NASH'S
WAR MANUAL
NASH'S
WAR MANUAL
LONDON
EVELEIGH NASH
1914
PRINTED BT BALLAKTYNE & COMPANY LTD
AT THE BALLANTTNE PRESS LONDON
CONTENTS
PAGE
CHRONOLOGY OF THE DIPLOMACY THAT
LED TO WAR 7
A PRECIS OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORRE-
SPONDENCE 12
SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN'S DISPATCH 37
SIR MAURICE DE BUNSEN'S DISPATCH 47
THE ALLIANCES THAT MADE THE WAR 60
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 74
GERMANY'S MOTIVES 87
"MADE IN GERMANY" 109
THE KAISER AND THE "MAILED FIST" 112
AUSTRIA'S CASE 124
ITALY'S HATRED OF AUSTRIA 136
THE BALKANS 139
HOLLAND'S POSITION 150
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 152
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 173
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 196
6 CONTENTS
PAGE
LISTS OF THE FIGHTING SHIPS (ENGLISH,
GERMAN, AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN,
FRENCH, RUSSIAN, ITALIAN) 222
AIR CRAFT OF THE WARRING NATIONS 255
NEW THINGS IN WAR 258
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY IN TIME OF WAR 280
WHAT AMERICA THINKS OF THE WAR 294
DUTIES OF THE UNITED STATES AS A
NEUTRAL 297
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS' HEALTH 308
NOTES ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION 323
THE RED CROSS OF THE WARRING
NATIONS 329
THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 340
CHRONOLOGY OF THE DIPLOMACY
THAT LED TO WAR
ON June 28, 1914, a Slav who thought he was a patriot killed the
German Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the throne of
Austria. An inquiry was begun in which evidence was intro-
duced to show that the assassin's work was part of a plot for the
revolt of the Southern Slav provinces of Austria, instigated by
Serbians if not by the Serbian Government. On July 23, how-
ever, before the investigation was completed, Austria sent an
ultimatum to Serbia ordering her to use every means in her
power to punish the assassins and also to stop all further anti-
Austrian propaganda. Austria demanded to be permitted to
have representatives in the work of investigation.
JULY 24TH
On July 24, Russia joined Serbia in asking for a delay. Austria
refused to grant this.
25TH
On July 25, when the ultimatum expired, the Serbian Premier
gave his reply to the Austrian Ambassador at Belgrade : Serbia
agreed to all the conditions and apologies demanded by Austria,
except that allowing Austrian officials to participate in the
inquiry to be conducted in Serbia into the assassination of the
Archduke. Even this was not definitely refused.
27TH
On July 27, the Austrian Foreign Office issued a statement
in which appeared these words :
" The object of the Servian Note is to create the false im-
pression that the Servian Government is prepared in great
measure to comply with our demands.
" As a matter of fact, however, Servia's Note is filled with the
7
8 DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR
spirit of dishonesty, which clearly lets it be seen that the Servian
Government is not seriously determined to put an end to the
culpable tolerance it hitherto has extended to intrigues against
the Austro -Hungarian monarchy."
Russia notified Austria that it could not allew Serbian territory
to be invaded. The great Slav nation had come to the rescue
of its little kinsman. Semi-officially, Germany let it be known
that no one must interfere with the Austrian-Serbian entangle-
ment— an intimation that Germany would back Austria.
To stem the trend toward war Sir Edward Grey, the British
Foreign Secretary, made the definite proposal that meditation
between Serbia and Austria be undertaken by a conference of
the Ambassadors in London. France and Italy accepted the
proposal. Germany and Austria declined.
28TH
On July 28, came the official announcement that turned
Europe into an armed camp :
VIBNNA, July 28. — Austria -Hungary's declaration of war
against Serbia was gazetted here late this afternoon. The text
is as follows :
" The Royal Government of Servia not having replied in a
satisfactory manner to the Note remitted to it by the Austro -
Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23, 1914, the Imperial
and Royal Government finds itself compelled to proceed to
safeguard its rights and interests and to have recourse for this
purpose to force of arms.
" Austria-Hungary considers itself, therefore, from this
moment in a state of war with Servia.
(Signed) " COUNT BERCHTOLD,
" Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary."
29TH
On July 29, the Tsar issued an imperial ukase calling all
reservists to the colours.
On July 30, the German Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg,
showed where he stood in the following telegram to the German
Ambassador at Vienna :
" We cannot expect Austria -Hungary to negotiate with Servia,
with whom she is in state of war. The refusal, however, to
exchange views with St. Petersburg would be a grave mistake.
DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR 9
" We are indeed ready to fulfil our duty as ally. We must,
however, refuse to be drawn into a world conflagration owing to
Austria -Hungary not respecting our advice. Your Excellency
will express this to Count von Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Minister, with all emphasis and great seriousness."
In reply to this communication Count Berchtold told the
German Ambassador that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
at St. Petersburg had already been instructed to begin negotia-
tions with Sergius Sazonoff, the Russian Foreign Minister. But
nothing came of these efforts.
30TH
On July 30, Germany asked Russia to stop its mobilization
and requested a reply within twenty-four hours. Great Britain
notified Germany that if a general conflict should occur it could
not stand aloof and see the balance of power in Europe destroyed.
31 ST
On July 31, Mr. Asquith announced in the House of Commons :
" We have just heard, not from St. Petersburg, but from
Germany, that Russia has proclaimed the general mobilization
of her army and her fleet, and that, in consequence of this,
martial law is to be proclaimed in Germany.
" We understand this to mean that mobilization will follow
in Germany, if the Russian mobilization is general and is pro-
ceeded with."
Russia paid no attention to the German ultimatum, but M.
Gorymykin, president of the Council of the Empire, issued a
manifesto which read :
" Russia is determined not to allow Servia to be crushed and
will fulfil its duty in regard to that small kingdom, which has
already suffered so much at Austria's hands."
The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, went to the
French Foreign Office and expressed the fear that dangerous
friction might arise between the Triple Alliance and the Triple
Entente in the event of the Powers of the Triple Entente not
taking steps to localize the conflict between Austria and Serbia.
ATTGtTST 1ST
On August 1, the German Ambasador handed a declaration
of war to the Russian Foreign Minister at 7.30 P.M.
The French Government issued a general mobilization order.
10 DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR
2ND
On August 2, Germany began the invasion of France through
the Duchy of Luxemburg. As this territory was neutralized
by the Powers, including Germany, in 1867, this act was generally
criticized as involving a breach of treaty. England asked
Germany if she would respect the neutrality of Belgium. Ger-
many replied that she could not answer the question at that
time. The British Cabinet spent the day in discussing what
attitude England should assume.
3RD
On August 3, Germany sent an ultimatum to Belgium de-
manding free passage for her troops. Germany said that it
already had information that France was to use Belgium as a
military base. Belgium refused entrance to German troops
and demanded that Germany respect her neutrality. She
followed up her reply by proclaiming martial law. The French
Government declared martial law in France and Algiers.
Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons read a telegram
addressed to King George by King Albert of Belgium, asking
" the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government
to safeguard the integrity of Belgium." So far as England's
treaty obligations with France were concerned, said Sir Edward,
" we have perfect freedom to decide." For years England had
" had a friendship with France. Whether that friendship
involves obligations, let every man look into his own heart and
feelings and construe the obligations for himself. If the German
fleet bombarded the unprotected French coast," he added,
" England could not stand aside with its arms folded." The
German Ambassador had made a strong bid for British neutrality.
The Emperor had promised not to attack the northern and
western coast of France if England would remain neutral. Mr.
Redmond, the Nationalist leader, aroused great enthusiasm by
pledging the support of all Irishmen, Protestant and Catholic,
to whatever course England decided upon.
Italy proclaimed her neutrality. Although a member of the
Triple Alliance, this alliance, her statesmen explained, was
intended to protect the parties to it against an attack. Italy
interpreted Germany's and Austria's acts as amounting to an
aggressive war.
The German Emperor gave the Russian Ambassador his
passports. British Fleet mobilized.
DIPLOMACY THAT LED TO WAR 11
4TH
On August 4, England sent an ultimatum to Germany, de-
manding a satisfactory reply by midnight on the question of the
neutrality of Belgium. No reply having been received from
Germany the British Foreign Office announced that a state of
war existed with Germany, dating from 11 P.M., August 4.
Meanwhile Germany had given the British Ambassador in
Berlin his passports.
STH
On August 5, President Wilson offered the good offices of the
United States in an attempt to bring about a settlement of the
European difficulties. The Germans began an attack upon
Liege, Belgium, and were repulsed.
Lord Kitchener appointed Minister of War.
GTH
On August 6, Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia. The
Austrian Ambassador left St. Petersburg.
Mr. Asquith moved in the House of Commons a vote of credit
for one hundred millions. Army to be increased by half a
million men.
TTH
On August 7, the German Government used strong representa-
tions to Italy, in its efforts to enlist its participation in the war.
Italy, however, maintained her neutrality. The Kaiser issued a
proclamation asserting that jealousy of German progress was
the real cause of the war.
9TH
On August 9, Serbia declared war against Germany in order
to get rid of the German Minister.
10TH
On August 10, France declared war on Austria as a result
of Austrian troops aiding Germany.
12TH
On August 12, Austria and Great Britain each declared war
on the other.
A PRECIS OF THE DIPLOMATIC
CORRESPONDENCE
"THE White Paper" [Cd. 7467] containing the
" Correspondence respecting the European Crisis "
is a document of such historic importance, that it
would seem a national duty to publish a precis of
it so that our readers may fully grasp the policy
of the German Emperor, which led to war. No
Diplomatic Correspondence has ever been pub-
lished of greater significance. No more terrible
indictment of a people has ever been revealed
to civilization. It is the proof absolute of German
war-madness, the documentary evidence of the
German intention, not only to force Austria into
war, but to bring on war against France and Russia
at a moment when German Diplomacy held those
countries to be unprepared.
June 28. — The Archduke Francis Ferdinand
was assassinated at Serajevo. July 20, the
crisis begins, Sir Edward Grey informing Sir E.
Goschen, at Berlin, that the position was ** very
uncomfortable. ' '
July 22. — Sir E. Goschen wires from Berlin
that the German Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs had just " insisted " that the question
at issue was one for " settlement between Serbia
12
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 13
and Austria alone " ; moreover, he had repeatedly
told the Serbian Minister that " Austro-Servian
relations should be put on a proper footing."
July 23. — Sir E. Grey is alarmed. He informs
Sir M. de Bunsen, at Vienna, that he (Grey)
had expressed great regret to the Austrian Am-
bassador in London that Austria should have
imposed a time limit to the communication ad-
dressed to Serbia, amounting thereby to an ulti-
matum. The Austrian Ambassador replied that
it was " absolutely necessary for Austria to pro-
tect herself." On Sir E. Grey pointing out the
possible consequences of offensive action on the
part of Austria, the Austrian Ambassador replied
that it would " all depend upon Russia."
July 24. — The Austrian Note to Serbia is
published. It is an ultimatum. The Powers
only know of it twelve hours after its delivery.
Sir E. Grey immediately wires to Vienna, saying
he had informed the Austrain Ambassador in
London, he (Grey) had never seen one State address
to an independent State a document so formidable ;
that England was concerned simply and solely
from the point of view of general peace.
The first note of alarm comes from Sir G.
Buchanan, in St. Petersburg. He wires Sir Ed-
ward Grey he has just seen M. Sazonoff (Minister
for Foreign Affairs), who said that Austria's
conduct was " both provocative and immoral " ;
that she " would never have taken such action unless
Germany had first been consulted ; some of the
Austrian demands were obviously unacceptable."
Sir G. Buchanan goes on to say that the French
Ambassador there pressed him for a declaration
14 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
of English solidarity with France who, in any case,
would unreservedly support Russia.
So that on July 24, France announced her
intention to fight on the side of Russia.
This telegram is highly important. It shows
that on July 24, both France and Russia antici-
pated war, and that Germany knew it, and that
Sir E. Grey was already being pressed for a
declaration of England's attitude.
July 24. — Mr. Crackanthorpe, from Belgrade,
wires that Serbia regards Austrian demands as
" unacceptable."
At this juncture the German Ambassador in
London communicates a Note to Sir E. Grey,
setting out that Austria's attitude is entirely
justified, can only be regarded as " equitable and
moderate," and that the German Government
regards the matter as one to be settled " exclu-
sively " between the contending parties.
Sir E. Grey telegraphs Sir F. Bertie in Paris,
suggesting that Germany, France, Italy and
England should act together as mediators simul-
taneously at Vienna and St. Petersburg ; the
important thing was to gain time in Vienna.
July 25. — The Russian Ambassador informs
Sir E. Grey that Russia deems it of the highest
importance to procure extension of the time limit.
Sir E. Grey wires to Paris and Vienna that the
Austrian Ambassador in London had just ex-
plained that the step taken at Belgrade was a
demarche, not an ultimatum ; but Sir F. Bertie
wires back to say that the French Government
had " not received " that explanation.
Sir G. Buchanan wires from St. Petersburg
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 15
(July 25) that, owing to the time limit, it was
impossible to act on Sir E. Grey's suggestion ;
that Russia was willing to leave the settlement
of the dispute to the non-interested Powers, but
that Russia regarded Austria's action as "in
reality, directed against Russia," " Austria aiming
at the overthrow of the present status quo in the
Balkans," to which M. Sazonoff adds that " Ger-
many was convinced that she should count on Eng-
land's neutrality."
July 25. — Sir H. Rumbold wires from Berlin
to Sir E. Grey that the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs * was away, thereby causing
serious delay ; but that Austria professed to be
optimistic regarding Russia's action.
Serious news comes from Vienna (July 25)
about warlike attitude of the Austrians. Mr.
Crackanthorpe wires that Serbia considers that,
unless Austria wants war, she must be content
with the full satisfaction offered in the Serbian
reply. Immediately after, Mr. Crackanthorpe
wires that the Austrian Minister had left Bel-
grade.
Sir E. Grey now realizes the grave danger to
Europe involved by what he himself calls the
" sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of
the Austrian demarche" He informs the German
Ambassador in London that the co-operation of
Germany is essential to any diplomatic mediation.
At the same time, both the French and Russian
* To be noted here is that the two indispensable forces for
peace, the German Emperor and the Austrian Foreign Minister,
were away, and so unapproachable the day of the expiry of
Austria's ultimatum to Serbia.
16 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Governments do their utmost to induce Austria
to extend the time limit.
In vain. Sir E. Grey receives a wire from
Vienna to the effect that the German Ambassador
there is " confident that Russia will keep quiet
during chastisement of Servia " ; that " France
also is not at all in a condition for war."
July 26. — Sir E. Grey proposes Conference.
France accepts (July 27). Italy and Russia
accept unreservedly. Germany refuses point-
blank. The Kaiser returns from the North.
July 27. — Sir E. Goschen wires that Secretary
of State says proposed Conference " would prac-
tically amount to a Court of Arbitration," and
Germany could not, therefore, co-operate ; he
thought personal conversations the better plan.
To be noted is that the Kaiser was in Berlin when
this attitude was decided on.
Sir E. Grey wires (July 27) that the German
Ambassador in London declares that Germany
is " ready to accept " mediation in principle ;
but from Berlin, Sir E. Goschen wires back that
this is not the case. Sir E. Grey, in conversation
with Count Mensdorff in London, says openly
that Austrian action looks as if war was intended ;
informs him that " the English Fleet, in the cir-
cumstances, cannot be disbanded " ; that it was
very disappointing to find Austria so hard towards
Serbia, who had agreed to humiliate herself more
than any independent country ever had done.
July 28. — Austria declares war on Serbia.
The same day a telegraphic Note is communi-
cated to our Foreign Office, stating that M. SazonoS
is convinced that "Germany is, if anything, in
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 17
favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted
by Austria ; that the Berlin Cabinet appears to be
doing nothing ; that the key to the situation is
to be found at Berlin."
July 28. — A wire from Vienna stating that
Austria " declines any suggestion on negotiations"
Sir E. Grey continues wiring to British Am-
bassador to the effect that the German Ambassador
in London protests that Germany is ready to
accept the joint mediation of Powers, though
Austria had already declared war and officially
refused all intervention.
This should be carefully noted. Up to this
point, the German Ambassador in London kept
on assuring Sir E. Grey of German willingness
to secure peace, in spite of our Ambassadorial
contradictions from Vienna, St. Petersburg, and
Berlin to Sir E. Grey, that the Berlin Government
regarded intervention as impossible.
July 28. — Sir E. Goschen informs Sir E. Grey
that the Austrian Ambassador told him that
" Russia neither wanted, nor was in a position
to make, war."
July 29. — Sir E. Goschen wires that the German
Chancellor had informed him it was "too late
to act upon (English) suggestion " of mediation.
In a further wire, Sir E. Goschen reports that
the German Secretary of State was much con-
cerned about Russian mobilization. He *' denied
that the German Government had recalled officers
on leave " — Sir E. Goschen adds to this, " as a
matter of fact, it is true."
To this telegram Sir E. Grey wires polite thanks
to the German Chancellor (July 29). Sir G.
18 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Buchanan wires from St. Petersburg, announcing
" Partial mobilization." Sir R. Rodd informs
Sir E. Grey from Rome that there appears to be
general difficulty in " making Germany believe
that Russia is hi earnest." Mr. Beaumont, from
Constantinople, informs Sir E. Grey that "Austrian
designs may extend considerably beyond the
Sanjak and a punitive occupation of Serbian
territory."
Even then, Sir E. Grey bravely persists. He
again (July 29) wires to Sir E. Goschen in Berlin
that the German Ambassador in London assures
him he (the Ambassador) has been instructed
from Berlin to mediate. Sir E. Grey adds : " I
told him that mediation was ready to come into
operation by any method that Germany thought
possible, if only Germany would ' press the button '
in the interests of peace."
Now there comes the first German bid for English
neutrality. Sir E. Goschen wires that the German
Chancellor declares that Germany " aimed at no
territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,
but that he could give no such assurance regarding
the French Colonies. If Holland remained neutral,
her neutrality would be respected. He had in mind
a " general neutrality agreement between England
and Germany."
July 29. — Sir E. Grey wires Sir F. Bertie
that he told the German Ambassador in London
not to be " misled into thinking that England
would stand aside if all the efforts made in the
cause of peace failed." Over Morocco, the case
was different : it was not an English interest. A
war between Austria and Russia, likewise, was a
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 19
Slav and Teuton question ; but with France it
was otherwise. England would then have to
consider the position, would have to decide what
*' British interests required her to do." He (Grey)
told Prince Lichnowsky " not to count on England
standing aside," intimating that, though this did
not imply inevitable military action on the part
of England, it left the matter open the moment
the question became one involving the hegemony
of Europe.
July 29. — Sir E. Grey next wires to Sir E.
Goschen in Berlin. He tells him he had informed
the German Ambassador of England's position,
saying he did not wish to be open to any reproach
that the " friendly tone of all our conversations
had misled the German Government into supposing
that we should not take action"
These two communications of Sir E. Grey are
of the highest importance. They show clearly
that on July 29 the German Government knew
of Sir E. Grey's official intimation that England
could not remain indifferent if France was drawn
in. None the less, Germany still maintained that
Austria could not accept mediation. The German
Ambassador at Vienna, well known for his anti-
Russian and anti-Servian feeling, was obviously,
as Sir M. de Bunsen pointed out to Sir E. Grey
(July 30), hardly the man to undertake peaceful
overtures. It was he who had telegraphed the
text of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia to the
German Emperor, before it was dispatched, thus
affording proof that the Emperor was perfectly
cognisant of what was taking place.
July 30. — Russia learns that Germany is
20 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
mobilizing, is making naval preparations in the
direction even of the Gulf of Finland. M. Sazonoff,
in desperation, draws up a formula as last hope,
to the effect that " Russia will stop all military
preparations if Austria declares her readiness to
eliminate points which violate principle of Sover-
eignty of Servia."
Sir F. Bertie wires (July 30) asking for intention
of England, France growing extremely anxious.
July 80. — Sir E. Grey wires Sir E. Goschen
regarding the German " bid for neutrality." This
telegram is so important that it is given here in
full:
No. 101
SIR EDWARD GREY to SIB E. GOSCHEN
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, July 30, 1914
" YOUR telegram of 29th July.
His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment
entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they
should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.
What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand
by while French colonies are taken and France is
beaten so long as Germany does not take French
territory as distinct from the colonies.
From the material point of view such a proposal
is unacceptable, for France, without further
territory in Europe being taken from her, could
be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great
Power, and become subordinate to German policy.
Altogether apart from that it would be a dis-
grace for us to make this bargain with Germany
at the expense of France, a disgrace from which
the good name of this country would never recover.
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 21
The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain
away whatever obligation or interest we have
as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could
not entertain that bargain either.
Having said so much, it is unnecessary to
examine whether the prospect of a future general
neutrality agreement between England and Ger-
many offered positive advantages sufficient to
compensate us for tying our hands now. We must
preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances
may seem to us to require in any such unfavour-
able and regrettable development of the present
crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.
You should speak to the Chancellor in the above
sense, and add most earnestly that the one way
of maintaining the good relations between England
and Germany is that they should continue to
work together to preserve the peace of Europe ;
if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations
of Germany and England will, I believe, be ipso
facto improved and strengthened. For that object
his Majesty's Government will work in that way
with all sincerity and good-will.
And I will say this : If the peace of Europe can
be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed,
my own endeavour will be to promote some arrange-
ment to which Germany could be a party, by which
she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile
policy would be pursued against her or her allies
by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or
separately. I have desired this and worked for
it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis,
and, Germany having a corresponding object,
our relations sensibly improved. The idea has
22 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of
definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so
much more acute than any that Europe has
gone through for generations, be safely passed,
I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which
follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the Powers than has been
possible hitherto."
Here we have English statesmanship at its
best. That message will secure Sir E. Grey a
lasting place among English statesmen. It shows
Sir E. Grey working unceasingly at the eleventh
hour for peace, but quite firm and frank on the
question of the national honour.
In the meanwhile, the crisis pivots on the attitude
of England in view of the German mobilization
against France.
July 31. — Sir E. Grey is informed by the French
Minister for Foreign Affairs that all French
advance-posts are withdrawn to a distance of
ten kilometres from the frontier, so as to avoid
any possibility of French aggression. The Note
ends by saying : " As you see, Germany has done
it," and the Minister adds that the German pre-
paration began the day the Austrian Note was
handed in.
On the evening of July 30, the German Chan-
cellor, who up till that moment had not found time
to reply to Sir E. Grey's supreme effort to obtain
the mediatory influence of the Four Powers, in-
forms Sir E. Goschen that he was " pressing the
button " at Vienna (as Sir E. Grey suggested),
but that, as the results of his efforts, " matters
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 23
had been precipitated rather than otherwise."
The Serbian efforts were " seriously handicapped "
by the Russian mobilization.
As a fact, the Tsar had wired to the German
Emperor at the time, craving his mediation.
July 31. — Sir E. Grey wires to Sir E. Goschen
that England would support any reasonable pro-
posal put forward by Germany : but that he (Grey)
had " told the German Ambassador that if France
became involved, we should be drawn in"
To this clear statement, on Sir E. Grey's part,
of the English attitude Germany replies, through
Sir E. Goschen (July 31st), that " Kriegsgefahr "
will be proclaimed at once.
From St. Petersburg comes a telegram announc-
ing Russian general mobilization.
Now begins the question of Belgian neutrality.
Sir E. Grey telegraphs to Paris and Berlin, asking
for specific engagements respecting the neutrality
of Belgium (July 31).
Sir E. Grey telegraphs to Brussels that "I as-
sume that the Belgian Government will maintain,
to the utmost of her power, her neutrality."
To these inquiries of England, France replies
at once, agreeing to Belgian neutrality. Belgium
undertakes to uphold it. The answer of Germany
is evasive.
Sir E. Goschen wires that the German Secretary
of State says he must " consult the Emperor and
the Chancellor before he could possibly answer "
(July 31).
The delay caused by Germany's evasive answer
gave the Germans a good couple of days' advantage.
Sir E. Grey wires to Berlin again.
24 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Here is the telegram :
No. 123
SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR E. GOSCHEN
FOREIGN OFFICE, August 1, 1914
" SIR,
I told the German Ambassador to-day that the
reply of the German Government with regard
to the neutrality of Belgium was a matter of very
great regret, because the neutrality of Belgium
affected feeling in this country. If Germany
could see her way to give the same assurance as
that which had been given by France it would
materially contribute to relieve anxiety and tension
here. On the other hand, if there were a violation
of the neutrality of Belgium by one combatant
while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.
I said that we have been discussing this question
at a Cabinet meeting, and as I was authorized to
tell him this I gave him a memorandum of it.
He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise
not to violate Belgian neutrality, we would engage
to remain neutral.
I replied that I could not say that ; our hands
were still free, and we were considering what our
attitude should be. All I could say was that our
attitude would be determined largely by public
opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium
would appeal very strongly to public opinion here.
I did not think that we would give a promise of
neutrality on that condition alone.
The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I
could not formulate conditions on which we would re-
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 25
main neutral. He even suggested that the integrity
of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.
I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely
any promise to remain neutral on similar terms,
and I could only say that we must keep our
hands free."
The news of the German ultimatum to Russia
and France is reported to Sir E. Grey from Paris
and St. Petersburg ; but still no reply comes from
Berlin regarding Belgian neutrality (August 1).
August 2. — The Luxemburg Minister of State
telegraphs that the Germans have violated the
neutrality of Luxemburg.
August 1. — Sir E. Grey wires Sir E. Goschen to
ascertain the ground for the detention of British
ships at Hamburg.
August 1. — News comes that Austria is pre-
pared to " discuss the substance of the ultimatum
to Servia."
This readiness on the part of Austria (it should
be noted) came after the expiry of the German
ultimatum to France and Russia, after the viola-
tion of the neutrality of Luxemburg before the
order of mobilization, after Austria had consis-
tently refused all possibility of mediation, in short,
when Germany was completely mobilised.
Germany throws it down, as the following com-
munication from Berlin shows :
SIR E. GOSCHEN to SIR E. GREY
(Telegraphic.) BERLIN, August 1, 1914
" YOUR telegram of to-day.
I have communicated the substance of the above
26 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
telegram to the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and spent a long time arguing with him
that the chief dispute was between Austria and
Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as
Austria's ally. If therefore Austria and Russia
were, as was evident, ready to discuss matters
and Germany did not desire war on her own ac-
count, it seemed to me only logical that Germany
should hold her hand and continue to work for
a peaceful settlement. Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs said that Austria's readiness to
discuss was the result of German influence at
Vienna, and, had not Russia mobilized against
Germany, all would have been well. But Russia
by abstaining from answering Germany's demand
that she should demobilize, had caused Germany
to mobilize also. Russia had said that her mobi-
lization did not necessarily imply war, and that
she could perfectly well remain mobilized for
months without making war. This was not the
case with Germany. She had the speed and Russia
had the numbers, and the safety of the German
Empire forbade that Germany should allow Russia
time to bring up masses of troops from all parts
of her wide dominions. The situation now was
that, though the Imperial Government had allowed
her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia
had sent no answer. Germany had therefore
ordered mobilization, and the German representa-
tive at St. Petersburg had been instructed within
a certain time to inform the Russian Govern-
ment that the Imperial Government must regard
their refusal to answer as creating a state of
war."
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 27
The following telegram regarding the Russian
position is instructive :
No. 139
SIR G. BUCHANAN to SIR EDWARD GREY. — (Received
August 2.)
(Telegraphic.) ST. PETERSBURG, August 1, 1914
" MY telegram of 31st July.
The Emperor of Russia read his telegram to the
German Emperor to the German Ambassador at
the audience given to his Excellency yesterday.
No progress whatever was made.
In the evening M. Sazonoff had an interview with
the Austrian Ambassador, who, not being definitely
instructed by his Government, did his best to
deflect the conversation towards a general discus-
sion of the relations between Austria-Hungary
and Russia instead of keeping to the question of
Servia. In reply the Minister for Foreign Affairs
expressed his desire that these relations should
remain friendly, and said that, taken in general,
they were perfectly satisfactory ; but the real
question which they had to solve at this moment
was whether Austria was to crush Servia and to
reduce her to the status of a vassal, or whether
she was to leave Servia a free and independent
State. In these circumstances, while the Servian
question was unsolved, the abstract discussion of
the relations between Austria-Hungary and Russia
was a waste of time. The only place where a
successful discussion of this question could be
expected was London, and any such discussion
was being made impossible by the action of Austria-
28 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Hungary in subjecting Belgrade, a virtually un-
fortified town, to bombardment.
M. Sazonoff informed the French Ambassador
and myself this morning of his conversation with
the Austrian Ambassador. He went on to say
that during the Balkan crisis he had made it clear
to the Austrian Government that war with Russia
must inevitably follow an Austrian attack on
Servia. It was clear that Austrian domination
of Servia was as intolerable for Russia as the de-
pendence of the Netherlands on Germany would
be to Great Britain. It was, in fact, for Russia
a question of life and death. The policy of Austria
had throughout been both tortuous and immoral,
and she thought that she could treat Russia with
defiance, secure in the support of her German
ally. Similarly the policy of Germany had been
an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it
mattered little whether the German Government
knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian
ultimatum ; what mattered was that her inter-
vention with the Austrian Government had been
postponed until the moment had passed when its
influence would have been felt. Germany was
unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and
St. Petersburg : the former was a violent Russo-
phobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had
reported to his Government that Russia would
never go to war. M. Sazonoff was completely
weary of the ceaseless endeavours he had made
to avoid a war. No suggestion held out to him
had been refused. He had accepted the proposal
for a conference of four, for mediation by Great
Britain and Italy, for direct conversation between
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 29
Austria and Russia ; but Germany and Austria-
Hungary had either rendered these attempts for
peace ineffective by evasive replies or had refused
them altogether. The action of the Austro-
Hungarian Government and the German pre-
parations had forced the Russian Government
to order mobilization, and the mobilization of
Germany had created a desperate situation."
August 2. — Sir E. Grey assures M. Cambon of
British help.
No. 148
SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR F. BERTIE
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 2, 1914
" AFTER the Cabinet this morning I gave M.
Cambon the following memorandum :
' I am authorized to give an assurance that, if
the German fleet comes into the Channel or through
the North Sea to undertake hostile operations
against French coasts or shipping, the British
fleet will give all the protection in its power.
' This assurance is of course subject to the
policy of his Majesty's Government receiving the
support of Parliament, and must not be taken as
binding his Majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by
the German fleet takes place.'
I pointed out that we had very large questions
and most difficult issues to consider, and that
Government felt that they could not bind them-
selves to declare war upon Germany necessarily
if war broke out between France and Germany
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French
30 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
Government, whose fleet had long been concentrated
in the Mediterranean, to know how to make their
dispositions with their north coast entirely unde-
fended. We therefore thought it necessary to
give them this assurance. It did not bind us to
go to war with Germany unless the German fleet
took the action indicated, but it did give a
security to France that would enable her to
settle the disposition of her own Mediterranean
fleet.
M. Cambon asked me about the violation of
Luxemburg. I told him the doctrine on that
point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon
in 1867. He asked me what we should say about
the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I
said that was a much more important matter ;
we were considering what statement we should
make in Parliament to-morrow — in effect, whether
we should declare violation of Belgian neutrality
to be a casus belli. I told him what had been
said to the German Ambassador on this point."
August 4. — The King of the Belgians makes his
dramatic appeal to King George.
August 4. — Sir F. Villiers informs Sir E. Grey
that Germany announces her intention to carry
out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable, to which Sir E. Grey
returns this clear and courageous answer :
SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR F. VILLIERS
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914
" You should inform Belgian Government that
if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 31
them to depart from neutrality, his Majesty's
Government expect that they will resist by any
means in their power, and that his Majesty's
Government will support them in offering such
resistance, and that his Majesty's Government
in this event are prepared to join Russia and
France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian
Government at once common action for the purpose
of resisting use of force by Germany against them,
and a guarantee to maintain their independence
and integrity in future years."
August 4. — The German Embassy makes an
attempt to " dispel distrust," but Sir E. Grey has
taken his stand, and vindicates the national honour
in the following telegram to Berlin :
SIR EDWARD GREY to SIR E. GOSCHEN
(Telegraphic.) FOREIGN OFFICE, August 4, 1914
" WE hear that Germany has addressed Note to
Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that
German Government will be compelled to carry
out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable.
We are also informed that Belgian territory has
been violated at Gemmenich.
In these circumstances, and in view of the fact
that Germany declined to give the same assurance
respecting Belgium as France gave last week in
reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin
and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask
that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram
of this morning be received hereby 12 o'clock
to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for
32 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
your passports, and to say that his Majesty's
Government feel bound to take steps in their
power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as
much a party as ourselves."
Out of this correspondence the attitude of Ger-
many stands as clear as the attitude taken up by
Sir E. Grey. We find from the outset that Austria
refuses all mediation, affecting diplomatic op-
timism ; and that Germany firmly upholds the
Austrian attitude.
It is clear that Germany believed in the un-
readiness of Russia to fight ; in the weakness of
France ; in the neutrality of England.
Not until the expiry of the German ultimatums
to France and Russia does Austria consent even
to discuss her attitude towards Serbia ; and when
at last she does seem to show some readiness to
help ward off a European conflagration, it is Ger-
many who absolutely declines on the ground that,
Russia having mobilized, she (Germany) could not
give Russia time to concentrate on the German
frontier.
On the French and Russian — particularly on
the Russian — sides, these dispatches reveal a quite
remarkable honesty of intention ; and the last
throw of M. Sazonoff, offering to disarm, if only
Germany would put forward some formula for
mediation, proves that Russia was sincerely anxious
for peace.*
* As the German Embassy in America are endeavouring to
show that Sir E. Grey took the opportunity to attack Germany,
it is to be hoped that all English-speaking peoples will carefully
read this White Paper, which is the documentary evidence that
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 33
The part played by Sir E. Grey all through is
probably the most peaceful, if not Quixotic, effort
ever made by a statesman in history.
It is clear that the German Ambassador in
London, wittingly or unwittingly, consistently led
Sir E. Grey to believe that Germany was " press-
ing the button " at Vienna, and that Sir E. Grey
was apparently inclined to trust him, whereas she
was, in reality, doing precisely the contrary, her
own Ambassador at Vienna being a notorious anti-
Russian fire-eater, and Germany arming at full
speed all the time.
Sir E. Grey went to the extreme limits of even
national safety. At the same time, he was splen-
didly firm and frank on the question of Belgian
neutrality.
It was he who first sent out messages demanding
declarations of Belgian neutrality, and at the same
time informing Germany that England would
uphold the neutrality of Belgium. And when
Germany violated it, Sir E. Grey's answer was
war.
On the German side, then, we find that she was
mobilizing before she sent her ultimatums to
France and Russia ; that she violated the neutrality
of Luxemburg before the declaration of war ;
that she violated international law by seizing
English ships and cargoes, while professing good
Sir E. Grey actually refused, even to the French ambassador,
to guarantee English help in the event of war, though the dis-
positions of the French and English fleets strategically provided
for English military co-operation, and only declared war after
German soldiers had invaded Belgium. Diplomatically, we
went to war over Belgium — not as the ally of France. Had
Grey been firmer earlier, war might have been prevented.
c
34 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
friendship in London for England ; that, diplo-
matically and militarily, she was preparing a
gigantic coup de main, while gaining time by diplo-
matic subterfuge, evasion, procrastination and
perfidy, believing that England would never
fight, and that Russia would probably back
out of it.
The dispatches of our respective Ambassadors
at Paris, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna,
and Belgrade show that none of them were, in
the least, duped by Germany's attitude ; that
one and all gave Sir E. Grey the clearest warning
of the German aim, and that they all contra-
dicted the friendly protestations carried on by
the German Ambassador to Sir E. Grey at
London.
In addition to the Ambassadors, the follow-
ing Sovereigns interceded on behalf of peace :
King George, the King of the Belgians, and
the Tsar. The notable omission is that of the
Kaiser.
Not a word from him. After his return on July
26, the German attitude became more rigid and
evasive, and the most talkative man in Europe
became the most silent.
The significance of this omission is all-important.
His silence means that he fully approved the
German attitude, and, as the German army cannot
mobilize without his permission, that he sanctioned
its mobilization, also the violation of treaties
and neutral territories which ensued before the
declaration of war.
These documents are the indisputable proof of
the Kaiser's complicity and duplicity. At any
DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE 35
moment he could have stopped war. As these
dispatches show, the question under contention
ceased to be the Serbian murders — nor must it
be forgotten that one of the assassins, Milan
Ziganovitch, was a subject of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy. The question was Euro-
pean peace, as Sir E. Grey repeatedly insisted
upon. Yet the German Emperor maintained
silence.
After his return to Berlin (July 26), the semi-
official German Press broke out in violent abuse
of Russia, and things drifted deliberately into war,
though the only thing needed to stave off the
conflagration was a diplomatic formula for dis-
cussion, Russia offering immediately to disarm
if only Germany would put one forward. Without
doubt, had Russia and France not taken military
precautions after July 29, Germany would have
caught them both unready. Without doubt the
Emperor had from the outset decided to support
(to insist on) Austria's unparalleled ultimatum to
Serbia at the risk of European war. Finally, there
is the fact that not until a week after actual
hostilities did England or Russia declare war on
Austria — whose actions formed the casus belli —
and that the Austrian Ambassador only left London
the tenth day after Germany had refused to
demobilize ; thus giving irrefragable proof that
even then, after Germany had entered Belgium,
that the Powers were willing to come to an agree-
ment with Austria whose right to inflict Serbia had
been from the outset admitted even at Petrograd.
The truth is that (1) mobilization ; (2) the ulti-
matum to the Powers ; (3) war — all three acts of
36 DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE
hostility, were committed by Germany, who, except
as the ally of Austria, had no grievance at all,
and that Austria was still at peace with the Powers
for a week after Germany's invasion of neutral
Belgium.
AUSTIN HARRISON
DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AM-
BASSADOR AT BERLIN RESPECT-
ING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
GERMAN GOVERNMENT
SIR E. GOSCHEN to SIR EDWARD GREY
SIR, LONDON, August 8, 1914
In accordance with the instructions contained
in your telegram of the 4th instant I called upon
the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired,
in the name of his Majesty's Government, whether
the Imperial Government would refrain from
violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow
at once replied that he was sorry to say that his
answer must be " No," as, in consequence of the
German troops having crossed the frontier that
morning, Belgian neutrality had been already
violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the
reasons why the Imperial Government had been
obliged to take this step, namely, that they had
to advance into France by the quickest and
easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead
with their operations and endeavour to strike
some decisive blow as early as possible. It was
a matter of life and death for them, as if they
had gone by the more southern route they could
37
38 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads
and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition, entailing
great loss of time. This loss of time would have
meant time gained by the Russians for bringing
up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity
of action was the great German asset, while that
of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops.
I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this fait
accompli of the violation of the Belgian frontier
rendered, as he would readily understand, the
situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him
whether there was not still time to draw back and
avoid possible consequences, which both he and
I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons
he had given me, it was now impossible for them
to draw back.
During the afternoon I received your further
telegram of the same date, and, in compliance with
the instructions therein contained, I again pro-
ceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed
the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial
Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock
that night that they would proceed no further
with their violation of the Belgian frontier and
stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand
my passports and inform the Imperial Govern-
ment that his Majesty's Government would have
to take all steps in their power to uphold the
neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a
treaty to which Germany was as much a party as
themselves.
Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret
he could give no other answer than that which
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT 39
he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that
the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely
necessary that the Imperial troops should advance
through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written
summary of your telegram and, pointing out that
you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when
his Majesty's Government would expect an answer,
asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it
were not possible even at the last moment that
their answer should be reconsidered. He replied
that if the time given were even twenty-four hours
or more, his answer must be the same. I said that
in that case I should have to demand my pass-
ports. This interview took place at about 7
o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued
Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret
at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of
the Chancellor, which had been to make friends
with Great Britain and then, through Great Britain,
to get closer to France. I said that this sudden
end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter
of deep regret and disappointment, but that he
must understand that under the circumstances
and in view of our engagements, his Majesty's
Government could not possibly have acted other-
wise than they had done.
I then said that I should like to go and see the
Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time
I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He
begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very
agitated. His Excellency at once began a har-
angue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He
said that the step taken by his Majesty's Govern-
40 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
ment was terrible to a degree ; just for a word —
" neutrality," a word which in war time had also
often been disregarded — just for a scrap of paper
Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred
nation who desired nothing better than to be
friends with her. All his efforts in that direction
had been rendered useless by this last terrible step,
and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted
himself since his accession to office had tumbled
down like a house of cards. What we had done
was unthinkable ; it was like striking a man from
behind while he was fighting for his life against
two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible
for all the terrible events that might happen. I
protested strongly against that statement, and
said that, in the same way as he and Herr von
Jagow wished me to understand that for strate-
gical reasons it was a matter of life and death to
Germany to advance through Belgium and violate
the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to
understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of
" life and death " for the honour of Great Britain
that she should keep her solemn engagement to
do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if
attacked. That solemn compact simply had to
be kept, or what confidence could any one have
in engagements given by Great Britain in the
future ? The Chancellor said, " But at what price
will that compact have been kept. Has the British
Government thought of that ? " I hinted to his
Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of conse-
quences could hardly be regarded as an excuse
for breaking solemn engagements, but his Ex-
cellency was so excited, so evidently overcome
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT 41
by the news of our action, and so little disposed
to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel
to the flame by further argument. As I was
leaving he said that the blow of Great Britain
joining Germany's enemies was all the greater
that almost up to the last moment he and his
Government had been working with us and sup-
porting our efforts to maintain peace between
Austria and Russia. I said that this was part of
the tragedy which saw the two nations fall apart
just at the moment when the relations between
them had been more friendly and cordial than
they had been for years. Unfortunately, not-
withstanding our efforts to maintain peace between
Russia and Austria, the war had spread and had
brought us face to face with a situation which, if
we held to our engagements, we could not possibly
avoid, and which unfortunately entailed our separa-
tion from our late fellow- workers. He would
readily understand that no one regretted this
more than I.
After this somewhat painful interview I returned
to the embassy and drew up a telegraphic report
of what had passed. This telegram was handed
in at the Central Telegraph Office a little before
9 P.M. It was accepted by that office, but ap-
parently never dispatched.*
At about 9.30 P.M. Herr von Zimmermann,
the Under-Secretary of State, came to see me.
After expressing his deep regret that the very
friendly official and personal relations between
us were about to cease, he asked me casually
whether a demand for passports was equivalent to
* This telegram never reached the Foreign Office.
42 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
a declaration of war. I said that such an auth-
ority on international law as he was known to
be must know as well or better than I what was
usual in such cases. I added that there were
many cases where diplomatic relations had been
broken off and, nevertheless, war had not ensued ;
but that in this case he would have seen from my
instructions, of which I had given Herr von Jagow
a written summary, that his Majesty's Govern-
ment expected an answer to a definite question
by 12 o'clock that night and that in default of a
satisfactory answer they would be forced to take
such steps as their engagements required. Herr
Zimmermann said that that was, in fact, a declara-
tion of war, as the Imperial Government could
not possibly give the assurance required either
that night or any other night.
In the meantime, after Herr Zimmermann left
me, a flying sheet, issued by the Berliner Tage-
blatt, was circulated stating that Great Britain
had declared war against Germany. The immediate
result of this news was the assemblage of an ex-
ceedingly excited and unruly mob before his
Majesty's Embassy. The small force of police
which had been sent to guard the embassy was
soon overpowered, and the attitude of the mob
became more threatening. We took no notice
of this demonstration as long as it was confined
to noise, but when the crash of glass and the land-
ing of cobble stones into the drawing-room, where
we were all sitting, warned us that the situation
was getting unpleasant, I telephoned to the Foreign
Office an account of what was happening. Herr
von Jagow at once informed the Chief of Police,
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT 43
and an adequate force of mounted police, sent
with great promptness, very soon cleared the street.
From that moment on we were well guarded,
and no more direct unpleasantness occurred.
After order had been restored Herr von Jagow
came to see me and expressed his most heartfelt
regrets at what had occurred. He said that the
behaviour of his countrymen had made him feel
more ashamed than he had words to express. It
was an indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin.
He said that the flying sheet circulated in the streets
had not been authorized by the Government ; hi
fact, the Chancellor had asked him by telephone
whether he thought that such a statement should
be issued, and he had replied, "Certainly not,
until the morning." It was in consequence of his
decision to that effect that only a small force of
police had been sent to the neighbourhood of the
embassy, as he had thought that the presence of
a large force would inevitably attract attention
and perhaps lead to disturbances. It was the
" pestilential Tageblatt," which had somehow got
hold of the news, that had upset his calculations.
He had heard rumours that the mob had been
excited to violence by gestures made and missiles
thrown from the embassy, but he felt sure that
that was not true (I was able soon to assure him
that the report had no foundation whatever),
and even if it was, it was no excuse for the dis-
graceful scenes which had taken place. He feared
that I would take home with me a sorry impression
of Berlin manners in moments of excitement.
In fact, no apology could have been more full and
complete.
44 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
On the following morning, August 5, the
Emperor sent one of his Majesty's aides-de-camp
to me with the following message :
"The Emperor has charged me to express to
your Excellency his regret for the occur-
rences of last night, but to tell you at the
same time that you will gather from those
occurrences an idea of the feelings of, his
people respecting the action of Great Britain
in joining with other nations against her
old allies of Waterloo. His Majesty also
begs that you will tell the King that he has
been proud of the titles of British Field-
Marshal and British Admiral, but that in
consequence of what has occurred he must
now at once divest himself of those titles."
I would add that the above message lost none
of its acerbity by the manner of its delivery.
On the other hand, I should like to state that I
received all through this trying time nothing but
courtesy at the hands of Herr von Jagow and the
officials of the Imperial Foreign Office. At about
11 o'clock on the same morning Count Wedel
handed me my passports — which I had earlier
in the day demanded hi writing — and told me that
he had been instructed to confer with me as to
the route which I should follow for my return to
England. He said that he had understood that I
preferred the route via the Hook of Holland to
that via Copenhagen ; they had therefore arranged
that I should go by the former route, only I should
have to wait till the following morning. I agreed
to this, and he said that I might be quite assured
THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT 45
that there would be no repetition of the disgraceful
scenes of the preceding night as full precautions
would be taken. He added that they were doing
all in their power to have a restaurant car attached
to the train, but it was rather a difficult matter.
He also brought me a charming letter from Herr
von Jagow couched in the most friendly terms.
The day was passed in packing up such articles
as time allowed.
The night passed quietly without any incident.
In the morning a strong force of police was posted
along the usual route to the Lehrter station, while
the embassy was smuggled away in taxi-cabs to
the station by side streets. We there suffered no
molestation whatever, and avoided the treatment
meted out by the crowd to my Russian and French
colleagues. Count Wedel met us at the station
to say good-bye on behalf of Herr von Jagow and
to see that all the arrangements ordered for our
comfort had been properly carried out. A retired
colonel of the Guards accompanied the train to
the Dutch frontier, and was exceedingly kind in
his efforts to prevent the great crowds which
thronged the platforms at every station where
we stopped from insulting us ; but beyond the
yelling of patriotic songs and a few jeers and in-
sulting gestures we had really nothing to complain
of during our tedious journey to the Dutch frontier.
Before closing this long account of our last days
in Berlin I should like to place on record and bring
to your notice the quite admirable behaviour of
my staff under the most trying circumstances
possible. One and all, they worked night and
day with scarcely any rest, and I cannot praise
46 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE
too highly the cheerful zeal with which counsellor,
naval and military attaches, secretaries, and the
two young attaches buckled to their work and
kept their nerve with often a yelling mob outside,
and inside hundreds of British subjects clamouring
for advice and assistance. I was proud to have
such a staff to work with, and feel most grateful
to them all for the invaluable assistance and sup-
port, often exposing them to considerable personal
risk, which they so readily and cheerfully gave
to me.
I should also like to mention the great assistance
rendered to us all by my American colleague,
Mr. Gerard, and his staff. Undeterred by the
hooting and hisses with which he was often greeted
by the mob on entering and leaving the embassy,
his Excellency came repeatedly to see me to ask
how he could help us and to make arrangements
for the safety of stranded British subjects. He
extricated many of these from extremely difficult
situations at some personal risk to himself, and
his calmness and savoir-faire and his firmness in
dealing with the Imperial authorities gave full
assurance that the protection of British subjects
and interests could not have been left in more
efficient and able hands.
I have, etc.,
W. E. GOSCHEN
DISPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AM-
BASSADOR AT VIENNA RESPECT-
ING THE RUPTURE OF DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH THE
AUSTRO - HUNGARIAN GOVERN-
MENT
SIR M. DE BUNSEN to SIR EDWARD GREY
SIR, LONDON, September 1, 1914
The rapidity of the inarch of events during the
days which led up to the outbreak of the European
war made it difficult, at the time, to do more than
record their progress by telegraph. I propose now
to add a few comments.
The delivery at Belgrade on July 23 of the
Austrian Note to Serbia was preceded by a period
of absolute silence at the Ballplatz. Except Herr
von Tchirschky, who must have been aware of
the tenor, if not the actual words of the Note,
none of my colleagues were allowed to see through
the veil. On July 22 and 23, M. Dumaine, French
Ambassador, had long interviews with Baron
Macchio, one of the TJnder-Secretaries of State for
Foreign Affairs, by whom he was left under the
impression that the words of warning he had been
instructed to speak to the Austro-Hungarian
Government had not been unavailing, and that
47
48 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
the Note which was being drawn up would be
found to contain nothing with which a self-
respecting State need hesitate to comply.
At the second of these interviews he was not
even informed that the Note was at that very
moment being presented at Belgrade, or that it
would be published in Vienna on the following
morning. Count Forgach, the other Under-
secretary of State, had indeed been good enough
to confide to me on the same day the true character
of the Note, and the fact of its presentation about
the time we were speaking.
So little had the Russian Ambassador been made
aware of what was preparing that he actually left
Vienna on a fortnight's leave of absence about
July 20. He had only been absent a few days
when events compelled him to return. It might
have been supposed that Duke Avarna, Ambassador
of the allied Italian Kingdom, which was bound to
be so closely affected by fresh complications in the
Balkans, would have been taken fully into the confi-
dence of Count Berchtold during this critical time.
In point of fact his Excellency was left completely
in the dark. As for myself no indication was given
me by Count Berchtold of the impending storm,
and it was from a private source that I received,
on July 15, the forecast of what was about to
happen which I telegraphed to you the following
day. It is true that during all this time the Neue
Freie Presse and other leading Viennese newspapers
were using language which pointed unmistakably
to war with Serbia. The official Fremdenblatt,
however, was more cautious, and till the Note was
published the prevailing opinion among my
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 49
colleagues was that Austria would shrink from
courses calculated to involve her in grave European
complications.
On July 24 the Note was published in the news-
papers. By common consent it was at once styled
an ultimatum. Its integral acceptance by Serbia
was neither expected nor desired, and when on
the following afternoon it was at first rumoured
in Vienna that it had been unconditionally ac-
cepted there was a moment of keen disappointment.
The mistake was quickly corrected, and as soon
as it was known later hi the evening that the
Serbian reply had been rejected and that Baron
Giesl had broken off relations at Belgrade, Vienna
burst into a frenzy of delight, vast crowds parading
the streets and singing patriotic songs till the small
hours of the morning.
The demonstrations were perfectly orderly,
consisting for the most part of organized pro-
cessions through the principal streets ending up
at the Ministry of War. One or two attempts to
make hostile manifestations against the Russian
Embassy were frustrated by the strong guard of
police which held the approaches to the principal
embassies during those days. The demeanour of
the people at Vienna, and, as I was informed, in
many other principal cities of the monarchy,
showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war
with Serbia, and there can be ro doubt that the
small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen
by whom this momentous step was adopted gauged
rightly the sense, and it may even be said the
determination, of the people, except presumably
in portions of the provinces inhabited by the
50 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
Slav races. There had been much disappointment
in many quarters at the avoidance of war with
Serbia during the annexation crisis in 1908 and
again in connexion with the recent Balkan War.
Count Berchtold's peace policy had met with little
sympathy in the delegation.
Now the flood-gates were opened and the entire
people and Press clamoured impatiently for imme-
diate and condign punishment of the hated Servian
race. The country certainly believed that it had
before it only the alternative of subduing Servia
or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at
her hands. But a peaceful solution should first
have been attempted. Few seemed to reflect that
the forcible intervention of a Great Power in the
Balkans must inevitably call other Great Powers
into the field. So just was the cause of Austria
held to be, that it seemed to her people inconceivable
that any country should place itself in her path,
or that questions of mere policy or prestige should
be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity
which had arisen to exact summary vengeance
for the crime of Serajevo. The conviction had
been expressed to me by the German Ambassador
on July 24 that Russia would stand aside.
This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz,
influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is
deplorable that no effort should have been made to
secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the
acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole
in some peaceful compromise of the Servian
question by which Austrian fears of Servian
aggression and intrigue might have been removed
for the future. Instead of adopting this course,
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 51
the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon
war. The inevitable consequence ensued. Russia
replied to a partial Austrian mobilization and
declaration of war against Servia by a partial
Russian mobilization against Austria. Austria
met this move by completing her own mobilization,
and, Russia again responded with results which
have passed into history. The fate of the pro-
posals put forward by his Majesty's Government
for the preservation of peace is recorded in the
White Paper on the European Crisis.
On July 28, I saw Count Berchtold and urged
as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation
mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons
on the previous day should be accepted as offering
an honourable and peaceful settlement of the
question at issue. His Excellency himself read
to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added
that matters had gone too far ; Austria was that
day declaring war on Servia, and she could never
accept the conference which you had suggested
should take place between the less interested
Powers on the basis of the Servian reply. This
was a matter which must be settled directly
between the two parties immediately concerned.
I said his Majesty's Government would hear with
regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as
you feared they would lead to European com-
plications. I disclaimed any British lack of
sympathy with Austria in the matter of her
legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed
out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making
these the starting point of her policy, his Majesty's
Government were bound to look at the question
52 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
primarily from the point of view of the main-
tenance of the peace of Europe. In this way the
two countries might easily drift apart.
His Excellency said that he too was keeping the
European aspect of the question in sight. He
thought, however, that Russia would have no
right to intervene after receiving his assurance
that Austria sought no territorial aggrandizement.
His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his
conversation, that though he had been glad to
co-operate towards bringing about the settlement
which had resulted from the ambassadorial con-
ferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he
had never had much belief in the permanency of
that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly
artificial character, inasmuch as the interests
which it sought to harmonize were in themselves
profoundly divergent. His Excellency maintained
a most friendly demeanour throughout the inter-
view, but left no doubt in my mind as to the
determination of the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to proceed with the invasion of Servia.
The German Government claim to have persevered
to the end in the endeavour to support at Vienna
your successive proposals in the interest of peace.
Herr von Tchirschky abstained from inviting my
co-operation or that of the French and Russian
Ambassadors in carrying out his instructions to
that effect, and I had no means of knowing what
response he was receiving from the Austro-
Hungarian Government. I was, however, kept
fully informed by M. Schebeko, the Russian
Ambassador, of his own direct negotiations with
Count Berchtold. M. Schebeko endeavoured on
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 53
July 28 to persuade the Austro-Hungarian Govern-
ment to furnish Count Szapary with full powers
to continue at St. Petersburg the hopeful con-
versations which had there been taking place
between the latter and M. Sazonoff (the Russian
Foreign Minister). Count Berchtold refused at
the time, but two days later, though in the meantime
Russia had partially mobilized against Austria,
he received M. Schebeko again, in a perfectly
friendly manner, and gave his consent to the
continuance of the conversations at St. Petersburg.
From now onwards the tension between Russia
and Germany was much greater than between
Russia and Austria. As between the latter an ar-
rangement seemed almost in sight, and on August 1
I was informed by M. Schebeko that Count
Szapary had at last conceded the main point at
issue by announcing to M. Sazonoff that Austria
would consent to submit to mediation the points
in the Note to Servia which seemed incompatible
with the maintenance of Servian independence.
M. Sazonoff, M. Schebeko added, had accepted
this proposal on condition that Austria would
refrain from the actual invasion of Servia. Austria,
in fact, had finally yielded, and that she herself
had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is
shown by the communication made to you on
August 1 by Count Mensdorff to the effect that
Austria had neither " banged the door " on com-
promise nor cut off the conversations. M.
Schebeko to the end was working hard for peace.
He was holding the most conciliatory language
to Count Berchtold, and he informed me that the
latter as well as Count Forgach had responded in
54 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
the same spirit. Certainly it was too much for
Russia to expect that Austria would hold back
her armies, but this matter could probably have
been settled by negotiation, and M. Schebeko
repeatedly told me he was prepared to accept any
reasonable compromise.
Unfortunately these conversations at St. Peters-
burg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of
the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a
direct conflict between Germany and Russia.
Germany intervened on July 31 by means of her
double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris.
The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one
answer is possible, and Germany declared war on
Russia on August 1, and on France on August 3.
A few days' delay might in all probability have saved
Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history.
Russia still abstained from attacking Austria, and
M. Schebeko had been instructed to remain at his
post till war should actually be declared against
her by the Austro-Hungarian Government. This
only happened on August 6, when Count Berchtold
informed the foreign missions at Vienna that " the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg
had been instructed to notify the Russian Govern-
ment that, in view of the menacing attitude of
Russia in the Austro-Servian conflict and the fact
that Russia had commenced hostilities against
Germany, Austria-Hungary considered herself also
at war with Russia."
M. Schebeko left quietly in a special train
provided by the Austro-Hungarian Government
on August 7. He had urgently requested to
be conveyed to the Roumanian frontier, so that he
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 55
might be able to proceed to his own country, but
was taken instead to the Swiss frontier, and ten
days later I found him at Berne.
M. Dumaine, French Ambassador, stayed on till
August 12. On the previous day he had been
instructed to demand his passport on the ground
that Austrian troops were being employed against
France. This point was not fully cleared up
when I left Vienna. On August 9, M. Dumaine
had received from Count Berchtold the categorical
declaration that no Austrian troops were being
moved to Alsace. The next day this statement
was supplemented by a further one, in writing,
giving Count Berchtold's assurance that not only
had no Austrian troops been moved actually to
the French frontier, but that none were moving
from Austria in a westerly direction into Germany
in such a way that they might replace German
troops employed at the front. These two state-
ments were made by Count Berchtold in reply
to precise questions put to him by M. Dumaine
under instructions from his Government. The
French Ambassador's departure was not attended
by any hostile demonstration, but his Excellency
before leaving had been justly offended by a
harangue made by the Chief Burgomaster of Vienna
to the crowd assembled before the steps of the town
hall, in which he assured the people that Paris
was in the throes of a revolution, and that the
President of the Republic had been assassinated.
The British declaration of war on Germany was
made known in Vienna by special editions of the
newspapers about midday on August 5. An
abstract of your speeches in the House of Commons,
56 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
and also of the German Chancellor's speech in the
Reichstag of April 4, appeared the same day, as
well as the text of the German ultimatum to
Belgium. Otherwise few details of the great events
of these days transpired. The Neue Freie Presse
was violently insulting towards England. The
Fremdenblatt was not offensive, but little or nothing
was said in the columns of any Vienna paper
to explain that the violation of Belgian neutrality
had left his Majesty's Government no alternative
but to take part in the war.
The declaration of Italian neutrality was bitterly
felt in Vienna, but scarcely mentioned in the news-
papers.
On August 5 I had the honour to receive your
instruction of the previous day preparing me for
the immediate outbreak of war with Germany, but
adding that, Austria being understood to be not
yet at that date at war with Russia and France,
you did not desire me to ask for my passport or
to make any particular communication to the
Austro-Hungarian Government. You stated at
the same time that his Majesty's Government of
course expected Austria not to commit any act of
war against us without the notice required by
diplomatic usage.
On Thursday morning, August 13, I had the
honour to receive your telegram of the 12th, stating
that you had been compelled to inform Count
Mensdorff, at the request of the French Govern-
ment, that a complete rupture had occurred between
France and Austria, on the ground that Austria
had declared war on Russia, who was already
fighting on the side of France, and that Austria
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 57
had sent troops to the German frontier under
conditions that were a direct menace to France.
The rupture having been brought about with
France in this way, I was to ask for my passport,
and your telegram stated, in conclusion, that
you had informed Count Mensdorff that a state
of war would exist between the two countries from
midnight of August 12.
After seeing Mr. Penfield, the United States
Ambassador, who accepted immediately in the
most friendly spirit my request that his Excellency
would take charge provisionally of British interests
in Austria-Hungary during the unfortunate inter-
ruption of relations, I proceeded, with Mr. Theo
Russell, Counsellor of his Majesty's Embassy, to
the Ballplatz. Count Berchtold received me at
midday. I delivered my message, for which his
Excellency did not seem to be unprepared, although
he told me that a long telegram from Count
Mensdorff had just come in but had not yet been
brought to him. His Excellency received my
communication with the courtesy which never
leaves him. He deplored the unhappy complica-
tions which were drawing such good friends as
Austria and England into war. In point of fact,
he added, Austria did not consider herself then at
war with France, though diplomatic relations with
that country had been broken off. I explained
in a few words how circumstances had forced this
unwelcome conflict upon us. We both avoided
useless argument. Then I ventured to recommend
to his Excellency's consideration the case of the
numerous stranded British subjects at Carlsbad,
Vienna, and other places throughout the country.
58 DIPLOMATIC RUPTURE WITH
I had already had some correspondence with him
on the subject, and his Excellency took a note of
what I said, and promised to see what could be
done to get them away when the stress of mobiliza-
tion should be over. Count Berchtold agreed to
Mr. Phillpotts, till then British consul at Vienna
under Consul-General Sir Frederick Duncan, being
left by me at the Embassy in the capacity of Charge
des Archives. He presumed a similar privilege
would not be refused in England if desired on behalf
of the Austro-Hungarian Government. I took
leave of Count Berchtold with sincere regret,
having received from the day of my arrival in
Vienna, not quite nine months before, many marks
of friendship and consideration from his Excellency.
As I left I begged his Excellency to present my
profound respects to the Emperor Francis Joseph,
together with an expression of my hope that his
Majesty would pass through these sad times with
unimpaired health and strength. Count Berchtold
was pleased to say he would deliver my message.
Count Walterskirchen, of the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Office, was deputed the following morning
to bring me my passport and to acquaint me with
the arrangements made for my departure that
evening. In the course of the day Countess Berch-
told and other ladies of Vienna society called
to take leave of Lady de Dunsen at the Embassy.
We left the railway station by special train for the
Swiss frontier at 7 P.M. No disagreeable incidents
occurred. Count Walterskirchen was present at
the station on behalf of Count Berchtold. The
journey was necessarily slow, owing to the en-
cumbered state of the line. We reached Buchs,
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY 59
on the Swiss frontier, early in the morning of
August 17. At the first halting place there had
been some hooting and stone throwing on the part
of the entraining troops and station officials, but no
inconvenience was caused, and at the other large
stations on our route we found that ample measures
had been taken to preserve us from molestation
as well as to provide us with food. I was left in
no doubt that the Austro-Hungarian Government
had desired that the journey should be performed
under the most comfortable conditions possible,
and that I should receive on my departure all the
marks of consideration due to his Majesty's repre-
sentative. I was accompanied by my own family
and the entire staff of the Embassy, for whose
untiring zeal and efficient help in trying times I
desire to express my sincere thanks. The Swiss
Government also showed courtesy in providing
comfortable accommodation during our journey
from the frontier to Berne, and after three days'
stay there, on to Geneva, at which place we found
that every provision had been made by the French
Government, at the request of Sir Francis Bertie,
for our speedy conveyance to Paris. We reached
England on Saturday morning, August 22.
I have, etc.,
MAURICE DE BUNSEN
THE ALLIANCES THAT MADE
THE WAR
BY THE EDITOR OF "THE NEW YORK
EVENING POST"
IT may be doubtful who lighted the match that
has wrapped Europe in a flame of war, but there
can be no question what constituted the material
of conflagration. It was the grouping of the
great Powers. They were as a series of powder
magazines so connected that when one was ex-
ploded the others blew up. Fire started in the
Triple Alliance set the Dual Alliance ablaze ; and
the Triple Entente speedily showed that it, too,
was highly inflammable. The verdict of history
will agree with the calmest contemporary judgment
in holding that but for these various alliances,
these balancings of the nations, these arrange-
ments, treaties, understandings, Europe could not
have been suddenly turned into a vast shambles.
It would be hard to find a swifter conception
or clearer statement of this truth than in the
columns of a leading organ of German public
opinion, on the very eve of the war. The Frankfurter
Zeitung of July 27, 1914, had a searching analysis
of the perilous situation created by the savage
ultimatum of the Austrian Government to Serbia.
60
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 61
The significance of that act penetrated the Euro-
pean mind much more quickly than it did the
American. This was partly because the press
of the United States was badly served by its foreign
correspondents in that affair. They cabled almost
nothing about it, even days after every intelligent
newspaper in England, in France, in Russia, and
in Germany was expressing a sense of the terrible
danger confronting Europe. It was again a
case (as with the tell-tale premonitions of the
Balkan War) when those who supply European
news to the American press found it easiest to
ignore the whole matter, as simply another of
those far-off, tedious quarrels in southern Europe
in which the public of the United States took
no interest. Near by, however, the alarm was
instant and acute. To go back to the Frank-
furter Zeitung's article of July 27, it began by
saying that the Austrian demand on Serbia would
be a severe test of " the existing system of Euro-
pean politics." It immediately perceived that
the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, Italy)
would be strained in its last fibre. It was in no
doubt that the Dual Alliance (Russia, France)
would at once vibrate in response, and that the
Triple Entente (Russia, France, England), also
beginning to move, the nerves of all Europe
would be racked. Then would come the answer
to the question whether these alliances were really
a splendid " instrument of peace." As such
they have long and loudly been vaunted, but the
intelligent Liberal newspaper of Frankfort pro-
ceeded to say : " We have not shared that belief,
but on the contrary have firmly maintained that
62 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
European peace did not depend upon an equipoise
of Powers in groups but upon the broad basis of a
justly ordered union of the peoples." Then it
added that the proof as to who was right would
soon be forthcoming. If the Triple Alliance pre-
vented war, it would be truly " rich in blessings
to European politics " ; but if not, it would be seen
to be "a chain binding the peace of Europe to
the will of persons and cliques in whom the citizens
of states governed in the spirit of liberty could
place small trust."
The event demonstrated that the fear was better
grounded than the hope. To alliances that were
long held up as the surest safeguards of peace is
directly traceable the most stupendous and, in
high probability, the most devastating war Europe
has ever known. Almost as the guns began to
go off, the President of France and the Tsar of
Russia were toasting in Petrograd the Dual
Alliance which, in their phrase, made peace a
certainty. Hardly had the words " la paix
assuree " died on their lips when declarations of
war were thundering all round the horizon. The
famous " Go, my son, and see with how little
wisdom the world is governed," gains new point
from the melancholy crumbling into ruin of the
fabric which the best statesmanship of Europe
has been for thirty years erecting.
To understand the system of alliances we must
know something of the system which preceded
it and which it displaced. This was the old
doctrine of a European equilibrium. It was
commonly known as the Balance of Power. This
has never been described more picturesquely,
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 63
and at the same time philosophically, than by
Kinglake :
Any prince who might be inclined to do a wrong to another
State casts his eyes abroad to see the condition of the great
Powers. If he observes that they are all in a sound state and
headed by firm, able rulers who are equal, if need be, to the
duty of taking up arms, he knows that his contemplated outrage
would produce a war of which he cannot foresee the scope or
limit, and, unless he be a madman or a desperado desiring war
for war's sake, he will be inclined to hold back. On the other
hand, if he sees that any great nation which ought to be foremost
to resist him is in a state of exceptional weakness or under the
governance of unworthy or incapable rulers, or is distracted by
some whim or sentiment interfering with her accustomed policy,
then perhaps he allows himself to entertain a hope that she may
not have the spirit or the wisdom to perform her duty. That
is the hope, and it may be said in these days it is the one only
hope which would drive a sane prince to become the disturber
of Europe.
This was the general theory of alliances — fluid
and changing as will be seen — which obtained
in Europe for fifty years after the Napoleonic
wars. It was brought to an end by Bismarck.
In place of it he set up the idea of rigid and hard-
and-fast alliances. Himself the creator of the
Triple Alliance, and — by reflex action — of the
Dual Alliance, it is the workings of his mind that
we must study if we would comprehend the
" system " of modern Europe that emerged from
it. A wonderful brain it was, that one of Bismarck's,
and for years it was busy combining and shift-
ing and re-combining the Powers, as a chess-
master works over the possible moves. To a
statesman who could occupy his sleepless hours
by selecting a new Cabinet for Portugal, the game,
or task, of so arranging and allying the countries
64 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
of Europe as, in the first place, to further German
policy, and, next, to keep the peace as long as pos-
sible, must have been fascinating. He did not
leave the world in ignorance of his view-points
or his methods. No more repaying chapters will
one find in his " Gedanken und Errinerungen "
than those in which he unfolds his theories of
European alliances. What he writes has to be
carefully checked at certain points, but as we
read we feel that we are being let into the first plans
of the architect who built the edifice that, until
the other day, stood before us in its proud and
fair proportions.
It all dates back to the battle of Sadowa in
1866. By this is meant that immediately after
that crushing military overthrow of Austria, Bis-
marck, whose spirit more truly than Metternich's
ever " wrestled with to-morrow," perceived that
Germany might soon need an alliance with Austria,
if not her friendship. Thereupon he proceeded
to enforce an amazing policy of moderation upon
the reluctant King William and the impatient
leaders of the Prussian army. He vetoed a
march into Vienna. In preparing for the treaty
of peace at Nikolsburg, he insisted that no territory
should be demanded from Austria. Why take
land that would have to be occupied by Prussian
soldiers when every available man would soon
be needed for the greater struggle with France ?
It required all Bismarck's force and authority to
carry through a settlement of this character. Only
by the aid of the Crown Prince was he able to
break down the strong opposition of the King.
But he succeeded ; and his foresight was completely
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 65
justified later. Having in his pocket the secret
treaties of offensive and defensive alliance with
Bavaria, Wiirtemberg and Baden, and with Aus-
tria's benevolent neutrality assured, he was free
to go on spinning his diplomatic and military net
about Napoleon III.
This germ of an alliance with Austria, Bis-
marck set himself to cultivate and expand after
the defeat of France and the consolidation of the
German Empire. He had no fancy for temporary
coalitions. They gave him nightmares, he said.
What he desired was an enduring combination of
Great Powers. The Triple Alliance, as he origin-
ally conceived it, consisted of an alliance of the
three Emperors. Later he hoped to bring in
Italy. He had cherished the plan even before
the end of the French War, and immediately after
the Peace of Frankfort set about accomplishing it.
Europe soon saw it in apparent effect. The
Dreikaiserbund — Austria, Russia, Germany —
worked successfully for three or four years. It
was broken up in 1875, by, as Bismarck maintained,
the provocations and lies of Gortchakoff . Whether
in that year Bismarck really intended to make
another war upon France is still disputed. It
is certain that Moltke urged him to do so. It is
also certain that England and Russia were seriously
alarmed, and that at this time began the Russian
inclination to France, out of which soon grew the
Dual Alliance. This compelled Bismarck to alter
his scheme, to abandon his hope of a firm under-
standing with Russia, which he protested to the
end that he always would have preferred, since
he believed that Russia was the natural ally of
66 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
Germany, and at the same time the strongest
one she could have, and to fall back on the only
powerful alliance then open to him — that with
Austria and Italy. In this way was born the
Triple Alliance, which has lasted for more than
thirty years since Bismarck formed it, and which
was the immediate cause, through its obligations
and binding military agreements, of the present
war in Europe.
Italy's motive for joining the Triple Alliance
has always seemed a little obscure. How could
Bismarck persuade her to clasp hands with her
hereditary enemy, Austria ? It has been said
that he did it by playing upon her vanity. Italy
was flattered by being invited into the circle of
the great Powers. But there was another and a
real inducement, which Bismarck knew how to
lay before Italy in attractive form. She was
jealous of French expansion in North Africa.
Against that she could fortify herself by entering
the Triple Alliance. And when the time came
for her descent upon Tripoli, she would have, as
she did have two years ago, a free hand. This
must have been the chief consideration in the mind
of those Italian statesmen who have for a genera-
tion held Italy true to what seems for her an un-
natural and awkward alliance. Now that she has
achieved the main end she aimed at, it is not
strange that she has displayed signs of coldness
to an alliance that could hereafter mean for her
only small benefit and great burdens.
Bismarck was perfectly frank in stating the
object he pursued in forming and maintaining
the Triple Alliance. His reasons were partly
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 67
dynastic. The houses of Hohenzollern and Haps-
burg he would firmly establish beyond the shock
of republican or socialistic agitation. The Roman-
offs he would have gladly included, had not Russia
drawn apart. He feared that there would be a
great struggle between the two European ten-
dencies which Napoleon called the Republican
and the Cossack. Bismarck was for the system
of order on the monarchical basis, and it was to
stiffen and strengthen it that he created the Triple
Alliance. But he had also a military purpose —
a defensive purpose, as he contended. He desired
to add to the fighting power of Germany the armies
of Austria and Italy, in such a way that the Em-
pire could be free from danger of attack, and might
enter securely upon that work of national develop-
ment and increasing influence in the councils of
Europe which he thought of as belonging by right
to the Greater Germany which he had built up.
And it is certainly a high tribute to his prescient
and puissant statecraft that this creation of his
genius should have endured, with scarce a change
in form, till this day. The Triple Alliance has been
regularly renewed, at each period of expiration, as
if it were one of the fixed institutions of European
politics.
It is not to be supposed that the Triple Alliance
was an alliance in everything. Each country
in it was free to act as it chose in those matters
which lay outside the agreed scope of common
action. The result is that there has often appeared
to be, in questions not exclusively European, a
regrouping of the Powers as if in utter disregard
to the Triple Alliance. One such case arose at the
68 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
close of the war between Japan and China. In
opposition to England, Russia and France were
closely drawn together with Germany in pro-
testing against the proposed cession of territory
to the Japanese. This they did indeed prevent.
At that period both Russian and French diplomacy
was strongly anti-English ; and an observer at
that time knowing nothing of what had gone before
would have concluded that the real Triple Alliance,
if one existed at all, was between France, Russia,
and Germany ! So like a dissolving view does
the whole system of European friendships and
alignments often appear.
No student of European politics could, for
example, have predicted anywhere between 1899
and 1903 that Europe would in a few years see,
over against the Triple Alliance, and supplementary
to the Dual Alliance, a Triple Entente uniting
France, Russia, and England, and bidding fair,
as it does at this moment, to re-fashion the whole
political system of Europe. This was, given the
past history and diverse interests of the countries
composing it, an even stranger mating of opposites
than the alliance which bound Italy and Austria
in the same bundle. That England could act
in hearty unison with France seemed only less
unlikely than that she could so act with Russia.
But she actually joined both in the Triple Entente !
Its nature has all along been indefinite ; its scope
has not been known accurately by the other Euro-
pean Powers ; it has been, as it were, the mystery
of diplomacy. There was no absolute Treaty
underlying it. This was made certain by the
statement a year ago of the British Prime
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 69
Minister, in answer to a question put to him in the
House of Commons, that England had not bound
herself by treaty to act jointly with France and
Russia. This left the matter still very much in
the dark. The first clear light was given by Sir
Edward Grey just before the war broke out. He
explained that, while no specific and binding agree-
ment had been made with France, an exchange
of notes had taken place between the two Govern-
ments. The purport of them was that if either
country were attacked by a third, the two would
consult together for common defence. Sir Edward
had nothing to say to the Commons about Russia.
But in the official publication of diplomatic corre-
spondence which he authorized shortly afterwards
was a telegram from the Tsar to King George
urging him " to stand by " Russia and France.
This would imply that all three were placed very
much on the same basis by the Triple Entente.
Not a formal pact, it was of the nature of " a
gentleman's agreement." All depended upon the
goodwill and good faith in which it was lived up
to. In the result, it appears to have been as
effective as an actual alliance cemented by treaty ;
having most of the advantages of the latter with-
out some of the embarrassments.
How the Anglo-Russian entente cordiale was
brought about is not definitely and fully known.
But the work of perfecting a good understanding
between England and France was done under the
eyes of the whole world. Sir Thomas Barclay,
in his recent volume of " Anglo-French Remini-
scences," has detailed most of the steps. Great
difficulties had to be overcome. There was in-
70 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
herited suspicion along with historical causes of
bitterness, on both sides. Moreover, there had
been recent instances of severe friction. The
position and the interests of France and England
in Egypt furnished material for sharp controversies
and almost open quarrels during a period of years.
The French annexation of Madagascar was a thorn
in the side of Great Britain. In 1898 Major Mar-
chand at Fashoda brought the two countries to
the very verge of war. And as long as Lord Salis-
bury, who neither liked nor trusted the French,
was in charge of the conduct of British foreign
relations, nothing was possible except the con-
tinuation of a policy of pin-pricking on both shores
of the Channel. A better spirit showed itself
when Mr. Balfour became Prime Minister ; and
little by little, by the aid of commercial organiza-
tions, by the tactful offices of King Edward, and
by means of a more intelligent diplomacy in Paris
as well as in London, the two countries entered
upon cordial and even close relations. The great
outward and visible sign of this significant change
was the Anglo-French Arbitration Treaty of 1904.
Indeed, in this was the formal decision of France
finally to give England an entirely free hand in
Egypt, as well as England's consent that Morocco
should thereafter be ear-marked for France ; and
any other question that might arise to disturb the
good feeling between the two countries, they agreed
to refer to arbitration. After this, the pressing
on to the fuller and more fruitful Entente, into which
Russia was soon drawn, was natural and easy.
Thus against Bismarck's Three came to stand a
Three which he and all the statesmen of his day
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 71
would have asserted that it would be absolutely
impossible to bring together. But the political
impossibility of one generation is often the estab-
lished fact of another.
Though the Triple Alliance was in effect for a
generation, it was until very recently of the nature
of a dormant force. Not what it did, but what
it might do, was long the chief concern of the other
European Powers. It was plainly a potential force.
Yet the purely ornamental or, at least, exterior
functions of the Triple Alliance were for many
years the only public proof that it gave of its
existence. There was the annual exchange of
royal visits between Vienna and Berlin and Rome ;
there were the military reviews, the naval displays,
the banquets, the toasts, the embracings. Similarly
the Dual Alliance seemed content to take it out
in flourishes about the undying friendship be-
tween Russia and France. But a sharp warning
was given six years ago. An overt act showed
that the latent possibility in the Triple Alliance
might any day become a threatening reality. In
1908 the Austrian Government suddenly announced
the annexation by Austria of Bosnia and Herze-
govina. These two provinces had by the Treaty
of Berlin been placed under an Austrian pro-
tectorate ; but their cool taking over as part and
parcel of a Dual Monarchy was a direct challenge
to European diplomacy. Russia was deeply
moved. Every Slavic fibre in her heart thrilled
with remonstrance against this subjection to
Austria-Hungary of Slav populations. England
was the first to protest. Sir Edward Grey urged
that no step in disregard, if not violation, of a
72 ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR
public treaty of Europe could be warranted except
by a congress of the Powers, of which he proposed
the early summoning. But Germany, of course
aware in advance of the Austrian plans, objected ;
and when Russia thereupon began to hint at using
force against Austria, the action of the Kaiser
was swift and menacing. He threatened an in-
stant mobilization on the Russian frontier ; and
the Tsar's military advisers warned him that the
Russian army was in no condition to resent this.
On the 24th of last July, however, the Minister of
War informed the Grand Council at Petrograd
that 1914 was very different from 1909, and that
Russia was now in position to ignore or defy the
military threats of Germany. This shows how the
affront, as Russia considered it, of the annexation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina had rankled in the
Tsar's mind these six years, and how he was deter-
mined not to be caught again by an anticipatory
German mobilization. The Bosnian incident may
also have had its effect on the year's crisis in an-
other way. It may have made Berlin over-con-
fident. Having frightened Russia from inter-
fering with Austria's forward policy once, why
not think to do it successfully twice ? However
this may have been, there can be no doubt that
the events of 1908-9 were the sure prelude to the
war of 1914.
In whatever way that war may end, one result
of it is certain to come. The Triple Alliance will
expire. This would happen even if German and
Austrian arms should triumph. In that case
Italy would come in for something very different
from an invitation to renew the Triple Alliance.
ALLIANCES THAT MADE WAR 73
Victory by England, France and Russia would
clearly make such a renewal impossible. Indeed
the whole system of European alliances will be
radically altered by the war. Perhaps in time
we may see it displaced by some form of that
Volkerverein of which the Frankfurter Zeitung
spoke. At all events, the Triple Alliance, which
was said to have kept the peace of Europe for
thirty years, and which has now plunged it into
the most terrible of all wars, will soon be as dead
as the Holy Alliance of our grandfathers.
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
AN AMERICAN PROFESSOR'S VIEW
BY ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
PBOFESSOE OF HISTORY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
FOR the wreck of this conflict which will increase
from day to day, is there any good, clear, inevitable
reason ? No Napoleon has forced his neighbours
to war. No Bismarck has racked Prussia in order
to make Germany. No Agadir incident has set
off the match. No invincible horde is advancing
out of Asia. Europe got through two Balkan
conflicts without general war.
It is no explanation to say that this king or that
emperor or the other president or prime minister
wants war. Sovereigns nowadays are, at their
strongest, only train-dispatchers who can order a
switch to be thrown in one or another direction. No
monarch can go against the spirit of his people.
Every country included is united in what is con-
sidered a natural war. It is not a war of dynasties
or statesmen or military leaders. It is not a war
of revenge for Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Questions of trade and markets play a large
part in the drama — but it is not the love of money
which leads great navies to spend what they do.
This is a war of peoples and not of interests.
74
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 75
The military spirit, commercial expansion, desire
for territory, and the self-assertion of great nations
are things that in the long run may overcome all
the checks of Parliaments and statesmen and the
Hague conferences. But none of them could have
brought about the fearful conditions of the year
1914. The strongest and determining reason for
war is the growth of race antipathies ; the world
has at last realized that the political boundaries
of Eastern Europe cut across older and more per-
sistent divisions of race, language and religion,
and thus bring conflicts with nations and between
them.
Europe is a mosaic of races. In most countries
the race elements have amalgamated or have
ceased to conflict with each other. In this crisis
the Irish in Great Britain and the Walloons in
Belgium have sunk their consciousness of race in
their consciousness of nationality. Eastern Europe
still bears the marks of the successive waves of
barbarian invasion out of the heart of Asia. The
Hungarians and the Bulgarians are both races
that forced their way into Europe, where they
found the Slavs, the Germans, and the Latins.
Then the Slavs received the fearful weight of the
Turkish invasion and for centuries lost independence
and vitality.
Yet till recently there was no strong race anti-
pathy between Germans and Slavs. Germany
and Russia have not been at war with each other
since the Tsar Peter III saved Frederick the Great
in 1762. Till forty years ago the Bohemians and
Germans got on tolerably well side by side. The
race strains which are pulling Europe to pieces at
76 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
last have showed themselves by rousing country
against country ; and inside Austria. There the
antipathy between Germans and Slavs has grown
so bitter that, in the judgment of the Austrian
statesmen, the Germans must fight Slavs either
outside of Austria or inside of Austria. They have
preferred to make the issue perfectly clear by
declaring war on the one markedly successful and
independent Slav state outside of Russia.
The challenge aroused Russia, but did not directly
concern other Powers farther west. Most of
them, to judge from the proclamations and official
communications, are fighting only in self-defence.
In the midst of the appalling misery of the time,
there shines out a comic gleam in the exchange of
discourtesies about mobilization. As soon as the
trouble began, every one of the four Central
European Powers began to move troops with all
possible speed toward its threatened frontiers, at
the same time calling the world to witness that they
were not " mobilizing." Every nation threatened
every other, hoping thus to frighten its neighbour
into giving way without war. The responsibility
for the war rests upon no individual and upon no
one nation, but upon the interlocking of Europe
commercially, territorially, and racially, so that one
Power after another was drawn into the maelstrom.
Perhaps statesmen felt that the cleaning time had
come at last ; and that the rival claims and pre-
tensions must be settled by the court of war, the
only one that executes its own decrees.
Perhaps this war is what Tolstoi thought all
wars to be, merely a blind movement of human
beings, they know not why, and they know not
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 77
whither, like a foray of soldier ants. Neverthe-
less reasons for war can be found in the make-up
of Europe, in the character, in the aims and am-
bitions of the great Powers. The continent of
Europe is divided into ten groups of nations.
Four of these are the minor groups of the Balkans ;
Scandinavia ; the neutralized Powers of Holland,
Belgium, and Switzerland ; and Spain and Portugal.
Alongside these and overtowering them in wealth
and military strength, are the six great Powers,
Italy, Russia, Great Britain, France, Austria-
Hungary, and Germany.
Europe has for some centuries been divided
between four main religions. The Moslems up
to two years ago still counted eight millions of
Turks, Bosnians, and Albanians, but there are
now only about three or four millions left in
Europe. The Protestants, principally Germans,
English, Swiss, and Hungarians, are about 100
millions. The Roman Catholics in all the Latin
countries, Southern Germany, Croatia, Albania,
Bohemia, and in Russian Austria and Russian
Poland are about 180 millions. The Greek
Catholics include Russia, the Balkan countries,
and a few provinces in the Austrian Empire, but
by no means all the Slavs. Their number is about
110 millions.
Differences of religion have caused many
European wars, but during the last hundred
years every European country has been obliged
to tolerate churches other than that established
by the State. These sects are attached to their
country. Protestant and Roman Catholic Magyars
are a unit when it comes to a discussion of their
78 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
place in the Austro-Hungarian Empire ; and there
is no visible difference between the Catholic
Bavarians and the Protestant Prussians in their
support of their country in the present war.
Four comparatively small groups of people of
Asiatic origin are the Finns, Magyars, Bulgarians
and Turks, in all about fourteen millions. The
Scandinavian group is small, though effective,
and the three countries together, Norway, Sweden,
and Denmark, have ten and a half million people.
The English, Scotch, Welsh, and Irish, between
whom there is no race division in time of national
danger, are forty-six millions. The Latin powers,
Spain, Portugal, France, Belgium, and Italy, count
106 millions. The two and a half million Greeks
are akin to the Latin. -The Germans in Germany,
German Switzerland, and Austria-Hungary are a
compactly situated mass of seventy-nine and a half
millions. The Slavs of Russia, including the Poles
and not the Finns, together with the Roumanians
(who claim to be a Latin race, but seem to have
more Slav blood than anything else), the Serbians
and the various Slavic elements in Austria-Hungary
are in all 111 millions.
Before sketching the status of the great Powers,
the place and influence upon the war of the minor
groups must be noticed. The Balkans is an ex-
ample to the world of the immense difficulty of
carrying on states which contain large numbers
of people who in race and in sympathies belong
to some neighbour. The second Balkan War in
1913 came about solely because there were so many
Bulgarians in Greek and Serbian territory, and
so many Greeks and Serbians in Bulgarian territory.
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 79
No geographical boundary line can be made to fit
with these race groups. The effort to adjust the
matter by killing off villagers of different race
from that of the conqueror of a region was so
thoroughgoing as to shock mankind, but not
drastic enough to solve the problem. If the war
is primarily a fight between the organized Slavs
and the Germans, the Balkans are not much
interested, since there are only about five million
Slavs south of the Danube. The Emperor William
last year called for a larger army and a bigger war
chest, because he felt that the armies of the Balkans
altered the balance of European military power.
If the Balkan Powers could have stood together
till this year, Austria could not have declared war
on Serbia. Bulgaria and Greece may easily be
drawn into the conflict, particularly if Turkey
makes war on the German side ; and when the
general peace comes, it must include a settlement
of the Balkan question.
The Scandinavian Powers are unwilling sharers
in the danger of war because two of them control
the natural entrance into the Baltic Sea ; and the
Swedes are convinced that Russia wants to subvert
them. Portugal is an ally of England, and may
join in the war. Spain may enter the lists if
France seems to need aid.
The three little neutralized Powers, Belgium,
Holland, and Switzerland, have already learned
what " neutrality " means between desperate
nations. The Emperor William some time ago
was much pleased by the Swiss manoeuvres,
because they prove that he could " spare two
army corps." The remark meant of course that
80 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
neither France nor Germany could safely force
a way through Switzerland. It meant also that
the Germans intended to use Belgium as their
highway into France, treaty or no treaty, in-
ternational law or no international law. Holland
has no protection from Germany except the troops
and ships of the nations that comprise the Triple
Entente.
ITALY
Italy joined the Triple Alliance about twenty
years ago, because she was then on very bad terms
with France. To Germany and Austria the
Italian navy and merchant marine were a special
attraction.
Italy has three territorial objectives which
must largely affect her position : (1) on the other
side of the Adriatic Sea, a decided conflict of
interest with Austria has developed ; (2) Italy
desires the extension of her colonies, as Tripoli
is at present her only valuable colonial possession.
Italy desires to annex Trentino, an Italian-speaking
district in the Southern Tyrol, and Trieste, the
population of which is Italian. But they might
as well attempt to pluck out the right eye of the
Emperor Francis Joseph as to take Trieste, for it
is the only seaport in the Austrian half of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire.
RUSSIA
Russia has for centuries been a reservoir of
compressed political gas, pushing in every direc-
tion for an outlet. When Peter the Great came
to the throne two centuries ago his country was
almost shut off from the Baltic by the Germans
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 81
and Swedes — and the Tartars cut him off from the
Black Sea. War after war was necessary to gain free
access to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. Mean-
while the Russians pushed into the thinly settled
area of North Asia until they reached the Pacific.
The obvious line of approach to the world's
commerce for Russia is through the Bosphorus
and the ^Egean Sea to the Mediterranean. That
route is held by the Turks, who for the last fifty
years have been backed up by first the English
and French, and then by the Germans.
Russia has gradually torn away fragments of
the Turkish Empire along the Black Sea and has
aided in building Roumania and Bulgaria out of
the ruins of Turkish provinces. In 1878 a Russian
army marched till it was in sight of the minarets
of Constantinople, but England under Disraeli
compelled Russia to give up the fruits of that
victory. As the great Slav Power, Russia is not
always keenly interested in the expansion of small
Slav Powers ; but it has for years urged the policy
of pan-Slavism, whatever that may mean. If
the issue of German against Slav is clearly raised,
as it seems to be in this war, Russia could no more
keep out of it than she could forbid her subjects
to attend the Greek Catholic Church.
It is a singular fact that till 1914 there never
had been a serious war between Russia and Austria.
Though the Russians were defeated by the French,
English, and Piedmontese in 1855, and by the
Japanese in 1905, they have in many wars shown
military talent and a fine fighting force. Russia
is the only nation which without the assistance of
allies defeated the great Napoleon.
82 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
In case of victory the Russians may possibly
demand Constantinople, which means that the
Turk would be finally shoved out of Europe.
What England and France will have to say with
regard to this is open to conjecture. Some
" rectification of the frontier " might be exacted
from Austria.
ENGLAND
England in this contest is not fighting to gain
anything new, but simply to hold what she has :
first of all her commerce. It is certain that she
can protect English merchantmen while German
and Austrian must lie in port or be captured.
The Japanese have undertaken to look after English
interests in Asia.
The English must shut the German navy
up in the North Sea, for without a supply of food-
stuffs from other parts of the world England
would be starved out after a few months ; while
France, Germany, Austria, and Russia can pro-
bably feed themselves and their troops. The
English colonies scattered all over the world are
a bait to the Germans. But Canada, Australia,
and probably South Africa can take care of them-
selves, and the attitude taken up by India has
falsified German hopes. Germany, Russia, or
France can be badly defeated without losing much
territory or dropping a place in the scale of nations ;
but not so with Great Britain. A victory of the
German powers would infallibly deprive Great
Britain of a part of her colonies, a large portion
of her trade, and the prestige of being the greatest
sea-Power in the world.
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 83
FRANCE
Of all the great powers France is the freest
from internal dissension. The 207,000 square
miles of the main country has but forty millions
of population ; and the French have been almost
in despair because Germany grows so much faster
and therefore has so many more recruits. The
colonies of France in Africa and Eastern Asia
are nearly as large as the United States and its
dependencies ; but they contain only forty-one
millions of an indifferent population. Almost
the whole population of France, so far as it has
religious affiliations, is Roman Catholic.
France is supposed to be the thriftiest large
country in Europe, and is able to raise nearly
£200,000,000 a year for national and local public
purposes ; but the debt is more than six years'
national income, and it will be much increased by
the war. The country has had a splendid foreign
trade of £340,000,000 of exports and £400,000,000
of imports, and it owns a considerable merchant
marine.
If the central powers should get control of the
sea it would go hard with the French colonies,
which it is supposed the Germans hope to secure.
What the French expect from the war is first of
all the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine, which the
school children are taught to consider two French
provinces temporarily in possession of a foreign
power. It was a tactical mistake for the Germans
to wrest from France provinces which have shown
themselves so French in feeling that they have
never been allowed to have a popular government.
84 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
The French frontier lies nearly within sight of
Metz, which is one of the strongest fortresses in
Europe. If the French have the physical power,
and their allies will back them up, Alsace-Lorraine
will be claimed as their reward at the end of the
war.
A second important object of France is to wipe
out the fearful disgrace of the war of 1870 and
1871. Napoleon the Third put his country in a
position to be disciplined ; but it was the French
nation, the French people, and the French army
that were defeated and humiliated. They mean
to prove to mankind that they cannot be so treated
a second time.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
The centre of the crater in European affairs
is Austria-Hungary, through which for ages has
run the boundary between the German and the
Slav races.
The Austro-Hungarians have but one sea-
coast stretching between the two ports of Trieste
and Fiume, beside the mountainous coast of
Dalmatia, which has a Serb population. Never-
theless she has developed a creditable commerce
and her ships run to Constantinople, to India,
and to New York. A main object of Austria in
this war is to push that coastline farther south,
wiping out Montenegro and part of Albania ;
or even to follow out a plan cherished for half a
century to obtain a tongue of land between Bosnia
and the ^Egean Sea, with the port of Salonica.
The three objectives of Austria in the war
therefore appear to be : (1) The " execution " of
WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT 85
Serbia as a lesson to all Serbs of what will happen
to any head that raises itself above the level.
(2) The extension of territory southward. (3) The
holding of the Slav population, partly by force,
and partly by trying to bring those people to feel
that their country is in danger. For it must never
be forgotten that both the Balkan people and
the Austro-Hungarian Slavs if they cannot be
independent will at least not be Russian. Pro-
bably every group of Slavs inside the Austro-
Hungarian boundary will stay there, rather than
incur any such danger.
Whatever happens to any other power, Austria-
Hungary is playing a desperate gambler's game
in this war. The Magyars, who have long hated
and thwarted the Germans, have now united with
them to keep their Slav fellow citizens in order.
If Austria and Germany were victorious, the
empire would be safe for the time ; although no
one outside the boundaries of that empire can guess
the possibility of Slav risings during the war,
or the likelihood that the Slavs will take to heart
the lesson that they must remain inferior and
subordinate in Austro-Hungarian affairs.
GERMANY
By common consent the most formidable
military power in Europe is Germany. In area
(209,000 square miles) it is almost exactly equal
to France, but the population is 65,000,000, of
whom 52,000,000 are Germans and 2,000,000 are
Slavic Poles. With that exception there is no-
where in the land a seriously discontented race
element. In its colonies, which are chiefly African,
86 WHY THE NATIONS FIGHT
the million square miles contain only 24,000 white
people. In the Empire there are 40,000,000
Protestants, 24,000,000 Roman Catholics and half
a million Jews.
The national taxes are nearly £200,000,000 a
year and the debt is about twelve years' income.
The country has a magnificent system of railroads
and canals, and a splendid merchant marine of
more than 3,000,000 tons ; and an inward and
outward trade of £1,000,000,000. No country
has ever made such efforts to carry on business,
government, and military affairs in a scientific
and systematic way.
Germany's objects in the war are perfectly
clear. First of all, to give notice to all the Germans
in Europe, to the Magyars, and to the German,
Austrian, and Hungarian Slavs who " stay good,"
the assurance that Germany will fight for them
and with them. In the second place, the Slavs
outside those two empires are notified that the
Germanic power is massed against them. In the
third place, if only Germany could get the command
of the sea (in which Austria can be of very little
aid) the French and English colonies would fall.
Germany is not likely to look for Russian territory,
except perhaps one of the German-speaking
provinces on the Baltic ; but if she can she will
insist upon a free hand in Asia Minor, either by
an understanding with Turkey or by crushing
Turkey. Finally, if Germany is able to bring it
about, Holland will almost surely be annexed.
It is the natural distributing point of German
commerce, and with Holland goes a large number
of Asiatic islands.
THE PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
OF GERMANY
BY THE EDITOR OF "THE ENGLISH REVIEW"
To understand the psychology and motives of the
German war-madness it is necessary to go back
to the day when the Emperor William dismissed
Bismarck and proclaimed the new course to be
" full steam ahead." From that hour the Kaiser
set up personal government in Germany. Coming
to the throne on the top of the patriotic swell
generated by the war of '70, the Emperor was not
only able to impose his limelight personality upon
a victorious people, but to intoxicate them with
his doctrine of the " historic " Hohenzollern mission
based upon the teachings of Treitschke and the
Pan-Germans, Paul de Legarde, Robertus, Jahn,
and Frederick List, who had all preached, as end
and aim of the national design, the consolidation
by force of an All-Germany.
From the date of the telegram to President
Kruger, which first drew the attention of the world
towards him, and was so intended, the German
Emperor has never looked back. And the first
thing he did was to reverse all existing policies,
all the old ideas, national habits and notions, and
centrifugal Germanic tendencies, making as the
87
88 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
force and expression of Germany — militarism
vested in the supreme will and control of the
" Kaiser-idea." Bismarck, Von Sybel, even
Treitschke, Mommsen, all fell into the Imperial
disfavour. He put his heel on Berlin and crushed
out all individuality ; on the arts ;* on all that
survived of pre-Sedanic sentimental, homely,
simple, Philistine Germany ; creating in its place an
all-powerful military organization after the manner
of " Old Fritz."
We must remember that by the Constitution,
the Federal Council is not responsible to the
" Reichstag," or the Chancellor to the " Bun-
desrath," the Ministry being responsible to the
Chancellor, and the Chancellor being responsible
to the Emperor alone. The German Government
is thus both powerless and irresponsible ; more-
over, the Kaiser, as the Supreme War Lord, is
absolutely free to declare or to end war. To an
energetic Sovereign, autocratically minded, the
power thus given is unlimited. The Emperor
took every advantage of it. The powers of the
Reichstag were nil. The Press was hidebound
and subservient. His personality soon became
a national obsession. In the Emperor's personal
composite Cabinet no man was tolerated who was
not entirely submissive and sycophantic. About
the year 1900 the Emperor's doctrine of Macht-
politik, or Force, had become the State religion
of the Empire.
* For the last twenty-five years Germany has produced no
notable writer, poet, painter or musician — Hauptmann, Suder-
mann, Strauss, Lembach, being all older than, or contemporaries
of, the Kaiser.
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 89
Every one knows how the Emperor used his
opportunities. He gave Germany a Navy,* find-
ing in Admiral Tirpitz a willing tool ; he built the
Kiel Canal ; he went to Palestine as the " Champion
of Mohammedanism " ; he initiated the Bagdad
Railway ; he gave out that it was his pleasure
to see Berlin the greatest " City of Pleasure " in
Europe ; he went to Morocco ; he told Germans
their future " lay on the seas " ; signalled himself
to the Tsar as " the Admiral of the West." Pan-
Germanism, militarism, what German professors,
in countless books and pamphlets, styled the
" Anthropological conception of life," mass pro-
duction, mass organization, mass application,
became the watchwords of the people ; in other
words, materialism, based on force, as opposed
to the old Germanic idealism of Goethe. An eco-
nomic school arose, in which the staidest German
economic professors vied with one another to
preach the gospel of Hohenzollern architectonics.
In all the schools, in all the school books, England
was proclaimed as the great enemy of Germanic
expansion to her " natural " boundaries — the
mouth of the Rhine, the Low German peoples,
the Adriatic. Everywhere the military spirit
became predominant. Drunk with success, young
Germany found in the Kaiser's religion a doctrine
after her own heart. Germans cultivated the
" dynamics of power," preached daily at the
* January 1, 1900, the Kaiser said : " I shall reorganize my
Navy, so that it shall stand on the same level as my Army, and
with its help the German Empire shall attain to a place which
it has not yet reached." No monarch ever declared his policy
in plainer terms.
90 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
universities. Deliberately, by Imperial order, Old
Germany was "wiped out." The Flottengedanke,
or Navy idea, became the idol of Germans.
Modern Germany grew up on the Hohenzollern
doctrine of race conquest, of force versus force,
of conquest and war. The sword alone, Germans
were told to believe, could solve the Germanic
problem which it was the mission of the Kaiser to
fulfil.
When the Boer War broke out we, in England,
were astonished to find all Germany arrayed
against us. We began to understand the nature
of the Teuton policy, the meaning of Germanic
Anglophobia. It led, as we know, to the Entente
with France — the policy which Germans called
the " coalition policy " of King Edward — to
" round up " Germany in Europe by a system of
hostile alliances.
Immediately, as the result of the Entente Cordiale,
the Pan-German League petitioned the Chancellor
to seize the West Coast and Hinterland of Morocco
as " suitable compensation." The Kaiser went
to Morocco, landed, and declared, in a speech at
Tangier, that the Sultan of Morocco "is an abso-
lutely independent sovereign."
Germany's Moroccan policy with France need
not be recalled. The point is that Germany,
regarding France as a negligible quantity, ever since
that visit used Morocco as a kind of unedited Ems
telegram, partly to test the quality of England's
arrangement with France, but chiefly with a view
to browbeat that Power whenever it pleased
Germany.
Up to Algeciras, however, the German Emperor
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 91
had maintained the foundation stone of German
policy laid down as axiomatic by Bismarck —
friendship with Russia. Time after time Bismarck
warned his countrymen that Germany could never
" risk a war with Russia," however important
it might be for Austria to seek to expand to her
" natural " boundaries. Bismarck's great fear
was always the renovation of the " Kaunitz
Coalition " — France, Russia, Austria. His whole
outlook was governed by this necessity of " Rein-
surance " with Russia, and until the defeat of the
Russians by the Japanese the Emperor William
held to it. Muscovite " demands " invariably
had the ear of the Wilhelmstrasse. " Pogroms,"
Armenian and Macedonian atrocities always found
Berlin " indifferent." When England complained
of the passage of Russian torpedo craft through
the Dardanelles, Germany regarded it as a " local "
question (1902). The " Manchurian question "
(before the Russo-Japanese War) was " not Ger-
many's concern." But after Mukden, Germans
came to regard the Russians with the same kind
of contempt as they regarded the French. The
victory of the Japanese was the last thing antici-
pated by Germany. Once more it showed the
Kaiser how "wrong" Bismarck had been.* The
Russian "bugbear" was gone. Germany felt
herself to be militarily supreme in Europe. Her
* It should be clearly understood that the Kaiser's policy
has had little to do with Bismarckianism which stopped at the
seas ; which always insisted that Germany could never become a
Great Colonial Power. The Emperor's aim has been Pan-
Germanism — the reclamation of all the Germans in foreign
parts. Nor would Bismarck ever have gone to war with Russia.
The Kaiser's policy has been Bismarckianism " gone crazy."
92 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
Philo-Turkish policy seemed to ensure the position
of Turkey in Europe as the buffer State between
Germany and Russia on the one hand, and as the
trade artery between Hamburg and Bagdad on the
other. After the Russian War it became the fashion
for the youngsters in the German Navy to drink to
the "great day (with England) about the year 1913."
A Prophetic forecast !
How has it been brought about ?
Once more we must seek the cause in the action
of the Kaiser. Hostile as Prince Billow always
was to England, he always held steadfastly to the
Bismarckian pro-Russian tradition. It was he
who secured the fall of M. Delcasse, by reinsuring
himself with Russia. Then, in turn, he fell, and
M. Delcasse returned to office (1911).
Since then the German Emperor has been abso-
solutely his own Chancellor. The German policy
of the " mailed fist " had, to all intents and appear-
ances, ** come off." France had been bullied suc-
cessfully time after time. Even the Austrian
Bosnian coup, in wrecking the Treaty of Berlin,
had been swallowed by Russia. Germany, " in
shining armour," had awed Europe. Moreover,
the price Austria paid was the creation of the
Austrian Dreadnoughts. From that hour the
difficult ethnic problem of the Austro-Hungarian
German Alliance was solved. Germany's help
welded again the two Empires together. It made
Austria the vassal of Berlin, reconsolidated the
Austrian arm of the Triple Alliance, even if German
politicians began clearly at the time to under-
stand that Italy could not be counted on as an
" active partner " against France.
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 93
But with the Kaiser his own master, unfettered
by a Chancellor with either influence or policy,
Germany seemed, in 1911, to have arrogated to
herself the position that Napoleon occupied in
Europe after Jena, without ever having fired a shot.
There were powerful pro-German agencies at
work in England — pro-Germanism, in fact, be-
came a Party affair, the concern of Mr. Stiggins.
The Liberal Government were reported to be work-
ing strenuously for " German friendship," hi the
conviction of the Kaiser's " peace policy," and
the new Chancellor took his cue accordingly. Al-
though Germany kept on increasing her Navy by
all the resources of her power, there was a strong
movement in England for an " agreement " with
Germany. The Emperor had good reason to
believe that the English Entente with France was
weakening, that, in short, England might even
be detached from it. German publicists wrote
openly of a " wave of sloppiness " emasculating
England ; there were the women ; there were the
" Peace men " ; there was the universal belief,
held in Germany, that the Liberal Government
would never draw the sword on behalf of France.
King Edward was dead — Russia had been
crushed by the Japanese. Nobody in Germany
feared France. On the other hand, the German
Navy was now the second (on paper) in Europe,
and Austria had taken a new life of national con-
sciousness and aggression, promising excellently
for the ethnic landslide down to Salonika, which
was to be the German jumping-off board to Asia
Minor. The Emperor could well point to tangible
results. He had kept the peace — if mainly by
94 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
means of threats. He had made Germany a
" world sea-Power." Men in England publicly
spoke of him as the " popular Kaiser," even as
the margin of superiority of English capital ships
kept diminishing year by year. In Germany he
had won " hands down." Parliamentary Social
Democracy had effected nothing. He had accom-
plished the task of the Great Elector — the Germans
were at last " all Germans."
A great wave of materialism swept over the
country. Berlin had become the " fastest " town
in Europe. All the world over men spoke of
German " thoroughness," German science, German
organization, German power and German culture.
The German significance was apparent to all.
Force seemed to radiate from the whole Teutonic
Empire. Krupp guns, German steel, German
cavalry charges — Europe looked on in silence.
The watchword " With God and Kaiser " seemed
in very truth to have created an invincible people
under the spell of a mediaeval and sinister
despot.
Then came the astonishing and unexpected
double war in the Balkans, resulting in the com-
plete transformation of power in Southern and
Central Europe to the advantage of the Slav.
With the expulsion of the Turks from Europe,
German near-Eastern policy collapsed. The rise
of Serbia changed the whole position for Germany,
diplomatically, economically, and strategically.
Germany saw herself hemmed in where least she
had expected it, with an ancillary tongue of Russia
running right under her base. As she had mis-
judged the Russo-Japanese war, so she misjudged
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 95
the Balkan War. The rout of the Turks was an
utter surprise to her. From the military point
of view — the only point of view held by Germany —
the result of the war was disastrous to the German
ambition.* With characteristic promptitude the
Kaiser answered it.
The Kaiser's answer was the Fifty Million
German War Loan (1913) promulgated " in the
name of God."
Its meaning was obvious. The money was
largely to be spent on fortifications and " strategic
structures " on the Eastern frontiers. Germany
meant to fight. From that date the Kaiser looked
exclusively towards the East. From that date
Russo-German relations began sensibly to dete-
riorate. At the time, I wrote in The English Review
(April 1913) : " The game now is between Ger-
many and Russia. Germany will neither listen
to sense nor remonstrance. As there is no justi-
fication for her war fever, so there will be no
justification for her actions. She will arm and
attack if, and when, she pleases. The whole
European situation is curiously similar to the
terrorism of Bonaparte. The War Drum is beating
in Europe. On the question of the stability of
France, English opinion will have to take a
decision, and it will be the turning-point in Euro-
pean history."
A word now about the psychology of the Kaiser,
who is that dangerous compound, a religious
mystic. In Germany his nature is perfectly under-
* As the result of the dislocation of power in the Balkans,
German export and import trade in those parts very materially
diminished during the last year.
96 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
stood, his chief characteristic being " sudden
inspiration," what the Germans call Plbtzlichkeit.
The Kruger telegram is an example. The visit
to Morocco was undertaken at a moment's notice.
Pathologically, the Emperor is a man liable to
violent starts and fitfulness. It is a well-known
thing in the Emperor's entourage that no man
knows what the Emperor may do on the morrow.
If proof were needed we have but to consider the
extraordinary waywardness and changeability of
German diplomacy during the last twenty years,*
and we can see at once how irresponsible the Ger-
man course has been, now friendly to France,
now bullying her ; now approaching England,
now insulting her ; a policy which thoughtful
Germans long ago denounced as " Imperial Patri-
archism," leading to that spirit of chronic malaise
which has been so typical of modern Germany.
To this must be added the Emperor's " versatility,"
his passion for tall talk, telegrams, speeches, for
pomp and theatricality ; in short, the Plotzlich-
keit-Kaiser, as he is called in the Fatherland, has
always been the subject of ominous fear and
speculation.
The influence of such an autocrat made itself
felt throughout Germany in the triumph of
mediocrity — all personality being anathema to
the Kaiser, who gathered round him only willing
servants, placemen and soldiers ; and what kind
* The German course received its first shock over the Samoan
question with America, when Admiral Dewey gave the Kaiser
his first lesson in international comity. Since then the Kaiser
has given up the " indemnity " tradition, and lickspittle has
been the watchword towards everything American.
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 97
of men these were was revealed very conspicu-
ously by the " scandals " of the Emperor's " Round
Table," denounced by the journalist, Harden.
Germans have long recognized the danger of this
one-man rule. In Bavaria men have for years
protested against the Prussianification policy of
the Kaiser, the government of drill and militarism,
the perils of reliance upon the all-wisdom of a
single man, the absence of all constitutional check
and control, the absolute sovereignty of the First
War Lord, supported by the fighting military
class and the huge civilian army of bureaucratic
mediocrities.
The Emperor's way of " suddenly doing the
unexpected " is well known to all Germans. When,
a short time before the outbreak of the present
war, the Kaiser one night ordered the " full
mobilization " of all the regiments quartered in
and round Berlin (amounting to some 50,000
men), Europe saw no hidden design ; it never
occurred to us that the Emperor had his reasons
for " testing " the readiness of Brandenburg ;
from that day, none the less, in Germany men
prepared for the crisis of war.
Thus Germany has been dragooned by the
Kaiser on militarism, military arrogance and
swagger, overweening pride and cocksureness,
braced for war whenever it might suit the
Emperor to declare it. The Cambridge professors
who wrote of a peace-loving Germany are dreamers,
grotesquely ignorant of modern Germany. To
understand the German mind we must remember
that ever since Algeciras, Prussianism, which
contains all the controlling forces in Germany,
98 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
has been spoiling for the " Gewaltsame Ausein-
andersetzung" or forcible settlement. Up to the
year 1909 Germany expected England to attack
because, obviously, it was not to the interest of
Great Britain to allow the German Navy to ap-
proach the margin of " the fighting chance " ;
and good German sportsmen openly expressed the
opinion that if England did not seek to destroy
the German Navy before it had grown too strong,
she was either a fool or afraid. Let me recall
what happened in April-May 1907 as the result
of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman's article, pub-
lished in the weekly, The Nation, in which he
proposed a General Disarmament discussion at
the projected Hague Conference. Immediately
a war panic broke out all over Germany. The
Army was mobilized. The Navy was cleared
for action. I was in Germany at the time.
A high official in the German Foreign Office
told me that it was " the most diabolic ruse
to force Germany into isolation," and that if
England carried it out, Germany would fight for
her life." *
Since then a more sober view has obtained in
Germany, and it became the object of the Emperor
and Admiral Tirpitz to allay English suspicions
and expedite the building of the German Navy.
In which task the German-English policy of
Imperial "petite soins" blandishments, and
* In a little book, " England and Germany," published 1907
(Macmillan), I wrote : " In the event of hostilities Germany
would invade France within a few hours after the declaration
of war directly through Belgium ; nor is there any doubt that all
her military plans are drawn up with that intention,"
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 99
subterranean influence proved (as we can now
grimly look back upon) signally successful.
No doubt, after 1908, a better feeling towards
England did arise in Germany, in Bavaria in par-
ticular ; unfortunately, German policy is controlled
neither by feeling nor sentiment. What is quite
certain is that the German Navy was being built
for the issue with England, as Admiral Tirpitz
said to me once at a private dinner-party, " to
assert Germany's right of say on the seas." There
was never the smallest secrecy about that in Ger-
many. The only fear was " would England allow
us to grow strong enough at sea to risk it ? " The
various Moroccan crises all seemed to show that
England would refrain as long as she could, and
they were regarded by Germans as useful tests
of England's attitude. But though things looked
peaceful enough, Germany was always expecting
the war, and since Russia's defeat no longer even
feared it. That is the key to Germany's out-
break. Germans stood in the centre of Europe
penned in — some day they would have to " hack
their way through." That has been the common
sentiment for the last nine years. Mothers have
brought up their sons to expect it. That is why
the Germans wrecked the first Hague Conference
and nearly went to war when the most peaceful
Premier England ever had proposed another.
As a nation in arms, the Germans were on the
constant look-out for the " opportunity." The
grand adventure and the rise of an All-Germany
has been the subject of thousands of books, lectures,
pamphlets, and newspaper articles, in which pro-
fessorial and intellectual Germany played a con-
100 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
spicuous part. Furor Teutonicus has been the
constant dream of middle and upper class
Germany.
While for some years past it has been the object
of German diplomacy to play upon English senti-
mentality by conjuring up recollections of the
" Old Fatherland " of Kant and Goethe, of music
and the professors, of Michael with his beer and
sausage sandwiches, as a fact so complete has been
the Emperor's education of his people that now for
years (since the Panther incident, to be exact)
the German Press — under the direct guidance
of the Press Bureau in the Foreign Office — has
written of the Emperor as " The Peace Kaiser,"
" The pusillanimous War Lord," " Our Poltroon
Hohenzollern," &c., nor have the stringent laws
of lese-majeste ever been enforced. All this was
part of the Emperor's game. It upheld the fiction
of " William the Peaceful." It had its considered
effect upon English politicians. It invested the
Emperor with a halo of mystery. Above all,
it acted in a very insidious and subtle way as a
national irritant. Germans felt gratified at the
thought of being more militant than their Em-
peror. They felt they were leading him, as they
did in the days of the deliberately worked-up
outbreak of Anglophobia. Thus the spirit of
war has been kept up all the time. To keep
Germans up to the war mark has been the avowed
policy of the Government. The recent talk of
peace, disarmament, and " Grand Illusions " has
been scouted by Germans as fantastic nonsense.
General Bernhardi's book has been their gospel,
so much so that in recent years even the leaders
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 101
of Social Democracy have openly come into line
with the " defensive " argument of German
military policy.
The effect of militarism upon modern Germany *
has been — and there is no other word for it — the
brutalization of the finer feelings of humanity.
Based on a misreading of Nietzsche, Max Stirner
and egocentric theories of life, the general attitude
of the Germans has been moulded on the copy-
book of the drill Serjeant. Dozens of German
novels have described it. " Drauf Schlagen "
(smash your way through) is the common principle,
and it is acted on through all classes of society.
Brutality in Germany is synonymous with virility.
The Berlin police are notorious for their brutality.
The treatment of horses is sickening — the lash
is a German driver's sole remedy. I have seen
cavalry horses flogged till they shrieked. The
German working-classes are the roughest in the
world. As the Emperor has deliberately fostered
the use of duelling, so in all classes " bullying " is
countenanced and encouraged. When two Germans
meet it becomes a question which shall treat the
other " like a dog." Towards women the German
manner is an institution. In the schools boys
are whipped with a ferocity hardly to be credited.
As for the Army, the Socialists are never tired
of bringing forward cases of men driven to suicide
* In its incidence upon the public, its effects have been disas-
trous, leading to what German doctors have themselves described
as a pathological insanity, in which sex perversities played a pro-
minent part. Those interested should read Maximilian Harden 's
" Prozene," wherein he fleshes his satire on the diseased condition
of moral and social Germany, based on the material of the Law
Court*.
102 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
by Serjeants and officers ; indeed, the Army scandals
are the stock " copy " of every newspaper. It
is not that Germans are cruel — they have become
brutal as part of the deliberate national training.
Pity is a word expunged from their vocabulary.
That is why the South Germans hate the Prussians
so fiercely. To any one who knows modern Ger-
many the accounts of German brutalities in the
present war cannot cause the smallest surprise.
When the Chancellor informed the Reichstag
(August 4) that " necessity knows no law,"
and that Germans had broken into Belgium, he
merely expressed what every German there knew
to be the German war attitude ; nor was there
a man present who was not aware that the
German offensive would take the field through
Belgium.
A Governance by bullies obviously shuts out
much of the intelligence of the country. Diplo-
matically, German blundering has been exhibited
on countless occasions during the last decade.
Vertiginous arrogance, which has been the charac-
teristic of modern Germany, is not likely to pro-
duce either statesmen or soldiers. We must
remember that Germans sincerely believed their
Army to be invincible ; that it was only through
the staying hand of the Kaiser that it was not
years ago set in motion. Germans have often
told me that £700,000,000 would be the " next "
French indemnity — I mention it because it shows
the spirit. There is no humility in the Fatherland.
This German arrogance is bound to play a great
part in the war. The Kaiser's war tactics have
frequently been denounced by Germans, by
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 103
Colonel Gaedke notably. It is commonly assumed
that they are based on " mass shock tactics,"
regardless of life. Militarily, I am not qualified
to speak, but at the last German manoeuvres I
attended (in Poland), I shall never forget the
plight of the German infantry and artillery
sullenly waiting to be ridden down by the great
cavalry attack, which was three hours late in
coming. We could see the horses cantering along
two hours before the charge. " Why don't you
get on to that strategic crest ? " I asked an
officer. ' ' Why wait in the hollow to be attacked ? ' '
And he smiled. " We are here to be ridden down,"
he replied, " or the Kaiser's charge would fail."
So they waited and were duly ridden down. An
English officer present said to me afterwards,
" If they do that in war, the Germans will be
wiped out."
If it is asked why Germany attacked all Europe,
what motives could she have for risking the long-
prophesied Armageddon, the answer is that war
is the logical result of Germany's war system, the
end for which the German Stratocracy was created.
In the Times (August 11) a very interesting account
was given of the Emperor's personal feelings
about the Serajevo murders, which, in his posi-
tion of Kaiser " by divine right," he naturally
regarded as a personal insult to Majesty. But
the real reason is more than pathological : it is
that the Emperor regarded the right moment to
have arrived for the trial of strength which should
complete the German destiny.
The war was undertaken to found the " Greater "
Germany, as the Prussian Monarchy was the
104 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
military creation of the Mark Brandenburg, as
the German Empire, with its union with Austria,
was the realization by war of Bismarck's policy
of " Blood and Iron," which ever since has been
the cognizance of the Imperial Government. The
whole State organization of Prussia (Germany)
has been military from top to bottom through
history. Its social system is military. Its mon-
archs have always been soldiers. The entire
regime of the country is martial, maintained by
the military Junker classes, whose sole profession
is war, an aristocratic caste ruling and trained for
war, under the supreme command of the Mon-
arch. There is, and can be, no true public opinion,
no free Press, in Germany, because of this warlike
class fetish, which has a monopoly of all govern-
ment, all social position, all authority, privilege
and prestige.
The sole justification of the military Junker
classes being war — the successful results of war —
Germany, under the Hohenzollern Emperor,
existed avowedly for that purpose, and boasted
of its challenge. In a hundred speeches the Em-
peror has proclaimed the German policy — to
** strike terror " into all foes of the Fatherland.
Those who argue that Germans have been duped
into the present war must be unable to read
history.
The truth is that Germans, even the Bavarians,
with their Catholicism and aesthetic tastes, long
ago accepted the Bismarckian-Hohenzollern con-
ception of State reason which, whether it be styled
Realpolitik or Military Despotism, stood there in
Europe for war. I have often talked this matter
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 105
over with * Germans of all trades and always I
have received this answer : " Man is a fighting
animal. Fighting is therefore natural and, so,
justifiable. The Germans are fighters, the Ger-
mans, therefore, will fight and have the right to
fight for the possessions of the world, on land
and on sea."
To argue that Germans were not ready for this
war is ignorance — they have been expecting such
an outbreak for years, only they thought the
Emperor would not " take on " England and
Russia at the same time. Talk of the European
conflagration has been as common during the last
five years in Germany as was for years the " spring
war " in the Balkans. As a fact, upper and bour-
geois Germany have talked battles all this summer.
Professors in Berlin have said : " We won't stand
this much longer," and if you asked them what
they meant by " this " they said : " Oh, the Franco-
Russian menace ! " What they implied was that
Germany considered the position of the Slav had
grown too strong and that Germany, as is her
wont, would not permit it. In this attitude, the
German women encouraged their men. At the
height of the outbreak of Anglophobia in Germany
during the Boer War, the Emperor, surprised at
its virulence, asked Dr. v. Symens, who knew
England and the English well, the inspirer of the
German Anatolian Railway, what was its cause ;
and Dr. Symens replied — " the women." He
was right. German women have kept up the
* International brotherhood is one of the leading principles
of Social Democracy. It is right to say that German Socialists
do not share the German view.
106 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
anti-English spirit ever since. Military despotism
does not make for humanitarian sentiment. I
have heard intelligent German women say at their
own tables that nothing could give them greater
pleasure than for their sons to die in a naval battle
against the English. All through this summer,
ever since the Balkan War, German women have
acclaimed Germany's right to " break out."
Nor can there be any doubt, indeed the proof
lies in the " Diplomatic Correspondence," of which
a prScis is given in this book, that it was the
German object to seize the mouth of the Rhine
and push to the sea through Belgium, as part
spoils of the " conquest."
" He is a fool," Frederick the Great said, " and
that nation is a fool, who, having the power to
strike his enemy unawares, does not strike and
strike his deadliest." Such has been the motto of
Hohenzollern-Germany ever since. And when,
in 1911, President Taft's " message " of brother-
hood resounded through the world, it was Herr
Bethmann-Hollweg (the present Chancellor, till
recently regarded by half our pro-German Govern-
ment and a Party school of " politicians," as the
Anglophil friend of peace and culture) who gave
the German answer in Bismarckian language :
" The vital strength of a nation is the only measure
of that nation's armaments." Again, to Mr.
Winston Churchill's "Naval holiday" (1911),
to Mr. Haldane's visit to Berlin, the Emperor's
answer was the great War Loan. General Bern-
hardi's watchword, "World-Power or Downfall,"
is the accepted reason of German State policy,
the end of the Imperial design. To arm. to force
PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES 107
European armaments to the breaking-point —
to that point when one by one the other nations
felt they would either have to stop the mad ex-
penditure or fight — such has been Germany's
cynical peace policy, hailed in this country as
friendly and progressive. That Germany set out
to fight England and Russia as well as France
is due simply to the arrogant stupidity of the
Emperor and the Emperor's soldier advisers —
Bismarck certainly would never have attempted
it. It is due to the Kaiser's miscalculation of
the English character, to his misreading of history.
That war had become imminent after the War
Loan of 1913 was plain to all serious students of
foreign affairs. For ten years the peace of Europe
had hung on his Majesty's pleasure. It had only
been averted at the time of Austria's Bosnian
coup by the " climbing down " of Russia, as, on
various occasions over Morocco, war had only been
staved off by the climbing down of the French.*
Convinced as he (and all Germany) was that Eng-
land would not move, the Emperor without a
doubt thought he could " take on " France and
Russia by rolling up the French armies before
the Russians could take the offensive. That is
the explanation of the furious anti-English out-
breaks in Germany when it became known that
* For the last two years the attitude of the French soldiers
and civilians has been one of quiet and expectant resolution,
for France had made up her mind not to put up with any further
German indignities. In May of this year in Paris I found
everybody ready for war, which was openly talked of as "a
continual and insupportable menace." Everywhere I inquired
I heard the conviction expressed that " this time the Germans
would get a full run for their money."
108 PSYCHOLOGY AND MOTIVES
England was " coming in." From the military
German point of view, the Slav arm at Germany's
base was certainly a serious matter. The Em-
peror had been told that civil war in Ireland would
keep England quiet ; it was August ; France was
at the seaside Tangoing ; the French President was
away ;* Russia was reported to be " concerned,"
but not bellicose ; in the summer weather the
armies could move quickly ; we may be sure that
the Emperor thought the time propitious, the
cause both justified and logical for Germany's great
" expansion." In a word, the Emperor went
war-mad, as he had taught all Germans to under-
stand that on the chosen day he \vould.
* There can be no doubt that Russia was on the eve of another
revolution, just as England stood on the brink of internecine
warfare in Ireland. The Germans, as Nietzsche wrote of
them, "ludicrously ignorant of psychology and penetrative
social instinct," entirely misjudged the national character of
both English and Russians ; thinking that, if war broke out,
socialist Russia would rise up against the Tsar, and that India
and Ireland would keep England too occupied to dispatch an
expeditionary force to France. Bismarck would never have
made such an elemental blunder in statecraft. It shows how
curiously Germany failed to understand the principles of human
liberty, or the basic conditions of what one may call Anglo-
American civilization.
"MADE IN GERMANY'
" THERE," said a German diplomat, pointing to a
box marked Made in Germany, " is the Briton's
grievance against us. Too many things are made
in Germany."
Germans generally believe that it is jealousy
of Germany's phenomenal industrial progress
and her fast-growing merchant marine that has
caused the talk of war between England and
Germany for the last decade. In a measure this
is true. The old agricultural Germany has become
a vast workshop. It imports food for one-seventh
of its population of 64,000,000 people. It has
become, in fact, a nation like England that must
have outside markets to prosper, for its home
consumption will not take up the goods it makes.
To get oversea markets it has built up its great
merchant marine and to protect its merchant-
marine it has built its great navy. The German
Government is intimately linked with German
trade. Germany's foreign policies are designed
to find larger markets for the ever-increasing
German manufactures. With Germany, as with
other countries, the flag is likely to follow trade.
German manufacturers want a trade outlet to the
East. For example, the German Government,
through its Austrian ally, would like to reach the
109
110 " MADE IN GERMANY '
^Egean Sea. In its rapid commercial and maritime
rise the European countries that it has most often
met in competition are England and France.
Naturally their policies and their colonial empires
were used to encourage their own trade rather
than Germany's. To ensure the future of its foreign
trade Germany has in the last decade risen to
contest Great Britain's supremacy on the sea.
Germany's expansion is a natural phenomenon.
The country is overpopulated. It must expand.
The Atlantic Ocean is a barrier to its westerly
expansion. The north is uninviting. The south is
being drained of its resources by active and intelli-
gent inhabitants. The Drang nach Osten of German
Imperialism is therefore ^inevitable. The line of
least resistance points to the east, where fertile
territory awaits development.
The attention, therefore, of Germany's states-
men has been directed toward Oriental countries,
whose wealth of natural resources and genial climate
combine to render them ideally attractive. The
verdant vales and forest-clad mountains of Serbia,
Greece, and Bulgaria abound with raw material
necessary for Germany's increasing industries.
Beyond the narrow watercourse intervening between
Europe and Asia at the Dardanelles and Bosphorus
lies Asia Minor, a land marvellously rich in minerals
and susceptible of great agricultural development.
Farther toward the rising sun the exceedingly
fertile Mesopotamian valley, once the granary of
the civilized world, stretches between the western
Euphrates and Tigris, and bids fair to provide
humanity anew with vast supplies of grain and
cereals.
" MADE IN GERMANY ' 111
This is the vision which has dangled alluringly
before the minds of German and Austrian states-
men, working hand in hand, Austria paving the
way in the Balkans, Germany forcing herself
successfully towards control of Asia Minor, which
to-day is a German colony in all but name. By
joint efforts, the Dual Alliance have laid the
foundation of an empire whose northern shores will
be washed by the Baltic and whose southern
boundary will be formed by the Persian Gulf.
To the east, in South America, in China, the
German fleets have carried the products of German
mills and German factories. That phenomenal
growth, however, like most such things, has
developed certain weaknesses. The iron ore of
Germany is not inexhaustible, and already the
Krupps, the German steel king Thyssen, and others
have gone into Scandinavia, into Belgium, and
into Morocco. As Germany is likely to need raw
materials from abroad in the future, it already is
a great borrower of capital. There is not money
enough in the country to finance its industry.
In the autumn of 1911, for instance, when the
Agadir incident seemed capable of producing a
European war, Germany had to borrow £12,000,000
from the United States at twice the usual rate
of interest. It is generally believed that Germany's
financial dependence prevented a war in 1911.
Since then both Germany and France have been
hoarding gold for the struggle which is now
raging.
THE KAISER AND THE "MAILED
FIST"
BLOOD AND IRON — MANILA BAY — THE KRUGER
TELEGRAM — BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA —
AGADIR — AND THEN THE DELUGE
THERE is an explanation of the " blood and iron "
policy of Germany, of the " mailed fist " of the
Kaiser, of what Mr. H. G. Wells calls " that tramp-
ing, drilling foolery in the heart of Europe, that
has arrested civilization and darkened the hopes
of mankind for forty years — German Imperialism
and German militarism." The explanation is in
the history of the rise of Prussia. Bismarck
lifted Prussia from a second-rate member of the
German Confederation, which was dominated
by Austria, to a first place among the German
states and then formed round it a new nation
— Germany, and made that nation one of the
great Powers of the world. Bismarck believed
in autocracy, he believed in " blood and iron,"
in the " mailed fist." He achieved his success
by war, deliberately planned, prepared for and
efficiently carried out.
Look closely at the lessons of war and diplo-
macy which Emperor William inherits from his
grandfather and the Iron Chancellor.
112
THE " MAILED FIST ' 113
In 1862, Emperor William I, the grandfather
of the present ruler, was struggling to get the
Prussian Diet to grant him money to double the
size of his army. He had been unsuccessful in
this effort. He was about to give it up when as
a final experiment he consented to invite into
his ministry the then young reactionary leader,
Otto von Bismarck. Bismarck's political ideas
centred around the belief in the Prussian monarchy.
It had been the Prussian kings, not the Prussian
people that had made Prussia great. Bismarck
believed in the king and disbelieved in the people.
He hated democracy. He also believed in war
as a means of national progress. In the most
famous speech of his life in 1863 he announced,
" Not by speeches and majority votes are the
great questions of the day decided — but by ' blood
and iron.' ' These are the views of the man from
whom the present Emperor learned his statecraft.
In 1863, Prussia and Austria went to war, a war
chiefly of Bismarck's contriving, against Denmark,
and took the duchy of Lauenburg and the pro-
vinces of Schleswig and Holstein, in which the
Kiel Canal and the German naval base now are.
Austria was to administer Holstein, and Prussia
Schleswig. Prussia paid Austria £360,000 for
the duchy of Lauenburg. Bismarck approved this
whole arrangement because he thought it would
lead to war with Austria, and it was a part of his
" blood and iron " policy that a German nation
under Prussian domination could come only after
a war with Austria. There was not room in a
German Confederation for both Austria and Prussia
— " one or the other must bend." Within a year
H
114 THE " MAILED FIST '
after the division of Schleswig-Holstein, Bismarck
had obtained a promise from Napoleon III to
remain neutral if Prussia attacked Austria. He
also made a treaty with Italy providing that Italy
would join Prussia in a war on Austria if Prussia
began the war within three months for the sake
of reforms in the German Confederation. The
enemy was thus isolated, and Prussia was prepared
to use both " blood and iron." Bismarck im-
mediately and quite unexpectedly introduced
into the Diet of Frankfort, the governing body of
the German Confederation, a new plan for the
federation of German states. With this as a
background, to satisfy the Italian treaty, Bismarck
picked a quarrel with Austria over its adminis-
tration of Holstein, declared the old confederation
dissolved, attacked Austria, and invited the other
German states to do likewise. None of the other
important states sided with Prussia. Four of
them stood with Austria. But Prussia was pre-
pared, trained and ready for war. In seven weeks
Austria was defeated and soon after all Germany
was at the mercy of the Prussians.
Prussia now annexed the kingdom of Hanover,
four duchies and the free city of Frankfort, bring-
ing under the Prussian king practically all the
peoples and land along the north coast from the
Russian border to the border of Holland. There
was no thought of having the people of these
states vote on the question of annexation as had
been done in Italy. They were annexed by the
right of conquest on decrees issued from Berlin,
where one king who ruled by " divine right "
deposed two or three others whose thrones were
THE " MAILED FIST ' 115
similarly bolstered up. Thus increased, Prussia
became the leader in a new German Confederation
which included all but four German states and
from which Austria was excluded.
The " blood and iron " policy had triumphed.
Prussia had humbled Austria and become the
dominant power in Germany. Yet Germany
was not united. The four southern states still
were outside the Confederation. So there was
need for more " blood and iron." Bismarck
believed a war between France and Prussia in-
evitable and (Hazen's " Europe Since 1815,"
pp. 289-90) " in his opinion it was desirable as
the only way of completing the unification, since
Napoleon III would never willingly consent to the
extension of the Confederation to include the
South German states. All that he desired was
that it should come at precisely the right moment,
when Prussia was entirely ready, and that it should
come by act of France, so that Prussia could pose
before Europe as merely defending herself against
a wanton aggressor. In his ' Reminiscences '
he avows that he entertained his belief as early
as 1866. ' That a war with France would succeed
the war with Austria lay in the logic of history ' ;
and again, ' I did not doubt that a Franco-German
war must take place before the construction of a
United Germany could be realized.' The unifica-
tion of Germany being his supreme aim, he was
bound by logic and ambition to see that that war
occurred."
He explains frankly in his " Reminiscences " how
he brought the war about. There was a delicate
diplomatic situation between Prussia and France
116 THE " MAILED FIST '
in 1870 which arose over the succession to the
Spanish throne. The King of Prussia was at Ems.
The French ambassador went to see him and made
certain demands. The Emperor telegraphed these
to Bismarck saying that he could use his discretion
about publishing them. Von Moltke and Roon,
the great Prussian soldiers, were with Bismarck
when the telegram came. They were in a dejected
mood, for they saw no chance of war. Then, says
Bismarck, " I reduced the telegram by striking
out words but without adding or altering. . . .
After I read out the concentrated edition to my
two guests Moltke remarked : ' Now it has a
different ring ; it sounded before like a parley ;
now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge.'
I went on to explain : ' If in execution of his
Majesty's order I at once communicate this text,
which contains no alteration in or addition to the
telegram, not only to the newspapers, but also by
telegraph to all our embassies, it will be known in
Paris before midnight, and not only on account
of its contents, but also on account of the manner
of its distribution, will have the effect of a red
rag upon the Gallic bull. Fight we must if we do
not want to act the part of the vanquished without
a battle. Success, however, essentially depends
upon the impression which the origination of the
war makes upon us and others ; it is important
that we should be the party attacked, and this
Gallic overweening and touchiness will make us
if we announce in the face of Europe, so far as we
can without the speaking-tube of the Reichstag,
that we fearlessly met the public threats of France.'
He adds that 'this explanation brought about
THE " MAILED FIST ' 117
in the two generals a revulsion to a more joyous
mood, the liveliness of which surprised me.' '
The trick had its desired effect. France de-
clared war against Prussia. The ever-ready
" blood and iron " were loosed again.
Everything was as Bismarck wished. The
South German states joined Prussia. The French
were defeated quickly and completely. In less
than six months, after the first gun was fired,
on January 18, 1871, King William the First was
crowned Emperor of a united Germany, the four
southern states had joined the Empire, and
Alsace and Lorraine had been annexed to Prussia.
In less than ten years the great Chancellor
had turned a second-rate German state into an
Empire, a first-class Power among the nations
of the world. He did it by " blood and iron,"
by unscrupulous diplomacy backed by the best
trained army in Europe, and by unhesitatingly
throwing the country into war where the army
could be used.
The present Emperor inherited German mili-
tarism and German Imperialism, a belief in the
divine right of kings and the strength of the German
army. The lessons of the history of his country
and of his family are plain. Germany was built
by " blood and iron."
On his accession to the throne, in the speech
he made to the army and navy three days before
his speech to the people, he reiterated Bismarck's
doctrine in these words :
14 The soldier and the army, not parliamentary
majorities, have welded together the German
Empire. My confidence is placed on the army."
118 THE " MAILED FIST '
At the centenary of the firm of Krupp, at Essen,
the Emperor said :
" The history of this firm is a piece of Prussian
and German history. Krupp guns have been
with the Prussian lines and have thundered on
the battlefields which made ready the way to
German unity and won it at last."
William II broke with bhe great Chancellor,
not because he believed more in the people than
Bismarck, but because he believed so much in
the rule by divine right that he was unwilling
even to be overshadowed by the Chancellor who
had made the Empire.
Bismarck's use of " blood and iron " made
Germany the strongest nation on the European
continent. But he recognized very clearly that
" blood and iron " was a policy to be used with
great care. Before every one of the three wars
he precipitated he was careful to do two things :
(1) to isolate the country he was going to attack
by arrangements that would keep other nations
from interfering with his war, and (2) be certain
that his army was better prepared than the
enemy.
This was the game that Bismarck played by
which he achieved the great ambition of his life —
the unification of Germany.
The Emperor William has an even larger vision.
" Our future is on the water," he announced.
" The more the Germans go upon the water the
better it will be for us." This announcement
was in 1901. But the date of the first naval
programme was 1893, three years after Bismarck's
retirement. The Kiel Canal was opened in 1895.
THE " MAILED FIST ' 119
To further his imperialism, the Emperor has used
the " mailed fist," the threat of his army rather
than the army itself. It is interesting to see what
the Kaiser's imperialism, backed by the " mailed
fist," has achieved, and its influence in the present
crisis.
In 1895, the year in which the Kiel Canal was
opened, Germany joined France and Russia in a
demand upon Japan that it give up Port Arthur,
which it had just taken from the Chinese. The
interest of Russia and therefore of its ally, France,
was plain enough. Russia wanted the port itself.
Germany's interference seemed entirely uncalled
for and provoked much resentment in Japan.
This combination against Japan threw that country
upon England and resulted in the Anglo-Japanese
alliance which now gives the Japanese fleet an
excuse to attack the German port of Kiao-chau.
In 1896, the day after the Jameson raiders were
captured by the Boers, the Emperor William
congratulated President Kruger that it had been
done " without appealing to the help of the friendly
Powers." This direct slap at England was met
by the formation of a flying squadron and by
calling attention to the London Convention re-
serving supervision of the foreign relations of the
Transvaal to England. Later the Emperor snubbed
Kruger and was very friendly to England, but the
incident served to set English public opinion
against the Kaiser almost until the rise of the Ger-
man navy gave England a renewed feeling of
coolness.
In 1898, after Admiral Dewey had defeated
the Spanish fleet in Manila, Admiral Diederich
120 THE " MAILED FIST '
with a German fleet entered the harbour and
sounded the English admiral, who arrived about
the same time, as to what his attitude would be
were Germany to try to force the American fleet
to give up Manila. The answer was sufficient to
prevent any move on the part of the German
admiral, but not to prevent a feeling against the
German Government.
In 1905, the Emperor in person landed in
Morocco, where France felt it had particular
claims. As a result of this visit the Sultan refused
to accept the French programme and asked for
a conference with representatives of the leading
Powers to advise him. M. Delcasse, the French
Minister of Foreign Affairs, protested that France
would attend to the matter alone. The German
Chancellor, Von Biilow, used threatening language.
France submitted, M. Delcasse resigned. The
" mailed fist " had been successful and another
country was provoked against Germany.
In 1908 Austria took over Bosnia and Herze-
govina, England and Russia protesting that this
was against the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin.
Russia intimated that the annexation of Slav
provinces might lead to its interference. The
German Emperor responded with a threat of instant
mobilization. Russia had not recovered from its
Manchurian campaigns, and the Tsar had to back
down. Again the " mailed fist " was successful
and another nation was given a grievance against
Germany.
In 1909 an agreement was made with France con-
cerning Morocco. All was seemingly satisfactory
when on the July 1, 1911, the First Secretary
THE " MAILED FIST ' 121
of the German Embassy called upon the French
Foreign Minister to inform him of Germany's
decision to send a warship to Agadir. The cruiser
Panther served as the " mailed fist " this time.
She failed of her mission. France was not in-
timidated as before, but the incident was fresh
fuel to the French feeling against Germany.
In July 1900, at the launching of the Wittelsbach,
William II declared that the " ocean was indis-
pensable to German greatness " :
" The ocean teaches us that on its waves and
on its most distant shores no great decision can
any longer be taken without Germany and without
the German Emperor. I do not think that it was
in order to allow themselves to be excluded from
big foreign affairs that thirty years ago our people,
led by their princes, conquered and shed their
blood. Were the German people to let them-
selves be treated thus, it would be, and for
ever, the end of their world-power ; and I do
not mean that that shall ever cease. To em-
ploy, in order to prevent it, the suitable means,
if need be."
The Emperor has carried out his policies. Ger-
many has not been excluded from big foreign
affairs. No great decision has been taken without
Germany and the German Emperor. But the net
result of the activity has been to leave Germany
nearly isolated when the great war came — in the
very predicament in which Bismarck used to
manoeuvre the enemies of Germany before pro-
voking war. Moreover, he has forgotten Bis-
marck's maxim that " success essentially depends
upon the impression which the origination of the
122 THE " MAILED FIST '
war makes upon us and others ; it is important
that we should be the party attacked."
Whatever the provocation in this war, Germany
actually declared war first on Russia and France.
There is another policy or rather belief which
the Emperor William inherits. It is exemplified
in the speech he made as late as 1910, in which
he said :
" Considering myself as the instrument of the
Lord, without heeding the views and opinions of
the day, I go my way."
Against the spread of democratic principles
the Kaiser stands as the first defence. Behind
him, are the Emperor of Austria and the Tsar.
But the German Emperor, the champion of
Teutonism against the Slav, is the defender of
autocracy of which the Tsar is the best exponent.
The German Emperor's insistence on his divine
right has lost Germany the sympathy of the
democratic countries of the world.
At Oxford this year the German Ambassador
to England was given an honorary degree, and
in giving it the college authorities dwelt upon the
fact that the strained situation between England
and Germany that was acute in 1911 had been
entirely relieved. A few days later six English
battleships were in the friendly harbour of Kiel
during the great Kiel Week. Officers of both
nations danced gaily on the decks of the British
Dreadnought Ajax.
Five weeks later the Ajax with a great fleet
was in the North Sea " to capture or destroy "
their hosts of but a short time before.
The German Emperor cut short his yearly visit
THE " MAILED FIST ' 123
to Norway. President Poincare hurried back
from Russia to France, Earl Kitchener was stopped
on his way to Egypt and brought back to organize
England for war. Germany's threat prevented
Russia disturbing Austria's Balkan policies once
before. The " mailed fist " had worked against
almost every country in Europe and yet no war
had occurred. Then suddenly it fell ; Germany's
threat of mobilization was met by mobilization
elsewhere, and the Emperor found himself isolated,
fighting half the world and with little sympathy
from the other half. With him is only Austria,
which precipitated the struggle and to whose
assistance he went.
AUSTRIA'S CASE
BY AN AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT
•
This article was written before Great Britain
declared war on Austria-Hungary, and is included
on the principle of hearing both sides.
AT this portentous moment in history, when the
activities of Austria-Hungary in the Near East
have suddenly been made a world-issue by the
outbreak of the most terrible war in the history
of civilization, the aims and methods of the dual
monarchy are of paramount significance.
Situated upon the outskirts of Central Europe,
in the debatable region between the West and the
East, Austria stands in a peculiar sense as the
connecting link between civilization and vanishing
barbarism, between to-day and yesterday. The
double eagle of Austria is the symbol that con-
nects racial fragments in a civic bond which spells
progress and peace. The aims of Austria, whether
in the Balkans or farther east, are mainly com-
mercial and cultural. They are political only in
so far as the geographical situation of the dual
Empire makes it incumbent upon her statesmen
to maintain her territorial integrity and to pro-
vide for the normal expansion of her industrial
output.
124
AUSTRIA'S CASE 125
The attempt to centralize and Germanize the
Austrian Empire as a whole has been twice made —
once under the Emperor Joseph II, toward the
end of the eighteenth century, and again under
Francis Joseph after the suppression of the re-
volution of 1848. In each case the attempt
failed, and it was abandoned as impracticable
by the present Emperor-King. Hungary had
always retained its old liberties under the hegemony
of the Magyars. By the compromise of 1867 the
dual form of the monarchy was definitely fixed.
So carefully were the rights of the various races
in the Empire safeguarded under this readjustment
that in Hungary, for instance, the Croatians were
recognized as a separate entity, under their own Ban
or Governor, their separate Diet, and their distinct
machinery of local and provincial administration.
In Austria proper the constitution of 1867
created a central parliament in Vienna and left
a large measure of autonomy to the old provinces.
One of the most important articles of the con-
stitution guarantees to every nationality the free
use of its language " in word and writing." By
this means it made for ever impossible any attempt
to interfere with the legitimate aspirations of the
various races in the Empire. In fact, the entire
spirit of the new constitution was to assure to
each race the greatest and freest use of its language
in its educational system, from the primary school
to the university, in the Diets, in the provincial
legislatures and in the administration, excluding
only the ministries at Vienna, and in the courts
with the sole exception of the Supreme Court in
the imperial capital.
126 AUSTRIA'S CASE
Even to this last reservation in favour of a
central authority an exception is made. In
Polish litigation the entire process of litigation
and judicature, including the highest court, may
be carried on in the Polish language.
Only in the army common to the Empire is
there a common language, and that language is
the German. This arrangement is not based
upon any propaganda, but is the outcome of the
entirely practical consideration that an army
made up of so many races as is the Austro-Hun-
garian would be badly handicapped in the per-
formance of its duties if it did not have a common
language of command and communication. The
selection of the German language for this purpose
was the logical outcome of the German origin of
the Empire.
The tangible result of this practically unlimited
freedom of race-development is presented by the
present complexion of the Reichstag in Vienna.
So long as the franchise was based upon property
qualifications the votes of the landed proprietors
kept a disunited German majority in the Reichstag,
but the granting of universal suffrage upon the
personal initiative of the Emperor a few years ago
resulted in the return of a Slavic majority in the
imperial legislative chamber — a remarkable result
if one is to believe the persistent charges that
Austria has sought to destroy or Germanize the
Slavic nationalities within its boundaries.
This presence of a Slavic majority in the chamber
has brought about a state of affairs wherein no
Austrian administration can neglect the wishes
of the Slavic groups without being forced to resort
AUSTRIA'S CASE 127
to the short-lived and unpopular expedient of
imperial decrees.
Thanks to its liberal treatment of the claims
of contending nationalities, the German element
in many parts of Austria is already on the de-
fensive, and the ascendancy of the Slav element
is more and more felt in the political and intel-
lectual life of the Empire. The Slav has taken
the offensive all along the line, and the Germans
have lost many important positions in the civil
and financial administration and in the courts.
Bohemia is the centre of the Slavic movement.
In Prague, the capital of Bohemia, the new Czech
university is a dangerous rival to the old German
university, the renowned Carolina, founded in
1348 by the Emperor Charles of Luxemburg.
This Czech university has become the focus of
Slav science, literature, and thought — and, un-
fortunately, also of pan-Slavic agitation, as hun-
dreds of Servian and Croatian students have
flocked to its gates to be imbued with the dreams
of the future universal Slavic domination.
In the midst of these contending racial forces,
the mission of Austria has been, first, to introduce
among the great Slavic populations within her
borders the ideals of German culture and German
civilization. Her greatest achievements in this
direction have been in Bohemia. It is recognized
by the Slavic world universally that the Slavic
movement in Prague is the outcome of German
culture inculcated by Austria. It is one of the tragic
circumstances of history that the German culture
imparted to the Czechs is now operating in favour
of the pan-Slavic cause, intellectual and political.
128 AUSTRIA'S CASE
In the east, the mission of Austria has been
suggestively indicated by the flow of the Danube.
Eastward and southward, with the current of
the mighty river, have gone Austrian cultural
and industrial activities, hand in hand. And
one of the earliest stations of the commercial and
moral expansion — the stations of Austria's Drang
nach Osten — are Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The destinies of Bosnia and Herzegovina came
under the purview of Austria in 1876-77, when
the revolutionary movement in the provinces,
in conjunction with the Servian war against
Turkey, was suppressed with unexampled severities
by the Ottoman Government. At that time the
natural refuge for the stricken Christians of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was Austria. Two hundred thousand
of them were cast upon the resources of the
authorities and had to be taken care of. As there
was no promise of the immediate amelioration
of the stricken provinces, the question of the day
at Vienna became the final solution of the problem
of introducing order and personal security in the
territory infested by brigands and terrorized by
official severities, just across the Turkish border.
The relation of Austria to Bosnia and Herze-
govina duplicated in a marked degree that of
the United States and Texas during the Texan
uprising against Mexico, and the solution of the
problem in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
as in that of Texas, appeared to be an Austrian
occupation. This destiny of the distracted pro-
vinces was recognized by the Congress of Berlin,
which adjusted the affairs of south-eastern Europe
after the defeat of Turkey by Russia in 1877.
AUSTRIA'S CASE 129
The congress, after a thorough balancing of inter-
national interests and international jealousies,
handed over the two provinces to Austria for
pacification and administration, and conceded to
Austria the right to occupy the Sanjak of Novibazar,
the narrow strip of territory which lay between
Servia and Montenegro. This occupation was in
the nature of a condominium with Turkey.
Installed in Bosnia-Herzegovina by the man-
date of Europe, Austria entered upon its task
of cleaning the Augean stable of Bosnian affairs
with an energetic realization of the difficulties
of its undertaking. The first obstacle that con-
fronted the newly installed authorities was an
uprising of the Begs, or Mohammedan nobility.
Aroused by the land-owning Moslems, secretly
instigated by the Sultan, they undertook to oppose
by force of arms the peaceful entrance of Austria
into its new functions. The outcome of the con-
tumacy of the Begs was a six months' war, which
ended in the suppression of the Moslem resistance
and the restoration of internal peace. Next,
Austria undertook the task of cleaning out the
brigands who infested the country and made
travel and commerce practically impossible.
Side by side with measures for the pacification
of the provinces and the restoration of internal
order, the new Austrian administration accom-
plished wonders in the construction of a system
of roads, the first that Bosnia and Herzegovina
had had since the Ottoman conquest.
The land question in the newly occupied
provinces was extremely delicate. When Austria
marched into Bosnia she found there a survival
130 AUSTRIA'S CASE
of the feudal ages in the distribution of the land.
The entire area of the provinces, with rare ex-
ceptions, was owned by the Begs, and the tenants
who cultivated them for the scant reward of one-
half the produce were in a condition of serfdom.
Two alternative solutions of the question presented
themselves. One was the forcible expropriation
of the lands of the nobles, and the other was the
gradual distribution of the holdings through a
period of years.
It is one of the foremost grievances of the
Servian agitators on the Austrian border provinces
that the administration of the dual monarchy
did not at once proceed to the seizure of the land
and its distribution among the peasantry by
arbitrary means, after the method employed by
the Servians after the fall of the Ottoman power
in Servia. Such, however, was not the Austrian
method of dealing with the rights of property,
and it had been understood by the signatories to
the treaty of Berlin that no agrarian revolutionary
measures would be undertaken by Austria.
Baron Kallay, the first Austrian civil adminis-
trator of Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, adopted
the much more equitable and on the whole far
more successful plan of encouraging thrift among
the peasants, and at the same time enabling them
to achieve independence by the gradual acquisition
of the lands they cultivated. This conservative
reorganization of the agrarian system of the country
was accomplished through the aid of the Land
Bank of Bosnia, an institution of private finance
under the rigid supervision of the Government.
Baron Kallay's project, which produced highly
AUSTRIA'S CASE 131
satisfactory results, was carried on by his successors,
Burian and Bilinski.
The educational problem of the provinces was
no less difficult than that presented by the dis-
tribution of the land. When Austria entered
Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878, she found no schools
there, with the exception of a few mosque classes
and madrasahs for the chanting of Arabic prayers
and verses from Al Koran. Far from attempting
to make German the language of the people, or
even the language of the more highly educated
among them, the Austrian authorities at once
undertook the establishment of native schools, in
which the instruction should be carried on in Serb
or in Croatian, the former written in the Cyrillic
or Bulgarian alphabet, and the latter in Latin
characters. Not only was no attempt made to
introduce German schools, but the Government
declined to permit the expenditure of public money
for instruction in any language except the two
named idioms of the Slavic language.
This liberal policy stands out in sharp contrast
to the destructive activities of the Servians in
the newly occupied Macedonian lands, where
they have closed all the Bulgarian schools amid
circumstances of severity, to which some reference
is made in the Report of the Carnegie Commission.
Certainly there is nothing in the establishment
of Serb schools by Austria in Bosnia and Herze-
govina to justify the contention of the Servians
that Austria is seeking to crush out Serb nationality
under the rule of the double eagle.
Nevertheless, the Servian propaganda in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, following closely the Servian
AUSTRIA'S CASE
propaganda in its first stage in Macedonia, was
conducted along cultural lines, quite regardless
of the palpable fact that the people of Servia
themselves stood in need of all the cultural efforts
of which their Government and their financial
resources were capable. This fact is easily de-
monstrable when it is remembered that in 1909
the Slavs of Bosnia and Herzegovina, after thirty
years of Austrian administration, stood higher
educationally than any of the independent Slavic
nations of the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the
manifestly hostile purposes of the so-called cultural
Servian propaganda in the border provinces, the
Austrian authorities took no measures to combat
it until it had entered the phase of bomb-throwing,
in which the Servians had become adepts in the
course of their abortive struggle for the conversion
of Macedonia to Serbism. And that final and
intolerable phase of the Serb nationalist pro-
paganda was close at hand. The crisis began in
1909, when the Austrian Government declared
the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This annexation was based upon three essential
considerations, each one of which would have
been considered sufficient in itself by any nation.
The first of these considerations was the mandate
of Europe ; the second was the right of conquest,
established at the beginning of the occupation
by the suppression of the armed resistance of the
recalcitrant Begs ; the third was the expenditure
of about £50,000,000 by the dual monarchy for
the construction of railways and other means of
communication, public works of various sorts,
and education and local improvements ; and the
AUSTRIA'S CASE 133
fourth was the duty of continuing a r6gime which
had brought peace and prosperity to the country
itself. All the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin
readily acquiesced in the accomplished fact as a
logical outcome of accomplished events.
Servia, however, conceived that it had been
robbed by the act of the Austrian Government,
and the press of that country launched a campaign
of bitter and indecent vilification of the dual
monarchy. The contention of the Serbs that they
were entitled to the annexed provinces was based
upon two considerations, each easily demonstrable
as absurd. The first was that Bosnia and Herze-
govina had been a part of the great Servian Empire
under Stefan Dushan about five hundred years
ago. This argument may best be compared with
a Mexican claim to Texas because that state had
formerly been a part of Mexico. And the Servian
pretension to Bosnia-Herzegovina is very much
weaker than the hypothetical Mexican claim to
possession of Texas, because the inclusion of the
contested provinces in the gigantic empire of
Dushan (The Strangler), which was only one-tenth
as large as the State of Texas, lasted, as did the
empire, only about twenty years.
The second basis of the Servian claim to Bosnia-
Herzegovina is the allegation that the provinces
are inhabited by people of Serb race, of Servian
language and of Serb faith. Not one of these
contentions even approaches the facts. Of the
less than two millions of people who populate the
provinces, only 800,000 at the most are orthodox
Serbs. The remainder are Roman Catholic
Croatians, whose written language the Orthodox
184 AUSTRIA'S CASE
Serb cannot even read unless he has a knowledge
of the Latin characters, or Mohammedans, who
detest the Servians heartily and despise them
profoundly.
The frothing protests which the Servian press
continued to make against the act of annexation,
it was realized clearly at Vienna, were instigated
partly from St. Petersburg, where the statesmen
saw, or pretended to see, a fresh sign of Austrian
encroachment upon the Southern Slavs, those dear
Southern Slavs whose destinies have been for
centuries the pawns on the chessboard of Russian
diplomacy. But the Russian statesmen did not
observe, or, observing, did not care to admit, that
Austria, while annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina,
had definitely abandoned her alleged road to
Salonika by the withdrawal of her troops from
the Sanjak of Novibazar, which was the key to
the military situation in any advance farther
south and east. A glance at the map will con-
vince even the most hostile critic of Austrian policy
in the Balkans that the abandonment of Novibazar
by Austria is incompatible with any suspicion
of an Austrian design of territorial expansion in
the direction of Salonika or of Constantinople.
Thus events wore on toward the culminating
tragedy of Serajevo. In 1913 the Serbs had
attained a wild dream through the annexation
of a large part of Bulgarian Macedonia by the
defeat of Bulgaria in the second Balkan War.
The Servian campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
following out its previous metamorphosis in the
Macedonian agitation that preceded the alliance
with Bulgaria for the first Balkan War, emerged
AUSTRIA'S CASE 135
from the " cultural " stage and entered the bomb-
throwing phase. The assassination of the Arch-
duke Francis Ferdinand and his consort at
Serajevo by a young Serb patriot this summer
startled the world and aroused Austria to the
imperative need of energetic action to put a check
upon a political and racial movement which had
degenerated into a conspiracy to commit murder.
The tremendous events which have cast the
world in gloom since July 23, are the outcome of
Servia's resistance to Austria's demand for a
cessation of this orgy of violence. The Servians
have opposed Austria's civilizing mission with
unpardonable venom, and Austria has not flinched
before the task of undertaking to crush that
opposition.
ITALY'S HATRED OF AUSTRIA
WHY SHE HELD BACK FEOM HER ALLIES OF THE
TRIPLE ALLIANCE
THE reason why Italy held off from her allies in
the Triple Alliance is written large in her history.
The grandfather of the present king of Italy,
Victor Emmanuel, of Sardinia, with Cavour's
guidance, made an alliance with Napoleon III and
picked a quarrel with Austria in 1859 much as
Bismarck in 1866 made a treaty with Italy and
picked a quarrel with Austria. In each case these
nation-builders deliberately provoked war as a
means to the unification of their country. In the cam-
paigns of 1859, Lombardy was taken from Austria.
In 1866, in alliance with Prussia, Italy went to war
with Austria again, this time, chiefly as a result of
the Prussian victory at Sadowa, receiving Venetia
from Austria. Austria was held to be the chief
enemy of Italy's independence and unity. Despite
this, however, in 1882 Italy joined Germany and
Austria in the Triple Alliance. This unnatural
alignment was entered into chiefly because France,
Italy's normal ally, had blocked her colonial
ambitions in Tunis. Yet the alliance never made
Austria popular with Italians, nor did it cover the
Mediterranean or the Adriatic. The head of the
136
ITALY'S HATRED OF AUSTRIA 137
Adriatic is a constant source of enmity between
Italy and Austria. In Trieste and Fiume, sea-
ports of Austria, the population is chiefly Italian.
Italy has always coveted not only these ports but
the Albanian shore of the Adriatic as well. She
looks with suspicion upon the German-Austrian
attempts to dominate the Balkans. Early in the
Italian-Turkish War Italy began to bombard the
Albanian coast, then held by Turkey. She was
immediately warned off from Avlona by Austria.
This added fresh vigour to the old antipathy.
Again, the tension over the control of the Adriatic
was so acute during the Balkan War that there was
even a possibility of hostilities between Italy and
Austria. When, therefore, the question of renew-
ing the Triple Alliance came up in 1913, it was only
with great difficulty that Germany succeeded in
getting Italy to join it again, even though it was
only a defensive alliance and did not include
the Mediterranean. The Italians look upon
securing Trieste and the control of the Adriatic
as the French look upon reconquering Alsace and
Lorraine.
Austria stands fair in the path of this ambition.
The memory of former wars and the recognition of
present conflicting policies make the Italian people
unwilling to support Austria. The Italian Govern-
ment's decision that it was not bound to help
Austria and Germany because they were not
engaged in a defensive war, relieved it from entering
upon a warlike policy which would probably have
failed of public support.
Moreover, Italy has nothing to gain by a war
against the Triple Entente, unless it might be part
138 ITALY'S HATRED OF AUSTRIA
of France's North African possessions. The chance
of acquiring these would hardly be worth exposing
a long coast-line to the French and English
Mediterranean fleets. On the contrary, a German-
Austrian victory would almost certainly work
harm to Italy's hope of control in the Adriatic.
THE BALKANS
THE GREATER SERBIA IDEA WHICH BROUGHT ON
THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT — THE SANJAK
OF NOVIBAZAR, A LITTLE-KNOWN LOCALITY
THAT WAS ONE OF THE PRIME CAUSES OF WAR
AT the present time the most interesting thing
about the Balkans is the idea of a greater Serbia.
In Serbia itself, including territory recently
acquired, there are about 4,500,000 Serbs. In
Montenegro there are perhaps 500,000. In Austria
there are nearly 3,500,000 Serbs and Croats who
belong to the Serbian race.
The Serbians dream and talk and write of a
greater Serbian kingdom that shall take in all
the Serbian race. They want it to take in more
than that. They want it to take in Bulgaria
also. They look back to the time of King Stephen
Dushan (fourteenth century) and his French wife,
when Serbia was supreme in the Balkans and was
nearly as advanced in civilization as the great
nations of Europe. They feel that the recent battle
of Kumanova against the Bulgarians atones for
the battle on the plains of Kossovo in 1389, which
put Serbia under Turkish rule — a battle about
which the Serbian peasants still sing folk-lore
ballads. The re-establishment of this ancient
189
140 THE BALKANS
kingdom has become a passion with the Serbs,
not only those in Serbia, but many of those in
Hungary as well. These Serbs might have become
satisfied with Hungarian rule if it had been more
enlightened, but the Magyars have followed a
repressive policy in trying to Magyarize the races
under their domination. No matter whose fault
it is, the fact remains that the Serbs of Hungary
have watched with eagerness and delight the
recent successes of Serbia.
As explained by Mr. Morton Fullerton, in his
" Problems of Power " : " Up to 1905 this little
nations of farmers and stock-breeders (in 1912,
Serbian exports amounted to about one hundred
million francs, out of which 62 per cent, was
represented by the products of the soil, and 20 per
cent, by cattle and pork), remained in economic
subjection to Austria. Austria's dream was to
annex Serbia to her great composite Empire.
Whenever Serbia displayed signs of political
independence, Austria, who all but monopolized
Serbian exports, began the economic blackmailing
of her imprisoned neighbour by closing her markets
to Serbian pork and beef. A Serbian statesman,
M. Pashitch, resolved to put an end to these
humiliations. In 1906 he proposed a customs
union between the three Slav states of the Balkans,
and thus took the first step towards the formation
of that Balkan Confederation which six years
later was to astonish the world. Serbian live-
stock was partially diverted from the old Austrian
routes and transported by the Danube, the
Ludwigs-Canal, and the Main to German markets.
A second outlet for Serbian products was procured
THE BALKANS 141
at Varna by means of concessions accorded on
the Bulgarian railways. A favourable treaty of
commerce was arranged with France. Little by
little the old trade-current through Bosnia and
to the Dalmatian coast was diminished and Serbia
was now selling her pork and cereals, without the
Austrian middleman, through the channel of the
Black Sea ports and Salonika, in all the Medi-
terranean ports, from Syria by way of Egypt to
Italy. The need of direct communication between
the Danube and the Adriatic became steadily
more obvious, and Serbian claims to economic
autonomy, the only form of independence which
in the modern world is the sign of political auto-
nomy, became more and more legitimate. Austrian
imports fell from 60 per cent, to 35 per cent.
Then came the war of 1912. Within only a few
days after the opening of hostilities, Austria beheld
the Serbian troops in possession of Uskub, of old
Serbia, of a large portion of the sanjak of Novi-
bazar, and rapidly making for the Adriatic coast-
line. A national policy of more than thirty years
was thereby suddenly stultified. Serbia had burst
her bounds, and was no longer the ward of the
Dual Monarchy. In an adroit appeal addressed
to English sympathy, through the Times (November
24, 1912), the Serbian Prime Minister, M. Pashitch,
explained that independence of trade and economic
liberty were not only necessary for Serbia's develop-
ment, and even for her existence, but also ad-
vantageous to the world ; an Adriatic outlet, he
argued, would give Serbia new neighbours, " since
every maritime nation would then be Serbia's
neighbour as much as Austria is to-day." Serbia
142 THE BALKANS
was particularly happy at the thought that she
was thus to secure direct contact with England,
and to live henceforth in close relations with the
nations of the West."
In 1908, when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Serbia felt that at any time it
might be the next victim. The army which was
launched first against the Turks and then against
the Bulgars was originally prepared to meet an
Austrian-Hungarian advance. It is now fulfilling
that mission. Austria-Hungary has naturally
chafed at the growth of a greater Serbian kingdom
which would mean not only the loss of her Serb
provinces but also the end of her ambition for
further outlets on the Adriatic and the ^Egean.
The Dual Monarchy has felt that not only Serbians
individually but the Serbian Government itself
was preaching this hostile doctrine. A former
prime minister, Count Aehrenthal, tried to show
the complicity of the Serbian Government in the
famous Agram trials, but it was proved that his
evidence was forged. Nevertheless, the funda-
mental situation remained. Serbia's success in
the Balkan War was propaganda enough. Sooner
or later, without the Serbian Government's moving
a finger, the Serbs of Hungary were likely to revolt.
A successful Serbia was therefore a perpetual
menace to Austrian peace and integrity. When a
Serb killed the Archduke Francis Ferdinand,
Austria saw its opportunity to remove the constant
menace from its frontier. It took his death as
the excuse, and declared war.
If this were all the story the war would have
been localized to these two countries. But Russia's
THE BALKANS 143
policy has been to encourage the Slav kingdom
of Serbia in territory where the Powers will not
let her go herself. On the other hand, Germany
has always hoped to reach the East through
its ally, Austria. Before the last Balkan War
there was a strip of territory, the sanjak of Novi-
bazar, belonging to Turkey, which ran up between
Serbia and Montenegro and touched Austria.
Through this route Austria, and through Austria,
Germany hoped to reach the ^Egean and the East.
After the Balkan War Serbia and Montenegro took
this territory and put a solid line of Slav domination
across the path of German -Austrian ambitions.
Unless the policy of years — the Drang nach
Osten — was to be given up, here was another
fundamental reason why Austria and the greater
Serbia idea could not live peaceably together.
In no country in the world has the question
of population caused so much bitter dispute as
in the Balkans. Because of racial and national
animosities and jealousies, census figures have
been deliberately padded and falsified, especially
in that territory which was, until recently, European
Turkey. Only in Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece
proper have genuine census enumerations been
made.
Bulgaria claims to have had a population, in
1910, before the war, of about 4,337,000, this
being increased since the war, through new
territory, by about half a million. Serbia reported
2,900,000 in 1910, the new territory increasing
this by a little more than 1,500,000. In Greece
the population was 2,730,000 before the war and
144 THE BALKANS
now is almost 4,400,000. Little Montenegro, one
hundred miles in length by a bare eighty in width,
adds a trifle more than 500,000 to the total. The
estimate for Albania, on a conservative basis, is
about 800,000.
It is in the proportionate numbers of the various
races and nationalities, however, that the greatest
confusion exists. Nowhere in the world is there
such a variety of different peoples intermingling
with each other.
Broadly classified, the Slavs, Turks, and the
Greeks are the chief elements. Of these three,
the Slavs predominate by a vast majority, but
they again are sharply subdivided into two
branches ; the Bulgars and the Serbians.
The consensus of opinion would indicate that
the Greeks predominate in the large cities and
towns and along the seacoasts. In the interior
they are not found much north of Salonika. Greeks
in the cities are found as far north as Varna and
Bourgas, and even on the other side of the Danube,
in Roumania, most of them being engaged hi
commercial vocations.
In the interior the Bulgarians claim that they
constitute the main bulk of the population down
almost to the foot of Mount Olympus and as far west
as Albania, up to Old Serbia, although the Serbians
affirm that many of these people are really Serbians
Bulgarized. Thence, up to the old frontiers and
over into Montenegro the Serbians preponderate.
The Turks are nowhere found in a solid mass,
but they are scattered over almost the entire
Balkans, even up in the Austrian provinces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Nowhere are they more
THE BALKANS 145
numerous than in northern Bulgaria, along the
banks of the Danube, and in the northern cities
of Varna and Bourgas they still form a considerable
portion of the population. The Bulgarian census
figures give their number at almost 500,000, about
a seventh of the total population. Serbia only
admits having 14,000 Turks within her territory,
but this is undoubtedly an under-estimate. There
is no doubt that the Serbians have been energetic
in driving the Turks out of Serbia during their
longer period of independence.
Of the minor race divisions the Albanians
deserve first mention. They are supposed to be
the direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians,
who have remained racially pure on account of
the mountainous character of their country.
While the majority are Mohammedans by faith,
they differ markedly from the Turks, being rough
in their manners, less fanatical in matters of re-
ligion, and not at all inclined toward steady
pursuits. They are still in the patriarchal stage
of social development, living in clans as did the
highlanders of Scotland two centuries ago.
Next to the Albanians in numbers come the
Jews. These are the direct descendants of the
Jews who were driven out of Spain during the
period of the Inquisition by Torquemada and were
so hospitably received by the Sultan of Turkey.
To this day their speech does not differ very much
from modern Spanish. Up in Bulgaria they
number nearly 40,000, and farther south they
become more numerous. In Salonika, now a
Greek city, the Jews form a big majority of the
population, numbering about 100,000 out of a
146 THE BALKANS
mixed total of 174,000. Almost to a man they are
engaged in trade. They have always had friendly
relations with the Turks and have enjoyed many
special favours under the Turkish Government.
The Wallachs are another considerable portion
of the population throughout the Balkans, especially
in the mountainous regions. They have usually
been classified as Roumanians, but they differ
somewhat from the Roumanians in Roumania
proper.
Another scattered element is the Gipsy, especially
in Bulgaria and Serbia. These people are the
lowest in standards of living and culture of all the
Balkan races. While all of them speak Turkish
their natural tongue differs from any other Balkan
dialect. They call themselves " Copts," which
alone would indicate their Egyptian origin.
Although the Serbians and the Bulgarians,
forming the biggest element in the Balkans, are
classified as Slavs, there is still a striking difference
in racial characteristics between them. The
Bulgar, slow, heavy, inclined to be morose and
tongue-tied, suspicious of strangers, uncouth, is
not really a pure Slav. Originally the country
which he now occupies was populated by an
Asiatic race, called Volgars, because of their having
come from the River Volga. It is supposed that
they and the Hungarians and the Finns are of the
same origin.
Later the Slavic hordes overran the country,
sweeping down to the borders of Greece. The
Bulgars were completely overcome and assimilated
with the Slavs. To-day not a trace of their
original tongue remains, the language of the
THE BALKANS 147
Bulgarians being the purest of all the Slavic
dialects, not excepting even the Russian. But
they still retain certain physical and tempera-
mental characteristics that are distinctly not
Slavic, such as their rather dark features and
stolidity.
The Serbians are everything that the Bulgarians
are not. Physically they are fairer and more
refined in appearance. By temperament they
are light-hearted, joyous, frivolous, and charming to
deal with. Their country being more suited for
defence, they were never completely overrun by
the Turks, and as a consequence they still retain,
like the Greeks, a native aristocracy of culture.
The Turks, too, present some wide differences
of race. In the north of Bulgaria, along the
banks of the Danube, there is a strong Tartar
strain among them, whereas farther south many
of them are simply converted Bulgars, called
Pomaks, speaking the same tongue as their
Christian neighbours, but hating them cordially.
Nor is there to be found a permanent friend-
ship between any of these elements. That they
could unite, even temporarily, during the attack
upon Turkey was the wonder of wonders to all
who have an acquaintance with the peoples of the
Balkans. This mutual animosity has its founda-
tion in history as well as in difference of race. In
recent times Serbia and Bulgaria have fought each
other twice. The Greeks have a universal pre-
judice against all Slavs, wherever they live.
In 1884, when Bulgaria took over the rebel-
ling province of Eastern Rumelia from Turkey,
Russia, fearing the menace of a territorially
148 THE BALKANS
aggrandized Bulgaria, yet not daring to interfere
openly on account of the attitude of Great Britain,
persuaded the Serbians to attack Bulgaria. The
Serbians were completely routed in one three-day
battle, for which defeat Russia was never able to
forgive Bulgaria. On then* side the Bulgarians,
though feeling a warm affinity for the Russian
people, have always violently hated the Russian
autocracy. Nowhere in Europe have the Russian
political exiles found a surer refuge than in Bulgaria.
Of all countries this is the only one which has
steadily refused to molest these refugees at the
behest of the Russian police.
Serbia, on the contrary, has always looked to
Russia as its protector against the aggressions
of the Austrians. As a natural political result
Bulgaria has found it necessary to maintain an
understanding with Austria, to counteract the
continual Russian intrigues against Bulgarian in-
dependence. Aside from that policy, of which the
mass of the people know little, the Bulgarian has
little sentiment to waste for the " Schwab," as
he calls all Germans. In any general upheaval
it is more than likely that politics would be for-
gotten if the will of the people were consulted, and
Bulgaria would stand side by side with the Russians.
With the exception of the northern Albanians,
who are chiefly adherents of the Roman Catholic
Church, all the Christians of the Balkan countries
belong to what is generally known as the Eastern,
or Greek, Catholic Church. At one time it was
really the Greek Church, with the Patriarch at the
head, which included them all within its flocks.
But after the liberation of Serbia and Bulgaria
THE BALKANS 149
these countries formed separate churches, between
which and the original Greek Church there existed
an animosity which was not felt toward the Roman
Church. As the various Governments have warred
for territory, so these churches have fought for
adherents. The original Greek Church carried
its propaganda so far that it organized bands of
armed men who overran parts of Macedonia,
forcing the adherents of the other churches to
declare themselves Greeks, the alternative being
the destruction of then* villages, cattle, and even
themselves and families. Nor were these empty
threats ; actually thousands of people, both men
and women, were killed by these terrorists of the
Church and dozens of villages were burned. The
peasants, on their part, organized armed bands to
protect themselves against the Greek Church, and
many were the bloody fights engaged in by these
armed bands, the Turkish soldiers supporting the
forces of the Church while the peasantry gave aid
and comfort to the informal militia bands. Hardly
a peasant in the mountain regions but has been out
at least once in a general or local insurrection
against the Turks or against the terrorist bands
of the Greek Church.
HOLLAND DEFENDED BY WATER
BY LETTING IN WATER THAT KEEPS
OUT THE ENEMY
WATER is the only means of defence of the low
countries. The Kingdom of the Netherlands has
no hills and to keep the heart of the country intact
it is obliged to sacrifice many miles of territory
which during the course of ages she has gained
upon the ocean. Instead of a defensive line of hills
Holland has a defensive line of water. The Dutch
Government never has been very liberal with the
details of its waterline defence, and the fortifications
which, in time of peace, look like artificial hills
covered with a luxurious coat of grass, can never
be approached by the curious tourist without an
immediate warning not to come too near and to
refrain from getting a very thorough look at
these strangely shaped mounds.
In case of danger the Government would be
removed from The Hague to Amsterdam. The
troops in the outlying provinces would slowly
retreat, destroying the bridges across the large
southern rivers and thus stopping the progress
of the enemy for several days. They would
then occupy the fortifications around Amsterdam
and make ready for a siege. The German invader
150
WATER DEFENDS HOLLAND 151
might come as far as the dykes of the old bed of
the River Rhine, but from there on he would meet
with grave difficulties. The large artificial lake
which would be formed by opening the locks of the
canals near Ymuiden and Katwyk and the dykes
near Amsterdam would, within twenty-four hours,
cover the entire countryside with a sheet of water
which is too deep to be crossed by a wading force,
and which at the same time is too shallow to
allow the use of armed vessels. It is true that
modern siege guns might fire across this expanse of
water. But the nature of the ground of the out-
lying territory is such that it will be so thoroughly
drenched after a few hours contact with water
that no heavy siege gun can be posted upon the
muddy substance.
The system of defence is a desperate one. It
will mean the loss of untold millions. It will
mean the undoing of the work of five or six
centuries. But in case the independence of Holland
is attacked it is the only means by which the
people can show their aversion to foreign domina-
tion ; and in the past they have several times
made the sacrifice.
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
BY AUSTIN HARRISON
THE Spartan example set by the Belgians, set by
the defenders of Liege, has given the watchword
to Allied Europe. It is clear that the Germans
never anticipated resistance in Belgium, that they
expected the mere presence of the German soldiery
in Belgian territory to strike the " terror " needful
for submission. For years Belgium has been
assiduously " courted " ad hoc by Germany, apart
from the pan-German racial pretension. When
King Leopold went to Berlin at the time of the
" Congo Atrocities " the whole German press
welcomed him with adulations. Only the other
day the Kaiser was received " royally " at
Brussels. For a long time past in pan-German
circles Belgium has been called the " West Mark."
But the military evidence alone is enough to show
that the Emperor confidently thought that his
regiments would march through " smiling " Bel-
gium, pushing through into France, and so fall
upon the French unexpectedly from behind and
crumble up the necessarily long French line of
defence on the frontiers.
The Belgians have frustrated the whole German
" surprise," which was to strike quickly and
152
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 153
decisively. Without any doubt, Liege will stand
out as one of the great corner-stones in history.
As a military achievement it will take rank among
the most heroic achievements of all time ; but
apart from its positive influence upon the German
plan, its moral influence will be decisive upon the
entire future course of the campaign. Caught
unawares, ignored and attacked solely because she
was supposed to be " helpless," Belgium has been
plunged into the horrors of war, invaded and
brutalized in a manner reminiscent only of Prussia's
attack on Denmark in 1864, as part of the then
German scheme of territorial aggrandizement ;
and Belgium has shattered the great myth of
German invincibility, has arrested the treacherous
offensive of Berlin, has given the call to civilization
to rise up and shatter the monstrous war-madness
of the Emperor at last revealed in his true light
to an astounded Europe.
The duty and task of Allied Europe is thus
defensive and punitive. Civilization stands to-day
in the position it was forced into a century ago,
only the cannibalism this time comes from Ger-
many. At the present moment the honour of
peoples is at stake. The cause for which the
Allied Forces have been compelled to take
up arms is the sacred cause of Liberty. Law,
progress, respect for national and civic rights,
responsibilities and obligations, communal and
individual decency, all that civilization has learnt
to prize and uphold, all that man holds dear — his
home, his liberty, his country, his independence
— these things Europe is fighting for with an
absolutely clean conscience. Not a nation in
154 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
Europe wanted war a month ago. We who have
no quarrel with the Germans qua Germans, who
admire them intensely, who demand nothing more
than to live and let live, are fighting now once
more the great battle of civilization, as we fought
for it in the Napoleonic era. What Europe is
fighting to-day is the madness of the greatest
military monarchism the world has ever known.
The Germans are fighting France and Russia,
Belgium and England, not for any grievance
political, diplomatic, economic, dynastic, princely
or religious, but because for predatory motives
their Emperor considered the time had come for
the long-heralded German attack upon the old
map of Europe ; the barriers of peoples which
shut out the German flag from the seas, which kept
Germany a geographical prisoner in the centre
of Europe, a map marked out, as Germans contend,
during the period of shame and disintegration of
the German peoples. It is a war of the Huns,*
the deliberate attempt on the part of Germans to
impose the doctrine of might upon Europe, to
conquer and crush down nationalities, to break
out over Europe after the manner of savage tribes,
and spread by force the Gormanic arm. In its
entire conception the German invasion is Napo-
leonic. It is what Germans have long spoken of
as the " Great Day." They are fighting to expand,
ruthlessly to destroy, to superimpose Germanism
* " When you meet the foe you will smash him. No quarter
will be given, no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into
your hands be at your mercy. Gain, the reputation of the Huns
of Attila." — The Kaiser to his troops (the Boxer Expedition,
July 27, 1900),
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 155
upon Western and South Central Europe ; to
claim the mouths of the Rhine and the Danube,
to flout every canon of civilization, to carry death
and destruction into the hamlets of the weaker
peoples and strangle their independence, to burn,
slay and subjugate the less warlike civilizations for
the glory of Teutonic ambition.
And this war is the logical and only possible
result of the giant armament system imposed upon
Europe in self-defence by German militarism.
To the Allies it is thus in the truest sense of the
word a religious war. No question of dogma, of
*' Holy Places." It is the struggle, the " bust-up,"
of materialism, the inevitable clash between the
polarities of Might versus Right which govern
Europe.
So European civilization stands upon its trial.
The triumph of German arms would mean the
breakdown of humanity under the despotism of
Force. It would sanctify the rights of brute
conquest, and destroy all vestige of national
liberty in Europe. If the enthusiasm which in-
spires the German soldiers is glory, the fire glowing
in the veins of every unit of the Allied Forces is
the religious flame of justice. Never have peoples
fought for a nobler cause. Every shot fired in its
name is aimed against tyranny, brutality, military
fanaticism, despotism, barbarism. The defence
of the little peoples of Europe has become a sacred
right. For failure spells ruin and the unutterable
shame of what we call civilization. Success, the
driving back of the Germanic invasion, means hope
— the hope civilization will at last have won to —
to realize itself for higher ends and truer purposes ;
156 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
to start afresh on nobler lines and for greater
causes ; to establish finer patterns of polity and
social governance, happier conditions — to remove
the incubus of the past.
This is certain. The German aim does not stop
at the mere defeat of the French, the holding up
of the Russian advance. It is far deeper. Ger-
many's object is the deliberate attempt to fight
to the coasts. On the way, France was to be
crippled ; Belgium to be annexed, and in all
probability Holland ; the Balkan States were to
be crushed and devastated ; Austria-Hungary
was to effect the long-cherished " landslide " down
to Constantinople ; and as a result Denmark, too,
would have been incorporated. These things have
long been the avowed ambition of pan-Germans,
of the Military Party, largely of intellectual
Germany,* of the German women. It is a war
of race. The technical cause of the war — Austria's
claim to punish Serbia — is the merest pretext.
Germany had but to find a diplomatic formula
and Austria would have been permitted to chastise
Serbia as much as she liked. She refused. At
any time the Emperor could have stopped the
crisis before the outbreak of hostilities. He refused.
Germany had decided to strike. With the despera-
tion that she decided to strike, so we may be sure
she will fight.
Let no one think this war has been lightly
engaged upon, or that the Germans will show a
craven spirit. Whatever German strategy will
reveal, we must count on a death struggle. To
* This is the war of aristocratic and middle-class Germany.
The poor are only the tools of the German despotism.
the Germans, to the German Empire, above all
to the Hohenzollern Emperor William, this war
means life or death : on its issue the entire future
of the German Empire depends, the fate of the
German military classes, and of the Prussian
military system — the fate of the Kaiser. He knows
that German defeat carries with it his certain
death. Born fanatic, soldier by the ancestral
tradition of centuries, he will fight as Frederick
fought, as the Barbarossas fought, as the Great
Electors of Brandenburg fought, in the spirit of
the " Mark." The German Army will fight with
him. As time goes on and German soldiers begin
to realize the stupendous resistance they have con-
jured up, the magnitude of the task before them,
we may be sure the national character of the
struggle will fire them to deeds of magnificent
bravery and stubbornness. To count on the
breakdown of German finance would be quite
wrong. To imagine that Germans at home will
rise up in " peace demonstrations " is to misjudge
the German character. On both sides now war
is regarded as a religious duty. Every German
will soon have it borne in upon him that he is
fighting for his Fatherland, for the German place
in history, for all that Bismarck and Moltke, Roon
and the war of 1870 gave to him. He will die for
these things. All the men who lead him are
traditional soldiers — they will not fail. Germany,
All-Germany, is fighting for history. They have
gone into war determined to conquer at all costs,
anyhow. They will wage war desperately, no
matter what mistakes the German staff makes,
no matter what holocausts are demanded of them.
158 THE TASK OF TH& ALLIES
Indeed, the mad storm of Liege proves it. Their
whole military training is based on the principle
of " shock tactics." Let us remember that, and
respect these men. They will attack like the
Japanese. The battles they will fight will be the
bloodiest affairs in history.
That the Germans will make many mistakes, will
sacrifice men ruthlessly and stupidly, is to be
expected — " gun carrion " is the German soldier's
trust. They have always scorned the lessons of
the modern arm, revealed in the Boer War. " We
can afford to lose men " is the axiom of German
military science. Almost alone in Europe, the
Germans have had no experience of modern
warfare. The contingent they sent out to China
was notoriously the worst equipped. At the
manoeuvres their serried ranks, their mass attacks
and toy cavalry charges, have been the annual
dismay of every foreign military attache in the
field. We may count confidently on terrible
German losses, but we should remember that in
German Kriegsspiel lives are of no account.
There is another point not to be overlooked —
the Socialism in the army (over four millions voted
" red " at the last elections) ; the known hatred
of the men for their officers and Serjeants, due to
the brutality of the discipline. That, too, will
play a part. There is a soul in all victorious
armies, which, with the Germans, is lacking.
Every French soldier worshipped Napoleon. To
the German soldiers the Kaiser means nothing
personal. Here the cynicism of modern material-
istic Germany will work with deadly destruction.
It is not conceivable that these Germans will fight
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 159
with the solidarity of the French and Belgians,
fighting for their very homes. There can be no
God with the Germans battling for vainglory.
The spirit of brutality running right through the
army is not an asset of strength in a struggle for
life. We may be sure of that. When the real
struggle for Germany begins, these things will
count desperately.
None the less the Allies must be prepared to
fight to the death. And Europe will win. Already
the Belgians have struck the note of the war —
the vindication of the little peoples. Once more, to
the astonishment of Bismarckian Germany, it is a
little nation which has saved Europe, united Europe
as never before in the modern world. There is no
question of diplomacy about it. The independence
which Belgium is fighting for is the key to the
whole situation. The German attack, which is
the climax of monarchic and military alliances,
systems and despotisms, has been challenged at
the outset by what was regarded as the most
insignificant military people in Europe. What
Belgium has struck for is the old principle of
Freedom. It is the justification of nationality,
the ideal ruthlessly destroyed by Prussia and
Bismarck, as a great many observers at the time,
including Disraeli, predicted. Instead of an up-
holder of peace, the European system of Alliances
— the Panjandrum Concert of the Powers — has
been the inevitable cause of the conflagration —
at the expense of the little peoples. It is for these
peoples, primarily, that the Allies are fighting.
Already their spirit has been seized in the Tsar's
proclamation of independence to the Poles. So,
160 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
at the very beginning of the war, the fell work
of Catherine, Maria Teresa, and Frederick has
been swept away in the cause of humanity and
national independence. It sounds the clarion
call of Allied Europe. It is Europe's answer
to Germanic invasion, the blast of Victory and
Freedom.
At the end of this war there will be vast changes,
upheavals and subversions. As civilization is now
fighting for its life's justification, so as the in-
evitable result that civilization will change. The
old order of things will go with the old ideas of
Monarchical government, with the musty Feudal
system of Kings and military autocracies which,
as we have seen, have burst by process of self-
combustion. Entirely new ideas, social and
political, will come into the world, for militarism,
as such, lies in its death grapple. The spirit of
man will come into life as the result of his victory,
and the old social systems which survive in Europe
will disappear. The peoples will take over the
right of war into their own hands. As the struggle
for freedom, this is the people's war : it will be
the people's victory. With it, a new political
science will arise. Germany, who went into the
war blessed by the Kaiser " with God," has shown
up, as nothing else could, the inept anachronism
of ecclesiastical Christianity powerless to prevent
this hideous crime, yet invoked grotesquely by
Germans to lead and anoint them. It is a quaint
thought that the most Catholic country in the
world started the war ; that Catholic and Protestant
Germans are fighting against Catholic and Pro-
testant defenders. Insensate, hollow and power-
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 161
less, ecclesiastical wooden Christianity stands
revealed to the world, and it will go with all the
other mediaeval legacies and shibboleths of an-
tiquity. This war will be the great clearing-house
of civilization. As its result, enlightened man will
start anew. The fog of mediaeval superstitions
will be blown away. It will close the book of
history as written by the schoolmen, the heroics
of the Carlyles and the Treitschkes — the copybook
history of Kings, with their courtiers' intrigues,
battles, princely feuds, and chapters of religious
tyranny. It is the final and inevitable cataclysm
of rotten, effete, and mischievous survivals,
heralding the dawn of a saner and nobler
epoch.
All this is inevitable. For years civilization has
stood on the brink of the debacle. For years
Europe has groaned under the insensate weight
of armaments, hanging on the fear of this or that
monarch's displeasure, entangled in the irre-
sponsible and anachronistic system of secret
diplomacy vested in the power of some half-dozen
more or less unknown individuals. It is incon-
ceivable that man — not to speak of modern woman
— will emerge from this field of blood, the old-time
pawn of militarism. When the dead are all buried,
there will have to be a totally new conception of
national responsibility, national government and
authority. " Never again " will have to be the
watchword of enlightened Europe, never again will
men tolerate the old dark secrecy of Courts and
Governments, the huge systems of military auto-
cracy, the delirium of vested kingship. Fitly,
logically, the European system has crumbled down,
162 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
because an Archduke * was assassinated, a man
whom the Germans themselves regarded with un-
disguised mistrust : notoriously a religious fanatic,
an element of discord and danger, whose advent
to the throne was commonly spoken of by
Austrians as the " storm signal " in Europe.
What form these changes will take, how they
will take place, whether by internal revolutions
or by the accord of the people's representatives,
it is too early to predict, perhaps unwise to attempt
to. But these changes will come sure enough.
This war is the last struggle of old pipeclay Europe,
its final act of desperation, inevitable and necessary.
It is the breakdown of material greed, gross con-
ceptions of life, false values, false idols, false gods
and their derivative human mannequins, and its
effects will purify and remodel the world.
In the meanwhile, the ghastly duty of Allied
Europe is war — war carried on against the German
invasion to the last extremities. We English
once more have been favoured by fortune. The
avowed enemy of this country, the people who
were getting ready by every means in their power
to challenge our supremacy on the seas, to destroy
our navy, and wrest our Colonies from us — this
enemy by the superlative folly of arrogant mili-
tarism now finds itself at grips not only with the
two most powerful forces on land, but with the
supreme power at sea. Almost it would seem a
Providence watched over Britain's interests. For
us — and the assertion is made in no spirit of brag-
* The full story of the murders has yet to be told. We may
very possibly hear that his assassination was not wholly distaste-
ful to Germany.
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 163
gadocio, but very deliberately as the result of
calm observation and reflection — this war cannot
but end beneficially to us in every sense of the word.
We could never have fought the Germans on land
without an army. Within ten years, had the peace
of Europe been upheld, we should have had to
fight for our very homes with Germany on the
seas. This chance, which, with our pacific political
notions, might have well reached the point of
jeopardy, has been spared to us. The German
onslaught will break itself against the guns of
France and Belgium, against the guns of Russia.
Our business is the destruction of the German
navy. As the certain result of the war, Europe
will be financially stricken down, destitute, its
trade largely shattered, its financial system
maimed, its mechanism in a state of chaos. We,
in our little Island — almost alone in Europe — will
remain immune. Our sea power is our world
power. The gigantic wealth of the country will
be ready when normal conditions come round
again to step in and play the banker — we and
America. Secure from invasion, England will
find herself, at the end of the war, in much the
same position towards Europe that we stood in
after Waterloo. It will give the needed stimulus
to English manufacturers, almost compel English-
men to provide much of what hitherto came from
Germany. Our merchants, our middlemen, our
buyers and sellers will almost inevitably take over
many of the markets formerly held by Germans.
We shall be able to lend where all Europe is a
borrower. Economically, the war will give England
the greatest commercial impetus it has ever
164 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
received ; nor can anything, short of the destruction
of our navy, prevent it.
During the war, of course, we shall suffer with
the rest of Europe, but mfinitesimally less in
comparison with all the other nations, thanks to
our insular position; thanks, above all, to the
British navy. It is, indeed, as if Fortune had
conspired to perpetuate the wealth and significance
of this country. The idea of panic in England
is fantastic. Any man who preserves a sane
outlook can see the inevitable economic results
of the present conflagration, the need there will
be for money and goods and markets, the desti-
tution of commercial Europe, beggared and hungry.
The succour necessary England will provide.
Those markets England will come into. The
money England will furnish. Had the god of Fate
been asked to bestow upon England the greatest
possible gift in his power, he could have given
us nothing half so profitable, half so improbably
providential. With the folly of madness, Germany
has cast all her wealth, national greatness, strength,
hegemony, and fortunes into the crucible of a war
which is bound to destroy her. Her military and
naval strength will be broken ; her wealth will
be dissipated ; her markets will be forfeited. All
that she has achieved in world-power she will lose.
And the moral effect of the German crash will be
even greater. The war will knit together, not only
the English peoples, but the entire English-speaking
world. It is impossible for America not to feel the
repercussion of the great European disaster ; it is in-
conceivable that she should not respond to it. She
will. As blood is thicker than water so this Teutonic
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 165
invasion, which is nothing less than an onslaught
on civilization, will kindle, in the entire English-
speaking world, that union of spirit and sentiment
which hitherto has been lacking — the brotherhood
of a common civilization, built up on the pillars
and altar of freedom. Instead of the consolidation
of the Germanic peoples — the object of the Kaiser's
war — it is the English-speaking peoples who will
perforce be welded together, united in a common
cause. One of the great principles which this war
will bring before humanity will be a settled standard
of civilization, the standard as set by England in
the defence of the French. In this trust, England
and America will be as one. The New World
sympathizes, and must sympathize, with the
Allied Defence. We may be sure Americans will
not forget it. They will triumph with our triumphs,
cheer for our victories, clasp hands across the
waters with us. The attempts at misrepresentation
made by the astute German Ambassador in America
will fail. Almost the entire American Press has
branded the Kaiser's outbreak as the action of a
" mad dog." See what a response there has been
in England across the seas ! We may feel proud
of these kinsmen of ours. We may feel equally
confident of the American spirit of common sense.
England, in her own despite dragged into
hostilities, goes into the European fray with the
quiet confidence of victory. It is an utter im-
possibility that the Germans should win, should
be able to " eviscerate " civilization. As before
said, we English stand to win all through. Already
we find the little Island recovered from the first
shock, calm and businesslike, unshaken, her credit
166 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
unimpaired. With the felicity of the English
practical man, Mr. H. G. Morgan has defined the
attitude of England as " business as usual." The
word is — carry on. We will carry on. England
has resumed the office of Pitt in Europe, naturally,
as it were, responding to her historic role. All
the qualities latent in the English race have risen
to the occasion, and there is neither complaint nor
bombast. A grim duty has fallen upon our sailors.
They will fulfil it. Our duty, primarily, is to
destroy the German fleet ; to assist the French
on land with all the means in our power. It is
not to be supposed that our navy will issue from
the ordeal unscathed. The Germans have sown
the seas with mines ; there have been " accidents ";
there may be a pitched and catastrophic naval
battle. But we who are sheltered on the island
look forward without trepidation. It is one of
the paradoxes of our insular situation that tens
of thousands of Englishmen who would give their
souls to stand in the fighting line in the defence
of country are doomed to impotence, and must
needs await the issue with what composure they
may. It is not the least of the trials to be borne
by us. To be sure, the most envied men in
England to-day are those who man our ships.
It is the same with the army. We saw young
Belgians crowded in trains en route for the front,
men who were " called up " against the enemy,
and we would have given all to be conscripts too,
going forth at the call of arms, instead of spectators
watching them from the stations . All over England
men gnash their teeth that they are not able to
help stem the barbaric onrush of the Kaiser.
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 167
Never has the nobility of a citizen Army been
brought home to us so poignantly. We feel it
to be the right of the individual male to face the
common foe. We hear of the Belgian and French
mobilizations, of France denuded of young men,
of women getting in the harvest, and our hearts
ache with the denial. At this moment we know
it is an honour to fight. The married men, those
over thirty, try hard to go about their business,
but every hour of the day is an exercise in discipline
and self-denial. Yes, it is very hard this enforced
passivity of Englishmen. What would thousands
of us not give now for conscription ! If the
Government were to impose compulsory service
in England to-morrow, it would be acclaimed as
the blessings of the millennium.
Had we a conscriptionist army, the Emperor
would never have attempted this war. The result
in England is a profound feeling of dissatisfaction
which at once found expression in a fervour of
sporadic volunteer organizations, schemes and
offers, as at the time of the Boer War, threatening
the waste inseparable from disjointed effort. Very
splendid, no doubt, but not what is needed to roll
up the Kaiser's legions. It is the price we pay
for the nation's refusal to have a citizen army.
As a result, thousands of men, especially men over
thirty, are debarred from any active participation
in the war, men who otherwise would be of in-
estimable service. In France, at the declaration
of war, every man went automatically to his post ;
there was no excitement, no confusion, nothing
was left to volunteer patriotism ; the entire male
machine of France was set in motion ; it was not
168 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
a question of only the young men having their
opportunity ; male France marched to the front
as one man. " C'est la guerre."
Even now at the time of writing all traces of the
" panicky " feeling have vanished. As a fact,
England is serenely safe. All idea of invasion may
be dismissed as fantastic. It has been accepted,
even by arm-chair strategists, that a raid on these
coasts could not be attempted under at least a
force of 100,000 men ; that such a raid, even
carried out successfully, could only be regarded
as a " desperate hope " for the purpose of frighten-
ing the general public ; and that "invasion by
evasion " — cutting through the defending navy
—is against our fleet hardly a serious proposition.
There can be no doubt about it. The military
authorities are quite right to take all precau-
tions, to prepare for raids, but unless our navy
is practically put "out of being," it is the most
improbable thing in the world that the Germans
will either find the men to spare for such a purpose
or find the means of " evasion " so easy that
any ship in the Kaiser's navy would attempt
it. Were Russia neutral, it would be a different
matter. As it is, the invasion is " not likely."
It being of great importance that things in this
country should carry on, it is to be hoped that by
September people will return to the east coast
resorts, many of which, owing to the ludicrous ideas
of bombs from German Zeppelins, raids and
torpedo attacks, have seriously suffered from the
exodus ; while many people in a small way — hotel-
keepers, lodging-house keepers, and shop-keepers
there have been very hard put to it. There are
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 169
probably not five airmen in Germany who could
hope to achieve anything by a flight across the North
Sea. As for the Zeppelins, nothing would give our
" old sports " more pleasure than to be able to snipe
at them, if by some untoward chance a couple or
so were blown this way. It is a pity that public
notices were not in the early days placarded by
the authorities in all these places, telling the public
there was no danger. As it was, a great many
families foolishly curtailed their holidays, and a
great deal of fun for the children on the shores was
lost.
No, England is as safe as the Mississippi, and
those who require proof have but to remember
the feat of our navy* in shepherding the Expedi-
tionary Army across the Channel " without acci-
dent." That was a splendid achievement. To
many of us, England's confounded safety is the
annoying part of this war. Here we are absolutely
shielded by our navy, bursting to do something,
dreaming we are lying in trenches by the side of
many of the waiters who the other day brought
us our dinner and " overcharged " us, yet con-
strained to go about our business, even to play
golf, because, well, because we are not trained
soldiers, and therefore are not wanted ! If 300,000
Germans effected a landing, a shout of joy would
go up among us. To be sure, not a man of them
would survive. But that, alas ! is not conceivable.
We can but fight with the " lead " of the Press :
seeking to acquire the contemplative spirit, for we
* The "fortunate and fruitful" scrap in the Bight of
Heligoland has given the Germans a foretaste of English sea-
power.
170 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
are the " women " in this war, the " Girls they
left behind them."
All the same, we have to steel our hearts for the
terrible events that will come, to be ready for
every emergency. The fight that has begun will
be pitiless, disastrous beyond all precedent. Con-
fident, as we have all reason to be, we may expect
set-backs, reverses, long intervals of anxiety and
silence. Not for a moment is it to be supposed
that the German forces will not fight with the
bravery of their race. Not for a moment is it to
be thought that the Allies' task is a light one.
On the contrary. This is the supreme crisis in
European history. The Allies will have to fight
their way through step by step, passionately,
heroically. Every inch of the German lines will
be disputed. Unless the Emperor proves himself
a poltroon — which is not to be anticipated — the
Germans will fight till they are beaten.
Militarily, apart from the Titanic forces engaged,
the conditions are against the Germans. They
are crippled at sea, with their entire oversea trade
swept off the waters, their fleet doomed to inaction
or to the " great chance " with England. On
land their whole campaign depended upon swift-
ness. It was to be a campaign of haste — the dash
through Belgium, the infliction of a pulverizing
defeat on the French so as to be ready to meet
the Russians. Haste is a bad general. So it has
proved. Hence the mad attempts to " rush "
Liege, the reckless pouring of German troops into
Belgium, regardless of commissariat, the attempts
of the Uhlans to " ride through " at any price, the
savage reprisals of German soldiers, maddened at
THE TASK OF THE ALLIES 171
the unexpected opposition. These things show
that the ground plan of the German advance has
miscarried. At the beginning their chief asset
was time. It has become their enemy, thanks to
the Belgian defence, which checked and " held
up " the German offensive. For the Germans the
war has opened badly. Their opportunity lay in
swift and devastating attack. It has failed. They
will now have to fight without the auxiliary of time.
Thus, the war which broke out as the result of
German diplomatic miscalculation has begun with
repulse due to haste and military misjudgment.
But the difficulties of war on this stupendous
scale are incalculable, and may well prove in-
superable. Owing to the terrific power of modern
guns, their awful moral effect, the enormous
strength of modern fortifications, the almost
impossibility of successful mass charges, rushes,
and the carrying of positions by assault, and the
stupendous difficulties of feeding and supplying such
armies, not to speak of the inevitable shortage of
horses and the rainy season beginning in September,
the armies on both sides may not improbably
fight themselves in the winter months to a condition
of stale -mate, neither side being able to push home
a " crowning mercy," to annihilate or put to rout.
We must expect a long and terrible war. The
experiences of the Japanese at the three weeks'
battle of Mukden rather point to the likelihood of
battles being neither won nor wholly lost, of de-
struction minus result. All the same, Germany has
far more to lose than the Allies have by the protrac-
tion of war which as yet has only begun.*
* This was written before the " staggering " successes of Russian
172 THE TASK OF THE ALLIES
The task of the Allies is clear. They must press
on. There can be no Peace now till the forces
of England and France, of Belgium and Russia,
march through the Brandenburg Gate of Berlin,
past the statue of Bismarck, to the gates of the
Emperor's Castle, there to impose the conditions
of Europe and restore to France the annexed
provinces. In the name of civilization, the Allied
Powers must cripple German militarism with all
that it stands for, once and for always. They
must decree the end of the Bismarckian era. They
must extract the fangs of the Hohenzollerns.
arms. Once more, German military opinion has failed. It was
supposed in Berlin that the German Western Army of invasion
had a good seven weeks before the Russians could effectively
move. As we have seen, their miscalculation has proved fatal.
At the moment of the German menace on Paris, every available
man had to be recalled to save Austria and East Prussia, resulting
in the German retreat from France, the great victory of the
Allies at the Marne, the complete failure of the strategic advance
in France, brought about by the Belgium defence, British
heroism and German misjudgment.
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
THEIR NUMBERS, CHARACTER, ARMS, AND THE
PROBLEMS BEFORE THEM — THE FORTIFICA-
CATIONS AND THE STRATEGY OF THE WAR
THE war in which all Europe is embarked will
undoubtedly be the most gigantic struggle in the
history of the world — so gigantic that even the
Napoleonic wars will seem like dwarfs in com-
parison.
To understand the present situation in Europe
one must look at the arms and aims of each country
in turn.
Ever since the reign of Ivan the Great (1462-
1505), Russia has pursued one policy with extra-
ordinary consistency, her effort being to obtain
access to the sea, especially in warm waters. The
wars which she has waged against Poland, Sweden,
the Turks of the Khanate of the Crimea, Prussia,
Napoleon, the Turks in 1877-78, and Japan, her
advance in Central Asia and her intrigues in the
Far East, in Persia and the Balkans, are all part
and parcel of this policy. She has constituted
herself the protectress of the Slavonic people in
the Balkans, in return for which they may help her
to secure Constantinople, the plum upon which she
has looked with longing eyes for centuries.
173
174 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
It is an open secret that Russian expansion
deliberately aims at a United Slavic Balkan penin-
sula, bordering south and eastward on the Adriatic,
the Marmora, and the Black Sea, with complete
control of their strategic sea-gates, the Bosphorus
and the Dardanelles. Germany, geographically
inside of Russia's enveloping ambitions, is even
more resolved upon an expanding empire, which
shall extend eventually from Dutch and Belgian
ports on the North Sea, clear through what is now
Turkey, along the line of the Bagdad railway to
the Persian Gulf.
Austria is keenly alive to its need to control
the Adriatic, hence her occupation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina in 1908, her resolution not to permit
the Serbians to have the port of Scutari, and her
recent creation of the Kingdom of Albania. Her
recent stand with respect to Serbia is based upon
her determination to permit no interference with
her rights in that part of Europe.
At the back of these Austrian ambitions is the
Pan-Germanic idea — the German slogan of the
famous March to the East — which is diametri-
cally opposed, as already indicated, to a Russianized
Balkans, or powerful Slav-Balkan state.
The map of Europe shows Great Britain separated
from the continent by a narrow strip of water
which has played a role in history only equalled
by the Mediterranean. Her security is dependent
mainly upon the ability of her fleets to prevent
invasion. Her land forces in the past have been
a secondary consideration. Her task is to defend
the British Isles ; to protect the carrying trade of
the world which is in her hands ; to keep open
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 175
communication with her colonial possessions
scattered all over the globe ; and to prevent her
food supply from abroad from being cut off lest
she starve to death.
The main motive in France is revenge for 1870-71
and the reconquest of the lost provinces of Alsace
and Lorraine.
European armament and European armies are
at the same time the result of these conflicting
ambitions, just briefly indicated, and the means
by which each nation hopes to satisfy its own
territorial hunger at the expense of the other
nations.
For the benefit of the uninitiated in military
matters, it may be said that almost every great
nation has a regular army, and one, two, or three
reserves. In time of peace the regular armies
are kept on a reduced or " peace footing." When
war is imminent, they are enlarged to their " war
footing " by augmenting them to full strength,
either by additional men drawn from the reserves
or by recruiting, and by organizing, equipping
and supplying them for active operations in the
field. This is known as mobilization. Army
affairs are administered by a council presided over
by the Minister of War, which includes certain
high military officers charged with duties necessary
to the proper management of land forces. One
of these is the Chief of the General Staff, who is
nearly always the commander-in-chief in time of
war. The General Staff prepares all plans of war,
sees to the proper co-ordination of the various
branches of the service, and superintends the
execution of the plans determined upon. There
176 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
are two kinds of troops : mobile, and fixed, i.e.
stationed in fortifications. The mobile troops
are of two sorts : those of the line, i.e. the fighting
men, which include the infantry, cavalry and
artillery; and those of the staff. Broadly speaking
the infantry is organized as follows :
THE ORGANIZATION OF AN ARMY
Infantry
& — A squad is 8 men under the command of a corporal.
/^ „ A section is 1 6 men under the command of a ser jeant,
<? — T 3., A platoon is from 50 to 75 men under a lieutenant.
'J&OA. company is 3 platoons, 200 to 250 men, under a captain.
& A battalion is 4 or more companies under a major.
^ & d & A regiment is 3 or more battalions under a colonel, or a
60 m, ^^JMSentenant-colonel.
Q A brigade is 2 or 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.
A division is 2 or more brigades under a major-general.
[* An army corps is 2 or more brigades, supplemented by cavalry,
artillery, engineers, &c., under a major-general or lieutenant-
general.
Cavalry
A section is 8 men under a corporal.
A platoon is 36 to 50 men under a lieutenant, or junior captain.
A troop is 3 to 4 platoons, 125 to 150 men, under a captain.
A squadron is 3 troops under a senior captain, or a major.
A regiment is 4 to 6 squadrons under a colonel.
A brigade is 3 regiments under a brigadier-general.
A division is 2 or 3 brigades under a major-general.
Artillery
A battery is 130 to 180 men, with 4 to 6 guns (8 in the Russian
army) under a captain.
A group or battalion is 3 or 4 batteries under a major.
A regiment is 3 or 4 groups (battalions) under a colonel.
When regiments are combined into brigades,
brigades into divisions, and divisions into army
corps, cavalry, artillery, and certain other auxiliary
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 177
troops, such as engineers, signal corps, aeroplane
corps, &c., are joined with them in such proportions
as has been found necessary. Every unit, from
the company up, has its own supply and ammuni-
tion wagons, field hospitals, &c.
In Europe almost every man has done com-
pulsory service with the colours, varying from
one to four years, and apart from the usual drills
and instruction, has received training in manoeuvres
great or small, where the endeavour is made to
reproduce the exact conditions which will occur
in war. At times, however, even the " grands
manoeuvres " degenerate into what smacks strongly
of optra bouffe, despite every effort to the con-
trary. The writer vividly recollects a charge of
five regiments of French cavalry across nearly
800 yards of absolutely open country against a
battery, a battalion of infantry, and a regiment
of dismounted dragoons in September last, and
the unconcealed disgust of one old soldier who had
fought in the battles around Metz in 1870 at what
he characterized as " crass idiocy." Even more
spectacular was the charge of eighty squadrons
of Bavarian cavalry, numbering more than 9000
men, across about 1000 yards of open ground against
a strong position held by a brigade of Saxon
infantry and several batteries, led by the German
Emperor in person some years ago. The umpires
decided that it was successful, whereat the military
attaches smiled and remarked, as did Marshal
MacMahon of the charge of the Light Brigade at
Balaclava, " C'est magnifique, mais ce rfest pas la
guerre ! " (It is magnificent, but it is not war !)
Upon another occasion the Kaiser indulged in a
178 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
similarly preposterous charge, but upon galloping
up to the umpires and inquiring, " How's that ? "
was greeted with the firm but diplomatic answer,
" All dead but one, your Majesty." It must not
be supposed that such licence is always the case,
for the training is often severe, and in the various
schools of musketry the utmost attention is paid
to good marksmanship — no nation being more
thorough in all that relates to military matters
than Germany.
To understand the efficiency of European
soldiers and the never-ceasing preparation for
war, let us examine the systems of the leading
continental Powers, beginning with the one which
has the greatest reputation.
GERMANY
The German army on a peace footing consists
of 31,459 officers and 768,540 men, military
service being compulsory and universal with
certain exemptions. Liability to service (Wehr-
pflicht) begins at the age of seventeen and ends at
forty-five ; actual service (Heerpflicht) commences
at twenty. With the active army the term of
service is seven years, two in the ranks and five
in the reserve for the infantry, five in the ranks
and four in the reserve for the cavalry and horse
artillery. The soldier is permanently attached to
some corps, and during his reserve service is
twice summoned for training with it for a period
limited by law to eight weeks, but in actual practice
rarely six weeks and more usually a month. From
the active reserve the soldier passes into the
Landwehr or second line army, composed of two
" bans," the first of five years for the infantry and
three for the cavalry and horse artillery ; the
second " ban " of six or seven years, or eight and
nine, for the cavalry and horse artillery. During
the first ban there are two periods of training of
eight to fourteen days each, in the second none,
while the Landwehr cavalry is exempted alto-
gether. The final reserve is the Landsturm —
a force purely for home defence — in which the
men remain until they have reached the age of
forty-five ; in other words, about six years. The
Landsturm is composed of two " bans," the first
comprising all men between seventeen and thirty-
nine who for any reason have received no military
training ; the second includes all men, trained or
untrained, between the ages of thirty-nine and forty-
five. The German army admits as volunteers for
one year only well-educated young men who pay
their own expenses and who serve to supply all
the Reserve and Landwehr officers. There are
also a considerable number of reserve troops inter-
mediate between the active army and the Land-
wehr, and a supplementary (Ersatz) reserve of
young men of twenty who are fit for service but
in excess of the required number of annual re-
cruits. They are liable for three periods of training,
one of ten weeks, one of six and one of four, stress
being laid on non-combatant duties, although
they are also available for depot duty. The object
of these various reserves is to keep the active
regiments up to full strength and to replace the
enormous wastage in men that invariably occurs
in war.
In the organization of the German army six
180 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
battalions form an infantry regiment, two regi-
ments a brigade, two brigades a division, and two
divisions an army corps. There are ten divisions
composed of three brigades each, and in the event
of war it is probable that the other divisions will
be similiarly augmented. Adding the necessary
auxiliary troops, viz. an artillery brigade of
twelve batteries composed of six guns each — or
four in the case of the horse batteries — a regiment
of cavalry of four squadrons, an engineer battalion,
sanitary troops, &c., a German three-brigade
division at war strength would number about
21,000, and an army corps — to which are further
attached four batteries of howitzers and a battalion
of rifles — about 43,000 combatants. The cavalry
division is composed of three brigades of two
regiments each and two or three batteries of horse
artillery, a total of twenty-four squadrons and
eight to twelve guns. Twenty-five corps con-
stitute the German army, whose war strength is
(1) active army, 1,700,000 ; (2) Landwehr, 1,300,000
and (3) Landsturm, 1,000,000, a grand total of
4,000,000 men.
The infantry is armed with the Mauser magazine
rifle, 1898 model, with a calibre of -311 inches and
fires a " spit ball," i.e. one pointed like a pencil.
The Mauser has a velocity of 2700 foot seconds,
a point-blank range of about 300 yards, and has
adjustable sights for ranges up to 2000 yards.
The cavalry is armed with a Mauser magazine
carbine, and all carry lances. The artillery, both
field and horse, use a Krupp piece of 1906 model,
firing a 15 -pound shell. The field howitzer is a
80-pounder, the heavy howitzer a 94-pounder.
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 181
The Army Law of 1913 provided for five aeroplane
battalions numbering seventeen companies with
about 400 aeroplanes, and that year there were
twenty-four dirigible balloons in the military
establishment.
The German General Staff has the reputation
of being the most thorough body of its kind in
the world. The writer has been told upon ex-
cellent authority that Field-Marshal von Moltke
used to declare that with the declaration of war
in 1870 came his rest. The story is characteristic
of the preparedness of the German General Staff,
but if the plans to which the Germans are so
wedded are upset, the result may be different from
their calculations. As indicative of the rule-of-
thumb from which no digression is permitted,
every observer of German manoeuvres has been
struck by the obligation of troops to take the exact
position assigned to them quite regardless of
whether circumstances have altered conditions
and whether the spot is surrounded by enemies.
In war such blind adherence to orders might entail
annihilation. Moreover, the training instils into
the men a dependence upon others, especially
the officers and non-commissioned officers, which
tends to rob them of all initiative ; and the most
casual observer cannot fail to remark upon the
difficulty of the leaders to make their men take and
keep open order in skirmishes and attacks, quite in
contrast to the French, English and Americans.
The German artillery is distinctly inferior to
the French as a weapon, and the Mauser rifle has
not such a flat trajectory (i.e. the bullet does
not carry so far in a straight line) as the French
182 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
small-arm at distances above 900 yards. The
administration of an army that includes the
commissariat, the quartermaster's department,
the medical corps, &c., which supply the troops
with food and all necessary stores, is only slightly
inferior to the French ; but its officials, whose
functions are semi-military and semi-civil, have
been subjected for years to the most overweening
arrogance on the part of the officers of the line,
and it would not be surprising to see revenge play
its r61e, especially if the supply system breaks
down under defeat.
Germany's railways are admirably situated for
military operations in every part of the Empire.
There is no lack of arms or ammunition so far as
is known, and in the tower at Spandau, near Berlin,
an enormous amount of gold has been stored for
years as a war chest. German powder is of
excellent quality and fully abundant. Supplies
are ample for a campaign of months, but if Germany
is cut off from the sea, difficulty will be experienced
in feeding her enormous armies. Her fortifications
are of the latest and most approved type, heavily
armed and provisioned for months. Each fortifica-
tion is provided with a wireless system for com-
munication with other fortifications, thus rendering
it possible for garrisons to unite either to harass
the enemy temporarily or for prolonged operations
— a performance heretofore so hazardous that it has
been rarely attempted in the presence of the enemy.
FRANCE
The last few years have witnessed an almost
incredible resurrection in the military spirit of
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 183
the French. Less than two years ago, when
Germany increased her standing army, France
instantly retaliated by lengthening the term of
active service from two to three years without
creating so much as a ripple in her internal affairs.
She is determined to recover her lost provinces
of Alsace and Lorraine, and, if the opinion of
military critics is not woefully at fault, she may
be counted upon to put up a desperate fight against
her German adversary.
The " National Army " of France is composed
of the " Metropolitan Army " and the Colonial
Army, the former numbering 753,403 and the
latter about 116,000 — 46,000 being in Morocco
and 39,000 in Algeria — a total of 869,403, exclusive
of 25,000 in the Gendarmerie or military police.
Military service is compulsory and universal from
the ages of twenty to forty-eight, the only ex-
emptions being for physical disability. After
three years in the active army, the soldier passes
to the reserve for eleven years, followed by seven
years in the Territorial army and seven in the
Territorial reserve. In the active reserve, the
conscript undergoes two periods of training and
manoeuvres lasting for four weeks each ; in the
Territorial army one period of two weeks ; in the
Territorial reserve, no fixed period. Unlike the
Germans, the French have no one-year volunteers
but every encouragement is given for voluntary
enlistment for three, four, or five years, parti-
cularly in the Colonial army. The length of
the reserve service produces more than 2000
reservists per battalion, so that in case of mobiliza-
tion , the active units can easily be maintained at
184 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
full war strength and each battalion and regiment
forms an additional reserve unit with men left
over for the depot. As a necessary precaution,
the troops stationed along the German frontier
are kept at a considerably higher strength than
the others.
In the organization of the French army, two
infantry regiments — composed of six or some-
times seven or eight battalions — form a brigade, two
brigades a division, and two divisions an army
corps. To every division is attached a field
artillery regiment of nine batteries of four guns
each. The corps artillery includes nine field and
three howitzer batteries, to which six reinforcing
batteries are added upon mobilization, so that each
corps on a war footing has 144 guns. Furthermore
an army corps in the field has attached to it a
cavalry brigade of two regiments, one chasseur
(cavalry) battalion, engineer companies, sanitary
and service troops, &c. The cavalry divisions
are composed of three brigades of two regiments
each — together with three batteries of horse
artillery. When mobilized the strength of an
army corps is approximately 33,000 combatants,
a cavalry division 4700. There is also an aero-
nautical corps with 334 aeroplanes and fourteen
dirigibles.
The French army is localized and territorialized.
Of the twenty-one army corps regions, all except
Algeria (the 19th) furnishes a complete army
corps. The eight infantry regiments of an army
corps are recruited from their respective regi-
mental districts, but the additional regiment is
obtained from the region at large. Like the
chasseur battalions, these additional regiments
are usually stationed near the eastern frontier,
so that the 6th Army Corps at Chalons and the 7th
at Besan9on are augmented to three divisions each.
The reserve army has two divisions in each
region, corresponding to those in the active army.
Upon mobilization the thirty-six reserve divisions
contain virtually the same organization and
strength as the troops of the first line. The
reserves of the regional regiments, engineers and
foot artillery can be utilized for garrisoning the
various fortresses to which allusion will be made
later. The Territorial army likewise consists of
thirty-six divisions and garrison troops. Upon
mobilization the remaining men of the Reserve
and Territorial armies are summoned to the depots
and are available to maintain the field army at
war strength. The Customs Corps, the Chasseurs
Forestiers, the Gendarmerie (25,000) and the
Garde Republicaine (2992) have also had military
training and can be utilized in time of war.
The French field army is composed of twenty
army corps, the brigade of fourteen battalions
stationed at Lyons, and ten divisions of cavalry.
Raised to their full war strength, the active army
numbers 1,009,000, the reserves and depots
1,600,000, the Territorial army 818,000, and the
Territorial reserve 451,000, a grand total of
3,878,000.
The infantry is armed with the Lebel magazine
rifle of -315 inch calibre, the cavalry with the
Lebel carbine, both excellent weapons. The field
piece is a rapid-fire gun of 7-5 centimetres (2 '95
inches) of the model of 1907, provided with a
186 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
shield for protection. The howitzers are of 12
or 15-5 centimetres (1 cm. = -3937 inch).
For many years there existed much uncertainty
as to who would command the French army in
time of war owing to the fear of a dictator like
Louis Napoleon or like General Boulanger at-
tempted to be (February 1889). In July 1911,
when the Moroccan trouble was at its height and
war seemed imminent, it was decided that the
power of appointing the commander-in-chief should
be taken away from the Conseil Supe*rieur de la
Guerre — which is charged with general military
questions under the presidency of the Minister of
War — and vested in the Conseil des Generaux,
which is composed of the officers commanding the
field armies and which had selected General Joffre
for supreme command.
The French artillery is generally admitted to
be in a class by itself and the Intendance (com-
missariat, &c.) is excelled by none other. The
infantry is most deceptive in appearance, but the
ability of the French to march and attack has never
been surpassed. The cavalry is first class and
will give a good account of itself. Its work will
be supplemented by the army aeroplane corps
and a volunteer aeroplane corps, the latter of which
can be counted upon to furnish several hundred
aeroplanes, which ought to keep the commanding
generals fully informed of every movement of the
enemy. The Minister of War recently stated that
there was no provision for the defence of the
fortifications against attacks from the air, and
there is also some question as to the efficiency of
the wireless apparatus installed in the fortresses.
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 187
The French naval powder is notoriously uncertain
and short-lived, but the same cannot be said of
the army powder, and so far as is known abroad,
there is no shortage in ammunition. The regimental
officers are excellent, but the French success will be
largely measured by the ability of the generals.
RUSSIA
The peace strength of the Russian army is
1,284,000 men, its war strength 5,962,306. Military
service is compulsory and universal, beginning at
the age of twenty and terminating with the end
of the forty-third year. Service in the active
army is for three years in the case of the infantry
and artillery, for four years in the other arms.
The soldier then passes into the reserve (Zapas)
for fourteen or fifteen years, during which he receives
two trainings of six weeks each. After eighteen
years in the active army and reserve, he is trans-
ferred to the Territorial army (Opolche'nie) for
five years. This embraces also the surplus of the
annual contingent, thus forming a supplementary
reserve, and, in the second " ban," all those
exempted from service, those not up to standard,
and the older classes of surplus men. There also
exists a modified system of volunteers for one
year who supply the bulk of officers required for
the reserve upon mobilization.
Owing to the enormous extent of the Russian
Empire, its army is divided into three forces,
the army of European Russia, the army of the
Caucasus, and the Asiatic army. The Russian
battalion contains 1000 men ; four battalions
constitute a regiment, two regiments a brigade,
188 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
and two brigades a division. The field batteries
are composed of eight guns, the horse batteries of
six. The ordinary army corps is made up of two
divisions, a howitzer division and one battalion of
sappers, and has a fighting strength of approxi-
mately 32,000 men. The rifle brigades form
separate organizations of eight battalions with
three batteries attached. The Cossacks, who hold
their lands by military tenure, are liable to service
for life, and provide their own equipment and
horses. At nineteen their training begins ; at
twenty-one they enter the active regiment of their
district, at twenty-five the " second category "
regiment, and at twenty-nine the " third category "
regiment, followed by five years in the reserve.
After twenty-five years of age, their training is
three weeks per annum. In European Russia
the field army consists of the Imperial Guard and
Grenadier Corps, twenty-seven line army corps
and twenty cavalry divisions ; in the Caucasus of
three army corps and four cavalry divisions. The
Asiatic army is composed of Russians with a few
Turkoman irregular horse (jigits), and is mainly
stationed in East Siberia. Since the Russo-
Japanese war these forces have been increased
and reorganized into a strong army which would
mobilize as five Trans-Baikal corps and two to
four Cossack cavalry divisions, numbering, together
with auxiliary troops, over 200,000 men.
The system of recruitment is territorial, that
is, each army corps draws its recruits from a
fixed district and is usually quartered in garrisons
there. In European Russia the majority of the
army is stationed west of the longitude of Moscow,
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 189
so that mobilization is slower under ordinary
circumstances than in France or Germany because
the recruits and reservists have long distances to
travel, particularly as many are consigned to corps
outside Great Russia. The comparative dearth
of railways is a great handicap in the matter of
supplies.
The small-arm of the infantry is the " 3-line "
rifle of the 1901 model. It has a magazine holding
five cartridges, a calibre of '299 inches, a muzzle
velocity of 2035 seconds, and is sighted to 3000
yards. The arm of the cavalry and Cossacks
has a barrel 2f inches shorter, but uses the same am-
munition, and is provided with a bayonet which no
other mounted troops use. The field piece is a
Krupp rapid-fire, shielded gun of the 1902 model,
with a muzzle velocity of 1950 foot seconds, the shell
weighing 13l Ibs. The Russian has always been a
capital fighting man, and too much stress cannot be
laid upon the value of actual experience in war. It
is highly doubtful that the Russians will encounter
any harder fighting than they did in Manchuria, and
it must be remembered that a great many of the
officers and men who fought against the Japanese
will participate in the present war. The Russian
army will therefore be a potent factor in any
equation.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Austria-Hungary's peace establishment is
472,716, the war strength of her regular army
1,360,000. Military service is universal and
compulsory, beginning at the age of 19 — but
more usually at 21 — and ending at 43. Service
with the " Common " or active army lasts for
190 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
2 years in the case of the infantry and 3 for the
cavalry and horse artillery ; in the Landwehr
(first reserve) 10 for the infantry and 7 for the
cavalry and horse artillery, followed by the Land-
sturm (second reserve) until the soldier's 42nd
birthday. Hungary possesses a separate and
distinct Landwehr (Honve"d) and Landsturm
(Nepfolkeles), which constitute the Hungarian
national army. There is also an Ersatz (supple-
mentary) reserve intended to maintain the units
of the Common army at full strength. The Ersatz
reservists receive 8 weeks' training in their first
year and are subsequently liable for the same
service as the other reservists of the army corps
to which they belong.
The Empire is divided into 16 army corps dis-
tricts, each presumed to furnish a complete army
corps of 2 divisions to the active army. Every
infantry division is composed of 2 brigades of 8
battalions each, 1 artillery brigade of 10 batteries
of 6 guns, a regiment of cavalry, a jager (rifle)
battalion, &c. The army corps also contains a
regiment of field artillery or howitzers, a pioneer
battalion, a pontoon company, &c., and numbers
about 34,000 combatants. There are 6 permanent
cavalry divisions, each consisting of 2 brigades
(24 squadrons), 3 batteries of horse artillery and
a machine-gun detachment and numbering about
4000 men. It is estimated that Austria's land
forces raised to their maximum war strength would
be as follows : Common or active army, 1,360,000 ;
Austrian Landwehr, 240,000 ; Hungarian Land-
wehr, 220,000 ; Landsturm, 2,000,000 ; Ersatz
reserve, 500,000 ; grand total, 4,320,000.
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 191
The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher
magazine rifle, calibre -315, 1895 model ; the
cavalry with a carbine of the same make. The
field gun, a Krupp, uses a shrapnel of 14| Ibs. ;
the field howitzer is a 10-5 cm. piece weighing
1000 Ibs. and firing a 30-lb. shell. On a peace
footing all batteries have 4 guns, on war footing
6, except the mountain batteries which are pro-
vided with 4 guns.
The Hungarian cavalry is admirable ; the rest
of the army is not comparable to the French or
German armies. It has not fought single-handed
since 1866, when it was decisively defeated by the
Prussians and their allies at Koniggratz.
ITALY
The Italian army on a peace footing numbers
250,860 officers and men, exclusive of the troops
in Africa. Service is compulsory and universal,
beginning at the age of 20. Two years in the
permanent army are followed by 6 years in the
reserve, 4 years in the mobile militia, and 7 years
in the territorial militia. In the reserve they
receive from 2 to 6 weeks' training which may be
extended over several years ; in the territorial
militia, 30 days' training. Each division consists
of 2 brigades composed of 2 regiments, each of
3 battalions, together with a regiment of field
artillery (5 batteries), and has a war strength of
14,156 officers and men and 30 guns. Four regi-
ments divided into 2 brigades and 2 horse batteries
comprise a cavalry division. Each army corps
has 2 divisions — save the 9th, which has 3 — a
regiment of field artillery (36 guns), 2 or 3 heavy
192 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
batteries, a regiment of cavalry and one of Ber-
saglieri (light infantry). Aside fron the Cara-
binieri or military police and the usual auxiliary
troops including the aeronautical corps with 7
companies, 30 aeroplanes, and 9 airships, are the
Alpini, frontier troops organized for the defence
of the mountain passes, consisting of 8 regiments
(26 battalions) of Alpine infantry and 2 regiments
of 36 mountain batteries. The field army com-
prises 12 army corps and 3 cavalry divisions, its
war strength is about 2,600,000, divided as follows :
active army 700,000, mobile militia 400,000, terri-
torial militia, a large part of whom are only partially
trained, 1,500,000.
The Italian infantry is armed with the
Mannlicher Carcano magazine rifle of 6-5 mm.
calibre, but the territorial militia still uses the
old Vetterli rifle. The field artillery is now being
rearmed with the De Port gun with a calibre of
7-5 cm. of the model of 1912.
The Italian army has recently been engaged
in war in Africa, and has doubtless profited by
its experience.
It is a compact force and well trained.
THE BRITISH ARMY
On the outbreak of war in August 1914, the total
number of " first line " British troops available
all over the Empire was approximately 246,000.
Of these, however, only 125,000 were distributed
in the British Isles. In India a force of 77,000 was
situated, and about 44,000 more were distributed
in our various Colonies.
The army reserve consisted of about 145,000,
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 193
all of whom were called up on mobilization, and the
Special Reserve (the old Militia) totalled 65,000
men. The Territorial force, whose nominal strength
should have been 315,400 men, numbered in fact
only 255,000, but within a few days of mobilization
the full establishment was completed.
In the Senior Division of the Officers Training
Corps (the Universities, &c.) there were about
5000 men of military age, and practically the
whole of these were drafted into Regular or
Territorial battalions.
The Expeditionary Force, which it has been
the rule to keep in a fairly advanced state of
preparedness for immediate active service, was com-
posed of 6 divisions of all arms. Each division
was composed of 3 infantry brigades (a brigade
consisting of 4 battalions, each 1000 strong), 3
field artillery brigades (an artillery brigade num-
bered 18 guns), 1 heavy gun battery, 1 howitzer
battery, 2 companies of Royal Engineers and 1
squadron of cavalry, totalling approximately
18,000 men. The strength of the 6 divisions, then,
would be about 110,000 men, and in addition to
them were 1 cavalry division of 10,000 men and
2 supplementary cavalry brigades. The British
Dominions beyond the seas immediately oiiered
to supply expeditionary forces of their own, and
within a month from the outbreak of war, Canada's
offer of a force of 20,000 men to be followed by a
similar number if necessary had been accepted.
From Australia and New Zealand another 40,000
men are being prepared for transportation to
Europe.
But the most striking tribute to England's
N
194 THE ARMIES OF EUROPE
greatness was seen in India, where the native
princes vied with each other in placing their
personal services and those of their subjects at the
disposal of Lord Kitchener. As a first instal-
ment, 70,000 men (2 divisions of infantry and three
of cavalry), representing every race and state in
India, were dispatched to the seat of war, the whole
cost being borne by the people of India themselves.
At home the Prime Minister in Parliament called
for a new army of 500,000 men, and these were
obtained within six weeks, and at the time of
writing recruiting for a second half million is
proceeding steadily. The Territorial force also,
owing to the formation of reserve battalions for
those volunteering for active service, had risen in
strength to nearly 400,000 men. Lord Kitchener
was able to state in the House of Lords on
September 17, that by the spring of 1915 there
ought to be an army of 500,000 men ready and
trained to fight alongside of or against the best
troops in Europe.
Finally, in South Africa the Boers, forgetting
their old differences, are actively mobilizing in
order to eject the enemy from their largest colonial
possession — South- West Africa.
OTHER NATIONALITIES
The Belgian army has a peace footing of 3,542
officers and 44,061 men, with a war strength
variously estimated at from 300,000 to 350,000.
The infantry is armed with the Mauser rifle, the
artillery with a shielded Krupp quick-fire piece
of 7-5 cm. calibre.
In 1913 the Netherlands had in its home army
THE ARMIES OF EUROPE 195
1543 officers and 21,412 men and 152 guns. On a
war footing it could probably be raised to about
270,000 men. The small-arm is the Mannlicher
rifle and carbine, the field gun is identical with
that of Belgium.
Serbia has 10 divisions divided into 4 army
corps, with a peace footing of 160,000, and a war
strength of over 380,000. The rifle is the Mauser,
model of 1899, with a calibre of 7 mm., of which
there are not nearly enough to arm the reserves ;
the field piece a quick-firing gun of the French
Schneider-Canet system.
Bulgaria has a peace establishment of about
3900 officers and 56,000 men, armed with the
Mannlicher magazine rifle, calibre -315, the Mann-
licher carbine, the Schneider quick-fire gun of
7-5 cm., and a light Krupp of the same calibre for
the mountain batteries. On a war footing she could
muster 4 army corps and about 550,000 men.
Roumania's army on a peace footing is about
5460 officers and 98,000 men, on a war footing
5 army corps and approximately 580,000 men.
The infantry uses the Mannlicher magazine rifle,
•256 calibre, the cavalry the Mannlicher carbine.
The field and horse batteries are armed with the
Krupp quick-firing, 75 mm. gun of the model of
1903.
In 1912 Greece had a peace establishment of
1952 officers and 23,268 men, but the recent war
has caused her to augment them to 3 army corps
and her war footing is not far from 250,000 men.
The infantry is armed with the Mannlicher-
Schonauer rifle of the 1903 model and the field
artillery with Schneider-Canet quick-fire guns.
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
THE present war is an exception to the general
rule that dominion is won or lost by the pre-
ponderance of sea-power or its opposite. At the
moment of writing the navies of all the great
Powers except Italy are involved in the struggle.
On one side those of Great Britain, France, and
Russia ; on the other, Germany and Austria.
The preponderance of force is thus very great
against the Germanic Powers.
GREAT BRITAIN
Great Britain has political dominion over nearly
35 per cent, of the habitable land of the globe and
over 27 per cent, of its population, the total of
which is estimated by one of the best authorities
at 1,623,300,000. No such empire has ever before
existed, and it is for the looking after of these
tremendous and wide-scattered interests that the
great navy of Britain exists. For all her highways
of communication are across the seas. For this
duty she has, now completed, 64 battleships,
9 battle cruisers, 84 armoured cruisers, 63 pro-
tected cruisers, 2 fast light cruisers, 8 scouts, 222
destroyers, 59 torpedo boats (and 50 old ones),
and 80 submarines, besides 52 sea-going auxiliaries
of the fleet, such as mother ships for destroyers,
196
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 197
mine-layers, distilling ships, oil ships, repair and
hospital ships.
The following are the details of this great fleetj
the types in each class being separated into groups :
The first group, completed between 1895 and
1898, includes the following battleships : Magnifi-
cent, Mmy*§tic, Prince George, Victorious, Jupiter,
Ccesar, Mars, Hannibal, and Illustrious.
They are all of 14,900 tons displacement, 12,000
horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 17-5 knots, 9 inches of armour
belt, and from 10 to 14 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
twelve 6-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire,
twelve 3-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and
2 machine guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above
water and 2 under water.
The next class includes six battleships, com-
pleted between 1899 and 1902 : Canopus, jrtcrrm,
Qvliuth, Glory, Vengeance, and Albion.
They are of 12,950 tons displacement, 18,500
horse-power, and 2300 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18-25 knots, 6 inches of armour
belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch
rapid fire, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, ten 8-inch
rapid fire, 2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns.
They have 4 torpedo tubes.
Then come eight ships, finished between 1901
and 1904 : F*tt nu'iJuftk, IrrcsiatMc, London, B#l-
wwrfir, Venerable, Implacable, Queen, and Prince of
Wales.
They are of 15,000 tons displacement, 15,000
horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They
198 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour
belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
twelve 6-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire,
2 light rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They have
4 torpedo tubes.
During 1903 and 1904 also were finished the
Albemarle, Duncan, Exmouth, Russell, and Corn-
wallis.
They are 14,000 tons displacement, 18,000
horse-power, and 2100 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour
belt, and from 6 to 11 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
twelve 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire,
and 2 machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.
In 1904 the smaller Evinmph and Swiftsure were
completed.
They are 11,800 tons displacement, 12,500
horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 19 knots, 3 to 7 inches of armour
belt, and from 6 to 10 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 10-inch,
fourteen 7 -5-inch rapid fire, fourteen 14-pounder
rapid fire, four 6-pounder rapid fire, 2 light rapid
fire, and 4 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo
tubes.
Between 1904 and 1906 eight battleships were
finished : Dominion, King Edward VII, Common-
wealth, Zealandia, Hindustan, Britannia, Africa,
and Hibernia.
b They are of 16,350 tons displacement, 18,000
horse-power, and 2150 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18-5 knots, 6 to 9 inches of armour
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 199
belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
four 9 -2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch
rapid fire, fourteen 3-pounder rapid fire, and 2
machine guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.
In 1906 came the famous Dreadnought, with
its 17,900 tons displacement, 23,000 horse-power
(turbine), 21 knots speed, and 2700 tons coal
capacity. Her armour belt is 11 inches and the
big gun protection from 8 to 11 inches. She has
ten 12-inch guns, twenty-four 3-inch rapid fire, 5
machine guns, and 3 torpedo tubes.
In 1908 the Agamemnon and the Lord Nelson
were completed.
They are of 16,500 tons displacement, 16,750
horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 4 to 12 inches of armour
belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
ten 9-2-inch, twenty-four 3-inch rapid fire, and 5
machine guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.
In 1909 England completed three battleships,
Bellerophon, Temeraire, and Superb.
They are 18,600 tons displacement, 23,000
horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 21 knots, 11 inches armour
belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch,
sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 5 machine guns.
They have 3 torpedo tubes.
In 1910 three more ships followed : St. Vincent,
Calling-wood, and Vanguard.
They are 19,250 tons displacement, 24,500
horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity.
200 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
They have a speed of 21 knots, 9-75 inches of
armour belt, and from 8 to 11 inches protection
for the big guns. The armament consists of ten
12-inch, eighteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine
guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.
In 1911 there were four ships completed, three
of them, the Neptune, Colossus, and Hercules, of
one type.
They are 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000
horse-power (turbine), and 2700 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 21 knots, 11 inches of armour
belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of ten 12-inch,
sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 machine guns.
They have 3 torpedo tubes.
The Orion, completed in 1911; and the Conquer or t
Thunderer, and Monarch, of 1912, formed the next
type.
They are of 22,500 tons displacement and
27,000 horse-power (turbine). They have a speed
of 21 knots, 12 inches of armour belt, and from
8 to 12 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of ten 13-5-inch, sixteen 4-inch
rapid fire, and 6 machine guns. They have 3
torpedo tubes.
The King George V, of 1912, and the Centurion
Ajax, and Audacious, of 1913, form the next class.
They are of 23,000 tons displacement, 31,000
horse-power (turbine), and 3700 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 21-5 knots, 12 inches of
armour belt, and from 8 to 12 inches protection
for the big guns. The armament consists of ten
13-5-inch, sixteen 4-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller
guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 201
This year there are two types. In the first
are the Iron Duke, Marlborough, Emperor of India,
and Benbow.
They are of 25,000 tons displacement, 89,000
horse-power (turbine), and 4000 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 22-5 knots, 12 inches of
armour belt, and 8 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of ten 13-5-inch,
twelve 6-inch rapid fire, and 6 smaller guns. They
have 5 torpedo tubes.
The second type launched this year includes
the Queen Elizabeth and Warspite.
They are of 27,500 tons displacement, 58,000
horse-power (turbine) and 4000 tons oil capacity.
They have a speed of 25 knots, 13-5 inches of armour
belt, and from 8 to 13-5 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of eight 15-inch,
twelve 6-inch rapid fire, and twelve 3-inch rapid
fire guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.
The four last are due for completion this year
and will of course under the circumstances of war
be hastened to completion. There are also building
the Valiant, Barham, and Malaya of the same type
as the Queen Elizabeth, and the Royal Sovereign,
Royal Oak, Resolution, Ramillies, and Renown, of
29,000 tons, 44,000 horse-power turbines, and of
the same armament as the Queen Elizabeth.
In addition to these there are ten battle cruisers,
equal to taking their place in the line of battle, of
which nine are now ready and the other nearly
so. They are the Inflexible, Indomitable, Invincible,
of 17,250 tons displacement and 41,000 horse-
power (turbine), the Indefatigable, of 18,750 tons
displacement and 43,000 horse-power (turbine) ;
202 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
the New Zealand, of 18,800 tons, and the Australia,
with 19,200 tons displacement, both with 44,000
horse-power developed by turbine-engines. All
these ships have a speed of 25 knots, 8 inches of
armour belt, 10 inches big gun protection, and a
coal capacity of 2500 tons. Their armament is
eight 12-inch, sixteen 4-inch quick fire, 5 machines
guns and 5 torpedo tubes.
The Lion and the Princess Royal, completed in
1912, and the Queen Mary, of 1914, are alike, ex-
cept that the Queen Mary has 27,000 tons dis-
placement and 75,000 horse-power.
The other two have 26,350 tons displacement,
70,000 horse-power, and 3500 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 28 knots, 9-75 inches of
armour belt, and 10 inches protection for the big
guns. The armament consists of eight 13-5-inch,
sixteen 4-inch quick fire and 5 machine guns.
They have 2 torpedo tubes.
This year's battle cruiser, the Tiger, has 28,000
tons displacement, her turbines develop 110,000
horse-power, she has a speed of 28 knots, 10-75
inches of armour belt, and 11 inches protection for
the big guns. Her coal capacity is 4000 tons. She
has eight 13-5-inch, twelve 6-inch quick fire, and
5 machine guns.
Following these are thirty-four armoured cruisers
of high speed, which may be called general service
ships, to be used for scouting or fighting as the
case may be. They have neither the armament
nor protection to enable them to take a place in
the line-of-battle, but their speed is sufficient to
evade action with all battleships now in actual
service. The list is as follows :
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 203
Completed between the years 1901 and 1904 are
the Cressy* Sutlej, Aboukir,* Hague,* Bacchante,
and Euryalus.
They are of 12,000 tons displacement, 21,000
horse-power, and 1600 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 21 knots, 6 inches of side armour,
and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of two 9 '2-inch, twelve 6-inch
rapid fire, twelve 3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid
fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.
In 1902-3 the Drake, Good Hope, Leviathan,
and King Alfred were completed.
They are of 14,100 tons displacement, 30,000
horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of side armour,
and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of two 9-2-inch, sixteen
6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch rapid fire, 3
smaller rapid fire, and 2 machine guns. They
have 2 torpedo tubes.
In 1903-4 were completed Kent, Essex, Mon-
mouth, Berwick, Donegal, Lancaster, Cornwall,
Cumberland, and Suffolk.
They are of 9800 tons displacement, 2200 horse-
power, and 1600 tons coal capacity. They have
a speed of 23 knots, 4 inches of side armour, and
5 inches protection for the big guns. The arma-
ment consists of fourteen 6-inch rapid fire, eight
3-inch rapid fire, 5 smaller rapid fire, and 8 machine
guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.
In 1905 the Antrim, Carnarvon, Hampshire,
Devonshire, Roxburgh, and, in 1906, the Argyle
were completed.
* Sunk by German submarines, September 22, 1914.
204 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
They are of 10,850 tons displacement, 21,000
horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 22-8 knots, 6 inches of side belt,
and from 5 to 6 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of four 7-5-inch, six 6-inch
rapid fire, 24 small rapid fire, and 2 machine guns.
They have 2 torpedo tubes.
The Black Prince, Duke of Edinburgh, Cochrane,
and Natal were completed in 1906, and the Achilles
and Warrior in 1907.
They are of 13,550 tons displacement, 23,500
horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 23 knots, 6 inches of armour belt,
and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of six 9 -2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid
fire, 22 small rapid fire, and 8 machine guns. They
have 3 torpedo tubes.
In 1908 came the Shannon, Minotaur and
Defence.
They are of 14,600 tons displacement, 27,000
horse-power, and 2250 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 22 £ knots, 6 inches of armour
belt, and 8 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of four 9-2-inch, ten
7'5-inch, sixteen 12-pr., and five machine guns.
They have 5 torpedo tubes.
The details of the actual fighting ships of im-
portance are completed with the following seventeen
heavily protected cruisers :
Edgar (1893), Endymion (1894), Hawke (1893),
Grafton (1894), Theseus (1894), of 7350 tons dis-
placement.
They have 12,000 horse-power and 1250 tons
coal capacity. They have a speed of 20 knots,
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 205
5 inches of protective deck, and 6 inches protection
for the big guns. The armament consists of two
9-2-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, 17 smaller rapid
fire, and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo
tubes.
The Gibraltar, Crescent, and Royal Arthur, of
7700 tons, have the same speed, armour, and coal
capacity. Their armament, however, is one 9-2-
inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, 19 smaller rapid fire,
and 2 machine guns, and 2 torpedo tubes.
The Terrible in 1898 was in a class by itself.
She is 14,200 tons displacement, 25,000 horse-
power, and 3000 tons coal capacity. She has
a speed of 22 knots, 6 inches of protective deck,
and 6 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of two 9-2-inch, sixteen 6-inch
rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid
fire, and 2 machine guns.
Between 1899 and 1902 twelve heavily protected
cruisers were built, all of 11,000 tons displacement.
The Diadem, Europa, Niobe, and Andromeda had
16,500 horse-power, the Amphitrite, Argonaut,
Ariadne, and Spartiate, 18,000 horse-power.
Each has 2000 tons coal capacity ; a speed of
20-5 knots, 4 inches of protective deck, and 6
inches protection for the big guns. The armament
consists of sixteen 6-inch rapid fire, twelve 8-inch
rapid fire, 14 smaller rapid fire, and 2 machines
guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.
Following these are the Arethusa and the Aurora,
of 8750 tons displacement, which are now ready.
They were designed as scouts. They have 87,000
horse-power turbines, and a designed speed of
30 knots. They carry only the light armament
206 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
of two 6-inch rapid fire, eight 4-inch rapid fire, and
2 machine guns. Eight more of 8740 tons of
40,000 horse-power, and 30 knots, with the same
armament, the same fuel capacity (of 750 tons of
oil), will not be ready until next year. All have a
belt of 3-inch steel and 4-inch protection for the
guns. They are, of course, in no sense fighting
ships, but their role is of the utmost importance :
that of supplying information regarding the where-
abouts of an enemy.
Of the light protected cruisers now ready (twenty-
eight of which antedate 1900), varying from 2135
to 5880 tons, there are twenty-six with a speed
of 25 knots. None carry heavier than 6-inch guns
and can be reckoned, for war, chiefly as scouts.
No one of them has more than 1225 tons fuel
capacity, and most of them much less. Their
radius of action is thus moderate.
One hundred and thirty-four of the completed
destroyers are of ocean-going type, and nearly all
these are oil-burners and of from 30 to 34 knots.
All exceed 700 tons displacement ; seventy exceed
800 tons ; forty are about 1000, and sixteen are from
1200 to 1350 tons. One, the Swift, completed so
long ago as 1908, has a displacement of 2170 tons,
30,000 horse-power, and a speed of 36 knots. All
are armed usually with 4-inch guns not exceeding
four in number, and the majority carry 21 -inch
torpedo tubes. Such torpedoes of the best type
have a range of more than five sea miles (say six
land miles) at an average speed of 24 knots.
In addition to the ships mentioned, England
has at command three merchant steamers of more
than 25 knots ; four of from 22 to 25 ; eleven from
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 207
20 to 22, and twenty-nine from 18 to 20. These can
all be utilized for cruising, but they can play no
real part in the present war except as against like
vessels of Germany, which latter is almost equally
well off in this respect.
FRANCE
The French navy, though fourth in rank of naval
Powers, naturally comes after that of England as
an ally. There are on the list twenty-four battle-
ships completed, five launched, and five building.
The Carnot was launched in 1896. Her dis-
placement is 11,954 tons, her horse-power 15,000,
and her coal capacity 700 tons. Her speed is
18 knots, her side armour 17-75 inches, and her
big gun protection 13-75 inches. Her armament,
like that of the Massena, launched in 1898, is two
12-inch, two 10-8-inch, eight 5-5-inch rapid fire, and
28 smaller guns, and 2 torpedo tubes above water,
and 2 below. The Masstna's displacement is
11,735 tons, her horse-power 13,500, and her coal
capacity 800 tons. Her speed is 18 knots, her
side armour is 17-75 inches, and the big gun
protection from 8-5 to 16 inches.
In 1898 France also launched the Charlemagne,
and Gaulois, and in 1900 the St. Louis. They are
of about 11,000 tons displacement, 14,500 horse-
power, and 1100 tons coal capacity. They have
a speed of 18 knots, 14 inches of side armour, and
from 8 to 13 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of four 12-inch, twelve
5-5-inch rapid fire, eight 3-9-inch rapid fire, 20
smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.
The Bouvet (1898), of 12,000 tons, has 14,000
208 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
horse-power, and 800 tons coal capacity ; 18
knots speed, 16 inches side armour, and 8 to 14-75
inches of protection for the big guns. She^carries
two 12-inch, two 10-8-inch rapid fire, eight 5-5-inch
rapid fire, and 19 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo
tubes above water and 2 below.
The Suffren (1903), of 12,527 tons, has 16,200
horse-power, and 1820 tons coal capacity ; 18
knots speed, 11 inches side armour, and 9 to 13
inches of protection for the big guns. She carries
four 12-inch, ten 6-4-inch rapid fire, eight 3-9-inch
rapid fire, and 30 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo
tubes above water and 2 below.
The Republique (1906) and Patrie (1907), of
14,635 tons, have 18,000 horse-power, and 1825
tons coal capacity ; 18 knots speed, 11 inches
side armour, and 9 to 13 inches of protection for
the big guns. They carry four 12-inch, eighteen
6-4-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They
have 2 torpedo tubes under water.
The Democratic, the Justice, and the Verite
were launched in 1908.
They are of 14,640 tons displacement, 18,000
horse-power, and 1825 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 11 inches of side armour,
and from 9 to 13 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of four 12-inch, ten 7-6-inch
rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. They have 2
torpedo tubes.
In 1911 came the Danton, Mirabeau, Diderot,
Condor cet, Voltaire, and in 1912 the Vergnaud.
They are of 18,027 tons displacement, 22,500
horse-power (turbine) and 2100 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 19-25 knots, 10 inches of
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 209
side armour and from 9 to 12 inches protection
for the big guns. The armament consists of four
12-inch, twelve 9-4-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-inch
rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have 2
torpedo tubes.
The Jean Bart and the Courbet were launched
in 1913, and the France and Paris in 1914.
They are of 23,095 tons displacement, 28,000
horse-power (turbine), and 3000 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 20 knots, 10£ inches of side
armour, and from 9 to 12 inches protection for
the big guns. The armament consists of twelve
12-inch, twenty-two 5-5-inch rapid fire, and 8
smaller guns.
France has no battle-cruisers but has nineteen
armoured cruisers, one of which, the Pothuau,
is of but 5374 tons ; one the Jeanne d'Arc of
11,092 ; three, the Gueydon, Montcalm, and
Dupetit Thouars of 9367 ; three (completed in
1903), the Dupleix, Desaix, and Kleber of 7578
tons ; four, the Marseillaise, Gloire, Aube, and
Conde of 9856 tons ; three (completed in 1904-
1906), the Leon Gambetta, Jules Ferry, and Victor
Hugo of 12,351 tons ; two (1908 and 1909), the
Jules Michelet and Ernest Renan, of 12,370 and
13,427 tons ; and two (1910 and 1911), the Edgar
Quinet and Waldeck Rousseau of 13,780 tons. The
heavier of these ships has a designed speed of
23 to 23| knots, 6 to 6| inches side armour, and
8-inch protection to their larger guns. They carry
from 2100 to 2300 tons of coal. Their main
batteries are generally of two 7 -6-inch rapid fire,
and eight 6-4-inch rapid fire. The Gambetta class,
however, carries four 7-6-inch with sixteen 6-4-inch,
o
210 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
both rapid fire. The Edgar Quinet and Waldeck
Rousseau carry fourteen 7-6-inch rapid fire.
Two protected cruisers, the D'Entreacasteaux
and Guichen, and ten light cruisers of no fighting
importance complete the list of French ships.
France is, however, strong, so far as numbers
go, in destroyers, torpedo boats, and submarines,
having ready eighty-four of the first with displace-
ments from 276 to 804 tons and speeds of 28 and
31 knots. She has one hundred and fifty-three
torpedo boats and seventy submarines, but many
of these are of small size. One hundred and one
of her torpedo boats are of but about 95 tons,
and twenty of the submarines have a displace-
ment of but 67 tons. They can hardly cut any
figure except for purely local defence. Thirty-three
of the submarines, however, have a surface dis-
placement of 390 tons ; two of 410 ; six of about 550 ;
two of 785, and seven of 830. The surface displace-
ment is usually (roughly) about 70 per cent, of the
submerged. These larger submarines carry from
6 to 8 torpedo tubes. Twelve now building, of
520 (surface) tons displacement, have Diesel motors
of 2000 horse-power. They are expected to have
a surface speed of 17| knots and a speed of 8 knots
submerged. This last class will carry 4 small guns.
There are attached to the fleet sixteen auxiliaries
as mine layers, submarine destroyers, and aero-
plane mother ships, of from 300 to 7898 tons ;
half, however, are under 1000 tons.
RUSSIA
Russia, since her fateful struggle with Japan,
has diligently laboured to re-establish her fleet,
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 211
but she has not as yet made any great actual
headway. But three of her old battleships were
left from the wreck of the war, the Tri Sviatitelia,
the Panteleimon, and Czarevitch.
The Tri Sviatitelia, of 1896 (in the Black Sea),
has a displacement of 13,318 tons, 10,600 horse-
power, a speed of 17 knots, and coal capacity
of 1000 tons. Her side armour is 16 inches, and
the big gun protection from 12 to 16 inches.
She has four 12-inch, ten 6-inch rapid fire, and four
4-7-inch rapid fire guns and 2 torpedo tubes above
water.
In the Black Sea also is the Panteleimon (1902),
of 12,480 tons, has 10,600 horse-power, and 1250
coal capacity, 17 knots speed, 7 to 9 inches of side
armour, and 10 to 12 inches of protection for the
big guns. She carries four 12-inch, sixteen 6-inch
rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch and 28 smaller guns.
She has 5 torpedo tubes under water.
The Czarevitch (1902), of 12,912 tons, has 16,300
horse-power and 1,360 tons capacity ; 18 knots
speed, 10 inches side armour, and 8 to 11 inches
of protection for the big guns. She carries four
12-inch rapid fire, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, twenty
3-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller guns. She has
2 torpedo tubes under water.
The Slava (1906), of 13,516 tons, has 16,000
horse-power and 1250 tons coal capacity ; 18
knots speed, 10 inches side armour, and 8 to 11
inches of protection for the big guns. Her arma-
ment is the same as that of the Czarevitch.
The Ivan Zlatoust (1910) and the Elstafi (1911)
are both in the Black Sea.
They are 12,733 tons displacement, 10,600 horse-
212 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
power, and 1400 tons coal capacity. They have
a speed of 16 knots, 7 to 9 inches of armour
belt, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 12-inch,
four 8-inch, twelve 6-inch rapid fire, fourteen
3-inch rapid fire, and 8 smaller guns. They have
5 torpedo tubes.
In 1907 the Andreas Pervozvanni and the Im~
perator Pavel I were launched.
They are of 17,200 tons displacement, 17,600
horse-power, and 8000 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 6 to 11 inches of side
armour, and from 10 to 12 inches protection for
the big guns. The armament consists of four 12-
inch, fourteen 8-inch, twenty 4-7-inch rapid fire, and
14 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.
There are altogether six armoured cruisers, none
of which are in the Black Sea.
The Rossia (1898), of 12,130 tons, has 18,000
horse-power and 2500 tons coal capacity ; 20
knots speed, 5 to 10 inches side armour, and 2
inches of protection for the big guns. She carries
four 8-inch, twenty-two 6-inch rapid fire, twelve
3-inch rapid fire, and 36 smaller guns. She has
5 torpedo tubes above water.
The Gromoboi (1901), of 12,336 tons, has 18,000
horse-power and 2500 tons coal capacity ; 20
knots speed, 6 inches side armour, and 2 to 16 inches
of protection for the big guns. She carries four
8-inch, twenty-two 6-inch, twenty 3-inch, and
31 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above
water and 2 below.
The Rurik (1907), of 15,170 tons, has 19,700
horse-power, and 2000 tons coal capacity ; 21
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 213
knots speed, 6 inches side armour, and 8 inches of
protection for the big guns. She carries four 10-
inch, eight 8-inch, twenty 4-7 inch rapid fire, and
18 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes
under water.
The Admiral Makharoff was launched in 1907,
and the Pallada and Bayan in 1911.
They are of 7900 tons displacement, 16,500
horse-power, and 1020 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 21 knots, 4 to 8 inches of side
armour, and from 3 to 7 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of two 8-inch,
eight 6-inch rapid fire, twenty 3-inch rapid fire,
and 7 smaller guns.
There are eight cruisers, of from 3100 to 6700
tons, of no fighting value however. These are
the Askold (at Vladivostok), Diana, Aurora, Kagul
(Black Sea), Oleg, Pamyat Merkurya (Black Sea),
Zemtchug (Vladivostok), and Almaz (Black Sea).
Russia has but 25 torpedo boats, all small and
of little value. She is, however, fairly well off as
to destroyers and submarines. She has 105 of
the former, 34 of which exceed 500 tons in dis-
placement, and 10 are more than 1000. About
80 of these destroyers are in the Black Sea
and 6 at Vladivostok. Of the 43 submarines
built or building, 25 are completed. Twenty-two,
however, are under 135 tons surface displacement ;
12 are of 360 tons or more, rising to 500.
GERMANY
Turning to the three Powers of the other alliance
(though Italy at the moment of writing is not yet
involved in the war), Germany of course easily has
214 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
the lead, with 33 battleships, 4 battle cruisers,
9 armoured cruisers, and 39 cruisers, as her sea
fleet. She has also, complete, 142 destroyers and
27 submarines. Her 47 torpedo boats are too
small to be of value, her attention being given,
very wisely, to the destroyer instead. The follow-
ing is the list of her battle fleet :
The Kaiser Friedrich III (1898), Kaiser Wil-
helm II (1900), Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse (1901),
Kaiser Karl der Grosser (1901), Kaiser Barbarossa
(1901) form the first type.
They are of 10,474 tons displacement, 3000
horse-power, and 1050 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 12 inches of side armour,
and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of four 9-4-inch, fourteen 5-9-
inch rapid fire, twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire, and 20
smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.
The second type includes the Wittelsbach, Wettin,
Zdhringen, launched in 1902, and the Schwaben
and Mecklenburg of 1903.
They are of 11,643 tons displacement, 14,000
horse-power, and 1450 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 9 inches of side armour,
and 10 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of four 9-4-inch, eighteen 5-9-
inch rapid fire, twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire, and 20
smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above
water, and 5 under water.
In 1904 the Braunschweig was launched, the
Elsass, Hessen, and Preussen in 1905, and the
Lothringen in 1906.
They are of 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000
horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 215
have a speed of 18 knots, 9-75 inches of side armour,
and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of four 11-inch, fourteen 6-7-
inch rapid fire, twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire, and 20
smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above
water and 2 below.
In 1906, 1907, and 1908 Germany built the
Deutschland, Hannover, Pommern, Schlesien, and
Schleswig-Holstein.
They are of 13,040 tons displacement, 16,000
horse-power, and 1800 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 18 knots, 9-75 inches of side armour,
and 11 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of four 11-inch, fourteen 6-7-
inch rapid fire, twenty-two 3-4-inch rapid fire,
and 8 smaller machine guns. They have 6 torpedo
tubes.
In 1909 and 1910 Germany built two ships a
year, the Nassau and Westfdlen in 1909 and the
Rhelnland and Posen in 1910.
They are of 18,600 tons displacement, 20,000
horse-power, and 2700 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 19-5 knots, 9-75 inches of side
armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of twelve 11-inch, twelve
5-9-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-4-inch rapid fire, and
2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.
In 1911 three ships were launched, the Ostfries-
land, the Helgoland, and the Thuringen. In 1912
there was but one, the Oldenburg.
They are of 22,500 tons displacement, 25,000
horse-power, and 3000 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 20-5 knots, 11 inches of side armour
belt and 11 inches protection for the big guns.
216 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
The armament consists of twelve 12-inch, fourteen
5-9-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-4-inch rapid fire,
and 2 smaller guns. They have 6 torpedo tubes.
In 1913 there were five battleships : the Fried-
rich der Grosse, Kaiser, Kaiserin, Konig Albert,
Prinz Regent Luitpold.
They are of 24,310 tons displacement, 28,000
horse-power (turbine), and 3600 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 21 knots, 13 inches of side
armour, and 11 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of ten 12-inch, fourteen
5-9-inch rapid fire, twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire, and
2 smaller guns. They have 5 torpedo tubes.
For 1914 there are the Markgraf, the Grosser
Kurfiirst, and the Konig.
They are of 26,575 tons displacement, 35,000
horse-power (turbine). They have a speed of
22 knots, 13 inches of side armour, and 13 inches
protection for the big guns. The armament con-
sists of ten 14-inch, fourteen 5-9-inch rapid fire,
twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire, and 2 smaller guns.
They have 5 torpedo tubes.
The Von der Tann (1910), of 18,700 tons, has
43,000 horse-power (turbine), and 2800 tons coal
capacity ; 25 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armour,
and 8 inches of protection for the big guns. She
carries eight 11-inch, ten 5-9-inch rapid fire, and
sixteen 3-4-inch rapid fire guns. She has 4 torpedo
tubes.
The Moltke (1911) and Goeben (1912), of 22,640
tons, have 52,000 horse-power (turbine), and
3100 tons coal capacity ; 25-5 knots speed, 4 to 8
inches side armour, and 8 inches of protection for
the big guns. They carry ten 11 -inch, twelve
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 217
5-9-inch rapid fire, and twelve 3-4-inch rapid fire
guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.
The Seydlitz (1913) is the same as the Moltke,
except its displacement is 24,610 tons and its
horse-power 63,000.
The Derfflinger (1914), of 28,000 tons, has 100,000
horse-power (turbine), and 30 knots speed ; 9|
inches of side armour. Her armament is unknown
except that she has 6 torpedo tubes.
The Fiirst Bismarck (1900), of 10,570 tons, has
14,000 horse-power and 1250 tons coal capacity,
19 knots speed, 4 to 8 inches side armour, and
8 inches of protection for the big guns. She carries
four 9-4-inch, twelve 5-9-inch rapid fire, ten 3-4-inch
rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo
tube above water and 2 below.
Prinz Heinrich (1902), of 8759 tons, has 15,000
horse-power, and 1500 tons capacity ; 20 knots
speed, 2 to 4 inches side armour, and 4 to 6 inches
of protection for the big guns. She carries two
9-4-inch, ten 5-9-inch rapid fire, ten 8-4-inch rapid
fire, and 14 smaller guns. She has 1 torpedo tube
above water and 2 below.
The Prinz Adalbert (1903) and Friedrich Kail
(1904), of 8858 tons, have 18,500 horse-power,
and 1500 tons coal capacity ; 21 knots speed, 3 to
4 inches side armour, and 4 to 6 inches of protection
for the big guns. They carry four 8-2-inch, ten
5-9-inch rapid fire, ten 8-4-inch rapid fire, and
14 smaller guns. They have 1 torpedo tube above
water and 3 below.
The Roon and the Yorck (1905), of 9350 tons,
have 19,000 horse-power, and 1600 tons coal
capacity ; 21 knots speed, 3 to 4 inches side armour
218 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
and 4 to 6 inches of protection for the big guns.
They carry four 8-2-inch, ten 5-9-inch rapid fire,
sixteen 3-4-inch rapid fire, and 14 smaller guns.
They have 4 torpedo tubes.
The Scharnhorst (1907) and Gneisenau (1908),
of 11,420 tons, have 26,000 horse-power, 22-5
knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side armour, and 6 to
6-75 inches of protection for the big guns. They
carry eight 8 -2-inch, six 5-9-inch rapid fire, twenty
3-4-inch rapid fire, and 18 smaller guns. They
have 4 torpedo tubes.
The Blucher (1909), of 15,550 tons, has 32,000
horse-power, 23 knots speed, 4 to 6 inches side
armour, and 6 inches of protection for the big
guns. She carries twelve 8-2-inch rapid fire,
eight 5-9-inch rapid fire, sixteen 3-4-inch rapid
fire. She has 4 torpedo tubes.
The Magdeburg, * Breslau, Strassburg, and Stral-
sund were launched in 1912.
They are of 4500 tons displacement, 22,300
to 25,000 horse-power (turbine), and 1200 tons
coal capacity. They have a speed of 26-75 knots,
4 inches of side armour, and 3 inches protection
for the big guns. The armament consists of
twelve 4-1 -inch rapid fire, and 2 machine guns.
They have 2 torpedo tubes.
The Karlsruhe and Rostock were launched in
1913. They are of 4820 tons displacement, 30,000
horse-power (turbine), and 1300 tons coal capacity.
They have a speed of 26-75 knots, 4 inches of side
armour, and 3 inches protection for the big guns.
The armament consists of twelve 4-1-inch rapid fire,
and 2 machine guns. They have 2 torpedo tubes.
* Sunk by submarines.
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 219
Though these are reckoned by some authorities
as armoured cruisers, their armour, and particularly
their gun protection, is too slight to bring them
properly in the category. They are really scouts
and of a high quality, as on their trials they were
nearly a knot to two knots above their designed
speed, the Strassburg showing 28-8. Some of the next
class, the protected cruisers, thirty-nine in number,
have practically equal value as scouts, the Kolberg,
Mainz* Koln,* and Augsberg, of 4281 tons, with
turbines of 19,600 horse-power, showing on trial
from 26-32 to 27-23 knots, and twenty-eight of
them from 21 to 24.
Germany is unusually strong in destroyers,
of which she has 142. Forty-two of these are
from 350 to 413 tons ; 5 of 480 ; 13 from 530 to
560 ; 47 of about 650 ; 36 of 840 and 900 tons.
Along with these are 27 submarines, 16 of which
have a surface speed of 18 knots and 12 under
water. What is known as the type U21, one of
which passed into service last year, has a length
of 213 feet 8 inches, and 20 feet beam.
AUSTRIA
Austria, Germany's ally, has nine battleships
ready, all which have been completed since 1905,
as follows :
In 1906 the Erzherzog Karl and Erzherzog Fried-
rich were launched, and in 1907 the Erzherzog
Ferdinand Max.
They are of 10,433 tons displacement, 14,000
horse-power, and 1315 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 19-25 knots, 6 to 8-25 inches of
* Sunk by submarines.
220 THE NAVIES OF EUROPE
side armour, and 9-5 inches protection for the
big guns. The armament consists of four 9-4-
inch, twelve 7-6-inch rapid fire, fourteen 3-inch
rapid fire, and 16 smaller guns. They have 2
torpedo tubes.
In 1910 came the Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand,
and in 1911 the Radetzky and Zrinyi.
They are of 14,226 tons displacement, 20,000
horse-power, and 1200 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 20 knots, 9 inches of side armour,
and 9-75 inches protection for the big guns. The
armament consists of four 12-inch, eight 9-inch,
twenty 8-9-inch rapid fire, 6 smaller rapid fire,
and 2 machine guns. They have 3 torpedo tubes.
In 1912, the Viribus Unitis was launched, in
1918 the Teggethoff and the Prinz Eugen.
They are of 20,000 tons displacement, 25,000
horse-power, and 2500 tons coal capacity. They
have a speed of 20 knots, 11 inches of side armour,
and 11 inches protection for the gig guns. The
armament consists of twelve 12-inch, twelve 5-9-
inch rapid fire, eighteen 14-pounder rapid fire, and
4 smaller guns. They have 4 torpedo tubes.
The Kaiserin Maria Theresa (1895), of 5187
tons, has 9000 horse-power and 740 tons coal
capacity ; 19 knots speed, 4 inches side armour,
and 4 inches of protection for the big guns. She
carries two 7-6-inch rapid fire, eight 6-inch rapid
fire, and 22 smaller guns. She has 4 torpedo tubes
above water.
The Kaiser Karl VI (1900), of 6151 tons, has
12,000 horse-power and 820 tons coal capacity ;
20 knots speed, 8-5 inches side armour, and 8
inches of protection for the big guns. She carries
THE NAVIES OF EUROPE 221
two 9 -4-inch, eight 6-inch rapid fire, and 28 smaller
guns. She has 2 torpedo tubes above water.
The St. Georg (1906), of 7185 tons, has 12,300
horse-power and 1000 tons coal capacity ; 21
knots speed, 6-5 inches side armour, and 5 to 8
inches of protection for the big guns. She carries
two 9-4-inch, five 7-6-inch rapid fire, four 6-inch
rapid fire, and 17 smaller guns. She has 2 torpedo
tubes.
The six light cruisers of Austria, varying in
size from 1506 tons to 8966, call for no particular
remark excepting the two last completed : the
Admiral Spaun, of 8500 tons, 20,000 horse-power,
and 27 knots, and the Saida, of the same tonnage,
but of 25,000 horse-power and (probably) 28 knots.
Both have turbine engines. Their chief value
in war could be only as scouts.
There are 18 destroyers ; 12 of 884 tons with
28£ knots speed, and 6 of 800 tons and 32£ knots.
These latter carry four 12-pounders and two 21-
inch torpedo tubes. They have oil fuel.
Of the 63 torpedo boats, 33 are of 250 tons and
24 of 197 tons, and are thus capable craft of their
kind. The r6le of such can only be, as a rule,
that of inshore work.
The 10 submarines are of but moderate size,
ranging from 216 to 235 tons at the surface.
THE BRITISH NAVY
A LIST OF HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS
BATTLESHIPS
* The main armament of each class is shown on p. 224
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Africa
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1906
* Agammenon
16,500
18
Lord Nelson
1908
2 Agincourt
27,500
22
Purchased from
1914
Turkey
Ajax
AnrinniniM '
23,000
21
91
King George V
1913
l<H-3
Albemarle
14,000
£ii
19
iVJftg ij COF£G V
Duncan
1903
Albion
12,950
18
Canopus
1902
Bellerophon
18,600
21
Bellerophon
1909
Benbow
25,000
22-5
Iron Duke
1914
Britannia
•p .i___i.
16,350
1 X. AAA
18
ift
King Edward VII
1906
Caesar
14,900
lo
17
j? ormiua. Die
Majestic
JL «7V*7
1897
Canopus
12,950
18
Canopus
1899
Centurion
23,000
21
King George V
1913
Collingwood
19,250
21
St. Vincent
1910
j" Colossus
20,000
21
Colossus
1911
Commonwealth
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1905
Conqueror
22,500
21
Orion
1912
Cornwallis
14,000
19
Duncan
1904
Dominion
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1905
10 Dreadnought
17,900
21
Dreadnought
1906
THE BRITISH NAVY
B ATTLESHIPS— continued
223
Displace-
ment
Speed
Class
Com-
Tons
Knots
pleted
Duncan
14,000
19
Duncan
1903
Emperor of India
25,000
22-5
Iron Duke
1914
Erin
23,000
21
Purchased from
1914
Turkey
Exmouth
14,000
19
Duncan
1903
Glory
12,950
18
1Q
Can opus
1901
IQTMk
Hannibal
14,900
lo
17
Majestic
iyuu
1897
Hercules
20,000
21
Colossus
1911
Hibernia
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1906
Hindustan
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1905
Illustrious
14,900
17
Majestic
1898
Implacable
15,000
18
Formidable
1902
Iron Duke
25,000
1C AAA
22-5
10
Iron Duke
1914
i rresisti ble
Jupiter
1O,UUU
14,900
lo
17
Majestic
1897
King Edward VII
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1905
King George V
23,000
21
King George V
1912
London
15,000
18
Formidable
1902
Lord Nelson
16,500
18
Lord Nelson
1908
Magnificent
14,900
17
Majestic
1895
Mars
14,900
17
Majestic
1897
Marlborough
25,000
21
Iron Duke
1914
Monarch
22,500
21
Orion
1912
Neptune
19,900
21
18
Colossus
1911
Orion
22,500
21
Orion
1911
Prince George
14,900
17
Majestic
1896
Prince of Wales
15,000
18
Formidable
1904
Queen
15,000
18
Formidable
1904
Russell
14,000
19
Duncan
1903
St. Vincent
19,250
21
St. Vincent
1910
Superb
18,600
21
Bellerophon
1909
Swiftsure
11,800
20
Swiftsure
1904
n
224
THE BRITISH NAVY
BATTLESHIPS— continued
.
Displace-
Speed
Class
Com-
Tons
Knots
pleted
Temeraire
18,600
21
Bellerophon
1909
Thunderer
22,500
21
Orion
1912
Vanguard
19,250
21
St. Vincent
1910
Venerable
15,000
18
Formidable
1902
Vengeance
12,950
18
Canopus
1901
Victorious
14,900
17
Majestic
1897
Zealandia
16,350
18
King Edward VII
1905
MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL BATTLESHIPS
Iron Duke (1914) : Ten 13-5-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
King George V (1912) : Ten 13-5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Orion (1911) : Ten 13-5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Colossus (1911) : Ten 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
St. Vincent (1910) : Ten 12-in., eighteen 4-in. guns.
Bellerophon (1909) : Ten 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Lord Nelson (1908) : Four 12-in., ten 9-2-in. guns.
Dreadnought (1906) : Ten 12-in guns, twenty-four 12 pr.
King Edward VII (1905) : Four 12-in., four 9-2-in., ten 6-in.
guns.
Swiftsure (1904) : Four 10-in., fourteen 7-5-in. guns.
Duncan (1903) : Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
Formidable (1901 ) : Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
Canopus (1899) : Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
Majestic (1895) Four 12-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
THE BRITISH NAVY
225
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displace-
]
ment
Class
g
Tons
Knots
1
Warspite
27,500
25
Queen Elizabeth
1913
Queen Elizabeth
27,500
25
Queen Elizabeth
1913
N.B. These ships, nearing completion, rely entirely on oil
fuel, while their heavy armament consists of eight 15-in. and
twelve 6-in. guns.
BATTLESHIPS BUILDING
Barham, Malayja,^ Valiant, Ramillies, Repulse, Renown,
Resistance, Resolution, "Kevenge, Royal Oak, Royal Sovereign.
N.B. Of these the first three belong to the Queen Elizabeth
class (see above), while the main armament of the remainder
(which will not be completed till 1916) will probably consist of
eight 15-in. and twelve 6-in. guns.
BATTLE-CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Invincible
17,250
25
Invincible
1908
Inflexible
17,250
25
Invincible
1909
Indomitable
17,250
26
Invincible
1909
Indefatigable
18,750
25
Indefatigable
1911
Lion
26,350
28
Lion
1912
New Zealand
18,800
25
Indefatigable
1912
Princess Royal
26,350
28
Lion
1912
Queen Mary
27,000
28
Queen Mary
1914
Tiger
28,000
28
Queen Mary
1914
226
THE BRITISH NAVY
MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL SHIPS
Queen Mary (1914) : Eight 13-5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Lion (1912) : Eight 13-5-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Indefatigable (1911) : Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
Invincible (1909) : Eight 12-in., sixteen 4-in. guns.
ARMOURED CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
12,000
13,550
10,850
21
23
Duke of Edinburgh
Devonshire
1907
1905
Achilles
Antrim
Argyll
10,850
12,000
9,800
221
21
23
Devonshire
Monmouth
1905
1903
Berwick
Black Prince
Carnarvon
13,550
10,850
23
Duke of Edinburgh
Devonshire
1906
1905
Cochrane
Cornwall
13,550
9,800
23
23
Duke of Edinburgh
Monmouth
1907
1904
Cumberland
12,000
9,800
21
23
Cressy
Monmouth
1901
1904
Defence
14,600
22£
Minotaur
1909
Devonshire
Donegal
Drake
10,850
9,800
14,100
22J
23
23
Devonshire
Monmouth
Drake
1905
1903
1902
Duke of Edinburgh
Essex
13,550
9,800
23
23
Duke of Edinburgh
Monmouth
1906
1903
Euryalus
Gfood HojJtu i •«»•»'
Hampshire
"^kMM^^^H^^^^^^^^Mtf**1*1
JTO^UB^
Kent
12,000
14,100
10,850
9^800
21
23
22J
21
23
Cressy
Drake
Devonshire
Cressy
Monmouth
1904
1902
1905
1902
1903
King Alfred
Leviathian
14,100
14,100
23
23
Drake
Drake
1903
1903
Lancaster
9,800
23
Monmouth
1904
Minotaur
14,600
22J
Minotaur
1908
Sunk by German submarines, September 22, 1914.
THE BRITISH NAVY
ARMOURED CRUISERS— continued
227
Displace-
ment
Ions
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
^^
90
1 QfiO
Natal
13,550
23
Duke of Edinburgh
1907
Roxburgh
10,850
22J
Devonshire
1905
Shannon
14,600
22J
Minotaur
1908
Suffolk
9,800
23
Monmouth
1904
Sutlej
12,000
21
Cressy
1902
Warrior
13,550
23
Duke of Edinburgh
1907
MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL
ARMOURED CRUISERS
Minotaur (1908) : Four 9-2-in., ten 7-5-in. guns.
Duke of Edinburgh (1906) : Six 9-2-in., ten 6-in. guns.
Devonshire (1905) : Four 7-5-in., six 6-in. guns.
Monmouth (1903) : Fourteen 6-in. guns.
Drake (1902) : Two 9-2 in., sixteen 6-in. guns.
Cressy (1901) : Two 9-2-in., twelve 6-in. guns.
PROTECTED FIRST CLASS CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Amphitrite
11,000
20|
Diadem
1900
Argonaut
11,000
20|
Diadem
1900
Europa
11,000
20J
Diadem
1899
Terrible
14,200
22
Powerful
1898
228 THE BRITISH NAVY
PROTECTED SECOND CLASS CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Birmingham
5440
25
Chatham /
1914
Bristol
4800
27
Bristol
1910
Challenger
5880
21
Challenger
1904
Chatham
5400
25
Chatham ft.
1912
Crescent
7700
20
Edgar
1894
Dartmouth
5250
25
Weymouth /
1911
Diana
5600
19-5
Talbot
1898
Dido
5600
19-5
Talbot
1898
Doris
5600
19-5
Talbot
1898
Dublin
5400
25
Chatham '•.
1913
Eclipse
5600
19-5
Talbot
1897
Edgar
7350
20
Edgar
1893
Endymion
7350
20
Edgar
1894
Falmouth
5250
25
Weymouth 1
1911
Gibraltar
7700
20
Edgar
1894
Glasgow
4800
27
Bristol
1910
Gloucester
4800
27
Bristol
1910
Grafton
7350
20
Edgar
1894
-."W60-
KATlA
20
an
Edgar
1893
1 QA9 -
Highflyer
oow
5600
— V
20
Highflyer
1900
Hyacinth
5600
20
Highflyer
1901
Isis
5600
19-5
Talbot
1898
Juno
5600
19-5
Talbot
1898
Liverpool
4800
27
Bristol
1910
Lowestoft
5440
25
Chatham >/
1914
Minerva
5600
19-5
Talbot
1897
Newcastle
4800
27
Bristol
1910
Nottingham
5440
25
Chatham 4 '
1914
Royal Arthur
Southampton
7700
5400
20
25
Edgar
Chatham <>
1893
1913
Talbot
5600
19-5
Talbot
1897
Theseus
7350
20
Edgar
1894
Venus
5600
19-5
Talbot
1895
Vindictive
5750
20
Arrogant
1897
Weymouth
5250
25
Weymouth f,
1911
Yarmouth
5250
25
Weymouth ^
1912
THE BRITISH NAVY
229
MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL SECOND CLASS
CRUISERS
Diadem (1898) : Sixteen 6-in. guns.
Chatham (1912) : Eight 6-in. guns.
Weymouth (1911) : Eight 6-in. guns.
Bristol (1910) : Two 6-in., ten 4-in. guns.
Challenger (1904) : Eleven 6-in. guns.
Highflyer (1900) : Eleven 6-in. guns.
Talbot (1896) : Eleven 6-in. guns.
Edgar (1893) : Two 9-2-in., ten 6-in. guns.
PROTECTED THIRD CLASS CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Active
3440
26
Boadicea
1911
Astrsea
4360
19-5
Astrsea
1894
Bellona
3350
26
Boadicea
1910
Blanche
3350
26
Boadicea
1910
Blonde
3350
26
Boadicea
1911
Boadicea
3300
26
Boadicea
1909
Chary bdia
4360
19-5
Astrsea
1895
Diamond
3000
23
Topaze
1905
Fearless
3440
26
Boadicea
1913
Fox
4360
19-5
Astrsea
1895
Hermione
4360
19-5
Astraea
1895
*DA/vn o-iitiT
2135
30
• i * Pclornfl
1899
JHipMIMPf— — -
Pelorus
2135
20
Pelorus
1897
Psyche
2135
20
Pelorus
1900
Proserpine
2135
20
Pelorus
1899
Pyramus
2135
20
Pelorus
1900
Philomel
2575
19
Philomel
1892
Sapphire
3000
23
Topaze
1905
Sappho
3400
20
Apollo
1893
Topaze
3000
23
Topaze
1905
* Sunk by German mine, August 6, 1914.
t Disabled by Konigsburg, September 20, 1914.
230
THE BRITISH NAVY
MAIN ARMAMENT OF TYPICAL THIRD CLASS
CRUISERS
Boadicea (1909) : Six 4-in. guns.
Topaze (1905) : Twelve 4-in. guns.
Pelorus (1897) : Eight 4-in. guns.
Astrsea (1894) : Two 6-in., eight 4-7-in. guns.
NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Arethusa
3750
29
Arethusa
1914
Aurora
3750
29
Arethusa
1914
NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Launched
Cordelia
3800
29
1914
Galatea
3750
29
—
1914
Inconstant
3750
29
—
1914
N.B. The main armament of these fast light Cruisers consists
of two 6-in. and eight 4-in. guns.
NEW FAST LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)
Calliope, Caroline, Carysfort, Champion, Cleopatra, Conquest,
Comus, Penelope, Phaeton, Royalist.
THE BRITISH NAVY
SCOUTS (LIGHT CRUISERS)
231
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Adventure
2670
25
Sentinel
1905
Amethyst
Attentive
3000
2670
23
25
Topaze
Sentinel
1905
1906
Foresight
Forward
2850
2850
25
25
Sentinel
Sentinel
1905
1905
Patrol
2940
25
Sentinel
f* . • i
1905
1805
1905
Sentinel
2895
25
Sentinel
Skirmisher
2895
25
Sentinel
1905
N.B. The main armament of these fast Scouts consists of
nine 4-in. guns.
* Sunk by German submarine, September 5, 1914.
MINE-LAYERS (LIGHT CRUISERS)
Apollo (3400 tons). Intrepid (3600 tons).
Andromache (3400 tons). Latona (3400 tons).
Iphigenia (3600 tons). Naiad (3400 tons).
Thetis (3400 tons).
FLOTILLA LEADERS
Swift (2170 tons) : Speed 37 knots, four 4-in. guns.
Broke
Faulknor
> Purchased from Chilian Government 1914.
FLOTILLA LEADERS (COMPLETING)
Kempenfelt : Speed 31 knots, six 4-in. guns.
Nimrod : Speed 31 knots, six 4-in. guns.
TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS
M " CLASS (building) : Manly, Mansfield, Mastiff, Matchless,
Mentor, Meteor, Milne, Minos, Moorsom, Morris, Murray,
Myngs.
232 THE BRITISH NAVY
" M " CLASS (completed) : Miranda.
"L" CLASS (1913-14): Displacement, 965 tons; 29 knots;
three 4-in. guns ; four torpedo tubes. Laertes, Laforey,
Lance, Landrail, Lark, Laurel, Laverock, Lawford, Legion,
Lennox, Leonidas, Liberty, Linnet, Llewellyn, Lookout
Louis, Loyal, Lucifer, Lydiard, Lysander.
« K " CLASS (1912-13) : Displacement, 935 tons ; 29-30 knots ;
three 4-in. guns ; two torpedo tubes. Acasta, Achates,
Ambuscade, Ardent, Christopher, Cockatrice, Contest,
Fortune, Garland, Hardy, Lynx, Midge, Owl, Paragon,
Porpoise, Shark, Sparrowhawk, Spitfire, Unity, Victor.
" I " CLASS (1911) : 27-30 knots ; two 4-in. guns ; two 12-pdrs. ;
two torpedo tubes. Acheron (773 tons), Archer (775 tons),
Ariel (763 tons), Attack (785 tons), Badger (800 tons) ;
Beaver (810 tons), Defender (762 tons), Druid (770 tons),
Ferret (750 tons), Firedrake (767 tons), Forester (760 tons),
Goshawk (760 tons), Hind (775 tons), Hornet (775 tons),
Hydra (770 tons), Jackal (746 tons), Lapwing (745 tons),
Lizard (745 tons), Lurcher (765 tons), Oak (765 tons),
Phoenix (765 tons), Sandfly (780 tons), Tigress (745 tons).
" H " CLASS (1910-11) : Displacement, 780 tons ; 27-29 knots ;
two 4-in. guns ; two torpedo tubes. Acorn, Alarm, Brisk,
Cameleon, Comet, Fury, Goldfinch, Hope, Lame, Lyra,
Martin, Minstrel, Nemesis, Nereide, Nymphe, Redpole,
Rifleman, Rugby, Sheldrake, Staunch.
" G " CLASS (1909-10) : Displacement, 885-984 tons ; 27 knots ;
one 4-in. gun ; two torpedo tubes. Basilisk, Beagle,
Bulldog, Foxhound, Grampus, Grasshopper, Harpy,
Mosquito, Pincher, Racoon, Rattlesnake, Renard, Savage,
Scorpion, Scourge, Wolverine.
" F " CLASS (1907-09) : Displacement, 865-1090 tons ; 33-35
knots ; five 12-pdrs. ; two torpedo tubes. Afride, Amazon
(2 4-in. guns), Cossack, Crusader (2 4-in. guns), Ghurka,
Maori (2 4-in. guns), Mohawk, Nubian (2 4-in. guns),
Saracen (2 4-in. guns), Tarter, Viking (2 4-in. guns),
Zulu (2 4-in. guns).
" E " CLASS : Displacement, 550 tons ; 25 knots ; four 12-pdrs. ;
two torpedo tubes. Arun, Boyne, Chelmer, Cherwell,
Cobie, Dee, Derwent, Doon, Eden, Erne, Ettrick, Exe,
Foyle, Garry, Itchen, Jed, Kale, Kennet, Liffey, Moy,
THE BRITISH NAVY
233
Ness, Nith, Ouse, Kibble, Rother, Stour, Swale, Test,
Teviot, Ure, Usk, Waveney, Wear, Welland.
D " Class (1896-1900) : Displacement, 300-400 tons ; 30
knots ; one 12-pdr. gun ; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes.
Angler, Coquette, Cygnet, Cynthia, Desperate, Fame,
Mallard, Stag.
C " CLASS (1896-1901) : Displacement, 300-^00 tons ; 30
knots ; one 12-pdr, gun ; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes.
Albatross, Avon, Bat, Bittern, Brazon, Bullfinch, Cheerful,
Crane.Dove, Electra, Fairy, Falcon, Fawn, Flirt, Flying Fish,
Gipsy, Greyhound, Kestrel, Leopard, Leven, Mermaid,
Osprey, Ostrich, Racehorse, BMMB*, Roebuck, Star,
Sylvia, Thorn, Velox, Vigilant, Violet, Vixen, Vulture.
B" CLASS (1895-1901): Displacement, 300^00 tons; one
12-pdr., five 6-pdr. guns ; two torpedo tubes. Albacore,
Arab, Bonetta, Earnest, Express, Griffon, Kangaroo,
Lively, Locust, Myrmidon, Orwell, Panther, Peterel, Quail,
Seal, Spiteful, Sprightly, Success, Syren, Thrasher, Wolf.
A " CLASS (1894-95) : Displacement, 275-320 tons ; on*
12-pdr. gun ; five 6-pdr., two torpedo tubes. Conflict,
Fervent, Lightning, Opossum, Porcupine, Sunfish, Surly,
Zephyr.
SUBMARINES
80 completed. 16 building.
Class
No. in
Class
Date of
Building
Submerged
Speed
Surface
Speed
Displacement
"A"
9
1904-06
9 knots
12 knots
200 tons
"B"
10
1904-06
9 „
13 „
314 „
"C"
37
1906-09
10 „
14 „
320 „
"D"
8
1910-11
10 „
16 „
550 „
"B"
16
1911-13
12 „
16 „
810 „
The boats of the " E " class are the latest in the Navy<
They have a radius of 2000 miles, and are capable of remaining
about twenty -four hours under water. They carry four torpedo
tubes and two quick-firing guns. On the surface they run with
heavy oil engines, and under water they are driven by motors
234 THE BRITISH NAVY
supplied with electric current from accumulators. They have
cabins and berthing for about twenty-five officers and men.
Most of them carry two torpedo tubes.
Several boats of the"F" class are now building, and will dis-
place nearly 1200 tons and carry six torpedo tubes, and dis-
appearing quick-firing guns.
TORPEDO BOATS IN COMMISSION
The number of torpedo boats is ninety-one, of which twenty-
one are over twenty years old.
LIST OF MERCHANT VESSELS
Commissioned as H.M. Ships
Alsatian, Anglia, Aquitania, Armadale Castle, Cambria,
Carmania, Caronia, Empress, Empress of Britain, Engadine,
Kinfauns Castle, Macedonia, Mantua, Marmora, Otranto,
Riviera, Scotia, Tara, Venetia, Victorian.
DEFENCE FORCES OF THE
DOMINIONS
AUSTRALIA
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Guns
Com-
pleted
BATT]
LE-CRU
ISER
Australia
19,200
25
Eight 12-in.,
sixteen 4-in.
1913
PROTECTED SECOND CLASS CRUISER
Encounter | 5880 | 21 | Eleven 6-in. | 1906
LIGHT CRUISER
Pioneer | 2200 I 20 | Eight 4-in. j 1900
THE BRITISH NAVY
AUSTRALIA— continued
235
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Guns
Com-
pleted
Melbourne
Sydney
5600
5600
Eight 6-in.
Eight 6-in.
1913
1913
NEW LIGHT CRUISER (BUILDING)
Brisbane 5600 25J
TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS
Parramatta (700 tons), Warrego (700 tons), Yarra (700 tons).
TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS (BUILDING)
Derwent (700 tons), Swan (700 tons), Torrens (700 tons).
SUBMARINES
*AE 1 ; AE 2.
* Sank, September 20, 1914.
CANADA
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Guns
Com-
pleted
FIRST CLASS CRUISER
Niobe | 11,000 | 20 | Sixteen 6-in. | 1899
SECOND CLASS CRUISER
Rainbow I 3600 I 20 I Two 6-in. 1893
THE GERMAN NAVY
BATTLESHIPS (MODERN)
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
f Konig Albert
Kaiserin
24,312
24,312
21
21
Kaiser
Kaiser
1913
1913
v Freiderich Der
: '> Grosse
f , Kaiser
24,312
24,312
21
21
Kaiser
Kaiser
1912
1912
Prinz Regent Luit-
pold
24,312
21
Kaiser
1913
Helgoland
22,440
20
Helgoland
1911
Oldenburg
22,440
20
Helgoland
1911
<7/> < Ostfreisland
Thuringen
22,440
22,440
20
20
Helgoland
Helgoland
1912
1911
>l , Nassau
18,600
20
Nassau
1909
Posen
18,600
20
Nassau
1910
' Rheinland
Westfalen
18,600
18,600
20
20
Nassau
Nassau
1910
1909
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displace-
£ •« 3
.0 O 3
ment
Knots
Class
* -2 "3,
Tons
*£J
Konig
Grosser Kurfurst
26,575
26,575
23
23
Konig
Konig
1914
1914
to
Markgraf
Kronprinz
26,575
26,575
23
23
Konig
Konig
1914
1915
236
THE GERMAN NAVY 237
MAIN ARMAMENTS OP TYPICAL
BATTLESHIPS
Kaiser (1913) : Ten 12-in., fourteen 5-9-in. guns.
Helgoland (1911) : Twelve 12-in., fourteen 5-9-in. guns.
Nassau (1909) : Twelve 11 -in., twelve 5-9-in. guns.
Konig (1914) : Ten 12-in., fourteen 5-9-in. guns.
BATTLESHIPS (MODERN) BUILDING
Ersatz Worth : Probable displacement, 29,000 tons ;
designed speed, 23 knots.
" T " : Probable displacement, 29,000 tons ; designed
speed, 23 knots.
N.B. These two ships may be armed with eight 15-in. and
sixteen 5-9-in. guns.
BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)
DispLace-
Speed
Cluss
Com-
Tons
Knots
pleted
Deutschland
13,000
19
Deutschland
1906
Hannover
13,000
19
Deutschland
1907
Schlesien
13,000
19
Deutschland
1908
Schleswig-Holstein
13,000
19
Deutschland
1908
Braunschweig
13,000
19
Braunschweig
1904
Elsass
A Hessen
[ Lothringen
13,000
13,000
13,000
19
19
19
Braunschweig
Braunschweig
Braunschweig
1904
1905
1906
//V-Preussen
13,000
19
Braunschweig
1905
Mecklenburg
11,643
18
Wittelsbach
1903
' ',, Wettin
11,643
18
Wittelsbach
1902
Wittelsbach
11,643
18
Wittelsbach
1902
Schwaben
11,643
18
Wittelsbach
1903
Zahringen
11,643
18
Wittelsbach
1902
Kaiser Barbarossa
10,600
17
Kaiser Friedrich
1901
Kaiser Friedrich
HT
10,600
17
Kaiser Friedrich
1898
238
BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)— continued
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Class
Com-
pleted
Kaiser Karl der
Grosse
10,600
17
Kaiser Friedrich
1901
Kaiser Wilhelm II
10,600
17
Kaiser Friedrich
1900
Kaiser Wilhelm
der Grosse
10,600
17
Kaiser Friedrich
1901
N.B. The Deutschland and Braunschweig classes are armed
with four 11 -in. and fourteen 6-7 in. guns ; the Wittelsbach
and Kaiser Friedrich classes are armed with four 9-4-in. and
eighteen 6-in. guns.
BATTLE-CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Main
Armament
Com-
pleted
Derfflinger
26,200
27
Eight 12-in.,
twelve 5-9-in.
1914
Goeben*
22,640
28
Ten 11 -in.,
twelve 5-9-in.
1912
Moltke
22,640
28
Ten 11-in.,
twelve 5-9-in,
1911
Seydlitz
24,600
27
Ten 11-in.,
twelve 5-9-in.
1913
Von der Tann
18,700
28
Eight 11-in.,
ten 5-9-in.
1911
Sold (?) to Turkey.
BATTLE-CRUISERS (BUILDING)
Ersatz Hertha : Probable displacement, 28,000 tons ;
designed speed, 27 knots.
THE GERMAN NAVY
239
Ersatz Victoria Luise : Probable displacement, 28,000
tons ; designed speed, 27 knots.
Liitzow : Probable displacement, 26,200 tons ; designed
speed, 27 knots.
ARMOURED CRUISERS
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Main
Armament
Com-
pleted
Twelve 8*2-in.,
1909
eight 5-9 in.
Gneisenau
11,400
23
Eight 8-2-iu.,
1908
six 5-9-in.
Scharnhorst
11,400
23
Eight 8-2-in.,
1907
six 5-9-in.
Fiirst Bismarck*
10,750
19
Four 9-4-in.,
1900
twelve 5-9-in.
Roon
9,350
21
Four 8-2-in.,
1905
ten 5-9-in.
"r '
9,350
21
Four 8'2-in.,
1905
ten 5-9-in,
Prinz Adalbert
8,850
21
Four 8-2-in.,
1903
ten 5-9-in.
Friedrioh Karl
8,850
21
Four 8-2-in.,
1903
ten 5-9-in.
Prinz Heinrich
8,760
20
Two 9-4-in.,
1902
ten 5-9-in.
* Is being converted into a torpedo training-ship.
PROTECTED CRUISERS
Displace-
Speed
Main
Com-
Tons
Knots
Armament
pleted
Kaiserin Augusta
6000
20
Twelve 5-9-in.,
1894
eight 3-4-in.
Freya
5600
19
Two 8-2-in.,
1898
six 9-5-in.
&U-
240 THE GERMAN NAVY
PROTECTED CRUISERS— continued
* m
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Main
Aimament
Com-"
pleted
Hansa
5791
19
Two 8-2-in.,
1899
eight 5'9-in.
Hertha
5600
19
Two 8-2-in.,
1898
six 5'9-in.
Victoria Luise
5600
19
Two 8-2-in.,
1898
six 6-in.
Vineta
5600
19
Two 8-2-in.,
1899
six 5'9-in.
Rostock
4870
28
Twelve 4-in.
1913
Karlsruhe
4870
28
Twelve 4-in.
1913
Graudenz
4870
28
Twelve 4-in.
1913
Regensburg
4870
28
Twelve 4-in.
1914
Breslau*
4520
28
Twelve 4-in.
1912
Strassburg
4520
28
Twelve 4-in.
1912
Stralsund
4520
28
Twelve 4-in.
1912
• Augsburg
4280
27
Twelve 4-in.
1910
Kolberg
4280
27
Twelve 4-in.
1910
Magdeburgf
4478
27
Twelve 4-in.
1912
Mainz J - • •• >•« »"
4280
26
Twelve 4-1 -in.
1909
KolnJ
4280
26
Twelve 4-1 -in.
1909
Dresden
3544
27
Twelve 4-in.
1908-
Emuen
3544
24^
Ten 4-in.
1909
3350
24
Ten 4-in.
1907
Nurnburg
3350
23
Ten 4-1 -in.
1908
Stettin
3350
23
Ten 4-1 -in.
1908
Stuttgart
3350
23
Ten 4-1 -in.
1908
Bremen
3200
22 \
Ten 4-1 -in.
1904
Berlin
3200
OO 1
AaVfJ
Ten 4-1 -in.
1905
Danzig
3200
22£
Ten 4-1 -in.
1907
Hamburg
3200
22£
Ten 4-1 -in.
1904
Leipzig
3200
22£
Ten 4-1 -in.
1906
Liibeck
3200
22J
Ten 4-1 -in.
1906
Munchen
3200
22J
Ten 4-1 -in.
1905
* Sold to Turkey,
f Sunk by Russian
j Sunk by British
fleet, August 27, 1914.
fleet, August 28, 1914.
THE GERMAN NAVY
PROTECTED CRUISERS— continued
241
Displace-
ment
Tona
Speed
Knots
Main
Armament
Com-
pleted
Arkona
2660
21
Ten 4-1 -in.
1903
Frauenlob
2660
21
Ten 4-1 -in.
1903
Undine
2660
21
Ten 4-1 -in.
1903
Amazone
2630
2H
Ten 4-1 -in.
1901
Gazelle
2630
20J
Ten 4-1 -in.
1898
Medusa
2630
il*
Ten 4-1-in.
1901
Niobe
2630
20
Ten 4-1-in.
1899
Nymphe
2630
20
Ten 4-1-in.
1901
Thetis
2630
2H
Ten 4-1-in.
1901
Ariadne*
2630
21*
Ten 4.1 -in.
1901
* Sunk by Russian fleet, August 27, 1914.
PROTECTED CRUISERS (BUILDING)
Ersatz Gefion : Probable displacement, 5500 tons ; designed
speed, 28 knots.
Ersatz Hela : Probable displacement, 5500 tons ; designed
speed, 28 knots.
GUNBOATS
Displacement
Tona
Speed
Knots
Completed
Condor
1600
15
1892-95
Cormoran
1600
15
1892-95
Geier , ,
——1600
15
1892-96
Seeadler
1600
15
1892-95
TU;~
880
14
1898-WOO
Jaguar
880
14
1898-1900
Ticyr
880
14
1898-1900
Lucha i "• •
880
14
1898-1900
Panther
900
14
1902-3
Eber
900
14
1902-3
242 THE GERMAN NAVY
TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS
142 completed. 10 building.
TORPEDO BOATS
47, excluding those twenty years old.
3 MINE-LAYERS
SUBMARINES
27 completed. 12 building,
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY
BATTLESHIPS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Arpad
8,208
19
1903
Badenberg
8,208
19
1904
Erzherog Friedrich
10,433
20
1906
Erzherog Karl
10,433
20
1905
Erzherog Ferdinand Max
10,433
20
1907
Erzherog Franz Ferdinand
14,226
20
1910
Habsburg
8,208
19
1902
Radetzky
14,226
20
1911
Tegetthoff
20,000
20
1913
Viribus Unitis
20,000
20
1913
Zrinyi
14,226
20
1911
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Launched
Prinz Eugen
20,000
20
1912
Szent Istvan
20,000
20
1914
243
244 THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NAVY
FIRST CLASS CRUISERS
-
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Kaiserin Maria Theresia
5185
19
1895
Kaiser Karl VI
6150
20
1900
St. Georg
7180
22
1906
LIGHT CRUISERS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Admiral Spaun
Aspern
Kaiserin Elizabeth
3500
2362
3966
26
20
19
1910
1901
1892
Kaiser Franz Josef I
3966
19
1891
Szigetvar
2313
20
1901
LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Launched
Helgoland
Novara
3500
3500
27
27
1912
1913
Saida
3500
27
1912
19 DESTROYERS
58 TORPEDO BOATS
SUBMARINES
10 completed. 4 building.
THE FRENCH NAVY
BATTLESHIPS (MODERN)
Displace-
ment
Tons
Speed
Knots
Main
Armament
Com-
pleted
Condorcet
18,028
19
Four 12 -in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
Courbet
23,100
20
Twelve 12-in.,
1913
twenty-two 5-5-in.
Danton
18,028
20
Four 12-in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
Diderot
18,028
19-73
Four 12-in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
Jean Bart
23,100
21
Twelve 12-in.,
1913
twenty -two 5-5-in.
Mirabeau
18,028
19-73
Four 12-in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
Vergniaud
18,028
19-67
Four 12-in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
Voltaire
18,028
20-66
Four 12-in.,
1911
twelve 9-4-in.
BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Bouvet
12,007
18
1898
Brennus
11,190
17
1893
Carnot
12,000
18
1897
Charlemagne
11,108
18
1898
245
246
THE FRENCH NAVY
BATTLESHIPS (OLDER)— continued
Displacement
Ions
Speed
Knot*
Completed
Charles Marlel
11,693
18
1897
Democratic
14,635
19
1907
Gaulois
11,105
18
1899
Henry IV
8,807
17
1902
Jaureguiberry
11,650
18
1896
Justice
14,635
19
1907
Massena
11,735
17
1898
Patrie
14,635
19
1906
Republique
14,635
19
1906
St. Louis
11,000
18
1900
Sunren
12,527
18
1903
Veritie
14,635
19
1908
N.B, Most of these battleships carry two 12-in. and two
10^-in., and a varying number of 5-5-in. guns.
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knota
Launched
Bretagne
France*
23,177
23,100
20
20
1913
1912
Lorraine
23,177
20
1913
Paris*
23,000
20
1912
Provence
23,177
20
1913
* Should be completed tbia year.
THE FRENCH NAVY
BATTLESHIPS (BUILDING)
247
Displacement
Tons
Designed
Speed
Knots
Beam
24,830
21
__
Flandre
24,830
21
—
Gascogne
24,830
21
—
Languedoc
24,830
21
—
Normandie
24,830
21
—
BATTLE-CRUISERS
None built or building.
FIRST CLASS CRUISERS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Amiral Aube
9,856
21
1904
Amiral Gueydon
9,367
21
1902
Conde
9,856
21
1904
Desaix
7,578
21
1903
Dupetit Thouars
9,367
22
1905
Dupleix
7,578
21
1903
Edgard Quinet
13,427
23
1911
Ernest Renan
13,427
25
1909
Gloire
9,856
21
1904
Jeanne d'Arc
11,092
21
1903
Jules Ferry
12,350
22
1906
Jules Michelet
11,092
23
1906
Kleber
7,578
21
1904
•-- 18;8S$
23
1904 '
Marseillaise
9,856
21
1903
Montcalm
9,367
21
1902
Victor Hugo
12,350
22
1907
Waldeck-Rousseau
13,780
23
1911
T
N.B. These ships carry two or more 7-6-in., eight 6-4-in. guns,
and several 4-1 -in. guns.
248
THE FRENCH NAVY
LIGHT CRUISERS
Displacement
lona
Speed
Knots
Completed
Amiral Charner
4702
18
1895
Bruix
4735
18
1896
Cassard
3890
19
1898
Chateaurenault
7898
24
1902
D'Entrecasteaux
7990
19£
1898
D'Estrees
2421
20J
1900
Du Chayla
3890
20
1897
Friant
3882
19
1894
Guichen
8150
23
1902
Jurien de la Gravidre
6590
22
1901
Lavoisier
2285
20
1899
Pothuau
5374
19
1895
DESTROYERS
83 completed. 4 building.
153 TORPEDO BOATS
SUBMARINES
70 completed. 23 building.
THE RUSSIAN NAVY
N.B. The abbreviation " B.S." denotes Black Sea Meet
BATTLESHIPS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Andrei Pervozvanni
17,400
21
1910
Cesarevitch
12,912
19
1903
Evstafi, B.S.
12,733
16
1911
Imperator Pavel I
17,400
18
1911
loann Zlatoust, B.S.
12,733
16
1910
Panteleimon, B.S.
12,582
17
1902
Rostislav, B.S.
8,880
16
1900
Sinope, B.S.
10,180
16
1890
Slava
13,516
18
1905
N.B. The more recent of these ships carry four 12-in. and twelve
8-in., and a large number of 4-7-in. guns.
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Launched
Alexander III, B.S.
22,500
21
1914
Gangut*
23,000
21
1911
Imperatritsa Maria, B.S.
22,500
21
1913
Petropavlovsk*
23,000
21
1911
Poltava*
23,000
21
1911
Sevastopol*
23,000
21
1911
* May be completed this year.
249
250
THE RUSSIAN NAVY
BATTLESHIP (BUILDING)
Ekaterina II, B.S., 22,500 tons.
BATTLE-CRUISERS (BUILDING)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Borodino
32,200
27
Ismail
32,200
27
—
Kinburn
32,200
27
—
Navarin
32,200
27
—
FIRST CLASS CRUISERS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Admiral Makaroff
7,900
22
1908
Bayan
7,900
21
1910
Gromoboi
13,220
20
1900
Pallada
7,900
21
1910
Rossia
12,130
20
1897
Rurik
15,170
21
1907
LIGHT CRUISERS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Almaz
3285
19
1904
Askold
5905
23
1901
Aurora
6700
20
1902
Diana
6630
20
1902
Kagul, B.S.
Oleg
Pamyat Mercuria, B.S.
Zemtchug
6675
6675
6675
3106
23
23
23
23
1905
1904
1907
1903
THE RUSSIAN NAVY
LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)
251
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Admiral Bontakoff
7600
32
_
Admiral Greig
7600
32
—
Admiral Lazareff, B.S.
7600
32
—
Admiral Nakkimofl, B.S.
7600
32
—
Admiral Nevelskoi
4300
32
—
Admiral Skiridoff
7600
32
—
Mouravieff Amoursky
4300
32
—
Svietlana
7600
32
105 DESTROYERS
25 TORPEDO BOATS
SUBMARINES
25 completed. 18 building.
THE ITALIAN NAVY
BATTLESHIPS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Ammiraglio di St. Bon
9,645
18
1901
Benedetto Brin
13,214
19
1905
Dante Alighieri
19,400
23
1912
Emanuelo Filiberto
9,645
18
1901
Guilio Cesare
22,340
23
1914
Leonardo da Vinci
22,340
23
1914
Napoli
12,425
22
1909
Regina Elena
12,425
22
1907
R-egina Margherita
13,214
20
1904
Re Umberto
13,673
19
1893
Roma
12,425
22
1909
Sardegna
13,640
20
1895
Vittorio Emanuelo HI
12,425
22
190T
Saint Bon
9,645
18
1900
BATTLESHIPS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Launched
Conte di Cavour
Doria (Andrea)
Duilio (Caio)
22,340
23,025
23,025
22
23
23
1911
1913
1913
252
THE ITALIAN NAVY
FIRST CLASS CRUISERS
253
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
1 ^Bl
Carlo Alberto
6396
19
1898
Franceso Femiccio
7294
20
1904
Guiseppe Garibaldi
Marco Polo
7294
4511
20
19
1901
1894
Pisa
9956
23
1909
San Giorgio
San Marco
9832
9832
22
22
1910
1910
Varese
7294
20
1901
Vettor Pisani
6396
20
1897
LIGHT CRUISERS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Calabria
2452
16
1897
Elba
2689
17
1895
Etruria
2245
19
1893
Libia
3690
22
1913
Liguria
Puglia
Quarto
2245
2498
3220
19
20
28
1894
1901
1912
LIGHT CRUISERS (LAUNCHED)
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Launched
Marsala
3400
28
1912
Nino Bixio
3400
28
1911
254 THE ITALIAN NAVY
LIGHT CRUISERS (BUILDING)
Basilicata (2460 tons).
Campania (2460 tons).
Mirabello (5000 tons).
DESTROYERS
36 completed. 10 building.
70 TORPEDO BOATS
SUBMARINES
18 completed. 10 building.
AIR CRAFT OF THE FIGHTING
NATIONS
BRITISH
BATTLE AIRSHIP (BUILDING)
One rigid battle airship of 23 tons displacement, with 44 knots
speed, is being built.
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
7 completed. 7 building.
Seven of these airships varying from 1 to 10 tons displace-
ment, with speed from 25 to 44 knots, are completed, while
7 varying from 10 to 15 tons displacement, with speed from
40 to 44 knots, are building.
GERMANY
BATTLE AIRSHIPS
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Zeppelin L3 *
Z8
32
22
40
42
1914
1914
» Z7
22
42
1913
* Has maintained a speed of over sixty miles an hour, and re-
mained in the air thirty-five hours. She can carry at least a ton and
a half of explosives.
255
256 AIR CRAFT
BATTLE AIRSHIPS— continued
Displacement
Tons
Speed
Knots
Completed
Zeppelin Z6
Z5
19
19
42
42
1913
1913
Z4
19
42
1913
Z3
17
42
1912
Z2
17
41
1911
Zl
19
42
1913
(Sachsen)
(Hansa)
(Victoria Luise)
Parse val
19
18
18
27
42
43
42
43
1913
1912
1912
1914
Schutte-Lanz L4
30
?
1914
SL2
23
1
1914
BATTLE AIRSHIPS (BUILDING)
One Zeppelin of 32 tons displacement, with 44 knots speed.
Other Zeppelins are doubtless building, but reliable particulars
are not available.
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
5 completed. 1 building.
Five of these airships varying from 6 to 13 tons displace-
ment, with speed from 24 to 41 knots, are completed.
One Scouting and Bomb-dropping Airship is being built.
AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES
About 500 completed.
FRANCE
BATTLE AIRSHIP (COMPLETED)
Zodiac, 20 tons displacement, completed 1912.
AIR CRAFT 257
BATTLE AIRSHIP (BUILDING)
Astra, 38 tons displacement, 61 knots speed.
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
8 completed. 4 completing.
3 building.
AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES
About 830 completed.
RUSSIA
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
7 (efficient) completed. 4 building.
AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES
About 500 completed.
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
3 completed. None building.
AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES
About 100 completed.
ITALY
SCOUTING AND BOMB-DROPPING AIRSHIPS
10 completed. 1 building.
AEROPLANES AND SEAPLANES
About 150.
K
NEW THINGS IN WAR
GUN-TURRETS ON LAND — AEROPLANE AND SUB-
MARINE— THE FRENCH ZEPPELIN DESTROYER-
MINES ON LAND AND AT SEA
BY JOHN S. GREGORY
WAR is now waged on earth, in the air, on the sea,
and beneath the waters thereof with the aid of
numerous devices never before tested in actual
hostilities. Aeroplanes, automobiles, and sub-
marines have been used in previous wars, but
on scarcely more than an experimental scale.
All have been greatly improved since these tests
and many accessories have been added.
The most spectacular of new developments in
warfare is the advent of the airship and the aero-
plane on an imposing scale. Military authorities
appear to have become convinced of the value
of these new fighting machines. At least, France,
Germany and Russia, and more recently England,
have displayed an energy amounting to frenzy
in the development of these machines. With
£6,500,000 for the purpose, Germany set out to
offset England's naval supremacy by building a
great fleet of dirigibles. At first the Admiralty
professed to scoff at Germany's purpose ; but after
contemplating the possibility of a fleet of airships
258
NEW THINGS IN WAR 259
flying across the North Sea a comprehensive pro-
gramme for building air craft was undertaken in
haste.
Millions have been lavished on experiments
with air craft, aviators have been drilled by hun-
dreds, every contingency in war that could be
foreseen has been tested at the annual army
manoeuvres of the great nations. The result has
been the development of two widely different
types of flying machines, each of which has its
own peculiar sphere of usefulness.
Germany pins her faith to the dirigible, " The
Dreadnought of the Air," of which two principal
types have been developed, the Zeppelin and the
Schuette-Lanz. These monsters are from 400
to 500 feet long, have a speed of 50 to 70 miles
an hour, a cruising radius of 1200 to 3000 miles,
and a carrying capacity of from 8 to 10 tons.
They are armoured against rifle and machine
gun bullets, carry small guns, wireless telegraph,
and a crew of 20 to 30 men.
As an indication of their reliability, the Zeppelin
Company announced that out of 334 days from
January 1 to December 1, 1912, their airships
flew on 308 days, bringing up a total of 1167
hours and covering a distance of 41,145 miles
and carrying a total of 10,291 persons, including
5609 members of the crews and 4682 passengers,
all without a single fatal accident.
From the German point of view these craft
are battleships of great destructive power, for
they can release half a ton of explosives at once ;
and in experiments thay have completely shot
to pieces the silhouette of a village from an alti-
260 NEW THINGS IN WAR
tude of six thousand feet. Another, flying at an
altitude of three thousand feet, got the range of
a canvas target representing a boat on Lake Con-
stance at the third shot, and then scored nearly
one hundred per cent, of hits. Some of these big
ships have a platform on the top of the gas bag on
which a machine gun is mounted as a protection
against aeroplanes.
Against these bulky and somewhat clumsy
dirigibles France has developed the " Zeppelin
Hunter," an aeroplane, armoured against machine
gun and rifle bullets, carrying two or three men
besides the pilot and a couple of machine guns.
The French regard an encounter between an aero-
plane and a dirigible as a climbing contest. The
strategy of the aeroplanist is to get above his
big and awkward antagonist and from this superior
height to drop explosives upon him. The dirigible,
on the other hand, depends upon its superior
armament and the far greater steadiness of its
gun platform to protect it from the aeroplane.
These widely different types of air craft are
expected to play two distinct roles : the dirigible
is a fighting machine to be directed against troops
in the field, and more especially against the
works of the enemy, trains, bridges, magazines,
&c., and to protect its own lines from incursions
by hostile aeroplanes on scouting expeditions.
The chief value of the aeroplane is in reconnaissance.
Its superior speed is expected to enable it to elude
dirigibles. Only in an incidental way is it expected
to assume the offensive, with its machine gun or
by dropping bombs.
An exception to this is the giant Sikorsky
NEW THINGS IN WAR 261
aeroplane, a Russian machine capable of carry-
ing seventeen men. With its great bulk and
comparatively slow speed this recently invented
type must necessarily be a fighting machine rather
than an aerial scout.
Notwithstanding the frequency of tragedies
in the air the aeroplane also has been developed
into a fairly trustworthy machine. Colonel Seely
surprised the House of Commons last April by
informing it that there were only six days in the
preceding year on which there had been no flights
by British army aviators, and that there had not
been a single fatal accident or the breakage of
any main part of a machine while in the air.
In France, where the aeroplane is considered
more valuable than the dirigible, the aviation
corps has been organized with the Escadrille as
the unit. The personnel and materiel of the
Escadrille is designed with the object of keeping
six machines in the field. Its transport con-
sists of three automobiles for the crews, two motor-
cycles, six motor trucks with " prolonges," an
extra pair of trailing wheels on which the aero-
planes, folded, are hauled, and two workshops
on motor trucks. One of these aviation camps
was struck, packed, and ready to move in less than
an hour at the 1913 manoeuvres.
THE NEW ART OF OBSERVATION IN Mro-AiR
The aeroplane scout must fly high and swiftly
to avoid hostile bullets. At an altitude of three
thousand feet, at which he is fairly safe, he has
a range of vision of four to five miles. Troops
on the march can be seen and their number esti-
262 NEW THINGS IN WAR
mated by the road space occupied. Artillery
in action is easily distinguishable, as are cavalry
and transport of all kinds on the move. Massed
infantry in the open is fairly distinct, though
khaki-clad men in open order or moving over
stubble or ploughed fields are difficult to distinguish
and they are not always readily seen on grass.
The flying scout can readily obtain an idea of
trenches, outposts, and methods of occupation
of bridges and fords. Field works, if their colour
and outlines do not blend with the landscape,
can be seen at a distance of five miles, though
they are not readily distinguishable. It is difficult
for the aviator to tell " dummy " trenches from
real ones.
French aerial scouting is superb. The com-
manding general can count on having any specified
region examined. The art of observation from
mid-air has been reduced to a system as exactly
regulated as that of cavalry reconnaissance.
British aviators have also distinguished themselves
by their success in aerial scouting.
Yet there is another side to the story, for aviators
are as far from perfection as their fellow mortals
are in other ways. At the 1913 manoeuvres, a
French general and his staff were surprised and
captured despite the utmost vigilance of his aerial
scouts. A British " Blue " division of twelve
thousand men with horses stole a march of sixteen
miles on the " Red " division while the aerial scouts
of the latter were hunting for it. The men skulked
along under hedgerows and other cover while
guns and transport wagons were hidden under
straw so that they might be mistaken for farmers'
NEW THINGS IN WAR 263
wagons. Whenever a " Red " aeroplane came
into view a whistle from the " Blue " lookout
warned very man to crouch in his tracks, or under
the nearest cover. Aerial scouts have been
repeatedly deceived in German manoeuvres.
Although the Germans claim to have dropped
bombs from an altitude of five thousand feet on
a target fifteen feet in diameter, extravagant
claims regarding the effectiveness of aerial bombs
must be accepted with reservations. In a lecture
before the Brooklyn Aeronautical Association,
Mr. Hudson Maxim, who must be conceded to be
an authority on explosives, said that explosives
so powerful and destructive when employed in
aerial bombs as to fulfil expectations and predic-
tions of the scaremongers could not be made.
The destructive power of torpedoes and shells
is enormous under favourable conditions, but never
so great as the average man supposes after a short
course in blood-curdling aerial fiction. Experi-
ments with dropped live shells and explosives
showed that although they might land within a
remarkably short distance of the target, it was
just that distance that made all the differ-
ence in the resulting damage ; for the effects of
high explosives are very local. Furthermore,
the momentum of a heavy object falling from a
great height is so great that it is buried in the
ground and the force of the explosion is thus neutra-
lized. Judging from analogy with artillery prac-
tice against towns, aerial bombs are not worth
the time, energy, ammunition, and risk to life
involved. In the Boer War, Ladysmith withstood
the battering of twenty thousand or more shells
264 NEW THINGS IN WAR
with practically no damage. Similar results were
observed at Pretoria. Lyddite shells dug caves
and made breaches in the walls of a fort at Omdur-
man, but did little real damage.
Experiments in defence against hostile aero-
planes and airships have been quite as elaborate
as those in offensive operations. It has been
found, for instance, that at three thousand feet
an aeroplane is a hard thing to hit, though
experience in actual warfare has shown that an
areoplane affords a pretty good target.
AEROPLANES VERSUS SUBMARINES
A curious development in aerial navigation
has been the pitting of the airship against the
submarine. In fairly clear and smooth water
submarines and even submarine mines can be
readily seen from the lofty outlook of an airship or
aeroplane. As the submarine moves slowly when
under water a battleship guarded by aerial scouts
might be able to manoeuvre out of the way. It
has also been proposed to use the airship as a
mine destroyer by dropping bombs near enough
to the mines to explode them, the ships following
close enough in the wake of 'the aerial pilot to
avoid other mines outside the cleared zone.
At all events, England regards the airship as
such an important naval auxiliary that the diri-
gibles have all been turned over to the navy, the
army retaining only aeroplanes. The navy also
has a number of seaplanes, and the naval estimates
for the current year have an item of £80,000 for
the construction of a new ship for carrying sea-
planes. This will be the first vessel of the kind
NEW THINGS IN WAR 265
ever constructed for this special purpose, though
France has two makeshift vessels of the kind.
Accessories to be used by or in connexion with
air craft are innumerable. Although Germany
has no fewer than thirty airship sheds between
Berlin and the frontier of France, special railway
cars have been provided with steel cylinders
kept filled with hydrogen gas with which to inflate
the huge dirigibles. These cars are always ready
and can be rushed anywhere they may be needed
in a hurry. The airship stations are equipped
to facilitate night work, being provided with
coloured electric flashes, each station having its
own code of signals for aerial pilots. The diri-
gibles are equipped with searchlights to aid in
alighting.
The actual number of craft in these aerial fleets
is known only to their respective governments.
Published statements differ so widely that the
following figures can be offered only as probably
the most trustworthy approximation :
Dual Alliance
Dirigibles Aeroplanes
Germany 22 . . 320
Austria-Hungary . . . . . 7 . . 100
29 . . 420
Triple Entente and Allies
France 16 .. 834
Russia 10 .. 164
Great Britain 6 . . 250
Belgium 2 . . 40
Serbia 10
Montenegro . . . . . . — . . 1
34 1299
266 NEW THINGS IN WAR
A German bomb designed for use from the
air weighs twenty pounds and is charged with
four pounds of trinitrotoluol and 340 steel balls.
To guard against mishaps it has a safety catch so
that it will not explode until a fall of at least two
hundred feet allows a revolving vane to unscrew
the safety catch and bring the firing pin in contact
with the explosive. A slight touch will then set
off the bomb.
The Krupp works have devised a fire bomb
which sheds a bright light during its flight to the
earth and after it strikes, so that airship gunners
may be able to aim accurately during the darkest
night.
Another German bomb for the use of aero-
pianists and airships releases a tremendous quantity
of dense smoke which spreads in a great cloud,
under cover of which the aviator may possibly
have a chance to make his escape.
Still another bomb is charged with 150 pounds
of chemicals which, upon exploding, is supposed
to fill the air with gases so poisonous that every
living creature within a radius of a hundred yards
will be killed, and the influence of the gas is ex-
pected to extend in a lesser degree to twice that
distance.
The French have a message carrier, to be dropped
by an aviator who wishes to continue his flight,
consisting of a brass tube in which the message
is enclosed with a charge of Bengal fire, which is
ignited by a firing pin on striking the earth. The
fire and smoke mark the spot long enough for a
man to reach it from a distance of three hundred
yards.
NEW THINGS IN WAR 267
Progress in submarine craft and projectiles has
been as marked as in airships. Submarines are
older than the flying machine but, even so, their
size, trustworthiness and radius of action are
amazing. A typical submarine is capable of a
speed of sixteen knots on the surface and ten knots
submerged. Some of the more recent have a
radius of action of 4500 miles ; that is, they could
cross the North Atlantic without replenishing
their fuel and stores. While cruising on the sur-
face they are propelled by gasoline engines. While
running submerged they use electric motors which
are driven by storage batteries, charged by the
gasoline engines while on the surface. They are
not particularly comfortable craft, even for the
most seasoned mariner ; but they can go any-
where at any time. If the weather gets too
rough they can submerge and thus escape the
worst of the wave motion. In tests submarines
have stayed under water for twenty-four hours
at a time.
Russia, which has produced a successful aero-
plane vastly larger than any other nation has
thought of building, is reported to be con-
structing a submarine so enormous that all
others seem pigmies by comparison. This
submarine cruiser is 400 feet long, 34 feet beam,
and of 5400 tons displacement, which is eleven
times the size of the next largest craft of the kind.
Its engines of 18,000 horse-power are capable of
driving it at a speed of 26 knots on the surface, and
its motors of 4400 horse -power are capable of main-
taining a speed of 14 knots submerged. Either on
the surface or beneath the waves the giant Russian
268 NEW THINGS IN WAR
is capable of swiftly overhauling any other vessel
of its kind. It has a cruising radius of 18,500
miles, and can run under water a distance of 275
miles at a stretch. Its armament consists of five
4 -7-inch guns for surface fighting, and 36 torpedo
tubes, of which 16 are on each broadside. It
carries 60 torpedoes and 120 mines, for it is
equipped for laying mines. It is capable of creep-
ing into an enemy's harbour under cover of dark-
ness so that no lurking aeroplane can discover it,
surrounding the hostile fleet with mines so that
certain destruction will follow any attempt to
move, and creep away again, and be not only out
of sight but also beyond suspicion when the tragedy
it has prepared is enacted.
As a protection against their new enemy,
the flying machine, the latest submarines are
equipped with a machine gun which folds down
within the hull when cruising either on the sur-
face or submerged. If an inquisitive aeroplane
comes too near, the submarine can rise to the
surface while a man climbs out, fishes up the
machine gun, and attacks the aerial enemy.
The unvarying accuracy of the new gyroscope
compass is expected to be of great value in enabling
the submarine to stalk its prey with the least
possible risk to itself. A hostile ship can be located
at a distance of eight miles, after which the sub-
marine can run fully submerged with the aid of the
gyroscope compass to within striking distance.
A TORPEDO THAT WEIGHS 1600 POUNDS
Great improvements have also been made re-
cently in the torpedo. Lieutenant Hardcastle,
NEW THINGS IN WAR 269
of the British Navy, has perfected a torpedo that
weighs 1600 pounds and that carries a charge
of 250 pounds of gun-cotton, enough to blow the
whole side out of a battleship. It has a range of
7000 yards, or about four miles. In this case,
too, the gyroscope plays a vital part. A torpedo
fitted with the new gyroscope is more certain of
hitting its mark than the big guns. Furthermore,
the gyroscope rudder can be set so that the torpedo
can be fired from the broadside of a ship, when it
will turn through an angle of ninety degrees and
run dead ahead to its target.
Other great improvements that have completed
the revolution of the torpedo are the substitution
of the turbine engine for the old three-cylinder
engine of the orginal Whitehead torpedo, and a
method of heating the compressed air that furnishes
the power. Air under high pressure is contained
in a flask within the torpedo. When the latter is
fired a valve is opened, admitting air to the engine
through a reducing valve which brings down the
pressure to 300 pounds. As the flask is emptied
the temperature falls, sometimes below zero.
This freezes oil on the bearings and generally
retards the torpedo and renders it ineffective.
By adding a flask of alcohol with a method of
igniting it when the torpedo is fired, the air is
heated after leaving the reducing valve and before
entering the turbines, thus greatly increasing its
efficiency. When the pressure in the air flask
is reduced and the temperature falls another burner
is automatically lighted that heats the air flask
itself, thus preventing freezing. This quadruples
the range of the projectile. According to the
270 NEW THINGS IN WAR
best available information the submarine equip-
ment of the five warring nations is as follows :
Submarines
Great Britain 80
France 70
Russia ........ 25
Germany ....... 27
Austria-Hungary ...... 10
These figures are some months old. Facts about
submarines are jealously guarded military secrets.
One of the most notable phases of the campaign
will be the wonderful revolution wrought in trans-
portation methods by the automobile and motor
truck. On the battlefield, as elsewhere, the horse
is yielding to motor-driven vehicles the place he
has held so long. In recent years Germany and
France have systematically subsidized motor trucks
on condition that they should be available for
governmental use in case of need. In Germany,
by complying with certain conditions, the pur-
chaser of a motor truck receives a subsidy of £200
to be applied on the purchase price, and £50 a
year for upkeep for four years. These subsidized
trucks must carry a load of 13,000 pounds and
haul a trailer besides ; be capable of running ten
miles an hour with full load, be able to climb a 14
per cent, grade, and be able to haul a second trailer
if necessary. Eight hundred subsidized trucks
were available, up to January 1, 1912. The
number has since been materially increased, and,
besides, the Government has the power to re-
quisition every motor vehicle in the Empire. At
the very beginning of hostilities it even exercised
the privilege of requisitioning the automobile of a
NEW THINGS IN WAR 271
party of American ladies who had innocently
crossed the frontier.
Even the motor-cycles are subsidized. When
the war began a force of 2000 subsidized motor-
cyclists, or schnellfahrer (fast riders), as the Germans
call them, were ready for instant service in carry-
ing dispatches, reconnoitring, and the like. In
times of peace, these schnellfahrer have the blessed
privilege of disregarding all speed limitations,
are paid 8s. a day at manoeuvres, are protected
against loss of their positions while serving the
Government, have their machines repaired at the
Government's expense in case of accident, and are
themselves cared for in hospitals without expense
if they get hurt while riding. In case of mobilization
they are paid full value for their machines.
In France the owner of a three-ton motor truck
can get a governmental subsidy of £120 and £40
a year for upkeep for three years. Here, too,
the Government freely exercises the right to take
possession of all motor vehicles if needed. All the
taxi-cabs in Paris were commandeered at the
beginning of hostilities.
Austria-Hungary also subsidizes motor vehicles
and requisitions all that are needed.
The result of all this is to render the armies in
the field to-day mobile beyond the wildest dreams
of strategists of a former generation.
Artillery, which has been so radically improved
that it now plays a far more important part in
deciding battles than it ever did before, is hauled
by motors to a large extent in the armies of all
the countries now at war, especially the big guns.
The French gave their artillery tractors an elaborate
272 NEW THINGS IN WAR
test in the 1913 manoeuvres. These tractors are
of a special build and of 35 horse-power. They are
equipped with a winch and chain cable for pulling
the gun out of the mud. They can carry a load
of two and a half tons and draw fifteen tons addi-
tional at a speed of fifteen miles an hour with a
full load. In an emergency the speed can be
considerably increased.
Everything that an army in the field needs,
or can use, is now provided, mounted on motor
trucks, though such equipment is by no means
universal. There are auto-ambulances, auto-
kitchens, auto-wireless outfits, armoured autos,
sleeping and office autos for the generals, and
special airship guns for firing at a high angle
mounted on motor trucks.
A Russian automobile field kitchen consists
of a motor truck carrying the stock of provisions
and a trailer containing the kitchen designed to
prepare food and coffee for 250 men at one time,
or 2000 men in twenty-four hours. The kitchen
includes a twenty-gallon coffee-pot and a kettle
of a capacity of fifty-three gallons that is jacketed
with glycerine, which retains the heat so that the
contents continue to cook after the fire is out and
keep hot for six or eight hours on the well-known
fireless cooker principle. Food and coffee are
transferred to fireless cookers to be taken to the
men in the field.
No commander has ever been able to keep in
as perfect touch with all the units of his force as
those in the field to-day, for in this line also there
have been improvements in recent years. The
portable field wireless telegraph is being used for
NEW THINGS IN WAR 273
the first time in a great war. Portable wireless
sets of various sizes are made for use in the field.
One outfit is transported on a single wagon. It
has telescoping masts that can be set up in a very
short time, and a gasolene motor for driving the
generator that furnishes the current. A still
smaller outfit which can be packed on three horses
has a generator that is driven by cranks turned by
two men.
The field telegraph and telephone, which have
rendered good service in former times, have been
developed into a combined instrument about the
size of a large field glass and weighing four and a
half pounds. An insulated field wire weighing
seventy-five pounds to the mile, which can be used
lying on the ground, can be laid from a reel on an
auto at ten miles an hour, or it can be carried on
horseback, or a man on foot wearing a reel strapped
to his breast can creep right up to the firing line,
where he can establish a station simply by thrusting
a steel ground rod into the earth. The commander
can maintain communication with each unit of
his force at all times, for these lines can be laid
as fast as troops can advance against the enemy.
However, the modern commander is by no
means dependent on the field telegraph or telephone
to keep in touch with his troops. He now has
aeroplane and motor-cycle messengers, besides
the signal flag and the heliograph, all which have
their place in the equipment of the modern army.
Even the homing pigeon, which was used for
carrying messages in the days of the Pharaohs»
still has its place in the scheme of military organiza-
tion, for the wireless telegraph and the motor-
274 NEW THINGS IN WAR
cycle can no more supplant these time-tried
messengers than the aeroplane scout can take the
place of cavalry. But even the homing pigeon
has been modernized. In no previous war did
pigeons have the advantage of military training.
The famous performance of these winged
messengers during the siege of Paris in the Franco-
Prussian war, when they carried upward of forty
thousand messages, was the result of an inspiration
rather than of forethought. Private citizens who
chanced to have pigeons offered them to the
Government. Their performance was such a
splendid success that France has ever since main-
tained large flocks in charge of the engineer corps.
The birds are carefully trained as soon as they
are able to fly and are then drilled daily for the
rest of their useful lives. They are taught to fly
and to alight on signal. The first thing Bismarck
did after the treaty of peace was signed was to
establish pigeon lofts in Berlin and elsewhere
throughout the Empire. Every other nation in
Europe followed his example, and to-day every
Government has thousands of pigeons, all ready
to carry messages in time of war.
At the siege of Port Arthur the Japanese made
such effective use of improvised hand grenades
that the attention of military experts was at-
tracted, with the result that this ancient weapon
has also been modernized. One type of modern
hand grenade, the Aasen, weighs one kilogram,
and contains 190 bullets. As these fly in all
directions, it can be used only from under cover.
Another form of the grenade can be fired from
a " howitzer " weighing about twenty-four pounds,
NEW THINGS IN WAR 275
which can be carried in a case like a rifle. It throws
a murderous missile weighing about two pounds
to a distance of three hundred yards. It explodes
on contact, scattering 215 bullets over an area
of about a hundred square yards. Still another
type of this so-called grenade can be fired, with
the aid of a stick thrust into a rifle barrel, to a
distance of four hundred yards.
Most deadly of all is the mine " grenade,"
weighing eight pounds and containing 400 large
bullets. This is buried a few inches under-
ground. When the enemy is over the mine the
touch of an electric button causes it to spring out
of the ground until it is checked by a chain at a
height of a yard above the surface, when it ex-
plodes, mowing down every man in the vicinity.
The mine at sea is not a new device. In the
Russo-Japanese war the Japanese used electro-
mechanical mines as well as free mines around
the harbour of Port Arthur. The Russian flagship,
the Petropavlovsk, was blown up by the mines set
off by electricity. On the other hand the Japanese
themselves were literally hoist by their own petard,
for they lost two of their largest ships, the Hatsuma
and the Yashima, from the free mines that they
loosed for the destruction of the Russian battle-
ships.
Every decade in the last half-century has seen
an improvement in the accuracy, range, and
power of heavy artillery and the destructive power
of the projectiles.
The Belgian prolonged resistance at Liege has
drawn public attention to modern fortresses and
their defence. Heavy shells fired from long ranges
276 NEW THINGS IN WAR
will penetrate as much as twenty feet of sand,
which offers more resistance than other soils.
Moreover, a shell which explodes after it has
penetrated soil will cause more damage than if
it explodes in the air, on account of the confine-
ment of the earth it has penetrated. Walls exposed
to fire are therefore made of from five to ten
feet of concrete, sometimes reinforced with steel.
Over these there is a few inches of soil as a bed for
grass, so that the fortification may be concealed.
There are hi most European countries either
turrets or iron and steel revolving cupolas con-
taining guns such as those as were at Liege. The
cupolas are a kind of flattened dome, and the
turrets are flat topped like those aboard ship.
There are " disappearing " cupolas mounting small
guns, oscillating cupolas set up on edge and balanced
by springs which turn the cupola forward after
a shot is fired until the gun is under cover, and
others that move on a central pivot. There are
large single gun cupolas with very heavy armament
and smaller ones of light batteries. There are
even portable ones.
The value of night attacks, always more or
less appreciated by military commanders, was
emphasized in the Russian-Japanese war, with
the result that troops have been specially drilled
in this form of operations, and numerous devices
for offence and defence have been invented. One
of these is the portable searchlight with which
all European armies are provided to some extent
at least. These consist of a generator driven by
a gasolene engine mounted on an automobile.
These are specially relied upon for protection in
NEW THINGS IN WAR 277
case of attack by a dirigible, and also in attacks
on the ground. Without light, artillery would
be of little use in a night attack ; but with a
searchlight playing upon an assaulting column,
it can be used with deadly effect.
In the absence of a searchlight a force may
be equipped with parachute lights, a sort of
grenade weighing fourteen ounces which, with
the aid of a firing stick, can be shot from a rifle
to a distance of fifty to a hundred yards where it
will float in the air and burn brilliantly for a half
to three-quarters of a minute. A larger form of
parachute light fired from a field gun with a small
charge of powder floats in the air, giving a dazzling
light for several minutes.
A phase of the war of interest to the military
expert is the fact that an American invention, the
gun silencer, devised by Hiram Percy Maxim, of
Hartford, may be given a thorough trial. There
are Maxim silencers in small numbers in each of
the nations now at war. The inventor expects
that the military advantages of the silencer will
be developed, just as Great Britain demonstrated
the value of machine guns at the battle of Omdur-
man. When the inventor's father, Sir Hiram
Maxim, first presented his Maxim gun it was
considered an extremely clever and interesting
novelty, but impractical under the conditions of
warfare. The old argument against Catling guns
was revived against it — that ammunition could
not be supplied fast enough. If it taxed the
organization to keep the firing line supplied with
ammunition when men with repeating rifles were
firing twenty shots a minute, what would happen
278 NEW THINGS IN WAR
if an attempt were made to supply machine guns
firing 650 shots a minute ? But when the English
at the battle of Omdurman were able to rout an
enormous rush of mounted Dervishes they decided
that the machine gun was a pretty good thing,
after all.
No world power has been at war with another
world power since the Maxim silencer was in-
vented, though very elaborate field trials have
been conducted. Some of the silencer's advantages
are, according to official reports, the muffling of
the noise of firing, allowing the voice of the officer
to be heard, thus giving better control of firing.
The nervous strain and consequent fatigue of the
soldier due to the distressing noise of firing is
abolished. Another important aspect is that it
not only muffles the noise but at the same time
reduces the recoil, so that it becomes a gentle push
instead of a sharp blow. The soldier no longer
flinches instinctively as he pulls the trigger. This
is conducive to better markmanship, and, by
abolishing nervous strain, the soldier is less liable
to yield to panic. The diminution of the noise
of the report increases the enemy's difficulty
in locating the firing line. The difficulty is still
further increased by the fact that the flash is
absolutely annulled in the dark.
All the foregoing facts show what a huge ex-
periment the present war is. It will settle not
only the fate of Europe for many years to come,
as all the diplomatists are predicting ; it will
settle the future of warfare itself. In many
respects these new contrivances, like the aeroplane
and submarine, introduce elements that really
NEW THINGS IN WAR 279
put a premium upon military skill. In others,
such as the new bombs and the proposed use of
gaseous fumes, they simply add to its most brutal
horrors. After considering these new engines,
the conviction remains that there is only one pos-
sible " improvement " in modern accoutrements.
The newspapers have recently described the so-
called invention of a young Italian by which
explosives could be shot off at a distance, something
on the wireless principle. That invention seems
clearly to have been a fraud. The idea, however,
seems to be about the only thing that could make
warfare more horrible than it is. Before this
conflict is over, possibly some one may actually
make it work.
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY IN
WAR TIME
ENGLAND'S SUPPLY DEPENDS ENTIRELY UPON HER
SUPREMACY AT SEA GERMANY'S LARGE IM-
PORTATIONS OF WHEAT — FRANCE, RUSSIA, AND
AUSTRIA - HUNGARY ESSENTIALLY SELF - SUP-
PORTING
BY JAMES MIDDLETON
READERS of history are fond of detecting a re-
semblance between the present European situation
and that which prevailed a century ago. Then
the greatest European Powers were united in a
struggle against one country — France ; now they
are united against another common enemy, Ger-
many. Now, as in 1814, all the forces of Europe
are determined to humiliate one overweening
personality. In one respect, however, and this
is a fundamental one, the situation is entirely
different. A hundred years ago practically every
great European Power was an economic entity.
Each one could have built a Chinese Wall about
itself and lived indefinitely. Each one, that is,
raised on its own soil enough of the essential food-
stuffs to support itself. Even England, in the
Napoleonic wars, was largely an agricultural
280
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 281
community. It raised both cereals and meat
in sufficient quantities to stand an indefinite siege.
Even as late as the Crimean War, in 1853, England
could go cheerfully to war with no fear of national
starvation.
If, as some one has said, an army travels upon
its stomach, the same statement may be made
of a nation itself at war. Clearly, a country that
has its supply of food cut off would immediately
have to submit to any humiliating terms proposed.
Its position would be that of a huge beleagured
fortress. And there is at least one of the nations
engaged in the present struggle, England, that
faces this contingency ; and another, Germany,
that certainly has reasons for apprehension. A
remarkable development of the present inter-
national situation is the dependence of one nation
upon others for its food supply. There is no
country of importance that does not import large
amounts of food from almost every other. The
United States, huge as are its foodstuffs, adds
millions of dollars' worth to its supply from other
sources. Even China, content, as we have sup-
posed with its staple rice, purchases immense
quantities of American canned goods, especially
salmon. Looking over the statistics, one is forced
to conclude that there is no longer any such thing
as a national taste in foods ; each nation is rapidly
picking up all the good things of another. The
extent to which almost the entire world depends
upon one or two countries for its coffee and tea
— foods which, in the Middle Ages, were practi-
cally unknown in Europe — sufficiently illustrates
the growth of this international taste.
282 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
In the present conflict, however, these special
foods will cut no particular figure ; the great
staples of life are the important considerations
in an international war. In this struggle, wheat,
not cotton, promises to be king. What, then, is
the situation of the several nations in this respect ?
How are they to feed not only the huge armies
in the field, but their own peoples ? Unques-
tionably this is the first time in history when war
has presented precisely this problem to the peoples
involved.
THE NATIONS THAT CAN SUPPORT
THEMSELVES
There are seven nations, at this crisis, im-
mediately involved. These are England, Ger-
many, France, Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary,
and Serbia. We can immediately clarify the
situation by arranging these countries in two
classes : those that raise the essential food materials
in sufficient quantities to support themselves, at
least in time of peace, and those that do not. This
division, as accurately as can be determined from
available statistics, is as follows :
Countries Self- Countries not Self-
supporting supporting
Russia England
France Belgium
Austria-Hungary
Serbia
Doubtful
Germany
Of these Russia, next to the United States,
is the largest wheat-growing country in the world.
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 283
Seven-eighths of all the peasants are tillers of the
soil. Two-thirds of all the lands are sown with
cereals. The nation raises not only enough to
support its own enormous population, but exports
large quantities. France, most investigators are
surprised to learn, ranks third — next to Russia
and the United States — as a wheat-growing land.
The thrifty French farmers, with their com-
paratively small acreage, raise more wheat than
the Argentine, British India, or Canada — all of
them usually regarded as huge granaries. They
produce 100,000,000 more bushels than the whole
of South America. France grows about 315,000,000
bushels a year — almost half as much as does the
United States in normal years ; it imports about
22,000,000 bushels. Clearly, with strict economy
enforced by war conditions, France can easily
furnish its own wheat supply without calling on
outside nations. Austria-Hungary and Serbia are
similarly situated. When we come to England,
Germany, and Belgium, however, the conditions
are different. The United Kingdom raises about
65,000,000 bushels of wheat every year and im-
ports 217,000,000. Belgium raises 14,000,000
bushels and imports 49,000,000. The situation
in Germany is not so acute as this, but still, with
importations shut down, the wheat situation
might become embarrassing. The empire raises
149,000,000 bushels a year and imports 67,000,000.
Clearly the sudden wiping out of these importations,
while they might not produce an actual wheat
famine, would so considerably reduce the food
supply as to amount to a distinct military dis-
advantage. Germany's situation is considerably
284 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
better than that of England, but inferior to that
of France and Russia. Russia raises all of its
wheat and more ; France raises ninety per cent. ;
Germany raises sixty per cent. On the other
hand Great Britain and Belgium raise only about
twenty per cent. each. On the theory that a
nation that raises only sixty per cent, of its most
important -article of food can hardly be regarded
as entirely self-supporting, Germany is included,
in the classification given above, as in a more or
less precarious position.
ENGLAND ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON
OUTSIDE SOURCES
From the standpoint of food supply in case
of war, England, of course, presents the most
interesting problem. There was a time when
English statesmen worried little over this situation.
The supremacy of England's sea power was re-
garded as a fixed, determined fact. The fleet was
so immeasureably superior to other navies, and,
indeed, to all of them combined, that England
went on serenely developing a huge industrial
state within, and depending upon other nations
for her food. About fifteen years ago, however,
Englishmen began to be nervous on this point ;
since then there have been periodical scares.
The building of other formidable navies, especially
that of Germany, began to cause general alarm.
The last of these great searchings-of-heart was in
1903. Parliament then appointed a Royal Com-
mission, of which the Prince of Wales, the present
king, served as chairman, to investigate the
question. This Commission collected a large array
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 285
of facts, most of them alarming. It found that
the precariousness of England's food supply was
about as black as it had been described. England
imports four-fifths of all her food. Most of it
comes from far distant countries — from North
and South America, British India and Australia.
She gets large quantities of butter, eggs, bacon,
poultry, fruit, and potatoes, and other vegetable*
from France, Denmark, and the Baltic ports.
A certain amount of grain comes also from
Russian-Baltic ports — and from the Black Sea
region. For the larger staples, however, like wheat
and meat, England has to go several thousand
miles. She always has a comparatively small
supply of food on hand. The swiftness of the
modern steam vessel has made any large storage
system unnecessary. Of butter she has normally
only a seven or ten days' supply ; of cheese only
a month's supply ; of eggs — England consumes
80,000,000 a week — only four or five weeks' supply.
Her resources in wheat vary through the year ; she
has the highest supply in September, when it has
enough for seventeen weeks, and the lowest in
August, when she has enough for only six and a
half weeks. England has a larger supply, however,
than that stored up in her own larder. There is
always an immense amount floating in ships — in
thousands of English vessels, crowding the trade
routes in all parts of the world. This usually
amounts to from three to seven weeks' supply.
An interesting fact herein disclosed is that England's
lowest stock on hand is reached in August — the
very month in which she went to war. The whole
food situation was well summed up in a formal
286 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
declaration made to the Royal Commission by the
most influential members of the wheat trade in
London : " We, the undersigned, concur in the
opinion that, if Great Britain should become
involved in a European war, the country must
be prepared to see bread at practically famine
prices."
THE UNITED STATES SENDS LITTLE
WHEAT TO ENGLAND
From 1870 until 1902, the United States did
the larger part in feeding the British Isles. They
not only had a large surplus of foodstuffs, but the
shortness of the voyage gave them an advantage
over competitors. The enormous increase in their
population forces them now to keep the larger part
of their food, especially wheat, to feed their own
stomachs. Although they are still the world's
largest wheat producers, they send comparatively
little of it abroad. England now draws her supply
from Russia, Canada, the Argentine, British India,
and Australia. The figures for 1911 are as follows :
PRESENT SOUBCE OF ENGLAND'S WHEAT SUPPLY
(Hundredweights)
British India 20,161,518
Russia 18,106,100
Argentine 14,748,600
Canada 14,373,700
Australia 13,910,720
United States 12,939,229
England likewise imports two-thirds of all her
meat. She gets a small supply fresh killed from
Holland and Denmark and a far greater amount
in the shape of live animals from Canada and the
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 287
United States. Her frozen carcasses come mainly
from the Argentine and Australia. She usually
has about one month's supply of all kinds of meat
on hand.
SEA POWER ENGLAND'S ONE SALVATION
The practical question that has agitated England
for many years has been : How are we to protect
our food supply in case of war ? Some authorities
have advocated the building of huge granaries
that would hold a large reserve supply. There
are many practical objections to this proposition
and it has never enlisted popular approval. Most
Englishmen who have had the courage to face the
situation have reached the same conclusion : that
there is only one way of protecting the food supply
and that is the navy. Even with England in
command of the sea, there might be certain
difficulties in feeding the nation ; without this
control, most people agree that the game would be
fairly up. With a hostile navy blockading the
important ports and so shutting out the food ships,
England could undoubtedly be starved into sub-
mission in a few weeks. The Royal Commission,
which investigated this subject, came to this
conclusion. The enormous navy which England
maintains in the North Sea, therefore, has ample
justification.
England will certainly control the sea in the
present conflict ; there are other problems, how-
ever, that she will have to solve. Many ships
are drawn from the mercantile marine for the
use of the Admiralty ; inasmuch as there are
thousands of English ships, however, this pro-
288 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
bably will not seriously interfere with transporta-
tion facilities. Nor does there seem much danger
that the German and Austrian navies will prey
to any extent upon English shipping. The days
of the privateer are over ; the steamship, involving
the difficulty of coaling, has practically made im-
possible this old-fashioned roving of the sea. Nor is
Germany likely to send many of her rapid cruisers
to prey upon English trade ; she will weaken her
fleet, already considerably overmatched, by doing
so. Neutrals ought not to suffer, especially as the
Declaration of London has settled the fact that
food, unless intended for military purposes — such
as the feeding of armies and fortresses — is not
contraband. Some English ships unquestionably
must be captured ; but there will be few in com-
parison with the depredations that seem likely
to be made on German commerce. One con-
sideration that especially protects England's food
supply is the fact that it is not drawn from any
one country, but from five — the United States,
Canada, Argentine, Russia, and British India.
It comes over three great trade routes — the North
Atlantic, the South Atlantic and the Mediterranean.
The first has its most important port in New York,
the second in Buenos Ayres, while the third leads
to Bombay and Australian depots. There seems
no likelihood that Germany can control these
three transportation routes, or any one of them.
When the Royal Commission made its investiga-
tion, the Mediterranean route was the one that
gave the greatest anxiety. The Entente Cordiale
was then not a factor in European politics ; and
war with France was not an impossibility. The
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 289
Republic's naval strength in the Mediterranean
in that event would have endangered such of
England's food supply as came by way of Suez.
The present European alignment makes this same
Mediterranean route perhaps better protected than
either of the other two routes.
UNITED STATES AS A FOOD SUPPLY
IN WAR TIME
* With an English fleet victorious on the sea,
therefore, the English food supply seems abun-
dantly safeguarded. In all probability, if the war
lasts any time, the United States will largely
increase its exports. Their natural position
should make them the largest storehouse of the
Englishman's food. The route to the River
Plata is 6500 miles ; that to Bombay is 6250
miles by the Suez Canal and 10,500 by the Cape.
New Zealand and Australia are 10,000 miles away ;
the distance to American ports, however, is only
3500 miles. Moreover the ships coming this short
distance can carry more than those sailing on the
other routes. The longer the voyage, the more
coal the ship has to carry, and, proportionately,
the smaller is its cargo. Inasmuch as England
will naturally import from the places whence the
food will come quickest and in the largest amount,
it should naturally draw first of all upon the
resources of the United States. It will do this
particularly this year, as their grain crop is un-
usually large and that of the other agricultural
nations unusually small.
When we look to Germany, however, the oppor-
tunities for food importations do not seem so
T
290 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
reassuring. German ships are not able to use
the North Sea. With both the French and the
British fleets in the Mediterranean, there is appar-
ently no hope of obtaining supplies from that
source. It is even probable that the larger part
of the mercantile marine which Germany has been
building up at such enormous cost will be swept
from the sea. That scurrying to friendly ports
that marked the first days of war has developed
into little less than a stampede. Moreover, while
the blockading of the English coast is a difficult
problem, owing to its character and extent, the
blockading of the German North Sea sealine pre-
sents comparatively few problems to a victorious
fleet. Germany will find some embarrassment
also in the fact that she has gone to war with the
country that furnishes the larger part of her ad-
ditional food. This is Russia. She takes from
the Tsar's empire large quantities of wheat, barley,
oats, and corn every year. In fact she imports
foodstuffs from much the same countries as Eng-
land herself. The following table, showing her
importations of wheat, illustrates this point :
GERMANY'S IMPORTATIONS OF WHEAT
(Tons) 1912
Russia 558,422
Argentine 546,439
Canada 269,530
United States 446,512
Australia 322,590
The Germans, therefore, use the same trade
routes as the English ships. With the English and
French commanding the sea, however, the Germans
annot draw any wheat from these sources.
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 291
GERMANY'S LARGE SUPPLIES OF MEAT
The stoppage of these foreign supplies would
not effect Germany to the same extent that a
similar scarcity would embarrass England. In
the British Isles such a calamity would mean
starvation ; in Germany it would mean a severe
scarcity of food. For Germany still produces
the larger part of what it eats. Although in
the last forty years the empire, like England, has
become a great industrial state, with the conse-
quent shifting of the population from town to
city, the imperial policy has still promoted agri-
culture. Agrarianism has long been a political
issue. As part of its monarchical system, the
ruling forces have used the powers of govern-
ment to sustain the landlord class. The junker
aristocracy has been the mainstay of the throne
and the prevailing social system. The Govern-
ment has, therefore, protected its interests by
placing high tariff duties upon agricultural and
meat products. As far as food is concerned the
empire has been in about the same position as
England before the passage of the corn laws ; it does
not raise food enough for its own purposes, and has
difficulties in importing it. Especial restrictions
have been placed upon the importation of meats.
As a result, large supplies are grown in the empire
itself. Germany produces almost one-third as
many cattle as does the United States — about
20,000,000 to their 71,000,000— and stands second
to the United States in the breeding of hogs. In
times of peace this protective policy has great
292 EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY
disadvantages. As one result meat famines have
become almost chronic. In recent years to supply
the need, the municipalities have themselves
erected slaughter houses and swineries. The in-
creased cost of living has been an even more acute
problem in Germany than here, and has figured
largely in politics. All popular appeals for the
removal of restrictions, however, have failed. And
in times like these the policy has certain com-
pensations. For it has furnished Germany with
a large supply of meat ; in all likelihood it can
worry along for an indefinite time without any
imports.
Their embarrassment will come only from
the destruction to crops that is incident to war,
and to the removal of large masses of cultivators
to face the cannon. No one can estimate, of
course, to what extent these circumstances will
affect the food situation.
The other three great countries, as already
said — France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia —
are practically self-supporting, so that their pro-
visioning will involve no particular problem.
A crisis of the most serious character for the
German farmer arose in the " four years of gloom "
from 1896 to 1900. The competition of agricul-
tural exporting countries, such as the United
States, Argentina, and Uruguay, caused a drop
of more than 25 per cent, in prices. Mortgages
increased, market value of land decreased, and
in those four years alone the indebtedness of the
farms increased by several million pounds.
Irretrievable ruin faced the German agricul-
turists and immediate steps were taken to save
EUROPE'S FOOD SUPPLY 293
the situation. The protectionist policy was made
more rigid, railway rates were lowered on behalf
of the home producer to enable him to meet foreign
competition more successfully, Government educa-
tion of advanced agricultural methods was widely
used, and a widespread system of credit in the
agricultural department was organized.
WHAT AMERICA THINKS OF THE WAR
A UNIVERSAL FEELING THAT THE KAISER HAS
FORCED ON THE CONFLICT
BY C. D. M.
AT the outbreak of the great war in August 1914,
I made it my business to ramble about the streets
of New York among the crowds watching the
newspaper bulletins, at cafes, on street-cars, talk-
ing with every one I came across. The current
of popular feeling was not difficult to trace. De-
nunciation of the Kaiser was hi most cases a sure
passport to the approval of the little knot of
listeners who gather to every argument. From
the Battery to the Bronx, everywhere I found a
definite anti-German sentiment. Not against the
German people, of course, who are bound to us by
close ties of blood and commerce ; but against the
Kaiser and the whole armour-plated superstructure
of German militarism which seems to have cudgelled
into war a people flourishing in the arts of peace,
a people whose genius is for literature and art and
commerce, the kindest -hearted people in the world.
Sympathy with the Germans there exists in abun-
dance, and horror at the task which their troops
are called upon to perform. But approval of the
German War Office ? No ! Unless it comes from
294
WHAT AMERICA THINKS 295
Germans or Austrians themselves. Near the Staats*
Zeitung office, or at the Kaiserhof, Liichow's, the
Hofbrau, Little Hungary or any other of the well-
known Pan-German restaurants, one may hear
" Hoch der Kaiser " uttered in all sincerity ; but
even there one finds thoughtful souls who think
that the War Lord is costing the Fatherland dear.
Any serious attempt to find the prevailing
national sentiment behind the street clamour
must reckon with the tremendous growth of
socialistic and anti-autocratic feeling which the
war is causing. A Europe generally undesirous
of war has been hurried into conflict by a few men
— such is the prevailing idea.
The death of M. Jaures, foully murdered for
having been brave enough to protest against war-
like preparations, has not gone unnoticed.
A handbill on the street announces a big anti-
war meeting of socialists. The legend began :
WAR IS HELL
And the workers of the world
Are roasted in its fires.
The sentiment is crudely expressed, but can any
one doubt its essential truth ? So in a way the
war is acting as a terrible public educator.
" I hope the war will be sharp enough to cure
the Germans of their Kaiser folly," said one man
to me. The New York Evening Post voices a
large public when it prophesies the defeat of the
Kaiser's armies and says :
" Out of the ashes must come a new Germany,
in which pure democracy shall rule, in which no
296 WHAT AMERICA THINKS
one man and no group of professional man-killers
shall have the power to plunge the whole world
into mourning. If this be treason to Germany,
our readers must make the most of it. To our
minds, it is of profound significance that so many
Americans are saying to-day : ' We wish that the
Kaiser might be beaten and the German people
win.' "
Undoubtedly Americans are realizing (what
has never been so plainly brought home before)
the cruel folly of a nation hurried into war by an
unrepresentative military clique. It is significant
that so many editorial-writers have now for the
first time appreciated the value to this country of
President Wilson's policy in Mexico.
In the crowd circulating in front of the Horace
Greeley statue by the Tribune building I asked
fifty men of all classes, all Americans as far as I
could judge, whether they were for the Germans
or against. The count was eight for and forty-two
against. If hard words could have killed the Kaiser,
he would have perished speedily on City Hall Square.
The verdict of the American people undoubtedly
is that the war was " Made in Germany."
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE
UNITED STATES AS A
NEUTRAL
BY CHARLES CHENEY HYDE
PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL, LAW IN
NORTH-WESTERN UNIVERSITY
UPON the outbreak of the European war the
United States finds itself placed in a new relation
to each belligerent Power, and suddenly subjected
to a variety of duties, and possessed of certain
rights that accrue only in such abnormal times.
With a merchant marine shrunken to insignificance,
with a vast export trade threatened with paralysis
by the lack of neutral bottoms, and with many
American citizens stranded on European soil,
we nevertheless face a situation that Washing-
ton would have rejoiced to substitute for that
which confronted him in 1793, for to-day the
United States as a neutral enjoys rights that were
not dreamed of at the close of the eighteenth
century, and those rights are in large degree
codified.
To the Hague Conventions of 1907, concerning
the rights and duties of neutral Powers in naval
war, and the rights and duties of neutral Powers
and persons in case of war on land, the United
297
298 UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL
States is, happily, a party. It has also accepted
the Declaration of London of 1909, concerning
the laws of naval war. The purpose of that agree-
ment was to make clear the law to be applied
by the proposed International Prize Court, the
arrangement for the establishment of which was
formulated at The Hague in 1907. Though the
Powers have not established the Prize Court or
accepted generally the Declaration of London,
the United States has formally ratified both
agreements. By so doing it has recorded its
approval of the rules enunciated in the latter
document. It cannot, therefore, complain of the
conduct of any belligerent which may seek to
conform to or rely upon them. Although the
Parliament of Great Britain has acted adversely
upon the Declaration of London, that country
is, nevertheless, free to change its position and to
make that arrangement the guide of its own
prize courts. Deriving their law from that source,
their decisions cannot be denounced by us as
unjust. For these several codifications the United
States has had to pay a price the extent of which
is hardly yet appreciated. However useful may
be the knowledge at the very commencement of
hostilities of what a neutral may reasonably
expect, the rules themselves are in certain respects
so adverse to interests of such a state that it is
only through the grim experience of a general
European war that the United States can fairly
estimate how well it has conserved its vital in-
terests in accepting as law principles that may
now be relentlessly applied.
According to The Hague Conventions, the
UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 299
United States as a Government is obliged to re-
frain from taking any part in the war. Impartial
participation does not suffice. We could not
excuse the sale of arms to Germany by pleading
readiness to supply likewise France or Russia.
The scope of the duty of abstention is broad.
The Government must not furnish a belligerent
with anything that will serve to increase its fighting
power, such as ammunition or other war material,
or warships. Incidental to this general duty to
abstain from participation, the neutral finds itself
burdened with a still more onerous duty to prevent
its territory and resources from being employed
to strengthen the military or naval power of a
belligerent. The diligence required of a neutral
is measured by the " means at its disposal."
Those means must be used to prevent the com-
mission of warlike acts within its waters, or the
passage of belligerent troops over its territory.
The neutral is obviously not responsible for what
it is powerless to prevent.
From the rules of the Treaty of Washington of
1871, which made possible the Geneva Arbitra-
tion of the so-called Alabama Claims, has been
derived the well-known principle expressed in
happier terms in 1907, that " a neutral Govern-
ment is bound to employ the means at its disposal
to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel
within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe
is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile opera-
tions, against a Power with which that Govern-
ment is at peace." The same vigilance is required
of a neutral to prevent the departure from its
territory of a vessel there adapted entirely or partly
300 UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL
for warlike use, and intended to cruise or engage
in hostile operations. Pursuant to this obligation
the United States has already taken extraordinary
precautions to prevent the departure from At-
lantic ports of merchant vessels sailing under
belligerent flags if equipped in such a way as to
fight for their own countries, and under contract
for public service in case of war.
In sharp contrast to these obligations is the
express understanding that a neutral is not bound
to prevent the export or transit for the use of a
belligerent of anything which can be of use to
an army or a fleet. Thus the United States is not
required to prevent its citizens from selling or
exporting arms or war material of any kind. Such
transactions would, nevertheless, constitute direct
participation in the war, and hence be regarded
as internationally wrongful, so as to subject the
participant to serious penalties hi case of the
capture of his property. Such conduct would
also, moreover, disregard the spirit if not the
letter of President Wilson's Proclamation of
Neutrality of August 4, in which it is declared
that " the statutes and the treaties of the United
States alike require that no person within the
territory and jurisdiction of the United States
shall take part, directly or indirectly, in said
wars."
Whether war is waged on land or sea, neutral
territory is deemed inviolable. As to this re-
quirement The Hague Conventions are explicit.
Acts of war in neutral waters are forbidden. Thus
if the Kronprinzessin Cecilie had been captured
by any enemy cruiser just as she entered French-
UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 301
man's Bay on August 4, the United States
would have had good cause to demand repara-
tion from the Government of the captor, and
would also have found itself compelled to demand
the release of the vessel. A Prize Court cannot
be set up on neutral territory or in neutral waters.
Nor can belligerent warships make use of such
waters for the purpose of increasing supplies of
war material or of completing their crews, or as a
base of operations against the enemy.
For numerous purposes a belligerent warship
may endeavour to make use of neutral waters.
The Hague Convention of 1907 indicates the scope
of the privileges that such a vessel may be permitted
to enjoy, and thereby enables the neutral to follow
with certainty a course that shall not expose it
to the charge of unneutral conduct. Let us
consider a situation that might arise. A French
cruiser, short of coal and provisions, and in an
unseaworthy condition, is pursued by the enemy,
and puts into Portland Harbour to escape capture,
and to rehabilitate herself generally. Just inside
of Cushing's Island she finds herself in the un-
welcome company of a German warship that
made the same port a few hours earlier. The
Hague Convention has marked out the general
course which the United States should follow,
and by his Proclamation of Neutrality, President
Wilson has indicated with precision what we
would permit. Accordingly, the French ship
would be allowed fuel sufficient to enable her to
reach her nearest home port, or half of that amount
if she were rigged to go under sail and also be
propelled by steam. Although the United States
302 UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL
could, without impropriety, if it had adopted
that method of determining the amount of fuel
to be supplied, allow the vessel to fill its bunkers
built to carry fuel, and thereby greatly increase
her efficiency, the President has announced a
rule that is consistent with our previous policy
and in harmony with what was, prior to 1907,
generally regarded as sound practice. The lati-
tude accorded the neutral in 1907 was not sought
by the United States, was vigorously opposed
by Great Britain, and was the result of a com-
promise to satisfy the far-reaching demands of
Germany. With respect to provisions, the French
ship could supply herself with garlic and Aroostook
County potatoes ad libitum, so long as the revictual-
ing did not exceed the so-called " peace standard."
If it were in a seaworthy condition the German
cruiser would be obliged to depart within twenty-
four hours after its arrival. The French vessel
might, however, be allowed additional time if
needed for recoaling or repairs. The latter might
necessarily consume a few days. Repairs would
not be permitted that would serve to do more
than place the ship in a seaworthy condition, and
even such repairs would not be allowed if they
necessitated a long sojourn. If, as in the case
of the Russian ship Lena, that entered San Fran-
cisco Harbour hi September 1904, during the
Russo-Japanese War, necessary repairs would
require a stay of several weeks or months, the
vessel would be promptly interned by the United
States. By interning the ship the United States
would be taking measures to render her incapable
of putting to sea during the war.
UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 303
It was declared in 1907 that the citizens of a
state which is not taking part in the war are con-
sidered as neutrals. To the Americans who are
now in belligerent European countries that
status is precious. It enables the possessor to
escape numerous burdens which the state that is
engaged in war justly and of necessity imposes
upon its own citizens. One cannot, however,
avail himself of his neutrality if he commits acts
against a belligerent, or if he voluntarily enlists
in the ranks of a party to the conflict. There
are, nevertheless, services which the neutral
citizen on belligerent soil may render without
losing his distinctive character. Americans in
France or Germany might, for example, organize
for the purpose of assisting in matters of police
or civil administration. They might also furnish
loans (if their means permitted) to one of the belli-
gerents in whose territory they did not reside.
Neutrals on belligerent territory where martial
law has been declared necessarily feel the rigour
with which the Government asserts its authority.
It must be obvious that measures which, in seasons
of peace, indicate abuse of power, in times of war
lose then* arbitrary aspect and, despite harsh
aspects, cease to be regarded as wrongful. Thus
the movement of neutrals on belligerent soil may
be restrained, and they may be even temporarily
prevented from leaving the country. Slight
ground for suspicion that they are acting as spies
justifies arrest and ample inquiry to determine
the grounds for such a charge.
To the people of the United States as a whole
the war presents no graver aspect than in its
304 UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL
bearing upon our right to export and transport
to the belligerent countries food, clothing, fuel,
and other things known as conditional contra-
band. To make clear the problem now confronting
us a brief explanation of the law is necessary.
" Contraband " is the term employed to describe
an article which is liable to capture because of its
use in the prosecution of the war, and because of
its hostile destination. Contraband is subject to
capture on a neutral vessel and is liable to con-
demnation. Goods which belong to the owner
of the contraband and which are on board the
same vessel are also liable to condemnation.
Moreover, according to the Declaration of London,
the vessel carrying such articles may be con-
fiscated if the contraband forms " by value, by
weight, by volume, or by freight, more than half
the cargo." Maritime states have long been aware
of the importance of the distinction between
articles adapted solely for use in war, such as guns
and projectiles, and those susceptible of use in the
pursuit of peace as well as in that of war, such
as food and coal. Articles of the former class
have come to be known as absolute contraband,
those of the latter as conditional contraband.
The purpose of the distinction is to limit the
right to capture articles of the latter kind to
occasions when they are destined for an essen-
tially hostile end, and to permit the capture of
those of the former kind whenever they are bound
for the territory of a state engaged in war. In
order to protect neutral commerce from inter-
ference, the United States has struggled hard for
recognition of the principle that what is capable
UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 305
of feeding and clothing, and otherwise minister-
ing to the sustenance of the people of a belli-
gerent state, should not be subject to capture
and condemnation, unless shown to be not only
capable of use in war, but also destined for that
use. Though maritime states are not indisposed
to accept this principle, there has been diversity
of opinion respecting, first, what articles should
be treated as conditional contraband, and secondly,
under what circumstances articles recognized as
such should be subject to capture. The Declara-
tion of London appears to have solved the first
difficulty by specifying in appropriate and careful
lists certain articles as absolute, and others as
conditional contraband (and still others as not
contraband at all). Thus arms of all kinds, gun-
mountings, clothing and harness of a distinctively
military character, animals suitable for use in
war, and armour-plate are among the articles
placed in the first category. They are subject
to capture if destined to territory belonging to
or occupied by the enemy. This is true whether
the carriage of the goods is direct, or entails tran-
shipment or subsequent transport by land. What
is decisive is the destination, not of the vessel
but of the goods. Thus a consignment of uniforms,
shipped from New York on an American vessel
bound for Naples or any other neutral European
port, would be subject to capture, even within
sight of Nantucket, if it were shown that the
ultimate destination of the goods was Trieste.
Articles in the second category, and described
by the Declaration of London as conditional
contraband, include foodstuffs, gold and silver,
u
306 UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL
paper money, boots and shoes, vehicles, material
for telephones and telegraph, fuel, lubricants,
and harness. These articles furnish a substantial
portion of the export trade of the United States.
The second difficulty already noted — concerning
when conditional contraband is subject to capture —
is the all-important question before the United
States to-day. In more concrete and simpler
form the question is : When is such contraband
to be deemed to be intended for a hostile use so
as to justify its capture ? The vital significance
of the answer that the belligerents may give is
hardly yet appreciated. Thus far popular atten-
tion in this country has been focussed on the
lack of American and other neutral ships available
for our foreign trade. Relying upon the assurance
that "free ships make free goods," we have con-
cerned ourselves about vehicles of transportation
rather than with the safety of our produce. It is
important to note what assurance the Declaration
of London affords. It is there provided that
conditional contraband is liable to capture if shown
to be destined for the use of the armed forces of a
belligerent, or for a department of its Govern-
ment unless, in the latter case, circumstances
show that the goods cannot in fact be used for
the purposes of the war. (This exception is not,
however, applicable to a consignment of gold or
silvc±, or paper money.) It is further provided
that a hostile destination is presumed to exist in
case the goods are consigned, not only to enemy
authorities, but also to a contractor in the enemy
country who as a matter of common knowledge
supplies articles of the same kind to the enemy.
UNITED STATES AS A NEUTRAL 307
Again, a similar presumption arises if the goods
are consigned to a fortified place belonging to the
enemy or to another place serving as base for its
forces.
In the meantime American exporters must
face the fact that, if propriety of conduct is
to be tested by the Declaration of London, the
belligerent Powers are in a position to capture
and condemn foodstuffs, coal, and other articles
within the same category, with an ease that renders
shadowy and dangerously vague the distinction
between what is conditional and what is absolute
contraband.
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS'
HEALTH
REDUCING THE LOSS FROM SICKNESS AND WOUNDS
— BUSINESSLIKE HUMANITY — BURYING 140 MEN
AN HOUR
SOLDIERS who escape death on the battlefield
in the great conflict of 1914 have had a far better
chance of returning home alive than any soldiers
ever had before. It must be remembered that
in all previous wars the worst enemy was not the
one with gun in hand under the opposing flag,
but disease, which mowed down troops on both
sides impartially. It has taken the world a long
time to grasp so obvious a fact, but the lesson has
been thoroughly learned at last, and it has been
applied in all civilized armies.
Sick soldiers of an earlier day received no atten-
tion whatever. If the wounded received any
care it was from a comrade or from the women
who followed in the wake of the army. Then the
barber became the army surgeon, when there were
any, to give way later to monks. Napoleon
paid little or no attention to sick and wounded.
In the Peninsular campaign about 60,000 French
soldiers were killed in battle in Spain, and about
400,000 died of disease. In the Russian campaign
308
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 309
of 1812, of 500,000 who crossed the Dnieper in
June scarcely 20,000 returned in December. Bullets
killed some, to be sure ; the deadly cold claimed
others ; but the great majority perished of disease.
The 1813 campaign after Leipzig was no less dis-
astrous. Of an army of 100,000 that left Leipzig
in October, only a few fragmentary battalions
followed the eagles across the Rhine in November.
The total ruin of this army was due to sanitary
neglect. Soldiers died of disease by thousands,
scattered among the villages along the route from
Germany, leaving pestilence in their wake.
In the Crimean campaign 230 out of each 1000-
British soldiers died annually of typhoid fever,
dysentery, and other infectious diseases.
In the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the
annual death-rate from disease among French
troops was 140-8 per thousand ; among the Germans
24-5.
In the Boer War, lasting two years and eight
months, 5774 British soldiers, in a force having
an average strength of 208,326, were killed in
battle, and 2108 died of wounds, a total of 7882,
or about 14 per thousand a year. Disease claimed
14,210, or 25-58 per thousand a year, which was
almost double the number slain by Boer bullets.
The total death-rate was 39 per thousand a year,
and the total wastage, including invalided, missing,
and prisoners, amounted to 40 per cent, of the
total strength of the army annually. Nearly
3 per cent, of the total strength was constantly
sick.
In the Russo-Japanese War, which lasted twenty
months, the number of Japanese alone, in killed
310 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
and death from wounds, averaged 54 per thousand
a year. Disease claimed 27,142 or 25 per thousand
a year, a showing no better than that made by
the Germans in the Franco-Prussian War.
The foregoing figures serve to give an idea of
the magnitude, as well as of the character, of the
task confronting the medical staff of the modern
army. All the world seems to have realized after
the Russo-Japanese War the absolute necessity
of caring for the health of troops in the field.
Soldiers are no longer regarded as merely " food
for cannon," but as valuable property belonging
to the State, which it is good business policy to
care for with at least as much pains as are
bestowed on other war material.
In the last ten years the medical staff of every
army has been completely reorganized and brought
up to date. In every language elaborate treatises
have been written on the proper methods for pre-
serving the health of troops and for taking care
of the wounded with a view to returning them
to the ranks as soon as possible. Text-books
containing " problems " are prepared for the young
military surgeon who aspires to promotion, so
that he may become skilled in the art of providing
for large numbers of wounded under various
difficult conditions, on paper at least. The most
minute studies have been made of every detail
in the daily life of the soldier in barracks, on the
march, in battle, and after he has been wounded.
The first department of the army with which
the prospective soldier comes in contact is the
medical staff, which examines all applicants for
enlistment and decides whether they shall be
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 311
accepted or rejected. In England, the only country
now at war in which military service is voluntary,
the physical examination is rigid and the percent-
age of rejections is high. Even in those countries
in which military service is compulsory and uni-
versal the unfit are excluded from the ranks. The
volunteer, or the conscript who reports for his
compulsory period of military duty, and is accepted
as a recruit, is never thereafter free from the watch-
ful care of the medical department until he is
discharged or dies and is buried under the direction
of that department.
The medical staff prescribes, or at least modifies,
the exercises and physical drill for the raw recruit
to make sure that he is not overworked ; for in
Europe the young recruit is likely to have been
underfed. The medical department makes a point
of feeding up these weaklings while it begins their
physical education. Hygiene is now all-important
in the military world, for the fact is recognized
that it is much cheaper to keep the soldier well
than to cure him after he becomes ill. Besides,
the commander wants a fighting force, not a hos-
pital population.
Thanks to vaccination, typhoid fever is be-
coming a negligible element in the military organiza-
tion. The United States army leads the world
in the extent to which this preventive is used,
and France is foremost in this regard among Euro-
pean nations. Owing to the great numbers in
continental armies, typhoid vaccination is pro-
portionately less used than in the. United States
army ; but American military surgeons predict
that if the war is prolonged all the troops will
312 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
be inoculated against their deadliest foe. Vac-
cination against smallpox is practically universal.
Besides these there are numerous infectious diseases
for which vaccine therapy has, as yet, provided
no remedy ; and these cause the army medical
officer no end of trouble. Soldiers seem prone
to mumps, measles, and kindred ailments, which
run through a camp or a garrison as through a
boarding school.
The medical staff is consulted about the soldier's
clothing, and especially about his boots ; for if
these are not properly made he becomes footsore
on the march. England, like the United States,
provides socks for her soldiers ; but troops on
the Continent, if they want such luxuries, must
buy them themselves. Germany, by unanimous
consent, is conceded to provide worse boots for
her troops than any other nation, though improved
footwear has recently been adopted.
Extraordinary care has been bestowed upon
the soldier's ration. Since the work men and
steam-engines can do depends upon the amount
and quality of fuel supplied them, the continental
soldier is nourished as carefully as a locomotive
is stoked by an expert fireman. The army medical
staff of each nation has made exhaustive experi-
mental studies in order to arrive at the proper
quantity of food required by the average individual
to do the average day's work for a soldier. This
amount is measured in calories, which is the stand-
ard heat unit used by physicists, a calorie being
the amount of heat required to raise the tempera-
ture of a kilogram of water from zero to one degree
Centigrade.
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 313
The Russian soldier either requires more food
than other men, or else he is blessed with a more
liberal Government, for his daily field ration
amounts to 4929 calories. The French soldier
is the next best fed, his daily field service ration
providing him 3340 calories. England ranks
third with a field ration of 3292 calories, and
the Dual Alliance is at the bottom of the list,
the German ration being 3147 calories, and the
Austrian only 2620 calories, or but little more
than half the Russian ration. From the military
surgeon's point of view this inferiority in rations
bodes no good to the Dual Alliance.
The British ration is not much different from
that of the American soldier, consisting of a pound
of bread and three-quarters of a pound of fresh
meat with bone, or seventeen ounces of preserved
meat when in camp or abroad. In addition to
these staples, he is allowed a messing allowance
of 5d. a day with which to purchase vegetables
and the like. For service in the field, the French
and Germans use to some extent tinned meats
strengthened with vegetables and consomme. In
some of their African campaigns the Germans
found that contractors, with a view to economy,
had filled the tins chiefly with water ; so now the
Government packs its own tinned meats for army
use.
Food may contain proteins and carbohydrates
in the proper proportions and be in good condition,
yet so unappetizing as to cause aversion, or even
loathing ; so the army medical officer must see that
the troops have the proper condiments to season
their food and that it is well cooked. For this
314 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
purpose they visit the men at meal time. Only
last year the sanitary chief of the French army
reported that the food of the soldier had been most
carefully considered and regulated with proper
regard to obtaining the highest efficiency from the
individual fed on a scientific diet. Since 1905,
when the doctors recommended a better cooked
and more varied diet, a system of instruction in
cookery had been introduced in the army with
gratifying results. One of the results is a death
rate in time of peace of only 3' 75 per thousand
as compared with a fraction more than 20 for the
nation, and 8 per thousand for the civilian popu-
lation between the ages of 20 and 22.
The motor omnibuses, familiar to visitors to
Paris, are now being used, with wire screens re-
placing the windows, to convey fresh meat to
the French troops in the field. One of these
vehicles can haul a load of two and a half tons of
frozen beef imported from Argentina, or fresh
killed beef from the herd, about forty miles back
from the front.
To wash down his carefully measured dose of
proteins and carbohydrates the English soldier
is allowed twenty-two hundredths of an ounce
of tea daily. On the Continent the average soldier
prefers coffee. The French soldier is provided
with a coffee-mill ; but the Germans, at least in
some of their African campaigns, had to use the
butts of their rifles, which proved to be a very
poor substitute for a coffee-mill.
From the military surgeon's point of view,
water is even more important to the soldier than
food. The classic example illustrating the con-
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 315
sequences of a hard march without water is Napier's
description of the march after Sauroren, when
" many fell and died convulsed and frothing at
the mouth, while others whose spirit and strength
had never before been quelled leaned on their
muskets and muttered in sullen tones that they
yielded for the first time."
It is an axiom among mountain climbers that
"the more you drink the farther you go." The
soldier is not allowed to drink whenever he pleases.
On the contrary the medical staff insists that water
discipline is as essential as firing discipline. They
say a man is not allowed to expend a single round
of ammunition without authority, and that he
should not be allowed a drop of water without
specific permission while on the march. Indeed,
in some native regiments in India, the water bottle
is carried in such a manner that its owner cannot
reach it while marching. He can get a drink
only when halted for that purpose.
The time for drinking and the quantity to be
allowed have been carefully calculated on a
scientific basis. It has been found that the evap-
oration of two grams of water abstracts one calorie
from the body and that the average expenditure
of energy per man in marching is 90 calories per
mile, which is equivalent to the evaporation of
180 grams of water. In six miles the evaporation
amounts to one litre, or If pints, or say, one-
fortieth of the water in the body, which is about
as much as should be lost without replacing, if
full vigour is to be maintained. But as it takes
a march of about three-fourths of a mile to raise
the temperature to the evaporating point, the
316 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
military surgeon calculates that the men should be
halted after marching the first seven miles, when
they should be allowed the contents of their water
bottles, which hold one litre. After that they
should be allowed one litre every six miles. In
the German army during manoeuvres mounted
officers, or orderlies on bicycles, are sent ahead of a
marching column to warn the inhabitants of villages
to turn out and have water ready on both sides of
the road for the troops. If possible a short halt
is made while the men refresh themselves ; if time
presses they must snatch a drink as they pass,
and if they can manage it they also fill their water
bottles.
The medical staff is keenly interested in the
equipment the soldier carries and the manner
of its adjustment ; for every pound added to his
load means the expenditure of energy at the rate
of 4'5 small calories a minute, and an awkwardly
placed load may interfere with his breathing, or
do some other mischief.
Foreign writers pay the American army the
compliment of saying that it has the best selected
and best managed equipment in the world. Some-
thing appears to be wrong with all other equipment
and the way it is carried, according to medical
writers on the subject.
Here is what every soldier must carry about
with him all the time while in the field : a rifle,
weighing about 9 pounds with bayonet, cleaning
materials for keeping his gun in order, ammunition,
and an entrenching tool ; his clothing, including
coat, trousers, puttees, boots, neckcloth, hand-
kerchief, a change of underwear, identification
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 317
disk, and first-aid dressing ; food, including one
reserve or emergency ration, or, in the case of the
Germans and Austrians, two reserve rations, and
in the case of the Russians two and a half ; water
bottle, mess tin, knife, fork and spoon, though
the Russians carry merely a wooden spoon stuck
in the boot in lieu of these refinements ; accoutre-
ments, including knapsack, belt, and braces ; a
great coat, and half a shelter tent, 4 by 6 feet,
which upon being buttoned or hooked to another
half carried by another man, forms a shelter for
the two ; personal necessaries, including toilet
articles and spare linen. In the case of the British
soldier this totals 47 pounds ; in the case of the
Germans, 38 pounds, and the French, 44 pounds.
These lighter weights are due to the fact that
the French and Germans carry fewer rounds of
ammunition than the British soldier, who never
has less than 150 rounds. The Russian soldier
has the heaviest load of all to carry, 61 pounds ;
or, when he sets out with four days' rations and
extra ammunition, 72 pounds.
The medical department also prescribes rules
for the sanitation of the camp, disposal of waste
material, and sees that public as well as personal
cleanliness is enforced.
Though it finds its sphere of greatest useful-
ness in maintaining the troops at the maximum
of physical efficiency, thereby contributing directly
to their fighting effectiveness, the medical depart-
ment has a second important function, and that
is to relieve the field force of the incumbrance of
sick and wounded. In this work the authority
of the medical director, or chief surgeon, is supreme.
318 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
In time of peace the medical department has con-
stantly under its care from 3 to 4 per cent, of the
entire force ; in war, more than twice this pro-
portion. The department must provide everything
required for the well-being of the men, their medical
and surgical treatment, food, clothing, and trans-
portation, from the time they fall out of the ranks
till they return.
Every soldier carries, in a sealed tin box, a first-
aid packet, consisting of a bandage, gauze, and
adhesive plaster. If the wound is but slight and
in an accessible place the soldier may apply the
dressing himself ; if more severe, a comrade may
apply it for him. The importance of this first-
aid may be better understood when it is said that
infection is the most frequent cause of death from
wounds not immediately fatal. This first-aid
serves the double purpose of preventing infection
to a large extent and of checking hemorrhage,
which ranks third in causes of death from wounds,
shock being second. Military surgeons say that the
great majority would recover from gun-shot wounds
if infection could be prevented. The fate of the
wounded is in the hands of the man who applies
first-aid.
The wounded soldier, with or without first-aid
dressing, passes back to the rear by the way of
dressing stations beside an ambulance in a spot
that is more or less sheltered from hostile fire to
the field hospital. As soon as he can stand trans-
portation, he is passed on to the general hospital,
and thence in due time to the convalescent camp
to recuperate. A large proportion of the wounded
require transportation by litter and ambulance
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 319
to the field hospital, which is located as near the
firing line as prudence will permit.
Though the medical staff of no two nations is
identical, it may be said, in a general way, that
equipment is provided on the theory that 10 per
cent, of a division will be killed or wounded in a
single battle. If the number engaged is 18,000,
20 per cent., or 3600 will be dead on the field ;
8 per cent., or 1440, will be so severely wounded
that it will be inadvisable to move them ; 40 per
cent., or 7200, will be able to walk, one-half of
them to the station for the slightly wounded at
the rear, the rest to the dressing station, and 32
per cent, will require transportation. In recent
wars the mortality among the wounded collected
and transported to the rear has averaged from
3 to 6 per cent. In the Manchurian campaign,
one-third of the wounded Japanese returned to
the ranks within a month.
In deciding on his arrangements for a battle,
the chief surgeon bears in mind that the wounded
will be distributed in " zones of losses." The
usual proportion of wounded is 20 per cent, up
to 1000 yards range ; from 1000 to 400 yards
range, 60 per cent. ; in the final rush, 10 per cent. ;
in pursuit, 10 per cent. The field hospital is
not pitched till the tactical situation develops
and the point where the main attack is to be made
is known. Then a site is chosen beyond range
of the enemy's fire, accessible to front and rear
by road, yet off the route of march of advancing
troops, convenient to wood and water and, if
possible, near buildings which may be used for
the overflow of wounded, for, of course, casualties
320 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
in battle are not limited by rule, and the facilities
provided may be overwhelmed. Conditions on
the battlefield are all unfavourable for clean sur-
gical work, and it is often impossible to reach
many of the wounded for hours. The results
achieved by modern military surgeons under the
difficulties inherent in their work seem little less
than miraculous.
A pleasant fiction widely credited is that men
have been studying for years to make war more
humane — as if war could be humane ! For ex-
ample, one of these " humane " devices is the
small bullet at high velocity. Stories are told
of men who, after being shot through the chest
or head with a modern bullet, about the diameter
of an ordinary lead pencil, have walked long
distances to the dressing station and have then
recovered in a miraculously short time.
Military surgeons who have seen actual service
tell a different tale. It is true that really slight
wounds made by modern bullets heal more quickly
and thoroughly than in former days. But severe
wounds are no less severe and much more frequent.
The Germans use a steel- jacketed bullet with
a core of lead hardened with antimony. The
steel jacket frequently comes off in jagged frag-
ments which horribly lacerate the flesh.
The French bullet, a mixture of copper and
zinc, is not jacketed, but is longer and sharper
than the German bullet. Bent by ricochetting,
it often enters the body as a hook ; sometimes it
" tumbles " and enters broadside on, making a
long, gaping wound. Up to a range of about
800 yards one horror is as bad as the other.
CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS 321
These " humane " bullets have three general
effects : up to a range of 500 yards they have
an explosive effect, splintering the bone so
thoroughly as to explain the frequent accusation
that explosive bullets have been used ; at ranges
of 500 to 1500 yards the effect is comminutive,
grinding the bone to powder, and not infrequently
carrying with it into the wound fragments of
soiled clothing, thus causing gangrene. The third
effect is contusive. A bullet fired into an empty
metal vessel enters and leaves by a small hole.
Fill the vessel with water, and the bullet will still
enter by a small hole, but will make a large, jagged
wound in leaving. The bullet has exactly the
same effect on the body or the head. In any
case the bullet strikes a heavy blow as with a
club.
Modern bullets are " humane " only when
compared with the effects of shells, and it must
be remembered that a far greater proportion of
casualties are due to shells than ever before. In
the Franco-Prussian War, shell wounds were 91
per thousand ; in the Manchurian campaign the
ratio had increased to 176 per thousand, and in
the Balkan War of 1912 the proportion was 364
per thousand. The Russians in Manchuria called
shrapnel " the devil's watering-pots." When they
burst they scatter hundreds of round bullets as
well as fragments of the shell itself. They are
most deadly within a radius of ten to thirty yards,
but even at a hundred yards the " dewdrops "
are lively enough to penetrate six inches of pine.
The common shell is still more terrible. The
fragments, heated to a very high temperature
322 CARING FOR THE SOLDIERS
by the explosion, burn the flesh so as to compel
cries of agony that only morphine can quiet. The
large shells of the navy not only cut like razors,
but asphyxiate, amputate portions of the body,
and crush. Altogether, the experienced military
surgeon is not unduly impressed with the " humane "
aspects of war.
The last service rendered to the soldier by the
medical department is to see that he is promptly
buried after the battle ; for as he has now be-
come waste matter, his disposal is properly
a part of the sanitary work of the medical staff.
The widow and orphans, waiting at home until
anxiety deepens into dread, and dread into despair,
may be able to form some estimate of the reverent
care with which this last rite is performed for their
loved one, " humanely " killed by modern methods,
when they know that the chief surgeon, according
to the standard authors, counts on a burial squad
of 500 men disposing of 140 bodies an hour,
after the bodies have been collected.
NOTES ON THE GENEVA
CONVENTION
" THE Geneva Convention is an international agree-
ment, adhered to by practically all the civilized
States, for the purpose of ameliorating the condition
of the sick and wounded in war. The objects
are essentially humanitarian."
The events which led up to the Convention
were connected with the battle of Solferino, in
1859, at which M. Dunant, a Swiss gentleman,
who had been influenced by Florence Nightingale's
work in the Crimea, was present as an onlooker.
Deeply moved by what he saw, he published
" Un Souvenir de Solferino," and subsequently
visited the various Courts of Europe with the view
of enlisting their sympathies. Eventually, a Con-
vention was held in Geneva in 1864, and a code of
rules drawn up, while the Red Cross on a white
ground was taken as a distinctive emblem " as a
compliment to Switzerland."
The present Geneva Convention is dated 1906,
and has certain differences from that originally
signed in 1864.
The following points are noteworthy :
Sick and wounded must be taken care of irre-
spective of nationality.
Medical personnel must be left in charge of sick
323
324 THE GENEVA CONVENTION
and wounded, and this personnel, if captured by
the enemy, must continue their duty under his
direction, receiving pay from the enemy at the
same rate as similar ranks in his medical service ;
they will be sent back to their own army when
their assistance is no longer indispensable.
None of the medical personnel are to be regarded
as prisoners of war, but shall be respected and
protected under all circumstances.
The sick and wounded, however, who fall into
the hands of the enemy are prisoners of war.
After each engagement the victorious commander
shall take measures to search for the wounded.
The following are protected by the terms of the
Convention provided that they wear, fixed to the
left arm, an armlet (brassard) with a red cross on a
white ground, delivered and stamped by the com-
petent military authority and accompanied by a
certificate of identification, in the case of persons
who are attached to the medical service of armies
but who have not a military uniform :
(i) Personnel engaged exclusively in the collection,
transport, and treatment of the wounded
and sick ;
(ii) Chaplains attached to armies ;
(iii) Personnel of voluntary aid societies, duly
recognized and authorized by their Govern-
ment, who may be employed in medical
units, and subject to military law ;
(iv) Personnel of a recognized society of a neutral
country.
The personnel of medical units may take
temporary possession of the weapons and am-
munition of those under their care.
THE GENEVA CONVENTION 325
A distinction is made in the Convention, between
mobile and fixed hospital establishments as
follows :
1. Material of mobile units of the Army' Medical
Service is not prize of war, and must be
restored whenever this can be done.
It can, however, be used by the enemy for
the treatment of sick and wounded pending
restoration.
2. Material of fixed medical units is prize of war,
but must not be diverted from its purpose
as long as there are sick and wounded
requiring succour.
3. Medical material of convoys, including special
ambulance and medical wagons, along with
their teams, ambulance trains, and river
or lake ambulance boats, are to be restored,
but not the general service or other military
vehicle of convoys.
4. Material belonging to voluntary aid societies
is private property in all circumstances where
it is found, and can only be retained on
requisition — that is to say, a receipt must be
given to the owner, or representative of the
owner, if it is necessary to make use of it, so
that the cost may be recovered subsequently.
5. Similarly, civilian vehicles belonging to con-
voys can only be retained by the enemy on
requisition.
It must be clearly understood that the Red Cross
on a White Ground is the emblem and dis-
tinctive sign of the medical services of armies,
and not, as is popularly supposed, of voluntary
aid societies.
326 THE GENEVA CONVENTION
The latter are entitled to use the sign, and
the words " Red Cross," only when they are
authorized by the State to render assistance
to the regular medical service of its army,
and are employed with medical units and
establishments of armies.
The national flag of the belligerent must always
be hoisted along with the Red Cross flag,
except when a medical unit is captured by the
enemy, in which case the Red Cross only is
flown.
Regarding the general use of the Red Cross
emblem, and the words " Red Cross " or
" Geneva Cross," the practice is strictly
forbidden, " either in time of peace or in
time of war, except to protect or to indicate
the medical units and establishments, and
the personnel and materiel protected by
the Convention."
INFORMATION FOR WORKING PARTIES
OR PRIVATE WORKERS
MATERIALS
Flannel — natural, grey, wincey, or striped union.
Flannelette (non-flam.).
Unbleached calico \ for bandages (must be
Twilled calico J washed).
Twilled cotton (white) for nightshirts.
Wool for knitting.
ARTICLES TO BE MADE
BANDAGES. — Can be made of flannel or domette,
4 in. wide, 8 yds. long ;
WORKING PARTIES 327
or mull muslin, 2| and 3 in. wide, 6 yds. long ;
or white calico, 2| and 3 in. wide, 6 yds. long ;
or thin unbleached calico (2|d. per yd.), 2£ and
3 1 in. wide, 6-8 yds. long, washed and
tightly rolled ;
or loosely woven cotton, same measurements.
Triangular bandages, 40 in. square of
unbleached calico, cut diagonally from
corner to corner, makes 2 bandages.
All bandages after being tightly rolled
should be fastened with a safety-pin.
PYJAMA OR BED JACKETS (flannel or wincey). —
Large size, reaching to knees, tied with tape
at waist and neck, pocket, and no buttons.
DRESSING GOWNS (washing). — Flannel, thick flannel
or soft serge.
DAY OR NIGHT SHIRTS, flannel or twill, 15£-16| in.
neck.
SURGICAL CASE SHIRT. — New approved pattern,
must be of 40 in. material. Ask for patterns
of BRACKNELL shirt at Messrs. Selfridge.
HELPLESS CASE SHIRTS. — White flannel, viyella
or wincey.
KNITTED CARDIGAN JACKETS. — Dark or khaki
wool. Get reliable pattern from Head's,
Sloane Street.
WOOLLEN SOCKS. — Foot 11-12 ins. Dark or
natural wool.
OPERATION STOCKINGS. — Heel-less, long, wide.
White wool.
KNITTED CHOLERA BELTS.
FLANNEL HOT WATER BOTTLE BAGS. — White or
natural.
INVALID SUPPERS. — Knitted or crocheted.
328 WORKING PARTIES
OTHER ARTICLES WANTED
Pillow cases. 24 in. by 32 in.
Towels of all kinds.
Sheets. Old ones washed.
Sheets, if made, best size 72 in. by 108 in.
Glass cloths. Dusters.
Handkerchiefs. Japanese paper handkerchiefs.
Scouring cloths.
Hot water bottles, rubber, with cover.
Rolls of butter muslin.
White tape (all widths).
Hair brushes and combs. Tooth brushes.
Safety razors, nail brushes, clothes brushes.
Slippers (new).
White waterproof sheeting, 1 yd. wide, 2s. 6d. yd.
Plain unbleached twill (for draw sheets).
Bundles of old linen and flannel (washed).
Blankets. Turkish towelling, by yards.
Safety-pins.
KIT BAGS are very useful. Special directions for
these can be obtained.
PATTERNS
Can be obtained from the British Red Cross
Society and seen at the following shops : — Messrs.
Gorringe, Selfridge, Barker, Debenham, Harrods.
N.B. Some of the patterns supplied prior to
August 15 are cut in a small size. It is desirable
that the largest sizes referred to on the instructions
on slips should be cut out.
THE RED CROSS OF THE WARRING
NATIONS
THE EFFICIENT RED CROSS OF RUSSIA — HOW IT
WORKS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY
THE women of many nations wearing the Red
Cross are following the armies on to the battlefields.
The work of the Red Cross is more rapid and
effective than ever before. Hospital corps have
trailed ammunition wagons and the wounded
have often been moved to field hospitals before
the first numbness of injury has given way to pain.
This is modern warfare, as unbelievably humani-
tarian as it is barbarous.
Every European nation in the war has an efficient
Red Cross service of its own. In every one the
Red Cross has a somewhat different standing.
In Russia it stands higher than anywhere else.
It is given great freedom and deserves it. At
the same time it is more of a state affair than
anywhere in Europe. It is supported by special
taxes and is given unusual privileges at all times.
The nurses of the Red Cross form a sisterhood.
They are, in a measure, consecrated to the cause.
The Russians have come to a better understanding
of the usefulness of women nurses on the battle-
field than have the people of any other nation.
329
330 THE RED CROSS
At the outbreak of the Spanish War, the Russian
Red Cross, which was at the time almost the only
effectively organized Red Cross in the world,
offered its services to both the United States and
Spain. The United States declined, but Spain
accepted. The United States might have done
better to accept. Lack of a modern Red Cross
was responsible for much suffering and loss of
life in Cuba and Porto Rico. Tampa and Chicka-
mauga might have had other stories to tell if the
Russian Red Cross had been there to help. Now,
of course, such conditions would be impossible.
The United States Red Cross has learned how
to handle the situation.
The Russians divide the field work of the Red
Cross into five divisions : Handling supply depots ;
taking the injured back from the firing line, which
means an emergency transportation system ; assis-
tance to the regular surgeons ; direct relief on the
battlefield ; and caring for the feeding stations
in the rear of the army. In war time the Russian
Red Cross does more than the Red Cross of any
other nation. Russia began developing the Red
Cross in the Crimean War. When the Russo-
Japanese War came on, the " white trains " given
by wealthy nobles were particularly conspicuous.
Altogether, the Red Cross took to the front 3000
truckloads of material and food. The nurses were
as efficient at the front as the organization was in
forwarding supplies. At the fall of Port Arthur
all stray ends of that ugly business were left to
them. The Red Cross really did the evacuating.
When Mukden was evacuated there were many
hundreds of wounded whom it was impossible to
THE RED CROSS 331
move. Surgeons and nurses remained behind
with them and were given every courtesy by the
conquering Japanese.
The Japanese themselves developed the Red
Cross into the best possible field force in a very
short time. Taking advantage of the national
patriotism, all the women of Japan were organized.
The nurses and cooks formed one body and went
to the front. Another body developed lunch
and refreshment rooms, and women everywhere
made bandages and helped to prepare field outfits.
Now the Red Cross operates hospitals throughout
Japan, and one out of every forty persons in the
empire belongs to the Red Cross organization.
In contrast to Russia's attitude is Germany's
limitation on all volunteer nursing. It is con-
trary to the German character to leave matters
of that kind to any chance. It is all worked out
methodically by the army medical corps, and
the volunteers are held in check. They are used
to help expand the regular forces, but they have no
such independence of action as they enjoy in Russia.
The French Red Cross has more of the liberties
of the Russian. It is a question of national tem-
perament. The French in their nursing make
up for lack of drill by the enthusiasm with which
they enter into the combat. The volunteer French
Red Cross is composed, as in the United States,
of the best trained nurses in France. They have
no experience in that particular service, but they
understand nursing and sanitation. They are
organized according to army divisions and do
better work perhaps because of their freedom
from red tape.
332 THE RED CROSS
The Italian Red Cross is admittedly the best
organized for war, and here again its effectiveness
is due to the lack of restraint. The Austrian
Red Cross has also been giving a good account
of itself for several years. Its organization is
much like the Italian.
Almost every nation was represented by the
Red Cross in the Balkans, but the absence of
Red Cross organizations in the Balkan States
themselves brought about in the first battles
suffering to which only the battlefields of the
Middle Ages could offer comparison. Stories that
came to the outside world from the few nurses
present roused the world and made the later battles
less awful. The graphic account of twenty-four
hours at an operating table in the rear of the Serbian
army, as told by the Countess Maggiolini, did
more for humanitarianism in the Balkan wars
than any other single influence.
The Red Cross has been even more conspicuous
in this war than in any previous one. Where
lines are so tightly drawn and the fighting is
frequently in a comparatively small area, the
crossing of lines and the invasion by hospital
corps of hostile territory bring up fine points.
It is a question how far the Red Cross may go
toward relieving the suffering of the non-com-
batants without interfering with the brutal pur-
pose of war. There have been charges of violation
of the Red Cross, and the extent to which the
Red Cross will be permitted to go will depend
largely upon the humanitarianism of the individual
commanders. Despite its many other activities
the Red Cross is always associated with the battle-
THE RED CROSS 333
field. There it has certain coveted rights in the
name of humanity, and it never yields any. If
anything, it is inclined to stretch them. At its
conventions war is always foremost, as it has a
perennial discussion as to its rights. Part of the
purpose of war is to lay waste the invaded country
and make its inhabitants suffer want. The Red
Cross stands for the alleviation of suffering wher-
ever found. These two cross-purposes constantly
clash, and the needs of war generally win. The
Red Cross can go no farther than it is permitted.
It can only be so bold before it is interfered with.
Besides trying to define and enlarge its rights
on the battlefields, the Red Cross conventions
bring out new inventions for giving better service.
The Dowager Empress of Russia contributed a
fund of about £10,000 to stimulate the inventive
ability. The first prize is of 6000 roubles, about
£600, the second of 3000 roubles, and the third
1000 roubles. These prizes, known as the Marie
Feodorovna prizes, have been won for the inven-
tion of a considerable list of handy contrivances —
from stretchers which can be changed to meet
almost any condition, to handy kits for the uses
of nurses in war. They have been awarded for
practical things, and the work of the Red Cross
in the present war, as well as the work of the
medical corps, will be greatly facilitated by the
fact that those prizes were given.
When the Geneva Convention was held in 1864
the world had been sickened with the smell of
blood. The horrors of war were uppermost in
the minds of the people. It was possible to gain
a wide appeal for the movement. But it was found
334 THE RED CROSS
out before long that the work of the Red Cross
was not always to the best interests of a conquering
army, and this, added to the poor handling of
the Red Cross, caused a reaction. In England's
various campaigns, particularly in Egypt, the
Red Cross met almost violent opposition from
the English army officers. It was not until army
officers discovered in the Spanish War that the
Red Cross could be effectively used for repairing
broken men that it began to gain in standing.
From the devoted labours of scattered volunteer
nurses, typified and ennobled in Florence Nightin-
gale and Clara Barton, the immediate care of the
wounded has become a part of the modern fighting
machine. It was found in the last war in the
Balkans that it paid as a mere matter of repairing
the injured men. Unless a man was mortally
wounded or required a serious operation, he was
usually back in the ranks fighting in two weeks.
The Red Cross had become a repair shop.
Efficiency has come in the Red Cross, as a matter
of fact, only with the passing of the compassionate
women like Clara Barton. She was frequently
alone on battlefields in the American Civil War
where hundreds lay wounded. She was nothing
short of the "angel of the battlefield." The
same was true of Florence Nightingale in the
Crimea. Those two women made names for
themselves that will outlast war. But the move-
ment languished. The American Association of
the Red Cross, of which Clara Barton was president
for twenty-two years, consisted chiefly of a dozen
women. The American National Red Cross of
to-day, incorporated in 1905, after Clara Barton's
THE RED CROSS 335
death, has 3500 trained nurses, all with three
years' hospital training, ready to mobilize as
rapidly as the army.
If the United States were to go to war the
volunteer organization of the Red Cross would
in fact be mobilized with the army. This was
made possible by an Act of Congress two years
ago authorizing the spending of the money. Much
the same thing happened when the European
armies mobilized. Not only the highly developed
hospital corps were immediately behind the
artillery, but the Red Cross came in behind as
medical reserve fully as well equipped. In most
of the armies, in fact, every soldier has had an
emergency kit the existence of which was due to
the Red Cross movement.
The Red Cross has become what it is in this
country to-day largely on account of the unneces-
sary sickness at Chickamauga during the Spanish-
American War. The modern sanitation campaign
carried on since by army surgeons, for that matter,
also had its rise in the Spanish War. The cleaning
up of Havana led to the sanitation of the Canal
Zone. The English learned their lesson in South
Africa, although the peculiar unhealthiness of
much of India had already forced some measures
of care. Both the Japanese and Russian armies
were followed in the Russo-Japanese War by
very good Red Cross corps. They worked to-
gether sometimes, in sorting the wounded, and,
through the French Red Cross, which was also
very active in Manchuria, the names of the dead
were listed to be sent back to friends and families.
The French Red Cross served as a news agency.
336 THE RED CROSS
It has only been within the last fifteen years
that the Red Cross has come to play the part it
now plays in warfare. It was thirty-five years,
after the organization of the international Red
Cross at Geneva, in 1864, before it became what
it was planned to be. This was almost simul-
taneous with the discovery in poverty of the man
who was responsible for it. Jean Henri Dunant,
the Swiss author, the founder of the Red Cross,
who stirred Europe with the horrors of war and
brought about the international convention at
Geneva, was found in an old man's home in Switzer-
land, in 1897. It was at this time that the Spanish-
American War showed how the development of
the Red Cross had been neglected and Dunant
began to assume the position in the world he de-
served. Four years later, the Nobel Peace prize,
given for the first time, went to him and to Frederick
Passy. His share of that was 104,000 francs,
about £4000, which, with a small pension from the
Dowager Empress of Russia, served him until
he died in 1910.
He, with his horrible description of Solferino,
and Florence Nightingale and Clara Barton, with
their vivid experiences, launched the international
Red Cross with much more to go on than it took
advantage of for many years. Clara Barton
even foreshadowed the industrial activities of the
American Red Cross by helping to organize work-
shops in Paris and Strassburg to save the women
left destitute by the Franco-Prussian War.
The report of the Sanitary Commission of the
American Civil War, which raised by voluntary
subscription £100,000, was also largely responsible
THE RED CROSS 337
for the shaping of the original Red Cross. The
Sanitary Commission used a Greek cross sur-
rounded by an oval band. But the red cross has
long ago become standard throughout the world
except where the red crescent is used.
Attempts have been made to protect the insignia
from indiscriminate use. It is frequently abused
in war for scouting purposes and non-combatants
adopt it as a shield. There is nothing to prevent
it. Even at catastrophes where the red cross
serves merely as a convenience in facilitating
progress it is usually abused. At the San Francisco
fire after three days every automobile displayed
the red cross and it came to mean nothing at all.
As a result, those who were entitled to use the
red cross changed suddenly to the use of a piece
of red flannel, and the red cross insignia was not
honoured.
The slowness of the Red Cross movement to
get under way, in fact, was due to the misuse of
it. In the Franco-Prussian War it fell into dis-
repute. Ignorance of the rules laid down by the
Geneva Convention was largely responsible.
Though it had been carefully laid down just how
far the Red Cross could go without being looked
upon as succouring the enemy, the volunteer field
workers paid no attention. There were also
jealousies between the various Red Cross organiza-
tions. The Red Cross got such a bad name among
military men in that one war that volunteer nurs-
ing was discouraged up to the time of the Spanish-
American War.
There is hardly any chance that there will be
any accidental complications of this kind in the
338 THE RED CROSS
present war. The Red Cross may be deliberately
used to get information or to advance supplies,
but the volunteer organizations are so completely
in hand now that they act under the orders of
the military surgeons. The Red Cross is to the
armies of the world now what the volunteers are
to the regular army. It is officered by army
surgeons and becomes a part of the army sanitary
body.
A dispatch dated Washington, August 6, 1914,
said : " Committees of the American National Red
Cross to-day were at work on plans to rush aid to the
sick and wounded in the European war. Surgeon-
General William C. Braisted and a party went
in search of a ship to carry doctors, nurses and
hospital supplies across the Atlantic, and others
were receiving and disbursing funds for supplies.
" The ship will be painted white with a red
cross on the funnels, and will sail under the Red
Cross flag. She will also be under the treaties
of Geneva and the Hague, and will be able to enter
any harbour."
The American Red Cross has played a leading
part in alleviating the suffering caused by every
kind of catastrophe, except war, during the last
ten years. Even in war it has done its part, es-
pecially in Turkey, feeding and clothing the non-
combatants when the Bulgarians made their
spectacular dash at Constantinople. From the
plague in Manchuria to the Triangle Building
fire in New York, the American Red Cross met
the emergency. But when it came to general
European warfare, every army had worked out
a complete Red Cross system.
THE RED CROSS 339
The American Red Cross did not jump directly
into the field in Europe because there was no
place for it. It would not fit in. It could be
useful only as an organization handling and for-
warding supplies. But once the armies are dis-
organized or the initial organization is broken up
by defeat, the American Red Cross, or any body
of foreign nurses, could do as good work as the
nurses of the country.
At present, however, the Red Cross societies
of the warring nations, with the same sympathy
and heroism that prompted Florence Nightingale
and Clara Barton, and with modern organization
and effectiveness, are caring for the sick and
wounded on the stricken fields of Europe.
THE BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
OBJECTS AND ORGANIZATION
Reprinted from Official Publications
THE British Red Cross Society was founded at a
meeting held at Buckingham Palace on July 17,
1905, under the Presidency of her Majesty Queen
Alexandra ; and is the outcome of the fusion of the
late " British National Society for Aid to the Sick
and Wounded in War," which was founded in the
year 1870 by the late Lord Wantage, V.C., and the
" Central British Red Cross Council " ; it having
been considered by his late Majesty King Edward
VII desirable that the Red Cross movement in the
Empire should be represented by one society,
which should co-ordinate all such associations as are
concerned with the succour of the sick and wounded
in war.
The National Society for Aid to the Sick and
Wounded in War was the first Red Cross association
to be established in England. Of its foundation,
Lord Rothschild, the chairman of the society, thus
spoke at the inauguration of the British Red Cross
Society on July 17, 1905 : " When the Franco-
German War broke out in 1870, that gallant
soldier, the late Lord Wantage, who had planted
340
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 341
the colours of his regiment on the heights of Alma,
for which he received the Victoria Cross, and who
had served with distinction all through the Cam-
paign in the Crimea — Lord Wantage, who knew
from experience the misery and sufferings of
wounded and sick soldiers in a campaign, who was
aware of how little was done in those days to
alleviate men fighting for the honour and glory
of their Sovereign and country, took advantage
of the rules of the new Geneva Convention to start
the society over which he long presided, namely,
' The National Society for Aid to the Sick and
Wounded in War.' His Majesty the King was
the patron of that society, and his Royal Highness
the Duke of Connaught was one of the trustees."
The great work accomplished by the late "British
National Society for Aid to the Sick and Wounded
in War " has been worthy of its distinguished
founder, and of the country in which it originated.
From the time of its foundation in 1870 to the
time it was merged into the British Red Cross
Society it expended nearly £500,000 in assisting
the sick and wounded in war.
On the outbreak of the recent war in the Near
East, the Governments of Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey, each having
accepted with gratitude the society's offer of
assistance, complete male Red Cross units were
organized, each with a personnel of eighteen,
consisting of three medical officers, three dressers
(medical students), six nursing orderlies (one acting
as serjeant-major), five general duty orderlies
and one cook, and dispatched with the utmost
expedition to the seat of war in each of the above
342 BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
countries. Each unit was self-contained and
independent, and capable of taking duty either in
the field or at the base, and, moreover, was furnished
with a complete medical and surgical equipment,
and with ample stores.
The importance of the practical work accom-
plished by the society throughout the war may
best be judged from the fact that it dispatched
to the seat of hostilities ten complete units and
four relief parties, with a total personnel of 222,
of whom two nursing orderlies succumbed to
enteric fever whilst nobly doing their duty, and
were buried with military honours.
The personnel was composed of three directors,
thirty-seven medical officers, one superintending
sister, thirty-seven dressers, nine trained female
nurses, eleven serjeant-majors, one X-ray operator,
sixty-six male nursing orderlies, forty-nine general
duty orderlies, six cooks, and two clerks, and in
addition a large supplementary Red Cross personnel
was engaged locally in each country. Base and
field hospitals were opened by the Red Cross units
in : BULGARIA — Lozengrade ; GREECE — Salonica ;
MONTENEGRO — Antivari, Boboti, Boric Vraki,
Pentari, S. Giovanni di Medua, Reci, Rjeka, St.
Nicola, Vilgar, Virpazar, Zogaj ; SERVIA — Uskub ;
TURKEY — Abi Bey Chiftlik, Bigardos, Fine Arts
Museum, Constantinople, Beicos, Kalikratia, Vehfa.
The total number of in- and out-patients treated
at these places was 16,358, whilst assistance,
though strictly outside the scope of the society's
work, was organized, and a certain amount of
relief afforded from the funds to the large numbers
of refugees in Greece and Turkey.
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 343
A part of the Red Cross appliances, including
the X-ray apparatus, which were actually em-
ployed and brought home by the society's units
from the recent Balko-Turkish War, have been
cleaned, sterilized, and placed on exhibition from
May to October 1913 in the Red Cross Portable
Hospital, and also in the Ducal Hall of the
Imperial Services Exhibition, Earl's Court, London.
The society was granted by his late Majesty
King Edward VII a Royal Charter of Incorpora-
tion by letters patent under the great seal on
September 3, 1908.
The work of the society in the United Kingdom
is organized and carried out mainly through the
medium of county branches, the president of each
respective branch usually being the wife of the
Lord -Lieutenant, or some person nominated by
him. The president of every respective colonial
branch is the Governor, or some person appointed
by him.
The primary object of the society is to furnish
aid to the sick and wounded in time of war. Such
aid must necessarily be supplementary to that
provided by the medical departments of the navy
and army.
Except in regard to the raising of voluntary aid
detachments under the War Office scheme for
dealing with medical organization in case of an
invasion of these islands, the society's aid will
consist only of additional comforts and of such
general help as may be considered beyond the
reasonable scope of the medical departments of
the navy and army under the control whereof the
society will act in time of war.
344 BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
The Admiralty and War Office have accorded
their official recognition to the British Red Cross
Society as the organization responsible for the
Red Cross movement throughout the Empire.
The society also is the only body specifically
named by the War Office for the purpose of under-
taking the formation and organization of voluntary
aid detachments in connexion with the medical
organization of the Territorial Forces, and the
county associations of the Territorial Force are
recommended to delegate this work to the British
Red Cross Society. This special side of the
society's activities is dealt with in " Form D,"
to be obtained on application.
It is, therefore, desirable to prepare for, syste-
matize, and co-ordinate all offers of help — in time
of peace — so as to be able to render prompt and
efficient assistance in time of war. It is only by
such preparation that confusion, waste and over-
lapping can be prevented.
In order to be ready to undertake its responsible
duties the society wishes — in time of peace — to
ascertain from its branches and other sources the
extent and nature of the voluntary aid which has
been promised or can be expected in the event of
war.
The nature of the aid furnished by the society
must, to a great extent, depend upon the cir-
cumstances in which military operations are
being carried out at the time, and especially
upon the climatic conditions of the theatre of
war.
Branches shall be formed throughout the
Empire, in the counties, cities, and principal
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 345
towns of the United Kingdom, as well as in the
colonies.
Through the medium of these branches members,
associates, adherents and assistants shall be
enrolled.
The society may enrol members and associates,
adherents and assistants.
Members shall be those who :
(a) Subscribe annually the sum of £l Is. to the
society's funds ; or
(b) Guarantee to contribute the sum of £5 5s.
to the society's funds, if called upon, on
the outbreak of a war in which British
forces are engaged.
Associates shall be those who :
(a) Subscribe annually the sum of 5s. to the
society's funds ; or
(b) Guarantee a contribution of £l Is. under the
conditions above-named.
[The society prefers the annual subscription
(a) to the guaranteed amount (b).]
Adherents shall be those who :
(a) Subscribe annually any sum less than 5s.
a year.
Subscribers are for the ordinary work of the
society, or for the voluntary aid detachment branch
of its work. Subscribers may allocate any part
of their subscription to either division of the work
at their choice.
Assistants shall be those who undertake any
practical work for a county branch of the society,
and county branches are authorized to enrol
workers under this name.
346 BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
All ladies who have received the decoration of
the Royal Red Cross, and approved lecturers who
have given five series of lectures for the society
gratuitously, shall be eligible as honorary members
of the society.
The moneys collected by all branches located in
England and Wales shall be forwarded to the
executive committee annually, minus a deduction
for the local expenses of the branch, unless the
money has been given for the voluntary aid de-
tachment side of the society's work.
The moneys collected for the voluntary aid
detachment side of the work may be retained by
the county branch and expended on the organiza-
tion, training and equipment of British Red Cross
Society detachments within the county borders :
but moneys so retained may not be expended for
any other purpose ; and if the raising and main-
taining of such detachments within the county
should at any time cease, any moneys remaining
at the credit of the voluntary aid fund of the county
branch shall be thereupon transferred to the fund
for the general purposes of the society in that
county.
The Secretary of State for War issued on August
16, 1909, to Territorial Force associations in
England and Wales, a " Scheme for the Organiza-
tion of Voluntary Aid for Sick and Wounded,"
in the event of war in the home territory. Full
details of this scheme are contained in the society's
" Form D."
From the inception of the above " Scheme "
the British Red Cross Society has taken an active
part in the organization of voluntary aid detach-
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 347
ments, and by July 1, 1913, the society had raised
and registered at the War Office 1759 Red Cross
detachments with a total personnel of 51,082.
In this " Scheme " a county system has been
adopted because it is the one upon which the
Territorial Force is organized, and which the
British Red Cross Society had adopted as the basis
of its constitution ; and the society is the body
recommended by the War Office to the Territorial
Force associations for the carrying out of this
important work.
The medical service of the Territorial Force has
no establishment for carrying out the duties in
connexion with (a) clearing hospitals, (b) stationary
hospitals, (c) ambulance trains, and (d) other
formations, viz., entraining and rest stations,
private hospitals, and convalescent homes.
In order to provide a personnel that will be
available for any or all of the duties indicated,
Red Cross voluntary aid detachments are organized
in each county, consisting respectively of men
and women, as follows :
MEN'S DETACHMENT
1 Commandant
1 Medical Officer
1 Quartermaster
1 Pharmacist
4 Section Leaders
48 Men (divisible into 4 sections of 12 men
each)
Total 56
348 BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
WOMEN'S DETACHMENT
1 Commandant (man or woman, and not
necessarily a doctor)
* 1 Medical Officer (to be attached when
available, and when the commandant
is not a doctor)
1 Lady Superintendent (who should be a
trained nurse)
1 Quartermaster (man or woman)
* 1 Pharmacist (if available)
20 Women (of whom 4 should be qualified
as cooks)
Total 23
Each detachment, as it is formed and approved,
is registered by the Council of the British Red
Cross Society, is given a consecutive number by
the War Office, and forms part of the technical
reserve, and is inspected annually by an inspecting
officer detailed by the War Office.
The society's uniform may be optionally worn
by members of detachments, and the regulations
in regard thereto are included in the society's
Form D (7).
The War Office having approved the certificates
granted by the society in first-aid and nursing,
the Red Cross branches are empowered to form
classes to use the society's syllabuses and text-
books and to hold examinations in these subjects,
in order to qualify candidates who do not already
possess such certificates for admission to detach-
ments. Proficiency badges are also awarded for
* Supernumerary.
BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY 349
examination successes in conformity with the regu-
lations detailed in Form C. The men's detachments
must be thoroughly trained as stretcher bearers,
and to some extent as male nurses. A certain
proportion of clerks, carpenters and mechanics
would be especially useful. The principal duties
of the personnel would consist in carrying sick
and wounded by stretchers, and, when necessary,
in preparing means of transport by road or rail,
in converting local buildings or whole villages into
temporary hospitals, and in disinfecting build-
ings, &c.
The women's detachments would be employed
chiefly in forming railway rest stations for preparing
and serving meals and refreshments to sick and
wounded during transit by railway, and in taking
temporary charge in the evacuation stations or
temporary hospitals of severe cases unable to
continue the journey. They should, therefore,
be trained not only in cooking and the preparation
of invalid diets, but also in the method of arranging
small wards for patients in suitable buildings,
preferably near a railway station, and in such
nursing as is necessary for the temporary care of
patients until they can be transferred to the general
hospitals. Detachments, or a certain portion of
a detachment, may be employed for duty in
ambulance trains.
Each member of a detachment, when called up
on mobilization for service, will be provided with
an identity certificate and a " brassard " or arm
badge bearing the Geneva Cross. The identity
certificate and brassard will be issued by a
responsible officer of the army. The wearer of the
350 BRITISH RED CROSS SOCIETY
brassard so issued is " protected " under the articles
of the Geneva Convention.
By the Geneva Convention Act, 1911, "it shall
not be lawful for any person to use for the purpose
of his trade or business, or for any other purpose
whatsoever, without the authority of the army
council, the heraldic emblem of the red cross on
a white ground formed by reversing the federal
colours of Switzerland, or the words " Red Cross "
or " Geneva Cross."
The British Red Cross Society has the authority
of the army council to use the heraldic emblem
of the Red Cross and the words " Red Cross."
The official badge of the society, with the emblem
of the society as a circular pendant attached to
an ornamental bar lettered with the name of the
respective county, may be worn by those who
belong to any branch of the society, or its voluntary
aid detachments so long as a connexion with the
branch is maintained. This badge is only issued
in accordance with the society's regulations, on
the nomination of its branches.
Detailed information as to joining Red Cross
voluntary aid detachments, or of the organization
and objects of the society, may be obtained on
application to the Secretary, 9 Victoria Street,
London, S.W.
AN IDEAL PRESENT
Foolscap 8vo. Price 3/6 net
-^
THE
FLAG OF ENGLAND
BALLADS OF THE BRAVE AND
POEMS OF PATRIOTISM
SELECTED BY
JOHN FAWSIDE
This volume contains the finest poems of
patriotism in the English language, and the
period covered is from 1375 to 1914.
LONDON
EVELEIGH NASH
36 KING STREET, COVENT GARDEN, W.C.
32465
UC SOUTHERN REGIONAL LIBRARY FACILIIY
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