On war

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ON WAR

ON WAR

MILITARY BOOKS

Hllltary Law: Its Procedure and

PrunLfia. By Lteut-CoLonal 5. C- Piatt-
SevuilHiiEb iBvii«! «UllliD •nUralr eohI tod
bnU^t up-lQ<iUEa, SouU ClVWD Bvo, pn«
4», 6d, lULUlaiy Uudbmb-I

The Campaign of Stmuagv de Cuba-

Hj HniniK, 5A»rirT. CipUio 5«aDdC«irklrr,
UalledSlai« VolimlHTlDfasK]', durlDfl Spanlu-
AnmLcBn Wai j Ucu ECDajjE-Colcjne] TvOLly-NlnUl
Unllflii Stale« VdIlldEoO' lallati?, DpaftdOU tQ Uia
PtiUlppiac^ cEc. Antbor D]"NjpalaiHi Bqdi-
putH ■ Flm Cufnpalia " uid " TbeCucpalfD ol
HvengD." LiriflcnHTD Avd, irjlb Hapt» UJ lhl«C
vüIuhma, price an. dbE-

Wbat to Know for the " C " Examlna-

Uon, By CipUiD J- C- Hahduiq NrwHAn.
Fcapr Svo, ILIuBtr«Ud, pijcc jt. bdr uel.

The Battle of Weatport By Paul B.

JtfKin- Cnwp &V9^ dbOi, pri« 71. 6d. Del.

KEGAN FAU'-, TRENCH, TRÖEHBR « CO. Ltd
DnroEH Hdqib, CnutiD Snur, W

O N W A R

By
Gen. carl VON CLAUSE WITZ

TRANSLATED BY

COLONEL J. J, GRAHAM
ysw ANn RsviasD edittos'

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY

COLONEL F. N. MAUDE, CB. (late R.E.)

m THREE VOLUMES
VOL. III.

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRÜBNER h CO, Ltd,

DRYDEN HOUSE, GERRARD. STREET

1 90S

CONTENTS

SKETCHES FOR BOOK VJL

THH ATTACK

1. The Attack in Relatjoh to the Defbuce t

T, Nature of the Stvateoecal Attack , . . 3

III. Of the Objecta op Stkategic^l Attack 6

IV, Dbcaeasikg Force op the Attack . . , , j

V. CULHINATJHO POlHT OF THE ATTACK . 8
V]. Dbbtiuctiom of the Ehbuv'b ARMIBB .,.10

Vfl, The Offeksivk Batti^e ii

VIII. PAasAOB or RivBM ij

I3L Attack of Defensive Pobitiome ... 17

X. Attack op ab EirritBHcnip Cauf . . 18

XI. Attack of a HouzfTAiN Range ..... 30

XIL Attack of Cordon Lines 34

XIIL Mansuvbibo as

XIV. Attack op Morassb», Inuh&atiob», Woods - iq
XV> Attack of a Theatre of Wab with the Vie« to

A Decision - < 3'

XVI, Attack of a Theatke op War without THB View

to a great Dbcixot« . i < . . , jO

XVII, Attack of Fobtrbbbes .40

XVIII« Attack op Cohvots ....... 46

XIX- Attack on the Enbhv's Aiiut in its Canton hehtb 50

XX> DlVEBSlON , . s

XXI, Invasion .... , - .

Z

SKETCHES FOR BOOK VIIL
PLAN OF WAR

I, iNTRODUCnOH 76

It, Abbolutk AMP Rbai. Wab .... -79

vi CONTENTS

■■dr. rMB

III. ^.--iHTErfOEfEKÜENCt OF THB FaKIS IM WaR - ■ S3

i?, — Op jhe Macäitubs 0]» iME Object or riin Wai,

AHD TBH EFFonT3 To DK MaDE . - ■ S7

THHUW Ol' rUL Ent.VV ...... ID^

V- Esoa rfc W^b Muhe PK£crsE:LV DepinCD (fiontinti^)

— LlHITEU ÜJJ}£i:T . . ' . . tl4

VI. d.— IWPLUEHce OF THK PoUTICAL ÜÜJtCI CM THh

MlUTAJtY OBJKT ilÄ

£.— Wa» A& ah ttfETJIVMeKT Or PüUCV . ,131

VII. LiuTTED OnjECT— Offehsive War . . . 13t

VIIL LtutrtD QjijecT— DfiTBNCE. 134

IX. Pi.AM op War whev tifE De^thuctiok or nu»

EsttaV 14 TWB OnjBCT MD

APPENDIX

bUMMARY OF THK INEmtUCTlON GIVEN DV THB AUTHOR

TO aiS KOVU- HJGIIMESS THE CBOWN PRINCE

IN Tat; YEARS [Bio, tHu. a^o iSii

SCkfSVE WHICH WAS LAEO ßEPOfl£ GSHVirAI- VOH GaUDV • tJtS

Tun BJOti luJ-DurANT Piuncii-Lxs or the Akt op W*b to

COMrLETC MV CotrifBE OF I W BTK trCTIOH OF Hl»

t(i^V4L Hl&HHJlSs THE CkOVVM PkIH^K . , . tB^

t. Cl^EhAL PKJHi^lCLEä TO L>E OsSEItVCD JN WaR . . iBl

U. Tactics ob tue Teieokv of Comuat - > ■ > 184
1- Geuetnl Prlndples :

X. Fof Ihe Defeitce I85

ß. For Ihp Attack - , > Ifl»

4. Pnucipl» lor Ibc U&s 'jrifogpi - ^ ... 195

J, PdDctplei Cor tbe Use of Ground tv>

III. Stutsqv ' ' , . . , > ' 30^
1. CeucTäl rrincEpletf ... . v , . S09
fl. DeltuEivc ... 1|(
3. AtlDck . - «»

IV. On THE PBAfncE ^H Wa« or tme 1'KTivciri.Ea »ow

LAlL^ L>OWN ...,,. ... m

O" THE OHCABIC DlVialOH OF AHUr-D FoflCE» . . ■ *Jt

ämTCB or A Flah pok TACTtc*. ot r«E Theo» aw the

ümos, TD Tmtic&, Uli Tuc Tiii;oEV of tui; Comoat 1^3

BOOK VII
THE ATTACK

CHAPTER 1

THE ATTACK IN RELATION TO THE DEFENCE

If two ideas form an exact l<^cal antithesis, that is to say,
if the one is the complement of the other, then, in fact,
each one is implied in the other ; and when the limited
power of our mind is insufficient to apprehend both at
once, and, by the mere antithe^, to recognise in the one
perfect conception the totality of the othei also, still, at
all events, the one always throws on the other a strong,
and in many parts a sufhcient light. Thus we think the
fii^t chapter on the defence throws a snfhcient light on
all the points of the attack which it touches upon. But
it is not so throughout in respect of every point ; the
train of thought could nowhere be carried to a duality ; it
is, therefore, natural that where the opposition of ideas
does not lie so immediately at the root of the conception as
in the first chapters, all that can be said about the attack
does not follow directly from what has been said on the
defence- An alteration of our point of view brings us
nearer to the subject, and it is natural for us to observe,
at this closer point of view, that which escaped observa-
tion at our fonner standpoint. What is thus perceived

VOL. ill, A

fl

ON WAR

[book VII.

will. tbfrMore, be the complement uf out Eonner train of
tbotight ; aad il will not Infrequently happen that what
Uftwid on the attack will tbrow a new light on th«; <Iderw:e.
In Iroalmg of the attack we shall, of course, very fr«?-
qucütly have the same subj^ts before us with whtch our
attention has been occupied in the defence. But we
huvc no Lnlentionj nor would it be ctmsistent with ttie
nature of the thing, to adopt the usual plan of works on
forrificatjon, nnd in treating of the attack^ to circumvent
ox up^t all that we have found of positive vaJue in the
defence, by showing that against every means of defence,
there is an infallible method of att.'ick- The defence
has its strong points and weak ones ; if tlie first are even
not uir^urmountablp. still Ihey can only be overc<)me at
a di&pTi>pnftion:ite price, and that must remain true
from whatever point of view we look at it, or we get in-
volved in a contradiction. Further, it 13 not our intmtion
thoroughly to review the recipri^^ actit^n of the means ;
each means of defence suggests a means of attack ; but
this is often so evident, that th^re is no occasion lo
transfer oneself from our standpoint in treating of the
defence to a fresh one for the attack, in order to per-
ceive it ; the one issues from the other of itself. Our
object is, in each subject, to set forth the peculiar
relations of the attack, so far a» they do not directly
come out of the defence, and this mode of treatment
must necessarily lead us to many chapters to which
ihrrr arc no corresponding ones in the defence.

CBAP. u.] TUE STRATEGICAL ATTACK 3

CHAPTER n

NATURE OF THE STRATEGICAL ATTACK

We h4Vf i««fi tlut the defmiiv« in Wv genenQy»
Ibcrefarct ^ho, the vtralefpc dddtuive— is 00 tbcolnt«
state of expectuKy ind waiding u0, thentfure no com
pie1«ly passive «täte, but thil it ü a [«Utivc tutc, aivd
cotvu^arntl}; impTr^nalnd tooti^ or \cs^ with oflentivt
piiaeipto. In Uw fcun» vr«y the oikciave i» no
httBocEoeoaa whole, bat incettanUy mixed up with Ibe
Ji fenny«- But thrre is tht» difl«rmcr hrtwrni tbc tv^^
tint a ddtsvive. without aji oSt^oskvt rttuni blow, canoot
be conceived \ tlul this rcinm blow ta a necemry coo-
stjtisent p(ut of the ddenÄvc, whiJct in the altark, the
Mow or act is in iUdC one complete idea. The defence
in >1wK i« not nroeanrily a part of the att^ick ; but time
and «pact, to wlacb it ia tineparably bound, imporl into
it the ddenaive aj a meccsaary ev-d. For in tlbc fint
place, the attack eaimot be coctintv^d uointenuptedl)- up
to its coRclosion. it must have »logea of rest, and in the»«
iia^, when ita action is neutralised, the »täte of ddencc
step« In ol itself ; in fhp saend place, fln^ ipac« which a
miUtaiy force, in it» advance, icavc» behind it» and which
b esaential to Its existence, cannot always be cuvered
by the attack itMll, but muri be specially protr^ted.

The act of attack in War. but pArtiCLilarLy in tbat bcandi
«hkh is called Stratr^y. »» therefore a perpetual alter-
nating and Gonibining ai att^k and drfcnc? ; but the
latter is not to be regarded as an cfloctaaJ preparation
for attack, as a means by which its force Is heiglitened,
that is to say, not a» an activi? priuciple. but ptirdy as a
aecwtry evil ; as the retarding weight arising from the
spetiftc ^vlty of the ma-s«^ ; it b its nriginal sin, Its seed
of nwrtality, W« »y : a rttardtn^ weight. t>ecause il tlir

4 ^^H ON WAR [Bocm vil

de£enc« does not contribute to strengthen the xittack, it
muM tend to diminish il5 fflect by the vety loss of time
wlucU U represents. Bui oow, may doI this delen&iv«
clement, which b contained in tvery attack, have over
it a positively di^advantagßous mfiüencc > If wr suppcec
the attach is tkg wsaker, the defense ike strongtr form of War,
it »eems to follow that the latter cannot act in a positive
stnsc prejudicially on the former ; for as long as wt have
sut^ient force for the wiaker form, wv &liould have more
than enough for the sirongf-r. In general— that is. as
regards the chief pLirt^this is true : in its detail we shall
analyse it more precisely in the chapter on the cu/minti/ing
poini of victory ; but we must not forget that that supe*
liority of the strategic dcfoncc is partly founded in ttiis,
that theattarkiT5elfc3nnot take place without a mixture
of defence, and of a delensrve of a very weak kind ; whnt
the aK^ailant has to carry about with him of this kind are
it* worst elements ; with respect to these, that whicb
hold'igood of the whole, in a general sense, crtnnot be main*
taincd ; ard Uierefore it is conceivable that ttie defensive
may act upon the attack positively as a weakening
principle. It IS just In these moments of weak defensiv«
in the attack, that the positive miction of the offensive
principle in the dffonivc should be introduced. During
the twelve hours' rest which usnally succeeds a day's
work, what a difference there is between the situation of
the dedöidrr in his chostrn, well-known, and prepared
position, and that of the assailant occupying a bivouac
Into which— like a blind man — he has groped hi» way, or
during a longer pericd of reat, required to obtain provl-
cioiu and to await reinforcement, eke, whi^n the delentkr
lacloM töhi« fortresses and supplies, whilst the situation
of tbeoüsailant^on theotherhand. ishke thatof abirdon
a tree. Hvery attack must lead to a deienca; what la
to be the result nf that defence depends on circumstance« ;

I

nO THE STRATEGICAI, ATTACK 5

Uieie circiuitttADc«« nuy ht very favoimble if tltc memy^
fony« sat di^troycd : trat they may hr Vf*y nnlavtmmblr
If Mch i& Dct Um com-, Althuuch Uus deUdaive do«8 not
bdoag ttt the attack itsdf , it» natnrf and cftect) must rtMl
tm the «ttacb, and mn&l Ink'* pan in drtmninirK il-^ vafaie.

The ÖMluctioQ Irodi thi& view t«, that in every attacii
tbf ddoiatve, wbkb it nec»MrUy an inhcrettt fcaion
In the iMtkr. mii«t mmi^ into cimnidL-nition, in order to
tea dearly the dnadv^uitageä to vhich it m »bfectt ai>d
tt> he prepaid for them.

On the othor hand, in annlhcr Tc^pfct. the attack b
ahvty» in IImU oot aod the same. But the deieiuiv«
hv its gradations acconlirif; ti*^ the principle of expectancy
approaches to an end, Thi» begets lonas ubich difler
ctttntlally from each other, u ha« been developed in the
chapter on the torms of defence.

As tbe principle ol the attack in itticUy actj\'e. and the
dcfejisive, whiich connects itself with it, is only a dead
wieijhti there ia, tlierdore, not the same kind of difference
in it. No dcTubt» in the energy employed m the attack,
in tbe rapidiCyandforcc of the biow, there maybe a great
difference, Init only a diSo'eDce m äagne, not m form. —
It is quite possible to conceive even that tlie JLl^ailant may
chooM A i)cfer«ive form» the t>etter to attain hi« objrct ;
for iastaiK«, that he may choose a strung positjou. that
he may be attacked there ; but such instances are so
Tare. Hut we do not think it neci^Tsiry to dtveil upon Ihcm
in our groupuig of ideas and facts, which Aie uJi*ayb
foondod on the practicai. We may, therelore, &ay that
tliare are no such grAdatiurut in the attack ujt thuse wtnch
prtficat themselves m the defence.

Ltstly, at a mir, the extent of the meanä of altsck
oonsnts cd tbe armed force <jjily ; ui couf^e, we mu»t add
to these the fortresses, for if in the vicinity d the theatra
tjS War, they have a decitled influenc« <he attack.

6 ON WAR [BOOK yii.

But this inllueiLce gE;idu^ll)' dLminiehes as the attack
advinces ; and it is conc«iv»bk that, in the attack, its
own fortresses tievrr can play such an important part as
in tho dderice, in which they often become objectä of
primary importance. The assistance of the people may
be suppcjscd in co-oporation with the attack, in those
caftes m which the LnhabJIanta of the country are better
disposed towards the invader of the country than they are
to their iiwn Army ; finally, the assailant may also have
allies, but then they are only the result of special or
accidental relations, not an assistance proceeding from
the nature of the aggressive. Although, therefore, in
speaking of the defence we have reckoned fortresses,
popular insuirections, and allien as available means o!
resistance ; we cannot do the same in the attack ; there
they belong to the nature of the thing ; here they only
appear rarely, aad lor the most part accidentally.

CHAPTER in

OF THE OBJECTS OF STRATEGICAL ATTACK

The overthrow of the enemy is the aim in War ; destruc-
tion of the hfKtile military forces, the means both in
attack and defence- By the destruction of the enemy**
nailitary force the defensive is led on to (he offensive, the
oftensive is led by it to the conquest of territoTy. Tcm-
tory is, therefore, the object of the attack ; but that
nr«l not be a whole country, it may be confined to a part,
a province, a strip of country, a fortress. All these things
may have a substantial value from their political import-
ance, in treating fur peace, whether they axe retained
or exchanged.
The object of the strategic attack is, therefore, con-

CHAP, iv.) FORCE OF THE ATTACK 7

cciv&bk ID 2D iofiaitc numtcr of gradatioDb, Cram tha
conqiKst of th« whol« country down to that of 90<De
tilsisntlkaDt plucc As vKin ak Otis ubji.<ct h nltuitivd,
and the att^ick ccjiM«, the dcfrn»vc commcDCC^ Wc
may, Ihcrrforc, rcprrscnl to oursclvfs the strategic altftcit
as a dittluicUy hiiiilix] luiU, But it t» not so if we 00a-
tider the matter pr^Cic^y, that b in -accordance with
octmL phrn£>mcTia Practkally Ihr momenta ni thr
attack» that >», ita ^iews and tn^Uäum. vlteii t'^ide jobt
as imperceptibly into the dcfmc« as the plans of the
defence into the ofTi^nsive. It iä seldom, or at all events
not alwayi», tlmt a Gexier^i lays down p^utivdy lur huns^tf
wlul he will conquer, hr I«ivrt that dependent on the
coiim* oi events. His attack o4trn leads him lurthor
than he had intended ; after rest more or less, he often
£cts renewed strength, without our being obliged to
make out of this two cguite different acts ; at .^nnthcr
time he ia brought to a standitil) sooner than he expected
without. hawevcTt f^^Hng up his int^^nlioru» and chunRin^
to a rcaJ defensive. W« «c, tlicrelorc, that if tlic sue-
ccctiful defence may change imperceptibly into ihe
oflt^nsive ; ao on the othiT liiind au att.ick may, in like
manner, change into n dcfrnor. TlieM- Kiadattun» muri
be kept in view, in order to avoid making a wrong applies-
Üon of what w« have to uy of tlie attack in general.

CHAfTER IV ,

DECREASING FORCE OF TUE ATTACK

This i% one of tlie principal points in Strategy : on its
right ^-Tihintion in the concrctr, drper^dn onr being able
to judge correctly wliat vte are able to do.
fht decrease of absolut«^ power ariftes^

8 ON WAR [BOOK Vit,

(I) Through ihe object ot the attark, the occupatioit of
Ihc tmftmy's CDiintry ; this genertiUy eummences first
after Ihc first decision, but the attack does not cease
upon the first decisiori.

(a) Tbroiigh Ihe neces&ity imposed uii the attacking
Army to guard the country in its rear, in order to preserve
its line of com mimical ion and mpans of subastp.nce.

(3) Through losses in action, und through sickness.

{4) Distance of the various depots of supplies and
rdnforccmenls-

(5) Sieges önd blockades ot fortresae*.

(6j Relaxation of efforti.

(7) Sccc^lon of allies,

But frequently, lu opposition to these weakening causes,
there may bi^ many others which contribute to strengthen
the attack- It is clear, at all events th^t i\ net result can
only be ohtained by comparing tliese different quantities :
thus, for exan^ple. th& weakening of the attack may be
partly or completely compen^ited, or tven suipassed by
the weakening vi thr defensive. This last is a case which
rarely happens; \vc cannot always bring into the com*
parison any more forces than those in the inmedjate
front Of at decisive points, not the whole vt the forces xü
Ihe lield,— Diffefrnl examples: The French in Austria
and Prussia, in Rub^a ] the AUitö in France, the French
in Spain.

CHAPTER V

CULMINATING POINT OF THE ATTACK

The succ^s of the attack is the result ul a present supe-
riority iii force, it being undeisfoüd that the moral as well
a« physical larces are includfd. In the preceding chapter
we have ahi>-*m that the power ol the attack giadually

■

I

CHAP. V.J POINT OF THE ATTACK

exhatnU itM-H ; posaiUy ai itie ftame lime tb« superiority
mky iiKTcate, but in most cuo It dimiahhes. The
a^UiUnt boys ap prospective advaoUictt which utc to be
turned 1u a<xuuat here^lCer in negotiatioviA for peace;
bot, in the meantime, be has to pay dou^ on tt>e spo4 for
tbem tt certain ajnount oi thU military force. If a pre-
pocderanc« on tbe aide ol (he attack, althc^ufli thu;i d^Qy
dinüiüftbing. is »till m^mtaiDcd unlll Pnce i^ roiurlnded,
the objett i? ntlained.— There arc ^Urategic iitiucks wliich
bave led to an munediate IVaco — but >och imtaac<« are
rare ; the majority» on the contrary, lead only to a point
at which the forces remainiiig are just suSiat^nt to main-
lam a defensive, and to wait for Pca».^ Beyond that
point the scale turn», there b a r«actk>n ; the violence o(
uch a reaction is cximnMinly much greater than Üie foite
of the blour, Thia we cäl\ the culminating point of the
attack. — As the object of tli^ att^Lck is the possc^ion M
the oiriny'» territory, it foDgwi^ tliat the advance inu»t
continue till the supericnty is exhatisted ; this cuifte,
therefore, itDpds u^ towurds the tiltiinatc object, and may
easily lead us beyond it.- -It we refli-ct upon Una number
of the elements of which an equation of the fore« in
action is composed, we may conceive how difficult it Is in
muny ca^e» to determine which ol two opponent» tiaa
Ibc «uperiorily nn his side. Often all bangi; on the
silken thread of imagination.

Bverything thendcpends on diäcovering the culminating
point by the line tact of judgment. Here we come upon
a seeming contradiction^ Tbe defence h gtrongcE than
the attack ; therefore wr^ should think that the latter can
never lead n« too far, lor oa long tut the weaker form
remains strong enough for what is required, Che fttrongCT
form ought to be ^UU more w,"

* Hcrt InlLenn in Urn M-^ thli notr : " IlpvalopmKnt ot tUt aubioci
after BdcA 111, m lh«< eaivf on tba CulmmAting J'tubt at Vutoryr"
Uadcr Ihi» liUc. u ma utvLoipeeaiknet] "VanouidiMtirtmhemtt to

lO

O^ WAR

[BOOK VII,

CHAPTER VI

DESTRUCTION Of THE ENEMY'S ARMIES

The defitmctitin of the ei:em>"s armed iorcts is tlie m^aos
to the end. — What is meant by this — The pric* it costs —
Diffrrrnt points of view which are possible in respect to
the ^abject,

(1) Only to deätroy as many as the object of the attack
requiriüA.

(1) Or ÄS many on the whole as is possible,

I3) The sparing of our own forces as the principal point
ol view.

(4) This may again be Carried so far. that the assailant
does nothing towards the destmclion of the en<.'niy's
force except whtn a favourabie üpportumiy offers^ which
may also be the case with regard to the object öi the
attack, as already mentioned in the tliird chapler.

The only means cf destioying the enemy'5 armed
force is by combat, but this may be done in two ways ;
(i) directly, (3) indirectly, thTough a combination of com*
hats,— II. therefore the battle is the chief means. stiUit
is not the only means. The capture of a fortress or of a
portion ot territory is in itself rcaCy a destruction of the
«nemy'4 force, and it may also lead to a stiU greater
destruction, and therefore, also, be an iuduect means»

The occupation of an undefended strip of territory,
therefore, in addition to the value which it has as a direct
fulfilment of the end, may also reckon as a destniction
of the enemy's force as well. The manceuvnuß» so as to
draw an enemy oul of a district of country which he has
occupii'd, is somewhat similar, and must, therefore, only
ht looked at from the same point of view, ajid not as a

malfrMs," ui «any litis htca found which apptar^ ta bt a tuvuioa Ot
tha cbcipGvr Man anly tksic'hod : it will bp founü elI the cod of the »vcal^i
book-— Edltoi'i Von.

ciiAF, Til.] THE OFFENSIVE BATTLE

II

of aanü. ptupfsriy ^pfuking.— Tli«^ mcAiis Are
generally «stimaled it mor« tJian they «* worth— they
have '^'Idnm the VAhie o! a bnttk ; bcüidm wlach it b
alw^y^ to be feared thai tlie difiadvuiUgvou« poiiilion to
«rhkh they lead will be overiooked ; they are seductive
throtigh the Uiw price which tliey co»t.

We Duut alw^tys consider meu» of thit df«:nption as
nkftU Investments, from which only ^mall profits are tn be
expected ; as means suited only to very liiniled StAtc
rcUtiom and weak motives. Then they &re cerlAinly
better than battles without a purpose— than victones,
the reaulti of whtdi cannot be reaIiM<i to the lull.

CHAPTER VU

TBE OFFENSIVE BATTLE

What we h»ve said about tht defensive battle throws a
«trong bght upon tfie oEEcnitivR abo.

We there had in view that class of battle in which the
defouive appears most decidedly pronounced, in order
that we might convey a more vivid impression of its
nature ;— but only the fewer Dumber are of that k:nd ;
mo«t battUfl ue " dami-rtncvntrss " in whicli the defei;sive
dutr»aer disappears to a great extent. It b othenvi»
with th« ofFenMve battle : it preM^r^-e« it« character undar
all ctrcvunstaDCe^ and can keep up that character tho
more boldly, »s the defender is out of hb proper sphere.
For thi» reason, in the battk which i% not purely defcnMve
and in the real r^contrti, there ^ways remams al«o some*
thing of the difference of the character of the battle on
the one t&ide and on the other. 'Hie cbtf dit^linctive
chATacteri«tic of the oEfcnsivc battle U the manceuvre
to turn or suTTound, therefore, the initiative as wrU.

U

12 ON WAR [BOOK vn.

A rnmbfit in lines, iotmcd to envelop, has evidently
in ilseli great advantiiges ; il is, howler, a subject of
tactic». The attack must not give up these advantages
bPT-iws*' the defence hss -n mcMis of count ^meting thpin ;
tor t'hc attack itself canzic^t make use ol that means,
inasnmch as it is one that Is too closoly dependcjit upon
other things connected with tlie defence. To be able in
turn tc operate with success against the l^^k£ of an
enemy, whose aun is to turn onr line, it is necessary
to liave a well-cho&ai and we|l-prepari?d position. But
what is much niore import;tnt is, that all the advantages
whjcli the defensive possesses, cannot be made use of ;
most defences are poor makeshifts ; the greater number
of defenders find themselves in a very bürü^srng and
critioil position, in whicli, expecting the worst, they meet
the attack half-way. The consequence of this is, that
battles formed witJi en^-eloping lines, or even with an
oblique front, which should properly result from an
advantageous relation of tJie lines of communication,
are comTnonly the result of a moral and physical pre-
pondaance (Marengo, Aiisteflitz. Jena). Besides, in the
Ant battle fought, the base of the assailant, if not supe-
rior to that oi the defender, is still mostly very wide In
extent, on account of the piosiniity of the frontier ; he
can, therefore, afford to venture a tiitlc_ — The flank-
attack, that is, the battle with cblique front, is moreover
generally more efficacious than the enveloping form. It
isan erroneous idea ibat an enveloping strategic advance?
(rom the verj' comuicncanent must be conn*«ted wilb tt,
as at Prague- (Th;vt strategic measure has seldom any-
thing in common with ilj and is very hajsardons ; of winch
we shall speak fuilher m the attack of a theatre of War,)

As it is an object wiih the Commander in the defensive
bottle to ddriy thr decision as long as possible, and gain
linu. bectLUse a defensn-e battle undecided at sunset is

CHAP, vm.} PASSAGE OF IfTvmS

conuDonly one guned : tbeiWore tbc Connuidff. ia
the offokävc Inttk, rcfiuirt» to batCoi thr d«ci$kn ;
hot, on Ihr otbcr hvid. Ihnc ts « grtMi rU in too modi
baite, beoiue it ksub to a waste of bva. One pectt^
larity m the cfiduive bottk » tbc uacctuiatj, la moft
caa«». » 10 (hr portion of the racny ; ki U a compkte
BTDpüigabtml^unon^ituji^ttcit uc imknown* (Aiatcr-
tit£, Wa^iuh. Hoh<nlmdfn, J«iu, tL^txhach). Tbe Don
th» H the Cftae, m omcb the morr CDOcmtratioa of forcts
becoons peuainouiti, and luiniiic a flank to be pnkrred
to mrroondinf. That the pnnäpü fntits of victory
are first gattx-red in lb« pureuit, we hava already leani
ID the twelfth chaptcf d Book IV, AccordiAg to tlie
oaliir? of the tbtog, the pu i «üt a more an inlegral patt oC
the whole ActM» in tJie oflcnaVT tbui tn Ibc deJccuive

CHAPTER VIII

PASSAGE OF BSV EMS

(1) A uuiCE m-cr which croMe« the diiecttoa ol the
attack U ahray« very incomv^nient (or the a ■Milan t ;
\<x wlicn he has crosfiM U he i& gfitcnlly limited to one
point of pasftigt. and. th«xefoce. unle«« be rtmuai ctae
to the ri^TT he bccpooi» ver)- mnch hamprred tn h»
movemeats- ^Vbetber be oudit^tes bnngmg on a deci-
sive battle alter cttaian^. or may expect ih« enemy lo
attack Itint, hcrxpcHrshim«e1fto^Fa1 dan/trr ; therefore,
without a decided superiohty, both in moraJ and pfayÄcal
fofc«» a General will »01 place himvU tn soch a position.

BjowlBl*"! tUl ■ rif[li ol bAoTB 4itef tb£ tfhtiaf [y^vi. T^ m( ^
nailjf iJ—ifiirt Bilira III cbr Pm^iaGflinlfa^ADSL IViinit tm
tvoicbc ftfcooi by the Impcniivr a«cc«it7 itf etaiüata teMon bcfarv
^MtJML — finvna.

14 ON WAR [book vii.

(a) From rhis mere disadvantage uf placing a river
bdünd an Army, arivcr is much oftencr capable of defence
tJun it would otberwiw be, H we suppa^ that this
defence is not considered the only means of safety, but
is so planned that even if it fails, still a stand can bo made
near the nver, then the ass^lknt in his calculations mast
add to the resistance which ho may experience Ln the
ddcncr ol the river, all the advantages mentioned in
No. [ij as being on the side of the defender ol a river,
and the effect of the two together is, that we usuaUy see
Generals show great respect to a river b<rfore they attack
it ilit Jiddended.

(3) But in the preceding book we have seen, that under
certain conditions, the real defence of a nver promises
right good resnUs ; and if we refer to experience, we must
allow that such results follow in reality much more fre-
quently than theory promises, because in theory we only
calculate with real circumstances as we £nd them take
place, whiie in the ejiccution, things commonly appear to
the assailant much more difficult tlian they really are, and
they become therefore a greater clog on his action.

Suppose, for instance, an attack which is not intended lo
end in .^ great solution, and which is not conducted with
thorough energy, we may be sure that in carrymg it out
a number oi little obstacles and accidents, which no
theory could calculate upon, will start up to the dxsäjl'
vantage of the assailant, because he is the acting party,
and must, therefc^rc, come ürst into collision with such
impediments. Let us just think for a moment how often
some of the insignißcant Hvers of Lombardy have been
succe^iuUy defended 1 — If, on the other hand, cases may
also be found m military history, in which the defence o(
rivers has failed to realise whnt vfss expected of them.
Hat li«a in the extravagant results sometimes looked for
from thi» mc^ns-, lesults not founded in nny kind of

way vol its Uctical oatun, but mefdf oa iU «eU-koown
efficacy, to wbkh people have tboo^t tl^re verc z»

(4> It b only wtea ÜM d rf ande r ccoumt« Um mirtafce
<4 pUciog bis «fltire dtpeodence oct tbc drfcpce of » rmf,
90 that in ca«c it b fbrtod Iw b< tf om t4 iavolv«d ta pnt
difficulty in a kiod ol cat^^Uoplw, tt isooty tbea übI Ike
dricpco of i. river c&n be kMtel opoa u a form of d*ftBCt
lavotirnblr^ to the attack, Cor it t« certainly ca«üf lo force
the passage ol a nvcr than to gaio an ofdin^ry battle,

(5) It follows o< itidf ffMU what ha» jo^t been ujd that
the defcoc« of a nvcr may become of great valtia if do
great »olutioo U dcnrfd . bat wbcre tbal k» to br expected,
dther from tbf snpcrior onabcr» or cfurgy of th^ cscaiy,
then Ibw mcuu, if wr«eifly need, nay torn to tb* po^tve
advantac^ ol tbe attailant.

(6) There ait vwy few nver4ineB of defen» whidi
Cttisot be turned cither on the mbah length or at som«
parliCuLar poinl> Tbertfore the tMaiUnt, nqienor in
nnmben 30<1 bent upon »erioti^ blows, ha» the meuia'el
oiakiiic a dcnumatration at one point and paalnt «I
aootbcr, and then by soperior nomben, asid advancing,
regardless of all oppoation, he can repair any dnadvaa-
tagcocu tdat»n» in which be may have been placed by
the tunc of the first cncoontcr» : for his general ittpe-
riority wiU «n^ible tuiu tu do &o. It very rordy happens
tlkal the parage ci a river i« actually tacticaUy forced by
pvecpe wcri ng the enemy*« principal pott by the effect of
«t perkic tire and greater valour on the part of the troop«,
and tbe exprewioo. forcing n fatsa^c is only to be taken tn
a «traiegicaenae, in so far that th«* aiw^thnt by his parage
at an undefended or only alightiyd^imdAl pomt valnn the
lioe of defcnOG, hravcs all the dac^er» which, in tbe
defender's view, sbuoUiemlt toliim tbrou^tbecTOttü^.
^B«t the worst wbkh an asMÜanl can do, i« to attenipt a

real pessoge at srveral point*, unless they lie close to rftdi
otbor and admit of -lU the troops joining in the combat ;
for a9 Iho dc^nöcr mnst necess^rilv h.ivc hi* forces
sep;tratcd> Uiemior«» if Uie a^äailunt breukä up hi» in like
manner, be throws aw^y liis ratur^il advantage. In th^t
way BcJlpgBTde lost the battle on the Mincin, 1814. where
by chuiice both Axmies parsed at different points at the
same lirae, and the Anstrians were more divided than
the French.

47) If Ihe defender rem li ins on this side oE the nver,
it necessarily foUows that there are two ways to gain a
strategic advanlage over him : either to pass at some
point, regardle^ oJ his position, and so to outbid him in
the same mean^* or to give bailie. In the first case,
the relalioiiä ot tlic ba,se and üi^es ol communication
should chiefly decide, bm it often happen* that special
drmmst^nces exercise more influencc than genera]
relations ; he who can choose the best jMteitions, who
knows best how to make his disposition , who is better
obeyed, whose Aimy m^irches fastest, ^c, may contend
with advantage against geneial circumstances. As le-
gards the second means, it presupposes on the part of
the assailjint the means, suitable rHations, ond the deter-
mination to äghl ; but when these conditions may be
presitp posed, the defender will not readily venture upon
this nujde of defending a nver,

{$) As a final result, we must therefore give as our
opmion thai, althougii the passage of a river in ittdf
rarely presents great difQculties, yet in ftll cases not
immediülely connected with a great decision, so many
nppTL-hc-nsions of the consequences and o( iuluie com-
fJicatioiu arc bound up with it, that at all events tbc
progress of the assailant may easily be so far ATTcsted
thai he rither leaves the defender on this side the river,
or he passes, and then renmns close Co the river. Foi it

I

*

fe

CHAF. IX 1 nEFES5T\T POSITIOHS 17

rarely i u ppo a » two Aimua remüii any ko^ c4 Une
conlrootiog ooe u>oth«T <m difleraK side« of a fitvT.

Bat aIihi ta cue» nf a KTrai sofatian, ft riv« i* ail impor-
tAQtobffct; it ilinjTiii ilrfniii>i1<fcnactfiltMrilr>ii¥i,
mdtbe m<Mt fonuiulf thtfl^tiittecAfl^Kif UK Mmder
ift mdiicnl throKtgU Uat duigrr lo look opoo Ibe nvrt
■s a UcIka] bviw, 4ad to laaJcc tbc fT**rTHr 4dae»
of that barrier Ibr principal ict of hk mbtUK» 90 that
xht a»3i*litnl at once obtains Ibe ad\^ota^ of l^iaic able
to sinke a öeaa^^ blow in a ^-cr^' ca^y ra^nacf.— Car-
taintir, ia like fine untaM^, thtt Uow wiD ort*« uwnnf
to a complete defeat ol tbe csemy, bat it mil cotviat ol
Mvertl advantijjwwi oonbaU, and tbc«e fariag abovt a
Uatc o4 gnwfal rriatkMV wy advene to the eoeaiy, «a
happened to tbe Aaslnam on the Low^ Rhme, 179&*

CHAPTBR IX
ATTACK OF OEFENSfVE POSmojfS

l» the book on the dftence, it baa been voBädently tx-
pUiTi«! Iknt far dtfcnuve poutuoK caa cooipd the
uuiUnL ülher to attack tJwm, or to give 19 hii athrance.
Only those which can ^ect this arc sabaervient to oat
ohjcct, and uiitfd to weax out or Aoitiahse Xlm Corca
oE the afsrcsMT. either trtwUy or i& pan. tad ta «> far
the attack can do oolhios agaiut «och poätima, that
n to aay, there are do mcaaa at its di^oui by which lo
cocintcihiIai>c< thi« ad^-aota^. Bat deies^ve positiota
are not all really of ibas knd. U üje osüibnl m» he
can pvTMie hi« object witbost attacking Mch a pocttian.
It woqU be an em»- to make the attack ; if he caaoM

to tf 13 Ao*M be rmsAMf «tt4M.— £Mn«.

voL.m.

l8 ON WAR (BOOK VII.

follow Aut his obj&ct. Iben it is □ question whr.thrr hr
c^Tmul inan<euvre Ihe «Miemy out o( his portion by
threatening hi* üank- It is only ü such means are
ircffr<^wal, that a CnmrrandeT- diztcrmincn on Ihr atl.ick
oi a ^oixl puipiUon, ^uid IheD an atl-ick «Ijn^tcd ag^iin&t
one tide, always in g«n«Tal presents tbe le4& difficulty ;
hut the choice of the side niU5t dfprtid nn the piKiilion and
direction vi the mutual hnes oi retreat, consequently ,
on the thteatwiing the a:emy's wtreat. and covering our
own. Between these Iwo objects a compvtiliian may
anse. in which c^i^e the finX is entitled to tbe preference,
as i1 is of an offensive naUire ; therefore homo^neous
with thp Mtackt wliilsl the other is oE a defensive<:harajCter-
But it is certain. an<i may be regarded as a truth of the
fint importanoc, that lo attack an cnfmy thoraugtUy inur^
to WoTt in a good pofiiiion, ts a crttical ihing. No doubt
instance arc not wanting of snr h battles, and of successful
ones loo, as Torgau, \^'agTam (we do not say Dresden,
because we caunot call the enemy there i:iuitc War sea-
soned) , but upon the whole, the danger is small, and it
vanishes al I ogel her, opposed totheinlinile mimbcrnf cases
in which we have seen the most resolute Commanders
make Their bow before such positions. (Torri?s \Wra5 )
Wc must not, however, confuse the subject now
before us with oidinary battles. Most battles are real
" rtineantr^i" Jn which one party certainly occupies a
position, but one whicli ha» not been prepared.

CHAPTER X

ATTACK OF AN ENTRENCHED CA^fP

It was for a time the fn^^hion to ^pr.ik with contempt of
entrenchment G and their utihtyn The cordon linc^ of the

I

CHAP. X.] ATTACK OF A CAMP ig

Freocb frontier, wUch bad been often bunt thiovfb;
tb^ jmtrmcb(?d camp ni BtcsJou in whurh tbr DuIet of
Bevcm wa» deieatod, the batde oi Tof^iu. ^utd vn-fni
other ca^es, I«d to this opinion of th<ir v^tu ; 4od tb«
%ictoctf« ol Frederick the Gnat, i^nnl by iheprlndpk ol
movement and the uso ol tbc ofinisive, tbrew a b«li
Ught on all kind« ol dcfciuiw action, all flying in « fijced
pnsitina, psuticuluiy m enduicbmeDts, and brooitbt
thnu »tiU cnore into contempt. Certainly, wben a few
lhou3and n>rn are to delrnd several miles of coontty,
and vbcn entiemULOKnts an nothing more thin ditchc»
rcvtned. they are «xirth nothing, and they constitute ft
dangerouä »larc througti the conftdcnoe whkh H placed
in tbera. But hit not inconsistent, or ratber oonscnsiiul,
to extend ibU view even to Uie idea ^ fidd fofii^at^»,
tn n nicrc &waf:gcxing spihl (a» Tctnplpbo4 don) ? What
wouJd be the object of entrenchments geoeraUy, if not to
strsnglbcn the defence ? So, not only reucn but expe-
rience, in hundretU and thoosandfi of iaUanco, abow that
4 wdl'traccd, sufficiently manned, and well-defended
entrenchment rL^asa nUe. U he iook^d M^on as <« imprtf'
nMe point, and i» aUoso regarded by the attack.* Start-
ing from tin« pcmt ol tbc efficiency <A a single entrencb-
inent, ve urgue that there can be no donbt as to the
altadc of an entrendied cimp bvtng a most diftcnlt
undertaking, and onr in which ^^eneraUy il will be impot-
able for the uskiiUnt to succecd-

U IS cociB^tent viilh the nature of ad entrenched camp
that it should be wipaltly ^rri&onrd ; bni »-iih good,
naliiral uta^cU« od groiuid and twining 6eld worin, it is
possible to btd de^anee to superior ncmbcr», FtederKk
the Crwt conKidrrcd the attack of the eamp of Ptnia
^ unprMtKaUe, altbovgb he had at lits command

* IfBttlx Mt«! ttel vbM Ouvvvtti «raih wtaerr did
■ol pOB^ jarihii;^ H'tcoirlin Iti OHXiltfB ih<U-po«tr cm lufe vkkb

h

OS WAR [book VII.

,Ue the ioTce oi the garrison ; and aJtbough it hae been
flA6CTt«d, h^re and there, that it was quit« possible
to have tukm it ; tlip only ptutif in fEivour cri this assertion
13 founded on the bad condition of the Saxon troops;
an firgtimcnt which docs not at aU detract in any way
from Itje value ol entr^nchmtmtH. But it i:i a question,
whether those who have since contended not only fcir the
ioawbihty but also (or the facility ol the attack would
have made up their ininda to execute it at the lime-

W«, tbereiore. think that the attack of an entrenched
CAmp belongs to the category of quite cxccptionnl means
on the part ol the oßensive- It i& only i1 the enlttnch*
menla have lieen thrown up in haste, are not completed,
»till Irs* strcngtt^encdi by obstacles toprpvent their being
Approached, or when, as is often the case taken altogether,
the whole camp is only an outline of what it was intendi^d
to br, a haH'fiiitshed ruin, that then an attack on it may
be advisable, and at the same time become the road to
gain an easy conquest over the enemy.

CHAPTER XI

ATTACK OF A MOUNTAIN RANGE

>M the fifth and following chapters of the Kixtb bock
be deduced gufTiciently the strategic relatione ul sx
mountain generally, both as regards the defence and the
attack. We have ahi) thr-rt^ endeavovired to estpbin the
part which a mountain range pUysas a line of delence*,
properly 50 called, and fiom that naturally follows how it
i» to be looked upon in thi^ Kignification from the side ol
the asuilant. There remains, therefore, littJe for us to £ay
here on thi* important subjpct. Our chief result was,
that tbe delence moat clioose a^ his point cf vkw a

I
I

citAp.xi.] ATTACK OP A MOUNTAIN RANGE «

MCoDdoxy combatt or the caludy dUl«xcQt ucur oJ a ^e«l
general actio«! : th^it in the first caae the attack of a rootui*
tain can only be rrgankd n$ a nccanry evij, brcainc all
the accnouUiKM an «aUvouraUe to it ; but ld tbc
tecood case the advanta^ are on the side of tli« attack.

An attack, titctcfun;, urmnl witli the inram and Ibe
TCfolotioQ Coc a battle, will give the cDcmy a iHMtlnf in the
moonlaii», and omainly find hb account in so doing.

But we mosl Iirrt- ouae more rcpeut tb4t it will be
di£bcQlt to cbt^in respect for ttus coodusioD, because it
ran couoler to appearaoo», and b abo, at Hn/t al^,
Gootraiy to the experience at War. It ha> bren ofaverved,
in most caics htih^no» that an Anny prcsung lofvard
to the attack (whether seeking a grctat general action or
not), ha5 considered it an unuana] piece o4 good fortuiM
if the eoeiny ha« not occTipied the intervening n^ountain«,
and has itsdf then hastened to be beforehand in the
Dccnpatioo of them. Ko one will und tltis loreataUing
of the enemy in any way inconaiateint with the intererti
ol the «asaiUnt ; in our view this b also quit« at^BiaäUa^
D<üy we must point out clearly a fine distiDetkn hen
be tw een drcumstancc».

An Anny advancing again &t the enemy, with the design
cf bringing liim to a genera action, if it has topaaaover
an unoccDpic^ mngc of numntain, lias nuturdly to ap|are-
bend that the cneniy may, at the last monkcnt, block up
those \'«ry paaaci which it propoa» to use on its march :
in sach a case, the .ifMitlnnt wilt by no mcnnx have the
»ame advantages as il the enomy occupied merely an
ordinary mountain powtion. The latter is, lor instance,
not then in n position c:xtrnded br?yiind measure, nor i& he
in uncertainty as to the road wbich the assailiint will take ;
the atsoilant has not been able to choose his r™ul with
reference to ihr; mamy*« ptjsitiou, and therefore tlUs
battle in the mountains is not then united with all those

^1 OH WAR [BOOK vTi.

dd^iintsges on his side of which wc have spoken in the
sixth book : undCT siich clrcumstanefs, the dofcndw
rajgbl btf loiuid in an imjJrnRnnblJT piisition, — Acrordins
to this, the defender might even have mo^ns at his com-
mnnd of making ndvanlagcous use of i>ic mountain* for
a great batllc.^Thi& ts. al any lati-, posaible ; b\ti if we
reflect on the difficulties which Ihe defender would have
to öicounter in cstLiblishing himself in a strong positirm
in the muunlainä just at tlie last inomeut» paiticufarly
if he has left it «ntircly unoccupied before, we may put
down thi^ menns nf defence as one npon which no diciien-
dcDce caD be placed» aud therefore a& one» the protfubility
of which the assailant has little reason to dread. But
even if it is a very imprcibable case, yet still it is natural
to fear it ; for in War, many a thing i5 very natural, and
yet in a certain measure superfluous.

But another measure which the assailant has tu appre-
hend here is, a preliminary defence of the mountains by atn
advanci? {^uurrl or chain of outposts. This means also
will seldom accord with the interests of the defender,
but the asfiailant has nol the means of discerning how far
It may be beneficial to the defender or otherwise, and
therefore he h^js only to provide against tlie worst.

Furthrr, our iHew by no means excludes possibility
of a position being quit* uniiNS:i liable from the mouw-
tunous character of the ground : thrrc are such positions
which ate not. on that ftcronni, in thr mountains (I^ma,
Sctmiotseifen, Meissen, FeldkircU]. und it is just because
they are not in the mountains, that they are so well
suited for defence. We may also very wi-ll rmicdvc
that positions may be found in mouAtoidS thcmsclvc«
wltore the defender mi^ht avoid the ordinary disadvan-
tage of mountain posjliuns, as, for instance, on lofty
plateaux ; but tliey are not common, and wc can only
take into our view the generality o( cases.

I

I

CHAT.XL) ATTACK OF A MOUNTAIN R,\NGE ^

ll is yast in tnilitary lii«tnir>' thjit wt tm bam little
iDOuut^iit jMjcilkin» ore suited to decisive dcCcittivt
Ivttl», for grtai Cenamb h^vt alyny% prdemd a poi^
Hdo in Ihr piniiu, «lifD i1 wat tbrir cih^E!Ct to tiglit u
taltJe ol the ^t ocd«i i and tbrou^bout the whole range
d militAfy b>»tc^. th«f« «n no examples ol decisive
battle« ID th(^ ffioiintainfi, rxcf-pt in the Rrvtilulkinaiy
Wa»> and evvu ilKre it wai» plainly ^ I^Uc ^ppiicati«
ud uitlogy whkb kd to tbe oM ol motmttm po«it>0D9,
sticrc of nccefidty a d^citivr battle had to be Eooght
U793 «id iTM m the Vo4f«. ^nd i;<)5, 1796, and 17^
ut llAly). Udos h^ becD geDerally blamed for not
having occniNcd the Alpine puus in iSoo ; but Mich
CTiticifiAS are nothi&g more than "early noiionf^ "<— we
■li^lii Say— childlike jud^Biefits founded 00 appeanocaa.
Buoiupartc, in Udj^^ft plaofr. would jost oa little have
thought od occupying tha paaief.

Tbe dispositions for the attack of mountain poaitions
arc mostly oi ^ Liccic-il n.ttiirc ; but wc think it ntrmnry
to insert here the following rrmark« lU to the general
outUoe, consoquenlly as to X]n^t: puiis which cxHue into
iinmedia.te contact with, und are coincident with.
Strategy.

(1) Aswecannot move wide of the roads in mountainsaa
we can in oilier districts, and form two or three column*
out of ooe, when the exicmfy ol the moment require«
that the ma» o( the troops slnmld be divided ; bul on
the contrary, we are generally conlined to long dc^lca ',
the Advance in mountain« must Rrnrmlly be made on
toeveral road&, or rather npoo a »umcwTiat broadet
front.

(3) Against a mountain line of drfrnce nf wide extent,
the attack mutt nAtur^Uy be mddc with concentrated
fore««: to surround the whole eannot be thought o4
thete, and if an tmportnnt F»ult itt to he F^nincd from

24 ON WAR [book rii.

vktory, it inu&t be obUiae<i fathei by bur^tuig tlui>u^b

Ihe enemy"» linen an*i separating the wings, than by
surrounding the force, and so cutting if o|7. A rapid
^uLitiDuuu» j^dvance upon the enemy's piincipd line of
retreat is there the naluraj endeavour of the as^iUnt.

(:j) But if the ent-myty bcntliickcd im-fupics a position
aoinewhil concentratedp turning aiovemenls are lin
essentia part of the scheme of attack, a« the front attacks
fall upon the mass of the defender's forces ; but the tum-
mg movements again must be made more with a view
to cutting off the enemy's retreat, than as a tactical
rolling up of the tlsmk or attack en the rear ; Joi moun-
tain positions are capable of a prolonged resistauce evea
in rear iJ forcps are not wanting, and the quickest result
iä invariably to be expected only from the enemy's appre-
hension oflosing his hne of retreat ; this sort of unoasine&s
arises sooner, and acta more powerfully in mounl:iiiis,
because, when it comes to the wor^t, it is not 60 ea^y to
make room sword in hand. A mere demouslraUou is no
Butncli?n1 means here ; it mij^ht certainly manceu%Te the
enemy out o( his position, but would not ensuivr any
sjjcciiil result ; the nim must therefore be to cut him oÖ.
in reahty, from his line of retreat.

CHAPTER XII

ATTACK Of CORDON LINES

If a supreme decision should lie in their defence ftni
their attack, they place the assailanl iu an advantageous
situation, for their wide extent is still more in oppositicn
to »U the requirements of n decisive battle than Ihe
dir«ct defence of a river or a mountain range. Eug^nr^
lines of Benain, 1712, are an illttstration to the point here,

xm.

SCANtEUVRlÜG

tor

^was quite eqtia] to a ccmpkt« dd«fti, but

vrankl liaTdly havr i^itird «ocb a vvrlory »g"***
n a C4)ncaitfat«d posituio. If tJic o0nnvc «iöe
Arte« not poasns th« m»D9 nqtilred for a öccfaiTc battlr,
tbt-D irvcti tinrv an? ttmtrd with ro^cct, that ö, il Ibey
ire oociipiM by tbc nuia body of an Army ; ioc iactaoce,
ibi»e of StoUhofcQ, beU by Loob ol Bad» tn Ibe fcftr
17ÜJ, WFTv ii3|Kctcd evffi by V^Un. But if Üi«y nn
only bdd by a secondary kifco, th«o it is mcrcty a qi>c»>
Ikm of ihc fitmi^h of the detachmmt which wr can
»pare for their attack. Tbc rcsuLukcc in aocb caMi b
«ddom great, bnt at the mme tinx the remit of the
victory h wldoin worth moch-

Tbe circumvallation Un» of a besieger have a |>ecuJtaf
character, of which we thall «peak in the chapter on the
attnck of a theatre of War.

AH po»iliou cd tlie cordon kind, as, loc to&tance,
entrenched line* of ootpoUSp Ac. ftc., have aiwaj^ thii
properly, that they can be cskly broken tbrough ; b«t
when tbey are not forced with a vkw ol goins fnrtber
aad brining on a decitiooi. there is «o little to be i^ined
in f cncral by the attack, that it hantiy repays the trouble
expended.

CHAPTER XIII

MAN(EVVRtSC

(t) Wc have alrc^y toudjed opun tJix& «ubjtict iu lli«
thirtieth chapl«T cf the sixth book. It is one whkh con*
cern^ the defence and the at1;ick in common ; nrvcrthc-
i«as it has alwa)-s in it something luure of the mtuie of
the oflensive than Ibe dclensive. \Vv shall therefore nuw
examine it mure tharciuffldy.
Man<7ui

ON WAR [BOOK ™.

the offensive by tore«, by means of gr«at buttUii : it
standi ^Iso opposed to every such expcuiiori of the
offeaeive as proceeds directly frr^m ufTt^nsive mcajis, kl it
be cither an operation ag.iinst the enemy'd coonnmmcai-
tlons. or line of retreat, ri diversion, Stc. ftc,

(3) n we adhere to the ordinary use of the wgrd, tber«
is in thi^ conception of manoeuvring ^m effect which is first
produced^ lo a certain extent, frnm nothing, that is^ from
a stalt? of rest or cfjuittbrtunt llirougU the miisluk^ into
which the enemy is enticed. It is Jike th* fir^t moves
ID ft gftme of che^sä. It la, thereloce, a game vi evenly
baUiiiccd powers, to obtain results from favour^iblc
opportuniiy, and then to use these as an adviLOtagt gver
the enemy.

(4) But those interests which, partly as the final oT^ect,
partly as the principal suppoitä (pivot) of action, must be
considered In this matter, arc chiefly :

(j) The subsistence from svhich it Is out object to cut
of! the enemy, or to impede his obtaining.
(6) The junction with other columns,

(c) The threatening other communications with the
interior of the country, or with olher Amucs or columns.

(d) Threatening (he retceat.

{£) Attack of isolated points with superior forces.

Theüe five interests may tetablisli themselves in Uie
smallest features of detail belonging to any particular
situation ; and any such object then becofnos^ on that
account» a point ruund wlu^li evorytliing for a tune
revolves. A bridge, a road, or an entrenchment, often
thus plays the pnncipal purt. It i^ easy to show In
each case that it is only Ihc relation which any such
object has to one of the above interest* which gives it
iinportaiice.

(/) The result of a succcraful manoeuvre, then, for
the offensive, or rather for the active party {which may

»

I

of m ptec« of tuid, a mj^anne, te'

(f) In a stratff^ nauücetiirp two coovmr pmpositfoa«
*ppeu, «bkb look Uke diffemil nananvrctt* and kaw
9eBwtiDU9 9eri<«d tor tbe daiv^tioo of late
role«, and havr fi^r branchr^ «liich mrr, howrvrr, in
mbty, ftU occtssary cmatitttenU ol Ibe nm« thtti^. tod
an to be regarded as tach, TIk fiot antitbcK* i* tlie
Hiiiuuiuhn|[ tbc funny, and tbe opcntinfE m tntcnar
UM»; tbe»ecoiidi»tlMccaceiitntiooii<loiCM,ajadtfaär
caclettslao ov«- ««veni porUs.

(A) Aft nganb the tintt ontiUwa, we ccrtataif OMBOt
Kiy that one of its mecnbcndesefvei a founl ptefc^ eD c c
over tbe otlwr ; lof partly H is mhiral that action of not
kind calls forth the other ax its oatoral coonterpotse, its
Ime rtiDedy ; parti)' the cnvylopotg ion» b hreiwffw^n«
tothaattadc, but the use ut inietfortaMtotbedafaBCc;
and therefore, in okmA cases, the &it b more soitable 10
the offensive aide, the latter to the defeoiive- That fonn
wiU gain the upper hajkd whteh is uted vith the gnaloit
fkiJI.

{i) The branches of the other antithesis can jtist as
Ultle be classed the one above the othef. The atroDgir
locce has tbe choice <d eKtendtn; itaetf over sevenü poalf ;
by that menns Ha will nUam for MnveH a cwvmient
Elrate^ situation, and liberty of action m many respect»,'
and spare the phyiical powers of his troops. The weak^,
gd ihp other hand, imül krrp himadf matv cuupntr-irrd,
ind seek by rapidity of movement toeoontcract the dis-
advantage oJ his inferior ntunbers. This greater mobility
fcuppu««* grt-ater readiness in mardiiDg. The vreakcr
must therefore pot a grv^atrr strain on hi« ph>'ücal and
moral forces— a final n^^ilt which wr matt nanu^ily come
upon everywhere if we wMuld alw^)-b be cooaislent, and
which, therefore, wercg^d, to a cert;ün extent, as the

4

«a ON WAR (BOOK VII.

logical ttst cf Ui« reasonings The c^tmpaign» of Frederick
t\ut (rrent against Daun« in the years ly^v) ^^tid 1760, and
against Laudon. 1761» ADd Monlt'cucuks a^jiin&t Turenne
In 1673, 1675, have always been reckoned the rnosl scier-
tiiic combinntiftns of this kind, and from them we have
chiefly d^v«d our view.

[k) Just as the fowr pftTt; of the two antithwes
supposed must not be abused by biding m^de the fcmnda-
tion of false maxims and rules, so we niuat a\&o give a
caution figairiat altachirig to other general relations, such
a» b^e, ground. StQ.t an unportanct:^ ;uid a decisive in-
fluence which they do not in reality possess. The smaller
the interests at slake, so much the more imporUnt the
details of time and pkce become, so much the more that
which is general and great falls into the Imckgroundj
having, in a certam measure, no place insmall calculations.
Is there to be found, viewed, generally» a more absurd
atuation than that of Turenne in 1675, when he stood
with liLs back close to the Rlime, his army along a line
of (ilteen miles in extent, and with his bridge o( retreat
at the extremity of his right wing ? But his measures
answered their object, and it is not without reason that
they are acknowledged to show .n high degree of skill and
intelligence. We can only understand Ihis result and
ttiis skill when we look more closely into details, and judge
of them t-tccording to the value which they must have hnd
in this particular case.

We are convinced that there are no rules of any Idnd
for strat^c muntcuvring ; that no method, no f^enerat
piinciple can detennine the mode of action ; but that
superior energy, precision, order, obediLnce, intrepidity
in the most special and trifling drcums1nneo% may find
means to obtain for themselves signal advantages, and
that, therefore, victory will depend chiefly on those
qunlifips.

CHAP. xnrO ATTACK OF MORASSES

^

CHAPTER XIV
ATTACK OF MORASSES, tNUSDATIONS, WOODS

Y

^P UoRASSKS, that is, Inipaf^sable wfonip», v^icli arr only

tnv«reed by a few embankmenU, pr««CDt peculiar diffl-

caltir^ to the tactical attack, as ur hav*r stated in treating

uj ÜHT defence. Tbeii bunultU biiidly cvei ntlmils oi the

enemy bdng driven from the oppoüte bank by artincry»

ai the ronstnictioD of a roftdway arro«. The

consequence n that endfavouw are made to

attarkinc thtrm by piUiinß round then». Whcrn

tbc «Ute of culture, ak in ninny low countrie«, is ao great

that the means of pastbg are iimumerablc. the resbtance

of the defender h titifl slror^ ei^ough reliti\*tly, but it is

propoctionably weakt^ncd for on absolute decision, nnd,

, thtfcforc, wholly unsuitable tor it. On the other hand,

H 11 tbe low Und <a& in Hol3&ndji%^=[idod by inundations, the

" rni^tapcc may becüme at^olate, and defy cvrry Attack.

IThb was ahown in HcUaad in the year 167a. when, after
the conquest and occupation of all the tortrittorift outside
the margin of l^te inurdation, 50,000 French troop»
became aviiiabk, who. — ^firsl undrr Condrf and then under
Luxemburg, — were unable to force the \\i\q of inundation,
I although it was only defended by about 20XW0 men. The
^p campaign of tbe PnuMimH, in ij^j^ undrr the Dukr of
^ BniBfwick, againat the Hutch, ended, it is true, in a quite
contrary way, as these lines were then carried by a force
very little superifjr totliedefendt^m^andwithinfiiniilrru ;
but the reason of that U to be found in the dissensions
amongf^ the rirfendrrs from jwiliticjil nnimnsities. and ft
n-aut of unity in the cmniiiard. Nollnng- hciwcvi-r, is
more certain tUan that the mccess of the campaign, that
is, the advanCiT through the last line of Lnnndatlcn up to
the walls of Amsterdam, depended on a point of sucfi

30 ON WAR l«ooK vn-

extreme nkety that it is impossible to draw any |eni^ntl
drduction ffom tliis case. The point :tl[irdcd to was tho
leaving unguarded the Sea oi Haarlem, By means of
this, tlie Duke turned the inundation line, and got in
rear nf the post ai Amsclvnoi. If the Dutch liad had a
coupltf oi ^rmed vessels on this lake the Duke would
never luve got to Amsterdam, for he was ''at the- end of
his r(srniTce&,*' What tnfluencft that might have hLLdon
the conclusion of peace docs not concern us here, but it
is certain that any further question of canying the last
line of inundatton would ha\e been put aii end ta
completely,

Tliewinterift,nf>dovibt, the natural enemy of Ihie means
of defence, us the French have äliown in 1794 and 1793.
hut it must be a s&uirc winter.

Woods, which are scarctly passable, we have also in- 1
eluded aunQng^t the means which aßord th« ddcnc«B
powerful assistance, H they arc of no great depth then
the assailant may force hi^ way through hy several reads
mnniny near one another, and thus reach belter ground,
for nü one point can have any great tactical strength, nflj
wc can never suppose a wood as absolutely impasKahle as
a river or a morass, — But when, as in Russia and Poland,
a very Inrße tract of eountry is nearly e\'PTywhere covered
with wood, and the assailant has not the power of gettJngi
beyond it. then. c«tainiy, his situation becomes very
emb^irraw^in^- Wc h^ve only to think of the diflicuItieSi
he mii«t contend witli to subgiät hi^ Army, and how htt]
he can do in the depth« c{ the forest to make his ubiquitoi
adversary f*-irl hi* *nprriority in numbers. Certainly
is one of the worst situations in which the offensive
be placed.

1

CHAP. XV.] THEATRE OF WAR, Ac.

31

CHAPTER XV

ATTACK Of A TittATRB Of WAR WITH THE
VltW W A DECISION

Tost oi tUe wt^ccts have b«o already louich«! upon
m Uuf sulti buuk. uiid by tliar mav tt-Ürciiaa, ilnrtw
mfi&cicnt ligbt on tb« attack.

Moffovtr, the concept i^D of an «nclosfd theatre of Wiir,
)u& A üeui«! relation to ttiv ildmcc! ttiun to ttir attack.
Umy of the tcidiflg point», Uta ohjtci 0/ aifacA, th4 sphere
9f atHom of vüüny, &c,, have bcien aJic;idy treated of in
ttui book, Aod tJut whicli is meat deduve diid oAmtiAl
on tJ>c natiirc of (be Attack, f-annot bn made to appear
uUl we gel tb tbo plan of War ; ätiU tlieiQ feniuin» a
9ood dtH iv Aay here, «nd we »lull again comniencc with
the CARipaign. in which a gr^i iiin'ji»i>it is ponUivrty
intfuUi.

(i> The tot aim of the attack is a victory. To all tlie
advanta|;cs which the dt^fmtkr findK m the nature of hU
sitiiaüontlhcaäsaitantc<\n only oppose supciior numbers;
and, perhap«, in addition, the Ui^ht adv^mtage which the
ieebng of bring \h<^ offensive and athancing udc giv^ an
Anny. Ttii: ünpoitancc of ilntt Iccling, however, i&
feoerally overrated : kr it doe« not La»t long, and will
not h<ild out again.tt real dÜEcuttiun. C)f cr^iUM", wc
vmoK that the defender is m (aultlc» and judicious
la all he doe» a* the aggressor Our object in this Observa-
tion is to let iViitU. thuüc vagnoideu^of sudden attack and
nirphtc which, in the attack, arc generally aMumed to
be fertile &ourcfs of virtnry, arfl which yet. in reality,
tkevti occur t^xcrpt tindef specui cucmnbht^incefi. The
nature of the real «trategic surprise, we h^ve already
«pok«n of etecwhmr,— If, then, the nttark i« infmor in
physical power, it must have the ascendancy ui moral

34 ON WAR iBCOK viiJ

coma in hne witb tb(^ drfcndcr, if the Uittrr bafl not
in the meantime m^e a lateral inovwneai» and placifd
himself across hi? path, he should tum himself in th«
dirucüon ol tlie üclvnikr'^ line ol cmnmLinic^liim m
order to «eek an action there ; ii the defender rcmauis
quite stflttonary, then the nssailant muat wheel round
tovracds him und aUuck Iiim in reur-

Of all the roads amongst which the assaU^nt has m
choice, the gTTJii roads which serve the commerce ol the
country are always Uie best and Uie nio&l natural to-'
choose. To avoid any vpry great bends, more direct
roadä, even i( smaller, niu:>t l*e chosen, fur a line of letieat
which deviates much from a direct line i» always perilous.

(5) The assailant, when he sets out with a view to a
great decisjoj], hits i?eldoni any reaä*m lor dividing his
forces» and if. net withstanding this, he does so. it gene-
rally proceeds from a want of clear vitws- H'j should
therefore nnly advLince with his columns on such 2. width
of front as will admit of their aU coming into action
together^ If Tlie enemy hiinsell has divided Iris foijces, fto
much the better for the ^ss^äot» and Xo present; tlus
further advantage small dem onsi rations should be made
against the enemy's corps which have separated frnni the
main body; \hcs.a arc the strategic famsc attaqun : a
detachment of force* for this purpose would then be
justifiable.

Such firp;irat]on into as m;iny columns as is indis*
pcnsably necessary must be marie use of for tlic disposition
of thp tjLctical Edtack in the enveloping form, for tbat
form h n^tur;«) to the attack, and must not be disregarded
without good rr^afton. But it must be only al a tut^ticul
nature, fi^r a i^Uatt^^ic envelopment when a great blow
take« pl*cc ift a complete waste of power. It ean only
be excused when the n!9«aibnt is so strong that Iherr can
be nci ikubt nl all ^boul the result ,

ft
ft
ft
ft

ft

I

CHAP. XV.) THEATRE OF WAR. Ac. JS

{(t) Bui the attack itho reqairt^t prudmct?. fur Ibc nssail-
OAt hft» also ft r«ar,änd hucontinuaicatioas which mutt be
protected. This wrvicc of protoction must be performed
09 (ur UJ» pij64^bli; by Lbe ma:in4.-r in wUich llu? Army
advancei, that U, to iptft by the Army it»df. If a force
niKt be ftprdnlly drlailrfl for thSii ^ty, and tbcrcffwc
a paitilion of forcef is rt^qutreO. thia cannut but iiJluially
weaken Iht force of the blow it*el(-— As a Jirgc Army
» always m the hnbit of ndviineing with n front of n
day's march al leafrt la breadth, therefuie, li ttiv lines
of rrtreat and eommunicalifm do not df^iat^ mtich frt>m
tUc pnprr^diciiI.-Lr, the covering oi Ihow lines w in most
cases attamed by the front of the Army^

Dangers cA thi§ deseription, to which lh<^ oxnilanl i»
expoftcd« mtut be meftMxrcd diicfly b^' thtr Kituation and
character of the advenary. When everything lie* under
the pressure of an bniniii<^1 grtat deci»iun, lhen^ is little
room tor the defmdcr to engnge in undertaking« of this
description ; the a»aUant hat, therefore, in ordinary
cifcumstimces not much to fear^ But if thr iidvunce is
over, it the assailant himsdf ih ^uduaUy p^iuiitg into the
defennve, then the covering of the rear become« every
moment more nrcf^^viiy. becomes more a thing of the
Urn ünpoTUnce. Vox the reir of the atdail^nt betng
naturally wraker fhnn that «f the defmder, therefore the
latter, long before he passes over to the real oflensave, and
even at the same time that he is yielding ground, mxy
hav4? commrnejTiJ I» operatt^ againid th» commuiucaliovM

the aääjuLmt.

36

ON WAR

[book VI LI

CHAPTER XVI

ATTACK OF A THEATRE OF WAR WITHOUT THE
VSEW TO A ORF.AT DECISION

(i) Although there is ndthw the will nor the power suffi-
cient lor a greut decision» there mny still exhX a decided
view in a strategic attack» but it is directed against seme
secondary object. If the attack saccceds, then, with the
attainment of tlni^ ubjrct the whole bU& agam into a d
state of r^t and equilibrium. U difficulties to a certain "
extent presi^nt themst^lve^, the güncral progress of the
attack comes tu ;l standstill befure the object Js gained.
Then in its place commences a me« ocr-asional offensive
or strategic manccuvring^ ThU is the chaTuctor of most
CAmpaigns-

(2) Thp objects which may be the aim of an offensive of
UÜ&descfiptio» are :

(a) A strip of territory ; gain in means of subäistence,
perhaps contnbutiore» sparing our own icrtjtory, equiva^
Ivnts in ik<^gotiations Cor peace — siicb ure the advantages
tu be derived from Ibis procedure. Sometimes an idea
of the credit of the Army is attached to it. as was per-^^H
petually tbi- case in the War^ of the French Marshals in V
the time of Louis XIV. It makes a \eiy impoitant
dillerence whether a portion of territory can be kept or
not- lit f,'eoL'r;il. the lir&l is the case only when the tern-
lory is on the ed^e of our own theatre of War, and forms a
natural complement of it. Only such portions come into
coiisideratioa as an equivalent in negotiating a peace,
other* iire usually only taken possesaion of *or the dura-
tion of a campaign, tu be evacuyit^d when winter brgimi,

(6) Ong o/ thr etismy's principal nuigtainti. U it is not
one of considerable importance, it can hardly be looked
upon ai the ub|ecl of an ofFtutüve determiuing a wlioW

CBAP- xvi.l THEATRE OF WAR

J7

campu^. It c^ainly in iisrif is a In« to the drfrn<3£*r,
and a f^nin to the aa^^anl ; tlie great advanlaee, haw*
ever. Irom it for the litt«r« b thai the loss may comp«!
tbe defeDtfcr to nrtirc a litllo nnd give up a strip of Icm-
tmy which he wuuld ütlierwUe häv« kepL Tlie cuplur«
o£ a naa^uinc h therefore in reality mo^e a mean», and it
only spoken tA h^rr as nn objt'Cl, b<T-.nisf, nntil captured,

brccittie», fof the time b«iD^. Üie immediate üeftnil« aim

action.

(tf) Tkfi c^pturr. ryf a ^ortrrfSÄ,— Wp huw^made the slf^e
of fortre»e& iJie sut>)ect of a separate chapter, to which
wc refer otir residers. For tbe reALHons there explained^
it is easy to concoiv« how it is that fotliesMs always
constitute the btst and most desirable object» to those
o6enxivc Waraand campai|^Tis in which viewt cannot W
directed to the complnlc overthrow of the enemy or the
conquest of an imporiant part of hi* territcryn We nuy
abo ea^ly ttnderit.an<^ how it in that in the Wars in the
Low Coantric«, where fortrcw» are so abundant, every-
thing ha* always turned on the poSMssion of one or other
of tbei^ forlTeaao, so mnch so Ihtit the iuc:rf*%ive con»
qiioU of whole pTDvinccft nn^i^ once appear as icading
iestmes ; while, on the other hand, each of these strong
places ti&ed 1o hv. regarded aa a separate thin^', which
bad an intrinsic value in itscU. and more attention was
paid to the convenience and facility with which it could
be attacked than to tlie value of the place ii»e]f<

At the same time, the attack of a place of «ome Impoft-
ance is always a f^rnt nndrrtaking, Ivcause it causes a
v«ry large expenditure ; ind. in Wjeb ip which tbe whole
b not ttaked at once on the game, this is a matter which
otight to l>e vtry mnch ronsidcred. Tlicreforr, snrh a
Stege takes its pl^e here as one of the most import^t
objects of a *trate|ic attack. Tbc more unimportant
a place, oi the les* earneslnös tliere is about the sipRC,

39

ON WAR

[book VI u

Ihr sm;tller the preparations (or il, the more il i&doM as z.
thing tn pauafU, so much the smaller al^ will be the
0tratfrg;ic ohjecl, ar\t\ the more it will be a service ftt for
BiniUl lorce^ and limited views ; and the whole thiiig then
often üinks into a kind orf sham-fightH inordertodoso the
tax^pfli^ with honour» because as nssailunt it is inctimbrnt
to (!(} Mime thing ■

(d) A succissfut combat, ^ttcattnifr, or ofOi battU, iar the
snkr of trophies, or tnc-rdy for the honour of Ihr 4nn%,
eamelinies even lor the mere ambition of Ihc Commandpers.
That this docs liappcn no one can doubt ^ iinloss hr knows
nothing at all of military history. Ln the campaigns of
thf French dnnng the reign of Louis XIV .m^^t of the
offensive battles worr- of Ibis kind. But whal is of more
importance for ns Js to observe that tfiese tl:ings are not
without objective value, they are not the mere pn&time
of vanity : they have a very distinct influence on Peace,
and therefore lead as it wer« direct to the obj«ct. The
military fame, the moral superiority of the Army and of the
General arc things, lbeinfl\iPnceof whicli.allhoughunseiai,
never ceases to bear upon the whole action in War»

The aim of such a combat of course presupposes ; (tf)
tliat there »s an a.deqnatc prospect of victory, [fl] thftt
there is not a very heavy stake dependent on the is^tie. —
Such ^ battle frmght in sitaitened lelations, and with a.
Limited object, must naturally not be confounded with a
victory which is rot turned to profttable aocoimt merely
from moral weaknesb.

(3) With the exception of the laU of these objects {d}
they may all be ntiainrd without a combat o1 importance,
and f*eneraHy they arc so oblained by the offensive.
Now« the mrsns which the Assailant l^as :tt command
without resorting to a decisive battle are derivod from
the inleiedts which the defensive ha« to protect in his
thc»trc of War ; they consist, therefore, in threatening

CHAF> xn.] THEATRE OF WAR 39

Uft Mao ol commvnicaDOTis, Hther thrmtgh objects coq-
necled witli sul»i&li;nctf, a» m:iKn/inctt, frttilr prcvinces,
waur comsuiucatio«)!. dx-, or important pctiiki& (bndgts,
dedic», «o4 such like), or also by placir^ cihcr d«1ach-
Bimbun til« occtipaticn uf titrong pc^litmEnittt-nti^ incon-
veniicntly nc-^ar to bim and from which be caiuwt igiin
drive Qs out ; the soiiriire of imporiant towns. f^rin<^ dia-
tricb», disturbed |>arta od tbe coiinlry, which ntny be
excited to rcbclJion, the threatening of wv^k sJli««, &c.
Ac. Should the attack cFFe^tuaUy mCemipt the com-
iDUiÜcutions. j.ad in »uch a pmmirr that tin- drfcnder
cannot re-c^t^btii^h thrm but at a great sacriücc, it compels
tiM dtdendcT to take up another po£t1ion more to the rsur
or to a dank to cover the objtcta, «it the Hine time giving
op obiccb^ of «fcondary hnport-inco. Thu« a ?ttnp of
tcmtcffy t&lcJt open ; a magazine or a fort rcwitncovrred ;
tb« one expoted to b« overrua, the otli«T to be invfr>t«d.
Out of ihh^ cf>mbnt-s Krealtr or le«t may ariu^, l>ut In
fruch case th'?y are not «ought for and treated ^t« an
object of the \V^ but «» a Dccessary crvi], und can never
exoeed a certain dcf^rn^ of greitnciu and importance.

(4) The Operation of the defensive on the communica-
tions o[ the oflennve ia 1 ktnd ol reaction which in War»
vagcd tor the great solution can only take place wh<^
the lines oi opcialion arc very long ; on the other hand,
this kind of reaction Ue9 more bi accordance with the
Hjitiire of things in WJirs wliieh are not aimed at tint |-Tv:it
solution. The enemy's hues of communication arc seldom
very long in sui:h a ca^ ; bnt then, neither is it here so
much aqoe<itiun of mllicting jjieal hisaes of thiv description
on the enemy, a mere impeding and cutting short hia
means of subsislencr often produces an ciTccr, nnd what
the lines want in length i-tmaile up for in ^ume degfi-e by
the length of time which can be expended in this kind of
contest with ibc pncmy : for this reason, the covering his

41 OH WAR [BOOK Vit

foF a sea&L>n> But there are cases m which the CBptnn;
oi this or tlut furUe&& is quite unavoidabJc, if the oH^n-S
sjvc is to b€ cortinued, and in such case a siege is lo be
coasidcTpd as an inlcnsiftcd progress of the attack; thc^^
crisis will hv &ü dilxIj greater tli« lesfi there has been dB«^|
cid«d previously. All that remains now lor coflisidemtioa
onthi&subjficl belongs to thcbciok otj the plan o( the War.

In campaigns with;i Jimited object, a fortrt^ i» generally
Dot the means but the end itself ; it is regarded a^ a »mall
independent cunqt](!St, and as such Itaa the fullnwing
advantages over every other : ^m

(i) Thht a fortress is a small, distinctly defined conquest,^"
which does not require a further expeiiditurc of force,
and therefore gives no cause to fear a reaction. ^H

(a) Tlialin negoliattngfor Peace, its value asanequiva^^
lent may be turned to account.

(3) That a siege is u real progress of the attack, or at
least Beems so, without const.intly dimini&hing the force
Ijkc every other advance of the oflensive^ ^m

U) That the siege is an enterprise without a catastropha^^

The result of these things is tliat the capture of one or
mote of the enemy's strong places is very frequently the
object of those strategic attacks which cannot aim ft^H
any higher object, ^B

The grounds which decide the choice of the fortress
which sitould bt^ attacked, in case that maybe donbtj
generally are :

(a) That it i» one which can be easily kept, therefoi
stands high in value as an equivalent in case of negotii
lions (or Peace.

(b) That the means of taking it are at hand, SmaN'
nieaü& ar« cidy suÄcient to take small places 1 but it ii
better to take d small one than to fail before a large oni^^

(c) The strength of its defences, which obviously arc
not always in proportion to it6 unportance m otlietf

II

I

I

k

CHAP, xvn] ATTACK OF FORTRHSSES 43

niftpncta. KotbinR H mure ithinid tlutn to viojdti forces
bcfon a vtry strong pl^c oi liltJo impoo&nce, if a plac«
of I«s ^rrengih Tnay be mado the obJ«ct of «ttftclL

{d) Tin; TitieiigUi iif th<^ jumamftit iukI r>{ the* i^ArtiMm
» wcU. If a fortrc» U n^ukly armed and iiisuOki«ntly
g&TTboncd. its capture must naturally be «atier; but
h^rre we mn^ ubacrve that ttie «trirngth nf the fi^niMii
and annamcnt are to be tt^koncd amongst those things
whkh make up the total imporlancr of the place, because
ganiMin and armainenta in. dirnctly pnrta ai the mrjny*;^
mdlitaxystreogth.vhichcannotbcf^idinihcsamemcaAiro
ol works of fortiücatiou. The conquest ol u forlresi witb
a strong ^amson can, therefore, much more readily tepay
the sacrifice it co>»t» than one with x-rry strong works,

(«) The facility of moving the aege-train. Must ^t*grs
(ail lor want of me;uis. ami tli? means are generally wont-
ing from tticdifecuJIyallendindthdr transport. Euprnr"»
swgeot Landrecl, i7i2,andFrG<lertck tho Great's sir^ of
OlmUtv, 1756, are very remarkable instances in point,

(/) Lastly, there remain« the facility of covcnng the
siege tt8 a point nnw to be cf-naidered.

There are two essentially diffen^nl wat)-* by wliich a
siege may be «wvered : by entr«idiing the besif^nfc force,
tJut u, fay a line of circtunvalUtinn, and by what is called
hncs of observation . The 6rst of these methods ha» gone
qnite out ol fu^hum. aJtbouf^li rvidrntly one important
point 9ipeaks in its favour, namely, that by this niethod
the foTcr of Ihr assailant <^ocs not suffer by division
vxnclly Ih^l ^At'akeuEnt; whichi%»ogeacmUy fmindagrrat
disadvantage at nefje^. But we grant there is still a
tvevkming in nnothrr way, to a very considerable degree,
because —

fi> The position round the forlre»», a« a rule, is of too
groat extent for Ihr ttrcnglh of thr army.

(z) The garrison, the streaglb cl whicli.added to that

<M

ON WAR

BOOK Yi\

ol Ihe relieving army» would only mAkc up the force
odgiiudly opposf d to u^. under thr-se circumstancfis is 1o be
loolcf^d upon as an pneiny's corps in Ih»^ middle oi oar
camp, which, protected by its walls, b invuintrabU^ or
at least not to be overpowered, by which its power is
immi-nsely increased.

(3) The defence of a line of circumvallatiön admits of
nothing bnt the mrGt absolute defensive, because Ihe
circular order, lacing oulwafds, ts the weakest and moat
disadvantageous o( all poa^ble orders of battle, ^nd i|fl
pntticulaily unfavourable to any advantageous counter-
att^ks. There is do alternative, in fact, but to defend^
ourselves to Ihe last exlremily within the en trench men ts<|
That these circumstances may cause a greater dlminQtloQ
of Ihe Army than one-third, which, perhaps, would be
occasioned by forming an army of observation, is easy to
conceive. If, nidded to that, we now think of Ihe general
preference which hai existed since the time of Frederick
Ihe Great lor the offensive, as it is called (but which, in
re^ility, is not always so), for movements and manceuvres,
and the aversion to entrenchments, we shäll not wendet
at lines o! drcumvatlation having gone quite out ol
fashion. But this weakening of the tactical resistance is
by no means its only disadvantage ; and we have only
reckoned up Ihe prejudices which forced themäelveü into
the judgment on the lines of clrcumvallalion next in
ordt^r after that disndvantage because thry are nearly
akin lo each other. A line of circumvalliilion in reality
only cover« that portion of the theatre of War which it
actually encloses ; all the rest is more or less given up to
the enemy if special detachments are not made use of
to cnvrr it, in wh^ch wny the very partition of force which
it was intended to obviatt! takes place. Thus the besieging
Army will be always in anxiety and embarrassment on
account of the convoys which it requires, and the covering

•

aiAP. XVII.] ATTACK OF FORTRESSES 45

the wmc by lines of circamvaJUtion » not <o be thought
ut if tbc Army nitd the sicgc-supplirs n-quiicd nrc con*
tidenble, «ad Üie euemy is ld the fii?ld üi strong forcB»
iirilf » under sucfa comUtions as utt found in th& Nether*
bods, wIktr thpTc is a whole systrm of lorlresebi^ IV^'^R
dcttc (o each other, ^od intermcdiat« IJDes connecting
them» wliioh cover the rest of the thealrc of War. and
CDtuidmibly ^htittcii ihr lines by wbidi troiLvport c^n be
afEcctcd» In the time of Louit XIV. the conception
of a ihcalTc of War had not yet bound itsolf up with
the poailion of an Army. In the Thmy Yeai*' War
particnlsirly, the ormic« moved here and Ihi^re iporadically
before this or that fortress, in Ih« neighbourhood of which
there w^ no enemy'» fore« at aU, and besieged it ai
long as the siege c^tiipmeot they had brought Vfith
ihem \asXed, aiul until aq enemy^it Army appraodied to
relieve the place. Tlien lines of drcumvallation had
their fonndation in lh<r nainre M ctrcumstanceä.

In future it in not hkdy they will be often und ai^aiR»
lude» where the enemy in the lieLd is very weak, or the
conception of th& theuire of War ^'ani8he» befüie that uf
the siege. Then it wdl be nAtutal to keep all the forcd
inthc«ief(r, a« B Mef;e by that me^nt iinqueition-
itns in energy in a high degree.

TheUneiof circLunviUatioii in the rcLgn uf LouiiXIV,,
at Ciunbrny und Valc-ndmne«, were nf little vac, -.la the
former were &torm«d hy Turenne, opposed to Cond^.
the latter by Cönd#oppH»ed to Tunfonc ; but wemuM not
overlook tiie endli::^ number of other gum^s in which they
were reacted, even when there exi&tcd in the place the
molt urgent need for relief ; and when the Commnnrter
on ll^H? ddeoMve «tide w;3.^ a man oE i;ieat Enterprise, a«
in 170S, when ViUan did not venture to attack tlie Allies
In their line« .-it Lille. Frede-rick the (ireat nt OltnlilE,
1758, and at Dresden, 1760, although he had no regular

ON WAR

[BOOK VllJ

]iiu>s of circumvalUtion, had a E^ysliTm which in al
ttaic WAS idcDticaJ ; hs uficd the s^mc Army to carry on
the siege, and also as a covering Army. The distance of
the Austrian Aniiy induced him to adtipL ihi^ plan at
OLmut£, but the loss of his convoy al Domi^tadtel made
him repent il; at Dresden in 1760, the motive« which
led liiin to this mode oi procef^ding w^re his contempt
for the Army of the Holy Ronton Empire, and his desire
to take Dresden as soon as possible,

Lu:»tlyp it i& a disadvantage m Unas oC circiunvallatioa,
that in case of a revcree it is mrire difficult t<> save the
aiege'trjitn. If a defeat is sustained al ^di^anceof oncor
more days^ march from the place besieged, the siege may
be raised before the enemy can arrive, and the heavy trains
may, in the irteantinie, gain also a day's march^

hi taJüßg up a poaition for an Army of observation, an
important que^ition to be considered is the distance at
which it should be placed from *he besieged place. This
question wiü. in most cases, be decided by ttie nature uf
the country, or by the position of other Armies or forces
with which the besiegers have to remain in communica-
lion. In other respect*, it is easy to see that, with a
greater distance, the^icge h bdler cöverM, but that by a
smaller diätance, not exceeding a few miles, the two Armias
AT* belter aWe to afford each other mutual support.

CHAPTER XVin

ATTACK OF CONVOYS

Thb attack and defenr*- of a convoy form a ^ubjecl
tactics: we should, |]iere fore, have uolhing to say upon
tlM subject here if it was not nwessary^ tirst, to demcn-
sirtfe feneralJy (be possibility of the thin^, which cat»

tiup. xviii) ATTACK OF CONVOYS 47

only be done from atiutegic motives and relations. We
ibould haw had to sprakof it in this rc*pcct before wticn
ticstiiigof tJiedekactf, h;idittt*jl Lnm ttut the lilt ttr which
caA be t-Aid abont it cun e^iiiiy be fromi^ to !»uit for both
attack and drfwicr, wbilr at ihr same time the fir« plays
Ih« higbd part m couuectioa witli it.

A moderate convoy of three or four hundred wiggons,
Id th< load be vh^t it mny, takr^ np n cniipic nf mile«, a
laigecoavDyokay beUamiJc&ui teiL^th. Now, how i» it
possible to expect that the few troops uiually lUotted to
4 convoy wiO «iifßc« for il:^ dHcnce ? If to thi« diliiculty
we add the imvietdy nature of this maä«. which can only
idvince at the slow«! pact», and which, b«id«i. is always
lublc to be thrown into disotdc^r, and l^ttly, that cvoty
pilt of a convoy must be equally protected, because the
moment tliat one pait is allackt^d by tlie enemy, the wlxole
\s broU(cht to a stop and thrown into a state of conliuion,
we may weU ask. How can tbc covering and defence of
nach a Iniin be possible! at all ? Or, in other words, why
are not alt convoys taken whfin llicy are attacked, and why
are not all attacked which require an e^ort, or, which is
the same thing, utl Ihut oume within reach ol the entmy ?
It is plain that all tactical expedient«, such as Tcmplchof's
nnoct impracticable Kheme of constantly hnlting and
UMfnblinc llie convoy ut &liort distances, and then moving
oEf afresh ; and the roitch better pliui of Scliamhorit, of
breaking up the convoy into ^vrral eoliimii.'-, are only
shght correctivefi od a radical evil.

Tfie expUnation consist« in this, that by far the greater
nnmbcTCilcionvnytidf^rivemiiticsra--nnty from the strategic
situation in general than any other parts expofncd to the
attacks of the enemy, which bestow» on ^heir limited
means of delence a very mui^h iIKrea^pd fthcacy. Con-
V03V generally move more or le« in rear of their own Army,
or. at least, at a great distance from that of the enemy.

48 ON WAR (800K VI

JIk cQiisifqueiice is, tliüt unly ytv^k «Jctacbments can
aenl lo attack them, and th^st ar< obliged to cover them-
sclvus by stTong reserves. Addt'd to this the unwieldiness
IX^li of the carriages iised m^ik^ il very diflkult to cairy
them oft ; the asaailiint must ihtrdore. in general, content
himselE with cutting the tnices, faking awnv the horsca,
And blowing up powder-waggcxis. by whicli llie whole U
certainly d<?taiai-'d and thrown into disorder, but not
curnplctely lost ; by all tbis wc may perceive that thjH
Kccurity ai «ucb trains hes more in the^e general relätiuas
Ihan in the defensive powfr of its escort. It naw to all
thi:& we add the defence by the e«:ortf which, although it
cannot by marching re*oh:tdy against the enemy directly
cover the convoy, is &til1 able to derange the plan ol tbe
enemy's attack ; then, at last, llie attack of a co^ivoy,
inKti^d oJ appearing <^!jsy and sure of success, will appe«^^
mther difficult, a.nd very uncertain in its result. ^^

But there remains still a chief point, which i& the danger
of the enemy's Army, or one of its fractions, reiaUatiTig on
the assaiiants of its convoy, and punishing it ultimately f<ic^_
the undifrtaking by defeating it. The appielieusion c8^
thi* puts a stop to many undertakings, without the real
cause ever appe^rini^ ; so tliat the safety of tlie convoy
is attributed to the e^ort, and people wontJer how &.
mifierable nrrangemcnl, such as an i^cort, should mcel
with such respect, In order to feel the truth of thii
observation *c have only to think of the famous retreat'
which Fiederick the tireat made through Bohtmia attcr^
the &iege of OlmiJtj, 1758, when the half of his Aniiy wad^
broken into a column of companies to cover a convoy of
^utH» carriages. What prevented Dauu from lulling 01
thi» monstrosity ? The fear that Frederick would ihroi
himwif upon him with the other half of his Amiy,
entaij|^lehL[ninA battle which Daundid nut deüre. What]
pievenied Laudon. who was constanilyat the si<le of xhM

CBAP. xvm-l ATTACK OF CONVOYS 4^.

convoy, from faning upon it at ZischbowitJt «nnrtifr and
more boldly than he did ? The fear that ht would get a
rap ovrt thr knuckles. Fifty mil« from his main Army
34x1 cocipictdy ^parated from it by Üxe Prussian Army,
he thoo^hl hiros^ in danger of a. serious defeat if the King,

I who hftd no reason ^t th^t time to bo coDCemed about
Dann, should f^ll upon bun with the bulk ol bis forcps.
1t bonly if (he strategic situation of ^n Army iuvolv««
it in the imnfitnrd nrct^'^ty M connecting itscK with Its
convoys by the d^ak or by it» front th;it th«i tiit^i; con-
vo>-* fife really [a great danger, and become an advan-
tagoou» object of attack for the cnenty, if hi« pci^ition
allowa him to dcUch troops for that purpose. The saine
eampai^ of 1758 affords an instance of the most com-
plete »ucce» of an luidertäJcing of this description» in the
cftpcurc of the convoy at Dom«tädtel, The road to Neiss
lay on the left flank of the Prussian position, and the

IKiDg's force^iwcre no neotraliKd by the siege and by tbe
troops watching Daiin, that the partisans had no re-iMU
lo be uneasy about themselves, and were able to make
their attack completely at their cäse,

|^^^len Eugene be^ie^d Landrecy in 1713. he drew his
ftupplies (or the siege from Bouchatn by Denain : there*
fore, in reiaUty, from the front of the str-vtcgic position.
It b well known what meanit he wai; obhjc^d to noe to
H orercome the diE^ulty o£ protcctmg liis convoys uo
that occasion, and Ld what embarrassments he involved

)hiro«:]f, eniiini; in a ccfmpMe cUungQ at circiimntanci«.
The conclusion we draw, therefore, ifi that hcwover easy
ui attack on a convoy may appear in it^ lacTical a»pecti
still it has not mticfi m it> favour on strategic i^tounda,
and only promises important results in iht exceptional
instances of Uncs of commnnication vrty much exp<i!uid-

voi^ 111.

30

ON WAR

[BOOK VI

CHAPTER XrX

ATTACK ON THE ENEMY'S ARMY W FTS
CANTONMENTS

Wb have not tre&led this subject in the defence. bec^uM
u lini- til c;jnlonmcnts is not tn bi? rt^gnrdrd as a drff^nfüve
mt%ns> but as a mere existence ol the Army in a stat^
which implies little readiness for battle. In res]
to tliis readiness lor battJe, we therefore did not
beyond wliat we required to say in connection with this
coDdiiiuu ot an Army lu lUe thirteenth chapter of
Afth book,

Btit here, in conaddrring tlic .ittai^k, wr have to thii
of an cncmy^ Army in ctintonrtients in aJi respect« as a'
speciaJ object i for. in the lirst place, such an attM'k is
a very pccxUiar kind in itseli ; and, in the n^xl place, it maj
beconsidercd as a sUategic means of particnlar cSicocy-J
Here we have before U5, thereiore, not the question <ji an
onslaught on a single cantonment or a smuU body dis-
persed anmngst a few viUages^ a^ the üriangewenta far
that arc entirely of a tactical nature, but d the attack
of a larg^ Armv, distributed in canlonments more or
les& extensive ; aji attack in which Üie object is not thf^_
mere surprise of a single cantonment, but to prcve^nt th^l
assembly oj the Aiiny.

The attack on an enemy's Army in cantonments is
therefore the sjirprise cf an Army not assembled. II thia^_
stixprz^ SQcceed^ fully, then the enemy's Army ifi pr»^|
vented iiom reaching its appointed place of assesnbly,
iAdi ihcrHore, compelled tn choose another more to the
rear ; as this change ol liie point ol assembly lo the reaj
iu a state of such emergency oin seldom be efiected in lest
than a d«y's march, but ^nemJly will require several day^^f
tbe liK& of ground which this occasions is by no means

stat^

^pcctfl

this^

»

>

vx tittigaificuil Joss ; and tbib ib tbe Ü£»t «idv^inta^«
gained b>- the auftiUnt.

Bat now, tbis «urprUr which t% in connection with th«
|til«faJ le&atioofij may oTTtainly at tbe same time, m iu
<aauii/tDcaaaii, be ^n umslau^hl on aom^ of tlie «n^my's
dogle cantoDmrntSs irnt certainly upnn uXU Q^ upon ;i gn^-^t
ntftny. because that would buppoM a tcaltrrmg of the
ftttadciog Army to an extent «hich coutd oevn be
advi»bl<i. TUatTforc, unly tlif^ incut itdvnncnd qu.irler»»
ofkly tliose which lie in the direction of the attacking
coJwnAS, can be «nrpmod. and ev«n this will seldom
h^ifwn to many ui tlicm, oi l^i^ Eorc«« cannot «mly
>ppm^ uD0b6c-r\'cd. However, this Hcmcni of the
altacJe ia by no means to be diäTf^rded ; and we
reckon the Mivantage« which may l>e thus obtained
u the sccood advantagt of thf srtrpnsr,

A third advantagB consists in the minor combats forced
upon tht enemy in which his Jesses will be considerable.
A great body ci troops do« not assemble itscK at once
by Single battalions at the spot appomlod for fhe general
otmocntntUiD of the Anny> but usually forms itself by
EMgatdes, IXvinon», or Corps, in the first pTac^, And
tbes« masses cannot Ihvn hattm at full spred to the
rrndexvous ; in case of meeting with an enemy's colutnn
in thrlr coiirsr, ihry an? nblit^od to enR^ße in n combat ;
Hiow, tjiey aiay certainly come oft victorious in the same,
particularly if the enemy's attacking column is not of
miFicirnt ^rengtli, Inil m conqueriu^', thiry lose torn*,
uid, m most cases, ^ tnky be c^ily conceived, a Corp«,
mider such circumstances, and In the general t<^ndenry
to gain a point whicb lies to the rear, wUl rot make ioiy
bnu^iftl Uf« of ill victory. On the other h^ind. they
may be beaten, and that ir the most prohahk i-^t^mc in
itMlf, becauao tht;y have not time to organise a good
rcsiatance. We may. therefore, very well suppose that

ja ON WAR {BOOK

in an atUck weU planned and «xMuted» the assAih

through the5& p^rlJal combats will gathe^r up a ccmsit
abl« aumber of trophies, which l>ecoine ä pruicipaJ point
in the general rr^sult.

Lastly, the fonrlh advantage^ and the keystone at
whole, is a certain momentary disorganisation and
couragcmcnt on Ihc side of the enemy, which, wlien thp
force is at last assemblttd. s<'ldom allows di its beini?
immediately brought into action, and gener^y obliges
the parry Attacked lo abandon still more ground to his
assailant, and to make a change generally in his plaa o4
operations.

Such are the proper cesuUs of a successful surprise of
the en«Biy in cantonments, that is, of on« in which thiH
enemy 15 prevented from assembling his Army without
loss at the pomt fixed m his plan. But by the nature
of the case, success has many degrees ; and, therefore,
the results may lie very great tn one case, and hardly
worth mentioning in another^ But even when^ throu^
the complete success of the enterprise, these results are
considemble. they will seldom bear comparison with
the gain of a great battle, partly because, m the first
place, the trophies are seldom as great, and in the next,
the moral impressioTi never strikes so deep.

This general result must always be kept in view, that
we may not promisi^ ourselves more from an enterpria^l
ol this kind than it can give. Mauy hold it to be the
Kon pins ultra of offensive activity ; but it is not so by
siny means, as we may so.- from this analysis, as well a*^
from military history.

One of the most brilliant surpirlaa m history b tha|
mndr by the Duke of fjnraine in 1643p ^^ the canton"
mcnts of the French» under General Ranaan, at Dutt-
lingen. The Corps was 16,000 men, and they lost the
General comnumding and 7000 men ; it vtiv^ a oumph

I

I
I

Kix.} THE ENEMY'S ARMY, &c. 53

d«f«at. The want of outposU was the cause of Xh<:

The HurprJM? of Tmunnc at MrTfir-nth<?im (M^iriendaJ,
u tbe French call it), in 1644, is in like manner to be
regarded itt rqiiaJ to a defeat io its effects, for he lost
jOoo ineu out of 8000. whicb waa prmcipdly «iwini: tu
his having b«en led into making an untimely ftand after
hcgothifimmi awcmWeri, Such resiilT'* wrrannot^ there*
fore^olten reckon upoo ; ii wasraUi^ri Hil- leauttofanill-
jvdged action than of the mrpri», properly spcaldng, for
'Hircnnt might easily have avoided the action, and have
rallied his troop« upon those m mvrt diitjint i^uarters,

A third notfid surprise is that which Turennc made
OR the AUIcK under the great Elector, the Imperial
Gfnera] Doumonville and the Duke of Lorrainen in
Alsace» in the year 1674. The truphie^ were very «mall,
tbc low of the AUies did not exceed aooo or 3000 men.
which could not decide the fate of a force of 50.000 ; but
the Allie* considered that they cotild not venture to
nuke any fnithcr resistanci? in Alsace, and retired across
tb« Rhine a^n. Thi« airal^c result wx^ oQ tliat
Turenne wanted, but we must not look for the cauw« of
it entirely in the surpnae. Titrtnne surprised Ihc plans
of his opponents mor* than the troops thcniselv*» ; the
vnknt of ttnaniiuity amongst the :illicrd Cmftr-nU and
the proximity of the Rhine did the rest. This cveni
altogether dr-^a-rvrs a doscr examination, as it is genc-
mliy view«d ui ;i ^ronf; li^ht.

Id 1742. Ndpperg surprised Frederick the Great in
his quarters - the wliob of the result was that the Kinf
iras obliged to 6^ht tlic battle of Mullwits before he had
collected all hb forces, and with a change of front.

In 1745, Frrdeiick tlie (heat surprised the Uukr of
Lorraine in his CAntonments in Lusatia : the chief success
was through the real surprise of one of the caost im*

54 ON WAR [book \ii.

portant qumlers, that of Henncrsiiorf, by which the
Aufttrinns suffered a lo^ of 2000 men ; the gfnrral result
wa« thai the Duke of Löcraine retrealt-d to Buliurtia by
Upper Ltisatia. but Miiit did not at all prevent his re-
tunung inlu Saxony by i\\c left bank of the Kibe, »
that without the battJ« ol Ke^^selsdorf, there would have
Iwcti no important rcsul*.

1758. The Duke Ferdinand snrprised the Ftcnch
quarters; the immedute result \Mas that the Fiench
to^t some thousands of men, and wem obliged to Ukke
tip a position behind the Aller, The moral effect may
hive been of more importance, and may have bad some
influence on the sub&c.'queiit evacuattun of Westphalia*

If from these different examples we seek for a con-
clusion as to the efBcw^y of this kind of attack, then onJv
the two first can be put tti comparison with a battle
^ined> But the forces engaged were only small, and
the want of outposts in the system of War in those days
was a cite uns tu ncp preatTy in favour of tljpse enter-
prises- Although th« tour other cases must bo reckoned
completely successfnl erterprises, it is plain that not one
of them is to be cumpatcd with a battle gained as respect«
its result. The general result could not have takeo
place ill any ol them except with an ad\'ersaTy weak
ui will and character, and therefore it did not take place
at nil in the cose of 1742,

In 1^06 the Pnisuan Army contemplated surprttif
the French in this manner in Franconia. The c«n
promised well fm* a satisfactory result, buoiuiparte
was not present, the French Corps were in widely ex-
tended cantonments ; under these circumstances, the
Pruwians, iicting wilb great rcA^lutiou and activity,
itiight very well reckon on driving the Frencli back across
the Rhine, with more or less loss. But this was also all ;
if tliey reckoned^upon mons tor instance, on lollowui^ up

cjtAF, XIX.] THE ESEMY^S ARMY, Ac. {3

their advantages beyond tbe Rhine, or on gaimog such
'A moTut aicendancy that thtr FrrticU wriuld nnt ^if^m
v«aUire to appttf 0£t the n^t bank of the river in the
tune campaign, Mcb an expeclalion bad 00 sufficient
groundR.

In tbe bffftjuxmg of August i9i3, tht* Rti:t«aa-£ from
Smolensk meditated falling upon the cantonments of
the Frrnrh whrn Napoleon haitM hh Army in the nclgh-
bOQibood of Witepfik. But tliey wdiiied courage to
carry oat the enterprt« : and it W4* fortunate for them
tbcy did ; for as tlic Frcucb C^mmnntlrr with hi^ ci^nlrc
was Dot only mere than twice the strength of their centre,
bQt uIk» in himself tbe mo^l resolute leader thüt ever lived,
as farther, the lo^ of a few miles of groiiud would have
dachkd nothing, and there was no natura] obftt^cle in
ajiy feature ol the cüuntrynear enough up to which ttiey
migbt pumue then success, and by that means, in %omt
mcamrc make it ctrtain. and Ustly» as the War of the
year iSia wat not in any way it camp^i^n of that kind
irhich draw« itMtl in a languid way to n conclusion, but
the «eriou5 ptnn of an asaaElant who had made up Idt
miAd to OQDquer his opponent cy^mpletely — therefore 1h«
Uidirg result* to be expected from a suq>ri»e of the
enemy in \m <ju-trt*-r* appear nothing else than utterly
dbpropoTtJonate to the solution of the problan, they
eOuld not ^5tify a hope of making good by their means
ttie great tnei^iiftlily of forre* and other fetation«. But
this «cheme serves to show how ^ confused idea of the
effect of this means nay lead to an entirely false appli"
cnlion of the aame.

What haa been hitharto said, places the anbjrct in the
l^ht of a stralt^c m^ms^ But it lies In Its nature that
its «^acution aha bt not purely tactical, but m part be-
longs again to Strategy »0 far. particaliirly that such an
atlackKgenerallymadf onafront ofcnnsidrrahleundth,

^6 ON WAR [BOOK nL

and the Army which carries it out can. and generally will,
come to blows before it is concentrated, so that the whole
is an aggloraoTation of partial combats. We mu^t now
add a few words on the most natoraJ organisation ot su&h
an attack.

The fir_^t crmditton is :

(i) To attack the front of the enemy's quartern in a
certain width of front, for (hat is the only means by which
we can reallv surprise several cantonments, cut trff others,
aiid create generally that disorganisation in the enemy**
Army which is intended. — The number of. and the in-
tervals between, the columns must depend on circum-
stances,

(a) The direction of the different columns must con-
verge upon a point where it is intended they should
unite ; for the enemy ends more or less with a concen-
tration of his force, and therefore we must do the game.
This point of concentration should, if possible, be the
enemy's point of assembly, or lie on his line of retreat,
]i x^ill tiaturally be best where that line crosses an im-
portant obstacle in the country,

(3) The separate columns when they come in contact
with the enemy's forces must attack them with gn^t
determmalion, with dash and boldness, as they have
general relations in their favour, and daring is always
there in its right place. From this it follows that the
Commanders of the separate columns must be allowed
freedom ol action and full power in this respect,

(4) The tactical plan of attack against those of the
pneray*5 troops that are the first to place themselves in
position must always be directed to turn a Sank, for the
greatest i^ault is always to be expected by separating
the several Oirps. and cutting them off.

(5) Each of the columns mxist be composed of portions
nf the three arm^, and must not betstinted in cavAJry, it

nay evm «amctirncs be well to divide amongst ttic;ti
the whole of tb« reserve cavalry ; lor it wotüd be 4 grcJ^t
miatAke to suppose th&t this body oi cavalry could play
oay giifit port in a mäs^ in 4n cntprprw at tUiü a^rt.
Tbc &nt vüU^, the sroallcst biidg«» the most ügnificint
tbkkei would bring it to a halt.

(6) Allliou^ti it lie» iu (he nature of a soipris« thai
the a^uiUiit should not s^nd his xdvince-gtiard very
far in front, that principle only appliea in thr finti np-
proacb to Itie eceuiyV quarters. Whea the ä^'ht häs
comriMnced in the cncnriy's qn-irlPTSH and therefore all
that was to he- expected from nctwil ^urpn&e h-is been
gamed» then tb« colunms oi the ^dvance-^ird of aJl
aims should push on as far as possibli^, for they may
greatJy incrcnfie the confusion on the side of th<? enemy
by more rapid movement. It a only by this m«ant
that it becomes possible to cuir^' ufE hert' and tliere the
OMSS of baggage, artillery, non -elective«, and cairp-
foUowers, which have to be dragged after a cantonment
suddenly broken up, and these ndvance-guard^ must
ftten be the chid uutiuinents in turning and cutting u£C
the enemy,

(7) Finally, the retreat In case of tlltttOC«l8 mu&t bfl
thought of, and a rallying-point be üxtd upon before-
hand.

CHAPTER XX

DIVERSION

to the ordinary use of language» under the
'äfrersion is understood such an ii^cursion into the
owmy's country as draws oS a portion of fais force (rora
the principa] pomt. It is only when this is the chief end
in view, and not the gain of the object which is selected

5» ON WAR [BOOK VII,

as th« point of attack, that i1 is an enl^rpHse of a spscia]
charactw, othcnivise it is only an ordinary attack.

N.^turaUy tho diversion must ctt thc^am« tim« always
have an object of attack, for it is ooJy the value of tliis
object tliat will induce the enemy to send troops for its
protection ; besides« in case th« uaderiaking does not
succeed as a diveraion, this objprt is a compensation for
the forces expended in the attempl.

Thesc objects of attack may be fortresses, or important
m^gurnnfü, er Heb and large tovms, especinlly capital
cities, contnbutioaft of aU kind& ; lastly, assistance may
be afforded in this way to discontented subjects of the
enemy.

It i» easy to conceive that diversions may be o««illl,
but thoy certainty arc not so always; on the contrary,
tbey are just as often injurious. The chiet condition it
that they should withdraw from the principal theatre
of the War nore of the enemy's troops than we employ
cm the diversion ; for if they uirly succeed in drawing oß
|nst the same number then their efficacy ,is divcnicns,
properly colled, ceases« and the undertaking becomes a
mere subordinate attack. Even where, on account of
circumstances, we have in view to attain a very great
end with a very small force, as, for instance, to make an
easy capture of an important fortress, and another
attack is made adjoining to the principal attack, to
a^ist the latter, that is no longer a diversion. Whoa
two States are at War» and a third falls upon one Oif
them, such an event is veiy commonly called adiversiou—
but such an attack dißers in nothing from an ordinary
Attack except in its direction ■ there 15, thrfrforr, no
occasion to give it a particular name, Jor in theory tt
should be a rule only to denote by particular names
such things as arc in their nature distinct.

But if nriAll forces are to attract large onea, there most

CHAP. XX.] DIVERSION 59

obviously be wmr sprcinl ranAr. and, thtrttott, ttvt the
object of a divi^r^on it ia oot suffici^iil nierely to d«Ucb
■one troops to a point not hitherto ixcäsned,

\i the «nÜAHt with ;i small drt«chmcTit of 1000 men
avecTuns one o( hi» envniy*» pruvinces. iiot bdutnging ti>
the theatre of War, and levies contribution«, &c,, it is
easy txi K« bcfareh^infl thnt th^ cnrmy rjtiinot pal a
9top to this by dcUchmg 1000 men, but that kl he meanä
to protect the province from invader», he mti« at all
rvmtt «end a ouniülcrsiblv lor^rr force. But it may
be a&ktdn Cannot a defender, In&tesd of protecting hit
own ptovioce, teHon the baluici> by lending :i vmiljir
dirtaichiacnt to plunder a province in our country f
Therefore, if an ftdvajit^tge is to be obtftincd by aa
aggressor in this way, it must first be avertained
that there is more to be got or to be thicatcnrd in the
defender'» provinces than in hi« own. If this ii the
case, then tio dcubt & i^^eak diversion will occupy a force
on the enemy's !»ide ^leuter than that composing the
eotrrprise. On the other hand, thi» advantage niturully
diminishes ss the maiMft increase, for 50,000 men can
defend a province of moderate extent not only a^inst
equal but «ven against srnnewhat suprrior nninbiTS-
T^vt advAntnge of large diversioits is, thereiore, very
doubtful, and the greater they become the more d«i»ive
mtist be the nth^i circumstances which favtmr \x diver-
if any good is to come out of such an enlcrpri»«
the whole,
Sow Ihe*?^ lavouiable circumstances luay be :

(a) Forces which the assailant holds available for a
diversion without weakening the gtfitt mass of his (orce-

(b) Points belonging to the defender which are of
vtXsd importance to him and can be thrratcned by a
divcr^un.

(c) Discontented subjects of the same«

6o ON WAR (BOOK VII.

(i^ A rich ptoviiicc which can supply a coneiderabltr
quantity of miinitioQ» of war.

H only !bese di vi-Tsj ons arp undprta-kon, wliir-h, whrii
tested by these diffcrenl considerations, promise fesuitä,
it wiU be found that an opportunity of making a, diver-
sion does aol offer irequently.

But now corae* another important point. Every
diversion brings War into a district into which it would
not olliejwi&e have penetrated ; for (hat reason il
will always be the means» more or less, of calling forth
military forces which would olherwise have continued
in abeyanc-?, tliis will be done in a way which will be
very sen^bly felt if the enemy has any organised militia,
and means of arming the Nation at large. It is qmte
in the natural order of things, and amply shown by
experience, that il a district is suddenly threatened
by an enemy's force, and nothing has been prepared
beforehand for its defence, all the most efficient olBcial
functionaries imm^iatety lay hold of and set in motion
every extraordinary means that can he imagined, in
order to ward off the impending danger. Thus, new
powers of resistance spring up, such as are next to a
people's War, and may easily excite one.

Thia is a point which should be kept well in view in
every diversion, in order that we may not dig our own
graves.

The expedilions to North Holland in 1799, arid to
Walcheren m iBo<), regarded as diversions, are only lo
be justified in so far that there was no other way of
employing the English troops: but there is no doubt
that the sum total of the means of resistance of tho
French was thereby increased, and every lajiding in
France would have just the same effect. To thre^ilen
the French coast certainly offers great advantages,
t^ecause by that_means an important body of troop*

CiiAP. XXI.1 INVASION

become« ncutr^Kd in watching the coast, but a Unding
with a liT^c iotcc can ncvrr be justiäablc unices wd can
couflt on tht? a-s&b1ai)ce of a prov-inc«; in uiiptiMÜon to
the Govcmnicnt.

Th^ kda a grp^t dcci^on i^ looked forward to in War
the moftf WÜ1 di^'^rsion« be allowable, but teo mtich Üie
ntuTcT will ;tl£0 certiinl^ be the gun to be derived Crom
them. They are only a means of bringing the sta^ant
into motion^

EXECVTTON

it) A diversion may include in itself a real attack, then
the execution h^ no special character in itself except
boldness and expcditjoo,

(2) It may also have as an object to appear more than
it TtgMy i», being, in fact, a df^nonslration ^ well»
The special meaiu to be employed in such a case can
only suggest themselves to a »uhtil mind well versed in
meo and in ihr existing sl^ite of circ urn stances. It
f(^vn from the nature of the thing that there must b« a
I fireat fracAioning of forces on such occasions.
^H (3) If the forces employed are not i^uite tncotisiderabLOj
^M tod the retreat is restricled to certain points, then a
H r«Mrv« on which the whole may rally is an essential
^l condition.

I

CHAPTER XXi
INVASION

AuflOST all that we have In !tay on this subject cons:st£
in an expl^jialion of the term. We tind the expression
very frequently used by modem authors and also that
they pretend to denote by it Sdmuthiiig particular,
Gu<r7€ J'invsfie» occurs pcrp(*lu^1Iy in French authors.

A

es ON WAR (BOOK vir.

They a% tt as a term for every Attach which cn(f!TS
deep into the «nejiiy's country, and perhaps äüRictLmce
mean to apply it a* the aotUhe^s to methodical attack,
tlmt is, or»; which only nibbtcy at the fmntirr. But
thi& is a very uuphiloäapbical couEumuq oi langaa^.
Whfrth«r AD attack is tc b« confined to the frontier or lo
be Crimed into the hcMl of the country', whether it shaU
make the sfimre oi iht vuemy'^ strong places the chief
object, or seek out the core oJ the enemy's power» and
purstie it unTL^mittingly, is the result of circumsl;tnces,
and not dependent on a systenj. In some cases, lo push
forward miiy be more methodicoJ, and at the same time
more prudent thin to tarry on the (rontier» but in
most cases it is nothing else than juat the fortiinale
result oi a vifjorous eUtack, and consequently does not
difier from it in any lespecL

ON THE CITLMINATING POINT OF VICTORY*

The conqueror in a War ls not always in a condition
to subdue his adversary completely. Often, in lacl
almost universally, there is a culmmating point oE victoty.
Experience shows this sutTiciently ; but as the subject
ifl one cspodaJly important tor the theory of War, and
the pivot oi aJmost all plans of campaigns, while, al the
same time, on its surface some apparent contradictions
ghlter, as in ever-changing coJour^, we therefore wish to
examme it more closely, and took for its efisenlial causes.

Victory, as a rule, springs from a preponderance of
thr «nm of ail the physical and moral powers combined ;
uodoubtodly it tacr^asas this preponderance, or it would
not be sought for and purchased al a great sacrifice.
Victory it^df dues this unqur^tionably ; also its cooise-
quencc« have the »anie efiect, but not to the utmost

• Sät Cht.pttn IV. uul V.

point— £ea«TaUy oaly up tu a certain pomL Thi» point
may b« very n^r at huM, jukd is MKneUmes to aear
that the whale, ni the risiuJts of a victncioi» bnltlfr nr€
coAliDod to ftn increase od the moreJ vupenority, Uow
thb com«4 about we have now to examine.

In the prcftTd!* »1 action in W'iiTt the combatant Cofce
i* ia ctwi atly nuMtinf with clwucots which btiei^tlien
it, tfid others which weaken it. Heoce it is a question
o^mpenohtyonancMdrnr thn other. Aüi-vrrydiniinii-
boo of power on one adc » to be regarded u an incrcaM
«• the opposite, it foUova. of course, that this double
Ctmoit, thk ebb and flow, tako plac« wbcthcr Uoop»
arc advtmcing or rettring.

It is tfaerdore necesäary to find out the principal c&uae
of this alteration m the one cue to determine the olher
along with H.

In advancing, th^ ino»t important cause« ol the trurMSe
0/ tUengtk whxdi the assailuit gains, are :

(i) The loss which the enemy's Army suff erf . because
it is usually grcstrx than that of the c'lss^ailant.

(a) The loss which the eneoay suffers in inert niihtaty
meanSr such as magaiine«, depots, bridges, &c. , and which
th« osuilant docs not sho^e with him.

(3) Thai from the moment the assailaat enters Iht-
enemy^ UariUtry, there is a Ujha of provincei to thr
MeocCt coDAcquen tly of the sources of new military lorcas.

(4) That thr aHvanr.mg ArmytEsin^ a portion of Ihose
mourcc?^ m other wordu, i;aius Uie udvantu^;^ ol hving
at the expense of the enemy.

(5) Thr low of internal orgünisntion and of the rc^lar
«CUon of eveiything on tlte side of the vncmy.

(6) That the AMx^ci the enemy secede from him, and
othorK join the conqueror^

(7) LasÜy» the di scour J^gcment of the enen^y who leU
the arms, in »om« n^ejistire, drop out of his hands.

$4 ON WAR [book vir.

The causes M dicrtAie of iir£ngth in an Army advancing,
ore :

(i) That it i£ compelled Xo lay siege to the enemy's
fortTcav«. to blockade them or observe them ; or that
(he enemy, who did the samp before the victory, in his
ntrcat draw^ in these troops to his main body^

(a) That from the moment the assailant «nters the
enemy's territory, the natuie of thr theatre of war is
changed ; it becomes hostile ; we roust occupy it, for we
cannot call any portion our own beyond what is in actual
occupation and yet it everywhere presents difiiculties
to the whole machine- which must necessarily tend to
weaken its effects.

(3) Thai we are remo%'ing lurther away from our re-
sources, whilst the enemy is drawing nearer to his ;
this causes a delay in the replacement ot expended
power.

(4) That the danger which threatens the Slate, rouses
other powers to its protection

(5) Lastly, the greater efforts ol the advcrsaiy. in
consequence of the increased danger ; on the other hand,
a relaxation of eflort on the side of the victorious State,

All thebe advantages and disadvantages can exist
together, meet each other in a certain measure, and
pursue ttieir way in opposite direcLions, except that
the last meet as real opposiies, cannot pass, therefore
mutually exclude each other> This ilone shows how
intinitely difierent may be the effect of a victory accord-
ing as it stuns the vanquished or stimulates him to
great« exertions.

We shall now try to characterise, in a few words, each
of these points singly,

(i) The loss o( the enemy when defeated may be at
the greatest in the fir^t moment of defeat, tnd then
daily dimini^ in amount until it amves at a point

*

i

CHAP, TXLi

TNVASK

fi5

wbere tlir balance is restored as re^nls onr fotte ; but
tt may go on increasing every d^y m otn ascending ntio.
Til? dißcTi!n<:r- ol ^Liuatton and relatione dcicrminfs this^
SVe can ouly viy iJiut, in |;enCTal, with a gor>d Army
tbe first u"iU be the ca*c, with an indifferent Army tbt
9CCCT\^ ; nr'Xt to the spirit of thr troops, the spirit of
Ibc Gmriiuiif^nl is br-tc iht^. most import^inl thing. It
Ü oi sreat ccniequence in War to distinguish t>ctwocD
tbe two rnft*A in practice, in order not to stop jmt at
the pout wber« we ou|^it to begin in gooij eamettt, ami

(3) The loss which thi? «ncniy sustains in Ibat part
of tbe apparatus of War wtnch U inert, may «bb and
flow just tn iht liune mann^^r, and thts will dtrpcnd on
tbe iiCCideiitd pcvition and nature of the dc]»(>ts ham
wbicb *opplics are drawn. Tliia subject, however, bi
tbe present day, cannot be compared with tbe othe»
in point of importance.

(3) The third advantage must necessarily increase as
the Army advance«; indeed, it may be 4üid that il doea
not oonto into consideration until an Army has pencttntcd
far into the rnrmy% country^ that is to »ay* until a
third or a fourth of the country haa been left in rear.
In addition, the intiinnc value which a province has in
coaneciion with the War comes also into consideration.

In tba sanse way the fourtli advant^e -.liuuld increase
irith tbe ad^-ance.

Bat with respect to thrse two Inst, it i% also lo be
obarTved that tlieir influence on the combataiU powers
actually engaged in the stnjggle i» «Jdom felt *o im-
mediately ; Ihry cnly work «Imvly ^nH by n circuitous
conrae ; therefore wb sliould not bend the bow too inucb
on their account, that is to say, not place ounelves in
any dAn^crou» pmiiiim.

Tbe nlih advantage, again, only comos into conGldera*

VOL. lU. E

66 ^^ ON WAR pooK VII.

tion ir wo have made a coneidviabk ^dv^uce, and if by
tb« form cJ tLe «necny'a coimtry some provinces can be
detached bam thv. principal mass, ns the^, hke limbs
Coaipr^&sed by ligatures» u^uaUy soon die oH-

As to six and ^vcrn. it is at least probable that they
incresse with the advance ; iurthtTmorc, we shall reium
to theju hcreaiUr. Let us now puss ou to the causes of
weakness.

{i) The besieging, blockade, and investment of for-
trisse» geueraily increase aft the Army advajice». Thi»
weakeeing influence alone act* so powerfully on the
condition oj ihe tornbatan^ (otcfi, that it may soon out-
weigh all the advantages gained- No doubt, in modem
times, Ji syslem has hcen introduced o1 blockading places
with i small number oi troops, or oi watchjn§ theni with
fl still smaller Duniber : and alK> the enemy mu&t kwp
gajTisona in thern. Neverlheleas, ihey remair a great
element of security, The garrL&uaa consist very often
in half of people, who have taken no pait in the War
previously. Betone those places which are situated
near the hrie of communiciition, U is nficessary lor the
as^Uant to leave a force at least double the strengtli
of the ganison ; and if it is desirable lo iay iormal siege
to» or to starve out, one single considerable place, a snial]
Ajtny is required for the purpose,

(2) Tlie second cause, the taking up a theatre of War
in the enemy's country, increases necesaarJly with tbe
advatkcei and Ü it does noi further weaken the condition
of the combatant force at the moment, it does so al all
events in the long run.

We can only regard as oiir theatre of War, 90 naiKb
ol the enemy*» country as we actually poäse6« ; that is
to say, where we either have small bodies in the fieldt
or where we hüve left here itnd there strong garrisons in
lBi$ß town», ur 0I4IJOUS aJoug tirt roadsj ate, ; nuw how-

^
>

N
N

'chap. XXI.] INVASION? 67

ever fiioaH tbe garrisons may be which are detached, still
tbey wralKTi the combatant fore« conaJdr^rably. But
this is tJi« Hialltst cviL

£vGfy Army bu ttrat«-^ Ö2nk«, chat is, tht country
whkcb botfdds both iidea oi its lin^s o( commuaicatioiv ;
till? vnMl;iiei» oJ Uivär |uitis i% nut sensibly Ie.lt »!& long
u the cocjQy is biroilaily ^tu^ted wiü^ respect to lü*.
Bat thftt can only be the case as long as wc arc in out
oura coiiutry; as sooc as w? get into the cacLrny*«
coontry» the weakness of thes<; parts is felt very much,
b«c&Ufic the smallest enteq^rise promises %mc result
•mbim diTKtfd ^g^uidt a Jong line orJy f<«bly. or cot
aU, covered; and these attacks may be made from any
qnartcr in an enemy's country.

The further we «dvtnce, the longer these flanks
iMcomif, and the danger urüing from them is enhanced
ifi an incrcuud ratio, for not only are they difficult to
cover, but the spirit of enterprise is also first rousod in
the enemy, chiefly by long insecure lines of com-
munication, and the consequences which their toss
may «nUul in cue of a retreat arc matter of grave
cmuvienation-

All this contributes to place a frcsli load on iui ad-
vanciAg Army at every step cd it« progress ; so that if
■II has not commenced with a morr than ordinary Hupe-
riority, it will foel itself always more and more cruuped
in its plans, gradually wcakenetl lh it% impulsive fortCt
ajsd at Ja&t in a &tate o( uncertainty and anxiety as to ita
sitnation.

(3) The third caiKP, the dintancr from thr *<jurc* from
which the incessantly diuiimshing combatant force is
to be Juat as incewantiy CKcd up. increasL^s with the
idvnnoe^ A concjui^ring Anny in like ttie Iif^ht ol a lamp
in this respect ; the more the oil ^vhich feeds it sinks
\n the reservoir and recedes from the focu» of light, tlie

smaUer the light

ON WAR [BOOK vn.

becomes, until at length it ia quite

exlinguished.

The richness of the conquered provinces may certainly
diminish this evil very much, but can never entirely
remove it, because there are always a number of things
which can only be supplied to th^ troops from their
own country — men in particular ; because the subsidies
furnished by the enemy's country are, in most cases,
neither so promptly nor so surely forthcoroing as io
onr own country; because the means of meeting any
unexpected lequirement cannot be so quickly procured ;
because niiaunder^tandtngs and mistalccs of all Idnds
cannot so soon be discovered and remedied.

If a Prince does not lead his Array in person, as bec^urte
the custom in the last Wars, if ho is not anywhere near
it, then another and very great inconvenience arises in
the loss of time occasioned by communications back-
wards and forwards; for the fullest powers con*
f erred on a Commander of an Army arc never
suf&cieut to meet every case in the wide expanse ot
his activity.

(4} The change in political alliances. If these changes,
produced by a victory» should be such as are disad-
vantageous to the conqueror, they wiD probably be so
in a direct relation to his pri^ess, just ae is the case if
they are of an advantageous nature. This all dq^nds
on the existing political alliances, interests, customs,
and teudencies, on princes, miniaters, &lc. In g;eDcfaI
we can only say that when a great State wbcb has
smaller Allies is conquered, these usuoUy secede veiy
soon from their alliance, so that the victor» in this respect,
becomes stronger with every blow ; but if the conquered
State is smalt, protectors much sooner present them^Ives
when his very existence is threatened, and otheis. who
have helped to place him m his present embarrass-

1

CÄAP. JOtl 1 INVASION 69

nwtt wiU tum roimd to prevvot bis compJtte dowa-

(5) Thc! increased rrsistaiicc an tht- pEitt oi ihv vanmy
irtikli >£ called forllL Somet^acs the enemy drops his
«Mpoa out of bis hands from terror and Mupefactioti ;
sooirtimr« on enthusiustic panixyvo MUJtc» bun. tvcry
«lu mil« to Arm^ uid the rcastUKe i» much «trongcr
after the first defeat than it was before. The character
ol thr people and of tU» (juvi^nunenl, Utc tialuiv vi tiie
coa&tr>' And iU pohtic;i ^Ijancoi, arc here iht d^ta
from which the probable rffect must be conjecturML

Wbat couxit]cs& diSertnccs these two last pt^iiUft alone
Ukake in the plans which may and should be made in
War in one case and ancthcr. Whilst one, tlirough

H an cxcau of caution, and what is called ujctbudicil
[fccit4infti fritters away his good fortune, nn other,
troin A urant of rational Tt;flectioD, tumble« into destruc-
tion.

■ Id addition, we mu^t here call to mind the «upincti«**
which not imlrequirntly comes over the victorious sUla
when dango 1% lemuved ; wlulst, on the contrary. le-
Dovcd cüorts are then rcf^uired in order to follow up the
succosfi. If we cast a gcnerul glance over these difTerenl
and anta|[Dini&tic principles, the deduciion doubtle^d lU
that the profitable 11^ »f the onward marrh in a War iif
aggreesiOQ, in the generality of cases, diminishes ttie
prqwndennc« with which tbc f^saailant »«t out, or which

Ibu been gnini^ by victory.
Here the question miint naturally strike us: Jf this be
10. what IS it which ijnpeh the conqueror to follow up
the career of victory to continue tl;e oflcnsivc! / And
can this really be c^cd making further u»e od the \'ictory ?
Would it not be better to stop where as yet there ia
liardly any daninuliuU of the pitpuudeiaiicc j-uiued ?
B To this we must naturally An&wer ; the preponder;ince

72 ON WAR [BOOK m.

(4) In the advantage of the state of expectancy.

It must be cvidctit that these principles cannot always
be forthcoming and activ« in a hk« degiee . Ibat, con-
sequently, one defence is not always like anolh« ; and
therefore, alsn, that the defence uill not always have
this same superiority over the offenave. Thas roust be
particularly the case in a defensive, which oonunences
after the exhaustion tA an offensive, and has its theatre of
War usually sUualed at the apeJtijf an offensive tnoji^le
thrust far forward into the country. Of the tour prin-
ciples above oamed» this defensive only enjoys the first —
the use of the ground — undiminished, the second genet;xlly
vanishes altogether, the third becomes negative, and the
fouttli is very mucli reduced. A few more words only, by
way of explanation, respecting the last.

H the imagined cqnihbrium. under the inflnence of
which whole campaigns have initen parsed without any
reuiJts. becaii^e the side which should as&unie the mitialive
is Wanting in the necessary resolution^ — and just therein
lies, s£ we conceive, the advantage of the state of expec-
tancy—if tins equilibrium is disturbed by an ofiensive
act. the enemy's interests damaged, and his will stirred
up to action, then the probability of his remaining io a
state of indolent irresolution is much diminished, A
ddence, which is organised on conquered territury^ has a
much more irritating character than one upon our own
soil ; the offensive principle is engrafted on it in a certain
measure, and its nature is thi?reby weakened. The quid
which Daun allowed Frederick 11, m Silesia and Saxony.
he would never have granted him in Bohen^ia.

Thus it is dear that tlie deleasivc, winch is interwoven
or mixed up witli an c^ensive undertaking, i£ weakened
in all its chief principles ■ and, therefore, will no longer
have the preponderan^t' w^hicli belongs to it originaily^

As no defensive c4Linp;u^D is composed of purely defeo-

i

CHAF. xxi.l INVASION 73

nxrt cltannats, so likc%visr tif> ofErnxivr c^^impnif^ vt wnda
up eaUrdy of oCiCQsivo «-Jcment» ; b<rcäui«, beside» the
abort inlervab m every cantpaign, in which both aid«»
•4lt oa Ihfc tlff^zisive, every atUuik wliicU d(3& Tiot lead
lo k peace mutt necics&irily end in a. ddenwvr-

In this manner it is the ddcnsivc ilscU vhich conlri-
bulob lo the weokcsiing i>f tlu^ olTen^ive. Thus is 9o Iat
iroRi being in idle subtlety, that oti the contrary, we con-
lUrr i1 a chiel disadvanta^ of the aUnck thai wc arc
ilterwafdtt rMliioed Üirmigh it to a veiy diäadvaiUu4;ei>u&
dcfenB-ve.

And this fixplains how the dLffer^nce whtcti ori^nal]^
«xisia between the sltcngtb ul the uÜensi\'c iad ddt&slv«
forms in War is ^adu-illy rcdiif^ed. Wc shall now show
bow it may completely disappear, and the advantage for
a abort time nuy choogc into the reverse»

If we m«y be allowed to make use of an idea liom
natuje> we sbili be abl« sooner to explain ouraclve»
— the time wtiich every toice in the matenaJ world
requLTCfi lo *how il« cffrcr A power, whkh tf applied
eJoH'Iy by degrees would be sufficient tu check n body
id motion, willbeovercoincbyitiftimclails. ThjsUwof
the material world U a striking iUuatmtion of maiiytif tho
phenomena in our iorer life. Ü we am once tuuscd to a
certain tr&in of thought, it is not every motive äul15rien1
in itself wluch c;ui chuiige or atop tha,t current ui thouglit.
Time, tranquillity and dkir^ble impre&^ona on our senses
ftfc required. So it is also in War. When once the
uujid h.La tuki?ii a decided direction toward» aii object,
or turned back towards a harbour of refuge, it may
cftüly happen that the motives which in the one case
uatuiJily M^ve to restiaiUj and tlioiae which m the othcj
As naturally excite to enterprise, are not felt at once in
their full force: «nd as the prngrr^ of action in the
lueuntuoe oocittnuea* one is coJiieil uJoni^ by Ibu &Lre;uu

f4 ON WAR [BOOK

ci! movement beyond tlir line of rqnilibntuii, beyond tl
colmmating point, without being aivar« of it. Indeed,
It majr «vcn happen that, hi spite of the exhaustion of
loTTt, tbp assailant, supported by tbt* mora! farces which
specially be in the oif^nsive, Like a horse drawing ai lo^d
uphfll, finds it less difficult to ad\'ance IharL to stop.
By this, wff bplicve, we have now shewn, without con-
tradiction in itficlft how the assailant nnay pass thj
point where, if he had stopped at the right momrnt,'^
be niiKbt sill!, through the defensive, have hud a result,
that is equilibrium. Rightly, to determine this point iVjfl
th^^^efo^^?. impurtiint in framing a plan of a cam[»aign,
as well for the offensive, that ije may not undertake what
is beyond his powers (to a certain extent contract debts),
&s for the defensive, (hat he may pt-rceive and profit by
this error if committed by the assaiiaut. K

Tf now we look back at all the points which the Com*"
mander should bear in mind in making his determination«
ajid remember tliat he can only estimate the tendencyfl
snd value of the most important of them through th*
consideration of many other near and distant Delations»

that he must to a certain extent guess at tliem— guess

whether the cnemy*s Army, after the first blow, wi]
show a stronger core and increasing soHdify, or, hke
Bologna phials will turn into dust as soon as the suif^
is injured ; guess the extent of weakness and prostratii
which the drying up of curtain sources, the lotcmiptioj
of certain communications will produce on tlie mihtai
state of the enemy i guess whether the rnemy, from t
buniing pain ol ttie blow wtiich has been dealt him, wi
collapse powerless, or whether, like a wounded buU,
will rise to a state of fury ; lastly, guess whether otl
powers will be dismayed or roused, what pohlicaJ alU-^
ances are likely (o be dissolved, and what are likely to be
foTmed. U^cii we say that he must hit all this,

CttAR XXI.] INVASION 75

much more, with the tact of his judgment, as the lifle-
man hits a mark, it must be admitted that such an act
of the human mind is no trifle. A thousand wrong roads,
nmning here and there, present themselves to the judg-
ment ; and wha.tever the number» the confusion, and
complexity of objects leaves undone, is completed by
the sense of danger and responsibility.

Thus it happens that the majority of Generals prefer
to lall short of the mark rather than to approach too
close ; and thus it happens that a üne courage and great
spirit of enterprise often go beyond the point» and there-
fore also fail to hit the mark. Only he that does great
things with small means has made a successful hit.

BOOK Vill

PLAN OF WAR

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Is the chapter on the essence and object of War, we
sk«tcheijp in a certain measure, its general conceptii^D,
aTi4 poinled out its relations to surrounding circuni-
slanc^ iri order to commence witti a sound fundamtrntal
idea. We tliere cast a glance at Uie manifold difficulties
which the mind encounters in the consideraticn of Ihis
subject, winlst w£' postponed the closer examinatioD of
them, and slopped at Ihe conclusion, tliat the overthrow
of the rnomy, consequently the destruction of his com'
butant force^ is the chief object of the whole ol the action
of War, This put us in a position to show in the follow-
ing chapter, that Ihe menus which the act of War emplo)"»
ifi the combat aJoxie. In this manner we think ^e have
obtained at the outset a correct point of view.

Having now ^one through singly all the principal
relations uid form» which appear in military action,
but are extraneous to, or outside of, the combat, in ardcr
that wc might ax more distinctly theu^ vsiue, partly
through the nature of the thing, partJy from the lessons
of esrperienw which military history affords» purify them

CHAP. I,] ISTRODUCTION 77

from, and root out, those vsgne ainbiguotu id^^s which
Kre generally mi3cr<l op wilb thrm, and also to put
prominently forward the re^il object ul Ihr act oJ Wftr,
the destmction of the crerny'» combatant force as th«
pnmftry object tini\'crsally brlorijpng t« it ; wc now
return to War u a whole, as we propose tu spr^ak of the
Plan of War, and of eampai^s : and that oblige» us Xo
revert ta the id«i5 in ßiit first book-
In tbfsc chapters, which air« to d«al with the whole
question, is contain«^ Strnt^gy. properly speaking, in it«
most comprehensive and injpyrlant Icalurcs. Wi? entrr
this iimcrmoit p.-irt cf it^ dt>m3in, where all other threads
meet, not without a degree ol dilhdcikce, which, indeed,
ii amply ju^tihed-

If, on the one hand, we *ee how extremely simple tlic
operations ol War appear \ if we hear and read Ijow the
greatcit GcdOnb ipe^ «f it, Ju»t in the plainest and
briefest manner, how the government and management
of thts ponderous machine, with its htmdred thousand
limbä» vs made no more of in their lips than if they were
only apeaking of their own person«, so that the whole
tremendous act of War i& individnnlisrd inlo a kind of
dnd ; if we find the motives also of their action brought
into connection «ometimes with a few «imple ideas,
Wfloetimes with some c^tcitcment of feeling; if we see
the euy. sure, we might almost say light manner, in
whieh they treat the subject — and now see, on the
other hand, the immense rmmber of circumstances
«inch present themselves for the consideration of the
mind ; the long, often indefuiite dis^tanccs to which tho
thieads of the subject run out and the numbei of com-
bmalions which lie before us; if we reflect that it is the
duty of tbeory to embrace all this systematically, that
is with ckoTTkess and fulness, and always to refer the
iction to the necessity of ^ sufficient cause, then comes

ON WAR [book tu

upon na 4ii ovi^rptiwering dread of being dragged di
to a ped;intic di>gm*tisri, to crawl about in the lowtf^
TC^unn oi heavy abstruse conceptions^ wbere we ^hall
never meet any gieat c^ipUun, with hi& tiätunü ^tmfi
d'ail. If the result of aji attempt at theory is to be odH
this kind, it would haw been as well, or rather, it woulc^
htivc bfiea btUer, not to have made Uve attempt ; it
conld only bring down on theory the comtempt of geniu^H
and the attempt itself would 3öon be forgettcn. And
on the other hand, this facile coup d'reii of the General,
this simple art ol torming notions, th^s peräonjhcatkrQ
of the whole action of War» is so entiTe1> and completoly
the soul of the right method of oonductjag War, tluit i>lH
no other but this broad way is it pnssibk to conceive^
that freedom of the mind which is in dispensable if it is,
to dominate ev«at^ not to be overpowered by them.

With some fear we proceed again ; wc can WÜy do
by j>vir^uJng the way which we have prescribed for OUT?
sdves Irom the first. Theoiry ought to throw a
light on the mass of objects, tliat the mind may
easier find it»> bearinga ; theory ought to pull up
weeds which error has sown broadcast \ it should show
the TPlations of things to each other, separate the im-
portant from the triäing^ Where ideas resolve thei
pivea spontaneously into such a core of Truth as
called Principle, when they of themselves keep such
hoc as forms a rule» Theory should mdicate the same.

Wbatevpr the mind seUca, the raya of light which
nwakened in it by this exploration amongst the fi
mental notions of things, that is th^ asiistance wAici
Theory agord& the ndnd. Theory can give no fonnulaa
with which to solve problems; it cannot conhne the
mind's course to the narrow line of necessity by Principl
s^i lip om both sides, It lets the mind take a look at Ihi
ma*fe of obj^ctä and tbeir relations, and then allows \\ U

CHAP. II, ^

lnd real war

»

Eo froc to lb«! bibber n^ions oi action, there to act Moord-
iog to the metture ol it& antufal iorce&, witlj the enorgy
of the whole of those force» ccmbtned. And to grasp the
True and the Ri^kij a^ one nnglr dear idcA, which,
ttoiUog lorth from mukr the muted pre^iu« of ^ tbew
fore«» would wem to be rftclier a product of feeliDg than
uf rctiuGUon.

CHAPTER U
.<BSOILT£' AND REAL WAR

Toe Plui of Iho Wu cüinprohcndi» the whole Military
Act ; through it (lut Act becomw -j. whuk\ which must
liave one final detcrmin.ite abject, vr\ which -ill particular
object» mtM became atMorbod« No War js coninjcnced,

■ or, at IcASt, no War should be cx>mmenced, ii people
acted wisely, without first «eekini; a reply to thr qntrstionp
Wb;ti ia to be attuned by mid in the klitie: ? The hrat it
the flnaJ object : the ether \% the intermediate aim. By
this chief consideration the whole course uf tlie War is
pretcxibed, tJir rxtcat of thr intuns and the measure of
energy arc determined ; it# influence manifests it»eU
down to the smallest organ of action.

H We »aid in the Itrst chaptt:r, that the overtbrow of
thr mrmy is Ihi? tututiLt rnd ui thi^ act of Waf ; and
that if wc would kccpwithia the strictly philowphic:il

»bpita of the idea, there can bo no other in reality.
A* thi» idea mvii uppiy tu both llie bdli^'^t^nt parties«
it must follow, Üiat there can he no suspension in ÜM
UiJltary Act, and peace cannot Tnkr place until one or
wthcr of the pjilie» Lcmcemed is oveilhiuwn.

In the chapter en the suspension of the Belligerent Act,
VG have iJiowTk how the %im[hlr principle of hL>sti]iiy
iipplied tv Us eiuL>üdinieut, uiau, ^uJ all urcuJualouceK

8o ON WAR [BOOK vm.

otit of whidi U makes a War, U subject to ch«ck^ and
mu(Iific:iUoiis [renn cuiise^s which are inliRTfjit in Ihi*
app;iratu$ of W^r.

But (hi* mofHficFition is not rrarly sufficient to carry
DS foom the anginal conception of War tu t}ie concrrt«
foTTB in wliicb U almost everywhere appears. Hoet
Wars appear only as nn angry fueling on both Sides,
under Ihu infiuvnce ol which» each side takes up ^irms
to protect hhnself. and 1o put his adversary in fear,
and — when oppcirtnnity off(?rs, to strike a blow. They
are, therefore, not like mutually dcsUuclive elements
brought into colHson, but like tension* of two elements
still ap^t which discharge themselves in small partial
«hock«.

But what is now the non-conUucting medium which
hinders the complete discharge ? Why is the philoso-
phical con<^eption not satisfied * That medium consists
in the nnmbpr of intc^rests, forces, and circumstanres of
v^ous kinds, in the existence o( the State, which are
affected by the War, and through the mfinite tamifi-
cations of which the logical consetjuence cannol be carrird
out as it wijuld on the simple tbre^^ds of a few conclu-
sions ; m this labyrinth it sticks fast, and man, who io^
great things as well as in small, usually act^ more on th^l
impulse of ideas and feelings, than according tv strictly
loRical conclusions, is hardly conscious of his confusion.
unsteadiness uf purpose, and iiKonaistency.

But if the intelligence by which the War is decreedl
could even go over y,ll these things relating to the War,
without for a moment losing sight of its aim, still all the
other intelligences in the State which are concerned
may ni>t bt? ablr? tn do the samt^ ; thus an apposition
trises, and with that comes the necessity for a fon»
capable of overcoming the inertia of the whole mas^—
a fgrce which is seldom iorthcominfi to the full.

ABSOLUTE AND REAL WAR

tti

I

Iha iQConsittttfDcy takes pi^e aii tmc or other ot the
riro tides, or it may be on botb «de«, aod become Üw
ttoM of tbr Wat boing «oiMthing qutle ditf«TCDt lo
vhst it ahmiM be. according to the couc^ptiuti ui it— a
TaU-ard-haU production, a thing without a pcHect inner
cobcfioD.

Tliis it how vrt lind it aJmoat o^'erywhcre, and v«
nighl doubt whether our notion of ila ab*olute cb&racter
or natuTF wu» loundod in fe^iiily« if wt had nui kcd real
varfare make itv appearance in tbi» abftoLut« cocnpiett-
oet» |ttst in our own limes. After a abort introductiofi
perforined by the French Revolution, the impetoous
Buonaparte quickly tTcuRht it to this point. Under
hjoi it was carried on without sJackcoiDg for a moment
nntiJ Um «oemy wa^ prostrated, and the countet »troke
followed almoAt with m little renunion. Ii it not natural
;uid necevur>' that thi» phcnomenoa should Iciid ut
back to the orlginaJ conception of War with all iu
rigoffoiB deductions ?

Shall we now test satisded with thU idta., and jud^
of all W&Tf according to it, bowc\'cr much they may
differ Irom it — deduce from it all the requir^mf^ts of
Uwofy ?

W> rouit decide upon thi» poini, for we C3.n »y nothing
Uni^twcrtby on tJie Plin oi Wir until we have made up
our minds whether War shouU only be *>i this kind,
or wlietbrr it may be of ;tnnther kind.

If WT g\v€ an afhrmativc to the hnt. then our Theory
wiU be, in all rr&pect«. nearer to the necessary, tt will be
ckaicr aiul mmre settled thing. But what vJiould we jay
then of all War* »incc Ihow of Alexander up to the tinu
ot Boonapfttte. if wc ostrcpi some camp-iipnii of the
Kouiaii» i VVe liiuuid Uavt tif iqect tlurm ui 3 loui|),
and yet we caonot. per haps, do m> without bem$ ashamed
of our presuniplion Bi:t nn additional evil n», thnl we
VOL. III. r

8s

ON WAR

[BOOK VITI-

musl say Iv «iirselvies, Ihal in Ihe n«tt len yeais th^rc
may perhaps be a War of that same kind again, in spite
of üur Theory; and tbat this Theory, wilh a rigarous
logic, is still quite poweile^i» against the iorce oi ciiciuii-
stances. We must, llverefore, decide to construe War
as it is to hCj and not from puri^ concepHon, but by
allowing room fur «verytliing of ä forci^ nature which
mixes up with it and fastens itself upon it— all the
natural inertia and friction of its parts, the wlick- nf the
I inconsistency, the x^agueness ^nd hesitation (or timidity)
of the human mind : we shall have to gtasp the idea that
War, and the foim which we give it, proceeds from
ideAS, feelings, and circumstances which dominate for
ihe moment ; indeed, if we would be perfectly candid wc
must admit that this has even been the case where it has
taken its absolute character, that is, under Buonaparte.

n we muil do so, if we must grant that \V,ir originate»
and takes its form not from a tivdl adjustment of the
innumerable relations with which it is connected, but
from some amongst them which happen to predominate,
then it iollcwä, aä a matter of coutse, that it rests upon
a play of possibilities, probabilities, good fortune and
bad, in which rigorous logical di?tIuct]on often gets lost^
and in which it is in general a useless, inconvenient
instrument for the head ; then it also follows that War
may be a thing wbich is sometimes War in a greater,
sometimes in a lesser degree.

All this, theory must admit, but it is its duty to give
the foremost place Co the absolute form of War, and to
use that form as a general point of direction, that who-
ever wishes to learn something from theory, may ac-
custom himself never to lose sight of it, to regard it aA
the natural measure of .4II his hoprs and fears, in orda
to approach it ^hcra he can. or whore he muit.

Tbat a leading idea, which lies at the root of cor

citAP, in.] INTERDEPENDENCE IS WAR 83

thoGghu and actione, ^vti th«m a certain tone and
char«ctrr. tvtti when tb« LmnicdUtcly detemtming
grotinds come Irom totally differfnt rt?i;Lonü, ia juat ^
c«rtaiii as that tb« painter can give thU cr that ten« to
his pkhirf by the colo^trs with which he Uyv on his
{Toomd. ,i

Theory It mdebted to the last Wan for bein^ able to
do thi» effectually ncnv^ Without the^ wamiii£ ex-
ampks of th« destructive force of the element Mt free«
she might have talked heraelf hoane to no purpose : no
one would have bdif\-cd po&sible what all have now
lived to «ee Tcali»rd,

Would PruKta have venluied to penetrate into France
in the year 171)8 with 70,000 men, if she had forcs«wn
that the reaiCtion in case of failure would be so strong aa
to overthrew f he old balance of power in Europe '

Would Prussia, in 18061 have made War with 100,000
agaimt France» it she bad »upposed that the first pistol
shot wotdd be a ip^k in the heart of the mine, which
woi^d blow it into the air }

CHAPTER III

A—IffTERDEPENDENCE OF THE PARTS W
WAR

A«:oRDi!0G u we bav« in ricw the absolute form of War,
or one of the real forms deviating more or less from it,
ftO likewise different notions of its result will arist

In the abaolute fomi, where everything is th« effect
of it» natural and nece^san' cause, one thing follow«
anothrr in rapid 5iu;ccssLan ; there is, if we may um the
expression, do neutiai space : there is — on account of
the manifold reactionary effects which War contains in

ON WAR

[BOOS WU,

jtcdf,* on account ol ihe connection in whicb, strictly
ipiaJdng, the whc^ wriM ol combat* f föUow on^^ alter
^aoCiier. on account uE tht' rulnitn^itinf^ point whirh
every victorj- has, beyond which lowcs ^nd defeats
cotnmrncc t— on account oi all thcsr natural rfJationfi
of War ÜiifTK is, 1 say. only uw umit to wrt, the A«r4/
r^sWf. Until it t^es place nothing is decided, nothing
won, rothing lost. Here we may say indeed ■ the end
crauns the work, In this view, tterelore. War isan jndn
visible whole, the parts of which («be subordinate results)
hav^ no value except in their relation to this whole.
The conquest of Moscow, and of half Russia in iSli,
was of no value to Buonaparte unless it oblmncd for fiim
th« peace which be desired. But it was only a part «f
his Plan of campaign ; to eompWte that Plan, ore p>Tt
wa^ atili wanted, the. destruction ol the Ku^^ian Army ;
if we suppo^i^ this, added to the other succew> then the
peace was as certain as it is possible for Ihing« oj this
kind to be. This second part Buonapaito mi5:?od al the
right time, and he couJd never afterwards attain it, ;iDd
so the whole of the first part was not only useless, but
iat^ to him.

To this x-iew of the relative connection of resttlls in
War. which muy be regarded as extreme, stands cpposfd
Bnnth^ extreme, according to which War is conipo^
of single independent results, in which, as tn any number
of games played, the preceding has no influence on the
next foUcwing ; everything here, thet<^ore^ depends
only on the sum total of the results, and we can lay up
each single one like a counter at play.

Just as the first kind of view derive» its truth from
the nature of things, so we &nd that of thr second in
liistoiy- ThtTc axe ca&ee without numhta ui which a

* Book I-, Quiptcr I. f '^''-

; Dti0lc VII., C^apu» IV. adü V. «CuJnuutinc i\iDt of Vxtetyt,

I

N
N

c«AP, m] INTERDEPENDENCE IN WAR 85

sataU mod«ntead«rutagc mi^ht have bf«n ^lined without
Afiy very oitctnnK «wndition bHn^ AtUcbcd to iL The
more Ibi- elifiiieiit oi \\\n js moditicd the more coounoD
ihesv C13CS become ; tut a» ItttI« a^ iTi« first o( the views
now imAgJn«d wsu ^ivtr compJntcly rt^vd in any WjiTi
jost as litUe is there ^ny W^t in which the last mit»
in all refpecU. and tli* fiMt eao be dispensed with.

H wr Iccpp lo thp firs* at tbfnc siippcncd virwa, we
masX peicdw the necossity of cvtry W« being looked
upon as a wboJc item the very commrnrrmrnt, ajwl that
at the vety fii»t «Icp iorworis, tin? Coit^manUer ihouM
have in hi» cft Iho object to which c\'cry' line must
converge.

li wc admit tbp »ecood view, then subordinate ad-
vantage« mxy be pureed on IhHr own account, and the
TvA Idt to subse>quenl e\Tntb.

As Ddther of thoc lorais oi conceptio«) ia entirdy
mlhoot r«sult, thercioiT theoiy cannot dispmtr with
dther. Bat it makes thi» diff^rence h^ the use of (hem.
th^ it rvquirc» the &tst to be Uid u a fundamental idea
at the root of everything, and thnt the kttef ühaO only
be ved aa a modiiiLcatiun which is fustificd by circvm-
ttanctt.

If Frederick the Great in the year* 1741» i^744i '757*
and 175S, thrust out froni SiJesia and Saxony a fresh
oßennvr point into the Aiistrian Empire, which he knew 4
very weJl contd not Iraicl U* -\ nnw and ilurjblc e»[|i|iif?it
Uke Uiat of SiUsia and Saxony, it wa« done not with «t
view to the overthrow of tht Austrian Empire, but frnm
a leser motive, nanidy, to g^un timt^ Aud atiengtli ; and
it was optional with him to pursue th.-it »ubordinatd
object wilhrMit tMring nfrRid lh.1t hr ahnuM thereby risk
\m wliule eaiatciice.* Bui ii l^nia&u m iäo6> and Austria

86

ON WAR

CHOKvitr

in 1805. t909, proposed to themselves a still more
Diod^rM« object, that ol driving th* French over the
RhinF, they wmild rot have actfcd in a reasonable
manner if they had not lir&t scanned in their mindfi the
whole »erl*s of event* which, either in (he case o( success
or of thr reverse, would prolrabiy lollow tlie ftrst step»
and lead up to peace^ This was quite indispensable, as
well to enable them to determine with themselves how
far victory might be followed up without danger, and
how ^d wh«re tbey would be in a condition to arrest
the cours(^ of victory on the enemy's side.

An attentive consideration of history shows wherein
the difference of the two cases consists. At the time
of the Sile^an W&r in the eiglitcentb century. War was
still a mere Cabinet affair, in which the people only took
part as a bhnd instrument ; at the beginning erf the
nineteenth century the people on each side weigh&d in
the scale. The Commajtders opposed to Fredehck tbe
Great were men who acted en commission, and just od
that account men in whom caution was a predominant
characteristic ; the opponent of the Austhans and
Prussians may be described in a few words as the very
God of War himself.

Must not these difierent circumstances give rise to
quite different considerations ? Should they not in
the years iSo5> 1806, and 1809 have pointed to the ex-

U would luvq b«Dtuc1i a lrBmcDdQo& blow th^t. he miglit lhf<n bav? oat«-
t«ined the idea ol marcluag la VIfooa to make the Auibün Coiut
tremble, ftod gun k parx ditriCÜy. This, in Ihot titQ4, uopLT&Ucled
reanlt. wluch woald bavc bcnn quitf like what wn hwe s^ea if aai day.
only sou marc wondefJul tad bfilhant Irani the contest being bttwtwo
a tittJa DavLd mod a groat Goliath, might very probably have uJiea
idue alCor tha gain at this oqe battle ; but that do« not tontndlcl
Ibe uiAitioa above mainuiD^d, lot it obty rcfet? to what the King
ori)i(Datiy looked lorwaid to from hi» oOenuve, Tbc? iTiirouading aiut
t*l"ae prtaonera Ehe enemy*! Airoy urai aö event whitb wu beyond »II
OlCuIdti&Q. and which Ihr^ Kmg aev?T thougbl at, at IbuE not until the
Anatnaa« Uid ihemKlvr^ open ta it by Ibc daakiltul pfMboQ la *lUcb
tb*]r placed dMnuelv« 4t l^tf ue^

I

CWlP. III.) MAGNITUDE OF OBJECT. Ac. 87

tjcmjty of diffMtGr as a very do« poseibi)it>'. nay, even
A v«ry great piobAbdity, ind should they not At the
same tiiTf hw^t led to widely difi^rent plan^ and measures
from any nicrriy aimc-il at thir ccmqucKt oi u t:ot]|i]c of
lonr«8«6 or » paltry pn>vißce ?

They did not do so in a df^ee commcnsunitc vnth
thdr impc^DiTcr. AJtbmigli both Aiutii;! apd l'ruäüa,
)ud^Q£ t>y XhfiT anuAiuc-jtt«, tdt that «torms were brevr-
ing in the poUlic&J atmosphcTc. They could not do
so bvciiustr ihosi- reJatiom at ttiat time were not yet
•o plainly developed a» thcjr have wnr c bi^en fram hiatory.
It is )u«t thoac very campaigns of 1805, i^6j 1^09, and
foUowiiig oaa. whidi have made it easier for us to fonn
a conception of modem s-bsolute War in its destroying
mergy.

Tlieory demaods, therefore, that at the conimence*
mcnt of every War hs eharacter ajid main outline shall
be defined according to what the politk.al conditiona and
lel&tioittleedusto&nticipate^pTobable. Tlic more that,
BDCording to this probat>tlity. its character approachd
the form of absolute War ; the more its outline enibruce«
the raa» ol the belligerent State» and drawi tlicni into
the YoncK — 10 much the more complete will be the
relation ol events to one another and the wbok, but so
mudi the more necess^ will it aI>o be not to take the
fimt step without thinking what may be the last.

I

B-OF THE MAGNtTVDU OF THE OBJECT OF THE
WAR AND THE EFFORTS TO BE MADE

The compulidon whkh we must use towards our enemy
will l>c r^^atcd by the propudiunä oi our own nind his
pohtka] denunds^ In so far as these are mutually
kmiwn they will give the noeflÄurc of the mutual rfforls ;
hut they arc not always quite 6u «vident, and lliib may

ga ON WAR [BOOK VIII.

First tyt all, thcfuforc, we mii&l admit that the judg-
in«üt on in appro^hing War, on the end to which itB

should bo «directed, nnr\ on thr means whic^ are required,^
can mily be formed iLfter ;t lull consideration oE the wLole
of the circijni^tances in connection with it : with which
thcrtforc must also be combined the meet individuaJ
traits ot the moment ; nexlf that this decision, like all
in military liie, cannot be purely objective, but must
be detennined by the mental and moral qualiti» of
Princes, Statesmen, and Generals» whelbei they
united in the person of one man or not.

The subject becomes general and more fit to be lieat«
of in the abstract if we look at the general relations in
which Slates have been plaiced by circumstanceä
difTerent times. Wc mn^t allow ourselves here a pas&ii
glance at history.

Half -civilised Tartars, the republics of andent timt
th»? feudal lords and commercial cities of the Mil
Ages, kbgs of the eighteenth century, and, lastly, pnnc«'
and people of the nineteenth century, all carry on War
in their own way, carry it on diüerently, with diüerent
means, and for a different object.

The Tarlars seek new abodes. They match out as
nation with their wives and children, they are, thereforei'
greater than any other Army in point of numbers, and
their object is to maktf the enemy submit or expel him
altogether. By these means they would soon over-
throw everything before them if a high degree of civilu
tion cQiuld be made compatible with such a condition.

The eld republics, with the exception of Rome» were
amall cxtunt ; still smaller their Annies, for they ex*
duded the great n\:ü,& of the populace ; they were too
numerous and lay tooclose together not to find an obstacle
to great enterprises in the natural equilibrium m whit
small separate parts always place themselves accordii

AttP inO MAGNITUDE OF OBJECT, Ac. qi

la Uw gwtral law oi nitii« : therdor« their Wan wer«
1*^ 10 dcv«i«Tatirg Ihp opnt i^nnntry and taking
iötüv: tüwm» in urder to eusu» to th^jti^lves in these a
ccTtäm degree of inHueoce (or the future.

Romn Alone fonrtfi an exception, but not until tbi.' lutir
p«fkod of it& hiftgty. Foi a long time» by m^anfi of timsÜ
buub. i1 carried on the usu^f warfare with its ncifihbmir»
for booty and Alliances. It buc4imc great more thrmigli
the allunc«» which it form^, and through which neigh-
booring p€oplc9 by degrees became ^rnialgftmnted with It
into one whole, than U;TOUgh actual conquests. It wu
only after having spread it*cU in this manner all ovtr
Southern Italy, that It began to adv-^E^ci? as a reaUy
conqueriDg power. Cajlhage fell, Spam and Gaul were
oonqturcd, Greece «ubdned. and its dominion extended
lo Egypt and Asia. At this period its military power
wa* immeue, without it» efforts being in the same pro-
portion. Tbc« forces were kept up by its riches : it no
Jonfper lesembled the ancient repubhcs, nor itMlf as it
had been ; it stands alone.

Jl»t ai peculiar in their way sre the Wars of Alexander.
With a small Army, but diaiingiuähed for its intrinsic
perfection, he overthrew the d«:ayed fabric of the Asiatic
Stat«» ; without re^t, and rc^rdlt^ of risks, he travcrscA
the br«adth oi Asia, and penetrates into India> No
rcpubhcs could do this. Only a King, in a certaiii
measure hi» own condottiere, cottld get through t^o much
so quickly.

The great and small monarchies of the Middle Ages
carried on thdr Warn with feudal levies, Evrrytlung
rwas theo restnctrd to a short period of time ; whatever
could oot be done in thai lime was held to be impr^*
ticablL^ Tlu£ feudal furce it^ell was raised through nti
tfg»Disation of voMaldcm ; the bond which held it
togethef was partly legal obligation, partly a voluntary

qa ON WAR [noox viii.

cnnfmct \ tJii* whnl^' f<inned n rral confcderalion. Tbr
armfinaent stitd tactic« wn« based on the riftl^t ol might,
im siriglr tombat. and iboMoK- little suited to !ax£[e
bodies- In iiifi, at nn pcrH™! hijs thr unifin cif SUit»^
be«n to weak, ^a<i the individual citiicn so LOdcprrdciil.
AH this influenced the chnractcr of the Wan at thai
period in !he niosl distinct manner- Tliey were com-
paratively rapidly corned oul, there was littk time apeni
idly In ranps^ but the f)b'(^t wa? generally only punisho
ux^, not ^nbduiag the enetny- Tlj«y cuned cfl his
catllr. burnl his towns, and then relumed home again.

Thc gTfat commercial towns and small rqiublks
brought loruard the condottierin That was an «Apcnaiv«,
and theTpforc, as far as visible strength, a very limited
military force; as for its intensive strength, it was od
»till less value in that respect : so far Irom their showing
anything like «Etieme energy or impetuosity in the field,
their combats were grn^aily only sham-hghts. Id a
word, hatred and enmity no bng^r roused a Stale to
personal activity, but had become articles of trade;
War lost n great part of Its danger, altered completely
its natoTiT-, and nothing we c^n say of the character
it then assumed would be applicable to it in its
reality.

The feudal system condensed itself by degrees into
n decided ternlufial supremacy ; the ties binding tiie
State together became closer; obiifations which con-
cerned the person were made the stihjecl of romprisitioo ;
by degrees g*^ld became (lie substitute in most ed^es, and
the feudal levies were turned into mercenaries. The
condottieri ffmned the connecting-link in the change,
and were therefore, tor a time, the inslrumeut of the
more powerful Slat« ; but this had not lasted lon^
when the soldier, hired for a limited term, was lumcd
into a itaitdins tnerumiry, ,ind the mibtaiy force od

^

^

>

Ol-I MAGNTTUDE OF OBJECT. Ac, ^

Sum iu>4 bc^^ame ah Anny» liüving lU ba» ui tbc
public trcaury.

It is QciEy nntunü thnt the ilow n4vune ta this ^age
C4afi<«i a divcrti^ed intcrweaviaf; of «IJ tbne kimla od
military fore*. L'nder Hctir)- IV. we find Ihe l^ocUJ
conUDgenU, comkittii-ri, Dnd KtJxndinK Army all rm-
ploytd CdgcthcT. Tbc condottjcn earned on tljeu
cxiaicnc« up lo Ihe period ol Ihe Thirty Yfrars' War,
indoed Üica are «imc aügbt traces ol tbem rvcn in tb«
«ightccnth c£:nti]Ty.

Ihe other relation« oJ (he States of Europe n.i Ihe«
diflerent period» were quite a» peculiar «i^ tht^ir mibtury
forcM, Upnn ihc whole thi* part of the world bod split
np into a umss of potty &tate8, partly f epul>lics in n »t&te
of intenud diweuMvi^ partly uxiah mmiardiic» in wliich
the power of the govcmnieni wa» very limited and in-
MCurc- A State in oilhor ot these c^he^ could not be
coDsidered a& 2. real unity ; it wa^ latb«^ an aggJo[nera-
tioD of loosely connected force», Nnthcr, thcrdore.
coold 6uch a State be Gon§id<-red an intelligent being,
tcün^ ia acccrdanoe with »ijuple logicaJ rules.

t ift from this point of view wi^ mu%t look at the foreign
politics and War» ot the Middio Ages. Let us only thmk
od the continual expedition» of the Emperors of Germany
into It.ily for five cr-nturi«, witliaut any suhst;iniinl
cooqucfil of that country re«ulting from them» or even
baving t>eeD »0 moch st» in view. It is easy to look upon
Üü» aa u fault n-pi4t(d over ^ind over a^ain— on a 1:jJem;
viwff which had its root in the nature of the tinic*, but
h b more in accordnnce with reason to regard it as the
cunvrf|uc?nce of a hiuidj<HS uupurtaiit cuu^^ti wLiich we
can parti-illy realiK in idea, but titc vitaJ enrrgy of which
it b impowihle for u* to »rfW^tand wi vividly a* IhosT
vbo wctre brituglit intu actuaJ coiUlict with Ihmo^ A»
iong *s the grciit Statf% which h^ye ri«ra ont of this

94

ON WAR

[book VIII.

Cbaos required lime tr consolidate and organvje thear-
selves, their whole power and energy is chiefly directed
to that point ; their forctgii Wars are few, and thoK Ihat
took pkce bear the stamp of a State unity not yd well
cemented.

The Wars between France and England are the first
that ippejT, and yet at that time France is not to he
considered a& really a monarchy» hut as an äggJomeraticn
of dukedomsand countships ; England, although hearing
more the semblance of a unity» still iought with tlie leudal
organisation, and was hampered by serious domestic
troubles-

Under Louis XL, France made its greatest step towards
internal unity; under Charles VIII. it appear* in Italy
as a power bent on conquest ; ajid under Louis XIV. it
had brought its poiiticaJ slate and its standing Army to
the highest perfection.

Spain attains to unity under Ferdinand the Catholic ;
through accidental mariiage coonections. under Charles V,
suddenly arose the great Spanish monarchy, composed of
SpaiD, BurgundVf Germany, and Italy united- What
this colossus wanted in unity and internal political co*
hesionn it made up for by gold, and its standing Army
came for the first time into collision with the standing
Army of France. After Charles's abdication, the great
Spanish colossus split into two parts, Spain and Austria.
The Jatter. strengthened by the acquisition of Bohemia
and Hungary, now appears on the scene as a great power.
towing the German Ceniedeiation hke a small vessel
behind her.

The end of the seventeenth century, the time of
Louis XIV., is to be regarded as the point in htstory at
which the standing niihtary power, such as it existed
in thr r-ighteenth centnry, reached the ee^ith. Thai
military (orce wjis babe<i on enhatment aud money.

I
I
I

lir] MAGNITUDE OF OBJECT, &c 95

SUt«s hu(J orgaoi^d themsclv«« into complel« uniliefi;
and th** Govenuncrts, by cömmtiling th* personal obliga-
tions of their subjects into a money payment, h^6 ccn-
ceutrated tteir ^tiole po^ei in their ti«;i±une&. Tliiough
the rapid strides in social improvements, and a more
CTilightened systf^m of government, this power had be-
come V^ty giett ID coiop^rigon to wh^it it had beeD,
Frau« >pp6ftr«d in the field u-ilh a standing Army of a
coui^f of hundred thousand men, and Ihc other powtf«
ill proportion.

The other relations of ^ates had likewiw altered^
Europe was divided into a, doien kingdoms and two
re|Mri)lks : it was now concfivabic that two of these
powers might fight with each other wilhovit (en timPs
AS many utheri beini; mixed up in the c|Uarrrl. 3s wmild
certainly have Ven the case formerly. The possible
combin;Ltions in political relations were ^tdl manifold,
but they could be discerned and determined from t^me
to time according to probability,

Internal relations hud almost t-verywhere settled down
into a pure monarchical form ; the rights and jnilnr-ncc
of prnikfcd bodies or esiates had graduaJJy died away,
and the Cabinet had become a complete unity, acting for
the State in all its externot relations. The lime bad
thf rpfon* come whrn a Bnit^ihl*- inslnimrnt a.nd a despotic
will could give W*r a. form in accordance with the
theoretical conception -

And at thi?i i-poch .ipprutrd three nrw Alrxandcrs —
GuslAVU£ Adolpl^j^, Charles Xll,, and Fiedenck the
Great, who»e aim wa^ by «mall but highly disciplined
Armies, in raise little Stat« to the rjnk of great mnn-
archies, and to throve down c\'crything that oppoicd
tliem^ U^d they only had to deal with fVsi^tic States
they winild have more closely resemfcded Alexander >n
the parts they acted. In dny case, we m^y look upon

9» ON WAR (book nil,

Cu3ta.vu9 Adolpnu», Charles XTI., &ri6 Fredenck tb«
Great, ut the \x^3.d of Armies just as excellent, could not
gain more prominence in the general masa of phenomena
— that even these men were obliged to be contented to
remain at the ordinary ievel of moderate results, is to
be attributed to the balance of power in Europe. Now^H
that Stfltcs had become greater, and their centres further ^^
apart from each other, what had formerly beoi done
through 6\Ttci perfectly natural interests, proximity,
contact, family connections, personal friendship, to
prevent any one single State among the number from
becoming suddenly great was effecred by a higher cultiva- ^
tion of the art of diplomacy. PoliticaJ tntirrefit«, attrac-^^
tions and repulsions developed into a very rerfmed sj^tem,
so that a cannon shol could not be fired in Europe without
all the Cabinets having some mterest in the occutrence.

A new Alexand» must therefore try the use of a good ^
pen as well as his good sword : and yet he never went^fl
very far with his conquests. ■

But although Louis XIV- had in view to overthrow
the balance of power in Europe, and at the end of tbe
seventeenth century bad already got to such a point as
to trouble himself little about the general feeling of
animosity, he carried on War just as it had heretofom
been conducted ; for while his Army was certainly that
of the greatest and richest monarch in Europe, in its
nature it was just like others.

Kundering and devastating the enemy's country,
which play such an important part with Tartars, with
ancient Datjons, and even in the Middle Ages, were no
longer in accordance with the spirit of the age. They
were justly looked upon as unnecessary barbanly, which
might easily induce reprisals, and which did more injury
to the enemy's subjects than the enemy's Govenuneot,
therefore, produced no effect beyond throwing the Nation

CHAP, m-I MAGNITUDE OF ObJECr Sc. 99

bade maoy Mag« in ail that rdatf« to pca^^ful arli and
dvilifiition. War. therefore, confiTml it««tf tnorr And
oiore, both 35 regards mfans and fAd, to the Army itself.
The Army, vrilh Us fortrewe* and aom* pr^pjred position»,
amxiitutcd n Stntc in a StaEr» withm whidi thr- Wrmiutt
<tf War slowly con^iuiied LtseJf, AU Europe rejoiced at
ftt taking thb diRclion» and b«ld it to be tbe neccsuziry
oonsDqumcp ot thu spirit ol profc^ir». Aithoiigh thtre
lay un tbi« an error» inasmuch as the progrcs» of the
homajv mind can nev^r lead to what is absurd, can never
make 6ve out od twice two, u we have already »aid :ind
mttSt a^'im rr-prat, Mill tipon the whoJe thin chan^r? had
a benHlcial edfcl for the people; only lI is not to 60
denied that it had a tendency to make War stilt rooro
an aflah" of the State, and to «epnrate it «till moTf^ (ram
the Interests oJ the people. The plan of a War on the
put of the State aMuming the oflensive in tho»e tinws
consiated generally in the conquest of one or othr^r of
the enemy's provinces \ the plan of Ih? defender was to
prrvcnt tliis; the particuUr plan of gainpajgn was to
lake one or other of thp «le-my'* (ortressQ< or to prevent
one of oui own bom being taken ; it wa« only when a
battle became unavoidable for this purpose that it wa*
«ought for and ffiußht. Wlioe^er fought n btittlt* without
this unavoidable nccc^ity. from mere innate de«ire of
gaining a victory, was reckoned a General with too
ttvach daniifj, Gvneiaily Llie campjjgri pLused ov^c with
one ticge, or. if it was a very active onc< with two
sieged^ and winter qnarrrr*. which were regarded .-w a
neceedty, and during wluch the laulty anan^einents of
the one could never be taken advantage of by the other,
and in which the mutiml relatiuns of the two portia
almost entirely cecised» formed a distinct hmiC to tbe
activity which was considered to belong to one campaign.
If tbe forces oppo;^ wi^re too muc:h on an eijuahty,

w

ON WAR

[book vni

or \i the ^ggresäor was di^idcdly tht' wcsikfu ul tire two,
then Deilbei battle nor siege took place, and the whoJ«
of the operations oi the campaign pivotod on thr main*
lenunci: ol cfülain poiilions itnd magiuijitSf and '^^^^
ri^är exhaustion of partjcakr districts of country. fl|

As long as War was universally cordoctcd in this
nmiiner» iind the niitorul limits of its farce were bo close
and obvious, so far (lom anything absurd baing perceived
in it, all was considefcd to be in the most re^lar order ;
and cnticisiii, wbich in the eighteenth century began to
ti:m its attention to the iield of art in War, addressed
itäcl/ tu details without troubling itself much about tho
b^^inninif and the end, Tlius there was eminence and
perfection of every kind, and even Field-Marshal Dau33^|
— to whom it was chiefly owing that Frederick the Cteat^
completely attained his object, and that Maria Theresa^^
completely lailed in hers — could stiU pass for a grea^|
Gcnf^ral. Only now and again a mote penetiatmg jndg*
ment made its appearance, that is» sound common s*nse
acknowledged thjit with suptrior numbers something
positive should be att^ed or War is badly conducted,
whatever art may be displayed.

Thus matters stood when the Freuch Revolution brolte
out ; Austria and Prussia tned their diplomatic Art
ol War; this very soon proved insufficient Whilst,
according to the usual way of string tilings, all hopes
were placed on a very limited müilary force in 1793, such
A force as no one had any conception of made its appear-
aAM. War had again suddenly become an a^i of the
people, and that of a people numbering thirty millions
every one of whom rrgankd himself as a citizen of th
State^ Wuhout entering here into the details o£ circiun'-
stances with which this great phenomenon was attended,
wc sliiill confine oitiselves to the results which interest us
at present. By this participation of the people ua the

CSAP. inj MAGNITUDE OF OBJECT, &c. loi

Wu- initead of a Cabinet zad an Army, a wbole Katicm
with it« natiiTTÜ wrJ^ht c^mr into thn scaT^. Kmc^
fonvard, the m^^ias a vail Lib] e— the effort« vrliich might
be caUed forth — had nc> lon^tr aay definite limits ; ihc
eücrgy witii which Ihr War tt*df mij^ht hr crmdiict«!
had no longer any coiintctpoi&c, ^nd consci^iienUy Ibe
dangpf for the advir'sary had n*on to tho extreme.

U the wlioiti Wjj ot iLe Revolution pusatd over without
aj] thut maldng iuctf felt m it« luU force and becoming
qtiitc wdetit ; if the Genn^s of the RcvoKition did not
persiitently presa on to llie final eatreme. and did nui
uvtrihrcw the mDnanrhie* in Etirope ; if the German
Annies now and a^ain hnd the opjKirlunity of re^if^ting
vith fuccess, tnd checking for a time the tormit cd!
victor^*— the cause lay in reality in (hat techtiical Hi-
completeness uitli which the Fnuich Itnd to contend,
urhich showed it*clf tir^t amonpt thr common soldier»,
then in the Generals, lastly, at the time of the Directory»
10 the Oovnmmc^nl itself.

After at] this was perfected by the hand of Buonaparte,
thi« military |>ower, bued on the strmgth uf tfi<.* whole
nation, maiched over Europe, ana^hinf^ everything in
pii«ccft so surely and cfrtaioly, that where it orUy en-
countered the old-fashioned Armies the result was not
doubtful for a moment. A reaction, however, awoko
in due time. In Spftm, the War became of ifnelf an
affair ol the peo^jle. In Au&tm> in the year 1809» the
Government commercj^d extraordinary effort*, by m-^ana
of Rrseu'« -ind I-andwrhr, which were nearer lo thn irui?
object, and far surpassed in degree what thifl Slate h»d
hitherto conceived posalble. In Russia. In t8i». the ex-
ample of Spain itndAuatrUi was t^iken as j p^Uern, the
cnorruon« dimenatoni of that Empire on the one ban
allowed the preparation*, AUhongh too long drfeucd, «ill
to produce eflect ; and, on the other tiand, tnleristfi»(J

I03

ON WAR
produced. The result

[book VI It.

tiie «tfect produced. The result was brilliant- In
Cermany, Pniwia rnse up the firsi, mncJf* the War n
Nülional Cause, and wilUoul either mouey or credit.
and With ;i population reduced one-^balf, toolc Xht Bdd
with an Army twice, as strong as Ihat of i8(j6, Thtr rral
of Germany followed Itie example ot Prussia fioonci or
later, and Austria, although less energetic than in i8o^.
stiTl came torward with muro than its usuji) strength.
Thus it was that Germany .and Roseia, in the years l%t^
and 1814. including all who took an acti^-e part io, of
were absorbed in these two campaigns, appeared against
France with about a million of men.

Under Ihese circumstances, the energy thrown into the
conduct of the War was quite diflerent ; ^nd, although
not quite on a level with that of the French» although at
some pornts timidity was still to be observed, the course
of the campaigns, upon the whole, may be said to have
been in the new, not in the old, style. In eight moDths
the theatre of War was remo\-ed from the Oder lo the
Scinp. Proud Paris had to bow its head for the 6rst
tim«: and the redoubtable Buonaparte lay fettered 00
the ground.

Thf?refore, since the time of Buonaparte, War, through
being first on one side, then again on the other, an iSm
of the whole Nation, has assumed quite a new nature, or
rather it has approached much nearer to its reai nature,
to its absolute perfeciton. The means then called forth
had no visible liiuit, the limit losing itself in the energy
and enthusiasm of the Govermnent and its subjects.
By the extent of the means and the wide field of possible
resuItSj as well as by the powerful exciteineut of feeling
which prevailed, energy in the conduct of ^^*a^ was
immensely increased ; the object of its action w^ the
downfall vl the foe ; and not uatij the enemy lay puwer^
ks> 00 the ground was it supposed to be possible to stop

CWAF- III.] MAGNITUDE OF OBJECT, Ac. 103

or to come to any onderstanding with respect to the
nmtufil objects o( the content.

Thus, therefoie. the element q( War, (reed (rom all
conveotioaaj re^txiclions, broke loose, with all its natural
fort?. The cauär was the participation of the people
ID this gr«at afftur «/ iiittU, aa4 this parttcipattoß »ro*«
partly from the effects of ihtf French Revolution on Ihe
inteni^ afiairs of countries, partly from the thrcuttnuig
aittitude oj the FrcrDch towards all Nations.

Now. »hethet this will be the case always ia futun,
whether a11 W^ts hereafter in Europe will be earned OD
With the whole power oJ the Sutc», and» conici^ucnily,
will only take place on account of great interests closely
ajfecting tbe people, or whether a separatiou of the
interests of the Government from those of the people will
again gradually arise, would be a difficult point to settle ;
least of all ähall we take it upon outselves to »eitle it.
But every one will agr«e with us, that bounds, which to a
certain extent existed only in an unconaciousneM of
what is po^ible, when once thrown down, are not ciuily
baill up a^ain ; and that, at Icait. whenever jreal
uitereätä are in dispute, mutual hostility wiU discharge
itself in tiie s^inte luaiuier as it hat» done In oux tune»,

Wc here briog our historical survey to a close, for it
wa» not our design to give at a j^altop some ot the priadple«
on which Wat has been carried on in each age, but only
to show how Bftch period has hfid its nwn peculiar forms
a( War, it» own restrictive conditions, and its own pre-
judices- Each penod would, therefore, also keep its own
theory of War, rvvn if everywhpnr, in <*arly time* as
wdl 05 in hiter, the Uiak had been undertaken of
working out a theory on philosophical principles.
The events m each a^ce musd, therefore, be judged
of in connection with the peculiarities of the time, and
only he whoj less through an anxious study of minute

104 ON WAR (BOOK nu.

deUiU than through an accurate glance at the whole.
can transfer hin^self into each particular age, is fit t(
nnderstand and appreciate its r.enerals,

But thifi conduct of War, canditinned by the pecnÜi
relations of States and of the military force cmploj'ed,
must still always contain in itself something more generalj
or lalhor somettiing quite generaJ, witli which, aboi
evetytlitog» theory 15 concerned.

Thr latest period of post time, in wliieh. War rcaefit
Its ab&olitte strength, contains most of wh^t is of general
aj>|>1iezi1ii>n and necessary. But it is just as improbable
that W^rs henceforth will all have this grand character
as that the wide barriers which have been open&d to
them will ever bo completely closed again. TherHore.
by a tlieofy which only dwells «poti this absr>!tite War,
all cases in which external influences alter the nature
of War would be «tchided or condumnod as false. Tills
cannot be the object of theory, which ought to be tl
science of War, not under ideal but under real circum*
fiances. Thpory, Iherofofe, whilst coating a s<raiching,^
di»ciuninating and daastfying glance at objects, s1iould_
always have in \Hew the manifold diversity of cai
Irom which War may proceed, ard should^ therefore:,
trace out its great feattjres as to leave room for what
required by the exigencies of time and the moment.

Accordingly, we must add that the object which every
one who undertakes War proposes to himself, and the
iiieün& wtnch lie calls fortli. are determined entirely
according to the particular details' of his position:
on that very account they will also bear in thirmMdvfi^|
the character of the time and of the genttal relations;
lastly, that they are always tuhject to the gfntfol concimhtu
io 60 deduced from ika rioiure of War,

ciMP. nr.J \\\R PRECISELY DEFINED

lOS

CHAPTER fV
ENDS IK WAR MORE PRECISELY DEFFNED

I

OVERTTntOW OP THE EHEMV

Tint aim <if War \n ronrrption mtt=it alway?i br thr ovrr-
throw of ttj« rminy ; thiü i» (lu; fiuKkuuifUtU idea Irom
wMcb we «t out.

Now, what \% t!ii^ ovrrtbrow ? Il dow not nlways
imply as necessary iLe compJet« conquest of the «ncmy*«
cowiUy. If ihi' Crfrroan* h=id reached Pww in 1793.
IhcK^ — in all human probability— the War vtth the
Rrvolutionaiy paity ^«oul<l have been brought to fta
end nt once for a «fa^nn ; it wiw not at all necessary at
that time to br.-tt thdr Arniic« beforohand, (ot thcue
Armies wftc not yet to be looked upon » potent power*
in tbcnwlvcs 4ingt>'- On the otho' hand, in 1814, th«
ADi«« would not have gained everything by taking Pari«
if Duonjpane hoid niü reiiuined at ihc head of ^ con-
HdeTflblt- Army ; bul *s his Army had nfarly mdted
äwfty, ihrrcfore, both in the yoai^ 1814 ajid 1815. Ihtr
tücin^ of Paria decided all If Buonaparte in the year
1S12, either before or aflL-r taking Uoscow, had been ahir
logi^Y' thcRj»i;LoArtnyof 120*000 on the Kalug» routda
complele defeat, snch as he- gave thf? Austhans Ln 18051
and tbi? Pru&iioD Amiy, 1^06» t}w-n tbi* poRu^aaicn of tliat
capitAJ would moft probably have brought aTxiut a pe^ce,
altbotigh an enormous trad of country still rcmntnM
to be coruiuered. In tine year ifo^ it w\i& tlie t>atUe of
AosterlitjE that wu decisive ; ^nd. therefore, the previous
possesion of Vienna and rvrrkthirdii of thr AiL<itrian
State« was iict of auflic\enl wdi^it tu gain lor Buonaparte
% pence ; bgt. on the other hand al«o, after that battle
of Austcrfttc, Ihr intfgrity of Hungry, ittUl intact, was

io6 ON WAR [BCOKvnt.

not of suf^cient weight to prevent the condusioo of peace. |
In tht' Rui&idn cajnpiiigii, the complete defeat of th?
Russian Army was the Ust blow required : Ibe Emperor
AJejcandpr had no other Army at hand, and, therefore,
peacf was the certain consequence of victory. If the |
Russian Army had been on the Danube along with the
Austrian in 1805, and had shared in its ddL'iilf then
probably the conquest oj Vienna would not have been
necessary, and peace would have been condudM in tiiu^

In other cases the complete conquest o( a country ha»
net bf^n sufiicient. as m the year iflj?, in Prussia, when
the blow levelled -igainst the Russian auxiliary Arniy,
in tlie doubtful battle of Eylau> was not decisive enough.
and the undoubted victory of Friodland was required ai
a finishing blow, Uke the victory of AuätcrLits eighteo^^
months before. ^|

We see that here, also, the result cannot be determined
from gQucral grounds; the individual causes, which no
one knows wIjo is not on the spot^ ^nd many of a iii<jral
nnture which are never heard of. even the smallest traits
and accidents, which only appear in history as anocdotes,
are often decisive. All that theory can here say is as
follows : That the great point is to keep the overruling
relations ol both paiti-.'s in view. Out of them a certain
centre of gravity, a centre of power and movement, wiU
form itself, on which everything depends; and against
this centre of gravity of tlie enemy, the conceatxated
blow oJ ail the force» must be directed. ^^

The little EJways depends on the great, the uniiQ^B
portant on the important» and the accidental on the^
essential. This must guide our view.

Alexander liad lus centre of gravity in his Army, so
hftd Gnstavus Adolpbus, Charles XII., and Frederick the
Great, and the carc>er of any one of them would swxi have '
been brought to a close by the destruction of his fighting

CBAP. IV.] WAK PRECISELY DEFIXEO 107

tont : in Suil«4 torn by intcmaJ diu«ii«on(, ttiis centre
SencraHy }icK in the c-ipitiU ; m sniAll Stntrs <k-pmdcnt
CO ^eatcr 00«, it U«s geiMtraJly Ui tbif Army »f Üuffi«
MIkS ^ in a cotfifcdency, tt Ue» in the unity of mtcrests ;
P tt « D^itioiii^ iiutuTTTCtion. in thr prrsnn of the Hütd
l«a<ler. and in public opinion ; flgaunfit thnc points Un
blow mutf be dircctrd. If the enemy by thb lo^-ti bU
btlanc«, no liine must be alluwi:d fdt him to rucuwr it ;
th« blow mutt be pcnistcntly rq?«ated in the umc direc*
H tion, or, in other word«, the conqncror mu»t always
direct ha bluw^ upon lh<; mass, but nol ^if^oinxt a fraction
oj the entmy. It is not by conqucfini; oor of the enemy'»
provinces, with htUc trouble and superior numbers, and
I pr^ernng the more secure poneAi^n uf Otts unimportant
conqu«iit Xq great remit», but by seftkinR out ccn*tantly
tiie hcirt oJ the hostile power, and staking evi-rything
in order to gain all, that we can efiectiuily stnke the
enemy to the ground.

Bat whatever may be the central point of the enemy^
power agaimt which we are to direct our cper^tioo«, «tUl
the conquest end de:itructi:>n of his Army i^ the »urest
conuncDcvmccit, and in bU case« the nio6t essential.

Hence we think that« according to the majority of
ucertalned facts, ttie fr>nowine cireuni»tances chiefly
bfiog about the ovrrthrow oi the enemy :

{!) Dispersion of his .\nny if it form*, in some degr«, a
potmtiaJ foroe.

(3) Capture of the cnemy'i capital dty, if it \% both th«
oenlTv of the power of the Slate and the seat of political
TunrmHiint and fuctiou»-

(3) An effectual blow again»! the principal AUy< if he
Is more powerful than Ihr enemy himself.

We havie always bitliertu supposed the eutmy in War
aa a unity, which is allowable for cousidcrationc of a very
geiieral nature. But having aaid That the subiu|;alion

no

ON \^'AR

[BOOK VIII

found in War of

reciprocal action bftween
nnd forct?. spch us takes place in dynaoiics.

Time IS necessary to both belligerents, and the only
question is : Which of the two, jnH^lng by his pnaif ion,
has must reason to expect speaai udvanta^is from time f
Now (e^cclusive of peculiarities in the situation on one
side or the otberj the vanqitishcd has plainly the most
reason, at Uie same lime qertimly nut by dynanuc. but
by psychologicaJ law*. Envy, jealousy, anxiety for self,
OS well as now and again magnanimily, are the natural
intercessors lot the unfortunate -, they raise up for him
on the one hand frit*nds, and on the other hand w&ak^
and dissolve the coahtion anionRst his entrmies. There*
fore, by delay something advantageous is more Jikeli
to happen for the conquered than for the conqueror.
Further, we must recollect that to niake right use o1
first victory, as we have already shown, a great expendjJ
turc of force is necessary i *his is not a mere outlay ont
for all. bul has to be kept up like housekeeping, on
gi«at scalt I the forces wliich have been sufficient to ^vi
us possession of a pro\ince are not always sufficient
meet this additional outlay ; by degrees the strain upon
our resources becomes greater, untd at la^t it b<?coi
insupportable ; time-, therefore, of itself may bring abonl
a change-
Could the contributions which Buonaparte levied froi
the Russians and Poles, m money and in other ways,
iSi2, have procured the hundreds of IhoiJSaBds of mi
that he must have sent to Moscow in order to ret&iD
position there ?

But if the conquered provinces axe »uflicirntly imJ
portant, if thfre are in them pnints which arc essential'
to the well'being ol those parts which are nut cnnqucTfrd,
30 that the evil, like a ca.ncer, is perpetually of itstU
gnawing lurthrr into the system, then it is possible

k
>

I

I

9

«AP. IV.] WAR PRECISELY DEFINED iii

thp conqueror, althongli nothing fnrlhcr i* dono» may
^ain moT^ than lir Icwü. Now in this state ol circum«
3taj\ces. if no help come* from without, then lirac oi^y
complete the work thus commrncpd ; what slill remains
uoconquered will, pt-rh^iK, Utll oi UsdL Thus iimr.
may also become a factor of bis forces, but this can
fmly tabr place if a return blow from the conquered is
no longer possible, a ctiang« oi fürtune in his luvour
□o longer conce:vable. when, therefore, this f.ictor of hit
is no longer of any value to the conqueror : for he
has accomplished the chief object, the danger of the
culminating point is past, in «hort, the enemy is already
subdiied.

Our objtct in the above rea^njng has been to shQW
dCBT'ly that no conqnest can be Unished too soon, that
S|BVadJng it ot-er a ^rei;iUf space 0/ tinu ihan is absolutely
WC<«sary for it» complelion, instead oi fadtUaiing it.
makes it more di^^uU. If this assertion is tnie, it is
further true also that i( we are strong eno\igh to effect a
certAiA conqueit, we must also be slrong enougli to do
it in one mnrrh without intemirdiate st:i1ians. Of courte
ve do not rriL^^in by this without short halts, in order to
concentrate the forces» and make other indispensaUe
arraAg«nienis.

By this view, which makes the character of a speedy
and persistent effort towards a derision essentiaJ to
offen«] ve War, we tliink we have completely set aside oO
I^Ottiub for that theory which, in place ol the irresistible
continne^ following rp of victory, would substitutp 9
alow iiielhodital system as being more sure and pnideoL
But even for those who ha%'e readily followed u« so far,
oor assertion heis, prrhap^, after aU so much the appe^^-
ance of a paradoi^is at ftrat sigiit 60 much opposed and
ofleruive to an opinion which, ^ike an old prejudice, has
taken deep root, and has been r4^pir;ited a tliuufi^nd times

ill A

1

ti2 OK WAR (book vuI-

ID book^ — that \Be considered \i advisable to ^xamioe
mureclosdy the (ountlaliun uf iUanti filausjble aigumtmU
which atiiy he advanced.

It i» ccTtiiinly cjisicr to reach an object neai as than
oae At 3, distance, but wiien tli«; neuri^l one does not suit
our purpose it does rot follow tlut di\'iding the work,
thnt n rpjitinjC-pnint, will cnablr U5 to gpi over the second
Jialf of the ro^d e.isicr, A aio^ jump la (;iiä:«t tlimi a
brge ore. but no one on that accmint, wishing to ci
» wide ditdi. wuuld jump h^ill of it Urst^

If we look closely Into the foundation o£ the contcpli
ol tilts 40-ttdk'd nit'tliodicid offensive War, we sliall find
it gunctaUy con&i&ls of the following tilings : ■

(i) Conquest of those fortresses belonging totheen^my
which we m^et with.

{2} Laying m the ntcessaiy supplies.

(3) Fortif^-inß important points, as magatinn. brid^ts,

(4) Kesting the troops in quarters during winter, c^^
when Ihey require to be recruited in health and r^ftcsbed,

l5) Wailing for the reinforcoments of the ensuing year.

H for the attainment ol ail these objects we ni:ike
formal division in the conrsc of the offcnsi^'c action, a'
resling'point in the movement, it is supposed that
gain a new base and renewed force, as if our own Stai
was foUowing up in the rear of the Army, and that tl
liKer Ijid in r*?newed vigour for every fresh campaign.

AU these praiseworthy motives may m^ke the oäensi<
Wor more convenient, but they do not make its results
surer, and are generally only make-bdjeve& to co\-cr
certain countenictin^ forces, such as the feelings of the
Commander or irri-sohition in the Cabinet. We
try to roll them up Iron: Ihe left fl^nk^

(1) The w^ttog (or reinforcements suits the
jusl 05 well, and is» we may say, more to his advantagf7

09 uic
C ^h,n

rcHAP, Pr.] WAR PRECISELY DEFINED

113

I

B^ide^, it ha la the luitura of the thing th;tt ;i State un
place in line ncarJy as nuny comhit.'Uit forcei in on?
year as in Two ; for all ih^ aciufil JT^rrracr of iroinbataiit
focie in tUe ^i^utul yarn 13 but tulimij lii leUUuu to Ih«

(2) ThecQciDyraitshiinsdfittthesaiDCtiineihaiwi^clQ.

(3) TL« fortification of tou-os and pofition^ is not the
wofk o* the Army, and ihcwforf no groimd ior aoy
ilelsiy.

(4) According to Xhc profival fiy&tem of »ubsistin^
Armies, ma^^udno^ ar^ moro nt^c^s^ry vh'hon th? tri^op«
m in ctntcnnirnu; th^ii wtii:^n tht^y ^c udv^wcmi;- As
long as wr advance with succptt, wr ccmtinunUy f^]! iato
pos&es^on oi some ol the enemy's provision depAts
^hich assist us when tin* country its*» is poor,

(5) Ttie taking of the pn<Tny"* ftirtr«*« cannot he re*
girded ^s a sii£p4Tn»ion of the atl.Kk : it is an intt'nsiri^d
progress, and therefoore the »eeniing suspension vrliidi i%
earned thi^oby b not proprr]y a case tiich as wc alKide
to, it is Dcitltt-r a suspensiun n^r a Tnod:fying of Ihe
VM oi forte. But wticthci a rcf;ii!ar sieg^, biockadi;, or a
mere ob^erTation of one or other is most to the piiipo«e
ib a question which can only bi: dot:.idcd according to
piVtiCQlaf circumstODces. Wc can oidy say th» at
(enerul, that in art!twerin(( this question onothrr mu:<t
be clearly dcC4ded, wlxich is, whether the nnk nül nut be
ttw greift if, while only blockading, we at tlic same time
make a, liuUier itd^-iin^t.-, \\~hc:ro this is not the co^c,
uid when there is ample room to extend our lorce&p It is
bett^ to postpone the fonnal siege tjJI the lermination
ef {he whole oflunsi*-*^ mavcmvtii. We must thrr^fore
take care not to be led into the error of ncglectuig the
«sscfitial. through the idea of immediately maJdng secure
that which is cun<iuert.'d.

No doubt it st^mh at if, by thus advancing, we at onee
VOL, lu, u

ti4

ON WAR

(bOOE VIII,

r

hafard thr io^ of what lias becD already gained, Oui
rvpinion, howev<rr, h lliat no divi^ioa of aclion, no r^ling-
poinU no tDtc^tmL-diate stations are in juxuulaitc« mjUj
the nature of ofiensive War, and that when the «amc are
nnavnidflblc, Ihcy arc to be regarded as an rvil which
make» the result not more certain, but, on the cunUaiy,
more uncertain ; and further, that, atxictly «peaking, if
from weakness or any cause iw havr been obliged lo
itop, a sttond spring at the object we have in viuw ;s, a»
a rule, impossible ; but if such a second spring is possible,
Hirn the stoppage at the intpnnedjate station was un*
uece&^ary» ajid thut wlieo an obj«ct at tiie veiy comiucuce-
men! t* beyond our strength, it will always rcmaiJi so.

We say this a]>peai^ to be the gener<ij truth» by which
we onJy wish to cut aside the idea that time of itself can
do something for the advantage o! the assiUant. But
ns the political rcfations may cliange from year to year«
thcTcfore, on that account alone, many cases may bappen
whicti are esceplions lo this genefiil Imrh.

It mayappeac, perhaps» as if we had left our general
point of WW» and had nothing in cur eye except offensive
War : but it is not so by ^ny mt-ans. Certainly, he who
can ^et before himself the complete overthrow of tlie
enemy as his object will not easily be reduced to take
refuge in the defeni^wc-, the immediate object of wbidi
is only to keep possession ; but ui we stand by the dccltfm-
tion throughout, that a defensive witliout any positive
principle is a contradict ion in strategy as well as in t^ictici,
and ttierefore always come back to the fact that every
delmuive. according to its sttenglh. wilt ^eek to ctian^e
lo Uie attack as &oon as it has exhausted the advantage
of the defensiv«, ». therefore, however great or small
thc^defcncemnybe.weatilJabü include in it contingently
the overthrow of the enemy as an object which this
attack may have, and which is to be considered as ll»e

CflAT, v.l WAR PRECISELY DEPENED

"5

pn^)CT object trf the defensive, and we say th^l there may
be caw^ in xvhicli Iho aaaatkot, notwithstanding h? has
in vww such a givat object, may atiU pr^er at Ürst to
make use of the defensive form. Hiat this idea is founds
in rmlity k» cnsi(y shown by the campaign of 1813. Tht?
£inp«ror Aleaiander in t-ngai^iug in llu? Wai did not
perhaps think of ruining his enemy completely, a« was
done in the «oqnel ; but is there anything which mcikes
such an idea impossibte ? And yet. if so, would it not
flu] reniaiD very natural that the Russians bc^^n the
iWar on the defoisive ?

CHAPTER V
ENDS IN WAR MORE PRECISELY DEPiSED

LIUITCD OB|ECT

le preceding chapter we have said that, under the
re»ian " overt hfijw of Ibo enemy," wc und<^r^tand
the real absolute aun ot the '* act of War " ; now we shall
KtM what remains to be done when the conditions tinder

which this object might be attained do itut exist.
H Thcw conditions prr*iupposc a great physical or moral
I »up«?riiJiity.ai agii^iilipintof f!iitL-ti«ii«-, un intiati? pro pen-
ality to extreme hac^rd«. Now where ^ this is not forth.
coming, the aim in the act of War can only be of two

»kinds; either thectrnquestolsiurii^Mniill f>r mcidcriitc por
tion of the enemy's country, or the dcfcnceof our own until
bctt^ times ; this last is the usual case in defensive War,
■ Whether the one or the otljer ul tlie^ aim» is of tlio
Hc^|bt kind can always be settled by caUing to mind the
^Hipresaon U*cd in reference to the last, Thfi waiting tül
man laWAUabtc Umes implies Uiat we have nason to

f l6 ON WAR [BOOK Vtl

expect sucb lime« hereafter, and this u-^ting for, that
dedcnn\<t; War, is always based oo this prospect ; on
<rth«r hand, odTcoslve War, that is, the Ukin^ advdikUi
of the presoit moment, is aJurays commanded wh*n Um
hiturv bßlds outabrttcr prospect, aot ti> ciurseLvcs, bi
to our adv«T«ary.

The third ca^, wlikh h probably the most eommon.
when neither pany has anything de&i;1e to loolt for fram
the fmare, when therefore it fumi&hes no notiv« for
deci^on. In this ea«r the offensive War b plainly i3^|
pctative upon him whu is ptihticoUy the aggressor, tha!^
i», who h^ the po^itivr motive ; for he has t^ken np artn^
with that object, and every momeot ol time which is Jost
without any goud reason is so much to^t time fifr htm, ^^

\\v have here decided for offensive or defensive War o^^
groiin<k which have nothing to do with the relative forces
o( the combatants r*apeclEveIy, and yet it may appear
that it would be ncurer right to make the choice of th^f
offensive or delensjve chiefly dependent on tb^ mutual^
relations of combatants in point ol mdiiary strengtii ;
our cipinion is. thai in doing s.o we ^loiitd just Irave ttw
right road. Tlie logical cortectness of coir simple ^t^
aunt no one wiJl dispute : we shall now see whether
the concrete case it lends to the contrary.
I Let us suppose a small State which i« involve is
contest with a very superior power, and forc^ee^ that
with each year it^ position wi]J become worst? : aJiuuid
it not. if U^ar is ineiHtable, make use of the time when
its situation is furthest from the worst > Then it mu«
attack, not because th« attack in $iself enäure^ ^uqfl
ad^'uitagM — il will rather increase the disparity o^^
forces — but brtrnrisp this State is under the uocessily of
either bringing tha matter completely to an isäur before
Ibe worst time arTi\<es. or ol g&ining at le^t in the
meantime lome Adv^nta^r« which it may hrreaficr

v.J WAR PRECTSRLY DEFINED 117

to account. This theory cannot appear Ab«uTd But
il thi? smaU State la quite certain that thr momy wiTI
advaticr AK^niit it, thc-n, crrtuinly, it c^n and may make
use of tbc deftn&ive again&t its enemy to procure ä first
advanta^ ; there I» then at any rate no danger of losing
time.

If, aijiiin. we siippo*^ a small Stat*^ engage«! tn War ftith
a ^rratfT, ar(^ that Ihe feitnr/» has no influoncc on tbdr
deciAiun^, &titl. it the small Stüle i^ poLticiUy the issAilantt
we demand of it also that it should go Eorward to Us
objfct.

U it ba» had the audacity to propose to itaelf a positive
end in the tace of suprrior numbers, then it rniist also act,
that ht attack the loe, il the letter docs not save it the
trouble. Waiting would be an absurdity ; unl<^ ;it the
moment of e?eecution it has altered itt political resohttion.
a case which very Em|urntly occurs, and contribute» in
no snail degree to giv« Wars an indefuiite charactn*.

These consi derations 01^ the limited Object apply to Its
cocui«ct)on both witli offen*i\-e War sind defeniiv« War !
we »hall consider both in «eparato chüptem- But we
shall tvst turn our attention to another phn&e.

Hitherto we b:i\"e deduced the modifications b the
object of War imlcly ffvim intrinsic reasons. TTie n^ittire
ol the political view <or dest^) we have only taken into
considerallon In so far as it is or is not directed at «ome-
Ihing |>nftitivp- KvprytUinR rise in the pdiiiral drtiii^

Lis in reaJily K>meth4ng extraneous to War ; but in the
second chapter of the first book (End and Means in War)
we have already admitted tliat tlie natun^ of thn political
ttjcct, the extent of our own or the eneniy's demand,
tsd our whnlc political relation pT<ictically have a most
_ decisive iiiiluence on the ctmüuct of the War. and we
sludl therefore devote the following chapter to that
subject specially.

1

iw ox WAR iBOOK vin,

lent by the War» and v^«xp«t toatiaio thatbymoderaid
tttori^. The onemy reason* in wty much the s&me way,j
Now, if '*ne or tht other finds Ihüt he has erred m his
rvdroning— that in place of being sJighUy siipcrior to the
memy. as he supposed, he is. if anything, rather wenkcr,
still, at that momoit, money and all other means, as weil
fts sufficient moral impulse for gre^t^ exertions, ki^ very
often defir^i'^nt t in such a case he just does what is follif^
" the best be can " ; hopes better things lo Ibe futurtflf
although he has net the slightest foundation for »tich
hope, and the War in the meantime drngs itself fecWi
alone> bke a body worn out wjlh sjclcness-

Thus it comes to pass that the reciprocal action, the
rivalry, the violence and impetuosity ol War lo&e th*
selves iß the stagnation of weak motives» and that boti
[Kirties move- with a certain kind of security in veil
circumscribed spheres.

If this influence of the political object is once pcnnittc^,
as it then must be, there is no longer any limit, and
must be pleased to come down to such warfare as consii
in a nure ihrt&ttning of Ike. ftiemy and in negotiating.

That the theoiy of War, if it is to be and to conlin)
a philosophiert! study, fmds iti^elf here in a difhculty ts'
clear. All that i* essentially inherent in the conccptioa,
of War seems to ßy from it, and it is in danger of bdi
left without any point of support. But the natural outJi
soon fthows itself. According as a modifying prind]
guin^ iiitluence over the act ol War, or rather, the wetaki
the motives to action become, the more the action will
gUdc into a pa^lve resistance, the less «tvfrntfnl it will
Income, and the les« jt will require guiding principles.
All military art then changes itself into mere pradenoc^^
the principal object of which will be to preveml the lreni^|
bÜDg balance from suddenly turning to our difadvanlage.
I ball War from changing into a complete eae.

the
botH

I

Joa^

CHAP. VI,] INSTRUMENT OF POLICY

lA

B.—WAR äS AN iNSTRUMENT Of POLICY

HaIpIXG made the requisite euminalion on both «ides of
that state of antagonisfn ic which th? nature of War
ttand» with relation Xo oUirr tnterests of m^tn indmüiutUy
■ADd of the bond of society, in order pot to neglect any of
the opposing ckmcnt« — an antagonism which is founded
in tiut own nature, and which, Itit^rcfort-, no phUowphy
can unravf^l^we shall aow look for that unit>' into whidi**

rbl pnctical lU«^, these antagonistic elements combine
thfjiudvc« by partly nrutrolliüng i^ach ottitrr. We should
have brought forward Ihi» anity at ths very commen«:*
ment if it had nol been necessary to bring out this con-
tradiction very plainly, and oho to look at the dißerent
elements separati^ly. Now, thU unity i« tkt conception
thai War is only a part of poliUcal intercourse, therefore hy
nc m^am an ftvdipctvdcnl thing in iUcif,

IWc know« certainly, that War i> only caJled forth
through the political intvrcourw of Governments and
Nations; but in general it is supposed that such inter*
coiir*p i* broken off by War, and that 3. totally different
state of things «uues, »bjoct to no laus Mit its own.

hWe ataiAtain, on the contrary, that War i« nottiuig
t a continuiition of poJilkal intrrcHurte, with a mixture
other means, We aay mixed with other mean« in
order thereby to maintain at the »ame time that this
B po?iticrtI intrrmnne don not cenjw by thr War it^lf, is
not c^Dgcd into something quite different, but tlial, in

I it»e9S«Ke, It continues to exist, whatever may be the form
of the msins w]iii:h it uwa, and tital the chiri linfis on
which the c^vcnts of the War progress, and to which they
$Mt attach^, are only the general features of policy which
ran all tbrougb tlit? Wiir until pe;tüe lukn place. And
how can we conceive rt to be othcrwi«; ? Doc» th«
ccaiaiion of diplomatic notca stop the political relations

19i ON WAR [Hfioic vni:

between <li0ercDt Nations and Govemments ? Ii not
War m^T^ly another kind of writing and langn^^ for
pulitioil Uiciughts ? It has cerUuily a gnaniuiar of iU^^
own, but its logic Is not peculiar to itsdl ^|

Accordingly, War can never be scpamicd from polttiral
intefcoiirw, iind iJ, m Uie consideration of Ibe matter,
this is done in any way, all the threads oi the different
relations are, to a certain extent, broken, and we have
before us ;i s«^nse]es!> thing without an object-

This kind of idea would be indispensable even if War
was perfect War, the perfeclly lUibridlrd r-lejntnt iif
hostility, for alJ the circumstances on which it reel*,
and which determine its leading feature*. vJi-, our own
power, the enemy's power. Allies on both sides, the
characteristics of the people and their Covcrnmeais
respectively, &c,, as enumerated in Ihe firet chaplcr of
the first book — are they not of a political nature, and
are they not so intimately connected with the whole
political intercourse that it is imposäible to separate
them ? But this view is doubly indispensable if we reflect
that real War is no stich consistent effort tending to aa
extreme, as it should be according to the abstract idea,
but a half-and'half thjiig, a contradaction in itself : thai,
AS such, it cannot follow its own laws, but must be looked
upon as a part of another whole — and thitwhole is policy.

Policy in making use of War avoids aU those ri^orous^
conchisions which proceed from its nature; it tremble« ^^
itself little about final possibilities, confining its attention
to iromediate probabilities. Et sitch uncertainty in the
whole iiction ensues thcrefromt if it Iherrhy becnm«
a sort of game, the policy of each C^ibinet plaices iu '
confidence in the belief thnt in this game it will surpus
iU iiidgbbour in ^11 and sliuipsightedn^ss. I

Thus policy makes out of the all-overpowering element
of War a mere inslniment, changes the tremendous battle-

i

ciiAP. %'(.J INSTRUMENT OF POLICY t^j

swcrd. which should bt^ lifted with both hancb und
th« whotr pf>wrT nf thr body to strikr ftnce for all, mtiy

light bandy weapon, whccb is even someltmeä notiiioi;
;more than a rapier to exchange thrusts and feint» and
Iperrlcs.

Thus Hie contratliclionä m which man, n^ittiratly timidj
jlNComcs involved by War may be solved, if we cht>o&e
to accept this ft» a solution.

If Wax bddcga to policy, it will naturally tak* its
charactfT frcim thence. If policy is grand and powrrful,
so also will be the War, and this may be carried to the
point at which War attains to its ahsotuU /orm.

In this way of wwing the siibjectn (herrforo, we need
hot fthul out of «ight the absnJute fomi of Wac« we rather
keep it continually in view in the background.

Only tliTough ihh kind of view War recovers unity ;
only by i1 can we see all Wars as things of one kind ; and
it to cnly through it that the judgment can obtain the
tr\tfr and perfect basis and point o1 view from which great
plan« may be traced out and determined upon.

It is true the political element do« not sink dtep (ntö
the details of War. Vedettes are not planted, palrob do
not make tlietr rounds (roini political considerations ; but
«niAll AS is its influence in thi?; respect, it is great in the
formalion of 3 plan for a whole War, or a campaign^ and

I often even for a battle.
Por this ratson wc wnrir in no hurry to establish this
view at the coiDmenceinent. Wltile atg^ged with par-
licTilars, it wottld have given us little help, and, on
the other hand, would hnvp diitrtcled our attention to
a certain extent; in the plan of a War or campaign it
i% Indi^rnMble.
There is. upon tlie whole^ nothing more important in
life than (o find out the right point of view from which
things shouJd be looked at and judgodfof, and then to

"«4

ON WAR

[BOOK THT-

krep 1o that point ; for we con onTy apprehend Üi
et events in their unity from ttnf stajadpoiQt ; ui
only the keeping to one point of View thai guards OS fro;
iacünsistency.

If, thei^ore, in drawing up a. plan of a War. it U n
ellowahio to have a tv/o-fold or three-fold point of view,
from whicli things may be looked at. now with the eye
a soldier, then with that of :in administrator, and then
again witli that of a politician^ &C-, then the next <^ueätioD
is, wlwther policy is ni^cessariJy paramount and every-
thing else subordinate to it.

That policy unites in it^i, and reconcile aU the inl
rests of internal administrations, even those of humanity,
and urhatever else are rational subjects of cocnside
tion is presupposed, for it is nothing in itäetl. except a
mere representative and exponent of atl these interests
towards othor S4ates. That policy may take & false
direction, and may promote unfairly the ambitious end^^M
the private interests, the vanity of rulers» does not coa-^
cem iisheic; for, under no circumstances can the
of War be regarded as its preceptor, and we can on!
look at policy here OS the representative of the inleresi
genorally of (lie whole community.

The only question, therefore, is wfiether in framing'
plans for a War the political point of view should give
way to tije puiely military {if ^^^^ a point is conceivabJe]
that is to say, should disappear altogether, or subordtnal
itself to it, or whet her the political is to remain thc^mlii^*
point of view and the military to be considered sub-
ordinate to it.

That the politicnf poini of view ahmild end complrieTy
when Wax begins is only conceivable in contests wUicJi
are Wan of life and death, from pure hatred : as Wars ,
arc in reality, they are, ix& we before ^id, only the ex-^l
preBsions or manifestations cf policy itseJf. Tlvi sab-

I

I

CHAF. VI,] INSTRUMENT OF POLICY i^S

Ordination of the poIiticaJ point oJ view to the milituy
wciiild }» contrary to cnrnmon scnäc, fox policy tuu di>
cibr«d the W^ ; it is the intelligent iucuJty, War only
th^ Instrument, and not the rc\Tnc. Tbi' subordinaiioii
ol the milit;iry point üf view to tlic politioü is, tht-iefcirc,
the only thing which is po&siblc.

If VC reflect on the nature of real War, afld eall to mjnd
wliat tiu> b«TU 3£iid in tlie Uurtl cliuptirr of thi^i huokp that
tKry War should he viewtd above ail ihingi aceordrng to
the probabiiUy of its character, and iH li^ading features at
ihey are to be deduced ftom the fivtUfeal forta and propor-
Uams, and that often — indeed wc rnay safely at&rni, in
our days, eUmasi always — War is to be regarded an nn
organic whole, from which the ain^ branches aiv not to
be9e|arai<.'d, in which therefore every indixidual activity
flow» mto thc^ whole, nnd also has its origin in tho idea of
this whole, then it becom«s certain and polpatilc to tu
that tht? suprriorst^rndpuint for 1h& conduct of the War,
irom whidi itK ieadm§ hnes must proceed, can lie no
«tber than that <A pohcy.

From this point of view the pLin.t come, a% it were,
mctof acut ; the apprehenaion of them and the judgramt
1900 Ültm become easier and more naturxl, our convjc-
tion* re^peetinc tliem gain in force, motive* are more
satisfying, ^nd lustory more intelligible.

At all events from this point of view there \% no longer
til tlu! itatuiL- uf IlLin^ a m^^is^iry convict brtween the
political and military Lntcrc£ts> and where it appe^us it
is therefore to be regarded aa imperfect knowledge only.
That policy niuki.-?. demmids on the W^ir whirh it cannot
d to, would be contrary to the suppo6ilion that it
the in^nimcnt which it b going 10 U9<.\ therefore,
itrary to u autuf^ü uiiU mU^apeiisuble suppoüition.
Bot if policy judge» correctly of tlic march of military
events, it H mtirrly its affnir to determine what are the

ia6 ON WAR [BOOK viii-!

rvcnts nnd what the diTcction of evenls most favourable^
i^> th« uJtimale and great end of the War^

In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view
is policy, but, no doubt^ a policy which tights bntllcs^^
Instead ot wrUing note&. ^M

According to this view, to leave a great mtlitaty entet-
|insc,nr the plan for one, t<i aputrty military judgment mtd
dfci^on is a diätinction whiuh cannot be allowed, and M
even prejudiciaJ ; indeed, it ii an irrational proceeding to
consult profiTSsional soldit^ni on thct plan of a War, that
they may give a purely military opinion lipon what Ih»
Cibini't cught tu do ; but ^lill moiv ubsurd ts the dc^niand
o£ Tht:ori£tä that a stateineiit of the available means o(
V/av should be kid before the General, thiit he may dra
out n purely inibtary plan fur (he War or for a campaign
in accordance with UtoF>e means. Experience m general
also teaches us that notwithstanding the multifarious
branches and sdentiüc character of military art in lb
present day, still the ic^ding outlines of a War are always
determined by the Ca-binct, that is, if we would use
technical Innguiige, by a political not n militaty organ.

This is petfeclly natural. None of the principal plans
which are required for a War can be made without an
insight mto the political relations ; and, in reality, when
people speak, as they often do. of the prejudicial iuOuenoe
of policy on the conduct of ;i War, tliey say in reality
something s-ery djfierent to what they intend. It is not
this influence but the policy itself which should be found
fault with. If policy is rif^ht^ tha.t i%, if it succeeds in
hitting the object, then it can only act with advanta^t
on the War, If this influence of policy causes a diver-
gence Iroiii the object, the cause i^ only lo be looked lur
in a mistaken pohcy.

It is only when policy promises itself a. wrong effect
from ci*it^LU tuiiitury uiiraus ^nd measuxct, ata effect

i

I

CiiAP. VI.) INSTRindEKT OF POLICY \irj

■ opposed to their nature, that it can ^x^rcbe a prejudicial
effect on War by the rom-v. it pn^Jcribra, Jn*l a« a
pei^oii in a Uii^uaiEe witb wbich he is ntfl convorunl
sometimes sa>'S what he doea not intend, 5o policy, when
mtcTidtng right, mAV altm tirdcr things whidi do imf taUy
with Its OWQ vicM'8.

TJii* ha? liappcnod times without mdj and it ahov's that
a Gvrt^in knuwktige ol the nature ul W^ i^ e»^iitidl tv
the fDanagemcnt of political intercour»«.

But before going furlhcr, wo nuiat giiard oursrlvc*
agaici^t a ialite mttrpr eta lion \A which this tii verysuicep*
lihlp. Wc are far (rom holdtns thtr opinion that a War
MiniUcr &motlierf:d in official papers» a f^ientihc engineer,
oc even a »oldier who has been w«li tried in tlje field,
would, any «f them, nece^urily tnake the best Mini»t^r
ot Slate widere the Soveitigndoesnot act for himself ; or,
in otlier words, we do not mean to say that this acquaint-
ance with the nattire cf War is the principal quaJiliCütion
lor a War Minister ; «kvation, sup<iriorily of mind,
»timglii of character, thesf are the principal qualifications
which htf mu*t posstsä ; a knowk'dge of War mny be
supplied in one way or the other. France was never
wofvc advised ui its military and political affairs than
by the two brothers Bclleisle and the Duke of Clioiaeul,
alÜJOUjfb all tfiree were good soldiers.

If War it li> barmanise entirely with fhe political view*
and pohcy, to accommodate it«clf to the nteans available
for War, there is only one alternative fo be recommended

I when the slatesman and ^uklLeru^e nut cumbiUK) iti one
per^n, which is, to make the Commander-in-Chief a
member of the Cabinet, that he may lake part in its

_ council» and decjanixis tai iinpoitunt ix:o:aHiüna, But
them, again, thi« it only po»«ible when the Cabinet, that
if, the Government itaelf» i^ near the IheatTe of War, so
thflt thing« can be ^tled without a serious waste ol liine,

I

laB ON WAR [BOOK vm

This tt what iht Emperor of Austria did in 1809, smd
the allied Sovereigns in ißij, 1814, 1815, aod the nrrBngir-
raent provod ctfoipletely satlsfj^toiy.

The influence cf any military man except the General-
in-Chief in the Qibinat is exltemdy danj^^rous ; it
seldom leads to able vigorous action- The example
France in 1793. 1704- ^795- when Camot, while rrsidij
in Paris, ntanoged the ciiudiict of the War, i» lu be avoii
as A system cf terror is not at the command of any but
a revolutionary government-

We shrill now couclude wiLii some reücsctiüiiä tlcrii
from history.

Id tho last decade of the pa&t century, when thai
rtmarkaWe clionge in tlie Art ol War in Eurup? took pUce
by which the best Armies found that ^ part of theif
methi>d of War had l>ecomc utterly unserviceable, i^nd
events were brought about of a ma^ilude Ur beyoni
who^t a^ny one had any previous conec^ption of,
certainly api>eared that a false cakulatioit oi ever]
thing was to be laid to the charge of the Art of War.
It was plain that while confined by habit within
nurrow circli; ol ctmceptions, she had bt^en surprised
by the force of a new state of relations. lyin^> no doubt,
outside that cirde, but stiU not outside the nature of
things. ■

Those observer« who took the most comprehenii\-e
view ascnbed llie circumslance to the genoral iiiflumc«j
which policy had exercised for centuries on the Art of Wi
and undoubtedly (o its very great disadvantage, iuid
which it had sunk inlu a half-measure, ofinn into mere'
5ham-£ghting, They were right as to fact, but they vm:
wrong in attributing it to something accidental, or whit
might have been avoided.

Others thought (hat everything was to be explained
by thr momentary inlluence of the particular policy

t«AP. VL] INSTKIIMKNT OF TOLICY 1J9

Aufilria, Prussia, England, &c.. with re|;ard to thetr ovm
interests tesppctivrly.

But 1$ U true tliat the real &uipn£e by which Clan's
minds w^re s«i«e<] was con&r^d 10 Ui« cotiduct ol War,
and did nnt rather rr.lntc to pnlic:y itArrJf ^ That ü :

I Did the UJ success proceed troiii the inllucnce ol policy
on the War» or Ircm a wrong policy itseli ?
Tili* pmdiKifiii» rffects ai thi? Fiench Rtwolution abroiid
weie evidently brought about much Jess through nc^w
methoda and views introduced by the French in the con-
duct of War lltun thixm^b thr changes which it wrought
in sUt^-crad and civil administration, in the character
B of Governments, in the conditLon ot tho people, Ac. That
other Governments took a mistaken view oE all these
things : that they endeavoured, with their ordiniry
means, lo hold their own o^ainM lorcrs of a novel kind
overwhelming in strength— all that was a blunder

Wotild it K-ivr been jxissble tn perceive nnd mend this
error by a scheme for the \S'ar from a purely military
point ol \"lew ? Impossiblp. For if there had been a
>htcaJ f*trategist, who mrrrly from thn nature oE
fte Iwstile elements had foreseen all Che consequences,
and prophesied remote possibilities, stiU it would have
been practically impt»säible to Iiavc turned such wisdom
to account.

II policy lad risen to a just appreciation of the fortes
which had sprung up in France, and of the new relations
B is the po1itic;tl state of Europe, it might have forraren
tlie oonsequcnc«6 which must follow in respect to the
great features of War. and it was only in this way that it
UHÜd aniv«! iit a connct virw ol the rxtrnt of thir mGini^
leqatrcd as well as of the best use to make of those mean«.

We may therefore say, that the twenty years' victories
d tlic K<;voltil:cin are cliiefly to U^ ascribed to the

VOL, itu 1

I3d "* OK WAR [BOOK vm.

«rror^ou* policy of the Gov^rnmcnla by which it w«

It U triic those errors tint dispJaytd thenudves in the
Wnr, and thr events of the War complHely disappoinle^
tlie expecldlLons which policy eji1ert.ini4fd. Bui this did
not take place becaüte policy oeglKted to consult iti
mililviry «dvLwjs. Thnt Art n( War m which thr. pnUli-
cian of the day could believt^ Daiaely, that derived Itoed
the reality of War at that time, that which belonged to the
policy oJ thi! diiy. Umt (amiliar instnimcnt which policy
had hitherto med— that Art of War. I say. was naturJiUy
involved in the error of policy, and therefore could not
t«ach jt anylhbg better. It is true that War itself undrr-
wetit iTnport:\nt :ilterations both in its nature and forms,
which brought it nearer to ils absolute form ; but thfw
changes wore not brought about because th« French
Government had» to & certain «xtt-zil, deltv^ed itieif
from the Ir^iding-strings of policy : tlicy aro^e fioin an
altered policy, produced by the Frtnch R(^olution> not
only in France, but over the rest of Europe as weU. This
policy had called (orth other means and other powen»,
by which il became poMtblc^ locondnct W-nr with a de^ec
of mipnty which could not have been thought of otherwise.

Therefore, the actual changes in the Art of War are a
C0Qaec|uence of alterations in policy ; and, ao far from
beinjf an argument for llie possible separation of the two,
thry are, on the contrary, very strong evidence of th«
intimiicy of their connection.

Therefore, once more : War is an instrument of policy ;
it must necew;if dy be^ its cliarac(«T, il mu«I mcAKiirr with
its scale : the conduct of War, in its great features, is
therefore poliry itself, whirh takes up the sword m place of
the- |>eri, but does^ not ini tlial nccnunt cease to tbinlc
according to iti own laws.

c*fAp. vnj

LIMITED C>BJFXT

13t

^^ CHAPTER VTI

^^^ UMTTEn OBJECT-^PPENSrVE WAR

' Even tl (he uomplttn ovprthrrw of Ihr rnrmy mnnol br
Ibc object« there may still beone wliich is directly )X)bt(Lvc,
and thi« positiv« ob]«ct can ht nothing c\^ than ihe
ooDque«it t>l a pmt of th^ cnpmy's country.

»The use of *uch A con<;ui?st is this, that wcw^Iccti
the cnr-oiy's resources genorally^ therefore, tA cuureo, liis
milUar^* powtr, wbilr wr increas« our own; tliat wc
IherHore carry an the War, to a certain ejctcnt, nl hid
e^pensM; ; further in (hi& way, that in ne^oti.itions for
the pu&4«s4tün üf the enemy's provinces may bi^
rdeil ai nrt gain, becaniw wt can either keep them or
«xchangc them for other advantdgeä,

TljA vifu' of a conquest of the enemy's provinces is
very aatural, an*! wouJd Iw open to no objection if it were
not tlut the defensive attitude, which must succeed the
ofiennive. may often cau^ uneasiness.

In the chapter on the culminating point of victory
we have »uIBcirntly expkmed the manner in wliich auch
mn offen^ve wenken.t the combatAnt force, nnd that it
may be succeeded by a situation causing anxiety &s to
the future.

Thi» wi:4keninK of mir mrmb-it-int force by the contpimt
cf part of ttie enemy's territory I^m its degree*, and the«
depend chiefly on the geographical position of this portion
of lertilofy. The mure il is an •innrx of fHjr own coiuilry,
b?-rng contiguous to or embraced by it. the more it i» in
the direcHon of our pHneipa! force, by so much the less
will it weaken our cunibatarl fcin*. In the Seven Years'
War, Saxony wa* a n^itura] complement of the Prussian
■tbcatrr of War, -nnil Prederirk thr Grcnt'ft Army, Jiitfteiul
kCf bcisif weakened, \tas strengt limed by (he potse^bn of

13* ON WAR [BOOK \ii

that province, because it lira nearer to Silesia than to tl
M;trk, 4tnd at the same time covers the latter.

Even in 174z and 1743, after Frederick the Gre^t had'
oner cnnquemd Silesia, it did ncit weaken his Army in
the M<lt because, owing to its form and situation as wet)
AS the contour of its frontier line, it only presented a
nnrrow point (o the Austtians, ajs long as they were rot
masters of Saxony, and besides that» this Entail point ol
contact also lay in the direction of the chief operations ol
th(r cnnlending forces. d

If, on »he other hand, the conquered territory is ft'
strip running up between hoattle provinces and has an
eccentric position and unfavoural^e configuration of
ground, then the weakening increases so visibly that
victorious bottle becomes not only ninr-h easier (or tl
enemy, but it may even become unnecessary as well.

The Austrians have always l>epn obliged to evacual
Provence without a battlewhen they have made attempts
on it from Italy. In the year 1744 the French were v*ry
well pleased even lo get out of Bohemia without having
lost a tiattle. in 1758 Frederick the Great could not hold
his position in Bohemia and Moravia with the same force
with which he had obtained s^ch brilliant ^ucccsae^ in
Silesia and Saxony in 1757. Examples of Armies not
being able to keep po^cssinn nf conqupred territory solely
because their combatant force was so much weakened
thereby are so common that it does not appear nece;
to quote any more of thcm.

Tlierefore, tlie question whetJier we sliuuld aim at such
an object depends on whether we can exp«t lo hold
possession of the conquest or wbfthrr ;i Irmporary
occupation (invasion, diversion) would repay the expendi-
ture of force required : especially, whettier we have not tt>
apprehend such ;l vi^orott« conn (erstrecke ;u. will com-
pletely destroy Ihe balance of forces. In the chapter on

I

CHAP. vtLl LIMITED OBJECT 133

tbe Gulmijoatijig point we have lr«a(«rd of tUe conüden-
Cion due I0 thi> question in each particuUr cbm.

Thrrr h jnsi oti«^ point which vr. UnVK still tn ndd.

An offcm^Lve of ttiis kinU will nut ^UwAjrs coujpvDsatif
u» Jot wJot we lose upon other points. Wiiilst we are
cngugrd in m^kini; 11 pciitin) rnnqiicsl, III« enemy may br
doing the «ame at other points, ^nd i£ our cnterpme 4ott
not greatly preponderate in importance then it will not
compel the t^nemy t« ^\-v up hi:(. It b, tlierefore, u
question for senou« conudrration whether we ttuty not
JoM more thun wc gain in a caj^ of tliis descnption-

Even U we suppuM^ two provinces [one ou eudi 4ide)
to be of equal value, we «hall alwny« lote morr" by the one
whidi llic cntsmy takrs fronj us Ihon wr cin gam by the
one wf tyike» because a number of uur forces become to«
cen^n extent lik*^ faui: frait. non'Cfit'<:tiw. But as the
ftimc lakes pl^cc on the enemy'» side ul»o. one would
Rjppo^ thai Ln reality there is no ground to attach more
tmpurl^ncv to tlie m:iintrn»nci? of what is our own tiian
to the conquest, Üut yet there i:^. The miuntenoncc of
OUT own territory is aJways a matter which morr deeply
concents us, and ilw <iul7ering inllicted on our uwn ätate
Cinuot be Outwd|;h«1. nor. tn a certain extent, neutra-
lised by what wc sa>n in return, unless the latter promises
a much greater percentage»

The consequence of all this is, that a strategic attack
directed ;iKaim;1 only ^ mixlrrntc object involves u grealer
Otccbsity for feteps to deji^nd other points which il dov^
not directly co%-cr itiun one which i» directed Ji^ainst the
centn! of tlic enemy's force ; continently, tn sueh nn
Attick the concentration of forces in time and »pace
OLonot be carried out to the same extent. In order that
it may take place, at least as regards time, it becomes
oeccssary for the advance to l^ niade oifen&iväly isom
every point possible, and at the same moni«it exactly ;

igfi ON WAR [ROOK viil^

new jitliAnc^ spnug up in favour of the defender, or o\
one« directed ngainst him iaW to pieces,

Heie. tJien, is the object for the drftfuder, ui cjse his'
weakness does not permit him to think of any important,
CMintrrstroke, But Ihis is not the oaturr of every d<'fri
Bive War, accordiug to l*ie coucepliun which we haw
given of its form. According to thjt conception it is thft'
stronger form of War, and on üccounl of that strength
it can äl«o he apphed when a countei^trokc more or less
Important is designed-

Ttiese two ca«rs must be kept distinct from the s-
fir*t, as they have an influence on tlie defence.

In the fifst case, the defender's object is lo keep
fliun of hi& own country as bng as possible, becauM; in
wny h^ gains most tirac ; and gaining time i* the onl]
way to alUin hi-^ object. The jwsitive object which hfl^
can in most cases attain, and which wiU ^;ve ttim an
opportunity of carrying out his object in ttie negotiation*
(ur peace, he c;iiinot yet JncluUr in his plan lor the W«r,
In this state of stiategic paasiveness, the advantages
which the defend<^r can gam at certain points consist ia
merely repelliog partial attacks ; the piepondesanc^H
pained at those points he tries to make of sennce Co him at
others, lor Jie is gciiecally hard pressed at all poinU^ U
he has not the opportunity of doing this, then tlicrc oJten
only accrues to him the small advantage that the enemy
will leave hini at re^t for a time. ^H

If the defender is not altogeltier too weak, »mall ofM^
sivc operations directed less towards pcMnEinent possf5>
ston than a tempontry advantage to cover lotscu, wliich
may be suaCaiued aftenvards, invasioas, diwrsions» or
tnirrprises against a single lorlrus?, may have a place in
this delensive system without altering its ot^Mt of
caacnce. H

But in the second case, in >vhich a podtivi; objeict a

CHAP. VI»-] LIMITED OBJECT 137

ab^ady grafted tipon the defensive, the greater Üie
oouDtfTülrolci^ thni i^ wnnmnted by cin:i]mKt;LncKi the
nwne the defenuve titjpuil^ mlu tbell ol u puaitive cha-
racter, la other word*, the more the defence ha* been
Adopted voiuDTntily. in ordrr to muki' thr Ürtt blow Mirer,
the bolder may be the anderes which the delender Jay«
lor hb opponeni. The boldest, and ii it succeeds, thfii
muat i-fErcluul, is tlic n^tri^at into tlie interiur uf (to
country ; and thin mc^ui» is then at the «Ainc time tliat
which differs most wjd<?ly from the other system.

Let U3 only t^iiiik of tlie difference between Ütt pOsritiOA
in which Frederick the Great was placed in the Seven
Vear%* War, and that of Russin in 1812.

XSThen the War beg^n, Frederick, through his adv^mced
«tale of pn^pnnttion for War. bad a kind of superiority;
this ^nvc hmi the advantage of Ix-ing »hlc to m^kc hjniscil
maMer of Saxony, which was besides such a rtälural
complement of his theatre ct War that the possession of
It did not dimmish, but increased his combntEtnt force-

At (he opening of the campaign of 1757, the King
endeavoured to |>Toceed with his strategic attack, which
iWinnJ not impossible as long as the Kusaions and Frencli
hiid not yet reached the theatre of War in Silesia, the
M-irk and Saxf>ny. But tho attack miscarried, und
Fiedehck was thrown back on the defensive lor the rest
of the canipaign, was obliged to evacuate Bohemia and
to rescue hut vwn theaue from the enemy, in whicJi he
only succeeded by tuminj; himself with one and the sajne
Army, ftrst upon the French, oJid then uponfhc Austrians,
Thiti advantage he owed eatiioiy to ttie deltriäive.

In the year 1758, when hia enemies had drawn round him
in n closer circle, and his forcwi w^ete dwindling down to a
very disproportionate relation, he deterniiiied on .111 oflen-
«ive OD A small scale in Moravia : hia plan was to tajoe
CUtnüta before his en«^iiefi were prepared ', not in the

I3fi ON WAR fnooJt vm,

^xpccUliQn^of 1ce«;üng posse^on of, or oE nukiitg it a
b^v for flirt hrrtidv^ince, hui io use it as a so>rf oi advance
wufk, a ctmntcr-approai^k oguuttit Uie AustnanSt who
wüuld be otiUged to devote the rest of tbe present c^m*
poign, and pcriiaps even a second, to npcovcT possession
of it. This ätuck also niificained, Frederick Ihtn gave
up all idea of a real oöensive, as he nw th^t it only
incrr^sed the dispruportiini of his Army. A compact
position in the heart of hi& own country m S^Jtouy anij
SUesia, the use of »hort lines» that he might be able r&pidly
to incruHse his forces at any point which might be mrnaced,
a battle when unavoidable, smaJt incuraion^ wheo oppor-
tunity offered, and along with this a patient stste of
W4Uing-fof (expectation), a saving of his means for better
times became now his general plan. By degrees the
execution of it became more ^nd more passive. As he
saw that even a victory cost him loo much, he tried
to man;.ige af still It's3 expense ; everything depended
on gaining time and on keeping what he bad got ; be
therefore became more tenacious of yielding any ground,
and did not hesitate to adopt a perfect cordon »ystem^
Thi; positions of Prince Henry in Saxony, a^ well as thoso
of ihc King in the Silesian mountains, m-iy be so tensed.
In his letters to the Marquis d'Argens, he maniiesls Ihe
impatience with which he looks forward to winter quaiters
and the satisfaction he felt at being able to take them up
again without having siiflered any serious lo8s>

ttlioever blames Frederick for this, and looks upon it
HA a nign tbnt his spirit had sunk, would, we think, pa^
judgment without much reflection.

If the cntr^^nched canip at BuDfclwitS. the positions
taken up by Fiince Hvmy m Saxony» and by the King
in the Siltsiiin mountain«, do not appear to us now as
measures on which a (ieniU'ii] should jilnci? his dependence
in a lu»t extremity becaui^c a ßnonapartc would auon

■crap. V111.) LIMITED OBJECT 139

liave Itiniät his iwütx) Uirousli such luctioil cubweba, we
untol not forget that Unics liavc changed, that War hai
bfcom^ a totally dlffcff^nt thlnf;, \% quickened with now
«aeries, and lliut ttiei«^fore puution» might luve bevn
caccdLent at that time, aJthough they are not so now,
Dnd that in ud^ilion l^ a\\, the character of thr rmvniy
dceenm altenlji^n. A^iiiua tbe Army of the German
■ Stat«, agjtinst Daun and Butturlin, it might have been
th<T height tf wisdom to employ means whicli Frederick

IwcvUd have dcspi&ed if used dgaiust himseJf.
Tlie rtfttiU Justified this view : in the state of pattent
cxpcctatjonr Frederick attained his object, and evaded
^ÄcvJti«« in ft coUisioD with which his forces would have
b««n dft^ed to pieces,
TIjc relation in point of numbeis between the küiuiau
and French Annies opposed (o each other at the opening
of the campaign in 1812 was ^lill mure unfavt>arjble
to the former tJjäa that between Frederick and hiseneime^
in the Seven Yean' War, But the Russians looked for-
ward lo being joined by large reinforcements m theci^uiäe
of the campaign. All Europe was in secret hostility to
^ Buonaparte, his power had been screwed up to tJie
f highest point, 3. devouring War occupied him in Spain,
and the vast extent of Rus&ia allowed of pushing the
exhaustion of the pnemy*s militiiry means lo th*^ utmost
«xtrcmitybya retreat over live hundred miles of country.
UiadeT cincumstaBCCS on this grand scale» a tremen-
dous counler^troke was not only to be expected if the
French enterprt^ failed (and how could it succeed if the
Russian Emperor would not make peace, or his subjects
did not ii^e in uksuriifctiou ^), but thjs counter&troke
Doigbt also end in the complete destruction oS the enemy,
^ The mmt profoimd sjgacity <:ouUl, Ihereforr, not have
fB d«vi6«d a better plan of campaign than that wbicli the
ttH**Ufia followed on th<^ spiu of tlie moment.

I^

ON WAR

[WX>K \lt!.

ThAi ibis W35 not the opinion at the time. And timt 5uclt
ti view wuuld then have been looked Upon »k prcprotrnius,
18 no reason Jur unt ntnv denying U to hv lliv right one.
If we are to Jeam from history, wc must look upon thiugi
wli^ch hnvc actually happened as also posaihk in the Eutuic»
aud thai llie seiies ul gieat events wliicU &ucc«eiled the
march upon Moscow is not a succession of mere accidents
cvury one will grant who can clntm to give an ojutiian
on such subjects. II it tia.d be«i posäibi« £uf tUe Ru^iaas,
with great efforts, to defend their frontier, it is certainly
probable that in such case also the French pinvcr would
have sunk, and that they would have at la^t suffer^ a
reverse of fortune ; but the reaction then would certainly
not have been &a violent <uid decisive. By sufferings and
sacrifices (wliich certainly in any other country would
have been greater, ;inU in most cases would liuve becQ
iinpossibk) Russia purcluscd this enormoua success.

Thus a great positive «ucc^s can never be obtain««]
«XCept through positive measures, planned not with a
view to a mete state of ''waiting-for/' but with a view
to A dcci^on, in shortv even on the defensive, there is do
great gain to be won except by a greal stake.

I

CHAPTER IX

PLAS OF WAR WHEN THE DESTRUCTION
or THE ENEMY IS THE OBJECT

Having characterised in detail the diflerent aims to whkb
War may be directed, wc shall go through the organisitioa
ol War as n whole for each of thü tJiiee separate gradations
correspooding to these aims.

In conf omit ly with all that has been said on the sub-
ject up to the piesent, two fundamental principles reign

I

CHAP, tx.} DESTRUCTION OP THE ENEMY 14X

throughoul th^ whole plan of the War, and serve as a
f^nidc for everything «la«.

The£int i& : lorMuc« the weight of the enrmy's pow«r
into ai few centr*^ of ßrnvity ns pn^^iblr, into ono if it
ran be done ; again, to conlni« tlw attacJc ui^auist tli^sc;
ctntrts of force to as few pnndpal tindertakmp« u possible»
to one H possible : laslly , to krrp ,nll vc^wd^ry ander,
takini^ «3 subordinal« as possible. In a uortJ, Ihe &nt
principle i»» /o ^oiicenfrifM at much at possibie.

The «econd principle nin* thns—r/i aa as mifUf «1
^fls*i6/tf; therefore, to allow of ciodelayordetotirii-itlumt
sufficient reason.

The redudng the f^emy'f^ power to one central point
drpöid*—

(I) On t^e nature of tta political connecfion. If it
consists ol Annies ai «nr Power, thrtr is ^eOT-illy no
difiicidty; U of allied Armies, of which one is acting
«nplyasanaUywithcitlanyicteTe^toltts own, then the
difficulty is not much jtre^tr-.r : if cf a coaJition for a
cotnnion object, theo it depends on the cordiality of the?
alliance ; we have already treated of t\i\% tMhye^i.

(3) On the Mtuation of the theatre of W^r upon which
the different hostile Armies make their appearance.

If the enemy's forces ire collected in oho Array upon
on« theatre of War. they constitute in reality a unity,
and we nred not inquire further ; if they are upon one
thi^aUe of War, but m separate Annies, which bi-lanj;
to different rower», tliere is no longer ab^okte unity ;
there \a^ however, »1 stifliciimt intrrdfrpMidenci* of part*
for a decisive blow upon <mr part to throw down thr oth^r
in the concussion. If the Armies, are ported in theatres
of Wot ad)i)inin|7 riich other, ;uLd not se;inT;Lt«] by nny
gnat natural obstadi^, then there i« in tuch case dl&o
a decided influence of the one upon the other; but if
the theatres of War are wide apart, if there is neutral

X4a OS WAR [BOOK VI

territory, peat mounlains, Brc.^ int^nTTiing betvceq
thcnt» lUen the influence is very doubtltil and iniprnb.iblc
as wdJ ; ii they are on quite opposite sides of the SUtc
fl^inst which thrWar b made, so thai Operations dirfCttd
4|r*xiDsl them must diverge on eccentlic Jines, tlien almost
tvtry trace o( connection is at an end.

If Prussia was attacked by Prance and Rn^ta at t
same lime, it would be as leÄptcls the conduct of the W.
much the same as if there were two separate Wars ; «I
the same lime the unity would appear in the nrgolbtlofis.
Saxony and Austria, on the contrary, as mititaiy
powers in (he Sever Years' War. were to be ffgarded a»
one; what the one sufTcred the other fdt also* partly
because the theatres of War lay in the same direction for
Frederick the Great, partly because Saxony hiid no
pohtical independence -

Numerous a^ wore the enemies of Buonaparte in Ger-
many in rSi^» still they all ätoucl very much in one dtrcc*
tion in respect to him, and the theatres of War tor Ibfir
Armir* were in close connection, and reciprocally in-
fluenced each other very powerfully. If by a cfwieentra*
tion of all his forces he had been abb to overpower the
mrtin Army, such a defeat would have had a decisive
effect on all the parts. If he had beaten the Boheiniaa
Grand Amiy. and maiched upon Vienna l>y Prague;
Blüclier. however wiJ>ing, conid not have remained in
Saxony, because he would have l>ecn called upon to co-
nperate in Brihemia, and the Crown Prince ol Sweden as
welt would have been unwiUing to remain in the Mark-
On the other hand, Austria, if carrying on War again&t
the French on the Rhine and Italy at the same time,
will always hnd it difhcult to give a decision tipon one of
those theatres by means of a successful stroke on the
other. Partly because Switaeriandj with its mountain»«
form« too strong a barrier tKl^^vvji the two theatres.

'4cfl

iV. ixO DE5TRUCTT0X OF THE ENEMY 1^3

aod partly bfcausi? IV dirertion of the road« on each
*ide i» diverKt^aU France, agiin, can much sooner decide
in the CDC by a. stjccessfut result in the other, because the
direction of its forcps in both converges upon Virnn«,
the centre oi the powier ol the whole Austrian empire ;
we may add further, that a decisive blow in Italy will
have more cffnM on (hr Rhine thrntrp than n siM^rcrw on
the KlÜDe would tiav« id Italy, becaust^ the blow Croun
Italy strikes oeÄrer to the centre, and that from the
Rhinr mon- upon Ihr flank, of tlir AtL-ilrian domimcms-

It proceeds Irom what we ha\-^ «id that the conccptioa
of separated or connected hostile piower extends through
all degree» of relationship, and tlut therefore, in each case»
the 6rst thin^ i& to diseover the inilnence which eventt
in one theatre may have upon the other, according to
which we may allerwards settle how far the difiercnt
forte* of the enemy may be reduced into one centre of
lorco.

There is only one exception to the principle of dixocting
jill our strength against the centre of gravity of the enemy*»
power, that is, if nndllnry exprditionx promiM; rxtrn-

inary ttdvanlngfs. ^nd sX\\\, in this cam, it is a condition
led, tliat we have such a decisive superiority as
enable» u« to undertake such rnterpnses without incuiripg
too great risk at the point which forms oitr great object.

When General Bülow marched mlo Holland m 1814, it
«■a» to be foreseen that the thirty thoosaod men com-
posing hiN car\:n would not only nrult^liäc the Mmc
numbc* of Prenchmcnt but would, besides, give tlie
English and the Dutch an opportunity of enterii^ the
field with farces whitli othejwise would never have l>een
brought into activity.

Thuft,fhrrefore,the first consideration in the combintition
of a plan for a War is to determine the centres of gravity
of the enemy's power, and, if possible, to reduce them to

144

ON WAR

f BOOK \'\

ttaj|

one. The secc^d b to unite the forces which are to be
«nplfiyed LigaiTjsl (he ccntm of force mio one grcAt »ction.

Here now the followuig groundg lor dividing our forces
may pfcwnt thcmselvM :

(i) The crigtnal position of Ihe mJitary forces, therefor*
also the situation of the States engaged in the oHensivt. ^

If the coTiceTilrntion of the forces would occasion detourt"
and loss o( tim«, and the danger of advancing by ^pciratr:
lines 13 not too great, then the some may be justifiable
on those grounds ; for to effect an unnecessary con-
cenlration of forces, with great loss of time, by which the
Ire^hne^ and rapidity of the fir^ blow is diminished.
would becorlrary to the second leading principle wc have
laid down. In all cases in which there is a hope of
Surprising the enemy in some measure, thi* dcSCl
particular attention.

But the case becomes stil] more important if the »tl
is undertaken by allied States which are not situated on a
line directed towards the State attacked — not one be-hmd
the other— but situated side by side. If rrusfiia and
Austria undertook a War against France, it ^voiild b|H
a very erroneous measure, a squandeiing cf time and
force if tbc Armies of the two Powers were obliged to Kt
out from the same point, as the natural hne for an Army
operating from Prussia against the heart of France is from
the Tower Rhine, und that of the Auslrians is from thifl
Upper Rliine. Concentration, therefore, in this case,
COuJd only be effected by a sacrifice ; consequently, in any
particular instance, the quesLicn to be decided would be,
Is the necessity for concentration so great that
sacriüce must bo made ?

(2) The attack by separate lines may oßer g
results.

As we are now speaking of advancing by separate IJoef
against on« ceuUd oE forc«^ we are, therefore, supposing

lid be,
t thi^

m

I

I

CIAP. ixj DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 145

AQ advaocf by eonvtrging iincs. A «epar^tc advance on
piraUel or ccnenthc linus belongs to the rubric of acct^frry
m idt rUikiit^t of wtiicb ue have ^re^idy 5t.Hjk<?]i.

Now, tvtryccnvtr^tnt attack in Stratf^y. a well as in
tactica. boJda out Ui^ prospect of ^i-Atf rr^Liltn ; Cur if
lt 9UDc«c<ds, the consequdice is cot «inipZy a defeat, but
moTcorlpM the CDtlingoff of the enemy. The concentric
attack. IS tliereforr, aiwuy^ ilmi which may Lcud to tbe
greAtest results ; but on account of the separation of the
parts of the foree, and the rnUrgemcnT of the thejitre of
Wfli, it involves als^ tlie ino»t risk : it is tlie same here oa
with iitt^ck and defence, the weaker form holds out the
^rr^atcr results in prospcc<-

Th* quation therefore is, whether the assaiUnt feels
slrrn^ enough to try (or tliia grrat result.

When Frederick the Grcil advanced upon Bohenii», in
the y«ar 1757, he wt cut from Saxony and Sile&ia with his
forces divided. Hie two principal reasons Eor his dolrg ta
were. first, thai his force^were so cantoned in thcwintrr
that a concent ration of thena at one point would have
divested the attack of ail tht^ advantages of a surpn^tc ; and
next, that by ihh concentric advance, c,ich of the two
Anttrisn theatre« of War was threatened in the flank» and
the rear. The danger to which Fcedt-nck the Great «^xpo&ed
himself on that occasion was that one ol his two Armies
might h'-ive been completrlydefr^ited by superior forces?
should the Aubtriansnof fr« Mis, then they wuuid have to
five battle with their centre only, or run the risk of being
thrown ofl thrir linr nf rommunication, either on one side
or the other, and meeting witJi u culaatrophe ; this was
the great result which the King hoped for by this advance.
The Alistrians prrferrrd thr hattlr in ihr centre, but
E'ra^e, where they took up tlirii pusitiun, was in a
situation too much under the influence of the convergent
attack, which, 3.%. they rcm;kEned perieetly passive in thdr

VOL. in. X

£46 ON M'AK [Bc<w viu.

position, had time to develop its efficacy to the «tmosi
Thr coin!^i]U£^iic« of this W4& that wliui tbty lost the<
batti«! it ^ A* a complete catastrophe ; .^s i* m.mifc^t (rom
the fact that Iwo-thirdsof the Army with the Comniandcr-
inOiiL-f weie obliged la shut themsdv^ np in Pnign«,

Thi» brilliant success it the opcnLng of th« cainpai|
was attained by the bold stroke with a concentric attack.
U FredericJi considered the precision oi his owa move-
ments, the energy of his GeneiaJ»» the moral superiority olj
his troops^ <m the one side, »nd thr sluggishness d tbci
AuslridJis on the other, as «ulhcient to ensure the success
ai his pl^n, vrh*) can blame \iim ? But as we cannot leaw
tlicac moral adv^antages out of coasiderution, neither can
we ascribe the success solely to the mere geometrical form
of th<' ,'4ltack, Lei us only tliink uf the nn le^s brtUiant
campaign of Buonaparte» in tlie year tjgö, when tlie
Austrians were =o severely punished for their ccmcen^Tic
march mto Italy. The means which the French Generat
had at command vn that ccc^sit^n, the Au.ttri^m General
had ako at his disposal m 1757 (with the exception of the
moral), indeed, he had r^ith^r more, lor he was rat, hke
Buonapartr. weaken thanhisadversary, TJiereJore, wheni
it is to be nppjehended that the advance nn separate
converging hues may afford the enemy the means oi
counteracting the inequahly oJ numerical force* by asing
mterior ttnes, such a form of attack is not advisable; andt
if on account of the sttAialion of the belUgefents it must be
resorted to, it can only be regarded as a necessary e\il.

li, irom thtB point cf view, we caet our eyes on the plan
which was adopted for the invasion of France in 1814, iti
isirnpoS5ihl^ to Rive it approval. The RussTan, Aosiriail,
and Prussian Airtues were concentrated at a point near
Fmnkfort-cn-thc-Maine. on the most natural and mort
direct tine to the centre of the force of the Prrmch inoii<
archy. These Armies wer** then separated, that one might.

^wFix.J DESTRUCTTON OF THE ENEMY 147

p*riMmtf in!o Fr^n<*»> from MayenCü. Ihc ötb^r from
SwiUeilaiit!. As the enemy's lurct* wast aa leducpti Ibat
a define« of the frontier wa» out of the (|u«slion, the
whotf^ advflntjg'^ tfi he eiqipffrH from this ronccntrie
advance, li it ^cceeited> yvna that wliile Lorraine und
AJftac« vrttt conquered by one Army, Franche-Corote
«TTiild brtnkm hy thcoThrr. Was this trifling ndvantag«
«■orih the tfouble of marchuig inlo Sw^teeilaml ? We
knuw vcr^' well that therr were other (but just as in-
»ulfkiml) gKiLinds which caused this tnnrch ; but wernn-
^^ fine outsdvc* h-^re to the point which we are considering.
^B On thr other Bidtr, Buonapurti? was a man who
^B|HK1}]>' understucd the defensive to oppose to a con-
^*^^Hf attack, <ts he had already shown in his mafttcrly
campai^of 1796; and ;il though thn Alhos were very con-
siderably superior in numbers, y*l the preponderance due
(o hiü superiority as a General was on all occasions
;u:knowledged- He joined his Amiy too l^te near Chalons,
and looked down rather too muTh, generally, on his
oppf>nenl4, s-till h^ was very near hitting ihe two Armies
Mparatdy; and what was the state be found theminiLt
Brirnnr ? Blucher had only 27,000 of hi* 65,000 men
I idthhim, and lht> Great Army, out of 200,000. hud only
^ft 100,000 pre^^ent. It was impossible to make a better ^me
for Ihr sdvenary. And from the moment that act ivr work
b^ai;, no greater want was felt thaik Ih.it ii\ reunion-
After afi these reflections, we tliink that akhough the
coTtcentric attack is in. itself a mtvin« of obtaininf;
grevter resuJl&, still it should generally only proceed from
a pret^ous «epmtion of the pans composing the ivhol«
Jnrce, and that there are f*?w cases in which we should da
right in giving up the shortest ^nd mo»t diTPCt line of
6peracjun for the sake of adopting thnt form.

(3) Tile breadth of ii Ihe.itie c>l War canbeaniotivolor
attacking on separat« linf?*.

148 ON WAR r^ooK ^^'

If an Army on thr offensive m its aHvnncoffom any pomt,
peuttiaU% with sut^t^a^ Id some disl^tnce mto ÜJc mt^nocJ
of tl:c cremy's country, then, certnirly, th* »pace whldii
it commands is not lestricted exactly to thr linr ot voad-
by which it marches, it will comaiand a margiß on catlii
3id^ ; »till thut will depend very much» if w* may uw the
figUTn, nn the solidity -ind cohrsion of Iht- oppci%in([
State, li Ihc State only hangs loosely together, if itfJ
people are an efftminaie rac<^ unaccuatomod to W«r, then,
without our taking mndi ttoiiblr, u «mMdcniblfl extL^nt cd
country will open behind our victorious Army ; but if w«
have to deal Kith a brave and loyal population, the ^pace
bchindoui Army will form a triangi«, more or Jed» acute.

It order to obviate (his evil, the attr»^ ktng force reqxii
torogulato its advance on a certain width oi front. If
enemy's force is concentrated at a pkirticular point, thiflj
breadth of front cao only be preserved so long as we ti
not in cnntact with the rni^my, and must be contraci
as we approach his position : that iseasy toundctstand.

Btit if the enemy hims^^lf h;is taken up a position with'
a certain extent of front, then there is nothing al^surd in
a corresponding extension on our part We »peak her« of
one theatre ol War. or of several if thfy are quite clo»e
to each other. Obviously this is, therefore;, th* ctM
when, according to our view» the chief operation i*, at the
same time, to be dr^cisive on subordinate jwinta.

But now, can we always run the chancr of this ? And
may we expose ourselves to the danger which mast arise
ii the inEuence of the chief operation is nul ^uIGciemt to
decide at Ihc minor |nnints ? Doe* not the want of a certain
breadth for a Ihtntfc o( W.irdeser\'e specinl ci-insideraiion?

He« as weJi as e\er>'where els« it i& linpoKsible to
exliaust the number of rombinations which may Iah place ;
but we mnintiiin lha(^ wilh h-wrxccpfion^, the derision OD
the capital point will carry with it the dedaion on all

I

I

CHAP, ixj DESTRUCTION' OP THE ENEMY 149

minor p^ts. Therefore, the actjon should be related
in conformity wi(b this principle, in all casts in wliich the
conlrary is not eviduat.

When Bitonaputc invadrd Russia, he bad goi>d reason
to hrlirvr ihflt by conquering the main body of the
Rutoi.!!) Aioiy he would compel their forces on the Upper
Dwtna to »iiGCumb, He left ^t first only the Corp« of
Ondinot to oppose thera^ but Wittgenstein assiimril (he
oSenalve, and Buonaparte was then obliged to »end aljto
the Mxth &jrp5 to that quarter-
On the other band, at the hfgmning of the campaign
he directed a part of his forces against BagraUon ; but
that Ceneral was carried along by the influence of the
backward movement in tlie centric, and Biioiiapartc wa&
CÄabIed then to recaU that part of his force*. If Wingen-
stein liad not had (o cover the second oupita] he would
also have (oUuwcd the retreat of the (jreat Army under
Barday.

In the yearB t^5 and 1809» Buonaparte*» victories at
Ulm and Rati?ibun decided nutterri in It^dy and ^so in
the Tyrol although tht^ first vrn% rather a diitant theatre,
and an independent one in itself. In the year 1806, liis
victories at Jena and Auerstadt were decisive in respect
to rvcrythinfc that mif^ht have been attempted .ngaln^
htm in Wcetph^a and Kes^e. ur oi\ the Fiankfoi L luuü,

Amooigvt the number of circumstainres which may
bftrr an infhicnoc on the leüistiince at ;ie[:ondaTy jtomi^.
ttman two which are the most prominent.

Tht first is : that in a country of vast extent, and also
relatively ut gri^ui powei. like Russia, we Con put off tiie
decisive blow at the chief point for some time, and arc
not obliged to do ^11 in a hnrry.

The »econd tu : when a minor pomt {like Sitvsia in Ih«
ycari8o6}, through a great nomber of fortresses, possess^
an extraordimtry degree of indcp<mdent strrmgtJi, Yet

4

ON WAR [book viu.:

Btt<mapart(^ treat«! that point with great cont^fi^t,
inftsonui^b n^, when he liaU to leave sucli a poitii compl«lcly
in hift rear on ihe march to Warsaw, he only <i«taclicd
SO.OCO men under hi^ brother Jerome to ihiit rjujirtcr.

li it happens (hat the blow at tli« CApltaJ point, in
probability, wiU not shike sncb a secondary pciot, or
no! donesoj and if the enemy has still forces at Ihm point/
then to the^— ^i& a ueccs&aiy evü — ^u adcqtutc force
must be opposed, because no one can absolutely lay op*n
his line of communication Irom the very ciirnmf5ici?iiicnl-

Out prudence may go a step further ; it niifcy require
that the advance upon the chie( point shall k<:ejt pao.*
with that on the secondary points, and consequently tlic
principal undertaking must be delayed wheftc\-er (]
secondary points will not succumb.

This principle docs not directly contradict ours as
uuiting all action as laras po^iblc in one great \mdi
tikinK, but ihc spirit [rom which it springs is dtamctricallj
opposed to the spinl in which oure is conceived. By'
foJlowmg su<:h a principle there would be such a meaaured^
puce in the mov^rnents, such a par^lysalion of the ini^fl
initsiv« force, such room for the fre^k of chnncc, and «ucti
a loss of time» as would he practically perfectly inoocuis-
tf-nl with iin otTcnsive directed tu the complete ovi
of the enemy.

The difliculty become* still greater If the forces statiOQfrd
at iLebe minor points can retire on divertieat lincs.—^j
What would then become ol the unity of our attack ?

We must, tticrefore, declare ourselves completely
opfKiscd in principle to the dependfrnce of the chxel alt;
on minor aftarks. and we maintain that an attack direct«
lu Hip destruction of the enemy which has not Ihc bol«
0«» to shoot. Like the point of an ;irrow, dir«ct at
heart of the enemy's power, can never hit Ihemarfc.

U) LasUy» tJi^re iS &tü] a fou^Ui ground for a «rpantf

"Hi

CMAP, txl DESTRUCTIOX OF THE ENEMY i$t
Advuicc in the faculty which it nuiy afEocd for nb*

RCACV*

It b certuDly taach pJ^nKantrr In m;i[i:h wilh a small
Army thixnighoA Opulent country» tli^n Ajthalax^e Acmy
tiirough a poor one ; but by «uitablc n3«=t4ur«^ and wilb an
Army accustvontrd to privntiom, thr bttrr k not unpofi-
sibte. ind. tb<TeJorc. the first should [icvcr h^vc sach an
mflur'ncc on our plan« aä 1o l^ad m iDto a grt^r danger.

Wv huvenow duoe justice to the Kiounds for a >L-pan^
tion of fonc«ft which divide» the chici operation into Mvtnd,
and if the soparatioii takes place on any of thaso p-ottada,
with a diuinct coaccption ol tlie object, and after due
conaideration of the advint.-iK» 2nd dts^dvantj^es, we
»haU [t(yt ventuie to hnd fault.

But U. as u&ually ba|^«n»» a plan is drawn out by a
learned Göieral ^tafi, merely according to routine ; if
difieKDl theatra of war, Jikr the squ^cs od ^ ches$>
board, must each have 115 piece Arst placed on it before

»the trifiVf^ bt'^in, if thtfic? move? approach the aim in
compljcdtcd Lines and teJiLtioiu by diiLl of aii imaginary
profundity in the art of conblnation, if the Armies are to
Wpante to-day in urder lo apply all Iheir skill in reuniting
vat the greatest xvik in fourteen d;iys— tlien we have a
B perfect horror of thi* .ihnnd-^nmcnt of the direct, simple,
I commoa^^eude road to ni&li in teat ion aUy into absolute
■pntftiflioii. Thb folly happen» more easily the leis the
General-in-Chief diircU the War, and conducts if ir» Ih**
Mnac which wc have pointed out in the hi^t chapter as an
act of his iadividuahty Invested with exIrAordinary
pcwera ; the more, theiefore, the whuk plan i» manu.
£actured by an inexperienced Stdfl. and from the ideas of
a do:tm smutfrrcrfi

We have sIlU now to oon&idtr the tliird part of our first
principle ; that is, to keep the subordinate parts as much
as püfsibl« in snlicirdination.

154 ON WAR [sooK viu.

If we call to iTkind what u'aa said id the chapter on the
subject of (he t^lr.iti^c attn^k TCApW-tinR »he pit of thr.
frton;;)ch in a SUlc. and further» x^hat appears lu Uir loLiitb
chapter of Ihift book, on the inllu^ticc cf lime, we bdi<^^
no further aigtunent i^ rc()iiitiid ti> provn that the iB*
lluenc<whkh wc cUimfor that prmciplo really bekni^
to it,

Buonaparte nevei acted otherwise- The shorlj
high roäd from Army to Anny. from one capital
another, w?l4 always th^ way he loved best.

And in what will now constat the principaJ »ctji
to whidi we have referred everjrthing, and for which wc
have demanded a swift and str^igbt forward «ccculioD t

In the fourth cliapler we have explained as far a» it a
possible in a general way what the total overthrow of the
en^my means, and it is uim^c^ssary to r^rpeat it^ What-
ever that may depend on at last in particular cases, still
the first step is always the same in all cases. n;iincly ;
Tha dcairudion of tha enemy's coTnbatant fofco^t tlint a^ «
great victory ovtir tha same ,tnd us dsipcnjon^ The sooner,
which means the nearer our own frontier*, this victoiy it
sought for, the easier it is ; the later, that ts, the furltasr
m the heart of the enemy's country, it is gained, the more
•iteisive it is- Here, as well as everywhere, the facility
success and iU magnitude balance each other,

li we are not so superior to the enemy that the victory
Ü beyond doubt, then wc should, when pr^&iblc, seek bim
out» that is his pi-jncipdl force, Wc say irhcn poi&ibt«, U
if this endeavour to find him lod to ^eat diU>nrs,
ttiractions, and a loss of time, it mif^ht very likdy
Mt a miaUke, H the enemy's principal forcr is not
our moil, and onr interests otherwise prevent our going in
quest ol him, we may be sure we shall mettwiLli lutn hert?-
afler, for he will not fail to place himself in our way.
«hall then, as we have just said, fight under les^ ad^

cmAT. rxj DESTRUCTIOX OF THE ENEMY 155

tAft^oi3£ dTtrnmsilflnrpft— nti 4^1 tn whinh wr mnxt ?nibmH.
Hovr«v«c> il we gain tli« battle, it will bt to mucli tli^ more

Prom this it follow« that, to thi- cow now a^CHiimn], it
would be an «nor to paj» b^thc enemy's prindpal fore«
dMd^edly. tf I1 plACi» it^lf in our way» at least if we

texjMxl tbttreby to taciUtate a victory.
On the other hand, it follows from what precedrt, that
if wr havr n drdded snprnoriljr ovet the enemy's prinripnl
iorce. we may dceignedly po^e it by ta order at a luture

Ilhnc to driver a mo™ cl<M^*ivt bnttle,
W« have bc^r spi^.ikm^ ol a complete victory, therefore
oE a ÜioTOugh defeU ^f th« «ncmy, and not oi a mere ttattle
gained. But such a victory teqiiires an envt^lopdng
attack, at a battle with an obliques front, for these two
forms always give the result a decisive character, It i»
tberefore an essential part ol a plan of a War to tnake
aitangenicnts for this movement, both as regards the
force* required and the direction to he given
I, of which nior« wiU be mid in the cliapter od the
pUa of campaign,
^L It is ccrt-iinly not impos«ible, thfti even battles fought
with parallel frortts may lead lo complete dclcatfr. and
caMd io point are not wanting in nuUtnjjy bii^toiy; but
mich an invent is uncommon and will l)c «till mo^<^ so the
more .\riiiie^ become on a pLLr as regards disciplio« And
handiiies4 in the field. We no longer xaVr twenty-one
batt^lmns in a village, as they did at BknhemL-

Oncc the great victory is gained, the next question is
jkoC about rest, not about talttng breath, not about
ounsidering, not about Teor^^aniMn^» &c, Sa^., but only
od pursuit of fresh blows wherever necessary, of the
capture of the etiemy*£ capital, of the attack of the
Armies of his Allien, ca of whatever else appears to be a
raUying-pojuL lot the enemy.

156

ON WAR

[BOOR VIllj

the

15 to^

If the tide oE vict^iry carries us near tne enemy
loiticfiscs, the laying siege to them or not will depend on
our moans. H we hav<? a great superiority of force it wocld
he a liias ui liTn<rnot t« take thcfn ajj soon as possible;
but if we arc not c^rrt^in of the further events b«f<>ie lU.
wc must k«p the fortreases in check" with as few troop»
as possihie. which precludes any rngiiiar formnl sieges.
The moment that the siege of a fortress compels us to
suspend our strategic advance, that advance, as a
has reached its culminating point. We demand, there-
fore, that the main body sliould press forward rapidJy in
pursuit \\itbout any rest i we have already condemned
the idea of allowing the advance towards tbe principal
point being made dependent on success at secon
points ; the consequence of this i^» that in all ordina
cases» our chief Army only keeps t^cliind it a nai
strip of territory which it can call its own. and w
thciefore constitutes its theatre ot War, How thi£
weakens the momentum at the head, and the dangers for
the offensive arising therefrom, we have shown aheady-
WiU not this difficulty, will not this intrinsic counterpoise
come to a point which impedes further advance ? Cer^
trunly Ihnt may occurs but just as we have already
insisted that it would be a mistake to try to avoid this
contrncted tbeatre of War at the commencement, and for
thu sake ol that object Ic rob the advance of its elasticit/f
so we ^Iso now m^iiniain, that as long as the Commander
has not yet oi-erihrown his opponent, as long as he
considers liimsell strong enoLigh to effect that object, sa.
long must he also pursue it- He does so perliaps at an
increased risk, Init iilso with the prospect of a greater
success. If he reaches a point which he cannot venture
to ^o beyond, where, in order to protect hb reir, he mtisl
extend himself right and left — well, then, this ts most
probably 1ÜS culminating point. The power of Sight is

CHAP. lX-1 DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 157

ftpcfit, and il th« eiwiry is not subdued, most probably
Ihr opportunity a l09t.

All thai ihf^ assailant now does lo mlensify liis attack
by conquest of fortresses, ddiles. provinces, is no doubt
stilla slrtw advance, but it ia only of a relative kind» It is
noloi;6er:ib5ültit<;. The enemy is nolongerin fliKht, be is
perhaps preparing a renewed resistance, and it is therefore
alre-idy possible Ihat, although the assailant stil} ,'vdvanccs
intensively, ttie position of the defence is every day
hnproving. In short, we corae bick to this, that, as a
n*le, there b no aecxind spring after a halt has once been
necesssfy^

TJieoiy therefore only requires that, as long as there is
an inteiitinD of destroying the eiteniy, th<^re rnust be no
^^ssation in the advance of the attack ; if the Commander
f^ives up this object bttnuse it is attended with too great
a risk, he does right to stop ;ind extend hcs force. Theory
only objects to this when he does it with a view td more
readily defeating the enemy.

We arc not so foolish as to muLntaLn that no inslorKc»
can be fotmd oJ States having been gradually r«duced to
tJtf! utmost extremity. In the lini pla«, the principle
we now maintain is no ^t^solutc truth, to which an
exception is iniposuble» tnit one founded only on the
ordioaiy and probable result; next, we must make a
distinction between cases in which the downfall of a
Stati* hn* hci*n effected by a slow, gradual process, and
tho&if la which ILuf event was ttjc result of a first campaign-
W<j ftTC here only treating of the latter case» for it is only
in sue.h that thnrr is that trnsion of forces which F.ithr.r
overcomes the cüotre of gravity of the weight» or is m
danger of being overcome by it. If in the first year we
gain modemtp advantage, In which in the followinR we
add aoother. and thus gradually advance towards our
object, there is nowhere ver>' imminent dftnger. but it is

Ij» ON WAR [BOOK viiu

distrihuird ovf^rtnflny poinl^ Kni^h piiiw* !i(?twe*-n cw>e ,
result and another gives the enemy fr^sh cbanc» : tbc^^
cfE«etfi of fh* firsi resull* have v<^ry little Infliienee on
those which fcjlhfw, often rion*?. ofleu a nt-f-ii(i%*e ooly,
because the enemy recovers himself, or is pcrhap» excited
to increased resistanre» or obtains forpifin «i^ : whrrnw,
when Jill is done in one marcli, the sncceM oi yeslerdiy
brings on with itself that of to-da^", one brand light* itself j
from another. If there arc. casc^ m whirh Stat« ha'
been overcome by successive blovr» — in whichi <Cll8fi-
qnently, Ti^uc. generally the patron of the defcu^ve, ha»
proved ii<lvi;rsc^»ow infinitely more mimerotis nre the
instances in wJJch the designs of the aggressor b^ve by
thnf means ntter^y failed- Let usonly thSnk of therr^l
of the Seven Years" War. in which thr Austnans sought
to attain their object äo comfortably, cautiously^ ajidi
prudently. Ihftt they eoinp!i>l<?ly missed it.

In this view, therefore, we cannot at all j(An in ti
opinion that the care which belongs to the preparation of
a theatre of wir, and tfie impulse which urgt-s us onwards,
are an 3 level in imporlu-ttce, and that the lonucr must, to'
a certiiin extent, be a counterpoise to the Tatter ; but we
look upon any evil whiclj springs out of the lOTwar«^'
movement as an unavoidable evil which onTy deserrcai
attenti<m when there is no longer hope for us ahead hy]
the forward movcmenL

Buonaparte's case in tSit, very far from shaking
opinion, has ralher cojifinm^ us in il.

Hi* campaign did not miscarry because he advaaceif
too »wiitly, or too lar, as is commonly belie^-ed, but'
bccztuM* the only means of sitccoss failed. The Rufts^ian
Empire is no country which can be regularly conquered,'
that is t« say, which can be hrld in possession, at le.-vat not .
by the forces t>f the present States of Europe, nor by Ihi
500.000 men with which Buonaparte invaded II» country.'

CHA^. XX,] DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 159

Such 3 cmmtiy can only bt miIxI jed by tis uwn wrntcnc-M,
and by the e^«cU of ioienul diucnncn. In order to
«Tiler thp^ viiltirmhlr pf>inlft in its prilitirjil ^xiaTeDCf»
Uitf country rnusl be :if;iUlifd lo ttä very crtjtrp. II Vf!i%
only by reaching Mo»ct>w vfitb tlie force of hii blow that
Bnonflparlr catM hnpc io shahr thr cfinrngr öt ihc
Govenmient, Itte loyatty and Meidfastne^fi of the |>«]pl(?.
In Moscow ht ^xpectfd to Und peace, and this was the only
mtäonal nb|r-ct which he could set before him^rlf in
ttiidert^kins i^ich a campaign.

Hr therefore led his main body against that of the
Rufluon». wZtJch fell buck bdorc him, trudged past thc
cuDp at Dhssa, and did no4 ttoj> wntil it reached Smolensk.
Kt canied Bagration along in his movemfuit» beat the
principal Russian Army, und look Muäow. IEp acted on
ihifi occasion as he had Alw;iys done : it was only in th^t
way that hi- m^tdr himself Ibe arbiter of Europe» and only
tn that way was i1 possible for him to do so.

He. thcriefoTc. who a<lmires Buonaparte in all hifi
tftrlifT campai^E as the greatest of General», ought not
to c^nsuTcr him is this Instance.

■ !t is quite allowable Ui judge ü.n event accordinf; to the
T<«lllt, iiÄ that IS the best cTitiri«m upon it fsTfr lifth
chipter, aecond book)» but this jud|;ment»dcrLved merely
Itam tbe result, miiit not then be passed off as evidcncf of
»aptrior uad^Tftuiding. To «cek out the causes of tlie
(ailon of a campfli^ h not going the length of making a
chtidsm upon tt : it is only if wi* show thnt thesr cnnwa
should neither have been ov^looked nor disregarded that
wo makf ft triticiflm and pla^^e ourwWes above the General,

■ Now we iiiaculhin that Jjay one who pronounc« the
'campaign of 1812 an absurdity merely on account of the

tremnndniir» reaction in it, und who, if it had bwn
sijccvMfu], would look upon it a& a mc«t splendid cum
bination, »howt tat utter incapacity of judgment.

i6d on war {book vm.

If Buonaparte h^ remained in LhhuAnia, as most of
bi» cniks rhink hr sboulcl, in ondrr first to get possession
oi Uielürlröi5e&- of which. nn>teüver, except Riga, situattnl
quite at en« side, ther« is hardly one, because Bobrubk is
nsmalltnaignificant place of arms, he wotiMh^jveinvclvfd
hjm»clf for the wiiiter in a rniserEble delensiv« system :
then the same people would have been the fint to excUim,
This; is not the cild Buonaparte I How is it, he bos not
got evon as far as ^ ßrst ^at battle > he who used to put
the final seal to his conquests on (he la^t raniparts of tb*
enemy's Slates, by victories such as Atist«tliU and
Fricdiand- Has his heart failed him that he has not
taken the enemy's capital, the defetwdess Moscow, ready
to open its gales» and thus left a nucleus round which
new elements of resistance may gather themselves ? Ho
had the singula! luck to take this far-oß and cnormouSi
colossus by surprise, ^ easily as one would surprise a
netghhouiing town, nr as Frederick the Great entered
the little state of Sxlc&ia, lying at hiä door, and he niakcs
no use of his good fortune, halts in the middle ol hij'
victorious career, as if some eivil spirit laid at his
heels i — This is the way in which he would luve been
judged after the result, for this is Ibc fashion of critics*
judgments in geneiral.

In opposition to this, we say, th« campaign of 1812 did
not succeed because the Government rem^iined firm, the
people loyal Anil steadfast, Im^hIusc it therefore could
not succeed- Buonaparte may have made a mistake ia
i]m3eTl;tking such an expedition ; ;it all evenbt. tbe rcmiH
has showD that he deceived himself in his calculation», but
ive maintain that, »upposirg it nrcrv^sary to uck the
Attainment of this object, it could not tiavt been done m^
any other way.

InMesd of hurthening himsrlf with an intenmaoliJe^
costly defeuuve Uar in the east, such as be h*d on hit

CHAP. IX.] DESTRUCTION OF THK HNEMY t6i

lukndA in the wfal, Kiioimpuit« attempted the only mmns
to gain hU ob^t : by <]nr bold stroke to extort a peace
from bis a^toni^hcd atJvjrsary. The destruction of hh
AiiTiy wiLH till- ilaft|;er Lo wliicb he exposed himscU in the
venture; it was the stake in the game, the price cf
grrftt rxpoctalion«. If this clostniction of his Army
w» more complete thun it need have beeu Ihiongh
}ä% own fiiill. this fault was not in his having penetrated
too tar tnto Ihe heart of th? country, lor th^it w^s bis
object and unavoidable, but in the Ute period at which
the campaign openod< the sacrifice of life occasion«! by
his tactics, the w^iit ol due care for the supply of his
Army» and lor his hue ol retreat, and lastly, in his having
loo long d^^Jrived his march from Moscow.

That the Russians were able to reach the Ber^ina
before him. intending regularly to Cut ofl his retreat, is qö
strong argunie-nt against u^. For in the first place, the
failure of that attempt )u&t shows how dtlficult it is really
to cut ofl an Army, as Ihe Army which was intercepted
In this case, under thf most unfuvouraWe circumstances
that can b^ conceived, still ti'ianag'^d Ai L\st to cut its way
through; and although thisact upon the whole contributed
certainly to increase its catastrophe, still it was not es-
»eotially the cause of it. Secondly, it was only Ihe very
prcxUiai nature ul the country which afforded the mrniw
tocarry thin^ as far as tHr Russians did: for if it had not
been for the mawhe^ of the Brncsina, with its wooded
impassable bordeis lying across Ihe great road, the
cutting off would have been still less possible. Thirdly,
there are ^rtieraliy no mcan& of guarding a^in^r anch an
eventuality except by inakiiig the forward movement
with the front ol the Army of «uch a width as we have
already disapprf^vert ; for if wc proceed on the plan of
pushing on in advance with the centre a^nd covtring the
«lags by Armies detarlied right and left, then if either of

TOl. 111. L

l6t ON WAR [eooK viii;

ltie»o detached Arim«s meets with a check« wc musl
b&ck with tht Cifrttre, aiul th«n very little cui be gained
th« ftttAck,

Uoreover, lE cannut be said that Bvionipirt« iM?^]ectcd
hi« wing«, A superior force remained froatiitg Witt-
gmstrin, n ^tTOparilrmxte siege-cwps 5tfiod hoiorp Ri^a^
which ^t the same time was not needed there, and in the
tOUth Schwartienhcrg hacJ 50,000 men with which he was
inp^rior to Tonnnsofl and almost equai to Tschitschagow :
in addition, there were jo.ooo men uudec Vjclor» covering
the rear of the centre. Even in the month of November,
therefore, at the decisive moment when the Kussiaa
Armies had been reinforeed» and the French were
much reduced, Ihe superiority of the Russians in rear of
tlie Moscow Army was not so very extraordinary- Witt-
genstein. Tschitschagow. and Sacken made up together
a force of 100,000- Schwartcenbcrg, Regnier, Victor-
Otrdinot. a[id St. Cyr had still 80.000 effectives.
most cautious General in advancing would hardlyde^tt
a greater proportion of liis force to the proieiction o( hia
fluiks.

If ont of the 600,000 men who crossed the Niemen
iSr^, Buonaparte had brought back 350,000 instead of th#
50,000 who repassed it under Schwartaenberg, Regnier,
and MEu:donald, which was possible, by avoiding th
mistakes with which he has t>een reproached, the campaign
would still have been ao unfortunate one. but tbecvy
would have had nothing to object to xi. for the loss of half
an Army in such a c^se is not at all unusual, and only
appears so to us in this instance on account of tbe
enormoQS scale of the whole enterprise.

So much for the principal operation, its nee
tendency, and the nnavoidable riaks. A^ regards t
subordinate operations« there must, above all things, be
a common aim for all : but this aim must be so situated

tber. I

jsiaa^j

uof^
Vltt-
:th«r '

h#"

" 1

CHAP. IX.J DESTRUCTtON" OF THE ENEMY 163

u Dol to paralyM faction ai aiiy of th« individi3:t] yaxi»,

Bif tt« invade Fnnc« from the Upp«r and Middle Rhine xn*X

Hcill.ind with tJif intmlion thf nnitinp a! Paris neither

tji tbc Armies employed to riak mytUjng tin thr ndv^ince.

but tr> k««p itself intaiCt until the concentrAlioo ij

e0c^1«d, thut i% what we caII a minoiiA plnn, Th«re

must neccswrily be 4 confitant compansoti of the ^tate oi

Ihis threefold movrmcni fAosmg dday, mdeciiioc, ind

ttoudilyin the forwnrd mnvt^ment of e.ich ol the Amtk«-

Blt i> better to uflgn to «i^ p^rt its müaios.lLnd only

Hto place Che point of union wherever these aeveni)

^Uctiviuee becotne unity ol themselves,

B TberefoiTc, whm a mihtary force advAnce^ toth^attAck

00 separate thoaticä ol W^ir, to each Army should be

■Mign«4aQ object against which the force o( its «hocki» to

_be directed. Here iha ^omf is that tiuic ihackt should

Bbc giv«n from all sides s:Tnu]läDeoiJsEy, but not that prcH

portioaal advantages shoiild re&uJt from all of them.
H If the task aMigned to one Army is found too difficttlt
'because the enrmy has made a disposition ol his force
different to that which waseatpected, it it »ostuns a dttt^U
this neither shoTild.nor innat have, any mfluence on the
action ol the othei^ or we should turn the pmbnbaUty of
the general succfss gainst ourselves at the very outset.
It is only the unsüccesäful issue ol the maiorityof etiter-
prtseft or of the pnncipaJ one which can and mu«t have
an influence upon the others : for then il comes under the
head of a plan which has miscanied-

This same rule applies to those Armies and portions of
tiieni which have ori^nally acted on the defensive^ and,
owing I0 the successes gaui^d, b&ve assumed the oflen-
üvt. unless we prefer to attach such spare force» to the
principal otfensivr, n point which will i:hieJly depend on
the geo^aphical situation of the theatre of War.
But under thev cLrcumi Lances, what become« of Ih«

jA^ on war [&OOK nti.

p^omelrical fonn ard unity of the whole attack, what of
the blanks and rear cl detachmenU when thoa« boUrts
Dcxt lo th^^m aie beaten ?

Thai is prrcisely what wp wish chiefly to combat- Thi&
glueing down of a great uffensive plan of attack OD a
geometrical «qua» is losing one's vray in th« rtgiona o\
taliacy.

In the fifteenth chapter of the third book we havt
shown that the geometrical element has lew Influeoc« in
Strategy than m tiictics ; and we shall only here repeal
the deduction there obtained, that in the attack «specially«
the actual resalts at tlie vanous points throughout de-
serve more attention thaa the geometrical figure, whidi
may gradually be (onned through the diversity of results.

But m any case it is «juite ceitiii:, that looking to the
vast spaces with which Strategy has to deal, the views
and resolutions which the geometrical situation of the
parts may create should be le£l to the Geaeral-in*Chief ;
that, therefore, no snbordinate General has a right to ask
what hi^ neiglibouT is doing or leaving undone, but each is
to be directed peremptorily to follow out Ills object. If
any serious incongnitty really arises from this, a remedy
can always he applied m time by the supreme authority.
Thus. then, may be obviated the chief evil of this separate
mode of action, which is, that in the place of realities, %
cloud of apprehensions and suppositions mix themselves
up in the progress of an operation, that every acadattt
aflects not only the part it comes immediately in contact
with, but also the whole» by the communication of
impressions, and that a wide field of action is opened
for the peri^onal fuilings and persona! animosities of
subordinate Commanders.

We think that these views will only appear paradoiocal
to lliose who liave not studied military history long enough
or with suflicient attention, who do not distinf^sh the

-w — -'■ ^ r , — - -- -, — •-- —^- —- ^

■ dcec conjunction of all parU at i!vfrrv momt^nt
' execution is not at all necessary, and it ü «tifl Ik

CHAF. IX,] DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 165

unpoTt^nt f rom theanlmpomnt.nor mike proper allow*
for thr influrnor of human w^-ikne;*« in gfn^ral.
If evea ta Uctic» Unere is a ditlicuUy, wliidi ^
experienced soldier» admit there U. in »ucpcecding in an
attaicic in «rpamlr cxilumn.s whrrr it drpctids on tha
ptrftct connection ol the several coluinnä. liow niucti njcire

»difficult» or rather how iinpossiblo, muM this be in Strategy
where the aeparatiun Ji »o much wider. ThcTeforr, if a
constant connection of all parts wsn a neccs&ary condition
of success» a Strat«^ plan of attack of that natur« must
be at once given up- But on the one h^uid, it is not left
to our option to ditcnrd it eompletfiy, hccaisur circcxm-
stances which we cannot control inkty determine m favour
of it i on the other hand, even in tactic». Urn constant

of the
necessary, and it i» «tifl less so in
Strsitegy. Therefore in Strategy we «honld pay the les»

I attention to this point, and insist the more upon n distinct
piece of work being a,sHgncd to euch jnui^
Wc have still to add one important obaerviLlioQ : it
relates to the proper allotment of partä.
■ In the yvai^ 1793 and 1794 the principal Austrian
Army was in the Netherbnd«, that of the Pruesianä on
the upper Rhine, The Austrians marched from Vienna
to Cond^ and Valenciennes. ctoMin^ the hnc of march of
Ihr Prnv^anit from Berlin to l^nndan. Thr Au&trianR had
certainly to defend their Bel^an provinces in that quarter»
and any conquests made in French FUoders would have
brcn ucquitiitions corivertientJy situuttd foi tlieiTi, but that
interest was not strong enough. After the death of
Prince Kaunitz. (he MiniMef Thugul carried a meafinre
for giving up the Nelherlmids entirely, lor the better
concentration of the Auitrian forces. In fact» Austria i9
abcnt twice AS far from Finndrrs as from Alsace ', and at
a time wben nuJitaiy resources were very limited, and

IM

ON WAR

[book VIII.

«vtfything had lo be pmd lor tu ready moaey, that w^
no triiUag consideration. StUl. iht Mbi&lcr Thugtit had
plainly something else in virw ; his object was, throtigh
tbe urgency of the dangei to conipi^l Heiland» Engluid,
and Prussia, the powers interested in the defence of the
Netl^erJands and Louder Rhine, to make gT?^t«r cflorts^
He certainly deceived himself in his calculalioiu, t>ecaiisa
nothing could be done with the Prussian CabLael at that
time, but this occurience ;tliväys shuws the intluencc od
political interests en the course of a War.

Pmssia had neither anything to conquer noT to defend
to Alsac«, In the ye^i 1793 U bad undc^rtakcn tbc march
through Lorraine into Champagne in a sort of chiv&lrou
»pirit. But as ttiat enterprisi.' ended m nothing, through
the unfavourable coutse of circumstances, il contmued
the War with a feeling of very little interest. U the
Prussian troops had been m the Netherlands, tbey would
have been m direct communicatioa with HoUajkd. which
fhcy niighi look upon almost as their own country,
ti.iving conquered it in the year 1787 ^ they wojiä then
have covered the Lower Rhine, and consequently that
part of the Prussian monarchy whicli lay next to the
theatre of War Prussia on aicccunt oJ subsidies would
also have had a closer alliance with England, which, under
these circumstances, wonJd not so easily have degenerated
into the crooked policy of which the Prussian Cabinet was
guilty at that lime.

A much better result, thereloie» might ha^'e been
expected it the Austrian* had appeared with their principal
loTce on the Upper FUiine, the Prussians with their whole
Joice m the Netherlands, and the Austrians had leit there
oniy a force of proportionate strcngth.

!f, inätpad o£ the enterjinsiiig Blnchei, General Barclay
had been placed at the head of the Silesian Army in 1814.
and BKicher and Srhwarte^nbrrg had been kept with

1

I

CHAP, ixj DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 167

Gnnd Army» the campaign would perhaps have tumed
out ;fc compl^f* f Atlvrr.

U Xht «i^lerpf isiiig Laudun, iiUlead ul Laving his lliralr«
of Wai at ilic aut>ng«*t point oJ the ?ru»»aii dominions,
luuneJy, m Sikün^ h.id b^rn in the pnsittoti of Ihr Onnnn
State« Amiy, perhaps iIli? wtiole Seven Yeara' War wuuld
hflv^ had quite a differeut tum lu order to examint tfus
«ubi«cl muii; nanowJy, wc must louk at the cases according
to their chief distinctions.

The first isJfweoirTy on War inco&jiincUon withothw
powcra, whonot only Ukep^irt a&our Allies, but «Ü£o have
ux independent interest as well.

The Mcond is, i( the Army of the Aily has come to cnir

The third i», when il is only a quMtton with regard to
the ]>pnioii^ c ha tact en sties of Ihr (jrncral.

In the two first cases the point mjy be rji»ed. whether
bettf^ to nux up (he (roo|i* of the different powers
"cömplelrly, so that eitch erpomlc Atmy is compowd of
troope of different powers, as was done in tlie Wars 1613
and 1014. or to keep thorn ^parale in much a* possible,
M that tlje Army od e;ich power m^y contmuc distinct and
&ct independently.

PUinty, th« hrst is ttie most uüntary plan ; hut ft
ftuppooe« a de^-ree of friendly feeling and community of
jnteresiU which is r,phlL>m iound, Wtien thert' i& this close
good fellowship between the troop», it it much more
ditficTiIi for the CabincU to srpÄraTe their interests : and
as rcj^ord^t the prcindidaj influence of the «gotiäli<:u] views
of Commanders, it con only »how itself under these cir-
ftt the suhttr*iinali? tiftnrrBU, therpfonr,
IfrovbiceLiI tactics, and even there not 60 freely
or wHb such impunity as when there is a complete Mpan-
tion- In tJie latter ouw, it affect» the Strategy, and
tUecefore makes decided m^rks. But. as alr^^dy observed*

I6fl ON WAR [BOOK viD^

Eur ttu^ fust case tbere must be a r.ire spirit oi cnndliatkiii
on the pjrL of llip Goveriuncnt»^ In Üie y«ir 1C13, ll»
exL^ncies üd tJie timr impelled lU G<^vcmiticDU in that
direction; und yet wc Cfinn£>t siifficicntiy preise thi« in
the Emperor of Ku^&i^. Uuil ultliougb Lie cnlvitu! tti«
field with the strongest Army, and Ihc ch;ingc oi foxtuac
v/as vliuMy bioiiglU ^ibout by him, yi^l ht? std n.sidrr «iLI pride
about appeojin^ ^t the he^ of a separat« and an iodc- ^
pendent ßu&sian Army, and placed his troops under thefl
PnisaiuTJ flnii Arislnan Cammsimlcrs. ^

If such a fusion of forces famiot be effected, a complcle
ocpjirafici» tif tlietii is certainly hotter tlian a liaU and lialf ^j
state oj tilings ; the wurst dJ all is when two mdept;nd«ni^|
Conimiind^rs of Armies o( different powers find themselves ^
on the same theatre of War, as fretjutntly happened in the
Seven Yeai-s' Wat with llie Araiies oi Russia, Austria, and
the German States- When there is a complete separaticftl
ol lorceä, tbc burdeLi3 which must be borne oic also better^
divided, and each sutlers only from wliat is bis own,
consequently is more impelled to activity by the force oi'^
circumstanceä ; but il tliey fmd lliemselves in
connection, or qiüte on the ^ame the^itre of W^r, tlüs
not the cjse. and besides that the ill-will of one paral;
also the powere o£ the other as weU-

In the first of the three supposed cäses, there will be no
dUftculty in the complete separation, as the natural
interest ni each Stale generally mdicates to il a sepoiate
mode o£ employing its force ; this may not be so in the,
second case, and then, as a. rule, there is nothing
done but to plact; one&eli completdy under ih« ai
Anny, if its strength is in Any way proportionate to tlml
measure, as the Austrian« dlcl in thriut Irr pari: of thcCATik-
pui^of iSiS.aiidÜK'l'iufoiansin Uie campaign of 1807^

With regard to the personal qualifications d the
Genera), wor^'thhi^ 111 tlus pus^e» into wluit b paitit

o in the

igtoh^

LUXiliai^^H

CHAP. IS.J DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 169

and individual ; but wc muM not gmit to mak« oti^ gem^ral
icmarki which », tJiat wc tJiould not, as lit gcneralty
dooe. pbcc at the h«»d ol »ubordinate Armie« the mori
prudent and rautious Commanders, but the mcH &nUr-
pming ; ior we lep^t Uiut m Strategic: o|>eTatioiib
conducted separately, there is nothing more important
Ih^in that rvrnr part should d^*vp!rip its powers to the full,
iu thAt way faidts coiitJiuttcu at vnv part m^iy bu com-
pensated for by ^ucc^ses at others. Tliis complex«
activity ut all points» hciwr^vcr, is nnly to be expected
when the Commaudets are spirited, enterprising men,
who are uffied forward by natural impuUiveoess by tlieir
owtt bckUts, because a aiere objective« cooUy r«iSoncd out.
conviction of tht necessity of action seldom suibcea.

Lastly, we liave to renuirk thatn if circunistaiice* In
□thd rapcctK pennit. the tiuopä and their Conim^-utdert,
as rcgaida their de&tination» should be employed in
accordance with their qualities and the nature of the
country — that is regular Annies ; good troops; numetvu»
cavahry; old. pnid<?nt, intelligent Generals in an open
country' ;^M[lilia ; national levies; young enterpribing
Conunaiidcrs in wooded country, mountains and dehJ»;
— auxiliary forces in rich provinces where they can make
thanwlvea comfortable.

What we have now said upon a plan ol a War in general,
and in this chapter upon those in pariicidar which arf'
duecled to the de^tiuctimi of the t^nemy, is Uktcndcd to
give special prominence to the object of Ihe same, and
next to indiciite prinr-iplrs wliich may serve as guide» in
the preparation of ways aiid means, Olit de»irc has been
in thii way to give a dear perception of what is to be, and
should b<?t dont in such ;t War. Wi^ hüve tried to eni-
pliaaise tl^e necessaiy and general, and to leave a margin
for the play of the particular and accidental : but to
exclude all that is arbitraryt unfounded, tnflwg^ Janias-

1^ V^^p ON WAR [book vjii,

tical, Of sophistical. li we have succeeded id this object,
we look upon out problem as solved.

Now, a any one wonders ut finding notbing here abo
tuTRing nvers, aboul commanding mouniains from their
highest points, about avoiding strong positions, and
^ding Ibe keys id a country, he lia& not understood
neither does he a^ yet understand War in its gen
relations according lo our views-

In preceding b<*oks we have charjclensed these subjcc
in general, and we there arrived at the conclusion tha
they are much more insignificanl in their nature tlian we
should think from Iheir high repute. Therefore, so much
the less can or ought Ihey to pl^y a great p^iH , Ilia! is, so
far as la influence the whole i>]an of a War, when it i%
War which has for \U object the destruction of the enemy.

At the end of the book we shall devote a cli3p<
Specially to the consideration of tlie Chief Command
the present chapter we shall close with an example,

if Austria, Pnts5ia, the German Confederation, tb
Netherlands and England, determine on a War wi
France, but Russia remains neutral — a ca^e which h.
frequently happened during the last one hundred and
fifty years— tliey are able to tarty on an oflensive War,
having for its object the overthrow of the enemy. For
powerful ancf great Jiä Fiance is, It is still po&^ible for it to
see more than half its territory overrun by the enemy, it»
capital occupied^ find itself reduce/i in its means tu u state^H
of complete inefficiency, without Ibere being any powert^^
except Russia, which can give it cßectual support- ^
Spain is loo distant and tno di^idvanUgnnu^Jy MtiialtHl ;^P
the Italian States are at prese:it too bnttic and powerleu-

The countries we have named have, exclusive of theit ^J

possessions out ol Enrcpe, above 75,000,000 inliulntunts'^^

* Tbl« ch>]^tPf vxt protdMy vrnttm in rRiS, un» whifh timv th*

I

I

I

CHAF. nc] DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 171

whilst Fruicc has only ;^OaOoo,ooo : and the Artny whicb
thtty couJd ciU out tor u \\':ir againi^t Franc«,^ Ttsilly miü^int
in earnest, would be a» follows, without exagget^tion ;

Au&liiu ..... 250,000

Pruuu 300,000

Thfr rp«l o( C«nuay . 150,000

NetherUiids , . , . 75.000

England 5o/xx>

Total 725,000

Should !hift force be pi]ac«d on a War footing it would,
in ail pTulxibihty. vtfiy mucli esicced thai which France
could oppohc ; for under BuonnpAtte the country luavcC
raiMd Uoop» of the like sUenph* Now, il we take into
account the deducliun^s required ns ^^trriwn-H for furlrvk^ea
and depAtS, to walch Ihc co^ts, &c., Iheic r.Aa be n»
doubt the Allies would h^ve a gre^t superiority in the
prtneipLiI theatre of War, ;vnd upon that the object or plnn
ot DVtithrowing the enemy is cbieJly founded.

The centre of gravity o! the Fiench power lie« in it»
military force and in Pari«. To defeat the former in one
at non b^ttl», to t^ke Pjiris and drive the wreck of the
French across the Iroue, must be ilw object of the Allies.
The pit of the slmnarh of the French monarchy is between
Paris And 13n;sfels on lh(%( side the frontier \s oiiJy on«
hundred and ilfty miles fr^vm the capital. Part of the
Allies— the Enghittit Netherlanders, Pnissiuns. and North
German State*— have their natural potnt of awcmbly ia
that direcfion, as these States lie partly in the imm^dialc
vkanily, partly in a diiect line behind it. Austria and
South Germany can only carry on thdr War conveniently
from the tipper Rhine. Their natural dirt^etion i« iipnT)

* Tlvi i%. rQCnilicd Uirci Id France lUcU^ la ttio CnmJ Anuy, ifiii.
«ity oDF^lhirl OT ih? unilB w^ro la fact FrtDrb : the rrmoitidFr tomtf

171

OM WAR

iPOtOi VIII.

TroycÄ and Paris, or it lu-iy bf Orleona. Both ähocJts,
tlKTclorc. that from Ibe Nrthi^Und« and the other from
tht^ Upper Rhine. 4re quite direct and natural, »hort and
pQttrrful ; and both inW upon the cpaltc of ^nviiy of Ihr
enemy's power, Bclween ttiese two poiuU. tberdcn.
the vf\i*>lv invading Army should be divided.

But ihctc arc two coniäticnktions whidi intrrfrrr witti
the simplicity of tlib pUa.

The Au&trianswould not t^y bare their Italian dominioinft,
thty wuiild wisl» Ui trXnm Ihc mustftry over cvcnb then?,
in any cisc, and therefore would not incur the mk of
making an alt^Lck on \ho heart of Francu» by wrhicb thrry
wuuld l^avc Italy only indirectly covered. Looking to
thi^ political state of the country, this collateral conüdeni-
joQ i« not to be treated with contempt ; but it would bo

decided mutdce if the old and olt-thed pldn of ui
uttuiclc from Italy, directed against the South of France«
wa« bound up with it, and if on that account ihc force tn
Italy was increaäcd to a üxe not re<^ aired for mere wcarity
agniin^t contingencies in the first campaign. Only the
uumber needed ior that security should rrmain in Italy,
ordy that number should be withdrawn from the great
undertaking, il we would not be unlaithluj to that flnl
maxim. Unity of plan, concentratton of fores. To think of
conquering France by the Rhone would be like trying to
lift a mueJcft by the point of its bayonet ; but also as an
auxü]ar>' enterprise, an attack on the Soutli o£ France
i» to be condrmnrd, for it only raificsi nrv fnrcrt a^aimit
uft. Whenever an attack is made on distant province*,
interest and activities are roused, which would other-
wise have loin dormant. It would only be in case the
fore« left for the aecurtty ot Italy wcfe in exec» of the
number required, and. therefore, to avoid 1ea\ing tbrm
uni^mploynj, tliat thrrr would br :;ny justiBcatiom lor an
attack on the South of Frauice from tJuLt quarter.

■

CRAP. IX.] DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMV 173

We thrrrfor^ repeat that the force Idt in ItaJy mu« be
kept down as low as circmnstances will pennit : and it
wit3 be quite large enough if it will suffice to prevent the
Austnans from Ifwing the whole countiy in one canipai^.
Let us >iLippose Ihat ni.tmber lo be 50^000 men lor the
purpose ol our illusträti^n-

An other conoid era tTon deserving attention is the
rdation of France in respect lo its sea coast. As England
has the upper hand at sea, it foUowrs that Franre must,
on that account, be very suscephble wilh reg.ird to the
whole of her Atlantic coast; and, consequently, must
protect it with garrisons of greater or less strength.
Now, however weak this coast defence may be, still the
French frontiers are tripled by it ; and large droits, on
that account, cannot fail to be withdrawn from the
French Array on the theatre of War. Twenty oc thirty
thou«and troops disposable to effect a landing, with which
the English threafen France, would probably absorb
Iwlcc! or three times the number of French troops ; and,
further, we must think not only of troops, hut a!^ of
money, artillery, &c. &c,, required (or ships and coast
batteries^ Let us suppose that the English devote
25,000 to this object-

Our plan of War would then consist simply m this :
(r) That tn the Netherlands :

200.000 Prussians»

75,000 Nethcrlandcrs,

35,000 English,

50,000 North German Confederation,

Total 350,000 be assembled^
6l whom ahout 50,000 should be set aside to garrison
frontier fortresses, and the remaining 300,000 should
advance -igainst Paris, and engage the French Array in ft
decisive battle.

■71 ON WAR tw>OK vin*

(3) That 3oo,noo Auftthnris and loo.ocyi f^onth Carman
Iroopfi stiuuld aäsemble on tlie Upper RUuie lo «dvunce
at Ihc *ame linie as the Army oJ the Netherlaod», their
clirpctinn büing tawariJs thr Üppi^r Seine, antl fmm ih^ncc
towaids the Loire, wUhi a view. likewise, to a gre^t battle.
The« Iwo attack* would, p^rhap», unite in one on th
Loire,

By this the «biel poiot is deterromed, WtiBt w« bave
to add is chiefly intonded to root out false conceplioa*,
and is as iotlows :

(I) To seek for the great bfttlle, as pracnbfd, tad
delwer it with such a rt^latiun, m point of nuTDfHcal
strength and under such urcumätänces, as promises a
decisive victory is the coursi^ for the chief Ccmm^ndfrs
to follow ; {'? this object (^vprythin^ niust be SMrrificed,
and as few m'ia ^ possible should bt employed in sieges,
blockades, garn^ns, Sec. If, like ScbwartienbcTg in
1814, as sooD as they enter the enemy's provinces the
spread out in eccentric r^ys all i& lost. That this did not
take plixce in 1814 the Allies may thank the powerlc^
state of France alone- The attack should be like a wedl^
well driven home, act Like a soap-bubbie, which di^teod^
itself till it bursts.

\2) Switzerland must be left to its own forces. If it
remains neutral it forms a good point d'uppui on the Upper
Rhine ; if it is attacked by France» let her stand up for
herself, which in more than one respect she Js very wqfl
able to do. Nothing is more absurd than to attribute to
SwitxefLand a predominant geographical inJlueoce upon
events in \^'ar because it is the highest land in Europe,
Such an influence only exists undt-r certain very restrirrcd
conditions, which are not to be found here, Ulien tho
French ai* attacked in the heart of their country theycao
undertake no affensive Ixoni Swit^arlcind, dthc; a|*atnst
Italy or Swabia. and. least of all, can the elevated situation

CHAP. IX} DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY 175

of Ibe cDontry comu into coni^i deration tk% a decisive
circuiR«Unce. The ädv^otd^e oi a country which 1»
dofnifiaCiDC in a ^tfi^tr^^c sen^f Is, in ibe first place,
chicRy impoitaot in the defensive, and any importance
f which it hi& ID the offensive ms^y manifest iUell i& a
single encounter- Whoever does not know this tias not
thought over the thing and arnved at a dear perception of
it, and incase tlut at any future council of potentate« and
Gfn^rak, some leaned oihcet of the Gcncf&l StalE should

I be found who, with an anxious brow, displays such
i^isdom, we now declare it beforehand to be mere folly,
and wt&h tlut in the same counctl ^ome true Saldier^ ^me
child of sound comnioQ ita^, may be piesent who will
stop his mouth-
(3) The apace between two attacks we think of very
little conac^jvjence Wlien 6oo»ooo assonble one hundred
and fifty to two hundred miles (torn Paria to mfircb
against the heart of Fiance, would any one think of
covering the Middle Rhine ki well a* l^rlin, Dreien,
Vienna, and Mnnicli ? There would be no sen^c in *uch
a thing. Are we to cover tlie communications ? TItat
would not be unimportant ; but th^i we might soon be
led into ^'ivinp; this covering the importance uf an attack,
rU<l then, maiead of advancing on two lines, a» the
ition of Ihp States positively requires, we should be
led to advance upon three, which is not required. T\itse
would then, perhaps, become five, or perhaps seven,
in that way the old tigmarole would once more
become the uid«r ol the day.

I Our two attacks have each their object ; the force«
employed on theennre very probably suprrinr to thrrncmy
innun^becs- If tizh purstteshis ni^rcb with vigour. Urey
cannot fail to react adv^mtagr^ously upon each other. If
one of the two attacks is unforliwate hccausr the cne-my
has not divided his force equally, we may fairly expect

Sj6 ^H^P ON WAR [BOOK vnu

that the result of the oth^r vrlll of ilwH repair th» disaster
and this is the true iT\t(?rdcpcndcnrf^ belwrrn Ihr two,
in I erde pen den ce ext*'iiding lo fso a,& to be dffecled
the events of each d;iy 15 miposirble on account of th
difltanoe; nHthcr is it nr^^es^ary, and thcMore t
immediate or rather the diiect cüimecliun b of no
great value.

Besides» the enemy attacked in the very centre of
domiaione will have no forces worth speaking of
employ m interrupling this connection ; ail that is to b«
apprehended iä that this tnterruption may be attempt^
by a co-operation of the inhabilants with the partisans,
that thi5 object does col actually cost the enemy an
troops. To prevent that, it i& stiQicient to send a body of
lOjOOO or 15.000 men, particularly strong m cavalry,
thL* direction from Trov*.'S to Rlieims. It will be able
drive every partisan before it. and keep in line with t
Grand Army. This corps should neither invest nor watch
fortresses, but march bflweon thf>m. depend on no fixed
bisis, but give way before superior forces in any direction,
no great misfortune could happen to it, and if such did
liappen, it would again be no serious misfortune for the
whole. Under these ärcumstanccs, such a. force migbt
probably serve as an intermediate link between the twi>.
attacks.

(4) The two subordinate undertakings, that is, t
Austrian Army in Italy, and the English Army (
landing on the coast, might foUow their object as appear
host If they do not remain idle< their mission is fulfilled
as regards the chieE point, and on no ncc^unt shonld
either of the two greit attacks be made dependent in an
way on these minor on^.

We are quite convinced Ihal in this way France may
overthrown and chastised whenever she thinks fit to p'
on that indolent air with which she has oppressed Euro

1

of

]

1

I

I
I

I

CHAP. 1X.1 DESTRUCTION OF THE EXEMY 177

for a hundred and fihy years- It is only on the other
side of Paris, on the Loire, that those conditions can be
wnmg £rom lior which aie necessary für the peace of
Europe. In this way alone the natural relation between
30 miUjons oE men and 75 millions will quickly tnoke
itself known, 1>ut not if the country from Dunkiik to
ücnoa is lo be soTTounded in the way it ha; been for 150
years by a girdJe of Annie», whilst hity different smaU
objects are aimed at, not one of which is powerful enough
to overcome the inertia, friction, and extraneous influences
which spring up and reproduce themselves everywhere,
but more especially in allied Armies.

How UttJe the pTovisional or]gani&ation of tbe German
Federal Armies is adapted lo such a disposition will strike
the reader. By that organisation the federative part of
Germany forms the nucleus ul the German power, and
Prussia and Austria, thus weakened, lose their natural
influence. But n federntive Stite is a very brittle nucleus
in War — there \9. in it no unity, no energy, no r.itit>nftj
choice of a Commander, no authority, no responsibility.

AuMria and Prussia arc the two natural centres of force
of tbe German Empire ; they foim tlic pivot [or fulcruu),
the forte of the «word ; they arc monarchical Stat«, uned
to War ; thoy have well-dehned intorestSj iudt-pcndcnce
of power ; they are predominant over tlje other*. The
Ofguniiiution ^hrniEd follow thrse nntimil lineiiment-s, and
not a false notion about unity, hich is un impossibihty
in snch a case : and he who ne^ecta the posaible in quest
of the luiptnajble i» a foul.

TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE CRO\S^
FHINCK

IN THE YEARS 1810, 1811, AND i8is

SCHEME \\T1!CH WAS LAID BEFORE
GENERAL VON GAUDY

Presuuimg that it is only a prdiminary knowledge of the
Art of War which His Royal Highness the Crown Prin« i*
to receive from me, with 3 view to His Roy;il Highniss
taeing enabled io understand modere military history, it
ift ai the first importance that I ahonld give the Prince a
clear idea of War^ and that 1 ?^hould do &o in such a
maniifrr as to avoid dißusene^s, or taxing the Prince^
iUulti^s too much.

In order to acquire :l thorough knowledge of a äcience.
It i» necessary to apply one's mind cliiefiy to the sti;dy
of it for some time, and it uppt^rs ia be loo soon for ihr
Prince to do this.

For these reasons I have adopted the following cour^,
wliicU appears to me most in accordance with the naturaJ
direction of the ide^s of a young mann

In carrying Jt out ray chief endeavour will be, in the
fir*t place, to make myself alwaj-s intelligible tcthePriace^
09 uthen^'iibi:^ the jno&t ultentive pupil must 5oon become

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION 179

i^e<3. coofujed and dbgiistcd ; secondly, in every cose
Ao avoid «{ivinK nny f-rroncoiis ideas, throiigh which his
instructioD or Ih*.* pii^r^^ of ills own studies
be impeded or inti^riercd \«ith.
For the itnke oE the find of these objects, 1 shall vn-

IdtfAvour to keep the subject always ia concgpoad«nc«
vHih tlir natura] understanding as much as pos^bl^^, and
in tltia Flfuit sliM ofti^n dcviati: from the ^ii^ntific »pirit
and #:^bobxlic Ecrm».
, I now Tiubmit to your Excellency the pJan 1 ha\*e
■ketch«d ba»tUyp aud beg you will do ntc tht? lavouf (o
correct my view in any points in which it may not be in
üccoidancc witti your own.

Next to a preparatory knowledge of weapons and the
jdiifercct kinds of troops, some conception of af^ed or
lacljcs. as tbcy are called, and Strategy, i% prin-
Vipally necessary in order to compcehend military history,
T^LCtics, or the theory of fighting» is in reality the principal
;, purtly becanw? bivftlt'S are decisive, partly because
it comprises the moi^t ol what can be taught. Strategy,
or the theory of the combinalion of geparate battle»
towards the object of the <:£Lnipaif;ii, ts a subject more of
natural and matuicd |x;)v'er of judgment ; stilly we must
at least point out clwriy the subjects which are therein
to I« foLuid, and »thow their mutual connection ajid
relation to the whole.

Firld fortifionfion in such a synoptical courw will
be most suitably placed with thu theory of the
defensii.-^ in tactics, pennanent fortification in or after
5trat<^,

Tactic» itself comprises two dtfleieDt classes of subjects.
One class may be understood without having an acquaint*
pnce with tlie »trate^c: rrlalions ol the whole; to this

i9^

OS WAR

bdong til« lormation for taciical purpose sod the mode
of fighting of all the «maUcr part^, from the Corapany or
SquJt(!lron op to a Brigade oi all umis, and tn al! kiada ol
Country. Those of the other c]xss are in intimate connec-
tion with strategic conceptions ; to this class bi'lorg the
UMJal ^tion of whole Corps and Armies in battle, outpost
services, and the minor operations of War, ftc. Ac,,
becuuftc in sudi Ihefe me intTodnc^^d cunceptions Ol
position, battle, march, &c., wtiich cannot be imderstood
without pri?vioua conceptions of the combination of tht
whole campaign,

T shall, therefore, separator the two dasses of subjefb ;
begin with a concise and very general dfscriplion ol
War, pass on to tactics, or the action of the smaller
divisions in battle^ and then ^top short when I rea^b
the position (order of battle) of wliole Corps or Armie«, ,
in order to return to the general v-iew of the «m- |
palgn, and to explain more in detail Ihe connection
of things; then the remaining chapters on tactics wi|tad
follow. ^^

La»tly, 1 shüU begin Strategy ngain^ with the idea of
the course of a campaign, in order to consider the »abject
from this new point of view.

From this now follows the arrangement its under:

Arms.

Powder, »mall arms, rifies. cannon, end all appeHainl
thereto.

ArtiOtry.

Theory of charges for horizontal and vertkd
firing.

Stivice of cannon of all kinds.
:" Organisation of a Battery.

Expense of guns ^nd ummunition^ &t;-

E^ect of art lUoLA^^r Aug««— probability of hitün^,'

SUWftARY OF INSTRUCTION

lai

Other tiintU c/ TroopB,

CÄvatry—light — heavy.

Iniantiy — ditto.

Formation — dcsl ioa tion — ch irictcr.

ApplUd or Highft Tactics.

A ^Fnerd ccoiceplion of War*-biitÜe*. Position at
divüuons, and their mode of fighting.

A Ompfiny of Infnnttywithorwithmit Artillrry on all
kjrid& of ground.

A SquAdron of Cavnlry the same.

Thc two toftcthcr.

Ditto in diff^^nl kind* ftf ^ound,

Ordi^r of battle for a Corps of several Brigados.

Ditto of an Army of »cvcra) Corps.

The two lut KCtion» without rrbtion to ground,
Iv^vjsf otherwise the id^^.i (ff position would be mlrodiiccd.

More dctuilrd expbn;ition of ü. campaign.

Organisation of Anny at the commencement of a cam-
paign^

Whilst it maxli^s, and take» up portions, it Tet^uins
mcaAiTcs of iccurily— outposts— patrols — reconnaissancea
— »det^ichmenta — minor warfare.

When an Army chooses a positioaj such arrangements
must be nude ih^t the Army tan defend itself m 111« aume
— tactical def^mivc-^dd foxtificAtion,

Attack of the enemy in *urh positions— conduct to bn
observed in the comb^^t itself— battle— retreat— pureuil,

Marches— defence of ri>"era— f aisage of rivers — lines of
posts — en n t on mcnt^s^

Stratc^.

View of a campaign ;uid of a whole War in Sliategy
respects.

What determines the result in War,

t<f ON WAR

difficult to maintain, but withoial which, with the mo6l
brilliant qualities t>f the mind, wc can *^«rt notbinR.
we luuät lumüianse ourselves vnth tli^ idCA of falUng wiUi
honour; cherish that idea constantly ^»nd completdy
acciistcrm nuradves to it. Be convinced, oioaE noble
Prince, that without this firm dcleraünalion DOthiog great
can be eöwted in the most Jortunate War. (o say nothing
of an unfortunate onc^.

Wc may he certain ttial this idea often occupied the
mind of Frederick IL dtiring his fir^t Sile^an cfimpai^ ;
and t>fcuuse he W3£ ^iccustomed to it he made Ihe attack
At Leuthen on thai memorable December 5» not because
he had inadf a calculation that with the obhque order
of battle he would in aJl probability beat the Auslrians.

(3) Amongst all the operations left to yourchoice in any
given case, amongi&t all the measures hich ate open ia
adoption, there will always be a choice between the bold
and the prudent. Some people think that theory is aJiimys
on the side of the pnidnnt. That is false. U theory could
give ad\ice in the matter, it would coumel the laost
decisive, consequently the boldest, as that is mcßl con-
sistent wjth the nature of W^t ; but it leaves to the
General to choose according to the measure of his own
courHge, of hig spirit oA enterprise, and confidence in
himself. Choose then according to the meature of these
inner powers ; always remembering that there never was
a great General who was wanting m boldness.

It— TACTICS OR THE THEORY OF COMBAT

War consists of a combination of many diitinct bgittlc».
Now, although this comWnation mny br rilhrr sktUul
or the reverse, and the result in a great jiiedsura de|>ends
upon that pdnt, still the battle itself stands before it in
point of importance, for nothing but a combination of

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

ife

^ix>cf»fiU battles gives a good result. Therefore, the
tttinE ot the higliHl trnfiortuncc in War will always br the
irt of eonqocring the enemy in baUIc. On KUm your
Royal Mighnt^ onnot bestow too much atteotion md
(bought« The Itjilowuig piinuplea I hi>l<l to be the most
important :

^^K I.-GENERAL PRINCIPLES

^^^^ ji<— FOR THE DEFENCE

■ {I) To keep troop& on the ddewaivc under cover from
hrt A» long a* powiWp. A^ we may be Attacked» con-
sequently may have to defend mirfirjvcs jit any nsoinfmt,
except when t»*careoiTrselvc4aclnig on the offensive ; wo
must therefore always tako up a poäition as much under
cover as possible.

{2) Not to bring the whole force into action it once.
If this Eault Is committed, all raltonal ^idanee of die
combat is at an end ; it la only with dispnsabZi^ troops
that w*- can l«m the coHrae of a battle.

»(3} To trouble ounwlvcs httio about the width of ouf
front, as it 1ft a matter of Utile consequence in itself, and
the depth of the positirm (that is, the number of troop*
placed onf behind the other) n diminished by an extonsiun

»of the fiont. Troops whirh arc in rear of (he front line
are dispo^ble; they can eitlter Im used to rvntorr the
comba,t at that point or be brought forward at other ad-
ifternt points. This printiplr fdluwi from thr preceding.
(4) At the enemy, whilst he attvicks some part of the
front, often seeks to outflank and envelop at the same
time, therefore the txoups placed in rear are iivtii3a.ble
to repel such attempt«, and accordingly supply the want
of loTfll nhstnclin on whirh tn rest the flanks, They are
better placed for that purpose than tf they stood in line
and extended the widtl) of the front, for in such ca^

ISB

ON WAR

gained by tliat pohlon of the ArcTu^ukc'« Army wtiich
vmt victorimis were ununportujU ; Ibu&e wlucli the
Empeior Napoleon gained in (he Kimc lime at the oppo-
gll« point w<TC dtdüve.

(la) II lui^iybeaUowed to billig forward cnceinore lb«
two last principles the combination of them yieUs n
moidin w^hkh, in the modem Art of War, m^iy he rr^nifd
as the first among alJ causes of victory, that a : lo foUow
up a f r«at &n<3 d^isive object wUh energy and penev«-
ranee.

<ij) Dangtr in case of failure is incrf^srd thercb)',
it is true; buf prudence increased at (he cost od vietoiy
is no Art ; it is ^ false prudence which, a» drcady said,
15 opposed to the very nature of War ; for Rrcat «id*
w« must venture much, Tmc prudence Is, if we rl&k
anylliing in War. to select and apply caicfuUy the meant
to our end, and to rpgl«:t nothing thtcugh indolrncc
or want of con^demtion- Of this kind wa« the prodmc«
of the Emperor Napoleon, who never followed ^reat
objects timidly and with huU measuted Ihrou^ti over-
prudence.

Among the few victorious defensive battlea tlial are
noted in history, you will find, noble Sir, that the greatest
were fought in the spirit of these principles, for they are
pnncipLes derived from the study of history.

At Minden, the Duke Ferdinand suddenly appeared on
a field of bailie on which the enemy did not ej(pr4:t him,
and proceeded to the attack ; whilst at Tannh%uä«ia In»
defended himself passively behind entrenchments.

At Rosebach, Frederick II. threw hunt*II on the
enemy at a point and at a time where bis attack wa» not
expected.

At Leignitf. the Austrian« found the King in tbe ni^fat
tD quite a different position from tliat in which they bad

SUMMARY OF iNSTRUCTION

189

Mm htm the dny bcfoTV ; h^. ir.Tl nptm a column a( tlie
enemy with the whole weight of hit Anny, an<3 deicaicd
il before the others oould take part io the engagement.

At Huiienlindeii, Muitau had live Uivisiona ui his
Iront ftjid four behind htm, «ither directly or obliquely
to Ihr rent ; lir hirncd Ihr rnrmy» und Irll upon the
hght^flank column before it couJd carry out its intended
attack.

At Katisbonn''. Marshal Davnnst defended himsdf
pasnvely. wtnie Nupgleun witli the nght wing attacked
the fifth ftnd sixth Austrian G>rps, and completely
defeated thpnj,

AI Wagram the Austrians were, in reality, on the
defensive, still ad they attacked the Eiuperot on the
MCond day with the greater port ol their force, we may
look upon the latter as ;ictin|( on the defensive. With hi«
right wing he att^Lcked Ihe Austrian lell, turned «nd beat
it, not troubling himself meanwhile about his weak left
wing (consisting of a single Divi^on), resting on the
OAiiubc ; but by ineartä i>f hi« strong re^crvi^ [deep
position) be pre\'ented the victory of the AuMri^n right
wing fTom having äiny inlluence on the victory he had
gained on the Rossbucti. With these reserve« lie le-loc^
Ad Erklär.

All the fore^ing prmciplo» ivre not plainly ejiemf^ified
In each of the battles enumerated, but all aie examples of
an active dcrlenaive.

The mobdlity of the ?ru»aan Army under Frederick H-
wfts a mcfuvt to viciory for him, ujwin which uv can no
lomger build, ;iUB other Armies are aa capable of moving !U
oun now -• On the other hand» at (hat time the turning

* 0«rlr>u*1y in iS66 tbf FViiptviu» mfcrrhrni ni^^rly twit- a% IaaI «■
tb? Avifi^An«, In >Hpi ntmtly Xbna tiuir* Ifuter UHy Uv dtajr b tl^
ITrracb, ~l^k mipctkat malikliiy in boili liiAtancri tanJiüoDol ih«r
iiuccAii- ITio Prvnch had forgoiiTD Ibc Hcrrt ol tiBrehfiif. rtre

i85

ON WAR

thoy themselves wßiild he. easily turned by th« en
This point Also further establishes the second.

(5) It there are many Iraops to t>e polled in Üie Dfar,
only a p^urt should be placed ditectly behind the front,
the refit are placed in an oblfqiic direction (in echelon)
ti> (he re^i beyond either flank.

From (his last position, the enemy's column* appT'
ing to turn <mr flank cun in turn l»c taken m ft:ink.

(6) 11 is a first maxim never to remain perfectly puäve,
but to fall upon the enf*my in front and flflnk, even when
he i:^ in the act of making an attack upon ua. We adopt
the defensive therefore on a cej-tain line only to eompd
the enemy to develop hj& furcea fur the attack of that
lin«, and v/e then pass over to the offensive with troops
which have been kept in reserve. As yoxtr Ro>"al High-
ness once justly remarked» The art ol field furtilication
U not to serve the defender like a wall behind which he
can stand in greater secuiily, but to aid him in attacking
the eni'my wilh more success, — the same applies to every
passive defence ; it is always only the means of attacking
the enemy with advantage on ground that we have looked
out und prepared lor ourselves, and where we have drawn
wp our troops,

(7) This attack, belongiug to the defensive, may b«
made either at the moment the enemy opens his attack
on us, or whilst he tä on the march to do ^o^ It tn^y also
be arranged so tliat. when the enemy commences hi$
attack, we draw back and thus lure him on to ^ound
of wiiich he is ignorant, in order to Jail upun liim on all
sides. For all disposition« of this kind, the deep fornu*
tion of an Army, that is, an order in which only Iwo-thtrda
or the half, or even less, are in front, and the rest ported
directly and obliquely in rear, under eover i( poi&ibic,
is very wdl suited ; and, therefore, this order of biittle
is a point of infinite imporUncc.

I

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

"87

I

{%) Therefore« if we have two Divi^oiUs it is better to
place one bchiiwi ihr »thcr thnn to place them in line;
with Ihiee Divifiioiis^ mw Hi iaasi ^li^tiid bepUctd in rcw;
with ioiiT. probably two ; with five, at least two, in many
cases, three, &r- Är_

{^) At the points where we remain paagive, we j^IiouJeJ
inalre ti*e of fisld fortification, Ijut only in ^parabe
frdcjsnl works tif hf>ld jinifilp,

(loj In forming a plan of battle, we should have a
grtat ohjett m view, as. for example, the .-iitaek of a ftlrong
column of tli« enerny, and a complete victtiry ijvcr it.
If we only choose a smiill obj«t^ whilst the enemy piirsiip*
ft great onr, wp sliall evidently be the to&ers. Wc piay
with tlialers ^^st pfenning*.

(ll) If ottr plan of defenci? is aimed at some ffreat
ohjrct (thi^ destruction of a column of an enemy. &c,),
wc niii*1 follow it np with the utmost energy, ejcpcod
Upon it all our force?. In most cases, the eßorls of the
aasaihint will be in :k:me other direction ; whilst we fall
upon his right win^. hewill he seeking to gain >n advan-
tage with liis left. If wc slncken our efforts sooner Ihan
the enemy, if we follow up our object with less energy
than he does, he will attain his object, he will gain his
advauta^e completely, whilst wcsh=ill only buH reach ours-
Thus the enemy obtains the preponderance, thus the
victory beconies his, and we must i;tve up even 010 ball
advantage gained. If your RoyuJ Highness reads atten-
tively the account of the Battles of Rutishonne and
Wägrani, you will sec t>oth the truth and importance
of this.

In both these battles the Kmperor Napoleon att^ickei]
with his right wing, standing on the defensive with the
left. The Archdnke Charles did the same, Bui thn one
did it with full rcäolution and energy, tht? cithi*r wns
undecided, and always stepped half-way. The succc^äcs

ON WAR

g*incd by that portion of the Archdukn"^ Array which
wa» victoru>uH were uDiniporUuit ; tbo&e wbidi lite
EmpfTor N^polron giitifd in iht same tunc at the oppo-
%Äit point wrrr äccisiva.

il2) II 1 iiuy be allowed to bring forward oiK« more Uie
two Uat principles» th<r combmatjon ol them yidda a
mAXim which, in Ihctnodrm Art of War, may brrf^nkd
AS the fir^t among a[J causes of victory, that is ; Xq (oJkw
tap a great and decisive object witb energy and p«rMV«<

(13) DangCT in case of failure ts increased th^eby,
It is true ; but prudence incrcusod at the cost oi victory
is no Art ; it b a false piudence wludi, ;ls ali«ady aatd,
is oppo^d to the very nature of War; for great codi
we must venture much- True prudrnce it, if wc rUc
anything in War, to select and apply carefully the mcaoi
to our end, and to neglrtl nothing tlirongli indoknc«
or want ol consideration. 01 tliia kind w.» the prviience
ol the Emperor Napoleon, who never followed ^tt^i
objects timidly and with half measures tliTOUgb ovcr<
prudence.

Among the few victorious dcfensiiTi battles that nrr
noted m histöty, you will find, noble Sii, thiit tlie gre^tctt
werr fojght in Hie spirit of these principle*, fmr Ihey are
principles derived from the study of hiätory.

At Minden, the Duke Ferdinand suddenly appeared on
a field of battle on which the euemy did n»t rxprct him,
and proceeded to the attack ; whilst at TannhauMB he
defended himself passively behind entrenchments.

At Ro5sl>ach, Frcdexick II. threw luiu&tU on tbe
enemy at a point and at a time where hi* attack wm uot
exp<^:ted^

At LeignitJ, tlie Aitslnans found the Kn^g m tbe night
in quite a diUcreot position from that in which they hod

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

189

I

seen him ih^ day beforf ; he lelt upon a column oi the
CDcrny with th« whole weight of his Army, And ^^fcatpH
it bpJmu Iht othrm r*inUl liikr jxirt in Uit cngaiscnient.

At nohcnlindcn. Morcan had live Divisions in hi«
front and four behind him» Hthcr directly or oWifinrly
to the xtiXt ; he tuiiit-d (tie enemy, und fdl upon the
right'fhnk coUuTui befoT« it cculd curry out itiinCmdcd
allAck.

At Kiiti^bu[]iie» Mai^hal Uavoual ddtriidiHl liimsell
pjusivcly, while N;ipolcan with the right wing attacked
the fifth and ^ixth Austrian Corps» and completely
defeated them.

At Wagram the Austrian^ were, in reality, on the
defensive. stiU as they attacked the Empetor on the
seoond day with the greater part of their force, we may
Jook npon the latter >s acting on the deferiMVe, U'Uh bis
nght wing he Attacked the Aufltrian left, turned and beat
it, not troubling hinuelf meanwhile :ibont his we;ik left
wing (consisltn^ of a single rhviäit*n), ri-stiiiii; on the
Danube; but by meana ol hi» strong rcÄervos (deep
position) he prevented the victory o! the Austrian right
wing fiioEn häVjTig any mflocnce on tiie victory he had
gained on the RoMbnch. "With these reserv« he re-took
Aderklaa .

AH the foregoing pfLUcipIc« are not plainly cTcetnphlicd
in each of tbr^ bnttl« enuuieiatnl. but all ate exattJpl« 1^
an acti\'c defeofiive-

TLe mobilily of the Pnis^i.m Army undrr Frodirrick II.
was a meuna to victory for him, upon which wc can uo
longer build, a* other .'Irtnie* are aa capable of moving a;s
oun now>* On the othc^r hand» at th^it time the turning

■ Curlouiify in iSäG tb? PruoitAna march««] noQrly twlc« ai l»t i^
tb? Atuaiuu. iti ttjit ovdiljr Üirr« tlmn lutwr liny Um dny u the
Fr«icb. Thii liaivfiut luobUity in both imUncv* luriUihuuvii thtii
111««**, Th» Prnocb liaü FoikOUhi ihr M^irt o* m»rfftlBj It»»

190

ON WAR

a flank wäs less gcmeraUy ia vogue, and, tbcr^orc, U>e
deep order of battle w^ le^ imperative.

i;,— FOR THE ATTACK

(1) We try to fall upon a point in the enemy's position \
Ihat y, n pari of hin Anny (a Division, a Corps), wjtli a
groat prcpondtrajice of force, whilst we keep the other
parts in uncertainty, that »5 lo ssy, occupy thcmn It is
only m this way that when our forces are equal or inferior
we can fight with the superiority on our side, that is, wixh
& probability of success^ If we tue very weak, then w«
can ciiiy spare very few troops to occupy the enemy at
other points, that we may be aa strong as possible at the
decisive point. Unquestionably Frederick II. only gained
the battle of Leutben because he had his small Army on one
spot ?ind well concent rat i:d, as compared witli the enemy,

(2) The principal blow^ ia directed against a wjog of the
enem/s force by an attack in front and flanic, or by
completely going round it and attacking it in rear. It ia
only if we push the enemy off his hne of nrtitat by
victory that we gnin a grent success,

(3) Even when in strong force wc often choose 9R\y one
point for the great shock, and give th? blow against that
point the grealcr strength ; for to surround an Array
completely is seldom possible, or supposes an ünoiens«
prepoTidprance both physically and morally. But the
enemy may alsu be cut olf from his line of retreat by
an attack directed against a point in one of his flanks
end that is g^^ncrally siifljcidnt to ensure great results,

(4] Generally the certainty (high probability) of thfi
victory— Ihat is. the certainty of being aWe to drive the
enrmy trom the ^cld of battle, is the principal jKiint.
Upon this, as an object orend, theplaa of the battle must
he formed, for a victory once gained, even if it b
decisive» is easily made so by energy in puinuit.

4

SUMMARY or INSTRUCTION i^i

(5) We cndeiivoor to taakc ciur attack conceittncolly
OD that wiog od ibe cnociy which i£ to receive Uio shack
of our main body, that is, in such a form that his troops
And them^elveä engaged on ail sides at once. Allowing
that the enemy has troops «nough to show a front in aD
diieciions, still the troops, undec such cixcumstaticcs,
become iilutc easily diftcourag^ ; they suQer uiui«*, ace
Sixmcc thrown into disorder» Ac. ; in &hc>a, we may expect
to make thi-m givi* way soonrr.

(6) T1ÜS turuiDg of the enemy compels the UMÜftDt
to develop a greater force iu front than the defender.

n

If the units a, b, c are to fall ccncentncaUy (or by
Convergjng lines) on Üw paxi c of the cnrjny'n force, they
must naturally stand on lines contiguous to each other.
But this development of our force m fiont must never
be carried 4d f*r tJiLtt wc do not retain strong reser\'ea.
That would be the greatest eTTor possible, and would
lead to defeat» if the enemy is only in some measure
prrpnred against being out-flanked.

«

H «, bf e nri> units inti^ndpfl 1» utUck e, a part dI
«n«iny's Army» th«ii the unitt /, g muft be kept in
WiUi this deep formallon wc can ince^^i^antly ruicw
itltncks upcm l?»pÄütnt point» a.iidi< tmr trüupftare
at the oppo*itf tJrtrcnüty o( ihn enemy'* ]>o«tion> we are
nol obltgfd to give wp the day at thw, bccausr wc ha%r a
^et-ofl to any success l^e enemy may tiav« gained, It
wM thus with the French at Wagram. Tli*^ leit wing,
which was opposL^d to the Austri^m right reaUni; cm the
Danube, was extremely weak and was toUUy defeated.
Ev«! their centre at Aderklaa was nol very Strange and
was obliged to give way to the Austrians un tlic fir>t diy.
But that did not sigrruy, because the Emperor's right,
with which lie atl^icked the Austrian left in front and
flank, had such a depth that he brought a hea\'y column
of cavalry and hotse ariiilcry to bear iijjun the Austtians
in Aderkl^t, ^nd if he did not beat thein. vrus ^ibk, at all
e\'ents, to fttop their progress.

(7) M in the defensive, so in the offensive, that pan
ol the enemy's Atniy which, in its destniction, will yirld
decisive advantages should be the ot)jccl of attack.

(8] As in the defeTlM^'e, so here, we must not ivinx orar
eflorts till we have Liltained our object, or that our inean«
are entirely exhrvusted. If the defendt-r is wbo nctive
if he attacks us at other points, wc have no chance of the
victory except by surpassing him In energy and bo1Jn(ss>
If he leniajns paj»sivt, ttien, in that case, we run no greut
danger.

(9) Long, continuous lines of troop» ar« to be par-
ticuJar]y avoided, they only lead to panülel attacks
which are now no longer to the pmpoie.

Each Divisiau maki.j^ iu own ntl.ick, nhhough in con-
formity with ibc plans of higher authority, and ctmse-
«luently so that they aceord with each other. But one
DiviSKin (Sooo tu IC, 000 men) vs nevei now formed in one

SUMMARY OF IN&TRICTION

193

I

Mnt, Always In thrtv^ or four : from this it follcw« that do
Lmifi. uiiitinuou» line» c^o bf uaed any more.

(lO) The itlacks of Divuioiu or Corp« in concert
musl not he rombinrd with Ihr irttr^tion of ihnr brinf(
under one guidaoce^&u thai, altliCfU|]i ul -a diät^nci:^ from
each otbtf and perhtp» cv«n »panted by the enemy,
Ihcy still tctn^iin in cfimmuniratinn, rvrn alif^in^ Ihr-m^
tdvec on each other, &Ct This U ^i eiToaeous ra^lhod
of carrying out a co-operation, which 1» liable to a thou-
sand accidents, Ibiou^h wliich notlung grent cin ever be
effrct^d, and by which onr is almost crrtain to be wcU
bL-ulfO li we have ludoal wUh ail active-, viguroiis enemy. •

The true wiy ü» to ^fve each Corp» or Division Com-
mander the generaJ control of hi:i march, to give him the
B6 thff paint on which his march is to be directed,
,tiie victory over the caemy a» the object of hie march.

Each Commander of a column hus. therefore. iUc order
to attack the enemy wherr he ürids hmi, and to do m> with
all hi» strength, He must not be made answerable for
the result, im ihat leads to indtM^uion : he must be
responsible for notlung more tlian that his Corp» joins
in the fight with all its energies and makes any sacrifice
ttial may be nocGssaty.

(ii) A wclI-orgam»ed independent Corps can resist the
attacks of a vastly superior force for a certain length of
time <6onie hours) ajid is. therefore, not to be dtälroyed
in a moment ; thtfefore, il U has even been «ngagrd too
soon witli the enemy and it bnitm, still it5 .i.ction 15 not
lost on the whole; the enemy must have deployed his
fofces» And expended a certain portion of tbcm on this
C<^p^. und tima i;iven uui other Corps a lavouräbio
opportunity for attack-

Of thr ori^nnUatioa of n Corpti for tliis purpose, wi; aUnW
speak hereafter.

VOL. lU. fi

I^ ON WAR

We ensure the harmonious action of the whole in cooccrt
when eichCorps ha^fn this man^iCT a certain ind«p«Tidaicc,
onH sre'ks out the enemy -.iml uttncks him a( an^rcoet.

(13) One of the most import;int principles foir cdfensjv«
War is the surprise of ihr cnf^my, Thr Taor<* tho allack
piiTliikes of the nature of a bufi^rtee, llie more ^ncce^fn]
wp may expect to be- The surprise which the defender
e£f«ls by the conceatoicnt of his dispositions, by the
covered pir^itioQ in which he places his troops, tlie olFevisive
cin only eßect by th^ nnexp^^cted march to the attack-
Tlri> is an occurtenct» which rarely hapjtens in modp-m
Warfare. This is partly owing to better measures for the
security of an Army ; partly owing to campiiigns being
now pfoseculed with more vigour, so tfiat tliere are not
new those long pans» Jn the operations which luQed the
one party to sleep, and gave the other a favoiuuble
opportunity to make a sudden attack-
Under the^e circurastances, except by a regular night-
surprise (as at Kochkirch), whidi is alvrays possible, the
only way now to surprise an enemy is to make a uuicb
to the flank or the rear, and then suddenly retuin upon
bim ; or il we are at a distance, then by forced marches,
and by great efforts, to rearh the enemy's portion soofier
than heexpects-

{13) The regdar surprise [by night, as at Hocbkircb),
affords the tiesi chance ol doing sametltinR whfn oiir
Army is small ; but it is allend^d with more risks föi th«
assailant, if the defender knows the country better than
he doesv The less we know of the country ,aod of the
enemy's arrangements the greater these risks are ; there-
fore, such attacks, in manyinatanc(*s, can only be regarded
as desperate means.

(14J In such attacks all the amngements must bt
more simple, and we must keep atlll more concentrated
than by day.

SUiniARV OF INSTRUCTION

^95

«-PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF TROOPS

(i) Sine« vre cannot ditpcns« with th« u&e of fire-Arms
(if we couict, why should wr carry them at ^11 ?) wt muit
open the cambdt witli tht-iii. .nnd Üie cavalry sbmild ant
be employed until the enemy h.is suffered contiderabJy
bf the action of mfnntry and nttiWrry. From this
foOoum;

(it) That the cavalry should be posted behind the
mfnntry,

ih) Tb^t vre mot not be Induced to bring the civalry
into action too ftoon. The cavalry should not be launched
boldJy to the attack until guch disorder prevail» in tbd
enemy's ranks that we may hope for success by hia hasty
retreat -

{2) The firr of artillery produces greater effect thnn that
oi infantty, A battery of eight aix-poundcrs does not
occupy a third pari of the front of a battalion of infnntry,
is workixl by an eighth of the nujEiber of mrn composing
a b^tt^on, and does certainly twncr, if not three times.
ta muich evecutior with it^ fire.* On the other hand,
artillery lia» the disadvantage of nut bving io avnly moved
as mfanlry. This applies in ßenrr:»l, even to thr lightest
description of horse artillery, for it cannot be used lilie
infantry upon any ground. From the commencement,
rhrrefore, the nrtillrry mniftt be kept united ni the mnst
important points, because \t cannot^ like inianlry, con-
centrate itwlf at those points during the progress of the
battlr, A Kf^"*t biittcry of twimty or thirty finns iä in
most Cites decisive at the point where it i« placed.

O) From the pjittinilars just «pfrtfird and others
wbtdi are evident, the lultowing rule« present theinsdve»

tinllflU A miniiU, HiitrK?i:(Lpia'ortyyiirrtiinf friin^ A t4ltiiUminf jifinnivi
in Line tmkr^ rnuKhly 400 yard». §,nd eiui clfUvcr lüHHit the uime nimihcr

196 ON WAR

for the «Br of (he different arms of iht service respec-
tively.

[a) The battle i$ commenced by artill«^'. The preiter
pmportimi rtf thnt nmi being brought into i«r fTom the
very lirst» it is only with large niasses of Uoops that both
borw and fool artillery are kept in reserve. AitiUety is
used m large masses brought together at ainf^'k- point«.
Twenty or thirty guns defend the principal point in one
great battery, or batter the point in the enemy'5 line which
it 15 intended to attadc.

(ft) We next use light infantry — eiiher markmcii,
litlcincni oi fusiliers — pnncipaUy m ocdrr not to bring
too many troops into fietion at once ; we try firet to (ed
v^t theie is in our front (for that can seldom t>c properly
examined), we want to see which direction the fight it
likely to take.

It wc can maiDtain an equal tight with Ihr enemy
with this line of skirmishers, and that there is no
rtsason for hastening the affair, we should do WTong
to hurry U>rward otltor forces; we »»hoald weary
out the enemy with this kind of fight as mudi as
poeaiblG,

^e) If the enemy brings so manv troops into tbrcombtt
u to overpower our line of skirmishers, or if we cannot
delay any lunger, we bring forwaid a full line of infantry,
which deploys itself at loo or loo • paces from the enemy,
and either opens fire or advances to the attack, aoccTCÜBg
to circumstances.

(i) This is the chief purpose for which the infantry is
draitined : if we are drawn np in such deep formation that
we have ^till ^ line of infantry in column in reserve, we
are tolerably well masler of the combat at this point.

* Tobhaf thftHa ideju up lad4t*H mÜ tiAt ia nricjKvkry u to mglQpl^

Ihf numbrt of gim» ami Ubüfu^o hy tpn— in the larta of the bfttüi^
there ii DQ inaiPiLiü cluki'Kc. Modern rAviLry cad cqvl^ ico Uma Ik«

SUUHARY OF INSTRUCTION

197

I

This MGond line of infantry «hould. if posäible, be used
only io columns, to d«clde Üie day.

{e) The cavalry during this time keeps in re^r of th«-
troops enguged in action, as nmr 3^ it cnn, tvilhout
suflering much l^>äs> that is beyond the leach of grap«
and musketry, It must, however, be at hand» tbat we
nuy hta .ibLe to proiit by any success wliicfi takt-s pl;ice
in the ccmr^t of the combat .

(^) In (olUiwing Ihcsr nilcs more or leas strictly, we
must keep in ^iew the folJowing principle, on which I
cannot iii^l too strongly, vie,, not to make a venture
witti all our forces at once, because we tiiua tlirow ;iw::iy
all means of directing them ; to wear^' oui adver^ry
with as few troops as possible, and keep in hand a con*
siderjble aas^ ior the la^t decisive moment. Once this
last reserve is staked, it must be led with the utmost
boldni?^^

(5) An order ol battle, that is, a method of drawing
up the troofe before and during the battle, must bo
established for the whole cankpaign. This order of bLitlle
is to be observed in all case& when there is not time to
n>nke apecial dispositions. U must, therefore, be hased
chiefly with a view to the defensive. This order of battle
wiU reduce the form or manner in which tlie Array fiehts
to a kind of rtv^hoä, which iä very necessary as well a*
«alutary, because a great munber of the Generals oi
second ordrr, and other officere ot the head of smaller
nmXs, have little knowledge of tactics, and no special
aptitude at all for War.

By this, a cerlatn methodicism Is instituted which lakes
the place ot art, where the latter is wanlin^^*. My jH-r-
suadon b that this exists to the greatest degree in th»
French Army,

(6) According to what has been fiaid respecting the
■a» of the different arms of the service, this order of

I9B

ON WAR

bitlüit for a Krigiuk would be fionicthing lib? the
following :

a ooooooo oo^ocoo oooooco ooooooo b

MMIMP

MU.:f,

m

Hk-r

tMrss:;-

I' a. b li a line gf light lalbntry which »peni Iht bättl». aatJ ku a brokru

curTit^ thm arliUtiy, £, i/, intnidpil to b* pUc«l in lialtoiy^ «I mdvut-
Ujrram pDinfa, Until pul tu ptuiitiim, it ramuili tf^rhind Hie imt hjif
Ol inTnntry. t, ^ I» tht Ariil Uac ol iaUnay, Intflnd«! CO <1«ptay lAd
opf'n hrc ; la tUti okw It te form<Kl or loiii battallotH : t- *- <^to n^
Incnti of cavalry ; i'^ A, the atcond liiui i>t Inrimiiy. wlilcli conttftata
tbe rsüTvi: iDteadtil to decide the resxilt of thi- butUc '< n, Itb CBvaby,

Accuiiling 1u till: satiic przndpli;^, a similar dtspusitioa
may be established for a Corps of larger proportions :
at the same time it is not c^cntial that the order adopted
should be precisely thai now laid down, it may difEcr m
some respects, so that it is in conformity with the fore-
going principles. Thus» for instancp, the usiml position
ol the cavalry» g, h^ may be in th» Ime /. m, and tlieii it is
only brought forward when it is found to be too for in
Tear at I, m.

(7} The Army consists of several such iodcpc-ndctit

SUIOIARY OF INSTRUCnOH 199

Corps, which have thetr Generals and Staß. They are
diawQ up in litiir, i^r im« bclund onodier. aocucilEn^ ;a&
Ihal may be prctcribcci by the g«ncml principle* for the
nimbot. One thing we have Mill to add, which U, that
il wear« nut tuu weak mi:av-a]ry, weT&luiuldfuniiä^ipvcLai
reserve of that arm, wMcb nAtuntlly will be placed quite
in refli, and ift for the following purposes :

(a) To plKsÄ upon the enemy, if he reUeaU Irom IIä
Held, and to Mtack the cavalry which h« employe in
covenng hh tetrtsit. If thr enony's cavntry b tx^tm
at that moment» great re^ull^ must follow. unlr^Sf the
enemy's infantry perfomis prodigies of viUo>ir. äiiiaU
bodies of cavalry will not jinswer the purpose on such an
occasion-

{b) To hasten the pursuit of the «rnomy if. without
being boiten, hr muk» a fetreat ; ot if, «dler a lo&l tattle,
he continue to retire on the following day. Cavalry
maiches quicker tlian infantry, and is more dreaded by
troops tii^t are retreating. And ne^ct to bei^iting the
enemy, the pursuit h the most important thing in War,

(c) If our object is to make a great turning inovement
(to turn tlie enemy Strategically), and on account of
the ditaur we tunst employ on urm which marches
quicker, then we may take thiä icäerve cavalry for tlic
purpoae^

In ordrr to nmlco thin Oirp» more inJep*mdi-nt, hor^e
artillery should be attached to it ; for there is greater
Mrength tn a combination of several anns,

(8) Tlie Older ul kittle for tl^ troopa has relatioQ to
the battle ; It is their disposition for that end.

The order of march is. in its eääentiiils, as fnllown :

{a) Each compk-le unit (whether Brigade or Division)
has it* own advance- dnd tear-guard, and forma a column
of itwrif ; thut does not, however, prevent several *ucb
units fiom marching on tbe same road one after another.

«u

ON WAR

and ttiQK, to a ceitaio «xtcnt, fonning a$ a wlx^ osk
grcAl cdlmnn.

{b} The units march according to their positioo in the
genera) order vi battle ; that is to **y, a<rcording as their
sippointnl place in th^it ordrr may h;tp]irn to br in line
with, or in rear of, each other, v>o they marcb>

(f) In tho columrs themselvM the following order i«
invarw-bly observed : the light infantry torni the advanc«-
and rear-guards, accompanied by ä proportion of cavalry ;j
then follows the infantry : then the artillery ; ]aMofali,|
Uic veftt of the cavalry,

lluji order i& kept, whether we move against the eremy
—in which case it is the natural order — or parallel with
the enemy, in which case, properly^ those who in the order
uf battio are to stand betimd one another should maicb
sdde by side. It we h^ve to form iine of battle, theivj
can never be want of time to such a degree that we cannot
witlidraw the cavalry and lh^ second line by one flank
or the other.

3.--PRINCIPLES FOR THE USE OF GROUND

(i) The tffrain (the ground or country) givt% iwoj
advantivges in War.

The tii^t is, tli^it obstacles to approsxh arc thus pn><l
rented which either render it impossible for an enemy
lo roach certain points, or compel hira lo march sUiwly
lo keep in culuniQ, &c.

The second is, that obstacles of ground enuble us to
conceal the poäitlon o( our troops. H

Both advantages are very important, but Ihe second^
Appears to tne the greatest : at all evrnts it is o^lainly
the one whidi we can most freqacnliy make us-e of.
becAute, even the most level country, la most cases, si
allow« oJ drawing tip Iroopä more or leas under ocn'er.

SUMMARY OF IKSTRVCTION

3or

I

I

Fonneriy. the trst of these adv^ntag«« was almost the
only one known» and very Ihtlc use w*? made of the
second. Now the mobility of all Amjira i» mjcU, that the
flnl is of less ser^-ice, and just on that account wc raust
make use themorc (requently olthcsecond, Thefirstof
th«&e two advantages isonly serviceable m the defensive,
second, in both attack and defence,

'(a) The ground, considt-red as an obstacle to appniEicti,
is of use chiefly in the folJowing points : (a) as a support
ior the flanks, [b] aa a means of strengthening the front»

(3) As a fit support lor a flank, ;in obst^e sliouM be
quite impaa^blo — such ns a large river, a Like, an tm-
paskibJc »wAiopn Tlicse arc all impediments which mrt
nrdy met with, and lber«iyre perfect supports for the
Sanies arc seldom ic be found, and tht; want of (hem U
left now nioTc fic^^iucntly lliun formerly, because AnnitTi
move more, do not remain so long in one position, conse-
quently require a greftler number of poMtmns in tlie
tlveatre of War.

If the obstacle to Approach is not an impassable barrier,
then it is, properly spe^iking, no poini d'appui for a ttankj
i\ ia only a point wluch strengthen» the puHtion. Troops
mQ«t then be placed behind it, and then af^in it becomes
iQ roUtion to these an obstacle to approach.

It k» certainly always of advantage Co streiigTheu the
ikuiks in thi» manner, us lewer troop« are tlien required
at those point« ; but we must take ptccAutiouK against
two things: the fir^i b, placing loo much reliance on
Bucb support» Iqt the Hank, and thus jitglL-ctin^ to have
strong reserved behind them; the second is, covering
both wingfi with obslach^ of this dtrschption, for a> they
do Out completely seciire either, they do not prevent
the possibility of a combat on both Banks ; thiii may
eaauly become £t oimt dUadvautageous defensjvet for the
obstacles will not allow u« easily to sally forth with an

202

ON WAR

active defence en one wing, and thus we may be reduciad
(o <lcfcnd ourselves in the mo&t ujiUvQurAbJc of all Jormi,
wilh Ixrth fljiTiks thrown back, a d,c^.
{^) TIlit^i^ LuiLMdeialions l&jd oguui tu the deep uidüd

ne I

of bnttle. Thi? Ic^ we are able to find sfcnre support I
the wings, the more troops we must have in rear, wi
which we may in turn outiknk any portion of the <ntmy^
amty which ^haW seek to ac\ against out llank.

{$) All kinds of ground which cannot be pdSMl
troops marching in line, all villages, all (mcloaurcti of
parc^lsof ground by hedges ^nd ditches, marshy meadows,
lastly, all hilfs winch can only be mounted with MOie
dtfliciiJly, come under the head of hindrances of this kind^
that ts, of obstacles that cannot be pstssed except wttli
difficulty, and dowJy i and which, therefore, add great
to t?ie strength of the ^oups po^t(*d behind Ihem in tlio
Gomlxit. Woods can ocdy be ijicluded in Ihis category
when the underwood is very thick and the ground marshy. -
A common wood of high trees is as easy to pass as 4 plain^^f
There is one point, however, in respect to a wood which
mvist not be overlooked, that is, that if may serve to con-
ceal the enemy. If we place ourselves inside it, then tliere
is the same disadvantage for both sides ; but it i* veiy
dangerous, and at the same time a great mi^TAlcn to have
woods in front or on the flank.* Such a thiii^ cau n«vcr

■ ModoTD i^acttetr bu altmd thlfi. Notbioe hcv« bvttoi
himpcr onkcy □' tommä&i:! m uttuking tnop* t^n im^l *roi;dt.
cuts are uudvf duvc Ore lion the deleader'n ptnithOL^EiMTUii.

SCMMARY OF INSTRIXTIOM «09

be allowable uiilt^K» Ihere are wry fi;w iiaüs by wbicb
they can b« travcracd. Ab;Lttb intended to bar the
pas&agrs arc so racily removed Ihnt they are not of mui4i
use.

<6) From aU thia it ioltows that wc «houLd endeavour
to nii^ke usr ol sncU »li^tnclcs upon onr flank, in order to
offer there a rHatively strong resistance- with few tiuüp«.
triiil^t wr cany out gwz intended offensive on Ihe other
flauk. Witik these ubstuclts^ Die use of i?nCreiichmc?nt&
may be combined with great advantagr, becauw then,
if the enemy paau» the obstacJe, the ßro tma the «ilrcnch-
mCDts may «ecurt our weak lorce from being ovenvbehne«!
bp A^crior numbcn, and thrown bnck to^) sudde^y.

(7) Wbcn wc are on Uie defensive, every ob^tacie
ing our front is of gr^^-Jit value>

Ail hilU un which p<&itions a.Te taken up are coly
occapied oq this account ; Ecr an clrvatnl po^ilion bat
tddom any important indaence, often noiK at al), on the
c5ect ol the arms in use. If we ntand abm'e lliei enemy
a^hcapproacbc», hcnnutaucndk-itliibfiicully. tlierefore
be adraaco «nly ilowly, hi* rank» ^ct into disorder,
tod be rachea m with ha pdiy^caJ povtfi rxhaiuted,
tat oa iriuch» with cquaJ bravexy aod oumbcn
cnch side, onghf to b^ decUw. Tbe gmt effect
of a rapid ctiar^ at lull speed ia a podat wbkb
rnma MK on any account be owdooked. The aoidi«r
vbD » advanctn^ boLuiuL-^ luseosibt« cvcfi to danfcf.
ttr «or who t» tuadiog still kives hia prev«« ol nuad-
lliiihinfm if»ayi ad* inii|,i»iiii inpliM ilw firat hnra
<i aiaaliy and artillery on high groond,

U Ae dope ol the hin Is »o sterp. its dn^vity «o biOliQ
^id ^mcs, that we cannot »weep il well wilh oor ftrtr
«feiA ia often the cue tbcn^ uut^ad ol pbdog ottr laM
^v aa IW flvnnit rid^ thai put abonld at moM only
by »lUnBÜhe», and the foD Bne «fconkl be ao

«4

ON WAR

r

pliiced on ttie reverse slo[)€. thiU at the moment wheo tbr
enemy reaches the summit ridge ^nd begins to nüly hi»
mnkti he is exposed to the greatest fire-*

All other localleatureswtiichionnobitacl« to approach,
such as small rivers, streams, hoüow ways, Ac,, icrve to
mnkn bti^aks in the enemy's front. He must. aiti;r passing
thetn, hiiit io le^iorm. and that delays liim; therefor?
be should then be brought within ramge of our nioHl
effectual fire. The most effectual file is avic (400 to 600
yard«), if tber« is |>leQty oi artillery available ; the fire oi
muakelry (150 to 200 yardsj^ if there ta little artillery it
hand.

(8) Through thi5 it becomes a nile to include within tlie
■one of our mo^t effective fire every ot^ätaclc to approach
with which we wish to strengthen our front. But, at the
same time, it is important to observe that our wlvAv
defence should never depend entirely on our fire, but a
considerable portion o( our troop* (one-third to one-half)
should &lw^3'3 be kept ready to attack with the bayonet.
Therefore, if we are very wcuk, we must merely pUce the
line of fire (riilemen and artillery) neat enough lo cover
the obstade with their fire, and place the reM of the troop»
in colutnns 600 or 800 yards further bock, and ü p<>vnble
under cover.

(9) Another way of making use of obstacles to approach
In front is to let theni be a little furtlwr in front oj our
line, so that Ihey shall be within the Hfrctivr rAQge ot
cannon-siiot (1000 Io 2000 yards)» and il the entfoyS
columns pass them, tlien to attack him from tU »ide^.
(At Minden, the Duke Ferdinand did somr^thing bkc tliiv-}
In this manner an obstacle of ground is favounble to
the plan of actively defending ourselves ; »nd ihh ftctw

■ Thl9 was Ihe Brltüb pioCllC« in the PtnfiuuLa ud ai WMCfloOk
At Li^ny the PtLiniauiOXhJ eaili«neBiy'tudvoI Uiu bilJ. WclUogw*.
u^bfl Otii froaa Bry, suLtl, " 01Ü BJQcber w;U «ft m«i daainAbly
uiaultc! , "— Btfi ivK.

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

W5

I

dfiencf', cjf whkh «vi? hnt'e already spoken elsewhere,
theo t^cfi plac« OQ our froot-

(lo) In ÜI« prtc^in^ obvrvatlons. obsCacls of groood
aiid toonUy huv«? l«wn c-on-Mdi^rrd thirßy as cx>nncctrd
Itoct in relation to cxle-jnuvc positions, but it is at<t»Axy

■ to »y «omctbing about ^\T\gk points.

Isolated poinls in general can only be defended eithf?r
by eotr« nehmen!» or by a strong natural obsUde of

I ground. Of the first wc do nnt speak at preaentT Ob^

I Stades oi ground which, standing isulated, may have lo

I be ddended can onlv* be —

I (a) Isolated steep Heights.

^ la tbi* cftsc, «ntrcnchmchts are indispensable, because
the enemy cao alwa^*3 advance against tlie defender with
a front niore or lew cxtended» and the defender must then
4t Ia5t be 1;tken in rrar, b«^ausc he wiU rarely be strong
enoii^ to >*how a front on all sidefi,

■ it) Defiiea.

Under this term we include r^feTy narrow wny forming

I the only approach by which the enemy can reach a par-
tialis point. Bridges, embankments, rocky gu]ley»tfritfa
precipitnus sides, belong to this claaa.
fn respect U-* all these cases it is to be observed, that
either it is impossible for the .assaiUnt to t«rn the obstacle
I ^-A5» itff instance , a bridge over a great river. In wliich case
the defender may then boldly nse dl his force m order to
bfin^ as much fire as possible tn bc^r on the point of
puäAdge^-or wearenot secure against the obstacle bring
turned — as In the case of bridgesover small streams, and
the f^esitcr niim1«r of mountain delile!i ; tiien it ia
luOtttBiy to rcierve i conMder;ible p:irt of the force (one-
third to one-half) for an attnrk in cXim^. ordi-r,

[c) Bmlding» and Enclusures, Village«, small Towns,
ice.

If troops are brave, and carry on a War wltti enthiuiasm.

to6

ON WAR

tbpre_ is no place or condition of ÜiinRs in which a tew can
%o veil resist many as in the; drfrticc of houK«. But if
arr not quite certain r*i ihr mrn inHivifluaily. it i^ brtl^r'
only lo oocupy Llio bou^eik, eiiidüDi, &c., wilh riilcmen, aiid
to phut guns it th(^ approacbe«, and to draw up the
^:rcntr-r piirt of ihe tionp» (on («third to »ne hall) in drae ,
column, in the place itself, or behind it under coa"«-, in
ordor to nish upon the enemy with this reserve when ^.^—
;;Ltleinptä to enter. ^H

(ii) These isolated posts serve the great operationi^
partly as outjuists, not intended to offCT an absolut«
defence, but mostly only Co detain the enemy, partly as I
point!4 which arc rf importance in the combinnlions
planned for the whole Anuy^ It is also cften necessary
to hold a distant point, in order to gain time for the
d(:votui:tnient of active defensive measures which we have
in view. If the point is remote, it is naturally on
aecouni isolated.

(i2) It is only now necessary to add two remarks con
cerning isolated points, the first is, that we must hold
troops in readiness behind thpse points for the detachments
to rally upon in case of being driven out ; the second
that whoever includes such a defence in the ^ries of
combinations should never reckon too much upon it,
the strength of the nritural obstacles ol ground be ewr so
great; that, on the other hand, whoever is cntnirtcd with
the defence must determine to carry ntil the ohjoct, I
ciccunislances be ever so adverse to him. For tbis,
spirit of resolution and self-devotion t& required, which cjiQ
only spring from a thirst for glory and from enthi»ta^n)
for this reasonn men must be chosen for *ucb dutifä wl
are not deficient in these nobJe quahties of the *ouJ.

(13) All that concerns the use of the grountl as a means
for covering our position and our march up to occupy
loquirvs no elaborate ex|XEÜtion.

Iiavci

con*^^
old

I

so

tb

I

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

W7

Wr. do net now pbci^ niiru^lvcs on u hiU we vri^ t(r
ddend (as was often done formerly) but behind it : we do
Jiot plac« ourvlvö beforf a wöod» biit in ft, nr hchi^d it ;
the Inttrt nnly whrn wr Ciiti ovpHimk the wood *ji lliick«!.
We keep our troop« Jii column« that they may be tTw raore
easily concealed ; wc take advantage of villages, pUnla«
tiom, all unduUitiiMis of the ground- in urdvr to conceal our
troopft behind them \ in adv.incing we clioose the mwt
broken intersected courtry • Äc.

In cultivatf^ cuunthes there are hardly any localities
»0 much overlooked tlut it is not possible by a skilful u^e
of such obstaclra and featiirfs ^ the ground presents to
keep a great part of the troops on the defensive from
being seen- For the assailant, there is more difficulty in
keeping a m^irch secret, because he must follow tfjc m;iin
roads.

Of course, when the ground is made use ol for purposes
of concealment of troops, this must be done with a due
regard to the end and the combinations which have bren
decided upon ; therefore, in this we must t.ikecare above
aU thmgs that wc do not pull to pieces the order of balll«,
although some small deviations nuiy hi: nKowable^

(14) If we sum up what hfls now been &iid cm ground,
we d^uce from it as respect« the defensive, that h, the
choice erf poäitiimä, Ihiit the following points are thoae of
mo«t tmparlADce :

1(a) Support Af one or both flankn.
iff) Open view before front aiid ßanks,
(c) Obslaclä to the approacli in front,
{£) M:L?<kr-4l pciiilionAfor tiotips.
To thin \s to be added —
_ (f) A hmkrn covmtty in rear, because that mnkes

B ■ ThU no looe^r \\<Mt j^nod. At St Priv&l tht Pruulaoi atUfbinc

I

I

la t t McM thoy tub«] cotupLvb)])'.
than tiQwr liom £fp.— Euiio«-

Lfaltyof coDUauulidiHgtnosamtUü

306

ON U'AR

putsujt diflicuh in case of disaster ; bat no doBli
near (a» at Fnedtand}» for that causes dcUy and

(15) [t wnuld be pedantic to »uppo^e ibat all ibrM
advant^es are to be obtained at every poiition which it
is necessary to take up in War, AH portions arc not oi
equal impctrtaiice ; Uieir iinporl^mce iiicre;i&eä m pio-
portion to the probability of our b^Jng 3ttitck«<i in than,
It is only in the most important U^at we try to ciimbiner
ij po&sil>le, all these advantages ; in gthcrs we tiy to
30 more or \e5s.

(16} Tlieconsideiatiotis which the assailant has to^tudy
in respect to ground are prindpfllly embr^kcod in
leading poinU ; not to clioose an over di^ult country lor
the point of attack ; and next, on all occasioos to :ulvancc
through the country so that the enemy can see »s httk
possible of our movements.

[ly) I close these observations on the use of
with ;i m^ocim of the highest importance lor the defence,
and which is to be regarded as the kcy-slone of Ukt whole
theory of defence» which is : Not W expect evcrythiit^ from
the siunglh oj the grouttd, consc^iucniiy n^er Ut he cfUicM
iniii a passive äc/oict by a itrong country. For iJ the
country is in reality so strong that it is imposttblc for c
a&sailant to drive U5 out ol our position, he wiU turti
which is always possible, and theo the atronge^t coun
is useless ; we are then compelled to fi^ht iindr-j <\v\tii
different circomätanceä, in quite a different country ; and
we might as well not have included the other locality in
our combinations. But ii thu ground lis not oi audi
strength, if it is poi^ble to attack it, still the ad^-antagc«
of such a position will never oiitweigh the di^idvar^ta^
of a passive defenccn All obstacles of ground uiuftt
therefore only bo taken advantage of for a partial de£«iH
Hve, in order to otler a itUtiv&ly great reaiatance with

:y of instruction

flog

III-— STRATEGY

>. and to gain time for the oßen^vc, by which the
ivo] victory is to be gainod at other pointa.

■ This is the combiruilicin of the singles battJ» of a Wnr,
I in order to attain to the object of the campaign.

I If wf know how to fight, if we know how to conc^cr,

■ ihert a itut much more wanted ; to combine! succcöIuI
BTcsuJt« i» ca«y, because it is merely an älfiir of n well*

prectised judgment, and does not depend» like the diroc-

*tioa of % battle, on special knowledge.
All that is essential in the few principle* wl^ich there
aie, and which dppend chiefly on the constitution of
States and Armies may. therefore» be brought withio a
smaJl compass.

I

i.-^ENERAL PRINCIPLES

(I) There are three principal objects in carrying oo
Wat;

(«] To conquer and destroy the cntrmy'K armed Ecrcc.

{b) To ^ possession of tbr material clrmcntf^ of
aggre^ioB, iind of tl^ other sources of existence of the
hostile Anuy

{c) To gam public opinion,

(a) To iittun the fiist of these objects, the ;:ltief opera-
ttOD mu9t be directed against thecnofny's principal Army,
or At Icftst against a very impart.int poi-tJon of the hostile
foroe ; for it must be beaten Leiore we can toliow up the
other two objects with success.

(3) In «Tdi?r lo ndi^f the material forces, operation» are
directed against those poiuts at wliicii those resources are
chiefly concentrated : principal towns» magazines, great
fortreEäci, On the road to these, the enemy's j>rmci]^U

VOL. III. u

310

ON WAR

force, or a tnrsiderable port of his Aimy, wiU bf ta*.
coontei^d.

{4) Public opinion is ultimately gainM by
victorips, ATvl by the pc>ssessiof» ol Ihr eiir-:ny"s cit^iitiil.

(5) "T^ie lirsl and most important maxim which wc cai
ftct before U5 for the atlainmcDt of thfs« objects is: to]
en^ploy ull the forces which we can make aviiilablc with]
the utmost energy. In every modiiicatiou which muii-'
fests il^lf in these respects^ there is & i^hortcnmtng as
r»p«ct$ the i>t>j(Xt. Ev«A a the result u tuWutHy
certain in itself, it is extremely imwia* not to u*e the
utmost effcvits to make it ferjectiy certain : for these
efforts can never produce injitrious effects. Let the
country sniier ever so much by it, no disadvantage can
ariäe from tluit, Ix.'cause the pressure ol the W^ is tht^^
aooner remov'^, ^^

The moral impression produced by vigorous prepnra-
tion» is of infinite value ; every one feels certain of «uccrss :
this h the best means f>f raising the spirits of the Nation.

(6) The second principle is to conceiilrale our force as
much as is possible at the point where the decisive blows
are to be struck, to run the risk even of hdng at a di*-l
advantage nt other pdinls, in order to mak^ sure of Iho'
result It the decisive point The success at that poinl
vrtll compensate foT all defeats at secondary points.

t7] The third principle is: not to lose time. U no
special a.nd considerable ivd\'nntf»ge will arise by dday.
it is important to commence work as quickly as possible..
By rapidity, many measures of the enemy are nipped
thi bud, and public opinion i* gained in our favour.

Surprise plays a nuich greiiler part in Stralcjjy tlanl
in tactics ; it is the most powerful element of victcffy _
Alexander, Hannibal. Cisar, Custavus Adolphus. FVwte-
lick II.. Napoleon, owe the brightest ray%ol tlieir fame
to tbelr promptitude.

H

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

211

(8> Lastly, the fourllt pnuciple h : to ItjUow up tUe
success we gain with the utmcist energy.

The pursuit of the memy when defeated is the only
means of gatliering up tiie IruiU of ™tury.

(9) The first of these pcinciplcs is the fcmndation of the
three others- If we have f^Ilnwed the first principle, we
can venture any l«ngtlk with rt^pect lt> tlie otliere, withtiut
nskiiig our idl. It ^v» tlie means of continuaUy creating
new fotceä hcliind us, and with fiesh forces every dtKister
may be Tepaired.

!n ihia, and not m going forward with timid steps, lies
that pnidence which may be called wise.

(to) Small States, in the present day, cannot make any
War» of conqu^ i but ^ at the same time, for a defensive
Wax, even tlieir ni^ns are very great. Therefore I am
perfectly convinced that whoever caU* forth all hi»
powers in order to appear incef^antjy with new maaftCS.
whoever adopts every imaginable mean& of preparation,
whoever concentrate* his force at the decisive point, who*
ever thus armed pursues a gr ei.it object with resolution and
energy, has done all that can be done in a generxl way iov
the strategical conduct of the War, n.nd that unless he is
altogether unfortunate in tjuttle, he will undoubtedly be
victoriouA in llie sanie measure as his adversary lius f;iUen
f^horl of thifi cxrrtian and energy.

(ri) Due attention licing paid to thnc principles, the
form Ln which the operations are carried on is in the end
of htlle conaetpiencLv 1 «hall» liuwever, try to cxplabi, in
a fcrw words, wb^t ih mo«t important.

In tactics, we always sock to get round the enemy, that
is to »ay, that ptHlion u( his fürte aguinal wUidi unr
principal attaclc i% directed, partly bccaui» the convergent
action of the coinbatant force in more advantiifT^^JUS than
the parallel, partly because it is the only method of editing
the enemy off from hia hne of retreat.

al«

ox WAR

If this, which relates to the enemy and hh position
tactically, isucd stnit^cnlly, and applied tn thr. I'nrmy^
llie^tr» of War (lliereture al&o to luä subsistence hitei],
then t!:e sepirale colum^is, or Arroio, which should
envelop the enemy- will be in most cases *o far apart from
each olljcr tliat tbcy cannot take part in one Acd the s^mc
battle- The enemy will be in the middle, and mAv be aWe
to tiiin with the m[i££ of his ioiccs ng^in^t thise Corps
singly, and beat them in detaÜ. Frederick K.'s ona*
paigni furnish exLimples of t!iis. more especially I hose of
1737 and 1758.

Now as the battle is the prindpol aifair, the deciu^*c om^
the party acting on con%^rging Iiti^, iinliss he has a nmt
decisive superionty in numbers, will lose by battles all
the advantages which the enveloping mfl\'ement wöuld
have gained for him ; lor an operation iigamst the lines ol
communication only lakes effect very slowly, but viel
in the battle very quickly.

Thenfote, in Strategy, he who f\nd9hinmU in the m
of hi& enemies ts better oil than lös opponmt who trie» tO"
envelop him, particularly if tlic forces on each tide are
equal, and ol course still more so IE there is an inferiority
on the enveloping side,

A strategic enveloping or turning movement is no doubt
a very eüective means of cutting the enemy o9 from his^,
line of tetreat ; but as this object may also just as well b^H
attained by a iL'xclical turning movp-menl. the strategK^^
•nveloping movement is therefore ;tever axlvisable unless I
we are {physically ^ind moffllly) so superior, that wc »hall
be strong enuugli ä.t (he decisive poml, :uid yet can at tl
same time dispense with the detached corpw.

Napolcfin never rngagrd in ;iltrmpts in turn hb mi
slratt^gicaJly, although be was f<o often, indeed al
always, both physically and moraJly superior.

Frederick II onlydidit mice, in the attack un Bohi

SLTMMARV OF IHSTRUCTION

213

1757, CerUirjly by lliat lueuis üie AuaUiin!» weie
prevented from bringing on a battle until tbey got to
Pmjruc ; but whnl was the beuHit to hitn nf l\\c*. fvinq\ic*1
i>l Botiemm ^a l^ti as Prague, without u dtfciaive Ixittlc ^
The twttle of KoUtn forced hini to give it up again — a
pronE that buttles decide dl At Pra^^ir lin was obviously
in daiigt^T of t>0L[igültdckvdby thewtiuLeof iht^ Austniin
forces before the aitivaJ ol Schwerin. He would not hav«
txpoi-ni liimsrU to Ihbt dinger tt he had murrhrd thiinih'h
Saxony with aU his fort» united. The £rsl battk would
in iluit ca^ probably ha.ve Ixwn fought at Büdin on the
Egcr, and tl^at woiUd have been ^ decisive oa tlie Battle
of Prague- This concentric march into Bohemia wa«
unquesttonabty a consoquence of the Pru^ian Army
having been bi^kt-'ir up during the winter in cantonments
in Silesia and Saxony, And it is of iniportanrr to ob*crvc,
thai reasons of this kind, in most rases, mv tnoTv ioflii-
ential than tlie advantagci in the form of the disposition
itself, for the facility of oper-itions is favourable to their
rapid execution, and the Inciion intierf-nl in tho immense
machinery of a great armed force is in any ca^ ^a great
that we fthftuld never add to it except from necessity,

(la) Besides thifef the principle: just slated» of concen-
trating aa much a^ posaibk at the decisi\'e point, i& opposed
to the idea of en^-cloping strateRicaUy, nnd the order of
iMttlcfor our troop&naturaUy springs from ttiat principle
of itscH On that account I said, with reason, thai the
farm ut tlic order of buttle is ol htlh- con!u>quencp. There
iSt tiowevcr. one ca» in which the operating strategically
ft^io» the enemy's ßank leads to great results, «similar to
lho*e of a battle ; tliat is, when in a i>i)or or im|Hiveriahed
ntry the enemy, by great exertions, has fcmted large
Bim% on the preservation of which hJs oprmtion^
entirely depeud. Id sucli a cae« it may perliap^ be
■ »dvt^ble not to march with the ma» of our forces against

I

«14

ON WAR

m win

the rii'my'ä principal forcr, \mi to pcwh forward a^aimt]
his IXL&e. For this there ax«t howoi^. two conditici
requiaiie :

{a) That the enemy is ?m» f-ir Irnm his hasf. that he
be forced by this meains to make a long retreat ; and

{b) Tliat with a few troops and the htip of natural and
artifiria! obatadea wi- shnll br able to Iwruss him in %uch a
manner on the road which his principal force must tik?,
that no conquests he can make in tl«it diroctioa will
compensate for the loss oi his base.

(13) The subsistence of troof^ being a conditiofi
is indis[>ensabie in the condiicl of War^ it httA ft
inßuence on the op^nitiuns of the War, paiticukrly in Ihits
way, that it will on]y allow of the concentration of troops
to a certain degree; and cvs it must be considened in
the choice of the line of operations, tlicrefore it has aa^
influence in determining thr^ theatre of War. ^|

(14] The subsistence for troops is provided^ whenever
thc^ state of a country allows of it, at tlie cost of
country, by requi^tions.

According to the present mode of making War, Aimii
take up considerably more space than formerly.
formation of separate independent corps hns made
po5&ib]e without our being placed at a disadvantage
opposed to an enemy who h concentrated in tlie old
manner [with 70,00^ to 100,000 men) at one %|mt ; for 01
of tliese Corps, org^iinised as they now arc, caD susi
itself for some limi? against an enemy twice or three tiin<
superior in numbers ; during this time other Corp:t anrw^l
and therefore, even if this Corps is actually bcfttcu, it wü
not have fought in vain, as we have already observed
elsewhere.

Accordingly, now. single Divisions or Corps lak«
field, marching separately either in line with each ot
or in succession ome alter another, and only so fai

SUMMAKY t>F INSTRUCTION

^'5

comtectioD tbat, if Ihey bdong to the same Anny, tbey
can Inkr part in any baltl« which may occur^

This makes it i>T.icUc;ibk to subsisl an Army foff a. timet
without magaiiiK*. It i» f&cUitated by the oTgAito^on
of Ihe Corps xxscU, by it» staff and iU commis^riat
depjiUnerit.

(15) U'hen iniport;int reasons (as for instinct! the
po&ition of thr rnr-my*R prinripal Army) do not deddr
Otherwise, one should clioo»« the richest and moHt pro-
ductive provinces to operate in. for ficility of subsistence
prooiotra rapidity of movrmrnt. Thetp is untbing which
in impc>rUnce*urpiSBestIicsul)Mslence,exceptlht position
of the enemy's principal Anny. which we are seeking, the
aituatjon of titr capiLJ dty, or strong pUce which wc wi»h
10 take. All other con^denttlons, for instance, the
ädvant^gcüus foim of drawing up the armed force (ordf^r
of tattle), of which we liavc already spoken, ^e, aü a
rule, much \cm important.

<i6) In spitp o( this new method of subsisting, wc am
very far from being able lo dJ&pen&e with ^1 ma^atinc»,
and a wiae Commander, even if the resource* of the
province arc quite sufhcient, will not neglect to form
magafint^s behind Mm a^ a provision ^gixmst imforese^-n
events ^"d so a» lo 1>e able the more readily to concenlrale
tu5 strengt}] at certain points- Ttiis n one of those
measures of precautinn which arc no detriment to the
0uun object.

a<— DEFENSIVE

(I) In political language, a defensive War is one which

State carries on to maintain it» independence : in

ief^, a deientüvi? W;u i> a citui|Kiif^n in whirh wt: limit

looTselvct to contending with the enemy in a theatre of

War which has been prepared by us for the purpose.

Whether the battl« we light in t^jü theulre i>f W;ir

116

ON WAR

UC ofl^fiive or defensive rtukfA no dificrence ifl this

(a) We choose the strategic defertave cluefly when the
«aemy is superior in force. Naturally fortrcocs Aod
«ntrrnch«) tamp«, which are to br te^^irrtwl as »he chief
preparations of a lhe;itiie ol War. afford gieat L;LUv;uit:if;e«.
to which may be added knowledge of the country and the
possession oi good ranps iind siirvcy:^. With thfv
advaiit3|[e«, a smatl Anny, or an Anny wljicb h lu^
on a small Stat** and limited resources, will be more in a
condiUon to oppose the enemy than witliout tlic aid o(
such assistance-
There are besides the two following grounds upon which
we may choose the defensive form of War by preference :
Fir^l, — H the poveriy of the provinces surrounding our
theatre of War makeiä our operations extremely d;6icull
on account of the questicn of subsistence. In that ca$e
we e?cape the disadvantage, and Ihe enemy most submtl
to it- This is. lormätaiLoe, at tins moment (1812) the eise
of the Russian Army.

Secondly- — If the enemy has greater advantages for
Cfttrying on the War. Li a prepared theatre of War —
which we know, where all the surrounding ciraun»t4QCc»
are in our favour — War is mort^eaüily conducted ; there
will not be so many faults comiuitted. In this case, that
Ky when the little dependence to be placed on oilf troops
and Generals compels us to tesort to the drjrnsive, we
gladly combine the tactical defensive with the strategic,
that is, we give battle in positions prepared beforehand ; I
we do so further because Ihere is less risk oi our com-
mitting faults-

{3) In defensive War, juat as much as in the offensive«
a great object should be pursued. This can Le ni>thing
else than to annihilate the enemy's Artny, either in a
t>attiet nr by making his subsistence so difficult aa to

I

f

I
I

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION aij

pTt>düce disorganisalion and ctunpd liim to r«1reflt, by
whkh be oiusi n«cessunly suffer comsidmbJc ]o»r4»
Wdlington'5 campnign in the years 1810 nnd ißii is an

finst^nci? of tliEä.
The defensive War, therefore, docs not consist in an
indolcDt wnrting fnr events ; wc miist nnly |)unue IIib
mitiog-foT »ybtciii w[iere Iheie ie a pv^lp^ibtr and d«cUive
OlilUy in tliat ittod*^ of prowdöre. That sort ol cnlm
bdore a stnnn, whibt Uie nffcn^vr- la i^^lhefiitK up new
force for great blows, is cxtrcntdy duigerous for tlte
defender.
If dw Austrian», after Ibo battle of A&pern. had r*-
inforced thrm*-^lv« to three times the sfix-nglK ol the
H Frp-nch Kniptror, which Ihcy «wtainty might hav*? done,
then ihc timt ol rest which tiiok pi jce before the b-ittle of

IWiigram mighl havr htt^n udvantagemis to them, but
only on that oonditicn ; nn tbny did not da so. it wa» SO
much lo^t time for them^ and it would hive been wi^cr if
they had talcfrn advantage of Kaj^oleon*'^ critic^ position
^ to irAp the fniits of their success at Aspcin-
W i4) ^ottrtsf^ are jutrndcd to occupy ^n important
part of the enemy's Army in beeieging them. This period
must, llierefore. be taken advantage ol to beat the wat of
_ the Army. Onr battles should be fought behind our
■ fortresses,not m/rcwfof them. At the same time, howevtj,
we mnsi not quietly look on itt their being captured, as
Bennmy^en did diuing tlie siege ol Uaittzi^,

Il5) A great river, that is, one we cannot build a bridge
jtcruss without considerable diflimltv — rivrrR hkc? Uic
Danube below Vienna, and the Lower Rhiue — affords a
natural hnc of defence of which we can avail ourwlves,
nut by diati ibuting our force's <?quuliy alang its banks, and
»eeking to hinder the pas&igc absolutely, which is f.
danRrtoiis mo-isurc, but hy watching it, and whpn tli*
enemy pasfies, Lhon falling upon iiun Irom ail side^ jo&t «t

ztB OX WAR

the moment when he ha^ not yet got .oil his forces tuider
command, ;ind is »till hemmed in within a oarraw »pdcc
close to Ihr river, TTir hnttir nf A^prrn n nt\ in^ftnce.
At the UkttJo of WAgTani the Austrian», without ariy
n^cegaily, all^^wed the French to got possession of far too
much ^pjicp, |jy which nu";tna tlxry did 4wuy with the
disadvantages peculiarly inherent to the possag« of a
river.

{(i) Mountains ar& tlie tM^cund natural obaUdes of
ground which afford a ^ood line of defence, as we can
cither ha\T them in froni, nnd only occupy them with a
itw light troops» treat them to a certain extent as a river
which tile entimy must crosä, and as soon ha tin debouch»
witti 1Ü5 single columns, fall upon one of them with our
whole weight, or we may ourselves take po^iiion in the
raowntjiins. In the last case, we must only defend the
single passes with small dct^-chment», dud a considcrtbJe
part of the Army (a third or a half ) must remain in re«T VC,
in order lo iail in supi'rior numbers on ;iny eohimn which
force* its way Ihrough. This gieat reserve ino^l, howcvcTp
not be split up with a view to absolutely preventing all
the cohinins fram pas»ng, but we must, frfini the first»
resolve t*> make use of it to attack that column whteh we
suppose lo be the strongest, H, in thTs way, we rout a
considerable part of the enemy^s force, the otlicT colomitf
which tiave forced their way through will of theDuctvei
retire again.

Tlie formation of mountain range* in general is such
that about the centre of the masses there are plateaux Of
plains at a greater or Less elevation^ and the sides next to
the level country are intersected by deep valleys fomdiig
the entrances or avenues. The defender, therefore, has
in the mountains a district in which he can make rap:d
movements right or left, whilst tfce attacking columns arc
separated from e^^h other by sleep, inaccessible ridges.

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

219

It iaonlyamoiinlfimmus&ofthU kind thill h wHI.id^ptnl
lor a good defence. If h U rugged ^nd impaesiblo
gecerally Ihroughout, m that the Corp» on the d^rfoi^ive
must be scattered and dif^conncütpcl. tlir^n to undcrtiikc
tlw defence with the principal Anmy i» a daagcrou»
aiM8Bre, for binder such cirrumsplnnrc« all ihc advantages
arc on the side ol the a^sailaiit. who can lalJ upun imy nl
the isolated posts with far superior number«, as no pud,
no single post is so strong that it cannot soon be taken by
superior numbeis.

(7) With reg;ird to mountain warfarp» it isspeeially to
be ob(>rTvcd that Jn it d great deal depends on the aptitude
ol subordinate officers, but still more on the high spirit
whieh animattts the ranks^ Great skiJl in manaavring
i» not liere requbite, but a mtlitary spirit and a heart
in the cau-*. for every one is more or leas left to act in-
dcprndrntly ; this is why niition^U levies find their
account in mountain warfare, for while Ihey arc deficient
ill the Urn quality, they possess the other in the highest
degree.

(8) I-Mtly, in respect to the strategic defensive, it b (o
be observed that, while it ts m itwlf stronger than the
offensive, it should only be uwd to gain the first great
result, and that if this object is attained, ^nd peace does
not immediately follow upon tlut. greater results can
only be obtained by the offensive ; for whnever remain«
always on the defeciälve expoises liim&eU tu thedisadvan-
tAge of always carrying on the War at his own expense-
No State cün endure that lor more than a certain time ;
and therefor«, if it exposes itself to the blows of its
adversary without ever striking in return» it is ^Imo^t
sure in the end t» become rxhau^ted, and tie obliged
to »ubmitn We should therefore begin with the de-
rive, thai we may with the more certainty end with the

ofIenM\%.

22X>

QK WAR

r

3-— ATTACK.

(I) Tlif *(ralegic nttack pursues Ih* aim of th^ W.
(Iin-i:tly, for if is a.iirpd directly at tlic dcstnictioti nf i
cnr my'« arra^ iorce, whiht tlte strategic defence «<vks to
obtm'n thii object partly only indirectly. FTom tbb ft
«mips Ui;it (hi- principles of tlip attack arc airrady con-
tained in Ihe general principles of Stratcg>'. Only two«
sTihjcrts require special mention. ^M

(a) The first is, keeping the Amjy constantly cuonpJete
in m^n ajid arms. To the defender, tbi* k ri^nti^'f'ly
easier, iTom (hoproxjmily oj hi» resources. The assiilant,
filthoagh In most crises pcaseoed of the resourc«» of a
powerlul State, must bring hi* means more or less from >
distance, and therefore, of couise, with greater di£cidty.
That he riay not run short in means, he must mak^fttich
arrangemcnlft that the lew of reeruils and transport of
arms anticipate his wants in Lhe^e respects. Tlic rod
on his line of operations must be incessantly covered wi
rrinforcemenls and train? ol supplies moving lo tlic
front ; on those nradg, military stations must be lormed
to expedite the transport,

(3) Even in the most prosperous circumstances, and
with the greraCest mora] and physiciil superiority, the
aesaiUnt must keep in view the possibility of a fjf»t
change of fortune. For this reason, he must provide
points fin the Tine of operations suitable for rcJuge, in
event of his Anny being beatpn. Such are fort
with entrenched camps, or »imply entrenched camp«.

Large rivers afford the best means of checlring the
pursuit ol 3n enemy for a time. We should tliQ^efore
secure the passages across them with bridge bejids,
surrounded wit ha |*irdle of strong redoubts-

For the defence of these pomts, and as garrisons for
important towns and fortrcMCS, troops, in greater or Icm

rovide
iniho^

treat^H

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

fl2I

I

I

number, must be left behind. According as wc have to
af^rphcod nttickft from thtr rncmy or the hostility oi the
inhabilAiit* ui the «»uaUy. Thi-ft?, with the reinloic^
mcnts coming up, fdrei new Corps, which, in cue of
succctti, iaUttw tilt" Anny, but in cajäc of disaxtir arc
stationed ;it the points which have t>cen loitiüed to secure
the rrtrcal,

Napdeon aJways äfiuwed great loresj^'ht in Uw. prnviNian
fie made in thU m^mna' in the rear of his Army ; and in
that wuy, i;vm in his boldtst operaiiona. he incurred lesa
mks than mi^ht be imagined aI ht^i sight.

IV^-ON THE PRACTICE IN WAR OF THE
PRINCIPLES NOW l^IU UÜWN

(i) Tiie principl«^ «f tlie Art of War are in themselves
very vmpic, and Are quite within th^ e ompns« f>i sound,
common sense ; and a)lhough in 1;icfic^ tliey re^t ra.ther
moie Ihan in Strategy upon special knowledge, still even
thi* knowledge is so limited that it can hardly be com-
pared with any other science, either in diversity or extent.
Lemming and profound science are, th^rrefore. ncl at aU
requisite, nor are e%'cn great powers of underslanding^
]f any special Faculty ol lUi; under^t binding, besides a
practi^d judgn^cnl, is required, it i*i clenr from nil that
precedes that it is a talent for iirtifice or stratitgem. The
exact contrary has been lung m^iniained, but merely from
a mispbcet) feelinp» of ;iwr regarding the subject, and
from the vanity of authors who have written on the
tabject- An in^purtia) consideration must convince us of
thts: but pxprrience (rnds to impn.-« upon us t!iis
CDDVidion still more fon:ibly. In thf Ulf Revolutionary
War, many men have made themselves conspicuous q5
ckilfnl Generals, often as GL-nerals of the first order,
H without bivin^ had the benefit of any mihtaiy education.

£>a

ON WAR

Afi rr^n!£ Cond6, Watlensloin, Suwarrow,* and man]
others it is at least a very doubtful point whether these
had c^njoyed any cither.

Thill Ihe conduct ilsell o( War is vtry difficult b
matter of no doubt : but the difficulty is not that special
Irnming, or great genius, is required to comprehend |]
true principles uf cujiductmg War ; that cin ht doiie h]
any well-organi^d Iwad, with a mind free from prejudice,
and not iLhogcfhL-r ignomnt of Xhc sahy^t. Even ll
application of these principles on a map, and on papccj
prMcnts na difficulty : and cvon a good plan of operatioi
is still no great masterpiece. Tlie grcdt difficulty i» Av'
adhere sUad/astly in execuii\^ to the principi4S which wf
havf adopted.

The object of this concluding observation, i» to
ftttcntion on this diflicuify, and to give your Roi
Highnes» n lucid nnd distinct id^ of it, for T look upou
that as being the most iuiportsnt point wtiich I can atui
by this paper.

The whole conduct of War is hke the .action of a com«
plicated nuchine, with an inimense amount of frictiOD
so ihat combinalions which are easily mmle on paper
only be carried mto execution by very great exertion.

Thctrfofc the free will, the mind of the Ccricral, tindi
itnU impeded in its action at every instanl, and it requiri»
a peculiar stiength of mind and under*Mnding toovei
thiR rnitütancp By thi^ friclinn tniiny :i go(»d idea is lost,
and wc are obliged to [ay down a plain, simple schem«,
when by a somewhat more complicated one great*
lesulls might be attained.

To enumerate the causes of this friction in full is perl
not possible, but the (r»Ilowing are the grcattst :

* CLfeuu<vritj might littvt i^üfU Cromwell, wtig ccnnioly luul lutJ na

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

^%

(i) \\> Alu-ays know ntoch lea> of the nctunl condition
l-and of the designs of the cn^^my than wc äss^ume on
supposition in forming our pJans ; innumerable doubts
Ti^e up a1 Ün^ mcimi^nt nl the execution of a reaoluLioci,
doubt« caused by the dangers to which we see we urt
expDfwd, if it should prove that wc havt? been much
deceived in the conjectures we liave formed, Tlut
f L^el ng of anxiety wtiich so easily acixes men in güoeral in

Ithr? execution of greut deKign:i then overpowers us, und
from thi« «tat? of anxiety to a itate of inesolation. from
Ük&l to half meflsures, is a ?hort step net pptceplible,
(i) Not only are we unc^Unn as to the strength of th(9
enemy, but rumour (all intelligence which we receive
K through outposts, spies, or by accident] incnaMfi bis
numbers. TTie great masses of the people arc timid by
nature, und th^^reby danger is mvjiiuibly exiigger^ted.
B All the inlluenc^ brougltt to bear on the Gmeral, thete^
fcfCi tend to give him a false impression of the strength of
tlic enemy before him ; yntl h^^rein lies u new source of
irrcftolntion.

■ Wc cannot imagine the full extent of ihi? uncertainty
I and it is, therefor«, important to prepare for it beforehand.
I I! we have quietly I'rilected on everything beforehand,

■ if we havp imp-iriinlly con-iidorcd, if wp have «ought ftw
and if wc have mfidc upour minds on the probi^bitilies
of the CMC, we should not be ready \o give up at once
thr lint Dinniun, Init tarefuIJy criticise reports us they
come in, compare «%'cral with each other, «end <^ut for
fufther information, Ac. Very often, by IhJs means,
false Intelligence is detected on the spot ; often (he first
infomution is confirmed ; in both cases, therefore, we
attain tocrrtaintyn und can foun :i resdlutioii occutUnigly.
U we cannot obtain thi« certainty, then we niu»t say to
oorselves that in War nftthin^ enn be cnmcd out without
a risk ; llmt the nature of W^c i>evei allows us thorou^iiy

flS4

\y\n

to 6ett at lU tiin^, wbidi way we u% goictg ; tlmt the
probflblf will ^llII ulwuys rrmain the probahJr^ rvr-n if It
dncA not strike^ upon our senses at once ; and that it Vft
have made Judicious Arrangcmcnls generally, vet »hoU aci
be frmjplridy iviuied al onue, even U llieru is anc error,

(3) The uncertainty jb to the existing state of things iX
any given miTinrnt npjiJitä to mir own Army <ls wtU as
thf enemy's. Our own Army can &(*ldoai be kept io
concentrated thai we can at any moment dearly com-
mand R \irv^ "f -ill piirls. Now, H we arr dii^pciutd to br
anxiou», tlien new doubts will thus arise, VVc sfiaU Wisk
to wnit and sec, and a delay in llie action ui the; whole i»
the inevitable consequence.

We must, ihcreforr, feol so much ronfidence in the
trnuigemcnts wo have m^de as to believe that they will
meet our expeclationfi. To this belongs in a special
mannei' Ä reliance on the subordinate Generals; we must,
thcrdure, make it a ml« to seJect officers upon whom we
can rely, making evt-ry otti«r considenuon give way to
thai. U we have made the disposition* which are
suitable, if we have provided for contingent mishaps, and
so arranged (hat in case such shouJd occur during the
execution of our measures we shtill not be completely
niinc^, then we must step boldly lorw^ud through llie^j
night ol uncertainty. ^H

(4) When we want to carry on a War which causes a ^^
great stiEiin upon our powers, then subordinate Geneials
and even the troof»* (il Ihey arenot used lo War)i*il|i^Hc-n
find obstadf^ whidi they represent as uisuperabJe. Thpy
will find Ihe march too Itmgn the fatigue too great, the
stibtistcnce impractieable. If we *ihould listi^n to all the^e
dificidti^s^ as Fiedr^rick U. Ciilled them, we should vion
tuve to succumb to them, and remain power1c<4 and
inactive instead nf .TCting with form and t^nrrgy.

To witlisUnd ail Xti\%, a degree ol conädence La ouf o«

SUMMARY OF INSTRUCTION

ity and convictions is re<iiiitit«, whrch commonly
looks like obstinacy at tlir momrni, but which is that

■pcwer ol the uiidcr^tanduig aad clufact«r which wf call
fimmeis.

l5) None- nf Uitr «f[cH:t« upon wtiicli wc c^tlculntir in War
Acome to p3«S so exactly a» say one would imagine who bai
■not wa(ch«d War attentively and been accustomed to it
Bin rrsility.

Wc oft«n make a niislalce of several hours »s to the
mftTCh ol a column, nrd yet wc arc unaWc to tell whore to
fix Um caiusi- uf the deby ; otist3x:ies often present ttiem«
Itlvei which could not be cal*:ulated upon beforehand ;
■often wc expect to arrive At a certain point with .in Army,
and find ourselves obliged to lidll some mil*s short of it \
often J poit wUieh wl» lüive established Tenders much lew
«crvicc than we e-xpectml ; one of the enemy's, on the
itltry, much more ; often the resources of a province
not amount to a& much as we ;tnticipated» &c.

such obslniction c^n only lie got over by K^^t
i, which the Genm) can only succeed in getting by
strictvie^ bordering on äG%'erity. Only by such means,
only when he is ceitxiin tJut the utmost po^ible will be
done, CAQ he fee! secure that thc«e little imprdimenU will
not exfjcisc a great influence on his operations, that he
wiU not fall short of the object which he proposed to
attatii-
,(6) We may feel certain that an Army is never in the
lifion in which n person following its operfltions in a
room supposefl it to be. li he is in favour of the Army,
■ he will ii^re it to himw^lf as bein^ from a third to a half
" ntronget ;ind ht^tt'^t Ihnn it rrally i.<, It in nn.tiitnl enough
that the Commaudex should fmd hmiself in the same case
In relation to the first plan of his operations» that he shovild
afteiward» vt^t ita Aimy nirlt aw.iy in u manner he never
Anticipated, his artilltf y and cavdry become unserviceable

VOL. uu V

i36

ON WAR

&c. Thus, whatnppTAredto thcoteErv^^^flnd tbf Gf'ni
But pcatÄhh audi easy at tlie openiiig ol Ihe caiDpalgn. wi
often prove difficuU or tmpos&ible in the execution. N*
\i thr Commetidcr is j. mun who, impdlnd by a lofti
lUiibition» still follows hb object with boldnc^
energetic win, then he will attain it, whUft an ordii»
miin will think liimselE fuUy ji^stifi«! in ulmndonini; il
lining to the condition of his Army,

MaMrra showed Jn Genoa and in Portugal, the po««t
whicb a General lia& uver his troops llirouKh the strenÄlh
of hi* will : in the one cnse by th<^ force, wl^ might *ay the
severity, of his chariicter, ht drove the mem to exUa-
ordinary exertions, which were crowned wjtJi success;
in Ihe other, in Porlti^l, he \\^\d out, at least, much longer
than any one el^e would have donc-

In most cases, the enemy's Army finds itselt in a shnilar
condition ; think of WaUensteln and Gustavus Adolphtifl
nt Nurembrrti» of Napnieon and Benningsen after the
bFittlt; of Eylau. The stale nf the enemy we do not sec»
our own is before our eyes \ therefore the latter inaJcea
a much greater impression than the former, because in
ordinary mortals sgnsumn impressions are more powerful
than the language cf the understanding.

(7) The snbsL&tencc o( the troops m whatever way It
may be majiaged (whether by magazines or requisitions),
presents such difficulties that it must -ilways have a very
decisive voice in the choice of measures, It is oftcit
opposed to the most effeciuflJ combination, and an Army
i6 scjTielimes compelled tu go m quest ol its subsistence
when it might be on tlie way to victoryi to bvUtiant
suceesses. TTircugh this, chiefly, the whole machine
acquires that unwieMineas by whicb the effects reallisod
fall far short of the flight of great plans.

A General who, with it tyrannicol powcVj demands from
his troops the utmost cffoTts, the most extreme hardships ;

I

SITMMARY OF INSTRUCTION S37

3tn Army aocuMomnl tn th«u? KnrriAcH throiigh Wars of
loDfl; durjttion — what ädvanUges will they uot have over
f^dltir opponents how much more rapidly will Uify pursoe
their object m apitc nf nil (ibsl;idr% ! With rqnnllv good
plan», how different will be Ihc result 1

(Ä) <;rTi'>rAlly, and in all the foregoing cases, wü can-
not keep our eyes too intently (ix«l an Ihp fuDciwing
tmlh:

The sensuous itnpressicna whirli romr before US in the
OOOTH of executioa are more vivid tluin those obtained
previously fhrough maiure r^fteriion. They are. however,
only hnt appraraDcef oi thing«, and that, as wc know,
sddom corrcspondi exactly with reality. We arc. there-
lore, in danyt-r of sacrificing our mature reflection to first
appearances-

That this first appearajicp, as a m!e, produces fear and
ever caution is owing to the natiitäl tiniidity of maD, who
takes only a partial view of everything^

Against this we must, theretore, arm ourselve», and
place a iirni rrljance on the re&tilts oE our own past rtuiiure
refisctions, in order to fortify ourselves by thai means
against the weakening impre^ona ol the momcnl.

r

Id this <lifliciilty of execution a great deal depends on
the certainty and &nnnc»4 of cur own convictions; on
Ih-nt account, Ihi^ri^forr, the study o( military history 19
important, becjiuse by it we learn the thin^ itself, we see
the development of event» themselves^ The principles

hieb we have learnt by ttiearntical uislruclion are
suited to facilitate the study of and direct our

ention to the points of greatest importance in miUtnry
history.

Your Roya) Highness must therefore make yourself
acquainted with these principles, with n view to proving

«18

ON WAR

th«n by the study of tniJiUry history, and «eeJnic wbne
they coincide with tbe coune of actual evcnU, And
when they arc modified or overthrown hy the same.

But besides this^ the »tudy of imHUry htttcvr>' in lln?
oaJy means of sappl^'ijig the place ot victual cxpff^hencc, by
Siving a clear idea o( thai whicli we have termed the
friction oi the wJiolc machine.

To this end we must not confine oursd^Ts to tht
leadiDg events, much less keep to the reasoning of his-
torian», hut tttudy detaiJs us much as is poa^ibk. Foe
historians rarely make perfect 5delity of reprei^ntation
their object : m geneTal, they desire to embellish the
deeds ot their Army, or to prove a eonsoii&ncc between
actual events and some imaginary rules. They invent
history, instead of writing it- Much reading of Imtory ii
not required for the above object. The knr»w!rd^c of t
few separate battles, in their details, is more useful than a
general knowledge of several campaigns. On this tcccnuit
it is more advantageous to read particular nairativcs aud
journals tlian regulur works of biätory. The ;iccoiint ol
the defence of Meuin, la the year 1794. in the merooiis od
General Schämhorst, is a pattern of tbb kind of narration
which cannot be surpassed. This narrative, especially
the account of the sortie and the mode in which the^
garrison cut their way through the enemy, will servj^
your Royal Highness as a critenon for the style ia
which military history should be written-

No battle m the wurld has more Iharougbly cunvince^^
mc that in War we should not despair of succes« up to th^l
iMt moment, and that the effects ot good principles, which
Can never manifest themselves in such a reg-oUi
as we suppose, will unexpectedly make their ap
even in the most desperate cases» when we beü
such influences are completely lost.

SXMMARY OF INSTRUCTION 23^

Some g;reat sentiment must stimulate great abilities in
the General, either ambition, as in Oesar, hatred of the
enemy, as in Hannibal» the pride of falling gloriously, as
in Frederick the Great.

Open your heart to a feeling of this kind. Be bold and
astute in your designs, firm and perseveiing in executing
them, determined to find a glorious end, and destiny will
press on your youthful brow a radiant crown — fit emblem
of a Prince, the rays of which will carry your image into
the bosom of your latest descendants.

ON THE ORGANIC DIVISION OF
ARMED FORCES*

TiiAT the grounds which dcl^miinc the division ^üd
fitrieiigth of the different p^ts ai an Army, and which
have their root in elementary tactic*, arc not very disiänd,
ai;d allow of much that is arbitrary, we must suppoä«, ifj
we look a1 the various mode« of formation which actually«
exist i but no great reflection is it-quin-ü to conviiu» as
thai these grounds cannot detennme the uaattCT more
exttclly. What is usually adduced in relation lo the
subject, as, iot instance, if a cavaJry oßicer tries to prove^
that a cavalry raiment can never be tgo strong, te^tiu
othentfise it is not in a condition to do anything, deserves no
»erious notice. This is the state ol things as regards til«
small divisions with which dement a ry tactics is concerned
— lliat is, Companies, Squadrons, Battalions, and Regt-
menl^ ; but it ia much worse still with the larger divisioof
which arc beyond elementary tactics, and where th« j
question depends on higher tactics or the theory of the^^
dispositions for a battle in conjunction with Strategy. Wc ^^
sh.tLI now take up tJie subject oi tht^L^ greater divisions —
Brigades, Divisions, Corps, and Amiics,

Let us fiist consider for a moment the rrtuonable
grounds (the philoscjphy) cf the thing. Why are the
masses, as 3 universal riile, divided into parts ? Plainly
because one person can only exercise dn-ccl cu^ninan
over a Limited number, The General cannot take 50,00
* Toinrvcuiui tlqddBtiiinDf chap, v-of BueLV.

I

I

^^ ORGANIC DU'ISION OF ARMED FORCES 231

I siA^iitii and piAcc CAcb man upon » psirlütalar «pot and
kc^p him there, and order him to do thi» and not to do
that, which, if &uch n thing wa^ conceivable, would plainly
be the best thing Ihtit ctiuld be done ; lor 001»- at tlie
countless subordin-it« Commanders ever intemiüc« fat
Jeast it would be an anomaly if hr did)» but riirh more or
l, less dtJiuQish^ä Iht ioKv vi the u£i^m;jl urdei. ;tnd t^ke:^
I froTn the first idea something of its originell precision^
Besides this, if there arc a ntimbrr of subordinate
divisions, the ordi-r lak^s con&iderjbly more lime lu reacti
its destination. From this it follow* thnt the divbion^
and subdivisions, by reason of which orders nui&t pass
tbroQ^h many hand« in succession, constitute a ntcfSiary
tvii. Here ends OUT philosophy, and we enter upon tactics
and Strategy.

A ma« entirely isolated which 1» oppoted to the enemy
as an independent whole, whether great or small, has
three parts which are essential, and without which &uch
a body can hardty l>c imagined, that is to a-iy, one part
which i( throws out in advance, one which in case ot
unfore&een events it places In rear, and the main
body between these two parts-

a.

TTicnrfore, if the divi^on of (he greater whole ia made
with a view to independence, it must never have lejs than
three parts II the permanent Division is to be in accord-
ance with tliivt constant requirement of independence
which mutt naturally be an object. But it is ea»y to
observe that even these three parts do not constitute quite
a natuiul arraugeraeDt ; for no one would willingly make
hik advance and rear gnard^ e:ich of the same aTrength
with the centre or m^sin body. ThrreCurr, it would be

^9 ON WAR

more naf jffLl to ronccivp iho centre m oonsisliiif of \i

le-^M two paits, cunseqiiently. to inok» a d)vi«iOQ Of Ihl]

whole into four parts in this o^dc^ :

n.

b.

Butcip'efthereit LSplajDwetuveaot yet got to theme

namrnl point. For, notwithstanding (be depth which rt
is usual iu?w to give an order cE buttUf, 4U diitnbution«
of force^H cither t^iclic^ or strategic, invambly :ha^
the linear form ; canscqufmtly, there arises of itseU tht
want of a right wiog, o( a left wing, and of a. centre.
five may ih^Teiota now bo looked upon üi tlw? oat]
number oi djviaions in ttiis form :

b,

a.

This formation now allows of onej or m case of
necessity, of two parts ot the principal maa« being det
right or left. Whoever, like myself, is n friend of stns
reserves, will perhaps find the part in rear (reserve)
wtak in relation to the whole, and» iherefoiv» will a
on thai account, another part, in order to havt oc
tliird in reserve. Then the whole will l« organiicd
under:

too]

t>.

n.

d.

c.

f.

If the foir^ wft have to organise is very larp^, a
siderable Anny, Ihen Strategy has to remark that
an Army almost always finds it nece^ary to detach
pnrf4 to the right and left ; Ihsl, thrrrfuTt*, on th»
account with such a force, two more parts

ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMED FORCES 333
^nrrally be a^cd ; wc then get the following »Iratc^c

a,
b. c. d< 0. f.-

Tr<tm this w^ ^educ« a» t re^ulf. that a whole mt» of
trooj}^ should nev» b« divided iniu ]fs^ thoii three c»r
more Iban eight pons. But still in this ll;ere Appears very
MiJc that U deAnUe, for what a mimber of differfnt com-
bmalion» may bt^ made- if we relied that we might divide
an Arroy into 3 x 3 x 3. if we shcrtjld base Corps, Divisions,
ajid Bngades upon Uiatnamber, which would giv« twenty-
seven Brigades, or into any other possible product of Üi^
given factors.

But the» are still same important points femaining for
consideration.

Wc have not entered upon the strength cif BattalJoiu
Regiments, lea\ uig that for ekrneutary tactics ; from
lT has just been said, It only toilows that we should
te the Brigades consist ol not le^than thii.-e Battalionit.
Upon this we certainly ins^t, and shall probably not
encounter any opposition : but it is more di^cult to
hmit the gretUfit strength which the Brigadt' should
have. A3 a rule a Brigade is considered to be such a body
»& can and must be guided by one man directly — that iu to
say, through the instrumentahty of his voice. II we
adhem ta that, then it should not exceed a strength of 4000
or 5000 tnen ; and, consequently, will consist of Nix or
figlit Battalions, according tc the strength of the battalion.
But hrie we mn.it bring in iinuther subject, which formf
a new clement m the inquiry. This etemunt is tht^
combination of the different ami». That this combination
should begin in u twdy of troops lowi^t down the st^ps
than a whole Aimy i* a point ^n wluch there is but one

K4

ON AVAR

r iwo

opjnio«) throughout Europe, But some would
commenc^c? with it in Cnrps^ that n, ma^es of :m>jQ0O
30.000 mtn. OtUcrswouJd have it in Lhviswms — that
masses of from 8000 to 12,000 mra. We shall not enl
into thia cunlrovrray at prr?scnt. but confine ourselves
this, which will hardly be disputed, that the indepeodt
of any body o( troop* is chiefly cooatitmed by the coi
bination vi tlie tliree arm^. nntl thnt, therefore, at
events for Divisions which arc dc6tjned to ^ud tbem^h
frequrntly isolated in War. this combination 15
desirable.

Further, we have not only to take into oonsidenil
the combination of all throe arms, but also that of two
of them, namely, ailillerj- and infantry. This
binaCiun, according to the generally prevailing custo]
takes pkce very much sooner, although ah ilkr^'Rient -
excited by the example of cavalrymen, show no alight
inclination to form again a little Army of their own. Thej^f
havCf however, aa yet been obliged to conteni lliemselves
with bt^ing divided amongst the Brigades, Through tUli
combination, therefore, of arlillery with infantry, the idea
of a Bngade takes 11 »ouiewh;it diflereut lorm, and tb^H
only question to be considered is, what should be the
mmimum size of a body of infantry to which, as a rule,
a portion of artillery must always be atladiod in a
permanent manner ? ^|

This question is more readOy answered than one woulrf^
at first sight suppose, for the number of gun^ wMch, 'or^-
every looo men, we can lake into tlie held, seldom dependä|
on our will, it is settled by a variety of other, partly very
remote, causes; then, again, the number of guns which
are united in a battery re^tä upon much more aubäUntiol
tactical groimd^ than any other similar organisation;
thus it is that wcdi> not aäk,Huwmany^ms shall thismasA
of mfanlry (for instance, a Brigade) have } bul, What iiia$#

ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMED FORCES 335

of mf;intTy is tu he jninnd Ifi a hnlfrry of artiU^ry } U Vfr.
bave, for example, ihtec guufl per 1000 men wilb the
Anny, and Ihen de<Jun one tor the reserve, there r«naiii
two to distribvitp amDrtppt thr nsl ol the troopri, which
allowifi a mass of 4000 inf^intry for a battery of eight gun«.
As this Is the ordinary proportion, it i* evident that, with
our caJculation, wr tumt? ne;»rly to whut has bci^ found
to ansv^er best In practice. After this, we shall add no
more in regard to the siif of a Bhgad'^ than that it Miould
consist accordingly of from thrive to five thuasand men.

Although the licid of division h limited on one «ide in
this way» and on the other it wa^ already hmiled by tlie
strength of the Army as 3t given quantity» a great number
of combination« «till alway» remain po^ible, And we
canoot let Ihem be disposed of at once by a rigorous
«fq^lc&tion of the principle of the least possible number
of fttfls ; we have atill to lake into consideration *ome
points of a general nature nnd wo must also allow «pocial
consideration; in particular caaes to have their right4>

First we must observe thai great b[>d!f* mutt be »iplil
into more parts than smaller oum, iu oidrT to he m^dc
sufficiently handy (as already noticed), and that small
bodies with too many stibdivi'^Lons or branches are not
easy to Ion die.

If an Army is forme<5 into two principal Corps, each of
whicli has its own spt^cial Commander,* tliat is ua much
aa to neutralise the Command -in -Chief- Every one who
ha» military experience will nTid<"Rtand this without any
further elucidation. It is not much better if the Anny i*
divided into three parts, for in such a case there can be no

■ Tbfl CAmmanil b Flu tru* hur at ilivinlon- If « Fidd-MvihAl
Cccunuiib roo^DOO tncrij ol vrliicb (ü.qüu nn under lUc ladett uf %
Üvnn-al ipedally 4nt«nuaij. whilit the Field Tufvihiu in ptnon Qon-
ÜDcth irtf olbfT ^MJii. totmvl JD nve Dlvlilou« « gM« vhicfi otivn
hinpffin. Ill* wlibJa U ni>t III Ewaiiiy dlvlJtU Id tvro put», but inio vx.
Only tbfti «nr of tbrui m hw liitiah u ttu^« u tli« olhvn.

«36

ON M'AR

€xptidUiou5 mov^'iuenU, uo suitable di^poftiljom lor x
batU«. without äo inwssant breaking up of ihcst thf«
princi]Ki! Corps, by whiih their Cammumlt^n» aiu vtry
soon put out oi temper.

The greater (he number o£ pari» the greater bccmnci
tite pi^wei: ol the Conmi ander -m-Chiiff aud Ujc aiotility of
the whole inass, There is, therefore, a reason tot going u
far OS possible in thiä directiün. As there arc mam numu
of putting 01 der^ la a train for execution at a headquarten
like that of the Commander of an Army than with tbe
limited &i^ü of n Cttipa or Divisbn. therefore, on gfinerttl
grounds, it is best to divide an Army into not Ic» than
ctgbt parts. If oUicr circumstances require it, thjs number
of part» may bt iucreased to nine or ten. It there are more
üitai ten parts, a difHcuhy arises tn transmitting orders
with the necessary rapidity and exactitude, for we must
not forget that it is not the mere question of th« order,
etat* an Army might have as many Divisioas aä tbei« arc
heads in a company, but that with orders, many diicctiona
and inquiries are connected wtiich it is easier to arrange
for sijf or eight Divisions than for twelve or fifteen.
^Again, a Division ii it is small as regards absolute
atreogth in numbers, one which therefore may be supposed
to Uiim part of a Corps, can always mak<i shill wiÜi lewtt
parts than we have given^as the normat number ; ijoitc
easily with four, in case of urgency with three. S\x uid
eight would be inconvenient, because its means an aot
sufhcient to transmit ordeis rapidly enough to %o OMsy
parts.

This revision of our proper normal number gives us a
result that an Army should have at least five parts, and
not more than ten ; that ttie Division should not Uav«
above five, and may be reduced to four. Betwre;i the
two now lies the Cor^, and both the question of
strengtli and the general question whether it should exiM

«

I

ORGANIC DIVISION OF ARMED FORCES 137
%i til, d«pfad on the adjuslment of the other two com-

Two tumdrccl thousand men in ten Divisions, and tlM
Dlvidon spUt into five Brigades, f^ive« the Brigade &
fitrenglh of 4000 men. lu &udi a force we could, ther^
fore, do very weU vritb Divisions only.

We rniild ccrtflinly divide this forr^ intf^ fivf Corps, the
Corps into lour Divisions, ."uid the Division mtu lour
Bri^des, then each Brigade would be 2500 men «trong-

To mc, the first arrangement appears the best ; far, in
the first pUce, it has one strp less in the giadatioD of rank»,
therefore orders arc transmitted tjujcker, &c. Secondly,
Ave branches äi4^ too fcw for an Army* it isn^t suifidenlly
pliable with that nuniber ; the same applies to a. Corps
divided inlo four Divisions, and 2500 men form a weak
Brigade, ol which Ihere -ire in this scheme eighty, instead
of which the other organisation makes only fifty, and is
therefore iimpler. These advantages are sacrificed for
the &ake of having only to give orders direct to five
Ccncrals instead of ten.

So tar general considerations extend, but the poinU
which require to be delermined in particul^ crises arc ol
infinite importance.

Ten Divisions may be eji^ily commanded in a level
country ; In widely extended mcuntAin position» th«
thing may he perfectly impossible..

A ^reat river which divide« .^a Army Gr«at«« a MOtuitty
for the appointment of a separate Commander on on9 ^de,
(itiieiiil rules are powerleas LlKain^t tJie force of drrum»
stances in all snch p.irticular cases ; however, it is to b«
Tcmarkcd that whm such spreial circnmslfloee* make
their appearance, those disadvantages, which a raulti-
pUciiy oi Divüions othcrA'isc produces, generally diKippenir
at the bame time. Certainly, even hru^e ubiisr^ may arise,
as for instance, if « bad organi^ticn is nude to gratify tlis

fl3B ON WAR

unseasonable ambition of individuals, or, out of want of
firmness, to resist personal considerations. But, however
fat the requirements of particular cases may extend, still
experience teaches us that the system of divisioning as a
rule is dependent on general principles.

I

SKETCH OF A I*LAN FOR TACTICS,
OR THE THEORY OF THE COMBAT

{N.B.— According io Ihis difUributinn, tht^ firsi part isioba
fevised and completed)

I.^INTRODUCTION; DEFINITION OF THE DIS,
TINCTION BETWEEN THE CONCEPTIONS OF
STRATEGY AND TACTICS.

11,— GENERAL THEORY OF THE COMBAT,
{Combat — CmUonmcnU — Camps— March^i.)

(i) Nature ol the combat — ^Acti\-e dements in the
came — Hatred and lioslilily— Modi lication— Other mnml
fottes— Judgmenl and talent.

(2) More preci&e dennition ol a combat — Independent
combftt — Partial ccmbal— How the latter arise.

(j) Object oJ the cumb^t ; Victory— Degree, apicTt'
dour, und weight o( victory.

{4)Cawsesof victory» that is.of (he enemy leaving the
field.

(5) Kind"5ofcombataccordinglrtaraifi— OoÄCCombÄt —
Fire conibat.

(6) Different act» of the combat — Destructive act-»
Deci^veact,

(7) Kinds of combat» according as its motive is po&itiv«
or negative — Attack and defence,

(8) Plan of the combat — Slr^itegic oliiect of the com-
bat^Its aim^Mean» — Determination of the kind ol
com bat^Ti me —Space — Reciprocal action — Ccmduct,

J

2|0

ON WAR

Iir^^OMBAlS : DEFINITE SL'BDIVISIONS IN
THE ABSTRACT. {Formation— OrtUr of BtOiU-
EUwtnlary TacUcs.)

(i) Jnlanlry,
{a) Artillery,
(J) Cavair>.

A.— The DrrntKENT Akus.

EfI«cU produced in action by cadi
arm— The formalion and Elementaiy
tactics of each in altack and didence
based on tliose cffccL^n

B. — Tee Different Arms combined m Attack
AM) Defence.

(i) Tlicory of the combinalion of arms :

(a) Infantry and Artillery.
' (fr) InbuUry and Cavalry,

(c) Cavalry and Artillery.
(i) All three imited.

(!) rixed Divisions wliich arc iormc^ out of them:

ia) Bri^ade-s. "j

(6) Divisions. I Their nrdcr of battle, position, movt-

(c) Corps. [ menl, combat.

id) Armies. I

IV.-BATTLES IN CONNECTION WITH COUNTRY
AND GROl^ND,

A.— On the iNFtUEHCE OF GROUND AND

Combat in ccnehal.

(i) On the deffnsive.
(a) On the attack,

NB. — Our TßiUcUons w«a( hern have the ftopcr icptal
thain, on account oj practkai comiderationi. Tut Gkolnd
must b£ taken into tjiew a^ snoH as potsibU. and this eann^
be dims u^thoui vur al tmce %nws'"*fg '<^ ouruh-es tk»

SKETCH OP A PUH FOR TACTICS 241

comifat as iaiäng plate undrr onr u/ ihe twa forms, attack or
dfffiK€ ; this is tfky Mv two su^'ttU mer^c ifUo one,

&.— CcKEHAL Theory of the Defence.

C— Ditto. Drrro, Attack-

D.— Defensive Com&ats op Defikite Bodies,

(1) Of a small number of troops, ffl) Of a Brigade.
(3) Of a Division. U) Of a Cofps. (5) Of aa Anny.

£. — Offensive Combats of Definite Boui&s.

(1) Of a small number of troops, (a) Of a Bn^adc.
(3) Of a DivUi^. {4} Of a Corps. (5} Of an Army.

v.— COMBATS WITH DEFINITE OBJECTS,

A-— Defence.

(I) Measure» of security,
(tt) Guanas. (*) Patrols, (c) Supports, (i) SmuU
pa^ts. («) Chains of advanced posts, (f) Inlenn«*
diate posts, (g) Advance guards, (A) Rear gu^irds.
(i) Advance Corps. {/t) Covering the flank» on
the march. (/) Delachmvnts I0 piucure inlelli^
gence- (m) DHachments of ubser^'atjvn. (n) Recon-
naUsanccs.

(3} Covering :
(a) Ofsingfeposta. {h) Ofconvoys. (c) Of foraging
parties.

(3] Lines of posts — Diversity of objects :
(d) In mounlatns. (b) Along rivers, [c) Near mo*
rassies. {d) In woods.

<4) Battles— Diversity of objoctH-Dflltnietioil of tht
enemy^s anned fo nee— Possession of country— Mc» moni
^ftsceaduicy— Credit of anns,

(a) Defensive battle without preparation, {b) In a
prrparpd [m-iilion, (*J In an enirencbed position.

VOL. III. Q

34a ON WAR

(5) Retreats :
[a) The simple retreat (the retinng) in presence of
the enemy ; a a, before a battle ; a fr, in the conise
of the same ; a c, after a battle, (fr) Strategic
retreat, that is, several consecutive simple retreats,
in their tactical dispositions.

B.— The Attack.

(t) Divided and treated according to the objects of the
defence.

(3) According to the particular objects of theattadc:
la) Surprise, (b) Cutting through the enemy.

VI.— OF CAMPS AND CANTONMENTS.

V1I.-OF MARCHES.

GUIDE TO TACTICS, OR THE
THEORY OF THE COMBAT

L— GENERAL THEORY OF THE COMBAT

Obt'eä of the Combat

(i) What is the object of the combat ?

(a) Destruction of the enemy's airoed forces.

{b] To giün possession of some object.

{€) Merely victory for the credit of our arms.

(i) Two of thcäe objects, or uli thiee t^en to^etl^ei.

Thtory of Vidory

(3) Any of Uiese four objects con only be obtained by
a vidory-

(3) Victory is the rctircmcot of ttic cnccny irom the
ßel<l d battle,

(4) The enemy is moved lo thia :

(a) U bis loss is excessive,

(i) ;Lnd he therefore fears he will be overpowered.

(ii) or finds that the object will cost htm too
much.
\h) If the fonnation of his Army, coiiscqoently the

efhcicncy o( the whok, is lou much shaken.
(p) It he begins to get on disadvantageous ground»

and thercfoiy^ has to fear excessive loss if he

continues the combat. (In tins is tlierelore

included the loss of the position«}

ft«

WAR

{d) H the form of the order o* battle is ailcndedimUi

(<) If htf is taken by surprise in any way, or suddenly
attcLcked, and theteforr hEis not limr 1u makM
suitaUlc dispoäiüons to give hi& measures thai
proper development,

(/) If ht; pra^dves thitt his opponent islaoupa:ic
to biiu ill nuiikbers.

(g) If he perceives tbat his opponent has too great
superiority tn tnorcLl forces.

(5) In all these cases a Commander may give tip th(
combat, because he ba^ no hupe ot matters taking
ijiVoumtüe tum, and has lo jpp:el^end that bis situatioa
will become still worse than it is ^t present. ^H

(6) Eiicept upon one ol Üiese pounds 3 retreat is no^^
jufitiüable. and, therefore» cannot be the dcdäon of the
General or Commander. ^M

(7) But a retreat can be made in point ol fiCl wilhout
Ilia utll-

[a) It the troops, from want Of couru^e or of

will, give way.
{h} If a panic drives them off.

(8] Under these circumstances, tho victory m^Y
conceded lo the enemy «gainst the will of tike Coouuj
and even when the results springing from Ibe other
reklions euumerated horn a to / incLine in our favour.

(9) This case can and must often happen with smi
bodies of ttoops. Tlie shuH duration of thn wluile
often hardly leaves the Commander tiroe to form
resolution.

(lod) But with large masses, such a case can only occi
with parts of the force, not easily with the whole. Should,
however, several parts yield the victory (has easily to
the eji&my, a disadvantageous result lot the wUoJe may
GAKue in those respect« noted from a to f. and thus

GUTDE TO TACTICS

«45

I

Commander may be compciled to fCbolve upon with-
drawing from the üüd,

(lofi) With ^ large wasa, the di^dvantageous «»latirtui

specified und^f a, fr, (and i, do not exhibit Ihem&eLves to

the Commander in the aritlimetical sum of all partial

disadvant^-iges which have tAkcti place, for ttie genial

view k& never so complete, but they &how tlienieeives

where, being compressed into a narrow compa», they

ioim an impo^jag whok- This may tx? the case either

with the principal body» or an importitnt part of that

. Tlie rrsolrttifjn then is dccidod by this pre-

nant feature of the whole act^

<ii) IjuÜy, tJie Commander may be prompted to give

ap the combaU and therefore to retreat for reasons

doaot lie in the combat, btit which may b* regarded

if fbfdgn to it, such as lotdhgence, which does away

with the object, or materially alters the strategic relatione.

This would be a breaking 06 of the combat, and does cot

M belong to Um place, because it is a strategic, not a

■ lactical, act.

I (12) The giving up of the combat is, therefore, an
I acknowlcd^inrnt ol the temporary superiority of our
H^fponent, let it be either physically or morally, ttnä a
^^ielding to hii wt££. In that con^sts the first moral force
_ of victory.

(13) As we cnn only give up the combat by leavmg th«
field of battle, thcreftjrc the retirement Irom the field i»
thf sign of this acknowltdptt^t, th4 hwcting of ohi' fiag aa
it were.

(14) Bat th< Ajgn [>/ vict&ry stiU decides nothing as tu its
greatness, importance, or splendour. These three thing!
often coincide, but are by no mean^ identicals

<X5) Th^ jjrealness of a victory depends on the gTCaln€*a
of the masptfs over whicli it has been gained, as well a% on
the greatness of the trophic«. Captured guns, pri^onefi«

i

I

tbmV

p

246 ON WAR

baggage taken, killed, wounded» Moag to tbi^. Ther^
fore, over a small body of troops no great victory can be
gained,

(lb) The imporUace of the vklory depends on \t/»
importance of the object which it «ewes to u», nt
conquest of an important pitution may mnkc'- an iasägnt-
ficanl victory very important.

(17) The splendour of a victory depends on the pro-
portion which the number of trophje^ bear» to the sitreogth
of the victorious Army.

(18) There arc therefore victories of different
and of xDAny diSerent degreo. Strictly »peaking.
can be no combat without a decision, consequently
without a victory ; but the ordinary use of langua^ and
the nature of the thing require that we sbcuJd only
consider those results of combats as victories which have
been preceded by very considerable efforts.

{19) U the enemy contenU himself with doing ]ot(
sufficient to fiscertain our designs, and as soon as he has
fi>Liiid them out gives way, we cannot call that a victory *
if he does mora th»n that, it can only be done with a view
to becoming conqueror in reality, and, therefore, in thai
case, if he gives up the combat, he i:^ to te considered as
conquered,

(30) As a combat can only cease by one or other or
both of the parlies who have been in contact retiring
partially, therefore it can never I» said, pruptrly «prnk'
ing, that both parties have kept the tield. In fto far,
however, as the nature of the thing and the ordinary cse
of language lequire uB to understand by the term battle-
field the position of the principal masses of the conteoding
Armies, and because the first conspqumcr?; nf \ie1ory
only commence with the retreat of the principal tuat^n,
therefore there may be battles which remain quite in-
dedsivB,

m

GUIDE TO TACTICS

»47

Tka Comiat is the Means of $^mn^ a Victory

(si) The means to obtain victory is the combat- A*
the pouit:> Dp«a6ed in No, 4 from ^ to ^ establisli the
\-ictory, therefore also the combat is directed on those
points as its immediate objects.

(as) We muM now mak« oorselv«» acquainted with
the combat in its diilercnt phases.

What U an Jnd^mdmt Cömhai ?

(13) In reality, every combat may be separated into as
Riany single Gorab;it3 as there are combatants, Bnt iht-.
mdividual only appears as a Beparatc item when he hgbts
singly, that is, independently.

(24) From single combats ihc units ascend to fresh
units co-otdin^tely with the ascending scale of sub-
divisions of command.

(25) These units arc bound together through (he object
and the pl^n, ^till ool so closely thnt the members
do not retain a certaiu de^^e of independence. This
Always becomes greater tbe higher the rank of the
units. How this gain oE independence on tbe part
of the members takes place we shall show afterward*.

(26) Tha^ every total combat consists of a great number
of lepante combats in descending order of memtxirs
(No, 97» &c.] down to tlip loweat member acting indts
pendent lyT

(37) But a tat'il combat consists also of »epeiate
comb^its following one another in succession.

(38) AH separate combats we call partial combats, and
the whole of them a total combat : hut we connect the
conception ui a whole combat with the üuppoaed condition
oi a peruana] command, and therefore only that belongs
to tm6 rombiit which is directed by ant^ wilK (In cordon
positions the limits between tbe two can never be defined.)

t48

OH WAR

{29} \\liat bas b^ax said here on the theory of cnmbat
f elates ti> the total combat, as well as to thr partial coonb^t,

Principi^t of the Combat

(30) Every fight is aa exprcssion ol hostility, whkh
pattes iiktc> combat mstinctively.

(31) This instinct to attack and destroy the «nony it
thp real dement oJ War.

(33) Even amongst the most savage tribes, this impul&e
to hostility is not pure instinct alone : the refle^tic^
tnteltigence supen'enes, aimless instinct becomes an act
with a piiqjosc,

133) In ^his manner the feelings are made submissiva,
to the understanding.

(34) But we can never consider them as completely
eliminated, and the pure object of ipason substituted in
their place ; for if they were swallowed up in the obj«ct

of renson, they would come to life again spontaneously ^B
in the lieat of the comba^t. "

(55) As our Wars are not utterances of the hostility of
Individuals opposed to individuals« so the combat seems
to be divested of all real hostlhty, and therefore to be aB
purely reasonable action, ^

(36) Bui it IS not so by any means. Partly there is
never wanting a collective haired between the partiesi
which then manifests itself more or less effecta^"ely in tho
individual» so that from liating and warring ag:ainst a
party, he hates and wars against the individual mmt ^
well ; partly m the course of a combat itself a real («eling
of hostility is kindled more or iesa in the indivtdnah
engaged.

(37) Desire of tame, ambition, self-interest, ant
tsprii dt' corpSj along with other feelings, take the place of J
hüstilily when that does not ejtist,

(33) Therefore, the mere will of the Commander, the

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS

>49

mere prescribed obifct, is sddom or never the ^e mnitive
<Ä action in th« combaUnts ; inftU^d of that, a vKry

■ Dotfiblc poTlioQ of the emotional forces will always be in
I airtivily^

1 [39) This acti\"ity is tncreased by the circümit^tncc (4

■H| combat irnving in the rp^'on r>f dangrr, in which all

^^notiuiiAl ti>iceä have greater weight.

V (40) But even the inteUigence which guides the combat
can ncrvrx ho a power purdy of the understand inff, ^nS,
therefoie, the combat can never be a subject of pure
calculation.

{«) Because it is tlie colhsion of living physical and
moral fore««, which can oaly be estimated generally,
but never subjected to any tegular calculation.

(6) Becau^ the tmotions which come into p!j.y may
make the comSai .-i ^iihjeci of enthusiasm, and through
that a subject for higher judgment-

(41) The combat may therefore be an act of talent aod
genius, in opposition to calculating reu'^on.

(4J) Now tlie feelings and the genius which manifest
themselves in the combat must be regarded m «eparate
moral ageocies which, owing to their great diversity and
elasticjty. mcessantly break out beyond the limits cd
calai bating reason

■ (43) It is the duty of the Art of War to take accouat of

■ these forces in theory and in practice.

I (44) The more they are used to the uliuuat, the more
I vigorous ;tnd fruitful of results will be the combat.
P (45) Ail inventions of art, «ich «s arms, orRanisationi
exercise in tactics» tlie principle« of the use of tlic diflerejit

I arm^ in the combat, are restrictions on the natural instinct,
which lui* Itj be led by indirekt means to a mere efiident
use of its powers. But the emotional forces wiQ not
submit to be thus dipped, and if we go too far in trying
to make instruments of theoa , we fob them oi their impuise

aso ON WAR

and force- There must, therefore, always be given them
aorlnin rtxim tn piny l)etw(^n ilic ntJcsoE Uimryand
iU practical excciJtion, This entails the oeossity oi &
higher point of view, of great uri^dora as respects
nnd i^nt tnct of judgmertt as respects pructioc.

J

Ttrir Moda frf Fighiing — Close Cnmfttä and Hn ('*

(46) Of ^U weapons which have yet been invented
hy humon ingrmiily, thos<? which brin^ the ccimbat;uiJs
into dosc&t contact, those which are n«rv«t to the
pugili&Hc encounter, arc the most natural, and cfirre-
»pond with most instuict. The dagger .md Ihe battle^
Axe axe mote so than the lance, the javelin, or
sling.

(47) Weapons with which the enemy can be attacki
while ho IS at a distance! are more inslrunient^ I<^ the
understanding ; they allow the feelings, tlte " instinct fo^f
fighting *' properly called, to remain abno&t at rest, and
this so much the nmrc nccoriling as the range of their
effects i& greater. With a sling we can mi:tgine to ourselvei,
a certain degree of anger accomjianying the Ibrwv, tbi
is less oi this feeling in discharging a musket, and Still If
in firing a cannon shot.

(48) Although there are shades of differenco, still aS
modem weapons may be placed under one or other of twclH
great classes, that is, the cnt-nnd-thrust weapons, and
hre^rms ; the former for close comttat, Uie iatt«r
lighting at a distance,

(4g) Therefore it follows that there arc two modes
fighting— the close combat (hand-to-hand) and the combat
with fire-anns,

(50) Both liave for their object the destruction of th«,
enemy-

(51) In close combut this effect is quite certam ; io
combat with fiie-anus it is only more or less probAUo.]

ind

3

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS ^i

From this diBcrence toUows 3. very di0erent bigmücitioEi
in the two modos of fighling,

(5a) As the de&liuclion in band-to-hurii! fighting is
inevitable, the smaQcst superiority cither throufth ad-
vfLQtages or in coutnge is df^isivp, and thrr party at a
difi^dvant^e, or inlerior in courage, Uie* to estape tlw
danger by flight,

Ü3) This occurs so r^^gularly, sn commonlVi and so sf>fi!i
in ill hand-lo-band &^hU in ihhicli severaJ arc engaged.
Ihat the destructive eflects properly belonging to this kind
tti tight are very much düniniähed thereby, ^nd its
principal effect cnn^ts rather in driving the enemy ofl
Ihe field than in destroying htm.

(54) If. therdore, we look for the practical cßcct of
dose corabafn wc must place our object not in the ifo-
strvctiiin ol the enemy, but in his expulsion from the field*
The destruction becomes the means.

(55) As In tlie tiand-to-hand tight, originally, the
destruction of the enemy was the object, so in the coiTitMt
with fire-arms the primary object is to put the «nfmy to
flight, and the dfslniction is only tlie means. We fire
opon the enemy to drive him JkWAy, and to apart? nurftdve«
the close combat for which we are not prepared,

(56) But the danger caused by (he combat with fire»
annuls not quite inevitable, it i& only more or less probable:
its effect, thereiore, is not 50 great on (he senses of in-
dividuals, and only becomes ^eat through continuance
and through its whole sum, which, as it does not affect
the sen&es so much, is not such a direct impr^sion. It is
therdore not esaentially necessary that one of the two

rSUes should withdraw Irnm it. From thin it follows that
«me party is not put to flight at once, ajid ;u many cases
may not beat all.

(57) U tlws is the cuse tl»?iip a» a rule at the con-
clusion of the combat with fire-arms, the cloae combr'

853 ON WAR

nnist be re^rtcwl to in order to put tbe enemy toi
fligbt-

(58) On the othi^r hand, the drstmctive HIect Bftios la-
intensity by conlinuiince o( tbe bre combat ju:»t aa madlj
as ll loses in the dose combat by the quick decbi^n-

(59] From this it follows that insCe.-id of thr putting
the ejiemy to Right being the general object of the fire
combat, that object 15 to be looked for in Ih* direct eÄWrl
of Uw applied means, thjit i«, in :h? <lrHtruction
weakening of Xhe cnomy's forcegp

(60) If the object of the closp combat k to dripe
tntmy /rem the fitid. that ot the comb^il with ßresutia (a
destroy his armed f^rcc. th?n the former is the real instru-
ment for the decisive ürokt^, thelattor is to be regarded as
the prtfaration.

(61) In each, howevei. there is a certain amount of thft^
effect pertaining to both principles- Theclose combat
not devoid of dötnictive cfiorts. neither is the coml
with fire-arms inpfTectuft! to drive the enemy oft the field-

(63) The destructive effect of ihr close combat i& ill^-
most cases extremely insigniiicant, very often It amoi*ntl^|
to nil ; it would^ therefore» hardly be taken account of d
it did not sometimes becun^e of con^derable importanc«H
by increasing the number of prisoners, V

(63] But It is wctl to observe that these cases generally
occur after the (ire has produced considerable eÖ«ct.

(^14} Close combat in the existing rektion of arms wonU
therefore, liave Uit an insigmücaat destructive
without the assistance of flrO-

(63) The destructive force of fire-arms in comb&it may
by continu^ce be intensified to the utmost extremityi
that is, to the shaking ^nd '■xtinction of coura^^ __

(66) The consequence of that is, that by far the grealol ^
share in the destruction of the enemy's combatant power*
b due to tlie cffrct of arc-arms.

the

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GUIDE TO TACTICS

«S9

I

(67) The woakening of the CDcmy throu^fh the fire
Combat cither —

{a) Causes hU rctTUt, or

(ft) Serves as a prcfkv«tioii for the hand-to-hand
encouQter,

(68) By putting tht tntmy to flight, which is the object
ol Üir huTid-to-hnnd cmnbnt, the real victory mny he
atumed, becau&c driving (he enemy Irum the turld
ronstitutes tt victory. U th^ whole ma»s enf^aged li
small, then such a victory muy etcihrucc the whole^ and
be a dft^iaive röult,

{69) But when Xhc dose combat has only taken place
between portions oJ the whole mass of forces, 01 when
several close combats in succession make up the whole
combat, thtfn the fesuJt in a single one can only be
considered as a victory in a fiaritai cvmbal.

{70} If the contiuered division is a considerable part of
whole, then in its defeat it may cany tl^e witgle along

Ih it ; and, thus, from the victory over a part, a victory
*>ver the whok- miiy immediately follow-

(71) Even il a success in close combat docs not amount
to a victory over the mass of the enemy's force«, ^till il
always ensures tJie Eoliowing advantages:

{a) Gala of grouad,

(6) Stiaking uf moral force.

(c) Ditorder in the enemy's rank«,

(i) DcJitniction of physical forc/^,

(73] In a partial comUit, the lire combat is thereiorc to
be regarded aa a destroying act, the clo«e combat u a
deciwvc act. How tlieae points are to be reviewed in
relation to the total comb^Li wc shall consider at a future
time.

254

ON WAR

Reiati<m of the two Forms of Combat in regard to ÄU4ck
and Dfifonec

(73) Xtkc comb<it cgnasU. tuithcr, od itUck umS
defence.

t (74) ^^■■^ utliuk lb Ihe positive iitt«ntioii, tlie daksce
ihencgativr^ The firataimsat^iAfiiKg the enemy l0/fl||Al;
the lüttCT^ merely at kfieping fiosses^on-

(75) But this ketptn^ po&iai&ion \s txo mere kMing e«l,
not passive endurance ; its »ucccm depcads on a vl^gKQ»
rcäctiün. This ce^^tion is ilie desUuctiun ui tbe atladt-
ing forces. Therefore, it b only the cbj^, cot the
m^iAp which is to bt; regarded as nt^ative.

(76) Uut ää it ioiluws of itsdi th^t i£ tlie defender
nuintaius his positioo the adversary must gi\*c way,
therefore, althon^ti the defender has the negative object,
the rctreit, thut is» tlie giving way of the euemy, i5 tb«
sign o( victory also for the defender.

(77) Naturally, on account ot a like object, the clow
combat is the element vl attack.

(7^) But oä close combat contains in it»df to bttl«
of the destriictivo principle, the assailant who confififi
tiimself tc the use of it alone would hardly be coouideral
äs El combatant in most cases, and in any com would plij
a very uneqiial game,

(79) Except when small bodies only tat enga^, <s
bodies consisting CDlircly of cavalry, the do» combat con
never constitute the whole attack. The larger the mas«ei
engaged, the more artillery and infantry come into play,
the less will it sii&ce for tlw end.

ifio) The attack niust> therefore^ also include in itMU
as much of the lire combat a^ is ncce^^ary.

(fit) In this, that is« in thefu^e CEtmbat, both sidc^i ore to
be regarded aä upon an equality, so far a» respects tbe
mode oJ fighting Therefore, the greater Üw propovtloa

A

GUIDE TO TACTICS

235

I

of fighting with firf-arms as compared with close combait,
the mate the original incquiility btrtwi^n attack and
dclencc is diminished^ As r^^rd« the rctiiaiaiiig du*
advantages of the dose combat, to which the aa^aUant
laufit ultimJitdy have recourse, thuy mu-tt he CdrnpiiiuatinJ
ior by such advaotages as are inherent Id that fornix and
by superiority of numbers

(&3) The üre combat is the lutturuj element ci the
defen^ve.

(83) When a succFssful result (the Tetrent of the
ilanl) IS oUaiiied hy that icrin ui ccunbat, there lA no
iily to hüve recourse to dose combat.

{84) When that result is not obtained, and the assailant
resortstodosecombät, the defender must do the same,

(85) Generally, the d»^lence does not by any means
«xdude the close combat, if the advantages to be expected
from it appeal greater than those of tlie combat with
äre-armä.

Advantageous Coniiitions in both Forms of Combat

(86) We must now examine more cioseiy the niiture in
general of Iwth combats, in order to ascertain the points
whicli give the prepuudetance in the same,

ld7) Th( fir£ £ombat.

(«) Supt^onty in the use of aims (this depends on
tbe organuätiot) ajid the qunJity of the troops}-

{b) Soporiorily in the formation (tactical organ iantioB)
nnd Uie elementajy idctic« as eätabliähed diapoutioni.
(See Hethodiciun. p. 63, vd. t)

In a question of the employment of rcgulnrly disciplined
troope in the combat, these things do not come into
consideration» because they arc supposed to belong to the
idea of troojis. But, us a subject of tlie ttteory of the
combat in its vi^ett ftnte, they may and should be
considered.

256 ON WAR

(c> Jht zaxmtcT.

(d) The form cf the line of faottle so i^T ts tt b
ftJrcady contained in b.

((f) The ground.

(68) A% wr ate only now tiealing of iA« em^hymitaU of
diicipUntd troops, wc have nothing to do Vitli 4 and k
Ihry are only to be taken into coELaideration a* givco
quaijtitie& ,

(S9a) Superiority of numbers^ ^P

!f two unequal bodi^ of infantry or artiUery arc drawn
up opposite to each other on p;iraUel lints of tbe samr
extent, then if every shot fired is directed hkc a Ur^ $kci
ag;ün5t ^ separate individual, tlie number of hitfi wiU lie in
proportion to the number of men hring. The pfoportwa
of hits would buar ju^t the same r^latron if the nhot« were
directed againat a full target — therelotc if the mark wai
no longe^r a single man, but a battaJion, a Line. &c. Tbii
is, indeed, also the way in whicli the &hül& äred by dui-
mishers in War may for the most part be estimated. But
here the target is not full ; instead of that it is a line d
men with intervals between them. The intervals duti
as the number of men increases in a given space ;
sequenlly. the eflect of a fire combat t>«ween bodies
troops of unequal number will be a sum mud«: out o4 Hit
number of those firing, and the number of the ea«fDyW|
troops they are liring against ; that is, in other word*, tbe
superiority in number in a tire combat prodnccs no
preponderating eflect, because that which ii gafawd
through the number o( shots is lost again (hruugb
greater ntimber of the enemy's taking eöo:t.

Suppose that 50 men place thcraäelves upon the
extent of ground as 500 opposite to them, Lt^t jo
out of 50 t» supposed to stnkc the target, that is.
quadrilateral occupied by tlie enemy's battalion ; thM,
out of the enemy's 500 sbols 300 will strike Itw 91

fie of
«of"

GUIDE TO TACTICS 257

lato^l occupied by our tity men. Elut the 500 ffifta

ft'etand t«n limt^5 ah dog« ^i» the 50. thtwiore uui ballb hit

m ten times a^ roany as the enemy*«, and thiu. by our

W 50 shots, exactly as many ot Ihr rn<'Tny ^rc hit ^ ntc

bit on oufftide by his 500.*

' Altbi>ugb thi$ result do«9 not exactly correspond
with the n!;itity, and tliercr is a. small advantaL^e in
general on the side of the superior nunibeis, »till tbcr»
is no doubt that it is cäfienlially comoct ; and that
theefltcacy on cither aid«» that is, the result in acomtat
with fi.re-arms, far from keeping exact pace with the
»nUpeTiohty in aumbei:». is scarcely incieosed at äU by
that superiority.

This result is of the utmost importance, for it con^ililute»
the basis cif tti.il cconorny tit torces in the preparatory
destructive act which may be rcfarded a» one of thf
sorest means to victory.

(896) Let it not be thought that iha result may lead
to an absurdity . and thiit, for example, two men (the
smallest number who can take up the line of our supposed
P Li^et)mu4t dojust a&muchexocuüon as 3000» provided
that the two men are placed at a di&tance apart equal to
thiC £n>Qt of the 3000. 11 the 300O always firtd directly
to thdr front, that might be the case. But if the number
I ol the weaker aide is si.i small Ihat the stronger directs his
conccotrat«d fire upon individuals, then naturally there
must Icllnw a great difference in the effect, for, in such a
ca«e, our buppoäition ot ^mplt turget-firmg ts set aside.
Likewise» a very weak Ime oi fire would never oblige the
enemy toengngc in a üre-comhat : instciid (A that, Mich a
would be driven from llie field by him at once. We
, therefore, thai the foregoing result is not to bo carried
to an extremtj in appUcatiun, but yet it i> o( grf»it im-
portance lor the reasons ^ven. Hundreds of tim« a liti«
t* 5*f(h4p.iit. Book llL— Ta.
ft

^

ON WAR

of Bir. has mainlined its own against one of twice iti
strength, ard it is easy to see what constqucQCCS tnay
wsult from that in the ecmnmy of force,

(ÖQä) We may, therefore, say Uial etlher oj the
opporäig sides has it in his power to increaK or redoce
the mutual, that is, the total effect of (he fire, according U
he brings or does not bring iHore combataritä into the una
which t^ Bring,

(gn) Thß form of the line of haiiU may ha :
(a) With parallel fronts of equal lengtlt ; then it id thA
same for both sides.

{b) With parallel frcnt, but outflanlcing th« fiiraiy
then it is advantageous (but, as we may easily conceive,
the advantage is small, on account of the limited range ef^|
tire-aims). "

(r) Enveloping. This is advantageous on account of the
double effect of the shots, nnd because the greater extent
of front follows of itself from that form. ^|

Forms the reverse of h and c are obviously disadvau-^^
tflgeous,
(91) GföttfKJ is avdantageous in combat with fire-a
[a) By affording cover like a breastwork,
(fe) By intercepting the view of the enemy, thus forming
an obstacle to his taking aim»

[c) As an obstacle to approach, by which the enemy (
kept long under onr fire, and impeded in the delivery of
his own fire.

(93) Inclosecombal theadvantagesaffordedby
are the same as in fire combat.

{93) The two first subjects {a and b No, 87) do oof
mto consideration here. But we must observe
superiority in the use of weapons does not make as
a dJUcience in close combat as in the fire combat ;
on the other hand, courage plays a most decisive
The subjects touched upon under b (No, S7) are e^ieciallv

~i

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I

GUIDE TO TACTICS «59

JTRporluit for cavalry, the arm by which most dorn
combaU are ftmght. '

(94) Inclose combat numWis much mofe decisive than
[In th? combat with fire-arms, it is almost the chirf (hibg>

(95) The tt>rm of Ihc <jrder of baitU is alsü much more
dedsiv« than in the combAt with fire-anns, ard when the
front is pnralkl, a small instead of a great extent of front
b the most eld v^^n t ageous.

(96) Th^ grounä—
(d] M obstade to approach. In this consists by far its

greatest efficacy in clo^e combat.

(b) A^ameansof conctMlmerl, This favoiire a "tuipriae,
which is especially important in close combat.

Anafy$iii c[ ik^ ContötU

(97) In No. 33 w^ have seen that every combat b «
whole, composed of many m<?mbers or parts, in which the
independence of the parts is very uncqttol, inasmuch as it
dimini&he« by a descending scale. We shall now examine
this point more closely.

(98) We can easily imagine m a singk mtmbcr, such a
nnmber as can be Ted into the light by the iford of cotH-
mand ; for instance, a Battalion, a Battery, or a Regiment
<rf cavalry, if these masses are really in close order.

(99) Whi^n the Word of Command no longer suffices, a
wriUcn or verbal Order commences,

(too) Thi? Word of Command admits of no gradfition«,
in pciint o( fact it is a part o( the execYition. Bui the
Order has degrees, from the utmost distinctness^ approach-
tug to (he Word of Cermmand, domn to the utmost
ßcnerolily. It is not the eiecution ttself, but only a
commission to execute,

(ini) No one subject to the Word of Command hfls any
will ot liis own \ but, whenever instead of that Word an
Order is given, a certain indepondcDce of members begin*

ON WAR

bcc&u&e the Order is of a gent-r^ü nature, and ili« wil
of the Leader must supply any insu&iency in )1
ttrms.

(xc3) If a combat admitted o[ beiog pejf^tly pr«-
arrangod ftnd forcswn in all its coinddent and stacces&ive
parts und events, i[, that is Co äay, its plan coufd dr^sccrtd
into the minutest dct^ls, as in the con^tructioD ol ^ piece
of inammale machinery, then the Order would have oofU^
ot thiti indefinit enesä- ^M

(103) But belligerents do not cease to be men. ajvl
jndividuab can never be converted inio machines having
no wlU of their own ; and the ground en which they ^ht
will seldom or never be a complete ard hare le^-el, whidi
can exercise no mfluence on the combat. It is, tlieiofore,
quite inipo^ibl^ to calculate beforehand ^ that is to take
place.

(104) This insufficiency of plan incrca«« with
duration of th« combat, and with the nurober of
combatant?. The close combat of a small troop i* almml
completely contained m lU plan ; but the plan lor i
combat with fire-arms of even very small bodi^ can oev«
be thoroughly complete to the same degree, on account ol
its duration and Ibe incidents which »pring up^ TheD
again, the c]o^f combat of hrge mass^, as, for mstaDce.
ol a Cavalry Division of 20oo ox jooo hor^, cannot be
carried out so completely in conformity with the original
plan that ihe will of its single leadeis is not freqnimtly
obliged tc supply something. As for the plan for a ^rul
battle, evcept as regards the preliminary part, it can onl y
be a vecy general outline. ^H

(10$) As this insTifßciency of plan (dispoution) incntaK»
with the time and space whidi the combat takes, so,
therefore, as a rule, a greater margin for contiogenda
miKst be allowed to large tlian to smaller bodice ci 1ioop0,
ajid the Order will increase in its precision a» tt de^icends

I
I

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS flSt

down to tho^p parts wtiich arc govtmcd by Word
of Command.

(io6) Further, Ihe independence o* the parts will also
difler *icc*jrd[ng tu the circumstances in which Ihcy are
placed. Space, tuiie, the cliaracter of the grouod and
country, and nature of the duty will dimini^ or incrtase
ttits independence as respects one und the same sub*
division.

(107) Besides this sys-tematic division of th« mtire
combat into separate parts according tu plan, a casu^
division may dso tdke place thus :

la) By out views e^tpanding beyond the limit» of the
original plan.

(&) By an imforvseen separation of parts, which ytt
intended to have kept ui^der Word of Command.

(loS) This fresh division depends on circuimtanc^s
which cannot be foreseen.

(109) The consequence b unequal result in parts which
have t^en :ill united as one whole (because, in point

fact, they becTime placed in different relations).

(no) Thus arises, at certain parts, the necessity for a
dränge not contemplated in the general plan,

{a) That these parts may avoid disadvantages of
ground, or of numbers, or of portion.

(4) That advantages gained in all these ditl&reiit
reaped» may be turned to account.

(Ill) The consequence of this is that. in\*oluntarily,
often more or less designedly, a tire combat pais^ into
close combat, or the other way. the latter into the former.

{112) Tliu problem, then, ts to make these changes fit
into the general plan, so that—

{a) If they lead to a disadvantage» it may be remedied
in one way or anotlier.

iP) If they lead to a success it may be used as far at
posaitsle, sboK of exposing us to the risk of a reverBe.

a6« ON WAR

(113) It U, tUeiclore, the latentionäl or unioUntiöaAl
divtaion of the total combat into a grcaK^r or les» aomber
vi minür^ independtnl outnbats, which caui«H the lorm
combat to change from close combat to fire coDibat,
well as from attack to defence, during the tola] combat-
Now tlte whole still recmuiiä to be considcnxl in

relation.

The Qimto tminxtt f»/ tvto Acts — ike Destm^iw and
Decisive Act

(114) From the fire combat, with l(a destructive prin-
ciple, and from the do«e combat with its principle ol
putting to flight, according to No, 73, prac««d two diffcrcol
act» tn the partial combat, the de&tmcUv« aod th«
decisive act,

(115) The smaller the musses are, the more thcte two
acts will resolve themselves into one simple fire combat»
or one close combat.

(116) Tile greater the masses the more must these two
acts be taken tn a collective sense, in such manner that
the destructive act is made up of a number ol simultaneout
and successive fire combats; and the decisive act in U»
same manner, of sever;;l close cojnbats.

(117] Iq this manner the division of the combat not
only conlmues, but also extends itself more and more,
the greater the masses brought into coaHict ; whilst Iht
destructive act and the decisive act nrc further ajid
further separated from each other in time.

The DestrucHve Ad

H

% im* I

(118) The greater the mass of troops, the more
port»int bi^eomes the physical destructinn, lor —

(a] The influence of the Commander is so mucti the Ifss.
(His influence is greater in close combat than in fir«
coin bat.)

I
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GUIDE TO TACTICS i6s

{h) Thr moral inequality is so mTii:h les& With laxge
niasäe£» whole Aimies for iiLstauce, there i» ncthin^ but
Xht difference cd natiooalily ; whilst in smaller bodicfl
tliere is tu be added tliat vi carps and of individuals;
and, Uslly, of special accidenul drcumrtancc», which
in large bodies balanu each other.

(f) The order ol battk is &o much the deeper, tbat is,
there are so many more rescnes to renew tli* combat, a*
w<; shall sec in the srqueL TTic number of purtial combulä,
efore, üicreASes, and coiisequenlly the duration of the
'total combat, and by that moans the influence of the fo^t
moment, whicli is sü very dedäve m putting the cneaiy to
ffight, is lessmed.

(iig) FrciQ the preceding number it follows that the
greater the mass of the Army, the greater must be the
physical destruction as a prepariition for the decision,

(120) Thb preparation consists in this, that the number
oC CMDbatants diminish^ oa both sides, but the relation
alters in our Iavout.

(lai) The first of these is sufhcient, if we are already
morally or phyaicaUy superior ; the second is rcquiute, if
such is not the case.

(laa) The destruction of the enemy's combatant force
ia made up —

(0) 01 all that fire put physically hon tU ctmUnti — killed,
wounded, and prisoners.

{b) Of whntrver part is spent physically and moraUy,
(133) Alter a are combat ol several hours^ duration«
in which a body of troops has suüered severe loss, lor
instance, a quarter or onc-tltird of its number», the dAbri$
may, tor the time, be looked upon as a heap of bumt-c\it
cinders, for—

(a) The men art: phy^cally exhausted.
(6) They have spent their ammunition.
(c) Their arms want cleaning.

264 ON WAR

{4) Uany have left the tiM with ihe woiinckd, although'
not Uiein^lves wounds >

{4} The re^t think theyhavcdone their part for the day,
find if once thi^y get beyond ihr sphcrr of liongfr doog
wLilingly rHum to U-

(/) The fftllng of courage with whidi they Atari
hnd Che edge taken off, the lotiginE tar Ihe fighl is süti

(£] The original org^isation and fonxiaticn arc p^rÜ
destroyed, or thrown into disorder.

(124) The consequences, e and /, malte Ihetrappc^aran
more or lesi, according a* the comb.it has bew) succesifd
or the reverse. A body ol troops which lias gain^
gryuiid, or successJully maintained the origloa] positi
n^ign«^ t<} it, can be made further use of more easily I
one tliat has been repulsi^d.

(lasai There are two dedoctions from No. 123 whi
we muBt bnng under nolice-

The hr&l is the eamomy of /oru, which is made by the
of A smaller riimber of men in the combat with lire
than tho «nemy employs. For, if the dilapidation of
forces in the üre ccmbiit consists not only in the less of
those placed hars de combat, but further in this, thflt all
wlio have fought are lowered m their powers ; then«
naturally, this lowering of power* will be less on that side
which brings the fewest troops into action.

If 500 men • have been able to mainiaifi their
against 1000, if the losses am r-qunl cm each ittde, wy 200
men, then on the one side there will remain Soo m<n who
are fati^cd, white the other aide will have 800, of wh<
300 are fatigued, but 5J0 are fresi».

(ii5£| The second deduction is that tlie weaken:
of tbe enemy, consequently the dilapidation of iki entmy
txtmhativt fo^isT, is of much greater extent th^Q the

* Thii [sHflgi «hoüM rt&d thua- li " auf«/ a boäytyf inno m/rm^ jO*

gTOunU

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GUIDE TO TACTICS 265

Dumber of kilkd, wounded, and phsf>n«r4 u-ouM «ccm to
repTiTKcnl, Thin nuinlHrr miumnis lu. |H-"rhiip*, nnly onp-
rixth of tbc whok ; there «hotild, thrrclcrc, renmiii five-
sixths. But ont of Ihal fivp-*iK»hs, in nil probability only
tine unkmch^d reserve, and some UiTr^jv^. which, dUhmiich
they have b«n in action, hive suffered very little, are, m
rfohty, tn hr rcgardi^d -issefvicB-abk\und tho rrmalndcr
(pcrhnp» four'^txlhsjinAy be looked upon for tb«prc!Mat

(lii(j) TliiB dinunution of Ihe efficient mass is thr first
aim of th*> dpitructiw* ÄCt ; the real decision can only be
Qccoinpli^hod by smaller miisses cf troops.

(1375 But— although the absolute sic« of the uiaMes b
not an unimpohatit n^attor, us hiXy men opposed I0 hfty
can proceed to a decision on tlie spot, wlule 50,000 opposod
lo 50.000 cannot do so — still it i« the relative, «o( the abio*
J«tf<siacofthi' masses, which is an obstacle to the decision.
Thus if fiv^-sixrhs of the whole h^ve meosxired tlidr
powers in the destructive act, then both Generals, even If
they have continued on nn equality, will be much nearer
to the final resolution which Ihey have to make, and it is
only a relatively small impulse whicli is required to bnni;
on tlie deaäive act. It i« all the same whether the aixth
pnrt remaining i* a sixth of an Army of 30,000, therefore
5000 men, or one-sixth of an Army of 150,000 men» thai
Is, l,f ,000 men.

(laÖ) Tliepiincipalobieclof each side in the dwtrudivc
act i» to work out for itself a prcpondeTAncc for the decisive

(129) This superiority can be oblahied by the dvsAiiJC-
tion of the enetny** phy<iic;il force, but it may also be
ubt^iniKl by tlic titlicr caiisi^ cnunirratt'd under No, 4-

(130) There Is, therefore, in the destructive act a
endeavour to profit by ^11 the advantages whicb

t9 fur u» ciicunutanctr:! will admits

ON WAR

(131) Now the combat oi large masses is aiwa]
Into several partia] combats (No. 23) which ^rr- Tnore or
Ivsa independtfpt, unU Iherelure miiei JrtTqtieatly CDoUiD
In themsdvcs botb a <le5tructive and a decisive act« ii tl
advantages obtained from the first of these acls urc to
tiuiied tv account,

(132) TI;rough the skilful and succe^ful mixture o( t!
dixic combut, we chiefly obtuin the udvaDtügrs wliich
to be derived from ^halting the enemy's courage, erektil
disorder ia his ranks, and gaining grcund.

(133) Evein the pUysiciil deslruclion ol llie eneniy"
forces is very much increased by that means, for prisoi
can only he made in close combat.

Thus we may conceive that if aji enemy's Daltalion ii
ahukt^n by our Hre, il liur bayonet attack drives it out of an
advantageous position, and we follow hnii m hjs üigbt witl^J
a couple of Squadrons, this partial success may place
important advantages oi ail kinds in the sc^e of the
general result ; but then it is a coadition that it b« done
without involving this victorious troop in difUculty, '^'^H
if our Battalion and our Sqtiadron through this means
should ^ into the hands of superior forces of the enemyi
then this partial decision h:ia bten Ul-Iimed.

(134) Ttie utiÜMug of tljese partial su<xesses is io
hands of the subordinate Commanders, *-ind gives a great
advantage to un Aimy which lias experienced o&cers at
the head of its Divisions, Brigades, Regiments, Battalions,^
Batteries, &c.

{135) Thus each oi the two Commanders seeks to obtain'
for himself in the cour^ of the destructive act those
advantages which bring about the decision^ atid a t all
events pave the way tor it. 4H

(136) The most important of these objects are alvmys
captured guns and ground gsined.

(137J The importancti uf the latter is increased ii.

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GUIDE TO TACnCS *$

the eoemy has maiJc It an object to detent a Strang
poutiüii.

(138) Thuä tbe destnictive act on both sides, but
especially on that of the offiailant, is a cautious adviinoe
towards the object.

(139) AsnumhcfsaresoEittlcdfdsiveinthefireceiBbat
(No. 53), therelort thn iTndfUivour niituTvilIy follows lo keep
op th« combat with a» few troop« 2& pos&iblc.

<i^o) Aa the liTc combat prcdominatis b the destruc-
tive act, Iherefors Hie giejleat cconinny oi lorcr Piust be
the prevailing principle in the «mc.

^141) As numr^rical force is so «'sscntial incJosoconiktt,
therefore for th« dedsicn of partial combats in the destruc-
tive act, superior numbers miist frequently I» employed.

(142] But upon. Ute whole tlic character of tbriU must
rule here also, and. m genera), only Ihoae decisioM arc to
the purpose which Tisiliw: themselves of theniselves ^% it
were, without ^ny grcut pr^^pondcrance of numt^cr»-

(143) An inopportune endeavour to g^in the decision
leads to Iht- fultowing consequence^^ ;

(d) If it is undertaken with economy of our force», we
get involved with superior forces.

(6) II the requisite force is used, we get exhausted
before the right lime.

(144) The question whether it is opportune to try lor a
decisioii recurs very frequently during the destructive act,
]ieveTlhclr:sä, as respects the great ultimate decision. It
presents itself at thu end of the dtiätructive act.

(145) The destructive act on tliis account nattirally
strives^ at certain points to pass into the dcsnstve act,
because no advantage developed m the course of that act
will attain conipleteness except through the decisive act,
which is its necess^uy complement.

(146) The more fnutiul in results the means applied id
the destructiw act are^ or the greater the physical and

968 ^^V ON WAR

mora! superiority, the stronger will be lliis tendency of the

{147) But when the r^ukts are fttnUl or negativ«,
whrn the many has the superiority, this tendency Iflci
may btf $0 lUie und so leeble at isolate pomts that,
r^spectn the whole» it is rauch the sAme as if it did not

iLtnll.

(148) This natural tendency may lead to ill-timed
decisions in pftrtia) combats as weil as io the total combat,
but it i» very inr from bein^ itn evil »n Ihiit acr.iniiit ; it i» !
rather a necessary property of the destructive act. becaa^^
without it much would be neglected. ^^^H

(149) The judgment of the Leader at each poönt, and
of Ibe Commarder-in-Chitf in the total combat, must
determine whether an opportunity which presents itadf
is advantageous lor a decisive blow or not. tb^t is, whether
it mny not J^ad to a counter blow, and thu& to a fidfrina
result,

(150} The conduct of a combat in relation to Ibe^
prepiirufion preceding the decisive stroke, or rather tba^|
piepardtion expressly for that stroke, consists. thereCore,
in organising a fire combat« and, in a wider senae, a de-
structive act,Lind giving to it a proj>ortionate dura tic n« that
is, in only proceeding to the deci^vcfitrokewbenitappean
that the destructive act has produced sufficient efiect,

(151) The judgment on this point must be guided lettl
by the clock, that b, less by the mere relations of timOtj
than by the events which iiave taken place, by 111
evident signs of a superiority having been obtaiDcd,

(153) Now as the destructive act, if uttonded with ^ood'
results» atrwes already of itself towards the decisive ;tc1,^y
therefore the duly of the Chief consists principally iafl
determining when and where the moment arrivrs to give
the ECins to this tendency.

(153) If the tendency towards the decisive act la verr

GUIDE TO TACTICS

269

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wtak durEDg Ih^ d<«tractive act, tliat is a tol^aUy »10c
wpi that \ictory ranoot be calf^ulatcd on-

<I54) In ftuch 4 C4ae, Ujcrelufc. Ui« Cliief ^nd fab
General* will usually not give but receive the deciaiv«
shock,

{'55) If A^ t< must be given, then it takes pkce by an
expTF» ordfT, which muit be accompanied by the use
oi iiU tilt- prr^uinaJ mrjins nf inspinting thi- mrji, ulL
Üie stimulatifig inäuuice which the GenersJ hat at lus
command.

Tkn Deci$ivi Act

(156) Tlw decision is thai event which produce» in twic
ol the Oenerals a rewlütion to quit the i\e\d.

(157) The grounds for quitting the field we have ^Jven
ig No. 4. These grounds may come forth giadu^ily by
one small disaster after aiit>thtT bfing heaped up in the
Gourde of the destnidive act, and the resolution may»
therefore» be taken without a really decisive event. In
Mich a case na deciuve ^ct in particular ta^kes place.

(15S) But the tcttolutiun may jüso be piuduced by one
single, very disaflroui cveot, therefore, suddenly, when
up to thai moment everything has br'on cvtriily balanced.

(159» Then that act vi the enemy which lias called forth
thi* rrsoliiliou :* tn be regnrdrd as the decisive act.

(t6o) Tbc most coiumon ca^e is that the decision ripens
gradually in the course of the destructive act, but the
resolution td iln- viUK|iiishisi i;rt& lis final impuiMr Jrom
feouic particular event. Therefore, in this case also, the
decisive act is to be considered as having bren given.

(161) If a decisive act is given, then it must be a positive
action—

(ii) It may b- an atULck ; or

(4) It may be only ihc advance of resen'es hitherto
h€ld under cove*.

«J»

ON WAR

(i6ii) Wttli »malt bodiv3> do» combat by a unfit charge
11 Qft«!n dMJsive.

(163) When Jarger miliar« are engaged, the attack
means of close combat may alaoaufBce, but «single
will thrn hardly be sufficicnf.

(164) If the masses are stiil larger, thero is 1
mixtiirv of the fire combat, as in the case of hor^ artinery
supporting tlie charge of heavy ma&ses of cav-jJry.

(165) With great bodies composed of all armft,
dcnsion can never testilt from close combat ttlont,
renewed fire combat is necessary.

(166) But this renewed fire combat will be of the naltinj
of an attack itself« it will be carried oiit in close masses,
therefore with an action concentrated Id time and space,
as a short preparation for the real attack-

(167) When the decision is not the result of a partiml^
close combat» but of a number of simultaneous and
consecutive combats of both kinds, it then tiecomes
distinct act l^elonging to the entire combat, as has been
already said in a general way fNo, 115),

(168) In tilts act the close combat predominates-

(169) In the same measure as the close combat pre-
dominates, so will also the offensiv-e, although at certain]
points the defensive may be preserved.

(170) Towards the close of a battle the hne of retreat if'
flilvays regarded wxtb increased jealousy, therefore a threat
against that line is always then a potent means of brin^iiig
on the decision,

(171) On that account^ when circumstances pemiit,
plan of the battle will be aimed at that point from the v
first,

(172) The more the battle, or combat, develops it
in the sense of a plan cf this kind, so much the mcr^^^
seriously the eremy*s line of retreat wUI t>e nipnnctMi- ^H

(173] Another great step towards victory is breaking^

1

GUIDE TO TACTICS a?i

ithc order of formation, The regular formafinn in which
'the troops commence Ihe action snfiers con^dei^bJy in
liht toDg destmctive combats, tn which they themselves
wring out their stren^h If this wear and te-ir and i*x-
banstiou has reached a certain fxiiuti then a rapid ;idvaiice
in concentrated masses on one side against the lime of
battk; of the other may produce m dagrct- oE di«an!<T

• which forbids the latter iny longer to think of victory,
«fld calh in requisition all hh powers to place the separate
parts ot Ilia lini* in ^ely, und to restore the connection

Iol the whok in the best way he can for the moment»
(174) From what preccdra il is evident that, as In the
preparatory acts» the utmost economy of force roust
predominate» so in the decisive act, to win the mastery
through numbers must be the ruling idea.

1(175) J"*^^ ^^ *'* ^'^* pir^jaralory acts, endurance,
firmness, and coolntss are th<? first qualitjrs, so in the
decisive act, boldness and fiery spiril must predominate.

r{iyt) Usually only one oi tlie oppo^ng ConiToanders
delivers the deciding stroke, the other receives it,
(177) As long as all continues in equilibrium, he who
gives the decisive blow may be^

»(ff) The as^ilant ; or
(b) Tlie defender,
<I7*) As the assailant has the positive object Jt Inmost
natural that lie should deliver it ; and, l);erefore, this la
what occurs most frequently,

1(17*1) But if the equilibrium is much disturbed, Ibcn
the decision luay be given —
(a) By the Commander who has the advantage.
(4) By the one who is under the disadv3nt;ige-
(180) The first is plainly more natural ; and if this
Commander is also the assailant, it is still mf>re natur<d :
thi^QT«, there arc few caries in which the deci^ou does
QOt cmanate from him.

«73

«M WAR

=1

(i8i) But ii Uie defender i« the party who
ndvantagr» then it i$ also nnlural thai he should
decision, «o tlut the re^Iativi; ^ituiitiuu which is prud
by degrees bas raore induence thui the original mtea
of offensive and dcff^ntüvRp

(1S2) AVhen the decision is given by tbc uuibjil,
although h? has palpably the disadvantage^, it looks like a
last attempt to gam his original object, I( tiie dieloDdeifl
who has gained advantAges, gives bim time to do so, it
certainly consistent with the nature of the positive i
t«]itJon of the asaaiUnt to make such ^ last attempt.

(183A) A defender who, although decidedly at a
advantage, still proceeds to give the decision, does that
which is contrary to Ük nature of things, and which ma
be regarded as an act of desperation.

(183^) The result in the decisive stage is conformabli
to thr relations just developed ; so that, as a rule, it will
only be favourable to the side which gives the decmon
he is naturally led to do so by the relations in which
stands.

(184} WlicnalJ issljUir a state of equiUbnuTo the result
l§generally favourable to the side which give* ttie ddcisiou«
for at thf momont wfiPn a buttle is ripe for decision, when
the forces have worn themselves uut on ciich othcr^ the
positive principle is of much greater weight thaß at tbe
CDmmencement.

(185) The General who recdves the decision may eith
determine on ao immediate retreat in cnnHrr)itcnce . and
decline aJJ further comb^it, or he may continue th« comUxt

(186) If bcconllnues the engagement lie can onty do 90
as—

{a) A commencement of his retreat, bfecäuw he wan
time to make the requisite arrangements; or.

(t) A virtual struggle through which be »till bnpis lor
victoiy.

'n

Ld
,t
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GUIDE TO TACTICS

«73

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(167) If the General w^o acttpis tbe decisioa stands in
very favourable relations.^ he TTiay in so doing alsn ndhiTTc
lo tbe defenave.

(i8$a) But if the decision proceeds nahif ally from the
advantageous situntion of the side giving it, then the
L<MOcnLl who Oiccepu it must aJso ps^s over to a more or
lva§ active defence, thai is, he must oppose attack by
attack, purlly bec^kuse the natural advantages o£ the
defence (^osifi'^n, ofdtr, iurpriit) wear themselves out by
degrees in the cour^ of the combat, aad, at lost, there is
not enough cf them left ; partly becau^ las we have said
in No. 184) the positive principle acquires incessantly more
and more weight.

Thfir Separation « wg^ris Time

(läSA) The view here propounded, that cvctycomlMt
is composed of two separate acü, will meet with stiong
opposition at first nght.

(189) This opposition will proceed partly from a false
view of the combat, which Ims become habitual» partly
from an over-pedantic imporlAnce being a?8cvibed to the
idea of such a division.

(190) V/e iinagiue (o ounelves the opposition between
attack and defence as loo decided, the two activities as
too completely antithetical, or, lather, we assume tJie
antithesis to be where it is not to be found in practice.

(191) From this it results that we imagine the itssailant»
from the first moment tp the last, as steadily and unremit-
tingly striving to advance, and every modificBtion in timt
advance as ait entirely jovoliintaiy and compulsory one,
which proceeds diucity from the resiafanco encoeiitcrrd.

(it)Z) According to Ibis idea mtlhmg would be more
natura than that every attack «hould begin with the
energy cf an assault.

(193) S(itl even those who adhere to this kind nf idea
VOL. lll< s

»74 ON WAR

haw become accastomed to a prepäratciry act on ihc pan
of the artillery, because it was too pUm that witliuut it an
assault uould generally b«! usfl^ss.

(194) But utht^Twisc that nb^hite Irndrrcy to advance
to the ;ittack h^A been considered so Qatural lliftt «n
Attack without a shot being £red is looked upon as lbs
ideal vi perlection.

£%'cn Frederick the Great, up to the iimt o£ ttw tuttle
of Zomdorf. looked upon ttrr in the attack as McnelhiBg
exct^ptionaJ,

(ig5) Although there ha« «ince been a disposition to
modily that notion, UJU there are numbers al the preacnt
time who think that the assailant cunnot mak« hioueif
ina^tL^r of the important points in a positiwi t&o soon.

(196] Those who make tlie greate&t conce^ions to fiie^
at the same time advocate an immediate advance to the
attack, the delivery of a few volleys tiy Baltnlions close 10
tite enemy's position, and then an onset with titc bayonet,

(197I But mihtary history and a glance at the nature
of our amis show that ab^jlutcJy to deapi^ the ui«e of
in the attack is an absurdity.

(1^) A little acquaintance with the nntnre of
combat and, above alU actual experience, teach ua alaa
that a body of troops which tias been enga^d uodcr fire
is seldom fit for a vigorous assault. Therefore, the COD-
cession mentionL'd in No. 196 la worth nothing.

(199) Lastly, military hiäCoty gives instances w
number in which^ owing to a premature adv^incr, nd
tages previously gained have had to be abandoned «rilh
serious loss, Therefore, the principle mentioned in
No. 195 is also not admissible^

1300) We maintain accordingly, that the idea now
alluded to of an unmixed kind of attack, if we may UiC
Hit expreasii>n, iä entirely lulse, becaua: it only ;in«tveC5
to a very few extremely exceptional case».

GUIDE TO TACTICS tys

(201) But if a cnmmcncmcnc with cli>sr combnt and
fa decbiun without prcparatiun in a great battle are not
coosistent with the nature of thing», then of itwlf there
ahscs ä distmction Ivtween (he prt^paration by fire toi Hue
deci&ion and the d^tiswn itsel). therefore, between the two
acts which we have been discu^ng.

(202) Wc have granted that this distinction may fall to
the ground in aSairs which are quite of a minor natur«
(as. for instance» between small bodies of cavalry). The
qurstion now is whether it docs not also comr to un end

IM the masses allaiii to certain proportions; not ftfl to
whether the employment of fire might cease, for thai
would be a contntdiction Jn itself, but whether the :ih;trp
distinction between the two activities ceases» so that they
Bean no longer be considftred a^ two separate acts,
" (203) It müy perhaps be maintained that a Battalion
should fire before it charges with the bayonet ; the one
■ must precede the other^ and thus two different acts take
pUcCp but only as rcg;irds the Datt;»Iioii, not as respects
the greater subdivision of the Brigade, &c. These hnve
no fire periixi and decision period ; ttiey seek to cnnie in
H contact with the object pointed out to them ;i£ speedily as
possible, und must leave the w<iy in which it is to be done
to the B^tttalions.

l2at) Ho we not perceive that in i\m way all unity

wuuld be liret ? As one Buttalinn fifihl* quit«- close tu

f' mother, the «accesses and re\'erscs of one must have a

p-'wury inftnenrr on others, and as the effect of our

^try lire is so sm.ill llml it requires euiiMiIerable

duration to make it eflicaciou$, the inßucnce just noticed

must tie grcatrr and morf' decisive through that duration.

Even on this ground alone theie must be, fur the Brigade

as well as for the Battalion, a certain general division of

time a* re5|>pc(s the destructive ?ind the decisive combats.

(305) ^^^ another more substantial reason is that for

A

^76 OX WAR

the decisis wc axe glad to xihG ire&li troopü at l«a$t Uoop&
that liavc not bwn engaged in the destructive act ; but
these must hv tukGn from tJie resprve, and tlic rtisrrvpa, by
their naturr, arc common property, And on thjit account
Cannot be divided bcforchaod amongat the Battalloiu.

(ao6) Now, ü* the iif^cesaUy ü( ;i divijuou in 11«? comtEil
passes on from the Battalion to the Brigjide. tberefocc
from tb:tt it paäsrs on to the Divi^on, and from Ih^i
Divi^oji to still Urger bodies. ^H

(207) But a^ the parts of a whole (divisions ol the fin^
order) ;L]ways become moie independent the larger the
whole is, therefore it is true Ihc unity of the whole wiU abo
press less stringently on them, and thus it happens that io
the course of a partial combat more decisive acts aay
ond will always take place according as the whole
greater.

(20fi) The decisions, when Corps arc lar^j will therefoce
not unite themselves into a whole to ihe äame degree is in
the case of Corps ol ^mallet sue, but will distribute them
selves more as regards time and space ; stiU, between the
beginning und the end, a notable distinction between
two diff^ent acts is always observable^

(zo^) Now the parts may be so lurgc, nnd their sepan
tion from each other w wide, that although their acti
in the combat is certainly still directed by the will o(
General (a neoeasary condition to uxistitntr nn md
dent combat), yet this direction limits itscli to ins
at the commencpmentj or at most lo a few orders in tht
course of tlie combat ; in (his case, such a part hn;^ in
itself almost complete power to organise its whole combat'

(210) The more impnrtnnt the rfp^isiona which reM with
n Corjis by its siluiiliun. so much the mvre t\wy tvill
influence the decision of the whole : indeed, we nuy evco
suppose the relation of some part^ tn be ^neh that in
deciHious that of the whole is at once contauied.

GUIDE TO TACTICS

'r?

therefore, a «paiatc decisive act for t)u! whole is no longer
required^

(an) ^X(»m/»i*.^Tn a great battle, in which the parts of
the Army of the first rank arc Corps, a Brigiidc may
receive the order at the commencement to take a village.
For this purpose it will make use for itself of its destnictive
act and its decisive acl^ Now, the lakiug of tlti& village
may have, more or less, an influence on the ultimate
decision of the whole ; but it h not in the natuir nf thiniQ»
that it should greatly iiLHuence, and much ]c£s that it
1d effect, that decision of itself , becausi? a Brigade la
small a body lo give a decision At the comjnencenient
of a tjattle ; hut we may v^ry well conceive that the
effectual taking of Üiis vilkge forms, nevertheleSKi put
o! the destructive measure by which the enemy'* force b
to be sltaltered and reduced.

On the other hand, if we suppose ^n order given to ;l
dcrahlc Corps» perhaps a third or a haJf of the whol»
force, to take a certain important part of the encmy\
poution» then the result expected Ihiough tliis Crtrpt may
caiÄIy be so important as to be decisive for the whole ;
if this Corps attains its object, no further decisive
a^ct may then be necessary. Now it is ei*y to conceive
further that, owing to distance and the nature of the
country, very i^w orders can be transmitted to this Corps
In the course of the battle, consequently that both pre-
paratory and decisive measures must be Ipft lo its discre-
tion- In this manner one common decisive act falls to the
^ound altofr^^ther» nnd it is divided into separate decisive
act» of Boiiw of the great parta-

(2ra) This, indeed, frequently takes place In great
battles, and a prdnntic notion of thc^ severance nf the two
nOs of which wc conceive the battle to consixt would
therefore be in contradiction with the course of such a
batUc.

««SL

W flirt

I
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ON WAR

(Z13) Allbuugh wc^ct up thisdMinctirm in Ihr.wnrkinit
of Abftttleasapoint i>fgrvat imporUQC^, it iflfarfromtw
inU^icut to (ilacc imporlance on the regular srvrrantf and
divisjoH ul these two attiviljes, and lo inwnt ujmid llial lui
A practica] principle ; we only wish to separate in ide^ ti
Ihingf^ which arc essentially diffe rpnt, and to show how thii
inherent diEEerence governs ol ttsflt ihe form of ihs combtA-

(214) The difference in the (orm shows itself mt
plainly In small combats, whrte the simple tfinr and dii»!
cumbat iotin a. complete contrast to each oilier. The
trast is less decided when the parts are larger,
then in the two acts the two forms of combat imtn
they proceed unite themselves a^in ; but iTic acts them-
selves are greater, take more lime, and coiiäe<|ueatly anH
further separ^^ted from each other in lime, ^

(215) There may be 00 separation also a* regards Ihe
■whole in so far that the decision has been alreiady hi
over to separate Corps of the fuät order; trat stilt even tb(
a trace of it will be found m the whole» as it must ht
endeavour to bring the decisions of theae different
into conceit in relation to time, whether it be that we
consider it necessary that the decisions »houW take place
sjinultaneoiisly, or that the decisions should tnke pUoc in
a certain order of succession.

(zt6) The diflcrcnce between these two acts will, there-
fore, never be completely lost, as respects Ihe whole. tuidH
that which is lost for the whole wiU reappcftr In the
elements of the first order. ^-

(217) This is the way in which our view b to be unde0^|
stood,andif thus understood, then, on the one hand, »twill
not come short of the reality, and on the othec, it will
direct the attention of the leader of a combat (let it be^
great or small, partiaJ or generaJ) to giving e^cb of the Cwi^|
acts of activity its due ^are, lliat there may te neither
preciptation nor negligence.

GUIDE TO TACllCS »79

{3181 Pr4tipiUtion there «-ilJ be ü ^ufiicient spftce
and limo »rc noi aMowed to iht djrslnictive net, if thing«
arc hniken ütross the knee ;■ Aa lUiJurtunale j&iue of the
decision results, which either carmot be repaired at all, or
at all ^vent$ rtnain^ a subslaniial di^adwintage.

B (3ig) Nfgti^encc in gt^exai there will b« ii 4 coiupkte
decision do<^f net lake place, either Jrom want ol cotirag«
or trom a wrong view o( the sitiiation ; the tesidt oJ this
is always wa^te ol force, but it may farther be a positivt

B disadvantage, because the maluriTy o( the decision docs
not quite depend upon tf^e dur^ition of the destructive act,
but on other circumstances as well, that is to say, on a
favourable opportunity.

Plan of Baltic— DefiniSion

(23oa} The pha of tlio battJe makes ita unity poseiblp ;
every action in ccwinion r«quiies stxch unity. Thi» unity
U nothing eJse but the object of the combat ; from il
proceed the directions which require to tie given to al) tl»
different parts, in order to attain the object in the best
way. The appoinfmenl of the object, and the arrange^
ment& consequent upon it, form therefore the plan.

(liob) We mean here, by plan, everything which
i» pr«cribed respecting (he battle, whether beforehand,
at the coDimcncemcnt. or in the course of tiie engage-
m^t ; coneequently, the wholr nprratioTi of intrUigPnco
on matter.

Itzoc) But t]iere is plainly an es^ntial diflemic«
between such directions on the onr hnnd, as mu^t be and
am be given prcMoualy, and tho*e, oti Uie other liand«
which the exigencies of the moment require.

{22od) The first cnnstilutes the Plan m the proper
•sentse, the latter w& tiuy call the CondMct (of the battle).

(Ml) Aft these determination* which the moment calls

* DoQV h^ad over had.— Tnaitk.

960 OH WAR

forth ZTt chiefly derived from the reciprocal action of th«
cippoang parlies» wc shtdl }«sivr the diiscussicn and analyäi
ol this difl«r«nce ontil we come to the subject of
"feclpn>ca] action."

(^£2) A pfLit of the plan lifsrt^^tdyinudf in the forma
(tactic^ organisation) of th« combatiDt forces, t>y which
the great fiiinnbcr of parts is reduced to a few,

(^2;^) In a partial combat thit» (ormation is a lhtD£
more consequence than in the total combat ; inthefonncr,
]t often constitutes the whc^^ plan, nnd the smallex t
body, the more thi5 will b^ the ca^e. A EtJitlahoD b
great battle dc«'s not use many other dispositions than
those prescribed by the regulatiotis and qh the drill
ground ; but that is not sufhdent for a Division, the
particular directions become more necessary.

(224) But in Uie total combat the formation is Mldom
the whole plan, even for the smallest body : the plan often
modities the fotmation to aiTord scope for special d
positions- ASquadron ujidertaking Ihesurpriseof onrol
the enemy's small posts di\'ides itself into several sep;iratc
parts ju^t as well as the largest Array,

Aim of the Plan

(225) Thfr object of the combat makes the unity of th0^
plan ; we may regard it as its aim, that is, the directioa
to which all activities should converge.

(226) The object of a combat is victory : in other words.
everything which is a condition of victory, and which is
included in No, 4.

[22j) None of the objects enumerated in No- 4 can
attained in battle, except by the drstniction at ihr. cnony**
force, which, therefore, appears to be the me^ns for all.
(228) It IS itself in most cases the principal object as wdL'
(329) If tbcit is the case the plan is aimed at thrgruutat
possible <lostruction ol the enemy's force*.

hQEU

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GUIDE TO TACTICS 381

(230) Wbm some of tbr other tbines [uuncd m No. i
fire of gnaUr imporUnce tlun the dc«tnict*oci of the
onamj^T force, it t^lc« a subordinate plnrr ;u a nutans ;
tbeo th^ greatest possibte b ru Junker drtii:UKk<l, bat only
ft scfficictit tlrätitKlioD, and wc caiy thcQ t^c thr nearest
way to the aim.

{'3'*) There are f^vs in which Ihc points lunvrd in
No. 4. c. rf. <- /, g, which Icid to the retreat ot the enemy,
may be attained without any destnicticn o( the f-netny's
ftrmed forces; theo theenemy is conquered by a mancrnivre
and not by a combat. But this xs no victory, therefor«
only for use when wc have something else than a victory
»n object.

(231ft) In such cases, the employment of mililary
force wtti still always irnply the- idea certainly o( a combat,
thrrrfore of a destruction of the enemy's force, bul onl;
as posnibU not as probahU. For inasmuch ai our views
are aimed at sfimelhing else thon the destruction of the
enemy's forces, we prc-suppose (Iie*e other tilings to bo
dlectual, and that Iheywill prevent any *erioiis Opposi-
tion ironi taking place« M wr cannot make such a pre-
supposition» then we ought not to choose these other
things for our «id, and tf we err in the pre-suppositioit,
the plan will miss its ^un.

{2^2) From the preceding number it follows that when-
«ver a cuiisiderable destruction oi Uie enemy's foro« is
the condition of victory, it must also be the chief object
of the plan.

t«J3) Now, as a manceuvxe is not in ilself a combat, but

combat tal:es pjace if a mancüuvre does not «uccced,
thcrrforr nrilher can th*? rules which apply to total
cnmbat suit the caso of a manceuvre ; and tbe particular
things which aw efficacious in a manfeuvre can contribute
nothing to tlie theory of tlu- combat.

(334) Many mixed relation« certainly arise in''pnictice,

ON WAR

but that is no leason &gaüiist »epAratiag thing« in iheory
which in thf^ntsclvfs nrc rswntinlly dificrmt ; if wr knov
the uature of each part, thou the coitibtn^tioa Qi ttiem
may casUy be made.

(235) The dcstniction of Ihf? irnemy's armnd foEci* tt,
therefore, in all cAses the aim, and the things niUMdj
in No. 4, fr. f . d, f, /, are first called iorih b)- It , but then «r-
tainly enter into rrdprocal action with it a% powrt» ^^d
themsdves, ^M

(236) Sucli of these things is perpetually recor— that
ia to say, arc nii( thf constquencc of »poclal relations—-
o\ight also properly to be regarded as eß«cts ol tl«{
destruction of the enemy's forces.

(337) Sn for, therefore, as it 1$ pofiüble to estaUif.h
anything quite g'?nera.l as to the pl^n of 2 battle, it can
only relate to the most effectual application o< our owa
forces to tlic de&truction of the enemy's.

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Rclaiion beüfcsn the Magniiudfi and Certainty o/f/ut RistJt'

(23$) In War, and therefore, of courw. iu combat, we
have to deal with moral forces and effect* which cjumat
be nicely calculated : there must, consrqucntly, atwn]
remuin a great uncertainty as to the result of the meaj
applied.

(330) ^i* ^* *'ill further increased by the number
contingencies witli winch operations in War arc brought
into contact. ^1

(240) WhpTPver there is uncertainty, risk become« a«^
eä^enüal elements

(241) To risk, in the ordinary acceptation. OMan^ to
build upon things which arc more improtnbte
probable, To risk, in the widest sense, is to sn]
things wLieh are not certJun. We shall take it
tlie latter san«?.

(343) Now, if there wa£ in all cases a clearly defined

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GUIDE TO TACTICS

1^

I

line betweeo probability and unprobabiijty. Ihc id^a
might occur to us to male« it the bound^ry-lin« ol lUk,
and bold th^ p^^^eing cC that lin^ .is itiädmissibk, that is,
a* risk in the restricted sense of the word.

i*43) B"ti to the first place, such a line is ä ctumcra ;
and, ID the next» the combat is not an iict of rrflcction
only, but of passion and courage as well. Thrse thing)
cannot be ahut out : il wp sliould try to confine them loa
dosely, we should divest our own powers ol the raost
powerful 5pring^ of action in War, and involve ours^lve»
in constant disadvantage ; (or in most cases the folhug
short of the <liue) line, which b so tinnvmdable and
frequent, is only compensated by our sometimes over-
it epping it.

(244) The more favounible our pre-snppositions— that
13 to say, the grrater the nsk we run — so much the greater
are the results which we expect by these same m^anSj and
therefore the objects which wc have m view-

(245) Tlie more we risk the leas the probability ,ind,
consequently, the certainty of the result.

(246) The greatness of the result and the certainty of
it st«Lnd, therefore, in opposition to each other when the
means given are the same.

(347) The fust question now h, how much value we
»hould put upon one or other of these two opposite
principles.

U43) Upon this nothing genera! can be laid down ;
on the contrary, of a]l questions in War it is the one moat
dependent on the particular circumstanceä in ejtch cane.
In the first place, it is detcrrnined by relations which, in
many cases, oblige us to run the grcatcsl risks. Secondly,
the spirit ol enterprise and courage are things purely
subjective, which cannot be prescribed. We can require
of a Commander that he sliould judge of his means and
relations with professional knowledge, and not over^

««4 ON WAR

Ofdniftlf. thrir Hfrct« ; if he Ancsi iht%, thrn wr mnM trs^i
to him to torn his means to th« befit advaota^ with tlM
aid ot hi« courage.

Heiuhon bctarijgn ike tnn^nitudff 0/ the rcavU and tht firia

(149) The second question b relation to th« destTUClioa
of the mcmy^s forces concema thr price to be i>aid for it.

(350) With the intention of destroying the enemy's
lofces Uccrtainlyingeneral included the idea of destroy-
ing mora than we shuU in turn :>acnüce on out own part i^
hut this is by DO means a nece^ary condition, for there
may be cases (for instance, when we have a great supe<
riority in numbeis) when tite mere dimiimtion of the
cnemy*s forces is an advantage, even if we pay for it by
greater toss on our own «ide.

(251) But even if we aim decidedly at destroying more
of the enetny*s force than we fwcrifice on our own side,
sliil there Always remains the question how great is Ihal
fiacrißce to be, lor according to it the chaace of the re»
naturally rises and falls.

(252) We readily perceive that tJie answer lo thif
question depends on the value which wc place on ouf
forces, therefore on individual interests. To these in-
terests the decision must be left ; and wc can neither
say that it is a rule to spare our own tronps as much
possible, or to make a lavish use of them.

ria^rntination of the naturt! 0/ combat for the wparate

(a53) The plan of the battje fixes for each aogle
Division where, when, and how it is to fythi — that 19, it
fixes Hrtic, pla^e^ and Jofm ol the combat.

(354) Here, as well as everywhere, the general relations,
that Is, those proceeding from the abstract idea, arc t<t be

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS 285

distinguished from those which the parlicuJar case bringa
with it.

{255) The manifold diversity in fjans of battlu must
naturally proceed from the ii|jccial n^lntiuns in each owe,
because when the special advantages md disadvauta^ee
are sought for and discovered, the former are brought into
us«, and the Utter arc iicuiialised.

U56) But tht general relations also give certain re*
faults, and ditltaugli (cw in number and ^mple in fono,
Miil they arc vcty important, Ikcausc they belong to th«
very essence o( the tbing, and constitute the bftsia in all
ttthcr decbiuii».

Attack and Pcfcncß

(157} In regurd to ttic nature of the combat tht*re are
only two distinction«, which always appear dud MXt
therefore general ; the first arises from the po*dtive or
negative intention, .md is the distinction between attack
or defence ; the other arises from the nature of jj^nis, ^nd
is the distinction between the lire combat and the close
combat.

(258) In the strictest sen^, defence should only be the
warding cff a^ blow» and should thereCore r£-<imrL- no other
weapon than ^ shield.

(259) But thcLt would bo a pure negation, a state
ahsolutdy poiääive; and making War is anyUung Intt
patient endurance ; tlie idea of thorough passivity cui
therefore never he laid nl thr timjI of defence.

(260) Strictly considered, hre-Amis, the niotil passive
of weapon», have still something positive and active in
their nature. Now the defence malies use, in gtixwixkX, oJ
the same weapons i and aboof the same forms of combat
as the attack, both in 6re and close conthat.

(361 ) Hic detence is thereiure to be considered r* contest
jusl as much as tlje attack.

«fK ON WAR

{36^) The object of thib content can be QotJiiDg but
victory : which is, Ihcrcfore, just as much an objfCt lor
the defi-nce a3 lor the a1tiu:k.

(263)^bcrc is DOthiDg to jiutijy the conception ol tte]
defender's victory being aomelhirig negative; if somewhAt'
lik« it, in cerUxin cas^, that lira in purtictüur conditivm I]
into the contiptioH of the defence thit notiovi mutt
enter, otherwi^ it reacts Togicatly on the whole idea at^
combat, and introduces into jt contradictious, or lewk
back again, by strict deduction, to that abAurdity, a ttateS
of absolute endumnce and sufferance.

(364) And yet there is a diifer^nce betweeo attack and
defence which, while it is the only one in principle, i^H
also a very essential one ; it is, that the assaUaiü viiEi Uu
aai<m [the combat), and caUt U in$c tit* : i^hM the d^tndff
»aiii for Ü.

(265) Tliis principle nins throiigh aU War, Ibrrriore
through the whole province of combat» and in it all
differences between attack and defence have their origin.

(266) But whoevei wills an action niuät aim at some-
thing thereby, and this object must be something ptmtmj^
because the intention that nothing should b^ done could
call forth no action. The offensive must, Ihovfocc, hav«

a positive «bject-

(967) Victory cannot be this object, for it is atJy a
means. Even in a case where victory i* sought entnrlf
on account of ttsetf, on account of the more honour ol
arms, or to influence political negotialions by its moral
weight, ätiil, that eficct, and not the victory itself, is
always tlie object.

(268) The defender, just as well aa the aggressor,
huvp victory in view, but in e.'irh the dcscre spiings
a different source ; in the offensive from the object which
the viflory is to serve ; in the defender, from The nere
fact of the combat. The cue look^ down upon it, ais il

?1I, IS

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I

GUIDE TO TACTICS ifeft^

were, front a bi^twr ^t^iidp^int ; the olher looks up to it
Irom a lower position, W'hocvcr fight» can only fight for
the victory.

(269) Now, wliy does Dw ilelcitdri' fifc'Ut, lUut U, why
docs he accept the c^mbi^it ? Dec*u*c he will not concede
the po»ttive object oE the offeiuivc ; or, in other words,
because he want> I0 maintain \hc siaius qua. This is the
pTut^ary And riecess.\ry object of the defender ; whatever
further may attach itself to IhU is not necessary.

(fljo] The necessaiy intention of the defender, or
rather the necessary part oE the defcnder^a intention, b
therefore negative.

(371^) \S'herever there is tins negativity on the part
of the defender, that is, wherever and whenever it is his
interest th.it nothing should he done, but that things
sliould remain as they are. he is thereby enjoined not to
net, but to wait until ht^ opponent acts ; but the moment
that the Utter acts, the defender can no longer attain his
object by waiting and not acting ; he, therefore, now act«
just aa well &a hL& opponent, and the difference ceaso»,

(2yib) If we apply this, iu Uje first place, to the whole
combat only, then oil difference between ntt;tck and
defence will con^st m lhi&, that the one wnits for the
other : but the courw of the actual combat will not be
further influenced by it.

(372) Dut this principle of the defence may aJso be
apphed to partial combnis '. it may he for the Interest of
Cori», or parta uf an Army, that no change should lAke
pJacc, and in th;it «way they may aÜM be led to adopt an
attitude of exprctnlion.

(z7j) Tins is nut only po^ble as r<gtld« blutcbM ind
Coipft on the >ide of the defender, but aJso Airetpeets tfio»
on the ^de of tht- owaihuit ; it täkn» place in redhty on
both ^dvs.

(374) it IS naluml, however, that it ahoold occur more

«8ft

ON WAR

r

UetfOffaiXy in the case ot the delecider than in that of U»
UNÜant, but thb can otit)' be shown when the pu'lLculdr
citcmnstancfS in connection with the defcnsi^'c pTincipie
come undei cuu^dejätion-

(275) The more we inugine the defensive principle
descending to the smallest branches in a lot^iJ cutnbot,
and the muie i^enerjüy it is <liUu&tid thri^ugbout all tb«
bnuLchcs. so much the mon: pawive becomes tlie wfcole
re^fttance, so much the more thr defence appruAchcs to
tbsit puint ut ubäolutc Kiidur^iice which we look upon as
an -ibHurdity.

(37^) The point in Eliis direction at which the udv^uitage
to the defender of waiting ceases, that ts, the point where
itä efficacy iä exlianstt'd, whtre, to a certain extent it m
KiCiated. we sbftli only be able to eAamine doady bertaller,

(277) For the present, all that we deduce from wliat
has t)een said is lliat the offensive or defensive intention
not only determines something as to the commericeineiit
of the combat, bnt may also pervade ita whoJe
that by that means there aic therefore in reality 1
different kinds of combat.

(278) The plan of the combat must therefore detem
In evory case whether as a whole il is to Lmt an oSenelvp
delenaive combat.

(279) It must also determine this point for those Co
which liave aä^i^^ned to them a mi^on diüeient I
that of the general body.

{tSa) U we DOW leave out of consi deration for the
pce^enl every particular circumstance which mit^ht d«cule
the choice of attack and defence, then there is only om^H
rule which presents itself, namely, thnt znkcH wfi wish iS^
äcjff (he iQiutitm ü's ntuit lut ds/emiü^y ; when vs
offmsively.

(^Qi) We sh^ll s^ this principle cornc into conoection
presently with another which will make it jihtmer.

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GUTOE TO TACTICS

rf9

I

Fife Combat and Ciose Combat
(a$a) The plan of th? combat must further delermific
the choice of the (orm of combat in tU rdalion 1o arms —
that is, ^re combat snd close combat.

(a83) But these two fonns arc not so much hrflnches of
the combat a£ esseiitidl elements of it. They Te&ult from
the armAment, they belong to each other, and ooly by the
combination of tlie two together can Ihc lull power of the
combat be developed.

(284) The troth of this view (which otherwise is not
abfiolute but only appnucimativr, com preltrit ding the
najority of cam«), shows hself by the combination of arms
lathe hands of one combatant , and by the intimate union
of diElerrnt kinds of troops wtiich tm& become a necessity.
<255) Bnt a separation of the» two element« and the
tiBe of the one without the other is not only poaaible. but
I very Ireqiiently happens.

H i^S&i In rc«pr?ct to the mutual relation» of the two, ^d
^^IbWT nntuiaj order amongst thcmsi^lves, the plan of the
^TMttle has nothing to determine, as these are determined
H already by conception, by the formation [t^ticnl or^ni-
H salion), and the drill-grouud, and therefore, hkc the
H fonnation» belong to the stereotypic part of the plan»
H (2S7} As to tile use of these two forms of combat apart
■ from each other, there is no general rule, unless this can
pass for such, that such separation must always be

I regarded as a neces*»ary evd, that is, as a less efleclive fonn
of action. AH cases in which we are obliged to make vse
of this weaker form belong to the domain of parlioilar
circumstances. Occasions for the use of th« bayonet
alone, such, for instance, as the execution of a surprise,
or when there is no time lo use firf-arms, or if we arc sure
of a great superiority cf courage on cur side arc pUinly
only isolated cnses,

toe III. T

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ON WAR

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Timt A^id Pt^4

(aRSJ As to tiie determination ol lim« and pUce, we
havf , ia the first pla«, to obäen-e in r<?fM*ftcc lo thwf two
things, tbs^t in the total combat Xht dcteimination oi place
bf-luri^^ tc tlie dHence alune. the determination of time
to the attack-

(^So) ß<i1 f^*^ partial cnmbatn. the pbin «itber ol ^
ofleiLtiive ur ol a deJeauve combat has to give detcr-
miiwUtms respiting both.

Time
U90) The appointment of time for a partial combat,
which seems at fir^t si^ht only to Rflcct Ihe fiubjcct at
most in a few poinlä. takes, however, a diäereat Iura 00
doser examination, and is »en to penetrate it thrcugh
and through with a niling ide^i, deciMve in the; higbfftt
degree» that is. the possibility of a süccfssi\'e use of foKM^r,

Successive üs£ of Forces

(291) Simultanieous action h, in itself, a fuodamentAl
condition of the common action ot «epanle tatter Thii
ia ako the case in War, and particuhuly in the combat.
For as the number of the combatAnts i« a f-ictor In th<
product of tlie sam^, Ihr^ri^lore, ceteris panbus, (he simni'
toneons application oi aH oux foices. that i&, the greatest
assemblage of them in time against an enemy who dots
not employ all his at once, will give Ihe victory, c«£tainly
in the first instance only» over that part of the oiemy^
force which has been employed ; but us this viclnry over
a part of the enemy*^ forces raises the moral force of ttue
conqueror, and lower? that of the vanquislied, it foUowi,
therefore, tliat ^llhongh tlie loss ol physticul farce n»y
be equal on both sides, still this fariiat viitcry bas the
effect of raising the lotaJ farces of the ronqveror and
diminiäbing those of the v^inquished, and that cxinu'
quently it may determine the result of the tot^ combaL

N

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS 291

(Z92) But th« do^luctioQ drawn Ln th« preceding

nximbM &uppijs^5 two conditions whkb do not rxist; in
the firsl placr, that the mimbcr (of troop») niuM have no
niaximum ; and^ sccfmdly, thai theuscof on^ acdthesame
force ha» no limiU as long a^ there is aoythini; teEt of it.

(1^3) As regards the first of these points, the number
of combntants is limited ^t nnec by space» for nil that
caanot be brought into actuaj use aie superiluou». By it
the depth acid extent of the formation of aU combatant*
infrndral to act simultiincimsly is limited, -nnd «"on«!-
quently the number of combatants.

(a9^) But a much more importsitit timitalion of
nmnbers lies in tlie nature oif the fire combat. We have
*e<^n iSa. 8ck) that in it, within certain limits, the locreasf
of number has only the pffcct of raising the strongth of (he
fire combat on both sides ; that b, its total efl«cts. Now
this increased effect, when it brings no advantage in itself
for one side, ceases (hen to be of service to that side ; it
therefor? easily reaches a maximum in that case.

{295) This maximum determmea itself entirely by the
individual case, by the ground, the monU relations between
the opposing troops« and the mere immediate object of
the fire combat. Here it is enough to say ttiat there is
such a thing,

I296] The number of troops to be employed slmul-
taneonsly haa, therefore, a maximum, beyond wluch a.
waste take* place.

{ J97) In the same way the use of one and the same body
of tmo|jfl lias lis bmili. We have seen (m No. i2^)how
trcKips under 6fe gradually become unserviceable -, but
there is likewiv a delrnoratton in dose cnmb.it. The
exhaustion of physical force is lc«s there than in fire
combat, but the moral effect produced by an unsuccessful
isswc is infinitHy prfsili?r.

(398) Through this deterioration, which forces used in

391 OK WAR

action s\iflcT. iocIudiDg as wril thow not fictuidly engn^,
A rr!w principle comes mio the combati which is thfl
inhcreut superiority of fwsh troops opposed to
already used.

(399) There is BliU a second subject lor ccnsideratioi
which consists in a temporary detcTioration of forces
have been engogcd in Ih*^ crisis which ßccüis in every acticoiii

(300J The dose combat in practice may be said to bftvt
no duration^ In the moment that the shock tttkes plaoe
between two cavaJiy regiments the thing is djecided, and
the few seconds of actual sword-light are of no cooseqacnce
as regards time : il is very much the same with infantry |
and with larg« ma^es^ But the alfair is not then finished
on that account ; the ?tate of crisis which ha? burst cidH
with the deci&jnn is not yet quite over ; the viclofW^^
Regimettt pursuing the vanquished at full spetd is not
the same Regiment lately drawn up on the field of battle
in perfect order ; its moral iorce is certainly intcnsifiqdj
but. as 3. rule, its physical force, as well as that resulting
from military order in its ranks, has suffered. It is onJy
by the loss which his adversary has suffered id moral
strength, and by the circumstance that he is just as much
disordered, that the conqueror retains his superiority»
therefore, if a uew adversary makes his appearante wit^,
his moral force intact, and his ranks in perfect order, thfij^^
can be no question that, supposing the troops cquall^
good, he will beat the conqueror.

(301) A similar crisis also takes place in the fire combat,
to snch ft degree that the side which has just been vie-
torious by its fire, and has driven hack its enrmy, stilt
finds itself, for the moment, in a decidedly weakened
condition as respects order in its ranks, and physical and
moral force, n condition which lasts until all that has brrit
thrown into disorder is once more restored to its nonuat

(302) What we have »iuü here of smaller units holda
goud with respect to kirger ones as well.

(303) The crisis is in it&etl gn^attr in similar Bfiitt,
because it ha* an effect unifoniUy througliout the wbol«,
but it is ol shorter dumtiun^

(304) Th« weakest is a genera crisiSi especially oi 4
whole Anny ; but it lasts the longest in large Armie», often
for several hours,

(305) As long 05 the conqueror is in the crisis o£ th«
combat, the conq^iercd has m that crisis a means o( sliU
restoring the ccmbat, tliat is, of tumiiig itä result, i£ he
can bring forwurd fresh troops in «utBcient number«,

(306) In this manner, llicrefore, the successive cm-
ploymcrnt of troops is introduced in a iksrond way, as as>
efficiicioui principle.

(307) But if the successive employment of troops
iB a series of combats following one after another 13
possible; and if the simtiltaneous use is not unlimited,
then it follow» of itself that the forces, which cannot
be ef&cacious iu simultaneous action, may become so
in successive efforts.

(3oäJ By this aeries of p^irlial combats, one after another,
the duration of the whole combat is considerably ex-
tended.

(309) This duration now brings into view a fresh
motive for the successive use of forces, by introducing a new
quantity into the calculation, which is the tmforesfiffn nwif-

<3io) H, in genera, 3, successive use of troops is possible,
then it fckllcrws that we can no long«^ know how the
Vierny will eruploy his ; for only that portion which is
brought into action at once comes within the scope of our
ob^T^rv^ition, the rest dot^ not, ^nd thr^refore we can only
form some general ccnjectures respecting it,

(311) By the mere duration of the action there i%
brought into our reckoning an increased amount of pure

»94

ON WAR

chancF.undih^tdanent naturally pbyü^iniuie impoft
pait ir War tliaji anywhere r Ue-,

(312) Unforeseen events require a gfneral ^y^tem of
piecaulion, aiul ihn c^zi cutiäiüt in iiollun^ ehe than
placing in nur a propoiftionatc force, which is the
rrservc, prcperly speaking*

Depth of the Ord^r t>f liaiilfi

(313) All battles which «re to be fought by bodies
tronps in snceeasinn require from their very nature Ihit
Iresh li^oops should be forlhcüming. Tliiese may either be
quite fresh, that is, troops which have not been engaged
at all, or such as have been in action, but hy rest hftvc
recovered more or less from their exhaustioo. It
fäsy to WQ that this gives room for many shadee o
difference.

(314) Both the use of quite fresh troops as well as the
use of such as have refreshed themselve« supposes that
they bave been in rear^lhat is, in a position beyond
region of destruction.

(315) This also has its degrees, for the region of
struction does not end at once, but decxeaM^ Kndually
until at last it ends entirely.

(316) The range of small arms and of grape are wt.
defined gradations.

(317) The further a body of troops is ported tn reor,
the fresher they will be when brought into action«

(318) But no body of troops which ha* hccn With!
reavh of an eflective üie Ol smaAl arm&, ot ül cusc, c-jh b^
considered fresh.

(339) We huve, therefore, three reasons forr kr^in;^ a
certain numl>er o4 troops in rear.

* Tbia aeflin <ihaw6 ihaK Clausewiti lud uot |{TiLvp*d th* iplrit «I
NupotPOD'» cunduci ol the latlle, HJi Fxpr*«* utijvcE WW, Id IihU
tlJCK üiipifT4c:totilpr coofrngvndet by compeUiJiJK bi* MlvcrMiT

M

GUIDE TO TACTICS

»9S

ttwy wrv« {s} to retuvc oc fvuiJoice extuusicd trcH^t
especially In fir« combat.

{b) Tu pro6t by thi* cH«!« in wltich tbr conqoeror b
[dac^ directly aifter his oucc^ss-

(f) As A proviüioii aga&iiM iiafortSMn ev^^nts.

(320} All Iniupa kept bock coroc under Üiorr categonei
vrfiatever arm tbcy bcl-;iDg to. vrbethec wt caü them a
second Une or reserve, whrtbfi tbcy tn part of a IM\nsian.
or vl the whale.

Pciarity of Ok SimtUUneüHi und Stueativ4 Use of Troops

<33l) As the Hinaltaneoiu and iIk tucce«ivc use cf
troDpa ar« oppo^ to one hnoCher» and «ech lia& lU
advantages, they may be rcf^arded a^ two poles, c^cb of
which attnct« thr resolution to itself, and by that ^1(^ans
fixes it at a point wberf they arc in a state of equiljbriiun.
provided Ibat this resolution iS founded on a right estimate
t4 the opposing force«.

(323) Now, we reqvmtokaoirUielamof this polarity
—that b, the advaatag«» and ^ondkthooB of thc«c two
applications of force, and thereby aim their T<rIation» with
one aaothei.

t3»3) The simvltan^uft empJoymetil of force» may be
fnteiuilxed—

A. With equal fronts — botb

(a) In firr combat,

(b) IncUMCOaibt.t.

B. U'itb a gr«at«r front, that is. enveloping.

I324) Only ttuoe force» which axe Inought utto efficient
activity at the same time cad be refarded as applied
simultaiteousty. Whm the frotiti are e<)ualr such ap-
plication a tlitrrelore limited by the poasibility of acting
eflectively. For instance. In fire combat^ throe mnks
migbt perhaps are at the same tiiue, but six cannot.

(315) Webaveshown(iDNo. $9) that twolincsolfireof

•95 ON WAR

Mn^^uaf Strength iks regards numbers may be a match lor
each other, and Ihnt a diminution (iff numbc») un one
Bide, U \i dov« not exci^<d certain limits, has only
Mmlt of r^dudn^ the mutual effect.

(336] But th(? moru Uie dL*Klructivt? vHcCt uf Uie fke
combat is diiuinishcd. the more time it required to producci
the iMC«63aiy effect. Thncforc, tbnl «idc which dosii
chi^y lo guiu lime? (tommoitiy tlia d«knsivi- ^de)
interested in modifying, as much as po»iUe, the ti
dfstmctivc effect of the fire (that is, thesumof thcxnuti
fire).

(3^7) Further, this must also be an objed with the
which is mncb the weaker in pomt of numbers, brcausci
when the loäses are equiiJ> his are always relatively greatest.

(328) Whon the condiUona are reversed, the inter«!*
will be reversed also.

(329} When DO spe<:iaj intcte&t for hastening the actioo
predominates^ it will be the interest of both ydes to
with as few troops aa possible, that is, as already said (N4
$9*}» only to employ so many thit the enemy wiJ] not
induced to come tci cEuae quarters at OQce, owing to
small ness of our numbers.

<33o) In this manner, therefore, the sfmull.inecuj
employment of forces in fire combat is limited by Ihe
wanl of tmy advantage, and both sides have to fall bade
uj>on the successive use of the spare forces,

iai) In close combat tlie superLority in numbers
above 4iU things decisive, and the ^itnuUan^ious cmployinenl
of troops is on tliat account so much to t>e preferred to the
iuccessivfi. that the latter in mere theory is almost com*fl
pletely excl Tided, and only becomes possible through
accessory circumstances.

(33a) Gose combat b in fact a decision, and one whtcfa

lasts ImrdJy any time ; this excludes the succeasm
of fore».

:1E

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GCTOE TO TACTICS

Ä97

I

<353) ^t ^^ ^ve already said that Uic cri»« of the
dose combat tittords favourable scope for th<^ locc^MdM
use ul lurces^

I334) TurthieT, the decisions in partial clo«c combat«
hrlonging to a pester wbole arc not absolute docisionft ;
therefore the appiicatiop ol our Eorce to the lurtJuef
CoiDbftts which are possible must also he taken into
coQsideratiün.

(335) This Leads then also to not using at one time more
troopi in clow combat than appear to be jusl rnxtmioy
to make certain of Ulc result.

(336) As regards this poml there ts no other general
rule, except that circumütancc^ which obstruct execution
{tuch as a ^ery courageous eneiny, difhcult ground,
Ac.) occasion a neces?ify for a greater number of troops,

(337) But for tlie general theory, it is of consetjuenc« to
observe that the employment of more troops than is
neces&ary in close combat is never so disadvantageous as
in fire combat, btc^usc in the hist, the tc^iops only
become unacr^iceable at the time of the crisi», ool for a
continuance.

(33S) The dmultancous employment of forces in the
close comb-nt is therefore subject to this rule, that it must
in all cases be sufficient to produce the result, and that
the successive use can in no way make up for insuftcioKy,
for the results cannot be added together as in l^re combat ;
and further, that when once the point of sufiicicncy is
rooiched, any greater simultaneous application of force
becomes a waste of power.

(539) 1^^* ^^' '"^ *^*^ considered the application of
largt' Ixidlti of Ifoc|)s in firp and cloae combat, by incren^
ing the depth of the same, we come to that which is
pos^blc by ejUcnding the /r<mtt that is, in the cnvelopmg
form,

{340) There are Two ways in which we may conceive

•9«

ON WAR

k

a greater number of combatants braught Kimuh;LneoiuI]ri
into action ttirough a gvealer width of front, viv. :

(a) By ext<;nding our front so as 10 cause the enemy t(
extend IÜS also. This docs not givr us any ^uiwriurilyj
over the enemy» but it has the effect of bruigüi([
forces into play on both sides.

[b) By outflanking the enemy's front.
<34i} To bring more forces into action on both tid<

can in very few cases be of any advanta^ to one of IbflJ
two sides, it is also uncectain whether the enemy will
respond to this further extension ol front,

(34^] If lie does not respond^ then a port of our front,'
that is of our forces» will be either unemployed, or we must ^
apply the overlapping part of our front to turn the encmy^^|

(343) It is then only the apprehension ol this turning^
which moves the enemy to extend as far äs wc have done,

(344) If, however, the enemy is to be turned, it is
plainly belter to m^kt arrangements for that purpoM
from the first, and therefore we should coosider
extension of front only from that point of vjew.

(345) Now, in the employment of troops, the envel
form has this peculiar properly, that it not only increojar
the nuntber of troops simultaneously engaged on the two
sides» but it also allows us (the party using it) to bring
more of them into activity tha.n the enemy can.

(546] If.forinstance, a Battalion with a front i$opace»|
in length is surroutided, and has to show front on four
sides, and if the enemy is at a di&tance of musketry range.
(150 yards) from it, then there would be room for eighty.
Battalions to art with effect agitinst that single Ba1talion,*^|

(347) The enveloping form therefore comes in here on^
account of this peculiarity ; but we mnst at the same time

* Nofv lb? r»uU »r iacrei»«>l rang« ol amiLmcDl-^the raji^ lnD|
1500 yards, dghty batlolli^na cäold canvpTEc (h^r tire onllieuDglf ocie»
litoilorly tor arliUery, The principle rnnoini nnftltcnd. only i1b sfopi

lurpoM
ler aiLH

(
I

I

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I

GUIDE TO TACTICS ^99

bring under cxmsidctalion it« other speciAlilics also, that
is. its jJkdv-ADt3fe& and dij>advLi£iUBe6-

(348) A MCOTid advantage of the envdoptng fonn U
the increased effect rrsulttng from Ihr concrntralion of
fire.

(J49) A third advantage is Sis effect In the Interception
of the enemy's retreat.

(350) These three advantages of enveloping diminish
according as the torces, or rather their fronts, bfTnmr
^ater» and they increase the smaller the fronts are.

(351) For as regards the firet (No. 345), (he range of
jtrms reinains tlie s^inic, whether the masses of troop« hv
great or small til being uode.'stood that they consist of
the same arms of the wrvire}^ tho actitaJ difference,
therefore, between the enveloping line and the line en-
vclopf^d is n quantity which alwa)^ remains the same ;
and, consequently, its relative vahte is always diminishing
in proportion as the front is eJiterided.

(352) To SBTTOund a Battalion, at 150 yards, eight
Battalions :ire requiiud (No, 346) ; but ten Bsittahons, on
the other hand, migtit be surrounded by only twenty
Battalions^

Ü53) T**^ enveloping form, however, is seldom, if ever,
csmcd out eompieifiy. that is to *^y, to the complete
dctle, rarely more than partially, and usually withjn t^".
Now. if we imagine to ourselves a body of fhesi^eof acon-
»idrrnblr Army, we see plainly how little wUl remain of tlie
hrst of the ;ibovc advantages under such circumatinces.

(354) It is j jst the same with the second advantage, ai
may be atxn at a glance-

(355) ^^ ^^^ advanta^, al»o, of ccmrw. notably
dJEDiiwhAbylhcgreatcrcxIcn^imof the front ; although,
ben* some other relations also come into considera-tion.

(356) But the enveloping form has also a peciiliar
disadvantage, which is, that the troops biding, by that

300 ON WAR

form, spread i^ul over a groatcr space, their cfikncDtactian
is duumiUied in two n^peut»-

(357) For instance, the tim« which \% rK}uired to go
ovicr n C(-rtuin spac^^ cunnot, ;it the <uuiii^ timr, be; ulitbed
for fighting. Now, all movenients whicb do not Ic^
perpendicularly on the eoemy's line have to be made ovtr
a greater space by tite e.u%"elopiiig party than by the party
enveloped, because the latter moves more or less on Che
radii of the smaJler circle, the fonner on the circumierencc
oi the greateri which makes an impuitant diSereoce.

(356} This gives the side enveloped the advantage oi a
greater faciltty iii the uae erf his forces at difJcraU points.

(359) But the Dnity of the whol« is also lessened by the
greater space covered, because intelligence and orders
ntust p;t^ over greater diätan^es.

(3^J 3oth these disadvantages ol enveloping incrcoAe
with the increflse in the width o( front. When there ars
only a few Battalions they are iiLsign:ficant ; with large
Armies, ou the other hand» they become important — for

{361) The difierence between radius and cifcuiikfercuce
is constant ; thetefOTG, the absolute difEerence becomes
always greater, the greater the front becomes ; ami it b
with absolute diffprcnces wt^ are now concerned.

(362} Besides, with quite small bodies of troops few OF
DO flank movements occur, whilst they become more
frequent as the ^ze of the masses increases.

(363) Lastly, as regards interchange of commumcations,
there is do difference as lung as the whole space is only
such as can be overlooked.

(364) Therefore, if the advantages of the enveloping form
arevery great and thedisadvantEigesveiy small when the
fronts are short ; if theadvantages diminish and the dis*
advantages increase with the extension of front, it follows
tiiat tliere must t>e a point wliere there is an equilibrium.*

■ Apply the above (QLmiins Co the Bcwr War. IpOO» We «CfS

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS

301

I

<365) Beyrmd thar poirl, tNrrin«?, *hr rxtannon f>f
bimt can no longer ofl^r any ^dvantj^«« over the suc-
cessive use cf tioop : but. on tb« contrary, diudvint^^«»
arise.

(366) The equilibrium between tho advant^ns of tbc
successive use of force*, and those ol a greater extent ol
front (No, ^ij must, therefore, be on Uiia side of thai
point -

(367) In order to find out lhi5 point of fqnilibrium, we
must bring tlie advantages oi Uie en^'elopioE form more
difitiDCily into view. The simplest way to do so is as
follows :

(368) A cerUin front i* necessary in order to exempt
ourselves from the effect of the first of the two disadvan-
tagcfl of being aurro^inded.

(^6g) As respects the convergent (doubie) effect of fire.
there is a Ieng;th of front where thai completely ceases,
namely, if the di&tnncc between the portions of the line
bent back, 10 caw we arc surroQiided by the enemy,
exceed» that of the range of fire-arms.

(370) But, in rear of every position, a space out of reach
of fire is required for the rcsprves, for those who command,
Ac., whose place is 111 rear of the front. If these were
exposed to are fioin three sides, then tfaey could no longef
fulfil the objects for which they are inlended.

(371) A& these details of themselves lorm considerable
masses in large Armies, and, consequently, require more
room, therefore, l>ie greater the whcj!c, the ^jrcntRr must be
the space out o( the reach cf fire in re^r of the front-
Accordingly, on ihi^ ground, the front must increase as
the maseiea mcreuÄe,

(37a) But the space (out of (irej beliind a considerable
m^kits of troops must be greatrr, not only hrcnuse the

tryiagC0VMtKt>U}i]|1.Eit paiiil wlipip Ihii «luilibriuni vrt Ui br«prfJmer>L
llftd w» known what me wera rraHy trying Co <lUootf cr. hr« «ZiOulilhlV«
foand It aaana and at la* cdt.— CorTi».

ON WAR

re?«rv», &c., occu^ more space, but, bc^Äd» Ihat abo,
ID order to afloTd gmaifr Grcunty ; for, in the ftr»t p)K^
the elE«ci of alray &hols would be more »riouK amount
Iftjgc masses of troops and military tfciins than amonpt
a frw Battalions ; secondly, the nnmb^iU of lai^e mafflts
laät itlucIj longer» ^ud, through that, the lobies are axaxh'
greater amongst the troops behind the front who arc
actually engoged in the combnt.

(3?3) !'• therefore, i certain length is fixed (or tJ
necessary extent of front, (hen it must mcrea« with thaj
siie of the mnsses,

(374) The other advantage of the enveloping form (lh*j
superioTity in the number acting simultaneouäly} le^ds U
no dctermindte quantity ior the üont of a bne ; we must
therefore confine ouT5el%'es to saying that tt dinaiÄUho^j
with the extension of front, ^M

(375) Further, we must point out that the «imult^ceous
action ot superior numbers here *5poken of chiefly rdattt
to wMnkciry fire ; for as long ua artillery alone ts in action.
space will never be wanting, e\'en for the enveloped on his
smaller curve to plant as many pieces as the enemy can ci
the greater curve ; because there never is enough attiUeiy'
with an Army to cover the whole front of a continudus,
line.-

(376] It cannot be objected tliat the enemy Uas stiU
alway^fln advantage in the greuter apace, berause his guns
need not stand so close, and therefore are less liable to be
struck ; for Batteries cannot be thus evenly distributed ,
by single guns at equal intervals over u groat space. ^|

(377) ^^ ^ comljat of artillery alone, or in one in which^^
the artillery plays the principal part, the greater extent of
the mveioprng tror;l gives an advantage, and a grrsit one j
too, through the great range of artillery, because that^f

■ Y«t even in 1870^ Batteries were Ircqiimtlj- crnwi^rrf orit ai Ijiw.^^
NowuJa^ ibpy viU often only und roum hy dcploymenl oot r^eiujvl Ibe

mtxt.—ZD<snn,

GUIDE TO TACTtCS

303

I

I

mak'^ n gr^t dißr^encc in ttic extent of the two fronts.
This case occuis, for cxainpl?, with single rc^doubts, But
■with Armies in which the rather atrns of the servier take
th*r moet prcmineni paJl, und attiUety only a »condoiy
put» there U not this advantage, because, as already
said, there iä never any want of space even for the ^dc
«nvdoped-

(376} It ia, therefore, principaJIy in infantry combats
that the advantage which tbe greater front affc^rds nf
bringing greater numbers into action simultaneously
must show itself- The difference of the two fronts in such
a case anioimts to three limes the ran^e of the musket (if
the envelopment rwichei an angle of ißo"), that is, about
600 paces. Before a front ol boo pace» in length, the
enveloping line will then be double, which will be sensibly
felt ; but before a front of 3000 paces the additional
lengtli would only bt one-hJth, which is no advantage
of any importance,

(379] We may say, therefore, respecting this point»
that the length of front is sufhcient as soon as the
difference resulting from the range of a musket *hol
ceases to give the enveloping line any vejy marked
superioriiy.

(3S0) From what has just been »aid of the two advan*
Liges of enveloping, it fuUow» thai tmuU massr^ hav£ a
dißruUy in obtaining the uquhiU dntrlpptncnt 0/ frimt ;
this IS io true tliat we know fi.>r a fact that tliey aie in most
Cnases obliged to give up their regular order of formation
and to extend much nune. It raridy happc^n.t tl^at a single
Battalion, if left to depend oti itself, will engage in a
combflt withnnt extending its frunt beyond the ordinary
length (150 and 300 paces) \ instead of keeping to that
fonnfttiOQ it will divide into companies with intervals
betwpcn them, Ihcn again will pxlend inlu fekiimishers,
and after a part is placed in reserve it will take up with the

3^1

ON WAR

rest, altogether twice, three or four times as miidi
Aft it fihniilH do normnlly.

(j8i} But tlie greater tlie masäes the canar it ut
attain the necessarj* extension of front, a5 the fT<
incTf^sr.^ with the wttsse» (No. 373), although «ti^ in
same proportion^

(382) Great maaws have, therefore, no necessity to
depurt from tlidr order of toTTnation» on the contnuy^
they are able to place troops in rear.

(383) The consequence of this 15, that for large m
a kmd of staitdin^ fuiioatioa lia'& beea introduced, in which'
portions of the force are drawn up in rear ; «uch b the
ordinary order of battle in two lines ; usually there is a
third one behind, consisting of cavalry, and besides thai.
ulso n reserve of one-«ighth to one-äxth, te. ^

^384) With very large masses [Arcnies of 100,000 t^^
150,000 or 200,000) we see the reserves always get greata
(one-quartei to one-thiid), a proof th^t Armies have
a conttQu^ tendency to increase further beyond what
required for the extent of front.

(385) We only introduce this now to show more
the truth of our demonstration by a glance at fact».

(386) Such, then, is the bearing of the fir&l two ad^
tages of euV4flopiug. It is di0erent with tlic third.

{387) The first two influence the «rtflifiiy of the rcsull
by intensifying our forces, the third does that also, bi
only with very short fronts.

(388) It acts particularly on the coorage ol t)
engaged tn the front of the enemy^s line by creating a it
of losing their line of retreat, an idea which has always i|
great influence on soldiers.

(38g) This is, however, only the case when the dan^
of being cut cfT is so imminent and evident that tl
impression overpowers all restraints of discipline in«
of authority, and cranes away the soldier involuntarily.

GUIDE TO TACTICS

305

(390) At i^tedtei diatuEicefi» iuid Ü Ih? boldiei ia «nly Led
to a «en»? of dan^^r indirecUy by tlie lound of artillery
and mnNkrtn' iti hJK rrnr, nnr.isy frrlinKs mny arinr within
him. but, unl«6^ hi^ spjrit i& already very b^d, tfae&« wUl
■ not prevent liia ob«yin^ the order* of hi» »up^rior».
I IJ91] In ihn case. tb«-tHorr, thr Jid^'^ntj^p in cutting
K«fi the «ncmy't retmt, which apperUins to the ciivdopiag
HbUc, cnnnot be re^^^rded as or<^ which makes ^axa$ more
^tgtwre, that is. nuire prohabk, but unly »5 one wJiicb
incriaics the rif^ nl of a success already commf nctd.

(393) In this tespecr, alfin. th« third ddvnntaicc at
envHoping is subject to ihe countcr-principlr, that it i$
greatest with a short front» and decreaae^ with the
L«xteDxiDii oi front, as is c^ndent.

(393) B^it this does not *e< asid^ the principle that
'grsater masfies should have a greiater extent ni fn^nt than
aottfU one», bpoiu&e äs a ntreat is never made in tlie whole
th of a posiiior. hut by certain roads^ m it ftjUowft of
irif that gi«at masses require morti time for a retreat
than small one» : thB longer tune therefore imposes tho
'necessity of a hkrgrr ftont, that the enemy who envelop«
thtt front mAy not so speedily gain tlu: point« through
which the line of retreat passes,

(3<J4) If (in accordance with No. 391] the lliird ad-
vantage of enveloping, in the majority of caws (that is,
whe.n the fronts arc not tixi short)^ only influmcra the
extent, but not the certainty, of succeäb. theo it follows
that it will have ix vefy different valne. according to the
reJatinitt and virw* nf the ^rnrnhatant*-

(395) When the probjibility of the le&ult is otherwiM
, the first consideration must be to increase the
ability ; Lii audi a tase. Ihrrrforn, an iidvanliigc

which relutes principally to the extent of the result cannot
be of much tonseiiiipnce,

(396) But if this advantage is quite opijoaed (No, 565}

VOL. II L. tr

306

ON WAR

tu c umlief-^"

to Ihe pTobahüity of success, in such case if hccamM

Ü^) 'n siich a case, rndcavour mu^l bo made, throngh
tbt ddvantLigt^ o1 til« succ«ä&i^^ uge u| |utc>-t, tu cmuitef-^
taluioe those of the greater extent of front.

(3fjfi) Wc see, thefcforr, th-it the point nf ini
{or tqudibnoufi) between the two poles of the lü
and tuccfs&ive spplicntion of our forces— of exttmsum o/,
froni und depth of puxiUon — is differently situatr^d, ni
only according a% the masses arc large or small, but
according to thr r^ktion« and intenlions of the respectl^
parties.*

(399) The weaker and the more prudent will givft tl
prelerence to the ^ucce^ive use^ the stmngct ^iiid the boll
to the simuluneoijs employment of the forces.

(400) It IS natural that the a^^ailünt shmild be 11
strtmgcr, or the bolder, whether fioin tlic character of tl
CcTtimander or from necessity,

(401) The enclosing fomi ol combat, or that form vfhich'
nnplies th« simultao^ouft use of forces on both ^de& in th«
higliest degree, is, theTeforc, naturul tn the assäilant,

(403) Tlic endowed» that m, one limited to the ?ijcce«sl^^
spptication of forces, and which, on that account,
danger of being surrounded, is, therelore, the natural
of the delensive,

(403) In the first there ts the lendmcy to a quick
solution, in the latter to gain time, and these tend^nc»
are in harmony with the object of eaicb fon^j^^
comba i . ^^^^1

(404) But in the nature of the defensive there lies *tIU

■ H it dear (rnm a!1 the above tliai CUaqcwiti hurt ni»Vfr cntlvoi'
plJitöJ the pOMibiLily of 4 vfbQle Army pQa,i:Miin^ « (TMt •np^iorlly
(two or thrco-roLil) in inobihly over It£ advcruay^ Nnth« lu»^ ih* liI«
torn« hamK Ell yri to rhny moilim writer on iacUcl Thi« tnttif^tci
tbvdlrDcÜiHiomre(ur)i^«n slumM tubci A t^^oloM topfrlofilyiD UdKiI
moliiülv would vpsel every UCÜcol prcvripUoQ m fxiiUrcf. prtcittty
u our mtthoilt were uiwl hy tlgei luvLnhty in ScHJtk Aük^

GUIDE TO TACTICS

307

I

I

another moiive» which inclines it (o the dwpcr order oi
battle.

{405) One of its most considcTAblt^ AdvdntAgM 10 tbe
BMJ«tanrr nf ihe cotinlry tun^ ground» »nd local defence
of tbe inline constitutes an impuit;Ltit dement uf tliu
advantage.

(1)06) Now cnii wnnid think this should lend to thr front
beinjj mad« as wjdc as possible» m trdtrr tu mjJce the m«*t
of this advanta^ ; a one-sdded view, which may be
rcgnTdrd n« th<; chief causw of Oimmnndrrs having hci^n
so ofleo led to occupy cxt^'nsive positions,

(407) But liilherlo we hiivt a]ways supposed the ex»
tmJtion of front a* cithpr cniu^mfc thp r-m^ny to «extend,
in like mfinner, or af^ Ir-ading to outßanking^ that is, to An
envelopment of the enemy's front.

(408) Aä long as we imagine both sides equally active,
therefore apart from tlie point of view of offensive and
defensive, the applicalion of a more extended front to
envelop the enemy prirsenls no difliculty.

(409) But as süf)n ai wt? combinL^ more or less local
defence with tlic combat in front (ok is done in the defen-
sive), then that applicallon of the overlapping portions
of the front ceasts ; it is oilher impossible. or very
difhcult, to combine local defence with outHanking.

(410) In order rightly to appreciate thi« difiinilty. we
mtist always bear in mind Ihe form which the case assumes
in reality when our view of an enemy"* measure* is inter-
ecplrd by ihr n^tuml means of cover which Ihr ground
aJUords» and therefore troops employed to defend any
particular locality moy be easily deceived nnd heid in
imiclivity.

{41 1) From this it follows, that in the defensive it is to
be Con'iidrTTd a decided disadvantage to occupy a greater
front than that which the «enemy necessarily requires lor
the deployment of his forcca-

ON WAR

n

(412) TTiff necpssnry extent of franl for the offensj^«
vjf fhA.\\ examine hereafter ; hrrc wc h,ivc only to obe«rv«,
that it thr offrnsivc tFtkra up tco rarrrrw d front, th«
dcteiL&ive doe^ iiol puiiibti hmi lot U, tlirtnigb liavin^
maid« his ovm front wide At finl. but by an cfftnsivs
enveloping counifirmfrvcmtmt.

(413) It is, therefore» certain thai th» defender, ia
order that he may not, in any ease, incur Ehe diaadvanUg?
of tiw wide a front, wJl always t-ike up the narrnw^
which circumstances uiU permit, for by that mcan^« he cid
place the more troops in rewrve ; at the 'i,ime time these
rweivei aie never likely io be kit uiactivi;, like portion*
of a too (^tended front.

(414) As loiig US the defender j& sati!G,fied with the
narrowest front, and seeks lo preser^-e the grtaifst depth,
Ihut is to say, as lon^ as he foUows the niittiral irnden<^
of 111» form of combat, in the ^ajne degre« there will be an
opposite tendency on the part of the ;isȟant ; Iw will
make tlic extent of his fnmt us great as possible, or,
other words, envelop his enemy iis far -is possible.

(415) Bitt this is a tendency, and no law ; for we have
seen thcit tiic advantages of this envelopment diminish
with the lengths ol the fronts ; and therefore, at certain
poinl^, no longer connterbalance the advantage of the
successive application of force. To this law the aseaiJant
is subject as well as the defender,

(416) Now, here we have to consider exifinicioin of fmnt
ol two kinds ; that which the defender fixes by liie^j
portion which he tak^ up, nnd that which the aauiUnt^l
is obliged to ^dopt with a view to üulßanking Ins memy.

(417} If the fxlenäon in the first case is so great that
all tJie lidvantagcs of cuUliinking vanish or become in-
effective, then that movement must be givieo «p; the
assflilant must then wek to gain an ad\"anta^ in smother
way, as ue sliall presently see.

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I

GUIDE TO TACTICS

309

(418) But if the defenders' front k^ as snutU as can
pos&tbly \k, if the ass^km, at th^ s^me time, ha^ n right
to look for advanUgL^^ by uutß;tnkin^ ^ind envelopmg,
ah'll, a^ain, Hic limits of tliis env<^lopment must bv ^xtd.

(419) Tliis limit is det^^rminod by the disadvuntage»
Inherent in any envdoping movement which is carried
too far (Nos, 356 and 365).

^4^0) These di^dv;:Lntuges anse wlien the envelupmenl

rftttccipied ügainst ^ front exceeding the length which
"ifüuld justify the movctnrmt ; but they are rvidcuUy
very much greatet iS IJie Uult consists in too wide an
envelopTDent (ti a short tine^

{431) When Uie a&sailsiit \v^ the» dis^dvatitages
linst him. then the advantages cf the enemy in the
'räccessive tniploynicnt oi furct tlirough bis short hne
must tcU with morr weight.

(422) Now, it c<-r1ainly appears that the defender who
adopts the narrow front and deep order of biittte does not
thereby retain oU tlie advantage^i ol Ihe succeiä&ive viAc of
force« on hi:t side - for if the assailant adopts a front as
unall, .ind, tlkerefore, does not outflank his enemy, then
it is possible f'>r both FqtiaUy to resort to the successive
U^ of Iht'ir forces ; biit if the assailant envdops liis
oppoi^ent, thrtn the tatter must oppose a front in ever)'
dirvction in which he is threatened, and, t}ierefore, ^ht
with the ^nie extent of front [except t!ie trifling; differeiico
txtwcen the extent of concentric circles, which is not
worth noticing). With respect to this there arc four
point» wtuch claim cm attention.

^433) In the iirst place, let the assailant contncl his
Inint BS much as ht? pleases, there is always an advantage
tor the defender in the combat changing from the form of
one in extended order and which will be tjuickly decidrd
ioto ou« which is concentrated and prolonged, for the
pTolon^tion of the combat is in favour of the defensive.

310

ON WAR

(414) Secondly» the deicDdcr, c^^cn if enveloped by his
advp-f^ry . i^ not nlwnys obllgrd to oppose n parollH Enmt
to cacti oi tiie UiviaiuiiabuiruumJiug him : he mny utuck
th^m in Bank or rear, lor which the geometHcaL reUtiOD«
Eire jiLsl th(u-p which uffnrd thr fx^t opportunity; hnt
thi» is at oDCe a Euccesaive u&r of furces, lor m that it ö
not at all a neciesftuy condition that the troop» enaployed
Jater should bir rn]|ilnycd ricuctly üä thr lin^t u«cd« or thnt
the last brought forward should take up the ground
occupied by the first» as we shall see prrs^ntLy more
plainly^ Without plating tioops in reserve it would nirt
be possible to tnväop ihr- enveloping foru in Ihi* manner.

(425) Thitdiy. by the short front, witli strong rraervcs
in rear» there is a possibility of the enemy carrying his
enveloping muvCTnent loo far (No, 420), of which ad-
vant;tge may then be tnkcn, just by mi»ss of tlie iorcga^
plnced in rear in reserve.

(426) Fourthly, in tlie last place, there is an advantage
to the defend4*r in being ^ecuced by this mean» ag^ün^t the
oppusite error of a waste of force, through portion« of the
front not being ^ittacked.

(427) These ^ire the advantages of a deep order of
battle, that is, of the successive employment of forei?«.
They not only check, over-extension on the piUt of the
defender, but also stop the ?LssaiIan1 from overstepping
CCLlain limitä in envetopmg ; williout, howevier, ^tupping
the tendency to extend wilhin these limits.

(438) But this tcndpucy will be weakened or oampletely
done away with if the defender ha^ extended himself too
far.

(439) Under thest- ciicunist jnces c«rtumly tlie del^idcr.
bcmg deficient in masses in reserve, cannot pnnish the
a^Lsailant for his too grent extension in his attempt to
envelop, but the advantages of the envelopment ax«, as
it ia, too small in suck a case.

GUIDE TO TACTICS

3"

I

(430) The AssjtiUnt w)U, therefore, now no longer »eek
the ndvnnta^cs of crvcloping if hii relations ihTf not such
tlut cutting off ia a t>ümt of )^e.d ünportonct- 1u Liiu.
In this w&y, tb«rdorc, the tendency to cnvclopiitg ü
dtmii^ishcd,

(431) Bui it will b« entirely doim away with it the
defender haa taken up la front of such cxt^t tint the
assailunt can leave a great part of it inactive, for that is
to him a decided galD.

f432) In stich ^9N. the a^saikat eeases to look for
advantages in extension and devä^ng^ ^ind Juukzi fur
them in the opposite direction, that is, in the concentrntion
of hi&i forces a^in&t some one point. It is easy to perceive
that tliiä signifies the same äs i deep order of battle.

(433) How far tlic a?&;ulan( may carry the contractioo
of the front of his position, depends on —

(a) The site of the masies,

{b) The extent of the enemy*» front, and

{c) Hisstateof preparation toassumea counter-offensive.

(434} With small force» it ia diaadvantagtous to leave
any part of the enemy's fr«nt inactive ; for, as the spaces
are small, evcryth])i|{ c^n bn %een, and such parts okn on
the imtant be .ippltcd to active purposes elsewhere,

(435) From tills follows of itself, that also with larger
mnaoea and fronts tlie front attacked must not be too
ijnaU, b^tiisr i^tlirrw^t^r thr disadvunta^ just noticed
would arise, at least partially,

(436) But, in general, it is natural that when the
aKiailant hii» i^od rr^uu>n I» si-j?k tor his advuntoge in a
concentration of his forces, on account of the exceg&ive
extension of front, or the passivity of the defi^ndcr, he can
gu liuÜJcr in contracting the extent of his front Uian the
defender, because the latter, through the too great
extension of his front, is not prepared for an offensive
cowiteracliou against the enveloping movements

3W

OK WAR

(437) Tlie greatw the liüiit <ii

the <lrf«idet, Ih
which the assailant

will bf thf nmjibtr of it» p:
leave tinaswiilpd,

(43a) The «am« will be tli« case tht more the mtefttkm
M local <lden*ive \% distinctly pronounced ;

(43g) And. \as>Uy^ the i;rfutrLT Iht? matbe« ai« e«aenJly4

(440) The ass^Unt will Ihercfoi« find the most adv««-]
ta^ in fi concentrfition of hi« frmtcf. H aU these favnuiaNftj
circui]i6länc€S are coiubined, namdy, Ikrge masses, ti
long a frr>nt , and a gre^l deal of local defence on the pai
of the c^eniy^

(441) This subject cannot be finuhed until we examine
the Tel.itions oi space. ^|

(441) We have already ahown (No. V91) the vac of Ihe
succt^ssive emplöym^Til of fürcos. We have onJy here '^^
c;lU the ;tttentiija ol oui Kaders to the point that iha^
motive« for it relate not only to tlic renewal of the
sumt comhül with fic^i troupe, but aIm» to every
hubsjequcnt (or ullemr) einpJoyineiit ol reserve troop!

(443) In tills ^i^bstqucnt use» there is iupftmc aUvantOff,
as will be &een in the s^qudn

(444) From the prect-ding exposition, Wf see that
piiinL wh^rre thi^ simultaneous ^nd the succe^ive UM
Uwipi balance each other is diflerent, according to the
mäst of iTOOpi in rt^ierve, according to the prop&rti^n
tune, according to aUnaUon and <^ۆt according t(
Doldntsi and Prudcna.

[443) That country and ginund have likewise a i;iea1
infloence. is, of course, understood, ^rnd it only
thi* bare menlion, bccauae all application is here left ouf
i»f sighl-

(446) With such m^inifold connections and compl
relations, no absolute numbcts c^in be fixed us ni
((uantities i but there must still be some uoit which MTveft
as a iixed point for these c^unplex changeable rdatiom».

9&,

J

GUIDE TO TACTICS 313

(447) ^^^ thCTt air two sucli guide«» one on each side ;
tot a cifLUju dtfptli« v/hidi ullows of the aimiUUm^uK
«tioD o! a.U Ihe {OTKt%. f»fly be looked upoct ;i5 one guide.
Tw rtducr ihis lirpih for ihr snltp of incrpasing thr exten-
sion of Jroot luust therdore be iv^aidtd a^ a mxaasaiy
evil. This, th«rdor«, determines the tt/cffsoi^' i«^.
The second guide is the srcuritv of the reserve, of v/hich
we hive already apokeu. This detcriuiiies /A* nafSMry
extonJiion.

{448) Tlie nect^s^ary depth fu&t meDtioned lies at the
foundation of aU standing formations ; we shall not be
able to prove this until ifci^reaiter, when we come to treat
specially of the ord«- of the |t^««) arms.

(4^91 But bvlore we c-in bring our gener-il conaiderations
to a fini^l coDcJuAjon, in antic^p^ttion of the above rc»tilt>
we musi inquir« inta the dr^lennmation of place, a« that
has some inlluenci.' upon it hkewise,

Dci^mnoiim of Place.

(450) The d? term mat ion of plac« answers Iho question
wher« the combat la to be, aa vk-dl lor the whole a« for the
part».

(451) The placf of combat for th« wholtflUDatej; from
itegy, with wlijch wc are not now Moeemed. We

have only \wxe to deal with th^? conatniction of the
coinbat ; wc mutt, therefore, »uppoec that both parties
have romc into contort, Ihc place of th*' comhnt will
tiieii gtnerjjly be eiLhei' where the enemy's Amiy ia
{in the attack), or where we can wait for it {tm the
äf-/fnsive),

(453f A± fegafils tfaa dctamiJiiation of \Aace for Ih*
members of the whote, it decides the gecmetnc^ form
which the combfitant^ on holli »ides should nasunie in tlie
combat,

<4M) We leave Mt of «Jght at p^eaent the forn» of

314 ON WAR

detail which are oontainnl Ui tli« regular (normalj fonna-
lion uhicb wc »haJI con^dcf aftenvfirds.

t454) 'Hw geümt^lncid lutm uf Uil- whuk TiKiy be reduced
to two typc& — namely, lo the parAltcl. ^d to th^it in con*
centric segments of circles. Every other form mttR into
one o! tliew.

(455) In tact» whatever parts are suppowd to be ia
actunl [:cmtlict must be supposed in p^mltrl linirs, H,
therefore, an Anny stioold deploy pecpeadkuUrly lo ibe
alignment of the other, the latter must either change its
frunt compickiy, :ind pla^ itself piriillel with tlic other, or
it must at Uast do so witli a portion of its line. But in the
latter CÄse» the other Army must then wlieel round that
portion of its line agEunst wliich no part of the rnemy*«
Ime has wheeled, if it h to be brought into use ; and thti»
arisiL's an ordi^r ol battle in concentric pieces of circles or
polygunoi p^tts.

(456) The rectilinear order ia plainly to be considerod is
indifferent, lor the relations o£ the two parties are pre-
ci&eiy alike.

(457) But we caimot say that the teclüinear form only
arises tram the direct and parallel attack (as appears at
first sight] ; it may aho take place by the defensive plaang
lümseli parallel to an oblique attack. In this case the
other circumstances will not certainly always be alike,
for often the new position will not be good, often it wiU
not be quite carried out, Ac. We nnw ;tntidpate thb,
only in order to guard ag'iinst a coniusiou ol idea^- The
indiSerence which we see in this case lies only in the form
of the order of buttle.

(45S) The nature of the Fonn in conceotnc segments of
circles [or portions of polygons, which is the same), bas
been already sufficiently developed; it is the ^Mvelopin^
and anvahped order.

(459) The question of the placing of the parts in space

GUnS TO TACTICS

9tS

would I» faDy wttbd by Itw geometrical form of the
nooiol order ot battle i£ il w^ necessary th;it some ai our
tfoopft »hould be oppowd lo those ot the enemy in t-vcsy
direction. TliU, however, is not itecessaiy ; it is much
more a question m each particular case : should aU patU
of the enemy's line be tn^aged or not > and in the Intti^r rase,

I which ?
(460) If we can leave a part of the enemy'» force
iinattacked, we become by that means slnongcr for the
cunte&t witU tlw ttsU dtliei' by the sjiuultancous or

»sucf^assive use of our force». By that mean^ a part of the
enemy*& force may have to contend wiUi the whole of out
Army,
(461 1 Thus we shall either be completely ^iperior lt> the
enemy at the points at which we w^nt our Icrcfs, or we
^all at least have jl atror^er force tb.m the general

Iitflations between the two Armies would give,
(463] But these points rnay be taken to represent the
wholly provided that we need not engage the others ;
tliere is, therefore, an artificial augmuntation oi onr force»,
by a greater conocntration of the same in space.
(463) It is evident that this means forms a most na-
portant eEement in any plan of a battle ; \{ is Ihut which
is mo&l generally u^ed.

1(464) The point now is therefore to examine thli
subject closer, in order tu delennine the parts til an
enemy's force which in this sense sliould be take» to
constitute ihc whole,
H (465) We have stated (m No. 4], the motives which
determine the retreat of one of the combatants in a battle.
It 15 plain that the circumstances trom whjch ttie^e
raotives arise affect eitlier the whole of the force, or at
^t such an essential part of it as surpasses all the rest in
Importance, and therefore carriet» them alung with d in ita
lale.

3i6

ON WAR

r

(466) Thai these rürcum«tikn»s aflcct the whole o( t
iorcc w«; cat! ea&ily conceive if the ma^fi t£ &mkU, but no^^
il is large. In auoh cas« certainly the moüv«:^ given u
d, I, p Cjunceni ih<' whole, but the others, cspecoUy I
U>%s, aflcct only certain parts, Cor with large masses it
extremely improbable that all part« have suffered slike,

(467J Now Ihosc |)af ts whose condition is the cause of A
retreat must natiar^iUy be considerable in rdatiun to
whole; WD fthaJI tor brevity'ssaJce call them the p»i^

(468} Thesa vanqiuebed parts coay eitber be conti^o
to each other, or Ihey may be mort or less interspe
through the whole.

(469) There IS uo re;]sciii tc consider the one case as more
decisive than the other. If one Corps of an Arrny is ,
«iniplelely bcalen but all the rest intact, thai may be in
one c^e worse, in another better than if the (oases ha^y
been uniformly distributed over the whole Army. ^H

J470) The second case supposes an equal eiitptoyinent of
the opposing force« ; but we Ait only occupied at present
with the eiT«?ct of an unequal uppltcaclon of forces, one that
is concentrated more at a smgle or at certain points ; wt j
have, therefore, only to do with the first case, ^H

(47l> II the vunquislied parts are dose to each 0(b^^^
they may be regacded coUecUvcly as a whole, and we nxan
it to be so nnderslood when wc speak of the divititms or
ptiinU attacked or beaten,

[473) If we can determine the situatSofi and relation of
that part which dommatcs over aiid will carry the wbol«
along with it in its fäte> then we have by that meajis aUo
di^overed the part of the whole against which the UxKM
intended to (ight the real stmggle must be diiec:(«L

(47J) If we leave out of sight aJi ciroumtance» of
ground, we have only position and mag^iinide (numbers)
by wliicb to determine the part to be atlacked. We tJuUI
first consider the numbers.

I

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS 317

(474) HtiTv. thprr an* twn c»s»i to hr. distinKi^i^brd ;
tht firet, if wc unite our forces ag^in&t apitrioi tUeeaemy^t
and iuppoM none to thf r^U cf kii Army ; the ftecond. if wc
oppoai; to tlie runainang putt n smaU farts mardy to occupy
it. Eadi is pUioly a eonccntration of forces in spac«.

(475) '^^ ^rs' ^f those qucsliom, vii.. how lar^e a ^i^it
of the enemy's Cort* iTiuat we necessarily engage, is evi-
dently the SEinte U5 Co Aou f ma// fori vf maj^f fAf viJXA 0/ our
/r^nf? We havr already discussed that subject in No.
433 und foUowing-

(476) In order the better to explain the üubjecl in the
second ca^, we shall begin by supposing tlie en'^my to Im
as positive and active as ourselves ; it follcju^ in such ewe
thit if we take steps to beat the smaller portion of hia
Arfny with the larger fraction ol our own, he will do the
same en his side.

<477) ThereiorCi ii wc would have the total resnll in our
favour, we mutt so arrange that i\\v. part of the onciDy'9
Army which we mean to defeat shall bear a greater
proportion to his whole force than the portion of our
fore« which we risk losing bears to the whole of our
Ancy.

(478) If. for instance, we would employ in thr principal
action three-fourths of our force, and use onMourth U>t
Ibf! occupation of ttmt port of the enemy'H Army not
Attacked, then the portion of the enemy'» Army which we
engage seriously should exred fmc-fo\Trth, should be about
onetlunL In Una case, il tlw lesull la lor Ui on one side,
and against us on the other, still, with three-fourths of our
fotcc, wc? hnvR bcntm one-third f>f the enemy*« ; whilst
he, with two-thifds of his, has only conquered one-fourth
of ours^the advantage is, therefore, manifestly in our
fa^'onr,

(479) If wc or« so supctior to the enemy in numbera
that three-fourths of our force is suflicient to ensure us a

3« ON WAR

victory over hall of his> then the total result would be still

(480J The strongei we are in numbers relativpjy thft
greater may be that portior of the enemy*» force which we
etigagc seriousiy, and !be greater will thm he th^ result.
The weaker w^ are, tb« smaller niiist be tbe portion
«eddusly attacked, whicli is in accordance ^-ith the
natural law, that thfi weak should amuntTotc. kit foff4$ iki
most.

(461) But, in all this, it is lacilly supposed that the
enrmy is occiipi^ as long m beating oi:r wr^k division sa
we are in completing our victory over the larger portion
of his lorcr. Should this not be ^o, and that there is e
eonsider^ble diffeTcntze in lime, then he mtf^ht sfiU hr-
to use a further part of his troof^ against our prind]
force>

(482) But now, as a rule, a victory is gained quicker in
propoTtian as the inequality between the rontecidiaj
lorces is greater ; hence, we cannot make the force which
we risk losing as small as wo please ; it mu^ beoir ■
reasonable proportion I0 the enemy's force, which it it to
keep occujiicd. Concentration has, therefore, limits CD
the weaker side,

(483) The supposition made in No. 476. is, however ,
very seldom realised. Usually, a part of the defender's
force is tied to «ime locality, so that he U not able to US«
the Ux laliofUi as [|uic.kly as is necessary ; when that s
the case, the assailant, in concentrating his forces, nuy
even somewhiit c^xceed the above proportion, and, if be
can beat one-third of the enemy^s force with two-thirds ol
his, there is still a probability oi miccess for him in the
total result, because the remaming one-thud ol hi« force
will hardly get into difficulty to an equal degree.

(484I Bui it wotild be wruuK in rd further with this
tnio of reasoning, and draw the coQduuoa, that if the

GUIDE TD TACTICS

J19

defensive took nn pmitivc nftinn üt ^!l ag;tiiist the weaker

porUoD of the as^ajl^nt^s force {a ca^ which very often
ha^Kiis), victory v^ould likewise follow io that case also
in favour of (hn aK^tilont ; for, in ct5(?s to which the party
attacked do^ not seek to mdemiuty hlmseli on tlie
weaker portion of ihe enemy's force, his chief reason for
not doing so is because he has stiU the means of making
Ilie victory of our principal force doubtful, by bringing
into action against it a portion ol that part oi his Anny
which has not been attacked.

(485) The smaller the portion of the enemy's force
which wp attack» the more possible this becomes, partly
on account cl spaces and distance being less, parttVi and
more especially, tweause the moral power of victory over
a smaller mass is so very much less ; if the mas$ of llie
enemy's force which 15 conquered is small, he does not so
soon lose head and heart to apply his stiD remaining means
to the work of restoration,

(486) It is only if the enemy 1» in such a position that
he js neither abl^ to do the one nor the other — that is,
neither to indemnify himself by a positive victoij' over
oar weaker portion» nor to bring forward bis spare forces
to oppose the principal attack, or if irresolution prevents
his doing io — that then the assailant can hope to conquer
him with even a relatively very small force, by means of
concentration,

(487! Theory must not, however, leave il to be inferred
that it is the defender only who i^. siihject to the disadvan-
tJige of not being able to indemnify himself properly for
the concentration of forces made by his adversary : it has
al£o to point out that eithsr of the imi pariia, either the
assailant or the defender, may be involved in such a
sit nation -

(468) The assemblage of forces more than are pnjpor*
tionate at some one point, in order to t>e superior 10

ON WAR

numbei^ iU Uial point i^, in poönt of fact» always lounded
on the bop« of surprijtng the enemy, »o that be >haU
nrithrr bavc tini<^ tn btinft up «iifUdrnt (ofctii tn thofipol
nor lo iet on foot nie^ur«« of retdliatioa, Tbe hope c4
the surprise »iiccffding. toundi it«elf »a(9iti&il>- on the
rctolntic^ti bdn^ tlie cftrtint made, that i» tm the
initial ive>

(-1^) But thi^ sdvnntA^r of Ihc initiative has also
a^;un it& disadvantage, oi which more wiil be aaid heR*
after ; we merely remark here, that it is no absolute
advantage» the effects of wTiich must «bow t1ientedvc& in
all case».

(^<lo) But ii we even leave out of consideration tlie
grounds fcr the success of an intended surpn&e wliidi «re
contained in the initiative, so thai no objective motive
rtiuiains. und tliat success has nothing on jt^ side but luck,
sldU even that is not to be rejected in theory, (or War is
a game from whicb it is impos^blc to exclude vtniurc^ It,
therefore, remains allowable, in the absence of oJl other
motives» lo conceotralc a pari ol our forces MJ a venture,
in the hope of =urpnsing the enemy with them,

(491) If the surprise succeeib on either side, whether it
be the offensive or defensive ^ide which succeeds, there will
fi>lk>w a certain irtabitity on tlte part i>f tho forco ftiii
to redress itself by a retaliatory stroke.

(491) As yet wc have been engaged in the rnr^idcTr^l
of the proportions of the p^ or point to be attacked,
now come to its position.

(4tjj) H we leave out every local and i^Uiei purticuhir
circumstajtce, then we can only distinguish the muqt,
flanks, uat and ccntrf, as points which have pcculiaiitiea
oi their oxvn.

(494) The tsringa, because there we m^y tum the «nemy^s
force,

(495) 1^1^^ fian^s, because we may expect to fight Uiera

kercwiU

GUIDE TO TACTICS

aai

upon a spot on which the t^cmy vt nut pirjmcd, und to
impede his retreat.

(496) The rMf, I'uat the same a? the Rankft, only that
the eii|>«ctaticn ui ob^tiucting or i:»iii|)ktety intercepting
his retreat b here more predominant»

(497) But in this action flgflinut flflnb; and fwvr. the
supposition iä necessarily implied that we can compel tht>
enemy lo oppose forces to u? tlxtie ; when we arc not
cerUin that Pur appraranci? tlitrc will have this effncl. the
meisure becomes dangerous : for where there is do enemy
lo attack, wc are inactive, and i( fhis is the ca.se with the
principe body« we should undoubtedly m^ss our object,

(498) Such St cose as that of an cn^my uncovt^ring his
ftajiks and rear certainly occurs v&iy rarely, still it doe^
happen, and most easDy» when the enemy indanniües
hfaiuelf by offensive counter-cr»terp rises iWagr^im, Hohen-
lindfOa Austerhts, are examples which may be quoted
here).

(4gg) The attack of the centre (hy which we undentand
nothing else than a part of the front, which is not a wing)^
ha» this property, that It may lead to a Mparation of part»
whidi is commonly termed hrealnng ih^ line.

(500) Breaking lite line is pl;ün1y thr opposite of (^<
velopmcnt. Both measures, in the event of victory, have
a very destructive effect on the enemy'* forces, but each
in a different manner, that is :

{a) Envelopment contribntcs ifi the rertainty of (he
result, by iL^ moral effect in lowering the coumge of the
cnem/s troops.

(A) Brcokinfi the centre cantributcä to ensure success by
enabling us to keep our forces more united together. We
have already treated of iwtJi,

(c) The envelopment may lead dirrdly to the destruction
of the enemy'» Army, ü it is made with very superior
number«, and «succeed«. If it lead« 10 victory, the early

vol. Ill Ä

3« ON WAR

results »re in every case grMttr by that mram ihan by
bcvakin^ Ihii niurmy'« ^nti.

{d) Breaking the enemy's lin« caacnly lead indirectly (0
tho destruction o\ bis Army, and |13 cff<n^ are hardly
aliown so much an thit fii%t day, but raUiiSf «UategicaUy
aiH«rwgLrds.

(501) The breaking through the aifmy'% Army by
masäiag gut piincipal loice ^igün^t onv poijit, suppose* an
excessive length of front on the part of the «i«ny ; for
in this ffirm of attack thf difTifulty of oocupyin^ tbe rt-
mainder o\ the enemy's force wilh few troopA bgr««tcr,
because the enemy'^ forces nearest to the principal attack
may easily join in oppoüng it. Now, in an att^k on Xht
centre^ there are such forces or both sides ; io an attack
on a flank, only on one side.

(502) The consequence ol this is. that such a central
attack may easily end in a very disadvantageous form of
combat, through a convergent counter-attack.

(503) The choice, therefore» between the^e two porAtsof
attack must be made aci^ording to the existing rdation^i
of the moment. Length of front» the nature and direction
of the line ol retre;it. the military qualiti« oi Ihe enemy's
troops and characteristics of thwr General, lastly, thi.-
ground must determiEie the choice. We shall coinsidcr
these subjects more fully in the sequel.

(504) We have supposed the concentmlion of {orces at
one point for the real attack ; but it may, no doubt, also
take place at several points, at two or three, without
ceasing to be a concerykation ol forces ugaiiist a pßrt of llie
enemy's force. At the same time, no doubt, by «very
increase in the number of points the strength of the
principal is weiikened.

(505) As yet wc ha,ve only taken into view the objecth^
advaiitagirs of such a concern trntinn, that i%, a mnre
favourable relation of force at the capital poiDt ; but

I

GUIDE TO TACTICS 3^3

ttiere b alao a ^ubjectivi- motive for tlic ConuaAndcr ot
General, which is. thai l\e keeps the ptindpal parts 0* his
UiKC morn in hand.

(506) Although in a battle, the will of the General and
his intclhgence conduct the whole» siill this will end this
iiLtelligeTica can onlyrcuch the Jawer lanke much diJuted,
ajid the farther the troops are from the General-in-Chief
the more will this be the case ; the importance and
independence of suboitlinale^ then tncrtiase, and that at
the expense of I he supreme wiU-

{5^7) l^ui it ^ both natuiBl, and as Joog as no anomaly
«arises also adviolageoui» that llie Commander-in-Chief
shmild retain direct control to the utmost extent which
circumstaDces will allow.

Reciprocal Action

l5od) In respect to the appUcation c( forces in combat,
we have now exhausted everything which can be deduced
generally from ttie nature of those forces,

{509) We havconly one »ubject still to examine, whicb
is the reciprocal action of the plans and acts of the two
sides.

(510) As the plan ol cotntut. properly so called, can
only determine k> much of the action as can be fore^uen,
it limits itself uäuuily tu three things. vi>. : —

(fl) The generül outline.

\P] The preparations-

{c} The details ul the commencement.

(511) Nothing but the commeucemeiit can in realHy be
laid down conipktrJy by tlin plan : the progress demands
new arrangements and orders, proceeding from circum*
stances : these arc the eondud of the battle.

<5i2) Naturally, it is desirable that the pnncipkftdd UM
[dui thculd be followed in the conduct, for means and end
ahMys remain the same ; therefore^ if it cannot alwny« be

324 ON WAR

dofM^iMcan only look upon that »i an inip«xicct>0Q iriiiek
cannot be avoided.

(5tj} The Lciuducl ol u bulUe is uadeniably a vvty
difE^cnt ttüng to making a plan for one, Tbe latter 1«
done mit od the iqpon of d«ngcr, and in pciicct kiature ;
the lorn^ef ^ways takes placft uodei tbo pr c^ iurc of the
moment. The pUin alway» d«Mdes things from a more
$Uvatfd »Landputnt, with a ander »piMitf« ot viwuu ; tJi«
coKrfficl is regulated by, indeed u often iorcibly cam«d
iivfny by, that which is tbc »^ardsf dnif mnKl tttdiviJual-
We »luU speak bereuiter of the diilercncc in the characUx
o( tlu^34; two functions of the inli^Uigi^nce, but here m
Icftvc thciD out of coRbidciation» und content ouraoKo
with havin« drawn a hnc betwc<-n Ihcra asdütinct cpoch».

(514) If we Lni;i^iiii: both piirltt^s in tbi& &iliuktk>n, tliat
neither ol tlurm know» Anything of llie dispo»iticns of bi&
T^pponent, then dch of them can only make his own
con^orinAÜly with tlic general prtnciplc» »i tUcijty. A
peat p^ri of tl)i& hes already in the fonnation, and in the
3^<alled 4kmeniitry tactics of an Anny, wluch üSc oatur^y
tuuDded only on what a genetaJ.

(5^5] l^ut it is evident that a di^io^tioo which only
rests upon ihal which ii» generiU can never ha\e tlu; ?«irie
eHicacy witli tiiat which in buiJt upon iodividuiLl ciicmn*
Stances.

(516] Con^quently, it mu:$t be a vny gx«at advantage
to combine ouc dispositions afUr the enemy, and with
reference to tho^ of the enemy, it is the advantaije oi tht
second hand at cards.

(517) Seldom, if ever, is a battle arranged without
fipecial re^rd to individual circumst^ncrs. The fird
cifcuinst^nc«» of wluch thee« uiuat ^way& bo mow
knowledge, is the ground.

(516] In knowledge of the ground the deimder httS the
ath-antage in gtaeiul in an e^>eciaJ dt^iee \ foif Ik alone

GUIDE TO TACTICS

335

know? exactly and bcfcrehand the spot on whicTi the battle
ia to take place ; and, IlK-itfort. has lime to examine tlit
locality fully. Here is the n»! of the whole theory of
po^ilinnSf \n as far as it belongs to tflctira,

(51g) Ttte ateadant, certainly, also examines thie giouEid
before <he fight commences, but only imperiectly, for the
dnlrnder i* in posürtsiön of it. and d*»*-* not allnw him In
make a full (xan^ination everywhere. Whatever he c^ji,
in some measure, ascertain from a. distance, serves him to
lay dffwn hi« plan.

(520) If the defender, besides the advantnge of ilie
mere knowledge of the gronnd, makes anolhrr nse of it —
\f he makes use of it for local defence — tiie result is a more
or less dcßttitc diiposiliim of his forces in dciati ; by that
means his ad^er^ary may find out his pUiiä, ^uid lake
them into account in making his own.

{541) This is. therefore, (he Brst calcvtlation made on
the enemy^s actual moves.

(522) In most cnses this is to be n^ided as the sta^e
at which the plans of both parties end *, that which Lakes
pUice subsequently belongs to the conduct.

{523) In combats m which neither of the two parlies
can be considered as really the defender, because both
advance to the encounter, formation, order of battle, and
elementary tactics (as re(^iJEir disposition somewhat modl-
ted by ground) come in in place of a pljin properly so Gilled.

[554I This happens very frequently with small bodies,
seldom with large masses^

(3^51 But if action is divided into attack and defence,
the assaüant, as far as respects reciprocal action, hai
evidently the advantage ht the st^c mentioned Id
No. saa. It 15 true that he has assumed the initisHve,
but his oppijnent, by his defensive dispositions, ha^ Lwen
obliged to disdoseT in great part, what he means to do.

(536) This is the ground on whirh. in theory, the atlnck

3a6 ON WAR

has bwji hitherto conaid^cd sr by far the most advaii'
Ugpiius form o4 combat-

1537) Bot to regard the attack a% th« moat advanta^eoos,
or, to use a more distinct riqjrniKinn, Jis the sfrtm^ötf form
of combat. Ieu4s to an absurdity, a« vt sbalj sbow bare-
afUr. This has be«ii oveHookod.

(538) The fiTor in the concJiifiion ftriu^ from over*
vduing the adv^^LUtagv mentioned lu No- 535- IT»!
advantage b important in connection with the reciprocal
actirm, but that h not mreryJAin;;;, To be- able? to mnlcr- use
of the ground ä£ an ally, and therct^. to A ccTlain extent,
to incrfase our forres, ta in very many cases of gr^^ttf
importance, and might be. in most cases, with proper
diapositioQS.*

(52g) &i>twTonguseofground(wryttctMided|io«ttoiis4
and a laJse £>-atcm 0I defence (pura pastMty) faftve »0
doubt givf^n to the advantage which the Assailant has of
keeping bis measures in the background an undue
importance, and to these errors alone the attack i» in-
debted for the siLccessea which it obtains in practice,
boyond the natural measure of its efficacy.

(530) As the influence of the intelligence ia do4 con£ned
to the plan properly so called, we must pumie our ex-
amination of the teciprocdl action ttu^ough the prwinct of

(531) Jtü cow &e or deration of the battle is the province
of the conduct of the battle ; buT Ihis duration U greater
in proportion as the socceasive use of lorcis i« more
employed^

[533) Therefore, where much depends on the €Widac4,
there must be a great depth in the order oJ battle^

(533) Now ari^s the question whether it is better to
tru5t more to the plan or to the conduct,

• Thfl riiM-nioin increoMC in ran^e, specially ot ■rtiUcry, hm iUvml
tblSFClAliüainatvrialty. tCouj^lily Ehe Af TiLck |iil± icimei] oa tbt i^njinot
the rani^, Tb« Delvact has gained only u the misr- — £oiTe^. *^

I

I

I

CU!DE TO TACTICS 3*7

(534> H were ^id«itly a1>siird knowingly to l^w
unexamined any datum which may come lo hand, or to
leave it out of accoimt in our ddibeTations, if it has any
vaTue eis tegitr^^ the proposed cnm^e of action. Bui that
i& as mucli ^ to say tliat th? plüit should pT««cribe the
course of action as far as there are available data, and (hat
the field nf the conduct isnrily tnrommnnrr whrrr ihr plan
no longer »u£[M:e& The conduct is therefore only a sub-
stitute for a plan, and so for i» to be regarded aa a
necessary evil

(535^ But let it be quite understood, we arc only
speaking of pians for whkti there are real motives. Dis-
positions which h-^ve necessarily an individu^ tendency
must not be founded upon axbitrary hypothesis, but upon
legular data,

■ (53^) ^Vhe[e. therefore, data are wanting, thero the
fixed dispositions of the pliin should cease, for it is plainly
better that a thing should lemain unMfirmineti, that is» he
placed undf^r the core of general pnncipleSp than that it
should be detennined in a manner not adapted lo dream*
stances which subsequently arise.

(5371 Every plan which enters too much into the detaO
of the cnurse of the combat 15 therefore fiiulty and
ruinous, for detail do^ not depend mcicly on general
grounds, but on other particulars which it is impossible
to know beforcliand.

{538) When we reject how the influence of single
drcumstancrs [occidental as well as others) increases with
time and spjice, we may see how it is that very wide and
complex movements seldom succeed, and that Ihey often
lead to disastcT-

(539) Here lie» the chief cause of the danger of aU very
complex and elaborate plans of battles, They are aU
founded, olten without its bein^ known, on uniasBcf insig-
nificant suppositions, a great part of which prove inexact.

ON WAR

(540) In phce cf unduly pxtending the plan, it t5
to Iravn mtlirr marr to the condtict.

(54X] But this suppofits (accordiQg to 533) a deep order
of battle, that ia, strcmg reserves,

(54a) Wr havr swtt-n (525) tluit as respect* red
action, the attack leaches furthest in his plan.

(M3) Ou the oth<T hand» the dcfensiw, through
(knowledge uf) the graund. has many reasona to dttCermine
beforehand the course of his combat, thjit is, to enter far
into his plan

(544) Were we to stop at this point of view, we shouJd
say that the pJans of the detenaive reach mncfi ftirthcr
than those of thf? offensive ; and ttiat, therefor«, the Salter
leaves much more to the conduct.

(545) Bui ^'^is advantage of the defensive only eatiita
in appearance» not in reality. We must be careful not to
forget that the dispositiona which relate to the groijnd are
only preparatory mttasmes founded upon suppositions, not
upon any actual measures of the enemy.

(546) It is only because these suppositions arc in
genpral very prol>abIe, and mUy wh^n they are so, that
they, as well as the dispo^tJons based on them, have any
real value.

(54?) But this condition attacking to the suppositions
of the defender, and the measures which he therefore
adopts» naturally hmils thesir vpty much» and compeb
him to be very circumspect in Ins plans and dispositions.

(548) If he hfis ^(ine too far with them, the assailant may
tlip away» and then there is an the spot a dead power, that
is, a :fasU of power ^

(549) Such may be the effect of positions which
are too extended, and the too frer^uenl use ol local
defence.

(55^) Both Miese vriry errois have often shown th«
injury to the defender from an undue exten^on oC bU plu:.

«

1

GUIDI- TO TACTICS

3=9

and the advanlagc which the offensive mfly derive from a
rational extension o( his.

(551) Only very strong positions give the plans of th*
deleneive more scope than tlie plan of the ns^aihvnt cnn
hav«. hut they must be portions which are Urong in tvtry
poirU of uicw.

(552) On the other handn in proportion as the position
available is only indißerently good, or that no suitable one
\% to be found, or thrit time i« wanting to prepare one, in
the same measure will the defender remain behind the
«asaüant in the determinfifion of his plana> and have to
trust the more to tlie conduct,

(553) This resuh therefore shows again that it is the
defender who must more particularly look to the suc-
ceAsive use of forces.

(554) ^^^ \\^vc seen before tliat only large masses can
have the advantage of a narrow front, and we may now
perceive additional motives for the defender to guard
himself a^'ainsl the dait^'er of an undur fxUnjiion of his
plan — a ruinous. icaUerin^ of kts farces on acaiunt vj the
natwf of th^ i'ound — and further that he should place hii
security in the aid whieh lies in the conduct» that is, in
strong reserve*,

(535) Prom Ihi» the evident deduction is, that the
rdation of the defence to the attack improves in proportion
as the masses increase.

(556) Dumtinn of the cnmhüt, that w, strtnt/i ffin/^M^
and ttu succcstivt u&c of them at much as possible, ctwütitute,
therefore, the first condition in the conduct : and the
^idvuntuge in these things mvist bring with it superiority
In the conduct apart from the talent of him who applies
them ; for ihe highest talent cannot be brought into fidl
play without meanfi» and we may very weil imagine that
the one who is less skilful, but has the most means at com-
mand, gains the upper hand in the course of the combat.

3JO ON WAR

(557) Now, there is stiJI a second ot^ectivr conditioo
which confers in ^rncr^I an adviDta^e in the conduct, and
this h quite on thp side of the ddcnsiv« : It b the ac-
quaintance! ipvith ttu? country. What .-tdvaota^c this must
give when rcftoIutioD« arc required wbich must b» made
without i^x;^ mi nation, and in the pressure oJ events, is
evident in itseli.

(55S) It tic« in thi^ nature ol things that the detennina-
tions of Ihr pian concrm more the divisions of high^r order.
and llioüü ui iha ctmäuct maxf. the injaitrr uncst ; (conse-
quently th;it etch »ingle drterminAtion of the bner is cd
les&er importance ; but a« those latter an? naturalty much
more numerous, the diffi^rence in importance Iwtwccn |>laii
and conduct is by that means pjirlly balancc^d.

(559) Further, it \\^ in the nature oi the thing that
reciprocal aciion has its own special field in the conduct ;
and also that it never ceases there Ltecauae tlie two paitio
are in sight of each other ; and consequentJy that it cither
causes or modifies (he greatest part of the dispoiitions.

(560) Now, if tho defender is sfieciälly led by his interest
to save up forces for the conduct (No. 553). if he tias a
generaJ advantage in their ose {No, 557), it follows that he
can, by superiority m the conduct, not only make good
the disadvantage in which be is placed by the reciprocal
action out of the plana, but nlso attain a supcnority in the
reciprocal action generally.

{561) Whatever may be the relation in this respect
between the opposing purties, in particular cases, np to a
certaLo point there will always be an endeavour to be the
last to take measures, in order to be able, whm dcnn^ so.
to take those ol the enemy into account.

[5Ö2) This endeavour is the real ground of the mudi
stronger reserves which are brought into use in large
Armies iu modern times.

(563) We liave no hesitation in saying that in this

GUIDE TO TACTICS

33*

Is thrte is, next to ^ivnnd, the best prindplr ol
defence for ^ coDÜderaUe m^'**^

CAorodtsr of Command

(564) We have said that tbcre is a dificrt^nce bctinxtfi
the eharactef of the determinfttions whitrh form the plui
«od thuätr which form the conduct ul j Lultlr : Lht? G»ae
of this is. That the circnnut^Lnce« undrr which the intdlt-
geßcr does its irork are diffmrnt,

(565) This dillerenc« of circumstftAces cooü&ts iii ihne
things in partietiUr» fnmely, in the wont of data, in the
want of time, and in danger

(566) Things which, had we a complete view of th«
aluation, and of all the great interrelation», would be lo
Uä erf primär^' importance, [nay not be »o if th^t comptlrte
view is waDtjng ; nthcx thio^ therefore, and, as a natter
of coui», circumstances mnre distinct, then become
predüminant.

(567) Consequently, if the plan of a combat b mort a
geometncal drawing, ttien the t-onduct (or command) i*
more a persipcctivn one ; the former is more a fcround
pUn, the latter more of a fHcture. How this def«ct may
be repaired we shaJl s» hereafter.

(568) The want of time, be&ides limiting our ability to
make a general survey of objects, has alsf) an inflncnrc on
the power of redectiou. It is less a judicial, dahbArative»
critical judgment than mere tact ; that is, a readine«» of
judgment a«|uiied by priicfice, which is then effrcttve.
This we muM also bear in rnind^

(369) That the immediate fej^ling of danger (to ourwlwes
and others] sJiould luiliience the Uire undentanding i» in
human nature,

(570) ff, then, the judgment of the nndrritnndJng ift in
that way lettered and weakened, where can it lly to for

ipport ?— Only to courage.

3ja ON WAR

(571I Here, plainly, courage of a two-fold Wind is
requisite : courage nat to be o^rrjiowcTed hy personal
danger, and courage to calculate upoii Ifae uucertain» and
upon that to frame a course of action,

(573) The sMond is usually called toum^ of the mind
(eouragi d'tispril) ; lr>r llie first tlicie is no naiue wllkh
satiifie« the law of antithesis, because the other term jnst
mc^ntirmr.d is not itsrif correct.

(573) ^f ^^ ^^ ourselves what is courj^e in itsoriginaJ
»n«e, it Is pergonal sacrifice in danger ; and from tliis poml
W(* must also start, for upon it everything rests at last.

(574) Such a feeling of devotion nay proceed from two
sources 0I quite difFerenl kinds ', first, from indiflerence to
danger, whether it proceeds front the organism of the
individual, indifference to life, or hahitiiati«Tn to danger;
and ftfixriidly, from a positive motive — love o( glory, low
of country, entlnjuaain of any kind.

(575) The first only is to be regarded as true coura^
which is inborn, or has become soc^nd nature ; and it has
this characteristic, that it is completely identified wHb the
being, therefore never fails,

[576} It is dlHenent with the courage which springs Cram
positive feelings, These place them^ves in oppo«itioa
to the impressions of danger, and therefore all depeed^
naturally on their relation to the same, Tliere are cues
in which they are far more powerful than indifTerfure to
the seTise of danger ; (here are others in which it is the
most powerful. The one {indi0erenc< (o danger) leave»
the judgment cool, -and leads to stedfaatrKSJt : the other
(feeling] makf^ men more enterprising. And leads lo
bcldnest.

(577) Tf wilh such positive impulses the indiflerence to
danger h combined, there is, then, the most complete
personal coiiragc.

(578) The courage we have aä yet been consid«tfiiig i*

GUIDE Tu TACTICS

333

sümeUüng quite subjective, it relates merely to pcrsoml
sacriüce, and may, on tliat account, b« called personal
eintrage.

(579} But, now, it is natura) th^t any one who plac<» no
great vaJue on Ihc sacriftce oi his own person will not mte
very high tlie oöering up ul ijlhers (who, in cunswquuace
ol his position, are made «ubjcct to his will). He looks
upon them ,^^ property which he can ilispose of just like
luä own person H

(5S0) In like nuinner. he who through some positive
feoling is dr,iwn into danger, will eitiier inUisei this feeling
into others or think hiniäeU justified in nijikin^ theni
subservient to \m feelings,

(381) Jn both w^iys courage gets an objeciivi sphere of
taction. It both stimulates self -sacri lice and inlluenccs
the use of the iurces mudt subjecl to it.

(51^2) When coniage has excluded from the mind ^11
over-vivid impressions of danger, it acts on the faculties
of Flio nndciralanding. Tliese be^onio irc&, because ihey
axe no longer undei the pr»»urc ot ^UAiety.

(563) But it will ccTt;;in]y not create power» of under*
staoding, where tliey Imvo no existence, still less will it
beget discernment -

(5^-1) TiicTefore, wheni there is a want of undcTHlanding
and of disüemmentr courage niay often lead to very wrong
measures.

L585] Of quite another ori^n is that courage which hofl
been teimed courage of the mind. It springs from a
conviction of the necessity of venturing, or even from a
superior judgment tu which the iisk appear» less than it
does to other«,

(586) This ronviction may aiao spring up in men who
have no perscjnal cuuiage ; but it only bctynii^s courage,
that is to sjy, it only beconm a power which supports the
man and keepi« up his equanimity under the preSiSure of

3J4 ON WAR

the momertt and of danger» when it reacts tm
fiM^lingK. ^vralcrns and clcvnt« thrir nohirr pdWi^m; HiH
oa Ihis account ih« tfxpreü&iou. cvwa^e of the mind, is «ut
quite correct, for it never spring» ixom the inteHigeDcc ^,
itself. But that tlic n^ind mny ifivr H^t to frrJinfT^, And^|
th^t those fecLugs, by the contiauad iaihiMice ol the ^
thinking laculties, may be intensified every one know^ ^
by exp<!rietice, ^|

(567) Whilst, on tbe one hand, pcnonaJ coura^ sup-
ports, and, by that means, heightens the powers of the mind,
on tlic other band, theconvictiunof tZietninduw;iknnsaiid
mnimntcs the emotionaJ powers ; the two approach each ^
Other, and may combine, that is, produce one and the^f
same result in oonunand^ This, liowevcr, seldom happens.
The manifestations of courage have generoUy sometbJD^
of the character fif Üiejr origin. r

[5^) When great personaJ courage is united to high^f
intelligence, then the command must naturally be nearest
to pcrlection. ^J

(5^9) The courage proceeding front convictions o4 tho^l
reason is natnr^ly connected chießy with the tGCurriog
of nsks in reljance on uncertain things and of good fortune,
and has less to do willi persoual danger ; for tlie latter
cannot rasUy become a cause oi much intellectu,il activity,

(590) We see, therefore, that in the conduct of th»
combat, that is. in the tumult ol the moment and of
danger, the feeling powers support the mind, and thö,
latter must awaken the powers of f^vltng.

(591) Such a lofty condition of soul is requisite if Iho]
judgmcnlj withimt a full view, without leisure, und4^ thi
most \iolent pr^sur^ of pacing evtfota, is to make ceiv*^
lutions which shall hit the nght pcnnt. This may bci
called nulit;uy tulent.

(593) Ifweconsideracombal With its mass ol great am
small branches, and the actions proceeding from these, it

GUIDE TO TACTICS

335

strike« u« at once thai the courage which proceed» from
pergonal drvotinn predaminata-^ in the inlerior rcgioD,
thuliih.njJeb moreover thesewndary branchc*, the other,
more over the higher,

(393) ^h**- further vjk descend Ihr urJer uf Uiia Uistnbu-
tiou, ui omcli the simpler become« the action, therelore
the more nearly common sense becomes aU that is npquired.
but so much the griTHtirr bcici;pines the jjerson^i d^uiger, and
consequently pcr«onaJ courage is so much the more
required.

(594) The higher we ;iKeii<l in this ordtr» the more
iraportflni and ihc more fratjght with consequences
becomes ttie action ol individuals, because the subjects
decided by individuals are more or lese those on which the
whole is dcpcndpnt- From this it follows that fhp power
of taking a general and comprehensive view is the more
required,

(595) ^*^^ c4?rt[UnJy the iiigher position has always a
wider huri»on^ overlooks the whole much better than a
lower one ; still the most commanding view which can be
obtained in a high position in the couree of an action is
insuilicientt and it is therelore. also, chießy there where so
much must be done by tact oi judgment, and in rehance
on good fortunt'.

(59Ö) Thi& becomes always more the characteristic of
the command &a the combat advances, for as the combat
ndvancps, the condition of tilings deviates so much the
fuflherfromthcfii^tstalcwith which we were acquainted.

(597) ^^"^ longer Ihc combat has laslcdn the more
accidents (thut i^ evE^nts not calculated upon) hnve tnken
place in it ; thereiote the more everything has loosened
itself from the bonds of regularity, the more everything
^Lppears disorderly and confus^rf here ;md Ihere.

■ (59^) I^ut the further the combat is Advanced, the more

■ the dociaions begin to muHiply them*clvcs. the faster

336

ON WAR
succession, the less time remains fof

they follow in

(599) Thus \t haippens that by degr««« tvta the higher
brancliGt— especiully at patticiilnr pnint:t and motncikts —
arc duwn into the vortex, whore per&oiLaJ courage is worth
more than rejection, and constituK-s atmoat everything.

{boo) fn tliis way m every cumUkt the t:otiibiiiutiun»
exhaust themsdv&s ^adu^üly, and At ]ksi it U aJ0K»t
courage alone which continues to fight and act.

(öoij We see» therdore, thai it is courage, liud tiildti-
gcnce (elevated by it, which have to overcome tiit difEen!-
ties Uidt oppose themselvr» to the execution cf commands
How far they can do so or not u not the question, btcauu
thti advcr^ry ts in the same situation ; our errors and
nust^ikes, thereXore» in the majority of cases, will be
balanced by hi^. But that which is an important point
is that tve should not bo inferior to the adverfiar^/ in
courage and intelligence, but ^bove all tTiin^ in the first-

(602) At the same time ihare is still one quality which
ja Jiere ol great importance : it is the fact of jutigmtiU.
This is not purely an inboni lalent i it i& cbie£y piactice
whicli faimliunäe^ us with tact? and appearancei^ and
makcä the discoveiy o( the truth, therefore a right judg*
mcnt. almost habiit*al. Herein con^iats the chief value ol
experience in War, as weil as the f^teal advantage wliicli
It give» an Army.

(603) Lastiy, we have still (ti oh^rve that, if circiim-<
stances in the conduct ol War always mvest what i& near
with an undue Imporlance over that which is higher or
more remote, lliis imperfect view of things can only be
compensated tor by the Commander, in the uocntainty
US to whether he has done righl, seeking I0 make his action
at loAsl dtciiive. This will be done d he strives to realise
all the pu«ait>Ie results which can be derived Jrom it. lA
this nmrmor the whole (oE the action), which sliould always

GUIDE TO TACTICS

if possible be conducted from a high standpoint, where
such A point Cannot be attained^ wtU at least be CAiried in
some certain directn?n from a secondary point.

We shall try to make Ihia plainer by an ilIü4irai:on.
When in the tempest of a great t^nttle a General of Division
is thrown out o[ his connection with tlie general plan, and
is imccrtain wheth^fr he ^ould still risk an attack or not»
then a he resolves upon mflting an attack, in dning *o the
only way to f«d satisfied, both as regards his own action
and the whole battle, is by striving not merely to make his
attack successful, but also to obtain ^uch a success as will
repair any reverse which may have in the meantime
occurred at other points,

(604) Such a course of action is called in a restricted
ftonte Toolute. The view, therefore, which we have her*
given — namely, that chance can only be governed in this
manner^leads to resolution, which prevents any half-
measures, and is the most briUiant quality in the conduct
of a great battle.

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