Skip to main content

Full text of "Of the proficience and advancement of learning"

See other formats


Presented to the 
LIBRARY of the 


UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO 


by 


Prof. Robert Finch 


. Ae lo 


’ 
. 
, : 
* 
oe 
‘ ; 
. 
. 
. 
; 
; | d ‘S 
¥ ‘ 
Bren : 
oy 
: £ Ms 
~ I . 
‘ 5 


OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
LEARNING. 


- 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2009 with funding from 
University of Toronto 


http://www.archive.org/details/ofproficienceadvOObaco 


PROFICIENCE 
AND 
ADVANCEMENT OF 
LEARNING 


BY FRANCIS BACON 


VISCOUNT ST. ALBAN 


EDITED BY THE 


REV. G. W. KITCHIN M.A. 
STUDENT AND LATE TUTOR 


OF CHRIST CHURCH 


CS S74 SEEZAAIASAAS AAAS AAAASZASALAAAYAAW FT 
SS OXK<—<—<— - i 
c™ 


» 
LONDON 
BELL & DALDY FLEET STREET 


SS s5 
Cs RT 


BEB ACE. 


SEG ORD BACON has given us his own 
Or eftimate of the value and pofition of 
eZ Ml the Advancement of Learning. ‘* This 
writing,” fays he, “‘ feemeth to me, 
fi nunquam fallit imago, not much better than that 
noife or found which muficians make while they 
are tuning their inftruments; which is nothing 
pleafant to hear, but yet is a caufe why the mufic 
is fweeter afterwards: fo have I been content to 
tune the inftruments of the Mufes, that they may 
play that have better hands.” Wherein he errs 
in two oppofite ways: for, on the one fide, the 
book is nobler than the fenfelefs jargon to which 
he likens it; while, on the other, the muficians 
that have taken up the work have fcarcely fuc- 
ceeded in playing harmonioufly together. He 
feems not to be aware of the intrinfic worth of 
the thoughts expreffed in every page, while he alfo 
feems to have imagined that a Millennium of 


vi PREFACE. 


Learning was about to begin, to which this book 
fhould be, as it were, the herald trumpet. Un- 
der fo almoft divine a fovereign as King James 
I. learning will furely be foftered and advanced. 
Controverfies in religion, he thinks, are all but 
worn out (and this on the eve of the great Puritan 
ftrugeles and fuccefles !), and we fhall have leifure 
to leave queftions of faith for the difcovery of the 
Laws of Nature. And yet, with al] this, he does 
not difcern the value of mathematics, that branch 
of learning which was then making great advance, 
and was deftined to work wonders. He fearcely 
cared to have an opinion on the ‘‘ Copernican 
Theory” of Aftronomy. He never mentions his 
famous countryman Gilbert without a fneer, or at 
leaft a difparaging remark; though he was en- 
gaged on thofe difcoveries in magnetifm which 
have tended to enlarge in many ways the empire 
of man over Nature. He by no means emanci- 
pates himfelf thoroughly from the thraldom of 
the old fcholaftic fyftems. He regards Poetry 
as complete, requiring no farther development : 
and is not confcious that he is living with thofe 
who were above all others to be the pride of 
Englifh Literature, and who fhould labour in 
broad fields of Poetry, which had never yet been 
touched by mortal hand. In thefe and other 


PREFACE. vil 


fubje&ts the book is defective enough; yet, re- 
membering all things, we muft marvel at the 
extraordinary breadth of knowledge and reading ; 
the fertility of thought, and happinefs of expreffion; 
the complete arrangement of fubjeéts, and lucid 
order of the work, which fhow themfelves through- 
out. Nor did Bacon himfelf fail to fee the im- 
portance of his pioneer-book—otherwife he would 
not have expanded it fo fully as he has done in the 
Latin—tranflating it into that tongue that it might 
the more readily gain accefs to all lands, and be 
read by the learned in every place; and carefully 
expunging all paflages which might be diftafteful 
abroad, left the Roman Church fhould be offended 
with the accidents, and fo neglect the effence of 
his writings. 

The frontifpiece of the original edition of the 
Novum Organum exprefles his feeling refpecting 
the Advancement. Between two pillars, the pil- 
lars of Hercules, the fhip of learning fails forth 
upon a toffed fea, bound for lands as yet unvifited, 
to bring thence goodly ftore of new and precious 
merchandife. Behind her lie all thofe well-known 
fhores of knowledge, of which the Advancement 
gives the map and chart. ‘They were, if we may 
fo fpeak, thofe Mediterranean lands which were 
the heart of the fourth or Roman Empire—trod- 


Vili PREFACE. 


den by every foot of learned men: familiar even 
to children in knowledge. But beyond the ftraits 
is the great outer fea, and continents as yet un- 
known, to be explored by painful daring, and def- 
tined to increafe the wealth of the world in a mil- 
lion ways. The old empire fhould give place to 
the new: juft as the Mediterranean ceafed to be 
all-important, when once the boldnefs of Bartho- 
lomew Diaz had fhown an eafier pathway to the 
wealth of India; and the infpired dreams of Co- 
lumbus had been realized by the difcovery of new 
continents acrofs the main. 

The Advancement of Learning was, therefore, 
the firft work in Bacon’s great feries. “That feries 
he ftyled the ‘ Inftauratio Magna,” and under 
the firft head of “ Partitiones Scientiarum” he 
placed this book. It was to be a chart of the 
lands already difcovered and known; fo as to di- 
rect the attention of the adventurer without lofs 
of time or labour to thofe parts which had not 
yet been explored. Then came the Novum Or- 
ganum; a ‘* Method” or inftrument by means of 
which men fhould arrive at thefe novelties :—the 
fhip, in fact, of his frontifpiece, on board of which 
(to ufe his own motto),— 


Multi pertranfibunt, et augebitur fcientia. 


After that, the “* Inftauratio”’ was to be compofed 
) p 


PREFACE. ix 


of fucceflive works, ending with a “ Philofophia 
fecunda,” or complete fyftem of knowledge. This, 
however, he felt muft be left to pofterity. 

Whoever, therefore, defires to acquaint himfelf 
with Bacon’s philofophical works muft begin with 
the Advancement, referring to the De Augmentis 
Scientiarum from time totime. Then, having thus 
become familiar with the ftyle of the great thinker, 
he will be able to go on to that noble work, the 
Novum Organum ; wherein are contained the feeds 
of marvellous wifdom, of knowledge which has 
grown and flourifhed to this day; and has affected 
for ever the courfe and fortunes of learning. 

In preparing this edition of the Advancement 
of Learning for the general reader, I have aimed 
at three things—a faithful text, full verification 
of quotations, and brevity and fimplicity of notes. 

As to the firft of thefe matters, there was but 
little difficulty. The variations in the text are 
very few, and very unimportant. Wherever it 
was poffible, I have followed the edition of 1605, 
leaving myfelf little {cope for conjecture. 

As to the next point, I had the work already 
done for me, to a great extent, both in the edition 
of Mr, Markby, and in the De Augmentis of the 
great Ellis and Spedding edition. I have been 
able here and there to fupply miffing references, 


x PREFACE. 


and have carefully verified thofe already found for 
me. 

But with refpect to notes, it is unneceflary that 
I fay more than that their aim is to be as unobtru- 
five as poffible, and that I hope they may be ufe- 
ful. 

Laftly, I fubjoin a brief analyfis of the work. 


ANALYSIS. 


Book I. (Preliminary.) Briefly removes the prejudices 
againft Learning, with proofs, divine and human, of its 
dignity. (Corre/ponds with De Augmentis, Bk. 1.) 

Book II. (Oz the main fubje&.) Commended to kings as 
nurfing fathers, (De Augm. ii. pref.) 

Learning is twofold—Divine and Human. Divine poft- 
poned. (De Augm. ii.) 

Human LearninG is threefold—I. Hiftory (which an{wers 
to the Memory). II. Poefy (to Imagination). III. 
Philofophy (to Rea/on). 


I. Hiftory. 
1. Natural. 
(a.) Of Creatures. 
(6.) Marvels. 
(c.) Arts. 
2. Civil. 
(a.) Memorials. 
(4.) Antiquities. 
(c.) Perfect Hiftory. 
i, Chronicles. 
a. Ancient. 
8. Modern. 
ii, Lives. 
iii. Narrations. 
iv. Annals. 
v. Cofmography. 
3. Ecclefiaftical. 
(a.) Of the Church. 
(4.) Of Prophecy. 
(c.) Of Providence. 
4. Literaty, or appendices to Hiftory. 


xii ANALYSIS. 


II. Poefy. (Herein is no deficiency.) 
1. Narrative. 
2. Reprefentative. 
3. Allufive or Parabolical. 


III. Philofophy. (De Augm. iii.) 
x. Divine (or Natural Theology, not = Divinity). 
Difcuffion of the Philofophia Prima. 
2. Natural 
i, Science. 
(1.) Phyfical (of material and efficient 
caufes), 
(z.) Metaphyfical (of formal and final 
caules), and under Metaphyfical 
come Mathematics, pureand mixed. 


ui. Prudence. 


1.) Experimental. 
(z.) Philofophical. 
(3-) Magical. 

3. Human. (De Augm. iv.) 

i. Segregate (7.e. of individual men) of (a.) 
Body and (4.) Mind, firft confidered in 
combination with refpeét to («.) Difcovery 
and (é.) Impreffion, and then feparately; 

(2.) Body. 

(a.) Medicine. 

(6.) Cofmetic Art. 

(y.) Athletics. 

(3.) Senfual Arts. 

(4.) Mind, 

(«.) Its Nature, (with two Appen- 
dices on Divination and Fa/- 
cination.) 

(8.) Its Fun&tions. (De Augm. v.) 

A. Intelle€tual, whofe Arts are 
four. 
(i.) Of Invention. 
(a.) Of Arts (de- 
ficient). 
(8.) Of Speech. 


ANALYSIS. Xili 


(ii.) Of Judgment, whofe Methods are— 
(a.) Of Direétion (Analytics). 
(4.) Of Caution (Elenches). 
(iii.) of Cuftody. 
(4.) By Writing. 
(4.) By Memory. 
(a.) Prenotion. 
(¢.) Emblem. 
(iv.) of Tradition. (De Augm. vi.) 


(a.) Its organ—fpeech, or writing 
rammar). 
(4.) Its method (Logic). 
(c.) Its illuftration (Rhetoric). 
(With appendices). 


B. Moral. (De Augm. vii.) 


(i.) Of the Nature of Good (omitting the fummum 
bonum, as belonging to another lite). 


(1.) Private. 


(a.) Aétive. 
(4.) Paffive. 


(a.) Confervative. 
(8.) Perfective. 


(2.) Relative. 


(a.) Of man as citizen. 
(4.) Of man as focial being. 


(ii.) Of Moral Culture. 
ii. Congregate. (De Augm. viii.) 


a.) In Converfation. 

rm In Negociation (with rules for felf-advance- 
ment). 

(c.) In Government (with notes on Laws). 


xiv ANALYSIS. 


In Conclufion. (De Augm. ix.) 
Theology—refers to man’s Reafon and Will. 
Difcuffed as to— 

1, The nature (or manner) of the Revelation 
(a.) Its Limits. 
(4.) Its Sufficiency. 
(c.) Its Acquifition. 

2. The thing revealed. 
(a.) Matter of Belief. 


(a.) Faith. 
(@.) Manners. 


(4.) Matter of Service. 
(a.) Liturgy. 
(@.) Government. 


THE TWO BOOKS OF FRANCIS BACON. 


Of the Proficience and 
Advancement of Learning, 
Divine and Human. 


To the King. 


o 


THE FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON: 


Of the Proficience and 


Advancement of Learning 


Divine and Human. 


To the King. 


Ves King, both daily Sacrifices and free- 

@/y\ will Offerings; the one proceeding 
v | upon ordinary obfervance, the other 
upon a devout cheerfulnefs: in like manner there 
belongeth to Kings from their fervants both tri- 
bute of duty and prefents of affection. In the 
former of thefe I hope I fhall not live to be want- 
ing, according to my moft humble duty, and the 
good pleafure of your Majefty’s employments : 
for the latter, I thought it more refpective to make 
choice of fome oblation, which might rather refer 
to the propriety and excellency of your indivi- 
dual perfon, than to the bufinefs of your crown 
and ftate. 


! Where the divifions occur in the Latin, I propofe to place re- 
ferences in the margins. 


B 


HERE were under the Law, excellent De Aug. 
Sc. I 


c. I. 


2 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Wherefore, reprefenting your Majefty many 
times unto my mind, and beholding you, not with 
the inquifitive eye of prefumption, to difcover that 
which the Scripture telleth me is infcrutable,* but 
with the obfervant eye of duty and admiration ; 
leaving afide the other parts of your virtue and for- 
tune, | have been touched, yea, and pofleffed with 
an extreme wonder at thofe your virtues and fa- 
culties, which the Philofophers call intelle¢tual ; 
the largenefs of your capacity, the faithfulnefs of 
your memory, the {wiftnefs of your apprehenfion, 
the penetration of your judgment, and the facility 
and order of your elocution: and I have often 
thought, that of all the perfons living that I have 
known, your Majefty were the beft inftance to 
make a man of Plato’s opinion,® that all know- 
ledge is but remembrance, and that the mind of 
man by nature knoweth all things, and hath but 
her own native and original notions* (which by 
the ftrangenefs and darknefs of this tabernacle of 
the body are fequeftered) again revived and re- 
ftored: fuch a light of nature I have obferved in 
your Majefty, and fuch a readinefs to take fame 
and blaze from the leaft occafion prefented, or the 
leaft {park of another’s knowledge delivered. And 
as the Scripture faith of the wifeft king, That his 
heart was as the fands of the fea ;> which though 


2 Prov. xxv. 3. 

3 Phedo, i. 72. I have ufed in all references to Plato the 
paging of the ed. Steph. 

4 The edition 1605 has motions, a word which miffes the point 
—editions 1629 and 1633 read notions. 

5 1 Kings iv. 29. 


BOOK I. 2 


it be one of the largeft bodies, yet it confifteth of 
the fmalleft and fineft portions; fo hath God given 
your Majefty a compofition of underftanding ad- 
mirable, being able to compafs and comprehend 
the greateft matters, and neverthelefs to touch and 
apprehend the leaft; whereas it fhould feem an 
impoffibility in nature for the fame inftrument to 
make itfelf fit for great and fmall works. And for 
your gift of fpeech, I call to mind what Cornelius 
Tacitus faith of Auguftus Cefar: Augu/fto pro- 
fluens, et que principem deceret, eloquentia fuit.° 
For, if we note it well, fpeech that is uttered 
with labour and difficulty, or fpeech that favour- 
eth of the affectation of art and precepts, or {peech 
that is framed after the imitation of fome pattern 
of eloquence, though never {fo excellent; all this 
hath fomewhat fervile, and holding of the fubject 

But your Majefty’s manner of {peech is indeed 
prince-like, flowing as from a fountain, and yet 
ftreaming and branching itfelf into nature’s order, 
full of facility and felicity, imitating none, and ini- 
mitable byany. And as in your civil eftate there 
appeareth to be an emulation and contention of 
your Majefty’s virtue with your fortune; a vir- 
tuous difpofition with a fortunate regiment ; a vir- 
tuous expectation (when time was) of your greater 
fortune, with a profperous poffeffion thereof in the 
due time ; a virtuous obfervation of the laws of 
marriage, with moft bleffed and happy fruit of 
marriage; a virtuous and moft Chriftian defire of 
peace, with a fortunate inclination in your neigh- 


6 Tac. Annal. xiii. 3. 


Learning, 


how difcre- 


dited. 


By Divines. 


6 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ce the entrance to the former of thefe, 

to clear the way, and as it were to 
make filence, to have the true tefti- 
monies concerning the dignity of 
nae to be better heard, without the interrup- 
tion of tacit objections, I think good to deliver it 
from the difcredits and difgraces which it hath re- 
ceived ; all from ignorance ; but ignorance feve- 
rally difguifed, appearing fometimes in the zeal 
and jealoufy of Divines; fometimes in the feve- 
rity and arrogancy of Politiques; and fometimes 
in the errors and imperfections of learned men 
themfelves. 

1. I hear the former fort fay, that Knowledge 
is of thofe things which are to be accepted of 
with great limitation and caution; that the afpir- 
ing to overmuch knowledge was the original 
temptation and fin whereupon enfued the fall of 
man; that Knowledge hath in it fomewhat of the 
ferpent, and therefore where it entereth into a 
man it makes him fwell; Sczentia inflat :° that 
Salomon gives a cenfure, That there is no end of 
making books, and that much reading 1s wearine/s 
of the fiefb 31 and again in another place, That in 
fpacious knowledge there 1s much contriftation, and 
that he that increafeth knowledge increafeth an- 
xiety 31° that St. Paul gives a caveat, That we be 
not fpoiled through vain philofophy ;* that expe- 


tor Gores wills a Il Eccl, xii. 12. 
12 eEceledle bos 13 Col. ii. 8. 


BOOK I. 7 


rience demonftrates how learned men have been 
arch-heretics, how learned times have been in- 
clined to atheifm, and how the contemplation of 
fecond caufes doth derogate from our dependence 
upon God, who is the firft caufe. 


To difcover then the ignorance and error of Their ob- 


this opinion, and the mifunderftanding in the 
grounds thereof, it may well appear thefe men do 
not obferve or confider that it was not the pure 
knowledge of nature and univerfality, a knowledge 
by the light whereof man did give names unto 
other creatures in Paradife,'* as they were brought 
before him, according unto their proprieties, which 
gave the occafion to the fall: but it was the proud 
knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in 
man to give law unto himfelf, and to depend no 
more upon God’s commandments, which was the 
form of the temptation. Neither is it any quan- 
tity of knowledge, how great foever, that can 
make the mind of man to {well; for nothing can 
fill, much lefs extend the foul of man, but God 
and the contemplation of God; and therefore Salo- 
mon, {peaking of the two principal fenfes of in- 
quifition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the 
eye is never fatisfied with feeing, nor the ear with 
hearing ;'° and if there be no fulnefs, then is 
the continent greater than the content: fo of 
knowledge itfelf, and the mind of man, whereto 
~ the fenfes are but reporters, he defineth likewife in 
thefe words, placed after that Kalendar or Ephe- 
merides, which he maketh of the diverfities of 


14 See Gen. ii. and iii. 5 Eccl. is 8. 


jections an- 
{wered. 


8 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


times and feafons for all actions and purpofes ; 
and concludeth thus: God hath made all things 
beautiful, or decent, in the true return of their fea- 
fons: Alfo he hath placed the world in man’s heart, — 
yet cannot man find out the work which God work- 
eth from the beginning to the end :© declaring not 
obfcurely, that God hath framed the mind of man 
as a mirror or glafs, capable of the image of the 
univerfal world, and joyful to receive the impref- 
fion thereof, as the eye joyeth to receive light; 
and not only delighted in beholding the variety of 
things and viciffitude of times, but raifed alfo to 
find out and difcern the ordinances and decrees, 
which throughout all thofe changes are infallibly 
obferved. And although he doth infinuate that 
the fupreme or fummary law of nature, which he 
calleth the work which God worketh from the be- 
ginning to the end, is not poffible to be found out 
by man; yet that doth not derogate from the capa- 
city of the mind, but may be referred to the impe- 
diments, as of fhortnefs of life, ill conjunétion of 
labours, ill tradition of knowledge over from hand 
to hand, and many other inconveniences, where- 
unto the condition of man is fubject. For that 
nothing parcel of the world is denied to man’s in- 
quiry and invention, he doth in another place rule 
over, when he faith, Zhe /pirit of man is as the 
lamp of God, wherewith he fearcheth the inwardne/s 
of all fecrets." If then fuch be the capacity and 
receipt of the mind of man, it is manifeft that there 
is no danger at all in the proportion or quantity 


IOP RGcl mete VW Prova xXae7e 


BOOK I. 9 


of knowledge, how large foever, left it fhould 
make it {well or out-compafs itfelf; no, but it is 
merely the quality of knowledge, which, be it in 
quantity more or lefs, if it be taken without the 
true corrective thereof, hath in it fome nature of 
venom or malignity, and fome effects of that ve- 
nom, which is ventofity or fwelling. This cor- 
rective f{pice, the mixture whereof maketh Know- 
ledge fo fovereign, is Charity, which the Apoftle 
immediately addeth to the former claufe: for fo he 
faith, Knowledge bloweth up, but Charity buildeth 
up ; not unlike unto that which he delivereth in 
another place: Jf I /pake, faith he, with the tongues 
of men and angels, and had not charity, it were 
but as a tinkling cymbal; not but that it is an 
excellent thing to fpeak with the tongues of men 
and angels, but becaufe, if it be fevered from 
charity, and not referred to the good of men and 
mankind, it hath rather a founding and unworthy 
glory, than a meriting and fubftantial virtue. 
And as for that cenfure of Salomon, concerning 
the excefs of writing and reading books, and the 
anxiety of fpirit which redoundeth from know- 
ledge ; and that admonition of St. Paul, That we 
be not feduced by vain philofophy ; \et thofe places 
be rightly underftood, and they do indeed excel- 
lently fet forth the true bounds and limitations, 
whereby human knowledge is confined and cir- 
cumfcribed ; and yet without any fuch contracting 
or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the 
univerfal nature of things; for thefe limitations are 


PPE Cor. Kills Is 


10 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 
three: the firft, That we do not fo place our feli- 


city in knowledge, as we forget our mortality: the 
fecond, That we make application of our know- 
ledge, to give ourfelves repofe and contentment, and 
not diftafte or repining: the third, That we do not 
prefume by the contemplation of nature to attain to 
the myfteries of God. For as touching the firft of 
thefe, Salomon doth excellently expound himfelf 
in another place of the fame book, where he 
faith:19 I faw well that knowledge recedeth as far 
from ignorance as light doth from darkne/s ; and 
that the wife man’s eyes keep watch in his head, 
whereas the fool roundeth about in darknefs: but 
withal I learned, that the fame mortality involveth 
them both. And for the fecond, certain it is, there 
is no vexation or anxiety of mind which refulteth 
from knowledge otherwife than merely by acci- 
dent; for all knowledge and wonder (which is the 
feed of knowledge) is an impreffion of pleafure in 
itfelf : but when men fall to framing conclufions 
out of their knowledge, applying it to their parti- 
cular, and miniftering to themfelves thereby weak 
fears or vaft defires, there groweth that careful- 
nefs and trouble of mind which is fpoken of : for 
then knowledge is no more Lumen /iccum, whereof 
Heraclitus the profound® faid, Lumen ficcum optima 
19 Eccl. li. 13, 14 
20 6 oKoreuvoc. 
My) rayic ‘HparXeirou ix’ dudaddr tireo BiBAov" 
Tov ‘deciov pada ro dveBaroc arpariroc 
"Oodvn Kai oxdroc éoriv Ghapreror, hy O& o€ phorne 


Eicayayy, gavepov NauTporep’ Hedtiov. 
Diog. Laert. ix. 


BOOK I. Si 


anima ; but it becometh Lumen madidum, or ma- 
ceratum, being fteeped and infufed in the humours 
of the affections.*!_ And as for the third point, it 
deferveth to be a little ftood upon, and not to be 
lightly paffed over: for if any man fhall think by 
view and inquiry into thefe fenfible and material 
things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal 
unto himfelf the Nature or Will of God, then in- 
deed is he {fpoiled by vain philofophy: for the con- 
templation of God’s creatures and works pro- 
duceth (having regard to the works and creatures 
themfelves), knowledge, but having regard to God, 
no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is bro- 
ken knowledge. And therefore it was moft aptly 
faid by one of Plato’s fchool,** That the fenfe of man 
carrieth a refemblance with the fun, which, as we 
fee, openeth and revealeth all the terreftrial globe; 
but then again it obfcureth and concealeth the ftars 
and celeftial globe: fo doth the fenfe difcover natu- 
ral things, but it darkeneth and fhutteth up divine. 
And hence it is true that it hath proceeded, that 
divers great learned men have been heretical, whilft 
they have fought to fly up to the fecrets of the 
Deity by the waxen wings of the fenfes. And as 
for the conceit that too much knowledge fhould 
incline a man to Atheifm,** and that the igno- 
rance of fecond caufes fhould make a more devout 
dependence upon God, which is the firft caufe ; 
1 Ady Enon Wuvx7 copwrarn. A corruption of ain Puxy 
sogwrdrn. (See note in Ellis and Spedding’s ed.) The phrafe 
occurs in Stobzeus, cf. Ritter, Hif?. Philos. vol. i. Heraclitus. 


22 Philo Jud. de Somn. 
23 See Bacon’s Ejfays—On Athei/m. 


12 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


firft, it is good to afk the queftion which Job 
afked of his friends: Will you lie for God, as one 
man will do for another, to gratify him?** For 
certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature 
but by fecond caufes: and if they would have it 
otherwife believed, it is mere impofture, as it were 
in favour towards God; and nothing elfe but to 
offer to the Author of Truth the unclean facrifice 
ofa lie. But farther, it is an affured truth, anda 
conclufion of experience, that a little or fuperficial 
knowledge of Philofophy may incline the mind of 
man to Atheifm, but a farther proceeding therein 
doth bring the mind back again to Religion: for in 
the entrance of Philofophy, when the fecond caufes, 
which are next unto the fenfes, do offer them- 
felves to the mind of man, if it dwell and ftay there 
it may induce fome oblivion of the higheft caufe ; 
but when a man paffeth on farther, and feeth the 
dependence of caufes, and the works of Provi- 
dence; then, according to the allegory of the 
poets, he will eafily believe that the higheft link of 
nature’s chain muft needs be tied to the foot of 
Jupiter’s chair.2° To conclude therefore, let no 
man upon a weak conceit of fobriety or an ill- 
applied moderation think or maintain, that a man 
can fearch too far, or be too well ftudied in the 
book of God’s word, or in the book of God’s 
works; divinity or philofophy: but rather let men 
endeavour an endlefs progrefs or proficience in 
both; only let men beware that they apply both 
to charity, and not to {welling ; to ufe, and not to 


2 Job xiii. 7. 23 Hom. Il. viii. 19. 


BOOK: 13 


oftentation ; and again, that they do not unwifely 
mingle or confound thefe learnings together. 

2. And as for the difgraces which Learning re- 
ceiveth from Politiques, they be of this nature ; 
that Learning doth foften men’s minds, and makes 
them more unapt for the honour and exercife of 
arms; that it doth mar and pervert men’s difpo- 
fitions for matter of government and policy, in 
making them too curious and irrefolute by variety 
of reading, or too peremptory or pofitive by ftrit- 
nefs of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and 
overweening by reafon of the greatnefs of examples, 
or too incompatible and differing from the times by 
reafon of the diffimilitude of examples; or at leaft, 
that it doth divert men’s travails from action and 
bufinefs, and bringeth them toa love of leifure and 
privatenefs; and that it doth bring into ftates a re- 
laxation of difcipline, whilft every man is more 
ready to argue than to obey and execute. Out of 
this conceit, Cato,*° furnamed the Cenfor, one of 
the wifeft men indeed that ever lived, when Car- 
neades the philofopher came in embaflage to Rome, 
and that the young men of Rome began to flock 
about him, being allured with the fweetnefs and 
majefty of his eloquence and learning, gave coun- 
fel in open fenate that they fhould give him his 
difpatch with all fpeed, left he fhould infect and 
enchant the minds and affections of the youth, and 
at unawares bring in an alteration of the manners 
and cuftoms of the ftate.*7 Out of the fame con- 
ceit or humour did Virgil, turning his pen to the 


25 See Pliny, Nat. Hift. vii. 31. 7 Plut. vit. Cat. 


By Politi- 


cians. 


Their ob- 
jeCtions re- 
futed. 


14, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


advantage of his country, and the difadvantage of 
his own profeffion, make a kind of feparation be- 
tween policy and government, and between arts 
and {ciences, in the verfes fo much renowned, at- 
tributing and challenging the one to the Romans, 
and leaving and yielding the other to the Gre- 
cians :— 
Tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento, 
He tibi erunt artes, &c.?8 

So likewife we fee that Anytus, the accufer of So- 
crates, laid it as an article of charge and accufa- 
tion againft him, that he did, with the variety and 
power of his difcourfes and difputations, withdraw 
young men from due reverence to the laws and 
cuftoms of their country, and that he did profefs a 
dangerous and pernicious f{cience, which was, to 
make the worfe matter feem the better, and to 
fupprefs truth by force of eloquence and {peech.*9 

(1.) But thefe, and the like imputations, have 
rather a countenance of gravity than any ground 
of juftice: for experience doth warrant, that both 
in perfons and in times, there hath been a meeting 
and concurrence in Learning and Arms, flourifh- 
ing and excelling in the fame men and the fame 
ages. For, as for men, there cannot be a better 
nor the like inftance, as of that pair, Alexander the 
Great and Julius Czfar the DiCtator; whereof the 
one was Ariftotle’s fcholar in philofophy, and the 
other was Cicero’s rival in eloquence: or if any 
man had rather call for fcholars that were great 


28 Virg. An. vi. 851. % Plato, Apol. Soc., i. 19, 24. 


BOOK I. 15 


generals, than generals that were great {cholars, let 
him take Epaminondas the Theban, or Xenophon 
the Athenian ; whereof the one was the firft that 
abated the power of Sparta, and the other was the 
firft that made way to the overthrow of the mo- 
narchy of Perfia. And this concurrence is yet 
more vifible in times than in perfons, by how much 
an age is a greater object thana man. For both 
in Egypt, Affyria, Perfia, Gracia, and Rome, the 
fame times that are moft renowned for arms, are 
likewife moft admired for learning, fo that the 
greateft authors and philofophers, and the greateft 
captains and governors have lived in the fame ages. 
Neither can it otherwife be: for as in man the 
ripenefs of ftrength of the body and mind cometh 
much about an age, fave that the ftrength of the 
body cometh fomewhat the more early :*° fo in 
ftates, Arms and Learning, whereof the one cor- 
refpondeth to the body, the other to the foul of 
man, have a concurrence or near fequence in 
times. 

(2.) And for matter of Policy and Government, 
that learning fhould rather hurt, than enable 
thereunto, is a thing very improbable: we fee it 
is accounted an error to commit a natural body to 
empiric phyficians, which commonly have a few 
pleafing receipts whereupon they are confident and 
adventurous, but know neither the caufes of dif- 
eafes, nor the complexions of patients, nor peril of 


% Cf, Ariftotle, Rhet. ii. 14. 4, where he fays that the body 
reaches perfection at the age of 35 (7X5), and the mind at 49 
(7X7-) 


16 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


accidents, nor the true method of cures: we fee 
it is a like error to rely upon advocates or lawyers, 
which are only men of practice and not grounded 
in their books, who are many times eafily fur- 
prifed when matter falleth out befides their expe- 
rience, to the prejudice of the caufes they handle: 
fo by like reafon it cannot be but a matter of 
doubtful confequence if ftates be managed by 
empiric Statefmen, not well mingled with men 
grounded in learning. But contrariwife, it is al- 
moft without inftance contradictory, that ever 
any government was difaftrous that was in the 
hands of learned governors.*!_ For howfoever it 
hath been ordinary with politic men to extenuate 
and difable learned men by the names of Pedantes ; 
yet in the records of time it appeareth, in many 
particulars, that the governments of princes in mi- 
nority (notwithftanding the infinite difadvantage of 
that kind of ftate) have neverthelefs excelled the 
government of princes of mature age, even for 
that reafon which they feek to traduce, which is, 
that by that occafion the ftate hath been in the 
hands of Pedantes; for fo was the ftate of Rome 
for the firft five years, which are fo much magni- 
fied, during the minority of Nero, in the hands o 

Seneca, a Pedanti ; fo it was again, for ten years’ 
fpace or more, during the minority of Gordianus 
the younger, with great applaufe and contentation 
in the hands of Mifitheus, a Pedanti: fo was it 
before that, in the minority of Alexander Severus, 
in like happinefs, in hands not much unlike, by 


51 See Plato, Rep. v. 473. 


BOOK I. 17 


reafon of the rule of the women, who were aided by 
the teachers and preceptors. Nay, let a man look 
into the government of the bifhops of Rome, as, 
by name, into the government of Pius Quintus, 
and Sextus Quintus, in our times, who were both 
at their entrance efteemed but as pedantical* friars, 
and he fhall find that fuch popes do greater things, 
and proceed upon truer principles of eftate, than 
thofe which have afcended to the papacy from an 
education and breeding in affairs of eftate and 
courts of princes; for although men bred in learn- 
ing are perhaps to feek in points of convenience 
and accommodating for the prefent, which the Ita- 
lians call Ragioni di /tato, whereof the fame Pius 
Quintus could not hear fpoken with patience, 
terming them inventions againft religion and the 
moral virtues ; yet on the other fide, to recom- 
penfe that, they are perfect in thofe fame plain 
grounds of religion, juftice, honour, and moral 
virtue, which if they be well and watchfully pur- 
fued, there will be feldom ufe of thofe other, no 
more than of phyfic in a found or well-dieted body. 
Neither can the experience of one man’s life fur- 
nifh examples and precedents for the events of one 
man’s life: for, as it happeneth fometimes that the 
grandchild, or other defcendants, refembleth the 
anceftor more than the fon; fo many times occur- 
rences of prefent times may fort better with ancient 
examples than with thofe of the latter or imme- 
diate times: and laftly, the wit of one man can no 


# Edit. 1605, prejudicial. The Latin has “fraterculis rerum 
imperitis.” 
Cc 


18 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


more countervail learning than one man’s means 
can hold way with a common purfe. 

3. And as for thofe particular feducements, or 
indifpofitions of the mind for policy and govern- 
ment, which Learning is pretended to infinuate ; 
if it be granted that any fuch thing be, it muft be 
remembered withal, that Learning miniftereth in 
every of them greater ftrength of medicine or re- 
medy than it offereth caufe of indifpofition or in- 
firmity. For if by a fecret operation it make men 
perplexed and irrefolute, on the other fide by plain 
precept it teacheth them when and upon what 
ground to refolve ; yea, and how to carry things 
in fufpenfe without prejudice, till they refolve; if 
it make men pofitive and regular, it teacheth them 
what things are in their nature demontftrative, and 
what are conjectural, and as well the ufe of dif- 
tin@tions and exceptions, as the latitude of prin- 
ciples and rules. If it miflead by difproportion or 
diffimilitude of examples, it teacheth men the force 
of circumftances, the errors of comparifons, and 
all the cautions of application ; fo that in all thefe 
it doth rectify more effectually than it can pervert. 
And thefe medicines it conveyeth into men’s minds 
much more forcibly by the quicknefs and penetra- 
tion of examples. For let a man look into the 
errors of Clement the feventh, fo lively defcribed 
by Guicciardine,** who ferved under him, or into 
the errors of Cicero, painted out by his own pencil 
in his Epiftles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from 
being irrefolute. Let him look into the errors of 


32 Guicciard. xvi. 5. 


BOOK I. 19 


Phocion, and he will beware how he be obftinate 
or inflexible. Let him but read the fable of Ixion,** 
and it will hold him from being vaporous or ima- 
ginative. Let him look into the errors of Cato 
the fecond, and he will never be one of the 4nzi- 
podes, to tread oppofite to the prefent world.** 

4. And for the conceit that Learning fhould 
difpofe men to leifure and privatenefs, and make 
men flothful; it were a ftrange thing if that which 
accuftometh the mind to a perpetual motion and 
agitation fhould induce flothfulnefs: whereas con- 
trariwife it may be truly affirmed, that no kind 
of men love bufinefs for itfelf but thofe that are 
learned; for other perfons love it for profit, as a 
hireling, that loves the work for the wages ; or for 
honour, as becaufe it beareth them up in the eyes 
of men, and refrefheth their reputation, which 
otherwife would wear; or becaufe it putteth them 
in mind of their fortune, and giveth them occafion 
to pleafure and difpleafure; or becaufe it exer- 
cifeth fome faculty wherein they take pride, and 
fo entertaineth them in good humour and pleafing 
conceits towards themfelves; or becaufe it ad- 
vanceth any other their ends. So that, as it is 
faid of untrue valours, that fome men’s valours are 
in the eyes of them that look on; fo fuch men’s 
induftries are in the eyes of others, or at leaft in 
regard of their own defignments: only learned men 
love bufinefs as an action according to nature, as 
agreeable to health of mind as exercife is to health 
of body, taking pleafure in the action itfelf, and not 


33 Pind. Pytb. ii. 21, fe. S40Cic. ad ttt. ii: 1. 


20 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


in the purchafe: fo that of all men they are the 
moft indefatigable, if it be towards any bufinefs 
which can hold or detain their mind. 

And if any man be laborious in reading and 
ftudy and yet idle in bufinefs and aétion, it grow- 
eth fram fome weaknefs of body or foftnefs of {pi- 
rit; fuch as Seneca {peaketh of: Quidam tam funt 
umbratiles, ut putent in turbido effe quicquid in luce 
eft;>> and not of Learning: well may it be that fuch 
a point of a man’s nature may make him give him- 
felf to Learning, but it is not learning that breedeth 
any fuch point in his nature. 

5. And that Learning fhould take up too much 
time or leifure; I anfwer, the moft active or bufy 
man that hath been or can be, hath, no queftion, 
many vacant times of leifure, while he expecteth 
the tides and returns of bufinefs (except he be 
either tedious and of no difpatch, or lightly and 
unworthily ambitious to meddle in things that may 
be better done by others :) and then the queftion 
is, but how thefe fpaces and times of leifure fhall 
be filled and fpent ; whether in pleafures or in ftu- 
dies ; as was well anfwered by Demofthenes to his 
adverfary Aifchines, that was a man given to plea- 
fure, and told him, That his orations did fmell of 
the lamp: Indeed, (faid Demofthenes) there is a 
great difference between the things that you and I 
do by lamp-light.*° So as no man need doubt that 
Learning will expulfe bufineis, but rather itwill keep 

35 Seneca, Epift. 3. quoted from Pomponius, ‘ Quidam adeo in 
latebras refugerunt, ut” &c. 


86 Plutarch. Libanius, Vit. Demofik. (Ed. Dindorf, p. 6.) Told 
of Pytheas, not of A®{chines. 


BOOK I. 2% 


and defend the poffeffion of the mind againft idle- 
nefs and pleafure, which otherwife at unawares 
may enter to the prejudice of both. 

6. Again, for that other conceit that Learning 
fhould undermine the reverence of laws and go- 
vernment, it is afluredly a mere depravation and 
calumny, without all fhadow of truth. For to fay 
that a blind cuftom of obedience fhould be a furer 
obligation than duty taught and underftood, it is to 
affirm, that a blind man may tread furer by a guide 
than a feeing man can bya light. And it is with- 
out all controverfy, that learning doth make the 
minds of men gentle, generous, maniable,*? and 
pliant to government; whereas ignorance makes 
them churlifh, thwart, and mutinous: and the evi- 
dence of time doth clear this affertion, confidering 
that the moft barbarous, rude, and unlearned times 
have been moft fubject to tumults, feditions, and 
changes. 

7. And as to the judgment of Cato the Cenfor, 
he was well punifhed for his blafphemy againft 
Learning, in the fame kind wherein he offended ; 
for when he was patft threefcore years old, he was 
taken with an extreme defire to go to fchool again, 
and to learn the Greek tongue, to the end to pe- 
rufe the Greek authors ; which doth well demon- 
ftrate that his former cenfure of the Grecian learn- 
ing was rather an affected gravity, than according to 
the inward fenfe of his own opinion. And as for 
Virgil’s verfes, though it pleafed him to brave the 


37 The edition of 1605 reads amiable, that of 1633 maniable. 
The latter word anfwers beft to the Latin, artes—teneros reddunt, 
Jequaces, cereos. 


22 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


world in taking to the Romans the art of empire, 
and leaving to others the art of fubjeéts ; yet fo 
much is manifeft that the Romans never afcended 
to that height of empire, till the time they had af- 
cended to the height of other arts. For in the time 
of the two firft Czefars, which had the art of go- 
vernment in greateft perfection, there lived the 
beft poet, Virgilius Maro; the beft hiftoriographer, 
Titus Livius; the beft antiquary, Marcus Varro; 
and the beft, or fecond orator, Marcus Cicero, that 
to the memory of man are known. As for the 
accufation of Socrates, the time muft be remem- 
bered when it was profecuted ; which was under 
the Thirty Tyrants, the moft bafe, bloody, and 
envious perfons that have governed ; which revo- 
lution of ftate was no fooner over, but Socrates, 
whom they had made a perfon criminal, was made 
a perfon heroical, and his memory accumulate with 
honours divine and human; and thofe difcourfes 
of his which were then termed corrupting of man- 
ners, were after acknowledged for fovereign medi- 
cines of the mind and manners, and fo have been 
received ever fince till this day. Let this, there- 
fore, ferve for anfwer to Politiques, which in their 
humorous feverity, or in their feigned gravity, have 
prefumed to throw imputations upon Learning ; 
which redargution neverthelefs (fave that we know 
not whether our labours may extend to other ages) 
were not needful for the prefent, in regard of the 
love and reverence towards Learning, which the 
example and countenance of two fo learned Princes, 


Queen Elizabeth, and your Majefty, being as Caf- 


BOOK I. 23 


tor and Pollux,Zucida fidera,** ftars of excellent 
light and moft benign influence, hath wrought in 
all men of place and authority in our nation. 

III. Now therefore we come to that third fort 
of difcredit or diminution of credit that groweth 
unto Learning from learned men themfelves, which 
commonly cleaveth fafteft: it is either from their 
fortune ; or from their manners; or from the na- 
ture of their ftudies. For the firft, it is not in their 
power ; and the fecond is accidental; the third 
only is proper to be handled. But becaufe we are 
not in hand with true meafure, but with popular 
eftimation and conceit, it is not amifs to fpeak fome- 
what of the two former. ‘The derogations there- 
fore which grow to Learning from the fortune or 
condition of learned men, are either in refpect of 
{carcity of means, or in refpect of privatenefs of 
life and meannefs of employments. 

I. (z) Concerning want, and thatit is the cafe of 
learned men ufually to begin with little, and not 
to grow rich fo faft as other men by reafon they 
convert not their labours chiefly to lucre and in- 
creafe: it were good to leave the common place 
in commendation of poverty to fome friar to handle, 
to whom much was attributed by Machiavel in this 
point; when he faid, That the kingdom of the clergy 
had been long before at an end, if the reputation and 
reverence towards the poverty of friars had not borne 
out the fcandal of the fuperfiuities and exceffes of bi- 
Jhops and prelates.°9 So aman might fay that the 

38 Hor. Carm. iii. 2. 


39 Mach. Difc. fopra Tita, Liv. iii. 1., {peaking of the Francifcan 
and Dominican orders. 


By learned 
men them- 
felves. 


This objec- 
tion exam- 
ined and 
refuted : 

1. As to 
their mean- 
ne{s, 


24 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


felicity and delicacy of princes and great perfons 
had long fince turned to rudenefs and barbarifm, if 
the poverty of Learning had not kept up civility and 
honour of life: but without any fuch advantages, 
it is worthy the obfervation what a reverend and 
honoured thing poverty was for fome ages in the 
Roman ftate, which neverthelefs was a ftate with- 
out paradoxes. For we fee what Titus Livius faith 
in his introduction : Ceterum aut me amor negotit 
fufcepti fallit, aut nulla unquam refpublica nec major, 
nec fanétior, nec bonis exemplis ditior fuit ; nec in 
quam tam fere avaritia luxuriaque immigraverint; 
nec ubi tantus ac tam diu paupertati ac parfimonie 
honos fuerit.*° We fee likewife, after that the ftate 
of Rome was not itfelf, but did degenerate, how 
that perfon that took upon him to be counfellor 
to Julius Czefar after his victory where to begin his 
reftoration of the ftate, maketh it of all points the 
moft fummary to take away the eftimation of 
wealth: Verum hec, et omnia mala pariter cum ho- 
nore pecunia definent; fi neque magiftratus, neque 
alia vulgo cupienda, venalia erunt.* ‘To conclude 
this point, as it was truly faid, that Rubore/fvir- 
tutis color, though fometime it come from vice ;# fo 
it may be fitly faid that Paupertas eff virtutis for- 
tuna, though fometime it may proceed from mif- 
government and accident. Surely Salomon hath 
pronounced it both in cenfure, Qui fe/tinat ad di- 
vitias non erit infons ;* and in precept; Buy the 
truth, and fell it not; and fo of wifdom and know- 


40 Livii Pref. 41 Epift. 1. ad C. Cas. de Rep. ord. 
“2 Diog. Cyn. ap. Laert. vi. 54. 43 Prov. xxviii. 22. 


BOOK I. 25 


ledge ;#* judging that means were to be {pent 
upon Learning, and not Learning to be applied to 
means. 

(8) And as for the privatenefs, or obfcurenefs (as 
it may be in vulgar eftimation accounted) of life of 
contemplative men; it is a theme fo common to 
extol a private life, not taxed with fenfuality and 
floth, in comparifon [ with] and to the difadvantage 
of a civil life, for fafety, liberty, pleafure, and dig- 
nity, or at leaft freedom from indignity, as no man 
handleth it but handleth it well; fuch a conf{o- 
nancy it hath to men’s conceits in the exprefling, 
and to men’s confents in the allowing. This only 
I will add, that learned men forgotten in ftates 
and not living in the eyes of men, are like the 
images of Caffius and Brutus in the funeral of 
Junia: of which not being reprefented, as many 


_ others were, Tacitus faith, Eo ip/o prefulgebant, 


quod non vifebantur.* 

(y) And for meannefs of employment, that 
which is moft traduced to contempt is that the 
government of youth is commonly allotted to 
them; which age, becaufe it is the age of leaft 
authority, it is transferred to the difefteeming of 
thofe employments wherein youth is converfant, 


_ and which are converfant about youth. But how 


unjuft this traducement is (if you will reduce things 
from popularity of opinion to meafure of reafon) 
may appear in that we fee men are more curious 
what they put into a new veflel than into a veflel 
feafoned ; and what mould they lay about a young 


Prov. Xx. 23. 4 Tac, Ann, iii. 76. ad fin. 


m1. As to 
their man- 
ners. 


26 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


plant than about a plant corroborate; fo as the 
weakeft terms and times of all things ufe to have 
the beft applications and helps. And will you 
hearken to the Hebrew rabbins? Your young men 
Jhall fee vifions, and your old men fhall dream 
dreams ;* fay they47 youth is the worthier age, 
for that vifions are nearer apparitions of God than 
dreams. And let it be noted, that howfoever the 
condition * of life of Pedantes hath been fcorned 
upon theatres, as the ape of tyranny ; and that the 
modern loofenefs or negligence hath taken no due 
regard to the choice of fchoolmafters and tutors ; 
yet the ancient wifdom of the beft times did always 
make a juft complaint, that {tates were too bufy 
with their laws and too negligent in point of edu- 
cation: which excellent part of ancient difcipline- 
hath been in fome fort revived of late times by the 
colleges of the Jefuits ; of whom, although in re- 
gard of their fuperftition I may fay, Quo meliores, 
eo deteriores ; yet in regard of this, and fome other 
points concerning human learning and moral mat- 
ters, I may fay, as Agefilaus faid to his enemy 
Pharnabazus, Talis guum fis, utinam nofter effes49 
And thus much touching the difcredits drawn from 
the fortunes of learned men. 

2. Astouching the manners of learned men, it 
is a thing perfonal and individual : and no doubt 
there be amongft them, as in other profeffions, 

46 Joel ii. 28. 

47 Ed. 1629 and 1633 read “ fay the.” 

48 Ed. 1605 reads ‘conditions. . . hath,” 1633 reads * con- 


ditions . . . have.” 
“9 Conference of Agefilaus and Pharnabazus, Plut. Vit. Ages. 


BOOK I. 27 


of all temperatures : but yet fo as it is not with- 
out truth, which is faid, that Abeunt ftudia in 
mores,°° ftudies have an influence and operation 
upon the manners of thofe that are converfant in 
them. 

(a) But upon an attentive and indifferent review, 
I for my part cannot find any difgrace to Learning 
can proceed from the manners of learned men not 
inherent*! to them as they are learned; except it 
be a fault (which was the fuppofed fault of Demof- 
thenes, Cicero, Cato the fecond, Seneca, and 
many more) that, becaufe the times they read of 
are commonly better than the times they live in, 
and the duties taught better than the duties prac- 
tifed, they contend fometimes too far to bring 
things to perfection, and to reduce the corruption 
of manners to honefty of precepts, or examples of 
too great height. And yet hereof they have caveats 
enough in their own walks. For Solon, when he 
was afked whether he had given his citizens the 
beft laws, anfwered wifely, Yea of fuch as they 
would receive :** and Plato, finding that his own 
heart could not agree with the corrupt manners of 
his country, refufed to bear place or office, faying, 
That a man’s country was to be ufed as his parents 
were, that is, with humble perfuafions, and not with 
conteftations.°*®> And Cefar’s counfellor put in the 

50 Ovid, Ep. xv. 83. 

51 De Augm. has nullum occurrit dedecus literis ex litteratorum 
moribus, quatenus funt literati, adberens, which explains it. The 
not before inherent goes with cannot according to the rule of double 
negative, as it prevailed in early Englifh writers. 


*2 Plutarch, Vit. Solon. 
53 Plato, Epift. Z. iii. 331. 


28: ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fame caveat, Non ad vetera inftituta revocans que 
jampridem corruptis moribus ludibrio funt :°* and 
Cicero noteth this error directly in Cato the fecond, 
when he writes to his friend Atticus ; Cato optime 
fentit, fed nocet interdum reipublice ; loquitur enim 
tanquam in reipublica Platonis, non tanquam in 
face Romuli.*> And the fame Cicero doth excufe 
and expound the philofophers for going too far, and 
being too exact in their prefcripts, when he faith, 
Ifti ipft preceptores virtutis et magiftri, videntur 
fines officiorum paulo longius quam natura vellet pro- 
tulifje, ut cum ad ultimum animo contendiffemus, ibi 
tamen, ubi oportet, confifteremus :°© and yet himfelf 
might have faid, AZonitis {um minor ipfe meis ;*" for 
it was his own fault, though not in fo extreme a 
degree. 

(8) Another fault likewife much of this kind 
hath been incident to learned men; which is, that 
they have efteemed the prefervation, good, and 
honour of their countries or mafters before their 
own fortunes or fafeties. For fo faith Demofthenes 
unto the Athenians ; [fit pleafe you to note it, my 
counfels unto you are not fuch whereby I fhould grow 
great among ft you, and you become little among/t the 
Grecians : but they be of that nature, as they are 
fometimes not good for me to give, but are always 
good for you to follow.*® And fo Seneca, after he 
had confecrated that Quinguennium Neronis®9 to 


54 Sall. Epift. de Rep. ord. 55 Cic. ad Att. ii. 1. 

56 Cic. pro Mur. xxxi. 65. 27 Ovid, 4. Am. ii. 548. 

58 Demofth. Chers. 187, ad finem. 

59 The Quinguennium INeronis refers to the firft five years of 
Nero’s reign, during which he was under Seneca’s influence. 


BOOK I. 29 


the eternal glory of learned governors, held on his 
honeft and loyal courfe of good and free counfel, 
after his mafter grew extremely corrupt in his 
government. Neither can this point otherwife be ; 
for Learning endueth men’s minds with a true fenfe 
of the frailty of their perfons, the cafualty of their 
fortunes, and the dignity of their foul and vocation: 
fo that it is impoffible for them to efteem that any 
greatnefs of their own fortune can be a true or 
worthy end of their being and ordainment; and 
therefore are defirous to give their account to God, 
and fo likewife to their mafters under God (as 
kings and ftates that they ferve) in thefe words ; 
Ecce tibi lucrefeci, and not Ecce mihi lucrefeci ;® 
whereas, the corrupter fort of mere Politiques, 
that have not their thoughts eftablifhed by learn- 
ing in the love and apprehenfion of duty, nor never 
look abroad into univerfality, do refer all things to 
themfelves, and thruft themfelves into the centre 
of the world, as if all lines fhould meet in them 
and their fortunes; never caring in all tempefts 
what becomes of the fhip of eftates, fo they may 
fave themfelves in the cockboat of their own for- 
tune: whereas men that feel the weight of duty 
and know the limits of felf love, ufe to make good 
their places and duties, though with peril; and if 
they ftand in feditious and violent alterations, it is 
rather the reverence which many times both ad- 
verfe parts do give to honefty, than any verfatile 
advantage of their own carriage. But for this 
point of tender fenfe and faft obligation of duty 


© Matt. xxv. 20. 


30 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


which learning doth endue the mind withal, how- 
foever fortune may tax it, and many in the depth 
of their corrupt principles may defpife it, yet it will 
receive an open allowance, and therefore needs 
the lefs difproof or excufation. 

(vy) Another fault incident commonly to learned 
men, which may be more properly defended than 
truly denied, is, that they fail fometimes in apply- 
ing themfelves to particular perfons: which want 
of exact application arifeth from two caufes; the 
one, becaufe the largenefs of their mind can hardly 
confine itfelf to dwell in the exquifite obfervation 
or examination of the nature and cuftoms of one 
perfon: for it is a fpeech for a lover, and not for 
a wife man: Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum 


fumus. Neverthelefs I fhall yield, that he that _ 


cannot contract the fight of his mind as well as 
difperfe and dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But 
there is a fecond caufe, which is no inability, but 
a rejection upon choice and judgment. For the 
honeft and juft bounds of obfervation by one per- 
fon upon another, extend no farther but to under- 
ftand him fufficiently, whereby not to give him 
offence, or whereby to be able to give him faithful 
counfel, or whereby to ftand upon reafonable guard 
and caution in refpeé of a man’s felf. But to be 
fpeculative into another man to the end to know 
how to work him, or wind him, or govern him, 
proceedeth from a heart that is double and cloven 
and not entire and ingenuous ; which as in friend- 
fhip it is want of integrity, fo towards princes or 


St A faying of Epicurus. Seneca, Epi/?. Mor. i. 7. 


BOOK I. 31 


fuperiors is want of duty. For the cuftom of the 
Levant, which is that fubjects do forbear to gaze 
or fix their eyes upon princes,® is in the outward 
ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good : for 
men ought not by cunning and bent obfervations 
to pierce and penetrate into the hearts of kings, 
which the Scripture hath declared to be infcru- 
table.® 

(0) There is yet another fault (with which I 
will conclude this part) which is often noted in 
learned men, that they do many times fail to ob- 
ferve decency and difcretion in their behaviour and 
carriage, and commit errors in {mall and ordinary 
points of action, fo as the vulgar fort of capacities 
do make a judgment of them in greater matters by 
that which they find wanting in them in {maller. 
But this confequence doth often deceive men, for 
which I do refer them over to that which was faid 
by Themiftocles, arrogantly and uncivilly being 
applied to himfelf out of his own mouth, but, 
being applied to the general {tate of this queftion, 
pertinentlyand juftly ; when, being invited to touch 
a lute, he faid, He could not fiddle, but he could 
make a {mall town a great ftate.°* So, no doubt, 
many may be well feen in the paflages of govern- 
ment and policy, which are to feek in little and 
punctual occafions. I refer them alfo to that 
which Plato faid of his mafter Socrates, whom he 
compared to the gallipots of apothecaries, which 
on the outfide had apes and owls and antiques, but 


62 Herod. I. 99. Prov. xxva 3- 
% Plutarch, Vit. Themift., ad init. 


32 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


contained within fovereign and precious liquors and 
confections ; acknowledging that to an external 
report he was not without fuperficial levities and 
deformities, but was inwardly replenifhed with 
excellent virtues and powers. And fo much 
touching the point of manners of learned men. 
But in the mean time I have no purpofe to give 
allowance to fome conditions and courfes bafe and 
unworthy, wherein divers profeflors of learning 
have wronged themfelves and gone too far ; fuch 
as were thofe trencher Philofophers which in the 
later age of the Roman {tate were ufually in the 
houfes of great perfons, being little better than 
folemn parafites ; of which kind, Lucian maketha 
merry defcription of the philofopher that the great 
lady took to ride with her in her coach, and would 
needs have him carry her little dog, which he doing 
officioufly and yet uncomely, the page fcoffed and 
faid, That he doubted, the philofopher of a Stoic 
would turn to be a Cynic. But above all the reft, 


the grofs and palpable flattery, whereunto many . 


not unlearned have abafed and abufed their wits 
and pens, turning, as Du Bartas faith,°’ Hecuba 
into Helena, and Fauftina into Lucretia, hath moft 
diminifhed the price and eftimation of learning. 
Neither is the moral® dedication of books and 
writings, as to patrons, to be commended : for that 
books, fuch as are worthy the name of books, 


65 Plat. Conv. ili. 215, where the thought is prefent, though the 
exact fimilitude is wanting. 
66 Lucian. de Merc. Cond., 33, 34. 
§7 See Bethulian’s Refcue, book v. 
“ Tous ces efprits dont la voix flattereufe 
Change Hécube en Héléne, et Fauftine en Lucréce.” 
68 Moral, here cuffomary. 


BOOK I. 33 


ought to have no patrons but truth and reafon. 
And the ancient cuftom was to dedicate them only 
to private and equal friends, or to entitle the 
books with their names: or if to kings and great 
-perfons, it was to fome fuch as the argument of 
the book was fit and proper for: but thefe and 
the like courfes may deferve rather reprehenfion 
than defence. 


Not that I can tax or condemn the morigera-, 


tion or application of learned men to men in for- 
tune. For the anfwer was good that Diogenes 
made to one that afked him in mockery, How it 
came to pafs that philofophers were the followers of 
rich men, and not rich men of philofophers? He 
anfwered foberly, and yet fharply, Becaufe the one 
fort knew what they had need of, and the other did 
not.°9 And of the like nature was the anfwer which 
Ariftippus made, when having apetition to Diony- 
fius, and no ear given to him, he fell down at his 
feet; whereupon Dionyfius ftaid, and gave him 
the hearing, and granted it; and afterward fome 
perfon, tender on the behalf of philofophy, re- 
proved Ariftippus that he would offer the profef- 
fion of philofophy fuch an indignity, as for a pri- 
vate fuit to fall at atyrant’s feet: but he anfwered, 
It was not his fault, but it was the fault of Diony- 
Jius, that had his ears in his feet.1? Neither was 
it accounted weaknefs, but difcretion in him that 
would not difpute his beft with Adrianus Cefar ; 
excufing himfelf, That it was rea/fon to yield to him 

6 Diog. Laert. Vit. Ariffippi, ii. 69; the anfwer was given by 
Ariftippus. 70 Ibid, ii. 79. 

D 


As to their 
follies. 


34. ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


that commanded thirty legions... "Thefe and the 
like applications, and ftooping to points of neceflity 
and convenience, cannot be difallowed ; for though 
they may have fome outward bafenefs, yet in a 
judgment truly made they are to be accounted fub- 
miffions to the occafion, and not to the perfon. 

3. Now I proceed to thofe errors and vanities 
which have intervened amongit the ftudies them- 
felves of the learned, which is that which is prin- 
cipal and proper to the prefent argument; wherein 
my purpofe is not to make a juftification of the 
errors, but by a cenfure and feparation of the errors 
to make a juftification of that which is good and 
found, and to deliver that from the afperfion of the 
other. For we fee that it is the manner of men to 
fcandalize and deprave that which retaineth the 
ftate?® and virtue, by taking advantage upon that 
which is corrupt and degenerate: as the heathens 
in the primitive Church ufed to blemifh and taint 
the Chriftians with the faults and corruptions of 
heretics. But neverthelefs I have no meaning at 
this time to make any exact animadverfion of the 
errors and impediments in matters of learning, 
which are more fecret and remote from vulgar 
opinion, but only to fpeak unto fuch as do fall under 
or near unto a popular obfervation. 

There be therefore chiefly three vanities in ftu- 
dies, whereby learning hath been moft traduced. 


71 Spartianus, Vit. Adriani, § 15. The excufe was made by 
Favorinus. 

72 Had Bacon been accuftomed to ufe the then modern word its, 
it is probable he would have ufed it here. As it is, “ the ftate and 
virtue” muft mean its pure and right condition, 


BOOK I. 35 


For thofe things we do efteem vain, which are 
either falfe or frivolous, thofe which either have 
no truth or no ufe: and thofe perfons we efteem 
vain, which are either credulous or curious; 
and curiofity is either in matter or words: fo 
that in reafon, as well as in experience, there 
fall out to be thefe three diftempers, as I may 
term them, of learning: the firft, fantaftical learn- 
ing; the fecond, contentious learning; and the 
laft, delicate learning; vain imaginations, vain al- 
tercations, and vain affectations ; and with the laft 
I will begin. (a) Martin Luther, conducted no 
doubt by a higher providence, but in difcourfe of 
reafon’ finding what a province he had under- 
taken againft the bifhop of Rome and the degene- 
rate traditions of the church, and finding his own 
folitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of 
his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity, 
and to call former times to his fuccours to make a 
party againft the prefenttime. So that the ancient 
authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which 
had long time flept in libraries, began generally to 
be read and revolved. This by confequence did 
draw on a neceflity of a more exquifite travail in 
the languages original, wherein thofe authors did 
write, for the better underftanding of thofe authors, 
and the better advantage of prefling and applying 
their words. And thereof grew againa delight in 
their manner of ftyle and phrafe, and an admiration 
of that kind of writing ; which was much furthered 


73 Dijfcourfe of reafon ; a proper logical term. Cf, Sanderfon, drs 
Log. 111. i. 


Folly in 


vain words. 


36 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


and precipitated by the enmity and oppofition that 
the propounders of thofe primitive but feeming new 
opinions had againft the {choolmen ; who were ge- 
nerally of the contrary part, and whofe writings 
were altogether in a different {tyle and form; taking 
liberty to coin and frame new terms of art to ex- 
prefs their own fenfe, and to avoid circuit of fpeech, 
without regard to the purenefs, pleafantnefs, and, 
as I may call it, lawfulnefs of the phrafe or word. 
And again, becaufe the great labour that’ then 
was with the people, (of whom the Pharifees were 
wont to fay, Execrabilis ifta turba, que non novit 
legem)*> for the winning and perfuading of them, 
there grew of neceffity in chief price and requeft 
eloquence and variety of difcourfe, as the fitteft 
and forcibleft accefs into the capacity of the vulgar 
fort: fo that thefe four caufes concurring, the ad- 
miration of ancient authors, the hate of the fchool- 
men, the exact {tudy of languages, and the efficacy 
of preaching, did bring in an affectionate ftudy of 
eloquence and copie of fpeech, which then began 
to flourifh. This grew {peedily to an excefs; for 
men began to hunt more after words than matter ; 
more after the choicenefs of the phrafe, and the 
round and clean compofition of the fentence, and 
the {weet falling of the claufes, and the varying and 
illuftration of their works with tropes and figures, 
than after the weight of matter, worth of fubject, 
foundnefs of argument, life of invention or depth 
of judgment. Then grew the flowing and watery 


74 Ed, 1629 and 1033) omit that ; but becaufe here=becaufe of. 
78 John vii. ro. 


BOOK I. 37 


vein of Oforius?® the Portugal bifhop, to be in 
price. “Then did Sturmius fpend fuch infinite and 
curious pains upon Cicero the Orator, and Her- 
mogenes the Rhetorician, befides his own books 
of Periods and Imitation, and the like. “Then did 
Car of Cambridge, and Afcham with their lectures 
and writings almoft deify Cicero and Demofthenes, 
and allure all young men that were ftudious, unto 
that delicate and polifhed kind of learning. “Then 
did Erafmus take occafion to make the fcoffing 
Echo: Decem annos confumpfi in legendo Cicerone ; 
and the Echo anfwered in Greek, “Ove, Afine.7 
Then grew the learning of the {choolmen to be 
utterly defpifed as barbarous. In fum, the whole 
inclination and bent of thofe times was rather to- 
wards copie than weight. 

Here, therefore, is the firft diftemper of learn- 
ing, when men ftudy words and not matter ; 
whereof, though I have reprefented an example of 
late times, yet it hath been and will be /ecundum 
majus et minus in alltime. And how is it poffible 
but this fhould have an operation to difcredit 
learning, even with vulgar capacities, when they 
fee learned men’s works like the firft letter of a 
patent, or limned book; which though it hath 
large flourifhes, yet is but a letter? It feems to 
me that Pygmalion’s frenzy is a good emblem or 
portraiture of this vanity :7® for words are but the 
images of matter; and except they have life of 
reafon and invention, to fall in love with them is 
all one as to fall in love with a picture. 


76 Bithop of Silves, died 1580. 
™ Collog. between Fuvenis and Echo. *® Ovid, Metam. x. 243, 


Folly in 
vain matter. 


38 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


But yet notwithftanding it is a thing not hatftily 
to be condemned, to clothe and adorn the obfcurity 
even of Philofophy itfelf with fenfible and plaufible 
elocution. For hereof we have great examples in 
Xenophon, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato 
alfo in fome degree ; and hereof likewife there is 
great ufe: for furely, to the fevere inquifition of 
truth and the deep progrefs into philofophy, it is 
fome hindrance ; becaufe it is too early fatisfactory 
to the mind of man, and quencheth the defire of 
further fearch, before we come to a juft period. 
But then if a man be to have any ufe of fuch know- 
ledge in civil occafions, of conference, counfel, per- 
fuafion, difcourfe, or the like; then fhall he find it 
prepared to his hands in thofe authors which write 
in that manner. But the excefs of this is fo juftly 
contemptible, that as Hercules, when he faw the 
image of Adonis, Venus’ minion, in a temple, faid 
in difdain, Nil facri es ;79 fo there is none of Her- 
cules’ followers in learning, that is, the more fevere 
and laborious fort of inquirers into truth, but will 
defpife thofe delicacies and affectations, as indeed 
capable of no divinenefs. And thus much of the 
firft difeafe or diftemper of learning. 

(@) The fecond which followeth is in nature 
worfe than the former: for as fubftance of matter 
is better than beauty of words, fo contrariwife 
vain matter is worfe than vain words: wherein 
it feemeth the reprehenfion of St. Paul was not 
only proper for thofe times, but prophetical for 
the times following; and not only refpective to 


79 Theocr. v. 2. ({chol.) or Erafmi dag. 


BOOK I. 39 


divinity, but extenfive to all knowledge: Devita 
profanas vocum novitates, et oppofitiones falfi nominis 
feientia. For he affigneth two marks and badges 
of fufpected and falfified {cience: the one, the no- 
velty and ftrangenefs of terms; the other, the 
ftrictnefs of pofitions, which of neceffity doth in- 
duce oppofitions, and fo queftions and altercations. 
Surely, like as many fubftances in nature which are 
folid do putrify and corrupt into worms ; {o it is the 
property of good and found knowledge to putrify 
and diffolve into a number of fubtle, idle, unwhole- 
fome, and, as I may term them, vermiculate quef- 
tions, which have indeed a kind of quicknefs and 
life of f{pirit, but no foundnefs of matter or goodnefs 
of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did 
chiefly reign amongft the Schoolmen :®! who hav- 
ing fharp and ftrong wits, and abundance of leifure, 
and {mall variety of reading, but their wits being 
fhut up in the cells of a few authors (chiefly Arif- 
totle their dictator) as their perfons were fhut up 
in the cells of monafteries and colleges, and know- 
ing little hiftory, either of nature or time, did out 
of no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation 
of wit fpin out unto thofe laborious webs of learn- 
ing which are extant in their books.®* For the wit 
and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which 
is the contemplation of the creatures of God, work- 
eth according to the ftuff, and is limited thereby ; 
but if it work upon itfelf, as the {fpider worketh his 


80 x Tim. vi. 20. 

81 For his judgment—a harfh one—on the Schoolmen, fee the 
Nov. Org.i. 71. 

82 See Hallam, Hift. of Lit. vol. i. init. § 18 —23. 


40 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


web, then it is endlefs, and brings forth indeed 
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the finenefs of 
thread and work, but of no fubftance or profit. 
This fame unprofitable fubtilty or curiofity is of 
two forts ; either in the fubject itfelf that they han- 
dle, when itis a fruitlefs {peculation or controverfy, 
(whereof there are no {mall number both in Divi- 
nity and Philofophy) or in the manner or method 
of handling of a knowledge, which amongft them 
was this; upon every particular pofition or affer- 
tion to frame objections, and to thofe objections, 
folutions ; which folutions were for the moft part 
not confutations, but diftinétions : whereas indeed 
the ftrength of all fciences is, as the ftrength of 
the old man’s fagot, inthe band. For the harmony 
of a fcience, fupporting each part the other, is and 
ought to be the true and brief confutation and fup- 
preffion of all the fmaller fort of objections. But, 
on the other fide, if you take out every axiom, as 
the fticks of the fagot, one by one, you may quarrel 
with them, and bend them, and break them at your 
pleafure: fo that, as was faid of Seneca, Verborum 
minutiis rerum frangit pondera ;* fo a man may 
truly fay of the fchoolmen, Que/tionum minutits 
feientiarum frangunt foliditatem. For were it not 
better for a man in a fair room to fet up one great 
light or branching candleftick of lights, than to go 
about with a {mall watch candle into every corner? 
And fuch is their method, that refts not fo much 
upon evidence of truth proved by arguments, au- 


88 Rerum pondera minutiflimis fententiis fregit.—QuinT. de Inf. 
Orat. x. 1. 


BOOK I. 4a 


thorities, fimilitudes, examples, as upon particular 
confutations and folutions of every fcruple, cavil- 
lation, and objection ; breeding for the moft part 
one quettion as faft as it folveth another; even as 
in the former refemblance, when you carry the 
light into one corner, you darken the reft; fo that 
the fable and fiction of Scylla feemeth to be a lively 
image of this kind of philofophy or knowledge ; 
which was transformed into a comely virgin for 
the upper parts; but then 


Candida fuccinétam la—trantibus inguina monftris :*4 


fo the generalities of the fchoolmen are for a while 
good and proportionable; but then, when you de- 
{cend into their diftintions and decifions, inftead of 
a fruitful womb for the ufe and benefit of man’s 
life, they end in monftrous altercations and barking 
queftions. So as it is not poffible but this quality of 
knowledge muft fall under popular contempt, the 
people being apt to contemn truth upon occafion 
of controverfies and altercations, and to think they 
are all out of their way which never meet; and 
when they fee fuch digladiation about fubtilties, 
and matters of no ufe or moment, they eafily fall 
upon that judgment of Dionyfius of Syracufe, 
Verba ifta funt fenum otioforum.®® 
Notwithftanding, certain it is that if thofe 
Schoolmen to their great thirft of truth and un- 
wearied travail of wit had joined variety and uni- 
verfality of reading and contemplation, they had 
proved excellent lights, to the great advancement 


8 Virg. Ecl. vi. 75. 85 Diog. Laert. iii. 18. (Vit. Platonis.) 


Folly in 
untruth, 


42 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


of all learning and knowledge: but as they are, 
they are great undertakers indeed, and fierce with 
dark keeping: but as in the inquiry of the divine 
truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle of 
God’s word, and to vanifh in the mixture of their 
own inventions; fo in the inquifition of nature, 
they ever left the oracle of God’s works, and 
adored the deceiving and deformed images which 
the unequal mirror of their own minds, or a few 
received authors or principles did reprefent unto 
them. And thus much for the fecond difeafe of 
learning. 

(y) For the third vice or difeafe of learning, which 
concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of all the reft 
the fouleft ; as that which doth deftroy the effen- 
tial form of knowledge, which is nothing but a 
reprefentation of truth: for the truth of being and 
the truth of knowing are one, differing no more 
than the direct beam and the beam reflected. 
This vice therefore brancheth itfelf into two forts; 
delight in deceiving, and aptnefs to be deceived ; 
impofture and credulity ; which, although they 
appear to be of a diverfe nature, the one feeming 
to proceed of cunning and the other of fimplicity, 
yet certainly they do for the moft part concur: 
for, as the verfe noteth, 


Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem eft,®° 


an inquifitive man is a prattler; fo, upon the like 
reafon, a credulous man is a deceiver: as we fee 
it in fame, that he that will eafily believe rumours, 


86 Hor. Ep, I. xviii. 69. 


_— ae 


BOOK I. 43 


will as eafily augment rumours, and add fomewhat 
to them of his own; which Tacitus wifely noteth, 
when he faith, Fingunt fimul creduntque :®" fo great 
an affinity hath fiction and belief. 

This facility of credit and accepting or admitting 
things weakly authorized or warranted, is of two 
kinds according to the fubject: for it is either a 
belief of hiftory, (as® the lawyers fpeak, matter of 
fact); or elfe of matter of art and opinion. As 
to the former, we fee the experience and inconve- 
nience of this error in ecclefiaftical hiftory ; which 
hath too eafily received and regiftered reports and 
narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, hermits, 
or monks of the defert, and other holy men, and 
their relics, fhrines, chapels, and images: which 
though they had a paflage for a time by the igno- 
rance of the people, the fuperftitious fimplicity of 
fome, and the politic toleration of others holding 
them but as divine poefies; yet after a period of 
time, when the mift began to clear up, they grew 
to be efteemed but as old wives’ fables, impoftures 
of the clergy, illufions of {pirits, and badges of 
Antichrift, to the great fcandal and detriment of 
religion. 

So in natural hiftory, we fee there hath not been 
that choice and judgment ufed as ought to have 
been; as may appear in the writings of Plinius, 
Cardanus,®9 Albertus,°° and divers of the Arabians, 

& Tac. Hift.i. 51. 

8 T have here followed the reading of Ed. 1605. 

89 Cardan—born in Pavia, 1501—wrote about 122 works on 
Phyfics, Mathematics, Aftronomy, Aftrology, Medicine, Ethics, 
Mufic, &c. 


9 Albertus Magnus—born in Swabia, about 1198—the moft 
learned man of his age. 


44, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


being fraught with much fabulous matter, a great 
part not only untried, but notorioufly untrue, to 
the great derogation of the credit of natural phi- 
lofophy with the grave and fober kind of wits: 
wherein the wifdom and integrity of Ariftotle is 
worthy to be obferved; that, having made fo dili- 
gent and exquifite a hiftory of living creatures, 
hath mingled it {paringly with any vain or feigned 
matter: and yet on the other fake,?! hath caft all 
prodigious narrations, which he thought worthy 
the recording, into one book:% excellently dif- 
cerning that matter of manifeft truth (fuch where- 
upon obfervation and rule were to be built), was 
not to be mingled or weakened with matter of 
doubtful credit; and yet again, that rarities and 
reports that feem incredible are not to be fup- 
prefled or denied to the memory of men. 

And as for the facility of credit which is yielded 
to arts and opinions, it is likewife of two kinds ; 
either when too much belief is attributed to the 
arts themfelves, or to certain authors in any art. 
The fciences themfelves, which have had better 
intelligence and confederacy with the imagination 
of man than with his reafon, are three in number ; 
aftrology, natural magic, and alchemy: of which 
fciences, neverthelefs, the ends or pretences are 
noble. For aftrology pretendeth to difcover that 
correfpondence or concatenation which is between 
the fuperior globe and the inferior: natural magic 


91 So in all the early editions ; fide has been fuggefted. 
% Oavpaova ’Akovopara—a treatife now generally thought 
not to be genuine, 


BOOK 1. 4S 


pretendeth to call and reduce natural philofophy 
from variety of fpeculations to the magnitude of 
works: and alchemy pretendeth to make fepara- 
tion of all the unlike parts of bodies which in mix- 
tures of nature are incorporate. But the deriva- 
tions and profecutions to thefe ends, both in the 
theories and in the practices, are full of error and 
vanity ; which the great profeflors themfelves have 
fought to veil over and conceal by enigmatical writ- 
ings, and referring themfelves to auricular traditions 
and fuch other devices, to fave the credit of im- 
poftures: and yet furely to alchemy this right is 
due, that it may be compared to the hufbandman 
whereof A“fop makes the fable; that, when he 
died, told his fons that he had left unto them gold 
buried under ground in his vineyard; and they 
digged over all the ground, and gold they found 
none; but by reafon of their ftirring and digging 
the mould about the roots of their vines, they had 
a great vintage the year following: fo afluredly the 
fearch and ftir to make gold hath brought to light 
a great number of good and fruitful inventions and 
experiments, as well for the difclofing of nature as 
for the ufe of man’s life. 

And as for the overmuch credit that hath been 
given unto authors in fciences, in making them 
diGtators, that their words fhould ftand, and not 
counfellors®* to give advice ; the damage is infinite 
that fciences have received thereby, as the principal 


93 Ed. 1629 and 1633 have confuls. De Augm. “ Diétatoria 
quadam poteftate munivit ut edicant, non fenatoria ut confulant.” 
Ellis fuggefts that Bacon wrote counfell'*. It clearly fhould be coun- 
Jellors. 


46 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


caufe that hath kept them low at a ftay without 
growth or advancement. For hence it hath come, 
that in arts mechanical the firft devifer comes 
fhorteft, and time addeth and perfecteth; but in 
fciences the firft author goeth fartheft, and time 
leefeth and corrupteth. So we fee, artillery, fail- 
ing, printing, and the like, were groffly managed at 
the firft, and by time accommodated and refined : 
but contrariwife, the philofophies and fciences of 
Ariftotle, Plato, Democritus, Hippocrates, Eu- 
clides, Archimedes, of moft vigour at the firft and 
by time degenerate and imbafed ; whereof the rea- 
fon is no other, but that in the former many wits 
and induftries have contributed in one; and in the 
latter many wits and induftries have been {pent 
about the wit of fome one, whom many times they 
have rather depraved than illuftrated. For as water 
will not afcend higher than the level of the firft 
{pringhead from whence it defcendeth, fo know- 
ledge derived from Ariftotle, and exempted from 
liberty of examination, will not rife again higher 
than the knowledge of Ariftotle. And therefore 
although the pofition be good, Oportet difcentem 
credere,® yet it muft be coupled with this, Oportet 
edoétum judicare; for difciples do owe unto mafters 
only a temporary belief and a fufpenfion of their 
own judgment until they be fully inftructed, and 
not an abfolute refignation or perpetual captivity : 
and therefore, to conclude this point, I will fay no 
more, but fo let great authors have their due, as 
time, which is the author of authors, be not de- 


8 Aritt. Sopb. El. 2. 


BOOK I. 47 


prived of his due, which is, further and further to 
difcover truth. 

4. Thus have I gone over thefe three difeafes of Leffer er- 
learning ; befides the which there are fome other pe 
rather peccant humours than formed difeafes: which Men. 
neverthelefs are not fo fecret and intrinfic but that 
they fall under a popular obfervation and traduce- 
ment, and therefore are not to be paffed over. 

(a) The firft of thefe is the extreme affecting of Affeétation 
two extremities; the one antiquity, the other no- %*™eme 
velty ; wherein it feemeth the children of time do 
take after the nature and malice of the father. For 
as he devoureth his children, fo one of them feeketh 
to devour and fupprefs the other; while antiquity 
envieth there fhould be new additions, and novelty 
cannot be content to add but it muft deface. Surely 
the advice of the prophet is the true direction in 
this matter, State /uper vias antiquas, et videte que- 
nam fit via reéta et bona et ambulatein ea. Anti- 
quity deferveth that reverence, that men fhould 
make a ftand thereupon and difcover what is the 
beft way; but when the difcovery is well taken, 
then to make progreffion. And to fpeak truly, 
Antiquitas feculi juventus mundi. Thefe times 
are the ancient times, when the world is ancient, 
and not thofe which we account ancient ordine 
retrogrado, by a computation backward from our- 
felves. 

(4) Another error induced by the former is a Diftrut of 
diftruft that anything fhould be now to be found "°v*lty- 
out, which the world fhould have miffed and paffed 


95 Jerem. vi. 16. % See Nov. Org. i. 84. 


Belief in 
the wifdom 
of the paft. 


48 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


over fo long time; as if the fame objection were 
to be made to time, that Lucian maketh to Ju- 
piter and other the heathen gods; of which he 
wondereth that they begot fo many children in 
old time, and begot none in his time; and afketh 
whether they were become feptuagenary, or whe- 
ther the law Papia, made againft old men’s mar- 
riages, had reftrained them. So it feemeth men 
doubt left time is become paft children and gene- 
ration; wherein, contrariwife, we fee commonly 
the levity and inconftancy of men’s judgments, 
which till a matter be done, wonder that it can be 
done; and as foon as it is done, wonder again that 
it was no fooner done: as we fee in the expedition 
of Alexander into Afia, which at firft was pre- 
judged as a vaft and impoflible enterprife ; and yet 
afterwards it pleafeth Livy to make no more of it 
than this: Nz7/ aliud quam bene aufus vana contem- 
nere ;%* and the fame happened to Columbus in 
the weftern navigation. But in intelle€tual mat- 
ters it is much more common ; as may be feen in 
moft of the propofitions of Euclid ; which till they 
be demonftrate, they feem ftrange to our affent; but 
being demonftrate, our mind accepteth of them 
by a kind of relation (as the lawyers {peak), as if 
we had known them before. 

3. Another error, that hath alfo fome affinity 
with the former, is a conceit that of former opin- 
ions or fects, after variety and examination, the beft 
hath ftill prevailed and fuppreffed the reft ; fo as, 
if a man fhould begin the labour of a new fearch, 


M7 Liv. ix. 17. 


BOOK I. 49 


he were but like to light upon fomewhat formerly 
rejected, and by rejection brought into oblivion: 
as if the multitude, or the wifeft for the multi- 
tude’s fake, were not ready to give paflage rather 
to that which is popular and fuperficial than to 
that which is fubftantial and profound; for the 
truth is that time feemeth to be of the nature of 
a river or ftream, which carrieth down to us that 
which is light and blown up, and finketh and 
drowneth that which is weighty and folid. 

4. Another error, of a diverfe nature from all 
the former, is the over early and peremptory re- 
duction of knowledge into arts and methods ; from 
which time commonly {ciences receive fmall or no 
augmentation. But as young men, when they knit 
and fhape perfectly, do feldom grow to a further 
ftature; fo knowledge, while it is in aphorifms and 
obfervations, it is in growth: but when it once is 
comprehended in exact methods, it may perchance 
be further polifhed and illuftrate?* and accommo- 
dated for ufe and practice; but it increafeth no 
more in bulk and fubftance. 

5- Another error, which doth fucceed that which 
we laft mentioned, is that after the diftribution of 
particular arts and fciences, men have abandoned 
univerfality, or philofophia prima; which cannot 
but ceafe and ftop all progreffion. For no perfect 
difcovery can be made upon a flat or a level: nei- 
ther is it poflible to difcover the more remote and 
deeper parts of any fcience, if you ftand but upon 


88 So in Ed. 1605. 
E 


Method. 


Love of 
particulars. 


Reverence. 


Intermix- 
ture of 
favourite 
fiudies, &c. 


50 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the level of the fame fcience, and afcend not to a 
higher {cience. 

6. Another error hath proceeded from too great 
a reverence, and a kind of adoration of the mind 
and underftanding of man; by means whereof 
men have withdrawn themfelves too much from 
the contemplation of nature, and the obfervations 
of experience, and have tumbled up and down in 
their own reafon and conceits. Upon thefe intel- 
letualifts, which are notwithftanding commonly 
taken for the moft fublime and divine philofophers, 
Heraclitus gave a juft cenfure, faying, Men fought 
truth in their own little worlds, and not in the great 
and common world ;* for they difdain to fpell, and 
fo by degrees to read in the volume of God's 
works : and contrariwife by continual meditation 
and agitation of wit do urge and as it were invo- 
cate their own fpirits to divine and give oracles 
unto them, whereby they are defervedly deluded. 

7. Another error that hath fome connedtion 
with this latter, is, that men have ufed to infe& 
their meditations, opinions, and doétrines, with 
fome conceits which they have moft admired, or 
fome fciences which they have moft applied; and 
given all things elfe a tincture according to them, 
utterly untrue and unproper. So hath Plato in- 
termingled his philofophy with theology, and Ant 
totle with logic; and the fecond fchool of Plato, 
Proclus and the reft, with the mathematics. For 
thefe were the arts which had a kind of primoge-. 


 Sext. Empir. adv. Matb. vii. 133. 
? See Nov. Orz. i. 63. 


| 


BOOK I. 5I 


niture with them feverally. So have the alchym- 
ifts made a philofophy out of a few experiments of 
the furnace; and Gilbertus,? our countryman, 
hath made a philofophy out of the obfervations of 
alodeftone. So Cicero, when reciting the feveral 
opinions of the nature of the foul he found a mu- 
fician that held the foul was but a harmony, faith 
pleafantly, Hic ab arte fua non receffit,c3 But 
of thefe conceits Ariftotle fpeaketh ferioufly and 
wifely, when he faith, Qui re/piciunt ad pauca de 
facili pronunciant.* 

8. Another error is an impatience of doubt, 
and hafte to affertion without due and mature 
fufpenfion of judgment. For the two ways of 
contemplation are not unlike the two ways of ac- 
tion commonly fpoken of by the ancients; the one 
plain and {mooth in the beginning, and in the end 
impaflable ; the other rough and troublefome in 
the entrance, but after a while fairand even. So it 
is in contemplation; if a man will begin with cer- 
tainties, he fhall end in doubts; but if he will be 
content to begin with doubts, he fhall end in cer- 
tainties. 

g. Another error is in the manner of the tradi- 
tion and delivery of knowledge, which is for the 
moft part magiftral and peremptory, and not in- 
genuous and faithful; in a fort as may be fooneft 
believed, and not eafilieft examined. It is true, 
that in compendious treatifes for practice that form 


2 See Nov. Org. i. 64. 

3 Tufeul. Difp.i. x. 20. He is {peaking of Ariftoxenus. Plato, 
in the Phads, pp. 56and 61, introduces the fame analogy. 

* De Gener. et Corrupt. i. 2. 


Impatience 
of doubt. 


Manner of 
tradition of 
knowledge. 


Low ends. 


Miftalee in 
the fartheft 
end of 

knowledge. 


52 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


is not to be difallowed: but in the true handling of 
knowledge, men ought not to fall either on the 
one fide into the vein of Velleius the Epicurean : 
Nil tam metuens, quam ne dubitare aliqua de re 
videretur ;> nor on the other fide into Socrates his 
ironical doubting of all things;® but to propound 
things fincerely with more or lefs afleveration, as 
they ftand in a man’s own judgment proved more 
or lefs. 

10. Other errors there are in the fcope that 
men propound to themfelves, whereunto they 
bend their endeavours; for whereas the more 
conftant and devote’ kind of profeffors of any 
fcience ought to propound to themfelves to make 
fome additions to their fcience, they convert their 
labours to afpire to certain fecond prizes: as to — 
be a profound interpreter or commenter, to be a 
fharp champion or defender, to be a methodical 
compounder or abridger ; and fo the patrimony of 
knowledge cometh to be fometimes improved, but 
feldom augmented. 

11. But the greateft error of all the reft is the 
miftaking or mifplacing of the laft or fartheft end 
of knowledge: for men have entered into a defire 
of learning and knowledge, fometimes upon a na- 
tural curiofity and inquifitive appetite; fometimes 
to entertain their minds with variety and delight ; 
fometimes for ornament and reputation ; and 

5 Cic. De Nat. Deor. I. viii. 18. : 
6 His Eipwrveva. See Plato, Apel. (p. 21), for the beft inftance of 
this. He there explains his fuperiority to confift in the know- 


ledge of his own ignorance. 
7 So Ed. 1605. 


BOOK I. 53 


fometimes to enable them to victory of wit and 
contradiction ; and moft times for lucre and pro- 
feffion ; and feldom fincerely to give a true ac- 
count of their gift of reafon, to the benefit and 
ufe of men: as if there were fought in knowledge 
a couch whereupon to reft a fearching and reft- 
lefs fpirit; or a tarraffe, for a wandering and 
variable mind to walk up and down with a fair 
profpect; or a tower of ftate, for a proud mind to 


raife itfelfupon; or a fort or commanding ground,’ 


for ftrife and contention; or a fhop, for profit or 
fale ; and not a rich ftorehoufe, for the glory of 
the Creator and the relief of man’s eftate. But 
this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt 
knowledge, if contemplation and action may be 
more nearly and ftraitly conjoined and united to- 
gether than they have been; a conjunction like 
unto that of the two higheft planets, Saturn, the 
planet of reft and contemplation, and Jupiter, the 
planet of civil fociety and action: howbeit, I do 
not mean, when I {peak of ufe and action, that 
end before-mentioned of the applying of know- 
ledge to lucre and profeffion; for I am not igno- 
rant how much that diverteth and interrupteth 
the profecution and advancement of knowledge, 
like unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, 
which while fhe goeth afide and ftoopeth to take 
up, the race is hindered ; 


Declinat curfus, aurumque volubile tollit.8 


12. Neither is my meaning, as was {poken of 


® Ovid, Metam. x. 667. 


54 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Socrates, to call philofophy down from heaven to 
converfe upon the earth ;9 that is, to leave natural 
philofophy afide, and to apply knowledge only to 
manners and policy. But as both heaven and 
earth do confpire and contribute to the ufe and 
benefit of man; fo the end ought to be, from both 
philofophies to feparate and reject vain fpecula- 
tions, and whatfoever is empty and void, and to 
preferve and augment whatfoever is folid and 
fruitful: that knowledge may not be, as a curte- 
fan, for pleafure and vanity only, or as a bond-wo- 
man, to acquire and gain to her mafter’s ufe; but 
as a fpoufe, for generation, fruit, and comfort. 
Thus have I defcribed and opened, as by a kind 
of diffeCtion, thofe peccant humours, (the principal 
of them,) which hath?* not only given impediment 
to the proficience of learning, but have given alfo 
occafion to the traducement thereof: wherein if J 
have been too plain, it muft be remembered, fidelia 
vulnera amantis, fed dolofa ofcula malignantis.™ 
This, I think, I have gained, that I ought to be 
the better believed in that which I fhall fay per- 
taining to commendation; becaufe I have pro- 
ceeded fo freely in that which concerneth cenfure. 
And yet I have no purpofe to enter into a lauda- 
tive of learning, or to make a hymn to the Mufes; 
(though I am of opinion that it is long fince their 
rites were duly celebrated:) but my intent is, 
without varnifh or amplification juftly to weigh 


9 Cic. Tufc. Difp. v. 4, 10. 

10 Tn all Editions bath. For in Bacon’s time the verb fingular 
was very commonly ufed with more nominatives than one, and 
even with plural nouns, as here. 

11 Prov. xxvii. 6. 


BOOK I. 55 


the dignity of knowledge in the balance with other 
things, and to take the true value thereof by tefti- 
monies and arguments divine and human. 

II. i. Firft therefore let us feek the dignity of Divine _ 
Knowledge in the archetype or firft platform, Looe 
which is in the attributes and acts of God, as far of Know- 
as they are revealed to man and may be obferved ie 
with fobriety; wherein we may not feek it by the 1. God's 
name of Learning ; for all Learning is Knowledge 3v “"" 
acquired, and all knowledge in God is original : 
and therefore we muft look for it by another 
name, that of Wifdom or Sapience, as the Scrip- 
tures call it. 

It is fo then, that in the work of the creation 
we fee a double emanation of Virtue from God ; 
the one referring more properly to Power, the 
other to Wiidom; the one expreffed in making 
the fubfiftence of the matter, and the other in dif- 
pofing the beauty of the form. ‘This being fup- 
pofed, it is to be obferved that for anything which 
appeareth in the hiftory of the creation, the con- 
fufed mafs and matter of Heaven and Earth was 
made in a moment; and the order and difpofition 
of that chaos or mafs was the work of fix days ; 
fuch a note of difference it pleafed God to put 
upon the works of Power, and the works of 
Wifdom ; wherewith concurreth, that in the for- 
mer it is not fet down that God faid, Let there be 
heaven and earth, as it is fet down of the works 
following ; but actually, that God made Heaven 
and Earth: the one carrying the ftyle of a Manu- 

_ facture, and the other of a Law, Decree, or 
Counfel. 


2. The wif- 


dom of 
Angels. 


3. Creation 
of light. 


4. God’s 
contempla- 
tion of 
Creation. 


5- Man’s 
endin Eden, 
knowledge. 


56 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


To proceed to that which is next in order from 
God, to Spirits ;1° we find, as far as credit is to be 
given to the celeftial hierarchy of that fuppofed 
Dionyfius the fenator of Athens, the firft place 
or degree is given to the angels of Love, which 
are termed Seraphim; the fecond to the angels of 
Light, which are termed Cherubim; and the 
third, and fo following places, to Thrones, Prin- 
Cipalities, and the reft, which are all angels of 
power and miniftry ; fo as the angels of Know- 
ledge and I]lumination are placed before the angels 
of Office and Domination,* 

To defcend from Spirits and Intelle&tual Forms 
to Senfible and Material Forms; we read the firft 
Form that was created was Light,!* which hath a 
relation and correfpondence in nature and corporal 
things to Knowledge in Spirits and incorporal 
things. 

So inthe diftribution of days we fee the day 
wherein God did reft and contemplate His own 
works, was blefled above all the days wherein He 
did effect, and accomplifh them.'5 

After the creation was finifhed, it is fet down 
unto us that man was placed in the garden to work 
therein ; which work, fo appointed to him, could 
be no other than work of Contemplation; that is, 
when the end of work is but for exercife and ex- 
periment, not for neceffity ; for there being then 
no reluctation of the creature, nor fweat of the 
brow, man’s employment muft of confequence 

it Cr. Hooker, 2. PP) 1. iv. 15/2. 

18 Dionys. De Coelefi Hierarch. cap. 7, 8,9. This work is, as 


Bacon hints, {purious, though no other auther is affigned, 
14 Gen. i. 3. A SGen aaa 


a ee ee 


BOOK I. 57 


_ have been matter of delight in the experiment, 
and not matter of labour for the ufe. Again, the 
firft aé&ts which man performed in Paradife con- 
fifted of the two fummary parts of knowledge; 
the view of creatures, and the impofition of names.?° 
As for the knowledge which induced the fall, it 
was, as was touched before, not the natural know- 
ledge of creatures, but the moral knowledge of 
good and evil; wherein the fuppofition was, that 
God’s commandments or prohibitions were not 
the originals of good and evil, but that they had 
other beginnings, which man afpired to know; to 
the end to make a total defection from God and 
to depend wholly upon himéelf. 

To pafs on: in the firft event or occurrence 
after the fall of man, we fee, (as the Scriptures 
have infinite myfteries, not violating at all the 
truth of the ftory or letter,) an image of the two 
eftates, the contemplative ftate and the active 
ftate, figured in the two perfons of Abel and Cain, 
and in the two fimpleft and moft primitive trades 
of life ; that of the fhepherd, (who, by reafon of 
his leifure, reft in a place, and living in view of 
heaven, is a lively image of a contemplative life, ) 
and that of the hufbandman:!7 where we fee again 
the favour and election of God went to the fhep- 
herd, and not to the tiller of the ground. 

So in the age before the flood, the holy records 
within thofe few memorials which are there en- 
tered and regiftered have vouchfafed to mention 
and honour the name of the inventors and authors 
of mufic and works in metal.!® In the age after 


16 Gen. ii, 19. aT iv. 2 18: lv. 2%, 22, 


6. Abel’s 
ftate of con- 
templation 
bleffed. 


7. God ho- 
nours 
inventors 
before the 
flood. 


58 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the flood, the firft great judgment of God upon the 
ambition of man was the confufion of tongues ;'9 
whereby the open trade and intercourfe of learn- 
ing and knowledge was chiefly imbarred. 

8. The To defcend to Mofes the lawgiver, and God’s 

nts °F firft pen: he is adorned by the Scriptures with 
this addition and commendation, That he was feen 
in all the learning of the Egyptians ;° which na- 
tion, we know, was one of the moft ancient 
fchools of the world: for fo Plato brings in the 
Egyptian prieft faying unto Solon: You Grecians 
are ever children; you have no knowledge of anti- 
quity, nor antiquity of knowledge.®' ‘Take a view 
of the ceremonial law of Mofes ; you fhall find, 
befides the prefiguration of Chrift, the badge or 
difference of the people of God, the exercife and 
impreflion of obedience, and other divine ufes and 
fruits thereof, that fome of the moft learned Rab- 
bins have travailed profitably and profoundly to 
obferve, fome of them a natural, fome of them a 
moral fenfe, or reduction of many of the cere- 
monies and ordinances. As in the law of the 
leprofy, where it is faid, If the whitene/s have over- 
Jpread the flefh, the patient may pafs abroad for 
clean ; but if there be any whole fle/h remaining, he 
is to be fhut up for unclean ;* one of them noteth 
a principle of nature, that putrefaction 1s more con- 
tagious before maturity than after: and another 
noteth a pofition of moral philofophy, that men 
abandoned to vice do not fo much corrupt manners, 


13 Gen. xi. 20 Act. Ap. vii. 22. 
1 Plat. Tim, iil. 22. 22 Levit. xiii. 12-14. 


BOOK I. 59 


as thofe that are half good and half evil. So in 
this and very many other places in that law, there 
is to be found, befides the theological fenfe, much 
afperfion of philofophy. 

So likewife in that excellent book of Job, if it be 
revolved with diligence, it will be found pregnant 
and {welling with natural philofophy; as, for exam- 
ple, cofmography, and the roundnefs of the world, 
Qui extendit aquilonem fuper vacuum, et appendit ter- 
ram fuper nibilum;? wherein the penfilenefs of the 
earth, the pole of the north, and the finitenefs or 
convexity of heaven are manifeftly touched. So 
again, matter of aftronomy ; Spiritus ejus ornavit 
ceelos, et obftetricante manu ejus eduétus eff coluber 
tortuofus.** And in another place; Nunguid con- 
jungere valebis micantes fellas Pleiadas, aut gyrum 
Aréturi poteris diffipare?* Where the fixing of 
the ftars, ever ftanding at equal diftance, is with 
great elegancy noted. And in another place, Qui 
facit Aréturum, et Oriona, et Hyadas, et interiora 
Auftri ;°° where again he takes knowledge of the 
depreffion of the fouthern pole, calling it the fe- 
crets of the fouth, becaufe the fouthern ftars were 
in that climate unfeen. Matter of generation ; 
Annon ficut lac mulfifti me, et ficut cafeum coagu- 
lafti me? &c.** Matter of minerals; Habet ar- 
gentum venarum fuarum principia: et auro locus 
eft in quo confiatur, ferrum de terra tollitur, et lapis 
folutus calore in @s vertitur :** and fo forwards in 
that chapter. 


23 Job xxvi. 7. SpeSKVI. 14. 25 XXXVI. 3Xs 
= ix: 9. cil o Go) 8 xxviii. I. 


g. Job’s 


learning. 


10. Solo- 
mon. 


11. Our 
Lord 
fubdued 
ignorance. 


60 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


So likewife in the perfon of Salomon the King, 
we fee the gift or endowment of wifdom and 
learning, both in Salomon’s petition and in God’s 
aflent thereunto, preferred before all other terrene 
and temporal felicity.°9 By virtue of which grant 
or donative of God Salomon became enabled not 
only to write thofe excellent Parables or Aphor- 
ifms concerning divine and moral philofophy; but 
alfo to compile a Natural Hiftory of all verdure, 
from the cedar upon the mountain to the mofs 
upon the wall, (which is but a rudiment between 
putrefaction and a herb,)*° and alfo of all things 
that breathe or move.*! Nay, the fame Salomon 
the King, although he excelled in the glory of 
treafure and magnificent buildings, of fhipping and 
navigation, of fervice and attendance, of fame and 
renown, and the like, yet he maketh no claim to 
any of thofe glories, but only to the glory of 
inquifition of truth; for fo he faith expreflly, The 
glory of God is to conceal a thing, but the glory of the 
king 1s to find it out ;*° as if, according to the inno- 
cent play of children, the Divine Majefty took 
delight to hide His works, to the end to have 
them found out ; and as if kings could not obtain 
a greater honour than to be God’s playfellows in 
that game; confidering the great commandment 
of wits and means, whereby nothing needeth to be 
hidden from them. 

Neither did the difpenfation of God vary in the 
times after our Saviour came into the world ; for 


29 y Kings iii, 5, fgg. °° Nov. Org. ii. 30. %! 1 Kings iv. 33. 
32 Prov. XXV. 2. 


BOOK I. 61 


our Saviour Himfelf did firft fhow His power to 
fubdue ignorance, by His conference with the 
priefts and doétors of the law,*3 before He fhowed 
His power to fubdue nature by His miracles. And 
the coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured 
and expreffed in the fimilitude and gift of tongues,°4 
which are but vehicula /cientia. 

So in the election of thofe inftruments, which 
it pleafed God to ufe for the plantation of the 
Faith, notwithftanding that at the firft He did em- 
ploy perfons altogether unlearned, otherwife than 
by infpiration, more evidently to declare His im- 
mediate working, and to abafe all human wifdom 
or knowledge; yet, neverthelefs, that counfel of 
His was no fooner performed, but in the next vi- 
ciffitude and fucceflion He did fend His Divine 
Truth into the world waited on with other learn- 
ings, as with fervants or handmaids; for fo we fee 
St. Paul, who was the only learned amongft the 
Apoftles, had his pen moft ufed in the Scriptures 
of the New Teftament. 

So again, we find that many of the ancient 
Bifhops and Fathers of the Church were excel- 
lently read and ftudied in all the learning of the 
heathen ; infomuch that the edict of the Emperor 
Julianus,® whereby it was interdiéted unto Chrif- 
tians to be admitted into fchools, lectures, or ex- 
ercifes of learning, was efteemed and accounted a 
more pernicious engine and machination againft 


3 Luke ii. 46. 34 AG. Ap. ii, 1. 
38 Gibbon, vol. ii. c. 23, who quotes Ammian. xxv. 5. 


12. The 
Apoftles 
not all 
unlearned. 
St Paul: 


13. Learned 
Bithops, &c. 


62 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the Chriftian Faith, than were all the fanguinary 
profecutions of his predeceflors; neither could the 
emulation and jealoufy of Gregory the firft of that 
name, bifhop of Rome,*® ever obtain the opinion 
of piety or devotion ; but contrariwife received the 
cenfure of humour, malignity, and pufillanimity, 
even amoneft holy men; in that he defigned to 
obliterate and extinguifh the memory of heathen 
antiquity and authors. But contrariwife, it was 
the Chriftian Church, which, amidft the inunda- 
tions of the Scythians on the one fide from the 
north-weft, and the Saracens from the eaft, did 
preferve in the facred lap and bofom thereof the 
precious relics even of heathen learning, which 
otherwife had been extinguifhed as if no fuch 
thing had ever been. 

14. Revival And we fee before our eyes, that in the age of 

Ee ae ourfelves and our fathers, when it pleafed God to 

formation, Call the Church of Rome to account for their de- 
generate manners and ceremonies, and fundry doc- 
trines obnoxious and framed to uphold the fame 
abufes ; at one and the fame time it was ordained 
by the Divine Providence that there fhould attend 
withal a renovation and new fpring of all other 
knowledges. And on the other fide we fee the 
Jefuits, (who partly in themfelves, and partly by 
the emulation and provocation of their example, 
have much quickened and ftrengthened the ftate 


86 Gibbon, vol. iv. c. 45. The ftory that St. Gregory de- 
ftroyed the Palatine Library is now rejected ; but as to his averfion 
to profane letters there can be no doubt. Milman’s Latin Chrif- 
tianity, bk. iii. c. 7. 


BOOK I. 63 


of learning,) we fee, I fay, what notable fervice 
and reparation they have done to the Roman fee. 

Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be ob- 
ferved, that there be two principal duties and fer- 
vices, befides ornament and illuftration, which 
philofophy and human learning do perform to 
faith and religion. ‘The one, becaufe they are an 
effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory 
of God: for as the Pfalms and other Scriptures do 
often invite us to confider and magnify the great 
and wonderful works of God,** fo if we fhould 
reft only in the contemplation of the exterior of 
them, as they firft offer themfelves to our fenfes, 
we fhould do a like injury unto the Majefty of 
God, as if we fhould judge or conftrue of the 
ftore of fome excellent jeweller, by that only 
which is fet out toward the ftreet in his fhop. 
The other, becaufe they minifter a fingular help 
and prefervative again{ft unbelief and error: for 
our Saviour faith, You err, not knowing the Scrip- 
tures, nor the power of God ;*° laying before us two 
books or volumes to ftudy, if we will be fecured 
from error; firft, the Scriptures, revealing the 
Will of God ; and then the creatures exprefling 
His Power ;%9 whereof the latter is a key unto the 
former: not only opening our underftanding to 
conceive the true fenfe of the Scriptures, by the 
general notions of reafon and rules of fpeech; but 
chiefly opening our belief, in drawing us into a 
due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which 
is chiefly figned and engraven upon His works. 


710 Pa, aie OLY. 38 Matt. xxii. 29. 39 Cf. Nov. Org. i. 89. 


15. Con- 
clufion. 


Human 
Proofs. 


Learning in 
higheft 
honour 
among the 
Heathen. 


1. As bear- 
ing much 
fruit. 


64 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Thus much therefore for divine teftimony and 
evidence concerning the true dignity and value of 
Learning. 

ii. As for human proofs, it is fo large a field, 
as in a difcourfe of this nature and brevity it is 
fit rather to ufe choice of thofe things which we 
fhall produce, than to embrace the variety of 
them. Firft, therefore, in the degrees of human 
honour amongft the heathen, it was the higheft to 
obtain to a veneration and adoration as a God. 
This unto the Chriftians is as the forbidden fruit. 
But we {peak now feparately of human teftimony: 
according to which, that which the Grecians call 
apotheofis, and the Latins, relatio inter divos, was 
the fupreme honour which man could attribute 
unto man: efpecially when it was given; not bya 
formal decree or act of ftate, as it was ufed among 
the Roman Emperors, but by an inward affent 
and belief. Which honour, being fo high, had 
alfo a degree or middle term; for there were 
reckoned above human honours, honours*® heroi- 
cal and divine: in the attribution and diftribution 
of which honours, we fee antiquity made this 
difference : that whereas founders and uniters of 
{tates and cities, law-givers, extirpers of tyrants, 
fathers of the people, and other eminent perfons in 
civil merit, were honoured but with the titles of 
worthies or demi-gods; fuch as were Hercules, 
Thefeus, Minos, Romulus, and the like: on the 
other fide, fuch a8 were inventors and authors of 
new arts, endowments, and commodities towards 


40 All the old Editions read boncur. 


BOOK I. 65 


man’s life, were ever confecrated amongft the gods 
themfelves ; as were Ceres, Bacchus, Mercurius, 
Apollo, and others: and juftly; for the merit of 
the former is confined within the circle of an age 
or a nation; and is like fruitful fhowers, which 
though they be profitable and good, yet ferve but 
for that feafon, and for a latitude of ground where 
they fall; but the other is indeed like the benefits 
of heaven, which are permanent and univerfal. 
The former, again, is mixed with ftrife and per- 
turbation; but the latter hath the true character 
of Divine Prefence, coming* in aura Jeni, without 
noife or agitation. 

Neither is certainly that other merit of learning, 
in repreffing the inconveniences which grow from 
man to man, much inferior to the former, of re- 
lieving the neceffities which arife from nature ; 
which merit was lively fet forth by the ancients in 
that feigned relation of Orpheus’ theatre, where all 
beafts and birds aflembled ; and, forgetting their 
feveral appetites, fome of prey, fome of game, 
fome of quarrel, ftood all fociably together liften- 
ing to the airs and accords of the harp; the found 
whereof no fooner ceafed, or was drowned by 
fome louder noife, but every beaft returned to its 
own nature: wherein is aptly defcribed the nature 
and condition of men, who are full of favage and 
unreclaimed defires of profit, of luft, of revenge ; 
which as long as they give ear to precepts, to 


41 In the edition 1605 com— ends a line, and the remainder of 
the word has been omitted. The editions 1629 and 1633 read 
commonly. 


F 


2. As bring- 
ing peace 
and fe- 
curity. 


; 
; 
; 
i 
1p 
I 
{ 
: 
{ 
| 


Efpecially 
under 
learned 
princes, 


66 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


laws, to religion, fweetly touched with eloquence 
and perfuafion of books, of fermons, of harangues, 
fo long is fociety and peace maintained ; but if 
thefe inftruments be filent, or that fedition and 
tumult make them not audible, all things diffolve 
into anarchy and confufion. 

But this appeareth more manifeftly, when kings 
themfelves, or perfons of authority under them, or 
other governors in commonwealths and popular 
eftates, are endued with learning. For although 
he might be thought partial to his own profeffion, 
that faid, Then /hould people and eftates be happy, 
when either kings were philofophers, or philofophers 
kings ;** yet fo much is verified by experience, that 
under learned princes and governors there have 
been ever the beft times: for howfoever kings 
may have their imperfections in their paffions and 
cuftoms; yet if they be illuminate by learning, 
they have thofe notions of religion, policy, and 
morality, which do preferve them, and refrain 
them from all ruinous and peremptory errors 
and excefles ; whifpering evermore in their ears, 
when counfellors and fervants ftand mute and 
filent. And fenators or counfellors likewife, 
which be learned, do proceed upon more fafe and 
fubftantial principles, than counfellors which are 
only men of experience: the one fort keeping 
dangers afar off, whereas the other difcover them 
not till they come near hand, and then truft to 
the agility of their wit to ward or avoid them. 


42 Plat. Rep. v. 473. 


BOOK I. 67 


Which felicity of times under learned princes, Such as the 
(to keep {till the law of brevity, by ufing the moft aay 
eminent and felected examples,) doth beft appear Domitian. 
in the age which paffed from the death of Domi- 
tian the emperor until the reign of Commodus ; 
comprehending a fucceffion of fix princes, all 
learned, or fingular favourers and advancers of 
learning, which age for temporal refpects, was the 
moft happy and flourifhing that ever the Roman H 
empire, (which then was a model of the world,) ! 
enjoyed: a matter revealed and prefigured unto | 
Domitian in a dream the night before he was 
flain ; for he thought there was grown behind 
upon his fhoulders a neck and a head of gold: 
which came accordingly to pafs in thofe golden 
times which fucceeded: of which princes we will 
make fome commemoration ; wherein although 
the matter will be vulgar, and may be thought 
fitter for a declamation than agreeable to a treatife 
_ infolded as this is, yet becaufe it is pertinent to the 
point in hand, 


Neque femper arcum 
Tendit Apollo,** 


and to name them only were too naked and cur- 
fory, I will not omit it altogether. The firft was 
Nerva; the excellent temper of whofe govern- (1.) Nava. 
ment is by a glance in Cornelius Tacitus touched 
to the life: Poffguam divus Nerva res olim infocia- 
biles mifcuiffet, imperium et libertatem.4* And in 
token of his learning, the laft act of his fhort 


* Hor. Od. ii. 10, 19.. MT Asrics Wits) C3, 


(2.) Trajan. 


68 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


reign left to memory, was a miffive to his adopted 
fon Trajan, proceeding upon fome inward difcon- 
tent at the ingratitude of the times, comprehended 
in a verfe of Homer’s: 


Telis, Phebe, tuis lacrymas ulcifcere noftras.4® 


Trajan, who fucceeded, was for his perfon not 
learned: but if we will hearken to the fpeech of 
our Saviour, that faith, He that receiveth a prophet 
in the name of a prophet, fhall have a prophet’s 
reward ;*© he deferveth to be placed amongft the 
moft learned princes: for there was not a greater 
admirer of learning, or benefactor of learning ; 
a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual advancer 
of learned men to office, and a familiar converfer 
with learned profeffors and preceptors, who were 
noted to have then moft credit in court. On the 
other fide, how much Trajan’s virtue and govern- 
ment was admired and renowned, furely no tefti- 
mony of grave and faithful hiftory doth more lively 
fet forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius Magnus, 
bifhop of Rome, who was noted for the extreme 
envy he bore towards all heathen excellency: and 
yet he is reported, out of the love and eftimation 
of Trajan’s moral virtues, to have made unto God 
paffionate and fervent prayers for the delivery of 
his foul out of hell :47 and to have obtained it, with 
a caveat that he fhould make no more fuch peti- 
tions. In this prince’s time alfo, the perfecution 

4 Ticsray Aavaoi tua ddaxpva coiot BéXeoow. Hom. LI. 
a. 42. Dionis. Epit. (Xiphilini), xii. 


4° Matt. x. 41. 
47 See Dante, Purgatorio, x. who feems to take it from the Life 


of Gregory, by John the Deacon, 


BOOK I. 69 


againft the Chriftians received intermiffion, upon 
the certificate of Plinius Secundus, a man of ex- 
cellent learning, and by Trajan advanced.* 


Adrian, his fucceflor, was the moft curious man (3.) Adrian. 


that lived, and the moft univerfal inquirer ; info- 
much as it was noted for an error in his mind, 
that he defired to comprehend all things, and not 
to referve himfelf for the worthieft things : falling 
into the like humour that was long before noted 
in Philip of Macedon, who, when he would needs 
over-rule and put down an excellent mufician in 
an argument touching mufic, was well anfwered 
by him again, God forbid, fir, faith he, that your 
fortune fhould be fo bad, as to know thefe things 
better than I.49 It pleafed God likewife to ufe the 
curiofity of this emperor as an inducement to the 
peace of His Church in thofe days. For having 
Chrift in veneration, not as a God or Saviour, but 
as a wonder or novelty; and having His picture in 
his gallery, matched with Apollonius, with whom 
in his vain imagination he thought he had fome 
conformity ; yet it ferved the turn to allay the 
bitter hatred of thofe times againft the Chriftian 
name, fo as the Church had peace during his time. 

And for his government civil, although he did not 
attain to that of Trajan’s in glory of arms, or per- 
fection of juftice, yet in deferving of the weal of 
the fubjeét he did exceed him. For Trajan 
erected many famous monuments and buildings ; 
infomuch as Conftantine the Great in emulation 


4 C, Plin. Epi. x. 97. 49 Plutarch, Apophth. 179. 


(4.) Anto- 
ninus Pius. 


70 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


was wont to call him Parietaria, wall-flower, 
becaufe his name was upon fo many walls: but 
his buildings and works were more of glory and 
triumph than ufe and neceffity. But Adrian fpent 
his whole reign, which was peaceable, in a per- 
ambulation or furvey of the Roman empire; giving 
order and making affignation where he went, for 
re-edifying of cities, towns, and forts decayed; and 
for cutting of rivers and ftreams, and for making 
bridges and paflages, and for policing® of cities and 
commonalties with new ordinances and conftitu- 
tions, and granting new franchifes and incorpora- 
tions; fo that his whole time was a very reftoration 
of all the lapfes and decays of former times. 

Antoninus Pius, who fucceeded him, was a prince 
excellently learned; and had the patient and fubtle 
wit of a fchoolman; infomuch as in common fpeech, 
which leaves no virtue untaxed, he was called 
Cymini Seétor,*! a carver or divider of cummin, 
which is one of the leaft feeds; fuch a patience he 
had and fettled fpirit to enter into the leaft and 
moft exact differences of caufes ; a fruit no doubt 
of the exceeding tranquillity and ferenity of his 
mind ; which being no ways charged or incum- 
bered, either with fears, remorfes, or fcruples, but 
having been noted for a man of the pureft good- 
nefs, without all fiGtion or affectation, that hath 
reigned or lived, made his mind continually pre- 
fent and entire. He likewife approached a degree 

30 Editions 1605 and 1629, pollicing, edition 1633, pollifbing. 

5! Unum de iftis puto qui cuminum fecant. Julian, Ces. So 


Ariftot. Erk. Nic. iv. 3, ei¢ Twv dtarpiovrwy To Kipuvoy: 
where, however, the phrafe is ufed of the * fkinflint,” or niggard. 


‘BOOK I. 71 


nearer unto Chriftianity, and became, as Agrippa 
faid unto St. Paul, half a Chriftian ;5* holding their 
religion and law in good opinion, and not only 
ceafing perfecution, but giving way to the advance- 
ment of Chriftians. 

There fucceeded him the firft Divi fratres, the 
two adoptive brethren, Lucius Commodus Verus,*? 
(fon to HZlius Verus, who delighted much in the 
fofter kind of learning, and was wont to call the 
poet Martial his Virgil,*4) and Marcus Aurelius 
Antoninus ; whereof the latter, who obfcured his 
colleague and furvived him long, was named the 
philofopher: who, as he excelled all the reft in 
learning, fo he excelled them likewife in perfection 
of all royal virtues ; infomuch as Julianus the em- 
peror, in his book entitled Cz/ares, being as a 
pafquil or fatire to deride all his predeceffors, 
feigned that they were all invited to a banquet of 
the gods, and Silenus the jefter fat at the nether 
end of the table, and beftowed a {coff on every 
one as they came in; but when Marcus Philofo- 
phus came in, Silenus was gravelled, and out of 
countenance, not knowing where to carp at him ; 
fave at the laft he gave a glance at his patience 
towards his wife. And the virtue of this prince, 
continued with that of his predeceflor, made the 
name of Antoninus fo facred in the world, that 
though it were extremely difhonoured in Com- 
modus, Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore 
the name, yet when Alexander Severus refufed 


52 Aéts xxvi. 28. 53 Better known as L. Aurelius Verus, 
*# See his life by Spartianus. 


(5 and 6.) 
L. Commo- 
dus Verus, 
and M, Aur. 
Antoninus, 


So under 
Queen 


Elizabeth. 


72 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the name, becaufe he was a {tranger to the family, 
the fenate with one acclamation faid, Quomodo 
Auguftus, fic et Antoninus. In fuch renown and 
veneration was the name of thefe two princes in 
thofe days, that they would have it as a perpetual 
addition in all the emperor’s ftyle. In this em- 
peror’s time alfo the Church for the moft part was 
in peace ; fo as in this fequence of fix princes we 
do fee the bleffed effects of learning in fovereignty, 
painted forth in the greateft table of the world. 
But for a tablet, or picture of {fmaller volume, 
(not prefuming to forwall of your majefty that liveth,) 
in my judgment the moft excellent is that of Queen 
Elizabeth, your immediate predeceffor in this part 
of Baan ; a princefs that, if Plutarch were now 
alive to write lives®> by parallels, would trouble 
him, I think, to find for her a parallel amongft 
women. ‘This lady was endued with learning in 
her fex fingular, and great®® even amongft mafculine 
princes; whether we fpeak of learning, of lan- 
guage, or of {cience, modern or ancient, Divinity 
or Humanity: and unto the very laft year of her 
life fhe was accuftomed to appoint fet hours for 
reading, fcarcely any young ftudent in a univerfity 
more daily, or more duly. As for her govern- 
ment, I affure myfelf I fhall not exceed, if I do 
affirm that this part of the ifland never had forty- 
five years of better times; and yet not through 
the calmnefs of the feafon, but through the wifdom 
55 Ed. 1605, /ynes. 


56 Edd. 1629, 1633, rare. Ed. 1605, grace, i.e. “learning 
in her fex fingular, and grace even among{t mafculine princes.” 


BOOK I. 73 


of her regiment. For if there be confidered of the 
one fide, the truth of religion eftablifhed; the con- 
ftant peace and fecurity; the good adminiftration 
of juftice; the temperate ufe of the prerogative, not 
flackened, nor much ftrained; the flourifhing ftate 
of learning, fortable to fo excellent a patronefs; the 
convenient eftate of wealth and means, both of 
Crown and fubje&t; the habit of obedience, and 
the moderation of difcontents: and there be con- 
fidered on the other fide the differences of religion ; 
the troubles of neighbour countries; the ambition 
of Spain, and oppofition of Rome; and then, 
that fhe was folitary and of herfelf: thefe things, 
I fay, confidered, as I could not have chofen an 
inftance fo recent and fo proper, fo I fuppofe I 
could not have chofen one more remarkable or 
eminent to the purpofe now in hand, which is 
concerning the conjunction of learning in the 
prince with felicity in the people. 

Neither hath learning an influence and opera- 
tion only upon civil merit and moral virtue, and 
the arts or temperature of peace and peaceable 
government ; but likewife it hath no lefs power 
and efficacy in enablement towards martial and 
military virtue and prowefs; as may be notably 
reprefented in the examples of Alexander the 
Great, and Czfar the dictator, mentioned before, 
but now in fit place to be refumed : of whofe 
virtues and acts in war there needs no note or 
recital, having been the wonders of time in that 
kind: but of their affections towards learning, and 


3. As pro- 
moting 
greatnefs in 
war. 


As Alexan- 
der. 


74 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


perfections in learning, it is pertinent to fay fome- 
what. 

Alexander®? was bred and taught under Arif- 
totle, the great philofopher, who dedicated divers 
of his books of philofophy unto him: he was at- 
tended with Callifthenes and divers other learned 
perfons, that followed him in camp, throughout 
his journeys and conquefts. What price and efti- 
mation he had learning in doth notably appear in 
thefe three particulars: firft, in the envy he ufed 
to exprefs that he bore towards Achilles, in this, 
that he had fo good a trumpet of his praifes as 
Homer’s verfes ; fecondly, in the judgment or fo- 
lution he gave touching that precious cabinet of 
Darius, which was found among his jewels ; 
whereof queftion was made what thing was wor- 
thy to be put into it; and he gave his opinion for 
Homer’s works: thirdly, in his letter to Ariftotle, 
after he had fet forth his books of nature, wherein 
he expoftulated with him for publifhing the fecrets 
or mytteries of philofophy ; and gave him to un- 
derftand that himfelf efteemed it more to excel 
other men in learning and knowledge than in 
power and empire. And what ufe he had of 
learning doth appear, or rather fhine, in all his 
fpeeches and anfwers, being full of fcience, and 
ufe of fcience, and that in all variety. 

And herein again it may feem a thing fcholaf- 
tical, and fomewhat idle, to recite things that 
every man knoweth ; but yet, fince the argument 
I handle leadeth me thereunto, I am glad that 


57 Thefe anecdotes of Alexander come from Plutarch, Vit. Alex. 


EEE 


BOOK I. 75 


men fhall perceive I am as willing to flatter, if 
they will fo call it, an Alexander, or a Cefar, or 
an Antoninus, that are dead many hundred years 
fince, as any that now liveth: for it is the difplay- 
ing of the glory of learning in fovereignty that I 
propound to myfelf, and not an humour of de- 
claiming in any man’s praifes. Obferve then the 
fpeech he ufed of Diogenes, and fee if it tend not 
to the true ftate of one of the greateft queftions 
of moral philofophy ; whether the enjoying of 
outward things, or the contemning of them, be the 
greateft happinefs : for when he faw Diogenes fo 
perfectly contented with {fo little, he faid to thofe 
that mocked at his condition, Were I not Alexan- 
der, I would wifh to be Diogenes. But Seneca in- 
verteth it, and faith; Plus erat, quod hic nollet 
accipere, quam quod ille poffet dare.® ‘There were 
more things which Diogenes would have refufed, 
than there were which Alexander could have 
given. 

Obferve again that fpeech which was ufual with 
him, That he felt his mortality chiefly in two 
things, fleep and luff ;°9 and fee if it were not a 
fpeech extracted out of the depth of natural phi- 
lofophy, and liker to have come out of the mouth 
of Ariftotle or Democritus, than from Alexander. 

See again that fpeech of humanity and poefy ; 
when upon the bleeding of his wounds, he called 
unto him one of his flatterers, that was wont to 
afcribe to him divine honour, and faid, Loof, this 
is very blood ; this is not fuch a liquor as Homer 


$8 Sen. De Benef. v. 4. 8? Sen. Ep. Mor. vi. 7. 


76 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Jpeaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand, when it 
was pierced by Diomedes.© 

See likewife his readinefs in reprehenfion of 
logic, in the fpeech he ufed to Caflander, upon a 
complaint that was made againft his father Anti- 
pater: for when Alexander happened to fay, Da 
~ you think thefe men would have come from fo far to 
complain, except they had juft caufe of grief ? 
And Caflander anfwered, Yea, that was the mat- 
ter, becaufe they thought they fhould not be difproved. 
Said Alexander laughing: See the fubtilties of 
Ariftotle, to take a matter both ways, pro et contra, 
re 

But note again how well he could ufe the fame 
art, which he reprehended, to ferve his own hu- 
mour: when bearing a fecret grudge to Callif- 
thenes, becaufe he was againft the new ceremony 
of his adoration, feafting one night where the 
fame Callifthenes was at the table, it was moved 
by fome after fupper, for entertainment fake, that 
Callifthenes, who was an eloquent man, might 
fpeak of fome theme or purpofe at his own 
choice ; which Callifthenes did; choofing the 
praife of the Macedonian nation for his difcourfe, 
and performing the fame with fo good manner, 
as the hearers were much ravifhed : whereupon 
Alexander, nothing pleafed, faid, /t was ea/y to be 
eloquent upon fo good a fubjeé?. But, faith he, Turn 
your ftyle, and let us hear what you can fay againft 
us: which Callifthenes prefently undertook, and 


60 “"Iywp, oidc mEp TE peer paxapecar Oeoiow. Il. €. 340. Cf, 
Seneca, ad Lucil. 59. 


BOOK I. 77 


did with that fting and life, that Alexander inter- 
rupted him, and faid, The goodne/s of the caufe 
made him eloquent before, and defpite made him 
eloquent then again. 

Confider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that 
excellent ufe of a metaphor or tranflation, where- 
with he taxed Antipater, who was an imperious 
and tyrannous governor: for when one of Anti- 
pater’s friends commended him to Alexander for 
his moderation, that he did not degenerate, as his 
other lieutenants did, into the Perfian pride, in ufe 
of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, 
of black ;© Trwe, faith Alexander, but Antipater is 
all purple within. Or that other, when Par- 
menio came to him in the plain of Arbela, and 
fhowed him the innumerable multitude of his 
enemies, efpecially as they appeared by the inf- 
nite number of lights, as it had been a new firma- 
ment of ftars, and thereupon advifed him to affail 
them by night: whereupon he anfwered, That he 
would not fteal the victory. 

For matter of policy, weigh that fignificant dif- 
tinction, fo much in all ages embraced, that he 
made between his two friends, Hephzftion and 
Craterus, when he faid, That the one loved Alex- 
ander, and the other loved the king: defcribing the 
principal difference of princes’ beft fervants, that 
fome in affection love their perfon, and others in 
duty love their crown. 

Weigh alfo that excellent taxation of an error, 
ordinary with counfellors of princes, that they 


St The Greek is Xevkorrdpu¢oc. 
2 Odordpgdupoc. Apop. Reg. et Imp. 


76 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Jpeaketh of, which ran from Venus’ hand, when it 
was pierced by Diomedes.© 

See likewife his readinefs in reprehenfion of 
logic, in the fpeech he ufed to Caffander, upon a 
complaint that was made againft his father Anti- 
pater: for when Alexander happened to fay, Do 
~ you think thefe men would have come from fo far to 
complain, except they had juf? caufe of grief ? 
And Caffander anfwered, Yea, that was the mat- 
ter, becaufe they thought they fhould not be difproved. 
Said Alexander laughing: See the fubtilties of 
Ariftotle, to take a matter both ways, pro et contra, 
ee 

But note again how well he could ufe the fame 
art, which he reprehended, to ferve his own hu- 
mour: when bearing a fecret grudge to Callif- 
thenes, becaufe he was againft the new ceremony 
of his adoration, feafting one night where the 
fame Callifthenes was at the table, it was moved 
by fome after fupper, for entertainment fake, that 
Callifthenes, who was an eloquent man, might 
fpeak of fome theme or purpofe at his own 
choice; which Callifthenes did; choofing the 
praife of the Macedonian nation for his difcourfe, 
and performing the fame with fo good manner, 
as the hearers were much ravifhed : whereupon 
Alexander, nothing pleafed, faid, /t was ea/y to be 
eloquent upon fo good a fubjec?. But, faith he, Turn 
your ftyle, and let us hear what you can fay againft 
us: which Callifthenes prefently undertook, and 


69 "Iywp, cidc wép TE pier waxdpecar Oeoior. Il. &. 340. CF, 
Seneca, ad Lucil. 59. 


BOOK 1. 77 


did with that fting and life, that Alexander inter- 
rupted him, and faid, The goodne/s of the caufe 
made him eloquent before, and defpite made him 
eloquent then again. 

Confider further, for tropes of rhetoric, that 
excellent ufe of a metaphor or tranflation, where- 
with he taxed Antipater, who was an imperious 
and tyrannous governor: for when one of Anti- 
pater’s friends commended him to Alexander for 
his moderation, that he did not degenerate, as his 
other lieutenants did, into the Perfian pride, in ufe 
of purple, but kept the ancient habit of Macedon, 
of black ;° True, faith Alexander, but Antipater is 
all purple within. Or that other, when Par- 
menio came to him in the plain of Arbela, and 
fhowed him the innumerable multitude of his 
enemies, efpecially as they appeared by the infi- 
nite number of lights, as it had been a new firma- 
ment of ftars, and thereupon advifed him to affail 
them by night: whereupon he anfwered, That he 
would not fteal the victory. 

For matter of policy, weigh that fignificant dif- 
tinction, fo much in all ages embraced, that he 
made between his two friends, Hephzftion and 
Craterus, when he faid, That the one loved Alex- 
ander, and the other loved the king: defcribing the 
principal difference of princes’ beft fervants, that 
fome in affection love their perfon, and others in 
duty love their crown. 

Weigh alfo that excellent taxation of an error, 
ordinary with counfellors of princes, that they 


St The Greek is Xevxordpudgoc. 
2 ohowdpgupoc. pop. Reg. ex Imp. 


80 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


he collected, we fee that he efteemed it more 
honour to make himfelf but a pair of tables to 
take the wife and pithy words of others, than to 
have every word of his own to be made an 
apophthegm or an oracle; as vain princes, by 
cuftom of flattery, pretend to do. And yet if I 
fhould enumerate divers of his fpeeches, as I did 
thofe of Alexander, they are truly fuch as Solomon 
noteth, when he faith, Verba fapientum tanquam 
aculei, et tanquam clavi in altum defixi :© whereof 
I will only recite three, not fo delectable for ele- 
gancy, but admirable for vigour and efficacy. 

As, firft, it is reafon he be thought a mafter of 
words, that could with une word appeafe a mutiny 
in his army, which was thus: The Romans, 
when their generals did fpeak to their army, did 
ufe the word milites, but when the magiftrates 
fpake to the people, they did ufe the word Quirites. 
The foldiers were in tumult, and feditioufly prayed 
to be cafhiered ; not that they fo meant, but by 
expoftulation thereof to draw Czfar to other con- 
ditions; wherein he being refolute not to give 
way, after fome filence, he began his fpeech, Ega, 
Quirites,™ which did admit them already cafh- 
iered ; wherewith they were fo furprifed, croffed, 
and confufed, as they would not fuffer him to go 
on in his {fpeech, but relinquifhed their demands, 
and made it their fuit to be again called by the 
name of milites. 

The fecond fpeech was thus: Czfar did ex- 
tremely affect the name of king; and fome were 


§$ Cic. Epift. ad Div. ix. 16. 6 Eccl: xuem 
67 Suet. Ful. Ces. c. 70. 


BOOK I. 81 


fet on as he paffed by in popular acclamation to 
falute him king: whereupon, finding the cry weak 
and poor, he put it off thus, in a kind of jeft, as 
if they had miftaken his furname; Non Rex fum, 
fed Cafar ;* a {peech that if it be fearched the life 
and fulnefs of it can fcarce be exprefled. For, 
firft, it was a refufal of the name, but yet not fe- 
rious: again, it did fignify an infinite confidence 
and magnanimity, as if he prefumed Czfar was the 
greater title ; as by his worthinefs it is come to pafs 
till this day: but chiefly it was a {peech of great 
allurement toward his own purpofe ; as if the ftate 
did ftrive with him but for a name, whereof mean 
families were vefted ; for Rex was a furname with 
the Romans, as well as King is with us.°9 

The laft fpeech which I will mention, was ufed 
to Metellus, when Czfar after war declared did 
poffefs himfelf of the city of Rome; at which 
time entering into the inner treafury to take the 
money there accumulated, Metellus being tribune 
forbade him: whereto Cefar faid, That if he did 
not defif?, he would lay him dead in the place. And 
prefently taking himfelf up, he added, 4dolefcens, 
durius eft mihi hoc dicere quam facere. Young man, 
it is harder for me to fpeak than to do it? A 
fpeech compounded of the greateft terror and 
greateft clemency that could proceed out of the 
mouth of man.” 


68 Suet. Ful. Ces. c. 70. 6 Cf. Hor. Sat. I. vii. 

70 Plutarch, Ful. Ces. 

71 To thefe might have well been added Czefar’s exhortation to 
the boatman, “‘ Thou carrieft Czfar and his fortunes.” 


G 


And Xeno- 
phon. 


82 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


But to return and conclude with him ; it is evi- 
dent, himfelf knew well his own perfeétion in 
learning, and took it upon him ; as appeared when, 
upon occafion that fome fpake what a ftrange re- 
folution it was in Lucius Sylla to refign his difta- 
ture; he fcoffing at him to his own advantage 
anfwered, That Sylla could not kill of letters, and 
therefore knew not how to diétate.7® 

And here it were fit to leave this point, touching 
the concurrence of military virtue and learning; (for 
what example would come with any grace after 
thofe two of Alexander and Czfar?) were it not 
in regard of the rarenefs of circumftance that I 
find in one other particular, as that which did fo 
fuddenly pafs from extreme fcorn to extreme won- 
der ; and it is of Xenophon the philofopher, who 
went from Socrates’ fchool into Afia, in the expe- 
dition of Cyrus the younger, againft King Arta- 
xerxes. [his Xenophon at that time was very 
young, and never had feen the wars before; neither 
had any command in the army, but only followed 
the war as a voluntary, for the love and conver- 
fation of Proxenus his friend.73_ He was prefent 
when Phalynus came in meflage from the great 
king to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was flain 
in the field, and they a handful of men left to them- 
felves in the midft of the king’s territories, cut off 
from their country by many navigable rivers, and 
many hundred miles. The meflage imported, 
that they fhould deliver up their arms, and fubmit 

77 Sucte yu, Cai: 77. ™ Xen, Anab. ii. ad fin. 


BOOK I. - 83 


themfelves to the king’s mercy. To which mef- 
fage before anfwer was made, divers of the army 
conferred familiarly with Phalynus, and amongft 
the reft Xenophon happened to fay, Why, Phaly- 
nus, we have now but thefe two things left, our arms 
and our virtue; and if we yield up our arms, how 
fall we make ufe of our virtue? Whereto Pha- 
lynus fmiling on him, faid, Jf I be not deceived, 
young gentleman, you are an Athenian: and, I be- 
lieve you ftudy philofophy, and it is pretty that you 
fay: but you are much abufed, if you think your vir- 
tue can withftand the king’s power.’* Here was 
the fcorn; the wonder followed: which was, that 
this young {fcholar or philofopher, after all the cap- 
tains were murdered in parley by treafon, con- 
ducted thofe ten thoufand foot through the heart 
of all the king’s high countries from Babylon to 
Grecia in fafety, in defpite of all the king’s forces, 
to the aftonifhment of the world, and the encou- 
ragement of the Grecians in time fucceeding to 
make invafion upon the kings of Perfia: as was 
after purpofed by Jafon the Theffalian, attempted 
by Agefilaus the Spartan, and achieved by Alex- 
ander the Macedonian, all upon the ground of the 
act of that young {cholar. 
To proceed now from imperial and military 4. Alfo in 


virtue to moral and private virtue: firft, it is an ‘* moist 
: 4 : E and private 

affured truth, which is contained in the verfes: _ effeéts by 
Scilicet ingenuas didiciffe fideliter artes, Ee 

Emollit mores, nec finit effe feros.7 a eke = 


It taketh away the wildnefs and barbarifm and 
™ Xen. Anab. ii. 1. 12. 75 Ov. Ep. Pont. ii. ix. 47. 


84 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fiercenefs of men’s minds; but indeed the accent 
had need be upon fideliter: for a little fuperficial 
learning doth rather work a contrary effet. It 
taketh away all levity, temerity, and infolency, by 
copious fuggeftion of all doubts and difficulties, 
and acquainting the mind to balance reafons on 
both fides, and to turn back the firft offers and 
conceits of the mind, and to accept of nothing 
but examined and tried. It taketh away vain 
admiration of anything, which is the root of 
all weaknefs: for all things are admired either 
becaufe they are new, or becaufe they are great. 
For novelty, no man that wadeth in learning 
or contemplation thoroughly, but will find that 
" printed in his heart Nil novi fuper terram.® Nei- 
ther can any man marvel at the play of puppets, 
that goeth behind the curtain, and advifeth well of 
the motion. And for magnitude, as Alexander 
the Great, after that he was ufed to great armies, 
and the great conquefts of the fpacious provinces 
in Afia, when he received letters out of Greece, 
of fome fights and fervices there, which were com- 
monly for a paflage or a fort, or fome walled town 
at the moft, he faid, It /eemed to him that he was 
advertifed of the Battle of the Frogs and the Mice, 
that the old tales went of. So certainly, if a man 
meditate much upon the univerfal frame of nature, 
the earth with men upon it (the divinenefs of 
fouls except,) will not feem much other than an 
78 Keclale9. 


7 "Eoucev, © Gvdpec, dre Aapsiov ipeic tvixdpev tvradda, 
éxet ric tv "Apkadia yeyovevat prvopayia. Plut. Ages. c, 15. 


BOOK I. 85 


ant-hill, whereas fome ants carry corn, and fome 
carry their young, and fome go empty, and all to- 
and-fro a little heap of duft. It taketh away or 
mitigateth fear of death, or adverfe fortune ; which 
is one of the greateft impediments of virtue, and 
imperfections of manners. For if a man’s mind 
be deeply feafoned with the confideration of the 
mortality and corruptible nature of things, he will 
eafily concur with Epictetus, who went forth one 
day and faw a woman weeping for her pitcher of 
earth that was broken; and went forth the next 
day and faw a woman weeping for her fon that 
was dead, and thereupon faid: Heri vidi fragilem 
frangi, hodie vidi mortalem mori."® And therefore 
Virgil did excellently and profoundly couple the 
knowledge of caufes and the conquett of all fears, 
together, as concomitantia: 


Felix, qui potuit rerum cognofcere caufas, 
Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum 
Subjecit pedibus, ftrepitumque Acherontis avari.7 


It were too long to go over the particular reme- 
dies which learning doth minifter to all the difeafes 
of the mind ; fometimes purging the ill-humours, 
fometimes opening the obftructions, fometimes 
helping digeftion, fometimes increafing appetite, 
fometimes healing the wounds and exulcerations 
thereof, and the like; and, therefore, I will con- 
clude with that which hath rationem totius, which 
is, that it difpofeth the conftitution of the mind not 
to be fixed or fettled in the defects thereof, but 


7% There is no fuch tale in Epictetus, but fee Simplicii in Epi&. 
Comment. cap. 33. 79 Virg. Georg. ii. 490. 


5. In giving 
dignity to 
human na- 
ture. 


86 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


{till to be capable and fufceptible of growth and 
reformation. For the unlearned man knows not 
what it is to defcend into himfelf, or to call him- 
felf to account ; nor the pleafure of that /uaviffima 
vita, indies fentire fe fieri meliorem.® The good 
parts he hath he will learn to fhow to the full, and 
ufe them dexteroufly, but not much to increafe 
them: the faults he hath he will learn how to hide 
and colour them, but not much to amend them: 
like an ill mower, that mows on iftill, and never 
whets his feythe: whereas with the learned man 
it fares otherwife, that he doth ever intermix 
the correction and amendment of his mind with 
the ufe and employment thereof. Nay, further, 
in general and in fum, certain it is that Veritas 
and Bonitas differ but as the feal and the print: 
for Truth prints Goodnefs ; and they be the clouds 
of error which defcend in the ftorms of paffions 
and perturbations. 

From moral virtue let us pafs on to matter of 
power and commandment, and confider whether 
in right reafon there be any comparable with that 
wherewith knowledge invefteth and crowneth 
man’s nature. We fee the dignity of the com- 
mandment is according to the dignity of the com- 
manded: to have commandment over beafts, as 
herdmen have, is a thing contemptible; to have 
commandment over children, as fchoolmafters 
have, is a matter of {mall honour; to have com- 
mandment over galley-flaves is a difparagement 
rather than an honour. Neither is the command- 


80 Xen. Mem. i. 6. 


BOOK I. 87 


ment of tyrants much better, over people which 
have put off the generofity of their minds: and 
therefore it was ever holden that honours in free 
monarchies and commonwealths had a fweetnefs 
more than in tyrannies; becaufe the command- 
ment extendeth more over the wills of men, and 
not only over their deeds and fervices. And there- 
fore, when Virgil putteth himfelf forth to attribute 
to Auguftus Czfar the beft of human honours, he 
doth it in thefe words: 
Vi@torque volentes 
Per populos dat jura, viamque affectat Olympo.®! 

But yet the commandment of knowledge is yet 
higher than the commandment over the will ; for 
it is a commandment over the reafon, belief, and 
underftanding of man, which is the higheft part of 
the mind, and giveth law to the will itfelf. For 
there is no power on earth which fetteth up a 
throne or chair of {tate in the fpirits and fouls of 
men, and in their cogitations, imaginations, opi- 
nions, and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. 
And therefore we fee the deteftable and extreme 
pleafure that arch-heretics, and falfe prophets, and 
impoftors are tranfported with, when they once 
find in themfelves that they have a fuperiority in 
the faith and confcience of men; fo great as if 
they have once tafted of it, it is feldom feen that 
any torture or perfecution can make them relin- 
quifh or abandon it. But as this is that which the 
author of the Revelation calleth the depth or pro- 
foundnefs of Satan :®? fo by argument of contra- 


8! Georg. iv. 561, 562. Baa evenilsi 2A 


6. In ad- 
vancing 
worldly 
intterefts. 


7. In giving 
pleafure. 


88 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ries, the juft and lawful fovereignty over men’s 
underftanding, by force®> of truth rightly inter- 
preted, is that which approacheth neareft to the 
fimilitude of the Divine Rule. 

As for fortune and advancement, the benefi- 
cence of learning is not fo confined to give fortune 
only to ftates and commonwealths, as it doth not 
likewife give fortune to particular perfons. For 
it was well noted long ago, that Homer hath 
given more men their livings, than either Sylla, or 
Ceefar, or Auguftus ever did, notwithftanding their 
great largeffes and donatives, and diftributions of 
lands to fo many legions. And no doubt it is hard 
to fay, whether arms or learning have advanced 
greater numbers. And in cafe of fovereignty we 
fee, that if arms or defcent have carried away the 
kingdom, yet learning hath carried the priefthood, 
which ever hath been in fome competition with 
empire. *+ 

Again, for the pleafure and delight of know- 
ledge and learning, it far furpaffeth all other in 
nature : for, fhall the pleafures of the affections fo 
exceed the fenfes, as much as the obtaining of de- 
fire or victory exceedeth a fong or a dinner ; and 
muft not, of confequence, the pleafures of the in- 
tellect or underftanding exceed the pleafures of the 
affections? We fee in all other pleafures there is 
fatiety, and after they be ufed, their verdure de- 
parteth ; which fhoweth well they be but deceits 


83 Ed. 1605 reads face. 
® Cf. Herod. ii, 141. for the afcendancy of the Priefthood in 


Egypt. 


BOOK I. 89 


of pleafure, and not pleafures: and that it was the 
novelty which pleafed, and not the quality; and 
therefore we fee that voluptuous men turn friars, 
and ambitious princes turn melancholy. But of 
knowledge there is no fatiety, but fatisfaction and 
appetite are perpetually interchangeable; and there- 
fore appeareth to be good in itfelf fimply, without 
fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleafure of 
{mall efficacy and contentment to the mind of man 
which the poet Lucretius defcribeth elegantly, 
Suave mari magno, turbantibus equora ventis, &c.® 

It isa view of delight, faith he, to fand or walk 
upon the fhore fide, and to fee a fhip toffed with 
tempeft upon the fea; or to be in a fortified tower, 
and to fee two battles join upon a plain; but it is a 
pleafure incomparable, for the mind of man to be 
Jettled, landed, and fortified in the certainty of truth ; 
and from thence to defcry and behold the errors, 
perturbations, labours, and wanderings up and down 
of other men. 

Laftly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that by 
learning man excelleth man in that wherein man 
excelleth beafts ; that by learning man afcendeth 
to the heavens and their motions, where in body 
he cannot come, and the like; let us conclude 
with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and 
learning in that whereunto man’s nature doth 
moft afpire, which is, immortality or continuance : 
for to this tendeth generation, and raifing of houfes 
and families; to this buildings, foundations, and 


* De Rer. Nat. ii. 1-10. 


8. Laftly, 
in giving an 
immortality 
to its pof- 
feffors. 


90 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


monuments ; to this tendeth the defire of memory, 
fame, and celebration, and in effect the ftrength 
of all other human defires. We fee then how 
far the monuments of wit and learning are more - 
durable than the monuments of power or of the 
hands. For have not the verfes of Homer con- 
tinued twenty-five hundred years, or more, with- 
out the lofs of a fyllable or letter; during which 
time, infinite palaces, temples, caftles, cities, have 
been decayed and demolifhed? It is not poffible 
to have the true pictures or ftatues of Cyrus, 
Alexander, Czfar; no, nor of the kings or great 
perfonages of much later years; for the originals 
cannot laft, and the copies cannot but leefe of the 
life and truth, But the images of men’s wits and 
knowledges remain in books, exempted from the 
wrong of time, and capable of perpetual renova- 
tion. Neither are they fitly to be called images, 
becaufe they generate ftill, and caft their feeds in 
the minds of others, provoking and caufing infi- 
nite actions and opinions in fucceeding ages: fo 
that, if the invention of the fhip was thought fo 
noble, which carrieth riches and commodities from 
place to place, and confociateth the moft remote 
regions in participation of their fruits, how much 
more are letters to be magnified, which, as fhips, 
pafs through the vaft feas of time, and make ages 
fo diftant to participate of the wifdom, illumina- 
tions, and inventions, the one of the other? Nay 
further, we fee fome of the philofophers which 
were leaft divine, and moft immerfed in the fenfes, 


BOOK I. gt 


and denied generally the immortality of the foul, 
yet came to this point, that whatfoever motions 
the fpirit of man could act and perform without 
the organs of the body, they thought might remain 
after death, which were only thofe of the under- 
ftanding, and not of the affection : fo immortal and 
incorruptible a thing did knowledgefeem unto them 
to be. But we, that know by divine revelation 
that not only the underftanding but the affections 
purified, not only the fpirit but the body changed, 
fhall be advanced to immortality, do difclaim in® 
thefe rudiments of the fenfes. But it muft be re- 
membered both in this laft point, and fo it may 
likewife be needful in other places, that in proba- 
tion of the dignity of knowledge or learning, I did 
in the beginning feparate divine teftimony from 
human, which method I have purfued, and fo 
handled them both apart. 

Neverthelefs, I do not pretend, and I know 
it will be impoffible for me, by any pleading of 
mine, to reverfe the judgment, either of A®fop’s 
Cock, that preferred the barley-corn before the 
gem ; or of Midas, that being chofen judge between 
Apollo, prefdent of the Mufes, and Pan, god of 
the flocks, judged for plenty :* or of Paris, that 
judged for beauty and love againft wifdom and 
power; nor of Agrippina, Occidat matrem, modo 
imperet, that preferred empire with conditions 

86 So all three editions. The Latin has, Nos autem .. . concul- 
cantes hac rudimenta...novimus, Perhaps in fhould be omitted— 


“€ do difclaim thefe rudiments of the fenfes.” 
POV, Met. xi. 153, feq. 


92 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


never fo deteftable ;® or of Ulyffes, Qui vetulam 
pratulit immortalitati,®9 being a figure of thofe 
which prefer cuftom and habit before all excel- 
lency; or of a number of the like popular judg- 
ments. For thefe things continue as they have 
been: but fo will that alfo continue whereupon 
learning hath ever relied, and which faileth not: 


TFuftificata eft fapientia a filiis fuis. 


8 Tacit. Aunal. xiv. 9. 

89 Cf. Cic. de Orat.i. 44, where it is Ithaca, not his old wife, 
that Ulyffes is faid to prefer to immortality. 

£0 Matt. xi. 19. 


THE SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON : 


Of the Proficience and 
Advancement of Learning 


Divine and Human. 


To the King. 


T might feem to have more conve- De Aug. ii. 
nience, though it come often other- ae 
wife to pafs, excellent King, that vancement 
thofe, which are fruitful in their gene- = base 2 

rations, and have in themfelves the forefight of to the care 

immortality in their defcendants, fhould likewife if pce 
be more careful of the good eftate of future times, 

unto which they know they muft tranfmit and 

commend over their deareft pledges. Queen Eli- 

zabeth was a fojourner in the world in refpect of 

her unmarried life, and was a bleffing to her own 

times ; and yet fo as the impreffion of her good 

government, befides her happy memory, is not 

without fome effet which doth furvive her. But 

to your Majefty, whom God hath already blefled 

with fo much royal iflue, worthy to continue and 


Three chief 
means of 
help: 

(1,) Re- 
wards 5 

(2.) Guid- 
ance ; 

(3.) Com- 
bination. 


94 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


reprefent you for ever, and whofe youthful and 
fruitful bed doth yet promife many of the like re- 
novations ; it is proper and agreeable to be conver- 
fant not only in the tranfitory parts of good go- 
vernment, but in thofe acts alfo which are in their 
nature permanent and perpetual: amongft the 
which, if affection do not tranfport me, there is not 
any more worthy than the further endowment of 
the world with found and fruitful knowledge. 
For why fhould a few received authors ftand up 
like Hercules’ columns, beyond which there fhould 
be no failing or difcovering, fince we have fo 
bright and benign a ftar as your Majefty to con- 
duct and profper us? To return therefore where 
we left, it remaineth to confider of what kind 
thofe acéts are which have been undertaken and 
performed by kings and others for the increafe and 
advancement of learning: wherein I purpofe to 
{peak actively without digreffing or dilating. 

Let this ground therefore be laid, that all works 
are overcome by amplitude of reward, by found- 
nefs of direction, and by the conjunction of la- 
bours. The firft multiplieth endeavour, the fecond 
preventeth error, and the third fupplieth the frailty 
of man: but the principal of thefe is direction : 
for Claudus in via antevertit curforem extra viam ; 
and Salomon excellently fetteth it down, Jf the 
iron be not fharp, it requireth more ftrength ; but 
wifdom is that which prevaileth ;* fignifying that 

1 A favourite thought of Bacon’s, and expreffed afterwards on 
the engraved title-page of the firft edition of the Nowum Organum, 


A.D. 1620. 
2 Eccl, x. -X0. 


BOOK I. 95 


the invention or election of the mean is more 
effectual than any inforcement or accumulation of 
endeavours. This I am induced to fpeak, for 
that (not derogating from the noble intention of 
any that have been defervers towards the ftate of 
learning) I do obferve, neverthelefs, that their 
works and acts are rather matters of magnificence 
and memory, than of progreffion and proficience ; 
and tend rather to augment the mafs of learning 
in the multitude of learned men, than to rectify or 
raife the fciences themfelves. 

The works or acts of merit towards learning Three ob- 
are converfant about three objects: the places = ara a 
learning, the books of learning, and the perfons of (1.) Places 
the learned. For as water, whether it be the dew ° learning ; 

: (2.) Books ; 
of heaven, or the fprings of the earth, doth fcatter (3.)Learned 
and leefe itfelf in the ground, except it be collected Perfons. 
into fome receptacle, where it may by union com- 
fort and fuftain itfelf, (and for that caufe the in- 
duftry of man hath made and framed {pring-heads, 
conduits, cifterns, and pools, which men have ac- 
cuftomed likewife to beautify and adorn with 
accomplifhments of magnificence and ftate, as 
well as of ufe and neceffity) fo this excellent 
liquor of knowledge, whether it defcend from 
divine infpiration, or fpring from human fenfe, 
would foon perifh and vanifh to oblivion, if it 
were not preferved in books, traditions, confer- 
ences, and places appointed, as univerfities, col- 


leges, and fchools, for the receipt and comforting 
of the fame. 


(1.) Places 
of learning, 


how helped. 


(2z.) Books, 
how beft 
cared for. 


(3.) The 
learned, 


how helped. 


96 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


The works which concern the feats and places 
of learning are four; foundations and buildings, 
endowments with revenues, endowments with 
franchifes and privileges, inftitutions and ordi- 
nances for government; all tending to quietnefs 
and privatenefs of life, and difcharge of cares and 
troubles ; much like the ftations which Virgil pre- 
fcribeth for the hiving of bees: 


Principio fedes apibus ftatioque petenda, 
Quo neque fit ventis aditus, &c.? 


The works touching books are two: firft, libra- 
ries, which are as the fhrines where all the relics 
of the ancient faints, full of true virtue, and that 
without delufion or impofture, are preferved and 
repofed : fecondly, new editions of authors, with 
more correct impreffions, more faithful tranfla- 
tions, more profitable gloffes, more diligent anno- 
tations, and the like. 

The works pertaining to the perfons of learned 
men, befides the advancement and countenancing 
of them in general, are two: the reward and de- 
fignation of readers in {ciences already extant and 
invented; and the reward and defignation of 
writers and inquirers concerning any parts of 
learning not fufficiently laboured and profecuted. 

Thefe are fummarily the works and aéts, 
wherein the merits of many excellent princes and 
other worthy perfonages have been converfant. 
As for any particular commemorations, I call to 
mind what Cicero faid, when he gave general 
thanks ; Difficile non aliquem, ingratum quenquam 


3 Virg. Georg. iv. 8. 


BOOK II. 97 


praeterire.* Let us rather, according to the Scrip- 
tures,? look unto that part of the race which is 
before us than look back to that which is already 
attained. 

Firft, therefore, among{ft fo many great foun- 
dations of colleges in Europe, I find it ftrange 
that they are all dedicated to profeffions, and none 
left free to arts and {ciences at large. For if men 
judge that learning fhould be referred to action, 
they judge well ; but in this they fall into the error 
defcribed in the ancient fable,® in which the other 
parts of the bedy did fuppofe the ftomach had 
been idle, becaufe it neither performed the office of 
motion, as the limbs do, nor of fenfe, as the head 
doth ; but yet, notwithftanding, it is the ftomach 
that digefteth and diftributeth to all the reft: fo 
if any man think philofophy and univerfality to be 
idle ftudies, he doth not confider that all pro- 
feffions are from thence ferved and fupplied. And 
this I take to be a great caufe that hath hindered 
the progreffion of learning, becaufe thefe funda- 
mental knowledges have been ftudied but in paf- 
fage. For if you will have a tree bear more fruit 
than it hath ufed to do, it is not anything you can 
do to the boughs, but it is the ftirring of the 
earth and putting new mould about the roots that 
muft work it. Neither is it to be forgotten, that 
this dedicating of foundations and dotations to pro- 


* Orat. poft Redit. in Sen. xii. 30, which in Bacon’s day was 
counted genuine, The actual paffage is fomething ftronger; for it 
has nefas inftead of ingratum. 

> Philip. iii. 13. SL Wil.132. 

H 


Seats of 
learning 
faulty, (1) 
as being de- 
dicated to 
particular 
profefiions. 


(2) As ill 
provided 
with public 
lectures, 


98 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


feffory learning hath not only had a malign afpe& 
and influence upon the growth of fciences, but 
hath alfo been prejudicial to ftates and govern- 
ments. For hence it proceedeth that princes find 
a folitude in regard of able men to ferve them in 
caufes of ftate, becaufe there is no education col- 
legiate which is free; where fuch as were fo dif- 
pofed might give themfelves to hiftories, modern 
languages, books of policy and civil difcourfe, 
and other the like enablements unto fervice of 
eftate. 

And becaufe Founders of Colleges do plant, and 
Founders of Le€tures do water, it followeth well 
in order to {peak of the defect which is in public 
lectures ; namely, in the fmallnefs and meannefs 
of the falary or reward which in moft places is 
affigned unto them; whether they be lectures of 
arts, or of profeffions. For it is neceflary to the 
progreffion of fciences that Readers be of the moft 
able and fufficient men; as thofe which are or- 
dained for generating and propagating of {ciences, 
and not for tranfitory ufe. This cannot be, except 
their condition and endowment be fuch as may 
content the ableft man to appropriate his whole 
labour and continue his whole age in that function 
and attendance; and therefore muft have a pro- 
portion anfwerable to that mediocrity or com- 
petency of advancement, which may be expected 
from a profeflion or the practice of a profeffion. 
So as, if you will have fciences flourifh, you muft 
obferve David’s military law, which was, That 
thofe which fiaid with the carriage fhould have 


BOOK I]. 99 


equal part with thofe which were in the aétion ;7 
elfe will the carriages be ill attended. So Readers 
in fciences are indeed the guardians of the ftores 
and provifions of {ciences, whence men in active 
courfes are furnifhed, and therefore ought to have 
equal entertainment with them: otherwife if the 
fathers in fciences be of the weakett fort, or be ill- 
maintained, 


Et patrum invalidi referent jejunia nati.$ 


Another defect I note, wherein I fhall need 
fome alchemift to help me, who call upon men to 
fell their books, and to build furnaces; quitting 
and forfaking Minerva and the Mufes as barren 
virgins, and relying upon Vulcan. But certain it 
is, that unto the deep, fruitful, and operative ftudy 
of many fciences, efpecially Natural Philofophy 
and Phyfic, books be not the only inftrumentals ; 
wherein alfo the beneficence of men hath not been 
altogether wanting: for we fee fpheres, globes, 
aftrolabes, maps, and the like, have been provided 
as appurtenances to aftronomy and cofmography, 
as well as books: we fee likewife that fome places 
inftituted for phyfic have annexed the commodity 
of gardens for fimples of all forts, and do likewife 
command the ufe of dead bodies for anatomies. 
But thefe do refpect but a few things. In gene- 
ral, there will hardly be any main proficience in 
the difclofing of nature, except there be fome 


Bereoail.XxX5 22, 8 Virg. Georg. iil. 128. 
9 See Nov. Org. ii. 7: “ Tranfeundum plane a Vulcano ad 
Minervam, fi in animo fit veras corporum texturas ct {chemati{mos 
. in lucem protrahere.” 


(3) As to 
means for 
inquiry 


into Nature. 


(4) As to 
the careleff- 
nefs of 
Vifitors. 


100 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


allowance for expenfes about experiments ; whether 
they be experiments appertaining to Vulcanus or 
Deedalus, furnace or engine, or any other kind: and 
therefore as fecretaries and fpials of princes and 
ftates bring in bills for intelligence, fo you muft 
allow the fpials and intelligencers of nature to bring 
in their bills ; or elfe you fhall be ill advertifed. 
And if Alexander made fuch a liberal affigna- 
tion to Ariftotle of treafure?° for the allowance of 
hunters, fowlers, fifhers, and the like, that he 
might compile a Hiftory of Nature, much better 
do they deferve it that travail in Arts of Nature.” 
Another defect which I note, is an intermif- 
fion or neglect in thofe which are governors in 
univerfities, of confultation ; and in princes or fu- 
perior perfons, of vifitation : to enter into account 
and confideration, whether the readings, exercifes, 
and other cuftoms appertaining unto learning, an- 
ciently begun, and fince continued, be well infti- 
tuted or no; and thereupon to ground an amend- 
ment or reformation in that which fhall be found 
inconvenient. For it is one. of your majefty’s 
own moft wife and princely maxims, That in all 


10 Elian, Var. Hif?.iv. 19, fays that Philip helped him, and 
Athenzus, ix. 398. f. ftates the amount faid to have been allowed 
him by Alexander, 800 talents. But Bacon takes his ftatement 
here from Plin. Nat. Hift. viii. 17. 

11 The Latin has for ‘travail in arts of Nature,” “ in labyrin- 
this artium viam fibi aperiunt,”—where Art is oppofed to Nature. 
So that the phrafe “ Arts of Nature” muft be modified to mean 
“¢ Arts concerned with Nature.” Or, poffibly, there is fome mif- 
take in the reading. All the old editions have travailes. If the 
reading is correét, the fenfe will be that they who lay down rules 
and general principles of Arts in things Natural are worthy of 
higher reward than are they who only collect Hiftories, i.e. cata- 
logues or regifters of detached facts. 


BOOK I]. IOI 


ufages and precedents, the times be confidered wherein 
they firft began; which, if they were weak or igno- 
rant, it derogateth from the authority of the ufage, 
and leaveth it for fufpecét. And therefore inaf- 
much as mott of the ufages and orders of the uni- 
verfities were derived from more obfcure times, 
it is the more requifite they be re-examined. In 
this kind I will give an inftance or two, for ex- 
ample fake, of things that are the moft obvious 
and familiar. The one is a matter, which though 
it be ancient and general, yet I hold to be an 
error ; which is, that f{cholars in univerfities come 
too foon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric, arts 
fitter for graduates than children and novices: for 
thefe two, rightly taken, are the graveft of {ciences, 
being the arts of arts; the one for judgment, the 
other for ornament: and they be the rules and 
direGtions how to fet forth and difpofe matter; 
and therefore for minds empty and unfraught with 
matter, and which have not gathered that which 
Cicero calleth Sylva and Supellex,!* ftuff and va- 
riety, to begin with thofe arts, (as if one fhould 
learn to weigh, or to meafure, or to paint the 
wind), doth work but this effec, that the wifdom 
of thofe arts, which is great and univerfal, is 
almoft made contemptible, and is degenerate into 
childifh fophiftry and ridiculous affectation. And 
further, the untimely learning of them hath drawn 
on, by confequence, the fuperficial and unprofit- 
able teaching and writing of them, as fitteth indeed 
to the capacity of children. Another is a lack I 


12 Sylva, de Orat. iii. 26. (103.) Supellex, Orat. 24. (80.) 


(5) As to 
intercourfe 
between 
Univerfities. 


102 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


find in the exercifes ufed in the Univerfities, which 
do make too great a divorce between invention 
and memory; for their fpeeches are either pre- 
meditate, /m verbis conceptis, where nothing is left 
to invention, or merely extemporal, where little is 
left to memory: whereas in life and action there 
is leaft ufe of either of thefe, but rather of in- 
termixtures of premeditation and invention, notes 
and memory; fo as the exercife fitteth not the prac- 
tice, nor the image the life; and it is ever a true 
rule in exercifes, that they be framed as near as 
may be to the life of practice; for otherwife they 
do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind, 
and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not 
obfcure, when fcholars come to the practices of 
profeffions, or other actions of civil life; which 
when they fet into, this want is foon found by 
themfelves, and fooner by others. But this part, 
touching the amendment of the inftitutions and 
orders of Univerfities, I will conclude with the 
claufe of Czefar’s letter to Oppius and Balbus, Hoc 
quemadmodum fieri poffit, nonnulla mihi in mentem 
veniunt, et multa reperiri poffunt; de iis rebus rogo 
vos ut cogitationem fufcipiatis. 

Another defect which I note, afcendeth a little 
higher than the precedent: for as the profi- 
cience of learning confifteth much in the orders 
and inftitutions of Univerfities in the fame ftates 
and kingdoms, fo it would be yet more advanced, 
if there were more intelligence mutual between 
the Univerfities of Europe than now there is. 


IS Cicead. Alt. 1x. 7.1G. 


BOOK Il. 103 


We fee there may be many orders and founda- 
tions, which though they be divided under feveral 
fovereignties and territories, yet they take them- 
felves to have a kind of contraét, fraternity, and 
correfpondence one with the other; infomuch as 
they have provincials and generals. And furely, 
as nature createth brotherhood in families, and arts 
mechanical contract brotherhoods in commonal- 
ties, and the anointment of God fuperinduceth a 
brotherhood in kings and bifhops ; fo in like man- 
ner there cannot but be a fraternity in learning 
and illumination, relating to that paternity which 
is attributed to God, who is called the Father of 
illuminations or lights.14 

The laft defe&t which I will note is, that there 
hath not been, or very rarely been, any pub- 
lic defignation of writers or inquirers concerning 
fuch parts of knowledge as may appear not to have 
been already fufficiently laboured or undertaken ; 
unto which point it is an inducement to enter into 
a view and examination what parts of learning 
have been profecuted, and what omitted: for the 
opinion of plenty is among the caufes of want, and 
the great quantity of books maketh a fhow rather 
of fuperfluity than lack ; which furcharge, never- 
thelefs, is not to be remedied by making no more 
books, but by making more good books, which, as 
the ferpent of Mofes, might devour the ferpents of 
the enchanters.!® 

The removing of all the defects formerly enu- 


4 James i. 17. 
4° Exod, vii. 10, It was Aaron’s rod that became a ferpent. 


(6) No 
perfons ap- 
pointed to 
inquire into 
deficient 
branches of 
learning. 


The re- 
moval of 


thefe defe&ts 
the work of 
kings, except 
part of the 
laft, i.e. the 
furvey of 
learning, 
which I 

will now 
attempt. 


104 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


merated, except the laft, and of the active part 
alfo of the laft, (which is the defignation of writers, ) 
are opera bafilica ; towards which the endeavours 
of a private man may be but as an image in a 
croflway, that may point at the way, but cannot 
go it: but the inducing part of the latter, which is 
the furvey of learning, may be fet forward by pri- 
vate travail, Wherefore I will now attempt to 
make a general and faithful perambulation of 
learning, with an inquiry what parts thereof lie 
frefh and wafte, and not improved and converted 
by the induftry of man; to the end that fuch a 
plot made and recorded to memory, may both 
minifter light to any public defignation, and alfo 
ferve to excite voluntary endeavours: wherein, 
neverthelefs, my purpofe is at this time to note 
only omiffions and deficiencies, and not to make 
any redargution of errors or incomplete profe- 
cutions ; for it is one thing to fet forth what ground 
lieth unmanured, and another thing to correét ill 
hufbandry in that which is manured. 

In the handling and undertaking of which work 
I am not ignorant what it is that | do now move 
and attempt, nor infenfible of mine own weaknefs 
to fuftain my purpofe ; but my hope is, that if my 
extreme love to learning carry me too far, I may ob- 
tain the excufe of affection; for that [t zs not granted 
to man to love and to be wife.© But I know well I 
can ufe no other liberty of judgment than I muft 
leave to others; and I for my part fhall be indif- 
ferently glad either to perform myfelf, or accept 


16 Publ. Syr. Sentent.166: Amare et fapere vix Deo conceditur. 


BOOK I1. 105 


from another, that duty of humanity; Nam qui 
erranti comiter monftrat viam, Sc." I do forefee 
likewife that of thofe things which I fhall enter and 
regifter as deficiencies and omiffions, many will 
conceive and cenfure that fome of them are al- 
ready done and extant; others to be but curiofities, 
and things of no great ufe; and others to be of 
too great difficulty, and almoft impoffibility to be 
compaffed and effected. But for the two firft, I 
refer myfelf to the particulars ; for the laft, touch- 
ing impoffibility, 1 take it thofe things are to be 
held poffible which may be done by fome perfon, 
though not by every one; and which may be done 
by many, though not by any one; and which may 
be done in the fucceffion of ages, though not with- 
in the hourglafs of one man’s life; and which may 
be done by public defignation, though not by pri- 
vate endeavour. But, notwithftanding, if any man 
will take to himfelf rather that of Salomon, Dicit 
piger, Leo eft in via, than that of Virgil, Poffunt 
quia poffe videntur,'? I fhall be content that my 
labours be efteemed but as the better fort of wifhes: 
for as it afketh fome knowledge to demand a quef- 
tion not impertinent, fo it required fome fenfe to 
make a wifh not abfurd. 


ference to the three parts of man’s 
underftanding, which is the feat of 
learning : i/tory to his memory, poe/y 


7 Ennius, quoted by Cic. de Off. i. 16.(5.) '® Prov. xxii. 13. 
Sev Ite. 227. V. 237. 


i 
Human 
Learning is 
triple, ac- 
cording to 
the three 
parts of the 
mind. 


106 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


(1.) Hiftory to his imagination, and philofophy to his reafon. 

( Venee Divine learning receiveth the fame diftribution ; 

. ? y > 

to Imagina- for the {pirit of man is the fame, though the reve- 
(..) Philo. lation of oracle and fenfe be diverfe : fo as theolo 

(3-) Philo- Sy 

fophy to confifteth alfo of the hz/ory of the church; of para- 

Realon. Jes, which is divine poefy; and of holy doctrine or 

precept: for as for that part which feemeth fuper- 

numerary, which is prophecy, it is but Divine Hif- 

tory ; which hath that prerogative over human, as 

the narration may be before the fact as well as after. 

DeAug-u.  Fiffory is natural, civil, ecclefiaftical, and lite- 

a Hiftory, ”@ry3 whereof the firft three I allow as extant, the 

(1.) Natu- fourth I note as deficient. For no man hath pro- 

(2.) Civil, Pounded to himfelf the general ftate of learning to 

(3.) Ecclefi- be defcribed and reprefented from age to age, as 

eae many have done the works of nature, and the ftate 

rary. civil and ecclefiaftical ; without which the hiftory 

of the world feemeth to me to be as the ftatua of 

Polyphemus with his eye out; that part being 

wanting which doth moft fhow the {pirit and life of 

the perfon: and yet I am not ignorant that in divers 

particular fciences, as of the jurifconfults, the ma- 

thematicians, the rhetoricians, the philofophers, 

there are fet down fome fmall memorials of the 

{chools, authors, and books; and fo likewife fome 

barren relations touching the invention of arts or 

ufages. But a juft ftory of learning, containing 

the antiquities and originals of knowledges and 

their fects, their inventions, their traditions, their 

diverfe adminiftrations and managings, their flou- 

rifhings, their oppofitions, decays, depreffions, 

oblivions, removes, with the caufes and occa- 


BOOK II. 107 


fions of them, and all other events concerning 
learning, throughout the ages of the world, I may 
truly affirm to be wanting. The ufe and end of 
which work I do not fo much defign for curiofity or 
fatisfaction of thofe that are the lovers of learning, 
but chiefly for a more ferious and grave purpofe ; 
which is this in few words, that it will make 
learned men wife in the ufe and adminiftration of 
learning. For it isnot St. Auguftine’s nor St. Am- 
brofe’s works that will make fo wife a divine,'as 
ecclefiaftical hiftory, thoroughly read and obferved ; 
and the fame reafon is of learning. 

Hiftory of nature is of three forts; of nature in 
courfe, of nature erring or varying, and of nature 
altered or wrought; that is, hiffory of creatures, 
hiftory of marvels, and hiffory of arts. The firft 
of thefe, no doubt, is extant, and that in good 
perfection ; the two latter are handled fo weakly 
and unprofitably, as I am moved to note them as 
deficient. For I find no fufficient or competent 
collection of the works of nature which have a 
digreffion and deflection from the ordinary courfe 
of generations, productions, and motions ; whe- 
ther they be fingularities of place and region, or 
the ftrange events of time and chance, or the 
effets of yet unknown properties, or the inftances 
of exception to general kinds. It is true, I find 
a number of books of fabulous experiments and 
fecrets, and frivolous impoftures for pleafure and 
ftrangenefs ; but a fubftantial and fevere collection 
of the heteroclites or irregulars of nature,® well 


2 Cf. Nov, Org. i. 45, and ii. 28. Thefe “inftances of ex- 


DeAug. 11. 
was 

(1.) Natu- 
ral. 

(a) Of 


creatures. 


(8) Of 
Marvels. 


108 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


examined and defcribed, I find not: efpecially not 
with due rejection of fables and popular errors: 
for as things now are, if an untruth in nature be 
once on foot, what by reafon of the neglect of ex- 
amination and countenance of antiquity, and what 
by reafon of the ufe of the opinion in fimilitudes 
and ornaments of fpeech, it is never called down. 

The ufe of this work, honoured with a prece- 
dent in Ariftole,*! is nothing lefs than to give 
contentment to the appetite of curious and vain 
wits, as the manner of Mirabilaries** is todo; but 
for two reafons, both of great weight; the one to 
correct the partiality of axioms and opinions, which 
are commonly framed only upon common and 
familiar examples; the other becaufe from the 
wonders of nature is the neareft intelligence and 
paffage towards the wonders of art: for it is no 
more but by following, and as it were hounding 
nature in her wanderings, to be able to lead her 
afterwards to the fame place again. Neither am I 
of opinion, in this hiftory of marvels, that fuper- 
{titious narrations of forceries, witchcrafts, dreams, 
divinations, and the like, where there is an aflu- 
rance and clear evidence of the fact, be altogether 
excluded. For it is not yet known in what cafes 
and how far effects attributed to fuperftition do 
participate of natural caufes: and therefore how- 
foever the practice of fuch things is to be con- 
demned, yet from the fpeculation and confideration 


ception to general kinds” he there terms inffantie monodice, quas 
etiam irregulares five beteroclitas appellare coniuevimus. 
21 De Miris Aujcultationibus ; (Qavpacia axotopara), fee p. 30. 
22 Mirabilaries. In De Augm., Sc. ii. he calls them “ Mirabil- 
aril et prodigiaftri.” 


BOOK Il. 10g 


of them light may be taken, not only for the dif- 
cerning of the offences, but for the further difclofing 
of nature. Neither ought a man to make {cruple 
of entering into thefe things for inquifition of truth, 
as your Majefty hath fhowed in your own example; 
who with the two clear eyes of religion and natu- 
ral philofophy have looked deeply and wifely into 
thefe fhadows, and yet proved yourfelf to be of the 
nature of the fun, which pafleth through pollutions, 
and itfelf remains as pure as before.*® But this | 
hold fit, that thefe narrations, which have mixture 
with fuperftition, be forted by themfelves, and not 
be mingled with the narrations which are merely 
and fincerely natural. But as for the narrations 
touching the prodigies and miracles of religions, 
they are either not true, or not natural; and there- 
fore impertinent for the ftory of nature. 

For hiftory of nature wrought or mechanical, I 
find fome collections made of agriculture, and like- 
wife of manual arts ; but commonly with a rejec- 
tion of experiments familiar and vulgar. For it is 
efteemed a kind of difhonour unto learning to 
defcend to inquiry or meditation upon matters 
mechanical, except they be fuch as may be thought 
fecrets, rarities, and fpecial fubtilties; which hu- 
mour of vain and fupercilious arrogancy is juftly 
derided in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a 
vaunting fophift, difputing with Socrates, a true 
and unfeigned inquifitor of truth; where the fub- 
jet being touching beauty, Socrates, after his 

%3 Cf. Nov. Org.i. 120. This thought is to be met with in 


Chaucer, Perfone’s Tale: ‘Certes, Holy Writ may not be defouled, 
no more than the fonne that fhineth on the myxene.” 


(c) Of 
Arts, 


110 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


wandering manner of induions, put firft an ex- 
ample ofa fair virgin, and then of a fair horfe, and 
then of a fair pot well glazed, whereat Hippias 
was offended, and faid, Adore than for courte/y’s 
Jake, he did think much to difpute with any that 
did allege fuch bafe and fordid inftances: where- 
unto Socrates anfwered, You have reafon, and it 
becomes you well, being a man fo trim in your veft- 
ments, Sc. and fo goeth on in an irony.** But 
the truth is, they be not the higheft inftances that 
give the fecureft information ; as may be well ex- 
preffed in the tale fo common of the philofopher, * 
that while he gazed upwards to the ftars fell into 
the water; for if he had looked down he might have 
feen the ftars in the water, but looking aloft he could 
not fee the water in the ftars. So it cometh often 
to pafs, that mean and {mall things difcover great, 
better than great can difcover the fmall: and there- 
fore Ariftotle noteth well, That the nature of every- 
thing is beft feen in its /mallef? portions. And for 
that caufe he inquireth the nature of a common- 
wealth, firft in a family, and the fimple conjuga- 
tions of man and wife, parent and child, mafter 
and fervant, which are in every cottage.*° Even 
fo likewife the nature of this great city of the world, 
and the policy thereof, muft be firft fought in mean 
concordances and fmall portions. So we fee how 
that fecret of nature, of the turning of iron touched 
with the loadftone towards the north, was found 
out in needles of iron, not in bars of iron. 


*4 Plato, Hipp. Maj. iii. 288 and 291. 
*° Thales. See Plat. Theet. i. 174. 
%6 Ariftot. Polit. I. iii. 1,and Phys. i. 


BOOK II. i 


But if my judgment be of any weight, the ufe 
of hiftory mechanical is of all others the moft radi- 
cal and fundamental towards natural philofophy ; 
fuch natural philofophy as fha!l not vanifh in the 
fume of fubtile, fublime, or deleCtable {peculation, 
but fuch as fhall be operative to the endowment 
and benefit of man’s life: for it will not only 
minifter and fuggeft for the prefent many inge- 
nious practices in all trades, by a connection and 
transferring of the obfervations of one art to the ufe 
of another, when the experiences of feveral myf- 
teries fhall fall under the confideration of one man’s 
mind; but further, it will give a more true and 
real illumination concerning caufes and axioms 
than is hitherto attained. For like as a man’s dif- 
pofition is never well known till he be croffed, nor 
Proteus ever changed fhapes till he was ftrait- 
ened and held faft ;* fo the paflages and varia- 
tions of nature cannot appear fo fully in the 
liberty of nature, as in the trials and vexations 
of art. 

For civil hiftory, it is of three kinds; not unfitly 
to be compared with the three kinds of pictures 
or images: for of pictures or images, we fee fome 
are unfinifhed, fome are perfect, and fome are de- 
faced. So of hiftories we may find three kinds, 
memorials, perfect hiftories, and antiquities ; for me- 
mortals are hiftory unfinifhed, or the firft or rough 
draughts of hiftory ; and antiquities are hiftory 
defaced, or fome remnants of hiftory which have 
cafually efcaped the fhipwreck of time. 


7 Virg. Georg. iv. 387, {qq. 


De Aug. 11. 
6. 


(2.) OF 
Civil Hif- 
tory. 


(a2) Me- 


morials, 


(4) Anti- 
quities. 


112 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Memortals, or preparatory hiftory, are of two 
forts; whereof the one may be termed commenta- 
ries, and the other regi/ers. Commentaries are they 
which fet down a continuance of the naked events 
and actions, without the motives or defigns, the 
counfels, the fpeeches, the pretexts, the occafions 
and other paflages of action: for this is the true 
nature ofa commentary; though Czefar, in modefty 
mixed with greatnefs, did for his pleafure apply 
the name of a commentary to the beft hiftory of 
the world. Regi/fers are collections of public acts, 
as decrees of council, judicial proceedings, declara- 
tions and letters of ftate, orations and the like, 
without a perfect continuance or contexture of 
the thread of the narration. 

Antiquities, or remnants of hiftory, are, as was 
faid, Tanquam tabula naufragii;** when induftrious 
perfons by an exact and fcrupulous diligence and 
obfervation, out of monuments, names, words, 
proverbs, traditions, private records and evidences, 
fragments of ftories, paflages of books that con- 
cern not ftory,” and the like, do fave and recover 
fomewhat from the deluge of time. 

In thefe kinds of unperfect hiftories I do affign 
no deficience, for they are Zanguam imperfeéte 
mifta; and therefore any deficience in them is 
but their nature. As for the corruptions and 
moths of hiftory, which are epitomes, the ufe of 
them deferveth to be banifhed, as all men of found 
judgment have confefled; as thofe that have fretted 

28 “¢ As was faid;” referring to the laft page. Cf. Nov. Org. 


1. 7+ 
29 Story here = hiftory: “librorum neutiquam hiftoricorum.” 


BOOK Il. 113 


and corroded the found bodies of many excellent 
hiftories, and wrought them into bafe and unpro- 
- fitable dregs.%° 

Hiftory, which may be called ju/? and perfect 
hiftory, is of three kinds, according to the obje& 
which it propoundeth or pretendeth to reprefent : 
for it either reprefenteth a time, or a per/fon, or an 
aétion. ‘The firft we call chronicles, the fecond 


De Aug. 
I. Fe 

(e:) Per- 
feét Hif- 


tory. 


i. Chroni- 


lives, and the third narrations or relations. Of “> 


thefe, although the firft be the moft complete and 
abfolute kind of hiftory, and hath moft eftimation 
and glory, yet the fecond excelleth it in profit and 
ufe, and the third in verity and fincerity. For 
hiftory of times reprefenteth the magnitude of 
actions, and the public faces and deportments of 
perfons, and paffeth over in filence the fmaller 
paflages and motions of men and matters. But 
fuch being the workmanfhip of God, as He doth 
hang the greateft weight upon the fmalleft wires, 
Maxima ¢ minimis fufpendens,* it comes therefore 
to pafs, that fuch hiftories do rather fet forth the 
pomp of bufinefs than the true and inward reforts 
‘thereof. But /ives, if they be well written, pro- 
pounding to themfelves a perfon to reprefent in 
whom actions both greater and fmaller, public and 
private, have a commixture, mutft of neceflity con- 
tain a more true, native, and lively reprefentation. 
So again narrations and relations of aétions, as the 
war of Peloponnefus, the expedition of Cyrus 
Minor, the confpiracy of Catiline, cannot but be 
% Asin the Epitomes written in the decline of Latin Literature. 
3! Job xxvi. 7. * Qui appendit terram fuper nihilum.” 
I 


a. Ancient, 


‘ 


114, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


more purely and exactly true than hiftories of 
times, becaufe they may choofe an argument com- 
prehenfible within the notice and inftructions of the 
writer : whereas he that undertaketh the ftory of 
a time, efpecially of any length, cannot but meet 
with many blanks and fpaces which he muft be 
forced to fill up out of his own wit and conjeCture. 
For the Hiftory of Times, I mean of Civil 
Hiftory, the providence of God hath made the 
diftribution: for it hath pleafed God to ordain 
and illuftrate two exemplar ftates of the world for 
arms, learning, moral virtue, policy, and laws; the 
ftate of Grecia, and the ftate of Rome; the hif- 
tories whereof occupying the middle part of time, 
have more ancient to them, hiftories which may 
by one common name be termed the antiquities 
of the world: and after them, hiftories which may 
be likewife called by the name of modern hiftory. 
Now to fpeak of the deficiencies. As to the 
heathen antiquities of the world, it is in vain to 
note them for deficient: deficient they are no 
doubt, confifting moft of fables and fragments ; 
but the deficience cannot be holpen ; for antiquity 
is like fame, Caput inter nubila condit,* her head 
is muffled from our fight. For the hiftory of the ex- 
emplar /tates, it is extant in good perfection. Not 
but I could with there were a perfect courle of hiftory 
for Grecia from Thefeus to Philopcemen, (what 
time the affairs of Gracia were drowned and ex- 
tinguifhed in the affairs of Rome ;) and for Rome 
from Romulus to Juftinianus, who may be truly 


31 Virg. Zn, iv. 177. 


BOOK II. 115 


faid to be Ultimus Romanorum.** In which fe- 
quences of ftory the text of Thucydides and 
Xenophon in the one, and the texts of Livius, 
Polybius, Salluftius, Czfar, Appianus, Tacitus, 
Herodianus in the other, to be kept entire without 
any diminution at all, and only to be fupplied and 
continued. But this is matter of magnificence, 
rather to be commended than required: and we 
{peak now of parts of learning fupplemental ane 
not of fupererogation. 

But for modern hi/tories, whereof there are fome 
few very worthy, but the greater part beneath 
mediocrity, (leaving the care of foreign ftories to 
foreign ftates, becaufe I will not be curiofus in 
aliena republica,**) | cannot fail to reprefent to your 
Majefty the unworthinefs of the hiftory of England 
in the main continuance thereof, and the partiality 
and obliquity of that of Scotland in the lateft and 
largeft author that I have feen :5* fuppofing that it 
would be honour for your Majefty, and a work 
very memorable, if this ifland of Great Britain, as 
it is now joined in monarchy for the ages to come, 
fo were joined in one hiftory for the times paffled ; 
after the manner of the Sacred Hiftory, which 
draweth down the ftory of the ten tribes and of 
the two tribes, as twins, together. And if it fhall 
feem that the greatnefs of this work may make it 
lefs exactly performed, there is an excellent period 


% Said of Caffius, Tac. Aun. iv. 34. “ Cremutius Cordus poftu- 
latur,. . . quod C. Caffium Romanorum ultimum dixiffet.” Cf. 
Plut. Brutus, 43. Suet. Tib. 61. who attributes it to both Brutus 
and Caffius. 

#3 Cic. Off 1. 34. 

% Buchanan, for whom King James had no love. 


B. Modern. 


116 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


of a much fmaller compafs of time, as to the ftory 
of England ; that is to fay, from the uniting of the 
Rofes to the uniting of the kingdoms; a portion 
of time, wherein, to my underftanding, there hath 
been the rareft varieties that in like number of 
fucceffions of any hereditary monarchy hath been 
known. For it beginneth with the mixed adop- 
tion of a crown by arms and title: an entry by 
battle, an eftablifhment by marriage, and therefore 
times anfwerable, like waters after a tempeft, full 
of working and {welling, though without extre- 
mity of ftorm; but well pafled through by the 
wifdom of the pilot, being one of the moft fufi- 
cient kings of all the number. Then followeth 
the reign of a king, whofe actions, howfoever 
conduéted, had much intermixture with the af- 
fairs of Europe, balancing and inclining them 
variably ; in whofe time alfo began that great 
alteration in the ftate ecclefiaftical, an aétion 
which feldom cometh upon the ftage. “Then the 
reign of a minor: then an offer of a_ufurpation, 
though it was but as febris ephemera. ‘Then 
the reign of a queen matched with a foreigner: 
then of a queen that lived folitary and unmarried, 
and yet her government fo mafculine, that it had 
greater impreffion and operation upon the {tates 
abroad than it any ways received from thence. 
And now laft, this moft happy and glorious event, 
that this ifland of Britain, divided from all the 
world, fhould be united in itfelf: and that oracle 
of reft, given to Aineas, antiquam exquirite ma- 


35 Virg. Ecl. i. 67. 


BOOK II. 117, 


trem,*© fhould now be performed and fulfilled upon 
the nations of England and Scotland, being now 
reunited in the ancient mother name of Britain, 
as a full period of all inftability and peregrina- 
tions. So that as it cometh to pafs in maffive 
bedies, that they have certain trepidations and 
waverings before they fix and fettle; fo it feem- 
eth that by the providence of God this monar- 
chy, before it was to fettle in your majefty and 
your generations, (in which I hope it is now 
eftablifhed for ever,) had thefe prelufive changes 
and varieties. 

For dives, I do find it ftrange that thefe times 
have fo little efteemed the virtues of the times, as 
that the writing of lives fhould be no more fre- 
quent. For although there be not many fovereign 
princes or abfolute commanders, and that ftates 
are moft collected into monarchies, yet are there 
many worthy perfonages that deferve better than 
difperfed report or barren elogies. For herein the 
invention of one of the late poets*’ is proper, and 
doth well enrich the ancient fiction: for he feign- 
eth that at the end of the thread or web of every 
man’s life there was a little medal containing the 
perfon’s name, and that Time waited upon the 
fhears; and as foon as the thread was cut, caught 
the medals, and carried them to the river of Lethe; 
and about the bank there were many birds flying 
up and down, that would get the medals and carry 


36 Virg. 4x. iii. 96. 
37 Ariofto, Orlando Furiofo, end of Bk. 34, and opening of Bk, 
35. (See Ellis’ and Spedding’s Ed. of the De Augm. Sc.) 


ii. Lives. 


iii. Narra- 
tions. 


118 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


them in their beak a little while, and then let them 
fall into the river: only there were a few fwans, 
which if they got a name, would carry it to a 
temple where it was confecrate. And although 
many men, more mortal in their affections than in 
their bodies, do efteem defire of name and me- 
mory but as a vanity and ventofity, 


Animi nil magnz laudis egentes ;%° 


which opinion cometh from that root, Non prius 
laudes contempfimus, quam laudanda facere defivi- 
mus :°9 yet that will not alter Salomon’s judgment, 
Memoria jufti cum laudibus, at impiorum nomen 
putrefcet :*° the one flourifheth, the other either 
comfumeth to prefent oblivion, or turneth to an 
ill odour. And therefore in that ftyle or addition, 
which is and hath been long well received and 
brought in ufe, Felicts memoria, pie memoria, bone 
memoria, we do acknowledge that which Cicero 
faith, borrowing it from Demofthenes, that Bona 
fama propria poffeffio defunétorum ;* which poffef- 
fion I cannot but note that in our times it lieth 
much watte, and that therein there is a deficience. 

For narrations and relations of particular actions, 
there were alfo to be wifhed a greater diligence 
therein ; for there is no great action but hath fome 
good pen which attends it. And becaufe it is an 


38 Virg. 4in.v. 751. 

39 Plin, Ep. iii. 21.  Poftquam defiimus facere laudanda, 
laudari quoque ineptum putamus.” Were Bacon’s quotations 
ufually from memory? 

40° Prov.x..7- 

41 Cic, Philip. ix. ‘¢ Vita enim mortuorum in memoria vivorum 
eft pofita.” From Dem. adv. Lept. 488. tv” ijy Zévrec éxrh- 
cavro cveotiay avrn Kal TeXEUTHKOOW adToic a7odoEIn. 


BOOK I]. 119g 


ability not common to write a good hiftory, as 
may well appear by the fmall number of them; 
yet if particularity of actions memorable were but 
tolerably reported as they pafs, the compiling of a 
complete hiftory of times mought be the better ex- 
pected, when a writer fhould arife that were fit 
for it: for the collection of fuch relations mought 
be as a nurfery garden, whereby to plant a fair and 
ftately garden, when time fhould ferve. 

There is yet another portion of hiftory which 
Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be 
forgotten, efpecially with that application which he 
accoupleth it withal, amnals and journals: appro- 
priating to the former matters of eftate, and to the 
latter acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For 
giving but a touch of certain magnificent buildings, 
he addeth, Cum ex dignitate populi Romani reper- 
tum fit, res illuftres annalibus talia diurnis urbis 
aétis mandare.* So as there is a kind of con- 
templative heraldry, as well as civil. And as 
nothing doth derogate from the dignity of a 
{tate more than confufion of degrees ; fo it doth 
not a little embafe the authority of a hiftory, 
to intermingle matters of triumph, or matters of 
ceremony, or matters of novelty, with matters of 
ftate. But the ufe of a journal hath not only been 
in the hiftory of time, but likewife in the hiftory 
of perfons, and chiefly of actions; for princes in 
ancient time had, upon point of honour and policy 
both, journals kept of what paffed day by day: for 
we fee the chronicle which was read before 


42 Tac. Ann. xiii. 31. 


De Aug. 1. 


9- 
iv. Annals, 


120 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Ahafuerus,** when he could not take reft, con- 
tained matter of affairs indeed, but fuch as had 
paffed in his own time, and very lately before: 
but the journal of Alexander’s houfe expreffed 
every {mall particularity, even concerning his per- 
fon and court ;#* and it is yet a ufe well received in 
enterprifes memorable, as expeditions of war, na- 
vigations, and the like, to keep diaries of that 
which paffeth continually. 
De Aug. il. I cannot likewife be ignorant of a form of writ- 
Efys on 2ng which fome wife and grave men have ufed, 
Hiftory containing a fcattered hiftory of thofe ations which 
ae they have thought worthy of memory, with politic 
difcourfe and obfervation thereupon : not incorpo- 
rate into the hiftory, but feparately, and as the 
more principal in their intention ; which kind of 
ruminated hiftory | think more fit to place amongft 
books of policy, whereof we fhall hereafter fpeak, 
than amongtt books of hiftory : for it is the true 
office of hiftory to reprefent the events themfelves 
together with the counfels, and to leave the obfer- 
vations and conclufions thereupon to the liberty 
and faculty of every man’s judgment. But mix- 
tures are things irregular, whereof no man can 
define. 
v. Cofmo- So alfo is there another kind of hiftory mani- 
ae ies foldly mixed, and that is biftory of cofmography 3 
mathema- being compounded of natural hiftory, in refpe&t of 


tics on their’ the regions themfelves; of hiftory civil, in refpeé 
phyfical 
fide. ASE ea vile « 
44 See Plutarch, Sympos. i. Qu. 6. 
48 Such books as Machiavelli’s Difcorfi fopra Livia are here 
meant. 


BOOK I]. I21 


of the habitations, regiments, and manners of the 
people ; and the mathematics, in refpect of the 
climates and configurations towards the heavens : 
which part of learning of all others in this latter 
time hath obtained moft proficience. For it may 
be truly affirmed to the honour of thefe times, and 
in a virtuous emulation with antiquity, that this 
great building of the world had never through- 
lights made in it, till the age of us and our fathers : 
for although they ‘had knowledge of the Anti- 
podes, 
Nofque ubi primus equis Oriens afflavit anhelis, 
Illic fera rubens accendit lumina Vefper :*° 

yet that mought be by demonftration, and not in 
fact ; and if by travel, it requireth the voyage but 
of half the globe. But to circle the earth, as the 
heavenly bodies do, was not done or enterprifed 
till thefe latter times: and therefore thefe times 
may juftly bear in their word, not only plus ultra," 
in precedence of the ancient non ultra, and imita- 
bile fulmen, in precedence of the ancient non imi- 
tabile fulmen, 


Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen ; &c.** 


but likewife imitabile celum; in refpet of the 
many memorable voyages after the manner of 
heaven about the globe of the earth. 

And this proficience in navigation and dif 
coveries may plant alfo an expectation of the 
further proficienceand augmentation of all {ciences ; 


48 Virg. Georg. i. 250, 251. 
47 Plus ultra was the motto of Charles V, (Ellis.) 
48 Virg. En, vi. 590. 


122 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


becaufe it may feem they are ordained by God to 
be coevals, that is, to meet in one age. For fo 
the prophet Daniel, {peaking of the latter times, 
foretelleth Plurimi pertranfibunt, et multiplex erit 
fcientia :*9 as if the opennefs and thorough paflage 
of the world and the increafe of knowledge were 
appointed to be in the fame ages; as we fee it is 
already performed in great part; the learning of 
thefe latter times not much giving place to the 
former two periods or returns of learning, the one 
of the Grecians, the other of the Romans. 


De Aug. Hiftory ecclefiaftical receiveth the fame divi- 
a dies fions with hiftory civil: but further, in the pro- 
(3.) Eccle- 


faftical priety thereof, may be divided into the hi/ffory of 

Hifttory. — the church, by ageneral name; hiftory of prophecy 5 

(a.) Of the and hiffory of providence. ‘The firft defcribeth the 

Church. times of the militant church, whether it be fluc- 
tuant, as the ark of Noah; or moveable, as the 
ark in the wildernefs ; or at reft, as the ark in the 
temple: that is, the ftate of the church in perfe- 
cution, in remove, and in peace. This part I 
ought in no fort to note as deficient ; only I would 
that the virtue and fincerity of it were according 
to the mafs and quantity. But IJ am not now in 
hand with cenfures, but with omiffions. 

(8.)OfPro- The fecond, which is hiffory of prophecy, con- 

pay: fifteth of two relatives, the prophecy, and the 
accomplifhment ; and therefore the nature of fuch 
a work ought to be, that every prophecy of the 
Scripture be forted with the event fulfilling the 
fame, throughout the ages of the world; both for 


49°Dan. xiiwa4s 


BOOK I]. 123 


better confirmation of faith, and for the better 
illumination of the Church touching thofe parts of 
prophecies which are yet unfulfilled: allowing 
neverthelefs that latitude which is agreeable and 
familiar unto divine prophecies; being of the na- 
ture of their Author, with whom a thoufand years 
are but as one day ;°° and therefore are not ful- 
filled punétually at once, but have fpringing and 
germinant accomplifhment throughout many ages; 
though the height or fulnefs of them may refer to 
fome one age. This is a work which I find de- 
ficient ; but is to be done with wifdom, fobriety, 
and reverence, or not at all. 

The third, which is hi/tory of providence, con- 
taineth that excellent correfpondence which is be- 
tween God’s revealed will and His fecret will: 
which though it be fo obfcure, as for the moft 
part it is not legible to the natural man; no, nor 
many times to thofe that behold it from the T’a- 
bernacle ; yet at fome times it pleafeth God, for 
our better eftablifhment and the confuting of thofe 
which are as without God in the world, to write 
it in fuch text and capital letters, that as the pro- 
phet faith, He that runneth by may read it ;>' that 
is, mere fenfual perfons, which haften by God’s 
judgments, and never bend or fix their cogitations 
upon them, are neverthelefs in their paflage and 
race urged to difcern it. Such are the notable 
events and examples of God’s judgments, chaf- 


S02 :Peter. ili. S. 
51 Hab. ii. 2. but mifquoted. “ That he may run that readeth,” 
—i. e. may haften to carry on the tidings. 


(c.) Of Pro- 
vidence. 


De Aug. 11. 


(4.) There 
are alfo Ap- 
pendices to 
Hiftory ; or 
Literary 


Hiftory. 


124 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


tifements, deliverances, and bleffings: and this is 
a work which hath paffed through the labour of 
many, and therefore I cannot prefent as omitted. 
There are alfo other parts of learning which 
are appendices to hiffory: for all the exterior pro- 
ceedings of man confift of words and deeds: 
whereof hiftory doth properly receive and retain 
in memory the deeds: and if words, yet but as 
inducements and paflages to deeds: fo are there 
other books and writings, which are appropriate 
to the cuftody and receipt of words only ; which 
likewife are of three forts: orations, letters, and 
brief [peeches or fayings. Orations are pleadings, 
fpeeches of counfel, laudatives, invectives, apolo- 
gies, reprehenfions, orations of formality or cere- 
mony, and the like. Letters are according to all 
the variety of occafions, advertifements, advices, 
directions, propofitions, petitions, commendatory, 
expoftulatory, fatisfactory, of compliment, of plea- 
fure, of difcourfe, and all other paflages of action. 
And fuch as are written from wife men, are of all 
the words of man, in my judgment, the beft; for 
they are more natural than orations and public 
fpeeches, and more advifed than conferences or 
prefent fpeeches. So again letters of affairs from 
fuch as manage them, or are privy to them, are of 
all others the beft inftructions for hiftory, and to 


‘a diligent reader the beft hiftories in themfelves. 


For Apophthegms, it is a great lofs of that book of 

Ceefar’s ;*° for as his hiftory, and thofe few letters 

of his which we have, and thofe apophthegms 
52 Vid. Cic. ad Fam. ix. 16. 


BOOK Il. 125 


which were of his own, excel all men’s elfe, fo I 
fuppofe would his collection of Apophthegms have 
done; for as for thofe which are collected by 
others, either I have no tafte in fuch matters, or 
elfe their choice hath not been happy. But upon 
thefe three kinds of writings I do not infift, be- 
caufe I have no deficiencies to propound concern- 
ing them. 

Thus much therefore concerning hiftory ; which 
is that part of learning which anfwereth to one of 
the cells, domiciles, or offices of the mind of man: 
which is that of memory. 

Poefy is a part of learning in meafure of words De Aug. 11. 
for the moft part reftrained, but in all other points 
extremely licenfed, and doth truly refer to the 
imagination ; which, being not tied to the laws of 
matter, may at pleafure join that which nature 
hath fevered, and fever that which nature hath 
joined; and fo make unlawful matches and di- 
vorces of things; Préforibus atque poetis, Sc. 
It is taken in two fenfes in refpect of words or 
matter ; in the firft fenfe it is but a charaéter of 
ftyle, and belongeth to arts of fpeech, and is not 
pertinent for the prefent: in the latter it is, as 
hath been faid, one of the principal portions of 
learning, and is nothing elfe but feigned hiffory, 
which may be ftyled as well in profe as in verfe. 

The ufe of this feigned hiftory hath been to give 
fome fhadow of fatisfaction to the mind of man in 
thofe points wherein the nature of things doth 
deny it, the world being in proportion inferior to 

58 Hor. Ep. ad Pis. 9. 


- 
Ww 


Il. ‘Poetry. 


126 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the foul ; by reafon whereof there is, agreeable to 
the fpirit of man, a more ample greatnefs, a more 
exact goodne(s, and a more abfolute variety, than 
can be found in the nature of things. ‘Therefore, 
becaufe the acts or events of true hiffory have not 
that magnitude which fatisfieth the mind of man, 
poe/y feigneth acts and events greater and more 
heroical: becaufe true hiffory propoundeth the 
fucceffes and iffues of actions not fo agreeable to 
the merits of virtue and vice, therefore poefy feigns 
them more juft in retribution, and more according 
to revealed providence: becaufe true hiftory re- 
prefenteth actions and events more ordinary, and 
lefs interchanged, therefore poefy endueth them 
with more rarenefs, and more unexpected and 
alternative variations: fo as it appeareth that 
poefy ferveth and conferreth to magnanimity, mo- 
rality, and to delectation. And therefore it was 
ever thought to have fome participation of divine- 
nefs, becaufe it doth raife and erect the mind, by 
fubmitting the fhows of things to the defires of the 
mind; whereas reafon doth buckle and bow the 
mind into the nature of things. And we fee, that 
by thefe infinuations and congruities with man’s 
nature and pleafure, joined alfo with the agree- 
ment and confort it hath with mufic, it hath had 
accefs and eftimation in rude times and barbarous 
regions, where other learning ftood excluded. 
The divifion of Poefy which is apteft in the 
propriety thereof, (befides thofe divifions which 
are common unto it with hiftory, as feigned chro- 
nicles, feigned lives, and the appendices of hiftory, 


BOOK I. 127 


as feigned epiftles, feigned orations, and the reft) 
is into poe/y narrative, reprefentative, and allufive. 
The Narrative is a mere imitation of hiftory, with 
the excefles before remembered; chooiing for fub- 
ject commonly wars and love, rarely ftate, and 
fometimes pleafure or mirth. Reprefentative is as 
a vifible hiftory; and is an image of actions as if 
they were prefent, as hiftory is of actions in nature 
as they are, (that is) paft. A/lufive or Parabolical 
is a Narrative applied only to exprefs fome {pe- 
cial purpofe or conceit. Which latter kind of 
parabolical wifdom was much more in ufe in the 
ancient times, as by the fables of AZfop, and the 
brief fentences of the Seven, and the ufe of hiero- 
glyphics may appear. And the caufe was, for that 
it was then of neceffity to exprefs any point of 
reafon which was more fharp or fubtile than the 
vulgar in that manner, becaufe men in thofe times 
wanted both variety of examples and {fubtilty of 
conceit : and as hieroglyphics were before letters, 
fo parables were before arguments: and neverthe- 
lefs now, and at all times, they do retain much life 
and vigour; becaufe reafon cannot be fo fenfible, 
nor examples fo fit. 

But there remaineth yet another ufe of Poefy 
Parabolical, oppofite to that which we laft men- 
tioned: for that tendeth to demonftrate and illuf- 
trate that which is taught or delivered, and this 
other to retire and obfcure it: that is, when the 
fecrets and myfteries of religion, policy, or philo- 
fophy, are involved in fables or parables. Of this 
in divine poefy we fee the ufe is authorized. In 


128 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


heathen poefy we fee the expofition of fables doth 
fall out fometimes with great felicity; as in the 
fable that the giants being overthrown in their war 
againft the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge 
thereof brought forth Fame: 

lllam terra parens, ira irritata Deorum, 

Extremam, ut perhibent, Ceo Enceladoque fororem 

Progenuit :°4 
expounded, that when princes and monarchs have 
fuppreffed actual and open rebels, then the ma- 
lignity of the people, which is the mother of re- 
bellion, doth bring forth libels and flanders, and 
taxations of the ftates, which is of the fame kind 
with rebellion, but more feminine. So in the fable, 
that the reft of the gods having confpired to bind 
Jupiter, Pallas®> called Briareus with his hundred 
hands to his aid: expounded, that monarchies need 
not fear any curbing of their abfolutenefs by mighty 
fubjeéts, as long as by wifdom they keep the hearts 
of the people, who will be fure to come in on their 
fide. So in the fable, that Achilles was brought 
up under Chiron the Centaur, who was part a 
man and part a beaft, expounded ingenioufly but 
corruptly by Machiavel,® that it belongeth to the 
education and difcipline of princes to know as well 
how to play the part of the lion in violence, and 
the fox in guile, as of the man in virtue and juf- 
tice. Neverthelefs, in many the like encoun- 
ters, I do rather think that the fable was firft, and 
the expofition devifed, than that the moral was 

54 Virg. Zn. iv. 178-180. 


35 Not Pallas, but Thetis, Hom. J/. A. 401, /79- 
36 Hom. J/. A. 831, and Machiav. Prince, c. 18. 


BOOK II. 129 


firft, and thereupon the fable framed. For I find 
it was an ancient vanity in Chryfippus, that trou- 
bled himfelf with great contention to faften the 
affertions of the Stoics upon the fictions of the 
ancient poets; but yet that all the fables and fic- 
tions of the poets were but pleafure and not figure, 
Linterpofe no opinion. Surely of thofe poets which 
are now extant, even Homer himfelf (notwith- 
ftanding he was made a kind of Scripture by the 
latter fchools of the Grecians,) yet I fhould with- 
out any difficulty pronounce that his fables had no 
fuch inwardnefs in his own meaning; but what 
they might have upon a more original tradition, is 
not eafy to affirm; for he was not the inventor of 
many of them.*7 

In this third®* part of learning, which is poefy, 
I can report no deficience. For being as a plant 
that cometh of the luft of the earth, without a 
formal feed, it hath fprung up and fpread abroad 
more than any other kind. But to afcribe unto 
it that which is due, for the exprefling of affec- 
tions, paffions, corruptions, and cuftoms, we are 
beholding to poets more than to the philofophers’ 
works; and for wit and eloquence, not much lefs 
than to orators’ harangues. But it is not good to 
ftay too long in the theatre. Let us now pafs on 
to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which 
we are to approach and view with more reverence 
and attention. 


57 Jn the Latin, in room of thefe examples, the fables of Pan, 
Perfeus, and Dionyfus, are expounded to fhow refpectively how 
phyfical, political, and moral do¢trines might be thence deduced. 

58 Rather the fecond than the third part of learning —Hiftory, 
Poefy, Philofophy. 


K 


130 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


DeAug.m. The knowledge of man is as the waters, fome 
a uno defcending from above, and fome fpringing from 
fophy. [Di- beneath; the one informed by the light of nature, 
vinity being the other infpired by divine revelation. The light 
referved to : 2 : 
the lat.] Of nature confifteth in the notions of the mind and 
the reports of the fenfes: for as for knowledge 
which man receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative 
and not original; as in a water that befides his 
own fpring-head is fed with other fprings and 
ftreams. So then, according to thefe two differing 
illuminations or originals, knowledge is firft of all 
divided into divinity and philofophy. 
Which is, In Philfophy, the contemplations of man do 
ie Neral either penetrate unto God,—or are circumferred 
(3.)Human, to nature,—or are reflected or reverted upon him- 
felf. Out of which feveral inquiries there do arife 
three knowledges, divine philofophy, natural phil- 
Jophy, and human philofophy or humanity. For all 
things are marked and {tamped with this triple 
character, of the power of God, the difference of 
nature, and the ufe of man. But becaufe the dif- 
tributions and partitions of knowledge are not like 
feveral lines that meet in one angle, and fo touch 
but in a point; but are like branches of a tree, 
that meet in a ftem, which hath a dimenfion and 
quantity of entirenefs and continuance, before it 
come to difcontinue and break itfelf into arms and 
boughs: therefore it is good, before we enter into 
the former diftribution, to erect and conftitute one 
The Piilofo- univerfal fcience, by the name of philofophia prima, 
phia Prima yimitive or fummary philofophy, as the main and 


precedes all 
divifions | Common way, before we come where the ways 


BOOK II. 131 


part and divide themfelves; which fcience whe- 
ther I fhould report as deficient or no, I ftand 
doubtful. For I find a certain rhapfody of natural 
theology, and of divers parts of logic; and of that 
part of natural philofophy which concerneth the 
principles, and of that other part of natural philo- 
fophy which concerneth the foul or {pirit; all thefe 
ftrangely commixed and confufed; but being ex- 
amined, it feemeth to me rather a depredation of 
other fciences, advanced and exalted unto fome 
height of terms, than anything folid or fubftantive 
of itfelf. Neverthelefs I cannot be ignorant of the 
diftin@tion which is current, that the fame things 
are handled but in feveral refpeéts. As for ex- 
ample, that logic confidereth of many things as 
they are in notion, and this philofophy as they are 
in nature; the one in appearance, the other in 
exiftence; but I find this difference better made 
than purfued. For if they had confidered quantity, 
fimilitude, diverfity, and the reft of thofe extern 
characters of things, as philofophers, and in nature, 
their inquiries muft of force have been of a far 
other kind than they are. For doth any of them, 
in handling quantity, {peak of the force of union, 
how and how far it multiplieth virtue? Doth any 
give the reafon, why fome things in nature are fo 
common, and in fo great mafs, and others fo rare, 
and in fo fmall quantity? Doth any, in handling 
Jimilitude and diverfity, affign the caufe why iron 
fhould not move to iron, which is more like, but 
move to the lode-ftone, which is lefs like? Why 
in all diverfities of things there fhould be certain 


132 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


participles in nature, which are almoft ambiguous 
to which kind they fhould be referred? But there 
is a mere and deep filence touching the nature and 
operation of thofe common adjunéts of things, as 
in nature: and only a refuming and repeating of 
the force andufe of them in f{peech or argument. 
Therefore, becaufe in a writing of this nature, I 
avoid all fubtilty, my meaning touching this ori- 
ginal or univerfal philofophy is thus, in a plain and 
grofs defcription by negative: That it be a recep- 
tacle for all fuch profitable obfervations and axioms 
as fall not within the compafs of any of the {pecial 
parts of philofophy or fetences, but are more common 
and of a higher ftage. 

Now that there are many of that kind need not 
to be doubted. For example: is not the rule, Sz 
inequalibus equalia addas, omnia erunt inequaiia, 
an axiom as well of juftice as of the mathema- 
tics £59 and is there not a true coincidence between 
commutative and diftributive juftice, and arithme- 
tical and geometrical proportion? Is not that 
other rule, Que in eodem tertio conveniunt, et inter 
Je conveniunt, a rule taken from the mathematics, 
but fo potent in logic as all fyllogifms are built 
upon it? Is not the obfervation, Omnia mutantur, 
nil interit,® a contemplation in philofophy thus, 
that the guantum of nature is eternal? in natural 
theology thus, that it requireth the fame Omnipo- 


59 In Ellis and Spedding’s ed, there is a note faying that this 
claufe and its fucceffor are tran{pofed in the original ed. This is 
not the cafe in the copy I have collated. And in one or two other 
notices of variation my copy did not bear out their remarks. 

60 Plat. Theet. i. 152. Ovid, Met, xv. 165. 


BOOK II. 133 


tence to make fomewhat nothing, which at the 
firft made nothing fomewhat? according to the 
Scripture, Didici quod omnia opera, que fecit Deus, 
perfeverent in perpetuum ; non poffumus eis quicquam 
addere nec auferre' Is not the ground, which 
Machiavel wifely and largely difcourfeth concern- 
ing governments, that the way to eftablifh and pre- 
ferve them, is to reduce them ad principia, a rule 
in religion and nature, as well as in civil adminif- 
tration ° Was not the Perfian magic a reduction 
or correfpondence of the principles and architec- 
tures of nature to the rules and policy of govern- 
ments? Is not the precept of a mufician, to fall 
from a difcord or harfh accord upon a concord or 
{weet accord, alike true in affection. Is not the 
trope of mufic, to avoid or flide from the clofe or 
cadence, common with the trope of rhetoric of 
deceiving expectation ?® Is not the delight of the 
quavering upon a ftop in mufic the fame with the 
playing of light upon the water? 


Splendet tremulo fub lumine pontus.®* 


Are not the organs of the fenfes of one kind with 
the organs of reflection, the eye with a glafs, the 
ear with a cave or ftrait determined and bounded? 
Neither are thefe only fimilitudes, as men of nar- 
row obfervation may conceive them to be, but the 
fame footfteps of nature, treading or printing upon 
feveral fubjeé&ts or matters. This fcience, there- 
fore, as I underftand it, I may juftly report as de- 


61 Ecclus. xlii. 21. 62 Difcourfe on Livy, iii. 1. 
e : Y 

63 See Nov. Org. ii. 27. ‘ Inftantie conformes.” 

6 Virg. Zn. vii. 9. 


De Aug. 111. 
2, 


(1.) Divine 
Philofophy, 
or Natural 
Theology. 


134 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ficient : for I fee fometimes the profounder fort of 
wits in handling fome particular argument will 
now and then draw a bucket of water out of this 
well for their prefent ufe; but the fpring-head 
thereof feemeth to me not to have been vifited ; 
being of fo excellent ufe, both for the difclofing of 
nature, and the abridgment of art. 

This fcience being therefore firft placed as a 
common parent, like unto Berecynthia, which had 
fo much heavenly iffue, 

Omnes Celicolas, omnes fupera alta tenentes,® 
we may return to the former diftribution of the 
three philofophies, divine, natural, and human. 

And as concerning divine philofophy or natural 
theology, it is that knowledge or rudiment of know- 
ledge concerning God, which may be obtained by 
the contemplation of His creatures; which know- 
ledge may be truly termed divine in refpect of the 
object, and natural in refpect of the light. The 
bounds of this knowledge are, that it fufficeth to 
convince atheifm, but not to inform religion : and 
therefore there was never miracle wrought by God 
to convert an atheift, becaufe the light of nature 
might have led him to confefs a God: but mira- 
cles have been wrought to convert idolaters and 
the fuperftitious, becaufe no light of nature ex- 
tendeth to declare the will and true worfhip of 
God. For as all works do fhow forth the power 
and {kill of the workman, and not his image ; fo it 
is of the works of God, which do fhow the omni- 
potency and wifdom of the Maker, but not His 

6 Virg. An. vi. 787. 


BOOK I]. 135 


image: and therefore therein the heathen opinion 
differeth from the facred truth; for they fuppofed 
the world to be the image of God, and man to be 
an extract or compendious image of the world ;© 
but the Scriptures never vouchfafe to attribute to 
the world that honour, as to be the image of 
God, but only the work of His hands : neither do 
they fpeak of any other image of God, but man: 
wherefore by the contemplation of nature to in- 
duce and enforce the acknowledgment of God, 
and to demonftrate His power, providence, and 
goodnefs, is an excellent argument, and hath been 
excellently handled by divers. 

But on the other fide, out of the contemplation 
of nature, or ground of human knowledge, to in- 
duce any verity or perfuafion concerning the points 
of faith, isin my judgment not fafe: Da fidei que 
fidei funt.© For the heathens themfelves con- 
clude as much in that excellent and divine fable of 
the golden chain: That men and gods were not able 
to draw “fupiter down to the earth; but contrari- 
wife, Fupiter was able to draw them up to heaven.®9 
So as we ought not to attempt to draw down or 
fubmit the myfteries of God to our reafon; but 
contrariwife to raife and advance our reafon to 
the divine truth. So as in this part of knowledge, 
touching divine philofophy, I am fo far from noting 
any deficience, as I rather note an excefs: where- 


66 Muxpéxoopoc—a favourite dogma with Paracelfus, who di- 
vided the body of man according to the cardinal points of the 
world. But Bacon is perhaps referring to the Platonifts in the firft 
part of the fentence. 

PPs, vila 3. . uke xx. 25. 6 Hom. Il. viii. 19-22. 


136 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


unto I have digrefled becaufe of the extreme pre- 
judice which both religion and philofophy have 
received and may receive, by being commixed 
together ; as that which undoubtedly will make an 
heretical religion, and an imaginary and fabulous 
philofophy. 

Otherwife it is of the nature of angels and 
{pirits, which is an appendix of theology both 
divine and natural, and is neither infcrutable nor 
interdicted ; for although the Scripture faith, Let 
no man deceive you in fublime difcourfe touching the 
worfbip of angels, preffing into that he knoweth not, 
&Fe.,7° yet, notwithf{tanding, if you obferve well 
that precept, it may appear thereby that there be 
two things only forbidden, adoration of them, and 
opinion fantaftical of them, either to extol them 
farther than appertaineth to the degree of a crea- 
ture, or to extol a man’s knowledge of them far- 
ther than he hath ground. But the fober and 
grounded inquiry, which may arife out of the paf- 
fages of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations 
of nature, is not reftrained. So of degenerate and 
revolted fpirits, the converfing with them or the 
employment of them is prohibited, much more 
any veneration towards them; but the contem- 
plation or fcience of their nature, their power, their 
illufions, either by Scripture or reafon, is a part of 
{piritual wifdom. For fo the apoftle faith, We are 
not ignorant of his ftratagems."' And it isno more 
unlawful to inquire the nature of evil fpirits, than 
to inquire the force of poifons in nature, or the 


7 Colofs, ii, 18. 43,2 (Cor, ike ae 


BOOK I]. 137 


nature of fin and vice in morality. But this part 
touching angels and fpirits I cannot note as defi- 
cient, for many have occupied themfelves in it;7* 
I may rather challenge it, in many of the writers 
thereof, as fabulous and fantatftical. 

Leaving therefore divine philofophy or natural 
theology, (not Divinity or infpired theology, which 
we referve for the laft of all, as the haven and 
fabbath of all man’s contemplations) we will now 
proceed to natural philofophy. 

If then it be true that Democritus faid, That 
the truth of nature lieth hid in certain eed mines 
and caves,@ and if it be true likewife that the al- 
chemifts do fo much inculcate, that Vulcan is a 
fecond nature, and imitateth that dexteroufly and 
compendioufly, which nature worketh by ambages 
and length of time, it were good to divide natural 
philofophy into the mine and the furnace: and to 
make two profeffions or occupations of natural 
philofophers, fome to be pioneers and fome {miths ; 
fome to dig, and fome to refine and hammer: and 
furely I do beft allow of a divifion of that kind, 
though in more familiar and fcholaftical terms ; 
namely, that thefe be the two parts of natural phi- 
lofophy,—the inqui/ition of caufes,and the production 
of effects; fpeculative, and operative; natural I[cience, 
and natural prudence. For as in civil matters there 
is a wifdom of difcourfe and a wifdom of direction ; 


® The nature of Angels was a favourite fubjeét of {peculation 
and difcuffion among the Schoolmen, whofe writings on it deferve 
Bacon’s cenfure. 

73 éy BuO yao 7 adnOea. Diog. Laert. ix. 72.—Whence our 
* Truth lies at the bottom of a Well.” 


De Augm, 
its Oh 

(z.) Natu- 
ral Philofo- 


phy. 


De Aug. 111. 


4. 
Natural 
{cience is 
Phyfical 
and Meta- 
phyfical : 
the latter 
defined. 


138 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fo is itin natural. And here I will make a requeft, 
that for the latter, or at leaft for a part thereof, I 
may revive and reintegrate the mifapplied and 
abufed name of zatural magic ;"* which, in the 
true fenfe, is but natural wifdom, or natural pru- 
dence; taken according to the ancient acception, 
purged from vanity and fuperftition. Now al- 
though it be true, and I know it well, that there 
is an intercourfe between caufes and effects, fo as 
both thefe knowledges, fpeculative and operative, 
have a great connection between themfelves ; yet 
becaufe all true and fruitful natural philofophy 
hath a double fcale or ladder, afcendent and de- 
fcendent : afcending from experiments to the in- 
vention of caufes, and defcending from caufes to 
the invention of new experiments; therefore I 
judge it moft requifite that thefe two parts be 
feverally confidered and handled. 

Natural fcience or theory is divided into phyfique 
and metaphy/ique: wherein I defire it may be con- 
ceived that I ufe the word metaphyfique in a dif- 
fering fenfe from that that is received : and in like 
manner, I doubt not but it will eafily appear to 
men of judgment, that in this and other particu- 
lars, wherefoever my conception and notion may 
differ from the ancient, yet I am ftudious to keep 
the ancient terms. For hoping well to deliver 
myfelf from miftaking, by the order and perfpi- 
cuous expreffing of that I do propound, I am 
otherwife zealous and affectionate to recede as little 


74 Cf. Nov, Org. ii. 9, and 51, and De Augm. iii. 5, where he 
afferts for the term Magic its proper honours. 


BOOK II. 139 


from antiquity, either in terms or opinions, as may 
ftand with truth and the proficience of knowledge. 
And herein I cannot a little marvel at the philo- 
fopher Ariftotle, that did proceed in fuch a {pirit 
of difference and contradiction towards all anti- 
quity: undertaking not only to frame new words 
of fcience at pleafure, but to confound and extin- 
guifh all ancient wifdom: infomuch as he never 
nameth or mentioneth an ancient author or opin- 
ion, but to confute and reprove ;’> wherein for 
glory, and drawing followers and difciples, he took 
the right courfe. For certainly there cometh to 
pafs and hath place in human truth, that which 
was noted and pronounced in the higheft truth: 
Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis me; fi quis 
venerit in nomine fuo eum recipietis.*© But in this 
divine aphorifm, (confidering to whom it was ap- 
plied, namely to Antichrift, the higheft deceiver,) 
we may difcern well that the coming in a man’s 
own name, without regard of antiquity or pater- 
nity, is no good fign of truth, although it be joined 
with the fortune and fuccefs of an Eum recipietis. 
But for this excellent perfon Ariftotle, I will think 
of him that he learned that humour of his fcholar, 
with whom, it feemeth, he did emulate; the one 
to conquer all opinions, as the other to conquer 
all nations; wherein neverthelefs, it may be, he 
may at fome men’s hands that are of a bitter dif- 
pofition get a like title as his fcholar did: 


7 Cf. Nov. Org. i. 63.67; where he likens him to the Turks, 
whofe Sultans on afcending the throne murder all the feed royal. 
Ci, Ar. Eth. Nic. I. 6.1. where Ariftotle declares that it is fome- 
times needful for truth’s fake cai ra oixtia avaupeiv. 


7 John v. 43. 


140 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Felix terrarum przdo, non utile mundo 
Editus exemplum, &c. 


So 


Felix doétrine praedo.77 


But to me, on the other fide, that do defire as 
much as lieth in my pen to ground a fociable 
intercourfe between antiquity and proficience, it 
feemeth beft to keep way with antiquity u/qgue ad 
aras; and therefore to retain the ancient terms, 
though I fometimes alter the ufes and definitions, 
according to the moderate proceeding in civil go- 
vernment; where although there be fome altera- 
tion, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wifely noteth, 
Eadem Magiftratuum vocabula.”® 
And diftin- | To return therefore to the ufe and acception 
ai of the term Metaphyfique, as I do now underftand 
Philofopbia the word; it appeareth, by that which hath been 
silico already faid, that I intend philofophia prima, Sum- 
mary Philofophy, and Metaphyfique, which here- 
tofore have been confounded as one, to be two 
diftin& things. For the one I have made as a 
parent or common anceftor to all knowledge ; and 
the other I have now brought in as a branch or 
defcendent of natural fcience. It appeareth like- 
wife that I have affigned to Summary Philofophy 
the common principles and axioms which are pro- 
mifcuous and indifferent to feveral fciences: I 


7 Illic Pellaei proles vefana Philippi 
Felix prado jacet, terrarum vindice fato 
iRaptusimese meme | 
Nam fibi libertas unquam fi redderet orbem, | 
Ludibrio fervatus erat, non utile mundo 
Editus exemplum,. Lucan. Phars. x. 20. 

TEV aC ageless 


BOOK II. 141 


have affigned unto it likewife the inquiry touching 
the operation of the relative and adventive charac- 
ters of effences, as quantity, fimilitude, diverfity, 
poffibility, and the reft: with this diftinction and 
provifion ; that they be handled as they have effi- 
cacy in nature, and not logically. It appeareth 
likewife that Natural Theology, which heretofore 
hath been handled confufedly with Metaphyfique, 
I have inclofed and bounded by itfelf. It is there- 
fore now a queftion what is left remaining for 
Metaphyfique; wherein I may without prejudice 
preferve thus much of the conceit of antiquity, 
that Phyfique fhould contemplate that which is 
inherent in matter, and therefore tranfitory ; and 
Metaphyfique that which is abftracted and fixed. 
And again, that Phyfique fhould handle that which 
fuppofeth in nature only a being and moving ; and 
Metaphyfique fhould handle that which fuppofeth 
further in nature a reafon, underftanding, and plat- 
form. But the difference, perfpicuoufly exprefled, 
is moft familiar and fenfible. For as we divided 
natural philofophy in general into the inquiry of 
caufes,and productions of effecis : fo that part which 
concerneth the inquiry of caufes we do fubdivide 
according to the received and found divifion of 
caufes ; the one part, which is Phyfique, inquireth 
and handleth the material and efficient caufes ; and 
the other, which is Metaphyfique, handleth the 
formal and final caufes.79 


Phyfique, taking it according to the derivation, OF, Phyfi- 


and not according to our idiom for medicine, is 


7 For thefe “ four caufes,” fee Arift. Poff. Anal.ii, 10. 1. Cf. 
Mill’s Logic, Bk. iii. Ch. 5. 


cal; of the 
material 
and effi- 
cient 
caufes, 


142 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fituate in a middle term or diftance between Na- 
tural Hiftory and Metaphyfique. For natural hif- 
tory defcribeth the variety of things; phyfique, 
the caufes, but variable or refpective caufes; and 
metaphyfique, the fixed and conftant caufes. 


Limus ut hic durefcit, et hac ut cera liquefcit, 
Uno eodemque igni : ®° 

Fire is the caufe of induration, but refpective to 
clay; fire is the caufe of colliquation, but refpec- 
tive to wax; but fire is no conftant caufe either 
of induration or colliquation : fo then the phyfical 
caufes are but the efficient and the matter. Phy- 
fique hath three parts ; whereof two refpect nature 
united or collected, the third contemplateth nature 
diffufed or diftributed. Nature is collected either 
into one entire total, or elfe into the fame prin- 
ciples or feeds. So as the firft do€trine is touch- 
ing the contexture or configuration of things, as 
de mundo, de univerfitate rerum. ‘The fecond is 
the doétrine concerning the principles or originals 
of times. The third is the doctrine concerning 
all variety and particularity of things; whether it 
be of the differing fubftances, or their differing 
qualities and natures; whereof there needeth no 
enumeration, this part being but as a glofs, or 
paraphrafe, that attendeth upon the text of natural 
hiftory. Of thefe three I cannot report any as 
deficient. In what truth or perfection they are 
handled, I make not now any judgment; but they 
are parts of knowledge not deferted by the labour 


of man. 
8% Virg. Ecl. viii. 80. 


BOOK I]. 143 


For Metaphyfique, we have affigned unto it the 
inquiry of formal and final caufes ; which affigna- 
tion, as to the former of them, may feem to be 
nugatory and void; becaufe of the received and 
inveterate opinion that the inquifition of man is 
not competent to find out effential Forms or true 
differences: of which opinion we will take this 
hold, that the invention of Forms is of all other 
parts of knowledge the worthieft to be fought, if 
it be poffible to be found.*t As for the poffibility, 
they are ill difcoverers that think there is no land, 
when they can fee nothing but fea. But it is ma- 
nifeft that Plato, in his opinion of Ideas, as one 
that had a wit of elevation fituate as upon a cliff, 
did defery, that Forms were the true object of know- 
ledge ;*° but loft the real fruit of his opinion, by 
confidering of Forms as abfolutely abftracted from 
matter, and not confined and determined by mat- 
ter; and fo turning his opinion upon theology, 
wherewith all his natural philofophy is infected.® 
But if any man fhall keep a continual watchful 
and fevere eye upon action, operation, and the ufe 
of knowledge, he may advife and take notice what 
are the Forms, the difclofures whereof are fruitful 
and important to the ftate of man. For as to the 
forms of fubftances, man only except, of whom it 
is faid, Formavit hominem de limo terre, et [piravit 
in faciem ejus fpiraculum vita, and not as of all 


81 See Nov. Org. ii. 1. Date nature formam .. . invenire, 
opus et intentio eft humane fcientie. The firft twenty chapters 
of Bk. ii. of the Now. Org. are an attempt at expanfion of this 
faying. 

82 Plato, Rep. x. init. 8 Nov. Org. i. 96. 


(2.) Meta- 
phyfical. 
(a.) Of for- 


mal caufes. 


144 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


other creatures, Producant aque, producat terra ;** 
the Forms of fubftances, I fay, as they are now by 
compounding and tranfplanting multiplied, are fo 
perplexed, as they are not to be inquired ; no more 
than it were either poflible or to purpofe to feek 
in grofs the Forms of thofe founds which make 
words, which by compofition and tranfpofition of 
letters are infinite. But, on the other fide, to in- 
quire the Form of thofe founds or voices which 
make fimple letters is eafily comprehenfible ; and 
being known, induceth and manifefteth the Forms 
of all words, which confift and are compounded 
of them. In the fame manner to inquire the Form 
of a lion, of an oak, of gold; nay, of water, of air, 
is a vain purfuit : but to inquire the Forms of fenfe, 
of voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, of 
gravity and levity, of denfity, of tenuity, of heat, 
of cold, and all other natures and qualities, which, 
like an alphabet, are not many, and of which the 
eflences, upheld by matter, of all creatures do con- 
fift ; to inquire, I fay, the true Forms of thefe, is 
that part of metaphyfique which we now define of. 
Not but that Phyfic doth make inquiry, and take 
confideration of the fame natures: but how? 
Only as to the material and efficient caufes of them, 
and not as to the Forms. For example; if the 
caufe of whitenefs in fnow or froth be inquired, 
and it be rendered thus, that the fubtile intermix- 
ture of air and water is the caufe, it is well ren- 
dered; but, neverthelefs, is this the form of white- 
nefs? No; but it is the efficient, which is ever 


BS Gen. its 751. 20. 24> 


BOOK II. 145 


but vehiculum forme.® This part of Metaphyfique 
I do not find laboured and performed: whereat I 
marvel not; becaufe I hold it not poffible to be 
invented by that courfe of invention which hath 
been ufed; in regard that men, which is the root 
of all error, have made too untimely a departure 
and too remote a recefs from particulars. 

But the ufe of this part of Metaphyfique, which 
I report as deficient, is of the reft the moft excel- 
lent in two refpects: the one, becaufe it is the 
duty and virtue of all knowledge to abridge the 
infinity of individual experience, as much as the 
conception of truth will permit, and to remedy the 
complaint of vita brevis, ars longa ;*° which is 
performed by uniting the notions and conceptions 
of fciences: for knowledges are as pyramids, 
whereof hiftory is the bafis. So of natural philo- 
fophy, the bafis is natural hiftory ; the ftage next 
the bafis is phyfique; the ftage next the vertical 
point is metaphyfique. As for the vertical point, 
opus quod operatur Deus a principio ufque ad finem,*' 
the fummary law of nature, we know not whether 
man’s inquiry can attain unto it. But thefe three 
be the true itages of knowledge, and are to them 
that are depraved no better than the giant’s hills: 


Ter funt conati imponere Pelio Offam, 
Scilicet atque Off frondofum involvere Olympum.*®* 


But to thofe who refer all things to the glory of 


85 Now. Org. ii. 3, efficiens et materialis caufa (que caufe fluxe 
funt, et nihil aliud quam vedicula et caufe formam deferentes in 
aliquibus.) 

= ippace-app. i. © Eccles. ili. ar. © Georg. i. 281, 282. 

L 


Good, as it 
abridges 
particulars. 


And as it 
gives liberty 
to man’s 
powers. 


146 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING 


God, they are as the three acclamations, Sanéfe, 
fanéte, fanéte ! holy in the defcription or dilatation 
of His works; holy in the connection or concate- 
nation of them; and holy in the union of them in 
a perpetual and uniform law. And therefore the 
fpeculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato, 
although but a fpeculation in them, that all things 
by feale did afcend to unity.89 So then always 
that knowledge is worthieft which is charged with 
leaft multiplicity ; which appeareth to be meta- 
phyfique; as that which confidereth the fimple 
Forms or differences of things, which are few in 
number, andthe degrees and co-ordinations whereof 
make all this variety. 

The fecond refpeét, which valueth and com- 
mendeth this part of metaphyfique, is that it doth 
enfranchife the power of man unto the greateft 
liberty and poffibility of works and effects. For 
phyfique carrieth men in narrow and reftrained 
ways, fubject to many accidents of impediments, 
imitating the ordinary flexuous courfes of nature ; 
but late undique funt fapientibus vie :® to fapience, 
which was anciently defined to be rerum divinarum 
et humanarum fcientia,® there is ever choice of 
means. For phyfical caufes give light to new in- 
vention in fimili materia ; but whofoever knoweth 
any Form, knoweth the utmoft poffibility of fuper- 
inducing that nature upon any variety of matter ; 
and {fo is lefs reftrained in operation, either to the 


89 Plato, Parm. 165, 166. 
90 Perhaps Prov. xv. 19, via juftorum abfque offendiculo. 
5! Cic. de Off. i. 43. (154.) 


BOOK Il. 147 


bafis of the matter, or the condition of the efficient; 
which kind of knowledge Salomon likewife, though 
in a more divine fort, elegantly defcribeth: non 
arétabuntur greffus tui, et currens non habebis of- 
fendiculum.* ‘The ways of fapience are not much 
liable either to particularity or chance. 

The fecond part of metaphyfique is the imguiry 
of final caufes, which | am moved to report not 
as omitted, but as mifplaced; and yet if it were 
but a fault in order, I would not fpeak of it: for 
order is matter of illuftration, but pertaineth not 
to the fubftance of fciences. But this mifplacing 
hath caufed a deficience, or at leaft a great impro- 
ficience in the fciences themfelves. For the hand- 
ling of final caufes mixed with the reft in phyfical 
inquiries, hath intercepted the fevere and diligent 
inquiry of all real and phyfical caufes, and given 
men the occafion to ftay upon thefe fatisfactory 
and fpecicus caufes, to the great arreft and preju- 
dice of further difcovery. For this I find done 
not only by Plato, who ever anchoreth upon that 
fhore, but by Ariftotle, Galen, and others which 
do ufually likewife fall upon thefe flats of difcourfing 
caufes.°3 For to fay that the hairs of the eyelids are 
for a quickfet and fence about the fight ; or that the 
firmnefs of the kins and hides of living creatures is 
to defend them from the extremities of heat or cold; 
or that the bones are for the columns or beams, where- 
upon the frames of the bodies of living creatures are 


92 Prov. iv. 12. 


% Ariftot. Phy/. ii. 8, 2, where he illuftrates by the teeth. Alfo 
Plat. Tim. iii, 70, and Galen, De Uju Partium. 


(8.) Of final 


caufes, 


148 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


built: or that the leaves of trees are for protecting of 
the fruit ; or that the clouds are for watering of the 
earth ; or that the folidne/s of the earth is for the 
Station and manjfion of living creatures and the like, 
is well inquired and collected in metaphyfique, but 
in phyfique they are impertinent. Nay, they are 
indeed but remore, and hindrances to ftay and 
flug the fhip from further failing ; and have brought 
this to pafs, that the fearch of the phyfical caufes 
hath been neglected, and paffed in filence. And 
therefore the natural philofophy of Democritus 
and fome others, (who did not fuppofe a mind or 
reafon in the frame of things, but attributed the 
form thereof able to maintain itfelf to infinite 
eflays or proofs of nature, which they term /for- 
tune) feemeth to me, as far as I can judge by the 
recital and fragments which remain unto us, in 
particularities of phyfical caufes, more real and 
better inquired than that of Ariftotle and Plato; 
whereof both intermingled final caufes, the one as 
a part of theology, and the other as a part of logic, 
which were the favourite ftudies refpectively of 
both thofe perfons. Not becaufe thofe final caufes 
are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being 
kept within their own province; but becaufe 
their excurfions into the limits of phyfical caufes 
hath bred a vaftnefs and folitude in that track. 
For otherwife, keeping their precinéts and borders, 
men are extremely deceived if they think there is 
an enmity or repugnancy at all between them. 
For the caufe rendered, that the hairs about the 
eye-lids are for the fafeguard of the fight, doth not 


BOOK II. 149 


impugn the caufe rendered, that pilofity is incident 
to orifices of moifiure ; mufcofi fontes,9* &c. Nor 
the caufe rendered, that the firmne/s of hides ts for 
the armour of the body againft extremities of heat or 
cold, doth not impugn the caufe rendered, that 
contraétion of pores 1s incident to the outwardeft 
parts, in regard of their adjacence to foreign or un- 
like bodies: and fo of the reft: both caufes being 
true and compatible, the one declaring an intention, 
the other a confequence only. Neither doth this 
call in queftion, or derogate from Divine Provi- 
dence, but highly confirm and exalt it. For asin 
civil actions he is the greater and deeper politique, 
that can make other men the inftruments of his 
will and ends, and yet never acquaint them with 
his purpofe, fo as they fhall do it and yet not know 
what they do, than he that imparteth his meaning 
to thofe he employeth; fo is the wifdom of God 
more admirable, when nature intendeth one thing, 
and Providence draweth forth another, than if He 
communicated to particular creatures and motions 
the characters and impreffions of His Providence. 
And thus much for metaphyfique: the latter part 
whereof I allow as extant, but wifh it confined to 
his proper place. 

Neverthelefs there remaineth yet another part 
of Natural Philofophy, which is commonly made 
a principal part, and holdeth rank with Phyfique 
fpecial and Metaphyfique, which is Mathema- 
tique; but I think it more agreeable to the 
nature of things and to the light of order to 


9 Virg. Ecl. vii. 45. 


De Augm. 
11. 6. 
Mathema- 
tics may be 
ranked 
under Meta- 
phyfics. 


This branch 
is, 
(a.) Pure. 


150 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


place it as a branch of Metaphyfique: for the 
fubject of it being quantity, (not quantity in- 
definite, which is but a relative, and belongeth 
to philofophia prima, as hath been faid, but guan- 
tity determined or proportionable), it appeareth to 
be one of the effential Forms of things; as that 
that is caufative in nature of a number of effects ; 
infomuch as we fee, in the fchools both of De- 
mocritus and of Pythagoras, that the one did 
afcribe figure to the firft feeds of things, and the 
other did fuppofe numbers to be the principles 
and originals of things: and it is true alfo that of 
all other Forms, as we underftand Forms, it is the 
moft abftracted and feparable from matter, and 
therefore moft proper to Metaphyfique ; which 
hath likewife been the caufe why it hath been 
better laboured and inquired than any of the other 
Forms, which are more immerfed in matter. 

For it being the nature of the mind of man, to 
the extreme prejudice of knowledge, to delight in 
the fpacious liberty of generalities, as in a cham- 
pain region, and not in the inclofures of particu- 
larity ; the Mathematics of all other knowledge 
were the goodlieft fields to fatisfy that appetite. 
But for the placing of this fcience, it is not much 
material: only we have endeavoured in thefe our 
partitions to obferve a kind of perfpective, that 
one part may caft light upon another. 

The Mathematics are either pure or mixed. To 
the Pure Mathematics are thofe fciences belonging 


95 For thefe opinions of Democritus and the Pythagoreans, fee 
Ariftot. De Anima, i. 2, Met. i. 4, 5. 


BOOK II. 151 


which handle guantity determinate, merely fevered 
from any axioms of natural philofophy ; and thefe 
are two, Geometry and Arithmetic ; the one hand- 
ling quantity continued, and the other diffevered. 
Mixed hath for fubject fome axioms or parts of (4.) Mixed. 
natural philofophy, and confidereth guantity de- 
termined, as it is auxiliary and incident unto them. 
For many parts of nature can neither be invented 
with fufficient fubtilty, nor demonftrated with 
fufficient perfpicuity, nor accommodated unto ufe 
with fufficient dexterity, without the aid and inter- 
vening of the mathematics ; of which fort are per- 
Ipeétive, mufic, aftronomy, cofmography, architecture, 
enginery, and divers others. 
In the Mathematics I can report no deficience, 
except it be that men do not fufficiently underftand 
the excellent ufe of the Pure Mathematics, in that 
they do remedy and cure many defects in the wit 
and faculties intellectual. For if the wit be too 
dull, they fharpen it; if too wandering, they fix 
it; if too inherent in the fenfe, they abftract it. 
So that as tennis is a game of no ufe in itfelf, but 
of great ufe in refpect it maketh a quick eye and a 
body ready to put itfelf into all poftures ; fo in the 
Mathematics, that ufe which is collateral and in- 
tervenient is no lefs worthy than that which is 
principal and intended. And as for the Mixed 
Mathematics, I may only make this predi¢tion, that 
there cannot fail to be more kinds of them, as 
nature grows further difclofed. “Thus much of 
Natural Science, or the part of nature fpeculative. ,. ., 
ii. Natural 
For Natural Prudence, or the part operative of Prudence. 


(1.) Experi- 


mental. 


De Augm. 
fit Ge 
(2.) Philo- 
fophical. 


(3-) Ma- 
gical, 


152 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Natural Philofophy, we will divide it into three 
parts, experimental, philofophical, and magical ; 
which three parts active have a correfpondence 
and analogy with the three parts fpeculative, na- 
tural hiftory, phyfique, and metaphyfique: for 
many operations have been invented, fometimes 
by a cafual incidence and occurrence, fometimes by 
a purpofed experiment: and of thofe which have 
been found by an intentional experiment, fome 
have been found out by varying or extending the 
fame experiment, fome by transferring and com- 
pounding divers experiments the one into the 
other, which kind of invention an empiric may 
manage. 

Again, by.the knowledge of phyfical caufes 
there cannot fail to follow many indications and 
defignations of new particulars, if men in their 
{fpeculation will keep one eye upon ufe and prac- 
tice. But thefe are but coaftings along the fhore, 
Premendo littus iniquum:°® for it feemeth to me 
there can hardly be difcovered any radical or fun- 
damental alterations and innovations in nature, 
either by the fortune and eflays of experiments, 
or by the light and direction of phyfical caufes. 
If therefore we have reported Metaphyfique defi- 
cient, it muft follow that we do the like of natural 
Magic, which hath relation thereunto. For as for 
the Natural Magic whereof now there is mention 
in books, containing certain credulous and fuper- 
{titious conceits and obfervations of fympathies 
and antipathies, and hidden properties, and fome 


Por For.y Odile 3 


BOOK I]. 153 


frivolous experiments, ftrange rather by difguife- 
ment than in themfelves; it is as far differing in truth 
of nature from fuch a knowledge as we require, 
as the ftory of King Arthur of Britain, or Hugh 
_ of Bordeaux, differs from Czfar’s Commentaries 
in truth of ftory. For it is manifeft that Czefar 
did greater things de vero than thofe imaginary 
heroes were feigned to do; but he did them not 
in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of learning 
the fable of Ixion9? was a figure, who defigned 
to enjoy Juno, the goddefs of power ; and inftead 
of her had copulation with a cloud, of which mix- 
ture were begotten centaurs and chimeras. So 
whofoever fhall entertain high and vaporous ima- 
ginations, inftead of a laborious and fober inquiry 
of truth, fhall beget hopes and beliefs of ftrange 
and impoffible fhapes. 

And therefore we may note in thefe fciences 
which hold fo much of imagination and belief, as this 
degenerate Natural Magic, Alchemy, Aftrology, 
and the like, that in their propofitions the defcrip- 
tion of the mean is ever more monftrous than the 
pretence or end. For it is a thing more probable, 
that he that knoweth well the natures of werght, 
of colour, of pliant and fragile, in refpe&t of the 
hammer, of volatile and fixed in refpect of the fire 
and the reft, may fuperinduce upon fome metal 
the nature and Form of gold by fuch mechanique 
as belongeth to the produétion of the natures 
afore rehearfed, than that fome grains of the 
medicine projected fhould in a few moments of 


7 Pind, Pyth. ii. 21, 


154 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


time turn a fea of quickfilver or other material 
into gold: fo it is more probable that he that know- 
eth the nature of arefaction, the nature of affimi- 
lation of nourifhment to the thing nourifhed, the 
manner of increafe and clearing of fpirits, the 
manner of the depredations which fpirits make 
upon the humours and folid parts, fhall by am- 
bages of diets, bathings, anointings, medicines, 
motions, and the like, prolong life, cr reftore fome 
degree of youth or vivacity, than that it can be 
done with the ufe of a few drops or feruples of a 
liquor or receipt. ‘To conclude, therefore, the 
true Natural Magic, which is that great liberty and 
latitude of operation which dependeth upon the 
knowledge of Forms, I may report deficient, as 
the relative thereof is. 

To which part, if we be ferious, and incline not 
to vanities and plaufible difcourfe, befides the de- 
riving and deducing the operations themfelves from 
Metaphyfique, there are pertinent two points of 
much purpofe, the one by way of preparation, the 
other by way of caution : the firft is, that there be 
made a kalendar, refembling an inventory of the 
eftate of man, containing all the inventions, being 
the works or fruits of nature or art, which are now 
extant, and whereof man is already poflefled ; out 
of which doth naturally refult a note, what things 
are yet held impoffible, or not invented: which 
kalendar will be the more artificial and ferviceable, 
if to every reputed impoffibility you add what thing 
is extant which cometh the neareft in degree to that 
impoffibility ; to the end that by thefe optatives and 


BOOK I. 155 


potentials man’s inquiry may be more awake in 
deducing direction of works from the fpeculation 
of caufes: and fecondly, that thofe experiments be 
not only efteemed which have an immediate and 
prefent ufe, but thofe principally which are of moft 
univerfal confequence for invention of other ex- 
periments, and thofe which give moft light to the 
invention of caufes ; for the invention of the ma- 
riner’s needle, which giveth the direction, is of no 
lefs benefit for navigation than the invention of the 
fails which give the motion. 

Thus have I paffled through Natural Philofophy, 
and the deficiencies thereof; wherein if I have 
differed from the ancient and received doétrines, 
and thereby fhall move contradiction ; for my 
part, as I affect not to diffent, fo I purpofe not to 
contend. If it be truth, 

Non canimus furdis, refpondent omnia fylve.% 

The voice of nature will confent, whether the 
voice of man do or no. And as Alexander 
Borgia was wont to fay of the expedition of the 
French for Naples, that they came with chalk in 
their hands to mark up their lodgings, and not 
with weapons to fight ; fo I like better that entry 
of truth which cometh peaceably, with chalk to 
mark up thofe minds which are capable to lodge 
and harbour it, than that which cometh with pug- 
nacity and contention.% 


Conclufion 
of this part. 


But there remaineth a divifion of natural philo- De Augm. 


98 Virg. Ecl. x. 8. 

9 Nov. Org. i. 35. This faying of Alexander VI. was called 
forth by the expedition of Charles VIII. which over-ran Italy in 
about five months, A.D. 1494. 


Ill. 4s 


156 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fophy according to the report of the inquiry, and 
nothing concerning the matter or fubject; and 
that is pofitive and confiderative ; when the in- 
quiry reporteth either an affertion or a doubt. 
Thefe doubts or non liquets are of two forts, par- 
ticular and total. For the firft, we fee a good 
example thereof in Ariftotle’s Problems, which 
deferved to have had a better continuance; but fo 
neverthelefs as there is one point whereof warning 
is to be given and taken. The regiftering of 
doubts hath two excellent ufes: the one, that it 
faveth philofophy from errors and falfehoods; when 
that which is not fully appearing is not collected 
into affertion, whereby error might draw error, but 
referved in doubt: the other, that the entry of 
doubts are as fo many fuckers or fponges to draw 
ufe of knowledge ; infomuch as that which, if 
doubts had not preceded, a man fhould never have 
advifed, but pafled it over without note, by the 
fuggeftion and folicitation of doubts, is made to be 
attended and applied. But both thefe commodities 
do fcarcely countervail an inconvenience which 
will intrude itfelf, if it be not debarred; which is, 
that when a doubt is once received, men labour 
rather how to keep it a doubt ftill, than how to 
folve it; and accordingly bend their wits. Of this 
we fee the familiar example in lawyers and {cholars, 
both which, if they have once admitted a doubt, 
it goeth ever after authorized for a doubt. But 
that ufe of wit and knowledge is to be allowed, 
which laboureth to make doubtful things certain, 
and not thofe which labour to make certain things 


BOOK I. 157 


doubtful. Therefore thefe kalendars of doubts I 
commend as excellent things ; fo that there be this 
caution ufed, that when they be thoroughly fifted 
and brought to refolution, they be from thenceforth 
omitted, decarded, and not continued to cherifh 
and encourage men in doubting. To which ka- 
lendar of doubts or problems, I advife be annexed 
another kalendar, as much or more material, which 
is a Kalendar of popular errors: I mean chiefly 
in natural hiftory, fuch as pafs in fpeech and con- 
ceit, and are neverthelefs apparently detected and 
convicted of untruth ; that man’s knowledge be not 
weakened nor embafed by fuch drofs and vanity. 
As for the doubts or mon liquets general, or in 
total, I underftand thofe differences of opinions 
touching the principles of nature, and the funda- 
mental points of the fame, which have caufed the 
diverfity of fects, fchools, and philofophies, as that 
of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parme- 
nides, and the reft. For although Ariftotle, as 
though he had been of the race of the Ottomans, 
thought he could not reign except the firft thing 
he did he killed all his brethren ;! yet to thofe 
that feek Truth and not magiftrality, it cannot but 
feem a matter of great profit, to fee before them 
the feveral opinions touching the foundations of 
nature ; not for any exact truth that can be ex- 


' See Ellis’ note on De Augm., iii. 4, where he fuggefts, moft 
probably, that Bacon is alluding to the aéts of Mahomet III. who, 
on becoming Sultan, in a.p. 1595, put to death nineteen brothers, 
and ten or twelve women, fuppofed to be with child by his father. 
He adds that the praétice was eftablifhed as a fundamental State 
Law by Mahomet II. 


158 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


pected in thofe theories; for as the fame pheno- 
mena in aftronomy are fatisfied by the received 
aftronomy of the diurnal motion, and the proper 
motions of the planets, with their eccentrics and 
epicycles, and likewife by the theory of Coper- 
nicus,° who fuppofed the earth to move, (and the 
calculations are indifferently agreeable to both,) 
fo the ordinary face and view of experience is 
many times fatisfied by feveral theories and philo- 
fophies; whereas to find the real truth requireth 
another manner of feverity and attention. For as 
Ariftotle faith,’ that children at the firft will call 
every woman mother, but afterward they come 
to diftinguifh according to truth, fo experience, if 
it be in childhood, will call every philofophy mo- 
ther, but when it cometh to ripenefs, it will difcern 
the true mother. So as in the mean time it is 
good to fee the feveral gloffes and opinions upon 
nature, whereof, it may be, every one in fome one 
point hath feen clearer than his fellows: therefore 
I wifh fome collection to be made, painfully and 
underftandingly, de antiguis philofophiis, out of all 
the poffible light which remaineth to us of them: 
which kind of work I find deficient. But here I 
muft give warning, that it be done diftinétly and 
feverally;* the philofophies of every one through- 


2 Now. Org. i. 45. where he calls thefe “ eccentrics and epi- 
cycles,” /inee fpirales et dracones. Bacon was ignorant of, and 
incurious about Mathematics and Aftronomy at this time; and 
fhows no good will towards Galileo and the ‘‘ Copernican theory.” 

3 Ariftot. Phys. i. 1. 

4 Edd. 1605, 1633, read feverely; but the Latin has diffinge, 
which feems to require feverally. 


BOOK II. 159 


out by themfelves; and not by titles packed and 
fagotted up together, as hath been done by Plu- 
tarch. For it is the harmony of a philofophy in 
itfelf which giveth it light and credence ; whereas 
if it be fingled and broken, it will feem more foreign 
and diflonant. For as when I read in Tacitus 
the actions of Nero, or Claudius, with circum- 
ftances of times, inducements, and occafions, I 
find them not fo ftrange; but when I read them 
in Suetonius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and 
bundles, and not in order of time, they feem more 
monftrous and incredible: fo is it of any philofo- 
phy reported entire, and difmembered by articles. 
Neither do I exclude opinions of latter times to 
be likewife reprefented in this kalendar of fects of 
philofophy, as that of Theophraftus Paracelfus,$ 
eloquently reduced into a harmony by the pen of 
Severinus the Dane :° and that of Telefius? and 
his fcholar Donius, being as a paftoral philofophy, 
full of fenfe, but of no great depth; and that of 
Fracaftorius,® who, though he pretended not to 
make any new philofophy, yet did ufe the abfo- 
lutenefs of his own fenfe upon the old; and that 
of Gilbertus our countryman,? who revived, with 

5 Paracelfus (von Hohenheim), enthufiaft and alchemift, born 
A.D. 1493, died a.p. 1541. He, though in a purpofely obfcure 
way, did much fervice to experimental philofophy. 

© Severinus, a Danith phyfician, died in 1602. 

7 Telefius, born in 1509 at Cofenza; who, as Bacon adds in the 
Latin, revived the philofophy of Parmenides. 

8 Fracaftorius, born in 1483 at Verona ; a man of greateft worth, 
difintereftednefs, and capacity ; whether as Poet, Philofopher, Phy- 
fician, Aftronomer, or Mathematician. But of courfe Bacon has 


no good word for him. 
® Gilbertus, Court Phyfician to Elizabeth and James I, a great 


(3-) De 
Augm. Iv, 1, 
Human 


Philofophy. 


160 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fome alterations and demonttrations, the opinions 
of Xenophanes: and any other worthy to be 
admitted. 

Thus have we now dealt with two of the three 
beams of man’s knowledge ; that is, radius direétus, 
which is referred to nature; radius refractus, 
which is referred to God, and cannot report truly 
becaufe of the inequality of the medium. There 
refteth radius reflexus, whereby man beholdeth and 
contemplateth himielf. 

We come therefore now to that knowledge 
whereunto the ancient oracle directeth us, which 
is the knowledge of ourfelves ;° which deferveth 
the more accurate handling, by how much it 
toucheth us more nearly. ‘This knowledge, as it 
is the end and term of natural philofophy in the in- 
tention of man, fo notwithftanding it is but a por- 
tion of natural philofophy in the continent of 
nature: and generally let this be a rule, that all 
partitions of knowledges be accepted rather for 
lines and veins than for fections and feparations ; 
and that the continuance and entirenefs of know- 
ledge be preferved. For the contrary hereof hath 
made particular fciences to become barren, fhallow, 
and erroneous, while they have not been nourifhed 
and maintained from the common fountain. So 
we fee Cicero the orator complained of Socrates 
and his fchool, that he was the firft that feparated 
philofophy and rhetoric ;* whereupon rhetoric 


experimentalift and difcoverer in Magnetifm. Bacon feems to have 
regarded him with efpecial ill-will. 
10 Plat. Alcib. Pr. ii, 124. "! Cic. de Orat. iii. 16, 17. 


4 


BOOK II. 161 


became an empty and verbal art. So we may fee 
that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rota- 
tion of the earth, which aftronomy itfelf cannot 
correct, becaufe it is not repugnant to any of the 
phenomena, yet natural philofophy may correct. 
So we fee alfo that the fcience of medicine, if it be 
deftituted and forfaken by natural philofophy, it is 
not much better than an empirical practice. With 
this refervation therefore we proceed to human 
philofophy or humanity, which hath two parts : the 
one confidereth man fegregate or diftributively ; 
the other congregate or in fociety. So as human 
philofophy is either fimple and particular, or con- 
jugate and civil. 

Humanity particular confifteth of the fame 
parts whereof man confifteth; that is, of know- 
ledges which refpeét the body, and of knowledges 
which refpe&t the mind. But before we diftribute 
fo far, it is good to conftitute. For I do take the 
confideration in general and at large of human 
nature to be fit to be emancipate and made a 
knowledge by itfelf: not fo much in regard of 
thofe delightful and elegant difcourfes which have 
been made of the dignity of man, of his miferies, 
of his ftate and life, and the like adjuncts of his 
common and undivided nature ; but chiefly in re- 
gard of the knowledge concerning the fympathies 
and concordances between the mind and body, 
which being mixed cannot be properly affigned to 
the {ciences of either. 

This knowledge hath two branches: for as all 
leagues and amities confift of mutual intelligence 

M 


Is either 
fegregate 
(of indivi- 
duals), or 
congregate 
(of focie- 
ties). 


i. Segregate. 
(a.) Of the 

Body. 

(4.) Of the 

Mind. 


Firft, as to 
the Sympa- 
thies be- 
tween them. 


This in two 
parts. 


(a.) Difco- 
very. 


162 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


and mutual offices, fo this league of mind and 
body hath thefe two parts ; how the one difclofeth 
the other, and how the one worketh upon the 
other; difcovery and impreffion. ‘The former of 
thefe hath begotten two arts, both of prediction or 
prenotion ; whereof the one is honoured with the 
inquiry of Ariftotle, and the other of Hippocrates.’* 
And although they have of later time been ufed to 
be coupled with fuperftitious and fantaftical arts, 
yet being purged and reftored to their true ftate, 
they have both of them a folid ground in nature, 
and a profitable ufe in life. The firft is phy/io- 
gnomy, which difcovereth the difpofition of the 
mind by the lineaments of the body: the fecond 
is the expofition of natural dreams, which difcover- 
eth the ftate of the body by the imaginations of the 
mind. In the former of thefe I note a deficience. 
For Ariftotle hath very ingenioufly and diligently 
handled the factures of the body, but not the gef- 
tures of the body, which are no lefs comprehen- 
fible by art, and of greater ufe and advantage.'s 
For the lineaments of the body do difclofe the dif- 
pofition and inclination of the mind in general ; 
but the motions of the countenance and parts do 
not only fo, but do further difclofe the prefent hu- 
mour and {tate of the mindand will. For as your 
majefty faith moft aptly and elegantly, 4s the 
tongue [peaketh to the ear fo the gefture fpeaketh to 

12 In his Prenotiones. 

13 Tn the treatifes on the Hiftory and Parts of Animals. The 


fubjeé&t of Gefture may be faid to come under the fhort treatifes on 
the External Phenomena of the Animal Kingdom: and in that on 


* the Motion of Animals. 


BOOK Il. 163 


the eye.* And therefore a number of fubtle per- 
fons, whofe eyes do dwell upon the faces and 
fafhions of men, do well know the advantage of 
this obfervation, as being moft part of their ability ; 
neither can it be denied, but that it is a great dif- 
covery of diffimulations, and a great direction in 
bufinefs. 

The latter branch, touching ‘mpre/fion, hath not 
been collected into art, but hath been handled dif- 
perfedly; and it hath the fame relation or anti- 
firophe that the former hath. For the confidera- 
tion is double: either how, and how far the humours 
and affects of the body do alter or work upon the 
mind; or again, how and how far the pajfions or 
apprehenfions of the mind do alter or work upon the 
body. ‘(he former of thefe hath been inquired and 
confidered as a part and appendix of medicine, but 
much more as a part of religion or fuperftition. 
For the phyfician prefcribeth cures of the mind in 
phrenfies and melancholy paffions ; and pretendeth 
alfo to exhibit medicines to exhilarate the mind, to 
confirm the courage, to clarify the wits, to corro- 
borate the memory, and the like: but the fcruples 
and fuperftitions of diet and other regimen of the 
body in the fect of the Pythagoreans, in the herefy 
of the Manicheans, and in the law of Mahomet, do 
exceed. So likewife the ordinances in the cere- 
monial law, interdi¢ting the eating of the blood 
and the fat, diftinguifhing between beafts clean 
and unclean for meat, are many and ftrict. Nay 


4 Spedding gives Bajfilikon Doron, Bk. iii, as the place whence 
this quotation comes, Cr. Horace, 4, P, 180, 181. 


(8.) Im- 
preffion. 


164 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the faith itfelf being clear and ferene from all clouds 
of ceremony, yet retaineth the ufe of faftings, ab- 
{tinences, and other macerations and humiliations 
of the body, as things real, and not figurative. 
The root and life of all which prefcripts is, befides 
the ceremony, the confideration of that dependency 
which the affections of the mind are fubmitted 
unto upon the ftate and difpofition of the body, 
And if any man of weak judgment do conceive 
that this fuffering of the mind from the body doth 
either queftion the immortality, or derogate from 
the fovereignty of the foul, he may be taught in 
eafy inftances, that the infant in the mother’s 
womb is compatible with the mother and yet fe- 
parable ;!° and the moft abfolute monarch is fome- 
times led by his fervants and yet without fubjection. 
As for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the 
operation of the conceits and paffions of the mind 
upon the body, we fee all wife phyficians, in the 
prefcriptions of their regiments to their patients, 
do ever confider accidentia animi as of great force 
to further or hinder remedies or recoveries: and 
more efpecially it is an inquiry of great depth and 
worth concerning imagination, how and how far 
it altereth the body proper of the imaginant. For 
although it hath a manifeft power to hurt, it fol- 
loweth not it hath the fame degree of power to 
help; no more than a man can conclude, that be- 
caufe there be peftilent airs able fuddenly to kill a 
man in health, therefore there fhould be fovereign 


'S Qui fimul cum matris affeétibus compatitur, et tamen e cor- 
pore matris {uo tempore excluditur. De dugm. 


~ 


BOOK II. 165 


airs able fuddenly to cure a man in ficknefs. But 
the inquifition of this part is of great ufe, though 
it needeth, as Socrates faid, a Delian diver," being 
dificult and profound. But unto all this know- 
ledge de communi vinculo, of the concordances be- 
tween the mind and the body, that part of inquiry 
is moft neceflary, which confidereth of the feats 
and domiciles which the feveral faculties of the 
mind do take and occupate in the organs of the 
body ; which knowledge hath been attempted, 
and is controverted, and deferveth to be much 
better inquired. For the opinion of Plato,!7 who 
placed the underftanding in the brain, animo/fity 
(which he did unfitly call anger, having a greater 
mixture with pride) in the heart, and concupifcence 
or fenfuality in the liver, deferveth not to be def- 
pifed; but much lefs to be allowed. So then we 
have conftituted, as in our own wifh and advice, 
the inquiry touching human nature entire, as a 
juft portion of knowledge to be handled apart. 
The knowledge that concerneth man’s body is 
divided as the good of man’s body is divided, unto 
which it referreth. The good of man’s body is of 
four kinds, Health, Beauty, Strength, and Pleafure: 


16 Diog. Laert. ii. 22. Socrates fpeaks of a work of Heraclitus 
which Euripides had lent him: ‘ Delio quopiam natatore in- 
diget.” 

17 Plat. Tim. 69, 70, (Steph.) In the head, rd Ociov: then 
below the ifthmus of the neck, the mortal part of man; firft rd 
perexov ripe Wuxije avdpeiacg Kai Ovpov; (fo that Bacon is 
icarcely right in his cenfure; for neither aydpeia nor Ovpoc is 
anger) then the diaphragm to divide the parts; then in the Aeart 
he placed @appog kai p6Boc; and below it ro éxiOupyrixdy, 
Womeo tv Garvy . - . KaTadedepévov—in the iver. 


De Aug. rv. 


Ze 

(a.) Of Hu- 
man Philo- 
fophy re- 
garding the 
Body. 


(a.) Medi- 


cine. 


166 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fo the knowledges are Medicine, or art of Cure; 
art of Decoration, which is called Cofmetic ; 
art of Activity, which is called Athletic ; and art 
Voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eruditus 
luxus.8 This fubjeét of man’s body is of all other 
things in nature moft fufceptible of remedy; but 
then that remedy is moft fufceptible of error. For 
the fame fubtility of the fubjeé&t doth caufe large 
pofibility and eafy failing; and therefore the in- 
quiry ought to be the more exact. 

To fpeak therefore of Medicine, and to refume 
that we have faid, afcending a little higher: the 
ancient opinion that man was microcofmus, an ab- 
(traét or model of the world, hath been fantaftically 
{trained by Paracelfus!? and the alchemifts, as if 
there were to be found in man’s body certain cor- 
refpondences and parallels, which fhould have 
refpeét to all varieties of things, as ftars, planets, 
minerals, which are extant in the great world. 
But thus much is evidently true, that of all fub- 
ftances which nature hath produced, man’s body 
is the moft extremely compounded. For we fee 
herbs and plants are nourifhed by earth and water 5 
beafts for the moft part by herbs and fruits ; man 
by the fleth of beafts, birds, fifhes, herbs, grains, 
fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, drefl- 
ings, and preparations of the feveral bodies, before 
they come to be his food and aliment. Add here- 
unto, that beafts have a more fimple order of life, 
and lefs change of affections to work upon their 


18 Tac. Ann. xvi. 18. 
19 See Ellis and Spedding’s note to Now. Org. ii. 48. (p- 339+) 


BOOK II. 167 


bodies: whereas man in his manfion, fleep, exer- 
cife, paffions, hath infinite variations : and it can- 
not be denied but that the Body of man of all 
other things is of the moft compounded mafs. 
The Soul on the other fide is the fimpleft of fub- 
ftances, as is well exprefled : 


Purumque reliquit 
Ethereum fenfum atque aurai fimplicis ignem.” 


So that it is no marvel though the foul fo placed 
enjoy no reft, if that principle be true, that AZotus 
rerum eft rapidus extra locum, placidus in loco. 
But to the purpofe: this variable compofition of 
man’s body hath made it as an inftrument eafy to 
diftemper ; and therefore the poets did well to 
conjoin Mufic and Medicine in Apollo,*! becaufe 
the office of Medicine is but to tune this curious 
harp of man’s body and to reduce it to harmony. 
So then the fubject being fo variable, hath made 
the art by confequence more conje€tural ; and the 
art being conjectural hath made fo much the more 
place to be left for impofture. For almoft all 
other arts and {ciences are judged by acts, or maf- 
ter-pieces, as | may term them, and not by the 
fucceffes and events. The lawyer is judged by 
the virtue of his pleading, and not by the iffue of 
the caufe ; the mafter of the fhip is judged by the 
directing his courfe aright, and not by the fortune 
of the voyage ; but the phyfician, and perhaps the 
politique, hath no particular acts demonttrative of 
his ability, but is judged moft by the event ; which 
is ever but as it is taken: for who can tell, if a 


20 Virg. En. vi. 747. 2! Ovid, Metam. i. 521. 


168 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


patient die or recover, or if a ftate be preferved‘or 
ruined, whether it beart or accident? And there- 
fore many times the impoftor is prized, and the 
man of virtue taxed. Nay, we fee the weaknefs 
and credulity of men is fuch, as they will often 
prefer a mountebank** or witch before a learned 
phyfician. And therefore the poets were clear- 
fighted in difcerning this extreme folly, when they 
made /E{culapius and Circe brother and fifter, 
both children of the fun, as in the verfes, 


Ipfe repertorem medicinz talis et artis 
Fulmine Pheebigenam Stygias detrufit ad undas : 2% 


And again, 
Dives inacceffos ubi So/is filia lucos, &c.*# 

For in all times, in the opinion of the multitude, 
witches and old women and impoftors have had a 
competition with phyficians. And what follow- 
eth? Even this, that phyficians fay to themfelves 
as Salomon exprefleth it upon an higher occafion ; 
If it befall to me as befalleth to the fools, why fhould 
I labour to be more wife?*> And therefore I can- 
not much blame phyficians, that they ufe com- 
monly to intend fome other art or practice, which 
they fancy more than their profeflion. For you 
fhall have of them antiquaries, poets, humanifts, 
ftatefmen, merchants, divines, and in every of 
thefe better feen than in their profeffion; and no 
doubt upon this ground, that they find that me- 
diocrity and excellency in their art maketh no 

22 Montabank—in the old editions—from montambanco, a quack- 
doétor. Holland, in his Plutarch, renders the word mount-bank. 


The word was confined in meaning to a quack in Bacon’s day. 
23 Virg, Abn. vii. 772. 24 Tbid. vil. 11. 45 Eccles. 11. 25. 


BOOK Ul. 169 


difference in profit or reputation towards their 
fortune ; for the weaknefs of patients, and fweet- 
nefs of life, and nature of hope, maketh men de- 
pend upon phyficians with all their defects. But 
neverthelefs, thefe things which we have f{poken 
of, are courfes begotten between a little occafion, 
and a great deal of floth and default; for if we 
will excite and awake our obfervation, we fhall fee 
in familiar inftances what a predominant faculty 
the /ubtilty of /pirit hath over the variety of matter 
or form: nothing more variable than faces and 
countenances : yet men can bear in memory the 
infinite diftinctions of them; nay, a painter with 
a few fhells of colours, and the benefit of his eye 
and habit of his imagination, can imitate them all 
that ever have been, are, or may be, if they were 
brought before him: nothing more variable than 
voices ; yet men can likewife difcern them per- 
fonally: nay, you fhall have a buffoon or pantomi- 
mus,°° who will exprefs as many as he pleafeth. 
Nothing more variable than the differing founds 
of words; yet men have found the way to reduce 
them to a few fimple letters. So thatit is not the 
infufficiency or incapacity of man’s mind, but it is 
the remote ftanding or placing thereof, that breed- 
eth thefe mazes and incomprehenfions : for as the 
fenfe afar off is full of miftaking, but is exact at 
hand, fo is it of the underftanding ; the remedy 
whereof is, not to quicken or ftrengthen the organ, 


26 Buffon, or pantomimus, in the original; fhowing that the 
words were newly imported into the Englifh tongue. The panto- 
mime was then a perfon, not a play. 


Deficient in 


170 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


but to go nearer to the objeét ; and therefore there 
is no doubt but if the phyficians will learn and ufe 
the true approaches and avenues of nature, they 
may aflume as much as the poet faith : 


Et quoniam variant morbi, variabimus artes ; 
Mille mali {pecies, mille falutis erunt.?? 


Which that they fhould do, the noblenefs of their 
art doth deferve ; well fhadowed by the poets, in 
that they made A®{culapius to be the fon of the 
fun, the one being the fountain of life, the other 
as the fecond ftream: but infinitely more honoured 
by the example of our Saviour, who made the 
body of man the object of His miracles, as the 
foul was the object of His doctrine. For we read 
not that ever He vouchfafed to do any miracle 
about honour or money, except that one for giving 
tribute to Czefar;*° but only about the preferving, 
fuftaining, and healing the body of man. 
Medicine is a fcience which hath been, as we 
faid, more profeffed than laboured, and yet more 
laboured than advanced ; the labour having been, 
in my judgment, rather in circle than in progref- 
fion. For 1 find much iteration, but fmall addition. 
It confidereth caufes of difeafes, with the occafions or 
impulfions ; thedifeafes themfelves, with the accidents ; 
and the cures, with the prefervations. “The defi- 
ciencies which I think good to note, being a few 
of many, and thofe fuch as are of a more open and 
manifeft nature, I will enumerate, and not place. 
The firft is the difcontinuance of the ancient 


= Patholo- and ferious diligence of Hippocrates,*? which ufed 


7 Ovid, R. A. 525. 28 Matt. xvil. 27. 
39 Hippocr. De Epidemiis. 


BOOK II. 171 


to fet down a narrative of the fpecial cafes of his 
patients, and how they proceeded, and how they 
were judged by recovery or death. ‘Therefore 
having an example proper in the father of the art, 
I fhall not need to allege an example foreign, 
of the wifdom of the lawyers, who are careful to 
report new cafes and decifions for the direction 
of future judgments. ‘This continuance of medi- 
cinal hiftory 1 find deficient ; which I underftand 
neither to be fo infinite as to extend to every 
common cafe, nor fo referved as to admit none but 
wonders: for many things are new in the manner, 
which are not new in the kind; and if men will 
intend to obferve, they fhall find much worthy to 
obferve. 

In the inquiry which is made by Anatomy, I 
find much deficience : for they inquire of the parts, 
and their /ub/tances, figures, and collocations ; but 
they inquire not of the diver/ities of the parts, the 
Jecrecies of the paffages, and the feats or ne/tlings of 
the humours, nor much of the foot/teps and impre/- 
fions of difeafes: the reafon of which omiffion I 
fuppofe to be, becaufe the firit inquiry may be 
fatisfied in the view of one or a few anatomies: 
but the latter, being comparative and cafual, muft 
arife from the view of many. And as to the diver- 
fity of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or 
framing of the inward parts is as full of difference 
as the outward, and in that is the caufe continent 
of many difeafes ; which not being obferved, they 
quarrel many times with humours, which are not 
in fault; the fault being in the very frame and 


Narrationes 
medicinales. 


And in 
Anatomy. 
Anatomia 
comparata. 


172 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


mechanic of the part, which cannot be removed 
by medicine alterative, but muft be accommodate 
and palliate by diets and medicines familiar. As 
for the paflages and pores, it is true which was 
anciently noted, that the more fubtle of them ap- 
pear not in anatomies, becaufe they are fhut and 
latent in dead bodies, though they be open and 
manifeft in live: which being fuppofed, though 
the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum was by Celfus 
juftly reproved ;°° yet in regard of the great ufe of 
this obfervation, the inquiry needed not by him fo 
flightly to have been relinquifhed altogether, or 
referred to the cafual practices of furgery; but 
mought have been well diverted upon the diflec- 
tion of beafts alive, which notwithftanding the 
diffimilitude of their parts, may fufficiently fatisfy 
this inquiry. And for the humours, they are com- 
monly paffed over in anatomies as purgaments; 
whereas it is moft neceflary to obferve, what ca- 
vities, nefts, and receptacles the humours do find 
in the parts, with the differing kind of the humour 
fo lodged and received. And as for the footfteps 
of difeafes and their devaftations of the inward 
parts, impofthumations, exulcerations, difcontinua- 
tions, putrefactions, confumptions, contractions, 
extenfions, convulfions, diflocations, obftructions, 
repletions, together with all preternatural fub- 
ftances, as ftones, carnofities, excrefcences, worms, 
and the like; they ought to have been exactly 
obferved by multitude of anatomies, and the con- 
tribution of men’s feveral experiences, and care- 


30 De Re Medica, i. 1. 


BOOK II. 173 


fully fet down, both hiftorically, according to the 
appearances, and artificially, with a reference to 
the difeafes and fymptoms which refulted from 
them, in cafe where the anatomy is of a defunét 


patient; whereas now, upon opening of bodies, - 


they are paffed over flightly and in filence. 

In the inquiry of difeafes, they do abandon the 
cures of many, fome as in their nature incurable, 
and others as paft the period of cure ; fo that Sylla 
and the Triumvirs never profcribed fo many men 


Through 
defpair of 
cures, 
Inguifitio 
ulterior de 
morbis in- 


to die, as they do by their ignorant edicts: whereof janabilibus, 


numbers do efcape with lefs difficulty than they 
did inthe Roman profcriptions. Therefore I will 
not doubt to note as a deficience, that they inquire 
not the perfect cures of many difeafes, or extre- 
mities of difeafes; but pronouncing them incurable, 
do enact a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance 
from difcredit. 

Nay, further, I efteem it the office of a phyfi- 
cian not only to reftore health, but to mitigate pain 
and dolours; and not only when fuch mitigation 
may conduce to recovery, but when it may ferve 
to make a fair and eafy paffage: for it is no {mall 
felicity which Auguftus Cafar was wont to wifh 
to himfelf, that fame Euthanafia ;*! and which was 
efpecially noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, 
whofe death was after the fafhion and femblance 
ofa kindly and pleafant fleep. So it is written of 
Epicurus, that after his difeafe was judged def- 
perate, he drowned his ftomach and fenfes with a 
large draught and ingurgitation of wine; where- 


31 Suet. Vit. dug. c. 99. 


De Eutha- 
nafia exte- 
riore. 


Through 
confufion 
of remedies, 
Medicine 
experimen- 
tales. 


174 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


upon the epigram was made, Hinc Stygias ebrius 
haufit aquas ;3* he was not fober enough to tafte 
any bitternefs of the Stygian water. But the phy- 
ficians contrariwife do make a kind of fcruple and 
religion to ftay with the patient after the difeafe is 
deplored ; whereas, in my judgment, they ought 
both to inquire the {kill and to give the atten- 
dances for the facilitating and afluaging of the 
pains and agonies of death. 

In the confideration of the cures of difeafes, 
I find a deficience in the receipts of propriety,*% 
refpecting the particular cures and difeafes: for 
the phyficians have fruftrated the fruit of tra- 
dition and experience by their magiftralities, in 
adding, and taking out, and changing guid pro 
quo, in their receipts at their pleafures; com- 
manding fo over the medicine, as the medicine 
cannot command over the difeafes: for except 
it be treacle and mithridatum,*' and of late dia/- 
cordium, and a few more, they tie themfelves to 


32 


roy aKkpaTov 
*Eoracey, tir’ Aidny Puypoy érsordcaro. 
Diog. Laert. x. 15. (Vit. Epic.) 
No ebrius here ; protenus and Jetius are fuggefted ; but either emen- 
dation would rob the {tory of its point. 

33 Receipts of propriety, i.e. proper or fit for each particular 
difeafe. 

34 Treacle and mithridatum, In the frontifpiece to the ed. of 
Hippocrates, which I confulted, Onptakdy and McOpidarucoy were 
placed fide by fide as the chief remedies. By treacle (therias) is 
meant, not the fyrup of fugar, &c. but a compofition of the parts 
of vipers; good for the cure of ferpents’ bites, and for other medi- 
cinal purpofes. M@ithridate (from king Mithridates’ antidote) 
was a medicine of general ufe. ‘‘ Was it not ftrange, a phyfician 
fhould decline exhibiting of Mithridate, becaufe it was a known 
medicine, and famous for its cures many ages fince?” Boyle’s 
Works, ii. p. 218. Diafeordium is {aid to have been invented by 
Fracaftorius, 


BOOK I. 175 


no receipts feverely and religioufly: for as to 
the confections of fale which are in the fhops, 
they are for readinefs and not for propriety; for 
they are upon general intention of purging, open- 
ing, comforting, altering, and not much appro- 
priate to particular difeafes: and this is the caufe 
why empirics and old women are more happy 
many times in their cures than learned phyficians, 
becaufe they are more religious in holding their 
medicines. Therefore here is the deficience 
which I find, that phyficians have not, partly out 
of their own practice, partly out of the conftant 
probations reported in books, and partly out of the 
traditions of empirics, fet down and delivered over 
certain experimental medicines for the cure of 
particular difeafes, befides their own conjectura! 
and magiftral defcriptions. For as they were the 
men of the beft compofition in the ftate of Rome, 
which either being confuls inclined to the people, 
or being tribunes inclined to the fenate ; fo in the 
matter we now handle, they be the beft phyficians, 
which being learned incline to the traditions of ex- 
perience, or being empirics incline to the methods 
of learning. 

In preparation of medicines, I do find ftrange, 
efpecially aigring how mineral medicines have 
been extolled,*” and that they are fafer for the out- 
ward than inward parts, that no man hath fought 
to make an imitation by art of natural baths and 
medicinable fountains: which neverthelefs are con- 


5 By Paracelfus and his {chool, who were chiefly diftinguithed 
by their ufe of mineral medicines. 


Through 
negleé& of 
baths, &c. 
Imitationes 
nature in 
Balneis et 
Aquis Me- 


dicinalibus. 


Filum Me- 
dicinale, five 
de wicibus 
Medicina- 


rum, 


Through 
want of care 
and variety 
of medi- 
cines. 


176 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fefled to receive their virtues from minerals: and 
not fo only, but difcerned and diftinguifhed from 
what particular mineral they receive tincture, as 
fulphur, vitriol, fteel, or the like; which nature, if 
it may be reduced to compofitions of art, both the 
variety of them will be increafed, and the temper 
of them will be more commanded. 

But left I grow to be more particular than is 
agreeable either to my intention or to proportion, 
I will conclude this part with the note of one de- 
ficience more, which feemeth to me of greateft 
confequence; which is, that the prefcripts in ufe 
are too compendious to attain their end: for, to 
my underftanding, it is a vain and flattering opinion 
to think any medicine can be {fo fovereign or fo 
happy, as that the receipt or ufe of it can work 
any great effect upon the body of man. It were 
a ftrange fpeech, which fpoken, or fpoken oft, 
fhould reclaim a man from a vice to which he 
were by nature fubject: it is order, purfuit, fe- 
quence, and interchange of application, which is 
mighty in nature ; which although it require more 
exact knowledge in prefcribing, and more precife 
obedience in obferving, yet is recompenfed with the 
magnitude of effects. And although a man would 
think, by the daily vifitations of the phyficians, that 
there were a purfuance in the cure: yet let a man 
look into their prefcripts and miniftrations, and he 
fhall find them but inconftancies and every day’s 
devices, without any fettled providence or projec, 
Not that every fcrupulous or fuperftitious prefcript 
is effectual, no more than every ftraight way is 


BOOK II. 177 


the way to heaven; but the truth of the direction 
mutt precede feverity of obfervance.% 

For Cofmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts ef- 
feminate : for cleannefs of body was ever efteemed 
to proceed from a due reverence to God, to fo- 
ciety, and to ourfelves. As for artificial decora- 
tion, it is well worthy of the deficiences which it 
hath ; being neither fine enough to deceive, nor 
handfome to ufe, nor wholefome to pleafe. 

For Athletic, I take the fubject of it largely, that 
is to fay, for any point of ability whereunto the 
body of man may be brought, whether it be of 
aétivity, or of patience; whereof activity hath two 
parts, /frength and /wiftne/s ; and patience likewife 
hath two parts, hardne/s againf? wants and extre- 
mities, and endurance of pain or torment ; whereof 
we fee the practices in tumblers, in favages, and in 
thofe that fuffer punifhment: nay, if there be any 
other faculty which falls not within any of the 
former divifions, as in thofe that dive, that obtain 
a ftrange power of containing refpiration, and the 
like, I refer it to this part. Of thefe things the 
practices are known, but the philofophy that con- 
cerneth them is not much inquired ; the rather, I 
think, becaufe they are fuppofed to be obtained, 
either by an aptnefs of nature, which cannot be 
taught, or only by continual cuftom, which is foon 
prefcribed: which though it be not true, yet I 
forbear to note any deficiencies: for the Olym- 
* 3° The paffage in the Latin on the prolongation of Life, which 
is inferted at this point, is moft curious. It was a fubje& to which 
Bacon had evidently turned his attention ; for he often refers to 
it, and had great hopes refpecting it. 
| N 


(8.) Cof- 


metic Art. 


(y-) Ath- 
letic Art. 


(6.) Arts of 
pleafure 
fenfual. 


De Augm, 
IV. 3. 

(4.) OF 
Human 
Philofophy 
as it con- 
cerns the 
Mind, 
which re- 
gards, 

(a.) Its na- 
ture. 

(8.) Its 
funétions, 
(a.) Nature 
of the Mind, 


178 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


pian games are down long fince, and the medio- 
crity of thefe things is for ufe ; as for the excellency 
of them it ferveth for the moft part but for mer- 
cenary oftentation. 

For arts of pleafure fenfual, the chief deficience 
in them is of laws to reprefs them.*7 For as it 
hath been well obferved, that the arts which 
flourifh in times while virtue is in growth, are 
military; and while virtue is in ftate, are /éberal ; and 
while virtue is in declination, are voluptuary; fo I 
doubt that this age of the world is fomewhat upon 
the defcent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary I 
couple practices joculary ; for the deceiving of the 
fenfes is one of the pleafures of the fenfes. As for 
games of recreation, I hold them to belong to 
civil life and education. And thus much of that 
particular human philofophy which concerns the 
body, which is but the tabernacle of the mind. 

For Human Knowledge which concerns the 
Mind, it hath two parts; the one that inquireth 
of the fubftance or nature of the foul or mind, the 
other that inquireth of the faculties or functions 
thereof. Unto the firft of thefe, the confiderations 
of the original of the foul, whether it be native or 
adventive, and how far it is exempted from laws 
of matter, and of the immortality thereof, and 
many other points, do appertain: which have 
been not more laborioufly inquired than varioufly 
reported ; fo as the travail therein taken feemeth 


to have been rather in a maze than in a way. 
37 This fubjet is very differently treated in the Latin. He 


there introduces mufic and painting, not as things to be repreffed,. 
but honoured. 


BOOK I. 179 


But although I am of opinion that this knowledge 
may be more really and foundly inquired, even in 
nature, than it hath been; yet I hold that in the 
end it muft be bounded by religion, or elfe it will 
be fubject to deceit and delufion: for as the fub- 
ftance of the foul in the creation was not extracted 
out of the mafs of heaven and earth by the bene- 
diction of a producat but was immediately infpired 
from God: foit is not poffible that it fhould be 
(otherwife than by accident) fubject to the laws of 
heaven and earth, which are the fubject of philo- 
fophy ; and therefore the true knowledge of the 
nature and {tate of the foul muft come by the 
fame infpiration that gave the fubftance. Unto 
this part of knowledge touching the foul there be 
two appendices ; which, as they have been han- 
dled, have rather vapoured forth fables than kin- 
dled truth, Divination and Fafcination. 
Divination hath been anciently and fitly divided 
into artificial and natural; whereof artificial is, 
when the mind maketh a prediction by argument, 
concluding upon figns and tokens; natural is 
when the mind hath a prefention by an internal 
power, without the inducement of a fign. Arti- 
ficial is of two forts; either when the argument 
is coupled with a derivation of caufes, which is 
rational; or when it is only grounded upon a co- 
incidence of the effect, which is experimental : 
whereof the latter for the moft part is fuperftitious ; 
fuch as were the heathen obfervations upon the 
infpection of facrifices, the flights of birds, the 
{warming of bees; and fuch as was the Chaldean 


(Appendix 
5 


1 
Divination. 


180 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


aftrology, and the like. For artificial divination, 
the feveral kinds thereof are diftributed amongft 
particular knowledges. The aftronomer hath his 
predictions, as of conjunctions, afpects, eclipfes, 
and the like. The phyfician hath his prediétions 
of death, of recovery, of the accidents and iflues 
of difeafes. The Politique hath his prediétions ; 
O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, fi emptorem in- 
venerit /*8 which ftayed not long to be performed, 
in Sylla firft, and after in Czefar. So as thefe pre- 
dictions are now impertinent, and to be referred 
over. But the divination which fpringeth from 
the internal nature of the foul, is that which we 
now {peak of ; which hath been made to be of two 
forts, primitive and by influxion. Primitive is 
grounded upon the fuppofition, that the mind, 
when it is withdrawn and collected into itfelf, and 
not diffufed into the organs of the body, hath fome 
extent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore 
appeareth moft in fleep, in ecftacies, and near 
death, and more rarely in waking apprehenfions ; 
and is induced and furthered by thofe abftinences 
and obfervances which make the mind-moft to 
confift in itfelf. By influxion, is grounded upon 
the conceit that the mind, as a mirror or glafs, 
fhould take illumination from the foreknowledge 
of God and fpirits:°9 unto which the fame regi- 
ment doth likewife conduce. For the retiring 
of the mind within itfelf, is the ftate which is 
moft fufceptible of divine influxions ; fave that 
Be Salli tee SEL V 


39 Plat. Tim. 71. (Steph). oloy tv carémrpy dexouivy riTtoug, 
and note the obfervation on payruk7), at the fame place. 


BOOK II. 181 


it is accompanied in this cafe with a fervency and 
elevation, which the ancients noted by fury, and 
not with a repofe and quiet, as it is in the other. 
Fafcination’is the power and act of imagination 
intenfive upon other bodies than the body of the 
imaginant, for of that we fpake in the proper 
place: wherein the fchool of Paracelfus, and the 
difciples of pretended Natural Magic have been fo 
intemperate, as they have exalted the power of 
the imagination to be much one with the power 
of miracle-working faith ; others, that draw nearer 
to probability, calling to their view the fecret paf- 
fages of things, and fpecially of the contagion that 
paffeth from body to body, do conceive it fhould 
likewife be agreeable to nature, that there fhould 
be fome tranfmiffions and operations from fpirit to 
{pirit without the mediation of the fenfes ; whence 
the conceits have grown, now almoft made civil, 
of the maftering fpirit, and the force of confidence, 
and the like. Incident unto this is the inquiry 
how to raife and fortify the imagination : for if the 
imagination fortified have power, then it is mate- 
rial to know how to fortify and exalt it. And 
herein comes in crookedly and dangeroully a pal- 
liation of a great part of Ceremonial Magic. For 
it may be pretended that Ceremonies, Charac¢ters, 
and Charms, do work, not by any tacit or facra- 
mental contract with evil fpirits, but ferve only to 
ftrengthen the imagination of him that ufeth it: 
as images are faid by the Roman church to fix the 
cogitations, and raife the devotions of them that 
pray before them. But for mine own judgment, 
if it be admitted that imagination hath power, and 


(Appendix 
ii.) 
Fafcination. 


De Aug. v. 
i. 
(B.) Of the 


fun@tions of 
the mind. 
Thefe are, 
(a.) Intel- 
le€tual. 

(8.) Moral. 


182 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


that Ceremonies fortify imagination, and that they 
be ufed fincerely and intentionally for that pur- 
pofe ;*° yet I fhould hold them unlawful, as op- 
pofing to that firft edit which God gave unto 
man, In fudore vultus comedes panem tuum.*' For 
they propound thofe noble effeéts, which God hath 
fet forth unto man to be bought at the price of 
labour, to be attained by a few eafy and flothful 
obfervances. Deficiences in thefe knowledges I 
will report none, other than the general deficience, 
that it is not known how much of them is verity, 
and how much vanity.* 

The Knowledge which refpecteth the faculties 
of the mind of man is of two kinds ; the one re- 
fpecting his Underftanding and Reafon, and the 
other his Will, Appetite, and Affection; whereof 
the former produceth Pofition or Decree, the 
latter Action or Execution. It is true that the 
Imagination is an agent or zuncius, in both pro- 
vinces, both the judicial and the minifterial. For 
Senfe fendeth over to Imagination before Reafon 
have judged: and Reafon fendeth over to Imagi- 
nation before the decree can be acted: for Ima- 
gination ever precedeth Voluntary Motion. Saving 
that this Janus of Imagination hath differing faces: 
for the face towards Reafon hath the print of Truth, 


49 Ceremonies. The word does not now convey quite the fame 
fenfe ; for in thefe paffages Bacon refers to invocation of fpirits : 
faying (as we gather alfo from the Latin) that they are illicit, 
though ufed only as phyfical remedies without any incantation, 

41 Gen. ili. 19. 

4° In the Latin, two defiderata are noticed ; Voluntary Motion, 
and Senfe and the Senfible: together with a curious difcourfe on 
the Form of Light. 


BOOK Il. 183 


but the face towards Action hath the print of 
Good ; which neverthelefs are faces, 


Quales decet effe fororum.*? 


Neither is the Imagination fimply and only a meffen- 
ger; but is invefted with, or at leaftwife ufurpeth 
no fmall authority in itfelf, befides the duty of the 
meflage. For it was well faid by Ariftotle, That 
the mind hath over the body that commandment, 
which the lord hath over a bondman ; but that rea- 
fon hath over the imagination that commandment 
which a magiftrate hath over a free citizen ;#* who 
may come alfo to rule in his turn. For we fee 
that, in matters of Faith and Religion, we raife our 
Imagination above our Reafon; which is the 
caufe why Religion fought ever accefs to the mind 
by fimilitude, types, parables, vifions, dreams. 
And again, in all perfuafions that are wrought by 
eloquence, and other impreffions of like nature, 
which do paint and difguife the true appearance of 
things, the chief recommendation unto Reafon is 
from the Imagination.** Neverthelefs, becaufe I 
find not any fcience that doth properly or fitly 
pertain to the Imagination, I fee no caufe to alter 
the former divifion. For as for poefy, it is rather 
a pleafure or play of Imagination, than a work or 
duty thereof. And if it be a work, we fpeak not 
now of fuch parts of learning as the Imagination 
produceth, but of fuch fciences as handle and con- 

43 Ovid, Metam. ii. 14. 

“4 Ariftot. Polit.i. 5,63; where dpektc, appetite, is the term here 
rendered by imagination. 


49 j,e. Rhetoric aims at the feelings rather than at the cool 
judgment, and inflames Imagination till fhe overpowers Reafon, 


(a.) Intel- 
leétual. 


184, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fider of the Imagination ; no more than we fhall 
{peak now of fuch knowledges as reafon pro- 
duceth, for that extendeth to all philofophy, but 
of fuch knowledges as do handle and inquire the 
faculty of reafon: fo as poefy had its true place. 
As for the power of the Imagination in nature, 
and the manner of fortifying the fame, we have 
mentioned it in the doctrine De Anima, where- 
unto it moft fitly belongeth. And laftly, for Ima- 
ginative or Infinuative Reafon, which is the fub- 
ject of Rhetoric, we think it beft to refer it to the 
Arts of Reafon. So therefore we content our- 
felves with the former divifion, that human philo- 
fophy, which refpecteth the faculties of the mind 
of man, hath two parts, rational and moral. 

The part of human philofophy which is rational, 
is of all knowledges, to the moft wits, the leaft 
delightful; and feemeth but a net of fubtilty and 
{fpinofity. For as it was truly faid, that know- 
ledge is Pabulum animi,* fo in the nature of men’s 
appetite to this food, moft men are of the tafte 
and ftomach of the Ifraelites in the defert, that 
would fain have returned ad ollas carnium,*" and 
were weary of manna; which, though it were 
celeftial, yet feemed lefs nutritive and comfortable. 
So generally men tafte well knowledges that are 
drenched in flefh and blood, civil hiftory, morality, 
policy, about the which men’s affections, praifes, 

46 Cic. Acad. iv. ad Lucullum, 32. a. (Steph. 225.) Eft enim 
animorum ingeniorumque naturale quoddam quafi pabulum confi- 
deratio contemplatioque nature. Or perhaps, De Sene&. 14. Si 
habet aliquid tanquam pabulum fiudii atque doérina, nihil eft otiofa 


feneétute jucundius. 
47 Numb. xi. 4—6. 


BOOK I1. 185 


fortunes do turn and are converfant ; but this fame 
lumen ficcum doth parch and offend moft men’s 
watery and foft natures. But, to fpeak truly of 
things as they are in worth, Rational Knowledges 
are the keys of all other arts, for as Ariftotle faith, 
aptly and elegantly, That the hand is the inftru- 
ment of inftruments, and the mind is the form of 
forms :* fo thefe be truly faid to be the art of 
arts: neither do they only direét, but likewife 
confirm and ftrengthen: even as the habit of 
fhooting doth not only enable to fhoot a nearer 
fhoot, but alfo to draw a ftronger bow. 

The 4&rts intellectual are four in number; di- 
vided according to the ends whereunto they are. 
referred: for man’s labour is to znvent that which 
is fought or propounded; or to judge that which 
is invented ; or to retain that which is judged ; or 
to deliver over that which is retained. So as the 
arts muft be four: Art of Inquiry or Invention: 
Art of Examination or Fudgment: Art of Cuftcdy 
or Memory: and Art of Elscution or Tradition. 

Invention is of two kinds, much differing: the 
one of Arts and Sciences ; and the other of Speech 
and Arguments. The former of thefe I do report 
deficient ; which feemeth to me to be fuch a defi- 
cience as if in the making of an inventory touch- 
ing the eftate of a defunct it fhould be fet down 
that there is no ready money. For as money will 
fetch all other commodities, fo this knowledge is 
that which fhould purchafe all the reft. And like 
as the Weft Indies had never been difcovered if the 


48 Ariftot. De Anima, iii. 8, 


Whofe Arts 
are four. 


De Aug. v. 


2. 

(i.) Art of 

Invention. 

(a.) Of Arts 
is deficient. 


Not pro- 
vided by 
Logic. 


186 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ufe of the mariner’s needle had not been firft difco- 
vered, though the one be vaft regions, and the other 
a {mall motion; fo it cannot be found ftrange if 
{ciences be no farther difcovered, if the art itfelf 
of invention and difcovery hath been pafled over. 

That this part of knowledge is wanting, to my 
judgment ftandeth plainly confeffled; for firft, 
Logic doth not pretend to invent fciences, or the 
axioms of fciences, but pafleth it over with a 
Cuique in fua arte credendum.9 And Celfus ac- 
knowledgeth it gravely, fpeaking of the Empirical 
and dogmatical fects of phyficians, That medicines 
and cures were firft found out, and then after the 
reafons and caufes were difcourfed; and not the 
caufes firft found out, and by light from them the 
medicines and cures difcovered. And Plato, in his 
Theaetetus, noteth well, That particulars are infi- 
nite, and the higher generalities give no fufjicient 
direction: and that the pith of all [ciences, which 
maketh the art{man differ from the inexpert, is in 
the middle propofitions, which in every particular 
knowledge are taken from tradition and experience.” 
And therefore we fee, that they which difcourfe 
of the inventions and originals of things, refer them 
rather to chance than to art, and rather to beafts, 
birds, fifhes, ferpents, than to men. 


49 Ellis and Spedding refer to Arift. Anal. Pr. 1. 303 Mr. 
Markby to Eth, Mag.1.i.17. Ariftotle declares (Réet. 1. i. 1) 
that neither Rhetoric nor Logic has any proper fubje¢t-matter, 
both being purely inftrumental; accordingly neither can “ invent 
{ciences,”” 

DO Der Re Ved. leh 

5! Notin the Theetetus certainly. As Bacon in the Latin intro- 
duces the quotation with Plato non femel innuit, he probably is not 
quoting any exact paffage. 


BOOK Il. 187 


Dig&tamnum genitrix Cretaa carpit ab Ida, 
Puberibus caulem foliis et flore comantem 
Purpureo; non illa feris incognita capris 
Gramina, cum tergo volucres hefere fagittz.*? 


So that it was no marvel, the manner of antiquity 
being to confecrate inventors, that the Egyptians 
had fo few human idols in their temples, but almoft 
all brute. 


Omnigenumque Deum monftra, et latrator Anubis, 
Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Minervam, &c.*° 


And if you like better the tradition of the Gre- 
cians, and afcribe the firft inventions to men; yet 
you will rather believe that Prometheus.firft ftruck 
the flints, and marvelled at the fpark, than that 
when he firft ftruck the flints he expected the 
fpark: and therefore we fee the Weft Indian Pro- 
metheus* had no intelligence with the European, 
becaufe of the rarenefs with them of flint, that 
gave the firft occafion. So as it fhould feem, that 
hitherto men are rather beholding to a wild goat 
for furgery, or to a nightingale for mufic, or to 
the ibis for fome part of phyfic, or to the pot-lid 
that flew open for artillery, or generally to chance,°® 
or anything elfe, than to logic, for the invention 
of arts and fciences. Neither is the form of in- 
vention which Virgil defcribeth much other: 


Ut varias ufus meditando extunderet artes 
Paulatim.*® 


For if you obferve the words well, it is no other 


52 Virg. xn. xii. 412. 53 Thid. viii. 698. 
54 Refers, doubtlefs, to the rubbing of two fticks together to 
produce fire. Cf. Now. Org. 1. ii. 16. 
°° Texvn roXnv torepee, kai rUXn TExYHY. Arift. Erb. Nic. 
vi. 4. 
58 Georg. i. 133. 


Neither by 
Induétion, 


188 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


method than that which brute beafts are capable 
of, and do put in ure; which is a perpetual intend- 
ing or practifing fome one thing, urged and im- 
pofed by an abfolute neceflity of confervation of 
being ; for fo Cicero faith very truly, U/us uni ret 
deditus et naturam et artem fepe vincit.” And 
therefore if it be faid of men, 


Labor omnia vincit 
Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egeftas !58 


it is likewife faid of beafts, 


Quis pfittaco docuit fuum yatpe ?59 


Who taught the raven in a drought to throw peb- 
bles into a hollow tree, where fhe efpied water, 
that the water might rife fo as fhe might come to 
it? Who taught the bee to fail through fuch a 
vaft fea of air, and to find the way from a field in 
flower a great way off to her hive? Who taught 
the ant to bite every grain of corn that fhe burieth 
in her hill, left it fhould take root and grow? 
Add then the word extundere, which importeth 
the extreme difficulty, and the word paulatim, 
which importeth the extreme flownefs, and we 
are where we were, even amongft the Egyptians’ 
gods ; there being little left to the faculty of rea- 
fon, and nothing to the duty of art, for matter of 
invention. 

Secondly, the Induétion which the Logicians 
fpeak of, and which feemeth familiar with Plato, 
(whereby the Principles of Sciences may be pre- 
tended to be invented, and fo the middle propofi- 


57 Cic. p. Corn. Balb. xx. 45. 58 Virg. Georg. 1. 145. 
59 Pers, Prol. 8, where it is expedivit, 


BOOK I]. 189 


tions by derivation from the Principles ;) their 
form of induction, I fay, is utterly vicious and 
incompetent : wherein their error is the fouler, 
becaufe it is the duty of Art to perfect and exalt 
Nature; but they contrariwife have wronged, 
abufed, and traduced Nature. For he that fhall 
attentively obferve how the mind doth gather this 
excellent dew of knowledge, like unto that which 
the poet fpeaketh of, 


Aérei mellis celeftia dona, 


diftilling and contriving it out of particulars na- 
tural and artificial, as the flowers of the field and 
garden, fhall find that the mind of herfelf by 
nature doth manage and act an induction much 
better than they defcribe it. For to conclude 
upon an enumeration of particulars, without in- 
ftance contradictory, is no conclufion, but a con- 
jecture; for who can affure, in many fubjects, 
upon thofe particulars which appear of a fide, that 
there are not other on the contrary fide which 
appear not? As if Samuel fhould have refted 
upon thofe fons of Jefle® which were brought 
before him, and failed of David, which was in the 
field. And this form, to fay truth, is fo grofs, 
as it had not been poffible for wits fo fubtile as 
have managed thefe things to have offered it to 
the world, but that they hafted to their theories 
and dogmaticals, and were imperious and fcornful 
toward particulars; which their manner was to 


60 Virg. Georg. iv. I. 


$! All the old editions fpell the word Ifzy, and the De Augm. 
(as a genitive) Jai. 
62 y Sam. xvi. 


Nor by Syl- 
logifm. 


190 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ufe but as /iéfores and viatores, for ferjeants and 
whifflers, ad /ummovendam turbam, to make way 
and make room for their opinions, rather than in 
their true ufe and fervice. Certainly it is a thing 
may touch a man with a religious wonder, to fee 
how the footfteps of feducement are the very 
fame in divine and human truth: for as in divine 
truth man cannot endure to become as a child; 
fo in human, they reputed the attending the induc- 
tions whereof we {fpeak, as if it were a fecond 
infancy or childhood. 

Thirdly, allow fome principles or axioms were 
rightly induced, yet neverthelefs certain it is that 
middle propofitions cannot be deduced from them 
in fubjec of nature® by fyllogifm, that is, by touch 
and reduction of them to principles in a middle 
term. Itis true that in fciences popular, as mora- 
lities, laws, and the like, yea, and divinity, (be- 
caufe it pleafeth God to apply himfelf to the capa- 
city of the fimpleft,) that form may have ufe; 
and in natural philofophy likewife, by way of argu- 
ment or fatisfactory reafon, Que affenfum parit, 
operis effaeta eft :** but the fubtlety of nature and 
operations will not be enchained in thofe bonds: 
for arguments confift of propofitions, and propo- 
fitions of words; and words are but the current 
tokens or marks® of popular notions of things ; 
which notions, if they be grofily and variably col- 


63 Tn the Latin, in rebus naturalibus. 

64 This quotation is omitted in the Latin, nor can I find whence 
it comes; could it be a faying of Bacon’s own? 

6 Teffere. Arift. Interp. 1.1. 2—7a rev tv TY Puxy waOn- 
parwy obpBoda. 


BOOK I]. IgI 


leted out of particulars, it is not the laborious 
examination either of confequence of arguments, 
or of the truth of propofitions, that can ever cor- 
rect that error, being, as the phyficians fpeak, in 
the firft digeftion: and therefore it was not with- 
out caufe, that fo many excellent philofophers be- 
came Sceptics and Academics, and denied any 
certainty of knowledge or comprehenfion ; and 
held opinion that the knowledge of man extended 
only to appearances and probabilities. It is true 
that in Socrates it was fuppofed to be but a form 
of irony, Scientiam diffimulando fimulavit,© for he 
_ufed to difable his knowledge, to the end to en- 
hance his knowledge: like the humour of Tibe- 
rius in his beginnings, that would reign, but would 
not acknowledge fo much: and in the later 
Academy, which Cicero embraced, this opinion 
alfo of acatalepfia,® I doubt, was not held fin- 
cerely: for that all thofe which excelled in copie 
of fpeech feem to have chofen that fect, as that 
which was fitteft to give glory to their eloquence 
and variable difcourfes ; being rather like progreffes 
of pleafure, than journeys to an end. But affu- 
redly many fcattered in both Academies did hold 
it in fubtilty and integrity: but here was their 
chief error; they charged the deceit upon the 
fenfes; which in my judgment, notwithftanding 
all their cavillations, are very fufficient to certify 

Mi@iceamawteesetG. Cf Cic. ad Ait. xiii. 19. 3. Thefe 
very words do not occur, 

STAG. canna. i... ET. 


68 Cic, Acad. ii. 6. 18, where karadnWic only is mentioned. 
Cf, Nov. Org. i. 37¢ 


192 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


and report truth, though not always immediately, 
yet by comparifon, by help of inftrument, and by 
producing and urging fuch things as are too fub- 
tile for the fenfe to fome effect comprehenfible by 
the fenfe, and other like affiftance. But they 
ought to have charged the deceit upon the weak- 
nefs of the intellectual powers, and upon the 
manner of collecting and concluding upon the 
reports of the fenfes. This I fpeak, not to dif- 
able the mind of man, but to ftir it up to feek 
help: for no man, be he never fo cunning or 
practifed, can make a ftraight line or perfect circle 
by fteadinefs of hand, which may be eafily done 
by help of a ruler or compafs. 
This part This part of invention, concerning the inven- 
ene tion of fciences, I purpofe, if God give me leave, 
hereafter to propound, having digefted it into two 
parts ; whereof the one I term experientia literata, 
and the other interpretatio nature: the former 
being but a degree and rudiment of the latter. 
But I will not dwell too long, nor fpeak too great 
upon a promife.% 
De Aug. v. ‘Lhe invention of fpeech or argument is not 
és) oe properly an invention, for to zmvent is to difcover 
Speech (not that we know not, and not to recover or refum- 
true Inven- mon that which we already know: and the ufe of 
tion), Sy se : ; 
this invention is no other but out of the know- 
ledge whereof our mind is already pofleffed to 
draw forth or call before us that which may be 
69 In the Latin, Bacon explains his experientia literata, which 
treats of methods of experiment; Venatio Panis he alfo ftyles it. 


Cf. Nov. Org. i, 101. The Interpretatio Nature is the fubje&- 
matter of the Now. Org. ; 


BOOK II. 193 


pertinent to the purpofe which we take into our 
confideration. So as to {peak truly, it is no in- 
vention, but a remembrance or fuggeftion, with 
an application ; which is the caufe why the fchools 
do place it after judgment, as fubfequent and not 
precedent. Neverthelefs, becaufe we do account 
it a chafe as well of deer in an inclofed park as in 
a foreft at large, and that it hath already obtained 
the name, let it be called invention: fo as it be 
perceived and difcerned, that the fcope and end 
of this invention is readinefs and prefent ufe of 
our knowledge, and not addition or amplification 
thereof. 

To procure this ready ufe of knowledge there 
are two courfes, Preparation and Suggeftion. 
The former of thefe feemeth fcarcely a part of 
knowledge, confifting rather of diligence than of 
any artificial erudition. And herein Ariftotle 
wittily, but hurtfully, doth deride the Sophifts 
near his time, faying, They did as if one that pro- 
Selfed the art of fhoe-making should not teach how to 
make a fhoe, but only exhibit in a readine/s a num- 
ber of fhoes of all fafhions and fizes."° But yet a 
man might reply, that if a fhoemaker fhould have 
no fhoes in his fhop, but only work as he is 
befpoken, he fhould be weakly cuftomed. But 
our Saviour, {peaking of divine knowledge, faith, 
that the kingdom of heaven is like a good Bice 
holder, that bringeth forth both new and old ftore :™ 
and we fee the ancient writers of Rhetoric do 
give it in precept, ‘that pleaders fhould have the 


7 Ariftot, Soph. El. 34s 7. Matt. xiii, 52. 


By Prepara- 
tion. 


By Suggef- 


tion, 


194 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Places, whereof they have moft continual ufe, 
ready handled in all the variety that may be;” as 
that, ‘‘ to fpeak for the literal interpretation of the 
law again{ft equity, and contrary; and to fpeak 
for prefumptions and inferences againft teftimony, 
and contrary.”72 And Cicero himfelf, being 
broken unto it by great experience, delivereth it 
plainly, that whatfoever a man fhall have occafion 
to {peak of, if he will take the pains, he may have 
it in effect premeditate, and handled, zm theft ;7% 
fo that when he cometh to a particular he fhall 
have nothing to do, but to put to names and 
times and places, and fuch other circumftances 
of individuals. We fee likewife the exact dili- 
gence of Demofthenes; who, in regard of the 
great force that the entrance and accefs into caufes 
hath to make a good impreffion, had ready framed 
a number of prefaces for orations and {peeches. 
All which authorities and precedents may over- 
weigh Ariftotle’s opinion, that would have us 
change a rich wardrobe for a pair of fhears. 

But the nature of the collection of this provi- 
fion or preparatory ftore, though it be common 
both to Logic and Rhetoric, yet having made an 
entry of it here, where it came firft to be fpoken 
of, I think fit to refer over the further handling 
of it to Rhetoric. 

The other part of invention, which I term fug- 
geftion, doth affign and direct us to certain marks, 


7 In the ed. 1605 thefe paffages are printed in black letter, as 
quotations. 
73 Cic. Orat. 14 (46). 


BOOK I]. 195 


or places, which may excite our mind to return 
and produce fuch knowledge as it hath formerly 
collected, to the end we may make ufe thereof. 
Neither is this ufe, truly taken, only to furnifh 
argument to difpute probably with others, but 
likewife to minifter unto our judgment to con- 
clude aright within ourfelves. Neither may thefe 
Places ferve only to apprompt our invention, but 
alfo to direct our inquiry. For a faculty of wife 
interrogating is half a knowledge. For as Plato 
faith, Whofoever feeketh, knoweth that which he 
feeketh for in a general notion: elfe how fhall he 
know it when he hath found it?** and therefore the 
larger your anticipation is, the more direct and 
compendious is your fearch. But the fame Places 
which will help us what to produce of that which 
we know already, will alfo help us, if a man of 
experience were before us, what queftions to afk; 
or, if we have books and authors to inftrué us, 
what points to fearch and revolve; fo as I cannot 
report that this part of invention, which is that 
which the fchools call Topics, is deficient.’ 

Neverthelefs, Topics are of two forts, general 
and fpecial.*© ‘The general we have fpoken to; 
but the particular hath been touched by fome, but 
rejected generally as inartificial and variable. But 
leaving the humour which hath reigned too much 
in the fchools, which is, to be vainly fubtle in a 
few things which are within their command, and 

74 Plato, Menon. 80. 

7 ‘This paffage is better arranged in the Latin. The paragraphs 


on Topics look as if they had been inferted as an afterthought. 
76 Cf, Ariftot. Rhet. 11. xxii, 16, 17. 


Of Topics. 


De Augm. 
Ve 4e 

(ii.) Art of 
Judgment. 
in Induc- 
tion. 


By Syllo- 
gifm, 


196 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


to reject the reft; I do receive particular Topics, 
(that is, places or directions of invention and 
inquiry in every particular knowledge,) as things 
of great ufe, being mixtures of, Logic with the 
matter of fciences; for in thefe it holdeth, ars 
inveniendi adolefcit cum inventis ;7 for as in going of 
a way, we do not only gain that part of the 
way which is pafled, but we gain the better fight 
of that part of the way which remaineth: fo every 
degree of proceeding in a fcience giveth a light to 
that which followeth ; which light ifwe ftrengthen 
by drawing it forth into queftions or places of 
inquiry, we do greatly advance our purfuit.”® 
Now we pafs unto the arts of Judgment, which 
handle the natures of Proofs and Demonftrations ; 
which as to Induétion hath a coincidence with 
Invention. For in all inductions, whether in good 
or vicious form, the fame action of the mind which 
inventeth, judgeth; all one as in the fenfe. But 
otherwife it is in proof by fyllogifm ; for the proof 
being not immediate, but by mean, the invention 
of the mean is one thing, and the judgment of the 
confequence is another; the one exciting only, 
the other examining. ‘Therefore for the real and 
exact form of judgment, we refer ourfelves to that 
which we have {poken of interpretation of nature."9 
For the other judgment by Syllogifm, as it is a 
thing moft agreeable to the mind of man, fo it 


™ Cf, Nov. Org, i. 130. 

78 In the Latin an inquiry de gravi et Jevi is here added as a 
Topic. 

79 In the Latin, legitimam (Induétionis formam) ad Novum Or- 
ganum remittimus. 


BOOK I]. 197 


hath been vehemently and excellently laboured ; 
for the nature of man doth extremely covet to 
have fomewhat in his underftanding fixed and 
immovable, and as a reft and fupport of the mind. 
And therefore as Ariftotle endeavoureth to prove, 
that in all motion there is fome point quiefcent ;®° 
and as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable 
of Atlas, that ftood fixed, and bare up the heaven 
from falling, to be meant of the poles or axle-tree 
of heaven, whereupon the converfion is accom- 
plifhed; fo affuredly men have a defire to have 
an Atlas or axle-tree within to keep them from 
fluctuation, which is like to a perpetual peril of 
falling; therefore men did haften to fet down 
fome principles about which the variety of their 
difputations might turn. 

So then this art of Judgment is but the reduc- 
tion of propofitions to principles in a middle term : 
the principles to be agreed by all and exempted 
from argument ; the middle term to be elected at 
the liberty of every man’s invention; the reduc- 
tion to be of two kinds, direct and inverted; the 
one when the propofition is reduced to the prin- 
ciple, which they term a probation offenfive; the 
other, when the contradictory of the propofition 
is reduced to the contradictory of the principle, 
which is that which they call per incommodum, or 
preffing an abfurdity ; the number of middle terms 
to be as the propofition ftandeth degrees more or 
lefs removed from the principle.®! 


® Ariftot. De Motu Anim.3. *' Cf. Sanderfon, Logic, iii. 5. 


Judgment 
defined, 


Its methods. 
(a.) Of di- 
rection. 

(Analytics. ) 


(b.) Of cau- 
tion. 


(Elenches.) 


Elenches, 
how treated 
by Ariftotle 
and Plato, 


198 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


But this art hath two feveral methods of doc- 
trine, the one by way of direction, the other by 
way of caution: the former frameth and fetteth 
down a true form of confequence, by the varia- 
tions and deflections from which errors and incon- 
fequences may be exactly judged. “Toward the 
compofition and ftructure of which form, it is 
incident to handle the parts thereof, which are 
propofitions, and the parts of propofitions, which 
are fimple words: and this is that part of Logic 
which is comprehended in the Analytics. 

The fecond method of doétrine was introduced 
for expedite ufe and aflurance fake; difcovering 
the more fubtle forms of fophifms and illaquea- 
tions with their redargutions, which is that which 
is termed elenches. For although in the more 
grofs forts of fallacies it happeneth, as Seneca 
maketh the comparifon well, as in juggling feats, 
which, though we know not how they are done, 
yet we know well it is not as it feemeth to be; ® 
yet the more fubtle fort of them doth not only 
put a man befide his anfwer, but doth many times 
abufe his judgment. 

This part concerning elenches is excellently 
handled by Ariftotle in precept, but more excel- 
lently by Plato in example, not only in the per- 
fons of the Sophifts, but even in Socrates himfelf; 
who, profeffing to affirm nothing, but to infirm 
that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly 
exprefled all the forms of objection, fallacy, and 


82 Sen. Epiff. Mor. 45. Sine noxa decipiunt, quomodo prefti- 
giatorum acetabula et calculi, in quibus fallacia ipfa dele€tat. 


BOOK Il. 199 


redargution.® And although we have faid that 
the ufe of this doctrine is for redargution, yet it 
is manifeft the degenerate and corrupt ufe is for 
caption and contradiction, which paffeth for a 
great faculty, and no doubt is of very great advan- 
tage: though the difference be good which was 
made between orators and fophifters, that the one 
is as the greyhound, which hath his advantage in 
the race, and the other as the hare, which hath 
her advantage in the turn, fo as it is the advantage 
of the weaker creature. 

But yet further, this doctrine of elenches hath a 
more ample latitude and extent than is perceived ; 


namely, unto divers parts of knowledge ; whereof 


fome are laboured and others omitted. For firft, 
I conceive, though it may feem at firft fomewhat 
ftrange, that that part which is variably referred, 
fometimes to logic, fometimes to metaphyfics, 
_ touching the common adjuné¢ts of eflences, is but 
an elench; for the great fophifm of all fophifms 
being equivocation, or ambiguity of words and 
phrafe, (efpecially of fuch words as are moft ge- 
neral, and intervene in every inquiry,) it feemeth 
to me that the true and fruitful ufe, leaving vain 
fubtilties and fpeculations, of the inquiry of majo- 
rity, minority, priority, pofteriority, identity, diver- 
fity, poffibility, act, totality, parts, exiftence, priva- 
tion, and the like, are but wife cautions againft the 
ambiguities of fpeech. So again the diftribution 
of things into certain tribes, which we call catego- 


83 Cf, Plato’s account of Socrates in the opening of the Thee- 
tetus. 


Capable of 
further ex- 
tenfion. 


Imagination 
affects judg- 
ment. 


Fallacies in 
the mind. 


: 


200 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ries or predicaments, are but cautions againft the 
confufion of definitions and divifions.®4 

Secondly, there is a feducement that worketh 
by the ftrength of the impreffion, and not by the 
fubtilty of the illaqueation ; not fo much perplex- 
ing the reafon, as overruling it by power of the 
imagination. But this part I think more proper 
to handle when I {hall fpeak of rhetoric. 

But laftly, there is yet a much more important 
and profound kind of fallacies in the mind of man, 
which I find not obferved or inquired at all,®° and 
think good to place here, as that which of all 
others appertaineth moft to rectify judgment: the 
force whereof is fuch, as it doth not dazzle or’ 
fnare the underftanding in fome particulars, but 
doth more generally and inwardly infect and cor- 
rupt the ftate thereof. For the mind of man is 
far from the nature of a clear and equal glafs, 
wherein the beams of things fhould reflect accord- 
ing to their true incidence; nay, it is rather like 
an enchanted glafs, full of fuperftition and impof- 
ture, if it be not delivered and reduced. For this 
purpofe, let us confider the falfe appearances that 
are impofed upon us by the general nature of the 
mind,®° beholding them in an example or two; 
as firft, in that inftance which is the root of all 
fuperftition, namely, That to the nature of the 
mind of all men it is confonant for the affirmative 
or adtive to affect more than the negative or pri- 

§4 Arift. Categ. 

& This is the doétrine of ‘ Idols,” expanded in the Latin, and 


ftill more in the Nov. Org. i. 39—68. 
% « Tdols” of the Tribe, Mow. Org, i. 24—31. 


BOOK IT. 201 


vative: fo that a few times hitting or prefence, 
-countervails oft-times failing or abfence ; as was 
well anfwered by Diagoras to him that fhowed 
him in Neptune’s temple the great number of 
pictures of fuch as had efcaped fhipwreck, and 
had paid their vows to Neptune, faying, Advife 
now, you that think it folly to invocate Neptune in 
tempef?: Yea, but, faith Diagoras, where are they 
painted that are drowned?*' Let us behold it in 
another inftance, namely, That the /pirit of man, 
being of an equal and uniform fubftance, doth ufually 
Juppofe and feign in nature a greater equality and 
uniformity than is in truth. Hence it cometh, 
that the mathematicians cannot fatisfy themfelves 
except they reduce the motions of the celeftial 
bodies to perfect circles, rejecting fpiral lines, and 
labouring to be difcharged of eccentrics. Hence 
it cometh, that whereas there are many things in 
nature as it were monodica, fui juris ;®9 yet the 
cogitations of man do feign unto them relatives, 
parallels, and conjugates, whereas no fuch thing is ; 
as they have feigned an element of fire, to keep 
fquare with earth, water, and air, and the like: 
nay, it is not credible, till it be opened, what a 
number of fictions and fancies the fimilitude of 
human actions and arts, together with the making 
of man communis menfura, have brought into na- 


87 Cic. De Nat. Deor. iii. 37. 

88 Bacon’s warning here is good, though his illuftration was 
foon fignally confuted by the promulgation of Kepler’s laws. See 
Nov. Org. i. 45. 

8° He feems to think the derivation of this term is ydvoc and 
dikn. , 


Phantoms 
of the Cave. 


202 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


tural philofophy ; not much better than the herefy 
of the Anthropomorphites,” bred in the cells of 
grofs and folitary monks, and the opinion of Epi- 
curus, anfwerable to the fame in heathenifm, who 
fuppofed the Gods to be of human fhape. And 
therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed not to 
have afked, why God fhould have adorned the 
heavens with ftars, as if he had been an edilis, 
one that fhould have fet forth fome magnificent 
fhows or plays.°! For if that great Work-mafter 
had been of a human difpofition, he would have caft 
the ftars into fome pleafant and beautiful works. 
and orders, like the frets in the roofs of houfes ; 
whereas one can fcarce find a pofture in fquare, 
or triangle, or ftraight line, amongft fuch an infi- 
nite number ; fo differing a harmony there is be- 
tween the fpirit of man and the fpirit of nature. 
Let us confider again the falfe appearances im- 
pofed upon us by every man’s own individual 
nature and cuftom,% in that feigned fuppofition 
that Plato’ maketh of the cave: for certainly if 
a child were continued in a grot or cave under - 
the earth until maturity of age, and came fuddenly 
abroad, he would have ftrange and abfurd imagina- 
tions. So in like manner, although our perfons 
live in the view of heaven, yet our fpirits are 


90 Anthropomorphites, a fe€t which flourifhed in the fourth and 
tenth centuries ; their diftinétive do@trine was that as God is faid 
to have made man in his own Image, therefore the Deity is 
clothed in human fhape. See Mofheim, Ecc/. Hif?, Cent. x. part 
i. th. 5s 

Ze Ch. De Nat. Deor. i. 9. 

92 6 Tdols” of the Cave, Now. Org. i. 31—35. 

% Plato, De Rep. lib. vii. init. 


BOOK II. 203 


included in the caves of our own complexions and 
cuftoms, which minifter unto us infinite errors and 
vain opinions, if they be not recalled to examina- 
tion. But hereof we have given many examples 
in one of the errors, or peccant humours, which 
-we ran briefly over in our firft book. 

And laftly, let us confider the falfe appearances 
that are impofed upon us by words, which, are 
framed and applied according to the conceit and 
capacities of the vulgar fort: and although we 
think we govern our words, and prefcribe it well, 
loquendum ut vulgus, fentiendum ut fapientes ; yet 
Certain it is that words, as a Tartar’s bow, do 
fhoot back upon the underftanding of the wifett, 
and mightily entangle and pervert the judgment. 
So as it is almoft neceflary in all controverfies 
and difputations to imitate the wifdom of the 
mathematicians, in fetting down in the very begin- 
ning the definitions of our words and terms, that 
others may know how we accept and underftand 
them, and whether they concur with us or no. 
For it cometh to pafs for want of this, that we 
are fure to end there where we ought to have 
begun, which is, in queftions and differences about 
words. ‘To conclude therefore, it muft be con- 
feffed that it is not poffible to divorce ourfelves 
from thefe fallacies and falfe appearances, becaufe 
they are infeparable from our nature and condition 
of life; fo yet neverthelefs the caution of them, 
(for all elenches, as was faid, are but cautions,) 
doth extremely import the true conduct of human 


Of the Mar- 
ket-place. 


Elenchi 
magni, five 
de Idolis 
animi hu- 
mani nativis 
et adventi- 
tiis. 


204 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


judgment. The particular elenches or cautions 
againft thefe three falfe appearances, I find altoge- 
ther deficient. 
Reference “I“here remaineth one part of judgment of great 
he ee excellency, which to mine underftandingis fo flightly 
jets defi- touched, as I may report that alfo deficient ; which 
or is the application of the differing kinds of proofs 
to the differing kinds of fubjects; for there being 
but four kinds of demonftrations, that is, by the 
immediate confent of the mind or fenfe, by induction, 
by /yllogifm, and by congruity (which is that which 
Ariftotle calleth demon/tration in orb or circle, 
and not a notioribus ;) every of thefe hath certain 
fubjects in the matter of fciences, in which re- 
fpectively they have chiefeft ufe; and certain 
others, from which refpectively they ought to be 
excluded ; and the rigour and curiofity in requiring 
the more fevere proofs in fome things, and chiefly 
the facility in contenting ourfelves with the more 
remifs proofs in others, hath been amongft the 
greateft caufes of detriment and hinderance to 
De Anabgia knowledge. The diftributions and affignations of 
Se demonftrations, according to the analogy of {ci- 
ences, I note as deficient. 
De Augm. ‘The cuftody or retaining of knowledge is either 
Git Artof 22 Writing or memory; whereof writing hath two 
cuftody. parts, the nature of the character, and the order 
aa of the entry; for the art of characters, or other 
vifible notes of words or things, it hath neareft 
conjugation with grammar ; and therefore I refer 
it to the due place: for the difpofition and Ccollo- 


% Ariftot. Analyt, Pr. ii. 5. 1. 


BOOK I]. 205 


cation of that knowledge which we preferve in 
writing, it confifteth in a good digeft of common- 
places; wherein I am not ignorant of the preju- 
dice imputed to the ufe of common-place books, 
as caufing a retardation of reading, and fome 
floth or relaxation of memory. But becaufe it 
is but a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be for- 
ward and pregnant, except a man be deep and 
full, I hold the entry of common-places to be a 
matter of great ufe and eflence in ftudying, as that 
which affureth copie of invention, and contracteth 
judgment to a ftrength. But this is true, that of 
the methods of common-places that I have feen, 
there is none of any fufficient worth; all of them 
carrying merely the face of a {chool, and not of a 
world; and referring to vulgar matters and pe- 
dantical divifions, without all life or refpeé& to 
action. 

For the other principal part of the cuftody of 
knowledge, which is Memory, I find that faculty 
in my judgment weakly inquired of. An art 9 
there is extant of it; but it feemeth to me that 
there are better precepts than that art, and better 
practices of that art than thofe received. It is 
certain the art, as it is, may be raifed to points of 
oftentation prodigious: but in ufe, as it is now 
managed, it is barren, (not burdenfome, nor dan- 
gerous to natural memory, as is imagined, but 
barren,) that is, not dexterous to be applied to the 
ferious ufe of bufinefs and occafions, And there- 


5 Cf. Ariftot. De Mem. See the article in the Encycl, Britan- 
nica, On Mnemonics,” Cf. Cicero, De Rhet. iii. and De Orat. ii, 


(é.) By Me- 
mory :—ill- 
handled. 
The Art 
of Memory 
bad, 


Art of Me- 
mory refts 
on 

(a.) Preno- 
tion ; 

(8.) Em- 


blem. 


De Augm. 
VI. I< 

(iv.) Art of 
Tradition. 


206 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fore I make no more eftimation of repeating a 
great number of names or words upon once hear- 
ing, or the pouring forth of a number of verfes or 
rhymes, ex tempore, or the making of a fatirical 
fimile of everything, or the turning of everything 
to a jeft, or the falfifying or contradicting of 
everything by cavil, or the like, (whereof in the 
faculties of the mind there is great copie, and fuch 
as by device and practice may be exalted to an 
extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of the 
tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, baladines :® the 
one being the fame in the mind that the other is 
in the body, matters of {trangenefs without wor- 
thinefs. 

This art of memory is but built upon two 
intentions ; the one prenotion, the other emblem. 
Prenotion difchargeth the indefinite feeking of 
that we would remember, and directeth us to feek 
in a narrow compafs, that is, fomewhat that hath 
congruity with our place of memory. Emblem 
reduceth conceits intelle€tual to images fenfible, 
which {trike the memory more; out of which 
axioms may be drawn much better practice than 
that in ufe; and befides which axioms, there are 
divers moe touching help of memory, not infe- 
rior tothem. But I did in the beginning diftin- 
guifh, not to report thofe things deficient, which 
are but only ill managed. 

There remaineth the fourth kind of rational 
knowledge, which is tranfitive, concerning the 
exprefling or transferring our knowledge to others; 


% Ballerino is Italian for a dancer. 


i] 
BOOK II. 207 


which I will term by the general name of tradi- 
tion or delivery. ‘Tradition hath three parts; the 
firft concerning the organ of tradition: the fecond 
concerning the method of tradition; and the third 
concerning the illuftration of tradition. 

For the organ of tradition, it is either fpeech or 
writing: for Ariftotle faith well, Words are the 
images of cogitations, and letters are the images of 
words ;% but yet it is not of neceffity that cogita- 
tions be exprefled by the medium of words. For 
whatfoever is capable of fufficient differences, and 
thofe perceptible by the fenfe, is in nature competent 
to expre/s cogitations. And therefore we fee in the 
commerce of barbarous people, that underftand 
not one another’s language, and in the practice of 
divers that are dumb and deaf, that men’s minds 
are exprefled in geftures, though not exactly, yet 
to ferve the turn. And we underftand further, 
that it is the ufe of China, and the kingdoms of 
the high Levant,* to write in characters real, 
which exprefs neither letters nor words in grofs, 
but things or notions; infomuch as countries and 
provinces, which underftand not one another’s 
language, can neverthelefs read one another’s 
writings, becaufe the characters are accepted more 
generally than the languages do extend ; and there- 
fore they have a vaft multitude of characters, as 
many, I fuppofe, as radical words. 


% Ariftot. De Interpret. i. 2. 
98 ¢¢ Tn China et provinciis ultimi Orientis.” (De 4ugm.) See 


a very interefting note on thefe paragraphs in Ellis and Spedding’s 
ed. of the De Augm. vi. 1. 


(a) Its or- 
gan; {peech 
or writing. 


De notis re- 
rum, 


208 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Thefe notes of cogitations are of two forts ; the 
one when the note hath fome fimilitude or con- 
gruity with the notion: the other ad placitum, 
having force only by contract or acceptation. Of 
the former fort are hieroglyphics and geftures. 
For as to hieroglyphics, things of ancient ufe, and — 
embraced chiefly by the Egyptians, one of the 
moft ancient nations, they are but as continued 
imprefles and emblems. And as for geftures, 
they are as tranfitory hieroglyphics, and are to 
hieroglyphics as words fpoken are to words writ- 
ten, in that they abide not; but they have ever- 
more, as well as the other, an affinity with the 
things fignified: as Periander, being confulted 
with how to preferve a tyranny newly ufurped, 
bid the meflenger attend and report what he faw 
him do; and went into his garden and topped all 
the higheft flowers: fignifying, that it confifted 
in the cutting off and keeping low of the nobility 
and grandees.29 Ad placitum, are the characters 
real before mentioned, and words: although fome 
have been willing by curious inquiry, or rather by 
apt feigning to have derived impofition of names 
from reafon and intendment ; a fpeculation elegant, 
and, by reafon it fearcheth into antiquity, reverent; 
but {paringly mixed with truth, and of {mall fruit. 
This portion of knowledge, touching the notes of 


9% Ariftot. Polit, iii. 13, and Herod. v. 92. Cf. alfo Livy, i. 54, 
where the ftory is transferred to Tarquinius Superbus. Grandees, in 
ed.1605, grandes ; the word being not yet naturalized in the Englith 
language. According to Richardfon, Burton (the Anatomy was 
publifhed in 1624) fpells it grandy. In my copy of the firft edition 
i have not met with the word. 


BOOK I. 209° 


things and cogitations in general, I find not in- 
quired, but deficient. And although it may feem 
of no great ufe, confidering that words and writings 
by letters do far excel all the other ways ; yet be- 
caufe this part concerneth, as it were, the mint of 
knowledge, (for words are the tokens current and 
accepted for conceits, as moneys are for values, 
and that it is fit men be not ignorant that moneys 
may be of another kind than gold and filver,) I 
thought good to propound it to better inquiry. 
Concerning fpeech and words, the confideration 
of them hath produced the fcience of grammar: 
for man ftill ftriveth to reintegrate himfelf in thofe 
benedictions, from which by his fault he hath been 
deprived ; and as he hath ftriven againft the firft 
general curfe by the invention of all other arts, fo 
hath he fought to come forth of the fecond general 
curfe, which was the confufion of tongues, by the 
art of grammar; whereof the ufe in a mother 
tongue! is fmall, in a foreign tongue more; but 
moft in fuch foreign tongues as have ceafed to be 
vulgar tongues, and are turned only to learned 
tongues. ‘he duty of it is of two natures; the 
one popular, which is for the fpeedy and perfe& 
attaining languages, as well for intercourfe of fpeech 
as for underftanding of authors ; the other philo- 
fophical, examining the power and nature of words, 
as they are the foot{teps and prints of reafon: which 
kind of analogy between words and reafon is han- 


1 The Latin is “linguis quibufque vernaculis.” Ed. 1605 has 
in another tongue, which is clearly a mifprint—the antithefis lying 
between a “‘ vernacular” or mother tongue, and a foreign language. 


rE 


Speech has 
produced 
grammar. 


The acci- 
dents of 
words. 


Ciphers. 


210 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


dled /parfim, brokenly, though not entirely ; and 
therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I 
think it very worthy to be reduced into a fcience 
by itfelf. 

Unto grammar alfo belongeth, as an appendix, 
the confideration of the accidents of words ; which 
are meafure, found, and elevation or accent, and 
the fweetnefs and harfhnefs of them ; whence hath 
iffued fome curious obfervations in rhetoric, but 
chiefly poefy, as we confider it in refpect of the 
verfe and not of the argument; wherein though 
men in learned tongues do tie themfelves to the 
ancient meafures, yet in modern languages it feem- 
eth to me as free to make new meatures of verfes 
as of dances: fora dance is a meafured pace, as a 
verfe isa meafured fpeech. In thefe things the 
fenfe is better judge than the art ; 


Cenz fercula noftre 
Mallem convivis quam placuiffe cocis.? 


And of the fervile expreffing antiquity in an un- 
like and an unfit fubje@, it is well faid, Quod tem- 
pore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate ef? maxime 
novum.® 

For ciphers, they are commonly in letters or 
alphabets, but may be in words. The kinds of 
ciphers, befides the fimple ciphers, with changes, 
and intermixtures of nulls and non-fignificants, 
are many, according to the nature or rule of the 
infolding, wheel-ciphers, key-ciphers, doubles, &c.* 


2 Martial. Epig. ix. 82. ; 
3 'This quotation, which is omitted in the Latin, is only another 
form and application of Bacon’s favourite “ Antiquitas feeculi, ju- 


ventus mundi.” : 
4 In the Latin a fpecimen ofa cipher (invented by himfelf when 


BOOK I. ait 


But the virtues of them, whereby they are to be 
preferred, are three ; that they be not laborious to 
write and read; that they be impoffible to deci- 
pher; and, in fome cafes, that they be without 
fufpicion. The higheft degree whereof is to write 
omnia per omnia; which is undoubtedly poffible, 
with a proportion quintuple at moft of the writing 
infolding to the writing infolded, and no other re- 
ftraint whatfoever. ‘This art of ciphering hath 
for relative an art of deciphering, by fuppofition 
unprofitable, but, as things are, of great ufe. For 
fuppofe that ciphers were well managed, there be 
multitudes of them which exclude the decipherer. 
But in regard of the rawnefs and unfkilfulnefs of 
the hands through which they pafs, the greateft 
matters are many times carried in the weakeft ci- 
phers. 

In the enumeration of thefe private and retired 
arts, it may be thought I feek to make a great 
mufter-roll of fciences, naming them for fhow and 
oftentation, and to little other purpofe. But let 
thofe which are fkilful in them judge whether I 
bring them in only for appearance, or whether in 
that which I fpeak of them, though in few marks, 
there be not fome feed of proficience. And this 
muft be remembered, that as there be many of 
great account in their countries and provinces, 
which, when they come up to the feat of the eftate, 


a youhg man at Paris) is introduced, to fhow how the art of writ- 
ing omnia per omnia can be attained to. See alfo Encycl. Brit. verb, 
Cipher. Trithemius, Bapt. Porta, and others, wrote treatifes on 
this art; and it is worth remembering that the Stuarts made con- 
fiderable political ufe of it. 


Conclufion. 


Aug. vi. 


( ) Method 
of Tradition, 


Method, a 
part of 
Logic. 


212 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


are but of mean rank and fearcely regarded; fo 
thefe arts, being here placed with the principal and 
fupreme fciences, feem petty things; yet to fuch 
as have chofen them to fpend their labours and 
ftudies in them, they feem great matters. 

For the Method of Tradition, I fee it hath moved 
a controverfy in our time.® But as in civil bufi- 
nefs, if there be a meeting, and men fall at words, 
there is commonly an end of the matter for that 
time, and no proceeding at all; fo in learning, 
where there is much controverfy, there is many 
times little inquiry. For this part of knowledge 
of Method feemeth to me fo weakly inquired as I 
fhall report it deficient. 

Method hath been placed, and that not amifs, 
in Logic, as a part of Judgment ;° for as the doc- 
trine of Syllogifms comprehendeth the rules of 
Judgment upon that. which is invented, fo the 
doctrine of Method containeth the rules of Judg- 
ment upon that which is to be delivered; for 
Judgment precedeth Delivery, as it followeth In- 
vention. Neither is the Method or the nature of 
the tradition material only to the ufe of knowledge, 
but likewife to the progreffion of knowledge: for 
fince the labour and life of one man cannot attain 
to perfection of knowledge, the wifdom of the 
tradition is that which infpireth the felicity of con- 


5 Between Ramus, whofe method was one of perpetual dicho- 
tomies, and others. 

© Not fo in the ufual text-books —Sanderfon, iil. 30, 31, and 
Aldrich, chap. vi. place it under Difcourfe; and it is defined as 
“ Ratio ita difponendi partes alicujus difciplinz vel tra€tationis, ut 
facillime a nobis integra difcatur.” 


BOOK Il. 213 


tinuance and proceeding. And therefore the moft 
real diverfity of method, is of Method referred to 
ufe, and Method referred to progreffion: whereof 
the one may be termed Magiftral, and the other 
of Probation. 

The latter whereof feemeth to be via deferta et 
interclufa. For as knowledges are now delivered, 
there is a kind of contract of error between the 
deliverer and the receiver: for he that delivereth 
knowledge, defireth to deliver it in fuch form as 
may be beft believed, and not as may be beft ex- 
amined; and he that receiveth knowledge, defireth 
rather prefent fatisfaction, than expectant inquiry ; 
and fo rather not to doubt, than not to err: glory 
making the author not to lay open his weaknefs, 
and floth making the difciple not to know his 
ftrength. 

But knowledge that is delivered as a thread to 
be fpun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, 
if it were poffible, in the fame method wherein it 
was invented: and fo is it poflible of knowledge 
induced. But in this fame anticipated and pre- 
vented knowledge, no man knoweth how he came 
to the knowledge which he hath obtained. But 
yet neverthelefs, fecundum majus et minus, a man 
may revifit and defcend unto the foundations of 
his knowledge and confent; and fo tranfplant it 
into another, as it grew in his own mind, For it 
is in knowledges as it is in plants: if you mean to 
ufe the plant, it is no matter for the roots; but if 
you mean to remove it to grow, then it is more 
affured to reft upon roots than flips: fo the deli- 


Of Proba- 

tion, or for 
progreffion 
(deficient. ) 


Magiftral, or 
for ufe. 


De Methodo 
Jfincera, five 
ad filios fci- 


entiarum. 


Enigma- 
tical. 


Compared 
with Aphor- 
ifms. 


214 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


very of knowledges, as it is now ufed, is as of fair 
bodies of trees without the roots; good for the 
carpenter, but not for the planter. But if you 
will have fciences grow, it is lefs matter for the 
fhaft or body of the tree, fo you look well to the 
taking up of the roots: of which kind of delivery 
the method of the mathematics, in that fubjedt, 
hath fome fhadow: but generally I fee it neither 
put in ufe7 nor put in inquifition, and therefore 
note it for deficient. 

Another diverfity of Method there is, which 
hath fome affinity with the former, ufed in fome 
cafes by the difcretion of the ancients, but dif- 
graced fince by the impoftures of many vain per- 
fons, who have made it as a falfe light for their 
counterfeit merchandifes ; and that is, enigmatical 
and difclofed.@ The pretence whereof is, to re- 
move the vulgar capacities from being admitted to 
the fecrets of knowledges, and to referve them to 
felected auditors, or wits of fuch fharpnefs as can 
pierce the veil. 

Another diverfity of Method, whereof the con- 
fequence is great, is the delivery of knowledge in 
Aphorifms, or in Methods; wherein we may ob- 
ferve that it hath been too much taken into cuftom, 
out of a few axioms or obfervations upon any fub- 
jet, to make a folemn and formal art, filling it 


7 I have read ufe for ure. For the Latin is u/us, and the word 
ure isarare one. Richardfon’s examplesare all from Chaucer, The 
meaning of both words is the fame. 

® Correfponds to the fcholaftic ‘ Methodus axpoapartxy et 
iEwreoucy,” Aldrich, Logic, vi. Bacon ufes thefe terms in the 
Latin, 


BOOK I]. 214° 


with fome difcourfes, and illuftrating it with ex- 
amples, and digefting it into a fenfible Method. 

But the writing in aphorifms hath many excel- 
lent virtues, whereto the writing in Method doth 
not approach. For firft, it trieth the writer, 
whether he be fuperficial or folid: for Aphorifms, 
except they fhould be ridiculous, cannot be made 
but of the pith and heart of fciences ; for difcourfe 
of illuftration is cut off: recitals of examples are 
cut off; difcourfe of connection and order is cut 
off; defcriptions of practice are cut off. So there 
remaineth nothing to fill the Aphorifms but fome 
good quantity of obfervation: and therefore no 
man can fuffice, nor in reafon will attempt to 
write Aphorifms, but he that is found and grounded. 
But in Methods, 


Tantum feries junéturaque pollet, 
Tantum de medio fumptis accedit honoris ;9 


as a man fhall make a great fhew of an art, which, 
if it were disjointed, would come to little. Secondly, 
methods are more fit to win confent or belief, but 
lefs fit to point to action ; for they carry a kind of 
demontftration in orb or circle, one part illuminat- 
ing another, and therefore fatisfy ; but particulars, 
being difperfed, do beft agree with difperfed direc- 
tions. And laftly, Aphorifms, reprefenting a know- 
ledge broken, do invite men to inquire farther; 
whereas Methods, carrying the fhow of a total, do 
fecure men, as if they were at fartheft. 

Another diverfity of Method, which is likewife 
of great weight, is the handling of knowledge by 


9 Hor. Ep. ad Pis, 242. 


By affertions 
and their 
proofs, or by 


216 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


See affertions and their proofs, or by queftions and 
' their determinations; the latter kind whereof, if 
it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicial to 
the proceeding of learning, as it is to the proceed- 
ing of an army to go about to befiege every little 
fort or hold. For if the field be kept, and the fum 
of the enterprife purfued, thofe fmaller things will 
come in of themfelves: indeed a man would not 
leave {ome important piece enemy at his back. 
In like manner, the ufe of confutation in the deli- 
very of fciences ought to be very fparing; and to 
ferve to remove ftrong preoccupations and pre- 
judgments, and not to minifter and excite difputa- 
tions and doubts. ; 
Differs ac- Another diverfity of Method is, according to 
ae the fubject or matter which is handled; for there 
matter. is a great difference in delivery of the mathematics, 
which are moft abftracted of knowledges, and po- 
licy, which is the moft immerfed: and howfoever 
contention hath been moved touching a uniform- 
ity of method in multiformity of matter, yet we 
fee how that opinion, befides the weaknefs of it, 
hath been of ill defert towards learning, as that 
which taketh the way to reduce learning to cer- 
tain empty and barren generalities ; being but the 
very hufks and fhells of fciences, all the kernel 
being forced out and expulfed with the torture 
and prefs of the Method. And therefore as I did 
~ allow well of particular topics for invention, fo I 
do allow likewife of particular Methods of tradition. 


10 This paffage is equivalent to *¢ although indeed a man would 
not leave fome fortified place hoftile to him in his rear.” 


BOOK Il. 217 


Another diverfity of judgment"! in the delivery 
and teaching of knowledge is according unto the 
light and prefuppofitions of that which is delivered ; 
for that knowledge which is new, and foreign from 
opinions received, is to be delivered in another 
form than that that is agreeable’* and familiar ; 
and therefore Ariftotle, when he thinks to tax 
Democritus, doth in truth commend him, where 
he faith, Jf we fhall indeed difpute, and not follow 
after fimilitudes, Sc.3 For thofe whofe conceits 
are feated in popular opinions, need only but to 
prove or difpute ; but thofe whofe conceits are be- 
yond popular opinions, have a double labour ; the 
one to make themfelves conceived, and the other 
to prove and demontftrate : fo that it is of neceflity 
with them to have recourfe to fimilitudes and tranf- 
lations to exprefs themfelves. And therefore in 
the infancy of learning, and in rude times, when 
thofe conceits which are now trivial were then 
new, the world was full of parables and fimilitudes ; 
for elfe would men either have paffed over with- 
out mark, or elfe rejected for paradoxes, that which 
was offered, before they had underftood or judged. 
So in divine learning, we fee how frequent para- 
bles and tropes are: for it is a rule, that whatfo- 
ever fcience is not confonant to prefuppofitions, 
muft pray in aid of fimilitudes. 


1! Bacon meant here to fay * diverfity of Method to be ufed 
with judgment,” &c.; for the Latin is ‘* Sequitur aliud ete 
difcrimen in tradendis fcientiis cum judicio adhibendum.” 

2 Agreeable. ‘‘Opinionibus jampridem imbibitis et receptis 
affinis.” 

3 Arift. Eth. Nic. vi. 3, fee note in Ellis and Spedding’s ed. 


According 
to the 
knowledge 
of the re- 
ceiver. 


Other dif- 
ferences, 


Deprudentia 
Traditionis. 


Method 
alfo confi- 
ders the 
limitation 
of propofi- 
tions. 


218 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


There be alfo other diverfities of Methods vul- 
gar and received: as that of Refolution or Ana- 
lyfis, of Conftitution or Syftafis, of Concealment 
or Cryptic, &c., which I do allow well of, though 
I have ftood upon thofe which are leaft handled 
and obferved. All which I have remembered to 
this purpofe, becaufe I would ere& and conftitute 
one general inquiry, which feems to me deficient, 
touching the Wifdom of Tradition. 

But unto this part of knowledge concerning 
Methods doth farther belong not only the archi- 
tecture of the whole frame of a work, but alfo the 
feveral beams and columns thereof; not as to their 
ftuff, but as to their quantity and figure. And 
therefore Method confidereth not only the difpo- 
fition of the argument or fubject, but likewife the 
propofitions: not as to their truth or matter, but 
as to their limitation and manner. For herein 
Ramus merited better a great deal in reviving the 
good rules of propofitions, Kaécaov mpatov xara 
gaytds, &c., than he did in introducing the canker 
of epitomes ;'* and yet (as it is the condition of 
human things that, according to the ancient fables, 
the moft precious things have the moft pernicious 
keepers ;) it was fo, that the attempt of the one 
made him fall upon the other. For he had need 
be well conducted that fhould defign to make 
axioms convertible, if he make them not withal 
circular, and non-promovent, or incurring into 
themfelves ; but yet the intention was excellent. 


14 Should this not rather have been Dichotomies ? “quam in 
unica fua Methodo et Dichotomiis obtrudendis,” 


BOOK II. 219 


The other confiderations of method, concern- 
ing propofitions, are chiefly touching the utmoft 
propofitions, which limit the dimenfions of fci- 
ences; for every knowledge may be fitly faid, 
befides the profundity, (which is the truth and 
fubftance of it, that makes it folid,) to have a lon- 
gitude and a latitude; accounting the latitude 
towards other fciences, and the longitude towards 
action ; that is, from the greateft generality to 
the moft particular precept. “The one giveth 
tule how far one knowledge ought to inter- 
meddle within the province of another, which is 
the rule they call Kaéaurd ;15 the other giveth 
rule unto what degree of particularity a knowledge 
fhould defcend: which latter I find paffed over in 
filence, being in my judgment the more material ; 
for certainly there muft be fomewhat left to prac- 
tice; but how much is worthy the inquiry. We 
fee remote and fuperficial generalities do but offer 
knowledge to {corn of practical men; and are no 
more aiding to practice, than an Ortelius’ ?° uni- 
verfal map is to direét the way between London 
and York. ‘The better fort of rules have been 
not unfitly compared to glaffes of fteel unpolifhed, 
where you may fee the images of things, but firft 
they muft be filed: fo the rules will help, if they 
be laboured and polifhed by practice. But how 
cryftalline they may be made at the firft, and how 
far forth they may be polifhed aforehand, is the quef- 
tion ; the inquiry whereof feemeth to me deficient. 

There hath been alfo laboured and put in prac- 


15 Viz. that Propofitions fhould be true effentially. 
16 Ortelius was an Antwerper, died 1598, ftyled the “* Ptolemzus 
fui feeculi,” 


Method 
alfo chiefly 
concerns 
univerfal 
propofi- 
tions, 


De produc- 
tiene Axi- 
omatum. 


Falfe Me- 
thod, as 


that of Ray- 
mond 
Lully. 


De Aug. 
Vi. 2. 

(c.) Illuftra- 
tion of tra- 
dition, or 
rhetoric. 


220 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


tice a method, which is not a lawful method, but 
a method of impofture ; which is, to deliver know- 
ledges in fuch manner, as men may fpeedily come 
to make a fhow of learning who have it not: fuch 
was the travail of Raymundus Lullius, in making 
that art which bears his name: not unlike to 
fome books of typocofmy, which have been made 
fince; being nothing but a mafs of words of all 
arts, to give men countenance, that thofe which 
ufe the terms might be thought to underftand the 
art; which collections are much like a fripper’s 
or broker’s fhop, that hath ends of everything, 
but nothing of worth. 

Now we defcend to that part which concerneth 
the illuftration of tradition, comprehended in that 
fcience which we call rhetoric, or art of eloquence ; 
a fcience excellent, and excellently well laboured. 
For though in true value it is inferior to wifdom, 
(as it is faid by God to Mofes, when he difabled 
himfelf for want of this faculty, 4aron fhall be thy 
fpeaker, and thou fhalt be to him as God:)® yet 
with people it is the more mighty: fo Salomon 
faith, Sapiens corde appellabitur prudens, fed dulcis 
eloquio majora reperiet ;9 fignifying, that profound- 
nefs of wifdom will help a man to a name or ad- 
miration, but that it is eloquence that prevaileth 
in an active life. And as to the labouring of it, 


. 7 Raymundus Lully, “the Enlightened Doétor,” was born in 
Majorca in 1225, ftudied Arabian philofophy, chemiftry, phyfic, 
and divinity. He was ftoned to death, at the age of 80, in Maure- 
tania, for preaching the gofpel. Fora brief account of his Method, 
fee note to Ellis and Spedding’s De Augm. vi. 2. (p. 669.) 

18 Exod, iv. 16, 19 Prov, xvi. 21. 


BOOK Ii. 221 


the emulation of Ariftotle with the rhetoricians 
of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath 
made them in their works of rhetorics exceed 
themfelves. Again, the excellency of examples 
of eloquence in the orations of Demofthenes and 
Cicero, added to the perfection of the precepts of 
eloquence, hath doubled the progreffion in this 
art; and therefore the deficiencies which I fhall 
note will rather be in fome collections, which may 
as hand-maids attend the art, than in the rules or 
ufe of the art itfelf. 

Notwithftanding, to ftir the earth a little about 
the roots of this fcience, as we have done of the 
reft ; the duty and office of rhetoric is, to apply 
reafon to imagination for the better moving of the 
will. For we fee reafon is difturbed in the ad- 
miniftration thereof by three means ; by c//aquea- 
tion or fophifm, which pertains to logic; by zma- 
gination or impreffion, which pertains to rhetoric ; 
and by paffion or affection, which pertains to mo- 
rality. And as in negotiation with others, men 
are wrought by cunning, by importunity, and by 
vehemency ; fo in this negotiation within our- 
felves, men are undermined by inconfequences, 
folicited and importuned by impreffions or obfer- 
vations, and tranfported by paffions. Neither is 
the nature of man fo unfortunately built, as that 
thofe powers and arts fhould have force to difturb 
reafon, and not to eftablifh and advance it. For 
the end of logic is, to teach a form of argument 


to fecure reafon, and not to entrap it; the end of - 


morality is to procure the affections to obey reafon, 


Definition 
of rhetoric. 


Plato un- 
derrated it. 


222 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is, to fill 
the imagination to fecond reafon, and not to op- 
prefs it: for thefe abufes of art come in but ex 
obliquo, for caution. 

And therefore it was great injuftice in Plato, 
though fpringing out of a juft hatred to the rheto- 
ricians of his time, to efteem of rhetoric but as a 
voluptuary art, refembling it to cookery, that did 
mar wholefome meats, and help unwholefome by 
variety of fauces to the pleafure of the tafte.2° For 
we fee that fpeech is much more converfant in 
adorning that which is good, than in colouring 
that which is evil; for there is no man but fpeak- 
eth more honeftly than he can do or think: and 
it was excellently noted by Thucydides in Cleon, 
that becaufe he ufed to hold on the bad fide in 
caufes of eftate, therefore he was ever inveighing 
againft eloquence and good {fpeech ;*! knowing 
that no man can fpeak fair of courfes fordid and 
bafe. And therefore as Plato faid elegantly, That 
virtue, if fhe could be feen, would move great love 
and affection ;** fo feeing that fhe cannot be fhowed 
to the fenfe by corporal fhape, the next degree is 
to fhow her to the imagination in lively reprefent- 
ation: for to fhow her to reafon only in fubtilty 
of argument, was a thing ever derided in Chryfip- 
pus and many of the Stoics; who thought to 
thruft virtue upon men by fharp difputations and 
conclufions, which have no fympathy with the will 
of man. 


20 Plat. Gorg. 462, eq. 31 Thucyd. iii. 42. 
42 Plat. Phedr. 250. 


BOOK II. 223 


Again, if the affe€tions in themfelves were pliant 
and obedient to reafon, it were true there fhould 
be no great ufe of perfuafions and infinuations to 
the will, more than of naked propofition and 
proofs; but in regard of the continual mutinies 
and feditions of the affections, 


Video meliora, proboque ; 
Deteriora fequor :? 


reafon would become captive and fervile, if elo- 
quence of perfuafions did not practife and win the 
imagination from the affections’ part, and contract 
a confederacy between the reafon and imagination 
againft the affections; for the affections them- 
felves carry ever an appetite to good, as reafon 
doth. The difference is, that the affection be- 
holdeth merely the prefent ; reafon beholdeth the 
future and fum of time. And therefore the pre- 
fent filling the imagination more, reafon is com- 
monly vanquifhed; but after that force of elo- 
quence and perfuafion hath made things future 
and remote appear as prefent, then upon the revolt 
of the imagination reafon prevaileth. 

We conclude, therefore, that rhetoric can be no 
more charged with the colouring of the worfe part, 
than logic with fophiftry,* or morality with vice. 
For we know the doétrines of contraries are the 
fame, though the ufe be oppofite. It appeareth 
alfo that logic differeth from rhetoric, not only as 
the fift from the palm, the one clofe, the other at 
large; but much more in this, that logic handleth 
reafon exact and in truth, and rhetoric handleth 


23 Ovid, Metam. vil. 20. 24 Arift, Rhet. 1. i. 14. 


Ufeful to 
quell the 
feditions of 
the paf- 


fions. 


Rhetoric by 
the fide of 
logic, 


a 


De pru- 
dentia Jer- 
monis pri- 
vati, 


Its defici- 
ences : no 
good collec- 
tion of co- 
lours of 
good and 
evil. 


224 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


it as it is planted in popular opinions and manners. 
And therefore Ariftotle®® doth wifely place rhe- 
toric as between logic on the one fide, and moral 
or civil knowledge on the other, as participating 
of both: for the proofs and demonftrations of 
logic are towards all men indifferent and the fame ; 
but the proofs and perfuafions of rhetoric ought 
to differ according to the auditors : 
Orpheus in fylvis, inter delphinas Arion.” 


Which application, in perfection of idea, ought to 
extend fo far, that if a man fhould fpeak of the 
fame thing to feveral perfons, he fhould fpeak to 
them all refpectively and feveral ways: though 
this politic part of eloquence in private fpeech it 
is eafy for the greateft orators to want: whilft by 
the obferving their well-graced forms of fpeech 
they leefe the volubility of application : and there- 
fore it fhall not be amifs to recommend this to 
better inquiry, not being curious whether we place 
it here, or in that part which concerneth policy. 

Now therefore will I defcend to the deficiences, 
which, as I faid, are but attendances :*7 and firft, 
I do not find the wifdom and diligence of Ariftotle 
well purfued, who began to make a colleétion of 
the popular figns and colours of good and evil, 
both fimple and comparative, which are as the 
fophifms of rhetoric, as I touched before.*® For 
example: 

25 Ariftot. Rhet. 1. 2.7. % Virg. Ecl..viil. 56, 

27 Attendances. ‘* Pertinent omnia ad promptuarium.” 

28 Thefe were publithed in 1597, at the end of the volume of 


Effays. They are reproduced in the correfponding place of the 
Latin. See Arift. Top. i. 12. 


BOOK I. 225 
Sophifma, 


Quod laudatur, bonum: quod vituperatur, malum. 
Redargutio, 


Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces, 


Malum eft, malum eft, inquit emptor: fed cum 
recefferit, tum gloriabitur !*° 

The defects in the labour of Ariftotle are three: 
one, that there be but a few of many; another, 
that their elenches are not annexed; and the third, 
that he conceived but a part of the ufe of them: 
for their ufe is not only in probation, but much 
more in impreffion. For many forms are equal 
in fignification which are differing in impreffion ; 
as the difference is great in the piercing of that 
which is fharp and that which is flat, though the 
ftrength of the percuffion be the fame: for there 
is no man but will be a little more raifed by hear- 
ing it faid, Your enemies will be glad of this: 


Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridz :?! 


than by hearing it faid only, This is evil for you. 

Secondly, I do refume alfo that which I men- 
tioned before, touching provifion or preparatory 
ftore for the furniture of fpeech and readinefs. of 
invention ; which appeareth to be of two forts; 
the one in refemblance to a fhop of pieces unmade 
up, the other to a fhop of things ready made up ; 
both to be applied to that which is frequent and 
moft in requeft: the former of thefe I will call 
antitheta, and the latter formule. 

Antitheta are thefes argued pro et contra; wherein 


PiHor. Pp. tis 2. 17. 30 Prov. xx. 14, 
31 Virg. nr. ii. 104. 


<3 


Deficient in 
antitheta 
and form- 
ule. 


Appendices 
to the art of 
tradition, 
(a.) Advice 
to critics, 


226 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


men may be more large and laborious: but, in 
fuch as are able to do it, to avoid prolixity of en- 
try, I with the feeds of the feveral arguments to 
be caft up into fome brief and acute fentences, 
not to be cited, but to be as fkeins or bottoms of 
thread, to be unwinded at large when they come 
to be ufed; fupplying authorities and examples by 


reference. 
Pro verbis legis. 


Non eft interpretatio, fed divinatio, quz recedit a litera : 
Cum receditur a litera, judex tranfit in legiflatorem. 


Pro fententia legis, 


Ex omnibus verbis eft eliciendus fenfus qui interpretatur fingula. 


Formule are but decent and apt paffages or con- 
veyances of {peech, which may ferve indifferently 
for differing fubjects ; as of preface, conclufion, di- 
greffion, tranfition, excufation, Sc. For as in build- 
ings, there is great pleafure and ufe in the well 
cafting of the ftaircafes, entries, doors, windows, 
and the like; fo in fpeech, the conveyances and 
paflages are of {pecial ornament and effect. 


Ai conclufion in a deliberative. 


So may we redeem the faults paffed, and prevent the inconve- 
niences future. 


There remain two appendices touching the tra- 
dition of knowledge, the one critical, the other 
pedantical. For all knowledge is either delivered 
by teachers, or attained by men’s proper endea- 
vours: and therefore as the principal part of tra- 
dition of knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of 
books, fo the relative part thereof concerneth read- 
ing of books ; whereunto appertain incidently thefe 
confiderations. ‘The firft is concerning the true 


BOOK II. 227 


correction and edition of authors ; wherein never- 
thelefs rafh diligence hath done great prejudice. 
For thefe critics have often prefumed, that that 
which they underftand not is falfe fet down: as 
the prieft that, where he found it written of St. 
Paul, Demiffus eff per [portam*? mended his book, 
and made it DemijJus ef? per portam; becaufe 
Jporta was a hard word, and out of his reading: 
and furely their errors, though they be not fo pal- 
pable and ridiculous, are yet of the fame kind. 
And therefore, as it hath been wifely noted, the 
moft corrected copies are commonly the leaft 
correct. 

The fecond is concerning the expofition and 
explication of authors, which refteth in annota- 
tions and commentaries: wherein it is over ufual 
to blanch the obfcure places, and difcourfe upon 
the plain. 

The third is concerning the times, which in 
many cafes give great light to true interpretations. 

The fourth is concerning fome brief cenfure 
and judgment of the authors; that men thereby 
may make fome election unto themfelves what 
books to read. 

And the fifth is concerning the fyntax and dif- 
pofition of ftudies ; that men may know in what 
order or purfuit to read. 

For pedantical knowledge, it containeth that 
difference of tradition which is proper for youth ; 
whereunto appertain divers confiderations of great 
fruit. 


SSVAGsiix..2'5¢ 


(.) OF pe- 
dantical 

knowledge, 
(i.e. wifdom 
in teaching.) 


228 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


As firft, the timing and feafoning of knowledges; 
as with what to initiate them, and from what for 
a time to refrain them. 

Secondly, the confideration where to begin with 
the eafieft, and fo proceed to the more difficult ; 
and in what courfes to prefs the more difficult, and 
then to turn them to the more eafy: for it is one 
method to practife {wimming with bladders, and 
another to practife dancing with heavy fhoes. 

A third is the application of learning according 
unto the propriety of the wits; for there is no 
defect in the faculties intelleCtual, but feemeth to 
have a proper cure contained in fome ftudies: as, 
for example, if a child be bird-witted, that is, hath 
not the faculty of attention, the mathematics giv- 
eth a remedy thereunto; for in them, if the wit 
be caught away but a moment, one is to begin 
anew. And as {ciences have a propriety towards 
faculties for cure and help, fo faculties or powers 
have a fympathy towards fciences for excellency 
or {peedy profiting: and therefore it is an inquiry 
of great wifdom, what kinds of wits and natures 
are moft apt and proper for what fciences. 

Fourthly, the ordering of exercifes is matter of 
great confequence to hurt or help: for, as is well 
obferved by Cicero,*> men in exercifing their fa- 
culties, if they be not well advifed, do exercife 
their faults and get ill habits as well as good; fo 
there is a great judgment to be had in the conti- 
nuance and intermiffion of exercifes. It were too 
long to particularize a number of other confidera- 


Cicer. Or. i. 44« 


BOOK I. 229 


tions of this nature, things but of mean appear- 
ance, but of fingular efficacy. For as the wronging 
or cherifhing of feeds or young plants is that that 
is moft important to their thriving: (and as it was 
noted that the firft fix kings being in truth as tu- 
-tors of the ftate of Rome in the infancy thereof, 
was the principal caufe of the immentfe greatnefs of 
that {tate which followed :) fo the culture and ma- 
nurance of minds in youth, hath fuch a forcible, 
though unfeen operation, as hardly any length of 
time or contention of labour can countervail it 
afterwards. And it is not amifs to oblerve alfo 
how {mall and mean faculties gotten by education, 
yet when they fall into great men or great matters, 
do work great and important effects ; whereof we 
fee a notable example in Tacitus** of two ftage 
players, Percennius and Vibulenus, who by their 
faculty of playing put the Pannonian armies into 
an extreme tumult and combutftion. For there 
arifing a mutiny amongft them upon the death of 
Auguftus Czfar, Blzfus the lieutenant had com- 
mitted fome of the mutineers, which were fud- 
denly refcued; whereupon Vibulenus got to be 
heard fpeak, which he did in this manner :— 
Thefe poor innocent wretches appointed to cruel death, 
you have reftored to behold the light; but who fhall 
reftore my brother to me, or life unto my brother, that 
was fent hither in meffage from the legions of Ger- 
many, to treat of the common caufe? and he hath 
murdered him this laft night hy fome of his fencers 
and ruffians, that he hath about him for his execu- 


=) Tacit. Ann: i. 22, 23. 


230 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


tioners upon foldiers. Anfwer, Blafus, what is done 
with his body? The mortale/? enemies do not deny 
burial. When I have performed my laft duty to the 
corpfe with kiffes, with tears, command me to be flain 
befide him; fo that thefe my fellows, for our good 
meaning, and our true hearts to the legions, may 
have leave to bury us. With which fpeech he put 
the army into an infinite fury and uproar : whereas 
truth was he had no brother, neither was there 
any fuch matter; but he played it merely as if he 
had been upon the ftage. 

But to return: we are now come to a period of 
rational knowledges ; wherein if 1 have made the 
divifions other than thofe that are received, yet 
would I not be thought to difallow all thofe divi- 
fions which I do not ufe. For there is a double 
neceflity impofed upon me of altering the divifions. 
The one, becaufe it differeth in end and purpofe, 
to fort together thofe things which are next in 
nature, and thofe things which are next in ufe. 
For if a fecretary of {tate fhould fort his papers, it 
is like in his ftudy or general cabinet he would 
fort together things of a nature, as treaties, inftruc- 
tions, &c., but in his boxes or particular cabinet 
he would fort together thofe that he were like to 
ufe together, though of feveral natures ; fo in this 
general cabinet of knowledge it was neceflary for 
me to follow the divifions of the nature of things; 
whereas if myfelf had been to handle any particu- 
lar knowledge, I would have refpeéted the divi- 
fions fitteft for ufe. The other, becaufe the 
bringing in of the deficiences did by confequence 


BOOK I], a 


alter the partitions of the reft. For let the know- 
ledge extant, for demonftration fake, be fifteen ; 
let the knowledge with the deficiences be twenty ; 
the parts of fifteen are not the parts of twenty ; 
for the parts of fifteen are three and five; the 
parts of twenty are two, four, five, and ten. So 
as thefe things are without contradi¢tion, and could 
not otherwife be. 


Sep E proceed now to that knowledge 
yh which confidereth of the appetite and 

Vie will of man: whereof Salomon faith, 

Ante omnia, fil, cuftodi cor tuum; nam 

jadi = actiones vite. In the handling of 
this fcience, thofe which have written feem to me 
to have done as if a man, that profeffed to teach 
to write, did only exhibit fair copies of alphabets 
and letters joined, without giving any precepts or 
directions for the carriage of the hand and framing 
of the letters. So have they made good and fair 
exemplars and copies, carrying the draughts and 
portraitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity; pro- 
pounding them well defcribed as the true objects 
and fcopes of man’s will and defires. But how 
to attain thefe excellent marks, and how to frame 
and fubdue the will of man to become true and 
conformable to thefe purfuits, they pafs it over 
altogether, or flightly and unprofitably. For it is 
not the difputing that moral virtues are in the 
mind of man by habit and not by nature,°° or the 


35 Prov. iv. 23. 
3 Arift. Eth. Nic. ii. 1, Eud. Eth. i. 3.1. 


De Aug. 
VII. 1. 

(8.) The 
Moral func- 
tions of the 
Mind; i.e. 
of the Ap- 
petite and 
Will ofmen. 
Til handled 
as yet. 


For men def- 
pife it as 
common, 


232 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


diftinguifhing that generous fpirits are won by doc- 
trines and perfuafions, and the vulgar fort by re- 
ward and punifhment, and the like {cattered glances 
and touches, that can excufe the abfence of this 
part. 

The reafon of this omiffion I fuppofe to be that 
hidden rock whereupon both this and many other 
barks of knowledge have been caft away ; which 
is, that men have defpifed to be converfant in or- 
dinary and common matters, the judicious direc- 
tion whereof neverthelefs is the wifeft doctrine, 
(for life confifteth not in novelties or fubtilties,) 
but contrariwife they have compounded {fciences 
chiefly of a certain refplendent or luftrous mafs of 
matter, chofen to give glory either to the fubtilty 
of difputations, or to the eloquence of difcourfes. 
But Seneca giveth an excellent check toeloquence; 
Nocet illis eloquentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem 
facit, fed fui.** Doétrine fhould be fuch as fhould 
make men in love with the leffon, and not with 
the teacher; being directed to the auditor’s bene- 
fit, and not to the author’s commendation. And 
therefore thofe are of the right kind which may 
be concluded as Demofthenes concludes his coun- 
fel, Que fi feceritis, non oratorem duntaxat in pra- 
Jentia laudabitis, fed vofmetipfos etiam non ita multo 
poft flatu rerum veftrarum meliore.*® 

Neither needed men of fo excellent parts to 
have defpaired of a fortune, which the poet Virgil 
promifed himfelf, and indeed obtained, who got as 


37 Sen. ad Lucilium, Ep. 52. 
38 Demofth. Olynth. B. ad fin. 


BOOK I. 233 


much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the 
expreffing of the obfervations of hufbandry, as of 
the heroical acts of Aineas :— 


Nec fum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere magnum 
Quam fit, et anguftis his addere rebus honorem.*® 


And furely, if the purpofe be in good earneft, 
not to write at leifure that which men may read 
at leifure, but really to inftruét and fuborn action 
and active life, thefe Georgics of the mind, con- 
cerning the hufbandry and tillage thereof, are no 
lefs worthy than the heroical defcriptions of virtue, 
duty, and felicity. Wherefore the main and pri- 
mitive divifion of moral knowledge feemeth to be 
into the exemplar or platform of good, and the 
regiment or culture of the mind: the one defcrib- 
ing the nature of good, the other prefcribing rules 
how to fubdue, apply, and accommodate the will 
of man thereunto. 

The dodtrine touching the platform or nature 
of good confidereth it either fimple or compared ; 
either the kinds of good, or the degrees of good ; 
in the latter whereof thofe infinite difputations, 
which were touching the fupreme degree thereof, 
which they term felicity, beatitude, or the higheft 
good, the doctrines concerning which were as the 
heathen divinity,*° are by the Chriftian faith dif- 
charged. Andas Ariftotle faith, That young men 
may be happy, but not otherwife but by hope ;* fo 
we mutt all acknowledge our minority, and em- 

39 Georg. iii. 289. 

40 j.e. Stood to the Heathen in the place of Divinity. “ Que 


ethnicis inftar Theologie erant.” 
4i Rbet. ii. 12. 8. 


Objects of 
Ethics. 
(i.) The 
nature of 
Good. 

(ii.) Moral 


culture. 


(i.) Of the 
nature of 
Good. 


We may 
omit the 
Summum 
Bonum, (as 
belonging 
to the fu- 
ture life.) 


234 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


brace the felicity which is by hope of the future 
world. 

Freed therefore and delivered from this doétrine 
of the philofopher’s heaven, whereby they feigned 
a higher elevation of man’s nature than was, (for 
we fee in what a height of ftyle Seneca writeth, 
Vere magnum, habere fragilitatem hominis, fecuri- 
tatem Dei,**) we may with more fobriety and 
truth receive the reft of their inquiries and labours. 
Wherein for the nature of good pofitive or fimple, 
they have fet it down excellently, in defcribing the 
forms of virtue and duty, with their fituations and 
poftures ; in diftributing them into their kinds, 
parts, provinces, actions, and adminiftrations, and 
the like: nay farther, they have commended them 
to man’s nature and {pirit, with great quicknefs of 
argument and beauty of perfuafions ; yea, and for- 
tified and entrenched them, as much as difcourfe 
can do, againft corrupt and popular opinions. 
Again, for the degrees and comparative nature of 
good, they have alfo excellently handled it in their 
triplicity of good, in the comparifon between a 
contemplative and an active life,* in the diftinc- 
tion between virtue with reluctation and virtue 
fecured, in their encounters between honefty and 
profit, in their balancing of virtue with virtue, and 
the like; fo as this part deferveth to be reported 
for excellently laboured. 

Notwithftanding, if before they had come to the 
popular and received notions of virtue and vice, 


pleafure and pain, and the reft, they had ftayed a 


42 Sen. ad Lucilium, Ep. 53. 43 Arift, Eth. Nic. x. 6-8. 


BOOK II. 235 


little longer upon the inquiry concerning the roots 
of good and evil, and the ftrings of thofe roots, 
they had given, in my opinion, a great light to that 
which followed; and {pecially if they had con- 
fulted with nature, they had made their doctrines 
lefs prolix and more profound; which being by 
them in part omitted and in part handled with 
much confufion, we will endeavour to refume and 
open in a more clear manner. 

There is formed in every thing a double nature 
of good: the one, as every thing is a total or fub- 
ftantive in itfelf; the other, as it is a part or mem- 
ber of a greater body; whereof the latter is in 
degree the greater and the worthier, becaufe it 
tendeth to the confervation of a more general form. 
Therefore we fee the iron in particular fympathy 
moveth to the lodeftone; but yet if it exceed a 
certain quantity, it forfaketh the affection to the 
lodeftone, and like a good patriot moveth to the 
earth, which is the region and country of mafly 
bodies : fo may we go forward, and fee that water 
and mafly bodies move to the centre of the earth ; 
but rather than to fuffer a divulfion in the conti- 
nuance of nature, they will move upwards from 
the centre of the earth, forfaking their duty to the 
earth in regard to their duty to the world. This 
double nature of good, and the comparative thereof, 
is much more engraven upon man, if he degene- 
rate not: unto whom the confervation of duty to 
the public ought to be much more precious than 
the confervation of life and being : according to 
that memorable fpeech of Pompeius Magnus, when 


Good either 
(1.) Pri- 
vate, or 
(2.) Rela- 


tive, 


Chriftianity 
exalts rela- 
tive (or fo- 
cial) good. 


This con- 
demns Arif- 
totle’s con- 
templative 
perfection 
of Life. 


236 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


being in commiffion of purveyance for a famine at 
Rome, and being diffuaded with great vehemency 
and inftance by his friends about him that he 
fhould not hazard himfelf to fea in an extremity of 
weather, he faid only to them, Nece//e eff ut eam, 
non ut vivam.** But it may be truly afirmed that 
there was never any philofophy, religion, or other 
difcipline, which did fo plainly and highly exalt the 
good which is communicative, and deprefs the 
good which is private and particular, as the Holy 
Faith; well declaring that it was the fame God 
that gave the Chriftian law to men, who gave 
thofe laws of nature to inanimate creatures that 
we {poke of before; for we read that the elected 
faints of God have wifhed themfelves anathema- 
tized and razed out of the book of life, in an 
ecftafy of charity and infinite feeling of commu- 
nion.* 

This being fet down and ftrongly planted, doth 
judge and determine moft of the controverfies 
wherein moral philofophy is converfant. For firft, 
it decideth the queftion touching the preferment 
of the contemplative or active life, and decideth 
it againft Ariftotle. For all the reafons which he 
bringeth for the contemplative are private, and 
refpecting the pleafure and dignity of a man’s felf, 
(in which refpeéts, no queftion, the contemplative 
life hath the pre-eminence) not much unlike to 
that comparifon, which Pythagoras made for the 
gracing and magnifying of philofophy and con- 
templation: who being afked what he was, an- 


4 Plut. Vit. Pomp. Rom. ix. 3. 


BOOK II. 237 


fwered, That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian 
games, he knew the manner, that fome came to try 
their fortune for the prizes, and fome came as mer- 
chants to utter their commodities, and fome came to 
make good cheer and meet their friends, and fome 
came to look on; and that he was one of them that 
came to look on.** But men muft know, that in 
this theatre of man’s life it is referved only for 
God and angels to be lookers on: neither could 
the like queftion ever have been received in the 
church (notwithftanding their Pretiofa in oculis 
Domini mors fanctorum ejus,* by which place they 
would exalt their civil death and regular profef- 
fions,) but upon this defence, that the monattical 
life is not fimply ** contemplative, but performeth 
the duty either of inceffant prayers and fupplica- 
tions, which hath been truly efteemed as an office 
in the church, or elfe of writing or taking inftruc- 
tions for writing concerning the law of God, as 
Mofes did when he abode {fo long in the mount.’ 
And fo we fee Enoch the feventh from Adam, 
who was the firft contemplative, and walked with 
God, yet did alfo endow the church with pro- 
phecy, which St. Jude citeth.6° But for contem- 
plation which fhould be finifhed in itfelf, without 
cafting beams upon fociety, afluredly divinity 
knoweth it not. 

It decideth alfo the controverfies between Zeno 
and Socrates, and their fchools and fucceffions, on 


© Cic. Tufc. Queft. v. 3. of Leo, tyrant of Phlius, not of Hiero, 
STOPS icEvi. 25. 48 Ed. 1605, fimple; 1629, 1633, fimply. 
a Ex, Xtiv. 30 Jude 14. 


It decides 
the quarrel 


between 
Stoics and 
Epicureans, 
&c., as to 
the nature 
of felicity. 


Cenfures 
Epictetus, 


238 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the one fide, who placed felicity in virtue fimply 
or attended, the actions and exercifes whereof do 
chiefly embrace and concern fociety ; and on the 
other fide, the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who 
placed it in pleafure, and made virtue, (as it is 
ufed in fome comedies of errors, wherein the mif- 
trefs and the maid change habits,) to be but as a 
fervant, without which pleafure cannot be ferved 
and attended, and the reformed {chool of the Epi- 
cureans, which placed it in ferenity of mind and 
freedom from perturbation, (as if they would have 
depofed Jupiter again, and reftored Saturn and the 
firft age, when there was no fummer nor winter, 
{pring nor autumn, but all after one air and fea- 
fon,) and Herillus, who placed felicity in extin- 
guifhment of the difputes of the mind, making no 
fixed nature of good and evil, efteeming things 
according to the clearnefs of the defires, or the 
reluctation ; which opinion was revived in the he- 
refy of the Anabaptifts,°! meafuring things accord- 
ing to the motions of the fpirit, and the conftancy 
or wavering of belief: all which are manifeft to 
tend to private repofe and contentment, and not 
to point of fociety. 

It cenfureth alfo the philofophy of Epictetus, 
which prefuppofeth that felicity muft be placed in 
thofe things which are in our power, left we be 
liable to fortune and difturbance : as if it were not 
a thing much more happy to fail in good and vir- 

51 Anabaptifts. Bacon here refers to the doctrines held by the 
German Anabaptifts. They believed themfelves to be under {pecial 


and divine influences, and therefore had no need of magiftracies, ot 
diftinét ranks of men, or of reftri¢tions in marriage. 


BOOK II. 239 


tuous ends for the public, than to obtain all that 
we can wifh to ourfelves in our proper fortune ; 
as Gonfalvo faid to his foldiers, fhowing them 
Naples, and protefting, He bad rather die one foot 
forwards, than to have his life fecured for long by 
one foot of retreat.©* Whereunto the wifdom of 
that heavenly leader hath figned, who hath af- 
firmed that @ good confcience is a continual feaft ;°° 
fhowing plainly that the confcience of good inten- 
tions, howfoever fucceeding, is a more continual 
joy to nature, than all the provifion which can be 
made for fecurity and repofe. 

It cenfureth likewife that abufe of philofophy, 
which grew general about the time of Epictetus, 
in converting it into an occupation or profeffion ; 
as if the purpofe had been, not to refift and ex- 
tinguifh perturbations, but to fly and avoid the 
caufes of them, and to fhape a particular kind and 
courfe of life to that end; introducing fuch a health 
of mind, as was that health of body of which Arif- 
totle fpeaketh of Herodicus, who did nothing all 
his life long but intend his health :°4 whereas if 
men refer themfelves to duties of fociety, as that 
health of body is beft, which is ableft to endure 
all alterations and extremities; fo likewife that 
health of mind is moft proper, which can go 
through the greateft temptations and perturba- 
tions. So as Diogenes’ opinion is to be accepted, 
who commended not them which abftained, but 
them which fuftained, and could refrain their mind 


52 Guicciardini, vi. 2. 53) Prov. XV. 15 
54 Arift. Rhet. i. 5. 10, 


And the 

error of 

making a 

profeffion 

of Philofo- 
hy. 


And with- 
drawalfrom 
bufinefs, 


De Aug. 
VIII. 2, 
(1.) Private 
good, either 
(a.) Adtive, 


or 
(4.) Paffive. 


(a.) Adtive. 


240 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


in precipitio, and could give unto the mind, as is 
ufed in horfemanthip, the fhorteft {top or turn.* 

Laftly, it cenfureth the tendernefs and want of 
application in fome of the moft ancient and reve- 
rend philofophers and philofophical men, that did 
retire too eafily from civil bufinefs, for avoiding 
of indignities and perturbations : whereas the refo- 
lution of men truly moral ought to be fuch as the 
fame Gonfalvo faid the honour of a foldier fhould 
be, ¢ tela craffiore, and not fo fine as that every. 
thing fhould catch in it and endanger it. 

To refume private or particular good; it falleth 
into the divifion of good aétive and paffive: for 
this difference of good, not unlike to that which 
among{t the Romans was exprefled in the familiar 
or houfehold terms of promus and condus, is formed 
alfo in all things, and is beft difclofed in the two 
feveral appetites in creatures; the one to preferve 
or continue themfelves, and the other to dilate or 
multiply themfelves ; whereof the latter feemeth 
to be the worthier: for in nature the heavens, 
which are the more worthy, are the agent; and 
the earth, which is the lefs worthy, is the patient. 
In the pleafures of living creatures, that of gene- 
ration is greater than that of food; in divine doc- 
trine, Leatius ef? dare quam accipere,® and in life, 
there is no man’s fpirit fo foft, but efteemeth 
the effeCting of fomewhat that he hath fixed in 
his defire, more than fenfuality ; which priority 
of the aétive good, is much upheld by the confi- 


55 Diog. Laert. Vita Diogenis, fee Ellis and Spedding’s ed. in loco. 
5 Acts xx. 35. 


BOOK Ul. 241 


deration of our eftate to be mortal and expofed to 
fortune. For if we might have a perpetuity and 
certainty in our pleafures, the ftate of them would 
advance their price: but when we fee it is but 
magni eftimamus mori tardius,* and ne glorieris 
de .craftino, nefcis partum diei,*® it maketh us to 
defire to have fomewhat fecured and exempted 
from time; which are only our deeds and works : 
as it is faid opera eorum fequuntur eos.°9 ‘The pre- 
eminence likewife of this active good is upheld by 
the affection which is natural in man towards va- 
riety and proceeding ; which in the pleafures of 
the fenfe, which is the principal part of paffive 
good, can have no great latitude: Cogita quamdiu 
eadem feceris ; cibus, fomnus, ludus; per hune circu- 
lum curritur; mori velle non tantum fortis, aut 
mifer, aut prudens, fed etiam fa/tidiofus pote/?. But 
in enterprifes, purfuits, and purpofes of life, there 
is much variety ; whereof men are fenfible with 
pleafure in their inceptions, progreffions, recoils, 
reintegrations, approaches and attainings to their 
ends: fo as it was well faid Vita fine propofito lan- 
guida et vaga eft.’ Neither hath this active good 
any identity with the good of fociety, though in 
fome cafe it hath an incidence into it ; for although 
it do many times bring forth acts of beneficence, 
yet it is with a refpect private to a man’s own 
power, glory, amplification, continuance ; as ap- 


57 Sen. Nat. Qua@ft. ii. 59. 58 Prov. xxvii. I. 

59 Revel. xiv. 13. 60 Sen. ad Lucil. Epift. 77. 

®1 Sen, ad Lucil. Epift. 95, where the words “ languida et” are 
wanting. 


R 


242 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


peareth plainly, when it findeth a contrary fubjec. 
For that gigantine {tate of mind which poffeffeth 
the troublers of the world, fuch as was Lucius 
Sylla, and infinite other in fmaller model, who 
would have all men happy or unhappy as they 
were their friends or enemies, and would give form 
to the world, according to their own humours, 
(which is the true Theomachy,) pretendeth and 
afpireth to active good, though it recedeth fartheft 
from good of fociety, which we have determined 
to be the greater. 
(2) Paffive. To refume paflive good, it receiveth a fubdivi- 
ee fion of confervative and perfe€tive. For let us 
vative, or take a brief review of that which we have faid: 
6.) Pertec- we have fpoken firft of the good of fociety, the 
; intention whereof embraceth the form of human 
nature, whereof we are members and portions, 
and not our own proper and individual form: we 
have fpoken of active good, and fuppofed it as a 
part of private and particular good: and rightly, 
for there is imprefled upon all things a triple de- 
fire or appetite proceeding from love to them- 
felves; one of preferving and continuing their 
form; another of advancing and perfecting their 
form; and a third of multiplying and extending 
their form upon other things; whereof the multi- 
plying, or fignature of it upon other things, is that 
which we handled by the name of active good. 
So as there remaineth the conferving of it, and 
perfecting or raifing of it; which latter is the high- 
eft degree of paffive good. For to preferve in 


BOOK II. 243 


ftate is the lefS, to preferve with advancement is 
the greater. Soin man,— 
Igneus eft ollis vigor, et czleftis origo. 

His approach or aflumption to divine or angelical 
nature is the perfection of his form; the error or 
falfe imitation of which good is that which is the 
tempeft of human life; while man, upon the in- 
ftin&t of an advancement formal and effential,. is 
carried to feek an advancement local. For as thofe 
which are fick, and find no remedy, do tumble up 
and down and change place, as if by a remove 
local they could obtain a remove internal ; fo is it 
with men in ambition, when failing of the means 
to exalt their nature, they are in a perpetual eftu- 
ation to exalt their place. So then paffive good 
is, as was faid, either confervative or perfective. 

To refume the good of confervation or comfort, 
which confifteth in the fruition of that which is 
agreeable to our natures; it feemeth to be the 
moft pure and natural of pleafures, but yet the 
fofteft and the loweft. And this alfo receiveth a 
difference, which hath neither been well judged 
of, nor well inquired: for the good of fruition or 
contentment is placed either in the fincerenefs of 
the fruition, or in the quicknefs and vigour of it ; 
the one fuperinduced by equality, the other by vi- 
ciffitude ; the one having lefs mixture of evil, the 
other more impreffion of good. Which of thefe 
is the greater good is a queftion controverted ; 
but whether man’s nature may not be capable of 
both, is a queftion not inquired. 


‘2 Virg. Zn. vi. 730. 


(8.) Perfec- 


tive. 


(a.) Confer- 
vative. 


244 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


The former queftion being debated between 
Socrates and a fophift, Socrates placing felicity in 
an equal and conftant peace of mind, and the fo- 
phift in much defiring and much enjoying, they 
fell from argument to ill words: the fophift faying 
that Socrates’ felicity was the felicity of a block or 
{tone ; and Socrates faying that the fophift’s feli- 
city was the felicity of one that had the itch, who 
did nothing but itch and fcratch.® And both thefe 
opinions do not want their fupports. For the 
opinion of Socrates is much upheld by the general 
confent even of the Epicures themfelves, that vir- 
tue beareth a great part in felicity ; and if fo, cer- 
tain it is, that virtue hath more ufe in clearing per- 
turbations than in compaffing defires. “The fo- 
phift’s opinion is much favoured by the affertion 
we laft fpoke of, that good of advancement is 
greater than good of fimple prefervation ; becaufe 
every obtaining a defire hath a fhow of advance- 
ment, as motion though in a circle hath a fhow of 
progreffion. 

But the fecond queftion, decided the true way, 
maketh the former fuperfluous. For can it be 
doubted but that there are fome who take more 
pleafure in enjoying pleafures than fome other, and 
yet neverthelefs are lefs troubled with the lofs or 
leaving of them? fo as this fame, Non uti ut non 
appetas, non appetere ut non metuas, funt animi pu- 
filli et diffidentis. And it feemeth to me, that moft 
of the doctrines of the philofophers are more fear- 
ful and cautionary than the nature of things re- 


63 Plat. Gorg. 4.92, 494- 


BOOK II. 245 


quireth. So have they increafed the fear of death 
in offering to cure it. For when they would have 
a man’s whole life to be but a difcipline or prepa- 
ration to die, they muft needs make men think 
that it is a terrible enemy, againft whom there is 
no end of preparing. Better faith the poet :— 


Qui fpatium vite extremum inter munera ponat 
Nature. 

So have they fought to make men’s minds too uni- 
form and harmonical, by not breaking them fufh- 
ciently to contrary motions: the reafon whereof 
I fuppofe to be, becaufe they themfelves were men 
dedicated to a private, free, and unapplied courfe 
of life. For as we fee, upon the lute or like in- 
ftrument, a ground, though it be fweet and have 
fhow of many changes, yet breaketh not the hand 
to fuch ftrange and hard ftops and paflages as a 
fet fong or voluntary ; much after the fame man- 
ner was the diverfity between a philofophical and 
a civil life. And therefore men are to imitate the 
wifdom of jewellers ; who, if there be a grain, or 
a cloud, or an ice,® which may be ground forth 
without taking too much of the {ftone, they help 
it; but if it fhould leflen and abate the ftone too 
much, they will not meddle with it: fo ought 
men fo to procure ferenity as they deftroy not 
magnanimity. 

Having therefore deduced the good of man 
which is private and particular, as far as feemeth 
fit; we will now return to that good of man which 


6 Juv. Sat. x. 358. 
65 “ Nubecula aliqua aut glaciecula,” De Augm. 


(2.) Good 


relative. 


(a.) Of man 


as a citizen, 


(2.) Asa to- 
cial being. 


246 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


refpecteth and beholdeth fociety, which we may 
term Duty; becaufe the term of Duty is more 
proper to a mind well framed and difpofed towards 
others, as the term of virtue is applied to a mind 
well formed and compofed in itfelf: though nei- 
ther can a man underftand virtue without fome 
relation to fociety, nor Duty without an inward 
difpofition. ‘This part may feem at firft to pertain 
to {cience civil and politic: but not if it be well 
obferved; for it concerneth the regiment and go- 
vernment of every man over himfelf, and not over 
others. And as in architeGure the direction of 
framing the pofts, beams, and other parts of build- 
ing, is not the fame with the manner of joining 
them and ereéting the building; and in mechani- 
cals, the direction how to frame an inftrument or 
engine, is not the fame with the manner of fetting 
it on work and employing it, (and yet neverthe- 
lefs in expreffing of the one you incidentally ex- 
prefs the aptnefs towards the other;) fo the doc- 
trine of conjugation of men in fociety differeth 
from that of their conformity thereunto. 

This part of Duty is fubdivided into two parts: 
the common Duty of every man, as a man or 
member of a ftate; the other, the refpective or 
fpecial Duty of every man, in his profeffion, voca- 
tion, and place. The firft of thefe is extant and 
well laboured, as hath been faid. The fecond 
likewife 1 may report rather difperfed than defi- 
cient; which manner of difperfed writing in this 
kind of argument I acknowledge to be beft. For 
who can take upon him to write of the proper 


| 


BOOK I]. 247 


duty, virtue, challenge, and right of every feveral 
vocation, profeffion, and place? For although 
fometimes a looker on may fee more than a game- 
fter, and there be a proverb more arrogant than 
found, that the vale beft difcovereth the hill; yet 
there is fmall doubt but that men can write beft, 
and moft really and materially, in their own pro- 
feffions ; and that the writing of {peculative men 
of active matter, for the moft part, doth feem to 
men of experience, as Phormio’s argument of the 
wars feemed to Hannibal, to be but dreams and 
dotage.© Only there is one vice which accom- 
panieth them that write in their own profeffions, 
that they magnify them in excefs. But generally 
it were to be wifhed, as that which would make 
learning indeed folid and fruitful, that active men 
would or could become writers. 

In which kind I cannot but mention, honoris 
caufa, your Majefty’s excellent book touching the 
duty of a king ; a work richly compounded of 
divinity, morality, and policy, with great afperfion 
of all other arts; and being, in mine opinion, one 
of the moft found and healthful writings that I 
have read; not diftempered in the heat of inven- 
tion, nor in the coldnefs of negligence; not fick 
of dizzinefs,® as thofe are who leefe themfelves in 
their order; nor of convulfions, as thofe which 
cramp in matters impertinent; not favouring of 
perfumes and paintings, as thofe do who feek to 


6 Cic. de Orat. ii. 18. 75. 87 Sc. the Bafilicon Doron. 
* Dizzinefs—Latin Vertigines. The ed, 1605 has dufineffe, 1629 


and 1633, bufineffe. 


= 


248 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


pleafe the reader more than nature beareth; and 
chiefly well difpofed in the {fpirits thereof, being 
agreeable to truth and apt for action; and far re- 
moved from that natural infirmity, whereunto I 
noted thofe that write in their own profeffions to 
be fubjeét, which is, that they exalt it above mea- 
fure: for your majefty hath truly defcribed, not a 
king of Affyria or Perfia in their extern glory, but 
a Mofes or a David, paftors of their people. Nei- 
ther can I ever leefe out of my remembrance, what 
I heard your majefty, in the fame facred fpirit of 
Government, deliver in a great caufe of judicature, 
which was, That kings ruled by their laws, as God 
did by the laws of nature; and ought as rarely to 
put in ufe their fupreme prerogative, as God doth 
his power of working miracles. And yet notwith- 
ftanding, in your book of a free monarchy,® you 
do well give men to underftand, that you know the 
plenitude of the power and right of a king, as well 
as the circle of his office and duty. Thus have I 
prefumed to allege this excellent writing of your 
majefty, as a prime or eminent example of trac- 
tates concerning {fpecial and refpective duties: 
wherein I fhould have faid as much, if it had been 
written a thoufand years fince: neither am I 
moved with certain courtly decencies, which ef- 
teem it flattery to praife in prefence ; no, it is flat- 
tery to praife in abfence ; that is, when either the 
virtue is abfent, or the occafion is abfent; and fo 
the praife is not natural, but forced, either in truth 
orin time. But let Cicero be read in his oration 


69 Sc. “ The True Law of Free Monarchies.” 


BOOK I. 249 


pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent 
table of Czefar’s virtue, and made to his face; _ be- 
fides the example of many other excellent perfons, 
wifer a great deal than fuch obfervers; and we 
will never doubt, upon a full occafion, to give juft 
praifes to prefent or abfent. 

But to return: there belongeth further to the 
handling of this part, touching the duties of pro- 
feffions and vocations, a relative or oppofite, touch- 
ing the frauds, cautels, impoftures, and vices of 
every profeffion, which hath been likewife handled: 
but how? rather in a fatire and cynically, than 
ferioufly and wifely : for men have rather fought 
by wit to deride and traduce much of that which 
is good in profeffions, than with judgment to dif- 
cover and fever that which is corrupt. For, as 
Salomon faith, he that cometh to feek after know- 
ledge with a mind to fcorn and cenfure, fhal] be 
fure to find matter for his humour, but no matter 
for his inftruction: Querenti derifori fcientiam 
ipfa fe abfcondit ; fed ftudiofo fit obviam.”° But the 
managing of this argument with integrity and 
truth, which I note as deficient, feemeth to me to 
be one of the beft fortifications for honefty and 
virtue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth 
of the bafilifk, that if he fee you firft, you die for 
it; but if you fee him firft, he dieth : fo it is with 
deceits and evil arts ; which, if they be firft efpied 
they leefe their life ; but if they prevent, they en- 
danger. So that we are much beholden to Ma- 
chiavel and others, that write what men do, and 


7 Prov, xiv. 6. 


The evils 
of focial 
life ill- 
handled. 


250 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


not what they ought to do. For it is not poffible 
to join ferpentine wifdom with columbine inno- 
cency,"! except men know exactly all the condi- 
tions of the ferpent: his bafenefs and going upon 
his belly, his volubility and lubricity, his envy and 
fting, and the reft ; that is, all forms and natures 
of evil: for without this, virtue lieth open and un- 
fenced. Nay, an honeft man can do no good 
upon thofe that are wicked to reclaim them, with- 
out the help of the knowledge of evil. For men 
of corrupted minds prefuppofe that honefty grow- 
eth out of fimplicity of manners, and believing of 
preachers, fchoolmafters, and men’s exterior lan- 
guage: fo as, except you can make them perceive 
that you know the utmoft reaches of their own 
corrupt opinions, they defpife all morality ; Non 
ecipit fiultus verba prudentia, nifi ea dixeris quae 
verfantur in corde ejus.7® 
Unto this part, touching Refpective Duty, doth 
alfo appertain the duties between hufband and wife, 
parent and child, mafter and fervant: fo likewife 
the laws of friendfhip and gratitude, the civil bond 
of companies, colleges, and politic bodies, of neigh-’ 
bourhood, and all other proportionate duties ; not 
as they are parts of government and fociety, but 
as to the framing of the mind of particular perfons. 
Of cafesof The knowledge concerning good refpeéting So- 
feet ciety doth handle it alfo, not fimply alone, but 
comparatively ; whereunto belongeth the weigh- 
ing of duties between perfon and perfon, cafe and 
cafe, particular and public: as we fee in the pro- 


7) Matt. x. 16. 72 Prov. xvili. 2. From the Vulgate. 


BOOK II. 251 


ceeding of Lucius Brutus again{ft his own fons, 
which was fo much extolled; yet what was faid? 


Infelix, utcunque ferent ea fata minores,7% 


So the cafe was doubtful, and had opinion on both 
fides. Again, we fee when M. Brutus and Caf 
fius invited to a fupper certain whofe opinions they 
meant to feel, whether they were fit to be made 
their aflociates, and caft forth the queftion touch- 
ing the killing of a tyrant being a ufurper, they 
were divided in opinion ;"* fome holding that fer- 
vitude was the extreme of evils, and others that 
tyranny was better than a civil war: and a num- 
ber of the like cafes there are of comparative duty ; 
amongft which that of all others is the moft fre- 
quent, where the queftion is of a great deal of 
good to enfue of a {mall injuftice. Which Jafon 
of Theffalia determined againft the truth: A/igua 
funt injufte facienda, ut multa jufte-fieri poffint.® 
But the reply is good, Auctorem prafentis juftitie 
habes, [ponforem future non habes. Men muft 
purfue things which are juft in prefent, and leave 
the future to the divine Providence. So then we 
pafs on from this general part touching the exem- 
plar and defcription of good. 

Now therefore that we have fpoken of this fruit 
of life, it remaineth to fpeak of the hufbandry that 
belongeth thereunto ; without which part the for- 
mer feemeth to be no better than a fair image, or 


73 Virg. En. vi. 823. Bacon, or a mifprint, has fubftituted 
fata for faa. 

74 See Plutarch, Life of Brutus. 

75 Plut. Prac. Ger. Reip. 24. 


De Aug. 
VII. 3- 
(1i.) OF Mo- 
ral Culture. 
Its excel- 
lence. 


252 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ftatua, which is beautiful to contemplate, but is 
without life and motion; whereunto Ariftotle him- 
felf fubfcribeth in thefe words: Neceffe ef? /cilicet 
de virtute dicere, et quid fit, et ex quibus gignatur. 
Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem noffe, ac- 
quirendeé autem ejus modos et vias ignorare: non 
enim de virtute tantum, qua fpecie fit, querendum 
eft, fed et quomods fui copiam faciat: utrumque enim 
volumus, et rem ipfam noffe, et ejus compotes fiert: 
hoc autem ex voto non fuccedet, nifi [ciamus et ex 
quibus et quomodo.*® In fuch full words and with 
fuch iteration doth he inculcate this part. So faith 
Cicero in great commendation of Cato the fecond, 
that he had applied himfelf to philofophy, Non ita 
difputandi caufa, fed ita vivendi.“ And although 
the neglect of our times, wherein few men do hold 
any con{ultations touching the reformation of their 
life, (as Seneca excellently faith) De partibus vite 
quifque deliberat, de fummé nema,'* may make this 
part feem fuperfluous; yet I muft conclude with 
that aphorifm of Hippocrates, Qui gravi morbo cor- 
repti dolores non fentiunt, iis mens egrotat,"? they 
need medicine, not only to affuage the difeafe, but 
to awake the fenfe. And if it be faid, that the 
cure of men’s minds belongeth to facred divinity, 
it is moft true: but yet moral philofophy may be 
preferred unto her as a wife fervant and humble 
handmaid. For as the Pfalm faith, that the eyes 
of the handmaid look perpetually towards the mi/- 


76 Eth, Mag. A. i. 3. 77 Cic. pro Mur. xxx. (62.) 
78 Sen. ad Lucil, Epift. 71. where it is “de partibus vite omnes 
deliberamus, de tofa nemo,” 79 Hippoc. 4p, ii. 6. 


BOOK I]. 253 


trefs,®° and yet no doubt many things are left to 
the difcretion of the handmaid, to difcern of the 
miftrefs’ will; fo ought moral philofophy to give 
a conftant attention to the doctrines of divinity, 
and yet fo as it may yield of herfelf, within due 
limits, many found and profitable directions. 

This part therefore, becaufe of the excellency 
thereof, I cannot but find exceeding ftrange that 
it is not reduced to written inquiry: the rather, 
becaufe it confifteth of much matter, wherein both 
{peech and action is often converfant ; and fuch 
wherein the common talk of men, (which is rare, 
but yet cometh jometimes to pafs,) is wifer than 
their books. It is reafonable therefore that we 
propound it in the more particularity, both for the 
worthinefs, and becaufe we may acquit ourfelves 
for reporting it deficient; which feemeth almoft 
incredible, and is otherwife conceived and prefup- 
pofed by thofe themfelves that have written. We 
will therefore enumerate fome heads or points 
thereof, that it may appear the better what it is, 
and whether it be extant. 

Firft, therefore, in this, as in all things which 
are practical, we ought to caft up our account, 
what is in our power, and what not; for the one 
may be dealt with by way of alteration, but the 
other by way of application only. The hufband- 
man cannot command neither the nature of the 
earth nor the feafons of the weather; no more 
can the phyfician the conftitution of the patient, 
nor the variety of accidents. So in the culture 


80 Ps, cxxill. 2. 


As yet but 
little han- 
dled in 
books, 


Some heads 
thereof. 


(1.) What 
is in our 
power? 


(2.) Men’s 
different 
characters 
mutt be 
ftudied. 


254 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


and cure of the mind of man, two things are with- 
out our command; points of nature, and points of 
fortune. For to the bafis of the one, and the con- 
ditions of the other, our work is limited and tied. 
In thefe things therefore it is left unto us to pro- 
ceed by application ; 


Vincenda eft omnis fortuna ferendo :%! 


and fo likewife, 
Vincenda eft omnis Natura ferendo. 


But when that we fpeak of fuffering, we do not 
{peak of a dull and neglected fuffering, but of a 
wife and induftrious fuffering, which draweth and 
contriveth ufe and advantage out of that which 
feemeth adverfe and contrary ; which is that pro- 
perty which we call accommodating or applying. 
Now the wifdom of application refteth principally 
in the exact and diftinét knowledge of the prece- 
dent ftate or difpofition, unto which we do apply: 
for we cannot fit a garment, except we firft take 
meafure of the body. 

So then the firft article of this knowledge is to 
fet down found and true diftributions and defcrip- 
tions of the feveral characters and tempers of men’s 
natures and difpofitions ; efpecially having regard 
to thofe differences which are moft radical in being 
the fountains and caufes of the reft, or moft fre- 
quent in concurrence or commixture ; wherein it 
is not the handling of a few of them in paflage, 
the better to defcribe the mediocrities of virtues, 
that can fatisfy this intention. For if it deferve 


81 Virg. Zn. v. 710. ‘¢Superanda omnis fortuna ferendo eft.” 


BOOK II. 2s 


to be confidered, that there are minds which are 
proportioned to great matters, and others to fmall,® 
(which Ariftotle handleth, or ought to have han- 
dled, by the name of magnanimity ;) doth it not 
deferve as well to be confidered, that there are 
minds proportioned to intend many matters, and 
others to few? So that fome can divide them- 
felves: others can perchance do exactly well, but 
it muft be but in few things at once: and fo there 
cometh to be a narrowne(s of mind, as well as a 
pufillanimity. And again, that fome minds are 
proportioned to that which may be difpatched at 
once, or within a fhort return of time; others to 
that which begins afar off, and is to be won with 
Jength of purfuit : 


Jam tum tenditque fovetque.® 


So that there may be fitly faid to be a longanimity, 
which is commonly alfo afcribed to God as a mag- 
nanimity. So further deferved it to be confidered 
by Ariftotle ; that there is a difpofition in conver- 
fation, ( fuppofing it in things which do in no fort 
touch or concern a man’s felf,) to foothe and pleafe ; 
and a difpofition contrary to contradict and crofs: 
and deferveth it not much better to be confidered, 
that there is a di/pofition, not in converfation or talk, 
but in matter of more ferious nature, (and fuppofing 
it ftill in things merely indifferent,) to take pleafure 
in the good of another: anda difpofition contrari- 
wife, to take diftafte at the good of another ?** which 


82 Arift. Erb. Nic, iv. 7. 83 Virg. 2x. i. 22. 
% Erb. Nic. iv. 6. 


With their 
fex, age, 
health, &c. 


256 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


is that property® which we call good nature or ill 
nature, benignity or malignity: and therefore I 
cannot fufficiently marvel that this part of know- 
ledge, touching the feveral characters of natures 
and difpofitions, fhould be omitted both in morality 
and policy ; confidering it is of fo great miniftry 
and fuppeditation to them both. A man fhall find 
in the traditions of aftrology fome pretty and apt 
divifions of men’s natures, according to the predo- 
minances of the planets; lovers of quiet, lovers of 
aétion, lovers of victory, lovers of honour, lovers of 
pleafure, lovers of arts, lovers of change, and {fo forth. 
A man fhall find in the wifeft fort of thefe rela- 
tions which the Italians make touching conclaves, 
the natures of the feveral cardinals handfomely and 
lively painted forth: a man fhall meet with in every 
day’s conference, the denominations of /en/itive, 
dry, formal, real, humorous, certain, huomo di prima 
impreffione, huomo di ultima impreffione, and the 
like: and yet neverthelefs this kind of obfervation 
wandereth in words, but is not fixed in inquiry. 
For the diftinétions are found, many of them, but 
we conclude no precepts upon them: wherein 
our fault is the greater; becaufe both hiftory, 
poefy, and daily experience are as goodly fields 
where thefe obfervations grow ; whereof we make 
a few pofies to hold in our hands, but no man 
bringeth them to the confectionary, that receipts 
might be made of them for ufe of life. 

Of much like kind are thofe impreffions of na- 
ture, which are impofed upon the mind by the 


§§ In all three early ed. this word is printed properly. 


BOOK II. 257 


fex, by the age, by the region, by health and fick- 
nefs, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which 
are inherent and not extern; and again, thofe 
which are caufed by extern fortune; as fove- 
reignty, nobility, obfcure birth, riches, want, ma- 
giftracy, privatenefs, profperity, adverfity, conftant 
fortune, variable fortune, rifing per faltum, per 
gradus, and the like. And therefore we fee that 
Plautus maketh it a wonder to fee an old man be- 
neficent, benignitas hujus ut adolefcentuli eft. St. 
Paul concludeth that feverity of difcipline was to 
be ufed to the Cretans, imcrepa eos dure, upon the 
difpofition of their country, Creten/es femper men- 
daces, male beftie, ventres pigri®’ Salluft noteth 
that it is ufual with kings to defire contradictories: 
Sed plerumque regia voluntates, ut vehementes funt, 
fic mobiles, fepeque ipfe fibi adverfe® Tacitus 
obferveth how rarely raifing of the fortune mend- 
eth the difpofition: /olus Vefpafianus mutatus in 
melius.89 Pindarus maketh an obfervation, that 
great and fudden ‘fortune for the moft part defeat- 
eth men gui magnam felicitatem concoquere non po/- 
Junt.© So the pfalm fhoweth it is more eafy to 
keep a meafure in the enjoying of fortune, than in 
the increafe of fortune: divitia fi affiuant, nolite 
cor apponere.’ ‘Thefe obfervations, and the like, 
I deny not but are touched a little by Ariftotle, as 
in paflage in his Rhetorics,9? and are handled in 
fome fcattered difcourfes: but they were never 


% Plaut. Mil. Glor. iii. 1. 39. oF, Tit, 15.12. 

88 Bell. Fug. 113. Tac. Hf. i 50, 

© warareVat péyay OABov ovk tduvacOn. Olym.i. 55. 

ar Ps, Ixus 30. 8 Arift. Rbet. ii, 12—17. 
S 


Alfo their 
affeétions. 


258 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


incorporated into moral philofophy, to which they 
do effentially appertain ; as the knowledge of the 
diverfity of grounds and moulds doth to agricul- 
ture, and the knowledge of the diverfity of com- 
plexions and conftitutions doth to the phyfician ; 
except we mean to follow the indifcretion of em- 
pirics, which minifter the fame medicines to all 
patients. 

Another article of this knowledge is the inquiry 
touching the affections; for as in medicining of 
the body, it is in order firft to know the divers 
complexions and conttitutions ; fecondly, the dif- 
eafes; and laftly, the cures: fo in medicining of 
the mind, after knowledge of the divers characters 
of men’s natures, it followeth, in order, to know 
the difeafes and infirmities of the mind, which are 
no other than the perturbations and diftempers of 
the affections. For as the ancient politiques in 
popular ftates9? were wont to compare the people 
to the fea, and the orators to the winds; becaufe 
as the fea would of itfelf be calm and quiet, if the 
winds did not move and trouble it; fo the people 
would be peaceable and tradable, if the feditious 
orators did not fet them in working and agitation: 
fo it may be fitly faid, that the mind in the nature 
thereof would be temperate and ftayed, if the af- 
feCtions, as winds, did not put it into tumult and 
perturbation. And here again I find ftrange, as 
before, that Ariftotle fhould have written divers 
volumes of ethics, and never handled the affec- 


%3 Bacon here feems to refer to Solon’s lines on Pififtratus. 
Ellis’ ed. quotes Cic. pro C/uent. 49. 


BOOK II. 259 


tions, which is the principal fubjeét thereof; and 
yet in his Rhetorics, where they are confidered 
but collaterally, and in a fecond degree, as they 
may be moved by fpeech, he findeth place for 
them,% and handleth them well for the quantity ; 
but where their true place is, he pretermitteth 
them. For it is not his difputations about pleafure 
and pain that can fatisfy this inquiry, no more than 
he that fhould generally handle the nature of light 
can be faid to handle the nature of colours; for 
pleafure and pain are to the particular affections 
as light is to particular colours. Better travails, 
I fuppofe, had the Stoics taken in this argument, 
as far as I can gather by that which we have at 
fecond hand. But yet, it is like, it was after their 
manner, rather in fubtilty of definitions, (which in 
a fubje& of this nature are but curiofities,) than in 
active and ample defcriptions and obfervations. 
So likewife I find fome particular writings of an 
elegant nature, touching fome of the affections ; 
as of anger, of comfort upon adverfe accidents, of 
tendernefs of countenance, and other.95 

But the poets and writers of hiftories are the 
beft doctors of this knowledge; where we may 
find painted forth with great life, how affections 
are kindled and incited ; and how pacified and re- 
frained ; and how again contained from act and 
further degree; how they difclofe themfelves ; 
how they work; how they vary ; how they gather 
and fortify; how they are inwrapped one within 
another; and how they do fight and encounter 


4 Arift. Rhet. ii. I—11. 89 Such as Plutarch’s and Seneca’s. 


Beft treated 
by Poets and 
Hiftorians. 


Points with- 
in ourown 
command. 


Cuftom and 
habit. 


260 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


one with another; and other the like particulari- 
ties: amongft the which this laft is of fpecial ufe 
in moral and civil matters; how, I fay, to fet af- 
fection againft affection, and to mafter one by 
another; even as we ufe to hunt beaft with beaft, 
and fly bird with bird, which otherwife percafe we 
could not fo eafily recover: upon which founda- 
tion is erected that excellent ufe of premium and 
pena, whereby civil ftates confift : employing the 
predominant affections of fear and hope, for the 
fuppreffling and bridling the reft. For as in the 
government of ftates it is fometimes neceflary to 
bridle one faction with another, fo it is in the go- 
vernment within. 

Now come we to thofe points which are within 
our own command, and have force and operation 
upon the mind, to affect the will and appetite, and 
to alter manners: wherein they ought to have 
handled cuftom, exercife, habit, education, ex- 
ample, imitation, emulation, company, friends, 
praife, reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, 
ftudies : thefe as they have determinate ufe in mo- 
ralities, from thefe the mind fuffereth; and of 
thefe are fuch receipts and regiments compounded 
and defcribed, as may feem to recover or preferve 
the health and good eftate of the mind, as far as 
pertaineth to human medicine: of which number 
we will infift upon fome one or two, as an ex- 
ample of the reft, becaufe it were too long to pro- 
fecute all; and therefore we do refume cuftom 
and habit to fpeak of. 

The opinion of Ariftotle feemeth to me a neg- 


BOOK I1. 261 


ligent opinion, that of thofe things which confift 
by nature nothing can be changed by cuftom; 
ufing for example, that if a ftone be thrown ten 
thoufand times up, it will not learn to afcend ;9° 
and that by often feeing or hearing, we do not 
learn to fee or hear the better. For though this 
principle be true in things wherein nature is pe- 
remptory (the reafon whereof we cannot now 
ftand to difcufs), yet it is otherwife in things 
wherein nature admitteth a latitude. For he might 
fee that a ftrait glove will come more eafily on 
with ufe; and that a wand will by ufe bend other- 
wife than it grew; and that by ufe of the voice 
we {peak louder and ftronger ; and that by ufe of 
enduring heat or cold, we endure it the better, 
and the like: which latter fort have a nearer re- 
femblance unto that fubject of manners he han- 
dleth, than thofe inftances which he allegeth. But 
allowing his conclufion, that virtues and vices 
confift in habit, he ought fo much the more to 
have taught the manner of fuperinducing that 
habit: for there be many precepts of the wife or- 
dering the exercifes of the mind, as there is of or- 
dering the exercifes of the body ; whereof we will 
recite a few. 

The firft fhall be, that we beware we take not 
at the firft either too high a ftrain, or too weak: 
for if too high, in a diffident nature you difcourage, 
in a confident nature you breed an opinion of fa- 
cility, and fo a floth ; and in all natures you breed 
a farther expectation than can hold out, and fo an 


% Eth. Nic. ii. 1.2. 


Some pre- 
cepts there- 
unto. 


262 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


infatisfaction in the end: if too weak on the other 
fide, you may not look to perform and overcome 
any great tafk. 

Another precept is, to practife all things chiefly 
at two feveral times, the one when the mind is 
beft difpofed, the other when it is worft difpofed ; 
that by the one you may gain a great ftep, by the 
other you may work out the knots and ftonds of 
the mind, and make the middle times the more 
eafy 97 and pleafant. 

Another precept is, that which Ariftotle men- 
tioneth by the way, which is to bear ever towards 
the contrary extreme of that whereunto we are 
by nature inclined; like unto the rowing againft 
the ftream, or making a wand ftraight by bend- 
ing®* him contrary to his natural crookednefs.99 

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to 
any thing better, and with more fweetnefs and 
happinefs, if that whereunto you pretend be not 
firft in the intention, but tanguam aliud agendb, 
becaufe of the natural hatred of the mind againft 
neceflity and conftraint. Many other axioms there 
are touching the managing of exercife and cuftom ; 
which being fo conducted doth prove indeed an- 
other nature ; but being governed by chance doth 
commonly prove but an ape of nature, and bring- 
ing forth that which is lame and counterfeit. 

So if we fhould handle books and ftudies, and 
what influence and operation they have upon man- 

97 Ed. 1605, has ea/ily—Latin, “ facile et placide delabentur”— 
from which Mr. Spedding fuggefts that Bacon may have originally 


written “run more ea/fily.” 


98 Ed. 1605 and 1624 have binding. 9 Eth. Nic. ii. 9. 5. 


BOOK II. 263 


ners, are there not divers precepts of great caution 
and direétion appertaining thereunto? Did not 
one of the fathers? in great indignation call poefy, 
vinum demonum, becaufe it increafeth temptations, 
perturbations, and vain opinions? Is not the 
opinion of Ariftotle worthy to be regarded, wherein 
he faith, That young men are no fit auditors of moral 
philofophy, becaufe they are not fettled from the boil- 
ing heat of their affections, nor attempered with 
time and experience?* And doth it not hereof 
come, that thofe excellent books and difcourfes of 
the ancient writers, (whereby they have perfuaded 
unto virtue moft effectually, by reprefenting her 
in ftate and majefty, and popular opinions againft 
virtue in their parafites’ coats fit to be fcorned 
and derided,) are of fo little effect towards honefty 
of life, becaufe they are not read and revolved by 
men in their mature and fettled years, but confined 
almoft to boys and beginners? But is it not true 
alfo, that much lefs young men are fit auditors of 
matters of policy, till they have been thoroughly 
feafoned in religion and morality ; left their judg- 
ments be corrupted, and made apt to think that 
there are no true differences of things, but accord- 
ing to utility and fortune, as the verfe defcribes it, 
Profperum et felix {celus virtus vocatur 5° 
and again, 
Ile crucem pretium fceleris tulit, hic diadema :* 

which the poets do fpeak fatirically, and in indig- 
nation on virtue’s behalf; but books of policy do 


1 Probably St. Auguftine. =a Pts Nicolay ene 
3 Senec. Herc. Fur, 251. 4 Juv. Sat. xiii. 105. 


264 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


{peak it ferioufly and pofitively ; for fo it pleafeth 
Machiavel to fay, That if Czfar had been over- 
thrown, he would have been more odious than ever 
was Catiline;> as if there had been no difference 
but in fortune, between a very fury of luft and 
blood, and the moft excellent fpirit (his ambition 
referved) of the world? Again, is there not a 
caution likewife to be given of the doctrines of 
moralities themfelves, (fome kinds of them,) left 
they make men too precife, arrogant, incompati- 
ble; as Cicero faith of Cato, In Marco Catone 
hac bona que videmus divina et egregia, ipfius [citote 
effe propria; que nonnunquam requirimus, ea funt 
omnia non a natura, fed a magifiro?® Many other 
axioms and advices there are touching thofe pro- 
prieties and effects which ftudies do infufe and 
inftil into manners. And fo likewife is there 
touching the ufe of all thofe other points, of com- 
pany, fame, laws, and the reft, which we recited 
in the beginning in the doétrine of morality. 

But there is a kind of culture of the mind that 
feemeth yet more accurate and elaborate than the 
reft, and is built upon this ground ; that the minds 
of all men are at fome times in a {tate more per- 
fect, and at other times in a ftate more depraved. 
The purpofe therefore of this practice is to fix 
and cherifh the good hours of the mind, and to 
obliterate and take forth the evil. The fixing of 
the good hath been practifed by two means, vows 
or conftant refolutions, and obfervances or exer- 


5 Machiav. difc. fopra T. Liwio, I. x. 
6 Cic. pro Mur. xxix. 61. 


BOOK I1. 265 


cifes; which are not to be regarded fo much in 
themfelves, as becaufe they keep the mind in con- 
tinual obedience. The obliteration of the evil 
hath been practifed by two means, fome kind of 
redemption or expiation of that which is paft, and 
an inception or account de novo, for the time to 
come. But this part feemeth facred and religious, 
and juftly ; for all good moral philofophy, as was 
faid, is but a handmaid to religion. 

Wherefore we will conclude with that laft point, 
which is of all other means the moft compendious 
and fummary, and again, the moft noble and ef- 
fe€tual to the reducing of the mind unto virtue 
and good eftate ; which is the electing and pro- 
pounding unto a man’s felf good and virtuous ends 
of his life, fuch as may be in a reafonable fort 
within his compafs to attain. For if thefe two 
things be fuppofed, that a man fet before him honeft 
and good ends, and again, that he be refolute, con- 
ftant, and true unto them; it will follow that he 
fhall mould himfelf into all virtue at once. And 
this indeed is like the work of nature; whereas 
the other courfe is like the work of the hand. For 
as when a carver makes an image, he fhapes only 
that part whereupon he worketh, (as if he be upon 
the face, that part which fhall be the body is but 
a rude ftone ftill, till fuch time as he comes to it;) 
but, contrariwife, when nature makes a flower or 
living creature, fhe formeth rudiments of all the 
parts at one time: fo in obtaining virtue by habit, 
while a man practifeth temperance, he doth not 
profit much to fortitude, nor the like: but when 


Concluding 
with advice 
as to the 
ends of Life 
to be 
chofen. 


266 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


he dedicateth and applieth himfelf to good ends, 
look, what virtue foever the purfuit and paflage 
towards thofe ends doth commend unto him, he 
is invefted of a precedent difpofition to conform 
himfelf thereunto. Which ftate of mind Ariftotle 
doth excellently exprefs himfelf that it ought not 
to be called virtuous, but divine: his words are 
thefe: Immanitati autem confentaneum eft opponere 
eam, que fupra humanitatem eft, heroicam five di- 
vinam virtutem: and a little after, Nam ut fere 
neque vitium neque virtus eft, fic neque Dei: fed hic 
quidem ftatus altius quiddam virtute eft, ille aliud 
quiddam a vitio.” And therefore we may fee what 
celfitude of honour Plinius Secundus attributeth 
to Trajan in his funeral oration ;® where he faid, 
That men needed to make no other prayers to the 
gods, but that they would continue as good Lords to 
them as Trajan had been ;9 as if he had not been 
only an imitation of divine nature, but a pattern 
of it. But thefe be heathen and profane paflages, 
having but a fhadow of that divine ftate of mind, 
which religion and the holy faith doth conduét 
men unto, by imprinting upon their fouls charity, 
which is excellently called the bond of perfection, 
becaufe it comprehendeth and fafteneth all virtues 
together.!° And as it is elegantly faid by Menander 
of vain love, which is but a falfe imitation of divine 


7 Arift. Eth. Nic. vii, 1. 1. 

8 Bacon feems to have thought that the Panegyric was delivered 
after Trajan’s death. He became aware of his error before the 
Latin was publifhed ; for he there omits the words ‘in his funeral 
oration.” 

9 Plin. Paneg. 74. 10 Colofs. iii. 14. 


BOOK II. 267 


love, Amor melior Sophifta levo ad humanamvitam,4 
that love teacheth a man to carry himfelf better 
than the fophift or preceptor ; which he calleth 
left-handed, becaufe, with all his rules and pre- 
cepts, he cannot form a man fo dexteroufly, nor 
with that facility to prize himfelf and govern him- 
felf, as love can do: fo certainly, if a man’s mind 
be truly inflamed with charity, it doth work him 
fuddenly into a greater perfection than all the doc- 
trine of morality can do, which is but a fophift in 
comparifon of the other. Nay further, as Xeno- 
phon obferved truly, that all other affections, 
though they raife the mind, yet they do it by dif- 
torting and uncomelinefs of ecftafies or excefles ; 
but only love doth exalt the mind, and neverthe- 
lefs at the fame inftant doth fettle and compofe 
it ;'* fo in all other excellencies, though they ad- 
vance nature, yet they are fubject to excefs ; only 
charity admitteth no excefs. For fo we fee, af- 
piring to be like God in power, the angels tranf- 
grefled and fell; A/cendam, et ero fimilis altiffimo: 
by afpiring to be like God in knowledge, man 
tranfgrefled and fell; Eritis ficut Dii, fcientes 
bonum et malum :'* but by afpiring to a fimilitude 
of God in goodnefs or love, neither man nor angel 
ever tranfgrefled, or fhall tranfgrefs. For unto 
that imitation we are called: Diligite inimicos 
veftros, benefacite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro 


1 6 Not Menander but Anaxandrides— 
*Epwe cogiorou yiverar dudacKkadoc 
TKavov TON Koeirrwy zpdc roy avOowrov Biov.” 
(Spedding.) 
12 Xen. Symp. ad init, 13 Tfai. xiv. 14. 14 Gen. iii. 5. 


Conclufion. 


268 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


perfequentibus et calumniantibus vos, ut fitis filii 
Patris veftri qui in ceelis eft, qui folem fuum oriri 
facit fuper bonos et malas, et pluit fuper juftos et in- 
juftos.© So in the firft platform of the divine na- 
ture itfelf, the heathen religion fpeaketh thus, Op- 
timus Maximus: and the facred Scriptures thus, 
Mifericordia ejus fuper omnia opera ejus.® 
Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral 

knowledge, concerning the culture and regimen of 
the mind; wherein if any man, confidering the 
parts thereof which I have enumerated, do judge 
that my labour is but to collect into an art of fci- 
ence that which hath been pretermitted by others, 
as matter of common fenfe and experience, he 
judgeth well. But as Philocrates fported with 
Demofthenes, You may not marvel, Athenians, that 
Demofthenes and I do differ ; for he drinketh water, 
and I drink wine ;" and like as we read of an 
ancient parable of the two gates of fleep, 

Sunt geminz fomni porte: quarum altera fertur 

Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris : 

Altera candenti perfeéta nitens elephanto, 

Sed falfa ad celum mittunt infomnia manes :!8 
fo if we put on fobriety and attention, we fhall 
find it a fure maxim in knowledge, that the more 
pleafant liquor of wine is the more vaporous, and 
the braver gate of ivory fendeth forth the falfer 
dreams. 

But we have now concluded that general part 

of human philofophy, which contemplateth man 


15 Luke vi. 27, 28. 18) Ps. cxhvs10s 
17 Demofth. de Fals. Leg. p. 355. 18 Virg. in. vi. 894. 


- 


BOOK I. 269 


fegregate, and as he confifteth of body and fpirit. 
Wherein we may further note, that there feemeth 
to be a relation or conformity between the good 
of the mind and the good of the body. For as we 
divided the good of the body into health, beauty, 
ftrength, and pleafure ; fo the good of the mind, 
inquired in rational and moral knowledges, tend- 
eth to this, to make the mind found, and without 
perturbation ; beautiful, and graced with decency; 
and ftrong and agile for all duties of life. Thefe 
three, as in the body, fo in the mind, feldom meet, 
and commonly fever. For it is eafy to obferve, 
that many have ftrength of wit and courage, but 
have neither health from perturbations, nor any 
beauty or decency in their doings; fome again 
have an elegancy and finenefs of carriage, which 
have neither foundnefs of honefty, nor fubftance 
of fufficiency: and fome again have honeft and 
reformed minds, that can neither become them- 
felves nor manage bufinefs: and fometimes two 
of them meet, and rarely all three. As for plea- 
fure, we have likewife determined that the mind 
ought not to be reduced to ftupid,’9 but to retain 
pleafure ; confined rather in the fubje& of it, than 
in the ftrength and vigour of it. 

19 Should this be fupidity or ffupor ? In the Latin it is *¢ reddat 


animum—non ftupidum, ied voluptatis—fenfum vivide retinen- 
tem.” 


De Aug. 
VIII. Ie 
(ii.) Philo- 
fophy con- 
gregate (or 
of focie- 
ties.) 


Is of three 
parts. 

(a.) InCon- 
verfation. 
(6.) In Ne- 
gociation. 


270 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


|| IVIL knowledge is converfant about 
a fubject which of all others is moft 
immerfed in matter, and hardlieft re- 

Sd] duced to axiom. Neverthelefs, as 
Cato the Cenfor faid, That the Romans were like 
Sheep, for that a man might better drive a flock of 
them, than one of them; for in a flock, if you could 
but get fome few to go right, the reft would follow :*° 
fo in that refpeét moral philofophy is more difficile 
than policy. Again, moral philofophy propound- 
eth to itfelf the framing of internal goodnefs ; but 
civil knowledge requireth only an external good- 
nefs ; for that as to fociety fufficeth. And there- 
fore it cometh oft to pafs that there be evil times 
in good governments: for fo we find in the holy 
ftory, when the kings were good, yet it is added, 
Sed adhuc populus non direxerat cor fuum ad Domi- 
num Deum patrum fuorum.*: Again, ftates, as 
great engines, move flowly, and are not fo foon 
put out of frame: for as in Egypt the feven good 
years fuftained the feven bad, fo governments for 
a time well grounded, do bear out errors follow- 
ing; but the refolution of particular perfons is 
more fuddenly fubverted. Thefe refpeéts do fome- 
what qualify the extreme difficulty of civil know- 
ledge. 

This knowledge hath three parts, according to 
the three fummary actions of fociety ; which are 
converfation, negotiation, and government. For 
man feeketh in fociety comfort, ufe, and protec- 


20 Plut. Vit. Cat. 4 2 Chrous ax, 342 


BOOK Il. 271 


tion: and they be three wifdoms of divers natures, 
which do often fever: wifdom of the behaviour, 
wifdom of bufinefs, and wifdom of ftate. 

The wifdom of converfation ought not to be 
over much affected, but much lefs defpifed ; for it 
hath not only an honour in itfelf, but an influence 


alfo into bufinefs and government. The poet 
faith, 


Nec vultu deftrue verbo tuo :”” 


a man may deftroy the force of his words with 
his countenance: fo may he of his deeds, faith 
Cicero, recommending to his brother affability and 
eafy accefs; Nil intere/t habere oftium apertum, 
vultum claufum ;* it is nothing won to admit men 
with an open door, and to receive them with a 
fhut and referved countenance. So, we fee, At- 
ticus, before the firft interview between Czfar 
and Cicero, the war depending, did ferioufly ad- 
vife Cicero touching the compofing and ordering 
of his countenance and gefture.** And if the go- 
vernment of the countenance be of fuch effet, 
much more is that of the fpeech, and other car- 
riage appertaining to converfation ; the true model 
whereof feemeth to me well exprefled by Livy, 
though not meant for this purpofe: Ne aut arro- 
gans videar, aut obnoxius; quorum alterum eft 
aliene libertatis obliti, alterum fue :*° "The fum of 
behaviour is to retain a man’s own dignity, with- 
out intruding upon the liberty of others. On the 


2 Ovid, ii. 312. de Art. Am. 
3 Q. Cic. de Petit. Conful. xi. 44. 
2 Cic. ad itt. 1x, 12. 2 Livy, xxili. 12. 


(c.) In Go- 


vernment. 


(a.)In Con- 


ver{ation. 


272, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


other fide, if behaviour and outward carriage be 
intended too much, firft it may pafs into affecta- 
tion, and then Quid deformius quam fcenam in 
vitam transferre (to act a man’s life)? But al- 
though it proceed not to that extreme, yet it con- 
fumeth time, and employeth the mind too much. 
And therefore as we ufe to advife young ftudents 
from company keeping, by faying, Amici fures 
temporis: fo certainly the intending of the difcre- 
tion of behaviour is a great thief of meditation. 
Again, fuch as are accomplifhed in that hour*® of 
urbanity pleafe themfelves in it,°? and feldom afpire 
to higher virtue; whereas thofe that have defect 
in it do feek comelinefs by reputation ; for where 
reputation is, almoft everything becometh; but 
where that is not, it muft be fupplied by puntos, 
and compliments. Again, there is no greater im- 
pediment of action than an over-cyrious obferv- 
ance of decency, and the guide of decency, which 
is time and feafon. For as Salomon faith, Qui 
re[picit ad ventos, non feminat; et qui refpicit ad 
nubes, non metet :*® a man muft make his oppor- 
tunity, as oft as find it. “To conclude, behaviour 
feemeth to me as a garment of the mind, and to 
have the conditions of a garment. For it ought 

26 Howr, ed. 1605; hour, 1633; forme, 1629. Mr. Spedding 
fuggefts and prints homor—not improbably. The Latin is, * Qui 
ptimas in urbanitate obtinent, et ad hanc rem quafi nati videntur” 
—to which “ primas”’ honor well agrees. It might poffibly be either 
foow or flower. But honor feems better, fave that the phrafe 
“ honor of urbanity”’ is forced. 

7 Init, Ed. 1605 and 1633 have in name; 1629, init. Latin, 
“ut fibi ipfis in illa fola complaceant,” which agrees with our 


reading. 
28 Eccles, xi. 4. 


BOOK I1. 298 


to be made in fafhion; it ought not to be too cu- 
rious ; it ought to be fhaped fo as to fet forth any 
good making of the mind, and hide any deformity ; 
and above all, it ought not to be too ftrait, or re- 
ftrained for exercife or motion. But this part of 
civil knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and 
therefore I cannot report it for deficient. 

The wifdom touching negotiation or bufinefs 
hath not been hitherto collected into writing, to 
the great derogation of learning, and the profeflors 
of learning. For from this root fpringeth chiefly 
that note or opinion, which by us is expreffed in 
adage to this effect, that there is no great concur- 
rence between learning and wifdom. For of the 
three wifdoms which we have fet down to pertain 
to civil life, for wifdom of behaviour, it is by 
learned men for the moft part defpifed, as an in- 
ferior to virtue, and an enemy to meditation ; for 
wifdom of government, they acquit themfelves 
well, when they are called to it, but that hap- 
peneth to few; but for the wifdom of bufinefs, 
wherein man’s life is moft converfant, there be 
no books of it, except fome few fcattered adver- 
tifements, that have no proportion to the magni- 
tude of this fubject. For if books were written 
of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men 
with mean experience, would far excel men of 
long experience without learning, and outfhoot 
them in their own bow. 

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this 
knowledge fhould be fo variable as it falleth not 
under precept; for it is much lefs infinite than 

T 


De Aug. 
VIII. 2. 

(4.) In Ne- 
gociation 
(deficient. ) 


Tt can be 
brought un- 
der precept, 
and is 
worthy. 


274, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


{cience of government, which, we fee, is laboured 
and in fome part reduced. Of this wifdom, it 
feemeth fome of the ancient Romans in the fad- 
deft and wifeft times were profeflors; for Cicero 
reporteth*? that it was then in ufe for fenators that 
had name and opinion for general wife men, as 
Coruncanius, Curius, Lzlius, and many others, to 
walk at certain hours in the Place, and to give 
audience to thofe that would ufe their advice ; and 
that the particular citizens would refort unto them, 
and confult with them of the marriage of a daugh- 
ter, or of the employing of a fon, or of a purchafe 
or bargain, or of an accufation, and every other 
occafion incident to man’s life. So as there is a 
wifdom of counfel and advice even in private 
caufes, arifing out of a univerfal infight into the 
affairs of the world; which is ufed indeed upon 
particular caufes propounded, but is gathered by 
general obfervation of cafes® of like nature. For 
fo we fee in the book which Q. Cicero writeth to 
his brother, De petitione confulatus, (being the only 
book of bufinefs that I know written by the an- 
cients,) although it concerned a particular action 
fet on foot, yet the fubftance thereof confifteth of 
many wife and politic axioms, which contain not 
a temporary, but a perpetual direétion in the cafe 
of popular elections. But chiefly we may fee in 
thofe aphorifms which have place among divine 
writings, compofed by Salomon the king, (of whom 
the Scriptures teftify that his heart was as the fands 


29 Cic. de Orat. iii. 133, 134 (cap. 33-) 
30 Ed. 1629 and 1633 have cau/es. 


BOOK II. 275 


of the fea,*! encompaffing the world and all worldly 
matters,) we fee, I fay, not a few profound and 
excellent cautions, precepts, pofitions, extending 
to much variety of occafions ; whereupon we will 
{tay awhile, offering to confideration fome number 
of examples. 

Sed et cunétis fermonibus qui dicuntur ne accom- 
modes aurem tuam, ne forte audias fervum tuum 
maledicentem tibi.** Here is concluded the provi- 
dent ftay of inquiry of that which we would be 
loth to find: as it was judged great wifdom in 
Pompeius Magnus that he burned Sertorius’ pa- 
pers unperufed.** 

Vir fapiens, fi cum ftulto contenderit, five ira/- 
catur, five rideat, non inveniet requiem.** Here is 
defcribed the great difadvantage which a wife man 
hath in undertaking a lighter perfon than himfelf; 
which is fuch an engagement as, whether a man 
turn the matter to jeft, or turn it to heat, or how- 
foever he change copy, he can no ways quit him- 
felf well of it. 

Qui delicate a pueritia nutrit fervum fuum, poftea 
Jentiet eum contumacem.** Here is fignified, that 
if a man begin too high a pitch in his favours, it 
doth commonly end in unkindnefs and unthank- 
tulnefs. 

Vidifti virum velocem in opere fuo? coram regi- 
bus flabit, nec erit inter ignobiles.*© Here is ob- 
ferved, that of all virtues for rifing to honour, 
quicknefs of defpatch is the beft; for fuperiors 

31 1 Kings iv. 29. 32 Eccles. vii. 21. 


33 Plut. Vit. Pomp. c. 20. $t Prov. s%xixo19: 
* Prov. xxix. 21. 36: xxiis29: 


Examples of 
it from 
Solomon. 


276 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


many times love not to have thofe they employ 
too deep or too fufficient, but ready and diligent. 

Vidi cunétos viventes qui ambulant [ub fole, cum 
adolefcente fecundo qui confurgit pro eo." Here is 
exprefled that which was noted by Sylla firft, and 
after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant folem ori- 
entem quam occidentem vel meridianum.* 

Si fpiritus poteftatem habentis afcenderit fuper te, 
locum tuum ne demiferis ; quia curatio faciet ceffare 
peccata maxima.*® Here caution is given, that 
upon difpleafure, retiring is of all courfes the un- 
fitteft ; for a man leaveth things at worft, and de- 
priveth himfelf of means to make them better. 

Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri: venit 
contra eam rex magnus, et vadavit eam, infiruxitque 
munitiones per gyrum, et perfecta eft obfidio; in- 
ventufque eff in ea vir pauper et fapiens, et liberavit 
eam per fapientiam fuam; et nullus deinceps recor- 
datus eft hominis illius pauperis.© Here the cor- 
ruption of ftates is fet forth, that efteem not virtue 
or merit longer than they have ufe of it. 

Mallis refponfio frangit iram.* Here is noted 
that filence or rough anfwer exafperateth ; but an 
anfwer prefent and temperate pacifieth. 

Iter pigrorum quafi fepes fpinarum.* Here is 
lively reprefented how laborious floth proveth in 
the end; for when things are deferred till the laft 
inftant, and nothing prepared beforehand, every 


37 Eccles, iv. 15. 

38 Plut. Vit. Pomp. and Tacit. Ann. vi. 46. The words wel 
meridianum are omitted in the Latin, as they fhould be here. 

39, Eccles. x. 4-  @ ixs1qg,15. “ Prov.xvii. “ig 


BOOK I]. B77 


ftep findeth a brier or an impediment, which 
catcheth or ftoppeth. 

Melior eff finis orationis quam principium.* 
Here is taxed the vanity of formal fpeakers, that 
ftudy more about prefaces and inducements, than 
upon the conclufions and iflues of {peech. 

Qui cognofcit in judicio faciem, non bene facit ; 
ifte et pro bucella panis deferet veritatem.** Here 
is noted, that a judge were better be a briber than 
a refpecter of perfons; for a corrupt judge oftend- 
eth not fo lightly* as a facile. 

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes fimilis eft imbri 
vehementi, in quo paratur fames.*© Here is ex- 
prefled the extremity of neceffitous extortions, 
figured in the ancient fable of the full and the 
hungry horfeleech. 

Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupta, eft juftus 
cadens coram impio.*” Here is noted, that one 
judicial and exemplar iniquity in the face of the 
world, doth trouble the fountains of juftice more 
than many particular injuries pafled over by con- 
nivance. 

Qui fubtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et dicit 
hoc non effe peccatum, particeps eft homicidii.*® Here 
is noted, that whereas men in wronging their beft 
friends ufe to extenuate their fault, as if they 
might prefume or be bold upon them, it doth con- 
trariwife indeed aggravate their fault, and turneth 
it from injury to impiety. 

43 Eccles. vii. 8. 44 Prov. xxviii. 21. 

45 Ed. 1629 and 1633 read highly, which is clearly inferior to 


lightly, which is the reading of 1605. 
46 Prov. xxviii. 3. poxxv. 20. 48 xxviii. 24. 


278 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Noli effe amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato 
cum homine furiofo.*9 Here caution is given, that 
in the election of our friends we do principally 
avoid thofe which are impatient, as thofe that will 
efpoufe us to many factions and quarrels. 

Qui conturbat domum fuam, poffidebit ventum.™ 
Here is noted, that in domeftical feparations and 
breaches men do promife to themfelves quieting 
of their mind and contentment; but ftill they are 
deceived of their expectation, and it turneth to 
wind. 

Filius fapiens letificat patrem: filius vero ftultus 
meftitia eft matri fue. Here is diftinguifhed, 
that fathers have moft comfort of the good proof 
of their fons; but mothers have moft difcomfort 
of their ill proof, becaufe women have little dif- 
cerning of virtue, but of fortune. 

Qui celat deliétum, quarit amicitiam; fed qui 
altero fermone repetit, feparat feederatos.* Here 
caution is given, that reconcilement is better ma- 
naged by an amnefty, and paffing over that which 
is paft, than by apologies and excufations. 

In omni opere bono erit abundantia; ubi autem 
verba funt plurima, ibi frequenter egeftas. Here 
is noted, that words and difcourfe abound moft 
where there is idlenefs and want. 

Primus in fua caufa juftus; fed venit altera pars, 
et inquiret in eum.** Here is obferved, that in all 
caufes the firft tale poflefleth much ; in fort that 
the prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly re- 


‘ 
49 Prov. xxil. 24. SORxI0208 Ere the 
PPXVI AQ: Bapxivs. 23. 5# xviii. 17. 


BOOK I]. 279 


meved, except fome abufe or falfity in the in- 
formation be detected. 

Verba bilinguis quafi fimplicta, et ipfa perveniunt 
ad interiora ventris.°° Here is diftinguifhed, that 
flattery and infinuation, which feemeth fet and 
artificial, finketh not far; but that entereth deep 
which hath fhow of nature, liberty, and fimpli- 
city. 

Qui erudit deriforem, ipfe fibi injuriam facit ; et 
qui arguit impium, fibi maculam generat. Here 
caution is given how we tender reprehenfion to 
arrogant and fcornful natures, whofe manner is to 
efteem it for contumely, and accordingly to re- 
turn it. 

Da fapienti occafionem, et addetur ei fapientia.>™ 

Here is diftinguifhed the wifdom brought into 
habit, and that which is but verbal, and fwimming 
only in conceit; for the one upon occafion pre- 
fented is quickened and redoubled, the other is 
amazed and confufed. 
- Quomodo in aquis refplendent vultus profpicien- 
tium, fic corda hominum manifefta funt prudenti- 
bus.*® Here the mind of a wife man is compared 
to a glafs, wherein the images of all diverfity of 
natures and cuftoms are reprefented ; from which 
reprefentation proceedeth that application, 


Qui fapit, innumeris moribus aptus erit.*9 
Thus have I ftayed fomewhat longer upon thefe 
fentences politic of Salomon than is agreeable to 
the proportion of an example; led with a defire 


55 Prov. xviil. 8. SOS 1217s StXaIe 
%8 xxvil. 19. 59 Ovid, de Art. Am. i. 760. 


This wif- 
dom beft 
drawn from 
hiftory. 


280 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


to give authority to this part of knowledge, which 
I noted as deficient, by fo excellent a precedent ; 
and have alfo attended them with brief obferva- 
tions, fuch as to my underftanding offer no violence 
to the fenfe, though I know they may be applied 
to a more divine ufe: but it is allowed, even in 
divinity, that fome interpretations, yea, and fome 
writings, have more of the eagle than others ;® 
but taking them as inftructions for life, they might 
have received large difcourfe, if I would have 
broken them and illuftrated them by deducements 
and examples. 

Neither was this in ufe only with the Hebrews, 
but it is generally to be found in the wifdom of 
the more ancient times; that as men found out 
any obfervation that they thought was good for 
life, they would gather it, and exprefs it in parable, 
or aphorifm, or fable. But for fables, they were 
vicegerents and fupplies where examples failed : 
now that the times abound with hiftory, the aim 
is better when the mark is alive. And therefore 
the form of writing which of all others is fitteft 
for this variable argument of negotiation and oc- 
cafions is that which Machiavel chofe wifely and 
aptly for government; namely, difcourfe upon 
hiftories or examples. For knowledge drawn 
frefhly, and in our view, out of particulars, know- 
eth the way beft to particulars again ; and it hath 
much greater life for practice when the difcourfe 
attendeth upon the example, than when the ex- 
ample attendeth upon the difcourfe. For this is 


60 j.e, foar higher than others. 


BOOK I]. 281 


no point of order, as it feemeth at firft, but of 
fubftance: for when the example is the ground, 
being fet down in a hiftory at large, it is fet down 
with all circumftances, which may fometimes con- 
trol the difcourfe thereupon made, and fometimes 
fupply it as a very pattern for action ;*! whereas 
the examples alleged for the difcourfe’ fake are 
cited fuccinétly, and without particularity, and 
carry a fervile afpect towards the difcourfe which 
they are brought in to make good. 

But this difference is not amifs to be remem- 
bered, that as hiftory of Times is the beft ground 
for difcourfe of government, fuch as Machiavel 
handleth, fo hiftory of Lives is the moft proper 
for difcourfe of bufinefs, as®* more converfant in 
private actions. Nay, there is a ground of dif- 
courfe for this purpofe fitter than them both, which 
is difcourfe upon letters, fuch as are wife and 
weighty, as many are of Cicero ad 4tticum, and 
others. For letters have a great and more par- 
ticular reprefentation of bufinefs than either chro- 
nicles or lives. Thus have we fpoken both of the 
matter and form of this part of civil knowledge, 
touching negociation, which we note to be defi- 
cient. 

But yet there is another part of this part, which 
differeth as much from that whereof we have 
fpoken as fapere and /ibi fapere, the one moving 


6! Ed. 1605 has gaine—Mr. Spedding fuggefts aim—Edd. 1629, 
1633, have aéion, 

$2 T have here followed Mr. Spedding’s amendment of as for is, 
which is no doubt correét, and far the beft folution of the diffi- 
culty of the paffage in the original. 


Efpecially 
from bio- 
graphy. 


For felf- 
advance- 
ment this 
knowledge 


gives much 
power over 
Fortune. 


282 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


as it were to the circumference, the other to the 
centre. For there is a wifdom of counfel, and 
again there is a wifdom of prefling a man’s own 
fortune ; and they do fometimes meet, and often 
fever. For many are wife in their own ways that 
are weak for government or counfel ; like ants, 
which is a wife creature for itfelf, but very hurtful 
for the garden. This wifdom the Romans did 
take much knowledge of: Nam pol fapiens, faith 
the comical poet, fingit fortunam /ibi ; and it 
grew to an adage, Faber quif/que fortune propria ;™ 
and Livy attributed it to Cato the firft, in hoc viro 
tanta vis animi et ingenii inerat, ut quocunque loco 
natus effet fibi ipfe fortunam facturus videretur.© 

This conceit or pofition, if it be too much de- 
clared and profeffed, hath been thought a thing 
impolitic and unlucky, as was obferved in Timo- 
theus the Athenian, who, having done many great 
fervices to the eftate in his government, and giv- 
ing an account thereof to the people, as the man- 
ner was, did conclude every particular with this 
claufe, And in this fortune had no part. And 
it came fo to pafs, that he never profpered in any 
thing he took in hand afterwards: for this is too 
high and too arrogant, favouring of that which 
Ezekiel faith of Pharaoh, Dicis, Fluvius eff meus 
et ego feci memet ipfum:© or of that which an- 
other prophet fpeaketh, that men offer facrifices 
to their nets and fnares :®° and that which the 
poet expreffeth, 

6 Plaut. Trin. i. 2. 48. 

64 J have not met with this. Itis attributed to Appius Claudius. 


65 Liv. xxxix. 40. 66 Plutarch, Sy//a, c. 6. 
7 Ezek, xxix. 3- 68 Habak. i, 16. 


BOOK Il. 283 


Dextra mihi Deus, et telum quod miffile libro, 
Nunc adfint ! © 


for thefe confidences were ever unhallowed, and 
unbleffed: and therefore thofe that were great 
politiques indeed ever afcribed their fuccefles to 
their felicity, and not to their fkill or virtue. For 
fo Sylla furnamed himfelf Felix, not Magnus : ‘fo 
Czefar faid to the mafter of the fhip, Cz/arem 
portas et fortunam ejus. 

But yet neverthelefs thefe pofitions, Faber gui/- 
que fortune fue: fapiens dominabitur aftris :™ 
invia virtuti nulla eff via,'* and the like, being 
taken and ufed as fpurs to induftry, and not as 
ftirrups to infolency, rather for refolution than for 
prefumption or outward declaration, have been 
ever thought found and good; and are, no quef- 
tion, imprinted in the greateft minds, who are fo 
fenfible of this opinion, as they can fcarce contain 
it within. As we fee in Auguftus Cefar, (who 
was rather diverfe from his uncle, than inferior in 
virtue,) how when he died, he defired his friends 
about him to give him a plaudite, as if he were 
confcient to himfelf that he had played his part 
well upon the ftage.** This part of knowledge 
we do report alfo as deficient: not but that it is 
practifed too much, but it hath not been reduced 
to writing. And therefore left it fhould feem to 
any that it is not comprehenfible by axiom, it is 


© Wirg. in, x. 773. 7° Plutarch, Cefar. 
71 Mr. Spedding ftates that this quotation is afcribed by Cognatus 
to Ptolemy. 


72 Ovid, Met. xiv. 113. 73 Sueton. Vit. Aur. c. 99. 


Of this rul- 
ing our For- 
tune great 
men are 
con{cious. 


Faber For- 
tune five de 
Ambitu 
vita. 


Rules to- 

wards the 

making of 
one’s for- 

tune. 


You mutt 
be able to 


284. ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


requifite, as we did in the former, that we fet 
down fome heads or paflages of it. 

Wherein it may appear at the firft a new and 
unwonted argument to teach men how to raife 
and make their fortune ; a doctrine wherein every 
man perchance will be ready to yield himfelf a 
difciple, till he fee the difficulty : for fortune layeth 
as heavy impofitions as virtue; and it is as hard 
and fevere a thing to be a true politique, as to be 
truly moral. But the handling hereof concerneth 
learning greatly, both in honour and in fubftance : 
in honour, becaufe pragmatical men may not go 
away with an opinion that learning is like a lark, 
that can mount, and fing, and pleafe herfelf, and 
nothing elfe ; but may know that fhe holdeth as 
well of the hawk, that can foar aloft, and can alfo 
defcend and ftrike upon the prey: in fubftance, 
becaufe it is the perfect law of inquiry of truth, 
that nothing be in the globe of matter, which 
fhould not be likewife in the globe of cryftal, or 
form ; that is, that there be not any thing in being 
and action, which fhould not be drawn and col- 
leéted into contemplation and doctrine. Neither 
doth learning admire or efteem of this architecture 
of fortune, otherwife than as of an inferior work: 
for no man’s fortune can be an end worthy of his 
being; and many times the worthieft men do 
abandon their fortune willingly for better refpects : 
but neverthelefs fortune, as an organ of virtue 
and merit, deferveth the confideration. 

Firft, therefore, the precept which I conceive 
to be moft fummary towards the prevailing in for- 


BOOK U. 285 


tune, is to obtain that window which Momus did 
require :’* who feeing in the frame of man’s heart 
fuch angles and recefles, found fault that there was 
not a window to look into them ; that is, to pro- 
cure good informations of particulars touching 
perfons, their natures, their defires and ends, their 
cuftoms and fafhions, their helps and advantages, 
and whereby they chiefly ftand: fo again their 
weaknefles and difadvantages, and where they lie 
moft open and obnoxious; their friends, factions, 
and dependencies ; and again their oppofites, en- 
viers, competitors, their moods and times, 


Sola viri molles aditus et tempora noras ;7° 


their principles, rules, and obfervations, and the like: 
and this not only of perfons, but of actions ; what 
are on foot from time to time, and how they are 
conducted, favoured, oppofed, and how they im- 
port, and the like. For the knowledge of prefent 
actions is not only material in itfelf, but without it 
alfo the knowledge of perfons is very erroneous : 
for men change with the actions; and whiles they 
are in purfuit they are one, and when they return 
to their nature they are another. Thefe informa- 
tions of particulars, touching perfons and actions, 
are as the minor propofitions in every active fyl- 
logifm ; for no excellency of obfervations, which 
are as the major propofitions, can fuffice to ground 
a conclufion, if there be error and miftaking in 
the minors. 

That this knowledge is poffible, Salomon is 
our furety ; who faith, Con/ilium in corde viri tan- 


74 Lucian. Hermot. 20. 7 Virg. Zn. iv. 423. 


fee into 
men. 


Be therein 

flow of be- 
lief and dif- 
truft. 


286 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


quam aqua profunda; fed vir prudens exhauriet 
illud.?® And although the knowledge itfelf falleth 
not under precept, becaufe it is of individuals, yet 
the inftructions for the obtaining of it may. 

We will begin, therefore, with this precept, ac- 
cording to the ancient opinion, that the finews of 
wifdom are flownefs of belief and diftruft; that 
more truft be given to countenances and deeds 
than to words: and in words rather to fudden 
paflages and furprifed words than to fet and pur- 
pofed words. Neither let that be feared which is 
faid, Fronti nulla fides :** which is meant of a ge- 
neral outward behaviour, and not of the private 
and f{ubtile motions and labours of the countenance 
and gefture; which as Q. Cicero elegantly faith, 
is Animi janua, the gate of the mind.® None more 
clofe than Tiberius, and yet Tacitus faith of Gallus, 
Etenim vultu offenfionem conjectaverat."9 So again, 
noting the differing character and manner of his 
commending Germanicus and Drutfus in the fenate, 
he faith, touching his fafhion wherein he carried 
his fpeech of Germanicus, thus ; AZagis in /peciem 
adornatis verbis, quam ut penitus fentire crederetur: 
but of Drufus thus: Paucioribus, fed intentior, et 
fida oratione :*° and in another place, {peaking of 
his character of fpeech, when he did any thing 
that was gracious and popular, he faith, that in 
other things he was velut eluctantium verborum ; 
but then again, /olutius vero loquebatur quando fub- 
veniret.®! So that there is no fuch artificer of dif- 

76 Prov. xx. 5. 7 Juv. Sat. ii. 8. 


78 De Petit. Conful. xi. 44. 79 Tacit. Ann. i, 12. 
80 Ibid. i. 52. 81 Ibid. iv. 31. 


BOOK I. 287 


-fimulation, nor no fuch commanded countenance, 
vultus juffus, that can fever from a feigned tale 
fome of thefe fafhions, either a more flight and 
carelefs fafhion, or more fet and formal, or more 
tedious and wandering, or coming from a man 
more drily and hardly. 

Neither are deeds fuch affured pledges, as that 
they may be trufted without a judicious confider- 
ation of their magnitude and nature: Fraus /ibi 
in parvis fidem praftruit, ut majore emolumento 
fallat :®* and the Italian thinketh himfelf upon the 
point to be bought and fold, when he is better 
ufed than he was wont to be, without manifetft 
caufe. For fmall favours, they do but lull men 
afleep, both as to caution and as to induftry ; and 
are, as Demofthenes calleth them, Alimenta fo- 
cordig.® So again we fee how falfe the nature of 
fome deeds are, in that particular which Mutianus 
practifed upon Antonius Primus, upon that hol- 
low and unfaithful reconcilement which was made 
between them; whereupon Mutianus advanced 
many of the friends of Antonius: /mul amicis 
ejus prefeciuras et tribunatus largitur :** wherein, 
under pretence to ftrengthen him, he did defolate 
him, and won from him his dependences. 

As for words, though they be like waters to 
phyficians, full of flattery and uncertainty, yet they 


82 Liv. xxviii. 42. 

83 See Mr. Spedding’s note on the De Augm. Sc. (p. 681), 
where thefe words are quoted with context, and traced through ED 
Wolf’s tranflation of Dem. PAi/. ithe Greek being fimply gore 
Tavra Ta THY ExdoToU pabupiay éxaviavorra. 

% Tacit. Hiff. iv. 39. 


Cautious in 
trufting to 
men’s 
deeds. 


Watchful 
as to their 
words. 


How re- 
ports of 
men at fe- 
cond hand 
fhould be 
received. 


288 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


are not to be defpifed, efpecially with the advan- 
tage of paffion and affedtion. For fo we fee Ti- 
berius, upon a ftinging and incenfing fpeech of 
Agrippina, came a ftep forth of his diffimulation, 
when he faid, You are hurt becaufe you do not reign; 
of which Tacitus faith, 4udita hec raram occulti 
pectoris vocem elicuere; correptamque Graco verfu 
admonuit, ideo ledi, quia non regnaret.” And 
therefore the poet doth elegantly call paffions, tor- 
tures that urge men to confefs their fecrets : 


Vino tortus et ira, ®6 


And experience fhoweth, there are few men fo 
true to themfelves and fo fettled, but that, fome- 
times upon heat, fometimes upon bravery, fome- 
times upon kindnefs, fometimes upon trouble of 
mind and weaknefs, they open themfelves ; efpe- 
cially if they be put to it with a counter-difiimu- 
lation, according to the proverb of Spain, Dz 
mentira, y facaras verdad (Tell a le and find a 
truth.) 

As for the knowing of men which is at fecond 
hand from reports; men’s weaknefles and faults 
are beft known from their enemies, their virtues 
and abilities from their friends, their cuftoms and 
times from their fervants, their conceits and opi- 
nions from their familiar friends, with whom they 
difcourfe moft. General fame is light, and the 
opinions conceived by fuperiors or equals are de- 
ceitful ; for to fuch men are more mafked : Verior 
fama e domefticis emanat.™ 


85 Tacit. Ann. iv. 52; Suet. Vit. Tib. c. 53. 
86 Hor. Epi/f. 1. xviii. 38. 87 Q. Cic. De Petit. Conful. v. 17. 


BOOK II. 289 


But the foundeft difclofing and expounding of 
men is by their natures and ends, wherein the 
weakeft fort of men are beft interpreted by their 
natures, and the wifeft by their ends. For it was 
both pleafantly and wifely faid, though I think very 
untruly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning from 
a certain nation where he ferved as lidger ; whofe 
opinion being afked touching the appointment of 
one to go in his place, he wifhed that in any cafe 
they did not fend one that was too wife; becaufe 
no very wife man would ever imagine what they 
in that country were like to do. And certainly it 
is an error frequent for men to fhoot over, and to 
fuppofe deeper ends and more compafs-reaches 
than are: the Italian proverb being elegant, and 
for the moft part true :— 


Di danari, di fenno, e di fede, 
Ce ne manco che non credi. 


There is commonly lefs money, lefs wifdom, and 
lefs good faith than men do account upon. 

But princes, upon a far other reafon, are beft 
interpreted by their natures, and private perfons 
by their ends. For princes being at the top of 
human defires, they have for the moft part no 
particular ends whereto they afpire, by diftance 
from which a man might take meafure and {cale 
of the reft of their actions and defires ; which is 
one of the caufes that maketh their hearts more 
infcrutable.® Neither is it fufficient to inform 
ourfelves in men’s ends and natures, of the variety 
of them only, but alfo of the predominancy, what 


88 Prov. xxv. 3. 
U 


You muft 
watch the 
natures and 
endsof men. 


Summary of 
this precept. 


290 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


humour reigneth moft, and what end is principally 
fought. For fo we fee, when Tigellinus faw him- 
felf outf{tripped by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero’s 
humours of pleafures, metus ejus rimatur,® he 
wrought upon Nero’s fears, whereby he brake 
the other’s neck. 

But to all this part of inquiry the moft compen- 
dious way refteth in three things : the firft, to have 
general acquaintance and inwardnefs with thofe 
which have general acquaintance and look moft 
into the world ; and efpecially according to the di- 
verfity of bufinefs, and the diverfity of perfons, to 
have privacy and converfation with fome one 
friend at leaft which is perfect and well intelli- 
genced in every feveral kind. The fecond is, to 
keep a good mediocrity in liberty of fpeech and 
fecrefy ; in moft things liberty ; fecrefy where it 
importeth ; for liberty of {peech inviteth and pro- 
voketh liberty to be ufed again, and fo bringeth 
much to a man’s knowledge; and fecrefy, on the 
other fide, induceth truft and inwardnefs. The 
laft is, the reducing of a man’s felf to this watch- 
ful and ferene habit, as to make account and pur- 
pofe, in every conference and action, as well to 
obferve as to act. For as Epictetus would have 
a philofopher in every particular aétion to fay to 
himfelf, Et hoc volo, et etiam inftitutum fervare,° 

89 Tacit. dnn. xiv. 57. Mr. Markby notices that Tacitus 
{peaks ‘ of the intrigues of Tigellinus againft Plautus and Sulla, 
by which he induced Nero to have both of them murdered. Pe- 
tronius Turpilianus was put to death by Galba, folely becaufe he 
had enjoyed Nero’s confidence. Vid. Tacit. Hift. i. 6.” 


9 Vid. Epictet. Enchir. c. 4.—(AotoacPar) OEdw, Kai THY 
éuauTov TOOaipEcLy KaTa PiaLY EXOVTaY THONCAaL 


BOOK II. 291 


fo a politic man in everything fhould fay to him- 
felf, Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addifcere. 1 have 
ftayed the longer upon this precept of obtaining 
good information, becaufe it is a main part by it- 
felf, which anfwereth to all the reft. But, above 
all things, caution muft be taken that men have 
a good ftay and hold of themfelves, and that this 
much knowledge do not draw on much meddling ; 
for nothing is more unfortunate than light and 
rafh intermeddling in many matters. So that this 
variety of knowledge tendeth in conclufion but 
only to this, to make a better and freer choice of 
thofe actions which may concern us, and to con- 
duct them with the lefs error and the more dex- 
terity. 
The fecond precept concerning this knowledge 2. You 
2 : : . ~  muift know 
is, for men to take good information touching their yourfeif 
own perfon, and well to underftand themfelves: well. 
knowing that, as St. James faith, though men look 
oft in a glafs,% yet they do fuddenly forget them- 
felves ; wherein as the divine glafs is the word of 
God, fo the politic glafs is the ftate of the world, 
or times wherein we live, in the which we are to 
behold ourfelves. 
For men ought to take an impartial view of 
their own abilities and virtues ; and again of their 
wants and impediments; accounting thefe with 
the moft, and thofe other with the leaft ; and from 
this view and examination to frame the confidera- 
tions following. 
Firft, to confider how the conftitution of their (a.)Seehow 


1 St. James i. 23, 24. 


your charac- 
ter agrees 
with the ge- 
neral ftate 
of affairs. 


(4.) Choofe, 
accordingly, 
the moft 
fuitable 
courfe of 
lite. 


(c.) Confider 
what com- 
petition 
there may 
be; and 
avoid it. 


292 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


nature forteth with the general ftate of the times ; 
which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all 
things to give themfelves more fcope and liberty ; 
but if differing and diffonant, then in the whole 
courfe of their life to be more clofe, retired, and 
referved: as we fee in Tiberius, who was never 
feen at a play, and came not into the Senate in 
twelve of his laft years; whereas Auguftus Czefar 
lived ever in men’s eyes, which Tacitus obferveth, 
alia Tiberio morum via.%* 

Secondly, to confider how their nature forteth 
with profeffions and courfes of life, and accord- 
ingly to make election, if they be free; and, if 
engaged, to make the departure at the firft 
opportunity : as we fee was done by Duke Va- 
lentine,9? that was defigned by his father to a 
facerdotal profeffion, but quitted it foon after in 
regard of his parts and inclination; being fuch, 
neverthelefs, as a man cannot tell well whether 
they were worfe for a prince or for a prieft. 

Thirdly, to confider how they fort with thofe 
whom they are like to have competitors and con- 
currents ; and to take that courfe wherein there is 
moft folitude, and themfelves like to be moft emi- 
nent: as Czfar Julius did, who at firft was an 
orator or pleader ; but when he faw the excellency 
of Cicero, Hortenfius, Catulus, and others, for 
eloquence, and faw there was no man of reputa- 
tion for the wars but Pompeius, upon whom the 
{tate was forced to rely, he forfook his courfe be- 


3°'Tac. Aan. 1. 5A: 
93 Sc, Cxefar Borgia, fon of Alexander VI. See Guicciardini, 
vi. 36 


BOOK II. 293 


gun toward a civil and popular greatne(s, and tranf- 
ferred his defigns to a martial greatnefs. 

Fourthly, in the choice of their friends and de- 
pendences, to proceed according to the compofi- 
tion of their own nature: as we may fee in Cefar; 
all whofe friends and followers were men active 
and effectual, but not folemn, or of reputation. | 

Fifthly, to take fpecial heed how they guide 
themfelves by examples, in thinking they can do 
as they fee others do; whereas perhaps their na- 
tures and carriages are far differing. In which 
error it feemeth Pompey was, of whom Cicero 
faith, that he was wont often to fay, Syl/a potuit— 
ego non potero?9* Wherein he was much abufed, 
the natures and proceedings of himfelf and his ex- 
ample being the unlikeft in the world; the one 
being fierce, violent, and preffing the fact; the 
other folemn, and full of majefty and circumftance, 
and therefore the lefs effectual. 

But this precept touching the politic knowledge 
of ourfelves, hath many other branches, where- 
upon we cannot infift. 

Next to the well underftanding and difcerning 
of a man’s felf, there followeth the well opening 
and revealing a man’s felf; wherein we fee nothing 
more ufual than for the more able man to make 
the lefs fhow. For there is a great advantage in 
the well fetting forth of a man’s virtues, fortunes, 
merits ; and again, in the artificial covering of a 
man’s weaknelles, defects, difgraces ; ftaying upon 
the one, fliding from the other; cherifhing the 


% Cic. ad Att, ix. 10. 


(d.) In 
choice of 
friends, fol- 
low the bent 
of your own 
charaéter. 


(e.) Do not 
be led aftray 
by examples. 


(3-) You 
muft take 
care to put 
yourtelf for- 
ward judici- 


oufly. 


294 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


one by circumftances, gracing the other by expo- 
fition, and the like: wherein we fee what Tacitus 
faith of Mutianus, who was the greateft politique 
of his time, Omnium que dixerat feceratque arte 
quadam oftentator :9° which requireth indeed fome 
art, left it turn tedious and arrogant; but yet fo 
as oftentation, though it be to the firft degree of 
vanity, feemeth to me rather a vice in manners 
than in policy: for as it is faid, 4udadter calum- 
niare, femper aliquid heret :° fo, except it be in 
a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audaéter te ven- 
dita, femper aliquid heret. For it will ftick with 
the more ignorant and inferior fort of men, though 
men of wifdom and rank do fmile at it, and defpife 
it; and yet the authority won with many doth 
countervail the difdain of a few. But if it be car- 
ried with decency and government, as with a na- 
tural, pleafant, and ingenious fafhion ; or at times 
when it is mixed with fome peril and unfafety, as 
in military perfons; or at times when others are 
moft envied ; or with eafy and carelefs paflage to 
it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being 
too ferious ; or with an equal freedom of taxing a 
man’s felf, as well as gracing himfelf; or by occa- 
fion of repelling or putting down others’ injury or 
infolence ; it doth greatly add to reputation: and 
furely not a few folid natures, that want this ven- 
tofity, and cannot fail in the height of the winds, 


9 Tacit. Hif. ii. 80. i 

96 Mr. Spedding confiders that this comes from the advice given 
by Medius to Alexander’s fycophants.—Plutarch, Quomodo quis 
difcernere, Gc. c. 24. 


BOOK II. 295 


are not without fome prejudice and difadvantage 
by their moderation. 

But for thefe flourifhes and enhancements of 
virtue, as they are not perchance unneceflary, fo 
it is at leaft neceflary that virtue be not difvalued 
and imbafed under the juft price; which is done 
in three manners: by offering and obtruding a 
man’s felf; wherein men think he is rewarded, 
when he is accepted ; by doing too much, which 
will not give that which is well done leave to fettle, 
and in the end induceth fatiety ; and by finding 
too foon the fruit of a man’s virtue, in commend- 
ation, applaufe, honour, favour; wherein if a man 
be pleafed with a little, let him hear what is truly 
faid ; Cave ne infuetus rebus majoribus videaris, fi 
hac te res parva ficuti magna deleétat.% 

But the covering of defects is of no lefs im- 
portance than the valuing of good parts; which 
may be done likewife in three manners, by caution, 
by colour, and by confidence. Caution is when men 
do ingenioufly and difcreetly avoid to be put into 
thofe things for which they are not proper: 
whereas, contrariwife, bold and unquiet fpirits will 
thruft themfelves into matters without difference, 
and fo publifh and proclaim all their wants. Colour 
is, when men make a way for themfelves, to have 
a conftruction made of their faults or wants, as 
proceeding from a better caufe, or intended for 
fome other purpofe: for of the one it is well faid, 

Szpe latet vitium proximitate boni,%° 


and therefore whatfoever want a man hath, he 
97 Cic. ad Heren, iv. 4. %8 Ovid, drt. Am. ii. 662. 


And cover 
your defects 
neatly. 


296 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


mutt fee that he pretend the virtue that fhadoweth 
it; as if he be dull, he muft affect gravity; if a 
coward, mildnefs ; and fo the reft : for the fecond, 
a man muft frame fome probable caufe why he 
fhould not do his beft, and why he fhould dif- 
femble his abilities ; and for that purpofe muft ufe 
to diffemble thofe abilities which are notorious in 
him, to give colour that his true wants are but in- 
duftries and diffimulations. For confidence, it is 
the laft99 but fureft remedy; namely, to deprefs 
and feem to defpife whatfoever a man cannot at- 
tain; obferving the good principle of the mer- 
chants, who endeavour to raife the price of their 
own commodities, and to beat down the price of 
others. But there is a confidence that paffeth 
this other ; which is, to face out a man’s own de- 
fects, in feeming to conceive that he is beft in 
thofe things wherein he is failing; and, to help 
that again, to feem on the other fide that he hath 
leaft opinion of himfelf in thofe things wherein he 
is beft: like as we fhall fee it commonly in poets, 
that if they fhow their verfes, and you except to 
any, they will fay, that that line coft them more 
labour than any of the ref? ; and prefently will feem 
to difable and fufpeét rather fome other line, which 
they know well enough to be the beft in the num- 
ber. But above all, in this righting and helping 
of a man’s felf in his own carriage, he muft take 
heed he fhow not himfelf difmantled, and expofed 
to fcorn and injury, by too much dulcenefs, good- 


99 je. the laft which fhould be made ufe of; ‘*impudens certe 
eft remedium, fed tamen, &c.” 


BOOK I]. 297 


nefs, and facility of nature ; but fhow fome fparkles 
of liberty, fpirit, and edge. Which kind of for- 
tified carriage, with a ready refcuing of a man’s 
felf from fcorns, is fometimes of neceffity impofed 
upon men by fomewhat in their perfon or fortune ; 
but it ever fucceedeth with good felicity. 
Another precept of this knowledge is, by all 
pofflible endeavour to frame the mind to be pliant 
and obedient to occafion; for nothing hindereth 
men’s fortunes fo much as this: Jdem manebat, 
neque idem decebat,| men are where they were, 
when occafions turn: and therefore to Cato, whom 
Livy maketh fuch an architect of fortune, he add- 
eth, that he had ver/atile ingenium.* And thereof 
it cometh that thefe grave folemn wits, which muft 
be like themfelves, and cannot make departures, 
have more dignity than felicity. But in fome it 
is nature to be fomewhat vifcous and inwrapped, 
and not eafy to turn; in fome it is a conceit, that 
is almoit a nature, which is, that men can hardly 
make themfelves believe that they ought to change 
their courfe, when they have found good by it in 
former experience. For Machiavel noted wifely, 
how Fabius Maximus would have been temporiz- 
ing ftill, according to his old bias, when the nature 
of the war was altered and required hot purfuit.* 
In fome other it is want of point and penetration 
in their judgment, that they do not difcern when 
things have a period, but come in too late after 
the occafion; as Demofthenes* compareth the 


' Cic. Brut. 95. (327-) 2 Livy, xxxix. 40, 
3 Mach. Difcorfi Jopra Livio, iii. g. * Demofth. Pdil. i. 51. 


4. Be onthe 
watch to 
feize oppor- 
tunities. 


5. Sail with 


the wind 
wherever 
poffible. 


6. But do 
not feem 
merely to 


298 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


people of Athens to country fellows, when they 
play in a fence fchool, that if they have a blow, 
then they remove their weapon to that ward, and 
not before. In fome other it is a lothnefs to leefe 
Jabours paffed, and a conceit that they can bring 
about occafions to their ply; and yet in the end, 
when they fee no other remedy, then they come 
to it with difadvantage ; as Tarquinius, that gave 
for the third part of Sibylla’s books the treble price,® 
when he might at firft have had all three for the 
fimple. But from whatfoever root or caufe this 
reftivenefs of mind proceedeth, it is a thing moft 
prejudicial ; and nothing is more politic than to 
make the wheels of our mind concentric and volu- 
ble with the wheels of fortune. 

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath 
fome affinity with that we laft {pake of, but with 
difference, is that which is well exprefled, Fatis 
accede Dei/que,® that men do not only turn with the 
occafions, but alfo run with the occafions, and not 
{train their credit or ftrength to over hard or ex- 
treme points; but choofe in their actions that 
which is moft paflable: for this will preferve men 
from foil, not occupy them too much about one 
matter, win opinion of moderation, pleafe the 
moft, and make a fhow of a perpetual felicity in 
all they undertake; which cannot but mightily 
increafe reputation. 

Another part of this knowledge feemeth to have 
fome repugnancy with the former two, but not as 


5 For the fame price, according to the Legend, Aul. Gell. i. 19. 
© Lucan, viii. 486. 


BOOK I]. 299 


I underftand it ; and it is that which Demofthenes 
uttereth in high terms ; Et guemadmodum receptum 
eff, ut exercitum ducat imperator, fic et a cordatis 
viris res ipfe ducende; ut que ipfis videntur, ea 
gerantur, et non ipfi eventus tantum perfequi cogan- 
tur.” For, if we obferve, we fhall find two differing 
kinds of fufficiency in managing of bufinefs: fome 
can make ufe of occafions aptly and dexteroufly, 
but plot little; fome can urge and purfue their 
own plots well, but cannot accommodate nor take 
in ;® either of which is very imperfect without the 
other. 

Another part of this knowledge is the obferving 
a good mediocrity in the declaring, or not declar- 
ing a man’s felf: for although depth of fecrecy, 
and making way, gualis eff via navis in mari,9 
(which the French calleth /ourdes menées, when 
men fet things in work without opening them- 
felves at all,) be fometimes both profperous and 
admirable; yet many times di/fimulatio errores 
parit, qui diffimulatorem ipfum illaqueant; and 
therefore, we fee the greateft politiques have in a 
natural and free manner profefled their defires, 
rather than been referved and difguifed in them. 
For fo we fee that Lucius Sylla made a kind of 
profeffion, that he wifhed all men happy or unhappy, 
as they ftood his friends or enemies. So Cefar, when 
he went firft into Gaul, made no fcruple to pro- 
fefs that he had rather be firft in a village, than 

7 Demofth. PAil. i. 51. 

8 Explained by the Latin ‘qui occafiones que opportune inci- 


dunt non arripiunt.” 
9 Prov. xxx, 19. 


follow cir- 
cumftances. 


7. Be nei- 
ther too 
open nor 
too re- 
ferved. 


300 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fecond at Rome.© So again, as foon as he had be- 
gun the war, we fee what Cicero faith of him, 
Alter (meaning of Czefar) non recufat, fed quedam- 
modo poftulat, ut, ut eft, fic appelletur tyrannus.™' 
So we may fee in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that 
Auguftus Czfar, in his very entrance into affairs, 
when he was a darling of the fenate, yet in his 
harangues to the people would fwear, lta parentis 
honores confequi liceat,'* which was no lefs than the 
tyranny ; fave that, to help it, he would ftretch 
forth his hand towards a ftatua of Czefar’s that was 
erected in the place: and!’ men laughed, and won- 
dered, and faid, Is it poffible? or, Did you ever 
hear the like? and yet thought he meant no hurt; 
he did it fo handfomely and ingenuoufly. And 
all thefe were profperous: whereas Pompey, who 
tended to the fame end, but in a more dark and 
diffembling manner, as Tacitus faith of him, Oc- 
cultior, non melior,* wherein Salluft concurreth, 
ore probo, animo inverecundo,'> made it his defign, 
by infinite fecret engines, to caft the ftate into an 
abfolute anarchy and confufion, that the ftate 
might caft itfelf into his arms for neceffity and 
proteétion, and fo the fovereign power be put upon 
him, and he never feen in it: and when he had 
brought it, as he thought, to that point, when he 
was chofen conful alone, as never any was, yet he 
could make no great matter of it, becaufe men un- 
derftood him not; but was fain, in the end, to go 


10 Plutarch, Apophthegms,  Cic. ad Att. x. 4. 2. 
1S Ad, Att Xvieihi5. ae 13 T follow ed. 1605 in this paflage. 
4 Tacit. Hift. ii. 38. 18 [Sueton.] de Clar. Gram, § xv. 


BOOK II. 301 


the beaten track of getting arms into his hands, 
by colour of the doubt of Czfar’s defigns: fo 
tedious, cafual, and unfortunate are thefe deep dif- 
fimulations: whereof it feemeth Tacitus made 
his judgment, that they were a cunning of an in- 
ferior form in regard of true policy ; attributing 
the one to Auguftus, the other to Tiberius; where 
_ {peaking of Livia, he faith, Et cum artibus mariti 
fimulatione filii bene compofita °° for furely the con- 
tinual habit of diffimulation is but a weak and 
fluggifh cunning, and not greatly politic. 
Another precept of this architeCture of fortune 
is, to accuftom our minds to judge of the propor- 
tion or value of things, as they conduce and are 
material to our particular ends: and that to do 
fubftantially, and not fuperficially. For we thall 
find the logical part, as I may term it, of fome 
men’s minds good, but the mathematical part er- 
roneous; that is, they can well judge of confe- 
quences, but not of proportions and comparifons, 
preferring things of {how and fenfe before things 
of fubftance and effect. So fome fall in love with 
accefs to princes, others with popular fame and 
applaufe, fuppofing they are things of great pur- 
chafe: when in many cafes they are but matters 
of envy, peril, andimpediment. So fome meafure 
things according to the labour and difficulty, or 
affiduity, which are {pent about them ; and think, 
if they be ever moving, that they muft needs ad- 
vance and proceed; as Cefar faith in a defpifing 


16 Tacit. Annal. v. I. 


8. Be accuf- 
tomed to 
judge the 
relative 
values of 
things. 


302 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


manner of Cato the fecond, when he defcribeth 
how laborious and indefatigable he was to no great 
purpofe; Hac omnia magno ftudio agebat So 
in moft things men are ready to abufe themfelves 
in thinking the greateft means to be beft, when it 
fhould be the fitteft. 
The bett As for the true marfhalling of men’s purfuits 
ne towards their fortune, as they are more or lefs 
wards ad- Material, I hold them to ftand thus: firft the 
vancement. amendment of their own minds. For the remove 
of the impediments of the mind will fooner clear 
the paflages of fortune, than the obtaining fortune 
will remove the impediments of the mind. In 
the fecond place, I fet down wealth and means ; 
which I know moft men would have placed firft, 
becaufe of the general ufe which it beareth towards 
all variety of occafions. But that opinion I may 
condemn with like reafon as Machiavel*® doth 
that other, that moneys were the finews of the 
wars; whereas, faith he, the true finews of the 
wars are the finews of men’s arms, that is, a valiant, 
populous, and military nation: and he voucheth 
aptly the authority of Solon, who, when Croefus 
fhowed him his treafury of gold, faid to him, that 
if another came that had better iron, he would be 
mafter of his gold. In like manner it may be 
truly affirmed, that it is not moneys that are the 
finews of fortune, but it is the finews and fteel of 
men’s minds, wit, courage, audacity, refolution, 
temper, induftry, and the like. In the third place 


17 Ces. de Bell, Civ. i. 30. 
18 Machiav. Dic. fopr. Liv. ii, 10. 


BOOK I. 303 


I fet down reputation, becaufe of the peremptory 
tides and currents it hath; which, if they be not 
taken in their due time, are feldom recovered, it 
being extreme hard to play an after game of repu- 
tation. And laftly, I place honour, which is more 
eafily won by any of the other three, much more 
by all, than any of them can be purchafed by 
honour. To conclude this precept, as there is 
order and priority in matter, fo is there in time, 
the prepofterous placing whereof is one of the 
commoneft errors: while men fly to their ends 
when they fhould intend their beginnings, and do 
not take things in order of time as they come on, 
but marfhal them according to greatnefs, and not 
according to inftance; not obferving the good 
precept, Quod nunc inftat agamus.'9 

Another precept of this knowledge is not to 
embrace any matters which do occupy too great 
a quantity of time, but to have that founding in a 
man’s ears, 


Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus :° 


and that is the caufe why thofe which take their 
courfe of rifing by profeffions of burden, as law- 
yers, orators, painful divines, and the like, are not 
commonly {fo politic for their own fortune, other- 
wife than in their ordinary way, becaufe they want 
time to learn particulars, to wait occafions, and to 
devife plots. 

Another precept of this knowledge is, to imi- 
tate nature, which doth nothing in vain; which 


19 Virg. Ecl. ix. 66. 20 Ib. Georg. iii. 284. 


9. Do not 

follow what 
requires too 
much time. 


10, Imitate 
nature, 


11. Secure 
a line of re- 
treat from 
any courfe 
you follow. 


304 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


furely a man may do if he do well interlace his 
bufinefs, and bend not his mind too much upon 
that which he principally intendeth. For a man 
ought in every particular ation fo to carry the 
motions of his mind, and fo to have one thing 
under another, as if he cannot have that he feek- 
eth in the beft degree, yet to have it in a fecond, 
or fo in a third; and if he can have no part of 
that which he purpofed, yet to turn the ufe of it 
to fomewhat elfe ; and if he cannot make anything 
of it for the prefent, yet to make it as a feed of 
fomewhat in time to come ; and if he can contrive 
no effect or fubftance from it, yet to win fome 
good opinion by it, or the like. So that he fhould 
exact an account of himfelf of every action, to 
reap fomewhat, and not to ftand amazed and con- 
fufed if he fail of that he chiefly meant: for no- 
thing is more impolitic than to mind aétions wholly 
one by one. For he that doth fo leefeth infinite 
occafions which intervene, and are many times 
more proper and propitious for fomewhat that he 
fhall need afterwards, than for that which he urg- 
eth for the prefent; and therefore men muft be 
perfect in that rule, Hac oportet facere, et illa non 
omittere.* 

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to 
engage a man’s felf peremptorily in any thing, 
though it feem not liable to accident ; but ever to 
have a window to fly out at, or a way to retire: 
following the wifdom in the ancient fable of the 
two frogs, which confulted when their plafh was 


21 Matth. xxiii, 23. 


BOOK II. 305 


dry whither they fhould go; and the one moved 
to go down into a pit, becaufe it was not likely 
the water would dry there; but the other an- 
fwered, True, but if it do, how fhall we get out 
again? 

Another precept of this knowledge is, that an- 
cient precept of Bias, conftrued not to any point 
of perfidioufnefs, but only to caution and modera- 
tion, Et ama tanquam inimicus futurus, et odi tan- 
quam amaturus ;*° for it utterly betrayeth all utility 
for men to embark themfelves too far in unfortu- 
nate friendfhips, troublefome fpleens, and childifh 
and humorous envies or emulations. 

But I continue this beyond the meafure of an 
example; led, becaufe I would not have fuch 
knowledges, which I note as deficient, to be 
thought things imaginative or in the air, or an ob- 
fervation or two much made of, but things of bulk 
and mafs, whereof an end is hardlier made than a 
beginning. It muft be likewife conceived, that in 
thefe points which I mention and fet down, they 
are far from complete tractates of them, but only 
as fmall pieces for patterns. And laftly, no man, 
I fuppofe, will think that I mean fortunes are not 
obtained without all this ado; for I know they 
come tumbling into fome men’s laps ; and a num- 
_ ber obtain good fortunes by diligence in a plain 
way, little intermeddling, and keeping themfelves 
from grofs errors. 


But as Cicero, when he fetteth down an idea’ 


of a perfect orator, doth not mean that every 


22 Ariftot. Rhet. ii. 13. 4. 
x 


12; Sit 
loofely in 
friendfhip 
and ill-will. 


Conclufion 
of the rules 
for making 
your fortune, 


306 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


pleader fhould be fuch; and fo likewife, when a 
prince or a courtier hath been defcribed by fuch 
as have handled thofe fubjects, the mould hath 
ufed to be made according to the perfe€tion of the 
art, and not according to common prattice: fo I 
underftand it, that it ought to be done in the de- 
fcription of a politic man, I mean politic for his 
own fortune. 

All thefe But it muft be remembered all this while, that 

rules are for the precepts which we have fet down are of that 

the purfuit : : 

of good, not kind which may be counted and called Bone Artes. 

evil ends. Ags for evil arts, if a man would fet down for him- 
felf that principle of Machiavel,® that a man feek 
not to attain virtue itfelf, but the appearance only 
thereof; becaufe the credit of virtue is a help, but 
the ufe of it is cumber: or that other of his prin- 
ciples, that he prefuppofe, that men are not fitly to 
be wrought otherwife but by fear; and therefore 
that he feek to have every man obnoxious, low, and 
in ftrait, which the Italians call feminar /pine, to 
fow thorns: or that other principle, contained in 
the verfe which Cicero citeth, Cadant amici, dum- 
modo inimict intercidant,** as the triumvirs, which 
fold, every one to other, the lives of their friends 
for the deaths of their enemies: or that other pro- 
teftation of L. Catilina, to fet on fire and trouble 
ftates, to the end to fifh in droumy waters, and to 
unwrap their fortunes, Ego fi quid in fortunis meis 
excitatum fit incendium, id non aqua fed ruina reft- 
inguam:* or that other principle of Lyfander, 


23 Prince, c. 17, 18. 24 Pro Reg. Deiot. ix. 25. 
% Cic. pro Mur, xxv. (51-) 


BOOK I]. 307 


that children are to be deceived with comfits, and 
men with oaths :*® and the like evil and corrupt 
pofitions, whereof, as in all things, there are more 
in number than of the good: certainly with thefe 
difpenfations from the laws of charity and integ- 
rity, the prefling of a man’s fortune may be more 
hafty and compendious. But it is in life as it ‘is 
in ways, the fhorteft way is commonly the fouleft, 
and furely the fairer way is not much about, 

But men, if they be in their own power, and 
do bear and fuftain themfelves, and be not carried 
away with a whirlwind or tempeft of ambition, 
ought, in the purfuit of their own fortune, to fet 
before their eyes not only that general map of the 
world, that all things are vanity and vexation of 
Spirit,” but many other more particular cards and 
directions: chiefly that—that being without well- 
being is a curfe—and the greater being the greater 
curfe; and that all virtue is moft rewarded, and 
all wickednefs moft punifhed in itfelf: according 
as the poet faith excellently : 

Que vobis, que digna, viri, pro laudibus iftis 

Premia poffe rear folvi? pulcherrima primum 

Di more/gue dabunt veftri.*® 
And fo of the contrary. And, fecondly, they ought 
to look up to the eternal providence and divine 
judgment, which often fubverteth the wHdom of 
evil plots and imaginations, according to that Scrip- 
ture, He hath conceived mifchief, and shall bring 


© Plut. Lys.—rove pév raidac dorpayddote, rove dé dvdpac 
dprotc Lararay. 
27 Eccl. il. 11. 28 Virg. én. ix, 252. 


Nor fhould 
men only 
feek their 
fortunes, but 
remember 
higher 
things alfo. 


308 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


forth a vain thing.*9 And although men fhould 
refrain themfelves from injury and evil arts, yet 
this inceflant and Sabbathlefs purfuit of a man’s 
fortune Jeaveth not the tribute which we owe to 
God of our time ; who we fee demandeth a tenth 
of our fubftance, and a feventh, which is more 
ftrit, of our time: and it is to fmall purpofe to 
have an erected face towards heaven, and a per- 
petual grovelling {pirit upon earth, eating duft, as 
doth the ferpent, 


Atque affigit humo divine particulam aurz.*° 


And if any man flatter himfelf that he will employ 
his fortune well, though he fhould obtain it ill, as 
was faid concerning Auguftus Cefar, and after of 
Septimius Severus, that either they fhould never 
have been born, or elfe they fhould never have died,* 
they did fo much mifchief in the purfuit and afcent 
of their greatnefs, and fo much good when they 
were eftablifhed ; yet thefe compenfations and fa- 
tisfactions are good to be ufed, but never good to 
be purpofed. And laftly, it is not amifs for men 
in their race toward their fortune, to cool them- 
felves a little with that conceit which is elegantly 
exprefled by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in 
his inftructions to the king his fon, That fortune 
hath fomewhat of the nature of a woman, that if 
fhe be too much wooed, fhe is the farther off.°* But 
this laft is but a remedy for thofe whofe taftes are 


29 Job xv. 35. % Hor. Sat, ii. 2579s 

3! Aurel. Victor, Epit. i. for Auguftus; for Severus, fee his 
life by Lampridius. 

32 See Ellis and Spedding on this in the De Augm. Bk. viii. 2. 


BOOK II. 309 


corrupted: let men rather build upon that foun- 
dation which is a corner-{ftone of divinity and phi- 
lofophy, wherein they join clofe, namely, that fame 
Primum querite. For divinity faith, Primum que- 
rite regnum Dei, et ifta omnia adjicientur vobis :°8 
and philofophy faith, Primum querite bona animt ; 
cetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. And although 
the human foundation hath fomewhat of the fands,?# 
as we fee in M. Brutus, when he brake forth into 
that fpeech, 


Te colui, Virtus, ut rem ; at tu nomen inane es ;°5 


yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. But 
this may ferve for a tafte of that knowledge which 
I noted as deficient. 

Concerning Government,” it is a part of know- 
ledge fecret and retired, in both thefe refpedts in 
which things are deemed fecret ; for fome things 
are fecret becaufe they are hard to know, and fome 
becaufe they are not fit to utter. We fee all go- 
vernments are obfcure and invifible : 

Totamque infufa per artus 
Mens agitat molem, et magno fe corpore mifcet.37 
Such is the defcription of governments. We fee 
the government of God over the world is hidden, 
inafmuch as it feemeth to participate of much ir- 


33 Matth. vi. 33. 

*4 So edd. 1629, 16335; ed. 1605 has /ame. 

35 & rAijpov aperr), \dyoc ap’ 706", Eyw Cé GE, 

Q¢ Egyov yoKxovv’ od 0’ dp’ édovAEvec riyy. 
Dio Caf. x\vii. 49. 

3° This upon Government is very differently given in the Latin ; 
the main fubjeét is poftponed ; and two defiderata are difcufled— 
the queftion of Enlarging an Empire, and that of Univerfal Juftice. 

37 Virg. Zn, vi. 726. 


De Aug. 
VIII. 3- 

(c.) In Go- 
vernment— 
a dark 
fubject. 


Should be 

declared as 

far as may 
Ce 


310 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


regularity and confufion: the government of the 
foul in moving the body is inward and profound, 
and the paflages thereof hardly to be reduced to 
demonftration. Again, the wifdom of antiquity, 
(the fhadows whereof are in the poets,) in the 
defcription of torments and pains, next unto the 
crime of rebellion, which was the giants’ offence, 
doth deteft the cffence of futility, as in Sifyphus 
and Tantalus.*® But this was meant of particu- 
lars: neverthelefs even unto the general rules and 
difcourfes of policy and government there is due a 
reverent and referved handling. 

But contrariwife, in the governors toward the 
governed, all things ought, as far as the frailty of 
man permitteth, to be manifeft and revealed. For 
fo it is exprefled in the Scriptures touching the 
government of God, that this globe, which feem- 
eth to us a dark and fhady body, is in the view of 
God as cryftal: Et in confpectu fedis tanquam mare 
vitreum fimile cryftallo®9 So unto princes and 
ftates, efpecially towards wife fenates and councils, 
the natures and difpofitions of the people, their 
conditions and neceffities, their factions and com- 
binations, their animofities and difcontents, ought 
to be, in regard of the variety of their intelligences, 
the wifdom of their obfervations, and the height 
of their {tation where they keep fentinel, in great 
part clear and tranfparent. Wherefore, confider- 
ing that I write to a King that is a matter of this 
{cience, and is fo well affifted, I think it decent to 


58 Vid. Pind. O/. 1. 55. 39 Rev. iv. 6, 


BOOK II. 311 


pafs over this part in filence, as willing to obtain 
the certificate which one of the ancient philofo- 
phers afpired unto ; who being filent, when others 
contended to make demonttration of their abilities 
by fpeech, defired it might be certified for his part, 
that there was one that knew how to hold his peace. 


Notwithftanding, for the more public part of Deficiency 


government, which is laws, I think good to note 
only one deficiency ; which is, that all thofe which 
have written of laws, have written either as phi- 
lofophers or as lawyers, and none as ftatefmen. 
As for the philofophers, they make imaginary laws 
for imaginary commonwealths; and their difcourfes 
are as the ftars, which give little light, becaufe they 
are fo high. For the lawyers, they write accord- 
ing to the ftates where they live, what is received 
law, and not what ought to be law: for the wif 
dom of a lawmaker is one, and of a lawyer is an- 
other. For there are in nature certain fountains 
of juftice, whence all civil laws are derived but as 
ftreams: and like as waters do take tin@tures and 
taftes from the foils through which they run, fo do 
civil laws vary according to the regions and go- 
vernments where they are planted, though they 
proceed from the fame fountains. Again, the 
wifdom of a lawmaker confifteth not only in a 
platform of juftice, but in the application thereof; 
taking into confideration by what means laws may 
be made certain, and what are the caufes and re- 
medies of the doubtfulnefs and incertainty of law; 
by what means laws may be made apt and eafy to 
be executed, and what are the impediments and 


in Law 
Books ; 
none are by 
ftatef{men. 


De Pru- 

dentia legif- 
latoria, five 
de Fontibus 


Furis. 


312 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


remedies in the execution of laws ; what influence 
laws touching private right of meum and tuum have 
into the public ftate, and how they may be made 
apt and agreeable; how laws are to be penned 
and delivered, whether in texts or in aé?s, brief or 
large, with preambles, or without ; how they are 
to be pruned and reformed from time to time, and 
what is the beft means to keep them from being 
too vaft in volumes, or too full of multiplicity and 
crofinefs ; how they are to be expounded, when 
upon caufes emergent and judicially difcuffed, and 
when upon refponfes and conferences touching 
general points or queftions ; how they are to be 
preffed, rigoroufly or tenderly ; how they are to 
be mitigated by equity and good confcience, and 
whether difcretion and ftrict law are to be mingled 
in the fame courts, or kept apart in feveral courts; 
again, how the practice, profeffion, and erudition 
of law is to be cenfured and governed ; and many 
other points touching the adminiftration, and, as 
I may term it, animation of laws. Upon which 
I infift the lefs, becaufe I purpofe, if God give me 
leave, (having begun a work of this nature in 
aphorifms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it in 
the mean time for deficient. 

And for your Majefty’s laws of England, I 
could fay much of their dignity, and fomewhat of 
their defect ; but they cannot but excel the civil 
laws in fitnefs for the government: for the civil 
law was non hos quefitum munus in ufus ;* it was 


40 Virg. in, iv. 647. 


BOOK I. 215 


not made for the countries which it governeth: 
hereof I ceafe to fpeak becaufe I will not inter- 
mingle matter of action with matter of general 
learning. 


= HUS have I concluded this portion of Conclufion 
Re 5 learning touching civil knowledge; and % the Re 
with civil knowledge have concluded Philo- 

Sy human philofophy ; and with human “Py: 
arama philofophy in general. And being now 

at fome paufe, looking back into that I have paffed 
through, this writing feemeth to me, /7 nunguam 

fallit imago,* (as far as a man can judge of his 

own work,) not much better than that noife or 
found which muficians make while they are tuning 

their inftruments: which is nothing pleafant to 
hear, but yet is a caufe why the mufic is fweeter 
afterwards: fo have I been content to tune the 
inftruments of the Mufes, that they may play that 

have better hands. And furely, when I fet before 

me the condition of thefe times, in which learning 

hath made her third vifitation or circuit in all the 
qualities thereof—as the excellency and vivacity of 

the wits of this age; the noble helps and lights 
which we have by the travails of ancient writers ; 

the art of printing, which communicateth books 

to men of all fortunes ; the opennefs of the world 

by navigation, which hath difclofed multitudes of 
experiments, and a mafs of natural hiftory; the 
leifure wherewith thefe times abound, not em- 


sity, Eel. ii. 27. 


314, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ploying men fo generally in civil bufinefs, as the 
{tates of Grzcia did, in refpeét of their popularity, 
and the ftate of Rome, in refpe& of the greatnefs 
of their monarchy ; the prefent difpofition of thefe 
times at this inftant to peace; the confumption of 
all that ever can be faid in controverfies of religion, 
which have fo much diverted men from other fci- 
ences; the perfection of your Majefty’s learning, 
which as a Phoenix may call whole vollies of wits 
to follow you; and the infeparable propriety of 
time, which is ever more and more to difclofe 
truth—I cannot but be raifed to this perfuafion 
that this third period of time will far furpafs that 
of the Grecian and Roman learning: only if men 
will know their own ftrength, and their own weak- 
nefs both; and take one from the other, light of 
invention, and not fire of contradiction; and efteem 
of the inquifition of truth as of an enterprife, and 
not as of a quality or ornament; and employ wit 
and magnificence to things of worth and excel- 
lency, and not to things vulgar and of popular ef- 
timation. As for my labours, if any man {hall 
pleafe himfelf or others in the reprehenfion of them, 
they fhall make that ancient and patient requeft, 
Verbera, fed audi;** let men reprehend them, fo 
they obferve and weigh them: for the appeal is 
lawful, though it may be it fhall not be needful, 
from the firft cogitations of men to their fecond, 
and from the nearer times to the times farther off. 
Now let us come to that learning, which both the . 


42 Themiftocles to Eurybiades, Plut. Rez, et Imper. Apop.— 
muratoyv piv ovy, adkovooy Oé. 


BOOK I1. 315 


former times were not fo blefled as to know, fa- 
cred and infpired divinity, the Sabbath and port of 
all men’s labours and peregrinations. 


= HE prerogative of God extendeth as 
aA eS well to the reafon as to the will of 
iy man; fo that as we are to obey His 

oo} law, though we find a reluctation in 
our will, fo we are to believe His word, though 
we find a reluétation in our reafon. For, if we 
believe only that which is agreeable to our fenfe, 
we give confent to the matter, and not to the au- 
thor ; which is no more than we would do towards 
a fufpected and difcredited witnefs ; but that faith 
which was accounted to Abraham for righteouf- 
nefs was of fuch a point as whereat Sarah laughed,* 
who therein was an image of natural reafon. 

Howbeit, if we will truly confider it, more 
worthy it is to believe than to know as we now 
know. For in knowledge man’s mind fuffereth 
from fenfe; but in belief it fuffereth from fpirit, 
fuch one as it holdeth for more authorized than 
itfelf, and fo fuffereth from the worthier agent. 
Otherwife it is of the ftate of man glorified; for 
then faith fhall ceafe, and we fhall know as we 
are known. 

Wherefore we conclude that facred theology, 
(which in our idiom we call divinity,) is grounded 
only upon the word and oracle of God, and not 
upon the light of nature: for it is written Cal 
enarrant gloriam Dei ;** but it is not written, Cal 


43 Vid. Gen, xviii. 41° Ps. xix.) Ee 


De Aug. 
1X. De 
Of Theo- 


logy. 


Grounded 
on the 
Bible and 
on Nature. 


316 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


enarrant voluntatem Dei: but of that it is faid, 4d 
legem et teftimonium: fi non fecerint fecundum ver- 
bum iftud,*® &c. This holdeth not only in thofe 
points of faith which concern the myfteries of the 
Deity, of the Creation, of the Redemption, but 
likewife thofe which concern the law moral truly 
interpreted: Love your enemies: do good to them 
that hate you; be like to your heavenly Father, that 
Juffereth his rain to fall upon the juft and unjuft.® 
To this it ought to be applauded, mec vox hominem 
Jonat:* it is a voice beyond the light of nature. 
So we fee the heathen poets, when they fall upon 
a libertine paffion, do ftill expoftulate with laws 
and moralities, as if they were oppofite and ma- 
lignant to nature ; 


Et quod natura remittit, 
Invida jura negant.*® 
So faid Dendamis the Indian unto Alexander’s 
meflengers, That he had heard fomewhat of Pytha- 
goras, and fome other of the wife men of Grecia, 
and that he held them for excellent men: but that 
they had a fault, which was that they had in too 
great reverence and veneration a thing which they 
called law and manners.*9 So it muft be con- 
fefled, that a great part of the law moral is of that 
perfection, whereunto the light of nature cannot 
afpire : how then is it that man is faid to have, by 
the light and law of nature, fome notions and con- 


45 Ifai. viii. 20. 46 Matth. v. 44. 

47 Virg. én. i. 328. 48 Ovid, Met. x. 330. 

49 Plut. Alexander. 65—evpveic piv airp yeyovévar doxovow 
ot dvdoec, Niay dé rode Vomove aicxuYdpmEvoar BEBiWKEVaL. 


BOOK II. 317 


ceits of virtue and vice, juftice and wrong, good 
and evil? “Thus, becaufe the light of nature is 
ufed in two feveral fenfes; the one, that which 
fpringeth from reafon, fenfe, induction, argument, 
according to the laws of heaven and earth; the 
other, that which is imprinted upon the fpirit of 
man by an inward inftinét, according to the law 
of confcience, which is a fparkle of the purity of 
his firft eftate ; in which latter fenfe only he is 
participant of fome light and difcerning touching 
the perfection of the moral law: but how? fuffi- 
cient to check the vice, but not to inform the 
duty. So then the dodtrine of religion, as well 
moral as myttical, is not to be attained but by in- 
fpiration and revelation from God, 

The ufe, notwithftanding, of reafon in fpiritual 
things, and the latitude thereof, is very great and 
general; for it is not for nothing that the apoftle 
calleth religion our reafonable fervice of God ;© in- 
fomuch as the very ceremonies and figures of the 
old law were full of reafon and fignification, much 
more than the ceremonies of idolatry and magic, 
that are full of non-fignificants and furd charac- 
ters. But moft efpecially the Chriftian faith, as in 
all things, fo in this deferveth to be highly magni- 
fied; holding and preferving the golden medio- 
crity in this point between the law of the heathen 
and the law of Mahomet, which have embraced 
the two extremes. For the religion of the heathen 
had no conftant belief or confeffion, but left all 
to the liberty of argument; and the religion of 


50 Rom. xii. 1. 


Reafon to 
be ufed in 
{piritual 
things. 


1. In appre- 
hending 
myfteries. 
2. In de- 
ducing doc- 
trine and 
direction. 


318 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


Mahomet, on the other fide, interdi€teth argu- 
ment altogether: the one having the very face of 
error, and the other of impofture: whereas the 
faith doth both admit and reject difputation with 
difference. 

The ufe of human reafon in religion is of two 
forts: the former, in the conception and appre- 
henfion of the myfteries of God to us revealed ; 
the other, in the inferring and deriving of doctrine 
and direction thereupon. The former extendeth 
to the myfteries themfelves; but how? by way 
of illuftration, and not by way of argument: the 
latter confifteth indeed of probation and argument. 
In the former, we fee, God vouchfafeth to defcend 
to our capacity, in the expreffing of his myfteries 
in fort as may be fenfible unto us; and doth graft 
his revelations and holy do&rine upon the no- 
tions of our reafon, and applieth his infpirations 
to open our underftanding, as the form of the key 
to the ward of the lock: for the latter, there is 
allowed us a ufe of reafon and argument, fecondary 
and refpective, although not original ‘and abfolute. 
For after the articles and principles of religion are 
placed and exempted from examination of reafon, 
it is then permitted unto us to make derivations 
and inferences from and according to the analogy 
of them, for our better direction. In nature this 
holdeth not; for both the principles are examin- 
able by induction, though not by a medium or . 
fyllogifm ; and befides, thofe principles or firft po- 
fitions have no difcordance with that reafon which 
draweth down and deduceth the inferior pofitions. 


BOOK Il. 319 


But yet it holdeth not in religion alone, but in 
many knowledges, both of greater and {maller na- 
ture, namely, wherein there are not only po/ita 
but placita; for in fuch there can be no ufe of 
abfolute reafon. We fee it familiarly in games of 
wit, as chefs, or the like: the draughts and firft 
laws of the game are pofitive, but how? merely 
ad placitum, and not examinable by reafon; but 
then how to direct our play thereupon with beft 
advantage to win the game, is artificial and ra- 
tional. So in human laws, there be many grounds 
and maxims which are placita juris, pofitive upon 
authority, and not upon reafon, and therefore not 
to be difputed: but what is moft juft, not abfo- 
lutely but relatively, and according to thofe maxims, 
that affordeth a long field of difputation. Such 
therefore is that fecondary reafon, which hath place 
in divinity, which is grounded upon the p/acets of 
God. 

Here therefore I note this deficiency, that there 
hath not been, to my underftanding, fufficiently 
inquired and handled the true limits and ufe of 
reafon in fpiritual things, as a kind of divine dia- 
lectic: which for that it is not done, it feemeth to 
me a thing ufual, by pretext of true conceiving 
that which is revealed, to fearch and mine into 
that which is not revealed; and by pretext of 
enucleating inferences and contradictories, to ex- 
- amine that which is pofitive: the one fort falling 
inte the error of Nicodemus, demanding to have 
things made more fenfible than it pleafeth God to 
reveal them, Quomodo poffit homo nafci cum fit 


Its limits 
not yet de- 
fined. 

De ufu le- 
gitimo ra- 
tionis hu- 
mana@ in 
divinis. 


Divinity 
has two 
parts. 


320 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


fenex?* the other fort into the error of the dif- 
ciples, which were fcandalized at a fhow of con- 
tradiction, Quid eff hoc quod dicit nobis ? Modicum, 
et non videbitis me; et iterum modicum, et vide- 
bitis me, &c.** 

Upon this I have infifted the more, in regard 
of the great and bleffed ufe thereof; for this point, 
well laboured and defined of, would in my judg- 
ment be an opiate to ftay and bridle not only the 
vanity of curious fpeculations, wherewith the 
{chools labour, but the fury of controverfies, where- 
with the church laboureth. For it cannot but 
open men’s eyes, to fee that many controverfies 
do merely pertain to that which is either not re- 
vealed, or pofitive ; and that many others do grow 
upon weak and obfcure inferences or derivations : 
which latter fort, if men would revive the bleffed 
ftyle of that great doctor of the Gentiles, would 
be carried thus, ego, non dominus ;*° and again, /e- 
cundum confilium meum, in opinions and counfels, 
and not in pofitions and oppofitions. But men 
are now over-ready to ufurp the ftyle, non ego, fed 
dominus ; and not fo only, but to bind it with the 
thunder and denunciation of curfes and anathemas, 
to the terror of thofe which have not fufficiently 
learned out of Salomon, that the caufele/s curfe 
fhall not come.** 

Divinity hath two principal parts; the matter 
informed or revealed, and the nature of the infoi- 
mation or revelation: and with the latter we will 


51 Joh. iii. 4. 52 Joh. xvi. 17. 
53 1 Cor. vil. 12. 40. 54 Prov. xxvi. 2. 


BOOK II. 321 


begin, becaufe it hath moft coherence with that 
which we have now laft handled. The nature of 
the information confifteth of three branches ; the 
limits of the information, the fufficiency of the in- 
formation, and the acquiring or obtaining the in- 
formation. Unto the limits of the information 
belong thefe confiderations ; how far forth parti- 
cular perfons continue to be infpired; how far 
forth the Church is infpired ; how far forth reafon 
may be ufed: the laft point whereof I have noted 
as deficient. Unto the fufficiency of the informa- 
tion belong two confiderations ; what points of 
religion are fundamental, and what perfective, be- 
ing matter of further building and perfection upon 
one and the fame foundation ; and again, how the 
gradations of light, according to the difpenfation 
of times, are material to the fufficiency of belief. 
Here again I may rather give it in advice, than 
note it as deficient, that the points fundamental, 
and the points of farther perfection only, ought to 
be with piety and wifdom diftinguifhed: a fubje& 
tending to much like end as that I noted before ; 
for as that other were like to abate the number of 
controverfies, fo this is likely to abate the heat of 
many of them. We fee Mofes when he faw the 
Ifraelite and the A®gyptian fight, he did not fay, 
Why ftrive you? but drew his fword and flew the 
Egyptian: but when he faw the two [Ifraelites 
fight, he faid, You are brethren, why /trive you? 
If the point of doétrine be an AXgyptian, it muft 
be flain by the fword of the fpirit, and not recon- 


85 Exod. ii. 11—14. 
= 


1. The na- 
ture of the 
revelation, 


a. Its limits. 


6. Its fuffi- 


ciency. 


De Gradibus 
unitatis in 
Civitate Dei. 


c. Its acqui- 
fition by in- 
terpretation. 


(1.) Me- 
thodical. 


322 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


ciled ; but if it be an Ifraelite, though in the 
wrong, then, Why /rrive you? We fee of the 
fundamental points, our Saviour penneth the league 
thus, He that is not with us, is againft us ;*© but 
of points not fundamental, thus, He that is not 
againft us, is with us.*7 So we fee the coat of our 
Saviour was entire without feam,®® and fo is the 
doctrine of the Scriptures in itfelf; but the gar- 
ment of the Church was of divers colours,°? and 
yet not divided: we fee the chaff may and ought 
to be fevered from the corn in the ear, but the 
tares may not be pulled up from the corn in the 
field. So as it is a thing of great ufe well to de- 
fine what, and of what latitude thofe points are, 
which do make men merely aliens and difincor- 
porate from the Church of God. 

For the obtaining of the information, it refteth 
upon the true and found interpretation of the 
Scriptures, which are the fountains of the water 
of life. The interpretations of the Scriptures are 
of two forts; methodical, and folute or at large. 
For this divine water,® which excelleth fo much 
that of Jacob’s Well, is drawn forth much in the 
fame kind as natural water ufeth to be out of wells 
and fountains; either it is firft forced up into a 
ciftern, and from thence fetched and derived for 
ufe ; or elfe itis drawn and received in buckets and 
veflels immediately where it {pringeth. The former 
fort whereof, though it feem to be the more ready, 

56 Matth. xii. 30. 57 Luke ix. 50. 58 Joh. xix. 23. 

59 See Pf. xlv. 10, 14 or it may refer to Jofeph’s coat of many 


colours— Gen. xxxvii. 3. 
60 Matth. xiii. 29. 6! Joh. iv. 13, 14. 


BOOK I, 323 


yet in my judgment is more fubject to corrupt. 
This is that method which hath exhibited unto 
us the fcholaftical divinity ; whereby divinity hath 
been reduced into an art, as into a ciftern, and the 
ftreams of doctrine or pofitions fetched and de- 
rived from thence. 

In this men have fought three things, a fum- 
mary brevity, a compacted ftrength, and a com- 
plete perfection; whereof the two firft they fail 
to find, and the laft they ought not to feek. For 
as to brevity we fee, in all fummary methods, 
while men purpofe to abridge, they give caufe to 
dilate. For the fum or abridgment by contraction 
becometh obfcure ; the obfcurity requireth expofi- 
tion, and the expofition is diduced into large com- 
mentaries, or into common places and titles, which 
grow to be more vaft than the original writings, 
whence the fum was at firft extracted. So, we 
fee, the volumes of the fchoolmen are greater 
much than the firft writings of the fathers, whence 
the Mafter of the Sentences® made his fum or 
colleGtion. So, in like manner, the volumes of 
the modern doétors of the civil law exceed thofe 
of the ancient jurifconfults, of which Tribonian® 


62 Peter Lombard received this name after writing a work en- 
titled ‘* The Sentences ;” a fummary of Theology in four Books. 
The objeé of the work was the fettlement of all difputed do¢trines 
by a collection of fentences from the Fathers. It is perhaps fu- 
perfluous to add that the work has not as yet fulfilled its objedt. 
Still he deeply affected Theology, for he laid by it the foundations 
of the Scholaitic Philofophy. He was born at the beginning of the 
twelfth century ; Bithop of Paris 1159; died 1164. 

3 Tribonian, Queftor, Conful and Matter of the Offices to Juf- 
tinian. With fixteen others he compiled the Digeft—promulgated 


it in 533- 


Herein men 
have fought, 
a. Brevity. 


8. Strength. 


y.- Com- 
pletene/s. 


324 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


compileth the digeft. So as this courfe of fums 
and commentaries is that which doth infallibly 
make the body of fciences more immenfe in quan- 
tity, and more bafe in fubftance. 

And for ftrength, it is true that knowledges re- 
duced into exact methods have a fhow of ftrength, 
in that each part feemeth to fupport and fuftain 
the other; but this is more fatisfactory than fub- 
ftantial: like unto buildings which ftand by archi- 
tecture and compaction, which are more fubject 
to ruin than thofe which are built more {trong in 
their feveral parts, though lefs compacted. But 
it is plain that the more you recede from your 
grounds, the weaker do you conclude: and as in 
nature, the more you remove yourfelf from par- 
ticulars, the greater peril of error you do incur: 
fo much more in divinity, the more you recede 
from the Scriptures by inferences and confequences, 
the more weak and dilute are your pofitions. 

And as for perfection or completenefs in divi- 
nity, it is not to be fought ; which makes this 
courfe of artificial divinity the more fufpect. For 
he that will reduce a knowledge into an art, will 
make it round and uniform : but in divinity many 
things muft be left abrupt, and concluded with 
this: O altitudo fapientia et fcientie Dei! quam 
incomprehenfibilia funt judicia ejus, et non invefti- 
gabiles vie ejus!®* So again the apoftle faith, Ex 
parte /cimus :® and to have the form of a total, 
where there is but matter for a part, cannot be 
without fupplies by fuppofition and prefumption. 


6 Rom. xi. 33. © x Cor, xii ge 


BOOK I]. 325 


And therefore I conclude, that the true ufe of 
thefe fums and methods hath place in inftitutions 
or introductions preparatory unto knowledge: but 
in them, or by deducement from them, to handle 
the main body and fubftance of a knowledge, is 
in all fciences prejudicial, and in divinity danger- 
ous. 
As to the interpretation of the Scriptures folute 
and at large, there have been divers kinds intro- 
duced and devifed ; fome of them rather curious 
and unfafe than fober and warranted. Notwith- 
ftanding, thus much mutt be confeffed, that the 
Scriptures being given by infpiration, and not by 
- human reafon, do differ from all other books in 
_ the author: which, by confequence, doth draw 
on fome difference to be ufed by the expofitor. 
For the inditer of them did know four things 
which no man attains to know; which are, the 
myfteries of the kingdom of glory, the perfection 
of the laws of nature, the fecrets of the heart of 
man, and the future fucceffion of all ages. For 
as to the firft it is faid, He that preffeth into the 
light, fhall be oppreffed of the glory. And again, 
No man fall fee my face and live To the fe- 
cond, When he prepared the heavens I was pre- 
Jent, when by law and compafs he inclofed the deep.™ 
To the third, Neither was it needful that any 
Should bear witne/s to him of man, for he knew well 
what was in man.® And to the laft, From the 
beginning are known to the Lord all his works.°9 


6 Exod. xxxiil. 20. 7 Prov. viii. 27. 68 Joh. ii, 25. 
@ Adts xv. 18. 


(2.) Solute, 
or at large. 


Expofition 
muft be fo- 
ber, becaufe 
God knows 
things hid- 
den from us. 


326 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


From the former two have been drawn certain 
fenfes and expofitions of Scriptures, which had 
need be contained within the bounds of fobriety ; 
the one anagogical, and the other philofophical. 
But as to the former, man is not to prevent his 
time: Videmus nunc per fpeculum in aenigmate, 
tunc autem facie ad faciem :™ wherein neverthe- 
lefs there feemeth to be a liberty granted, as far 
forth as the polifhing of this glafs, or fome mode- 
rate explication to this enigma. But to prefs too 
far into it, cannot but caufe a diffolution and over- 
throw of the {pirit of man. For in the body there 
are three degrees of that we receive into it, aliment, 
medicine, and poifon; whereof aliment is that 
which the nature of man can perfeétly alter and 
overcome: medicine is that which is partly con- 
verted by nature, and partly converteth nature ; 
and poifon is that which worketh wholly upon na- 
ture, without that, that nature can in any part 
work upon it. Soin the mind, whatfoever know- 
ledge reafon cannot at all work upon and convert 
is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a diffolu- 
tion of the mind and underftanding. 

But for the latter, it hath been extremely fet on 
foot of late time by the fchool of Paracelfus, and 
fome others, that have pretended to find the truth 
of all natural philofophy in the Scriptures; fcan- 
dalizing and traducing all other philofophy as hea- 
thenifh and profane. But there is no fuch enmity 
between God’s word and His works; neither do 
they give honour to the Scriptures, as they fuppofe, 


70 + Cor. xiii. 12. 


BOOK I]. 327 


but much imbafe them. For to feek heaven and 
earth in the word of God, (whereof it is faid, 
Heaven and earth fhall pafs, but my word fhall not 
pa/s,") is to feek temporary things amongft eternal : 
and as to feek divinity in philofophy is to feek the 
living amongft the dead,’* fo to feek philofophy in 
divinity is to feek the dead amongft the living: 
neither are the pots or lavers, whofe place was in 
the outward part of the temple, to be fought in 
the holieft place of all, where the ark of the tefti- 
mony was feated. And again, the fcope or pur- 
pofe of the fpirit of God is not to exprefs matters 
of nature in the Scriptures, otherwife than in 
paflage, and for application to man’s capacity, and 
to matters moral or divine. And it is atrue rule, 
auétoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas ; for it were 
a ftrange conclufion, if a man fhould ufe a fimi- 
litude for ornament or illuftration fake, borrowed 
from nature or hiftory according to vulgar conceit, 
as of a Bafilifk, an Unicorn, a Centaur, a Briareus, 
an Hydra, or the like, that therefore he muft needs 
be thought to affirm the matter thereof pofitively 
to be true. To conclude, therefore, thefe two in- 
terpretations, the one by reduction or enigmatical, 
the other philofophical or phyfical, which have 
been received and purfued in imitation of the rab- 
bins and cabalifts,** are to be confined with a nol 
altum fapere, fed time." 

7! Matth. xxiv. 35. 72 Luke xxiv. 5. 

78 Cabalifts—expounders of the Jewifh Cabala, or hidden fcience 
of divine myfteries, faid by the Rabbins to have been delivered to 


Mofes with the Law. 
74 Rom, xi. 20. 


328 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING, 


But the two latter points, known to God and 
unknown to man, touching the fecrets of the heart, 
and the fucceffions of time, do make a juft and 
found difference between the manner of the ex- 
pofition of the Scriptures and all other books. For 
it is an excellent obfervation which hath been 
made upon the anfwers of our Saviour Chrift to 
many of the queftions which were propounded to 
him, how that they are impertinent to the ftate of 
the queftion demanded; the reafon whereof is, 
becaufe, not being like man, which knows man’s 
thoughts by his words, but knowing man’s thoughts 
immediately, he never anfwered their words, but 
their thoughts: much in the like manner it is 
with the Scriptures, which being written to the 
thoughts of men, and to the fucceffion of all ages, 
with a forefight of all herefies, contradi@ions, dif- 
fering eftates of the church, yea and particularly 
of the elect, are not to be interpreted only accord- 
ing to the latitude of the proper fenfe of the place, 
and refpectively towards that prefent occafion 
whereupon the words were uttered, or in precife 
congruity or contexture with the words before or 
after, or in contemplation of the principal fcope of 
the place; but have in themfelves, not only totally 
or collectively, but diftributively in claufes and 
words, infinite fprings and ftreams of dotrine to 
water the church in every part. And therefore 
as the literal fenfe is, as it were, the main ftream 
or river; fo the moral fenfe chiefly, and fometimes 
the allegorical or typical, are they whereof the 
church hath moft ufe; not that I wifh men to be 


BOOK Ii. 329 


bold in allegories, or indulgent or light in allufions: 
but that I do much condemn that interpretation 
of the Scripture which is only after the manner as 
men ufe to interpret a profane book. 

In this part, touching the expofition of the 
Scriptures, I can report no deficience ; but by way 
of remembrance this I will add: in perufing books 
of divinity, I find many books of controverfies ; 
and many of commonplaces and treaties ; a mafs of 
pofitive divinity, as it is made an art; a number 
of fermons and lectures, and many prolix com- 
mentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmonies 
and concordances: but that form of writing in di- 
vinity which in my judgment is of all others moft 
rich and precious, is pofitive divinity, collected 
upon particular texts of Scriptures in brief obfer- 
vations ; not dilated into commonplaces, not chaf- 
ing after controverfies, not reduced into method 
of art; a thing abounding in fermons, which will 
vanifh, but defective in books which will remain; 
and a thing wherein this age excelleth. For I 
am perfuaded, (and I may fpeak it with an adb/it 
invidia verbo,’° and no ways in derogation of an- 
tiquity, but as in a good emulation between the 
vine and the olive,) that if the choice and beft of 
thofe obfervations upon texts of Scriptures, which 
have been made difperfedly in Sermons within this 
your Majefty’s ifland of Britain by the fpace of 
thefe forty years and more, leaving out the large- 
nefs of exhortations and applications thereupon, 
had been fet down in a continuance, it had been 


7 Livy, ix. 19. 


Emanationes 
Scriptura- 
rum in doc- 
trinas pofi- 


tivas. 


330 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


the beft work in divinity which had been written 

fince the Apoftles’ times. 
Se The matter informed by divinity is of two 
formed by kinds; matter of belief and truth of opinion, and 
ou matter of fervice and adoration; which is alfo 
lief, judged and directed by the former: the one being 
Se, Of fer- as the internal foul of religion, and the other as 
; the external body thereof. And therefore the 
heathen religion was not only a worfhip of idols, 
but the whole religion was an idol in itfelf; for it 
had no foul, that is, no certainty of belief or con- 
feffion: as a man may well think, confidering the 
chief doors of their church were the poets: and 
the reafon was, becaufe the heathen gods were no 
jealous gods, but were glad to be admitted into 
part, as they had reafon. Neither did they refpect 
the purenefs of heart, fo they might have external 

honour and rites. 

But out of thefe two do refult and iffue four 
main branches of divinity ; faith, manners, liturgy, 
a. Faith. and government. Faith containeth the doctrine of 
the nature of God, of the attributes of God, and 
of the works of God. The nature of God con- 
fifteth of three perfons in unity of Godhead. The 
attributes of God are either common to the Deity, 
or refpective to the perfons. The works of God 
fummary are two, that of the creation and that of 
the redemption ; and both thefe works, as in total 
they appertain to the unity of the Godhead, fo in 
their parts they refer to the three perfons: that of 
the creation, in the mafs of the matter, to the 
Father ; in the difpofition of the form, to the Son; 


BOOK I. 331 


and in the continuance and confervation of the 
being, to the Holy Spirit. So that of the redemp- 
tion, in the election and counfel, to the Father ; 
in the whole act and confummation to the Son; 
and in the application, to the Holy Spirit; for by 
the Holy Ghoft was Chrift conceived in flefh, 
and by the Holy Ghoft are the elect regenerate 
in fpirit. This work likewife we confider either 
effeQtually, in the eleé&t; or privatively7® in the 
reprobate; or according to appearance, in the 
vifible church. 

For manners, the do¢trine thereof is contained 
in the law, which difclofeth fin. The law itfelf 
is divided, according to the edition thereof, into 
the law of nature, the Jaw moral, and the law po- 
fitive ; and according to the ftyle, into negative 
and affirmative, prohibitions and commandments. 
Sin, in the matter and fubject thereof, is divided 
according to the commandments; in the form 
thereof, it referreth to the three perfons in Deity : 
fins of infirmity againft the Father, whofe more 
{pecial attribute is power ; fins of ignorance againft 
the Son, whofe attribute is wifdom; and fins of 
malice again{ft the Holy Ghoft, whofe attribute is 
grace or love. In the motions of it, it either 
moveth to the right hand or to the left; either to 
blind devotion, or to profane and libertine tranf- 
greffion ; either in impofing reftraint where God 
granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where God 


78. All old edd. have privately ; but I cannot find that this word 
is ever ufed as the ienfe of this paffage requires it, and fo have fub- 
ftituted privatively. 


&. Manners. 


c. Liturgy. 


d. Govern- 
ment. 


332, ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


impofeth reftraint. In the degrees and progrefs 
of it, it divideth itfelf into thought, word, or act. 
And in this part I commend much the deducing 
of the law of God to cafes of confcience ; for that 
I take indeed to be a breaking, and not exhibiting 
whole of the bread of life. But that which quick- 
eneth both thefe doétrines of faith and manners, is 
the elevation and confent of the heart ; whereunto 
appertain books of exhortation, holy meditation, 
Chriftian refolution, and the like. 

For the liturgy or fervice, it confifteth of the 
reciprocal aéts between God and man; which, on 
the part of God, are the preaching of the word, 
and the facraments, which are feals to the cove- 
nant, or as the vifible word; and on the part of 
man, invocation of the name of God; and under 
the law, facrifices; which were as vifible prayers 
or confeffions: but now the adoration being in 
Jpiritu et veritate,?” there remaineth only vituli 
labiorum ;78 although the ufe of holy vows of thank- 
fulnefs and retribution may be accounted alfo as 
fealed petitions. 

And for the government of the church, it con- 
fifteth of the patrimony of the church, the fran- 
chifes of the church, and the offices and jurifdic- 
tions of the church, and the laws of the church 
directing the whole; all which have two confi- 
derations, the one in themfelves, the other how 
they ftand compatible and agreeable to the civil 
eftate. 

‘This matter of divinity is handled either in form 


77 John iv. 24. 78 Hofea xiv. 2, 


BOOK I. 433 


of inftruction of truth, or in form of confutation 
of falfehood. The declinations from religion, be- 
fides the privative, which is atheifm, and the 
branches thereof, are three; Herefies, Idolatry, 
and Witchcraft ; herefies, when we ferve the true 
God with a falfe worfhip ; idolatry, when we wor- 
fhip falfe gods, fuppofing them to be true: and 
witchcraft, when we adore falfe gods, knowing 
them to be wicked and falfe: for fo your Majefty 
doth excellently well obferve, that witchcraft is 
the height of idolatry. And yet we fee though 
thefe be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that 
they are all of a nature, when there is once a re- 
ceding from the word of God; for fo he faith, 
Quafi peccatum ariolandi ef? repugnare et quafi {celus 
idololatria nolle acquiefcere.?9 

Thefe things I have pafied over fo briefly be- 
caufe I can report no deficience concerning them: 
for I can find no fpace or ground that lieth vacant 
and unfown in the matter of divinity: fo diligent 
have men been, either in fowing of good feed, or 
in fowing of tares. 


(= 23)|HUS have I made as it were a {mall 
be i globe of the intellectual world, as truly 
tg fe) and faithfully as I could difcover: with 

£9) 2 note and defcription of thofe parts 
which feem to me not conftantly occupate, or not 
well converted by the labour of man. In which, 
if I have in any point receded from that which is 
commonly received, it hath been with a purpofe 


7 1 Sam, xv. 23. 


Conclufion. 


334 ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. 


of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud; a mind 
of amendment and proficience, and not of change 
and difference. For I could not be true and con- 
{tant to the argument I| handle, if I were not will- 
ing to go beyond others ; but yet not more willing 
than to have others go beyond me again: which 
may the better appear by this, that I have pro- 
pounded my opinions naked and unarmed, not 
feeking to preoccupate the liberty of men’s judg- 
ments by confutations. For in anything which is 
well fet down, I am in good hope, that if the firft 
reading move an objection, the fecond reading will 
make an anfwer. And in thofe things wherein I 
have erred, I am fure I have not prejudiced the 
right by litigious arguments ; which certainly have 
this contrary effect and operation, that they add 
authority to error, and deftroy the authority of that 
which is well invented: for queftion is an honour 
and preferment to falfehood, as on the other fide 
it is a repulfe to truth. But the errors I claim 
and challenge to myfelf as mine own: the good, 
if any be, is due tanquam adeps facrificiz,®° to be 
incenfed to the honour, firft of the Divine Ma- 
jefty, and next of your Majefty, to whom on earth 
I am moft bounden. 


80 Tfaiah xlili. 24. 


DEO GLORIA. 


GLOSSARY 


OF WORDS EITHER OBSOLETE OR USED 
IN SENSES NOT NOW ALLOWED. 


(The numbers refer to the paging.) 


ji} CCEPTION, 138, = acceptation. 

ACCOMMODATE, 172, an adjective in ufe in 
Bacon’s day, but here equivalent to the 
participle and almoft = adjujfted. 
ADVENTIVE, 141, —adventitious—from the 
verb to advene, which is alfo obfolete. 

AFFECTS, 163, —affections—not ufed here with any fenfe 
of infincerity. 

AMBAGES, 137, 154, “ambiguities of fpeech, fubterfuges, 
evafions :? Richardfon, who quotes Chaucer,— 

“< And but if Calcas lede us with ambages, 
That is to faine, with double words flie, &c.” 
Troil. and Crefs. Bk. v. 
Bacon ufes the word according to its derivation—ambe 
(ugh), agere (4ye1)—“ nature worketh by ambages,” 
z.é. circuitous paths. 

ANTIPODES, 19, of the dwellers on the other fide of the 
earth, not of that other fide itfelf. So Holland, Plinie, 
B. ii. c. 65,— The Antipodes thould marvaile why we 
fell not down.” 

APPROMPT, 195, to ftir up, quicken. 

ASPERSION, 58, 247, fprinkling, now ufed chiefly, if not 
entirely metaphorically, and in a bad fenfe—then fre- 
quently in a good,— 

“No iweet a/perfions fhall the heavens let fall.” 

SHAKES., Tempef?, iv. 1. 


336 GLOSSARY. 


ATTEND, 280, ufed aétively,—‘ I have attended them with 
obfervations.” 


BIRD-WITTED, 228, incapable of continuous attention. 
Bp. Fither ufes the compound gro/s-qwitted—Hall, /ubtil- 
witted. (Not in Richardfon.) 

BLANCH, 227, = blink, to avoid or evade; alfo =blench. 
So Shakefpere, Meafure for M. iv. 5. “ Do you blench 
from this?” 

BrIBER, 277, here a receiver, not a giver, of bribes. This 
agrees with the origin of the word (fee Richardfon)— 
be-reaver, or be-robber, the original ufage being = thief. 
So, as the word changed meaning, it became “a receiver 
of unlawful gain.” Then in modern Englifh it is trans- 
ferred to the agent who bribes. 


CAPTION, 199, quibbling and deceit—ufed of fallacies. 

CARNOSITIES, 172, a medieval term, for growth of flefhy 
fubftances, as wens. (The word is not noticed in Rich- 
ardfon.) 

CAUTELS, 249, tricks and frauds—the word having drifted 
away from cautela, while caution has continued to repre- 
fent the Latin. So Hall, Henry VI, anno 26,—‘‘ By 
this praty cautele and flight impofture was the town 
taken.” 

“* So now no foil, nor cautel doth befmirch 
The virtue of his will.” —Suakes., Hamlet, i. 3. 

CEASE, 49, ufed tranfitively, “‘ to ceafe progreflion,” equi- 
valent to ‘‘ put a ftop to.” 

CENSURE, 312, =to be kept under cenforfhip—not — blame. 

CEREMONIES, 181, 182, ufed of fuperftitious ufages, in- 
tended to invoke the aid of fpirits. So Shakefpere, 
Ful. Caf. ii. 1:— 

“ For he is fuperftitious grown of late, 
uite from the main opinion he held once 
Of phantafy, of dreams, and ceremonies.” 

CIVIL ESTATE, 3, condition as member of a civitas. The 
higheft afe of the term is now almoft, if not entirely, gone. 
See Trench, Glo/s. verbo. A “ civil opinion,” =re- 
ceived, 181. 

CHAMPAIGN, 150, plain land—locus campeftris. In Bacon’s 
day both a fubftantive and (as here) an adjective. 

CIRCUMFER, 130, almoft = transfer, a rare verb, though 
its fenfe is plain enough, and its derivative common. 


GLOSSARY. 227 


COARCTATION, reftraint. 

COEVALS, 122, coincident in point of time—ufed as a fub- 
ftantive. Hakewill, Apologie, “ taunted at by his coe- 
vals,” 

COLLIQUATION, 142, melting—oppofed (by Sir T. Brown, 
Vulgar Errors, Bk. ii. c. 1.) to coagulation. 

COLUMBINE, 250, dove-like—the innocency of the dove, 
as oppofed to “‘ferpentine wifdom.” This is the only 
inftance of the ufe of this adjective. 

COMPASS, 192, = (now) a pair of compaffes. By the 
change of ufe we diftinguifh between this inftrument and 
the mariners’ compais. 

COMPASS-REACHES, 289. This compound is not noticed 
in Richardfon, Its fenfe is that of roundabout fteps 
taken towards the accomplifhment of any object — 
reaching forth to compa/s it. 

COMPLEXION, 203, —(probably) temperament or difpofi- 
tion. ‘The word has now been degraded from the in- 
ward parts of a thing or perfon to the ¢znt of the out- 
ward countenance. ‘The tranfition is marked in Rich- 
ardfon (quoting Cook’s Voyages, vol. i. c. 10.) ‘ with- 
out the leaft appearance of what is called complexion” — 
where he is {peaking of a man’s fkin as dead white, 
without colour. 

CONFECTIONARY, 256, the maker of confections, not the 
confections made. So 1 Sam. viii. 13. ‘* He will take 
your daughters to be confectionaries.” ‘The word con- 
Section is not rightly limited to {weet ftuff. Bacon here 
ufes it as equal to apothecary (a word formed in the fame 
manner)—and in medizval Latin the apothecary was 
confectionarius. Comfit is derived from the fame fource. 

CONSCIENT, 283, =con{cious. Richardfon does not ac- 
knowledge the exiftence of this word; but, quoting the 
paflage whence it comes, alters it to con/cious. 

CONSIST IN, 180,—=depend upon. Richardfon quotes 
Ford— 

“‘Tho’ the ufe 

Of fuch fet entertainments more con/i/ts 
In cuftom, than in caufe; yet, &c.” 

CONTENTATION, =contentment. 

CONTESTATIONS, 27, —contefts, contentions. 

CONTINENT, 160,—=the whole extent of anything. So 
here “the continent of Nature” is ‘all that comes 
within the limits of Nature.” 

iz 


338 GLOSSARY. 


CONTRISTATION, 6, = trouble or diftrefs. In Eccles. i. 18. 
the word which Bacon englifhes by contriftation, the 
Authorized Verfion renders grief. 

CoPIE, 36, 37, 191, 205, —=plenty—a French word im- 
ported into England in the fixteenth century. We ftill 
retain its adjective copiows—and copy is really another 
form of the fame word, though its ufage is different. 
To copy is ‘‘ copiam tacere ex{cribendi,” and perhaps 
carries us back to the days of the multiplication of 
** copies” of books by the hand.—See Dean Trench’s 
Glojary. ‘There is a curious ufe of the word in p. 275 
—‘* howfoever a man change copy, he can no ways quit 
himfelf well of it” (of contending with a fool.) The 
Latin fimply has “‘ quocunque nos vertamus,” 

CORROBORATE, 26, = ftrong, matured. 


DECARDED, 157, = difcarded—de or dis—carta, to 
throw away one’s hand at cards. Richardfon quotes 
Macklin’s Dumb Knight,— 


‘* Indeed, mine are two queens, and one, I'll throw 
away— 
Can you decard, madam ?” 


DEDUCEMENTS, 280, = deduétions. 

DEFUNCT, 185, a fubftantive, now only ufed as an adjettive. 

DESIGNMENTS, 1g, = intentions. 

DESTITUTED, 161, = abandoned. 

DEVOTE, 52, = devoted, (not devout, as one ed. reads it,) 
given up to any matter—then ‘(efpecially) to the wor- 
thip of God. 

DIFFICILE, 270, = difficult. 

DIGLADIATION, 41, = fencing, with fwords, properly : 
thence with fharp inftruments—as the tongue. 

DILATATION, 146, power of expanfion. Bacon, in faying 
that God is “ Holy in the de/cription or dilatation of his 
works,” feems to ufe thefe words as fynonyms, whereas 
they are more properly ufed, di/atation—ot the expan- 
fion of the thing itfelf; de/cription—of the limitation 
of the thing by inveftigators. 

DISCOURSE, 35,280,281. See Trench’s Glofary. * Might 
have received large di/cour/e,” illuftration or inveftiga- 
tion of a fubjeét. Soagain, ‘ di/cour/e of government,” 

*¢ difcourfe of bufinefs,” and *€ difcourfe of reafon,” are 
all phrafes ufed by Bacon in the original fenfe of the 


GLOSSARY. 339 


word, fpringing out of the Latin d/curfus —the paff- 
ing from thought to thought, fubject to fubjeét; or, as 
in logic, from premife to conclufion; and thence the 
word defcends to the modern ufage—of difcuffion by 
talk. There is a curious ufage of di/courfing in p. 147, 
where Bacon ufes it (unlefS fome words have been 
omitted) as = fizal cauies. 

Drovumy, 306, = difturbed, troubled, “to fith in droumy 
waters.” The Latin has “ in aquis turbidis pifcari.” 
The word is not found in Richardfon’s diétionary, nor 
can I trace its hiftory. 

DUuLceENESs, 296, —{weetnefs. I find no other example 
of this fubftantive, though dulcet and the verb to dulce 
are not uncommon in old writers. (This fubftantive 
is not in Richard{fon.) 


EASILIEST, 51, = moft eafily. 

ELENCH, 198, a technical term—refutation of an argu- 
ment or pofition. 

EmBasg, fee Imbafe. 

ENABLEMENT, 98, = aid or means. 

EsTUATION, 243, — heat and commotion. 

EXCEED, 163, = pafs beyond the bounds of moderation— 
ufed without a cafe after it. 

EXPULSED, 216, = expelled. 

EXQUISITE, 44,—carefully fought out (not refined, as now.) 

EXTERN, 131, 248, 257, — foreign or outward. 

EXTIRPER, 64, — extirpator—the old verb being #o extirp, 
not to extirpate. 


FACTURES, 162, 171, = fafhion or features of a thing. 
For the word feature is only another form of the word 
jaéture. 

FANTASTICAL, 35, — (in this place) falfe—bafed upon the 
fancy alone, without any bafis of fact or truth. 

FLExuous, 146, — bending and pliant. 

FRIPPER, 220, broker. We retain the word in our 
Srippery—trom frivolus, a feller of frivolous or worth- 
lefs goods, See Trench’s Glofary. 


GAMESTER, 246, = player—not with the flighteft fenfe 
of gambling. So in Shakefpere,— 
“Sirrah, young game/fter, your father was a fool.” 
Taming of the Shrew, ii. 1. 


340 GLOSSARY. 


And,— 

** You are a merry gameffer.”—Henry VIII, i. 4. 
The word is ftill ufed in its right fenfe in the Weft of 
England, 

GIGANTINE, 242, = gigantic, giant-like. (This adjeétive 
is not in Richardfon.) 

GRAVELLED, 71, = ftuck or fet faftin gravel ; then, embar- 
raffled. So Shakefpeare, As you Like It, iv. 1.“ Gravelled 
for lack of matter.” Dean Trench quotes the Rheims 
verfion of the Aéts, xxvii. 41, “ When they were fallen 
into a place between two feas, they gravelled the fhip.” 
The word has now pafled out of the original fenfe. 
Gravel is derived either from glareola or from gravare 
—the loading of fhips for ballaft—or from to grave or 
dig out—(to grub)—a doubtful fuggeftion of Serenius. 
The firft feems to be the moft probable. 

GROUND, 24.5, = an accompaniment with an inftrument in 
mufic—the metaphor being fomewhat fimilar to that 
which would conneét ba/s with bajfe or ground-floor of 
anything. The bafo part is fimply the /ow part—as 
diftinét from tezore, midway ; alto, high ; foprano, above 
all. Thus bafs or ground would be the foundation on 
which all refts. 


HOLDING OF, 3, = pertaining to. 

Humour, HUMOROUS, 22, 62, 256. ‘This word (Lat. 
humor, moifture) was originally ufed of the four ‘ hu 
mours” of the body, blood, phlegm, choler, melancholy ; 
it came to a morbid ftate of the mind arifing from excefs 
of thefe; and fo Bacon here ufes it; ‘*the cenfure of 
humour, malignity, and pufillanimity ” where it is not = 
ill-humour in our fenfe, but rather =a difeafed or jaun- 
diced condition of mind. We apply the word in me- 
dicine to a moift difeafed ftate of the body :—in common 
language, to good and ill humour, or a cheerful or 
morofe condition of temper ;—and to a quality of mind, 
difficult to define—a deep, almoft folemn, fenfe of the 
incongruities which coexift in the world. ‘* The 4u- 
morous man (2.é. the melancholy man) fhall end his part 
in peace.” —Hamlet, ii. 2. 


ILLAQUEATION, 198, 221, = entanglement. The 
chief part of the gloffary under this letter muft be taken 
up with Latin words which entered into our language, 


GLOSSARY. 341 


when learned men began to ufe it inftead of Latin for 
literary purpofes. The early part of the feventeenth 
century, under a pedantic king, was the time when this 
tranfition was moft marked. As the Englifh tongue 
gathered ftrength by greater ufe in philofophical writ- 
ings, it threw off thefe excrefcences of unnatural words, 
and we are rid of confiderable numbers of them. 

IMAGINANT, 164, = perfon who imagines—a good word, 
though perhaps not now in attual ule. 

IMBAR, 58, — bar or hinder. 

IMBASE (or embafe), 46, 119, 157, 295, 327, = to lower, 
degrade; almoft = deba/e. 

IMPERTINENT, 148, = out of place, according to the ac- 
ceptance of the word among other writers. 

IMPOSTHUMATION, 172, — tumour or cyft formed in any 
part of the body by the humours withdrawn from the 
other parts. 

IMPROFICIENCE, 147, — want or abfence of progrefs. 

INCEPTION, 241, 265, — beginning. 

INDIFFERENT, 27, impartial. Thence it came naturally 
to = moderate ; thence, of courfe, lukewarm and carele/s. 
So hard is it for one who feels to help being a partifan 
—and fo rare is a really impartial and judicial {pirit. 

INFIRM, 198, —to deprive of ftrength. Ufed by Bacon 
as the oppofite of affirm. The method of Socrates, he 
fays, was to “‘ infirm that which was affirmed by an- 
other.” 

INFLUENCE INTO, 312, ufed in a fenfe of its derivation, as 
of one ftream flowing into another. 

INGURGITATION, 173, =a greedy {wallowing. So Burton, 
Anatomy of Mel. (p. 235), has, “‘ to eat and ingurgitate 
beyond all meafure.”’ 

INQUIRE, 174, ufed as our “ inquire into.” 

INSATISFACTION, 262, = difappointment or abfence of 
fatisfaction. 

INSINUATION, 126, = bending of onefelf, fo as to corre- 
{pond with the form of a thing—(not in a bad fenfe.) 

INTEND, 272, 303, — attend to. 

INTRINSIC, 47, = internal (not as now = real.) 

INVENT, 185, =difcover (imvenire) ; the wider ufe of the 
term, now limited to the productions of man’s ingenuity 
and fkill. 


JOCULARLY, 178,=pertaining tojugglery, to which form 


342 GLOSSARY. 


it has been contracted in courfe of time. The joculator 
in low Latin was the merry-andrew, or juggler (jocus.) 

JURISCONSULTS, 106, = lawyers—profeflors of law ; being 
the Latin word fimply transferred into the Englifh 
tongue. 


LEESE, 46, 90, 95, 224, 247,298. This is the old fpelling 
of the fame verb as “to /ofe;”’ akin to it are /ofs, lefs, to 
loofe. In p. 46, Bacon ufes it as equivalent to waj/fe, 
or diminifh a thing; in pp. 90, 224, = #0 lofe. (So, 
too, the termination /e/s comes from this verb—blame- 
lefs, &c.) ; fo Germ. los, free. 

LEVANT, THE, 31, =the Eaft, not part of the Mediter- 
ranean fea. 

LipGER, 289, = legate (a corrupt form of the word not no- 
ticed by Richardfon). In Bailey’s Dict. it is fpelt ~ 
ledger. 

LIKER, 75, = more likely. 

LIMNED, 37, = illuminated ; the derivation being the fame. 

Lust, 129, ufed by Bacon of Poefy, which “is as a plant 
that cometh of the /u/? of the earth”—fo ufed as nearly 
equivalent to its German meaning. 


MACHINATION, 61, =machine. The bad fenfe of 
the term is met with early. Richardfon quotes Sandy’s 
Pfalms, p. 96,— 

“¢ How long will you machinate, 
Perfecute with ceafelefs hate !” 

MAGISTRAL, 51, = our dogmatic. 

MaGISTRALITIES, 174. Magiffery was a term ufed by 
chemifts. Paracelfus defcribes it thus—“ a preparation 
whereby the whole or very near the whole of any body, 
by the help of fome additament, greater or lefS, is turned 
into a body of another kind.” (BoyYLe, Works, i. p. 
637-) This explains Bacon’s ufe of the term; but in 
p- 157, he ufes it as almoft equivalent to dogmati/m. 

MANIABLE, 21, = manageable, tractable (through the 
French manier, from manus). This French form of 
the word never took root. 

MANURED, 104, 229. The fame word as manceuvre— 
auvre into ure. To manure, then, is to work by hand, 
or cultivate—firft land, then intelle&ts. Richardfon 
quotes Bifhop Hall, who, in one of his Satires, Bk. v. 
Sat. i, {peaks of “‘ many a load of marle and manure.” 


GLOSSARY, 343 


This brings in the modern ufage of the term—a very 
reftricted and debafed ufe. 

MIRABILARIES, 108, works containing things marvellous. 
(?) Note-books of Marvels. 

MOE, 27, 206. See Richardfon, v. More. Bacon ufes the 
word as a comparative. It is (according to the ety- 
mologifts) that which is mow-en, or mow-ed, into a 
heap (mawan, to mow, A. S.) Then mo; mo-er, 
(more) ; mo-e/?, (moft.) Our much is a derivation of 
mo—mickle. ‘The general ufe of the word is compara- 
tive and = more. 

Moral, 32, =(perhaps) cuftomary—a Latinifed ufe “ fe- 
cundum morem”—deriving the adjeétive from the fin- 
gular, not from the plural of mos. 

MORIGERATION, 33, —complai{ance or compliance ; ‘* mo- 
rem gerere alicui,” to humour him. 

MoucHt, 119, 121, 172, = might. 


NON-PROMOVENT, 218. This is not Latin, as one 
edition feems to make it, but an Englifh word, formed 
after the type of fuch compounds as xon-proficient, non- 
conforming, &c. Bacon himfelf interprets it by ‘ incur- 
ring into themfelves.” The meaning is =“ not ad- 
vancing” as are arguments iz circulo. 


OCCUPATE, 165,=occupy. Ufedasan adjective in 333, 
= occupied. 


PAINFUL, 303, = painftaking, induftrious— here and 
elfewhere an epithet of the clergy. 

PALLIATE, 172, = palliated, or mitigated, 

PANTOMIMUS, 169, the perfon, not the thing. See Trench’s 
Gloffary. 

PARCEL, = part. 

PARTICIPLES, 132, = partaking of more kinds than one; 
ufed generally and not folely of grammar. 

PasQUuIL, 71,— pafquinade, or lampoon (from an image at 
Rome, to which libels and fatires were affixed). 

PEDANTES, 16,26. ‘This word was written thus by Bacon 
as a foreign word (Italian or Spanifh, probably the 
latter), newly introduced into the Englifh tongue and 
not acclimatifed. It does not feem to carry its modern 
notion of affe4ation joined with learning, in the ufe 
Bacon makes of the word pedantical (p. 227). 


ey a ee 


344 GLOSSARY. 


PERCASE, 260, = perchance. 

PLY, 298. ‘This word is again ufed as a fubftantive by 
Bacon in the Effay on Cuftom: ‘ Late learners cannot 
fo well take the p/y; except it be in fome minds, that 
have not fuffered themfelves to fix.” Where we fee the 
fame fenfe as in the compound app/y—the bending or 
turning the mind to any matter. In this paflage Bacon 
ufes the word as almoft = purpofe: ‘can bring occafion 
to their ply,”—z.e. “can bend circumftances to their 
fervice,” &c. 

POPULARITY, 314, = populoufnefs, Sir T. Browne ufes 
populofity—which, ugly as it is, would be the more cor- 
rect form of the word. 

PRAGMATICAL, 2 284, — officious, bufy—now folely “ prig- 
gifh,’— a word which perhaps comes from it. See 
Trench’s Gla ary. 

PRENOTION, 162, a fubdivifion of that part of human {ci- 
ence which treats of the fympathy between mind and 
body. Alfo, 206, the procefs of marking off before- 
hand what has no connection with the fubjeét. Ufed 
by Bacon as one of the two “ intentions” or means in 
the received Arts of Memory. 

PREPOSTEROUS, 303, ufed in its exact fenfe of wrong order 
of things. 

PRESENTION, 179, = prefentiment, or previous perception 
inwardly of that which is about to occur. (Not in 
Richardfon.) 

PROFICIENCE, 95, 121, 334, =a making of progrels. 
(Profit is the fame word under another form.) 

PROPRIETY, 5, 314, property in its /ogical fenfe. 

PUNCTUAL, 31, = to a point—thence exact even to little- 
nefs; later confined to time only, in fenfe of accurate. 
See Trench’s Glofary. 

PuNTO, 272, (Spanifh) =ceremony, punéctilio. Another 
example of the Spanifh connection with England about 
this period of our hiftory. 

PURGAMENT, 172, = that which purges or cleanfes. 


QUT, 275, = acquit. So in the Bible, A. V.— Quit 
you like men.”—1 Cor, xvi. 13. 


REDARGUTION, 104, 198, 199, = refutation. 
RE-EDIFY, 70, =rebuild. The verb edify being ufed in 
its original fignification, as edifice ftill is. 


GLOSSARY. 345 


REGIMENT, 3, 164, 261, —rule, government (regimen)— 
When did the technical ufe of the term for a body of 
men under ftriét government firft obtain? Dryden ufes 
it. 

REINTEGRATE, 138, 209, — re-eftablifh anew. (Not 
merely to renew, but to go back to the beginning—as 
Bacon ufes it of the term magia which he propotes to 
‘* revive and reintegrate,” z.e. to bring back to its ori- 
ginal fenfe.) 

RELUCTATION, 56, 234, 315, —refiftance. We ufe re- 
luGant ftill, of one ftruggling againft what he diflikes, 
yet is driven to. 

REMORA, 148 (remorare, mora), a little fifh, as was thought, 
which, clinging to a fhip’s keel, ftayed her courfe. 
Thence metaphor of any hindrance. 


“¢ All fodainly there clove unto her keele 
A little fith, that men call remora, 
Which ftopt her courfe, and held her by the heele, 
That winde nor tide could move her thence away.” 
SPENSER, The World’s Vanitie. 


REMOVE, 302, = removal. 

RESPECTIVE, 2, =refpectful (almoft)—more exactly, hav- 
ing due refpeét or regard to the worth of the perfon 
dealt with. The honour which would be re/pective to 
a king would {carcely be re/pective to a {quire. 


SAD, 274, =grave, firm, and fixed ; derived from the A. S. 
Jfet—{o that fad is that which is /et or fixed ; then grave 
or fedate ; then ferious, mournful. See Trench’s Glofary. 

SAKE, 44 (if the reading be correct), either =/ide (which 
has been fuggefted as an emendation), or = queft—fol- 
lowing its derivation from the verb /eek, “ on the other 
fake” would then be ‘on the other fide of the invefti- 
gation,” referring to Ariftotle’s two treatifes—one on 
Natural Hiftory, the other (attributed to him) of Pro- 
digies, &c. 

SAPIENCE, 55, = wifdom. 

SCHOLASTICAL, 74, = pedantic, not neceflarily in a bad 
fenfe. 

SECURED, = free from care or hindrance (?). 

SEEN, TO BE WELL, 168, = to be efteemed. 

SEGREGATE, 269, as oppofed to congregate, or aggregate— 
feparated part from part. 


346 GLOSSARY. 


SEVER, TO, 269, = to be disjoined, or diffevered ; “* feldom 
meet, and commonly fever.” 

SLUG, TO, 148, =to render fluggifh ; flug is from the fame 
root as flow. 

SOLUTE, 322, —loofe and unreftrained. 

SORT, 278, 318. “In fort that”—we now ufe “in fuck 
fort.” 

SORTABLE, 73, — agreeable to, correfponding with. 

SPIAL, 100, —{py. Shakefpere ufes e/pial, Hamlet, iii. 1. 

SPINOSITY, 184, = pricklinefs, as of thorns. 

STATUA, 106, 252, 300, = ftatue. The Englifh form was 
in ufe long before Bacon’s time, fo that he might as 
well have written it inftead of disfiguring his text with 
an unneceflary Latin word. Shakefpere (according to 
Collier and Knight) wrote /ffatue, not ftatua, in Fulius 
Cefar, iii. 2,—‘ Even at the bafe of Pompey’s /fatua.” 

STOND, 262. ‘Knots and /fonds of the mind.” Rich- 
ardfon fays it = ftanding-place or ftation ; ftay, ftop. It 
feems to be more like the joints and divifions of the ftem 
of a plant. 

SUPPEDITATION, 256, — fupport and fupply. 

SuRD, 317, almoft = abfurd—i.e. without proper fignifi- 
cance, “idolatry and magic, that are full of non-figni- 
ficants and furd charaéters.” So in mathematics, /urds 
are “ roots incapable of being exhibited in a finite form,” 
and incommenturable. 

SYNTAX, 227, = arrangement in relation to one another. 
Bacon ufes it of the “ order or purfuit”’ in which ftudies 
may be undertaken. 


TABLE, 72, = picture (tableau.) So Holland’s Pliny, 
xxxv.c.g. So Tablet (ibid.) 

TARRASSE, 53,—terrace. So fpelt, following the pronun- 
ciation, &c. of the French terrafe, or of the Spanifh 
terrazo. 

Tax, TO, 25, 30, 33, 168, 294, ufed abfolutely, (almoft = 
depreciated.) ‘The impofter is prized, and the man 
of virtue taxed.” So Barrow, vol. iii. fer. 3,—** He 
was not like thofe mafters of philofophy, fo frequently 
taxed and derided by the fatirifts.” Is it equivalent to 
“ taxed with folly,” or (following the original fenfe), 
weighed, or rated, and found wanting? So Bacon ufes 
taxation, pp. 77, 128. 

TERRENE, 60, = earthly. 


GLOSSARY. 347 


THEORY, 138, ufed in the original fenfe of 4ewpia—invefti- 
gation, chiefly of things abitract. 

THWanrT, 21, =perverfe, twifted. The verb fo thwart is 
in general ufe, the adjective has now difappeared. The 
fubftantive thwart of a boat (crofs piece of board 
whereon the rowers fit), and athqwart are alfo in ufe. 
A. S. thweorian, to wrelt; thweort, paft participle. 
Shakefpere, King Lear, i. 4,—‘‘ And be a thwart dif- 
natured torment.” 

TRACTATES, 305, — treatifes—we now have cut the word 
down to trad, and its meaning down to a flimfy or 
fhort paper of a few pages. A tradate was a complete 
work on fome {pecial fubjeét. 

TREACLE, 174, not our fyrup of molaffes, but a medicine 
compofed of viper’s flefh, as an antidote to the viper’s 
bite—fee note, p. 174. 

‘TRIVIAL,217,=common and well-known :—not in Bacon’s 
ufe = worthle{s; but (according to its derivation) of 
things in the high-way, beaten down by many feet: 
the fenfe worthlefs is later. Richardfon notices the 
fimilarity of fenfe and found with ¢rifle; but the words 
are not really conne¢ted. 

TyYPocosMY, 220,—a figure or reprefentation of the world; 
NOT pLOU TUIOG. 


UNDERVALUE, 5, the verb is common enough,—the 
fubftantive is not now in ufe. Bacon takes itin the fenfe 
of deficiency in worth: ‘what defects and undervalues 
I find in fuch particular aéts.” 

UNPERFECT, 112, — imperfect. 

UNPROPER, 50, = improper. 

URE, 188, 214, (if this reading be allowed, initead of w/e.) 
There are two derivations fuggefted—u/ura, which is 
improbable ; and @uvre, as manure from main, euvre. 
The meaning is much the fame as that of w/e. Chaucer, 
Complaint of the Black Knight, ufes it thus :-— 


‘he fo piteoufly gan cry 
On his fortune and on ure al{o.”’ 


i.e. fortune = chance, and ure = labour, not of chance. 
So Milton, Paradife Lo/?, ufes the verb inure (or enure) 
not as derived from ure, but (as above) from @uvre. 


VASTNESS, 148 (vaftitudo), a wafte or defert—following 


348 GLOSSARY. 


the derivation of the word. (Richardfon gives no ex- 
ample of this ufage of the term.) 

VENTOSITY, 118, 294, = windinefS, or lightnefs, as of 
air. 

VERDOR, 60, faid by Mr. Spedding to be a different word 
from verdure, but this feems to be very doubtful. 

VERMICULATE, 39. Bacon is drawing a comparifon be- 
tween the corruption of fome folid fubftances into 
worms, and the tendency of found knowledge to pu- 
trify into idle and unwholefome “and, as I may term 
them, vermiculate queftions ;” where the word clearly 
fignifies queftions that are corruptions of knowledge, 
though fome notion of entanglement and intricacy may 
poffibly alfo enter in. 

VOLLIES OF WITS, 314, = flights (as of birds) of men of 
learning and wifdom. This fenfe is rare, if not pecu- 
liar to Bacon. The ordinary meaning of difcharges of 
flying fhot is at the bottom of all the paflages mentioned 
by Richardfon. 

VOLUBLE, 298, volubility, 250 (volubilis), apt or eafy to 
roll—‘ voluble with the wheels of Fortune.” Volubi- 
lity is ufed by Bacon as an epithet of the ferpent. Now 
ued chiefly, if not entirely, of {peech, and that too in 
rather a difparaging fenfe. 


WHIFFLER, 190, =piper—conneéted with wif, a 
flight breath of wind; alfo perhaps with waft—fuch a 
current of air as may be made by the waving of a fan— 
(Richardfon.) Mr. Markby, very appofitely to the 
paffage in Bacon, quotes Shakefpere, King Henry V.v. 
(chorus) — 

“‘ The deep-mouthed fea, 
Which, like a mighty w4ziffer before the king, 
Seems to prepare his way.” 


INDEX. 


j\| BEL, type of the contemplative ftate, 57. 
Abraham, 315. 

Academic philofophers, why popular, 191. 
Acatalepfy in philofophy, 191. 

Accidents of words, an appendix to gram- 


mar, 210. 

Achilles, envied by Alexander becaufe he had a vates facer 
in Homer, 74; educated by Chiron, 128. 

AGive good better than pafflive, 240. 

Adonis, Venus’ minion, 38. 

Adrian, “ mafter of thirty legions,” 33; a learned prince 
and great inquirer, 69 ; curious as to Chriftianity, and 
hung up Chrift’s picture in his gallery, 75. 

Advancement of Learning, compared to the tuning of in- 
ftruments before a concert, 313. 

LE fchines’ {neer at Demofthenes, 20. 

4: fculapius and Circe, fable of, 168 ; he was the fon of the 
fun, 170. 

4 fop, fable of the cock, 91; his fables are parabolical 
poefy, 127. 

Affections, inquiry refpecting the, 258; infufficiently han- 
died by the ancients, 259; beft treated by poets and 
hiftorians, 2d, 

Agefilaus, 83; his fpeech to Pharnabazus, 26. 

Agrippa, half a Chriftian, 71. 

Agrippina, deteftable choice of, 91; ftung Tiberius by a 
{fpeech, 288. 

Ahajfuerus, his journals, 120. 

Albertus Magnus, too credulous in natural hiftory, 43. 

Aichemifits depend on Vulcan, 99, 137- 

Alchemy, 51, related to imagination rather than reafon, 44; 


350 INDEX. 


has a good aim, and has produced good refults, 45; 
furpafled by natural prudence, 153. 

Alexander Borgia’s faying refpeéting the French expedi- 
tion, 155. 

Alexander the Great, Ariftotle’s fcholar, 14, 74; his expe- 
dition into Afia, 48, 83; his eftimate of learning, 74; 
his letter to Ariftotle, z+. ; examples of his acutenefs, 75 ; 
his faying about Greek wars, 84; his allowance to 
Ariftotle for inquiry, 100; the journals of his houfe, 
120; his title of predo, 140; fends meflengers to Den- 
damis the Indian, 316. 

Alexander Severus, 16, 72. 

Anabaptifts (of Muntfter), their evil tenets, 238. 

Analytics, their place in logic, 198. 

Anatomy, too much negleéted, 171. 

Angels in a hierarchy, 56; our knowledge of them limited, 
136; fell by afpiring to be like Gop in power, 267. 

Annals of Tacitus, 119. 

Anthropomorphites, herefy of the, 202. 

Antipater, 76; a bad ruler, 77. 

Antipodes, 19. — 

Antiquities are hiftory defaced, 111; of the world, 114. 

Antiquity worfhipped by fome, 47; not to be neglected, 
139; ‘¢ antiquitas feeculi juventus mundi,” 26. 

Antitheta, or thefes argued pro and con., 225. 

Antoninus, Marcus Aurelius, his learning, 4, 71. 

Antoninus Pius, moft learned, nicknamed xvgvorpicrns, 70 5 
became half a Chriftian, 71; his name how honoured 
after, 2b. ; died a peaceful death, 173. 

Antonius over-reached by Mucianus, 287. 

Anytus, accufer of Socrates, 14. 

Aphorifms are knowledge in growth, 49 ; compared with 
methodical writings, 214. 

Apollo ruled over mulic and medicine, 167. 

Apollonius, 69. 

Apophthegms, 124.3 Czefar’s, 2b. ; Solomon’s, 274. 

Apotheofis of the learned, 64. 

Appendices to hiftory, 124. 

Arabian philofophers too credulous in natural hiftory, 43. 

Archimedes, 46. 

Archite@ure illuftrates man’s perfonal relation with fociety, 
246. 

Ariofto’s conceit of pofthumous fame, 117. 

Ariftippus’ reply after having fallen at Dionyfius’ feet, 33. 


INDEX. 351 


Ariftotle, 46, 51; Alexander’s tutor, 14; Dictator over the 
{choolmen, 39; not too credulous, 44; mixes philo- 
fophy with logic, 50, 148; helped in his inquiries by 
Alexander, 100; his De Miris Aufcult., 108 ; on {mall 
things, 110; contradicts antiquity, 139; is too fond of 
final caufes, 147; his Problemata a valuable work, 
156; is compared to the Turkifh Sultan who murders 
his brethren, 157; notices the growth of obfervation in: 
children, 158; wrote on prediction, 162; but not on 
gefture, 76.; on imagination (dpef) and reafon, 183; 
on the mind, 185; derides the fophifts, 193 ; expounds 
the fable of Atlas, 197; on elenches, 198; on argu- 
ment in a circle, 204 on fpeech, 207; taxes Demo- 
critus, 217; on rhetoric, 221; compares logic and rhe- 
toric together, 224 ; his collections of figns of good and 
evil (in the topics), 25.; not well worked out, 225; faid 
that the young only can be happy, 233; his giving 
the firft place to the Prog Gewpusrixdg condemned by Chrift- 
ianity, 236; blames Herodicus, 239; on moral cul- 
ture, 252; on magnanimity, 255; does not duly con- 
fider the relations of age, fortune, &c., to morals, 257; 
but touches on thefe points in the Rhetoric, ib.; does 
not duly difcufS the affections, 258; except cafually in 
the Rhetoric, 259 ; carelefs in his difcuffion as to cuftom 
and habit, 261; gives precepts for habituation, 262 ; 
caution required in training youth, 263; on heroic or 
divine virtue, 266. 

Arithmetic, 151. 

Arts, hiftory of, 109; calendar of them to be made, 154; 
their duty to exalt nature, 189. 

Afcham’s veneration for Cicero and Demofthenes, 37. 

Afirology related to imagination rather than reafon, 44; 
has a noble aim, 7b.; divides men’s natures according 
to the planets, 256. 

Afironomy, can be explained either by the “ received,” or 
by the Copernican hypothetis, 158. 

Atalanta, 53. 

Atheif, how far encouraged by knowledge, 12. 

Athletic art, 177. 

Atlas, fable of, how expounded by Ariftotle, 197. 

Atticus, 300 ; his advice to Cicero on bearing, 271. 

Auguftine, St., not fo great a teacher as ecclefiaftical hif- 
tory is, 107. 

Augujius Cafar, his eloquence defcribed by Tacitus, 3; 


252 INDEX. 


praifed by Virgil, 87; defired euthanafia, 173; re- 
quefted a plaudite when dying, 283; lived before men’s 
eyes, 292; his feigned franknefs to the people, 300; 
hoped to employ well his ill-gotten fortune, 308. 
Authority in {cience is too highly credited, 45, 46. 
Axioms applicable to more than one {cience, 132, 133. 


Babel, 58. 

Bacon, Lord, promifes a work on Laws, 312. 

Ba/filifk, fable of the, 249. 

Baths, medicinal, much neglected by phyficians, 175. 

Beajfis get the credit of moft inventions, 186, 187. 

Behaviour is like a garment, 272. 

Bias, precept of, concerning friendfhip, 305. 

Biography, 1173; teaches beft the ‘ wifdom of negocia- 
tion,” 281. 

Bird-witted (or inattentive), people cured by mathematics, 
228, 

Blaefus, 229. 

Books to be cherifhed in a ftate, 95; plentiful, but not good, 
265. 

Briareus, the hundred-handed, 128. 

Brutus, Lucius, his act towards his fons, 251. 

Brutus and Caffius, their images abfent from Junia’s funeral, 
25; their {upper and difcourfe on tyrants, 251; Brutus’ 
f{peech on fortune, 309. 

Bufinefs, wifdom of, much negleéted, 273, 274. 


Cafar, Augufius, (fee Augu/fus.) 

Cafar, Fulius, (fee Fulius.) 

Cain, type of the active life, 57. 

Calendar of knowledge to be made, 154; and of doubts, 
156; and of popular errors, 157. 

Callifthenes attended Alexander, 74; his eloquence, 76. 

Car, of Cambridge, almoft deified Cicero, 37. 

Caracalla, 71. 

Cardan, too credulous, 43. 

Cardinals, their temperaments noted in the accounts ot 
conclaves, 256. 

Carneades, ambaflador to Rome, 13. 

Caffander, argued with Alexander, 76. 

Caffus (and Brutus), their images not fhown at Junia’s fu- 
neral, 25; their fupper and difcuffion on affaflination 
of tyrants, 251. 


INDEX. 353 


Cafuifiry, cafes of, in focial life, 250, 251. 

Categories, their ufe, 200. 

Catiline, 113 ; withed to “ fith in droumy waters,” 306. 

Cato the cenfor, wifhed to have no learning at Rome, 13; 
withed to learn Greek in his old age, 21 ; his judgment 
on his countrymen, 270; Livy’sjudgment on him, 282, 


297. 

Cato the fecond (of Utica), his errors in judgment, 19, 27, 
28; praifed by Cicero, 252; cenfured by Czfar, 302. 

Catulus, the orator, 292. 

Caujfes, the four, how inveftigated, 141. 

Celjus, condemned azatomia vivorum, 172; acknowledges 
that logic has nothing to do with medicine, 186. 

Ceremonies (in the old fenfe) not lawful, 182. 

Chance gets the credit of moft inventions, 187. 

Char aéters of men to be ftudied by the moral philofopher, 


255. 

Charity, * the very bond of virtues,” 266 ; admits of no ex- 
Gels, -2.67. 

Charles V. on fortune, 308. 

Charms, how fuppofed to act, 181. 

Cherubim, angels of light, fecond in rank, 56. 

Chefs, 319. 

Chinefe charatters, 207. 

Chiron, the centaur, Achilles’ preceptor, 128. 

Chriftianity, has fettled the queftion as to fummum bonum, 
233; exalts focial above private good, 236. 

Chronicles, 113. 

C4ryfippus tried to interpret the fables of the poet, 129; 
followed a bad way of perfuading men to virtue, 222. 

Church, the, charged with the excefles of heretics, 34; be- 
friended learning, 61, 62. 

Church Hiftory too credulous, 43; how divided, 122. 

Cicero, M, Tullius, 51, 188, 292, 306; had no refolution, 
18; beft or fecond beft of orators, 22 ; hisphilofophy was 
adorned by eloquence, 38; on pofthumous fame, 118 ; 
his complaint againft Socrates, 160; an academic, 191; 
commends rhetorical preparations, 194; on rhetoric, 
221; on faulty exercife of the faculties, 228; his 
Oratio pro Marcello, 249; praifes Cato the Second, 
252; his judgment on Cato, 264; his interview with 
Czfar, 271; {peaks of the “ profeffors of bufinefs” at 
Rome, 274; his Ad Atticum ufeful for wifdom of bufi- 

AA 


354 INDEX. 


nefs, 281; cenfures Pompey, 293; calls Cafar tyrannus, 
300; relates how Auguttus feigned franknefs, 76.; his 
perfect orator, 305. 

Cicero, Quintus, his advice to his brother as to his bearing, 
2713; his book De Petitione Confulatus, 274; calls the 
face animi janua, 286. 

Ciceronian ftyle revived at the Reformation, 35—37. 

Ciphers, 210. 

Circe and AE {culapius, 168. 

Civil Hiftory, 111; knowledge, 270. 

Clement VII, 18. 

Cleon hated eloquence, 222. 

Coat of Chrift without a feam, 322. 

Cobwebs of learning {pun by the fchoolmen, 39, 40. 

Columbus, 48. 

Commentaries, 112; in theology are bad, 323. 

Commodus, 71. 

Common-place Books, prejudice againft, 205; their ufe, id. 

Conclaves, 256. 

Confufion of tongues the fecond curfe of man, 209. 

Confcience, a {parkle of man’s original purity, 317. 

Conftantine nicknamed Trajan Parietaria, 70. 

Contemplation, the beft ftate, 55—57 ; Ariftotle placed it 
above active life, Chriftianity places it below it, 236; 
referved for God and angels, 237. 

Contradigtory inftances not to be negleéted in induétion, 
189. 

Controverfies in religion nearly extinét (fo Bacon hopes), 
314; an affliction to the Church, 320. 

Copernicus’ theory of aftronomy, 158, 161. 

Corruption of learning a great evil, 39. 

Coruncanius ufed to walk in the forum to be confulted on 
bufinefs, 274. 

Cofmetic Art, 177. 

Cofmography, hiftory of, 120. 

Countenance, the, a tell-tale, 286. 

Craterus, Alexander’s friend, 77. 

Credulity, akin to impofture, 42. 

Cretans, how judged by St. Paul, 257. 

Critics, advice to, 226, 227. 

Crefus’ interview with Solon, 302. 

Curius, 274. 

Cuftody of knowledge, art of, 214. 


INDEX. 355 


Cujiom and habit, confidered as affecting moral aéts, 260, 
261. 

Cyrenaic {chool, wherein it placed happinefs, 238. 

Cyrus Minor, 113. 


Dedalus, 100. 

Dancing anfwers to verfifying, both being meafured, 210. 

Darius, 74. 

De Petitione Confulatus of Quintus Cicero, the one work or 
bufinefS written among the ancients, 274. ; 

Death, preparation for, renders fear of it the greater, 245. 

Dedications of books to patrons fervile, 32. 

Deeds of men not to be too much trufted by him who would 
make his fortune, 287. 

Defeés of chara&ter, how to be concealed, 295. 

Definitions, neceflary before difcuflion, 203. 

Democritus, 46,157 ; of the truth of Nature, 137 ; faid that 
there was no ruling mind in the univerfe, 148 ; his phi- 
lofophy (as to phyfics) more found than Ariftotle’s, 26. ; 
bafed his philofophy on numbers, 150; taxed by Arif- 
totle, 217. 

Demojfthenes, his reply to AEfchines, 20; counfel to the 
Athenians, 28; prepared beforehand prefaces for his 
orations, 194; his examples of eloquence, 221; cares 
more for the right effeét of eloquence than for praife, 
232; rallied by Philocrates, 268 ; calls {mall favours 
alimenta focordiz, 287; his comparifon of Athens to a 
countryman fencing, 298 ; exhorts men to govern cir- 
cumttances, 299. 

Dendamis the Indian, 316. 

Diagoras the atheift, his wife reply, 201. 

Diafcordium, 174. 

Differences, the object of metaphyfics, 143. 

Diogenes, his defence of philofophers (Ari/fippus, not Dio- 
genes), 33; his interview with Alexander, 75; on felf- 
reftraint, 239. 

Dionyfius had his ears in his feet, 33 ; his fpeech about phi- 
lofophy, 41. 

Dionyfius the Areopagite, 56. 

Direéion (or guidance), the chief help to learning, 94. 

Divination, 179. 

Divines have objected to learning, 6, 7. 

Divinity, briefly difcuffed, 315; two chief parts, 320; four 
main branches thereof, 330. 


356 INDEX. 


Domitian’s dream, 67. 

Donius, 159. 

Doubt and fufpenfion of judgment wholefome, 51; fhould 
always be regiftered, 156. 

Dreams, expofition of, the only true part of prenotion, 162. 

Drufus, how commended by Tiberius, 286. 

Du-Bartas on flattery, 32. 

Duty, the good of man as regards fociety, 246. 


Eccentrics and epicycles, 158 

Ecclefiaftical Hiftory, too credulous, 43; a great teacher, 
107; its divifions, 122. 

Eden, man’s labour in, really contemplation, 56. 

Education, honourable and important, 25; of youth, affeéts 
the character ever after, 229. 

Egypt, a moft learned land, 58; why fo few human figures 
in her temples, 187. 

Eg yptian prieft’s judgment on the Greeks, 58; hierogly- 
phics, 208. 

Elenchs, a method of judgment, 198; how handled by 
Plato and Ariftotle, 7b.; can be ufed to guard againft 
metaphorical ambiguities, 199. 

Elizabeth, Queen, and King James I, are Caftor and Pol- 
lux, 22 ; a moft learned princefs, 72 ; the glories and 
dangers of her reign, 73; her good government feen 
in its lafting effects, 93; her mafculine rule, 116. 

Elogies, barren, 117. 

Eloquence, {ometimes defired above fenfe, 36 ; not to be con- 
demned, 38 ; bafed chiefly on imagination, 183. 

Emblem, one of the foundations on which the art of me- 
mory refts, 206. 

Empedocles, 157. 

Empirics, in phyfic, 15; in ftatecraft, 16. 

Ends of life muft be well chofen, 265. 

England, hiftory of, during Tudor period efpecially, 115, 
116. 

Enoch, the firft contemplative perfon, endowed the Church 
with prophecy, 237. 

Enquiry, power of wife, is the half of knowledge, 195. 

Epaminondas, general and {cholar, 15. 

Epigetus’ philofophy cenfured, 238; his precept on felf- 
government turned into one on felf-advancement, 290. 

Epicurus, his manner of death, 173; thought the gods to 
be of human fhape, 202; wherein his {chool placed 


INDEX. 357 


happinefs, 238; held that virtue had much to do with 
it, 24.4. 
Epifiles are appendices to hiftory, 114. 
Epitomes, the moths of hiftory, 112. 
Erafmus colloquy of Fuvenis and Echo, 37. 
Effays are ruminated hiftory, 120. 
Ethics, ill-handled as yet, 231 ; how divided, 233. 
Euclid, 46; his propofitions feem ftrange till proven, 48. 
Euthanafia, much defired, 173. 
Evil, knowledge of, neceflary, 249 ; arts, precepts of, 306. 
Exercifes at the Univerfities very defective, 102. 
Experiment and inquiry, not futiciently provided for, 99. 
Experimental philofophy, 152. 
Exftatic vifions, &c., 180. 
Extremes of novelty and antiquity to be avoided, 47. 
Ezekiel on Pharaoh’s arrogance, 282. 


“ Faber quifque fortune fue,” 282, 283. 

Fabius Maximus would have carried on his policy too 
long, 297. 

Fable of Ixion, 19; of the giants, 128; of Jupiter attacked 
by the Gods, 76.; of the bringing up of Achilles, 76. ; 
expounded, 7b. ; of the horfe-leeches, 277; of the frogs, 
304; invented as fubftitutes for hiftorical examples, 
280. 

“¢ Fa&a non verba,” 278. 

Faith, its objeéts, 330. 

Fall of Maz, how it came about, 57, 267; of angels, 267. 

Fallacies, 199, 200. 

Falfity in fubftance a great fault, 38, /9q. 

Fame, why created, according to the table, 128. 

Fantajiical learning, 35. 

Fafcination, 181. 

Fafting, retained under the Gofpel, 164. 

Felicity, what it is is determined by Chriftianity, 238. 

Final caufes, their ftudy mifplaced and mifdirected, 147. 

Fire, how generated in the Weft Indies, 187. 

Flattery, its groffnefs, 32 ; fome inftances of it, 1—5, 93, 
94, 310, 314; mutt be fine, if it is to fucceed, 279. 

Forms, effential, their difcovery the object of metaphyfics, 


143. 
Forms of fubftances are infinite, 144. , 
Formula, or fet paflages, fit for different fubjeéts in rhe- 
toric, 226. 


358 INDEX. 


Fortune, good, hard to be borne wifely, 257; men can 
fafhion it for themfelves, 282 ; may be too much def- 
pifed, 7b.; rules for making one’s, 284, /gq.; lays as 
hard a burden on us as virtue does, 76.; not an end 
worthy of man’s being, zb.; falls into fome men’s laps, 
305. 

Fracaftorius, 159. 

Friends, caution in choofing, 278. 

Frivolous learning, 35. 

Fulfilments of prophecy, gradual, 123. 

Fundamental truths, 322. 


Galen makes too much of final caufes, 147. 

Gallus, 286. 

Games, a part of civil life, 178. 

Geometry, 151. 

Germanicus and Drufus, how commended by Tiberius, 
286. 

Geffures often ftand inftead of {peech, 207. 

Gilbert, on the magnet, 51; revived the views of Keno- 
phanes, 159. 

GOD, His fecret things not to be reached by the fenfes, 10; 
His word and His work both to be ftudied, 11; His 
power and wifdom, 55; His providence not impeached 
by the ftudy of other than final caufes, 149; to be imi- 
tated in His goodnefs and love, 267; His providence 
controls and changes evil counfels, 307; He demands 
one-tenth of our fubftance, and one-feventh of our time, 
308 ; fees all things clearly, 310. 

Godline/s ranks before fortune, 309. 

Gold, the attempt to make it has caufed many inventions, 


45. 

Gonfalvo’s {peech to his foldiers at Naples, 239. 

Good, nature of, 233; difcuffions as to fummum bonum are 
folved by Chriftianity, 2b. ; is either private or relative, 
235; active or paffive, 240; that of the mind and that 
of the body are analogous, 269. 

Goodnature and its contrary, 256. 

Gordianus the younger, 16. 

Government, carried on by acting on men’s affections, 260; 
moves flowly, 270 ; a fecret part of knowledge, 309 ; of 
the Church, 332. 

Grammar, produced by the requirements of fpeech, 209 ; 
endeavours to remedy man’s fecond curfe, 2b, 


INDEX. 359 


Greece and Rome, the two exemplar ftates, 114. 

Gregory, St., his hoftility againft learning, 62 ; his prayers 
for Trajan’s foul, 68. 

Guife, Henry Duke of, his ambition, 78. 


Habituation, difcufled, 261 ; precepts for, 262, /9q. 

Hannibal thought little of Phormio’s views on war, 247. 

Happine/s, its nature, &c., determined by Chriftianity, 2 38 
not to be fo purfued as to deftroy magnanimity, 245. 

Heatheni/m has no fixed belief, 317 ; is, like an idol, foul- 
lefs, 330. 

Heliogabalus, 71. 

Henry VII, reign of, 116. 

Henry VIII, reign of, 116. 

Hephaftion, Alexander’s friend, 77. 

Heraclitus, the profound, his lumen ficcum, &c., 10; his 
cenfure of intellectualifts, 50. 

Hercules defpifed Adonis’ image, 38; his pillars, 94. 

Herefies, 333- 

Herillus, wherein he placed happinefs, 238. 

Hermes Trifmegittus, 5. 

Hermogenes, the rhetorician, 37. 

Herodicus, blamed by Ariftotle, 239. 

Heteroclites, or irregulars of pature, 107. 

Hieroglyphics, 127, 208. 

Hippocrates, 46; treated of prenotion, 162 ; kept notes of 
‘cafes, 171 ; his aphorifm on ferious illnefs, 252. 

Hifforians and poets have beft treated of the affections, 


259. 

Hite. related to memory, 105; divifions of, 106; of 
learning, deficient, 7b.; civil, 112 ; perfect, 113; mo- 
dern, 114, 115; antiquities of, 2d. ; of England, Tudor 
period, 115, 116; ruminated, 120; ecclefiaftical, how 
divided, 122; appendices to, 124; true, as compared 
with feigned (or poetry), 126. 

Holy Spirit, His coming expreffed by the gift of tongues, 
61; fin againft, 331. 

Homer’s Iliad, viii. 19, alluded to, 12; how eftimated by 
Alexander, 74 has given a living to many, 88; his 
fame more lafting than that of conquerors, 90; a kind 
of {cripture to the later Greeks, 129. 

Hope, the portion of all who undertake great things, 78. 

Horfe-leeches, fable of the, 277. 

Horten/ius, the orator, 292. 


360 INDEX. 


Human philofophy, or felf-knowledge, 160; or humanity, 
161; its divifions, 2b. 

Humility, needed, but avoided, in things divine and human, 
190. 


Idolatry, 333. 

“¢ Tdols’’ of the mind, 200; of the tribe, i6.; of the cave, 
202; of the market-place, 203. 

Images (in the Roman Church), how fuppofed to affeét 
worthippers, 181. 

Imagination, how it affe&ts the body, 164; its power be- 
tween man and man, 181; hath two faces towards 
reafon and aétion, 182 ; in religion is above reafon, 183 ; 
affects judgment, 200. 

Immortality, 91 ; that whereunto man’s nature moft afpires, 
89; children are a fort of, 2b. 

Impofture akin to credulity, 42; its profeffors intoxicated 
by it, 87. 

Taprefien a part of the fympathy between body and mind, 
163. 

InduGion, as in ufe, cannot difcover arts, 188; natural 
an{wers better, 189 ; how judgment is applied to it, 196. 

Inquifitivenefs, akin to babbling, 42. 

Infight into men’s charaéters needful to him who would 
make his fortune, 285. 

Infpiration, 321. 

Inftind of animals, 188. 

Invention of arts, 185; of fpeech, 192; placed after judg- 
ment by the {choolmen, 193; art of it expands with it, 
196. 

es honoured by God before the flood, 57; deified 
by the ancients, 187. 

Italian proverb, 289. 

Italians, fafpicious of kind deeds, 287. 

Ixion, fable of, 19; interpreted, 153. 


James, St., quoted, 29r. 

Fames I, his praifes, 1—5, 93, 94, 310, 3143 his fentiment 
as to geftures, 162; his book on a king’s duty, 247; 
on the true law of free monarchies, 248. 

‘Fafon, the Theffalian, 83; his judgment on doing a little 
evil to bring about great good, 251. 

Fefuits, their wifdom in education, 26; have much pro- 
moted learning, 62. 


INDEX. 361 


Feweller’s kill in grinding precious ftones, 245. 

Fob’s queftion to his friends, 12; his learning, 59. 

Fournals in hiftory, 119. 

Fudge, a corrupt better than a facile, 277. 

Fudgment, acts of, 196; defined, 197; methods of, 193; 
affeéted by the imagination, 200. 

Fulian the emperor, interdigted Chriftians from learning, 
61; his book entitled Czfares, 71. 

Fupiter, planet of civil fociety and aétion, 53; his chain, 


135. 
Fuftinian, ultimus Romanorum, 114. 


Kalendar. (See Calendar.) 

Kindne/s, fometimes affumed to lull fufpicion and create 
idlenefs, 287. 

Kings, to be regarded reverently, 31; if learned, are beft, 
66; their duty, according to James I, 248. 

Knowledge, only remembrance, according to Plato, 2; St. 
Paul warns againft mifufe of, 6; bounds and limita- 
tions of it, 10; does not lead, if found, to atheifm, 11, 
12; its ftrength in its connections, 40; hindrances to 
its growth, 47—54; miftakes as to the ends of, 52; its 
true end, 53; fhould produce fruit, 54; ‘alittle know- 
ledge is a dangerous thing,” whence this faying comes 
to be attributed to Bacon, 84; it never palls, 89; feems 
immortal, even to atheifts, 90; is as a pyramid, 145; 
has three ftages, 146; of ourfelves, 160; is continuous 
and entire, ib.; is pabulum animi, but till diftafteful to 
the carnal mind, 184; rational, 185; arts for attaining 
thereto are four, 185, /9q. 


Lalius ufed to advife the Romans as to their affairs, 274. 

Languages, their ftudy revived at the Reformation, 35, 36; 
are vehicula fcientia, 61. 

Laws of England, 312; their fubje& hitherto handled only 
by philofophers or lawyers, not by ftatefmen, 311 ; how 
to be treated, 312; of nature, moral and pofitive, 331. 

Lawyers write of law as it is, not as it fhould be, 311. 

Learned men, their manners not neceffarily rude, 26, 27 ; 
apt to fix too high a ftandard, 27; their follies, 34, /gq.;. 
to be cherifhed in a ftate, 95. 

Learning, flourifhes beft in company with arms, 15; of ufe 
to ftatefmen, 7b. ; does not caufe floth, 19; nor leffen 
refpect for law, 21; not really difcredited by learned 


362 INDEX. 


clowns, 7b. ; teaches men their fmallnefs, 29; its peccant 
humours, 47—54; purfued for mean ends, 52; is ac- 
quired knowledge, 55; its dignity, 55, /gg. ; cherifhed 
by the Church, 61; helps faith, 63; feats of, are faulty 
in feveral refpects, 97, /gq.; diftribution of, 105; three 
periods of, Greek, Roman, and Xvi—xvil century, 
313; divine, 315. 

Leéures, but ill provided for in places of learning, 98. 

Legends, too readily believed in the Church, 43. 

Leprofy, the law refpeéting, applied to morals, 58. 

Letters, like fhips, carry wealth from age to age, 90; moft 
ufeful to teach wifdom of bufinefs, 281. 

Levant, the, 31. 

Lex Papia, 48. 

Libraries are fhrines of true faints, 96. 

Life, how likely to be prolonged, 154. 

Light, firtt created, 56; of nature, an infufficient guide, 315, 
316; ufed in two fenfes, 317. 

Liturgy or fervice, a part of divinity, 332. 

Livy, beft of hiftorians, 22 ; makes but little of Alexander, 
48; his dictum on behaviour, 271 ; judgment on Cato 
the cenfor, 282, 297. 

Lodefione, why does it attract iron? 235; has only a limited 
power, 7d. 

Logic (and Rhetoric) too early ftudied at the Univerfities, 
101; difcuffes things in notion, but confufedly, 131; 
does not profefs to invent fciences, 186; the fyllogifm, 
what, 190; compared with Rhetoric, 223. 

Longanimity, 255. 

Love, the very bond of all virtues, 266, 267. 

Lucian, on the Stoic and the lap-dog, 32 ; his objection to 
the gods, who begat no children in his day, 48. 

Lucretius (quoted), 89. 

Lully, Raymond, his falfe method, 220. 

Luther awakened all antiquity to help him, 35. 

Lyfander on the art of deceit, 306. 


Machiavelli on the poverty of the friars, 23; interprets the 
fable of Achilles and Chiron, 128; on the means of 
preferving governments, 132; writes what is valuable 
as a warning, 249; on queftions of policy fhuts his eyes 
to moral good and evil, 264; his form and fubje& of 
writing the beft for civil prudence, 280; his note on 
the policy of Fabius Maximus, 297; on money as the 


INDEX. 363 


** finews of war,” 302 ; his precept as to the difadvan- 
tage of virtue, &c., 306. 

Magic, Natural, 181; related to imagination rather than 
reafon, 44; has a noble aim, 45; Perfian, what it was, 
132; its true fenfe, 138; prefent degradation, 152. 

Magnanimity, 255. 

Mahomet’s law regarded diet, &c., 163; interdiéts all ar- 
gument and ufe of reafon, 317, 318. 

Man, a microcofm, 135, 166. 

Manichean here/y, 163. 

Manners (mores) in divinity, 331. 

Mariner’s compafs, 155, 186. 

Mafter of the fentences, 323. 

Mathematique, 149; divided into pure and mixed, 150; 
handmaid to many {ciences, 15; pure, valuable for 
mental training, to fix attention, 228. 

Medicine, fcience of, apt to be too empirical, 161; dif- 
cuffed, 166; its uncertainty gives room for impofture, 
167; is judged by its refults, 26. ; analogous to morality 
in order of its inveftigations, 258. 

Memorials, or hiftory unfinifhed, 111, 112. 

Memory, art of, 205. 

Menander on love, 266. 

Menenius Agrippa, fable of, 98. 

Mental philofophy, how divided, 178. 

Metaphyfique, uied in fomewhat a different fenfe from its 
ordinary acceptation, 138; how limited, 140, 141; 
diftinguifhed from phyfics, 141; its functions, 143 ; 
abridges the multitude of particulars, 145 ; enfranchifes 
man’s powers, 146. 

Metellus, how addrefled by Czfar, 81. 

Method, a hindrance to learning, 49. 

Method of tradition of arts, 212 ; its place in logic, 2b.; of 
probation, 213; magiftral, ib. ; enigmatical, 214 com- 
pared with aphorifms, ib., 215; varies according to 
different fubjects, 216; ufeful in limiting propofitions, 
218; a falfe kind of, 220. 

Microcofm, man faid to be a, 135, 166. 

Midas judgment, gt. 

Mind, its nature, 178 ; funétions, 182; is naturally full of 
fuperftition and impofture, 200; Georgics of the, 233. 

Mirabilaries, 108. 

Miracles, not confidered among marvels, 109 ; not wrought 
for atheifts, but for the idolatrous and fuperttitious, 134. 


364 INDEX. 


Mifitheus, a pedant, ruled wifely, 16. 

Mithridatum, 174. 

Mixed mathematics will extend as knowledge does, 151. 

Modern Hiftory, 114; times are truly the moft ancient, 47. 

Momus, wanted a window to look into men’s hearts, 285. 

Monaftic life, not good unlefs joined with action, 237. 

Money, not merely of gold and filver, 209 ; not the ‘ finews 
of war,” 3023 its value for advancement, 7d. 

Monodica, many things in nature are fuch, 201. 

Monjfirofities, or marvels in nature, not fufficiently noted, 


107. 

Moral Philofophy, 251, fqq.; a wife handmaid to divinity, 
252; muit confider what is poffible, 253; charaéters 
mutt be ftudied by it, 254; fhould take note of age, 
fex, CSC.5 2503.257- 

Mojfes, a learned man, 58; on the mount, 237; a pattern 
for controverfialifts, 321; his law regulated queftions 
of diet, &c., 163. 

Mo/s, between putrefaction and a herb, 60. 

Mountebanks, often preferred to phyficians, 168. 

Mujfic, 24.5; cadences in, 133. 

Mujfician, the, who held the foul to be a harmony, 51. 

Mutianus, overreached Antonius, 287; his character in 
Tacitus, 294. 

Mpyfteries, enveloped in * poefy parabolical,” 127. 


Naples, Gonfalvo at, 239. 

Narrations of particular a€tions (monographs), 118. 

Narrowne/s of mind a hindrance to learning, 50. 

Natural Hiftory, 107; philofophy is of the mine and fur- 
nace, 137; how fubdivided, 138; magic, 26.; pru- 
dence, what, 151, 152. 

Nature, book of God’s works, 12, 63; helps us to under- 
ftand the Scriptures, 7b.; how divided, 142; her fum- 
mary law, 145; refufes to be enchained by fyllogifm, 
190; light of, infufficient, 315, 316; ufed in two fenfes, 
317. 

Negociation, part of civil prudence, 273. 

Nero, in his minority governed by Seneca, 16, 28. 

Nerva, a good and learned prince, 67. 

Nicodemus, his error, 319. 

Novelty, to be avoided in extremes, 47; not to be diftrufted, 
ib. 

Nuncio, the advice of a papal, 289. 


INDEX. 365 


Olympian games, 177 ; vilited, according to Pythagoras, 
for many purpoles, 237. 

Orations, appendices to hiftory, 124. 

Orators, compared with fophifts, 199 ; ftir the paffions of 
republics, as the wind the fea, 258. 

Organs of fenfe and reflection akin, 133; of the body, are 
they feats of correfponding mental faculties? 165. 

Orpheus’ theatre, 65. 

Ortelius of Antwerp, 219. 

Oforius, his “‘ watery vein,” 37. 

Oftenfive reduction, 197. 

Offentation, a fault of manners, not of policy, 294. 

Ottomans, the Sultan of the, flays his brethren at his accef- 
flon, 157. 


Papia Lex, 48. 

Paracelfus’ philofophy reduced by Severinus, 159; held 
that man is a microcofm, 166 ; exalted the imagination, 
181; views of his fchool on theology, 326. 

Paris, judgment of, gt. 

Parmenides, 157 ; his {peculation as to the ultimate unity 
of all things, 146. 

Parmenio’s advice to Alexander, 77, 78. 

Particulars, purfuit of, a hindrance to learning, 49. 

Paul, St., a learned man, 61; wifhed himfelf anathema 
for his brethren, fo placing focial above perfonal good, 
236; judgment on the Cretans, 257; his wifdom, 
320. 

*¢ Pedantes,” fuccefsful as governors, 16 ; ftyled the “ apes 
of tyranny,” 26. 

Pedantical knowledge, or how knowledge may be handed 
down to youth, 227, 228. 

Percennius and Vibulenus, 229. 

Periander’s advice as to the preferving a tyranny, 208. 

Perfian magic, 133. 

Phalynus, brought Artaxerxes’ meflage to the Greeks, 82. 

Pharaoh’s arrogance, 282. 

Philip of Macedon, how an{wered by a mufician, 69. 

Philo-Fudzus, on knowledge, 11. 

Philocrates, 268. 

Philopeemen, 114. 

Philofopher, the, who carried the lap-dog, 32. 

Philofophers too cautionary in their precepts, 2445 not wife 
writers on laws, being too vifionary, 311. 


366 INDEX. 


Philofophia prima, 49, 130; its character not fatisfactory, 
131; defined, 132. 

Philofophy, mental, tends towards degeneracy, 46; related 
to reafon, 106 ; threefold—divine, natural, and human, 
130; divine, 134; ancient, to be inveftigated, 158 ; 
not to be treated asa profeffion, 239 ; moral, 251, /9q. ; 
what part is in our power, 253. 

Phocion’s obltinacy, 19. 

Phormio’s theory of wars, 247. 

Phyficians, it wife, will confider the effeét of mind on body, 
164; apt to undertake other arts befides medicine, 168 ; 
muit not defpair of cure, 173; muft endeavour to leffen 
pain, 2b. 

Phyfics, diftinguifhed from metaphyfics, 141 ; their funétions 
difcuffed, 26. ; limited to the material with which they 
have to do, 146. 

Phyfiognomy, the only found part of prediéfion, 162. 

Pindar on fudden fortune, 257. 

Pius Quintus, 17. 

Places of learning to be helped by the ftate, 95. 

Plato, 46, 58; his doétrine of remembrance, 2 ; would not 
bear office, 27; on Socrates, 31; adorned philofophy 
with his eloquence, 38; mixed philofophy with theo- 
logy, 50, 148; held that kings fhould be philofophers, 
or philofophers kings, 66; derides men’s contempt for 
common things, 109 ; held that forms are the true ob- 
jects of knowledge, 143; his fpeculation as to the ulti- 
mate unity of all things, 146 ; makes too much of final 
caufes, 147; on the feats of the different faculties in 
the body, 165; commends middle propofitions in fei- 
ences, as fruitful, 186; his induction vicious, 188, 189; 
faw the advantage of well-direéted enquiry, 195; why 
he introduced Socrates and the fophifts, 198 ; his fup- 
pofition of the cave, 202; defpifed rhetoric, 222 ; his 
faying as to the beauty of virtue, 75, 

Platonif?s mix philofophy with mathematics, 50. 

Plautus, marvels at beneficence in old age, 257; (quoted), 
282. 

Pleafure, how related to happinefs according to the ancients, 
238. 

Pliny, too credulous, 43 ; faved the Chriftians from perfe- 
cution, 69; his panegyric, 266. 

Plutarch, adorned philofophy with his eloquence, 38; has 


INDEX. 367 


fagotted together the ancient philofophies unfatisfac- 
torily, 159. 

Poefy related to imagination, 105, 183; is feigned hiftory, 
125; compared with hiftory, 126; its effets even on 
barbarians, 2b.; its divifions, 127; fables of, have they 
an inward meaning? 129; regarded as to its form, 
210; called winum demonum by one of the fathers, 263. 

Poets and hiftorians have beft handled the affections, 259. 

Politicians, why they object to learning, 13; the corrupt 
fort of them feek only their own gain, 29. 

Pompey, his faying when charged with the relief of Rome 
from famine, 236 ; wifely burned Sertorius’ papers, 275 ; 
the only great captain when Czefar began his career of 
war, 292; erred in following Sylla’s example too far, 
293; damaged himfelf by clofenefs, 300. 

Pofitive precepts of law and theology, 319. 

Poverty, its praifes fit fubject for friars, 23; honoured in 
the beft days of Rome, 24; “ paupertas virtutis for- 
tuna,”’ 2b. 

Power, varies according to the degree and pofition of the 
governed, 86. 

Preaching, fottered by the Reformation, 36. 

Predicaments (or categories), their ufe, 200. 

Prediéiion and prenotion, arts referring to the conneétion 
between body and mind, 162. 

Prenotion, foundation to the art of memory, 206. 

Preparation, as an inftrument for invention, 193. 

Priefthood, of {ome weight in empire, 88. 

Princes, beft feen into by watching their natures, 289. 

Proclus and the Platonifts, 50. 

Prometheus, his inventions, 187. 

Promus and condus in Roman houfekeeping, 240. 

Prophecy, is divine hiftory, 106, 122. 

Proteus, 111. 

Proverb (Spanifh), 288; (Italian), 289. 

Providence, hiftory of, 123. 

Proxenus, Xenophon’s friend, 82. 

Pygmalion’s frenzy, 37. 

Pythagoras bafed his philofophy on numbers, 150; his 
praife of a contemplative life, 237. 

Pythagorean fuperftitions as to diet, &c., 163. 


Quantity, the fubje& of mathematics, 150; the moft abftraét 
of all forms, 7d. 


368 INDEX. 


Quicknefs of difpatch moft ufeful for rifing in the world, 275. 
Quirites, 80. 


Rabbins, their labours in the law, 58 ; their interpretations 
to be reftrained, 327. 

“* Ragioni di fiato,” 17. 

Ramus did well in reviving the rules of propofitions, 218. 

Raven, the, his inftinét, 188. 

Raymond, Lully, his falfe method, 220. 

Readerfhips in {ciences, fhould be fo well endowed as to 
get the beft men, 98. 

Reajon, fubordinate to divine truth, 135; its exceflive ap- 
plication in “ divine philofophy ” likely to beget error, 
136; but not to be neglected therein, 317 ; Chriftianity 
holds the mean as to it, ib.; ufe of it of two kinds, 
318; not yet enough enquired into, 319. 

Reduétion in logic, of two kinds, oftenfive and ad abfurdum, 
197. 

Reformation, the, awakened learning, and a claffical ftyle, 
35, 62. 

Regifters, 112. 

Religion, deals with the imprefflions of body on mind, 163. 

Remedies, much confufed, 174. 

Republics (like the fea), ftirred by any wind, 258. 

Revelation, 315, 316. 

Reverence, a hindrance to learning, 50. 

Rewards, a chief help to learning, 94. 

Rhetoric (and Logic) too early ftudied at the Univerfities, 101; 
feparated from philofophy by Socrates, 160; engaged 
on imaginative reafon, 1843 requires ftore of places (or 
topics), 194.; difcuffed at length, 220; defined, 221 ; 
defpifed by Plato, 2b. ; helps to keep the paffions in or- 
der, 223; compared with logic, zb.; Ariftotle’s treatife 
thereon difcufles the affections, 259. 

Rhetorical furprifes, akin to mufical, 133. 

Romans, the, were profeflors of a wifdom of bufinefs, 274 ; 
their wifeft men ufed to walk in the forum giving ad- 
vice to their fellow-citizens, 2b. 

Rome and Greece, the two exemplar ftates, 114; under the 
fix kings fhe prepared for her greatnefs, 229. 

Romulus, 114. 


Salluj?, on royal fancies, 257; cenfures Pompey’s referved 
and dark ways, 300. 


INDEX. 369 


Samuel, 189. 

Saracens, foes to learning, 62. 

Sarah, an image of natural reafon, 315. 

Saturn, planet of reft, 53. 

Saviour, our, the great phyfician, 170; commends rhe- 
torical preparation, 193. 

Sayings, or brief {peeches, appendices to hiftory, 124. 

Scale or ladder of knowledge, 138. 

Sceptic philofophers had good grounds for becoming fuch, 


I9I. 

Schoolmafters held in too little honour, 25. 

Schoolmen, the rudenefs of their ftyle, 36 ; held in contempt 
as barbarous, 37; their degenerate or “‘ vermiculate” 
learning, 39 ; their ufelefs {ubtilty in matter and man- 
ner, 40; drew from their own minds, not from nature, 
42; their voluminous writings, 323. 

Scornful, the, will not receive correction, 279. 

Scotland, hiftory of, ill handled, 115. 

Scriptures, the, a well of life, 322 ; how interpreted, 323; 
plentifully expounded in England, 329. 

Sculptor, the, compared with Nature, 265. 

Scylla, a type of fcholaftic learning, 41. 

Self-advancement, rules for, 284, /qq. 

Seneca governed wifely during Nero’s minority, 16, 28 ; 
on weaknefs of character, 20 ; adorned philofophy with 
eloquence, 38; his fubtilty of mind, 40; compares fal- 
lacies to juggling tricks, 198 ; condemns eloquence for 
difplay, 232; feigned too high an elevation for man’s 
nature, 234; complains that men care little for reforma- 
tion of manners, 252. 

Seraphim, angels of love, the higheft order, 56. 

Sermons, in King James I.’s time, excellent, 329. 

Serpent, his nature, 250. 

Sertorius’ papers burnt by Pompey, 275. 

Seven Sages, their fayings akin to poefy parabolical, 127. 

Severinus the Dane, 159. 

Severus (Septimius) hoped to employ well his ill-gotten 
fortune, 308. 

Sextus Quintus, 17. 

Sibyl, the, felling her books to Tarquin, 298. 

Sin, its divifions, 331. 

Sifyphus, his offence of futility, 310. 

Sleep, the gates of, 268. 

Sloth, its drawbacks, 276. 

BB 


370 INDEX. 


Small things beft difcover great, 110. 

Socrates, accufed of corrupting youth, 14; reaction in his 
favour when dead, 22 ; his uglinefs and goodnefs, 31 ; 
his irony, 52, 191 ; called philofophy down from heaven, 
543 his reply to Hippias, 110; charged with feparating 
philofophy and rhetoric, 160; his method of refutation, 
198; wherein he placed true felicity, 238 ; difputes with 
a fophift, 244; quoted, 231, 249, 272, 320. 

Solomon, his learning, 60; his aphorifms on civil wifdom, 
2745 /97- 

Solon’s Laws, their wifdom, 27; his juft judgment as to 
Croefus’ wealth, 302. 

Sophifm, the greateft, is equivocation, 199. 

Sophifis compared with orators, 199. 

Soul, nature of the, 178; not a proper fubjeét for invefti- 
gation, 179. = 

Spani/h proverb, 288. 

Speech, an organ of tradition, 207. 

Spirits in divers ranks, 563 evil, not to be dealt with, though 
their power may be enquired into, 136. 

Standing-point for argument, men defire a, 197. 

Statefmen, learned and experienced, compared, 66. 

Stoics, their dogmas fitted to the fables of the poets by 
Chryfippus, 129; their difpute with the Epicureans as 
to felicity fettled by Chriftianity, 238; feem to have 
difcuffed the affections well, 259. 

Sturmius ftudied Cicero and Hermogenes, 37. 

Suetonius not fo credible as Tacitus, 159. 

Suffering, when wife, overcomes difficulties, 254. 

Suggeftion, an inftrument of invention, 194. 

Summaries of theology are bad, 323. 

Summary \aw of Nature, 145. 

“© Summum bonum,” the, not to be difcuffed by us, 234. 

Superfiitious narrations not always defpicable, 108; divi- 
nation, 179. 

Sun, the, is never defiled, fee what he may, 109. 

Sylla, 180, 276; how judged by Cefar, 82; never con- 
demned fq many to die as phyficians do in their igno- 
rance, 173; a troubler of the world, 242; modeft 
towards Fortune, ftyling himfelf Felix, not Maguus, 
2833 his aflumed franknefs, 299. 

Syllogifm, cannot invent arts, 190; Nature refufes to be en- 
chained by it, 26°; ufe of judgment in, 196; in civil 
life the “‘ minor premifes” the more important, 285. 


INDEX. 371 
Sympathies between body and mind difcufled, 161, /7q. 


Tacitus, 166, 229; on the eloquence of Auguftus, 3; his 
judgment on Nerva, 67; his annals, 119; his note on 
the retention of ancient terms and titles, 140; far more 
truftworthy than Suetonius, from the form of his nar- 
rative, 159; on fudden profperity, 257; obfervation on 
Tiberius and Agrippina, 288; on Tiberius’ referved 
manners, 292; his judgment on Mutianus, 294; on 
Pompey’s dark dealing, 300; on Livia, 301. 

Talk, the common, is fometimes wifer than books, 253. 

Tantalus, 310. 

Tarquin buys the Sibyl’s books, 298. 

Telefius, 159. 

Tennis gives quick eye and body, 151. 

Thales, 110. 

Themiffocles, his faying as to mufic and government, 31. 

Theology, how divifible, 106 ; difcuffed briefly, 315. 

Thefeus, 114. 

Thirty Tyrants, the, 22. 

Thucydides on Cleon’s hatred of eloquence, 222. 

Tiberius concealed his power at firft, 191; jealous of his 
heir, 276; clofeft of men, 286, 292; his manner of 
fpeech, 26.; quarrels with Agrippina, 288. 

Tigellinus intrigues againft Turpilianus, 290. 

Time, the author of authors, 46 ; devours his children, 47 ; 
as a river, finks things weighty, and carries down what 
is light and worthlets, 49. 

Timotheus, the Athenian, too arrogant towards fortune, 
282. 

Topics, not deficiently handled, 195; of two forts, 2b. ; the 
‘particular’? ones commended, 196; combine logic 
with fubjeét-matter, 2. 

Tradition of knowledge, faulty, and a hindrance to learn- 
ing, 51; art of, 206. 

Trajan, though not learned, a patron of learning, 68; 
nicknamed ‘‘ wall-flower” by Conftantine, 75; how 
praifed by Pliny, 266. 

Travels, much multiplied of late, 121. 

Treacle, 174. 

Tribonian, 323. 

Trifagion of knowledge, 146. 

Triumvirs, the, fold their friends to one another, 306. 

Trufé and diftruft flowly, if you will make your fortune, 
286. 


272 INDEX. 


Truth of being and of knowing are one, 42; demands 
much feverity of inveftigation, 157, 158. 

Tudor period of hiftory, 115, 116. 

Tumblers and ropedancers can do with the body what 
“* memoria technica” enables men to do with their 
minds, 206. 

Turpilianus deftroyed through Tigellinus’ intrigues, 290. 


Ulyffes’ judgment, 92. 

Union of England and Scotland, 117. 

Univerfal propofitions in f{ciences, 219. 

Univer/fities to be cherifhed, 95 ; teach logic and rhetoric 
to minds not ftored with {ubjeét-matter (knowledge), 
101; their exercifes faulty, 102 ; do not keep up fufh- 
cient intercourfe with one another, 76. 

Untruth in learning, 42. 

Urbanity fometimes too much confidered, 272. 


Valentine, Duke (Czefar Borgia), his charagter, 292. 

Valour, falfe, lies in the eyes of its beholders, 19. 

Varro, belt of antiquaries, 22. 

Velleius, the epicurean, his impatience of doubt, 52 ; his 
queftion as to the ordering of ftars by God, inconfiftent 
with his principles, 202. 

Verus, ZElius (fc. Ceionius Commodus), patron of Martial, 
71; L. Commodus ({c. Aurelius), a learned prince, 76. 

Vibulenus, 229. 

Virgil prejudiced againft learning, 13; beft of poets, 22 ; 
quoted, 85; lines on Auguftus, 87; got great glory by 
finging of humble matters, 233. 

Virtue, not to be undervalued, 295 ; is rewarded, 307. 

Vifions, prophetic, 180. 

Vifitors of colleges, &c., negle&tful, 100. 

Vitality, how likely to be increafed, 154. 

Voluptuary arts flourith moft in a decaying ftate, 178. 

Vulcan, god of alchemifts, 99, 137. 


Whitenefs, the caufes of, 144. 

Wifdom, an attribute of God, 55; three kinds of, in civil 
life, 271, 2733 true, compared with verbal, 279; of 
prudence, beft drawn from hiftory, 280; helps much 
towards felf-advancement, 282. 

Witchcraft, the height of idolatry, 333. 

Women judge by fortune rather than excellence, 278. 


i] 


INDEX. 373 


Wonder, feed of knowledge, is broken knowledge, 7. 

Word of God, the, 315. 

Words, images of matter, 37; tokens of current notions of 
things, 190, 209 ; apt to impofe on us, 203; of others, 
not to be unnoted, if you will build your fortune, 288. 

World, the, wrongly judged to be an image of God, 135. 

Writing, art of, 204. 


Xenophon, a general and fcholar, 15, 82; adorned philo- 


fophy with eloquence, 38 ; on the good effeéts of love, 
267. 


Young men not fit auditors of queftions of morals or policy, 
till their good habits are formed, 263. 


Zeno, 237. 


CHISWICK PRESS :—PRINTED BY WHITTINGHAM AND WILKINS, 
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON. 


Che Librarp of English THorthies. 


A Series of reprints of the best Authors carefully edited and col- 
lated with the Early Copies, and handsomely printed 
by Whittingham in Octavo. 


OWER’S Confessio Amantis, with Life by Dr. Pauli, 
. and a Glossary. 3vols. 2/. 2s. Antique calf, 3/.6s. Only a 
limited number of Copies printed. 
= This important work is so scarce that it can seldom be met 
with even in large libraries. It is wanting in nearly every collection of 
English Poetry. 

Bishop Butler’s Analogy of Religion; with Analytical Index, by 
the Rey. Edward Steere, LL.D. 12s. Antique calf, 1/. 1s. 

“ The present edition has been furnished with an Index of the Texts of 
Seripture quoted, and an Index of Words and Things considerably fuller 
than any hitherto published. These and the carefulness of the typo- 
graphy are small things in themselves perhaps, but he who values Butler 


at his true worth, will value any assistance in reading and referring to 
him.”—£iitor’s Preface. 


Bishop Jeremy Taylor’s Rule and Exercises of Holy Living and 
Dying. 2vols. 1l/.1s. Antique calf, or morocco, 2/. 2s. 

Herbert’s Poems and Remains; with 8. T. Coleridge’s Notes, 
and Life by Izaak Walton. Revised, with additional Notes, by Mr. J. 
Yeowell. 2vols. 1/. 1s. Antique calf, or morocco, 2/. 2s. 

Spenser’s Complete Works; with Life, Notes, and Glossary, by 
John Payne Collier, Esq., F.S.A. (Shortly. 


Uniform with the above. 


The Physical Theory of Another Life. By Isaac Taylor, Esq., 
Author of “ Logic in Theology,” “« Ultimate Civilization, &c.” New 
Edition. 10s. 6d. Antique calf, 21s. 


The Aldine Edition of the British Boets. 


KENSIDE’S Poetical Works, with Memoir by the Rev. 
A. Dyce, and additional Letters, carefully revised. 5s. Mo- 
rocco, or antique calf, 10s. 6d. 


Collins’s Poems, with Memoir and Notes by W. Moy 
Thomas, Esq. 3s. 6d. Morocco, or antique calf, 8s. 6d. 


Gray’s Poetical Works, with Notes and Memoir by the Rey. 
John Mitford. 5s. Morocco, or antique calf, 10s. 6d. 
Shakespeare’s Poems, with Memoir by the Rev. A. Dyce. 5s. 
Morocco, or antique calf, 10s. 6d. 
om. Poems, with Memoir by the Rev. John Mitford, and 
additional Poems. 2 vols. 10s. Morocco, or antique calf, 1/. 1s. 
Kirke White’s Poems, with Memoir by Sir H. Nicolas, and addi- 
tional notes. Carefully revised. 5s. Morocco, or antique calf, 10s. 6d. 
The general principle of Editing which has been adopted is to 
give the entire Poems of each author in strict conformity with the Edition 
which received his final revision, to prefix a Memoir, and to add such 
notes as may be necessary to elucidate the sense of obsolete words or ex- 
plain obscure allusions. Each author will be placed in the hands of 
a competent editor specially acquainted with the literature and 
bibliography of the period, 


New and Standard Publications. 


Uniform with the Aldine Edition of the Poets. 


oR. S. W. Singer’s New Edition of Shakespeare’s Dra- 

matic Works. The Text carefully revised, with Notes. The 

Life of the Poet and a Critical Essay on each Play by W. W. 

Lloyd, Esq., M.R.8.L. In 10 vols., price 6s. each. Calf, 5/. 5s. 

Morocco, 61. 6s. 

Large Paper Edition, crown 8vo., 41. 10s. Calf, 67. 16s. 6d. Morocco, 8/. 8s. 
“Mr. Singer has produced a text, the accuracy of which cannot be sur- 


passed in the present state of antiquarian and philological knowledge.” — 
Daily News. 


The Works of Gray, edited by the Rev. John Mitford. With 
his Correspondence with Mr. Chute and others, Journal kept at Rome, 
Criticism on the Sculptures, &e. New Edition. 5vols. ld. ds. 


The Temple and other Poems. By George Herbert, with Cole- 


ridge’s Notes. New Edition. 5s. Antique calf, or moroceo, 10s. 6d. 


Vaughan’s Sacred Poems and Pious Ejaculations, with Memoir 
by the Rey. H. F. Lyte. New Edition. 5s. Antique calf, or morocco, 
10s. 6d. Large Paper, 7s. 6d. Antique calf,14s. Antique morocco, 15s. 

“ Preserving all the piety of George Herbert, they have less of his 
quaint and fantastic turns, with a much larger infusion of poetic feeling 
and expression.” —Lyte. 


Bishop Jeremy Taylor’s Rule and Exercises of Holy Living and 
Holy Dying. 2s. 6d. each. Flexible morocco, 6s. 6d. each. Antique calf, 
qs. 6d.each. Alsoin one volume, 5s. Antique calf, or morocco, 10s. 6d. 


Bishop Butler’s Analogy of Religion; with Analytical Introduc- 
tion and copious Index, by the Rev. Dr. Steere. 6s. Antique calf, lls. 6d. 


Bacon’s Essays; or, Counsels Civil and Moral, with the Wisdom 
of the Ancients. With References and Notes by 8. W. Singer, F.S.A. 5s. 
Morocco, or antique calf, 10s. 6d. 


Bacon’s Novum Organum. Newly translated, with short Notes, 
by the Rey. Andrew Johnson, M.A. 6s, Antique calf, 11s. 6d. 


Locke on the Conduct of the Human Understanding ; edited by 
Bolton Corney, Esq., M. R.S. L. 3s. 6d. Antique calf, 8s. 6d. 
** T cannot think any parent or instructor justified in neglecting to put 
this little treatise into the hands of a boy about the time when the reason- 
ing faculties become developed.” —Hallam. 


Ultimate Civilization. By Isaac Taylor, Esq. 6s. 
Logic in Theology, and other Essays. By Isaac Taylor, Esq. 6s. 
The Physical Theory of Another Life. By Isaac Taylor, Esq., 


Author of the “ Natural History of Enthusiasm,” “‘ Restoration of Belief,” 
&e. New Edition. 6s. Antique calf, 11s. 6d. 


BELL & DALDY, 186, FLEET STREET. 


Pl 


—— —~— sa | = 


1