Full text of "Oceanography : joint hearing before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of the Committee on National Security and the Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans Subcommittee of the Committee on Resources, House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, first session, hearing held December 6, 1995"

See other formats

[H.N.S.C. No. 104^1]

Y4.SE2/1 A: 995-96/41

\PHY

Dceanographyi -*H.K.S.C. No. 1D4-41I

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND THE

FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
[Serial No. H.J.-2]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 6, 1995

"''0,1,

\/0f>,.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASraNGTON : 1996

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053903-X

^^^

[H.N.S.C. No. 104^1]

Y 4, SE 2/1 A: 995-96/41

Dceanographsi, -"H.H.S.C. Ho. 104-411... ^HY
JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND THE

FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES
[Serial No. H.J.-2]

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 6, 1995

^0 fss;,

■%^..

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1996

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC 20402
ISBN 0-16-053903-X

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

CURT WELDON. Pennsylv

Chairman

JAMES V. HANSEN. Utah

TODD TIAHRT, Kansas

RICHARD *DOC' HASTINGS, Washington

JOHN R. KASICH, Ohio

HERBERT H. BATEMAN, Vii^nia

ROBERT K DORNAN, California

JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado

RANDY "DUKE" CUNNINGHAM. California

JOHN M. MCHUGH. New York

JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana

VAN HILLEARY, Tennessee

JOE SCARBOROUGH. Florida

WALTER B. JONES, JR.. North Carolina

JOHN M. SPRATT, Jr., South Carolina

PATRICIA SCHROEDER, Colorado

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ. Texas

JOHN TANNER, Tennessee

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi

MARTIN T. MEEHAN. Massachusetts

ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD. Guam

JANE HARMAN. California

PAUL McHALE. Pennsylvania

PETE GEREN, Texas

PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Islana

Douglas C. Roach, Professional Staff Member

William J. ANDAHAZY, Professional Staff Member

Jean D. Reed, Professional Staff Member

Christopher A. Willl\MS, Professional staff Member

John RayFIELD, Professional Staff Member

Tracy W. FINCK, Staff Assistant

COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman

W.J. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana
JAMES V. HANSEN, Utah
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California
WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland
KEN CALVERT, California
RICHARD W. POMBO, California
PETER G. TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona
FRANK A. CREMEANS, Ohio
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming
WES COOLEY, Oregon
HELEN CHENOWETH. Idaho
LINDA SMITH, Washington
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California
WALTER B. JONES, Jr., North Carolina
WILLIAM M. (MAC) THORNBERRY, Texas
RICHARD (DOC) HASTINGS, Washington
JACK METCALF, Washington
JAMES B. LONGLEY, Jr., Maine
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona
JOHN E. ENSIGN, Nevada

GEORGE MILLER, California
EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
NICK J. RAHALL II, West Vir^nia
BRUCE F. VENTO, Minnesota
DALE E. KILDEE. Michigan
PAT WILLIAMS, Montana
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico
PETER A. DeFAZIO, Or^on
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American

Samoa
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
OWEN B. PICKETT, Virginia
FRANTi PALLONE, JR., New Jersey
CALVIN M. DOOLEY, California
CARLOS A. ROMERO-BARCELO, Puerto

Rico
MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
ROBERT A. UNDERWOOD, Guam
SAM FARR. California
PATRICK J. KENNEDY. Rhode Island

Daniel Val Kish, ChUf of Staff

David Dye. Chief Counsel

Christine A. Kennedy, Chief Clerk /Administrator

John Lawrence. Democratic Staff Director

(II)

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS

JIM SAXTON, New Jersey, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts

WJ. (BILLY) TAUZIN, Louisiana GEORGE MILLER, California

WAYNE GILCHREST, Maryland SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut

PETER TORKILDSEN, Massachusetts SOLOMON ORTIZ, Texas

LINDA SMITH, Washington FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey

WALTER JONES, Jr., North Carolina SAM FARR, California

JACK METCALF, Washington PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island

JAMES B. LONGLEY, Maine

Harry Burroughs, Staff" Director

John RayFIELD, Professional Staff"

Rick HEALY, Democratic Legislative Staff

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Page

Kennedy, Hon. Patrick J., a Representative from Rhode Island 9

Pallone, Hon. Frank, Jr., a Representative from New Jersey 7

Saxton, Hon. Jim, a Representative from New Jersey, Chairman, Fisheries,

Wildlife and Oceans Subcommittee: Prepared Statement 10

Spratt, Hon. John M., Jr., a Representative from South Carolina, Ranking

Minority Member, Military Research and Development Subcommittee 6

Young, Hon. Don, a Representative from Alaska 14

Weldon, Hon. Curt, a Representative from Pennsylvania, Chairman, Military

Research and Development Subcommittee 1

PRINCIPAL WITNESSES WHO APPEARED IN PERSON OR SUBMITTED
WRITTEN STATEMENTS

Brass, Dr. Garrett W., Director, Arctic Research Commission:

Statement 103

Prepared statement 106

Biyn, Kare, Director General/Ambassador, Resources Department, Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs:

Statement 25

Prepared statement 28

Colson, Ambassador David A., Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans,
International Environment, Department of State:

Statement 47

Prepared statement 51

Edmond, Dr. John M., Professor of Geochemistry, Department of Earth, At-
mospheric and Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology:

Statement 143

Prepared statement 145

Gershwin, Dr. Lawrence K., National Intelligence Council:

Statement 110

Prepared statement 114

Goodman, Sherri W., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental
Security:

Statement 62

Prepared statement 65

Grassle, Dr. Fred, Director, Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences, Rutgers
University:

Statement 148

Prepared statement 151

Hecht, Ur. Alan D., Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of Inter-
national Activities, Environmental Protection Agency:

Statement 70

Prepared statement 74

Millemann, Beth, Executive Director, Coast Alliance:

Statement 156

Prepared statement 159

Pelaez, Rear Adm. Marc, Chief of Naval Research, Department of the Navy:

Statement 88

Prepared statement 93

Valent, Dr. Philip J., Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center:

Statement 128

Prepared statement 130

(V)

Page

Yablokov, Dr. Aleksai V., Russian Federation, Interagency Commission on
Ecological Security, National Security Council:

Statement ^_

Prepared statement ^^

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Letter from Vice President Gore 3

Additional information submitted for the record ao"

THE DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND
OTHER TOXIC WASTE IN OCEANS AND TRIBUTARIES

House of Representatives, Military Research and
Development Subcommittee of the Committee on
National Security and the Fisheries, Wildlife
AND Oceans Subcommittee of the Committee on
Resources, Washington, DC, Wednesday, December 6,
1995.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 1:42 p.m., in room
2118, Raybum House Office Building, Hon. Curt Weldon (chairman
of the Military Research and Development Subcommittee) and Hon.
Jim Saxton (chairman of the Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans Sub-
committee) presiding.

Members present: Representatives Weldon, Saxton, Farr,
Gilchrest, Hastings, Jones, Spratt, Ortiz, Pallone, Underwood,
McHale, Geren, and Kennedy.

Staff present: Bill Andahazy and John Rayfield.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CURT WELDON, A REPRESENT-
ATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY RE-
SEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. Weldon. The subcommittees will come to order.

This morning, it gives me a great pleasure to cochair with Con-
gressman Jim Saxton of the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife
and Oceans what I call a landmark hearing. I call this a landmark
hearing because, for the first time, we bring together other nations
in a Congressional forum to discuss the environmental impacts
caused by both the construction and destruction of the cold war,
weapons that, thank God, we never had to see used, but today may
be just as destructive, silently causing devastation of our eco-
system. We are all concerned about the potential impacts on radio-
activity from exposed obsolete nuclear weapons or products of nu-
clear weapons that are improperly stored or haphazardly dumped
in our oceans.

Last Congress, as the ranking member of the Subcommittee on
Oceanography, Gulf of Mexico, and the Outer Continental Shelf, I
worked closely with my good friend and chairman of that sub-
committee, Solomon Ortiz, our honorable friend who is here with
us today as he is also a member of this subcommittee, to begin to
raise the awareness of our colleagues in the House regarding the
importance of understanding the marine environment.

As a matter of national security, the U.S. military has long uti-
lized oceanography as a tool for maintaining a strong national de-
fense. Historically, however, the United States in a nondefense ca-
pacity has spent relatively little understanding our oceans while at

(1)

the same time spending billions exploring outer space, which I
have supported, I might add.

Today's hearing, which focuses specifically on the dumping of ra-
dioactive material and other toxic wastes, will kick off a series of
ocean hearings which will follow up on the work of the 103d Con-
gress and hopefully provide us with a better understanding of the
marine environment. Vice President Al Gore is behind this effort,
and I would, without objection, submit a letter from the Vice Presi-
dent to me applauding this subcommittee and our colleagues on the
Science and National Resources Committee for their cooperation in
moving forward with this series of three hearings.

[The letter from Vice President Gore follows:]

THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASH INGTON

December 6, 1995

The Honorable Curt Weldon

Chairman

Subcommittee on Military Research

24 52 Rayburn House Office Building

Washington, B.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As you know, the topics on which the Committee will focus
during this series of hearings have been of interest to me for
some time, and I am pleased to have this opportunity to share my
perspective. As President Lyndon Baines Johnson said during his
tenure, "The waters which flow between the banks belong to all
the people." While the President was speaking about a domestic
issue at the time, his message resonates today.

Oceans cover 71 percent of the Earth's surface, and we face
a common threat to this precious resource. In this time of lean
budgets, creative efforts to exploit existing research and
technology efforts for dual purposes are not only sensible but
essential. The United States has tremendous resources which only
have to be harnessed, and the Committee's hearings represent a
significant step in that direction.

As we approach the 21st Century, I welcome efforts to ensure
that our country is well prepared to act on the basis of the very
best data. I particularly want to thank you for your efforts in
this regard. Your ideas and insight on these issues are
important to me, and your continued support is essential.

Again, please accept my very best wishes for a productive
series of hearings.

Sincerely,

AG/jec

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Mr. Weldon. While our subcommittee has jurisdiction over
oceanography in the context of military operations, there exists a
unique opportunity for a joint effort in research exploration be-
tween the defense and civilian community. I am happy to announce
that a major joint hearing examining the concept of technology de-
velopment through partnerships has been planned for early next
year, in fact, on January 25, between the Subcommittee on Re-
search and Development, the Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife
and Oceans, and the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of
the House Science Committee.

In September 1993, I urged then-Chairman Ortiz to hold a hear-
ing examining the dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic
Ocean. The intention was not to point fingers at the Russians for
past environmental actions. As many of you remember, we were
quick to hold the U.S. Navy accountable for its own actions. At the
hearing, I pressed the Navy to declassify information on two sunk-
en U.S. nuclear submarines, the Thresher and the Scorpion. Within
weeks, the Navy complied, and those videos were broadcast on
"Nightline" in the national media.

In addition, we just recently learned of the dumping of low-level
waste in the 1960's off the coast of the FaroUon Islands by the
United States Government. I believe we should be held accountable
for these actions, as well.

The intent of the 1993 hearing, however, was to assess the short-
and long-term effects of dumping radioactive waste in the Arctic,
to determine the extent of Russia's dumping practices, and to de-
termine the lack of Russia's ability to store and dispose of future
nuclear waste. My colleagues have been given a map, an Arctic por-
trayal of the world, and when you look at how close we are, we can
quickly get a glimpse of how important it is for us to work to-
gether.

Of principal concern to the subcommittee in 1993 was a report
prepared for Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin by Dr.
Aleksai Yablokov. As most of you know. Dr. Yablokov provided us
with the first ever detailed report of Russian dumping activities.
The Yablokov Report confirmed what many had been hearing for
years, that the Russians had dumped over 2.5 million curies of ra-
diation in the Arctic Ocean and the Sea of Japan over the past sev-
eral decades, including 16 naval reactors from seven former Soviet
Union submarines, the icebreaker Lenin; between 1959 and 1991,
low-level liquid radioactive waste in the Baltic, White, Barents, and
Kara Sea; and between 1964 and 1991, low and intermediate solid
radioactive waste was dumped at sites in the Barents and Kara
Seas.

It is an honor to have Dr. Yablokov testify before the subcommit-
tees today and I want to stress the importance of his presence. A
mere 5 years ago, it would have been unheard of for a high-ranking
Russian official to come before a committee of this Congress to de-
tail documented cases of Russian nuclear dumping. I believe this
signifies an important first step toward a more open and honest re-
lationship between the former Soviet Union and the Western World
regarding the state of the environment in Russia and the world
today.

I want to acknowledge to my colleagues who do not know Dr.
Yablokov, in reading the reports as I do every morning, last week,
I came across three articles, each of which documented problems
inside of Russia. In each of the articles, which were criticizing Rus-
sia on its chemical weapons levels, on low priority on smaller nu-
clear weapons, and on decommissioning nuclear submarines, they
quoted one individual and that is the individual appearing before
us today. Dr. Yablokov. He is the leading authority in Russia on
environmental matters and has the ear of President Yeltsin, which
is all the more reason why we need to understand and work with
him and share his perspectives.

While we are beginning to reveal the location and quantity of nu-
clear contamination worldwide, still little is known about the short-
and long-term effects of dumping radionuclides and other toxic
waste in the oceans, the health risks that may occur, and the im-
pact to the ocean ecosystem as a whole.

Since 1992 and 1993 when this problem was first brought to us,
there has been committee after committee, council after council,
conference after conference, international meeting after inter-
national meeting to determine what impact this waste may have on
the environment. But the truth is, there has been insufficiency in
funding, insufficiency in leadership, and insufficiency in commit-
ment to address this issue head-on with our international friends.

If we are to successfully address the problem, greater inter-
national cooperation is an imperative. The final report issued by
the Office of Technology Assessment just recently, just several
months ago, on nuclear waste in the Arctic stressed this point em-
phatically and called for increased expansion of international ef-
forts. We need to go beyond the Arctic region in this cooperative
effort.

I am happy to be here also as the chair of the Oceans Task Force
of the United States branch of GLOBE USA, Global Legislators for
a Balanced Environment, working with our counterparts in the
Russian Duma headed by Nicholai Veransoff, the Japanese Diet
headed by Akiko Dimota, and the European Parliament headed by
Carlos Pimento and Tom Spencer. We are working together in the
parliaments and legislative bodies of each of those nations and bod-
ies on these common environmental problems.

I am also serving this year as the U.S. Vice President for
ACOPS, the Advisory Committee on the Protection of the Seas.
Through these two international organizations, we are successfully
coordinating international efforts in regard to the world's oceans.

Finally, we are in the process of establishing an exchange pro-
gram between Members of this Congress in a bipartisan manner
with members of the Russian Duma who are working on defense
issues as well as environmental issues in the context of the post-
cold-war era.

Today, we are honored to have this distinguished panel of ex-
perts from the Russian Federation and Norway, and policy makers
and technical experts from throughout our country. In addition to
Dr. Yablokov, we will hear from Kare Bryn, Director General/Am-
bassador of the Resources Department of the Norwegian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs who will give us the international perspective.

Prior to our hearing today, we had a press conference with the
Bellona Foundation and highhghted the concern that many of us
in the world have with the security agency in Russia, having just
recently infiltrated their headquarters and confiscated photographs
and documentation and computer systems and software that was
being used to document some gross nuclear storage problems inside
of Russia.

We are not here, however, to criticize Russia alone. We are here
to say this is a world problem. We have not always been as forth-
coming in this country and we are going to talk about that today
in this hearing. But we are committing to work together, to use the
resources of this subcommittee and the other involved subcommit-
tees to make things happen. I pledge my full unequivocal support
and I think I know that that is shared by our colleagues on both
sides of the aisle, to have results that benefit the entire world com-
munity. Hopefully in that regard we can find solutions to these
most vexing and difficult problems.

With that, I will yield to my distinguished friend and colleague
and longtime leader on national security, the honorable gentleman
from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. SPRATT, JR., A REPRESENTA-
TIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, RANKING MINORITY MEM-
BER, MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUB-
COMMITTEE

Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The room is full and we have important witnesses. I do not want
to take much time. I want to start, though, by thanking you and
commending you for calling this hearing. I once chaired the Depart-
ment of Energy panel on this committee and our mission, part of
it was to focus attention on the legacy of 50 years of nuclear weap-
ons production.

We should acknowledge from the outset, and our chairman al-
ready has, that this is not a problem that is unique to the former
Soviet Union. This is our problem, too. And the purpose of this
hearing, as the chairman said, is not to point fingers at our former
adversaries. It is to shed light on a common problem and an enor-
mous problem for both of us.

Today, in particular, we bring attention to one phase of the prob-
lem which has received too little attention. We have tended to treat
the oceans as someone else's problem, as a place to put things that
is off our shore and off our national territory and therefore of no
immediate concern to us but is eventually of immediate concern to
everybody because the oceans belong to all of us and affect all of
us.

I want to welcome our witnesses to our hearing today. Some of
you have traveled great distances to come and we look forward to
your testimony.

Safely disposing of the wastes that we have generated to support
our nuclear arsenals during the cold war is a huge challenge and
it will take staggering sums of money to deal with it. For our coun-
try alone, the cost estimates run from $400 billion to as much as
$1.4 trillion, and as the chairman said, we have not yet stepped up
to the funding challenge. Indeed, this very committee reduced the

funding request from the Department of Energy this year by $500
million for environmental waste and remediation at a time when
we were plussing up the rest of the budget by $7.5 billion, so this
is a timely hearing for this very committee.

I want to credit the Clinton administration for several steps it
has taken to address this problem. I had the pleasure to go with
Vice President Gore when he was Senator Gore under the Arctic
Circle with the Navy to see what the Navy was doing in response
to the strategic environmental initiative taken by the Senate com-
mittee, which Ms. Goodman had a hand in crafting some years ago.
We are seeing the fruits of that today with the release of the enor-
mous store of infonnation that the Navy has amassed over the
years.

I want to credit the President, too, for taking a bold step and de-
claring a moratorium on nuclear testing. It was not a popular step
in every quarter but it has had a number of positive effects. The
most important, of course, was the extension of the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty, but it also gave the Russians a political cover
to stop testing, and the testing they were doing at that time was
no longer in Kajakistan, it was in the Arctic Circle and it was an
active, ongoing source of radioactive pollution. This also gave both
countries the opportunity to devote more resources and attention to
cleanup and remediation.

This administration also reversed the longstanding U.S. policy
and signed a pledge not to dump nuclear waste in the world's
oceans as an addendum to the London Convention, a long overdue
step for our Nation.

And finally, the administration has shown that it is committed
to making the cleanup of national waste a budget priority.

Today, we are looking at just one aspect of the problem in the
former Soviet Union, the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. The
United States and the former Soviet Union are still paying for the
cold war and will do so for decades to come.

I commend the chairman once again for calling today's hearing
so that we have an opportunity to consider the consequences of nu-
clear dumping at sea, to begin thinking about what we are going
to do about it, and for reminding my colleagues on this committee
that this is but one part of an enormous problem which we have
only begun to pay for and deal with.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Spratt.

Are there other members who would like to make brief opening
statements? Mr. Pallone.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW JERSEY

Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am an original cosponsor of your bill, H.R. 1154, that would
amend the Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act to
close loopholes in our laws relating to the ocean dumping of radio-
active waste. I know you have been a leader in this area and I
want to commend you for your efforts.

But I came today, because even more important to me locally, be-
cause I represent a coastal district, is the second part of today's

hearing, which deals with the disposal of waste on the ocean floor.
In 1988, Congress passed legislation that banned the ocean dump-
ing of waste at sea. In that same year, the New Jersey State Legis-
lature enacted our State's ocean dumping ban. Dumping at sea was
a threat to our marine environment and to the health and economic
well-being of those who are dependent upon coastal resources. It
was the main reason I decided to run for Congress.

It is hard for me to believe that just over 15 years ago, there
were more than 400 industries and municipalities which had per-
mits or were seeking permits to dump waste in the ocean. Just 7
years ago, washups of sewage sludge and medical waste on the
New Jersey Shore forced closures and scared tourists away to the
point where we lost some $3 billion in potential revenue in the
State of New Jersey.

However, thanks to the ocean dumping ban in 1993, New Jer-
sey's coastal regions received about 14 million overnight visitors
who spent some $10.3 billion and helped create over 171,000 jobs.
I only mention that to show how important ocean water quality is
to the New Jersey Shore.

Despite all the progress we have made on ocean protection and
the clear policy statement of Congress on ocean dumping, in 1992,
as was mentioned before, in the Merchant Marine Committee, our
former colleague. Bill Hughes, our current chairman, Jim Saxton,
and myself found ourselves fighting a backdoor attempt to reopen
the ocean dumping ban. That year, advocates of a technology called
deep ocean isolation sought to authorize the use of the ocean floor
as a landfill. Clearly, they were reopening the ocean dumping ban
even for research purposes and that would have represented a re-
treat from the strong action that Congress took in 1988 and from
efforts to reduce, reuse, and recycle our society's wastes.

Today, we are once again faced with an attack on one of the most
important environmental laws by a group of people who seem in-
tent on dumping wastes at sea. Late yesterday, I found out that
supporters of ocean dumping succeeded in getting a provision in
the Commerce, Justice, and State conference report that we are
going to vote on today that would have the Federal Government
spend taxpayer dollars to develop a demonstration project on deep
ocean isolation of waste. This language was not in the House Com-
merce report. It was not in the Senate Commerce report. But sud-
denly, mysteriously, it is in the conference report that we are going
to vote on today without any opportunity to take that out of the
conference report.

Deep ocean isolation and this tethered container technology in
particular has already been specifically rejected by the Department
of Commerce as not only unsafe but antithetical to U.S. and inter-
national law regarding the dumping of waste at sea. In addition,
the Naval Research Lab has already analyzed the technology and
in January of this year deemed it unacceptable.

I hope my colleagues will take full advantage of this hearing to
join me in expressing their outrage over the appropriators' actions
and their efforts to go behind the back of our subcommittee to re-
open the issue of ocean dumping. This is not the first time in this
Congress that appropriation bills have been used to deal with

things that should have gone through the authorizing committees,
but I think it is particularly egregious in this case.

Ocean dumping is illegal. At a time when Congress is proposing
to cut funding for the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) by
21 percent and to significantly weaken many of our most important
environmental protections, it is particularly irresponsible, in my
opinion, and wrong to use taxpayers' money to fund experiments in
ocean dumping of any kind of waste.

I do not want to take up your time because I know we are going
to deal with this in the fourth panel, and that is later today, Mr.
Chairman, but I am so concerned about it because of what is hap-
pening on the floor today and, of course, I am going to go over
there at some point today to make my point during the debate on
the conference report. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentlemen.

Are there other members who would like to make opening state-
ments? Mr. Kennedy.

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. KENNEDY, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first want to begin by commending you for your leadership on
this issue. I also want to commend Bill Andahazy from the profes-
sional staff here for his effort in bringing today's witnesses to tes-
tify.

I would like to say that I look forward to working with you on
this panel and on the Natural Resources Committee, to which I
have just been appointed, to work on this to determine what the
size and extent of the problem is and all the circumstances with
which various forms of pollution can become really hazardous to
the environmental security that I think everyone on this coiAmittee
has an interest in, not only we in this country but countries all
over the world, given the fact that 70 percent of our world's surface
is ocean and we need to understand what we have done in the past
and what we continue to do and what its impact is on our environ-
ment. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon. I thank my friend and colleague and would add
that we are committed to doing the second of the three hearings
on this topic in the area of the gentleman's district in cooperation
with the Woods Hole and I look forward to that field hearing, as
well.

I would like to insert the opening statement of the gentleman
from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton, who, as I mentioned, is on the House
floor now and will be joining us later this afternoon.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Saxton follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE JIM SAXTON,
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES,
WILDLIFE AND OCEANS, AT THE JOINT OVERSIGHT
HEARING ON OCEAN DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE
MATERL^LS: DECEMBER 6, 1995.

I am pleased to join with my National Security
Committee colleagues today to examine the issue of
radioactive waste dumping in the Arctic and the use of the
abyssal plain for waste disposal.

Since I serve on both committees, it is nice to see this
overlap of concerns. I would also note that the former
Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, on which both
Curt and I served, held hearings on both of these topics. I

-2-

am glad that despite the demise of that committee, Congress is
still considering ocean issues.

Certainly the United States, and all the nations that
border the Arctic Ocean, must be concerned about the
dumping of radioactive and other contaminated materials
there. Therefore, I look forward to hearing from both our
international and domestic witnesses on the fate of material
already disposed of in the Arctic Ocean, and on plans to
prevent future contamination.

In preparing for today's panel on deep ocean disposal of
dredged material, I looked back at my remarks about deep
ocean disposal before the Coast Guard Subcommittee in 1993.
At that time, I said that deep ocean disposal was "a

12
-3-

cockamamie idea driven more by profit than by rational
environmental policy". At present, I have no reason to
change my views.

Removing our wastes from sight is not the same as
responsible management of those wastes, nor does it replace
efforts to develop practical cost-effective ways to reduce the
stream of waste we produce. Our efforts should be focused
on pollution reduction so that we don't end up being forced to
choose between a host of more unacceptable and less
unacceptable alternatives. Despite my strong opposition to the
dumping of land-based or nearshore-based waste in the ocean,
I am interested in hearing what today's witnesses have to say.

JS:jrm

Mr. Weldon. I would also like to include the opening statement
of Chairman Don Young of the Resources Committee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Young follows:]

STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE DON YOUNG
(R-AK) AT THE JOINT OVERSIGHT HEARING ON
OCEAN DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS:
DECEMBER 6, 1995.

I am pleased that the Subcommittees are holding this joint
hearing today. As the Member who represents the Arctic
Ocean shoreline of the United States, I am, of course, very
concerned about how that ocean is used. I look forward to
the witnesses' assessments of the environmental fate of the
material that has already been dumped into the Arctic Ocean,
and what can be done to prevent additional contamination of
the Arctic.

I also look forward to hearing from the panel dealing
with deep ocean disposal of dredged material. Improved

-2-
scientific understanding of the environment and advances in

technology have already improved our environmental
management capabilities dramatically, and hold the promise
for significant additional improvements. As our under-
standing of the deep ocean environment increases, we may
find that deep ocean placement technology provides a disposal
option for some materials that will improve near-coastal water
quality, and avoid the need to develop additional land-based
disposal alternatives.

I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses.

DY:jrm

Mr. Weldon. Are there any other opening statements? With
that, Dr. Yablokov, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALEKSAI V. YABLOKOV, RUSSIAN FEDERA-
TION, INTERAGENCY COMMISSION ON ECOLOGICAL SECU-
RITY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Dr. Yablokov. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask somebody to
show some pictures, if it is possible. It may be more informative
than my written presentation.

I have to say that I deeply appreciated your invitation. I greatly
appreciated such possibility to express my understanding of this
situation, because the situation with Arctic pollution is not only a
Russian problem. It is a problem for all Arctic countries, including
the United States, Canada, and maybe even not only the Arctic but
all countries which belong to the Northern Hemisphere.

For example, you know not only pollution from military Russian
source but also from Great Britain is detectable, even in the Kara
Sea, in the White Sea, especially in the Barents Sea.

This is the last minute before dumping of one of the nuclear sub-
marines near shore in the new land. The dumping place is only 20
meters deep. It is a last minute life of submarine. So the 17 sub-
marine was dumped near new land. The last expedition shows that
only near submarine some radioactivity was slightly higher than in
the Kara Sea, so it does not create immediate danger. We have
time. We have time, maybe several years to improve the situation.
I hope that in several years, we have the possibility to erase all of
this submarine and to blaze it into safety deposition.

Mr. Weldon. Dr. Yablokov, you have to excuse us. Do you have
these technical problems in Russia?

Dr. Yablokov. Yes, of course. It is typical. [Laughter.]

Dr. Yablokov. In my written text, you can see a more detailed
explanation of what the Russian Government has done and tried
to do in this direction. Some visible activity, especially in the last
year. Just in the last month, my government approved a special
Federal program to overcome the nuclear waste problem. It is a
big, big project, many pages, but only $1 billion which they allo-
cated to spend during 10 years. It is nothing, if you count the prob-
lem which we are facing and what we need for this problem, for
radioactive contamination of the Arctic.

We will have a possibility to show my picture, or I can talk with-
out the picture.

Mr. Weldon. If you can proceed, we will try to get it corrected.
I think the light bulb went out. But if you can proceed without the
photo, we will try to get it corrected and then put it up. Do you
have photos you can pass around. Dr. Yablokov?

Dr. Yablokov. Yes. I will continue without pictures.

What we have to do, the scale of problem, we understand it is
an enormous scale of problem, not only nuclear submarines which
were dumped but also three installations in Central Siberia which
produced military plutonium have an enormous amount of radio-
active waste which are going to the Arctic Ocean, because as you
recall, the northern slope. Asia has some slope to the Arctic Ocean
and all waste is going to the Arctic sooner or later.

The official estimation and the minimal estimation is that 3 bil-
lion curies which are in the Yenisey River basin and the Ob River
basin, and in several tens of years, maybe 100 years, no more than
100 years, all this radioactivity will be in the Arctic Ocean if we
cannot do something just now or in the next years.

Mr. Weldon. Excuse me, did you say 3 billion curies?

Dr. Yablokov. Three billion curies. Three billion curies. Three
billion curies.

The problem is also with so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. In
the Soviet time, we conducted more than 100 peaceful nuclear
explosions. The bulk of them, maybe about 35 or 37 of them were
conducted in the Arctic. It is also an additional source of radio-
active pollution.

But it is not only radioactive pollution. We have enormous oil
and gas pollution. The amount of oil in the mouth of Siberia in the
river, especially in the Ob River, jumped during the last 20 years
10 times and continues rising. Every year in Siberia, we catch
about 200 million tons of oil. At least 5 million tons of oil we lost
because of leaking, leaking in the pipeline, leaking during transpor-
tation and so on and so on and so on. All this oil is going into the
northern ocean. Fifteen percent of the Bering Sea is covered by a
film from oil.

I have to continue a description of the environmental pollution
of the Arctic, but now I have to turn your attention to what we can
do, what we have to do. First of all, we need a special agree-
ment or treaty about Arctic protection. We were near to this treaty
2 years ago but it was the State Department of the United
States who spoiled this treaty. We have practically full ready text
of such a treaty for protection, a Russian-American treaty for pro-
tection of the Arctic, but your State Department, because here is
some ridiculous, from my point of view, obstacles for this treaty
stopped this activity.

Now, I think we have no possibility to repeat it because our mili-
tary have now more powers than 2 years ago and for Russia's
side, it would be an enormous problem to come back to this treaty.
We have lost this possibility. But we tried to do something in this.

I will show you the level of radioactivity and the place where we
produce plutonium, Krasnoyarsk-26, Tomsk-7, and Chelyabinsk-70.
The first number is the radioactivity in surface water, 1 billion cu-
ries in Chelyabinsk and zero on the ground. In Tomsk, 500 million
in the surface and 500 million on the ground dumping. And in the
Krasnoyarsk, about 100 million curies in the lake and 600 million
curies on the ground.

This map shows us the places for underground nuclear explo-
sions, underground nuclear explosions. You can see how many nu-
clear explosions were conducted in the Arctic and all this radio-
activity going to the Arctic. The next slide, please.

This shows us oil pollution, oil pollution in the Barents Sea. Now
it is much more water polluted, not only in the Barents Sea but
also in the Kara Sea. I took your attention, it is just before the fa-
mous leaking in the Komi Republic which took all public attention
in last year. It is just before the Komi leaking we have such heavy
oil pollution in the Barents Sea. Next, please.

This is interesting. This is a night view from space on the world.
This is from the National Geographic map. Look for the angle, the
right angle here is the brightest place all over the world. It is not
New York, it is not Los Angeles, but it is Surgood. It is the Surgood
region in Northwestern Siberia, the gas and oil deposition. Tens of
thousands of gas storage creates such an enormous light which is
located from hundreds and hundreds of kilometers from space. It
has created not only light but it has created enormous pollution.

I fully agree with my friend Al Gore, who, in his book which was
published 4 years ago, mentioned that the fastest way to stop cli-
mate change is to stop leaking and to stop gas storage in North Si-
beria. And the last one?

So what do we have to do now? This is a joke, of course, but this
joke has a sense. All our problems are going to the Soviet past,
going to the Soviet past. Yes, the cold war is over but we have an
enormous problem, how we can conduct, how we can deal with the
problem which was created during the cold war. You created this
problem. We created this problem. Now we have joined our
strengths to overcome this problem.

Thank you very much. The lights, please?

My first proposition was about the Arctic agreement. My next
proposition is we need to do something with the London Conven-
tion. Until now, the London Convention, which is against any
dumping, does not cover any pollution, any radioactive pollution
from land. We know that fuel in Great Britain, in the reprocessing
plant in France, continues to dump, practically to dump an enor-
mous amount of radioactive contamination into the North Atlantic.

The next proposal, after the white book in Russia about dump-
ing, we dream that other countries who conduct such activity also
published its own book but we have no white book about dumping
in the United States. We have no white book about dumping in
Great Britain. We have no white book about dumping in Japan. We
know the enormous scale of dumping in Japan, but nobody cal-
culated it officially. We need such a calculation.

Also, I never mentioned it before but I mention it here, we have
an enormous problem with Arctic pollution from space activity.
Twenty-two million hectares in the Russian territory are highly
polluted from space remnants, but not only territory, also Arctic
pollution. The Arctic Ocean is highly polluted in several places in
the Arctic Ocean. What is your English place where you are land-
ing your space rockets?

Mr. Weldon. Cape Kennedy.

Dr. Yablokov. It is a more active place for landing all over the
globe. It has a visible negative effect for the Arctic.

I think we have to support the Norway, American, and Russian
agreement to overcome some enormous problem. We need to de-
velop this agreement and maybe to raise the level of this agree-
ment some.

This is my main proposal and my last note. It is just the right
place and the right time to raise the question before the Gr-7. In
several months, the G-7 has a meeting in Moscow specially de-
voted to the radioactive problem. It will be exactly in 10 years after
the Chernobyl catastrophe. Just now, you have to elaborate some

new proposal and during the G-7 meeting it will be approved. This
proposal is just the proper time.

TTiank you very much for your attention.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Yablokov follows:]

ASET

Job #58132348

12/5/95

For Use in the Testimony of Alexei V. Yablokov

Conunittee on National Security

U.S. House of Representatives

December 6, 1995

1. On the current state of rivers feeding the Northern Arctic Ocean

There different types of pollution for the rivers in the various regions of the Russian
Arctic:

Heavy metals (particularly mercury): the Northern Divina (the paper industry) and the
Aldan, a tributary of the Lena River (the gold refining industry);

Petroleum products the Pechora River Basin; the Ob' River Basin;

Phenols: the Northern Divina, the Pechora, the Lena; the Yana; the Indigirka and the
Kolyma Rivers (decaying wood).

Radionuclides: the Yenisei (plutonium has been discovered at the mouth of the river due
to in-line cooling of military icactors at Krasnoyarsk-26);

The Tobol River Basin (a tributary of the Ob' River) due to plutonium production at the
Mayak Production Association (CheIyabinsk-70);

The Tom* River Basin (a tributary of the Ob' River) due to plutonium production at the
Siberian Chemical Mining Plant (Tomsk-7).

2. The current state of research and methods of avoiding the influx of new
pollutants

In the climate of very limited financial support characteristic of the current scientific
environment in Russia research on radioactive conditions in the Barents Sea and Kara Sea were
accelerated after the publication of the White Book on Radioactive Dumping in Russian Seas
(1993) Maritime expeditions are conducted annually. Two such expeditions were conducted in
conjunction with Norway.

At the same time the network of observation posts along the rivers and Arctic coastline is
being curtailed due to budgetary financing shortfalls from the Russian State Committee on

Hydrometerology [Roskomgidromet].

There is no unified state plan to prevent pollution the Arctic Basin. The Federal State
Committee on Northern issues-which repeatedly focused on the need to deal with pollution of
the Arctic-was abolished two years ago. This committee was re-established by decree of the
President of Russia one week ago.

Isolated measures which could help to stabilize the pollution level have been set forth in
state programs for handling radioactive waste and dioxins adopted in the last two months.
However, given budgetary financing levels (approximately one million U.S. dollars for radioactive
waste and even less for dioxins) reveals the more symbolic rather than realistic nature of such
programs.

A fijndamentally new method of detecting radiation levels accumulated in the bodies of
mammals (electro-paramagnetic resonance analyses of tooth enamel) have revealed that wild
reindeer on Novaya Zemlya were exposed to enormous radiation doses prior to the termination of
nuclear testing there. Large scale research utilizing this method has not yet been possible due to
the lack of sufficient financial support.

3. The level of assistance from interaational projects in preventing new
pollution

World Bank credits of one hundred million dollars is helping to reduce oil pollution in the
Pechora River Basin.

A small amount of assistance fi'om the Republic of Sakha (Yakutiya) to improve water
quality in the Lena River has been obtained through the Northern Council.

Efforts to reduce air pollution emissions of some of the most hazardous regional polluters-
-the Sevronikel and Pechenganikel metallurgical plants on the Kola Peninsula-have been
undertaken within the framework of inter-govemmental accords between Russia and Norway.
Seminars (courses) for mid-level management for dissemination of natural conservation and
resource saving technologies in the Barents region (Murmansk and Arkangel Province, Republic
of Kareliya have already been conducted for several years at the impetus of Norway.

There is an inter-govemmental Norweigan-American-Russian agreement to provide
assistance to Russia for treating liquid and storing solid radioactive waste in the Murmansk
region.

4. The success of Russian organizations in environmental protection and
nuclear security

A new federal law-the Russian Water Code-went into effect November 23. 1 995.
Article 104 of the Water Code expressly prohibits all discharge and disposal of radioactive and
toxic substances in water bodies. This same law forbids a broad range of operations associated

with the possible hazardous pollution of water bodies, including pollution deriving from nuclear
explosions.

Unfortunately, Article 42 of the federal law that went into effect on November 25, 1995
"On the Use of Nuclear Energy" authorizes the discharge of nuclear materials and radioactive
substances in quantities that do not "exceed limits established by standards and regulations in the
field of nuclear energy use".

The draft law "On Environmental Security" which has not yet adopted by Parliament (but
has already passed through two reviews before the State Duma) stipulates a comprehensive ban
on underground nuclear explosions, including those employed for peaceful purposes which have
in the past had a substantial impact on radioactive pollution of the Arctic. Pollution of the Arctic
by space-oriented operations has not yet been legally regulated (the Plesetsk Cosmodrome: the
most extensively utilized space facility on earth). On September 1, 1995 at the impetus of the
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, the govenunent adopted a Targeted Program for
Reprocessing and Recycling of Metallic Radioactive Waste (primarily salvaging of nuclear
submarines) v^th anticipated costs of approximately five million U.S. dollars by the year 2002.
This program stipulates the development of four systems for reprocessing of metallic radioactive
waste with a total annual capacity of up to 150,000 metric tons. It is bebeved that Russia
currently contains up to 600,000 metric tons of such waste (including more than 140 nuclear
submarines that are no longer in service).

A State Commission for Comprehensive Resolution of the Problem of Radioartive Waste
was established in 1993 (the chairman was Y. G. Vishnevskiy, Director of Goskomatomnadzor
[Russian Federal Oversight of Nuclear Energy]. However, in June of 1995 the President of
Russia (under severe pressure by the Ministry of Defense) to create that Goskomatomnadzor was
to be stripped of the right to inspect nuclear and military radiation facilities.

On October 23. 1995 the government adopted the Targeted Federal Program "Handling of
Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Materials, Their Recycling and Disposal for 1996-2005" for
a total federal budgetary financing level of near one million dollars. This program included
(among other elements) the following measures affecting the Arctic region:

The design and construction on the Novaya Zemlya Archepelago of a facility for disposal
of radioactive waste from salvaging of nuclear submarines (approximately 50 million dollars by
the year 2005).

Upgrade and construction of new spent nuclear fuel storage facilities from nuclear
submarines (approximately 20 million dollars from 1997 through the year 2005);

The modernization and development of facilities for conditioning liquid and solid radwaste
at nuclear civilian fleet facilities (approximately eight million dollars from 1996 through the year
2000) as well as for the military fleet (approximately 1 1 million dollars from 1996 through the
year 2005),

Survey radwaste disposal sites in northern and far-eastern seas (approximately 15 million
dollars from 1997 through the year 2005);

Clean-up of the Yenisei and Tom' River Basins to eliminate radioactive contamination
attributable to plutonium production reactors (approximately 1 1 million dollars from 1997
through the year 2000).

On November 2, 1995 the Russian government adopted the Federal Targeted Program
Entitled "Establishment of a Unified State Automated System for Monitoring Radiation
Conditions on the Territory of the Russian Federation" (EGASKRO) under which approximately
100 million dollars is to be spent by the year 2002 (beginning in 1997). However, there are
serious doubts that this program will come to fruition due to a lack of financing.

5. The degree of impact of the London Conference and the Gore-
Cbemomyrdin Commission on reducing the need for nuclear waste disposal in
the oceans.

Russia's acknowledgment of its obligations in 1993 deriving from the London Conference
significantly changed the situation in naval forces which during the Soviet period assumed that the
disposal of liquid radioactive waste in the Arctic and far-eastern seas was entirely acceptable.
Such disposal practices have been nearly entirely eliminated in the Northern Fleet.

Discussions within the framework of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission have been
usefijl for developing specific proposals to facilitate the development of projects for reprocessing
of liquid radioactive waste in the Northern Fleet.

6. What research programs and international projects can be treated as
priority areas for development of an effective program for prevention of
nuclear and other waste disposal in ocean ecosystems?

An international agreement (accord or convention) on Arctic environmental protection is
necessary.

It would be advisable for the US. to follow Russia's example and publish a White Book
of its radwaste disposal sites at sea This would provide a good political foundation for
development of a joint American-Russian (possibly also involving Norway) program for clean-up
of the Arctic seas to eliminate hazardous solid radwaste dumped into these waters.

It would advisable to develop a special international agreement for environmental
protection from space activities (specifically the dumping of separable rocket booster stages
containing hazardous rocket fiiel into the Arctic seas).

A special convention (agreement or accord) or annex to the London Convention to
prohibit radwaste disposal into the sea from coastal locations is required. Radwaste from Sella-

field and the Lya-aga (the British and French spent nuclear fuel reprocessing factories,
respectively) have been dumped in enormous quantities into the ocean for many tens of years
along extended pipelines from the sea coast and such waste is being discovered throughout the
seas in the northern Atlantic and the Kara Sea.

It would be usefiil, as an extension and development of Russian-American-Norweigian
agreements to prevent radwaste disposal in the Arctic, to develop a special program of
international assistance for Russia to resolve the problems associated with organizing safe storage
of the enormous quantity (estimated at over 40 million curie of radwaste from the Soviet Navy
operating in the Muransk region (the problem of organizing safe storage of spent nuclear fuel
from nuclear submarines and the problem of salvaging nuclear submarines and storing the
submarine reactors). However, for political reasons, this program can only be developed after
appropriate resolution at the presidential level between our countries.

Chairman of the Inter-Govemmentai Commission
on Environmental Security
Russian Committee on Security

{Professor A. Yablokov)
Moscow, 4 December 1995

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Dr. Yablokov. We will have questions
for you but we would like to hear from our distinguished Nor-
wegian panelist, Mr. Kare Bryn.

STATEMENT OF KARE BRYN, DIRECTOR GENERAL/AMBAS-
SADOR, RESOURCES DEPARTMENT, NORWEGIAN MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mr. Bryn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen. It
is a pleasure for me to participate in this hearing. I have prepared
a written statement for the record and I will highlight the main
points from that.

My thesis is that the problem is not so much the waste already
dumped in the oceans but rather the spent nuclear fuel and radio-
active waste that in the future may end up in the marine environ-
ment unless urgent and decisive action is taken by the inter-
national community.

To go back, Mr. Chairman, in spring 1994, the Norwegian Gov-
ernment presented the report to our parliament on the threat of
nuclear pollution in areas adjacent to our northern borders. The
background was the mounting evidence which had come to light
after the collapse of the Soviet Union of safety deficiencies at nu-
clear facilities, as well as practices of dumping nuclear structures
and radioactive waste in the ocean. Gradually, as contacts with the
Russian authorities developed, we also became aware of their prob-
lems with storage facilities and the management of radioactive
waste.

The debate on this report in Parliament took place in June 1994,
and it led to a call for a plan of action and intensified cooperation
both with Russia and other countries in order to deal with the
problems. Such a plan was made public in March 1995.

To follow up the plan of action, the parliament also authorized
approximately $20 million U.S. for this year and we expect that a
similar sum is to be available for the financial year 1996.

So far, international cooperation has mainly focused on the oper-
ational safety of civilian nuclear powerplants. This, of course, is
natural in the light of the Chernobyl accident and involves the
amount of documentation available of unsatisfactory safety at East-
ern and Central European nuclear powerplants. The nuclear safety
accounts operated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development was a timely response by the international commu-
nity to this challenge.

Mr. Chairman, looking at the threat to the marine environment
which is the theme for this hearing, the situation is less clear and
far more complex both technically and politically. Today, we have
a very positive situation as far as the radioactivity in the northern
seas is concerned. For instance, I could mention that the level of
cesium- 137 in the Bering Sea is about seven becerel [?] per cubic
meter of water. This is the same level as can be found in the Atlan-
tic Ocean. The level is almost 15 times higher in the Irish Sea,
which no doubt is a result of the considerable emissions from the
Sellafield reprocessing plant in the United Kingdom.

To preserve the favorable situation in the Bering Sea is very im-
portant, as here we find some of the richest fishing grounds in the
world.

In order to map out the situation, Norwegian and Russian sci-
entists have undertaken joint expeditions to the Soviet dumping
areas in the Kara Sea and along the coast in 1992, 1993, and 1994.
In these areas, several reactors with and without spent fuel, ves-
sels, barges, and numerous containers with radioactive waste, as
well as a large quantity of low-level liquid nuclear waste, have
been dumped before 1991.

The main conclusion from these expeditions is that although
leakages do occur, the radionuclides can be traced only in sedi-
ments in the very close vicinity of the dumped objects. However, we
have no guarantee that this positive situation will continue. A reg-
ular monitoring program is definitely needed, but it seems clear
that in the short run, other problems should be given higher prior-
ity as far as concrete efforts to prevent contamination is concerned.

If you can take some comfort from the investigations of the
dumping sites, the opposite is true when it comes to the question
of management, storage, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and ra-
dioactive waste. We know that existing storage facilities are full
and that many are in extremely bad condition. Here lies the poten-
tial for accidents, future dumping, and leakages to the marine envi-
ronment if corrective action is not taken.

The question for the international community is, can we afford
to leave the situation as it is and wait until the Russians have the
economic strength to deal with the problems themselves?

Some countries have already demonstrated their willingness to
start addressing these issues. Norway and the United States are
now developing plans to assist Russia to upgrade and expand the
plant for treatment of low-level liquid radioactive waste in Mur-
mansk. A review meeting of the plans between Russian, American,
and Norwegian scientists will take place in Oslo in a week's time.
Hopefully, the construction phase can start early in 1996.

Another example of concrete action is the advisory committee
which has been formed to consider the plans to deal with the stor-
age of ship Lepse. The United States, France, Norway, and the Eu-
ropean Commission and Russia are taking part in this cooperation.
Here again, we expect concrete proposals to be put on the table in
1996.

These projects are very important in themselves, and really, I
would say, invaluable in gaining experience to deal with central
and local Russian authorities, but the main problem is not the ci-
vilian nuclear facilities but the military ones. Our cooperation with
the Russian Navy and the northern fleet is much less developed
than cooperation with the civilian authorities. The problem is
manifold. The Russian Navy has exhausted their storage capac-
ities. There is pollution coming from inland facilities which may
spread through the river systems, as talked about by Dr. Yablokov.

In addition, at least 17 nuclear submarines which have already
been decommissioned are lying around the shores of the Kola Pe-
ninsula. Spent fuel has been removed from less than one-third of
them. The number of submarines taken out of service is growing
steadily.

Of course, I think it is very important to state that the Russian
Navy must set aside resources to address these problems. Our im-
pression is that they are showing an increasing willingness to do

so. The question is if they can, even if they really tried, deal with
the enormous backlog which for many reasons has developed.

A significant step was recently taken by the Russian authorities
in developing a plan for the decommissioning of submarines. A
Norwegian company financed under our plan of action has taken
part in the development of this plan. I am sure we will hear more
about this in the months ahead.

It seems to me that a key to addressing the waste problem in the
Russian northern fleet is to build up relations with those organs
responsible on the Russian side. Inter alia, for this purpose, a mili-
tary expert group has been set up between Russia, the United
States, and Norway. We hope that the group also will gradually ex-
pand its work to solving concrete problems.

Significant work in confidence building as well as in research has
also been done through the pilot study which has been created by
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, in jargon called the NACC.
The first phase of the pilot study was concluded in September this
year. This study was the result of a Norwegian initiative in 1992
to exploit the new possibilities opened up by the end of the cold
war and the creation of the NACC.

I believe it is fair to say that our expectations were met and that
the first phase of the study was successful. The participation of
more than 20 countries, as well as the final report on radioactive
and chemical pollution problems bear witness to this. A phase 2 of
the study has now been launched with broad participation and we
have great expectation that the phase 2 will help us develop a com-
mon understanding of the challenges identified in the first phase.

Mr. Chairman, although each country must take the responsibil-
ity for its nuclear facilities, we cannot overlook the fact that the sit-
uation Russia finds itself in after the cold war is a very special one.
Furthermore, the interdependence and transboundary character of
the problems are such that we cannot afford to leave the situation
as it is until Russia can deal with it herself. Therefore, an inter-
national effort to assist Russia and assist ourselves is urgently
called for.

At the G-7 summit in Halifax this year, the G-7 leaders and
President Yeltsin agreed to arrange a summit on nuclear safety in
Moscow in April 1996. We have great expectations that the sum-
mit, in addition to considering the safety of nuclear reactors and
illicit tracking of nuclear materials, also will address in a sub-
stantive way the problems of management and storage of spent nu-
clear fuel and radioactive waste.

The summit should initiate urgent work to further study these
problems, as well as give impetus to international cooperation on
concrete projects. An appropriate multilateral forum for coordinat-
ing activities should be identified.

Last, the summit should initiate discussions regarding how na-
tional efforts may be supplemented by multilateral financial assist-
ance, for instance, as a parallel to the nuclear safety account oper-
ated by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryn follows:]

35-799 96-2

IV RGE rOmi^EISf NORWAY
)IIVEGE IV : n|S|l#LlV C RUE Gi
r WJk\ JiORloBlV f ORE r JVC

UNITED STATES CONGRESSIONAL HEARING TO ASSESS THE MAGNITUDE
AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF DUMPING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND
OTHER TOXIC WASTE INTO THE WORLD OCEANS AND TRIBUTARIES

6 DECEMBER 1995

STATEMENT BY

MR KARE BRYN, DIRECTOR GENERAL
ROYAL NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Mr. Chairman,
ladies and gentlemen.

It is a pleasure for me to participate in this Hearing on radioactive waste issues. Let me right
away state my main thesis which will guide my presentation: The problem is not so much the
waste already dumped in the oceans, but rather the spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste
that may end up in the marine environment in the future unless urgent and decisive action is
taken by the international community. My emphasis is on the challenges of radioactive waste
management, with particular reference to nuclear facilities and activities in Northwest Russia.

I BACKGROUND

Nuclear activities raise questions of serious concern which need to be addressed by the
international community. In particular, safety deficiencies at nuclear facilities and materials
located in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union pose a threat not only to
the countries themselves, but also to the environment far beyond their borders. These threats
require action by all countries concerned with preserving the quality of the environment and
promoting nuclear non-proliferation.

Each country is ultimately responsible for the safety of its nuclear facilities and for solving
any problems resulting from the operation of these facilities. However, in some instances the
problems are so severe, the solutions so costly, and the transborder consequences of accidents
or continued malpractices so frightening, that broad-based international co-operation is
necessary to deal with them adequately and responsibly.

A number of nuclear facilities are located in Northwest Russia. These include i.a. a nuclear
power plant on the Kola Peninsula, eight civilian nuclear-powered icebreakers, several
storage facilities for spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, and the world's largest
concentration of nuclear-powered naval vessels, the Northern Fleet. The Russian navy has
more than 80 operational nuclear submarines and two nuclear-powered cruisers stationed at
bases on the Kola Peninsula. In addition, at least 70 nuclear submarines have already been
decommissioned, although spent nuclear fuel has been removed from only about 21 . The
number of submarines taken out of service is growing steadily.

The operation of these facilities are characterized by unsatisfactory safety standards.
Radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel pile up, and the decommissioned submarines are
more often corroding at various naval bases than disposed of in a safe way.

II NORWEGIAN PLAN OF ACTION ON NUCLEAR AFFAIRS

The Norwegian Government has considered various ways and means of strengthening co-
operation with the Russian Federation in order to improve nuclear safety and prevent
radioactive pollution. The Government presented a report in 1994 to the national assembly,
the Storting, on nuclear activities and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our Northern
borders. A Plan of Action to follow up the Report to the Storting was presented in March

1995. Approximately USD 20 mill, has been earmarked for projects in 1995, and a similar
amount will be available to continue this important work in 1 996. A number of projects have
been identified in four priority areas:

* Safety measures at nuclear facilities.

* Management and storage of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.

* Dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents- and Kara Seas, and inputs into the sea via
rivers in the Russian Federation.

* Arms-related environmental hazards.

Norway and Russia have recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding concerning
cooperation on nuclear affairs. The Parties agreed i.a. to establish a procedure for
consultations at state secretary level in the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to facilitate
co-operation on projects and similar activities in the priority areas specified above, including
efforts to expand the political, technological and financial basis for such co-operation.

In addition, selected nuclear issues, i.a. the Norwegian-Russian expeditions to the Kara Sea,
are on the agenda of the Joint Environmental Commission and its Expert Group on the
investigation of radioactive contamination of the Northern areas.

Through the Report to the Storting, the Plan of Action and the MOU the Norwegian
Government wishes to demonstrate its strong commitment to actively participate in a
partnership with the Russian Federation, other countries, the EU and international
organizations, in addressing one of the most serious threats to security, human health, and the
environment.

Norway encourages other countries to formulate domestic policies and programmes for
assistance to promote nuclear safety and the safe management, storage £ind disposal of spent
nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, in particular in the Russian Federation.
These policies and programmes must be matched by an appropriate organizational structure as
well as by sufficient funds for project implementation.

Ill RADIOACTIVE WASTE DUMPED IN THE BARENTS- AND KARA SEAS

The Norwegian-Russian expedition to the Kara Sea in 1992 was the first expedition to this
area to investigate the dumping of nuclear material with participation of western scientists.
The expeditions to the Tsivolki, Stepovogo and Abrosimov Fjords at Novaja Zemlja (1993,
1994) were the first international expeditions to the dumping sites. In addition to Norwegian
and Russian scientists, observers from the IAEA and EU (fi-om 1993) participated in the
expeditions. According to the Russian Whitebook (1993) several reactors with and without
spent fuel, vessels, barges, and numerous containers have been dumped in these fjords.

The main conclusion from these expeditions is that enhanced levels of artificially produced
radionuclides in sediments collected in the very close vicinity of almost all localized dumped
objects demonstrate that some leakages occur. The highest contamination of 137Cs, 60Co,
90Sr, or 239,240Pu is observed in sediments collected close to dumped containers in the
Abrosimov and Stepovogo Fjords.

The levels of radionuclides in the waters, sediments and biota in the Open Kara Sea, however,
cannot be attributed to the dumped objects, but rather to fallout from the atmospheric nuclear
weapon tests, marine transport of effluents from European reprocessing plants, especially the
Sellafield plant in the UK, marine transport of fallout from the Chernobyl accident, and
transport by the rivers Ob and Yenisey.

The level of radionuclides in waters, sediments, and biota in the Kara Sea is very low
compared to other marine systems, e.g. the Irish Sea, the Baltic Sea and the North Sea. The
radiation doses from the present level of contamination are negligible.

Radioactive contamination in the Arctic is not an acute crisis, but rather a long-term problem
if corrective action is not taken in time.

International structures already exist for data collection, risk analyses, environmental
assessments, and monitoring:

* The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) with the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Programme (AMAP)

and

• The International Arctic Seas Assessment Programme (lASAP) in the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Ver>' few mechanisms exist, however, to prevent future releases.

( Cf Report on the results from the Russian-Norwegian 1993 expedition to the Kara Sea, and
the Extended summary of the results from three years of investigations (1992-94) in the Kara
Sea).

IV THE LONDON CONVENTION

Tlie London Convention of 1972 is a global convention on the prevention of marine pollution
by dumping of wastes and other matter, including radioactive waste. The dumping of high
level radioactive waste has been prohibited in accordance with the London Convention since
1974. In 1983 the parties to the convention adopted a voluntary moratorium on all types of
radioactive waste. This was prolonged in 1985. The Inter-govemmental Panel of Experts on
Radioactive Waste Disposal at Sea, IPGRAD, presented its final report in 1993, followed by
the adoption at the 16th consultative meeting of the London Convention of a total ban on
dumping of radioactive waste. All parties, except the Russian Federation, have acceded to this

Norway, the USA and Russia co-operate to upgrade and expand the capacity of the nuclear-
powered icebreaker fleet's effluent treatment facility for low-level radioactive waste in
Murmansk. The design phase of the project is nearly completed and hopefully the
consuuction of the facility can begin shortly. This project figures prominently on the agenda
of the Gore/Chernomyrdin Commission.

Norway is of the opinion that the Moscow Summit on nuclear issues should result in a
Russian pledge to accede to the ban on dumping of radioactive waste at sea adopted in 1 993
by the London Convention of 1972. The Norwegian- American-Russian project to expand the
capacity of the effluent treatment facility in Murmansk should facilitate such a policy change.

V MANAGEMENT, STORAGE AND DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL AND
RADIOACTIVE WASTE.

According to a recently published United States General Accounting Office (GAG) report on
nuclear safety, there are 221 nuclear facilities operating in the Former Soviet Union. 99 of
them are located in the Russian Federation. The list in the GAO report does not include the
nuclear-powered submarines, ice-breakers, and support ships in the Russian military and
civilian fleets.

All nuclear facilities generate radioactive waste and spent nuclear fiiel, the accumulation of
which is a major problem. Few, if any, countries with nuclear facilities have arrived at
satisfactory, long-term solutions to this problem.

Existing storage facilities in the Russian Federation are virtually filled to capacity and in very
poor condition. Some of these facilities are located quite close to the Norwegian-Russian
border and within a few hundred meters from Qords ending in the Barents Sea with some of
the richest fishing grounds in the world. The more information we get, the more dramatic the
situation seems to be.

Safe management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste from civil
and military facilities are matters of urgency if we are to prevent accidental releases, leakages
to the marine environment and fiirther dumping. Assistance in this field will address a serious
environmental threat which is also an important security risk.

The question for the international community is: Can we afford to leave the situation as it is
and wait until the Russian Federation has the economic strength to deal with the problems
herself?

VI INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

International co-operation on safety problems in nuclear power plants is well established e.g.
under the auspices of the EBRD, as a result of the decision of the G-7 Summit in Munich in
1992 to establish the Nuclear Safety Account (NSA). Valuable work is also done by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
to improve safety at nuclear power plants.

Norway is prepared to continue, intensify and expand the emerging contacts between
Norwegian, Russian and American defence communities with a view to preventing
radioactive contamination from defence-related activities and installations. This is an attempt
to pave the way for closer co-operation in order to address key problems relevant to the

protection of the Arctic environment. These problems include i.a. the accumulation of
radioactive waste, spent fiiel and decommissioned submarines at naval bases.

Significant work in confidence-building, as well as in research, has also been done in the
NATO/NACC/CCMS Pilot study on cross-border environmental problems emanating from
defence-related installations and activities. The study is a result of a Norwegian initiative in
1992 to exploit the new possibilities opened up by the end of the cold war and the creation of
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The participation of more than 20 countries
and the final reports on radioactive and chemical pollution bear witness to the success of the
first phase of the study. Phase two has recently been launched with broad participation and
with the following sub-topics:

* Hazardous constituents in defence-related activities, with the USA as the lead country.

* Transport of contaminants through rivers, deltas, and estuaries, with France as the lead
country.

* Safe disposal of radioactive and mixed waste, with Norway as the lead country.

* Environmental risk assessments for specific defence-related problems, also with
Norway as the lead country.

We have great expectations that phase two of this NATO/NACC/CCMS Pilot study will help
us develop a common understanding of the challenges identified in phase one. It is important
to identify the know-how and technologies needed as well as organizational aspects of
managing defence-related environmental problems.

TTie Russian Federation, Norway, USA, France and the European Commission have
established an Advisory Committee to co-ordinate their efforts to assist Russia to deal with
the vessel "Lepse". which is used for storing spent nuclear fuel in the Murmansk harbour. We
believe that the choice of technological solution to this problem, as well as the organizational
model, may be relevant for other, similar projects, too.

A Norwegian-Russian project to formulate a programme for the complete disposal of Russian
nuclear-powered submarines decommissioned from the Northern Fleet, may form the basis
for future international co-operation concerning one of the most serious environmental threats
in Northwest Russia. A Norwegian company, financed under our Plan of Action on nuclear
affairs, is taking part in developing this programme. This and other projects indicate an
increasing openness on the Russian side about nuclear problems, and an increasing
commitment to address them.

As for other countries' and international organizations' co-operation with the Russian
Federation concerning radioactive waste management programmes, I would like to draw your
attention to the proceedings from the IAEA seminar in May 1 995 on International co-
operation on nuclear waste management in the Russian Federation.

VII THE WAY AHEAD.

The present economic situation in the Russian Federation makes it difficult for the authorities
to fulfill their responsibilities in dealing adequately with nuclear safety and nuclear waste
problems. Expanded and strengthened international co-operation is imperative if we are to
find satisfactory solutions to these problems and thereby help prevent future Arctic
radioactive contamination. Moreover, international co-operation is important to avoid
unnecessary and costly duplication of work. The situation requires creative and flexible
approaches by the international community. So far, management of radioactive waste has not
attracted as much attention from the international community as the issue of nuclear safety at
civilian nuclear power plants.

In order to facilitate international co-operation, we need an appropriate forum and adequate
funds for addressing and solving the most pressing problems concerning the management,
storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste (as a parallel to the Nuclear
Safety Account).

An appropriate forum is emerging. A Contact Expert Group (CEG) for facilitating
international co-operation on radioactive waste management projects in the Russian
Federation, including technical, legal, organizational and financial aspects, is scheduled to
have its first meeting early in 1996. The establishment of the CEG is the most important
follow-up measure to the seminar on international co-operation on nuclear waste management
in the Russian Federation, which was arranged in May 1995 by the IAEA, at the request of the
Nordic Council of Ministers.

The seminar proceedings provide the first comprehensive picture of the waste management
infrastructure of the Russian Federation to countries and organizations that may wish to begin
or to extend co-operative programmes in this area.

The Russian delegation at the seminar demonstrated the resolve of the Government, the
relevant Russian authorities and organizations, and the regions to deal speedily and effectively
with the problem of radioactive waste management, in full collaboration with the international
community.

Norway sees the establishment of the CEG as an interesting forum for future international co-
operation on nuclear waste management projects, and would encourage the USA and other
countries to participate actively in the CEG.

Norway welcomes the decision to arrange a G-7/P-8 summit meeting on nuclear issues in
Moscow in April 1996. We have great expectations that the Summit, in addition to
considering the safety of nuclear reactors and security of nuclear materials, also will address
in a substantive way the problems of management, storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel
and radioactive waste. The summit should initiate studies as well as give impetus to
international co-operation on concrete projects. The summit should initiate discussions on
how national efforts may be supplemented by multilateral financial assistance, for instance as
a parallel to the Nuclear Safety Account operated by the EBRD. Norway has prepared a paper

with our comments to the summit draft agenda. We hope our input will influence the
outcome of the Summit next year.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Bryn, and thank vou both for the
excellent testimony. I am sure we will have a numoer of questions,
so I will start off and iust ask a few myself so that we can give
everyone a chance to ask you questions and come back for a second
round.

Dr. Yablokov, you referred to the London Convention. As my col-
league and friend, Mr. Spratt, mentioned, this administration did,
in fact, change the previous position of this country in regard to the
London Convention. As a matter of fact, a number of us involved
in the GLOBE organization here signed a letter to the President
urging him to reverse that policy, to support the convention and
make it the official policy of this country to stop the dumping. That
is when I introduced legislation, which passed the House in the
last session, to codify that. Hopefully, this session, we will get the
Senate to follow suit to put it into law.

My question has to do with some recent reports that I picked up
in a statement by Victor Kotsenko which appeared in the Moscow
press on November 1 in regard to his prediction that Russia per-
haps would make an announcement as early as December that it
may resume the practice of dumping its liquid nuclear waste in the
oceans. Would you comment on that and whether or not you think
that is valid?

Dr. Yablokov. I only have to say that literally 10 days ago, we
had the new Russian parliament pass a special new law regarding
water code [?], a special article of this water code. Any nuclear
dumping is strictly prohibited. But the situation is complicated, be-
cause aifter this law, our parliament passed the next law about the
use of nuclear energy, and under the next law, using nuclear en-
ergy, they have passed some loophole and mentioned that, yes, nu-
clear dumping is principally prohibited, but in some cases it is pos-
sible under some condition and so on and so on and so on.

So now we have a contradiction between the laws. In the juridi-
cal sense, the water code is a much higher law than the ordinary
law about nuclear energy, but let us see what happens. I do not
know.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you. Dr. Yablokov. In your testimony, your
oral and your written, you mention that you thought that 2 years
ago we were very close to an agreement on solving some of the en-
vironmental problems but that there were delays. I think you spe-
cifically cited the State Department.

They are going to be testifying in the next panel, and perhaps
they would disagree, but I would ask you to elaborate on your com-
ments and what the Russian perspective is in terms of why the bu-
reaucracy eventually caused that agreement to fall apart and tell
us in your own observations what happened and where we are now
in terms of perhaps restarting that process.

Dr. Yablokov. I can say that 3 years ago, 2V'2 years ago, I per-
sonally participated in the preparing of this law. I know that this
law passed, maybe you have other procedure, but in Russia we
have such procedure. Any international agreement has to pass
through all Federal agencies and each Federal agency has to sign
it, not quite to sign it, with some addition and so on.

We had been lucky that the Minister of Defense and all other
powerful ministers signed this agreement, this draft agreement 2

years ago, and we hoped that this agreement will be signed by our
President 2 years ago.

I had a discussion with the State Department here and I know
that the State Department, it was the body here who strongly was
against this law for some, I can repeat, ridiculous reason, some
small, smallest, smallest disagreement, not principle but smallest
formal disagreement with some formality, with some technical for-
mality.

But now I feel that we have no possibility to pass such draft of
law through our military, through our KGB, because during the
last 2 years, the secrecy, the governmental secrecy has been arising
enormously. Literally 3 days ago, my President signed, or 1 week
ago, my President signed a special decree about state secrets.
Under this decree — I have this decree with me — practically any
Arctic investigation, any Arctic activity has the possibility to an-
nounce like classified activity.

So we have a real — it will meet with some active development of
our military. We are past the point.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you. I have one final question before I turn
to our ranking member for questions. Dr. Yablokov, it is no secret
the Russian Navy is decommissioning a number of nuclear-powered
submarines and decommissioning a lot of nuclear material. What
happens if there are no additional dollars nor additional commit-
ment to deal with the problem? What do you predict is going to be
the result of this massive downsizing? As you have testified, there
is a huge storage problem now that is not protected storage of nu-
clear waste and nuclear fuel. What is going to happen if the world
does not respond to the problem that Russia has?

Dr. Yablokov. I mentioned, not now but in the press conference,
I mentioned that during last year, my Government passed a special
declassified resolution about organizing the commission of nuclear
submarine and failed. But September 1, it was a special open dec-
laration, open resolution of my Government, which looked like a
good step for solving this problem. They created a special society,
half government, half commercial society. They put some money to
cut down this nuclear submarine.

It is an enormous problem, much, much larger than my friend
from Norway just mentioned. We have 142 decommissioned nuclear
submarines — 142 — not only in the Arctic but all over my country,
and nobody knows what we have to do with such a huge amount
of metal, a huge amount of so on and so on and so on.

It looks like this decision of my Government opens the door,
opens the door. It is possible to involve some commercial capital
money to solving this problem. Let us see what happens.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you. Dr. Yablokov.

I now turn it over to the distinguished gentleman from South
Carolina.

Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you both for your testimony. Unfortunately, I had to step out and
I missed some of it, so if I repeat your question, I beg your pardon.

Basically, I want to ask a few fundamental questions. First of all,
I am curious to know the sources of your information, the places
where you obtained the information that you lay out in your testi-
mony. Is this in the open domain? Is this information available to

you as a citizen or did you obtain it through the Academy of
Sciences or as a member of the Duma?

Dr. Yablokov. My official position is chairman of Interagency
Commission for Environmental Security in the National Security
Council. My commission has 18 members. The first deputy minister
of defense is a member of my commission. The first deputy KGB
is a member of my commission. The first deputy minister of envi-
ronment, chairman of land committee, chairman of water commit-
tee, chairman of hydro, metallurgical committee, and so on, such
a top level of governmental body.

The main source of my information, it is official information
which was previously classified. We tried action under law about
state secrets. We have a law about state secrets, 2 years old. We
have a special article, article 7, in the law about state secrets.
Under this article 7, the law about state secrets, environmental in-
formation and information which could deal with public health has
to be open, has to be open.

I used this law to open this information. My commission has a
meeting every month, this official meeting, and we have received
all information, classified information and open information. And
after a meeting of my commission, I, going under this law, opened
this information to the public. This is the main source of my infor-
mation.

Mr. Spratt. Are you satisfied that you have a good, comprehen-
sive estimation of the waste, where it is and how much and what
quantities?

Dr. Yablokov. No, of course not, because it is a difficult ques-
tion, especially, for example — we discussed in my commission,
three times in this year we discussed the problem of radioactive
waste in different, radioactive waste which is generated from under
destroying of nuclear arms, radioactive waste which we have in
Myak, radioactive waste which, and so on. And after this discus-
sion, the minister of nuclear energy several times gave us the full
information when they collect especially for us.

The ridiculous situation is that nobody has information in Rus-
sia. Nobody has full information in Russia, part information col-
lected by the Norwegian environmental organization, part informa-
tion collected by Greenpeace, part information collected by my com-
mission in their official way. When we put all this information to-
gether, we hope that we receive something near to real.

Mr. Spratt. Has anyone attempted to develop a cost estimate, an
estimate of what it would cost to clean up, remediate, correct these
problems in Russia alone, or the former Soviet Union States?

Dr. Yablokov. We hope that we now understand the scale of the
problem, not the detail but the scale of the problem. The scale of
problem we know is a billion curies. We discussed 6 billion curies
of radioactive waste we have in Russia or a billion curies we have
in Russia. This is maybe 9 billion curies.

Mr. Weldon. Would you yield for a question?

Mr. Spratt. Certainly.

Mr. Weldon. I am not a scientist, but just to put that into per-
spective, you say 6 billion curies. My lay understanding is that
Three Mile Island at its worst gave off 15 curies of radioactivity,

and I see some heads shaking, so 15 curies and you are saying 6
billion curies is what the problem is in Russia?

Dr. Yablokov. Yes. A more visible unit for radioactive fallout is
Chernobyl. All Chernobyl fallout, it was 50 million curies — 50 mil-
lion curies. It was all Chernobyl catastrophe, and 50 million, it is
enough to cover all the globe, practically all the globe. You can
reach Chernobyl fallout even in this room just now. So 50 million.
We have at least 6 billion curies.

Mr. Spratt. Is there any effort or program now in Russia to cor-
rect this problem, to clean it up?

Dr. Yablokov. Yes. I just mentioned, we have a huge program
which passed through the Government October 23 and signed by
my Premier Chernomyrdin, a Federal program about how to deal
with radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel between 1996 and
2005. But I mentioned the money which is allocated for this pro-
gram, only about $1 billion, no more, but the problem costs, really
costs hundreds of billion dollars. It is a visible step but it is abso-
lutely not enough. It is only a first step, maybe the intention to
solve the problem, not solving.

Mr. Spratt. Mr. Bryn, could I ask you also your sources of infor-
mation, where you developed the data that you presented?

Mr. Bryn. We had the same problem as Dr. Yablokov explains.
We really talk about that we have three phases as far as dealing
with these problems are concerned. The first phase is the gathering
of information, the second is making the priorities, and the third
is the operative one.

By and large now, in some of the areas, we have a pretty good
view of the situation. As I mentioned, the expeditions we have had
to the dumping sites around Novaja Zemlja. We feel we know what
is there. We can then on the dumping side, at least, start to make
priorities.

Where we lack information is obviously how the situation is in
the northern fleet shipyards and also in the facilities inland. There,
new information is coming to hand. , We know the general picture
that it is very difficult as far as the storage is concerned. We know
that the number of submarines that is easily counted and so on.
So one knows quite a lot, and probably enough to start a sort of
international program which we feel is necessary.

But, as I said, I think it has to be an ongoing process to gather
information while at the same time we make some priorities and
start operational work. As I said, I am happy to say that at least
Norway and the United States are cooperating on some start, real-
ly very small projects, but they give great promise for the future,
not least in getting used to dealing with the Russian authorities,
both centrally and locally, which is tremendously important, be-
cause we cannot force cooperation on the Russians. We have to
stimulate the sort of cooperation, and I am particularly talking
about the military establishment. Thank you.

Mr. Spratt. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you.

Mr. Hastings.

Mr. Hastings. I just have one question of Mr. Bryn. You talk
about the summit next year in Moscow. What countries will be par-

ticipating in that, and what expectations that there will be a solu-
tion, I guess, to all of this, or a start of talking about a solution,
and is there an3rthing in setting up this summit in Moscow that
would have some sort of a binding agreement among those that are
participating? First, how many countries are participating?

Mr. Bryn. Thank you. Of course, this is a meeting for the G-7
group of countries, the seven leading industrialized countries, the
United States, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada,
and Japan, then meeting together with Russia.

What can come out of it remains to be seen. The agenda covers
three substantive items. The first item has to do with reactor S2ife-
ty. I think there we have international processes which have start-
ed and which really are working. The nuclear safety account under
the EBRD is effective. A lot of work has been done to upgrade the
security of power plants in the Soviet Union and other Eastern Eu-
ropean countries.

The third — I skipped the second agenda point for the time being,
but the third agenda item point has to do with smuggling, illicit
trafficking of nuclear material, and I think there, what we would
like to see coming out of the Moscow summit would be a plan of
action, how to deal with it. That, again, I feel is very much an orga-
nizational problem. It has very much to do to establish procedures
to account for nuclear materials and so on. I think it is solvable.

But where we have not seen the sort of international processes
being set up is on the second agenda item, which has to do with
the waste issue. That has very much to do, I think, with the lack
of information which has been the situation up to now and which
we have talked about. We feel now that there is much greater un-
derstanding in both Canada, the United States, and other countries
among the authorities for these problems.

I had a meeting yesterday in the State Department here. I was
in Ottawa on Monday. We have great hopes that what will come
out of the summit will be establishing some processes, because ob-
viously one needs to go further into these problems, like Dr.
Yablokov said, to get information to make the priorities, because
these are costly things.

And when we make these priorities, we also have to talk about
the financing. There are positive signs that the Russian authorities
are taking these matters seriously and also will be able to use
quite considerable funds for them. But if we want a quick solution,
a quick cleanup, we need to start to consider creating some much
larger mechanism in order to assist the Russians.

And I would underline again, we are not talking here about a
permanent situation for the next 50 or 100 years. This is a one-
time operation to clean up a very deplorable situation which has
come about through the political developments in the world during
the last 30 or 40 years. Thank you.

Mr. Hastings. So the waste issue that you are addressing is not
confined just to the oceans, is it, but it is also land-based waste
then, also?

Mr. Bryn. That is right.

Mr. Hastings. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.

And, in fact, the Bellona Foundation, which is here today, has a
report which they will share with you on land-based problems.
They were the target of an action by the security functions in Rus-
sia to confiscate their documentation, but they have photographs
and documentation which they will give you.

Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. Ortiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me commend you for
doing a great job. I know that you are very interested in the seri-
ous problems that we have worldwide.

Dr. Yablokov, I am happy to see you here again. I remember
about 18 months ago when Chairman Weldon and I led a delega-
tion to Russia. You gave us a very, very good briefing. I was just
wondering, what has happened during the last 18 months? Is the
problem getting worse, that we have more dumping sites than we
had 18 months ago? Is the problem more serious? Are the inter-
national countries that we are working with, are they helping out?
Can you give us more or less what has changed? Is it more positive
change, more negative change in the last 18 months?

Dr. Yablokov. The situation is extremely controversial in Mos-
cow. We had a dramatic presidential decree in July this year.
Under this decree, the Gosatomnadzor, the nuclear regulating body
in Russia, lost half of its power, at least half of its power, because
under the new presidential decree, he has no possibility to inspect
any military installation. This presidential decree had been signed,
obviously after huge pressure from the military, because the mili-
tary did not want to open its dirty places. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission was one independent body who showed us the hot
topic, what we have to concentrate our energy on.

So this is a bad situation, but we have also a good situation, be-
cause I mentioned the new law about nuclear energy. Under this
new law, which is now only newborn, two weeks, maybe, it was
published 25 November, under this new law, the Government has
to create a new Federal body specially devoted to the problem of
nuclear waste. Nobody knows what it will look like, this body, who
will belong, the minister of nuclear energy or some minister of en-
vironment, nobody knows, but it is under discussion.

Anyway, we have a decision that you have a new body which is
doing something, something sound with the nuclear waste problem.
It is good. So it is extremely controversial, also.

I am enthusiastic about the G-7 meeting in Moscow. We have no
choice. We have to do something to prepare for this meeting. I
know Russian custom. Now we have no good proposals, but 2
weeks before, we have very sound, good proposals, maybe some
breakthrough. I hope for some breakthrough in this problem at the
end of March.

Mr. Ortiz. I would just like to have one more question for Mr.
Bryn. Welcome again to this committee. Are we beginning to see
an impact on marine life and human beings, people getting sick?
Is this something that is visible now or is it something that is
going to take years before it shows?

Dr. Yablokov. We are lucky. Until now, we have no real evi-
dence about the harmful effect of nuclear dumping. I agree with my
Norwegian colleague that all data through us, it is only local, only
local influence. Yes, it is a huge amount of radioactivity created on

the new land in the Kara Sea, but the influence of this dumping,
maybe several hundred meters about each place, and the Kara Sea,
it has no fishing, practically has no fishing. In the Bering Sea, we
have not any evidence that some level of radioactivity is rising in
fish or in other organisms, no.

Mr. Bryn. Yes, and that is exactly our impression, as well. Our
concern is that we want to preserve this very positive situation we
have in the Bering Sea because of the fish resources, of course. For
us, it is really to apply a precautionary principle which says that
if there is a danger for irreparable damage, then one should act,
even if one does not necessarily have full scientific knowledge at
the time, because the odds here are very high, indeed.

It is those dangers which so far have not really developed in the
worst way, as we talked about the nuclear submarine situation, the
storage facility with the northern fleet, the runoff from the river
systems, and so on. That could be catastrophes in the next ten, 20,
30 years, and so on. So that is the sort of preemptive action we are
talking about and that is the important thing.

We must do those things now. You cannot wait, because if the
damage has been done, it is too late, actually. But it is important
to have in mind all the time that, as Dr. Yablokov said, as well,
that dumping so far has not led to any catastrophe. We have come
to the conclusion, as I said, that for us, the priority is not now to
deal with those objects which have been dumped. Thank you.

Mr. Ortiz. We thank both of you for your dedication and commit-
ment to making this world a safer place. We appreciate your testi-
mony today.

Mr. Weldon. I thank our colleague.

Mr. Underwood from Guam.

Mr. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, would
like to commend you for this very important meeting. I know it is
important on an international scale. It is very important to those
of us who live in the middle of the ocean.

Dr. Yablokov, you have outlined a very sobering picture about
the problems that are attendant to cleanup and storage and man-
agement of nuclear waste, and in the course of your presentation
you indicated, without giving any specific sums of money, you said,
well, maybe $100 billion would start to work us toward a solution
of this.

I would like to just ask two questions off" of that. One, what is
Russia doing currently in terms of the expenditure of resources or
the dedication of resources to this problem, and second, let us as-
sume for the sake of argument that you had access to $100 billion.
What would you do? How would you tackle the problem? What
would you do in maybe two or three easy steps that someone like
me can understand?

Dr. Yablokov. That is a difficult question. I have no good an-
swer. I have to say that our military now tried to drain more power
in my society, drain more budget money, and it will happen. Using
this tendency, my commission, during the last meeting of my com-
mission in the national security council last month, in November,
raised the question about creation inside the military, inside the
military forces, special environmental forces. If my military has
more money, why cannot we use this money for the proper way, not

for military, for armament, but for battle with sicknesses of past
military activity.

We have such a solution. We have such a resolution, an official
resolution, and I hope that we maybe in the next half-a-year will
try to create inside the military troops, specially environmental
troops, which are fully concerned, which are doing something with
radioactive pollution, with chemical pollution, with oil pollution.
You have an enormous problem with oil pollution in the military,
also.

So it is one of part of the solution to this problem, because, of
course, we have no money, enough money to overcome this prob-
lem, obviously.

The next maybe not theoretically but maybe more wide question,
in our energy policy, what is the nuclear cycle you have to conduct
in Russia is a hot topic for discussion in our military and our nu-
clear industry. You have not here reprocessing in the United
States. All spent nuclear fuel, you keep under special places. In my
country, we have reprocessing. We have one place for reprocessing
nuclear fuel in the South Ural, in Myak, is the name of this fac-
tory, Myak.

And we have a special presidential decree to create a new huge
reprocessing plant in the Krasnyosk, but they have no money. They
dream that they collect money from Switzerland, from Taiwan,
from Japan, not from Norway but from Germany and so on and so
on, and when they collect this money, they construct this reprocess-
ing plant. But with the end of this reprocessing plant, plutonium,
you see, plutonium. What can we do with plutonium? We need to
create a new generation of nuclear power plant which works on
plutonium fuel. We environmentalists are strongly against this
plant.

But, you see, your question has no answer, has no good answer,
because under discussion is the strategy, the strategy of reprocess-
ing. If you continue to reprocess or are rising the scale of reprocess-
ing fuel, there is an enormous problem with plutonium. Maybe dur-
ing the G-7 meeting we have to discuss this problem, also.

Mr. Underwood. It seems like, based on your answer, you are
going to engage in the kind of debate that we have engaged in here
in this country about whether strictly defense appropriations and
what you do with them and what are environmental issues, and I
think there is a strong basis for arguing that they are so intimately
related, particularly in an instance like this.

Dr. Yablokov. Yes.

Mr. Underwood. Mr. Bryn, this is perhaps a question a little far
afield from you, but I caught in your testimony that you stated that
the problem is not so much what has already been dumped but the
management of future radioactive waste. Of interest to me are
plans in the Pacific, such as those, plans that I do not agree with,
but plans, for example, by the republic of the Marshall Islands to
invite radioactive waste to be stored in those islands since they as-
sume that those islands are already so polluted. What is your im-
pression or opinion about those kinds of plans?

Mr. Bryn. I do not know those plans in detail, so it is very dif-
ficult to comment on them. But, of course, the main principle we
tried to stick to as much as possible is that each country has a re-

sponsibility for its own waste and its own debris, so that is at least
a useful point of departure. Thank you.

Mr. Underwood. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Underwood.

Mr. Kennedy from Rhode Island.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

When facing the problem, it seems to me first you do an inven-
tory of the problem and you do a risk assessment. To me, I just
want to clarify some of the questions that have been raised so far
as to what you have participated in and what we have done as a
country.

As I understand it, the International Atomic Energy Agency has
already begun an assessment of the radioactive contamination due
to dumped radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas, is that
not the case? So there is already cooperation between your govern-
ments and ours in determining just to what extent there is this
dumping that has already taken place.

Am I to conclude from this that we have some pretty hard data
from your slides that you showed of where there are problems and
how much waste there actually is? We have scientific data on that,
am I right?

Dr. Yablokov. Yes.

Mr. Kennedy. So it seems to me what we need to continue to do
is determine to what extent in the future that is going to become
a problem, and it requires the best scientific kind of evaluation of
where these radionuclides are and other toxic waste sites are and
what is the possibility of them spreading, so you sort of do a risk
assessment.

So what I am asking you is, is not this already taking place? I
mean, I see the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program has al-
ready been up and its report is due this spring. I understand it is
done in conjunction with your countries. It is an intercountry group
that is doing this. They will be able to issue a report that will say
pretty specifically where there are problems and what the hier-
archy of our interest should be in terms of which problems we need
to solve first, am I right?

I mean, are we going to get a pretty good map here? Not only
do we have a map of all the sites, but we also have a map of which
sites, in an order of priority, we would want to go after first as op-
posed to second or down the road. So that would answer my col-
league's question as to where would we spend the money first if we
had it. Is that pretty much the case?

So what I would like to hear from you, given the cooperation that
seems has already taken place between our two countries, is where
do we have an agreed-upon approach of the technical capabilities
that we share in this world for determining what the extent of a
given problem is and what the best technology is for mitigating
that problem, whether it is capping it or excavating it and dumping
it someplace else. To what extent do you think there can be com-
mon agreement on that issue, of what is the best way to go about
this?

I want to hear your acceptance of my premise, and that is we
have already got the map and we already have a list of priorities
as to which are the hot spots and which are not. Am I to under-

stand that we also can draw predictive models scientifically as to
what areas may cause the most problems in the future?

Mr. Bryn. Thank you. I partly agree with you, because we have
those data more and more, not fully fledged perhaps yet, but as far
as the present dumping is concerned, I think we are starting to get
the data we need. What is needed for that is constant monitoring
of the situation, that the situation is stable.

Where we do not have the data is the waste, including the de-
commissioned submarines which rest with the northern fleet, with
the military, and I am talking now particularly about the Kola Pe-
ninsula problems. There, we lack the data. TTiere, much is based
on work like what is being done by Bellona, other groups, what we
get out through official meetings, what Dr. Yablokov can tell us,
but we do not really have scientific confirmed data for these areas
and that is why we have felt that this is such a huge problem.

It involves so many structures and it is so much linked to high
politics, really, that it is an area for the G-7 leaders at the summit
in Moscow to start the sort of processes which will lead to the data.

Mr. Kennedy. Let me just interrupt there. Is it that there is not
data that is being disclosed? You are saying that is a problem, not
everyone has come up with where the problems are on an objective
basis, not scientific here, just on objective data of where the prob-
lem is? In your military and ours, there has not been a forthcoming
set of hard data as to where the problems are, is that the problem?

Mr. Bryn. That is absolutely correct.

Mr. Kennedy. All right.

Mr. Bryn. Let me add one thing. We have started a very inter-
esting cooperation through what I call the pilot study under the
North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the NACC. I think everybody
has seen the reports which have come out of the first phase and
are quite impressed with the ability to draw in experts both from
the United States Navy and from the Russian Navy, and the sec-
ond phase will take another couple of years to be on the table. I
think we will bring some very interesting information out.

But in order also to get the right people to participate in that
sort of work is absolutely necessary that the order come from the
very top, and that, again to return to my favorite them, that if the
G-7 Russia summit in April can start those processes, I think we
are on the right track.

Mr. Kennedy. It would seem to me, before anything else can
take place, we need to do an inventory. We cannot determine what
the problem is unless we have an inventory. So afterwards, I will
look forward to hearing the other panelists. Once you get the in-
ventory, then we can move on to determine to what extent these
are problems and what extent they are not, and then what tech-
nologies to use to mitigate these problems and what technologies
are not cost effective.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to continuing this with the other
witnesses.

Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman. His questions are excellent.
During our second panel and third panel, we will talk about some
of the things our agencies are doing to cooperate. I know there are
some initiatives underway right now, both classified and unclassi-

fied, to share the process, perhaps a new process of understanding
where problems are, and then we can, as you say, respond to them.

With that, the gentleman from Texas, my good friend, Mr. Geren.

Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say I appre-
ciate very much your working on this issue and bringing it to the
attention of the Congress and of the American people.

I do not have any questions at this time. I most certainly have
found this very disturbing, very eye-opening, and I look forward to
this committee's continued work in this area and I commend our
panel today for their work in this area.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Geren.

I have a couple of followup questions and then we will thank you
both for being here. I think we have allowed our members to ask
their questions.

Dr. Yablokov, there have been some reports of dumping of high-
level waste near Lake Karachi. Is that true? I understand that, in
fact, this could be more severe than any other of the existing sites
that we know about, and certainly it would even exceed the 1993
white paper, your report, the Yablokov Report. Since Lake Karachi
drains into other rivers leading to the Arctic Ocean, could you
elaborate on what you know about the dumping in Lake Karachi?

Dr. Yablokov. I am sorry, I cannot follow. Would you repeat,
please, what is your question?

Mr. Weldon. The reports of dumping high-level waste near Lake
Karachi and what extent that dumping has been. Are you aware
of it, and if so, to what extent has that dumping been?

Dr. Yablokov. If I understand you correctly, I think the more
dangerous situation is not with dumping but with radioactive pol-
lution going through the Siberian River to the Arctic is potentially
much more dangerous, because we can lift the dumped containers,
the dumped submarines. It is possible to conduct in the next sev-
eral years. But what we have to do with the huge, many, many
times, much more polluted river.

For example, the latest situation in Myak, you know Lake Kara-
chi is a more polluted, radioactively polluted place which contains
about 1 billion curies in one lake. They covered it sifter the tragedy
in 1961 when it was extremely dry season and some small [?]
catches radioactive dust and cover the secret city, Chelyabinsk- 70.
After this, they tried to do something with this lake, but to cover
it, it is concrete.

My government allocates 5 billion rubles for this in the last year,
to cover this, and now it is near to the end. of this process. But
what happened, enormous pollution underground. Now, the lake is
dead. There is a huge body, underground body of heavily polluted
waters going through the Tobol River each year for 65 or 87 me-
ters, in large this water underground leaves. If this process will be
continued, in 5 years, the Tobol River, one of the tributaries of the
Ob, will be highly polluted.

I asked my specialists, my advisors, my experts how we can stop
it. Technically, it is possible. We need only $6 or $8 billion to stop
the dispersion, the distribution, the ground distribution of this pol-
lution. Nobody has such money, nobody.

Mr. Weldon. Dr. Yablokov, one final question. There is a press
story running in the Western media this past week quoting
Nicholai Veransoff, saying that the upcoming December elections
for the Duma really have no candidates who are out front on envi-
ronmental issues. And, in fact, Mr. Veransoff makes the case that
there is one faction running, one party claiming to be an environ-
mental group and he says there is no one in that party who, in
fact, is concerned with the environment. Would you comment on
that?

Dr. Yablokov. It is strategy for our political systems. We have
one small official green party. This party belongs to some oil mag-
nates. In my point of view, it is specially created to intervene in
the Duma, not to solve the environmental problem but for other
reasons, maybe half criminal reasons.

Now, I know only three or four visible environmental activists
who have a good chance to be elected to the next Duma. One of
them is Madam Zlotnica from Olenburg [?], one of the leaders of
the green movement in the existing Duma. But let us see what
happens. Let us see what happens.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, and thank you both for your testimony.
It was outstanding. We appreciate you being here and for making
a long trip to our country.

With that, we will convene our next panel. Ambassador David
Colson from the Department of State, Assistant Secretary for
Oceans, International Environment; Sherri Goodman, Deputy
Under Secretary, Department of Defense, for Environmental Secu-
rity; and Dr. Alan Hecht, Principal Deputy Assistant Administrator
for the Environmental Protection Agency, to discuss what, in fact,
is happening within the U.S. Government and our agencies to as-
sist in the problems that we have just discussed internationally,
and I am sure to respond to Dr. Yablokov's comments.

Ambassador Colson, we appreciate you being here. We know you
have to catch a plane back to London for the London Convention
discussions, I assume, and we appreciate you coming out in spite
of the fact that you will be on an airplane in a few short hours.
We will allow you to go first, and if we have questions we will ask
them of you. Then you can feel free to take off. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR DAVID A. COLSON, ACTING AS-
SISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR OCEANS, INTER-
NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador Colson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do
have a prepared statement and ask that it be placed in the record.

I had the privilege to testify for the administration before the
House Oceanography Subcommittee on this subject in 1993 and I
think perhaps the best thing I could do is simply note some
changes that have happened in the last 2 years. I will hit four spe-
cific areas.

First, in respect to administration policy, in June 1994, after ex-
tensive interagency consideration, the President endorsed an Arctic
policy for this Nation based on six objectives: Protecting the Arctic
environment and conserving its biological resources; assuring that
natural resource management and economic development in the re-
gion are environmentally sustainable; strengthening institutions

for cooperation among the eight Arctic nations; fourth, involving
the indigenous peoples of the Arctic on decisions that affect them;
fifth, enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local, re-
gional, and global environmental issues; and finally, meeting post-
cold- war national security and defense needs.

Mr. Chairman, it is within this framework that U.S. agencies
now work on Arctic issues. This Arctic policy review, which was the
first in over a decade, reflects the needs and realities of the post-
cold-war era. Vigilance in the Arctic in defense of our national se-
curity will be no less, but we recognize that other objectives must
be pursued, as well.

When there was last a hearing on this subject in September
1993, we had all just become aware of the Yablokov Report, which
detailed Soviet dumping illegally of high- and low-level radioactive
waste in the Arctic. We were intent at that time on achieving glob-
al international agreement on a prohibition on dumping in the
ocean of high- and low-level nuclear waste. Fortunately, we
achieved that in the fall of 1993 in the London Convention, which
is the appropriate international forum. Unfortunately, Russia, as
the only country, stood upon its treaty rights and opted out of this
decision in respect of low-level liquid radioactive waste.

There are several ways one can look at this turn of events. It is,
perhaps, honest recognition that Russia does not and has not the
facilities to process and store such waste on land at the present
time. On the other hand, it appears to reflect an unwillingness to
give high priority to waste management within the Russian mili-
tary system. After all, at least with respect to low-level waste stor-
age and processing, the cost is relatively modest, certainly so when
compared to the cost of a nuclear submarine or to the operation of
a nuclear submarine.

To try to assist the Russian Gk)vemment and assure against Rus-
sian dumping, we have acted on two fronts. First, at the September
1994 summit here in Washington, we secured a joint statement be-
tween Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin to solidify political commit-
ment by Russia at its highest level not to dump radioactive waste
in the ocean.

Second, together with Norway and Russia, we are working on the
Murmansk project, which will provide the necessary facilities in
the northern region. Dr. Hecht, I am sure, will go into this project
in more detail. Likewise, we encouraged Japan in similar efforts in
the Vladivostok region.

The third area where there has been progress is in international
cooperation on Arctic matters. Bilaterally, in December 1994, with-
in the Gore-Chernomyrdin context, we reached agreement on an
Arctic contamination agreement that is particularly noteworthy in
its provisions providing for access to important research sites. This
agreement is not limited to radioactive waste investigation, as we
assume that other contaminants may be of even greater concern,
particularly in the near term.

Here I have to pause and speak to the point raised by Dr.
Yablokov and the reflection that the State Department somehow
did something with respect to an agreement that Russia proposed.
I think it is fair to say that we did receive — we, the United States
Government — received a proposal within the Gore-Chernomyrdin

context from Russia. The end result of the negotiation of that pro-
posal was this agreement which was reached and signed by Vice
President Gore in December 1994.

We certainly did not accept the first Russian draft. It was a draft
that contained no particular commitment on Russia's part to do
anything in particular and it has us essentially funding everything.
I think that if we had accepted this, we would have been criticized.

We wanted an agreement that gave us access to important areas
that we thought that our scientists needed access to and we wanted
recognition that cooperation was a two-way street and we also
wanted recognition that other contaminants, and others, I think, on
these panels following us will go into the fact that other contami-
nants may be of, at least in the near term, even higher importance
than the radioactive waste. We feel that we got that in the agree-
ment that was finally reached.

Multilaterally, we continued to stress the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Program as one of the key components of the Arctic en-
vironmental protection strategy. There is, as well, the Barents
Council, a Norwegian initiative, and ongoing discussions of an Arc-
tic Council that has been proposed by Canada.

Mr. Chairman, all of these are relatively new international ini-
tiatives and I must confess some concern about our ability to lead
as we confront the funding and personnel constraints in front of us.
Moreover, I must also note that the Arctic has become a bit of a
fad. We need to guard against a proliferation of meetings, of insti-
tutionalization of new bureaucracies associated with Arctic coopera-
tion and new initiatives which simply sap our strength and our re-
sources and keep us from really accomplishing much.

Dr. Yablokov mentioned that he thought that the London Con-
vention might be reconfigured to also deal with land-based sources
of pollution. That, of course, goes outside of the mandate of the
present convention and it is an area in which the administration,
again, exercised leadership on in hosting a conference here in
Washington just at the end of October on land-based marine pollu-
tion, including radioactive waste from land-based sources and de-
veloped a program of action in that connection, and we feel that
that is the better vehicle through which to pursue international co-
operation on land-based activities that pollute the marine environ-
ment

Finally, Mr. Chairman, on the research front, a great deal has
been accomplished since 1993. Only since 1991 have our scientists
begun to share data and to conduct collaborative research in the
north of Russia, where the land and the river and the sea and the
ocean pollution have international implications. Only in the last 2
years have joint Norwegian and Russian cruises investigated dump
sites in the Barents and Kara Seas. Assessment of these and other
findings in the International Arctic Seas Assessment Project of the
IAEA are now beginning to be published. Joint cruises have also
taken place off Russia's far east coast.

With funds supplied to the U.S. Defense Department, the Arctic
Nuclear Waste Assessment Program during fiscal years 1993
through 1995, we have for the first time studies from a variety of
areas, including in the Ob and Yenisey Rivers, which drain into the
Arctic.

The assessment of the information generated continues. A great
deal of work remains, however. Frankly, baseline information is
lacking in many areas. That is why Arctic monitoring programs are
so essential. Our domestic agencies work in a coordinated fashion
through the National Science Foundation-chaired interagency Arc-
tic Research Policy Committee and internationally within the
framework provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program.

But again, Mr. Chairman, I have to note that the IAEA is a U.N.
institution, and thus, it is within the target area as funding for
U.N. agencies is slashed. Also, the new IAEA programs, such as
the present Arctic work, must be done through voluntary contribu-
tions and there is likely to be less of that in the days ahead. Our
support for AMAP, the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program,
has largely been via a dedication of U.S. agency personnel and the
small grants program that my bureau in the State Department has
administered since fiscal year 1992. Unfortunately, that program
may not exist in fiscal year 1996.

The Arctic cannot be monitored for free. The administration and
the Congress need to work together to see how that might best be
done. We have made a start by developing a coordinated Arctic re-
search budget, as called for several years ago by P.L. 101-609 and
reaffirmed in the administration's policy review. However, funding
remains inconsistent, fragmented, and in some cases nonexistent.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, there is no lack of enthusiasm within
agencies or internationally in establishing programs to tackle these
issues, but we are all struggling with very real budget constraints
and prioritization must occur among the many needs that we all
have. The big question we face, frankly, is just where do these is-
sues of Arctic contamination really stand in that priority list.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity. I do have about a
half hour and I would be happy to wait.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Colson follows:!

TES^'IMONY OF

AMBASSADOR DAVID A. COLSON

ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ACTING)

FOR OCEANS AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

AND SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BEFORE A JOINT HEARING BY THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY

AND

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS

OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON RESOURCES

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

6 DECEMBER 1995

Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to appear before the joint Committees on
National Security and Resources to discuss the problems of
radioactive and other toxic contamination in the Arctic.

My presentation addresses these important issues from the
international perspective and seeks to place them within the
context of United States Arctic policy and the international
mechanisms, both regional and bilateral, within which we pursue
that policy.

In June 1994, President Clinton endorsed an Arctic Policy
reflecting our unique and critical needs and interests in the
region. This endorsement followed a broad interagency review of
U.S. interests in the Arctic, based on analyzing and responding
to post Cold-War challenges in the North in the areas of
security, resources, science and the environment.

Let me review the policy briefly. It is based on the
following goals:

Protecting the Arctic environment and conserving its
biological resources.

Assuring that natural resource management and economic
development in the region are environmentally sustainable.

strengthening institutions tor cooperation among the eight
Arctic nations.

Involving the Arctic's indigenous people in decisions that
affect them.

Enhancing scientific monitoring and research on local,
regional, and global environmental issues.

Meeting post-Cold War national security and defense needs.

A major focus in the implementation of our Arctic policy has
been to address the issues of radioactive and other contaminants
in the Arctic, Particular concern has been generated by reports
of potential radioactive contamination from the former Soviet
nuclear weapons and other military programs, including illegal
ocean dumping and other disposal of nuclear wastes and
components, as well as discharges through rivers. A primary
objective in the efforts to respond to these issues has been to
secure the involvement of Russia in efforts to deal with them.

Turning to the international institutional framework
relevant to the Arctic environment within which we implement
this policy, there are two major global instruments that are
specifically applicable to Arctic contaminants.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
sets forth obligations to prevent, reduce and control pollution
of the marine environment from all sources. Though the United
States and the other Arctic nations, with the exception of
Iceland, are not yet Parties to the Convention, its marine
environmental protection obligations are recognized as
reflecting international law, binding on all nations.

Also of particular relevance to the problems of
contamination in the Arctic are the Law of the Sea Convention's
provisions on prevention, reduction and control of pollution
from land-based sources, a topic to which I will return toward
the end of my remarks.

The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
the Dumping of wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention)
implements the obligations of the Law of the Sea Convention with
respect to ocean dumping. It includes a prohibition on the
deliberate disposal at sea of high-level radioactive wastes and,
in 1993, was amended to extend the prohibition to all
radio.active wastes, including low-level radioactive wastes.

- 3

There are two primary multilateral channels directly
applicable to addressing the contaminants in the Arctic.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the
international organization charged, inter alia, with promoting
the safe use of nuclear energy and preventing radioactive
contamination from any such uses, including in the Arctic.

At the regional level, efforts to address Arctic
contaminants have been centered within the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS) , a cooperative program among the
United States and the seven other Arctic nations (Canada,
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden and Russia) . A
primary objective of the Strategy is securing ongoing Russian
involvement, particularly in light of the extensive pollution
from past Soviet disposal of toxic waste and radioactive
material .

The London Convention:

The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
the Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London Convention)
is the primary international agreement controlling the
deliberate disposal of wastes at sea. The London Convention
prohibits the disposal at sea of high-level radioactive waste.
While the original provisions of the Convention permitted, under
special permit, the dumping of low level of radioactive waste,
the Parties adopted a voluntary moratorium on such disposal in
1985. However, concern arose both within the London Convention
forum and within the IAEA over reports of significant at sea
disposal of radioactive wastes by the Soviet Union and, later,
Russia. As a result, the government of Russia committed itself
to provide information and, in May 1993, released the Yablokov
Report (or the white Book).

The Yablokov Report detailed Soviet and later Russian
disposal practices in the Kara and Barents Seas and in the Sea
of Okhotsk, the Sea of Japan and North Pacific Ocean, from 1959
through 1992. These practices included past disposal of high
level wastes that violated the London Convention's ban and
ongoing disposal of low level wastes inconsistent with the
voluntary moratorium.

In November 1993, the Parties to the London Convention
adopted an amendment that extended the prohibition on disposal
to low level radioactive wastes. Under Convention procedures,
the amendment would enter into force for all Parties, except for
those that declared within 100 days of adoption (that is, by
February 24, 1994) that they were unable to accept it. Russia
abstained on the adoption of the amendment and later filed an

objection, thereby opting out of its provisions. At the same
time, Russia indicated its intent to seek means of establishing
the capability of adhering to the prohibition as rapidly as
possible. As will be noted, the U.S. has sought, in a variety
of ways, to work with Russia in fulfilling this commitment.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA):

In 1992 at the request of the London Convention, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) initiated an effort to
evaluate the state of radioactive contamination due to dumped
radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas; to assess the
risks to human health and the environment; and, if necessary, to
examine possible remedial actions. Exploratory cruises to the
dumping areas were conducted in 1992, 1993 and 1994. Since
1993, the U.S. has contributed a total of $270,000 from funds
designated to support international organizations, and also
provided the expert services of U.S. scientists to the Agency's
Marine Environmental Laboratory. It is widely recognized that
it was the U.S. contribution which made this program possible.
The results of the IAEA's efforts are to be reported to the
London Convention in 1996, and the collection and management of
scientific data is being coordinated with the regionally-based
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy.

While it appears from the IAEA's evaluation that there are
no significant regional or global effects at present from the
dumped waste, the gradual deterioration of the barrier materials
used to contain the contaminants could lead to future impacts.
These could occur through contamination of the marine food
chain, possibly resulting in the radiation exposure of humans
through the consumption of fish and other marine foodstuffs.
Since the wastes are lying in shallow waters, the possibility of
radiation exposure by other routes -- such as the movement and
transport of the waste packages by natural events (ice or storm
action), or deliberate human action — cannot be ruled out.
The half-lives of the radioactive materials involved are very
long (tens of thousands of years) and, therefore, the possible
impact of climatic change has also to be taken into account. In
order to provide answers to these questions, it is necessary to
have a thorough understanding of the present and future
physical, chemical, and biological characteristics of the
environment surrounding the wastes and of the wastes themselves.

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) :

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was
established in 1991. Its origins extend back to 1989, when the
eight Arctic nations agreed to a process of creating an

informal, cooperative association for the purpose of studying
the current state of Arctic contamination from all sources. The
Strategy identifies six pollution threats requiring urgent
attention, including radioactive substances, persistent organic
pollutants, oil, heavy metals, noise, and acidification and
there are four AEPS working groups addressing issues of
contamination.

One of the principal working groups under the AEPS is the
Arctic Monitoring and Assesment Program (AMAP) . AMAP's first
report is due in late 1996 or 97. It will be a comprehensive
survey of the state of pollution in the Arctic, and will include
coverage of persistent organic pollutants, heavy metals and
radionuclides. NOAA is the agency responsible for coordination
of U.S. data input. The U.S. has also supplied funding for
general data compilation related to AMAP.

Another important working group under AEPS is that on
Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME) . PAME's
final report, including U.S. data coordinated by NOAA, is due in
March, 1996. The report is a survey of Arctic sources of Arctic
marine contamination and existing legal mechanisms to address
such contaminants. It is noteworthy that in both of these
international scientific working groups, Russian scientists have
been very forthcoming about their national problems. A third
AEPS working group is devoted to studying the need for Emergency
Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) . The U.S. Coast
Guard is playing a leading role in the development of this
group's report. The group has used the recent oil spill in the
Komi Republic of Russia as a real-life case study for
monitoring. The subsequent clean-up effort is being used as a
model for planning purposes.

One aspect of Arctic pollution which will not be addressed
in detail in the AEPS reports is that of contaminants which
originate outside of the Arctic, but are transported there by
various means. The study of the transport mechanisms for
pollutants is an area which requires further study, as is the
impact of the pollutants on the plant, animal and human
inhabitants of the Arctic.

Bilateral Efforts with Russia:

There are a variety of bilateral channels through which we
seek to address issues of Arctic pollution, obviously most
importantly with Russia. Many of the specific initiatives of
this nature will be addressed by my fellow witnesses. I will
refer to several of those directly relevant to Arctic
contaminants .

- 6

President Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin
announced at their summit meeting in September 1994, that
cooperation in the resolution of the problems of processing and
storage of Russian liquid radioactive wastes in the North of
Russia was an important component of any regime for effective
protection of environmental quality and the natural resources of
the Arctic. Specifically, their announcement stated that:

The Russian Federation and the United States of America
confirmed their readiness to cooperate in consistently
preventing the dumping of liquid radioactive wastes, in
accordance with the London Convention, and to proceed to a
solution of the problem of Arctic pollution from all sources.

To this end, Russia and the United States agreed to
undertake, in cooperation with Norway and other interested
countries, a step-by-step expansion and upgrade of the
treatment facility in Murmansk. At the same time, Russia
stated its intention to continue to abide by its voluntary
commitment to prohibit the dumping of liquid radioactive
wastes under the London Convention with a view to eventual
formal adherence to the prohibition.

It is important for Russia to support the ban and not to
dump in the ocean, not just in the Arctic but also in the north
Pacific where Japan has concentrated similar efforts. Japan had
agreed to provide up to $15 million to construct processing and
storage facilities near Vladivostok, moving this issue to center
stage in the Japan-Russia relationship. Japan has made it
clear, however, that such financial assistance would be severely
jeopardized if Russian dumping continues.

Whether we discuss the Murmansk facility or Vladivostok or
dumping in general, we can assume the environmental side of the
Russian bureaucracy is with us (and Japan) on the issue.
However, the problem rests with the Russian Navy. The Navy is
the institution with the budgetary responsibility to deal with
the storage problem and we are endeavoring to work with them on
this issue.

At the end of 1994, the United States and Russia signed an
agreement on cooperation in dealing with Arctic contaminants -
the Agreement between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Russian Federation on
Cooperation in the Prevention of Pollution of the Environment in
the Arctic. The agreement emerged from the Gore-Chernomyrdin
process. Fully implementing that Agreement will take time.
While the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy remains the
main forum for multilateral cooperation, this Agreement should
help ensure access to a bilateral forum and to raise the profile
of work already being done.

Another area involving U.S. -Russia bilateral activity has
been in response to trhe major oil spill in the Komi region of
Russia caused by rupture of pipeline. The spill including
discharge into the Pechora River that flows into the Arctic
Ocean threatened major environmental impacts. The U.S. was
instrumental in facilitating World Bank involvement in cleanup
operations .

The World Bank and the lead contractor for the Komi
clean-up, Hartec of Anchorage, Alaska, report that, to date, 94
percent of the oil from last year's massive spill has been
cleaned up. Hartec executed its activities in two phases -
containment and clean-up. The six major spill sites required
significantly different remediation strategies, and in some
cases, total reconstruction of Russian-built siphon dams and
dikes. Russian clean-up efforts prior to arrival of Hartec were
minimal and intentional burning of slicks complicated clean-up
drastically.

Before the onset of the Russian winter, Hartec had 500
Rus.sians at work processing about 500 tons of oil per day, much
of it re-injected into the pipeline; new equipment installed
this Fall tripled the number of personnel involved and the
processing rate. Repairs on the problem sections of the
pipeline are reported to be finished and with clean-up
activities essentially complete. Attention in Komi now turns to
containment of residual oil. The World Bank projects a new
pipeline will be constructed within 3-5 years.

Finally, a contract for an environmental monitoring program
for the Komi/Kolva region will be awarded very soon. We noted
to the Bank that the Russians have lobbied hard at the GCC and
the AEPS for a more extensive program to cover the Pechora Basin
as a whole (and thus, the Arctic). The Bank agreed that such a
program would have environmental and political value. At last
week's AEPS meeting, there was wide-spread regional support for
such efforts with the aim of pollution prevention.

Land-Based Sources - The Global Programme of Action for
Protection of the Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities:

The most recent international undertaking that bears upon
what must be a long-term effort to deal with pollution in the
Arctic is a program of action that emerged from the conference
held here in Washington one month ago aimed at protection of
oceans and coastal areas from the impacts of land-based
activities. The conference hosted by the United States, in
partnership with the United Nations Environment Programme,
adopted the Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the
Marine Environment from Land-Based Activities. The Programme of

Action is designed to identify and facilitate practical steps to
implement the legal obligations of states set forth in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to prevent,
reduce and control impacts upon the marine environment from
land-based activities.

Municipal, industrial and agricultural wastes and run-off
resulting from land-based activities contribute most of the
pollution load of the oceans. The impacts of these activities
encompass the effects of a broad range of pollutants and harmful
processes, including sewage (pathogens and microorganisms),
persistent organic pollutants, radioactive substances, heavy
metals, oils (hydrocarbons), nutrients, sediment mobilization,
litter, and physical alterations and destruction of habitat.

The programme of action:

a) incorporates practical guidance for national programs,
including a methodology for accurate identification and
assessment of the sources of land-based impacts; and for
establishing clear priorities for dealing with those sources;

b) calls for cooperation at the regional level, through
legal instruments and action plans; and,

c) cooperative steps at the global level to facilitate
effective action at the national and regional levels,
including building national capacity for effective action;
mobilization of financial resources in support of such
action; and involving the relevant United Nations and other
institutions in the implementation effort.

The United States is pleased with the results of the
Washington conference. We consider effective steps to implement
The Global Programme of Action for the Protection of the Marine
Environment from Land-Based Activities as a major priority for
our oceans policy. The Programme stresses action at the
regional level and I believe offers an important platform upon
which to identify and apply "what works" in addressing problems
of Arctic contamination.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Ambassador. I just have a couple of
questions. I appreciate the work that has been done with the
money that we spent, and as the chairman of this subcommittee
have supported and will continue to support the administration in
requesting dollars.

Unfortunately, in the past, while we have had the success of pri-
marily Senator Stevens putting money in, in this year's defense
bill, to my knowledge, there has been no money added and there
was no request from the administration. Therefore, we are looking
at a zero dollar amount for fiscal year 1996. That is unfortunate,
and it is troubling in light of what we have heard today. Do you
have any suggestions as to the administration planning on asking
for some reprogram dollars or something that we can do to help
prod some additional money in that area?

Ambassador COLSON. Mr. Chairman, it is dangerous for me to
talk about money issues, but I think all of us that are interested
in these issues have to be mindful of the budget processes and to
fight our battles within them. Certainly, within the administration
process, we will again be revisiting this as we plan for fiscal year
1997 and we have not given up on trjdng to find some money at
least within the State Department to — the small grants program is
a very small program, but sometimes if you can bump something
with a $10,000 or $15,000 contribution, it really makes a dif-
ference. We will still be working within the Department so that
once we do have a budget, maybe we are able to have some of that
money.

Mr. Weldon. I extend my offer to work with you in a bipartisan
mode to help accomplish that objective and to make sure that we
do not renege on the financial commitment necessary. I am willing
to stand up within my own party and make that case because I
think this is an extremely important priority for this country and
really for the world.

The ONR has been, I guess, the lead agency in this. Is that satis-
factory from the State Department's standpoint in terms of this
issue?

Ambassador COLSON. Mr. Chairman, I think, again, our job on
an issue like this is to coordinate and take on the international
side of the debate. We are not a technical agency in any sense. The
money has come to ONR but they have worked with and through
the established interagency process that NSF chairs to identify our
priorities. They have worked and our agencies have worked within
the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program that has been put
together, so all of this has tied together rather well, I think. It can
always be done a little bit better, but we certainly have no com-
plaints in that respect,

Mr. Weldon. One of the questions I am going to ask our other
panelists, both after you leave and the other panel, is in regard to
the United States DOD-Russian DOD memorandum of understand-
ing on environmental protection that was signed in June 1995, the
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, which has the potential for re-
moving the bureaucratic barriers that arise. I guess I want to get
to the heart of the perception that perhaps there have been some
within the naval-nuclear-environmental community who have not
been maybe as forthcoming and as cooperative as maybe they

should be. Is that your assessment, and are there things that per-
haps we could do to help prod that along?

Ambassador COLSON. I do not have that assessment. I do not
have that knowledge. If you are speaking of our people and our
naval officers and the Defense Department, I think there has been
good cooperation within the interagency community.

I know that Deputy Secretary Talbot talked to former Deputy
Secretary Perry about this at an earlier date to try to advance the
cooperation with Norway and to bring our military into this, be-
cause we did feel that working sort of through the normal State
Department to foreign ministry channels was not the right way to
accomplish what we needed to accomplish with the Russian mili-
tary. I think the kinds of military to military contacts that we are
now having are essential and it is something that the Department
of State certainly supports.

Mr. Weldon. So you are not aware of any opposition from the
U.S. Navy's naval reactors program?

Ambassador CoLSON. I am not aware of any, no, sir.

Mr. Weldon. That is a question I will ask the other panelists.
I am giving them a heads-up in case they want to think about their
answer prior to that question being asked.

I will now turn to my good friend from Guam, Mr. Underwood.

Mr. Underwood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I was struck by the comment, I guess, that you
said that some of the attention given to the Arctic is somewhat of
a fad. Given the nature of the earlier panel, perhaps you could give
me some reason to believe that it is a fad. How does this compare
in terms of the dangers overall worldwide and what would lead you
to make such a comment, at the risk of wanting the Pacific to be
a fad.

Ambassador COLSON. Perhaps the use of the word "fad" was un-
fortunate, but I do find that oftentimes in international activities,
there will become an issue that will be popular and it will become
the source of funding for lots of meetings but not for any particular
work.

I think that that is what we are finding today in many respects
in the Arctic, that some government, some agency is interested in
the Arctic. It is sort of a new issue. It was an issue that during
the cold war we did not talk about Arctic cooperation because it
really did not exist. Now that has broken down and there are lots
of environmental groups, there are a lot of other countries inter-
ested in things Arctic.

My point was simply that we have to guard against a prolifera-
tion of nonproductive initiatives. We can get bogged down very eas-
ily with the limited resources that we have simply going off to
meetings, flying in airplanes to talk about Arctic things and not
getting anything done. It is one of these issues where just about
every government has their own Arctic initiative and I think we
have to guard against that and focus in and try to use our re-
sources wisely and efficiently, and that sometimes means saying no
to simply the interest in having meetings or forums and things like
that.

Mr. Underwood. But it is not meant to delimit the impact or the
presentation of the severity of the situation?

Ambassador COLSON. No, clearly not, and if I gave that impres-
sion, I apologize.

Mr. Underwood. Turning to some place a little bit warmer, I am
sure that in the course of your own work you have had perhaps the
opportunity to deal with the proposal by people in the Marshall Is-
lands to do some nuclear storage on Bikini Atoll. I am curious.
What has been the State Department's interaction with the Mar-
shall Islands on this issue? Is there an official position? Are steps
being actively taken to kind of dissuade them from this notion and
what is the status of that?

I guess the logic of it is that they are going to store it on Bikini
because it is already contaminated. Is that technically seen as
land-based because of the possibility of seepage into the ocean? I
know that it is supposed to have a geological base of some 18,000
feet.

Ambassador CoLSON. On the latter point, I think in the way we
categorize these issues, I think we would call that land-based. But
I am generally aware of the issue. This is something that we have
been deferring the technical issues to the U.S. Geological Survey
and other agencies of the Government that have much more capa-
bility to judge the feasibility of this.

We have been also telling the Marshall Islands and the other
South Pacific countries that we would like to see a more clear
statement of the interests of the Pacific Island countries them-
selves in this project. It, as you know, is often the case that the
small island countries of the Pacific do stand together on issues,
whether it is fisheries or anything like this, and we think it is in-
cumbent on the Marshalls to try to make their case to their neigh-
bors before they really come to the United States Government ask-
ing for a blessing.

We have withheld that blessing. We have withheld criticism of
it and we would like to see if they can develop some international
consensus within the region that this is the right and proper thing
to do before we take any sort of formal position on it.

Mr. Underwood. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Underwood.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to ask the Ambassador what you feel in terms of the
Arctic environmental protection strategy, you feel that this is the
best way to go forward, that it is already a working program to
bring into focus what the problem is and how to measure the prob-
lem, monitor it, and determine where the problems will be in the
future? Do you think that is the hook to hang ourselves on in terms
of the Arctic environment and what the former panel was testifying
to? Do you think that is the best?

Ambassador COLSON. I think our general judgment is that the
Arctic environmental protection strategy is a viable international
cooperative mechanism through which we can accomplish the kinds
of assessment and monitoring programs and coordinate the pro-
grams that the United States does, that Russia does, that Norway
does, and the other Arctic countries do in the Arctic. We do not
need to duplicate efforts and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Program helps us to avoid duplication.

It will also help us and is developing the map that you were
speaking of earlier, where I think in another few months we will
have the best compilation of information of the hot spots in the
Arctic that we might have not only with respect to radioactive
waste but with respect to a host of other contaminants that we are
concerned about.

We have to continue to work these other parts of this puzzle. We
have to work bilaterally with the Russians when that would seem
to be the best way to proceed. We have to work trilaterally with
Norway and Russia in other contexts. But I think for the general
overview of scientific cooperation in the Arctic, that the Arctic envi-
ronmental protection program and the component of that called
AMAP, the monitoring and assessment program, is the area that
we think is probably the best focal area.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you. Could I have Sherri Goodman talk

Mr. Weldon. Would the gentleman jdeld? We have not had them
testify yet. I just wanted to finish with Ambassador Colson. He has
to leave for a plane.

Mr. Kennedy. Excuse me. I am sorry.

Mr. Weldon. That is all right. He has to go back to London. Do
you have any other questions for the Ambassador?

Mr. Kennedy. No.

Mr. Weldon. Mr. Ambassador, thank you. We appreciate your
testimony and your willingness to work with us and we pledge our
support to work with you.

Ambassador COLSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, and have a safe plane trip.

Ms. Groodman, thank you for waiting for us. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF SHERRI W. GOODMAN, DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY

Ms. Goodman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittees. I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will submit my statement
for the record and I will summarize it for you.

I would like to address DOD's unique role in the effort we are
discussing today, the criteria for our involvement, and our work to
date. The Department's primary goal is security. In the Arctic, se-
curity means protecting human health and safety. It also means
ensuring that the Arctic ecosystem remains healthy and resilient.
Keeping the Arctic healthy avoids tension between adjacent nations
who depend upon its resources for food, economic benefit, transpor-
tation, and research.

The Department of Defense role begins with national security.
The threat of widespread contamination, real or perceived, is a
threat to security. Protecting the environmental resources all
States share is thus a critical component to protecting security. Ad-
ditionally, the Department of Defense has an operational interest
in retaining access to the Arctic sea lanes.

DOD has an array of environmentally-friendly tools upon which
to draw. We have a Navy patrolling global waters, undertaking so-
phisticated scientific research in the course of its operations. We
have environmental professionals deployed on U.S. bases around

the world, and we have the wisdom borne of 25 years of experience
in integrating environmental protection into military activities.

Before I describe how the Department of Defense has applied
these capabilities in the Arctic region, let me address the criteria
for DOD involvement here. In the Arctic, as elsewhere, the Depart-
ment must continuously scrutinize its activities to ensure that we
achieve maximum return on our investment for the national secu-
rity dollar.

The criteria for judgment in the Arctic are, first, to minimize po-
litical tensions generated by real or perceived pollution. Radio-
active waste has attracted the most attention in this regard.

Second, to minimize the real threat to human health and the
natural environment in the Arctic by military activities.

Third, to realize the best return for our investment of time and
resources.

Fourth, to address environmental problems according to a risk-
based analysis, as Congressman Kennedy has alluded to.

The source of much of the environmental security concerning the
Arctic today stems from the Russian military, and that brings me
to the fifth criteria, which is to measurably improve Russian mili-
tary environmental management of nuclear and hazardous waste.

The good news is that the Department's and others' research to
date indicates that there is not a significant immediate threat to
human health and to the food chain in the Arctic, but good news
should not lull us into complacency. The Arctic remains vulnerable
to a host of commonplace toxins, such as heavy metals and persist-
ent organic pollutants. We have a responsibility to do all we can
to help ensure that an environmental disaster never occurs, be-
cause once it does, it could take decades or centuries to reverse.

Let me now briefly address how we have set DOD's capabilities
to work with others in the Arctic. First, the Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission, which under the leadership of the Vice President, Vice
President Gore, provides an enduring forum for bilateral coopera-
tion. Because the Vice President and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin
meet several times a year, there is plentiful opportunity for ex-
change. The Department of Defense is a full participant in a num-
ber of the committees, not only the National Security Committee
but the Environment Committee, as well, and I have personally
had the opportunity to present the Department of Defense environ-
mental program to Russian defense and environmental officials at
a Moscow meeting of the GCC.

Second, in June 1995, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, and
his Russian counterpart. Minister Grachev, did sign a memoran-
dum of understanding, as you referred to, Mr. Chairman, to facili-
tate military environmental cooperation. Under this agreement, we
can share information and experiences in a wide variety of sub-
jects, ranging from risk analysis as an environmental prioritization
tool to environmentally sound weapons demilitarization to person-
nel education and training. We would like to commence developing
project proposals under this agreement as early as possible.

Next, the Secretary of Defense, Dr. Perry, established the Arctic
Military Environmental Cooperation Program, which we refer to as
AMEC, at the request of the Norwegian Minister of Defense,
Kosmo, in June 1994. This is a trilateral military-to-military dialog

among the United States, Russia, and Norway on Arctic military
contamination. At the first trilateral meeting in Horton, Norway,
in the spring, United States and Norwegian officials presented the
results of our research on nuclear contamination in the Arctic and
briefed Russian officials on the integration of sound environmental
management practices into military activities.

Let me note at this point and respond to your question about the
participation of the U.S. Office of Naval Reactors. Let me say they
have been very productive participants in this dialog and overall in
our Arctic military environmental strategy. In fact, the Naval Reac-
tors Office has been an active participant on this delegation and
was part of the briefings presented to the Russians on the United
States nuclear fuel cycle.

We are still hoping to have a meeting early next year. What
needs to happen now is engaging the northern fleet, the Russian
northern fleet and the ministry of defense in this military-to-mili-
tary dialog. This would be a useful step in encouraging the Rus-
sians to take responsibility for their actions and to improve envi-
ronmental management of the active and decommissioned sub-
marine fleet. In essence, we need to have the right Russian mili-
tary participants attend these meetings in order productively to
have a dialog that could lead to some specific proposals and to the
Russian Navy taking greater responsibility for environmental man-
agement of their submarine fleet.

Next, the Department's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Pro-
gram, called ANWAP, is a 3-year-old effort begun by Congress to
assess the nature and extent of nuclear waste in the Arctic region.
The Office of Naval Research, as you know, conducts this program
and Admiral Pelaez will address the program in detail during his
testimony today.

So I will go now finally to the Murmansk initiative, which will
be addressed in greater detail by Dr. Hecht, but the Department
of Defense is a partner in that initiative. We have supported that
project financially with the Government of Norway and other Unit-
ed States agencies to upgrade an existing low-level radioactive
waste processing facility for use by the Russian northern fleet.

Let me conclude with two thoughts, Mr. Chairman. First, the De-
partment of Defense views protection of the Arctic environment as
important to national security, and second, we must focus on posi-
tively influencing the Russian military's environmental manage-
ment.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Department's per-
spective today.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Goodman follows:]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
AND HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AND

DISPOSAL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AND OTHER

TOXIC WASTE IN OCEANS AND TRIBUTARIES

Statement of

Sherri W. Goodman

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(environmental security)

Before the

Committee on House National Security's

Subcommittee on Research and Development

AND

Committee on House Resources'
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans

December 6, 1995

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
AND HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittees, I thank you for the opportunity to
testify today.

U.S. Goals and Objectives

I would like to address with you today DoD's unique role in this effort, the criteria
for our involvement, and our work to date. The Department's primary goal is security. In the
Arctic, security means protecting human health and safety. It also means ensuring that the
Arctic ecosystem remains healthy and resilient. Keeping the Arctic healthy avoids tension
between adjacent nations who depend upon its resources for food, economic benefit,
transportation and research. It also ensures that the Arctic environmental resources will be
available for generations to come. DoD has developed strategic partnerships with other U.S.
agencies and with members of the international community to further these security goals.

Department of Defense Role

The Department of Defense role begins with national security. The threat of
widespread contamination, real or perceived, is a threat to security. Nations concerned with
the quality of the air blowing over their soil, the cleanliness of the water at their shores or the
health of the fish feeding their populations, cannot work together harmoniously. Protecting
the environmental resources all states share is thus a critical component to protecting security.
Additionally, DOD has an operational interest in retaining access to the Arctic sea lanes.
Public sentiment opposed to Russian radioactive waste dumping could lead to restrictions on
Arctic transit. To safeguard access for the U.S. military, we need to promote environmental
stewardship by all militaries that operate in the Arctic.

DOD has an array of environmentally friendly tools upon which to draw. We have a
Navy patrolling global waters, undertaking sophisticated scientific research in the course of its
operations. We have environmental professionals deployed on U.S. bases around the world.
And we have the wisdom borne of 25 years of experience in integrating environmental
protection into military activities. Our soldiers, sailors and airmen work cooperatively with
militaries with a long history of environmental protection, such as the Norwegian Ministry of
Defense; and with those new at ecosystem management, such as the Russian Ministry of
Defense. The Department's activities are guided fundamental policy goals. Executive Orders,
and by specific agreements such as the Agreement between the Government of the United
States of A merica and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Field
of Environmental Proection and Natural Resources of June 1994, and the Agreement between
the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation
in the Prevention of Pollution in the Arctic of December 1994.

Before I describe how the Department of Defense has applied these capabilities in the
Arctic region, let me address the criteria for DOD involvement.

DoD Criteria

In the Arctic as elsewhere, the Department must continuously scrutinize its activities
to ensure that we achieve maximum return on investment for our national security dollar.
The criteria for judgment in the Arctic are:

o First, minimize political tensions generated by real or perceived pollution. Radioactive

waste has attracted the most attention in this regard.

o Second, minimize the real threat to human health and the natural environment in the

Arctic by military activities.

o Third, realize the best return for our investment of time and resources; or more

colloquially, to maximize the "bang for our environmental security buck."

o Fourth, address environmental problems according to a risk-based analysis.

The source of much of the environmental security concern in the Arctic today stems
from the Russian military. The Russian Northern Fleet has operated for decades with little
regard for the environment. The Fleet leadership asserts that it is working toward halting
nuclear dumping and improving management practices, but much more needs to be done.
That brings me to the fifth criteria:

o Measurably improve Russian military environmental management of nuclear and

hazardous wastes.

The good news is that the Department's studies indicate the immediate threat to human
health and the food chain in the Arctic is negligible. But good news should not lull us into
complacency. The Arctic remains vulnerable to a host of commonplace toxins, such as heavy
metals and persistent organic pollutants. Environmental disasters, once visited upon the
Arctic, can take decades or centuries to reverse. We have a responsibility to do all we can to
help ensure an environmental disaster never occurs.

Cuirent DOD Activities

Let me now briefly describe how we've set DoD's unique capabilities to work with
others in the Arctic region.

The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC), under the leadership of Vice President
Gore, provides an enduring forum for bilateral cooperation. Because the Vice President and
Russian Prime Minister meet several times a year, there is a plentiful and predictable stream
of political will to form lasting relationships, and present results. I have personally had the
opportunity to present the Department of Defense's environmental program to Russian defense
and environment officials at a Moscow meeting of the GCC. Within the Environmental

Working Group under the GCC, we and the Russians are exploring how intelhgence assets
developed during the Cold War can be used to characterize environmental contamination at
military bases. We will exchange the first derived products next year.

In June 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry and his Russian counterpart
Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev signed a Memorandum of Understanding to facilitate
military environmental cooperation. Under this agreement we can share information and
experiences in a wide variety of subjects, ranging from risk analysis as an environmental
prioritization tool, to environmentally sound weapons demilitarization, to personnel education
and training.

The Secretary of Defense established the Arctic Military Environmental Cooperation
program at the request of Norwegian Minister of Defense Kosmo in June 1994. It comprises
a trilateral military-to-military dialogue between the U.S., Russia and Norway on Arctic
military contamination. At the first trilateral meeting in Horton, Norway this spring, U.S. and
Norwegian officials presented the results of our research on nuclear contamination in the
Arctic, and briefed Russian officials on the integration of sound environmental management
practices into military activities. We are still hoping to have a meeting eariy next year.
Engaging the Northern Fleet in this military-to-military dialogue is a useful step in
encouraging the Russians to take responsibility for their actions and improving the
environmental management of the active and decommissioned submarine fleet.

The Department's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP) is a three-
year old effort begun by Congress to assess the nature and extent of nuclear waste in the
Arctic region. The Office of Naval Research conducts this research program. ADM Palaez
will address the program in detail in his testimony today. The study found that no
radioactivity from dumped Russian material is measurable except in very localized regions;
that is, directly adjacent to some of the dumped material. Currently, there appears to be no
risk to the coast of Alaska, or the Arctic basin as a whole from the radioactive waste disposal
practices of the former Soviet Union. As part of the project, ONR is developing a model
which will be useful to examine the risk from any type of contaminant (both radioactive and
non-radioactive) entering the Arctic from any source. Using an eariier version of this model,
it shows that even assuming a worst-case scenario for release of the dumped material, no
radioactivity above background would reach Alaskan shores. What may be deserving of
additional study is potential risk from heavy metals and persistent organic pollutants,
emanating from industrial facilities near rivers flowing into the Arctic.

Finally, through the Murmansk Initiative DoD is partnering with EPA, AID, DOE and
the Government of Norway to upgrade an existing low-level radioactive waste processing
facility for use by the Russian Northern Fleet. The current facility services the civilian
nuclear icebreaker fleet of the Murmansk Shipping Company, and has a capacity of 1200
cubic meters a year. After the upgrade, the facility will be able to process the high-saline
wastes generated by the Northern Fleet, with a total capacity of 5,000 cubic meters per year.
The Russian Navy and Ministry of Defense have indicated that they will use the facility, on a

fee-for-service basis, to process low-level radioactive waste from their active and
decommissioned nuclear submarines. Storage facilities for this waste are reported to be 95%
full at the present time. The Government of Russia has plans to further expand the facility to
15,000 cubic meters, in anticipation of accelerating the decommissioning process.

Summary

Thank you for allowing me to appear today to discuss DoD's environmental security
goals, criteria and activities in the Arctic. I would like to conclude with two thoughts. First,
the Department of Defense views protection of the Arctic environment as critical to national
security. Although studies indicate that radioactive waste dumped in the Arctic seas does not
pose a significant health risk today, some continued monitoring is appropriate. We must be
equally conscious of the enduring effects of heavy metals, persistent organic pollutants and
other military-generated toxins which have received less public attention.

Second, we must focus must be on promoting positive change in the Russian military's
environmental management. DoD's role is to engage the Russian military on environmental
management. Other U.S. agencies with differing missions and authorities can make
contributions to creating institutional and legal infrastructure, business development, and
public-private dialogue on environmental management. As each of these developments
strengthens democracy, each contributes to national security. Thus in the field of
environmental security, partnership between agencies and countries is a necessary component
to promoting responsible environmental stewardship.

Thank you again for the opportunity to provide the Department's perspective on this
issue.

-- End --

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Ms. Goodman.
Dr. Hecht.

STATEMENT OF DR. ALAN D. HECHT, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY AS-
SISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AC-
TIVITIES, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Dr. Hecht. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the sub-
committees. I am very pleased to have an opportunity to join this
panel. I am not sure that EPA often has a chance to speak in a
panel on environmental or national security.

You have my testimony and I would only like to highlight a few
points, since I assume the testimony will be part of the record.

Mr. Weldon. Without objection.

Dr. Hecht. It is obvious that EPA's principal objective is envi-
ronmental protection, the health and safety of U.S. citizens. This
is, of course, predominately a domestic agenda, but many of the is-
sues we face have an international dimension, and EPA's inter-
national program, of which we are dealing with one today, ema-
nates from our responsibility to protect U.S. citizens from either
transboundary pollution or, of course, global environmental threats.

In addition, EPA, as one agency of the Government, is an ele-
ment, is an arm of our efforts to implement foreign policy, and in
that regard EPA has had some responsibilities over the years to as-
sist the State Department and other agencies of Government in
carrying out these objectives.

For example, EPA has worked for many years with our Agency
for International Development in assistance programs in Eastern
Europe under the Seed Act and in the former Soviet Union under
the freedom Act. More particularly, EPA has had a very long and
productive history of cooperation with Russia dating back to at
least 1972. The first environmental agreement, which was revised
more recently in 1974, was in many ways a hallmark of cooperation
during difficult periods of the cold war.

More recently, with the initiative of Gore and Chernomyrdin to
establish a commission to deal with areas of cooperation across the
board, EPA Administrator Carol Browner was asked to chair the
environmental committee or the environmental working group of
that activity and in that regard has brought the full resources of
EPA to begin to address a number of these important bilateral is-
sues.

At the same time on the international arena, our accession and
our agreement in the London Convention, something that EPA was
a strong supporter of, has given us an opportunity to work with
Russia and other governments to facilitate their accession to the
terms of the London Convention.

There are a number of important policy documents that have
helped frame what we have done in Murmansk. Many have been
mentioned already today, but let me just highlight a few. The Arc-
tic environmental protection strategy is basically an agreement
under which AMAP, this monitoring and research program, has
been carried out. The United States-Russian environmental agree-
ment, which was signed in December 1994, is an update and a re-
newal of the agreement that was signed in 1992.

The United States-Russian comprehensive Arctic agreement,
which Ambassador Colson had referred to earlier, attempts to ad-
dress in a comprehensive way issues in the Arctic. The Presidential
Directive on the Arctic, which Ambassador Colson also alluded to
just a few moments ago, are all frameworks in which implementa-
tion of any specific project at least has a policy framework.

Many of these agreements do not have a road map to implement
them, but in at least the case I am going to discuss with you today,
Murmansk, we are beginning to develop a kind of road map and
a means by which the full resources of all of our agencies can be
brought to bear on these problems.

Murmansk has been mentioned many times and you have been
promised that I would say something in more detail about it, so let
me deal with that. From our leadership on the environment com-
mittee of the Gore-Chernomyrdin process and as a result of Rus-
sia's difficulty in acceding to the terms of the London Convention,
we have been very interested in seeking ways to ensure that radio-
active dumping in all of the oceans and in the Arctic is stopped.

We have been motivated, I think to a large extent, by discussions
with Norway. They have been a key partner in terms of our discus-
sions with Russia and have been early-on in helping us to identify
the opportunities that exist at the Murmansk facility. While it is
primarily a facility for processing civilian radioactive waste, low-
level waste, there are enormous implications and enormous oppor-
tunities that emerge from a successful collaboration between the
United States, Russia, and Norway to upgrade this facility to proc-
ess more than the current cubic meters of radioactive waste and,
at the same time, to ensure that the Russian military uses it in
their process of the decommissioning of submarines under the
terms of international agreements.

So beginning in fall 1993, we began to have discussions with
Norway and Russia and the United States about the technical is-
sues related to this facility and what it would take to upgrade it
to begin to process more of the low-level radioactive waste. In the
course of the period since fall 1993, the facility in Murmansk has
been visited by several technical groups. We have hosted Russian
technical experts to the United States with the help of the Depart-
ment of Energy. I believe. Congressman Weldon, you yourself have
been at the facility. Many of my EPA colleagues have been there.

We are now at an absolutely crucial point in this process, be-
cause we designed this in three stages. There is the stage which
is about to be completed, the assessment stage, which is can we ex-
pand the facility, whether technical difficulties, what kind of tech-
nology will be used, what are the engineering specifications, this
whole range of assessment functions. That is about to be completed
and next week in Norway we will have a meeting to finalize those
assessment reports.

The second phase is the construction phase. That is to expand
this facility and make it operational, to go from the 15,000 cubic
meters of radioactive low-level waste to the 5,000 that it is being
designed for.

And beyond that, there is another phase. There is the operational
phase of assessing that we have done this correctly, that every-
thing fits together, and that the Russian Government is going to

use that as a basis to expand their activities and their intention
to use this facility to go beyond the 5,000 cubic meters to 15,000.

All of this has been enormously successful in the sense that we
have completed the assessment stage. And while both Governments
or all three Governments, the Russian, the United States, and Nor-
way have from the data that are available, and it is not all the
data, at least some assurance that the containment of the radio-
active waste is not an immediate threat to the global food chain,
this project, in our judgment, is absolutely crucial in laying a foun-
dation for future work, and let me list a number of reasons why
I think this is the case, because, in essence, this is the core, I
think, of why this international cooperation is important and con-
tinues to be important.

First, by means of this project, we are building trust with the
Russian Government, both in the civilian sector and in the military
sector, and I think that is extremely important in terms of just
being able to talk to each other and be able to discuss these issues
in an open way.

The collaboration with Norway has been essentisd and lays the
groundwork for further expansion with other governments. We
have discussed the participation of Canada in this process and we
think that the more governments of the Arctic region that are in-
volved, the stronger will be the commitment to see this through to
the end.

The ability to deal with the northern fleet has been one of the
real successes in terms of this project. We have had meetings with
the admiral and vice admiral of the northern fleet. They have indi-
cated to us, and we can give you a very nice report of their assess-
ment of the situation, their priorities, which will help us in future
planning.

This is also a project which is now beginning to help us in terms
of experience of how we put together a project like this, a project
of design, construction, construction in Russia, which involves
many agencies and three governments.

It is a project that addresses a specific problem with a result in
the end which leads to a policy decision, which has led to a policy
decision in the Russian Grovernment to use the facility on the mili-
tary side and to go beyond — go beyond — what we are able to do,
but to take on the responsibilities to expand it later.

And finally, two other things. One, it is a model of how a number
of Government agencies have been able to pool their resources, pool
their authorities, and pool their interests together to accomplish
something as described here. I will not take time to lament with
you the difficulty, as I am sure you can imagine, there has been
to get these resources together, but without the leadership under
the Gore-Chernomyrdin process, which I think is a good example
of why that is a good mechanism, and just genuine cooperation on
the part of DOD and DOE and State and EPA to do this, I think
we would have not been able to put the resources together to do
the assessment stage and the resources to do the initial construc-
tion stage.

I will be very frank with you in saying, of course, that what hap-
pens in the future is very uncertain in terms of where our budgets
are and in terms of what is available, but we have made effort to

leverage our resources, and I think our work with Norway has been
a good example of this.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is one project which we have re-
ferred to several times today. It is really a bridge between what
has emerged in public policy literature and certainly in the public
literature about, "What is environmental security and how does it
relate to national security?" The policy of the United States is that
environmental security is part of national security.

In EPA, I think it is new to us to think in those terms, but the
very important linkage here, nexus, is that as Russia continues to
meet their obligations to decommission their military fleets, more
waste is generated. That waste is a potential threat not only to
their own citizens but to all the Arctic nations.

Automatically, the two of us here from Defense and EPA have a
new relationship to begin to explore, and I know that from our
point of view, as a policy issue, this opportunity to take the small
leverage that EPA brings to the table and contribute to foreign pol-
icy development is something that we are very happy in EPA to be
able to do.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, this has been a very successful first
step. This is really, for me, an opportunity and I am very pleased
to be here with Dr. Yablokov and Kare Bryn, people we have
worked with over the years. This is the beginning of the future for
us in terms of a new direction, and I would only like to end, I have
brought with me, which I will give to you for the record, copies of
a report done by our science board.

I am not sure this has been made available to this committee,
but I do want to leave it with you, called Beyond the Horizon:
Using Foresight to Protect the Environmental Future by the EPA
Science Advisory Board, and I will give you that because in the
end, among the many recommendations, it says, "The United
States must begin to develop strategic national policies that link
national security, foreign relations, environmental quality, and eco-
nomic growth, and EPA should play a strongly supportive role in
this process." We are using this example and our capabilities and
our human resources to try and contribute in that way. Thank you,
sir.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hecht follows:]

TESTIMONY OF

DR. ALAN D. HECHT

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR

FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITIES,

U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

BEFORE THE

JOINT RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS

OF THE HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

DECEMBER 6, 1995

Mr. Chairmen, members of the subcommittees, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. I would like to discuss
EPA's role in addressing environmental contamination from past
ocean dumping of radioactive and associated hazardous wastes.
The focus of. my testimony will be on EPA's efforts to address
contamination in the Arctic, a region which we share with seven
other nations, including Russia and Norway.

We are all familiar with the recent disclosures that large
quantities of radioactive waste have been dumped into the Arctic
seas by the Former Soviet Union. There has been great concern
here and abroad about potential impacts from these past events to
the fragile Arctic ecosystem and the health of U.S. and other
coastal populations in the North. Now we know that the range and

magni

tude of the radioactive contaminatiion problems is even

greater as the Russian Federation attempts to deal with the
decommissioning and dismantlement of ii:s vast nuclear submarine
fleet. These problems range from the processing of low- level
liquid radioactive waste to the transport and storage of spent
and damaged nuclear fuel from the submarine reactors.

EPA recognizes that the Arctic is a fragile environment and
that the impact of releases of radioactive and associated
hazardous materials in this region may have unknown adverse
consequences to the unique ecosystems 'involved. It is the
potential for biological change that iJs of most concern to
people. Therefore, a careful scientific approach must be used

when considering the release of radioactive and associateid

J
hazardous contaminants into these Arctic seas. Since there are

multiple sources of contaminants to the Arctic, we advocate a

comparative approach to assessing risk so that the most important

sources can be mitigated as quickly as possible.

ync

You have asked us for a -short synopsis of past U.S. dumping
activity and current policy. The U.s! phased out all ocean
dumping of radioactive materials by 1970. In that year, the
Council on Environmental Quality issued a recommendation (Ocean
Dumping: A National Policy) calling for cessation of any future
ocean dumping of radioactive materials by the United States . In
1972, Congress enacted the Marine Protection, Research and

Sanctuaries Act (PL 92-532) which proh
all high level radioactive waste.

bited the ocean dumping of

At the international level, control of radioactive waste
dumping in the ocean is addressed in the provisions of the 1972
London Convention (Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter) which went into

force in 1975 and to which the U.S. is! a party. Specifically,

this Convention banned the dumping of high-level radioactive
wastes and other matter, but, prior to 1993, did not address low-
level radioactive wastes. In 1993, thle London Convention was
amended to prohibit the ocean dumping of radioactive materials
containing more than de minimis concentrations of radioactivity.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was a strong
proponent of this amendment .

Continuing with the international! picture, you have asked
about the degree to which international partnerships are

assisting in prevention of additional

contamination in Arctic

waters. These partnerships take two forms;

(1) formal agreements and mechanisms for cooperation, such
as the:

o Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) of
June 1991, between the! eight Arctic countries;

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
International Arctic Seas Assessment Program
(I ASAP) ;

Gore -Chernomyrdin Commission (GCC) ;

(2) informal agreements, such as, memoranda of
understanding and records ofl discussion.

I
Under the AEPS, EPA is participatling in two key working

groups, (1) Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAMi

and (2) the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) .

PAME is developing a list of priority tasks to address Arctic
contamination problems. Under AMAP, EPA is leading the U.S.
effort and working with Norway to assess radiation sources and
associated radiological consequences in the Arctic environment
from all sources of radioactivity. 1

The IAEA's International Arctic Seas Assessment Program
(lASAP) is assessing the environmental impact of the past dumping
activities of the former Soviet Union! in the Arctic marginal seas
near Northwest Russia. Under this program, EPA is chairing the
group of experts evaluating the performance of the barrier
materials/packaging used to isolate the radioactive waste
sources dumped in the Arctic marine environment. lASAP is also

studying transport pathways of radioactive materials released
from these sources and relative risk to populations that may be

exposed to radiation from any released

EPA is the lead U.S. agency for the Environment Committee of

the Gore-Chernoniyrdin Commission. The

radioactive materials,

Environment Committee of

the GCC is the forum for facilitating Cooperative projects at the
highest levels in the U.S. and Russian} governments . The key
Arctic project in this forum is the Muirmansk Initiative, an
ongoing initiative that EPA, along with other federal agencies,
Norway and Russia is taking to address one of these problems. I
will describe this project to you in some detail later.

U.S. concern for the potential impacts on Alaska of past

radioactive waste dumping by the forme
a three year research, monitoring and

r Soviet Union resulted in
assessment program, the

Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP) , which began in
1993 . Although this program will be covered in much greater
detail by scientific experts in later testimony, EPA is the lead
organization in two key studies:

evaluation of the two key barrier materials used in the
packaging of the high-level radioactive waste dumped in
the Kara Sea (furfurol and special steels) ,

the immobilization poten

tial

of sediments m the Kara

Sea for radionuclides, such as Cesium-137 and
Strontium- 90.

These projects are being conducted with the cooperation of Norwa
and Russian research institutes. Thes4 are examples of
international informal agreements involving EPA.

I would like to complete my testi-nony by discussing the
Murmansk Initiative in some detail. I feel that this project
could be a blueprint for future U.S. ihternational partnerships
for effective prevention of further contamination of the Arctic
environment by radioactive and associated hazardous materials.

In 1993, the Russian Federation identified a particularly

urgent radioactive waste management problem preventing their

formal adherence to the amendments to! the London Convention that

i
were negotiated that year. Their problem was the inability to

process the large volumes of low-level liquid radioactive waste

(LLRW) arising from the decommissioning of nuclear submarines.

Consequently, they were also unable to fully meet their

commitments under the START II agreement. At the London

Convention Consultative Meeting in 1993, the Russian Federation

made it clear that if interested countries could assist them in

solving this problem in both Northwest Russia and the Far East,

then Russia would be prepared to formally adhere to the

prohibition under the London Convention which bans the dumping of

both high and low level radioactive wastes. We will focus our
comments on the situation in Northwest Russia, since Japan is
working on the problem in the Far East.

This problem has become increasingly urgent as the number of
nuclear submarines taken out of operation (decommissioned)
increased. By early 1995, about 125 Russian submarines had been
decommissioned, mostly in the last five years, and another 40-80
nuclear submarines are expected to be decommissioned by the end
of the decade. Most of these submarines are attached to Russia's
North Navy in the Murmansk region of the Kola Peninsula. The
waste is being temporarily stored both on land and in floating
vessels, but this capacity is being rapidly exhausted and is
reported to be 90-95 percent full.

EPA became active in this issue with the goal of
facilitating Russia's signing of the amended London Convention.
EPA's domestic concerns in the Arctic^ region have involved us in
programs which may appear outside of our authorities and mission.
Yet, environmental and national security interests in the Arctic
are linked, and we have therefore begun cooperative international
projects working with other federal agencies.

In 1994, the United States and Norway began exploring with
Russia the possibility of expanding and upgrading the only
operational Russian LLRW processing facility. This facility,

located in Murmansk, was designed to process the wastes produced
by Russia's nuclear powered icebreaker fleet.

The concept for upgrading the Murmansk facility was
presented at the Gore -Chernomyrdin Commission meeting in June
19 94 by the EPA Administrator, Carol Browner. This concept was
accepted by both Vice-President Gore and Russian Prime Minister,
Viktor Chernomyrdin and was subsequently presented at the Summit
meeting of the Heads of State. President Clinton and President
Yeltsin issued a joint U.S. -Russian Summit Announcement on
September 28, 1994 that cooperation on the resolution of the
problem of processing and storing Russian liquid radioactive
waste is considered an important component of more effective
protection for the environmental quality and natural resources of
the Arctic.

This project moved very quickly. On the U.S. side, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense and the Agency
for International Development have jointly collaborated on this
Murmansk Initiative, within the context of U.S. Arctic
environmental protection, pollution prevention and environmental
security objectives.

In Norway, there has been active participation led by the
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including the

Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, Ministry of Environment
and Defense Research Establishment. The Russian Federation,
including various ministries and institutes and the civilian
operators of the icebreaker fleet have given their full
participation and cooperation to this project. The participating
Russian Ministries have included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ministry of Atomic Energy, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
Environment, and Ministry of Transportation. Regional
representatives from the Murmansk and Arkangelsk Oblasts and the
Murmansk Shipping Company have also actively participated.

Since May, 1994, a series of technical discussions and
exchange visits have been held between U.S., Norwegian and
Russian technical experts, including two U. S . -Norwegian trips to
Murmansk, two technical meetings in Oslo and a visit to the U.S.
Hanford facility in Richland, Washington. These technical
efforts resulted in a final engineering design, in November 1995,
for expanding and upgrading the Murmansk facility. A meeting
will be held in Oslo, Norway, on December 13-14, 1995 for the
purpose of formally completing the design phase of the Murmansk
Initiative and initiating the construction phase. Constr-jction
will get underway very soon thereafter. Financial support for
the construction has been obligated and will be provided by
Norway and the United States. Russia will provide in-kind
assistance, including scientific and engineering support. The
construction phase is scheduled for completion by early 1997.

While the LLRW processing problem may not be the most
serious Arctic environmental threat from the perspective of
environmental risk, it illustrates how effective partnering, team
building, and sharing of technical know-how can help solve this
and other more complex Arctic environmental security issues.
Norway has been and continues to be a strong leader and partner
in our efforts in this region.

Successful completion of this Murmansk Initiative can
provide a bridge to addressing broader Arctic environmental
contamination problems. Many of the remaining problems facing
the Arctic nations are either direct or indirect consequences of
the era of the Cold War. The nature of the environmental
problems exceeds the ability of any one nation or any one
governmental agency to successfully address. As the Murmansk
Initiative has demonstrated, we need cooperative efforts between
governments and cooperative efforts by the agencies or ministries
of the participating governments to develop the processes by
which the broad range of environmental problems in the Arctic can
be solved.

I thank the members of both subcommittees for the
opportunity to address these important matters.

[The report of the Environmental Protection Agency Science Ad-
visory Board will be retained in committee files.]

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Dr. Hecht. Thank you both for your
comments and your testimony.

Can either of you come up with an idea of how much total U.S.
dollars are being spent on the Arctic or the Arctic dumping prob-
lem, if you look at DOD, EPA, State, NOAA, and perhaps any other
agency, the Geological Survey or whatever, any idea what that
total amount is annually?

Dr. Hecht. I am not sure. Off the top, I have the total number
that reflects all of the agencies' work under the Arctic environ-
mental strategy, but the Arctic research community, which is here
in full force today, has lots of documents and I think that we can
get from them, from NSF, which is part of this group, or even the
next panel, a good assessment of all the agencies.

Mr. Weldon. We will get that, I guess. It looks like we are going
to get that, then.

Dr. Hecht. Separate from that, I can tell you that for just the
Murmansk activity which I have just described, the assessment
phase has been on the order of about $400,000, of which Norway
has contributed $50,000. The construction phase is something on
the order of $1.2 million, and Norway will contribute half of that;
the United States Government will contribute half. And then be-
yond that is the operational phase.

So I would look to the interagency community that is here today
to give you a good, solid number which reflects, I think, what all
the agencies are doing.

Mr. Weldon. I have been very supportive of the money that has
been spent up until now, both within the committee and on the
floor of the House, defending our investment because of the impor-
tance in this area and the spin-off impact it is having. I was
pleased to attend a conference hosted by one of our friends in the
audience. Dr. Radvani, down at Mississippi State University, par-
tially funded with money, to encourage the Japanese to step up to
the plate and provide similar support for a solution out on the east-
em part of Russia, which I understand now is moving along.

As a matter of fact, I got a fax to me that looks as though there
is an effort by the Japanese to put as much as $20 million into a
floating barge that will be used to dispose of low-level nuclear
waste from submarine decommissioning, which is a success that is
taking place.

So I am supportive of this and I would just ask Ms. Goodman
if, in all the money that we are going to spend on environment this
year in the defense bill, which, if I am not mistaken, and correct
me if I am wrong, is about $13 billion if you take both nuclear and
non-nuclear dollars that we are going to spend this year, do you
think it is possible for us to find that $10 million that was not put
in because it was not requested and because perhaps it fell through
the cracks? Do you think that is possible that we could get from
the administration some assistance in trying to find those dollars
to keep that program going?

Ms. Goodman. Mr. Chairman, the answer to that depends on the
Department having an authorization or direction to invest that
money. The $13 billion you refer to, more of that is in the Depart-

ment of Energy's environmental management program, as you well
know. The DOD program is about $5 billion, but it has been com-
ing down.

We do not have the authority today to make that investment,
other than if we are directed to do so by Congress. We have in-
vested $30 million over the last several years at congressional di-
rection in the Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, which
Admiral Pelaez will address in his testimony. I think that has been
wisely invested. I do think there are opportunities for wise, though
modest, levels of investment in the future and we would welcome
your support and congressional direction on that.

Much of the investment we make in this area really comes from
what is called the Nunn-Lugar funds. That $30 million that is in-
vested so far has been part of that funding. As you know, that is
very important to Dr. Perry. It has also been a subject of much de-
bate and discussion among the Congress. To date, much of that in-
vestment has gone to helping the Russians meet their treaty com-
mitments, some of which, including $25 million that has helped the
Russians dismantle their missile compartments, has some applica-
tion in this area, although it is not designed exclusively to address
environmental management practices, but further direction by Con-
gress to us in this area could be helpful.

Mr. Weldon. I will just say on the record that you have my as-
surance that I will assist you in the administration's attempt or
success in finding the money to reprogram for this, because a re-
programming request from the administration to us carries with it
the authorization that is needed to fund the program. So if we, in
fact, can get the administration to work with us in that regard, I
will perform my task in helping you through the process and would
just offer that to you for further consideration. I am sure we will
be discussing that in the future.

One final question, and I appreciate you answering the question
on the U.S. naval reactor program. I am not here to trash anyone,
because I do not have any hidden agenda here. It is just to find
out the facts.

I have been told, and I want to ask this question on the record
just so I can get an answer, if not right now, perhaps for the
record, that there was a specific request made by Nicholai Yegeroff,
the Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy, back in, I think it was Feb-
ruary, to bring a team of Russians over — ^this request was made
through DOE so it did not go to DOD directly — ^to understand the
way that we remove reactor compartments from our ships. They
were going to go to Puget Sound, and then I think they wanted to
go to Hanford to see how this material is, in fact, handled by us.

I have been told that that was never responded to nor was
agreed to. Now, there may be reasons for that. Maybe there are se-
curity reasons. Maybe there are other things that I do not know
about and perhaps maybe did not even occur. Perhaps you cannot
answer this for the record, but I would appreciate a response to
know whether or not — I know the reqeust was made, because I
have a copy of Yegeroff s letter, but was there a response? Was it
negative? And if it was negative, why, so that I can better under-
stand.

Perhaps there are areas in which we cannot work with the Rus-
sians, and I need to understand that. But I do not have that an-
swer now and I would appreciate it if you could help me get that,
if you do not have an answer now, which I assume you do not.

Ms. Goodman. I am not personally familiar with it but I will get
you the answer. I do know that under the auspices of the Depart-
ment of Energy, a Russian delegation has been to Hanford and I
will look into this invitation.

Mr. Weldon. I will give you a copy of the letter. Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted to ask Ms. Goodman about the statement that you
made about the Department studies indicate the immediate threat
to human health and the food chain in the Arctic is negligible.
What is that based upon, what assessment?

Ms. Goodman. That is based on the studies that have been con-
ducted by the Office of Naval Research, which Admiral Pelaez will
address, as well as other research conducted by Russia and Nor-
way. As I also said in my next sentence, that is not necessarily a
sign for complacency. It is an indication that there is not an imme-
diate risk to human health and that most of what we can detect
today is localized as opposed to spreading throughout the Arctic.

But there is reason to continue to understand the Arctic environ-
ment better, particularly to understand the impact of chemicals
and persistent organic pollutants. Those are as important, perhaps
more important in their environmental effect than the radioactive
contaminants.

Mr. Kennedy. How is this measured, can you tell me? How are
these assessments made? Can you give me a description of how the
study was conducted?

Ms. Goodman. There were a whole series of studies, and what
I would like to do is ask Admiral Pelaez in his testimony to address
that so that he can give you the best technically accurate state-
ment on that.

Mr. Kennedy. That is terrific. Thank you.

If I could just ask Dr. Hecht, what you were talking about was
essentially how prospectively we keep this stuff from ever getting
dumped to begin with, just so that we can understand what your
testimony was, because I think it is confusing for us, talking about
ocean dumping, when we are thinking about all the sites out there,
to distinguish between what has been dumped and what you are
working on doing and that is building a facility so that they do not
ever have to dump it. They put it and process it in the facility.

I applaud your efforts, but I just wanted to make that very clear,
because the threat of contamination spreading is as much a part
of keeping the thing from ever being dumped as it is keeping what
has already been dumped from spreading. It may seem like I am
splitting hairs here, but it was not clear to me. I think it is impor-
tant for the committee later on to understand what you are doing
is prospective and it is not looking back at what has already been
done.

Dr. Hecht. You are quite correct. I think in stages, thanks to the
report of Dr. Yablokov, and I think you really cannot underesti-
mate the importance of that white paper, we have the history of

a series of dumpings, radioactive waste in the Arctic, with subse-
quent studies both by ship traverse and other means to determine
whether that past dumping poses a significant threat to the Arctic
nations.

The bulk of the information right now, as just described by
Sherri and others, is that it is localized. It does not seem to have
gotten into the full food chain and poses, at least for the moment,
no serious environmental risk to the health and safety of the Arctic
nations.

The problem is to make certain that we monitor and fully docu-
ment where they all are and make sure there are no surprises here
that we do not know about yet, and second, to ensure that as we
go forward with further decommissioning, further retirement of
vessels, that the ocean is not used as the disposal grounds for
them. That means in the Arctic, a facility both for the liquid and
the solid. In the Far East, as the chairman has pointed out, an
area of an equal problem. And what we have done with our efforts
in Murmansk is to ensure that we create the right policy and polit-
ical framework and technical capability to move away from the
ocean, in this case, Arctic dumping.

Mr. Kennedy. Let me ask you finally, do we have hard science
on how soluble and what the chemical compounds of all these dif-
ferent toxics are and the environment in the ocean that they are
in, how deep it is, how cold it is, how much current there is, so that
with each of these sites we can say that it is safe?

What I need is to hear that there is hard science that says, we
know where this is. We know that this will not dissolve. We know
the containers. The containers are two inches thick here and we do
not have to worry about this thing deteriorating any time soon, and
if it does, it is going nowhere because the current is not — I mean,
do we have all that?

Dr. Hecht. I would say that my best answer to you is, let us do
it in writing. But I think on the information that we have, one can
draw certain conclusions, and the information that we have in-
cludes some of the information you are requesting, in addition to
some modeling about how the currents are moving.

Mr. Kennedy. But can we have predictive models? You can tell
me now, we have an inventory of 10 sites, ones at this step, ones
at this step, and here is how much we have of this radionuclide
and you can give me the power of it and the like, and then we can
use, given what we know about the ocean and the salinity and the
temperature and the rest, and you can do predictive models saying
when this is going to become a problem and when it is not. I mean,
can you do that kind of a model?

Dr. Hecht. On principle, yes, but let me defer the question and
get back to you in terms of really what is the quality of the data
that we have now, what are the models that are available. It goes
beyond what I have at my fingertips. Let me give you kind of the
assessment that forms the basis of our current thinking.

Ms. Goodman. Congressman, I believe Admiral Pelaez will be
able to address those questions for you in his testimony and, in
fact, has prepared a briefing on those issues.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you very much.

Mr. Weldon. I thank our colleague and thank both of you for
coming in today, for your excellent testimony, and I appreciate your
follow-up to questions that need to be resolved. Thank you both
very much.

Our third panel, the assessment panel, we are pleased to have
join us Admiral Marc Pelaez, the Chief of Naval Research for the
Department of the Navy; Dr. Garrett Brass, Director of the Arctic
Research Commission; and Dr. Lawrence Gershwin, National Intel-
ligence Council.

Thank you all for appearing. We welcome you to the committees
and we will, without objection, enter your statements into the
record as written and you can be prepared to discuss whatever
comments you would like to make. We will start off with Admiral
Pelaez. Thank you for coming in.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MARC PELAEZ, CHIEF OF NAVAL
RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

Admiral Pelaez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
members. I do appreciate the opportunity to discuss this important
program that the Office of Naval Research has been conducting for
the Congress, actually. It was a congressional initiative, and I
think a very good one.

The Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program, and we have
used the acronym ANWAP in a number of fora, was initiated in
1993 as a result of United States congressional concern over the
disposal of nuclear materials by the former Soviet Union, as we
have all heard. It had three principal science and technology objec-
tives— and at the risk of burdening the committee, I am going to
go through a little bit of that and try and answer the questions
that the committee and its staff has posed — the magnitude and lo-
cation of radioactive waste in the Arctic marine environment, the
transport pathways of radioactive contamination through the Arctic
basin and the present levels away from the various contamination
sources, and third, the impact on the environment and human
health from observed and projected radioactive contamination.

I would say that this program has strong linkages with both na-
tional and international organizations concerned with the Arctic
environment, including, and I have a fairly long list in my testi-
mony but I will summarize some of them, the U.S. Interagency
Arctic Research Policy Committee, the Grore-Chemomyrdin Com-
mission Environment Committee, the NATO Committee for Chal-
lenges in Modem Society, Norwegian bilateral cooperations. Inter-
national Arctic Seas Assessment Program, Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy, Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program,
and the U.S. State Department, Department of Energy, and Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency programs. So I think it has been con-
ducted in very much a joint government and international pro-
gram.

Russian participation in the program has been an area of par-
ticular emphasis, with over 10 percent, for instance, in 1995 of the
funds going to Russian institutions. Russian collaboration included
exchange of data, radionuclide source term characterization, a mon-
itoring feasibility study, radiological dose assessment to large ani-
mals, cooperative surveys throughout the Arctic basin and Siberian

river systems, and a human health survey in the Tamyr region.
Seven other countries have also participated in this program.

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, before outlining some
of ANWAP's accomplishments and addressing your interest in a fu-
ture research agenda, I want to emphasize the tremendous lever-
age this program has enjoyed. The results achieved to date in ad-
dressing an acute problem of national concern would never have
been possible in 3 short years without the prior decades of basic
research investment by my organization in the Arctic. A high-qual-
ity pool of scientists with high-latitude expertise, reliable and accu-
rate field instruments, and powerful numerical models were all
available when we needed them.

This technology base grew from our sustained commitment to re-
search in the Arctic. The $30 million of this particular program's
effort has capitalized on more than $500 million of research over
the last 30 years. This is a good example of how wise investment
in science and technology pays dividends for national security in a
world where threats may come in unexpected forms.

The over 70 different projects in this pro-am include field sur-
veys, laboratory experiments, modeling studies, and archival data
analysis. Over 120 investigators from academic institutions, gov-
ernment laboratories and agencies, foreign institutions, and indus-
try are participating.

I have brought several posters which I would like to refer to dur-
ing my presentation, and I would point out that Lt. Comdr. Bob
Edson is my program manager. He is an oceanographer in this
field.

The first poster, and I know it is difficult to read but I think you
can see it in context, shows the research surveys which this pro-
gram has sponsored over the last 3 years in order to quantify the
radionuclide levels and the relevant transport pathways. Twenty-
three multinational and multidisciplinary cruises, including the
submarine USS Cavalla, have conducted survey operations. These
surveys have collected water, sediment, and biological samples and
have covered the Eastern Arctic near the dump sites, the Ob,
Yenisey, Lena, Kalema, and Anadyr River systems, the Kara,
Laptev, East Siberian, Chuckchea, Beaufort, and Bearing Seas, and
across the Arctic basin.

Surveys provide the necessary chemical, physical, and biological
baseline data to understand environmental processes and to assess
the potential threat of radioactive contamination to the Alaskan
economy, for example, or the health of U.S. citizens in that region,
which was one of the interests of the congressional mandate.

The results of the sampling support the preUminary conclusion,
and I will say preliminary because, as I will state later, our final
report will probably be out early in 1997 as we are still analyzing
data, the preUminary conclusion that the radioactive waste dis-
posal activities of the Soviet Union have to date not significantly
impacted the Arctic environment.

On the next chart, one of the methods used for tracking radio-
nuclide contamination is analysis of sediment cores. A representa-
tive core sample taken from the old estuary by the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institute is shown in this poster. These cores show
a clear record of radioactivity levels back to the prenuclear age. A

peak radioactivity level is seen in the early 1960's, coincident with
a cessation of the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. Levels
fall off after this point, continuing to fall to the present day with
the exception of a small signal from the Chernobyl accident.

Research surveys further upriver have supported the Russian re-
ports that radioactivity is measured above background levels only
when one gets within a few hundred kilometers of the nuclear fa-
cilities. Surveys of the Anadyr River, the closest major Russian Si-
berian river to Alaska, have shown a very clean, nearly pristine en-
vironment. Now, those sites that we talked about, the dump sites,
the holding sites, the processing plants are not in that river sys-
tem. It is only at very localized sites in the Kara Sea region that
elevated radionuclide concentrations are identified.

The major conclusion from the program sampling so far is that
the largest signals for regionwide radionuclide contamination in
the Arctic marine environment appear to arise from atmospheric
testing of nuclear weapons, nuclear fuel reprocessing wastes from
facilities in Western Europe and accidents such as Chernobyl, in
that order.

This program is not restricted to in situ sampling but has also
developed a suite of very sophisticated models to analyze transport
of radionuclides throughout the Arctic basin. The core of this suite
is the Navy's operational polar ice prediction model, which has
been adapted to address contaminant transport questions. It is im-
portant to note that this is a physics-based model requiring the lat-
est supercomputing resources to operate.

Now, I have a presentation, both a poster of one piece of the out-
put, but I have right here next to me, if we can turn the lights,
Dr. Ruth Preller from the Naval Research Laboratory who is in
charge of this model, and I have a video which should show the
model running over a 10-year period.

[A video tape was played.]

Admiral Pelaez. I think it is important to note that in that sim-
ulation, Mr. Chairman, it has some conservatism in it. It assumed
a constant rate of discharge out of these rivers, but it did not give
any consideration for settling that might occur, so we assumed full
transport and mixing to be the case there, which does become more
conservative. I cannot say it is the worst case because it was a con-
stant introduction over a 10-year period.

But that is the sort of thing that we have the capability of pre-
dicting very accurately and being able to look at various situations
of potential contaminants entering those three river systems. We
have similar models that will show, for instance, contamination en-
tering at other points.

^^^lile the physical processes which affect contaminant transport
may vary from one contaminant to the next, it should be noted that
this model, as well as the other models developed, are robust
enough. They can show that transport throughout the basin. There-
fore, the tremendous investment I believe that has been made in
this has far-reaching applications, much beyond the specific man-
date of this program.

At this time, radionuclide concentrations in Alaskan waters re-
main at background levels, and I am talking about the manmade
radionuclides. Indeed, human radiation dosage from naturally oc-

curring isotopes, such as polonium-210 in fish, are 100 times high-
er than that fi-om contaminated sources at present in Alaskan wa-
ters, both Arctic and Pacific. Our measurements of marine life thus
far, and it tracks around the world, show that there are naturally
occurring radioactive sources throughout the world that today we
measure at 100 times the effects that we are seeing from any man-
made, and that includes the nuclear weapons testing.

If disposal is controlled in the future, the main risk will be ex-
treme contaminant releases from existing waste sites, particularly
along the major rivers. This possibility remains one of the most in-
tensive areas of research within our program. A major progi*am
goal was to develop innovative monitoring techniques and tech-
nologies. I think that some of the other witnesses said we need to
have continuing monitoring and we are trying to assess and de-
velop innovative technology and monitoring techniques to allow us
to put in place a cost-effective monitoring strategy for critical
transport and food chain pathways.

While United States monitoring efforts are aimed at waters near
Alaska, this program is also working with the Russian investiga-
tors to develop monitoring strategies for Russian coastal waters.

The program is currently working on a formal, integrated risk
assessment of the radioactive waste in the Arctic environment.
This assessment is being accomplished by a team of individuals
from institutions, laboratories which have had experience in this
area. The first iteration of the risk assessment will be completed
by late spring/early summer 1996 and our intent is to submit that
for peer review by the scientific community to get any potential
criticisms and be able to address them appropriately and incor-
porate them in our final risk assessment, which I believe, as I said,
will be out in about spring 1997.

This program and the Navy, as a matter of policy, will ensure
the prompt and accurate communication of the research results
and the final risk assessment to the citizens of the State of Alaska,
and we have had quite a bit of interaction with them as they are
one of the concerned parties from the United States, and the Amer-
ican public and policy makers, of course. The details of environ-
mental studies and all environmental concerns are clearly of the
utmost importance to the Navy and to our national interests. Inter-
action with Alaskan Native groups is ongoing, and every effort is
being made to integrate the local populus into the process and ad-
dress their concerns.

Clearly, both research and monitoring must continue to guard
against the threat of contamination of both domestic waters and
international waters. We also recognize that potential contami-
nants include a broader spectrum of substances than the radio-
nuclides investigated by direction in our program. The program's
research will produce an initial integrated risk assessment that can
be used to develop an effective research and monitoring strategy.
Implementing such a strategy must be a multiagency endeavor.
Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee has begun this proc-
ess, and the Navy will continue its active role in interagency co-
ordinated activities.

The U.S. Navy is in a strong position to support any future ef-
forts in this area, providing both innovative technology, sampling

35-799 96-4

systems, and numerical models, and an enhanced understanding, I
will say, as a result of this program, of the environment to enable
these powerful tools to be efficiently and cost effectively employed.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Pelaez follows:]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY
COMMITTEE (RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE)
AND THE HOUSE RESOURCES
COMMITTEE (FISHERIERS,
WILDLIFE AND OCEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE)

STATEMENT OF

REAR ADMIRAL MARC PELAEZ
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH

BEFORE THE

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

AND THE

FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE

OF THE

HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

OCEAN DUMPING OF NUCLEAR AND HAZARDOUS WASTE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNTIL
RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE

(RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE) AND THE
HOUSE RESOURCES COMMITTEE

(FISHERIERS, WILDLIFE AND
OCEANS SUBCOMMITTEE)

REAR ADMIRAL MARC Y. E. PELAEZ
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH

RADM Pelaez became the 18th Chief of Naval Research
on June 18, 1993. A native of Hollywood, Florida, RADM
Pelaez is a 1968 graduate of the United States Naval Academy.
He was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in 1993.

Following training in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program in 1969, RADM Pelaez reported aboard the USS
SIMON BOLIVAR (SSBN 641), where he held various
divisional and departmental assigiunents, culminating in duties
as Engineer Officer. In 1972, he was transferred to the Naval
Military Persormel Command, Submarine/Nuclear Power
Division, where he served as the assignment officer for all
nuclear trained junior submarine officers. Upon graduation
from the Submarine Officers Advanced Course in New London,
Connecticut in 1976, RADM Pelaez was assigned as Engineer
Officer, USS TUNNY (SSN 682). After a successful three-year tour, he was transferred to the USS
JAMES MONROE (SSBN 622), where he served as Executive Officer. During his tour, the JAMES
MONROE was awarded the Battle Efficiency CE") award and was chosen "Best Fleet Ballistic Missile
Submarine' in the Atlantic Fleet.

In 1981, RADM Pelaez was assigned as Assistant for Research and Development Submarines,
Naval Sea Systems Command, Washington, D.C. He was transferred in 1984, ass\iming command of the
nuclear attack submarine USS SUNFISH (SSN 649). Under his command, the SUNFISH was awarded
two meritorious unit commendations. After completion of this tour, RADM Pelaez became the program
manager for the Advanced Submarine Combat System at the Naval Sea Systems Command. As a result
of congressional direction to start a comprehensive submarine technology program, RADM Pelaez was
detached in January 1988 to a joint assigiunent at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) as program manager of the Advanced Submarine Technology Program. After completion of
his DARPA assigiunent, RADM Pelaez became Executive Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition) (ASN(RD8tA)).

As the Chief of Naval Research, RADM Pelaez manages the science and technology programs of
the Navy and Marine Corps from basic research through advanced technology development
Organizational entities reporting to the Chief of Naval Research include the four directorates of the
Office of Naval Research (ONR); the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, D.C. and its field
activities; and ONR's overseas offices in Tokyo and London. ONR's aimual budget of approximately
$1.5 billion is allocated for research and development work conducted at universities, Navy
laboratories, and industry.

RADM Pelaez reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy via ASN(RD8tA). He is the Navy's
science and technology executive, and ranks organizationally vnth Deputy Assistant Secretaries of the
Navy.

RADM Pelaez's awards include the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit with
gold star, the Meritorious Service Medal with gold star, the Navy Commendation Medal with gold star,
the Navy Achievement Medal, a Navy Unit Commendation, three Meritorious Unit Commendations, the
Battle "E" Ribbon, the Navy Expeditionary Medal, the National Defense Service Medal, and the Sea
Service Ribbon (five awards).

RADM Pelaez is married to the former Sheila Prom of Miami Springs, Florida. They have two
children, John and Jeannine.

STATEMENT OF
REAR ADMIRAL MARC PELAEZ
CHIEF OF NAVAL RESEARCH

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee and
staff, I appreciate this opportunity to discuss the impact of
radioactive waste disposed in the marine environment by the
Former Soviet Union, and to discuss the Office of Naval
Research's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program (ANWAP) .

OVERVIEW

In the early 1990 's, new information on environmental
conditions in the Former Soviet Union (FSU) became available.
One revelation concerned the large quantities of radioactive
waste disposed in the marine environment and in the catchment
basins of several Arctic river systems. The 1993 Yablokov Report
to the President of Russia officially documented the scope of the
radioactive waste problem and described disposal sites of both
high and low level waste in both the Arctic and North Pacific.
Other potential sources of radioactive contamination in the
Arctic are the nuclear fuel processing facilities and nuclear
power reactors in the water sheds of the Ob and Yenisey Rivers.
These facilities have deposited significant waste into the
environment with risk of contamination of the river systems
draining into the Arctic Basin.

ARCTIC NUCLEAR WASTE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

The ANWAP was initiated in 1993 as a result of U.S.
Congressional concern over the disposal of nuclear materials by
the Former Soviet Union into the Arctic marine environment.
Total funding has been $30 million dollars over 3 years. The
science and technology aspects of ANWAP are conducted by the
Ocean, Atmosphere and Space Modeling and Prediction Division of
the Office of Naval Research. ANWAP objectives are to determine:

a) the magnitude and location of radioactive waste in the
Arctic marine environment;

b) the transport pathways of radioactive contamination
through the Arctic basin and the present levels away
from the various contamination sources; and

c) the impact on the environment and human health from
observed and projected radioactive contamination.

ANWAP emphasizes impact on Alaska, and has strong linkages

with both national and international organizations concerned with
the Arctic environment including the:

U.S. Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee;
Gore /Chernomyrdin Commission Environment Committee;
NATO Committee for Challenges in Modern Society;
Norwegian bilateral cooperations;
International Arctic Seas Assessment Program;
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy;
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program; and
U.S. State Department, Department of Energy, and
Environmental Protection Agency.

Ten percent of the funds have gone to Russian institutions
for research or logistical support, with over $1 million dollars
committed in FY1995. Russian collaboration includes:

exchange of data;

radionuclide source term characterization;
a monitoring feasibility study;

a radiological dose assessment to large animals;
cooperative surveys of the Kara, Laptev, and East
Siberian Seas, the Ob and Yenisey Rivers;
• a human health study in the Tamyr region.

CAPITALIZING ON OUR RESEARCH BASE

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, before outlining
some ANWAP accomplishments and addressing your interests in a
future research agenda, I want to emphasize the tremendous
leverage this Program has enjoyed. The results achieved to date
in addressing an acute problem of national concern would never
have been possible in three short years without the prior decades
of basic research investment by ONR in the Arctic. A high quality
pool of scientists with high latitude expertise, reliable and
accurate field instruments, and powerful numerical models were
all available when we needed them. This technology base grew
from our sustained commitment to research in the Arctic. The $30
million dollars ANWAP effort has capitalized on well more than
$500 million dollars of effort for over 30 years. This is a good
example of how wise investment in science and technology pays
dividends for national security in a world where threats may come
in unexpected forms.

RESEARCH ACTIVITIES

The 70 different projects in ANWAP include field surveys,
laboratory experiments, modeling studies and archival data
analysis. Over 120 investigators from academic institutions,
government laboratories and agencies, foreign institutions, and
industry are participating. Surveys provide the necessary

chemical, physical, and biological baseline data to understand
environmental processes and to assess the potential threat of
radioactive contamination to the Alaskan economy or the health of
U.S. citizens. Twenty -three multi-national and multidisciplinary
cruises (FIGURE 1), including the U.S. submarine CAVALLA, have
collected water, sediment, and biological samples in the eastern
Arctic near the dump sites, in the Ob, Yenisey and Anadyr River
systems, the Kara, Laptev, East Siberian, and Beaufort Seas and
across the Arctic Basin. Processes investigated include:

• ice uptake and movement of radionuclides and sediment;

• density driven currents on Arctic shelves;

• sediment dynamics in the Kara Sea;

• interactions between colloids and radionuclides in the
Arctic river systems;

• corrosion of disposal barrier materials;

• identification of sentinel organisms for the monitoring
and evaluation of Arctic radionuclide contamination;

• radionuclide levels and bioconcentration in Arctic
animals;

• deposition of radionuclides due to interactions with
phytoplankton; and

• sublethal biological effects from radionuclide
contamination .

Transport modeling efforts account for marine surface and
subsurface layers, coastal currents, estuarine and river water,
and ground water over a broad range of spatial and temporal
scales. Near -field modeling at dump sites includes sediment re-
distribution physics and biology. Model validation and
integration are key ongoing activities that build upon decades of
previous research.

A major data compilation effort at the Naval Research
Laboratory (NRL) uses a Geographic Information System to analyze
changes in marine radionuclide levels over space and time. The
three largest contamination signals in the Arctic region can be
seen in Cesium-137 distributions in the surface layer {0-50m) of
the ocean. Fallout from atmospheric bomb tests, which ceased in
the early 1960's, resulted in elevated levels (10-20 Bq/m3)
throughout the region that have since decayed considerably.
Radioactive waste discharges from the Sellafield re-processing
facility, which peaked during the early 1980 's, can now be traced
(10-30 Bq/m3) throughout the eastern Arctic basin following the
major oceanic current systems. Trace amounts of this source have
recently been detected in the Ji/estern Arctic as well. In the
1990 "s, the Sellafield signal has decreased and the effects of
the Chernobyl accident dominate, particularly in the Baltic (over
100 Bq/m3) . Signatures of these events can also be seen in
sediment cores throughout the region (FIGURE 2) . At this time,
concentrations in Alaskan waters remain at background levels.

consistent with model predictions (FIGURE 3). Indeed, human
radiation dosage from naturally occurring isotopes such as
polonium-210 in fish are two orders of magnitude higher than that
from contaminated sources at present in Alaskan waters (both
Arctic and Pacific) . If disposal is controlled in the future,
the main risk will be extreme contaminant releases from existing
waste sites, particularly along the major rivers. Local sites of
elevated radionuclide concentration from dumping and weapons
testing have also been identified in the Kara Sea region.

Pre-existing and new radionuclide data as well as
bathymetric, sediment, chemical and physical information are
included in a major ANWAP data base project. This database
effort is being conducted jointly with the Arctic Monitoring and
Assessment Program and the International Arctic Marine
Radioactive Contamination Database in Norway, and is jointly
funded by the Norwegian government. The database project is also
being coordinated with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
Korean investigators to prevent duplication and ensure that all
date is compatible and accessible to the worldwide scientific
community.

MONITORING AND ASSESSMENT

A major ANWAP goal is to develop innovative monitoring
techniques and technologies and an integrated cost-effective
monitoring strategy for critical transport and food-chain
pathways. While U.S. monitoring efforts are aimed at waters near
Alaska, ANWAP is also working with Russian investigators to
develop monitoring strategies for Russian coastal waters. This
year, for example, a project was initiated to investigate
monitoring dumped materials in Stepovogo Bay.

Research results are being synthesized into an integrated
risk assessment for radiological dosage to man and the
environment. These new tools enable evaluation of existing and
future radionuclide contamination as well as other pollutants.
The risk assessment includes consideration of extreme events such
as river floods, dam failures, and accidents at civilian power
plants and other nuclear facilities. An output of this effort
will also be a sensitivity /uncertainty analyses to help guide
future research. Factors with the greatest impact on risk will
be given top priority for research.

COMMUNICATION

A continuing goal of ANWAP and the Navy, as a matter of
policy, is to promptly and accurately communicate the results of
the research and the final risk assessment to the citizens of the
State of Alaska, and the American public and policy makers. The
details of environmental studies and all environmental concerns
are of the utmost important to the Navy and the U.S. policy.

Interaction with Alaskan native groups is ongoing, and every
effort is being made to integrate the local populace into the
process, and address their concerns at every step of the process.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, both research and monitoring must continue to guard
against the threat of contamination of domestic waters. We also
recognize that potential contaminants include a broader spectrum
of substances than the radionuclides investigated by direction in
our Program. ANWAP research will produce an initial, integrated
risk assessment that can be used to develop an effective research
and monitoring strategy. Implementing such a strategy must be a
multi -agency endeavor. Inter -agency Arctic Research Policy
Committee has begun this process, and the Navy will continue its
active role in inter -agency coordinated activities. If funded,
our contribution, consistent with our overall mission, will be
innovative technology, both sampling systems and numerical
models, and an enhanced understanding of the environment to
enable these powerful tools to be efficiently and cost-
effectively deployed. We look forward to continued working with
the other agencies who are responsible for long term monitoring
and risk assessment.

100

Figure 1

101

C8-137 Distribution in a Core
from tlie Ob River Deita

1992

i ><. Cs-137from

^ 1986

1 ^ Chernobyl

1 T Accident

g 1978

f ^N.

j^ "^^

.•^^

m ^*V».

■"S 1970

1 Atmospheric >v

f Bomb Fallout ^^\^

15 1

§■

■^

Ifii' ^^0^^^^^^^""^

C 1962

^^K ^

20 CO

^B j.of"''''^^

^^^b^^"^""^^

^^^Dk

52 1954

Wm-

25 g

I^Ik

^^^^

^Hk-

gl946

^BL^^'fe^ucleai' Age

0 12 3 4

Cs-137 Activity (disintegration/minute/gram)

Figure 2

102

OCEAN CURRENirrRACER (15M)

RV+SLFD

Levels of radioactivity (in PCi/1) in the surface level of the ocean at the end
of ten years. Source locations are the Ob, the Yenisei and the Pechora
rivers as well as Sellafield. Vectors represent surface level ocean currents.

Figure 3

103

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Admiral.
Dr. Brass.

STATEMENT OF DR, GARRETT W. BRASS, DIRECTOR, ARCTIC
RESEARCH COMMISSION

Dr. Brass. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity. I did
submit written testimony, which you have already agreed to enter
into the record.

With me is Mr. Greorge Newton, who is a member of the Commis-
sion and is here to answer any questions you may have on the sci-
entific ice experiment with the Navy nuclear submarine that I will
mention.

Mr. Weldon. Welcome.

Dr. Brass. It is not necessary to elaborate on the testimony al-
ready given here on the extent of the threat of contamination of the
Arctic, especially by emissions from the former Soviet Union. Envi-
ronmental concerns were of a pretty low priority in the former So-
viet Union and many potential contaminants are widespread and
either uncontained or only partially and insecurely stored.

The United States has been fortunate. The reactor accident at
Chernobyl occurred just a few short weeks after the annual dissipa-
tion of the stable Arctic haze layer, which would have trapped air-
borne contaminants and transported substantial amounts of radio-
active byproducts of the accident to the United States.

Similarly, the Komi oil spill occurred during winter when the riv-
ers and streams were frozen and the temperatures so low that the
oil did not flow easily. A summertime spill, particularly in one of
the oil fields closer to the seas and/or near a large and unfrozen
river would probably not have been contained, much less cleaned
up, and serious pollution of the Arctic Ocean and transport to our
shores would probably have been the result.

One indication of the ongoing risk that we suffer is that in the
former Soviet Union, an amount of oil greater than the amount
spilled from the Exxon Valdez is spilled every day.

On page 21 of the Commission's goals report, the Commission
recommended that the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy
Committee's Arctic Contaminants Initiative be fully funded. This
plan is included in one form in the biennial Arctic Research of the
United States Interagency Arctic Research Plan and in a more de-
tailed way in the blue-covered plan which I also submitted to your
office.

This program envisions an attack on four key classes of contami-
nants: Persistent organic compounds, trace and heavy metals,
radionuclides, and chronic hydrocarbon contamination. The pro-
gram is based on an integrated, comprehensive assessment includ-
ing data and information management, data rescue and synthesis,
observations, process-oriented research, model development, and
impact analysis and determination of risk.

Although constructed by lARPC to meet the Nation's needs and
approved by the Office of the President when the biennial revision
of the plan was approved, the plan is not included in the budget
request nor is it, as far as I can tell, included in any way in con-
gressional budget initiatives. The Office of Naval Research's Arctic
Nuclear Waste Assessment Program has not been funded this year

104

and that program will be rapidly winding down as the currently
appropriated funds are expended. The result is that the United
States will have no organized program for the study of contami-
nants in the Arctic.

The Federal agencies have not remained passively on the side-
lines even though the initiative was not passed, and we can look
to two other programs, one ongoing and one proposed. The ongoing
program is the scientific ice experiment, SCICEX. The Arctic Re-
search Commission coordinated the signing of an MOA between the
Navy, the National Science Foundation, NOAA, NSF, and the U.S.
Geological Survey for a program of annual deployments of a Navy
nuclear submarine into the Arctic Ocean.

This program, known as SCICEX, conducts an ambitious sci-
entific program and in 1995 has just finished its program in the
summertime. Four civilian scientists sailed in the USS Cavalla
from Pearl Harbor through the Bering Strait and into the Arctic
Ocean. The scientific program occupied 44 days and covered a track
of 10,800 nautical miles. The 1996 expedition is under active plan-
ning. It will sail in the coming summer on the USS Pogey.

These studies represent the best way that intermediate and
wide-ranging surveys can be carried out in the Arctic Ocean. The
mobility and endurance of the nuclear submarine makes it a re-
search platform without peer. The limited availability, the small
size of the science party, and the limitations in onboard working
space are obstacles which the scientific community has worked
hard to overcome with the outgoing and thorough cooperation of
the Navy and the active and enthusiastic participation of the sub-
marine's officers and crew.

This is a unique activity for civilian science and it has gone ex-
tremely well and yielded important results which are entering the
literature now. The oceanography meeting of the American Geo-
physical Union and ASLO, the American Society of Luminology and
Oceanography, next February will have a session on Arctic ocean-
ography every one of the 5 days.

We need to exploit this opportunity fully. The NOAA coastal Arc-
tic initiative is a planned initiative, and I sent over to you the
NOAA one-pager on that. There are more detailed descriptions of
the plans and I think they are still evolving, so I am not going to
go into any detail with them, but they do include integrated model-
ing of contaminant transport, establishment of an Alaska early
warning system, the assessment of contaminated coastal sites, and
an evaluation of risk to all comers.

You have asked about international cooperation and we want to
reinforce what has been said about the Arctic environmental pro-
tection strategy. I will not go into any details on AEPS, but it is
the view of the Arctic Research Commission and the Interagency
Arctic Research and Policy Committee that that is a major forum
for our international collaboration in understanding contamination
in the Arctic.

Mr. Chairman, the Nation needs an integrated program to study

fundamental questions in the Arctic, such as the paths by which

"materials of all kinds are transported in the Arctic and the proc-

ss which can transfer contaminants from one transport path to

105

another, such as the inclusion of contaminated sediment into sea
ice, a process we know happens but do not understand.

We need an inventory of contaminants throughout the Arctic,
particularly in the former Soviet Union, not just radionuclides but
all of the contaminants that we have discussed already.

We need to rescue historical data which can help us understand
phenomena such as the statistics of river flooding and the prob-
ability that the 100-year flood, the biggest flood that occurs in
every century, can mobilize contaminants that lay dormant almost
all of the rest of the time under normal river flow conditions.

We must look out for problems such as thaws of permafrost,
which global change appears to be bringing to the Arctic. They can
release from frozen soil where fluids are highly immobile into the
mobile liquid realm large quantities of pollutants.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, contamination in the
Arctic has a dangerous potential to affect the lives of citizens of the
United States and of the world. The Federal agencies have been ac-
tive in formulating plans for a comprehensive approach, but lack
of funding has crippled and fragmented their efforts. I am afraid
that the research, monitoring, and assessment necessary to meet
the nation's needs has a low priority in the budgetary process, and
as a result, the United States has not produced the integrated Arc-
tic research effort of which we are capable.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Brass follows:]

106

ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION

TESTIMONY

before the House Research and Development Subcommittee and the House Fisheries,
Wildlife and Ocean Subcommittee

Dr. Garrett W. Brass
Executive Director

Chairman Weldon, Chairman Saxton, members of the Committees, the Arctic Research
Commission thanks you for this opportunity to discuss the important question of
contamination in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic Research Commission was established
by the Arctic Research and Policy Act of 1984 (PL 98-373 as amended by PL 101-609)
which also established the Interagency Arctic Research and Policy Committee (lARPC).
lARPC is composed of representatives of the twelve agencies with research and/or
policy interests in the Arctic. The lARPC agencies are responsible for the National
Arctic Research Plan and, with guidance from the Commission, lARPC conducts a
biennial revision of the plan. I have brought with me several copies of the
Commission's Biennial Statement entitled Goals and Priorities to Guide United States
Arctic Research (the Goals Report) and copies of volume 9 (Spring '95) of the journal
Arctic Research of the United States published by lARPC which contains the most
recent revision of the US Arctic Research Plan for the years 1 996-2000.

I need not elaborate on testimony already given here on the extent of the threat of
contamination of the Arctic, especially by emissions from the Former Soviet Union
(FSU). Environmental concerns were of low priority in the FSU and many potential
contaminants are wide spread and either uncontained or only partially and insecurely
stored. The United States has been fortunate. The reactor accident at Chernobyl
occurred just a few short weeks after the annual dissipation of the stable Arctic Haze
layer which would have trapped airborne contaminants near the surface and would
probably have transported substantial amounts of radioactive byproducts of the
accident to the United States. Similarly, the Komi oil spill occurred during winter when
the rivers and streams were frozen and temperatures so low that the oil did not flow
easily. A summertime spill, particularly in one of the oil fields of closer to the sea and/or
near a larger and unfrozen river would probably not have been contained (much less
cleaned up) and serious pollution of the Arctic Ocean and transport to our shores would
probably have been the result. We have been lucky - very lucky - twice.

On page 21 of the Commission's Goals Report the Commission "recommends that the
lARPC Arctic Contaminants Initiative be fully funded." On pages 12-18 of the US Arctic
Research Plan. lARPC describes the Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment
Program. The publication of the Plan was approved by the office of the President. I

4350 NORTH FAIRFAX DRIVE, SUPTE 630, ARUNGTON, VIRGINIA 22203
703-525-01 11 _ . FAX 703-525-01 1 4

107

have also brought copies of the Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment
Program detailed description which includes budget figures for the various agencies
who wish to participate in the program.

This program envisions an attack on four key classes of contaminant in the Arctic: ♦
persistent organic compounds, trace and heavy metals, radionuclides and chronic
hydrocarbon contaminants. The Program is based on an integrated, comprehensive
assessment including:

Data and information management, data rescue and synthesis;

Observations;

Process-oriented research;

Model development; and

Impact analysis and determination of risk.

Although constructed by lARPC to meet the nation's needs and approved by the office
of the President, the plan is not included in budget requests nor is it, as far as I can tell,
included in any way in Congressional budget initiatives. The Office of Naval
Research's Arctic Nuclear Waste Assessment Program has not been funded this year
and that program will be rapidly winding down. The result is that the United States will
have no organized program for the study of contaminants in the Arctic.

The Federal agencies have not remained passively on the sidelines even though the
lARPC Initiative was not supported. We can look to one planned, two current and one
recent agency activity focussed on Arctic contamination. These are: The NOAA
Coastal Arctic Initiative, AEPS, SCICEX and AMAP.

The NOAA Coastal Arctic Initiative: The planned activity is the NOAA Coastal Arctic
Initiative, i have brought with me a few of the summary discussion notices of the NOAA
Coastal Arctic Initiative. This program is focussed on the problems affecting the coast
of the Arctic including the following activities:

Memoranda of Understanding for cooperation in the initiative between NOAA

and other Federal and State of Alaska agencies;

Formal accords and other arrangements for involvement in the initiative of the

North Slope Borough and regional organizations;

Preliminary assessment of the current extent and magnitude of contamination

and biological effects in the US Arctic;

Microcomputer-based information management and delivery system for the

Arctic for officials, international organizations and students;

Establishment of a long-term environmental and ecosystem monitoring network

in the US Arctic;

Establishment of an Alaskan Early Warning System so that catastrophic events

can be monitored;

Integrated modeling of contaminant transport and exposure pathways, especially

108

radionuclides and persistent organic pollutants; and
• Assessment of contaminated coastal sites in terms of potential risks to regional
or local environmental quality, biota and ecosystems, habitats, human and
coastal economies.

More information on this program can be obtained from NOAA as it develops its plans.
I expect that NOAA will request funds for their Coastal Arctic Initiative in the next
budget cycle.

The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy: Many of the concerns expressed
about Arctic contaminants are addressed by an international program known as the
Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). AEPS is currently divided into five
studies:

The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP);
The Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF);
Preservation of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME);
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR); and
The Sustainable Development Working Group.

The United States is a full participant in the AEPS and the lARPC Agencies are
responsible for supporting participation in working groups and producing reports on US
data and activities. Unfortunately, this program was adopted without a new funding
base and the lARPC Agencies are forced to curtail current activities to provide funds for
AEPS participation. In these time of budget stringency this task is difficult and
international participants and observers have expressed concern to me that US
participation in the AEPS system has been weak.

SCICEX: The Arctic Research Commission has coordinated the signing of a
Memorandum of Agreement between the US Navy, the National Science Foundation,
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Office of Naval Research
and the US Geological Survey for a program of annual deployments of a Navy nuclear
attack submarine into the Arctic Ocean. This program, known as SCICEX, conducted
an ambitious scientific program to study the Arctic Ocean in 1995. Four civilian
scientists sailed in the USS Cavalla from Pearl Harbor, through the Bering Straits and
into the Arctic Ocean. The scientific program occupied 44 days and covered a track
10,800 nautical miles long. The 1996 expedition is under active planning and review
now and subsequent expeditions are mapped out until 1999. These studies represent
the best way that immediate and wide ranging surveys can be carried out in the Arctic.
The mobility and endurance of the nuclear submarine makes it a research platform
without peer. The limited availability, the small size of the science party and the
limitations on onboard work space are obstacles which the scientific community has
worked hard to overcome with the outgoing and thorough cooperation of the Navy and
the active and enthusiastic participation of the submarine's officers and crew. This is a
unique activity for civilian science in the Arctic and the junction of academic and military

109

cultures has gone extremely well and yielded important results which are entering the
literature now.

ANWAP: The ANWAP study which Admiral Pelaez has/will described in some detail
had a limited objective - the potential for contamination of the Arctic Ocean and
adjacent seas by past and present submarine and icebreaker reactor operations by the
FSU. But this program's limited objectives and short duration have only allowed us to
glimpse what needs to be done.

The nation needs need a an integrated program to study fundamental questions in the
Arctic such as the paths by which material of ail kinds are transported in the Arctic, the
process which can transfer contaminants from one transport path to another such as
the inclusion of contaminated sediment into sea ice, a process we know occurs but
don't understand well. We need an inventory of contaminants throughout the Arctic,
particularly in the FSU and we need to rescue historical data which can help us
understand phenomena such as the statistics of river flooding and the probability that
the "1 00 year flood" can mobilize contaminants which have lain dormant for years. We
need to watch and at the same time to develop the means to mitigate these risks when
they occur.

Chairman Weldon, Chairman Saxton, members of the Committees, contamination in
the Arctic has a dangerous potential to affect the lives of citizens of the US and of the
world. The Federal agencies have been active in formulating plans for a
comprehensive approach to the problem but lack of funding has crippled and
fragmented their efforts. Furthermore, the provisions of the Arctic Research and Policy
Act which require OSTP to "consult closely with the Interagency Committee and the
Commission to guide the Office of Technology Policy's efforts (SEC. 110. (a)(2).)" have
not been adhered to. Neither has the requirement that 0MB "consider all Federal
agency requests for research related to the Arctic as one, integrated, coherent, and
multiagency request, which shall be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget
prior to submission of the President's annual budget request for adherence to the Plan
(SEC. 110. (b)(1).)" I am afraid that the research, monitoring and assessment
necessary to meet the nation's needs has a low priority in the budgetary process. As a
result, the United States has not produced the integrated Arctic research effort of which
we are capable.

Mr. VVkldon. Thank you. Dr. Brass.
Dr. Gershwin, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. l^WRENCE K. GERSHWIN, NATIONAL
INTELUGENCE COUNCIL

Dr. Gershwin. Mr. Chairman. I would like to make a few re-
marks about some unique capabilities that the intelligence commu-
nity has brought to bear on this problem and some observations we
have on the Russian contamination issue.

The intelligence community has published a number of classified
intelligence reports on the magnitude and nature of environmental
contamination in the former Soviet Union and that includes a na-
tional intelligence estin\ate produced last year. In June this year,
the CIA presented a classified report to several members of your
committee. 1 would like to just briefly mention a few highlights of
some of our analysis.

Regarding the Yablokov Report. April 1993. that report obviously
presents a clear, credible picture oi the magnitude of the former
boviet and Russian radioactive waste dumping at sea. and the CIA
has. in many instances, corroborated that report. CIA analysis
shows that solid and liquid radioactive wastes were dumped and
that barges and ships that were possibly contaminated by or laden
with radioactive waste were, in fact, scuttled.

Measurements indicate that the Arctic has also been contami-
nated by industrial sources. These pollutants include chemicals,
heavy metals, and organics and are generally transported into the
Arctic by atmospheric and water-borne paths and are generally ac-
cepted to be the primary components of what is known as Arctic
haze, a phenomenon similar to lower latitude smog.

The CIA is aware of research being conducted on industrial con-
taminants in the Kara Sea. but I must defer comments on that
issue to a closed and classified session.

Russian policy on nuclear waste is truly murky and subject to
sudden changes because of the large number of organizations in-
volved and constiintly changing laws and decrees, some of which,
in fact, are conflicting, as has already been obser^-ed today. Russia
has several laws and Government decrees that stipulate procedures
for accepting, handling, and disposing of nuclear wastes.

One murky area is the acceptance of foreign nuclear waste,
which can be reprocessed but not permanently stored in Russia.
However. Russia's definition of permanent storage is unclear and
Moscow has not resolved whether or not it will accept nuclear
waste from other former Soviet States and countries with Russian
nuclear reactors.

Some of the Russian Government's recent actions send a trou-
bling signal regarding Moscow's commitment to stopping nuclear
waste dumping in the Arctic waters. For example, a presidential
decree that was issued in July that has been referred to earlier re-
scinds an earlier edict that, in fact, established civilian oversight
of the militar>''s management of radioactive waste. This effectively.
by rescinding this, effectively allows the Russian military to police
its own dumping practices, uncontrolled by civilian authority.

According to a report released recently by the Norsvegian en\'i-
ronmental group Bellona, which works closely with Russian envi-

Ill

ronrnental groups, the main nuclear storage facility of Russia's
northern fleet is makeshift, dilapidated, and contains 1,000 times
more radiation than the largest of this year's French nuclear tests.

While this report was being prepared, Bellona's offices in Mur-
mansk were raided by the Russian Federal security service, essen-
tially the successors to the KGB, which confiscated all of Bellona's
materials on radioactive waste generated by the northern fleet and
later called in for questioning many of Bellona's Russian contacts.

Bellona's experience attests to the growing difficulties that West-
em and Russian environmental groups confront in trying to mon-
itor military nuclear waste management in the fact of nationalist
political pressures, skepticism about foreign involvement in mili-
tary matters, and especially the steady widening of the powers en-
joyed by Russia's internal security services, and this trend, we
think, is most worrisome.

Turning to some of the intelligence community's activities, we
are now engaged in a number of new cooperative projects that
bring unconventional resources to bear on these issues. As part of
the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission effort, the United States and
Russia have agreed to share products derived from national intel-
ligence assets to help solve environmental problems of concern to
both countries. The proposed projects include a study of the Arctic.

In addition to the intelligence community, prominent U.S. sci-
entists brought together by the Environmental Task Force are
playing an important role in this endeavor. As many of you may
be aware, the Environmental Task Force was established in 1992
to determine how our Nation's national security assets could help
answer key environmental questions in addition to fulfilling their
more standard intelligence and defense role.

The ETF brought together a team of about 50 prominent U.S. en-
vironmental and global change scientists, now known as MEDEA,
who have been reviewing our most advanced reconnaissance sat-
ellite programs and Navy systems to determine what unique envi-
ronmental and global change information could be derived from
them. Working with both our intelligence and defense communities,
MEDEA conducted several demonstrations that addressed specific
environmental questions.

I would like to summarize those aspects of this work that would
help address the environmental impact of radionuclide waste
dumping in the oceans. Although MEDEA has not yet conducted a
demonstration to determine specifically how national security sys-
tems could monitor radionuclide waste or help in risk assessment,
it has demonstrated a range of environmental capabilities of these
systems that have a direct bearing on their ability to provide such
information in the future.

These capabilities fall into two broad categories. The first is the
ability to detect directly and monitor the location of toxic pollution,
either by observing the pollutant itself or by observing its effect on
the local environment.

The second is the ability to provide information that can help
predict the transport of a pollutant both down rivers and siround
the oceans, and thus its potential impact on other locations.

The best example of how our national security assets can monitor
pollutants directly and determine their potential impact on other

112

regions is the so-called Komi oil spill. The Komi Republic of Russia
became the focus of international attention last fall when the press
reported a number of large oil spills. It is estimated that 100,000
tons of crude oil were spilled, an amount nearly three times the
size of the Exxon Valdez disaster.

International concern was raised that spilled oil might make it
into nearby rivers that feed into the Barents Sea, thereby polluting
the Arctic Ocean. At the request of senior policy makers, MEDEA
worked closely with intelligence community and NOAA and EPA
analysts to determine the risk to the Arctic Ocean. Data from na-
tional security assets and other sources were analyzed to determine
the location of the largest spills.

In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the specific type of
permafrost terrain surrounding the oil spill locations was deter-
mined in this way. This information, combined with the knowledge
that the oil was a high-paraffin crude, led to a consensus that these
spills posed only a minimal threat to regions outside of the imme-
diate area, mainly because the local marshes prevented much of
the oil from reaching the major rivers.

The Komi oil spill demonstrates the ability of national security
systems to provide detailed local information for characterizing and
monitoring a pollutant. In order to understand the more global im-
pacts, scientists and decisionmakers must be able to predict where
the pollutant may be transported and how much of it will reach a
given destination.

For oceaii dumping of toxic wastes, this requires the use of mod-
els that predict the circulation of water bodies and the flow rate
of rivers and tributaries. To be accurate, these models depend on
inputs describing environmental conditions and processes that are
not well understood for all parts of the world.

This is the second area where data from national security sys-
tems can have an impact. To improve existing transport models,
several MEDEA investigations are estimating global ocean circula-
tion patterns as well as flow patterns in coastal regions. This infor-
mation is difficult or impossible to generate with other existing re-
mote sensing systems and requires the unique attributes of the na-
tional security systems. The large classified Navy data bases are
also rich with data and MEDEA is working closely with the Navy
on these activities.

An important point here is that data taken by national security
systems can be combined with data from civil systems to provide
a much better base for the application of models developed by the
Navy, NOAA, EPA, and the Department of Energy.

An upcoming MEDEA investigation that will have direct impact
on the use of national security systems for monitoring oceanic pol-
lution is the Arctic Climatology Study, which will combine United
States and Russian data bases to provide an unparalleled global
view of the Arctic. Russian hydrographic and ice information will
provide a much finer view of Arctic processes than the United
States currently possesses and this will significantly improve exist-
ing circulation models. In addition, this study will specifically in-
vestigate the use of radionuclides as traces for oceanic circulation
patterns, thus providing a necessary validation of the models.

113

In summary, MEDEA activities directly relate to the problem of
ocean dumping of radioactive and toxic wastes in three ways. First,
MEDEA and the intelligence community have demonstrated the ca-
pability of national security systems to detect and monitor pollut-
ant spills, to characterize the local terrain near the spill, and to use
this information to predict the impact of the spill outside of the im-
mediate area.

Second, a number of MEDEA activities are extracting oceanic in-
formation from national security systems and Navy data bases that
characterize the processes needed to model circulation and trans-
port of pollution. This environmental information can be used to
improve existing circulation models and thereby improve their pre-
diction of toxic waste transport.

Third, the working interaction between the scientific community
and the national security community has enabled a rapid response
with more complete information to environmentally-related policy
questions. This, plus the greater openness of the intelligence com-
munity that has allowed results from national security systems to
be discussed in an open forum, was used successfully in the Komi
oil spill study and may be a useful model for addressing future pol-
lutant problems. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gershwin follows:]

114

Testimony of Lawrence K. (^ershwin, National Intelligence Officer for Science and
Technology, 6 December 1995

Research and Development Subcommittee, House National Security Committee
and Subcommittee on Wildlife, Fisheries and Oceans, House National Security
Committee

The Intelligence Community has published a number of classified intelligence
reports on the magnitude and nature of environmental contamination in the former Soviet
Union including a National Intelligence Estimate. On 28 June 1995, CIA presented a
classified summary to several members of your committee. At this time I would like to
briefly summarize the analysis.

In early April 1993, the Russian Government released a report on radioactive
waste dumping in the Northern and Far Eastern seas. It is known as the "Yablokov
Report," after its principal investigator Dr. Aleksey Yablokov, at that time Special
Advisor to President Yeltsin on Ecology and Public Health who headed the investigation.
The report:

• Contains details about the dumping of radioactive waste, including used reactors
from submarines, in the Northern (Barents, White, and Kara Seas) and Far Eastern
Seas (Sea of Japan, Sea of Okhotsk, and northwestern Pacific Ocean).

• Lists 13 dump sites in the Northern Seas and 10 in the Far Eastern Seas.

• Indicated that between 1959 and 1992, more than 2.3 million curies' of radioactive
waste were dumped in the Northern Seas, and 19,200 curies of radioactive waste
were dumped in the Far Eastern Seas.

The Yablokov Report presents a clear, credible picture of the magnitude of
former Soviet and Russian radioactive waste dumping at sea, and CIA has, in many

1 A Curie is a unit of radioactivity. It is equal to 3.7 x 10 Becquerel; I Becquerel = 1
nuclear decay per second.

115

instances, corroborated this report. CIA analysis shows that solid and liquid radioactive
wastes were dumped and that barges and ships probably contaminated by or laden with
radioactive waste were scuttled.

Although intelligence cannot verify the accuracy of all the dumpsites reported in
the Yablokov repon, CIA believes that:

• Based on the observed movements of radioactive waste ships since at least 1979, the
locations and types of wastes reportedly dumped are accurate.

• Civilian and naval ships probably began dumping liquid and solid radioactive waste
in the Barents and Kara Seas and the Sea of Japan in the mid-1960s. Civilian ships
probably have not conducted at-sea dumping since 1986.

• This at-sea dumping activity does not present a direct threat to US fisheries or
personnel, including Alaska.

The probable contamination of the Arctic can be traced to the industrial and
nuclear activities of many countries and regions - including Great Britain, the United
States, China, Russia (and the former Soviet Union), and eastern Europe.

Past, present, and future sources of Russian radionuclide contamination in the
Arctic include atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons from Novaya Zeml'ya and
Semipalatinsk, intentional dumping of radioactive materials by the Russian Northern and
Pacific navy fleets, and accidents including Chernobyl' and the Russian nuclear
submarine Komsomolets which sank off the Norwegian coast.

Ambient radiation levels in the waters of the Arctic Ocean generally are similar to
those found in other ocean basins. The threat to marine life is unclear, since no records
are available on the exact composition of the waste and because the extent of radioactive
leakage from containers is unknown. However:

116

• Studies by Russian and western scientists have noted an increase in the levels of
Cesium- 137 and Strontium-90 in Arctic waters following the Chernobyl' nuclear
power plant accident in 1986.

• Based upon measurements taken during a 1991 international expedition to the Arctic
polar basin, a Danish researcher stated that the radioactivity in the Arctic Sea areas is
four times higher than the quantity of radioactive fallout would suggest.

• Russian researchers who took samples while floating across the Arctic Ocean on an
ice floe between 1985 and 1987 have determined that much of the Arctic Ocean's
cesium- 137 contamination is concentrated in the top 200 meters.

• CIA believes that some of the cesium- 137 probably originated in Russian plutonium
production facilities and was carried into the Arctic by the Ob' and Yenisey rivers .

Based on known oceanographic conditions in both the Barents and Kara Sea
dumping areas, any contaminants would tend to be dispersed and diluted thus increasing
the difficulty of detection and decreasing environmental hazard.

Measurements indicate that the Arctic has also been contaminated by industrial
sources. These pollutants are transported into the Arctic by atmospheric- and water-
borne paths and are generally accepted to be the primary components of Arctic Haze - a
phenomenon similar to lower latitude smog. By the early 1980s, scientific studies had
shown that chemicals, heavy metals, and organics were major components of Arctic
Haze. CIA is aware of research being conducted on industrial contaminants in the Kara
Sea, but I must defer comment on this issue to a closed, classified session.

The Yablokov Report, although thorough, may not be exhaustive. For example,
in May 1993 a Russian government committee told Japanese officials that in 1987 a
Soviet Navy helicopter crashed into the Sea of Okhotsk while carrying an atomic-energy
battery, according to press reporting. While the Russians told the Japanese that no leaks
were detected from the accident, the battery, which used Strontium-90 as its power
.source, contained more than 20 times the amount of radiation the Russians had

117

previously announced that they dumped into the Sea of Japan. This accident (with its
radioactive source) was not included in the Yabiokov Report

Russian policy on nuclear waste is murky and subject to sudden changes because
of the large number of organizations involved and constantly changing laws and decrees-
-some of which are conflicting. Russia has several laws and government decrees that
stipulate procedures for accepting, handling ^d disposing of nuclear wastes. One murky
area is the acceptance of foreign nuclear waste, which can be accepted for reprocessing
but cannot be pemianently stored on Russian territory. However, permanent storage has
been the subject of a variety of definitions and the question of Russia's acceptance of
nuclear wastes from other former Soviet states and countries with Russian nuclear
reactors remains unresolved.

Some of the Russian government's recent actions send a troubling signal
regarding Moscow's commitment to stop dumping nuclear waste in Arctic waters. For
example:

• A presidential decree issued in July rescinds an earlier edict establishing civilian
oversight of the military's management of radioactive waste-although Russia's chief
nuclear safety authority, Gosatomnadzor, has complained all along that it has been
denied access to information about the navy—and effectively allows the military to
police its own dumping practices.

• According to a report released last month by the Norwegian environmental group,
Bellona, which works closely with Russian environmental groups, the main nuclear
storage facility of Russia's Northern Reet is makeshift, dilapidated, and contains 1,000
times more radiation than the largest of this year's French nuclear tests.

• While the report was being prepared, Bellona' s office in Murmansk was raided by the
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), which confiscated all of Bellona's materials

118

on radioactive waste generated by the Northern Fleet and later called in for
questioning inany of Bellona's contacts throughout Russia.

Bellona's experience attests to the growing difficulties which Western and Russian
environmental groups confront trying to monitor military nuclear waste management in the
face of nationalist political pressures, skepticism about foreign involvement in military
matters, and especially the steady widening of the powers enjoyed by Russia's internal
security services. Earlier this year, for example, the FSB publicly charged numerous
Western aid and environmental groups with spying, and subsequently issued a series of
shrill warnings about foreign threats to state secrets. Such retrogressive, Soviet-era trends
will increasingly undermine efforts to monitor ocean dumping and, more importantly, to
have the practice stopped.

For its part, over the past four years, CIA has stepped up its use of national
technical means, and has worked closely with its colleagues in the Intelligence
Community and US Govemment to provide requirements and to disseminate our analysis
of technical collection to assess the potential levels of contamination by both
radionuclide and industrial sources. Naturally, we also study available open source
information. Although we cannot readily declassify our information on ocean dumping
because of the sensitive nature of the national technical means used to obtain the data, we
could provide further details in closed classified session.

The Intelligence Community is engaged in a number of new cooperative projects
that bring unconventional resources to bear on these issues. As part of the Gore-
Chemomyrdin Commission effort, the United States and Russia have agreed to share
products derived from national intelligence assets to help solve environmental problems
of concern to both countries. The proposed projects include a study of the Arctic. In
addition to the Intelligence Community, prominent U.S. scientists brought together by
the Environmental Task Force are playing an important role in this endeavour.

119

As many of you may be aware, the Environmental Task Force was established in
1992 to determine the role that our nation's national security assets could play in
answering key environmental questions in addition to fulfilling their more standard
intelligence and defense role. The ETF brought together a team of about 50 prominent
U.S. environmental and global change scientists ~ now known as MEDEA ~ who have
been reviewing our most advanced reconnaissance satellite programs and Navy systems,
as well as a number of additional classified military and energy programs, to determine
what unique environmental and global change information could be derived from these
data. Working with both our Intelligence and Defense Communities, MEDEA is
developing and demonstrating the capabilities of the national security systems to generate
environmental information. These capabilities can be used to help monitor and predict
the impact of ocean dumping of radioactive materials and other toxic wastes, and would
offer a significant source of information for any future activity to assess the effect and
magnitude of such dumpings on the world's oceanic environment.

Today I would like to summarize those aspects of this work that would help
address the environmental impact of radionuclide waste dumping into the oceans.
Although MEDEA has not conducted a demonstration to determine specifically how
national security systems could monitor radionuclide waste or help in risk assessment, it
has demonstrated a range of environmental capabilities of these systems that have a
direct bearing on their ability to provide such information.

These capabilities fall into two broad categories. The first, is the ability to detect
directly and monitor the location of toxic pollution, either by observing the pollutant
itself or by observing its effects on the local environment. I will discuss in a moment a
MEDEA demonstration concerning an oil spill in the Komi Republic of Russia that

120

illustrates this capability. The second broad category is the ability to provide
environmental information that can be used as input to models to predict the transport of
the pollutant, and thus its potential impact on other locations. For the purposes of the
particular pollutants under discussion at these hearings -radionuclides and toxic wastes
dumped into the world's oceans- the main concerns would be circulation models that
would predict how much of the pollutant would be moved around the major oceans, as
well as flow models for individual rivers near the source of the pollution. I will describe
some MEDEA activities that have determined the unique capabilities of our national
security assets in gathering such information on ocean processes and some datasets that
MEDEA has been coordinating that will provide information needed as input to models.
Finally, I will briefly summarize an investigation that MEDEA will perform in FY '96 to
address the question of radionuclide migration directly.

The best example of how our national security assets can monitor pollutants
directly and determine their potential impact on other regions is the so-called Komi oil
spill. The Komi Republic of Russia became the focus of international attention in fall
1994, when the press reported a number of large oilspills. The spills were concentrated
along the main pipeline connecting the Vozey and Usinsk oilfields along the Kolva
River, affecting about 175 acres of land and 25 miles of stream banks over a 22 mile
section of the pipeline. It is estimated that 100,000 tons of crude oil were spilled- an
amount nearly three times the size of the Exxon Valdez disaster. International concern
was raised that spilled oil might make it into nearby rivers that feed into the Barents Sea,
thereby polluting the Arctic Ocean.

At the request of senior policymakers, MEDEA worked closely with Intelligence
Community and NOAA and EPA analysts to determine the risk to the Arctic Ocean.
Data from national security assets and other sources were analyzed to determine the

121

locatioiis of the largest oil spills. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, the specific
type of permafrost terrain surrounding the oil spill locations was detemiined. This made
it possible to predict whether a significant amount of the spilled oil would flow through
the local terrain and into the nearby rivers, or whether the local terrain would trap most
of the oil, preventing further significant contamination. This information, combined with
the knowledge that the oil was a high-paraffin crude led to a consensus that these spills
posed only a minimal threat to regions outside of the immediate area, mainly because the
local marshes prevented much of the oil from reaching the major rivers.

The Komi study illustrated that national security systems could provide detailed
information concerning both the pollutant and the local environment that was essential in
estimating the impact of the spill on a larger region. This and other studies demonstrate
an additional capability that MEDEA has been developing over a range of its activities
that will be very important to future evaluations: the ability to combine the talents
available in the scientific community, civil government agencies, and the Intelligence
Community to respond to policy-related questions concerning world-wide pollution
effects. Integrating the expertise of the MEDEA scientists with the analytical resources
of the Intelligence Community led to a quick and accurate response to the Komi oil spill.
This, plus the greater openness of the Intelligence Community that has allowed results
from national security systems to be discussed in an open forum, was used successfully
in the Komi oil spill study, and may be a useful model for addressing future pollutant
problems.

The Komi oil spill demonstrates the ability of national security systems to provide
detailed local information for characterizing and monitoring a pollutant. In order to
understand the more global impacts, scientists and decision makers must be able to
predict where the pollutant may be transported and how much of it will reach a given

122

destination. For ocean dumping of toxic wastes, this requires the use of models that
predict the circulation of water bodies and the flow rates of rivers and tributaries. To be
accurate, these models depend on inputs describing environmental conditions and
processes that are not well understood for all parts of the world.

This leads to the second area where data from National Security Systems can
have an impact —general oceanography. Observations from national overhead systems
can lead to better data on local winds and other meteorology, bathymetry, oceanic fronts,
and tidal currents, as well as general circulation and upwelling areas.

To improve existing transport models, several MEDEA investigations are
estimating global ocean circulation patterns, as well as flow patterns in coastal regions.
This information is difficult or impossible to generate with other existing remote sensing
systems, and requires the unique attributes of the national security systems.

The large classified Navy databases are also rich with data, and MEDEA is
working closely with the Navy on these activities, to determine what unique
environmental information the national security systems can provide, and to combine and
coordinate the Navy databases with remote sensing data to provide more global coverage
for many of these parameters. The Navy MEDEA effort has established a bridge between
the scientific community and a number of classified Navy databases, and is providing the
scientific community with access to a wide range of new information. Together, MEDEA
and the Navy are working to extract environmental information from these databases to
input into ocean circulation and transport models. An important point here is that data
taken by national security systems can be combined with data from civil systems to
provide a much better base for the application of models developed by the Navy, NOAA,
EPA, and DOE.

123

An upcoming MEDEA investigation that will have direct impact on the use of
national security systems for monitoring oceanic pollution is the Arctic climatology
study, which will combine U.S. and Russian databases to provide an unparalleled global
view of the Arctic. Russian hydrographic and ice information will provide a much finer
view of Arctic processes than the U.S. currently has, and this will significandy improve
existing circulation models. In addition, this study will specifically investigate the use of
radionuclides as traces for oceanic circulation patterns, thus providing a necessary
validation of the models.

In summary, MEDEA activities directly relate to the problem of ocean dumping
of radioactive and toxic wastes in three ways. First, MEDEA and the Intelligence
Community have demonstrated the capability of national security systems to detect and
monitor pollutant spills, to characterize the local terrain near the spill, and to use this
information to predict the impact of the spill outside of the immediate area. Second, a
number of MEDEA activities are extracting oceanic information from national security
systems and Navy databases that characterize the processes needed to model circulation
and transport of pollution. This environmental information can be used to improve
existing circulation models and thereby improve their prediction of toxic waste transport.
Third the working interaction between the scientific community and the National
Security Community has enabled a rapid response with more complete information to
environmentally related policy questions and, as demonstrated by the Komi oil spill
study, this may be a useful model for addressing future pollutant problems.

35-799 96-5

124

Mr. Weldon. Thank you very much, Dr. Gershwin.

I thank all four of you for appearing today and for your excellent
statements. I just have a few questions, one that I will repeat from
the second panel and that is, what is our total of dollar allocation
that we are putting forth out of the Federal budget for Arctic work?
I noticed that. Dr. Brass, I think you had your handle on that.

Dr. Brass. Just let me point to it, Congressman. It is in the
back. This, by the way, is the Arctic Research of the United States
publication that I mentioned before. The total budget in fiscal year
1994 for research in the Arctic was $191 million, in fiscal 1995,
$174.9, and in fiscal 1996, proposed, $169.6. Our research funds for
the Arctic are steadily declining.

You might be interested in the DOD totals, which were $35 mil-
lion in 1994, $33.6 million in 1995, and $23.2 million in 1996. That
reflects the loss of the $10 million Nunn-Lugar threat reduction
money.

Mr. Weldon. Dr. Brass, how much of that money goes through
the Arctic Commission and how do you get your funding?

Dr. Brass. The Arctic Commission does not fund research, Mr.
Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. At all?

Dr. Brass. It is our job to set policy and guide the interagency
group in their formulation of the research plan.

Mr. Weldon. How are you funded?

Dr. Brass. We are actually funded as an independent agency but
through the appropriation for the National Science Foundation.

Mr. Weldon. Very good. The impact of the $10 million loss, I
guess I should say, first of all, what is undone, and I applaud the
job. Admiral Pelaez, that you have done here, and I agree that you
have done great work. What is left to be done? What needs to be
done, perhaps, as opposed to asking you what amount of money
you want, which puts you on the spot. What needs to be done?

Admiral Pelaez. My assessment would be the following. One, we
took some 30,000-plus samples. While the procedures we used to
gather some of those samples would not necessarily support the
other toxin analysis, many of those samples would and they are
preserved but, one, it has not been in our mandate and it has not
been in our charter to go look at other pollution sources and their
transport. Nevertheless, that is a very rich data base which could
serve that, so there is some work to be done there.

I think that you will see in our assessment that we need to be
able to monitor conditions throughout this region. I am particularly
concerned about up the rivers and these containment facilities.
Some of these rivers, just to put them in perspective, have water-
sheds that are the equivalent of half the U.S. mainland. The ability
to monitor that, to really get in to more detail on the security of
those potential pollutants I think would be an area that we should
be looking at as a continuing evolution.

I believe that our assessment in 1997 will give us an accurate
and good and, for the money that we have — we are pretty close to
being able to finish that, I think, and if not, I have been supporting
it myself. We will be able to give a good assessment of the impact
of the existing dumped nuclear waste on the environment and the
transport.

125

But as I said and as other witnesses have said, there are a num-
ber of other issues which we need to address, and there needs to
be, and I think Ms. Goodman stated it as well, a sustaining pro-
gram of monitoring. I think that we are well on the road with the
tools that we have to be able to do that, understand when some-
thing happens what the impact might be, how much time we have
to react, what the technical challenges might be in dealing with
that. It is a complex problem and it does require sort of a continu-
ing effort as we work also to control and prevent the release of fur-
ther toxic wastes.

Mr. Weldon. Admiral and others on the panel, has part of your
function been to monitor the Komsomolets and any problems there,
or is that not within the jurisdiction and it has not been a part of
what has happened in terms of our work?

Admiral Pelaez. None of our direct measurements were on that
site.

Dr. Brass. I can comment briefly, Mr. Chairman, that my under-
standing is from the other international participants in these kinds
of programs that for the moment, at least, there appears to be no
significant release from Komsomolets, but, of course, all of these
problems involve the fact that we do not know enough about the
corruption of reactor vessels, fuel rod cladding. There are two nu-
clear torpedoes in Komsomolets, as we understand it. We do not
know what their corrosion resistance is, how long they will last.

Admiral Pelaez. Mr, Chairman, I think it is fair to say, though,
that from the sites we have visited, even where there was breach
of containment of some of the storage vessels, in some cases, in
fact, they shot them full of holes to make them sink, even after
they went through some precautions to contain the material, the
release has been localized, very local in nature so far. So we are
very fortunate in the nature of these types of materials, that they
tend to be trapped into sediment and they do tend to stay in the
near vicinity of the release.

Mr. Weldon. Did you want to add something. Dr. Gershwin?

Dr. Gershwin. Yes. Certainly, CIA analysis would agree. I mean,
the worst thing you could do in a sense would be to try to raise
this thing. Leave it where it is.

Mr. Weldon. There was some discussion. I have heard others
who say you should raise it

Dr. Gershwin. No.

Mr. Weldon [continuing]. But the bulk of the evidence I heard
is that that should not occur. I assume we are doing even a more
aggressive job in monitoring the Thresher and Scorpion.

Admiral Pelaez. Yes. The U.S. Navy has a continuing program
and has had since the Thresher and Scorpion went down.

Mr. Weldon. And no problems?

Admiral Pelaez. No.

Dr. Gershwin. Could I add a point, though, which is a general
problem we have in assessing all of this is that while we know the
sites and we have information on measurements and so on of the
situation in the ocean, what we really do not know is really what
is there. We do not know the composition of what has been
dumped. We do not know how much of it is leaking. I mean, there
is just a basic lack of information on our part on what the Russian

126

nuclear dumping was. Knowing that would add significantly to our
understanding of potential future risks.

Dr. Brass. I might add something to that, as well, Mr. Chair-
man, and Bob Edson can give you even more information on this,
but it turns out in pursuing the records of dumped material, not
all of the things supposed to have been dumped are dumped where
it says they were dumped. There has been considerable effort to
find some and at least one large one has not yet been found. One,
for example, that was listed as a barge full of radioactive material
looks in sonar imaging to be the Liberty ship.

Mr. Weldon. Are we using the same modeling that you talked
about to model and watch the dumping that occurred off the San
Francisco coast a few years ago? Are any of you familiar with that?
Is that part of this? You would not know that, I guess.

Admiral Pelaez. I would have to take that for the record to an-
swer that specifically. Of course, we run global ocean models. We
have running global ocean models, but I do not know if it was used
at all in any particular dumping there.

Mr. Weldon. Very good. And Dr. Gershwin, you mentioned the
Bellona Foundation. As I mentioned earlier, we have been joined
today by Frederick Hodge, who is the chief director of Bellona and
we had a press conference before this hearing to state our concern
for what occurred to Bellona in terms of the security apparatus in
Russia.

I have one final question. The recommendation of Bellona today
to us was that perhaps we should have an international commis-
sion established to monitor nuclear waste sites, and since there is
currently no such operation, we have all these commissions looking
at nuclear weapons but we do not have anjrthing specific to nuclear
waste sites. What is your response to that, if any, off the top?

Admiral Pelaez. I would be a strong supporter.

Mr. Weldon. The others, the same?

Dr. Gershwin. I would certainly say that from the point of view
of the U.S. intelligence community, we would understand a lot bet-
ter what the risks are if we had access to information.

Mr. Weldon. And the Arctic Commission?

Dr. Brass. I think, in addition to simply monitoring, to standing
and watching these operations, it is probably worthwhile to conduct
at least a basic research program in them. You heard Dr. Yablokov
discuss the motion through the groundwater of the Myak radio-
nuclides. This is a very serious problem and it takes more than just
a few monitoring sites to keep track of what is going on and what
processes are active in the system.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have questions that I will follow up with the individual panel
members later on. Thank you.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Mr. Kennedy.

Let me thank the panelists for their excellent testimony and
their comments. This concludes the one part of our hearing.

We are going to move into our fourth and final panel picking up
a different issue, but before we do, there are a number of publica-
tions that I would like to simply acknowledge for the record that

127

are out there. Some of them have been referred to here today, some
outstanding pubHcations put forth by the Bellona Foundation
which are available. This is the one document that I would urge
people to contact Bellona for, which I first came on 2 years ago, I
guess, when it was first released.

OTA did an outstanding study which was just released this past
fall and that also is available through the Office of Technology As-
sessment.

Several of the publications that you mentioned, we have already
highlighted, but they also, I think, are worthwhile, and a publica-
tion by Murray Feshbock from Georgetown University also, I think,
sums up the problem and is worth considering, as well as this doc-
ument which I referred to earlier from the Ajnerican Association
for the Advancement of Science on "Ocean Pollution in the Arctic
North", another publication available.

I think we have raised a lot of interesting points. We have a sta-
tus report on what is happening, both within our Cjovernment and
internationally. We have a real commitment here that we are mak-
ing to follow through. In our second hearing, we will look at broad-
er ways that we can perform dual use cooperation in understanding
the ocean and working with the military, but I will continue to fol-
low through as a personal priority of mine the support to keep this
Arctic research program underway and to assist the Russians with
this terrible problem of disposing of their nuclear wastes.

I thank all of you for coming in.

Mr. Weldon. With that I would invite our fourth panel to step
up to the table, Dr. Philip Valent from the Naval Research Labora-
tory, Stennis Space Center; John Edmond, professor of geo-
chemistry from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Dr.
Fred Grassle, director. Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences
from Rutgers University; and Ms. Beth Millemann, executive direc-
tor of the Coast Alliance.

Let me welcome you all to the subcommittees and apologize for
making you sit through a rather long hearing. We try to combine
the hearings to take advantage of the two subcommittees coming
together, and also at the request of Chairman Jim Saxton, my good
friend from New Jersey.

Unfortunately, Jim is tied up on the floor, at least temporarily,
with the same issue that was raised by Congressman Frank
Pallone, a very important issue on the floor right now relative to
one of our appropriation bills. He will join us when that act has
been completed, but I understand it is causing a great deal of con-
troversy, as you might imagine, at the eleventh hour among the
members.

We are extremely concerned about the abyssal waste plain dis-
posal plan and the panel that we have assembled here today we
think will give us some insights into where we are going. In 1992,
the former Coast Guard Navigation Subcommittee held a hearing
on the enforcement of the ocean dumping ban and on research and
development of waste management technology that could place ma-
terial on the abyssal plain. The Naval Research Laboratory has
also undertaken work to assess the environmental feasibility of the
isolation of dredged material, sewage sludge, and municipal incin-

128

erator ash on the abyssal plains of the deep ocean. I look forward
to hearing from Dr. Valent about that study.

I also look forward to hearing from Drs. Edmond and Grassle
about the status of knowledge about the deep ocean environment
and Beth Millemann about the legal and policy implications of deep
ocean placement.

Personally, I have grave concerns about deep ocean disposal. Re-
moving our waste from plain sight is not the same as responsible
management of those wastes, nor does it replace efforts to develop
practical, cost effective ways to reduce the stream of waste that we
produce. However, I am interested in hearing the testimony of our
distinguished panelists today and perhaps this will be the begin-
ning of additional dialog on this issue in the Congress.

Thank you all for coming. Your statements will be placed in the
record. Feel free to make whatever comments you would like, ei-
ther following your statement or without your notes. We will start
with Dr. Valent. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF DR. PHILIP J. VALENT, NAVAL RESEARCH
LABORATORY, STENNIS SPACE CENTER

Dr. Valent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Philip Valent. I am the associate superintendent of
the Marine Geosciences Division, Naval Research Laboratory, and
a marine geoscientist and a registered civil engineer. I submit my
written statement, which I will summarize orally.

The United States relies mostly on land-based waste manage-
ment alternatives since the cessation of ocean disposal of wastes
with the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988. In fiscal year 1993, Con-
gress tasked the Department of Defense to study the advantages,
disadvantages, and economic viability of storing industrial waste in
the abyssal plains of the ocean floor. Please note, the industrial
waste is defined here as sewage sludge, fly ash from municipal in-
cinerators, and dredged material and does not include radioactive
waste, such as discussed in the previous panels.

DOD tasked the Naval Research Laboratory to perform the paper
study to examine the abyssal waste isolation option. I am the prin-
cipal investigator on that project.

Our first task was to conduct a technology assessment of the ca-
pabilities to transport and place wastes on the abyssal sea floor.
Four concepts emerged as being technically feasible. The least risky
and least costly concept is depicted in the first figure of a packet,
which I hope you have. This figure depicts the barge transport of
waste contained in geotextile bags. The waste-filled bags are re-
leased through trapdoors and free-fall to the abyssal sea floor with-
out loss of material to the water column.

Our second task was to perform an environmental assessment
where we sought first to identify areas of the abyssal sea floor
within 1,000 nautical miles of the U.S. mainland where environ-
mental isolation of waste would be maximized, where the environ-
mental impact of placing the waste on the sea floor would be mini-
mized, and where economic zones of other countries would be ex-
cluded. Favorable sites are shown on the second figure, with the
darker squares marking those more favorable.

129

The results from the environmental predictive models are de-
scribed in my written testimony.

The results of the study lead to the following conclusions. One,
placement of subject wastes on the abyssal sea floor with no accom-
panying loss to the water column appears feasible with modest ad-
vancements in technology. Initial indications are that the abyssal
waste isolation option will be cost competitive with present waste
management methods for higher priced areas.

Two, model predictions suggest that for reasonable waste isola-
tion scenarios, the placed waste would likely be contained locally
within a defined site, would burj' local fauna which would be re-
placed by different, more opportunistic abyssal communities, and
would impact geochemical processes beneath the waste site for
thousands to tens of thousands of years.

Three, the Atlantic offers the most favorable sites for waste isola-
tion. The Pacific sites are less favorable. The Gulf of Mexico offers
poor choices for isolation sites.

Four, overall impacts of placed waste are predicted to be local-
ized.

Our recommendations are, one, an in situ experiment using
uncontaminated, organic-rich, fine-grained dredged material would
be needed to generate the data necessary for further development
and validation of models to predict changes in physical, biological,
and chemical environments of the abyssal sea floor if perturbed by
large-volume deposits of contaminated dredged material.

'^0, research must be undertaken to better predict the perform-
ance of waste-filled geotextile bags, especially hydrodynamic re-
sponse and geotextile strains during release from a transport plat-
form, descent through the water column, and impact on the sea
floor.

Three, development of technologies necessary for the handling,
bagging, and transport of contaminated dredged material would be
needed to ensure technology availability when, and if, environ-
mental acceptability of the abyssal sea floor waste isolation option
is demonstrated.

In June 1995, NRL was funded by the Advanced Research
Projects i^ency [ARPA], to extend portions of this paper study, ap-
plying advanced simulation technologies to the waste isolation
problem with focus on the end-to-end simulation and visualization
of the relocation of contaminated dredged material to the abyssal
sea floor and the potential environmental impact. The scope of this
new project is summarized in my written testimony.

My colleagues and I thank the chairman and the committee for
this opportunity to make the results of our work known to the sub-
committees. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have
on our work.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Valent follows:]

130

TESTIMONY OF

PHILIP J. VALENT

ASSOCIATE SUPERINTENDENT, MARINE GEOSCIENCES DIVISION, NAVAL

RESEARCH LABORATORY, STENNIS SPACE CENTER, MS

before the

NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

and the

RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE AND OCEANS

6 December 1995

Messrs. Chainnen and Members of the Subcommittees: My name is Philip Valent. I am
Associate Superintendent of the Marine Geosciences Division, Naval Research Laboratory,
Stennis Space Center, Mississippi. I submit this, written statement, which I will stmmiarize
orally, for inclusion in the hearing record.

In addition to my administrative duties, I am also Project Manager and Principal Investigator for
a project tasked to the Department of Defense (DoD) in the FY93 Appropriations Bill to "...study
the advantages, disadvantages, and economic viabihty of storing industrial waste in the abyssal
plains of the ocean floor" (see Figure 1). I thank you for this opportunity to report to you the
results, conclusions, and recommendations of that project.

Background

The US has had to rely largely on land-based waste management alternatives since the cessation
of ocean disposal of wastes with enactment of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988.
Remediation of contaminated wastes, though technically feasible, is very costly; and, therefore,
land disposal is experiencing increased use.

Implementing an environmentally sound and economically viable program for remediation of
highly contaminated bottom sediments, and obtainmg regulatory and public approval of such
action, poses a particularly vexing problem. Inaction in remediation of these highly
contaminated sediments from shipping berths, turning basins, and navigation channels, because
of concern over the environmental impact of removing these sediments by present alternatives, is
compelling maritime commerce to avoid affected US ports (Haggerty 1993).

In introducing our project report, let me acknowledge the recent prior work on the topic of waste
isolation on the abyssal seafloor. Two workshops sponsored by the Sloan Foundation were
conducted at Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution (WHOI), 7-10 January 1991, and
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 12-14 June 1991, to examine "the potential
benefits and problems of an 'industrial scale' experiment extending over a period of 10 or so
years..." involving "...the delivery of from one to a few million tons per year of waste to the deep

131

sea floor" (Spencer 1991 , p 2). The waste stream considered in these WHOI/MIT workshops
was sewage sludge, fly ash from municipal incinerators, and dredged material. The WHOl
workshop developed the research program requirements for the experiment, and the MIT
workshop reviewed potential systems for monitoring the waste deposit.

The recommended 10-year, industrial scale expenment was not pursued, in part, due to the
environmentally controversial nature of such a full-scale experiment. Continuing waste disposal
problems, particularly those of managing/disposing of contaminated dredged materials, as
indicated by the conduct of a Congressional hearing (House Hearing 1992), have stimulated
further interest in the abyssal seafloor disposal option.

Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program Project

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) responded to the FY93 Congressional tasking with a
proposal to the Department of Defense Strategic Environmental Research and Development
Program, titled "Technical and Economic Assessment of Storage of Industrial Waste on Abyssal
Plains." Our proposal was funded in November 1993, sdl research and development work was
completed in September 1994, and the last of six reports was submitted for printing in September
1995. The effort was limited to a paper study addressing the same materials as the WHOI/MIT
workshops. During the course of our work we adopted a shortened version of the project title,
"Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation (APWI) Project."

To carry out the APWI Project work, NRL augmented its in-house expertise in oceanography,
geology, and geophysics with industrial expertise for most of the technical assessment
(Oceaneering International, Inc.) and academic expertise for portions of the environmental
assessment (geochemistry, Richard Jahnke, University of Georgia; benthic biology, Gilbert
Rowe, Texas A&M; and physical oceanography, Curtis Collins, Naval Postgraduate School) and
for the economics of waste handling (Di Jin and Hauke Kite-Powell, WHOI).

Technology Assessment - The technology assessment for transporting and placing wastes on the
abyssal seafloor was approached by first conducting a patent search to identify all potential
applicable concepts and then assessing the technical feasibility of each. Four concepts emerged
from the 128 patents as being most technically feasible for lowering waste through 6,100 m to
the abyssal seafloor. They are synopsized as:

1) Controlled lowering of the waste in a tethered bucket with a 250 metric ton payload;

2) Pumping the waste down twin 1 .37-m (54-in.) diameter, 7600-m long pipes;

3) Containing a barge-load of wastes in 50 geotextile bags (380 m' per bag) and free-
falling the waste-filled bags to the seafloor; and

4) Carrying 153 waste-filled bags (127 m^ per bag) to near the seafloor in an unmaimed
submersible and free-falling the bags from 200 m above the seafloor.

Sewage sludge would not be readily moved to and maintained in a fixed position on the abyssal
seafloor because of its relatively low bulk density (1.04 MN/m' (65 Ib/ft^)) which is slightly

132

heavier than seawater. Thus, geotextile bags filled only with sewage sludge would sink very
slowly through the water column and drift laterally for long distances. Methane gas generated in
the sludge would decrease the bulk density even further, and the bags could float! Therefore,
sewage sludge would require blending with a fine-grained weighting material to facilitate
transporting the sludge to a specified abyssal seafloor isolation site and then ensuring that the
sludge remains in place. Fly ash and dredged material, while not completely free of handling and
placement problems, did not pose significant problems in the technical assessment.
Concept 1 above was eliminated at an early stage fi-om the technical assessment because it
became clear that the rate of placing waste material on the abyssal seafloor would be one-tenth
the rate estimated for the remaining concepts; therefore, the bucket concept was eliminated as not
being cost competitive. Both risk and capital-operating cost analyses revealed Concept 3, that of
free-falling the waste-filled bags from the ocean surface to the abyssal seafloor, to be the best
option (see Figure 2) (Hightower et al. 1 995a, b, c).

Environmental Assessment -

Site Selection - We sought first to identify areas of the abyssal seafloor within 1800 km (1000
nautical miles) of the US mainland where environmental isolation would be maximized, where
the environmental impact of placing the wastes on the seafloor would be minimized, and where
economic zones of other countries would be excluded. A site assessment model was developed
to quantitatively compare the suitability for waste isolation within 10-degree (latitude-longitude)
squares of the abyssal seafloor. Included in the analysis were environmental and anthropogenic
factors. Areas in the Hatteras Abyssal Plain (Atlantic) and the abyssal hills province west of
southern California (Pacific) were shown to be the most suitable for waste isolation because of
low currents, low eddy kinetic energy, favorable sediment type, favorable weather, and low
anthropogenic activity. Atlantic sites scored somewhat better because of lower seafloor slopes
and less roughness. Even the best areas in the Gulf of Mexico were shown to be poorly suited
due to the high near-seafloor currents and high eddy kinetic energy (see Figure 3).

Hydrodynamic Processes - Simulations were conducted using the NRL six-layer, basin scale,
ocean circulation model. Model results show that, if any dissolved contaminants were to be
released into the water column during waste placement, these contaminants would not be
advected shallower than 1000 m water depth for a 10-year simulation period. Well within this
period of time, we would expect that the contaminants will have been adsorbed on/scavenged by
particulates in the water column and would have settled to the seafloor. Model results, validated
with existing data, indicate that near-seafloor currents at the most suitable abyssal seafloor sites
will not be strong enough to erode/suspend uncontained dredged material or fly ash (Valent and
Young 1995).

Biological Processes - The overall response of abyssal animals to the placement of one or more
million cubic meters of organic-rich material, containing varying degrees of adsorbed
contaminants, on the abyssal seafloor is not known with any certainty. It is clear that all resident
animals buried under the bags and the sediment apron resulting from the impact plumes

133

generated by bag impact on the bottom would be smothered. Deposits of material greater than
several millimeters depth would probably bury many invertebrates, which have adapted to
extremely low sedimentation rates characteristic of the abyssal seafloor. Analogies with benthic
recovery rates from abyssal turbidites suggest that it may take hundreds to thousands of years to
return to an equilibrium community of animals following episodic disposal of waste materials
greater than several centimeters over large areas of the abyssal seafloor. Given this very
long-duration response of the abyssal community to disturbances on the large scale of turbidity
flows, it would be preferable to limit the size and number of waste placement sites to minimize
overall environmental impact.

Direct transport of contaminants to surface waters by abyssal animals via bioaccumulation
processes would not occur because they do not venture out of abyssal depths. There does exist
one potential pathway, however, via transport in the yolks of eggs of certain fishes and
invertebrates. These eggs are known to rise to shallow depths in the ocean and develop into
larvae which, in turn, mature into juveniles, and the juveniles then return to the abyssal depths.
While the eggs, larvae, and/or juveniles are at the shallow water depths, they could be consumed
by other species closer to food chains utilized by man.

Ten-year numerical simulations of a simplified abyssal food chain were run to simulate impact of
a one-year duration placement of sewage sludge and/or organic-rich dredged material on the
abyssal seafloor. One model simulation predicts a significant perturbation of the reproductive
and growth cycle, with the natural 1-year cycle altered to a 6-year cycle for the megafauna
(fishes and large invertebrates); we note that the timing of these cycles may be an artifact of
oversimplifications in the modeled food chain - or this timing may ttim out to be real - at this
point too little is known about the origin of this mathematical result to make any informed
judgements about its origin (see Figure 4). To better understand the significance for eggs of
megafauna as potential pathways for contaminant export from the abyssal seafloor, the export of
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) via this pathway was estimated using data from the
1 06-mile site: the annual transport of PAHs from a 1-year placement of sewage sludge and/or
dredged material (assuming 1x10* m') is estimated to be 1 .7 grams, truly minuscule (Valent and
Young 1995).

Geochemical Processes - Placement of million-plus cubic meters of sewage sludge and/or
dredged material on the abyssal seafloor would significantly alter the local oxic/anoxic balance
affecting geochemical processes at the seafloor surface and in the subseafloor (see Figure 5). We
have conducted numerical model simulations of the impact of placement and remineralization of
combined sewage sludge and dredged material on the abyssal subseafloor, predicting the impact
of organic matter oxidation reactions on profiles of oxygen, nitrate, sulfate, sulfide, ammonium,
total inorganic carbon, alkalinity, and particulate organic carbon. The model results show that
the available oxygen in the water overlying and downcurrent of the isolation site would not be
depleted to a level injurious to abyssal animals. However, to attain geochemical equilibrium
(referenced to conditions prior to waste placement) would take thousands to tens-of-thousands of
years. This result is not surprising because turbidite deposits at abyssal depths which occurred

134

over 12,000 years ago have not reached geochemical equilibrium (Valent and Young 1995).

Regarding the contaminants contained in the wastes, US Army Corps of Engineers experience
with dredged material placed at shallow water depths indicate that the contaminants would
remain adsorbed on the clay mineral particles with some of the organic contaminants adsorbing
on organic particulates in the dredged material. Geochemical changes in the waste deposit could
cause iron and manganese compounds to go into solution, but the iron and manganese would
then precipitate as oxides when reaching the deposit interface with the oxygenated overlying
water. The oxides would then serve as scavengers of other heavy metal contaminants that may
leach to the deposit-seawater interface (Spencer 1991, p 78). Sewage sludge poses possibly a
somewhat greater problem due to a potential deficit of appropriate clay minerals to provide
adsorptive surfaces for scavenging heavy metal ions. This shortcoming could be corrected by
blending clay mineral material into the sewage sludge during handling, which would increase
overall volumes to be isolated and cost per unit volume. Fly ash poses the largest problem to the
waste isolation option due to its easily leachable, high content of lead, cadmium, dioxins and
furans. To isolate fly ash on the abyssal seafloor, the fly ash would probably have to be blended
into a fme-grained, organic-rich dredged material to provide sufficient adsorptive surfaces for the
contaminants. Developing an adequate approach to isolation of contaminants within a sewage
sludge or fly ash deposit would require some laboratory experimentation which was beyond the
scope of the DoD tasking for this study.

Conclusions -

(1) Placement of subject wastes on the abyssal seafloor with no accompanying loss to the water
coluitm appears feasible using technology that could be developed.

(2) Model predictions suggest that for reasonable waste isolation scenarios the placed wastes
would (a) likely be contained locally within a defmed site, (b) bury local faima which will be
replaced by a new abyssal community of animals, and (c) impact local geochemical processes for
thousands to tens-of-thousands of years.

(3) Regarding potential abyssal sites for the isolation of wastes (a) the Atlantic offers the most
favorable sites, (b) the Pacific sites are favorable but less so than those in the Atlantic, and (c) the
Gulf of Mexico offers poor choices for isolation sites.

(4) Overall impacts of placed wastes are predicted to be localized in extent. However, very little
is actually known about the environmental impacts of such emplacement.

Reconmiendations - Before deep ocean isolation of wastes could safely occur, significant
additional research would be needed.

(1) The models upon which this study was based, and disposal activity would be based, need to
be refined. Some additional models need to be developed. This is imderway in the ARPA study,
discussed below.

(2) In-situ research would be needed to learn more about the abyssal environment, including its
processes and inhabitants, to accurately assess potential enviroimiental impacts.

(3) Research must be undertaken to better predict the performance of waste-filled geotextile bags

135

especially (a) hydrodynamic response and geotextile strains during release from a transport
platform, descent through the water column, and impact on the seafloor; and (b) responses of the
geotextile bags to physical, chemical, and biological degradation caused by the combination of
contained waste and abyssal environment.

(4) An in-situ experiment using uncontaminated, organic-rich, fine-grained dredged material
would be needed to generate the data necessary for fiirther development and validation of models
to predict changes in physical, biological, and chemical environments of the abyssal seafloor
when perturbed by large-volume deposits of contaminated dredged material. Tracers should be
added to the material in the experiment to mimic potential contaminant bioaccumulation and
transport if such were to occur with implementation of the abyssal waste isolation option.

(5) Development and refmement of techniques necessary for the safe handling, bagging, and
release of contaminated dredged material would be needed when, and if, environmental
acceptability of the abyssal isolation option is demonstrated.

Advanced Research Projects Agency Project

Scope and Approach - In June 1995, NRL was funded by the Advanced Research Projects
Agency (ARPA) to apply, to the extent possible, the concept of Simulation-Based Design to the
waste isolation problem, focusing entirely on the end-to-end concept of dredged material
isolation on the abyssal seafloor and the environmental impact, with the goal of optimizing the
dredging-to-isolation system. The project scope includes consideration of dredging techniques
and dredged material handling necessary to facilitate containment for transport and lowering
through the water column. Model improvements and developments programmed for simulating
the dredging-to-placement segment of the process include (1) modeling of improved
full-containment dredge design and transport ship loading system; (2) optimization of the surface
transporter through application of linear and, if merited, non-linear ship design models; (3)
optimization of the geotextile bag-hopper-release system design to reduce potential for bag
tearing on release; and (4) modeling of the hydrodynamics of waste-filled bags in free-fall to
understand and control the deviation from ideal free-fall path to the seafloor with the intent of
maximizing the concentration of bags from each transporter payload drop. To facilitate
improved understanding of the environmental impact of placing dredged material on the abyssal
seafloor, model improvements and development underway include (1) modeling of the plume
generated by filled bags impacting on the ocean bottom, and the subsequent advection,
dispersion, and settlement of the plume materials; (2) modeling of the geochemical processes
within individual dredged material-filled bags and sediments buried under bags; (3) modeling the
formation of methane hydrate within the deposit and assessing potential impact on isolation; and
(4) modeling the pathways for toxicant bioaccumulation.

Participants and Progress - We are now at an early stage of the ARPA project. We have brought
all expected academic participants on board including one new participant, Robert Moorhead,
Mississippi State University, who will develop a visualization of simulation products. We are in
final contract negotiations with a contractor team of industrial and academic participants for
developing the dredging-to-seafloor placement portion of the modeling and simulation. We

35-799 96-6

expect completion of the ARPA project in September 1996.

Synopsis

I believe that the technology for placing contaminated dredged material at a specified abyssal
seafloor site is either in hand or within easy reach. It is the environmental impact of the
proposed deposit of several million cubic meters of dredged material that is difficult to predict
with certainty. An in-situ experiment, spanning 7 years (including 2 years for planning and
set-up), involving the placement of several thousand cubic meters of uncontaminated,
organic-rich dredged material, will be the most efficient way 4o generate data and understanding
necessary for predictive model development and validation.

My colleagues and I thank the Chairmen for this opportunity to make the results of our work
known to the Subcommittees.

References

Haggerty, B. 1993. "Dredge-Lock," Workboat Magazine, Nov-Dec, pp 28-31.

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards, S. Balinski, W. Briggs, T. Foster, D. Mauck and A. Marcy
1995a. "Technical Assessment Report for Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project,"
NRL/CR/740 1-95-0021, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 143 p and
7 appendices.

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards and A.L. Marcy 1995b. "Economic Viability Report for Abyssal
Plains Waste Isolation Project," NRL/CR/740 1-94-00 16, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis
Space Center, MS, 34 p.

Hightower, J.M., W.R. Richards, S. Balinski, W. Briggs, T. Foster, D. Mauck and A. Marcy
1995c. "Summary Engineering Report for Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Project,"
NRL/CR/7401 -95-001 8, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 63 p.

House Hearing 1992. "Ocean Dumping Enforcement and the Current Status of Research Efforts",
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Navigation of the Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Serial No. 102-96, US Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC, 573 p.

JOC 1995. "Toxic Load of Mud Springs Leak," by A. Abrams, Journal of Commerce, 19 Oct, p
lA, 8 A.

Spencer, D.W. 1991 . "Report of a Workshop to Determine the Scientific Research Required to
Assess the Potential of the Abyssal Ocean as an Option for Future Waste Management, An
Abyssal Ocean Option for Waste Management," Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, 7-10

137

Jan, 111 p.

USACOE 1995. "New York Harbor Dredged Material Management Plan: Phase I Report - Plan
of Study," US Army Corps of Engineers New York District, Jul.

Valent, P.J., and D.K. Young 1995. "Abyssal Seafloor Waste Isolation: Environmental Report,"
NRL/MR/7401-95-7576, Naval Research Laboratory, Stennis Space Center, MS, 477 p.

138

Q DC
O 0

Q -co

0 0
^ CO

^ =

E cL

^ 2

§■&
S<

-i«: Q

i5 o

D) O

CO Q

Q E
o 2

+- CD
Q. QL

E o
o w
c c

0 Q.
CO (0

- >>

CO ^

0 CO

iS ^

§.=

■D 0

CO en

0 -C

r: o
^^

= • 'B

CO
CO
0

1_
CO
CO

c o

CO -^
CO »-
CO 0

^§

0
x>

o
o

° 0

0 0

gj E

o dj

-o ''^

C 0

CO 0

0 .^

=s ^

B E

CO o

>,o

"cO 2

o CO

CD 3

JD O

C« ^

.W 0

B D)

O C

CO O

i_ —

0) ^

S .2
« 0

i: SI
(/> CO

■? ■>

■«-• ^

(2 CO

0 Q.

c To

3 CO

r-^ CO

CO >s

C JD
O CO

:^^

o E

Q. CO

< E

JO
0
S

O -D
0 C

Q. =

CO 0

0 O

O CO

0
CO

CO 0)
JQ

0 3
W CO

CO 0
CO o

55 ^ H-

CO 0

CO CO

c c

CO Q. CO

139

* —

1 (^'f.

* i

o E

140

141

*. o
« o

o HI
^ IL
V IL

t; ui

« z

e. UI

7; s

< cs

cor

00000

u^ o 000
"'0000
II o coo t-

^^ llg^

II m '^ ^

in o o o o
-^0000
^ o 100 in

II Wt- O II

in „ „ in ^

^O II
CM

142

143

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Dr. Valent.

Dr. Edmond, I apologize for your name tag not appropriately in-
cluding your title. We apologize, so Dr. Edmond, welcome.

STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN M. EDMOND, PROFESSOR OF GEO-
CHEMISTRY, DEPARTMENT OF EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC AND
PLANETARY SCIENCES, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF
TECHNOLOGY

Dr. Edmond. It is a pleasure to be before your panel. I think
from the research support you just heard about, there really is no
question about the technical feasibility of disposing of these rel-
atively benign materials on the sea floor. We can place them accu-
rately and one of the bags in this room at 3 miles water depth, rou-
tinely. We could stack them up and fill the whole room for you, if
you like. So technically, we are extremely capable in terms of oper-
ating in the deep sea, largely, as was pointed out earlier, because
of the enormous investment the Federal Government has made
over the last 50 years in oceanographic research and, of course,
anti-submarine warfare.

The question is, should we, and if you ask that, then you want
to look at a cost-benefit analysis. That is to say, we have a large
inventory of waste. There is not anybody advocating that we just
keep generating waste. Our problem is the inventory that we have
right now is enormous, both in place in harbors and then also in
essentially uncontrolled landfills.

The question is, how can we dispose of that in the most benign
way in terms of ecological and environmental impact, and I would
argue that the place to put it is in the deep sea floor, which is
about a third of the area of the planet — there is a lot of room down
there — in that it is the lowest energy environment on the planet,
so the potential for dispersal of material is minimal, either phys-
ically in the water column or by contamination of ground water.

There is no ground water in the deep sea. It is a static system.
There are no storms to speak of. There are no sea gulls to disperse
things. There are no children to crawl into the dump site, and you
will see, any dump site you go past, you see children. Plus, the
standing crop of organisms is very low.

Now, I have to be careful here. My distinguished colleague and
friend, Fred Grassle, has made extremely exciting discoveries about
the enormous variety of species that live predominately in the deep
sea floor, but you must distinguish between the number of species
and the standing crop of live organisms.

The organic carbon content of the sediments that we are talking
about impacting is about a tenth of a percent. Almost all of that
carbon is the equivalent of humus in your garden. It is not live.
The amount of live carbon in the abyssal sea floor is probably
something like 0.05 to 0.01 percent by weight of the sediment. So
we are talking about impacting a restricted area, a very restricted
area, maybe a square mile of an enormous ecosystem that is rel-
atively homogeneous laterally.

So in terms of environmental damage, I would argue that this is
the minimum damage site of any that we could conceivably access
economically, and from that point of view, I think we have a great
opportunity to use the enormous investment that we made in un-

144

derstanding the deep sea to solve a very important societal prob-
lem, which I do not think is going to get easier to solve if we con-
tinue along the conventional routes that we are on right now.
Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Edmond follows:]

145
29 November 1995

National Security Subcommittee on Military Research and

Development

and

Resources Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans

House of Representatives

Congress of the United States

Witness Statement by Prof. .Tohn M. Edmond. Professor of
Marine Geochemistry, MIT, for joint hearing, 6 December 1995

At the outset let me express my gratitude at being invited to
testify before these two House Subcommittees today. As a
foreign-born scientist who, over the last thirty years, has
pursued a successful research career in the United States funded
very largely by this Government through the National Science
Foundation and the Office of Naval Research, I feel a strong
obligation to be of service. It is also gratifying to be asked to
help present the results of the enormous national investment
made by this Government in oceanographic research over the
last fifty years in support of your deliberations on a pressing
societal problem, the disposal of waste streams.

Post-WWII, oceanography developed as a quintessential Cold
War science. The fundamental driver was anti-submarine
warfare. Of course, numerous spin-offs occurred in particular
the thriving off-shore oil industry. Over the last decade or so
oceanographic studies have become central to our understanding
of the complexities of our environment and its response to
natural and, increasingly, human perturbations. It must be
recognized that this new orientation would have been impossible
without the massive military-related investments mentioned
above. Your Subcommittees have the opportunity to apply the
insights, understanding and experience of the oceanographic
sciences and engineering to the resolution of an increasingly
critical problem in our society, and the world, the safe and

146

permanent disposal of the various streams of industrial solid
waste.

The abyssal plains of the deep ocean are an attractive
location for the disposal of solid wastes for a number of
reasons;

1. They represent the minimum energy environment on this
planet. There are no storms or flowing groundwater to disperse
the emplaced waste.

2. The area available is vast, approximately one half of the
surface of the Earth, as compared to that of the sites impacted.
It is also quite homogeneous geologically and biologically. No
site would be affecting a unique environment.

3. The abyssal plains are accessible to all the coastal
conurbations of the U.S., a few days ship transit time at most,
thus minimizing the cost of transport.

4. The technology exists todav to completely by-pass the
biologically productive upper M'ater column and emplace waste
on the floor of the deep sea with the accuracy of a good dump
truck on a landfill, to permanently archive the positioning
information and to relocate and monitor the site as need he-
Development costs for this disposal option would be minimal.

5. Because the sites would be accurately located with the
information in the public domain they would not be accidentally
disturbed by, for example, deep sea mining ventures since these
would be employing the same navigation techniques. Due to
their remoteness at between two and three miles water depth,
the possibility of deliberate disturbance can be ruled out.

6. The biota in the deep sea is sparse although diverse in
species, mainly of microfauna. The abundance of living
biomass is extremely low, close to desert-like. Thus the
ecological impact would be very much smaller than at a similar
site on land. Bio-dispersal of the waste material might occur
for short distances LatfirallY; however there is no significant
possibility of vertical transport of the material and its re-
introduction into the primary food chain in the upper waters.

147

7. We can be confident of these statements based on existing
experience in the exploration for hot vents in the deep sea.
These occur only in volcanically active areas remote from the
abyssal plains. Although large volumes of hot water (600°F)
laden with heavy metals are being expelled, significant effects
are restricted to a few hundreds of feet laterally around the
vent sites and perhaps a thousand feet in the water column
above. There is absolutely no manifestation at the sea surface.
In fact vent fields are quite difficult to find! The exploration,
navigation and monitoring techniques discussed above for the
waste sites are exactly those used to study vents.

148

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Dr. Edmond, for your statement and
for your comments. We look forward to a dialog among the wit-
nesses as we get to questions.

Dr. Grassle, we welcome you from beautiful New Jersey, my
neighboring State, my summer home State.

STATEMENT OF DR. FRED GRASSLE, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF
MARINE AND COASTAL SCIENCES, RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

Dr. Grassle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
distinguished members of the subcommittees for the opportunity to
discuss the potential use of the deep ocean environment as a repos-
itory for certain types of waste, particularly contaminated dredge
material.

With support from the NOAA National Undersea Research Pro-
gram, I have led several deep diving submersible expeditions to
study the fate and effects of municipal sludge at the 106-mile deep
water site, a depth of about 1.5 miles on the continental rise off of
New York and New Jersey. Our institute at Rutgers has also
played a role in issues associated with dredging and management
of contaminated sediments in the New York-New Jersey Harbor
Estuary and we have held three conferences for the port authority
of New York and New Jersey on sediment remediation and dredg-
ing technologies.

Marine scientists have only recently appreciated the richness of
life found in the deep ocean. Indeed, the dark, cold, and inhos-
pitable environment of the deep sea has previously been thought of
as a desert-like habitat that is largely devoid of any life. Very few
individuals have had the opportunity to observe the diversity of
deep sea life that Dr. Edmond referred to and even fewer have the
knowledge to identify deep sea life forms so that they can be enu-
merated and compared from one part of the ocean to another. Re-
cent estimates indicate a richness of species in the deep ocean as
high as from any environment on earth.

The importance of our studies of deep ocean municipal sludge
disposal at the 106-mile site is to predict the probable effects of the
gradual buildup of pollutants that is occurring from other sources.
Surface disposal of sludge over an approximately 75-nautical-
square-mile area at the surface contaminated over 1,400 nautical
square miles of deep sea floor.

A reexamination of the site in 1994 suggested that as a result
of cessation of sludge dumping in 1992, measurable recovery of the
environment has started. If the National Undersea Research Pro-
gram continues to be able to support this research, we expect to
study the site again this coming summer. Our objective is to meas-
ure the progress toward recovery of the site and ideally predict the
time to complete recovery.

I also chaired an international working group on biological effects
of deep ocean disposal in 1991 held at Woods Hole. We concluded
that deep ocean marine disposal should only be considered where
alternative disposal methods are inadequate, either now or in the
foreseeable future. We further recommended that all risks needed
to be assessed and an environmental cost-benefit audit be con-
ducted before adopting new technology.

149

Because of the limited knowledge of the deep oceans, we rec-
ommended against ocean disposal of highly toxic wastes but in
favor of an experiment on the mass disposal of relatively benign
high-volume waste, such as sludge, and its impact on abyssal
ecosystems. Such an experiment should include replicated experi-
mental treatments and should be designed to maximize its useful-
ness in predicting future changes in oceanic ecosystems.

In calculating whether deep ocean disposal is practical, the cost
of bringing the knowledge of deep ocean processes up to levels we
take for granted in other environments should be factored into the
cost of disposal. Alternative approaches that include beneficial use,
source reduction, and alternatives available for waste isolation
should be carefully evaluated.

A substantial portion of the cost associated with disposal alter-
natives are related to management and regulation, where obstacles
have little to do with actual costs of containment or treatment. For
purposes of comparison, costs associated with the most efficient
management practices achievable should be used.

Some of the interest in using the abyssal plains as a dumping
ground for contaminated sediments is a result of a crisis presently
faced by the port authority of New York and New Jersey. In my
previous testimony before the House Subcommittee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries in 1993, I recommended continuation of the
use of the 6-mile mud dump site in the short term, pending devel-
opment of another method for containment; determination of the
sources of contamination and a study of the transport processes as-
sociated with deposition of contaminated sediments in the shipping
channels and berths; use of specially designed pits for subseabed
containment within the harbor; and initiation of a broad-based,
long-term strategy to develop methods for remediation of Newark
Bay sediments.

Some of the reasons there has been little progress in any of these
areas include a complex and fragmented regulatory framework,
lack of an adequate mechanism to evaluate new technology, an in-
adequately informed public, and our inability to manage the port
as an entire system. I believe that the limited resources available
to the port should be used to improve management of contaminated
sediments rather than for development of techniques for isolation
of sediment on the abyssal plain.

This conclusion perhaps begs the more general question about
the feasibility of using the abyssal to isolate wastes. Considerable
investment by the Department of Energy was made approximately
a decade ago to evaluate the possibility of using the abyssal plain
for placement of high-level radioactive waste. Uncertainties associ-
ated with an inability to control the placement and transport of the
material have argued for disposal under more manageable cir-
cumstances.

Unfortunately, the deep sea is a habitat that is particularly dif-
ficult to access. Thus, once wastes have been planted there, future
remediation is near impossible from a logistic or financial stand-
point. It is possible that risks associated with land or near-shore
disposal of some materials may be so great in the future that the
equivalent of a landfill on the abyssal plain will eventually be
needed. I believe this eventuality can be avoided.

.150

In any case, because there are unmeasured effects of global in-
creases in pollutant concentrations in deep sea sediments, it would
be prudent to learn about life on the abyssal plain and to inves-
tigate the transport, fate, and effects of pollutants. I encourage you
to continue to support research on deep ocean processes.

I thank Mr. Saxton, Mr. Weldon, Mr. Pallone, and other mem-
bers of the subcommittees for their continuing efforts to improve
the knowledge base for developing environmental policy and for
their continuing and strong support of ocean programs.

I will be pleased to address any questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Grassle follows:]

151

Testimony

Delivered by Frederick Grassle, Director

Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences

Rutgers University

Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans

Subcommittee on Military Research and Development

Wednesday, December 6, 19 95

Chairman Saxton, Chairman Weldon, and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee on Fisheries, Wildlife and Oceans and Subcommittee on
Military Research and Development, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the potential use of the deep-ocean environment as a
repository for certain types of waste, particularly contaminated
dredge material. For the last 3 0 years I have been among the
relatively few scientists to study processes on the deep-ocean
floor, and, especially, the living organisms on or in the deep-sea
bed. Since coming to Rutgers University in 1989, I have led the
development of the Institute of Marine and Coastal Sciences and
have continued my interest in the deep ocean. In conjunction with
scientists from the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution, the U.S.
Geological Survey, and two other universities, and with support
from the NOAA National Undersea Research Program, I have led
several deep-diving submersible expeditions to study the fate and
effects of municipal sludge disposal at the 106 -mile Deepwater
Municipal Sludge Site at a depth of over 1.5 miles on the
continental rise off New York and New Jersey. Our Institute has
also played a role in issues associated with dredging and
management of contaminated sediments in the NY/ NJ Harbor Estuary
and we have held three conferences for the Port Authority of New
York and New Jersey on sediment remediation and dredging
technologies. I had the opportunity to give testimony before the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee on these subjects in
1993 .

Marine scientists have only recently appreciated the richness of
life found in the deep ocean. Indeed, the dark, cold and
inhospitable environment of the deep sea has previously been
thought of as a desert -like habitat that is largely devoid of any
life. Very few individuals have had the opportunity to observe the
diversity of deep-sea life and even fewer have the knowledge to

152

identify deep-sea life forms, so that they can be enumerated and
compared from one part of the ocean to another. Recent estimates
indicate a richness of species in the deep sea as high as from any
environment on earth. Although the deep ocean might be called a
desert if only total numbers or weight per area of animals is
considered, it cannot be considered a desert if we take into
account the richness of species- -a richness that has yet to be
fully described. Most of the deep ocean has never been sampled
properly, and it is therefore likely to reveal many more surprises
in the future. The deep-sea fauna is a vast reservoir of
biological innovation that can be tapped for use as pharmaceuticals
or for the development of other useful compounds.

Since the lowest points on the planet are in the deep ocean,
gravity dictates that the deep-sea floor is also a repository for
the relatively small amount of waste that is transported large
distances in the atmosphere, or through ocean circulation, great
distances from land. Pollutants are detectable wherever they have
been looked for in the deep sea, but so far the concentrations have
not been shown to be a cause for immediate alarm.

The main importance of our studies of deep-ocean municipal sludge
disposal is to predict the probable effects of the gradual build-up
of pollutants that is occurring from other sources. The surface
discharge of sludge from 1986 to 1992, at a rate of about 8-9
million tons per year, resulted in: 1. significant increases in
bottom contamination by both metal and organic pollutants over
background concentrations (despite predictions to the contrary), 2.
changes in bacterial community composition, 3. transfer of sludge-
derived carbon into the tissues of deep-sea animals, 4. a twofold
increase in the oxygen uptake of deep-sea sediments, and 5. the
appearance of species not normally common at the site. Surface
disposal of sludge over an approximate 75 nautical square mile area
affected and contaminated over 1,400 nautical square miles of deep-
sea floor. A re-examination of the site in 1994 suggested that, as
a result of cessation of sludge dumping in 1992, measurable
recovery of the environment had started. These results are
available in a number of reports and published articles that we can
make available to you. If the National Undersea Research Program
continues to be able to support this research, we expect to study
the site again in the summer of 1996. Our objective is to measure
the continued recovery of the site and to determine the time scales
over which this sort of environmental disturbance might be expected

153

to completely abate.

In 1991, I participated in a workshop at the Woods Hole
Oceanographic Institution sponsored by the Sloan Foundation on "The
Abyssal Ocean Option for Future Waste Disposal." I chaired a
working group of participants from France, Germany, Norway, the
United Kingdom and the U.S.A., which considered the biological
effects of deep-ocean disposal. We concluded that:

"marine disposal should only be considered where alternative
disposal methods are inadequate either now or in the
forseeable future."

We recommended:

"that all risks needed to be assessed and an environmental
cost/benefit audit be conducted before adopting new
technology. "

Because of the limited knowledge of the deep oceans we recommended
against ocean disposal of highly toxic wastes, but in favor of a
large-scale experiment on the mass disposal of a relatively benign,
high- volume waste, such as sludge, and its impact on abyssal
ecosystems. Such an experiment should include replicated
experimental treatments and should be designed to maximize its
usefulness in predicting future changes in oceanic ecosystems.

Such a deep-sea, disposal experiment should have the following
features :

disposal should not proceed until a quantitative assessment of

the species normally occurring in the environment has been

conducted,

in addition to direct effects on deep-sea life, attention must

also be given to the possibility of contaminants reaching

commercial fish species through food web transfer,

analyses should not make assumptions about effects on the

organisms living on or in the abyssal sea bed without direct

measurements,

the rate of lateral transport across the seafloor over decades

should be studied, especially if the material is not capped or

otherwise contained.

154

In calculating whether deep-ocean disposal is practical, the cost
of bringing the knowledge of deep-ocean processes up to the levels
we take for granted in other environments should be factored into
the cost of disposal. The costs of prevention of short dumping,
and the enforcement of protocols for emplacement on the seafloor
should also be included. Alternative approaches that include
beneficial use, source reduction, and alternatives available for
waste isolation should be carefully evaluated. A substantial
portion of the costs associated with disposal alternatives are
related to management and regulation, where obstacles have little
to do with the actual costs of containment or treatment. Rather
than using the worst cases of management of contaminated sediments,
costs associated with the most efficient management practices
achievable should be used.

Some of the interest in using the abyssal plain as dumping ground
for contaminated sediments is a result of a crisis presently faced
by the Port of New York and New Jersey. In my previous testimony
before the House Subcommittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries in
1993, I recommended:

continuation of the use of the 6 -mile Mud Dump Site in the

short term pending development of another method for

containment,

determination of the sources of contamination and a study of

the transport processes associated with deposition of

contaminated sediments in shipping channels and berths,

use of specially-designed pits for sub-seabed containment

within the Harbor, and

initiation of a broad-based, long-term strategy to develop

methods for remediation of Newark Bay sediments.

Some of the reasons there has been little progress in any of these
areas include: a complex and fragmented regulatory framework, lack
of an adequate mechanism to evaluate new technology, an
inadequately informed public, and our inability to manage the Port
as an entire system. I believe that the limited resources
available to the Port should be used to improve management of
contaminated sediments rather than for development of techniques
for isolation of sediment on the abyssal plain.

This conclusion perhaps begs the more general question about the
feasibility of using the abyssal plain to isolate wastes.

155

Considerable investment by the Department of Energy was made
approximately a decade ago to evaluate the possibility of using the
abyssal plain for emplacement of high-level radioactive waste,
"ncertainties associated with an inability to control the placement
and transport of the material have, thus far, argued for disposal
under more manageable circumstances. Unfortunately, the deep sea
is a habitat that is particularly difficult to access; thus, once
wastes have been planted there, future remediation is near
impossible from a logistic or financial standpoint. It is possible
that risks associated with land or near-shore disposal of some
materials may become so great that the equivalent of a landfill on
the abyssal plain will eventually be needed. In any case, because
there are unmeasured effects of global increases in pollutant
concentrations in deep-sea sediments, it would be prudent to learn
about life on the abyssal plain and to investigate the transport,
fate and effects of pollutants. I encourage you to continue to
support research on deep-ocean processes and congratulate Mr.
Saxton and his Subcommittee on their continuing efforts to improve
the knowledge base for developing environmental policy. I would
also like to thank Mr. Saxton, Mr. Weldon, Mr. Pallone and other
members of the subcommittees for their continuing and strong
support of ocean programs. I will be pleased to address any
questions you may have at this time. Thank you.

156

Mr. Weldon. Thank you, Dr. Grassle, for your excellent state-
ment.
Ms. Beth Millemann, welcome. The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF BETH MILLEMA>fN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COAST ALLIANCE

Ms. Millemann. Thank you. I would like to thank you for stay-
ing for the very bitter end of this hearing. It has been many hours
and very instructive for all of us who were here.

I must comment that there is a certain schizophrenia inherent
in having the first three panels and then this panel. The informa-
tion that was raised in the previous panels raised the most sober-
ing and disturbing of conclusions about what a willy-nilly approach
to disposing of wastes in the ocean can bring 10 years and 15 years
later after the fact, and that we are having a panel talking about
introducing new wastes into the deep ocean is personally very dis-
turbing to me, particularly in light of the very sobering information
that was presented earlier.

I am presenting testimony today on behalf of the Coast Alliance
and also 35 other environmental groups and sports and commercial
fishing organizations and water recreation groups. We are very
pleased to be here.

I wanted to raise essentially five different issues that our groups
have concerns over beginning deep ocean dumping. The first deals
with the fact, as Dr. Grassle has raised before, that we are getting
to learn more and more about the deep ocean and the fact that, as
you stated, it is not a dead zone, that there is a variety of life.

Beginning a waste disposal practice in an area that we are just
now learning about its variety and abundancy seems to me pre-
cisely the wrong direction to go, and certainly the direction of
waste disposal policies in this country vis-a-vis the ocean has been
precisely the opposite direction. It has been to get out of the ocean,
not to go back to the ocean for additional disposal.

The passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act in 1988 and the re-
cent changes to the London Convention in 1993 are only two exam-
ples of the fact that the public does not support ocean dumping of
wastes. When the public becomes sufficiently concerned about the
quality of ocean waters, it reacts very violently. The history of the
ocean is not one of half-measures. When the public becomes suffi-
ciently concerned, activities dumping in the ocean are banned. I
think that any movement forward toward introducing a new deep
ocean dumping regime will be met with the most hostile of public
responses.

Regarding the ban, the materials that are discussed in the Naval
Research Lab report of January this year contemplate the disposal
of dredge materials but also incinerator ash and also sewage sludge
in the ocean. The Ocean Dumping Ban Act banned the disposal of
sewage sludge and industrial wastes in the oceans. It also banned
the incineration of wastes at sea. It also banned the transportation
of those wastes across U.S. waters for purposes of dumping.

The London Convention also bans the disposal of industrial
wastes in the ocean, and there is certainly a good deal of conversa-
tion going on now about potentially expanding that ban to sewage
sludge dumping. So the elements that are discussed in the Naval

157

Research Lab report discuss in part the disposal of materials that
are illegal under current U.S. law and under international law.
This is a profoundly disturbing point, that we are spending tax dol-
lars into researching a proposal that is illegal under domestic and
international regimes.

Also, if we talk about beginning a deep ocean dumping policy,
what we are really doing is leaving a legacy of shame for our
grandchildren. I remember the proponents of nuclear power talked
about waste that would be too cheap to meter and we are talking
about beginning a new, hugely expensive and hugely intrusive
waste disposal practice that ultimately our grandchildren will be
left to bear the brunt of.

Now, I say that because I have looked at some of the proposals
that are included in the Naval Research Lab report. One of the pro-
posals is this so-called tethered container proposal, which I was
glad to see the report rejected as being unworkable. Unfortunately,
that same proposal is what is in the Commerce Committee report
that has come before you for a vote today.

I was very disturbed, however, to see what the first choice was
that was described in the lab report and it is a so-called surface
emplacement project. Essentially, what would happen under that
proposal would be this. A barge would sail from a major metropoli-
tan area; Philadelphia is listed as one of the cities. It would be
loaded with 55 million tons of Waste; 50 bags would be packed on
this barge and the waste would be loaded in the 50 bags. The barge
would sail anywhere from 200 to 2,300 miles offshore.

It would dump the 55 million pounds of waste through SV2 miles
of water onto an ocean dump site that is almost as big as 100 foot-
ball fields, and for the amount of wastes that are discussed in the
lab report solely for dredged materials, we are talking about a uni-
verse of wastes that would be dumped every year in the deep ocean
of 44 trillion pounds of dredged sediments. This is outrageous to
even consider undertaking this kind of an activity in the deep
ocean and we are very disturbed to see that time has been given
to that.

I was also disturbed to read that in the Naval Research Lab re-
port, it cast grave doubts about the bags into which the waste
would be put. Those bags have only been tested in 295 feet of water
as opposed to 20,000 feet of water, as proposed in the Naval Re-
search Lab report, so they are not tested in deep water. They also
have a propensity to rip, and it is not at all clear that they would
be able to withstand on the ocean floor the effects of the deep
ocean.

So we are talking about embarking on a waste management
strategy with devices that may or may not work, have never been
tested, for waste that we do not need to dump in the deep ocean,
because, finally, my concluding remark is that we cannot legally
dump industrial waste or sewage sludge in the oceans. That leaves
dredged material. If the dredged material is clean, it should not be
dumped in the ocean. It is a resource. It is fabulous for beach re-
nourishment, for landfill cover, for nurseries, plant nurseries. It
can all be used. We should not throw it away.

If it is contaminated, it should not go into the ocean no matter
what the size or the type of the container is. Again, under the

158

Ocean Dumping Act of 1972, we are not to dump materials in the
ocean that degrade the marine environment.

So there is not a waste crisis that is pushing this industry. What
we can do is prevent the waste from being created in the first part
and pursue a different Federal program that has been on the books
since 1987, which is the development of technologies to clean up
contaminated sediments, not to put them in bags and dump them
in the ocean or put them in containers and dump them in the
ocean but clean them up so they can be safely disposed of

The groups that I work with around the country strongly support
that program and that approach to waste management rather than
opening up the oceans for a variety of wastes. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Millemann follows:]

159'

lliance

215 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003 Tel: 202/546-9554 Fax: 202/546-9609

TESTIMONY

BOABD Of DIRECTOBS-

0«rb Catler

Southern Envifonmental Law Center
Serah Chasis

Natural Resources Defense Coundl
David Conrad

3 Federation

Conservation Izw Foundation
1m Etchenbery
Center for Marine Conservation

People tor Puget Sound
GonJon Glover
Bren Huisey

BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE ON

MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE

RESOURCES SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISHERIES, WILDLIFE

AND OCEANS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Regarding the Potential Use of the Deep Ocean Environment as a
Repository for Certain Types of Waste

by Beth MiUemann, Executive Director

Coast Alliance

Washington, D.C.

On Behalf of:

Committee to Presen/e Assateague li
Andy Kerr
Oregon Natural Resources Council

American Littoral Society (Highlands, NJ)
Baykeeper, American Littoral Society (Highlands, NJ)

Cape Arago Audubon (North Bend, OR)

Center for Marine Conservation (Washington, D.C.)

Clean Ocean Action (Highlands, NJ)

Coast Alliance (Washington, D.C.)

Coastal Advocates (Los Gatos, CA)

Concerned Citizens of Montauk (Montauk, NY)

Conservation Law Foundation (Boston, MA)

Fisher's Island Civic Association (Fisher's Island, NY)

Fisher's Island Conservancy, Inc. (Fisher's Island, NY)

Friends of the Earth (Washington, D.C.)

Great Lakes United (Buffalo, NY)

Greenpeace International (Washington, D.C.)

Heal the Bay (Santa Monica, CA)

Jersey Coast Angler's Association (Toms River, NJ)

Lake Michigan Federation (Chicago, IL)

Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation (Metairie, LA)

League fdr Coastal Protection (Malibu, CA)

Louisiana Environmental Action Network (New Iberia, LA)

ManaSota-88 (Palmetto, FL)

Montauk Fishermen's Emergency Fund (Montauk, NY)

35-799 96-7

160

Narragansett Baykeeper (Nanagansett, RI)

Natural Heritage Institute (San Francisco, CA)

Natural Resources Defense Council (Washington, D.C.)

North Carolina Coastal Federation (Newport, NC)

Northwest Environmental Advocates (Portland, OR)

Ocean Advocates (Dickerson, MD)

Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations (Sausalito, CA)

People for Puget Sound (Seattle, WA)

Saratoga Springs Hazardous Waste Coalition (Saratoga Springs, NY)

Save The Bay (Providence, RI)

Save the Harbor/Save the Bay (Boston, MA)

Save Our Shores (Santa Cruz, CA)

Sierra Club, Northeast Regional Field Office (Saratoga Springs, NY)

Staten Island Sport Fishing Federation (Staten Island, NY)

Surfrider Foundation, Santa Cruz Chapter (Santa Cruz, CA)

December 6, 1995

161

My name is Beth Millemann, and I am Executive Director of the Coast Alliance, a
national coalition of environmental leaders headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Coast
Alliance works to educate the public about the value of ocean and coastal resources. I am
presenting testimony today on behalf of the Coast Alliance and 35 other fishing, water recreation
and environmental organizations. We appreciate the opportunity to express our grave concerns
about, and opposition to, proposals to dump wastes in the deep ocean.

FoUow-Up To The 1992 Hearing

In the letter inviting me to testify. Chairmen Weldon and Saxton described today's
hearing as an investigation into potential use of the deep ocean environment as a repository for
certain types of waste, particularly contaminated dredge material. Today's hearing was
described as a follow-up to a 1992 hearing on using the deep ocean for contaminated dredge
disposal.

Many extremely valid concerns were raised at that 1992 hearing, and they are as relevant
today as they were then. For example. Chairman Saxton joined his colleagues from New Jersey
~ former Representative William Hughes and Representative Frank Pallone - in pointing out
the potential for deep ocean dumping to degrade the marine environment. Mr. Hughes vowed
to work against any experimental ocean disposal program. Mr. Pallone rightly described
proposals to dump in the deep ocean as turning the ocean floor into a landfill. And Chairman
Saxton cautioned that:

"Until scientifically determined conclusions are made beyond our present state of
ignorance, this government during a time of fiscal restraint would be hard-pressed
to assist research efforts seeking to inject more waste into the ocean floor. "

The Oceans Are Biologically Rich

Since Chairman Saxton's 1992 observations, our state of ignorance has greatly improved
with regard to the deep ocean. In October 1995, the New York Times reported an astonishing
breakthrough in knowledge about the deep ocean and sea floor (see attached). According to
scientists interviewed by the New York Times, the deep ocean has now been discovered to
"harbor a riotous diversity of life":

* The diversity of species in the deep ocean is so high that it may rival that of
tropical rain forests, often seen as the pinnacle of biological richness.

* The estimates for the number of species on the deep-sea floor have now soared
to 10 million or even 100 million, hundreds of times larger than old projections.
According to Dr. Lambshead, a marine biologist at the Natural History Museum
in Londori, "all sorts of ecologic theories that looked good suddenly fall apart.
We're having to change all our ideas.'

* A huge variety of life occurs throughout the deep sea. Along with its ecological
importance, there is the potential for significant comraerdal value.

162

The Oceans Are Rich But The Country Is Not

Our knowledge of the deep ocean environment has grown since 1992, as has the nation's
ddbt. This Congress is focusing enormous attention on the budget and major financial problems
facing the nation. A Summary Engineering Report prepared for the Naval Research Laboratory
in January 1995 estimates that operating one barge for deep ocean dumping activities would cost
$15 million per year, while another of the proposed ships would cost $32 million a year to
operate. Presumably, several barges and ships will be needed to dispose of the 20 million metric
tons of sediments discussed in the rqx>rt, as 800 trips from port to dumpsite and back to port
again will be needed to dump all that mud. The cost of retrofitting or building these barges and
operating them could easily be in the hundreds of millions of dollars per year. In comparison,
the program for developing technologies to decontaminate dredged sediments costs $5 million
a year.

The government would be called on to be a major fmancial player in the development
of the dumping industries, shouldering the costs of modelling, testing, designing, building
prototypes, and finalizing the technologies for commercial development ~ and for profit-making
by the private companies once the government has paid to research and develop the machines.
Instead of spending precious tax dollars on developing new ways to dump polluted waste in the
ocean - a practice which is illegal and strongly opposed by the public - the Federal government
should continue its extremely modest investment in technologies that can clean up toxic
materials, not just get them "out of sight and out of mind."

The Naval Research Lab's Report was conducted over the strong objections of Senator
Frank Lautenberg who urged in 1993 that the study be dropped because of "scarce federal
resources. " He also pointed to the improvement of fisheries and water quality with the end of
sewage sludge dumping off the Jersey shore. Representative Gerry Studds also cautioned the
Dqiartment of Defense to abide by the Ocean Dumping Ban Act, which makes it unlawful to
dump, or transport for the purpose of dumping, sewage sludge or industrial waste.

The Summary Engineering Report

The Summary Engineering Report for Abyssal Plains Waste Isolation Projea was
completed in January 199S for the Navy. It is one of the more recent documents proposing deq>
ocean dumping. It is useful to examine what this newest document prqwses.

In a nutshell, the Rqwrt focusses on deep ocean dumping of industrial waste in the form
of incinerator ash, sewage sludge and contaminated dredged sediments. These materials cannot
be legally ocean dumped. In addition to being ill^, any new ocean dumping activities would
be extremely unpopular. The public has spokai out forcefully and repeatedly against ocean
dumping of pollutants, including shore touiisra interests, water recreation businesses, fishermen
and conservationists.

163

What does the Navy's Report Recommend?

The Report ranks different dumping concepts. It's number one choice is the "Surface
Emplacement Concept. " In this instance, a barge would sail out to one of 400 dumpsites. Off
the Atlantic coast, the waste-loaded barge would have to sail from over 630 miles to over 1,250
miles to reach the dumpsite. For the Pacific, the barge would travel from 275 miles to nearly
2300 miles from px)rt to dumpsite. For the Gulf of Mexico, the barge would have to sail from
250 to 712 miles from port to dumpsite. The dumpsites would be located off such heavily
populated cities as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Seattle, San Francisco, Los
Angeles, San Diego, Tampa, and Galveston.

Each barge would carry 25,000 metric tons of wastes that are currently illegal to dump
in the ocean. That translates into more than 55 million pounds of waste, per barge. The wastes
would be put into 50 bags. So barges travelling hundreds if not thousands of miles out to sea -
- subject to storms, hurricanes, and nor'easters - would be loaded up with 55 million pounds
of waste.

Once the dumpsite was reached, the barge would dump bags of incinerator ash,
contaminated dredged sediments, or sewage sludge into the ocean. The bags would be dropped
from the bottom of the barge to sink through roughly 20.000 feet of water. This is a depth of
over three-and-a-half miles.

The 50 bags containing a total of 55 million pounds of waste would be dropped on a
dumpsite measuring 500 meters by 500 meters. This translates into roughly 2.7 million square
feet - making the dumpsite an area the size of nearly 100 football fields. The bags would be
dropped through water over three-and-a-half miles deep, from a sight far out in the high seas
subject to storm conditions and currents, to cover an ocean area the size of nearly 100 football
fields.

In the Report, an estimate of roughly 20 million metric tons of dredged material is listed
as "suitable" for deep ocean disposal every year. This translates into 40 trillion pounds of
dredged sediments annually.

The Report estimates that the per-port capacity is 2.5 million metric tons, which means
that presumably eight ports would be ports-of-call for the dumping barges. To dump 20 million
metric tons of waste in the ocean, 800 trips would have to be made at the rate of 25,000 metric
tons per trip.

Therefore, the Report must envision the use of several barges to service the eight ports-
of-call to make the 800 trips necessary to dump 40 trillion pounds of dredged sediments in the
ocean.

164

To summarize the Report's number one choice for deep ocean dumping:

A barge would sail from a major metropolitan area, loaded with 55 million tons
of waste. It would sail anywhere from 276 to 2300 miles offshore. It would
dump 50 bags containing a total of 55 million pounds of waste into the ocean.
The bags would sink through more than 3 1/2 miles of water. The dumpsite area
on the ocean floor would be the size of nearly 100 football fields. If only
dredged sediments are dumped ~ as opposed to sewage sludge and incinerator
ash, as also proposed by the report - 44 trillion pounds ofsedimems would be
dumped in the ocean annually.

The top ten reasons why this proposal is fiill of flaws are:

1. It would be illegal under U.S. and international law to dump the wastes
proposed by the Report.

2. It would be illegal under U.S. law to transport the wastes through U.S. waters
for the purposes of dumping. Therefore, you could neither transport nor dump
the wastes discussed by the Report.

3. Transportation hazards would be enormous. Distances of hundreds or
thousands of miles would be covered by a ship loaded with 55 million pounds of
waste. What happens in the event of a storm, or leak, or spill?

4. The deep ocean is extraordinarily vibrant and filled with life, much of it with
great commercial potential. In addition, the ocean is traversed by marine
mammals, all of which are endangered or threatened species. Vitally important
fisheries use the ocean and depend on clean water for survival. It would be
extremely difficult to monitor the impact on migratory marine mammals and
fisheries from exposure to the wastes. However, common sense dictates that
dumping 44 trillion pounds of waste in the ocean would make an impact on its
biological integrity.

5. A dumpsite on the ocean floor the size of 100 football fields is the equivalent
of firebombing the ocean floor.

6. U.S. waste policy has developed more of an emphasis on monitoring disposal
facilities to ensure that wastes are not moving offsite. Monitoring the movement
of hundreds of bags on the ocean floor 3 1/2 miles below the water surface would
be extremely difficult if not impossible.

7. Ocean floor dumping would make waste retrieval for treatment nearly
impossible, dooming the ocean floor to be a landfill forever.

8. If the bags decayed or split open, cleaning up the resulting hazardous waste
area would be impossible. In addition, the bags of waste would be dumped
through extremely deep water. The only experience to date with dumping
geotextile bags filled with waste has been in water less than 300 feet deep. This
Report proposes dumping in water 20,000 feet deep.

9. There is no practical experience with the bags proposed to hold 1 million

165

pounds of waste each. They have never been tested in deep water; they have the
potential to rip as they are dumped off the barge; there is no evidence showing
they can withstand the forces of the deep ocean; and it is likely that their disposal
in the ocean would be illegal under international and domestic law.
10. There is no need to embark on this proposal of herculean and completely
unproven proportions. Contaminated sediments can be stored on site, in upland
facilities or treated. It is illegal to dump any other wastes in the ocean, with the
exception of clean dredged materials. If the dredged sediments are clean, there
are many beneficial reuse options, beach renourishment or safe disposal
alternatives available: they are a resource, not a waste.

The Report acknowledges some of these very fundamental problems in its next-to-the-last
page. It acknowledges that the downside of the "Surface Emplacement" concept is that "the bags
are expected to drift apart as they fall through the water column," which presumably would
make it difficult to actually dump in the designated dumpsite. Earlier in the Report, it is noted
that the only experience with dumping bags of waste in the ocean has come from the Army
Corps of Engineers in water depths of less than 300 feet, which is less than 5 percent of the
depth of water discussed for deep ocean dumping. The susceptibility of bags to drift is raised.
Bag survivability on the ocean floor is also a complete unknown. The bags can also rip as they
exit the barge. And there aren't enough of them: currently, 700 are made a year and the
"Surface Emplacement" project would require seven times that.

This entire concept pivots on the notion that wastes will be kept out of the marine
environment because they will be in bags. But almost nothing is known about these bags,
whether they can survive on the seafloor, whether they will land in the targeted dumpsite,
whether they will rip on their way out of the barge, even whether there will be enough of them
to sustain this new mini-industry.

This concept also depends on current law being overturned. On the last page, the Report
notes that the Ocean Dumping Ban Act made it illegal to dump sewage sludge at sea.
Incinerator ash may contain contaminants that are prohibited from ocean dumping under the
international treaty called the London Convention. And the synthetic bags themselves could well
be illegal since the Lx>ndon Convention, the International Convention on the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act
(MPRSA) make it unlawful to dump persistent synthetics in the ocean.

Why is an activity that is illegal, potentially very damaging to the environment, extremely
costly and entirely unproven being considered?

Decontamination Technologies Are Further Developed Than Deep Ocean Dumping
Technologies

Instead of sinking Federal dollars into developing ocean dumping techniques, the Federal

166

government should continue developing techniques that don't shuffle wastes around: rather, they
reduce or remove the contaminants that make the waste problematic. Since 1987, the Federal
government has supported demonstration projects at five sites in the Great Lakes that are geared
toward developing ways to make contaminated sediments safe for re-use or disposal. In 1992,
a demonstration project was authorized in the New York-New Jersey Harbor.

These Great Lakes and New York-New Jersey decontamination projects show real
promise for de-coraaminating wastes, not just bagging them and dumping them. The
Environmental Protection Agency, the Army Corps of Engineers and entrepreneurs have
cooperated to further develop methods to make contaminated sediments clean enough for reuse
as landfill cover, plant nursery application, or safe disposal.

Waste Dumping In The Deep Ocean Is Unwise and Unnecessary.

There are several reasons why embarking on a deep ocean dumping concept is unwise
and unnecessary.

1. Ocean dumping of wastes other than clean dredged sediments is illegal under U.S. law, while
the ocean dumping of most other wastes is illegal under international law.

A. Domestic Law. The Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act (MPRSA) was passed
in 1972. It was later amended by the Ocean Dumping Ban Act of 1988 (ODBA). The 1988 law
banned ocean dumping of sewage sludge and industrial waste, and prohibited ocean incineration
of wastes. It also banned the transportation of wastes through U.S. waters for the purpose of
ocean disposal.

The ODBA bans were in addition to prohibitions already included in the original 1972
law, the MPRSA. Under it, pollutants that cause cancer or genetic damage cannot be dumped
in the ocean above "trace" amounts. Many of these pollutants are found in sediments dredged
from harbors or rivers, including dioxin, PCBs, mercury and DDT. Therefore, under the
MPRSA, dredged materials containing more than "trace" levels of carcinogens or mutagens
cannot be legally dumped in the ocean. That leaves only one material that can be legally ocean
dumped: dredged sediments that are clean or whose pollutant levels are below "trace."

In sum, the Navy's Summary Engineering Report proposes to dump materials in the ocean
that are illegal under the MPRSA and the Ocean Dumping Ban Act.

B. International Law. The London Convention governs waste dumping activities in the ocean,
and the United States - along with dozens of other countries ~ has been a part of the
Convention since 1972. Like U. S. law, the London Convention has been steadily moving in
the direction of increased ocean protection and decreased waste disposal at sea. In 1994, the
London Convention voted to ban hazardous waste incineration at sea. It also banned the disposal
of industrial waste at sea, and outlawed the disposal of high-level and low-level radioactive waste
dumping at sea. Only two materials may be legally dumped: sewage sludge and dredged

167

sediments, and there is movement toward banning sewage sludge disposal soon.

The direction taken by the international community through the London Convention and
the United States through passage of the Ocean Dumping Ban Act is clear: the eventual
elimination of waste dumping at sea.

In addition to the London Convention's prohibitions, the MARPOL convention
(International Convention on the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) regulates waste dumping
at sea. As mentioned above, it, along with the London Convention and MPRSA, prohibits ocean
dumping of persistent synthetics, which raises questions about the legal ability to dump
synthetically bagged wastes in the sea.

Both U.S. and international law have moved away from the ocean as a waste repository.
By and large, the wastes contemplated for a new deep ocean dumping regime cannot be legally
dumped at sea. Starting a new ocean dumping industry would also run completely counter to
U.S. and international waste disposal policies.

2. Embarking on a new at-sea waste dumping protocol is completely inconsistent with U.S.
waste management policies.

Waste dumping in the deep ocean would run counter to established waste management
policies for the following reasons:

A. deep ocean dumping would act as an enormous disincentive for waste
prevention, recycling and reuse.

B. waste disposal on the seafloor hundreds or thousands of miles offshore in
depths of water over three miles deep would make waste monitoring incredibly
difficult, while making waste retrieval and site clean-up nearly impossible.

C. beginning a new deep ocean practice would divert limited Federal funds from
the development of technologies that solve waste problems, not just move them
around.

D. scattering bags of wastes across the ocean floor would leave a legacy of waste
for our grandchildren and great-grandchildren to grapple with.

Waste Policy Has Shifted To Prevention, Recycling And Reuse

The first preferred action in the waste management hierarchy is prevention, followed by
recycling and reusing wastes. Ocean dumping is a throw-back to an out-of-sight, out-of-mind
outlook on waste management. As history has shown, as long as the oceans have been available
for waste dumping, preferred activities such its waste prevention and reuse have languished.
While the oceans received sewage sludge, little effort was made to determine environmentally
safe ways of decontaminating and disposing of sludge. When the Ocean Dumping Ban Act
passed in 1988, states and municipalities were forced to develop alternatives. As we've closed

168

the ocean as the ultimate garbage can, waste management has developed a more proactive and
environmentally safe approach, which benefits everyone.

The only material that can be legally ocean dumped in U.S. waters is dredged sediment.
Contaminants in the sediment pose a threat to the marine environment. Decontamination
technologies developed in the Great Lakes, as well as techniques pioneered by mining
companies, are succeeding in recycling useful minerals from sediments and removing harmful
pollutants. If sediments were lumped into a bag and tossed overboard, the ability to mine them
for useful elements or reduce their toxicity would be lost.

Waste Monitoring, Retrieval And Site Clean-Up Would Be Nearly Impossible With Deep
Ocean Dumping.

In terms of waste disposal on land, the emphasis is on constructing facilities whose
activities can be closely monitored to determine if harm to the environment or human health is
occurring. For example, landfills are now required to have double liners to help reduce the
possibility that wastes will filter through to underground water supplies. Monitoring systems
are required to determine if wastes are moving offsite or leaking fi-om the disposal area. Wastes
are supposed to be confined so that, if possible, treatment can occur.

None of these criteria would be met with deep ocean dumping. Monitoring would be
extremely difficult through 3 1/2 miles of water in an area subject to currents, underwater
storms and wave action. Leakage or offsite movement would be difficult to determine and if
found, remedies would be practically non-existent.

A New Deep-Ocean Dumping Practice Would Divert Federal Ftinds Away From Problem-
Solving

In the Navy's Report, Federal funding would be required to develop and test the
technologies that are in the five "concepts" discussed in the Report. As this Congress knows,
Fedoal Funding budget for innovative technologies that benefit the environment is extremely
limited. The entire budget for the Assessment and Remediation of Contaminated Sediments
(ARCS) program in the Great Lakes is a modest $S million per year. Since this program has
been ongoing for eight years, and its New York-New Jersey counterpart has been in existence
for a couple of years, it would make better fiscal sense for tfie Federal government to direct its
limited resources into technologies that hold the promise of solving the waste problem, not just
re-locating it.

Deep Ocean Dumping Would Leave A Legacy For Future Generations To Confront

This country has a history of embarking on waste disposal activities whose impacts are
not realized for generations. For example, liquid hazardous wastes were dumped into unlined
landfills, which led to toxics leaching out and poisoning drinking water. Tall stacks spewed air
pollutants that resulted in acid rain and significant forest damage. Too often our response to a

169

perceived "waste crisis" has been to jump first and think later. Deep ocean dumping would
leave another waste legacy to our grandchildren and great-grandchildren, who are already
burdened with the problems created to date.

3. There is no need to begin waste dumping in the deep ocean as economically and
environmentally preferable waste disposal, prevention and reuse options exist and are being
further developed.

Clean-up technologies are being developed through the Great Lakes and New York-New
Jersey programs. While they are not currently ready for commercial application, they are
moving toward that goal. It is quite possible that launching a deep ocean dumping industry will
take as long as getting the decontamination technologies to a position of commercial readiness.

Even in the absence of clean-up methods, new disposal and reuse options are reducing
the volume of waste proposed for deep ocean dumping. For example, some ports are avoiding
ocean dumping by using approaches such as creating new subaqueous pits for storage of
contaminated sediments. The Port of New York-New Jersey is investigating this option for
storage of polluted dredged materials. The Port of Boston has decided to avoid ocean dumping
of problem sediments and is, instead, creating a disposal pit in one of its channels. On-site
disposal options are also being pursued by the Port of Seattle and some of the Great Lakes ports.
Some sediments are being treated to the point that they are suitable for landfill cover, thereby
becoming an asset, not an encumbrance.

With everything banned for ocean disposal except dredged materials, the need for
embarking on a massive new ocean dumping program is completely absent.

4. Waste dumping in the deep ocean could harm living marine resources and industries
dependent on them.

The New York Times and other publications, including Smithsonian and BioScience
magazines, have reported new scientific breakthroughs regarding the incredible diversity and
richness of the deep ocean. As well as threatening the plants and animals that live in the abyssal
plain and elsewhere in the deep ocean, waste dumping activities would threaten animals that live
closer to shore. For example, ships hauling 55 million pounds of waste would sail for huge
distances through areas used by endangered and threatenal marine mammals. These areas are
also rich commercial and recreational fisheries. If a spill or leak were to occur in transit, the
impacts could be disastrous. In addition, the action of dumping hundreds of million-pound bags
through miles of water onto the seafloor could have catastrophic impacts. At a bare minimum,
life on the ocean floor would be smothered or crushed by the bags landing intact or breaking
apart on impact. Waste bags tossed into ocean waters also threaten the delicate microlayer of
the sea, which is a thin zone of water and air which supports foodchain basics like
phytoplankton. The dumping activities ~ transportation, water dumping and seabed landing -

170

10
are fraught with problems for the ocean and the resources it supports.

As proposed by the January 1995 Report done for the Navy, deep ocean dumping would
involve wastes that cannot legally be disposed in the ocean or even transported over it for
purposes of disposal. The Report's number one recommended proposal would go against long-
standing public opposition to waste dumping in the ocean. It would involve long-distance
transportation over storm-prone seas to a site where literally trillions of pounds of waste would
be tossed into the ocean to sink through over three miles of water and despoil an area of the
ocean floor the size of almost 100 football fields.

This proposal is unworkable. It is also unnecessary. Other more environmentally
sensitive disposal, reuse, recycling and prevention options exist.

Any deep ocean dumping proposals would, by their nature, divert scarce Federal funds
from supporting the development of technologies that would deal head-on with pollutants in
waste, not just bundle them up and dump them at sea.

On behalf of the fishing, water recreation and conservation interests I represent today,
I strongly urge the subcommittees to prevent deq) ocean dumping activities from occurring.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify.

171

172

THE NEW YORK TIMES, TUESDAY. OCTOBER 17. im

Deep Sea Floors Teem With Diversity of Life

Continued From Page CI

thcyo

s probably conservallve,"

Half-inch crustacean, Ischnomcsus brunni, from sea floor.

pnnly driven by reproductive Isola-
lion. Species oficn arise, he held,
when barriers like mountains or de-
serts prevent the Interbreeding of

bate. Dr. Robert M. May, a zoologist
at Oxford University, faulted the fig-
ures as unsupportable and said that
the deep total was unlikely lo exceed
a half million species.

By contrast. Dr. Gary C. B. Poore
and Dr. George D. p. Wilson, Aus-
tralian biologists, said their own field
studies In the Pacific suggested that
global species richness was even
greater than 10 million.

"We suspect new estimates could
be much higher." they wrote In the
Feb. 16. 1993, Issue of the journal
Nature.

Other experts, such as Dr. Lamb-
shead of the Natural History Mu-
seum, formerly the British Museum,
suggested that the estimates would

im kept the sam
t during rciricval.

mplc from

Pacific and Caribbean tslcs.

In this case, however, the endcmlc-
Ity is occurring in water — a medium
famous for Its lack of Isolating barrl-

geographic

scientific h
explaining i

fact Darwin ;

history.

The potential commercial value of
the new organisms lies in their great
gcncttc diversity. In general, all

taboHsms from odd places around
the earth are starting to be aggres-
sively Investigated as possible
' biological wealth. 11ic

hy the land appeared to
so much richer biologically than
sea. This logic seemed reinforced
considering the deep, which not
few environmental barriers
lacked primary producers such
as plants. For food. Its Inhabitants
mainly had lo rely on a rain of organ-
ic scraps falling from far above nr to
prey on niic nnolhcr.

Expeditions over the decades that
dropped lines and dredges into the
deep seemed lo confirm the waste-
land Idea. The few glimmerings of
life that were discovered tended to
be monotonously similar. The sea
cucumbers of the deep Atlantic were

The first hint
Ically diffcrcnl

In the field, allowing a nci
precision. Now, for the first
distribution of deep fauna
exactly mapped. Though I
samples were small, repeated ones
over a region could give a clear

f species density.

1980's. with
the field rea
Dr. Grassle,

of ihc United States for llic Interior
Department's Minerals Manage-
ment Service, which was considering
oil and gas development In deep wa-

Dr. Hesslcr of Scrlpps. the d«

New drugs may
emerge from a vast
pool of exotic genes
in the depths.

biodiversity pioneer, said In an Inter-

Armed with a few ml
Dr. Grassle, Dr. Nancy J. Mnclolck.
Dr. James A. Blake and Dr. Brigitte
Hllbig. among others. In the mld-
19S0'sdropf>ed box corers measuring
one fool square Into waters off Dela-
ware, New Jersey. New England.

Souih Carolina. A

total of 55G box I

taken at sites up to 2.2 miles deep.

The feast of life extracted from the

great that l

dollars, 'f'clr rough

limaies. '"What

seemingly i\
of Darwin. Dr. Grassle of Rutgers
said the disparity i
apparent than real His '

gcsts that extraordinarily

dcrsianding the fate o

"Species diversity is one of tli
most sensitive Indicators of change.

dccp-sca taxonomy, in
short, the richness was debatable.

The work was slowly extended In
the 1970's lo many new sites in the
Pacific and Atlantic, with similar
startling results. Even so, skepticism
continued In some circles because
the sampling was Imprecise. Sled
runs tor diffcrcnl limes and speeds
produced different results. And It
was hard lo know how far the sleds

ul might Iwld 1
species of small invertebrates. As-
suming ihai abyssal regions far
from coiUlncnl.nl shciv)
less life, ibcy said, a ni
number was 10 millions

the new population csti-
at Just Identifying
[ the abyss could

■•The kinds of n

* up with are frightening," he said.
f we're only halfway right, many
eclcs could be forced into extlnc-
•n before they'r

»facl

the density of sampled II

ambiguous.

So Dr. Hessler, after I
Scrlpps. worked with

173

Mr. Weldon. Thank you for your statement. I thank each of you
for your excellent statements and comments and your testimony.

It is very infrequently that we have a panel of witnesses appear
before a committee of the House of Representatives at the very
same time that the issue that they are here to testify about is on
the House floor, so you have a unique opportunity here to directly
impact at least four votes here in the Congress on this issue. I do
not think we have voted on this yet.

We have heard the pro and con here and we have heard reserva-
tions about the capability. We have the capability, but perhaps the
technology relative to the bags, and we are talking about from
what I understand on the appropriations conference report the pat-
ented tethered technology delivery system that you mentioned,
which I understand has been rejected by the Navy.

So the question that we have to decide for ourselves today I am
going to put to each of you, and that is. should we be spending
NO,/^'s money on this issue.

Frank, would you give us an update? Has there been a vote yet?

Mr. Pallone. Do you want me to tell you?

Mr. Weldon. Has it been resolved yet? I will yield to the gen-
tleman from New Jersey to give us the latest update. We are not
putting you on the spot until we hear what he has to say, so you
can think about your answer.

Mr. Pallone. This really says a lot about the process, unfortu-
nately, and the way things operate around here in terms of certain
special interests, if you will, getting their way. But essentially, due
to the work of Congressman Saxton and also Congressman
Torkildsen from Massachusetts and myself, we had a dialogue on
the House floor during the general debate on the conference report,
which is occurring right now, with Mr. Livingston.

And Mr. Livingston, of course, said that this research project
would not result in any ocean dumping actually taking place,
which, of course, I contest. But leaving that aside, he agreed basi-
cally that no action would be taken with regard to the research
project until our subcommittee, meaning the Fisheries, Wildlife and
Ocean Subcommittee, reported a bill authorizing it.

As you know, Mr. Burton has introduced a bill that is essentially
the same as what is in the conference report, so that is certainly
a positive development because it would mean, at least in theory,
that nothing would move forward until our subcommittee took ac-
tion on the authorizing bill. That is at least the way I understood
it, and maybe Mr. Saxton can confirm that when he comes back.

But I am still concerned, because the suggestion was being made,
Mr. Chairman, by Mr. Livingston that this was not going to result
in any ocean dumping. Of course, my position all along has been
that the research project itself is essentially an open-ended oppor-
tunity to conduct various forms of ocean dumping and that is the
reason why both the Commerce Department, when they did their
study, and the Naval Research Lab, when they did their study,
suggested that this not be done.

If I could just read this and then I will leave you all alone here,
and I read this on the floor, in the letter that came to the chairman
of our Resources Committee, Mr. Young, July 28 this year, the
General Counsel of the Department of Commerce says that, "The

174

bill," the Burton bill, "is inconsistent with the spirit as well as the
letter of the Ocean Dumping Act and the London Convention. It al-
lows for large-scale open-ended dumping without limitation on the
amount of material. It contains no guidance or requirements with
regard to prior consideration of the impacts of the authorized waste
on the marine environment, monitoring programs after disposal, or
methods of packaging or containment of the materials. Therefore,
the research program requirements fail to ensure that activities
will be scientifically sound, appropriately limited, and undertaken
only after consideration of potential adverse impacts."

So my point, Mr. Chairman, was that the research program itself
is essentially an open-ended opportunity to do ocean dumping of
dredged materials, you name it. There is no real definition. So I do
not agree with Mr. Livingston that the research project, if it moved
forward, would not result in ocean dumping. It would. But thank-
fully now, we have a commitment that it would not do this re-
search project or this study until our subcommittee acts.

At least, that is the way I understood it. I think that past experi-
ence tells us we have to be vigilant in this regard and constantly
make the case that this should not happen, but I think that we at
least made some progress today.

Mr. Weldon. I thank the gentleman from New Jersey for his
comments and for his work on the House floor, and I thank our col-
league from New Jersey, who I know is alive and well someplace
in this building or the building across the street. Hopefully, we will
see him before we adjourn the session.

But with the comments that our good friend and colleague, Mr.
Pallone, just made, we do have a distinguished panel of experts
here, scientists, and as we know, in the scientific community there
is always room for disagreement on a number of issues and that
has been evident by the testimony today. So I would go down the
line and ask each of you, if you had the chance to take action on
this issue today and to allocate funds through NOAA, as I under-
stand it would have been, to allow a research project to move for-
ward, what would your position be? We will start with Dr. Valent
and go right down the line.

Dr. Valent. To perform this 15-year demonstration project? Ab-
solutely no.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you. Dr. Edmond.

Dr. Edmond. I think absolutely yes. If you are talking contami-
nated dredged soil, the volumes involved are enormous. The ex-
pense of cleaning it up chemically is enormous. It is in the ocean
already. Unfortunately, it is in one of the most biologically produc-
tive parts of the ocean, estuaries. We are taking it to the least bio-
logically productive part of the ocean and disposing of it in an orga-
nized, safe way, and we should not be misled by the bags breaking.
Those are engineering questions. We can solve those. It is an op-
tion that should not be walked away from because the situation is
getting progressively more serious, both in this country and inter-
nationally.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you. Dr. Grassle.

Dr. Grassle. In terms of our priorities, I do not think we should
go forward with the proposal as stated. I think that for contami-
nated sediments, there are bigger issues to be solved, particularly

175

with respect to some of the things that I mentioned in my testi-
mony. There are certainly alternative approaches. Beth Millemann
mentioned beneficial use. Certainly, source reduction and taking a
systems engineering approach to contaminated sediments in our
harbors is what is needed, considering the problem in its entirety.
I think isolating the problem as an engineering issue somewhat
begs the question.

Mr. Weldon. And Ms. Millemann.

Ms. Millemann. I would agree with that. I would also say that,
as we know, this is a time of very scarce Federal funds and what
I would suggest instead of this kind of a completely unproven and
unnecessary project would be to continue congressional support for
the program that was begun in 1987, which is seeking to find a so-
lution to the problem of contaminated sediments to begin with,
which is ways to render those sediments safe enough to be reused
or to be disposed of safely. That project has been joined by a project
that Mr. Pallone has long championed to test different technologies
in the New York-New Jersey Harbor area to find ways to clean
those sediments up.

I would also add that several of the ports, as Dr. Grassle pointed
out also, including the Port of New York-New Jersey, are taking
steps to create ways to deal with contaminated sediment issues
that they face now. The Port of New York-New Jersey is talking
about digging an underwater pit for storage of contaminated sedi-
ments. The Port of Boston is doing the same thing for its sediment
contamination issue. The Ports of Seattle and Tacoma are doing
upland disposal and on-site disposal. So the ports are trying to deal
with this as well, too, and that is the prudent course.

Mr. Weldon. What agency is heading up that program?

Ms. Millemann. The decontamination projects that were created
in 1987 were amendments to the Clean Water Act that the EPA
runs

Mr. Weldon. So the EPA is running it?

Ms. Millemann [continuing]. Through the Great Lakes National
Program Office. The project that Mr. Pallone has championed is
run jointly by the Army Corps of Engineers ajid the EPA and it
was authorized through the Water Resources Development Act of
1990.

Mr. Weldon. Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy.

Mr. Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Weldon. Let me thank you for sticking through this mara-
thon landmark hearing. You have been here from the beginning
and we appreciate that. Thank you.

Mr. Kennedy. Not at all. It has been a real education. I look for-
ward to working with my new colleague, Congressman Pallone, and
furthering his endeavors on the committee as a recent appointee of
the Natural Resources Committee. I look forward to working with
some of the panel members as we discuss this issue going forward.

I cannot help but just immediately be struck by the importance
of this issue economically. I mean, you can just see all of our land-
based dump sites are getting to be such problems, and the cost of
transporting waste across State lines is another issue altogether.
You can only begin to imagine why this is now being debated in

176

the conference report. There is no mystery to this. There are big
dollars behind this and I am anxious to get more educated and
aware of it because I am sure if my constituency really understood
what we are talking about here, they would be very interested in
learning more about it, so thank you.

Mr. Weldon. I would thank the gentleman and would say that
when we have the field hearing up in your area, this is certainly
an area that we could pick up on as it relates to Rhode Island and
the coastal States in that area.

Mr. Pallone, do you have any other comments or questions?

Mr. Pallone. I just wanted to say briefly, I know the day is long
here, but

Mr. Weldon. It is very long.

Mr. Pallone [continuing]. I appreciate all the testimony. I did
miss some of it, and I think maybe the most important thing, Mr.
Saxton has come back now so I am sure he will comment on it,
but

Mr. Weldon. He will adjourn the hearing.

Mr. Pallone. The most important thing, I think, is to continue
to be vigilant. We know that this has come up before in the Mer-
chant Marine and Fisheries Committee. As I said, there is no doubt
in my mind that this was put in the conference because it was not
to see the light of day. If it had come up in this authorizing com-
mittee or if it had come up in even the regular appropriations proc-
ess, it never would have gotten through.

Now that this has been shifted back to our subcommittee, I think
that we just have to make sure that we bring to light the problems
with this bill and why it is essentially ocean dumping, albeit maybe
on a limited scale or maybe not.

I just wanted to thank Mr. Saxton and also Mr. Torkildsen for
bringing this up on the floor today because I think that we at least
have thrown another roadblock in the way, but it is going to come
back to bite us again and we have to be constantly vigilant. So
thank you, Beth, and thank you Fred and thanks to the others for
bringing it to our attention again today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Millemann. We really thank both of you for your good work
and very quick response time on this issue. It was really so impor-
tant for you to raise your voice again for the ocean £ind we really
appreciate your hard work on this.

Mr. Saxton [presiding]. Thank you all. I apologize, but as you
know, things do not usually happen in twins around here but they
did today on the same subject, so I had to choose, as Mr. Pallone
has just correctly stated, to be on the floor addressing this same
issue. I think we have done so today successfully, and I thank Mr.
Pallone, who was the vanguard of ferreting out some language in
the appropriations bill that was objectionable to the New Jersey
delegation, so I am very pleased.

I guess I would just ask that my statement be included in the
record at the appropriate place.

Just let me ask a question for anyone who wishes to respond. As
you know, I just mentioned the conference report on the Depart-
ment of Commerce appropriations bill includes direction to study
potential technology delivery system for deep ocean material place-

177

ment. Since apparently the Navy has at least indicated serious res-
ervations about this technology or maybe even has rejected the
technology do you think it is appropriate that we spend or direct
NOAA to spend its funds relative to this topic. I am sorry if you
may have adready answered this question, but if you would like to
address that issue, I would appreciate it.

Dr. Valent. My approach will be to transfer my reports and our
findings and what not to NOAA to a contact that I have been talk-
ing to there, Don Pryor, and offer them to him for his use in reply-
ing to that Congressional tasking. I do not think they are going to
come up with any different findings than we did, and basically,
that finding is that a tethered bucket under controlled lowering has
about one-tenth the throughput, or in other words, it will cost 10
times as much to get the waste to the sea floor using a tethered
bucket concept that is controlled on the way down.

As far as the issue of speeding it up by allowing that bucket to
free-fall, that is technically not feasible, but we will be happy to
provide all of our information.

Mr. Saxton. I thank you, and if you would provide a full set of
that information, if you have not already done so, to the sub-
committee we would appreciate that, because we believe that the
changes that were made to the intent of the bill language today re-
affirms the authority of the subcommittee to deal exclusively with
this matter, so it would be presumptuous on our part to ask you
to send that to NOAA at this point. We would prefer that you send
it to us.

Dr. Valent. I see. Thank you.

Mr. Saxton. We think we have a commitment from all parties
now that this process will not proceed until this subcommittee au-
thorizes it.

Dr. Valent. I see. Thank you. We will do so.

Mr. Saxton. We think that we have made that much progress.

Does anybody else want to respond?

Ms. MiLLEMANN. I would just like to respond and say that I
think that since there has already been an analysis done of this
process that outlined its inherent weaknesses, spending tax dollars
to repeat that would be a silly use of money. We also believe that
there is no need to start a deep ocean dumping regime. It is also
illegal under the law that you and Mr. Pallone worked so hard to
pass in 1988, the Ocean Dumping Ban Act.

So many of the materials that have been discussed for deep
ocean dumping are illegal under U.S. law, international law, in-
credibly expensive, examined, and rejected. We would prefer to see
a continuing commitment to developing the decontamination tech-
nologies that are under development in the New York-New Jersey
region through the demonstration project and in the Great Lakes
region through the ARCS program.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you. Dr. Grassle.

Dr. Grassle. I would also like to add that we should not consider
the problem narrowly as an engineering problem, that there are
some issues about our understanding of deep ocean processes and
life on the sea floor which need to be considered before we would
contemplate putting waste on the abyssal plain.

178

The other side of the issue is that the question of the contami-
nated sediments in our ports needs to be addressed broadly. We
need to take a systems approach to contaminated sediments in our
ports, looking at the entire system. As has been mentioned, we
need to consider remediation technologies, but in the short term,
it is more important to look for better approaches to containment
of the dredged materials. There are a number of innovative propos-
als to contain sediments in our ports at a reasonable cost.

Mr. Saxton. Thank you. Mr. Edmond.

Dr. Edmond. I will be in the minority. I think this is an option
that is well worth looking into, certainly at the level of paper stud-
ies, as they are called, although I do not find them very valuable.
I think if you look at the bag technology, it would work. It would
be cheap. It would be accurate. I have almost as many Alvin dives
as Fred, and when you get down in the submarine with about a
couple hundred pounds, you go straight down. We could accurately
emplace material on the sea floor using the bag technology.

We would be taking material from one of the most biologically
productive areas in the ocean — remember, the dredged soil is al-
ready in the ocean — and putting it in the least biologically produc-
tive area, which seems to make sense, doing it at a cost that would
be competitive certainly with remediation, and doing it with a sys-
tem which could operate on a scale comparable to the problem,
which is not only contaminated harbors in this country but world-
wide.

There is an international problem associated with disposal of
contaminated soil. Nobody has come up with a good way of doing
it. The study that has been funded has been in existence now for
what, 7 or 8 years without any real bullet in the hands. It seems
to me that this is an option that should be looked at.

The law is the law and the law can be changed, so the law is
not an argument. If it is in the national interest, legislation could
be passed. And I think if you think of the problem seriously, as we
all do, then there is at the moment no obvious way out that is not
going to cost us an arm and a leg.

Mr. Saxton. Yes, sir, and that is why we had originally sched-
uled this hearing today, to begin that process, and we want to do
that.

I am not a scientist, but I come as other members of this panel
do at this from a commonsense point of view and from some experi-
ence, I might add. Back several decades ago, we had a problem
with sewer sludge and we decided that since the sea was such a
vast area, that if we just transported it 12 miles off" the tip of Mr.
Pallone's district, that it would be out of sight and out of everyone's
mind forever.

We finally decided that that did not work, so we moved it to a
site 106 miles off the southern tip of my district and dumped it
there for a time, and finally we collectively decided that that did
not work, in spite of the fact that the sea is such a vast area.

So now we are considering the more vast reaches of the ocean be-
cause the first two did not work. So from an experience point of
view as well as from a commonsense point of view, one of the
things that many of us have concluded is that out of sight is not
out of mind when it comes to these types of materials.

179

I do not claim to know what the answers are, but from some of
our experiences in recent years and recent decades, it certainly ap-
pears that we need to move very cautiously on these issues.

In any event, I am sure that we have not heard the last of this
matter, as Mr. Pallone correctly points out. We thank you for com-
ing to share your visions and your perspectives of this issue with
us. We will continue to search together for answers.

Thank you very much. The hearing is concluded.

[Whereupon, at 5:48 p.m., the subcommittees were adjoumed.l

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

180

>RV G£IS[ imallAIV RUE i

WAY ORIMKIV ORE 1^ i

FACT SHEET
March 1995

PLAN OF ACTION FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPORT NO. 34 (1993-94)
TO THE STORTING ON NUCLEAR ACTTVITIES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN
AREAS ADJACENT TO OUR NORTHERN BORDERS

The Government presented Report no 34 (1993-1994) to the Storting on nuclear activities
and chemical weapons in areas adjacent to our northern borders on 8 April 1 994 The report
was debated in the Storting on 16 June 1994

The Government has now drawn up a Plan of Action for following up this report High pnonty
is given to measures to increase nuclear safety and prevent radioactive contamination

Summary of the Plan of Action

Although Norwegian efforts in connection with nuclear issues will primarily be concentrated
on northwest Russia, it may also prove appropriate to provide assistance for cenain projects in
the Baltic states and Central and Eastern European countries

The Plan of Action includes projects designed to address the following major problems

1 Unsatisfactory safety standards at nuclear facilities (power plants, nuclear-powered
civilian vessels, nuclear-powered naval vessels and reprocessing plants)

2 Unsatisfactory management and storage of spent uranium fijel and radioactive waste

3 Dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Sea and input into the sea fi'om
Russian rivers

4 Weapons-related environmental hazards

Although the responsibility for solving these problems lies primarily with the Russian
authorities, external support is necessary Norway is seeking to initiate broad international
cooperation on the technical and financial aspects of these problems.

181

Increasing international cooperation

In a short period of time, the attention focused on nuclear problems and on the cooperation
necessary to solve them has increased considerably

Norway participates actively in a large number of formal and informal bilateral, trilateral,
regional and multilateral fora for cooperation and consultation. Cooperation has been initiated
with Russia, the Nordic countries, France and the USA.

Furthermore, nuclear safety and radioactive contamination have been placed on the agenda in a
large number of multilateral fora. The most imponant of these are:

the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),

the OECD countries' G-24 group for nuclear safety,

the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA),

the Nuclear Safety Fund of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

(EBRD),

the London Convention of 1 972,

NATO/the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC),

the Barents Cooperation,

the Baltic Sea Council,

the Nordic Council/Nordic Council of Ministers,

the Rovaniemi Process,

the UN and

theEU.

Sound financial basis for increased Norwegian activity

The Plan of Action encompasses surveys and analyses, technical assistance (including training),
equipment deliveries, work in connection with international agreements and conventions and
political processes for obtaining as much information as possible and promoting the broadest
possible international involvement in combating the threat of radioactive contamination in areas
adjacent to our northern borders.

The Storting has provided a sound financial basis for increased Norwegian activity in this field.
The Government has earmarked up to NOK 130 million for implemenution of the Plan of
Action in 1995.

In 1995 the Government's efforts to improve nuclear safety and prevent radioactive
contamination will focus on the following:

1 . Unsatisfactory safety standards at nuclear facilities

* Technical assistance including training and equipment deliveries to the nuclear power
plant on the Kola Peninsula.

* Risk and impact assessments related to accidents at the nuclear power plant on the Kola

182

Studies and measures related to the use of alternative energy sources, energy-saving and
efforts to increase the efficiency of the energy sector in northwest Russia

Increased cooperation between Norwegian and Russian authorities which are responsible
for safety and control measures at nuclear facilities

Contributions to the work of the Nuclear Safety Fund to improve safety standards at
high-risk nuclear reactors in Russia and Eastern Europe pending their closure in the near
future Norway attaches great importance to ensunng the success of the Fund in
implementing a project to improve safety standards at the nuclear power plant on the
Kola Peninsula

Support for international cooperation on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power
plant in Ukraine

Participation in the work of the IAEA and the OECD/NEA related to liability for
nuclear damage

Unsatisfactory management and storage of spent uranium fuel and radioactive waste.

Financial and technical assistance for an international conference under the auspices of
the IAEA on the management and storage of radioactive waste in Russia

Continuation of the Norwegian-Russian-US project aimed at expanding the capacity of
the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet's effluent treatment facility for low-level radioactive
waste in Murmansk. Funds may be made available for the co-financing of the facility

Efforts to initiate international cooperation on measures for the safe handling of the
vessel "Lepse", which is used by the nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet in Murmansk as a
storage facility for radioactive waste, including high-level spent uramum fuel Vis-a-vis
countnes and international organizations that have expressed an interest in this matter,
Norway will propose the establishment of a steering group for international cooperation
in connection with "Lepse". Funds have been reserved for specific measures in this
connection

Continuation of the contacts between Norway, the USA and Russia with a view to
preventing radioactive contamination from defence-related activities and installations.
Funds have been reserved for specific measures in this connection

Continuation, under Norwegian leadership, of the NATO/NACC pilot study on cross-
border environmental problems emanating from defence-related installations and
activities, with special emphasis on obtaining information and developing methods for
implementing nsk assessments in connection with the decommissioning of nuclear-
powered submannes and the handling and storage of waste resulting from this process.

Participation in the efforts coordinated by the IAEA to draw up an international
convention on the safety of radioactive waste management.

183

* Renewed initiatives vis-a-vis the G-7 countnes concerning the preparation of an
international programme of action and the establishment of an international fund for
multilateral projects to promote the safe management and storage of radioactive waste
and fissile matenal

3 Dumping of radioactive waste in the Barents and Kara Seas and input into the sea from
Russian rivers

* Completion of analyses and preparation of a scientific report on the 1994 expedition to
the Kara Sea.

* Completion of the first phase of the survey on the risk of radioactive contamination from
the Mayak reprocessing plant.

* Risk assessment of the hazards to humans and the environment posed by dumped
radioactive waste.

* Development of a programme for monitoring radioactivity in the Northern seas in
cooperation with Russia and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme
(AMAP)

4 Weapons-related environmental hazards

* Proposals to the Russian authorities aimed at initiating a scientific survey on radioactive
contamination resulting from nuclear tests.

* Participation in international cooperation to promote the adoption of a comprehensive
test ban treaty. Contribution to a system of verification and control

* Measures contributing to the environmentally sound destruction of Russian chemical
weapons in areas adjacent to our borders.

* Promotion of an unconditional and indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). Norway considers it imponant that the treaty be ftirther strengthened by
umversal adherence Norway is also making efforts to ensure that the verification
arrangements of the NPT - the IAEA's safeguard system - is strengthened with emphasis
on greater transparency and with the right to inspect and monitor all nuclear facilities.

* Financial contributions to the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow

Panicipation in international cooperation to prevent illicit traffic in radioactive
substances and nuclear material. Implementation of specific measures to improve border
controls between Russia and Norway.

184

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF LEQISUOTVE AFFAIRS
I300 NAVY PCNIAaON
WASHINOTON OC 20380-1300 m RCPLT mnn

LA-581-235
3 Oct 95

Mr. Bill Andahazy
Professional Staff Member
Committee on National Security
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Andahazy,

In response to your request for information concerning the
process the Navy uses to determine channel dredging requirements
to support harbor and Naval base access, the attached information
is provided.

Sincerely,

P.W. DUNNE
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, Navy Programs

185

Rvspona* to Con<jr»SBion«l R*qu«st for Informmtion

Question] Based on projected Navy Force Structure, explain tho
process Navy uses to determine channel dredging requirements to
eupport harbor and Kaval Bace Accecc . Provide a lict of channel
and harbors that will require dredging to support Naval
opcrutiono in the next 15 years.

Anawer: Dredging requii-ements are principally baoed on criteria

from Na-^ Design Manual 26.1. Harbors and channels are dredged

ill ctwUULdaiiitJt! wlLh moutlmuiu iidvlydLioxirfl dxaCu and undeiktiel
safety requirements (such as ship motion frorr. waves, trim, list,
squat, r-ides, salinity, diver clearance, etc.) of the vessels
that will transit cr be berthed in the area. Additional dredge
depth may be required to account for siltation and/or aquatic
plant growth.

Navy dredging is categorized as either Maintenance or
Construction dredging. Maintenance dredging is dredging to
offset the effects of silLaLioi. . CuusLiacLion diedging j.s
dredging in support of a new requirement or waterfront
upqrade/replacenient prelect.

Ports requiring dredging in the next 15 years include:

NA.? North Island, CA
NAS Pensacola, FL
NAV.«?TA .<;;in Dipgn, CA

NAVSTA Pearl Harbor, HI

NAV3TA Maypor-, FL

NAVSTA Norfolk, VA

NAVSTA Ingle side, TX

NAVSTA Pascagoula, MS

SUEASE Kingn Bay, CA

SUBASE New London, CT

CUDAGC Danger, WA

Puget Sound Kaval Shipyard, WA

Norfolk Navdl Shipyard, VA

WPNSTA Earle, NJ

WPNSTA Ycrk;towr., VA

QUESTION: Over the next 15 years, what is the Navy's estimate
tor the nunPer ot dredging operations that wil_ be req^uired? How
much dredge material v^'<^ result, How much of this nateriai can
be considered cjr.tarr.inated or hazardous and will require special
disposal methods?

ANSWER: An estimated number of required dredging " ope r.-;it -Ions" is
not available. The number of construction dredging operations is
predicated on how dredqinq recfuirements are packaqed into
contracts and the availability of military construction funds to
support construction dredgir.g require'rien-a . The number of

186

r>i;*int>^iK-ti»ce dredging operations i3 baaed or. siltat ion
racGs/aquaUic plant growth.

Estimated dredging quantities through 2010:

ConstrucL-or. Dredging:

14 Million CY. 30-40% potenr.ia'ly contaminated.

Maintenance Dredging:

30 Million cy, generally, lecG than lOV potentially
contam-.natcd.

QUESTION: HOW aoes the Navy currently dispose of dredge
material, both contaminated and clean? Are enviroiiinental
restrictions resulting in disposal problems that Kavy will have
to address in the future?

ANSWER: No::-contaTiinated dredge material is uRf'd apt fill
material, or for near -shore or on-shore beach replenishment.
Nor.-contaminatd material not 3\ji~.ah'p fnr- b«ach replenishment io
disposed of at an off-shore disposal site.

Contarr.inar.ed material is disposed of in upland disposal sites,
capped (above w^^it-pr ot bolowl by claan dredge natcrial or may be
chemically treated to remove or arrest tie contaminants in the
drftdg«=.r3 m;5rericil .

nff-chorc disposal eitec ai-c iijw open to all users ctud die
primarily controlled by tho Army Corps of Engineers. These sices
have United capacity and are subject Lu liicieasing public
scrutiny and environmental restrictions. Disposal of
c.-jiitc»niinatcd dredge material in upland disposal sites IS
extremely expensive. Disposing of conLaiuinated dredge material
will continue to be « challenge as env.iromental regulations
become more restrictive.

187

The following is a list of printed information retained in committee files:

• Goals and Priorities to Guide United States Arctic Research, Beinnial
Statement, Arctic Research Commission, January 1995.

• Arctic Research of the United States, Interagency Arctic Research Policy
Committee, Volume 9, Spring 1995.

• Ocean Pollution in the Arctic North and the Russian Far East, Edited by
Elizabeth J. Kirk, American Association for the Advancement of Science,
September 1, 1994.

• Facts and Problems Related to Radioactive Waste Disposal in Seas Adjacent to
the Territory of the Russian Federation, Office of the President of the Russian
Federation, Moscow, 1993.

• Arctic Contamination Research and Assessment Program, Interagency Arctic
Research Policy Committee (lARPC).

BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY

3 9999 05903 619 2

ISBN 0-16-053903-X

9 780160"539039

90000

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

See other formats