Outlines of psychology

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OUTLINES

OF

PSYCHOLOGY

BY

WILHELM WUNDT

TRANSLATED WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE AUTHOR

BY
CHARLES HUBBARD JUDD, Ph. D. (LEIPZIG)

INSTEUCTOE OF PSYCHOLOGY, YALE TJNIVEESITY

SECOND REVISED ENGLISH EDITION
FROM THE FOURTH REVISED GERMAN EDITION

LEIPZIG

PUBLISHED BY WILHELM ENGELMANN
LONDON I NEW YORK

WILLIAMS & NOEGATE | GTJSTAV E. STECHEET

1902.

fofU-z.

J?

q^

TKANSLATOE'S PEEFACE

TO FIEST ENGLISH EDITION.

IhIS translation lias been made with the cooperation
of the author, who has not only contributed many valuable
criticisms and suggestions in regard to terminology, but has
read all the proof-sheets as they were being prepared for
the press. A few verbal changes have been introduced into
the text with a view to making the discussion somewhat
clearer.

The difficulties that arise in choosing English equivalents
for many German words, are too familiar to require detailed
discussion. The translator has derived assistance in this
respect from a comparison of other standard translations,
especially the English versions of Falokenberg's "History
of Modern Philosophy", Wundt's "Lectures on Human and
Animal Psychology", and KIjlpe's "Outlines of Psychology".
The terminology here employed differs, however, at many
points from that used in the works mentioned. A glossary
of the principal terms has been added for the benefit of
those familiar with the German. The translation of the
word ''Perceptions^ is unusual. If it were translated 'per-
ception' it would be easily confused, especially in its verbal
forms, with the only possible equivalent of " Wahrnehmung^^
'' wahrnehmen''\ and '' Anschauung'^\ Since the process re-

IV Translator's Preface to first English Translation.

f erred to by '^Perception'''' is so entirely different from that
indicated by the English word perception, it seemed best to
employ a word whose signification is not so fixed. Apprehen-
sion was, accordingly, used, and the danger of confusing it
with the translation of "Auffassung" was for the most part
avoided by using other equivalents for the latter.

The thanks of the translator are due to the author for
his courtesy throughout the progress of the work. Mr. Gr. H.
Stempel has kindly aided in the task of preparing the proof-
sheets for the press.

Middletown, September, 1896.

C. H. J.

AUTHOE'S PEEFACE

TO THE FIRST GEEIAN EDITION.

i HIS book has been written primarily for the purpose
of furnishing my students with a brief manual to supplement
the lectures on Psychology. At the same time it aims to
give the wider circle of scientific scholars who are interested
in psychology, either for its own sake or for the sake of its
application^, (a systematic survey' 'of the fundamentally im-
portant results and doctrines of modern psychologyj In view"
of this double purpose, I have limited myself in detailing
facts to that which is most important, or to the examples
that serve most directly the ends of illustration, and have
omitted entirely those aids to demonstration and experiment
which are properly made use of in the lecture-room. The
fact that I have based this treatise on the doctrines that
I have come to hold as valid after long years of labor in
this field, needs no special justification. Still, I have not
neglected to point out both in a general characterization
(Introduction § 2), and with references in detail, the chief
theories that differ from the one here presented.

The relation in which this book stands to my earlier
psychological works will be apparent after what has been
said. The " Orundzilge der physiologischen Psychologies^ aims
to bring the means employed by the natural sciences,

yi Author's Preface to the first German Edition

especially by physiology, into the service of psychology, and
to give a critical presentation of the experimental methods
of psychology, which have developed in the last few decades,
together with their chief results. This special problem ren-
dered necessary a relative subordination of the general psy-
chological points of view. The second, revised edition of
the '' Vorlesungen uber die Menschen- und ThierseeW'' ^) (the
first edition has long been out of date) seeks to give a more
popular account of the character and purpose of experimental
psychology, and to discuss from the position thus defined
those psychological questions which are also of more general
philosophical importance. While the treatment in the " Orund-
zilge'^ is, accordingly, determined, in the main, by the rela-
tions of psychology to physiology, and the treatment in the
^''Vorlesungen^^ by philosophical interests, this Outlines aims
to present psychology in its own proper coherency, and in
the systematic order that the nature of the subject-matter
seems to me to require. In doing this, however, it takes up
only what is most important and essential. It is my hope
that this book will not be an entirely unwelcome addition
even for those readers who are familiar with my earlier works
as well as with the discussion of the ''Logik der Psychologie'"'
in my '^Logik der Geisteswissenschaften'^ (Logik, 2. Aufl., 11^
2. Abtk.).

1 have not thought it necessary to repeat here the refer-
ences to psychological works, in view of the fact that I have
given such references very fully under the various heads in
my '^ Grundzilge^\ The reader who wishes to make a more

1) Translated by Prof. J. E. Creighton and Prof. E. B. Titchener:
'^Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology''^ Swan Sonnenschein & Co.,
1894.

Author's Preface to the first German Edition. VII

thorough study of any particular question will turn in any
case to the more elaborate work. For the literature that
has appeared in this department since the fourth edition of
the '' Orundzuge'^ (1893), the reader has but to refer to the
last volumes of the various periodicals devoted to psychology :
to the ''Philosophische Studien^\ the '^ Zeitschrift fiir Psy-
chologie und Physiologie der 8innesorgane^\ the '^Americmi
Journal of Psychology ^\ and the '' Psychological Review ^\
The last three contain also reviews of the current literature
in psychology. As a recent addition to these the ^'Psycho-
logische Arheiten^'' edited by E. Kraepelin and devoted especi-
ally to individual characterology and practical psychology,
may be mentioned.

Leipzig, January, 1896.

W. Wundt.

AUTHOE'S PEEFACE

TO THE FOURTH GEEIAN EDITIOI!^.

IHIS fourth edition contains more additions and minor
revisions than do the second and third editions. The chief
change is one which I have introduced in compHance with
a request that has frequently been made; this change con-
sists in the addition of brief lists of reading references at
the end of each of the sections and chief divisions. These
references, in keeping with the general character of the
book, must of course be limited to the most important con-
tributions to the discussions in question; and not all the
important references can be given, but those must be selected
which will furnish the reader who wishes to go into the
subject more thoroughly with easy means of finding further
references for his study. Sections of my '^Grundzuge der
psysiologischen Psychologie^\ and my '^Vorlesungen uher die
Menschen- und Thierseele", which have been included in
these lists of references are cited from the fourth and third
editions respectively, and are referred to by abbreviated
titles n.

1) In the English edition the titles have been given in full,
that of the Grundziige in its German form, that of the Vorlesungen
in the form adopted by the translators, '^Lectures on Human and
Psychology^\ Tr.

Author's Preface to the fourth German Edition. IX

The '^Lectures'^ may serve in a certain sense as a supple-
ment to the '•^Outlines^\ for the Lectures contain a more
complete elementary discussion of the experimental methods
of psychology and also certain diagrammatic figures. For the
benefit of readers of the Outlines who are not otherwise
supplied with these aids, I have given page and number ref-
erences to the figures in the Lectures.

Leipzig, March, 1901.

W. Wundt.

TKANSLATOE'S PKEFACE

TO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION.

iHIS second edition includes all tliat the author has
incorporated in the fourth German edition. The most ex-
tended additions to the text are to be found on the following
pages of this edition: 18—20, 50, 78—79, 94, 97—99, 108,
110—113, 127, 138, 184-185, 192—193, 221—222, 232
—233, 248—251, 271—274, 285—286, 306—307, 330, 341
— 345, 346 — 349. There are also a number of lesser revi-
sions. The reading references which the author inserted in
his fourth edition are repeated without change !of any kind
except the substitution of English titles for German titles
wherever this was possible. Since the references are pre-
sented by the author as a selected bibliography, it did not
seem wise to make any additions. The pages on which these
referenes appear in this edition are given in the index under
"References".

Changes have been freely introduced in the phraseology
of the English translation. It has not been necessary to
make any signii&cant changes in the terminology adopted for
the earlier edition. The translator is under obligations to
the reviewers of his work, and to a number of those who
have used the book as a class text-book for suggestions of
which he has taken advantage in his work of revision. It is

Translator'' s Preface to the Second English Edition. XI

hoped that these friendly critics will find the present form
of the translation improved at points where the earlier edition
may have been open to objection. Finally, the translator
wishes to acknowledge his obhgations to the publisher who
has spared no pains in effort to make as easy as possible
the difficult task of putting an English book through a
German press.

New Haven, 1902.

C. H. J.

CONTENTS.

INTEODUCTION.

§ 1. Problem of Psychology 1

1. Older definitions. 2. Psychology as the science of
immediate experience. 3. Relation to the mental and to
the natural sciences. 3 a. Knowledge as gained through
the natural sciences mediate and conceptual, that gained
in psychology immediate and perceptual.

§ 2. GrENERAL FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGY 6

1. Metaphysical psychology: spiritualistic and material-
istic, dualistic and monistic systems. 2. Empirical psy-
chology: two principles for the classification of its varieties.
3. Psychology of the inner sense. 4. Psychology as the
science of immediate experience. 5, Descriptive psychol-
ogy: faculty-psychology. 6. Explanatory psychology: in-
tellectualistic and voluntaristic psychology. 7. Intellec-
tualistic forms: logical theory and association psychology.
8. Erroneous intellectualistic attribution of the nature of
things to ideas. 9. Voluntaristic psychology. 10. Govern-
ing principles of the following treatise. 10a. Tabular sum-
mary of chief forms. Their historical development.

§ 3. Methods of Psychology . . . „ 23

1. Relation of experiment and observation in general.
2. Application to psychology: particular significance of ex-
perimental methods for psychology. 3. Pure observation
in psychology. Analysis of mental products: social psy-
chology.

XIV Contents.

page
§ 4. GrENERAL SURVEY OF THE SUBJECT 29

1. Analytic and synthetic problem of psychology. Psy-
chical elements. 2. The various synthetic problems in order:
psychical compounds, interconnections, and developments.
3. Laws of psychical phenomena and their causality.

I. PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS.

§ 5. Chief Forms and Gteneral Attributes of Psy-
chical Elements 32

1. Discovery of psychical elements through abstrac-
tion. 2. Two kinds of psychical elements: sensations and
feelings. 3. Elementary nature and specific character of
psychical processes not identical. 4. Common attributes of
psychical elements : quality and intensity. 5. Homogeneous
and complex, one-dimensional, two-dimensional, and many-
dimensional systems of quality. 6. Distinguishing charac-
teristics of sensational and affective elements. 6a. Remarks
on the history of the concepts sensation and feeling.

§ 6. Pure Sensations 42

1. The concept pure sensation. 2. Rise of sensations.
Sense-stimuli, 3. Physiological substrata of the sensational
systems. Mechanical and chemical senses. 4. The so-called
law of specific energy of nerves. 5. The law of parallelism
of changes in sensation and physiological stimulation.
5 a. On the history of the concept "specific energy".

A. Sensations of the general sense 51

6. Definition of the general sense. Sensational systems
of this sense. 7. Attributes and differences of the various
parts of the organ of the general sense. 8. The four systems
of the general sense in detail.

B. Sensations of sound 55

9. Simple noise sensations. 10. Tone sensations. 11. The
system of tone sensations.

C. Sensations of smell and taste 59

12. Sensations of smell. 12 a. Classes of olfactory
qualities. Reciprocal neutralization of odors. 13. Sensa-
tions of taste. The four primary qualities. 13a. Mixture
and neutralization of gustatory stimuli.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. PEOBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGY.

1. Two definitions of psychology have been the most
prominent in the history of this science. According to one,
psychology is the "science of mind": psychical processes are
regarded as phenomena from which it is possible to infer
the nature of an underlying metaphysical mind-substance.
According to the other, psychology is the "science of inner
experience": psychical processes are here looked upon as
belonging to a specific form of experience, which is readily
distinguished by the fact that its contents are known through
"introspection", or through the "inner sense", as it is called,
if one uses the phrase which has been employed to distin-
guish introspection from sense-perception through the outer
senses.

Neither of these definitions, however, is satisfactory to
the psychology of to-day. The first, or metaphysical, defini-
tion belongs to a period of development that lasted longer
in this science than in others, but is here too forever left
behind, since psychology has developed into an empirical
discipline, operating with methods of its own; and since the
"mental sciences" have gained recognition as a great de-
partment of scientific investigation, distinct from the sphere
of the natural sciences, and requiring as a general ground-

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 1

2 Introduction.

work an independent psychology, free from all metaphysical
theories.

The second, or empirical, definition, which sees in psychol-
ogy a "science of inner experience", is inadequate because
it may give rise to the misunderstanding that psychology has
to do with objects totally different from the objects of so-
called "outer experience". It is, indeed, true that there are
certain contents of experience which belong in the sphere of
psychological investigation, and are not to be found among
the objects and processes studied by natural science: such
are our feelings, emotions, and decisions. On the other hand,
there is not a single natural phenomenon that may not,
from a different point of view, become an object of psychol-
ogy. A stone, a plant, a tone, a ray of light, are, when
treated as natural phenomena, objects of mineralogy, botany,
physics, etc. In so far, however, as they are at the same
time ideas., they are objects of psychology, for psychology
seeks to account for the genesis of these ideas, and for their
relations, both to other ideas and to those psychical proc-
esses, such as feelings, volitions, etc., which are not referred
to external objects. There is, then, no such thing as an
"inner sense" which can be regarded as an organ of intro-
spection, and as distinct from the outer senses, or organs
of objective perception. The ideas of which psychology seeks
to investigate the attributes, are identical with those upon
which natural science is based; while the subjective activities
of feeling, emotion, and volition, which are neglected in
natural science, are not known through special organs, but
are directly and inseparably connected with the ideas referred
to external objects.

2. It follows, then, that the expressions outer and inner
experience do not indicate different objects, but different
^points of view from which we take up the consideration and

§ 1. Problem of Psychology. 3

scientific treatment of a unitary experience. We are natu-
rally led to these points of view, because every concrete ex-
perience immediately divides into two factors: into a content
presented to us, and our apprehension of tliis content. We
call tlie first of these factors objects of experience^ the second,
experiencing subject. This division indicates two directions
for the treatment of experience. One is that of the natural
scie7ices, which concern themselves with the objects of ex-
perience, thought of as independent of the subject. {The other
is that of psychology^ which investigates the whole content of
experience in its relations to the subject and also in regard
to the attributes which this content derives directly from the
subject. The point of view of natural science may, accord-
ingly, be designated as that of mediate experience^ since it
is possible only after abstracting from the subjective factor
present in all actual experience; the point of view of psy-
chology, on the other hand, may be designated as that of
immediate experience, since it purposely does away with this
abstraction and all its consequences.

3. The assignment of this problem to psychology, making
it a general, empirical science coordinate with the natural
sciences, and supplementary to them, is justified by the method
of all the mental sciences^ for which psychology furnishes
the basis. All of these sciences: philology, history and
political and social science, have as their subject-matter,
immediate experience as determined by the interaction of
objects with knowing and acting subjects. None of the
mental sciences employs the abstractions and hypothetical
supplementary concepts of natural science; quite otherwise,
they all accept ideas and the accompanying subjective
activities as immediate reality. The effort is then made
to explain the single components of this reality through
their mutual interconnections. This method of psychological

1*

4 Introduction.

interpretation employed in each of the special mental
sciences, must also be the mode of procedure in psychol-
ogy itself.

3 a. Since natural science investigates the content of ex-
perience after abstracting from the experiencing subject, its
problem is usually stated as that of acquiring "knowledge of
the outer world". By the expression outer world is meant the
sum total of all the objects presented in experience. The problem
of psychology has sometimes been correspondingly defined as
"self-knowledge of the subject". This definition is, however,
inadequate, because the interaction of the subject with the outer
world and with other similar subjects is just as much a part
of the problem of psychology as are the attributes of the single
subject. Furthermore, the expression can easily be interpreted
to mean that the outer world and the subject are separate
components of experience, or, at least, components which can be
distinguished as independent contents of experience, whereas, in
truth, outer experience is always connected with the apprehending
and knowing functions of the subject, and inner experience always
contains ideas from the outer world as indispensable components.
This interconnection is the necessary result of the fact that in
reality experience is not a mere juxtaposition of different elements,
but a single organized whole which requires in each of its
components the subject that apprehends the content, and the
objects that are presented as content. For this reason natural
science can not abstract from the knowing subject entirely, but
only from those attributes of the subject which either disappear
entirely when we remove the subject in thought, as, for example,
the feelings, or from those attributes which, on the ground of
physical researches, must be regarded as belonging to the subject,
as, for example, the qualities of sensations. Psychology, on the
contrary, has as its subject of treatment the total content of
experience in its immediate character.

The only ground, then, for the division between natural
science on the one hand, and psychology and the mental sciences
on the other, is to be found in the fact that all experience
contains as its factors a content objectively presented, and an
experiencing subject. It is to be noted, however, that it is by

§ 1. Problem of Psychology. 5

no means necessary that logical definitions of these two factors
should precede the separation of the sciences from one another,
for it is obvious that such definitions are possible only after
they have a basis in the investigations of natural science and
of psychology, they can never precede these investigations. All
that it is necessary to presuppose at first, is the conscious-
ness which accompanies all experience, that in this experi-
ence objects are being presented to a subject. There can, at
this early stage, be no knowledge of the conditions upon
which the distinction is based, or of the definite characteristics
by which one factor is to be distinguished from the other. Even
the use of the terms object and subject in this connection must
be regarded as the application to the first stage of experience,
of distinctions which are reached only through developed logical
reflection.

The forms of interpretation in natural science and psychol-
ogy are supplementary, not only in the sense that the first
considers objects after abstracting, as far as possible, from the
subject, while the second has to do with the part which the
subject plays in the rise of experience; but they are also sup-
plementary in the sense that each takes a different point of
view in considering any single content of experience. Natural
science seeks to discover the nature of objects without ref-
erence to the subject. The knowledge that it produces is
therefore mediate or conceptual. In place of the immediate ob-
jects of experience, it sets concepts gained from these objects
by abstracting from the subjective components of our, ideas.
This abstraction makes it necessary, continually to supplement
reality with hypothetical elements. Scientific analysis shows that
many components of experience — as, for example, sensations
— are subjective effects of objective processes. These objective
processes in their objective character, independent of the subject,
can therefore never be a part of experience. Science makes up
for this lack of direct contact with the objective processes by
forming supplementary hypothetical concepts of the objective
properties of matter. Psychology, on the other hand, investigates
the contents of experience in their complete and actual form,
both the ideas that are referred to objects, and also the sub-
jective processes that cluster about these ideas. The knowledge

6 Introduction.

thus gained in psychology is, therefore, immediate B,nd j^erceptual:
perceptual in the broad sense of the term in which, not only
sense-perceptions, but all concrete reality is distinguished from
all that is abstract and conceptual in thought. Psychology can
exhibit the interconnection of the contents of experience, as
these interconnections are actually presented to the subject, only
by avoiding entirely the abstractions and supplementary concepts
of natural science. Thus, while natural science and psychology
are both empirical sciences in the sense that they aim to explain
the contents of experience, though from different points of view,
it is obvious that, in consequence of the special character of its
problem, psychology is the more strictly empirical.

§ 2. GENERAL FOEMS OF PSYCHOLOaY.

1. The view that psychology is an empirical science which
deals, not with a limited group of specific contents of ex-
perience, but with the immediate contents of all experience,
is of recent origin. It encounters even in the science of to-
day hostile views, which are to be looked upon, in general,
as the survivals of earlier stages of development, and which
are in turn arrayed against one another according to their
attitudes on the question of the relations of psychology to
philosophy and to the other sciences. On the basis of the
two definitions mentioned above (§ 1, 1) as being the most
widely accepted, two chief forms of psychology may be dis-
tinguished: iTietaphysical psychology and empirical psychology.
Each is further divided into a number of special tendencies.

Metaphysical psychology generally values very little the
empirical analysis and causal interpretation of psychical
processes. Regarding psychology as a part of philosophical
metaphysics, its chief effort is directed toward the discovery
of a definition of the "nature of mind" that shall be in ac-
cord with the metaphysical system to which the particular

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 7

form of psychology belongs. After a metaphysical concept
of mind has thus been established, the attempt is made to
deduce from it the actual content of psychical experience.
The characteristic that distinguishes metaphysical psychology
from empirical psychology is, then, to be found in the attempt
of metaphysical psychology to deduce psychical processes , not
from other psychical processes, but from some substratum
entirely unhke these processes themselves: either from the
manifestations of a special mind-substance, or from the at-
tributes and processes of matter. According as the sub-
stratum of psychical processes is defined in the one way or
the other, metaphysical psychology branches off in tiw di-
rections. In the first place, it may become spiritualistic
psychology^ in which case it considers psychical processes as
the manifestations of a specific mind-substance and regards
this mind-substance either as essentially different from matter
[dualism], or as related in nature to matter (monism or
monadology). The metaphysical tendency of spiritualistic
psychology is expressed in the assumption of the supersensible
nature of mind, and in connection with this, the assumption
of the immortality of the mind. Sometimes the further notion
of preexistence is also added. In the second place met^^
physical psychology may become materialistic psychology. It
then refers psychical processes to the same material sub-
stratum as that which natural science employs for the hypo-
thetical explanation of natural phenomena. According to this
view, psychical processes, like physical vital processes, are
connected with certain organizations of material particles which
are formed during the life of the individual and broken up
at the end of that life. The metaphysical character of this
form of psychology is determined by its denial that the mind
is supersensible in its nature as is asserted by spiritualistic
psychology. In order to make good its position such a

8 Introduction.

materialistic form of psychology resorts to one of the two
following devices. It may explain the content of psycho-
logical experience by means of a vague and inexact theory
of molecular processes in the brain [mechanical materiaHsm) ;
or it may regard sensation as a necessary attribute, either
of all material particles, or else of brain molecules in par-
ticular, in which case it treats all complex mental processes
as combinations of such sensations, and explains their rise
as the result of various combinations of physical brain proc-
esses [psycho-physical materialism). Materialism in its various
forms and spiritualistic psychology in its various forms, agree
in this: they do not seek to interpret psychical experience,
by experience itself, but rather attempt to derive this ex-
perience from some kind of presuppositions in regard to
hypothetical processes which are assumed to take place in
some metaphysical substratum.

2. From the strife that followed these attempts at meta-
physical explanation, empirical psychology arose. Wherever
empirical psychology is consistently carried out, it either
strives to arrange psychical processes under general concepts
derived directly from the interconnection of these processes
themselves, or it begins with certain of these processes, as a
rule with the simpler ones, and then explains the more com-
plicated processes as the results of the interaction of those
with which it began. There may be various fundamental
principles upon which to base such an empirical interpreta-
tion, and thus it becomes possible to distinguish several
varieties of empirical psychology. In general, these may be
classified according to two principles of division. The first
principle has reference to the relation of inner and outer
experience, and to the attitude which the two branches of
empirical science, namely, natural science and psychology,
take toward each other. The second principle refers to the

<^ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 9

facts themselves, or to the derived concepts v^hich are em-
ployed in the interpretation of mental processes. Every
system of empirical psychology takes its place under both of
these principles of classification.

3. On the general question as to the nature of psychical
expedience there stand over against each other the two forms
of psychology already mentioned (§ 1) on account of their
decisive significance in determining the problem of psychol-
ogy: psychology of the inner sense ^ and psychology as the
science of immediate experience. The first treats psychical
processes as contents of a special sphere of experience coor-
dinate with the sphere of experiences which are derived
through the outer senses, and are assigned to the natural
sciences. It also holds that the two spheres of experience
though coordinate are totally different from each other. The
second form of psychology, namely, psychology as the science
of immediate experience, recognizes no real difference between
inner and outer experience, but finds the distinction only in
the different points of view from which unitary experience
is considered in the two cases.

The first of these two varieties of empirical psychology is
the older. It arose primarily through the effort to establish the
independence of psychological observation, in the face of the
encroachments of natural philosophy. In thus coordinating
natural science and psychology, it sees the justification for the
equal recognition of both spheres of science in the fact that they
have entirely different objects and modes of perceiving these
objects. This view has influenced empirical psychology in two
ways. First, it favored the opinion that psychology should
employ empirical methods, at the same time holding that these
methods, like psychological experience, should be fundamen-
tally different from those of natural science. Secondly, it gave
rise to the necessity of showing some connection or other

10 Introduction.

between these two kinds of experience, which were supposed
to be different. In response to the first demand, it was chiefly
the psychology of the inner sense that developed the method of
pure introspection (§ 3, 2). In attempting to solve the second
problem, this psychology was necessarily driven back to a
metaphysical basis, because of its assumption of a difference
between the physical and the psychical contents of experience.
For, from the very nature of the case, it is impossible, from
the position here taken, to explain the relations of inner to
outer experience, or the so-called "interaction between body
and mind", except through metaphysical presuppositions.
These presuppositions must then, in turn, affect the psycho-
logical investigation itself in such a way as to result in the
importation of metaphysical hypotheses into it.

4. Essentially distinct from the psychology of the inner
sense is the form of psychology which defines itself as "the
science of immediate experience". Eegarding, as it does,
outer and inner experience, not as different paxts of experience,
but as different ways of looking at one and the same ex-
perience, this form of psychology cannot admit any funda-
mental difference between the methods of psychology and
those of natural science. It has, therefore, sought above all
to cultivate experimental methods wliich shall lead to just
such an exact analysis of psychical processes as that which
the explanatory natural sciences undertake in the case of
natural phenomena, the only differences being those which
arise from the diverse points of view. This form of psychol-
ogy holds, furthermore, that the special mental sciences
which have to do with concrete mental processes and cre-
ations, stand on the same basis as itself, that is, on the
basis of a scientific consideration of the immediate contents
of experience and of their relations to acting subjects. It
follows, then, that psychological analysis of the most general

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 11

mental products, such as language, mythological ideas, and
laws of custom, is to be regarded as an aid to the under-
standing of all the more complicated psychical processes. In
its methods, accordingly, this form of psychology stands in
close relation to other sciences: as experimental psychology,
to the natural sciences ; as social psychology^ to the special
mental sciences.

Finally, from this point of view, the question of the rela-
tion between psychical and physical objects disappears en-
tirely. They are not different objects at all, but one and
the same content of experience. This content is examined
in the one case, that is, in the natural sciences, after ab-
stracting from the subject. In the other case, that is, in
psychology, it is examined with a view to discovering its
immediate character and its complete relation to the subject.
All metaphysical hypotheses as to the relation of psychical
and physical objects are, when viewed from this position,
attempts to solve a problem that never would have existed
if the case had been correctly stated. Psychology must then
dispense with metaphysical supplementary hypotheses in re-
gard to the interconnection of psychical processes, because
these processes are the immediate contents of experience.
Another method of pfocedure, however, is open since inner
and outer experience are supplementary points of view.
Wherever breaks appear in the interconnection of psychical
processes, it is allowable to carry on the investigation ac-
cording to the physical methods of considering these same
processes, in order to discover whether the absent link can
be thus supplied. The same holds for the reserve method
of filling up the breaks in the continuity of our physiological
knowledge, by means of elements derived from psychological
investigation. Only on the basis of such a view, which sets
the two forms of knowledge in their true relation, is it

12 Tntroduetion.

possible for psychology to become in the fullest sense an em-
pirical science. Only in this way, too, can physiology become
the true supplementary science of psychology, and psychol-
ogy, on the other hand, the auxiliary of physiology.

5. Under the second principle of classification mentioned
above (2), that is, the 'principle based on the facts or concepts
luitli which the hivestigation of psychical processes begins^
there are two varieties of empirical psychology to be distin-
guished. They are, furthermore, successive stages in the
development of psychological interpretation. The first cor-
responds to a descriptive^ the second to an explanatory stage.
The attempt to present a discriminating description of the
different psychical processes, gave rise to the need of an
appropriate classification. Class-concepts were formed, under
which the various processes were grouped; and the attempt
was made to satisfy the need of an interpretation in each
particular case, by subsuming the components of a given
compound process under their proper class-concepts. Such
concepts are, for example, sensation, knowledge, attention,
memory, imagination, understanding, and will. They correspond
to the general concepts of physics which are derived from
the immediate perception of natural phenomena, such as
weight, heat, sound, and light. Like those concepts of
physics, the derived psychical concepts mentioned may serve
as a first means of grouping the facts, but they contribute
nothing whatever to the explanation of these facts. Empirical
psychology has, however, often been guilty of confounding
this description with explanation. Thus, the faculty-psychol-
ogy considered these class-concepts as psychical forces or
faculties, and referred psychical processes to their separate
or united activity.

6. Opposed to this method of treatment found in de-
scriptive faculty-psychology, is that of explanatory psychol-

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 13

ogy. When consistently empirical, the latter must base its
interpretations on certain facts which themselves belong to
psychical experience. These facts may, however, be taken
from different spheres of psychical activity, and so it comes
that explanatory treatment may be further divided into two
varieties that correspond respectively to the two factors, ob-
jects and subject, which go to make up immediate experience.
When the chief emphasis is laid on the objects of immediate
experience, intellectualistic psychology results. This attempts
to derive all psychical processes, especially the subjective
feelings, impulses, and volitions, from ideas ^ or intellectual
processes as they may be called on account of their impor-
tance for knowledge of the objective world. If, on the con-
trary, the chief emphasis is laid on the way in which imme-
diate experience arises in the subject, there results a variety
of explanatory psychology which attributes to those subjec-
tive activities which are not referred to external objects, a
position as independent as that assigned to ideas. This
variety has been called voluntaristic psychology^ because of
the importance that must be conceded to vohtional processes
in comparison with other subjective processes.

Of the two varieties of psychology which result from the
different general attitudes on the question of the nature of
inner experience (3), that form which we have called psychol-
ogy of the inner sense commonly tends towards intellec-
tualism. This is due to the fact that, when the inner sense
is coordinated with the outer senses, the contents of psychical
experience which first attract consideration are those which
are presented as objects to this inner sense, in a manner
analogous to that in which natural objects are presented
to the outer senses. It is assumed, accordingly, that the
character of objects can be attributed to ideas alone of
all the contents of psychical experience, because ideas are

14 Introduction.

regarded as images of the external objects presented to the
outer senses. Ideas are, thus, looked upon as the only real
objects of the inner sense, while all processes not referred
to external objects, as, for example, the feelings, are inter-
preted as obscure ideas, or ideas related to one's own body,
or^ finally, as effects arising from combinations of ideas.

The psychology of immediate experience (4), on the other
hand, tends toward voluntarism. It is obvious that here,
where the chief problem of psychology is held to be the
investigation of the subjective rise of all experience, special
attention will be devoted to those factors from which natural
science abstracts.

7. Intellectualistic psychology has in the course of its
development separated into two forms. In one, the logical
processes of judgment and reasoning are regarded as the
typical forms of all psychoses; in the other, certain combi-
nations of successive memory ideas distinguished by their
frequency, the so-called associations of ideas ^ are accepted
as typical. The logical theory is most clearly related to the
popular method of psychological interpretation and is, there-
fore, the older. It finds some acceptance even in modern
times. The association theory arose from the philosophical
empiricism of the last century. The two theories stand, to
a certain extent, in antithesis, since the first attempts to
reduce the totahty of psychical processes to higher processes,
while the latter seeks to reduce this same totality of proc-
esses to lower and, as it is assumed, simpler forms of in-
tellectual activity. Both are one-sided, and not only fail to
explain affective and volitional processes on the basis of the
assumption with which they start, but are not able to give
a complete interpretation even of the intellectual processes.

8. The union of psychology of the inner sense with the
intellectuahstic view has led to a peculiar assumption that

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 15

has been in many cases fatal to psychological theory. We
may define this assumption briefly as the erroneous and in-
tellectualistic attribution of the nature of things., to ideas.
Not only was an analogy assumed between the objects of the
so-called inner sense and those of the outer senses, but the
former were regarded as the images of the latter; and so
it came that the attributes which natural science ascribes to
external objects, were transferred to the immediate objects
of the "inner sense", that is, to ideas. The assumption was
made, accordingly, that ideas are themselves permanent things,
just as much as the external objects to which we refer them;
that these ideas disappear from consciousness and come back
into it; that they may, indeed, be more or less intensely
and clearly perceived, according as the inner sense is stimu-
lated through the outer senses or not, and according to the
degree of attention concentrated upon them, but that on the
whole they remain unchanged in qualitative character.

9. In all these respects voluntaristic psychology is opposed
to intellectualism. While the latter assumes an inner sense
and specific objects of inner experience, voluntarism is related
to the view that inner experience is identical with imme-
diate experience. According to this doctrine, the content of
psychological experience does not consist of a sum of objects,
presented to the subject, but it consists of all that which
makes up the process of experience, that is, of all the ex-
periences of the subject in their immediate character, un-
modified by abstraction or reflection. It follows of necessity
that the contents of psychological experience are here re-
garded as an interconnection of processes. Psychical facts
are occurrences^ not objects ; they take place, like all occur-
rences, in time and are never the same at a given point in
time as they were the preceding moment. In this sense
volitions are typical of all psychical processes. Voluntaristic

16 Introduction.

psychology does not by any means assert that volition is the
only real form of psychosis, but merely that, with its closely
related feehngs and emotions, volition is just as essential a
component of psychological experience as are sensations and
ideas. It holds, further, that all other psychical processes
are to be thought of after the analogy of volitions, they too
being a series of continuous changes in time, not a sum of
permanent objects, as intellectualism generally assumes in
consequence of its erroneous attribution to ideas of those
properties which we attribute to external objects. The rec-
ognition of the immediate reality of psychological experience
renders impossible any attempt to derive the particular com-
ponents of psychical phenomena from processes specifically
different from the experiences themselves. The analogous
attempts of metaphysical psychology to derive all conscious
processes from imaginary processes of an hypothetical substra-
tum, are for the same reason inconsistent with the real
problem of psychology. "While psychology concerns itself,
accordingly, with immediate experience, it nevertheless as-
sumes from the first that all psychical contents contain ob-
jective as well as subjective factors. These are to be dis-
tinguished only through deliberate abstraction, and can never
appear as really separate processes. In fact, observation
teaches that there are no ideas which do not arouse in us
feelings and impulses of different intensities, and also that
a feehng or a volition which does not refer to some ideated
object is altogether impossible.

10. The governing principles of the psychological position
maintained in the following chapters may be summed up in
three general statements.

1) Inner, or psychological, experience is not a special
sphere of experience apart from others, but is iminediate
experience in its totality.

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 17

2) This immediate experience is not made up of unchang-
ing contents, but of an interconnected system of occurrences'^
not of objects, but of processes^ of universal human experi-
ences and their relations in accordance with certain laws.

3) Each of these processes contains an objective content
and a subjective process., thus including the general con-
ditions both of all knowledge and of all practical human
activity.

Corresponding to these three general principles, we have
a threefold relation of psychology to the other sciences.

1) As the science of immediate experience, it is supple-
mentary to the natural sciences^ which, in consequence of
their abstraction from the subject, have to do only with the
objective', mediate contents of experience. Any particular
fact can, strictly speaking, be understood in its full sig-
nificance only after it has been subjected to the analyses of
both natural science and psychology. In this sense, then,
physics and physiology are auxiliary to psychology, and the
latter is, in turn, supplementary to the natural sciences.

2) As the science of the universal forms of immediate
human experience and their combination in accordance with
certain laws, it is the foundation of the mental sciences. These
sciences treat in all cases of the activities issuing from im-
mediate human experiences, and of the effects of such activities.
Since psychology has for its problem the investigation of the
forms and laws of these activities, it is at once the most
general mental science, and the foundation of all the others,
that is, of philology, history, political economy, jurispru-
dence, etc.

3) Since psychology pays equal attention to both the
subjective and objective conditions which underlie not only
theoretical knowledge, but practical activity as well, and since
it seeks to determine the interrelation of these subjective

WcNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 2

Ig Introduction.

and objective conditions, it is the empirical discipline the
results of which are most immediately useful in the investi-
gation of the general problems of the theory of knowledge
and ethics^ the two foundations of philosophy. Thus, psy-
chology is, in relation to the natural sciences, the supple-
7nenta7y science; in relation to the mental sciences it is the
fundamental science; and in relation to philosophy it is the
propaedeutic empirical science.

10 a. The following tabular summary presents in their sys-
tematic relation, the chief forms of psychology above described

(1-3).

METAPHYSICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Spiritualistic psycliology. Materialistic psychology.

Dualistic Monastic Mechanical Psycho-physical

psychology. psychology. materiaHsm. materialism.

(Monadological
systems)

EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Psychology of inner sense.
(Pure introspection)

Psychology as science of immediate

experience.
(Experimental and Social psychology)

Pescriptive psychology. Explanatory psychology.

(Faculty-psychology) ,' ,. ,. ' —, — . . ..

Intellectualistic Voluntaristic

psychology. psychology.

Logical Association

psychology. psychology.

In their historical development many of these forms of
psychology have grown up together. One may, however, mark
off certain general sequences. Thus, metaphysical forms have
generally preceded empirical forms; descriptive forms have pre-
ceded explanatory; and finally, intellectualism has preceded
voluntarism. The oldest work which treated of psychology as

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 19

an independent science was Aristotle's work entitled "On the
Soul". This work is to be classified as belonging to the dualistic
grbup in its metaphysics, and to the group of faculty-psychol-
ogies on the side of its empirical explanations. (The soul was
treated as the living principle in the body. There were three
fundamental faculties^..^ namely, alimentation, sensation, and
thought.) Modern spiritualistic psychology begins with Des-
CART|:s' dualism which recognizes two distinct forms of reality,
first, the soul as a thinking and unextended entity, and second,
matter as an extended and nonthinking reality. The Cartesian
system found the point of contact between these two forms of
reality in a particular region of the human brain, namely, the
pineal gland. The founder of modern materialism is Thomas
HoBBES (1588 — 1679). (The ancient materialistic dualism of
Democrates had not yet differentiated itself from spiritualistic
dualism). Hobbes, together with La Mettrie and Holbach,
developed in the 18th century a mechanical materialism, while
Diderot and Helvetius developed a psycho-physical materialism
which has representatives even in present times. Spiritualistic
monism first arose in the monadology of Leibniz. In modern
times this has been taken up by Herbart and his school, by
LOTZE, and oth^s. The establishment of the psychology of the
inner sense may be properly attributed to John Locke (1632
— 1704). This form of psychology has been defended in modern
times, to some extent by Kant, and with special emphasis by
Eduard Beneke (1798 — 1854), K. Fortlage, and others.
Modern faculty-psychology arose with the work of Christian
Wolff (1679 — 1754), who distinguished as the chief faculties,
knowledge and desire. Since the time of Tetens (1736 — 1805)
three faculties have been more commonly accepted than "Wolff's
two. Plato named these three, ^s did also Kant. They are
knowledge, feeling and desire. Logical intellectualism is the
oldest of the explanatory forms of psychology. This corresponds
directly to the popular interpretation of psychical processes.
The earlier empiricists, as for example, Locke, and even
Berkeley (1648—1753) who in his "Essay towards a New Theory
of Vision" anticipates modern experimental psychology, are to
be classed as representatives of logical intellectualism. This
view is at the present time to be found in the psychological

2*

20 Introduction.

discussions indulged in by physiological writers, when, for
example, they treat of sense perception. Among the philo-
sophical representatives of this logical intellectualism in our day,
one must mention especially Frakz Brentano and his school.
Association psychology is first found in the works of two writers
who appear at about the same time, namely, David Hartley
(1704—1757) and David Hume (1711—1776). These two writers
represent, however, two different tendencies which continue
even in present-day psychology. Hartley's association psychology
refers the association processes to certain physiological con-
ditions, while Hume's regards the association process as a psy-
chological process. The first form allies itself, accordingly, to
psycho-physical materialism, this is found in the works of such
a modern writer as Herbert Spencer. Closely related to Hume's
psychological associationism is the psychology of Herbart. Her-
bart's doctrine of the statics and mechanics of ideas is a purely
intellectualistic doctrine. (Feeling and volition are here recognized
only as certain phases of ideas). It is in agreement with as-
sociationism in its fundamental mechanical view of mental life.
This similarity is not to be overlooked merely because Herbart
sought through certain hypothetical assumptions to give his
psychological discussions an exact mathematical form. There
are many anticipations of voluntaristic psychology in the works
of psychologists of the "pure introspection" school, and of the
association schools. The first thoroughgoing exposition of this
form of psychology was the work of the author of this Outlines
of Psychology in his psychological treatises. It is to be noted
that this psychological voluntarism, as, indeed, one can see
from the description which has already been given, is to be
clearly distinguished from metaphysical voluntarism as devel-^
oped by such a writer as Schopenhauer. Metaphysical volun-
tarism seeks to reduce everything to an original transcendental
will, which lies back of the phenomenal world as its substratum.
Psychological voluntarism, on the other hand, looks upon em-
pirical volitional processes, with their constituent feelings, sen-
sations, and ideas, as the types of all conscious processes.
For such a voluntarism even volition is a complex phenomenon
which owes its typical significance to this very fact that it in-
cludes in itself the different kinds of psychical elements.

§ 2. General Forms of Psychology. 21

Beferences. Psychology of the inner sense: Locke, An Essay con-
cerning Human Understanding, 1690. Eduard Beneke, Psychologische
Skizzen, 2 vols., 1825—1827, and Lehrbuch der Psychologic als Natur-
wissenschaft, 1833, 4th. ed. 1877. K. Fortlage, System der Psycho-
logic, 2 vols., 1855.

Faculty -psychology: Christian Wolff, Psychologia empirica,
1732, Psychologia rationalis, 1734; and Verniinftige Gedanken von
Gott, der "Welt, der Seele des Menschen etc., 1719. Tetens, Philo-
sophische Versuche liber die menschliche Natur, 1776 — 1777. Kant,
Anthropologic, 1798 (a practical psychology, well worth reading even
at this late date because of its many nice observations).

Association psychology: Hartley, Observations on Man, 1749.
Priestly, Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, 1775. Hume, Treatise
on Human Nature, 1739—1740; and Enquiry concerning Human Un-
derstanding, 1748. James Mill, Analysis of the Phenomena of the
Human Mind, 1829, later edited with notes by Alexander Bain, John
Stuart Mill and others, 2d. ed. 1878. Alexander Bain, The Senses
and the Intellect, 1855, 4th. ed. 1894; and The Emotions and the
Will, 1859, 3rd. ed. 1875. Herbert Spencer, Principles of Psychology,
1855, 5th. ed. 1890. Herbart, Psychologie als Wissenschaft, 2 vols.,
1824—1825; and (English trans, by M. K. Smith 1891] Text-book of
Psychology, 1816.

Works which prepared the way for experimental psychology:
Lotze, Medicinische Psychologie, 1852. G. T. Fechner, Elemente der
Psychophysik, 2 vols., 1860.

More extended modern treatises. Of the Herbartian School:
W. F. VoLKMANN, Lehrbuch der Psychologie, 2 vols., 4th. ed., 1894.
M. Lazarus, Leben der Seele in Monographien, 3 vols., 3rd. ed. 1883.
Of the Association School (generally with a tendency toward psycho-
physical materialism): Euelpe, (English trans, by E. B. Titchener,
1901) Outlines of Psychology, 1893. Ebbinghaus, Grundziige der Psy-
chologie, 1st. half-vol. only as yet, 1897. Ziehen, (English trans, by
*VAN LiEvv and Beyer 1899) Introduction to the Study of Physiological
Psychology, 5th. Ger. ed. 1900. Munsterberg, Grundziige der Psychol-
ogie, 1st. vol. only as yet, 1900. Works standing between association
psychology and voluntaristic psychology : Hoeffding, (English trans,
by Lowndes, 1891, from the German trans. 1887) Outlines of Psychol-
ogy, 2nd. Danish ed. 1893. W. Jerusalem, Lehrbuch der empirischen
Psychologie, 2nd. ed. 1890. Works representing a form of intellec-
tualism related in method to scholasticism: Brentano, Psychologie
vom empirischen Standpunkte, 1st. vol. only, 1874. Meinong, Psy-
chologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie, 1894. Works
emphasizing the independence of psychology and based on an empirical

22 Introduction.

analysis of conscious processes: Lipps, Grundthatsachen des Seelen-
lebens, 1883. Jodl, Lehrbucli der Psyclaologie, 1896. The same em-
pirical analysis, and on the basis of this analysis voluntaristic psy-
chology in the sense above described, are presented by the author
of this Outlines of Phychology in his other works also, namely, Grund-
ziige der physiologischen Psychologie, 2 vols., 4th. ed., 1893 (English
trans, in preparation by E. B. Titchener) ; and (English trans, by E.
B. Creighton and E. B. Titchener, 1894) Lectures on Human and
Animal Psychology, 3rd. Ger. ed. 1897. Works treating chiefly of
the philosophical character of fundamental psychological concepts:
XJPHUES, Psychologie des Erkennens, 1893. J. Rehmke, Lehrbuch
der allgemeinen Psychologie, 1894. Natorp, Einleitung in die Psy-
chologie, 1888. American, English and French works all follow in
the path of associationalism. Furthermore, they tend for the most
part toward psycho-physical materialism or toward dualistic spiri-
tualism, less frequently toward voluntarism. From among the nu-
merous American works, the following are to be mentioned: James,
Principles of Psychology, 2 vols., 1890. Ladd, Psychology De-
scriptive and Explanatory, 1894. Baldwin, Handbook of Psychol-
ogy, 1889. Scripture, The New Psychology, 1897. Titchener, An
Outline of Psychology, 1896. French works are as follows: Ribot's
monographs on various psychological subjects are to be mentioned.
)A11 translated into English: Attention, The Diseases of Memory,
The Diseases of the Will, The Diseases of Personality, General Ideas,
The Creative Imagination). Also, the works of Fouillee, which are
related to German voluntarism, but contain at the same time a great
deal of metaphysics and are somewhat influenced by the Platonic
doctrine of ideas (L'evolutionisme des idees-forces, 1890, and Psycho-
logie des idees-forces, 1893).

Works on the history of psychology especially worthy of men-
tion: Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, Pt. 1st., 1880—1884, and
also articles in the first three vols, of Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil, (these
cover the ancient and medieval periods). Lange, History of Materialism.
Dessoir, Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie, 2nd. ed. 1897
(including as yet only 1st. half-vol.). Sommer, Grundziige einer Ge-
schichte der deutschen Psychologie und Aesthetik von Wolf-Baum-
garten bis Kant-Schiller, 1892. Ribot, (Englisch trans, by Baldwin)
German Psychology of To-day, Fr. ed. 1885, Eng. ed. 1886.

§ 3. Methods of Psychology, 23

§ 3. METHODS OF PSYCHOLOGY.

1. Since psychology has for its object, not specific con-
tents of experience, but general experience in its immediate
character, it can make use of no methods except such as
the empirical sciences in general employ for the deter-
mination, analysis, and causal interpretation of facts. The
fact that natural science abstracts from the subject, while
psychology does not, can be no ground for modifications in
the essential character of the methods employed in the two
fields, though this fact does modify the way in which the
methods are applied.

The natural sciences, which may serve as an example for
psychology in this respect, since they were developed earlier,
make use of two chief methods, namely, experiment and ob-
servation. Experiment is observation under the condition of
purposive control by the observer, of the rise and course
of the phenomena observed. Observation j in the narrower
sense of the term, is the investigation of phenomena without
such control, the occurrences being accepted just as they are
naturally presented to the observer in the course of experi-
ence. Wherever experiment is possible, it is always used in
the natural sciences ; for under all circumstances, even when
the phenomena in themselves present the conditions for suf-
ficiently exact observation, it is an advantage to be able to
control at will the rise and progress of these phenomena, or
to isolate the various components of a composite phenomenon.
Yet, even in the natural sciences the two methods have been
distinguished according to their spheres of application. It is
held that the experimental methods are indispensable for
certain problems, while in others the desired end may not
infrequently be reached through mere observation. If we
neglect a few exceptional cases due to special relations,

24 Introduction.

these two classes of problems correspond to the general
division of natural phenomena into processes and objects.

Experimental control is required in the exact determina-
tion of the course, and in the analysis of the components,
of any natural process, such for example, as light vibration,
sound vibration, an electric discharge, or the contraction of
a muscle. As a rule such control is desirable because exact
observation is possible only when the observer can determine
the moment at which the process shall commence. It is
also indispensable in separating the various components of-
a complex phenomenon from one another. As a rule, this
is possible only through the addition or substraction of certain
conditions, or through a quantitative variation of them. The
case is different with objects of nature. They are relatively
constant and are always at the observer's disposal and ready
for examination. Here, then, experimental investigation is
really necessary only when the production and modification
of the objects are the subjects to be investigated. When,
on the contrary, the only question is the actual nature of
these objects, mere observation is generally enough. Thus,
mineralogy, botany, zoology, anatomy, and geography, are
pure sciences of observation so long as they are kept free
from the physical, chemical, and physiological problems which
are, indeed, frequently brought into them, but which have
to do with processes of nature, not with the objects in
themselves.

2. If we apply these considerations to psychology, it is
obvious at once, from the very nature of its subject-matter,
that exact observation is here possible only in the form of
experimental observation. The contents of this science are
exclusively processes, not permanent objects. In order to
investigate with exactness the rise and progress of these
processes, their composition out of various components, and

§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 25

the interrelations of these components, we must be able first
of all to bring about their beginning at will, and we must
also be able to vary the conditions at will. This is possible
here, as in all cases, only through experiment, not through
observation. Besides this general reason there is another
reason which is peculiar to psychology, and does not apply
at all to natural phenomena. In the case of the natural
sciences we purposely abstract from the perceiving subject,
and under circumstances, especially when favored by the
phenomena, as in astronomy, mere observation may succeed
in determining with adequate certainty the objective contents
of the processes. Psychology, on the contrary, is debarred
from this abstraction by its fundamental principles, and
proper conditions for chance observation can appear only
when the same objective components of immediate experience
are frequently repeated in connection with the same subjec-
tive states. It is hardly to be expected, in view of the great
complexity of psychical processes, that this will ever be the
case. Such chance coincidence is especially improbable since
the very intention to observe^ which is a necessary condition
of all observation, modifies essentially the rise and progress
of psychical processes. The chief problem of psychology,
however, is the exact investigation of the rise and progress
of subjective processes, and it can readily be seen that in
such investigations the intention to observe either essentially
modifies the facts to be observed, or completely suppresses
them, at least, if the observation is of the ordinary intro-
spective type, unaided by experimental devices of any sort.
If, on the other hand, we consider the experimental methods,
we see that psychology is led, through the very nature of
the origin of the processes with which it deals, to employ,
just as do physics and physiology, the experimental mode of
procedure A sensation arises in us under the most favor-

26 Introduction.

able conditions for observation when it is aroused by an
external sense stimulus. The idea of an object is always
produced originally by the more or less complicated cooper-
ation of sense stimuli. If we wish to study the way in
which an idea is formed, we can choose no method other
than that of imitating this natural way in which an idea
arises. In doing this, we have at the same time the great
advantage of being able to modify the idea itself by chang-
ing at will the combination of the impressions that cooperate
to form it, and of thus learning what influence each single
condition exercises on the product. Memory images, it is
true, can not be directly aroused through external sense im-
pressions, but follow these impressions after a longer or shorter
interval. Yet, it is obvious that the attributes even of memory
images can be most accurately learned, not by waiting for
their chance arrival, but by using such memory ideas as may
be aroused in a systematic, experimental way, through imme-
diately preceding impressions. The same is true of feehngs
and volitions; they will be presented in the form best adapted
to exact investigation when those impressions are purposely
produced which experience has shown to be regularly con-
nected with affective and volitional reactions. There is, then,
no fundamental psychical process to which experimental
methods can not be applied, and therefore none in the in-
vestigation of which such methods are not logically required.
3. Pure observation^ such as is possible in many depart-
ments of natural science, is, from the very character of psy-
chical phenomena, impossible in individual psychology. The
possibility of pure observation would be conceivable only under
the condition that there existed permanent psychical objects,
independent of our attention, similar to the relatively perma-
nent objects of nature, which remain unchanged by our obser-
vation. There are, however, certain facts at the disposal of

§ 3. Methods of Psychology. 27

psychology, which, although they are not real objects, never-
theless, have the character of psychical objects, inasmuch
as they possess the attributes of relative permanence and
independence of the observer, and are unapproachable by
means of experiment in the common acceptance of the term.
These facts are the mental products which have developed
in the course of history, such as language, mythological
ideas, and customs. The origin and development of these
products depend in every case on general psychical condi-
tions which may be inferred from the objective attributes of
the products. All such mental products of a general character
presuppose as their condition the existence of a mental co7i%-
munity composed of many individuals, though, of course,
their deepest sources are the psychical attributes of the in-
dividual. Because of this dependence on the community, in
particular on the social community, the whole department
of psychological investigation here involved is designated as
social psychology., and is distinguished from individual psy-
chology, or as it may be called because of its predominat-
ing method, experimental psychology. In the present stage
of the science these two branches of psychology are generally
taken up in different treatises, although they are not so
much different departments as different methods. So-called
social psychology corresponds to the method of pure obser-
vation, the objects of observation in this case being the mental
products. The necessary connection of these products with
social communities, which has given to social psychology its
name, is due to the fact that the mental products of the in-
dividual are of too variable a character to be the subjects of
objective observation. The phenomena gain the necessary
degree of constancy only when they become collective.

Thus psychology has, like natural science, two exact
methods: the experimental method, serving for the analysis

28 Introduction.

of simpler psychical processes, and the observation of general
mental products, serving for the investigation of the higher
psychical processes and developments.

3a. The introduction of the experimental method into psy-
chology was originally due to the modes of procedure in phy-
siology, especially in the physiology of the sense-organs and the
nervous system. For this reason experimental psychology is
also commonly called "physiological psychology" ; and works
treating it under this title regularly contain those supplemen-
tary facts from the physiology of the nervous system and of
the sense-organs, which require special discussion with a view
to the interests of psychology, though in themselves these facts
belong to physiology alone. "Physiological psychology" is, ac-
cordingly, an intermediate discipline which is, however, as the
name indicates, primarily psychology ^ and is, apart from the
supplementary physiological facts that it presents, just the same
as "experimental psychology" in the sense above defined. The
attempt sometimes made, to distinguish psychology proper from
physiological psychology, by assigning to the first the psycho-
logical interpretation of inner experience, and to the second the
derivation of this experience from physiological processes, is to
be rejected as inadmissible. There is only one kind of causal
explanation in psychology, and that is the derivation of more
complex psychical processes from simpler ones. In this method
of interpretation, physiological elements can be used only as
supplementary aids, because of the relation between natural
science and psychology as above defined (§ 2, 4).

Eeferences. For a general discussion of the methodology of psychol-
ogy, see chapter on "Logik der Psychologie" [in the author's Logik,
2nd. ed., 1895. On methods of experimentation see Philosophische
Studien, vol. I. Also, Stanford, A Course in Experimental Psychol-
ogy, 1897 — 1898. SoMMER, Lehrbuch der psychopatholog. Unter-
suchungsmethoden, 1899,

§ 4. General Survey of the Subject 29

§ 4. GENERAL SUEVEY OF THE SUBJECT.

1. The immediate contents of experience which constitute
the suhject-matter of psychology, are in all cases processes
of a composite character. Sense perceptions of external ob-
jects, memories of such sense perceptions, feelings, emotions,
and volitional acts, are not only continually united in the
most various ways, hut each of these processes is itself a
more or less composite whole. The idea of an external
body, for example, is made up of partial ideas of its parts.
A tone may be ever so simple, but we localize it in some
direction, thus bringing it into connection with the idea of
external space which is highly composite. Every feeling
is referred to some sensation that aroused the feeling, and
every volition is referred to an object willed. In dealing
with a complex fact of this kind, scientific investigation has
three problems to be solved in succession. The first is
the analysis of composite processes; the second is the dem-
onstration of the combinations into which the elements
discovered by analysis enter; the third is the investigation
of the laws that are operative in the formation of such com-
binations.

2. The second^ or synthetic, problem is made up of
several partial problems. In the first place, the psychical
elements unite to form composite psychical compounds which
are separate and relatively independent of one another in
the continual flow of psychical processes. One group of
examples of such compounds is to be found in ideas, whether
referred directly to external impressions or objects, or inter-
preted by us as memories of impressions and objects perceived
before. Other examples are composite feelings, emotions,
or voHtions. Then again, these psychical compounds stand
in the most various interconnections with one another. Thus,

30 Introduction.

ideas unite to form larger simultaneous ideational complexes
or regular successions, while affective and volitional processes
form a variety of combinations with one another and with
ideational processes. In this way we have the interconnection
of psychical compounds as a class of synthetical processes of
the second order, consisting of a union between the simpler
combinations that have arisen from the earlier combinations
of elements into psychical compounds. The separate psychical
interconnection of the second order unite in turn to form still
more comprehensive combinations, which also show a certain
regularity in the arrangement of their components. In this
way, combinations of a third order arise, which we desig-
nate by the general name psychical developments. These
may be divided into developments of different scope. Devel-
opments of a more limited sort are such as relate to a single
phase of mental activity, for example, the development of
the intellectual functions, of the will, or of the feelings, or
of merely one special branch of these functions, such as the
aesthetic or moral feelings. From a number of such partial
series arises the total development of a psychical personality.
Finally, since animals, and in a still higher degree human
individuals, are in continual interrelation with their fellow
beings, there arise above these individual forms, general
psychical developments. These various branches of the study
of psychical development are in part the psychological foun-
dations of other sciences, such as the theory of knowledge,
pedagogy, aesthetics, and ethics, and are, accordingly, treated
more appropriately in connection with those subjects. In part
they have become special psychological sciences, such a child-
psychology, animal psychology and social psychology. "We
shall, therefore, in this treatise discuss only those results
from the last mentioned departments which are of the most
importance to general psychology.

§ 4. General Survey of the Subject 31

3. The solution of the last and most general psycholog-
ical problem, namely, the problem of discovering the laws
of psychical phenomena, depends upon the investigation of
all the combinations of different orders, the combination of
elements into compounds, of compounds into interconnections,
and of interconnections into developments. And as this in-
vestigation is the only means by which we can learn the
actual composition of psychical processes, so also the only
means of discovering the attributes of psychical causality,
which finds expression in these processes, is in the investi-
gation of the laws followed by the contents of experience
and their components in their various combinations.

We have, accordingly, to consider in the following
chapters :

1) Psychical Elements,

2) Psychical Compounds,

3) Interconnection of Psychical Compounds,

4) Psychical Developments,

5) Psychical Causality and its Laws.

L PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS.

§ 5. CHIEF FOEMS AND GENERAL ATTRIBUTES
OF PSYCHICAL ELEMENTS.

1. All the contents of psychical experience are of a com-
posite character. It follows, therefore, that psychical elements y
or the absolutely simple and irreducible components of psy-
chical phenomena are the products of analysis and abstraction.
This abstraction is rendered possible by the fact that the
elements are in reality united in different ways. If an ele-
ment, a, is connected in one case with the elements b, c, d . . .j
and in another case with b\ c', d' . . ., it is possible to ab-
stract it from all the other elements, because none of them
is always united with it. If, for example, we hear a simple
tone of a certain pitch and intensity, it may be located now
in this direction, now in that, and may be heard at different
times in connection with various other tones. But since
the direction is not constant, or the accompanying tone
in all cases the same, it is possible to abstract from these
variable elements, and we have the single tone as a psy-
chical element.

2. As a result of psychical analysis, we find that there
are psychical elements of tivo kinds ^ corresponding to the
two factors contained in immediate experience (§ 1, 2),
namely, to the objective contents of experience and to the
experiencing subject. The elements of the objective contents
we call sensational elements^ or simply sensations: such are

<^ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 33

a tone, or a particular sensation of heat, cold, or light, if
in each case we neglect for the moment all the connections
of these sensations with others, and also all their spacial
and temporal relations. The subjective elements, on the
other hand, are designated as affective elements^ or simple
feelings. We may mention as examples, the feelings ac-
companying sensations of light, sound, taste, smell, heat, cold,
or pain, the feelings aroused by the sight of an agreeable or
disagreeable object, and the feehngs arising in a state of
attention or at the moment of a volitional act. Such simple
feelings are in a double sense products of abstraction: every
such feehng is connected in reality with an ideational ele-
ment, and is furthermore a V^omponent of a psychical process
which occurs in time, during which the feehng itself is con-
tinually changing. '"^

3. The actual contents of psychical experience always
consist of various combinations of sensational and affective
elements, so that the specific character of a given psychical
process depends for the most part, not on the nature of
its elements, so much as on their union into a composite
psychical compound. Thus, the idea of an extended body
or of a rhythm, an emotion, and a volition, are all specific
forms of psychical experience. But their character as such
is as Httle determined by their sensational and affective
elements as are the chemical properties of a compound body
by the properties of its chemical elements. Specific character
and elementary nature of psychical processes are, accordingly,
two entirely different concepts. Every psychical element is
a specific content of experience, but not every specific con-
tent is at the same time a psychical element. Thus, spacial
and temporal ideas, emotions, and volitional acts, are spe-
cific, but not elementary processes.

4. Sensations and simple feeHngs exhibit certain common

Wtjndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 3

34 ^' Psychical Elements.

attributes and also certain characteristic differences. They
have in common two determinants^ namely, quality and in-
tensity. Every simple sensation and every simple feeling has
a definite qualitative character that marks it off from all
other sensations and feelings; and this quality must always
have some degree of intensity. Our designations of psychical
elements are based entirely upon their qualities; thus, we
distinguish such sensations as blue, grey, yellow, warmth and
cold, or such feelings as grave, cheerful, sad, gloomy, and
sorrowful. On the other hand, we always express the dif-
ferences in the intensity of psychical elements by the same
quantitative designations, as weak, strong, medium strong,
and very strong. These expressions are in both cases class-
concepts which serve for a first superficial arrangement of
the elements, and each expression embraces an unlimitedly
large number of concrete elements. Language has developed
a relatively complete stock of names for the qualities of
simple sensations, especially for colors and tones. Names for
the qualities of feelings and for degrees of intensity are far
behind in number and precision. Certain attributes other
than quality and intensity, such as distinctness and indistinct-
ness, are sometimes classed with quality and intensity as
fundamental attributes. But since clearness, obscurity, etc.,
as will appear later (§ 15, 4), always arise from the inter-
connection of psychical compounds, they can not be regarded
as determinants of psychical elements.

5. Made up, as it is, of the tivo determinants, quality
and intensity, every psychical element must have a certain
degree of intensity from which it is possible to pass, by
continual gradations, to every other degree of intensity in
the same quality. Such gradations can be made in only two
directions : one we call increase in intensity, the other decrease.
The degrees of intensity of every qualitative element, form

§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychieal Elements. 35

in this way a single dimension, in which, from a given point,
we may move in two opposite directions, just as from any
point in a straight line. This fact in regard to intensity
may be expressed in the general statement: The various in-
tensities of every psychical element form a continuity of one
dimension. The extremities of such a continuity we call the
minimal and m^oximal sensations., or the minimal or maximal
feelings^ as the case may be.

In contrast with this uniformity in intensities, qualities
have more variable attributes. Every quahty may, indeed, be
assigned a place in a definite continuity of similar qualities in
such a way that it is possible to pass uninterruptedly from a
given point in this continuous series to any other point. But
the various continuities of different qualities, which we may call
systems of quality^ exhibit differences both in the variety of
possible gradations, and in the number of directions of gra-
dation. With reference to these two kinds of variations in
systems of quality, we may distinguish, on the one hand,
homogeneous and complex systems, and on the other hand,
one - dimensional , two - dimensional , and many - dimensional
systems of quality. Within a homogeneous system, only such
small differences are possible, that generally there has never
arisen any practical need of distinguishing them by different
names. Thus, we distinguish only one quality of pressure, of
heat, of cold, or of pain, only one feeling of pleasure or of
excitement, although, in intensity, each of these qualities may
Jiave many different grades.) It is not to be inferred from
this fact that in each of these systems there is really only
one quality. The truth is that in these cases the number
of different qualities is merely very limited; if we were to
represent the system geometrically, we should probably never
reduce it to a single point.) Thus, for example, sensations
of pressure from different regions of the skin show, beyond

3*

36 I' Psychical Elements.

question, small qualitative differences which are great enough
to make it possible for us to distinguish clearly any point
of the skin from others at some distance from it. Such
differences, however, as arise from contact with a sharp or
dull point, or from a rough or smooth body, are not to be
regarded as different qualities. They Always depend on a
large number of simultaneous sensations, and without the
various combinations of these sensations into composite psy-
chical compounds, the impressions mentioned would be im-
possible.

Complex systems of quality differ from those we have
been discussing, in that they embrace a large number of
clearly distinguishable elements between which all possible
intermediate forms exist. In this class we must include the
tonal system and color system, the systems of smells and
tastes; and among the complex feeling systems we must in-
clude those which form the subjective complements of these
sensational systems, such as the systems of tonal feelings,
color feelings, etc. It is probable also that many systems
of feelings belongs here, which are objectively connected with
composite impressions, but are as feelings, simple in character;
such are the various feeHngs of harmony or discord which
correspond to various combinations of tones. The differences
in the number of dimensions have been determined with cer-
tainty only in the case of two or three sensational systems.
Thus, the tonal system is one-dimensional. The ordinary
color system, which includes the colors and their transitional
qualities to white, is two-dimensional; while the complete
system of light sensations, which includes also the dark
color-tones and the transitional qualities to black, is three-
dimensional.

6. In regard to the relations discussed thus far, sensa-
tional elements and affective elements agree in general. They

§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 37

differ, on the other hand, in certain essential attributes
which are connected with the fact that sensations are im-
mediately related to objects, while feelings are immediately
related to the subject.

1) When varied in a single dimension, sensational ele-
ments exhibit pure qualitative differences^ which are always
in the same direction until they reach the possible limits of
variation, where they become inaximal differences. Thus, in
the color system, red and green, blue and yellow, or in the
tonal system, the lowest and highest audible tones, are the
maximal differences and are at the same time purely quali-
tative differences. Every affective element, on the contrary,
when continuously varied in the proper direction of quality,
passes gradually into a feeling of opposite quality. This is
most obvious in the case of those affective elements which
are regularly connected with certain sensational elements, as
for example, tonal feelings or color feelings. \ As sensations,
a high and low tone present differences that approach more
or less the maximal differences of tonal sensation; the cor-
responding tonal feelings are opposites. |In general, then,
series of sensational qualities are hounded at their extremes
hy maximal differences; series of affective qualities are hounded
by maximal opposites. Between affective opposites is a middle
zone, where the feeling is not noticeable at all. j It is, how-
ever, frequently impossible to demonstrate this indifference-
zone, because, while certain simple feelings disappear, other
affective qualities remain, or new ones may arise. The
latter case appears most commonly when the passing of the
feeling into the indifference -zone depends on a change in
sensations. Thus, in the middle of the musical scale, those
feelings disappear which correspond to the high and low
tones, but the middle tones have independent affective qual-
ities of their own which appear clearly only when the other

38 I- Psychical Elements.

complicating factors are eliminated. This is to be explained
by the fact that a feeling which corresponds to a certain
sensational quality is, as a rule, a component of a complex
affective system, in which it belongs at the same time to
various dimensions. Thus, the affective quality of a tone of
given pitch belongs not only to the dimension of pitch feelings,
but also to that of feelings of intensity, and finally to the
different dimensions in which the clang character of tones
may be arranged. A tone of middle pitch and intensity
may, in this way, lie in the indifference-zone so far as feelings
of pitch and intensity are concerned, and yet have a very
marked clang feeling. The passage of affective elements
through the indifference-zone can be directly observed only
when care is taken to abstract from other accompanying
affective elements. The cases most favorable for this obser-
vation are those in which the accompanying elements disap-
pear entirely or almost entirely. Wherever such an indif-
ference-zone appears without complication with other affective
elements, we speak of the state as /"ree from feelings, and of
the sensations and ideas present in such a state, as indifferent
~ 2) Feelings which have specific, and at the same time simple
and irreducible quality, appear not only as the subjective com-
plements of simple sensations, but also as the characteristic
attendants of composite ideas or even of complex ideational
processes. Thus, there is a simple tonal feeling which varies
with the pitch and intensity of tones, and there is also a
feehng of harmony which, regarded as a feeling, is just as
irreducible as the tonal feeling, but varies with the character
of compound clangs. Still other feelings, which may in turn be
of the most various kinds, arise from melodious series of clangs.
Here, again, each single feeling taken by itself at a given
moment, appears as an irreducible unit. Simple feelings are,
then, much more various and numerous than simple sensations.

§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 39

3) The various pure sensations may be arranged in a
number of separate systems, between the elements of which
there is no quahtative relation whatever. Sensations belonging
to different systems are called disparate. Thus, a tone and a
color, a sensation of heat and one of pressure, or, in general,
any two sensations between which there are no intermediate
qualities, are disparate. According to this criterion, each of
the four special senses (smell, taste, hearing, and sight) has
a closed, complex sensational system, disparate from that
of the other senses; while the general sense (touch) contains
four homogeneous sensational systems (sensations of pressure,
heat, cold, and pain), i All simple feelings, on the other hand,"
form a single interconnected manifold, for there is no feeling
from which it is not possible to pass to any other, through
intermediate forms or through indifference-zones. But here
too we may distinguish certain systems the elements of which
are more closely related, as, for example, feelings from colors,
tones, harmonies and rhythms. These are, however, not ab-
solutely closed systems, for there are everywhere relations
either of likeness or of opposition to other systems. PThus,
feelings such as those from sensations of moderate warmth,
from tonal harmony, and from satisfied expectation, however
great their qualitative differences may be, are all related in
that they belong to the general class of "pleasurable feelings".
Even closer relations exist between certain single affective
systems, as for example, between tonal feelings and color
feelings, where the feelings from deep tones seem to be
related to those from dark colors, and feelings from bright
colors to those from high tones. When in such cases a
certain relationship is ascribed to the sensations themselves,
it is probably due entirely to a confusion of the accompany-
ing feelings with the sensations.

This third distinguishing characteristic shows conclusively

40 1- Psychical Elements.

that the source of the feelings is unitary while that of the
sensations, which depend on a number of different, and in
part distinguishable, conditions, is not unitary. Probably
this difference in the character of the sources of feeling and
sensations is directly connected, on the one hand, with the
relation of the feelings to the unitary subject, and, on the
other hand, with the relation of sensations to the great
variety of objects.

6a. It is only in modern psychology that the terms "sen-
sation" and "feeling" have gained the meanings assigned to them
in the definitions above given. In older psychological literature
these terms were sometimes used indiscriminatingly, sometimes
interchanged. Even yet sensations of touch and sensations from
the internal organs are called feelings by physiologists, and the
sense of touch itself is known as the "sense of feeling". This
corresponds, it is true, to the original significance of the word,
where feeling is the same as touching, and yet, after the dif-
ferentiation has once been made, a confusion of the two terms
should be avoided. Then again, the word "sensation" is used
even by psychologists to mean not only simple, but also com-
posite qualities, such as compound clangs and spacial and tem-
poral ideas. But since we have the entirely adequate word
"idea" for such compounds, it is more advantageous to limit the
word sensation to sense qualities which are psychologically simple.
Finally the term "sensation" has sometimes been restricted so
as to mean only those impressions which come directly from
external sense stimuli. For the psychological attributes of a
sensation, however, this circumstance is entirely indifferent, and
therefore, such a definition of the term is unjustifiable.

The discrimination between sensational elements and affective
elements in any concrete case is very much facilitated by the
existence of indifference-zones in the feelings. Then again it
follows from the fact that feelings range between opposites
rather than mere differences, that feelings are much the more
variable elements of our immediate experience. This changeable
character, which renders it almost impossible to hold an affective

§ 5. Chief Forms and General Attributes of Psychical Elements. 41

state constant in quality and intensity, is the cause of the great
difficulties that stand in the way of the exact investigation of
feelings.

Sensations are present in all immediate experiences, but
feelings may disappear in certain special cases, because of their
oscillation through an indifference -zone. Obviously, then, we
can, in the case of sensations, abstract from the accompanying
feelings, but we can never abstract from sensations in the case
of feelings. In this way two false views may easily arise, either
that sensations are the causes of feelings, or that feelings are
a particular species of sensations. The first of these opinions is
false because affective elements can never be derived from sen-
sations as such, but only from the attitude of the subject, so
that under different subjective conditions the same sensation
may be accompanied by different feelings. The second view,
that feelings are a particular species of sensations, is untenable
because the two classes of elements are distinguished, on the one
hand by the immediate relation of sensations to objects and of
feelings to the subject, and on the other hand, by the fact that
the former range between maximal differences, the latter between
maximal opposites. Because of the objective and subjective factors
belonging to all psychical experience, sensations and feelings are
to be looked upon as real and equally essential, though every-
where interrelated, elements of psychical phenomena. In the inter-
relation of the two groups of elements, the sensational elements
appear as the more constant ; they alone can be isolated through
abstraction, by referring them to external objects. It follows,
therefore, of necessity that in investigating the attributes of both
kinds of elements, we must start with the sensations. Simple
sensations, in the consideration of which we abstract from the
accompanying affective elements, are called pure sensations.

Eeferenees. Kant, Anthropologie, 2nd. Bk. Herbart, Text-book
of Psychology, § 68 and 95. (Differentiation of the concepts sensation
and feeling in the present-day sense.) HoRWicz, Psychologische
Analysen auf physiolog. Grundlage, 2 vols., 1872—1878. Wundt,
Ueber das Verhaltniss der Gefiihle zu den Vorstellungen, Viertel-
jahrsschr. f. wiss. Philos., Ill, 1879. (Also in Essays, 1885.)

42 I- Psychical Elements.

§ 6. PUEE SENSATIONS.

1. The concept "pure sensation" as shown in § 5 is the
product of a twofold abstraction: 1) from the ideas in which
the sensation appears, and 2) from the simple feelings with
which such a sensation is united. "We find that pure sensations,
defined in this way, form a number of disparate systems of
quality; each of these systems, such as that of sensations
of pressure, of tone, or of light, either is homogeneous or it
is a complex continuity (§ 5, 5) from which no transition to
any other system can be found.

2. The rise of sensations^ as physiology teaches us, is
regularly dependent on certain physical processes that have
their origin partly in the external world surrounding us,
partly in certain bodily organs. We designate these con-
ditioning processes by a name borrowed from physiology,
as sense stimuli or sensation stimuli. If the stimulus is a
process in the outer world we call it a physical stimulus ; if
it is a process in our own body we call it a ^physiological
stimulus. Physiological stimuli may be divided, in turn, into
peripheral and central^ according as they are processes in
the various bodily organs outside of the brain, or processes
in the brain itself. In many cases a sensation is attended
by all three forms of stimuli. Thus, an external impression
of light acts as a physical stimulus on the eye; in the
eye and optic nerve there arises a peripheral physiological
stimulation; finally a central physiological stimulation takes
place in the corpora quadrigemina and in the occipital regions
of the cerebral cortex, where the optic nerve terminates.
In many cases the physical stimulus may be wanting, while
both forms of physiological stimuli are present; as, when
we perceive a flash of light in consequence of a violent
ocular movement. In still other cases the central stimulus

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 43

alone is present; as, when we recall a light impression pre-
viously experienced. The central stimulus is, accordingly,
the only one that always accompanies sensation. When a
peripheral stimulus causes a sensation, it must be connected
with a central stimulus, and when a physical stimulus causes
a sensation it must be connected with both a peripheral and
a central stimulus.

3. The physiological study of development renders it
probable that the differentiation of the various sensational
systems has been effected in part in the course of general
development. The original organ of sense is the outer skin
with the sensitive inner organs adjoining it. The organs of
taste, smell, hearing, and sight, on the other hand, are later
differentiations of the skin structure. It may, therefore, be
surmised that the sensational systems corresponding to these
special sense-organs, have also gradually arisen through dif-
ferentiation from the sensational systems of the general sense,
that is, from sensations of pressure, heat and cold. It is
possible, too, that in lower animals some of the systems now
so widely differentiated in human beings are more alike.
From a physiological standpoint the primordial character of
the general sense is also apparent in the fact that it has
either very simple organs or none at all for the transfer of
sense stimuli to the nerves. Pressure stimuli, temperature
stimuli, and pain stimuli, can produce sensations at points
in the skin where, in spite of the most careful investigation,
no special end-organs can be found. There are, indeed,
special receiving organs in the regions most sensitive to pres-
sure (touch-corpuscles, end-bulbs, and corpuscles of Yater),
but the structure of these organs renders it probable that
they merely favor the mechanical transfer of the stimulus
to the nerve-endings. Special end-organs for heat, cold, and
pain have not been found at all.

44 I- Psychical Elements.

In the special sense-organs which are of later origin we find,
on the other hand, elaborate structures which not only effect
the suitable transfer of the stimuli to the sensory nerves, but
generally bring about a physiological transformation of the
stimulation, which transformation seems to be indispensable
for the rise of the particular sensational qualities. But even
among the special senses there are differences in this respect.

The receiving organ in the ear, in particular, appears to
be of a character different from that of the organs of smell,
taste, and sight. In its most primitive forms the ear consists
of a vesicle filled with one or more solid particles (otoliths),
and supplied with nerve-bundles distributed in its walls.
The solid particles are set in motion through sound vibrations,
and must cause by their motion a rapid succession of weak
pressure stimulations in the fibres of the nerve-bundles. The
auditory organ of the higher animals shows an extraordinary
complexity, but in its essential structure it recalls this prim-
itive type. In the cochlea of man and the higher animals
the auditory nerve passes at first through the axis, which is
pierced by a large number of fine canals, and then emerges
through the pores which open into the cavity of the cochlea.
Here the branches are distributed on a tightly stretched
membrane, which extends through the spiral windings of the
cochlea and is weighted with special rigid arches (arches of
Corti). This membrane — the basilar membrane, as it is
called — m.ust, according to the laws of acoustics, be thrown
into sympathetic vibrations whenever sound waves strike the
ear. It seems, therefore, to play the same part here as the
otoliths do in the lower forms of the auditory organ. At the
same time, one other change has taken place which accounts
for the enormous differentiation of the sensational system.
The basilar membrane has a different breath in its different
parts, for it grows continually wider from the base to the

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 45

apex of the cochlea. In this way it acts like a system of
stretched cords of different lengths. And just as in such a
system, other conditions remaining the same, the longer cords
are tuned to lower, and the shorter to higher tones, so we
may assume the same to be true for the different parts of
the basilar membrane. We may surmise that the simplest
auditory organs with their otoliths have a homogeneous sen-
sational system, analogous perhaps to our system of sensations
of pressure. The special development of the organ as seen
in the cochlea of higher animals explains the evolution of
an extraordinarily complex sensational system from this orig-
inally homogeneous system. In spite of all these changes
the structure remains the same in this respect, that it seems
adapted, in the latter case as in the former, to the best
possible transfer of the physical stimulus to the sensory nerve
rather than to any transformation of the stimulus. "^This
view agrees with the observed fact that, just as sensations
of pressure may be perceived on regions of the skin not
supplied with special receiving organs, so, in the case of
certain animals, such as birds, where the conditions are
specially favorable for their transmission, sound vibrations
are transferred to the auditory nerve and sensed even after
the removal of the whole auditory organ with its special
receiving structure.

With smelly taste^ and sight the case is essentially different.
Organs are present which render impossible direct action of
the stimuli on the sensory nerves. The external stimuli are
here received through special organs and modified before
they excite the nerves. These organs are specially metamor-
phosed epithelial cells with one end exposed to the stimu-
lus and the other passing into a nerve -fibre. Everything
goes to show that the receiving organs here are not merely
for the transfer of the stimuli, but are rather for the trans-

46 I- Psychical Elements.

formation of the stimuli. In the three cases under discus-
sion it is probable that the transformation is a chemical
process. In smell and taste we have external chemical
agencies, in sight we have light, as the causes of chemical
disintegrations in the sensory cells. The processes in the
cells then serve as the real stimuh.

These three senses may be distinguished as che?mcal senses,
from the inechanical senses of pressure and sound. It is im-
possible to say with any degree of certainty, to which of these
two classes sensations of cold and heat belong. One indication
of the direct relation between stimuli and sensation in me-
chanical senses, as contrasted with the indirect relation in
chemical senses, is that in the case of the mechanical senses,
the sensation lasts only a very little longer than-the external
stimulus, while in the case of the chemical senses, the sensation
persists very much longer. Thus, in a quick succession of
pressures and more especially in a quick succession of sounds,
it is possible to distinguish clearly the single stimuli from one
another; lights, tastes and smells, on the other hand, run
together even when given at a very moderate rate of succession.

4. Since peripheral and central stimuli are regular phys-
cal concomitants of elementary sensational processes, the
attempt to determine the relation between stimuli and sen-
sations is very natural. In attempting . to determine this
relation, physiology generally considers sensations as the re-
sult of physiological stimuli, but assumes at the same time
that in this case any proper explanation of the effect from
its cause is impossible, and that all that can be undertaken
is to determine the constancy of the relations between par-
ticular stimuli and the resulting sensations. Now, it is found
in many cases that different stimuli acting on the same end-
organ produce the same sensations; thus, for example, me-
chanical and electrical stimulations of the eye produce light

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 47

sensations. This result was generalized in tlie principle, that
every receiving element of a sense-organ and every simple
sensory nerve-fibre together with its central terminus, is capable
of only a single sensation of fixed quality; that the various
qualities of sensation are, therefore, due to the various
physiological elements with their different specific energies.
This principle, generally called the "law of specific energy
of nerves", is untenable for three reasons, even if we neglect
for the moment the fact that it simply refers the causes of
the various differences in sensations to a qualitas occulta of
sensory and nervous elements.

1) It is contradictory to the physiological doctrine of the
development of the senses. If, as we must assume according
to this doctrine, the complex sensational systems are derived
from systems originally simpler and more homogeneous, the
physiological sensory elements must also have undergone a
change. Such a change is, however, possible only under the
condition that organs may be modified by the stimuli which
act upon them. That is to say, the sensory organs deter-
mine the qualities of sensations only secondarily, as a result
of the properties which they acquire through the processes
of stimulation aroused in them. If, then, these sensory organs
have undergone, in the course of time, radical changes due
to the nature of the stimuli acting upon them, such changes
could have been possible only under the condition that the
physiological stimulations in the organs themselves varied to
some extent with the quality of the stimulus.

2) The principle of specific energy is contradictory to
the fact that in many senses there are no distinct sensory
elements corresponding to the different sensational qualities.
Thus, from a single point in the retina we can receive all
possible sensations of brightness and color; in the organs of
smell and taste, we find no clearly distinguishable forms of

48 I- Psychical Elements.

the sensory elements, while even a limited area of the sen-
sory surfaces in both these senses can - receive a variety of
sensations, which, especially in the case of the olfactory
organ, is very large. Where we have every reason to as-
sume that qualitatively different sensations actually do arise
in different sensory elements, as in the auditory organ, the
structure of the organ shows that this difference is not due
to any attribute of the nerve-fibres or of other sensory ele-
ments, but that it comes originally from the way in which
these elements are arranged. Different fibres of the auditory
nerve will, of course, be stimulated by different tone-vibra-
tions, because the different parts of the basilar membrane
are tuned to different tones, but this is not due to some
original and inexplicable attribute of the single auditory
nerve-fibres. It is due to the way in which the single nerve-
fibres are connected with the end-organ.

3) Finally, the sensory nerves and central elements can
have no original specific energy, because the peripheral sense-
organ must be exposed to the appropriate stimuli for a suf-
ficient interval, or at least must have been so exposed at
some previous period, before the corresponding sensations
can arise through the excitation of the central organs. Persons
congenitally blind and deaf do not have any sensations of
light or tone whatever, so far as we know, even when the
sensory nerves and centres were originally present.

Everything goes to show that the differences in the qual-
ities of sensations are conditioned by the differences in the
processes of stimulation that arise in the sense-organs. These
processes [are dependent primarily on the character of the
'physical stimuli, and only secondarily on the peculiarities of
the receiving organ. And even then peculiarities are due to
the adaptation of the sense-organs to the physical stimuli. As
a result of this adaptation, however, it may come to be true

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 49

that even wlien some stimulus other than that which has
effected the original adaptation of the sensory elements, that
is, when an inadequate stimulus acts, a sensation may arise
which corresponds to the adequate stimulus. This does not
hold, however, for all stimuH, or for all sensory elements.
Thus, heat and cold stimulations can not cause cutaneous
sensations of pressure or sensations in the special sense-
organs; chemical and electrical stimuli produce sensations of
light only when they act upon the retina, not when they act
on the optic nerve ;j and, finally, mechanical and electrical
stimuli can not arouse sensations of smell or taste. When
an electric current causes chemical disintegration, it may,
indeed, arouse such sensations, but it is through the ade-
quate chemical stimuli produced.

5. From the very nature of the case, it is impossible to
explain the character of sensations from the character of
physical and physiological stimuli. Stimuli and sensations can
not be compared with one another at all; the first belong
to the mediate experience of the natural sciences, the second
to the immediate experience of psychology. An interrelation
between sensations and physiological stimuli must necessarily
exist, however, in the sense that different kinds of stimulation
always correspond to different sensations. This p7'inciple of
the parallelism of changes in sensation and in physiological
stimulation is an important supplementary principle in both
the psychological and physiological doctrines of sensation.
In psychology it is used in producing definite changes in the
sensation, by means of intentional variation of the stimulus.
In physiology it is used in inferring the identity or non-
identity of physiological stimulations from the identity or
non-identity of the sensations. Furthermore, the same prin-
ciple is the basis of our practical life and of our theoretical
knowledge of the external world.

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 4

50 ^- Psychical Elements.

5 a. The principle of "specific energy" appears as the im-
plicit assumption in many of the earlier physiological discussions,
but it remained for Johannes Muller to give it a definite
formulation. The principle was later employed, especially by
Helmholtz in his theories of hearing and vision. In the later
expositions the form of the principle has been somewhat modi-
fied. As a rule the nerve fibres themselves are no longer con-
sidered as the seats of the specific energy; they are looked upon
rather as indifferent conductors. It is the peripheral sensory
elements (rods and cones of the retina, the endings of the audi-
tory fibres in the cochlea etc.) or sometimes the nerve cells in
the central sensory centres, or both of these, which are regarded
as the seats of specific energy. Such views are, however, en-
tirely hypothetical. Our knowledge of the processes in either the
peripheral sensory cells, or in the central nerve cells, and even
the greater part of our knowledge of the anatomy of these cells,
is so very incomplete that we are not able to base any conclusions
upon such knowledge. The only ground for the principle is, there-
fore, to be found in the phenomena, of like sensations arising from
different stimuli, and these phenomena, as already remarked, do
not give the principle any adequate ground for general acceptance.
Indeed, in many cases the facts are capable of a very much simpler
explanation on the basis of the conditions which surround the per-
ipheral nerve endings. For example, the discrimination of the diff-
erent tones in accordance with the law of sympathetic resonance,
requires no reference to the principle of specific energy to show
how each auditory fibre is affected by a particular sound wave,
because the corresponding part of the basilar membrane is tuned
to the particular sound wave in question. To be sure, the reson-
ance hypothesis thus stated by Helmholtz has been the subject
of many attacks. No one has succeeded, however, in finding any
hypothesis to replace it which agrees better with the laws of
acoustics and with the structural relations in the organ of hearing.

References. J. Muller, Lehrbuch der Physiologic des Menschen,
4th. ed. 1844, vol. I, p. 667. Helmholtz, Physiol ogische Optik, 2nd.
ed., p. 233, and (Engl, trans, by Ellis) Sensations of Tone, Sect. 3 and
4. GoLDSCHEiDER, Gos. Abhandlungon, I, 1, 1898. Schwarz, Das
Wahrnehmungsproblem, Pt. 2, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der phys.
Psych., vol. I, chapter 7, § 4.

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 51

A. SENSATIONS OF THE GENERAL SENSE.

6. The definition of the "general sense" includes a spa-
cial and a temporal factor. In point of time the general
sense is that which precedes all others and therefore belongs
to all beings endowed with mind. In point of spacial attri-
butes, the general sense has the most extensive sensory sur-
face exposed to stimuli. This surface includes not only the
whole external skin and the adjoining areas of the mucous
membrane, but also a large number of internal organs sup-
pHed with sensory nerves, such as joints, muscles, tendons,
and bones, which are accessible to stimuli either regularly,
or at least at certain times, and under special conditions, as
is the case with bones.

The general sense includes four specific, distinct sensa-
tional systems: sensations of pressure, heat, cold, and pain.
Not infrequently a single stimulus arouses more than one
of these sensations. The sensation is then immediately rec-
ognized as made up of a mixture of components from the
different systems. For example, we may have together sen-
sations of pressure and pain, or sensations of heat and pain.
In a similar manner, as a result of the extension of the
sense-organ, we may often have mixtures of the various
qualities of one and the same system, for example, we may
have qualitatively different sensations of pressure, when an
extended region of the skin is touched.

The four systems of general sense are all homogeneous
systems (§ 5, 5). This shows that the sense is genetically
earlier than the others, the systems of which are all complex.
The sensations of pressure from the external skin, and those
due to the tensions and movements of the muscles, joints, and
tendons, are generally grouped together under the name touch
sensations., and distinguished from the common sensations.,

4*

52 I- Psychical Elements.

which include sensations of heat, cold and pain, and the
sensations of pressure which sometimes arise in the other
internal organs (stomach, intestines, lungs, etc.). Touch sen-
sations may in turn be divided into external touch sensations
and internal touch sensations. The first include the external
skin impressions of pressure, the second, the impressions
arising in the joints, muscles and tendons during movement.
The internal touch sensations are again subdivided, with
reference to the physiological organs from which they rise,
as joint sensations and muscle sensations; with reference to
the conditions which produce them, as sensations of move-
ment or contraction, and as sensations of tension or effort.
7. The ability of the different parts of the general sense-
organ to receive stimulations and give rise to sensations, can
be tested with adequate exactness only on the external skin.
The only facts that can be determined in regard to the
internal parts, are that the joints are in a high degree sen-
sitive to pressures, while the muscles and tendons are much
less so, and that sensations of heat, cold, and pain, in the
internal organs are exceptional and rise to a noticeable
intensity only under abnormal conditions. On the other
hand, there is no point of the external skin, or of the im-
mediately adjoining parts of the mucous membrane, which
is not sensitive to stimulations of pressure, heat, cold and
pain. The degree of sensitivity may, indeed, vary at different
points, in such a way that the points most sensitive to
pressure, to heat, and to cold, do not, in general, coincide.
Sensitivity to pain is everywhere about the same, varying at
most in such a way that in some places the pain stimulus
acts on the surface, and in others not until it has penetrated
deeper. On the other hand, certain regions of the skin
appear to be most favorable for stimulations of pressure,
heat and cold. These points are called respectively, pressure-

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 53

spots, heat-spots and cold-spots. They are distributed in
different parts of the skin in varying numbers. Spots of
different modahty never coincide; yet, temperature-spots al-
ways receive sensations of pressure and pain as well; and
a pointed hot stimulus applied to a cold-spot as a rule
causes a sensation of heat, while heat-spots do not seem to
be stimulated by pointed cold stimuli. Furthermore, heat-
spots and cold-spots may give rise to their usual sensations
in response to properly applied mechanical and electrical
stimuli. It is to be noted also that the pressure-spots lie
relatively near to each other. This, together with the fact
that the skin itself tends to distribute any pressure stimu-
lation, explains why it is that sensitivity for absolute pres-
sures, and especially for pressure differences, when tested
by weights of a limited area and of a somewhat diffuse
character, is found to be nearly uniform for all parts of the
skin, except in those areas which are covered with a very
heavy layer of epidermis (soles of feet, etc.). The degree
of this sensitivity is seen in the fact that one can distinguish
clearly weights which differ in quantity by only 1/12 of their
intensity, and this ratio remains about constant for all such
cases ("Weber's Law § 17, 10).

8. Of the four qualities mentioned, sensations of pressure
and those of pain form closed systems which show no relations
either to each other or to the two systems of temperature sen-
sations. The temperature qualities, on the other hand, stand
in the relation of opposites; we apprehend heat and cold, not
merely as different, but also as contrasted sensations. It is,
however, very probable that this is not due to the original
nature of the sensations themselves, but partly to the con-
ditions of their rise, and partly to the accompanying feelings.
For, while the other qualities may be united without limitation
to form mixed sensations — as, for example, pressure with

54 I' Psychical Elements.

pain, cold with pain — heat, and cold exclude each other, be-
cause under the conditions of their rise, the only possibilities
for a given cutaneous region are either a sensation of heat,
or one of cold, or else an absence of both. When one of
these sensations passes continuously into the other, the change
regularly takes place in such a way, that either the sensation
of heat gradually disappears and a continuously increasing
sensation of cold arises, or conversely, the sensation of cold
disappears and that of heat gradually arises. Then, too,
elementary feeHngs of opposite character are connected with
heat and cold, the point where both sensations are absent
corresponding to their indifference-zone.

In still another respect the two systems of temperature
sensations are peculiar. They are to a great extent depen-
dent on the varying conditions under which the stimuK act
upon the sense-organ. A considerable increase above the
temperature of the skin is perceived as heat, while a con-
siderable decrease below the temperature of the skin is per-
ceived as cold. The temperature of the skin itself, which
is thus the indifference-zone between the two forms of sen-
sation can, within fairly wide limits, adapt itself rapidly to
the existing external temperature. The fact that in this
respect too, both systems are alike, favors the view that
they are interconnected and also antagonistic.

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefuhl , Hand-
worterb. der Physiol. Ill, 2. Blix, Zeitschr. f. Biologie 20, 21.
GoLDSCHEiDER, Archiv f. Physiol., 1885, 1886, and 1887, and also
Ges. Abhandlungen 1898, I (pressure-spots, heat-spots, and cold-spots),
and Ges. Abhandl. II (muscle sense). Dessoir, Archiv f. Physiol.,
1882. KiESOW, Philos. Studien vol. 6. von Frey, Ber. der sachs.
Ges. der Wiss, vols. 46 and 47, and Abhandl. der math.-phys. CI.
vol. 23. WuNDT, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9 § 1,
and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych, lecture 5.

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 55

B. SENSATIONS OF SOUND.

9. We possess two independent systems of simple auditory
sensations, which are, however, generally connected with
each other as a result of the mixture of the two kinds of
impressions. The two systems are, the homogeneous system
of simple noise sensations, and the complex system of simple
tone sensations.

Simple noise sensations can be produced only under con-
ditions that exclude the simultaneous rise of tone sensations.
Such conditions are presented, for example, when air vi-
brations are produced at a rate too rapid or too slow for
tone sensations to arise, or when the sound waves act upon
the ear for too short a period. Simple sensations of noise,
thus produced, may vary in intensity and duration, but apart
from these differences they appear to be qualitatively alike.
It is possible that small qualitative differences exist among
them, due to the conditions of their rise, but such differences
are too small to be marked by distinguishing names. The
noises, commonly so called, are compound ideas made up
of such simple noise sensations and of a great many irreg-
ular tonal sensations (cf. § 9, 7). The homogeneous system
of simple noise sensations is probably the first to develop.
The auditory vesicles of the lower animals, with their simple
otoliths, could hardly produce anything but simple noise
sensations. In the case of a man and the higher animals
it may be surmised that the structures found in the vestibule
of the labyrinth receive only homogeneous stimulations, cor-
responding to simple sensations of noise. Finally, experiments
with animals deprived of their labyrinths, make it probable
that even direct stimulations of the auditory nerve can pro-
duce such sensations (p. 45). In the embryonic development
of the higher animals, the cochlea develops from an original

56 I- Psychical Elements.

vestibular vesicle, which corresponds exactly to a primitive
auditory organ. We are, therefore, justified in supposing
that the complex system of tone sensations is a product of
the differentiation of the homogeneous system of simple noise
sensations, but that in every case where this development
has taken place, the simple system has remained along with
the higher.

10. The system of simple tone sensations is a continuity
of one dimension. We call the quality of a single simple
tone its jpitch. The one-dimensional character of the system
shows itself in the fact that, starting with a given pitch, we
can vary the quality only in two opposite directions : change
in one of these directions we call raising the pitch, change
in the other we call lowering the pitch. In actual experience
simple sensations of tone are never presented alone, but al-
ways united with other tone sensations and with accompany-
ing simple sensations of noise. But since, according to the
scheme given above (p. 32), these concomitant elements can
be varied indefinitely, and since in many cases they are
relatively weak in comparison with one of the tones, the
abstraction of simple tones was early reached through the
practical use of tone sensations in the art of music. The
names c, c^, c?^, and d stand for simple tones, though the
clangs of musical instruments or of the human voice by
means of which we produce these different pitches, are al-
ways accompanied by other, weaker tones, and often too,
by noises. But since the conditions for the rise of such
concomitant tones can be so varied that these concomitants
become very weak, it has been possible to produce really
simple tones of nearly perfect purity. The simplest means
of doing this is by using a tuning-fork, and a resonator
tuned to its fundamental tone. Since the resonator increases
the intensity of the fundamental only, the other, accompany-

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 57

ing tones are so weak when the fork sounds, that the sen-
sation is generally apprehended as simple and irreducible.
If the sound vibrations corresponding to such a tone sen-
sation are examined, they will be found to correspond to
the simplest possible form of vibration, namely, to the so-
called pendulum oscillation. This name is used because the
vibrations of the atmospheric particles follow the same laws
as a pendulum oscillating in a very small amplitude i). That
these relatively simple sound vibrations correspond to sen-
sations of simple tones, and that we can even distinguish
the separate tones in compounds, can be explained according
to the above-mentioned (p. 44) resonance hypothesis, from
the structure of the organs in the cochlea, as an application
of the law of sympathetic vibration. The basilar membrane
in the cochlea is, in its different parts, tuned to tones of
different pitch, so that when a simple oscillatory sound-
vibration strikes the ear, only the part tuned to that par-
ticular pitch will vibrate in sympathy. If the same rate of
oscillation comes in a compound sound-vibration, again only
the part of the membrane tuned to that particular rate of
vibration will be affected by it, while the other components
of the wave will set in vibration other sections of the mem-
brane, which correspond in the same way to their pitch.
(Compare § 9, 7a.).

11. The system of tone sensations shows its character
as a continuous series in the fact that it is always possible
to pass from a given pitch to any other through continuous
changes in sensation. Music has selected at option from
this continuity, single sensations separated by considerable

1) Pendulum-oscillations may be represented by a sine-curve be-
cause the distance from the position of rest is always proportional
to the sine of the time required to swing to the point in question.

58 I- Psychical Elements.

intervals, thus substituting a tonal scale for the tonal line.
This selection, however, is based on the relations of tone
sensations themselves. We shall return to the discussion of
these relations later, in taking up the ideational compounds
arising from these sensations (§ 9}. The natural tonal Kne
has two extremities, which are conditioned by the physio-
logical capacity of the ear for receiving sounds. These ex-
tremities are the lowest and highest tones; the former cor-
responds to 10 — 16 double vibrations per second, the latter
to 30,000, 40,000 or even 50,000. The limit defined by
these latter figures is, however, doubtful, since both the sub-
jective recognition of intervals and the objective determination
of the rate of vibration of the sounding body (tuning-fork
or pipe) are very uncertain for these high pitches. For tones
of medium pitch (from 200 to 1000 vibrations) we can dis-
tinguish differences in the pitch of tones which are given in
succession, even when these tones differ only about one fifth
of a vibration per second; and the difference thus necessary
for discrimination remains in this part of the scale an ab-
solute, fixed quantity, even though the pitch of the tone
varies. Another fact which stands in full accord with that
just described is "the fact that if, depending entirely upon
our recognition of tonal intervals, we bisect a certain tonal
interval, say that which lies between the tones a and c, by
determining upon a third tone, 5, which shall stand half
way between the two with which we began, then this third
tone, &, will, in all cases, even when the interval is entirely
unharmonious , lie in point of the number of its objective
vibrations half way between a and c. In the case of very
low tones, and much more in the case of very high tones,
the sensitivity for qualitative differences becomes decidedly
less and less. The sensitivity for quantitative differences of
both tones and noises is also very deficient. Another fact

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 59

also appears in this connection, which differentiates the sen-
sitivity for quantitative differences from that which was found
in the case of medium tonal qualities. Like the sensitivity
of the skin for pressures (p. 53), the sensitivity for sound
intensities is constant, not for absolute differences in inten-
sity, but for relative differences only. The ratio of just
noticeable differences between successive sound impressions
is Ys of the objective intensity of the original impression.

References. Helmholtz, (Engl, trans.) Sensations of Tone, Sects.
1, 4, and 9. Hensen, Physiol, des Gehors, in Hermann's Hand-
bucli der Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2 (1880). Stumpf, Tonpsychologie,
vol. II, § 28 on noise and clangs (1890). Wundt, Grundzuge der
phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9 § 3, and Lect. on Hum. and Anim.
Psych., lecture 5 (for tone vibrations and beats see fig. 6 and 7).
PnEYER, Die Grenzen der Tonwahrnehmung , 1876. LuFT, Unter-
scheidung von Tonhohen, Philos. Studien, vol. 4. Lorenz, Einthei-
lung von Tonstrecken, Philos. Studien, vol 6. For a discussion of
sensitivity for differences in sound intensity see also § 17, 10. For
a discussion of the limit of high pitches see in addition to the text,
the inconclusive discussion between Appunn, Melde, Stumpf and
E. KoNiG, in vols. 64, 65, 67, and 68 of Wiedemann's Annalen der
Physik, New Series. For further references on tone perception see
§ 9 below.

C. SENSATIONS OF SMELL AND TASTE.

12. Sensations of smell form a complex system the ar-
rangement of which is still unknown. All we know is that
there are a great many different olfactory qualities, between
which there are all possible transitional forms. There can,
then, be no doubt that the system is a continuity of many
dimensions.

12a. Olfactory qualities may be grouped in certain classes^
each of which contains those sensations which are more or less
related. This fact may be regarded as an indication of how
these sensations may perhaps be reduced to a small number of
principal qualities. Such classes are, for example.

60 ^- Psychical Elements.

like those from ether, balsam, musk, benzine, those known as
aromatic, etc. It has been observed in a few cases that certain
olfactory sensations which come from definite substances, can
also be produced by mixing other substances. But these obser-
vations are still insufficient to reduce the great number of simple
qualities contained in each of the classes mentioned, to a limited
number of primary qualities and theii mixtures. Finally, it
has been observed that many odors neutralize each other, so
far as the sensation is concerned, when they are mixed in the
proper intensities. This is true not only of substances that
neutralize each other chemically, as acetic acid and ammonia,
but also of others, such as caoutchouc and wax or tolu-balsam,
which do not act on each other chemically outside of the ol-
factory cells. Since this neutralization takes place when the
two stimuli act on entirely different olfactory surfaces, one on
the right and the other on the left mucous membrane of the
nose, it is probable that we are dealing, not with phenomena
analogous to those exhibited by complementary colors (22), but
with a reciprocal central inhibition of sensations. Another ob-
served fact tells against the notion that such neutt'alizing qual-
ities are complementary. One and the same olfactory quality
can neutralize several entirely different qualities, sometimes even
those which in turn neutralize one another, while among colors
it is always two fixed qualities, and only two, that are in each
case complementary.

13. Sensations of taste have been somev^hat more thor-
ougly investigated than those of smell, and we can here dis-
tinguish four distinct primary qualities. Between these
primary qualities there are all possible transitional tastes,
which are to be regarded as mixed sensations. The primary
qualities are sour^ sweety hitter^ and saline. Besides these,
alkaline and metallic are sometimes regarded as independent
qualities. But alkaline qualities show an unmistakable re-
lationship to saline, and metallic to sour, so that both are
probably mixed sensations (alkaline made up perhaps of
saline and sweet, metallic of sour and saline). Sweet and

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 61

saline are opposite qualities. When these two sensations
are united in proper intensities, the result is a neutral mixed
sensation (commonly known as "insipid"), even though the
stimuli that here reciprocally neutralize each other do not
enter into a chemical combination. The system of taste
sensations is, accordingly, in all probability to be regarded
as a two-dimensional continuity, which may be geometrically
represented by a circular surface on the circumference of which
the four primary, and their intermediate, qualities are ar-
ranged, while the neutral mixed sensation is in the middle,
and the other transitional taste qualities are on the surface,
between this middle point and the saturated qualities on
the circumference.

13a. In these attributes of taste qualities, we seem to have
the fundamental type of a chemical sense. In this respect taste
is perhaps the antecedent of sight. The obvious relation to the
chemical nature of the stimulation, makes it probable even here
that the reciprocal neutralization of certain sensations, with which
the two-dimensional character of the sensational' system is per-
haps connected, depends, not on the sensations in themselves,
but on the relations between the physiological stimulations, just
as in the case of sensations of heat and cold {p. 54). It is well
known that very commonly the chemical effect of certain sub-
stances can be neutralized through the action of certain other
substances. We do not know what the chemical changes are
which are produced by the gustatory stimuli in the taste-cells,
but from the neutralization of sensations of sweet and saline
we may conclude, in accordance with the principle of the paral-
lelism of changes in sensation and in stimuli (p. 49), that the
chemical reactions which sweet and saline substances produce in
the sensory cells, also counteract each other. The same would
hold for other sensations for which similar relations could be
demonstrated. In regard to the physiological conditions for
gustatory stimulations, we can draw only this one conclusion
from the facts mentioned, namely the conclusion that the chemical

62 ^- Psychical Elements.

processes of stimulation corresponding to the sensations which
neutralize each other in this way, probably take place in the
same cells. Of course, the possibility is not excluded that sev-
eral different processes subject to neutralization through op-
posite reactions, could arise in the same cells. The known
anatomical facts and the experiments of physiology in stimula-
ting single papillae separately, give no certain conclusion in
this matter. "Whether we are here dealing with phenomena that
are really analogous to those exhibited by complementary colors
(v. inf. 22) is still an open question.

References. On smell : Zwaardemaker, Physiologie des Geruchs,
1895. On taste, W. Nagel, in Bibl. zool., 18, 1894, and in Pfliiger's
Archiv f. Physiol, vol. 54. Oehrwall, Skand. Archiv f. Physiol, vol. 2.
KiESOW, Philos. Studien vols. 9, 10, and 12.

D. SENSATIONS OF LIGHT.

14. The system of light sensations is made up of two
partial systems: that of sensations of achromatic light and
that of sensations of chromatic light. Between the qualities
in these two systems, all possible transitional forms exist.

Sensations of achromatic light., when considered alone,
form a system of one dimension, which extends, like the
tonal line, between two limiting qualities. The sensations in
the neighborhood of one of these limits we call hlack., those
in the neighborhood of the other we call white., while between
the two we insert grey in its different shades (dark grey,
grey, and light grey). This one-dimensional system of achro-
matic sensations differs from that of tones in being at once
a system of quality and of intensity., since every qualitative
change in the direction from black to white is seen at the
same time as an increase in intensity, and every qualitative
change in the direction from white to black is seen as a
decrease in intensity. Each point in the series, which thus
has a definite quality and intensity, is called a degree of

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 63

brightness. The whole system may, accordingly, be designated
as that of sensations of 'pure brightness. The use of the
the word "pure" indicates the absence of all sensations of
color. The system of pure brightness is absolutely one-
dimensional; both the variations in quality and those in
intensity belong to one and the same dimension. This
system differs essentially, in this respect, from the tonal
line, in which each point is merely a degree of quality, and
has by itself a whole series of gradations in intensity.
Simple tone sensations thus form a two-dimensional con-
tinuity so soon as we take into account both determinants,
quality and intensity, while the system of pure brightness
is always one- dimensional^ even when we attend to both
determinants. The whole system may, therefore, be regarded
as a continuous series of gi^ades of brightness^ in which the
lower grades are designated black so far as quality is con-
cerned, and weak so far as intensity is concerned, while the
higher grades are called white and strong. Our sensitivity
for differences in brightness is, especially for medium inten-
sities, very great. The ratio is from Yioo to Y150 of the
brightness with which we start in the comparison of two
intensities. Like the ratios of pressure intensities and sound
intensities (p. 59), this ratio of brightness intensities is con-
stant in its relative magnitude. (Weber's Law 17, 10.)

15. Sensations of color also form a one-dimensional system
when their qualities alone are taken into account. Unlike
the system of sensations of pure brightness, this system
returns upon itself from whatever point we start, for at first,
after leaving a given quality, we pass gradually to a quality
that shows the greatest difference, and going still further
we find that the qualitative differences become smaller again,
until finally we reach the starting point once more. The
color spectrum obtained by refracting sunlight through a prism.

64 L Psychical Elements.

or that found in the rainbow, shows this characteristic,
though not completely. If in these cases we start from the
red end of the spectrum, we come first to orange, then
to yellow, yellow-green, green-blue, blue, indigo-blue, and
finally to violet, which last is more like red than any of
the other colors except orange, which lies next to red.
The Kne of colors in the spectrum does not return quite
to its starting-point, because it does not contain all of
the colors that we have in sensation. Purple shades, which
can be obtained by the objective mixture of red and violet
rays, are wanting in the spectrum. Only when we fill out
the spectrum series with purple, is the system of actual
color sensations complete, and then the system is a closed
circle. This characteristic of the color series is not to be
attributed to the fact that we are accustomed to seeing the
spectrum always arranged in this order. Even children who
have never observed attentively a solar spectrum or a rain-
bow, and can, therefore, begin the series with any other
color just as well as with red, always arrange the series in
the same order when called on to arrange a promiscuous
group of colored objects in the order of their subjective
relations.

The system of pure colors is, accordingly, to be defined
as oncrdimensional. It does not extend in a straight hne but
returns upon itself. Its simplest geometrical representation
would be a circle. From a given point in this system we pass,
when the sensation is gradually varied, first to similar sen-
sations, then to those most markedly different, and finally to
others similar to the first quality, but lying on the opposite
side. Every color must, accordingly, be related to one maxi-
mum of difference in sensation. This different sensation may
be called the opposite colo?% and in the representation of the
color system by a circle, two opposite colors are to be placed

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 65

at the two extremities of the diameter. Thus, for example,
parple and green, yellow and blue, light green and violet,
are pairs of opposite colors, that is, colors which exhibit
the greatest qualitative differences. Sensitivity for either
absolute or relative objective color differences as expressed
in the number of vibrations, is entirely irregular, changing
constantly from point to point on the color line. Sensitivity
is generally at its maximum in yellow and blue, at its mini-
mum in red and violet. It has a third relatively low point
between yellow and blue, that is, in green. A regularity
such as is to be found in the case of tonal qualities (p. 58)^
or in the case of different degrees of brightness (p. 63), is
entirely wanting here.

The quality determined by the position of a sensation in
the color system, as distinguished from other qualitative deter-
minations is called color-tone, a figurative term borrowed from
tone sensations. In this sense the simple names of colors,
such as red, orange, yellow, etc., denote merely color-tones.
The color circle is a representation of the system of color-
tones considered without reference to the other attributes
belonging to the sensations. In reality, every color sensation
has two other attributes, one we call saturation of the color,
the other its brightness. Of these two attributes saturation
is peculiar to chromatic or color sensations, while brightness
belongs to both chromatic and achromatic sensations.

16. By saturation we mean the attribute of color sensa-
tions by virtue of which they appear in all possible stages
of transition to sensations of pure brightness, so that a con-
tinuous passage is possible from every color to any point in
the series of whites, greys, and blacks. The term "satura-
tion" is borrowed from the common method of producing
these transitional colors objectively, that is, by the saturation
of some colorless soluble with color-pigment. Since the end of

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 5

QQ I. Psychical Elements.

every series of diminisliing grades of saturation of any color
quality is thus an achromatic sensation, the degree of satura-
tion may be thought of as an attribute of all color sensa-
tions, and, at the same time, as the attribute by which the
system of color sensations is directly united with the system
of sensations of pure brightness. If, now, we represent
some particular sensation of white, grey, or black by the
central point of the color circle, all the grades of color
saturation that can arise as transitional stages from any
particular color to this particular sensation of pure bright-
ness, will obviously be represented by that radius of the circle
which connects the centre with the color in question. If
the grades of color saturation corresponding to the continuous
transitional stages from all the colors to a particular sensa-
tion of pure brightness, are thus geometrically represented,
we have the system of saturation-grades as a circular surface^
the circumference of which is the system of simple color-
tones and the centre of which is the sensation of pure
brightness, corresponding to the absence of all saturation.
For the formation of such a system of saturation-grades any
point whatever in the series of sensations of pure brightness
may be chosen, so long as the condition is fulfilled that the
white is not too bright, or the black too dark, for in such
extreme cases differences in both saturation and color dis-
appear. When such systems are made for all possible points,
the system of saturation will be supplemented by that of
grades of brightness.

17. Brightness is just as necessary an attribute of a color-
sensation as it is of achromatic sensations, and is in the case
of color sensations also, both a quality and a degree of in-
tensity. Starting from a given grade, if the brightness in-
creases, every color approaches white in quality, while at
the same time the intensity increases; if the brightness de-

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 67

creases, the colors approach black in quality, and the inten-
sity diminishes. The grades of brightness for any single
color thus form a system of intensive qualities, analogous to
the system of pure brightnesses, only in place of the achro-
matic gradations between white and black, we have the cor-
responding grades of saturation. From the point of greatest
saturation there are two opposite directions for variation in
saturation: one positive^ towards white, accompanied by an
increase in the intensity of the sensation, and the other
negative^ towards black, with a corresponding decrease in
intensity. As limits for these two directions we have, on
the one hand, the pure sensation white, on the other, the
pure sensation black; the first is at the same time the
maximum, the second the minimum of intensity. It follows
obviously that there is a certain medium brightness for
every color, at which its saturation is greatest. From this
point, the saturation decreases in the positive direction,
that is, towards white, when the brightness increases; and
in the negative direction, that is, towards black when the
brightness decreases. The grade of brightness most fa-
vorable for the saturation is not the same for all colors,
but varies from red to blue, in such a way that it is most
intense for red and least intense for blue. This accounts
for the fact that in twilight, when the degree of brightness
is small, the blue color-tones — of paintings, for example
— are still clearly visible, while the red color-tones appear
black (Purkinje's phenomenon).

18. If we neglect for the moment the somewhat different
relations of the maximal saturations of the various colors
with respect to the line of brightness, we may represent the
general relation which exists by virtue of the gradual tran-
sition of colors into white and black, that is, we may re-
present the general relation between sensations of chromatic

5*

68 ^' Psychical Elements.

brightness and sensations of pure, or achromatic, brightness
in the simplest manner by the following figure. First, we
may represent the system of pure color-tones, that is, of the
colors at their maximal saturation, by a circle, as above.
Then we may draw through the centre of this circle, per-
pendicular to its plane, the straight line of pure brightness,
in such a way that where it cuts the plane of the circular
surface, it represents the sensation of pure brightness cor-
responding to the minimum of saturation of the colors with
which we started. In Kke manner, the other color circles
for increasing and decreasing grades of brightness, may be
arranged at right angles along this line, above and below
the circle of greatest saturation. But the decreasing satura-
tion of the colors in these latter circles must also be ex-
pressed, and this can be done by the shortening of their
radii; just as in the first circle, the shorter the distance
from the centre, the less the saturation. The radii in suc-
cessive circles grow continually shorter, until finally, at the
two extremities of the line of brightness the circles disappear
entirely. This corresponds to the fact that for every color
the maximum of brightness passes into the sensation white,
while its minimum passes into black i).

19. The whole system of sensations of chromatic bright-
ness may, accordingly, be most simply represented by a
spherical surface the equator of which represents the system
of pure color-tones, or colors of greatest saturation, while
the two poles correspond to white and black, the extreme
sensations of chromatic brightness. Of course, any other

1) It must be observed, however, that the actual coincidence of
these sensations can be empirically proved only for the minimum
of brightness. Grades of brightness which approach the maximum
are so injurious to the eye that the general demonstration of the
approach to white must be accepted as sufficient.

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 69

geometrical figure with similar attributes, as, for example,
two cones with a common base and with apexes pointing in
different directions, would serve the same purpose. The
only thing essential for the representation, is the gradual
transition to white and black, and the corresponding decrease
in the variety of the color-tones, which finds its expression
in the continual decrease in the length of the radii of the
color circles. Now, as above shown, the system of sensations
corresponding to a particular sensation of pure brightness,
may be represented by a circular surface which contains all
the sensations of light belonging to one grade of brightness.
"When we unite grades of saturation and brightness into a
single system, the total system of all light sensations may be
represented by a solid sphere. The equator is the system
of pure color-tones; the polar axis is the system of pure
brightnesses; the surface represents the system of chromatic
brightnesses, and finally, every circular plane at right angles
to the polar axis, corresponds to a system of saturations of
equal brightness. The total system of light-sensations is, ac-
cordingly, a closed continuity of three dimensions. The three-
dimensional character of the system arises from the fact
that every concrete sensation of light has three determinants:
color-tone, saturation, and brightness. Pure, or achromatic,
brightness on the one hand, and pure, or saturated colors,
on the other hand, are to be regarded as the two extreme
qualities in the series of saturations. The closed form of the
system comes from the circular character of the color-line,
and from the fact that the system of chromatic brightness
terminates in the extremes of pure brightness. A special
characteristic of the system is, that only the changes in two
dimensions, namely, in color-tones and saturations, are pure
changes in quality, while every movement in the third di-
mension, namely, in the direction of brightness, is at once a

70 I- Psychical Elements.

modification of both quality and intensity. As a consequence
of this fact the whole three-dimensional system is required
to represent fully the qualities of light sensations, though it
includes also the intensities of these sensations.

20. Certain principal sensations are prominent in this
system, because we use them as points of reference for the
arrangement of all the others. These are tvhite and blacky
in the achromatic series, and in the chromatic, the four
principal colors: red^ yellotVy green and blue. This group of
four colors was first pointed out as important by Leonardo
DA Vinci. Only these six sensations have clearly distinguished
names in the early development of language. All other sen-
sations are then named either with reference to these or
even with modifications of the names themselves. Thus, we
regard grey as a stage in the achromatic series lying between
white and black. We designate the different grades of
saturation according to their brightness, as whitish or blackish,
light or dark color-tones; and we generally choose compound
names for the colors between the four principal ones, as,
for example, purple -red, orange -yellow, yellow -green, etc.
These all show their relatively late origin by their very
composition.

20 a. From the early origin of the names for the six qualities
mentioned, the conclusion has been drawn that they are funda-
mental qualities of vision, and that the others are compounded
from them. Grey is declared to be a mixture of black and
white, violet and purple |to be mixtures of blue and red, etc.
Psychologically there [is no justification for calling any light
sensations compound in comparison with others. Grrey is a simple
sensation just as much as white or black; such colors as orange
and purple are just as much simple colors as red and yellow;
and any grade of saturation which we have placed in the system
between a pure color and white, is by no means, for that reason,
a compound sensation. The closed, continuous character of the

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 71

system makes it necessary for language to pick out certain
especially marked differences in reference to which all other
sensations are then arranged, for the simple reason that it is
impossible to have an unlimited number of names. It is most
natural that white and black should be chosen as such points
of reference for the achromatic series, since they designate the
greatest differences. "When once these two are given, all other
achromatic sensations will be considered as transitional sensations
between them, since the extreme differences are connected by a
series of all possible grades of brightness. The case of color
sensations is similar; only here, on account of the circular form
of the color line, it is impossible to choose directly two abso-
lutely greatest differences. Other motives besides the necessary
qualitative difference, are decisive in the choice of the principal
colors. We may regard as such motives, the frequency and af-
fective intensity of certain light impressions, due to the natural
conditions of human existence. The red color of blood, the
green of vegetation, the blue of the sky, and the yellow of the
heavenly bodies in contrast with the blue of the sky, may well
have furnished the earliest occasions for the choice of certain
colors as those to receive names. Language generally names the
sensation from the object that produced it, not the object from
the sensation. In this case too, when certain principal qualities
were once determined, all others must, on account of the con-
tinuity of the series of sensations, seem to be intermediate
color-tones. The difference between principal colors and tran-
sitional colors is, therefore, very probably due entirely to external
conditions. If these conditions had been other, red might have
been regarded as a transitional color between purple and orange,
just as orange is now placed between red and yellow^).

1) The same false reasoning from the names of sensations, has
even led to the assumption that the sensation blue developed later
than other color sensations, because, for example, even in Homer
the word for blue is the same as that for "dark" (L. Geiger, Zur
Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit, 1871.). Tests of the color
sensations of uncivilized peoples whose languages are much more
deficient in names for colors than that of the Greeks at the time of
Homer, have given us a superabundance of evidence that this as-
sumption is utterly without ground (Grant Allen, On Color, 1880.).

72 I' Psyehical Elements.

Eeferences. Purkinje, Beobaclitungen und Yersuclie zur Physio-
logie der Sinne, 2 vols., 1819—1823. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik,
§ 19—21. Hering, Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinn, 5 and 6, 1874—1878.
(Hering holds to the view that the naming of the colors is due to
their subjective characters and then proceeds to draw conclusions
from this view for the theory of light sensations.) Wundt, Die Em-
pfindung des Lichts und der Farben, Philos. Studien, vol. 4, also,
Grundziige der Phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 9, § 4., also, Lectures on
Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 6. (Figures 10 — 13 give the geo-
metrical representations of the system of light sensations.) On sen-
sitivity for color-differences : A. Konig and Dieterici, Archiv f. Oph-
thalm., vol. 30, no. 2. Konig, Zeitschr. f. Psychol, u. Phys. d. Sinnesorg.,
vol. 3. Mentz, Philos. Studien, vol. 13.

21. The attributes of the system of light sensations above
described, are so peculiar that they lead us to expect a priori
that the relation between these psychological attributes and
the objective processes of stimulation, is essentially different
from that which we inferred in the cases of the sensational
systems discussed before, especially in the case of the general
sense and auditory sense. Most striking in this respect,
is the difference between the system of colors and that of
tones. In the case of tones the principle of paralleHsm
between sensation and stimulus (p. 49), holds, not only for
the physiological processes of stimulation, but to a great
extent for the physical processes as well. A simple sensa-
tion corresponds to a simple form of sound vibration, and
a plurality of simple sensations corresponds to a compound
form of vibration. Furthermore, the intensity of the sensa-
tion varies in proportion to the amplitude of the vibrations,
and its quality varies with the form, so that in both directions
the subjective difference between sensations increases with
the growing difference between the objective physical stimuli.
The relation in the case of light sensations is entirely different.
Like objective sound, objective light also consists of vibrations
of a certain medium. To be sure, the actual form of these

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 73

vibrations is still a question, but from physical experiments
on the phenomena of interference we know that they consist
of very short and rapid waves. Those seen as light vary in
wave-length from 688 to 393 millionths of a millimetre, and
in rate from 450 to 790 billion vibrations per second. For
light, as for sound, simple sensations correspond to simple
vibrations, that is, to vibrations of like wave-length; and the
quality of the sensation varies continuously with the wave
length and with the rate of vibration ; thus, red corresponds to
the longest and slowest waves, and violet to the shortest and
most rapid, while the other color-tones form a series between
these, varying with the changes in wave-length. Even here,
however, an essential difference appears, for the colors red
and violet, which are the most different in wave-length, are
more similar in sensation than are most of the colors which lie
between 1). There are also other differences. 1) Every change
in the amplitude of the physical vibrations corresponds, as
we noted above in the discussion of sensations of brightness,
to a subjective change in both intensity and quality. 2) All
light, even though it be made up of all the different kinds
of vibration, is simple in sensation, just as much as ob-
jectively simple light, which is made up of only one kind of
waves. This is immediately apparent if we make a subjective
comparison of sensations of chromatic light with those of
achromatic light. From the first of these facts it follows
that light which is physically simple may produce not only

1) Many physicists, to be sure, believe that an analogous relation
is to be found between tones of different pitch, in the fact that every
tone has in its octave a similar tone. But this similarity, as we
shall see (§ 9), does not exist between simple tones, but depends on
the actual sympathetic vibration of the octave in all compound
clangs. Attempts to support this supposed analogy by finding in
the color line intervals corresponding to the various tonal intervals,
third, fourth, fifth, etc., have all been entirely futile.

74 I' Psychical Elements.

chromatic, but also achromatic sensations, for the sensation
from such simple light approaches white when the amplitu de
of its vibrations increases, and black when the amplitude
decreases. The quality of an achromatic sensation does not,
therefore, determine unequivocally its source ; such a sensation
may be produced either through a change in the amplitude of
objective light vibrations or through a mixture of simple vi-
brations of different wave-lengths. In the first case, however,
there is always connected with the change in amplitude a
change in the grade of brightness, which does not neces-
sarily take place when a mixture is made.

22. Even when the grade of brightness remains constant,
an achromatic sensation may have one of several sources.
A sensation of pure brightness of a given intensity may re-
sult not only from a mixture of all the rates of vibration
contained in solar light, as, for example, in ordinary day-
light, but it may also result when only tivo kinds of light-
waves are mixed in proper proportions. The kinds of Hght
necessary to thus produce a sensation of pure brightness are
those which correspond to sensations subjectively the most
different, that is, to opposite colors^ or at least to colors
very nearly opposite in quality. "Whenever the objective
mixture of two colors produces white, these colors are called
complementary colors. As examples of such complementary
colors, we may mention spectral red and green-blue, orange
and sky-blue, yellow and indigo-blue.

Each of the color sensations may, like achromatic sen-
sations, though to more limited extent, have one of several
sources. When two objective colors which lie nearer each
other in the color-circle than opposites, are mixed, the mixture
appears, not white, but of a color which in the series of
objectively simple qualities lies between the two with which
we started. The saturation of the resulting color is, indeed.

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 75

very much diminislied when the components of the mixture
approach complementary colors; but when the component
colors are near each other, the diminution in saturation is
no longer perceptible, and the mixture and the corresponding
simple color are generally subjectively alike. Thus the orange
of the spectrum is absolutely indistinguishable from a mixture
of red and yellow rays. In this way, all the colors in the
color-circle between red and green can be obtained by mix-
ing red and green, all between green and violet by mixing
green and violet, and, finally, purple, which is not in the
solar spectrum, can be produced by mixing red and violet.
The whole series of color-tones possible in sensation can,
accordingly, be obtained from the three objective colors, red,
green and violet. By means of the same three colors we
can also produce white with its intermediate stages. The
mixture of red and violet gives purple, and this is the
complementary color of green, and, finally, the white secured
by mixing purple and green gives, when mixed in different
proportions with the various colors, the different grades of
saturation.

23. The three objective colors that may be used *in this
way to produce the whole system of light sensations, are
called fundamental colors. In order to indicate their signif-
icance, a triangular surface is chosen to represent the system
of saturations, rather than the circular surface which is de-
rived from the psychological relations alone. The special
significance of the fundamental colors is then expressed by
placing them at the angles of the triangle. Along the sides
are arranged the color -tones in their maximal saturation,
just as on the circumference of the color circle, while on the
triangular surface are the other grades of saturation in their
transitions to white, the white lying, as in the circle, in the
centre. Theoretically any set of three colors could be chosen

76 I- Psychical Elements.

as fundamental colors, provided they were suitably distant
from one another. Practically, those mentioned, namely, red,
green and violet, are preferable because at the two ends of
the spectrum sensations vary most slowly in proportion to
the period of vibration, so that when the extreme colors of
the spectrum are used as fundamental colors, the result ob-
tained by mixing two neighboring ones is most like the inter-
mediate, objectively simple color i).

24. These phenomena show that in the system of light
sensations a simple relation does not exist between the
physical stimuli and the sensations. This can be understood
from what has been said above (3) as to the character of
the ][)hysiological stimulation. The visual sense is to be
reckoned among the chemical senses, and we can expect a
simple relation only between the photochemical processes in
the retina and the sensations. Now, we know from experience
that different kinds of physical light produce like chemical
disintegrations, and this explains in general the possibility
mentioned above, of having the same sensation from many
different kinds of objective light. According to the principle
of parallelism between changes in sensation and in the physio-
logical stimulation (p. 49), it may be assumed that the various
physical stimuli which cause the same sensation, all produce
the same photochemical stimulation in the retina, and that
altogether there are just as many kinds and varieties of the
photochemical processes as kinds and varieties of distin-

1) In the neighborhood of green this advantage does not exist,
and the mixtures always appear less saturated than the intermediate
simple colors. This is a clear proof that the choice of the three
fundamental colors mentioned is indeed the most practical, but
nevertheless arbitrary, and at bottom due to the familiar geometrical
principle that a triangle is the simplest figure that can enclose a
finite number of points in the same plane.

§ 6. Pure Sensations, 77

guishable sensations. In fact, all that we know, up to the
present time, about the physiological substratum of light
sensations is based upon this assumption. The investigation
of the physiological processes of light stimulation, has not
yet given any further result than that the stimulation is in
all probability a chemical process.

25. The relatively long persistence of the sensatioji after
the stimulation that originated it, is explicable on the as-
sumption that the light stimulations are due to chemical
processes in the retina (p. 46). Such persistence of the sen-
sation is called, with reference to the object used as stimulus,
the after-image of the impression. At first this after-image
appears in the same brightness and color as the object:
white when the object is white, black when the object is
black, and if the object is colored, the after-image appears
in the same color. These are the positive and like-colored
after-images. After a short time the after-image passes, in
the case of achromatic impressions, into the opposite grade
of brightness, white into black, or black into white; in the
case of colors, it passes into the opposite or complementary
color. These are the negative and complementary after-
images. If light stimuli of short duration act upon the eye
in darkness, this transition from positive to negative after-
images may be repeated several times. A second positive
after-image follows the negative, and so on, so that an os-
cillation between the two phases takes place. The positive
after-image may be readily explained by the fact that the
photochemical disintegration caused by any kind of light,
lasts a short time after the action of the light. The nega-
tive and complementary after-images can be explained by
the fact that disintegration in a given direction causes a
partial consumption of the photochemical substance most
directly concerned, and this results in a corresponding modi-

78 I- Psychical Elements.

fication of the photochemical processes when the stimulation
of the retina continues.

26. The phenomena of color induction and light induction
are probably very closely related to positive and negative
after-images. These phenomena consist in the appearance of
simultaneous sensations of opposite brightness and color in
the neighborhood of any light impression. Positive light in-
duction is the less common of these two kinds of phenomena.
It appears most noticeably in those cases in which one part
of the retina is intensely stimulated and a contiguous region
is left entirely unstimulated. In such a case the positive
light stimulation, or color stimulation seems to spread out
over the unstimulated area. In all other cases the opposite
form of induction, namely, negative induction, appears. In
consequence of such negative induction a white surface ap-
pears to be surrounded by a dark margin, a black surface
by a bright margin, and a colored surface by a margin of
the complementary color. These phenomena are, further-
more, accompanied by psychological contrast phenomena which
belong under the general principle to be explained later
(§ 17, 11), namely, the principle of emphasis of opposites.
Indeed, the term "contrast" is, as a rule, applied to the total
effects of such combined physiological and psychological influ-
ences. Such a use of the term is justified to a certain degree
by the impossibility of separating the two kinds of influences
from each other, but it would be much more appropriate to use
the term induced excitation only for the physiological factor,
and to reserve the term contrast for the psychological factor.
For this psychological factor corresponds fully to the psycho-
logical emphasizing of opposites which can be demonstrated
in other spheres, especially among spacial and temporal ideas,
and among the feelings. Light induction and color induction,
in this purely physiological sense, consist probably in a kind

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 79

of negative irradiation of the stimulation, in which the stimu-
lation is not carried over directly to contiguous regions in
its own proper quality as it is in the case of positive in-
duction, but rather excites in these neighboring regions a
stimulation process of opposite character. Such negative ir-
radiation may possibly be due to the fact that the photo-
chemical substances which are used up in the stimulation of
a certain region of the retina, are replaced in part through
an influx of other similiar substances from the surrounding
regions. If, then, a light impression is applied to these im-
poverished neighboring regions, the result would be the same
as that which would appear in the case of an after-image
on the originally stimulated area (p. 77). Evidence in favor
of assuming this connection between the facts of induction
and after-images, appears in the fact that in both cases the
effects are heightened by an increase in the intensity of the
light impressions. But just at this point there shows itself
a very fundamental difference between these physiological
processes of light induction and the psychological processes
of contrast with which they are usually erroneously classified.
To this fundamental difference we shall return when we
come to the general treatment of contrasts (§ 17, 10).

26 a. If we take the principle of parallelism between sen-
sation and physiological stimulation as the basis of our sup-
positions in regard to the processes that occur in the retina, we
may conclude that the photochemical processes corresponding to
chromatic and achromatic sensations, are relatively independent
of each other, in a way analogous to that in which the cor-
responding sensations are relatively independent. Two facts,
one belonging to the subjective sensational system, the other
to the objective phenomena of color-mixing, can be very natur-
ally explained on this basis. The first is the fact that every
color sensation tends to pass into one of pure brightness as the
grade of its brightness decreases or increases. This fact is most

80 I' Psychical Elements.

simply interpreted on the assumption that every color stimulation
is made up of two physiological components, one corresponding
to the chromatic, the other to the achromatic stimulation. To
this assumption we must add the further condition, that for
certain medium intensities of the stimuli the chromatic com-
ponents are relatively the strongest, while for greater and smaller
intensities the achromatic components predominate more and
more. The second fact is, that there are complementary colors.
This fact is most easily understood when we assume that op-
posite colors, which are subjectively the greatest possible differ-
ences in sensation, depend upon objective photochemical proc-
esses that neutralize each other. The fact that as a result of
this neutralization an achromatic stimulation arises, is very
readily explained by the presupposition that such an achromatic
stimulation accompanies every chromatic stimulation from the
first, and is, therefore, all that is left when antagonistic chro-
matic stimulations counteract each other. This assumption of a
relative independence between the chromatic and achromatic
photochemical processes, is supported by the- existence of an
abnormality of vision, sometimes congenital^ sometimes acquired
through pathological changes in the retina, namely total color-
blindness. In such cases all stimulations are seen, either on the
whole retina or on certain parts of it, as pure brightness, with-
out any admixture of color. This is proof that the chromatic
and achromatic stimulations are separable physiological proc-

If we apply the principle of parallelism to the chromatie
stimulation, two facts present themselves. The first is that two
colors separated by a limited, short distance, when mixed give
a color that is like the intermediate simple color. This indicates
that color stimulation is a process which varies with the physical
stimulus, not continuously, as the tonal stimulation, but in short
stages, and in such a way that the stages in red and violet are
longer than in green, where the mixture of colors fairly near
each other, shows the effects of complementary action. The
second fact is that certain colors which correspond to rather
large differences in stimulation, namely, the complementary colors,
evidently depend upon processes which neutralize each other.
Now, let it be remembered that chemical processes can neutralize

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 81

each other only when they are in some way opposite in character,
and that for every color recognizable in sensation there is an
opposite quality, it will then be seen that for every stage in the
photochemical process of color stimulation there must be a stage
of complementary action. Furthermore, since there are two
opposite series of gradations through which these complementary
effects may be reached, we are justified in drawing the con-
clusion that the return of the color circle to its beginning has
its corresponding physiological fact in a return of the chemical
processes to closely related forms. The whole series of chro-
matic stimulations, beginning with red and passing beyond violet
through purple mixtures back to its first point, running parallel,
as it does, with continuous changes in the wave-length of ob-
jective light, is to be regarded as an indefinitely long succes-
sion of photochemical disintegrations. All these processes to-
gether form a closed circle in which there is, for every stage,
a neutralizing opposite, and in which there are two possible paths
of transition in different directions to this neutralizing opposite.
We know nothing about the total number of photochemical
stages in this circle of processes. The numerous attempts made
to reduce all color sensations to the smallest possible number
of such stages, lack adequate foundation. Sometimes they in-
discriminatingly translate the results of physical color -mixing
into physiological processes, as in the assumption of three fun-
damental colors, red, green, and violet, from the different mix-
tures of which all sensations of light, even the achromatic, are
to be derived (Young-Helmholtz' hypothesis). Sometimes they
start with the psychologically untenable assumption that the
naming of colors is not due to the influence of certain external
objects, but to the real significance of the sensations themselves
(v. sup. p. 71), and assume accordingly four fundamental colors
as the sources of all color sensations. The four fundamental
colors here assumed are the two pairs red and green, yellow
and blue, to which are added the similar pair of sensations of
pure brightness, black and white. All other light sensations
such as grey, orange, Violet, etc., are regarded as subjectively
and objectively mixed colors (Hering's hypothesis). The evidence
in support of the first as of the second of these hypotheses has
been derived for the most part from the not infrequent cases

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 6

82 I' Psychical Elements.

of partial color-blindness. Those who accept three fundamental
colors, assert that all these cases are to be explained as a lack
of the red or green sensations, or else as a lack of both. Those
who accept four, hold that partial color-blindness always includes
two fundamental colors which belong together as opposites, that
color-blindness is, accordingly, either red-green-blindness or yel-
low-blue-blindness. An unprejudiced examination of color-
blindness does not justify either of these assertions. The three-
color theory can not explain total color-blindness, and the four-
color theory is in contradiction to cases of pure red-blindness
and pure green-blindness. Finally, both theories are overthrown
by the cases that unquestionably occur, in which such parts of
the spectrum as do not correspond to any of the three or four
fundamental colors, appear colorless. The only thing that our
present knowledge justifies us in saying, is that every simple
sensation of light is probably conditioned by a combination of
two photochemical processes, an achromatic and a chromatic.
The first is made up, in turn, of a process mainly of disinte-
gration when the light is more intense, and a process of resti-
tution when the light is weaker. The chromatic process varies
by stages in such a way that the whole series of photochemical
color disintegrations forms a circle of processes in which the
products of the disintegration for any two relatively most distant
stages, neutralize each other i).

Various changes in the living retina have been observed as
a result of the action of light, all of which go to support the
assumption of a photochemical process. Such changes are, first,
the gradual change into a colorless state, of a substance which
in the retina not exposed to light is purple (bleaching of the visual

1) The further assumption is made by the defenders of the four
fundamental colors, that two opposite colors are related just as bright
and dark achromatic stimulations, that is, that one of these colors
is due to a photochemical disintegration (dissimilation), the other to
a restitution (assimilation). This is an analogy that contradicts the
actual facts. The result obtained by mixing complementary colors
is on its subjective side a suppression of the color sensation, while
the mixture of white and black, on the other hand, produces the
grey.

§ 6. Pure Sensations. 83

purple) ; second, microscopical movements of the pigmented pro-
toplasm between the sensitive elements, or rods and cones; and
finally, changes in the form of the rods and cones themselves. At-
tempts to use these phenomena in any way for a physiological
theory of light- stimulation, are certainly premature. The most
probable conclusion which we can now draw is that the difference
in the forms of the rods and cones is connected with a difference
in function. The centre of the human retina, which is the region
of direct vision, has only cones, while in the peripheral regions
the rods predominate. In the centre (which, furthermore, has
no visual purple) color differentiation is much more complete
than in the peripheral regions. At the extreme outer limits of
the retina color vision disappears entirely. The periphery is, on
the other hand, more sensitive to brightness than the centre.
It is probable that these differences in the function are related
to the differences in the photochemical properties of the rods
and cones, the cones being the chief organs of color vision, the
rods being the chief organs for achromatic vision. This division
of functions is, however, obviously not absolute.

References. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, § 20—25. Hering, Zur
Lehre vom Lichtsinn, 1 — 6. von Kries, Die Gesichtsempfindungen
und ihre Analyse, 1882. Wundt, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I,
chap. 9, § 4., and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 6
and 7. On After-images: Fechner, Poggendorff's Ann. der Physik,
vols 44 and 50. Hering, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 43. Kunkel,
Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 9. Charpentier, Compt. rend., 1881, no. 113.
WiRTH, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. On light induction (contrast) : Bruche,
Denkschr. der Wiener Akad. Math.-naturw. CI., vol. 3. Fechner,
Poggendorff's Ann., vol. 50. Hering, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 41. Kirsch-
MANN, Philos. Studien, vol. 6. On color-blindness: Holmgren, Die
Farbenblindheit, 1878. Konig and Dieterici, Zeitsch. f. Psych, u.
Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., vol. 4. Brodhun, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol.
d. Sinnesorg., vols. 3 and 5. Konig, same journal, vol. 20. v. Kries,
same journal, vols. 13 and 19. Kirschmann, Philos. Studien, vol. 8.
On light sensations in indirect vision: ScHON, Die Lehre vom Ge-
sichtsfeld, 1874. A. E. Pick, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 43. Kirschmann,
Philos. Studien, vol. 8. Hellpach, Philos. Studien, vol. 15. v. Kries,
Zeitsch. f. Psychol, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg., vols. 9 and 15. Sherman,
Philos. Studien, vol. 13. Tschermak, Pfltiger's Archiv f. Physiol.,
vol. 82.

6*

84 I- Psychical Elements.

§ 7. SIMPLE FEELINGS.

1. Simple feelings may originate in very many more ways
than simple sensations. For even such feehngs as we never
observe except in connection with more or less complex
ideational processes, are often subjectively unanalyzable (p. 38).
Thus, for example, the feeling of tonal harmony is just as
simple as the feeling connected with a single tone. The
only essential difference between the two is that the feelings
which correspond to simple sensations can be easily isolated
from the interconnections of which they form a part in our
experience, by the same method of abstraction as that which
we employed in discovering the simple sensations (p. 32).
Those feelings, on the other hand, which are connected with
some composite ideational compound, can never be separated
from the feelings which enter into the compound as subjective
complements of the sensation factors. Thus, for example,
it is impossible to separate the feeling of harmony connected
with the chord c e g from the simple feelings connected with
each of the single tones c, e, and g. The latter may, indeed,
be pushed into the background, for as we shall see later
(§ 12, 3 a), they always unite with the feeling of harmony
to form a unitary total feeling .^ but they can never be
ehminated.

2. The feehng connected with a simple sensation is com-
monly known as a sense- feeling., or as the affective tone of a
sensation. These two expressions are capable of misinter-
pretation in opposite ways. There is a tendency to see in
the term "sense-feeHng" a reference, not merely to a com-
ponent of immediate experience which may be isolated by
abstraction, but more than that, reference to a component
of such experience which may appear quite independently
of other elements. The term "affective tone", on the other

§ 7. Simple Feelings. 85

hand, is looked upon as indicating tliat some affective quality
is an invariable attribute of a sensation, just as "color-tone"
is a necessary determinant of a color sensation. In reality,
however, a sense-feeling without a sensation can no more
exist than can a feeling of tonal harmony without tonal sen-
sations. When, as is sometimes the case^ the feelings ac-
companying sensations of pain, of pressure, of heat and of
cold, and the feelings accompanying muscle sensations, are
called independent sense-feelings, it is due to the confusion
of the concepts sensation and feeling (p. 40) which is still
prevalent, especially in physiology. As a result of this con-
fusion certain sensations, such as those of touch, are called
"feelings", and in the case of some sensations accompanied
by strong feelings, as sensations of pain, the discrimination
of the two elements is neglected. In the second place, it
would be just as inadmissable to ascribe to a given sensa-
tion, as one of its attributes, a definite feeling fixed in quality
and intensity. The real truth is that in every case the sen-
sation is only one of the many factors that determine the
feeling present at a given moment; besides the sensation,
the processes that have gone before and the permanent dis-
positions — • conditions that we can only partially account
for in special cases — play an essential part. The concept
"sense-feeHng" or "affective tone" is, accordingly, in a double
sense the product of analysis and abstraction: first, we must
think of the simple feeling as separated from its concomitant
pure sensation, and secondly, we must pick out from among
all the various changing affective elements which are con-
nected with a given sensation under different conditions, the
one which is most constant and the one in the case of
which all the influences that could disturb or complicate
the simple effect of the sensation are as far as possible
absent.

86 ^- Psychical Elements.

The first of these conditions is comparatively easy to
meet, if we keep in mind the psychological meaning of the
concepts sensation and feehng. The second is very difficult,
and, especially in the case of the most highly developed
sensational systems, that is, the auditory and visual systems,
it is never really possible to remove entirely such indirect
influences. Thus, for example, the sensation green arouses
almost unavoidably the idea of green vegetation, and since
there are connected with this idea composite feelings the
character of which may be entirely independent of the af-
fective tone of the color itself, it is impossible to determine
directly whether the feeling observed when a green impression
is presented, is a pure affective tone, a feeling aroused by
the attending idea, or a combination of both.

2 a. This difficulty has led many psychologists to argue
against the existence of any pure affective tone whatever. They
assert that every sensation arouses some accompanying ideas, and
that the affective action of the sensation is due in every case
to these ideas. But the results of experimental variation of the
conditions for light sensations, tell against this view. If the
attendant ideas were the only sources of the feeling, then the
feeling would necessarily be strongest when the sensational con-
tents of the impression were most like those of the ideas. This
is by no means the case. The affective tone of a color is
greatest when its grade of saturation reaches a maximum. The
pure colors of the spectrum observed in surrounding darkness
have the strongest affective tone. These colors are, however,
generally very different from those of the natural objects to
which accompanying ideas might refer. There is^ equally little
justification for the attempts to derive tonal feelings exclusively
from ideas. It can not be doubted that familiar musical ideas
may be aroused through a single tone ; still, on the other hand,
the constancy with which certain tonal qualities are chosen to
express particular feelings, as, for example, deep tones to express
grave and sad feelings, can be understood only on the ground

§ 7. Simple Feelings. 87

that the corresponding affective quality belongs to the simple
tone sensation, rather than to a suggested idea. The circle in
which the argument moves is still more obvious when the af-
fective tones of sensations of taste, smell, and the general sense
are referred to accompanying ideas. "When, for example, the
agreeable or disagreeable tone of a taste sensation is increased
by the recollection of the same impression as experienced before,
this can be possible only under the condition that the earlier
impression was itself agreeable or disagreeable.

3. The varieties of simple sense-feelings are exceedingly
numerous. The feelings corresponding to a particular sen-
sational system form an affective system, since, in general,
a change in the quality or intensity of the affective tone
runs parallel with every change in the quality or intensity
of the sensations. At the same time these changes in the
affective systems are essentially different from the correspond-
ing changes in the sensational systems. Thus, if the inten-
sity of a sensation is varied, the affective tone may change
not only in intensity, but also in quality ; and if the quality
of a sensation is varied, the affective tone may change not
only in quality, but also in intensity. For example, increase
the sensation sweet in intensity and it changes gradually
from agreeable to disagreeable. Or, gradually substitute for
a sweet sensation one of sour or bitter, keeping the inten-
sity constant, it will be observed that, for equal intensities,
sour, and more especially bitter, produce much stronger
feelings than sweet. In general, then, every change in sen-
sation is usually accom'panied hy a hvofold change in feeling.
The way in which changes in the quality and intensity of
affective tones are related to each other follows the principle
that every series of affective changes in one dimension ranges
between opposites., not, as is the case with the corresponding
sensational changes, between greatest differences (p. 37).

88 I- Psychical Elements.

4. In accordance with this principle there correspond to
the greatest quahtative differences in sensation, the greatest
opposites in affective quahty, and the maxima of affective
intensities. These extremes are either equal, or at least, ac-
cording to the special peculiarities of the qualitative oppo-
sites, approximately equal. The middle point between them
corresponds, when only the single dimension to which the
opposites belong is considered, to an absence of all intensity.
This absence of intensity can be observed only when the
corresponding sensational system is absolutely one-dimensional.
In all other cases, a point which is a neutral middle for
one particular series of sensational differences, belongs at
the same time to another sensational dimension or even to
a number of such dimensions, in each of which it has a
definite affective value. Thus, for example, spectral yellow
and blue are opposite colors which have correspondingly op-
posite affective tones. In passing gradually along the color
line from one of these to the other, green would be the
neutral middle between them. But green itself stands in
affective contrast vnth its opposite color, purple; and, further-
more, it is, like every saturated color, one extremity of a
series made up of the transitional stages of a single color-
tone to white. Again, the system of simple tone sensations
forms a continuity of only one dimension but in this case
more than in others it is impossible to isolate the corre-
sponding affective tones through abstraction, as we did the
pure sensations, because in actual experience we always have,
not only the tonal series to deal with, but also series of
transitions between absolutely simple tones and noises which
are made up of a profusion of simple tones. The result of
these conditions is that every many-dimensional sensational
system has a corresponding complex system of affective tones,
in which every point generally belongs at once to several

§ 7. Simple Feelings. 89

dimensions, so that the neutral middle between opposite af-
fective qualities can actually be found in experience only
in the special cases where the affective tone of a particular
sensation corresponds to the neutral middle of all the dimen-
sions to which it belongs. This special condition is obviously
fulfilled, at least approximately, for the many-dimensional
sensational systems, especially those of sight and hearing, in
just the cases in which it is of special practical value for
the undisturbed occurrence of affective processes. For vision
it is sensations of medium brightness, and those of the low
grades of chromatic saturation approximating them, which
form the neutral indifference -zones of affective quality; in
the case of hearing it is the auditory impressions of our
ordinary environment, which are between a tone and a noise
in character (as, for example, the human voice). On both
sides of these zones arise the more intense affective tones of
the more marked sensational qualities.

5. The variations in affective quality and intensity that
run parallel to the different grades of sensatioiial intensity ^
are much simpler. They can be most clearly seen in the
homogeneous sensational systems of the general sense. Each
of these systems is of a uniform quality throughout, and is
fairly well represented geometrically by a single point (p. 35) ^
so that the only possible sensational changes are those of
intensity, and these can be attended only by a one-dimen-
sional series of affective changes between opposites. The
neutral indifference-zone is, accordingly, always easy to ob-
serve in these cases. It corresponds to the medium sen-
sations of pressure, heat and cold, which medium sensa-
tions are connected with the normal, medium intensity of
ordinary sense-stimuli. The simple feelings on both sides
of this zone exhibit decidedly opposite characters, and can
usually be classified on one side as pleasurable feelings, on

90 I- Psychical Elements.

the other as unpleasurable (v. inf. 7). The unpleasurable feel-
ings are the only ones that can be produced with certainty,
by increasing the intensity of the sensation. Through habit-
uation to moderate stimuli, such an expansion of the indif-
ference-zone has taken place in these systems of the general
sense, that when the stimuli are weak, as a rule only a suc-
cession of sensations strikingly different in intensity or qual-
ity, can produce noticeable feelings. In such cases, feelings
of pleasure always correspond to sensations of medium in-
tensity.

The regular relation between sensational intensity and
affective tone, can be better observed without this influence
of contrast, in the case of certain sensations of smell and
taste. At first a pleasurable feeling arises with weak sen-
sations and increases with the increasing intensity of the
sensations to a maximum, then the feeling sinks to zero with
a certain medium sensational intensity, and finally, when this
intensity increases still more, the feeling becomes unpleasur-
able and increases until the sensational maximum is reached.

6. The variety of simple affective qualities seems to be
indefinitely great, at least it is greater than that of sensa-
tions. This is due to two facts. First, every sensation of
the many-dimensional systems belongs at once to several
series of feelings (p. 88). Secondly, and this is the chief
reason, the different compounds arising from the various
combinations of sensations, such as intensive, spacial, and
temporal ideas, and also certain stages in the course of
emotions and volitions, have corresponding feelings, which
are irreducible, and must therefore be classed among the
simple feelings (p. 38).

It is greatly to be regretted that the names of simple
feelings are so much more hazy than the names of sensations.
The proper nomenclature of feeling is limited entirely to the

§ 7. Simple Feelings. 91

expression of certain general antitheses, as agreeable and
disagreeable, grave and gay, excited and quiet, etc. These
designations are usually based on the emotions into which
the feelings enter as elements, and they are, furthermore,
so general that each includes a large number of single simple
feelings of very different character. In other cases the names
of complex ideas with affective characters similar to the
feehng in question are used in describing the feelings con-
nected with simple impressions, as, for example, by Goethe
in his discription of the affective tone of colors, and by
many writers on music in describing the feelings accompany-
ing clangs. This poverty of language in special names for
the feelings, is a psychological consequence of the subjective
nature of the feelings. All the motives of practical life
which give rise to the names of objects and their attributes,
are here wanting. To infer from this poverty of language
that there is a corresponding poverty of simple affective
qualities themselves, is a psychological mistake, which is the
more fatal since it renders an adequate investigation of the
composite affective processes impossible from the first.

7. In consequence of the difficulties indicated, a complete
list of simple affective qualities is out of the question, even
more than is a complete list in the case of simple sensations.
Then, too, there are still other reasons why it would be im-
possible to make such a list of feelings. The feelings, by
virtue of the attributes described above, do not form separate
systems, as do the sensations of tone, of light, or of taste,
but all feelings are united in a single manifold, interconnected
in all its parts (p. 36). In this manifold of feelings, it is
however, possible to distinguish certain different chief affective
series, or dimensions^ terminating in affective opposites of
predominant character. Such series, or dimensions may al-
ways be designated by the two names that indicate their

92 I' Psychical Elements.

opposite extremes. Each name is^ however, to he looked
upon as a collective name including a great variety of feelings
differing from one another in certain minor individual char-
acteristics.

Three such chief dimensions may be distinguished. We call
them the series of pleasu7'able and unpleasurahle feelings^ that
of arousiiig and subduing (exciting and depressing) feelings, and
finally that of feelings of strain and relaxation. Any concrete
feeling may belong to all of these dimensions, or it may belong
to only two^ or even to only one of them. The last mentioned
possibility is all that makes it possible to distinguish the
different directions. The combination of different affective
dimensions which ordinarily takes place^ and the influences
mentioned above (p. 38), and explained as due to the over-
lapping of feelings arising from various causes, all go to
explain why we are perhaps never in a state entirely free from
feeling^ although the general nature of the feehngs renders
it theoretically certain that there is an indifference-zone.

8. Feelings connected with sensations of the general sense
and with impressions of smell and taste^ may be regarded
as good examples of pure pleasurable and unpleasurahle
forms. A sensation of pain^ for example^ is regularly ac-
companied by an unpleasurahle feeling without any admixture
of other affective forms. In connection with pure sensations,
arousing and subduing feehngs may be observed best in the
case of color impressions and clang impressions. Thus, red
is arousing^ blue subduing. Feelings of strain and relaxation
are always connected with the processes of attention. Thus,
when we expect a sense impression, we note a feeling of
strain^ and on the arrival of the expected event, we note a
feeling of relaxation. Both the expectation and satisfaction
may be accompanied at the same time by a feeling of ex-
citement or, under special conditions, by pleasurable or un-

j^ 7. Simple Feelings. 93

pleasurable feelings. These other feelings may^ however^ be
entirely absent, and then the feelings of strain and relaxation
are recognized as specific forms which can not be reduced
to others, just as the other forms were recognized as distinct
and separate in the examples mentioned before. The pres-
ence of more than one affective tendency may be discovered
in the case of very many feelings which are, nevertheless,
just as simple in quality, as the feelings mentioned. Thus,
the feehngs of seriousness and gaiety connected with the
sensible impressions of low and high tones or dark and
bright colors, are to be regarded as characteristic qualities
which are outside the indifference-zone in both the pleasurable
and unpleasurable dimension and the exciting and depressing
dimension. We are never to forget here that pleasurable
and unpleasurable, exciting and depressing, are not names
of single affective qualities, but of dimensions or series,
within which an indefinitely large number of simple qualities
appear, so that the unpleasurable quality of seriousness is
not only to be distinguished from that of a painful touch,
of a discord, etc., but even the different cases of seriousness
itself may vary in their quality. Again, the series of pleas-
urable and unpleasurable feelings, is united with that of
feelings of strain and relaxation, in the case of the affective
tones of rhythms. The regular succession of strain and
relaxation in these cases is attended by pleasure, the disturb-
ance of this regularity, by the opposite feeling, as when we
are disappointed or surprised. Then, too, under certain cir-
cumstances the feeling of rhythm may be of either an ex-
citing or a subduing character.

8 a. Of the three affective dimensions mentioned, only that
of pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings has generally been
recognized ; the others are usually treated as emotions. But the

94 I' Psychical Elements.

emotions, as we shall see in § 13, are combinations of feelings ;
it is obvious, therefore, that the fundamental forms of emotions
must have their antecedents in the affective elements. Some
psychologists have regarded pleasurable and unpleasurable feel-
ings, not as collective terms including a great variety of simple
feelings, but as entirely uniform, concrete states, so that, for
example, the unpleasurableness of a toothache, of an intellectual
failure, and of a tragical experience are regarded as identical in
their affective contents. Still others seek to identify the feelings
with special sensations, especially with cutaneous sensations or
muscle sensations. Such theories are utterly helpless when con-
fronted with the problems that arise in the study of complex
emotions, as for example, throughout the sciences of aesthetics
or ethics, or else they make shift to meet these problems by
an intellectualistic mode of interpretation copied from the psy-
chology of the unscientific man. In this latter case the aesthetic
effects are entirely suppressed under certain logical reflections
about such effects, and then the assertion is subsequently ac-
cepted that these logical reflections are themselves the aesthetical
effects. It would be more within reason to think that the six
classes of feelings which appeared in the classification of the
chief affective tendencies, or dimensions (pleasure, unpleasantness,
excitation and subduing feeling, strain and relaxation) are them-
selves simple, concrete qualities, capable of giving rise to quali-
tative differences in emotions through combinations in different
proportions and in different intensities, and through such com-
binations only. Such a view of feeling as this, seems in fact
to be supported by the testimony of those who are partially
hypnotized and are, therefore, through the consequent concen-
tration of consciousness (§ 18, 8) in a condition especially adapted
to subjective analysis of the feelings (0. Yogt). It is possible,
however, that the concentration of consciousness which favors
this discrimination of the chief affective tendencies in hypnosis,
hinders, after all, a complete analysis. At all events, the sup-
position that there are six uniform fundamental qualities is
contradicted by the character and attributes of simple color
feelings and tonal feelings. When, for example, one changes
the deep sky blue of the spectrum at which he may be looking,
into indigo-blue, he will feel in both cases the peculiar quieting

<^ 7. Simple Feelings. 95

effect of blue, but in the two cases there will be a different
shade of this feeling which it would be very difficult to account
for by assuming the admixture of any other feeling. It is still
more difficult to give adequate explanations of the feelings which
are connected with complex impressions, on the basis of this as-
sumption that there are only three pairs of simple feelings.
Thus such musical intervals as the third, fourth, and fifth are
accompanied, each by feelings of pleasure which are not merely
quantitatively different, but also qualitatively different. The
lack of proper designations makes very difficult, to be sure,
the accurate verbal discrimination of these finer shades of feel-
ing, but this lack of terms can not be attributed to a lack of
feelings, especially as in this case there are obvious grounds
on which the lack of terms can be more fully understood.
Indeed, one might draw upon the case of sensations for cor-
roboration of this view in regard to the lack of terms for
feelings. The names of sensations are very much more numer-
ous than the names of feelings, because of the constant use
of such names for objective designations, but even though
this is true, yet the names of sensations are very far indeed
from equaling in number the different qualities that are sub-
jectively distinguished, especially in the cases of tones, lights,
and colors.

References. Goethe, Farbenlehre, Pt. 6. Fechner, Vorschule
der Aesthetik, vol. II, p. 212. Nahlowsky, Das Gefiihlsleben, 2nd.
ed., 1884. Zieglek, Das Gefuhl, 1893. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze
des menschl. Gefiihlslebens, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der physiol.
Psychol., vol. I, chap. 10, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych.,
lecture 14 (Figure 40 gives a three-dimensional representation of the
feelings). 0. Vogt, Zeitschrift fiir Hypnotismus, vols. 14 and 15.

9. The question whether or not particular physiological
processes correspond to the simple feelings is more difficult
to answer than was the similar question in regard to the
sensations. In looking for such processes, it follows from
the subjective nature of the feelings, that we should not
expect to find them, as in the case of sensations, among the

96 I' Psychical Elements.

processes produced directly in the organism by external
agents, we must look rather among the reactions which arise
indirectly from these first processes. Further evidence point-
ing in the same direction is derived from observation of
psychical compounds made up of affective elements, that is,
from observation of emotions and volitions, the physiological
concomitants of which are always external movement.

The analysis of sensations, and of the psychical compounds
derived from them, makes direct use of the impression
method) while the investigation of simple feelings, and of the
processes resulting from their combinations^ can employ this
method only indirectly. On the other hand, the expression
method^ that is^ the investigation of the physiological reactions
of psychical processes, is especially adapted to the examination
of feelings and processes made up of feehngs. All the
phenomena in which the inner state of the organism is out-
wardly expressed, may be utilized as aids in the expression
method. Such are, besides the movements of the external
muscles, especially the respiratory and cardiac movements,
the contraction and dilation of the blood-vessels in particular
organs, the dilation and contraction of the pupil of the eye,
etc. The most delicate of these is the beating of the heart,
which can be examined as exactly reproduced in the pulse
of some peripheral artery. In addition to these pulse changes,
the changes in the tension of the muscles of the small arteries
(the so-called vaso-motor innervations) and the changes in
the respiratory movements, are more or less characteristic
symptoms. The mimetic movements appear clearly only when
the feelings pass into emotions (§ 13, 4).

10. Of the chief dimensions of feeling mentioned above,
especially the dimension of pleasurable and unpleasurable
feelings can be shown to stand in regular relation to the
pulse. When the feeling is pleasurable, the pulse is retarded

§ 7. Sifnple Feelings. 97

and intensified, when unpleasurable, the pulse is accelerated
and weakened. Of the other forms of feeling, the exciting
feehngs show their presence through stronger pulse-beats, and
subduing feehngs through weaker pulse-beats, there being no
apparent change of rate in either case. For feelings of strain,
and for those of relaxation the changes seem to consist
chiefly in temporary irregularities of the pulse, which may
perhaps be connected with the inhibition of respiration ac-
companying strain, and with the acceleration of respiration
accompanying relaxation. Single feelings belong for the most
part to several of these dimensions at the same time; as a
result the innervation symptoms are in many cases evidently
complex in character. It is, accordingly, impossible to infer
from these physiological processes what are the corresponding
states of feehng in any special case, and this is all the more so
because each of the innervation processes is^ in addition to its
own complexity, complicated by the presence of certain purely
physiological processes such as the processes of metabolism
and other processes going on in the lower nerve centres.
Bodily activity can, then, at best do no more than indicate
the preponderance of this or that affective tendency, and
even these indications are not certain unless they are cor-
roborated by direct observations of the feelings themselves.

10 a. The investigation of the physiological symptoms of
feelings needs to be made more complete in several directions.
The pulse changes that accompany feelings of strain and relaxa-
tion are especially uncertain. We may accept as established the
general fact that correspondence exists between certain affective
opposites and similarly opposite physical symptoms, but we must
also recognize that any single symptom may have a variety of
meanings because of the large number of possible complications
between the effects of different feelings. It follows directly from
this fact that we can never infer forthwith from the physio-

Wdndt, Psycliology. 2. edit. 7

98 ^- Psychical Elements,

logical symptoms that certain particular feelings are present,
and that there is no justification for recognizing the method of
expression as of equal value for psychology with the method of
impression. The method of impression is the only one which,
from the nature of the case, can be employed in arousing mental
processes at will, or in varying them in a similar manner.

The physiological conditions of cardiac, vaso-motor, and re-
spiratory symptoms are, for the most part, still obscure. The
cardiac innervations are the ones which have been most fully
investigated. Physiology shows that the heart is connected with
the central organs by two kinds of nerves: excitatory nerves^
which run through the sympathetic system and originate in-
directly in the medulla, and inhibitory nerves^ which belong to
the tenth cranial nerve (vagus) and also have their source in
the medulla. The normal regularity of the pulse depends on
a certain equilibrium between excitatory and inhibitory influences.
Such influences come not only from the brain, but from the
centres in the heart itself. Thus, every increase and every
decrease of the heart's energy may be interpreted in two dif-
ferent ways. Increase may be due to an increase of excitatory^
or to a decrease of inhibitory innervation, and decrease may
be due to a decrease in excitatory or to an increase in inhibitory
innervation, or in both cases the two influences may be united.
We have no universally applicable means of investigating these
possibilities, still, the fact that the stimulation of the inhibitory
nerves has a quicker efl'ect than the stimulation of the excitatory,
gives us good ground in many cases for conjecturing the presence
of the one or the other. The changes in the pulse always
follow very quickly the sensations that cause them. It is, there-
fore, probable that in the case of feelings and emotions, we have
chiefly changes in inhibitory innervation, originating in the brain
and conducted along the vagus. It may well be assumed that
the affective tone of sensation corresponds on its physiological
side to a spreading of the stimulation from the sensory centre
to those central regions which are connected with the sources
of the inhibitory nerves of the heart. What central regions
these are, we do not know- But the fact that the physiological
substrata for all the elements of our psychological experience,
are in all probability to be found in the cerebral cortex, leads,

§ 7. Simple Feelings. 99

very naturally to the assumption that the same is true of the
centre of these inhibitory innervations. Furthermore, the essential
differences between the attributes of feelings and those of sen-
sations, make it probable that this centre is not identical with
the sensory centres. If a special cortical region is assumed as
the medium for these inhibition effects, there is no reason for
supposing a special inhibitory region for each sensory centre.
Indeed, the complete uniformity in the physiological symptoms
goes more to show that there is only one such region, which
must serve at the same time as a kind of central organ for the
connection of the various sensory centres. (For further signif-
icance of such a central region, and its probable anatomical
position, compare § 15, 2 a.)

References. Mosso, Ueber den Kreislauf des Blutes im menschl.
Gehirn, 1881. Fere, Sensation et mouvement, 1887. Lehmann, Haupt-
gesetze des menschl. Gefiihlslebens, 1892, and Die korperlichen AuCe-
rungen psychischer Zustande, 1899. Mentz, Die Wirkung akustischer
Sinnesreize auf Puis u. Athmung, Philos. Studien, vol. 11. Wundt,
Bemerkungen zur Theorie der Gefiihle, Philos. Studien, vol. 15. Isen-
BERG and VoGT, Zeitschr. f. Hypnotismus, vol. 10. Wundt, Lectures
on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 14. (Figures 38 and 39, table for
the changes in the pulse and for their investigation.)

LofC.

7*

11. PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS.

§ 8. DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF
PSYCHICAL COMPOUNDS.

1. By "psychical compound" we mean any composite
component of our immediate experience which is marked off
from other contents of this experience by characteristics
peculiarly its own, in such a way that it is recognized as a
relatively independent unity and is, when practical neces-
sity demands it^ designated by a special name. In devel-
oping such a name, language has followed the general rule
that only classes and the most important species into which
phenomena may be grouped shall have special designations.
Thus such terms as idea, emotion, volitional act, etc., des-
ignate general classes of psychical compounds, such terms
as visual idea, joy, anger, hope^ etc.^ designate special species
included in these classes. So far as these designations are
based upon actual, distinguishing characteristics^ they have
a certain value for psychological analysis. But in granting
this, we must avoid from the first, two presuppositions to
which the existence of these names might easily mislead us.
The first is, that a psychical compound is an absolutely in-
dependent content of immediate experience. The second is,
that certain compounds, as for example, ideas, have the nature
of things. The truth is that compounds are only relatively
independent units. Just as they are made up of various

§ 8. Defmition mid Classification of Psychical Compotmds. 101

elements^ so they themselves unite to form a complete inter-
connection^ in which relatively simple compounds may con-
tinually combine to form more composite ones. Then, again,
compounds, like the psychical elements contained in them,
are never things, but processes which change from moment
to moment, so that it is only through deliberate abstraction,
which is, indeed, indispensable for the investigation in many
cases, that they can be thought of as constant at any given
moment (p. 32).

2. All psychical compounds may be resolved into psychical
elements, that is, into pure sensations and simple feelings.
The two kinds of elements behave, however, in an essentially
different manner, in keeping with the special properties of
simple feelings described in § 7. The sensational elements
found by such a resolution, always belong to one of the
sensational systems already considered. The affective ele-
ments, on the other hand, include not only those which cor-
respond to the pure sensations contained in the compounds,
but also those due to the interconnection of the elements
into a compound. The systems of sensational qualities, ac-
cordingly, remain the same, no matter how many varieties
of compounds arise, while the systems of simple affective
qualities continually increase. Furthermore, it is a general
principle valid for all psychical compounds, whether they are
composed of sensations only, of feelings only^ or of combi-
nations of both sensations and feelings, that the attributes
of psychical compounds are never limited to those of the ele-
ments that enter into them. It is true rather that new at-
tributes, peculiar to the compounds themselves, always arise
as a result of the combination of these elements. Thus, a
visual idea has not only the attributes of the light sensations
and sensations of ocular position and movements contained
in it, but it has also the attribute of spacial arrangement

102 ^I- Psychical Compounds.

of the sensations, a factor not present in the elements them-
selves. Again a volition is made up not only of the ideas
and feelings into which its single acts may be resolved, but
there result also from the combination of these single acts,
new affective elements which are specifically characteristic of
the complex volition. Here, again, the combinations of sensa-
tional and affective elements are different. In the first case^
on account of the constancy of the sensational systems^ no
new sensations can arise, but only peculiar forms of their
arrangement. These forms are the extensive spacial and
temporal manifolds. When, on the other hand, affective ele-
ments combine^ new simple feelings arise, which unite with
those originally present to make intensive affective units of
composite character.

3. The classification of psychical compounds is naturally
based upon the character of the elements that enter into
them. Those composed entirely or chiefly of sensations are
called ideaSy those consisting mainly of affective elements^
affective processes. The same limitations hold here as in the
case of the corresponding elements. Although compounds
are more the products of immediate discrimination among
actual psychical processes than are the elements, still, there
is in all exactness no pure ideational process and no pure
affective process, but in both cases we can only abstract to
a certain extent from one or the other component. As in
the case of the two kinds of elements, so here^ we can
neglect the accompanying subjective states when dealing with
ideaS;, but we must always presuppose some idea when giving
an account of the affective processes.

"We distinguish, accordingly, three chief forms of ideas:
1) intensive ideas, 2) spacial ideas, 3) temporal ideas; and
three forms of affective processes: 1) intensive affective com-
binations, 2) emotions, 3) volitions. Temporal ideas constitute

§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 103

a sort of link between the two kinds of compounds, for certain
feelings play an important part in their formation.

§ 9. INTENSIVE IDEAS.

1. A combination of sensations in which every element
is connected with every other element in exactly the same
way is called an intensive idea. Thus, for example, a com-
pound clang made up of the tones d^ f and a is such an inten-
sive idea. For the immediate perception each of the partial
combinations into which this compound clang can be resolved,
as df^ da^ fd^ fa, ad., af are all quite equivalent, in what-
ever order they are thought of. "We may, accordingly,
define intensive ideas, as co7nbinations of sensational ele-
ments., in which the order of the elements may he indefi-
nitely varied.

It follows from their nature, that intensive ideas do not
have, arising from the way in which their elements are
united, any characteristics by means of which they can be
resolved into separate parts. Such a resolution is possible
only through differences in the constituent elements them-
selves. Thus, we discriminate the elements of the compound
clang d f a^ only because we hear in it the qualitatively
different tones d^ f and a. Still, the separate components
in such a unitary idea are less clearly distinguishable than
in their isolated state. This relative suppression of the ele-
ments which is of great importance in all processes of per-
ception, we call in general the fusion of sensations., and in
particular, for intensive ideas, intensive fusion. If the con-
nection of one element with others is so close that the single
element can be perceived as a part of the whole only
through unusual concentration of the attention aided by
experimental variation of the conditions, we call the fusion

104 ^I' Psychical Compounds.

complete. If, on the other hand, the elements are immediately
recognized in their proper quahties, and merely recede some-
what into the background in comparison with the impression
of the whole, we call the fusion incomplete. If certain par-
ticular elements are more prominent in their characteristic
qualities than others, we call them the pi^edominating ele-
ments. The concept of fusion as here defined is a purely
psychological concept which must he assigned to its appro-
priate place among the processes of association to he dis-
cussed later (§ 16, 4).

In reality, every intensive idea always enters into certain
spacial and temporal combinations. Thus, for example, a
compound clang is always a process having a certain duration,
and is at the same time localized by us in some direction
or other, though often only very indefinitely. But since
these temporal and spacial attributes can be indefinitely
varied, while the intensive character of the idea remains the
same, we may abstract from space and time in investigating
the intensive attributes.

2. Among ideas of the general sense we have intensive
fusions in the form of combinations of sensations of pressure
with those of heat or cold, or in combinations of pain sensa-
tions with those of temperature or pressure. All these fusions
are incomplete, and very of ten. there is no decidedly pre-
dominating element. The combinations of certain sensations
of smell and taste are more intimate. This is obviously
favored on the physiological side by the proximity of the
sense-organs, and on the physical side by the uniform con-
nection between certain stimulations of the two senses. In
such cases the more intense sensations are generally the
predominating elements, and when these are the sensations
of taste, the composite impression is usually regarded as a
taste quality only. Thus, most of the impressions known in

§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 105

ordinary life as "tastes", are in reality combinations of tastes^
and smells.

The greatest variety of intensive ideas, in all possible
gradations of complexity, is presented by the sense of
hearing. The relatively most simple of these ideas and those
which are most closely related to simple tones, are the single
clangs. As more complex forms, we have compound clangs.
Complex noises may arise from compound clangs when these
are united with sensations of simple noises, and also under
certain other circumstances.

3. A single cla?ig is an intensive idea which is made up
of a series of tonal sensations regularly graded in quality.
These elements, the partial tones of the clang, form a com-
plete fusion, in which the sensation of the lowest partial
tone becomes the predominating element. The pitch of the
clang is determined by this principal tone. The other ele-
ments are higher and are, accordingly, called overtones. The
overtones are all grouped together under the name clang-
color which is thus recognized as a second determinant of
the clang, added to the predominating tone. All the partial
tones that go to determine the clang-color are placed along
the tonal line at certain regular intervals from the principal
tone. The complete series of possible overtones in a clang
consists of the first octave of the principal tone, the fifth of
this octave, the second octave of the principal tone and the
major third and the fifth of this second octave^ etc. This
series corresponds to the following proportions between the
number of objective tonal waves:

1 (principal tone), 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, ... . (overtones).
When the pitch of the principal tone remains constant, only
the second determinant of the tonal quality, the clang-color,
can vary according to the number, position, and relative in-
tensity of the overtones. In this way we can explain the

106 U. Psychical Compounds.

great variety of clang-colors in musical instruments, as well
as the fact that for every instrument the clang-color changes
somewhat with the pitch; for in the case of low tones the
overtones are generally relatively strong, in the case of high
tones relatively weak, while they disappear entirely when they
are too high to be audible.

From a psychological point of view the chief condition
for the rise of a single clang, is the complete, or approxi-
mately complete, fusion of several tonal sensations with only
one predominating element. As a rule, it is impossible to
distinguish with the unaided ear the overtones in a clang.
They can be made perceptible by the use of resonators
which are tuned to the overtones sought, and are thus able to
strengthen them through resonant reinforcement. After they
have been isolated in this experimental way the stronger over-
tones can be successively heard in the clang if the attention
is directed to them, even without the aid of the resonators.

4. There are three conditions which must be fulfilled if
there is to be only one predominating element in a tonal
fusion. First, one tone must be relatively more intense.
Secondly, in its qualitative relations to the other partial
tones, the principal tone must be the fundamental of a series
whose members are all harmonious. Tliirdly^ all the partial
tones must be sounded at exactly the same time. This coin-
cidence in time is objectively guaranteed by deriving the
clang from a unitary source^ (that is^ producing the clang
through the vibrations of one stringy one reed-pipe, etc.). A
failure to comply with the first condition does not destroy
the idea of a single clang. If^ on the other hand, the second
condition is not fulfilled the combination becomes a compound
clang when the predominating fundamental is wanting^ or it
becomes a noise when the series of tones is not harmonious,
or finally, it becomes a mixed form, between a clang and a

§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 107

noise, wlien both parts of the condition are unfulfilled. If
the third condition is not met the single clang may again pass
into a compound clang. A series of simple clangs from a
number of tuning-forks which should unite to form a single
clang so far as intensity and quality are concerned, always
produces in reality the idea of a compound clang.

5. A compound clang is an intensive combination of single
clangs. It is in general an incomplete fusion with several
predominating elements. There are, as a rule, all possible
grades of fusion in a compound clang, especially when it is
made up of single clangs of composite quality. In such a
case, not only does every single clang form a complete fusion
in itself, but these single clangs fuse the more completely
with one another the more their fundamentals approach the
relation of elements of a single clang. So it comes that in
a compound clang made up of single clangs rich in over-
tones^ those components whose fundamentals correspond to
the overtones of some other single clang in the compound,
fuse more completely with the related clang than with others.
The other clangs, in turn, fuse the more completely the more
their relation approaches that of the first members of a series
of overtones. Thus, in the compound clang c e g c the
clangs c and c form a nearly complete fusion, while the
fusions of the clangs c and ^, c and e, are incomplete. Still
less complete is the fusion between c and eK A determination
of the degree of fusion may be obtained in all these cases by
allowing an observer to hear the compound clang for a very
brief interval, after which he is to decide whether he per-
ceived only one clang or several. This experiment is repeated
many times, and the relative number of judgments in favor
of the unity of the clang is a measure for the degree of fusion.

6. Besides the elements contained in the single clangs of
a compound, there always arise from the combination of

108 ^I' Psychical Compounds.

vibrations in the auditory organ, additional elements which
cause new tonal sensations, characteristic of the different
kinds of compound clangs. These may also fuse more or
less completely with the original clang. They are sensations
of difference-tones; they correspond, as their name indicates,
to the difference between the number of vibrations in two
primary tones. Some of these tones are due to the inter-
ference of sound waves in the outer air, outside of the ear
(objective difference-tones). Such tones can be reinforced
by properly tuned resonators inserted in the ear. Other
difference-tones arise within the ear itself, either through the
interference of the sound waves in the organs of the outer
ear, especially in the tjnupanic membrane and in the chain of
ossicles, or else through interferences in the inner ear. This
second class of difference-tones (subjective difference-tones)
can not be reinforced by using resonators. Through the
presence of these difference-tones compound clangs become
very complex psychical compounds, for such difference-tones
may result not merely from the interference of the primary
tones of the complex clang, but also from the interference
of overtones. It is even possible for the difference-tones to
interfere with each other, or with the primary tones. To
distinguish these various classes of difference-tones they are
designated as difference-tones of the first order, second order,
third order, etc. The strongest of these difference-tones are
those which result from the interference of the primary tones
and then follow in general those which are loiver in pitch
than the primaries i). The fusion of the difference-tones with

1) In addition to difference-tones there may arise also, as Helm-
HOLTZ has shown, under similar conditions of interference summation-
tones, the number of vibrations in which corresponds to the sum of
the number of vibrations in the two primaries. The general term
combination-tones is used to cover both the difference-tones and the

§ 9. Intensive Ideas. 109

the primary tones of the compound clang is the more com-
plete the weaker the difference-tones, and the more nearly
they correspond to tones which are harmonious with the orig-
inal elements of the clang. The difference tones are, ac-
cordingly, as a result of these characteristics, to be compared
in respect to their importance for the compound clang as a
whole, with overtones in their relation to simple clangs.

7. A compound clang may pass through all possible
intermediate stages into a third form of intensive auditory
ideas, namely, ideas of noise. When two tones are no longer
included within a series of harmonious tones and when at
the same time the difference between the number of their
vibrations does not exceed certain limits (for higher tones
about sixty vibrations and for lower thirty or even fewer)
there arise interruptions in the compound clang, which cor-
respond in number to the difference between the number of
vibrations in the primary tones. These interruptions are due
to the alternating coincidence of like and opposite phases of
vibration. They are called beats when they consist merely
in successive weakenings and reinforcements of the clang.
When, on the other hand, full breaks appear in the clang,
a result which appears most frequently in the case of low
tones, we speak of tonal beats. If the differences in the
number of vibrations exceed the numbers mentioned, the
tones are at first heard as continuous, for the interruptions
disappear, but they are harsh. Later the harshness dis-
appears and we have pure dissonance. As a rule beats re-
sulting from the interference of difference-tones are perceived
as combined with this impression of roughness and pure
dissonance. Ordinary dissonance is^ accordingly, made up

summation-tones. The summation-tones are in general very weak
and coincide, for the most part, with the overtones. They have
therefore no significance in the perception of clangs.

110 II' Psychical Compounds.

in a very complex manner, of beats, of roughness from the
combined tones, and of pure dissonance. In this complex of
tones each of the elements, namely, primary tones, over-tones,
and difference-tones of various orders, has its place. If the ele-
ments of dissonance, that is, if beats, tonal beats, and rough-
ness, are combined in sufficiently great numbers through the
simultaneous sounding of a great number of tones, the whole
complex becomes ultimately a noise. On the psychological
side this means that the predominating tonal elements dis-
appear entirely or become mere modifying elements in the
total idea. In the case of noises which last for a short
interval only, the general pitch of the most intensive elements
is determinative for our perception. In the case of noises
which last longer, the form of the disturbance resulting from
the rapidity of the beats, from the accompanying tonal beats,
etc., also has an influence.

Human articulations are characteristic examples of dif-
ferent forms of noise. The vowels are intermediate between
clangs and noises with predominantly clang character; the
resonants are noises of long duration, and the proper con-
sonants, noises of short duration. In whispers the vowels
become simply noises. The fact that the differences in vowels
are perfectly distinct in whispers, goes to prove that the
character of vowels depends essentially on their noise ele-
ments. It is probable that simple sensations of noise (p. 55)
enter, together with the numerous tonal elements into all
experienced noises. The irregular air-vibrations arising from
the disturbances in the tonal waves, excite both the nervous
elements in the vestibule of the labyrinth, and also the audi-
tory nerve-fibres themselves.

7 a. The process of "fusion" occurs here , in the case of
intensive tonal fusion, under the simplest possible conditions.

§ 9. Intensive Ideas. Ill

"We shall come upon fusions of a somewhat different form when
we take up spacial and temporal ideas. In the case of tonal
fusions the compound resulting from the fusion process differs
relatively less from a simple addition of its elements, than do
the extensive fusions. The general characteristics which distin-
guish an intensive tonal fusion from a mere sum of the single
tones which enter into the fusion, are three in number. First,
many or all (as for example in many noises) of the elements
sink into insignificance as compared with the total impression
of the whole compound. Secondly, there is a union of all the
elements into a single unitary idea with a unitary affective
value, as may be seen with especial clearness in harmonious
chords. Thirdly, and finally^ certain dominating elements stand
out above the others, as for example^ the fundamental tone in
a single clang. The first and second characteristics are con-
stant, the third is variable. In the case of complex clangs the
third characteristic is less noticeable than in the case of single
clangs, and in the case of noises it is entirely absent. Further-
more, it will be noted that all of these characteristics are psy-
chological, so that the concept fusion is also a purely psycho-
logical concept. And since like, or analogous, phenomena appear
whenever we find psychological elements combining with each
other^ there is no reason for seeking to find in these characteristics
anything except an expression of a certain regular form of
psychological action. Some investigators have strayed from the
simple empirical facts in their use of the concept "tonal fusion"^
and have regarded the synthesis of the elements into a fusion-
product as a logical act added to the sum of the sensory ele-
ments — as a kind of judgment of unity (Stumpf). In op-
position to this view it is to be recognized most clearly that
tonal fusions present themselves as pure examples of elementary
psychical processes of fusion. The incorrect logical theory ob-
viously arises from the confusion of logical reflections about
psychical experiences with the experiences themselves — a form
of confusion which is so frequently, even today, carried over
from popular psychology into scientific psychology (p. 14).

The resonance hypothesis formulated by Helmholtz (see
p. 44 and 57) was the first which attempted to give any account
of one of the most important of the phenomena which appear

112 II. Psychical Compounds.

in tonal fusions^ namely, of the synthesis into a single clang
idea of all the elementary tonal sensations into which a clang
may be separated even in its objective nature. It is assumed
that certain parts of the auditory organ are so tuned that tonal
waves of a given rate always set in sympathetic vibration only
the part correspondingly tuned. This explains in a general
way the analyzing ability of the auditory sense. But it is not
to be overlooked that the resonance hypothesis succeeds in
giving a physiological explanation of only one side of the proc-
ess of tonal fusion, namely, the persistence of single sensations
in the total intensive idea. It does not explain the other side
of the process, that is, the more or less complete union of the
elements. Since the tonal elements which produce a given in-
tensive clang idea both continue as real sensations in this idea,
and at the same time give up more or less completely their
independent existence in the idea as a whole, it is possible that
tonal fusion is a psychical process and requires as a psychical
process, no special physiological explanation. But since this
fusion is very different under different objective conditions, as,
for example, when the impressions are due to the combined
vibrations from a single source or to vibrations from several
distinct sources; these differences must have some physiological
and physical grounds for their explanation. The most natural
way to attempt such an explanation is properly to supplement
the resonance hypothesis. If we assume that besides the ana-
lyzing parts of the auditory organ, that is, the resonant membrane,
still others exist which are affected by the total^ unresolved clang,
we have a sufficient physiological substratum for the different
effects of the various conditions. We are thus supplied with
two forms of stimulation, one diffuse and the other selective.
Through the combined effects of the two it is possible to ex-
plain the fact that difference-tones of low pitch sometimes ex-
ceed in intensity the primary tones (Hermann), and that the
interruptions of a single tone through beats of proper rapidity
may unite to form a second tone sensation (B. Konig). These
latter facts, as well as the earlier ones described, could not be
explained by the resonance hypothesis alone. "Where the seat
of the diffuse tone stimulation is situated, whether, for example,
it is in the sensory area in the vestibulum, or in the sensory

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. y 113

fibres of the resonating membrane itself, it is impossible to say
with any definiteness. It has never been possible to explain
the phenomena of clang analysis with the same degree of com-
pleteness by means of any of the theories of hearing which have
not accepted the resonance hypothesis. There is nothing, how-
ever, in the fact that the resonance hypothesis has proved itself
up to this time indispensable, which could stand in the way of
an effort to supplement the hypothesis in the manner described.
For a treatment of the attributes of the complex feelings which
arise with complex clangs (feelings of harmony and discord) see
§ 12, 9.

References. Helmholtz, (English trans, by A. J. Ellis) The Sensa-
tions of Tone, Pt. I and II. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie, vol. 2. Wundt,
Grundziige der physiol. Psych., vol. 2, chap. 12, and Lectures on Hum.
and Anim. Psych., lecture 5. On Tonal Fusion: Lipps, Grundthatsachen
des Seelenlebens, chapter 21. Stumpf, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol.
d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 15. R. Schulze, Philos. Studien, vol. 14. On
Difference-tones and Beats: R. Konig, Poggendorff's Ann. der Physik,
vols. 157 and 158. Hermann, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 49.
ScHAFER, Pfluger's Archiv f. Physiol., vols. 78 and 83. Kruger, Philos.
Studien, vols. 16 and 17. On Theories of Hearing: Hermann, Pfluger's
Archiv, vol. 56. M. Meyer, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnes-
organe, vol. 16. Ewald, Eine neue Hortheorie, 1899.

§ 10. SPACIAL IDEAS.

1. Spacial and temporal ideas are fully distinguished
from intensive ideas by the fact that the parts of spacial
and temporal ideas are united, not in an arbitrarily variable
order, but in a definitely fixed order, so that when the order
is thought of as changed the idea itself changes. Ideas with
such a fixed arrangement are called in general extensive
ideas (p. 102).

Of the possible forms of extensive ideas, spacial ideas
are distinguished by the fact that in them it is only in
respect to the relation of the parts to one another., that there

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 8

114 II- Psychical Compounds.

is a fixed arrangement. With respect to the relation of
the parts to the ideating subject there is no such fixed ar-
rangement. This relation of the parts to the subject may
be thought of as varied indefinitely. The objective indepen-
dence of spacial compounds from the ideating subject is ex-
pressed by saying that spacial compounds are capable of
movements hackwaj^ds and forwards and of rotation around
any axis. The number of directions in which movement and
rotation may take place, is limited. They may all be reduced
to three dimensions, in each of which it is possible to advance
in two opposite directions. The number of directions in
which the parts of a single compound may be arranged
as well as the number in which various compounds may be
arranged with reference to one another, is the same as the
maximal number of directions in which movement and rota-
tion are possible. This is what we call the three-dimensional
character of space. A single spacial idea may, accordingly,
be defined as a three-dimensional compound whose parts are
fixed in their location with reference to one another^ hut capable
of indefinite variation in their location with reference to the
ideating subject. This definition neglects, of course, the
frequent changes which occur in reality in the arrangement
of the parts of spacial compounds. When these changes
take place, they are to be regarded as transitions from one
idea to another. This three-dimensional arrangement of
spacial ideas must of necessity include one-dimensional and
two-dimensional arrangements as special cases. In such cases,
however, the wanting dimensions must always be added in
thought as soon as the relation of the idea to the ideating
subject is taken into account.

2. This relation to the ideating subject, which is really
present in all spacial ideas, renders it from the first psycho-
logically impossible that the arrangement of the elements in

§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 115

such an idea should be an original attribute of the elements
themselves, in any such way as intensity or quality of sen-
sations are original attributes of these elements. It is
obvious, rather, that this arrangement results from the
bringing together of these elements, and arises from some
new psychical conditions which depend upon this coexistence.
If this is not admitted, it becomes necessary not only to
attribute a spaeial quality to every single sensation, but
also to postulate for every sensation, however Hmited, a sim-
ultaneous idea of the whole of three-dimensional space in
its location with regard to the ideating subject. This would
lead to the acceptance of an a priori space-perception, prior
to all concrete sensations, which is not only contradictory
to all our experiences as to the conditions of the rise of
psychical compounds in general, but also contradictory to
our knowledge of all the influences that underlie spaeial ideas.
3. All spaeial ideas are arrangements either of tactual
or of visual sensations. Indirectly, through the connection
of other sensations with either tactual or visual ideas, the
spaeial relation may be carried over to other sensations. In
the cases of touch and sight, it is obvious that the extended
surface of the peripheral sense-organs, and their equipment
with organs of movement, which render possible a varying
location of the impressions in regard to the ideating subject,
are both favorable conditions for an extensive, spaeial ar-
rangement of the sensations. The tactual sense is the earlier
of the two here in question, for it appears earlier in the
development of organisms and shows the structural relations
in much coarser, but for that reason in many respects much
plainer, form than does the more delicately organized visual
organ. Still, it is to be noted that where vision is present, the
spaeial ideas from touch are greatly influenced by the ideas
from sight, because of the higher development of vision.

8*

116 II- Psychical Compounds.

A. SPACIAL TOUCH IDEAS.

4. The simplest possible touch idea is that of a siiigle
impression from a point on the skin. If such an impression
is presented even when the eyes are turned away, there arises
a definite idea of the place touched. Introspection shows
that this idea, which is called the localization of the stimulus^
is not, under the usual condition where vision is present,
immediate, as we should expect it to be if the spacial quality
were an original attribute of sensations, but it depends upon
a secondary, generally very obscure, visual idea of the region
touched. Localization is, therefore^ more exact near bounding
lines of the touch-organs than on the uniform intervening
surfaces, since these bounding lines are more prominent in
the visual images. The rise of a visual idea from the tactual
impression, even when the eyes are turned away, is possible
because every point of the organ of touch gives to the touch
sensation a peculiar qualitative coloring, which is independent
of the quahty of the external impression, and is probably
due to the character of the structure of the skin. This
qualitative coloring varies from point to point and is never
exactly the same in two separate regions.

This local coloring is called the local sign of the sen-
sations. It varies from point to point in different regions
of the skin at very different rates: rapidly on the tip of the
tongue, on the ends of the fingers, and on the lips; slowly
on the broader surfaces of the limbs and trunk. A measure
of this variation may be obtained by applying two impres-
sions near each other to any region of the skin. So long
as the distance of the impressions is less than that of distin-
guishable local signs, the two impressions are perceived as
a single one, but so soon as they pass this limit they are
perceived as spacially separate. The smallest, just noticeable

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 117

distance between two impressions is called the space threshold
for touch. It varies from one or two millimetres (tips of
tongue and fingers) to sixty-eight millimetres (back, upper
arm, and leg). On the pressure-spots (p. 52), when the stimuli
are favorably applied, still shorter distances can be perceived.
Then, too, the threshold is dependent on the condition of
the tactual organ and on practice. As a result of the first,
for example, the threshold is smaller for children than for
adults, since the differences in structure that condition the
local signs, are obviously more crowded together. As a
result of practice, the threshold is smaller in the case of
the blind than it is in the case of those who have vision.
This is especially true of the ends of the fingers which are
most used for touching.

5. The influence of visual ideas of the regions touched,
as just described, teaches that the locahzation of tactual
impressions and the spacial arrangement of a number of such
impressions is not due to an original spacial quality of
cutaneou.s points or to any primary space-forming function
of the tactual organ. On the contrary, it presupposes spacial
ideas of sight. These can be made use of, to be sure, only
because the various parts of the tactual organ have certain
qualitative attributes, local signs, which arouse the visual
image of the part touched. But there is no reason for at-
tributing an immediate spacial relation to the local signs
themselves; it is obviously enough that they act as qualitative
signals to arouse the appropriate visual images. This connection
with vision depends upon the frequent union of the two.
The keenness of localization will, therefore, be aided by all
the influences that increase either the clearness of the visual
images or the qualitative differences in local signs. -

We may describe the formation of spacial ideas in this
case as the arrangement of tactual impressions in visual

118 n. Psychical Compounds.

images already present. The whole process is a consequence
of the constant connection of these visual images with the
quahtative local signs of the tactual impression. The union
of the local signs and the visual images of the corresponding
region may, then, be regarded as an incomplete , but very
constant., fusion. The fusion is incomplete because both
visual image and tactual impression retain their independent
character; but it is so constant that, when the state of the
tactual organ remains the same, the fusion seems to be in-
variable. This last fact explains the relative certainty of
localization. The predominating elements of this fusion are
the tactual sensations. For many persons the visual images
are pushed so far into the background that they can not be
perceived with any certainty, even when examined with the
greatest attention. The perception of space, in such cases,
is perhaps an immediate function of tactual and motor sen-
sations, as for the blind (v. inf. 6). As a rule, however, more
careful observation shows that it is possible to recognize the
position and distance of the impressions only by attempting
to make more distinct the indefinite visual image of the
region touched.

6. The conditions that hold when vision is present, are
essentially different from those found in cases of blindness^
especially blindness which is congenital, or acquired early
in life. Persons who become blind later retain for a long
time memory images of familiar visual objects, so that the
spacial ideas of touch always remain, to some extent, products
of a fusion between tactual sensations and visual images.
But these visual images can not be continually renewed, so
that the persons in question make large use of movements.
The tactual sensations that arise from the joints and muscles
when the hand passes from one tactual impression to another
(p. 52), serve as a measure for the movement executed and,

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 119

at the same time, as a measure for the distance between
the two impressions. These sensations of movement, which
in acquired blindness are additions to the gradually fading
visual images and in part substitutes for them, are, in con-
genital blindness, the only means present from the first for
the formation of an idea of the relative position and distance
of the single impressions. We observe in congenital blind-
ness continual movements of the touch-organs, especially the
fingers, over the object. Added to these movements are a
more concentrated attention to tactual sensations and a
greater practice in their discrimination. Still, the low grade
of development of touch as compared with sight, always
shows itself in the fact that the perception by the blind of
continuous lines and surfaces is much less perfect than the
perception of points arranged in various ways. The neces-
sity of making a blind-alphabet of arbitrary figures formed
by various combinations of raised points, is a proof of this.
Thus, for example, in the ordinary alphabet (Braille's) one
point represents A, two points in a horizontal line B, two
points in a vertical line C, etc. With six points at most all
the letters can be formed, but the points must be far enough
apart to be perceived as separate with the end of the index
finger. The way in which this alphabet is read shows clearly
how the space ideas of the blind have developed. As a rule
the index fingers of both hands are used in blind reading.
The right finger precedes and apprehends a group of points
simultaneously (synthetic touch), the left finger follows some-
what more slowly and apprehends the single points succes-
sively (analytic touch). Both the synthetic and analytic im-
pressions are united and referred to the same object. This
method of procedure shows clearly that the spacial dis-
crimination of tactual impressions is no more immediately
given in this case than in the case where vision was present,

120 JJ^' Psychical Compounds.

but that in the case of the bhncl the movements by means
of which the finger that is used for analytic touch passes
from point to point, play the same part as did the accom-
panying visual ideas in the normal cases with vision.

An idea of the extent and direction of these movements
can arise only under the condition that every movement is
accompanied by an inner tactual sensation (p. 52, 6). The
assumption that these inner tactual sensations are immedi-
ately connected with an idea of the space which is traversed
in the movement, would be liighly improbable, for it would
not only presuppose the existence of a connate perception
of surrounding space and of the position of the subject in
respect to the same (p. 115), but it would also include another
particular assumption. This is the assumption that inner
and outer touch sensations, although they are otherwise alike
in quality and physiological substrata, still differ in that inner
sensations give, along with the sensation, an image of the
position of the subject and of the spacial arrangement of
the immediate environment. This would really necessitate
a return to the Platonic doctrine of the memory of innate
ideas, for the sensations arising from touch are here thought
of as the mere external occasional causes for the revival of
innate transcendental ideas of space.

7. Apart from its psychological improbability, such an
hypothesis as that just mentioned can not be reconciled with
the influence exercised by practice on the discrimination of
local signs and on the discrimination of differences in move-
ments. There is, therefore, no way, except to attribute
the rise of spacial ideas of the blind, as we did the spacial
ideas of normal individuals (p. 117), to the combinations
of the sensations as presented in experience. These com-
binations result from the fact that every pair of sensa-
tions, a and Z?, with their difference in local signs, always

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 121

have a corresponding inner touch sensation, a^ accompanying
the movement from one to the other, while two sensations,
a and c, with a greater difference in local signs, have a
more intense sensation of movement, y. For the blind there
is always such a regular combination of inner and outer
touch sensations. It can not, therefore, be affirmed that
either of these sensational systems, in itself, brings the idea
of spacial arrangements; we can only say that this arrange-
ment results regularly from the combination of the two. On
this basis the spacial ideas of the blind, arising, as they do,
from external impressions, may be defined as a product of
the fusion of exte7mal tactual sensations and their qualita-
tively graded local signs, tvith internal tactual sensations
graded according to intensity. The external sensations with
their attributes as determined by the external stimulus, are
the predominating elements in this fusion. They push the
local signs with their qualitative peculiarities and the inner
tactual sensations with their intensive attributes, so far into
the background, that, like the overtones of a clang, all these
secondary elements can be perceived only when the attention
is especially concentrated upon them. Spacial ideas from
touch are, accordingly due to a complete fusion (p. 103). Their
characteristic peculiarity, in contrast with such fusions as
intensive tonal fusions, is that the subordinate and supple-
mentary elements are different in character, and are at the
same time related to one another according to definite laws.
They are different, for the local signs form a purely qualita-
tive system, while the inner touch sensations which accompany
the movements of the tactual organs, form a series of in-
tensities. They are related, in that the motor energy used
in passing through an interval between two points increases
with the extent of the interval, so that, in proportion as the
qualitative difference between the local signs increases, there

122 II- Psychical Compounds.

must also be an increase in the intensity of the sensations
which accompany the movement.

8. The spacial arrangement of tactual impressions is thus
the product of a twofold fusion. First, the subordinate ele-
ments fuse. That is, the various qualities of the local sign
system, which is spread out in two dimensions, are related
to one another according to the grades of intensity of the
inner tactual sensations. Secondly, the tactual impressions
as determined by the external stimuli, fuse with the product
of the first union. Of course, the two processes do not take
place successively, but in one and the same process, for the
local signs and movements must both be aroused by the
external stimuli. Still, the external sensations vary with the
nature of the objective stimulus, while the local signs and
internal tactual sensations are subjective elements, the mutual
relations of which always remain the same even when the
external impressions vary. This is the psychological con-
dition for the constancy of attributes which we ascribe to
space itself, in contrast with the great changeableness of the
qualitative attributes of objects in space.

9. After the spacial fusion of tactual sensations has once
been effected, either one of the elements which took part in
the fusion is able by itself, though perhaps in a limited
degree, to bring about a localization of the sensations. In
this way not only normal individuals with vision, but also
the blind, even the congenitally blind, have an idea of the
place touched, and can perceive as spacially separate two
impressions that are far enough apart^ even when the touch-
organs remain perfectly quiet. Of course, the congenitally
blind can have no visual image of the region touched, but
they have instead of this an idea of a movement of the part
touched and where several impressions are received, they
have the idea of a movement from one to the other. The

§10. Spacial Ideas. 123

same fusion takes place in ideas thus formed as takes place
in the ordinary cases where movements are really present.
The difference is that one factor, namely, the inner tactual
sensation, is merely a memory image.

10. In the same way, we have the converse process. The
real contents of experience may be a sum of inner tactual
sensations which arise from the movement of some part of
the body, while no noticeable external tactual sensations
whatever are given, and yet these internal sensations which
accompany the movement may be the basis of a spacial idea.
This is regularly the case when we have j^ure ideas of our
own movements. If, for example, we shut our eyes and then
raise an arm, we have at every moment an idea of the
position of the arm. To be sure, external tactual sensations
that arise from the torsion and folding of the skin, play
some part here too, but they are unimportant in comparison
with the internal sensations from the joints, tendons, and
muscles.

It can easily be observed that where vision is present,
this idea of position comes from an obscure visual image of
the limb with its surroundings, which image is aroused even
when the eyes are closed or turned away. This connection is
so close that it may arise between the mere memory image of
the inner tactual sensation and the corresponding visual idea,
as is observed in the case of paralytics, where sometimes
the mere will to execute a certain movement arouses the
idea of a movement really executed. Evidently, the ideas
of one's own movements depend, when vision is present, on
incomplete fusions just as do the external spacial ideas of
touch. The only difference is that here the internal sen-
sations play the part which the outer sensations play in the
former case. This leads to the assumption that the inner
tactual sensations also have local signs, that is, the assumption

124 ^I' Psychical Compounds.

that the sensations in the various joints, tendons, and muscles
show certain series of local differences. Introspection seems
to confirm this view. If we move alternately the knee-joint,
hip-joint, and shoulder-joint, or even the corresponding joints
on the right and left sides, the quality of the sensation
varies a little each time, even if we neglect the fact that there
is a visual image of the limb which can never he entirely
suppressed.

11. From the relations that exist in the normal cases
of persons who have vision, we can understand the way in
which persons who are congenitally blind form ideas of their
own movements. Here, instead of a fusion with a visual
image, there must be a fusion of sensations of movement
with the local signs. Outer tactual sensations also act as aids
in this case. In fact, they are much more important here
than when vision is present. The ideas of the bhnd as to
their own movements are exceedingly uncertain so long as
they are unaided by contact with external objects. When,
however, they touch such objects, they have the advantage
of greater practice with the external tactual sense and a
keener attention to the same. The so-called "distance-sense
of the blind" is a proof of this greater practice. It consists
in the ability to perceive from some distance, without direct
contact, a resisting object, as, for example, a neighboring
wall. Now, it can be experimentally demonstrated that this
distance-sense is made up of two factors : a very weak tactual
stimulation of the forehead by the atmospheric resistance,
and a change in the sound of the step. The latter acts as
a signal to concentrate the attention so that the weak tactual
stimulations can be perceived. The ''distance-sense" disap-
pears, accordingly, when the tactual stimulations are prevented
by binding a cloth around the forehead or when the steps
are rendered inaudible.

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 125

12. Besides our ideas of the position and movements of the
various parts of our body, we have also an idea of the position
and movement of our whole body. The ideas of the position
of parts of the body can never have anything but a relative
significance; it is only when considered in connection with
the idea of the body as a whole that they become absolute.
The organ of orientation for this general idea is the head.
We always form a definite idea of the position of the head ;
the other organs are localized, generally, indeed, very in-
definitely, with reference to the head, each idea depending
on the particular complexes of inner and outer tactual sen-
sations presented in that case. The specific organ of orient-
ation in the head is the system of semicircular canals, to
which are added, as secondary aids, the inner and outer
tactual sensations resulting from the action of the muscles
of the head. The function of these canals as an organ of
orientation can be most easily understood by assuming that
inner tactual sensations with especially marked differences in
local signs, arise in them through the influence of the chang-
ing pressure of the fluid medium which fills them. It is
highly probable that dizziness^ which comes from rapid
rotation of the head, is due to the sensations caused by the
violent movements of this fluid. This is in accord with the
observations that partial derangements of the canals bring
about constant illusions in localization, and complete derange-
ment of the same is followed by an almost total suspension
of the ability to localize.

12 a. The antagonistic theories in regard to the psychical
formation of spacial ideas, are generally called nativism and em-
piricism. The nativistic theory seeks to derive localization in
space from connate properties of the sense-organs and sense-
centres, while the empiristic theory seeks to derive it from the
influence of experience. This discrimination does not give proper

126 U. Psychical Compounds.

expression to the actual opposition that exists, for the assumption
of connate spacial ideas may be attacked without affirming that
these ideas arise through experience. This is the case when, as
above, space perceptions are regarded as products of psychical
fusions due both to the physiological properties of the organs
of sense and organs of movement, and to the general laws govern-
ing the rise of psychical compounds. ' Such processes of fusion
and the arrangements of sense impressions based upon them,
are everywhere the conditions of our experience, but for this
very reason it is inadmissible to call them "experience" itself.
It is much more proper to point out the opposition which really
exists as the opposition between nativistic and genetic theories.
Genetic theories may then be subdivided into empirical theories
and theories of fusion. In view of the fact that the associative
processes in the fusion theories, are necessary even for the first
formulation of experience, we may designate these theories as the
praeempirical forms of genetic theory. It is to be noted that
the widely accepted nativistic theories contain empirical elements?
while, on the other hand, empirical theories contain nativistic
elements, so that the difference is sometimes very small. Sup-
porters of the nativistic view assume that the arrangement of
impressions in space corresponds directly to the arrangement of
sensitive points in the skin and retina. The special way in
which the projection outward is effected especially in ideas of
the distance and magnitude of objects and in the reference of
a plurality of spacially separated impressions to a single object is
accounted for as dependent upon "attention", "will", or even "ex-
perience". Supporters of the empirical theory, on the other hand,
generally presuppose space as given in some way or other, and
then interpret each single idea as a case of localization in this
space, the particular localization being in each case due to some
empirical motive. In the theory of spacial ideas from sight,
tactual space is generally regarded as this originally given space;
in the theory of tactual ideas, original spacial qualities have
sometimes been attributed to inner tactual sensations. Thus,
in the actual concrete theories empiricism and nativism are very
ill-defined concepts. They agree in the use of the complex con-
cepts of popular psychology, such as "attention", "will", and
"experience", without any examination or analysis. In this

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 127

respect they are different from tlie fusion theory, which seeks
to discover, by means of a psychological analysis of the ideas,
the elementary processes from which the ideas arise.

The special influence of the head on ideas of bodily position
and movement shows itself in the phenomena of dizziness, and
in the ideas which we form of movement through space when
the body is carried along without effort on our own part. This
special influence was originally attributed to certain parts of
the brain, especially to the cerebellum. And it is not unlikely
that the cerebellum participates in a measure directly, and in a
measure indirectly as the centre for the peripheral organ of
orientation, in the processes of orientation and in the disturb-
ances of orientation. As to the peripheral organs of orientation
the partial and total exterpations which have been performed
on the semicircular canals, especially on the canals of birds,
make it evident that the most important of these peripheral
organs of orientation are the semicircular canals. In addition,
however, it must not be overlooked that external touch sen-
sations and visual perceptions are of supplementary importance,
especially in that they make possible a gradual correction of
the disturbances of orientation which arise when the semicircular
canals are disabled. Further confirmation of a striking type is
found for the belief that the canals are of the first importance
in the observation that deaf mutes very frequently suffer from
disturbances in orientation. Such disturbances probably appear
in every case in which the pathological conditions which, as is
usual in such deafness, appear early and attack the labyrinth,
have also attacked the canals.

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl, Handworterb.
der Physiol., vol. Ill, pt. 2, 1846. Lotze, Medicinische Psychologic,
1852. (On p. 324, appears the first statement of the concept local
signs. This presentation was essentially metaphysical in motive.)
WuNDT, Beitrage zur Sinneswahrnehmung, sect. 1, 1862. Vierordt,
Grundriss der Physiol., 5th. ed. (1877) p. 340. Washburn, Philos.
Studien, vol. 11. Judd, Philos. Studien, vol. 12. Goldscheider, Ges.
Abhandlungen, vol. 1. On the Blind: Heller, Philos. Studien, vol. 11.
On Nativistic and Genetic Theories: Wundt, Grundziige der physiol.
Psych., vol. II., chap. 11, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych.,
lecture 9. Lipps, Grundthats. des Seelenl., (1883) chap. 22. On Ideas

128 -f^- Psychical Go77ipounds.

of the Position of the Body as a Whole : Goltz, Pfliiger's Archiv f.
Physiol., vol. 3. Beeuee,, Pfliiger's Archiv, vol. 48. Mach, Grundlinien
der Lehre von den Bewegungsempfindungen, 1875. Delage-Aubert,
Studien iiber die Orientirung, 1888. Ewald, Physiol. Untersuch. liber
das Endorgan des Nervus octavus, 1892. Kreidl, Pfliiger's Archiv,
vols. 61 and 54 (on the ability of the deaf and dumb to stand).

B. SPACIAL SIGHT IDEAS.

13. Tlie general properties of the touch sense are repeated
in the visual sense, but in a more highly organized form.
Corresponding to the sensory surface of the outer skin, we
have here the retina with its rods and cones arranged in
rows and forming an extraordinarily fine mosaic of sensitive
points. Corresponding to the movements of the tactual organs,
we have the movements of both eyes in fixating objects and
following thek bounding lines. But there is this difference,
while tactual impressions are perceived only through im-
mediate contact with the objects, the refractive media in front
of the retina throw upon the visual surface inverted reduced
images. These images allow space for a large number of
simultaneous impressions, and the ability of light to traverse
space makes it possible for both neighboring and distant
objects to yield impressions. Vision thus becomes a distance
sense in a much higher degree than hearing.

14. With regard to its spacial attributes, every visual
idea may be resolved into two factors : 1) the location of the
single elements in relation to one another, and 2) their loca-
tion in relation to the ideating subject. Even the idea of
one single point of light, contains both these factors, for we
must represent a point in some spacial environment, and also
in some direction and at some distance from ourselves. These
factors can be separated only through dehberate abstraction,
never in reality, for the relation of any point in space to its
environment regularly determines its relation to the ideating

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 129

subject. As a result of this dependence, the analysis of
visual ideas may better start with the location of the elements
in relation to one another, and then take up later the location
of the compound in relation to the subject.

a. The Location of the Elements of a Visual Idea
in Relation to One Aiwther.

15. In the perception of the reciprocal relations between
elements of a visual idea, the characteristics of space per-
ception through the tactual sense are all repeated, only in a
much more highly organized form, and with a few modifi-
cations which are important in determining the special char-
acter of visual ideas. Thus, in vision as in touch, we im-
mediately connect with the simplest possible impression of a
point the idea of its ^lace in space; that is, we give it a
certain definite position in relation to the parts of space
about it. This localization is not effected, however, as in
touch, by the direct reference of the impression to the cor-
responding point of the sense-organ itself; we project it
rather into a field of vision^ which lies at some distance out-
side of the ideating subject. Here too we have a measure,
as in the case of touch, of the accuracy of localization, in
the distance at which two points can be just distinguished
as spacially different. The distance is not given in this case
as a directly measurable hnear extension on the sensory
surface itself, but as the shortest perceptible interval between
two points in the field of vision. The field of vision may
be at any distance whatever, so that it is best to use as a
measure for the fineness of localization, not a linear exten-
sion, but an angle., the angle formed by the intersection of
the lines passing from the points in the field of vision, through
the optical centre of the eye, to the corresponding retinal

WuNDT, Psychology. 2, edit. 9

130 II- Psychical Compounds.

points. This angle of vision remains constant so long as the
size of the retinal image is unchanged, while the distance
between the points in the field of vision increases in pro-
portion to their distance from the subject. If an equivalent
linear distance is sought in place of the angle of vision, it
can be found in the diameter of the retinal image. This
may be calculated directly from the angle and the distance
of the retina from the optical centre of the eye.

16. The measurements of the keenness of visual locali-
zation made according to this principle show that there is
a great difference in different parts of the field of vision,
corresponding to the differences found for different regions
of the tactual organs (p. 117). Still, the distances that
measure the smallest perceptible visual intervals are all very
much smaller than in the case of touch. Then too, while
there are many regions of finer discrimination scattered
over the tactual organ, there is only one region of finest
discrimination in the field of vision. This is the middle of
the field of vision which corresponds to the centre of the
retina. From this region towards the periphery the fineness
of localization diminishes very rapidly. The whole field of
vision, or the whole retinal surface, is, accordingly, analogous
to a single tactual region, as, for example, that of the index
finger, except that the visual region much surpasses the tactual
in fineness of localization, especially at the centre, where
two impressions at a distance corresponding to 60" — 90" in
the angle of vision, are just distinguishable; at two degrees
and a half from the centre toward the periphery, the smallest
perceptible extension is 3' 30"; and at eight degrees toward
the periphery it increases to 1°.

In normal vision we turn the eye towards objects of
which we wish to gain more accurate spacial ideas, in such
a way that these objects occupy the middle of the field of

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 131

vision, their images falling, as a result, on the centre of the
retina. "We speak of such objects as seen directly^ of all
others, which lie in the eccentric parts of the field of vision,
as seen indirectly. The centre of the region of direct vision
is called the point of regard^ or the fixation-point. The
line that unites the centre of the retina with the centre of
the field of vision is known as the line of regard.

If we compute the distance on the retina that cor-
responds to the smallest angle of vision at which two points
in the centre of the field of vision may be perceived as
separate, we shall find it to be .004 to .006 mm. This dis-
tance is about equal to the diameter of a retinal cone, and
since the centre of the retina has only cones and these are
so close together that they are in direct contact, it may be
concluded with probability that two impressions must fall
upon at least two different retinal elements if they are to be
perceived as separate in space. This view is supported
by the fact that in the peripheral regions of the retina the
rods and cones, which are the two forms of elements sen-
sitive to light, are really separated by greater intervals. It
may, then, be assumed that the keenness of vision is directly
dependent on the proximity of the retinal elements to one
another, for two impressions can be distinguished as spacially
different only when they act upon different elements.

16 a. Because of this relation between the keenness of vision
and the arrangement of retinal elements, it has often been con-
cluded that every retinal element has from the first the property
of localizing any stimulus that acts upon it, in that position in
space which corresponds to its own projection in the field of
vision. In this way the attempt has been made to explain the
fact that the visual sense represents its objects in an external
field of vision at some distance from the subject, as a connate
energy of the retinal elements or of their central connections

9*

132 11- Psychical Compounds.

in the visual centre in the brain. There are certain pathological
disturbances of vision that seem at first sight to confirm this
assumption. When some region of the retina is pushed out of
place as a result of inflammation underneath, certain distortions
in the images, the so-called 7netamorphopsia^ arise. The extent
and direction of these distortions can be fully explained when
it is assumed that the displaced retinal elements continue to
localize their impressions as they did when in their normal
positions. But it is obvious that these distortions of the images,
when they appear, as they do in most cases, as continually
changing phenomena, during the gradual formation and disap-
pearance of the excretion, furnish us with no more evidence
of a connate energy of localization in the retina, than does the
readily observed fact that distorted images of objects are seen
when one looks through prismatic glasses. Furthermore, if a
stationary condition is gradually reached, the metamorphopsia
disappear, and that, too, not only in cases where it may be
assumed that the retinal elements return to their original position,
but even in those cases where such a return is entirely improb-
able on account of the extent of the afi'ection. In cases like
the latter, the development of a new connection between the
single retinal elements and their corresponding points in the
field of vision, must be assumed^). This conclusion is supported
by observations made with normal eyes on the gradual adapta-
tion to such distorted images as are produced by external optical
appliances. If a pair of prismatic glasses be worn before the
eyes, marked and disturbing distortions of the images are the
regular results. The straight bounding lines appear bent and
the forms of the objects are thus distorted. These disturbances
gradually disappear entirely if the glasses are worn some time.

1) A process analogous to this elimination of the metamorphopsia
is sometimes observed in binocular vision when the disturbances
arising from squinting are gradually overcome. When the squinting
begins, the two lines of regard no longer meet in the field of vision,
so that double images of objects arise. These may gradually dis-
appear, however, if the condition of the eyes remains perfectly
stationary; a new set of relations is developed for the retinal ele-
ments of the squinting eye.

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 133

When the glasses are removed, the distortions may appear in
the opposite direction.

17. Besides the retinal sensations there are other psy-
chical elements that always take part in the spacial arrange-
ment of light impressions. The physiological properties of
the eye point a priori to the sensations that accompany
ocular movements^ as such elements. These movements ob-
viously play the same part in the estimation of distances in
the field of vision as do the tactual movements in the estima-
tion of tactual impressions. By means of a most admirably
arranged system of six muscles, the eye can be turned in
all directions about its centre of rotation, which is fixed in
its relation to the head. It is thus well suited to following
continuously the bounding lines of objects or to passing each
time in the shortest line from a given fixation-point to
another. Movements in the direction which corresponds to
the position of the objects most frequently and closely ob-
served, namely, movements downward and inward are favored
above the others by the arrangement of the muscles. Further-
more, the movements of the two eyes are so adapted to one
another through the synergy of their innervation, that nor-
mally the two lines of regard are always turned upon the same
fixation-point. In this way a cooperation of the two eyes is
made possible which not only permits a more perfect per-
ception of the position of objects in relation to one another,
but also furnishes the most essential means for the determi-
nation of the spacial relations of objects to the subject
(24 seq.).

18. The phenomena of vision teach that the idea of the
relative distance of two points from each other is dependent
on the motor energy employed in passing through this dis-
tance, just as the discrimination of two distinct points in the

134 II- Psychical Compoitnds.

field of vision depends on the arrangement of the retinal
elements. The motor energy becomes a component of the
idea through its connection with a sensation of tension which
can be perceived, especially in extensive movements and by
comparing ocular movements in various directions. Thus, for
example, an upward movement of the eyes is clearly ac-
companied by more intense sensations than an equal down-
ward movement; and the same is true of outward move-
ments of the eye as compared with inward movements.

The influence of these inner tactual sensations is most
apparent in the fact that the disturbances in localization
which arise from partial paralysis of single ocular muscles
correspond exactly to the changes in the amount of energy
required to move the eye. The general principle of such
disorders is that the distance between two points seems
greater when these points lie in the direction of the more
difficult movement. The more difficult movement has a corre-
spondingly more intense sensation of tension which intense sen-
sation under normal conditions accompanies a more extensive
movement. As a result, the distance passed through appears
greater. Furthermore, the same illusion may appear for dis-
tances that lie in the direction of difficult movement, but
have not been actually passed through, for the standard ac-
quired during movement determines the motor impulse in the
eye even when it is not moved.

19. Similar variations can be demonstrated for the normal
eye. Although the ocular muscles are so arranged that their
movements in various directions require about the same
amount of exertion, still, there is not exact equality in this
respect. The reasons for the existing differences are con-
nected with the adaptation of the eye to its functions. The
neighboring objects of our immediate environment, on which
the lines of regard must be converged, are the ones at which

§ 10. Spaeial Ideas. 135

we most often look. For this reason, the muscles of the
eye have so adapted themselves that the movements for the
convergence of the Knes of regard are the easiest, particu-
larly those directed downwards as compared with other pos-
sible movements of convergence. This facilitation of con-
vergent movements is brought about by the special mode of
placing the muscles which move the eye upward and down-
ward. These muscles, the superior rectus and the inferior
rectus, do not lie exactly in the vertical median plane of the
eye^ from which position they would give the eye a simple
upward and downward vertical movement; they lie rather at
such an angle to this median plane that their contraction
results in an inward, as well as an upward and downward
movement. Furthermore, each of these recti muscles is sup-
plemented by an oblique muscle^ the superior rectus by the
inferior oblique, and the inferior rectus by the superior
oblique. These oblique muscles aid in producing upward
and downward movements and at the same time counter-
balance the rotation movements produced in the eyes by the
asymmetrical placing of the recti muscles. As a result of
the greater complexity of muscular activity in upward and
downward directions, the exertion required to run over Knes
in these directions is greater than the exertion required for
horizontal lines, where only the internal and external recti
act. Furthermore, the relative ease of downward movements
of convergence as contrasted with upward movements shows
itself partly in the differences in intensity of sensations ac-
companying the downward movements, as already remarked,
and partly in the fact that downward convergence is in-
voluntarily too great and upward convergence too small.

There are certain constant optical illusions depending on
the position of a given object in the field of vision., which
correspond to these differences in the motor mechanism.

136 II' Psychical Compounds.

They are of two kinds: illusions of direction, and those of
length.

Both eyes are subject to an illusion as to the direction
of vertical lines in the field of vision. Such a line whose
upper end is inclined 1° — 3° outward, appears vertical, and
one really vertical, seems inclined inward. Since the illusion
is in opposite directions for the two eyes, it disappears in
binocular vision. It can obviously be explained by the fact
just noted, that the downward movements of the eyes are
connected with an involuntary increase in convergence, and
the upward movements with a decrease in convergence. This
deflection of the movement from the vertical is not noticed
in itself, it is referred to the object as a deflection in the
opposite direction.

An equally regular illusion of length appears when w^e
compare straight lines extending perpendicularly to each other
in the field of vision. This too is to be explained by the differ-
ences in the arrangement of the muscles which move the eye
upward and downward as compared with those which move the
eye outward and inward. The illusion consists in the fact that
a vertical straight line is judged on the average 1/7 to Yio too
long as compared with an equal horizontal line. A square,
accordingly, appears as a rectangle whose base is shorter
than its sides, and a square drawn by the eye is always too
short in its vertical dimensions. As in the case of partially
paralyzed eyes, so here in normal vision, distances in the
direction of the more difficult movement appear greater.

Besides this difference between vertical and horizontal
distances, which is most noticeable because it is so large,
there are less marked differences between upward and down-
ward and also between outward and inward distances. The
upper half of a vertical line is overestimated on the average
by Y16 of its length, and the outer half of a horizontal line

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 137

by 740- The first of these illusions corresponds to the fa-
cilitation of downward movements (described p. 135), the
second corresponds to the general facilitation of movements
of convergence.

20. In addition to these two constant illusions, which
arise from the special structure of ocular muscles in their
adaptation to the purposes of vision, there are certain other
variable optical illusions which are due to certain attributes
common to all our voluntary movements and which have
their analogues in the movements of the tactual organs.
These variable illusions may also be divided into those of
direction^ and those of length. The former follow the rule
that acute angles are overestimated, obtuse angles under-
estimated, and that the direction of the lines forming the
angles varies correspondingly. For the illusions of length
we have the rule, that forced or interrupted movements
require more exertion than free and continuous ones. Any
straight line that necessitates fixation is, accordingly, over-
estimated in comparison with an open distance marked off
by two points, and a straight Hne interrupted by several
dividing lines is overestimated in comparison with an uninter-
rupted line.

20 a. The tactual analogues of the illusion in visual angles is
to be found in the tendency to overestimate small articular
movements and to underestimate large ones. This comes under
the general principle that a relatively greater expenditure of
energy is required for a short movement than for a more ex-
tensive one, because it is relatively more difficult to begin a
movement than to continue it after it is already started. The
tactual phenomena analogous to the overestimation of interrupted
lines, is that a distance estimated by a movement of one of the
limbs always seems shorter when it is traversed in a single con-
tinuous movement, than it does when the movement is several
times interrupted. Here too, the intensity of the sensation

138 JI- Psychical Compounds.

corresponds to the expenditure of energy, both being, of course,
greater for an interrupted movement than for a continuous
movement. The overestimation of interrupted lines by the eye
takes place, as we can easily understand, only so long as no
motives arise from the way in which the division is made, to
hinder the movement of the eye over the interrupted line. Such
a hindrance is present, for example, when the line is interrupted
only once. This one point of division makes fixation necessary.
If we compare such a line with a continuous one, we tend to
estimate the first without any movement, the point of division
being the fixation-centre, while the second is perceived by a
movement of the eye. As a result the continuous line seems
longer than the interrupted line.

20b. All of these illusions of direction and length, whether
variable or constant, are classified as "geometrical optical il-
lusions", and are thus distinguished from certain other optical
illusions which depend upon pure optical irregularities. The
term geometrical is used because it is in the construction of
geometrical figures that the best opportunities for the discovery
of such illusions appear. The term is extended so as to cover
not only these illusions which have been described and which
depend upon the characteristics of eye movements, but also to
include other unusual forms of visual space perception which
are due to the laws of association to be discussed later. These
latter we may distinguish by the special designation "association
illusions". Such association illusions are exemplified by the
fact that a given line when placed near a very much shorter line
is overestimated, and, conversely, when placed near a long line
the same given line is underestimated. Similar underestimation
or overestimation appears in the case of an angle compared
respectively with a larger and smaller angle. These facts are
obviously analogous to the facts of light and color contrast
(§ 17, ll). Similar associations appear in the variable illusions
of direction and length described above in which the illusory
figures due to difi'erences in the energy of movement, were in
each case brought into agreement with the retinal images by a
projection of the flat figure into depth. Thus, for example, we
not only see an interrupted straight line as longer than an
uninterrupted line of equal length, but we also interpret the

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 139

interrupted line as lying at a greater distance. This latter fact
of interpretation depends upon the general rule of perception
which has been established by a large number of associations,
that of two objects casting retinal images of equal size the
more remote is the larger. Such perspective association illusions
appear more clearly in cases of rigid fixation than when the
eye is moving freely, because such illusions depend very largely
on the direct comparison of retinal images. They furnish also
a means of distinguishing between variable illusions and constant
illusions, for the constant illusions do not, as a rule, show any
of these tendencies towards perspective interpretation. For
further discussion of association illusions compare § 16, 9. For
spacial contrast § 17, 11.

21. Both the variable and the constant optical illusions
point to the immediate dependence of the perception of
spacial directions and distances on ocular movements. As
further evidence pointing in the same direction, we have the
negative fact that the arrangement of the retinal elements,
especially their proximity to one another, normally has no
appreciable influence on the ideas of direction and magnitude.
This is most strikingly evident in the fact that the distance
between two points appears the same whether observed in
direct or indirect vision. Two points that are clearly dis-
tinguished in direct vision, may become one in the eccentric
parts of the field of vision, but so soon as they are dis-
tinguished at all, they will appear just as far apart in one
region as in the other, or if there is is any apparent differ-
ence, it is so uncertain and so variable that it to be en-
tirely overlooked as bearing upon the main fact, in view of
the very marked differences in the distribution of the sen-
sitive elements at the centre and periphery of the retina.
This fact that our perception of magnitude is independent
of the proximity of the retinal elements holds even for a
part of the retina that is not sensitive to light at all — for

140 II- Psychical Compounds.

the blind spot^ where the optic nerve comes into the eye.
Objects whose images fall on the blind spot are not seen.
The size of this spot is about 6°, and it is located 15" in-
ward from the point of fixation. Images of considerable
size, as, for example, that of a human face at a distance of
six feet, may disappear entirely on it. Still, when points
appear at the right and left or below and above this region,
we localize them just as far from each other as we should
in any other, uninterrupted part of the field of vision. The
same fact is observed when some part of the retina becomes
blind through pathological conditions. The resulting break
in the field of vision shows itself only in the fact that
images falling on it are not seen, it never appears through any
changes in the localization of objects lying on opposite sides
of the blind region i).

22. The keenness of vision Biid the pe7xeption of directions
and distances in the field of vision., are, as all these phenom-
ena show, two different functions, which depend upon dif-
ferent conditions: the first depends on the proximity of the
retinal elements to one another., the second on ocular move-
ments. It follows directly that spacial ideas from sight can
not be regarded as original ideas or ideas arising from light
impressions in themselves, any more than the spacial ideas
of touch can be referred directly to the tactual impressions
themselves. The spacial order is in both cases developed
from the combination of certain sensational components which,

1) In this connection we have the fact that the blind spot does
not appear in the field of vision as a break, without sensational
content, but as a continuation of the general brightness and color
of the whole field. Thus, the field is seen as continuously white
when we are looking at a white surface, as black when we look at
a black surface. This filling out of the blind spot is possible only
through reproduced sensations, and is to be considered as one of
the phenomena of association to be discussed later (§ 16).

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 141

taken separately, have no spacial attributes whatever. Other
conditions also indicate that the elements are related in
vision in the same way as in the case of touch, and that
the development of visual space under normal conditions
runs entirely parallel to the development of space in cases
of congenital bhndness, that is, under the only condition
under which touch attains a similar independence. Retinal
impressions correspond to impressions of contact, and ocular
movements to touch movements. Tactual impressions can
gain spacial qualities only through the local coloring of the
sensations connected with them — the local signs — and
in Hke manner, we must recognize the same to be true for
retinal impressions.

22 a. To he sure, a qualitative gradation of local signs on
the retina can not be demonstrated with the same evidentness
as for the skin. Still, by the use of colors it can be established
in a general way that at relatively great distances from the
retinal centre the sensational quality gradually changes. Colors
are not so saturated in indirect vision, and the color-tone also
changes; for example, yellow appears orange. There is, indeed,
in these facts of retinal response no strict proof of the existence
of pure local differences in the sensations, at least not in the
fine gradations that must be assumed in the retinal centre. Still,
the facts show that local differences in sensations do exist, and
this seems to justify the assumption of such differences even
beyond the limits of demonstration. This assumption is all the
more justifiable because in vision where the gradations are
much finer than in touch, the tendency to translate sensational
differences directly into local differences, a tendency which has
already been noticed in the case of touch, would certainly do
much more to destroy the specifically qualitative character of
these local differences. As a confirmation of this view we have
the fact that the demonstrable sensational differences at greater
distances from the retinal centre, can be observed only under
favorable conditions, that is, when limited impressions are used;

142 ^I- Psychical Compounds.

they disappear entirely when surfaces of uniform color are
looked at. This disappearance of marked qualitative differences
must be attributed in part at least to their relation to local
differences.

23. We assume, accordingly, qualitative local signs, which,
judging from the data derived from the keenness of vision,
are graded in the finest stages at the retinal centre and
more slowly in the eccentric parts. The formation of visual
space may then be described as a combination of this system
of local signs arranged in two dimensions, with a system of
intensive inner tactual sensations. For any two local signs
a and h there will be a corresponding sensation of strain «,
arising from the movement through the distance a 6, and
serving as a measure of the same. A longer distance a e
will have a more intense sensation af strain, y. Just as the
point of finest discrimination on the finger is the centre of
reference, so in the same way the retinal centre is such a
point of reference for the eye. In fact, this is, because of
the laws of ocular movements, more obvious for the eye than
it is for the tactual organ. Any luminous point in the field
of vision is a stimulus for the centre of ocular innervation,
and tends to turn the line of regard reflexly upon itself.
This reflex relation of eccentric stimuli to the retinal centre
is probably an essential condition for the development of the
synergy of ocular movements mentioned above, and is, at
the same time, an explanation of the great difficulty of ob-
serving objects in indirect vision. This difficulty is evidently
due to the greater reflex impulse toward a point in indirect
vision when the attention is concentrated upon it. As a
result of the preeminent importance which the retinal centre
h-as for ocular movements, the point of fixation necessarily
becomes the centre of reference in the field of vision, and
all distances in this field are brought under a unitary standard

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 143

by being determined with reference to the fixation-point.
The excitation of local signs is due to the action of external
impressions, and both together cause the movement towards
the retinal centre. The whole process of visual space ar-
rangement is thus due to the fusion of three different sen-
sational elements: first, the sensational qualities depending
upon the character of the external stimulus, second the
qualitative local signs depending on the points upon which
the stimuli act, and third, the intensive motor sensations
determined by the relation of the stimulated points to the
centre of the retina. The latter elements may either ac-
company actual movements — this is the original case —
or, when the eye remains at rest, these elements are mere
motor impulses of a particular intensity. Because of the
regular connection between qualitative local signs and in-
tensive sensations of strain which accompany the movements,
the two factors may together be regarded as a single system
of complex local signs. The spacial localization of a simple
visual impression, is a product of a complete fusion of the
sensation caused by the external stimulus with the two inter-
connected elements belonging to this system of complex local
signs. The arrangement of a number of simple impressions
in space consists in the combination of a great number of
such fusions, which are graded in quality and intensity ac-
cording to the elements of the system of local signs. The
predominating elements in these fusions are the sensations
due to the external stimulation. In comparison with these,
the elements of the system of local signs are little recognized,
because in the immediate perpeption of objects the local
signs are entirely swallowed up in their spacial interpretation.

144 II- Psychical Compounds.

b. The Location of Visual Ideas in Relation to the
Ideating Subject.

24. The simplest case of a relation between an impres-
sion and the subject, which can appear in a visual idea, is
evidently that in which the impression is limited in extent
to a single point. If a single point of light is presented in
the field of vision, both Hues of regard are, as a result of
the reflex impulse exerted by the stimulus (p. 142), turned
upon it in such a way that in both eyes the images fall
upon the retinal centres. Furthermore, the organs of ac-
commodation are also adapted to the distance of the point.
The point thus represented on the centres of both retinas
is seen as single^ and as situated in a certain particular
direction, and at a certain particular distance from the
ideating subject.

The subject is represented, as a rule, by a point which
may be defined as the middle point of the straight line con-
necting the centres of rotation of the two eyes. We will
call this the jpoint of orientation for the field of vision, and
the straight line drawn from this point to the intersection of
the two lines of regard, that is to the external fixation-point,
we will call the line of orientation. When a point in space
is fixated, there is always a fairly exact idea of the direction
of the line of orientation. This idea is produced by the inner
tactual sensations arising from the position of the two eyes.
Such sensations are very noticeable because of their intensity,
when the eyes are rotated much out of the central position.
They are just as perceptible for a single eye, so that locali-
zation in direction is as perfect in monocular as in binocular
vision. In monocular vision, however, the line of orientation
generally coincides with the line of regard i).

1) The habit of seeing with two eyes results in exceptions to

§10. Spacial Ideas. 145

25. The idea of the dista?ice of objects from the subject,
or of the absolute le^igth of the line of orientation, is much
more indefinite than the idea of direction. We are always
inclined to ideate this distance shorter than it really is, as
may be shown by comparing it with a standard placed
somewhere in the field of vision perpendicular to the line of
orientation. In this way we find that the distance on the
standard which is judged to be equal to the line of orienta-
tion , is always much shorter than the real length of this
line. The discrepancy between the two increases as the
point of fixation moves further away, that is, as the line of
orientation becomes longer. The only sensational components
that can produce this idea of distance, are the sensations of
tention arising from the position of the two eyes. These
sensations arise particularly from the convergence of the
lines of regard and give somewhat of a measure of the ab-
solute extent of this convergence. In fact, it is possible to
observe sensations when the convergence is changed: from
the inner angle of the eye when the degree of convergence
is increased, from the outer angle when the convergence
is decreased. The sum of all the sensations correspond-
ing to a given position of convergence distinguishes such a
position completely from all others.

26. It follows that an idea of a definite, absolute length
of the line of orientation can be developed only through
experience, during which there appear, in addition to the
sensational elements, a great many associations. This explains
why these ideas always remain indefinite and why they are

this rule. Often when one eye is closed, the line of orientation re-
mains the same as in binocular vision and does not coincide with
the line of regard. In such cases the closed eye usually makes the
movements of convergence to a fixation point which is the same as
that of the open eye.

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. XQ

146 II- Psychical Compomids.

sometimes aided, sometimes interfered with by other com-
ponents of visual ideas, especially by the size of the retinal
images of familiar objects. On the other hand, we have in
the sensations of convergence, a relatively fine measure for
differences in the distances of objects. For positions in which
the lines of regard are nearly parallel, changes in convergence
may be perceived that correspond to an angle of vision of
60" or 70". When the convergence increases, the absolute
amount of this least perceptible change in convergence also
increases considerably, but, in spite of this increase in angular
amount, the corresponding differences in the length of the
line of orientation become smaller and smaller. Thus the
purely intensive sensations which accompany movements of
convergence, are translated directly into ideas of changes in
the distance between the fixation-point and the point of
orientation of the subject.

This translation of a certain particular sensational com-
plex into an idea of distance, is not due to any connate
energy, but to a particular psychical development, as is shown
by a great number of experiences. Among these is the fact
that the perception both of absolute distances and of differ-
ences in distance, is greatly improved by practice. Children
are generally inclined to localize very distant objects in the
immediate neighborhood: they grasp at the moon, at the
slater on the tower, etc. In the same way, it has been ob-
served that the congenitally blind are, immediately after an
operation, entirely unable to distinguish near and far.

27. It is of importance for the development of this dis-
crimination between far and near, that under the natural
conditions of vision, not mere isolated points are presented,
but extended three-dimensional objects^ or at least a number
of points at different depths, to which we assign relatively
different distances along their respective lines of orientation.

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 147

Let us consider first the simplest case, where two points
a and h are presented, lying at different depths and con-
nected by a straight line. A change in the fixation from
a to & is always accompanied by a change in convergence,
and brings about, first, the passage through a continuous
series of retinal local signs corresponding to the points on
the line a 5, and, secondly, an inner tactual sensation, a,
corresponding to the difference in convergence between a
and h. This gives us the elements of a spacial fusion.
The product of this fusion is, however, pecuHar in kind;
it differs in both its components, that is, in the successive
series of local signs and in the concomitant tactual sen-
sations of movement, from the fusions that arise when we
view a line in the field of vision (p. 142), which does not
extend in the third dimension, but lies entirely in a given
plane. In the latter case the changes in local signs and
sensations of movement are alike for both eyes, while in
the former case, that is^ in changing the point of fixation
from far to near, or the reverse, the changes in local signs
are opposite in the two eyes. For when the convergence
gives the right eye a rotation towards the left, it will
produce a rotation towards the right in the left eye, and
vice versa. The same must also hold for the movement of
the retinal images: when the image of the point as it
leaves the point of fixation, moves towards the right in the
right eye, it moves towards the left in the left eye, and vice
versa. The first takes place when the eyes turn from a
nearer to a more distant point, the latter, when they move
in the opposite direction. Such fusions arising from move-
ments of convergence have, so far as their qualitative and
intensive components are concerned, a composition analogous
to the fusion on which the arrangement of the elements in
the field of vision with regard to one another depends; but

10*

148 I^- Psychical Compounds.

the special way in which these elements are united is entirely
different in the two cases.

28. Thus, the fusions between local signs and inner tac-
tual sensations form a system of complex local signs which is
analogous to that described above (p. 142), but is in some
respects unique in its composition. This second system of
local signs adds to the reciprocal relation between the ob-
jective elements, a relation between the ideating subject and
these elements. This relation to the subject divides into two
ideational elements, characterized by distinctive sensational
elements : the idea of direction and that of distance. Both refer
primarily to the point of orientation in the head of the
ideating subject, and are then secondarily applied to the
relations of external objects in regard to one another. Thus,
we come to assign to two points which lie at different
distances along the line of orientation a certain direction
and a certain distance in relation to each other. All such
ideas of spacial distance of various positions along the line
of orientation, when taken together make up what are called
ideas of depth., or when they are also ideas of particular
single objects ideas of tJiree-dimensioiial objects.

29. An idea of depth arising in the way described varies
according to objective and subjective conditions. The deter-
mination of the absolute distance of an isolated point in the
field of vision, is always very uncertain. Even the deter-
mination of the relative distance between two points a and h
lying at different depths is generally certain only under the
conditions assumed above, namely, the conditions that the
points are connected by a line along which the points of
fixation for the two eyes can move in changing the con-
vergence from one to the other. We may call such lines
which connect different points in space with one another
lines of fixation. The principle may then be formulated:

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 149

points in space are perceived in their true relations, only
when they are connected by lines of fixation, along which
the points of fixation of the two eyes may move. This
principle is explicable on the ground that the conditions for
a regular union of the local signs of the retina with sen-
sations of strain that accompany convergence, are obviously
fulfilled only when impressions are presented which can
arouse on the retina local signs appropriate to the particular
sensations of strain given through the convergence.

30. When the conditions mentioned are not fulfilled and
there either arises an imperfect and indefinite idea of the
differences in the relative distance of the two points from the
subject, or else the two points seem to be equally distant —
a phenomenon which can appear only when one of the points
is rigidly fixated — there always arises in the idea another
important change consisting in the fact that only the fixated
point is seen as single, the other is seen as double. The
same thing happens in looking at extended objects when
they are not connected with the binocular fixation-point by
means of lines of fixation. Double images that arise when
the fixated point is nearer than the observed object, are
uncrossed i. e., the right belongs to the right eye, the left
to the left eye; they are crossed when the point of fixation
is beyond the object.

Binocular localization in depth and binocular double
images are, accordingly, phenomena directly interrelated.
Where localization is indefinite and imperfect we have double
images, and where, on the other hand, double images are
absent, the localization in depth is definite and exact. The
two phenomena stand in such a relation to the line of
fixation that, when such a line is present, it aids in forming
the idea of depth and in doing away at the same time with
double images. Stilly this rule is not without exception, for

150 II- Psyehical Compounds.

when a point is rigidly fixated witli both eyes, double images
may arise in spite of any lines of fixation that may be present.
This is explained by the general conditions mentioned above
(p. 149) as necessary for ideas of depth. Just as the absence
of lines of fixation results in the lack of the required suc-
cession of the local signs, so in a similar way the inner
tactual sensations connected with movements of convergence
are absent in rigid fixation.

c. Belations between the Location of the Elements in Regard
to one another and their Location in Regard to the Subject.

31. "When the field of vision is thought of merely as a
series of locations of visual impressions in relation to one
another^ we represent this field to ourselves as a surface,
and call the single objects lying in this surface two-dimen-
sionalj in contrast with those which have also depth. But
even an idea of two dimensions must always be related to
the seeing subject in two ways. For, in the first place,
every point in the field of vision is seen in a particular
direction on the subjective line of orientation mentioned
above (p. 144), and secondly, the whole field of vision is
localized at a more or less definite distance from the subject.

The location in a particular direction results in an erect
ideational object corresponding to an inverted retinal image.
This relation between the objective localization in direction
and the retinal image is as necessary a result of ocular
movements, as the inversion of the image is a result of the
optical properties of the eye. Our line of orientation in
space is the external line of regard, or, for binocular vision,
the middle line resulting from the combined effects of move-
ments of fixation. A direction upward on this line of ori-
entation in external space corresponds to a direction down-

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 151

ward in the internal ocular space where the retinal image
lies, behind the centre of ocular rotation. And the converse
is true for directions downward on the line of orientation.
32. The location at some distance or other, which also
is never absent, results in the fact that all the points of the
field of vision seem to be arranged on the surface of a concave
hemisphere the centre of which is the point of orientation,
or, in monocular vision, the centre of the eye's rotation.
Now small areas of a large curved surface appear plane, so
that the two-dimensional ideas of single objects are as a
rule plane\ thus, for example, figures drawn upon a plane,
such as those of plane geometry. But as soon as some
parts of the general field of vision separate from this field
in such a way that they are localized before or behind, that
is in different planes, the idea of two dimensions gives place
to one of three.

32 a. The fusions formed between qualitative local signs and
inner tactual sensations when we change from the fixation of
a more distant point to the fixation of a nearer, or the reverse,
may be called complex local signs of depth. Such local signs
form for every series of points lying before or behind the
fixation-point, or for every extended body which is nothing but
a series of such points, a regularly arranged system in which
a stereometric series of points located at a particular distance
is always unequivocally represented by a particular group of
complex local signs of depth. When one of two points lying
at difi'erent distances is fixated, the other is represented in a
definite and unequivocal manner by the positions of its images
in the two eyes, which positions with their corresponding complex
local signs are different in the two eyes. The same is true of
connected series of points or extended bodies. "When we look
at a solid object, it throws images in the two eyes that are
different from each other on account of the different relative
X^ositions of the object with reference to the two .:;''^s. We
designate the difference between the positions of a certain ^^^ ">int

152 U. PsyGhieal Compounds.

in the image in the two eyes as the binocular parallax. This
parallax is zero for the point fixated and for those points which
are equally distant on the line of orientation; for all other
points it has some real positive or negative value according as
such points are more or less distant than the fixation-point.
If we fixate solid objects with both eyes, only the point fixated
together with those points which are equidistant and in its
neigborhood in the field of vision, will give rise to images cor-
responding in position in the two eyes. All points of the
object located at different distances, give images varying in
position and size. These differences in the images are just what
produce the idea of the solidity of the object when the proper
lines of fixation are present. For in the way above described,
the angle of binocular parallax for the image of any point lying
before or behind the point of fixation and connected with the
same by a line of fixation, furnishes, according as the direction
and magnitude of the parallax varies, a measure of the relative
distance of this point in depth. This measure it furnishes
through the complex local signs connected with the angle of
parallax. This angle of parallax for a given objective depth,
decreases as the distance of the solid object from the subject in-
creases, so that the impression of solidity diminishes, the further
off the objects are, and when the distance is so great that all
angles of parallax disappear, the body will appear flat, unless
the associations to be discussed later (§ 16, 9) produce an idea
of depth.

33. The influence of binocular vision on the idea of depth
may be investigated experimentally by means of a stereo-
scope. This instrument consists of two prisms with their
angles of refraction turned toward each other in such a way
that it renders possible a binocular combination of two plane
drawings which correspond to the two retinal images from
a three-dimensional object. The influence of the various
conditions that underlie the formation of ideas of depth,
may, in this way, be studied much better than by looking

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 153

at actual three-dimensional objects, for in tlie stereoscope we
may vary tlie conditions at will.

To give a concrete illustration, it is observed that complex
stereoscopic pictures generally require several movements of
convergence back and forth before a clear plastic idea arises.
Furthermore, the effect of the parallax appears in looking
at stereoscopic pictures the parts of which are movable in
respect to each other. Such movements are always accom-
panied by changes in the relief which answer exactly to the
changes in binocular parallax. This parallax is dependent
on the distance of the two eyes from each other, so that
ideas of depth can be produced even in the case of objects
too distant in reality to give a plastic effect. Plastic effect
is secured in such cases by combining in the stereoscope,
pictures taken from positions much further apart than the
two eyes. This is done, for example, in making stereoscopic
photographs of landscapes. The result is that these photo-
graphs when combined, do not look like real landscapes, but
like plastic models regarded from a short distance.

34. In monocular vision all the conditions which are
connected with movements of convergence are absent. There
are, furthermore, no binocular differences in the retinal
images such as may be artificially reproduced in the stereo-
scope. But even here not all the influences are wanting to
produce a localization in the third dimension, although this
localization is more imperfect.

The direct influence of movements of accommodation is,
in comparison with other conditions, relatively small. Still,
like movements of convergence, movements of accommodation
are also accompanied by sensations which can be clearly per-
ceived in the case of greater changes of accommodation from
distant, to neighboring points. For smaller changes in depth
these sensations are very uncertain. As a result the move-

154 II- Psychical Compounds.

ment of a point in the direction of the line of regard, when
it is looked at with only one eye, is generally not clearly
observed until a change in the size of the retinal image
appears.

35. For the development of monocular ideas of depth
the influences which the components of the so-called per-
spective exercise, are of the greatest importance. These are
the relative magnitude of the angle of vision, the direction
of limiting lines, the direction of shadows, the change in
colors due to atmospheric absorption, etc. All these in-
fluences, depend on associations of ideas, and will, therefore,
be treated in a later chapter (§16).

35 a. "We have in general the same opposing theories for
the explanation of visual ideas as for tactual ideas (p. 125).
The empirical theory has sometimes committed the fallacy of
limiting itself to optics and turning the real problem of space
perception over to touch. In such cases it has tried to explain
only how a localization of visual ideas can take place with the
aid of experience, on the basis of already existing spacial ideas
from touch. Such an interpretation is, however, not only self-
contradictory, but it also conflicts with experience, which shows
that in normal persons with vision, visual space perception de-
termines tactual, not the reverse (p. 115). The fact of general
development, that touch is the more primitive sense, can not be
applied to the development of the individual. The chief evi-
dences in support of nativistic theories are, first, the meta-
morphopsia after dislocation of retinal elements (p. 132) and,
secondly, the position of the line of orientation (p. 144), which
indicates united functioning of the two eyes from the first. It
has been noted already (p. 132) that the metamorphopsia and
other related phenomena prove the exact opposite as soon as
the changes to which they are due become stationary. Further-
more, the fact that in long continued use of only one eye the
line of orientation conies to coincide with the line of regard
(p. 144), proves that the position of this line is not given from
the first, but that it has arisen under the influence of the con-

§ 10. Spacial Ideas. 155

ditions of vision. Still another fact against the nativistic and
in favor of the genetic theory, is the development in the child
of the synergy of ocular movements under the influence of ex-
ternal stimuli and the organization of space perceptions which
apparently accompanies it. Here as in many other respects the
development of most animals is different. In animals the reflex
connections of retinal impressions with movements of the eyes
and head, function perfectly immediately after birth (v. inf.
§ 19, 2).

The fusion theory has gained the ascendency over older na-
tivistic and empirical views, chiefly through the more thorough
investigation of the phenomena of binocular vision. Nativism
has difficulty with the question why we generally see objects
single although they produce images in each of the two eyes.
The effort is made to avoid the difficulty by assuming that two
identical retinal points are connected with the same optic fibre
which divides in the chiasma, and that in this way the two
retinal points represent what in the sensorium is only a single
point. This doctrine of the "identity of the two retinas"
became, however, untenable as soon as the actual conditions of
binocular vision in three dimensions began to be investigated.

Keferences. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, sect. 3. Hering, Her-
mann's Handbuch Physiol., vol. Ill, pt. 1, sect. 4. Wundt, Grund-
ztige der phys. Psych. voL II, chap. 13, and Lectures on Hum. and
Anim. Psych., lectures 10 to 13. On the Keenness of Vision: Aubert,
Physiol, der Netzhaut, (1865) p. 187. Wertheim, Archiv f. Ophth.,
vol. 33, no. 2. A. E. Pick, Archiv f. Ophth., vol. 45. A. Konig, Ber.
der Berliner Akad., 1897. On eye Movements: Hering, Lehre vom
binocularen Sehen, 1868. Wundt, Grundziige der physiol. Psych.,
vol. II, p. 109, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 10,
see fig. 21 for the muscles of the eye. On Geometrical Optical
Illusions: J. Oppel, Ber. des physik. Vereins zu Frankfurt, 1854, 1856
and 1860. Muller-Lyer, Archiv f. Physiol., Supplement for 1889,
and Zeitschr. f. Psychol, und Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vols. 9 and
13. LiPFS, Raum/asthetik und geometrisch-optische Tau.,c''iungen, 1897.
Wundt, Abhandl. der sachs. Ges. d. Wiss., math. -phys. Ci., vol. 24
(1898), and Philos. Studien, vol. 14, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim.
Psych., lecture 10 (figures 22 and 23). On the Influence of Conver-
gence and Accommodation: Hillebrand, Zeitschr. f. Psych, und
Physiol, der Sinnesorgane, vol. 7. Arrer, Philos. Studien, vol. 13.

156 I^- Psychical Com'pounds.

On Binocular Vision, and Stereoscopic Vision: Wheatstone, Philo-
sophical Transactions, 1838. Dondees, Archiv f. Ophth., vol. 17.
WuNDT, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 12 and 13
(figures 26 — 37). On the Behavior of the congenitally Blind after
Operation: Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, p. 428. Rahlmann, Zeitschr.
f Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 2. Uhthoff, Zeitschr. f.
Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 14. On Theories of spacial
Vision: Nativistic Theories: J. Muller, Zur vergl. Physiol, des Ge-
sichtssinns, 1826. Panum, Physiol. Untersuchungen iiber das Sehen
mit zwei Augen, 1858. Hering, Hermann's Handb., vol. Ill, pt. 1.
Empirical Theories: Berkeley, Essay toward a New Theory of Vision,
1709. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, § 23. Fusion Theories: Herbart,
Psychologie als Wissenschaft, Pt. 2, sect. 1, chap. 3. Wundt, Bei-
trage zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmungen, (1862) pts. 3 and 4, and
Philos. Studien, vol. 14. Lipps, Grundthatsachen des Seelenlebens,
chap. 23, and Psychol. Untersuchungen, I, 1885.

§ 11. TEMPOEAL IDEAS.

1. All our ideas are at once spacial and temporal. But
just as the conditions for the spacial arrangement of im-
pressions belong originally to the tactual and visual senses,
and just as spacial relations are only secondarily carried
over from these to all other sensations, so there are only
two kinds of sensations, namely, the inner tactual sensations
from movements and the auditory sensations, which are
primary sources of temporal ideas. Still, there is a charac-
teristic difference between spacial and temporal ideas in the
fact that in the case of spacial ideas the two senses men-
tioned are the only ones which can develop an independent
spacial order, while in the case of temporal ideas the two
most important kinds of sensation are merely those in which
the conditions are most favorable for the rise of temporal
ideas. These conditions are not entirely wanting in any sen-
sations. This indicates that the psychological basis of tem-
poral ideas is more general^ and that it is not determined

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 157

by the special structures of particular sense organs. In
agreement with this view is the fact that we attribute to
subjective processes, *such as feeHngs and emotions, the same
temporal attributes as we attribute to ideas. It is to be
noted, however, that no justification for the conclusion that
time perception is in itself a more universal form of per-
ception, is to be found in this fact that the conditions
of time perception are more general than are those of
space perception. In the same way that we carry over
spacial attributes from the two senses that give us space
perception to other kinds of sensations, so also we give
spacial attributes secondarily to feelings and affective proc-
esses, through the sensations and ideas inseparably connected
with them. It may with equal right be doubted whether
affective processes in themselves, without their related ideas,
would have temporal attributes, for among the conditions of
a temporal order are certain attributes of the sensational
elements of ideas. The real facts in the case are that all
psychical contents, are at once spacial and temporal. The
spacial order arises from certain particular sensational ele-
ments : in normal cases where vision is present from visual im-
pressions, in blindness, from tactual impressions. Time ideas,
on the other hand, can arise from all possible sensations.

2. Temporal compounds like spacial, and in contrast to
intensive ideas, are characterized by the definite, unchange-
able order of their component elements. If this order is
changed, the given compound becomes another, even though
the quality of its components remains the same. In spacial
ideas, this unchangeableness of the order refers only to the
relation of the elements to one another, not to the relation
of the elements to the ideating subject. In temporal com-
pounds, on the other hand, when the relation of one element
is changed with respect to other elements, it is at the same

158 li- Psychical Compounds.

time changed with respect to the ideating subject. There is
no change of position in time analogous to that possible in
the case of space compounds.

2 a. This property of the absolute, strictly speaking unchange-
able, relation with respect to the ideating subject which belongs
to every temporal compound, and every time element, however
short, is what we call the -flow of time. Every moment in time
filled by any content whatever, has, on account of this flow,
such a relation to the ideating subject that no other moment
can be substituted for it. With space the case is just reversed :
the very possibility of substituting any spacial element in its
relation to the subject for any other element whatever, is what
gives rise to the percept of constaney., or absolute duration, as
we express it, by applying a time idea to a space idea. The
idea of absolute duration, that is, of time in which no change
takes place, is strictly speaking impossible in time perception
itself. The relation to the subject must change continually.
"We speak of an impression as lasting, when its single periods
in time are exactly alike so far as their sensational contents and
affective contents are concerned, so that they differ only in their
relation to the subject. The concept of duration when applied
to time is, therefore, a merely relative concept. One time idea
may be more lasting than another, but no time idea can have
absolute duration. Even an unusually long unchanging sen-
sation can not be retained. We interrupt it continually with
other sensational and affective contents.

We may, however, separate the two temporal relations always
united in actual experience, namely, that of the elements to one
another, and that of the elements to the ideating subject, since
each relation is connected with certain particular attributes of
time ideas. In fact, this separation of the two relations found
its expression in special terms for certain forms of occurrence
in time, even prior to an exact psychological analysis of time
ideas. If the relation of the elements to one another is alone
attended to, without regard to their relation to the subject,
temporal modes come to be discriminated, such, for example, as
brief, long, regularly repeating, irregularly changing, etc. If,

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 159

on the contrary, the relation of the subject is attended to, and
the objective forms of occurrence neglected, we have as the chief
forms of this relation the temporal stages, past, present, and
future.

A. TEMPORAL TOUCH IDEAS.

3. The original development of temporal ideas belongs
to touch. Tactual sensations, accordingly, furnish the general
substratum for the rise of both the spacial and temporal
arrangements of ideational elements (p. 115, 3). The spacial
functions of touch, however^ come from the outer tactual
sensations, while the iimer touch sensations which accompany
movements are the primary contents of the earliest temporal
ideas.

The mechanical properties of the Hmbs are important
physiological bases for the rise of these ideas. The arms
and legs can be moved in the shoulder-joints and hip-joints
by their muscles, and are at the same time subject to the
action of gravitation drawing them downward. As a result
there are two kinds of movements possible for these ex-
tremities. First, we have movements which are continually
regulated by voluntary activity of the muscles and may,
therefore, be indefinitely varied and accommodated at every
moment to existing needs — we will call these the arhyth-
mical movements. Secondly, we have movements in which the
voluntary energy of the muscles is operative only so far as
it is required to set the limbs oscillating in their joints and
to maintain this movement — rhythmical movements. We
may neglect for our present consideration the arhythmical
movements exhibited in the various uses of the limbs. Their
temporal attributes are in all probability derived from the
rhythmical movements, and only a very indefinite comparison
of the duration of irregular movements is possible.

150 ^^' Psychical Compounds.

4. With rhytlimical movements the case is different. Their
significance for the psychological development of time ideas
is due to the same principle as that which gives them their
importance as physiological organs, namely, the principle of
the isochronism of oscillations of like amplitude. In walking,
the regular oscillations of our legs in the hip-joints not only
reduce the amount of the muscular energy expended, but
also reduce to a minimum the continual voluntary control
of the movements. Furthermore, in natural walking the
arms are supplementary aids. Their oscillation is not inter-
rupted at every step as is that of the legs by the placing
of the foot on the ground, so that they furnish, because of
the continuity of their movement, a means for the more
uniform regulation of the whole action.

Every single period of oscillation in such a movement is
made up of a continuous succession of sensations which are
repeated in the following period in exactly the same order.
The two limits of the period are marked by a complex of
outer tactual sensations: the beginning by the impression
accompanying the removal of the foot from the ground, the
end by the impr-ession accompanying the return of the foot
to the ground. Between these there is a continuous series
of weak inner tactual sensations from the joints and muscles.
The beginning and . end of this series of inner sensations
coincide in time with the appearance of outer sensations,
and are more intense than the intermediate internal sensa-
tions. These more intense internal sensations accompany
the impulse of movement coming to the muscles and joints
and the sudden inhibition of these impulses, and they assist
much in marking off the successive periods.

Connected with this regular succession of sensations is a
regular and exactly parallel series of feelings. If we con-
sider a single period in a series of rhythmical movements,

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 161

there is always at its beginning and end a feeling of fulfilled
expectation. Between the two limits of the period there is,
beginning with the first movement, a gradually growing feeling
of strained expectation., which suddenly sinks at the last
moment from its maximum to zero, and gives place to the
rapidly rising and sinldng feeling of fulfillment. From this
point on the same series is again repeated. Thus, the whole
process of a rhythmical touch movement consists, on its
affective side, of a succession of two qualitatively antagonistic
feelings. In their general character these feelings belong to
the series of straining and relaxing feelings (p. 92). One
of these feelings is very rapid in its course, the other grad-
ually reaches a maximum and then suddenly disappears. As
a result, the most intense affective processes are crowded
together at the extremities of the periods, and are made all
the more intense through the contrast between the feeling
of satisfaction and the preceding feeling of expectation. Just
as this sharply marked limit between the different periods
has its sensational substratum in the strong outer and inner
tactual impressions arising at this instant, as above pointed
out, so there is also a complete series of feehngs of expec-
tation corresponding to the continuous series of weaker inner
tactual sensations accompanying the oscillatory movements
of the limbs.

5. The simplest temporal ideas of touch are made up of
the rhythmically arranged sensations which, when like oscil-
latory movements are repeatedly carried out, follow one
another with perfect uniformity in the manner described.
But even in ordinary walking a slight tendency towards a
somewhat greater complication arises. The beginning of the
first of two successive periods is emphasized, both in the
sensation and in the accompanying feeling, more than the
beginning of the second period. In this case the rhythm of

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. W

162 I^' Psychical Compounds.

movement begins to be metrical A simple regular succession
of accented and unaccented ideas corresponds to the simj^lest
measure, ^/g-time. It arises easily in ordinary walking because
of the physiological superiority of the right side, and appears
very regularly when several persons are walking together —
in marching. In the latter case even more than two periods
may be united into one rhythmical unit. The same is true
of the complicated rhythmical movements of the dance. But
in such composite tactual rhythms the auditory temporal
ideas have a decided influence.

B. TEMPORAL AUDITORY IDEAS.

6. The attribute of the auditory sense which most of all
adapts it to the more accurate perception of the temporal
relations in external processes, is the exceedingly short per-
sistence of its sensations after the cessation of the external
stimulation, as a result of which any temporal succession of
sounds is reproduced with almost perfect fidehty in the cor-
responding succession of sensations. Connected with this
fact are certain psychological properties of temporal auditory
ideas. In the first place, temporal auditory ideas differ from
temporal ideas of touch in that often only the extremities
of the single intervals that go to make up the total idea,
are marked by sensations. In such a case the relations of
such intervals to one another are estimated by means of
the apparently empty or heterogeneously filled intervals that
lie between the limiting sensations.

This is especially noticeable in the case of rhythmical
auditory ideas. There are in general two possible forms of
such ideas ; continuous, or only rarely interrupted successions
of relatively lasting sensations, and discontinuous successions
of strokes, in which only the extremities of the rhythmical
periods are marked by external sounds. Eor a discontinuous

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 163

succession of entirely uniform sounds the temporal attributes
of the ideas are in general more apparent than for lasting
impressions, since in the former case any effects from the
tonal qualities as such are entirely obviated. We may con-
fine our consideration to discontinuous series, because the
principles that apply here hold for continuous successions
also. In fact, the rhythmical division in the latter case, is
made by means of certain single accents which are either
given in the external impression or voluntarily applied to it.

7. A series of regular strokes made in this way as the
simplest form of temporal auditory ideas, as for example, a
series of ticks of a clock or of a metronome, is distinguished
from the simplest form of temporal touch ideas, described
above (p. 161), mainly by the absence of all objective sensa-
tional content in the intervals. The external impressions
here do nothing but divide the separate intervals from one
another. Still, the intervals of such a series are not entirely
empty, they are filled by subjective affective and sensational
contents which correspond fully to those observed in tactual
ideas. Most emphatic of all are the affective contents of the
intervals consisting of successive periods of expectation. This
expectation gradually rises in each period and is at the end
of such a period suddenly fulfilled. Even the sensational sub-
stratum for this feeling is not entirely absent; it is merely
more variable. Sometimes it is nothing but the sensations
of tension of the tympanic membrane, in their various inten-
sities. Then again, in those cases in which an involuntary
rhythmical movement is connected with the auditory series,
it is the accompanying sensations of tension from other
organs, or finally, it is a series of some other kind of inner
tactual sensations.

The influence of the subjective elements on the character
of time ideas shows itself most clearly in the case of the

11*

164 II' Psychical Compounds.

rhythmical auditory impressions in the effect produced by
different rates of succession of the sensations. A certain
medium rate of about 0.2 sec. is found to be most favorable
for the union of a number of successive auditory impressions,
and it is easy to observe that this is the rate at which the
above mentioned subjective sensations and feelings are most
pronounced in their alternation. If the rate is made much
slower, the strain of expectation is too great and passes into
an unpleasurable feeling which becomes more and more un-
endurable. If, on the contrary, the rate is accelerated, the
rise of the feeling of expectation is interrupted so soon
that the feeling is barely noticeable. Thus, in both di-
rections, limits are approached at which the synthesis of
the impressions into a rhythmical time idea is no longer
possible. The upper limit is about one second, the lower
about 0.1 sec.

8. Then again, this influence of the course of our sen-
sations and feelings upon our perception of temporal inter-
vals, shows itself just as clearly in the changes that our
ideas of such an interval undergo when the conditions of
perception are varied without changing the objective length
of the interval. Thus, it has been observed that in general
a period divided into intervals is estimated as longer than
one not so divided. We have here a phenomenon analogous
to that observed in the illusion with interrupted Knes (p. 137).
The overestimation is always much greater for temporal
intervals. This is obviously due to the fact that the oft
repeated alternations of sensations and feelings in an interval
of time have a greater influence than the interruption of the
movement through points of division in the case of the
similar space-illusion. Furthermore, if in a series of regular
beats, single impressions are emphasized by their greater
intensity or by some qualitative peculiarity, the result is al-

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 165

ways that the intervals preceding and following the empha-
sized impression are overestimated in comparison with the
other intervals of the same series. If, however, a certain
rhythm is produced successively with weak and then with
strong beats, the rate appears slower in the first case than
in the second.

These phenomena are also explicable from the influence
of the sensational and affective changes. An impression dif-
ferent from the rest, produces a change in the course of
the sensations, and especially in the course of the feelings
which precede its apprehension, for there must be a more
intense strain of expectation and a correspondingly stronger
feeling of relief or satisfaction. The feeling of expectation
lengthens the interval preceding the impression, the feeling of
relief that following. The case is different when the whole
series is made up at one time of weak impressions, and at
another of strong ones. In order to perceive a weak im-
pression we must concentrate our attention upon it more.
The sensations and feelings of tension are, accordingly, more
intense, as may be easily observed, for weaker beats than
for stronger ones. Here too, then, the different intensities
of the subjective elements that give rise to the temporal
ideas are reflected in the differences between these ideas.
The effect is, therefore, not only lost, but even reversed,
when we compare, not weak beats with strong, but strong
beats with still stronger beats.

9. The tendency found in the case of rhythmical touch
ideas for at least two like periods to unite and form a reg-
ular metrical unit, shows itself in auditory ideas also, only
in a much more marked degree. In tactual movements,
where the sensations that limit the single periods are under
the influence of the will, this tendency to form a rhythmical
series shows itself in the actual alternation of weaker and

166 11. Psychical Compounds.

stronger impressions. With auditory sensations, on the other
hand, where the single impressions can be dependent only
on external conditions, and are, therefore, objectively exactly
alike, this tendency may lead to the following characteristic
illusion. In a series of beats which are exactly alike in in-
tensity and are separated by equal periods of time, certain
single beats, occurring at regular intervals, are always heard
as stronger than the others. The rhythm that most frequently
arises when there is nothing to determine it, is that known
as Ys-time, that is, a regular alternation of arses and theses.
A slight modification of this, the ^/g-time, where two unac-
cented beats follow one accented beat, is also very common.
This tendency to mark time can be overcome only by an
effort of the will, and then only for very fast or very slow
rates, where, from the very nature of the series, the limits of
rhythmical perception are nearly reached. For medium rates,
which are especially favorable to the rise of rhythmical ideas, a
suppression of this tendency toward rhythmical arrangement
for any length of time is hardly possible. If the effort is made
to unite as many impressions as possible in a unitary time
idea, the phenomena become more complicated. "We have
accents of different degrees which alternate in regular suc-
cession with unaccented members of the series and thus,
through the resulting divisions of the whole into groups, the
number of impressions that may be comprehended in a single
idea is considerably increased. The presence of two different
grades of accent gives ^1^-tim.Q and Ys-^me, the presence of
three grades gives Y4~'thne and ^4-^^16, and as forms with
three feet there are '^j^-iim.Q and ^Yg-time. More than three
grades of accentuation or, when the unaccented note is
counted, more than four grades of intensity, are not to be
found in either musical or poetical rhythms, nor can we
produce more by voluntary formation of rhythmical ideas.

<^ 11. Temporal Ideas. 167

Obviously, these three grades of accentuation mark tlie limits
of the possible complexity of temporal ideas, in a way anal-
ogous to that in which the maximal number of included
impressions (§ 15, 6) marks the limits of the length of tem-
poral ideas.

The phenomena of subjective accentuation and the in-
fluence of this accentuation on the sensations that go to
make up the rhythms, show clearly that temporal ideas,
like spacial ideas, are not derived from objective impres-
sions alone, but that there are always connected with these,
subjective elements which help by their character to deter-
mine the mode of apprehending the objective impressions. The
primary cause of the accentuation of a particular impression
is always to be found in the increase in the intensity of the
preceding and concomitant feelings and inner tactual sen-
sations of movements. This increase in the intensity of the
subjective elements is then carried over to the objective im-
pression, and makes the latter also seem more intense. The
strengthening of the subjective elements may be voluntary^
when the tension of the muscles which produce inner tactual
sensations is voluntarily intensified, thus producing a corre-
sponding intensification in the feeling of expectation. Or
the strengthening of the subjective elements may be in-
voluntary^ when a grouping of the elements of the temporal
idea is brought about as an immediate consequence of the
fluctuations in sensation and feeling that take place during
the effort to include as many factors as possible in the
percept.

C. GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR TEMPORAL IDEAS.

10. If we seek to account for the rise of temporal ideas
on the basis of the phenomena just discussed, we must start
with the fact that a sensation thought of by itself can no

168 I^- Psychical Compounds.

more have temporal than it could have spacial attributes.
Position in time can be possible only when single psychical
elements enter into certain characteristic relations with other
such elements. This condition holds for temporal ideas just
as much as for spacial ideas. The nature of the union is,
however, characteristic and essentially different for the two
kinds of ideas.

The members of a temporal series a h c d e f^ can all
be immediately presented as a single whole, when the series
has reached /", just as well as if they were a series of points
in space. In the case of a spacial idea, however, the ele-
ments would, on account of original ocular reflexes, be ar-
ranged in relation to the point of fixation, and this fixation
point could, at different times, be any one of the impressions
a to f. In time ideas, on the other hand, it is always the
impression of the present moment in relation to which all
the rest are arranged in time. "When a new impression
becomes, in a similar manner, the present impression, even
though its sensational contents are exactly the same as that
of the earlier idea, still, it will be perceived as subjectively dif-
ferent, for though the affective state accompanying a sensation
may, indeed, be related to the feelings of another moment,
the two can never be identical. Suppose, for example, that
following the series a h c d e f^ there is a second series of
impressions, a' h' c' d' e' /', in which a' = a, h' =^ &, c' = c,
etc., so far as their sensational elements are concerned. Let
us represent the accompanying feelings hj a ^ y d e cp and
a' /?' y' d' e' cp'. Then a and «', ^ and /?', y and 7', etc.,
will be similar feelings, because the sensations are the same ;
but they will not be identical, because every affective ele-
ment depends, not only upon the sensation with which it is
immediately connected, but also upon the state of the subject
as determined by the totality of its experiences. The state

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 169

of the subject is different for each of the members of the
series a' h' c' d! . . ., than it was for the corresponding
member of the series a b c d . . .^ because when the im-
pression a' arrives, a has already been present, and so a
can be associated with a, while no such thing was possible
in the case of a. Analogous differences in the affective states
show themselves in composite series when repeated. These
states are never identical, however much the subjective con-
ditions of the momentarily present feelings may agree, for
every one of them has its characteristic relation to the to-
tality of psychical processes. If we assume, for example, a
succession of a number of similar series a b c d, a' b' d d' .,
ct' b" d' d!\ etc., in which a equals o! and d\ b equals V
and V\ etc., so far as their sensational contents are con-
cerned, still, d' differs from a in its affective conditions, for
a! can be associated only with a., while d' can be associated
with both d and a. Besides this, it is true that other
differences between impressions alike in themselves always
arise from some chance accompanying sensations which in-
fluence the affective state.

11. Since every element of a temporal idea is, as above
remarked, placed in some fixed relation to the impression
immediately present, it follows that this present impression
will have an attribute which makes it more prominent than
any of the other elements of the same idea. This attribute
is similar to that possessed by the "point of fixation in the
field of vision, or by the central points of the tactual sur-
faces, and consists in the fact that the present impression
is the most clearly and distmctly perceived of all the ele-
ments of the idea. But there is a great difference in that
this most distinct perception in the temporal idea is not con-
nected with the physiological organization of the sense-organ,
but is due entirely to the general attributes of the ideating

170 ^^- Psychical Compounds.

subject, as expressed in the affective processes. The mo-
mentary feeling accompanying the immediately present im-
pression is what helps to make it the impression most clearly
perceived. "We may, accordingly, call the part of a temporal
idea which forms the immediate impression the fixation-point
of the idea or in general, since it does not depend on ex-
ternal structure, as does the fixation-point of spacial ideas,
we may call it figuratively the inner fixation-point. The
impressions that lie outside this point of fixation, that is, im-
pressions that have preceded the present, are indirectly per-
ceived. They are arranged in a regular gradation of dimin-
ishing degrees of clearness, from the fixation-point. A unitary
temporal idea is possible only so long as the degree of clear-
ness of each of its elements has some positive value. When
the clearness of any element sinks to zero, the idea divides
into its components.

12. The inner fixation-point of temporal percepts differs
essentially from the outer fixation points of spacial percepts
in that its character is primarily determined, not by sensa-
tional, but by affective elements. Since these affective ele-
ments are continually changing, in consequence of the vary-
ing conditions of psychical life, the inner fixation-point is
also always changing. This change of the inner fixation-
point is called the continuous flow of time. By the phrase
continuous flow we mean to express the fact that no moment
of time is like any other, and that no such moment can
return (cf. sup. p. 158, 2 a). This fact is connected with the
one-dimensional character of time, which is due to this very
condition that the inner fixation-point of temporal ideas is
continually moving forward, so that a single point can never
recur. The arrangement of time in one dimension, with
reference always to a changing point of fixation in which
the subject represents himself, is what gives rise to the result

§ 11. Temporal Ideas. 171

tliat the elements of time ideas have a fixed relation, not
only with respect to one another, but also with respect to
the ideating subject (p. 157, 2).

13. If we try to give an account of the means through
which this reciprocally interdependent order of the parts of
an idea, and the determination of these parts with reference
to the ideating subject, originate, it is obvious that these
means can be nothing but certain of the elements connected
with the idea itself, which elements, however, considered in
themselves, have no temporal attributes, but gain such at-
tributes through their union. "We may call these elements
temporal signs, after the analogy of local signs. The charac-
teristic conditions for the development of temporal ideas in-
dicate from the first that these temporal signs are, in the
main, affective elements. In the course of any rhythmical
series every impression is immediately characterized by the
concomitant feeling of expectation, while the sensation is of
influence only in so far as it arouses the feeling. This may
be clearly perceived when a rhythmical series is suddenly
interrupted. Furthermore, the only sensations that are never
absent as components of all time ideas are the imier tactual
sensations. In the case of tactual time ideas these inner
tactual sensations fuse immediately with the tactual sensa-
tions which arise from the movements of the part of the
body in action, while in auditory and other ideas that are
brought into the time form, they stand out distinctly from
the other outer impressions as subjective accompanying phe-
nomena. We may, accordingly, regard the feelings of ex-
pectation as the qualitative temporal signs, the inner tactual
sensations described, as the intensive, temporal signs of a
temporal idea. The idea itself must then be looked upon
as a fusion of the two kinds of temporal signs with each
other and with the objective sensations arranged in the tem-

172 II- Psychical Compounds.

poral form. Thus, the inner tactual sensations, as a series
of intensive sensations, give a uniform measure for the ar-
rangement of the objective sensations; the accompanying
feelings, on the other hand, furnish the qualitative charac-
teristics of these impressions which are necessary for the
temporal ideas.

13 a. The inner tactual sensations play a similar part in
the formation of both time ideas and space ideas. This common
sensational substratum leads very naturally to a recognition of
a relation between these two forms of perception, which finds
its expression in the geometrical representation of time by a
straight line. Still, there is an essential difference between the
complex system of temporal signs and the systems of local signs
in the fact that the former is based primarily, not on the qual-
itative attributes of sensations connected with certain special
external sense-organs, but on feelings which may come in exactly
the same way from the most widely differing kinds of sensation,
for these feelings are not dependent on the objective content
of the sensations, but on their subjective synthesis. The marked
variations in the conditions that control the course of these
feelings explain, furthermore, why it is that our time ideas are
very much less certain than our space ideas. The influence of
the particular course of the feelings in any given case shows
itself in the fact that the degree of certainty of any subjective
estimation of a time interval depends primarily on the duration
of the interval. Our comparison of temporal quantities, as,
for example, in the case of successive rhythmical periods, is
most accurate, other things being equal, for those intervals
which are most favorable in point of length for rhythmical di-
vision. This favorable interval is, in the case of auditory sen-
sations about 0.2 seconds (7). It may be observed when such
an interval is given that the exactness of perception is conditioned
by the favorable succession of feelings of expectation and ful-
fillment. Such a favorable succession makes it possible to rec-
ognize with greatest certainty when a new impression inter-
rupts the feeling of expectation before it has risen to the same
intensity as in a preceding case, or when, on the other hand,

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 173

the new impression has, by its delay, allowed the feeling to
reach a higher degree of intensity. "When the succession of
impressions is very slow the feelings of expectation become ex-
cessively intense. When, on the other hand, the succession is
very rapid, it is almost possible to notice a feeling of surprise
accompanying every impression. Even this feeling of surprise,
however, can reach only a moderate intensity because of the
relatively small degree of intensity attained by the preceding
feelings of tension. For the facts of time memory compare
§ 16.

13 b. Here again we have on the question of the psycho-
logical origin of time ideas the same opposed nativistic and
genetic theories which we had in the case of spacial ideas
(p. 125, 12 a). In this case, however, nativism has never devel-
oped a theory in any proper sense. It usually limits itself to
the general assumption that time is a "connate form of per-
ception", without attempting to give any account of the in-
fluence of the elements and conditions of temporal ideas which
can be actually demonstrated. The genetic theories of older
psychology, as, for example, that of Herbart, seek to deduce
time perception from ideational elements only. This is, how-
ever, pure speculation and loses sight of the conditions given
in actual experience.

References. Vierordt, Der Zeitsinn, 1868. Mach, (English trans.)
Analysis of Sensations. This is an attempt to develop a nativistic theory.
Meumann, Philos. Studien, vols. 8 and 9. Schumann, Zeitsch. f. Psych,
u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 4. Nichols, Amer. Journal of Psychol.,
vol. 4. On Rhythm: Meumann, Philos. Studien, vol. 10. Bolton,
Amer. Journal of Psychol., vol. 6. Bucher, Arbeit und Rhythmus,
2nd. ed. 1899. Smith, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. Wundt, Grrundziige
der phys. Psych., vol. II, chapt. 16, § 5, and Lectures on Hum. and
Anim. Psychol., lectures 17 and 18.

§ 12. COMPOSITE FEELINGS.

1. In the development of temporal ideas it appears clearly
that the discrimination of sensational and affective components
in immediate experience is purely a product of abstraction.

174 II' Psychical Compounds.

For time ideas the abstraction proves impossible, because, in
this case, certain feelings play an essential part in the rise
of the ideas. Time ideas may, therefore, be called ideas
only when the final results of the process, that is, the ar-
rangement of certain sensations in relation to one another
and to the subject, are considered. "When their real com-
position is looked into, they are complex products of sen-
sations and feelings. They are thus to a certain extent
transitional forms between ideas and those other psychical
compounds which are made up of affective elements, and
are designated by the general name affective processes.
Affective processes resemble time ideas especially in the im-
possibility of an abstract separation of their affective ele-
ments from their sensational elements in any investigation
of their rise. This impossibility of abstract separation is
due to the fact that in the development of all kinds of af-
fective processes, sensations and ideas are included as de-
termining factors.

2. Intensive affective combinations., or composite feelings,
must be the first affective processes discussed, because in
them the characteristic attributes of the single compound are
the products of a momentary state. The description of the
feeling, therefore, requires only the exact comprehension of
the momentary condition, not a comprehension at once of
several processes occurring in time and proceeding from one
another. There are, on the other hand, certain relatively
permanent combinations of such feelings which appear not
infrequently. Such permanent combinations we call moods.
These moods frequently pass into emotions and thus may
be looked upon as lying on the boundary line between feel-
ings and emotions. Such boundary forms must be classified,
because of their relatively permanent character, under the
composite feelings.

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 175

3. Composite feelings, then, are intensive states of uni-
tary character in which single simple affective components
are to be perceived. We may distinguish in every such
feeling, component feelings and a resultant feeling. The fun-
damental component feelings are always simple sense-feelings.
Several of these may unite to form a partial resultant which
enters into the whole as a compound component.

Every composite feeling may, accordingly, he divided,

1) into a total feeling made up of all its components, and

2) into single partial feelings which go to make up the total
feeling. These partial feelings are in turn of different grades
according as they are simple sense-feelings (partial feehngs
of the first order) or feelings which are themselves composite
(partial feelings of the second or higher orders). Where we
have partial feelings of higher orders, complicated combi-
nations or interlacings of the component elements may take
place. A partial feeling of lower order may, at the same
time, enter into several partial feelings of higher order.
Such interlacings may render the nature of the total feeling
exceedingly complicated. The whole may sometimes change
its character, even when its elements remain the same, ac-
cording as one or the other of the possible combinations of
partial feelings predominates.

3 a. Thus, the musical chord g e g has a corresponding total
feeling of harmony, the fundamental elements of which, or partial
feelings of the first order, are the feelings corresponding to the
single clangs c, e, and g. Between these two kinds of feeling
stand, as partial feelings of the second order, the three feelings
of harmony from the double clangs c e, e ^, and c g. The char-
acter of the total feeling may have four different shades ac-
cording as one of these partial feelings of the second order pre-
dominates, or all are equally strong. The cause of the pre-
dominance of one of these complex partial feelings may be either
the greater intensity of its sensational components, or the

176 II- Psychical Compounds.

influence of preceding feeling. If, for example, c e g follows cP e g
the effect of c e will be intensified, while if c e ^ follows c e a
the same will hold for g g. Similarly, a number of colors may-
have a different effect according as one or the other partial
combination predominates. In the last case, however, because
of the extensive arrangement of the impressions, the spacial
proximity has an influence antagonistic to the variation in the
manner of combination and, furthermore, the influence of the
spacial form with all its accompanying conditions is an essen-
tially complicating factor.

4. The structure of composite feelings is, thus, in general
exceedingly complicated. Still, there are different degrees
of development even here. The complex feelings arising
from impressions of touch, smell, and taste are essentially
simpler in character than those connected with auditory and
visual ideas.

The total feeling connected with outer and inner tactual
sensations is designated in particular as the common feeling^
since it is regarded as the feeling in which our total state
of sensible comfort or discomfort expresses itself. From this
point of view, the two lowest chemical senses, those of smell
and taste, must also be regarded as contributors to the sen-
sational substratum of the common feeling, for the partial
feelings that arise from these two senses unite with those
from touch to form unanalyzable affective complexes. In
single cases one or the other of these feelings may play the
chief part. But, in the midst of all this change in its sen-
sational substratum, the common feeling is always the im-
mediate expression of our sensible comfort and discomfort,
and is, therefore, of all our composite feelings most closely
related to the simple sense -feelings. Auditory and visual
sensations, on the other hand, contribute to the sensational
substratum of the common feeling only in exceptional cases,
especially when the intensity is unusually great.

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 177

5. The common feeling is the source of the distinction
between pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings. This dis-
tinction is then carried over to the single simple feelings
that compose it, and sometimes even to all feelings. Pleas-
urable and unpleasurable are expressions well adapted to in-
dicate the chief extremes between which the common feel-
ing, as a total feeling corresponding to the sensible comfort
or discomfort of the subject, may oscillate. Though it is to
be noted that this feeling may not infrequently lie for a
longer or shorter period in an indifference-zone. In the same
way, these expressions, pleasurable and unpleasurable, may
be applied to the single constituents that go to make up
one of the total feelings. On the other hand, it is entirely
unjustifiable to apply these names to all other feelings, or,
as is sometimes done, to make their applicability a neces-
sary factor in the general definition of feeling. Even for
the common feeling, pleasurable and unpleasurable can only
be used as general class names which include a number of
qualitatively different feelings. The differences among feelings
of the same class result from the very great variations in
the composition of the single total feelings that we have
included under the general name common feeling (cf.
p. 92 sq.).

6. This fact that certain common feelings are composite
in character explains why it is that there are common feelings
which can not, strictly speaking, be called pleasurable or
unpleasurable, because they consist in a succession of ele-
ments belonging to both classes, and under circumstances
either the one kind of element or the other may predominate.
Such feelings made up of partial feelings of opposite character
and deriving their characteristics from this combination, may
be called contrast- feelings. A simple form of such among
the common feelings is that of tickling. It is made up of

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 12

178 I^- Psychical Compounds.

a weak pleasurable feeling accompanying a weak external
tactual sensation, and of feelings connected with muscular
sensations whicli are aroused by the strong reflex impulses
from the tactual stimuli. These reflex impulses may spread
more or less, and often cause inhibitions of respiration when
they reach the diaphragm, so that the resultant feeling may
vary greatly in different single cases, in intensity, scope, and
composition.

6 a. The combination of partial feelings into a composite
feeling was first noticed in the case of the common feeling.
The psychological laws of this combination were indeed mis-
understood, and, as is usually the case in physiology, the feeling
was not distinguished from its underlying sensations. Common
feeling was, thus, sometimes defined as the "consciousness of
our sensational state", or again as the "totality, or unanalyzed
chaos of sensations" which come to us from all parts of our
body. As a matter of fact, the common feeling consists of a
number of partial feelings. But it is not the mere sum of these
feelings ; it is rather a resultant total feeling of unitary character.
At the same time it is, however, a total feeling of the simplest
possible composition, made up of partial feelings of the first
order, that is, of single sense-feelings which generally do not
unite to form partial feelings of the second or of higher orders.
In the resultant feeling a single partial feeling is usually pre-
dominant. This is more especially the case when a very strong
local sensation is accompanied by a feeling of pain. On the
other hand, weaker sensations may determine the predominant
affective tone through their relatively greater importance. This
is especially frequent in the case of sensations of smell and taste,
and also in the case of certain sensations connected with the
regular functioning of the organs, such as the inner tactual
sensations accompanying the movements of walking. Often the
relatively greater importance of a single sensation is so slight
that the predominating feeling can not be discovered except by
directing our attention to our own subjective state. In such a
case the concentration of the attention upon it can generally
make any partial feeling whatever predominant.

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 179

Keferences. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl. Wundt,
Beitrage zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung, sect. 6, and Grund-
ziige der phys. Psycla. vol. I, chapt. 10, § 3, and Lectures on Hum.
and Anim. Psych., lecture 14. On Pathological Changes in the Common
Feeling: Storking, Vorlesungen iiber Psychopathologie (1900), lectures
23 and 24.

7. The composite feelings from sight and hearing are
commonly called elementary aesthetic feelings. This name
includes all feelings that are connected with composite per-
ceptions and are therefore themselves composite. As a special
form of feelings belonging to the class defined by the broader
meaning of the term aLod-rjaig, we have those feelings which
are the elements of aesthetic effects in the narrower sense.
The term elementary does not apply in this case to the
feelings themselves, for they are by no means simple, but
it is merely intended to express the relative distinction be-
tween these feelings and still more composite, higher aesthetic
feelings.

The perceptive^ or elementary aesthetic, feelings of sight
and hearing may serve as representatives of all the com-
posite feelings that arise in the course of intellectual proc-
esses, such as the logical^ the moral, and the higher aesthetical
feelings, for the general psychological structure of these
complex affective forms is exactly like that of the simpler
perceptive feelings, except that the former are always con-
nected with feelings and emotions that arise from the whole
interconnection of psychical processes.

While the extremes between which the common feelings
move are chiefly the affective qualities which we call pleas-
urable and unpleasurable in the sense of personal comfort
and discomfort, the elementary aesthetic feelings belong for
the most part to the same affective series, but in the more
objective sense of agi'eeahle and disagreeable feelings. These
latter terms express the relation of the object to the ideat-

12*

180 ^^- Psychical Compounds.

ing subject, rather than any personal state. It is still more
apparent here than in the case of pleasurable and unpleas-
urable feelings, that each of these terms is not the name of
a single feehng, but indicates a general group, to which
belong an endless variety of feeKngs with individual peculi-
arities for each single idea. In single cases, too, but more
variably, the other affective series, (p. 92), namely, those of
the arousing and subduing feelings, or of the straining and
relaxing feelings, may show themselves.

8. If we neglect for the moment this general classifi-
cation mentioned, according to which the single cases are
brought under the chief affective forms, the perceptive feel-
ings may be divided into the two classes of intensive and
extensive feelings, according to the relations which exist be-
tween the corresponding sensational elements and determine
the quality of the feelings. By intensive feelings we mean
those that depend on the relation of the quahtative attributes
of the sensational elements of ideas, by extensive feeUngs
those that arise from the spacial and temporal arrangement
of the elements. The expressions "intensive" and "extensive"
do not refer to the character of the feelings themselves,
for the feelings are in reality always intensive, but the
terms refer rather to the conditions of the rise of these
feelings.

Intensive and extensive feelings are, accordingly, not
merely the subjective concomitants of the corresponding
ideas but, since every idea consists usually of elements that
are qualitatively different and also consists of some extensive
arrangement of these elements, the same idea may be at
once the substratum of both intensive and extensive feelings.
Thus, a visual object made up of different colored parts
arouses an intensive feeling through the mutual relation of
the colors and it also arouses an extensive feeling through

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 181

its form. A succession of clangs is connected with an in-
tensive feeling wliicli corresponds to the qualitative relation
of the clangs, and also with an extensive feeling coming
from the rhythmical or arhythmical temporal succession of
these clangs. In this way, both intensive and extensive
feelings are always connected with visual and auditory ideas,
but, of course, under certain conditions one form may push
the other into the background. Thus, when we hear a clang
for just an instant, the only feeling perceived is the inten-
sive feeling. Or when, on the other hand, a rhythmical
series of indifferent sounds is heard, only the extensive feel-
ing is noticeable. For the purpose of psychological analysis
it is obviously of advantage to produce conditions under
which one particular affective form is present and others are,
so far as possible, excluded.

9. When inte^isive feelings are observed in this way, it
appears that those accompanying the combination of colors
follow the rule that there corresponds to a combination of two
colors between which the qualitative difference is a maximum,
a maximal agreeable feeling. Still, every particular color
combination has its specific character which is made up of
the partial feeling from the single colors, and of the total
feeling arising as a resultant of the combination. Then, too,
as in the case of simple color-feelings, the effect is complicated
by chance associations and the complex feelings coming from
these associations (p. 86). Combinations of more than two
colors have not been adequately investigated.

The feelings connected with combinations of clangs are
exceedingly numerous and various. They constitute the affect-
ive sphere in which we see most clearly the formation dis-
cussed above (p. 175), of partial feeKngs of different orders,
together with the interfacings of such feelings which arise
under special conditions. The investigations of the single

182 J^I- Psychical Compounds.

feelings that arise in this way is one of the problems of the
psychological aesthetics of music.

10. Extensive feehngs may be subdivided into spacial
and temporal. Of these, the first, or the feelings of form^
belong mainly to vision, and the second, or the feelings of
rhythm^ belong to hearing, while the beginnings of the de-
velopment of both forms are to be found in touch.

The optical feeling of form shows itself first of all in
the preference of regular to irregular forms, and then in
the preference among different regular forms of those which
have certain simple proportions in their various parts. The
most important of these proportions are those of symmetry,
or 1:1, and of the golden section, or x -]- 1 : x == x : 1
(the whole is to the greater part as the greater part is to
the smaller). The fact that symmetry is generally preferred
for the horizontal dimensions of figures and the golden
section for the vertical, is probably due to associations,
especially with organic forms, such as that of the human
body. This preference for regularity and for certain simple
proportions can have no interpretation other than that the
measurement of every single dimension is connected with an
inner tactual sensa^tion from the eye and with an accompany-
ing sense-feeling which enters as a partial feeling into the
total optical feeling of form. The total feeling of regular
arrangement that arises at the sight of the whole form, is
thus modified by the relation of the different sensations to
one another, and also by the relation of the partial feelings
to one another. As secondary components, which also fuse
with the total feeling, there are here also associations and
their concomitant feelings.

The feeling of rhythm is entirely dependent on the con-
ditions discussed in considering temporal ideas. The partial
feelings here are the feelings of strained and fulfilled expec-

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 183

tation, which in their regular alternation constitute the rhyth-
mical time ideas themselves. The way in which these partial
feelings are united, however, and especially the predominance
of special ones in the total feeling, is dependent even more
than is the momentary character of an intensive feeling, on
the relation in which the feeling present at a given instant
stands to the preceding feehngs. This is especially apparent
in the great influence that every alteration in rhythm exer-
cises on the accompanying feeling. For this reason as well
as hecause of their general dependence on a particular tem-
poral form of occurrence, the feelings of rhythm are direct
forms of transition to the emotions. To be sure, an emotion
may develop from any composite feeling, but in no other
case is the condition for the rise of a feeling, as here, at
the same time a necessary condition for the rise of a certain
degree of emotion. The emotion is, however, usually moder-
ated in this case, through the regular succession of feelings
(cf. § 13, 1, 7).

11. The immense variety of composite feelings and the
equally great variety of their conditions, render it impossible
to formulate any such comprehensive, and at the same time
unitary, psychological theory as that which was possible for
spacial and temporal ideas. Still, there are even here some
common attributes, through which composite feelings may
be brought under certain general psychological heads. There
are two factors which go to make up every feeling: first,
the relation of the combined partial feelings to one another,
and second, their synthesis into a unitary total feeling. The
first of these factors is more prominent in intensive, the
second in extensive feelings. In reality both factors are al-
ways united, and determine each other reciprocally. Thus,
a figure which is all the time agreeable, may be more and
more complex the more the relations of its parts accord with

184 -?^- Psychical Compounds.

certain rules, and the same holds for a rhythm. On the
other hand, the union into a single whole helps to emphasize
the separate affective components. In all these respects
combinations of feelings show the closest resemblance to in-
tensive ideas. The extensive arrangement of impressions,
on the contrary, especially the spacial arrangement, tends
much more to favor a relatively independent coexistence of
several ideas.

12. The close intensive union of all the components of
a feeling, even in the case of those feelings which corre-
spond to spacial or temporal ideas, is connected with a
principle that holds for all affective processes, including those
which we shall have to discuss later. This principle we can
call the principle of the unity of the affective state. It may
he formulated as follows: in a given moment only one
total feeling is possible, or in other words, all the partial
feelings present at a given moment unite, in every case, to
form a single total feeling. This principle is obviously con-
nected with the general relation between idea and feeling.
For the "idea" deals with an immediate content of ex-
perience and the properties that belong to it, without regard
to the subject; the "feeling" expresses the relation that in-
variably exists between this content and the subject.

12 a. Of all the different forms of elementary aesthetic feel-
ings mentioned, the feelings of tonal hannony and discord are
the most suitable for the purposes of psychological analysis,
because of the relatively obvious character of their sensation
basis. Furthermore, the interest in the study of the aesthetics
of music has existed for a long time and has served to bring
out a great variety of theoretical explanations of these feelings.
To be sure, these explanations have not infrequently paid too
little attention to the actually observable facts. They have often
substituted hypothetical and purely arbitrary assumptions for
observation. Such is the case when harmony is explained as

§ 12. Composite Feelings. 185

an unconscious recognition of regular number relations (Euler);
or when harmony is attributed to an unconscious effect of the
rhythm of sound vibrations (LiPPS) ; or finally, when harmony is
attributed to the effects of tonal fusion (Stumpf). Sometimes,
on the other hand, a single contributing factor is given undue
prominence, as when the disturbing effect of beats is the only
recognized factor in dissonance (Helmholtz). On the basis of
the facts pointed out in §§ 6 and 9 we may recognize the
following three conditions as those which probably have the
greatest significance for the feeling of harmony. The first con-
dition consists in the fact that there is a preference for simple
divisions of the tonal line, in keeping with the principle of
arithmetical division which holds for our tonal sensations. This
is illustrated in the case of the major cord where the ratios
are 4:5:6 (p. 58 sq., metrical principle). This preference ex-
plains the agreeableness of harmonious intervals when tones which
are entirely without overtones are sounded, either simultaneously
or in succession. The second condition consists in the coin-
cidence of the partial tones of the clang, which coincidence in-
creases in degree as the harmony increases. This phonic principle,
as we may call it, shows itself in the relation between tones
when the tones are successive, and when the tones are simulta-
neous it shows itself in the intensification of certain partial
tones (difference-tones or over-tones) which are characteristic of
the given intervals in any particular case. The third condition
consists in the fact that beats of the primary tones, or beats of
the over-tones and difference-tones, appear in the case of dis-
sonant intervals in compound clangs. (Principle of dissonant
beats).

Eeferences. On the Affective Results of Color Combinations:
Goethe, Farbenlehre. J. Cohn, Philos. Studien, vol. 10. On Feelings
of Optical Form: Fechner, Vorschule der Aesthetik (1876), vol. I,
and Abhandl, der sachs. Ges. der Wiss., vol. 14. Witmek, Philos.
Studien, vol. 9. Vischee, Das optische Formgefuhl, 1873. Hildebkand,
Das Problem der Form in der bildenden Kunst, 1893. Lipps, Raum-
asthetik und geometrisch-optische Tauschungen, 1897. On Clang
Harmonies: Helmholtz, The Sensations of Tone, sect. 19. v. Oettingen,
Harmoniesystem in dualer Entwicklung, 1866. Stumpf, Zeitsch. f.

186 II- Psychieal Compounds.

Psycla. u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorgane, vol. 15. Riemann, Elemente der
musikalischen Aesthetik, 1900. Lipps, Psychol. Studien, 1885. Wundt,
Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. 11, chap. 12.

§ 13. EMOTIONS.

1. Feelings, like all psychical phenomena, are never per-
manent states. In the psychological analysis of a composite
feehng, therefore, we must always think of a momentary af-
fective state as if it were held constant. This can be done
the more easily the more slowly and continuously the psy-
chical processes occur, so that the word feeling has come to
be used mainly for relatively slow processes and for those
which in their regular form of occurrence never pass beyond
a certain medium intensity, such as the feelings of rhythm.
Where, on the other hand^ a series of feelings succeeding
one another in time unite into an interconnected process
which is distinguished from preceding and following processes
as an individual whole, and which has in general a more
intense effect on the subject than a single feeling, we call
such a succession of feelings an emotion.

This very name indicates that it is not any specific sub-
jective contents of experience which distinguish emotion from
feeling, but rather the arousing effect which comes from a
special combination of particular affective contents. In this
way it comes that there is no sharp line of demarcation
between feeling and emotion. Every feehng of greater in-
tensity passes into an emotion. The separation of the feel-
ings within an emotion from one another is always a more
or less arbitrary sundering of complete relations. In the
case of feelings which have a certain particular form of oc-
currence, that is in feelings of rhythm^ such a breaking up
of the emotions is entirely impossible. The feeling of rhythm

§ 13. Emotions. 187

is distinguished from an emotion only by the small inten-
sity of its moving effect on the subject^ which is what gives
"emotion" its name. And even this distinction is by no means
fixed, for when the feelings produced by rhythmical impres-
sions become somewhat more intense, as is usually the case,
especially when the rhythm is connected with sensational
contents that arouse the feehngs greatly, the feelings of
rhythm become in fact emotions. Rhythms are for this
reason the important means both in music and poetry of
portraying emotions and arousing them in the auditor.

2. The names of different emotions, like those of feelings,
do not indicate single processes, but classes in which a large
number of single affective processes are grouped because of
certain common characteristics. Emotions such as joy, hope,
anxiety, care, and anger, are accompanied in every case by
new ideational contents; their affective elements also, and
even the way in which the emotions themselves occur, may
vary greatly. The more composite a psychical process, the
more variable will be its single concrete manifestations; a
particular emotion will, therefore, be less apt to occur in
exactly the same form than will a particular feeling. Every
general name for emotions indicates^ accordingly, certain
typical forms in which related affective processes occur,

3. Not every interconnected series of affective processes
is called an emotion or is to be classed as such under one
of the typical forms discriminated by language. An emotion
is a unitary whole which is distinguished from a composite
feeling through two characteristics. First, an emotion has a
definite temporal course and secondly, it exercises a more
intense present and subsequent effect on the interconnection
of psychical processes. The first characteristic arises from
the fact that an emotion is a process of a higher order as
compared with a single feehng, for it always includes a

188 II- Psychical Compounds.

succession of several feelings. The second characteristic
depends on the intensification of the effect produced by the
summation of the feehngs.

As a result of these characteristics, emotions have in the
midst of all their variations in form a regularity in the
manner of their occurrence. They always begin with a more
or less intense inceptive feeling which in its quality and
direction is immediately characteristic of the nature of the
emotions. This inceptive feehng is due either to an idea
produced by an external impression (outer emotional stimu-
lation) or to a psychical process arising from associative or
apperceptive conditions (inner stimulation). Following this
inceptive feeling, comes an ideational process accompanied
by its corresponding feehngs. This process shows in cases
of particular emotions, characteristic differences both in the
quahty of its feehngs and in its rapidity. Finally, the emotion
closes with a terminal feeling which continues even after the
emotion has given place to a quiet affective state. In this
terminal feeling the emotion gradually fades away, unless it
passes directly into the inceptive feeling of a new emotion.
This last mentioned transition sometimes occurs, especially
in feelings of the intermittent type (inf. 13).

4. The intensification of the effect which may be observed
in the course of an emotion, appears not merely in the psy-
chical contents of the feelings that compose it, but in the
physical concomitants as well. For single feelings these
accompanying phenomena are usually limited to slight changes
in the innervation of the heart and respiratory organs, which
can be demonstrated only by using exact graphic methods
(p. 96 sq.). It is only in relatively rare cases that there
are added to these minor forms of reaction, mimetic move-
ments of even moderate extent and intensity. "With emotions
the case is essentially different. As a result of the summa-

§ 13. Emotions. 189

tion and alternation of successive affective stimuli there is
in emotions not only an intensification of the effect on hearty
blood-vessels, and respiration, but the external muscles are
always affected in an unmistakable manner. Strong move-
ments of the mimetic muscles appear at first, then movements
of the arms and of the whole body (pantomimetic movements).
In the case of stronger emotions there may be still more
extensive disturbances of innervation, such as trembling,
convulsive contractions of the diaphragm and of the facial
muscles, and paralytic relaxation of the muscles.

Because of their symptomatical significance for the emo-
tions, all these movements are called expressive movements.
As a rule they are entirely involuntary, being either reflexes
following emotional excitations, or else impulsive acts prompted
by the affective components of the emotion. They may be
modified, however, in the most various ways through volun-
tary intensification or inhibition of the movements or even
through intentional production of the same, so that the whole
series of external reactions which we shall have to discuss
under volitional acts, may enter into these expressive move-
ments (§ 14).

5. According to their symptomatical character, expressive
movements may be divided into three classes. 1) Purely
intensive symptoms; these are always expressive movements
for more intense emotions, and consist of strong movements
for emotions of middle intensity, and of sudden inhibitions
and paralysis of movement for violent emotions. 2) Quali-
tative expressions of feelings] these are mimetic movements,
the most important of which are the reactions of the oral
muscles, resembling the reflexes following sweet, sour, and
bitter impressions of taste. The reaction for sweet corresponds
to pleasurable emotions, the reactions for sour and bitter,
to unpleasurable emotions, while the other modifications of

190 II- Psychical Compounds.

feeling, such as excitement and depression, strain and relief,
are expressed by a tension of the muscles. 3) Expressions
of ideas'^ these are generally pantomimetic movements that
either point to the object of the emotion (indicative gestures)
or else describe the objects as well as the processes con-
nected with them by the form of the movement (represen-
tative gestures). These three classes of expressive movements
correspond exactly to the psychical elements of emotions : the
first class corresponds to the intensity of the psychical ele-
ments, the second to the quality of the feelings, and the
third to the ideational content. A concrete expressive move-
ment may unite all three forms in itself. The third class,
that of expressions of ideas^ is of special psychological sig-
nificance because of its genetic relations to speech (cf.
§ 21, 3).

6. The changes in pulse and respiration that accompany
emotions are of three kinds. 1) They may consist of the
immediate effects of the feelings which make up the emotions,
as, for example, a lengthening of the pulse curve and respira-
tion curve when the feelings are pleasurable, and a shorten-
ing of the same for unpleasurable feelings (cf. sup. p. 96).
This holds only for relatively quiet emotions, where the single
feelings have sufficient time to develop. When sufficient
time is not given, other phenomena appear which depend,
not merely on the quality of the feehngs, but also, and that
mainly, on the intensity of the innervations, due to the sum-
mation of these innervations. 2) Such summations may consist
of intensified innervation. This arises from an increase in
the excitation which in turn results from an adding together
of the separate effects when the succession of feelings is not
too rapid. This increase shows itself in retarded and strength-
ened pulse-beats, since the more intense excitation affects
most the inhibitory nerves of the heart. Besides these there

§ 13. Emotions. 191

is usually an increased innervation of the mimetic and panto-
mimetic muscles. These are called sthenic emotions. 3) If
the feelings are very violent or last an unusually long time
in a single direction, the emotion brings about a more or
less complete paralysis of the innervation of the heart and
a reduction of the tension of the outer muscles. Under
certain circumstances disturbances in the innervation of special
groups of muscles appear, especially in the innervation of
the muscles of the diaphragm and the innervation of the
sympathetic facial muscles. The first symptom of the par-
alysis of the regulative cardiac nerves is a marked acceler-
ation of the pulse and a corresponding acceleration of the
respiration, accompanied by a weakening of the same, and a
relaxation of the tension of the external muscles to a degree
equal to that in paralysis. These are the asthenic emotions.
There is still another distinction, which is not important
enough, however, to lead to the formation of an independant
class of physical effects of emotions, since we have to do
here only with modifications of the phenomena characteristic
of sthenic and asthenic emotions. It is the distinction between
rapid and sluggish emotions, based upon the greater or less
rapidity with which the increase or inhibition of the inner-
vation appears.

7. Both in natural and in voluntarily aroused emotions
the physical concomitants have, besides their symptomatica!
significance, the important psychological attribute of being able
to intensify the emotion. This attribute is due to the fact
that the excitation or inhibition of certain particular groups
of muscles is accompanied by inner tactual sensations which
produce certain sense-feelings. These feelings unite with the
other affective contents of the emotion and increase the in-
tensity of the emotion. From the heart, respiratory organs^
and blood-vessels we have such feelings only in cases of

192 U. Psychical Compounds.

emotions, when the feelings may indeed be very intense.
On the other hand, even in moderate emotions the state of
greater or less tension of the mimetic and pantomimetic
muscles, exercises an influence on the affective state and
thereby on the emotion.

7a. Older psychology, because of its general tendency to
give an intellectualistic interpretation to psychical processes,
generally offered logical reflections about emotions, as a theory
of the emotions, or even as a full description of them. The
best illustration of this kind of a theory of the emotions is the
doctrine of Spinoza. In such theories the psychological treat-
ment was very largely influenced by ethical considerations. As
one result of such influence, we have the distinction between
emotions and passions^ the latter term being employed to des-
ignate those conditions in which certain particular impulses
through long continued feeling and emotions, gain the complete
ascendency over volition. Kant modified these definitions of
emotions and passions, in that he regarded the essential attribute
of emotions to be their sudden rise, while the essential attribute
of passions consisted for him in the fact that the tendencies of
feeling have settled into fixed habits. These modes of classi-
fication are all either of merely practical significance and belong
accordingly in the domain of characterology or ethics, or else
they are based upon characteristics which are essential only in
discussions of the intensity and course of emotions, and will,
accordingly, be dealt, with under these heads in a later para-
graph (12). From the psychological point of view, the passions
are in no essential respect different in nature from the emotions.
In contrast with this practical mode of treating the emotions,
there has arisen a tendency in recent times to give more and
more attention to the expressive movements, and to the other
physiological accompaniments of the emotions which show them-
selves in the pulse and respiration and in the vaso-motor changes.
There begins to show itself thus, a recognition of the value of
these phenomena as aids to the study of the emotions, just as
there is a recognition of the innervation symptoms of feelings.
To be sure, the study of these outer phenomena can never take

§ 13. Emotions. 193

tlie place of immediate observation of the psychical processes
themselves ; it can serve at most to call attention to certain
of the attributes and relations of the psychical processes which
might perhaps be otherwise overlooked. Thus, for example, the
objective observation suggests very easily the fact that emotions
are intensified through the sensory feelings which are connected
with the expressive movements. But when Lange and James
make these concomitant phenomena the exclusive causes of the
emotions, when they describe the emotions as psychical processes
which can be aroused only through expressive movements, we
must reject their paradoxical view for the following three reasons.
First, the definite outer symptoms of emotions do not appear
until such time as the psychical nature of the emotion is al-
ready clearly established. The emotion, accordingly, precedes
the innervation effects which are looked upon by these investi-
gators as causes of the emotion. Secondly, it is absolutely
impossible to classify the rich variety of psychical emotional
states in the comparatively simple scheme of innervation changes.
The psychical processes are much more varied than are their
accompanying forms of expression. Thirdly, and finally, the
physical concomitants stand in no constant relation to the psy-
chical quality of the emotions. This holds especially for the
effects on pulse and respiration, but is true also for the pan-
tomimetic expressive movements. It may sometimes happen that
emotions with very different, even opposite kinds of affective
contents, may belong to the same class so far as the accompany-
ing physical phenomena are concerned. Thus, for example, joy
and anger may be in like manner sthenic emotions. Joy ac-
companied by surprise may, on the contrary, present the ap-
pearance, on its physical side of an asthenic emotion.

7 b. The general phenomena of innervation which give rise
to the distinction between sthenic and asthenic, and rapid and
sluggish emotions, do not show the character of the affective
contents of these emotions, but only the formal attributes of the
intensity and rapidity of the feelings. This is clearly proved by
the fact that differences in involuntary innervation analogous
to those which accompany the different emotions, may be pro-
duced by a mere succession of indifferent impressions, as, for
example, by the strokes of a metronome. It is observed in

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 13

194 II' Psychical Compounds.

such a case that especially the respiration tends to adapt itself
to the faster or slower rate of the strokes, becoming more rapid
when the rapidity of the metronome increases. Commonly, too,
certain phases of respiration coincide with particular strokes.
Furthermore, the hearing of such an indifferent rhythm is not
unattended by emotion. When the rate changes, we observe
at first a quiet, then a sthenic, and finally, when the rapidity
is greatest, an asthenic emotion. Still, the emotions in this
case have to a certain extent a mere formal character; they
exhibit a great indefiniteness in their contents. This indefinite-
ness disappears only when we think into them concrete emotions
of like formal attributes. This is very easy, and is the con-
dition of the great utility of rhythmical impressions for describ-
ing and producing emotions. All that is necessary to arouse
an emotion in all its fulness, is a mere hint of qualitative af-
fective content, such as it is possible to give in music through
the clangs of a musical composition.

7 c. The external expressive effects of emotions are, accord-
ingly, ambiguous symptoms and can, therefore, have^ when taken
by themselves, no psychological value. They may, however,
acquire such value when connected with introspection which has
been properly provided for in an experimental way. Indeed,
as checks for experimental introspection the expressive move-
ments have great value. The principle that observation is
wholly inadequate when applied to psychical processes which
present themselves in the natural course of life, holds especially
for the emotions. In the first place, emotions come to the
psychologist by chance, at moments when he is not in a con-
dition to subject them to scientific analysis; and secondly, in
the case of strong emotions the causes of which are real,
we are least of all able to observe ourselves with exactness.
Exact observation can be carried on much more successfully
when we voluntarily arouse in ourselves a particular emotional
state. In such a case, however, it is not possible to estimate
how nearly the subjectively aroused emotion agrees in intensity
and in mode of occurrence with one of like character due to ex-
ternal circumstances. For this reason the simultaneous investiga-
tion of the physical effects, especially of those effects most re-
moved from the influence of the will, namely, the effects on the

§ 13. Bniotions, 195

pulse and respiration, furnishes a check for introspection. For
when the psychological quality of emotions is alike, we may
infer from their like physical effects that their formal attributes
also agree. Indeed, the intensity of the expressive movement
furnishes a fairly reliable measure of the degree in which the
artificial emotion approximates the natural emotion.

References. Kant, Anthropologic, Bk. 3. Darwin, The Expres-
sion of the Emotions, 1872. Piderit, Mimik und Physiognomik, 2nd.
ed. 1866. Hughes, Die Mimik des Menschen, 1900. Lehmann, Die
korperlichen AeuCerungen psychischer Zustande, vol. 1, 1899. Mosso
(English trans, by Kiesow), On Fear. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie,
vol. I, pt. 1, chap. 1. James, Principles of Psychology, vol. II, chap. 25.
Wundt, Zur Lehre von den Gemiithsbewegungen, Philos. Studien,
vol. 6 (contains also a criticism of the various theories).

8. The great number of factors that must be taken into
consideration for the investigation of emotions renders a
psychological analysis of the single forms impossible. This
is all the more so because each of the numerous distin-
guishing names marks off a whole class^ within which there
is a great variety of special forms, including in turn an end-
less number of single cases of the most various modifications.
All we can do is to take a general survey of the fundamen-
tal forms of emotions. The general principles of division
here employed must be psychological^ that is, such as are
derived from the immediate attributes of the emotions them-
selves, for the accompanying physical phenomena have only
a symptomatica! value and are even then, as noted above,
frequently equivocal in character.

Three such psychological principles of classification may
be made the basis for the discrimination of emotions: 1) emo-
tions may be grouped according to the quality of the feelings
entering into the emotions, 2) according to the intensity of
these feelings, 3) according to the form of occurrence., this
form being conditioned by the character and rate of the
affective changes.

13*

196 ^^- Psychical Compounds.

9. On the basis of quality of feelings we may distinguish
certain fundamental emotional forms corresponding to the
chief affective dimensions distinguished above (p. 92). This
gives us pleasurable and unpleasurable emotions, exciting
and depressing emotions, straining and relaxing emotions.
It must be noted, however, that because of their more com-
posite character the emotions are always, even more than
the feelings, mixed forms. Generally only a single affective
tendency can be called primary for a particular emotion.
There are affective elements belonging to other dimensions
which enter in as secondary elements. The secondary char-
acter of such elements usually appears in the fact that
under different conditions various sub-forms of the primary
emotion may arise. Thus, for example, joy is primarily a
pleasurable emotion. Ordinarily it is also exciting, since it
intensifies the feelings, but when the feelings are too strong,
it becomes a depressing emotion. Sorrow is an unpleasur-
able emotion, generally of a depressing character; when the
intensity of the feelings becomes somewhat greater, however,
it may become exciting, and when the intensity becomes
maximal, it passes again into depression. Anger is much
more emphatically exciting and unpleasant in its predominant
characteristics, but when the intensity of the feeHngs be-
comes greater, as when it develops into rage, it becomes
depressing. Thus, exciting and depressing tendencies are
always mere secondary qualities connected with pleasurable
and unpleasurable emotions. Feelings of strain and relaxa-
tion, on the contrary, may more frequently be the primary
components of emotions. Thus, in expectation, the feeling
of strain peculiar to this state is the primary element of the
emotion. When the feeling develops into an emotion, it
may easily be associated with unpleasurable feelings which
are, according to circumstances, either exciting or depressing.

§ 13. Emotions. 197

In the case of rhythmical impressions or movements there
arise from the alternation of feelings of strain with those
of relaxation, pleasurable emotions which may be at the
same time either exciting or depressing, according to the
character of the rhythm. When they are depressing there
may be unpleasurable feelings intermingled with them, or
the feehngs may all become unpleasurable, especially when
other affective elements cooperate, as for example in feelings
of clang or harmony.

10. Language has paid the most attention in its devel-
opment of names for emotions to the qualitative side of
feelings, and among these qualities particularly to pleasurable
and unpleasurable forms. These names may be divided into
three classes. First we have names of emotions that are sub-
jectively distinguished, chiefly through the nature of the affec-
tive state itself. Such are joy and sorrow and, as subforms
of sorrow in which either depressing, straining, or relaxing
tendencies of the feeling are also exhibited, sadness, care,
grief, and fright. Secondly, there are names of objective
emotions referring to some external object, such as delight
and displeasure and, as subforms of the latter in which,
various tendencies unite, annoyance, resentment, anger, and
rage. Thirdly, we have names of objective emotions that
refer rather to outer events not expected until the future^
such as hope and fear and, as modifications of the latter,
worry and anxiety. They are combinations of feehngs of
strain with pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings and, in
different ways, with exciting and depressing tendencies as well.

Obviously language has produced a much greater variety
of names for unpleasurable emotions than for pleasurable.
This may be due either to an actual superiority in the number
of unpleasurable forms of emotion, or it may be due to the
fact that unpleasurable experiences attract a higher degree

198 II- Psychical Compounds.

of attention. Probably the full explanation involves both
factors.

11. On the basis of the intensity of the feelings, tv^o
classes of emotions, namely, the iveak and the strong may
be distinguished. These concepts, derived from the psychical
properties of the feelings, do not coincide with the concepts
of sthenic and asthenic emotions, based upon the physical
concomitants, for the relation of the psychological categories
to the psycho-physical, is dependent not only on the inten-
sity of the feelings, but on their quality as well. Thus,
weak and moderately strong pleasurable emotions are always
sthenic, while, on the contrary, unpleasurable emotions be-
come asthenic after a longer duration, even when they are
of a low degree of intensity, as, for example, care and
anxiety. Finally, the strongest emotions, such as fright,
worry, rage, and even excessive joy, are always asthenic.
The discrimination of the psychical intensity of emotions is
accordingly of subordinate significance, especially since emo-
tions that agree in all other respects, may not only have
different degrees of intensity at different times, but may on
the same occasion vary from moment to moment. Then too,
since this variation from moment to moment is essentially
determined by the sense-feelings that arise from the accom-
panying physical phenomena, in accordance with the prin-
ciple of the intensification of emotions discussed above (p. 191),
it is obvious that sthenic and asthenic character which is
due originally to certain physiological conditions, often has
a more decisive influence even on the psychological character
of the emotion than the primary psychical intensity itself.

12. The third distinguishing characteristic of emotions,
the form of occurrence^ is more important. Here we distinguish
three classes. First, there are sudden^ irruptive emotions,
such as surprise, astonishment, fright, disappointment, and rage.

§ 13. Emotions. 199

They all reach their maximum very rapidly and then gradually
sink to a quiet affective state. Secondly, we have gradually
arising emotions, such as anxiety, doubt, care, mournfulness,
expectation, and in many cases joy, anger, worry. These
rise to their maximum gradually and sink in the same way.
As a third form, and at the same time a modification of
the class just mentioned, we have intermittent emotions, in
which several periods of rise and fall follow one another
alternately. All emotions of long duration belong in this
last class. Thus, especially joy, anger, mournfulness, and
the most various forms of gradually arising emotions, come
in waves and often permit a distinction between periods of
increasing and those of decreasing emotional intensity. The
sudden, irruptive emotions, on the contrary, are seldom in-
termittent. They are intermittent only in cases in which
the emotion may belong also to the second class. Such
emotions of a very changeable form of occurrence are, for
example, joy and anger. They may sometimes be sudden
and irruptive. In such cases, to be sure, anger generally
becomes rage. Or such emotions may gradually rise and
fall; they are then generally of the intermittent type. In
their psycho-physical concomitants, the sudden irruptive emo-
tions are all asthenic, the gradually arising emotions may
by either sthenic or asthenic.

12 a. The form of occurrence, then, however characteristic
it may he in single cases, is just as little a fixed criterion for
the psychological classification of emotions as is the intensity of
the feelings. Obviously a psychological classification can be
based only on the quality of the affective contents, while in-
tensity and form of occurrence may furnish the means of sub-
division. The way in which these conditions are connected
with one another and with the accompanying physical phenomena
and through these with secondary sense -feelings, shows the
emotions to be most highly composite psychical compounds which

200 n. Psychical Compounds.

are therefore in single cases exceedingly variable. A classifica-
tion which is in any degree exhaustive must, therefore, sub-
divide such varying emotions as joy, anger, fear, and anxiety
into their sub forms, according to their modes of occurrence, ac-
cording to the intensity of their component feelings, and finally
according to their physical concomitants, which physical con-
comitants are dependent on both the psychical factors mentioned.
Thus, for example, we may distinguish a strong, a weak, and
a variable form of anger, a sudden, a gradually arising, and
an intermittent form of its occurrence, and finally a sthenic,
asthenic, and a mixed form of its expressive movements. For
the psychological explanation, an account of the causal inter-
connection of the single forms in each particular case is much
more important than this mere classification. In giving such
an account, we have to deal in the case of every emotion with
two factors: first the quality and intensity of the component
feelings, and second, the rapidity of the succession of these
feelings. The first factor determines the general character of
the emotion, the second its intensity in part, and more especially
its form of occurrence, while both together determine its physical
accompaniments and the psycho-physical changes resulting from
the sense-feelings connected with these accompanying phenomena
(p. 189). It is for this very reason that the physical con-
comitants are as a rule to be called psycho-physical. The ex-
pressions "psychical" and "psycho-physical" should not, however,
be regarded as absolute opposites in such a case as this where
we have to do merely with symptoms of emotion. We speak
of psychical emotional phenomena when we mean those that do
not show any immediately perceptible physical symptoms, even
when such symptoms can be demonstrated with exact apparatus
(as, for example, changes in the pulse and in respiration). On
the other hand we speak of psycho-physical phenomena in those
cases which can be immediately recognized as two-sided.

References. Maass, Versuch iiber die Leidenschaften, 2pts., 1805.
(This is a comprehensive resume of the older psychology). Bain,
The Emotions and the Will, 3rd. ed, 1888. Ribot, Psychologic des
sentiments, 1896. Bourdon, L'expression des emotions et des ten-
dances dans le langage, 1892. Lehmann, Die Hauptgesetze des mensch-

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 201

lichen Gefuhlsleben, 1892. Wundt, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. II,
chap. 18, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 25
and 26.

§ 14. VOLITIONAL PEOOESSES.

1. Every emotion, made up, as it is, of a unified series
of interrelated affective processes, may terminate in one of
two ways. It may give place to the ordinary variable and
relatively unemotional course of feelings. Such affective proc-
esses that fade out without any special result, constitute the
emotions in the strict sense, such as were discussed in the
last paragraph. In a second class of cases the emotional
process may pass into a sudden change in ideational and
affective content, which brings the emotion to an instanta-
neous close; such changes in the sensational and affective
state which are prepared for by an emotion and bring about
its sudden end, are called volitional acts. The emotion to-
gether with its result is a volitional process.

A volitional process is thus related to an emotion as a
process of a higher stage, in the same way that an emotion
is related to a feeling. Volitional act is the name of only
one part of the process ^ that part which distinguishes a
volition from an emotion. The way for the development of
volitions out of emotions is prepared by those emotions in
connection with which external pantomimetic expressive move-
ments (p. 189) appear. These expressive movements appear
chiefly at the end of the process and generally hasten its
completion; this is especially true of anger, but to some ex-
tent also of joy, care, etc. Still, in these mere emotions
there is an entire absence of those changes in the train of
ideas, which changes are the immediate causes of the mo-
mentary transformation of the emotion into volitions, and
are also accompanied by characteristic feelings.

202 ^I' Psychical Compounds.

This close interconnection of volitional acts with panto-
mimetic expressive movements necessarily leads ns to con-
sider as the earliest stages of volitional development those
volitions v^hich end in certain bodily movements, which are
in turn due to the preceding train of ideas and feelings.
In other words, we come to look upon volition ending in
external volitional acts, as the earliest stages in the devel-
opment of volitions. The so-called internal volitional acts,
on the other hand, or those which close simply with effects
on ideas and feelings, appear in every case to be products
of later development.

2. A volitional process that passes into an external act
may be defined as an emotion which closes with a panto-
mimetic movement which has, in addition to the character-
istics belonging to all such movements and due to the quality
and intensity of the emotion, the special property of ;pro-
ducing an external effect which removes the emotions itself.
Such an effect is not possible for all emotions, but only for
those in which the very succession of component feelings
produces feelings and ideas which are able to remove the
preceding emotion. This is, of course, most commonly the
case when the final result of the emotion is the direct op-
posite of the preceding feelings. The fundamental psycho-
logical condition for volitional acts is, therefore, the contrast
between feelings^ and the origin of the first volitions is most
probably in all cases to be traced back to unpleasurable feel-
ings which arouse external movements, which in turn produce
contrasted pleasurable feelings. The seizing of food to re-
move hunger, the struggle against enemies to appease the
feeling of revenge, and other similar processes are original
vohtional processes of this kind. The emotions coming from
sense-feelings, and the most widespread social emotions such
as love, hate, anger, and revenge, are thus, both in men

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 203

and animals, the common origin of will. A volition is dis-
tinguished in such cases from an emotion only by the fact
that the former has added to its emotional components an
external act that gives rise to feelings which, through con-
trast with the feehngs contained in the emotion, bring the
emotion itself to an end. The execution of the vohtional
act may then lead directly, as was originally always the case,
or indirectly through an emotion of contrasted affective
content, into the ordinary quiet flow of feelings.

3. The richer the ideational and affective contents of
experience, the greater the variety of the emotions and the
wider the sphere of vohtions. There is no feeling or emo-
tion that does not in some way prepare for a volitional act,
or at least have some part in such a preparation. All feel-
ings, even those of a relatively indifferent character, contain
in some degree an effort towards or away from some end.
This effort may be very general and aimed merely at the
maintenance or removal of the present affective state. While
volition appears as the most complex form of affective proc-
ess, presupposing feehngs and emotions as its components,
still, we must not overlook, on the other hand, the fact that
single feehngs continually appear which do not unite to form
emotions, and emotions appear which do not end in voli-
tional acts. In the total interconnection of psychical proc-
esses, however, these three stages are conditions of one
another and form the related parts of a single process which
is complete only when it becomes a volition. In this sense
a feeling may be thought of as the beginning of a volition,
or a volition may be thought of as a composite affective
process, and an emotion may be regarded as an intermediate
stage between the two.

4. The single feelings in an emotion which closes with
a volitional act are usually far from being of equal impor-

204 U. Psychical Compounds.

tance. Certain ones among them, together with their re-
lated ideas, are prominent as those which are most important
in preparing for the act. Those combinations of ideas and
feehngs which in our subjective consciousness are the immediate
antecedents of the act, are called motives of volition. Every
motive may be divided into an ideational and an affective
component. The first we may call the moving reason., the
second the impelling feeling of action. When a beast of
prey seizes his victim, the moving reason is the sight of the
victim, the impelling feeling may be either the unpleasur-
able feeling of hunger or the race-hate aroused by the sight.
The reason for a criminal murder may be theft, removal of
an enemy, or some such idea, the impelling feeling the feel-
ing of want, hate, revenge, or envy.

When the emotions are of composite character, the reasons
and impelling feelings are mixed, often to so great an extent
that it would be difficult for the author of the act himself
to decide which was the leading motive. This is due to the
fact that the impelling feelings of a volitional act combine,
just as the elements of a composite feeling do, to form a
unitary whole in which all other impulses are subordinated
to a single predominating one; the feelings of like direction
strengthening and accelerating the effect, those of opposite
direction weakening it. In the combinations of ideas and feel-
ings which we call motives, the final weight of importance in
preparing for the act of will belongs to the feelings, that is, to
the impelling feelings rather than to the ideas. This follows
from the very fact that feelings are integral components of
the volitional process itself, while the ideas are of influence only
indirectly, through their connections with the feelings. The as-
sumption that a volition may arise from pure intellectual con-
siderations, or that a decision may appear which is opposed
to the inclinations expressed in the feelings, is a psychological

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 205

contradiction in itself. It rests upon the abstract concept
of a will whicli is transcendental and absolutely distinct from
actual psychical volitions.

The combination of a number of motives, that is, the
combination of a number of ideas and feelings which stand
out from the composite train of emotions to which they
belong as the ideas and feelings which determine the final
discharge of the act — this combination furnished the essential
condition for the development of tvill, and also for the dis-
crimination of the single forms of volitional action.

5. The simplest case of volition is that in which a single
feehng in an emotion of suitable constitution, together with
its accompanying idea, becomes a motive and brings the
process to a close through an appropriate external move-
ment. Such volitional processes determined by a single motive,
may be called simple volitions. The movements in which
they terminate are often designated impulsive acts. In
popular parlance, however, this definition of impulse by the
simplicity of the motive, is not sufficiently adhered to. An-
other element, namely, the character of the feehng that
acts as impelling force is, in popular thought, usually brought
into the definition. All acts that are determined by sense-
feelings., especially common feelings, are generally called im-
pulsive acts without regard to whether a single motive or a
plurality of motives is operative. This basis of discrimina-
tion is psychologically inappropriate and there is no justifica-
tion for the complete separation to which it naturally leads
between impulsive acts and volitional acts as specifically
distinct kinds of psychical processes.

By impulsive act, then, we mean a simple voKtional act,
that is, one resulting from a single motive, without refer-
ence to the relative position of this motive in the series of
affective and ideational processes. Impulsive action, thus

206 II- Psychical Compounds.

defined, must necessarily be the starting point for the de-
yelopment of all volitional acts, even though it may continue
to appear later, along with the complex volitional processes.
To be sure, the earliest impulsive acts are those v^hich come
from sense - feehng. Thus, most of the acts of animals are
impulsive, but such impulsive acts appear continually in the
case of man, partly as the results of simple sense emotions,
partly as the products of the habitual execution of certain
volitional acts which were originally determined by complex
motives (10).

6. When several feelings and ideas in the same emotion
tend to produce external action, and when those components
of an emotional train which have become motives tend at
the same time toward different external ends, whether related
or antagonistic, then there arises out of the simple act a
complex volitional process. In order to distinguish this from
a simple volitional act, or impulsive act, we call it a volun-
tary act.

Voluntary and impulsive acts have in common the char-
acteristic of proceeding from single motives, or from com-
plexes of motives that have fused together and operate as a
single unequivocal impulse. They differ in the fact that in
voluntary acts the decisive motive has risen to predominance
from among a number of simultaneous and antagonistic
motives. When a clearly perceptible strife between these
antagonistic motives precedes the act, we call the volition
by the particular name selective act^ and the process pre-
ceding it we call a clwice. The predominance of one motive
over other simultaneous motives can be understood only when
we presuppose such a strife in every case. But we perceive
this strife now clearly, now obscurely, and now not at all.
Only in the first case can we speak of a selective act in
the proper sense. The distinction between ordinary volun-

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 207

tary acts and selective acts is by no means hard and fast.
In ordinary voluntary acts the psychical state is, however,
more like that in impulsive acts, and the difference between
such impulsive acts and selective acts is clearly recognizable.

7. The psychical process immediately preceding the act,
in which process the final motive suddenly gains the as-
cendency, is called in the case of voluntary acts resolution^
in the case of selective acts decision. The first word in-
dicates merely that action is to be carried out in accordance
with some consciously adopted motive; the second implies
that several courses of action have been presented as pos-
sible and that a choice has finally been made.

In contrast to the first stages of a volition, which can
not be clearly distinguished from an ordinary emotional pro-
cess, the last stages of voHtion are absolutely characteristic.
They are especially marked by accompanying feelings that
never appear anywhere but in volitions, and must therefore
be regarded as the specific elements peculiar to volition.
These feelings are first of all feelings of resolution and feel-
ings of decision. Feelings of decision differ from feelings
of resolution only in the fact that the former are more in-
tense. They are both exciting and relaxing feelings, and
may be united under various circumstances with pleasurable
or unpleasurable factors. The relatively greater intensity
of the feeling of decision is probably due to its contrast
with the preceding feehng of doubt which attends the waver-
ing between different motives. The opposition between doubt
and decision gives the feeling of relaxation a greater intensity.
At the moment when the volitional act begins, the feelings
of resolution give place to the specific feeling of activity.^
which has its sensational substratum, in the case of external
volitional acts, in the sensations of tension accompanying the
movement. This feeling of activity is clearly exciting in its

208 II- Psychical Compounds.

character, and may, according to the special motives of the
volition, be accompanied now by pleasurable, now by un-
pleasurable elements, which may in turn vary in the course
of the act and alternate with one another. As a total feel-
ing, this feeling of activity is a rising and falling temporal
process extending through the whole act and finally passing
into the most various feelings, such as those of fulfilment,
satisfaction, or disappointment, or into the feelings and emo-
tions connected with the special result of the act. Taking
the process as seen in voluntary and selective acts as com-
plete volitional acts, the essential reason for distinguishing
impulsive acts from complete volitional acts is to be found
in the absence of the antecedent feelings of resolution and
decision. The feeling connected with the motive passes in
the case of impulsive acts directly into the feeling of activ-
ity, and then into the feelings which correspond to the effect
of the act.

8. The transition from simple to complex volitional acts
brings with it a number of other changes which are of great
importance for the development of will. The first of these
changes is to be found in the fact that the emotions which
introduce volitions lose their intensity more and more, as a
result of the counteraction of different mutually inhibiting
feelings, so that finally a volitional act may result from an
apparently unemotional affective state. To be sure, emotion
is never entirely wanting; in order that the motive which
arises in an ordinary train of feelings may bring about a
resolution or decision, it must always be connected with
some degree of emotional excitement. The emotional ex-
citement can, however, be so weak and transient that we
overlook it. We do this the more easily the more we are
inclined to unite in the single idea of the volition both the
short emotion which merely attends the rise and action of

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 209

the motive, and the resolution and execution which con-
stitute the act itself. This weakening of the emotions results
mainly from the combinations of psychical processes which
we call intellectual development and of which we shall treat
more fully in the discussion of the interconnection of psy-
chical compounds (§ 17). Intellectual processes can, indeed,
never do away with emotions; such processes are, on the
contrary, in many cases the sources of new and character-
istic emotions. A volition entirely without emotion, deter-
mined by a purely intellectual motive, is, as already remarked
(p. 204), a psychological impossibility. Still, intellectual de-
velopment exercises beyond a doubt a moderating influence
on emotions. This is particularly true whenever intellectual
motives enter into the emotions which prepare the way for
volitional acts. This may be due partly to the counteraction
of the feelings which generally takes place, or it may be
due partly to the slow development of intellectual motives,
for emotions usually are the stronger, the more rapidly their
component feelings rise.

9. Connected with this moderation of the emotional com-
ponents of voHtions under the influence of intellectual motives,
is still another change. It consists in the fact that the act
which closes the volition is not an external movement. The
effect which removes the exciting emotion is itself a psychical
process which does not show itself directly through any ex-
ternal symptom whatever. Such an effect which is imper-
ceptible for objective observation is called an internal voli-
timial act The transition from external to internal voHtional
acts is so bound up with intellectual development that the
very character of the intellectual processes themselves is to
be explained to a great extent by the influence of voHtions
on the train of ideas (§ 15, 9). The act that closes the
volition in such a case is some change in the train of ideas,

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 14

210 ^-^- Psychical Compounds.

which change follows the preceding motives as the result of
some resolution or decision. The feelings that accompany
these acts of immediate preparation, and the feeHng of ac-
tivity connected with the change itself, agree entirely with
the feelings observed in the case of external volitional acts.
Furthermore, action is followed by more or less marked
feelings of satisfaction, of removal of preceding emotional
and affective strain. The only difference, accordingly, be-
tween these special volitions connected with the intellectual
development and the earlier forms of volition, is to be found
in the fact that here the final effect of the volition does not
show itself in an external bodily movement.

Still, we may have a bodily movement as the secondary
result of an internal volitional act, when the resolution refers
to an external act to be executed at some later time. In
such a case the act itself always results from a second, later
volition. The decisive motives for this second process come,
to be sure, from the preceding internal volition, but the two
are nevertheless distinct and different processes. Thus, for
example, the formation of a resolution to execute an act in
the future under certain expected conditions, is an internal
volition, while the later performance of the act is an ex-
ternal action different from the first, even though requiring
the first as a necessary antecedent. It is evident that where
an external volitional act arises from a decision after a conflict
among the motives, we have a transitional form in which
it is impossible to distinguish clearly between the two kinds
of volition, namely, that which consists in a single unitary
process and that which is made up of two processes, that
is, of an earlier and a later volition. In such a transitional
form, if the decision is at all separated in time from the
act itself, the decision may be regarded as an internal voli-
tional act preparatory to the execution.

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 211

10. These two changes which take place during the de-
velopment of will, namely, the moderation of emotions and
the rendering independent of internal volitions, are changes
of a progressive order. In contrast with these there is a
third process which is one of retrogradation. When complex
volitions with the same motive are often repeated, the conflict
between the motives grows less intense; the opposing motives
that were overcome in earlier cases grow weaker and finally
disappear entirely. The complex act has then passed into
a simple, or impulsive act This retrogradation of complex
voHtional processes shows clearly the utter inappropriateness
of the limitation of the concept "impulsive" to acts of will
arising from sense-feelings. As a result of the gradual ehm-
ination of opposing motives, there are intellectual, moral,
and aesthetic, as well as simple sensuous, impulsive acts.

This regressive development is but one step in a process
which unites all the external acts of living being, whether they
are volitional acts automatic reflex movements. When or
the habituating practice of certain acts is carried further,
the determining motives finally become, even in impulsive
acts, weaker and more transient. The external stimulus
originally aroused a strongly affective idea which operated as
a motive, but now the stimulus causes the discharge of the
act before it can arouse an idea. In this way the impulsive
movement finally becomes an automatic movement. The more
often this automatic movement is repeated, the easier it, in
turn, becomes, even when the stimulus is not sensed, as, for
example, in deep sleep or during complete diversion of the
attention. The movement now appears as a pure physio-
logical reflex, and the volitional process has become a simple
reflex process.

This gradual reduction of volitio7ial to mechanical proc-
esses., which depends essentially on the elimination of all

14*

212 II' Psychical Compounds.

the psychical elements between the beginning and end of
the act, may take place either in the case of movements
that were originally impulsive, or in the case of movements
which have become impulsive through the retrogradation of
voluntary acts. It is not improbable that all the reflex move-
ments of both animals and men originate in this way. As
evidence or this we have, besides the above described re-
duction of volitional acts through practice to pure mechanical
processes, also the purposeful character of reflexes, which
points to the presence at some time of purposive ideas as
motives. Furthermore, the fact that the movements of the
lowest animals are all evidently simple volitional acts, not
reflexes, tells for the same view, so that here too there is
no justification for the assumption frequently made that acts
of will have been developed from reflex movements. Finally,
we can most easily explain from this point of view the fact
mentioned in § 13 (p. 189), namely, that expressive movements
may belong to any one of the forms possible in the scale
of external acts. Obviously the simplest movements are im-
pulsive acts, while many complicated pantomimetic move-
ments probably came originally from voluntary acts which
passed first into impulsive and then into reflex movements.
Observed phenomena make it necessary to assume that the
retrogradations that begin in the individual life are gradu-
ally carried further through the transmission of acquired
dispositions, so that certain acts which were originally vol-
untary may appear from the first in later descendants as
impulsive or reflex movements (§ 19 and § 20).

10 a. For reasons similar to those given in the case of emo-
tions, the observation of volitional processes which come into ex-
perience by chance, is an inadequate and easily misleading
method for establishing the actual facts in the case. Wherever
internal or external volitional acts are performed in meeting

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 213

either the theoretical or practical demands of life, our interest
is too much taken up in the action itself to allow us at the
same time to observe with exactness the psychical processes that
are going on. In the theories of volition given by older psy-
chologists — theories that very often cast their shadows in the
science of to-day — we have a clear exhibition of the unde-
veloped state of the methods of psychological observation. Ex-
ternal acts of will are the only ones in the whole sphere of
volitional processes that force themselves emphatically on the
attention of the observer. As a result the tendency was to
limit the concept will to external volitional acts, and thus not
only to neglect entirely the whole sphere so important for the
higher development of will, namely, internal volitional acts, but
also to pay very little attention to the components of the voli-
tion which are antecedent to the external acts, or at most to
pay attention only to the more striking ideational components
of the motive. It followed that the close genetic interconnec-
tion between impulsive and voluntary acts was not observed,
and that the former were regarded as not belonging to will,
but as closely related to reflexes. "Will was thus limited to the
voluntary and selective actions. Furthermore, the one-sided
consideration of the ideational components of the motives led
to a complete neglect of the development of volitional acts
from emotions, and the singular idea found acceptance that
volitional acts are not the products of antecedent motives and
of psychical conditions which act upon these motives and bring
one of them into the ascendency, but that volition is a process
apart from the motives and independent of them, a product of
a metaphysical volitional faculty. This faculty was, on the
ground of the limitation of the concept volition to voluntary
acts, even defined as the choosing faculty of the mind, or as
the faculty for preferring one from among the various motives
that influence the mind. Thus, instead of deriving volition from
its antecedent psychical conditions, only the final result, namely,
the volitional act, was used to build up a general concept which
was called will, and this class-concept was treated in accordance
with the faculty-theory as a first cause from which all concrete
volitional acts arise.

It was only a modification of this abstract theory when

214 II- Psychical Compounds.

Schopenhauer and, following liim, many modern psychologists
and philosophers declared that volition in itself is an "uncon-
scious" occurrence which comes to consciousness only in its
result, the volitional act. In this case, obviously, the inade-
quate observation of the volitional process preceding the act,
has led to the assumption that no such process exists. Here,
again, the whole variety of concrete volitional processes is sup-
planted by the concept of a single unconscious will, and the
result for psychology is the same as before : in place of a com-
prehension of real psychical processes and their combination^
an abstract concept is set up and then erroneously looked upon
as a general cause.

Modern psychology and even experimental psychology is still
to a great extent under the control of this deep-rooted abstract
doctrine of will. In denying from the first the possibility of
explaining an act by the concrete psychical causality of the
antecedent volitional process, this theory leaves as the only
characteristic of an act of will the sum of the sensations which ac-
company the external act, or may, in cases where the act has
often been repeated, immediately precede the act as pale memory-
images. The physical excitations in the nervous system are
regarded as the causes of the act. Here, then, the question of
the causality is taken out of psychology and given over to
physiology instead of to metaphysics, as in the theory discussed
before. In reality, however, it is here too lost in metaphysics
in attempting to cross to physiology. For physiology must, as
an empirical science, abandon the attempt to give a complete
causal explanation of the physical processes accompanying a
complex volitional act, from the antecedents of these processes^
not only for the present, but for all time, because this leads
to the problem of an infinite succession. The only possible
basis for such a theory is, therefore, the principle of material-
istic metaphysics, that the so-called material processes are all
that make up the reality of things and that psychical processes
must accordingly be explained from material processes. But it
is an indispensable principle of psychology as an empirical
science, that it shall investigate the facts of^ psychical processes
as they are presented in immediate experience, and that it shall
not examine their interconnections from points of view which

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 215

are entirely foreign to the facts themselves (§ 1 and p. 18 sq.).
It is impossible to find out how a volition proceeds, in any-
way other than by following it exactly as it is presented to us
in immediate experience. In this experience, however, volition
is not presented as an abstract concept, but as concrete single
volitions. Of any particular volition, too, we know nothing
except what is immediately perceptible in the process. We can
know nothing of an unconscious or, what amounts to the same
thing for -psychology, a material process which is not imme-
diately perceived but merely assumed hypothetically on the basis
of metaphysical presuppositions. Such metaphysical assumptions
are obviously mere devices to cover up an incomplete or en-
tirely wanting psychological observation.

References. Review of the chief Theories of Volition : Volkmann,
Lehrbuch der Psychologic, vol. II, § 147 (Herbartian Intellectualism).
Baumann, Handbuch der Moral, 1879, and Philos. Monatshefte, vol. 17
(ordinary view). Munsterberg, Die Willenshandlung, 1888 (psycho-
physical materialism). In opposition to all these theories see Wundt,
Philos. Studien, vols. 1 and 6, and Lectures on Hum. and Animal
Psych., lectures 14 and 16.

11. The exact observation of volitional processes is, for
the reasons given above, impossible in the case of volitional
acts that come naturally in the course of life; the only way
in which a thorough psychological investigation can be made,
is, therefore, through experimental observation. To be sure,
we can not produce volitional processes of every kind when-
ever we wish to do so, but we must limit ourselves to the
observation of such processes as can be easily influenced
through external means, namely, such as begin with external
stimulations and terminate in external acts. The experiments
which serve this purpose are called reaction experiments.
They may be described in their essentials as follows. A
volitional process of simple or complex character is incited
by an external sense-stimulus and then after the occurrence of
certain psychical processes which serve in part as motives, the

216 II- Psychical Compounds.

volition is brought to an end by a motor reaction. Eeaction
experiments have a second and more general significance in
addition to their significance as means for the analysis of voli-
tional processes. They furnish means for the measurement of
the rate of certain psychical and psycho-physical processes.

The simplest reaction experiment that can be tried is as
follows. A short interval (2 — 3 sec.) after a signal that
serves to concentrate the attention, an external stimulus is
allowed to act on some sense-organ. At the moment when
the stimulus is perceived, a movement that has been de-
termined upon and prepared before, as, for example, a move-
ment of the hand, is executed. The psychological conditions
in this experiment correspond essentially to those of a simple
volition. The sense impression serves as a simple motive,
and this is to be followed invariably by a particular act.
If now we measure objectively by means of either graphic
or other chronometric apparatus, the interval that elapses
between the action of the stimulus and the execution of the
movement, it will be possible, by frequently repeated ex-
periments of the same kind, to become thoroughly acquainted
with the subjective processes that make up the whole reac-
tion, while at the same time the results of the objective
measurement will furnish a check for the constancy or pos-
sible variations in these subjective processes. This check is
especially useful in those cases where some condition in the
experiment, and thereby the subjective course of the volition
itself, is intentionally modified.

12. Such a modification may, indeed, be introduced even
in the simple form of the experiment just described, by vary-
ing the way in which the reactor prepares^ before the ap-
pearance of the stimulus, for the execution of the act.
When the preparation is of such a character that expecta-
tion is directed toward the stimulus which is to serve as a

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 217

motive, and the external act does not take place until the
stimulus is clearly recognized, there results a complete form
of reaction, or the form known as sensorial reaction. When,
on the other hand, the preparatory expectation is so directed
toward the motive which is to arouse the act, that the move-
ment follows the reception of the stimulus as rapidly as
possible, there results a shortened form of reaction, or the
so-called muscular reaction. In the first case the ideational
factor of the expectation is a pale memory image of the
familiar sense impression. When the period of preparation
is more extended, this image oscillates between alternating
clearness and obscurity. The affective element is a feeling
of expectation that oscillates in a similar manner and is
connected with sensations of strain from tho sense-organ to
be affected, as, for example, with tension of the tympanic
membrane, or of the ocular muscles of accommodation and
movement. At the moment when the impression arrives the
preparatory feelings mentioned are followed by a compara-
tively weak relieving feeling of surprise. This surprise in
turn gives place to a clearly subsequent arousing feeling
of activity which accompanies the reaction movement and
appears in conjunction with the inner tactual sensations. In
the second case^ on the other hand, where the reaction is of
the shortened form, we may observe during the period of
preparatory expectation a pale, wavering memory image of
the motor organ which is to react {e. g.., the hand) together
with strong sensations of strain in the same, and a fairly
continuous feeling of expectation connected with these sen-
sations. At the moment when the stimulus arrives the state
of expectation gives place to a strong feeling of surprise.
There connects itself, then, with this surprise both the
feeling of activity which accompanies the reaction and also
the sensations that arise in the reaction. So rapid is this

218 II- Psychical Compounds.

connection that the surprise and the subsequent state are
not distinguished at all, or at most only very vaguely.
Complete reaction-time is on the average 0.210 — 0.290 sec.
(the shortest time is for sound, the longest for light), with
a mean variation of 0.020 sec. for the single observations.
Shortened reaction-time is 0.120 — 0.190 sec, with a mean
variation of 0.010 sec. The different values of the mean
variation in the two cases are chiefly important as objective
checks for the discrimination of these forms of reaction i).

13. By introducing special conditions we may make
complete and shortened reactions the starting points for the
study of the development of volitions in two different direc-
tions. Complete (sensorial) reactions furnish the means of
passing from simple to complex voKtions because we can in
this case easily insert different psychical processes between
the perception of the impression and the execution of the
reaction. Thus we have a voluntary act of relatively simple
character when we allow an act of cognition or discrimina-
tion to follow the perception of the impression and then let

Ij Complete and shortened forms of reaction are further dis-
tinguished by the characteristic fact that in long series of these
two classes of reactions no early reactions or mistaken reactions ap-
pear among the complete reactions, while they are very frequent
among the shortened reactions. Both early reactions and mistaken
reactions may be observed when the true stimulus is, in frequently
repeated experiments, preceded at a uniform interval by a prepara-
tory signal. An early reaction is one in which the reactor moves his
hand before the arrival of the signal agreed upon. A mistaken reac-
tion is one in which the reactor moves in response to some acci-
dental sensory stimulus. The reaction-times for sensations of taste,
smell, temperature, and pain are not reckoned in the figures given.
They are all longer. The differences are, however, obviously to be
attributed to purely physiological conditions (slow transmission of the
stimulation to the nerve-endings, and in the case of pain slower
central conduction), so that they are of no very great interest for
psychology.

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 219

the movement depend on this second process. In this case,
not the immediate impression, but the idea that results from
the act of cognition or discrimination is the motive for the
act to be performed. This motive is only one of a greater
or smaller number of equally possible motives that could
have come up in place of it ; as a result the reaction move-
ment takes on the character of a voluntary act. In fact, we
may observe clearly the feeling of resolution antecedent to the
act and also the feeHngs preceding the feehng of resolution
and connected with the perception of the impression. This is
still more emphatically the case, and the succession of idea-
tional and affective processes is at the same time more com-
plicated, when we bring in still another psychical process, as,
for example, an association, to serve as the motive for the
execution of the movement. Finally, the voluntary process
becomes one of choice when, in such experiments, the act is
not merely influenced by a plurality of motives in such a
way that several must follow one another before one de-
termines the act, but when, in addition to that, one of a
number of possible different acts is decided upon according
to the motive presented. This takes place when preparations
are made for different movements, for example, one with the
right hand, another with the left hand, or one with each of
the ten fingers, and the condition is prescribed for each move-
ment that an impression of a particular quahty shall serve
as its motive, for example, the impression blue for the right
hand, red for the left.

14. Shortened (muscular) reactions, on the contrary, may
be used to investigate the retrogradation of volitional acts as
they become reflex movements. In this form of reaction the
preparatory expectation is directed entirely towards the ex-
ternal act which is to be executed as rapidly as possible,
so that voluntary inhibition or execution of the act in ac-

220 ^I' Psychical Compounds.

cordance with the special character of the impression can
here not take place. In other words, a transition from
simple to complex acts of will, is in this case impossible.
On the other hand, it is easy by practice so to habituate
one's self to the invariable connection of an impression and
a particular movement, that the process of perception fades
out more and more or takes place after the motor impulse,
so that finally the movement becomes just like a reflex move-
ment. This reduction of volition to a mechanical process,
shows itself objectively most clearly in the shortening of the
objective time to that observed for pure reflexes, and shows
itself subjectively in the fact that for psychological obser-
vation there is a complete coincidence in point of time, of
impression and reaction, while the characteristic feehng of
resolution gradually disappears entirely.

14 a. The chronometric experiments familiar in experimental
psychology under the name of "reaction experiments", are im-
portant for two reasons: first, as aids in the analysis of voli-
tional processes, and secondly, as means for the investigation of
the temporal course of psychical processes in general. This
twofold importance of reaction experiments reflects the central
importance of volitions. On the one hand, the simpler proc-
esses, feelings, emotions, and their related ideas, are com-
ponents of a complete volition ; on the other, all possible forms
of the interconnection of psychical compounds may appear as
components of a volition. Volitional processes are, consequently,
appropriate subjects to form the links between what has gone
before and the topic to be discussed in the next chapter, namely,
the interconnection between psychical compounds.

For a "reaction experiment" which is to be the basis of an
analysis of a volitional process or any of its component psychical
processes, we must have first of all exact and sufficiently fine
(reading with exactness to ^-qVf ^®^-) chronometric apparatus
(electric clock or graphic register). The apparatus must be so
arranged that we ca^ determine exactly the moment at which

§ 14. Volitional Processes. 221

the stimulus acts and that at which the subject reacts. This
can be accomplished by allowing the stimulus itself (sound, light,
or tactual stimulus), to close an electric current that sets an
electric clock, reading to j-^jj sec, in motion, and then allow-
ing the observer, by means of a simple movement of the hand
which raises a telegraph-key, to break the current again at the
moment at which he perceives the stimulus. In this way we
may measure simple reactions varied in different ways (complete
and shortened reactions, reactions with or without preceding
signals), or we may bring into the process various other psy-
chical acts (discriminations, cognitions, associations, selective
processes) which may be regarded either as motives for the voli-
tion or as components of the general interconnection of psychical
compounds. A simple reaction always includes, along with the
volitional process, purely physiological factors (conduction of the
sensory excitation to the brain and of the motor excitation to
the muscle). If, now, we insert further psychical processes (dis-
criminations, cognitions, associations, acts of choice), a modifica-
tion which can be made only when complete reactions are em-
ployed, the duration of clearly definable psychical processes may
be gained by subtracting the interval found for simple reactions
from those found for the compound reactions. In this way it
has been determined that the time required for the cognition
and for the discrimination of relatively simple impressions (colors,
letters, short words) is 0.03—0.05 sec. ; the time of association
is 0.3 — 0.8 sec. The time for choice between two movements
(right and left hand) is 0.06 sec, between ten movements (the
ten fingers) 0.4 sec, etc As already remarked the value of
these figures is not their absolute magnitude, but rather their
utility as checks for introspection. Furthermore, we may at
the same time apply this introspective observation to processes
subject to conditions which are prescribed with exactness by
means of experimental methods and which may therefore be
repeated at pleasure. One must not lose sight of the fact that
as the reaction processes become more and more complex, the
figures given can be less and less definitely assigned to special
clearly differentiated psychical processes. Thus, a choice process
or an association process is composed of a great number of
elementary processes which in different individual cases are com-

222 I^- Psychical Compounds.

bined in different ways and appear in different degrees of com-
pleteness. The result is that the average time found by trying
a large number of experiments gives a certain relative measure
of the complexity of the processes, but no absolute indication
of the duration of any single definitely distinguishable psychical
phenomenon. In general it is to be noted that reaction ex-
periments are among the most difficult of investigation in ex-
perimental psychology, if they are to be conducted in such a
way as to have any value for psychology. They require the
greatest technical care, the collection and statistical treatment of
a large number of observations ; and they require also the
highest degree of practice in introspection. Unfortunately, these
conditions are not met in all cases. Sometimes far reaching
conclusions in regard to the nature of psychical processes are
based upon a few cursory observations. Or else the individual
differences in the reaction times of different reactors, as dis-
covered in a few experiments, which differences carry in them-
selves no evidence of being anything but chance variations, are
treated as "typical" differences. When the experiments are
carried out with proper care these individual differences (which
belong to the discussions of psychological characterology, dis-
appear more and more. As the individual differences disappear,
the influences of the variable conditions, such as differences in
preparation and in the direction of attention, become more
clearly apparent.

References. DONDERS, Archiv f. Anat. u. Physiol. 1868 (the first
attempt to work out the value of reaction experiments for psychol-
ogy). ExNER, Pfliiger's Archiv, wol. 7. Wundt, Philos. Studien, vol. 1
(on psychological methods). Merkel, same, vol. 2. Cattell, same,
vols. 3 and 4. L. Lange, same, vol. 4. Alechsieff, same, vol. 16.
Kraepelin, Ueber die Beeinflussung einfacher psychischer Vorgange
durch einige Arzneimittel, 1892. Wundt, Grundzuge der phys. Psych,
vol. II, chap. 16, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 18.
(Figures 49 and 60.)

III. INTERCONNECTION OF PSYCHICAL
COMPOUNDS.

§15. CONSCIOUSNESS AND ATTENTION.

1. Every psychical compound is composed of a number
of psychical elements which usually do not all begin or end
at exactly the same moment. As a result, the interconnec-
tion which unites the elements into a single whole always
reaches beyond the individual compounds, so that different
simultaneous and successive compounds are united, though
indeed somewhat more loosely than are the elements within
a single compound. We call this interconnection of psychical
compounds consciousness.

Consciousness, accordingly, does not mean something that
exists apart from psychical processes, nor does it refer merely
to the sum of these processes without reference to how they
are related to one another. It is the name for the general
synthesis of psychical processes, in which general synthesis
the single compounds are marked off as more intimate com-
binations. A state in which this interconnection is inter-
rupted, as deep sleep or a faint, is called an unconscious
state; and we speak of "disturbances of consciousness" when
abnormal changes in the combination of psychical compounds
arise, even though the compounds themselves show no internal
changes whatever.

224 m. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

2. Consciousness stands under the same external con-
ditions as psychical phenomena in general. Indeed, con-
sciousness is merely another name for these phenomena, re-
ferring more particularly to the mutual relations of the com-
ponents of these phenomena to one another. As the substratum
for the manifestations of an individual consciousness we have
in every case an individual animal organism. In the case
of men and similar higher animals the cerebral cortex, in
the cells and fibres of which all the organs that stand in
relation to psychical processes are represented, appears as
the immediate organ of this consciousness. The complete
interconnection of the cortical elements may be looked upon
as the physiological correlate of the interconnection of psy-
chical processes in consciousness, and the differentiation of
the functions of different cortical regions, as the physiological
correlate of the great variety of single conscious processes.
The differentiation of functions in the central organ is, in-
deed, merely relative; every psychical compound requires
the cooperation of numerous elements and many central
regions. When the destruction of certain cortical regions
produces definite disturbances in voluntary movements and
sensations, or when such a destruction interferes which the
formation of certain classes of ideas, it is perfectly justifiable
to conclude that these regions furnish certain indispensable
links in the chain of physical processes which run parallel
to the psychical processes in question. The assumptions often
made on the basis of these phenomena, that there is in the
brain a special organ for the faculties of speech and writing,
or that visual, tonal, and verbal ideas are stored in special
cortical cells, are not only the results of the grossest phy-
siological misconceptions, but they are irreconcilable with the
psychological analysis of these functions. Psychologically
regarded, these assumptions are nothing but modern revivals

j5? 15. Consciousness and Attention. 22b

of that most unfortunate form of faculty-psychology known
as phrenology.

2 a. The facts that have been discovered in regard to the
localization of certain psycho-physical functions in the cortex,
are derived partly from pathological and anatomical observations
on men, and partly from experiments on animals. They may
be summed up as follows : 1) Certain cortical regions correspond
to certain peripheral sensory and muscular regions. Thus, the
cortex of the occipital lobe is connected with the retina, a part
of the parietal lobe is connected with the tactual surface, and
a part of the temporal lobe with the auditory organ. The
central ganglia of special groups of muscles generally lie directly
next to, or between the sensory centres functionally related to
them. 2) Certain complex disturbances have been demonstrated
as occurring when certain cortical regions which are not directly
connected with peripheral organs, but are inserted between other
central regions, fail to carry out their functions. The only
relation of this kind which has been proved beyond a doubt,
is that of a certain region of the frontal lobe to the functions
of speech. The front part of this region is connected in par-
ticular with the articulation of words (its disturbance results
in interference with motor coordination, "ataxic aphasia"), the
part further back is connected with the formation of word ideas
(its disturbance hinders sensorial coordination and produces in
this way the so-called "amnesic aphasia"). It is also observed
that these functions are as a rule confined entirely to the left
frontal lobe and that generally apoplectic disturbances in the
right lobe do not interfere with speech, while those in the left
lobe do. Furthermore, in all these cases, in both simple and
complex disturbances, there is usually a gradual restoration of
the functions in the course of time. This is probably effected
by the vicarious functioning of some, generally a neighbouring,
cortical region in place of that which is disturbed (in disturb-
ances of speech, perhaps it is the opposite, before untrained,
side that comes into play). Localization of other complex psy-
chical functions, such as processes of memory and association,
has not yet been demonstrated with certainty. The name

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 15

226 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

"psychical centres", applied to certain cortical regions by many
anatomists, is for the present at least based exclusively either
on the very questionable interpretation of experiments on animals,
or else on the mere anatomical fact that no motor or sensory
fibres running directly to these regions can be found, and that
in general connective fibres are here developed relatively late.
The cortex of the frontal brain is such a region. In the human
brain it is noticeable for its large development. It has been
observed in many cases that disturbances of this part of the
brain soon result in marked inability to concentrate the atten-
tion or in other intellectual defects which are possibly reduce-
able to this; and from these observations the hypothesis has
been made that this region is to be regarded as the seat of the
function of apperception which will be discussed later (4), and
of all those components of psychical experience in which, as in
the feelings, the unitary interconnection of mental life finds its
expression (comp. p. 99). This hypothesis requires, however, a
firmer empirical foundation than it has at present. It is to be
noted that certain cases which differ from the first ones men-
tioned, in the fact that a partial injury of the frontal lobe is
sustained without any noticeable disturbance of intelligence, are
by no means proofs against this hypothesis. There is much
evidence to show that just here, in the higher centres, local
injuries may occur without any apparent results. This is probably
due to the great complexity of the connections and to the various
ways in which the different elements can, therefore, take the
places of one another. The expression "centre" in all these
cases is, of course, employed in the sense that is justified by
the general relation of psychical to physical functions, that is,
in the sense of a parallelism between the two classes of elementary
processes, the one regarded from the point of view of the natural
sciences, the other from that of psychology (comp. p. 2 and
§ 22, 9).

Eeferences. H. Munk, Ueber die Functionen der GroChirnrinde,
1891. Flechsig, Gehirn und Seele, 2nd. ed. 1896, and Neurol. Cen-
tralbl., No. 21, 1898. Wundt, Philos. Studien, vol. 6, and Grundziige
der phys. Psych., vol. I, chap. 5, and Lect. on Hum. and Anim. Psych.,
lecture 30. On the Speech Centre : Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I,
Pt. 1, chap. 5.

§ 15. Goiiseiousness and Attention. 227

3. The interconnection of psychical processes, which con-
stitutes what we understand under the concept consciousness,
is in part a simultaneous, in part a successive interconnection.
The sum of all the processes present at a given moment is
always a unitary whole whose parts are more or less closely
united. This is what constitutes the simultajieous intercon-
nection. On the other hand, a present state is derived directly
from that which immediately preceded it, in one of two ways.
Either certain processes disappear and others change their
course and still others arise, or else a state of unconscious-
ness intervenes and the new processes are brought into rela-
tion with those which were present befoxc. These are what
constitute successive interconnections. In all these cases the
scope of the single combinations between preceding and
following processes determines the state of consciousness.
Consciousness gives place to unconsciousness when this inter-
connection is completely interrupted, and it is more incomplete
the looser the connection between the processes of the moment
and those preceding it. Thus, after a period of unconscious-
ness the normal state of consciousness is generally only slowly
recovered through a gradual reestablishment of relations with
earlier experiences.

So we come to distinguish grades of consciousness. The
lower limit, or zero grade, is unconsciousness. This con-
dition, which consists in an absolute absence of all psychical
interconnections, is essentially different from the disappearance
of single psychical contents from consciousness. The latter
is continually taking place in the flow of mental processes.
Complex ideas and feelings and even single elements of these
compounds may disappear, and new ones take their places.
Any psychical element that has disappeared from conscious-
ness, is to be called unconscious in the sense that we assume
the possibility of its renewal, that is, its reappearance in the

15*

228 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

actual interconnection of psychical processes. Our know-
ledge about an element that has become unconscious does
not extend beyond this possibility of its renewal. For psy-
chology, therefore, it has no meaning except as a disposition
for the rise of future components of psychical processes,
which components are connected with earlier conscious proc-
esses. Assumptions as to the state of the "unconscious" or
as to "unconscious processes" of any kind which are thought
of as existing along with the conscious processes of experi-
ence, are entirely unproductive for psychology. There are,
of course, physical concomitants of the psychical dispositions
mentioned, of which some can be directly demonstrated,
some inferred from various experiences. These physical con-
comitants are the effects which practice produces on all organs,
especially on the organs of the nervous system. As a uni-
versal result of practice we observe a facilitation of action
which renders a repetition of the process easier. To be sure,
we do not know any details in regard to the changes that
are effected in the structure of the nervous elements through
practice, but we can represent them to ourselves through
very natural analogies with mechanical processes, such, for
example, as the reduction of friction resulting from the
rubbing of two surfaces against each other.

4. It was noted in the case of temporal ideas (p. 168),
that the member of a series of successive ideas which is im-
mediately present in our perception, has the most favorable
position. Similarly in the simultaneous interconnection of
consciousness, for example in a compound clang or in a
series of spacial objects, certain single components are favored
above the others. In both cases we designate the differences
in the perception as differences in clearness and distinctness.
Clearness is the relatively favorable recognition of the content in
itself, distinctness the sharp discrimination from other objects.

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 229

Distinctness is generally connected witli clearness. The state
which accompanies the clear grasp of any psychical content
and is characterized by a special feeling, we call attention.
The process through which any content is brought to clear
comprehension we call ajpperception. In contrast with this,
perception of content which is not accompanied by a state
of attention, we designate apprehension. Those contents of
consciousness upon which the attention is concentrated are
spoken of, after the analogy of the external optical experi-
ences of fixation, as being at the fixation-point of conscious-
ness^ or at the inner fixation-point. On the other hand,
the whole content of consciousness at any given moment is
called the field of consciousness. When a psychical process
passes into an unconscious state we speak of its sinking
below the threshold of consciousness and when a psychical
process arises we say it appears above the threshold of con-
sciousness. These are all figurative expressions and must
not be understood literally. They are useful, however, be-
cause of the brevity and clearness they permit in the de-
scription of conscious processes.

5. If we try to describe the train of psychical compounds
in their interconnection, with the aid of these expressions,
we may say that this train of compounds is made up of a
continual coming and going. At first some compound comes
into the field of consciousness and then advances into the
inner fixation-point, from which it returns to the field of
consciousness before disappearing entirely. Besides this train
of psychical compounds all of which are apperceived, there
is also a coming and going of other compounds which are
merely apprehended, that is, there are compounds which
enter the field of consciousness and pass out again without
reaching the inner fixation-point. Both the apperceived and
the apprehended compounds may have different grades of

230 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

clearness. In the case of apperceived compounds this appears
in the fact that the clearness and distinctness of apperception
in general is variable according to the state of consciousness.
To illustrate: it can easily be shown that when one and the
same impression is apperceived several times in succession,
if the other conditions remain the same, the successive ap-
perceptions are usually clearer and more distinct. The dif-
ferent degrees of clearness in the case of compounds that
are merely apprehended, may be observed most easily when
the impressions are composite. It is then found, especially
when the impressions last but an instant, that even here,
where all the components are obscure from the first, there
are still different gradations. Some seem to rise more above
the threshold of consciousness, some less.

6. These relations can not be determined with certainty
through chance introspections, they require systematic ex-
perimental observations. The best kinds of conscious contents
to use for such observations are ideas because they can be
easily produced at any time through external impressions.
Now, in any temporal idea, as already remarked (§ 11,
p. 168), those components which belong to the present moment
are in the fixation-point of consciousness. Those of the
preceding impressions which were present shortly before,
are still in the field of consciousness, while those which were
present longer before, have disappeared from consciousness
entirely. A spacial idea, on the other hand, when it has
only a limited extent, may be apperceived at once in its to-
tality. If it is more composite, then its parts too, must pass
successively through the inner fixation-point if they are to
be clearly perceived. It follows, therefore, that composite
spacial ideas (especially momentary visual impressions) are
peculiarly well suited to furnish a measure of the amount
of content that can be apperceived in a single act, or of the

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 231

scoi^e of aUeibtio)i\ while composite temporal ideas (for example,
rhythmical auditory impressions , hammer-strokes ) may be
used for measuring the amount of content that can enter
into consciousness at a given moment, or the scope of con-
sciousness. Experiments made in this way give, under dif-
ferent conditions, a scope of from 6 to 12 simple impres-
sions for attention and of 16 to 40 such impressions for
consciousness. The smaller figures hold for those impressions
which do not unite at all to form ideational combinations,
or at most unite very incompletely, while the larger figures
hold for those impressions in which the elements combine
as far as possible into composite compounds.

6 a. The most accurate way of determining the scope of atten-
tion is to use spacial impressions of sight, for in such cases it
is very easy, by means of an electric spark, or by means of
the fall of a screen made with an opening in the centre, by
means of a tachistoscope, to expose the objects for an instant
and in such a way that they all lie in the region of clearest
vision. In these experiments there must be a point for fixation
before the momentary illumination, in the middle of the surface
on which the impressions are to appear. Immediately after the
experiment, if it is properly arranged, the observer knows that
the number of objects which were clearly seen in a physiological
sense, is greater than the number included within the scope of
attention. When, for example, a momentary impression is made
up of letters, it is possible, by calling up a memory image of
the impression, to read afterwards some of the letters that were
only indistinctly recognized at the moment of illumination. This
memory image, however, is clearly distinguished in time from
the impression itself, so that the determination of the scope of
attention is not disturbed by it. It is true, rather, that careful
introspection easily succeeds in fixating the state of conscious-
ness at the moment the impression arrives, and in distinguish-
ing this from the subsequent acts of memory, which are always
separated from it by a noticeable interval. Experiments made
in this way show that the scope of attention is by no means

232 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds,

a constant magnitude, but that, even when the concentration
of the attention is approximately at its maximum, its scope
depends in part on the simplicity or complexity of the impres-
sions, in part on their familiarity. The simplest spacial im-
pressions are arbitrarily distributed points. Of these a maximum
of six can be apperceived at one time. AVhen the impressions
are somewhat more complex, but of a familiar character, such
as simple lines, figures and letters, six are, as a rule, perceived
simultaneously. The figures just given hold for vision; for
touch the same limits seem to hold only in the case of the
simplest impressions, namely, points. Six such simple impressions
can , under favorable conditions , be apperceived in the same
instant. This fact has been made use of in a practical way in
the blind alphabet made with points (p. 119). For both touch
and vision the number of familiar ideas that can be grasped
at once decreases as the complexity increases. In such cases,
however, it should be noted that the total number of elements
increases in spite of the decrease in the number of separate
total ideas. Thus, when nonsense syllables are used, from six
to ten letters can be apperceived at once. Familiar phrases and
proverbs may appear to be apperceived in a much more ex-
tensive way. Indeed, sometimes apperception seems to include
four or five short words with a total of twenty or thirty letters.
In these cases, however, the process of apperception is decidedly
complicated by the fact that assimilation (which will be discussed
in § 16) makes itself felt in a very marked degree. If assim-
ilation is checked by a closer concentration of the attention
upon the impression itself, the scope of attention is again re-
duced even for these familiar groups of words to about the same
limits as those which appear in the case of separate impressions.
Another group of conditions under which the scope of attention
seems to be much enlarged is the group of conditions presented
when impressions are given for a relatively longer period of
time, so that the attention finds opportunity to pass from point
to point, thus approximating the conditions which arise in or-
dinary reading. If, however, these complications of successive
observation, and the above mentioned complications of reproduc-
tive association, are all eliminated, the maximum scope of atten-
tion for both vision and touch seems to be expressed by the

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 233

figures given at first. The scope of attention includes from four
to six simple impressions. Under any conditions, then, the
assertion sometimes made that attention can be concentrated on
only one impression, or one idea at a time, is false.

Then too, the observations overthrow the assumption that
the attention can sweep continuously and with great rapidity
over a great number of single ideas. In the experiment described,
if the attempt is made to fill up from memory the image which
is clearly perceived an instant after the impression, a very
noticeable interval is required to bring into clear consciousness
an impression that was not apperceived at first. The successive
movement of attention over a number of objects appears ac-
cordingly, to be a periodic process, made up of a number of
separate acts of apperception following one another. Such a
periodic rise and fall of attention can, under favorable conditions,
be directly demonstrated. It is generally irregular in its periods,
but when there are special conditions favoring rhythmical suc-
cession the periods may become regular. Thus, if we allow a
weak continuous impression to act on a sense organ and remove
as far as possible all other stimuli, it will be observed when
the attention is concentrated upon this impression that at certain,
generally irregular, intervals, the impression becomes for a short
time indistinct, or even appears to fade out entirely, only to
appear again the next moment. This wavering begins, when
the impressions are very weak, after 3 — 6 seconds; when they
are somewhat stronger, after 18 — 24 seconds. These variations
are readily distinguished from changes in the intensity of the
stimulus itself, as may be easily demonstrated by purposely
weakening or interrupting the stimulus in the course of the
experiment. There are two characteristics that distinguish the
subjective variations from those due to the changes in the
stimulus. First, so long as the impression merely passes through
subjective variations there is always an idea of the continuance
of the impression, just as there was in the experiments with
momentary impressions an indefinite and obscure idea of the
components which were not apperceived. Secondly, the oscilla-
tions of attention are attended by characteristic feelings and
sensations which are added to the increasing and decreasing
clearness of the impressions, and which are entirely absent when

234 HI' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

the changes are objective. The characteristic feelings are those
of expectation and activity, which will be described later and
which regularly increase with the concentration of attention and
decrease with its relaxation. The sensations come from the
sense-organ affected, or at least emanate indirectly from it. They
consist in sensations of tension in the tympanic membrane or in
sensations of accommodation and convergence, etc. These two
series of characteristics distinguish the concepts, clearness and
distinctness of psychical contents from the concept intensity of
sensational elements. A strong impression may be obscure
and a weak one clear. The only relation between these two
different concepts is to be found in the fact that in general
the stronger impressions force themselves more upon appercep-
tion. "Whether or not they are really more clearly apperceived,
depends on the other conditions present at the moment. The
same is true of the advantages possessed by those parts of a
visual impression which fall within the region of clearest vision.
As a rule, the fixated objects are also the ones apperceived.
But, in the experiments with momentary impressions described
above, it can be shown that this interconnection may be broken
up. This happens when we voluntarily concentrate our atten-
tion on a point in the eccentric regions of the field of vision.
The object which is obscurely seen then becomes the one which
is clearly ideated.

6 b. In the same way that momentary spacial impressions
are used to determine the scope of attention, we may use im-
pressions which succeed one another in time, as a measure of
the scope of consciousness. In this case we start with the as-
sumption that a series of impressions can be united in a single
unitary idea only when they are all together in consciousness,
at least for one moment. If we listen to a series of hammer-
strokes, it is obvious that while the present sound is apperceived,
those immediately preceding it are still in the field of conscious-
ness. Their clearness diminishes, however, just in proportion
to their distance in time from the apperceived impression, and
those lying beyond a certain limit disappear from consciousness
entirely. If we can determine this limit, we shall have a
measure of the scope of consciousness under the special con^
dition given in the experiment. As a means for the determi-

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 235

nation of this limit we may use tlae ability to compare temporal
ideas which follow one another immediately. So long as such
a more or less complex idea is present in consciousness as a
single unitary whole, we can compare a succeeding idea with it
and decide whether the two are alike or not. On the other
hand, such a comparison is absolutely impossible when the pre-
ceding temporal series is not a unitary whole for consciousness,
that is, when a part of its constituents have passed into un-
consciousness before the end is reached. Thus, we may produce
in immediate succession two series of strokes by means of a
metronome, marking oif each series by a signal at its beginning
with a bell-stroke. "When now, these two series are perceived,
we can judge directly from the impression, so long as the strokes
of the given series can be grasped as single wholes in con-
sciousness, whether the two series are alike or not. Of course,
in such experiments counting of the strokes must be strictly
avoided. In making the judgments it may be noticed that the
impression of likeness is produced by the same affective elements
as in the temporal ideas mentioned before (p. 170). Every stroke
in the second series is preceded by a feeling of expectation cor-
responding to the analogous stroke of the first series, so that
every stroke too many or too few produces a feeling of dis-
appointment due to the disturbance of the expectation. It
follows that it is not necessary for the two successive series to
be present in consciousness at the same time in order that they
may be compared; but what is required is the union of all the
impressions of one series into a single unitary idea. The rela-
tively fixed boundary of the scope of consciousness is clearly
shown in the fact that the likeness of two temporal ideas is
always recognized with certainty so long as these ideas do not
pass the bound that holds for the conditions under which they
are given, while the judgment becomes absolutely uncertain when
this limit is once crossed. The extent of the scope of conscious-
ness as found in measurements made when the conditions of
attention remain the same, depends partly on the rate of the
successive impressions and partly on their more or less complete
rhythmical combination. When the rate of succession is slower
than about one every four seconds, it becomes impossible to
combine successive impressions into a temporal idea; by the time

236 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Compoimds.

a new impression arrives, the preceding one has ah'eady dis-
appeared from consciousness. When the rate passes the upper
limit of about one every 0.12 sec, the formation of distinctly
defined temporal ideas is impossible because the attention can
not follow the impressions any longer. The most favorable rate
is a succession of strokes, one every 0.2 — 0.3 sec. "With this
rate and with the simplest rhythm of ^/g time which generally
arises of itself when the perception is uninfluenced by any special
objective conditions, as a rule, 8 double or 16 single impres-
sions can be just grasped together. The best rhythm for the
perception in one group of the greatest possible number of
single impressions is the Y4-measure with the strong accent on
the first stroke and the medium accent on the fifth. In this
case a maximum of five feet or forty single impressions, can
be grasped at once. If these figures are compared with those
obtained when the scope of attention was measured (p. 231),
putting simple and compound temporal impressions equal to
the corresponding spacial impressions, we find that the scope of
consciousness is about four times as great as that' of attention.

References. On the Scope of Attention: Cattell, Philos. Studien,
vol. 3. Zeitler, Philos. Studien, vol. 16. On Fluctuation of Atten-
tion: N. Lange, Philos. Studien, vol. 4. Eckner, Pace, Philos. Studien,
vol. 8. On the scope of consciousness: Dietze, Philos. Studien, vol. 2.
WuNDT, Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. II, chap. 16, and Lect.
on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 16 and 17 (Fig. 41 Tachisto-
scope, Fig. 43 Measure of the scope of consciousness).

7. Besides the properties of clearness and distinctness
which belong to conscious contents in themselves or in their
mutual relations to one another, there are regularly other
properties which are immediately recognized as acco7npa7iying
processes. These are partly feelings which are characteristic
of particular forms of apprehension and apperception, partly
sensations of a somewhat variable character. Especially the
ways in which psychical contents enter the field of conscious-
ness^ and the way in which they enter the fixation-point of
consciousness, vary according to the different conditions under

j^ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 237

which the entrance takes place. When any psychical process
rises above the threshold of consciousness, it is the affective
elements which, as soon as they are strong enough, are what
first become noticeable. They begin to force themselves
energetically into the fixation-point of consciousness before
anything is perceived of the ideational elements. This is the
case whether the impressions are new or are revivals of earlier
processes. This is what causes those peculiar states of mind
the reasons for which we are usually unable to discover.
They are sometimes states of a pleasurable or unpleasurable
character, sometimes they are predominantly states of strained
expectation. In this latter case the sudden entrance into
the scope of the attention of the ideational elements belong-
ing to the feelings, is accompanied by feelings of relief or
satisfaction. When we are trying to recall something that
has been forgotten, this affective state may arise. Often
there is vividly present in such a case, besides the regular
feeling of strain, the special affective tone of the forgotten
idea, although the idea itself still remains in the background
of consciousness. In a similar manner, as we shall see later
(§ 16), the clear apperception of ideas in acts of cognition
and recognition is always preceded by special feelings. Sim-
ilar affective states may be produced experimentally by the
momentary illumination of a field of vision in which there
are in the region of indirect vision, impressions of the strongest
possible affective tone. All these experiences seem to show
that every content of consciousness has some influence on
attention. Every content thus shows itself partly through
its own proper affective tone, and partly through the feel-
ings connected with acts of attention. The whole effect
of these obscure contents of consciousness on the atten-
tion fuses, according to the general law of the synthesis
of affective components (p. 175), with the feelings attending

238 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

the clearly conscious contents, thus forming a single total
feeling.

8. When any psychical content enters the fixation-point
of consciousness, new and peculiar affective processes are
added to those that have been described. These new feelings
are in turn of different kinds, according to the different con-
ditions attending the entrance of the content into the fixa-
tion-point. The conditions are of two classes and are related
for the most part, to the above described preparatory affec-
tive influences of the content before it is apperceived.

First, the new content may force itself on the attention
suddenly and without preparatory affective influences; this
we call passive apperception. While the content of conscious-
ness is becoming clearer both in its ideational and affective
elements, there is first of all a concomitant feeling of passive
receptivity, which is a depressing feeling, and is generally
stronger the more intense the psychical process, and the
more rapid its rise. This feeling soon sinks and then gives
place to an antagonistic, exciting feeling of activity. There
are connected with both these feelings characteristic sen-
sations in the muscles of the sense-organ from which the
ideational components of the process proceed. The feeling
of receptivity is accompanied by a transient sensation of
relaxation, that of activity by a succeeding sensation of strain.

Secondly, the new content may be preceded by the ]3re-
paratory affective influences mentioned above (7), and as a
result the attention may be concentrated upon this content
even before it arrives; this we call active apperception. In
such a case the apperception of the content is preceded by
a feeling of expectation^ sometimes of longer, sometimes of
shorter duration. This feeling is generally one of strain and
may at the same time be one of excitement; it may also
have pleasurable or unpleasurable factors, according to its

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 239

ideational elements. This feeling of expectation is usually
accompanied by fairly intense sensations of tension in the
muscles of the sense-organ affected. At the moment in
which the content arises in clear consciousness, this feeling
gives place to a feeling of fulfillment which is generally very
short and has the character of a feeling of relief. Under
circumstances it may also be depressing or exciting, pleas-
urable or unpleasurable. After this feeling of fulfillment,
we have at once the feeling of activity. This is the same
feeling as that which appeared at the close of passive apper-
ception, and is here, as it was there, attended by an increase
in the feelings of strain.

8 a. The experimental observation of the different forms of
apperception can be carried out best with the aid of the reaction-
experiments described in § 14. Passive apperception may be
studied by the use of unexpected impressions, and active, by the
use of expected impressions. At the same time it will be ob-
served that between these typical differences there are intermediate
stages. Either the passive form will approach the active because
of the weakness of the first stage, or the active will approach
the passive form because in the sudden relaxation of the ex-
pectation the contrast between the expectation and the relief
and depression which come in the succeeding feeling of fulfill-
ment, is more marked than usual.

9. If the affective side of these processes of attention is
more closely examined, it appears that the affective elements
are exactly the same as in the case of all volitional processes.
It is also clear that in its essential character passive apper-
ception corresponds to an impulsive act while the active form
of apperception corresponds to a voluntary act. In the first
case the psychical content which forces itself upon attention
without preparation is evidently the single motive, and there-
fore arouses the act of apperception without any conflict

240 ni. Interconnection of Psychical Go^npounds.

with other motives. The act is here too connected with the
feeling of activity characteristic of all volitional acts. In
the case of active apperception, on the other hand, other
psychical contents with their affective elements tend to force
themselves upon the attention during the preparatory Mective
stages, so that the act of apperception when it finally is
performed is often recognized as a voluntary process. It
may even be recognized as a selective process when the
conflict between different contents comes clearly into con-
sciousness. The existence of such selective acts under the
circumstances mentioned was recognized even in older psy-
chology where "voluntary attention" was spoken of. But
here too, as in the case of external volitional acts, will was
made to stand alone; there was no explanation of it by its
antecedents, because the central point in the development,
namely, the fact that so-called involuntary attention is only
a simpler form of internal volition, was entirely overlooked.
Then, too, in accordance with the methods of the old faculty-
theory, "attention" and "will" were regarded as different,
sometimes as related forces, sometimes as mutually excluding
psychical forces, while the truth evidently is that these two
concepts refer to the same class of psychical processes.

10. In connection with these internal volitional acts which
we call processes of attention, there takes place the forma-
tion of certain concepts of the highest importance for all
psychical development. This is the formation of the concept
subject and the establishment of the correlate concept objects,
as independent realities standing over against the subject.
The full formation of these concepts can be carried out in
logical form only with the aid of scientific reflection, still
the concepts have their bases in the processes of attention.

Even in immediate experience there is a division between
components of this experience. On the one hand are those

§ 15. Conseiotisness and Attention. 241

components which are arranged in space with relation to
the point of orientation mentioned above (p. 144), and are
either called objects^ that is, something outside the perceiving
subject, or are called with reference to the mode of their
rise in consciousness, ideas ^ that is something which the
subject perceives. On the other hand, there are other com-
ponents of experience which do not belong to this spacial
order, though they are continually brought into relation with
it through their quality and intensity. These latter com-
ponents as we saw in § 12 — 14, are intimately interconnected.
Feelings are parts of emotions and emotions are to be con-
sidered as components of volitional processes. Any such
process may end before it is fully completed, as is often the
case when a feeling gives rise to no noticeable emotion, or
when an emotion fades out without really causing the voli-
tional act for which it prepared the way. All affective proc-
esses may, then, be subsumed under the general concept
volitional process. Volition is the complete process of which
the other two are merely components of simpler or more
complex character. From this point of view we can easily
understand how it is that even simple feelings contain, in
the extremes between which they vary, a volitional direction;
and that these same feelings express by their tendencies the
amount of volitional energy present at a given moment; and
finally, that they correspond to certain particular phases of
the volitional process itself. The direction of volition is ob-
viously indicated by the pleasurable or unpleasurable direc-
tions of feelings, which correspond directly to an effort to
reach something, or to an effort to avoid something. The
amount of volitional energy finds its expression in the arous-
ing and subduing directions of feelings, while the opposite
phases of a volitional process are related to the directions ;
of strain and relaxation. - iii'j(ii([o

WuNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit. 16

242 J^I- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

11. Thus, volition proves to be the fundamental fact from
which arise all those processes which are made up of feelings.
In the process of apperception^ which is found through psy-
chological analysis to have all the characteristics of a voli-
tional act, we have the direct relation between this funda-
mental fact of volition and the ideational contents of ex-
perience. Now, voHtional processes are recognized as being
unitary processes and as being uniform in character in the
midst of all the variations in their components. As a result
there arises an immediate feeling of this unitary intercon-
nection in connection with the feeling of activity which ac-
companies all volition. This feeling of unity is then carried
over to all conscious contents because of the relation men-
tioned in which these conscious contents stand to volition.
This feehng of the interconnection of all psychical experi-
ences of an individual, is called the "ego". It is a feeling,
not an idea as it is often called. Like all feelings, however,
it is connected with certain sensations and ideas. The idea-
tional components most closely related to the ego are the
common sensations and the idea of one's own body.

That part of the affective and ideational contents which
detaches itself from the totality of consciousness and fuses
with the feeling of the ego, is called self-consciousness. It
is no more a reality, apart from the processes of which it
is made up, than is consciousness in general. It is merely
a name for the interconnection of these processes, which
furthermore, especially in their ideational components, can
never be sharply distinguished from the rest of conscious-
ness. This shows itself most of all in the facts that the
idea of one's own body sometimes fuses with the feeling of
the ego, sometimes is distinct from this feeling as an idea of
an object, and that in general self-consciousness in its devel-
opment always tends to reduce itself to its affective basis.

§ 15. Consciousness and Attention. 243

12. This separation of self-consciousness from the other
contents of consciousness also gives rise to the discrimination
of subject and objects. The concept subject has, accordingly,
as a result of its psychological development three different
meanings of different scope, each of which may at different
times be the one employed. In its narrowest sense the subject
is the interconnection of volitional processes, which inter-
connection finds expression in the feeling of the ego. In
the next wider sense it includes the real content of these
volitional processes together with the feelings and emotions
that prepare their way. Finally, in its widest significance it
embraces the constant ideational substratum of these sub-
jective processes, that is, the body of the individual as the
seat of the common sensations. In the line of development
the widest significance is the oldest, and in actual psychical
experience the narrowest is continually giving way to a return
to one of the others, because the narrowest form can be
fully attained only through conceptual abstraction. This
highest form is, then, in reality merely a kind of limit to-
wards which self- consciousness may approach more or less
closely.

12a. This discrimination of subject and objects, or of the
ego and the outer world as it is commonly expressed by reducing
the first concept to its original affective substratum and gather-
ing the second together in a general concept — this discrim-
ination is the basis of all the considerations responsible for the
dualism which first gained currency in the popular view of things
and was then carried over into philosophical systems. It is on
this ground that psychology comes to be set over against the
other sciences, in particular the natural sciences, as a science of
the subject (§ 1, p. 4). Such a view could be correct only
under the conditions that the discrimination of the ego from the
outer world were a fact preceding all experience and that the
concepts subject and objects could be unequivocally distinguished

16*

244 JII' Intercomiection of Psychical Compounds.

once for all. But neither of these conditions is fulfilled. Self-
consciousness depends on a whole series of psychical processes
of which it is the product, not the producer. Subject and
object are, therefore, neither originally, nor in later develop-
ment, absolutely different contents of experience. They are
concepts which are due to reflection and they result from the
interrelations of the various components of the absolutely unitary
content of our immediate experience.

Keferences. Staude, Der Begriff der Apperception in der neueren
Psychologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 1. Kulpe, Die Lehre vom Willen
in der neueren Psychologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 5. Wundt, Grund-
zuge der phys. Psych., chapters 16 § 6, and 22 § 1. Lectures on Hum.
and Anim. Psych., lecture 17.

13. The interconnection of psychical processes which makes
up consciousness, has its deepest spring in the processes of
combination which are continually taking place between the
elements of the single contents of experience. Such proc-
esses are operative in the formation of single psychical com-
pounds and they are what give rise to the simultaneous unity
of the state of consciousness present at a given moment and
also to the continuity of successive states. These processes
of combination are of the most various kinds; each one has
its individual coloring, which is never exactly reproduced in
any second case. Still, the most general differences are
those exhibited by attention, in the passive reception of im-
pressions and the active apperception of impressions. As
short names for these differences we use the term association
to indicate a process of combination in a passive state of
attention, and the terms apperceptive combination to indicate
a combination in which the attention is active.

§ 76. Associations. 245

§ 16. ASSOCIATIONS.

1. The concept association has undergone, in the modern
development of psychology, a necessary and very radical
change in meaning. To be sure, this change has not been
accepted everywhere, and the original meaning is still re-
tained, especially by those psychologists who support, even
to-day, the fundamental positions on which the association-
psychology grew up {§ 2, p. 13 sq.). Association-psychology
which is predominantly intellectualistic, pays attention to
nothing but the ideational contents of consciousness and, ac-
cordingly, limits the concept of association to the combina-
tions of ideas. Hartley and Hume, the two founders of
association-psychology, spoke of "association of ideas" in this
limited sense i). Ideas were regarded as objects, or at least
as processes that could be repeated in consciousness with
exactly the same character as that in which they were present
at first (p. 14, 8). This led to the view that association was
a principle for the explanation of the so-called "reproduction"
of ideas. Furthermore, it was not considered necessary to
account for the rise of composite ideas through psychological
analysis, since it was assumed that the physical union of
impressions in sense perception was sufficient to explain their
psychological combination, and so the concept of association
was limited to those forms of reproduction in which the
associated ideas succeed one another in time. For the dis-
crimination of the chief forms of successive associations,
Aristotle's logical scheme for the memory processes was
accepted, and in accordance with the principle of classification
by opposites the following forms were discriminated : association

[1) The author remarks that the English word idea as here used
corresponds to the German Vorstelhmg. Tr.]

246 III- Intercomiection of Psychical Compounds.

by similarity and contrast, and association by simultaneity
and succession. These class-concepts gained by a logical
dichotomic process were dignified with the name "laws of
associations". Modern associationism has generally sought
to reduce the number of these laws. Contrast is regarded
as a special form of similarity, for only those contrasted
concepts are associated which belong to the same general
class; and associations by simultaneity and succession are
both included under contiguity. Contiguity is then regarded
as outer association and contrasted with inner association
by similarity. Some psychologists believe it possible to
reduce these two forms to a single, still more fundamen-
tal, "law of association" by making association by con-
tiguity a special form of similarity, or, what is still more
common, by explaining similarity as a result of associa-
tion by contiguity. In both cases association is generally
brought under the more general principle of practice or
habituation.

2. The whole foundation for this kind of theorizing is
destroyed by two facts which force themselves irresistibly
upon us as soon as we begin to study the matter experimen-
tally. The first of these facts is the general result of the
psychological analysis of sense perceptions, namely, the fact
that composite ideas, which association-psychology regards
as irreducible psychical units, are in fact the results of syn-
thetic processes which are obviously closely related to the
complex processes commonly called associations. The second
fact comes from the experimental investigation of memory
processes. It is found that the reproduction of an idea in the
strict sense of a renewal in its unchanged form of an earlier
idea, never takes place at all. What really does happen in
an act of memory is the rise of a new idea in conciousness ;
this new idea always differs from the earlier idea to which

*? 16. Associations. 247

it is referred, and usually derives its elements from a number
of preceding ideas.

It follows from the first fact that there are elementary
processes of association which unite the components of ideas
and are earlier in their appearance than the associations of
composite ideas with one another, although it is this later
group of processes to which the name associations is gener-
ally limited. The second fact proves that ordinary associa-
tions can be nothing but complex products of the earlier
elementary associations. These conclusions show the utter
lack of justification for the exclusion from the concept asso-
ciation of the elementary processes the products of which are
simultaneous ideas rather than successive ideas. Then, too,
there is no reason for limiting the concept even to ideational
processes. The existence of composite feelings, emotions,
etc., shows, on the contrary, that affective elements also enter
into regular combinations, which may in turn unite with as-
sociations of sensational elements to form complex products,
as we saw in the rise of temporal ideas (§ 11, p. 156 sq.).

3. It follows from what has been said that the concept
of association can gain a fixed, and in any particular case
unequivocal, significance, only when association is regarded
as in itself an elementary process which never appears in
actual psychical processes except in a more or less complex
form, so that the only way to find out the character of
elementary association is to subject complex associated products
to a psychological analysis. The ordinarily so-called associa-
tions (the successive associations) are only one, and the
loosest at that, of all the forms of combination. In contrast
with these we have the closer combinations from which the
different kinds of psychical compounds arise. For these
processes we have already adopted the general name fusions.,
because of the closeness of the union (p. 103 sq.). The next

248 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

stage of combination is found in the simultaneous associa-
tions whicli arise when a given psychical compound is changed
through the influence of the elements of other compounds
acting upon it. We designate these processes, because of
the way in which the elements interact, assimilations. In
addition to these assimilations we have another group of
associations which are also generally simultaneous in character,
namely, the processes which Hekbart called complications.,
and which consist in simultaneous associations of jpsycMcal
compounds derived from different spheres of sensation. Finally,
there are associations which unite psychical compounds into
temporal successions of ideas. These are the forms of as-
sociation which are most easily observed. They were there-
fore, the only forms recognized at first. We call these suc-
cessive associations.

A. FUSIONS.

4. The various forms of fusion of psychical elements
which are possible, have been described in detail in the
course of the discussion of psychical compounds. These
compounds are, indeed, nothing more nor less than the
products of such fusions. The various fusion processes require,
therefore, at this point only a brief treatment with special
reference to the definition of their relation to the other
processes of association. With reference then, to their special
characteristics as association processes, the processes of fusion
may be described as thoroughly fixed associations of psychical
elements. An element of a fusion may, to be sure, appear
in other combinations, but it can never appear alone. It is
the processes of fusion, then, through which all the real
psychical compounds of our conscious experience arise, for
there are no isolated elements in consciousness (p. 32). The
existence of these simplest forms of association could have

§ 16. Associations. 249

been inferred from the existence of more complex associa-
tions, even if there had been no direct evidence of the simple
associations in the analysis of the various forms of psychical
compounds. For it would hardly be comprehensible that
combinations should arise between complex compounds if
there were no tendency towards these combinations in the
elements. Indeed, it will appear as a fact in the later dis-
cussions, that the associations of complex compounds are
always to be traced back to associations between the ele-
ments of these compounds (p. 256).

5. We may distinguish as the chief forms of psychical
fusion y intensive fusion and extensive fusion. This agrees
with the results of our earlier discussions of psychical com-
pounds. The intensive fusions subdivide into sensation fusions
and affective fusions. The chief examples of sensation fusions
are those which appear in clang compounds (p. 105), and
the chief examples of affective fusions are composite feelings
(p. 175). If we neglect for the moment those differences
between various forms of intensive fusion which result from
the nature and relations of the specific elements which in
each case enter into the fusions, there are two distinguish-
ing characteristics common to all intensive fusions. In the
first place, such fusions result from the combination of sen-
sational components, or affective components belonging to a
single system. For example, the elements of a clang fusion
belong to the sphere of tone sensations, the elements of a
common feeling belong to the sphere of touch. In the
second place, in every intensive fusion one element of the
combination stands out as the predominant factor. For
example, in a clang there is a chief tone, in a total feeling
there is a chief feeling. Extensive fusions include spacial
and temporal ideas, emotions and volitional processes. They
are more complex than the intensive fusions because they

250 m- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

always include combinations of disparate elements. But even
here there are certain predominating elements which give to
the fusion products their unitary character. As predomina-
ting elements in the case of spacial ideas, -we find outer
tactual sensations and visual sensations. In the case of
temporal ideas the feelings of tension and relief are such
predominating factors. In the case of emotions and volitions
the predominating factors are the partial feelings which result
from the above mentioned feelings of tension and relief, and
from feelings of excitation and depression (p. 171, 203). In
point of complexity the various extensive fusions may be
arranged in a series beginning with the least complex. The
first members of such a series are the spacial ideas which
are pure sensational ideas. They are, as compared with the
other extensive fusions, relatively simple, while they are, as
compared with intensive compounds, more complicated in
character. Following the spacial ideas in the series, come
temporal ideas. These contain both sensational and affective
elements, but certain sensations are so closely fused with
the dominating feelings that even the feehngs are more or
less ideational in character, that is, are directly referred to
sensory impressions. The last members of the series are the
emotional and volitional processes. These processes differ
only in their closing phase, and all belong, therefore, to a
single form. They constitute the transitional stage between
fusions and complex associations, because in them, complex
compounds, such as spacial and temporal ideas and com-
pound feelings, all enter as accessories to the main process.
The extensive fusions, including the spacial ideas as their
simplest form, and volitional processes as their most complex
form, may be said to have the same characteristics in
regard to the kinds of elements which they contain as
have complications. They also show^ certain of the essential

§ 16. Associations. 251

characteristics of successive associations. In this way it may be
said that there are in the various forms of fusions, anticipa-
tions of each of the complex forms of association which are
to be described. Assimilations are anticipated in intensive
fusions; complications are anticipated in extensive spacial
fusions; and, finally, successive associations are anticipated
in temporal fusions and in emotional and vohtional processes,
which appear as the more highly developed complications
arising from temporal ideas. Intensive fusions and spacial
fusions may also be classified, together with assimilations
and complications, as simultaneous processes. Temporal ideas,
emotions and volitions belong, together with the memory
processes to be described later and the related processes,
under the general head of successive associations.

B. ASSIMILATIONS.

6. Assimilations are forms of association which constantly
appear during the formation of intensive ideas and spacial
ideas and thus serve to supplement the process of fusion.
Assimilation is most clearly demonstrable when certain single
components of the product of an assimilation are given
through external sense impressions, while others belong to
earlier ideas. In such a case the assimilation may be de-
monstrated by the fact that certain components of the idea
which are wanting in the objective impression or are there
represented by components other than those actually present
in the idea itself, can be shown to arise from earlier ideas.
Experience shows that of these reproduced components, those
are most favored which are very frequently present. Certain
single elements of the impression are, however, after the
analogy of the dominating elements in fusion, usually of
more importance in determining the association than are the

252 IJI- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

others, so that when these dominating elements are altered,
as may be the case especially with assimilations of the visual
sense, the product of the assimilation undergoes a correspond-
ing change.

7. Among intensive compounds it is the auditory ideas
which are most frequently the results of assimilation. They
also furnish the most striking examples of the influence on
present processes of earlier combinations which have become
familiar through repetition. Of all the auditory ideas, the
most familiar are the readily available ideas of words, for
these usually receive more attention than other sound im-
pressions. As a result the hearing of words is continually
accompanied by assimilations; the sound impression is in-
complete, but it is entirely filled out by earher impressions,
so that we do not notice the incompleteness. So it comes
that not the correct hearing of words, but the misunder-
standing of them, that is, the erroneous filling out of in-
complete impressions through incorrect assimilations, is what
generally leads us to notice the process. We may find an
expression of the same fact in the ease with which any sound
whatever, as, for example, the cry of an animal, the noise
of water, wind, machinery, etc., can be made to sound like
words almost at will.

8. In the case of intensive feelings we note the presence
of assimilations in the fact that impressions which are ac-
companied by sense-feelings and elementary aesthetic feelings,
very often exercise a second direct affective influence for
which we can account only when we recall certain ideas of
which we are reminded by the impressions. In such cases
the association is usually at first only a form of affective
association, and only so long as this is true is the assimila-
tion simultaneous. The related ideational association which
explains the effect is, on the contrary, usually a later process

§ 16. Assooiations. 253

which must be classified as a form of successive association.
For this reason it is often hardly possible, when we have
clang impressions or color impressions accompanied by par-
ticular feelings ; or when we have simple spacial ideas, to
decide what is the immediate affective influence of the im-
pression itself, and what is the influence of the association.
As a rule, in such cases the affective process is to be looked
upon as the resultant of an immediate factor and an asso-
ciative factor which unite to form a single, unitary total
feeling in accordance with the general laws of affective
fusion (p. 175).

9. Association in the case of spacial ideas is of the most
comprehensive character. It is somewhat less noticeable in
the sphere of touch when vision is present ^ on account of
the small importance of tactual ideas in general and espe-
cially on account of the small importance of touch for memory.
For the blind, on the other hand, touch is the essential
means of rapid orientation in space, as for example, in the
rapid reading of the blind-alphabet. The effects of assimila-
tion are most strikingly evident when several tactual surfaces
are concerned, because in such cases assimilation is easily
betrayed by the illusions which may arise in consequence
of some disturbance in the usual interrelation of the sensa-
tions. Thus, for example, when we touch a small ball with
the index and middle fingers crossed, we have the idea of
two balls. The explanation is obvious. In the ordinary
position of the fingers the external impression here given
actually corresponds to two balls, and the many perceptions
of this kind which have been perceived before, exercise an
assimilative action on the new impression.

In visual sense perceptions , assimilative processes play a large
part. They aid especially in the formation of ideas of the magni-
tude, of the distance, and of the three-dimensional character of

254 IIJ- Interconnection of Psychical Oompoimds.

visual objects. In this last respect they are essential supple-
ments of immediate binocular motives for projection into depth.
Thus, the correlation that exists between the ideas of the
distance and ideas of magnitude of objects, as, for example,
the apparent difference in the size of the sun or moon on
the horizon and at the zenith, is to be explained as an effect
of assimilation. The perspective of drawing and painting
also depends on these influences. A picture drawn or painted
on a plane surface can appear three-dimensional only on
condition that the impression arouses elements of earlier
percepts which are assimilated with the new impression. This
is most evident in the case of unshaded drawings that can
be seen either in relief or in intaglio. Observation shows
that these differences in appearance are by no means accidental
or dependent on the so-called "power of imagination", but
that there are always elements in the immediate impression
which determine definitely the assimilative process. The
elements that are thus operative are, above all, the sensa-
tions arising from the position and movements of the eye.
Thus, for example, a hnear design of a prism which is looked
at with one eye only so as to eliminate the binocular data
for the perception of depth, will be seen alternately in relief
and in intaglio according as we fixate in the two cases the
parts of the drawing which correspond ordinarily to a solid
or to a hollow object. A solid angle represented by three
lines in the same plane appears in relief when the fixation-
point is moved along one of the lines, starting from the
apex; it appears in intaglio when the movement is in the
opposite direction, that is from the end of the line towards
the apex. In these and all like cases the assimilation is
determined by the rule that in its movement over the fixation-
lines of objects the eye usually passes from nearer to more
distant points, and when it fixates any point for a longer

§ 16. Associations, 255

period of fixation, it generally turns toward those parts of
the object which lie near at hand. Effects of assimilation
are also noticeable in cases of misreading of words. These
facts of misreading correspond fully with the facts of in-
correct hearing described above (p. 252). In reading we
overlook the misprints in a book. This is due, not so much
to the fact that we have failed to notice the wrong letter
which was present, as to the fact that we have substituted
the right letters for the wrong one^).

In other cases the geometrical optical illusions § 10 (19
and 20) which are due to the laws of ocular movements,
produce as secondary effects certain ideas of depth which
eliminate the contradictions between the retinal images which
result from these figures, and the illusions of length and
directions which arise from the perceptions of the impressions.
Thus, to illustrate, an interrupted straight line appears longer
than an equal uninterrupted line (p. 137); as a result we tend
to project the first to a greater depth than the latter. Here
both lines cover just the same distances on the retina in
spite of the fact that because of the different motor energy
connected with their estimation their lengths are perceived
as different. An elimination of the contradiction which thus
arises is effected by the formation of different ideas of
distance, for when one of two lines the retinal images of
which are alike appears longer than the other, this longer
line must, under the ordinary conditions of vision, belong
to a more distant object. Again, to take another illustra-
tion, when one straight line is intersected at an acute angle
by another line, the result is an overestimation of the acute

1) Assimilation processes which take place during reading may
be studied most advantageously by means of the tachistoscope men-
tioned on page 231. This apparatus allows the words to be seen
only for a short interval.

256 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

angle, which overestimation sometimes gives rise, when the
line is long, to an apparent bending of the line near the
point of intersection (p. 137). Here too the contradiction
between the true course of the line and the increase in the
angle of intersection, is eliminated by the apparent projec-
tion of the line into the third dimension. In all these cases
the perspective can be explained only as the assimilative
effect of the elements of earlier ideas.

10. In none of the assimilations discussed is it possible
to show that any former idea has acted as a whole on the
new impression. Generally such action of a whole idea is
impossible because we must attribute the assimilative in-
fluence to a large number of ideas, differing in many respects
from one another. Thus, for example, a straight line which
intersects a vertical at an acute angle, corresponds to in-
numerable cases in which an inclination of the line with its
accompanying increase of the angle appeared as a component
of a three-dimensional idea. But all these cases may have
been very different in regard to the size of the angle, the
length of the lines, and other attending circumstances. We
must, accordingly, think of the assimilative process as a
process in which not a single definite idea is operative, nor
even a definite combination of elements from earlier ideas,
but rather, as a rule, we must think of it as a process in
which a great number of such combinations are operative.
These many antecedents need agree only approximately with
the new impression in order to affect consciousness.

We may gain some notion of the way in which this effect
is produced from the important part that certain elements
connected with the impression play in the production of the
process, as, for example, the inner tactual sensations in visual
ideas. Obviously it is these immediate sensational elements
which serve to pick out from the great mass of ideational

§ 16. Associations. 257

elements reacting on tlie impression, certain particular ele-
ments which correspond to themselves. The present sensa-
tions then hring these selected factors into a form agreeing
with the form of the rest of the components of the immediate
impression. At the same time it appears that not merely
are the elements of our memory images relatively indefinite
and therefore variable, but that even the perception of an
immediate impression may, under special conditions, vary
within fairly wide limits. In this way the assimilative process
starts primarily from elements of the immediate impression,
chiefly from such as are of preeminent importance for the
formation of the idea, as, for example, in visual ideas, the
sensations of ocular position and movement. These elements
call up certain particular memory elements corresponding to
themselves. These memories then exercise an assimilative
effect on the immediate impression, and the impression in
turn reacts in the same way on the reproduced elements.
These separate acts are, like the whole process, not succes-
sive, but, at least for our consciousness, simultaneous. For
this reason the product of the assimilation is apperceived as
an immediate, unitary idea. The two distinguishing charac-
teristics of assimilation are, accordingly, 1) that it is made
up of a series of elementary processes of combination, that
is, processes that have to do with the components of ideas,
not with the whole ideas themselves, and 2) that the united
components modify one another through reciprocal assim-
ilations.

11. On this basis we can explain without difficulty the
main differences between complex assimilative processes, by
the very different parts that the various factors necessary
to such processes play in the various concrete cases. In
ordinary sense perceptions the direct elements are so pre-
dominant that the reproduced elements are as a rule entirely

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 17

258 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Gompoimds.

overlooked, although in reality they are never absent and
are often very important for the perception of the objects.
These reproduced elements are much more noticeable when
the assimilative effect of the direct elements is hindered
through external or internal influences, such as indistinctness
of the impressions or affective and emotional excitement. In
all cases where the difference between the impression and
the idea becomes, in this way, so great that it is apparent
at once on closer examination, we call the product of the
assimilation an illusion.

The universality of assimilation makes it certain that such
processes occur also between reproduced elements, in such a
way that any memory idea which arises in the mind is im-
mediately modified by its interaction with other memory ele-
ments. Still, in such cases we have, of course, no means of
demonstration. All that can be established as probable is
that even in the case of so-called "pure memory processes",
direct elements in the form of sensations and sense-feelings
aroused by peripheral stimuh, are never entirely absent. In
reproduced visual images, for example, such elements are
present in the form of inner tactual sensations of the eye.

C. COMPLICATIONS.

12. Co7nplications , or the combinations between unlike
psychical compounds, are no less regular components of con-
sciousness than are assimilations. Just as there is hardly an
intensive or extensive idea or composite feeling which is not
modified in some way through the processes of reciprocal as-
similation between direct and reproduced elements, so almost
every one of these compounds is at the same time connected
with other, dissimilar compounds, with which it has some
constant relations. In all cases, however, complications are

§ 16. Associations. 259

different from assimilations in the fact that the unlikeness
of the compounds makes the connection looser, however
regular it may be, so that when one component is direct
and the other reproduced, the latter can be readily distin-
guished at once. There is, however, another reason which
makes the product of a complication appear unitary in spite
of the easily recognized difference between its components.
This is the predominance of one of the compounds, which
pushes the other components into the obscurer field of con-
sciousness.

If the complication unites a direct impression with memory
elements of disparate character, the direct impression with
its assimilations is regularly the predominant component,
while the reproduced elements sometimes have an influence
noticeable only through their affective tone. Thus, when
we speak, the auditory word ideas are the predominant com-
ponents, and in addition we have as obscure factors, direct
motor sensations and reproductions of the visual images of
the words. In reading.^ on the other hand, the visual images
come to the front while the others become weaker. In
general it may be said that the existence of a complication
is frequently noticeable only through the pecuhar coloring
of the total feeling which accompanies the predominant idea.
This is due to the power of obscure ideas to have a rela-
tively intense effect through their affective tones on the atten-
tion (p. 237). Thus, for example, the characteristic impres-
sion of a rough surface, a dagger-point, or a gun, arises
from a complication of visual and tactual impressions, and
in the last case, of auditory impressions as well; but as a
rule such complications are noticeable only through the
feelings they excite.

17*

260 III- Interconnection of Psyehieal

D. SUCCESSIVE ASSOCIATIONS.

13. Successive association is by no means a process that
differs essentially from the two forms of simultaneous asso-
ciation, assimilation and complication. It is, on the contrary,
due to the same general causes as these, and differs only in
the secondary characteristic that the process of combination,
which in the former cases consisted, so far as immediate
introspection was concerned, of a single instantaneous act,
is here protracted and may therefore be readily divided into
two acts. The first of these acts corresponds to the appear-
ance of the reproducing elements, the second to the appear-
ance of the reproduced elements. Here too, the first act is
often introduced by an external sense impression, which is
as a rule immediately united with an assimilation. Other
reproduced elements which might enter into an assimilation
or complication are held back through some inhibitory in-
fluence or other — as, for example, through other assimila-
tions that force themselves earlier on apperception — and
do not begin to exercise an influence until later. In this
way we have a second act of apperception clearly distinct
from the first, and differing from it in psychical content.
The difference is the more essential, the more numerous the
new elements which are added through the retarded assimi-
lation and complication, and the more these new elements
displace the earlier elements because of their differences in
character.

14. In the great majority of cases the association thus
formed is hmited to two successive ideational or affective
processes which are connected, in the manner described,
through assimilations or complications. New sense impres-
sions or some apperceptive combinations (§. 17) may then
connect themselves with the second member of the associa-

§ 16. Associations. 261

tion. Less frequently it happens that the same processes
which led to the first division of an assimilation or complica-
tion into a successive process, may be repeated with the
second or even with the third member, so that in this way
we have an associational series. G-enerally, however, such a
series is formed only under exceptional conditions. Such
conditions arise when the normal course of apperception has
been disturbed, as for example, in the so-called "flight of
ideas" of the insane. In normal cases and under the ordinary
conditions of life, serial associations hardly ever appear.

14 a. Such serial associations may be produced most easily
under the artificial conditions of experimentation, when the effort
is purposely made to suppress new sense impressions and ap-
perceptive combinations. But the process resulting in such
cases differs from that described above in that the successive
members of the series do not connect, each with its immediate
predecessor, but all go back to the first, until a new sense im-
pression or an idea with an especially strong affective tone
furnishes a new starting point for the succeeding associations.
The associations in the "flight of ideas" of the insane generally
show the same typical tendency to return to certain predominant
centres.

a. Sensible Recognition and Cognition.

15. The cases in which the ordinary form of association
which is made up of two partial processes, may be most
clearly observed arising out of simultaneous assimilations
and complications, are the cases designated by the special
names, sensible recognition and cognition. The qualification
"sensible" is added when referring to these associative proc-
esses, to indicate, on the one hand, that the first member
of the process is always a sense impression, and, on the
other, to distinguish these associations from the logical proc-
esses of cognition.

262 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

The case of recognition which from the psychological
point of view is the simplest, is that in which an object has
been perceived only once and is recognized as the same when
met a second time. If this second perception follows very soon
after the first, or if the first was especially emphatic and
exciting, the association usually takes place inunediately, as
a simultaneous assimilation. This process differs from other
assimilations, which take place in connection with every sense
perception, only in the characteristic accompanying feehng,
the feeling of familiarity. Such a feeling is never present
except when there is some degree of "consciousness" that
the given impression has been received before. It is, there-
fore, evidently one of those feeKngs which comes from the
ideas obscurely present in consciousness. The psychological
difference between this and an ordinary simultaneous assim-
ilation must be looked for in the fact that at the moment
when, in the apperception of the impression, the assimilation
takes place, there arise in the obscure regions of conscious-
ness some components of the original idea which do not
enter into the assimilation. The relation of these obscure
components to the elements of the idea which is apperceived,
finds expression in the feehng of familiarity. The unassim-
ilated components may be elements of an earher impression
which were so different from certain elements of the new,
that they could not be assimilated, or, and this is usually
the case, they may be comphcations that were clear before,
but now remain unobserved. This influence of complication
explains how it is that the name of a visual object, for
example, the proper names of persons, and often other
auditory qualities, such as the tone of voice, are very great
helps in recognition. To serve as such helps, however,
they need not necessarily be clear ideas in consciousness.
When we have heard a man's name, the recognition of the

§ 16. Associaiions. 263

man the next time we meet him may be aided by the mime
without oui' calling it clearly to mind.

16. The observations described show what are the con-
ditions under which a recognition may pass from a simul-
taneous into a successive association. If a certain inteiTal
elapses before the elements of the earher idea which gradu-
ally rise in consciousness, can produce a distinct feeling of
familiarity, the whole process divides into two acts: into the
act of perception and the act of recognition. Perception de-
pends on the ordinary simultaneous assimilations only, while in
recognition the obscui'e, unassimilated elements of the earher
idea show theii' influence. The line of division between these
partial processes is, accordingly, more distinct the greater the
difference between the earher impressions and the new one.
In a case of marked difference not only is there usually a
long period of noticeable inhibition between perception and
recognition, but certain additional apperceptive processes,
namely, the processes of voluntary attention which take part
in the act of recollection, also come to the aid of the asso-
ciation. As a special form of this kind of process we have
the phenomenon called -mediate recognition". This consists
in the recognition of an object, not through its own attributes,
but thi'ough some accompanying mark, which stands in a
chance connection with it, as, for example, when a person
is recognized because of his companion. Between such a
case and a case of immediate recognition there is no essential
psychological difference. For even those characteristics that
do not belong to the recognized object in itself, still belong
to the whole complex of ideational elements that help in
the preparation and final carrying out of the association.
And yet, as we should naturally expect, the retardation
which divides the whole recognition into two ideational
processes, and often leads to the cooperation of voluntary

264 lU. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

recollection, generally appears in its most evident form in
mediate recognitions.

17. This simple process of recognition which takes place
when we meet again an object that has been perceived once
before, is a starting point for the development of various
other associative processes, for processes which like recognition
stand on the boundary between simultaneous and successive
associations, and for processes in which there is a more
marked degree of that retardation in the formation of asso-
ciations and complications which leads to a successive rather
than simultaneous occurrence of the processes. Thus, the
recognition of an object that has often been perceived is
easier and, therefore, as a rule an instantaneous process.
It is also more like the ordinary assimilation because the
feeling of familiarity is much less intense. Sensible cognition
differs generally but little from the recognition of single
familiar objects. The logical distinction between the two
concepts consists in the fact that recognition means the
establishment of the individual identity of the newly per-
ceived object with a formerly perceived object, while cognition
is the subsumption of an object under a familiar concept.
Still, there is no real logical subsumption in a process of
sensible cognition any more than there is a fully developed
class-concept under which the subsumption could be made.
The psychological equivalent of such a subsumption is to
be found in this case in the mere process of associating the
impression in question with an indefinitely large number of
objects. This presupposes an earlier perception of various
objects which agree only in certain particular properties, so
that the process of cognition approaches more nearly to the
ordinary assimilation in its psychological character, the more
familiar the class to which the perceived object belongs, and
the more the object agrees with the most common objects

16. Associations. 265

of this class. In equal measure the feelings peculiar to the
processes of cognition and recognition decrease and finally
disappear entirely, so that when we meet very familiar objects
we do not speak of a cognition at all. The process of
cognition is noticeable only when the assimilation is hindered
in some way, either because the perception of the class of
objects in question has become uncommon or because the
single object shows some unique characteristics. In such a
case the simultaneous association may become successive by
the separation of perception and cognition into two succes-
sive processes. Just in proportion as this happens, we have
a specific feeling of cognition which is indeed related to the
feeling of familiarity, but, as a result of the different con-
ditions for the rise of the two, differs from the feeling of
familiarity especially in its temporal course.

b. Memory processes.

18. There is another direction, essentially different from
that just described, along which the process of recognition
may develop. This shows itself when the hindrances to im-
mediate assimilation which give rise to the transition from
simultaneous to successive associations, are so great that the
ideational elements which do not agree with the new per-
ception, unite — either after the recognition has taken place
or even when there is no such recognition whatever — to
form a special idea referred directly to an earlier impression.
The process that arises under such circumstances is a memory
process and the idea that is perceived is a memory idea., or
memory image.

18 a. Memory processes were the ones to which association
psychology generally limited the application of the concept asso-
ciation. But, as has been shown, these are associations that

266 III- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

take place under especially complicated conditions. The erro-
neous view of association psychology rendered an understanding
of the genesis of an association impossible from the first, and
it is easy to see that the doctrine accepted by the associationists
is limited essentially to a logical rather than a psychological
classification of the association products which are to be ob-
served in memory processes. An insight into the character of
the more complex processes is possible, however, only through
a study starting with the simpler associative processes, for the
ordinary simultaneous assimilations and simultaneous and suc-
cessive recognitions present themselves very naturally as the
antecedents of memory associations. But even simultaneous re-
cognition itself is nothing but an assimilation accompanied by
a feeling which comes from the unassimilated ideational elements
obscurely present in consciousness. In the second process these
unassimilated elements serve to retard the process, so that the
recognition develops into the primitive form of successive asso-
ciation. The impression is at first assimilated in the ordinary
way, and then again in a second act with an accompanying
feeling of recognition which feeling serves to indicate the greater
influence of certain reproduced elements. In this simple form
of successive association the two successive ideas are referred
to one and the same object, the only difference being that each
time some different ideational and affective elements are apper-
ceived. "With memory associations the case is essentially different.
Here the elements of the earlier impressions which are different
from those in the present impression predominate, and the first
assimilation of the impression is followed by the formation of
an additional idea. This idea is made up of elements of the
present impression and of elements belonging to certain earlier
impressions, which earlier impressions are suitable for the assim-
ilation because of certain of their components. The more the
elements of the earlier impression which differ from the elements
of the present impression, predominate, the more the second
idea differs from the first, or, on the other hand, the more the
like elements predominate, the more the two ideas will be alike.
In any case the second idea is always a reproduced idea and
distinct from the new impression as an independent compound.

§ 16. Associations. 267

19. The general conditions for the rise of memory images
may also exhibit shades and differences which correspond
to the differences which appear in the processes of recogni-
tion and cognition (15, 17). Thus the recognition of an
object perceived once and the recognition of an object familiar
through frequent perceptions, and finally, the cognition of
an object that is familiar in its general class- characteristics
may all become sources of various modifications in memory
processes.

Simple recognition becomes a memory process when the
immediate assimilation of the impression is hindered by ele-
ments that belong, not to the object itself, but to circum-
stances that attended its earlier perception. Just because
the former perception occurred only once, or at least only
once so far as the reproduction is concerned, these accom-
panying elements may be relatively clear and distinct and
sharply distinguished from the surroundings of the new im-
pression. In this way we have transitional forms between re-
cognition and remembering: the object is recognized, and at
the same time referred to a particular earlier sense perception
the accompanying circumstances of which add a definite spacial
and temporal relation to the memory image. The memory
process is especially predominant in those cases in which the
elements of the new impression that gave rise to the assim-
ilation are entirely suppressed by the other components of the
image, so that the associative relation between the memory
idea and the impression may remain entirely unnoticed.

19 a. Such cases have been spoken of as "mediate memories",
or "mediate associations". Still, just as in the case of "mediate
recognitions", so here, we are dealing with processes that are
fundamentally the same as ordinary associations. Take, for
example, the case of a person who, sitting in his room at even-
ing, suddenly remembers without any apparent reason a landscape

268 III- Interconneetion of Psychical Gompoimds.

that he passed through many years before; examination shows
that there happened to be in the room a fragrant flower which
he saw for the first time in that landscape. The difference
between this and an ordinary memory process in which the
connection of the new impression with an earlier experience is
clearly recognized, obviously consists in the fact that here the
elements which recall the idea are pushed into the obscure back-
ground of consciousness by other ideational elements. The not
infrequent experience, commonly known as the "spontaneous
rise" of ideas, in which a memory image suddenly appears in
our mind without any assignable cause, is in all probability
reducible in every case to such latent associations.

20. Memory processes that develop from recognitions
which have been often repeated and from cognitions^ are, in
consequence of the greater complexity of their conditions,
different from those connected with the recognition of objects
perceived but once. When we perceive an object that is
familiar either in its own individual characteristics or in the
characteristics of its class, the range of possible associations
is incomparably greater, and the way in which the memory
processes shall arise from a particular impression depends
less on the single experiences which give rise to the associa-
tion, than it does on the general disposition and momentary
mood of consciousness, and also on the interference of certain
active apperceptive processes and on the intellectual feelings
and emotions which are connected with these processes. Word
ideas are important aids to association. These ideas are in
many cases connected with individual objects (proper names),
but they are especially important when they refer to class
characteristics of ideas (class names). "With conditions which
are so varied, it is easy to see that as a general thing it is
impossible to calculate beforehand what the association in
any given case will be. As soon as the act of memory is
ended, however, the traces of its associative origin seldom

§ 16. Associations. 269

escape careful examination, so that we are justified in re-
garding association as the universal and only cause of memory
processes under all circumstances.

In thus deriving memory from association, it is never
to be forgotten that every concrete memory process is by
no means a simple process, but is made up of a large
number of elementary processes., as is apparent from the
fact that every such process is produced by a psychological
development of its simple antecedents, namely, the simul-
taneous assimilations. The most important of these ele-
mentary processes is the assimilative interaction between
some external impression and the elements of an earlier
psychical compound, or between a memory image already
present and such elements. Connected with this there are
two other processes which are characteristic of memory
processes : one is the hindrance of the assimilation by unlike
elements, the other is to be found in the assimilations
and complications connected with these elements and giving
rise to a psychical compound which differs from the first
impression and is referred more or less defiinitely to some
previous experience, especially through its complications. This
reference to the earlier experience shows itself through a
characteristic feeling, the feeling of remembering., which is
related to the feeling of familiarity, but is in its temporal
genesis different, probably in consequence of the greater
number of obscure complications that accompany the appear-
ance of the memory image.

If we try to find the elementary processes to which both
memory processes and all complex associations are reducible,
we shall find two such processes : combinations resulting from
identity and combinations resulting from contiguity. In general
the first class is predominant when the process is more like
an ordinary assimilation and recognition, while the second

270 I^I- Interconnectio7i of Psychical Compounds.

appears more prominently the more the processes approach
mediate memory in character, that is, the more the processes
take on the semblance of spontaneous ideas.

20 a. It is obvious that the usual classification, which makes
all memory processes associations by either similarity or con-
tiguity, is entirely unsuitable if we attempt to apply it to the
modes of psychological genesis that these processes manifest.
On the other hand, it is too general and indefinite if we try
to classify the processes logically according to their products,
without reference to their genesis. In the latter case the various
relations of subordination, superordination, and coordination, of
cause and end, of temporal succession and existence, and the
various kinds of spacial connection, find only inadequate expres-
sion in the very general concepts "similarity" and "contiguity".
When, on the other hand, the manner of origin is studied, every
memory process is found to be made up of elementary processes
that may be called partly associations by similarity, partly asso-
ciations by contiguity. The assimilations which serve to intro-
duce the process and also those which serve to bring about the
reference to a particular earlier experience at its close, may be
called associations by similarity. But the term "similarity" is
not exactly suitable even here, because it is identical elementary
processes which give rise to the assimilation, and when an
identity of elements does not exist, such identity is always
produced by reciprocal assimilation. In fact, the concept of
"association by similarity" is based on the presupposition that
composite ideas are permanent psychical objects and that asso-
ciations take place between these finished ideas. The concept
of association by similarity must be rejected when once this
presupposition is given up as entirely contradictory to psychical
experience and fatal to a proper understanding of the same.
"When certain products of association, as, for example, two suc-
cessive memory images, are similar, this likeness is always re-
ducible to processes of assimilation made up of elementary com-
binations resulting from identity or contiguity. The association
through identity may take place either between components that
were originally the same, or between those that have gained

§ 16. Associations. 271

this character through assimilation. Association by contiguity
is the form of combination between those elements that hinder
the assimilatiouj thus dividing the whole process into a succes-
sion of two processes, and also contributing to the memory image
those components which give it the character of an independent
compound, different from that of the impression which gave rise
to it. The joint action of associations of identity and contiguity
is also very obvious in the case of the simplest forms of memory
association, namely, in those forms which are made up of simple
sensory impressions. Indeed, it is only by means of this joint
action of the two forms of association that we can give any
natural explanation of the facts in question. Thus, when a
yellow color impression calls up in the mind the similar color
orange, the explanation offered by the pure theory of associa-
tion by similarity is that the close similarity between the two
colors produced the association. On the other hand, the pure
theory of contiguity explains the same fact on the ground that
the two impressions have been seen next to each other an in-
definite number of times in the rainbow, in the spectrum, and in
the shadings of painted surfaces. In reality the facts are not
as stated in either of these explanations. It is true, rather, that
colors, like tones, form a continuous sensation series within which
the impressions standing nearest to each other are always most
closely associated on account of the conditions of their natural
rise and variation. There are always brought into conscious-
ness with any given color impression, other associated colors,
especially those that lie nearest to the given color. This is
possible only because the present color calls up first the color
which is identical with itself in some memory complex, and then
calls up through this identical color the one next to it in the
memory complex. Yellow, for example, can call up the yellow
which has been seen before in the spectrum (association by iden-
tity) and then through this first process, may further call up
the neighboring orange (association by contiguity). It is especi-
ally obvious in this case that there must be a combination of
the two forms of association, because the two stages in the
complete association are much more distinctly separate than in
the case of complex ideas where the two stages unite at once
into a single composite process.

272 III' IntercomieGtion of Psychical Compounds.

21. All the results of memory associations, so far as they
are related to earlier impressions, are commonly grouped
together under the name memory. This concept memory
originated in popular psychology and was then carried over
into the now abandoned faculty psychology. Memory must,
of course, in every particular case be subjected to a special
analysis to show what are the elementary association proc-
esses involved in the special phenomena under consideration,
and what are the particular effects of these association proc-
esses. Such analysis finds the simplest conditions for its
application in those cases in which the memory associations
take place between simple impressions, or at least between
impressions which arise under relatively simple and uniform
conditions. Thus, one may investigate the memory for tone
sensations, or for simple visual objects, by measuring the
accuracy of such memory in terms of the clearness with which
an earlier impression is recognized after the lapse of a given
interval. As a result of such measurements it appears that
immediately after an impression is given, its reproduction is
relatively accurate. Very soon (in the case of tones after
even two seconds, in the case of simple visual objects after
an interval somewhat, but not very much, longer) reproduction
reaches its maximum of accuracy and then begins to decrease
with gradually lessening rapidity until, finally, (after about
60 seconds) it reaches a point at which it remains approxi-
mately constant for a long time. In the course of this general
decrease in accuracy of reproduction, there appear successive
periods of fluctuating accuracy which probably are related
to the fluctuations of attention already mentioned (p. 233).
Of special interest for the investigation of the relation of
intervals to memory processes are the facts of time me^nory.
By time memory we mean the memory for temporal intervals.
This form of memory can be investigated with the highest

§ 16. Associations. 273

degree of exactness, just as can the attributes of time ideas
in general, by using so-called empty intervals marked off by
auditory impressions. Through investigations of this sort it
appears that the relation betv^een the memory image of an
interval and the objective length of this interval depends, in
the first place, on the length of the interval in question;
and, in the second place, on the amount of time that elapses
between the giving of the impression and the formation of
the memory image. The length of the given interval affects
the process in accordance w^ith the general rule, that short
intervals are overestimated in memory and long inte?^vals are
underestimated. Between these two forms of false estimation
lies an indifference-interval for which the remembered interval
is, on the average, equal to the given interval. When the
reproduction follows the impression very quickly this in-
difference-interval is 0.5 — 0.6 sec. If the interval is increased
in length there appears here also a kind of periodic recur-
rence of exact estimations, for which the regular rule is, that
all the multiples of the indifference -interval are more ac-
curately estimated than are the intervals lying between these
multiples. This periodic recurrence of exact estimations is
probably due to the fact that longer intervals have to be
broken up into groups of short intervals in order to be
grasped in consciousness as single wholes. In such division
and grouping the indifference-interval presents itself as the
standard simple unit. The fact of periodic accuracy in
estimation is also doubtless connected with the above de-
scribed processes of involuntary rhythmical subdivision of
long time intervals (p. 165). When the period between im-
pression and reproduction is longer, the exactness of estima-
tion suffers a general decrease, just as in the case of the
reproduction of qualitative tone sensations and light sensa-
tions. It finally reaches a minimum at which it continues

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 13

274 III- Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds.

for a relatively long period of time at an approximately
constant level. With a lengthening of the period between
impression and reproduction the reproduced interval becomes
more and more clearly shortened in comparison with the
original interval. No very exact determinations have been
made of these last described facts. They are, however,
familiar from every-day experience.

22. The character of memory ideas is intimately connected
with the complex nature of the memory processes. The de-
scription of these ideas as weaker, but otherwise faithful,
copies of the direct sense perceptions is as far out of the
way as it could possibly be. Memory images and sense
perceptions differ, not only in quality and intensity, but most
emphatically in their elementary composition. We may
diminish the intensity of a sensible impression as much as
we Hke, but so long as it is perceptible at all it is an essen-
tially different compound from a memory idea. The incom-
pleteness of the memory idea is much more characteristic than
the small intensity of its elements. For example, when I
remember an acquaintance, the images I have of his face
and figure are not mere obscure reproductions of what I
have in consciousness when I look directly at him, but most
of the features do not exist at all in the reproduced ideas.
Connected with the few ideational elements which are really
present and which can be but little increased in number
even when the attention is voluntarily concentrated upon the
task, are certain factors added through contiguity and certain
complications, such as the environments in which I saw my
acquaintance, his name, and finally, and more especially,
certain affective elements which were present at the meeting.
These accompanying components are what make the image
a memory image.

23. There are great differences in the effectiveness of

§ 16. Associations. 275

these accompanying elements and in the distinctness of the
sensational elements of the memory image in the cases of
different individuals. Some persons locate their memory
images in space and time much more precisely than do others ;
the ability to remember colors and tones is also very markedly
different. Very few persons seem to have distinct memories
of odors and tastes; in place of these most of us have, as
substitute complications, accompanying motor sensations of
the nose and taste-organs.

These differences between different individuals are all
referred to as differences in "memory". The concept memory
is, thus, a supplementary concept which is very useful in
giving clear expression to these individual differences in the
memory processes. It must, however, never be forgotten
that the term always refers to what is in reality a series of
processes, and that in each particular case a special explana-
tion of the facts is required. We speak of a faithful, com-
prehensive, and easy memory, or of a good spacial, temporal,
and verbal memory, etc. These expressions serve to point
out the different directions in which, according to the original
disposition or habit of the person, the elementary assimila-
tions and complications occur.

One important phenomenon among the various differences
referred to, is the gradual iveakening of memory with old
age. The disturbances resulting from diseases of the brain
agree in general with the results of this weakening of memory
through age. Both are of special importance to psychology
because they exhibit very clearly the influence of complica-
tions on memory processes. One of the most striking symptoms
of failing memory, in both normal and pathological cases,
is the weakening of verbal memory. It generally appears
as a lack of ability to remember, first proper names, then
names of concrete objects in the ordinary environment, still

18*

276 J^II- Interco7inection of Psychical Compounds.

later abstract words, and finally, particles that are entirely
abstract in character. This succession corresponds exactly
to the possibility of substituting in consciousness for single
classes of words other ideas that are regularly connected
with them through complication. This possibility is obviously
greatest for proper names, and least for abstract particles,
which can be retained only through their verbal signs-
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objects), Philos. Studien, vol. 15. On Memory for Time: Vierordt,
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(Experiments on memorizing, etc.): Ebbinghaus, Das Gedachtniss, 1885
Muller and Schumann, Ztschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg.,
vol. 6. Muller and Pilzecker, Zeitschr. f. Psych, u. Physiol, d.
Sinnesorg., Supplement No. 1, 1900. Binet and Henri, Annee psychol,
vol. 1, 1894. Bolton, Franz, Honston, Psychological Review, vol. 3,
1896. On Diseases of the Memory: Ribot, Diseases of the Memory.
Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, Pt. 1, chap. 5 (on word m emory)

§ 17. APPERCEPTIVE COMBINATIONS.

1. Associations in all their forms are regarded by iis as
passive experiences, because the feeling of activity, which is
characteristic of all processes of volition and attention, never
arises except as it is added to the already completed asso-
ciation process in a kind of apperception of the resultant^

§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 277

given content (p. 238). Associations are, accordingly, proc-
esses that can arouse volitions but are not themselves
directly influenced by volitions. This absence of any de-
pendence on vohtion is, however, the criterion of a passive
process.

The case is essentially different with the second kind of
combinations which are formed between different psychical
compounds and their elements, namely, the apperceptive com-
binations. Here the feeling of activity with its accompany-
ing variable sensations of tension does not merely follow the
combinations as an after-effect produced by them, but it
precedes them so that the combinations themselves are im-
mediately recognized as formed with the aid of the attention.
In this sense these experiences are called active experiences.

2. Apperceptive combinations include a large number of
psychical processes that are distinguished in popular parlance
under the general terms thinking, reflection, imagination,
understanding. These are all regarded as psychical processes
of a type higher than sense perceptions or pure memory
processes, while at the same time they are all looked upon
as different from one another. Especially is this true of the
so-called functions of imagination and understanding. In
contrast with this loose view of the faculty theory, associa-
tion psychology sought to find a unitary principle by sub-
suming also the apperceptive combinations of ideas under
the general concept of association, and at the same time
limiting the concept, as noted above (p. 245), to successive
association. This reduction to successive association was
effected either by neglecting the essential subjective and ob-
jective distinguishing marks of apperceptive combinations, or
by attempting to avoid the difficulties of an explanation,
through the introduction of certain supplementary con-
cepts taken from popular psychology. Thus, "interest" and

278 ^11- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

"intelligence" were credited with an influence on associations.
Yery often this view was based on the erroneous notion that
the recognition of certain distinguishing features in apper-
ceptive combinations and associations meant the assertion of
a fundamental division between the former and the latter.
Of course, this is not true. All psychical processes are con-
nected with associations as much as with the original sense
perceptions. Yet, just as associations always form a part
of every sense perception and in spite of that appear in
memory processes as relatively independent processes, so
apperceptive combinations are based always on associations,
but the essential attributes of these apperceptive combinations
are not traceable to associations.

3. In trying to account for the essential attributes of
apperceptive combinations, we may divide the psychical proc-
esses that belong to this class into simple and complex ap-
perceptive functions. The simple functions are those of
relating and comparing^ the complex those of synthesis and
analysis.

A. SIMPLE APPERCEPTIVE FUNCTIONS.
(Relating and Comparing.)

4. The most elementary apperceptive function is that
of relating two psychical contents to each other. The grounds
for such relating are always given in the single psychical
compounds and their associations, but the actual carrying
out of the process itself is a special apperceptive activity
through which the relation itself becomes a special conscious
content, distinct from the contents which are related, though
indeed inseparably connected with them. For example, when
we recognize the identity of an object with one perceived
before, or when we are conscious of a definite relation between
a remembered event and a present impression, there is in

§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 279

both cases a relating apperceptive activity connected with
the associations.

So long as the recognition remains a pure association,
the process of relating is limited to the feeling of familiarity
which follows the assimilation of the new impression either
immediately, or after a short interval. When, on the contrary,
apperception is added to association, this feeling is supplied
with a clearly recognized ideational substratum. The earlier
perception and the new impression are separated in time and
then brought into a relation of agreement on the basis of
their essential attributes. The case is similar when we become
conscious of the motives of a memory act. This also pre-
supposes that a comparison of the memory image with the
impression which occasioned it, is added to the merely asso-
ciative process which gave rise to the image. This, it will
be seen, is a process that can be brought about only through
active attention.

5. Thus, the relating function is brought into activity
through associations, wherever these associations themselves
or their products are made the objects of voluntary observa-
tion. The relating function is connected, as the examples
mentioned show, with the function of comparingj whenever
the related contents of consciousness are clearly separated
processes, belonging to one and the same class of psychical
experiences. Relating activity is, therefore, the wider concept,
comparison is the narrower. A comparison is possible only
when the compared contents are brought into relation with
one another. On the other hand, conscious contents may be
related without being compared with one another, as is the
case, for example, when an object and the attributes of the
object are related, or when one process is related to another
which regularly follows or precedes it. As a result of this
it follows that where the fuller conditions necessary for a

280 JJ^I- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

comparison are present, the experiences given may be merely
related, or they may also be compared with each other.
Thus, one calls it relating when he thinks of a present
impression as the reason for remembering an earlier experi-
ence; he calls it comparing, on the other hand, when he
establishes certain definite points of agreement or difference
between the earlier and the present impression.

6. The process of comparing is, in turn, made up of two
elementary functions which are as a rule intimately inter-
connected. These two elementary functions are first, the
pejxeption of agreements., and second, the perception of dif-
ferences. There is a mistaken view prevalent even in present-
day psychology. It originated in popular psychology and
was strengthened by the discussions of logical intellectualism.
It consists in the acceptance of the notion that the mere
existence of psychical elements and compounds is identical
with their apperceptive comparison. Every sensation is ac-
cordingly treated as a "sensory judgment", every immediate
perception of distance as a "judgment of depth", and so on
through the whole series of processes. In all these cases,
however, the judgment appears after the sensations and ideas ;
the judgment must, therefore, be recognized as a separate
process. To be sure, agreements and differences arise in
our psychical processes, if they did not we could not observe
them. But the comparing activity through which these like-
nesses and differences in sensations and ideas are made evident,
is not identical with the sensations and ideas themselves.
It is a function that may arise in connection with these
elements, but does not necessarily so arise.

7. Even the psychical elements, that is, sensations and
simple feelings, can be compared with reference to their
agreements and differences. Indeed, it is through a series
of such comparisons that we arrange these psychical elements

§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 281

into systems, each one of which contains the elements that
are most closely related. Within a given system two kinds
of comparison are possible, namely, comparison in respect to
quality and comparison in respect to intensity. Then, too,
a comparison between grades of clearness is possible when
attention is paid to the way in which the elements appear
in consciousness. In the same way comparison is applied to
intensive and extensive psychical compounds. Every psychical
element and every psychical compound, in so far as it is a
member of a regular system, constitutes a psychical magnitude.
A determination of the value of such a psychical magnitude is
possible only through comparison with some other in the same
system. Psychical magnitude is, accordingly, an original at-
tribute of every psychical element and compound. It is of
various kinds, as intensity, quality, extensive (spacial and tem-
poral) value, and, when the different states of consciousness
are considered, clearness. But the determination of psychical
value can be effected only through the apperceptive function
of comparison.

8. Psychical measurement differs from physical measure-
ment in the fact that the latter may be carried out in acts
of comparison separated almost indefinitely in time, because
its objects are relatively constant. For example, we can
determine the height of a certain mountain to-day with a
barometer and then after a long time we may determine the
height of another mountain, and if no sensible changes in
the configuration of the land have taken place in the interval,
we can compare the results of our two measurements. Psy-
chical compounds, on the other hand, are not relatively per-
manent objects, but continually changing processes, so that
we can compare two such psychical magnitudes only when
other conditions remain the same, and the two factors to
be compared follow each other in immediate succession.

282 III- Interconnection of Psychical

These requirements have as their immediate corollaries : first,
that there is no absolute standard for the comparison of
psychical magnitudes, but every such comparison stands by
itself and is of merely relative validity; secondly, that finer
comparisons are possible only between psychical magnitudes
of the same dimension, so that a reduction, analogous to
that by which the most widely separate physical quantities,
such as periods of time and physical forces, are all expressed
in terms of one dimension of space, is out of the question
in psychical comparisons.

9. It follows that the possible relations between psychical
magnitudes which can be established by direct comparison
are limited in number. The establishment of such relations
is possible only in certain particularly favorable cases. These
favorable cases are 1) the equality between two psychical
magnitudes and 2) the just noticeable difference between two
such magnitudes^ as, for example, two sensational intensities
of like quality, or two qualities of like intensity belonging
to the same dimension. As a somewhat more complex case
which still lies within the limits of immediate comparison we
have 3) the equality of two differences between magnitudes^
especially when these magnitudes belong to neighboring parts
of the same system. It is clear that in each of these three
kinds of psychical measurements the two fundamental functions
in apperceptive comparison, the perception of agreements and
the perception of differences, are both applied together. In the
first case one of two psychical magnitudes, A and B is gradu-
ally var^d until it agrees for immediate comparison with the
other; thus, for example, B is varied until it agrees with A,
In the second case A and B are taken equal at first and then
B is changed until it appears either just noticeably greater
or just noticeably smaller than A. Finally, the third case is
used to the greatest advantage when a whole line of psy-

§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 283

chical magnitudes as, for example, of sensational intensities,
extending from ^ as a lower limit to C as an upper limit,
is so divided by a middle quantity 5, which has been found
by gradual variations, that the partial distance AB w> ap-
perceived as equal to BC.

10. The most direct and most easily utilizable results
derived from these methods of comparison are given by the
second method, or the method of minimal differences as it is
called. The difference between the physical stimuli which
corresponds to the just noticeable difference between psychical
magnitudes is called the difference threshold of the stimulus.
The intensity at which the resulting psychical process, as for
example, a sensation, can be just apperceived, is called the
stimulus threshold. Observation shows that the difference
threshold of the stimulus increases in proportion to the
distance from the stimulus threshold, in such a way that the
relation between the difference threshold and the absolute
quantity of the stimulus, or the relative difference threshold.,
remains constant. If, for example, a certain sound the in-
tensity of which is 1 must be increased -| in order that the
sensation may be just noticeably greater, one whose intensity
is 2 must be increased |, one 3 must be increased |, etc.,
to reach the difference threshold. This law is called Weber's
law., after its discoverer E. H. "Weber. It is easily under-
stood when we look upon it as 'a law of apperceptive com-
parison. From this point of view it must obviously be inter-
preted to mean that psychical magnitudes can he compared
only according to their relative values.

This view that Weber's law is an expression of the general
law of the relativity of psychical magnitudes, assumes that
the psychical magnitudes which are compared, themselves in-
crease in direct proportion to their stimuli, within the limits
of the validity of the law. It has not yet been possible to

284 ^^^- Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds.

demonstrate tlie truth of this assumption on its physiological
side, on account of the difficulties of measuring exactly the
stimulation of nerves and sense-organs. Still, we have evidence
in favor of it in the psychological fact that in certain special
cases, where the conditions of observation lead very natur-
ally to a comparison of absolute differences in magnitude, the
absolute difference threshold, instead of the relative thresh-
old, is found to be constant. We have such a case, for
example, in the comparison, within wide limits, of minimal
differences in pitch (p. 58). Then, too, in many cases where
large differences in sensations are compared according to
the third method described above (p. 282), equal absolute
stimulus differences, not relative differences, are perceived
as equal. This shows that apperceptive comparison may
follow two different principles under different conditions: a
principle of relative comparison (Weber's law) which is the
more general, and a principle of absolute comparison which
takes the place of the first principle under special conditions
which favor such a form of apperception.

10 a. Weber's law has been shown to hold, first of all, for the
intensity of sensations and then, in a more limited way, for the
comparison of extensive compounds, especially temporal ideas,
and also, to some extent, for spacial ideas of sight and for motor
ideas. On the other hand, it does not hold for the spacial ideas
of external touch, obviously on account of the complexity of the
local signs (p. 115); and it can not be verified for sensational
qualities. The scale of tonal intervals is relative because every
interval corresponds to a certain ratio between the number of
vibrations (for example, an octave 1 : 2, a fifth 2:3, etc.). This
is probably due to the relationship between clangs which is due
to the relation of the fundamental tone to its overtones (comp.
p. 105 sq.). Even when an absolute comparison takes place instead
of a comparison according to "Weber's law of relativity, we must
not confuse this with the establishment of an absolute measure.

§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 285

That would presuppose an absolute unit, that is, the possibility of

finding a constant standard, which, as noted above (p. 282), is in

the psychical world impossible. Absolute comparison must take

the form of a recogiiition of the equality of equal absolute differences.

This is possible in certain single cases without a constant unit.

Thus, for example, we compare two sensational lines AB and BG

according to their relative values, when we think in both cases of

the relation of the upper to the lower extreme sensation. In such

a case, accordingly, we judge AB and BC to be equal when

7? C

— = — (Weber's law). On the other hand, we compare AB and

A B

BG according to their absolute values when the difference between
G and B in the single sensational dimension in question appears
equal to that between -B and ^, that is, when G' — B = B — A
(law of proportionality, Merkel). The recognition of quanti-
tative or qualitative difference is rendered more difficult when
the two stimuli to be compared are presented in continuous
sequence, and with neither a time or space interval separating
them. The difference threshold is, accordingly, greater in such
cases, and it grows still longer the more slowly the continuous
transition from one stimulus to the other takes place. Thus,
the threshold for brightness, when two distinct stimulations are
compared with each other, is Y^oq (P- ^^j- When, on the other
hand, the two stimuli are not separate, but the first passes directly
into the second, the threshold is Yioo if ^^^ transition is rapid
and about ^^/loo if it is slow. The threshold for distinctly sep-
arated tones is ^fr, vibrations (p. 58); for continuous tonal
changes Yg to 1^2 vibrations. The treshold for distinctly sep-
arated pressures is Y^oo (P- ^S)? for continuous changes ^Yioo
to ^'^/loo? the larger fraction represents the results of slow tran-
sitions. Even under the more difficult conditions of comparison
described, Weber's law holds true for those spheres of com-
parison to which" it applies under any conditions.

By treating Weber's law as an expression of the functional
relation between sensation and stimulus and by assuming that
the law is valid for infinitely small changes of both sensation and

(] J?
stimulus, Fechner worked out the formula, dE ■= G • —^[B

286 -WI. Interconnection of Psychical Compomids.

represents the stimulus and E the sensation). From this formula
he derived as the formula for finite sensation values and stimuli
the following logarithmic expression E=k - log B -{- c. That is,
the sensation is proportional in its increase to the logarithm of the
stimulus, c and k representing constants which must be determined
by experiment (Fechner's Psycho-physical Law). This formula,
however, because of its assumption of an immediate relation be-
tween sensation and stimulus, fails to indicate the fact that in all
probability the law depends upon the relation between the sensations
measwred. If we recognize the relation as one between the sen-

JE
sations, we may adopt the formula V =^ m ' -— - . ^E repre-

E

sents the difference threshold, V the ratio of comparison. This
formula contains nothing but psychical magnitudes thus con-
forming to the probable significance of Weber's law.

The methods for the demonstration of Weber's law, or of
other relations between psychical magnitudes, whether elementary
or compound, are usually called psycho-physical methods. The
name is unsuitable, however, because the fact that physical
means are here employed is not unique, but holds for all the
methods of experimental psychology. The methods could better
be called "methods for the measurement of psychical magnitudes".
With these methods it is possible to follow one of two courses
in finding the relations mentioned as favorable for judgment.
A first or direct mode of procedure is as follows: one of two
psychical magnitudes A and B^ as, for example, A^ is kept
constant, and B is gradually varied until it stands in one of
the relations mentioned, that is, either equals A or is just
noticeably greater or smaller, etc. These are the adjustment
methods. Among these we have as the method frequently applied
and that which leads most directly to conclusions, the "method
of minimal changes", and then as a kind of modification of this
for the case of adjustment in which equality is the end sought,
the "method of average error". The second mode of procedure
is to compare in a large number of cases any two stimuli, A
and B^ which are very little different, and to compute from the
number of cases in which the judgments are A = B^ A"^ B,
A <^ Bj the position of the relations mentioned, especially the

§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 287

difference threshold. These are the calculation methods. The chief
of these is the method known as that of "right and wrong cases".
It would be more proper to call it the "method of three cases"
(equality, positive difference, and negative difference). Details
as to this and the other methods belong in a special treatise
on experimental psychology.

There are two other interpretations of Weber's law still
met with besides the psychological interpretation given above;
they may be called the physiological and the psycho -physical
theories. The first derives the law from hypothetically assumed
relations in the conduction of excitations in the central nervous
system. The second regards the law as a specific law of the
"interaction between body and mind". The physiological inter-
pretation is entirely hypothetical and in certain cases, as, for
example, for temporal and spacial ideas, entirely inapplicable.
The psycho-physical interpretation of Fechner is based upon a
view of the relation of mind which must be rejected by the
psychology of to-day (cf. § 22, 8).

References. E. H. Weber, Tastsinn und Gemeingefiihl, Hand-
worterb. d. Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2. Fechner, Elemente der Psycho-
physik, 1860, and In Sachen der Psychophysik, 1877, and Revision
der Hauptpunkte der Psychophysik, 1882 and Ueber die psychischen
MaCprincipien , Philos. Studien, vol. 4, 1887. G. E. Muller, Zur
Grundlegung der Psychophysik, 1878. Delboeuf, Elements de psycho-
physique, 1883. G. F. LiPPS, Grundriss der Psychophysik, 1899. Wundt,
Philos. Studien, vols. 1 and 2, and Grundziige der phys. Psych., vol. I,
chap. 8, and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 2 — 4, and
Logik, vol. II, Pt. 2, chap. 2 (on the measurement of psychical magni-
tudes in general). Special Investigations: Merkel, Philos. Studien,
vols. 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9. Tischer, Philos. Studien, vol. 1. Kraepelin,
vol. 2. Angell, vol. 7, Kampfe, vol. 8. On Comparison of Changes
in Sensations: Hall and Motora, Amer. Journal of Psych., vol. I.
Stratton, Philos. Studien, vol. 12. Stern, Psychologic der Verande-
rungsauffassung, 1898.

11. As special cases among the apperceptive comparisons
generally falKng under Weber's law, are the comparisons of
magnitudes which are related to each other as relatively
greatest sensational differences or, when dealing with feelings.

288 IIL Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

as opposites. The phenomena that appear in such cases are
usually grouped together under the class name contrasts.
In the department where contrasts have been most thoroughly-
investigated that is, in the case of light sensations^ there is
generally an utter lack of discrimination between two phe-
nomena which are obviously entirely different in origin, though
their results are to a certain extent related. We may dis-
tinguish these as light induction or physiological contrast
(p. 78), and true contrast or psychological contrast. Phy-
siological contrasts are closely connected with the phenomena
of after-images, perhaps they are the same (p. 77 sq.). Psy-
chological contrasts are essentially different; they are usually
pushed into the background by the stronger physiological
contrasts when the impressions are intense. Psychological
contrasts are distinguished from physiological by two impor-
tant characteristics. First, psychical contrasts do not reach
their greatest intensity when the brightness and saturation
are greatest, but when the sensations are at the medium
stages, where the eye is most sensitive to changes in bright-
ness and saturation. Secondly, psychical contrasts can be
removed by comparison with an independent object. Especially
the latter characteristic shows these contrasts to be unqual-
ifiedly the products of comparisons. Thus, for example,
when a grey square is laid on a black ground and close by
a similar grey square is laid on a white ground and all are
covered with transparent paper, the two squares appear
entirely different; the one on the black ground looks bright,
nearly white, that on the white ground looks dark, nearly
black. Now after-images and irradiations are very weak
when the colors are thus seen through translucent media, so
that it may be assumed that the phenomenon described is a
psychical contrast. If, again, a strip of black cardboard
which is also covered with the transparent paper, and there-

§ 17. Apperceptive Combinations. 289

fore appears exactly the same grey as the two squares, is
held in such a position that it. connects the two squares, the
contrast will he removed entirely, or, at least, very much
diminished. If in this experiment a colored ground is used
instead of the achromatic ground, the grey squares will appear
very clearly in the corresponding complementary color. But
here, too, the contrast can he made to disappear through
comparison with an independent grey object.

12, Similar contrasts appear also in other spheres of
sensation when the conditions for their demonstration are
favorable. They are also especially marked in the case of
feelmgs and may arise under proper conditions in the case
of spacial and temporal ideas. Sensations of pitch are
relatively most free, for most persons have a well developed
ability to recognize absolute pitch and this probably tends
to overcome contrast. In the case of feelings the effect of
contrast is intimately connected with the natural opposition
between affective qualities. Thus, pleasurable feeHngs are
intensified by unpleasant feelings immediately preceding, and
the same holds for many feelings of relaxation following
feeHngs of strain, as, for example, a feehng of fulfilment
after expectation. The effect of contrast in the case of spacial
and temporal ideas is most obvious when the same spacial
or temporal interval is compared alternately with a longer
and with a shorter interval. In such cases the interval ap-
pears different, in comparison with the shorter it appears
greater, in comparison with the longer, smaller. Here, too,
the contrast between spacial ideas can be removed by bring-
ing an object between the contrasted figures in such a way
that it is possible easily to relate them.

13. "We may regard the phenomena which result from
the apperception of an impression the real character of which
differs from the character expected^ as special modifications

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 19

290 ^^^' Intereonneetion of Psychical Compounds.

of psychical contrast. For example, if we are prepared to
lift a heavy weight, and find in the actual lifting of the
weight that it proves to be light, or if we Hft a heavy weight
when we expected a light one, the result is in the first case
an underestimation, in the second an overestimation of the
real weight. If a series of exactly equal weights of different
sizes are made to vary in size so that they look like a set
of weights varying regularly from a lighter to a heavier,
they will appear to be different in weight when raised. The
smallest will seem to be the heaviest and the largest to be
the lightest. The familiar association that the greater volume
is connected with the greater mass determines in this case
the tendency of expectation. The false estimation of the
weight then results from the contrast between the real and
the expected sensation.

Beferences. On Light Contrasts : H. Meyer, Poggendorff's Ann.
d. Physik, vol. 44. Helmholtz, Physiol. Optik, Pt. 2, § 24. On Space
Contrasts: Muller-Lyer, Zeitschr. f. Psych u. Physiol, d. Sinnesorg.,
vol. 9. WUNDT, Geometr.-optische Tauschungen, Abh. d. sachs. Ges.
d. W., 1898. On Time Contrast: Meumann, Philos. Studien, vol. 8.
On Illusions of Weights through Contrast: MtJLLER and Schumann,
Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol., vol. 37. Seashore, Scripture's Studies
of Yale Psych. Lab., 1895.

B. COMPLEX APPERCEPTIVE FUNCTIONS.
(Synthesis and Analysis.)

14. When the simple processes of relating and compar-
ing are repeated and combined several times, the complex
psychical functions of synthesis and analysis arise. Sy^ithesis
is primarily the product of the relating activity of apper-
ception, analysis of the comparing activity.

As a combining function apperceptive synthesis is based
upon fusions and associations. It differs from fusions and
^associations in the fact that some of the ideational and affective

§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 291

elements which are brought forward by the association are
voluntarily emphasized and others are pushed into the back-
ground. The motives of the choice can be explained only
from the whole previous development of the individual con-
sciousness. As a result of this voluntary activity the product
of this synthesis is a complex in which all the components
are derived from former sense perceptions and associations,
but in which the combination of these components may differ
more or less from the original forms.

The ideational elements of a compound thus resulting
from apperceptive synthesis may be regarded as the sub-
stratum for the rest of its contents, and so we call such a
compound in general an aggregate idea. When the combi-
nation of the elements is peculiar, that is, markedly different
from the products of associations, the aggregate idea and
each of its relatively independent ideational components is
called an idea of imagination or image of imagination. Since
the voluntary synthesis may vary more or less from the com-
binations presented in sense perception and association, it
follows that practically no sharp line of demarcation can be
drawn between images of imagination and those of memory.
But we have a more essential mark of the apperceptive
process in the positive characteristic that it depends on a
voluntary synthesis than in the negative fact that the com-
bination does not correspond in character to any particular
sense perception. This positive characteristic is also the
source of a most striking difference between images of imagi-
nation and those of memory. This difference consists in the
fact that the sensational elements of an apperceptive com-
pound are much more like those of an immediate sense per-
ception in clearness and distinctness, and usually also in
completeness and intensity. This is easily explained by the
fact that the reciprocally inhibitory influences which the

19*

292 III' Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds.

uncontrolled associations exercise on one another, and which
prevent the formation of fixed memory images, are diminished
or removed by the voluntary emphasizing of certain partic-
ular ideational compounds. It is possible to mistake images
of imagination for real experiences. In the case of memory
images this is possible only when they become images of
imagination, that is, when the memories are no longer allowed
to arise passively, but are to some extent produced by the
will. Generally, there are such voluntary modifications of
memories through a mixing of real with imagined elements.
All our memories are therefore made up of "fancy and
truth" 1). Memory images thus change under the influence
of our feelings and volition to images of imagination, and
we generally deceive ourselves with their resemblance to real
experiences.

15. From the aggregate ideas which thus result from
apperceptive synthesis there arise two forms of apperceptive
analysis which work themselves out in opposite directions.
The one is known in popular parlance as activity of the
imagination^ the second as activity of the understanding.
The two are by no means absolutely different, as might
be surmised from these names, but are, rather, closely
related and almost always connected with each other.
Their fundamental determining motives are what distin-
guish them and condition all their secondary differences
and also the reaction that they exercise on the synthetic
function.

In the case of the activity of Hmagination^'^ the motive
is the reproduction of real experiences or of experiences anal-
ogous to reality. This is the earlier form of apperceptive
analysis and arises directly from association. It begins with

1) "Dichtung und Wahrheit".

§17. Apperceptive Gomhinations. 293

a more or less comprehensive aggregate idea made up of a
variety of ideational and affective elements and embracing
the general content of a complex experience in which the
single components are only indefinitely distinguished. The
aggregate idea is then divided in a series of successive acts
into a number of more definite, connected compounds, partly
spacial, partly temporal in character. The primary voluntary
synthesis is thus followed by analytic acts which may in
turn give rise to the motives for a new synthesis and thus
to a repetition of the whole process with a partially modified,
or more limited aggregate idea.

The activity of imagination shows two stages of devel-
opment. The first is more passive and arises directly from
the ordinary memory function. It appears continually in the
train of thought, especially in the form of an anticipation
of the future, and plays an important part in psychical
development as a preparation or antecedent of volitions. It
may, however, in an analogous way, appear as a represen-
tation in thought of imaginary situations or of successions
of external phenomena. The second, or active^ form of
imagination is under the influence of a fixed idea of some
end, and therefore presupposes a high degree of voluntary
control over the images of imagination, and a strong inter-
ference, partly inhibitory, partly selective, with the memory
images that tend to push themselves into consciousness
without voluntary action. Even the first synthesis of the
aggregate idea is more systematic when produced by this
active process. And an aggregate idea, when once formed
in this way, is held more firmly and subjected to a more
complete analysis. Very often the components themselves
are subordinate aggregate ideas to which the same process
of analysis is again applied. In this way the principle of
organic division according to the end in view governs all

294 III' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

the products and processes of active imagination. The pro-,
ductions of art show this most clearly. Still, there are, in
the ordinary play of imagination, the most various inter-
mediate stages between passive imagination, or that which
arises directly from memory, and active imagination, or that
which is directed by fixed ends.

16. In contrast with this imagination or imaginative re-
production of real experiences, or of experiences which may
be thought of as real, the function of the '^ understanding^^
is the perception of agreements and differences and other
derived logical relations between contents of experience. Under-
standing also starts with aggregate ideas in which a number
of experiences that are real or may be ideated as real, are
voluntarily set in relation to one another and combined into
a unitary whole. The analysis that takes place in this case,
however, is turned by its fundamental motive in a different
direction. Such analysis consists not merely in a clearer
grasp of the single components of the aggregate idea, but
it consists also in the estabHshment of the manifold relations
which exist between the various components and which we
may discover through comparison. In establishing such rela-
tions it is possible, as soon as analyses have been made
several times, to introduce into any particular case the results
gained through relating and comparing processes carried out
on other occasions.

As a consequence of this more strict apphcation of the
elementary relating, and comparing functions, the activity
of understanding follows definite rules even in its external
form, especially when it is highly developed. The fact which
showed itself in the case of imagination and even of memory,
appears here in a developed form. The fact in question is,
that the apperceived relations between the various psychical
contents are presented in imagination and memory, not merely

§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 295

simultaneously, but successively^ so that we proceed from one
relation to the next, and so on. In the case of under-
standing, this successive presentation of relations develops
into the discursive division of the aggregate idea. This is
expressed in the law of the duality of the logical forms of
thought^ according to which, analysis resulting from relating
comparison divides the content of the aggregate idea into
two parts, subject and predicate, and may then separate
each of these parts again once or several times. These
secondary divisions give rise to grammatical forms that stand
in a logical relation analogous to that of subject and pred-
icate, such as noun and attributive, verb and object, verb
and adverb. In this way the process of apperceptive anal-
ysis results in a judgment which finds expression in the
sentence.

For the psychological explanation of judgment it is of
fundamental importance that judgment be regarded, not as
a synthetic, but as an analytic function. The original ag-
gregate ideas which are divided by judgment into their recip-
rocally related components, are exactly like ideas of imagi-
nation. The products of analysis which result from judgment
are, on the other hand, not as in the case of imagination,
images of more limited extent and greater clearness, but
conceptual ideas .^ that is, ideas which stand, with regard
to other partial ideas of the same whole, in some one of
the relations which are discovered through the general
relating and comparing functions. If we call the aggre-
gate idea which is subjected to such a relating analysis a
thought., then a judgment is a division of this thought inta
its components, and a concept is the product of such a
division.

17. Concepts found in this way are arranged in certain
general classes according to the character of the analyses

296 UJ^- Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

that produced them. These classes are the concepts of objects.,
concepts of attributes, and concepts of states. Judgment as a
division of the aggregate idea, sets an object in relation to its
attributes or states, or it sets various objects in relation to one
another. Since a single concept can never, strictly speaking,
be thought of by itself, but is always connected in the whole
idea with one or more other concepts, the conceptual ideas
are strikingly different from the ideas of imagination because
of the indefiniteness and variableness of the former. This
indefiniteness is essentially increased by the fact that as a
result of the like outcome of different kinds of judgment,
concepts arise which may form components of many ideas
that differ in their concrete characters. Such general concepts
constitute, on account of the wide application of relating
analysis to different contents of judgment, the great majority
of all concepts ; and they have a greater or smaller number
of corresponding single ideational contents. A single idea
is selected from this group of contents as a representative
of the concept. This gives the conceptual idea a greater
definiteness. At the same time there is always connected
with this idea the consciousness that it is merely a repre-
sentative. This consciousness generally takes the form of a
characteristic feeling, the conceptual feeling. This feeling
may be traced to the fact that obscure ideas, which have
the attributes that make them suitable to serve as represen-
tations of the concept, tend to force themselves into con-
sciousness in the form of memory images. As evidence of
this we have the fact that the feeling is very intense when
any concrete image of the concept is chosen as its represent-
ative, as, for example, when a particular individual stands
for the concept man, while it disappears almost entirely as
soon as the representative idea differs entirely in content
from the objects included under the concept. Word ideas

§17. Apperceptive Combinations. 297

fulfil this latter condition and that is what gives them their
importance as universal aids to thought. Word ideas
are furnished to the individual consciousness in a finished
state, so that we must leave to social psychology the
question of the psychological development of the processes
of thought which are active in their formation (comp.
§ 21, A).

18. From all that has been said it appears that the
activities of imagination and understanding are not specific-
ally different, but interrelated; that they are inseparable in
their rise and manifestations, and are based at bottom on
the same fundamental functions of apperceptive synthesis and
analysis. What was true of the concept ^'memorif (p. 272),
holds also of the concepts ^'understanding'^ and 'imagina-
tion^'' : they are names , not of unitary forces or faculties,
but of complex phenomena made up of the usual elementary
psychical processes, not of elementary processes of a specific,
distinct kind. Just as memory is a general concept for
certain associative processes, so imagination and understand-
ing are general concep*ts for particular forms of apperceptive
activity. They have a certain practical value as ready means
for the classification of a variety of differences in the capacity
of various persons for intellectual activity. Each class thus
found may in turn contain an endless variety of gradations
and shades. Thus, neglecting the general differences in grade,
we have as the chief forms of individual imagination the per-
ceptive and combining forms; as the chief forms of under-
standing, the inductive and deductive forms, the first being
mainly concerned with the single logical relations and their
combinations, the second more with general concepts and
their analysis. A person's talent is his total capacity re-
sulting from the special tendencies of both his imagination
and understanding.

298 I^I' Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

References. Wundt, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture
21, and Logik, vol. I, chap. 1 and Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, Pt. 2,
chap. 7.

§ 18. PSYCHICAL STATES.

1. Tlie normal state of consciousness upon which the
discussion of the foregoing paragraphs has been based may
undergo such a variety of changes that general psychology
must give up the attempt to discuss these changes in detail.
Then, too, the more important of these changes, namely,
those which are observed in the various forms of nervous
diseases, brain-diseases, and insanity, belong to special branches
of pathology which border upon psychology and are more
or less dependent upon it. All that psychology can do is
to indicate the main psychical conditions for abnormal states.
We may distinguish in general three kinds of such condi-
tions. They may consist 1) in the abnormal character of
the psychical elements^ 2) in abnormalities in « the way in
which psychical compounds are constituted, and 3) in ab-
normalities in the way in which psychical compounds are
combined. As a result of the intimate interconnection of
these different kinds of conditions it hardly ever happens
that one of these three conditions is operative alone; all
three usually unite. The abnormal character of the elements
results in abnormalities of the compounds, and this in turn
brings about changes in the general interconnection of con-
scious processes.

2. The psychical elements.^ that is, sensations and simple
feelings, show only such changes as result from some dis-
turbance in the normal relation between them and their
psycho-physical conditions. In the case of sensations such
changes may be reduced to an increase or decrease of the
sensitivity for stimuH (hyperaesthesia and anaesthesia) result-

§ 18. Psychical States. 299

ing especially from the action of certain physiological in-
fluences within the sensory centres. The most important
psychological symptom in this case is the increased excita-
bility which is one of the most common factors of complex
psychical disturbances. In similar fashion, changes in the
simple feehngs betray themselves in states of depression or
exaltation as a decrease or increase in the affective excita-
bility. These different states may be recognized from the
way in which the emotions and volitional processes occur.
Thus, changes in the psychical elements can be demonstrated
only by the influence that they exercise on the character of
the various psychical compounds.

3. The defects in ideational compounds arising from
peripheral or central anaesthesia are generally of limited
importance. They have no far-reaching effect on the inter-
connection of psychical processes. It is essentially different
with the relative increase in the sensation which results from
central hyperaesthesia. The effect of such hyperaesthesia is
especially important because when it is present, reproduced
sensational elements may become as intense as external sense
impressions. The result may be that a pure memory image
is objectified as a sense perception. This is an hallucination.
Or, when elements are united which are partly from direct
external stimulation, partly from reproduction, the sense im-
pression may be essentially modified through the intensity
of the reproduced elements. The result is then an illusion
of fancy ^]. The two abnormalities are not always distin-

1) The expression "illusions of fancy" is used when this class of
illusions is to be distinguished from the sense illusions that appear
in the normal state of consciousness, as, for example, from the radiat-
ing' form of the stars, which is due to the refraction of light in the
crystalline lens, or the varying apparent size of the sun or moon
at the horizon and at the zenith.

300 -HI Interconneetion of Psychical Compomids.

guisliable, for though in many cases particular ideas can be
shown to be illusions of fancy, the presence of pure hallu-
cinations is almost always doubtful because it is so easy
to overlook some direct sensational elements. In fact, it is
by no means improbable that the great majority of so-called
hallucinations are illusions. These illusions are in their psy-
chological character nothing but assimilations (p. 251 sq.).
They may be defined as assimilations in which the repro-
duced elements predominate. Just as normal assimilations
are connected with successive associations, so for the same
reason, the illusions of fancy are closely related to the
changes in the associative ideational processes to be discussed
later (5).

4. In the case of complex affective and volitional processes
the abnormal states are clearly distinguishable as states of
depression and exaltation. The state of depression is due
to the predominance of inhibitory, asthenic emotions, that
of exaltation to a predominance of exciting, sthenic emo-
tions, while at the same time we observe, in the first case
a retardation or complete checking of resolution, in the
second an exceedingly rapid, impulsive activity of the motive.
In this sphere it is generally more difficult to draw the
line between normal and abnormal conditions than in the
sphere of ideational compounds, because even in normal
mental life the affective states are continually changing. In
pathological cases the change between states of depression and
exaltation, which are often very striking, appear merely as
intensification of the normal oscillation of the feelings and
emotions about an indifference-condition (pp. 87, 186). States
of depression and exaltation are especially characteristic
symptoms of general psychical disturbances; their detailed
discussion must therefore be left to psychical pathology.
Greneral psychical disturbances are always symptoms of dis-

§ 18. Psychical States. 301

eases of the brain, so that these abnormalities in affective
and volitional processes are doubtless accompanied, like ab-
normalities of the sensations and ideas, by physiological
changes. The nature of these changes is, however, still un-
known. We can only surmise, in accordance with the more
complex character of affective processes, either that they
are more extensive than the changes in central excitabihty
accompanying hallucinations and illusions, or that they affect
the central cortial regions directly concerned in apperceptive
processes.

5. Connected with these changes in the sensory excita-
bility and with states of depression and exaltation, there are,
as a rule, simultaneous changes in the interconnection and
course of psychical processes. Using the concept conscious-
ness which we employ to express this interconnection (p. 223),
we may call these changes abnormal changes of consciousness.
So long as the abnormality is limited to the single psychical
compounds, ideas, emotions, and voHtions, consciousness is of
course changed because of the changes in its components,
but we do not speak of an abnormality of consciousness
itself until not merely the single compounds, but also the
combinations of these compounds, exhibit some noticeable
abnormalities. Such changes in the combinations always
arise when the elementary disturbances become greater, be-
cause the combinations of elements into compounds and of
compounds with one another, are processes that pass con-
tiuously into each other. Corresponding to the different
kinds of combination which make up the interconnection of
consciousness (p. 244), there may be distinguished in general
three kinds of abnormahties of consciousness: 1) changes in
the associations, 2) changes in the apperceptive combinations,
and 3) changes in the relation of the two forms of combi-
nation.

302 ^11 Intereonnection of Psychical Compounds.

6. Chaiiges in associations are the first to result directly
from tlie elementary disturbances. The increase of sensory
excitability changes normal assimilations into illusions of
fancy, and this results in an essential disturbance in the
associative processes of recognition (p, 261). Sometimes that
which is known to the subject appears to be unknown, and
then again what is unknown appears familiar, according as
the reproduced elements are connected with definite earlier
ideas, or are derived from perceptions which have only a
remote relation to one another. Then, too, the increased
sensory excitability tends to accelerate the association, so
that the most superficial connections, which are occasioned
by accidental impressions or by habit, are the ones that pre-
dominate. The states of depression and exaltation, on the
other hand, determine mainly the quality and direction of
the association.

In a similar manner the elementary ideational and affective
changes influence apperceptive combinations^ either retarding
or accelerating them, or else determining their direction.
Still, in these cases all marked abnormalities in ideational
or affective processes result in an increase, to a greater or
less degree, of the difficulty of carrying out the processes
connected with active attention, so that often, only the
simpler apperceptive combinations are possible, sometimes
only those are possible which through practice have become
simple associations. Connected with the last mentioned fact
are the changes that take place in the relation between ap-
perceptive and associative combinations. The influences dis-
cussed thus far are in the main favorable to associations,
but unfavorable to apperceptive combinations. In keeping
with this is the fact that one of the most frequent symptoms
of a far-reaching psychical abnormality is a great preponder-
ance of associations. This is most obvious when the dis-

§ 18. Psychical States. 303

turbance of consciousness is a continually increasing process,
as it is in many cases of insanity. The observation may be
made in such cases that the functions of apperception, that
is, the so-called processes of imagination and understanding
are more and more supplanted by associations, until finally
the latter are all that remain. If the disturbance progresses
still further, the associations gradually become more limited
and confined to certain habitual combinations (fixed ideas).
Finally this state gives place to one of complete mental
paralysis.

7. Apart from mental diseases in the strict sense of the
term', the irregularities of consciousness just discussed are
to be found in two conditions that appear in the course of
normal life: in dreams and hypnosis.

The ideas which arise in dreams come, at least to a great
extent, from sensations, especially from those of the general
sense, and are therefore mostly illusions of fancy, probably
only seldom pure memory ideas that have become hallucina-
tions. The decrease of apperceptive combinations in com-
parison with associations, is also striking and goes to explain
the frequent modifications and exchanges of self -conscious-
ness, the confusion of the judgment, etc. The characteristics
of dreams which distinguish them from other similar psy-
chical states, are to be found, not so much in these positive
attributes, as in certain negative attributes. The increase of
excitability is limited entirely to the sensory functions, the
external volitional activity being in ordinary sleep and dreams
completely inhibited. When the fanciful ideas of dreams
are connected with corresponding volitional acts, we have
the very infrequent phenomena of sleep-walking ., which are re-
lated to certain forms of hypnosis. Motor concomitants are
generally limited to articulations, and appear as talking in
dreams.

304 in. Interconnection of Psychical Compounds.

8. Hypnosis is the name applied to certain states related
to sleep and dreams and produced by means of certain defi-
nite psychical agencies. Consciousness is here generally in
a condition halfway between waking and sleeping. The main
cause of hypnosis is suggestion., that is, the communication
of an idea strong in affective tone. This communication
generally takes the form of a command from some other
person (outward suggestion), but may sometimes be given by
the subject himself, when it is called autosuggestion. The
command or resolution to sleep, to make certain movements,
to perceive certain objects which are not present, or not to
perceive objects which are present, etc., — these are the most
frequent suggestions. Monotonous stimuli, especially tactual
stimuli are helpful auxiliaries. Then, too, there is a certain
disposition of the nervous system of unknown character,
which is necessary for the rise of the hypnotic state and
this disposition is decidedly increased when the state is re-
peatedly produced.

The first symptom of hypnosis is the more or less complete
inhibition of external volitional acts. This is connected with
a concentration of the attention on one thing, generally the
command of the hypnotizer (automatism). The subject not
only sleeps at command, but retains in this state any position
that is given him, however unnatural (hypnotic catalepsy).
If the sleep becomes still deeper the subject makes, to all
appearances automatically, the movements which he is directed
to make, and he shows that ideas suggested to him appear
like real objects (somnambulism). In this last state it is
possible to give either motor or sensory suggestions which
are to go into effect when the subject awakes, or even at
some later time (terminal suggestions). The phenomena that
accompany such "posthypnotic effects" render it probable
that the after-effects are due either to a partial persistence

§ 18. Psychical States. 305

of the hypnosis or (in the case of terminal suggestions) to
a renewal of the hypnotic state.

9. It appears from all these phenomena that sleep and
hypnosis are related states, differing only in the fact that
their mode of origin is different. They have as common
characteristics the inhibition of processes of volition and at-
tention, and a disposition toward aroused excitability in the
sensory centres that brings about an assimilation of the sense
impressions and thus results in illusions of fancy. The char-
acteristics which distinguish sleep and hypnosis are the
complete inhibition of volition in sleep, especially of the
apperceptive function and of every phase of motor function,
and the concentration in hypnosis of the passive attention
on one thing. This concentration is conditioned by suggestion
and is at the same time favorable to the reception of further
suggestions. These differences are, however, not absolute, for
in sleep-walking the will is not completely inhibited, while,
on the other hand, it is inhibited in the first lethargic stages
of hypnosis just as in ordinary sleep.

Sleep, dreams, and hypnosis are, accordingly, in all prob-
ability, essentially the same in their psychophysical conditions.
These conditions consist in the specially modified dispositions
to sensational and volitional reactions, and can, therefore,
like all such dispositions, be explained on their physiolog-
ical side only by assuming changes in the activity of certain
central regions. These changes have not yet been investigated
directly. Still, we may assume from the psychological symp-
toms that the physiological conditions consist as a rule, in
the inhibition of activity in the regions connected with proc-
esses of volition and attention, and in increased excitability
of the sensory centres.

9 a. It is then, strictly speaking, a physiological problem to
formulate a theory of sleep, dreams, and hypnosis. Apart from,

WxjNDT, Psycliology. 2. edit, 20

306 ^U. Interconneetion of Psychical Compounds.

the general assumption based on psychological symptoms, of an
inhibition of activity in certain parts of the cerebral cortex,
and increase in the activity of other parts, we can apply only
one general neurological principle with any degree of proba-
bility. This is the principle of compensation of functions^ ac-
cording to which the inhibition of the activity of one region is
always connected with an increase in the activity of the other
interrelated areas. This interrelation may be either direct, neuro-
dynamic^ or indirect, vasomotoric. The first is probably due to
the fact that energy which accumulates in one region as the
result of inhibition, is discharged through the connecting fibres
into other central regions. The second is due to contraction
of the capillaries as a result of inhibition and a compensating
dilation of the blood-vessels in other regions. The increased
blood supply due to this dilation is in turn attended by an
increase in the activity of the region in question. Judging
from the psychological symptoms, one of the essential differ-
ences between dreams and hypnosis seems to consist in the
fact that in dreams the central regions which are related to
apperception are in a more or less completely inactive state,
so that all stimulations flow, according to the principle of com-
pensation, to the sensory centres. In hypnosis, on the other
hand, it is possible for different regions within the appercep-
tion centre itself to be so related that while certain of these
regions are partially inhibited, others are correspondingly more
open to excitation. This line of inference seems to be justified
by the examination of certain states of partial hypnosis which
may arise through an increased disposition on the part of a
subject to become hypnotized, which increased disposition results
from practice. In such states of partial hypnosis the subject
may carry out in an automatic way complicated acts, all his
other functions seeming to be in a waking state. Or he may
show certain psychological activities of clearer discrimination,
or strikingly exact recognition, or reproduction of certain par-
ticular sensations and feelings to the exclusion of all other forms
of activity. This last mentioned state of partial hypnosis in
which attention is concentrated in a single direction is the only
form of hypnosis which can possibly be thought of as having
any direct psychological value. This state may be of some

§ 18. Psychical States. 307

value because of the introspection which it renders possible in
response to experimentally prepared sensory stimulations. But
even in this state the greatest possible care will be necessary
to avoid one danger which will always be present, namely, the
danger that deceptive suggestions from others or from one's self
are interfering with the introspection.

Dreams and hypnosis are often made the subjects of mystical
and fanciful hypotheses, in some cases even by psychologists.
We hear of increased mental activity in dreams and of in-
fluence of mind on minds at a distance in dreams and hypnosis.
Especially hypnotism has been used in this way, to support
superstitious spiritualistic ideas. In connection with "animal
magnetism", which may be completely explained by the theory
of hypnosis and suggestion, and in connection with "somnam-
bulism", there are a great many cases of self-deception and
intentional humbug. In reality all that can stand the light of
thorough examination in these phenomena is in general readily
explicable on psychological and physiological grounds; what is
not explicable in this way has always proved on closer exami-
nation to be superstitious self-deception or intentional fraud.

References. On Psychical Disturbances in general: Kraepelin,
Psychiatric, 5th. ed., vol. I, 1896. Storking, Vorlesungen iiber Psycho-
pathologie, 1900. P. Janet, Nevroses et idees fixes, vols. 1 and 2,

1898. SoMMER, Lehrb. der psychopathol. Untersuchungsmethoden,

1899. WuNDT, Grundztige der phys. Psych., vol. II, chap. 19, and
Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lectures 21 and 22, On Sleep
and Dreams: Purkinje, Wachen, Schlaf und Traum, Handworterb. d.
Physiol., vol. Ill, Pt. 2. Radestock, Schlaf und Traum, 1879. Giessler,
Aus den Tiefen des Traumlebens, 1890. Weygandt, Entstehung der
Traume, 1893. Michelsen, Tiefe des Schlafes, Kraepelin's Psychol.
Arbeiten, vol. 2. On Hypnosis: Bernheim, Die Suggestion, 1888.
Forel, Der Hypnotismus, 2nd. ed., 1891, Lehmann, Die Hypnose,
1890. 0. Yogt, Zeitschr. f. Hypnotismus, vols. 3—6. Wundt, Philos.
Studien, vol. 8. Lipps, Sitzungsber. der Miinchener Akad., 1897, vol. 2,
and Zeitschr. f. Hypnot., vol. 6.

20*

IV. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

§ 19. PSYCHIOAL ATTEIBUTES OF ANIMALS.

1. The animal kingdom exhibits a series of mental devel-
opments which may be regarded as antecedents to the mental
development of man, for the mental life of animals shows itself
to be throughout, in its elements and in the general laws
governing the combination of these elements, the same as
the mental life of man.

Even the lowest animals (protozoa and coelenterata) mani-
fest vital phenomena that allow us to infer ideational and
volitional processes. They seize their food, to all appearances
spontaneously; they flee from pursuing enemies, etc. There
are also to be found in the lowest stages of animal life
traces of associations and reproductions and especially proc-
esses of sensible cognition and recognition (p. 261). In the
higher animals these function reach a more advanced stage of
development only through the increase in the length of time
through which the memory processes extend. Furthermore,
from the fact that structure and development of the sense
organs is similar in man and animals, we must draw the con-
clusion that the character of the sense ideas is in general the
same, the only difference being that in the lowest forms of life
the sensory functions are limited to the general sense of touch,
jast as they are in the case of the higher organisms in the
first stages of their individual development (p. 51).

§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 309

In contrast with this uniformity of psychical elements
and their simpler combinations, there are great differences in
all the processes connected with the development of apper-
ception. Passive apperception is never absent as the basis
of the simple impulsive acts which are found everywhere,
but active apperception in the form of voluntary attention
to certain impressions and choice between different motives,
probably never exists except in the higher animals. Even
here it is limited to the ideas and associations aroused by
immediate sensible impressions, so that we can find even in
animals with the highest mental development certainly nothing
more than the first beginnings of intellectual processes in
the proper sense of the word, that is, of activities of imagi-
nation and understanding. Indeed, it may be questioned
whether even these first beginnings are here present. Con-
nected with this fact is the fact that higher animals have
no developed language, though they are able to give ex-
pression to their emotions and even their ideas, when
these ideas are connected with emotions, through various
expressive movements which are frequently related to those
of man.

2. Though the development of animals is in general far
behind that of man, in spite of the 'qualitative likeness of
the fundamental psychical processes, still, in two ways it is
often superior. First, animals reach psychical maturity much
more rapidly., and secondly, certain single functions partic-
ularly favoured by the special conditions under which the
species lives, are often more highly developed. The fact of
more rapid maturity is shown by the early age at which many
animals (some immediately after birth) are able to receive
relatively clear sense impressions and to execute purposive
movements. To be sure, there are very great differences
among higher animals in this respect. For example, the

310 I^- Psychical Developments.

chick just out of the shell begins to pick up grain^ while
the pup is blind at birth, and is for a long time after birth
clumsy in his movements. Yet, the development of the child
seems to be the slowest and the most dependent on help
and care from others.

3. The special one-sided development of single functions
in some animals is even more striking. These functions show
themselves in certain impulsive acts regularly connected with
the satisfaction of certain needs, either of alimentation, re-
production, or protection, arid in the development of the
sense perceptions arid associations that form the motives for
such acts. Such specially developed impulses are called
instincts. The assumption that instincts belong only to animal
and not to human consciousness is, of course, entirely un-
psychological, and contradictory to experience. The disposi-
tion to manifest the [general animal impulses, namely, the
alimentive impulses and sexual impulses, is just as much a
connate attribute of man as of the animals. The only thing
that is characteristic of animals is the special highly devel-
oped form of the purposive acts by which many animals
reach the ends aimed at. Different animals, however, are
very different in tliis respect. There are numerous lower and
higher animals whose acts resulting from connate instincts
show as few striking characteristics as those of men. It is
also noteworthy that domestication generally tends to do
away with the instincts that animals had in their wild state^
and to develop new ones which may generally be regarded
as modifications of the wild instincts. This is seen, for
example, in the instincts of certain hunting dogs, especially
those of bird-dogs and pointers. The relatively high devel-
opment of certain special instincts in animals as compared
with men, is simply a manifestation of the general unsym-
metrical development of animals. The whole psychical life

§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 311

of animals consists almost entirely of the processes that are
connected with the predominating instinct.

4. In general, instincts may be regarded as impulsive
acts that arise from particular sensations and feelings. The
physiological sources of the sensations chiefly concerned in
instincts are the alimentary and genital organs. All animal
instincts may, accordingly, be reduced to alimentive and
sexual instincts, though in connection with the latter, espe-
cially in their more complex forms, there are always auxiliary
protective and social impulses which may be regarded, from
the character of their origin, as special modifications of the
sexual impulse. Among these auxiliary forms must be clas-
sified the impulses of many animals to build houses and nests,
as is the case with beavers, birds, and numerous insects (for
example, spiders, wasps, bees, ants), and also the instinct of
animal marriage found chiefly among birds and appearing
both in the monogamic and polygamic forms. Finally, the
so-called "animal states", as those of the bees, of ants, and
of termites, belong under this head. They are in reality not
states, but sexual communities, in which the social impulse
that unites the individuals, as well as the common protective
impulse, are modifications of the reproduction impulse.

In the case of all instincts the particular concrete impul-
sive acts arise from certain sense stimuli partly external,
partly internal. The acts themselves are to be classed as
impulsive acts, or simple volitions, since they are preceded
and accompanied by particular sensations and feelings which
serve as simple motives. The complex, connate character
of these acts can be explained only from general inherited
attributes of the nervous system, as a result of which
connate reflex mechanisms are immediately, without practice
on the part of the individual, set in action by certain stimuH.
The purposive character of these mechanisms must also

312 IV^- Psychical Developments.

be regarded as a product of general psycho-physical devel-
opment. As further evidence of this we have the fact that
instincts show not only various modifications in different in-
dividuals, but they also show a certain degree of higher de-
velopment through individual practice. In this way, the bird
gradually learns to build its nest better; bees accommodate
themselves to changing needs, instead of sending out new
colonies they enlarge the hive if they have the necessary
room. Even abnormal habits may be acquired by a single
community of bees or ants ; bees, for example, may learn to
rob a neighbouring hive instead of gathering the honey from
the flowers, or ants may acquire the remarkable habit of
making the members of another species slaves, or of domes-
ticating plant-lice for the sake of their honey. The rise,
growth, and transmission of these habits, as we can trace
them, show clearly the way in which all complicated instincts
may arise. An instinct never appears alone, but there are
always simpler forms of the same instinct in related classes
and species. Thus the hole that the wall-wasp bores in the
wall in which to lay her eggs, is a primitive pattern of the
ingenious hive of the honey-bee. Between these two extremes
there is, as the natural transition stage, the hive of the
ordinary wasp made of a few hexagonal cells constructed of
cemented sticks and leaves.

"We may, accordingly, explain the complex instincts as
developed forms of originally simple impulses which have
gradually differentiated more and more in the course of
numberless generations, through the gradual accumulation of
habits that have been acquired by individuals and then trans-
mitted. Every single habitual act is to be regarded as a
stage in this psychical development. The gradual passage
of a habit into a connate disposition is to be explained
as a psycho -physical process of practice through which

§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 313

complex volitional acts gradually pass into automatic move-
ments following immediately and reflexly the appropriate
impression.

5. If we try to answer tlie general question of the genetic
relation of man to the animals on the ground of a compari-
son of their psychical attributes, it must be admitted, in
view of the likeness of psychical elements and of their simplest
and most general forms of combination, that it is possible
that human consciousness has developed from a lower form
of animal consciousness. This assumption is also rendered
stronger by the fact that the animal kingdom presents a whole
series of different stages of psychical development and that
every human individual passes through an analogous devel-
opment. The doctrine of psychical development thus confirms
in general the results of the theory of physical evolution.
Still we must not overlook the fact that between the psychical
attributes of man and those of the animals, as expressed in
the intellectual and affective processes resulting from apper-
ceptive combinations, there are differences much broader
than the differences in their physical characteristics. Then,
too, the great stability of the psychical condition of animals,
which condition undergoes little change even in domestica-
tion, renders it exceedingly improbable that any of the present
animal forms will develop in their psychical attributes, much
beyond the limits that they have already reached.

5 a. The attempts to define the relation of man and animals
from a psychological point of view vary between two extremes.
One of these is the predominating view of the old psychology
that the higher "faculties of mind", especially "reason", are
entirely wanting in animals, or that, as Descartes held, animals
are mere reflex mechanisms without mind. The other is the
wide -spread opinion of representatives of special animal psy-
chology, that animals are essentially equal to man in all respects.

314 I^- Psychical

in ability to consider, to judge, to draw conclusions, in moral
feelings, etc. "With the rejection of faculty-psychology the first
of these views becomes untenable. The second rests on the
tendency prevalent in popular psychology to interpret all objec-
tive phenomena in terms of human thought, especially in terms
of logical reflection. The closer analysis of so-called manifesta-
tions of intelligence among animals shows, however, that they
are in all cases fully explicable as simple sensible recognitions
and associations, and that they lack the characteristics belonging
to concepts proper and to logical operations. But associative
processes pass without a break into apperceptive, and the be-
ginnings of the latter, that is simple acts of active attention
and choice, appear without any doubt in the case of higher
animals, so that the difference is after all more one of the degree
and complexity of the psychical processes than a difference in kind.
Animal instincts presented a very great difficulty to the older
forms of psychology, such as the faculty theory and the intellec-
tualistic theories (§ 2). There the attempt to deduce these instincts
from the conditions given in each individual case led to an im-
probably high estimation of the psychical ability of the animal,
especially when the instinct was more complex. As a result,
the conclusion was often accepted that instincts are incomprehen-
sible, or, what amounts to the same thing, due to connate ideas.
This "enigma of the instincts" ceases to be an enigma when
we come to look upon instincts, as we have done above, as
special forms of impulsive action, and consider them as analogous
to the simple impulsive acts of men and animals, for which we
have a psychological explanation. This is especially true when
we follow the reduction of what were originally complicated acts,
to impulsive or reflex movements in the phenomena of habit.
Such reduction can be easily observed in the case of man, as,
for example, in the habituation to complex movements in learn-
ing to play the piano (comp. p. 212 sq.). It is often argued
against this theory of instinct that it is impossible to prove
empirically the transmission of acquired individual variations
which we have assumed; that, for example, there are no certain
observations in proof of the transmission of mutilations, as was
formerly so frequently asserted. Many biologists accept the
view that all the properties of the organism arise through the

§ 19. Psychical Attributes of Animals. 315

selection resulting from the survival of the individual best ad-
apted to natural conditions; that all such properties of the in-
dividual are accordingly deducible from "natural selection", and
that in this way alone changes can be produced in the germ
and transmitted to descendants. Though it is admitted that an
attribute acquired by a single individual, generally has no effect
on the descendents, still, there is no apparent reason why habitual
acts, which are indeed indirectly due to outer natural conditions,
but depend primarily on the inner psycho-physical attributes of
the organism, may not, just as well as the direct influences of
natural selection, cause changes in the nature of the germ, at
least, when the acts in question are repeated through many
generations. Further evidence in favor of the view we have
been defending is to be found in the fact that in some cases
whole families inherit peculiar expressive movements or technical
ability in some line. This does not exclude in any case the
cooperation of natural influences, but is in full agreement with
the facts of observation which show that these influences act in
two ways: first, directly in the changes that natural selection
brings about in the organism while the organism remains passive,
and secondly, indirectly in the psycho-physical reactions which
are caused by the outer influences, and which then in turn give
rise to changes in the organism. If we neglect the latter fact,
we not only lose an important means of accounting for the
purposive character of organisms, but further, and more espe-
cially, we render impossible a psychological explanation of the
gradual development of volition and its retrogradation into pur-
posive reflexes as we see those processes in a large number of
connate expressive movements (§ 20, l).

References. Schneider, Der thierische Wille, 1880. Romanes,
Mental Evolution in Animal. Espinas, Die thierischen Ges ells chaf ten,
1879. Lubbock, Ants, Bees and Wasps. Wasmann, Instinct und In-
telligenz im Thierreich, 1897, and Die psychischen Fahigkeiten der
Ameisen, Zoologica, vol. 26, 1899. Bethe, Pfliiger's Archiv f. Physiol.,
vol. 70 (the author seeks to reduce the instinctive acts of ants and
bees to pure mechanical reflexes). Gross, (Engl, trans, by Baldwin)
The Play of Animals. Wundt, Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych,
lectures 23, 24, 27 and 28.

316 I^' Psychical Developments.

§ 20. PSYCHICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CHILD.

1. The fact that the psychical development of man is
regularly slower than that of most animals is to he seen in
the much more gradual maturing of the child's sense functions.
The child, to be sure, reacts immediately after birth to all
kinds of sense stimuli, most clearly to impressions of touch
and taste, with the least certainty to those of sound. Still,
it is impossible to doubt that the special forms of the reac-
tion movements in all these cases are due to inherited re-
flexes. This is especially true of the child's crying when
affected by cold and tactual impressions, and of the mimetic
reflexes when he tastes sweet, sour, or bitter substances. It
is probable that all these impressions are accompanied by
obscure sensations and feelings, yet the character of the
movements can not be explained from the feelings, the
symptoms of which they may be considered to be, but must
be referred to connate central reflex tracts.

Clearly conscious experiences begin to show themselves
after the end of the first month, but they are, as the rapid
change of moods shows, sensations and feelings of a very
changeable character. This date of the first rise of experi-
ence is fixed by the fact that we begin to observe symptoms,
not only of unpleasurable feelings, but those of pleasurable
feelings also in the child's laughter, and in lively rhythmical
movements of his arms and legs after certain sense impres-
sions. Even the reflexes are not completely developed at
first — a fact which we can easily understand when we
learn from anatomy that many of the connecting fibres
between the cerebral centres do not develop until after birth.
Thus the associative reflex-movements of the two eyes are
wanting. To be sure, from the first, each of the eyes

§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 317

generally turns by itself towards a light. The movements
of the two eyes are entirely irregular, and it is only in the
course of the first three months that the normal coordina-
tion of the movements of the two eyes towards a common
fixation-point, begins to appear. Even then the developing
regularity of movement is not to be regarded as a result
of complete visual perceptions, quite the reverse, it is to
be recognized that this regularity of movement is an external
manifestation of the gradual functioning of a reflex-centre,
which then renders complete perception possible.

2. It is impossible to gain any adequate information
about the qualitative relations of psychical elements in the
child's consciousness, for the reason that we have no certain
objective symptoms. It is probable that the number of
different tonal sensations, perhaps also the number of color
sensations, is very limited. The fact that children two years
old not infrequently use the wrong names for colors ought
not however, to be looked upon as unqualified evidence that
they do not have the sensation in question. It is much more
probable that lack of attention and a confusion of the names
is the real explanation in such cases.

Towards the end of the first year the differentiation of
feelings and the related development of the various emotions
take place and show themselves strikingly in the character-
istic expressive movements that gradually arise. We now
observe unpleasurable feelings and joy, and then in succes-
sion, astonishment, expectation, anger, shame, envy, etc. Even
in these cases the physiological dispositions for the combined
movements which express the single emotions, depend upon
inherited physiological attributes of the nervous system which
generally do not begin to function until after the first few
months. As further evidence of such a view of hereditary
transmission, we have Dakwin's observation that not infre-

318 ^^- Psychical Developments.

quently special peculiarities in expressive movements show
themselves in v^^hole families.

3. The physical conditions for the rise of spacial ideas
are connate in the form of inherited reflex connections which
make a relatively rapid development of these ideas possible.
But for the child the spacial perceptions seem at first to be
much more incomplete than are such perceptions in the case
of many animals. There are manifestations of pain when
the skin is stimulated, but no clear symptoms of localization.
Distinct grasping movements develop gradually from the
aimless movements that are observed even in the first days,
but they do not, as a rule, become certain and consciously
purposive until aided by visual perceptions, after the twelfth
week. The turning of the eye toward a source of light
which is generally observed very early, is to be regarded as
reflex. The gradual coordination of ocular movements is the
result of these reflex adjustments. It is probable that along
with these reflexes there are developed spacial ideas. We
can not observe the first beginnings of these ideas, but only
their gradual development from very crude beginnings. This
is due to the fact that the whole development is a gradual,
continuous process, and is from the first interconnected with
its original physiological substratum. Even in the child the
sense of sight shows itself to be decidedly more rapid in
its development than the sense of touch, for the symptoms
of visual localization are certainly observable earlier than are
those of tactual localization, and the grasping movements, as
mentioned above, do not reach their full development until
aided by the sense of sight. The field of binocular vision
is much later in its development than that of monocular
vision. Monocular localization shows itself in the discrimi-
nation of directions in space. The beginnings of the devel-
opment of a field for binocular vision coincide with the first

§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 319

coordination of ocular movements and belong, accordingly,
to the second half of the first year. The perception of size,
of distance, and of various three-dimensional figures, remains
for a long time very imperfect. Especially, distant objects
are all thought to be near at hand^ so that they appear
relatively small to the child.

4. Temporal ideas develop along with the spacial ideas.
The ability to form regular temporal ideas and the pleasure
derived by the child from these ideas, show themselves in the
first months in the movements of his limbs and especially
in the tendency to accompany rhythms that are heard, with
similar rhythmical inovements. Some children can imitate
correctly, even before they can speak, the rhythmical melodies
that they hear, in sounds and intonations. Still, the ideas
of longer intervals are very imperfect, even at the end of
the first year and later, so that a child gives very irregular
judgments as to the duration of different periods and also
as to the sequence of these periods.

5. The development of associations and of simple apper-
ceptive combinations goes hand in hand with the development
of spacial and temporal ideas. Symptoms of sensible recog-
nitions (p. 261) are observable from the very first days, in
the rapidly acquired abiHty to find the mother's breast and
in the obvious habituation to the objects and persons of the
environment. Still, for a long time these associations cover
only very short intervals of time, at first only hours, then
days. Even in the third and fourth years children either
forget entirely, or remember only imperfectly, persons who
have been absent for a few weeks.

The case with attention is similar. At first it is possible
to concentrate attention upon a single object only for a
very short time, and it is obvious that passive apperception
which always follows the predominating stimulus, that is, the

320 I^- Psychical Development

stimulus which has. the strongest affective tone (p. 238), is the
only form of apperception present. In the first weeks, how-
ever, a lasting attention shows itself in the way in which
the child fixates and follows objects for a longer time,
especially if they are moving; and at the same time we
observe the first trace of active apperception in the ability
to turn voluntarily from one impression to another. From
this point on, the ability becomes more and more fully de-
veloped; though the attention, even in later childhood, fatigues
more rapidly than in adults, and requires a greater variety
of objects or a more frequent pause for rest.

6. The development of self-consciousness keeps pace with
the development of the associations and apperceptions. In
judging of this development we must guard against accepting
as signs of self-consciousness single symptoms, such as the
child's discrimination of the parts of his body from objects
of his environment, his use of the word "I", or even the
recognition of his own image in the mirror. The adult
savage who has never before seen his own reflected image,
takes it for some other person. The use of the personal
pronoun is due to the child's imitation of the examples of
those about him. This imitation comes at very different
times in the cases of different children, even when their in-
tellectual development in other respects is the same. Such
use of the first personal pronoun is, to be sure, a symptom
of the presence of self- consciousness, but the first beginnings
of self-consciousness may have preceded this discrimination
in speech by a longer or a shorter period of time in differ-
ent cases. Again, the discrimination of the body and its
parts from other objects is a symptom of exactly the same
kind. The recognition of the body is a process that regularly
precedes the true recognition of the image in the mirror,
but one is as little a criterion of the beginning of self-con-

§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 321

sciousness as the other. They both presuppose the existence
of some degree of self-consciousness beforehand. Just as
the developed self-consciousness is based upon a number of
different conditions (p. 243), so in the same way, the self-
consciousness of the child is from the first a product of
several components, partly ideational in character, partly
affective and volitional. Among the ideational processes, we
have the discrimination of a constant group of ideas, among
the affective and volitional processes, we have the develop-
ment of certain interconnected processes of attention and
certain volitional acts. The constant group of ideas does
not necessarily include all parts of the body, as, for example,
the legs, which are usually covered, and it may, as is more
often the case, include external objects, as, for example,
the clothes generally worn. The subjective affective and
volitional components, and the relations that exist between
these and the ideational components in external volitional
acts, are the factors that exercise the greater influence. The
influence of these subjective factors is shown most strikingly
in the fact that strong feelings, especially those of pain,
very often mark in an individual's memory the first moment
to which the continuity of his self-consciousness reaches back.
But there can be no doubt that a form of self-conscious-
ness, even though less interconnected, exists even before this
first clearly remembered moment, which generally comes in
the third to the sixth year. Still, since the objective obser-
vation of the child is not based at first on any sure criteria,
it is impossible to determine the exact moment when self-
consciousness begins. Probably the traces of it begin to
appear in the first weeks; after this it continually becomes
clearer under the constant influence of the conditions men-
tioned^ and increases in temporal extent just as does con-
sciousness in general.

Wdndt, Psychology. 2. edit. 21

322 IV^- Psychical Developments.

7. The development of will is intimately connected with
the development of self-consciousness. The development of
will may be inferred partly from the development of atten-
tion described above, partly from the rise and gradual per-
fection of external volitional acts. The immediate relation
of attention to will appears in the fact that symptoms of
active attention and voluntary action come at exactly the
same time. Yery many animals execute immediately after
birth fairly perfect impulsive movements. These are ren-
dered possible by inherited reflex mechanisms of a complex
character. The new-born child, on the contrary^ does not
show any traces of such impulsive acts. We observe, how-
ever, in the first days the earliest beginnings of simple voli-
tional acts of an impulsive character. These result from
the reflexes caused by sensations of hunger and by the
sense perceptions connected with appeasing hunger. The
primitive volitional acts growing out of these reflexes are to
be seen in the evident quest after the sources of nourish-
ment. With the obvious growth of attention come the voli-
tional acts connected with impressions of sight and hearing:
the child purposely, no longer merely in a reflex way^ follows
visual objects, and turns his head towards the noises that
he hears. Much later come the movements of the outer
muscles of the limbs and trunk. Especially the muscles of
the limbs, show from the first lively movements ^ generally
repeated time and time again. These movements are accom-
panied by all possible feelings and emotions, and when the
emotions become differentiated, the movements begin gradu-
ally to exhibit certain differences characteristic of the quality
of the emotions. The chief difference consists in the fact
that rhythmical movements accompany pleasurable emotions,
while arhythmical, and, as a rule, violent movements result
when the emotions are unpleasurable. These expressive mpve-

§ 20. Psychical Develojmient of the Child. 323

ments, which must be looked upon as reflexes attended by
feelings pass^ as occasion offers, and as soon as the attention
begins to turn upon the surroundings, into ordinary voluntary
expressive movements. Thus, the child shows through the
different accompanying symptoms that he not only feels pain,
annoyance, anger, etc., but also that he wishes to give expres-
sion to these emotions. The first movements, however, in
which an antecedent motive is to be recognized beyond a
doubt, are the grasping movements which begin in the twelfth
to the fourteenth week. At first, the foot takes part in these
movements as well as the hand. We have here also the
first clear symptoms of sense perception, as well as the first
indications of the existence of a simple vohtional process
made up of motive, decision, and act. Somewhat later
intentional imitative movements are to be observed. Simple
mimetic imitations, such as puckering the lips and frowning,
come first, and then pantomimetic, such as doubling up the
fist, beating time, etc. Very gradually, as a rule not until
after the beginning of the second half of the first year,
coinplex volitional acts develop from these simple ones. The
oscillation of decision, the voluntary suppression of an in-
tended act or one already begun, are clearly observed at
this period.

Learning to walk^ which usually begins in the last third
of the first year, is an important factor in the development
of voluntary acts in the proper sense of the term. The
importance of this development is due to the fact that
wa^lking to certain particular places furnishes the occasion
for the rise of a number of conflicting motives. Learning
to walk is itself to be regarded as a process in which the
development of the will and the effect of inherited disposi-
tions to certain particular combinations of movements are
continually interacting upon each other. The first impulse

21*

324 ^^- Psychical Developments.

for the movement comes from volitional motives; the pur-
posive way in which the act is carried out, however, is pri-
marily an effect of the central mechanism of coordination,
which in turn is rendered continually more and more pur-
posive as a result of the individual's practice directed by
his will.

8. The development of the child's ability to speak follows
that of his other volitional acts. This, too, depends on the
one hand, on the cooperation of inherited modifications in
the central organ of the nervous system and depends on
the other hand, on outside influences. The most important
outside influences in this case are those that come from the
speech of those about the child. In this respect the devel-
opment of speech corresponds entirely with the development
of the other expressive movements, among which it is, from
its general psycho-physical character^ to be classed. The
earliest articulations of the vocal organs appear as early as
the second month, as reflex phenomena, especially accom-
panying pleasurable feelings and emotions. After that they
increase in variety and exhibit more and more the tendency
to repetition (for example, ba-ba-ba, da-da-da-da, etc.). These
expressive sounds differ from those of many animals only in
their greater number and continually changing variety. They
are produced on all possible occasions and without any in-
tention of communicating anything, so that they are by no
means to be classed as elements of speech. Through the
influence of those about the child these sounds generally
become elements of speech after the beginning of the second
year. This result is brought about chiefly by certain imita-
tive movements. The imitation here involved is a two-fold
imitation of sounds. On the one hand, the child imitates
adults, on the other, adults imitate the child. In fact, as
a rule, it is the adults who begin the imitating ; they repeat

§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 325

the involuntary articulations of the child and attach a par-
ticular meaning to them, as, for example, "pa-pa" for father,
"ma-ma", for mother, etc. It is not until later, after the
child has learned to use these sounds in a particular sense
through intentional imitation, that he repeats other words
of the adults' language also, and even then he modifies these
borrowed words to fit the stock of sounds that he is able
to articulate.

Gestures are important as means by which adults, more
instinctively than voluntarily, help the child to understand
the words they use. G-estures are generally indicative gestures
or gestures towards the objects; less frequently, and ordinarily
only in the case of words meaning some activity such as
strike, cut, walk^ sleep, etc., the gestures take the form of
representative gestures. The child has a natural under-
standing of the meaning of these gestures, while he has no
such understanding of the meaning of words. Even the
onomatopoetic words of child speech (such as bow-wow for
dog, etc.) never become intelligible to the child until the
objects have been frequently pointed out. The creator of
these onomatopoetic words is not the child, it is rather the
adult, who seeks instinctively to accommodate himself to the
stage of the child's consciousness in this respect as well as
in others.

All this goes to show that the child's learning to speak
is the result of a series of associations and apperceptions in
the formation of which associations and apperceptions both
the child and those about him take part. Mother or nurse
voluntarily designates particular ideas by using certain words
taken from the expressive sounds produced by the child, or
by using onomatopoetic words made arbitrarily after the
pattern of the first class. The child apperceives this com-
bination of word and idea after it has been made intelligible

326 ^^- Psychical DeDelopments.

to him by means of gestures and he then associates the idea
with his own imitative articulative movements. Following
the pattern of these first apperceptions and associations the
child now forms others, by imitating of his own accord more
and more the words and verbal combinations that he acci-
dentally hears adults using, and by making the appropriate as-
sociations with their meanings. The whole process is thus the
result of a psychical interaction between the child and those
about him. The sounds are at first produced by the child
alone, those about him take up these sounds and make
use of them for purposes of speech.

9. As a result of all the simpler processes of develop-
ment thus far discussed there arise the complex functions
of apperception J that is, the relating and comparing ac-
tivities, and the activities of imagination and understand-
ing which are made up of relating and comparing proc-
esses (§ 17).

Apperceptive combinations appear at first exclusively in
the form of imagination^ that is^ in the combination, analysis,
and relating of concrete sensible ideas. Thus, individual
development corroborates what has been said in general about
the genetic relation of these functions (p. 278). On the basis
of the continually increasing association of immediate im-
pressions with earlier ideas, there arises in the child, as soon
as his active attention is aroused, a tendency to form imag-
inative combinations voluntarily. The number of memory
elements freely combining with the impression and added
to it, furnishes us with a measure of the fertility of the in-
dividual child's imagination. As soon as this combining
activity of imagination has once begun to operate, it shows
itself with an impulsive force which the child is unable to
resist, for there is not as yet, as in the case of adults, any
activity of the understanding to prescribe definite intellectual

§20. Psychical Development of the Child. 327

ends regulating and inhibiting the free sweep of the ideas
of imagination.

This unchecked relating and coupling of ideas in imagi-
nation is connected with volitional impulses which aim to find
for the ideas some starting points in immediate sense per-
ception, however vague these starting points may be. This
is what gives rise to the child's j^lay impulse. The earhest
games of the child are those of pure imagination; while, on
the contrary, the games of adults (cards, chess^ lotto, etc.)
are almost as exclusively intellectual games. Only where
aesthetical demands exert an influence, are the games of
adults the productions of the imagination (drama, piano
playing, etc.), but even here they are not wholly untrammeled
like those of the child, but are regulated by the under-
standing. When the play of a child takes its natural course,
it shows at different periods of its development all the inter-
mediate stages between the game of pure imagination and
the game in which imagination and understanding are united.
In the first years play consists in the production of rhyth-
mical movements of the arms and legs, then the movements
are carried over to external objects as well, with preference
for such objects as give rise to auditory sensations, or such as
have bright colors. In their origin these movements are ob-
viously impulsive acts aroused by certain sensational stimuli
and dependent for their purposive coordination on inherited
traits of the central nervous organs. The rhythmical order of
the movements and of the feelings and sound impressions that
result from them, obviously arouse pleasurable feelings, and
the arousal of such feelings very soon results in the voluntary
repetition of the movements. After this, during the first years,
play becomes gradually a voluntary imitation of the occupa-
tions and scenes that the child sees about him. The range
of imitation then widens and is no longer limited to what is

328 ^y^' Psychical Developments.

seen, but includes a free reproduction of what is heard in
narratives. At the same time the interconnection between
ideas and acts begins to follow a more fixed plan. This
indicates the regulative influence of the activity of under-
standing, which shows itself in the games of later childhood
in prescribed rules. This development of games is often
accelerated through the influence of those about the child
and through artificial forms of play generally invented by
adults and not always suited to the child's imagination. In
all cases, however, this development is to be recognized as
natural, and conditioned by the reciprocal interconnection of
associative and apperceptive processes, since such a course
of development corresponds with the general development
of the intellectual functions. The way in which the processes
of imagination are gradually curtailed and the functions of
understanding more and more employed, renders it probable
that the curtailing is due, not so much to a quantitative
decrease of imagination, as to an obstruction of imagination
through abstract thinking. "When this process of obstruction
has once set in, the activity of imagination may itself through
lack of use, and because of the greater exercise of abstract
thought, begin to decrease. This view seems to be supported
by the fact that savages usually have all through their lives
an imaginative play impulse related to that of the child.

10. From these primitive imaginative forms of thought
the functions of understanding develop very gradually in
the way already described (p. 294). Aggregate ideas which
are presented in sense perception or are formed by the com-
bining activity of imagination are divided into their conceptual
components, that is, into objects and their attributes, into
objects and their activities, or into the relations of different
objects to one another. The decisive symptom of the rise
of the functions of understanding is therefore the formation

§ 20. Psychical Development of the Child. 329

of concepts. On the other hand, actions that can be explained
from the point of view of the observer by logical reflection,
are by no means proofs of the existence of such reflection
on the part of the actor, for such actions are very often
obviously derived from associations, just as in the case of
animals. In the same way there may be the first beginnings
of speech without abstract thinking in any proper sense,
since words refer originally only to concrete sensible im-
pressions. Still, the more perfect use of language is not
possible until ideas are conceptually analyzed, related, and
transferred, even though the processes are in each case
entirely concrete and sensible. The development of the
functions of understanding and the development of speech,
accordingly, go hand in hand, and the latter is an indis-
pensable aid in retaining concepts and fixing the operations
of thought.

10 a. Child psychology often suffers from the same mistake
that is made in animal psychology, namely, from the mistake
of not interpreting observations objectively. The observations
are filled out with subjective reflections. Thus, the earliest
ideational combinations, which are in reality purely associative,
are regarded as acts of logical reflection, and the earliest mimetic
expressive movements, as, for example, those of a new-born
child due to taste stimuli, are looked upon as reactions to feel-
ings, while they are obviously at first nothing but connate re-
flexes. These reflexes may, it is true, be accompanied by ob-
scure concomitant feelings, but certainly such feelings can not
be demonstrated with certainty. The ordinary view as to the
development of volition and of speech, labors under a like mis-
conception. Generally there is a tendency to consider the child's
language, because of its peculiarities, as a creation of his own.
Closer observation, however, shows that it is created by those
about him, though in doing this adults use the sounds that the
child himself produces, and conform as far as possible to the
child's stage of consciousness. Thus it comes that some of the

330 I^- Psychical Developments.

very detailed and praise-worthy accounts of the mental develop-
ment of the child in modern literature can serve merely as sources
for objective facts. Their psychological deductions require cor-
rection along the lines marked out above, because they stand
on the basis of reflective popular psychology. The efforts which
have frequently been made to employ experimental methods in
the investigations of child psychology have attained a degree
of success only when these methods have been used with children
of fairly advanced age, for example, with school children. When
thus applied, experiments have produced results which have
pedagogical as well as psychological value. Such are the results
in regard to the course and duration of attention, the relation
between bodily fatigue and mental fatigue, etc. During the earlier
periods of the child's life experimental methods are hardly ap-
plicable at all. The results of experiments which have been
tried on very young children must be regarded as purely chance
results, wholly untrustworthy on account of the great number
of sources of error. For these reasons it is an error to hold,
as is sometimes held, that the mental life of adults can never
be fully understood except through the analysis of the child's
mind. The exact opposite is the true position to take. Since
in the investigation of children and of savages, only objective
symptoms are in general available, any psychological interpreta-
tion of these symptoms is possible only on the basis of mature
adult introspection which has been carried out under experi-
mental conditions. For the same reasons, it is only the results
of observations of children and savages which have been sub-
jected to a similar psychological analysis, which furnish any
proper basis for conclusions in regard to the nature of mental
development in general.

References. Kussmaul, Untersuchungen fiber das Seelenleben des
neugebornen Menschen, 1859. Preyer (English trans, by H. W. Brown)
The Mind of the Child. Sully, Studies of Childhood, 1896. Compayre,
Die Entwicklung der Kindesseele, 1900. Egger, Development de I'in-
telligence et du langage chez les enfants, 1879. Darwin, Expression
of the Emotions. Ament, Entwicklung vom Sprechen und Denken
beim Kinde, 1899. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, chap. 3 and 7
and Lectures on Hum. and Anim. Psych., lecture 27. Gross, (English
trans.) The Play of Man.

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 331

§ 21. DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL COMMUNITIES.

1. Just as the psychical development of the child is the
resultant of his interaction with his environment, so matured
consciousness stands continually in relation to the mental
community in which it has a receptive and an active part.
Among most animals such a community is entirely wanting.
Animal marriage, animal states, and flocks, are only in-
complete forerunners of mental communities, and they are
generally limited to the attainment of certain single ends.
The more lasting forms, that is animal marriage and the
falsely named animal states (p. 311), are really sexual com-
munities; the more transient forms such as flocks, for ex-
ample flocks of migratory birds, are communities for pro-
tection. In all these cases it is certain instincts that have
grown more and more fixed through transmission, which
hold the individuals together. The community, therefore,
shows the same constancy as do instincts', and such a
community is very little modified by the influences of in-
dividuals.

While animal communities are, thus, mere enlargements
of the individual existence, aiming at certain physical vital
ends, human developi]4ent seeks^ from the first, so to unite
the individual with his mental environment that the whole
community is capable of development, serving at once the
satisfaction of the physical needs of life and the pursuit of
the most various mental ends, while permitting at the same
time great variations in these ends. As a result, the forms
of human society are exceedingly variable. The more fully
developed forms, however, enter into a continuous train of
historical development which extends the mental ties con-
necting individuals further and further beyond the bounds
of immediate spacial and temporal proximity. The final

332 ^^- Psychical Developments.

result of this development is the formation of the notion of
humanity as a great general mental community which is di-
vided up according to the special conditions of life into single
concrete communities, peoples, states, civilized societies of
various kinds, races, and families. The mental community
to which the individual belongs is, therefore, not merely a
single union, it is rather a changing group of mental unions
which are all interlaced in the most manifold ways and
which become more and more numerous as development
progresses.

2. The problem of tracing these developments in their
concrete forms or even in their general interconnection, be-
longs to the history of civilization and to general history,
not to psychology. Still, we must give some account here
of the general psychical conditions of community life and
the psychical processes arising from these conditions, which
processes distinguish social from individual life.

The condition which is a prime necessity of every mental
community at its beginning, and a continually operative factor
in its further development, is the function of speech. This
is what makes the development of mental communities from
individual existences psychologically possible. In its origin
speech comes from the expressive movements of the individual,
but as a result of its development it becomes the indispens-
able form for all common mental contents. These common
contents, or the mental processes which belong to the whole
community, may be divided into two classes, which are merely
interrelated components of social life, not distinct processes,
any more than the processes of ideation and volition are
distinct in individual experience. The first of these classes
of common contents is the class of the common ideas. In
this class we find especially the common feelings and emotions
of fear and hope — these are the mythological ideas. The

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 333

second class consists of the common motives of volition,
which correspond to the common ideas and their attending
feelings and emotions — these are the Imvs of custom.

A. SPEECH.

3. "We obtain no information in regard to the general
development of speech from the individual development of the
child, because in the case of the child the larger part of
the process depends on those about him rather than on the
child himself (p. 324 sq.). Still, the fact that the child learns
to speak at all, shows that he has psychical and physical
traits favorable to the reception of language when it is com-
municated. In fact, it may be assumed that these traits
would, even if there were no communications from without,
lead to the development of some kind of expressive movements
accompanied by sounds, which sounds would form an in-
complete language. This supposition is justified by the ob-
servation of the deaf and dumb, especially deaf and dumb
children who have grown up without any systematic educa-
tion. In spite of this lack of education, an energetic mental
intercourse may take place between them. In such cases,
however, since the deaf and dumb can perceive only visual
signs, the intercourse must depend on the development of a
natural gesture language made up of a combination of sig-
nificant expressive movements. Feelings are in general ex-
pressed by mimetic movements, ideas by pantomimetic move-
ments, either by pointing at the object with the finger or by
drawing some kind of picture of the idea in the air, that
is, by means of indicative or representative gestures (p. 109)//^
There may even be a combination of such signs with each
other, thus leading to a kind of sentence structure by means
of which wishes and questions are expressed, things are

334 VI' Psychical Developments.

described, and occurrences narrated. This natural gesture
language can never go any further, however, than the com-
munication of concrete sensible ideas and their interconnec-
tions. Signs for abstract concepts are entirely wanting.

4. The primitive development of articulate language can
hardly be thought of except after the analogy of the rise
of this natural gesture language. The only difference is that
in this case the ability to hear, results in the addition of a
third form of movements to the mimetic and pantomimetic
movements. This third form consists in the articulatory move-
ments, and since such articulatory movements are much more
easily perceived, and capable of incomparably more various
modifications, it must of necessity follow that they soon exceed
the others in importance. But just as gestures owe their
intelligibility to the immediate relation that exists between
the character of the movement and its meaning, so here also
we must presuppose a like relation between the original ar-
ticulatory movement and its meaning. Then, too, it is not
improbable that articulation was at first aided by accom-
panying mimetic and pantomimetic movements. Evidence in
support of this view is to be found in the unrestrained use
of such gestures by savages, and in the important part
which gestures play in the child's learning to speak. The
development of articulate language is, accordingly, in all
probability to be thought of as a process of differentiation,
in which the articulatory movements have gradually gained
the permanent ascendency over a number of different variable
expressive movements which originally attended them. The
articulation movements have, then, dispensed with these
auxiliary movements as they themselves gained a sufficient
degree of fixity. Psychologically the process may be divided
into two acts. The first consists in the expressive move-
ments of the individual member of the community. These

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 335

are impulsive volitional acts, among which the movements
of the vocal organs gain the ascendency over the others in
the effort of the individual to communicate with his fellows.
The second consists in the subsequent associations between
sound and idea, which gradually become more fixed, and
spread from the localities where they originated through
wider circles of society.

5. From the first there are other physical and psychical
conditions which take part in the formation of language
and produce continual and unceasing modifications in its
components. Such modifications may be divided into two
classes, namely, modifications of sound and modifications of
meaning.

Modifications of sound have their physiological cause in
the gradual changes that take place in the physical structure
of the vocal organs. These changes seem to come partly
from the general changes which the transition from a savage
to a civilized condition produces in the whole psycho-physical
organism, and partly from the special conditions which result
from increased practice in the execution of articulatory move-
ments. Many phenomena go to show that the gradually in-
creasing rapidity of articulation is one of the facts of practice
which is of especially great influence. Then, too, the words
that are in any way analogous, act upon one another in a
way which gives evidence of the direct psychological influence
of association, especially of association between verbal ideas
which are in any way related, either through sound only,
or through likenesses in both sound and meaning (so-called
analogous word constructions).

As the change in sound modifies the outer form of words,
so the change in meaning modifies the inner content. The
original association between a word and the idea it expresses
is modified by the substitution of another, different idea.

336 I^- Psychical Developments.

This process of substitution may be several times repeated
with the same word. The change in the meaning of words
depends, therefore, on a gradual modification of the asso-
ciative and apperceptive conditions which determine the idea-
tional complications that shall arise in the fixation-point of
consciousness when a word is heard or spoken. It may,
accordingly, be briefly defined as a shifting of the ideational
component of the complications connected with articulate
sounds (p. 259). It is due at times to association, at times
to apperception.

These changes in the sound and meaning of words operate
together in bringing about the gradual disappearance of the
originally necessary relation between sound and meaning,
so that a word finally comes to be looked upon as a mere
external sign of the idea. This process is so complete
that even those verbal forms in which this relation seems
to be still retained, that is, in the case of onomatopoetic
words, we must recognize the forms themselves as for the
most part relatively late products of a secondary assim-
ilative process, which process seeks to reestablish the ori-
ginally present, but now lost, affinity between sound and
meaning.

Another important consequence of this combined action
of changes in sound and meaning, is to be found in the fact
that many words gradually lose entirely their original con-
crete sensible significance, and become signs of general con-
cepts and means for the expression of the apperceptive
relating and comparing functions and their products. In
this way abstract thinking is developed. Such abstract thinking
would be impossible without the change in meaning of words
upon which it is based, and it is, therefore, a product of the
psychical and psycho-physical interactions on which the pro-
gressive development of language depends.

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 337

6. Just as the components of language, or words, are
undergoing a continual modification in sound and meaning,
so in the same way, though generally more slowly, changes
are going on in the combinations of words into larger wholes
that is, in sentences. No language can be thought of with-
out some such syntactic order of its words. Sentences and
words are, therefore, equally essential forms of thought.
Indeed, the sentence is the earlier of the two, for the thought
appears at first as a single whole and is later broken up
into its components (p. 291). In the more incomplete stages
of language the words of a sentence are, accordingly, only
very uncertainly distinguished from each other. There is no
universal rule even for the order of words, any more than
there is for the relation of sound to meaning. The order
that logic favors with a view to the relations of reciprocal
logical dependence between concepts, has no psychological
universality; it appears, in fact, to be a fairly late product
of development, due in part to arbitrary convention, and
approached only by the prose forms of some modern languages
which are syntactically nearly fixed. The original principle
followed in apperceptive combination of words is obviously
this, the order of the words corresponds to the succession of
ideas. As a result those parts of speech that arouse the
feelings and attract the attention most intensely are placed
first. Following this principle, certain regularities in the
order of words are developed in any given community. In
fact, such a regularity is to be observed even in the natural
gesture language of the deaf and dumb. Still, it is easy to
understand that the most various modifications in this respect
may appear under special circumstances. In general, how-
ever, the habits of association lead more and more to the
fixing of particular syntactic forms, so that gradually a
certain regularity begins to assert itself through a kind of

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 22

338 -^^- Psychical Developments.

associative attraction exerted by the forms most commonly
employed.

Apart from the general laws presented in the discussion
of apperceptive combinations, and there shown to arise from
the general psychical functions of relating and comparing
(p. 278), the detailed discussion of the characteristics of syn-
tactic combinations and their gradual changes, must be left,
in spite of their psychological importance, to social psychol-
ogy, because such syntactic combinations depend so much
on the specific dispositions and conditions of civilization in
a given community.

Eeferences. Steinthal, Einleitung in die Psychologie und
Sprachwissenschaft, vol. I, 1871. Paul, Principien der Sprachen-
geschichte, 3rd, ed,, 1898. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie, vol. I, (Die
Sprache) 1900.

B. MYTHS.

7. The fundamental function which in its various forms of
activity gives rise to all mythological ideas, is a characteristic
kind of apperception belonging to all naive consciousness and
suitably designated by the name ^personifying apperception. It
consists in the complete determination of the apperceived ob-
jects through the nature of the perceiving subject. The subject
not only finds his own sensations, emotions, and voluntary
movements reproduced in the objects, but even his momentary
affective state is in each case especially influential in de-
termining his view of the phenomena perceived, and in
arousing ideas of the relations of these phenomena to his own
existence. As a necessary result of such a view the pei^sonal
attributes which the subject finds in himself are assigned to
the object. The inner attributes, of feeling, emotion, etc.,
are never omitted. The outer attributes of voluntary action
and other expressions like those of men, are generally as-

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 339

signed to objects only when there are actually perceived
movements. Thus, the savage may attribute to stones, plants,
and v^rorks of art, an inner capacity for sensations and
feelings and for the resulting effects of these processes^ but
he usually assumes immediate action only in the case of
moving objects, such as clouds, heavenly bodies, winds, etc.
In all these cases the personification is favored by associa-
tive assimilations which readily reach the intensity of illusions
of fancy (p. 299).

8. Myth-making, or personifying, apperception is not to
be regarded as a special form or even as a distinct sub-form
of apperception. It is nothing but the natural inceptive stage
of apperception in general. The child shows obvious traces
of it, partly in the activities of his imagination in play (p. 251),
partly in the fact that strong emotions, especially fear and
fright; easily arouse illusions of fancy with an affective
character analogous to that of the emotion. In the case of
children; however, the manifestations of a tendency to form
myths are early checked and soon entirely suppressed through
the influences of environment and education. With savage,
and partly civilized peoples it is different. There the sur-
rounding influences present a whole mass of mythological
ideas to the individual consciousness. These, too, originated
in the minds of individuals^ and have gradually become fixed
in some particular community, and through language have
been transmitted from generation to generation and become
gradually modified in the transition from savage to civilized
conditions.

9. The direction in which these modifications take place,
is determined in general by the fact that the momentary
affective state of the subject is the chief influence in settling
the character of the myth-making apperception. In order
to gain some notion of the way in which the affective state

22*

340 I^- PsyGhioal Developments.

of the subject has , changed from the first beginnings of
mental development to the present, we must appeal to the
history of the development of mythological ideas, for other
evidences are entirely wanting. It appears that in all cases
the earliest mythological ideas referred to the personal fate
in the immediate future^ and were determined, by the emo-
tions aroused by the death of comrades and by the memory
of these comrades, and were also determined in a high degree,
by the memories of dreams. This is the source of so-called
"animism", that is, all those forms of belief in which both
the spirits of the dead and certain demons connected with
certain objects, places or practical occupations (demons of
the woods and fields, of agriculture and navigation) are
thought of as taking the parts of rulers of fortune and
as bringing either weal or woe into human life. "Fetishism"
is a branch of animism, in which the attribute of ability to
control fate is carried over to certain objects in the environ-
ment, such as plants, stones, works of art, especially objects
which arouse the feelings on account of their striking char-
acter or on account of some accidental outer circumstance.
The phenomena of animism and fetishism are not only the
earliest, but also the most lasting, productions of myth--
making apperception. They continue, even after all others
are suppressed, in the various forms of superstitions among
civilized peoples, such aa belief in ghosts, enchantments,
charms, etc.

10. After consciousness reaches a more advanced stage,
personifying apperception begins to deal with the greater
natural phenomena which act upon human life both through
their changes and through their direct influence, that is, with
the clouds, rivers, winds, and greater heavenly bodies. The
regularity of certain natural phenomena, such as the alter-
nation of night and day, of winter and summer, the processes

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 341

in a thunderstorm, etc., gives occasion for tlie formation of
poetical myths, in which a series of interconnected ideas are
woven into one united whole. In this way the nature myth
arises. The chief difference between nature myths and the
earlier forms of belief in spirits and demons consists in the
fact that nature myths deal with 'personal gods. These various
gods are given a great variety of characteristics, and are
gradually freed from any special connection with definite
places, times, or activities. They come to be nothing more
nor less than anthropomorphic personalities with superhuman
power. They are worshiped as the governors of natural
phenomena as well as human destinies. As the result of
this development of more comprehensive ideas of the gods,
the demons and minor deities gradually sink into the back-
ground, or else they are so united with the ideas of the gods
themselves that they come to be regarded as attributes of
the deities or as special forms in which the gods appear.
The process of combination and fusion of these ideas and
feelings usually goes a step further than the creation of a
number of personal gods. Some single one of these deities^
at first in an irregular and doubtful way, and then much
more permanently, becomes superior to all the others. Thus
a strong monotheistic tendency shows itself from a very early
period in the nature myth^ which is essentially polytheistic in
character. On the other hand, a tendency in the opposite
direction, namely, in the direction of breaking up the ideas of
the gods into a great number of personalities, may result from
a fusion of the ideas of the gods with those of the earlier
special deities and demons. In this way there arise certain
local deities and tribal deities. These deities can then, be-
cause of their personal character, easily be disassociated from
the special conditions which gave rise to them, and they
then become the bases for the various forms of hero myths.

342 ^^' Psychical Developments.

Traces of historical truth get themselves grafted into these
personal myths or hero myths, and thus the tendency to
make the deities more and more like men, which tendency
showed itself to some extent even in the nature myth, goes
even further. The hero myths thus challenge the poetical
genius of the individual to its highest efforts and these myths
become components of popular, and then of literary poetry.
At the same time, however, the hero myth undergoes a
change in meaning through the fading out of some of the
features of the single mythical figures and the appearance
of other new features. This change, in turn, makes possible
a progressive inner change analogous to the change in words,
by which the change in the myth is always accompanied.
As the process goes on, single poets and thinkers gain an
increasing influence.

In this way there comes about finally, a division of the
total original content of the myths into science and rehgion.
This division is very materially assisted by philosophy which
in its first stages is more than half mythical in its ideas.
The original ideas of gods and heroes now give place more
and more to ethical ideas of deity. This transition is in
part due to the reflex influence of philosophy on religion.
As in the case of the nature myth, so even at the later
stage of developed ethical religion, there are tendencies to
lapse back into the older forms because the old motives for
the creation of these early forms still continue. Special
deities, demons, and spirits push themselves into the fore-
ground of consciousness, sometimes for longer periods of
time, sometimes merely for the passing moment. Such revived
beliefs sometimes constitute a sort of secondary addition or
supplement to religion itself, sometimes when positively re-
jected by religion they continue to exist independently in
the form of superstitions.

§ 22. Development of Mental Communities. 343

References. Tylor, Researches in tlie Early History of Mankind.
Fr. Schultze, Psychologie der Naturvolker, 1900. Wundt, (English
trans.) Ethics, Sect. 1, chap. 2. Rohde, Psyche (Beliefs of the Greeks
in regard to the Mind and Immortality), 1894. Usener, Gotter-
namen, 1896.

C. CUSTOMS.

11. Customs appear as far back as we can trace them
in two groups which may be described by the twofold classi-
fication into rules of individual volition, and rules of social
conduct. The first govern the conduct of the individual in
his occupations and in his relations with others, the second
determine the forms of community life in the clan, family,
state, or other social group. Both individual and social laws
of custom are, therefore, connected with community life.
The former relate to the conduct of the individual in the
community, the latter relate to the members of the com-
munity in their common activities , in the activities which
determine the particular character of their life together.

The individual rules of conduct which have become customs
are generally connected in their beginnings, which are indeed
frequently obscure, with myths in a way corresponding directly
to that in which outer volitional acts are related to inner
motives. Wherever we can trace the origin of such customs
with any degree of probability, we find that they are remnants
or modifications of certain cult forms. Thus, the funeral
feasts and burial ceremonies of civilized peoples point to a
primitive ancestor-worship. Numerous feasts and ceremonies
connected with particular days^ with the change of the
seasons, the tillage of the fields, and the gathering of the
harvest, all point back to certain demon cults, and nature
myths. The custom of greeting, in its various forms, betrays
its direct derivation from the ceremonies of prayer.

In contrast with these demands on individual practice.

344 IV. Psychical Developments.

there are certain necessary demands arising out of the con-
ditions of community life, and out of the particular ways in
which the impulses of self preservation and tribal preser-
vation show themselves; and as a result of these necessary
demands, there grow up social laws of custom. Thus, it was
the surrounding conditions under which a primitive people
lived which determined the method of making clothing and
dwellings, the mode of preparing food, and the particular
forms of subdividing the community. Even the changes
which have taken place in all these respects as the people
have slowly passed from a savage to a civilized state, have
all taken place in response to the requirements of practical
advantage. Especially notable illustrations of this are to be
found in the earliest kinds of community life and in the wider
and narrower social units that have grown out of these early
forms. Thus, the tribe in which men everywhere lived at
first, was divided into smaller groups or subtribes under the
force of external conditions of life^ and because of the in-
crease in the number of individuals in the tribe. The smaller
groups or subtribes usually continued organized after their
separation from each other in a general protective league
which gave the impulse for the formation of general families
through the intercourse of individuals of different tribes.
From these general families in turn, there arose^ as civiliza-
tion progressed, the single family. The tribe itself gradu-
ally underwent a change in character during this process of
subdivision. As the interrelations between individuals, which
arose at first out of temporary causes, began to be reduced
to permanent rules, the tribe passed immediately into the
first stages of state organization by becoming a confederation
of tribes. From this confederation arose in much later times
political states. These are usually the results of war alli-
ances and represent therefore the divisions natural in war.

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 345

12. With customs, as with language and myths, the
change in meaning has exercised a modifying influence on de-
velopment. In individual customs there arise as a result of
this change in meaning tivo chief kinds of transformation.
In the first, the original mythical motive is lost and no new
meaning whatever takes its place. The custom continues
merely as a consequence of associative hahit, but loses its
imperative character and becomes much weaker in its out-
ward manifestations. In the second class of transformations,
a moraUsocial purpose takes the place of the original mytho-
religious motive. The two kinds of change may in any single
case be most intimately united; and even when a custom
does not serve any particular social end directly, as is the
case, for example^ with certain rules of deportment, of
etiquette, on the manner of dressing, eating, etc., still, the
custom may serve some social end indirectly in that the ex-
istence of some common rules for the members of a com-
munity is favorable to their united life and therefore to
their common mental social life.

In social customs the change is in a direction opposite
to that seen in individual customs. Social customs usually
retain, more than individual customs, the old significance
along with the new they acquire. The transformation of
social customs thus consists always in an enlargement of the
significance so that as a rule religio- mythical motives are
sooner or later added to the original motives which are the
necessities of social life. Thus^ the rules of action which at
first grew up as the result of certain necessary impulses,
come to be regarded as commands of the gods, or they are
rendered sacred by some kind of religious ceremonial. For
example, the common meals, the erection of common dwell-
ing places, agreements and confederations, declarations of
war and treaties of peace and marriage, are all combined

346 I^' Psychical Developments.

with certain mythical concepts or else they arouse the myth-
making apperception to such an extent that new deities are
created especially for the governing of these social customs.
Finally, it is to he noted that the mythical notions which
have attached to social customs may in time fade out. There
then takes place a kind of retransformation in which the
religious element of the custom either disappears, or remains
merely as a formality due to hahit and unsupported hy
recognized significance.

The psychological changes in customs just pointed out;
constitute the preparation for their differentiation into three
spheres, namely into the classes of pwx custom^ of law, and
of morality. The last two are to he regarded as special
forms of custom aiming at certain social ends. The detailed
investigation of these processes of development and differen-
tiation is, however, a prohlem of social psychology, and the
discussion of the rise of law and morality belong both to
social psychology, and to general history, and ethics.

Eeferences. LiPPERT, Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit, 2 vols.,
1887. ViERKANDT, Naturvolker und Kulturvolker, 1896. Spencer,
Principles of Sociology, vols. 2 and 3. v. Ihering, Der Zweck im
Recht, vol. I, Pt. 2, 1877—1883. Wundt, (English trans.) Ethics,
Sect. I, chap. 3. Barth, Die Philosophic der Geschichte als Sociol-
ogie, vol. 1, 1897.

D. GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE DEVELOPMENTS STUDIED
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY.

13. Speech, myths and customs constitute a series of
closely related subjects which are of great importance to
general psychology for the reason that the relatively per-
manent character of speech, myths^ and customs renders it
relatively easy to recognize clearly through them certain
general psychical processes, and to carry out through them

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 347

certain psychological analyses. Such recognition of general
processes and such analyses are much easier here than in
the case of transient compounds of individual consciousness.
Indeed, such transient compounds require as their necessary
conditions preliminary social developments, especially if com-
pounds are in any way connected with language and there-
fore dependent upon the laws of social thought which have
been crystalized in language. Thus, it was necessary in an
earlier paragraph, when treating of the processes of apper-
ceptive synthesis and analysis, to call attention to the effects
of these processes as they appear in speech (p. 290). Just
as the psychical processes of individual consciousness show
themselves in language as there indicated, so also in the
case of broader social developments, the psychical processes
which underlie the observed phenomena are most clearly
recognizable in the attributes and modifications of the ideas
which are expressed in speech. The accompanying processes
of affective excitation can be inferred only indirectly through
an examination of the total series of facts and with the aid
of certain known conditions.

There are certain processes which are essential in char-
acter and are constantly reappearing on the ideational side
in all development of language, custom and myths. "We
may point out three such processes which are closely related
to each other. They may be called respectively, condensa-
tion of ideas, obscuring of ideas, and finally, corru^ption of
ideas. Ideas become condensed when a number of ideas
which were originally separate are, in consequence of re-
peated and strongly affective association, so united that they
come to be bound together in apperception in a single whole.
But since certain elements in the course of such a process
of condensation are more clearly apperceived because of
their more intense affective influence, it follows that other

348 I^- Psychical Developments.

elements not strong, in affective tone sink into obscurity and
may at length disappear entirely out of the complex product.
In this way, a corruption of the ideas may finally take place
which will give as its final stage, especially when condensa-
tion and obscuring have been repeated several times, and
have effected different components each time, a product which
is entirely different from the original ideas with which the
processes started. Condensation, obscuring and corruption
in their various forms are what bring about all the changes
in the meaning of words and all the transformations in
myths and customs. When either a word, a myth, or a
custom, has been modified, the others may be indirectly
affected also. Thus, when a word changes, it is very easy
for the mythological ideas connected with it to undergo a
modification. The change in the myth may then react upon
the word. It is possible in cases in which other conditions
are favorable, for words to give rise directly to mythological
ideas which put content into the word furnished by language.
On the other hand, the existence of a myth may lead to the
formation of a name or word to fit.

Throughout all these general social processes, it is the idea
which is first noticed. Psychological analysis shows, however,
that it is after all the affective processes and the volitional
processes which are the determining factors in the original
formation of the ideas and in their gradual transformation.
Thus, we can think of the original incoherent sounds which
must be recognized as the beginnings of speech only as simple
impulsive actions which follow directly upon the reception of
a strongly affective impression and which serve in some way
to communicate this impression to the listener. The communi-
cation may be through the sound alone, or through the aid
of added gestures (p. 333). When the development of social
thought has once begun, the mythological ideas show beyond

§ 21, Development of Mental Communities. 349

a doubt traces of the influences of the feelings. Personify-
ing apperception which shows itself in the myth differs from
mare highly developed consciousness in one characteristic
more than in any other. In personifying apperception the
subject refers not merely the formal attributes and the sen-
sation content of the percept to the object, but he refers
also his whole affective and volitional state to the object.
For example, a hopeful subject finds in the object before
him a protecting spirit, while the fearful subject finds in the
same object a demon of injury. In the processes of nature,
the savage sees a will which corresponds to his association
of these processes with his own actions and corresponds also
to the effect produced on his feelings. Even the three
processes of condensing, obscuring and corrupting of ideas
are to be looked upon as indications of changes in the
a:iective state of the subject. These changes in affective
state result at first in a change in the significance of myth
and custom and then secondarily they react upon language
also.

14. In mental communities and especially in their devel-
opment of language, myths and customs, we discover, thus,
mental interconnections and interactions which differ in es-
sential respects from the interconnection of the psychical
compounds in an individual consciousness. And yet these
social interconnections have just as much reality as the in-
dividual consciousness itself. In this sense we may speak of
the interconnection of the ideas and feelings of a social
community as a collective consciousness^ and of the common
volitional tendencies as a collective tvill. In doing this we
are not to forget that these concepts do not mean some-
thing that exists apart from the conscious and volitional
processes of the individual, any more than the community
tself is. something besides the union of individuals. Sincei

350 ^^- PsyehiGol Developments,

the social union, however, brings forth certain mental pro-
ducts, for which only the germs are present in the individual,
and since this union determines the development of the in-
dividual from a very early period, it is just as much an
object of psychological study as is the individual conscious-
ness. For psychology must give an account of the interactions
v/hich give rise to the products and attributes of collective
consciousness and of the collective will.

14 a. The facts arising from the existence of mental com-
munities have only recently come within the pale of psycholog-
ical investigation. These problems were formerly referred either
to the special mental sciences (philology, history, jurispru-
dence, etc.) or, if of a more general character, to philosophy,
that is, to metaphysics. If psychology did touch upon them at
all, it was dominated, as were the special sciences, by the re-
flective method of popular psychology, which method tends to
treat all mental products of communities, to as great an extent
as possible, as voluntary inventions designed from the first for
certain utilitarian ends. This view found its chief philosophical
expression in the doctrine of a social contract, according to
which a mental community is not something original and natural,
but is derived from the voluntary union of a number of in-
dividuals. This position is psychologically untenable, and com-
pletely helpless in the presence of the problems of social psy-
chology. As one of its after-effects we have even to-day the
grossest misunderstandings of the concepts collective conscious-
ness and collective will. Instead of regarding these simply as
expressions for the actual agreement and interaction of in-
dividuals in a community, some continue to suspect that there
is behind these terms a mythological being of some kind, or
at least a metaphysical substance. That such notions are utterly
false requires no further proof after what has been said. It
is obvious that these notions are themselves the results of the
unjustifiable use of the concept substance, which concept has
so long dominated psychology and led to the identification of
substance and reality. Furthermore, the confusion of the con-

§ 21. Development of Mental Communities. 351

cepts substance and reality shows clearly how close is the true
inner relation between popular spiritualism and materialism
although such spiritualism is openly at war with materialism
(compare § 2, p. 7).

References. Lazarus and Steinthal, Zeitschr. f. Volkerpsychol-
ogie u. Sprachwissenschaft, vol. I, 1860. Wundt, Volkerpsychologie,
vol. I, Introduction.

V. PSYCHICAL CAUSALITY
AND ITS LAWS.

§ 22. CONCEPT OF MIND.

1. Every empirical science has, as its primary subject of
treatment, certain particular facts of experience the nature
and reciprocal relations of which it seeks to investigate. In
dealing with such facts it is found to be necessary, if science
is not to give up entirely the grouping of the facts under
leading heads, to have general supplementary concepts which
are not contained in experience itself, but are gained by a
process of logical treatment of experience. The most general
supplementary concept of this kind which has found its
place in all the empirical sciences, is the concept of causality.
It comes from the necessity of thought which prescribes that
all our experiences shall be arranged according to reason
and consequent, and that we shall remove, by means of
secondary supplementary concepts and if need be by means
of concepts of a hypothetical character, all contradictions
standing in the way of the establishment of a consistent
interconnection of experience in accordance with the principle
of reason and consequent. In this sense we may regard all
the supplementary concepts that serve for the interpretation
of any sphere of experience, as applications of the general
principle of causation. These concepts are legitimate in so
far as they are required, or at least rendered probable, by

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 353

the causal principle; they are unwarranted as soon as they
prove to be arbitrary fictions resulting from foreign motives,
and contributing nothing to the interpretation of experience.
2. The concept matte7' is a fundamental supplementary
concept of natural science formulated under the principle
stated. In its most general significance matter designates
the permanent substratum assumed as existing in universal
space, that is, the substratum of the activities to which we
must attribute all natural phenomena. In this most general
sense the concept matter is indispensable to every explana-
tion of natural science. The attempt in recent times to raise
energy to the position of a governing principle, does not
succeed in doing away with the concept matter, but merely
gives it a different content. This content, however, is given
to the concept by means of a second supplementary concept,
which relates to the causal activity of matter. The concept
of matter that has been accepted in natural science up to
the present time, is based upon the mechanical physics of
G-alileo, and uses as its secondary supplementary concept
the concept of force^ which is defined as. the product of the
mass and the momentary acceleration. A physics of energy
seeks to introduce everywhere instead of this concept force,
the concept energy., which in the special form of mechanical
energy is defined as half the product of the mass multipHed
by the square of the velocity. Energy, however, must, just
as well as force, have a position in objective space, and
under certain particular conditions the points from which
energy proceeds may, just as well as the point from which
force proceeds, change their place in space, so that the
concept of matter as a substratum contained in space, is
retained in both cases. The only difference, and it is indeed
an important one, is that when we use the concept force,
we presuppose the reducibility of all natural phenomena to

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit. 23

354 V. Psychical Causality and its Laws.

forms of mechanical motion, while when we use the concept
of energy, we attribute to matter not only the property of
motion without a change in the form of energy, but also
the property of the transformability of qualitatively different
forms of energy into one another without a change in the
quantity of the energy.

3. The concept of mind is a supplementary concept of
psychology, in the same way that the concept matter is a
supplementary concept of natural science. It too is indis-
pensable in so far as we need a concept which shall express
in a comprehensive way the totaHty of psychical experiences
in an individual consciousness. The content of the concept,
however, is in this case also entirely dependent on the sec-
ondary concepts which give a more detailed definition of
psychical causality. In the definition of this content psy-
chology shared at first the fortune of the natural sciences.
Both the concept of mind and that of matter arose primarily,
not so much from the need of explaining experience as from
the effort to reach a fanciful doctrine of the general inter-
connection of all things. But while the natural sciences have
long since outgrown this mythological stage of speculative
definition, and make use of some of the single ideas that
originated at that time, only for the purpose of gaining def-
inite starting points for a strict definition of their concepts,
psychology has continued under the control of the mytho-
logical, metaphysical concept of mind down to most modern
times, and still rem.ains, in part at least, under its control.
The concept mind is not used as a general supplementary
concept which serves primarily to gather together the psychical
facts and only secondarily to give a causal interpretation of
them, but it is employed as a means of satisfying so far as
possible the need of a general universal system, which system
includes both nature and individual existence.

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 355

4. The concept of a mind substance in its various forms,
is rooted in this mythological and metaphysical need. In
the development of this concept there have not been wanting
efforts to meet as far as possible, from the metaphysical
position, the demand for a psychological causal explanation,
but such efforts have in all cases been afterthoughts; and
it is perfectly obvious that psychological experience alone,
independent of all foreign metaphysical motives, would never
have led to a concept of mind substance. This concept has
beyond a doubt exercised a harmful influence on the scientific
treatment of experience. The view, for example, that all
the contents of psychical experience are ideas, and that
these ideas are more or less permanent objects, would hardly
be comprehensible without such presuppositions. That this
concept is really foreign to psychology, is further attested by
the close relation in which it stands to the concept of material
substance. Mind substance is regarded either as identical
with material substance_, or else as distinct in nature, but still
reducible in its most general formal characteristics to one of
the particular forms of material elements, namely to the atom.

5. Two forms of the concept mind substance may be
distinguished, corresponding to the two types of metaphysical
psychology pointed out above (§2, p. 7). The one is
materialistic and regards psychical processes as the activities
of matter or of certain material complexes, such as the
brain elements. The other is spiritualistic and looks upon
psychical processes as states and changes in an unextended
and therefore indivisible and permanent being of a specific-
ally spiritual nature. In this case matter is thought of as
made up of similar atoms of a lower order (monistic, or
monadological spiritualism), or the mind atom is regarded
as specifically different from matter proper (dualistic spirit-
ualism) see table p. 18).

23*

356 ^- Psychical Causality and its Laivs.

In both its materialistic and spiritualistic forms, the con-
cept mind substance does nothing for the interpretation of
psychological experience. Materialism does away with psy-
chology entirely and puts in its place an imaginary brain
physiology of the future, or when it tries to give positive
theories, falls into doubtful and unreHable hypotheses of
cerebral physiology. In thus giving up psychology in any
proper sense, this doctrine gives up entirely the attempt to
furnish any practical basis for the mental sciences. Spiritualism
allows psychology as such to continue, but in such psychol-
ogy actual experience is entirely subordinated to arbitrary
metaphysical hypotheses, through which the unprejudiced
observation of psychical processes is obstructed. This appears
as a rule in the incorrect statement of the problem of psy-
chology, with which the metaphysical theories start. Such
theories regard inner and outer experience as totally heter-
ogeneous, though in some external way interacting, spheres.

6. It has been shown (§ 1, p. 3) that the phases of ex-
perience dealt with in the natural sciences and in psychology
are nothing but phases of one experience regarded from
different points of view : in the natural sciences experience is
treated as an interconnection of objective phenomena and,
in consequence of the abstraction from the knowing subject,
as mediate experience; in psychology experience is treated as
immediate and underived.

When this relation is once understood, the concept of a
mind substance immediately gives place to the concept of the
actuality of mind as a basis for the comprehension of psy-
chical processes. Since the psychological treatment of ex-
perience is supplementary to that of the natural sciences,
in that it deals with the immediate reality of experience,
it follows that there is no place in psychology for hypo-
thetical supplementary concepts such as are necessary in

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 357

the natural sciences because of the presupposition in the
natural sciences of an object independent of the subject.
The concept of the actuality of mind, accordingly, does not
require any hypothetical determinants to define its par-
ticular contents, as does the concept of matter, but quite
to the contrary, the concept of actuality excludes such
hypothetical elements from the first, by defining the nature
of mind as the immediate reality of the processes themselves.
Still, since one important component of these processes,
namely the totality of ideational objects, is at the same time,
the subject of consideration in the natural sciences, it ne-
cessarily follows that substance and actuality are concepts
that refer to one and the same general experience, with the
difference that in each case experience is looked at from a
different point of view. If we abstract from the knowing
subject in our treatment of the world of experience, that
world appears as a manifold of interacting substances; if,
on the contrary, we regard the world of experience as the
total content of the experience of the subject including the
subject itself, then the world appears as a manifold of inter-
related occurrences. In the first case, phenomena are looked
upon as outer phenomena^ in the sense that they would take
place just the same, even if the knowing subject were not
there at all, so that we may call the form of experience
dealt with in the natural sciences outer experience. In the
second case, on the contrary, all the contents of experience
are regarded as belonging directly to the knowing subject,
so that we may call the psychological attitude that of
inner experience. In this sense outer and inner experi-
ence are identical with mediate and immediate, or with ob-
jective and subjective forms of experience. All these terms
serve to designate, not different spheres of experience, but
different supplementary points of view in the consideration

358 V'. Psychical Causality and its Laivs.

of an experience which is presented to us as an absolute
unity.

7. That the method of treating experience employed in
natural science should have reached its maturity before that
employed in psychology, is easily comprehensible in view of
the practical interests connected with the discovery of regular
natural phenomena thought of as independent of the subject.
It was, furthermore, almost unavoidable that this priority
of the natural sciences should, for a long time, lead to a
confusion of the two points of view. This did really occur
as we see by the different psychological substance concepts.
When the reform came in the fundamental position of psy-
chology, and the characteristics and problems of this science
were sought, not in the specifically distinct nature of its
sphere, but in its method of considering all the contents
presented to us in experience in their immediate reality, un-
modified by any hypothetical supplementary concepts —
when this reform came it did not originate in psychology
itself, but in the single mejital sciences. The view of mental
processes based upon the concept of actuality, was familiar
in these mental sciences long before it was accepted in
psychology. This inadmissible difference between the fun-
damental position of psychology and the mental sciences
is what has kept psychology until the present time, from
fulfilling its mission as a foundation for all the mental
sciences.

8. When the concept of actuality is adopted, one of the
questions on which metaphysical systems of psychology have
been long divided is immediately disposed of. This is the
question of the relation of body and mind. So long as
body and mind are both regarded as substances, this relation
must remain an enigma in whatever way the two concepts of
substance may be defined. If they are like substances, then

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 359

the different contents of experience as dealt witli in the
natural sciences and in psychology can no longer be under-
stood, and there is no alternative but to deny the indepen-
dence of one of these forms of knowledge. If they are
unlike substances, their connection is a continual miracle.
If we start with the theory of the actuality of mind, we
recognize the immediate reality of the phenomena in psy-
chological experience. Our physiological concept of the bodily
organism, on the other hand, is nothing but a part of this ex-
perience, which we gain, just as we do all the other empirical
contents of the natural sciences, by assuming the existence
of an object independent of the knowing subject. Certain
components of mediate experience may correspond to certain
components of immediate experience, without there being
any necessity for this reason of reducing the one component
to the other or of deriving one from the other. In fact,
such a derivation is absolutely impossible because of the
totally different points of view adopted in the two cases.
Still, the fact that we have here, not different objects of
experience^ but different points of view in looking at a uni-
tary experience, renders necessary the existence at every
point, of relations between the two. At the same time it
must be remembered that there is an infinite number of
objects which can be approached only mediately, through
the method of the natural sciences: here belong all those
phenomena which we are not obliged to regard as physio-
logical substrata of psychical processes. On the other hand,
there is just as large a number of important facts which
are presented only immediately, or in psychological experi-
ence: these are all those contents of our subjective con-
sciousness which do not have the character of ideational
objects, that is, are not directly referred to external objects.
This includes our whole world of feeling so long as this

360 V- Psychical Causality and its Laivs.

world is considered entirely from the point of view of its
subjective significance.

9. As a result of this relation, it follows that there must
be a necessary relation between all the facts that belong at
the same time to both kinds of experience, that is, to the
mediate experience of the natural sciences and to the im-
mediate experience of psychology, for these two kinds of
experience are nothing but phases of a single experience
which is merely regarded in the two cases from different
points of view. Since certain facts belong to both spheres,
there must be an elementary process on the physical side,
corresponding to every such process on the psychical side.
This general principle is known as the principle of psycho-
physical parallelism. It has an empirico- psychological sig-
nificance and is thus totally different from certain meta-
physical principles which have sometimes been designated by
the same name, but which have in reality an entirely dif-
ferent meaning. These metaphysical principles are all based
on the hypothesis of a psychical substance. They all seek
to solve the problem of the interrelation of body and mind,
either by assuming two real substances with attributes
which are different, but parallel in their changes, or by as-
suming one substance with two distinct attributes which
correspond in their modifications. In both these cases the
metaphysical principle of parallelism is based on the as-
sumption that every physical process has a corresponding
psychical process and vice versa; or it is based on the
assumption that the mental world is a mirroring of the
bodily world, or that the bodily world is an objective real-
ization of the mental. This assumption is, however, en-
tirely indemonstrable and leads in its psychological appli-
cation to an intellectualism which is contradictory to all
experience. The psychological principle, on the other hand,

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 361

as above formulated ^ starts with the assumption that there
is only one experience, which, however, as soon as it be-
comes the subject of scientific analysis, is, in some of its
components, open to two different kinds of scientific treat-
ment: to a mediate form of treatment, which investigates
ideated objects in their objective relations to one another,
and to an immediate form, which investigates the same
objects in their directly known character, and in their rela-
tions to all the other contents of the experience of the
knowing subject. So far as there are objects to which both
these forms of treatment are applicable, the psychological
principle of parallelism requires relation at every point be-
tween the processes on the two sides. This requirement is
justified by the fact that both forms of analysis are in these
two cases really analyses of one and the same content of
experience. On the other hand, from the very nature of
the case, the psychological principle of parallelism can 7iot
apply to those contents of experience which are objects of
natural- scientific analysis alone ^ or to those which go to
make up the specific character of psychological experience.
Among the latter we must include the characteristic com-
hinations and relations of psychical elements and compounds.
To be sure, there are combinations of physical processes
running parallel to the psychical processes, in so far at least
as a direct or indirect causal relation must exist between
the physical processes the regular coexistence or succession
of which is indicated by a psychical interconnection, but the
characteristic content of the psychical combination can, of
course, in no way be a part of the causal relation between
the physical processes. Thus, for expample, the elements
that enter into a spacial or temporal idea, stand in a regular
relation of coexistence and succession in their physiological
substrata; or the ideational elements that make up a process

362 V- Psychical Causality and its Laios.

in which psychical contents are related or compared, have
corresponding combinations of physiological excitation of
some kind or other, which are repeated whenever these
psychical processes take place. But the physiological proc-
esses can not contain anything of that which goes to form
the specific nature of spacial and temporal ideas, or anything
of that which goes to form the relating and comparing
processes, because natural science purposely abstracts from
all that is here concerned. Then, too, there are two con-
cepts that result from the psychical combinations, which,
together with their related affective elements, lie entirely
outside the sphere of experience to which the principle of
parallelism applies. These are the concepts of value and
end. The forms of combination which we see in processes
of fusion or in associative and apperceptive processes, as well
as the values that they possess in the whole interconnection
of psychical development, can only be understood through
psychological analysis, in the same way that objective phe-
nomena, such as those of weight, sound, light, heat, etc., or
the processes of the nervous system, can be approached only
through physical and physiological analysis, that is, through
analysis which makes use of the supplementary substance-
concepts of natural science.

10. Thus, the principle of psycho-physical parallelism in
the incontrovertible empirico-jpsychological significance above
attributed to it, leads necessarily to the recognition of an
independent psychical causality^ which is related at all points
to physical causality and can never come into contradiction
with it, but is just as different from this physical causality
as the point of view adopted in psychology, or that of im-
mediate, subjective experience, is different from the point of
view taken in the natural sciences, or that of mediate, ob-
jective experience due to abstraction. And just as the nature

§ 22. Concept of Mind. 363

of physical causality can be revealed to us only in the fun-
damental laivs of nature., so the only way in which we can
account for the characteristics of psychical causality is to
abstract certain fundamental laivs of psychical phenomena
from the totality of psychical processes. We may distinguish
tivo classes of such laws. The laws of one class show them-
selves primarily in the processes which condition the rise
and immediate interaction of the psychical compounds; we
call these the psychological laivs of relation. Those of the
the second class are derived laws. They consist in the
complex effects which are produced by combinations of the
laws of relation within more extensive series of psychical
facts; these we call the psychological laivs of development.
In order to understand the real value of these laws one
must bear in mind the fact that their significance depends,
just as does the significance of natural-scientific laws, not
on their mere abstract form, but on the degree in which
they can be applied to particular cases. Thus, the principle
of inertia would seem to be, if considered merely in its
abstract form, a hazy proposition. Its value comes out only
in particular mechanical and physical applications.

Eeferences. Yolkmann, Lehrbucli der Psycliologie, vol. I, Sect. 1.
(This presents the substance concept of the Herbartian School, to-
gether with an historical review of the development of this concept.)
LoTZE, Medicin. Psychol., chap. 1. (This presents a substance concept
which shows some tendencies toward the theory of actuality.) Theory
of Actuality: Paulsen, (English trans.) Introduction to Philosophy.
WuNDT, Ueber psychische Causalitat und das Princip des psycho-
physischen Parallelismus , Philos. Studien, vol. 10, and Ueber die
Definition der Psycbologie, Philos. Studien, vol. 12, and Grundziige
der phys. Psych., vol. II, chaps. 23 and 24, and Lectures on Hum.
and Anim. Psych., lecture 30.

364 V. Psyehical Causality and its Laivs.

§ 23. PSYCHOLOaiCAL LAWS OF RELATION.

1. There are three general psychological laws of relation.
We designate them as the laws of psychical resultants^ of
^psychical relations^ and of psychical contrasts.

2. The law of psychical resultants finds its expression in
the fact that every psychical compound shows attributes
which may indeed be understood from the attributes of its
elements after these elements have once been presented, but
which are by no means to be looked upon as the mere sum
of the attributes of these elements. A compound clang is
more in its ideational and affective attributes than merely a
sum of single tones. In spacial and temporal ideas the
spacial and temporal arrangement is conditioned, to be sure,
in a perfectly regular way by the combination of elements
which make up the idea, but still the arrangement itself can
by no means be regarded as a property of the sensational
elements themselves. The nativistic theories that assume this,
implicate themselves in contradictions that cannot be solved ;
and besides, in so far as they admit subsequent changes in
the original space perceptions and time perceptions, they
are ultimately driven to the assumption of the rise, to some
extent at least, of new attributes. Finally, in the apper-
ceptive functions and in the activities of imagination and
understanding, this law finds expression in a clearly rec-
ognized form. ISTot only do the elements united by apper-
ceptive synthesis gain, in the aggregate idea which results
from their combination, a new significance which they did
not have in their isolated state, but what is of still greater
importance, the aggregate idea itself is a new psychical
content made possible, to be sure, by the elements, but by
no means contained in these elements. This appears most

§ 23. Psychological Laivs of Relation. 365

strikingly in the more complex productions of apperceptive
synthesis, as, for example, in a work of art or a train of
logical thought.

3. The law of psychical resultants thus expresses a prin-
ciple which we may designate, in view of its results, as the
principle of creative synthesis. This principle has long been
recognized in the case of higher mental creations, but it has
not been generally applied to the other psychical processes.
In fact, through an unjustifiable confusion with the laws of
physical causality, it has even been completely reversed. A
similar confusion is responsible for the notion that there is
a contradiction between the principle of creative synthesis
in the mental world and the general laws of the natural
world, especially the law of the conservation of energy.
Such a contradiction is impossible from the outset because
the points of view of judgment, and therefore of measure-
ments wherever such are made, are different in the two
cases, and must be different, since natural science and psy-
chology deal, not with different contents of experience, but
with one and the same content viewed from different sides
(§ 1, p. 3). Physical measurements have to do with objective
masses., forces^ and energies. These are supplementary con-
cepts which we are obliged to use in judging objective ex-
perience; and their general laws, derived as they are from
experience, must not be contradicted by any single case of
experience. Psychical measurements, which are concerned
with the comparison of psychical components and their re-
sultants, have to do with subjective values and ends. The
subjective value of the psychical combination may be greater
than the value of its components; its purpose may be dif-
ferent and higher than theirs, without any change in the
masses, forces, and energies concerned. The muscular move-
ments of an external voKtional act, the physical processes

366 V- Psychical Causality and its Latvs.

which accompany sense perception, association, and apper-
ception, all follow invariably the principle of the conser-
vation of energy. But the mental values and ends which
these energies represent may be very different in quan-
tity even while the quantity of these energies remains the
same.

4. The differences pointed out show that physical measure-
ment deals with quantitative values, that is, with quantities
that admit of a variation in value only in the one relation
of the quantity of the phenomena measured. Psychical
measurement, on the other hand, deals in the last instance
in every case with qualitative values^ that is, values that vary
in degree only in respect to their quahtative character. The
ability to produce purely quantitative effects, which we des-
ignate as physical energy is, accordingly, to be clearly dis-
tinguished from the ability to produce qualitative effects, or
the ability to produce values, which we designate as psychical
energy.

On this basis we can not only reconcile the increase of
psychical energy with the constancy of psychical energy as
accepted in the natural sciences, but we find also in the two
facts reciprocally supplementary standards for the judgment
of our total experience. The increase of psychical energy
is not seen in its right light until it is recognized as the
reserve, subjective side of physical constancy. The increase
of psychical energy, being as it is indefinite, since the standard
may be very different under different conditions, holds only
under the conditioii that the psychical processes are continuous.
As the psychological correlate of this increase we have the
fact which forces itself upon us in experience, that psychical
values disappear.

5. The laiv of psychical relations supplements the law of
resultants ; it refers not to the relation of the components of

§ 23. Psychological Latos of Relation. 367

a psychical interconnectioii to the value of the whole^ but
rather to the reciprocal relations of the psychical components
within a compound. The law of resultants thus holds for
the synthetic processes of consciousness, the law of relations
for the analytic. Every resolution of a conscious content
into its single members is an act of relating analysis. Such
a resolution takes place in the successive apperception of
the parts of a whole which whole is ideated at first only in
a general way, a process which is to be seen in sense per-
eptions and associations, and in clearly recognized form in
the division of aggregate ideas. In the same way, every
apperception is an analytic process the two phases of which
are the emphasizing of a single content, and the marking
off of this one content from all others. The first of these
two partial processes is what produces clearness^ the second
is what produces distinctness of apperception (p. 228, 4). The
most complete expression of this law is to be found in the
processes of apperceptive analysis and in the simple relating
and comparing functions upon which such analysis is based
(p. 278 and 292). In comparison more especially, we see
the essential import of the law of relations in the prin-
ciple that every single psychical content receives its sig-
nificance from the relations in which it stands to other
psychical contents. When these relations are quantitative^
this principle takes the form of a principle of relative quan-
titative comparison such as is expressed in Weber's laiv
(p. 283).

6. The third law, the law of psychical contrasts is, in
turn^ supplementary to the law of relations. It refers, like
the law of relations, to the relations of psychical contents
to one another. It is itself based on the fundamental di-
vision of the immediate contents of experience into objective-
and subjective components, a division which is due to the

368 1^' Psychical Causality and its Laws.

very conditions of' psychical development. Under subjective
components are included all the elements and combinations
of elements which^ like the feelings and emotions, are essential
constituents of volitional processes. These subjective com-
ponents are all arranged in groups made up of opposite
qualities corresponding to the chief affective dimensions of
pleasurable and unpleasurable feelings, exciting and depress-
ing feelings, and straining and relaxing feelings (p. 92).
These opposites obey in their succession the general law
of intensification through conti^ast. In its concrete appli-
cation, this law is always determined in part by special
temporal conditions, for every subjective state requires a
certain period for its development; and if, when it has once
reached its maximum, it continues for a long time, it loses
its abihty to arouse the contrast effect. This fact is con-
nected with another fact, namely that there is a certain
medium, though greatly varying, rate of psychical proc-
esses most favorable for the intensity of all feehngs and
emotions.

This law of contrast has its origin in the attributes of
the subjective contents of experience, but is secondarily
applied also to ideas and their elements, for ideas are always
accompanied by more or less emphatic feelings due either
to the ideational content or to the character of the spacial
and temporal combinations involved. Thus the principle
of intensification through contrast finds its broader appli-
cation most clearly in the case of certain sensations, such
as those of sight, and in the case of spacial and temporal
ideas.

7. The law of contrast stands in close relation to the
two preceding laws. On the one hand, it may be regarded
as the application of the general law of relations to the
special case in which the related psychical contents range

§ 24. Psychological Laivs of Development. 369

between opposites. On the other hand, the fact that under
suitable circumstances antithetical psychical processes may
intensify each other, while falling under the law of contrast,
is at the same time a special application of the principle of
creative synthesis.

References. Wundt, Ueber psychische Causalitat, Philos. Studien,
vol. 10, and Logik, vol. II, Pt. 2, Sect. 4, chap. 2, § 4, and System
der Philosophie, 2nd. ed., Sect. 6.

§ 24. PSYCHOLOGICAL LAWS OF DEVELOPMENT.

1. "We have as many psychological laws of development
as we had laws of relation, and the former may be regarded
as the application of the latter to more comprehensive psy-
chical interconnections. We designate the laws of develop-
ment as laws first of mental growth., second of heterogony of
e7ids, and third of development toward opposites.

2. The law of mental growth is as little applicable to
all contents of psychical experience as is any other psycholog-
ical law of development. It holds only under the limiting
condition which appHes to the law of resultants, the appli-
cation of which it is, namely the condition of the con-
tinuity of the processes (p. 366). But since the circumstances
that tend to prevent the reahzation of this condition, are,
of course, much more frequent when the mental develop-
ments concerned include a greater number of psychical
syntheses, than in the case of the single syntheses themselves,
it foUows that the law of mental growth can be demonstrated
only for certain developments taking place under normal
conditions, and even here only within certain hmits. Within
these Hmits, however, the more comprehensive developments,
as, for example, the mental development of the normal in-
dividual and the development of mental communities, are

Wundt, Psychology. 2. edit. 24

370 v. Psychical Causality and its Laws.

obviously tlie best exemplifications of the fundamental law
of resultants, wbicli law lies at the basis of this devel-
opment.

3. The law of hete7vgony of ends is most closely con-
nected with the law of relations, but it is also based on the
law of resultants, which latter is always to be taken into
consideration when dealing with the larger interconnections
of psychical development. In fact, we may regard this law
of heterogony of ends as a principle of development which-
controls the changes arising, as results of successive creative
syntheses, in the relations between the single partial contents
of psychical compounds. The resultants arising from united
psychical processes include contents which were not present
in the components, and these new contents may in turn
enter into relation with the old components, thus changing
again the relations between these old components and con-
sequently changing the new resultants which arise. This
principle of continually changing relations is most strikingly
illustrated when an idea of ends is formed on the basis of
the given relations. In such cases the relation of the single
factors to one another is regarded as an interconnection of
means, which interconnection has for its end the product aris-
ing from the interconnection. The relation between the actual
effects in such a case and the ideated ends, is such that sec-
ondary effects always arise which were not thought of in the
first ideas of end. These new effects enter into new series
of motives, and thus modify the earlier ends or add new ends
to the earlier ones.

The principle of heterogony of ends in its broadest sense
dominates all psychical processes. In the special teleological
coloring which has given it its name, however, it is to be
found primarily in the sphere of volitional processes^ for here
the ideas of end together with their affective motives are

§ 24. Psychological Laivs of Development. 371

of the chief importance. Of the various spheres of applied
psychology, it is therefore especially ethics for which this
law is of great importance.

4. The law of development towm^ds opposites is an appli-
cation of the law of intensification through contrast, to more
comprehensive interconnections which form in themselves series
of developments. In such series of developments there is a
constant play of contrasting feelings in accordance with the
fundamental law of contrasts. First, certain feelings and
impulses of small intensity begin to arise. Through contrast
with the predominating feelings this rising group increases
in intensity until finally it gains the complete ascendency.
This ascendency is retained for a time and then from this
point on the same alternation may be once or even several
times repeated. But generally the principles of mental growth
and heterogony of ends operate in the case of such an os-
cillation, so that succeeding phases though they are like cor-
responding antecedent phases in their general affective direc-
tion, yet differ essentially in their special components.

The law of development towards opposites shows itself
in the mental development of the individual, partly in a
purely individual way within shorter periods of time, and
partly in certain universal regularities in the relation of
various periods of life. It has long been recognized that
the predominating temperaments of different periods of life
present certain contrasts. Thus, the light, sanguine ex-
citability of childhood, which is seldom more than super-
ficial, is followed by the slower but more retentive tempera-
ment of youth with its frequent touch of melancholy. Then
comes manhood with its mature character, generally quick
and active in decision and execution, and last of all, old
age with its leaning toward contemplative quiet. Even more
than in the individual does this principle of antithesis find

24*

372 V. Psychical Causality and its Laws.

expression in the alternation of mental tendencies whicli appear
in social and historical life, and in the reactions of these
mental tendencies on civilization and customs and on social
and political development. As the principle of heterogony
of ends applied chiefly to the domain of moral life, so this
principle of development tov^ards opposites finds its chief
significance in the more general sphere of historical life.

References. Compare § 23, page 369.

GLOSSARY,

Accord

chord.

Affect

emotion.

angeboren

connate.

Anschaulich

perceptual (p. 5).

Anschaung

perception.

Raum-

space p.

Zeit-

time p.

Apperception

apperception.

-function

apperceptive function.

personificirende

personifying.

-verbindung

apperceptive combination.

Assimilation

assimilation.

Association

association.

Aehnlichkeits-

by similarity.

Beriilirungs-

by contiguity.

Gleicbheits-

by identity.

reibweise

serial.

Auffassung

perception, apperception (see Per-

.

ception], or looser forms of

expression as view, recogni-

tion, etc.

Aufmerksamkeit

attention.

Aufrechtsehen

erect vision.

Bedingung

condition.

Begleiterscheinung

concomit.a,Tit or accompanying

phenomenon.

Begriff

concept, (sometimes in looser

sense) definition.

Actualitats- der Seele

concept of the actuality of mind.

AUgemein-

general c.

Hulfs-

supplementary c.

374

Glossary.

Begriff Werth-

Zweck-
begrifflich.
Beobaclitung

Selbst-
Beweggrund
Bewegung

Ausdrucks-

mimische

pantomimische
Bewusstsein

Gesammt-

Selbst-
Beziehung

c. of value.

c. of end.

conceptual.

observation.

introspection.

reason for action.

movement.

expressive m.

mimetic m.

pantomimetic m.

consciousness.

collective c.

self-c.

relation.

Complication
Contrast

Farben-

Licbt-

Rand-

complication.
contrast,
color c.
ligbt c.
marginal c.

Dauer

Nach-
Deutlicbkeit
Doppelbilder
Druck

-punkt

duration.

persistence.

distinctness.

double images.

pressure.

p. -spot.

Eigenschaft

Eindtuck

Elemente

Empfindlichkeit

Empfindung

Druck-

Farben-

farblose

Helligkeits-

Geruchs-

Geschmacks-

Haupt-

Haut-

Kalte-

attribute or property.

impression.

elements.

sensitivity.

sensation.

s. of pressure or pressure s.

color s. or s. of chromatic ligbt.

acbromatic s. or s. of achromatic

light.
s. of brightness.
s. of smell.
s. of taste,
principal s.
cutaneous s.
s. of cold.

375

Empfindung Licht-

Schall-

Sclimerz-

Ton-

Warme-
Entscheidung
EnscMiessung
Entstehung
Entwickelung

regressive
Erfalirung

mittelbare

unmittelbare
Erinnerungsbild
Erinnerungsvorgang
Erkennung

light s. or s. of light.

s. of sound or sound !

pain s. or s. of pain.

tonal s. or tone s.

s. of heat.

resolution.

decision.

rise.

development.

retrogradation.

experience.

mediate.

immediate.

memory image.

memory process.

cognition.

Farben

Erganzungs-

-ton

Gegen-

Grund-
Fixationslinie
Fixationspunkt

colors.

complementary c.

c. tone.

opposite c.

fundamental c.

line of fixation.

fixation-point or point of fixation.

Oebilde
Gedachtniss
Gefallen
Gefiihle

allmahlich ansteigend(

Anfangs-

Begiffs-

Bekanntheits-

beruhigende

Contrast-

deprimirende

End-

Erinnerungs-

Erkennungs-

Erleiden (G. des)

excitirende

Form-

-ton

compound.

memory.

agreeable feeling.

feelings.

gradually arising.

inceptive f.

conceptual f.

f. of familiarity.

quieting f.

contrast f.

depressing f.

terminal f.

f. of remembering.

f. of cognition.

f. of passive receptivity.

exciting f.

f. of form.

aflFective tone.

376

Gefiihle Gemein-

common f.

losende

relaxing f.

Lust-

pleasurable f.

rhythmisclie

f. of rhytbm.

sinnliclie

sense-f.

spannende

straining f.

Thatigkeits-

f. of activity.

Total-

total f.

Unlust-

unpleasurable f.

zusammengesetzte

composite f.

Geisteserzeugniss

mental product.

Geisteswissenscliaft

mental science.

geistig

mental.

Gemeinschaft

community.

Gemiitlisbewegung

affective process.

Gemiithslage oder

Gemiithszu-

affective state.

stand

Gerausch

noise.

Geschelien

phenomena.

Gesetz

law.

Beziehungs-

1. of relation.

G. d. Contraste

1. of contrasts.

G. d. Relatione!!

1. of relations.

G. d. Resultante

1. of. resultants.

G. d. Entwicklung

in Gegen-

1. of development towE

satzen

posites.

G. d. Heterogonie der Zwecke

1. of beterogony of ends,

G. d. geistigen Wachstliums

1. of mental growth.

Gesichtswinkel

visual angle.

Grossenbestimmung

measurement.

Handlung

act, action.

Helligkeit

brightness.

Hemmung

inhibition.

Illusion

illusion.

pbantastische

i. of fancy.

Indifferenzzone

indifference-zone.

Inhalt

content.

Klang

clang.

Einzel-

single cl.

-farbe

clang-color.

op-

Glossary.

311

Klang Zusammen-

compound cl.

Klarheit

clearness.

Localisationscliarfe

keenness of localization.

Localzeichen

local signs.

Methode

method.

AbzaUungs-

calculation m.

Ausdrucks-

expression m.

Eindrucks-

impression m.

Einstellungs-

adjustment m.

der Minimalanderung

m. of minimal changes.

d. minimalen Unterschiede

m. of minimal differences.

d. mittleren FeMer

of average error.

Missfallen

disagreeable feeling.

Ifaclibild

after image.

Nahrungsinstinct

alimentive instinct.

Orientation

orientation, or location in rela-

tion to.

■linie

line of orientation.

-punkt

point of orientation.

Perception

apprehension.

Phantasie

imagination.

Punkt

point or spot.

Druck-

pressure-sp.

Kalte-

cold-sp.

Warme-

heat-sp.

Raum

space.

Reaction

reaction.

zusammengesetzte

compound r.

RecM

law.

Reiz

stimulus.

Richtung

direction, or (figuratively) theory,

form of.

Sattigung

saturation.

Schema

scheme.

Schmerz

pain.

Schopferische Synthese

creative synthesis.

378

Glossary.

Schwebungen
Schwelle

Raum-

Reiz-
Seele
Sehfeld
Sells cMrfe
Sinn
Sitte
Spraclie

Geberden

Laut-
Suggestion
System

gleiclaformiges

mannigfaltiges

beats.

threshold.

space t.

stimulus t.

mind.

field of vision.

keenness of vision.

sense.

custom,

speech or language.

gesture 1.

articulate 1.

suggestion,

system.

homogeneous s.

complex s.

Tiefe
Tone

Differenz-

Grund-

Ober-

Stoss-
Tonempfindung
Tonhohe

-linie

-scala

-stosse
Trieb

-feder

-handlung

Spiel-

depth or third dimension.

tones.

difference-t,

fundamental t,

overtones.

beat t.

tonal sensation or sensation of t.

pitch.

tonal line.

tonal scale.

tonal beats.

impulse.

impelling feeling.

impulsive act.

play impulse.

Umfang
Urtheil

scope,
judgment.

Verbindung

Vergleichung

Verbal tniss

Verschmelzung

Verstand

Volkerpsychologie

Vorgang

combination.

comparison.

relation or proportion.

fusion.

understanding.

social psychology.

process.

379

Vorstellung

idea.

Gelior-

auditory i.

Gesammt-

aggregate i. i)

Gesichts-

visual i.

raumliche

spacial i.

Raum-

space i.

zeitliche

temporal i.

Zeit-

time i.

Wahrnehmung

sense-perception.

Wesen

nature.

Wiedererkennung

recognition.

sinnliclae

sensible r.

Wille

will.

Gesammt-

collective w.

Wahl- (z. B. Vorgang)

selective (process),

Willens- ( „ „ )

volitional (p.)

WiUkur- ( „ „ )

voluntary (p.)

Zeitarten

temporal modes.

Zeitstufen

t. stages.

Zeitzeichen

t. signs.

Zusammenlaang

interconnection.

Zustande

states.

Zweckmassig

purposive.

1) For this translation I am indebted to Prof. Titcbener.

INDEX.

page

page

A.

Aesthetics .... 30

Abnormalities

Affective dimen-

apperception .

302

sions 94

association . .

302

- processes 102, 174

consciousness .

301

- states, unity of 184

elements of con-

- tone 85

sciousness . .

298

After-images. . . 77

feelings ....

300

Aggregate ideas . 291

ideational com-

discursive divi-

pounds ....

299

sion of. . . .295

volitions . . .

300

Agreement, per-

Abstract thought

336

ception of 280, 294

Abstraction, psy-

Alkaline sensations 60

chical ... 15, 32

Allen 71

Accentuation . .

166

Alphabet, blind- . 19

Accomodation,

Anaesthesia . . . 298

movements of.

153

Analysis, function

Achromatic light

of 277

seijsations . .

62

- psychological 32

Acquired charac-

Angle of vision . 130

teristics . . .

314

Animal

Acts

marriage . . . 311

impulsive . . .

205

psychology . . 30

selective . . .

206

psychoses . . . 308

voluntary . . .

206

states 311

Activity

Animism .... 340

feeling of . 207,

238

Aphasia 225

mental ....

30

Apperception 229, 276

subjects of psy-

abnormalities . 302

chology . . .

17

active 238

Actuality, concept

animals .... 309

of

356

centre 226

page

Apperception child 319
complex func-
tions of . . . 290
myth-making . 339
passive .... 238
personifying . . 338
synthesis . . . 290
volition .... 242
Apprehension . . 229
Aristotle ... 18, 245
Arousing feeling. 92
Articulations . . 110
- development of 334
Assimilations . . 251
auditory. . . . 252
intensive feel-
ings 252

spacial ideas . 253

visual 254

Associations . . . 245
abnormalities . 302

child 319

contiguity. 246, 270
contrast .... 270
of ideas .... 14
laws of .... 246
mediate .... 263

serial 261

similarity . 246, 270
simultaneous . 248
successive. 260, 248
theory of . . . 14

Index.

381

page

page

page

Asthenic emotions 191

Causality psychical 31

Color system, re-

Atom 355

Chemical senses 46, 76

presentations of 66,

Attention . . 229,296

Child

75

child 319

development. . 316

theories .... 81

scope of. . . . 231

psychology. 30, 329

-tone 65

volition .... 239

mistakes of . 329

triangle .... 75

voluntary . . . 240

Choice . . . 206, 219

Combinations

Auditory nerve, as

Chromatic light

apperceptive. . 296

receiving organ 45,65

sensations . . 62

demonstration of 29

Automatic move-

Chronometric ap-

intensive affec-

ment 211

paratus .... 220

tive 174

Civilization,

laws of ... . 29

B.

growth of . . 344

Combination-tones 108

Basalar membrane 44,

Clang 105

Comfort, sensible 176

57

color 105

Communities,

Beats ...... 109

compound . . . 107

mental .... 331

- tonal .... 109

single 105

Community ... 27

Berkeley .... 19

Clearness .... 228

- customs . . . 344

Bitter sensations. 60

comparison . • 281

Comparing func-

Black 62

Cochlea. ... 44, 55

tion. . . . 277, 279

Blind-alphabet. . 119

Cognition

Complementary

Blindness, tactual

feeling of . . . 265

colors . . . 74,80

space in . . . 118

sensible. . 261, 264

Complete reac-

Blind spot. ... 140

Cold, sensations of 52

tions 217

Body, position of 125

Cold-spots .... 54

Complications 248, 268

relation to

Collective conscious-

Compounds psy-

mind 358

ness 349

chical . 29,31,100

Braille 119

- will 349

analysis of . . 101

Brentano .... 20

Color

classification. . 102

Brightness. ... 66

-blindness ... 80

extensive . . . 102

chromatic ... 68

circle . . . . 64, 75

intensive . . . 102

color 65

complementary 74

various degrees

pure 63

contrast .... 78

of 30

fundamental

Concepts .... 296

C,

qualities ... 70

child 329

Cardiac innerva-

induction ... 78

classes of . . . 296

tions 98

mixing . . . 70,79

general .... 296

Catalepsy, hy-

names 71

hypothetical in

pnotic .... 304

opposite. ... 64

science .... 5

Causality

principal ... 70

scientific ... 352

concept .... 352

saturation ... 65

supplementary . 362

laws of ... . 31

sensations ... 63

Conceptual ... 6

382

Index.

page

Condensation of
ideas 347

Cones, retinal . . 83

Consciousness
abnormalities . 301
collective . . . 349
defined .... 223
field of .... 236
fixation-point . 229
grades of . . . 227
physiological
conditions . . 224
processes classi-
fied 244

scope of . 231, 234

-self 242

threshold ... 229

Consonants . . . 110

Content, objective 3, 17

Content of imme-
diate experience 17

Content of mediate
experience . . 17

Contiguity
association . . 246
combinations . 269

Contrast 288

affective. ... 289
association by . 246

color 78

-feeling .... 177
marginal ... 79
psychical . . . 367

Convergence, opt-
ical 135

Coordination of
eyes, child's . 318

Corruption of ideas 347

Cortex and con-
sciousness . . 225

Corti, arches of . 44

Cortical centres . 225

Creative synthesis 365

Customs ....

. 343

meaning of

. 344

laws of. . .

27, 333

religious char-

acter of .

. 345

D.

Dance ....

. 162

Darwin . . .

. 307

Decision . .

. 207

Deduction . .

. 297

Democrates .

. 19

Depression .

. 300

Descartes . . .

19, 313

Development

animals . .

. . 309

auditory organ. 44

child . . .

. . 316

community

. . 331

laws of . .

. 369

senses . . .

. . 43

speech . .

. . 333

words . . .

. . 335

Developments,

psychical .

. 30,31

Diderot . . .

. . 19

Difference thresh-

old... .

. . 283

Difference-tone

s . 108

Differences ma-

ximal . .

. . 37

Dimensions, three

of space .

. . 114

- of systems

of

quality . .

. . 36

Disagreements, per-

ception of 280, 294

Discomfort, sen-

sible . . .

. . 176

Discord . . .

. . 184

Disparate qualities 39

page

Dispositions, psy-
chical 228

Dissonance, pure. 109
Distance, absolute

visual .... 145
Distance-sense of

blind 124

Distinctness . . . 228
Dizziness .... 125
Double images. . 149
Doubt, feeling of. 207

Dreams 303

Dualism . . 7,19,355

E.

Ear 44

Ego 242

Elementary, defi-
nition of . . . 33
Elementary proc-
esses in associa-
tion 247

Elements
abnormalities . 298
affective .... 33
child's mind . . 316
predominating
in fusion . . . 104
psychical . . 32, 101
reproduced 257,260
sensational . 32, 37
unconscious . . 227
Emotions .... 186
abnormalities . 300
asthenic .... 191
classification. . 195
expressive mo-
vements ... 1^^
formal attributes 193
gradually rising 199
history of
theories of . . 192

Index.

383

Emotions incep-
tive feelings in 188
intensification
through, sense-
feelings . . . 191
intensity. . . . 198
intermittent . . 199
irruptive . . . 198
mode of occur-
rence 198

names 197

objective . . . 197
physical condi-
tions . . . 188, 193
pulse . . . . .190
quality .... 199
respiration. . . 190
rhythm and . . 183
sthenic .... 191

strong 198

subjective . . . 197
termin al f e elings

in 188

weak 198

Empirical sciences 6
Empiristic theory 125
End-organs ... 43
Ends, subjective . 365
Energy

concept .... 353

physical .... 366

psychical . . . 366
Ethical ideas,

origin of . . . 342
Ethics. ..... 30

Etiquette .... 345

Exaltation. ... 300

Experience
immediate 3, 15, 16,
356

inner 1, 16

mediate 3, 15, 16, 356

Experience objects

of 3

outer 2, 8

Experiment ... 23
in psychology . 26
Expression method 96
Expressive move-
ments .... 212
classification of 189
Extensive com-
pounds .... 102

Factors in fusions 249

- objective . . 16

- subjective . . 16
Faculties .... 19
Faculty -psychol-
ogy 12

Familiarity, feel-
ing of ... . 262
Fancy, illusions of 299

Fechner 285

Fechner's law . . 286
Feeling
activity .... 207
aesthetic . . . 179
affective series. 91
agreeable . . . 179
arousing. ... 92
child's .... 317

clang 181

cognition . . . 265

color 181

common .... 176
component . . 175
composite . . . 173
conceptual. . . 296
conditions for
rise of .... 180
contrast of . . 289
decision .... 207

Feeling depressing 92

disagreeable . .

179

doubt ....

207

effects on myths

339

ego

242

exciting ....

92

expectation . .

161

extensive . . .

180

familiarity . . .

262

form

182

fusions of . . .

252

impelling . .

204

inceptive . .

188

indifference-

zone . . . .89,90

influence on ap

perception .

237

intensive . .

180

interlacing of

175

maximal . . .

35

minimal . . .

35

names of . .

90

partial . . .

175

physiological

processes . . {

)5,97

pleasurable . 3^

), 92,

177

qualities . . .

92

receptivity .

237

relation to sen

sations . . . ^

H,87

relaxation . .

92

remembering

269

resolution . .

207

resultant . .

175

rhythm . . .

182

simple. . . . c

53,84

smell ....

178

sources of . .

. 40

strain ....

. 92

subduing . .

92

systems of. .

39

384

Index.

reeling taste . . 178

term 40

terminal. . . . 188
tickling .... 177
total .... 84, 175
unpleasurable92, 177
Fetishism .... 340
Field of conscious-
ness 236

Field of vision. . 128
Fineness of locali-
zation .... 129
Fixation lines . . 148
Fixation-point,

inner . . 170, 229
- visual .... 131
Flow of time . . 158
Force, concept of 353
Form, feelings of 182
Forms of psychol-
ogy, table . , 18
Formula
Fechner's ... 285
Weber's Law . 285

Fortlage 19

Frontal brain . . 226

Fusion . 10.3,247,248

classification of

forms .... 249

conditions of . 110

spacial .... 253

Fusion theories of

space .... 126
Fusion theories of
visual space . 155

G.

71

Geiger ....
General sense-
organ .... 43
Genetictheoryl26,173
Gestures .... 333

page

Gestures child's . 325
Gods, in myths . 341

Goethe 91

Golden section . 182
Grades of con-
sciousness . . 227

Grey 62

Growth, mental . 369

H.

Hallucinations . . 299
Harmony .... 182
Hartley . . . 20,245
Head, as organ of

orientation . . 125
Heat sensations 61, 52
Heat-spots. ... 53
Helmholtz50, 111, 185
Helvetius .... 19
Herbart 19, 20, 173, 248
Hering's hypothe-
sis 81

Hermann .... 112
Hero myth ... 341
Heterogony of

ends 370

Historical sum-
mary 18

Hobbes 19

Holbach 19

Humanity, con-
cept of . . . . 332
Hume .... 20,245
Hyperaesthesia . 298
Hypnosis . . 303,304
Hypotheses, meta-
physical .... 11
Hypothesis, reson-
ance ... 58, 111

I.

Ideas 102

abnormalities . 299

Ideas, aggregate . 291
associations of 14,
245
common .... 332
conceptual. . . 295
condensation . 347
corruption of . 347
expressions of . 190
extensive . . . 113
flight of .... 261
of imagination. 291
intensive . . . 103
memory . . 265, 274
of movement . 123
mythological . 332
nature of . . . 14
obscuring of. . 347
of orientation . 125
of position . . 125
spacial .... 113
temporal . . . 156
term. . . . 40,245
of third dimen-
sion 148

words . 252, 268, 296

Identity, combina-
tions through. 269

Illusions

associative. . . 255
constant optical 135
direction . . . 136
direction of ver-
ticals 136

fancy 299

geometrical 138, 255

length 136

tactual .... 137

time 164

variable optical 137

Images

distorted visual 132
double .... 149

index.

385

page

Images memory . 265

Imagination 277, 292,

296

active 293

child's 325

ideas of .... 291
passive .... 293
Immediate experi-
ence ..... 3
Immortality ... 7
Impression method 96

Impulse 205

Impulsive acts. . 311
Indiflerence-inter-

val 273

Indifference-zone 38, 90
Induction .... 297
Induction, color
and light ... 78

Instincts 310

alimentive . . . 311

sexual 311

Intensity .... 34
comparison of . 281

light 63

pressure .... 53

tones 59

Intensive com-
pounds .... 102
Interaction ... 10
Interconnection of
psychical com-
pounds .... 31
Interpretation

empirical ... 8

natural scientific 5

psychological . 5

Intervals, tonal . 58

Introspection,

pure . . . .10,20
Irradiation. ... 79

page
J.

James 193

Joint sensations . 52
Judgment .... 295

E.

Kant 19,192

Keenness of vision 131
Knowledge, theory
of ..... . 17

Konig 112

Labyrinth, audi-
tory 55

La Mettrie ... 19

Lange 193

Language, gesture 333

Law 346

of contrasts . . 367
of creative syn-
thesis .... 365
of development
toward oppos-

ites 371

of growth, men-
tal 369

of heterogony . 370
of relations . . 366
of relative
magnitudes . . 283
of resultants. . 364
Weber's .... 283
Laws

of association . 246
of combination 29
of custom . . . 333
of development 369
of nature . . . 363
of psychical phe-
nomena ... 31
of relation . . . 364

WuNDT, Psychology. 2. edit.

page

Leibniz

19

intensity . . .

73

sensations . . .

62

sensations, phy-

siological proc-

esses . . . . 72, 80

vibrations . . .

72

Limbs, regular mo-

vements . . .

160

Line of orienta-

tion

144

Line of regard. .

131

Lines of fixation .

148

Lipps

185

Local signs . . .

116

complex, of vi-

sion

143

of depth. . 148,151

visual

141

Localization, brain

functions . . .

225

- fineness of. .

129

- of touch stim-

uli

116

Location of visual

objects ....

125

Locke ......

19

Logical division .

295

forms

295

Lotze

19

M.

Magnetism, animal 307

Magnitude, psy-

chical ....

281

Man and animals

313

Marching ....

162

Marginal contrasts

79

Materialism . . .

355

mechanical . .

8

psycho-physical

8

25

386

Index.

46

3

5

267

263

44

page

Matter 7

concept of. . . 353
Meanings , modi-
fications of . . 335
Measurement
physical. . 281,366
psychical . 281, 282,
366
Mechanical senses
Mediate experi
ence ....
knowledge . .
memory . . .
recognition .
Membrane, basilar
illemories, mediate 267

Memory 296

idea. . . . 265,274

image 265

processes . . . 265

term 272

time 272

verbal. .... 275

Mental sciences 1, 3,

10, 17, 350, 356

Merkel 285

Metalic, sensations

of 60

Meta-morphosia. . 132
Metaphysics ... 6

Meters 166

Method

calculation ,
experimental
expression . . .
impression. . .
minimal differ-
ences. ....
right and wrong

cases

Methods

empirical . . .

. 287
10,24
. 96
. 96

283

287

page
Methods experi-
mental .... 28
of measurement 283
psycho-physical 286
Metrical ideas . . 162
Mimetic move-
ments .... 189
Mind
concept of. . . 354
problem of . . 6
relation to body 358
science of . . . 1
-substance 1, 7, 355
-substance, ma-
terialistic. . . 355
-substance, spi-
ritualistic. . . 355
Minimal differ-
ences, method

of 283

Modes, temporal . 158
Monadology ... 7
Monism .... 7, 355
Monotheistic ten-
dency in myths 341

Moods 174

Morality 346

Motives 204

intellectual . . 209
common .... 333
Movements
idea of pure . . 123
accommodation 153
arhythmical . . 159
automatic . . . 211
convergence . . 146
expressive . . . 198
mimetic .... 189
ocular .... 133
pantomimetic . 190
rhythmical . . 159
tactual .... 120

page

Miiller, Johannes .

50

Muscle sensations

52

Muscles, ocular 133, 135

Myth, hero . . .

341

nature

341

Mythological ideas

27,

332

Myths

338

N.

Names

colors

71

elements . . .

32

emotions . . .

187

feelings ....

34

sensations . . .

34

Nativistic theory

125,

154,

173

Natural selection

315

Natural sciences .

2.3

Nature Myths . .

341

Noise . . 55, 106,

109

0.

Objects .... 11, 40
concept of. 240, 243
methods of in-
vestigating . . 24
of nature ... 24
Obscuring of ideas 347
Observation ... 23
psychological . 25

pure 26

Odors , neutraliz-
ing 60

Onomatopoetic

words . . 324, 336
Opposites, devel-
opment toward 371
Orientation
ideas of .... 125
line of .... 144

Index.

m

Orientation, organ
of . . .
point of .
Otoliths . .
Outer world
Overtones .

page

125
144
46
243
105

P.

Pain 51,52

Pantomimetic mo-
vements .... 190
Parallax, binocular 152
Parallelism, prin-
ciple of . . 49,360
Passions. .... 192
Pedagogy .... 30
Perceptual. ... 6
Personality, psy-
chical .... 30
Perspective, visual 154
Philosophy ... 18
Photochemical

processes . 76, 79

Pitch 56

Plato 19

Play 327

Pleasurable feel-
ings .... 92,93
Poetry, origin . . 342
Point of orienta-
tion 144

of regard . . . 131
Practice, effects of 228
Preexistence ... 7
Pressure, sensa-
tions of . . . 51
Pressure-spots . . 53
Principal tone . . 105
Principle of paral-
lelism ... 49, 360
Problem of psy-
chology ... 1

page
Processes .... 15
affective. ... 174
conscious . . . 244
memory .... 265
methods of in-
vestigating . . 24
natural .... 24
volitional . . . 201
Products, mental. 27
Psychical elements 31
Psychical proc-
esses, classific-
ation 12

Psychological laws 362
Psychology
association- . . 245

child 329

definition , em-
pirical .... 1
definition, meta-
physical ... 1
descriptive . . 12
empirical . . . 6, 8
experimental 11, 27
explanatory . . 12
faculty- .... 12
forms of, table. 18
foundation of
mental sciences 17
historical devel-
opment of . . 18
immediate ex-
perience ... 9
individual ... 26
inner experi-
ence 10

inner sense . . 1, 9
intellectualisticl3,14
materialistic . . 7
metaphysical . 6
physiological . 28
popular .... 14

page

Psychology,

pro-

paedeutic

science . . .

. 18

relation to other

disciplines .

. 17

social . 11,

27, 345

spiritualistic

. 7

supplementary

science . . ,

. 17

voluntaristic .

13,15

Psycho -physical

and psychical. 200

Psycho -physical

law ....

. 286

Psycho -physical

parallelism

. 363

Pulse ....

96, 190

Purkinje's phe-

nomenon .

, ,67

<i.

Qualities . . .

. 35

affective . .

37,92

olfactory .

. 59

sensational

. 37

Oualitv . . .

. 34

comparison

. 281

opposite. .

. 37

R.

Reaction

experiments

. 220

times . .

. 216

Reactions .

. 96

complete

. 217

complex . .

. 219

early . .

. 218

mistaken

. . 218

muscular

. 217

sensorial

. . 217

shortened

. . 217

Reading . .

. . 259

25*

388

Index.

page

Reality 6

immediate ... 16
Reason, moving . 204
Recognition
mediate .... 263
sensible .... 261
References
abnormalities of
consciousness . 307
apperception. . 244
apperceptive
functions . . . 298
associations . . 278
brain functions 226
common feel-
ings 179

composite feel-
ings 185

concept of mind 363
contrasts . . . 290
customs .... 346
development of
animals. . . . 315
development of

child 330

development of
communities . 338,
351
elements ... 41
emotions . . . 200
emotions , phy-
sical conditions 195
feelings .... 95
feelings, phy-
sical conditions 99
general sense . 54
historical and
general. ... 21
intensive ideas 113
laws of develop-
ment 372

laws of relation 369

page
References light
sensations . . 72, 83
methods of psy-
chology ... 28

myths 343

reaction time ex-
periments . . 222
scope of atten-
tion and con-
sciousness . . 236
pure sensations 50

sound 59

space, touch. . 127
space, visual . 155
taste and smell 62

time 173

volition .... 215
Weber's law. . 287
Reflex processes . 212
Regard, line and

point of . . . 131
Relating function 277,
279
Relations, law of 366
Relativity, law of
(see Weber's
Law)
Relaxing feeling . 92

Religion 342

Remembering,

feeling of. . . 269
Reproduction of

ideas 245

Resolution. ... 207
Resonance hypo-
thesis ... 58, 111
Resonators for

sound analysis 56
Respiration . . . 190
Resultants, law of 364
Resultants, psy-
chical .... 364

page
Retina, centre and

periphery . . 83
Retinal processes 79
Retrogradation of

volition . . . 211
Rhythm of atten-
tion 233

auditory .... 162

and emotions . 186

Rods, retinal . . 83

S.
Saline sensations 60
Saturation of

colors .... 65
Scale, tonal ... 58
Schopenhauer. 20,214
Sciences
experimental . 24
mental (see men-
tal sciences)
natural (see na-
tural sciences)
Scope of attention 231
of consciousness 231,
234
Selective acts . . 206
Self consciousness 242

child's 320

Self-knowledge . 4
Semicircular

canals . . 125,127

Sensations .... 32

achromatic light 62

alkaline .... 60

bitter 60

brightness ... 63
chromatic
brightness . . 68
chromatic light 62

cold 61

color ..... 63

Index.

389

page

Sensations, com-
mon 51

of

general sense
heat. .
joint .
light .
maximal
metallic
minimal
muscle
noise .
pain. .
persistence
pressure
pure .
rise of
saline .
skin. .
smell .
sound .
sour. .
sweet .
taste .
temperat
tendons
term .
tonal .
touch .

ure

. 51

. 61

. 52

. 62

. 35

. 60

. 35

. 52

. 55

. 51

. 77

. 51
41,42

. 42

. 60

. 52

. 59

. 55

. 60

. 60

. 60

. 53

. 52

. 40
55, 56

. 51

Sense, chemical 46, 61
distance of blind 124
inner . . 1, 2, 9, 15

-feelings . . .

-functions,

child's . . .

mechanical .
Sensitivity

brightness . .

pressures . .

tones . . . .

Sentences . . .

Series, associa-

tional . . .

84

316

46

63

53

59

337

261

Series feelings . . 96
- reactions . . 97
Shortened reac-
tions 217

Similarity, associa-
tion . . . 246,270
Skin sensations . 52

Sleep 305

Sleep-walking . . 303
Smell sensations . 59
Social conduct. . 343

laws 343

psychology . 30, 345
Somnambulism . 304
Sound, modifica-
tions of in
words .... 335
Sound

sensations ... 55
vibrations ... 57
Sour sensations . . 60
Space, source of. 115
subjective rela-
tions 122

theories of . . 125
Spacial fusion and

movement . . 120
Spacial ideas . . 113

child's 318

visual 128

Speaking .... 259
Specific energy . 47
historical sum-
mary 50

Specific forms of
experience . . 33

Speech 332

centre 225

child's 324

development . . 333

Spencer 20

Spinoza 192

page
Spiritualism . . . 355
Squinting .... 133
Stages, temporal. 159
States, psychical. 298
States, animal . . 311
States, develop-
ment of . . . 344
Stereoscope . . . 152
Sthenic emotions . 191
Stimuli , various

forms .... 42
Strain, feeling of. 92
Stumpf . . . 111,185
Subduing feeling 92
Subject .... 11,40
concept of. 240,243
experiencing. . 3
Suggestion , . . 304
posthypnotic. . 304
Summation-tones. 108
Sweet sensations. 60
Symmetry .... 182
Sympathetic vi-
brations ... 57
Synergy of optical

movements . . 133

Synthesis .... 277

apperceptive. . 290

creative .... 365

System

brightness , re-
presentation of 68
light, represen-
tation of . . . 69
characteristics

of 35

complex .... 36
of elements . . 35
homogeneous . 35

T.

Table of forms of
psychology . . 18

JUL

25
/2<

1903

390

page

Tachisto scope . . 231

Tactual sensations 172
Tactual space in

blindness . . . 118

Talent 297

Taste sensations . 60
Tastes, neutraliz-
ing 61

Temperature sen-
sations .... 53
Temporal ideas,
child's .... 319
sources .... 156
theory of . . . 168
Temporal percep-
tion 170

Temporal signs . 171

Tendon sensations 52

Tetens 19

Theories

color vision . . 81

space 125

visual space 140, 150
Threshold

consciousness . 229

difference-. . . 283

tactual .... 117
Time
favorable forfeel-

ings 164

ideas of ... . 156
ideas and affec-
tive elements. 160
ideas and sensa-
tional content 160
memory .... 272
memory, indif-
ference interval 273
rhythm .... 159
Tonal sensations 55, 56
Tone, affective . . '84
Tone, principal . 105

/

Index.

page

Tones , combina-
tions of . . . 108
fundamental . . 56
highest . . . . ' 58
intervals ... 58

lowest 58

summation- . . 108

Touch

analytic .... 119
sensations ... 51

space 116

space threshold 117
synthetic . . . 119

Transformation of
stimuli .... 44

. ^•
Unconscious proc-
esses .... 223
Unconsciousness

concept of . . 227

Understanding. . 277,

292, 294, 296

child's 328

Unity of affective

states .... 184
Unpleasurable

feeling ... 92, 94

T.

Values, subjective 365

Vinci, Leonardo da 70

Vision
angle of. ... 130
centre of . . . 130

direct 131

erect 150

field of .... 129
indirect .... 131
peripheral . . . 141

depth 147

estimation of
distances . 134, 139

Visual purple . . 82

Volitions

abnormalities . 300
apperception. . 242
attention . . . 239
complete . . . 208
complex .... 206
direction of . . 241
energy of . . . 241
experiments on 215
external. ... 202
internal . . 202, 209
primitive form. 202
simple .... 205

sleep 305

theories of. . . 213
typical of mental

life 15

Volitional acts. . 201
Volitional proc-
esses 201

Voluntarism

metaphysical . 20

psychological . 20

Vorstellung . . . 245

Vowels 110

W.

Walking, child's . 323

Weber 283

Weber's law . 53, 283
Whispers .... 110

White 62

Will, child's ... 322
collective . . . 349

Wolff 19

Words

development of 335
ideas of 252, 268, 296
order in sent-
ences 337

Y.

Young - Helmholtz
hypothesis . . 81

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