ... ... 15
Do. do. .1870-1 . . 314
Lefroy, Major-General, the story of the
36-inch mortars of 1855-8, by ... 203
Library, R.A. Institution, books pur¬
chased for ... ... ... 9, 306
Library, R.A. Institution, presentation
of books to . 5, 303
Life-saving rockets ... ... ... 409
Limber-pit, proposed by Capt. G. B.
Macdonell, R.A. ... ... ... 494
Limbers introduced into the field artillery 130
List of members of the R.A. Institution,
April, 1871 . 320
List of Proceedings published during the
year 1869-70 ... ... ... ... 2
Do. do. 1870-1 . . 300
M.
Macdonell, G. B., Capt. R.A., on the
entrenchment of field artillery ... 489
Maievsky, General, on the flight of pro¬
jectiles . 306
Majendie, V. D., Capt. R.A., on English
guns and foreign critics .
60
516
INDEX.
PAGE
Mallet’s 36-incli mortar of 42 tons ... 206
Mallet’s 36-inch mortar, No. 1, table of
practice with ... ... ... ... 214-
Mallet’s mortar, original design for ... 227
Mallet, Mr., on partial penetration of
armour . 397
“ Malta instrument,” for sighting vessels
at sea ... ... ... ... ... 174
Manufacture of guns, facility of ... 260
Manufacture of guns, the present systems
of . 146
Maps for use of troops in the field ... 610
Materiel for siege guns and guns of
position ... ... ... 27
Maxwell, LL. H., Col. R.A., on breaching
by indirect fire ... ... 440
On camel guns . 165
Metals for guns . ... ... 259
Metz, description of fortress of... ... 192
Miller, F., Lt.-Coh, 3R£, on the expendi¬
ture of ammunition by field guns . . . 289
Mitrailleuses . ... ... 407
Mobility of light field artillery, by Lt.-
Col. G. Carleton, R.A... ‘ . 477
Mobility of field artillery, by Major W.
Stirling, R.A. ... ... ... ... 280
Mobility of field artillery, past and
present, by Lt. H. W. L. Hime, R.A.
(No. 2) . 127
Do. do. do. (No. 3) 455
Morgan, J. P., Capt. R.A., on a very
heavy breech-loading gun of novel
construction ... ... ... ... 145
Morgan, J. P., Capt., on the determina¬
tion of the explosive force of gun¬
powder ... ... ... ... ... 413
Morgan, J. P., Capt., remarks upon paper
read by Capt. C. O. Browne, R.A.,
“ Our rifled projectiles and fuzes,” by 35
Mortars, 36-inch, of 1855-8, story of the 203
Mounting field battery detachments, 168, 249
Mounting of gunners of field artillery . . . 460
Mounting of twelve 12-ton guns at Malta,
1870, by 10th Brigade, R.A. ... ... 293
Multiplying Alidade, or practice register,
by Major A. Innes, Aberdeenshire
Artillery Volunteers ... ... ... 483
Museum of artillery transferred to the
charge of R.A.I. Committee ... ... 314
Museum, presentations to ... ... 10
Muzzle-loading field guns, the most
suitable metal for ... ... ... 253
N.
Noble, A., Capt., experiments with gun¬
powder by ... ... ... ... 420
Noble, W. H., Capt. R.A., observations
on the comparative penetrative
superiority of different projectiles, by 72
Noble, W. H., Capt., on complete pene¬
tration of armour plates ... ... 400
Nolan’s, Capt., range-finding apparatus,
by Lieut. C. E. B. Leacock, R.A. ... 40
Non-ignition of gunpowder on firing ... 428
Number of rounds fired by Woolwich
guns of different calibres ... ... 106
O.
Object of placing guns in high sites ... 176
Observations amongst German armies
during 1870, by Colonel H. A. Smyth,
R.A. ... ' . ' ... 184
Observatory, a new telescope for R.A.I.
Ogival-headed elongated service shot,
tables of velocities, time of flight, &c.,
of
Our rifled projectiles and fuzes, a paper
read at the R.A. Institution, March 8,
1870, by Capt. C. O. Browne, R.A. ...
Oxen, use of, for artillery draught
P.
Palliser and steel projectiles .
... Guns, manufacture of .. .
Projectiles, principles of manu¬
facture of .
Pebble powder, observations on use of. . .
Penetration of 36-inch shells
Percussion shells, advantageous and dis-
ad vantageous use of ...
Persian camel artillery (plate) ...
Picric powder
Positions of magazines...
Practice with Krupp guns
Presentation of silver salver to C. L.
Bloxam, Esq. ...
Presentations to R.A.I. museum during
the years 1869-70 and 1870-1 ... 1C
Prize essay (R.A.I.) of 1871
Prize firing, discussed ...
Programme of autumn manoeuvres, 1871
Proj ectiles for heavy guns
Proof of gunpowder, explained ...
Proposal for the drill of gunners of field
batteries at other than regimental
exercises, by MajorH. Le G. Geary, R.A.
Prussian tactics, the reform of, by Lt.-
Col. C. C. Chesney, R.E.
R.
R.A. Institution Prize Essay of 1871 ...
Range-finder, Captain Nolan’s, described
Ranges of shells of 35‘6 ins. diameter,
and an average weight of 2594 lbs.,
at 45° ...
Re-armament of Gibraltar, by Captain
J. B. Richardson, R.A.
Recoil of guns
Reeves, Lieut., case shot proposed by ...
Relative powers of Krupp and “Wool¬
wich” guns, with the descriptions and
charges of powders now officially
adopted ...
Remarks on the extracts from the Re¬
ports and Proceedings of the Ordnance
Select Committee, Vol. IV., quoted by
Captain von Doppelmair .
Report on the Abyssinian expedition,
translated from the German, by Lt.
D. F. Jones, R.A. ... .
Richardson, J. B., Capt. R.A., on the
re-armament of Gibraltar
Rifled guns passed into the service up
to October 31, 1870 .
Rifled projectiles and fuzes, present
construction and probable efficiency
on service, by Capt. C. Orde Browne,
R.A. ... .
Rockets, life-saving
Use of ...
Rodman’s experiments with gunpowder
Rotunda museum transferred to charge
of R.A.I. Committee ...
I Russian table of ranges and elevations
PAGE
313
381
19
139
394
153
23
434
221
248
166
394
180
74
315
), 308
328
37
499
20
56
182
240
328
40
220
172
266
25
123
107
448
172
106
19
409
337
422
314
443
index:.
51?
PAGE
S.
Segment, 9-pr., diagram of practice
with, at Dartmoor ... ... 31
... Shells and their fuzes ... ... 29
Shells, Boxer shrapnel ... ... ... 22
... Billed, common, described ... 22
Double do. ... 20
“ Short Notes on Professional Subjects ”
published during 1869-70 ... ... 2
Do. do. 1870-1 301
Shot, case, described . 25
. Size of balls for, discussed ... 26
Shrapnel shells and their fuzes . 29
Siege guns, materiel for . ... 27
Skirmishing, discussion as to the best
mode of . 249
Sladen, J., Lieut. B.A., on the merits
of a large bore and small bore con¬
trasted . 273
Sladen, Lieut., on the resistance of the
air . 395
Smith, F. M., Capt. B.A., on the ex¬
amination and proof of gunpowder ... 50
Smyth, H. A., Col. B.A., some obser¬
vations amongst German armies dur¬
ing 1870, by . . 184
Spare wheels, carriage of deprecated ... 271
Splitting of Palliser chilled shells ... 36
Do. do. do. remedied 38
Steel and bronze, relative merits of, for
inner barrel of a gun .. . ... ... 257
Steel as a metal for guns ... ... 253
Stirling, W., Major E.A., on mobility
of field artillery ... ... ... 280
Story of the 36-inch mortars of 1855-8,
by Major-General Lefroy, C.B., P.K.3.,
B. A . 203
Strange, Capt., observations on Capt.
C. O. Browne’s paper, “ Our rifled
projectiles and fuzes” . 34
Superiority of muzzle-loading over
breech-loading guns . 87
T.
Table for facilitating the calculation of
the range corresponding to a given
loss of velocity of any spherical
shot ... ... ... ... 391
... Do. do. elongated shot (ogival
head) . 392
... Giving comparison of ranges of
shells of different weights fired
with the same charge . 218
... Of comparative practice with a
13-inch land service mortar of
36 cwt . 224
... Of endurance of heavy M.L. rifled
guns . 255
... Of field battery and horse artillery
equipment . 263
... Of practice with Mallet’s 36-inch
mortar, No. 1 ... 214
... Showing observed times of flight
compared with the times due to
the same ranges in vacuo ... 219
PAGE
Table showing the comparative weights
of guns and number of rounds
carried by the horse and field
artillery of various armies . . . 282
... Showing the constitution of the
Swedish light artillery in 1797 ... 466
... Showing the relative power of guns
in the service . 275
... Showing the relative velocity of
our service rifled guns ... ... 287
... Showing the velocities of 9-pr. and
12-pr. projectiles . 265
... Showing weight behind team in
English, Prussian, French, Aus¬
trian, and Indian services ... 171
Tables of remaining velocity, time of
flight, and energy of various pro¬
jectiles, by the Eev. F. Bashforth,
e.d . 367
Tactics of Prussian armies . 199
Telescope for B.A.I. Observatory ... 313
Testing gunpowder by “ flashing ” ... 52
Do. do. for foreign matters 52
Thionville, situation, fortification, in¬
vestment, &c., of . 184
“ Times ” correspondent on the relative
cost of “Woolwich” and Krupp
systems of guns ... ... ... 95
Tweedie, M., Capt. B.A., a system of
iron-plating a cruising ship, by ... 486
y.
Velocities of 9-pr. and 12-pr. projectiles 265
Of rifles used by the English,
French, and German in¬
fantry ... ... ... 277
Velocity of our service rifled guns ... 287
Vertical fire, observations on . 28
W.
Waltham Abbey, examination and proof
of gunpowder at ... ... ... 50
Warde, Sir Edward, Major-General, on
mobility of field artillery . 288
White tiger skin, presented to B.A.I.
by Capt. C. W. Wilson, B.A. ... 310
Wolfe, W. S. M., Capt. B.A., on the
autumn manoeuvres of 1871 ... ... 496
“ Woolwich ” and Krupp’s B.L. systems,
competitive trial be¬
tween . 62
... Guns, projectiles for ... 20
B.M.L. guns, cost of ... 94
Wr ought-iron forgings, experiments
with . 207
Guns . 253
Y.
Yonge, W. L., Capt. B.A., on a new
system of signalling . 479
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